The United States and Iran: Sanctions, Wars and the Policy of Dual Containment (Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics)

The United States and Iran

When and why did the United States policy of containment of Iran come about? How did it evolve? Where is it going? Much has been said about the US policy of dual containment, particularly as it pertains to Iraq. However, there has been little in-depth analysis of this policy when it comes to Iran. Sasan Fayazmanesh explores this often neglected subject by examining the history of this policy. In developing this argument, the book:

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• • • •

analyzes the role the Carter and Reagan Administrations played in the Iran– Iraq war, the numerous sanctions imposed on Iran by the Clinton Administration and the aggressive and confrontational policy toward Iran adopted by the George W. Bush Administration after the events of September 11, 2001 provides an extensive analysis of the US sanctions policy toward Iran, from the freeze of Iranian assets in 1979 to the present looks at the role of lobby groups in formulating and implementing US foreign policy toward Iran examines Iran’s nuclear program and provides a detailed history of accusations made by the US and Israel since 1984 concerning Iran building nuclear weapons assesses the ascendancy of the so-called neoconservatives to power and their dual rollback policy

This topical read synthesizes a range of primary sources, including firsthand reports, newspaper articles, and electronic media, and presents a coherent analysis of the ebbs and flows in US thinking on Iran and Iraq. It will be of interest to International Relations and Middle East specialists for decades to come. Sasan Fayazmanesh is Professor of Economics and Co-Director of the Middle East Studies Project at California State University, Fresno, USA. His current areas of research include the political economy of the Middle East and monetary history and theory.

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The United States and Iran Sanctions, wars and the policy of dual containment Sasan Fayazmanesh

The United States and Iran Sanctions, wars and the policy of dual containment

Sasan Fayazmanesh

First published 2008 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2008. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2008 Sasan Fayazmanesh All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Fayazmanesh, Sasan, 1950– The United States and Iran: sanctions, wars, and the policy of dual containment / Sasan Fayazmanesh. p. cm. — (Routledge studies in Middle Eastern politics; 7) Includes bibliographical references and index 1. United States—Foreign relations—Iran. 2. Iran—Foreign relations— United States. 3. United States—Foreign relations—Iraq. 4. Iraq— Foreign relations—United States. 5. Israel—Foreign relations—Iran. 6. Iran—Foreign relations—Israel. 7. Israel—Foreign relations— United States. 8. United States—Foreign relations—Israel. 9. United Nations—Sanctions. I. Title. E183.8.I55F395 2008 327.73055—dc22 2007037625

ISBN 0-203-94620-0 Master e-book ISBN ISBN10: 0-415-77396-2 (hbk) ISBN10: 0-203-94620-0 (ebk) ISBN13: 978-0-415-77396-6 (hbk) ISBN13: 978-0-203-94620-6 (ebk)

Contents

Acknowledgments 1

Introduction

2

On the origins of the dual containment policy

viii 1 12

The freeze of 1979 13 US giving the green light to Saddam Hussein to invade Iran 15 Overthrowing the Iranian government and warming up to Saddam Hussein 17 Linking the threat of war to the hostages 18 A plague o’ both your houses: the beginning of the dual containment policy 24

3

The dual containment policy in the 1980s

28

Saddam Hussein’s “new, powerful secret weapon” 30 The Rumsfeld affair 33 The events of the early 1980s viewed in the early 2000s 35 The undeclared American war to save Saddam 38 USS Vincennes affair 40 Iran accepts the UN ceasefire 42 Playing both sides: a plague o’ both your houses 44 Moving against Saddam Hussein 46

4

Israel and the dual containment policy The Revolution of 1979: when the party is over 54 Israel, the Iran–Iraq war, and the Iran-Contra affair 56 A different game for Iran: Martin Indyk and the Washington Institute 62 AIPAC and the three “misbehaviors” of Iran 67

52

vi Contents

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The Clinton years and the dual containment policy Sanctions and more sanctions: who is more loyal to Israel and hostile to Iran? 73 Strange bedfellows: MEK, US, Israel, and Saddam Hussein 79 Enter the corporate lobby 85 The corporate wind blows faster: the second half of the Clinton years 91

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The neoconservatives, dual rollback, and Israel 9/11 and the containment of Iraq 102 The new administration, AIPAC, and renewal of ILSA 102 9/11, the courtship dance, and the spoiler 104 The puzzling Karine-A affair 110 The “axis of evil” speech 113 Israel, neoconservatives, and Iran 116

7

Pushing Iran to the top of the “to do” lists

120

MEK, its “revelation,” and the Israeli connection 120 On the origin of Iran’s nuclear program 123 Earliest reports of the Iranian bomb 129 The guessing game and more “revelations” 134 More guessing games and the “revelation” 137

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Paving the road to the UN Security Council

141

The need for a smoking gun 141 Psychological warfare 143 Additional Protocol, EU 3, the war drum, and the call for UN sanctions 145 The source of contamination, the IAEA report, and the smoking gun 147 MEK, neoconservatives, and Iran’s complicity in Iraq insurgency 149 Existential threat to Israel and the IAEA 150 Pressure mounts for referring Iran to the Security Council 152 The spy network 153 The case of Lavisan-Shian: a smoking gun? 155 The case of Parchin: another smoking gun? 157 The Paris Agreement 158 Another IAEA resolution, Parchin, and the attempt to remove ElBaradei 159

9

Iran is referred to the Security Council

162

The “carrot and stick” policy 164 Another AIPAC policy conference focusing on Iran 165 Iran’s reaction to “carrot and stick” policy, and the Iranian presidential election 166

Contents vii The end of the Paris Agreement 168 More forecasts about the Iranian nuclear bomb 170 Another IAEA report, Parchin, and the Resolution of September 2005 171 Ahmadinejad and “wiping Israel off the map” 174 Parchin again and the mysterious laptop 176 The Russian “compromise” and its opponents 178 The final push for UN sanctions 179 The IAEA “update” and the full report 181 Iran’s referral to the Security Council 183

10 On the road to UN sanctions

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Bringing democracy to Iran and US public opinion 185 Another “largest-ever” AIPAC conference 187 Rejection of another compromise solution and the first Security Council draft 188 The push for Chapter 7 resolution and threat of war 190 Another IAEA report, the alleged hidden program, and ElBaradei’s plea 192 Iran, Nazi Germany, and the yellow insignia 193 A new US strategy, the “carrot and stick” package 195 More sticks than carrots: financial sanctions 197 Iran’s response to the “carrot and stick” package and the August 22 deadline 198 UN Security Council Resolution 1696 200 Iran’s August 22 response to the “carrot and stick” package 202 US response: more sticks 203

11 Success at last: UN sanctions imposed on Iran

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No compromise, only sanctions 206 On the Israeli front 208 Almost there: draft of UN sanctions circulates 209 War drums beating before the UN resolution 210 Resolution 1737, the crown jewel of Iran containment 212 US provocative acts post-Resolution 1737 214 Thinking beyond Bush and the 2007 Herzliya conference 216 War or no war? 218 Another IAEA report, fabricated US intelligence, and the laptop story 220 The US pushing for a second set of UN sanctions 221 Israel, another AIPAC conference, and the second set of UN sanctions 222 Success again: UN Resolution 1747 225

12 Conclusions Notes References Index

229 237 255 258

Acknowledgments

This book is the culmination of a series of essays, interviews, and presentations over the years. In particular, an earlier essay of mine, “The Politics of the US Economic Sanctions against Iran,” became the basis for the book (Fayazmanesh 2003). The essay analyzed the circumstances under which the US enacted major sanctions against Iran since the Iranian Revolution of 1979. It examined the 1979 US freeze of the Iranian government’s assets, the function of the sanctions in the US policy of dual containment in the 1980s, the role of Israel in formulating and implementing the sanctions policy of the US in the 1990s, and the concerted lobbying efforts of US corporations to combat the sanctions. The essay ended with a discussion of the US sanctions policy toward Iran in the late 1990s, a policy which, as a result of the pull and push of various lobby groups, had become incoherent and inconsistent. Much has happened since early 2001, when “The Politics of the US Economic Sanctions against Iran” was written. The ascendancy of the so-called neoconservatives and the events of September 11, 2001 have added a new dimension to the US’s policy of dual containment, so much so that an entire book could be devoted to the containment of Iran since 9/11. Moreover, my earlier essay was narrowly focused on the sanctions policy; it did not encompass the historical background necessary to put this policy into perspective. The present work addresses this shortcoming and tries to present a comprehensive view of how the US and Israel have attempted to contain Iran for more than a quarter of a century. Over the years I have been encouraged by friends, colleagues, and members of the general public, who have read my essays or listened to my presentations and interviews, to publish a book on the containment of Iran. I thank them all for their encouragement and hope that this book is what they were looking for. I would also like to thank those who read the manuscript or its outline and made suggestions, including Routledge’s anonymous referees. In particular, I am grateful to Afshin Matin-Asgari and Vida Samiian, my partner in life, who read the entire manuscript and provided useful and critical comments. I also thank my son, Nima, who originally made me interested in the issue of sanctions and encouraged me to put in writing what I had researched and talked about for years. I dedicate this work to the victims of the policy of dual containment, to those who have lost their lives or suffered in Iran and Iraq as the result of sanctions and wars.

1

Introduction

Much has been said about the US policy of dual containment of Iran and Iraq, particularly as it pertains to Iraq. However, there has been very little in-depth analysis of this policy when it comes to Iran. This book is an attempt to address that shortcoming by investigating when and why the policy came about, how it evolved, and where it stands today. To the extent that Israel has been involved in US policy making, the study will also include the role that Israel has played in the containment of Iran. Also, since the fate of Iran has been inextricably linked to that of Iraq, occasionally the investigation will overlap with the containment of Iraq. It will be argued that the policy of dual containment of Iran and Iraq originated during the Carter Administration, but it was not until the Clinton Administration that the expression “dual containment” became popular. Despite its widespread use, the meaning of the expression is not crystal clear; different individuals have had different interpretations of “containment” of Iran and Iraq. For some, it has meant keeping the two countries militarily, economically, and politically in check. This was the case with Iraq between 1990—when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait and United Nations sanctions were imposed on Iraq—and 2003—when the US invaded Iraq for the second time and occupied the country. In the case of Iraq, it was hoped initially that economic pressures through extensive United Nations sanctions, as well as some limited military actions, would create discontent and lead to “regime change.” But since sanctions did not result in the overthrow of Hussein, Iraq was not exactly contained. The 2003 US invasion and occupation of Iraq showed that containment could go beyond sanctions and limited military operations; it could involve outright invasion of a country to achieve the desired goals. As of July 2007, when this book is being completed, the US military adventure in Iraq has not been successful, and the future of Iraq and its government remains uncertain. In this sense, some may argue that Iraq has not been contained. But a few might disagree with this conclusion. For these individuals Iraq has already been contained, since the country has been economically ruined, militarily shattered, and politically disintegrated. For decades to come, Iraq will not be able to rise from the ashes and challenge the US and Israel; and this, in the opinion of these individuals, is a successful containment. Such a view might appear to be too cynical to be held by anyone. But, as will be argued in this book, the attitude of

2 The United States and Iran many US and Israeli officials toward the Iran–Iraq war indicates that this view did actually exist. Some American and Israeli officials wished to see Iran and Iraq destroy one another in a costly and protracted war. They helped to prolong the war and make sure that neither side had a decisive victory. The horrendous eight-year war, which resulted in a massive loss of human life and severe economic losses, was therefore viewed as a kind of containment. The same view of containment seems to exist today among many so-called neoconservatives who, after pushing for the Iraq invasion, show no remorse for the resulting carnage and are now advocating bombing Iran. Whatever the interpretation of the dual containment of Iran and Iraq, one aspect of this policy has been to use war, or threats of war, to bring about the desired change. Another has been to rely on sanctions. US unilateral sanctions against Iran, as will be seen, started shortly after the 1979 Revolution and continued throughout the Iran–Iraq war. In this period many of the imposed sanctions were intended to prevent Iran from winning the war against Hussein’s Iraq. But it was also hoped that sanctions would bring about popular dissatisfaction in Iran and result in the overthrow of the new government. Such sanctions continued and became even more intensified after the Iran–Iraq war, particularly in the 1990s. Yet, even though these sanctions did harm the Iranian economy, they did not bring about the intended “regime change.” The failure was attributed to the unilateral nature of these sanctions, and therefore multilateral sanctions, imposed through the United Nations, were sought. As this book is being prepared for publication two Security Council resolutions, imposing UN sanctions, have been passed against Iran and another is pending. Whether these sanctions will have the desired results and, eventually, would do to Iran what has been done to Iraq is hard to predict. But it is even harder to make any predictions about the future without knowing the past. It is in the spirit of documenting the history, in order to better understand the present and the future, that this book is written. Besides this Introduction and the Conclusions, the present book consists of ten chapters. The early chapters are general and cover longer spans; the later ones, nearing the imposition of UN sanctions, become more detailed and often cover events month by month. Chapter 2 traces the origin of the dual containment policy to the Carter Administration. It is argued that there is plenty of evidence to suggest that individuals within the Carter Administration, contrary to their denials, gave Hussein the green light to invade Iran and assisted him after the invasion. It was hoped that the war would not only lead to the resolution of the so-called hostage crisis, but that it might lead to the overthrow of the Iranian government and the restoration of the old order, where the Shah of Iran maintained a symbiotic relationship with the US and Israel. However, assisting Hussein in his war against Iran did not mean that the US was planning to establish a long-term relationship with him. Befriending Hussein was temporary; and while the US was helping the Iraqi government, the Israelis were selling arms to Iran with the full knowledge of the US. Indeed, the Carter Administration itself was considering the possibility of providing Iran with military spare parts as well. This was the beginning of the policy of dual

Introduction 3 containment, when the US, playing the role of a double agent, tried to make sure that neither side would achieve a decisive victory in the Iran–Iraq war. Chapter 3 continues with the policy of the dual containment in the 1980s. It is argued that while the US assisted Hussein covertly during the Carter period, it did so overtly during the Reagan Administration, despite the official US policy of remaining neutral in the war. The support also became more vigorous. US officials tried to prevent Iran from winning the war against Hussein by providing him with intelligence, weapons, and extension of credit. They also established full diplomatic relations with Hussein’s government, lifted trade sanctions against Iraq, and imposed new economic sanctions against Iran. In addition, the Reagan Administration closed its eyes to the use of chemical weapons by Iraq in the war, and, indeed, supplied Saddam Hussein with chemical compounds that had multiple uses, including making poison gas. Subsequently, with the Iranian military victories, the US entered the war against Iran directly to assure that Hussein was not defeated. With this direct US intervention, in 1988 Iran was forced to accept a humiliating ceasefire, especially after the USS Vincennes affair. In the end, the Reagan Administration had managed by means of indirect and direct war to defeat Iran for all practical purposes and contain it. Yet the policy of dual containment demanded that not only Iran but also Iraq be emasculated as a potential challenger. Therefore, while helping Hussein, the US also sold arms to Iran, mostly with the help of the Israelis, in what came to be known as the “Iran-Contra scandal.” Furthermore, the US administration provided both Iran and Iraq with deliberately distorted or inaccurate intelligence data on the other’s capabilities. More importantly, with the end of the Iran–Iraq war—and the emergence of Iraq militarily stronger at the end of the war than at the beginning—the US turned its attention toward containing Iraq. This was accomplished through manufactured sensational news and incidents, as well as a sudden US interest in the “gross violation of international law” by Iraq during the Iran–Iraq war. The final incident was Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait after the US gave confusing messages to Hussein. Following this invasion, the US tried to contain Iraq by means of a war, UN economic sanctions, and limited military operations. Chapter 4 deals with Israel’s role in the policy of dual containment. After a brief review of the relationship between Israel and the Shah, the chapter concentrates on Israel’s campaign against the new Iranian government. However, once the Iran–Iraq war started, Israel began to sell arms to Iran. This was not because Israel was against the US policy of dual containment and the devastation of Iran and Iraq in a costly and protracted war, but because Israel wished to see Iraq contained before Iran. As a result, while the US was aiding Iraq, Israel was selling arms to Iran, and, eventually, got the US to sell arms to Iran in the infamous Iran-Contra scandal. When put in historical context the Iran-Contra affair does not appear as an aberration or isolated incident. It was part of the policy of helping to contain both countries. At the end of the Iran–Iraq war, however, Israel, like the US, largely concentrated on containing Iraq. In so doing, Israel contributed greatly to the propaganda campaign against Saddam Hussein before Iraq was invaded by the US. After the imposition of UN sanctions against Iraq in

4 The United States and Iran 1990 and the first US invasion of Iraq, Israel turned its attention toward containing Iran. With the help of its lobby groups in the US, particularly the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), Israel concentrated on strengthening US economic sanctions against Iran. In this pursuit, Martin Indyk, the head of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, an AIPAC affiliate, became instrumental. The meteoric rise of Martin Indyk to power in the Clinton Administration allowed him to carry on the policy of dual containment—which he took credit for devising—primarily by means of increasing sanctions against Iran. In this policy Iran was accused of three misbehaviors: sponsoring terrorism worldwide, opposing Middle East peace efforts, and developing weapons of mass destruction. Once formulated, these alleged misbehaviors became the rationale for maintaining and strengthening US sanctions against Iran. Indeed, during the Clinton Administration Israeli lobby groups became the major underwriters of US foreign policy toward Iran. Chapter 5 concentrates mostly on individuals, other than Martin Indyk, in the Clinton Administration who helped develop the Iran sanctions policy. In particular, the role of former Secretary of State Warren Christopher, who had a particular animosity toward Iran since his hostage negotiation days, will be examined. This animosity, it is argued, came in handy for Indyk and the Israeli lobby groups in implementing their sanctions policy against Iran. But this was not all; there was also a competition between a predominantly Republican Congress and a Democratic Administration as to which was more hostile to Iran and thus faithful to Israel. In this competition, the role of Senator Alfonse D’Amato in trying to pass sanctions acts against Iran is examined. One major act, the Iran–Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA)—which imposed secondary sanctions on foreign companies that would make new investments of at least $40 million in Iran—becomes a major focus of this chapter. With the passage of ILSA, however, the US sanctions policy started to fall apart. Not only did many countries around the world defy it, the US corporate lobbies, too, began to organize to oppose various Israeli lobby groups. In this regard, the chapter examines the role of some heavyweights that the corporate lobby brought forth to oppose the sanctions—such as two former national security advisors, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft—the formation of an umbrella lobby organization called USA*ENGAGE, various individuals or lobbyist groups working with the Iranian government who started to organize, and a number of US Congressmen who were lobbied by the corporations to oppose the passage of further unilateral sanctions against Iran. All this, the chapter will conclude, as well as the appointment of a new Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, who tilted more toward the corporate lobby, resulted in an incoherent and inconsistent US policy toward Iran at the end of the Clinton era, a policy that tried to reconcile the irreconcilable aims and interests of Israel and the US corporations. Chapter 5 also includes a digression on the Mujahedin-e-Khalq-e-Iran (MEK), an Iranian exile group that during the Clinton years became a convenient tool in the hands of strange bedfellows—namely Iraq, the US, and Israel—in a campaign to overthrow the Iranian government. Even though in 1997, as a result of some shifts in US foreign policy, the US State Department put MEK officially on

Introduction 5 the list of terrorist organizations, the group operates relatively freely in the US to this day. The next five chapters focus on the George W. Bush Administration and how in this period the US and Israel achieved a goal not attained under previous administrations: imposing multilateral sanctions against Iran using the United Nations. This was a great achievement for the two adversaries of Iran and requires a detailed account of how it was accomplished. Chapter 6 begins with the 2000 US presidential election and the uncertainty surrounding the future policies of the Bush Administration toward the Middle East in general and Iran in particular. The fact that the new administration was topheavy with former oil executives added to this uncertainty. Yet, in spite of the uncertainty, Israel correctly perceived that the policy would be made more by the neoconservative forces within the new administration—such as Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle—than anyone else, including those in the State Department. Wolfowitz and Perle—who were on the Board of Advisors of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, an offshoot of AIPAC—had advocated, at least since 1992, the use of military force against Iraq. But Israel was more interested in containing Iran rather than Iraq and was hoping that the neoconservative forces, particularly those within the administration, would achieve that goal. The events of September 11, 2001 played a determining role in both containments. The neoconservative forces got what they had wished for when it came to invading Iraq. But as far as Iran was concerned, the initial reaction of the US State Department after 9/11 was to start a courtship dance with Iran, a dance that Israel, its lobby groups, and its neoconservative allies, in and out of the administration, watched with a great deal of trepidation. A concerted campaign was waged by Israeli officials, including Binyamin Netanyahu and Ariel Sharon, to end the dance. The US was warned by these officials not to cozy up to Iran. Such warnings, as well as the puzzling Karine-A affair, managed to end the US State Department’s attempt to approach Iran. The death of the rapprochement was made official by President Bush in his “axis of evil” speech on January 29, 2002, a speech in which Iran was accused, along with Iraq and North Korea, of aggressively pursuing weapons of mass destruction and exporting terror. In the end, Israel, its various lobby groups, and its neoconservative allies changed the direction of US policy toward Iran as conceived by the US State Department. A case had to be made as to why Iran should be targeted. Israel put forward a list of allegations against Iran that included everything from Iran’s involvement in the Karine-A affair to pursuing missiles capable of striking Israel with chemical and biological weapons, dispatching its Revolutionary Guards to foment anti-Israel activity in Lebanon, and being on schedule to develop a nuclear bomb by 2005. Yet even though Israel had made its case for targeting Iran, and wished to see Iran attacked before Iraq, it had to settle for second-best: wait until after the invasion of Iraq to contain Iran. Thus, in an interview with The Times (London) on November 5, 2002, Sharon stated that he considered Iran to be the “centre of world terror,” and “that as soon as an Iraq conflict is concluded, he will push for Iran to be at the top of the ‘to do’ list.”

6 The United States and Iran Chapter 7 is the first of four consecutive chapters that follow the path of Iran as it was pushed to the top of the US’s “to do” list. It is argued that, as in the case of Iraq, Iran’s alleged development of weapons of mass destruction became the rallying point for targeting the country. The first step in the process came in late summer 2002, when, in a dramatic press conference, a representative of MEK revealed the construction of a uranium enrichment facility and a heavy water production plant in Iran, neither of which had been reported to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The actual source of the revelation appears to have been Israel, which passed the information to MEK. Once these constructions were disclosed, the US and Israel started to build a case for reporting Iran to the United Nations Security Council and for the imposition of sanctions. How the case proceeded is narrated in this and the following chapters. Before that, however, the origin of Iran’s nuclear program is discussed. It is argued that the US and Israel had no problems with Iran’s nuclear program when the Shah of Iran was in power. Indeed, the US helped the Shah with nuclear technology and encouraged him to build nuclear power plants. Subsequently, the Shah signed an agreement to purchase two reactors from Germany to be installed at Bushehr. The construction of these power plants began in 1975, but after the 1979 Iranian Revolution the Germans left the country without completing the project. In 1995 Iran signed a formal agreement with Russia to finish the Bushehr reactor. But as this book is being completed, the reactor is unfinished and nuclear fuel has not been delivered, primarily because of pressure exerted on Russia by the US and Israel. Given Russia’s continuous foot-dragging, as well as the numerous US sanctions imposed on Iran, it appears that Iran had engaged in a number of nuclear-related activities not reported to the IAEA, including building the two structures that were disclosed by MEK. Even though, technically speaking, the construction of these facilities did not violate the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—to which Iran is a signatory—it provided the perfect excuse to the US and Israel to argue that Iran was clandestinely developing nuclear weapons. Such claims, however, were not new. They were heard as early as 1984, when a neoconservative argued that Iran might be only two years away from acquiring nuclear weapons. Following this claim there were numerous others concerning the impending development of nuclear weapons by Iran. Indeed, in the 1990s a number of sources associated with Israel claimed that Iran had already purchased three or four nuclear warheads from the former Soviet republic of Kazakhstan. That allegation and subsequent assertions concerning Iran developing nuclear arsenals all proved to be false. But the guessing game continued well into the late 1990s and early 2000s. With each day passing and no nuclear weapons or even evidence of development of such weapons showing up, the ever-changing prediction of doomsday appeared to attract little attention until the revelation of the two unreported nuclear-related facilities in Iran. Once this revelation was made, Israel could push for Iran to be at the top of the US’s “to do” list. Chapter 8 continues with the theme of Chapter 7, looking at how the road to reporting Iran to the Security Council was paved. The 2003 IAEA report mentioned certain failures by Iran to disclose information. It also encouraged Iran

Introduction 7 to sign the “Additional Protocol” to the IAEA Safeguards Agreements. But the report did not show any smoking gun and, therefore, was not the report that the US and Israel needed to contain Iran. Nevertheless, the report left a number of open questions that made the US and Israel hopeful about taking Iran before the Security Council. For example, why was Iran developing a facility to produce heavy water, building a uranium enrichment facility, manufacturing uranium metal, and hesitant to allow IAEA inspectors to visit an electric workshop and take environmental samples? The last question, in particular, made the US and Israel contend that Iran was hiding something, and this could be an indication of a nuclear weapons program. In the end, this allegation proved to be incorrect. However, as this chapter and the next make clear, such allegations continued to be made until Iran was reported to the Security Council. In addition to making false claims, the US and Israel intensified their psychological warfare against Iran, threatening a preemptive military strike on her nuclear facilities. Such threats made the Europeans, particularly France, Britain, and Germany (EU 3), worry and start negotiating with Iran in October of 2003 to sign the “Additional Protocol,” stop nuclear enrichment, and provide full disclosure of its nuclear program. The Iranian government capitulated and signed an agreement in December 2003, even though the Iranian parliament refused to ratify the “Additional Protocol.” The US and Israel, however, continued their pressure on Iran by making false claims and portraying Iran as a threat to Israel and the world at large. Pressure mounted in summer of 2004 to report Iran to the Security Council. The EU 3 made a last-ditch effort to stop Iran’s enrichment activities. The result was the November 2004 Paris Agreement, which asked Iran to suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities voluntarily and temporarily in exchange for some vague and, for all practical purposes, undeliverable economic promises. The US gave this agreement guarded approval but made it clear that it was a kind of “good-cop, bad-cop arrangement,” where the Europeans and Americans were working together but playing different roles. Chapter 9 begins with the US and Israel intensifying their threats of a preemptive strike against Iran in 2005. By now the argument had changed from not allowing Iran to develop nuclear weapons to not even tolerating Iran having knowledge of nuclear enrichment. At the same time there were reports that the US might support EU negotiations with Iran and accept the so-called carrot and stick approach. Even though this was no more than the bad cop joining the good cop, Israel and its lobby groups were opposed to any shift in US policy and waged a campaign against it. In Iran, too, there was opposition to the Paris Agreement, especially after the US gave the agreement its tacit blessing. The opposition became stronger with the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as President of Iran, a man who was demonized by a massive US and Israeli disinformation campaign as soon as he took office. After protesting that the Paris Agreement was turning a voluntary and temporary halt in uranium enrichment activities into a permanent freeze and that the EU had not kept its part of the bargain, Iran ended the agreement. The campaign to report Iran to the Security Council by the IAEA gained momentum and a resolution to this effect was passed; however, the question of the timing of when the matter would be referred to the Security Council was left open.

8 The United States and Iran A number of events speeded up the process of referral. One such event was Ahmadinejad quoting Ayatollah Khomeini as saying that the occupying regime of Jerusalem must disappear from the page of time. The statement was translated in both Israel and the US as “wipe Israel off the map,” and was used in a massive campaign to portray Iran as Nazi Germany and Ahmadinejad as another Hitler poised to commit a holocaust. Another was the claim by American intelligence officials that they had discovered a stolen laptop showing Iran’s attempt to design a nuclear warhead. The contents of the laptop were shown to IAEA inspectors, but, as will be seen in the following chapters, IAEA officials doubted the authenticity of the material, and believed that much of the information provided by the US and other intelligence services had proved to be wrong. Numerous assertions, even though false, made any compromise solution impossible. In the end, a relentless effort by the US and Israel to bring Iran before the Security Council and impose UN sanctions against her paid off in early 2006. The IAEA was forced to issue an early update brief followed by a full report on Iran’s compliance with the earlier resolution. But even before the full report was issued, the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany reached an agreement, and soon afterwards the US obtained the necessary vote to refer Iran to the Security Council. Iran, in turn, ended all voluntary cooperation with the IAEA. Chapter 10 follows the events that led to the passage of the first Security Council resolution against Iran, threatening the country with the imposition of UN sanctions. The chapter begins with continued US and Israeli accusations and threats against Iran even after Iran’s referral to the Security Council. As the US allocated more funds to bringing “democracy” to Iran, AIPAC mounted another “largestever policy conference” aimed at bringing about the harshest possible sanctions against Iran. Frantic efforts by those uneasy about imposing UN sanctions, including the Director General of the IAEA, failed as most US policy makers followed the lead of Israel and its allies in the US. The Security Council issued in late March 2006 a draft statement asking Iran to halt all enrichment activities, and ordered the Director General of the IAEA to report in 30 days on Iran’s compliance. This was not exactly the harsh resolution that the US and Israel were hoping for. The US pushed for the passage of a UN Chapter 7 resolution against Iran that could result in the use of military force against her. In this effort, parallels were continuously drawn between Iran and Nazi Germany and Ahmadinejad and Hitler. Iran’s alleged hidden nuclear programs were reported and talks of pre-emptive military attacks by either the US, Israel, or both were heard. In this atmosphere even the most outrageous tales would become credible news. One such story was an alleged new law in Iran that would force the Iranian Jewish population to wear yellow insignia. Even though the “news” proved to be a complete fabrication, it lingered for some time and enabled many political figures around the world, particularly Americans, to condemn and demonize Iran. The US, however, still had to get the reluctant Russians and Chinese on board to impose sanctions against Iran. A new strategy was adopted: the US would join the EU 3 in negotiating with Iran if Iran halted all enrichment activities. The Bush Administration knew full well that this offer would not be accepted by Iran and was, indeed, worried about a

Introduction 9 possible positive response by Iran. The US gambit paid off, and the “carrot and stick” package offered was ultimately rejected by Iran. The US wielded more sticks, including financial sanctions to paralyze the Iranian banking system. Security Council Resolution 1696 was passed in July 2006, demanding that Iran suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and that the Director General of the IAEA give a report by the end of August 2006 on Iran’s compliance. If Iran did not comply, according to Resolution 1696, UN sanctions would be imposed. The stage was set for the imposition of the first set of UN sanctions against Iran. Chapter 11 rounds off the narrative of the long journey to contain Iran by looking at Security Council Resolutions 1737 and 1747. The chapter begins with the August 2006 IAEA report indicating that Iran was not complying with UN Resolution 1696. The report is followed by Iran’s adversaries calling for immediate imposition of sanctions. Any compromise offered, including a temporary suspension of uranium enrichment by Iran, was ruled out by the US and Israel. The US further tightened its financial sanctions against Iran, and Israel raised, once again, the specter of Iran becoming another Nazi Germany determined to commit another holocaust. The campaign to impose UN sanctions against Iran was beginning to bear fruit. Draft resolutions for such sanctions began to circulate in November 2006. War drums beat intensely and there was again talk of a possible military strike by Israel against Iran’s nuclear facilities. US pressure mounted for adopting a sanction resolution. The push resulted in Security Council Resolution 1737 in December of 2006, the first UN sanction resolution against Iran. The resolution demanded that Iran halt all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and suspend work on all heavy water-related projects. It asked all states to take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale, or transfer of all items, materials, equipment, goods, and technology which could contribute to Iran’s enrichmentrelated, reprocessing, or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. It also asked all states to exercise vigilance regarding the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals engaged in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. In addition, the resolution provided a list of certain Iranians and asked all states to freeze their funds, other financial assets, and economic resources. Moreover, the resolution established a sanctions committee to monitor Iran’s compliance with the resolution and collect information from countries about their trade with Iran. Finally, the resolution asked the Director General of the IAEA to provide a report in 60 days on Iran’s compliance. Resolution 1737 was the crown jewel of the US–Israeli policy of containment of Iran. More than a quarter of a century of US unilateral sanctions against Iran, many underwritten by forces close to Israel, had not contained Iran. Even though this resolution was too weak to contain Iran, it was hoped that future resolutions would do the job. Iran shrugged off the sanctions and reduced its cooperation with the IAEA. The US levied more accusations against Iran and engaged in more provocative acts. Israel continued to call Iran an existential threat. In early 2007 there were fears that a war with Iran might become inevitable. In the end, however, the threats

10 The United States and Iran of war were used to set the stage for the second round of UN sanctions against Iran. After an IAEA report indicating Iran’s non-compliance with Resolution 1737, the US and Israel pushed for another resolution. The result was Security Council Resolution 1747 in March 2007, which extended previous sanctions. The resolution called upon all states to exercise vigilance and restraint regarding the entry into or transit through their territories of some additional Iranians engaged in or associated with Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. In addition, it provided another list of Iranian entities involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities and entities whose funds or assets shall be frozen. Among these was one of the largest banks in Iran. Resolution 1747 also stated that Iran shall not supply, sell, or transfer any arms or related materiel. Furthermore, it called upon all states to exercise vigilance and restraint in the supply, sale, or transfer of any battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles, or missile systems. Finally, the resolution asked all states and international financial institutions not to enter into new commitments for grants, financial assistance, and concessional loans to the Iranian government. As in the previous case, the resolution asked the Director General of the IAEA to prepare a report within 60 days as to whether Iran had complied with the demands of Resolutions 1737 and 1747. Iranian officials were defiant and shrugged off the effect of the resolutions. Yet Resolutions 1737 and 1747 put great pressure on Iran economically and politically, setting the stage for further, and harsher, resolutions to follow. Moreover, Iran’s defiance of UN resolutions could, at some future point, result in the US and Israel launching a military attack against her. After many years of fueling the Iran–Iraq war, imposing US unilateral sanctions, waging negative campaigns, and issuing threats, the US and Israel had pushed Iran into a corner, where Iran had become constrained by multilateral sanctions and ripe for future and final containment. Chapter 12 concludes the account of the policy of dual containment as it pertains to Iran. The problems with the exact aims of this policy, its direction, and its duration are discussed. The problem of trying to predict what the future has in store as far as the containment of Iran is concerned also features. Some warnings are in order. Even though scholarly research related to the dual containment of Iran and Iraq is cited, this book relies heavily on firsthand reports and news items, particularly as it deals with more recent times.1 The devil, as the saying goes, is in the detail. One cannot fully appreciate the depth of the Iran containment policy, particularly during the Administration of President George W. Bush, without delving into the minutiae; and thanks to modern technology the minutiae become available minute by minute on the electronic pages of Associated Press (AP), Agence France Presse (AFP), United Press International (UPI), etc. Over the years the author has collected and compiled not only printed reports and newspaper articles but also electronic news items relating to the containment of Iran. These form the basis of much of the analysis in this book. Indeed, the last chapters often tell the history of Iran’s containment by quoting directly from news sources. This is intentional. Letting news reports speak directly, without much paraphrasing, filtering, or interpretation, might document history better. Of

Introduction 11 course, the extensive use of news reports does not mean that raw news is taken at face value. As we witnessed, prior to the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, many reports concerning Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction proved to be factually incorrect. Yet cross-referencing numerous reports from many different sources, as this author has done for many years, can help establish a relatively clear and undistorted account of events. Finally, even though at times references are made to the foreign policy of the Iranian government and its reaction and responses to outside forces, the book’s focus is mostly on the policies of the US and Israel toward Iran. This should not be construed, in any form or manner, as condoning the foreign policy of the Iranian government. Neither should it be interpreted as exonerating the Iranian government from any domestic wrongdoing. Separate books are needed to analyze critically Iran’s foreign and domestic policies.

2

On the origins of the dual containment policy

The Revolution of 1979 in Iran ushered a new era in US policy in the Persian Gulf. Up to this year, Iran was considered by the US to be the main pillar of the “two pillar” policy in the area, the other, of course, being Saudi Arabia. The US, having helped to put the Shah back on his throne with the CIA-staged coup of 1953, enjoyed, for a quarter of a century, a symbiotic relationship with the Shah.1 The Shah maintained the economic and political interests of the US, and the US, in turn, helped to maintain the rule of the Shah. In the economic sphere, for example, the Shah spent vast sums of Iranian petrodollars on arms from the US, making Iran, by the mid-1970s, the largest buyer of US military goods. This was the Shah’s way of recycling some of the Iranian oil revenue back into the so-called US military-industrial complex. In the political sphere, after the departure of British military forces from the Persian Gulf in 1971, the Shah became the custodian of the old order in the region, putting down nationalist movements in the area and destabilizing governments that were not political allies of the US. For example, the Shah used his military might to put down a small guerrilla force in Dhofar between 1973 and 1976 and, in 1972, agreed to cooperate with the US and Israel to destabilize the Iraqi government by supporting the Kurdish rebels in Iraq.2 All of this changed in 1978–9. The revolutionary momentum that swept Iran toppled the Shah and brought to power a new government, one that despite all that the US did or hoped for was unwilling to maintain the old order. Thus, in the language of Washington policy makers, “Iran was lost.” A few months after the revolution, the US paid a heavy price for its past policies in Iran, especially the CIA coup of 1953. In November of 1979, a faction of militant university students attacked the US embassy in Tehran, or what they called the “nest of spies,” and took some hostages. Soon after, the US froze Iranian assets, worth over $12 billion, in US banks and imposed a trade embargo on Iran.3 Subsequently, in September of 1980, Saddam Hussein invaded Iran. Was there a relation between the US retaliatory policy toward Iran, as exemplified by the freezing of assets and sanctions, and Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Iran? Before answering this question let us briefly examine the freeze of 1979.

On the origins of the dual containment policy

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The freeze of 1979 It is a popular belief that the US freezing of Iranian assets was merely a response to the storming of the US embassy and the act of hostage taking. This popular belief, however, ignores the role of both US financial institutions and US corporations in the freeze of 1979. A brief overview is in order. The rapid rise in the price of petroleum in the 1970s and the extensive deposit of petrodollars by the wealthy OPEC countries in US banks made the banking community worried about the potential effect of a sudden withdrawal of these funds.4 The result was the passage of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) in 1977, which gave the US president the right to declare national emergency in the case of “an unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy or economy of the United States” (Alerassool 1993: 18). In short, the IEEPA gave the president the power to stop any withdrawal of foreign assets from the United States. It was precisely this act, the IEEPA, that President Carter invoked on November 14, 1979, to freeze Iranian assets and properties. Yet plans for invoking this act had been drawn up long before the storming of the US Embassy in Iran. According to the US Congressional record: Nine months before the hostages were seized, … legal technicians in the Department of Treasury concluded that the conditions for invoking IEEPA existed. … The “emergency” apparently resulted from the alleged vulnerability of the US banking and financial system to the threat of a withdrawal of Iranian assets. (Alerassool 1993: 30) Thus, in the final analysis, the storming of the US Embassy was merely the trigger that allowed US administrators to carry out a long-awaited plan to protect US financial institutions against sudden withdrawal of funds. The freeze of 1979 also had a more specific connection to the US financial sector. When it came to personal finances, including acquisitions and loans, David Rockefeller’s Chase Manhattan was the bank of choice of the Shah, his family, and their Pahlavi Foundation. Moreover, the bank had complicated dealings with both the central bank of Iran or Banke Markazie Iran (BMI) and the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). Chase not only issued letters of credit for the purchase of Iranian oil, but it also received the oil revenue from NIOC and transferred it to BMI’s operating account in New York and its call account in London. The latter was an interest-earning demand deposit that would circumvent Regulation Q’s restriction by operating outside of the US. This complicated procedure was set up in such a way that the Shah and his family would skim some of the oil revenue before it was transferred to the BMI’s accounts. Chase Manhattan made a great deal of profit from this exclusive relationship. Its profit came not only from large deposits made by both NIOC and BMI, but also from fees collected for issuing letters of credit.5

14 The United States and Iran For Chase, the overthrow of the monarchy in 1979 meant losing to its competitors a lucrative and extensive business with the Shah. It also meant that some of its loans to Iran—which, because of Chase’s special relation with the Shah, had circumvented proper legal procedure and thus could be challenged by the new government in Iran—were in danger of not being paid back. As a result, Chase welcomed the freezing of the Iranian assets in the US, since they could be used to offset the loans. In the final analysis, the economic freeze of 1979 created a windfall for US banks. Not only did they manage to hold on to more than $10 billion in Iranian assets for more than a year, but they also managed to retrieve all the secured and unsecured loans made to Iran prior to the overthrow of the Shah (Alerassool 1993; Farahanipour 2000). Indeed, in an unexpected twist of events on January 15, 1981, just prior to the formal signing of the Algiers Accord on January 19, the Iranian government decided to unconditionally pay back the loans (Alerassool 1993). This meant that Iran would return $3.7 billion in syndicated US bank loans and open an escrow account of $1.4 billion for the payment of non-syndicated loans (Gillespie 1990). The justification given by the Iranian government for this decision was that the loan payments would reduce the heavy pressure on Iran exerted by the US banks, would rescue Iran from paying high rates of interest charged by these banks, and would cut monetary and banking relations with “US imperialism” (Farahanipour 2000: 6). Whatever the reason for the Iranian government’s decision, US banks received what they might not have been able to retrieve in the absence of the 1979 freeze. But US financial institutions were not the only beneficiary of the freeze of Iranian assets and properties. Non-financial corporations, mainly oil companies and arms manufacturers, also benefited from the US government’s action. Approximately 500 such corporations had dealings with Iran prior to the overthrow of the Shah (Gillespie 1990). Many of these suffered losses as a result of economic dislocation just before and after the overthrow of the monarchy and the subsequent nationalization of some industries by the Iranian government. Prior to the 1979 freeze only a few of these corporations filed lawsuits against Iran in the US courts (Alerassool 1993; Gillespie 1990). The number of lawsuits, however, mushroomed after the freeze. Approximately 400 lawsuits were filed in the US courts for difficulties associated with repatriation of profits, expropriation of property, and breach of contracts (Gillespie 1990). In the climate of hysteria created by the hostage crisis, the US courts were, of course, more than sympathetic toward these claims. The cases subsequently were referred to the Hague Tribunal that was established under the Algiers Accords. The agreement set up an escrow account of $1 billion to cover the claims by the US parties against Iran, with the condition that funds be replenished whenever the account fell below $500 million (Gillespie 1990).6 The large sum of money in the escrow account opened the floodgate for further lawsuits, some of which were highly dubious and even fraudulent. Given that under the Algiers Accords the Iranian government could not directly sue US corporations, and that the Hague Tribunal mostly favored US claimants, Iran lost a great deal in the settlements (Gillespie

On the origins of the dual containment policy

15

1990). Indeed, according to Alerassool, “the settlements with Iran provided a judicial and financial basis that enabled claimants who otherwise would not have thought of instituting legal action against Iran, to come forth and receive funds for their claims” (Alerassool 1993: 168). As of February 2000 the US plaintiffs had brought about $17 to $18 billion worth of claims against Iran, of which $2.14 billion had been settled in the Hague Tribunal and paid through the guaranteed account (Farahanipour 2000: 1). In the final analysis, contrary to popular belief, the 1979 US freeze of Iranian assets and properties was not merely a spontaneous reaction to the storming of the US embassy. It was a calculated move, planned long before these events, to protect the interest of US financial institutions and corporations. The action of “students following Imam Khomeini’s line” gave the US a perfect excuse to carry out the long-awaited plan. The result was that Iran lost billions of dollars and US corporations gained more than they had bargained for. But, as will be seen, these gains were only in the short run. In the long run, the freeze of 1979 and the subsequent events would result in huge losses for US corporations, causing them to scramble to get back into Iran. But was there a relationship between the freezing of Iranian assets and Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Iran?

US giving the green light to Saddam Hussein to invade Iran In reference to Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Iran President Jimmy Carter contends in his book Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President that “[w]e had no previous knowledge of nor influence over this move, but Iran was blaming us for it nevertheless” (Carter 1995: 516). Elsewhere, he repeats the same contention by saying: “Typically, the Iranians accused me of planning and supporting the invasion.” Carter, of course, denies the charge without discussing why the Iranians blamed him for starting the war and how they were wrong. But he is right about the Iranian accusation. Various sources in Iran, within and outside the government, had accused the Carter Administration—particularly the national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski—of having encouraged Saddam Hussein to invade Iran. On June 4, 1980 The Washington Post reported that the Iranian authorities today released another purported American document— allegedly a confidential memo on White House stationery from President Carter’s national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, to then-secretary of state Cyrus Vance—designed to show America’s continued attempts to interfere in Iran’s internal affairs. The four-paragraph, single-spaced memo, dated Aug. 6, 1979, said President Carter wants “to exploit the climate of suspicion and mistrust that exists between Iran and its neighbors—presumably Iraq and the Soviet Union—to weaken the foreign policy positions of the new government here” … The alleged Brzezinski-to-Vance memorandum, marked “confidential,” was reported to have been found in the U.S. Embassy here by militant students who occupied it Nov. 4. Photocopies of the memo were distributed to

16 The United States and Iran reporters today at an Iranian government-sponsored conference aimed at detailing alleged illegal intervention by the United States in Iranian affairs in the last 27 years. According to the document distributed today, President Carter wanted American diplomats here “to establish contacts with leaders of all political trends and organizations, without exception, including the minorities and the extremist groups, which are able to provoke armed uprisings against [Ayatollah Ruhollah] Khomeini’s regime.” In his 1991 book, My Turn to Speak: Iran, the Revolution and Secret Deals with the US, Abul Hassan Bani-Sadr, Iran’s president at the time, writes: We knew that Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter’s national security advisor, and Saddam Hussein had met in the first week of July 1980. Brzezinski has never denied this trip to Amman and his memoirs refers to the Iran–Iraq war once, saying that he prepared a report for Carter explaining that this conflict was consistent with American policy in the region. (Bani-Sadr 1991: 70) Similarly, he writes that “Brzezinski had assured Saddam Hussein that the United States would not oppose the separation of Khuzestan from Iran” (Bani-Sadr 1991: 94). Elsewhere, Bani-Sadr also mentions a document detailing a “royalist plan to regain power with the help of Iraq,” a plan which cites a meeting between Brzezinski and Saddam Hussein two months before the Iraqi attack (Bani-Sadr 1991: 13). This plan, according to Bani-Sadr, gave the green light to Saddam to invade Iran. “The plan,” Bani-Sadr goes on to say, “also detailed the military preparations and the attack zones, which later became the front” (Bani-Sadr 1991: 13). Like Carter, Brzezinski of course denies all of this. In a letter to the editors of the Wall Street Journal, Brzezinski contends that “allegations made by Abol Hasan [sic] Bani-Sadr in his book, ‘My Turn to Speak: Iran, the Revolution and Secret Deals with the US,’ that Brzezinski met with Saddam Hussein in 1980 are ‘absolutely false’” (Wall Street Journal, July 3, 1991). Similarly, on April 11, 1980, many months before Saddam’s invasion of Iran, The Washington Post wrote: “Last night, presidential adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski sharply repudiated what he called the ‘lunatic assertions’ from Tehran concerning alleged U.S. involvement with Iraq. He also said the United States might have to take ‘appropriate measures’ if Iran and Iraq got into a war that threatened to widen into a major conflict.” The documents pertaining to the role that the US government played in Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Iran have never been released. However, there is plenty of circumstantial evidence to suggest that the Iranian allegations were not merely “lunatic assertions” and that the Carter Administration, particularly Zbigniew Brzezinski, might indeed have given the green light to Saddam Hussein to invade Iran.7 In particular, the evidence seems to suggest that the US: (1) intended to overthrow the Iranian government and, as such, was warming up to Saddam; (2) saw the threat of war between Iran and Iraq as a way of encouraging the Iranians to release the hostages; and (3) used Iranian exiles, such as the Shah’s former general

On the origins of the dual containment policy

17

Gholam Ali Oveissi, as a go-between to carry messages to Saddam and encourage him to attack Iran. Each of these points needs to be examined.

Overthrowing the Iranian government and warming up to Saddam Hussein On February 25, 1980 the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts reported: On 22nd February Tehran Radio’s Arabic service broadcast a commentary criticizing the charter proposed by the President of Iraq on 8th February as a plot by Carter and Brzezinski to fill the vacuum created in the region when the Shah was deposed. The USA was assigning Saddam Husayn [sic] the same role once played by the Shah—supporting US interests and obstructing the USSR. Whether the US was trying to replace the Shah with Saddam on a permanent basis or was merely using Saddam to start a war between the two countries is discussed later. But one thing is certain: the Carter Administration, and particularly Brzezinski, had clearly indicated that they wished to overthrow the Iranian government. On August 22, 1980 the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts referred to a Pravda article, in which Brzezinski was quoted as saying “the aim of the USA is to overthrow the present regime in Iran.” One more thing is also certain: the Carter Administration, and again particularly Brzezinski, had clearly indicated that they wanted to improve relations between Washington and Baghdad. For example, on May 5, 1980 The New York Times wrote the following abstract: “Editorial cites national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski proposal for improvement in Iraqi–US relations. Holds Iraq must oppose Iran’s reckless policies, remain civil toward Saudi Arabia and maintain oil exports to West.” Similarly, Newsweek reported on October 6, 1980: Last April national-security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski told a television audience that “we see no fundamental incompatibility of interests between the United States and Iraq … We do not feel that American–Iraqi relations need to be frozen in antagonism.” The Administration has also allowed some U.S. firms to do business with Iraq, entering into agreements for oil exploration, health-care equipment and airplanes. Until the war with Iran broke out, Washington even endorsed the use of American-made engines in four combat frigates that are being built for Iraq in Italy.8 Similarly, on July 26, 1980, in an article entitled “For Iran, read Iraq?”, The Economist explained how the “Europeans have fallen over themselves to sell to Iraq anything it wants to buy,” and then added: “In America, Mr. Zbigniew Brzezinski has been broadmindedly prepared to forget Iraq’s unsavory past and welcome a potential new ally; but officials at the state department, noting Mr. Hussein’s root-and-branch rejection of Israel and the political repression in Iraq

18 The United States and Iran itself, have pursed their lips.” This warming of relations came despite the fact that Iraq was blacklisted by the US as a country that supports international terrorism and, therefore, the sale of any military related goods to it was illegal. In the final analysis, it seems that the US policy was to overthrow the Islamic government of Iran and, at the same time, to establish closer relations with Saddam Hussein. But as we shall see later, given Saddam’s Hussein unfriendly attitude toward Israel, the cozying up to Saddam was merely tactical. The policy of the US, along with Israel, was what later came to be known as “dual containment,” a policy which is analyzed throughout this book.

Linking the threat of war to the hostages Given the aims of the US policy, the Iranian allegation that US was trying to start a war between the two countries does not appear to be far-fetched. Actually, Iran was not the only source of such allegations; other sources argued the same thing. For example, on April 14, 1980, the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, quoting a TASS dispatch from New York, carried an article with the headline “Brzezinski’s Speech at Editors’ Meeting: ‘Whipping Up’ Iranian–Iraqi Hostility.” The article stated: Washington is stepping up the provocative campaign of crude threats and military blackmail against Iran. Z. Brzezinski, the President’s National Security Assistant, speaking at the convention of the Society of Newspaper Editors threatened that the United States “would not remain idle” and “was resolved to use any means necessary” to free the hostages. From Brzezinski’s speech, who, as is well known, is one of the main conductors of the militarist anti-Iranian psychosis currently being whipped up by the White House, it is evident that the actions of the USA are aimed at setting Iran and Iraq against each other and thus provoking an aggravation of tension in that region. Having pointed out the strategic importance for the USA in particular, and the West in general, of the oil-rich Persian Gulf region, the President’s Assistant “stated menacingly that Washington could adopt appropriate measures should a major conflict break out between Iran and Iraq threatening the West’s interests.” The US President’s National Security Assistant, Brzezinski used his speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors to whip up the hostility between Iran and Iraq. From his speech it is clear that Washington wishes to make use of the complications which have arisen in Iranian–Iraqi relations to further the selfish imperialist aims of the USA and is inciting the two sides to a conflict in order to create a pretext for military intervention by the USA. If a major conflict occurs between Iran and Iraq which threatens the interests of the West, “the United States would be forced to take appropriate measures”, Brzezinski said. “We will not stand idly by if a single American hostage suffered”. Local observers naturally ask: Why does the USA drag in the question of the hostages into Iranian–Iraq relations, and what do they have to do with this

On the origins of the dual containment policy

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matter? If Brzezinski talks like this, then he obviously knows the reasons for the violations of Iranian frontiers from outside. Brzezinski, indeed, did seem to know something about an impending invasion of Iran and was linking the issue of the hostages to Iran–Iraq relations. This was reported by a number of other sources. On April 15, 1980 The Washington Post wrote: Presidential assistant Zbigniew Brzezinski warned Iran last night that its “national integrity” as well as its well-being are increasingly jeopardized by the continued captivity of 53 Americans in Tehran. In an interview on public television’s McNeil–Lehrer Report, Brzezinski said part of this threat arises from reports of “a steady buildup of Soviet bases in the Transcaucasian military district” on the Soviet Union’s side of its border with Iran. “Growing tension between Iran and Iraq” was also cited by Brzezinski as an indication of intensified danger to Iran. The White House national security affairs adviser declined to discuss possible U.S. action against Iran such as mining or blockading its coast, which have been under discussion in the Carter administration as a last-resort means of exerting pressure for release of the hostages. But Brzezinsksi said that if the situation in Iran continues, that country may confront “danger of partition.” This suggests that various external forces, including the Soviet Union, Iraq and possibly other countries, might help themselves to portions of a lightly defended and chaotic Iran [added emphasis]. Jimmy Carter, too, was coupling the issue of hostages with Iran–Iraq relations. On September 22, 1980 the Associated Press (AP) reported the following: President Carter said Monday the United States will not take sides in the border fighting between Iraq and Iran but that it’s possible the strife could induce Iran to release its American hostages. “I can’t predict to you a rapid movement toward release of our hostages,” the president said in reply to a question from the audience at a high school in Torrance, Calif. But, he said, the fighting could convince Iran that it needs friends and neighbors “and therefore induce them to release the hostages.” Zbigniew Brzezinski’s travel to Saudi Arabia and his possible meeting with Saddam Hussein was not “a lunatic assertion” either. Brzezinski did in fact go to Saudi Arabia in July 1980. The Washington Post reported on July 22, 1980 that “the CIA warned the White House that Saudi Arabia’s ruling regime might collapse within two years” and that Brzezinski is “to depart within days on a

20 The United States and Iran delicate trip to Saudi Arabia.” But this was not the only trip that Brzezinski had made to the Middle East. On February 22, 1980 the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, quoting the Hungarian Telegraph Agency, stated that there was a “Zbig’s pilgrimage” to Saudi Arabia in February and that “the content of the actual talks Brzezinski had with the Saudi leaders touchy in questions of secrecy is not known to us.” Similarly, on February 4, 1980 The Washington Post reported that “Brzezinski and Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher leave here Monday for Saudi Arabia.” Did Brzezinski meet Saddam on these trips? Without release of classified files it is difficult to answer this question definitively. But knowing that such meetings took place would not be necessary to establish complicity. The US government and, particularly, Brzezinski had already established close relations with Saddam through the Shah’s agents who were in contact with both the US and the Iraqi regime. One among many such agents was General Gholam Ali Oveissi, the Shah’s former ground forces commander, who “on Sept. 8, 1978, opened fire on an antishah demonstration, killing hundreds in what has come to be known as the Black Friday massacre” (The Washington Post, May 17, 1980). On April 30, 1980 the Christian Science Monitor reported that the exiled “former Iranian Prime Minister Shahpour Bakhtiar and two former Iranian generals are trying to rally United States, Western, and Muslim countries’ support for a counterrevolution against Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s regime.” One of these two generals was Bahram Aryana and the other Gholam Ali Oveisi. According to the report, until “about two months ago, General Oveisi was living some of the time in the United States. Though unpublicized, a demand for his extradition to Iran, along with the Shah, was among the early conditions posed by the militants for release of the American hostages.” The report also stated that Oveisi had “moved quietly behind the scenes to develop a strong military team and the bases from which to prepare. His funding position is known to be sound.” The report did not say where his funding was coming from, but it did say that Oveisi was “working with the government of Iran’s hostile Arab neighbor, Iraq, and Gen. Bahram Aryana.” Bakhtiar and Aryana, in turn, were living in Paris, according to the same report. Subsequently, in a detailed report on May 17, 1980, The Washington Post quoted exiles, including a relative of the Shah, as saying: “Everything is being woven around Oveissi.” According to the report: Oveissi, who fled to the United States before the shah left Iran and moved to Paris in November 1979, seems to travel a lot between here and Iraq. His friends say that he has also been inside Iran, in rebellious Kurdistan, in recent months. … They believe that once Oveissi decides to move with the officers and men he has been organizing in camps in Egypt, Iraq and Israel, the Khomeini government will melt away, to be replaced in a mass uprising rather than by a purely military operation. The report went on: “There are suggestions of Israeli involvement with the exiles.” The report also added that in addition to France, Iraq’s other main arms supplier is

On the origins of the dual containment policy

21

the United States via Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, the report stated that Saddam Hussein is “helping anyone they think can make trouble for the Iranian authorities. Iraq seems to be worried about Khomeini’s appeals to its large Shiite Moslem population against the ruling Baath party.” Lastly, according to the report, Bakhtiar had: indicated that he had conversations with Iraqi leader Hussein, but he refused for “security” reasons to say how many times he has been to Baghdad recently. Asked if he is getting financial help from Iraq, Bakhtiar said, “If I asked for it, I’d get it.” He said he would take arms and other help from Iraq. Actually, according to an April 19, 1980 report in The Washington Post, Bakhtiar had held a press conference in Paris in which he had said that “he had visited Iraq to consult there with other Iranian opponents of the revolutionary government.” Moreover, he had indicated that while, unlike the other exiles, he personally “opposes the use of neighboring Iraq as a base for a military re-conquest of Iran,” he “had no objection to commando operations by the United States or others that would damage the Iranian oil-producing facilities centered near the southern border with Iraq.” Three days after the above report, on May 20, 1980 The Washington Post again reported that Oveissi “was preparing an exile army to invade Iran from seven points.” The Post also reported that “Oveissi was currently in Iraq.” A few days later, on June 12, 1980, The New York Times reported that Oveissi was visiting Washington. It then stated: “While acknowledging that he had ‘many American friends,’ the solidly built 5-foot 6-inch soldier said that he did not plan to meet with any Carter Administration aides during his current visit. In Washington, however, officials confirmed that they had met with aides to General Oveissi on what one called ‘a personal basis’”. According to this report, the US “officials were reluctant to talk about these discussions,” since they faced the “delicate problem” of trying to avoid “antagonizing Teheran and further jeopardizing the lives of the 53 American hostages there.” Similarly, on June 19, 1980 the Christian Science Monitor reported that: After several visits to Iraq and a meeting with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in Baghdad, Mr. Bakhtiar met Tuesday in Paris, where he lives in exile, with Gen. Gholam Ali Oveissi and Gen. Ahmed Palizban, both of whom have been gathering forces and arms in Iraq for an Iraqi-supported strike against the Ayatollah, the émigrés said. The report further added that the “US State Department has shied away from backing Mr. Bakhtiar or the Iran Freedom Foundation [a group of exiles organized in the US], but Oveissi did meet American officials during a visit to the US last month.” The travels of the Iranian exiles, particularly Oveissi, between Washington, Paris, and Iraq continued throughout the summer of 1980. On September 27, 1980

22 The United States and Iran The New York Times stated that Oveissi and Bakhtiar “were said to have visited Baghdad frequently between the end of August and the middle of September.” Oveissi, however, returned to the US just before Saddam invaded Iran on September 22. On September 28, 1980 The Washington Post reported that: Gholam Ali Oveissi, the most important ex-general in the exile movement, is understood to have returned to Paris today after having sat out the first week of the Iraqi offensive in the United States. Some of his supporters were said to be urging him to return to Iran to attempt a military uprising against Khomeini. While Oveissi apparently heeded the views circulated by Iranian monarchists that “anyone who returns to Iran in the baggage train of the Iraqi Army will be swept away,” he has yet to make any public statement disavowing the Iraqi invasion.9 Indeed, the report went on to say that there “have been several press stories saying large numbers of exile troops are in Iraq and elsewhere” and that the “West German weekly Stern spoke of 45,000 in 20 border camps under the command of Oveissi,” a number that according to “informed sources” was “wildly exaggerated.” The report also stated that Bakhtiar had admitted to having made “four or five” trips from Paris to Baghdad and having received money from Saddam. Given the list of recorded contacts between Iranian exiles, Saddam Hussein, and the US, it seems unnecessary to establish direct connection between Zbigniew Brzezinski and Saddam Hussein to show US complicity in starting the Iraq–Iran war. US officials were, indeed, in contact with Saddam Hussein through Iranian exiles who were traveling back and forth to Washington from Iraq and meeting US government officials. Such meetings were not merely “lunatic assertions” made by the Iranian government. They were facts stated in US newspapers and confirmed by US officials at the time, even though the Carter Administration tried to downplay the meetings, given the delicate situation of the US hostages in Iran. Also, such meetings were very much in tune with the linkage made by US officials between a possible invasion of Iran by Saddam Hussein and the issue of the US hostages. The US was hoping that warning Iran about such an invasion might lead to the release of the hostages. Brzezinski’s linkage between the issue of hostages and the “national integrity” or “danger of partition” of Iran and, similarly, Carter’s aforementioned statement that “the strife” between Iraq and Iran “could induce Iran to release its American hostages” were surely intended to push Iran in that direction. However, the intentions of the US policy makers went beyond the issue of the release of the hostages. As stated earlier, the US government’s intention was to overthrow the Iranian government. Given this, it was only natural to cozy up to Saddam Hussein and help him to invade Iran. In sum, claims by Iranians of US involvement with Saddam Hussein prior to Iraq’s invasion of Iran were not a matter of “lunatic assertion.” As has been argued, even without access to classified material there is plenty of evidence in the news media of the time to show that the US officials—particularly Zbigniew Brzezinski—not only knew of such an invasion but actually gave it

On the origins of the dual containment policy

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their blessing. Indeed, the memoirs of some US policy makers not only do not exonerate them but lend support to the view that they played a crucial role in starting the war. For example, in the 587 pages of Brzezinski’s Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor, 1977–1981, there is hardly a mention of the Iran–Iraq war, a historic event which surely must have preoccupied many minds in the Carter Administration. Even when there is a reference to this war, not a mention is made of the Iranian exiles, such as Oveissi, who were meeting with US officials and Saddam Hussein, and traveling back and forth from Washington to Baghdad. Were the foreign policy advisors around President Carter so ignorant or incompetent that they did not know about the activities of the Shah’s agents in the US? If they knew, should not such meetings, which led to the longest war in the twentieth century and the death of reportedly a million people, get more than a passing mention in the hefty memoirs of US officials? Actually, a few scattered comments by Brzezinski on Iran and Iraq seem to confirm the validity of this analysis of the role of the US in starting the Iran–Iraq war. For example, in reference to hostage negotiations with Iran, Brzezinski writes that: [T]he outbreak of the Iran–Iraq war created in Iran a need for American spare parts, and we began to hold out that option as a way of enticing the Iranians into prompt settlement. By the middle of October, we were even discussing among ourselves the possibility of pre-positioning some of these spare parts in Germany, Algeria, or Pakistan, so that the Iranians could then promptly pick them up with their own aircrafts. (Brzezinski 1983: 504) He continues: It was at this juncture that we learned, much to our dismay, that the Israelis had been supplying American spare parts to the Iranians, without much concern for the negative impact this was having on our leverage with the Iranians on the hostage issue. Muskie and I discussed this at some length and decided that the Secretary would make a strong demarche to the Israelis, since this was obviously undercutting our sensitive efforts. He did so, and, as far as I know, at least for a while the Israelis held back. In any case, in retrospect it seems clear that the Iraq–Iran war created less opportunity for negotiations than we may have thought and more of a complication for the Iranians, who became even less capable of focusing on the resolution of the hostage issue. (Brzezinski 1983: 504, added emphasis) Thus, according to Brzezinski, the Iraq–Iran war was seen by US officials as an “opportunity” in which the Iranian government would settle the hostage issue in exchange for military spare parts. To put it differently, the US was following a tit for tat policy, American hostages for military equipments purchased earlier by Iran

24 The United States and Iran from the US but never delivered. Is it a “lunatic assertion” to say that the US officials had a hand in creating this “opportunity” in the first place?

A plague o’ both your houses: the beginning of the dual containment policy As mentioned earlier, almost a month after the takeover of the US Embassy in Iran, Iraqi forces entered Iranian territory but were repulsed.10 Such clashes continued until September 17, 1980, when Saddam Hussein announced that he was terminating the Algiers Agreement of 1975 that formalized the boundaries between Iran and Iraq and gave each equal access to the Shatt al-Arab. He further added that he considered Shatt al-Arab “totally Iraqi and totally Arab.”11 Five days later Iraqi forces invaded Iran in full force. It should be pointed out that the United Nations, which “condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait” in its first resolution on the invasion of August 2, 1990, did not condemn the Iraqi invasion of Iran in its resolution of September 28, 1980.12 Actually, despite the overwhelming evidence that it was Iraq that invaded Iran, the UN maintained, throughout the eight-year war, that it had to set up “an impartial body with [the task of] inquiring into responsibilities for the conflict.” 13 The justifications given by the Iraqi government for invading Iran and the conditions set for ending the hostilities were from the very beginning logically inconsistent. For example, it was argued that the Iranian government had tried to revive the Iraqi Kurdish rebellion, that Iran had instigated terrorist attacks in Iraq, and that the Iranian government had publicly asked the Iraqi people to overthrow the Ba’ath party and its leader Saddam Hussein.14 However, instead of asking the Iranian government to stop such activities and thus ending the war, the Iraqi government asked for the return of all of the Shatt al-Arab to Iraq, as well as three islands in the Persian Gulf, hundreds of miles away from Iraq, that the Shah of Iran had occupied in 1971 after the departure of the British from the region. 15 Iraq’s blitzkrieg against Iran and the inconsistent arguments concerning its reasons and aims were in many ways similar to its invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the justification given for this act. But unlike the latter invasion, which resulted in US fury being unleashed on Iraq, the invasion of Iran did not bring even a public condemnation of Saddam’s action. Instead, on September 24 President Carter publicly “pledged” not to intervene in the Iraq–Iran war by declaring: “Our own position is one of strict neutrality and we’re doing all we can through the United Nations and other means to bring a peaceful conclusion to this combat” (The New York Times, September 24, 1980).16 But, considering what was said earlier concerning the role that the US seems to have played in starting the war, this “neutrality” was nothing but a sham from the beginning.17 Six days after the Iraqi invasion the US sent four AWACS (airborne warning and control systems) and several hundred support personnel to Saudi Arabia, one of the main allies and financiers of the Iraqi government.18 The move was seen by Iran as yet another sign of the US and Saddam Hussein’s collusion. In a speech delivered at the United Nations on October 17, 1980 the Iranian Prime Minister,

On the origins of the dual containment policy

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Mohammed Ali Rajai, stated that “American imperialism” has been directly and indirectly “helping the Baathist Government of Iraq” and that the “United States, with its Awacs planes in Saudi Arabia, controls the movements of Iranian troops and passes all the information along to Iraq” (The New York Times, October 18, 1980). Similarly, in a news conference the day after, Rajai stated: “The way we see it, the Jordan Government and other governments which are protégés of the United States, they have been mobilized to help the Saddam regime, and also a good example of it is the sending of Awacs planes to Saudi Arabia and the voyaging of the American ships into the Arabian Sea” (The New York Times, October 19, 1980). He then added: We never had any real desire to go to war with Saudi Arabia. We have never considered a question of such magnitude. After the conditions for freeing the hostages were mentioned in Iran by some high quarters, this question of Awacs planes being sent there was raised, which then again really for my people was considered a setback. Since the Awacs were not there when these conditions were set, we could see the removal of these instruments as a great sign of good will of the U.S. Government. (The New York Times, October 19, 1980) In other words, Iran saw the transfer of AWACS to Saudi Arabia as yet another attempt to help Saddam Hussein, and this, in turn, complicated the issue of freeing hostages. US officials, of course, immediately denied Rajai’s charges. When asked about giving information to Saddam Hussein, Tom Ross, the Defense Department’s chief spokesman, stated: “We are supplying information from the Awacs only to the Saudi Arabians and only about threats to their air space” (The New York Times, October 17, 1980). This was the line put forward by Zbigniew Brzezinski as well. In his memoirs, Brzezinski justifies the decision to send AWACS and military personnel to Saudi Arabia by arguing that shortly after the beginning of the Iran– Iraq war the “Saudis asked for the deployment of American AWACs, enhanced air defenses, and greater intelligence support. Apparently the Iraqis were planning to stage an attack on Iranian facilities along the Gulf from the territory of some of the Arabian Gulf states, and the Saudis feared a retaliatory Iranian response, directed at their oil fields” (Brzezinski 1983: 452, emphasis added). It is interesting to note that Brzezinski uses the word “apparently,” as if he, the national security advisor, did not know what Iraqis were doing. It is also interesting to note that he conveniently leaves out the role played by the Saudis in the air strikes against Iran, a role that was no secret. As many newspapers were reporting at the time, “Saudi Arabia had allowed its airspace to be used by the Iraqi planes and helicopters flying to Oman” (The New York Times, October 6, 1980). Thus, Saudi Arabia was not an innocent bystander in the war but an active participant. Brzezinski’s remaining account of why AWACS and US military personnel were sent to Saudi Arabia is also interesting. He states that in the meeting held

26 The United States and Iran between September 27 and October 7 there were disagreements over this move between different US policy makers, with himself and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown in favor of the action and Secretary of State Edmund Muskie and his deputy Warren Christopher opposed. Muskie and Christopher, according to Brzezinski, argued that such an act would be viewed as “provocative” by both the Iranians and the Soviets (Brzezinski 1983: 453). Christopher, Brzezinski goes on to say, “countered that the United State should be neutral in the Iraqi–Iranian war and that, therefore, it should not respond favorably to the Saudi request” (Brzezinski 1983: 453). Once again, Brzezinski’s account of the events are inconsistent. Had not President Carter stated earlier—on September 24 to be exact—that the US would be “strictly neutral” in the conflict? If so, why was Warren Christopher saying that the US “should be neutral” in the war? Was there any doubt as to what the US policy was at the time? Moreover, how would sending AWACS and personnel to Saudi Arabia violate US neutrality, if the Saudis were not a party to the war, as Brzezinski would have us believe? Lastly, why did the Saudis feel threatened by the Iranians? Would it not have been suicidal for the Iranians to broaden the scope of the war and engage much stronger foes, such as the Saudis? As usual, Brzezinski’s recollection of events appears to be at odds with the facts. Indeed, four years after sending the AWACS to Saudi Arabia Saddam Hussein himself confirmed the fact that they were providing him with information on Iranian military positions. On May 12, 1984 the Financial Times of London reported: “The Iraqi president was asked by Kuwaiti journalists visiting Baghdad last week if data from four Awacs (advanced warning and control systems) supplied to Saudi Arabia at the start of the Gulf war, but manned and controlled by the U.S., had been used by Iraq. The President replied: ‘We have benefited from the Awacs in Iraq’”. “This,” the report stated, “is the first admission by Iraq that it is receiving direct military assistance from the U.S.” The report also went on to discuss how the Saudis, as well as the Kuwaitis, had been helping Saddam with oil and cash and how Iran had long suspected that the Saudis were giving military information provided by AWACS to the Iraqis. The role that US military personnel and AWACS played in the initial phase of the Iran–Iraq war and thereafter has, of course, become well known in recent years, particularly after the second US invasion of Iraq. Journalist and Middle East analyst Dilip Hiro wrote in The Observer, on September 1, 2002: “Despite its repeated reiteration of neutrality, the US had all along been pro-Baghdad. It lost no time in supplying Iraq with intelligence collected by the Saudi-owned but Pentagon-operated Airborne Warning and Control Systems (Awacs) plying in the region” (Hiro 2002b).19 Similarly, documentary film-maker and journalist Rory O’Connor wrote on October 12, 2004: Throughout the Iran–Iraq war, the Saudis—with the knowledge and approval of United States government officials—backed Iraq with money, weapons, and intelligence. As [Howard] Teicher [who served on the National Security Council from 1982 to 1987] put it, ‘They were providing financial assistance;

On the origins of the dual containment policy

27

they provided logistics support; they were providing intelligence information. … They took the information that we provided them about our assessments of the Iranian military and provided it to Iraq. I believe that some of that information contributed to Saddam Hussein’s decision to invade Iran in the first place.20 In sum, it appears that the Carter Administration, with Zbigniew Brzezinski in the lead, encouraged and assisted Saddam Hussein in his invasion of Iran. The dispatching of AWACS and military personnel to Saudi Arabia in 1980, which were intended to provide information on Iranian military capabilities and formation, benefited Saddam, as he himself admitted a few years later. But was the intention of the Carter officials, especially Brzezinski, to establish a long-term relationship with Saddam Hussein? The answer to this question appears to be negative. As mentioned earlier, what the US policy makers, particularly Brzezinski, wished for went beyond the mere release of hostages. They hoped to overthrow the Iranian government; and, given this desire, Saddam Hussein was befriended. Yet, as became clearer later on, befriending Saddam Hussein was temporary. The policy that the US government adopted, which later became known as the “dual containment policy,” was one in which both Iran and Iraq would engage in a long and costly war that neither side could win. In a book written after the Iraq–Iran war, Brzezinski himself explains the policy in this way: During the 1980s, the United States strove to maintain a de facto balance of power between Iraq and Iran so that neither would be able to achieve a regional hegemony that might threaten American interests. The United States provided some help to Iraq during the Iran–Iraq War of 1980–88, moved in other ways to counter the spread of Iranian-backed Islamic militancy, and provided—with Israeli encouragement—some help to Iran, chiefly in the context of seeking the release of American hostages. (Brzezinski and Scowcroft 1997: 4–5) This is a damning admission of the role that the US played as a double agent in the Iran–Iraq war. Brzezinski does not tell us the details of how “a de facto balance of power between Iraq and Iran” was maintained. Neither does he state what role he played in this policy. But, as argued above, it appears that this was actually a policy set in motion by Brzezinski himself. As noted earlier, he states in his memoirs that by the middle of October 1980 the Carter Administration was considering the possibility of placing some of these spare parts in different countries, so that the Iranians could pick them up. We do not know if this possibility ever materialized, but even if it did not, contemplating the sale of spare parts to Iran, at the same time that Saddam was being helped with information, would mean that the US was playing the role of a double agent in the war. Thus it can be concluded that the policy of dual containment of Iran and Iraq started with the Carter Administration and was conceived by Brzezinski himself. But in order to see how this brainchild of Brzezinski evolved, we need to turn to subsequent administrations.

3

The dual containment policy in the 1980s

The Reagan Administration continued the dual containment policy of the Carter Administration, but with much more vigor. The policy also became more blatant. This was, of course, despite the official US policy of remaining neutral in the war. It was also contrary to the Algiers Accords, alluded to in the previous chapter, signed in 1980 between the US and Iran to end the hostage crisis. The Algiers Accords specifically stated: “The United States pledges that it is and from now will be the policy of the United States not to intervene, directly or indirectly, politically and militarily, in Iran’s internal affairs” (quoted in Alerassool 1993: 121–2). Yet this agreement between the US and Iran did not prevent the Reagan Administration from actively supporting Saddam Hussein in his war against Iran. Moreover, as we shall see in this chapter, the Reagan Administration at times played the role of double agent by selling arms to Iran as well, mostly using Israel as the conduit. After their initial crossing of the Shatt al-Arab in 1980, Saddam Hussein’s forces moved very rapidly into Khuzestan, the richest province of Iran in terms of oil reserves and oil refining facilities. The Iraqi regime was hoping to provoke an uprising against the Iranian government by the Arab-speaking inhabitants of Khuzestan and thus leading to the eventual annexation of this region, which the Iraqi regime called “Arabistan.”1 However, this was a miscalculation. No such event took place and the Iranian troops, having overcome the initial shock of the invasion, regrouped and fought back. In the early years of the Reagan Administration the situation turned around. By 1982 Iranian troops had not only recaptured Khuzestan but started to move into Iraqi territory. With these successes the Iranian government became bolder and ordered advances toward Baghdad to “rid the Iraqi people of the Ba’th” party.2 Continuing with the dual containment policy, the Reagan Administration saw Iranian victory over Saddam Hussein as unacceptable. This is clearly evident in the news reports of the time. The New York Times, for example, wrote on May 26, 1982: “Reagan Administration officials said today that Iran’s rout of Iraqi forces threatened the stability of Persian Gulf states and was creating a situation potentially more dangerous to Western interests than the unresolved Arab–Israeli conflict.” It then added: “Now that Iran has regained virtually all the territory it lost to Iraq in the 20-month-old war, officials here said that the Teheran Government

The dual containment policy in the 1980s 29 would probably decide in the next two to three weeks whether it would send its forces into Iraq to try to bring down the Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein, who is backed by Jordan and the Persian Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain.” The next day, May 27, 1982, the Christian Science Monitor wrote about the same prospect: The Reagan administration is under conflicting pressures about how to react to the threat to the stability of the oil-rich Gulf after Iran’s victory over Iraq at Khorramshahr. There is no doubt that the United States is deeply concerned about what could happen next–whether it be the crossing into Iraq of the victorious Iranian Army or an upsurge of Iranian subversive activity in the oil-producing conservative Arab states of the Gulf. A minimum further aim of the Iranians would seem to be the overthrow or at least public humiliation of Iraqi strong man Saddam Hussein, who made such a mistake in launching his war against Iran in September 1980. The US policy of not letting Iran overthrow Saddam Hussein or win the war, however, did not mean letting Saddam Hussein win, either. Reagan’s Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, openly stated in May of 1982: “We want to see the war end in a way that does not destabilize the area. … An Iranian victory is certainly not in our national interest.”3 But what was exactly the nature of the policy of not letting “the war end in a way that does not destabilize the area” and how was it implemented? On February 26, 1982 the Reagan Administration removed Iraq from the list of so-called terrorist nations, and lifted trade sanctions against Iraq.4 The Washington Post wrote on the following day that in “removing Iraq from the list, Commerce gave no reason other than to note that the secretary of state has determined that Iraq’s record has improved in terms of support for terrorist organizations. It gave no details to support that determination.” There was, of course, no support for the contention because none existed. The decision to remove Iraq from the list of “terrorist states” was simply a tactical one. In so doing, the US was able to undertake a variety of actions that materially aided the Iraqi war efforts. For example, two months later the US started to sell Iraq “transport planes” and a few months later “small jets.”5 Shortly afterwards, agricultural credit was extended to Iraq. On December 31, 1982 Facts on File World News Digest reported the following: The U.S. was granting Iraq $210 million in food credits, the Agriculture Department announced Dec. 15. The credits, consisting of three-year loan guarantees, comprised $120 million for wheat, $80 million for rice and $10 million for barley. Although the U.S. and Iraq did not maintain diplomatic relations, a Dec. 15 news story said Iraq had been buying U.S. commodities over the past few months with financing from conservative Arab states. 6

30 The United States and Iran The removal of Iraq from the list of “terrorist states,” however, did more to prevent Saddam Hussein from being defeated. The action allowed the US to send to Iraq “dual-use” goods, such as Hughes Helicopters that were supposed to be used only for civilian purposes. But many of these items were used by the Iraqis for military purposes.7 In addition, a US court case in the 1990s revealed that the CIA used a Chilean arms dealer, Carlos Cardoen, to sell arms to Iraq in order to halt its slide toward defeat. On February 5, 1995 The New York Times, reported that Howard Teicher, “who worked for the National Security Council from 1982 to 1987 as a main adviser on the Middle East,” had filed an affidavit showing that he had helped the Chilean arms dealer to sell cluster bombs to Iraq in the early 1980s.8 The report quoted Teicher as saying that William J. Casey, the Director of Central Intelligence, was “adamant that cluster bombs were a perfect ‘force multiplier’ that would allow the Iraqis to defend against the ‘human waves’ of Iranian attackers.” 9 Subsequently, between 1983 and 1984, the US took a series of measures to ensure that Iran would not win the war. These measures included the launching of “Operation Staunch” in October of 1983. This operation, according to an AP report of January 22, 1987, was “an effort to limit the flow of arms to Iran from third countries after the National Security Council concludes it would not be in the U.S. interest for Iraq to lose the long-running war between the two Persian Gulf nations.” The US also encouraged its allies to increase arms shipments to Iraq, including those weapons that had been previously banned by the US. In 1984 the US also started to provide direct military information to Hussein, which as we saw in the previous chapter was acknowledged by Saddam Hussein himself. American officials eventually confirmed this, when in April of 1987 they said that the US “will continue to supply Iraq with intelligence information on Iranian movements in the region.”10 In addition, on January 13, 1984 the US designated Iran as a supporter of international terrorism, invoking a ban on any foreign assistance, loan, or transfer of arms to Iran, and requiring validation of export licensing of goods and technology to Iran (Kemp 1994: 105–7). By putting Iran on the list of terrorist states, the Reagan Administration tried to make it difficult for Iran to engage in international trade. Thus, the designation was not so much due to Iran’s alleged involvement in the bombing of the US Marine base in Beirut, as is commonly understood; rather, it was due to the continuance of a US policy that was aimed at the paralysis of Iran in the war.

Saddam Hussein’s “new, powerful secret weapon” The measures that the Reagan Administration took were very effective in halting Iranian successes on the battlefield and thus the war reached stalemate. The Iraqi government, however, realized as early as 1983 that, in spite of all the help from the US and its allies, it could not win the war by conventional methods and thus started a new campaign. On December 28, 1983 Saddam Hussein declared that

The dual containment policy in the 1980s 31 “Iraqi forces would use new weapons against any future Iranian ‘aggression,’ but did not specify what kind of weapons he meant” (The Washington Post, December 29, 1983).11 Talk of such weapons that “will destroy any moving creature” had been heard many times before.12 Indeed, on October 27, 1982 the Christian Science Monitor reported that an Iraqi diplomat had said in Copenhagen that “Iraq will use a new, powerful secret weapon against Iranian troops if they mount an offensive over the Iran–Iraq border today.” The newspaper then went on to say: “The diplomat asked for the world’s forgiveness and understanding in advance of using the weapon, which he said was designed to kill hundreds of thousands of troops. He refused to divulge the nature of the weapon, but said it was neither nuclear nor chemical. He said it was produced by an unspecified Western country and was not banned by international arms conventions.” The New York Times also reported the same comments made by Salah Ali Fathi, the chargé d’affaires at Iraq’s embassy in Copenhagen. It further stated that the announcement “mystified Western intelligence sources,” since “Mr. Fathi refused to disclose the character of the weapon but said it was neither nuclear nor chemical.” Thus the news was discounted, according to The New York Times, as perhaps a form of “psychological weapon intended to deter an Iranian offensive.” In retrospect we know that the “new, powerful secret weapon” that Saddam Hussein and his officials were speaking of was indeed nothing but a chemical weapon. This became known worldwide in late 1983 and early 1984. On January 25, 1984, for example, AP, relying on Jane’s Defence Weekly, reported that “Iraq is using mustard gas against human-wave attacks by Iranian forces in their Persian Gulf war.”13 In the following months, other sources—such as the Iranians, Swedish, and United Nations teams—also reported on the use of chemical weapons by the Iraqis. For example, the Christian Science Monitor reported on March 5, 1984 that according to IRNA, the official Iranian news agency, “Iraq used chemical weapons against its attacking forces in the 42-month-old Gulf war, injuring about 1,000 Iranian troops” and that “16 victims of chemical warfare were sent to Switzerland and Sweden.” The news was confirmed on the same day by The New York Times, when it stated: “One of five Iranian soldiers being treated in Sweden died today, and doctors said they believed he had been ‘exposed to chemical weapons.’” Similarly, a UN team that arrived in Iran on March 13, 1984 to check the allegation reported on March 26 of the same year that “‘chemical weapons, in the form of aerial bombs’ had been used in the areas they inspected” and that “the weapons included mustard gas and nerve agents” (The New York Times, March 14 and 27, 1984). 14 The news of Saddam Hussein using chemical weapons against the Iranians was also confirmed by Reagan Administration officials. On March 6, 1984 The Washington Post reported that “The State Department yesterday accused Iraq of using internationally outlawed ‘lethal chemical weapons’ against Iranian troops.” But the report immediately added that despite being officially “neutral,” the Reagan Administration “has tended to be more sympathetic toward Iraq.” It further added that even though the US government officials “strongly” condemned the use of chemical weapons, “[p]rivately, some officials were less harsh on the Iraqis. They

32 The United States and Iran said the country faced a situation in which it was being attacked by ‘human waves’ of Iranian troops and any major crack in the Iraqis’ defenses could bring down the army and the government. Thus, they said, it was not surprising that Iraq would use any weapon in its arsenal.” The New York Times also reported the same news on March 6, 1984, stating: “the State Department said that the United States ‘has concluded that the available evidence’ indicates that the weapons were used, in violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which Iraq agreed to adhere to in 1931.” But then the report added: “The Administration, however, balanced the strong criticism of Iraq with an attack on Iran for its ‘intransigent refusal’ to stop the war until it has overthrown the Iraqi Government. This, the statement said, was ‘inconsistent with the accepted norms of behavior among nations.’” The New York Times and Washington Post reports of March 6, 1984 contained other revelations. Both newspapers referred to US officials’ claims that the Iraqi chemicals were manufactured at home. The Washington Post went on to report that these same officials spoke of the location of “three plants producing poisonous gas” and what they produced. The newspapers also stated that the US government knew in advance that Saddam Hussein was going to use chemical weapons against Iran, as well as exactly when he first started to use them. The New York Times, for example, stated that the “United States has had information for at least a year that the Iraqis were considering the use of chemical weapons.” It further stated that the US had “urged Iraq several times through diplomatic channels not to do so.” But The New York Times added immediately that “Washington has been increasingly concerned about an Iranian victory and the repercussions this would have in moderate Arab countries in the Persian Gulf.” The Washington Post stated that “U.S. specialists said that Iraq used mustard gas against Iranian forces in October and November and again much more recently.” Looking back at these reports, one can conclude that the Reagan Administration knew at least a year before the use of chemical weapons by Saddam Hussein that he had every intention of using them. But they did not divulge the information. They also knew that Saddam Hussein started to use such weapons in October of 1983 but they did not disclose this information, either, until March of 1984, when the news had become known worldwide. The Reagan Administration then officially condemned the use of chemical weapons by Saddam Hussein but privately thought it was justifiable if Saddam Hussein’s government was to survive. It is interesting to note that some news items of the time confirm US complicity in Saddam Hussein’s development of chemical weapons. For example, on March 31, 1984 The Washington Post wrote: “The United States, saying that Iraq has used nerve gas in its war with Iran, yesterday announced the imposition of new regulations to restrict the shipment of five sensitive chemical compounds to both countries.” The report then added: “There is no confirmation that American-made chemicals have been used by Iraq in its military effort, but officials said a rush shipment to Iraq of one of the newly controlled chemical compounds was recently halted. The chemical compounds were described as having many industrial and commercial uses as well as being possible components in poison gas.” Such early reports seem to indicate that, at the very least, the US was supplying Saddam

The dual containment policy in the 1980s 33 Hussein with chemical compounds that had multiple uses, including those used in making poison gas. Hence, once the news of Iraqi chemical warfare became widely known, the US imposed “new regulations” to restrict shipment of some chemical compounds to Iraq. But why did the US restriction mention Iran, given that Iran had not used chemical weapons and had no trade relations with the US? The answer is found in another part of the same report: “Iran is not known to be using chemical weapons. Its inclusion on the control list apparently was for the sake of symmetry and to preclude the possibility it would seek to match Iraq.” We now know, of course, much more about what the US gave to Saddam Hussein in terms of chemical compounds, as well as military information and arms, in the early to mid-1980s. Such information became widely available much later—particularly in the aftermath of the US plan to invade Iraq for the second time—when some material pertaining to the US policy toward Iraq and Iran in the 1980s became declassified. But before looking at this new information, the role of Donald Rumsfeld, the special envoy to the Middle East who carried out US policy in the first half of the 1980s, is worth examining.

The Rumsfeld affair The Financial Times of London reported on December 20, 1983 that “Donald Rumsfeld, the special U.S. Middle East envoy, paid an unexpected visit to Iraq yesterday.” This, as the Christian Science Monitor pointed out on December 21, 1983, was quite unexpected since it was “the first visit by a senior US official in 16 years.” In this visit—which came soon after the use of chemical weapons by the Iraqi government against Iranians—Rumsfeld met both Saddam Hussein and Tariq Aziz.15 But what was the purpose of the trip and was the issue of chemical weapons ever discussed? From the perspective of the Iranians this visit was quite ominous, particularly coming immediately after the deployment of Iraqi chemical weapons. On February 17, the Financial Times stated that “Iranian officials attached great significance to the recent visit to Baghdad by U.S. Middle East envoy Donald Rumsfeld, and Iraqi threats issued shortly after.” The Reagan Administration, however, tried to downplay the significance of Rumsfeld’s trip and put a different spin on it. According to the Financial Times, “U.S. officials in Washington emphasized that his [Rumsfeld’s] visit to Baghdad had nothing to do with Iraq’s war with Iran and did not constitute any ‘tilt’ toward Baghdad in the conflict.” Yet this was an outright lie, since subsequent statements by US officials contradict the assertion. For example, on January 8, 1984 The Washington Post reported that a “White House official said yesterday … that Reagan’s special mideast envoy, Donald H. Rumsfeld, raised the issue of the shipping in the Strait of Hormuz when he met with Iraqi officials on the most recent round of Middle East talks.” Indeed, some later reports went beyond this and suggested that Iraqi officials told Rumsfeld about using chemical weapons in the war. For example, the Financial Times wrote on February 13, 1984 that “Mr Donald Rumsfeld, the U.S. special envoy to the Middle East, was told by Iraqi leaders in Baghdad last month that all weapons at their disposal would be used to

34 The United States and Iran attack Iran, if another offensive was launched.” Since the Reagan Administration knew all about Saddam Hussein’s use of chemical weapons, it is quite clear that Rumsfeld, the special envoy to the Middle East, knew perfectly well what was meant by Iraqi leaders using “all weapons at their disposal.” There is, of course, nothing in the reports of the time that suggests Rumsfeld was dismayed by Saddam Hussein’s use of chemical weapons or that he advised Hussein not to use such weapons. The Reagan Administration’s second disclaimer, that Rumsfeld’s trip did not constitute a “tilt” toward Baghdad in the Iran–Iraq war, is also interesting. In some perverted sense this was true. As was shown in the previous chapter, the US had already been involved with Saddam Hussein since before the Iran–Iraq war and, therefore, there was no new “tilt” here. But in another sense this claim was false. The US, as we shall see soon, was laying the groundwork for establishing full diplomatic relation with Saddam Hussein, and Rumsfeld’s trip was part of this work. There is a hint of this undertaking in the news reports of the time. For example, when on December 21, 1983 the Christian Science Monitor reported on Rumsfeld’s trip to Iraq, it quoted the “official Iraqi news agency” as saying that Rumsfeld met “Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz ‘in a cordial and frank atmosphere.’” The Monitor then added: “The agency did not mention any possibility of restoring diplomatic relations severed in 1967 after the Arab–Israeli war. President Saddam Hussein has said that restoring relations during the Iran–Iraq war might be misinterpreted.” Reading between the lines, and knowing what we now know, we can say that the issue of restoring full diplomatic relations between the US and Iraq was discussed, but was put on the back burner because Saddam Hussein asked that it be postponed on account of how it might have been “interpreted” at the time. More recently, it has become known that there was another noteworthy subject that Rumsfeld and Saddam Hussein discussed in their 1983 meeting. On April 14, 2003 The New York Times stated: “The primary goal of Mr. Rumsfeld’s visit to Baghdad was to improve relations with Iraq. But another matter was also quietly discussed. The powerful Bechtel Group in San Francisco, of which Secretary Shultz had been president before joining the Reagan administration, wanted to build an oil pipeline from Iraq to the Jordanian port of Aqaba, near the Red Sea. It was a billion-dollar project and the U.S. government wanted Saddam Hussein to sign off on it.” The report then goes on: It was known by the fall of 1983 that Iraq had used chemical weapons against Iran. That did not prevent the U.S. from pursuing improved relations with Saddam, or curb the enthusiasm for the Aqaba pipeline—a project promoted by a company that had given the Reagan administration not just its secretary of state, but also its secretary of defense, Caspar Weinberger, who had been Bechtel’s general counsel. The pipeline deal, however, was rejected by Saddam Hussein, the report continues, since “It didn’t seem to make very good commercial sense.”

The dual containment policy in the 1980s 35 Donald Rumsfeld’s second trip to Iraq in March of 1984 is also noteworthy. On the same day that the United Nations team issued its report about Iraq’s use of chemical weapons against Iran, Rumsfeld was in Iraq. Yet he said nothing about the issue of chemical weapons publicly and there is no evidence that he even raised it privately with the Iraqi regime. Right after reporting on the UN specialists’ account, The New York Times of March 27, 1984 carried a brief report stating that Rumsfeld stayed in Iraq for six hours and met with Saddam Hussein’s officials. The report then stated: “The Iraqi Foreign Ministry said the envoy [Rumsfeld] met with Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz to discuss the war and ‘bilateral relations and the Middle East situation.’ No further details were provided.” Two days after Rumsfeld’s second visit to Iraq, that is, on March 29, 1984, The New York Times wrote: “American diplomats pronounce themselves satisfied with relations between Iraq and the United States and suggest that normal diplomatic ties have been restored in all but name.” Rumsfeld’s trip had accomplished what it had set out to do: laying the groundwork for establishing full diplomatic relations with Iraq in order to prevent Saddam Hussein from being defeated in the war with Iran. On November 26, 1984 the US did in fact establish full diplomatic relations with Iraq after a break of 17 years. The action had been delayed, according to a number of news reports, such as The New York Times of October 13, 1984, because “President Saddam Hussein” wanted “to consider re-establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States after the American elections Nov. 6.” On November 27, 1984 the Guardian (London) reported the news by saying that while still claiming to be “neutral” in the Iran–Iraq war, the US restored “diplomatic relations with Iraq and feted Iraq’s Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Tariq Aziz, at the White House.” “Mr Aziz,” the report went on to say, “was given the full red carpet treatment at the White House. In addition to a session with President Reagan, he had talks with the Secretary of State, Mr George Shultz, and paid calls on the National Security Adviser, Mr Robert McFarlane, and the Defence Secretary, Mr Casper Weinberger.” Needless to say, the US move to establish full diplomatic relations with Iraq was interpreted by Iran as bringing the Reagan Administration–Saddam Hussein relation into the open. On this, the Guardian wrote on October 29, 1984 “[m]oves to restore diplomatic relations between the US and Iraq are strengthening Iran’s belief that US policy has shifted to open and unequivocal support for Baghdad in the Gulf war.” This open and unequivocal support for the Iraqi regime, as we shall see, allowed the US to directly engage Iran in the war.

The events of the early 1980s viewed in the early 2000s Before going any further, it is worth noting how some of the news related to the Iran–Iraq war would resurface nearly 20 years later on the eve of the US’s second invasion of Iraq. On September 21, 2002 Donald Rumsfeld was interviewed by CNN news reporter Jamie McIntyre. After Rumsfeld was asked if there was anything that Saddam Hussein could do to avert war, the following dialogue took place:

36 The United States and Iran MCINTYRE:

Well, let me take you back to about 20 years ago. The date, I believe, was December 20, 1983. You were meeting with Saddam Hussein, I think we have some video of that meeting. Tell me what was going on during this meeting? RUMSFELD: Where did you get this video, from the Iraqi television? MCINTYRE: This is from the Iraqi television. RUMSFELD: When did they give it to you, recently or back then? MCINTYRE: We dug this out of the CNN library. RUMSFELD: I see. Isn’t that interesting. There I am. MCINTYRE: So what was going on here, what were you thinking at the time? RUMSFELD: Well, Iraq was in a battle, a war, with Iran. And, the United States had just had 241 Marines killed, and President Reagan asked me to take a leave of absence from my company and serve as a temporary special envoy, and I traveled throughout the Middle East for a period of months. And we were trying to get the Syrians to get out of Lebanon, and stop killing Americans at the Marine barracks. And among other things, we believed it would be helpful if Saddam Hussein’s Iraq would behave in a way in that region that would be helpful to our goals with respect to Syria and the terrorist threat that existed. And we decided it was worth having me go in and meet with him. In that visit, I cautioned him about the use of chemical weapons, as a matter of fact, and discussed a host of other things. MCINTYRE: You were pressed during the briefings—during the hearings this week by Senator Byrd on the question of whether the U.S. in any way aided Saddam Hussein in his chemical weapons program. At the time during the hearings, you said you had no knowledge of it. Have you looked into it since then? RUMSFELD: I had no knowledge. I have no knowledge today. I also, I think advised him, I thought it was most unfortunate that even the implication of that would be raised simply because of some article that somebody wrote. I cannot believe that that would be true. And certainly, I would have had absolutely nothing to do with it. The cables from the visit I had with Saddam Hussein and Tariq Aziz indicate that I cautioned them about their own chemical program, let alone what was suggested by the Senate hearing.16 It is noteworthy that Rumsfeld finds the existence of an unexpected video—which showed him being warmly greeted by Saddam Hussein and his entourage—“interesting.” What is more noteworthy is the discrepancy between what he stated in the interview and known facts. As stated earlier, when he first met the Iraqi regime, the US government stated that his “visit to Baghdad had nothing to do with Iraq’s war with Iran.” By admitting not only that he did talk about Iran but that he raised the issue of the use of chemical weapons, Rumsfeld contradicts the earlier claim. Other contradictions were reported in the press shortly after the interview. For example, on December 30, 2002 The Washington Post published a relatively lengthy article on US policy toward Saddam Hussein in the 1980s. In reference to the CNN interview the article pointed out a number of fallacies in the recollections of Reagan’s US special envoy to the Middle East and George W. Bush’s Secretary

The dual containment policy in the 1980s 37 of Defense. For example, the article stated that Rumsfeld’s claim that he “cautioned” Hussein about the use of chemical weapons is “at odds with declassified State Department notes of his 90-minute meeting with the Iraqi leader.” According to the article, “Pentagon spokesman, Brian Whitman, now says that Rumsfeld raised the issue not with Hussein, but with Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz. The State Department notes show that he mentioned it largely in passing as one of several matters that ‘inhibited’ U.S. efforts to assist Iraq.” The article also points out that Rumsfeld’s claim that he had “‘nothing to do’ with helping Iraq in its war against Iran” is also false: “the documents show that his visits to Baghdad led to closer U.S.–Iraqi cooperation on a wide variety of fronts. Washington was willing to resume diplomatic relations immediately, but Hussein insisted on delaying such a step until the following year.” This last fact—namely, that one of Rumsfeld’s major objectives in meeting with the Iraqi government was to establish full diplomatic relations with Saddam Hussein—has already been established and does not need elaboration. The Washington Post’s account of the Rumsfeld affair in the Iran–Iraq war, like the rest of the article, contains a few previously unknown facts. The article, for example, does tell us about the existence of “National Security Decision Directive 114 of Nov. 26, 1983, one of the few important Reagan era foreign policy decisions that still remains classified.” The article then states: “According to former U.S. officials, the directive stated that the United States would do ‘whatever was necessary and legal’ to prevent Iraq from losing the war with Iran.” It was this directive, the paper goes on to say, which gave Rumsfeld the mandate to establish full diplomatic relations with Saddam Hussein’s government. The article also states that “on Nov. 1, 1983, a senior State Department official, Jonathan T. Howe, told Secretary of State George P. Shultz that intelligence reports showed that Iraqi troops were resorting to ‘almost daily use of CW’ against the Iranians.” Moreover, the article tells us some of the biological and chemicals compounds supplied by the US to Saddam Hussein: “The administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush authorized the sale to Iraq of numerous items that had both military and civilian applications, including poisonous chemicals and deadly biological viruses, such as anthrax and bubonic plague.” For the most part, however, there is nothing in the article that could not be found in the 1980s archives of The Washington Post itself, much of which has been cited earlier in this chapter. For example, the article briefly mentioned how the US directly and indirectly supplied intelligence and logistical support to the Iraqi regime to stop the Iranian “human wave” in the battlefields, provided billions of dollars in credit to Saddam, gave dual-use goods to Iraq that had military applications, tried to cut off arms sales to Iran in “Operation Staunch,” etc.17 Yet, given the failure of such articles to provide comprehensive and critical analysis, many of the old archive materials appear as revelations and are attributed to a recent “review of thousands of declassified government documents.” Similarly, since the entire history of the US–Saddam Hussein entanglement is not taken into account, some aspects of the reporting appear to be actually incorrect. For example, the Reagan Administration policy in the Iran–Iraq war, particularly the Rumsfeld affair, is

38 The United States and Iran viewed by The Washington Post of December 30, 2002 as “tilting” the US policy toward Baghdad. But as was argued in the previous chapter, the Reagan Administration basically followed the Carter Administration’s dual containment policy toward Iran and Iraq, as formulated originally by Zbigniew Brzezinski. The basic difference is that what was done covertly during the Carter Administration was done overtly and intensely during the Reagan Administration, given the latter’s fear that Saddam Hussein might actually be defeated in the war. Yet, as the war progressed and the Iraqi government’s position weakened, the Reagan Administration felt it necessary to directly engage Iran on behalf of Saddam.

The undeclared American war to save Saddam In 1984, the Iraqi government started the so-called war of the cities, the indiscriminate bombing of civilian targets. In the same year, Saddam Hussein started to attack tankers carrying Iranian oil. The Financial Times reported on May 17, 1984 that Iraq was using French-supplied Super Etendard jets equipped to deliver Exocet missiles. The Iranian government, in turn, tried to retaliate by attacking Iraq’s and its allies’ tankers. As such, the Financial Times reported that “Hashemi Rafsanjani, Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, had said cryptically in Tehran that either ‘the Persian Gulf will be safe for all or for no one.’”18 Following the policy of assisting Saddam, the Reagan Administration became alarmed by Iran’s ability to carry out similar attacks. In an interview with foreign correspondents published in The Washington Post on June 1, 1984 Ronald Reagan stated that Iran “was going ‘beyond bounds’ in attacking neutral ships.” He further stated that “I think we’ve always recognized that in a time of war the enemy’s commerce and trade is a fair target if you can hurt them economically … So in that sense, Iraq has not gone beyond bounds, as Iran has done.” To protect Iraq and its allies in the war, the Reagan Administration declared at this time that it was willing to provide air cover for the Gulf countries and send in military forces to protect their shipping. With this offer, the US policy of helping Saddam Hussein in the war took on a new dimension. The United States started to escort the tankers carrying Iraq’s and its allies’ oil, particularly those of Kuwait, safely through the Persian Gulf but allowed Iraq to hit at will tankers carrying Iranian oil. Soon afterwards, the US also offered to re-flag Iraqi allies’ tankers. This situation continued until early 1986, when Iranian forces once again started to score military victories by capturing the Iraqi Faw peninsula. Iraq increased the intensity of its tanker war on Iran and Iran retaliated. Kuwait asked the UN Security Council in late 1986 for protection of its tankers in the Gulf. Shortly afterwards, the US started to re-flag Kuwaiti tankers with the American flag.19 This was the beginning of the US directly entering an undeclared war against Iran at the behest of Saddam Hussein. In the undeclared war that followed the US started to attack Iranian ships. For example, The Washington Post reported on September 23, 1987 that two days earlier American helicopters had attacked an Iranian vessel on the pretext that it was laying mines. As a result of the attack, the report went on to say, a number of

The dual containment policy in the 1980s 39 Iranian sailors were killed, injured, or missing. A day after the attack, according to the same report, US Navy commandos boarded and captured the Iranian ship, and then fired warning shots at an Iranian hovercraft that came toward the disabled vessel. A few days later, the US Navy blew up and sank the ship (Sunday Mail, September 27, 1987). The US actions were viewed not only by Iran but also by the US Congress as something akin to declaration of war against Iran by the Reagan Administration. On September 25, 1987 the COURIER-MAIL reported that the “Iranian President, Mr Khamenei, said yesterday he feared United States actions in the Persian Gulf would lead to an American invasion of his country.” The report further quoted Khamenei as saying that the “presence of the US in the Gulf is a sign of war … All these battleships and the great armada there are not for defence, they are for invasion.” On September 23, 1987 The Washington Post reported that the US Congress had asked “for constraints on U.S. tanker-escort operations” and that some were considering invoking the “1973 War Powers Resolution,” which requires congressional approval for sustained US combat operations. Engaging Iran at the behest of Saddam Hussein continued throughout the rest of 1987 and 1988. For example, on October 9, 1987 the Guardian reported the sinking of three Iranian gunboats by the US on the pretext that they had “hostile intent”, and on April 19, 1988 The Washington Post reported the sinking or crippling of six more Iranian ships by the US. Also in this period the US started to attack Iranian oil platforms. For example, according to the COURIER-MAIL of October 21, 1987, the US attacked two Iranian oil platforms two days earlier “in response to that country’s missile attacks on tankers flying the US flag.” According to the same source, “Mr Reagan was asked if the attack meant the two nations were at war”, and he responded by saying “No, we’re not going to have a war with Iran, they’re not that stupid.” Similarly, the Journal of Commerce reported on April 19, 1988 that a day earlier the US Navy destroyed two offshore Iranian oil platforms. In this same period (1987–8) the US also started to engage the Iranian air force. For example, according to the Financial Times of September 23, 1987, on August 8 of the same year “a carrier-borne F-14 Tomcat fighter unleashed two missiles at an Iranian jet spotted on its radar which had flown too close for comfort to an unarmed US surveillance aircraft.” Similarly, the Journal of Commerce reported on April 19, 1988 that a “U.S. warship fired missiles at two approaching Iranian jet fighters, but the fighters reversed course.” Before looking at the conclusion of the US–Saddam Hussein military engagement with Iran, it is worth noting the war on the sanction front. On October 1, 1987 the Department of Commerce banned the export of scuba gear to Iran alleging that it would be used for laying mines. Subsequently, both houses of the US Congress passed, nearly unanimously, a resolution calling for an end to the import of Iranian oil. On October 29, 1987 President Reagan issued an executive order which stated that “no good of Iranian origin may be imported into the United States,” with the exception of a few items such as petroleum products refined from Iranian oil by a third party.20 The act also prohibited exports of 14 types of goods with potential military uses, such as inboard and outboard motors, mobile communications equipment, and electrical generators. Further redefining of the Reagan executive

40 The United States and Iran order by the Secretary of the Treasury in the Iranian Transaction Regulations set forth “detailed licensing procedures for goods exempted from the import ban” (Kemp 1994: 107). All such sanction acts must be simply viewed as attempts to prevent an Iranian victory in the war. By early 1988 it was clear that Iran could not win a war against the combined forces of Saddam Hussein and the US. Even the gains by Iranian forces in the eight-year war were now being lost. The coordinated and jointly planned actions between the US and Iraq in April of 1988, for example, resulted in Saddam Hussein’s government retaking the Faw peninsula. On April 19, 1988 The Washington Post reported the US attack on Iranian ships and oil platform. It also reported that, according to Iran, the retaking of Faw by the Iraqi forces was supported by US helicopters. The time had come for Iran to take the bullet and accept a humiliating ceasefire offered by the US-dominated United Nations, the same institution that after eight years of war apparently could not still determine which party was guilty of starting it. But before looking at the ceasefire, one more event in the long saga of the Iran– Iraq–US war is worth mentioning.

USS Vincennes affair The last major event that brought about the final capitulation of Iran occurred on July 3, 1988. On that day the American warship Vincennes shot down an Iranian airliner over the Persian Gulf, killing all 290 passengers on board. True to its pattern of denying any role in the Iran–Iraq war, at first the United States government tried to deny culpability in the downing of the civilian airliner. On July 3 AP reported that the “Pentagon said U.S. Navy forces in the gulf sank two Iranian patrol boats and downed an F-14 fighter jet in the Strait of Hormuz on Sunday during an exchange of fire.” The report also said that, according to Iran, the US shot down not an F-14 but a civilian airliner killing all passengers on board. “U.S. Navy officials in the gulf,” the report went on say, “denied the Iranian claim.” Many similar reports were made by foreign journalists, particularly the Japan Economic Newswire, which also reported on July 3, 1988 that the “U.S. Defense Department issued a statement on the crash of an Iran air airbus Sunday and denied U.S. involvement in the incident as claimed by Iran.” However, once the charred bodies of passengers of the Iran Air Flight 655 were shown floating in the ocean, the US admitted that the plane brought down was not an F-14 but a civilian airliner. In what The New York Times of July 4, 1988 titled the “Quotation of the Day,” Admiral William J. Crowe Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated: “After receiving further data and evaluating information available from the Persian Gulf, we believe that the cruiser U.S.S. Vincennes, while actively engaged with threatening Iranian surface units and protecting itself from what was concluded to be a hostile aircraft, shot down an Iranian airliner over the Strait of Hormuz. The U.S. Government deeply regrets this incident.” Subsequently, the US claimed that the “Iranian airliner, in some ways, was not acting like a passenger plane … It was heading directly for the ship, appeared to be descending (as though it might be

The dual containment policy in the 1980s 41 attacking) and was about four miles outside the usual commercial air corridor” (The Washington Post, July 4, 1988). The Pentagon further asserted that USS Vincennes was in international waters, i.e. outside the territorial waters of Iran, and that the passenger plane was emitting a military electronic code. Slowly but surely, all the above claims were proved to be false. Vincennes was not in international waters, but in Iran’s territorial waters. The Iranian Airbus was not heading for the ship or even descending but ascending. The plane was not four miles outside of the usual commercial air corridor, but well within it. Moreover, Flight 655 was not emitting any military signals but regular transponder signals, which identified it as a commercial aircraft. 21 All these contradictions resurfaced four years later, when on July 1, 1992 the ABC News program Nightline broadcast a piece, investigated jointly with Newsweek magazine, entitled “The USS Vincennes: Public War, Secret War.”22 Newsweek magazine itself published on July 13, 1992 a separate article by John Barry and Roger Charles which appeared under the title “Sea of Lies.” Both pieces showed the contradictions in the US claims, four years earlier, concerning the downing of the Iranian civilian plane. Indeed, with regard to the answers provided by the US government to the questions “Where, precisely, was the Vincennes at the time of the shoot down?” and “What was she doing there?” ABC’s Nightline stated that the “official response to those two questions has been a tissue of lies, fabrications, half-truths and omissions.” For example, on the issue of the exact position of USS Vincennes when it shot the Iranian airliner, the following exchange between Ted Koppel of Nightline and Admiral William J. Crowe Jr. took place: TED KOPPEL:

But if I were to ask you today, was the Vincennes in international waters at the time that she shot down the Airbus— WILLIAM J. CROWE JR.: Yes, she was. TED KOPPEL: In international waters? WILLIAM J. CROWE JR.: No, no, no. She was in Iran’s territorial waters. TED KOPPEL: Let me ask you again. Where was the Vincennes at the time that she shot down the Airbus? WILLIAM J. CROWE JR.: She was in Iran’s territorial waters. After showing more such contradictions in the official US account of the incident, the program concentrated on the second question: “What was USS Vincennes doing in Iran’s territorial waters?” The answer given by Nightline was that Vincennes, as well as other US naval forces in the Persian Gulf, was there as part of an “undeclared,” “covert,” or “secret war” against Iran. In this war USS Vincennes had entered Iran’s territorial waters provoking the Iranian navy to engage in a fight when it shot down Iran Air Flight 655. “Sea of Lies” told the same story but in greater detail. It recounted how the “trigger happy” captain of USS Vincennes, Will Rogers III, had invaded the territorial waters of Iran looking for a fight under the pretext of rescuing a Liberian tanker, the Stoval, which in reality did not exist. Then, after creating a tense situation, the inevitable happened: it shot down a civilian airliner. What followed was a campaign

42 The United States and Iran of lies and fabrications at the highest levels of US government to “cover up” what had actually happened and the place of this incident within the broader US war against Iran. “The top Pentagon brass,” write John Barry and Roger Charles, “understood from the beginning that if the whole truth about the Vincennes came out, it would mean months of humiliating headlines. So the U.S. Navy did what all navies do after terrible blunders at sea: it told lies and handed out medals.” 23 If one knows the history of the US’s role in the Iran–Iraq war, then the USS Vincennes affair does not come as a big surprise. In the absence of such knowledge, however, the Nightline and the subsequent Newsweek magazine reports appear to be revelations. Many newspapers wrote about what had been reported. The Washington Post of July 1, 1992, for example, called “Public War, Secret War” a “provocative report” with an “entirely different take on the story.” It further said that ABC News and Newsweek reporter John Barry and Nightline anchor Ted Koppel made “the persuasive—though not conclusive—case that the United States not only provoked the incident but also lied to cover it up.” But, The Washington Post went on to say, once the report claimed that the US was engaged in a “‘secret war’ against Iran on behalf of its erstwhile ally in the region, Iraq,” then it moved onto “shakier ground.” Obviously The Washington Post had no clue as to how deep, long, and extensive the “secret war” of the US against Iran was. Even some US Congressmen appeared to be surprised by the reporting. For example, according to The Washington Post of July 7, 1992, following the Nightline and Newsweek reports, Senator Sam Nunn, then Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, wrote to Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney to request “an expeditious inquiry into these serious allegations.” Needless to say, nothing came out of these inquiries. The New York Times reported on July 22, 1992 that Admiral Crowe appeared before the House Armed Services Committee, and delivered a 27-page response to the report, denying that “American military had cooperated with the Iraqi military as part of a secret war against the Iranians. ‘The accusations of a cover-up are preposterous and unfounded,’ Admiral Crowe said.” However, he “acknowledged that the Vincennes was in Iranian waters when she shot the airliner but asserted that the location did not have an important bearing on the investigation,” the report said. From the perspective of many Iranians, who knew full well the US’s role in the Iran–Iraq war, the Vincennes affair was, even if an accident, the epitome of an undeclared war against Iran. Some Iranians even went beyond that and, as The Washington Post reported on July 4, 1988, accused the US of “deliberately shooting down an Iranian civilian airliner.” In turn, they asked for revenge. Yet, as stated earlier, the downing of Iran Air Flight 655 marked the end of the Iran–Iraq war, since it had now become clear that Iran was engaged in a direct war with the US, a war that Iran could not possibly win.

Iran accepts the UN ceasefire Almost two weeks after the downing of the civilian airliner by the USS Vincennes Iran accepted UN Resolution 598, calling for a ceasefire. On July 21, 1988 The

The dual containment policy in the 1980s 43 Washington Post reported that “Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the supreme leader of Iran, took personal responsibility today for the decision to accept a cease-fire with Iraq and, in words with the ring of defeat, called it worse than swallowing poison.” The actual quotation was: “Making this decision was deadlier than swallowing poison. I submit[ted] myself to God’s will and drank this drink for His satisfaction” (The New York Times, July 21, 1988). The reason for such expressions of dismay and desperation was that by accepting UN Resolution 598 Iran was capitulating to the US–Saddam Hussein interests. This was a resolution that had been endorsed by the US, and the US had warned Iran repeatedly to accept it. For example, in his address to the 42nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, on September 21, 1987, Ronald Reagan—the man whose administration had helped to perpetuate an eight-year slaughter and was now shedding crocodile tears over the “carnage” and “hundreds of thousands” of fallen bodies in the “bloody conflict”— had given Iran the following ultimatum: And this month marks the beginning of the eighth year of the Iran–Iraq war. Two months ago, the Security Council adopted a mandatory resolution demanding a cease-fire, withdrawal, and negotiations to end the war. The United States fully supports implementation of Resolution 598, as we support the Secretary-General’s recent mission. We welcomed Iraq’s acceptance of that resolution and remain disappointed at Iran’s unwillingness to accept it. In that regard, I know that the President of Iran will be addressing you tomorrow. I take this opportunity to call upon him clearly and unequivocally to state whether Iran accepts 598 or not. If the answer is positive, it would be a welcome step and major breakthrough. If it is negative, the Council has no choice but rapidly to adopt enforcement measures.24 This was the same resolution that Iran had refused to accept since its adoption by the UN Security Council in July of 1987. The resolution said nothing about who started the war, how it began and why it had happened. Indeed, the resolution was so one-sided in favor of the US and Saddam Hussein that despite overwhelming evidence that it was Iraq who eight years earlier invaded Iran, it still left the question of who was to blame unanswered. On the issue of who was at fault it simply requested “the Secretary General to explore, in consultation with Iran and Iraq, the question of entrusting an impartial body with inquiring into responsibility for the conflict and to report to the Security Council as soon as possible.” 25 The travesty of Resolution 598, of course, did not escape Iran, who refused to accept it when it was first offered. On September 22, 1987, one day after the US President’s speech at the UN, the Iranian President, Ali Khamenei, presented Iran’s response to Reagan’s ultimatum. According to the COURIER-MAIL of September 24, 1987 Khamenei “bitterly attacked the terms of the resolution, repeatedly demanding that Iraq be branded as the aggressor.” The UN refused to do so.26 The US response came from the Secretary of State, George Shultz, who, according to the same report, stated that the “US was stepping up its consultations

44 The United States and Iran with other members of the Security Council about imposing a worldwide arms embargo on Iran.” It was this same resolution, previously rejected by Iran for not even blaming Iraq as the aggressor, which Iran accepted after the USS Vincennes attack. Accepting this resolution—which gave Iran nothing in terms of war retribution, left some of its territory occupied by Iraqi forces and left open even the question of who started the war—was tantamount to accepting defeat by Iran. It should be added that even after the ceasefire became formally effective on August 20, 1988, Saddam Hussein continued to use chemical weapons against Iranian forces with impunity. For example, on August 24, 1988 The New York Times reported that “United Nations inspectors said today that Iraq used poison gas against Iranian civilians in a bombing raid earlier this month.” The report then added that after “examining fragments of the bombs, the experts concluded that they were similar to those found after earlier poison gas attacks against Iran that the United Nations investigated in 1984, 1986, 1987 and earlier this year.” Yet there was no reaction from the US or even the UN, as the report also added: “This is the seventh time United Nations investigators have found that chemical weapons have been used against Iran during the gulf war. But diplomats say the Security Council is unlikely to take any further action since Iran and Iraq have accepted a cease-fire.” It is also worth noting that even after the ceasefire agreement Saddam Hussein continued to use chemicals on Iraq’s own Kurdish population without any repercussions. On August 17, 1988 the Guardian reported—after mentioning that Iran expected major attacks by Saddam Hussein before the ceasefire took effect—that “the Iraqis mounted a new assault with chemical weapons on the Kurds’ key strongholds, near Rawanduz, adjacent to the Iranian frontier.” Since April 14 1987, according to The Washington Post of May 11, 1987, Iraqi planes had “dropped mustard gas on at least two dozen Kurdish villages that straddle the border between Iran and Iraq.” The attacks continued throughout 1987 and 1988 with the full knowledge of the US and without any serious challenge. The atrocities became particularly noticeable when Iranian forces entered the Iraqi Kurdish town of Halabja in the spring of 1988. On March 26, 1988 the COURIER-MAIL published a gruesome account of “wax-like” corpses and the overpowering “stench of death” in the streets and houses of Halabja. The report went on to give Kurdish accounts of how Iraqi planes and artillery had released mustard gas, cyanide, and other chemicals on the population. No action was taken either by the US or the UN to stop Saddam Hussein.

Playing both sides: a plague o’ both your houses In the end the Reagan Administration had managed by means of indirect and direct war to defeat and contain Iran for all practical purposes. Eight years of war had left Iran so devastated in terms of human and economic losses that it could pose no serious challenge to the US or its client states, particularly Saudi Arabia and Israel.27

The dual containment policy in the 1980s 45 The policy of dual containment, however, was intended to contain not just Iran but also Iraq. As stated earlier, Secretary of Defense Weinberger had stated in May of 1982 that the war must end in such a way that it “does not destabilize the area.” Two years later, in a congressional hearing, Richard Murphy, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs, would state the policy even more clearly. According to The New York Times of June 12, 1984 Murphy stated that the “Administration’s basic position in the war between Iran and Iraq was that ‘a victory by either side is neither militarily achievable nor strategically desirable.’” In other words, the policy of the Reagan Administration was to allow neither Iran nor Iraq to achieve a decisive military victory and, therefore, bleed them both in a lengthy and costly war. Thus it was that the US, while helping Saddam, also sold arms to Iran, mostly with the help of the Israelis, in what came to be known as the Iran-Contra scandal. The scandal, which is well known, is dealt with briefly in the next chapter, when examining the role of Israel in shaping US policy toward Iran. But it should be pointed out that even before the Iran-Contra affair, Israel was selling arms to Iran with the full knowledge and approval of the US. This issue, too, is examined in the next chapter. However, it is worth first noting certain facts concerning the dual containment policy that were revealed during and after the Iran-Contragate hearings. On January 12, 1987 The New York Times published an extensive report on the US providing information and misinformation to both Iran and Iraq. To be exact, the report stated that “American intelligence agencies provided Iran and Iraq with deliberately distorted or inaccurate intelligence data in recent years to further the Reagan Administration’s goals in the region, intelligence sources said today.” The “information,” the report went on to say, “had been shared in an effort to prevent either Iran or Iraq from prevailing in their conflict.” On the intelligence provided to Iraq, the report went on to say, “some information derived from satellite photography that was shared with Iraq was altered to make it misleading or incomplete. One source said, for example, that the images were cropped to leave out important details.” On the intelligence provided to Iran, the report referred to Ronald Regan’s January 17, 1986 order which “allowed CIA to provide intelligence, training, guidance and communications” to certain elements in Iran. According to the report, there “were several meetings between American intelligence officers and Iranian officials in 1986 in which data was exchanged. A secret Senate report disclosed, for instance, that a retired C.I.A. agent involved in the Iran program met in Frankfurt with an Iranian and gave him intelligence on the Soviet threat. It could not be learned whether the information passed on in this meeting was among the deceptive materials provided to Teheran.” But, the report went on to say, the US did try to spread false information about the Soviet Union getting ready to invade Iran. Overall, the report was at pains to explain the apparently contradictory policy toward Iran, a policy which included: (1) selling “weapons to Iran,” (2) providing “covert assistance to émigré groups trying to overthrow the Iranian Government,” (3) giving “reliable intelligence on the infiltration of Soviet agents into the Iranian Communist organization,” and (4) sharing “unreliable or incomplete intelligence information with Iran.”

46 The United States and Iran The fact that at times the US was giving false information to Iraq was also known to the Iraqis. On January 18, 1987 AP reported that, in reference to the “Iranian victory in capturing the Faw peninsula last year,” the Iraqi deputy prime minister, Taha Yassin Ramadan, charged that “the U.S. government supplied inaccurate information as part of a ‘premeditated design’ to prolong the Persian Gulf war and increase U.S. influence in the region.” The report went on to quote Ramadan as saying that the “U.S. wanted to ensure the continuation of the war so that it could use the Iranian threat to pressure the Gulf states to accept its intervention and allow the setting up of American military bases in the region.” Similarly, on July 1, 1988 The New York Times reported that “Iraq has accused the United States of supplying intelligence information to Iran that disclosed details of Baghdad’s military plans to mount its successful attack on an Iranian-held oilfield last weekend.” This was in reference to Iraqi forces capturing Majnoon Islands, which had fallen earlier into Iranian hands. The New York Times further quoted Saddam Hussein as saying that “‘the Americans informed the Iranians by all means about the massing of Iraq’s troops, their numbers, distribution and whereabouts.’ He added that the United States ‘supplied the Iranians with information they obtained by satellite.’” It appears, therefore, that the US was giving information, as well as misinformation, to both Iran and Iraq in the war. From the perspectives of those who did not have full understanding of the events and did not know the entire story, this policy appeared to be chaotic, contradictory, and irrational. Indeed, the January 12, 1987 New York Times article mentioned above stated that “a senior Administration official who has since learned of these operations termed them a ‘hodgepodge’ that, taken together, reflected a lack of deeper thought or understanding of the region.” It is, of course, possible that some of the policies pursued by the Administration were chaotic. But given the nature of the dual containment policy, the overall policy was not as chaotic as it seemed. As both the Iranians and Iraqis had found out, the US was engaged in what appeared to be contradictory policies of giving information and misinformation, as well as selling military weapons, to both sides in order to prolong the war and destroy both countries as regional economic and military powers. As stated earlier, this policy was successful in defeating Iran. But, when the war was over, Iraq was still standing as a military power. Indeed, according to some studies, at the end of the eight-year war Iraq was militarily much stronger than at the beginning.28 Years of arms supply by the West had resulted in a massive stockpile of arms in Iraq, including chemical and biological weapons. The US now had to “contain” Iraq. How this was accomplished falls outside the purview of this study. But to complete the tale of the dual containment policy in this era a brief account of how the US turned against Saddam Hussein after the Iran–Iraq war is in order.

Moving against Saddam Hussein With the virtual defeat of Iran and the emergence of Iraq as the strongest military power in the region US policy shifted mostly toward “containing” Iraq. This is evident from the increasing number of reported antagonistic “incidents” after the

The dual containment policy in the 1980s 47 Iran–Iraq war between Iraq and the US, as well as between Iraq and the principal allies of the US. The following are but a few examples of such reported incidents. On September 10, 1988 The Washington Post reported that the US Senate approved economic sanctions against Iraq for its “gross violation of international law” when Iraq used chemical weapons against the Kurdish population. The report also said that according to the State Department, “‘the next step’ should be for Iraq to issue a statement stating ‘a firm position that chemical weapons should not be used.’” The report went on to say that “a U.S. request for such a declaration is being presented to Iraqi officials in Baghdad by U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie.” In addition the report stated that “Secretary of State George P. Shultz bluntly accused Iraq Thursday of employing chemical weapons in attacks on Kurds in recent weeks and warned that U.S.–Iraqi relations would be affected if poison-gas attacks and other human-rights abuses against the Kurds continue.” A few days later, on September 15, 1988, The New York Times reported that “Reagan Administration officials said today that the United States had intercepted Iraqi military communications indicating that Iraq had used poison gas against Kurdish guerrillas.” It then quoted Secretary of State George P. Shultz as saying that he was “quite confident” that Iraq had used chemical weapons in its efforts to put down a rebellion by the Kurds. The report also mentioned that Representative Tom Lantos (Democrat, California) had sponsored a House Bill to impose economic sanctions on Iraq. These reports were the beginning of the US policy of targeting Iraq. As shown earlier, the Iraqi regime had used chemical weapons against the Kurds since at least April 14 1987, and the US had full knowledge of this. Also, as stated earlier, Saddam Hussein had been using chemicals against Iranian troops since 1983, again with the full knowledge of and even cooperation from the US. Yet as long as the Iran–Iraq war continued, neither the Reagan Administration nor the US Senate tried to stop Saddam Hussein. It was only after Iran had been “contained” that the use of chemical weapons became an excuse to “contain” Iraq. From this point the tension between the US and Saddam Hussein would escalate, particularly during the first Bush Administration. On November 17, 1988 The Washington Post reported that “Iraq has quietly expelled a senior American diplomat from Baghdad for having contacts Iraq judged too extensive with its minority Kurdish population.” On November 18, 1988 the Guardian stated that “The US yesterday declared an Iraqi diplomat persona non grata in retaliation for what it described as an ‘unjustified expulsion’ of a US diplomat by Baghdad.” 29 In January of 1989, there were numerous reports in the US media on Iraq’s development of chemical and biological weapons.30 Subsequently, The Washington Post reported on May 5, 1989 that the US Commerce Department intercepted a shipment of what they claimed to be vacuum pumps intended to be used for production of nuclear fuel. Such interceptions continued until March of 1990, when, in a sensational piece of news, the British arrested a few individuals and charged them with smuggling US-made electronic trigger devices to Iraq to manufacture nuclear bombs.31 It was reported that these arrests were the result of an “18month undercover investigation” by US and British investigators.32 However,

48 The United States and Iran when in April of 1990 the International Atomic Energy Agency inspected Iraq’s nuclear facilities, they found no evidence that Iraq had diverted sensitive material toward the production of a nuclear bomb. 33 Just prior to the arrest of the alleged arms smugglers, there was another incident involving Britain. In September of 1989, an individual by the name of Farzad Bazoft was arrested in Iraq while taking pictures at a supposedly secret military base, which had previously been the site of an explosion. On March 15, 1990 Bazoft, reportedly an “Iranian-born journalist,” was hanged by the Iraqi government after being convicted on charges of spying for Britain and Israel.34 According to the British government, Bazoft, who was apparently working for The Observer, was an innocent journalist. However, a day after Bazoft was hanged, it was revealed in the British press that he was a convicted felon who had been sentenced, in 1981, to serve 18 months in a British jail for armed robbery, and, moreover, had acted as a police informant on several occasions between 1987 and 1989.35 After these revelations even some members of the UK Parliament expressed doubt over the government’s assertion that Bazoft was a journalist and not a spy. One Member of Parliament was actually quoted as saying “it would be highly likely he [Bazoft] would offer himself to the Israelis,” and another said that “perhaps the biggest story of all is yet to be told.”36 However, the British government laid the story to rest by not disclosing any information. After this incident, the British withdrew their ambassador from Iraq, prohibited visits to Iraq by government officials, and expelled six Iraqi military trainees. The number of reported incidents between Iraq and the US–UK–Israel alliance grew considerably in late March and April of 1990. Among these, the most important incidents were: (1) the release of a “classified American intelligence reports” on March 30, with regard to the deployment of “six launchers for modified Scud missiles” in the western part of Iraq; (2) US Customs officials blocking the delivery of “high-speed capacitors” to Iraq on March 31; and (3) the US expelling an Iraqi UN diplomat for “abuse of his privileges” in early April.37 In the last case, the Iraqi diplomat was somehow linked to a mysterious assassination plot against an unidentified Iraqi opposition member in the US. The expulsion of the diplomat prompted an Iraqi Foreign Ministry spokesman to say that this incident “cannot be isolated from the series of feverish campaigns to harm Iraq in such a way that serves the aggressive goals of Israel,” a contention which was also echoed by King Hussein of Jordan when he said “the campaign directed against Iraq was vicious and harsh.”38 In retaliation, Iraq announced on April 9 that it was expelling a US diplomat. On the same day, the US Department of Commerce cancelled an aerospace trade mission to Iraq.39 However, in late March and early April of 1990 there was more sensational news involving Iraq and the US–UK–Israel alliance. On March 30, 1990 The New York Times reported that “Iraq has constructed for the first time launchers for missiles within range of Tel Aviv and Damascus, according to classified American intelligence reports. While the weapons could be used for offensive purposes, American intelligence experts believe that the missiles are intended in part to discourage any possible Israeli attack on Iraqi nuclear or chemical weapon installations.” The report

The dual containment policy in the 1980s 49 further added that “Iraq’s construction of launchers within range of Israel was described in a carefully worded White House statement as a ‘destabilizing development.’” Saddam Hussein saw all such news as a pretext to attack Iraq. On April 3, 1990 The New York Times reported that “President Saddam Hussein of Iraq, boasting that he had acquired advanced chemical weapons, threatened today to annihilate half of Israel if it moved against his country.” The report also said that Saddam’s “statement reflected a deepening mood of defiance, anger and suspicion that Western criticism of Baghdad’s human rights record and assertions that it is seeking nuclear arms are part of an attempt to justify an attack on it.” According to the report, Saddam Hussein also alluded to criticism by the United States and Britain as providing a possible “diplomatic cover for Israel to strike at Iraq.” The most sensational news in April of 1990, however, had to do with a super-gun that Iraq was allegedly constructing. In December of 1989, Iraq launched a missile capable of carrying a satellite into space. In March of 1990, a Canadian ballistics expert by the name of Gerald Bull was murdered in Brussels, after being warned by a friend that the Israeli secret police, Mossad, was planning to kill him. Following this incident, news circulated in the Western media that Bull may have actually built the Iraqi missile, a charge which was denied by Bull’s son, Michael. The younger Bull argued that what their company, Space Research Corporation, provided Iraqis with was “some basic engineering which may or may not have been of use” in launching the missile.40 He added that both the Saudis and the Israelis possessed such ballistic capabilities, and that the British were creating “hysteria” over the issue.41 Yet the news about the Iraq–Bull connection continued to pour in, especially when, on April 12, British customs officials seized a shipment of alleged “heavy metal tubes bound for Iraq.”42 The British authorities argued that these tubes were to be used by Bull to construct a super-gun capable of launching atomic or chemical missiles toward Tel Aviv or Iran. Iraq on the other hand argued that the tubes were to be used in petrochemical plants. The manufacturer of the tube, Sheffield Forgemasters, called the British allegation “absurd,” and said that these tubes would blow up if used in construction of a super-gun; moreover, they argued that they had previously shipped 26 similar pieces to Baghdad without any incident.43 However, the news of the Iraqi construction of the super-gun was kept alive in the remainder of the month of April, as well as part of the month of May when Italy, Turkey, and Greece, and some other Western countries, “discovered” and intercepted the shipment of different parts of the super-gun to Iraq.44 Attempts to confront Iraq and threats against her continued throughout spring and summer of 1990. For example, on April 14, 1990 the Financial Times reported, along with the super-gun story, that “Robert Dole, the Senate Republican leader, visited Iraq and handed Mr Saddam a letter expressing concern over Iraqi weapons programmes. ‘Your efforts to develop a nuclear, chemical and biological capability seriously jeopardize—rather than enhance—your security, potentially threaten other nations of the region and provoke dangerous tensions throughout the Middle East,’ said the letter, which was written in consultation with President Bush.” Later that month, some Congressmen closely aligned with Israel, particularly Senator Alfonse D’Amato and Representative Tom Lantos, pressed for a Bill to end economic aid to

50 The United States and Iran Iraq and impose sanctions against her. The Guardian wrote on April 27, 1990 about such pressure, saying that D’Amato was “outraged” by “Iraq’s threat on April 3 to attack Israel.” Similarly, the report quoted Lantos as calling Iraq the “most murderous dictatorship on the face of this planet.” The report also said that the Bush Administration “under congressional pressure to impose sanctions on Iraq, put President Saddam Hussein’s regime on probation yesterday, threatening to cut US loans and other ‘appropriate action’ if Baghdad does not quickly mend its ways.” The time bomb to “contain” Iraq was ticking. All that was needed was some chain of events to trigger it; and these events occurred following the feverish campaign waged by the US, Israel, and Britain against Saddam. In spring of 1990 Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates drove the price of oil to a low level of $14 per barrel by producing more than their OPEC production quota and flooding the market with excess oil. This act prompted the Iraqi government to issue a warning to Kuwait on June 26, 1990 to curb its excess production because “it was having a negative impact on Iraq and OPEC’s vital interests.”45 Yet Kuwait did not heed the warning and continued with its policy of excess production. Another warning was issued by Baghdad in mid-July. On July 19, 1990 The Washington Post reported that the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, accused Kuwait of reducing Iraq’s oil income by cooperating with an “imperialist-Zionist plan” to depress oil prices through excess production, refusing to cancel Iraq’s war debt, stealing Iraqi oil, and building military installations on its territory. According to the same report, Saddam Hussein, too, accused Kuwait a day earlier of back-stabbing Iraq with “a poison dagger” by exceeding their production quota, in what he said was a US-led conspiracy to ensure low oil prices. This accusation was followed, the report went on to say, by the threat that “if words fail to protect Iraqis, something effective must be done to return things to their natural course and return usurped rights to their owners.” The US response to this obvious threat was a series of contradictory and confusing messages. According to the report in The Washington Post of July 19, 1990 “a State Department spokesman said the United States remains ‘strongly committed to supporting the individual and collective self-defense of our friends in the gulf with whom we have deep and longstanding ties,’ but he declined to say whether the United States would provide Kuwait with military help against an Iraqi attack.” Similarly, on July 20, 1990 The Washington Post reported that “[US Secretary of Defense] Richard B. Cheney said today that the U.S. commitment to come to Kuwait’s defense if it is attacked remains in force.” However, according to the report, when asked “if a general US pledge to come to Kuwait’s aid still applied,” Cheney would not speculate “on how the United States might respond if Iraq moved to seize Kuwaiti territory.” Even as late as July 31, when Iraq had amassed 100,000 troops on its border with Kuwait, Assistant Secretary of State John H. Kelly said that we “do all we can to support our friends when they are threatened,” but, he added, the United States has no defense treaty with any gulf country.46 The most confusing message to Saddam Hussein, however, was given by the US Ambassador, April Glaspie. In the famous conversation between the two on July 25, the US Ambassador seemed to express a sense of indifference on the part of the US toward the way Hussein

The dual containment policy in the 1980s 51 would settle his problem with Kuwait. In response to Hussein’s comment that Kuwait is waging an “economic war” against Iraq and that Iraq needed higher oil prices, the Ambassador said that “I know you need funds. We understand that and our opinion is that you should have the opportunity to rebuild your country. But we have no opinion on the Arab–Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait.”47 It was after these contradictory messages that Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait and the US waged a ferocious war against Iraq, a war which, according to many observers, took Iraqi society back to the pre-industrial era. US messages to Saddam Hussein prior to his invasion of Kuwait were so contradictory and confusing that in a Congressional hearing in which April Glaspie appeared, Lee Hamilton, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Middle East subcommittee, said that they “confused me, confused this subcommittee … and it is not unreasonable to think it might have confused Saddam Hussein as well.”48 But, given the US policy of dual containment, the contradictory and confusing messages given to Iraq make perfect sense. These messages led Saddam Hussein to believe that he could invade Kuwait with impunity, as in the case of invading Iran. This was, however, a miscalculation on his part. Times had changed. Iran had been “contained.” It was now Iraq’s turn to be “contained.” Saddam Hussein simply did not read the policy of dual containment correctly. Before ending this chapter it should be made clear why, even though Iraq was contained after the first invasion of Iraq, Saddam Hussein was not removed from power by the US. At the end of the war, and in the aftermath of the Kurdish and Shia Muslim uprisings, the US decided not to completely destroy the Iraqi military forces and to allow Saddam Hussein to remain in power temporarily. The US government was as usual reluctant to state publicly the reasons behind this decision, a decision which ultimately resulted in a great human tragedy once Saddam Hussein turned his forces loose against the Kurds and the Shia population. However, the Saudis had no such reluctance. As early as November of 1990, some Saudi officials stated that “in the event of the war, Iraq’s military capability should not be obliterated because Baghdad was the strongest Arab deterrent to Iran and Israel.”49 “However,” they added, “they wanted President Hussein removed from power and Iraq’s ability to threaten its Arab neighbors destroyed.”50 In this delicate balancing act, where the military power of Iraq had to be destroyed and simultaneously preserved in such a way that no one in the region would threaten the rule of the Al Saud family or Israel, the US decided to allow Saddam Hussein to stay in power just long enough to put down the uprisings of the Kurds and the Shia Muslims. After this was accomplished, the US once again resorted to a massive campaign to remove Saddam Hussein and replace him with a strongman of its choice, one who was also acceptable to the Saudi regime. This rationale for the US allowing Saddam Hussein to stay is well known by now but is explained by the present author in his 1991 essay on US foreign policy in the Persian Gulf. 51

4

Israel and the dual containment policy

In the decade following the 1956 Suez War Israel adopted the policy of “alliance of the periphery.”1 The basic concept was to develop close relations with non-Arab countries in the region, such as Iran and Turkey, to offset Arab nationalism and anti-colonialism. In this scheme the Shah of Iran, with his grandiose vision of Iran and the Aryan race, was seen by Israel as the perfect partner. A symbiotic relationship therefore developed between the Shah and Israel similar to that which existed between the Shah and the US. This relationship included economic deals between the two countries, such as oil imports from Iran to Israel and the Shah’s financing of an oil pipeline from Eilat to the port of Ashkelon. It also involved Israel assisting the Shah with intelligence services and internal security forces to put down dissent, for example training the Shah’s secret police. Furthermore, the relationship included military cooperation, such as helping the Shah’s development of missile technology and establishing a partnership with the Shah to counter Arab countries, particularly Iraq. More specifically, the flow of Iranian oil to Israel, which started in 1950, continued throughout the reign of the Shah. By the end of this reign, according to different estimates, between 50 to 70 percent of Israel’s oil consumption was shipped from Iran to the Israeli pipeline terminal at Eilat.2 Israel, in turn, exported goods to Iran. The Washington Post of December 30, 1978 estimated that in that year Israel was exporting goods worth $120 million to Iran. But Iranian oil did not just purchase goods. It also bought military hardware. At times oil was directly exchanged for arms; sometimes the deals, amounting to billions of dollars, were made by the same individuals who would later be involved in the so-called IranContra affair.3 According to Jonathan Marshall, the “Iranian arms market was worth at least $500 million a year to Israel” in the last years of the Shah’s reign (Marshall et al. 1987: 169). In addition to economic relations, Israel and the Shah also managed a very close political relationship, one that was contrary to the sentiment of the majority of Iranians, who did not view Israel favorably. This relationship included cooperation between the Shah’s intelligence service, SAVAK, and Israel’s Mossad. The notorious SAVAK was created in the spring of 1957 with the help of US and British intelligence. In September 1957 the head of SAVAK, General Taimur Bakhtiar, established relations with Mossad which continued throughout the rule

Israel and the dual containment policy 53 of the Shah. Given the role of SAVAK in putting down internal dissent, Israel, as well as the US, was viewed by many Iranians as the Shah’s partner in the massive repression of the people of Iran and the crimes committed against them, including the imprisonment of thousands of political prisoners, their torture and execution, as well as contributing to the general atmosphere of fear prevailing in the country. Indeed, the role of Israel in training the Shah’s secret police became an important issue in the revolution of 1979. Just before the overthrow of the Shah, the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts reported on January 25, 1979 that some of Khomeini’s advisors had stated that there would be no relations between Iran and Israel because, among other things, “Israel trained the personnel of SAVAK, the secret police.” Mossad, however, did more than help the Shah to stifle opposition to his rule. It also assisted the Shah in cultivating anti-Arab, and particularly anti-Palestinian policies. In particular, Israel and its secret service were instrumental in trying to destabilize Iraq with the help of the Shah, especially by using the Kurds as an instrument of destabilization. Thus, for many years, especially in the 1974–5 Kurdish uprising in Iraq, the Shah funneled arms, including those provided by Israel, to the Kurds, and offered Iraqi Kurds sanctuary in Iran. In 1975, however, the Shah suddenly and unexpectedly signed the Algiers Agreement with Saddam Hussein, an accord whereby the Shah abandoned the Kurds in exchange for Iraq redefining the Iran–Iraq boundary along the Shatt al-Arab waterway. Israel was apparently surprised and angered by the Algiers Agreement. On April 7, 1975 Newsweek wrote that Israel was upset that the US knew in advance, but did not tell them, about the Shah’s impending deal with Iraq to stop supporting the Kurds. The article then added: For five years, Israel had supplied arms and military advisers to the Kurds in a three-way deal with the U.S. and Iran. The Shah at that time was backing the Kurds, but U.S. arms shipments to Iran were not big enough to let him divert weapons for the rebels. So American arms for the Kurds were lumped into consignments to Israel and then shipped on from there. The Israelis learned of the Shah’s change of heart from the monarch himself—several days after it had been known in Washington. For the most part, however, the anti-Arab policies of Israel and the Shah were pursued in tandem, and this resulted in massive purchase of arms by the Shah from Israel, as well as Israeli assistance to the Shah in developing missile technology. On April 1, 1986 The New York Times reported that before “the fall of the Shah in 1979, Israel was involved in a multibillion-dollar project to modify advanced, surface-to-surface missiles for sale to Iran, according to documents said to have been left in Teheran by Israeli diplomats.” The report also stated that the “documents reveal that the Israelis told the Iranians that the missiles could be fitted with nuclear warheads, although this possibility was not pursued.” “The Israeli–Iranian project,” according to the report, “code-named ‘Flower,’ was one of six oil-forarms contracts signed in April 1977 in Teheran by Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlevi

54 The United States and Iran and Shimon Peres, then the Israeli Defense Minister.” The operation was kept secret from the US, but a former general under the Shah, according to the report, confirmed it and said that although “the Israelis never explicitly said that they had a nuclear ability or that they were willing to turn over such a capability to Iran, it was implied in the discussions.” It therefore appears that in pursuing its “alliance of the periphery” policy Israel was even entertaining the possibility of providing missiles with nuclear capability to the Shah. In sum, Israel’s relations with the Shah were in many ways similar to the US’s relations with the monarch. But there were some differences. One was that Israel’s policy toward Iran, as well as other non-Arab countries in the region, was mostly based on the principle that “an enemy of my enemy is my friend.” Israeli leaders were fully aware of the animosity of many Iranians and the fact that Israel’s relationship was with the Shah and not with the people of Iran. They also knew perfectly well that the Shah had no particular love for the Israelis and his interest in Israel was mostly tactical, based on a symbiotic relationship. Indeed, at the end, when the Shah’s regime was about to collapse, The Washington Post of December 30, 1978 reported: “What some Israelis fear most—and see as an imminent possibility—is that the shah may cast aside his tentative ties to Israel in a last-ditch effort to appease the opposition and that Israel would be left in the cold even if the shah managed to retain his throne.” This, indeed, happened. In a desperate move before his overthrow the Shah tried to save his throne by promising to stop giving oil to Israel. On January 4, 1979 The New York Times reported that Shahpur Bakhtiar, the Shah’s last Prime Minister, announced in a news conference that his “new government will no longer sell oil to Israel and South Africa, a move that had been demanded by exiled religious leader Ayatollah Khomeini and other Moslem religious figures.” Another, and perhaps more important difference was that while the relationship between the Shah and the US was relatively open, the Shah tried very hard to keep his relations with Israel a secret, given the general distaste of many Iranians for Israel. Reports of Israel’s relations with the Shah are often filled with accounts of numerous Israeli officials arriving in Tehran past midnight in some remote corner of the airport, sometimes in disguise.4 Indeed, relations between the Shah and Israel were so secretive that even though the Shah officially recognized Israel in 1950, there was no Israeli embassy in Iran. Israel had just a mission in Iran and even that had no sign identifying it as such. Yet despite all the attempts at secrecy, the relationship between the Shah and Israel was commonly known and resented by many Iranians; occasionally, when a few dared to do so, there were expressions of anti-Israeli sentiments, such as burning effigies of Israeli officials or attacking the office of the Israeli airline El Al.

The Revolution of 1979: when the party is over As in the case of the US, the Revolution of 1979 ended the symbiotic relationship between Israel and the Shah, whereby Israel helped to protect the Shah by training

Israel and the dual containment policy 55 his secret police and providing intelligence in exchange for oil and the Shah’s commitment to anti-Arab policies. With the overthrow of the Shah, Israel, like the US, “lost Iran.” As indicated earlier, one of the main demands of the opposition groups to the Shah was for an end to Iran’s relations with Israel and South Africa. On January 2, 1979 The Washington Post reported that “Khomeini stressed that once the shah fell Iran would cease selling oil to South Africa, because of its apartheid policy, and to Israel, which he charged with training agents of SAVAK, the secret police, and ‘participating in torturing our militants.’” The Shah did fall and oil shipment to Israel and South Africa stopped. Also, Iran’s military and intelligence relations with Israel and South Africa came to an end. With the break in diplomatic relations and the expulsion of the Israelis from Iran, the new government of Iran recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization and established diplomatic relations with it. On February 19, 1979 The Washington Post reported the arrival of an “overjoyed Yasser Arafat” in Iran and his “meetings with leaders of Iran’s revolution.” The report stated: “In a triumphant gesture today, Arafat visited the building that housed the Israeli mission in Tehran and claimed it as the local office of the Palestine Liberation Organization.” This was, of course, the same building that a week earlier had been “ransacked by antishah revolutionaries.” The report also mentioned that Arafat called Iran his “second home” and hailed the “common goals of Iranians and Palestinians.” Arafat, the report went on to say, “told a crowd of some 2,000 Iranians that ‘the road to Palestine now leads through Iran.’” This new reality was hard for Israel to accept, particularly after 29 years of close relations with the Shah of Iran. But Israel did not stand still. Even before the Revolution, the Israelis, with their vast network of intelligence services in Iran, knew that the Shah’s reign was over. On September 26, 1980 the Christian Science Monitor reported that in “June 1978 the Israeli Ambassador in Tehran, Uri Lubrani, warned that the Shah’s days appeared to be numbered.”5 With this knowledge, Israel started a massive campaign of encouraging Iranian Jews to leave Iran for Israel. On February 7, 1979 the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts reported that the “number of immigrants from Iran since the disturbances began there in August 1978 has reached 1,500.” The report also stated that the immigrants are offered various economic incentives, including “easy-term loans and to free [from duty] the many carpets the immigrants are bringing with them.” According to The Washington Post of May 10, 1979 the number of Iranian Jews leaving Iran before the February Revolution was actually more than 12,000. The campaign to get the Iranian Jews to Israel occurred despite the fact that neither before nor after the Revolution was there any visible sign of danger to the Jewish community in Iran. Actually, even prior to the departure of the Shah the Islamists had promised not only safety to the Jewish population of Iran, but even their participation in the new government. On January 25, 1979 the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts stated that the political adviser of the Shi’i Iranian leader, Ayatollah Khomeyni, said this evening that contacts are being made with leaders of the Jewish community in

56 The United States and Iran Iran in order to incorporate them in the Moslem Cabinet which is soon to be set up by the Ayatollah. … According to him, the Jewish community should not fear Khomeyni’s return. The Jews are our brothers and will remain our brothers, the adviser said, who is regarded as the probable foreign and information minister in the cabinet to be set up by the Shi’i leader. All such declarations, however, before and after the Revolution, did not hamper Israel’s campaign. The campaign became even more intense after the Revolution, when a notoriously corrupt Iranian tycoon, Habib Elghanian, who had used his close contact with the Shah and Israelis to accumulate vast sums of money, was arrested and executed in a wave of mass executions. Following his execution, on May 10, 1979 The Washington Post reported that the “Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin denounced the execution … [and] urged the world not to remain silent following ‘the executions of this murderous regime.’” According to the report, Begin said that “Elghanian ‘was a good Zionist and one who helped Israel.’” Similarly, on May 13, 1979 an “abstract” in The New York Times stated that “World Zionist Organization chmn Aryeh Dulzin says execution of Habib Elghanian, Jewish community leader in Iran, by Islamic revolutionaries has created ‘very dangerous situation’ and aroused alarm among Jews everywhere. Says Israel will take action to protect 65, 000 Jews in Iran.” The scare tactics and propaganda alleging the dangers facing the Iranian Jewish population was the first of many campaigns that Israel would launch to bring down the new Iranian government and restore the old order. But before looking at other campaigns, the role of Israel in the Iran–Iraq war should be examined.

Israel, the Iran–Iraq war, and the Iran-Contra affair As argued in Chapter 1, the US appears to have initiated the Iran–Iraq war by giving Saddam Hussein the green light to invade Iran. What role, if any, Israel played in this initial invasion is hard to tell. But once the war was underway, Israel followed the same US policy of dual containment. Indeed, as will be seen shortly, one of the associates of Yitzhak Shamir who became a powerful member of the Clinton Administration took credit for coining the phrase “dual containment.” It was this policy that led to Israel selling arms to Iran during the Iran–Iraq war, and, subsequently, getting the US involved in the so-called Iran-Contra scandal, as discussed below. But before dealing with the specifics, it is worth noting that a few Israeli writers have already alluded to Israel’s policy of dual containment of Iran and Iraq without using the phrase. Samuel Segev (1988: 21), for example, writes: From Israel’s point of view there was little difference between Khomeini’s regime in Iran and Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. They were both extreme and hostile governments. The best result in Israel’s eyes, therefore, was a stalemate that would seriously weaken both countries for a long time. If one side were to win, however, the Israeli defense establishment preferred it be Iran.

Israel and the dual containment policy 57 Elsewhere, he states: American and Israeli evaluations of Iran were identical on some points, although different on others. One basic conflict of interest existed between the US and Israel. The former wanted the war to end, but in a way that would not topple the Baghdad regime or destabilize the Arab oil sheikhdoms. Israel, on the other hand, preferred that the war continue to erode the ability of both Iran and Iraq to take part in any further military adventures beyond their mutual borders. It was for this reason that Israel saw no contradiction between giving Iran limited aid, so long as it did not change the balance of power with Iraq. (Segev 1988: 140) Such observations have been made by other Israeli writers as well. The historian Shlaim (2000: 441) writes with regard to the Iran–Iraq war: Ideally, the Israelis would have liked both sides to lose this war. The secondbest scenario was for Iran and Iraq to demolish one another in a long, drawnout war of attrition. The supply of arms to Iran, which had been under a strict American embargo since the revolution, was one way of fueling the war and sustaining the stalemate. As long as Iraq remained bogged down in this conflict, it could not join forces with Syria or Jordan to form an eastern front against Israel. The above analysis by Israeli writers captures the essence of Israel’s policy during the Iran–Iraq war: Israel, like the US, wished to prolong the war and let the two countries destroy one another. However, the US and Israeli attitude toward the Iran–Iraq war differed in one respect. The US wished to see Iran contained first. Israel wanted the opposite. The Israeli preference was clear even at the very beginning of the Iran–Iraq war. On September 28, 1980 The New York Times reported that “Israel is concerned that Iraq is emerging from its war with Iran as the dominant military power in the Persian Gulf and the most dangerous Arab threat to Israel’s existence, according to Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir.” “The Iraqi leaders have great ambitions,” the report quoted Shamir as saying, their “ambition is to dominate all the Middle East. Saddam Hussein dreams to be the successor of Nasser. So far he has been going deliberately and successfully in this direction.”6 A day later, i.e. on September 29, 1980, AP quoted Shamir as saying that both Iran and Iraq are “ruled by extremist, irresponsible and trigger-happy regimes.” The report also stated that on the previous day Israeli Deputy Defense Minister Mordechai Zippori had suggested that “Israel supply arms to Iran provided Tehran abandoned its hostile policy toward Israel.” This appears to be one of the first indications that Israel intended to contain Iraq first by selling arms to Iran.7 One day after the above report appeared, i.e. on September 30, 1980, the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts also mentioned that the Israeli Knesset foreign affairs and security committee discussed the Iran–Iraq war and, according to various sources, Deputy Minister of Defense Zippori “said that Israel could help

58 The United States and Iran Iran with weapons if the latter were to change its policy toward us.” On October 1, 1980 AP reported that Moshe Dayan, the former Israeli Defense Minister, “does not believe Iran can win its war against Iraq without American help.” A few days later, on October 18, 1980, AP stated that Israel was “rooting for Iran against Iraq in the Persian Gulf war” because Iraq “is a far more immediate enemy of Israel than Iran is.” It therefore appears that as soon as the Iran–Iraq war started, Israel saw the opportunity to contain Iraq, the “immediate enemy,” by first helping Iran.8 Arms were shipped to Iran from Israel as early as the first few days of October 1980. An AP report of October 9, 1980 stated that “Israeli leaders have offered Iran military aid and warned Jordan against supporting the Iraqis.” A few days later, on October 25, 1980, AP reported that “Israel has been sending war-torn Iran spare parts for its U.S.-supplied F-4 combat aircraft, with the knowledge of the Carter administration.” “The administration,” the report went on, “has known for at least two weeks that the spare parts have been moving to Iran via the Netherlands … ” The next day AP reported that Vice President Mondale had “said he did not know whether Israel was sending U.S. equipment to Iran” and that he had “ruled out providing Iran with U.S. military equipment, at least until the American hostages are released.” Mondale’s statement, which once again linked the hostage issue with the war, was part of the policy of denying any role that the US was playing in the policy of dual containment of Iran and Iraq. Israel, too, tried to deny any such role. According to the same AP report of October 25, 1980 the Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman said the news of arms sales is “totally unfounded.” Even the Deputy Defense Minister, Mordecai Zippori, who had earlier openly advocated selling arms to Iran, had “no comment” to make when asked about such a sale, according to the report. But the cat was already out of the bag and it was hard to deny the facts. Moreover, there were subsequent reports of arms sales to Iran by Israel. For example, on November 3, 1980 Newsweek reported that “Israel is secretly selling ammunition to Iran for use in the Persian Gulf war … and Israeli sales include mortar and artillery shells and machine-gun bullets. Most of the trade is taking place in Holland, but no estimates of the amounts are available.” Israel selling arms to Iran while the US was helping Iraq eventually led to the Iran-Contra scandal. Since much has been written about the affair there is no need to discuss the details here. The affair is usually presented as an aberration, whereby in 1985 with the help of the Israeli government some Israeli arms dealers and agents—with previous dealings with the Shah—approached the US government to send arms to Iran in exchange for Iran helping to release US hostages held by Hezbollah in Lebanon. In the process, it was hoped, some inroads in Iran might also be made. The initial deal, as the usual account of the scandal goes, eventually turned into diversion of some of the profits from the arms deal to Nicaraguan counter-revolutionaries (Contras) in order to overthrow the Sandinista government. On the Israeli side, the host of players in the scandal included Prime Minister Shimon Peres and Israeli arms dealers and agents, such as “David Kimche, a former director-general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry; Al Schwimmer, the American-born founder of Israel Aircraft Industries; and Yaacov Nimrodi, a former

Israel and the dual containment policy 59 Israeli senior intelligence official who built a fortune selling arms to the Shah” and Amiram Nir, an advisor to the Israeli Prime Minister (The New York Times, November 27, 1988). On the US side, the main characters included Robert McFarlane, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Caspar Weinberger, the Secretary of Defense; William Casey, Director of Central Intelligence; Oliver North, the National Security Council aide; John M. Poindexter, replacing Robert McFarlane as the National Security Advisor; and President Ronald Reagan himself. Other individuals involved included the Iranian-born Manucher Ghorbanifar, a shadowy character suspected by the CIA of being an Israeli agent, and his friend Michael Ledeen, a part-time aide to McFarlane. With regard to the last two individuals, the Christian Science Monitor of March 4, 1987 wrote: “According to two internal NSC computer memos cited in the recent Tower Commission report, the officials suspected that Iranian middleman Manucher Ghorbanifar and NSC consultant Michael Ledeen were secretly cooperating in a ‘financial arrangement’ unknown to the Israeli, American, or Iranian governments.”9 On August 27, 2004, in the midst of an investigation of leaks of information from a Pentagon official to Israel, United Press International (UPI) reported that in the 1980s Ledeen’s security clearances had been downgraded from “Top Secret-SCI [sensitive compartmented information] to Secret.” This came, according to the report, after an earlier boss of Ledeen’s, “Noel Koch, the Principal Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, had urged the FBI to begin a probe of Ledeen, then a consultant on terrorism, for passing classified materials to a foreign country, believed to be Israel.” The report stated that according to Stephen Green, a former CIA counter-terrorism chief, Ledeen was considered by the CIA to be “an agent of influence of a foreign government: Israel.” 10 When read out of historical context, the Iran-Contra affair appears to be an isolated incident or aberration. The aberration, which at times verges on the theater of the absurd, seems to have been brought about by a host of bumbling characters: politicians with little or no knowledge of Iran, incompetent bureaucrats, opportunists who mixed ideology with money-making, merchants of death, actual or would-be spies, habitual liars, etc.11 But once put in a historical context, the IranContra affair would not appear as an aberration at all. The affair was the logical outcome of the dual containment policy pursued for a long time by the US and Israel. Indeed, as newspapers began to dig up the story of the Iran-Contra scandal in the late 1980s, it came to light that long before this affair the US knew about and approved the Israeli sales of arms to Iran. For example, The Washington Post reported on November 29, 1986 that in “1981, then-Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. gave permission for Israel to ship U.S.-made military spare parts and fighter plane tires to Iran.” The report went on to say that the “first hint of the Israeli proposal in 1981 came in late 1980 when Reagan campaign’s foreign policy adviser, [Richard] Allen was approached by Morris Amitay, an official with the American Israel Political Action Committee, who asked how the incoming administration would view Israel’s shipment to Iran of wheel and brake assemblies for F4 fighter planes.”12 The report also added that in “November 1981, then-Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon came to Washington and proposed the

60 The United States and Iran Iranian arms shipments to Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger.” But, since “Weinberger put up a red light,” Sharon “then proposed it to Haig, who then had McFarlane handle the matter. The shipments were subsequently made.” Even though Haig tried to deny this, the report stated, Sharon himself had confirmed the report in a May 1982 interview with The Washington Post, saying that the “United States was informed in detail in advance of the arms shipment and offered no objection.” AP also reported on October 26, 1986 that in an interview Sharon “insisted that the United States gave Israel its approval to sell military hardware to Iran in 1982.” It should be emphasized that Israel had no love for Iran and these arms sales were part of the dual containment policy. At the same time that they were dealing with the Iranians, or persuading the US to do so, the Israelis were trying to establish some sort of relation with Saddam Hussein. On September 26, 2002 the Chicago Sun-Times reported on the US policy of exporting “disease-producing and poisonous materials” to Iraq in the mid to late 1980s and then referred to the “sworn court statement by Howard Teicher on Jan. 31, 1995.” According to this report, “Teicher, a National Security Council aide who accompanied Rumsfeld to Baghdad, said Rumsfeld relayed Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir’s offer to help Iraq in its war.” The report stated that “Aziz refused even to accept the Israeli’s letter to [Saddam] Hussein offering assistance,” according to Teicher, “because Aziz told us that he would be executed on the spot.”13 But even if Saddam’s regime was opposed to receiving assistance from the Israelis, at times it played the Israeli game and went along. For example, on December 30, 2002, The Washington Post reported on the US build-up of Saddam’s chemical industry in the 1980s and in particular the role that Nizar Hamdoon, the flamboyant Iraqi chargé d’affaires in Washington, played in this build-up. The report quotes “Geoffrey Kemp, a Middle East specialist in the Reagan White House,” as saying that Hamdoon, who “was hosting suave dinner parties at his residence, which he parlayed into a formidable lobbying effort,” was “particularly effective with the American Jewish community.” According to Kemp, One of Hamdoon’s favorite props was a green Islamic scarf allegedly found on the body of an Iranian soldier. The scarf was decorated with a map of the Middle East showing a series of arrows pointing toward Jerusalem. Hamdoon used to “parade the scarf” to conferences and congressional hearings as proof that an Iranian victory over Iraq would result in “Israel becoming a victim along with the Arabs.” Thus, even though Israel was selling arms to Iran, she and her allies in the US were simultaneously trying to assist Saddam; and while Saddam might not have accepted direct assistance from Israel, he seems to have flirted with the Israelis as well. In sum, for all practical purposes, Israel pursued the same policy as the US with regard to the Iran–Iraq war in the 1980s. They both tried to prolong it, hoping that in a protracted war the two countries would demolish one another.14 Yet there was

Israel and the dual containment policy 61 a difference between the Israeli and the American positions. For the most part, Israel wished to destroy Iraq first and Iran second. The US policy makers in general had the reverse in mind. Israel finally managed, in the case of the IranContra affair, to get some US officials to go along, at least partially, with this plan. The result was that the US at some point was selling arms to both sides in the Iran–Iraq war. The infamous Iran-Contra scandal was, therefore, nothing but the manifestation of the dual containment policy that both Israel and the US were following, a cynical and atrocious policy that cost the lives of perhaps as many as a million people and, for decades to come, destroyed the economy of both Iran and Iraq. With the conclusion of the war the dual containment policies of Israel and the US became more alike. Both countries started to concentrate on containing Iraq, given that Iran militarily was out of action. As pointed out in the previous chapter, this process began with an intense propaganda campaign against Iraq. In this campaign some old news, such as Iraq’s development of chemical and biological weapons or missile technology, occupied the center stage. Since the issue of targeting Iraq is not the primary focus of this book, it is not dealt with here and the reader is referred to the brief account provided in the previous chapter. The following, however, is worth noting. On July 21, 1990, after starting a campaign against Saddam, The Independent of London reported that “the Israeli Defence Minister, Moshe Arens, made an unexpected visit to Washington yesterday, prompting Israeli military specialists to suggest that Israel and the United States were holding emergency consultations over the verbal conflict between Iraq and Kuwait.” According to the report, Arens met “the US Defence Secretary, Richard Cheney, for the discussion of unspecified ‘strategic matters.’” But the report added that it was “difficult to see what ‘strategic matters’” was, except for the “latest tension in the Gulf.” The report also stated that “Israel’s leading defence writer, Ze’ev Schiff, of the daily paper Ha’aretz, said Mr Arens may have been asked to join talks on potential US action should hostilities break out between the two Gulf neighbors. Mr Schiff, who is often privy to thinking at the top of the Israeli defence establishment, said an Iraqi–Kuwaiti conflict could involve the US indirectly in a massive re-supply effort to Kuwait, its long-time ally.” It should be noted that all such talks concerning conflict in Kuwait and Israel’s role in the “strategic matter” occur even prior to April Glaspie’s infamous meeting with Saddam on July 25, when she told him “we have no opinion on the Arab–Arab conflicts” (The Washington Post, September 13, 1990). Moshe Arens and his colleagues in the US, of course, wasted no time demonizing Saddam one last time before Iraq was invaded. On July 24, 1990, a few days after his arrival in the US, the COURIER-MAIL reported in a short article entitled “Israel warns US on Iraqi threat” that: Israel was very concerned about Iraqi threats, the Israeli Defence Minister, Mr Arens, reportedly told American Jewish leaders yesterday. He said the possibility of war was greater now than in the recent past. Seymour Reich,

62 The United States and Iran chairman of the Conference of Presidents of American Jewish Organisations, quoted Mr Arens as saying that “glasnost has not come to the Middle East”. Mr Arens told the United States Defence Secretary, Mr Cheney, that the danger of war was higher now than in recent years. Mr Reich also quoted the Defence Minister as expressing to Mr Cheney “strong concern about Iraqi President Saddam Hussein whom he described as another Hitler”. Mr Hussein has repeatedly threatened to destroy Israel with chemical weapons if Israel attacks an Arab country. Mr Reich said Mr Arens also voiced concern about the military relationship between Iraq and Jordan.15 The war that Israel wished for would be underway soon, and Saddam’s demise was just a matter of time.

A different game for Iran: Martin Indyk and the Washington Institute After the devastation of Iran and Iraq in the eight-year war, and further devastation of Iraq in the 1991 US war, Israel turned its attention to containing Iran. Since a military confrontation between the US and Iran was not on the horizon, Israel chose a different game to advance its Iran policy, the game of sanctioning Iran. As stated in the previous chapters, the US used various sanctions to contain Iran after the 1979 Revolution and, more particularly, during the Iran– Iraq war. In the 1990s Israel concentrated mostly on strengthening these unilateral US sanctions, hoping to derail the economy of Iran and thus weaken the Iranian government. The intensification of the US sanctions against Iran will be dealt with in the next chapter. Here, however, a few words are in order about the role of some major players, allied with Israel, in intensifying the US sanctions policy. Strengthening US sanctions policies became easier for Israel when Martin Indyk, an individual well connected to Israel, was put at the helm of formulating Middle East policy in the Clinton Administration. While in Israel, Indyk, who was raised and educated in Australia, was the media and communication advisor to Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir.16 After his arrival in the US, Indyk became a “staffer at the American–Israel Public Affairs Committee (Aipac)” (The Jerusalem Post, January 29, 1993). More will be said of AIPAC itself and its Iran policy later. At this point, however, Martin Indyk’s relation to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy is worth examining. According to The Washington Post of February 2, 1995, when in Australia in 1978, Indyk became “deputy director of current intelligence for the Middle East.” But he “quit his Australian intelligence job, he has said, because he was frustrated by bureaucratic battles and by the lack of interest in the only region he cared about: the Middle East.” In 1982, the report goes on to say, Indyk was asked “by a friend to set up a research department for the powerful pro-Israeli Public Affairs Committee.” According to the same report:

Israel and the dual containment policy 63 Indyk became frustrated anew: His research was not taken seriously because AIPAC was seen as an Israeli propaganda organ. At the same time, he felt that the traditional think tanks in Washington were too pro-Arab. With the backing of an AIPAC board member and $100,000 in contributions, largely from the Jewish community, he became executive director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy in early 1985 … This was never going to be just another academic study group. “We were very driven with this sense that we were not just around spinning ideas,” an early participant said. It was clear “that we were really trying to influence policy. We focused narrowly on the Washington policymaking community, and we were going to try to influence them and to educate them. We felt that the [US] policy at that time was based on false assumptions and that we should try to change that” to a more pro-Israel view, the participant said. Indyk and his associates were quite successful in “educating” the policy makers in Washington. According to the above report, Indyk briefed the likes of Michael S. Dukakis, George H. W. Bush, and Bill Clinton. Indeed, the report goes on to say, Indyk briefed presidential candidate Clinton many times and wrote a “policy paper for the transition team.” Subsequently, in mid-December 1992 Clinton’s national security advisor Anthony Lake offered the job of senior director for Middle East matters at the National Security Council to Indyk, a move which The Jerusalem Post of January 29, 1993 said had made Israeli officials “delighted.” But according to The Washington Post of February 2, 1995 “there was one hitch” with the appointment of Indyk: he was not a US citizen. This, however, was solved by making him a US citizen in January 1993, a “little more than a week before Clinton appointed him to the NSC job.” As the report points out, Indyk’s ascent to power was “meteoric.” He went on to become Special Assistant to the President and advised Clinton on Middle East matters, including Iran. Subsequently, in 1995, Secretary of State Warren Christopher appointed Martin Indyk Ambassador to Israel, a move which baffled even some reporters because it clearly represented a conflict of interest, as pointed out in the above report. But in 1997 Indyk was back in the US serving as the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs at the US Department of State. He was reappointed as Ambassador to Israel in January 2000 and served in that position until September 2000. In late September that year, Indyk was accused by the FBI of mishandling classified material. His security clearances were suspended and he was ordered to remain in Washington.17 A day later, however, Israel and its lobby groups in the US raised the usual outcry of “anti-Semitism,” and shortly afterwards Indyk was back at his job.18 In between these activities, Indyk and his colleagues at the Washington Institute and AIPAC managed to gain almost complete control of formulating US policy toward Iran. This was true not only for the Clinton Administration, but, as we shall see later on, for the George W. Bush Administration as well. The major difference is that under the former the policy makers, such as Indyk, were associated mostly

64 The United States and Iran with the Israeli Labor Party. Under the latter, however, the architects of the US policy, such as Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle, while still associated with the Washington Institute and the Israeli lobby in general, represented the Likud wing of the Israeli government. Indyk’s inaugural address as national security advisor was delivered on May 18, 1993 at the Washington Institute.19 Interestingly, it makes no distinction between the US interest and that of Israel. Almost all references to “our” or “American interest” in the speech could easily be read as the interest of Israel. In the speech Indyk stated that “as a result of the Iraq–Iran War and the Gulf War,” we are fortunate to inherit a balance of power in the region and a much reduced level of military capability to threaten our interests. The million-man Iraqi army of seventy divisions is no more. The challenge here is to maintain that situation in the face of determined efforts by both Iran and Iraq to rebuild their arsenals, particularly in the nuclear and ballistic missile fields. It is interesting to note that the two wars—in which the US and Israel played major roles and which left over a million people dead—made Indyk feel “fortunate” because “a balance of power” had been established and the military power of Iraq had disappeared. But how did Indyk propose to “maintain” this “balance of power”? The answer that he gives is imbedded in the policy of “dual containment” of Iraq and Iran, a policy “encapsulating the Clinton administration strategy.” According to Indyk: The Clinton administration’s policy of “dual containment” of Iraq and Iran derives in the first instance from an assessment that the current Iraqi and Iranian regimes are both hostile to American interests in the region. Accordingly, we do not accept the argument that we should continue the old balance of power game, building up one to balance the other. We reject that approach not only because its bankruptcy was demonstrated in Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. We reject it because of a clear-headed assessment of the antagonism that both regimes harbor toward the United States and its allies in the region. And we reject it because we don’t need to rely on one to balance the other. The coalition that fought Saddam remains together, as long as we are able to maintain our military presence in the region, as long as we succeed in restricting the military ambitions of both Iraq and Iran, and as long as we can rely on our regional allies—Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia and the GCC, and Turkey—to preserve a balance of power in our favor in the wider Middle East region, we will have the means to counter both the Iraqi and Iranian regimes. We will not need to depend on one to counter the other. Indyk either did not know the nature of the previous US policy toward Iran and Iraq or, more likely, tried to give the old policy the new name of “dual containment” and take credit for its invention.

Israel and the dual containment policy 65 The old policy did not consist of “building up” Iran or Iraq to balance one another, as Indyk contended. Rather, as has been explained in the previous chapters, the policy consisted of trying to contain both countries by means of a protracted war in which Iran and Iraq would destroy one another. The policy, of course, did not work perfectly, or even consistently, for a number of reasons that have been already explained. For example, the US and Israel did not see eye to eye when it came to the order of containment of Iran and Iraq. Furthermore some policy makers had very little knowledge of the region or were simply inept and incompetent. Indeed, as the Iran-Contra affair showed, at times policy was being made by arms merchants, low-level intelligence agents, and shadowy characters. Nevertheless, since 1979 US policy toward the region had been nothing but that of “dual containment” of Iran and Iraq, and the original architect of this policy was not Indyk but Brzezinski. Thus Indyk’s assertion concerning the novelty of his policy of “dual containment” was incorrect. This is especially true in the case of Iraq. “Containment” of Iraq, Indyk announced, was to be carried out through UN economic sanctions: “the Clinton administration is intent on ensuring, through the UN resolutions and their enforcement and inspection measures, that as long as the Saddam Hussein regime survives, it will not be in a position to threaten its neighbors or to suppress its people with impunity.” This was not a new position. The George H.W. Bush Administration had also tried to contain Iraq through UN-imposed sanctions. This was despite the fact that certain factions in the Israeli lobby close to the Likud, who operated at the lower echelon of the Bush Administration, did not want to have anything to do with the UN and were rooting for an all-out war against Iraq. One such person was Paul Wolfowitz, who acted as the Pentagon’s Under Secretary in the Bush Administration. As The New York Times of March 8, 1992 reported, Wolfowitz drafted in 1992 a document concerning the future of the US political and military mission in the post-cold war era. Among other visions of the US global role, Wolfowitz indicated that “military force, if necessary,” must be used “to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in such countries as North Korea, Iraq.” The report also stated that Wolfowitz’s “document is conspicuously devoid of references to collective action through the United Nations.” This view of a unilateral US action against Iraq was more representative of the hawkish Israeli Likud Party than the Labor Party that Indyk represented. Nevertheless, Indyk’s “containment” of Iraq meant a weak and disarmed Iraq that would not be in any position to oppose Israel. Continued UN sanctions, with or without Saddam, he believed, would achieve this goal. “We will not be satisfied with Saddam’s overthrow before we agree to lift sanctions,” Indyk stated in his May 18, 1993 speech at the Washington Institute. “Rather,” he said, “we will want to be satisfied that any successor government complies fully with all UN resolutions.” Nor was Indyk’s vision of how to “contain” Iran new. He proposed to maintain US unilateral sanctions against Iran to change its “behavior”: “We will pursue this effort of active containment unilaterally, maintaining the counterterrorism sanctions and other measures enacted by previous administrations to encourage a

66 The United States and Iran change in Iranian behavior.” But what “behavior” of Iran made it a pariah, or, to put it differently, what were the “sins” committed by Iran? Indyk put forward a series of reasons why Iran, like Iraq, was misbehaving and needed to be contained: Containing the threat from Iran is a more difficult though no less necessary undertaking. When we assess Iranian intentions and capabilities we see a dangerous combination for Western interests. Iran is engaged in a five-part challenge to the United States and the international community. It is the foremost state sponsor of terrorism and assassination across the globe. Through its support for Hamas and Hezbollah, Iran is doing its best to thwart our efforts to promote peace between Israel, the Palestinians and the Arab states. Through its connections with Sudan, Iran is fishing in troubled waters across the Arab world, actively seeking to subvert friendly governments. Through its active efforts to acquire offensive weapons, Iran is seeking an ability to dominate the Gulf by military means. And, perhaps most disturbing, Iran is seeking a weapons of mass destruction capability including clandestine nuclear weapons capability and ballistic missiles to deliver weapons of mass destruction to the Middle East. To his long list of allegations about the “Iranian regime’s behavior,” Indyk added the “abuse of the human rights of the Iranian people.” The net that Indyk cast to contain Iran was wide and his accusations were murky. For example, why was Iran’s alleged support for Hamas a challenge to the United States and the international community, given that Hamas had been active only against Israel? Why did Iran’s opposition to the Olso peace process make her an outcast, given that Israel would eventually reject the same process? How did Indyk know that Iran was clandestinely developing nuclear weapons, given that to this day the International Atomic Energy Agency has been unable to find any evidence for the development of such weapons? Indyk, with his list of unclear accusations, tried to perpetuate US unilateral sanctions against Iran. But he was hoping for more: imposition of multilateral sanctions. He stated, after discussing the continuation of US sanctions, that “we recognize that success will require multilateral efforts since much of what Iran seeks in order to build up its military power is obtainable elsewhere. In this regard, we will seek to impress upon our allies the necessity for responding to the Iranian threat and the opportunity now presented by Iran’s current circumstances.” The imposition of unilateral sanctions against Iran was made all the more urgent, Indyk contended, because if “we fail in our efforts to modify Iranian behavior, five years from now Iran will be much more capable of posing a real threat to Israel, to the Arab world and to Western interests in the Middle East.” Moreover, Indyk argued: Iran does not yet face the kind of international regime that has been imposed on Iraq. A structural imbalance therefore exists between the measures available to contain Iraq and Iran. To the extent that the international community, as a result, succeeds in containing Iraq but fails to contain Iran, it will have

Israel and the dual containment policy 67 inadvertently allowed the balance of power in the Gulf to have tilted in favor of Iran, with very dangerous consequences. That imbalance therefore argues for a more energetic effort to contain Iran and modify its behavior even as we maintain the sanctions regime against Iraq. Thus what Indyk, and his colleagues at the Washington Institute, wished to achieve was the imposition of multilateral sanctions on Iran, similar to those imposed against Iraq. This way, both Iraq and Iran would be militarily “contained,” that is, disarmed, in favor of Israel. Moreover, it was hoped that multilateral sanctions would wreck the economies of these countries, bring about popular discontent, and cause the overthrow of the Iranian government in favor of the establishment of a US–Israel friendly regime. Even though Indyk’s policy of “dual containment” was not new, his list of alleged misbehaviors of Iran laid the foundation for the development of future US policy toward the country. Some of these alleged misbehaviors were soon dropped. For example, Iran’s “connections with Sudan” and “fishing in troubled waters across the Arab world” disappeared. Iran’s attempt to “dominate the Gulf by military means” was also set aside. Some other Iranian “misbehaviors,” such as Iran’s “abuse of the human rights of the Iranian people,” would resurface only once in a while. However, three other reasons why Iran had to be contained would endure. These were Iran’s support for international terrorism, opposition to the peace process in the Middle East, and pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.

AIPAC and the three “misbehaviors” of Iran Once formulated, these three “misbehaviors” or sins of Iran would be repeated ad nauseam by various Israeli lobby groups in the US in order to maintain and even strengthen US sanctions against Iran. One such group is, of course, AIPAC, which gave rise to the Washington Institute and the promotion of Martin Indyk. AIPAC is usually ranked as one of the most powerful lobbies in the US.20 In 1997 it was ranked by Fortune magazine as the second most powerful lobby after AARP.21 AIPAC’s own website often boasts of its strengths. For example, in 2005, under “Who We Are,” the website read: When the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) began in the 1950s, only one name was associated with the newly formed organization—Si Kenen—founder and Washingtonian. Today, AIPAC has 100,000 members across all 50 states who are at the forefront of the most vexing issues facing Israel today: stopping Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, fighting terrorism and achieving peace. And above all, ensuring that Israel is strong enough to meet these challenges. For these reasons, The New York Times has called AIPAC the most important organization affecting America’s relationship with Israel, while Fortune magazine has consistently ranked AIPAC among America’s most powerful interest groups.

68 The United States and Iran Through more than 2,000 meetings with members of Congress—at home and in Washington—AIPAC activists help pass more than 100 pro-Israel legislative initiatives a year. From procuring nearly $3 billion in aid critical to Israel’s security, to funding joint U.S.–Israeli efforts to build a defense against unconventional weapons, AIPAC members are involved in the most crucial issues facing Israel.22 The above publicity concerning the power of AIPAC is no exaggeration. Using various tactics, AIPAC does usually get what it wants. As Douglas MacArthur, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Affairs, once observed, the Israeli lobby influences or intimidates members of Congress by the use of such tactics as “promises of votes and campaign contributions or threats of opposition.” 23 The power of AIPAC in underwriting Middle East policy, particularly policy toward Iran, has grown tremendously over the years. This is especially true since the Clinton Administration, when the Washington Institute formulated US Middle East policy for the White House and AIPAC assured implementation of these policies through the US Congress. As will be seen in the forthcoming chapters, AIPAC’s hold over US Middle East policy is so strong that even after it came under investigation by the FBI in summer of 2004—for receiving classified material on Iran and passing it to the Israeli government—there was no noticeable change of attitude toward the lobby group in the US. In spring of 2005, still under FBI investigation, AIPAC held its annual meeting and, subsequently, its website read: AIPAC held its largest-ever Policy Conference in Washington, D.C. May 22– 24. Policy Conference brought together more than 4,000 pro-Israel activists from all 50 states. Featured speakers at Policy Conference included Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton (D-NY), and dozens more. The annual gala banquet featured addresses from Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-TN), Senate Democratic Leader Harry Reid (D-NV), Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert (R-IL) and House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-CA). 24 Indeed, under “AIPAC Policy Conference” the website boasted that “1/2 the Senate and 2/3 of the House” attended “the gala banquet of AIPAC in spring 2005.” 25 AIPAC’s subsequent “Policy Conferences” and their effects on the US foreign policy toward Iran, particularly the sanctions regime, are discussed in the following chapters. But, as the above paragraphs show, during both the Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations AIPAC concentrated its efforts on containing Iran as the main power standing in the way of Israel. In this effort, the three sins of Iran formulated by its “think tank,” the Washington Institute, were used ad nauseam. For example, in its tactic of flooding Congressional members with tailor-made email messages in 2000, AIPAC would ask its members to write:

Israel and the dual containment policy 69 Representative and Senators: I am writing to express my opposition to making further unilateral gestures toward Iran before it ends its support for international terrorism, opposition to the peace process and pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. 26 These three sins or “misbehaviors” of Iran were as murky as those first pronounced by Martin Indyk in 1993. For example, given that in 2000 Iran had not yet enriched uranium, it was not at all clear what AIPAC meant by Iran’s “pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.” As Geoffrey Kemp once observed, “weapons of mass destruction” was a vague and catch-all term, which may cover such things as “bombers with a range of more than 600 nautical miles and missiles” (Kemp 1994: 108). Iran’s support for international terrorism apparently meant any support, moral or material, that Iran might provide to those groups who were strongly opposed to the Israeli occupation of Arab lands, such as Hamas and the Islamic Jihad in the Palestinian Territories and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Again, how these groups threatened US interests was unclear. By “opposition to the peace process,” the Israeli lobby meant Iran’s opposition to the Oslo accord. But soon the Israelis themselves would oppose and shelve the accord. Yet the ambiguity and lack of logic of these accusations would bother neither AIPAC nor the US Congress that was under its spell. As will be seen in the next chapters, AIPAC, its affiliate—the Washington Institute—and various other Israeli lobby groups and “think tanks” did underwrite the US policy toward Iran in the next two administrations.

5

The Clinton years and the dual containment policy

Even though through Martin Indyk Israel already had the ears of President Clinton before he took office, some Israelis were not satisfied with the make up of Clinton’s foreign policy team when it was first formed. Chief among their complaints was that the team had a number of people from the days of the Carter Administration, individuals who were not deemed to be “sympathetic” to Israel by Israeli standards. For example, Samuel Berger, appointed as Deputy National Security Advisor, was considered to be “worrisome,” according to an opinion piece in The Jerusalem Post of January 20, 1993, because he had contributed financially to “Americans for Peace Now.” Similarly, according to an article in The Jerusalem Post of December 23, 1992, Israel was concerned that Anthony Lake, National Security Advisor, had been “unsympathetic to Israel during his time under Carter.” This was despite the fact that Lake was the one who “offered Indyk the White House job in mid-December 1992” (The Washington Post, February 2, 1995). But The Jerusalem Post of December 23, 1992 expressed concern about newly appointed Secretary of State Warren Christopher, who was the former Deputy Secretary of State under Carter. It stated: American Jews are concerned about Christopher’s policy toward Israel and the peace process. When his name was first floated as a possibility for secretary of state, there were widespread reports of American Jewish opposition. However, Aipac later publicly issued a statement saying that it had not found “a scintilla of evidence” that Christopher had ever made statements critical of Israel. Yet, the report went on to say, while Christopher is not on record as hostile to Israel, “it would be equally fair to say that he does not have a record of being a pronounced supporter of Israel,” warned one Jewish official. Christopher, he said, “is embedded in that community which has great faith in foreign policy professionals, otherwise known to us as State Department Arabists.” In retrospect, the worries of Israel and its lobby in the US about Christopher were quite unfounded, at least when it came to the US’s Iran policy. Warren

The Clinton years and the dual containment policy 71 Christopher managed to work very closely with Martin Indyk. Indeed, according to The Washington Post of February 2, 1995 it was Christopher who picked Indyk as US Ambassador to Israel because he “wanted someone the Israelis were comfortable with.” Indyk, the report stated, “was highly regarded by Christopher and national security adviser Anthony Lake.” Together with Indyk, Christopher adopted the hostile policy of maintaining and intensifying the sanctions against Iran. In so doing, Christopher’s own background played a role. As Deputy Secretary of State during the Carter Administration and the chief negotiator of the Algiers Accords, Christopher had been the target of scorn and name-calling by some members of the Iranian government. The verbal abuse continued even after Christopher became Secretary of State. For example, AP reported on November 3, 1993 that Iran’s spiritual leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, “ruled out any prospect of talks with the United States” and “branded Secretary of State Warren Christopher as ‘that ugly-faced foreign minister’ in a speech on the eve of the 14th anniversary of the takeover of the U.S. embassy in Tehran.” Apparently, the result of such insults was Christopher developing a bitter feeling toward Iran and the Iranians. As both the proponents and opponents of US sanctions observed, this bitter feeling played a great role in the formulation and implementation of policy toward Iran by Martin Indyk in the early years of the Clinton Administration.1 Christopher openly showed signs of hostility toward Iran from early on and used various negatively tinged adjectives to describe the country. For example, The New York Times of December 2, 1993 reported that in a news conference at the European Community headquarters Christopher stated that “Iran is an outlaw nation resisting the Middle East peace process as well as being involved in terrorist actions in many countries around the world.” These were, of course, among the charges that had been levied against Iran by Martin Indyk and his colleagues at the Washington Institute and AIPAC to tighten sanctions against Iran. Given that Iran was allegedly an “outlaw nation,” Christopher tried to “squeeze Iran’s economy” by breaking her relations with European states, as the above report went on to say. Similarly, when Iran tried to get a loan from the World Bank, Christopher branded Iran as “one of the principal sources of support for terrorist groups around the world,” and accused it “of determination to acquire weapons of mass destruction” (The New York Times, March 31, 1993). In addition, according to the same report, Christopher labeled Iran an “international outlaw” and a “dangerous country” that should not be given a loan by the World Bank, a recommendation that resulted in halting extension of loans to Iran by the World Bank in 1993 (see also The Washington Post, March 31, 1993). Furthermore, in an editorial piece on foreign policy, Christopher referred to Iran and Iraq, along with South Korea, as “rogue states,” a label which became commonly used by politicians and news media when referring to Iran (The New York Times, February 13, 1995). In an interview in Tel Aviv—on the occasion of Conoco’s decision to develop offshore oil and gas fields with Iran—Christopher stated that wherever you look, “you will find the evil hand of Iran in this region”

72 The United States and Iran and argued that the Conoco deal was “inconsistent with the containment policy that we have carried forward” (The New York Times, March 10, 1995). Christopher’s degree of hostility toward Iran was often so intense and his use of language so harsh that reporters were sometimes hard put to explain his behavior. For example, on May 28, 1995 Jim Hoagland wrote in The Washington Post that a “normally laconic, deeply reserved secretary of state has recently lashed out again and again at Iran. … This is a stunning reversal of form for a corporate lawyer who reflexively seeks to dedramatize issues, drain emotion out of conflicts and get lions and lambs to reason together.” The only meaningful answer offered by Hoagland to the question “What’s eating Warren Christopher?” was the past “frustrations Christopher experienced in negotiating fruitlessly to free the US hostages in Tehran as Jimmy Carter’s deputy secretary of state.” Christopher’s accusations and name-callings were, of course, in tune with those of the Israeli government and its lobby groups in the US. Indeed, not only did the Israeli lobby exert a direct influence over President Clinton through Martin Indyk, it also exerted a direct influence over Christopher. As mentioned earlier, Israel and its lobbies were not satisfied with the composition of the Clinton foreign policy team from the very start, including the appointment of Christopher himself. However, once Christopher was in office, they tried to make sure that the rest of the foreign policy team would be subservient to Israel. This is evident, for example, in a meeting reported on January 7, 1993 in The New York Times. According to the report, the meeting was arranged in the office of Senator Joseph Lieberman between Christopher, the chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, the vice president of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, the leading Israeli lobby group, and AIPAC’s political director. The report goes on to state that the purpose of the meeting was to allay the fear of Jewish organizations that some of the recently appointed members of the new administration, who were veterans of the Carter Administration, “might not be inclined to carry out the pro-Israel policies Mr. Clinton espoused during the campaign.” Israel and its lobby groups, as will be seen in the rest of this chapter, managed to get what they wished for. On December 8, 2000, when the administration of George W. Bush was about to take office, The Jerusalem Post complained once again about the make up of the new foreign policy team, claiming that many “Jewish leaders” who were “accustomed to having Clinton’s ear” are now “worried about losing their own clout.” The combination of direct Israeli pressure on Christopher to restructure his team and Christopher’s own personal hostility toward Iran ensured that Indyk could easily implement the “dual containment” policy. The three sins of Iran, i.e. sponsoring terrorism worldwide, opposing Middle East peace efforts, and being involved in the development of weapons of mass destruction, became the rationale for such a policy. On April 1, 1995 The New York Times would write that “Secretary of State Warren Christopher has concluded that the American strategy for isolating Iran is not working and has recommended that the United States ban most trade with the country.” The report added that “Mr. Lake is also said to believe the

The Clinton years and the dual containment policy 73 current strategy needs to be strengthened.” “Nearly two years after it unveiled a policy of ‘dual containment’ to isolate both Iran and Iraq,” the report went on to say, “the Administration still considers Iran an ‘international outlaw’ that sponsors terrorism worldwide, opposes Middle East peace efforts and is involved in a crash program to develop nuclear weapons.”

Sanctions and more sanctions: who is more loyal to Israel and hostile to Iran? The result of coordinated efforts by Israel and the US government was the passage of tighter and tighter sanctions against Iran. The first in the series was the amendment of the Iran–Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act. This act, originally sponsored by Senator John McCain and cosponsored by Senator Alfonse D’Amato, became law in October of 1992. In accordance with the policy of the “dual containment,” as it existed prior to the Clinton Administration, the act was to extend to Iran the same licensing prohibition that applied to Iraq under the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990. In general, the act stated: It shall be the policy of the United States to oppose, and urgently to seek the agreement of other nations to oppose, any transfer to Iran and Iraq of any goods or technology, including dual use goods or technology, whenever that transfer could materially contribute to either country’s acquiring chemical, biological, nuclear, or destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons.2 Further, the act specified sanctions against Iran and Iraq. In particular, it called on the President to “apply sanctions and control with respect to Iran, Iraq, and those nations and persons who assist them in acquiring weapons of mass destruction” (Alikhani 2000: 171). It also called on the President urgently to “seek the agreement of other nations to adopt and institute, at the earliest practicable date, sanctions and controls comparable to those the United States is obligated to apply under this subsection” (ibid., pp. 171–2). In 1993, Senators McCain and Lieberman expanded and toughened numerous aspects of the law. With Martin Indyk and Warren Christopher at the helm of US foreign policy, the tougher sanctions easily became law. But soon a competition ensued between a predominantly Republican Congress and a Democratic Administration as to which was more hostile to Iran and thus loyal to Israel. In this competition Israeli lobby groups such as AIPAC—which, as we saw in the previous chapter, boasts of having half of the Senate and two-thirds of the House at its gala banquets—played a leading role. A case in point is Senator Alfonse D’Amato’s attempt to outbid the Clinton Administration in support for Israel. D’Amato’s usually scandalous symbiotic relationship with various Israel-affiliated groups in the US, including his slim election in 1992 with the help of such organizations as the Council of Jewish Organizations of Borough Park, his subsequent diversion of Federal and State grants to this

74 The United States and Iran organization, the illegal use of these funds, and the subsequent indictment of this organization for various criminal acts, usually filled the pages of newspapers.3 The symbiotic relationship meant that D’Amato would be another conduit for Israel in the US Congress. As the Wall Street Journal reported on June 18, 1996, since his election to the US Senate, D’Amato “had been offering sweeping Iran sanctions bills,” but the bills “languished” in Congress despite the general animosity toward Iran. According to the same report, then “AIPAC recognized that all that was needed was an organized effort to refine the legislation and push it through. The lobby became the locomotive.” The report went on to say that with the Republican takeover of Congress in early1995 and D’Amato becoming the chairman of the Banking Committee “the bill’s fortunes—and AIPAC’s—were about to change.” On January 25, 1995 D’Amato introduced a bill to bar all trade with Iran and to cut off the estimated $3.5 billion a year in oil purchased from Iran by subsidiaries of US companies and sold in third countries (Journal of Commerce, February 22, 1995). In his attempt to get Congress to pass a later version of the bill, D’Amato resorted to his usual tactic of reporting sensational news that was patently false, a series of name-callings and saber-rattling statements, and the testimony of individuals closely associated with Israeli policy. For example, in the Congressional hearing on March 23, 1995 he stated: “Iran has placed chemical weapons on disputed islands in the Strait of Hormuz.”4 The statement was blatantly false. But in order to please the pro-Israeli crowd D’Amato would come up with even more sensational news that was complete fabrication. In the same hearing D’Amato referred to Iran’s “twisted criminal acts of terrorism” and stated that Iranians “are now, like with the case of the placement of Hawk missiles a few weeks ago, issuing a direct challenge to the West in the waterway so vital to the flow of oil: the Persian Gulf.” To give urgency to such frightening news, and thus impose more sanctions on Iran, D’Amato then produced the testimony of a star witness estimating the effects of comprehensive United States sanctions on Iran. The witness was Patrick Clawson, an influential member of Israeli lobby groups and the current deputy director for research of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Prior to the second US invasion of Iraq Clawson was a frequent witness in the US Congress when a case against Iraq had to be made. Clawson is also an “expert” when testimony is needed against Iran. His testimonies, however, are often fraught with exaggerations, inaccuracies, and data that cannot be supported by hard evidence. But above all, his statements are often quite bellicose and filled with belligerent expressions such as “Iranian misbehavior,” “inept thuggishness” of Iranian authorities, “Iran as a problematic country,” “aggressive foreign policy behavior” of Iran, “unacceptable Iranian behavior,” “rogue” state, “terrorist” state, etc.5 His accusations and policy recommendations are almost inevitably identical to those formulated by Israel. As D’Amato’s witness, Patrick Clawson repeated the same fabricated news and the same saber-rattling statements. Then, with sleight of hand, Clawson estimated the cost of the new sanction to Iran to be “most probably less than $50 million per year,” or “tens of millions, if not a hundred million or more dollars a year,” or

The Clinton years and the dual containment policy 75 “several tens of millions of dollars each year.”6 Such testimonies usually complete the cycle of Israeli lobby groups carrying forward US sanctions policy: they formulate the law, use surrogates in the US Congress to introduce the law, and then provide “expert” witnesses to ensure the law is passed. With the Republicans, and particularly D’Amato, leading the Israeli lobby, the Clinton Administration tried to take center stage using the pending $1 billion deal between Iran and a European affiliate of Conoco. The result was the executive order of March 15, 1995 which prohibited a US citizen from entering into contracts for the financing of or the overall management or supervision of the development of petroleum resources located in Iran or over which Iran claims jurisdiction.7 The order blocked the pending deal between Conoco and Iran (Journal of Commerce, March 20, 1995). This case was particularly interesting, since on March 14, 1995 The New York Times reported that three “members of the Bronfman family who hold powerful positions on the board of E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Company are expected to vote against a deal by the Conoco subsidiary of Du Pont to develop two large oilfields in Iran, making it unlikely that the project will be approved.” According to the same report, the Bronfmans not only “owned 24.2 percent of Du Pont,” but were “also active in Jewish organizations,” such as “World Jewish Congress and the Anti-Defamation League.” The Clinton policy announcement, therefore, superseded the internal corporate fight. The Israeli lobby groups, however, were not satisfied. On March 20, 1995 the Journal of Commerce reported: “Under new pressure from a threatened boycott of companies doing business with Iran, President Clinton may expand last week’s executive order on oil projects into an embargo covering all U.S. trade with the Islamic state, a government official said.” The report went on to say that the “White House is worried about reported calls for a secondary boycott from Washington’s powerful pro-Israel lobby, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (Aipac). The trade tactic would encourage Jewish Americans and supporters to stop doing business with U.S. companies that deal with Iran.” Such a boycott, the report stated, “could have serious implications for U.S. oil companies, like Exxon Corp., that purchase an estimated $4 billion a year of Iranian crude oil through foreign subsidiaries for refineries in Europe and Japan.” Yet the report quoted Toby Dershowitz, “an Aipac spokeswoman in Washington,” as saying: “We’re exploring with members of Congress other measures with regard to Iran.” Another member of AIPAC, the report stated, “said that ‘secondary sanctions’ are being considered for companies and subsidiaries that trade in military, dual-use or energy products with Iran.” The report also added that even though the Clinton Administration is worried about the impact of secondary economic sanctions on the US corporations, it is “also eager not to get on the wrong side of Aipac, which is seen as a key to both media and political support.” “I don’t know of any politicians who have survived that,” the report quoted a “Washington lobbyist” saying. In addition, the report stated that the Clinton Administration knew that any resistance to a full unilateral embargo could prove futile, since D’Amato had the votes to pass his measure in “both houses easily.” The measure, according to the

76 The United States and Iran Journal of Commerce of March 20, 1995, “proposed by Sen. Alfonse D’Amato, RN.Y., chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, would add to the existing U.S. trade embargo against Iran by prohibiting U.S. companies from buying Iranian crude and reselling it overseas.” The intent of the bill, according to D’Amato, was “to force Iran to end human rights violations and its support of international terrorism,” the report stated. Specifically, D’Amato’s “Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Act of 1995” prohibited US government procurement from any foreign company that engaged in business with Iran and barred the issuance of export licenses to affiliates of foreign firms operating in Iran (Journal of Commerce, March 29, 1995). The act was so irrational that a former Commerce Department official stated: “It’s suicidal. Almost every country you ever heard of is trading with Iran” (ibid.). Still trying to compete with the likes of D’Amato, and yet fearing the reaction of other countries, Clinton announced on April 30, 1995 his plan for a total US trade embargo on Iran. According to The New York Times of May 1, 1995 Clinton’s move was “heavy with political symbolism and appeal because he made the announcement at a dinner of the World Jewish Congress honoring Edgar M. Bronfman, the patriarch of the Seagram’s distilling family and a leading critic of Iran as a threat to the drive for Middle East peace, with the Israeli Foreign Minister, Shimon Peres, sitting across the table.” This “political symbolism” was transformed into the May 6, 1995 executive order 12959, which banned all trade with Iran. President Clinton’s rationale for this new round of sanctions was stated in his May 6, 1995 “Letter to Congressional Leaders on Additional Economic Sanctions Against Iran”: On March 15, 1995, I reported to the Congress that … I exercised my statutory authority to declare a national emergency to respond to the actions and policies of the Government of Iran and to issue an Executive order that prohibited United States persons from entering into contracts for the financing or the overall management or supervision of the development of petroleum resources located in Iran or over which Iran claims jurisdiction. Following the imposition of these restrictions with regard to the development of Iranian petroleum resources, Iran has continued to engage in activities that represent a threat to the peace and security of all nations. I have now taken additional measures to respond to Iran’s continuing support for international terrorism, including support for acts that undermine the Middle East peace process, as well as its intensified efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction. I have issued a new Executive order and hereby report to the Congress.8 Clearly, there was nothing new about the Iranian “activities” that warranted these additional measures. The justifications given for these measures by the President, i.e. support for international terrorism, opposition to the peace process, and efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, were all the old excuses that the Washington Institute had invented many years before in order to overthrow the Iranian government. The real reason for imposing these harsher measures by the Clinton

The Clinton years and the dual containment policy 77 Administration was pressure from the Israeli lobby groups and the need to keep the Republicans, particularly D’Amato, from scoring more points with them. For Israel and its allies in the US Congress the new executive order was not enough. They pushed for tougher measures against Iran. On December 22, 1995 the Journal of Commerce reported that two days earlier, “after three months of pressure by Sen. Alfonse M. D’Amato,” the US Senate unanimously passed an act advocating “sanctions against foreign companies that help Iran develop new oil and gas projects.” To be more specific, the act imposed sanctions on foreign companies that would make new investments of at least $40 million in Iran. This act—which according to the same report was amended at the “last minute” by Senator Edward M. Kennedy to include Libya as well—became known as the Iran–Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA). With the unanimous vote for ILSA in the US Senate, on December 22, 1995 The Jerusalem Post wrote: “The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) has been a major proponent of the sanctions laws. AIPAC director Neal Sher said yesterday that the vote is ‘a pivotal step in the effort to curb terrorism and the nuclear threat to the free world.’” Similarly, on the same day The Washington Post stated: “The campaign against Iran has been strongly supported by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, the chief pro-Israel lobbying organization. AIPAC has aggressively lobbied for the new sanctions legislation, which would impose penalties on foreign corporations, banks and lending institutions that make major investments in Iran’s oil and gas industries, the country’s principal source of revenue.” In giving the President the choice of various sanctions, ILSA and its later House of Representatives version, sponsored by Representative Benjamin Gilman, were so haphazard that one reporter, Michael Lelyveld, referred to them as the “menu approach” to sanctions (Journal of Commerce, March 21, 1996). On July 24, 1996 Congress finally passed ILSA. The passage came almost a week after the crash of TWA Flight 800, a crash that after many months of investigation was attributed to mechanical failure. Yet, given the hostile environment created by the Israeli lobby groups in the US, Iran immediately became a suspect and, therefore, the bill passed through Congress rapidly and unanimously.9 ILSA became law when on August 5, 1996 President Clinton put his signature to it. Given that there had been nothing new on the part of Iran or Libya to warrant this action, President Clinton’s remarks prior to signing the bill were general and vague: We come together around the common commitment to strengthen our fight against terrorism. Terrorism has many faces, to be sure, but Iran and Libya are two of the most dangerous supporters of terrorism in the world. The Iran and Libya sanctions bill I sign today will help to deny those countries the money they need to finance international terrorism. It will limit the flow of resources necessary to obtain weapons of mass destruction. 10 President Clinton probably knew that the estimate of the effectiveness of the sanctions against Iran could not be correct, since many countries around the world

78 The United States and Iran refused to go along with ILSA. Indeed, as the Guardian wrote on August 24, 1996: “with the ink barely dry on President Clinton’s controversial law designed to isolate Iran and fellow ‘rogue’ Libya, Malaysia and Pakistan both announced agreements that are a shot in the arm for Tehran.” The refusal of many countries to abide by ILSA, particularly in the case of a Canadian firm’s plan to develop an oilfield in Iran, made Alfonse D’Amato lash out at different countries breaking the US sanction (The Ottawa Citizen, June 19, 1997). ILSA was difficult to enforce, and additional measures, such as the executive order of August 19, 1997, did not do much toward clarification and enforceability of the act.11 The ultimate blow to ILSA, however, came when on September 28, 1997 the French firm Total defied US laws and signed a multibillion dollar deal with Iran to develop the South Pars gas field. The US now found itself in the embarrassing position of having to waive the sanctions in exchange for some “technical concessions.”12 This was the beginning of the end of the US attempt to enforce Israeli-sponsored secondary boycotts against Iran. Soon afterwards, the Israeli lobby itself came to realize that setting US foreign policy is one thing and controlling the foreign policy of the rest of the world is something else. The Journal of Commerce reported on March 30, 1998 that the “chief sponsors of US sanctions against Iran have quietly toned down their campaign.” According to the report, while AIPAC “strongly opposes a waiver for Total, it is not hounding the administration for what one senior official called a ‘receding horizon’ on deciding whether the deal is sanctionable.” “The group’s focus,” the report went on to state, “has shifted to preventing Iran’s development of missiles and other weapons of mass destruction.” Given this shift, the report further added, “Mr. D’Amato also has been noticeably silent on the administration’s failure to enforce his law against major petroleum investments in Iran.” The last part of the report, however, was most telling: But a glacial shift appears clear in the influential force that has been the prime mover behind sanctions. AIPAC has gone so far as to differ with some senior Israeli officials who believe that the Islamic regime of Iran can be replaced. Instead, the lobby has come to agree with US intelligence assessments that Islamic rule will remain for some time. By accepting and making the best of it, the administration and the Israel lobby are gradually stepping back from the long confrontation that has roiled international relations and trade. The above report seems to confirm that the main aim of the US and Israeli sanctions policy was “regime change” in Iran. The campaign to overthrow the Iranian government went hand in hand with other measures adopted by the US government. One such measure, as reported in The Washington Post of December 22, 1995, was a bill passed by Congress and signed by the President to increase the funding of the CIA to “$20 million for a covert anti-Iran program.”13 This, the report went on to say, was despite

The Clinton years and the dual containment policy 79 the fact that “CIA Director John M. Deutch and other U.S. intelligence officers have told lawmakers in recent months that Iran’s leadership faces no serious domestic opposition for at least the next three years, and they outlined various difficulties the CIA would face in trying to destabilize the government.” The report also added that one major problem is that key Iranian opposition leaders operate from the territory of Iraq, a U.S. enemy, or receive Iraqi funding. The Clinton administration has refused to have any dealings with the principal opposition group, known as the Mujaheddin, but several members of Congress have urged the administration to reconsider its position. The above reference to “Mujaheddin” requires some explanation. The exact reference is to an organization called Mujahedin-e-Khalq-e-Iran or Mujahedin-e-Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO), which also operates under various other names, such as the National Council of Resistance of Iran. The support for this group in the US goes beyond several members of Congress. The group has had, and continues to have, extensive relations with the US government and the Israeli lobby groups, and a brief digression clarifying these relations is in order.

Strange bedfellows: MEK, US, Israel, and Saddam Hussein The US Department of State’s “Country Reports on Terrorism,” issued in April 2005, states under “Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK)”: a.k.a. The National Liberation Army of Iran, The People’s Mujahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI), National Council of Resistance (NCR), The National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), Muslim Iranian Students’ Society. Description The MEK philosophy mixes Marxism and Islam. Formed in the 1960s, the organization was expelled from Iran after the Islamic Revolution in 1979, and its primary support came from the former Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein starting in the late 1980s. The MEK conducted anti-Western attacks prior to the Islamic Revolution. Since then, it has conducted terrorist attacks against the interests of the clerical regime in Iran and abroad. The MEK advocates the overthrow of the Iranian regime and its replacement with the group’s own leadership. Activities The group’s worldwide campaign against the Iranian Government stresses propaganda and occasionally uses terrorism. During the 1970s, the MEK killed US military personnel and US civilians working on defense projects in Tehran and supported the takeover in 1979 of the US Embassy in Tehran. In 1981, the MEK detonated bombs in the head office of the Islamic Republic Party and the

80 The United States and Iran Premier’s office, killing some 70 high-ranking Iranian officials, including Chief Justice Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, President Mohammad-Ali Rajaei, and Premier Mohammad-Javad Bahonar. Near the end of the 1980–1988 war with Iran, Baghdad armed the MEK with military equipment and sent it into action against Iranian forces. In 1991, the MEK assisted the Government of Iraq in suppressing the Shia and Kurdish uprisings in southern Iraq and the Kurdish uprisings in the north. In April 1992, the MEK conducted near-simultaneous attacks on Iranian embassies and installations in 13 countries, demonstrating the group’s ability to mount large-scale operations overseas. In April 1999, the MEK targeted key military officers and assassinated the deputy chief of the Iranian Armed Forces General Staff. In April 2000, the MEK attempted to assassinate the commander of the Nasr Headquarters, Tehran’s interagency board responsible for coordinating policies on Iraq. The normal pace of antiIranian operations increased during “Operation Great Bahman” in February 2000, when the group launched a dozen attacks against Iran. One of those attacks included a mortar attack against the leadership complex in Tehran that housed the offices of the Supreme Leader and the President. In 2000 and 2001, the MEK was involved regularly in mortar attacks and hit-and-run raids on Iranian military and law enforcement units and Government buildings near the Iran–Iraq border, although MEK terrorism in Iran declined toward the end of 2001. After Coalition aircraft bombed MEK bases at the outset of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the MEK leadership ordered its members not to resist Coalition forces, and a formal cease-fire arrangement was reached in May 2003.14 The above report is neither comprehensive nor scholarly.15 For example, it does not say that MEK lost any popular support that it might have had in Iran because it fought on the side of Saddam Hussein in the Iran–Iraq war. The report also fails to mention that even though MEK has been labeled as a terrorist organization by the US Department of State, it is basically free to operate in the US, intensely active and constantly in touch with some members of the US government and Israeli lobby groups. MEK’s campaign in the US and its contacts with powerful American and Israeli interests actually started in the 1980s. On August 9, 1985, for example, The New York Times wrote: “At least 19 members of Congress signed letters or statements circulated by the People’s Mujahedeen Organization of Iran unaware that the State Department had called the rebel group a terrorist movement responsible for the deaths of six Americans in Iran.” According to the same report the “members of Congress or their aides acknowledged in interviews that they had lent their prestige to the organization, which then ran their names in a full-page advertisement in The New York Times on July 28.” The report also stated that the “organization and its affiliate, the National Council of Resistance, was characterized as anti-American in a State Department background paper twice provided to Congress on Feb. 14 and June 17.” Furthermore, the report stated that according to the State Department the group “is ‘masquerading’ as freedom fighters to dupe Congress into offering support.” On December 11, 1985 The Washington Post also ran a piece on

The Clinton years and the dual containment policy 81 the activities of MEK in the US. It wrote that a “group that federal officials say is linked to an Iranian terrorist organization has been going door to door soliciting charitable contributions in the Washington area and in 12 states elsewhere.” According to the report, “U.S. State Department officials said that the group, the Washington-based Iran Relief Fund, is affiliated with the People’s Mujaheddin Organization of Iran, which has engaged in ‘bombings, assassinations of Iranians, attacks on Israeli offices in Tehran and bank robberies’ since its inception in the 1960s.” The report put the figure collected from Americans by the “Iran Relief Fund in Maryland and Virginia” in 1984 alone as $97,230. The report further stated that Maryland’s Secretary of State had revoked the group’s registration “after learning from the U.S. State Department that the primary purpose of the fund was not charitable or benevolent.” According to the same report, the organization was registered to solicit money in “California, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas, Virginia, Wisconsin and the District.” Despite these and similar reports concerning the nature of MEK, the group was not only allowed to operate openly and actively throughout the US, but met with officials at the highest level of the US government and Israeli lobby groups. Indeed, The Ottawa Citizen published an article on January 19, 1993 about the Iran–Iraq policy of the incoming (Clinton) Administration and stated that the new Administration is worried about the “increasing power of Iran.” It then went on to say: Last month, Clinton wrote a private letter to the leader of the Iranian Mujahedeen resistance movement, Massoud Rajavi, in which he set out his commitment to furthering the cause of democracy, with U.S. financial and other support, as a cornerstone of the Clinton foreign policy. Couched in general terms, and without pledging U.S. backing to any attempt to overthrow the government in Tehran, the letter built on an earlier meeting between Mujahedeen officials and [Vice President] Gore. A day earlier, January 18, 1993, the Chicago Sun-Times reported the same news with some added details. It stated “Bill Clinton and his congressional allies are making secret moves against the nerve center of militant Islamic fundamentalism in Iran by encouraging a democratic alternative to Tehran’s dictatorship of the mullahs.” According to this report: “At the heart of Clinton’s emerging policy is the well-armed People’s Mujaheddin, based along the Iran–Iraq border and believed to have extensive political ties inside Iran, including elements of the regular army. It has been all but ignored for 12 years by the Reagan and Bush administrations.”16 The report also mentioned the same letter written by Clinton to Rajavi and the meeting between a representative of MEK and Gore. With regard to the latter, the report stated: “Rajavi’s top foreign policy adviser, Mohammad Mohaddessin, conferred last fall with Vice President-elect Al Gore. This week in Washington, he briefed Stu Eizenstat, a prominent Democratic lawyer and leader in the American-Jewish community, and House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Lee Hamilton, who sees Iran’s mullahs posing a graver threat to the West today than before its war with

82 The United States and Iran Iraq.” On the issue of the meeting between MEK and Stu Eizenstat, on January 19, 1993 the Guardian reported: “The mojahedin believe their hopes of respectability and an influence on Mr Clinton’s foreign policy will hinge on the support of the influential pro-Israel lobby in Washington. The mojahedin argue that their commitment to a democratic future in Iran and Iraq is the best way to guard against religious fundamentalism. This, they claim, should be in the interests of Israel and the US.” MEK had correctly realized that the Israeli lobby groups are the nerve-center of US foreign policy in the Middle East, and, as such, they concentrated their efforts on befriending these groups and their representatives in the US government. This was, of course, quite ironic. Just a few months earlier, on June 20, 1992, the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts reported that in his meeting with Saddam Hussein, MEK leader Rajavi had stated: “Iranian national movements and their masses strongly denounced the Iranian regime’s alliance with US imperialism, world Zionism and regional reactionaries to launch aggression against Iraq, participate in the blockade against it and interfere in the domestic affairs of this safe, steadfast country in the interests of colonialist schemes and conspiracies.” The report further quoted Rajavi as saying: “rapprochement of the Iranian rulers to the West showed the falsity of their claims about being hostile to colonialism and Zionism and clearly indicated their backward approach by standing in the face of progress and struggle for the liberation of the peoples of the region.” Thus, while the leader of the group was talking to Saddam about “US imperialism” and “Zionism,” other, and lesser, members were courting US government officials and Israeli lobby group representatives in the US. The politics of overthrowing the Iranian government had made strange bedfellows out of the US, Israel, Iraq, and MEK. Neither speeches by the MEK leader in Iraq against the US and Israel, nor the past history of the organization, however, stopped US government officials— particularly very active members of Congress associated with Israeli lobby groups—from vigorous support of MEK. In 1994 the issue came to the fore when, after some debate over US Iran policy, the US Congress asked the Department of State for a comprehensive review of MEK. Subsequently, a 38-page review by Kenneth Katzman was submitted to Congress by the US State Department.17 The Washington Post, November 1, 1994, called the report a “scathing assessment” of MEK. This was, according to The Washington Post, because MEK was assessed as an “autocratic, Marxist-oriented terrorist organization with little popular support in Iran and little credibility outside”; and because the organization was an “antiAmerican stooge of Iraqi president Saddam Hussein.” The Washington Post’s appraisal of the US State Department’s report as “scathing” was only partially correct. The report summarized some of the violent activities of the group, including assassinations and bombing, and its vague ideology, referring only occasionally to some scholarly and academic works, such as Ervand Abrahamian’s The Iranian Mojahedin (1989). It also correctly pointed out that neither MEK’s activities nor its ideology matched its rhetoric or its public relation campaign. It further referred to the undemocratic and autocratic nature of the group and the fact that it is nothing more than a cult around Rajavi and his wife.

The Clinton years and the dual containment policy 83 In addition, the report mentioned some of the practices of the group, such as its cunning lobbying efforts—i.e. portraying itself as a democratic organization and “freedom fighters”—switching ideology as needed and being deceitful. What the report left out, however, was the relationship between MEK, US government officials, and Israeli lobby groups. Indeed, the report verged on being devious when it stated that despite its massive efforts to gain worldwide support, “the Mojahedin in fact are supported by only one government in the world— Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.” Had the US State Department looked around, it would have seen that the group had, in addition to Saddam Hussein, the US and Israeli governments as its main supporters. Whatever the shortcomings of the report, the reaction of MEK and Congressmen supporting it was predictable. Even before the report was submitted to Congress, MEK and its supporters, anticipating some public display of dirty laundry, dismissed the report as biased, especially since no members of MEK were interviewed for the report. The Christian Science Monitor, for example, wrote on October 20, 1994 that MEK “say the State Department is rough on them because it is afraid of offending Tehran, with which it ultimately hopes to do business. The Mojahedin claim that the Tehran government has mounted a vigorous campaign to influence the State Department report against them—and has sent emissaries to the US to encourage Americans espousing rapprochement with the mullahs.”18 Given Warren Christopher’s animosity toward Iran, MEK’s charges were, of course, absurd. But some members of Congress closely associated with the Israeli lobby groups, too, tried to pre-empt the report. Without being specific, the same report referred to a “slew in Congress who think the State Department ought to be talking with an organization that is in a war against a regime that is also the enemy of the US.” But after the report was submitted, the names of some of the “slew in Congress” emerged in the news media. For example, the same article of November 1, 1994 in The Washington Post mentioned the objection of several members of Congress to the report even before its submission and then stated “Reps. Gary L. Ackerman (D-N.Y.), Robert G. Torricelli (D-N.J.) and Dan Burton (R-Ind.), all senior members of the House Foreign Affairs committee, issued statements yesterday criticizing the State Department and the report.” Ackerman was in particular quite adamant in his opposition to the report before it was put forward. On October 4, 1994 at a Congressional hearing on Europe and the Middle East he questioned Robert Pelletreau, Assistant Secretary of State for Near-Eastern Affairs, a number of times as to why he did not want to deal with Mujaheddin-e-khalq. Pelletreau answered by referring to the history of the group, including killing Americans and serving Saddam Husein, and stated: “I admit they have made a considerable effort over the past year to try to cultivate the members of the U.S. Congress and other Western parliaments and to say that they have changed their spots, that they are a leopard that has changed its spots. But the reason that we have not dealt with them up to this time is—are the reasons that I have laid out” (Federal News Service, October 4, 1994). Actually, in his prepared statement, Pelletreau had already explained his reasons:

84 The United States and Iran In recent weeks there has been an effort by the Iranian opposition group Mojahedin-e-Khalq, with the support from some members of Congress and some media opinion, to press the Administration to establish contacts with this group. The argument goes that we cannot prepare an unbiased report on the Mojahedin-e-Khalq as mandated by Congress without sitting down and talking to its leaders. We believe such contacts are unnecessary, Mr. Chairman, to meet the Congressional requirement. The U.S. Government possess a great deal of information on the group’s activities, some of it directly from Mojahedin published sources. I can assure you that the report will be comprehensive and factual. (Federal News Service, October 4, 1994) These comments by Pelletreau appear to have had no effect on Congressmen Ackerman, Gilman, and Lantos. As the text of the hearing shows, they questioned Pelletreau obsessively about the sins of Iran rather than the nature and history of MEK. There are, of course, a number of other individuals in the US Congress who are closely associated with Israeli lobby groups and support MEK. One such person is Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen. In a session on “U.S. Policy Towards Iran: A One-Year Review” on Wednesday, June 3, 1998, Representative Gary Ackerman submitted the “remarks of Ms. Soona Samsami, a representative of the National Council of Resistance in Washington,” as well as those of some fellow members of Congress, such as Ileana Ros-Lehtinen from Florida.19 The Congresswoman lamented the fact that the “National Council of Resistance,” i.e. MEK, had been added to its list of terrorist organizations by the Department of State. She then stated: The realities of Iran dictate that the United States must recognize the right of the Iranian people to resist, and its own moral obligation to keep a distance from this medieval and utterly oppressive regime. A proper policy must take stock of the continuing realities in Iran, with the realization that the Iranian Resistance presents some new prospects for a change in government. Instead of trying to shore up a sinking ship, we must quickly ally ourselves with the Iranian people and Resistance, whose democratic, pluralistic and secular platform makes for a far better lasting solution with the retrogressive and brutal ruling regime.20 How a cult centered around an individual, who, according to Abrahamian, bears the titles of the “first supervisor,” “Guide,” “Present Imam,” “Imam of the age” or “Messiah,” etc., could be called “democratic,” “pluralistic,” or “secular” is, of course, beyond the imagination of those familiar with the history and practices of MEK.21 It should be emphasized that the support of members of Congress close to the Israeli lobby groups for MEK is not confined to Congressional hearings. Some such members actually attend demonstrations organized by the cult. On July 18, 1999, for example, The Jerusalem Post reported that “several” members of the US Congress joined a rally organized by MEK. The report then quoted Ileana Ros-

The Clinton years and the dual containment policy 85 Lehtinen: “We are convinced that tangoing with Teheran’s tyrants will lead nowhere.” According to the same report, the Congresswoman also said that “she was speaking for the majority of the House who have signed petitions or voted in support of the Mujahideen Khalq.” Among the demonstrators were Senator Robert G. Torricelli and Soona Samsami, who was Congressman Ackerman’s witness (The Boston Globe, July 17, 1999). In sum, Mujahedin-e-Khalq-e-Iran became a convenient tool in the hands of strange bedfellows, i.e. Iraq, the US, and Israel, in a campaign to overthrow the Islamic regime. MEK members seem to believe that they are using their various patrons to meet their own aims, but the opposite is usually the case. For example, as far as Saddam Hussein was concerned they were, as one reporter observed in The Washington Post of July 17, 1993, nothing but his “mosquitoes: more a persistent nuisance than a mortal danger [to Iran].” Their US and Israeli supporters, too, seem to have a temporary use for them. In an interview in 2001 with the Village Voice, Congressman Gary Ackerman told the interviewers the following about his support for MEK: “I don’t give a shit if they are undemocratic. … OK, so the [MEK] is a terrorist organization based in Iraq, which is a terrorist state. They are fighting Iran, which is another terrorist state. I say let’s help them fight each other as much as they want. Once they all are destroyed, I can celebrate twice over.”22 As we shall see in coming chapters, this cynical use of MEK actually increased during the next administration, when so-called neoconservatives took command of US foreign policy in the Middle East. Before ending this digression, it should be noted that in 1997, as a result of some shifts in US foreign policy—explained below—the US State Department put MEK officially on the list of terrorist organizations (The New York Times, October 9, 1997). This action, needless to say, raised the ire of MEK’s supporters in Congress. As the Christian Science Monitor reported on September 23, 1998: “A statement signed by 220 members of the 435-seat House of Representatives Sept. 16 demanded a review of the MKO’s terrorist status, and called Clinton’s detente moves ‘wrong-headed.’” In response, the report went on to say, “Iran Radio declared that the statement ‘is part of the congressmen’s drive to raise campaign funds in order to win in forthcoming elections, and America’s Zionist circles are generous in funding candidates.’” Let us now return to the sanctions policy and discuss its erosion in the second half of the Clinton Administration.

Enter the corporate lobby As explained above, the ineffectiveness of ILSA, as well as the realization that the overthrow of the Iranian government may be much harder than anticipated, made the pursuit of economic sanctions against Iran by the US and Israel less intense in the second half of the Clinton presidency. But there were other factors that explain the decreasing intensity. One factor was the departure of Warren Christopher and the appointment of Madeleine Albright as the new Secretary of State in 1996. This appointment removed the element of personal vendetta from the making of US foreign policy toward Iran.

86 The United States and Iran Another, and perhaps more important reason for the decreasing intensity of US economic sanctions against Iran was the increasing pressure from US corporations to remove such sanctions. Many US firms—after wholeheartedly supporting the 1979 sanctions against Iran and receiving compensations—turned around and became the staunchest opposition force to the use of economic sanctions. For example, Amoco was awarded $600 million dollars in 1990 by the Hague Tribunal for facilities seized in 1979 in the Iranian Revolution (Financial Times, June 16, 1990). A few years later, however, the same company started to bitterly complain “about the cost of complying with curbs against Iran” in the face of ILSA and pressures from the US government to reroute planned oil pipelines from Azerbaijan, so that they would not pass through Iran (Journal of Commerce, February 20, 1997). Similarly, Chevron reached a $115 million settlement with Iran in 1986 (Guardian, January 31, 1986). But the same company would later be “struggling with the politics of gaining a foothold in Iran” and would contend that “unilateral sanctions hurt US business and US workers” (Offshore, September 2000). Dealing with all such cases would be, of course, too time consuming. It is best to concentrate not on firms but on industries and their efforts to remove economic sanctions against Iran. In particular, two major and representative industries, oil and agriculture, are considered, while others, such as aerospace, headed mostly by Boeing, ignored. As mentioned in the case of Conoco, despite numerous sanctions against Iran, the oil companies managed to have dealings with Iran one way or another until the executive order of March 15, 1995 which prohibited US citizens and companies from financing, supervising, and managing projects in Iran. This prohibition came at a time when US oil companies were engaged in a feeding frenzy in the oil-rich regions of the former Soviet Union’s Central Asian republics, particularly in Azerbaijan’s Baku region. The cheapest method of transporting oil from this region would have involved Iran. However, the US government’s prohibition of transporting oil to Kharg Island or swapping it with Iran ruled out these methods and required oil companies to accept more costly methods, such as transporting oil to Turkey’s Mediterranean port of Ceyhan (Journal of Commerce, February 20, 1997; Journal of Commerce, November 24 1997). Furthermore, as a result of the 1992 Congressional restrictions on US aid to Azerbaijan, this country was unable to secure loans from the US to develop its oil fields. The oil companies actively fought the US restrictions and, as The Washington Post of July 6, 1997 reported, the fight “lured a prestigious group of US prospectors: former high-ranking government officials bent on winning a stake in the bonanza for themselves or their companies.” According to this report, the list included, among others, “two former national security advisers, Brent Scowcroft and Zbigniew Brzezinski; former White House chief of staff John N. Sununu; Defense Secretary Richard C. Cheney and Secretary of State James A. Baker III from the Bush administration; and President Clinton’s former treasury secretary, Lloyd Bentsen.” These “heavyweights,” the report went on to say, were not there just to help Azerbaijan, but to take “advantage of business opportunities.” “Scowcroft, for example, was paid $100,000 in 1996 by Pennzoil Co. for ‘consulting on special international projects,’”

The Clinton years and the dual containment policy 87 and “earned a $30,000 director’s fee from the company, which is a partner in the Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC).” Also, the report stated: “AIOC … is a client of the law firm of Baker, while Cheney is chairman of Halliburton Inc., an oil services firm operating in the Caspian fields;” “Sununu’s management consulting firm, JHS Associates, is expected to sign a major contract with the Azeri government;” “Bentsen is a shareholder in Frontera Resources, an oil services company working in Azerbaijan;” and “Brzezinski is a consultant to Amoco, another AIOC partner promoting Azerbaijan’s cause in Washington.” The report further added that even though these officials have not registered as lobbyists for Azerbaijan, some “have testified in Congress or spoken at conferences to promote an activist US policy there. Most are members of the US–Azerbaijan Chamber of Commerce, the most forceful advocate in Washington for US investment there.” The lobbying efforts of some of these “dignitaries” within the academic world should also be noted. For example, in 1997, the same year the “heavyweights” of the oil industry waged their most intense war against the US sanctions, we witness the publication of a small book by the Council on Foreign Relations entitled Differentiated Containment: US Policy Toward Iran and Iraq, with the additional subtitle: Report of an Independent Task Force. 23 The “taskforce” was chaired by none other than Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft. These early architects and executors of the “dual containment policy” now attributed the policy to the Clinton Administration and criticized it for its “high financial and diplomatic cost” (Brzezinski and Scowcroft 1997: 3). After mentioning how US foreign policy is made—including such things as the action of the Republican Congress and President Clinton’s “eye on domestic politics at the World Jewish Congress”—these oil lobbyists reached policy conclusions that are quite expected: The policy of unilateral US sanctions against Iran has been ineffectual, and the attempt to coerce others into following America’s lead has been a mistake … One negative consequence of current policy is the damage inflicted on America’s interest in gaining greater access to energy sources of Central Asia. An independent and economically accessible Central Asia is in the interest of both the United States and Iran. … Another area of common interest is the resuscitation of US–Iranian commercial relations. To this end, Washington should be open-minded regarding the resumption of activity by American oil companies in Iran. (Brzezinski and Scowcroft 1997: 6, 11, 12) Given the role that Brzezinski and Scowcroft had played in the containment of Iran, one has to conclude that the role of a lobbyist is definitely very different from that of a policy maker. The list of “dignitaries” fighting the US sanctions was not confined to those mentioned above. A cursory look at some lobbying organizations combating the US sanctions reveals a wide range of former US government officials and

88 The United States and Iran academicians working hand in hand with the oil companies. One such example is the non-profit and tax exempt American Iranian Council (AIC), which was set up in 1997 after the passage of ILSA. AIC had a board of directors and advisory council that contained numerous former US government officials, such as former Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance, former Assistant Secretary of State and Ambassador Robert H. Pelletreau, former Assistant Secretary of State and Ambassador Richard M. Murphy, as well as a host of oil and other corporate executives. 24 AIC also listed, as its corporate members, Conoco, Inc., Unocal Corporation, and Mondoil Corporation.25 These and many more major US oil companies were proudly listed by AIC on its website as the “sponsors and co-organizers” of its seemingly academic events.26 Besides sponsoring events through front organizations, the oil companies also directly sponsored events at major universities. For example, in 1997 Unocal sponsored a two-day forum on the Caspian Sea at Columbia University to make its case against the US sanctions (Journal of Commerce, December 9, 1997). The forum, which was co-sponsored by other major oil companies, featured a combination of oil executives—including the representative of Azerbaijan International Operating Company—and academics. Some of these academicians might have been simply pawns of the oil lobbyists. Others, however, appeared to be professors/entrepreneurs, moonlighting as either advocates for their own business, the oil companies, the Iranian government, or all of the above. For example, according to the AIC’s website, the founder of the organization, as well as its president, was Dr. Hooshang Amirahmadi, a Rutgers University Professor of Urban Planning and Policy Development. Yet one could also read: “Dr. Amirahmadi has been a consultant for many international organizations and governments including … the Governments of Iran and Haiti.”27 In the Unocal-sponsored two-day event at Columbia, Professor Amirahmadi appeared not only to represent the Middle East Program at Rutgers, but also Caspian Associates Incorporated, a managing consultant firm based in Princeton, New Jersey.28 The oil industry’s lobbying efforts were, of course, not confined to employing “dignitaries” to work against the US sanctions. A large number of organizations were involved in such efforts. Dealing with each and every lobbying organization is, of course, impractical. Suffice it to say that the industry did not miss any opportunity to fight the sanctions. A case in point was the Iranian Trade Association (ITA), a small lobbying organization based in San Diego that published newsletters and maintained a website, appealing largely to the patriotic feelings of the Iranian community in the US and asking them to “get involved.”29 According to a San Diego newspaper, Shahriar Afshar, the founder of ITA, was an Iranian expatriate and a real estate salesman in San Diego City Hall who in 1997 “thought of creating an Iranian trade group” (The San Diego Union-Tribune, May 22, 1998). “The association began to take off,” the report went on, “after he went to the East Coast in February [1998], visiting with Conoco’s leading lobbyists in Washington, D.C., Iranian educators in New York and Iran’s ambassador to Canada.” The entrepreneurial activity of this individual apparently paid off, according to the report, when “Conoco Oil joined his fledgling association in February.” But

The Clinton years and the dual containment policy 89 Conoco, the report stated, was not the only investor in this scheme; the impressive list of lobbyists meeting Afshar in Washington for “closed-door talks” included, besides Conoco, “Caterpillar, Unocal, Motorola, Mobil and other companies that are lobbying against the sanctions.” Another major industry that had been involved intensely in lobbying efforts to remove the US sanctions against Iran was the agricultural industry. The industry includes big players such as Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) and Continental Grain (Financial Times, December 4, 1998). Prior to 1995, US grain sales to Iran, particularly by these two giants of the industry, were common (Journal of Commerce, December 21, 1998). Once the sanctions of 1995 dried up the flow of profits from Iran, the industry went into action using all its resources, including past and present US government officials, big- and small-time lobbyists, and “think tanks.” The list of US government officials often included, among others, such names as Clayton Yeutter, the former US trade representative, farm states, former Congressmen Lee Hamilton and Phil Crane, and Senators Richard Lugar, Larry Craig, and Byron Dorgan (Financial Times, October 24, 1997; Journal of Commerce, December 21, 1998; and Journal of Commerce, October 9, 1998). Hamilton, Crane, and Lugar were particularly active in introducing and reintroducing “sanctions reform acts” to help the agricultural industry (Journal of Commerce, October 24, 1997; Journal of Commerce, June 29, 1998; and Journal of Commerce, March 25, 1999). As will be seen, their efforts, in conjunction with other lobbying activities, paid off temporarily. The list of lobbyists working on behalf of the agricultural industry included at least “eight agriculture groups, including the National Association of Wheat Growers” (Journal of Commerce, December 21, 1998). But the list also included some shadowy groups, such as the Iranian Trade Association and Niki Trading Company. The latter in particular was an interesting case. When in 1998 some factions in the Iranian government ordered the purchase of $500 million worth of agricultural products, a “Niki Trading Company” in the US was commissioned to seek licenses for the sale. Senator Lugar actually wrote a letter of support on behalf of Niki Trading Company to National Security Advisor Sandy Berger (Reuters, January 22, 1999).30 But at the beginning of the affair no reporter seemed to have heard of Niki Trading Company. Indeed, as the Journal of Commerce of December 21, 1998 wrote: “Little is known about Niki Trading or the origin of Iran’s reported request.” According to the report, all that could be gathered from the office of Senator Larry Craig was that the “company is newly formed for the purpose and is based in Washington.” But it later became clear that Niki Trading was no more than a shell set up to sell US agricultural products to Iran. The “company” was headed by Richard W. Bliss, a Washington, DC attorney/lobbyist, whose website was maintained by Afshar’s ITA.31 Actually, it was stated on this site that “ITA is proud to welcome Niki Trading Company as a 1999 Corporate ITA member” and that this “exclusive web page has been created in order to better introduce you to Niki.” However, instead of an introduction to the firm and its nature, the

90 The United States and Iran home page provided a “Chronology of Events Regarding Sale of US Agricultural Commodities to Iran.” The agriculture industry, of course, had its own set of think tanks that worked hand in hand with the US government officials and the oil lobbyists. An example was the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). This “research institution” publicly announced its corporate ties by stating on its website: “Contributions from more than 300 corporations, foundations, and individuals constitute 85 percent of the revenues required to meet the Center’s budget.” 32 The CSIS’s Board of Trustees included many former US government officials, including oil industry heavyweights Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft.33 Its list of “experts” included some of the same names that appeared on the board of directors of the American-Iranian Council, such as Shireen T. Hunter and Judith Kipper.34 The institute regularly published papers or books that tried to appear scholarly and researchbased, but were often no more than position papers for the oil and agricultural industries. A case in point was a book published by the CSIS entitled Feeling Good or Doing Good with Sanctions. The author of the book, Ernest H. Preeg, was a frequent witness in Congressional testimony for free trade. His name also appeared on the staff of Manufacturers Alliance/MAPI, a “research organization serving the needs of senior management,” according to its own website.35 For obvious reasons, Preeg’s book argued against the US’s unilateral sanctions in different regions of the world, including Iran. But in its lack of scholarly content the study is in many ways similar to those put out by the proponents of the sanctions, such as those affiliated with AIPAC.36 Yet Congressman Lee Hamilton, who wrote the foreword for the book, praised it for its “comprehensive examination and quantification of the economic impact of unilateral sanctions” (Preeg 1999: viii). Similar praise was bestowed upon the book by Senator Richard Lugar on the back cover. Much more could be said about the various interrelated corporate lobbies that were attempting to stop Israel and its lobby groups from underwriting the US sanctions policy. To save space, however, only one more lobbying group is mentioned here, an umbrella organization known as “USA*ENGAGE.” After the passage of ILSA, the name of this interest group often appeared in the press. For example, in reference to Lee Hamilton and Richard Lugar’s sanctions reform act, the Journal of Commerce wrote on September 8, 1997 that the “bill, tentatively dubbed the Strategy Through Engagement and Farm Security Act, is a brainchild of USAEngage, a coalition of more than 600 firms.” The website of USA*ENGAGE stated that it is a “coalition representing American business and agriculture” and boasted of having “over 650 members, including 40 National and State Associations and organizations from major sectors of the US economy.”37 The list of members on the website was a basic Who’s Who of US corporations, including, among others, giant oil, agricultural, and aerospace companies.38 According to the organization’s website, the coalition was launched on April 16, 1997, at a press conference that included, among other dignitaries, the following participants: the President of the National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC), the Chairman and CEO of Caterpillar Inc., the President of the American Farm Bureau Federation, the President and CEO of Ingersoll-Rand Company, Congressmen Lee

The Clinton years and the dual containment policy 91 H. Hamilton, Donald Manzullo, Jim Kolbe, and Senator Richard G. Lugar.39 The President of NFTC stated at the press conference: “Our chief objective is to open a serious, bipartisan dialogue with the Congress, the executive branch and with governors, mayors and other local authorities about the limited effectiveness of these unilateral measures, their cost to the US economy, and about the importance of engagement, as well as other effective ways to achieve the objectives we believe we can all agree on.”40 In support of this objective, he then read a letter from President Jimmy Carter addressed to Congressman Hamilton. In this ironic twist of history, President Carter, the man who signed into law the first economic sanction against Iran, now lamented in the letter that the “complicated question of how to have an impact on countries like Cuba or Iran requires a much more serious approach. Unilateral sanctions are clearly not the way and I hope you will be able to build support for much more positive and effective alternatives.”41 After NFTC’s President, many other corporate, government, and think tank representatives spoke on the virtues of laissez-faire and the evils of economic sanctions. The think tank representative in this particular event was the director of the Institute for International Economics (IIE), Fred Bergsten, who presented the typical free-market analysis of the effect of economic sanctions on the US economy and the need for free trade. As a number of reporters hinted afterward, the story of USA*ENGAGE was not as simple as first appeared. The organization was, and still is, a front for NFTC, which had “enlisted two top Washington lobbyists—Clayton Yeutter, the former US trade representative during the Reagan administration, now at the law firm Hogan & Hartson, and Anne Wexler of the Wexler Group, who has extensive Democratic contacts” (Journal of Commerce, February 4, 1997).42 The Democratic contacts of Anne L. Wexler—who according to her own website, is among “Washington’s 10 most powerful lobbyists”—included President Carter, for whom she had worked as “policy aide.”43 Wexler’s other influential positions included membership of the Council on Foreign Relations, and serving as a senior advisor to the Clinton/Gore Transition Team. According to the Journal of Commerce of February 4, 1997 besides commissioning Wexler and the Institute for International Economics, NFTC is “also seeking help from former Cabinet members and think tanks including the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Cato Institute and the Council on Foreign Relations.” “All that heavy artillery,” the report aptly stated, “is likely to give exporters new ammunition in the form of cost figures and horror stories that can be fired back at Congress whenever new measures are proposed.”

The corporate wind blows faster: the second half of the Clinton years The heavy artillery that US industries, particularly oil and agriculture, brought against US sanctions slowed the unimpeded advancement of Israel and its US allies in underwriting US foreign policy toward Iran. The result, however, was a chaotic policy that took no particular direction. One of the first signs of change in policy was, as mentioned earlier, the

92 The United States and Iran designation of MEK as a terrorist organization. The New York Times reported on October 9, 1997 that “the State Department designated 30 groups as foreign terrorist organizations today, making it illegal to provide funds for them and denying their members visas.” Among these was one group associated with Iran, “Islamic Group; Mujahedeen Khalq” or MEK. This designation, as mentioned earlier and discussed in later chapters, was quite cosmetic, since the group has continued to operate in the US relatively freely to this day. But there were more substantive changes. On June 18, 1998 Madeleine Albright, who is herself an alumna of the Center for Strategic International Studies, delivered a famous speech at the Asia Society, an organization that was listed as one of the “Sponsors and Co-organizers of AIC Events.”44 In her speech, Albright reversed policy and asked Iran to join the US in drawing up “a road map leading to normal relations” (The New York Times, June, 18, 1998).45 Nothing substantial had changed, in terms of the Israeli-formulated three sins of the Islamic state, to warrant a reversal of US policy. Indeed, Albright herself claimed that neither “Iran’s support for terrorism” nor its efforts “to develop long range missiles and to acquire nuclear weapons” had altered. Even in the area of the Israel–Arafat “peace process,” the visit of Yasser Arafat to Iran, which was mentioned by Albright as a positive point, had produced no tangible result and had not lessened Iran’s support for Arafat’s rival groups. Yet the strong corporate pressure persuaded the Secretary to change policy, using such excuses as the election of President Khatami, which had happened more than a year earlier, and “Iran’s [positive] record in the war against drugs” (The New York Times, June 18, 1998). The Iranian government’s response to Albright’s speech was delivered by its Foreign Minister, Kamal Kharrazi, at another meeting of the Asia Society a few months later. “Mr. Kharrazi’s speech,” noted The New York Times of September 29, 1998, “was underwritten by the American oil company Conoco, which was on the verge of signing a billion-dollar deal to develop Iranian oil and gas fields when the Clinton Administration blocked it.” A few days after Albright’s speech, according to the Journal of Commerce of June 24, 1998, President Clinton vetoed, for the first time, the “Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act,”a bill sponsored by Congressman Benjamin Gilman that would have cut off “US aid and exports for two years to any entity charged with helping Iran’s missile program.” This veto, the report went on to say, raised the ire of the Israeli government, AIPAC, and its supporters in the US Congress.46 To avoid “a showdown with AIPAC” and the Congressional override of the veto, the Clinton Administration came up with a compromise: impose sanctions against some Russian institutes that were under investigation for supplying missile technology to Iran (Journal of Commerce, July 17, 1998). In December of the same year, in yet another attempt to appease corporate America and the Iranian government, President Clinton made the empty gesture of removing Iran from the list of “major drug-producing countries” by arguing that “it no longer met the standard for inclusion set by Congress” (The Washington Post, December 8, 1998). But even this empty gesture was opposed by the likes of Congressman Gillman, who argued that the move was “not based on substantive

The Clinton years and the dual containment policy 93 grounds related to drug control but on the speculative hope that such a unilateral gesture will win diplomatic points in Iran for some anticipated rapprochement” (The Washington Post, December 8, 1998). On the agricultural front, following Niki’s deal between Iran and the US farming industry, the Clinton Administration announced, on April 28, 1999, that “it had decided to ease its sanctions policy to permit the sale of food and medical supplies to Iran” (The New York Times, April 29, 1999). The move came, according to Stuart E. Eizenstat, the Under Secretary of State for Business and Economic Affairs, after the administration learned from a “two-year review” that the sale of food and medicine “doesn’t encourage a nation’s military capability or its ability to support terrorism” (ibid.). Another reason given for the shift in policy was a humanitarian one: “food should not be used as a tool of foreign policy” (ibid.). Such reasoning, however, did not fool the reporters who had followed the story from its beginning. Indeed, most reports made the obvious connection between the removal of the sanctions and the activities of USA*ENGAGE and the “Niki Trading Company” (ibid.). President Clinton also showed a remarkable change of heart toward Iran in 1999. This sudden change was noted in The New York Times of December 3, 1999, which reported: “At times in recent months, Mr. Clinton has seemed passionate about Iran. He has even talked in terms of reconciliation with an Islamic country that had suffered at the hands of the West.” “At a black tie White House dinner in April,” the report continued, “Mr. Clinton went out of his way to say he was trying to understand Iran. According to the same report, Clinton said it was important to recognize that Iran ‘has been the subject of quite a lot of abuse from various Western nations. I think sometimes it’s quite important to tell people, look, you have a right to be angry at something my country or my culture or others that are generally allied with us today did to you 50 or 60 or 100 or 150 years ago,’ the president said.” Even though the President did not elaborate on the “something” that the US and its allies had done to Iran, these were still remarkable statements and a complete turnaround. Only four years earlier Clinton had stated in front of the World Jewish Congress that “Iran has broadened its role as an inspiration and paymaster to terrorists” and that no “further engagement will alter that course” (The New York Times, May 1, 1995). Mr. Clinton had also said about Iran, at the time of signing ILSA, that “you simply can’t do business with people by day who are killing your people by night.”47 Were the President’s April 1999 remarks about Iran being the “subject of quite a lot of abuse” the result of a new awakening or of increasing corporate pressures? It suffices to say that in January of the same year, Cyrus R. Vance, the former Secretary of State and the Honorary Chairman of the American–Iranian Council, had delivered what The New York Times of January 15, 1999 referred to as a “diplomatic bombshell,” a lecture organized by the AIC at the Asia Society in which Vance urged the Clinton Administration and the Iranian government to “embark on the rapid reestablishment of diplomatic relations.” The reporter, who had not followed the story closely from its beginning, was unclear “whether the initiative

94 The United States and Iran for resuming ties with Iran was blessed from the top or whether it needed to be pushed from the bottom up.” The ultimate change of heart, however, was expressed by Madeleine Albright in her famous speech of March 17, 2000. The speech was delivered at an AIC-sponsored event before corporate lobbyists and academic entrepreneurs. Indeed, the President of the AIC, Hooshang Amirahmadi, started his opening remarks by thanking US government officials, the “Iranian–American entrepreneurs in the technology sector” for “their generosity and vision,” and a lobbyist and representative of the oil companies, Richard Sawaya, for “fund-raising efforts.”48 After a sales-pitch for his “tax-exempt” organization, and without any mention of the corporate backers of AIC—i.e. Conoco, Unocal, Mondoil, InterMarine Inc., and American International Group Inc.—Amirahmadi introduced Secretary Albright. The secretary then delivered a rambling, inconsistent, and ledger-like speech, in which she enumerated the list of US grievances and culpabilities. On the guilt side, the list was relatively short: In 1953, the United States played a significant role in orchestrating the overthrow of Iran’s popular prime minister, Mohammed Mossadegh. … the coup was clearly a setback for Iran’s political development and it is easy to see why so many Iranians continue to resent this intervention by America in their internal affairs. As President Clinton has said, the United States must bear a fair share of responsibility for the problems that have arisen in US–Iranian relations. Even in more recent years aspects of US policy towards Iraq during its conflict with Iran appears to have been regrettably shortsighted, especially in light of our subsequent experience with Saddam Hussein.49 In so far as no previous US Secretary of State had ever admitted that the US had any hand in overthrowing the nationalist government of Iran, Albright’s speech was unprecedented. But what “significant role” the US played in the CIA coup of 1953, what the US’s “share of responsibility” was for the “problems that have arisen in US–Iranian relations,” or what “aspects of US policy towards Iraq” in the Iran–Iraq war were “regrettably shortsighted,” Madam Secretary did not elaborate. This, of course, was not surprising, since the intention of Albright was not to set the historical records straight, but to please the corporate lobby. Moreover, the Secretary had to do a difficult balancing act: while pleasing the US corporations she had to make sure not to antagonize Israel and its lobby groups, which were advocating the opposite policy that the corporate lobby was promoting. This was done by means of a list of grievances, and this list was much longer. It included not only the “embassy takeover” of 1979, but also the three sins formulated by the Israeli lobby groups: Iran’s support of “terrorism,” its opposition to the “Middle East peace process,” and the “proliferation” of weapons of mass destruction.50 Regurgitating these sins, however, did not please Israel or its lobby groups, who could feel the winds of change blowing from the corporate lobby. The Jerusalem Post wrote on March 20, 2000: “Senior Israeli officials

The Clinton years and the dual containment policy 95 yesterday sharply criticized the US’s more positive attitude toward Iran, saying it will succeed only in encouraging a government opposed to the peace process and keeping a real democratic revolution in Iran at bay.” Earlier, on March 19, 2000, the same newspaper wrote that “American Israel Public Affairs Committee, Israel’s No. 1 lobby in Washington,” would support Albright’s gesture only if it does “not result in large flows of currency into Iran, which is necessary to finance its weapons-of-mass-destruction programs.” It then quoted AIPAC spokesman Ken Bricker as saying: “We have no quarrel with the people of Iran, but rather with the policies of their government, especially with regard to its acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, opposition to the Middle East peace process, and support for international terrorism.” It also quoted the Anti-Defamation League as saying it is “premature to begin to normalize relations with a nation that has sponsored international terrorism, developed weapons of mass destruction, has shown continual hostility toward the State of Israel, and is about to try 13 innocent Jews on trumped-up charges of espionage.” Israel and its lobby groups, however, could not stop the US State Department from trying to improve relations with Iran by slowing down the sanction policy and even removing some token sanctions. Indeed, in her speech Albright announced “a step that will enable Americans to purchase and import carpets and food products such as dried fruits, nuts and caviar from Iran.”51 This appeared to be an unprecedented move, since for almost two decades there had been nothing in US policy toward Iran besides erecting new sanctions. At last, it seemed, the corporate wind was blowing faster than the Israeli wind. The corporate wind, however, was blowing too late in the season, since the Clinton Administration was reaching the end of its second term. On August 1, 2000 The Jerusalem Post wrote an article about the Republican Party 2000 platform in which it stated that the “Republican administration will patiently rebuild an international coalition opposed to Saddam Hussein” and the “Republican nominee will also halt the unilateral efforts at rapprochement with Iran started under Clinton.”

6

The neoconservatives, dual rollback, and Israel

When George W. Bush became a presidential candidate there was much uncertainty about the future of US Middle East policy. It was not at all clear how Bush’s affiliation with oil companies—such as Arbusto Energy Inc., Spectrum 7, and Harken Energy—would influence policy. It was also unclear if the affiliation of some of Bush’s top advisors—such as his future Vice President Cheney having been the Chairman and CEO of Halliburton or National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice having served on Chevron’s board of directors—would make any difference in US policy decision making. Cheney, as mentioned in the previous chapter, was one of the oil lobbyists who had fought against sanctions imposed on Iran. Indeed, on August 3, 2000 The Jerusalem Post reported that “at a World Petroleum Congress meeting in Canada, Cheney declared his support for doing business with Iran.” The report quoted Cheney as saying “‘I would hope we could find ways to improve’ US–Iran relations.” He further stated, according to the report: “One of the ways I think is to allow American firms to do the same thing that most other firms around the world are able to do now, and that is to be active in Iran.” Also, the report stated that Cheney “reiterated his view on Sunday talk shows this week that American sanctions on Iran should be lifted and said he would try to persuade Bush of his position.” But, the report went on to say, “Bush has said his administration would take a tougher approach to Iran than US President Bill Clinton’s administration, which has made unanswered gestures of rapprochement.” The uncertainty concerning the Bush Administration’s Middle East policy and, in particular, its policy toward Iran continued even after Bush was declared winner of the presidential election. On December 8, 2000 The Jerusalem Post published a lengthy and interesting article about the composition of the new foreign policy team: Pro-Israel activists, Middle Eastern leaders and nearly everyone else concerned about the fragile situation are waiting anxiously to see who will formulate the new US policy in the region. … Some Jewish leaders are worried that many of Bush’s father’s advisers, who were not particularly warm toward Israel, will wield extraordinary influence in the administration, while the leaders themselves—many of them

The neoconservatives, dual rollback, and Israel 97 accustomed to having Clinton’s ear— are worried about losing their own clout. “I think the Jewish community is going to have a more difficult time gaining the level of support that they’ve seen in the Clinton years,” said Jack Rosen, president of the American Jewish Congress. “And I think we are going to face an administration where a lot of the key players are going to be less inclined to view the Middle East from the traditional Israeli standpoint and security issues surrounding Israel.” The report then stated that there were two groups surrounding the new President. One consisted of the “policy makers from Ronald Reagan’s Cold War era” who, for example, “are cool to the idea of normalization with Iran.” “On the other side,” the report went on to say, “are personalities associated with George Bush Sr.’s administration, who many in Israel remember, some say unfairly, with a sense of dread.” This group, the report stated, are “influenced by former secretary of state James Baker (who has been Bush Jr.’s front man in the Florida election quagmire) and National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft.” According to the article, “Cheney himself, as Bush Sr.’s secretary of defense, falls into this camp, which perceives the Middle East largely through the lens of oil interests and believes in a moral obligation to Israel, but stresses that ties with the Arab world are of equal importance.” The article included Condoleezza Rice in the latter group since “her mentor is Scowcroft.” The article also mentioned that she “has little experience in Middle East issues, though she recently visited Israel for a quick tutorial” and that Binyamin Netanyahu had been trying to establish “new connections” with her. The report then turned its attention to Colin Powell as a shoo-in for secretary of state. According to the report, even though Powell’s views were not widely expressed he was “placed firmly in the Bush, Sr.-Scowcroft camp.” Moreover, the report went on to say, even though Powell “grew up in a heavily Jewish-populated neighborhood in New York City,” had “a surprising basic command of Yiddish,” had “one Jewish ancestor on his father’s side,” and was “close friends with Prime Minister Ehud Barak,” he “originally opposed the Gulf War, to the dismay of Israel and the pro-Israel community.” Lastly, the report dealt with some personalities close to the new administration who were also very close to Israel. One such person was “Richard Perle, former assistant secretary of defense for international security policy, who serves on the board of directors of numerous corporations.” The report mentioned the fact that “Perle is a virulent opponent of the Oslo process: he encouraged Netanyahu to scrap the deal entirely when the Likud leader took power in 1996, and urged Barak to walk out of Camp David negotiations.” According to the report, “Perle, who served as an informal foreign policy adviser to Bush during the campaign, will not seek a position in the administration, but hopes to place others in positions of power who share his hard-line views, according to sources close to him.” The second individual mentioned was “Paul Wolfowitz, dean of the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University and a former assistant secretary of state for East

98 The United States and Iran Asian and Pacific affairs under Reagan.” The report concluded with these lines: Both Perle and Wolfowitz have been especially outspoken critics of Clinton’s policy toward Iraq and the peace process. … Both Perle and Wolfowitz are the type of candidates the pro-Israel lobby is pushing. Will they, or those on the other side of the Republican rift, have more influence? At this point, only Bush and Cheney may know. Israel and its lobby groups could not have pushed for better candidates than Perle and Wolfowitz. As mentioned in Chapter 4, these individuals represented the Likud wing of the Israeli lobby in the US and were on the “Board of Advisors” of the Washington Institute, the “think tank” of AIPAC.1 Both Perle and Wolfowitz had a track record as “neoconservatives,” an expression which is both highly ambiguous and hyped.2 As pointed out in Chapter 4, since at least 1992 Wolfowitz had advocated the use of military force against Iraq. Similarly, in September 2000, Wolfowitz appeared as one of the “project participants” in a well-known manifesto that the so-called neoconservatives put out. This manifesto—entitled “Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century. A Report of The Project for the New American Century”—sounded the alarm bell and called for an aggressive approach not only toward Iraq, but North Korea and Iran as well: The current American peace will be short-lived if the United States becomes vulnerable to rogue powers with small, inexpensive arsenals of ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads or other weapons of mass destruction. We cannot allow North Korea, Iran, Iraq or similar states to undermine American leadership, intimidate American allies or threaten the American homeland itself. The blessings of the American peace, purchased at fearful cost and a century of effort, should not be so trivially squandered. 3 Richard Perle, too, had advocated the same approach to Iraq. The above reference to Perle having advised Netanyahu, in The Jerusalem Post of December 8, 2000, appears to be a reference to a famous 1996 policy paper for then-Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu entitled “A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm.” As many newspapers, including The Washington Post of September 4, 2004, pointed out this policy paper “called for removing Hussein from power in Iraq as part of a broad strategy to transform the region and remove radical regimes.” In advising Netanyahu on how “Israel can shape its strategic environment” and roll back Syria, the document refers to “removing Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq” as an “important Israeli strategic objective in its own right.”4 Also, both Perle and Wolfowitz, along with a number of other neoconservatives—such as Elliott Abrams, John Bolton, William Kristol, James Woolsey, Zalmay Khalilzad, Robert Kagan, Francis Fukuyama, and Donald

The neoconservatives, dual rollback, and Israel 99 Rumsfeld—wrote a letter to President Clinton on January 26, 1998 asking for the “removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime from power.”5 In the letter they warned Clinton about an Iraqi “threat in the Middle East more serious than any we have known since the end of the Cold War.” They argued that the “policy of ‘containment’ of Saddam Hussein has been steadily eroding over the past several months.” They raised the specter of Saddam’s “weapons of mass destruction” posing threats to “our friends and allies like Israel and the moderate Arab states, and a significant portion of the world’s supply of oil.” They proposed that in the “near term” Clinton should undertake “military action” and that in the “long term” he should remove “Saddam Hussein and his regime from power.” “That,” they said, “now needs to become the aim of American foreign policy.” They also warned the President that “American policy cannot continue to be crippled by a misguided insistence on unanimity in the UN Security Council.” Finally, they told Clinton: We urge you to act decisively. If you act now to end the threat of weapons of mass destruction against the U.S. or its allies, you will be acting in the most fundamental national security interests of the country. If we accept a course of weakness and drift, we put our interests and our future at risk. Perle, Wolfowitz and their fellow travelers did not achieve their goal of the US invading Iraq during the Clinton Administration and had to wait until they, themselves, would take office. But their advocacy of total war against Iraq made many Israelis happy when it became clear that these individuals would occupy some of the highest positions in the incoming Bush Administration. On January 19, 2001 The Jerusalem Post published yet another insightful evaluation of the Middle East policy makers in the new Bush Administration. The article, entitled “All the President’s Middle East Men,” was, in some respects, prophetic. It began with the erroneous assumption that the “Iraqi President Saddam Hussein is quietly developing weapons of mass destruction.” It then stated that in the new Administration two “distinctly different visions of how the US should use its superpower status are being espoused by the top chiefs—Colin Powell and Donald Rumsfeld respectively. … While Powell advocates a more limited use of US forces abroad, Rumsfeld is more at ease with deploying troops and exercising US might overseas.” The report quoted “one informal Bush foreign policy adviser who may join the administration” as saying: “What you will have is two institutions grappling for control of policy, and a weak National Security Council.” “Condoleezza Rice,” the essay stated, “is largely expected to focus on Russia policy and to be muscled out of Middle East decisions by vice president Dick Cheney and by Rumsfeld and Powell and their teams.” “It is no secret in Washington,” the essay went on, “that the policies will be determined less by Bush himself and more by his inner circle of advisers.” The essay then dealt with some of the personalities in the Administration and how close they are to Israel. With regard to Richard Armitage, the likely Deputy Secretary of State, the article stated: “One former AIPAC official, who helped the pro-Israel lobby defeat a US–Jordan arms deal Armitage authored in the early 1980s, said Armitage ‘sees Israel as a

100 The United States and Iran strategic asset in a Cold War context.’” It also stated: “Some in the pro-Israel camp fear he will place strengthening ties with Arab allies above strengthening the US– Israel relationship.” With regard to Paul Wolfowitz, whose exact position had not yet been announced, the article wrote the “Jewish and pro-Israel communities are jumping for joy. While skeptical regarding the Oslo Accords, Wolfowitz is considered a strong supporter of Israel. He has been one of the loudest proponents of a tough policy toward Iraq focused on finding a way to bring down Saddam Hussein’s regime.” Discussing what to expect in future, the article mentioned that the “administration will publicly state the long-term objective of removing Saddam Hussein from power.” On Iran, the essay simply said sanctions “will be reevaluated.” In realizing the lack of knowledge of Middle East matters on the part of the President and his National Security Advisor, predicting the internecine feud that would develop between the State and Defense Departments, and the role that Paul Wolfowitz would play in bringing Saddam Hussein down The Jerusalem Post of January 19, 2001 showed once again how Israel and its various lobby groups had almost complete knowledge and command of US foreign policy. The US news media showed no such insightful analysis beyond the fact that both President Bush and Condoleezza Rice were ignorant when it came to Middle East matters. For example, on June 16, 2000 The New York Times reported Rice’s scant knowledge of Iran, stating that when asked in an interview to support her assertion in her recent article in Foreign Affairs that Iran is trying to spread “fundamentalist Islam” beyond its borders, she replied, “Iran has been the state hub for technology and money and lots of other goodies to radical fundamentalist groups, some will say as far-reaching as the Taliban.” The New York Times then stated that she had to be “reminded that Iran was a bitter enemy of the Taliban and that the two countries [Iran and Afghanistan] had almost gone to war in late 1998.” The same report also mentioned that when Mr. Bush was asked about “Taliban,” he could “only shake his head in silence,” not knowing who they were. The report also wrote much more about the President’s limited knowledge of world affairs in general and his unabashed “dependence on Ms. Rice.” But given that Rice herself was very much in the dark when it came to the Middle East, it was clear that individuals such as Wolfowitz and Perle would play a major role in formulating US Middle East policy. This last fact, however, eluded the US news media and was only fully apparent to the Israeli sources, which were jubilant about people such as Perle and Wolfowitz being in positions to make policy. Ultimately, Paul Wolfowitz accepted the position of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Richard Perle became the chairman of the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board. These individuals were then joined by some old fellow travelers who, as The Jerusalem Post had predicted, also acquired “positions of power.” Some well-known characters in such positions were Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, John Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control, Lewis “Scooter” Libby, Chief of Staff and National Security Advisor for Vice President Cheney, Elliott Abrams, Special Assistant to the President and senior director for Near East and North African affairs, David Frum, speechwriter

The neoconservatives, dual rollback, and Israel 101 for George W. Bush, Michael Ledeen, on contract for the Office of Special Plans, etc.6 All these individuals had close association with Israel and its lobby groups. Some, such as Elliott Abrams and Michael Ledeen, were left over from the IranContra scandal era. Some, such as Perle and Wolfowitz themselves, as well as Douglas Feith, had been investigated for sharing with the Israelis or AIPAC members sensitive US government information (Inter Press Service, August 31, 2004).7 Some had openly advocated the use of military force against Iraq. This was not only true of the top two individuals, Wolfowitz and Perle, but of Douglas Feith, whose name appears also as one of the “Participants in the Study Group on ‘A New Israeli Strategy Toward 2000’” who wrote “A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm.” In his confirmation hearing in the Senate on June 5, 2001 Feith was asked by Senator Max Cleland about the US strategy toward Iraq. Feith answered by saying “United States policy on Iraq, Senator, is now being looked at. The United States has a strong interest, which I know is shared widely on this committee and throughout the Congress, in facilitating as best we can the liberation of Iraq. The exact means that are most appropriate at the moment are the subject of review right now” (Federal News Service, June 5, 2001). Senator Cleland responded by saying: “Well, that’s the most disturbing answer of all. As somebody who was committed to a ground force effort in Vietnam with no particular strategy for winning and no particular exit strategy, your answer disturbs me greatly” (ibid.).8 Before leaving the neoconservatives, one more individual is worth mentioning, David Wurmser. Wurmser is another veteran of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and “Participants in the Study Group on ‘A New Israeli Strategy Toward 2000.’” From 2001 to 2003 he was an aide to the neoconservative John Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, and subsequently became a National Security Advisor to Vice President Dick Cheney. In 1999 he published a book with the American Enterprise Institute called Tyranny’s Ally: America’s Failure to Defeat Saddam Hussein. In the book he proposed a “Dual Rollback of Iran and Iraq” instead of dual containment. He wrote: “Both Iran and Iraq, and the ideas upon which the two states are constructed, are threats to the United States. How can we vanquish one without helping the other?” (Wurmser 1999: 72). Wurmser proposed the following: An effective policy on Iraq offers the United States an opportunity to endanger and ultimately triumph over Iran’s Islamic revolution as well. … Launching a policy and resolutely carrying it through until it razes Saddam’s Ba’thism to the ground will send terrifying shock waves into Tehran. Obsessed with the policies of survival, most Middle Eastern regimes shun losers and embrace winners. … The survival of Ba’thism in Iraq is integrally connected with the survival of Khomeiniist Shi’ite revolution in Iran—even though the two nations hate each other. Ridding Iraq of Ba’thism can sabotage the Islamic revolution and its regional allies. … Iran must be severed from its Shi’te foundations. And this can be accomplished by promoting an Iraqi Shi’ite challenge. … Iraqi

102 The United States and Iran Shi’ites, if liberated from this tyranny, can be expected to present a challenge to Iran’s influence and revolution. Shi’ite Islam is plagued by fissures, none of which has been carefully examined, let alone exploited, by the opponents of Iran’s Islamic republic. (Wurmser 1999: 72–4) A few pages later, Wurmser also added: “For the first time in half a century, Iraq has the chance to replace Iran as the center of Shi’ite thought, thus resuming its historic place, with its tradition of clerical quiescence and of challenge to Sunni absolutism. … A free Iraqi Shi’ite community would be a nightmare for the theocratic Islamic Republic of Iran” (Wurmser 1999: 78–9). In sum, Wurmser, one of the most influential members of the neoconservative movement, proposed killing two birds with one stone: launch a policy that “razes Saddam’s Ba’thism” and challenges Iran by empowering Iran’s rival, Iraqi Shi’ites.

9/11 and the containment of Iraq With the neoconservatives in positions of power, the fate of Iraq was sealed. All that was needed was an excuse; and the excuse came on September 11, 2001, when 19 men, mostly from Saudi Arabia, attacked the World Trade Center. Even though the attack had nothing to do with Iraq, the event provided the perfect opportunity for Perle, Wolfowitz, Feith, Wurmser, Bolton, et al., to get what they had been waiting for: an all-out attack on Iraq. They used a menu option for waging the war, including Saddam Hussein’s alleged weapons of mass destruction, his support for terrorism, harboring Al-Qaeda, violating human rights, invading Iran and Kuwait, and lack of democracy in Iraq. But as Wolfowitz said in an interview in Vanity Fair on May 9, 2003, “for reasons that have a lot to do with the U.S. government bureaucracy we settled on the one issue that everyone could agree on which was weapons of mass destruction as the core reason.”9 Thus Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction became the main excuse for waging another war against Iraq and, finally, containing it. Since it is the containment of Iran that mostly concerns us, and, also, since the circumstances concerning the second invasion of Iraq are well known, we now leave Iraq behind and return to our main subject, Iran.

The new administration, AIPAC, and renewal of ILSA As stated earlier, when the Bush cabinet was taking shape Israel was not quite sure just what US policy toward Iran would look like. Would it be formulated by the State Department or the Pentagon? Would Cheney advocate the removal of the sanctions against Iran, as he had done when he was the head of Halliburton? Would Wolfowitz and Perle make sure not only that sanctions remained in place but that the US would adopt a military approach to Iran? There was much uncertainty. This uncertainty was quite visible when, as mentioned earlier, The Jerusalem Post of January 19, 2001 could say no more with regard to Iran than sanctions “will be reevaluated.”

The neoconservatives, dual rollback, and Israel 103 The first major sanction which came up for re-evaluation in August of 2001 was the Iran–Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA). To the Israelis, the re-evaluation of ILSA appeared to be a litmus test of the Bush Administration’s policy toward Iran, and the alarm went off quite early. In an article dealing with the AIPAC conference and Ariel Sharon’s visit to the US, The Jerusalem Post of March 23, 2001 wrote about the additional aid that Israel was asking from the US and then added: “But the battle over aid could pale in comparison to disputes that may arise with the administration over sanctions, particularly unilateral US sanctions on Iran and Libya. On August 5, legislation known as the Iran–Libya Sanctions Act expires.” The report expressed Israel’s and AIPAC’s fear that ILSA might not be renewed, citing such things as corporate resistance to sanctions, the US’s reluctance to implement ILSA in the face of European opposition, and Cheney’s previous speeches against unilateral US sanctions. It quoted AIPAC executive director Howard Kohr as saying the “business community has mobilized on the issue in a way they didn’t five years ago … A number of major American corporations are organizing their own coalition with a lot of resources and mounting a very significant campaign.” Given such opposition, the report stated that “AIPAC knows it is far from a sure bet that sanctions will be saved” and, therefore, AIPAC has elevated “preserving ILSA to one of its top priorities.” “ILSA’s going to be a test for them,” the report quoted an Israeli diplomat. Lastly, the report mentioned that Congressman Henry Hyde, “chairman of the House International Relations Committee, threw his support behind a renewal of ILSA in his remarks to AIPAC.” In a similar essay on May 2, 2001, The Jerusalem Post mentioned that at the “Northeast Regional Dinner of the America–Israel Public Affairs Committee,” where Foreign Minister Shimon Peres was speaking and many members of Congress were present, Senator John D. Rockefeller promised to co-sponsor the renewal of ILSA in August. A few days later, on May 10, 2001, in a report dealing with how Israel and its lobby groups were trying to prevent Iran from getting a loan from the World Bank, The Jerusalem Post stated that on the previous day “on Capitol Hill, AIPAC executive director Howard Kohr testified before the House International Relations Middle East subcommittee on the need to keep ILSA in place.” Subsequently, on June 7, 2001, The Jerusalem Post wrote that a “battle between the Bush administration and Congress that could also pit the White House against the pro-Israel lobby AIPAC is shaping up over the Iran–Libya Sanctions Act.” According to this report, “House and Senate versions of the bill call for a full fiveyear extension, but administration officials—under pressure to eliminate the sanctions from the Europeans, who are most affected by the law, and the US business community—revealed this week that they support only a one- or two-year renewal.” But, the report stated, advocates of the bill, “like Malcolm Hoenlein, executive vice chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, say a softening of the sanctions would send an erroneous message to Iran that the US does not care about its continued support for terrorism, testing of long-range missiles, or development of weapons of mass destruction.” “One to two years is not long enough,” the report quoted Hoenlein as saying. The

104 The United States and Iran report ended with a headcount and prediction: “The House version of the bill introduced late last month has roughly 218 co-sponsors. It is expected to pass overwhelmingly in the House International Relations Committee when it comes for a vote next Wednesday. The Senate version with 72 co-sponsors is to be introduced today.” The next day, June 8, 2001, The Jerusalem Post stated that Senators Gordon Smith and Charles Schumer “introduced yesterday the Senate version of a bill to reauthorize the Iran Libya Sanctions Act for a full five years.” It then gave an even more optimistic headcount of the bill’s co-sponsors in the Senate and the House. Ultimately, Israel and its lobby groups got what they asked for. On Sunday August 5, 2001 The Jerusalem Post wrote tersely but triumphantly that “President George W. Bush signed into law on Friday a five-year renewal of the Iran–Libya Sanctions Act. Both the House and the Senate approved the renewal by overwhelming majorities.” The report added: “Bush, who had wanted only a two-year renewal, called for the sanctions to be reviewed ‘frequently to assess their effectiveness and continued suitability.’” Once again, Israel and its lobby groups had defeated the corporate lobby. On May 11, 2001 The Washington Post published a plea by the corporate heavyweight Brent Scowcroft, National Security Advisor under Presidents Ford and Bush. Scowcroft asked the new administration not to renew ILSA. But even Scowcroft could not stop the Israeli wind that was blowing in the opposite direction. The corporate lobby had to wait for another favorable wind.

9/11, the courtship dance, and the spoiler Ironically, a favorable wind started to blow in the direction of the US corporations in the wake of September 11, 2001. The attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon actually began a courtship dance between the US Department of State and Iran. Immediately after these attacks, many people in Iran, as well as elements within the Iranian government, strongly condemned them. President Khatami, for example, stated that “the Islamic Republic of Iran and I condemn the terrorist operations of hijacking and attacking public places in American cities,” and “I would like to express my deep regret and condolences to the American nation” (BBC Monitoring, Middle East, September 11, 2001). A few days later, according to The Washington Post of September 19, 2001, about “200 people, many dressed in black, held a candlelight vigil in a public square in northern Tehran” and “about 50,000 people observed a minute of silence to honor the dead at the start of the Iran–Bahrain soccer match Friday night at Tehran’s Azadi stadium.” As this report and others noted, such demonstrations—tolerated by even the conservative elements within the Iranian government—seemed to send a message to the US to improve relations between the two countries. Encouraging messages from Iran did not escape the attention of the US State Department, particularly Colin Powell. As the Daily Telegraph (London) reported on September 17, 2001, Powell “said that Iran’s comments were encouraging and hinted at possible co-operation.” The report quoted Powell as saying:

The neoconservatives, dual rollback, and Israel 105 Iran made a rather positive statement—for Iran. We have serious differences with the government of Iran because of its support of terrorism. But it seems a statement that is worth exploring to see whether they now recognize that this is a curse on the face of the earth. Some European leaders, too, tried to use the occasion to push the US and Iran closer together. For example, en route to the US, British Prime Minister Tony Blair had a satellite telephone conversation with President Khatami. Afterwards he stated: “I have just put down the phone after a conversation with the president of Iran, and that in itself was a remarkable conversation. … Not only did he give his full solidarity in terms of what had happened to the USA and his strong condemnation of terrorism. … It was a conversation I could not have imagined having a couple of weeks ago” (AFP, September 20, 2001). European diplomats were also busy delivering messages back and forth between the US and Iran. For example, subsequent to an Iranian MP signing on behalf of the Iranian Parliament the US condolence book in Tehran, the Swiss Ambassador delivered a confidential message from Powell to Iran and carried back replies to Washington (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, September 18, 2001; and September 22, 2001). Similarly, a European Union delegation headed by EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana and Belgium’s Foreign Minister, Louis Michel, left for Iran carrying messages (Financial Times, September 25, 2001). Almost at the same time Jack Straw, British Foreign Secretary, made a visit to Iran, which as the media noted was “the first visit to Iran by a British foreign minister in more than 20 years” (Daily Telegraph (Sydney), September 26, 2001). The courtship dance continued in the following month, particularly when the US invaded Afghanistan in October and, in so doing, allied itself with the Iranianbacked Afghani Northern Alliance, who were fighting the Taliban. Just before this invasion the US extended sanctions on 25 organizations listed as “terrorist groups;” among the “groups redesignated by Powell was the Mujahedin Khalq (MEK)” (St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri), October 6, 2001). Subsequently, in what The New York Times of October 16, 2001 called a “ballet” with the US, Iran “sent a secret message to the Bush administration agreeing to rescue any American military personnel in distress in its territory.” This was, as the report noted, based on a request made by the Bush Administration and agreed to by Iran. As part of the “ballet,” the same report also noted that the Administration “has, for the first time, asked a federal judge to throw out a lawsuit brought against Iran by the 52 Americans who were held hostage for 444 days beginning in 1979 and many of their relatives, who are seeking damages from the Tehran government.” In addition, the report mentioned the fact that “American and Iranian officials met face to face on Oct. 7 in an obscure United Nations-sponsored forum in Geneva for the second time since the Sept. 11 attacks to discuss the shape of a future Afghan government.” Also, on October 25, 2001, USA TODAY reported that as part of seeking “a new opening to an old enemy, a half-dozen members of Congress hosted Iran’s U.N. ambassador [Mohammed Hadi Nejad-Hosseinian] at the Capitol last week and discussed ways to ease more than 2 decades of estrangement between the

106 The United States and Iran United States and Iran.” The group of senators was headed by Arlen Specter. This, as the report went on to say, appeared to have been “the first time a senior Iranian diplomat was in the Capitol since the Iranian revolution in 1979.” Other important news in October of 2001, reported mostly on the newswires, was an expected meeting between Colin Powell and the Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi at the United Nations (The Bulletin’s Frontrunner, October 30, 2001). Probably because of pressure from certain elements within both governments such a formal meeting never materialized, but an informal meeting did take place. On November 12, 2001 AFP reported that Powell and Kharazi “had a brief but cordial exchange on Monday on the sidelines of the UN meeting on the future of Afghanistan.” According to the report, the “meeting occurred in a hallway at the UN headquarter.” Powell, the report stated, “greeted him [Kharazi] and thanked him for his kind words of support” when Kharazi made sympathetic remarks about the crash of an American airliner earlier that day. Around the same time, even the US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, showed some friendly gestures toward Iran. When appearing on Face the Nation he stated that US and Iranian military advisors are fighting side by side in Afghanistan and that Iran has “a legitimate interest in what happens in that country … And certainly they’re going to be a player in what that new government looks like because they have an interest in that” (AFP, November 11, 2001). Israel, its lobby groups, and neoconservative allies watched this courtship dance with a great deal of trepidation. Immediately after the September 11 events Israel and its allies in the US had tried to link these events to countries unfriendly to Israel. For example, the American Jewish Congress issued a press release on September 12, 2001 stating: We do not yet know who did this. We do know the identity of those who have countenanced and even encouraged the debased notion that terrorism is an appropriate response to alleged oppression. One way or another, they are complicit in yesterday’s tragedy. Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Libya have proudly defended the political use of terrorism. Any country that has excused, justified or given shelter to terrorists must share the blame for what happened yesterday. (PR Newswire, September 12, 2001) The same messages appeared in the Israeli media. For example, on September 12, 2001 The Jerusalem Post stated that “former Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu called upon all democratic nations of the world to join an international coalition to crush the terrorist organizations and the regimes that sponsor them.” The report stated that “Netanyahu warned last night that the attack could be a harbinger of worse tragedies that could kill millions of people once Iran or Iraq acquires nuclear weapons.” The same report went on to state that the “fact that no organization took responsibility for the attacks is irrelevant, Netanyahu said, because the root cause of the attacks are ‘terrorist states like Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and the Palestinian entity’ that want to ‘devour the West.’” Similarly, in an editorial piece The Jerusalem Post of September 13, 2001 wrote that “a war against terrorism that avoids

The neoconservatives, dual rollback, and Israel 107 the issue of regime change in countries such as Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan cannot be won, because it has not even really been joined.” A day later, again in The Jerusalem Post, Netanyahu wrote another editorial piece asking the US to show “firm and resolute action” and to home in on its targets: “Down the line, a far worse catastrophe may be in the offing: terrorist regimes like Iran and Iraq wielding atomic weapons.” The campaign by Israel and its lobby groups to pin the blame for the September 11 attacks on countries unfriendly to Israel—particularly Iran, Iraq, and Syria— and get the US to overthrow the government of these countries was intense. Instead, what they saw coming initially from the US State Department was an attempt to build a coalition with Iran and Syria. This, Israel, its lobby groups, and neoconservatives found unbearable and tried to change. On September 21, 2001 The Jerusalem Post reported that “Netanyahu, testifying before the House Government Reform Committee, said yesterday that if the US includes terrorismsponsoring regimes like Syria, Iran, or the Palestinian Authority in a coalition against worldwide terrorism, then the alliance ‘will be defeated from the beginning.’” “Take away all the state support and the entire scaffolding of international terrorism will collapse into the dust,” The Jerusalem Post quoted Netanyahu as saying. He was further quoted as saying “The international terrorist network is based on regimes—on Iraq, on Iran, on Syria, on Taliban Afghanistan, Yasser Arafat’s Palestinian Authority, and several other Arab regimes such as the Sudan.” According to this same report, “Netanyahu, aligning himself with those like Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz—who would like the US war to include action against Iraq, a terrorist-sponsoring state bent on acquiring weapons of mass destruction—warned that a failure to preempt acquisition by Iraq or Iran of such capabilities would lead to hundreds of thousands of casualties.” Needless to say, as the report also noted, Netanyahu “received unprecedented applause at the end of his testimony.” A few days later, on September 29, 2001, the Daily Telegraph (London) reported that Richard Perle, consultant to Donald Rumsfeld, had harshly criticized Jack Straw’s visit to Iran and said: “There was a rather foolish foray from the British foreign minister to Teheran, for exactly what purpose I cannot be sure. But it certainly looked as though it was an effort to add Iran to the coalition which, in light of Iran’s support for terrorists, seems to me absurd.” The report also indicated that Israeli officials were furious about Straw’s visit to Iran and said it was a “knife in Israel’s back.” Indeed, The Jerusalem Post of September 25, 2001 stated that Sharon cancelled a planned meeting with Straw after the British Foreign Minister said in Tehran: “One of the factors that helps breed terror is the anger that many people in the region feel at events over the years in the Palestinian territories.”10 On October 21, 2001 the Chicago Sun-Times published an interview with Richard Perle. In response to a question concerning Rumsfeld having said that “America is at war with terrorism but not any state,” Perle stated: If we confine ourselves to the terrorists alone, we will lose the war. We will alter our way of life significantly to provide for our security, and we will

108 The United States and Iran change the nature of our open society. We will suffer more attacks of this kind, and possibly much larger ones. It’s a strategy that will fail. The interviewer then asked Perle if “Iran and Iraq must be part of this campaign?” Perle responded by saying: “And Syria. And the others.” “But the administration is not saying so,” the interviewer stated. Perle answered “No, they’re not. And I can understand why. Even if they agree with it, they do not find it convenient to say so now. And I have no quarrel with that. But in the end, they will either share this view and act accordingly, or we will get hit again, and then they will share this view.” Israel, its allies in the US government—such as Perle—and its lobby groups were hard at work reprimanding the Department of State and trying to derail any efforts on its part to modify the US policy in the Middle East and build coalitions. The most serious warning, ultimately, came from none other than Ariel Sharon. As The New York Times wrote on October 6, 2001, “Mr. Sharon stunned and surprised the Bush administration when he called on the United States not to ‘repeat the terrible mistake of 1938, when enlightened European democracies decided to sacrifice Czechoslovakia so as to reach a convenient temporary solution.’” He warned Mr. Bush not to “appease the Arabs at our expense; we cannot accept it.” What made Sharon furious was not just the attempt by Powell and some European leaders to reach out to countries such as Iran, but Powell’s attitude toward the Palestinians. Following the September 11 attacks, Colin Powell and even George W. Bush, sensing that such attacks are related to US policy in the Middle East, began to talk about the creation of a Palestinian state. For example, according to The Jerusalem Post of October 3, 2001, Bush stated on October 2: “The idea of a Palestinian state has always been a part of a vision, so long as the right of Israel to exist is respected.” Also, in the early phase of post-September 11 imposition of sanctions against “terrorist groups,” the US Department of State did not include some militant factions fighting against Israel. Indeed, as made clear in a Reuters report of October 25, 2001, Colin Powell argued at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that “some groups sometimes described as terrorist might be seeking to redress grievances, gain rights or achieve freedom from oppressors.” The report quoted Powell as saying that “not every case would be ‘black and white’ and that there would be ‘gray areas’ that might need to be treated politically.” Powell was further quoted as saying “you start to run into areas where one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter and that is where you have to apply judgment. … These are difficult calls to make. … You can be quite challenged in explaining these differences with respect to the Middle East.” Such comments, concerning a vision of a Palestinian state and attitudes toward militant Palestinian groups, made the Israelis quite enraged. For example, the aforementioned report in The New York Times of October 6, 2001 stated “Mr. Sharon was angered that the administration did not place Hezbollah and Hamas, two militant Muslim anti-Israeli organizations, on a list of terrorist organizations whose financial assets would be seized.” Moreover, the report stated, “the Israeli

The neoconservatives, dual rollback, and Israel 109 Prime Minister also was angered earlier this week when administration officials said they were considering a new diplomatic initiative that would embrace the idea of a Palestinian state.” The Jerusalem Post of October 7, 2001 reported the same “warning” to Washington by Sharon. It also added that Powell’s “overtures to Israel’s top foes—Iran and Syria—to join its war on terrorism” has made AIPAC nervous. In addition, the report stated that AIPAC would back US policies only under certain conditions, such as if the “war on terror” includes all “terrorist groups,” including Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah, or if the “administration sets criteria that rogue nations must meet before joining the US-led coalition against terrorism.” Subsequently, in a lengthy article which began by asking “Is Saddam Hussein next?”, The Jerusalem Post of October 12, 2001 brought up the issue of “the two camps” in the administration, one “led by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz,” who “wants the US to define the war on terrorism as broadly as possible and to target all state sponsors of terrorism, particularly Iraq,” and the other “associated with Secretary of State Colin Powell,” who would like to see the US “building coalitions” with countries like Iran.11 The article then stated: “For now, Israeli officials have not engaged the Bush administration on the Iraq question, but rather have lobbied in general for a broader definition of terrorism that includes groups and states bent on Israel’s destruction. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, in his two visits to the US to meet with Bush, focused most of his chat time on the issue of long-range, existential threats to Israel emanating from Iraq and Iran.” In early November, under heavy pressure, the State Department finally gave in to one of the main demands of Israel and its allies in the US. As The Jerusalem Post of November 4, 2001 announced victoriously, in “a move applauded by pro-Israel advocates, the US has added anti-Israeli terrorist groups Hamas, Hizbullah, Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine to a presidential executive order that instructs foreign banks and financial institutions to freeze terrorists’ accounts or face American sanctions.” This, however, did not satisfy Israel and its lobby groups. They had two other major demands: an end to any talks about the creation of a Palestinian state and the termination of any rapprochement between the State Department and Iran. On November 16, 2001 The Jerusalem Post reported: Israel has loudly protested any signs of US cuddling up to Iran and certainly would fear any expansion of Iranian influence over Afghanistan in a postTaliban world. The US has tried to assuage Israeli concerns with promises that Iran is not being brought into the coalition immediately, repeating frequently that nations must ‘choose sides’ in the war on terrorism, and by adding Iranian-backed Hizbullah to an executive order calling for the freezing of terrorist assets. The same report quoted “Rebecca Needler, a spokeswoman for AIPAC” as saying “Iran, the number one sponsor of terrorism, is being given an unprecedented opportunity. Iran must decide whether it will continue to sponsor terrorism or join the US-led effort against terrorism.”

110 The United States and Iran It was now just a matter of time before Israel and its allies in the US achieved their goals of ending the US Department of State’s rapprochement with Iran and stopping the “vision” of a Palestinian state. Conveniently enough, both goals were achieved after a single “incident” involving, allegedly, Iran and the Palestinian Authority.

The puzzling Karine-A affair On Sunday January 6, 2002 The Jerusalem Post reported: In a sensational Friday afternoon press conference, Chief of General Staff Lt.Gen. Shaul Mofaz revealed that Israel had captured a Palestinian Authority ship laden with illegal weapons in the Red Sea. The ship, the Karine-A, left Iran several days ago and was carrying 50 tons of armaments when it was captured by Israel Navy commandos on Thursday, some 500 nautical miles off Israel’s coastline in international waters. This daring operation, which succeeded in thwarting the PA’s brazen attempt to smuggle weapons of war, only serves to underline the dangers posed by rogue regimes such as Iran and the PA to regional peace and security. “In addition to the usual array of light weapons,” The Jerusalem Post report continued, “the ship contained a terrorist’s wish-list of high-powered and extremely lethal arms.” One day later, on January 7, 2002, The Jerusalem Post quoted Ariel Sharon as saying: By his own behavior, Arafat has made himself irrelevant and a bitter enemy of Israel. … Arafat has taken another step by linking himself with the center of world terror—Iran. (Arafat) is behaving like an enemy in every way. Anyone who is preparing these sorts of destructive weapons understands that their sole intention was to put Israel in an insufferable position. The report also quoted Sharon as saying the “PA is a major player in the network of international terrorism, spearheaded by Iran and aimed at sowing death and destruction throughout the entire world.” On the following day, January 8, 2002, The Jerusalem Post also stated that “the Karine A was registered to an Iraqi national.” Almost immediately after the news broke, both Iran and the Palestinian Authority denied any involvement with the weapons shipment (The Irish Times, January 7, 2002). The Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman stated that Israel was making the allegations to “intensify a crackdown on the Palestinian intifada” (The Seattle Times, January 9, 2002). Arafat, too, as reported by AFP, January 8, 2002, “denied any involvement in the purchase or transport of the 50 tonnes of arms but has pledged to launch an inquiry into the incident which has threatened to derail a renewed US peace effort headed by envoy Anthony Zinni.” Indeed, Arafat announced shortly after the alleged incident that “he had launched an internal investigation into Israel’s capture of a ship it said was smuggling arms, and vowed

The neoconservatives, dual rollback, and Israel 111 to punish anyone involved” (The Jerusalem Post, January 8, 2002). Even Hezbollah, which is usually not shy about its activities, “denied Israeli charges that it was involved in the arms shipment” (The Washington Post, January 7, 2002). Besides the fact that both Iran and the Palestinian Authority denied having anything to do with the Karine-A affair, several aspects of the story raised puzzling questions. First, the timing of the incident was too convenient. It came at a time when Israel was trying hard to stop any talk of a Palestinian state and any cozying up between the US State Department and Iran. Second, there were certain logical problems with the story, some of which were raised by a few Israeli analysts. For example, according to Israel, one of the original sins of Iran was its opposition to the Oslo peace process, a process which was supported by the Palestinian Authority and Arafat. Another sin was Iran’s support for the three groups, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah. All these groups were opposed to the Olso peace process. Given this opposition, it made little sense for Iran to send arms to the Palestinian Authority. Also, given that many in the Iranian government, including some conservative elements, were trying to improve relations with the US, it is hard to imagine that they would choose this particular time to establish relations with Arafat. Moreover, given the prevailing tense situation after September 11 and heightened alert, why would Iran choose a perilous journey through troubled waters to send arms to the Palestinian Authority? Furthermore, given the bad blood between the US and Iraq, as well as Iraq and Iran, it was unclear why Iran would choose a ship registered to an Iraqi national to deliver arms. These and many other questions made the Karine-A affair quite puzzling. Actually, given the denial of both Iran and the Palestinian Authority, The Jerusalem Post of January 18, 2002 wrote that “some Israeli pundits warn that the denials cannot be dismissed offhand, because the evidence is simply too shaky.” The Jerusalem Post added that according “to Post columnist Gerald Steinberg, director of the Program on Conflict Resolution and Negotiation at Bar-Ilan University, if the arms shipment did originate in Iran, it may have been organized by one of the quasi-military organizations associated with the country’s more conservative elements.” The Jerusalem Post also pointed out another difficulty with the alleged affair, the fact that “most of Israel’s evidence remains strictly confidential.” Given the convenient timing of the affair and some logical holes in the account, one would not have expected the Karine-A story to make much of a headline in the US. Yet the alleged affair became sensational news in the US. The Washington Post, for example, uncritically reported the affair a number of times, and on January 9, 2002 published Sharon’s warning about “what he called an emerging alliance between the Palestinian Authority, Iran and Hezbollah.” Similarly, The New York Times of January 10, 2002 carried a typical William Safire editorial piece entitled “Arafat’s Implausible Denials,” in which Safire declared, with complete certainty, that the “clear purpose of the 50 tons of Iranian arms, intercepted by Israeli commandos last week, was to help Yasir Arafat’s coalition of terror win Iran’s undeclared war on Israel.” The US government uncritically accepted Israel’s claims about the Karine-A and even the US State Department joined the chorus. On January 11, 2001, for example, The Jerusalem Post reported Bush as saying in reference to Arafat: “I think it’s very

112 The United States and Iran important for our administration to remain engaged with both parties. Obviously, I want to make sure that the evidence is definitive, but I’m, like many, beginning to suspect that those arms were headed … to promote terror.” The report quoted Powell as saying: “We are deeply disturbed by the arrival of this ship in the region and the fact that it could have completed its mission and offloaded weapons that would have been put to the worst kind of use against Israel and others in the region.” On January 25, 2002 The Jerusalem Post reported that the White House “backed the [Israeli] government’s decision to keep Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat in Ramallah, and a US official told The Jerusalem Post the Aksa Martyrs’ Brigades would soon be added to the State Department list of foreign terrorist organizations.” It further added that when asked by “reporters whether President George W. Bush believes it is proper for Arafat to be ‘boxed in’ in Ramallah, White House spokesman Ari Fleischer said: ‘The president understands the reason that Israel has taken the action that it takes, and it is up to Chairman Arafat to demonstrate the leadership to combat terrorism.’” The report also added that “since Israeli intelligence officials briefed American officials on the Karine A two weeks ago, there has been a palpable paralysis in US diplomacy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, particularly because of a deep split between the Pentagon and the State Department on how to proceed.” The “State Department,” the report went on to say, “is firmly against some of the toughest options being aired, like closing the PLO representative’s office here, severing ties with Arafat, or levying sanctions on the PA.” But, according to the report, from “the Pentagon, there are calls to take tough measures against Arafat and the PA. The Pentagon, which has taken the lead in the war on terrorism, largely believes cooperation among the PA, Hizbullah, and Iran—as illustrated by the Karine A affair— leaves the US no choice but to sever ties with Arafat.” On January 25, 2002 The Washington Post further reported: “Some administration officials, in particular those centered in Vice President Cheney’s office, want to see the United States break its ties with Arafat because they consider him to be untrustworthy and tainted by terrorism, officials said.” The same report stated that “White House officials were particularly exasperated by a letter Arafat sent to Bush within the past week in which Arafat said he knew nothing about the arms shipment, according to sources familiar with the correspondence. Officials were incredulous, finding his denial insulting.” This same report stated that pressure is also coming from Representatives Tom Lantos and Gary L. Ackerman to cut all contacts with Arafat. Ackerman, in particular, was quoted as saying: “We have to, first of all, continue to keep our own State Department’s feet to the fire.” According to the report, Ackerman “threatened to withhold funding when Powell presents his budget.” The following day, it was reported that after a White House meeting, in which a range of sanctions against the Palestinian leader were considered, President Bush decided to continue the suspension of U.S. peacemaking efforts by retired Gen. Anthony Zinni, his special envoy. … The president also reportedly authorized aides to escalate their criticism of Arafat” (Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (Pennsylvania), January 26, 2002). The day after, The Jerusalem Post quoted Bush as saying “[o]rdering up weapons that were intercepted on a boat headed for that part

The neoconservatives, dual rollback, and Israel 113 of the world is not part of fighting terror. That’s enhancing terror.” It also reported that Powell was coming along and was weighing “the idea of tough sanctions on the PA or freezing ties with Arafat at this time.” In short, the puzzling Karine-A affair killed two birds with one stone. The Palestinian initiative was dead. As David Frum, President Bush’s speech writer, would write a year after the alleged affair: “The Karine A. incident finished off Arafat in Bush’s eyes. In conversation, Bush ceased to conceal either his contempt for the thuggish Palestinian or his irritation with the thug’s European protectors. ‘They just luuuuuve Arafat,’ he would say with elongated wonder” (National Review Online, January 27, 2003). Similarly, the rapprochement with Iran was over. The death of both initiatives was officially proclaimed in the famous “axis of evil” speech.

The “axis of evil” speech On January 29, 2002 President Bush delivered his State of the Union Address, in which he stated: North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens. Iran aggressively pursues these weapons and exports terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian people’s hope for freedom. Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror. The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and nuclear weapons for over a decade. This is a regime that has already used poison gas to murder thousands of its own citizens—leaving the bodies of mothers huddled over their dead children. This is a regime that agreed to international inspections—then kicked out the inspectors. This is a regime that has something to hide from the civilized world. States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic. 12 In this well-known “axis of evil” speech, President Bush blended together North Korea, Iran, and Iraq as dangerous enemies of the United States. The speech made it clear to anyone in the US government, particularly Secretary of State Colin Powell, not only that Iran should not be treated as a potential partner in the “war on terror” but should be included in the war itself. Following the speech it was reported that David Frum’s wife had stated in emails to friends that it was her husband who had included the phrase “axis of evil” in the speech. Later, the news was corrected to say that “Frum proposed ‘axis of hate’ to describe Iraq, Iran and North Korea” and it was Michael Gerson, Bush’s chief speechwriter, who “changed ‘hate’ to ‘evil’” (Chicago Sun-Times, February

114 The United States and Iran 10, 2002). Whether “axis of evil” or “axis of hate,” President Bush’s speech showed how Israel and its allies had taken almost complete command of US foreign policy in the Middle East. Indeed, in evaluating how much clout Israel had over the Bush inner circle and how happy Israelis were with the turn of events, The Jerusalem Post of January 18, 2002 wrote: “many of Bush’s key senior staff are Jews, including Ari Fleischer, the face of the White House; Josh Bolten, the deputy chief of staff; Ken Melman, Karl Rove’s right-hand man; David Frum, Bush’s economic speech writer; and arguably the most influential of them all.” This was, of course, written before President Bush delivered David Frum’s “axis of evil” or “axis of hate” speech. Afterwards, The Jerusalem Post published numerous articles reporting Israeli praise for Bush’s speech, particularly for including Iran in the “axis of evil.” On January 31, 2002, for example, an editorial piece in The Jerusalem Post stated: “When historians sum up the first decade of the 21st century, US President George W. Bush may stand as one whose role in rescuing the free world is best compared with that of Winston Churchill, some six decades before.” On the same day, the Post quoted Dore Gold, a foreign policy advisor to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, as saying the “‘headline’ of US President George W. Bush’s state of the union address as far as Israel is concerned was the mention of Iran as part of the ‘axis of evil.’” In another editorial piece on February 6, 2002, after mentioning the alleged Karine-A affair, the Post wrote: “Bush was right on target, therefore, when he cited Iran as a member of the ‘axis of evil’ in his State of the Union speech last week. … Both in its actions and in its words, Iran has become a global menace.” In a number of such articles published by The Jerusalem Post there were also references to how Israel had influenced the new US policy. For example, on February 7, 2002, in yet another editorial piece, The Jerusalem Post wrote: “Arafat has become a squeaky wheel hanging off Bush’s aptly named ‘axis of evil.’ For the first time and for its own reasons, America is actually ahead of Israel in correctly focusing on the regional problem of militant Islam rather than the Palestinian issue. Israeli prime ministers have for years urged the US to pay more attention to Iran and Iraq, but now Sharon will be pushing on an open door.” In another essay, on February 22, 2002, which was aptly titled “Sharon’s Czech-mate,” the Post mentioned how Sharon’s earlier warning to the US about not repeating “the dreadful mistake of 1938, when enlightened European democracies decided to sacrifice Czechoslovakia for a convenient temporary solution” had “made an about-face” in US policy and put all the “bad guys,” i.e. Iran, Iraq, Syria, Hamas, Hezbollah, and Arafat, on notice. In addition to the above, some of The Jerusalem Post articles reported on how the so-called neoconservatives had influenced Bush’s thinking, his “axis of evil” speech, and the overall change in US policy. For example, in an enlightening essay, published on March 1, 2002, entitled “A Kristol-clear Perspective,” The Jerusalem Post interviewed William Kristol, the “conservative American-Jewish commentator and Weekly Standard editor,” who according to the Post was “now ‘the hottest pundit’ in Washington.” According to this lengthy interview, William Kristol, a “neo-conservative” son of Irving Kristol, stated that he was not a fan of former

The neoconservatives, dual rollback, and Israel 115 President George Bush because he thought he was “weak in foreign policy—especially regarding Israel—and who failed terribly by not taking out Saddam in 1991.” But since September 11, 2001, the article stated, Kristol had “become one of the younger Bush’s No. 1 fans.” The Post then stated that after Bush’s “axis of evil” speech Kristol wrote an opinion piece in praise of the President, which stated that Bush’s declaration not to allow the “most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons” was “the most significant sentence spoken by an American president in almost 20 years.” Furthermore, the Post wrote that Kristol was happy to see that Bush had changed the policy of rapprochement, decided to isolate Arafat, and listed Iran in the “axis of evil” in “the wake of the Karine A arms smuggling affair.” Above all, the Post spoke of the direct and indirect influence that Kristol himself has had in formulating the “axis of evil” policy. As an example of “Kristol’s indirect influence,” the Post mentioned “that the phrase [axis of evil] was rumored to have been penned by Weekly Standard alumnus-turned Bush speechwriter David Frum.” Of course, the Post pointed out, Kristol’s “main target nowadays is Iraq; fighting and ultimately ousting Saddam has become Kristol’s cause célèbre.” Saddam being “in power with nukes, VX (a chemical weapon), and anthrax,” as well as suggesting that Saddam may have had a role in the September 11 attack, were mentioned by the Post as reasons behind Kristol’s push to attack Iraq. In this push the Post argued that some of “Kristol’s critics suggest that his Iraq policy is influenced more by Israeli interests than US ones,” but Kristol “points out that Israel is in fact more concerned with Iran than Iraq, and that he is not in agreement with the Israeli government on every issue.” It goes without saying that Bush’s “axis of evil” speech not only pleased Israel and the neoconservatives who helped to draft it in the first place, but also Israeli lobby groups in the US. On April 4, 2002 The Washington Post reported: “President Bush’s stalwart support of Israel is winning effusive praise from major organizations representing American Jews, who voted against Bush in overwhelming numbers 17 months ago.” The report then added: “Several leading pro-Israel lobbyists said they have concluded that Bush is profoundly, personally sympathetic to Israel. They attributed that sympathy to the president’s religious outlook, his inclination to think in terms of good and evil.” “Friends of Israel,” the report quoted the executive director of AIPAC Howard Kohr saying, “feel a sense of deep appreciation for the stance that the administration, led by the president, is taking at this moment of crisis.” The report continued: AIPAC praised the president’s State of the Union address for his reference to Iraq and Iran as part of an “axis of evil.” And, Kohr said, “it is not lost on our community that the foreign leader who has been more times to the White House than any other” is Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, while Arafat has not been invited even once since Bush took office. The report also quoted Kohr as saying that Bush’s “deep personal feelings about Israel … have a connection to his own religious beliefs about Israel, about good and evil, that infuse all the things he’s been doing since September 11th.”

116 The United States and Iran In the end, Israel, its various lobby groups, and its neoconservative allies, in and out of the Bush Administration, were quite pleased at this change in direction of US policy toward Iran. Bush’s speech ended any Iran initiative. On February 8, 2002, a few days after the speech, the Christian Science Monitor would state: “In a significant policy shift propelled by the war on terrorism, the Bush administration has effectively ruled out a rapprochement with the government of Iran—while voicing support for popular opposition to the Tehran regime.” The report quoted an unidentified “senior Pentagon official” referring to the “axis of evil” speech and saying: “The president settled the whole debate by saying ‘Iran, this is not the moment. This is not a regime we can have a warm and fuzzy relationship with.’” The same report quoted Richard Perle as saying the “broad public [in Iran] is openly fed up with the government. I think it is the beginning of the end for the Iranian regime.” A case now had to be made for “regime change” in Iran. Before this could happen, however, the neoconservatives needed to concentrate their efforts on making a case for attacking Iraq and containing it once and for all. How the case was made is, of course, highly interesting. But the limited scope of this inquiry forces us to skip discussing the 2003 invasion of Iraq and to continue with the case of Iran. Before doing so, however, let us briefly discuss some major differences between Israel and its neoconservative allies over Iran policy.

Israel, neoconservatives, and Iran In the above-mentioned “A Kristol-clear Perspective” article in The Jerusalem Post of March 1, 2002, William Kristol stated that he had some differences with Israel over Iran and Iraq policy and that “Israel is in fact more concerned with Iran than Iraq.” This difference—which existed not only between Kristol and Israel but between Israel and many other neoconservatives—is worth examining. As stated in the previous chapters, after the 1991 invasion of Iraq by the US and the severe sanctions imposed on Iraq, Israel turned its attention mostly toward Iran. This was the case even as the US was preparing the groundwork for attacking Iraq for a second time. For example, on January 4, 2002, shortly before Bush’s “axis of evil” speech, The Jerusalem Post published an editorial piece by Binyamin Netanyahu about what US policy should be. The piece, which was quoted in some US newspapers, employed a commonly used Israeli theme, one that equates the “war on terror” with the war against “Nazism,” “Hitler,” or “totalitarianism.” In this scheme, if the US attacks a number of countries in the Middle East, destroys their “totalitarian mindset,” and brings about a “democratic mindset,” then the “war on terror” would succeed. This justification for war, which had been argued by Netanyahu and other Israelis many times before, ultimately became the cornerstone of US foreign policy.13 In the Jerusalem Post editorial piece of January 4, 2002 Netanyahu used this excuse to target a number of countries or organizations for US attack: Today, the US understands that the best way to defeat terror is not to concentrate on bringing individual terrorists to justice, but rather, to destroy the

The neoconservatives, dual rollback, and Israel 117 regimes that support terror. Terrorist organizations are not suspended in midair. They train their operatives, indoctrinate their recruits, and hatch their plots from territory sheltered by certain regimes. Take away the support of sovereign states, and the entire scaffolding of international terror collapses into the dust. American power topples the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, and the alQaida network there crumbles on its own. The United States must now act similarly against the other terror regimes—Iran, Iraq, Arafat’s dictatorship, Syria, and a few others. Some of these regimes will have to be toppled, some of them punished and deterred. But all must be made to understand a simple message: surrender terrorism or surrender power. Netanyahu’s rank ordering of “terror regimes” that must be overthrown illustrates Israel’s desire to see Iran targeted by the US before Iraq. Besides Netanyahu there were other Israelis who, after Bush’s “axis of evil” speech, argued that Iran must be put at the top of the US target list. For example, on January 31, 2002 AP reported that Ephraim Sneh, the Israeli Transportation Minister, “welcomed President Bush’s ‘Axis of Evil’ speech characterizing Iran as a supporter of terrorism, but called on Washington to pressure Russia to stop helping Iran’s nuclear weapons program.” “The most important and maybe the most urgent thing is to urge the Russians to stop technological assistance (to Iran),” Sneh was quoted as saying in the report. Furthermore, the report stated that Sneh was “calling for economic sanctions against Tehran to deny it the funds to nuclear arms.” Similarly, the report stated that Shimon Peres, the Israeli Foreign Minister, had told the Israeli parliament a day earlier that “Iran has provided the Hezbollah with about 10,000 missiles with ranges between 20 to 70 kilometers … sufficient to ignite regional conflagration.” Peres was reported also as saying that “Iran is developing missiles that could reach Europe and later, North America.” In the same report Sneh likened this alleged deployment of Iranian missiles to the “1962 Cuban missile crisis.” A few days later, the Israeli Defense Minister Binyamin Ben Eliezer was quoted as saying to a group of Jewish leaders: “The worst thing is that by very close support of Russians and North Koreans, they (Iran) are to produce their first non-conventional bomb, within the year 2005” (AFP, February 6, 2002). Such sensational news coming shortly after Bush’s “axis of evil” speech forced Iran to warn the US and Israel against any military adventure. On February 5, 2002 AFP quoted the Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi as saying that Israel was “hijacking the anti-terrorism effort and changing it to unconditional US support for occupation and state terrorism.” According to the same report, Hamid-Reza Asefi, Kharazi’s spokesman, stated that the “recent US accusations against Iran are inspired by the Zionist regime” and that any US attack on Iran would be “a huge, irresponsible mistake.” Noting the tension created by the Israeli saber-rattling and the Iranian reaction, the same AFP report of February 5, 2002 stated that some US officials had become concerned with the “increasingly alarmist declarations Israel has been making toward its arch enemy [Iran].” The report also said that when Sharon visited Washington in the next few days, he would be asked “to soften his tone towards Iran.”

118 The United States and Iran Sharon’s tone, however, was not softened. On February 7, 2002 The Washington Post reported that upon his arrival in the US, Sharon and other Israeli officials would be “redoubling efforts to warn the Bush administration that Iran poses a greater threat than the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein.” According to the report, a “series of Israeli leaders have carried that message to Washington recently in the hope of influencing a debate that has centered not on Iran but on whether to pursue the overthrow of the Iraqi government.” The report also stated that in his meeting with Vice President Cheney the day before, Israeli Defense Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer “warned of the hazards posed by Iranian support for terrorist groups and development of advanced weapons. ‘Today, everybody is busy with Iraq,’ Ben-Eliezer said in an interview. ‘Iraq is a problem. … But you should understand, if you ask me, today Iran is more dangerous than Iraq.’” As to why Iran must be targeted before Iraq, Israeli officials used the menu option, which included Iran’s involvement in the alleged Karine-A affair, Iran providing weapons to, and working with, “the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah,” “Iran’s pursuit of missiles capable of striking Israel with chemical and biological weapons,” Iran dispatching “Revolutionary Guards to foment antiIsrael activity in Lebanon,” Iran being on “schedule to develop a nuclear bomb by 2005,” etc. The report also stated that Israeli officials see Saddam Hussein as “posing less of a threat than Iran after more than a decade of U.N. sanctions and international isolation.” Upon his arrival in the US Sharon and other Israeli officials did in fact try to persuade the Bush Administration to rethink strategy and target Iran before Iraq. For example, on February 8, 2002 The Boston Globe quoted an “Israeli military official” as saying that “the Israelis told their American counterparts that ‘Iran is standing at the head of a global coalition of terror’ for its support of Palestinian groups and other militant organizations.” It further added that the “Israelis also believe that Iran poses a greater risk than Iraq because of its advanced missile program, and because of fears it could develop nuclear weapons.” Yet in spite of repeated pressure, Sharon and his entourage could not get the Bush Administration to target Iran before Iraq, and the US went ahead with its plan to invade Iraq. Once the plan for the invasion of Iraq became certain, the Israelis tried to make the best of the situation by arguing that Iran should be next. In an interview with The Times on November 5, 2002 Sharon stated that he considered Iran to be the “centre of world terror,” and “that as soon as an Iraq conflict is concluded, he will push for Iran to be at the top of the ‘to do’ list.” This was, indeed, what Sharon and his associates did. Once the US had invaded and occupied Iraq, Israel and its allies in the US moved Iran to the top of the US’s “to do” list, as we shall see in the next chapter. But for the time being, we should note the difference between what the Israelis wished for, i.e. the US targeting Iran before Iraq, and what their neoconservative counterparts in the US were trying to achieve, i.e. the US attacking Iraq before moving on to Iran. It is difficult to say why this difference existed. One possible explanation is that the neoconservatives were more realistic than their Israeli counterparts about what was feasible when it came to US military operations. They knew Iraq was a much easier target than Iran.

The neoconservatives, dual rollback, and Israel 119 Moreover, the neoconservatives had a much better appraisal of what was achievable given the personality of the President. They knew that Bush had limited knowledge of the Middle East. Also, they were well aware of George W. Bush’s personal animosity toward Saddam Hussein, given his father’s supposedly unfinished war against Hussein and the alleged attempt by the Iraqi Intelligence Service to assassinate the former president. In addition, the neoconservatives knew, as The Washington Post of April 4, 2002 pointed out, that Bush was “profoundly, personally sympathetic to Israel,” and that this sympathy stemmed from his religious views and his inclination to see the world in terms of “good and evil.” If the reports concerning the President’s religious beliefs were correct, the neoconservatives close to the President must have known about it as well. The Washington Post of June 27, 2003, for example, reported that according to the Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz, President Bush had told Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Abu Mazen that “God told me to strike at al Qaeda and I struck them, and then he instructed me to strike at Saddam [Hussein], which I did, now I am determined to solve the problem in the Middle East.” The report of the President talking directly to God has not been confirmed, since the White House refused to comment on a “private conversation” when the story resurfaced in a BBC documentary in 2005.14 Confirmed or not, however, the extreme religious views of President Bush were all too well known to the neoconservatives and Israeli lobby groups. As pointed out earlier, The Washington Post of April 4, 2002 quoted the executive director of AIPAC, Howard Kohr, as saying that President Bush’s “deep personal feelings about Israel … have a connection to his own religious beliefs about Israel, about good and evil, that infuse all the things he’s been doing since September 11th.” Following the September 11 events, these “deep personal feelings about Israel” must have been exploited by the neoconservatives to nudge the President—who saw Saddam Hussein as the embodiment of evil poised to destroy Israel—in the direction of invading Iraq. The neoconservatives must have known, however, that invading Iran would be harder to sell to President Bush, since he did not seem to have the same intense religious beliefs about the Iranian government as he had about Saddam Hussein, at least not immediately after September 11, 2001. Israeli leaders, on the other hand, were thinking strategically. Iraq, as we have seen them argue, after two wars and a decade of UN sanctions, was mostly contained. Its economy was in ruins and its military forces in tatters. Iran, on the other, was not contained. After more than two decades of US sanctions, Iran was still standing, and its economy, with all its difficulties, was growing at a healthy rate. It had also rebuilt its military forces since the Iran–Iraq war. Strategically, therefore, in the eyes of Israeli leaders it was Iran that the US had to target first and not Iraq. But this argument, which they presented repeatedly, would not change the mind of a President who, purportedly, was told by God to “strike at Saddam.” In the end the Israelis had to settle for the reverse order of business—something that neoconservatives could actually deliver, given the mindset of the President: the US contains Iraq first and then Iran. Given this reality, Israel had to wait and prepare the ground for putting Iran at the top of the US’s “to do” list after Iraq. How this was accomplished is dealt with in the next chapter.

7

Pushing Iran to the top of the “to do” lists

Following the “axis of evil” speech the Bush Administration, pushed by Israel, tried to prepare the groundwork for confronting Iran after invading Iraq. As in the case of Iraq, the menu was employed. But the US’s menu option was broader than what was put forward by Israel. Besides the usual “misbehaviors” of Iran—such as support for “terrorist” groups opposed to Israel and pursuit of weapons of mass destruction—the US menu included such “misbehaviors” as Iran destabilizing Afghanistan, harboring Al-Qaeda, lacking democracy, being ruled by unelected individuals, violating human rights, not protecting the rights of women, not being forward-looking and modern.1 Yet, as in the case of Iraq, the US and Israel finally settled “on the one issue that everyone could agree on which was weapons of mass destruction as the core reason,” to use Paul Wolfowitz’s apt explanation for invading Iraq (Vanity Fair, May 9, 2003). The US and Israel now had to make a case for why Iran needed to be targeted. The first effective step in this direction came in late summer of 2002.

MEK, its “revelation,” and the Israeli connection On August 14, 2002 a representative of the US-designated “terrorist” organization MEK, Alireza Jafarzadeh, held a dramatic press conference at Willard Inter-Continental Hotel, in Washington, DC about “New Information on Top-Secret Projects of the Iranian Regime’s Nuclear Program” (Federal News Service, August 14, 2002).2 Jafarzadeh claimed that what he was going to “reveal today is the result of extensive research and investigation by the Committee of Defense and Strategic Studies of the National Council of Resistance of Iran.” The main revelation was about “two topsecret sites of the Iran regime that they have succeeded to keep it secret until today. One of these two top-secret projects is a project in the city of Natanz … The other one is the—Arak’s atomic facility.” The purpose of the “Natanz project,” according to Jafarzadeh, was “nuclear fuel production.” The second project at Arak, contended Jafarzadeh, was “a heavy water project.” After a long, arduous, and confusing litany of street names and individuals allegedly associated with these “top-secret” sites, Jafarzadeh went on to discuss further the “horrifying weapons of mass destruction program of the Iranian regime,” such as chemical and biological weapons. In the question and answer period that ensued Jafarzadeh was asked by a reporter what his source

Pushing Iran to the top of the “to do” lists 121 of information was. In faltering English Jafarzadeh answered “Now, number one, in response, you—our sources—this information was provided by the sources of the Iranian Resistance inside Iran. And these are people who were directly associated or involved with this—had access to information directly about this kind of activities, and that’s how we got it. And traditionally, that’s how we have gotten our information.” The reporter then asked if his sources were people within the government. Jafarzadeh answered: “Certainly these are people who have access to this information within the regime, yes—within the regime.” Subsequently, in response to the same reporter asking if the information had been shared with the US authorities, Jafarzadeh—who was a member of a US-designated “terrorist” organization—stated: “Yes, this information have been available to the proper authorities in this country.” Lastly, in response to another question concerning whether he has photographic evidence, such as satellite photos, Jafarzadeh stated: “The—all the little details of these facilities are not something that would be available through satellite, and I’m sure satellite, you have access to—everybody has access to satellites already.” How an outlawed “terrorist” organization, supposedly on the run not only in the US but in many European countries, might have access to satellites was, of course, a puzzling question, but it was one that no reporter asked. Indeed, in some subsequent “revelations”— which all turned out to be false—MEK representatives used satellite photography; but no one asked how they obtained such imagery. For example, on November 18, 2004 The Washington Post reported that one of the representatives of MEK, Mohammad Mohaddessin, “used satellite photos to pinpoint what he said was the new facility, inside a 60-acre complex in the northeast part of Tehran known as the Center for the Development of Advanced Defense Technology.” According to the report, the “group said that the site also houses Iranian chemical and biological weapons programs and that uranium enrichment began there a year and a half ago, to replace a nearby facility that was dismantled in March ahead of a visit by a U.N. inspections team.” This “revelation,” as well all subsequent “revelations” by MEK, turned out to be false. But, again, the question of how an outlawed organization obtained satellite images or how it received the only two pieces of information that actually turned out be correct and were checked out later by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors remained unanswered. In Chain of Command, Seymour Hersh claims that MEK was given the information about Natanz and Arak by Israel. Hersh contends that on a trip to the Middle East in 2004 he was told that the “Israeli signals-intelligence agency, known as Unit 8200, had broken a sophisticated Iranian code and begun monitoring communications that included talks between Iran and Pakistan” (Hersh 2004: 349). Furthermore, he contends that the “Israeli intelligence community had many covert contacts inside Iran”—dating back to the Shah’s time—and “maintained close contact with many Iranian opposition groups, such as the National Council [MEK]” (Hersh 2004: 349). According to Hersh, a connection was made—directly or indirectly—and the Israeli intelligence about Iran’s nuclear program reached the National Council. A senior IAEA official

122 The United States and Iran subsequently told me that he knew that the council’s information had originated with Israeli intelligence, but he refused to say where he had learned that fact. (An Israeli diplomat in Washington, asked to comment, said “Why would we work with a Mickey Mouse outlet like the council?)” (Hersh 2004: 349) Similar accounts of how MEK came to possess the information about Natanz and Arak could be found elsewhere. For example, in her March 6, 2006 New Yorker Magazine essay, “Exiles: How Iran’s Expatriates Are Gaming the Nuclear Threat,” Connie Bruck tells the same story. She mentions the fact that repeated claims by MEK had turned out to be false, but their 2002 claim about Natanz and Arak proved to be correct. “This time,” she writes, “the I.A.E.A. was able to confirm the allegations, and in early 2003 the M.E.K. attained a level of credibility it had never had before.” She then writes: An Iranian-American political activist told me, however, that the N.C.R.I.’s [MEK’s] intelligence had actually come from Israel. This person said that Israel had earlier offered it to a monarchist group, but that that group’s leaders had decided that “outing” the regime’s nuclear program would be viewed negatively by Iranians, so they declined the offer. Shahriar Ahy, Reza Pahlavi’s [the former Shah’s son] adviser, confirmed that account up to a point. “That information came not from the M.E.K. but from a friendly government, and it had come to more than one opposition group, not only the mujahideen,” he said. When I asked him if the “friendly government” was Israel, he smiled. “The friendly government did not want to be the source of it, publicly. If the friendly government gives it to the U.S. publicly, then it would be received differently. Better to come from an opposition group.” Israel is said to have had a relationship with the M.E.K. at least since the late nineties, and to have supplied a satellite signal for N.C.R.I. broadcasts from Paris into Iran. When I asked an Israeli diplomat about Israel’s relationship with the M.E.K., he said, “The M.E.K. is useful,” but declined to elaborate. Hersh’s and Bruck’s accounts do not provide concrete proof that it was the Israelis who gave MEK the only accurate piece of information on Iran’s nuclear activities that they ever revealed. But given the relationship between MEK and Israelis—as mentioned in previous chapters—Bruck’s account of why this information was given to MEK appears to be highly plausible. Indeed, as far as Israel and her allies in the US were concerned, it did not matter whether MEK was a “Mickey Mouse outlet” or a “terrorist” organization working for Saddam Hussein; all that mattered was that MEK was a useful tool in containing Iran. As we saw in Chapter 5, Congressman Gary Ackerman stated that he did not “give a shit if they [MEK] are undemocratic” or a “terrorist organization” based in Iraq; what was important was that they helped to destroy both Iran and Iraq (Village Voice, December 2001). Other Israeli allies in the US showed similar sentiments. For example, after the US invasion of Iraq, in a piece in The New York Post on May 20, 2003 entitled “A Terrorist U.S. Ally?”, neoconservatives Daniel Pipes and Patrick Clawson came to

Pushing Iran to the top of the “to do” lists 123 the defense of MEK as “useful” to “Western spy agencies” and mentioned that MEK had supplied “key information” on Iran “building a nuclear bomb.” As such, they argued that MEK members should be allowed by the US to keep their arms, be removed from the list of terrorist states, maintained as an organized group in order to “intimidate and gain leverage over Tehran,” and be used as deterrence against the “mullahs” who support “terrorism against coalition troops in Iraq” or are building “building nuclear weapons.” Indeed, they argued, “it could prove highly effective to threaten” Iran with “U.S. meetings with the MEK or providing help for its anti-regime publicity campaign.” Some other allies of Israel in the US went further than merely advocating the use of MEK against Iran. For example, Richard Perle, one of the main architects of the US invasion of Iraq, attended a demonstration organized by MEK. According to a report in The Washington Post of January 29, 2004 under the name of the “IranianAmerican Community of Northern Virginia” and in the guise of raising funds for the victims of earthquake in the Iranian city of Bam, MEK held a rally at the Washington Convention Center. FBI agents, the report went on to state, attended the rally and, later, the Treasury Department “froze the assets of the event’s prime organizer, the Iranian-American Community of Northern Virginia.” According to the report, Richard Perle attended the rally and delivered a “paid speech.” After being questioned by the reporter about attending a MEK event, Perle contended that he was “unaware of any involvement by the terrorist group.” A few weeks later, a “former official” of MEK seemed to pour cold water on Perle’s denial when in an editorial piece in The New York Times of February 18, 2004 he used the presence of Perle and his speech at their rally as affirming the legitimacy of MEK. In sum, Israel and its allies in the US had been working—and continue to work to this day—very closely with MEK. Thus the claims made by Hersh and Bruck concerning the use of MEK as a conduit to break the news of Iran’s nuclear facilities at Natanz and Arak seem quite conceivable. Of course, as Bruck points out in her article, MEK has not been the only exile group that the Israelis have been using against Iran. Monarchists, as well as numerous other Iranian expatriate operatives, some of whom are mentioned in Bruck’s essay, are also used by the Israelis in making a case for containing Iran after Iraq.3 But MEK appears to be the only exile group that went public with Israeli-supplied information concerning Natanz and Arak. Once the news was out, the Americans and Israelis tried to get the UN to impose sanctions against Iran. How this was accomplished is discussed below and in the following chapters. But before doing so, a digression about the origin of Iran’s nuclear program is in order.

On the origin of Iran’s nuclear program The US and Israel had no problem with Iran’s nuclear research and development when Iran was ruled by the Shah. Under the Shah Iran not only engaged in nuclear research but tried—and nearly succeeded—to construct nuclear power plants. According to some sources, the Shah might even have entertained the idea of building nuclear weapons. All this happened without any objection from the US

124 The United States and Iran and its allies, including Israel. Indeed, it was with the consent, advice, and help of these countries that Iran, under the Shah, carried out its nuclear program. The Shah’s foray into nuclear research went back to the 1950s. In 1957, according to Daniel Poneman, at the opening of an American Atoms for Peace exhibit in Tehran, the “Shah announced the signing of a proposed agreement for cooperation in research on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy” (Poneman 1982: 84). Under the agreement the US provided technical assistance and a few kilograms of enriched uranium to Iran. In the following year a nuclear training center under the auspices of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) was moved from Baghdad to Tehran, and, from that moment, “nuclear energy interested the Shah personally” (Poneman 1982: 84). Two years later the Shah ordered the establishment of Tehran University Nuclear Research Center and, soon afterwards, purchased a small research reactor from the US for the Center.4 However, as Poneman points out, nothing much happened in the next few years as far as Iran’s nuclear development was concerned, especially since, given Iran’s oil reserves, there was no pressing energy need. For example, the small reactor that the US had provided remained unused until 1967, when the US provided small quantities of enriched uranium and plutonium to Iran. In 1968 Iran signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This was, according to Akbar Etemad, the Shah’s appointed head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), without any “clear understanding of the limitations it [NPT] imposed on national sovereignty” (Etemad 1987: 203).5 Two years later Iran ratified the NPT. The massive increase in the price of oil in the early 1970s, however, resulted in the Shah’s decision to speed up the development of nuclear energy. In the eyes of the Shah, as well as the US, oil was too valuable for internal consumption. As Poneman (1982: 85) quotes the Shah as saying in 1974: “The oil we call the noble product will be depleted one day. It is only a shame to burn the noble product for the production of energy to run the factories and houses. … We plan to get, as soon as possible, 23,000 MWe from nuclear power stations.” The Shah, therefore, resorted to a crash program to develop nuclear energy. As part of this program, he established in 1974 the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) under Dr. Akbar Etemad and announced that the “matter is of high importance so the commission will operate under my direct supervision” (Poneman 1982: 86). The Shah envisioned the construction of 20 nuclear reactors in as many years (Poneman 1982: 86). This vision was encouraged by the US and her allies, such as France and Germany, who would benefit from constructing the reactors. Negotiations took place and some lucrative contracts were signed. For example, in 1974 the head of the US Atomic Energy Commission, Dixie Lee Roy, signed an agreement with the Shah to sell two reactors, as well as enriched uranium, to Iran. Subsequently, in 1975, the deal was expanded when US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger signed a $15 billion trade agreement with Iran, which included the Shah’s purchase of eight reactors from the US at the cost of $6.4 billion (Poneman 1982: 87). But the deal languished, since, technically, the 1957 US– Iran agreement covered only cooperation in the area of research and not nuclear

Pushing Iran to the top of the “to do” lists 125 power development. According to Poneman (1982: 87), the new agreement with Iran to construct power plants was then bemired “in disagreement over the right of Iran to reprocess the plutonium and other elements from the spent fuel extracted from the reactors.” Why was the Shah disagreeing with the US over reprocessing plutonium and other material from spent fuel? Was he contemplating developing nuclear weapons? It has been hinted by various sources that indeed he was. For example, in his “Iran’s Nuclear Program. Part I: Its History,” Mohammad Sahimi refers to Etemad’s admission that the Tehran University Nuclear Research Center was experimenting with plutonium extracted from spent fuel as a sign that building nuclear bombs was contemplated by the Shah.6 But Etemad contends that the claim that the “Shah was toying with the idea of a military nuclear future” is incorrect, and he bases this contention on his “personal experience” and “revealing discussions” with the Shah (Etemad 1987: 212). Yet the claim that the Shah at some point was entertaining the idea of building a nuclear bomb persists. Sahimi, for example, states that Asadollah Alam, the Shah’s court minister, writes in his memoirs that the Shah had envisioned Iran having nuclear weapons. Other research works also point in the same direction. For example, Spector and Smith (1990: 203) argue that under “the Shah, Iran’s nuclear activities had included two major components: a widely publicized commercial nuclear power program and a partially clandestine nuclear research effort. Some activities under the latter were oriented toward the development of nuclear weapons.”7 The chronology provided by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI)—to which IAEA occasionally refers as a source—also makes the claim that the Shah was thinking about making nuclear weapons.8 Using a number of sources, NTI states that in June of 1974 the Shah proclaimed that Iran will have nuclear weapons “without a doubt and sooner than one would think.” NTI also points out that the statement was later denied by Iran’s embassy in France, and the Shah had to retract it by saying that “not only Iran, but also other nations in the region should refrain from planning to gain atomic arsenals.” Even though the Shah had said, or at least appeared to have said, that Iran would have nuclear weapons, neither the US nor her allies, including Israel, tried to deny him access to nuclear technology. Indeed, they did the opposite. A recent article entitled “Past Arguments Don’t Square with Current Iran Policy,” published in The Washington Post of March 27, 2005, points out how “U.S. companies, including Westinghouse and General Electric, scrambled to do business” with the US ally, the Shah, who “had deep pockets and close ties to Washington.” The article also points out that Bush Administration officials argue that Iran does not need nuclear energy, and yet “Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and outgoing Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz held key national security posts when the Ford administration made the opposite argument 30 years ago.” According to the article, “Ford’s team endorsed Iranian plans to build a massive nuclear energy industry, but also worked hard to complete a multibillion-dollar deal that would have given Tehran control of large quantities of plutonium and enriched uranium—the two pathways to a nuclear bomb.” The article also quotes

126 The United States and Iran Henry Kissinger, President Ford’s Secretary of State, as saying “I don’t think the issue of proliferation came up.” The report then contrasts the role played by Kissinger in the Shah’s development of nuclear technology with an opinion piece in The Washington Post on March 9, 2005 in which Kissinger stated “for a major oil producer such as Iran, nuclear energy is a wasteful use of resources.” In addition, the report states that after “balking initially, President Gerald R. Ford signed a directive in 1976 offering Tehran the chance to buy and operate a U.S.-built reprocessing facility for extracting plutonium from nuclear reactor fuel. The deal was for a complete ‘nuclear fuel cycle’ … That is precisely the ability the current administration is trying to prevent Iran from acquiring today.” The US’s lucrative nuclear deals with the Shah, however, ran into a major snag when President Carter was elected and “stressed the importance of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and his concern led to more restrictive US nuclear export policy” (Poneman 1982: 87). Another block to negotiation, according to Poneman, was that “the US Congress was considering a bill that would further restrict the conditions under which US nuclear exports would be permitted,” a bill that could make any agreement reached with the Shah obsolete (Poneman 1982: 87). The US, of course, was not the only ally of the Shah’s trying to sell him nuclear reactors. Other countries, such as France and Germany, did the same. In November of 1974 the Shah signed an agreement to purchase two reactors from the German firm Kraftwerk Union (a subsidiary of Siemens), to be installed at Bushehr. Earlier, in June of 1974, he had made a deal with France for the purchase of five reactors, according to Poneman (1982: 88). But this deal, as well as some subsequent deals with France, did not quite materialize. Apparently this was because of technical glitches, such as dealing separately with some subcontractors in the early phase of the plan and, later on, falling oil prices, and credit crunches. In March of 1979, after the ousting of the Shah, Framatome of France, which, according to Poneman (1982: 96), had worked without payment since October of 1978 to build two nuclear power plants south of the city of Ahvaz, pulled out of Iran. The deal with the Germans, however, nearly materialized. The construction of the Bushehr reactors began in 1975, based merely on a letter of intent, and a formal agreement in 1976 made the project official. Yet falling oil prices and credit crunches slowed down the completion of Bushehr as well. When the Shah was toppled in 1979, the Bushehr reactors were only partially complete.9 In the end, the Shah’s grand vision of building at least 20 power plants never came to pass. The Revolution ended all deals. The Americans, French, and Germans left Iran, and projects worth billions of dollars remained incomplete and uncompensated. The new Iranian government, headed by Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan, decided that at the time Iran did not need nuclear energy. This was not, however, a decision that everyone in the new government agreed with. If oil was too valuable as an export under the Shah’s rule, it was also valuable under other forms of government. Moreover, severe shortages of electricity after the revolution, particularly during the Iran–Iraq war, rapid growth in population, and the need to have technological know-how made some elements in the Iranian government think about

Pushing Iran to the top of the “to do” lists 127 pursuing nuclear energy, but not on the grand scale that the Shah had envisioned. Therefore, after the Revolution there were attempts to continue nuclear research and development and complete the Bushehr reactors. But now the US and her allies had completely changed their position regarding Iran’s need to develop nuclear energy. The US’s reversal of policy and imposition of unilateral sanctions against Iran made pursuing nuclear research and development or even completing the Bushehr reactors extremely difficult, if not impossible. Iran appealed to Kraftwerk Union a number of times to complete Bushehr.10 But Kraftwerk Union refused to do so, using a number of excuses, including the Iran–Iraq war. Of course, as the war progressed, Iraq did attack Bushehr seven times between March 24, 1984 and July 19, 1988.11 But even after the conclusion of the Iran–Iraq war the German government did not allow the project to be completed. Indeed, three years after the war, when Siemens-Kraftwerk Union appeared ready to complete the project, the German government denied permission, citing “a lack of security at the site” and arguing that Iranians should “meet their energy needs by building more power stations fired by natural gas,” according to a UPI report on July 7, 1991. Given the German stance, Iran started to negotiate with various other countries not closely allied with the US to complete the Bushehr project. Ultimately, in March 1990, Iran signed a protocol with the former Soviet Union “for cooperation in nuclear energy, fisheries, transportation, heavy industries, and other fields” (Japan Economic Newswire, March 8, 1990). According to this protocol, Russia would complete the Bushehr reactor and build two additional reactors in exchange for natural gas.12 The protocol, however, did not produce immediate results. Two years later both sides were still talking about reaching a preliminary agreement. On December 22, 1993 the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts stated that according to the Russian ambassador, “financial problems have delayed the project.” But the report pointed out implicitly another and, perhaps, more important reason for the delay, US opposition to the project. It quoted the ambassador as saying: “Despite opposition from Washington, we are determined to go ahead with the project. … We have an independent policy with respect to Iran.” It was not, however, until two years later that a formal deal between Iran and Russia was signed to complete the Bushehr facility. In early January 1995, news agencies reported that “Iran has signed an $800 million deal with Russia to finish building a nuclear facility halted by the 1979 Islamic revolution” (AP, January 9, 1995). The first of the two power plants was supposed to be completed in four years. Yet more than a decade later, as this book is being written, the Bushehr power plant is not yet complete. The delay is mostly due to pressure from the US and Israel. For example, in 1995, shortly after Russia decided to complete the Bushehr project, both the US and Israel threatened Russia with punitive measures. On March 8, 1995 AFP reported that according to the head of the Likud party Evet Liebermann, “Israel will impose sanctions on Russia if it goes ahead with plans to build a nuclear plant that would enable Iran to produce nuclear weapons.” He was quoted as saying that “Israel will prevent, by all means possible, Russia from building a nuclear plant in Iran.” The report also stated that according to Liebermann, “Israel and the United States have already discussed sanctions that

128 The United States and Iran would be imposed on Russia if ‘Moscow supplies the Islamic extremists with weapons.’” Liebermann, the report went on to say, “added there was no explanation for a rich country like Iran to want a nuclear plant other than for producing weapons.” Similar threats came from the US a few days later. On March 28, 1995 AFP reported that “Energy Secretary Hazel O’Leary said Tuesday Washington has put off signing an agreement on the peaceful use of nuclear power with Moscow as a signal of strong US concern over Russia’s nuclear assistance to Iran.” The report also added that “Republican leaders in the US Congress have threatened to cut aid to Russia if it goes ahead with the deal.” Such threats caused Russia to use various excuses to delay the completion of the Bushehr project. Indeed, as will be seen later, Russia has yet to supply Iran with nuclear fuel for Bushehr even though a final deal was reached in 2005, according to which Russia would provide fuel for Bushehr and would receive the spent fuel back (AP, February 27, 2005). Given Russia’s reluctance to complete the reactors in Bushehr and supply nuclear fuel, and given that there was no other country to turn to, Iran appears to have tried to become self-sufficient in making nuclear fuel. But US unilateral sanctions prevented her from doing so openly. As a result, it appears that Iran carried out a number of actions that were covert and not reported to the IAEA. Among these were the construction of a uranium enrichment facility in Natanz and the construction of a heavy water production plant in Arak, the two facilities that were “revealed” by MEK on August 14, 2002. It should be noted that the construction of such facilities was not against the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Article IV of this Treaty reads: 1

2

Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world. 13

Thus, according to the Article quoted, Iran has the right to construct nuclearrelated facilities, including nuclear fuel cycle facilities, as long as it is for peaceful purposes. It should also be noted that even though Iran did not report constructing new nuclear facilities, it did not violate any laws or regulations. In 1992, after the US invasion of Iraq, the IAEA Board of Governors “approved a plan to demand the submission by states of preliminary designs of nuclear facilities as soon as a decision is taken to construct them” (The Independent (London), February 27, 1992).

Pushing Iran to the top of the “to do” lists 129 According to this plan, the IAEA requires “designs to be submitted 180 days before fissile material is loaded on to the site.” Since Iran had not introduced fissile material into its facilities under construction, it did not legally have to report these facilities.14 Even though Iran was not technically in violation of the NPT agreement, the construction of yet-to-be-disclosed nuclear facilities at Natanz and Arak gave the US and Israel a perfect excuse to: (1) justify their old accusation that Iran had been attempting to make nuclear weapons; (2) force the IAEA to probe every aspect of Iran’s nuclear research and development; (3) use the IAEA to provide intelligence on Iran’s non-nuclear military installations; (4) heighten tension around the world, particularly among Europeans, about the alleged threat posed by Iran to Israel and world security; (5) get the backing of Europeans, Russians, and Chinese to make the IAEA report Iran to the UN for violating NPT agreement; (6) get the UN to impose sanctions against Iran to weaken the Iranian economy and, hopefully, create massive discontent in Iran; and (7) overthrow, if necessary by means of military action, the Iranian government and install a government agreeable to the US and Israel. The remainder of this chapter and the following chapters are devoted to examining each of these steps.

Earliest reports of the Iranian bomb Even before the end of the Iran–Iraq war some intelligence services and individuals close to Israel were preparing the ground for containing Iran by accusing it of building nuclear weapons. For example, according to the July 1984 Department of State Bulletin, on May 2, 1984 the neoconservative Kenneth L. Adelman, the Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency at the time, gave an “Address before the Mid-America Committee” in Chicago in which he spoke of some “frightening thoughts,” such as Iran, Libya, or the Palestine Liberation Organization acquiring a nuclear bomb. Adelman stated that “today, talk about the spread of nuclear weapons to Iran is in the news. A British defense journal recently alleged that Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran is only 2 years away from acquiring nuclear weapons.” The journal that he referred to was Jane’s Defence Weekly of April 1984, which had published some fabricated news about Iran building a nuclear bomb with some “very enriched uranium” from Pakistan, based on some “West German intelligence.” After repeating this false news, Adelman toned down the “frightening thoughts” by saying that our “own assessment is that it would take many more years for either Iran or Iraq to develop nuclear weapons, even if they decided to do so.” It should be noted that it was the same Kenneth Adelman who on February 13, 2002 published his famous article, “Cakewalk in Iraq,” in The Washington Post, claiming that “liberating Iraq would be a cakewalk.” We have already seen how after the Iran–Iraq war the US and Israel started their massive campaign against Iran’s sins, particularly the sin of developing “weapons of mass destruction.” The expression “weapons of mass destruction” was, as mentioned earlier, mostly unclear at the beginning. But obviously the US and Israel were hinting at Iran developing a nuclear bomb. Such hints appeared as early

130 The United States and Iran as 1991. For example, on November 25, 1991 Nuclear Fuel reported that India had offered Iran a research reactor and that “a senior Israeli official” had claimed “that the Indian reactor would soon enable Iran to produce a significant amount of plutonium.” The report also stated that Yuval Ne’eman, Israeli Minister of Energy and Science, had said a few days earlier that the “sale of the Indian research reactor to Iran would put Iran close to producing a nuclear weapon in a few years.” In addition, the report stated that, according to “Israeli experts,” the status of “Iran’s nuclear infrastructure corresponds to that of Iraq’s program eight years ago.” One such “expert” from Tel Aviv University’s Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, according to the report, stated: “If Iranian efforts continue at the current rate … Iran will be able to produce the bomb by the end of the decade.” Lastly, the report stated: “One Western diplomat said the U.S. and other countries ‘share’ Israeli concern about the future of Iran’s nuclear effort. However, he added, concern in Israel has been ‘magnified’ by the Israeli government in an apparent attempt to deflect U.S. pressure on Israel to cease plutonium production and scale down its own nuclear weapons program.” Shortly afterwards, other reports emerged from Israel about Iran developing a nuclear bomb. However, since there had been no sale of a research reactor to Iran by India—as had been reported on November 25, 1991—the story of India helping Iran to make nuclear bombs was replaced by other, more sensational stories. For example, a news item in The Jerusalem Report of March 26, 1992 started with this statement: “Israel keeps a wary watch on Teheran’s march to the Bomb. By the year 2000, Iran will almost certainly have the Bomb.” The report then went on to say that “three missiles with nuclear warheads missing from the former Soviet republic of Kazakhstan were spirited away, at a price, to Teheran.” But Kazakhstan was not the only country allegedly helping Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. Other countries mentioned in The Jerusalem Report as knowingly or unknowingly helping Iran with its nuclear bombs were “China, Pakistan, India, France, Germany, Argentina, Brazil and Russia.” China, for example, was said to be helping Iran to build a reactor near Qazvin. The report also stated that “according to Iranian dissidents, a uranium enrichment facility, necessary for military nuclear development, at Darkhovin” is being built by the Chinese. The report reiterated: “Israeli, German and American intelligence estimates concur: Iran will have the Bomb within a decade.” The “Iranian dissidents” that the above report refers to were, of course, members of the MEK group with whom Israel was working closely in conjuring up sensational news. Indeed, other news sources linked the same news concerning Iran and Kazakhstan to MEK. For example, on November 3, 1992 the Financial Times reported: “The Iraq-based Mujahideen Khalq, the main Iranian opposition group, says Kazakhstan has sold several nuclear warheads to Iran.” This sensational claim, as well as many other such claims made by both MEK and Israel, was obviously complete fabrication. The report was denied a number of times by Iran, Kazakhstan, and Russia. For instance, on March 16, 1992 AP quoted the Russian Defense Ministry spokesman Ivan Krylnik as saying: “The information is not true. … All nuclear weapons are under the strictest centralized control and selling them or stealing them is impossible.” The report also quoted a spokesman for the

Pushing Iran to the top of the “to do” lists 131 government of Kazakhstan describing the repeated news as “another canard.” “Our president,” he went on to say, “has more than once emphasized that our nuclear weapons are under safe control,” and that Kazakhstan was “living up to its obligations on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.” The IAEA inspectors also confirmed that the report of Iran having nuclear warheads was false. On May 6, 1992 Moneyclips, for example, reported that Hans Meyer, a spokesman for the IAEA, had stated that the IAEA knows nothing about Iran’s acquisition of nuclear warheads and that it “is up to other parties to the NPT especially those who have intelligence to inform the IAEA.” This statement came, as the report pointed out, after a four-member team from the IAEA visited Iran in February of 1992, at the invitation of Iran. The IAEA reported that “facilities and sites were found to be consistent with the peaceful application of nuclear energy.” The report, however, was dismissed by the US as “naïve”; and Hans Blix, the IAEA’s Director-General, stated the following in response: We had indicated to the Iranian authorities a number of sites that would be interesting to visit and all these sites were opened to the group without exception and a programme was arranged for the group to see them in detail and the group was then able to familiarise themselves with the needs and type of programmes that were pursued and they have given a report to me on this and we have made a press release indicating that all the activities that they saw at these various sites were consistent with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. … If we look at the press releases, if we look at what I stated at the board I don’t think we are exhibiting naivety. (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 2, 1992) In the following year the IAEA again visited Iran to “inspect previously unchecked buildings at Iranian nuclear sites for any evidence of a clandestine nuclear weapons program,” according to The Washington Post of November 20, 1993. This visit, too, was at the invitation of the Iranian government to prove that Israeli– US accusations were false. The Washington Post quoted an Iranian official as saying that the IAEA inspectors could go “anywhere, anytime.” Again, the IAEA inspectors found nothing (Moneyclips, January 31, 1994). In the final analysis, not only there were no nuclear warheads in Iran, there was no evidence of Iran having a nuclear weapons program. Yet Israel and its allies would not give up and would continue to put forward sensational fabrications as news. It should be noted that many reporters closely associated with the neoconservatives and Israeli circles were, and continue to be, instrumental in propagating news concerning Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons program. For example, Kenneth R. Timmerman, a member of the Board of Advisors of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA) and, as of 1995, the “Executive Director of the Foundation for Democracy in Iran,” wrote a report in 1992 for the Simon Wiesenthal Center in which he claimed that “Iran, Syria and Libya are amassing large arsenals of chemical weapons and are determined to obtain or produce nuclear arms and the ballistic missiles to deliver them to

132 The United States and Iran distant targets by the end of this decade” (The Jerusalem Post, August 2, 1992).15 According to Timmerman, the “Iranian bomb could come sooner if Iran obtains technology and assistance from Central Asian countries formerly a part of the Soviet Union” (AP, August 4, 1992). Furthermore, Timmerman contended, Syria and Iran had signed a “nuclear pact,” under which Iran agrees to provide Syria with a “nuclear umbrella” in the event of an Israeli attack.16 It should be pointed out that as the “Executive Director of the Foundation for Democracy in Iran,” Kenneth R. Timmerman also provides, under the title “The Iran Brief,” a collection of “news,” some of it complete fabrication.17 Similar “news” was reported in the same period by Amir Taheri, a member of the neoconservative publicity agency Benador Associates and, according to this same source, the former “editor-in-chief of Kayhan, one of the most prominent newspapers under the Shah.”18 For example, according to the Nuclear Threat Initiative’s “Iran Profile: Nuclear Chronology,” Taheri reported on December 31, 1991, in Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), that Iran has received nuclear weapons technology from Brazil and India.19 Subsequently, he wrote an article on “Tehran’s Growing Nuclear Ambitions” in which he claimed that an “an Iranian researcher” involved in Iran’s nuclear program had stated: “We want to have the technical expertise and the industrial base necessary to produce nuclear weapons if and when that becomes necessary” (Moneyclips, January 27, 1992). All of these news items were, of course, untrue. As will be seen in Chapter 10, in more recent times one of Taheri’s manufactured reports created a great deal of scandal. It should be pointed out that ever since the early 1990s a number of pro-Israeli magazines and newspapers have also been quite active in propagating false news about Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons program. One such magazine is U.S. News & World Report, which is owned by Mortimer Zuckerman, the former chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations. The magazine regularly published in the early 1990s, and continues to publish to this day, fabricated news. For example, on February 12, 1990 it reported that “Pakistani engineers are helping to build a plutonium reactor in Iran.” This, of course, was patently false. On March 23, 1992 it stated: “A high-ranking Russian officer in Moscow has confirmed a U.S. intelligence report that three tactical nuclear weapons have vanished from a former Red Army arsenal in Kazakhstan. Analysts strongly suspect that the weapons have been sold to Iran, possibly with the cooperation of several Kazakh nuclear specialists recently seen in Tehran.” Again, the news was a sensational falsehood. On March 29, 1993 U.S. News & World Report wrote of “secret deals between the Stalinists of North Korea and the ayatollahs of Iran” under which “North Korea has agreed to sell an unspecified number of nuclear bombs to the Iranians and to provide them with designs for nuclearweapons-reprocessing plants.” And then again on October 25, 1993 it stated: “Intelligence sources have confirmed that Tehran did indeed buy weapons-grade uranium from Kazakh scientists who worked on the Soviet Union’s nuclear program.” Once more, all such reports were pure fabrication. At times, it seems, U.S. News & World Report worked hand in hand with MEK, simply reporting their

Pushing Iran to the top of the “to do” lists 133 manufactured news. For example, under the heading “Tehran’s Magic Mountain,” on May 1, 1995 the magazine wrote: Iranian exiles in Europe say the Tehran regime has built a secret facility for developing nuclear weapons inside a tunnel hollowed out of a mountain north of the capital city. Although U.S. officials could not confirm the report, the exiles—quoting countrymen inside Iran—say the installation is situated on a mountain road about 20 miles south of the city of Chalus on the Caspian Sea. This was, of course, a sheer lie. Another example of a newspaper that published in the early 1990s—and continues to publish to this day—manufactured news about Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons, often manufactured by MEK, is The Washington Times. For example, on October 14, 1992 the newspaper reported false news concerning the transfer of nuclear weapons from Kazakhstan to Iran and then stated that officials of “the former Soviet republic of Kazakhstan yesterday denied a claim by the People’s Mojahedin of Iran, an Iraq-based opposition group, that Tehran had purchased four nuclear warheads from Kazakhstan.” The Washington Times went on to quote Mohammed Mohaddessin, one of MEK’s spokesmen, as saying: “The denial was predictable. What did you expect?” In the early 1990s some US officials, including the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, were busy making a case for Iran allegedly building nuclear weapons by the year 2000. For example, on March 28, 1992 The Houston Chronicle reported that a day earlier CIA Director Robert Gates had told a House Armed Services Subcommittee that Iran was “trying to develop nuclear weapons,” but “could not acquire nuclear weapons before 2000 unless it got substantial technical help from outside.” Later reporting of the same news stated that, according to Gates, Iran could have a nuclear bomb “by the year 2000 if the West does not prevent it” (The Washington Post, November 17, 1992). A year later, the new director of the CIA, R. James Woolsey, made the same assertion. According to The New York Times of February 25, 1993 in his first Congressional testimony, Mr. Woolsey “expressed particular concern about Iran, which he described as the most aggressive customer for weapons technology” and said that “Iran was still 8 to 10 years away from being able to produce nuclear weapons, but that the pace might be accelerated with assistance from abroad.” The following year, even after the IAEA visited Iran and found no indication of a weapons program, Mr. Woolsey would still say: “We believe that Iran is eight to 10 years away from building such weapons and that help from the outside will be critical in reaching that timetable” (AP, September 27, 1994).20 We now know that various reports in the early 1990s concerning Iran making a nuclear bomb by the end of the last century were complete falsehood. No such bomb was ever made by Iran by the year 2000 or even 2007, when this book is being completed. As time passed, however, the frequency of such reports increased. Since no nuclear weapons, or even a program to build such weapons, showed up by the projected date, the Israeli and US intelligence services kept

134 The United States and Iran revising the date with each new report. Given the high frequency of these reports, it is nearly impossible to mention them all. The best approach is to list some of the changing US–Israeli estimates of when the alleged Iranian bomb will be ready.

The guessing game and more “revelations” As we saw earlier, in September of 1994 CIA Director James Woolsey estimated that Iran is eight to ten years away from building nuclear weapons. On January 5, 1995 The New York Times stated: “Iran is much closer to producing nuclear weapons than previously thought, and could be less than five years away from having an atomic bomb, several senior American and Israeli officials say.” According to the report, the “reassessment of Iran’s nuclear potential is now described by Israeli officials as the most serious threat facing their country.” The report further added: “Senior Israeli officials say that if the program is not halted, they will be forced to consider attacking Iran’s nuclear reactors, a tactic they used against Iraq in 1981, when Israeli warplanes bombed an Iraqi reactor.” The report also quoted “a senior Israeli military official” as saying: “When we look at the future and ask ourselves what is the biggest problem we will face in the next decade … Iran’s nuclear bomb is at the top of the list.” A year later, to be exact on July 30, 1996, the Guardian stated that according to John Holum, director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, “Iran is 10 to 15 years away from acquiring nuclear weapons.” The following year, the same John Holum estimated that Iran was “eight years away” from making a nuclear bomb (AFP, March 5, 1997). Throughout the mid-1990s both the IAEA and Iranian officials denied the existence of any nuclear weapons program. For example, The Independent reported on January 11, 1995 that the “International Atomic Energy Agency said it had no evidence from its inspections that Iran was building nuclear weapons, contradicting recent US and Israeli claims that Iran could build a nuclear bomb within seven to 15 years.” On the same day, AP quoted Iran’s President Rafsanjani as saying: “We do not have nuclear weapons … The International Atomic Energy Agency said yesterday our research was 100 percent civilian and had no military purposes. We are all for a Persian Gulf area that is free of nuclear weapons.” Yet, despite these denials, the US and Israel kept up a constant barrage of accusations of Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons program throughout the mid-1990s. Indeed, Israel started to threaten Iran with military attacks. For example, on May 22, 1995 The Independent reported that “Israel is considering attacking Iranian nuclear facilities to prevent Iran acquiring a bomb, according to Israeli press reports. The aim would be to repeat Israel’s success in 1981 in bombing Iraq’s Osirak reactor.” The report further added that “Israel’s concern about the Iranian programme has been growing since last year but it has hitherto looked to the United States to put pressure on Iran to prevent it developing a nuclear device.” The report also stated: “There has been no official denial of the press reports” about such an attack by the Israelis. The accusations against Iran continued even more intensely throughout the late 1990s, and estimates of when Iran will have atomic bombs varied as widely as

Pushing Iran to the top of the “to do” lists 135 before. However, with the approach of the new century and no bomb in sight, most estimates were pushed forward into the next century. At the same time Israel’s accusations against Iran and pressure on the US to target Iran heated up. For example, on November 17, 1997 The Jerusalem Post wrote: “Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu said yesterday that Iran could pose a bigger danger than Iraq and that Tehran may even end up with nuclear weapons aimed at the United States.” On December 18, 1997 The Jerusalem Post quoted Knesset member Ephraim Sneh as saying: “According to intelligence estimates, they [Iranians] may have a nuclear warhead within 18 months. There is therefore a threat that in a few years’ time, Iran will have the ability to strike Israel with weapons of mass destruction.” The next day the International Herald Tribune published an article saying: “For the Clinton administration, the problem of Tehran’s buildup is complicated by Israel’s response to it. Israel has started talking about its nuclear capability as a counterforce to enemy nations’ advanced weapons.” According to the report, recently “Israel hinted that it might deploy its nuclear weapons in a ‘launch-onwarning’ mode: If missiles were detected heading toward Israel, it would immediately launch its own nuclear force before the unidentified missiles landed.” The report then stated: “Last month, Ariel Sharon, minister of national infrastructure, put Iran and Iraq publicly on notice against the use of chemical weapons, warning that Israel was ‘ready to respond with all our might’—a phrase widely taken to mean nuclear retaliation.” The report added: “Shimon Peres, the dovish former prime minister, recently invoked ‘nuclear capability’ as necessary in Israel’s current and foreseeable circumstances. None of these Israeli political barons outdoes Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in talking tough.” The tough talk of Israeli leaders was coming at a time when the corporate lobby in the US was putting pressure on the Clinton Administration to ease up in its sanctions policy toward Iran. This was clear when the above report in the International Herald Tribune referred to intensified lobbying efforts of “anti-Iranian and proIsraeli groups in Congress,” which feared that “Israel was being left to face the Iranian threat without adequate help from a Clinton administration.” In the late 1990s Israel and its allies also started to manufacture and re-manufacture some sensational news. For example, the old, fake story about Kazakhstan selling nuclear weapons to Iran resurfaced with some new twists. On April 9, 1998 The Jerusalem Post started its sensational report this way: “Iran received several nuclear warheads from a former Soviet republic in the early 1990s and Russian experts maintained them, according to Iranian government documents relayed to Israel and obtained by The Jerusalem Post.” “The documents,” the Israeli newspaper went on to say, “deemed authentic by US congressional experts and still being studied in Israel, contain correspondence between Iranian government officials and leaders of the Revolutionary Guard that discusses Iran’s successful efforts to obtain nuclear warheads from former Soviet republics.” The old and false news, revived by The Jerusalem Post, now included one more warhead and some enriched uranium as well: “The documents appear to bolster reports from 1992 that Iran received enriched uranium and up to four nuclear warheads from Kazakhstan, with help from the Russian underworld.” There were other “revelations” in the

136 The United States and Iran “documents,” as well. A sensational revelation was that “warheads are being stored in the Lavizan military camp in the Teheran area.” On April 10, 1998 The Jerusalem Post ran another piece on the same story. This time it stated: “Iran paid $25 million for what appears to have been two tactical atomic weapons smuggled out of the former Soviet Union in a highly classified operation aided by technicians from Argentina, according to Iranian government documents marked top secret and obtained by The Jerusalem Post.” The source of these documents—which were said to have been in “US government hands for several years and are currently being studied by Israel”—was stated to be “an exiled Iranian scientist.”21 After much detail about this sensational story, however, The Jerusalem Post threw some cold water on it: “The Israeli government acknowledged receipt of the Iranian government’s [documents], but would not vouch for their veracity.” Worse yet, it stated that after being asked about “The Jerusalem Post story,” State Department spokesman “James Rubin said the US believes this is false.” “The US looked into the matter in 1992, when reports first surfaced, and concluded ‘there was no evidence to substantiate such claims,’ he said.” Even though The Jerusalem Post story was patently false, some of the US allies of Israel would not let go of it and would, indeed, claim that Iran already had atomic weapons. For example, on April 16, 1998 The Jerusalem Post published yet another article in which it stated that two US House members, Representatives Jim Saxton and Bill McCollum, “who have closely followed Teheran’s military programs say Iran has obtained nuclear weapons as well as established a ballistic missile command and control system to launch them.” The report quoted Saxton as saying “I believe that Iran already has nuclear weapons and that our policy should reflect that.” The same was said by McCollum, who stated that all Iran needed now was “a delivery system to launch them.” The Jerusalem Post also stated that according to a “US analyst with extensive connections in the US intelligence community,” Iran “has a small-sized nuclear weapon—even though so far Washington has been unable to locate it.” Throughout late 1990s Iran was inspected by the IAEA and not only were no bombs found but also no activity aimed at developing nuclear weapons was detected. Thus, the IAEA refused to issue a false report condemning Iran and, instead, reported that Iran’s nuclear activities appear to be peaceful. This angered Israel and her allies to such an extent that in August of 1998 the US Congress voted to “cut U.S. voluntary contributions to the International Atomic Energy Agency by the amount the agency spends on nuclear energy projects in Iran” (AP, August 3, 1998). The measure, which was passed 405 to 13, also asked the Secretary of State to review the IAEA’s activities annually and report to Congress. Active in the passage of the measure was Representative Benjamin Gilman, who contended that Iran has a “nuclear weapons program” and that the passage of a similar resolution finding Iraq “in material and unacceptable breach” of its international obligations was in response to “the mounting evidence that Iraq continues to defy the decisions of the U.N. Security Council with regard to its weapons of mass destruction” (AP, August 3, 1998).

Pushing Iran to the top of the “to do” lists 137

More guessing games and the “revelation” The twenty-first-century history of Israel and the US accusing Iran of making atomic bombs began with sensational and astonishing news. On January 17, 2000 Judith Miller and James Risen wrote in The New York Times: “In a sharp departure from its previous assessment of Iran’s nuclear capacity, the Central Intelligence Agency has told senior Clinton administration officials that Iran might now be able to make a nuclear weapon, according to several United States officials.” The revelation was attributed to unnamed “American officials” and it was not clear whether it was really based on the CIA’s assessment or the writers’ imagination. Whatever the source, the logic of the story was peculiar. It stated that the CIA’s new assessment was “apparently not based on evidence that Iran’s indigenous efforts to build a bomb have achieved a breakthrough.” “Rather,” the report said, “it seems to be based on the fact that the United States cannot track with great certainty increased efforts by Iran to acquire nuclear materials and technology on the international black market, mainly from the former Soviet Union.” This same peculiar logic appeared in the rest of the article. For example, a few sentences later the report stated: “The agency has told policy makers that it is not certain that Iran actually has atomic weapons now. Instead, the new assessment says that the C.I.A. can no longer rule out the possibility that Iran has acquired them.” If the logic of this sensational story was unclear, the intention was clear: use a number of unsubstantiated and unclear claims, attributed to undefined sources, to make Iran appear to be a threat to the US. Indeed at one point the report stated that, according to the “American intelligence community,” “by 2010 Iran, using Russian technology and assistance, might test a missile that could reach targets in the United States.” The claim was, of course, absurd, since any missiles targeted at the US by Iran would result in Iran’s total annihilation. Yet logic was immaterial. The task at hand was to scare the public and achieve the desired result, a tactic that proved quite useful in the second invasion of Iraq. Throughout 2001 the Israelis kept up the usual scare tactics of estimating the day when Iran would have the bomb and would attack the world. For example, a Jerusalem Post report of February 26, 2001 started with: “Iran and Iraq appear to be just a few years away from attaining atomic bomb capability, according to Dr. Dany Shoham, an expert on weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East arena.” Dr. Shoham, “a senior researcher at Bar-Ilan University’s Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies,” maintained that if both countries could acquire fissile material from outside “they could conceivably have nuclear bombs or atomic warheads within a year.” Dr. Shoham was, of course, either not a very good “expert” or was intentionally deceitful, because he maintained that since 1998 “Saddam Hussein’s regime has been vigorously renewing missile development and its non-conventional weapons programs.” But Israeli “experts’ were not the only ones pinpointing and re-pinpointing the doomsday. Israeli officials were busy doing the same. AP reported on July 9, 2001 that “Israel’s defense minister told Turkish officials Monday that Iran could have nuclear weapons by 2005.” “Binyamin Ben-Eliezer,” the report went on to state, “also said that Iranian

138 The United States and Iran missiles could reach any point in the Middle East, a prospect that worries both Israel and Turkey.” A few weeks later, on August 13, 2001, UPI reported that Binyamin Ben-Eliezer warned the Israel–American Chamber of Commerce and Industry that “Tehran would have a nuclear bomb within four years,” and that Washington “should focus on Iran, not Iraq.” According to Ben-Eliezer, although “Iran threatens the entire free world, including the United States, the United States is focusing on Iraq.” It was, however, at the end of 2001 that Israelis found an excuse to back their long-standing claim that Iran is a threat to Israel. At a prayer meeting in support of the Palestinians on “Quds Day” in Tehran, on December 14, 2001 Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the former Iranian President, made a long speech about the US, Britain, and Israel. In this speech he stated that “colonialists” have supplied vast quantities of weapons of mass destruction and unconventional weapons to Israel. They have permitted it to have them and they have shut their eyes to what is going on. They have nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and long-range missiles and suchlike. … If one day, the Islamic world is also equipped with weapons like those that Israel possesses now, then the imperialists’ strategy will reach a standstill because the use of even one nuclear bomb inside Israel will destroy everything. However, it will only harm the Islamic world. It is not irrational to contemplate such an eventuality. Of course, you can see that the Americans have kept their eyes peeled and they are carefully looking for even the slightest hint that technological advances are being made by an independent Islamic country. If an independent Islamic country is thinking about acquiring other kinds of weaponry, then they will do their utmost to prevent it from acquiring them. Well, that is something that almost the entire world is discussing right now. Israel was quick to use these remarks to argue that Iran was building nuclear weapons to destroy Israel. On December 26, 2001 The Jerusalem Post reported: “Foreign Minister Shimon Peres protested to the international community yesterday over an implied Iranian threat to destroy Israel with a nuclear bomb.” Peres, the report went on to say, has written a letter “to the foreign ministers of the countries serving on the UN Security Council, the European Union, and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan,” saying that “Rafsanjani’s ‘bone-chilling statements’ contradict Iran’s claim that it is acquiring nuclear power for peaceful purposes only.” A few days later Peres used the Hitler card. According to BBC Monitoring International Reports on January 12, 2002 Peres stated in a television interview that “I want to tell you that this statement by Rafsanjani, that they will produce a nuclear bomb to destroy Israel, is tantamount to a statement by Hitler, and we must not treat this issue lightly or allow to deflect attention from this, and we will do everything possible so that the entire world will know about this.” Rafsanjani, however, could hardly fit the image of Hitler and his statement could scarcely be interpreted as vowing to annihilate Israel with a nuclear bomb.

Pushing Iran to the top of the “to do” lists 139 Israel needed a more dramatic event to push Iran to the top of the US’s “to do list.” That event, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, turned out to be the “revelation” by MEK on August 14, 2002. The “revelation,” it should be recalled, was that Iran was constructing two nuclear facilities not reported to the IAEA, one a nuclear enrichment facility at Natanz and the other a heavy water production facility at Arak. As also mentioned earlier, constructing these facilities did not violate the NPT agreement, since the IAEA requires “designs to be submitted 180 days before fissile material is loaded on to the site.” But even though Iran had technically not violated the NPT, the seemingly sensational “revelation” was what Israel needed. As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, according to Seymour Hersh and Connie Bruck, Israel was the source of MEK’s “revelation.” It can also be argued that other people, including the head of the IAEA, knew about the existence of the facilities. The Scotsman of December 14, 2002 reported that in “Vienna, Mohamed El-Baradei, the director of the agency, told reporters he had known of the Iranian nuclear expansion for six months” (added emphasis). The report also quoted Mr. ElBaradei as saying: “This is not a surprise to us. … It would have been better if we had been informed earlier about the decision to build these facilities.” It therefore appears that the Director of the IAEA knew about the existence of such facilities prior to MEK’s “revelation,” since six months earlier puts the date before the news broke in August 2002. If ElBaradei knew of the existence of such facilities before they were “revealed” by MEK, it is safe to assume that the US government also knew. There is, indeed, much support for this assumption. For example, on December 14, 2002 The Washington Post published a report claiming that the “construction of two nuclear facilities in Iran” is worrying the US and the White House and making them express “serious concerns” about these facilities. The report quoted the White House spokesman Ari Fleischer as saying that the Iranian facilities reinforce growing US fears about Iran’s “across-the-board pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and missile capabilities.” The report then added something interesting: U.S. intelligence officials knew about, and had been monitoring, the sites before they were revealed publicly, but they said it was impossible to know their precise stage of development until IAEA inspectors can get to the sites. Determining the extent of Iran’s nuclear program has been, and remains, a priority for U.S. intelligence agencies [added emphasis]. If such reports were accurate, one has to say that not only Israel but also the US knew about the Iranian facilities. But Israel, and perhaps even the US, used MEK to “reveal” them. Connie Bruck, as we saw earlier, has argued that Israel did not want to be the source of the news itself and offered it to Iranian exiles, including the monarchists. But only MEK went public with the story. There are, however, other reasons for choosing MEK as a conduit. First, by disclosing the location of some nuclear facilities in Iran it was hoped that MEK would appear to be more than a “Mickey Mouse outlet” and would be taken a bit more seriously by the

140 The United States and Iran media, especially after providing so much false news earlier. Second, MEK “revealing” the “news” deflected attention away from the US and Israel and their zeal to catch Iran red-handed. Whatever the reason, the moment that the US and Israel were waiting for had arrived. After nearly two decades of false charges against Iran, the US and Israel had some excuse to tell the world that (1) Iran is hiding something, (2) the IAEA must scrutinize every aspect of Iranian nuclear research and development, (3) Iran must be reported to the Security Council for the violation of NPT agreements, and (4) sanctions must be imposed against Iran by the UN. In addition to the above, the US and Israel now had some excuse to force Iran to sign the Additional Protocol to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, allowing the IAEA to make snap inspections across Iranian territory. In the case of Iraq, the ability to carry out such inspections and snoop around had been very handy in containing it. Secret agents were sent to Iraq as inspectors to gather information. A case in point is David Kay, who served as the IAEA/UNSCOM (United Nations Special Commission) Chief Nuclear Weapons Inspector in Iraq, was accused by Iraqi officials of being a spy, and was quite instrumental in building the case for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. He once admitted that some inspections in Iraq went hand in hand with spying. When in 1999 he was asked on PBS’s Frontline what he thought about infiltration of the UNSCOM by intelligence agents, he answered: Well, I think it was a Faustian bargain. The intelligence communities of the world had the only expertise that you could use if you were unmasking a clandestine program. … So, from the very beginning, you needed that expertise, but I can say for myself personally—and I’m really only comfortable talking about myself— although a number of us discussed this in the early days—I realize it was always a bargain with the Devil—spies spying. The longer it continued, the more the intelligence agencies would, often for very legitimate reasons, decide that they had to use the access they got through cooperation with UNSCOM to carry out their missions.22 Given the “Faustian bargain,” the Americans and Israelis were, therefore, quite anxious to force Iran to sign the Additional Protocol, hoping that they could gather information on the military capabilities of Iran. The August 14, 2002 “revelation” made all this possible. Iran was now pushed to the top of the US’s “to do” list. It was now just a matter of getting UN sanctions imposed against Iran to contain it, as had been done in the case of Iraq.

8

Paving the road to the UN Security Council

The disclosure concerning the Iranian nuclear facilities at Natanz and Arak provided a perfect excuse for the US and Israel to push Iran to the top of the “to do” list. However, the world, including the IAEA, was mostly concerned with the issue of the impending US invasion of Iraq. ElBaradei, the IAEA chief, visited Iran in February 2003 to inspect, among other things, the facilities in Natanz and Arak. But as AFP, February 22, 2003, reported he had to cut short his inspection tour of nuclear facilities in Iran because of his “heavy workload.” The report went on to say that he and a team of IAEA inspectors visited the construction site at Natanz in central Iran, but did not go to the Arak site. After this visit, the IAEA inspectors carried out several more inspections in Iran ahead of a report that was to be issued in June of 2003 (AFP, May 28, 2003). Under “Findings and Initial Assessment,” the IAEA report of June 6, 2003 concluded that “Iran has failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material, the subsequent processing and use of that material and the declaration of facilities where the material was stored and processed.”1 There were, specifically, five failures mentioned, the most important of which appeared to be: “Failure to declare the import of natural uranium in 1991, and its subsequent transfer for further processing.”2 Given these “failures,” the report stated: “The Director General has repeatedly encouraged Iran to conclude an Additional Protocol. Without such protocols in force, the Agency’s ability to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear activities is limited.”

The need for a smoking gun This was not exactly the report that the US and Israel were hoping for. Even though there were references to facilities in Arak and Natanz in the report, the construction of such facilities was not mentioned as Iran’s “failure” to comply with its obligation. Nor did the report say that Iran had a weapons program. Yet US officials sounded as if the report confirmed their allegation that Iran was actually developing nuclear weapons. For example, in reference to the question “Do you have any reaction to the IAEA’s report on Iran’s nuclear efforts?” Ari Fleischer, the White House Press Secretary, stated: “Well, the President welcomes the

142 The United States and Iran international community’s report about Iranian attempts to develop nuclear weaponry” (Federal News Service, June 19, 2003). President Bush himself stated: “The international community must come together to make it very clear to Iran that we will not tolerate construction of a nuclear weapon. … Iran would be dangerous if it had a nuclear weapon” (AP, June 18, 2003). Kenneth Brill, the US Ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency, called the report “deeply troubling” (AP, June 19, 2003). He also stated: “The US expects the agency’s accumulation of further information will point to only one conclusion—that Iran is aggressively pursuing a nuclear weapons program” (AFP, June 19, 2003). John Bolton, US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, described the report as a “significant step forward,” and stated: “The substance (of the issue) is that Iran has a clandestine nuclear weapons programme and that its pursuit of that programme in our judgment constitutes a threat to international peace and security” (Financial Times, June 21, 2003). A day earlier, he also stated in an interview with the BBC that the “United States reserves the right to take military action to stop Iran developing nuclear weapons” (Reuters, June 20, 2003). John Bolton, as mentioned earlier, is a noted neoconservative associated with such institutions as the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, Manhattan Institute, American Enterprise Institute and Project for the New American Century.3 As such, Bolton played a key role in carrying out the policy of dual containment, and after the US invasion of Iraq he turned his attention exclusively to containing Iran. As Under Secretary of State he tried to isolate Iran from the international community and, in particular, stop Russia from constructing the Bushehr nuclear power plant. Indeed, on October 9, 2002 UPI quoted Bolton as saying we “remain very concerned that the nuclear and missile program of Iran and others, including Syria, continue to receive the benefits of Russian technology and expertise.” He then threatened Russia implicitly by saying that “Russia’s performance on its arms control and non-proliferation commitments have already adversely affected important bilateral efforts, and unless resolved could pose a threat to new initiatives including the global partnership” (UPI, October 9, 2002). We will return to Bolton’s pivotal role in the US–Israel attempt to contain Iran in the remainder of his term in the Department of State and, thereafter, as the US Ambassador to the UN. Before doing so, however, let us return to the IAEA’s report. Even though the report of June 6, 2003, was not exactly what the US and Israel were hoping for, it left a number of open questions that made both the Americans and Israelis hopeful about ultimately taking Iran before the UN Security Council. The Financial Times of June 21, 2003, pointed this out when it wrote: The IAEA will draw up a further report casting more light on the Iranian programme, which Washington hopes will give it ammunition to refer the matter to the UN Security Council. In particular, this next report will explore four key issues: 1 Why is Iran developing the ability to produce heavy water at a factory in Arak when this does not appear to be necessary for its civilian nuclear programme?

Paving the road to the UN Security Council 143 2 Why has Iran manufactured uranium metal, when there are no civilian uses for it? 3 Why did Iran prevent IAEA inspectors visiting Kalaye electric plant this month? 4 Why is Iran building such a massive uranium enrichment facility at Natanz when it claims it has never enriched uranium before? Among these questions, the issue of the Kalaye Electric Company is particularly interesting. The IAEA report of June 6, 2003 pointed out that the IAEA team had asked Iran about “the possible conduct of enrichment activities at the workshop of the Kalaye Electric Company in Tehran.” “The Iranian authorities,” the report went on to say, “acknowledged that the workshop had been used for the production of centrifuge components, but stated that there had been no operations in connection with its centrifuge enrichment development programme involving the use of nuclear material, either at the Kalaye Electric Company or at any other location in Iran.” But, according to the report, the Iranians were hesitant about “permitting the taking of environmental samples” by the IAEA at the workshop. If this reluctance meant that Iran was enriching uranium at the workshop, which was contrary to its NPT agreement, then the smoking gun that the US and Israel were looking for had been found. The next IAEA report, therefore, became crucial in providing such a smoking gun. On August 26, 2003 IAEA issued its next report.4 The report stated that between August 9 and 12 IAEA inspectors “were permitted to take environmental samples at the Kalaye Electric Company workshop … The results of the analysis of these samples are not yet available.” But it “was noted by inspectors that there had been considerable modification of the premises since their first visit in March 2003.” “Experts” in the US and Israel were quick to claim that Iran was hiding something and this could be an indication of a nuclear weapons program. One such “expert” was David Albright, the head of the “think tank,” the Institute for Science and International Security. On August 27, 2003, Albright told The Washington Post: “it is “legitimate to worry that the [Kalaye] refurbishment is to hide past uraniumenrichment activities.” Before the IAEA released its next report, news leaked that its inspectors had found traces of highly enriched uranium at Kalaye. The association of this news with Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons program was swift. According to The New York Times of September 26, 2003 President Bush stated: “It is very important for the world to come together to make it very clear to Iran that there will be universal condemnation if they continue with a nuclear weapons program.” His spokesman, Scott McClellan, the report went on to say, stated that the finding was “part of a longstanding pattern of evasions and deception to disguise the true nature and purpose of Iran’s nuclear activities.”

Psychological warfare Pressure mounted on Iran. Israel threatened Iran with military strike. On October 12, 2003 AFP reported the following from Jerusalem: “Newspapers were gripped

144 The United States and Iran here Sunday by US and German press reports of Israel’s nuclear capabilities and that spy agency Mossad has drawn up preemptive plans to attack six nuclear sites in arch foe Iran.” The report—which had appeared in the Los Angeles Times, Der Spiegel and Israeli newspapers—stated that “modified US-made cruise missiles are capable of carrying nuclear warheads on submarines, allowing Israel to launch atomic weapons from land, air or sea.” A “special Mossad unit,” the report said, “received orders two months ago to prepare plans for strikes on half-a-dozen targets in Iran suspected of being used to prepare nuclear weapons. Complete destruction of the targets by F-16 fighter bombers was deemed achievable by Mossad,” according to “Israeli security officials.” However, according to AP, October 12, 2003, “Israeli and foreign defense experts” dismissed “a report that Israel had modified submarine-based missiles to carry nuclear warheads.” Planting ominous news, and either revising it or denying it later, was part of the Israeli strategy of waging a psychological war against Iran and putting pressure on the Americans and Europeans to impose UN sanctions on Iran. This strategy was also apparent before October. For example, according to AFP, July 2, 2003, Israeli “Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom told European Union foreign ministers in Brussels that Iran’s nuclear program was threatening world stability and warned the new missile could also reach Europe.” The Washington Post of August 13, 2003 reported that Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon gave a grim warning to President Bush, saying that “Iran is much closer to producing nuclear weapons than U.S. intelligence believes” and “Israel is seriously considering a preemptive strike against Iran’s Bushehr nuclear reactor.” The report also added that “Sharon dramatized his forecast by bringing Maj. Gen. Yoav Galzant,” who “showered a worried-looking Bush with photographs and charts from a thick dossier on Iran’s covert program.” Warnings and threats intensified in September 2003, as Israel “hinted at possible military action to stop what it calls a nightmare scenario—nuclear weapons in the hands of Iran” (AP, September 9 and 17, 2003). The timing for Iran to have the nuclear bomb also changed from “two to three years,” to “they could reach the ‘point of no return’ by next year” (ibid.).5 These claims and threats became so severe that Iran had to warn Israel not to commit the error of waging a military attack, because it would face a “slap it will never forget” (AFP, September 18, 2003). Throughout this period forces aligned with Israel also tried to plant sensational news. MEK, for example, made numerous claims. Among these was the charge that Iran was secretly constructing an additional building to enrich uranium in Isfahan, a claim which turned out to be complete fabrication (AFP, October 14, 2003). The so-called neoconservatives were also busy fabricating news. One such individual was Michael Ledeen who, as mentioned earlier, was a central figure in the Iran-Contra scandal. He was now quite active in pursuing the dual containment policy, particularly when it came to Iran. According to The Washington Post of March 10, 2003 Ledeen also became a consultant to Karl Rove, President Bush’s closest advisor.6 In October of 2003 Ledeen and his associate, Manucher

Paving the road to the UN Security Council 145 Ghorbanifar, were back in the news for having “passed allegations to the Bush administration that enriched uranium was smuggled from Iraq into Iran five years ago and some may remain hidden in Iraq” (AP, October 16, 2003). But the news was so outlandish that no one would buy it. According to the Guardian of October 17, 2003 the CIA issued a statement denouncing Ghorbanifar as a “fabricator who has peddled false information for financial gain.” With regard to the source of information, the Guardian report quoted one intelligence source as saying that Ledeen’s contact couldn’t answer any questions, so we said ‘get us a sliver of uranium’, and he got mad. He demanded money and when he didn’t get it, he walked away. … The whole story was the same old crap. It was typical Ghorbanifar. The idea that these Iranian agents would smuggle uranium out five years ago, and only now go down with radiation sickness – it was all well-designed fabrications designed to make headlines. Needless to say Ledeen was not happy about the CIA dismissing his whole story as pure fabrication.

Additional Protocol, EU 3, the war drum, and the call for UN sanctions Even though much of the news put forward by various intelligence sources turned out to be fabrication, the US–Israeli accusations and threats against Iran were sufficiently ominous to make some Europeans worry. Britain, France, and Germany, or the EU 3, as they came to be known, started to exert pressure on Iran to sign the “Additional Protocol,” stop nuclear enrichment, and provide full disclosure of its nuclear program, a pressure which resulted in the foreign ministers of the EU 3 traveling to Iran on October 20, 2003 (Guardian, October 21, 2003). What the EU 3 offered Iran in return was not fully disclosed beyond certain generalities, such as providing Iran with nuclear technology. The following day Iran issued a statement, which “reaffirmed that nuclear weapons have no place in Iran’s defence doctrine and that its nuclear programme and activities have been exclusively in the peaceful domain.”7 It then stated: “The Iranian Government has decided to engage in full co-operation with the IAEA to address and resolve through full transparency all requirements and outstanding issues of the Agency and clarify and correct any possible failures and deficiencies within the IAEA.” “To promote confidence,” the statement went on to say, “the Iranian Government has decided to sign the IAEA Additional Protocol” and “while Iran has a right within the nuclear non-proliferation regime to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes it has decided voluntarily to suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as defined by the IAEA.” The statement also said: “Once international concerns, including those of the three governments, are fully resolved Iran could expect easier access to modern technology and supplies in a range of areas.” On October 23, 2003, according to AP, Iran also “handed the U.N. nuclear agency

146 The United States and Iran documents on its past atomic energy activities … ahead of an Oct. 31 deadline to prove its nuclear program is peaceful.” In addition, the report went on to say, Iran allowed IAEA “inspectors to view some sites, including at least one military facility.” Some in Iran saw the agreement between the EU 3 and Iran as “capitulation” and there were demonstrations against it (Deutsche Presse-Agentur, October 24, 2003). Iranians knew that the agreement was reached under conditions where both the US and Israel were threatening Iran. Indeed, UPI on October 30, 2003 reported: “European parliament members who visited Tehran recently reportedly warned Iran’s supreme national security chief Israel would attack Iran’s nuclear installations if Iran rejects the International Atomic Energy Agency’s demands that it end its nuclear enrichment program.” Iranians also knew that given the US sanctions, “access to modern technology and supplies in a range of areas” was impossible. Actually, Hassan Rowhani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, had argued that in the past Iran “concealed part of its legal nuclear activities” because of the “illegal sanctions against it” (Iran News Agency, October 21, 2003). Given that Iran agreed to European demands under threats and that little was expected from Europe in return, it was not until December 18, 2003 that Iran’s representative to the IAEA, Ali A. Salehi, and IAEA Director ElBaradei actually signed the Additional Protocol to the NPT; and even then the Iranian parliament refused to ratify it (Financial Times, December 19, 2003). In the meantime, the IAEA released its report of inspection of Iranian facilities on November 10, 2003.8 It confirmed traces of highly enriched uranium at Kalaye. But it stated that the “Iranian authorities attributed the presence of these particles to contamination originating from centrifuge components which had been imported by Iran.” “In connection with its efforts to verify that information,” the report went on, “the Agency requested, and Iran provided in October 2003, a list of imported and domestically produced centrifuge components, material and equipment, and an indication of the batches of items that Iran claims to have been the source of the contamination.” The report also stated that traces of highly enriched uranium was found at Natanz. In general, under “Findings,” the report stated: “Iran’s nuclear programme, as the Agency currently understands it, consists of a practically complete front end of a nuclear fuel cycle,” and “Iran has now acknowledged that it has been developing, for 18 years, a uranium centrifuge enrichment programme, and, for 12 years, a laser enrichment programme.” The report, once again, was not what the US and Israel had been hoping for. It did not say that Iran is in violation of its NPT Safeguards Agreement. Nor did it conclude that Iran had a nuclear weapons program. Indeed, it stated unambiguously: “To date, there is no evidence that the previously undeclared nuclear material and activities referred to above were related to a nuclear weapons programme.” This irritated the Americans and Israelis, who, in turn, kept the war drums beating. John Bolton, US Under Secretary of State, stated that the IAEA’s conclusion—namely, that there was no evidence so far that Iran had tried to build a nuclear weapon—was

Paving the road to the UN Security Council 147 “simply impossible to believe” (The Washington Post, November 19, 2003). Secretary of State Colin Powell tried to persuade his European counterparts that Iran was in “violation of the treaty” and that they should “get tougher with Iran over its nuclear program, which the United States believes is being used to pursue weapons” (AP, November 18, 2003). Meir Dagan, the chief of the Mossad overseas intelligence agency, stated that “Iran’s nuclear program poses the biggest threat to Israel’s existence since the country’s creation more than five decades ago,” and “Israeli Defense Minister, Shaul Mofaz, warned that Iran would reach a ‘point of no return’ in its nuclear program within a year unless there were concerted efforts to stop it” (AFP, November 17, 2003). Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom stated “a robust European stand is needed” because “Iran has violated its commitments” under IAEA rules and “I believe it should be moved to the Security Council” (AFP, November 19, 2003). Taking the case to the Security Council to impose sanctions was what the US advocated as well. According to AFP, November 21, 2003, the US tried in “intense, sometimes acrimonious, closed-door negotiations at [IAEA headquarters],” to change the language of the resolution being written by “toughening” it. The report stated that the US “wants to declare the Islamic Republic in ‘noncompliance’ with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)” and that “noncompliance” is the “trigger-word for bringing the issue before the United Nations Security Council, which could impose sanctions.” Knowing the intentions of the US and Israel, there was resistance on the part of other members of the Board of Governors, particularly Russia, to toughen the language. AFP, November 17, 2003, made the position of Russia clear when it quoted Russia’s atomic energy minister, Alexander Rumyantsev, as saying: “Sanctions are unacceptable as nothing has been discovered … Iran has shown everything it has (in the nuclear field). It is hard to imagine Iran still has something to disclose.” In the end, the US and Israel did not get what they wished for. They could not include the “trigger mechanism” in the resolution. The harshest language that the US managed to include in the Resolution of November 26, 2003 was that the Board of Governors “[s]trongly deplores Iran’s past failures and breaches of its obligation to comply with the provisions of its Safeguards Agreement, as reported by the Director General; and urges Iran to adhere strictly to its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement in both letter and spirit.”9 “US lying in wait for Iran nuclear violations,” the title of an AFP report, November 27, 2003, aptly described the position of the Americans and Israelis. A better title, of course, would have been “US and Israel hoping for an excuse to carry out a long-awaited plan.”

The source of contamination, the IAEA report, and the smoking gun As stated earlier, on December 18, 2003, Iran signed the Additional Protocol to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) pending ratification by the Iranian parliament. Three days later news emerged about the sources of highly enriched

148 The United States and Iran uranium in certain Iranian facilities, particularly in Kalaye. According to a report in The Washington Post of December 21, 2003 documents given earlier by Iran to the IAEA pointed “overwhelmingly to Pakistan as the source of crucial technology,” including centrifuges, as well as the source of contamination. In this transfer of technology the name of Abdul Qadeer Khan, the “father of the Pakistani bomb,” stood out. With regard to Kalaye, however, the report stated that “sophisticated laboratory tests by the IAEA detected traces of Soviet-made highly enriched uranium at Iran’s Kalaye nuclear facility.” Whichever country was the source of the contaminants and whatever the level of enrichment, these reports proved US– Israeli “experts” wrong and confirmed Iran’s earlier argument that the origin of such particles was foreign. This was also confirmed by the IAEA report that was issued on February 24.10 Indeed, it was reconfirmed later that Iran was right about its claim concerning contamination. For example, on August 10, 2004 AP reported: “New findings by the U.N. atomic agency appear to strengthen Iran’s claim it has not enriched uranium domestically and weaken U.S. arguments that the country is hiding a nuclear weapons program, diplomats said Tuesday.” The report stated that the IAEA “has established that at least some enriched particles found in Iran originated in Pakistan.” The February report, however, chided Iran for not having provided, back in October of 2003, a complete picture of its past atomic energy activities. For example, it stated that the “types of uranium contamination found at the Kalaye Electric Company workshop differ from those at Natanz, even though Iran states that the source of contamination in both cases is the imported centrifuge components.” Also, the report pointed out that IAEA “is still waiting for Iran to provide requested information detailing the origin of the centrifuge equipment and components.” In addition, the report stated that Iran had failed to mention in October that it had “received P-2 centrifuge drawings from foreign sources in 1994,” a kind of centrifuge that was more advanced than the P1 centrifuge that Iran already possessed. The news of Iran’s P-2 centrifuge designs gave an excuse to US officials and neoconservative allies of Israel to push for UN sanctions against Iran. Immediately after the “diplomats” broke the news, John Bolton stated at a security conference in Berlin: “There is no doubt in our minds that Iran continues to pursue nuclear weapons. They have not complied even with the commitment they made in October” (AP, February 12, 2004). Henry Sokolski, one of the chief neoconservatives, stated with regard to the P-2 news: “This, in fact, is the smoking gun,” and that “the IAEA governors should report Iran to the U.N. Security Council at their March 8–10 board meeting” (Reuters, February 13, 2004).11 Even Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, who was not considered to be a neoconservative, stated: “We have been following the question of Iran pretty closely and there’s no doubt in our mind that Iran continues to pursue a nuclear weapons program” (AFP, February 13, 2004). Secretary of State Colin Powell also stated that Iran “needs to pledge an end—not just a suspension—to all of its WMD programs and it must follow those promises with action” (AFP, February 20, 2004). The rest of the world, however, did not construe the February report of IAEA, particularly with regard to Iran’s P-2 centrifuge designs, as a smoking gun. Even

Paving the road to the UN Security Council 149 though much pressure was exerted by the US and Israel, the resolution adopted by the Board of Governors of the IAEA on March 13, 2004 was not what the Americans and Israelis were looking for. It expressed “serious concern that the declarations made by Iran in October 2003 did not amount to the complete and final picture of Iran’s past and present nuclear programme.” It also “deplored” the fact that Iran omitted reference to its “possession of P-2 centrifuge design drawings and to associated research, manufacturing, and mechanical testing activities.” However, much to the dismay of the US and Israel, the resolution did not say that Iran was in violation of its NPT agreement or that the matter should be referred to the Security Council. By now most members of the Board of Governors, particularly those belonging to the so-called non-aligned nations, knew perfectly well what the true intention of the US was. This fact was even known to the head of the IAEA as well. For example, the Financial Times of March 18, 2004 wrote that ElBaradei “has told the Bush administration that resolution of the mounting crisis over Iran’s suspected nuclear weapons programme might only be resolved in the context of normalisation of relations with the US.” “But,” the report went on to say, “powerful figures in the Bush administration believe that only regime change in Tehran will end Iran’s weapons programmes.” Since IAEA inspectors and ElBaradei himself had repeatedly stated that they had no proof of a weapons program by Iran, they knew that the US intention was merely “regime change” and that the issue of nuclear weapons was an excuse. 12

MEK, neoconservatives, and Iran’s complicity in Iraq insurgency Unable to get the IAEA to report Iran to the UN Security Council, the forces allied with the US and Israel began another series of concerted efforts to achieve their goal. MEK went into action conjuring up new revelations. Its representative Alireza Jafarzadeh—who, given the MEK terrorist label, had transformed himself into the “President” of some entity called “Strategic Policy Consulting Inc.”—was now saying that Iran’s nuclear program had been split into two parallel operations—a secret one run by a “special unit” of the Revolutionary Guard and other military institutions and headed by Khamene [sic], and a publicly declared one run by Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization (Reuters, April 27, 2004). According to Jafarzadeh, the “military special unit has its own advanced labs and facilities, which operate away from the IAEA inspections, and are kept totally secret” (Reuters, April 27, 2004). This was, of course, complete fabrication and the IAEA was no longer taking MEK’s claims seriously. Yet, some “U.S. officials” on “condition of anonymity” would repeat exactly the same false story as MEK (AP, April 27, 2004). Other forces allied with Israel were also busy manufacturing sensational news. Neoconservatives such as Michael Rubin were writing incessantly about how Iran is leading the Iraqi “insurgency” and how “Anti-American and Anti-Semitic slogans decorate the compound Hezbollah and the Iranian-subsidized Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq share in Basra.”13 These accusations,

150 The United States and Iran indeed, resulted in a battle between the State Department—which saw “no hard evidence of any Iranian role in the unrest in Iraq”—and the Defense Department, including Secretary Donald Rumsfeld himself—who maintained that “Iran was interfering in Iraq” (Voice of America, April 9, 2004). In the end, nothing came out of these series of accusations in spring of 2004. Yet, in the following years the neoconservatives continued to blame Iran for the failures of the US war in Iraq and, in so doing, they tried to expand the war to contain Iran. However, like earlier attempts to connect the US war in Afghanistan to Iran, coupling the US war in Iraq with Iran had only limited success. Therefore, the issue of Iran allegedly developing nuclear weapons had to be kept alive.

Existential threat to Israel and the IAEA Israeli officials kept beating the war drums. Sharon, wrote The Independent on April 25, 2004, “indicated that the US recognised Israel needs a credible deterrent against the threat from Iran and other hostile countries that pose an ‘existential threat’ to Israel.” President Bush, in turn, would mimic the Israeli accusations. In his “Remarks by the President at the Newspaper Association of America Annual Convention,” on April 21, 2004, Bush would state: I mention to you—look, I mentioned to you the need for international bodies to be effective. We’re working with the IAEA with Iran. And the Iranians need to feel the pressure from the world that any nuclear weapons program will be uniformly condemned. It’s essential that they hear that message. An appropriate international body to deal with them is the IAEA … It would be intolerable to peace and stability in the Middle East if they get a nuclear weapon, particularly since their stated objective is the destruction of Israel.14 The Israeli lobby groups, on the other hand, would focus mostly on influencing Congress to pass resolutions against the alleged Iranian nuclear weapons. On May 6, 2004, for example, the AIPAC website would read: In the wake of years of secret development of a nuclear arms capability and ongoing efforts by Iran to undermine the work of U.N. arms inspectors, Congress is considering legislation to halt the Islamic republic’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. International Relations Committee Chairman Henry Hyde (R-IL) and Ranking Member Tom Lantos (D-CA) have introduced a bill (H. Con. Res. 398) which updates a previous version of similar legislation introduced by Reps. Curt Weldon (R-PA) and Jane Harman (D-CA). The bill calls upon all signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), including the United States, to use all appropriate means to deter, dissuade, and prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. The legislation was unanimously approved by the International Relations Committee and sent to the House floor for an expected vote in the coming days. Meanwhile, the Senate is

Paving the road to the UN Security Council 151 considering a similar bill (S. Con. Res. 81) by Sens. Jon Kyl (R-AZ) and Dianne Feinstein (D-CA). Urge your House members to vote in favor of this resolution and urge your Senators to co-sponsor it. Despite American and Israeli pressure, the world was not yet ready to sanction Iran. What was needed was some “revelation” or act of defiance by Iran to move the case to the UN. The IAEA’s June 1, 2004 report, once again, did not reveal any “smoking gun.”15 The most damning disclosure was that until late May 2004 Iran had failed to report the fact that it had imported some components for advanced P-2 centrifuges. The US was quick to react. “The United States,” read the AFP headline of June 2, 2004, “accused Iran of using deceit and denial to hide clandestine development of nuclear weapons, after damning new revelations from the UN nuclear watchdog on the Islamic republic’s atomic energy program.” The report went on to say that Kenneth Brill, US ambassador to the IAEA, told reporters that Iran’s refusal to fully cooperate with the agency “fits a long-term pattern of denial and deception that can only be designed to mask Iran’s military nuclear program.” ElBaradei was also quoted as saying that Iran’s cooperation had been “less than satisfactory,” particularly with regard to reporting the importation of P-2 centrifuge components (Reuters, June 14, 2004). Correspondingly, the resolution of June 18, 2004, which was drafted by Britain, France, and Germany, “deplored” the “fact” that, overall, “Iran’s cooperation has not been as full, timely and proactive as it should have been.”16 In particular, it called on Iran “to take all necessary steps on an urgent basis to help resolve all outstanding questions,” particularly with regard to “the nature and scope of Iran’s P-2 centrifuge programme.” The resolution came out at a time when one newswire headline read: “The U.N. nuclear watchdog was forced to make an embarrassing admission Thursday—that it had wrongly accused Iran of withholding information about imports of potentially weapons-related technology” (Reuters, June 17, 2004). “Iran,” the report said, in fact, had “produced a tape recording of an Iranian businessman who imported the parts [of the P-2 centrifuge] telling an IAEA inspector verbally in January” of 2004. In spite of the error, The New York Times wrote on June 18, 2004 the resolution “survived a last-minute hurdle” but the “mistake led the board to soften a part of the statement that had criticized Iran for its ‘changing or contradictory information.’” The IAEA error was symptomatic of an agency under pressure to produce certain results with regard to Iran demanded by the US and, ultimately, Israel. This pressure—which gave rise to seemingly endless inspections, probes, reports, and resolutions—was observed by many countries around the world. As with the Iraqi case in the 1990s, the IAEA appeared to be an agency used by the US and Israel to target a country and not a fair-minded and independent international body. This appearance, coupled with the fact that the IAEA did nothing when it came to Israel, which has not become a signatory to the NPT and is widely believed to have nuclear weapons, created a public relations problem for the IAEA. ElBaradei— who seemed to know perfectly well that much of the hype about the Iranian nuclear

152 The United States and Iran program was political—tried to improve the negative image of the IAEA and make it appear more even-handed by traveling to Israel and asking her “to open up nuclear facilities to inspections by the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency” (BBC Monitoring, Middle East, June 27, 2004). ElBaradei’s public relation stunt was a fiasco. Sharon told Israeli Army Radio that Israel will not change its policy of “no show, no tell” and that he did not know what ElBaradei “is coming to see” (BBC Monitoring, Middle East, July 7, 2004). After arriving in Israel, ElBaradei “was taken on a flight over Israel by a senior air force official” and “saw from afar the Dimona plant, where Israel is believed to make the material for its nuclear warheads” (AFP, July 8, 2004). He was told by the Israelis “that there would be no change in the government’s longstanding ‘strategic ambiguity’ policy” (AFP, July 8, 2004). In the end this stunt of ElBaradei’s produced nothing and he left Israel completely empty-handed. Actually, this attempt at damage control added to the image problem of the IAEA. Israel, as many, including Iran and even ElBaradei himself, noted, not only refused to discuss its nuclear program, but turned the tables on Iran. 17 ElBaradei’s trip came at a time when the US and Israel were actually intensifying their campaign against Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons. “The United States and Israel,” AFP reported on July 6, 2004, “highlighted Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons program as the UN’s atomic energy agency moved to probe Tel Aviv’s nuclear strength.” The report went on to say that Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom “charged that Iran, regarded as the Jewish state’s number one enemy, was trying to develop ‘a new missile that will include Berlin, London and Paris, and the southern part of Russia in its range. … So if we would have to do something with ElBaradei, is to ask him to continue with his efforts to push the Iranians to put an end to its effort to develop a nuclear weapon.’” And, of course, since no nuclear weapon had ever materialized in Iran, the date when Iran would have the bomb was changed and moved to the future. “Israeli intelligence chiefs,” wrote AFP on July 21, 2004, “told Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s security cabinet in a joint assessment that Iran will have a nuclear weapons capacity by 2007.” The US officials would, of course, repeat the same warnings, but without being as precise as Israel, perhaps realizing how many times they had misstated their facts in the past.

Pressure mounts for referring Iran to the Security Council In summer of 2004 there was more talk of referring Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons program to the Security Council. AFP, July 29, 2004, quoted US Secretary of State Colin Powell as saying to reporters accompanying him on a visit to Kuwait: “I think it is getting more and more likely that this matter is going to have to be referred to the Security Council.” The pressure from the US and Israel was so intense in July 2004 that one report read: It sounds like an Iraq summer rerun: Weapons of mass destruction. Support for terrorism. Talk of U.N. Security Council action. Hints of a push for regime change. This time, however, the fuss is not over Iraq but about that country’s

Paving the road to the UN Security Council 153 next-door neighbor, Iran. Recent developments have been unsettling. (AP, July 21, 2004) The pressure mounted in the following months. On August 2, 2004 National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice warned: “The Iranians have been trouble for a very long time. And it’s one reason that this regime has to be isolated in its bad behavior, not quote-unquote, ‘engaged’” (Reuters, August 2, 2004). Similarly, on August 17, 2004, Under Secretary of State John Bolton stated at an event held at the neoconservative Hudson Institute:18 Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons capability is moving it further and further down the path toward international isolation. We cannot let Iran, a leading sponsor of international terrorism, acquire nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them to Europe, most of central Asia and the Middle East, or beyond. Without serious, concerted, immediate intervention by the international community, Iran will be well on the road to doing so.19 A few days earlier Bolton had implicitly threatened Iran with military action. The Guardian reported on August 10, 2004 that the “US will ask a meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency on September 13 to declare Iran in breach of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, a prelude to seeking punitive UN sanctions.” John Bolton, the report then went on to say, has “hinted at using military force should the UN fail to act. ‘The US and its allies must be willing to deploy more robust techniques’ to halt nuclear proliferation, including ‘the disruption of procurement networks, sanctions and other means.’” The report added “Israel, Washington’s ally, has also been stoking the fire. It is suggested there that if the west fails to act against Iran in timely fashion, Israel could strike pre-emptively as it did against Iraq’s nuclear facilities in 1981.” Furthermore, the report stated, Condoleezza Rice “vowed to aim some ‘very tough [IAEA] resolutions’ at Iran this autumn.”

The spy network Interestingly enough, the US–Israeli push for a UN resolution against Iran came at a time when it was divulged that Lawrence Franklin—“a desk officer in the Pentagon’s Near East and South Asia Bureau,” who specialized in Iranian affairs—and “at least two employees at AIPAC” were under investigation for “passing classified information to Israel,” information which “was said to have been the draft of a presidential directive related to U.S. policies toward Iran” (The Washington Post, August 28, 2004). Larry Franklin had “ties to top Pentagon officials Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith,” according to CBS News of August 28, 2004. Also, according to the September 6, 2004 issue of Newsweek, Franklin was “a close friend” of Michael Ledeen, the US–Israel go-between in the Iran-Contra scandal. Franklin’s name, as The Washington Post of August 28, 2004 pointed out, also “surfaced in news reports last year that disclosed he and another Pentagon

154 The United States and Iran specialist [Harold Rhode] on the Persian Gulf region had met secretly with Manucher Ghorbanifar.” The two AIPAC employees, it was learned later, were Steve Rosen and Keith Weissman, respectively AIPAC’s former “policy director” and “deputy director for foreign policy issues” (The New York Times, May 4, 2005). The discovery of an AIPAC spying network neither damaged relations between the US and Israel nor slowed down the concerted and coordinated efforts of the two to contain Iran. AIPAC, the agency that was accused of being involved in the spying, appeared to be undaunted. A few days after the news broke, AIPAC’s regular webpage was replaced by a short statement labeling the “allegation” as “false.”20 Subsequently, the FBI official in charge of the investigation was labeled an “anti-Semite.”21 Soon the case was forgotten and AIPAC was back at work making, among other things, a case for why the US should target Iran. Indeed, a few weeks later, in the midst of the US presidential campaign, the representatives of both presidential candidates—namely, Condoleezza Rice and Richard Holbrooke—appeared at what AIPAC’s website said was the “largest-ever national summit” on October 24–5 in Hollywood, Florida.22 The appearance of such prominent individuals at the “summit” was used by AIPAC to argue that there was no basis for investigation. The Jewish Times of September 11, 2004 stated that “Jewish leaders now are minimizing the investigation, suggesting it can’t be of real merit because it has been going on for two years without arrests. They also note that if there were merit to the case it’s unlikely that President Bush and his national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, would have addressed the group after the investigation was launched.” In the end, AIPAC remained completely unscathed and the news of spies passing secret US policy to Israel was pushed to the back pages of newspapers. In October 2005 Larry Franklin pleaded guilty to “sharing the information and also to illegally having classified documents at his home” (Reuters, January 20, 2006). He was sentenced to 12 years and 7 months in prison for “passing U.S. defense information to two pro-lobbyists and for sharing classified information with an Israeli diplomat” (Reuters, January 20, 2006). AIPAC, which had stated that it had nothing to do with the spying case, unceremoniously “fired” Steve Rosen and Keith Weissman (Ha’aretz, April 4, 2005).23 On March 7, 2006, during the annual meeting of AIPAC, The Washington Post wrote: “ask people at this week’s gathering about Steve Rosen, the father of modern AIPAC, who goes on trial next month for disseminating classified information, and you get the sort of look you’d expect if you inquired about an embarrassing medical condition.” “Who?”, the report stated the response was when a delegate was asked about Rosen. “‘Rosen? Which one is he?’ answers a charity executive, with a smile,” said the report. AIPAC’s meeting—minus the two discarded members—started its “Plenary Sessions” on Sunday, March 5, 2006 with “OPENING LUNCHEON PLENARY—Global Challenge: How the International Community Can Stop Iran.” This was followed by addresses delivered by “Ambassador John R. Bolton,” the “Honorable Ehud Olmert,” and “Dr. David Kay Former

Paving the road to the UN Security Council 155 IAEA/UNSCOM Chief Nuclear Weapons Inspector.”24 Two days later Vice President Cheney delivered his AIPAC address. The main topic of all such addresses was, of course, Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons. Part of the transcript of Cheney’s AIPAC address reads: The Iranian regime needs to know that if it stays on its present course, the international community is prepared to impose meaningful consequences. (Applause.) For our part, the United States is keeping all options on the table in addressing the irresponsible conduct of the regime. (Applause.) And we join other nations in sending that regime a clear message: We will not allow Iran to have a nuclear weapon. (Applause.) 25 Before getting too far ahead, let us return to the autumn of 2004, when the US and Israel were hoping to get very tough IAEA resolutions on Iran.

The case of Lavisan-Shian: a smoking gun? As mentioned earlier, many in Iran saw the agreement reached between Iran and the EU 3 to suspend uranium enrichment and to sign the additional protocol as capitulation.26 The Iranian parliament (Majles), therefore, never ratified the additional protocol. Given such opposition, Iran’s Foreign Minister spoke of Iran’s “legitimate right” to enrich uranium (Khaleej Times Online, August 4, 2004). As Reuters reported on August 1, 2004 Iran also declared that “it had resumed building nuclear centrifuges” and, according to “diplomats,” it had also “restarted work at a uranium conversion facility near the central city of Isfahan.” Technically, building centrifuges and converting uranium did not violate the Iran–EU 3 agreement. However, as the report mentioned, the EU 3 were not happy with Iran’s action and, of course, the Americans were quick to argue that Iran was backing out of its commitment. Colin Powell, the report stated, “warned Iran” that “its case was increasingly likely to be referred to the sanction-imposing U.N. Security Council for failing to meet IAEA commitments.” The IAEA report of September 1, 2004 contained, once again, no smoking gun.27 A new issue that was touched upon in the report was inspection of a military site called Lavisan-Shian (also spelled “Lavizan”), which, as the report stated, was “relevant to alleged nuclear activities.” Before proceeding with IAEA findings, some background information about this site is in order. On May 15, 2003 Alireza Jafarzadeh and Soona Samsami, representatives of MEK, held a “news conference” at the Willard Hotel, Washington, DC. The purpose of the “news conference,” according to Jafarzadeh and Samsami, was “to reveal detailed information that we have received from inside Iran” (Federal News Service, May 15, 2003). The “information” included, among other things, the existence of “a new biological weapons center” that is “based in Lavizan Shian Technological Research Center.” Even though MEK’s “information” apparently had to do with “biological weapons,” the story soon morphed into Lavisan being the site of nuclear weapons research.28

156 The United States and Iran Whatever was happing at Lavisan, MEK’s “information” appears to have originated in Israel. Prior to MEK’s “news conference” Israel was contending that Lavisan was being used to store nuclear weapons. For example, as we saw earlier, on April 9, 1998 The Jerusalem Post wrote that according to some “documents relayed to Israel and obtained by The Jerusalem Post” and authenticated by “US congressional experts,” Iran “received several nuclear warheads from a former Soviet republic in the early 1990s.” But there was more to this fabricated news. The “documents,” The Jerusalem Post wrote, showed that “nuclear warheads are being stored in the Lavizan military camp in the Teheran area.” Also, wrote the Post, an “April 3, 1992, document discusses the production of a solid fuel missile prototype, called Zalzal 300, completed in Lavizan which was soon to be ready for launch.” The claims concerning Lavisan were fabrications. Yet the story of Lavisan was kept alive by the US–Israeli alliance and the IAEA was delegated to visit the military site. Iran, of course, was reluctant to let IAEA investigators gather information about its military sites, knowing full well about the “Faustian bargain” that David Kay had talked about. The IAEA report of September 2004 stated that IAEA investigators were allowed by Iran, albeit reluctantly, to visit the Lavisan-Shian site. The report pointed out that the site had been razed in November of 2003, an action which Iran claimed was the result of the municipality of Tehran wanting to turn the place into a park.29 The IAEA report also stated that it had taken environmental samples, particularly from what Iran had described as a former physics research center. A few days after the IAEA report was derestricted the result of environmental sampling came in. “Initial tests of soil samples,” reported AP on September 28, 2004, “have revealed no signs of nuclear activities at a site in northern Iran that the United States says Tehran could have used to run secret uranium enrichment programs, diplomats said.” The report added that the “State Department earlier this year said Lavizan had undergone a complete dismantling and razing as part of an attempted nuclear cover-up.” The Americans and Israelis were unhappy with the IAEA report and the result of environmental sampling that showed no nuclear activities at Lavizan. Before the September 18 IAEA resolution much pressure was exerted by Israel and the US to report Iran to the Security Council, even though ElBaradei maintained that there was no “proof of a weapons program” or even “indication of undeclared (uranium) enrichment” (Reuters, September 14, 2004). “Israel sought to ratchet up the pressure on Iran,” reported AFP on September 13, 2004, “by claiming its arch enemy could be in a position next year to develop nuclear weapons without outside help, as a UN watchdog scrutinized Tehran’s atomic program.” According to the report, the head of Israeli military intelligence, General Aharon Zeevi, was now saying that the “next six months will determine if Iran will achieve in the spring of 2005 a non-conventional capability in the sphere of nuclear research and development.” John Bolton was also following suit, making a trip to Israel “as part of an effort to give priority to the Iranian nuclear issue at the upcoming meeting of the United Nations Security Council” (Ha’aretz, September 11, 2004).

Paving the road to the UN Security Council 157

The case of Parchin: another smoking gun? The IAEA report of September 1, 2004 was followed by the Board of Governors’ resolution of September 18, 2004.30 The resolution noted with “serious concern” that Iran had “not heeded repeated calls from the Board to suspend, as a confidence building measure, all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities.” The resolution also expressed concerns that at “its Uranium Conversion Facility, Iran is planning to introduce 37 tonnes of yellowcake.” After calling upon Iran “as a further confidence-building measure, voluntarily to reconsider its decision to start construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water,” the resolution asked for another IAEA report in November, 2004. Iran, however, defied the resolution a few days later by announcing that it had “started converting raw uranium into the gas needed for enrichment” (AP, September 21, 2004). “The announcement,” Reuters added on September 21, 2004, “was likely to provoke an angry reaction from Washington and increase suspicion in Israel, which plans to buy 500 ‘bunker buster’ bombs from the United States that could take out Iran’s underground atomic facilities.” On September 23, 2004, in a speech delivered at the UN General Assembly, Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom lashed out by saying: The international community now realizes that Iran—with missiles that can reach London, Paris, Berlin and southern Russia—does not only pose a threat to the security of Israel, but to the security and stability of the whole world. Indeed, Iran has replaced Saddam Hussein as the world’s number one exporter of terror, hate and instability. Israel and America now had to intensify their work if they were to convince the rest of the world that Iran, like Iraq, must be contained, otherwise missiles would rain upon Europe. The next window of opportunity was in November 2004, when another IAEA report was due. Before this date, however, some other fictitious stories emerged. A few days after the release of the IAEA’s September 1 report, the US and Israel started a new claim. “A senior U.S. official,” Reuters reported on September 16, 2004, stated “that satellite photographs of a suspected nuclear industrial site in Iran demonstrated its intention to develop atomic weapons, an allegation Tehran dismissed as ‘a new lie.’” The new site was another military complex southeast of Tehran called Parchin; and, once again, the “expert” who would verify the news was David Albright. Albright, the report stated, “made the allegation about Parchin. … He also said the IAEA had asked to inspect Parchin but had been ignored.” Iran not only “categorically” denied any nuclear-related testing at Parchin, but argued that the IAEA had not requested such a visit, adding that Iran would cooperate if such a request was made (AFP September 16, 2004). The story of Parchin, too, appears to have originated from sources linked to Israel. In his August 14, 2002 “news conference,” MEK representative Alireza Jafarzadeh claimed that Parchin was involved in chemical weapons production

158 The United States and Iran and referred the reporters to his previously “revealed” information about that site (Federal News Service, August 14, 2002). Some years back, however, the site had been mentioned in Kenneth R. Timmerman’s “Iran Brief” in a different context. In July 3, 1997, “Iran Brief” reported the existence of a “Top Secret report” which estimated that Iran would have nuclear weapons “in five, or at most seven years from now.” Along with this fabricated news, “Iran Brief” then stated the “report identifies a key missile research center in Parchin, on the outskirts of Tehran—the home of the Middle East’s oldest gunpowder works. It asserts that Russia is assisting the program under the guise of a space research project.” Ultimately, such fabricated news about Parchin morphed into the claim that the military site was actually involved in the development of nuclear weapons. The IAEA was pressured to inspect the site. On October 1, 2005 Reuters reported that IAEA inspectors would soon inspect Parchin military complex. The same report stated that “IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei said last month there were no indications that Parchin was a nuclear weapons site, but U.S. officials said ElBaradei was not qualified to make such a statement without having inspected the site.”

The Paris Agreement In addition to inspecting Parchin, the IAEA came under pressure from the EU 3 to make Iran stop all enrichment related activities indefinitely, including making centrifuges and converting uranium. Indeed, the EU 3 “offered a package of incentives in return for Tehran’s agreement to permanently give up uranium enrichment” (AP, October 25, 2006, added emphasis). The incentives apparently included a light-water nuclear reactor, according to an AFP report of October 22, 2005. Iranians, of course, realized that “indefinite” should not mean “permanent” (AP, October 25, 2006). They also realized that they were being pressured into giving up permanently their “inalienable right” guaranteed under Article IV of the NPT in exchange for promises which could not be kept. Their unease was particularly acute since the US “frowned” on the European package and expressed “concerns” about “Iran’s acquisition of any new nuclear technology” (AFP, October 20, 2004). Iran, therefore, had a difficult time accepting the package as it was. The Majles actually “passed a bill backing the resumption of uranium enrichment,” and the spokesman for the Iranian Foreign Ministry, Hamid Reza Asefi, stated that the Europeans should “specify their precise commitments, concrete and clear” before any agreement is reached (AFP, October 31, 2004). On November 2, 2004 AFP reported that the “European Union is no longer explicitly calling for an indefinite suspension of Iran’s uranium enrichment.” Subsequently, on November 14, 2004, an agreement was reached between the EU 3 and Iran based on a new proposal offered by the EU 3 on behalf of the European Union. What became known as the “Paris Agreement” recognized “Iran’s rights under the NPT” and stated:31

Paving the road to the UN Security Council 159 To build further confidence, Iran has decided, on a voluntary basis, to continue and extend its suspension to include all enrichment related and reprocessing activities, and specifically: the manufacture and import of gas centrifuges and their components; the assembly, installation, testing or operation of gas centrifuges; work to undertake any plutonium separation, or to construct or operate any plutonium separation installation; and all tests or production at any uranium conversion installation. The IAEA will be notified of this suspension and invited to verify and monitor it. The suspension will be implemented in time for the IAEA to confirm before the November Board that it has been put into effect. The suspension will be sustained while negotiations proceed on a mutually acceptable agreement on long-term arrangements. The agreement reiterated that the “E3/EU recognize that this suspension is a voluntary confidence building measure and not a legal obligation.” Furthermore, the suspension was only to last “while negotiations on a long-term agreement are under way.” In exchange for this voluntary and temporary suspension, the EU 3/ EU agreed to “provide firm guarantees on nuclear, technological and economic cooperation and firm commitments on security issues.” “Once suspension has been verified,” the agreement went on to say, “the negotiations with the EU on a Trade and Cooperation Agreement will resume. The E3/EU will actively support the opening of Iranian accession negotiations at the WTO.” The last promise was an allusion to the fact that the US had continuously prevented Iran from joining the World Trade Organization (WTO). The conclusion of the agreement stated: “Irrespective of progress on the Nuclear issue, the E3/EU and Iran confirm their determination to combat terrorism, including the activities of Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups such as the MKO.” It should be remembered that MEK (MKO) is, to this day, freely operating in Europe and the US. A day after the EU–Iran agreement the US State Department gave its guarded approval and stated that “Iran’s promise to freeze all activity related to nuclear enrichment [was] useful but said the suspension had to be verified” (Reuters, November 16, 2004). A few days later, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage said that “my view would be that the incentives of the Europeans only work against the backdrop of the United States being strong and firm on this issue. … In the vernacular, it’s kind of a good-cop bad-cop arrangement. If it works, we’ll all have been successful” (The New York Times, November 21, 2004). If the “good-cop bad-cop” story was correct, then the US, or at least the State Department, was in on the game that the EU was playing: in exchange for some vague promises that could not be fulfilled Iran would stop all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities indefinitely.

Another IAEA resolution, Parchin, and the attempt to remove ElBaradei As an agreement was being reached between the EU 3 and Iran, the IAEA issued its November 15 report.32 The report pointed out that IAEA had asked Iran “in the

160 The United States and Iran interest of transparency, for a visit to a site located at Parchin in order to provide assurance regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities at that site.” The report also requested that “Iran sign, ratify and fully implement a Protocol Additional to its Safeguards Agreement,” show “transparency and cooperation with the Agency,” and “suspend all enrichment related and reprocessing activities.” But, once again the report did not show a smoking gun. The Board of Governors’ resolution that followed on November 29, 2004 actually “welcomed” the fact that “Iran has decided to continue and extend its suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities, and underlines that the full and sustained implementation of this suspension, which is a voluntary, non-legally-binding, confidence building measure, to be verified by the Agency, is essential to addressing outstanding issues.” Following the November resolution, the inspection of Parchin, and other military sites, became the rallying point of the US and Israel. US officials, as well as “experts,” kept on insisting that “Iranians may be testing there [at Parchin] ‘highexplosive shaped charges with an inert core of depleted uranium’ as a dry test for how a bomb with fissile material would work” (AFP, December 5, 2004). Iran was reluctant to open this military site—as well as new sites that MEK was claiming to be nuclear-related, such as Lavizan-II—to what “Western diplomats” called “fishing expeditions” (AFP, December 2, 2004). But, as will be seen in the next chapter, in January of 2005 Iran did permit the IAEA to visit Parchin. Subsequent environmental samples taken showed that there was no nuclear material present.33 Once again, the accusation of the US–Israeli “experts” was shown to be false. By now even ElBaradei knew that these claims were fishing expeditions intended to increase pressure and gather information about Iran’s military capabilities. On December 5, 2004 AFP quoted ElBaradei as saying that “the issue has been raised that ‘we do not have the authority to go everywhere,’ but he said this was a ‘non-issue because we have received access to every facility we asked for in Iran.’” Such statements by ElBaradei—as well as his 2003 debunking of some fabricated news concerning Iraq’s alleged nuclear weapons—brought out the wrath of US officials. ElBaradei was accused of having shown his report to Iran beforehand and having “heeded Iranian demands to drop mentions of IAEA requests to visit the Parchin military site,” according to AFP, December 4, 2004. The report stated: “ElBaradei angrily denied charges he had collaborated with Iran ahead of publishing written reports on his investigation of the Islamic Republic’s controversial nuclear program.” There were, however, more charges against ElBaradei. The same report stated that he was being accused of such things as having “Islamist bias.” In response, ElBaradei stated that “whether a country he works on ‘is Moslem or Buddhist makes not an iota of difference,’ especially since IAEA reports are a ‘collective process’ involving international teams of experts.” The report also pointed out inadvertently the real cause of the US’s anger toward ElBaradei. The “United States wants the IAEA to take Iran to the UN Security Council,” according to the report, “but ElBaradei says the ‘jury is still out’ on whether Tehran’s program is peaceful or not.” The US administration was, indeed, so upset with ElBaradei’s

Paving the road to the UN Security Council 161 refusal to send Iran to the UN Security Council that it tried to remove him from office. “The Bush administration,” wrote The Washington Post of December 12, 2004, “has dozens of intercepts of Mohamed ElBaradei’s phone calls with Iranian diplomats and is scrutinizing them in search of ammunition to oust him as director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, according to three U.S. government officials.” The report quoted a US official as saying the “plan is to keep the spotlight on ElBaradei and raise the heat.” It also mentioned that John Bolton was “eager to see ElBaradei go.”34 In addition, the report stated, even Colin Powell, who did not see eye to eye with Bolton, believed that “ElBaradei should step aside” after his term expired in spring 2005 and not run for a third term. ElBaradei was now under pressure to either deliver the goods, i.e. push for reporting Iran to the UN Security Council, or lose his job. The US and Israel were inching their way toward their goal of containing Iran, and the clock was ticking.

9

Iran is referred to the Security Council

The year 2005 started with the US and Israel intensifying their threats against Iran. On January 17, 2005 Seymour M. Hersh published an article in The New Yorker entitled “The Coming Wars.” Hersh began by pointing out that Israel did not like the EU 3 approach. “I don’t like what’s happening,” Hersh quoted Silvan Shalom as saying. “If they can’t comply,” according to Shalom, “Israel cannot live with Iran having a nuclear bomb.” Hersh also quoted some individuals in the US on the need to threaten Iran. Patrick Clawson, Hersh went on to say, believed that “force, or the threat of it, was a vital bargaining tool with Iran.” Hersh further quoted Clawson as saying that “it would be much more in Israel’s interest—and Washington’s—to take covert action. The style of this Administration is to use overwhelming force—‘shock and awe.’ But we get only one bite of the apple.” Hersh then contended that the US had been conducting secret reconnaissance missions inside Iran to help identify potential nuclear, chemical, and missile targets.1 “There has also been close, and largely unacknowledged, cooperation with Israel,” contended Hersh. Furthermore, he wrote that a “government consultant with ties to the Pentagon said that the Defense Department civilians, under the leadership of Douglas Feith, have been working with Israeli planners and consultants to develop and refine potential nuclear, chemical-weapons, and missile targets inside Iran.” Hersh’s sources were mostly intelligence community members, particularly those close to Israel. Whether Hersh was aware of it or not these sources were following a deliberate strategy of using the threat of war to make the Europeans agree to impose UN sanctions against Iran. US and Israeli officials, too, were using the same strategy.2 On the same day that Hersh’s essay appeared, i.e. January 17, 2005, Reuters reported that President Bush stated that “he would not rule out military action against Iran.” Two days later Condoleezza Rice stated in her Senate confirmation hearings: “It’s really hard to find common ground with a government that thinks Israel should be extinguished” (Reuters, January 19, 2005). A few days later Vice President Cheney stated: “If, in fact, the Israelis became convinced the Iranians had significant nuclear capability, given the fact that Iran has a stated policy that their objective is the destruction of Israel, the Israelis might well decide to act first, and let the rest of the world worry about cleaning up the diplomatic mess afterwards” (Reuters, January 20, 2005). Four days later Shimon Peres told Israel’s Army Radio: “Iran has become the focal point of all the dangers of the

Iran is referred to the Security Council 163 Middle East. … This problem should be of concern to the whole world and not just Israel” (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, January, 24, 2005). Similarly, Shaul Mofaz, the Israeli Defense Minister, was warning that “Iran is very close to the point of no return, which means the enrichment of uranium, and we believe that the leadership of the U.S. together with the European countries should stop as soon as possible this military nuclear program in Iran … The tools should be sanctions and a very deep inspection in all the nuclear locations in Iran with a full transparency” (AP, January 27, 2005). And, of course, John Bolton continued his incessant push to contain Iran by means of imposing UN sanctions, even traveling to the Persian Gulf Arab states and warning them about Iran and its alleged nuclear weapons. When faced with the inevitable question as to why a “Middle East free of nuclear weapons” should not include Israel, he stated: “We don’t see Israel as a threat to use nuclear weapons anywhere in the region, in part because it’s a democratic state and in part because it’s allied with the United States and we have made it very clear where we stand on their capabilities” (Reuters, January 30, 2005). The intense push by the US and Israel to get the UN to impose sanctions against Iran was coming at a time when ElBaradei was maintaining that “we are getting good cooperation from Iran” (AFP, January 29, 2005). He was also quoted as saying we “cannot work on the basis of beliefs, we have to work on the facts … As long as we have cooperation, and we do not see a smoking gun, the international community should bear with us. … If people have information and on this basis are coming to the conclusion that this is a weapons programme, then I would very much like them to share it” (AFP, January 29, 2005).3 This, however, did not deter President Bush from categorically stating in his State of the Union Address that Iran is “pursuing nuclear weapons.” 4 In the following months Israel intensified the drumbeat of war. The Sunday Times, for example, reported on March 13, 2005 that “Israel has drawn up secret plans for a combined air and ground attack on targets in Iran if diplomacy fails to halt the Iranian nuclear programme. The inner cabinet of Ariel Sharon, the Israeli prime minister, gave ‘initial authorisation’ for an attack at a private meeting last month on his ranch in the Negev desert.” The report also mentioned how “Israeli forces have used a mock-up of Iran’s Natanz uranium enrichment plant in the desert to practise destroying it.” However, given the IAEA’s continued insistence that there is no evidence of a nuclear weapons program in Iran, the Israelis were now raising the bar as to what constitutes danger to Israel: Iran, they began to argue, can’t even have the knowledge of uranium enrichment. Thus Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom would say in a visit to London on February 13, 2005: “The question is not if the Iranians will have a nuclear bomb in 2009, 10 or 11, the main question is when are they going to have the knowledge to do it … We believe in six months from today they will end all the tests and experiments they are doing to have that knowledge” (Reuters, February 16, 2005). Interestingly enough, a few months later Silvan Shalom’s forecast would change, once again, as he would say “Iran will have the technological know-how within six to nine months to build a nuclear bomb” (Reuters, May 13, 2005). American officials would soon adopt the same argument as their Israeli counterparts, that is, even the knowledge of nuclear

164 The United States and Iran weapons technology must be prohibited when it comes to Iran. For example, after many years of arguing that Iran does not need nuclear energy, President Bush finally agreed in 2005 that Iran might have the right to have nuclear energy but “without learning how to make a bomb” (Reuters, September 13, 2005).

The “carrot and stick” policy By early 2005 there was some rumbling among US policy makers, particularly in the Senate, about the wisdom of the Bush Administration’s policy toward Iran. On February 5, 2005 Reuters reported that “U.S. senators have launched a review of U.S. intelligence on Iran to try to avoid pitfalls that marked the path to the invasion of Iraq.” Similarly, The Washington Post reported on February 12, 2005 that the “intelligence community is conducting a broad review of its Iran assessments, including a new look at the country’s nuclear program, the future of its ruling clerics and the impact of the Iraq war on Tehran’s powerful position in the region.” At the same time there were reports that the US might be shifting its policy slightly by supporting the EU negotiations with Iran and adopting the so-called carrot and stick approach, that is, offering Iran some vague economic incentives for agreeing to give up its “inalienable right” under Article IV of the NPT or face UN sanctions. For example, AP reported on February 28, 2005 that in “a potential strategy shift, the Bush administration is considering joining Europe in offering Iran economic incentives in exchange for abandoning its nuclear fuel program.” This “rethinking” in policy was attributed by the report to President’s Bush’s trip to Europe and his meeting with the European leaders. According to the report, the European leaders tried to persuade President Bush that Iran should be offered some economic incentives—“including possible eventual membership for Iran in the World Trade Organization”—and should be allowed to buy spare parts for its airplane fleet. Soon afterwards, Condoleezza Rice announced that President Bush “has decided that the US will drop its objection to Iran’s application to the World Trade Organization and will consider, on a case-by-case basis, the licensing of spare parts for Iranian civilian aircraft, in particular from the European Union to Iran” (AFP, March 11, 2005). The “bad cop,” to use Richard Armitage’s expression, seemed to have decided to join the “good cop.” But since the ultimate goal of “regime change” had not changed, there was not much substantive change in the policy; the US was now offering a few rotten “carrots” while still waving many big “sticks.” The “bad cop” joining the “good cop,” however, posed some new challenges. The main challenge was that the Israelis had to approve the policy. Thus, for example, AFP reported on April 13, 2005, that President Bush tried to convince Sharon, who was visiting Bush at his Texas ranch, that he should support the “European diplomatic efforts to ensure Iran does not develop nuclear weapons.” This, as the report stated, was while Sharon was showing “Bush satellite photos of Iranian nuclear sites and warned that Tehran was approaching a ‘point of no return’ in learning how to make an atomic bomb.” The New York Times reported the same news on April 13, 2005 and quoted “a senior Israeli official,” traveling

Iran is referred to the Security Council 165 with Sharon, as saying: “This can’t be delayed much longer … There is very little time until the point of no return is reached.” The report also stated that “Sharon argued that European nations negotiating with Iran were softening their position and may be willing to allow it to hold on to technology to enrich uranium.” According to an AP report of April 13, 2005 “Sharon pressed the U.S. to threaten with international sanctions.” Given the pressure, the US had to use more stick than carrots with Iran. For example, AFP reported on April 14, 2005 that according to Condoleezza Rice the “United States is giving European efforts to rein in Iran’s nuclear program a few more months before considering tougher measures.” The report quoted Rice as saying “obviously at some point in time the UN Security Council is an option.”

Another AIPAC policy conference focusing on Iran The Israeli pressure, however, intensified in the following month as AIPAC held its annual “largest ever policy conference” (Financial Times, May 23 2005).5 The list of speakers included Ariel Sharon, Condoleezza Rice, Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, Senate Democratic Leader Harry Reid, Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert, House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi, Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton, Representative Jane Harman, Democratic National Committee Chairman Howard Dean, and Republican National Committee Chairman Ken Mehlman.6 “Hundreds more congressmen,” Ha’aretz reported on May 23, 2005, “will take part in a ball Monday evening.” This massive participation by US politicians in the AIPAC meeting was surreal, since a few days earlier Larry Franklin was formally charged with passing classified military information to Steve Rosen and Keith Weissman, the two AIPAC officials who were fired in the previous month by AIPAC for allegedly receiving these material and passing them to Israel (Ha’aretz May 5, 2005, and April 21, 2005). But AIPAC’s meeting had more surreal and macabre aspects. The Financial Times of May 23, 2005 described one such aspect in this way: In the bowels of the Washington Convention Centre lurks an interactive dystopia: a step by step guide to how Iran is “pursuing nuclear weapons and how it can be stopped”. The tour is the brainchild of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee and has been created for its largest ever policy conference, which began yesterday. AIPAC has made fears about Iran’s nuclear intentions a central plank of its congressional agenda … The Disney-inspired nuclear tour begins in a dark room, with a strange mottled effect on the carpet and a giant screen introducing “the five main players in Iran’s nuclear cat and mouse game”. The report then went on to describe the rest of the Disney-style tour of Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons. Indeed, the focus of AIPAC’s 2005 Conference was Iran’s alleged nuclear

166 The United States and Iran threat to the world at large and, in particular, Israel. As posted on the website of AIPAC, the Sunday May 22 “Forums” began with a session entitled “The Day After the Bomb: How a Nuclear Iran Would Change the World.” Michael Ledeen, the Iran-Contra scandal operative, was one of the featured speakers at this session. AIPAC’s “Iran: Questions and Answers,” also posted on AIPAC’s website, began with “Why would a nuclear-capable Iran be a threat to the United States and a destabilizing force in the entire Middle East?” “If Iran actually gets a nuclear bomb, along with its advanced missile delivery capability,” the piece added, “the entire Zionist enterprise of the last 120 years will be at risk.” The AIPAC 2005 conference featured speaker after speaker on the alleged danger posed by Iran. Among these was, of course, Condoleezza Rice, who received applause after every negative comment concerning Iran. She stated: The United States has focused the world’s attention on Iran’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. And along with our allies, we are working to gain full disclosure of Iran’s efforts to obtain nuclear weapons. The world must not tolerate any Iranian attempt to develop a nuclear weapon. (Applause.) Nor can it tolerate Iran’s efforts to subvert democratic governments through terrorism. (Applause.)7 The 2005 AIPAC conference had tangible results. In the month of May AIPAC sponsored yet another sanction bill against Iran in the US Congress. The bill’s main sponsor, as Ha’aretz of May 14, 2005 reported, was Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen. According to the same report: “More than 200 members of the House of Representatives—almost half the body—are co-sponsoring a bill that would tighten and codify existing sanctions, bar subsidiaries of U.S. companies from doing business in Iran and cut foreign aid to countries that have businesses investing in Iran.”

Iran’s reaction to “carrot and stick” policy, and the Iranian presidential election The US joining the EU 3 negotiation with Iran posed certain challenges. In Iran, some saw the EU 3 deal as a Faustian bargain, especially after the tacit blessing of the US. This resulted in tensions between those who were opposed to capitulation and those who feared the consequences of being reported to the UN and were, therefore, willing to capitulate. As a consequence, the Iranian side lacked a coherent and cohesive strategy and made contradictory remarks almost on a daily basis. For example, on May 8, 2005 AFP reported that the Iranian “government is planning to submit a bill to parliament to ratify an additional protocol to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that allows tougher international control of Iran’s nuclear activities.” Yet, a day later Reuters reported that “Iran said on Monday it would resume uranium enrichmentrelated activities within days, a move the United States and the European Union have warned would see its nuclear case escalated to the U.N. Security

Iran is referred to the Security Council 167 Council.” A few days later, the Iranian parliament “approved a bill pressuring the government to pursue ‘peaceful use’ of nuclear energy, including uranium enrichment” (AP, May 15, 2005). Iran’s contradictory positions were exacerbated by the fact that by now public opinion in Iran, too, seemed to be shifting against any capitulation. The title of The New York Times report on May 30, 2005 captured the public mood in Iran: “For Many Iranians, Nuclear Power Is an Issue of Pride.” The Iranian policy makers had to balance this public “pride” with the fear of UN referral. For example, Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi, who stated that “Iran is frustrated and wants to see results from the negotiations over the future of its nuclear program,” also stated: “We have insisted that we are looking for something tangible to convince our public opinion” (The Washington Post, May 5, 2005). Given the dilemma, no clear policy with regard to enrichment activities would emerge in Iran. On May 26, 2005 Reuters reported that Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, Hassan Rohani, had warned that an agreement with the European Union to provide a “two-month breathing space” in nuclear talks could still unravel if Iran’s leadership objects.” Until the election of a new president in Iran this policy of finding a “breathing space” would not change. The 2005 presidential election in Iran gave new ammunition to the US and Israel to contain Iran. President-elect Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was immediately accused by US–Israeli sources of having been involved in the 1979 hostage taking. The Washington Times wrote on June 30, 2005 that “Americans held in the 1979 seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Iran said yesterday they clearly recall Iranian President-elect Mahmoud Ahmadinejad playing a central role in the takeover, interrogating captives and demanding harsher treatment for the hostages.” The report quoted one former hostage as saying: “As soon as I saw his picture in the paper, I knew that was the bastard.” Immediately afterwards it was reported that the White House “was investigating whether Iran’s new president played a role in seizing the American Embassy and holding 52 U.S. captives a quarter century ago,” and President Bush stated that “allegation by former hostages ‘raises many questions’” (AP, June 30, 2005). The rumors spread in the media about Ahmadinejad being a hostage-taker were based on a 1979 picture of two Iranians escorting an American Embassy employee. One of the two Iranians was said to be Ahmadinejad, even though there was no resemblance between the man in the picture and him. Yet, the disinformation sources allowed the rumors to fester. A month later, and quite unceremoniously, it was reported that “analysis has concluded a hostage-taker pictured in an old photo at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran is not Iranian President-elect Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a U.S. official said” (Reuters, July 29, 2005). But as this fabricated news was being discounted, another report, concerning Ahmadinejad having been involved in the assassination of some Kurdish leaders in Vienna in 1989, was being disseminated by individuals such as Benador Associate’s Amir Taheri and MKO’s Alireza Jafarzadeh.8 It was not until August of 2005, when Ahmadinejad was making plans to appear before the UN and needed a US visa, that the US government had to admit that rumors about Ahmadinejad’s past were false. On

168 The United States and Iran August 12, 2005 The Washington Post wrote with regard to Ahmadinejad’s involvement in the 1979 takeover of the US Embassy that a “secret U.S. intelligence report circulated within the administration yesterday said that there is so far no evidence Ahmadinejad was involved—and that he may have opposed the takeover because of fears about the neighboring Soviet Union.” The Post further added: “The secret report also says U.S. intelligence has found no evidence to back up assertions from Iranian dissidents that Ahmadinejad was involved in planning the assassinations of Iranian Kurdish politician Abdul-Rahman Ghassemlou and two colleagues on July 13, 1989, in Vienna.” The disinformation campaign to demonize Ahmadinejad had started even before he publicly expressed any opinion about Israel. The Israelis were not only spreading false rumors about Ahmadinejad through their surrogates, but they were trying to link the election of Ahmadinejad to the issue of Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons. For example, according to The Jerusalem Post of June 27, 2005 Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom “called on the international community and in particular the United Nations Security Council on Sunday to step up its efforts to curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions following the election of Iranian hard-liner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.” Similarly, Israeli Finance Minister Binyamin Netanyahu “warned that the West must do more to counter Iran’s potential nuclear threat following the election last month of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad” (Ottawa Citizen, July 10, 2005).

The end of the Paris Agreement The election of a new president in Iran did, to some extent, change the stalemate between EU and Iran. Ahmadinejad appeared to be one of those who saw the Paris Agreement as capitulation. Given the change in leadership, political power in Iran shifted more toward those who argued that enrichment was a right guaranteed by the NPT and that the EU 3/EU were trying to take away that right. On August 1, 2005 the IAEA published a communication received from the “Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran” to the Agency.9 In the communication Iran grieved about the Paris Agreement and the fact that not only had the EU 3/EU not kept their part of the bargain but that they seemed to be using delaying tactics to turn Iran’s voluntary and temporary halt in all uranium enrichment activities into a permanent freeze. The communication stated: It is now self-evident that negotiations are not proceeding as called for in the Paris Agreement, due to E3/EU [EU 3/EU] policy to protract the negotiations without the slightest attempt to move forward in fulfilling their commitments under the Tehran or Paris Agreements. This protracted continuation is solely geared to serve the purpose of keeping the suspension in place for as long as it takes to make the cessation a fait accompli. This is contrary to the letter and spirit of the Paris Agreement and is not in line with principles of good faith negotiations.

Iran is referred to the Security Council 169 The communication further stated: The suspension [of uranium enrichment] has been in place for nearly 20 months, with all its economic and social ramifications affecting thousands of families. The E3/EU has failed to remove any of its multifaceted restrictions on Iran’s access to advanced and nuclear technology. In a twist of logic, it has attempted to prolong the suspension, thereby trying to effectively widen its restrictions instead of fulfilling its commitments of October 2003 and November 2004 to remove them. As the IAEA Board of Governors has underlined, suspension “is a voluntary, non-legal binding confidence building measure”. When the Board itself explicitly recognizes that suspension is “not a legally-binding obligation”, no wording by the Board can turn this voluntary measure into an essential element for anything. In fact the Board of Governors has no factual or legal ground, nor any statutory power, to make or enforce such a demand, or impose ramifications as a consequence of it. The letter went on: “In light of the above, Iran has decided to resume the uranium conversion activities at the UCF [Uranium Conversion Facility] in Esfahan on 1 August 2005.” However, it added, “Iran will continue to maintain its voluntary suspension of all enrichment-related activities.” Subsequent to the above communication, the EU 3 threatened Iran with sending the case to the Security Council; and Iran, in turn, pushed back by a few days its deadline for resuming uranium conversion activities (AFP, August 3, 2005). Also, according to the same source, the Iranian nuclear negotiator Hassan Rowhani stated: “There is no judicial or political logic to send the issue to the Security Council, this would mean that the Europeans have given in to US pressure and they must assume the consequences.” On August 5, 2005, the EU 3 submitted to Iran a “Framework for a Long-Term Agreement,” a package of trade and technology “incentives” if Iran agreed to abandon all nuclear fuel work (BBC Monitoring, Middle East, August 5, 2005).10 The incentives offered, however, were quite general and vague. For example, the “Framework” stated that the “E3/EU recognize that Iran should have sustained access to nuclear fuel for the Light Water Reactors forming Iran’s civil nuclear industry. Russia has committed itself formally to supplying nuclear fuel for the life-time of Russian-built reactors in Iran.” But, given that Russia was already years behind in supplying fuel for Bushehr and was under US pressure not to do so, how Russia would fulfill its role remained unclear. Similarly the “Framework” stated that the E3/EU “offer continued political support for Iranian accession to the World Trade Organization, and technical support to assist Iran making the necessary technical adjustments to its economy.” But, given that the US had for years prevented Iran from joining WTO and had numerous sanctions in place against Iran, how the EU would support Iranian accession to the WTO also remained unclear. The “Framework” tried also to restrict Iran’s “inalienable right” under the NPT. While it mentioned Article IV of the NPT and the rights to the use of

170 The United States and Iran nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, it demanded from Iran—as a measure of “confidence building”—a number of measures that violated the spirit of Article IV, such as asking Iran to “stop construction of its Heavy Water Research Reactor at Arak, which gives rise to proliferation concerns.” On August 6, 2005 The Washington Post wrote that according to Iranian officials, the EU proposal, which “includes more than a dozen conditional and sometimes ambiguous incentives, was insulting.” The report quoted Javad Zarif, Iran’s ambassador to the United Nations, as saying: “Maybe the Europeans are willing to sell out their own rights at a cheap price, but Iran is not.” The offer, Zarif stated, was “absurd, demeaning and self-congratulatory.” Subsequent to Iran’s rejection of the “Framework,” the Board of Governors of the IAEA issued a resolution on August 11, 2005 expressing “serious concern at the 1 August 2005 notification to the IAEA that Iran had decided to resume the uranium conversion activities at the Uranium Conversion Facility in Esfahan, at the Director General’s report that on 8 August Iran started to feed uranium ore concentrate into the first part of the process line at this facility and at the Director General’s report that on 10 August Iran removed the seals on the process lines and the UF4 at this facility.”11 It then urged “Iran to re-establish full suspension of all enrichment related activities including the production of feed material, including through tests or production at the Uranium Conversion Facility, on the same voluntary, non-legally binding basis as requested in previous Board resolutions, and to permit the Director General to re-instate the seals that have been removed at that facility.” Iran’s reaction to this resolution was that Iran was in full conformity with the NPT and was exercising its “inalienable right” (IRNA, August 12, 2005).

More forecasts about the Iranian nuclear bomb In the month of August there were new estimates as to when Iran would have a nuclear weapon. On August 2, 2005 The Washington Post reported: “A major U.S. intelligence review has projected that Iran is about a decade away from manufacturing the key ingredient for a nuclear weapon, roughly doubling the previous estimate of five years, according to government sources with firsthand knowledge of the new analysis.” This, the report stated, is in “contrast with forceful public statements by the White House.” Administration officials, the report further added, “have asserted, but have not offered proof, that Tehran is moving determinedly toward a nuclear arsenal. The new estimate could provide more time for diplomacy with Iran over its nuclear ambitions.” According to the report, the new National Intelligence Estimate, ordered by the National Intelligence Council in January, “expresses uncertainty about whether Iran’s ruling clerics have made a decision to build a nuclear arsenal.” This report—that Iran is at least ten years away from the “bomb” and that there is not even certainty that there is going to be a “bomb”—was a revelation for those who were not familiar with the history of the US–Israel attempt to contain Iran. Indeed, the report received much attention in the news media. Yet it failed to point out that the claim concerning the looming danger from

Iran is referred to the Security Council 171 Iran’s alleged nuclear weapon was at least 20 years old and that such claims were revised every few years. It is interesting to note that in the same month of August there was another estimate by the Israelis concerning the timing of the alleged Iranian bomb. AFP reported on August 6, 2005 that “Israel expects Iran to be capable of producing a nuclear weapon within three years, military intelligence chief General Aharon Zeevi told MPs at a closed-door briefing.” “Barring an unexpected delay,” the report quoted Zeevi, “Iran is going to become nuclear capable in 2008 and not in 10 years as was recently reported in the American press.” By now these wild, random, and ever-changing predictions of when Iran would acquire a nuclear bomb had become too common to be taken seriously by the rest of the world. Yet the US–Israeli push to contain Iran finally made headway in September of 2005, as we see below.

Another IAEA report, Parchin, and the Resolution of September 2005 On September 2, 2005 the IAEA Board issued yet another report on Iran. Interestingly enough this was the report that showed the US–Israeli allegation concerning Parchin was a fabrication. The report stated that in January 2005, Iran agreed, as a transparency measure, to permit the Agency to visit a site located at Parchin in order to provide assurance regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities at that site. Out of the four areas identified by the Agency to be of potential interest, the Agency was permitted to select any one area. The Agency was requested to minimize the number of buildings to be visited in that area, and selected five buildings. The Agency was given free access to those buildings and their surroundings and was allowed to take environmental samples, the results of which did not indicate the presence of nuclear material, nor did the Agency see any relevant dual use equipment or materials in the locations visited. But because of pressure from the same sources that sent the IAEA fishing in the first place, the report indicated that the IAEA needed a second visit to Parchin: “In the course of the visit, the Agency requested to visit another area of the Parchin site.” The story of Parchin, however, was lost in the lengthy report of September 2. The report devoted much space to the past failures of Iran “in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material, its processing and its use, as well as the declaration of facilities where such material had been processed and stored.”12 Toward the end of the report it was mentioned that Iran had informed the Agency on August 1, 2005 of its decision to resume uranium activities at UCF and that the Agency had “installed additional surveillance equipment at UCF between 8 and 10 August 2005.” Iran replied with a line-item, “131-page reply to

172 The United States and Iran the report of IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei” and protested “that the UN Agency has been influenced by a political propaganda campaign against Iranian nuclear program” (IRNA, September 14, 2005). Of course, the protest received no attention. Even before the IAEA report was issued, the US was preparing for a showdown. “The Bush administration,” reported AP on September 1, 2005, “is trying to rally other nations to agree to impose U.N. sanctions on Iran to force it to negotiate an end to its nuclear programs.” The report went on to quote Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns as saying: “We fully expect that the IAEA will refer this issue to the United Nations Security Council, where it should be.” Given the IAEA rules, the US needed a simple majority vote, or the nod from 18 out of 35 members of the IAEA board, to get a resolution against Iran. The US, however, wished to have more than a simple majority vote in the Board of Governors and, at same time, no opposition from Russia and China. This they achieved by means of threats, arm twisting, and bribing. As The New York Times aptly put it in the first line of its report on September 26, 2005, “The Bush administration threatened, cajoled and played every card it held to win the split decision Saturday on Iran’s nuclear program before the International Atomic Energy Agency.” A case in point was India, a country that was opposed to sending Iran to the Security Council. The US Administration wished to change India’s position and have her vote against Iran in the Board of Governors. Given this wish, they started to bribe India in July 2005. As The Washington Post of July 20, 2005 reported, the Bush Administration “offered a new deal to supply India with civilian nuclear technology and conventional military equipment.” Since India had never signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, it was not clear to some members of the Congress, even those trying to contain Iran, why such an offer was made. Indeed, some Congressmen opposed the deal on the grounds that India had opposed sending Iran to the UN Security Council in the first place. On September 9, 2005 The Washington Post reported that the “Bush administration came under heavy criticism yesterday by Republican and Democratic members of Congress for signing a major nuclear deal with India, which has expressed support for Iran’s right to a nuclear energy program despite U.S. efforts to pressure Tehran into giving it up.” Among the opponents was the usual crowd trying to contain Iran, such as Representatives Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Brad Sherman. Apparently, these members of Congress were unaware that a deal had been reached between India and the Bush Administration, and the deal, even though undermining the US nonproliferation policy, was in perfect accord with the policy of containing Iran. In the end, as we see below, India accepted the bribe and stopped its opposition to sending Iran to the Security Council. The “good cop,” i.e. the EU 3, which had now joined the “bad cop,” i.e. the US, was in charge of drafting the resolution against Iran. The resolution of September 24, 2005, stated that “Iran’s many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement, as detailed in GOV/2003/75, constitute non compliance in the context of Article XII.C of the Agency’s Statute.”13 It also stated that

Iran is referred to the Security Council 173 the history of concealment of Iran’s nuclear activities referred to in the Director General’s report, the nature of these activities, issues brought to light in the course of the Agency’s verification of declarations made by Iran since September 2002 and the resulting absence of confidence that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes have given rise to questions that are within the competence of the Security Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The question of when the matter would be referred to the Security Council was left open. In the meantime Iran was told, among other things, to “re-establish full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related activity,” “reconsider the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water,” and promptly “ratify and implement in full the Additional Protocol.” As usual, the US tried to include the harshest possible language in the resolution and the speedy reporting of Iran to the Security Council. But this was the best that the US could get, given the opposition from Russia and China. In the end the resolution was passed with the “vote of 22 to 1, with 12 countries abstaining” (The New York Times, September 25, 2005). Venezuela voted against the resolution and Russia and China were among those abstaining (BBC Monitoring, Middle East, September 25, 2005). India, which had been bribed by the US many months ahead of the voting, voted for the resolution. The US thanked India a number of times for carrying out the deal. In fact, the IndoAsian News Service (New Delhi) reported on September 30, 2005, that “US President George W Bush on Friday called Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and is understood to have appreciated India’s stand on the Iran nuclear issue.” Opponents of the Indian government “accused it of buckling under US pressure” (BBC Monitoring, Middle East, September 25, 2005). On February 16, 2007 The Hindu reported that in 2005 India was “coerced” into voting against Iran. The assertion was attributed to former US disarmament official Stephen Rademaker, who was addressing a security conference in India. The day after the passage of the IAEA Resolution of September 24, 2005, AP quoted the Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns as saying “We have a patient long-term strategy … It’s to isolate Iran on this question; it’s to ratchet up the international pressure on Iran.” This was, indeed, an apt description of the US policy. However, as we have seen in this book, the “patient long-term strategy” was longer than Mr. Burns would have us believe; it was decades old. Moreover, in terms of the long-term strategy the nuclear issue was merely an excuse to contain Iran. In September of 2005, after many decades of trying, the US and Israel were much closer to their objective of imposing UN economic sanctions against Iran. It was now just a matter of time before the US, Israel, and their European allies could take the case of Iran to the Security Council.

174 The United States and Iran

Ahmadinejad and “wiping Israel off the map” The US and Israel got even closer to getting what they wished for when on October 26, 2005 President Ahmadinejad delivered a keynote address at the “World without Zionism” conference in Tehran organized by the Association of Islamic Students Societies. At one point in his speech, which dealt mostly with the Palestinian issue, Ahmadinejad’s comment about Israel made headlines.14 A literal translation of the comment reads: Our dear Imam [Ayatollah Khomeini] stated that this Quds [Jerusalem] occupying regime must disappear from the page of time. This is a very wise statement. The Palestine problem is not one with which we could compromise partially. Israeli sources were quick to translate the comment in such a way that it would help the push for UN sanctions against Iran. The headline in The Jerusalem Post of October 27, 2005 read: “Iranian president: ‘Wipe Israel off map.’” The piece began: “For a decade no Iranian official of significance dared utter the words that Iran’s new hard-line president said Wednesday. But President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad told an audience in Teheran that ‘Israel must be wiped off the map.’” A few words about The Jerusalem Post article, as well as similar articles, are in order. First, the translation of Ahmadinejad’s comment was inaccurate. As my literal translation shows and, also, as the context of the statement reveals, Ahmadinejad did not say that “Israel must be wiped off the map.”15 Second, the statement was originally made by Khomeini, when Israel was selling arms to Iran. And when Khomeini “dared utter the words,” Israel showed no sign of outrage. Finally, Ahmadinejad was not the first “Iranian official of significance” in a decade to be accused by the Israelis of threatening them with annihilation. As we saw in Chapter 7, former Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani was called a Hitler by Shimon Peres for his December 14, 2001 speech in which he allegedly threatened to destroy Israel with a nuclear bomb. The inaccurate translation of Ahmadinejad’s statement became a tool in the arsenal of US and Israel devices to contain Iran. The Israeli officials were quick to seize the moment and intensify the campaign against Iran. The aforementioned report in The Jerusalem Post of October 27, 2005 read: “Vice Prime Minister Shimon Peres called for Israel to work to get Iran kicked out of the United Nations saying Ahmadinejad’s comments represented a ‘crime against humanity.’” “The president of Iran’s call,” The Jerusalem Post reported Peres as writing to Sharon, “is even more grave in light of Iran’s attempts to develop nuclear weapons and acquire long range missiles.” “Israel should immediately turn to the general-secretary of the UN and to the Security Council with an unequivocal demand to distance Iran from the UN,” the report continued, quoting Peres. The report also stated that “Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom said the comments only served to underline the need to send the file on Iran’s nuclear development to the UN Security Council for the imposition of sanctions.” Subsequently, Ariel Sharon himself stated: “A

Iran is referred to the Security Council 175 country that calls for the destruction of another people cannot be a member of the United Nations. … Such a country that has nuclear weapons is a danger, not only to Israel and the Middle East, but also to Europe” (Reuters, October 27, 2005). Similarly, Israel’s UN Ambassador, Dan Gillerman, stated “I certainly think that a country whose head of state calls for the destruction of any other member state of the United Nations does not deserve a seat in this very civilized organization” (CNN.com, October 28, 2005). Israel’s call for the expulsion of Iran from the UN or, at least, imposition of sanctions was followed by the usual analogy with Hitler and Nazi Germany: “It was just 60 years ago that another leader, democratically elected in a European country, called [for] the destruction of a whole people,” stated Dan Gillerman (CNN.com, October 28, 2005). It should be emphasized that the Israelis were comparing Iran to Nazi Germany even before Ahmadinejad made his famous speech. On September 30, 2005 The Washington Times stated that “three senior Israeli lawmakers from across the political spectrum” have warned the US that in the absence of any action “Israel itself would act unilaterally to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear arms.” It then quoted Yuval Steinitz, “a member of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s ruling Likud Party,” as saying: We see an Iranian bomb as a devastating, existential threat to Israel, to the entire Middle East, to all Western interests in the region … Despite all the different circumstances, we see similarities to what happened in the 1930s, when people underestimated the real problem or focused on other dangers. For us, either the world will tackle Iran in advance or all of us will face the consequences. The translation of Ahmadinejad’s comment in the US media was the same as that in the Israeli media. “Iran’s President Says Israel Must Be ‘Wiped Off the Map,’” read the headline of an article in The New York Times of October 26, 2006. The reaction to this mistranslated statement by US politicians was also predictable. On October 28, 2005 AFP reported: “The US House of Representatives passed a resolution condemning Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s call for Israel to be ‘wiped off the map,’ with some members demanding that Iran be expelled from the United Nations for the remarks.” Those members of Congress closely allied with Israel were, of course, leading the call for Iran’s expulsion and invoking the name of Hitler as often as possible. “The leader of Iran made one of the most repugnant remarks the international community has heard since Adolf Hitler,” the AFP report quoted Representative Tom Lantos as saying. He was further quoted as saying: “With his bone-chilling call for Israel to be ‘wiped off the map’, the Iranian dictator placed himself and his benighted regime far beyond the pale of the civilized world.” Similarly, Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen stated: “Ahmadinejad’s incendiary remarks were appalling. In calling for the annihilation of Israel—a United Nations member state—Iran stands in grave breach of the UN Charter, which stipulates that member states must foster peaceful relations with one another.”

176 The United States and Iran It was not until many months later that some doubts were cast on the accuracy of the translation of Ahmadinejad’s statement. Apparently, this came about when on May 3, 2006 Professor Juan Cole wrote in his online Informed Comment that Ahmadinejad’s statement had been mistranslated and that Ahmadinejad could not have said what is attributed to him since “there is no Persian idiom to wipe something off the map.”16 Afterwards, a few other Farsi experts also wrote about the mistranslation and the fact that it suited the political campaign against Iran. Yet, to this day, as this book is being written, Ahmadinejad’s alleged statement about “wiping Israel off the map” is often invoked in the US–Israeli drive to contain Iran. Added to this alleged remark were comments made in December of 2005 by Ahmadinejad questioning the accuracy of the number of Jewish people reportedly killed by Hitler and how the killing has been used to justify the occupation of Palestine.17

Parchin again and the mysterious laptop On November 2, 2005 AP reported that “Iran has granted U.N. nuclear inspectors new access to a high-security military site as part of efforts to avoid referral to the Security Council, diplomats said.” “The diplomats,” the report went on to say, stated that “experts of the IAEA were allowed to revisit Parchin as they try to establish whether Tehran has a secret nuclear weapons program.” It should be recalled that Parchin was inspected by an IAEA team in January 2005 and nothing was found to support the allegations of US–Israeli “experts.” Subsequently, the IAEA asked for another inspection of the military site. The November 2, 2005 visit was therefore a second fishing expedition by the IAEA initiated by the US and Israel. This time, too, the charges proved to be nothing but fabrication. On November 11, 2005, even before the IAEA officially reported on its findings, the AFP reported: “Initial results from a UN inspection of the Parchin military site in Iran have shown no signs of nuclear activity, diplomats told AFP, although final results are not yet in.” As will be seen later, the final results, too, showed no sign of nuclear activity at the military site. But now the US and Israel put forward a new story, the story of a mysterious laptop. In a sensational piece on November 13, 2005 The New York Times reported: In mid-July, senior American intelligence officials called the leaders of the international atomic inspection agency to the top of a skyscraper overlooking the Danube in Vienna and unveiled the contents of what they said was a stolen Iranian laptop computer. The Americans flashed on a screen and spread over a conference table selections from more than a thousand pages of Iranian computer simulations and accounts of experiments, saying they showed a long effort to design a nuclear warhead, according to a half-dozen European and American participants in the meeting. The documents, the report went on to say, showed that Iran “is trying to develop a compact warhead to fit atop its Shahab missile, which can reach Israel and other

Iran is referred to the Security Council 177 countries in the Middle East.” According to the report, the Bush Administration had also briefed “ElBaradei on the contents of the laptop.” The laptop, the report stated, had been obtained in “mid-2004 from a source in Iran who they said had received it from a second person, now believed to be dead.” Moreover, the report went on to say, “American intelligence officials insisted that it had not come from any Iranian resistance groups, whose claims about Iran’s nuclear program have had a mixed record for accuracy.” By “Iranian resistance groups” the officials apparently meant MEK, who had been continuously fabricating news, sometimes with the help of the Israelis. Yet, as the report also pointed out, there were some doubts “among some foreign analysts” about the authenticity of the story, particularly after seeing how documents were manufactured prior to the US invasion of Iraq. Indeed, the report quoted ElBaradei as saying that his agency was bound to “follow due process, which means I need to establish the veracity, consistency and authenticity of any intelligence, and share it with the country of concern.” Where did the laptop come from and how did the US come to possess it? As the above report stated, the US officials stated that the mysterious laptop did not come from “Iranian resistance groups.” But the same report indicated that “a year ago in a conversation with reporters, Colin L. Powell, then secretary of state, briefly referred to new, missile-related intelligence on Iran.” Indeed, a year earlier such news made headlines. On November 18, 2004 The Washington Post reported that the “United States has intelligence that Iran is working to adapt missiles to deliver a nuclear weapon, further evidence that the Islamic republic is determined to acquire a nuclear bomb, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said Wednesday.” The next line read: “Separately, an Iranian opposition exile group charged in Paris that Iran is enriching uranium at a secret military facility unknown to U.N. weapons inspectors.” The “opposition” was, of course, MEK, and their new revelation was another fabrication. But whether there was any link between MEK and documents received by the US was left to the imagination of the reader. The day after, in a more elaborate piece, The Washington Post reported that according to one “official,” the US received the documents from a “‘walk-in’ source” who “approached U.S intelligence earlier this month with more than 1,000 pages purported to be Iranian drawings and technical documents, including a nuclear warhead design and modifications to enable Iranian ballistic missiles to deliver an atomic strike.” Who the “walk-in source” was and whether it had anything to do with MEK remained unclear. The report stated that “The Washington Post did not know the identity of the source or whether the individual is connected to an Iranian exile group that made fresh accusations about Iran at a news conference Wednesday in Paris.” Also unclear was whether any of this information had anything to do with nuclear weapons, since as this and subsequent reports mentioned, the documents did not mention anything about nuclear-related material. Indeed the report stated: “Even if the documents are authentic, Iran’s possessing them would not by itself violate international law, officials said.” To this day, of course, the source of the laptop remains a mystery. Iran stated that the “laptop scenario is another ploy of US and Israel to spoil atmosphere ahead of the forthcoming meeting of Board of Governors of International Atomic Energy

178 The United States and Iran Agency” (BBC Monitoring, Middle East, November 15, 2005). In support of this contention they referred to how the US and Israel had “fabricated” news concerning nuclear activities at such places as Parchin and Lavizan. But it was not just Iran that considered Israel to be the prime suspect behind the laptop story. On February 8, 2006 The Washington Post, reported that “CIA analysts, some of whom had been involved only a year earlier on the flawed assessments of Iraq’s weapons programs, initially speculated that a third country, such as Israel, may have fabricated the evidence. But they eventually discounted that theory.” It is, of course, difficult to accept the CIA’s dismissal of Israel as the source of the laptop story, since the intelligence services of the US and Israel often work very closely with one another. All that can be said is that to this day the source of the laptop remains unknown. As will be seen in Chapter 11, the IAEA doubted the authenticity of the mysterious laptop, despite the sensational presentation made by the US. That is probably why there was no mention of it in the IAEA report of November 18, 2005.18 The report—which was derestricted on November 24, 2005—mentioned a second visit to Parchin by IAEA inspectors. But now the IAEA was asking for a second visit to the Lavisan-Shian site as well, as the report indicated. The report also indicated that the “Agency has continued to monitor installations related to the uranium gas centrifuge and laser enrichment programmes, and has not observed any inconsistency with Iran’s voluntary undertaking not to carry out any enrichment activities.”

The Russian “compromise” and its opponents Prior to the IAEA report of November 18, 2005 it was reported that a deal had been reached between Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice that would allow Iran to expand “its nuclear activities if Tehran agreed to enrich uranium in Russia instead of domestically” (AP, November 11, 2005). After the IAEA report came the news that “Governors of the U.N. nuclear watchdog broadly agree it is better to explore a Russian compromise over Iran’s nuclear activities than to report Tehran to the Security Council” (Reuters, November 24, 2005). This “compromise” came as the Iranian Majles approved a bill “requiring the government to block international inspections of its atomic facilities if the U.N. nuclear monitoring agency refers Iran to the Security Council for possible sanctions” (AP, November 11 and 20, 2005). Israel and its allies were, of course, opposed to any “compromise” and wanted nothing less than containment of Iran. AFP reported on December 5, 2005 that former Israeli Prime Minister “Benjamin Netanyahu hinted that he could consider a pre-emptive air strike against Iran’s nuclear installations if he were to be reelected.” According to the report, Netanyahu stated that “Israel needed to ‘act in the spirit’ of the late premier Menachem Begin who ordered an air strike on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981.” Netanyahu was not alone in threatening to take action if the US did not. Ariel Sharon was also saying “Israel, and not only Israel, cannot accept a situation in

Iran is referred to the Security Council 179 which Iran has nuclear weapons … We are also taking all the necessary preparations to be ready for this kind of situation” (Reuters, December 1, 2005). On December 11, 2005 the Sunday Times reported that “Israel’s armed forces have been ordered by Ariel Sharon, the prime minister, to be ready by the end of March for possible strikes on secret uranium enrichment sites in Iran, military sources have revealed.” These threats were combined with the usual wild and everchanging array of Israeli predictions as to when Iran might have the “bomb.” 19 Israel’s allies in the US were not sitting idle, either, and tried to derail any possible “compromise.” On December 26, 2005 The Washington Post reported: “After years of unwavering support for the Bush administration, the powerful proIsrael lobbying group AIPAC has begun to sharply criticize the White House over its handling of Iran’s nuclear program.” “In lengthy news releases and talking points circulated to supporters on Capitol Hill,” the report stated, “the Bush administration’s recent policy decisions on Iran are described as ‘dangerous,’ ‘disturbing,’ and ‘inappropriate.’” The report further added that in a statement to members of Congress, AIPAC stated that it “is concerned that the decision not to go to the Security Council, combined with the US decision to support the ‘Russian proposal,’ indicates a disturbing shift in the administration’s policy on Iran and poses a danger to the US and our allies.” Indeed, as press releases posted on AIPAC’s website on November 23 and 30, 2005 reveal, the Israeli lobby wanted nothing less than reporting Iran to the Security Council and getting sanctions imposed on it. The usual allies of AIPAC in the US Congress were also exerting pressure to stop the compromise. For example, Reuters reported on December 16, 2006 that an “influential Republican congresswoman expressed frustration on Friday over Iran and said pressure is building for a tougher U.S. policy.” The Congresswoman was, of course, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen. She was quoted as saying: “I love President Bush and I support him, but on the issue of Iran, I take great exception to what they have been doing … There is a growing restlessness at a bipartisan level in the House to get tougher on Iran and I think that that’s going to build up even more.”

The final push for UN sanctions The relentless push by Israel and the US to bring Iran before the Security Council to impose UN sanctions finally paid off in early 2006. The task became easier when on January 10, 2006 Iran resumed work on its uranium enrichment program after more than two years of suspension, a suspension that gave Iran nothing in return. Iran did so by “ordering inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency to remove seals they placed on equipment at an enrichment plant at Natanz” (The Washington Post, January 11, 2006). The move, according to Iran, was related to research on nuclear fuel technology and not production of nuclear fuel. The report quoted Mohammad Saeedi, the deputy chief of Iran’s nuclear agency, as saying: “Production of nuclear fuel remains suspended.” Yet whatever the extent of the move and the reason behind it, this was a move that the US and Israel were waiting for. According to the same report, US Ambassador to the

180 The United States and Iran International Atomic Energy Agency Greg Schulte immediately stated: “By cutting IAEA seals, Iran’s leadership shows its disdain for international concerns and its rejection of international diplomacy.” On January 12, 2006 the Guardian reported that the “White House yesterday stepped up diplomatic pressure by saying that Iran had made a ‘serious miscalculation’ by clearing the way to resume uranium enrichment, and that intensive diplomacy with European allies and others was starting over what to do next.” According to the report, Tony Blair stated that “it was likely that the US and Europe would agree to refer Iran to the UN Security Council.” One day later, it was reported that the “foreign ministers of Britain, Germany and France called Thursday for Iran to be referred to the U.N. Security Council for violating its nuclear treaty obligations, saying that their 2½ years of negotiations reached a dead end this week when the Iranians resumed enriching uranium” (The Washington Post, January 13, 2006). The Jerusalem Post wrote on January 13, 2006: “Israel which for months has been calling for the Iranian nuclear issue to be brought to the UN Security Council for possible sanctions applauded the British, French and German decision Thursday to do just that.” Of course, now that the US and the Europeans were leading the charge against Iran, Israel was trying to appear less conspicuous. The above report in The Jerusalem Post further said: “Israel has been cautious in not taking the lead on this matter feeling that the diplomatic track would yield better results if it were led by the British French and Germans.” The report also quoted Ariel Sharon as saying—in an interview with the Japanese newspaper Nikkei Shimbun—that “while Israel was not spearheading the battle to prevent Iran from becoming nuclear it has been engaged in intensive negotiations behind the scenes to deal with the Iranian issue.” He was further quoted as saying “Israel was working with the US and Europe when it comes to intelligence, when it comes to the evaluation of the situation.” Even though attempting to appear less noticeable, Israel had a difficult time stopping its incessant campaign for the containment of Iran. In January of 2006, after a bombing in Tel Aviv, Ariel Sharon’s aide Raanan Gissin stated: “This attack was in Tel Aviv. Tomorrow it may be in Berlin or in Paris or in London— countries that may vote against Iran on the issue of its nuclear program” (Reuters, January 20, 2006). A day after, according to Reuters, Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz warned the people of Iran “that their president would bring disaster and suffering upon them if he continued to call for the destruction of the Jewish state.” He also stated: “You, who are leading your country in an ideology of hatred, terror and anti-Semitism. You had better take a glance at history and see what became of tyrants like you who tried to annihilate the Jewish people. They only brought destruction upon their own people.” Mofaz was further quoted as saying: “Israel’s policy is … to bring this hot potato to the Security Council to impose sanctions and invasive inspection.” In the final push for the UN sanctions Israel’s allies in the US Congress were not sitting idle either. AP reported on January 25, 2006: “As the Bush administration pushes to refer Iran to the U.N. Security Council, many members of Congress

Iran is referred to the Security Council 181 support keeping the use of military force as an option to thwart Tehran’s nuclear ambitions.” The report quoted Representative Gary Ackerman, a House International Relations Committee member, as saying: “If you eliminate the threat of military action, the possibility of it, then there’s no way to secure compliance.” The neoconservatives who pushed for the invasion of Iraq were also increasing their efforts to contain Iran. In a piece entitled “Bush Seen Resisting Calls to Toughen Iran Policy,” Reuters mentioned on January 31, 2006 the barrage of pressure exerted on the Administration by the neoconservatives for regime change in Iran: “In addition to Pletka and Reuel Marc Gerecht, an AEI Middle East expert, others arguing openly for ‘regime change’ in Iran include Robert Kagan and William Kristol, leading pro-Bush neoconservatives who helped lay the intellectual ground for the U.S. invasion of Iraq.” The EU 3, too—who were under heavy pressure from the US and Israel— started to push for the referral of Iran to the Security Council. AP reported on January 20, 2006 that “European powers have drafted a resolution that calls for referring Iran to the 15-nation council but stops short of asking for punitive measures against Iran.” The report expressed the European fear that in the absence of a referral, Israel might attack Iran. “The international community must absolutely do everything in its power to avert an even bigger conflict,” the report quoted Italy’s Foreign Minister Gianfranco Fini saying. He was further quoted as saying: “With the same firmness with which I say that Iran represents a danger and therefore we need to be very firm and very decisive … I tell Israel that you cannot and must not think of launching a pre-emptive attack because it would set the whole Middle East and the whole world on fire for who knows how many decades.” The fear, of course, was based on repeated threats coming from Israeli sources in the month of January 2006 about plans to bomb Iranian nuclear facilities. Indeed, The Jerusalem Post of January 12, 2006 quoted an Israeli Air Force officer as saying that Iran is increasingly fearful of attack but “they are limited in their ability to create an effective air defense.” The pressure exerted by Israel and its allies was so intense that IAEA was asked to submit an early report on Iran to speed up the process of referral to the Security Council. Reuters reported on January 23, 2006 that “ Western powers want IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei to make a broad accounting of Tehran’s nuclear project to the special IAEA meeting they called for February, rather than wait for a regularly scheduled March 6 session.” But, the report went on to state, “ElBaradei said in written responses to the U.S. and EU requests that he had given Iran until the March meeting to answer questions in IAEA inquiries into its nuclear project.” The report quoted ElBaradei as saying in a letter to the US, British, French, and Australian ambassadors to the IAEA: “Due process, therefore, must take its course before (we are) able to submit a detailed report.”

The IAEA “update” and the full report Under pressure, however, the IAEA provided a four-page “Update Brief” by the “Deputy Director General for Safeguards” on January 31, 2006.20 Much of the

182 The United States and Iran “update” was old news, but there was also a new, and seemingly ominous piece of information: On 5 December 2005 the Agency reiterated its request for a meeting to discuss information that had been made available to the Agency about alleged undeclared studies, known as the Green Salt Project, concerning the conversion of uranium dioxide into UF4 (“green salt”), as well as tests related to high explosives and the design of a missile re-entry vehicle, all of which could have a military nuclear dimension and which appear to have administrative interconnections. On 16 December 2005 Iran replied that the “issues related to baseless allegations.” Iran agreed on 23 January 2006 to a meeting with the DDGSG for the clarification of the Green Salt Project, but declined to address the other topics during that meeting. In the course of the meeting, which took place on 27 January 2006, the Agency presented for Iran’s review a copy of a process flow diagram related to bench scale conversion and communications on the project. Iran reiterated that all national nuclear projects are conducted by the AEOI, that the allegations were baseless, and that it would provide further clarifications later. Who provided the information concerning the “Green Salt Project,” how true or accurate the information was, and what the information, if true, proved, were issues not discussed in the document. However, on February 1, 2006 The New York Times reported that according to some “officials” the information was “based at least in part on intelligence provided by the United States.” The New York Times report also made a connection between the new information and the mysterious laptop. The update, the report stated, “does not give the precise sources of its information, but American officials say that the accusations are based in part on material from a laptop computer seized in Iran.” In addition, The New York Times wrote: “Even though the report is confidential, copies began to surface in Vienna almost as soon as it was posted on a Web site available only to member countries of the I.A.E.A.” In addition to the “Green Salt Project,” the January 31, 2006 IAEA “update” stated the following: Iran has shown the Agency more than 60 documents said to have been the drawings, specifications and supporting documentation handed over by the intermediaries, many of which are dated from the early-to mid-1980’s. Among these was a 15-page document describing the procedures for the reduction of UF6 to metal in small quantities, and the casting of enriched and depleted uranium metal into hemispheres, related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon components. It did not, however, include dimensions or other specifications for machined pieces for such components. According to Iran, this document had been provided on the initiative of the network, and not at the request of the AEOI. Iran has declined the Agency’s request to provide the Agency with a copy of the document, but did permit the Agency during its

Iran is referred to the Security Council 183 visit in January 2006 to examine the document again and to place it under Agency seal. This was, of course, not the first time that the issue of Iran being in possession of these documents had been discussed, but it was the first time that an IAEA report stated that some documents were “related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon components.” A full report by the Director General was presented on February 27, 2006.21 The report made references to the “Green Salt Project” and mentioned that on December 16, 2005 Iran replied by calling the allegations “baseless.” It also mentioned that on January 27, 2006 “ Iran reiterated that all national nuclear projects are conducted by the AEOI, that the allegations were baseless and that it would provide further clarifications later.” Furthermore, the report stated that on February, 26, 2006 the IAEA representatives met with Iranian authorities to discuss the “alleged Green Salt Project” and that “Iran repeated that the allegations ‘are based on false and fabricated documents so they were baseless,’ and that neither such a project nor such studies exist or did exist.”

Iran’s referral to the Security Council The US and Israel, however, did not wait for the full report of February 27, 2006 to make their move; the IAEA “update” of January 31, 2006 was quite sufficient to move on Iran. On the same day that the “update” was released The Washington Post reported: The five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council—the United States, Britain, France, Russia and China—along with Germany, agreed Monday night to report Iran to the Security Council over its nuclear program. The decision, reached in London through a compromise with Russia and China, was a victory for the United States and its European allies, who had pressed for the matter to be sent to the council. But Russia and China were able to soften the agreement by stipulating that the Security Council not take up the matter until March. That gives Iran more time to comply with U.N. nuclear inspectors and avoid the threat of sanctions. The resolution of the IAEA, adopted on February 4, 2006, enumerated the steps that Iran must take, including re-establishment of “full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities.”22 It then requested the “Director General to report to the Security Council of the United Nations that these steps are required of Iran by the Board and to report to the Security Council all IAEA reports and resolutions, as adopted, relating to this issue.” As AP reported on February 4, 2006, 27 nations voted for the resolution. The US, as usual, used various tactics to win some of the votes. For example, one AFP headline on January 25, 2006 read: “India could lose out on a historic nuclear deal with the United States if it does not vote against Iran at a key meeting of the UN

184 The United States and Iran nuclear watchdog agency, the US ambassador to India warned.” Ultimately, according to former US disarmament official Stephen Rademaker, the US managed to force India to vote against Iran for a second time. The Hindu of February 16, 2007 quoted Rademaker as saying: “I am the first person to admit that the votes were coerced.” Russia and China, too, were pushed to vote for the referral. But, as the AP report of February 4, 2006 indicated, Russia and China “agreed to referral only on condition the council take no action before March.” Also, as the report stated, Syria and Venezuela voted against the resolution and Algeria, Belarus, Indonesia, Libya, and South Africa abstained. Soon after the vote, Iran ended all voluntary cooperation with the IAEA, as it had argued it would do in the event of referral to the Security Council. Iran also stated its intention to resume uranium enrichment (AP, February 7, 2006). Further negotiations concerning a joint uranium enrichment project between Russia and Iran on Russian soil were now dead (The Washington Post, February 26, 2006).

10 On the road to UN sanctions

For the entire month of February 2006, even after the IAEA had resolved to report Iran to the Security Council, the US and Israeli accusations and threats against Iran continued. Reuters reported on February 1, 2006 that “President George W. Bush vowed on Wednesday the United States will rise to Israel’s defense if needed against Iran and denounced Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for ‘menacing talk’ against Israel.” Three days later Reuters reported that “Richard Perle, a key U.S. architect of the Iraq invasion, said the West should not make the mistake of waiting too long to use military force if Iran comes close to getting an atomic weapon.” “Israel,” he stated, “had chosen not to wait until it was too late to destroy the key facility Saddam Hussein’s secret nuclear weapons program in Osirak, Iraq in 1981.”1 On February 4, 2006 the National Iranian American Council reported that at a panel discussion entitled “Next Steps: The Iranian Threat”—held at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI)—Patrick Clawson, deputy director at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, stated: “Only a fall of the Islamic Republic will lead to an end of the Iranian [nuclear] program.” The same report stated that Clawson’s remarks were shared by other panelists, including Danielle Pletka of AEI who equated the end of “the nuclear weapons program” with the “the end of the [Iranian] regime.” Three days later Vice President Dick Chaney was quoted as saying: “When you think about a government like Iran that has a history of sponsorship of terrorist organizations … a nation that is now governed by a man who has talked repeatedly, for example, about the destruction of Israel, that everybody’s concerned that if Iran were equipped with nuclear weapons, that would become a major source of instability in that part of the world” (Reuters, February 7, 2006). Subsequently the Voice of America reported on February 17, 2006 that the “U.S. House of Representatives has overwhelmingly approved a non-binding resolution condemning Iran over its nuclear program, and calling for international sanctions to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.” The vote, according to the report was, 404 to1 in favor, with Representatives Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Tom Lantos leading the pack.

Bringing democracy to Iran, and US public opinion In addition to the above fury, in February 2006 the US government devoted more funds to bringing “democracy” to Iran. As The Washington Post reported on

186 The United States and Iran February 16, 2006 “Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice asked Congress yesterday to provide $75 million in emergency funding to step up pressure on the Iranian government, including expanding radio and television broadcasts into Iran and promoting internal opposition to the rule of religious leaders.” This was in addition to $10 million already appropriated for that purpose. The report quoted Rice as saying: “The United States will actively confront the policies of this Iranian regime, and at the same time we are going to work to support the aspirations of the Iranian people for freedom in their own country.”2 This renewed interest in “democracy” in Iran was indicative of the fact that, as in the case of Iraq, the US was employing the menu option, or a series of excuses, to contain Iran. A few weeks after asking the Congress for more funds to push for “democracy” in Iran, Secretary Rice appeared before the Senate Appropriations Committee and gave the following host of reasons as to why the Iranian government must be changed: Mr Chairman, I’d like to say just a word about the request here for democracy promotion money for Iran. We may face no greater challenge from a single country than from Iran, whose policies are directed at developing a Middle East that would be 180 degrees different than the Middle East that we would like to see develop. This is a country that is determined, it seems, to develop a nuclear weapon in defiance of the international community that is determined that they should not get one. It is the country that is the central banker for terrorism, whether that terrorism is in southern Iraq or in the Palestinian territories or in Lebanon. And in all of those cases, Iranian support for terrorism is retarding and in some cases, helping to arrest the growth of democratic and stable governments. And Iran, of course, has a terrible human rights effort and a country in which an unelected few are frustrating the desires and wishes of the Iranian people for democracy.3 The constant beating of war drums had its effect on US public opinion, even though the public by now was starting to realize how it had been misled into invading Iraq. As AP reported on February 7, 2006, according to Andrew Kohut, director of the Pew Research Center, the “threat from Iran has really penetrated, with two of three saying Iran’s nuclear program represents a major threat … Among people who have been following news about the issue, there’s even greater concern.” According to the same report, Iran had now replaced Iraq, China, and North Korea as the “biggest threat to the U.S.” 4 A later Gallup poll reported that “Iran has replaced Iraq as the country Americans consider to be their greatest enemy” (AP, February 24, 2006). “Thirty-one percent of Americans,” the report went on to say, “gave the nod to Iran as the worst enemy … This represented an increase from 14 percent last year, and appeared to reflect growing American concern over the potential for the Islamic republic to acquire nuclear weapons.”

On the road to UN sanctions 187

Another “largest-ever” AIPAC conference Iran was now on its way to the UN Security Council and faced the imposition of UN sanctions. To speed up the process US–Israeli pressure was mounting throughout the month of March, 2006. The month actually began with another AIPAC annual meeting, which, as usual, was declared the “largest-ever annual Policy Conference in Washington, D.C., March 5–7, drawing more than 5,000 pro-Israel activists from all 50 states and several foreign countries.”5 The main focus of the conference was quite evident on the AIPAC website on March 3, 2006. A menacing picture of Ahmadinejad was followed by the caption: Decades of Deception: Iran’s Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL MUST TAKE DECISIVE ACTION AGAINST IRAN

The International Atomic Energy Agency has reported Iran to the Security Council—an important next step in the international effort to prevent Iran from attaining nuclear weapons. The Security Council must use its authority to make clear to Iran that the continued flouting of its non-proliferation obligations will be met with strong and decisive sanctions and Tehran’s further isolation. As President Bush said in his State of the Union address, “The nations of the world must not permit the Iranian regime to gain nuclear weapons.” The list of AIPAC’s speakers was, as usual, a Who’s Who of US and Israeli political figures and “experts.” It included John Bolton, Ehud Olmert, Binyamin Netanyahu, and Dick Cheney. It also included past and present Senators, such as Susan Collins, Evan Bayh, and John Edward. There were also past and present Representatives, such as Jane Harman and Newt Gingrich, and many more. The hot topic was, once again, allegedly the gravest threat facing mankind, i.e. Iran.6 Vice President Dick Cheney, for example, stated that “the United States is keeping all options on the table in addressing the irresponsible conduct of the regime” and that “the international community is prepared to impose meaningful consequences” on Iran.7 Another official who attended the AIPAC meeting was Daniel Gillerman, the Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations, who, according to a report in The Washington Post of March 7, 2006, “shouted a barnyard obscenity involving a bull when he dismissed the theory that Iran and Hamas might soften their anti-Israel views. The audience gave Gillerman a standing ovation.” According to the report, the “undiplomatic diplomat went on to describe a war on radical Islam: ‘While it may be true—and probably is—that not all Muslims are terrorists, it also happens to be true that nearly all terrorists are Muslim.’” He was further quoted as saying: “Thank God for AIPAC … This is for us the greatest guarantee and insurance policy for the survival of Israel … Please don’t ever change.”8 Another Israeli official who thanked God for AIPAC was Acting Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who had appeared live via satellite. He stated:

188 The United States and Iran And let me say from the outset, thank God we have you. Thank God we have AIPAC—the greatest supporter and friend that we have in the whole world. An organization made up of people who care so much and who devote so much of their energies and resources and love and care to the people of Israel and for the friendship between the United States and the state of Israel. You know how important America is to the state of Israel.9 Iran, which according to Olmert was “a major threat to all the civilized world,” was of course at the top of Acting Prime Minister’s agenda after the Palestinian issue. On that issue Olmert referred to his “good friend,” Bolton: I know that you heard earlier my good friend and a wonderful person, Ambassador John Bolton. He has been the leading administration representative in the campaign against the attempts by Iran to possess nuclear capabilities and now as Ambassador in the United Nations, he is leading this campaign further and hopefully together with other European countries he will succeed in forcing some measures against Iran in order to prevent them from enriching uranium which can become a major source of threat to the very existence of Israel and many other countries. US and Israeli diplomats were, of course, joined by Middle East and nuclear “experts,” such as William Kristol, Richard Perle, Patrick Clawson, David Albright, and David Kay. Indeed some of the same people that had led the US into invading Iraq were now focusing on preparing the ground for invading Iran. David Kay, for example—who made the case for the “Faustian bargain” and invasion of Iraq, and who after the invasion simply said “we were all wrong”—was now making a similar case against Iran by saying: “We may indeed not arrive at the conclusion that Iran has a nuclear weapons program until Iran tests its first nuclear device if you demand that degree of proof. That is for me a frightening reality and a deep concern about international inspection.”10 As The Washington Post of March 7, 2006 noted, during the entire AIPAC conference there was no mention of former heads of AIPAC who were accused of spying for Israel: “ask people at this week’s gathering about Steve Rosen, the father of modern AIPAC, who goes on trial next month for disseminating classified information, and you get the sort of look you’d expect if you inquired about an embarrassing medical condition.” The report also noted that AIPAC, which was “unharmed by the Rosen flap,” was putting on “its biggest and best show ever this week: 4,500 participants, including more than 1,000 students, paying visits to at least 450 House and Senate offices.”

Rejection of another compromise solution and the first Security Council draft With most of the US policy makers following the lead of AIPAC and other Israeliassociated bodies, the US backing down from its push to impose UN sanctions

On the road to UN sanctions 189 against Iran appeared to be impossible. On March 6, 2006 AP reported that ElBaradei had stated that a “deal on Iran’s suspect nuclear program could be only a few days away, making U.N. Security Council action unneeded.” According to the report, ElBarade’s “optimism was believed to be linked to a confidential Russian proposal to allow Iran to enrich some uranium domestically.” Reuters actually reported on March 6, 2006 that Iran was open to the idea and that she had agreed to “delay industrial-scale enrichment for up to two years” in exchange for a small-scale enrichment; this, as the report pointed out, would be a “face-saving solution” for Iran. The US, however, immediately ruled out any compromise. According to an AP report of March 6, 2006 John Bolton stated that the “United States would oppose any enrichment on Iranian soil.” “It’s been a core element of our view and the view of the European three, and certainly of the Russian Federation that no enrichment in Iran is permissible,” Bolton was quoted as saying. He was further quoted as saying that “even small so-called research enrichment programs could give Iran the possibility of mastering the technical deficiencies that it’s currently encountering in its program” and translate them into large-scale enrichment later. Any compromise to end the stand-off was dead. Two days after the rejection of Russia’s proposed solution, i.e. on March 8, 2006, at the close of the Agency’s Board of Governors meeting in Vienna, ElBaradei transmitted his report on Iran’s nuclear program to the UN Security Council.11 For the rest of the month of March the US pushed for the harshest possible UN resolution against Iran. In a style reminiscent of scare tactics used before the invasion of Iraq—such as the “smoking gun” becoming “a mushroom cloud”—Secretary of State Rice was now telling “a congressional hearing in Washington that the threat from Iran could grow exponentially” and that if “you can take that and multiply it by several hundred, you can imagine Iran with a nuclear weapon and the threat they would then pose to that region” (Reuters, March 9, 2006).12 “We may face no greater challenge from a single country,” warned the Secretary (ibid.). Indeed, the tactics used by the US for imposing UN sanctions against Iran were so similar to those used for invading Iraq that on March 30, 2006 The New York Times reported that “China’s vice minister of foreign affairs, rejected the idea of sanctions and offered a thinly veiled criticism of the war in Iraq when he said, ‘The Chinese side feels there has already been enough turmoil in the Middle East. We don’t need any more turmoil.’” The same sentiment was expressed by none other than ElBaradei. On March 30, 2006 Reuters quoted ElBaradei as saying: “Sanctions [against Iran] are a bad idea. We are not facing an imminent threat. We need to lower the pitch.” He was further quoted as saying: “I work on facts, we fortunately were proven right in Iraq, we were the only ones that said at the time that Iraq did not have nuclear weapons and I hope this time people will listen to us.” Given the warnings by various countries and individuals that the Iraq scenario should not be repeated, the US–Israeli push to get sanctions against Iran did not succeed rapidly and smoothly. Actually, the UN draft statement that was issued did not even mention sanctions.13 It simply stated: The Security Council notes with serious concern Iran’s decision to resume

190 The United States and Iran enrichment-related activities, including research and development, and to suspend co-operation with the IAEA under the (Non-Proliferation Treaty’s) Additional Protocol. The Security Council calls upon Iran to take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors, notably in the first operative paragraph of its resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear program and to resolve outstanding questions, and underlines, in this regard, the particular importance of reestablishing full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the IAEA. This was followed by a deadline for action: The Security Council requests in 30 days a report from the director-general of the IAEA on the process of Iranian compliance with the steps required by the IAEA Board, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration Even though much closer to their goal, this was not exactly the resolution that the US and Israel, or even the EU 3, wished for. As AP pointed out on March 30, 2006, “Western countries” had proposed much harsher language, but after pressure from Russia and China finally agreed to “drop language that proliferation ‘constitutes a threat to international peace and security.’” “Also gone,” pointed out the report, was “a mention that the council is specifically charged under the U.N. charter with addressing such threats.” “Russia and China,” the report went on to say, “had opposed that language because they wanted nothing in the statement that could automatically trigger council action after 30 days.”

The push for Chapter 7 resolution and threat of war The US and Israel, however, pushed for harsh UN measures against Iran, particularly after Iran announced that it “started enriching uranium to the 3.5 percent level” (The Washington Post, April 11, 2006). Indeed, nothing short of passing a UN Chapter 7 resolution against Iran would satisfy these forces. Chapter 7, which has the title “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression,” could easily result in the imposition of sanctions or the use of military force against a country.14 Thus, when on April 13, 2006 Condoleezza Rice was asked “what options the U.N. Security Council should consider, Rice said it should look at chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter to force Iran to comply with international obligations over its nuclear plans,” reported Reuters.15 As the report noted, a “Chapter 7 resolution passed against Iraq has been seen as giving the United States a legal argument for the bombing and then invasion of that country.” John Bolton, too, repeatedly called for the passage of a Chapter 7 resolution against Iran in April of 2006. 16 Passing a Chapter 7 resolution, however, required continuing the campaign to

On the road to UN sanctions 191 portray Iran as a threat to Israel and the world peace. Therefore, on a daily basis Israeli leaders compared Iran to Nazi Germany and Ahmadinejad to Hitler. For example, Avigdor Lieberman—the head of the Yisrael Beitenu Party and poised to be a member of the Israeli cabinet at the time—stated that Iran’s nuclear program “represents an existential threat for Israel which will oblige us to take unilateral action if the international community does nothing to stop it … The only difference between the aspirations of the madmen of the current regime in Tehran and Hitler is that their (Iranian) threat is more concrete” (AFP, April 17, 2006).17 Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz said that “Ahmadinejad was the world’s most dangerous leader since Adolf Hitler and that Israel was now under an existential threat from Iran” (AFP, April 24, 2006). Shimon Peres stated: “This is the first man [Ahmadinejad] since Hitler to stand up and say that the Jewish people must be exterminated” (AFP April 25, 2006). Earlier, Shimon Peres, compared the Iranian President to the former President of Iraq and stated that “Ahmadinejad would end up like Iraq’s Saddam Hussein” (Reuters, April 15, 2006). Besides invoking the image of Nazi Germany and Hitler, the campaign to pass a Chapter 7 resolution against Iran involved the threat of military action. In spring 2006 Seymour Hersh published an article in which he claimed the “Bush Administration, while publicly advocating diplomacy in order to stop Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapon, has increased clandestine activities inside Iran and intensified planning for a possible major air attack.”18 Among possible scenarios being considered by the US, Hersh mentioned the “use of a bunker-buster tactical nuclear weapon, such as the B61-11, against underground [Iranian] nuclear sites.” Even though much of Hersh’s essay was, once again, based on the information provided by close allies of Israel—who had an interest in spreading fear of war to assure UN sanctions against Iran—the essay correctly pointed out that “President Bush’s ultimate goal in the nuclear confrontation with Iran is regime change.” Reports similar to Hersh’s appeared elsewhere. For example, on April 9, 2006, in a report entitled “U.S. Is Studying Military Strike Options on Iran,” The Washington Post stated that the “Bush administration is studying options for military strikes against Iran as part of a broader strategy of coercive diplomacy to pressure Tehran to abandon its alleged nuclear development program.” The report stated that the “administration is also coming under pressure from Israel, which has warned the Bush team that Iran is closer to developing a nuclear bomb than Washington thinks and that a moment of decision is fast approaching.” According to the report, “Israel is preparing, as well. The government recently leaked a contingency plan for attacking on its own if the United States does not, a plan involving air strikes, commando teams, possibly missiles and even explosives-carrying dogs.” The White House spokesman Scott McClellan described the above reports concerning a military attack against Iran as “wild speculation,” and, yet, in typical double-talk, maintained: “No president is taking options off the table” (AFP, April 4, 2006). Indeed, Reuters reported on April 18, 2006 that President Bush “refused on Tuesday to rule out nuclear strikes against Iran if diplomacy fails to curb the Islamic Republic’s atomic ambitions.” Similarly, The Washington Post reported on April 16, 2006 that the Pentagon had developed plans for attacking Iran under

192 The United States and Iran the code-name TIRANNT, an acronym for “Theater Iran Near Term.” The plan, according to the report, included land invasion of Iran led by the US Marine Corps and attacking Iranian nuclear sites. The task of attacking Iran, the report claimed, “was given to Army Gen. John P. Abizaid, now commander of CENTCOM [United States Central Command], in 2002.” Neoconservatives, in and out of the US government, were also busy pushing for a military attack on Iran. For example, in an opinion piece entitled “Target: Iran,” The Weekly Standard wrote on April 24, 2006: “A military option against Iran’s nuclear facilities is feasible … The existence of a military option may be the only means of persuading Iran—the world’s leading sponsor of terrorism—to back down from producing nuclear weapons.” Military action, the piece advocated, should be combined with attempting to “cripple the [Iranian] leaders’ power to control their own people. Iran’s diverse population should be fertile ground for a covert operation.” Similar calls for a military attack against Iran, as well as fomenting ethnic violence, came from other neoconservative groups and individuals.

Another IAEA report, the alleged hidden program, and ElBaradei’s plea On April 28, 2006 the Director General of the IAEA issued his report “on the process of Iranian compliance with the steps required by the IAEA,” as the Security Council had asked on March 29.19 The report, of course, showed that Iran was not complying with the demand of the UN resolution. On the enrichment issue the report stated: On 13 April 2006, Iran declared to the Agency that an enrichment level of 3.6% had been achieved. On 18 April 2006, the Agency took samples at PFEP [Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant], the results of which tend to confirm as of that date the enrichment level declared by Iran. On that day, UF6 gas was again being fed into the 164-machine cascade, and two additional 164-machine cascades were under construction. Iran’s reaction to the report and its consequences was dismissive. A few days after this report Iran announced that it had enriched uranium up to 4.8 percent purity, which is “the upper end of the range needed to make fuel for reactors,” according to an AP report of May 5, 2006. Following his IAEA report, ElBaradei tried, once again, to slow down the drive to enforce UN sanctions against Iran. On May 12, 2006 AFP reported that according to unidentified “diplomats” some “UN inspectors have found traces of highly enriched uranium in vacuum pumps” at the Lavizan-Shian site. According to the report, “non-proliferation expert David Albright said the reported find was ‘significant’ and that this could be part of Iran’s known centrifuge program or a parallel (hidden) program.” On the same day, however, when ElBaradei spoke about Iran, he not only made no reference to the alleged “new” findings and the

On the road to UN sanctions 193 “parallel (hidden) program,” but stated: “We haven’t seen a clear and present danger. We haven’t seen an imminent threat” (Reuters, May 12, 2006). Similarly, on numerous other occasions on which ElBaradei spoke in the month of May there was no mention of Iran’s hidden program. Recognizing the political nature of the dispute, ElBaradei actually attempted throughout this month to convince the US to talk directly to Iran.20 On May 30, 2006 Reuters reported ElBaradei as saying that “the world shouldn’t ‘jump the gun’ with erroneous information as he said the U.S.-led coalition did in Iraq in 2003, nor should it push the country into retaliation as international sanctions did in North Korea.”

Iran, Nazi Germany, and the yellow insignia ElBaradei’s plea for direct talks between the US and Iran, however, fell on deaf ears. A letter of rapprochement written in early May, 2006 by President Ahmadinejad to President Bush also fell on deaf ears.21 The US, Israel, and the EU 3 continued their push for UN sanctions against Iran. Israeli officials kept up their campaign tactic of depicting Iran as an existential threat to Israel and the world at large. The threat, at times, was said to be impending. For example, according to an AP report of May 21, 2006 Olmert stated in a CNN interview that “Iran is just a few months away from acquiring the technological know-how that will allow it to build an atomic bomb.” The campaign to compare Ahmadinejad to Hitler and Iran to Nazi Germany also continued. In the same CNN interview Olmert was quoted as saying, in reference to the Holocaust, in “modern times, we have to remember what happened when the world did not listen to dictators threatening other nations [with] annihilation” (CNN.com, May 21, 2006). To the hype about the impending Holocaust a sensational piece of “news” was added in spring of 2006. On May 19, 2006 the National Post (Canada) published a news item by Amir Taheri of the neoconservative publicity agency Benador Associates about a new law in Iran that would require Iranian Jews to wear yellow insignia.22 “Jews,” Taheri wrote in the article, “would be marked out with a yellow strip of cloth sewn in front of their clothes.” At the end the following statement appeared: “Dangerous Parallel: Is Iran turning into the new Nazi Germany? Share your opinion online at national post.com.” The news report was immediately republished by Benador Associates.23 The same news also appeared in The Jerusalem Post on May 19, 2006 with two pictures: a yellow star, with a caption reading “Jews were forced by law to wear yellow stars in public in Nazi Germany” and a menacing picture of Ahmadinejad, with the caption: “Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad awaits the coming of the Hidden Imam.” While The Jerusalem Post article began by saying that Iranian officials “denied a report published by the Canadian National Post,” it went on to say how the entire world had condemned the action. “US State Department Spokesman Sean McCormack,” The Jerusalem Post wrote, “said any such measure would be ‘despicable’ and carry ‘clear echoes of Germany under Hitler.’” “Internal Security Minister Avi Dichter,” the report stated, “responded to the new law Friday night, saying, ‘Whoever makes Jews anywhere wear the yellow star

194 The United States and Iran again, will find themselves in a coffin draped in black.’” “The new law resembles the Holocaust,” the report quoted the head of the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles, Rabbi Marvin Heir as saying. He also warned that “Iran was nearing Nazi Ideology.” Similarly, the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations was quoted as saying: “While such legislation would be reminiscent of dark periods in the past, like the Nazi era when Jews and others had to wear identifying badges, it is also consistent with the racist and extremist ideology propagated by President Ahmadinejad.” The news concerning the impending law making Iranian Jews wear yellow insignia turned out to be another fabrication. Indeed, a few hours after the publication of Taheri’s story, the National Post ran a second article—still accompanied by a picture reading: “A yellow badge worn by Jews in Nazi Germany during the 1940s”—casting doubt on the veracity of the first article.24 The second article started by saying: “Several experts are casting doubt on reports that Iran had passed a law requiring the country’s Jews and other religious minorities to wear coloured badges identifying them as non-Muslims. The Iranian embassy in Ottawa also denied the Iranian government had passed such a law.” The article also added that Rabbi Marvin Hier, the dean of the Simon Wiesenthal Centre in Los Angeles—who had originally confirmed the news—“acknowledged that he did not have independent confirmation of the requirement for Jews to wear badges, but said he still believes it was passed.” Soon afterwards, of course, this belief was also put to rest when the National Post actually published an apology. On May 24, 2006 Douglas Kelly, the editor-in-chief of the paper began his apology, entitled “Our mistake: Note to readers,” by staying: “Last Friday, the National Post ran a story prominently on the front page alleging that the Iranian parliament had passed a law that, if enacted, would require Jews and other religious minorities in Iran to wear badges that would identify them as such in public. It is now clear the story is not true. Given the seriousness of the error, I felt it necessary to explain to our readers how this happened.” He ended his piece: “We apologize for the mistake and for the consternation it has caused not just National Post readers, but the broader public who read the story. We take this incident very seriously, and we are examining our procedures to try to ensure such an error does not happen again.” Soon afterwards, a number of other sources, including some Jewish ones, also came out to debunk the story and explain how the fabrication came about. For example, on May 25, 2006 the Jewish Daily Forward wrote: “It was not exactly up there with the failure to uncover weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, but the effort to discredit the Iranian regime took an embarrassing turn this week with a false media report claiming that Tehran had passed a law requiring Jews and other religious minorities to wear special badges.”25 The essay went on to identify the main source of the false news as Amir Taheri, “a staunch advocate of regime change in Iran,” a “former editor of the state-owned Kayhan newspaper under the shah of Iran before the 1979 Islamic revolution,” and a member of Benador Associates, “a public relations firm representing several prominent neoconservative authors.” The essay also pointed out that the National Post “is managed by CanWest principals David and Leonard Asper, who are known for their strong support of Israel.”

On the road to UN sanctions 195 Similarly, The Jewish Week published on May 29, 2007 a detailed essay about the whole sordid affair under the title “‘YELLOW’ JOURNALISM!! Anatomy of a hoax: False story alleging special yellow insignia for Iranian Jews spurred by Wiesenthal Center’s flawed confirmation.”26 According to this source, it was actually Benador Associates, “a boutique firm specializing in promoting neoconservative figures such as Taheri, Michael Ledeen, Richard Perle, Charles Krauthammer and others who supported the Iraq war and ‘regime change’ in Iran,” which “placed the story with The National Post.” The essay then went on to explain how the false news was further spread by pro-Israeli groups and newspapers and how politicians, such as Canada’s new Prime Minister, Stephen Harper, and Australian Prime Minister John Howard, lined up to denounce Iran. Even after the details of the false story were published US government officials met the author of the fabricated news to get his advice on policy toward Iran. On May 31, 2007 the Financial Times reported: US President George W. Bush and Tony Blair, the UK prime minister, have received separate background briefings from Iranian opposition activists, including one visitor to the White House on Tuesday who caused a storm earlier this month by reporting Iran had passed a law requiring Jews to wear special identification … White House officials said Amir Taheri, a Londonbased former editor, was among a group of experts invited to discuss Iraq and the region with Mr Bush … Mr Taheri is well known for his support of the war in Iraq and regime change in Iran. In the end, even though the story of the Iranian law requiring Jews to wear special insignia turned out to be a fabrication, those who helped to propagate it managed to achieve their desired goal. The retractions were less visible than the initial story and, on the whole, Iran was demonized further. Also, the fact that such a hoax could be taken seriously even by some Western leaders was indicative of how successful the campaign to demonize Iran had become. Israel and its allies had succeeded in portraying Iran as an existential threat not only to Israel but to the whole world. Iran was now viewed as another Nazi Germany and its leader, Ahmadinejad, was seen as Adolf Hitler out to commit another Holocaust, this time a Hitler equipped with nuclear weapons. Given the level of fear created, it was now just a matter of time before UN sanctions were imposed on Iran.

A new US strategy, the “carrot and stick” package Before imposing UN sanctions, however, the US still had to get Russia and China on board. To achieve this, a new strategy was adopted: the Bush Administration was willing to talk to Iran if and only if Iran would stop all enrichment-related activities. The offer, of course, was dead on arrival and the Administration knew it, since Iran had made it clear that its enrichment right was guaranteed under the NPT and would not be given up. Yet much was made of the apparent change in US policy toward Iran in the media.27 For example, on May 31, 2006 a news item in

196 The United States and Iran AFP started: “The United States, in a major policy shift, offered to participate directly in talks on Iran’s disputed nuclear program if Tehran suspended all uranium enrichment activity.” The report quoted President Bush as saying: “My decision today says the United States is going to take a leadership position in solving this issue.” Similarly, according to the report, Condoleezza Rice stated: “To underscore our commitment to a diplomatic solution and to enhance the prospects for success, as soon as Iran fully and verifiably suspends its enrichment and reprocessing activities, the United States will come to the table with our EU colleagues and meet with Iran’s representatives.” Subsequently, on June 1, 2006 The New York Times wrote: “After 27 years in which the United States has refused substantive talks with Iran, President George W. Bush reversed course because it was made clear to him—by his allies, by the Russians, by the Chinese, and eventually by some of his advisers—that he no longer had a choice.”28 But the paper added: “Few of his aides expect that Iran’s leaders will meet Bush’s main condition: that Iran first re-suspend all of its nuclear activities, including shutting down every centrifuge that could add to Iran’s small stockpile of enriched uranium.” In other words, the Bush Administration offered to join the EU negotiation expecting that Iran would not accept the preconditions for the negotiation. Actually, the only anxiety on the part of the US was “what if Iran accepts the preconditions?” As The New York Times of June 4, 2006 wrote: “Mr. Bush’s own early misgivings about the path he was considering came in a flurry of phone calls to Ms. Rice and to Stephen J. Hadley, his national security adviser, that often began with questions like ‘What if the Iranians do this,’ gaming out loud a number of possible situations.” The new US strategy actually speeded up the process of imposing UN sanctions on Iran. In what became known as “P5+1,” Russia and China joined the three other permanent members of the Security Council and Germany to offer Iran what The Independent called, on June 2, 2006, a “‘carrot-and-stick’ package.” The report then stated that “the foreign ministers of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, plus Germany, overcame months of differences at talks in Vienna in order to reach agreement on the package of incentives and penalties aimed at securing a diplomatic solution to the stand-off with Iran.” But the report also pointed out: “Details of the package were yet to be released at the time of publication.” Even though details did not become immediately available to the public, it was clear that they were such that Iran’s reaction was precisely what the US had expected. As the report pointed out, “Manouchehr Mottaki, Iran’s Foreign Minister, said that Iran was ‘ready to hold talks over mutual concerns’, but added: ‘We will not give up our nation’s natural right [to enrichment], we will not hold talks over it.’” The details of the “carrot and stick” package, which eventually appeared unofficially on some websites, show that the package of June 1, 2006 offered to Iran was not much different from the “Framework” offered by the EU 3 in 2005. Once again, the package asked Iran to “commit to addressing all the outstanding concerns of the IAEA; suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities to be verified by the IAEA, as requested by the IAEA Board of Governors and the

On the road to UN sanctions 197 UN Security Council, and commit to continue this during these negotiations; and resume implementation of the Additional Protocol.”29 In exchange, Iran was offered many of the same “incentives” offered in the 2005 “Framework.” But like the earlier case, what was offered either lacked sufficient specificity or was simply undeliverable. For example, on the issue of security guarantee for Iran, the package merely offered “[s]upport for a new conference to promote dialogue and cooperation on regional security issues.” But given that both the US and Israel continuously talked of “leaving all options open,” this offer appeared to be an empty and vague gesture. Though the P5+1 offered, once again, to “actively support the building of new light water power reactors in Iran through international joint projects,” it was not clear what was meant by “actively support” or how this was at all possible, given that Iran was under numerous US sanctions. On the question of “Fuel Guarantees,” Iran was told that Russia will “provide enrichment services for a reliable supply of fuel.” But, again, since Russia was years behind in providing fuel for Bushehr reactor, it was not clear how “reliable” the supply of fuel could be. On the issue of “Civil aviation,” the P5+1 offered “the possible removal of restrictions on US and European manufacturers, from exporting civil aircraft to Iran.” But given that there was no concrete promise of removal of numerous US sanctions against Iran, it was not clear how “possible” was the “removal” of restrictions imposed on civil aircraft.

More sticks than carrots: financial sanctions As the P5+1 were offering the “carrot and stick” package to Iran, the US Administration was actually tightening the Iran sanction noose. In this tightening, the role of Stuart Levey, the Treasury Department’s Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, was particularly interesting. In 2005 Stuart Levey gave an address at the AIPAC Policy Conference.30 The address began: “It is a real pleasure to be speaking with you today. I have been an admirer of the great work this organization does since my days on the one-year program at Hebrew University in 1983 and 1984. I want to commend you for the important work that you are doing to promote strong ties between Israel and the United States and to advocate for a lasting peace in the Middle East.”31 After discussing what the “Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial and Intelligence” does, Levey went on to say that his “office brings a wide range of authorities and capabilities together under a single umbrella, allowing us to wield a range of tools against various threats—whether they are terrorists, narcotics traffickers, proliferators of WMD or rogue regimes, like Iran and North Korea.” “We,” he went on to say, “levy economic sanctions to pressure obstructionist regimes, and we have the ability to freeze the assets of wrongdoers.” Nearly a year after his AIPAC address Stuart Levey gave testimony before the Senate Appropriation Subcommittee. He counted among his office’s “key achievements” the implementation of “targeted financial sanctions under a new Executive order against North Korean, Iranian, and Syrian facilitators of WMD proliferation.”32 As state “sponsors of terrorism,” Iran and Syria, Levey stated,

198 The United States and Iran “present a vexing problem, providing not only money and safe haven to terrorists, but also a financial infrastructure through which terrorists can move, store, and launder their funds.” But, Levey added, the “Treasury Department’s tools, combined with cooperation from responsible financial institutions, can make a difference.” A month after Levey’s testimony, many media sources started to report that foreign banks, particularly European ones, were under pressure from the US to stop working with Iranian banks. For example, on May 22, 2006 The New York Times reported: “Prodded by the United States with threats of fines and lost business, four of the biggest European banks have started curbing their activities in Iran, even in the absence of a Security Council resolution imposing economic sanctions on Iran for its suspected nuclear weapons program.” The report quoted Stuart Levey as saying: “We are seeing banks and other institutions reassessing their ties to Iran. They are asking themselves if they really want to be handling business for entities owned by a government engaged in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and support for terrorism.”

Iran’s response to the “carrot and stick” package and the August 22 deadline As will be shown later in this book, the US Treasury Department, especially under Stuart Levey’s direction, was successful in pressuring a number of foreign banks to stop dealing with Iran. But the important point is that as the US was offering a “package” of incentives to Iran, it was tightening and expanding economic sanctions. This did not go unnoticed in Iran. Yet given the threat of sanctions and even military attacks, Iran’s immediate reaction was not an outright rejection of the package. As stated earlier, initially Iran indicated that it was ready to hold talks but without the precondition of giving up its right to enrich uranium. This position seemed to be acceptable to some European countries. For example, Reuters reported on June 28, 2006 that according to Germany’s Defense Minister, Franz Josef Jung, “Iran should be allowed to enrich uranium for power generation provided there is close monitoring by U.N. inspectors to ensure it is not trying to develop atomic weapons.” “But,” Reuters added, “it is unclear if this view would be acceptable to hardline camps in Washington and London.” The view was certainly not acceptable to Washington and London, and soon afterwards the US was again showing more sticks to Iran and no carrots. Yet the dilemma of how to respond to the “package” apparently split the policy makers in Iran. As the Guardian reported on June 7, 2006, after meeting with Javier Solana, the EU foreign policy chief, Ali Larijani, the head of Iran’s national security council and its chief nuclear negotiator, stated that “the package contained positive elements and could form the basis for renewed negotiations.” He was also quoted as saying the “proposals had some positive steps in them and some ambiguities that should be removed.” However, the report also stated that according to “analysts,” the Iranian “regime is split over the offer,” with “moderates,” such as Larijani and former president Hashemi Rafsanjani in favor of the deal “at the right price.”

On the road to UN sanctions 199 According to the report, the “supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, has yet to indicate his views.” Khamenei’s views did become known a few days later. On June 28, 2006 The Independent reported that while Khamenei did not categorically say “no” to the package, he did state: “Negotiations with the United States would have no benefit for us, and we do not need them.” The report also quoted him as saying: “We do not negotiate with anybody on achieving and exploiting nuclear technology … But if they recognise our nuclear rights, we are ready to negotiate about controls, supervisions and international guarantees.” This was not, however, Iran’s last word on the package. The New York Times, on June 22, 2006, quoted President Ahmadinejad as saying: “We want equal and fair negotiations with no precondition.” According to the report, he also stated that “Iran would announce its response to the proposal toward the end of August.” To be exact, as other sources, such as TASS on June 21, 2006, pointed out, Ahmadinejad gave the deadline of August 22, 2006—which in the Persian calendar corresponds to the end of the month of Mordad, 1385—for Iran’s official response. Some supporters of Israel even turned Iran’s August 22 deadline into a twisted story and used it as a propaganda weapon against Iran. The most prominent among them was Professor Emeritus Bernard Lewis, who is credited with coining the term “clash of civilizations” (Lewis 2000). In an opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal, August 8, 2006 entitled “August 22: Does Iran Have Something in Store?” Lewis claimed: It seems increasingly likely that the Iranians either have or very soon will have nuclear weapons at their disposal, thanks to their own researches (which began some 15 years ago), to some of their obliging neighbors, and to the ever-helpful rulers of North Korea. The language used by Iranian President Ahmadinejad would seem to indicate the reality and indeed the imminence of this threat. Lewis then contended: “There is a radical difference between the Islamic Republic of Iran and other governments with nuclear weapons. This difference is expressed in what can only be described as the apocalyptic worldview of Iran’s present rulers.” According to Lewis, Ahmadinejad believed, as a fanatical Shia Muslim, in “the long awaited return of the Hidden Imam, ending in the final victory of the forces of good over evil.” That is: Mr. Ahmadinejad and his followers clearly believe that this time is now, and that the terminal struggle has already begun and is indeed well advanced. It may even have a date, indicated by several references by the Iranian president to giving his final answer to the U.S. about nuclear development by Aug. 22. This was at first reported as ‘by the end of August,’ but Mr. Ahmadinejad’s statement was more precise. What is the significance of Aug. 22? This year, Aug. 22 corresponds, in the Islamic calendar, to the 27th day of the month of Rajab of the year 1427. This, by tradition, is the night when many Muslims commemorate the night flight of

200 The United States and Iran the prophet Muhammad on the winged horse Buraq, first to ‘the farthest mosque,’ usually identified with Jerusalem, and then to heaven and back (cf Koran XVII.1). Under ordinary circumstances such a tall tale about the significance of Iran’s deadline of August 22—which merely coincided with the end of the month of Mordad in Iran’s official calendar—might not have found its way into the opinion pages of the Wall Street Journal.33 But these were no ordinary times; just about any bizarre story which demonized Iran was acceptable. As negotiations between Ali Larijani and Javier Solana dragged on, it became clearer why Iran had set August 22 as the deadline to announce its official response. The New York Times reported on July 12, 2006 that according to Larijani “Iran would have to wait until various committees studying the proposal had time to finish their work, adding that Iran had the legal right under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to continue enriching uranium.” The report went on to say that “Iranian officials are skeptical that the West will deliver on whatever incentives are agreed upon, particularly light-water nuclear reactors.” The report added that “Mr. Larijani also asked for unambiguous assurances that the world powers were ‘sincere,’ noting that talk about regime change in Iran created an atmosphere of distrust.” Furthermore, the report went on to say, according to Iranian officials “the incentives package came only after Tehran succeeded in running a 164-centrifuge cascade to enrich uranium. To give up their only bargaining chip would be foolish.” Lastly, the report stated, “Ayatollah Khamenei has made clear in high-level meetings that he does not trust the world powers to make good on their promises, according to Iranian officials familiar with the meetings.” “He is,” according to the report, “particularly distrustful of the United States, which he believes is using the talks as a pretext to eventually harm Iran, but has told his nuclear team that in the interest of ‘consensus,’ he would allow them to continue to negotiate, the officials said.”

UN Security Council Resolution 1696 As stated earlier, the Bush Administration joined the EU negotiations expecting that Iran would not accept the preconditions for negotiation and this would lead to rapid imposition of UN sanctions against her. It is therefore understandable that the US was quick in finding Iran’s August 22 deadline for giving its response unacceptable. When informed of Iran’s deadline, according to The New York Times of June 22, 2006, “President Bush responded that it seemed ‘like an awful long time’ to wait for an answer.” Threats of UN sanctions followed thereafter. On July 11, 2006 a Reuters headline read: “The United States led pressure on Tuesday for Iran to face U.N. action after it defied calls for an early response to an offer of incentives aimed at ending a nuclear standoff.” Two days later, according to AP, John Bolton stated that Iran would be given a limited period of time to suspend enrichment. “If Iran fails to comply,” the report went on, “Bolton said economic penalties would be the next step.” On the same day it was reported that agreement has been reached between

On the road to UN sanctions 201 P5+1 to give Iran “days, not weeks, to suspend its nuclear enrichment activities or face a United Nations resolution and sanctions” (St. Petersburg Times (Florida), July 13, 2006). On July 20, 2006 AFP was reporting, once again, the possible passage of a UN Chapter 7 resolution against Iran. According to the report, John Bolton, “who wants to see the resolution passed this week, said: ‘I’m not sure how we’ll do this by Friday. But creative minds might yet find a way through.’” On July 25, 2006, Reuters was quoting Bolton as saying we “made a lot of progress today. This was probably the most productive session. This brings us very close.” “Iran,” the report quoted Bolton, is bound “mandatorily to suspend its uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities.” At the same time, the US, led by Bolton, was preventing the passage of any UN resolution against Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, including Israel’s attack on a UN post. Frustrated by this obstruction, according to Reuters of July 27, 2006 China “warned the United States that its opposition to a statement condemning a deadly attack on a U.N. post in Lebanon could have a ‘negative impact’ on U.N. talks on Iran’s nuclear ambitions.” In the end, both China and Russia caved in. While they still prevented the use of the harsh language that the US wished to include, both China and Russia voted for the July 31, 2006 UN Security Council Resolution 1696.34 “Acting under Article 40 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations in order to make mandatory the suspension required by the IAEA,” the resolution demanded that Iran “suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the IAEA.” The resolution also asked for a report by August 31 “from the Director General of the IAEA primarily on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in this resolution.” Resolution 1696 was adopted by the Security Council 14 to 1.35 The lone negative vote was from Qatar, whose representative stated that “for more than two decades, his region had been surrounded by fires” and that he did not “approve of proceeding with the draft resolution when his region was ‘inflamed.’” Iran’s immediate response came from her UN Ambassador, Javad Zarif, who, according to the above text of the resolution and related statements, stated that “Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme posed no threat to international peace and security” and that dealing with the “issue in the Council was, therefore, unwarranted and void of any legal basis or practical utility.” Subsequent comments by Iranian officials, however, indicated that there was intense discussion among them as to how to react to Resolution 1696. For example, on August 16, 2006 the Iranian Foreign Minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, was quoted by The New York Times as saying that “we are willing to talk about all issues … We can even discuss the issue of suspension, which is not acceptable based on any logic. But the discussions should be serious.” Yet on August 13, 2006 AFP quoted parliamentary speaker Gholam-Ali Hadad-Adel as stating in Iran’s Majles that “Iran doesn’t accept suspending its uranium enrichment … If the result of our being part of international organisations and the IAEA is to be deprived of our absolute right (in nuclear matters), there is no reason for us to continue to be part of such organisations.”

202 The United States and Iran

Iran’s August 22 response to the “carrot and stick” package On August 22, 2006 Iran did issue its official response to the P5+1 package. An unofficial copy of the response, which is over 20 pages long, became available on the internet.36 According to this, Iran pointed out a number of ambiguities in the package. For example, with regard to Iran’s right guaranteed under the NPT, the response stated that the “proposed package is vague on whether recognition of Iran’s right is theoretical or empirical.” Specifically, it stated: Since the enrichment and nuclear fuel cycle for peaceful use is one issue under consideration, the producers of the proposed package should clarify whether they recognize the NPT as the basis for determining the scope of this right. And whether, in their view, fuel cycle activities and in particular enrichment for peaceful use is within that scope or not. Iran’s response also stated that the “proposed package is vague on nuclear cooperation, transfer of nuclear technology, construction of nuclear power plants in Iran and guaranteed supply of required fuel. References are also made, in this response, which imply the intention to restrict nuclear cooperation to specific areas, and this adds to the ambiguity.” Iran, therefore, asked for the removal of these ambiguities through further negotiation and concluded by stating: it needs to be emphasized that despite the contradictory behavior of some countries in proposing the package, and pursuing the unjustifiable act of passing the recent security council resolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran, responding to the proposed package, with its goodwill and intention to provide a reasonable breakthrough, has tried to lay the groundwork for resolving Iran’s nuclear case through a constructive path for negotiations. However, if some of the parties with adventurous inclinations react to Iran’s goodwill with the Security Council instrument, in that case, the positions expressed in this response would be void and the Islamic Republic would choose a different course of action. In its response, Iran made a vague reference to the “suspension of Iran’s dossier in the security council during the negotiation period by the other party, and suspension of enrichment activities by Iran through negotiations.” But there was no mention of a permanent enrichment freeze. Iran’s response was precisely what the US had expected. Also expected was the US reaction. AP reported on August 23, 2006 that according to the White House, Iran’s response “falls short of the conditions set by the Security Council.” Any negotiation was therefore impossible and the threat of sanctions against Iran by US officials continued.

On the road to UN sanctions 203

US response: more sticks On August 23, 2006 Reuters reported that Stuart Levey, Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, was warning the banking community around the world of the “stigma” of working with Iran. The report stated that, according to Levey, banks handling money for Iran will “run the risk of some day being exposed to the same stigma associated with banks linked to Nazi Germany.” Levey was quoted as saying: “What I think we’re likely to see and what I’m going to try to make happen is you’re going to see banks around the world—and you’re already seeing banks around the world—ask themselves the question, ‘Do I want to be Iran’s banker?’” Subsequently, according to AP August 28, 2006, Levey stated: “Iran is like the elephant in the room if you will … they are the central banker of terror. It is a country that has terrorism as a line-item in its budget.” Similar threats came from other neoconservative members of the Bush Administration, such as John Bolton. According to AFP on August 22, 2006, as Iran asked for further negotiations, John Bolton stated: “We will obviously study the Iranian response carefully, but we are also prepared, if it does not meet the terms set, to proceed here in the Security Council … with economic sanctions … I think we will be prepared to submit elements of a resolution in the council very quickly.” On August 26, 2006 the Los Angeles Times reported that according to Bolton, “the United States planned to introduce a resolution imposing penalties such as a travel ban and asset freeze for key Iranian leaders soon after the Aug. 31 deadline,” and if “Russia and China do not accept it, the U.S. is working a parallel diplomatic track outside the U.N.” Bolton was also quoted as saying: “We will continue to enhance PSI [Proliferation Security Initiative] to cut off flows of materials and technology that are useful to Iran’s ballistic missile program and nuclear programs … We will be constraining financial transactions under existing terrorism laws.” It was not just the Bush Administration, particularly its neoconservative elements, who were pushing for more belligerent actions against Iran; the US Congress was doing the same. On August 23, for example, the House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, headed by Peter Hoekstra and Jane Harman, released its “Staff Report” entitled “Recognizing Iran as a Strategic Threat: An Intelligence Challenge for the United States.”37 The cover of the report showed an ominous picture of Ahmadinejad speaking at the conference on “The World without Zionism.” As its title and cover picture implied, the purpose of the report was to show that Iran is a threat to both Israel and the US. Indeed, in the 29page report there were more than 30 instances of the word “threat.” The report started with three quotations attributed to the Iranian president: “The annihilation of the Zionist regime will come … Israel must be wiped off the map … And God willing, with the force of God behind it, we shall soon experience a world without the United States and Zionism;” “They have invented a myth that Jews were massacred and place this above God, religions and the prophets;” and “I officially announce that Iran has joined countries with nuclear technology.” As mentioned in the previous chapter, the first statement attributed to Ahmadinejad was incorrectly translated and by now numerous individuals had pointed out the

204 The United States and Iran mistranslation. The second one, too, as many people pointed out, was a misquotation and taken out of context.38 But the intelligence report did not make any attempt to check the accuracy of these quotations by looking at the original statements in Farsi. Indeed, it provided no sources for the quotations. Worse yet, the intelligence report was filled with numerous inaccuracies, unsubstantiated accusations, and misinformation. For example, the report stated: “Iran’s claim that its nuclear program is for electricity production appears doubtful in light of its large oil and natural gas reserves.” As earlier chapters demonstrated, Iran’s nuclear program started under the Shah, and, at the time, the US not only supported it but helped to push it forward. Obvious inaccuracies in the Hoekstra-Harman intelligence report soon became the subject of ridicule in various online articles. Even the IAEA was apparently troubled by the report. In a letter—a copy of which appeared on the web—Vilmos Cserveny, an IAEA representative, addressed Peter Hoekstra and stated: “I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the Staff Report … contains some erroneous, misleading and unsubstantiated information.”39 Among these, Cserveny noted, was that “Iran is currently enriching uranium to weapons grade using 164machine centrifuge cascades.” This weapons grade claim, Cserveny went on to say, was “incorrect,” since weapons grade implied “uranium enriched to the order of 90% or more in the isotope of uranium-235.” But, Cserveny pointed out, at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant in Natanz, Iran had only reached a “3.6% enrichment level.” Cserveny then called “incorrect and misleading” the Staff Report’s assertion that ElBaradei tried to “remove” a senior safeguard inspector of the IAEA, Chris Charlier, for “allegedly raising concerns about Iranian deception regarding its nuclear program and concluding that the purpose of Iran’s nuclear programme is to construct weapons.” Furthermore, Cserveny stated, “the report contains an outrageous and dishonest suggestion that such removal might have been for ‘not having adhered to an unstated IAEA policy barring IAEA officials from telling the whole truth about the Iranian nuclear program.’”

11 Success at last UN sanctions imposed on Iran

While intelligence reports were being manufactured and war drums beaten, the imposition of UN sanctions against Iran was becoming more and more a reality. On August 31, 2006 the IAEA issued its report on Iran’s compliance with UN Resolution 1696.1 The six-page report summarized its findings by stating that “Iran has been providing the Agency with access to nuclear material and facilities, and has provided the required reports.” Yet, the report went on to say, “Iran has not addressed the long outstanding verification issues or provided the necessary transparency to remove uncertainties associated with some of its activities.” Moreover, “Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities; nor has Iran acted in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol.” Lastly, the report noted that the “Agency will continue to pursue its investigation of all remaining outstanding issues relevant to Iran’s nuclear activities. However, the Agency remains unable to make further progress in its efforts to verify the correctness and completeness of Iran’s declarations with a view to confirming the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.” The immediate reaction of the US to the IAEA report was predictable: the UN must impose sanctions on Iran immediately. On September 1, 2006 Reuters quoted John Bolton as saying on Fox News: “What we’re looking for are sanctions that affect the Iranian nuclear weapons program, their ballistic missile program, target the leadership and the riches that they’ve accumulated.” Similarly, according to AP, September 1, 2006, President Bush stated that “there must be consequences … the world now faces a grave threat from the radical regime in Iran.” According to the same report, however, the European Union stated that it was “too early to punish Tehran for its failure to halt uranium enrichment by the U.N. Security Council’s deadline.” China, France, and Russia resisted the US call for immediate sanctions according to a report in Reuters on September 7, 2006. The report quoted the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang: “China advocates this issue be resolved through negotiation and dialogue in a peaceful way and this position remains unchanged.” According to the same report, “France suggested world powers may be flexible over an earlier demand that Iran suspend its uranium enrichment work before starting talks.” The report quoted Foreign Minister

206 The United States and Iran Philippe Douste-Blazy as saying the “question is to know at what point this suspension takes place in relation to the negotiations.” AP, September 9, 2006, reported similar news: “Recent statements from some government officials suggest that Russia, China and France might be leaning toward dropping the demand that Iran stop enrichment before talks begin, in exchange for a promise to accept such a moratorium at some point in negotiations.” On September 18, 2006, according to AP, President Jacques Chirac himself “proposed a compromise” solution: “He suggested the international community suspend the threat of U.N. sanctions and that Iran, in turn, suspend enrichment while the two sides talk.” As expected, the US accepted no compromise, particularly as Israel pushed for immediate sanctions. AFP quoted Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, on September 18, 2006, as warning that “Iran is just ‘a few months’ from being able to enrich uranium, a key step to building a nuclear bomb.” “The crucial moment is not the day of the bomb,” the report quoted Livni as saying, the “crucial moment is the day in which Iran will master the enrichment, the knowledge of enrichment.” Iran is “not only a threat to Israel,” Livni stated, the “recent understanding, also, of moderate Arab states is that Iran is a threat to the region.” “Livni added that it was ‘time for sanctions’ against Iran,” the report went on. Livni’s comments came amid indirect Israeli military threats against Iran. A report in The Jerusalem Post of September 19, 2006 stated: “Tactical nuclear weapons would be required to penetrate the defenses Iran has constructed around its nuclear facilities, according to Col. (res.) Shlomo Mofaz, an international consultant on terrorism and intelligence and a research fellow at the Institute of Counterterrorism at the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya.”

No compromise, only sanctions The US and Israel’s position did not change even when Iran reportedly expressed willingness to suspend enrichment on a temporary basis. On September 10, 2006 AP stated that according to some “diplomats” close to the IAEA “Iran is ready to consider suspending uranium enrichment for up to two months.” This came amid intense negotiations between Ali Larijani and Javier Solana. Larijani, the report went on to say, “floated the possibility of stopping enrichment activities ‘voluntarily, for one or two months if presented … in such a way that it does it without pressure.’” The news appeared to be credible, since other sources, such as Reuters, September 10, 2006, quoted Solana as saying: “We have made progress and we want to continue in that line and for that purpose we are going to meet again next week. These (talks) have been worth it.” The support for this moratorium even came from Iran’s President, when on September 21, 2006 Reuters reported that, according to Ahmadinejad, “Iran is prepared to negotiate a suspension of its most sensitive nuclear work if it receives fair guarantees in talks with major powers.” Whether Iran actually offered to suspend all its enrichment activities temporarily and whether it asked in return something specific remained unclear. What was clear, however, was that as talks between the EU and Iran continued, threats

Success at last 207 were being made by the US against Iran. On September 10, 2006, the same day that the news of Iran’s offer of suspension of enrichment appeared, Reuters reported that according to Condoleezza Rice it “was ‘quite, quite certain’ that the major UN Security Council members, including Russia and China, will support the sanctions in light of Iran’s refusal to suspend uranium enrichment.” The report quoted her as saying: “There are things that you can do to cut off financing to Iran’s programs, to make clear to Iran that it will not be able to take advantage of the international financial system in the way it needs to be able to use those proceeds from oil.” As Condoleezza Rice was issuing warnings, the Department of the Treasury was trying to cut off Iranian banks from the financial system. For example, AFP reported on September 8, 2006, that the “US Treasury Department announced that it had blacklisted one of Iran’s largest banks, Bank Saderat, from having any links with US-owned banks.” The reason given for this blacklisting was Iran’s alleged “support for terrorism.” The report quoted Stuart Levey as saying “Bank Saderat facilitates Iran’s transfer of hundreds of millions of dollars to Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations each year.” On September 16, 2006 Reuters reported that Levey was “visiting Britain, France, Switzerland and Italy to stress the importance of denying Iran access to the global banking system.” On the same day AFP reported that three “Japanese major banks will refrain from doing business with Iran’s state-run bank in line with US financial sanctions.” The Iranian bank being sanctioned was, of course, Bank Saderat. On September 22, 2007 the opening line of a report in the Christian Science Monitor, read: “American attempts to persuade Europe to think again about financial involvement in Iran may be starting to bear fruit, according to European banking officials.” “Two of Europe’s largest banks,” the report went on to say, “have recently decided to ramp down decisively their involvement in Iran. UBS canceled business with individuals, companies, and banks in the country earlier this year; Credit Suisse is conducting a ‘controlled withdrawal’ by refusing new business.” The report pointed out that the US trying to cut off Iranian banks from the international financial system was due to “lack of speedy progress in the UN toward imposing economic sanctions on Iran over its suspect nuclear program.” This was, of course, not the same reason given earlier for financial sanctions, i.e. Iran’s alleged support for international terrorism. But by now Iran’s “misbehaviors” had become interchangeable. In October, two more European banks joined the Swiss banks in curbing their dealings with Iranian banks and businesses. The two banks, according to The New York Times of October 16, 2006, were HSBC in Britain and ABN Amro in The Netherlands. As the report pointed out, Iran started to react to these financial moves by trying to shift its oil sales transactions away from the dollar and to other currencies. Needless to say, it was not just the US executive branch that was pressing for more sanctions; the legislative branch, too, was busy doing the same. AFP reported on September 28, 2007 that the “House voted Thursday to impose mandatory sanctions on entities that provide goods or services for Iran’s weapons programs. The vote came as U.S. diplomats continued to press the U.N. Security Council to

208 The United States and Iran penalize Tehran if it fails to end its uranium enrichment program.” Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen was leading the sanction bill, stating, according to the report, it “would be a critical mistake to allow a regime with a track record as bloody and as dangerous as Iran to obtain nuclear weapons. … Enough with the carrots. It’s time for the stick.” Representative Tom Lantos was not far behind. He was quoted in the report as saying: “If we fail to use the economic and diplomatic tools available to us, the world will face a nightmare that knows no end.”

On the Israeli front In the month of October 2006 Israel continued its relentless effort to get UN sanctions imposed on Iran. Iran resembling Nazi Germany and Ahmadinejad being a new Hitler were the constant reasons given for imposing such sanctions. For example, on October 23, 2007 AP quoted Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert as saying: “It is inconceivable that … a member of the United Nations continues to be received throughout the world as a legitimate leader while he stands up and says another U.N. member state should be wiped off the map … We shall never repeat the mistakes of 60 years ago, of taking things lightly, ignoring what was being heard then when it was still possible to save lives.” A few days earlier Olmert was making his international rounds trying to assure the imposition of UN sanctions against Iran. AFP reported on October 18, 2007 that Olmert was in the Kremlin seeking “President Vladimir Putin’s support for a tougher stance against Iran’s nuclear programme.” He was quoted as saying: “We are at a critical juncture and the entire international community must join ranks to block Iran’s true intention of arming itself with nuclear weapons … I leave this meeting with the sense that President Putin understands that danger.” Similarly, on October 15, 2007, AFP reported that the Israeli ambassador to the UN, Daniel Gillerman, called for “much harder sanctions to be imposed on a demented Iranian regime that seeks to destroy a UN member state (Israel), and totally denies the Holocaust, while preparing to perpetrate a second Holocaust.” The Israeli analogies between Iran and Nazi Germany and Ahmadinejad and Hitler were so frequent that an internal debate began in Israel about their overuse. On October 10, 2007 Reuters reported on such a debate. The report pointed out that “Israeli leaders have long been quick to liken Middle Eastern foes to Adolf Hitler—Egypt’s late Gamal Abdel Nasser, Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, the Palestinians’ former leader Yasser Arafat, and, currently, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.” But, the report went on to say, “some Israeli historians, military experts and even a government official caution that, by invoking the Holocaust too readily regarding Iran, the country risks a credibility crisis.” These warnings, however, did nothing to diminish the constant use of such analogies by Israeli leaders. Israeli lobby groups also worked relentlessly in October of 2006 to get UN sanctions imposed against Iran. On October 22 and 23 of that year, AIPAC held its “National Summit” in Houston, with its website showing, once again, an

Success at last 209 ominous picture of Ahmadinejad and a banner reading “Israel must be wiped off the map.” The headline read “Israel is still under fire: Now is the time for leadership … Yours.” “Summit Topics” included “Race Against Time: How Close is Iran to Developing Nuclear Weapons?” The confirmed guest list included, as usual, many US and Israeli politicians, such as Former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, Senators John McCain, Christopher Dodd, and Kay Bailey Hutchison, Ambassador John Bolton, and Deputy Assistant to the President Elliott Abrams. Not appearing on the guest list this time was Representative Jane Harman, who, with Peter Hoekstra, had issued the fraudulent intelligence report discussed in the previous chapter. According to Time magazine of October 22, 2006—and subsequently various other sources, including Ha’aretz, The New York Times, and The Washington Post—Harman was being investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Justice Department for “improperly” enlisting the support of AIPAC for getting “Harman reappointed as the top Democrat on the House intelligence committee, according to knowledgeable sources in and out of the U.S. government.” Time reported that “the investigation by Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which has simmered out of sight since about the middle of last year, is examining whether Harman and AIPAC arranged for wealthy supporters to lobby House Democratic leader Nancy Pelosi on Harman’s behalf.” In addition, the report went on to say, “the probe also involves whether, in exchange for the help from AIPAC, Harman agreed to help try to persuade the Administration to go lighter on the AIPAC officials caught up in the ongoing investigation.” This was a reference to the Steve Rosen and Keith Weissman spying case.

Almost there: draft of UN sanctions circulates The campaign by the US and Israel to impose UN sanctions against Iran was beginning to bear fruit. However, the head of the IAEA was still reluctant to go along. According to a report by Reuters on October 22, 2007 ElBaradei “remained unconvinced Iran was developing nuclear weapons.” He was quoted as saying: “Once you start applying penalties, it brings hardliners in the driver’s seat.” He was also quoted by The New York Times of October 24, 2007 as saying: “Penalizing them is not a solution … At the end of the day, we have to bite the bullet and talk to North Korea and Iran.” Similarly, as a sanction resolution was being circulated by the US and its European partners, according to an AP report of October 21, 2006 Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that there “is no proof that Iran is pursuing a military nuclear program. There are suspicions and questions that have not yet been answered.” He was also quoted as saying: “We won’t be able to support and will oppose any attempts to use the Security Council to punish Iran or use Iran’s program in order to promote the ideas of regime change there.” Ten days later, Reuters quoted Lavrov again: “We do not have information that would suggest that Iran is carrying out a non-peaceful (nuclear) program … Sanctions should not be adopted for their own sake.” Yet a few days after this statement was made it

210 The United States and Iran became clear that Russia was caving in under US, Israel, and EU 3 pressure and was going along with UN sanctions. In early November numerous reports appeared concerning a draft resolution circulated by the EU 3 for imposing UN sanctions against Iran.2 According to Reuters, November 6, 2006, the resolution would demand that “all countries prevent the sale and supply of equipment, technology and financing contributing to Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. It also would freeze the assets of people and entities involved in these programs and bar them from traveling.” The US, the report stated, was asking for a much tougher resolution, and John Bolton circulated “a series of amendments, including stronger language on the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear ambitions.” “Conversely,” the report went on to say, Russia, backed by China, proposed amendments that “would soften the sanctions and cut some of them.” Another report by Reuters, November 13, 2007, stated that the European draft “demands nations prevent the sale or supply of any equipment, technology or financing that would contribute to Iran’s nuclear or ballistic missile programs,” while “Russia wants sanctions to focus only on ‘enrichment-related and reprocessing activities,’ heavy-water reactors and the development of ‘nuclear weapon delivery systems.’” Moreover, the report stated, “Moscow’s amendments delete European demands for a freeze of assets abroad and travel bans against individuals, businesses and groups connected with Tehran’s nuclear program.” Furthermore, the report went on to say, the EU 3 “draft exempts from sanctions Russia’s construction of a reactor” in Bushehr but “not the delivery of nuclear fuel to the plant.” “Russia’s amendments,” on the other hand, “crossed out all mention of Bushehr.” According to AP, November 16, 2006, “six rounds of closed-door talks between the Russians and Europeans” had yet to resolve the differences.

War drums beating before the UN resolution Amidst a flurry of discussions over the limits of UN sanctions Israel and its allies kept the pressure on and issued threats. AP reported on November 10, 2006 that Israeli Deputy Defense Minister Ephraim Sneh had indicated that Israel “might be forced to launch a military strike against Iran’s disputed nuclear program.” The report quoted Sneh as saying “I am not advocating an Israeli pre-emptive military action against Iran and I am aware of its possible repercussions … I consider it a last resort. But even the last resort is sometimes the only resort.” A day later, according to AFP, after meeting President Bush at the White House, Olmert stated that he “had a ‘deep conversation’ with Bush and that the two leaders had ‘complete understanding over their objectives’ regarding Iran.” Bush himself was quoted as saying that Iran is “incredibly destabilizing, and obviously very threatening to our strong ally.” On November 15, 2006 AFP quoted the outgoing Israeli Ambassador to the US, Danny Ayalon, as saying in an interview: “US President George W. Bush will not hesitate to use force against Iran in order to halt its nuclear program … I have been privileged to know him well, he will not hesitate to go all the way if there is no choice.”

Success at last 211 On November 16, 2006 Ha’aretz reported that at the annual United Jewish Communities General Assembly in Los Angeles former Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu stated: “It’s 1938 and Iran is Germany. And Iran is racing to arm itself with atomic bombs.” The report went on to say that Netanyahu was “repeating the line several times, like a chorus, during his address.” “Believe him and stop him,” Netanyahu was quoted as saying about Ahmadinejad. “This is what we must do. Everything else pales before this.” He was further quoted as saying that Ahmadinejad “is preparing another Holocaust for the Jewish state.” But that was not all. According to Netanyahu, “Iran is developing ballistic missiles that would reach America, and now they prepare missiles with an adequate range to cover the whole of Europe.” Ha’aretz also stated that earlier, speaking on Army Radio, “Netanyahu hinted that Israel possesses the military capabilities necessary for curbing by itself the Iranian nuclear threat.” On November 20, 2006 AFP reported that Israel’s Foreign Minister, Tzipi Livni, stated at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London that Iran is a “bully of the neighborhood,” a “global threat,” and a “very strong decision by the United Nations Security Council is needed.” The neoconservative allies of Israel in the US also beat the war drums in the month of November. A case in point was Joshua Muravchik, “a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.” On November 19, 2006 he wrote an editorial piece in the Los Angeles Times entitled “WE MUST Bomb Iran.” He started the piece by stating: “It has been four years since that country’s secret nuclear program was brought to light, and the path of diplomacy and sanctions has led nowhere.” After stating that an “Iranian bomb would constitute a dire threat to Israel’s 6 million-plus citizens,” Muravchik concluded: The only way to forestall these frightening developments is by the use of force. Not by invading Iran as we did Iraq, but by an air campaign against Tehran’s nuclear facilities. We have considerable information about these facilities; by some estimates they comprise about 1,500 targets. If we hit a large fraction of them in a bombing campaign that might last from a few days to a couple of weeks, we would inflict severe damage. This would not end Iran’s weapons program, but it would certainly delay it. Threats coming from inside and outside Israel continued throughout the month of December as well, particularly as Israeli politicians made their rounds of the world and asked for tougher sanctions against Iran. In Germany, according to Reuters, December 9, 2007, Ehud Olmert was quoted as saying that as far as the impending UN sanction against Iran was concerned, “I am anything but happy … I expect significantly more dramatic steps to be taken.” According to the same report, when asked if he would not rule out a military strike against Tehran, Olmert replied “I rule nothing out.” A few days later, Olmert was quoted as saying “Iran openly, explicitly and publicly threatens to wipe Israel off the map. Can you say that this is the same level, when they are aspiring to have nuclear weapons, as America, France, Israel, Russia?” (The New York Times, December 12, 2006).

212 The United States and Iran Olmert’s comments were construed as admitting implicitly that Israel has indeed nuclear weapons, an admission that would change the Israeli policy of maintaining nuclear ambiguity. Whether this was a slip or a conscious strategy to frighten Iran remained unclear.3 Such comments and threats were, of course, followed by yet another Israeli prediction about when Iran would have its nuclear bomb. AFP reported on December 18, 2006 that according to the head of Mossad, Meir Dagan, “Iran will have its first atomic bomb within three or four years if its nuclear weapons programme continues to develop at the current pace.”

Resolution 1737, the crown jewel of Iran containment In the month of December, 2007 the US exerted its final push to get UN sanctions imposed on Iran, even though John Bolton, one of the leading neoconservatives in the US Government, was forced to resign as US Ambassador to the UN early in the month. The opening line of The Washington Post on December 1, 2006 stated that, according to Condoleezza Rice, the “United States is willing to risk a breach with Russia if the Russians do not soon sign on to a U.N. Security Council resolution to punish Iran for its nuclear activities.” She was then quoted as saying: “Obviously, we’d like to keep the unity of the P5-plus-one … but unity is not an end in itself. The goal is to get a resolution that makes sense in terms of convincing the Iranians that their behavior is not acceptable in the international community. We have to do something.” The pressure on Russia to go along with sanctions against Iran continued even after the Iraq Study Group—headed by former US Secretary of State James Baker and former Representative Lee Hamilton—recommended that the United States talk directly to Iran and Syria to resolve the situation in Iraq. In the end both Russia and China caved in under the pressure and went along with much of the sanction provisions proposed by the US and EU 3. On December 23, 2006 the Security Council adopted Resolution 1737. 4 The Resolution stated: Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 1.

2.

3.

Affirms that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and to resolve outstanding questions; Decides, in this context, that Iran shall without further delay suspend the following proliferation sensitive nuclear activities: (a) all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the IAEA; and (b) work on all heavy water-related projects, including the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water, also to be verified by the IAEA; Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all

Success at last 213 items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to Iran’s enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. Down the line, and under decision 10, the Resolution called upon all States to exercise vigilance regarding the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals who are engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and decides in this regard that all States shall notify the Committee of the entry into or transit through their territories of the persons designated in the Annex to this resolution. Furthermore, under decision 12, the Resolution “decided” that all States shall freeze the funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories at the date of adoption of this resolution or at any time thereafter, that are owned or controlled by the persons or entities designated in the Annex, as well as those of additional persons or entities designated by the Security Council or by the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems. The “Annex” listed seven Iranians under “Entities involved in the nuclear programme,” three under “Entities involved in the ballistic missile programme,” seven under “Persons involved in the nuclear programme,” four under “Persons involved in the ballistic missile programme” and one under “Persons involved in both the nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.”5 Resolution 1737 also established a sanctions committee to monitor Iran’s compliance and collect information from countries about their trade with Iran. The committee was given the task “to report at least every 90 days to the Security Council on its work and on the implementation of this resolution, with its observations and recommendations.” Moreover, the resolution requested within 60 days a report from the Director General of the IAEA on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in this resolution, as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board and with the other provisions of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration. Should Iran fail to comply, Resolution 1737 stated, the Security Council will adopt “further appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to persuade Iran to comply with this resolution and

214 The United States and Iran the requirements of the IAEA.” Further “decisions will be required should such additional measures be necessary,” the resolution stated. Resolution 1737 was the crown jewel of the US–Israel containment policy. More than a quarter of a century of US unilateral sanctions against Iran, many underwritten by forces close to Israel, had not contained Iran. Thus for many years the US and Israel had tried to impose United Nations sanctions on Iran to contain it. The December 23, 2006 Resolution was the first step in this direction and, in this sense, was a great achievement for both the US and Israel. Indeed, immediately after the passage of the resolution both the US and Israel praised it (AP, December 23, 2006). But Resolution 1737 would not impose on Iran the kind of sanctions that would devastate the Iranian economy, bring about social revolt, drastically weaken Iran’s military capability, and make Iran ripe for an invasion. Tougher sanctions were needed to achieve the desired result. The fact that in 60 days Iran could be reported by the IAEA for non-compliance would ensure the passage of increasingly tougher measures. Iran’s reaction to Resolution 1737 was, for the most part, to make empty threats or simply shrug it off. For example, Iran’s parliament passed a bill a few days after the passage of Resolution 1737 “obliging the government to ‘revise’ the level of its cooperation with the IAEA” (Reuters, December 27, 2006). President Ahmadinejad, on the other hand, was quoted as saying about the UN resolution: “It is a piece of torn paper … by which they aim to scare Iranians” (The Daily Telegraph (Australia), December 26, 2007). In the end, however, neither the empty threats nor the shrugging off produced any positive results for Iran. Even though the Iranian government’s policies, particularly those of Ahmadinejad, came under severe criticism at home, Iran did not quit the NPT, as some had suggested; nor did Iran substantially reduce its cooperation with the IAEA. It is worth mentioning that some individuals who were pushing for UN sanctions had hoped for a stronger reaction by Iran—such as withdrawing from the NPT—which could have resulted in a stronger counter-reaction by the US. On January 5, 2007, in a conference call with members of AIPAC, John Bolton stated: I think the Iranian reaction to the sanctions resolution has been very telling in that respect, although they’ve passed a resolution in parliament to re-evaluate their relationship with the International Atomic Energy Agency, they have not rejected the sanctions resolution, they have not done anything more dramatic, such as withdrawing from the nonproliferation treaty, or throwing out inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which I actually hoped they would do—that that kind of reaction would produce a counter-reaction that actually would be more beneficial to us.6

US provocative acts post-Resolution 1737 Iran’s inaction was followed by even more aggressive and provocative US policy. On January 10, 2007, President Bush addressed the nation on his plan to increase the size of the US force in Iraq. In justifying his plan, Bush argued that

Success at last 215 the “consequences of failure are clear: Radical Islamic extremists would grow in strength and gain new recruits … Iran would be emboldened in its pursuit of nuclear weapons.”7 He then accused Iran of “providing material support for attacks on American troops” and stated: “We will disrupt the attacks on our forces.” Bush stated that he had “ordered the deployment of an additional carrier strike group” in the Persian Gulf and “Patriot air defense systems to reassure our friends and allies.” We “will work with others,” he went on say, “to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear weapons and dominating the region.” One day after President Bush’s address, AFP reported that US troops raided Iran’s consulate in the northern Iraqi city of Arbil and arrested five employees. The report also stated that the US troops took computers and documents in the consulate. On January 11, 2007, according to AFP, Secretary of State Rice stated that the “United States won’t ‘stand idly by’ if Tehran tries to disrupt Washington’s renewed effort to stabilize [Iraq].” According to the same report, Rice did not comment on the arrest of Iranians in Arbil and “declined repeatedly to rule out US military action against Iran.” The seriousness of US accusations, the threatening language, and provocative acts were so ominous that there were widespread speculations about possible US plans to launch a military attack against Iran. Yet in what appeared to be a game of cat and mouse, the US denied that there were any such plans. According to Reuters, January 12, 2007, White House spokesman Tony Snow stated that “he wanted to knock down an ‘urban legend’ that Bush was ‘trying to prepare the way for war with either country [Iran or Syria] and that there were war preparations under way … There are not … What the president was talking about is defending American forces within Iraq.’” Yet even some US Congressional leaders became worried that the Bush Administration might be trying a new military adventure. For example, according to Reuters, January 11, 2007, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Joseph Biden “bluntly told Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice he did not think Bush had the authority to launch attacks to stamp out militant networks in Iran and Syria.” The same report pointed out that Republican Senator Chuck Hagel of Nebraska “also expressed concern about potential future U.S. action in Iran or Syria.” On January 20, 2007 The New York Times stated that Senator John D. Rockefeller IV, the new Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, had “sharply criticized the Bush administration’s increasingly combative stance toward Iran, saying that White House efforts to portray it as a growing threat are uncomfortably reminiscent of rhetoric about Iraq before the American invasion of 2003.” Senator Rockefeller was quoted as saying: “To be quite honest, I’m a little concerned that it’s Iraq again … This whole concept of moving against Iran is bizarre.” The report also pointed out that Rockefeller “believed President Bush was getting poor advice from advisers who argue that an uncompromising stance toward the government in Tehran will serve American interests.” Unlike the prelude to the Iraq invasion, however, some reports published in the US media questioned the accuracy of the Bush Administration’s claim that Iran was behind insurgents’ attacks in Iraq. For example, the Los Angeles Times wrote

216 The United States and Iran on January 23, 2007 that the “evidence of Iranian involvement in Iraq’s troubles is limited. U.S. troops have found mortars and antitank mines with Iranian markings dated 2006 … But there has been little sign of more advanced weaponry crossing the border, and no Iranian agents have been found.” The report then added that for “all the aggressive rhetoric” the Bush Administration “has provided scant evidence to support these claims. Nor have reporters traveling with U.S. troops seen extensive signs of Iranian involvement.” Yet accusations against Iran and provocative acts by the US continued throughout the month of January. On January 26, 2007 The Washington Post stated that the “Bush administration has authorized the U.S. military to kill or capture Iranian operatives inside Iraq as part of an aggressive new strategy to weaken Tehran’s influence across the Middle East and compel it to give up its nuclear program.” The report went on to say that since the previous summer some “senior administration officials decided that a more confrontational approach was necessary, as Iran’s regional influence grew and U.S. efforts to isolate Tehran appeared to be failing.” Moreover, the report stated, US allies were “resisting robust sanctions against the Tehran government.” According to the report, the “decision to use lethal force against Iranians inside Iraq began taking shape last summer, when Israel was at war with Hezbollah in Lebanon.” Senior Bush administration officials, the report stated, “who regularly attend the highest-level counterterrorism meetings agreed that the conflict provided an opening to portray Iran as a nuclear-ambitious link between al-Qaeda, Hezbollah and the death squads in Iraq.” The report also mentioned that one of those senior officials involved in the discussions was Elliott Abrams, a wellknown neoconservative and a convicted Iran-Contra scandal figure (later pardoned), who was appointed in 2005 as Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Global Democracy Strategy.

Thinking beyond Bush and the 2007 Herzliya conference While the Bush Administration was engaged in provocative acts against Iran, Israelis in and out of the government were adding fuel to the fire. In a frank and straightforward opinion piece in Ynet News on December 30, 2006 Oded Tira, a former Israeli Defense Forces chief artillery officer, stated that “President Bush lacks the political power to attack Iran.”8 Thus, he wrote, as “an American strike in Iran is essential for our existence, we must help him pave the way by lobbying the Democratic Party (which is conducting itself foolishly) and US newspaper editors. We need to do this in order to turn the Iranian issue to a bipartisan one and unrelated to the Iraq failure.” He then stated: “We must turn to Hillary Clinton and other potential presidential candidates in the Democratic Party so that they publicly support immediate action by Bush against Iran. We should also approach European countries so that they support American actions in Iran, so that Bush will not be isolated in the international arena again.” Binyamin Netanyahu, too, continued his worldwide campaign of comparing Iran to Nazi Germany and the possibility of another Holocaust. According to AFP, January 25, 2007, in an interview for the BBC, he “called for Iranian President

Success at last 217 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to be put on trial to prevent what he warned could be a new Holocaust by a nuclear-armed Iran.” At home Netanyahu was repeating the same line: “I want to call on the world that didn’t stop the Holocaust last time to stop any attempt this time and what needs to be done is divest genocide” (AP, January 21, 2007). These comments were part of a speech delivered by Netanyahu at the Herzliya annual conference in Israel. The 2007 Herzliya conference is itself worth further mention. The conference, January 21 to 24, represented the Who’s Who of US–Israeli government officials, US presidential hopefuls, neoconservatives of various sorts, and some academics.9 The major theme of almost all speeches was the alleged Iranian threat. The headline of The Jerusalem Post of January 25, 2007 summed it up best: “Herzliya Conference: In a Word: Iran.” The historian Bernard Lewis stated that the “second Iranian revolution occurring now” is a “major threat to the Middle East Sunni countries,” and that Ahmadinejad, who “truly believes in the apocalyptic message,” is “very dangerous.” Richard Perle spoke of the danger of “waiting too long to take action” against Iran. He also argued for the need to “change regime internally” and contended that if “the Israeli government comes to the conclusion that it has no choice but to take action [against Iran], the reaction of the U.S. will be the belief in the vitality that this action must succeed.” At the same conference, the Democratic presidential hopeful and former Senator John Edwards stated that Iran is at “the top” of the “threat to the world and Israel” and that “we need to keep ALL options on the table,” a statement that he repeated for emphasis. The Republican candidate and former Governor of Massachusetts Mitt Romney stated that the “heart of the Jihadist threat is Iran” and that “Iran’s leaders and ambitions represent the greatest threat the world has seen since Communism and Nazism.” “Iran,” Romney said, “must be stopped and it can be stopped” and “Iran needs to understand that a military option remains on the table.” The US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Nicholas Burns, stated that the “United States does not seek confrontation with Iran; however the US has left all of the options on the table.” He concluded by saying that we “are committed to our alliance with Israel. We continue to be Israel’s strongest security partner. … The USA and Israel have similar strategic interests.” Shaul Mofaz, Israel’s Deputy Prime Minister and former Defense Minister, stated that when it comes to Iran strong “words are not enough and we are called to take action. … 2007 is a decisive year.” Prime Minister Ehud Olmert devoted his entire address to “a report of the state of the Iranian threat.” After a litany of charges, from the Iranian “efforts to acquire nuclear weapons,” to “support of Palestinian terror,” “assistance of terror in Iraq,” etc. he spoke of UN Resolution 1737 against Iran and how “[w]e know that our efforts contributed greatly to the result.” Yet, he argued, “Israel is not spearheading the struggle against the Iranian threat.” “This threat,” he went on to say, “must be dealt with seriously and responsibly, first and foremost by the major powers and by other key nations.” The speeches at the Herzliya conference were indicative of the hysteria that was being generated about Iran’s alleged threat to Israel and the world at large.

218 The United States and Iran

War or no war? By February of 2007 the US government was still sending out contradictory messages concerning its military intentions toward Iran. On the one hand, it kept up its provocative and potentially explosive acts, and, on the other, it denied planning a war. On February 2, 2007 Reuters reported Defense Secretary Robert Gates as saying: “The president has made clear, the secretary of state has made clear, I’ve made clear … we are not planning for a war with Iran … What we are trying to do is, in Iraq, counter what the Iranians are doing to our soldiers, their involvement and activities, particularly these explosively-formed projectiles (EFPs) that are killing our troops.” This assertion concerning Iranian mischief was made repeatedly in early February, and the US government promised to present concrete evidence for it. Yet the presentation was postponed a number of times. As the Christian Science Monitor reported on February 6, 2007, when Stephen Hadley, President Bush’s National Security Advisor, was asked why there had been so many postponements, he answered “the truth is, quite frankly, we thought the briefing overstated, and we sent it back to get it narrowed and focused on the facts.” Two days later, AFP reported that in a Congressional hearing Condoleezza Rice was grilled by Congressman Ron Paul about the US policy toward Iran and its similarity to Iraq policy. Paul accused the Bush Administration of “unproven accusations of Iranian support for the Iraqi insurgency” and “escalating our sharp rhetoric toward Iran.” “Pressed for proof of dramatic claims of Iranian involvement in Iraq,” Paul said, “the administration keeps promising that they are compiling it.” “This sounds like Iraq,” the Congressman stated, “where accusations came first and proof was supposed to come later—only that proof never came because the accusations turned out to be false.” To all this, Secretary Rice gave an ambiguous answer: “We are not planning or intending an attack on Iran. … What we are doing is that we are responding to a number of Iranian policies both in Iran and around the world that are actually quite dangerous for our national security.” A few days later, cold water was poured on the US allegations against Iran. On February 13, 2007 AP reported that General “Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, called into question assertions by three senior U.S. military officials in Baghdad on Sunday who said the highest levels of Iranian government were responsible for arming Shiite militants in Iraq with the bombs, blamed for the deaths of more than 170 troops in the U.S.-led coalition.” The report quoted General Pace as saying that even if some explosive devices were made in Iran it “does not translate that the Iranian government per se, for sure, is directly involved in doing this.” In early February President Bush himself played down the talk of a US military attack on Iran. In an interview with C-SPAN, he dismissed all such talks as political “noise” by his critics (AFP, February 12, 2007). In the same interview Bush showed much confusion when he said that the “Iranian people are good, honest, decent people and they’ve got a government that is belligerent, loud, noisy, threatening—a government which is in defiance of the rest of the world and says, ‘We want a nuclear weapon.’” As many commentators pointed out afterwards, the

Success at last 219 Iranian government had never said such a thing. Subsequently, on February 14, 2007, Reuters reported that in his press conference Bush “backed away from a U.S. claim that Iran’s leaders directed an effort to give bomb devices to Iraqi militants and said he was not using the charges as a pretext for a war with Iran.” The press conference, once gain, showed how confused President Bush was about the Iran case. For example, as the transcript shows, at one point he stated that we have to convince “the Iranians to get rid of its nuclear weapons,” as if Iran actually had nuclear weapons.10 The Bush Administration’s denials of the intention to go to war with Iran did not appear to be quite convincing, even to some members of the US Congress. For example, according to AP, February 15, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi stated that she accepted President Bush’s denial, but, she went on to say, “I do believe that Congress should assert itself, though, and make it very clear that there is no previous authority for the president, any president, to go into Iran.” She also stated, according to the report, that she would fully support a measure that would “prohibit any military action against Iran without specific congressional approval.” The Bush Administration, however, continued taunting Iran throughout the month of February. On February 6, 2007, for example, AP reported that according to an Iraqi government official, Jalal Sharafi, the second secretary at the Iranian Embassy in Baghdad, had been abducted by “an Iraqi army unit that reports directly to the U.S. military.” The report went on to say that the Iranian government condemned the seizure and stated that “Iran holds American forces in Iraq responsible for the safety and life of the Iranian diplomat.” Soon afterwards it was reported that the US was increasing its fleet of aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf. On February 22, 2007 AP reported that the “carrier USS John C. Stennis—backed by a strike group with more than 6,500 sailors and Marines and with additional minesweeping ships—arrived in the [Persian Gulf] region.” The report went on to say that Stennis “joined the carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower after President Bush ordered the buildup as a show of strength to Iran.” On February 23, the International Herald Tribune reported that “Patriot missile batteries capable of striking down ballistic missiles have been readied in several Gulf countries, including Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Qatar.”11 In a lengthy article entitled “Blowup? America’s Hidden War With Iran,” published on February 19, 2007, Newsweek mentioned some of these provocative and ominous acts and quoted Hillary Mann, the administration’s former National Security Council Director for Iran and Persian Gulf Affairs, as saying: “They intend to be as provocative as possible and make the Iranians do something [America] would be forced to retaliate for.” The aggressive US acts were accompanied by many rumors about the US and Israel’s impending attack on Iran. On February 20, 2007 the BBC reported that the “US insists it is not planning to attack, and is trying to persuade Tehran to stop uranium enrichment. … But diplomatic sources have told the BBC that as a fallback plan, senior officials at Central Command in Florida have already selected their target sets inside Iran.” According to the report, the targets included Iranian air bases, naval bases, missile facilities, and command-and-control centers, and the

220 The United States and Iran attack would involve “‘bunker-busting’ bombs in an effort to penetrate the Natanz site.” On February 24, 2007 the Daily Telegraph reported that “Israel is negotiating with the United States for permission to fly over Iraq as part of a plan to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities.” The report stated that according to a senior Israeli defense official, “negotiations were now underway between the two countries for the US-led coalition in Iraq to provide an ‘air corridor’ in the event of the Israeli government deciding on unilateral military action to prevent Teheran developing nuclear weapons.”12 The Bush Administration’s aggressive acts made the rumors of an impending US or Israeli attack on Iran appear rather more credible, even if the rumors were mostly part of the psychological warfare intended to bring about harsher UN sanctions against Iran. The plan for such sanctions was already underway, since it was clear that Iran would not accept the terms of UN Resolution 1737.

Another IAEA report, fabricated US intelligence, and the laptop story The 60-day deadline of Resolution 1737 came to an end on February 22, 2007, and the Director General of the IAEA issued its report.13 As expected, the report indicated that Iran was not complying with the mandates of the resolution. In particular, it stated that “Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities.” Interestingly enough, the Director General’s report came a few days after he stated, once again, that sanctions would not stop Iran’s nuclear enrichment and the issue at hand was political. On February 19, 2007 Reuters reported ElBaradei as saying: “The Iran issue is not going to be resolved through sanctions alone. You need to reach out to the country and bring them to engagement. You need to get that process going.” He was further quoted as saying: “Iran feels insecure. They live in a neighborhood which is not the most friendly … There are grievances between Iran and the West. You have got to address the security issue.” A few days after ElBaradei’s report there were further revelations about the false intelligence that the US had been giving to the IAEA and the contents of the mysterious laptop that was discussed in Chapter 9. On February 22, 2007 the Guardian reported that, according to “informed sources” at the IAEA, “most of the tip-offs about supposed secret weapons sites provided by the CIA and other US intelligence agencies have led to dead ends when investigated by IAEA inspectors.” The report quoted an IAEA “diplomat” as saying: “Most of it has turned out to be incorrect. … They gave us a paper with a list of sites. [The inspectors] did some follow-up, they went to some military sites, but there was no sign of [banned nuclear] activities.” The report then referred to the mysterious “stolen laptop” that the US had in its possession and supposedly showed Iran’s “plans to build a nuclear warhead.” As the report pointed out and as discussed in previous chapters, in “July 2005, US intelligence officials showed printed versions of the material to IAEA officials, who judged it to be sufficiently specific to confront Iran.” But the report pointed out that IAEA officials doubted the authenticity of the laptop. “First of all,” the

Success at last 221 Guardian quoted one such official as saying, “if you have a clandestine programme, you don’t put it on laptops which can walk away … [Moreover, the] data is all in English which may be reasonable for some of the technical matters, but at some point you’d have thought there would be at least some notes in Farsi. So there is some doubt over the provenance of the computer.” A similar report appeared on February 25, 2007 in the Los Angeles Times under the heading “U.N. Calls U.S. Data on Iran’s Nuclear Aims Unreliable.” The report quoted a “senior diplomat at the IAEA” as saying: “Since 2002, pretty much all the intelligence that’s come to us [by way of the CIA and other Western spy services] has proved to be wrong.” This report, too, pointed out that some IAEA officials doubted the authenticity of the laptop story.

The US pushing for a second set of UN sanctions The IAEA Director General’s report had hardly arrived when the US threat of more UN sanctions was announced. Reuters reported on February 22, 2007 that Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns stated that there would be a meeting of P5+1 in London to impose more UN sanctions against Iran. The report quoted him as saying: “We expect to see Iran repudiated again by the Security Council.” Once more, the US cajoled and arm-twisted other members of the Security Council to impose the harshest possible punishment on Iran, even if they did not believe that Iran posed a threat to Israel and beyond. For example, France’s President Jacques Chirac expressed doubt about such a threat when, according to The New York Times of February 1, 2007, he stated: “Where would Iran drop this bomb? On Israel? … It would not have gone off 200 meters into the atmosphere before Tehran would be razed to the ground.” Russia, too, did not seem to believe that Iran was a threat to anyone and continued to argue that the issue was political in nature. On February 1, 2007 AFP reported that “Russian President Vladimir Putin has voiced support for a proposal by the UN nuclear watchdog for a timeout in the international row over Iran’s nuclear programme and said Moscow was committed to cooperation with the Islamic state.” He was quoted as saying Iran “has a right to access modern technology, including nuclear technology. The point is to find an option … that fully guarantees Iran access but also allays the concerns of the international community. Such an option exists. Mr ElBaradei has proposed this.” Subsequently, Russia expressed its concern about a possible US military attack on Iran. On February 26, 2007 AFP quoted Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov as saying: “We are worried that the forecasts and suppositions of a possible attack on Iran have become more frequent.” Two days later, he was quoted by AP: “We are concerned about the possibility of a military scenario … We are observing a U.S. military buildup in the Persian Gulf. Such a buildup of forces always threatens to trigger a military conflict, even by accident.” Russia, however, was clearly under pressure from the US to go along with more UN sanctions and even stop its work at Bushehr. On February 19 AP reported that the “launch of a Russian-built nuclear power plant in Iran could be delayed

222 The United States and Iran because Iran has fallen behind in payments, Russian officials said.” As the report stated, Russia had earlier agreed to ship nuclear fuel to Bushehr by March 2007 and launch the facility in September. Yet, as the report pointed out, after receiving “$900 million for the plant’s construction,” the Russians claimed that Iran was late in further payments, a claim that “Mohammad Saeedi, the deputy head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, denied.” What the report failed to point out was that according to the 1995 agreement between Iran and Russia, the nuclear facility at Bushehr was supposed to cost $800 million and be completed in four years. Russia was clearly dragging its feet. The reason, as became clearer in the month of March, was mostly US and Israeli pressure.

Israel, another AIPAC conference, and the second set of UN sanctions The stage was set for another UN resolution against Iran. But prior to the resolution Israel and its lobby groups launched another massive campaign to impose the harshest possible punishment on Iran. AFP, March 12, 2007, reported that Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni stated in Washington that “UN sanctions were having an impact on Iran, and urged that they be ‘strengthened and extended without delay.’” “The international community,” Livni was quoted as saying at a meeting of AIPAC in Washington, “must not close its eyes.” As the report correctly pointed out, “Livni’s comments came as the United Nations’ five security council permanent members and Germany in New York mull a draft resolution to tighten sanctions against Iran for its controversial nuclear fuel work.” Two days later, i.e. on March 14, 2007, AP reported that Livni and “Defense Minister Amir Peretz discussed Iran and other challenges Israel is facing with Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon during a nearly hour-long meeting.” Livni was quoted as saying: We expect the Security Council to take another resolution and to expand and to strengthen the sanctions on Iran because the world cannot live with a nuclear Iran. … This is clear—and it is clear that their goal is to pursue a nuclear weapon. … Time is of the essence because while we are talking, they are working … to master the technology and to achieve this goal. So we have to stop it. As the Israeli leaders were making their rounds of the US, they were also attending another AIPAC “Annual Policy Conference.” On its website, AIPAC declared the conference, March 11–13, to be the “largest policy conference ever.” Indeed, as various sources, including The Jewish Daily Forward of March 16, 2007, reported, the delegates were estimated to number 6,000. The list of “major” speakers was, as usual, a Who’s Who of Israeli and American political figures. Livni, Peretz, and Netanyahu, of course, were among the many Israeli participants. But at the top of the list were the leaders of Democratic and Republican circles: Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, House Republican Leader John Boehner, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, Senate Republican Leader Mitch McConnell.

Success at last 223 The top leadership was then followed by the two Representatives who specialize in containing Iran: House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Tom Lantos and House Foreign Affairs Committee Ranking Member Ileana Ros-Lehtinen. In addition to the above, Ehud Olmert, via video link from Jerusalem, and Dick Cheney, in person, also spoke. The topic of Iran was, as usual, at the top of the AIPAC conference agenda. Cheney, in particular, used the issue of Iran to defend the Administration’s Iraq policy, arguing that the US withdrawing “before Iraqis could defend themselves” would result in “growing Iranian influence, widening the conflict into a regional war.”14 Olmert held a similar position, contending that withdrawing from Iraq would “harm Israel and efforts against Iran” (The Jerusalem Post, March 14, 2007). Olmert’s support for the Administration’s Iraq policy, however, ran contrary to Nancy Pelosi’s position, which advocated disengagement from Iraq. As many sources, including The Jewish Daily Forward of March 16, 2007, pointed out, Pelosi’s criticism of the Iraq war resulted in some boos from AIPAC delegates. But if there were disagreements between the Democratic leadership on the one side and Israel and the Bush Administration on the other, there was little disagreement over Iran. In her speech, Pelosi recalled that “[t]wo years ago I came before you as leader and said the greatest threat to Israel’s right to exist now comes from Iran. For too long leaders of both political parties in the United States have not done nearly enough to confront the threat of Iran.”15 “You,” she told the AIPAC audience, “were early to see the danger that Iran posed to the world.” After making a number of such comments about Iran in the span of a five-and-a-halfpage speech, Pelosi stated “I salute you for your advocacy for a strong Iran Sanctions Bill, which I know you’ll be advocating for today.” As a number of sources keen on Israeli lobby groups pointed out, after the AIPAC meeting Pelosi stripped out of the funding bill for Iraq a provision that would have required President Bush to seek congressional approval before launching any military action against Iran. JTA (Jewish Telegraphic Agency), for example, stated on March 16, 2007 that “AIPAC lobbying helped remove a provision from a bill that would have required President Bush to seek congressional approval for war against Iran.” According to JTA, a “number of congressional sources confirmed that the American Israel Public Affairs Committee backed dropping the provision from the Iraq war spending bill introduced Tuesday by Democrats.” AP, March 12, 2007, also stated that Pelosi and other members of the Democratic leadership backed away from their demand with regard to Iran after some Democrats “concerned about the possible impact on Israel had argued for the change in strategy.” One of the Democrats mentioned was Representative Gary Ackerman. In the report he was quoted as saying “I didn’t think it was a very wise idea to take things off the table if you’re trying to get people to modify their behavior and normalize it in a civilized way.”16 Israel and its allies in the US, including AIPAC, not only ensured the ability of the Bush Administration to threaten Iran with a military strike, but they secured more sanctions against Iran by the US and the UN Security Council. Binyamin Netanyahu, in particular, was quite instrumental in bringing about new sanctions.

224 The United States and Iran In his six-and-a-half-page speech at the AIPAC Conference on March 12, 2007, Netanyahu mentioned Iran and Iranians 34 times and spoke about a policy that he had been advocating for some time, divesting from pension funds that indirectly invest in Iran. He stated: Our opportunity is to target the 300 or so publicly traded companies that are investing in Iran. You know who else is investing in Iran? You; each of you is probably investing in Iran. Now you don’t know that you’re investing in Iran, but you are. You have pension funds; you have mutual funds? Those funds do not invest in American companies that operate in Iran because that’s forbidden by law, but they’re not forbidden by law to put their money—to put your money in those 300 corporations that are now being the—I would say they’re the mainstay and supporter of the Iranian economy.17 He then told his audience to talk to a “State Treasurer,” a “Governor,” and “the State Assembly person and tell them that it’s unconscionable that Americans would be funding a regime that says America and Israel should not exist.” Netanyahu, himself, had been very successful doing just that. On February 28, 2007 the Financial Times reported that Netanyahu “had already had talks with US politicians, including Arnold Schwarzenegger, the governor of California, calling for a policy of disinvestment.” Policies similar to what Netanyahu was advocating were also being pursued by Representatives Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Tom Lantos. For example, AFP reported on March 6, 2007, “Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, introduced legislation Tuesday that would require that US government pension plans and mutual funds to sell any investments in companies with ties to Iran’s energy sector.” Similarly, the report mentioned that her Democratic counterpart Lantos was introducing a legislation that would, in Lantos’ own words, “increase exponentially the economic pressure on Iran.” The Iran sanctions frenzy was augmented by the US Department of the Treasury under the direction of Stuart Levey. On March 7, 2007 Reuters reported that Levey, who was in Dubai, “urged Middle East-based companies not to do business with Iran, saying they could be helping to fund terrorist activities or weapons proliferation.” “Corporations,” Levey was quoted as saying, “are in the process of reconsidering their investments in Iran because they do not want revenue generated from their projects diverted toward threatening and destabilizing policies such as illicit weapons proliferation and terrorism.” In a congressional hearing on March 21, 2007 AP quoted Levey as saying that Iran operates as the “central banker of terror.” According to the report, Levey also stated that “the U.S. government wants to put as much pressure as it can on Iran.” However, he went on to say, the “US must also be mindful that administering financial sanctions against companies in Europe or other countries that are allies with the United States could prompt a ‘backlash’ that could harm the international coalition that has formed against Iran.” As a result, Levey stated, the US is “relying more and more on ‘targeted’ measures directed at specific individuals, key members of the government, front companies and financial institutions.”

Success at last 225

Success again: UN Resolution 1747 The US and Israel were, of course, not limiting their efforts to imposing more US unilateral sanctions on Iran; they were working simultaneously on the second set of UN sanctions against Iran. Their attempt to inflict maximum punishment on Iran, once again, met some resistance from China and Russia, as well as South Africa, which was holding the rotating presidency of the UN Security Council for the month of March. AFP reported on March 9, 2007 that the text of the draft resolution, which it had obtained in advance, stipulated that “Iran shall not export any arms or related material and further decides that all states shall prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft.” The report also stated that the proposed resolution banned “new commitments for grants, loans and credits to the (Iranian) government and state-owned institutions, except for projects for a primarily humanitarian purpose.” China, according to the report, expressed reservations about this point. In addition, the report stated, “China and Russia also voiced reservations about another paragraph urging ‘vigilance and restraint’ in government financial aid for trade with Iran.” Furthermore, according to the report, the “two countries also had concerns about a proposal to extend an assets freeze to ‘entities, owned or controlled by the Iranian Revolutionary Corps (IRGC)’ and take measures to prevent ‘all transactions or the provision of any technical assistance, training or financial assistance’ to entities involved in Iran’s nuclear and missile programs.” Three days later, that is, on March 12, 2007, Reuters reported that because of resistance from China and Russia “a mandatory travel embargo on a list of Iranian officials had been dropped, although attempts were being made to tighten a voluntary travel ban endorsed previously.” Two days later, AP reported that P5+1 had agreed on a new package of sanctions against Iran, and the resolution would soon reach the Security Council. According to the report, China’s UN Ambassador stated that “he wasn’t happy with the list of additional individuals and entities that would be subject to sanctions, but he added: ‘I think one has to reach agreement, so there has to be a package.’” South Africa, however, stood in the way of a rapid passage of the resolution against Iran. According to AFP, March 15, 2007, the South African UN Ambassador, who was chairing the UN Security Council in March, stated: “We want a political solution to this matter. … So we will read this document looking to language that opens the door for political negotiations.” Four days later AP reported that South Africa had called for a “90-day ‘time out’ on sanctions against Iran and said a resolution drafted by six world powers should drop an embargo on arms exports and financial sanctions targeting Iran’s Revolutionary Guards and an Iranian bank.” The proposal was immediately ruled out by the US, France, and Britain. Resolution 1747, the second set of UN sanctions against Iran, was passed unanimously on March 24, 2007. As The Washington Post reported on the same day, resistance from South Africa, as well as Qatar and Indonesia, was overcome by “adding provisions that highlight the importance of a nuclear-free zone in the

226 The United States and Iran Middle East and the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency” in resolving the nuclear dispute with Iran. The resolution came amid two disputes: (1) Iran’s arrest of 15 British sailors who Iran claimed had entered its territorial waters illegally; and (2) President Ahmadinejad’s attempt to appear before the UN Security Council prior to its deliberations, an attempt that, according to Iran, was thwarted by the US delay in issuing a visa. Resolution 1747 reaffirmed previous resolutions, particularly 1737, and added a number of new penalties against Iran.18 It called upon all States “to exercise vigilance and restraint regarding the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals who are engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.” Annex I of the resolution listed the names of such individuals, eight new “Persons involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities” and seven “Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps key persons.” States were asked to notify the “Committee,” established under Resolution 1737, of the entry into, or transit through, their territories of these individuals. In addition, Annex I added the names of ten new Iranian “entities involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities” and three “Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps entities” whose funds or assets shall be frozen. Among these was Bank Sepah, one of the largest banks of Iran. Resolution 1747 also “decided” that “Iran shall not supply, sell or transfer directly or indirectly from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft any arms or related materiel.” In addition it called upon all States to exercise vigilance and restraint in the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems. Furthermore, the resolution asked “all States and international financial institutions not to enter into new commitments for grants, financial assistance, and concessional loans, to the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, except for humanitarian and developmental purposes.” Once again, the resolution asked the Director General of the IAEA to prepare a report within 60 days as to whether Iran had complied with the demands of Resolutions 1737 and 1747. As before, many Iranian officials were dismissive of the new set of sanctions. On March 13, 2007 AFP stated that Iran “shrugged off the threat of further UN sanctions over its nuclear programme, saying more punitive action would hurt neither the controversial atomic drive nor the country’s economy.” It then quoted a government official as saying that the “adoption of another resolution is unwelcome but is not worrying. … It will not affect our work and will not concern our people.” The report also stated that President Ahmadinejad has “angrily brushed off warnings from within Iran that a second Security Council resolution against Tehran would put the country in an increasingly risky situation.” He was quoted as saying: “Those who say that this country is in a critical situation just think they are

Success at last 227 politicians. … Which part of our country is in a critical condition?” Yet the new set of sanctions did put Iran in a risky situation. A case in point is Bank Sepah. The US government had been trying to paralyze this bank for a long time. On January 9, 2007 Stuart Levey used UN Resolution 1737 as a justification for designating “Bank Sepah, the fifth largest Iranian state-owned bank, as a supporter of WMD proliferation.”19 Levey was, of course, jumping the gun, since Resolution 1737 said nothing about Bank Sepah. But if the earlier resolution did not sanction Bank Sepah, the new resolution did. Other elements of Resolution 1747 were also troubling. For example, the call on all governments and financial institutions not to make any new commitments of grants, financial assistance, or concessional loans to the Iranian government was detrimental to Iran’s economy. No less detrimental was a ban on Iranian arms exports. Given the often imprecise language of the resolution, these bans, credit controls, and freezes could give the US and Israel plenty of ammunition to contain Iran in the future. The new UN sanctions also seemed to put on hold indefinitely the construction of Bushehr power plant by the Russians. As mentioned earlier, in February 2007 Russia started to claim that fuel for the project could not be delivered in March, since Iran had fallen behind in its payments, a claim that was denied by Iran. The skirmish between the two countries continued. On March 11, 2007 AFP reported that according to Iran, Moscow was yielding to US pressure to halt the work on Bushehr. The report quoted Gholam Reza Aghazadeh, the head of Iran’s atomic energy agency, as saying: “Today our nuclear question has become politicised. The start-up of Bushehr has had its delays and we hope that in the current situation the Russians will not politicise this question.” On March 14, 2007 AP reported that the US Deputy Energy Secretary Clay Sell, who was in Moscow, stated that “he and Russian officials discussed the Bushehr issue this week, adding that Washington and Moscow share similar concerns about the Iranian nuclear program in general.” On March 19, 2007 The New York Times reported that “Russia has informed Iran that it will withhold nuclear fuel for Iran’s nearly completed Bushehr power plant unless Iran suspends its uranium enrichment as demanded by the United Nations Security Council.” A day later, AFP stated that the Russian Ambassador to the UN, Vitaly Churkin, told reporters “I can tell you that the report is not accurate, that there has been no Russian ultimatum to Iran of any kind.” Yet on March 20, 2007 AP reported that “Russia is bringing home its technicians and engineers from Iran’s unfinished nuclear reactor site at a time of growing international pressure on Tehran to curb its atomic ambitions.” Two days later, Reuters reported that the US was “stressing the importance of Russian pressure on Iran to suspend uranium enrichment.” The same report stated that “Nicholas Burns, the U.S. undersecretary of state, praised Russia for putting its own pressure on Iran.” According to the report, Burns “told a congressional committee that Russia’s recent decision to delay delivering fuel for an Iranian nuclear reactor it is constructing was significant and showed Moscow would no longer do ‘business as usual’ with Tehran because of proliferation concerns.” Burns, the report went on to say, “cited the

228 The United States and Iran Russian position as evidence that Washington’s diplomatic effort to isolate Tehran was making progress.” All such reports seemed to indicate that Russia and the US had reached some sort of agreement concerning Bushehr nuclear power plant prior to Resolution 1747, and that this resolution would fortify the indefinite postponement of launching the power plant. Iran, of course, saw the Russian act as perfect proof that it could not rely on nuclear fuel supplies from outside. Russian behavior, an Iranian law-maker stated, “strengthened Iran’s determination to obtain the full technology to build nuclear power plants and end its dependence,” according to AP, March 17, 2007. In the final analysis, UN Resolutions 1737 and 1747, contrary to some Iranian officials’ denials, put tremendous pressure on Iran economically and politically. Worse yet, these resolutions set the stage for further and harsher acts to follow. In addition, Iran’s defiance of UN resolutions put her in a precarious position, where at some future point such defiance could be used as an excuse to launch military attacks against her. This was a tremendous victory for the US and Israel. After decades of trying to contain Iran by fueling and lengthening the Iran–Iraq war, imposing unilateral US sanctions against Iran, demonizing Iran as a threat to Israel and beyond, the US and Israel had achieved what they had worked for slowly and meticulously, the imposition of UN sanctions against Iran. Like Iraq in the 1990s, Iran was now becoming ripe for the ultimate containment.

12 Conclusions

The policy of dual containment of Iran and Iraq has been in existence for over a quarter of a century. Yet it is unclear what this policy is trying to accomplish, where it is going, and how long it will last. As stated in the Introduction, and shown throughout the book, the policy has meant different things to different people. In 1980, when the Carter Administration apparently gave the green light to Saddam Hussein to invade Iran, the policy, for the most part, was aimed at releasing US hostages and helping to overthrow the Islamic government. In the 1980s the policy of dual containment, as articulated by a number of Reagan Administration officials, evolved into making sure that neither Iran nor Iraq would win the war. This was accomplished by the US providing intelligence to both sides, but mostly to Saddam Hussein. The Reagan Administration closed its eyes to Hussein’s use of chemical weapons in the war and even supplied Iraq with chemical agents needed to produce such weapons. Ultimately, the US engaged Iran directly in the war when it became clear that Hussein might be defeated. The result of all this was a horrific eight-year war that costs the lives of an estimated one million Iranians and Iraqis and left the economies of both countries in ruins. The same policy was pursued by Israel. As Shlaim (2000: 441) argued, “the Israelis would have liked both sides to lose this war. The second-best scenario was for Iran and Iraq to demolish one another in a long, drawn-out war of attrition.” Thus, in the 1980s, for both the US and Israel dual containment meant helping Iran and Iraq destroy one another in a costly and protracted war. The only difference in policy was that while the US wished to see Iran demolished first, Israel hoped for the opposite. After the war, and particularly during the Clinton Administration, the concept of dual containment became a matter of imposing US sanctions against Iran and UN sanctions against Iraq. In the latter case, the US also used limited military actions. In the former, numerous unilateral sanctions were imposed and, progressively, these sanctions became harsher. It was hoped in this period that economic hardship in these countries would bring about popular revolts, which would, in turn, result in the overthrow of the two governments in favor of US–Israeli friendly regimes. Dual containment therefore became synonymous primarily with economic deprivation. Of course, in terms of human suffering, the cost of this economic deprivation was much higher in Iraq than Iran. For

230 The United States and Iran example, it is estimated that half a million children died in Iraq as a result of sanctions (Guardian, March 4, 2000).1 There were, however, those in the 1990s whose vision of containment of Iran and Iraq went beyond waiting for the economic siege to bear fruit. For these people, dual containment meant a military attack by the US against Iraq and, down the road, against Iran and other adversaries of Israel. This was the view of the Israeli Likud Party and many of their neoconservative counterparts in the US. Such views did not dominate US foreign policy in the 1990s. They did so, however, when George W. Bush was elected. Post-September 11, 2001 the neoconservatives pushed for and achieved the invasion and occupation of Iraq, knowing full well that such a military adventure would not be the promised “cakewalk.” The result was the tragedy that has unfolded: death, destruction, and mayhem in Iraq. Once the neoconservatives achieved their goal, they mostly walked away from the Iraq tragedy and concentrated on Iran. Some are pleading for the US to bomb Iran. For example, in his “The Case for Bombing Iran: I Hope and Pray that President Bush Will Do It” in the Wall Street Journal on May 30, 2007 the influential neoconservative Norman Podhoretz, editor of Commentary magazine, advocated “a bombing campaign” against Iran that “would without question set back its nuclear program for years to come, and might even lead to the overthrow of the mullahs.” For these neoconservatives and their counterparts in Israel dual containment seems to mean the destruction of those forces that stand in the way of Israel. This harks back to the Iran–Iraq war. Then it was hoped that the two countries would demolish one another. Now it is hoped that US bombs would do the job. In the final analysis what the policy of dual containment has tried and is trying to achieve remains unclear. Depending on the ideology, zealousness, and aims of the policy makers, “containment” could mean anything from keeping a country in check militarily, economically, and politically, to its devastation and destruction. Given the lack of clarity as to what “containment” means and what its aims are, it is not clear where the dual containment policy is going. As this book has shown, the policy has often been improvised by various individuals or forces with particular agendas. During the Reagan Administration, for example, at times US policy was made by people who had no familiarity with the complexities of Iran, and, therefore, were relying for direction on arms merchants and swindlers. During the last years of the Clinton Administration US policy toward Iran had become completely incoherent and inconsistent, as it was being pulled and pushed by two contradictory forces: Israel and its lobby groups on the one hand and the US corporate lobby on the other. During the George W. Bush Administration some ideological zealots used the events of September 11, 2001 to launch a destructive war against Iraq that rages to this day and seems to have no end in sight. The same zealots are now using every excuse, including the fact that the war in Iraq is not going as well as promised, to push for a war against Iran. How long will the policy of dual containment continue? This, too, is hard to predict. One lasting desire in the long history of the dual containment has been

Conclusions 231 “regime change,” that is, the establishment of US–Israeli-friendly governments in Iran and Iraq, similar to that which existed under the Shah of Iran. But so far neither sanctions nor wars have been able to bring about the desired change. In Iraq, the government created under occupation appears to be too weak to survive, and, given the toll in human life, misery, and destruction that has resulted from sanctions and wars, it is doubtful that any future government will be friendly to the US and Israel. This is, of course, to assume that Iraq does not disintegrate and fall into complete chaos. In Iran, there is also no sign of “regime change.” Indeed, the numerous sanctions levied against the country and the continuous threats of war might have created a siege mentality in Iran. Ironically, this seems to have contributed to the longevity of the current government in Iran, making it less prone to substantive and extensive reforms. This uncertainty about the exact aims of the dual containment policy, its direction, and its duration makes any prediction of what the future has in store for Iran rather difficult. As this book is being concluded in July 2007, a third round of UN sanctions is being contemplated. The prelude to this new set of sanctions is the same as before. The guessing game as to when Iran will have its first nuclear weapon continues almost on a daily basis. On April 22, 2007, in a reversal of earlier predictions that Iran’s bomb is imminent, Olmert stated that “Iran is far from crossing the nuclear threshold … Unfortunately, it is not as far as I would like it to be but it is also not as close as it proclaims to be” (AP). On April 27, 2007 UPI reported that a “U.S. intelligence report on Iran’s nuclear program said Tehran might be able to produce a nuclear weapon in less than three years.” According to the report, “Iran has overcome technical difficulties in its uranium enrichment program and could have enough material to produce one weapon by 2010 but only if it makes more technical progress. The United States is holding to its official estimate that Iran will produce a nuclear weapon in 2015.” According to the same report, “expert David Albright” stated that “I think Iran can get enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon sooner than that … I think the 2015 number reflects too much skepticism about Iran’s technical capabilities and they are making progress.” On May 15, according to AP, Albright stated that “Iran is making ‘slow but steady’ progress in its efforts to enrich uranium, but probably still wouldn’t have enough fuel for a single nuclear warhead until 2009 at the earliest.” Similarly, AP reported on June 6, 2007 that according to Israeli ambassador Sallai M. Meridor Iran “has not yet crossed the threshold of being able to make nuclear weapons but may be only two years away.” Such guessing games, as we have seen, go back at least as far as 1984, when the neoconservative Kenneth Adelman stated that according to a British defense journal Iran is only two years away from acquiring nuclear weapons. The blame game is also continuing on a daily basis. Iran is now being accused of supporting insurgency in Afghanistan. For example, on June 4, 2007 Bloomberg reported that “U.S. military commanders recently have said weapons of Iranian origin are turning up in Afghanistan,” and that in Kabul Defense Secretary Robert Gates “repeated that accusation, while saying it wasn’t clear whether the Iranian government was responsible.” The same report stated,

232 The United States and Iran however, that “Afghanistan’s President Hamid Karzai said that relations between his country and Iran have never been better and downplayed suggestions that the government in Tehran is aiding the Islamist Taliban movement.” Subsequently, on June 6, 2007, AP quoted Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns as saying that there is “irrefutable evidence” that Iranians are now shipping weapons to Taliban insurgents. According to Burns, the arms are “certainly coming from the government of Iran. It’s coming from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard corps command, which is a basic unit of the Iranian government.” On June 14, 2006 AP reported that “Afghanistan’s defense minister on Thursday dismissed claims by a top U.S. State Department official that there was ‘irrefutable evidence’ that the Iranian government was providing arms to Taliban rebels.” He was further quoted as saying: “Actually, throughout, we have had good relations with Iran and we believe that the security and stability of Afghanistan are also in the interests of Iran.” The same report stated that “State Department later appeared to step back from Burns’ assertion, but stressed that the United States has proof that weapons from Iran were reaching Taliban fighters in Afghanistan.” The accusation that Iran is supporting the insurgency in Iraq also continues even though no proof has yet been provided. Indeed, in early July 2007 the US accused Iran of having a direct hand in the January 2007 attack in the Iraqi city of Karbala that killed five American troops. AP reported on July 2, 2007 that according to a US military spokesman, Brigadier General Kevin J. Bergner, “the Quds Force, part of Iran’s elite Republican Guards, was seeking to build an Iraqi version of Hezbollah to fight U.S. and Iraqi forces” and that “the senior leadership in Iran is aware of this activity.” On July 11, 2007, by a vote of 97 to 0 the US Senate adopted a measure introduced by Senator Joseph Lieberman, and supported by Senator Carl Levin, “censuring Iran for what it said was complicity in the killings of US soldiers in Iraq” (AFP).2 Earlier, Senator Lieberman had said that the US should consider a military strike on Iran because of Tehran’s involvement in the insurgency in Iraq. According to AP, June 10, 2007, Lieberman stated “I think we’ve got to be prepared to take aggressive military action against the Iranians to stop them from killing Americans in Iraq … And to me, that would include a strike over the border into Iran, where we have good evidence that they have a base at which they are training these people coming back into Iraq to kill our soldiers.” Senator Lieberman’s call for action against Iran was an example of the threat game that continues on a daily basis. Lieberman, of course, is not alone in issuing threats. On May 8, 2007, in an interview with Al Arabiya television, Condoleezza Rice stated that the “American president will not abandon the military option and I believe that we do not want him to do so” (Reuters). Three days later, in a speech on board the USS John C. Stennis, Vice President Cheney warned that the US will not allow Iran to obtain nuclear weapons and stated: “With two carrier strike groups in the Gulf, we’re sending clear messages to friends and adversaries alike” (The New York Times, May 11, 2007).3 And on July 10, 2007 it was reported that the US Navy had sent a third aircraft carrier, Enterprise, to the Persian Gulf (Reuters).

Conclusions 233 Israel, too, is continually issuing threats. On April 28, 2007, AFP quoted Ehud Olmert as saying in an interview: “It may not be possible to destroy all of the Iranian nuclear programme, but it is possible to damage [it] in such a way it would be set back several years.” He was further quoted to say: “It’s technically feasible. It would require 10 days and the launch of a thousand Tomahawk missiles.” Once again, in a game of cat and mouse, Israel later denied what was attributed to Olmert. On June 6, 2007 AP reported that Shaul Mofaz, Israel’s Deputy Prime Minister, met with the US Secretary of State and told her that “his country is running out of patience with a U.S.-backed diplomatic overture to head off Iran’s nuclear ambitions.” Three days later AP reported that according to Mofaz, “military action is one of the options in dealing with Iran’s nuclear program.” Soon afterwards, Iran wrote a letter to the UN Security Council condemning the threats made against her by Israel (IRNA, June 12, 2007). But the letter was ignored and threats continued. A few days later, in a meeting with Ehud Olmert, President Bush reiterated his famous line: “All options are on the table” (Reuters, June 19, 2007). Subsequently, on June 22, 2007, The Jerusalem Post reported that the “Israeli Air Force (IAF) has been training on long-range flights, including refueling in midflight, in preparation for potential strikes against Iranian nuclear targets.” According to the report, the attack might come at the end of 2007, after the US and Israel “hold a joint assessment to ascertain the influence of economic sanctions against Iran.” Above all, the sanctions game continues. The US is tightening its unilateral sanctions on various fronts. The divestment campaign against pension funds headed in Israel by the Likud Party leader Binyamin Netanyahu and in the US by Representatives Tom Lantos and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen is beginning to bear fruit. On June 2, 2007 the Sacramento Bee reported that California lawmakers took a step closer toward “ordering the state’s two giant public pension funds [CalPERS and CalSTRS] to unload more than $2 billion in retirement money invested in foreign companies doing business in Iran.” The vote, according to the report, was 68 to 0 in favor of divestment, even though state pension board leaders had opposed the measure. On June 10, 2007 The Jerusalem Post reported that Florida “became the first US state to outlaw pension fund investments in any companies doing business with Iran’s energy sector.” The report went on to say that “Israel and the American Jewish community are watching state governments and their divestment policies closely. Many welcomed the Florida decision.” Similar divestment measures, according to the Los Angeles Times of July 10, 2007, “have emerged in about a dozen other states, including New York, Texas, Michigan, Georgia and Massachusetts.” More US unilateral sanctions were being worked out on different fronts. On June 28, 2007 AP reported that Congressman Tom Lantos had “championed” a bill that “would end the Bush administration’s power to waive sanctions against foreign companies that invest in Iran.” “Our goal must be zero foreign investment,” the report quoted Lantos as saying. Similarly, Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey has been busy carrying out what the BBC, on June 13, 2007, called “America’s financial war on Iran.” The

234 The United States and Iran financial war has paid some dividends. On June 24, 2007 the Financial Times reported that “Japan’s private sector has responded to signals from Washington by adding to financial pressure on Iran—restricting loans and rejecting an Iranian request to pay for oil imports in currencies other than dollars, banking and official sources say.” Of course, the aggressive US campaign has created resentment. On July 19, 2007 the Guardian reported: “A mounting US crackdown on foreign companies and banks doing business with Iran is provoking serious opposition in the UK and Europe, where diplomats are warning that the action could lead to a new trade war.” The biggest game of all, however, continues to be tightening the multilateral sanctions against Iran, using the IAEA and UN Security Council. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Resolution 1747, passed on March 24, 2007, mandated that the IAEA prepare a report within 60 days on whether Iran has complied with the demands of Resolutions 1737 and 1747. On May 23, 2007 the IAEA issued its four-page report.4 After stating that Iran has actually increased the number of installed centrifuges at the Fuel Enrichment Plant, the report stated: “Although the Agency is able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, the Agency remains unable to make further progress in its efforts to verify certain aspects relevant to the scope and nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.” Moreover, the report went on to say, the “Agency’s level of knowledge of certain aspects of Iran’s nuclear related activities has deteriorated.” Lastly, the report concluded that “Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities.” Before and after the issuance of his report, the Director General of IAEA, ElBaradei, continued to make comments that irritated those who wished to contain Iran. On May 15, 2007 The New York Times reported that inspectors of the IAEA “have concluded that Iran appears to have solved most of its technological problems and is now beginning to enrich uranium on a far larger scale than before, according to the agency’s top officials.” The report quoted ElBaradei as saying: “We believe they pretty much have the knowledge about how to enrich. … From now on, it is simply a question of perfecting that knowledge. People will not like to hear it, but that’s a fact.” He added: Quite clearly suspension is a requirement by the Security Council, and I would hope the Iranians would listen to the world community … But from a proliferation perspective, the fact of the matter is that one of the purposes of suspension—keeping them from getting the knowledge—has been overtaken by events. The focus now should be to stop them from going to industrial scale production, to allow us to do a full-court-press inspection and to be sure they remain inside the treaty. In another interview, ElBaradei was quoted as saying: “I believe that demand (for enrichment suspension) has been superseded by events” (Reuters, May 22, 2007). ElBaradei’s admission that Iran had passed the so-called point of no return— which the US and Israel had said would not be allowed to happen—brought out the wrath of the US and her allies. On May 22, 2007 it was reported that the “United

Conclusions 235 States and some European allies plan to complain to the head of the U.N. nuclear watchdog about his proposal for Iran to retain some nuclear enrichment activities” (Reuters). Subsequently, on May 25, 2007 AFP reported that the “United States led three allies Friday in warning the UN atomic chief against making comments that could harm the international drive against Iran’s contested nuclear programme.” Yet ElBaradei continued to comment on the political nature of the nuclear dispute. In an interview for the BBC published on May 31, 2007 he described those wanting to bomb Iranian nuclear facilities as “new crazies” and stated that “he did not want to see ‘another war.’” He stated: “I wake every morning and see 100 Iraqis innocent civilians are dying … I have no brief other than to make sure we don’t go into another war or that we go crazy into killing each other. You do not want to give additional argument to new crazies who say ‘let’s go and bomb Iran.’” A few days later ElBaradei stated that an attack on Iran would be “an act of madness ... (that) would not resolve the issue” (AP, June 14, 2007). The US, Israel, and the EU 3, however, did not heed the Director General’s warning. Even before the IAEA report was released the US was threatening Iran with another round of UN sanctions. As early as May 9, 2007 Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns stated: “If Iran doesn’t say yes to negotiations … they’re going to find a third Security Council (sanctions) resolution in the month of June” (Reuters). Similar threats were issued by other US officials, including President Bush himself, who, according to AFP on May 17, 2007, stated at a joint press conference with Tony Blair: “If we’re unable to make progress with the Iranians, we want to work together to implement new sanctions through the United Nations.” The threats of more UN sanctions became numerous after the IAEA released its report. On June 23, 2007 The Washington Post reported that the “United States and Britain are preparing drafts for a punishing new U.N. resolution against Iran that could impose sweeping travel bans on the country’s top military and security officials, require inspections on its cargo flights and ships, forbid all import and export of arms shipments, and freeze the assets of major Iranian banks, according to U.S. and European officials.” But the report added that the drafts “could face significant resistance from Russia and China.” This resistance appears to have delayed the passage of a third UN sanctions resolution against Iran. Also contributing to the delay is a proposal made earlier by ElBaradei that calls for a “time out” or “freeze for freeze.” According to this proposal, Iran would be permitted to continue its already existing uranium enrichment but would freeze new construction of centrifuges and reprocessing of nuclear material. In return, there would be no new UN sanctions against Iran. AP reported on June 22, 2007 that “key U.S. allies” have begun debating such a proposal. The idea was immediately ruled out by the US as soon as it appeared in the media. On June 24, 2007 AP stated that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice maintained a firm line “against efforts to soften conditions for Iran to enter talks over its disputed nuclear program, dismissing as ‘chatter’ discussions among U.S. allies about a new approach.” As of late July 2007, the fate of this proposal remains uncertain, particularly since Iran has not clearly announced its position on “time out” but has been negotiating with the EU representative and

236 The United States and Iran has resumed its voluntary cooperation with the IAEA. Also uncertain is when the third set of UN sanctions will be imposed on Iran. As this book is being concluded, there is much talk about imposing such sanctions later in 2007. Regardless of any new sanctions, the existing sanctions, both unilateral and multilateral, seem to be taking their toll on the Iranian economy. As stated earlier, a number of banks around the world have come under severe pressure not to deal with Iran. In turn, Iran has taken some measures to reduce the impact of this pressure. For example, AFP reported on May 6, 2007 that Iran’s Central Bank has adopted a directive that would allow foreign firms to set up branches in Iran and buy stakes in Iranian banks. On June 11, 2007 Reuters reported that “Iran is in discussions to store strategic oil reserves in China and to build refineries around Asia … as the country seeks secure outlets for its crude in the face of Western economic sanctions.” In July Iran started to admit that sanctions are affecting its economy. For example, on July 3, 2007 AFP quoted Iranian Oil Minister Kazem Vaziri Hamaneh telling IRNA that the “problems that they [unilateral and multilateral sanctions] have made for banks have troubled financing of some projects.” He also stated that the Iranian government “was attempting to use its own resources, built up from the windfall receipts of recent years of high world oil prices, to make up for the shortfalls in foreign investment.” Six days later, on July 9, 2007, AFP quoted Akbar Torkan, managing director of the state-run Pars Oil and Gas Company, telling Shargh newspaper: “Currently on average we produce four million barrels a day, but if no new investment flows in, five percent of this capacity will be lost each year.” A few days later, in an unusually frank talk, Foreign Ministry spokesman Mohammad Ali Hosseini admitted: “The third resolution would have its impact on Iran.” As of late July 2007, Iran is clearly feeling the pain of numerous sanctions. It is, however, uncertain whether this pain is sufficient for Iran to relinquish its “inalienable right” to “develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination,” as guaranteed under Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The fact that after two rounds of UN sanctions Iran has promised full, voluntary cooperation with the IAEA shows that Iran might be bending under the pressure. But even if Iran does forfeit its right and capitulates, it is uncertain whether the US and Israel would stop their attempts to contain Iran. If containment means the destruction of any country that stands in the way of US and Israel, the fate of Iran might be similar to that of Iraq; ultimately an excuse will be found to do to Iran what was done to Iraq. Ironically, it appears that so far the carnage and mayhem created by the US invasion and occupation of Iraq has prevented a military attack on Iran. World opinion, and even public opinion in the US, has tuned against the bloody and costly war in Iraq. This has made bombing Iran, which the neoconservatives have been advocating, much harder. The storm, however, is not over. The advocates of the dual containment policy, particularly those who had argued that Iran should be contained before Iraq, have been relentless. They will not stop until they achieve the ultimate containment of Iran.

Notes

Chapter 1 1

A few books were published in the 1990s on the containment of Iran (see, for example, Cordesman and Hashim 1997). Most did not focus on what the dual containment policy was trying to achieve, and instead dealt mainly with such issues as Iran’s economy, politics, and military forces. In the past few years there has been a proliferation of books on Iran, particularly on Iran’s nuclear program and relations with the US (see, for example, Chubin 2006; Takeyh 2006; Howard 2004; and Kemp 2004). None of these books, however, takes the approach adopted here.

Chapter 2 1 2

3 4 5 6 7

8

9 10 11 12 13

For an account of the CIA coup in Iran, see Gasiorowski (1987). See also Roosevelt (1979); Risen (2000); and Kinzer (2003). On the Shah’s role in Dhofar see, for example, “US Strategy in the Gulf,” MERIP Reports (April 1975), pp. 17–28, or Cottam (1979). On the Shah’s support for the Kurds, see, for example, “The Kurds Trust a Bad Ally,” MERIP Reports, No. 38 (June 1975), pp. 25–6. For an account of the dispute over these assets, see Gillespie (1990). On the fear of US banks of possible default by Iran, see Gillespie (1990: 19–20). For an estimate of the profit made by Chase, see Alerassool (1993: 22–6). In 1994 the balance actually fell below the minimum amount required (Farahanipour 2000: 5). The reporter Robert Parry, who worked as a correspondent for Associated Press and Newsweek in the 1980s, has posted on his website a document that he contends shows the Carter Administration’s complicity in Saddam’s invasion of Iran. The document, Perry argues, is a “two-page ‘Talking Points’ prepared by Secretary of State Alexander Haig for a briefing of President Reagan” after Haig’s first trip to the Middle East in April 1981 (online at: http://www.consortiumnews.com/ archive/xfile5.html). According to the document, Haig states that both Sadat of Egypt and Fahd of Saudi Arabia provided useful “intelligence” concerning such matters as Iran “receiving military spares for U.S. equipment from Israel.” Subsequently Haig writes: “It was also interesting to confirm that President Carter gave the Iraqis a green light to launch the war against Iran through Fahd” (online at: http://www.consortiumnews.com/2003/haig-docs.html). Actually, this sale raised some eyebrows in the US Congress. The Washington Post reported on February 7, 1980 that “two members of Congress protested the granting of export licenses for U.S.-made engines to power four Iraq Navy frigates. Reps. Jonathan Bingham (D-N.Y.) and Millicent Fenwick (R-N.J.) objected to the sale because Iraq has been listed as a country that supports international terrorism.” The report also stated that the Iranian exiles were splintered on the issue of supporting the Iraqi invasion of Iran, with some members of the “royal family” opposing it. See the chronology of events in Chubin and Tripp (1988: 296). Dessouki (1981: 108). For the text of Resolution 660, see US Department of State Dispatch, September 10, 1990. For the text of Resolution 598, see Jabber (1989: 75).

238 Notes 14 15 16 17

18 19 20

Ibid., 17–23. Ibid., 109. See also Dessouki (1981: 109). In an early essay on the Iran–Iraq war, Joe Stork and Martha Wenger suggested that Iraq received Western intelligence reports on Iranian military capabilities when it invaded Iran, as is evident from the visits of General Oveissi to Washington and Baghdad immediately before the war (Stork and Wenger 1984). Dessouki (1981: 110). See also Dilip Hiro, “Iraq and Poison Gas,” The Nation, August 26, 2002. See http://www.alternet.org/waroniraq/20155/. Howard Teicher’s comments were broadcast in PBS’s Frontline The Arming of Saudi Arabia, produced by Rory O’Connor, February 16, 1993 (online at: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/programs/info/1112.html). A transcript of the show can be found at: http://emperors-clothes.com/news/arming-i.htm.

Chapter 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

10

11 12 13 14

15 16

The Middle East Journal (MEJ), Chronology, 1982, p. 220. Quoted in Chubin and Tripp (1988: 299). Quoted in Chubin (1988: 208). MEJ, Chronology, 1982, p. 402. MEJ, Chronology, 1982, p. 403; and 1983, p. 82. By 1987, Iraq was the largest recipient of US credit to purchase food. See MEJ, Chronology, 1988, p. 291. Village Voice, December 18, 1990, pp. 33–5; and MEJ, Chronology, 1988, p. 82. For a detailed discussion of the Teicher affair, as well as other issues related to the arming of Saddam Hussein, see Friedman (1993). Unofficial copies of Teicher’s affidavit, which appear on the web, contain more details than those reported by The New York Times. The affidavit argues that in 1982 the Reagan Administration and CIA were fearful that Saddam was losing the war. It was therefore decided, in a National Security Decision Directive in June of 1982, to “do whatever was necessary and legal to prevent Iraq from losing the war with Iran.” Thus the “United States actively supported the Iraqi war effort by supplying the Iraqis with billions of dollars of credits, by providing U.S. military intelligence and advice to the Iraqis, and by closely monitoring third country arms sales to Iraq to make sure that Iraq had the military weaponry required.” Among the arms provided to Iraq, the affidavit goes on to say, were “bombs and anti-armor penetrators.” Teicher also contends that “President Reagan sent a secret message to Saddam Hussein telling him that Iraq should step up its air war and bombing of Iran.” The text of the affidavit is available online at: http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article1413.htm. MEJ, Chronology, 1987, p. 426. It is interesting to note that when, in September 1991, Robert Gate was asked before the Senate Intelligence Committee about the covert activities of the CIA in the Iran–Iraq war, particularly about supplying the Iraqis with military intelligence, Committee Chairman David Boren interrupted, saying that “we are verging on classified information. … we cannot discuss in open session.” See Los Angeles Times, September 18, 1991, p. 12. See also MEJ, Chronology, 1984, p. 294. Quoted in Chubin and Tripp (1988: 59). See also MEJ, Chronology, 1984, p. 499. It is interesting to note that despite the reports by their own team of investigators into the use of chemicals by Saddam Hussein’s government, it was not until two years later that the UN even confirmed Iraqi use of chemical weapons. This delayed reaction showed how the UN was merely following US policy toward the Iran–Iraq war. For a video clip of this meeting see “Shaking Hands with the Enemy,” online at: http:// www.informationclearinghouse.info/article2038.htm. The text of this interview is available online at: http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2002/ t09212002_t921cnn.html. The video clip that is referred to in the interview is, as mentioned earlier, available online at: http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article2038.htm.

Notes 239 17

18 19 20 21

22 23

24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44

45

There are also references to Howard Teicher and his 1995 affidavit in the article. For example, the article quotes Teicher as characterizing US policy in the Iran–Iraq war as “realpolitik,” or arguing that without removing Iraq from the State Department terrorism list in February 1982 “it would have been ‘impossible to take even the modest steps we were contemplating’ to channel assistance to Baghdad.” See also MEJ, Chronology, 1984, pp. 716–17. For greater detail, see Stork (1987). See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Regan, vol. 2, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1987, pp. 1244–5. See also Kemp (1994: 107). Subsequently, after admitting that many of these claims were incorrect, the US military investigators blamed the downing of the plane on “psychological stress of the combat situation” and “incorrect data by the crew to the captain.” See MEJ, Chronology, 1988, p. 80. A transcript of ABC’s “The USS Vincennes: Public War, Secret War” is available online at: http:/ /homepage.ntlworld.com/jksonc/docs/ir655-nightline-19920701.html. On the issue of medals, the Guardian reported on April 24, 1990 that the “captain of the USS Vincennes, the American cruiser which shot down an Iranian civilian airliner over the Gulf on July 3, 1988, killing all 290 people on board, has been awarded the US armed forces’ second highest peacetime medal. … Captain Will Rogers received the Legion of Merit ‘for exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding service as commanding officer’ of the Vincennes in the period from April 1987 to May 1989, according to a navy citation issued in the name of President Bush. … The Vincennes’ weapons and combat systems officer, Lieutenant-Commander Scott Lustig, who was on duty in the ship’s combat information centre when the airliner was attacked, also won two Navy Commendation Medals.” As John Barry and Roger Charles write in “Sea of Lies,” given the target, the awarding of such medals was “surreal.” “But,” they add, “so was the atmosphere in the Vincennes CIC that July morning, and the attempt, in the months and years that followed, to cover up what happened there.” Available online at: http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1987/092187b.htm. See Resolution 598 in Jabber (1989: 75). The text of Resolution 598 is available online at: http:// daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/524/70/IMG/NR052470.pdf?OpenElement. See MEJ, Chronology, 1987, p. 90. On the human toll of the war, see Hooglund (1989). On the economic impact of the war, see Mofid (1990). See Cordesman (1989: 73–89). See also The New York Times, November 18, 1988. MEJ, Chronology, 1989, p. 485. See The New York Times, March 29, 1990. See also the Guardian, March 29, 1990. See The New York Times, March 29, 1990. See The New York Times, May 9, 1990. The New York Times, March 17, 1990. The New York Times, March 17, 1990. Ibid. The New York Times, March 30, 1990; The Washington Post, March 31, 1990; and The New York Times, April 7, 1990. The New York Times, April 10, 1990. Ibid. The Washington Post, April 6, 1990. Ibid. The Washington Post, April 13, 1990. See Financial Times, April 14, 1990; The Washington Post, April 13, 1990. See MEJ, Chronology, 1990, pp. 688–9. The Washington Post reported on July 20, 1991 that Iraq did indeed possess a 350mm gun with a 172-foot barrel, and was in the process of building an even larger gun. It was not clear from the report, however, if the interceptions of April 1990 had anything to do with these guns. MEJ, Chronology, 1990, p. 678.

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The Washington Post, August 1, 1990. The Washington Post, September 13, 1990. See also the Guardian, September 12, 1990. For the text of the conversation between Glaspie and Saddam, see The New York Times, September 23, 1990. The text of this conversation was released by Iraq in September as proof that it was misled by the US into believing that the Bush administration would express no serious opposition to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. The authenticity of this transcript was not challenged by the US when it was first released. However, six months later the accuracy of the transcript was challenged ons the grounds that it contained some crucial deletions. Yet the US did not publish its own version of the conversation or Glaspie’s summarizing cable on the talks. See Los Angeles Times, March 23, 1991. See The Independent, March 23, 1991. MEJ, Chronology, 1991, p. 301. MEJ, Chronology, 1991, p. 301. Fayazmanesh (1991).

Chapter 4 1 2

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See Shlaim (2000). According to the U.S. News & World Report of January 15, 1979 US experts estimated Israel received 70 percent of its oil from Iran. The Economist of January 20, 1979 put the estimate at a “good half or more.” See Segev (1988), particularly p. 95. Segev (1988: 65), for example, writes, that in 1966 “Eban left Tehran in disguise. Israeli security men equipped him with a wig, a bushy moustache, and a thick coat of make up.” Similar accounts, concerning the secret trips of high-ranking Israeli officials to Iran, also appear in Segev. Officially, Uri Lubrani was not an ambassador, since Israel had no embassy in Iran. He was the head of the Israeli mission in Iran. The report also stated that Shamir “severely criticized France for agreeing to provide President Hussein with a nuclear research laboratory.” Marshall et al. (1987: 285) refer to an interview—published in Executive Intelligence Review on October 14, 1980—with General Mordechai Hod, a former Israeli air force commander, in which he raises the possibility of Iran’s air force collapsing and discusses “an Israeli initiative” toward rapprochement with the Iranian President, Bani-Sadr. A few years later, on November 23, 1986, Thomas Friedman would write in The New York Times: “In the early years of the Gulf war, when Iraq was on the ascendant, Israel secretly funneled small amounts of arms and spare parts to the Iran of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini on the assumption that Arab Iraq was a lasting enemy and ‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend.’” As the war progressed, Friedman wrote, and an Iranian victory became a distinct possibility, Israeli reasoning became that “Iraq has no common border with Israel, while Iran, through her messengers and her religion, is actually on our border” and that the “rule of ‘My enemy’s enemy is my friend’ does not hold when my enemy’s enemy is also my enemy.” In his book Perilous Statecraft: An Insider’s Account of the Iran-Contra Affair (1988), Michael Ledeen denies the charges that he worked for the Israeli government or that he was skimming money from the arms deals (p. 262). He also denies the accusation of having “dual loyalty.” He attributes all such accusations to a “staple of modern anti-Semitism,” even though two of his main accusers, as he himself admits, were Jewish. According to Ledeen, the Congressional investigation and the suspicion that Israel and its associates were behind the Iran-Contra affair, was based on an “Israeli conspiracy” theory and was basically a witch-hunt. “Those involved in the hunt,” he writes, “invariably assumed that Jews were the most likely suspects” (p. 259). That is why, he says, there were allegations that “I was a Mossad agent, and that I acted on behalf of Israel to trick the American government into approving Israeli arms sales to Iran” (p. 259). Stephen Green’s essay “Serving Two Flags: Neo-Cons, Israel and the Bush Administration” originally appeared on February 28/29, 2004 in the online newsletter CounterPunch. Available at: http://www.counterpunch.org/green02282004.html. The account of bumbling characters in the Iran-Contra affair is at times so comical that one

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wonders how it is actually possible that the foreign policy of a superpower could be formulated by the likes of such individuals. Perhaps one of the most comical incidents in the whole affair is the 1986 arrival of the American delegation in Tehran in the month of Ramadan, when Muslims fast, with a “large chocolate cake” that Oliver North had “purchased in Tel Aviv, as symbol of a new, sweet beginning to American–Iranian relations” (Segev 1988: 270). “American Israel Political Action Committee” should be “American Israel Public Affairs Committee.” An unofficial text of Teicher’s affidavit reads as follows: “The United States was anxious to have other countries supply assistance to Iraq. For example, in 1984, the Israelis concluded that Iran was more dangerous than Iraq to Israel’s existence due to the growing Iranian influence and presence in Lebanon. The Israelis approached the United States in a meeting in Jerusalem that I attended with Donald Rumsfeld. Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir asked Rumsfeld if the United States would deliver a secret offer of Israeli assistance to Iraq. The United States agreed. I traveled with Rumsfeld to Baghdad and was present at the meeting in which Rumsfeld told Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz about Israel’s offer of assistance. Aziz refused even to accept the Israelis’ letter to Hussein offering assistance, because Aziz told us that he would be executed on the spot by Hussein if he did so.” Available online at: http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article1413.htm. In an interview with the FBI in July 1985, Oliver North spoke of meeting with one Kevin Kattke—whom he described as “a right-wing ideologue”—who tried to facilitate funding of Contras, according to The Washington Post of May 2, 1987. Kevin Kattke, who was also involved in trying to extend credit to Iraq, later told a congressional hearing that when he and Howard Teicher met with North to discuss the Iran–Iraq war, “[w]e said that for Israel’s sake the war had to go on” (The Atlanta Journal and Constitution, October 11, 1992). See also another version of the same report in The Jerusalem Post of July 24, 1990. The analogy between Saddam and Hitler had been made by Israel numerous times immediately prior to the first US invasion of Iraq. See Grace Halsell, “Clinton’s Indyk Appointment One of Many from Pro-Israel Think Tank,” Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, March 1993. Available online at: www.washingtonreport.org/backissues/0393/9303009.htm. See the Los Angeles Times, September 24, 2000. See The New York Times, September 25, 2000; The San Diego Union-Tribune, September 28, 2000; and the Los Angeles Times, October 11, 2000. The text of the speech is available online at: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ templateC07.php?CID=61. All quotations from the speech are from this source. Much has been written about the power of AIPAC in shaping US foreign policy (see, for example, Findley 1989 and Tivnan 1987). One of the most recent is John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy,” Faculty Research Working Paper No. RWP06-011, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, March 13, 2006. Available online at: http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/Research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP06-011/$File/ rwp_06_011_walt.pdf. A different version of the paper was also published in the London Review of Books, Vol. 28, No. 6 (March 23, 2006), available online at: http://www.lrb.co.uk/v28/n06/ mear01_.html. This 82-page account, however, deals with AIPAC’s role in shaping US foreign policy in general. As such, the account does not specifically deal with the role that AIPAC has played in formulating US foreign policy toward Iran. Even though my intention in this book is not to write such an account, a relatively detailed picture of how AIPAC has shaped, and continues to shape, the US’s Iran policy will emerge in the following chapters. For AIPAC’s ranking see Huey (1997: 16). As noted in the Wall Street Journal, “Aipac isn’t a politicalaction committee; it is the chief US lobbying group for Israel and is financed by private fund raising in this country” (R. Greenberger, “Progress of Iran-sanctions Measure in Congress Signals Comeback for Pro-Israel Lobbying Group,” Wall Street Journal, 18 June, 1996). There are, of course, many other Israeli lobbies operating in the US besides AIPAC. One such organization is the American–Israeli Cooperative Enterprise, which publishes names of those who vote for and against Iran sanction bills in the US Congress; see for example: http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/US-Israel/impsa.html. “Who We Are,” AIPAC, 2005; available online at: http://www.aipac.org/documents/whoweare.html.

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Douglas MacArthur, “The United States and Israel. Time for a Reappraisal,” Christian Science Monitor, March 16, 1987, p.14. “About AIPAC,” AIPAC, 2005; online at: http://www.aipac.org/whatis.cfm. http://www.aipac.org/AIPAC-pc2005.htm. Ha’aretz Daily also reported on March 27, 2005: “Last year, about half the Senate and one-third of the Congress was at the banquet, alongside governors and dozens of other politicians.” “Urge a Cautious Approach to Iran,” AIPAC, 2000; online at: congress.nw.dc.us/aipac/ elecmail.html.

Chapter 5 1 2 3 4 5

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See, for example, Clawson (1998: 86, 88) and Preeg (1999: 48). For a copy of the act see Alikhani (2000: 171–6). See, for example, The New York Times, December 2, 1996; The New York Times, December18, 1996; The New York Times, December 19, 1996; and The New York Times, August 9, 1997. See Alfonse D’Amato, “Regarding Iran,” Congressional Record, US Senate, March 23, 1995, S4519. See Patrick Clawson, “ILSA’s First Year: What Effect on Iran and on Allied Policy Towards Iran?”, Meeting of the House Committee on International Relations, July 23, 1997 (a copy of the statement is available online at: http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1997_h/h970723c.htm); and Patrick Clawson, “Financial Penalties as a Counter-Terrorism Technique,” October 27, 1999, Senate Judiciary Committee (a copy of the statement is available online at: http://judiciary.senate.gov/oldsite/ 102799pc.htm). See D’Amato, “Regarding Iran.” See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton, vol. 1, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1995, p. 357. See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton, vol. 1, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1995, pp. 653–4; online at: http://frwebgate5.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/waisgate.cgi?WAISdocID=523746114448+4+0+0&WAISaction=retrieve. See the Journal of Commerce, July 24, 1996; and The Houston Chronicle, July 24, 1996. See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton, vol. 2, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1996, pp. 1245–55; online at: http://frwebgate1.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/waisgate.cgi?WAISdocID=540422185983+2+0+0&WAISaction=retrieve. For a discussion of the August 19, 1997 executive order, see Alikhani (2000: 203–7). See Financial Times, September 30, 1997; and Journal of Commerce, October 7, 1997. The report also stated that there was much pressure from House Speaker Newt Gingrich to pass the bill. According to the report, “Gingrich told a Jewish group in October that he favored making ‘Iran a real project,’ after earlier likening the idea to ‘a serious, sophisticated campaign plan’ or a battlefield effort ‘that applies all sorts of indirect pressures.’ He has only vaguely described what this plan should consist of but said in February that its aim should be to replace the regime in Iran.” See United States Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2004,” April 2005; online at: http://usinfo.state.gov/is/img/assets/4475/ Country_Report_Terrorism_31727.pdf. On the early history of this organization, see Abrahamian (1989). According to The New York Times of November 1, 1994 a representative of MEK, Shahin Gobadi, had indicated that “the State Department under President Ronald Reagan began contacts with the Mujahedeen in 1987 but cut them off soon after, when Iran threatened that American hostages in Lebanon would never be released if such a dialogue continued.” See Kenneth Katzman, “Iran: the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran,” Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 1994. The lobbying efforts of MEK and its supporters must have worked even on some well-known newspapers. The same Christian Science Monitor of October 20, 1994 also reported: “The New York Times weighed in with a recent editorial denouncing the US boycott of the Mojahedin and deploring the fact that the boycott was treated as a victory by the Iranian mullahs.”

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According to the The Boston Globe of July 17, 1999 Soona Samsami was the representative of the “Paris-based National Council for Resistance of Iran, the group that oversees the Mujahideen and the National Liberation Army.” The National Liberation Army (NLA), according to the Department of State’s report written by Kenneth Katzman, was created in “1987 with assistance from Saddam Hussein” and was dependent on “Saddam for money, arms, bases (approximately five), and permission to strike.” The report also states that the NLA “conducted raids into Iran during the latter years of the 1980–1988 Iran–Iraq war” and that the “NLA’s last major offensive reportedly was conducted against Iraqi Kurds in 1991, when it joined Saddam Hussein’s brutal repression of the Kurdish rebellion.” See Gary L. Ackerman, “US Policy Towards Iran: A One-Year Review,” Extension of Remarks, House of Representatives, Wednesday, June 3, 1988, p. E1000. Available online at: http:// thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?r105:1:./temp/~r1054GB1IU:e0. See Abrahamian (1989: 250–1, 260–1). James Ridgeway and Camelia Fard, “With Friends Like These: ‘Terrorists’ Share Space With Press in D.C. Building,” Village Voice, December 5–11, 2001. The book is no more than a short essay, published in the May/June issue of Foreign Affairs, with some odd material thrown in to support the new view of the authors. http://www.american-iranian.org/Pages/LDRSHP.HTM, accessed in 2001 and since changed. The new page is at: http://www.american-iranian.org/home.php?mains=2. http://www.american-iranian.org/Pages/MBRSHP.HTM (the page has been removed since accessed in 2001). Some corporate names appear at: http://www.american-iranian.org/ home.php?mains=2&subs=15. http://www.american-iranian.org/Pages/NEWSEV.HTM (removed since accessed in 2001). http://www.american-iranian.org/Pages/BIOGHA.HTM (removed since accessed in 2001). http://www.sipa.columbia.edu/RESOURCES/CASPIAN/infra.html (removed since accessed in 2001). ITA still maintains a website at: http://www.iraniantrade.org. A reference to the letter can still be found online at: http://www.iraniantrade.org/niki.htm. See “Home” at: http://www.iraniantrade.org/niki.htm. http://www.csis.org/about/index.htm (the page has changed since accessed in 2001). http://www.csis.org/about/index.htm#5 (the page has changed since accessed in 2001). http://www.csis.org/html/4schola3.html#mideast (the page has been removed since accessed in 2001). The AIC’s addresses still exist and can be found online at, respectively: http://www.american-iranian.org/home.php?mains=10&subs=126; and http://www.american-iranian.org/ home.php?mains=10&subs=124. http://www.mapi.net/html/whoweare.cfm; and http://www.mapi.net/html/staff.cfm (these pages have been removed since accessed in 2001). There were, at the time, several scholarly works dealing with the economic aspect of the US sanctions against Iran; see, for example, Amuzegar (1997). http://www.usaengage.org/about_us/members/index.html. This webpage has been removed since accessed in 2001 and the new page is at: http://www.usaengage.org/archives/news/970416pc.html. http://www.usaengage.org/about_us/members/index.html (removed since accessed in 2001). See http://www.usaengage.org/archives/news/970416pc.html. Ibid. Ibid. See also Ken Silverstein, “So You Want to Trade with a Dictator,” Mother Jones, May/June, 1998. Silverstein’s article has a distinctive, sensational style. However, much of the information cited in the article was readily available elsewhere, including the Journal of Commerce and the internet. The article is also one-sided; it mentions only some of the anti-sanction lobbyists and completely ignores the pro-sanction lobbyists, such as AIPAC. See http://www.wexlerwalker.com/wexler.htm. http://www.csis.org/experts/4albright.htm; http://www.american-iranian.org/Pages/NEWSEV.HTM. This page has been removed since accessed in 2001, but a reference to the Asia Society being one of the “AIC Sponsors and Collaborators” can still be found at: http://www.american-iranian.org/ aboutus/brochure.pdf.

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Albright’s speech is available online at: http://www.fas.org/news/iran/1998/980617a.html. See also The Jerusalem Post, June 25, 1998. See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton, vol. 2, pp. 1254–5. http://www.american-iranian.org/Conference/Intro.html; and http://www.opensecrets.org/ lobbyists/98profiles/20968.htm (both pages removed since accessed in 2001). Madeline Albright, “American–Iranian Relations,” Washington, DC: US Department of State, March 17, 2000. A transcript is available online at: http://www.usinfo.org/wf-archive/2000/ 000317/epf502.htm. The list of grievances was more compactly formulated in the Secretary’s press briefing as Iranian “desire to acquire weapons of mass destruction, their support for terrorism, and their lack of support for the Middle East Peace Process.” Madeline Albright, “Press Briefing on American– Iranian Relations,” Washington, DC: US Department of State, March 17, 2000. See also: http:// www.fas.org/news/iran/2000/000317a.htm. Albright, “Press Briefing on American–Iranian Relations.”

Chapter 6 1

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As of fall 2005 the names of the board members listed on “About the Institute” were “Warren Christopher, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Alexander Haig, Max M. Kampelman, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Samuel W. Lewis, Edward Luttwak, Michael Mandelbaum, Robert McFarlane, Martin Peretz, Richard Perle, James G. Roche, George P. Shultz, Paul Wolfowitz, R. James Woolsey, Mortimer Zuckerman.” For current listing see: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ templateC11.php?CID=133&newActiveSubNav=Board%20of%20Advisors&activeSubNavLi nk=templateC11.php%3FCID%3D133&newActiveNav=aboutUs=. In her study of Leo Strauss, the purported founding father of “neoconservatism,” Shadia B. Drury writes that the “term neoconservatism was first used by a critic to refer to a new breed of conservatism who began to exert a certain influence on American politics after 1945. The label was later adopted by Irving Kristol as a term of approbation to describe his own point of view and that of other conservatives who shared his political outlook” (Drury 1997: 137). Irving Kristol himself argues that “I am generally thought to be the ‘godfather’ of the neoconservative ‘movement’” (Kristol 1979: ix). He further argues that it was the “socialist Michael Harrington,” who, in “a spirit of contempt for ‘renegades,’” referred to those who turned from liberalism to conservatism as neoconservatives (pp. ix, 33). None of this, of course, clarifies what exactly is meant by “neoconservatives” and what is “neo” about them. Nor do Kristol’s own writings shed much light on the matter. Even though pretentious, these writings are at best journalistic and autobiographical. We are told by Kristol, for example, that he has been “a neo-Marxist, a neo-Trotskyist, a neo-socialist, a neo-liberal, and finally, a neoconservative” (p.3). But since there is no theoretical analysis in Kristol’s writings it is not clear what these labels mean, particularly in their “neo” sense. It is also unclear what he means when he states that he is a “neo-orthodox Jew,” especially since being highly religious appears to be incompatible with being a “Marxist” or “Trotskyite” (pp. 3 and 429). All that one can gather from Kristol’s writings is that he is a zealous supporter of Israel. This support seems to justify adopting any belief or label, be it liberal or conservative, or taking any action that advances the cause of Israel. In this sense, one can see why Kristol and his fellow travelers are so infatuated with Machiavelli (pp. 151–64). In the final analysis, “neoconservatives” seem to be nothing more than opportunistic and Machiavellian supporters of Israel who for a time tied their fortunes to some rightwing elements in the US. See Donald Kagan, Gary Schmitt (Project Co-Chairmen), and Thomas Donnelly (Principal Author) “Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century: A Report of The Project for the New American Century,” Washington, DC: Project for the New American Century, 2000, p. 75; available online at: http://www.newamericancentury.org/ RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf. The text of “A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm” is available on the internet. See for example: http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article1438.htm. The text of the letter can be found at: http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm. All further references to the letter are to this source.

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On the last-named individual, UPI reported on August 27, 2004, “In 2001, Ledeen was hired by Feith to work on contract for the Office of Special Plans, which involved the handling of sensitive materials, Green said, a fact confirmed last week to UPI by congressional investigators.” The reference to Green is to Stephen Green’s essay “Serving Two Flags: Neo-Cons, Israel and the Bush Administration,” which originally appeared on February 28/29, 2004, in the online journal CounterPunch: http://www.counterpunch.org/green02282004.html. For details see also Green’s “Serving Two Flags.” See also Financial Times, June 6, 2001. See http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030509-depsecdef0223.html. The following day The Jerusalem Post reported that Straw met with Sharon after all, following a personal request by British Prime Minister Tony Blair. This report is extremely valuable in shedding light on how the so-called neoconservatives were preparing the grounds for attacking Iraq. In particular, it mentions that “the Wolfowitz camp, have zoomed in on remarks by Czech officials that Egyptian-born terrorist Mohammed Atta, believed to have been in control of the American Airlines jet that crashed into the first Twin Tower, met a member of Iraqi intelligence in Prague.” The report also stated: The Wolfowitz people will keep trying to persuade the Powell people that Iraq should be a target. In addition to Iraq, they are also starting to spread the idea that some members, and courted members, of the American coalition—principally Saudi Arabia and Syria—are more part of the problem than the solution. In sum, they will continue to pound home the theme that state sponsorship should be the focus of the war on terrorism.

12

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We now know that the “Wolfowitz people” did persuade the “Powell people” to invade Iraq. But they did not get their wish for other invasions. “The President’s State of the Union Address,” The United States Capitol, Washington, DC, January 29, 2002. It is interesting to note that in the speech Bush also singled out four “terrorist underworld” groups, three of which were those fighting Israel, i.e. Hamas, Hezbollah, and Islamic Jihad. The text of the speech is available online at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 2002/01/20020129-11.html. In 1996 Netanyahu argued for the need to bring about “democracy” in the Middle East before the US Congress. See “Netanyahu Tells Congress Democracy Key to Peace,” The Washington Post, July 11, 1996. On October 6, 2005 AFP also reported the comments in reference to a BBC documentary. According to this documentary, the former Palestinian Authority Foreign Minister Nabil Shaath, who witnessed the same comments, remarked “President Bush said to all of us: I’m driven with a mission from God. God would tell me, ‘George, go and fight those terrorists in Afghanistan.’ And I did, and then God would tell me, ‘George, go and end the tyranny in Iraq …’ And I did. And now, again, I feel God’s words coming to me, ‘Go get the Palestinians their state and get the Israelis their security, and get peace in the Middle East.’ And by God I’m gonna do it.”

Chapter 7 1

On January 31, 2002, according to AFP, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld stated that “Iranian actions were contributing to instability in Afghanistan” and that “Tehran is supplying weapons to factions there.” The report also added that “Rumsfeld provided no details on Iran arms supplies or other activities in Afghanistan, except to say ‘We do see things that clearly demonstrate Iran’s interest in the western portion—at the minimum—of Afghanistan.’” Even Secretary of State Powell joined the chorus of those claiming Iran was destabilizing Afghanistan, as reported by AP on February 6, 2002. In a February 18, 2002 “editorial-opinion” piece in USA TODAY, Condoleezza Rice mentioned no less than three sins of Iran in one paragraph: “Iran’s direct support of regional and global terrorism and its aggressive efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction are real and present threat. The people of Iran have made clear their desire for freedom, but an unelected few continue to frustrate that hope.” Later, on May 31, 2003, in an interview with the Financial Times, Rice stated that the “US would like to see a different kind of regime in Iran that would move away from ‘pursuing an aggressive agenda based on terrorism

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and weapons of mass destruction.’” According to the report, Rice had also told the paper that the “White House wanted to see an elected government in Tehran which meets the demands of the Iranian people for ‘a regime which protects the rights of women, which is forward looking and modern.’” All further references to this are taken from the same source. Pictures of the Shah’s son, Reza Pahlavi, with the neoconservative Daniel Pipes, Senator Joseph Lieberman, and the neoconservative publicity agent Eleana Benador at a cocktail party appeared on the personal website of Bob Guzzardi, a self-proclaimed real estate lawyer, in 2003: http:// www.bobguzzardi.com/about.php. Guzzardi’s 2006 website stated that he is “heavily involved in supporting organizations such as America–Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC); Zionist Organization of America (ZOA); American Jewish Congress; Interfaith Taskforce of America and Israel,” etc.: http://www.bobguzzardi.com/orgs.php. The pictures, which caused quite a bit of embarrassment for Iranian monarchists, were subsequently removed, but not before they were copied by many Iranians as a sign of complicity between the monarchists and Israeli circles. See also Etemad (1987: 207). In his March 31, 2006 interview with Berliner Zeitung Etemad argued that he was opposed to the entry of Iran into the NPT, because the NPT “was from the outset a bad trade.” Interestingly enough, the Shah’s former director of AEOI stated: The nuclear-armed states protected their own nuclear weapons, and yet made it illegal for others to obtain them. The deal was connected with a vague appeal to the nuclear-armed states to continue the disarmament negotiations—but without any obligations, and without any controls. Now, after 35 years we realize the fact that the nuclear-armed states do not want to disarm, and even worse they are building more advanced and improved nuclear weapons. And I do not have any doubt that the nuclear powers will never provide their nuclear technology to non-nuclear weapon states willingly, although they are obligated to so under the NPT. My position has been confirmed. India did not join the NPT, and it developed nuclear technology and nuclear weapons—yet it was not punished for it. However, Iran has signed the NPT, and has not manufactured any nuclear weapons—but the West is refusing to transfer nuclear technology to Iran, and Iran’s legal right to develop nuclear technology is denied by the West, although they agreed to transfer nuclear technology, when they signed the NPT. The NPT is an instrument, in order to establish an apartheid regime between the nations. Therefore I always was against the NPT.

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The interview is available online at: http://www.berlinonline.de/berliner-zeitung/politik/ 538747.html. Mohammad Sahimi, “Iran’s Nuclear Program. Part I: Its History,” 2003; available online at: http:/ /www.payvand.com/news/03/oct/1015.html. This strong and unequivocal claim, however, does not seem to be based on any concrete and detailed evidence. The only evidence that they provide, beyond that offered by others, is that Iran under the Shah might have received “yellowcake” from South Africa (Spector and Smith 1990: 205). NTI’s “Iran Profile: Nuclear Chronology” is available online at: http://www.nti.org/e_research/ profiles/Iran/1825_1826.html. For the IAEA reference see “In Focus : IAEA and Iran,” available online at: http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/iran_timeline.shtml#september02. Even though NTI’s nuclear chronology of Iran mostly embraces reliable academic sources, it also includes some dubious, politically motivated sources, such as a book by Kenneth R. Timmerman. Timmerman, who is closely associated with Israeli circles and Iranian monarchists, is the manufacturer of some bizarre and sensational news such as the “October Surprise” of 2000. According to this, the Clinton Administration was going to make “a ‘package deal’ with the government of Iran in time for the November elections that would resolve 20 years of hostility between the United States and Iran.” This deal was supposed to get Vice President Gore elected. See “October Surprise, Part 1, Clinton, Iran plan election-eve coup,” posted on WorldNetDaily.com, September 25, 2000: http://www.wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=20211. Estimates of the completion of the Busheher reactors varied. The BBC Summary of World Broadcasts of April 11, 1979 stated that they were 50 percent complete. The Washington Post of May

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30, 1979 estimated completion to be 77 percent. Sahimi, in his “Iran’s Nuclear Program,” argues, without providing references, that at the time of the toppling of the Shah one of the Bushehr reactors was 90 percent complete and the other 50 percent. See, for example, “Middle East’s Uneven Nuclear Progress,” Financial Times, June 16, 1982. See BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 24, 1989; and AP, July 20, 1988. See also BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 13, 1990. The Treaty is available online at: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/ infcirc140.pdf. See also Sahimi, “Iran’s Nuclear Program.” JINSA’s profile of Timmerman is available online at: http://www.jinsa.org/about/adboard/ adboard.html?documentid=3305. NTI’s “Iran Profile: Nuclear Chronology” is available online at: http://www.nti.org/e_research/ profiles/Iran/1825_1826.html. See http://www.iran.org; and http://www.iran.org/tib/tib_index.htm. It is unfortunate that the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) also uses sources such as “The Iran Brief” to report “news” dealing with Iran. See Benador Associates’ profile for Taheri at: http://www.benadorassociates.com/taheri.php. For his affiliation with the Shah’s Kayhan see: http://www.benadorassociates.com/article/18507. See NTI’s “Iran Profile: Nuclear Chronology.” It should be pointed out that Mr. Woolsey is a well-known neoconservative member of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA) and was instrumental in pushing for the invasion of Iraq. For Woolsey’s JINSA profile see: http://www.jinsa.org/about/adboard/adboard.html?documentid=2059. Given that the Israelis and MEK were working hand in hand in manufacturing news, it is safe to say that the “exiled Iranian scientist” was a member of MEK. See http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/unscom/interviews/kay.html. In this same interview, after making a case for why Iraq should be invaded and its proverbial weapons of mass destruction destroyed, he said: Well, if you’re asking American men and women to fight and die, it’s incumbent that they have the best available intelligence. So at that point, the intelligence agencies became under increasing pressure to collect all the possible information. Now, what did they do? They immediately realized that the only access they had to Iraq in those days was through the UN inspection teams. And my view is, that’s the point where the relationship started to tilt. There’s an old Russian term that goes back to the Russian Revolution … it means, “Who eats whom?” And that was always the relationship. I’m convinced that in the period of 1991, ’92, ’93 the intelligence community contributed a lot more to UNSCOM’s success than they ever got out of it. I think by 1994 and ’95, the balance inevitably started swaying as the realization was, “The only way out is Saddam goes.” It’s a Faustian bargain. Of course, subsequent to this interview, Kay went on to advocate the invasion of Iraq frantically. Once the mission was accomplished and Iraq was occupied to the satisfaction of US–Israeli policy makers, the CIA sent Kay back to Iraq to find the mythical weapons of mass destruction. After spending a few months in Iraq Kay said that there appeared to be no such weapons, “We were all wrong!”

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The report is available online at: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/ gov2003-40.pdf. The natural uranium came from China (see The Irish Times, June 16, 2003). For a political biography of John Bolton and his neoconservative affiliations, see International Relations Center, Right Web, online at: http://rightweb.irc-online.org/profile/972. The report is available online at: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/ gov2003-63.pdf. The claim that Iran was reaching the point of no return was made by Paula DeSutter, Assistant

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Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance, at the “U.S.–Israel Joint Parliamentary Committee” (AP, September 17, 2003). But Israeli officials were also saying the same thing. See also Jim Lobe, “Veteran Neo-con Advisor Moves on Iran,” Asia Times, June 26, 2003; available online at: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/EF26Ak03.html. A copy of the statement, “In Focus: IAEA and Iran, Statement by the Iranian Government and visiting EU Foreign Ministers,” available online at: http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/ IaeaIran/statement_iran21102003.shtml. Available online at: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-75.pdf. The Resolution is available online at: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/ gov2003-81.pdf. The report is available online at: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/ gov2004-11.pdf. For Henry D. Sokolski’s credentials as a neoconservative, see the International Relations Center, Right Web, online at: http://rightweb.irc-online.org/profile/1357. See, for example, the AP report of March 18, 2004 which stated that ElBaradei, the “head of the U.N. nuclear watchdog agency says he has no ‘specific proof’ that Iran is developing nuclear weapons.” National Review Online, April 15, 2004; available online at: http://www.nationalreview.com/ rubin/rubin200404150836.asp. The text is available online at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/04/200404215.html. The report is available online at: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/ gov2004-34.pdf. The Resolution is available online at: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/ gov2004-49.pdf. The first lines of a report in BBC News World Edition, July 7, 2004, read: “Head of the UN nuclear watchdog Mohamed ElBaradei says Israel has expressed concern over Iran’s nuclear ambitions.” A Reuters report on July 9, 2004 stated: “A leading Iranian cleric on Friday criticised the head of the UN’s nuclear watchdog for allowing Israel to divert attention away from its presumed nuclear arsenal by focussing talks on Iran’s nuclear programme. … ‘The Zionists have many warheads, and Mr ElBaradei goes there and instead of asking them to correct their behaviour they sit and discuss Iran,’ Ayatollah Mohammed Emami-Kashani said during a Friday prayers sermon in Tehran.” A profile of the Hudson Institute is available online at: http://rightweb.irc-online.org/profile/ 1480. See http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/35281.htm. The statement published on the AIPAC website, August 29, 2004, was as follows: AIPAC Statement on Recent Events Today, AIPAC learned that the government is investigating an employee of the Department of Defense for possible violations in handling confidential information. News stations tonight reported that the investigation centers around a supposed “mole” in the Department of Defense who allegedly disseminated internal White House policy deliberations on Iran to Israel through two AIPAC staff members. Any allegation of criminal conduct by AIPAC or our employees is false and baseless. Neither AIPAC nor any of its employees has violated any laws or rules, nor has AIPAC or its employees ever received information they believed was secret or classified. AIPAC is cooperating fully with the governmental authorities. It has provided documents and information to the government and has made staff available for interviews. We will continue to offer our full cooperation and are confident that the government will find absolutely no wrongdoing by our organization and its employees. AIPAC is an American organization comprised of proud and loyal U.S. citizens committed to promoting American interests. We take our responsibilities as American citizens seriously. We do not condone or tolerate any violation of U.S. law or interests, and we have and will continue to follow the law in all its facets. As American citizens concerned about the enduring strength of the U.S.–Israel relationship, AIPAC has and will continue to have discussions with policymakers at all levels of

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government. The right to petition our government is one of the fundamental rights of American citizens, which AIPAC members proudly exercise every day. We will not let any innuendo or false allegation against AIPAC distract us from our central mission—supporting America’s interests in the Middle East and advocating for a strong relationship with Israel. AFP reported on September 29, 2004 that “A US lawmaker [Congressman Robert Wexler] demanded that the FBI official heading a Pentagon spy probe be replaced, alleging the agent has ‘a record of unfairly targeting Jews.’” Actually, Reuters reported on September 3, 2004 that “President Bush’s top national security advisers were told more than two years ago of an FBI investigation into whether classified information was passed to Israel by a powerful pro-Israeli lobbying group.” This warning, however, appears to have done nothing to change the cozy relation between the White House and AIPAC in the following two years. See also The Washington Post, April 21, 2005. For an interesting report on how AIPAC went about its usual business after the sordid affair and how the two influential members were easily forgotten, see “Amid AIPAC’s Big Show, Straight Talk with a Noticeable Silence,” The Washington Post, March 7, 2006. AIPAC website, March 5–7, 2006. See “Transcript: Vice President Cheney Speaks to The American Israel Public Affairs Committee 2006 Policy Conference,” The Washington Post, March 7, 2006. AFP, for example, reported on August 10, 2004 that “Iran’s conservative-controlled parliament put the heat on Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi for his alleged mishandling of Iran’s nuclear dossier,” and some asked “Why did we surrender to the demands of the Europeans and the West?” The report is available online at: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/ gov2004-60.pdf. On June 29, 2004, for example, Reuters reported on Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons program and added: “In May 2003, an Iranian exile group accused Iran of having a biological weapons program at Lavizan.” See, for example, AFP, June 27, 2004. The resolution is available online at: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/ gov2004-79.pdf. The text of the Iran–EU Agreement on Nuclear Programme is available online at: http:// www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/eu_iran14112004.shtml. The report is available online at: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/ gov2004-83.pdf. See the IAEA report of September 2, 2005, available online at: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/ Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-67.pdf. The Independent actually stated on December 13, 2004 that Bolton was the “leader of the campaign to get rid of him [ElBaradei].”

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The article is available online at: http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/01/24/050124fa_fact. The Washington Post also reported on February 12, 2005 that the “Bush administration has been flying surveillance drones over Iran for nearly a year to seek evidence of nuclear weapons programs and detect weaknesses in air defenses.” On February 16, 2005 AP added that “Iran’s intelligence chief on Wednesday accused the United States of flying spy drones over its nuclear sites and threatened to shoot down the unmanned surveillance crafts.” At one point Hersh wrote: “It is possible that some of the American officials who talk about the need to eliminate Iran’s nuclear infrastructure are doing so as part of a propaganda campaign aimed at pressuring Iran to give up its weapons planning” (Hersh 2005). This contention was correct in so far as the “propaganda campaign” was concerned. But Hersh was wrong in thinking that the battle was over nuclear weapons rather than the containment of Iran. Similarly, The Washington Post reported on February 16, 2005 that ElBaradei stated that “there

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had been no discoveries in the last six months to substantiate claims that the Islamic state is secretly working toward building a nuclear bomb.” The “State of the Union Address,” February 2, 2005, is available online at: http:// www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050202-11.html. A few weeks later the AIPAC website also read “AIPAC held its largest-ever Policy Conference in Washington, D.C. May 22–24. Policy Conference brought together more than 4,000 pro-Israel activists from all 50 states.” As listed on AIPAC’s website, “The AIPAC Policy Conference 2005,” May 22–4. “Remarks at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee’s Annual Policy Conference,” Secretary Condoleezza Rice, Washington Convention Center, Washington, DC, May 23, 2005. Available online at the Department of State website at: http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/46625.htm. For Taheri’s article see The New York Post, July 5, 2005; available online through Benador Associates’ website at: http://www.benadorassociates.com/article/16519. For MEK’s allegation see AP, July 2, 2005. The communication is available online at: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/ 2005/infcirc648.pdf. For excerpts from the “Framework” see BBC Monitoring, Middle East, August 5, 2005. All further references are to this source. The Resolution is available online at: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/ gov2005-64.pdf. The report was derestricted on September 24, 2005. Available online at: http://www.iaea.org/ Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-67.pdf. The Resolution is available online at: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/ gov2005-77.pdf. The actual statement in Farsi, as reported by the Iranian Students News Agency (ISNA) on October 26, 2006, is:

Available online at: http://www.isna.ir/Main/NewsView.aspx?ID=News-603386. At one point Ahmadinejad stated: “The issue of Palestine will only be resolved when all of Palestine comes under Palestinian rule, when all the refugees return to their homes, and when a popular government chosen by this nation takes the affairs in its hands. Of course, those who have come to this land from far away to plunder this land have no right to participate in the decision-making process for this nation.” This appears to be the crux of Ahmadinejad’s argument. The argument does not seem to be compatible with the idea of “wiping Israel off the map.” See http://www.juancole.com/2006/05/hitchens-hacker-and-hitchens.html. According to Reuters, on December 8, 2005, Ahmadinejad stated at a news conference: “Some European countries insist on saying that Hitler killed millions of innocent Jews in furnaces and they insist on it to the extent that if anyone proves something contrary to that they condemn that person and throw them in jail … Although we don’t accept this claim, if we suppose it is true, our question for the Europeans is: is the killing of innocent Jewish people by Hitler the reason for their support to the occupiers of Jerusalem? … If the Europeans are honest they should give some of their provinces in Europe—like in Germany, Austria or other countries—to the Zionists and the Zionists can establish their state in Europe. You offer part of Europe and we will support it.” The report is available online at: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/ gov2005-87.pdf. “Israel’s army chief said on Tuesday Tehran could start enriching uranium by March 2006 and might be capable of producing nuclear bombs within three years” (Reuters, December 13, 2005). “Iran will be able to build an atom bomb within two years, the head of Israel’s Mossad overseas intelligence service, General Meir Dagan, was quoted as saying” (AFP, December 27, 2005). American “experts,” too, would soon join the chorus. The New York Times, January 13, 2006,

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quoted David Albright and Corey Hinderstein of the Institute for Science and International Security as saying: “Iran could have its first nuclear weapon in 2009.” See “Developments in the Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran and Agency Verification of Iran’s Suspension of Enrichment-related and Reprocessing Activities.” Available online at: http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/DDGs/ 2006/heinonen31012006.pdf. The report was derestricted on March 8, 2006. It is available online at: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-15.pdf. See http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-14.pdf.

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Grammatical errors appear in the original. Supporters of Israel in the US Congress, of course, wanted more. For example, as the report pointed out, Senator Sam Brownback, “who has called for $100 million to promote democracy in Iran, applauded the initiative as the ‘absolutely right move at this point in time.’” See “FY 2006 Supplemental Budget Request,” Secretary Condoleezza Rice, “Opening Remarks before the Senate Appropriations Committee,” Washington, DC, March 9, 2006. Available online at: http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/62900.htm. On what similar polls showed and how the neoconservatives were shaping public opinion and fanning the flames of war with Iran see Jim Lobe’s “Politics-U.S.: In Public’s Eyes, Iran Biggest Foreign Menace,” Inter Press Service News Agency, February 9, 2006. “AIPAC Policy Conference 2006 Highlights.” Available online at: http://www.aipac.org/ PC2006/. For a partial list of speakers see “AIPAC Policy Conference 2006 Highlights,” available online at: http://www.aipac.org/PC2006/transcripts.cfm; and U.S. Newswire, “America’s Pro-Israel Lobby Holds Its Annual Policy Conference in Washington D.C., 3/1/2006,” available online at: http://releases.usnewswire.com/GetRelease.asp?id=61668. A full list is available online at: http:/ /www.aipac.org/PDFDocs/PC06_2Pager_WC_FINAL.pdf See “Vice President Dick Cheney, AIPAC Policy Conference, March 7, 2006,” available online at: http://www.aipac.org/PDFDocs/PC06_Transcript_Cheney.pdf. Another Israeli representative at AIPAC was Lt. Gen. Moshe Ya’alon, former Israel Defense Forces (IDF) chief of staff and, subsequently, a Visiting Military Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, who, in a speech at the Hudson Institute on March 7, 2006, stated: Senator John McCain said recently: “There is only one thing worse than the U.S. exercising a military option, and that is a nuclear-armed Iran.” I agree with him. But before going to the military option, Iran must be isolated politically and economically; the military option can be used only when these methods have been exhausted. A military option has the potential to significantly damage the Iranian nuclear project. Such an operation might well postpone Iran’s achievement of nuclear capabilities for years, as happened regarding Iraq’s nuclear program after Israel’s attack on the Osiraq reactor.

9 10 11 12 13

The text of the speech is available online at: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ templateC07.php?CID=287 See “Acting Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, AIPAC Policy Conference, March 5, 2006 Live Via Satllite (sic),” available online at: http://www.aipac.org/PDFDocs/PC06_Transcript_Olmert.pdf. See “Dr. David Kay, AIPAC Policy Conference, March 5, 2006,” available online at: http:// www.aipac.org/PDFDocs/PC06_Transcript_Kay.pdf. “Report on Iran’s Nuclear Programme Sent to UN Security Council,” available online at: http:// www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2006/bog080306.html. On September 8, 2002, Condoleezza Rice said on CNN’s Late Edition “we don’t want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud” (AP, September 8, 2002). For the text of the resolution see “Draft Statement on Iran’s Nuclear Program,” Reuters, March 29, 2006. The Reuters draft also appeared on washingtonpost.com on the same day.

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The text of Chapter 7 is available online at: http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter7.htm. The actual text of Condoleezza Rice’s statement, “Remarks with Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Peter MacKay after their Meeting,” April 13, 2006, is available online at: http:// www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/64545.htm. See, for example, Reuters, April 6, 2006; AFP, April 24, 2006; and AP, April 28, 2006. On December 3, 2006 an AFP headline read: “Israel Creates New Ministry to Deal with Iran Threat.” The new ministry was headed by none other than Avigdor Lieberman. See Seymour Hersh, “The Iran Plans: Would President Bush Go to War to Stop Tehran from Getting the Bomb?” The New Yorker, March17, 2006. The report, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” is available online at: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-27.pdf. Reuters, for example, reported on May 25, 2006 that ElBaradei has asked the US to negotiate directly with Iran. He was quoted as saying “I leave it for the U.S. to decide whether they would like to be part of the negotiating process.” The text of the letter is available online at: http://www.lemonde.fr/web/article/0,1-0@2-3218,36769886,0.html. The article was accompanied by a picture captioned: “A middle-class businessman in Berlin in 1935, with a yellow star on his overcoat to indicate he is a Jew.” A second article, by Chris Wattie, entitled “Iran Eyes Badges for Jews: Law Would Require Non-Muslim Insignia,” appeared on May 19, 2006 in the National Post, with a picture bearing the caption: “A Jewish couple wear yellow stars in the Budapest ghetto in 1944.” The article tried to confirm the story by referring to “Iranian expatriates living in Canada” and Rabbi Marvin Hier, Dean of the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles, who stated: “This is reminiscent of the Holocaust … Iran is moving closer and closer to the ideology of the Nazis.” See Amir Taheri, “A Colour Code for Iran’s ‘Infidels,’” National Post, May 19, 2006, available online at: http://www.benadorassociates.com/article/19504. On the relationship between Taheri and Benador Associates, see Larry Cohler-Esses, “Bunkum from Benador”, The Nation, July 3, 2006, available online at: http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060703/cohleresses. See “Experts Say Report of Badges for Jews in Iran is Untrue,” National Post, May 19, 2006, available online at: http://www.canada.com/nationalpost/news/story.html?id=6626a0fa-99de4f1e-aebe-bb91af82abb3. See Marc Perelman, “False Report Triggers Rush of Iranian–Nazi Comparisons,” available online at: http://www.forward.com/articles/false-report-triggers-rush-of-iranian-nazi-compari/. The essay is available online at: http://thejewishweek.com/news/newscontent.php3?artid=12511. Much was made of the change even by some neoconservatives who did not immediately see the true intention of the policy. For example, on June 25, 2006 Richard Perle wrote an editorial piece in The Washington Post entitled “Why Did Bush Blink on Iran? (Ask Condi).” He criticized the State Department for expressing willingness to negotiate with the “mullahs.” Similar views were expressed by other neoconservatives, such as Michael Ledeen, Michael Rubin, and Frank J. Gaffney (see “Rice’s Offer to Iran Spurs Unease from Right,” Los Angeles Times, June 12, 2006). Similar news concerning a supposed reversal of the US policy toward Iran also appeared in other major newspapers. See, for example, “Rice Key to Reversal on Iran,” The Washington Post, June 4, 2006. This article provides many details on how the alleged “reversal” came about. A copy of the package offered to Iran is available online at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/90569.pdf. “Address of Under Secretary Stuart Levey, The American Israel Public Affairs Committee Policy Conference 2005,” Department of the Treasury, The Office of Public Affairs, May 23, 2005; available online at: js-2466, http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js2466.htm. Stuart Levey’s third sentence indicated that this was not the first time he had attended AIPAC meetings: “The world’s view of terrorism today is very different from when I attended my first AIPAC event.” “Testimony of Stuart Levey, Under Secretary Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Transportation, Treasury, the Judiciary, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies” (April 6, 2006); available online at: http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js4163.htm.

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An even taller tale by Robert Spencer, Iran’s Day of Terror?”, appeared on July 27, 2006 on FrontPageMagazine.com; available online at: http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ ReadArticle.asp?ID=23533. The Resolution and related statements are available online at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/ docs/2006/sc8792.doc.htm. In a 2006 essay, Kuziemko and Werker (2006) provide a detailed, scholarly analysis of how the US bribes members of the UN Security council to get the votes it needs in passing resolutions. See http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/iranresponse.pdf. online at: http://intelligence.house.gov/Media/PDFS/ The report is available IranReport082206v2.pdf. See, for example, Anneliese Fikentscher and Andreas Neumann, “Does Iran’s President Want Israel Wiped off the Map—Does He Deny the Holocaust?” June 19, 2006, on Information Clearing House: http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article12790.htm. The letter is available online at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/ document091406.pdf.

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11

12 13

The report is available online at: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/ gov2006-53.pdf. The New York Times of November 3, 2006 reported that the draft resolution was drawn up two weeks earlier. For possible motivation behind the comments see “Ambiguity Isn’t What It Used to Be,” The Jerusalem Post, December 13, 2006. The Resolution is available online at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/ sc8928.doc.htm. The Washington Post reported on December 11, 2006 that when “the State Department recently asked the CIA for names of Iranians who could be sanctioned for their involvement in a clandestine nuclear weapons program, the agency refused, citing a large workload and a desire to protect its sources and tradecraft.” As a result, the report went on to say, “the State Department assigned a junior Foreign Service officer to find the names another way—by using Google. Those with the most hits under search terms such as ‘Iran and nuclear,’ three officials said, became targets for international rebuke.” See http://www.stopaipac.org/boltontape.htm. A video segment of Bolton’s speech appears at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mjSwO54p_YQ. For other segments of Bolton’s conference call see The Jewish Daily Forward, January 10, 2007. The address is available online at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/ 20070110-7.html. Oded Tira, “What to Do with Iran?”; available online at: http://www.ynetnews.com/Ext/Comp/ ArticleLayout/CdaArticlePrintPreview/1,2506,L-3346275,00.html. A list of speakers and their lecture summaries is available online at: http:// www.herzliyaconference.org/Eng/_Articles/Article.asp?CategoryID=223&ArticleID=1598. All subsequent references to the individuals participating in the conference are to this website. “Press Conference by the President,” February 14, 2007; available online at: http:// www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/02/20070214-2.html. It is interesting to note that at least twice in the press conference the President referred to Iran as Iraq. The sale of weapons to the Arab states was not only intended to intimidate Iran but was, of course, financially quite lucrative. The same report in the International Herald Tribune stated: “If they follow through on the deals announced recently, it is estimated that countries like the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Oman and Saudi Arabia would spend up to $60 billion this year.” According to AFP, February 24, 2007, Israeli Deputy Defense Minister Ephraim Sneh denied the story and stated that there “has never been such a request.” The report, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006) in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” is available online at: http:// www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2007/gov2007-08.pdf.

254 Notes 14 15 16

17

18 19

See “Remarks by the Vice President at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee 2007 Policy Conference,” White House Press Office, March 12, 2007. See “Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi,” AIPAC Policy Conference, March 13, 2007; available online at: http://www.aipac.org/Publications/SpeechesByPolicymakers/Pelosi-PC-2007.pdf. An interesting speaker on the issue of Iran at the 2007 AIPAC Annual Policy Conference was Pastor John Hagee. His appearance at the conference created controversy even before the event. For example, in an online report entitled “Hardline Pastor Gets Prime AIPAC Spot,” The Jewish Week wrote on March 9, 2007 that the scheduled appearance of such a “Christian Zionist” at the conference even “troubles some AIPAC supporters.” The report stated that at “a time when pro-Israel forces are being accused of beating the drums for war with Iran, Rev. Hagee seems to believe such a conflict is both inevitable and necessary.” The report further stated that in “his apocalypse-oriented book ‘Jerusalem Countdown,’ he predicted a nuclear showdown with Iran and said, ‘The end of the world as we know it is rapidly approaching … rejoice and be exceedingly glad, the best is yet to be.’” The report also stated that “[l]ast year, Rev. Hagee told the Jerusalem Post that ‘I would hope the United States would join Israel in a military pre-emptive strike to take out the nuclear capability of Iran for the salvation of Western civilization.’” Pastor Hagee did address the AIPAC Conference audience on March 11, 2007. In his five-page speech Hagee made 11 references to Iran. Comments such as “Iran poses a threat to the State of Israel that promises nothing less than a nuclear holocaust,” or “it is 1938; Iran is Germany and Ahmadinejad is the new Hitler,” were typical. Hagee’s address is available online at: http://www.aipac.org/Publications/SpeechesByPolicymakers/HageePC-2007.pdf. After the talk, The Jewish Daily Forward wrote on March 16, 2007: “Perhaps the most enthusiastically received speaker at this year’s annual Aipac conference was the fiery evangelical leader Pastor John Hagee. During his speech Sunday night to the 6,000 delegates, he drew no fewer than seven standing ovations, including one that came after he bellowed, ‘It is 1938, Iran is Germany and Ahmadinejad is the new Hitler.’” His speech is available online at: http://www.aipac.org/Publications/SpeechesByPolicymakers/ Netanyahu-PC-2007.pdf. On March 13, 2007 the neoconservative Frank J. Gaffney published an editorial piece in the Washington Times entitled “Invest Terror-Free” in which he advocated the same thing as Netanyahu, that is, divesting from “terror-wielding enemies—nations like Iran.” Resolution 1747 is available online at: http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/ unsc_res1747-2007.pdf. “Prepared Remarks of Stuart Levey, Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, On the Designation of Bank Sepah for Facilitating Iran’s Weapons Program,” United States Department of the Treasury, Press Room, January 9, 2007. Available online at: http:// www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp220.htm.

Chapter 12 1

2 3

4

In her infamous interview with 60 Minutes’ Lesley Stahl on May 12, 1996 Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was asked about this figure and if such high casualties were worth it. She did not challenge the figure and stated: “I think this is a very hard choice, but the price, we think the price is worth it.” See also Congressional Record, US Senate, July 11, 2007, S9002. In the media there were many reports concerning a great divide over Iran policy between the US State Department and the Vice President’s office headed by Cheney’s advisor David Wurmser (see, for example, The New York Times, June 1, 2007). Publicly, however, the statements made by the two sides were very similar. The report is available online at: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2007/ gov2007-22.pdf.

References

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256 References Fayazmanesh, S. (2003) “The Politics of the US Economic Sanctions against Iran,” Review of Radical Political Economy, Vol. 35, No. 3, 221–40. Findley, P. (1989) They Dare to Speak: People and Institutions Confront Israel’s Lobby, Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books. Friedman, A. (1993) Spider’s Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq, New York: Bantam Books. Gasiorowski, M.J. (1987) “The 1953 Coup d’etat in Iran,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 19 (August), 261–86. Gillespie, K. (1990) “US Corporations and Iran at the Hague,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 44, No. 1, 18–36. Hersh, S.M. (2004) Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib, New York: HarperCollins Publishers. Hersh, S.M. (2005) “The Coming Wars,” The New Yorker, January 17. Hersh, S.M. (2006) “The Iran Plans: Would President Bush Go to War to Stop Tehran from Getting the Bomb?” The New Yorker, March 17. Hiro, D. (2002a) “Iraq and Poison Gas,” The Nation, August 26. Hiro, D. (2002b) “When US Turned a Blind Eye to Poison Gas,” The Observer, September 1. Hooglund, E. (1989) “The Islamic Republic at War and Peace,” MERIP Reports, No. 156 (January–February), 4–12. Howard, R. (2004) Iran in Crisis: Nuclear Ambitions and American Response, London: Zed Books. Huey, J. (1997) “Power Lobbying,” Fortune, December 8. Jabber, P. (1989) Great Power Interests in the Persian Gulf, New York: Council on Foreign Relations. Kemp, G. (1994) Forever Enemies: American Policy and the Islamic Republic of Iran, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment. Kemp, G. (2004) Iran’s Bomb: American and Iranian Perspectives, Washington, DC: Nixon Center. Kinzer, S. (2003) All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons. Kristol, I. (1979) Reflections of a Neoconservative, New York: Free Press. Kuziemko, I. and Werker, E. (2006) “How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 114, No. 5, 905–30. Ledeen, M. (1988) Perilous Statecraft: An Insider’s Account of the Iran-Contra Affair, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. Lewis, B. (1990) “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 266, No. 3 (September), 47– 60. Marshall, J., Scott, P.D. and Hunter, J. (1987) The Iran Contra Connection: Secret Teams and Covert Operations in the Reagan Era, Boston: South End Press. Mearsheimer, J.J. and Walt, S.M. (2006) “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy,” Faculty Research Working Paper No. RWP06-011, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, March 13. Mofid, K. (1990) The Economic Consequences of the Gulf War, London: Routledge. Poneman, D. (1982) Nuclear Power in the Developing World, London: George Allen & Unwin. Preeg, E.H. (1999) Feeling Good or Doing Good with Sanctions, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies.

References 257 Risen, J. (2000) “Secrets of History: The CIA in Iran,” The New York Times, Sunday, April 16. Roosevelt, K. (1979) Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran, New York: McGraw-Hill. Segev, S. (1988) The Iranian Triangle: The Untold Story of Israel’s Role in the Iran-Contra Affair, New York: Free Press. Shlaim, A. (2000) The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World, New York: W.W. Norton & Company. Spector, L.S. and Smith, J.R. (1990) Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1989–1990, Boulder: Westview Press. Stork, J. (1987) “Reagan Re-flags the Gulf,” MERIP Reports, No. 148 (September– October), 3–5. Stork, J. and Wenger, M. (1984) “US Ready to Intervene in Gulf War,” MERIP Reports, No. 125/6 (July–September), 44–8. Takeyh, R. (2006) Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic, New York: Times Books. Tivnan, E. (1987) The Lobby: Jewish Political Power and American Foreign Policy, New York: Simon and Schuster. Wurmser, D. (1999) Tyranny’s Ally: America’s Failure to Defeat Saddam Hussein, Washington, DC: The AEI Press.

Index

Abrams, Elliott 101, 216 Ackerman, Gary (Congressman, US) 112, 122, 181, 223 Adelman, Kenneth L. (Director US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency) 129, 231 Afghanistan 105, 106, 109, 117, 120, 231–2 Afshar, Shahriar (founder ITA) 88 Aghazadeh, Gholam Reza (Head of Iran Atomic Energy Agency) 227 Ahmadinejad, President Mahmoud (Iran): accused by Israel 193–4, 211, 217; accused by US 167–8, 199; compared to Adolf Hitler 191, 195, 208; elected president 7; mistranslated statement 174–6, 203–4, 208–9; offers talks with UN 206; prevented from travelling to US 226–7; quoting Ayatollah Khomeini 8; on Resolution 1737 214 AIC (American–Iranian Council) 88, 93 aid from USA: to Russia 128 AIOC 87, 88 AIPAC (American Israel Public Affairs Committee): accuses Iran 71, 95; conference 165–6, 187–8, 208–9, 222–4; criticizes US policies 179; disagree with President Clinton 92; ILSA 102–4; involved in spying 101, 153–5; lobbies for sanctions 4, 59, 74, 77, 78; power within US 67–9; research 62–3; supports US policies 109, 115; website 150 Albright, David (Institute for Science and International Security, US) 143, 157, 188, 192, 231 Albright, Madeleine (Secretary of State) 4, 85, 92, 94 Alerassool, M: Freezing Assets (1993) 13 Algiers Accords (1980) 14, 24, 28–51 Algiers Agreement (1975) 53

American Enterprise Institute (AEI) 185 American–Iranian Council (AIC) 88, 93 American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC): accuses Iran 71, 95; conference 165–6, 187–8, 208, 222–4; criticizes US policies 179; disagree with President Clinton 92; ILSA 102–4; involved in spying 101, 153–5; lobbies for sanctions 4, 59, 74, 77, 78; power within US 67–9; research 62–3; supports US policies 109, 115; website 150 Amirahmadi, Dr. Hooshang (founder AIC) 88, 94 Annan, General Kofi (UN SecretaryGeneral) 138 Arafat, Yasser (Chairman, Palestine Liberation Organization) 110–12, 115 Arak 120, 121, 128–9, 141, 142, 170 Arens, Moshe (Defense Minister, Israel) 61–2 Armitage, Richard 99–100, 148, 164 arms supplies 53–4, 56–62; banned 227 Asefi, Hamid Reza (Iranian Foreign Ministry) 158 assets frozen 12–15, 226 Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) 124 “axis of evil” speech 113–16, 120 Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC) 87, 88 Aziz, Tariq (Foreign Minister, Iraq) 33–5, 37, 50, 60 Baker, James (former Secretary of State, US) 97 Bakhtiar, General Taimur (Head of SAVAK) 52 Bakhtiar, Shahpour (Prime Minister, Iran) 20–2, 54

Index 259 Bani-Sadr, President Abul Hassan (Iran): My Turn to Speak: Iran, the Revolution and Secret Deals with the U.S. (1991) 16 Bank Saderat 207 Bank Sepah: assets frozen 226–7 Bazoft, Farzad 48 Berger, Samuel (Deputy National Security Advisor, US) 70 Bergsten, Fred (Institute for International Economics – IEE) 91 Blair, Tony (Prime Minister, Britain) 105, 180, 235 Blix, Hans (Director-General, IAEA) 131 Bolton, John: disbelieves IAEA 146; against Iranian nuclear development 189; Iran’s nuclear weapons 142, 153; lobbies for sanctions 203, 205; Resolution 1696 200–1; Resolution 1737 214; travels to Israel 156; travels to Persian Gulf States 163 Bruck, Connie 122, 123, 139 Brzezinski, Zbigniew (national security advisor): in contact with Saddam Hussein 22; deployment of AWACs in Saudi Arabia 25–7; dual containment 38; memo to Cyrus Vance 15–16; opposes sanctions 4, 17–20, 86–7; Power and Principle: Memoirs of a National Security Adviser, 1977–1981 (1983) 23 Bull, Gerald 49 “bunker buster” bombs 157, 220 Burns, Nicholas (Under Secretary of State, US) 221, 227–8, 232, 235 Bush, President George H. W. 97 Bush, President George W.: accuses Iran 142; changes policy 164, 218–19; containment policies 10, 96–7, 191; elected president 5, 230; Iraq 37, 47, 65; might negotiate with Iran 8; Palestine 108, 112; Resolution 1696 205; threatens Iran 162, 185, 233, 235 Bushehr (Iran) 6, 126–8, 142, 144, 221–2, 227–8 Carter, President James: diplomatic relations 17; dual containment 1, 2–3, 38; hostages 22–3, 229; IEEPA 13; Iran–Iraq war 24; Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (1995) 14–15; opposes sanctions 91 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 90, 92

centrifuge designs (P2) 148–9, 151 Cheney, Richard (Defense Secretary, US): condemns Iran 185; opposes sanctions 96, 102; threatens Iran 162, 232; Yasser Arafat 112 China: diplomatic relations 196, 236; opposes sanctions 189, 195, 225, 235; warns US 201 Christoper, Warren (US Secretary of State) 4, 26, 63, 70–2, 83, 85 Clawson, Patrick 74, 122–3, 162, 185, 188 Clinton, President William 70–95; dual containment 1, 229; foreign policy (US) 62, 68, 135, 230 Cole, Professor Juan: Informed Comment 176 Conoco 71–2, 74, 86, 88–9, 92 containment policies: dual containment 230; foreign policy (US) 1, 10, 186; Resolution 1737 212–14; World Trade Center attacks 102 contamination 147–8 corporate lobby 91–2 Csverney, Vilmos (IAEA) 204 Dagan, Meir (Head of Mossad) 212 D’Amato, Senator Alfonse 4, 49–50, 73–8 Dayan, Moshe (Defense Minister, Israel) 57 Deutch, John M. (Director CIA) 79 diplomatic relations 48, 112; Iran and Palestine 55; Israel and Iran 52–5; USA and Iraq 33–5 Douste-Blazy, Philippe (Foreign Minister, France) 205–6 dual containment 28–51, 70–95; Bolton, John 142; Carter administration 2–3; Clinton administration 4, 64–5; foreign policy (US) 1, 10, 18, 24–7, 230, 236; future 231; Iran-Contra Scandal 56–62; Reagan administration 229 economic deprivation 229–30, 236 Eizenstat, Stuart (Under Secretary of State for Business and Economic Affairs, US) 81–2, 93 ElBaradei, Mohamed (Director IAEA): Additional Protocol 146; follows due process 177; Iranian nuclear program 139; reports on Iran 181, 189, 192–3, 220, 234–5; travels to Israel 151–2; upsets US 159–61; urges diplomacy 149, 209, 221 Elghanian, Habib 56

260 Index Eliezer, Binyamin Ben 117–18, 137–8 environmental samples 143, 156, 171 Esfahan: uranium enrichment facility 169, 170 Etemad, Dr. Akhbar (AEOI) 124–5 EU 3 (France, Britain and Germany) 7, 145–6, 168–9, 196, 210 European Union 205 Feith, Douglas 162 Financial Times 195 Fleischer, Ari (White House Press Secretary) 141–2 Ford, President Gerald R. 126 foreign policy (Iran) 53 foreign policy (Israel) 53 foreign policy (US): Bush administration 5, 96, 108, 114, 230; Clinton administration 4, 72, 82; dual containment 45, 67–8; Iran 11; Iran– Iraq war 18; Iranian Revolution (1979) 12; policy shift 85, 127, 164, 196; provocative action 214–15; regime change 78, 173; Saddam Hussein 36; toward Iran 218 Franklin, Lawrence 153 Frum, David (speech writer for George W Bush) 113, 115 Gates, Robert (Director, CIA) 133, 231 Ghorbanifar, Manucher 59, 144–5, 154 Gillerman, Dan (UN Ambassador, Israel) 175, 187, 208 Gilman, Benjamin 77, 92, 136 Glaspie, April (US Ambassador to Iraq) 50–1 Gore, Vice President Al (US) 81 Green Salt Project 182–3 Ha’aretz 61, 119, 156, 209, 211 Hadley, Stephen J. (National Security Advisor, US) 196, 218 Hagee, Pastor John 254n16 Hamas 66, 69, 108, 109 Harman, Jane 209 heavy water 7, 120, 128, 143, 170 Heir, Rabbi Marvin (Simon Wiesenthal Center) 194 Hersh, Seymour 121, 123, 139, 162, 191 Herzliya Conference (2007) 217 Hezbollah 108, 109, 111, 149 Hiro, Dilip 26 Hitler, Adolf (Saddam Hussein compared to) 8, 62, 116

Hoagland, Jim 72 Hoenlein, Malcolm (Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations) 103–4 Holum, James (Director US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency) 134 Hosseini, Mohammad Ali (Foreign Ministry spokesman, Iran) 236 hostages: Carter administration 2, 57, 229; foreign policy (US) 16, 18–24; Iranian Revolution (1979) 12; US freezes Iranian assets 13, 14 Hussein, President Saddam: foreign policy (US) 94, 115, 119; invades Iran 12, 14, 16, 24–5; meets Massoud Rajavi (MEK) 82; meets with Iranian dissidents 21–2; propaganda campaign against 3; supported by US 17–18, 29–31, 38–40, 60, 229; targeted by US 45–51, 98–100; terminates Algiers Agreement (1975) 24; uses chemical weapons 44; visited by Donald Rumsfeld 33–5 IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency): Bush administration 150; centrifuges 148; Esfahan 170; inspects Iran 131, 136, 139; inspects Iraqi facilities 48; Iran co-operates 145–6, 192, 235–6; lack of evidence 134; laptop evidence 8; Lavisan-Shian 156; Natanz 121–2, 128–9; Parchin 158–9, 176–8; reports Iran to UN Security Council 185; reports on Iran 141–2, 171–3, 190, 213, 220–1, 226; Resolution 1696 9, 201, 205; Safeguards Agreements 7; update brief 181–3 ILSA 4, 77–8, 85, 86, 88, 103–4 India 173, 184 Indyk, Martin 4, 62–7, 70, 71 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 209; Bush administration 150; centrifuges 148; Esfahan 170; inspects Iran 131, 136, 139; inspects Iraqi facilities 48; Iran co-operates 145–6, 192, 235–6; lack of evidence 134; laptop evidence 8; Lavisan-Shian 156; Natanz 121–2, 128–9; Parchin 158–9, 176–8; reports Iran to UN Security Council 185; reports on Iran 141–2, 171–3, 190, 213, 220, 226; Resolution 1696 9, 201, 205; Safeguards Agreements 7; update brief 181–3

Index 261 International Herald Tribune 135 international terrorism 67, 69, 76, 77, 95, 207 Iran 113–16; accused by US 215; defies UN Resolutions 228; threatened by US 185, 191–2, 207, 215 Iran-Contra Scandal 3, 45, 52, 56–62, 65 Iran–Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act (US) 73 Iran–Iraq war 3, 24–7, 38–40, 56–62, 129; US intervention 30–5, 45 Iran–Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) 4, 77–8, 85, 86, 88, 103 Iranian Revolution (1979) 6, 12, 88, 126–7 Iranian Trade Association (ITA) 88, 89 Iraq 1, 113–16; aid from USA 29–30; invades Iran 5, 18–24; invades Kuwait 51 Iraq Sanctions Act 1990 (US) 73 Isfahan (Iran) 155 Israel: accuses Iran 150, 185; Bushehr (Iran) 127; containment policies 9; dual containment 18, 52, 55–62; foreign policy 3, 11, 162, 180; threatens Iran 134, 143–4, 191, 207, 210, 220; wants to contain Iran 62–7 ITA (Iranian Trade Association) 88, 89 Jafarzadeh, Alireza (MEK) 120–1, 149, 155–6, 157, 167 Jerusalem Post, The: foreign policy (US) 109; Jews in Iran 193; Karine-A 114; mistranslated statement 138; nuclear weapons 135–6, 206; Palestine 111–12 Jung, Franz Josef (Defense Minister, Germany) 198 Kalaye Electric Company 143, 146, 148 Karine-A 110–13, 114, 118 Kay, David (IAEA Nuclear Weapons Inspector) 140, 156, 188 Kazakhstan 6, 130–1, 132–3, 135 Kemp, Geoffrey 60, 69 Khamenei, President Ali (Iran) 199 Kharrazi, Kamal (Foreign Minister, Iran) 92, 106, 117, 167 Khatami, President (Iran) 104–5 Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah (Iran) 43, 71, 129, 174, 200 Kissinger, Henry (Secretary of State, US) 124, 126 Kohr, Howard (director AIPAC) 115, 119 Kohut, Andrew (director Pew Resreach Center) 186

Kristol, William 114–15, 116, 188 Krylnik, Ivan (Defense Ministry, Russia) 130 Kuwait: invaded by Iraq 51 Lake, Anthony (National Security Advisor, US) 70 Lantos, Tom: calls for sanctions 49–50, 208, 224, 233; compares Ahmadinejad to Hitler 175; introduces a bill to sanction Iran 150 laptop evidence 176–8, 220–1 Larijani, Ali (National Security Council, Iran) 198, 200 Lavisan-Shian 155–6, 178, 192 Lavrov, Sergey (Foreign Minister, Russia) 178, 209, 221 Ledeen, Michael 59, 101, 144–5, 153, 166, 195 Lelyveld, Michael (journalist) 77 Levey, Stuart (Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, Treasury Department, US) 197–8, 203, 207, 224, 227, 233 Lieberman, Senator Joseph 73, 232 Liebermann, Evet (head Likud Party, Israel) 127 Livni, Tzipi (Foreign Minister, Israel) 206, 211, 222 MacArthur, Douglas (Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Affairs, US) 68 McIntyre, Jamie (CNN news reporter) 34–5 MEK (Mujahedin-e-Khalq-e-Iran) 79–85, 149–50; declared terrorists 4–5, 92, 105; Israel passes information 6, 130, 139–40; makes revelations 120–3, 132–3, 144, 155–6, 160 military action 9, 192, 229, 230; US threatens Iran 223, 232 military build up 221 Mofaz, Shaul (Defense Minister, Israel) 147, 163, 180, 191, 217, 233 Mohaddessin, Mohammad (MEK) 121, 133 Mossad 52–3, 144, 147 Mossadegh, Mohammed (Prime Minister, Iran) 94 Mottaki, Manouchehr (Foreign Minister, Iran) 201 Mujahedin-e-Khalq-e-Iran (MEK) 79–85, 149–50; declared terrorists 4–5, 92, 105; Israel passes information 6, 130,

262 Index 139–40; makes revelations 120–3, 132–3, 144, 155–6, 160 Murphy, Richard (Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs, US) 45, 88 Natanz 120, 121, 128–9, 141 National Council of Resistance of Iran 79, 80, 84, 121–2 National Post 194, 195 Ne’eman, Yuval (Minister of Energy, Israel) 130 Nejad-Hosseinian, Mohammed Hadi (UN Ambassador, Iran) 105–6 neoconservatives 98–9, 116, 131, 181 Netanyahu, Benjamin: calls for sanctions 106, 107, 223–4, 233; foreign policy (US) 116; threatens Iran 178, 211; warns of Holocaust 216–17; writes against Iran 135 New York Times, The 133, 134, 137, 143, 175, 201 Niki Trading Company 89, 93 North Korea 113–16 NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) 6; Additional Protocol 7 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 128–9; Additional Protocol 7, 140, 141, 166; Article IV 236; Iran signs 124; non-compliance 147; non-violation 6, 139; Paris Agreement (November 2004) 158–9; right to enrich uranium 164, 169–70, 195, 200, 202, 236; Safeguards Agreements 146, 172–3; violation 149, 187 nuclear weapons: development by Iran 73, 92, 117, 118, 129–34, 165–6; Iran 6, 123–4; Israel accuses Iran 208; Israel threatens Iran 144, 162, 206, 211, 220; Israel to provide Iran 54; proliferation 126, 150, 226; UN accuses US 221; US accuses Iran 142, 186, 215, 218 Olmert, Ehud (Prime Minister, Israel): accuses Iran 193, 231; attends AIPAC conference 187–8, 223; Herzliya Conference (2007) 217; sanctions 208, 211–12; talks to US 210; threatens Iran 233 Operation Staunch 30, 37 Oveissi, General Gholam Ali 17, 20–2 Pahlevi, Shah Mohammed Reza (Shah of Iran) 53–4

Palestine 108–9 Palestine Liberation Organization 55 Parchin 157–8, 160, 171–3, 176, 178 Paris Agreement (November 2004) 7, 158, 168 Pelletreau, Robert (Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, US) 83–4, 88 Pelosi, Nancy 223 Peres, Shimon (Defense Minister, Israel): accuses Iran 117, 138, 162; compares Ahmadinejad to Saddam Hussein 191; compares Rafsanjani to Hitler 174; Iran-Contra Scandal 58; threatens Iran 135; trades with Iran 54 Perle, Richard: attends AIPAC conference 188; attends MEK meeting 123; Herzliya Conference (2007) 217; influences US policy 5, 97–100, 107–8, 185; regime change 116; represents Likud 64 Poneman, Daniel 124–5 Powell, Colin: accuses Iran 177; influences US policy 99; Palestine 113; sanctions 147, 152, 155; urges diplomacy 104–6, 108, 109 pre-emptive strike 7, 179 Preeg, Ernest H.: Feeling Good or Doing Good with Sanctions 90 propaganda campaign 3, 7, 79, 193, 203; against Iran 174–6, 208 provocative action: by US 219 psychological warfare 143–4, 220 Rafsanjani, President Ali Akhbar Hashemi (Iran) 134, 138, 198–9; compared to Adolf Hitler 138, 174 Rajavi, Massoud (MEK) 81–2 Reagan, President Ronald: chemical weapons in Iraq 229; containment policies 44–5; dual containment 3, 28–34, 230; Iran–Iraq war 37–9, 43 regime change 231; Amir Taheri 195; containment policies 229; foreign policy (US) 116, 181, 186; sanctions policy aims 78, 209; war on terrorism 107 Resolution 1696 9, 200–1, 205 Resolution 1737 9, 10, 212–14, 226, 234 Resolution 1747 9, 10, 225–8, 234 revolution (Iran, 1979) 54–6, 62 Rice, Condoleezza: accuses Iran 162, 189; attends AIPAC conference 165–6; Bush administration 96, 99;

Index 263 containment policies 153; diplomatic relations 196; questioned in Congress 218; sanctions 186, 190, 207, 235; talks to Russia 178; threatens Iran 232 Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana: attends AIPAC conference 223; mistranslated statement 175; sanctions 166, 179, 185, 208, 224, 233 Rosen, Steve 154, 188 Rowhani, Hassan (Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Iran) 146, 167 Rumsfeld, Donald 33–6, 60, 98–9, 106, 125, 150 Russia: Bushehr (Iran) 6, 127, 142; Kazakhstan 135–6; offers to help Iran 178, 189; opposes sanctions 173, 183, 195, 225, 235; promises nuclear fuel to Iran 169, 197; sanctions 147, 196, 201, 212; withholds nuclear fuel from Iran 227–8 Saeedi, Mohammad (deputy chief nuclear agency, Iran) 179, 222 Sahimi, Mohammad: Iran‘s nuclear program. Part 1: its history 124 sanctions: containment policies 1; dual containment 4; eased 93; economic 46, 86, 95, 173, 203, 213; financial 9, 71–2, 197–8, 207, 224, 233–4; hostages 12; against Iran 62, 66; against Iraq 50; Iraq Sanctions Act 1990 (US) 73; Israel threatens Iran 163; Israel threatens Russia 127–8; multilateral 5, 9–10, 66–7, 172, 185, 234; opposed by oil companies 86–7, 89; Resolution 1696 200; trade 3; unilateral 112, 119, 225, 228, 229, 233; United Nations Security Council 2, 8, 145–6, 236 Saudi Arabia 20, 25–7 SAVAK (Iranian Secret Intelligence Service) 52–3, 55 Schulte, Greg (Ambassador to IAEA, US) 179–80 Scowcroft, Brent (national security advisor) 86–7, 90, 97, 104; opposes sanctions 4 Shah of Iran 2, 6, 12, 52, 231 Shalom, Silvan (Foreign Minister, Israel) 147, 157, 162, 163, 168, 174 Shamir, Yitzhak (Foreign Minister, Israel) 56, 60, 62 Sharon, Ariel: accuses Iran 150; authorises attack on Iran 163; influences US

policy 5, 59–60, 117–18, 164–5, 180; mistranslated statement 174–5; terrorism 108–9; threatens Iran 135, 144, 178–9 Shultz, George (Secretary of State, US) 43–4, 46 Sneh, Ephraim (Transportation Minister, Israel) 117, 135, 210 Solana, Javier (EU foreign policy chief) 198, 200, 206 Straw, Jack (Foreign Minister, Britain) 105, 107 Taheri, Amir (Benador Associates) 132, 167, 193, 194–5 Teicher, Howard 27, 30, 60 terrorism: AIPAC statement 95; Iran supports 67, 69, 93, 120, 185; MEK (Mujahedin-e-Khalq-e-Iran) 79, 92, 123; political use 106; sanctions 76; US declares terrorist groups 109 Timmerman, Kenneth R. (Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs - JINSA) 131–2, 158 United Nations: resolutions 7, 24; sanctions 8 United Nations Security Council: Additional Protocol 145, 155, 173, 197, 205; AIPAC 187; Chapter 7 6, 190, 200–1, 213–14; IAEA 160; Iran referred to 7, 149–50, 152–3, 179, 183; Iran writes to 233; Iraq 136; Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 147; protests from Israel 138, 174; Resolution 1696 9, 200–1, 205; Resolution 1737 212, 220, 226, 228, 234; Resolution 1747 9, 10, 225–8, 234; Resolution 598 42–3; resolutions 8, 9, 10, 189; sanctions 179–81, 192, 208, 213, 220, 231; sanctions against Iran 2; sanctions against Iraq 3–4; sanctions drafted 210; uranium enrichment 166–7 uranium enrichment: Additional Protocol 145–6; Chapter 7 190; IAEA report 201, 205, 220, 234; Iran resumes processing 158, 184, 192; Isfahan (Iran) 144, 155; Israel threatens Iran 163, 179; Jerusalem Post, The 135; Kalaye Electric Company 143; Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 166, 168, 195, 198; Parchin 171; reported by MEK 121, 124, 128,

264 Index 177; suspension offered by Iran 206; US threatens Iran 7 .S.New U s& WorldeRp ort 132–3 USA*ENGAGE (lobbying group) 90, 93 USS V incennes 40–2 Vance, Cyrus (Secretary of State) 88, 93; memo from Zbigniew Brzezinski 15– 16 incennes, USS 40–2 V war: US and Iraq 51, 230; US threatens Iran 219 Washington Institute for Near East Policy 4, 5, 62–7, 71, 101 WashingtonPost,The : AIPAC 179; MEK (Mujahedin-e-Khalq-e-Iran) 82; memo from Zbigniew Brzezinski 15–16; nuclear technology 172; nuclear weapons 133, 144, 170, 177; Resolution 1747 225; sanctions opposed by oil companies 86; United Nations Security Council 235; US supports Iraq 37–8; US threatens Russia 212 weapons: chemical 31–3, 36–7, 46, 49, 131–2, 229; nuclear 6 weapons of mass destruction (WMDs):

“axis of evil” speech 120; development by Iran 6, 67, 94; foreign policy (US) 72, 76, 148, 197–8, 227; Iraq 11, 99, 102, 107; Israel accuses Iran 129, 135, 152; Lavisan-Shian 136; reported by MEK 137, 139 Weinberger, Caspar (Secretary of Defense, USA) 29, 60 Wolfowitz, Paul 65, 107, 109, 125, 153; influences US policy 5, 97–100; represents Likud 64 Woolsey, R. James (Director, CIA) 133, 134 World Trade Center attacks 102, 104 World Trade Organization: Iranian accession 159, 164, 169 Wurmser, David: Tyranny’sA lly: merica’sF A ailuretoeDfeatSaddam ussein 101–2 H yellow insignia 193–5 Zarif, Javad (Ambassador to United Nations, Iran) 170, 201 Zeevi, General Aharon (head of Israeli military intelligence) 156, 171 Zippori, Mordechai (Deputy Defense Minister, Israel) 56, 57