The United Nations Security Council in the 1990s: Resurgence and Renewal (Suny Series in Global Politics)

The United Nations Security Council in the 1990s SUNY series in Global Politics James N. Rosenau, editor The United...

Author: Juergen Dedring

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The United Nations Security Council in the 1990s

SUNY series in Global Politics James N. Rosenau, editor

The United Nations Security Council in the 1990s Resurgence and Renewal

Juergen Dedring

State University of New York Press

Published by State University of New York Press, Albany © 2008 State University of New York All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission. No part of this book may be stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means including electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission in writing of the publisher.

For information, contact State University of New York Press, Albany, NY www.sunypress.edu Production by Ryan Morris Marketing by Anne M. Valentine

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Dedring, Juergen. The United Nations Security Council in the 1990s : resurgence and renewal / Juergen Dedring. p. cm. — (SUNY series in global politics) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-7914-7543-0 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. United Nations. Security Council. I. Title. JZ5006.7.D43 2008 341.23'2309049—dc22 2007044489 10

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Contents

Introduction Chapter One: Chapter Two:

vii Procedural Developments in the UN Security Council’s Work in the 1990s

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The UN Security Council Emerging from the Cold War Era

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Chapter Three: The Phase of the Resurgence of the UN Security Council

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Chapter Four:

The Situation in the Occupied Arab Territories

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Chapter Five:

The Lessons of Tajikistan and Sierra Leone

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Chapter Six:

The UN Security Council at Work: Peacekeeping, Terrorism, and Nonproliferation

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Chapter Seven: The UN Security Council at Work: Peace Building, Refugees, and Humanitarian Assistance

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Chapter Eight: The UN Security Council at Work: Miscellaneous Thematic Issues

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Conclusion

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Appendix

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Notes

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Bibliography

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Index

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SUNY series in Global Politics

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Introduction

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he years since the millennium have gone by with an interesting dichotomy in world affairs. On the one hand, the loud demands for the long overdue reform of the United Nations (hereafter UN) have not stopped, and some have even predicted the inevitable demise and disappearance of the global instrument,1 and on the other, the world has witnessed the continuing and uninterrupted functioning of the main organs of the UN including, in particular, the UN Security Council (hereafter the Council) designed by the UN Charter (hereafter the Charter) as the core tool for the maintenance of international peace and security. Interestingly enough, this tension between the criticism and the living reality of the UN has shaped the discourse over the lifetime of the intergovernmental organization.2 Looking back on the principal crises of the years since 2000, the 2003 war against Iraq and the 2006 violent conflict between Israel and Lebanon both reflect among other events and developments an intense role of the Council in the exercise of its Charter function. Various observers described the failure of the Council to authorize the start of the war against Iraq as a major defeat of the august body.3 It can, however, be argued that the members of the fifteen-member Council exercised their highest task under the Charter, namely, deciding in favor of war or peace, in a most responsible fashion and in that sense reaffirmed effectively the purpose and meaning of the Charter. Moreover, considering the 2006 processes in and around the Council in search of an effective cease-fire in the Middle East conflagration, it is again worth emphasizing that in the end a precarious cease-fire accord in the Council resulted in the termination of the war activities and in the restoration of a minimal semblance of order in the severely wrecked Lebanon in particular.

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Introduction

If indeed the UN and its Council were close to their final collapse, why would the United States and the other members of the Council convene every day on a list of items reflecting a troubled world? Why would the most powerful state seek the active involvement and decision of this troubled organ in the sixth decade of its operations?4 There are no simple answers to these probing questions regarding the fundamental dichotomy of contemporary global governance. If the contrast is posited between unilateralism and multilateralism in contemporary world politics, then it becomes apparently clear that the place of the Council in this political context is awkward and feeble as the forces of unilateralism are most likely to seek the removal of that multilateral barrier in order to gain a free range for its security moves. It comes as no surprise that the voices of criticism and calumny hail largely from the conservative and nationalist circles of the US elites. The honest call for UN reform has often been exaggerated to malign the purpose and machinery of the global organization. Sober judgments about the enormous complications connected with a thorough revamping of the global instruments are dismissed with the claim that the UN system is beyond repair. It should be absolutely clear that the reform debate must be brought down to a dialogue among reasonable and moderate spokespeople who disdain exaggeration and hyperbole. They would be capable to focus on realistic goals and advance logical aims seeking politically feasible, honest improvements.

II Without exploring any further the endless and futile squabbles about reform of and for what, another important constraining factor about the Council should be highlighted. The Council as a collectivity operates as a consulting, deliberating, and deciding body.5 The only decisions to be taken by the Council are either a formal resolution or an equally binding, but less formal, statement of the president. Once the Council has completed the particular meeting and adopted either of the two feasible decisions, the implementation of its decision lies in the hands of the secretary-general or other addressed state and non-state partners. For this basic reason, the Council’s effectiveness either is understood in the quality of its decision making, or one has to examine the post-decision implementation outside of the Council’s realm. Critics who charge the Council with ineffectiveness must actually spell out what they have in mind. The cease-fire called for by the Council must be realized in the field, in 2006, in the IsraeliLebanese confrontation brought about by the hostile Hezbollah operation. Numerous examples from the repertoire of decisions of the Council could be cited in order to underline the point made here. Regardless of what the verdict is as to the viability of the Council, one cannot hold the Council and its fifteen state representatives accountable for the

Introduction

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implementation—or the lack of it—of its prior consensus or voted decision. The measure to be applied should be judged according to the quality of policy making in the Council’s conduct of business. Is the policy making process characterized by thoroughness and principled reasonableness? Does it reflect the information, which the Council has received, or is it arrived at by horse trading, dealing and wheeling, and base calculation of the gain to be obtained? In view of the procedural characteristics of the Council’s place in international politics, it might be useful to engage in a closer review of its practices in dealing with international conflicts and related themes and issues. The subsequent treatment of this whole field of engagement serves the purpose to reopen the reform question and to shed light on the innermost movements among the members of the Council and of the body as a collective decision maker.

III This monograph reflects a long professional association with the UN in general and the Council in particular. Thirteen years of analytical work at the beginning of my UN work were directly related to the deliberations and decisions of the Council. This intimate connection with the operations of the Charter’s peace and security organ taught me a lot that had been unknown to me before I joined the UN secretariat in 1975 and helped open my eyes to the persistent endeavor, which the Council’s members demonstrated in engaging the role and functions of this key organ in a meaningful and constructive manner, even though the cold war had paralyzed to a large degree the Council’s anticipated capability to affect international conflicts and other threatening situations. While I moved into other units of the secretariat at the end of the 1980s, I never lost sight of the Council’s activities and was especially delighted with the tremendous resurgence that it experienced in the years beginning in 1987 and lasting through the early 1990s, after which the speed of change and innovation began to ebb somewhat, and the level of friction among the Council’s members ever so often rose a bit. This period of transition defines the start of the annotated personal history of the Council presented in the chapters that follow. It has been my intention to depict as objectively as possible the workings of the Council, with its changing membership, but adhering carefully and closely to the framework set out by the Charter for its role in the international system. The account as conceived and shaped seeks to offer a representative picture of the Council’s activities over a period of about fifteen years without providing yet another account of the Somalia disaster, the Rwanda massacre, the Liberia agony, or the Yugoslavia fratricide. Instead, the text as composed deals with minor agenda items that also required attention and policy decisions from the Council, and especially in the time since 1995 with the wave of thematic issues taken up by the Council in awareness of

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interconnections and linkages in the constant effort to gain new insights and acquire new methods and techniques to approach the unending stream of internationally relevant crises and emergencies in many parts of the contemporary world. This perspective on the Council in its pivotal position in the international arena has been the measure for identifying important focal points in the analysis of its attention to a diverse range of questions, all of which have helped shape the events of the last decade of the twentieth century, including its treatment of the situation in the occupied Arab territories, a side issue to the key Middle East question, but not any less revealing for the cleavages in the international community in regard of fairness and equity in that region of the world. Furthermore, in a parallel approach, the Tajikistan and Sierra Leone situations are included in the narrative, as these cases reveal a fully engaged and vibrant Council in the late 1990s. In the following three chapters organized along chronological and issue lines, an attempt has been made to offer an overview over the many minor agenda items and thematic issues taken up by the Council during the period under review. This narrative seeks to demonstrate that since the end of the cold war the Council has exercised its Charter-based mandate in a proactive and flexible manner, seeking always the common ground among the members and proving through the choice of consensus decision making the strength and relevance of their joint political action. Hereby, the account sheds light on many aspects of the Council’s work that are neither reported by any of today’s media nor publicized by the overburdened diplomats serving on the fifteen delegations making up its collective membership. Emphasis in these analytical narratives is placed on the stated views and enacted policies of Council members and on the striking range of catalytic movers initiating critical steps toward understanding, and acting upon, complex developments of political crises demanding reactions from the Council as the principal organ for the maintenance of international peace and security. Here it becomes abundantly clear that in the sum total of the Council’s deliberations and decisions, the presumed predominance of the five permanent members (P-5) does not appear as decisive or even critical. Many new items were introduced by nonpermanent members, often small member states, whose initiative taking was mentioned and applauded in the ensuing debates, a situation that justifies to counter the general mistaken belief that the Council’s decisions are totally dependent on the will and whim of the P-5. Moreover, the selection of items during these ten to fifteen years shows strikingly the widening angle and deepening thoroughness of the Council’s engagement before the volatile changes in the international relations of our time. All of this material is preceded by a first chapter dealing with important procedural developments during the 1990s. While the number of procedural changes has been limited, it must be underlined that these innovations have greatly helped overcome the traditional reserve and secretiveness of the Council’s practice. The result has been that the Council’s operations have literally been

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opened to the public interest, and everything has been done to enhance transparency and access while preserving the Council’s capability to arrive at sensitive and relevant political decisions in often tense and contentious circumstances. Most of what has transpired in the 1990s would not have been feasible without these significant changes in the Council’s procedures. From what has been stated so far, it also should be clear that this account is not loaded too much with notes and scholarly references. The emphasis is placed on the Council’s practice and what it conveys to the reader about the purposefulness and sincerity of its deliberations and decisions. While the author holds certain views on the role of the UN and the place of the Council within the UN institutional setting, the personal judgments are usually identified in the running text as personal observations about specific aspects of the Council’s process. Still, the fundamental purpose of this annotated “analytical history” of the Council in the 1990s is to familiarize the reader with the ways in which the Council, over these years, has carried out its daunting Charter mandate and how it has been much more successful than what outside observers have been willing to acknowledge. It might facilitate a better and more honest understanding of the dynamic that has propelled the Council through these years full of important matters and pressed for time nearly all of the time. Nevertheless, the commitment of its members to its mandate and its growing agenda has been remarkable far beyond expectations, and the published record fully reflects this political reality. To sum up my introductory reflections, let me point out that this book serves a clear purpose, namely, to bring to a wider audience of students and scholars an image of the Council as a vibrant and an engaged body of, at present, fifteen diplomatic representatives whose intent and purpose is deliberation and decision making about critical matters of international peace and security. My work at the UN and my prolonged research on significant debates and resolutions of the Council have validated my deep conviction that this organ, in its “unreformed state,” is still the best option for the international system as it is evolving from year to year. I have found that the Council and its state members have shown a strong commitment, determination, and an ability to learn from past errors and weaknesses. It can be further argued that the Council has changed with the times, and without using the Charter amendment route it has updated its procedures and widened the circle of associated partners. The consistent display of this characteristic has helped maintain its international standing and has revitalized its key role of guarding the overall peace on a global scale. Hence, I maintain a strong position in favor of the Council’s standing as guardian of the world peace and as policy instrument for the members of the UN and in particular for the fifteen diplomatic representatives serving on the Council.


Chapter One

Procedural Developments in the UN Security Council’s Work in the 1990s

Introduction

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his chapter introduces the project to evaluate the UN Security Council (hereafter the Council) after the collapse of the cold war system and the onset of what was then prematurely labeled the “new world order.” The Council continues to be in the news, such as dealing with the escalating conflict in and around the Democratic Republic of the Congo, formerly Zaire, to name just one major case out of the large list of issues with which the Council is seized. The argument about its effectiveness or ineffectiveness or relevance or irrelevance does not seem to end. Many judgments about its place in the system of global governance are based on a superficial reading of its resolutions and decisions lacking a parallel effort to look behind the closed doors of its confidential consultations and to observe its members in businesslike proceedings to deal with a pending conflict or dispute and thereby to facilitate some easing of a dangerous confrontation. Such a perspective on the Council will improve the chances for a balanced assessment of its utility in the turbulent politics of the 1990s. This chapter is the first step in a major effort on the part of this author to delve thoroughly into the massive documentation available and to arrive at meaningful findings about the Council’s place in the contemporary international system.1 While the international system began to undergo fundamental change already in the period 1986–1987, a result of Gorbachev’s radical revision of Soviet policies and his turn toward international cooperation, the effects of that course correction became evident in the successful termination of the long and bloody Iran-Iraq war through the formulation and adoption of a suitable format for a cease-fire eventually ratified by both the Iraqi regime and the Iranian government

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under Ayatollah Khomeini. This breakthrough, together with the movement toward the independence of Namibia and the resolution of several other so-called “regional conflicts,” documented persuasively that the paralysis of the Council as the central instrument for the maintenance of international peace and security had come to an end. The immediate response around the world was enthusiastic and full of renewed hope for a more peaceful world. Thus at the onset of the last decade of the twentieth century, the possibilities for a stable global peace suddenly seemed strong and real, and the Council and the international community looked with renewed determination and confidence into the future.2 The fact that the euphoric start of the 1990s was brutally disturbed by the Iraqi aggression and annexation of small neighboring Kuwait and finally ruined in the course of the failed intervention in the internecine struggle in Somalia, and that the following years were characterized by a resurgence of tension and antagonism enfeebling the impact of the Council’s actions in an increasingly destabilized political environment, is well known. However, it is more important that one tries to understand why this most regrettable deterioration occurred and how it can be explained on the basis of necessarily incomplete data. While the context of these erratic and grating policy gyrations must be kept in mind as one engages in a minute examination of the intergovernmental decision-making processes in and around the Council, the focus of the present inquiry is restricted to a few separate issues. Based on the materials available about the Council’s work, the first part deals with the way this organ and its fifteen constituent member governments operated throughout the ten-year period 1989–1999, and how the mesmerizing increase in agenda items, consultations, and meetings, as well as resolutions and presidential statements, has been managed by the diplomats assigned to this prestigious, albeit labor-intensive and time-consuming, function. It also will be attempted to weigh the relative power of the respective fifteen members in shaping the thinking of the membership as a whole and to put this into the context of group representation and changing alignments in the Council’s activity. A major aspect of that perspective is, of course, the standing of the foremost Council member, the powerful and highly ambivalent United States.3 On the basis of these two principal arguments, an attempt can be made to explain the largely misunderstood Council in its role as an organ of global governance. The questions raised at the beginning of this book will be reconsidered. As far as effectiveness and relevance are concerned, the preliminary impression will need to be confirmed throughout the much larger study undertaken in what follows.4 Nevertheless, the initial approach to a huge subject matter should not be underestimated. As the inquiry proceeds, first judgments will be revised and fine-tuned, hopefully arriving at a more factual, evenhanded, and balanced comprehension of the inner workings and political articulations of the Council.

Procedural Developments in the UN Security Council’s Work

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The whole complex of Council reform is not the subject of this chapter. It also deliberately excludes the review of some of the biggest cases taken up by the Council, such as Iraq-Kuwait, Somalia, Rwanda, or the former Yugoslavia. Good case studies and analyses are available on many of these complex crises, and at this point in the pursuit of the given project it appears more useful to maintain the focus on the neglected areas of the Council’s involvement.5 Still, many of the underlying issues and questions will evidently be on the minds of academic observers and practitioners, including this author.

How the Security Council Worked in the 1990s The general misperception of the Council’s activities is basically due to the fact that the policy making leading to the formal decisions of the organ is for all practical purposes hidden from the public view. Since the height of postwar decolonization, which brought with it many new member states from formerly dependent territories and also led to the increase in the Council’s membership from the original eleven to fifteen members, of which ten fell into the category of nonpermanent members, it had become clear to the permanent members of the Council that the open conduct of its debates was no longer feasible or effective, and that closed sessions away from the bright light of publicity were required in order to enable the divided and contentious membership to find a common consensus position obviating the need for formal voting that far too often resulted in stalemates and vetoes. The evolving consultation procedure that has been maintained in its basics until this day consists of three phases, a first phase in which the Council president, in office during that particular month, would informally consult with the states’ parties, bringing the matter to the Council as well as with individual Council members about the importance of the particular dispute or situation and about ways and means to handle the case. Assuming that the agreement in the first round is in favor of proceeding with the matter, the president would then undertake a second round of informal consultations in which the partners would be groups or blocs within the Council, such as the nonaligned group, the Communist side, and the Western group, plus groups interested in the matter at hand on the outside of the Council. In this phase, the issue under consideration was not only whether or not to place the item on the Council’s agenda but also what was feasible in terms of the Council’s response to the crisis before it. If joint opinion still favored pursuing the request for Council involvement, the president would then commence the third phase of this elaborate and sometimes lengthy and time-consuming procedure and invite all members and the secretarygeneral to a consultation of the whole. In this closed session, with the president chairing the deliberations, the request before the Council would be fully aired, and all necessary measures would be discussed and, if a consensus emerged,

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decided. That would include the procedural decision to place the item on the Council’s agenda, a further procedural decision to invite outside parties and member states to the formal meeting of the Council, and, most importantly, the preparation of a draft decision, in the form of either a resolution or a presidential statement, in blue copy, which would then require adoption or issuance in a formal public meeting of the Council. Due to the given complexity of many of these situations, it happened frequently that the consultation of the whole needed to be suspended or adjourned and then later resumed so that further bilateral and mostly multilateral contacts could be engaged that would help facilitate a full agreement among all fifteen members. The consequence of this lengthy procedure in search of a consensus position has been that the general membership of the organization and the wider public on the outside has been compelled to rely on rumors, allegations, and leaks to find out what was going on behind the closed doors of the Council’s chambers.6 The practice of these “informals” continues until our time. Council members, permanent and nonpermanent, acknowledge that openness and transparency should characterize the Council’s place on the international arena, but they all emphasize that without the prior confidential engagements the Council would not manage to present a united front in response to any of the many disturbances landing on the Council’s plate. The crucial nature of the confidential dialogue and interaction of the diplomatic representatives within the high walls of the Council’s operations is dramatically confirmed by the fact that despite the tremendous avalanche of critical issues throughout the 1990s, the Council in all these years has not once deviated from the standard recourse to the informal consultation of the whole. It would appear from all that has come out of the Council and its immediate diplomatic environment that the diplomatic actors, big and small, see no alternative to that by now long-standing and fully vetted practice. This elaborate pattern of the Council’s working methods has resulted in impressive statistics for the years under consideration. Culled from the annual reports of the Council to the General Assembly, the following picture emerges: During the period June 16, 1989–June 15, 1990, the Council held 49 meetings and adopted 22 resolutions. This reflects still a rather inactive posture of the Council. During the next twelve months, from June 16, 1990, to June 15, 1991, the Council held 65 meetings and adopted 41 resolutions. The main crisis engaging the Council was the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the numerous Council measures taken to restore the sovereignty and territorial independence of Kuwait. During the period June 16, 1991–June 15, 1992, the Council held 92 meetings. It adopted 46 resolutions and issued 50 presidential statements.


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The marked increase in meetings, resolutions, and presidential statements is due to the outbreak and rapid escalation of the Yugoslav crisis. From the period June 16, 1992–June 15, 1993, the Council held 152 meetings, adopted 81 resolutions, and issued 95 presidential statements. The increase in all three categories of Council activity should be noted. During the period June 16, 1993–June 15, 1994, the Council held 153 meetings, adopted 87 resolutions, and issued 68 presidential statements. Moreover, it held 252 consultations, lasting 353 hours. The Council received and dealt with 120 Secretary-General (SG) reports; additionally, it handled 1,500 other documents. From the period June 16, 1994–June 15, 1995, the Council held 152 meetings, adopted 70 resolutions, and issued 82 presidential statements. Furthermore, it held 274 consultations lasting 420 hours. The Council received and handled 100 SG reports and about 1,000 other documents. During the next twelve months, from June 16, 1995, to June15, 1996, the Council held 132 meetings, adopted 64 resolutions, and issued 62 presidential statements. It held 240 consultations, taking altogether 377 hours, and it handled 70 SG reports, plus about 1,079 other documents. From the period June 16, 1996–June 15, 1997, the Council held 115 meetings, adopted 52 resolutions, and issued 54 presidential statements. In addition, it held 342 hours of consultations and handled 105 SG reports and 1,214 other documents. During the period June 16, 1997–June 15, 1998, the Council held 103 meetings, adopted 61 resolutions, and issued 41 presidential statements. It held 215 consultations, totaling 588 hours, and handled 92 SG reports and about 1,079 other documents. Finally, from June 16, 1998, to June 15, 1999, the Council held 121 meetings, adopted 72 resolutions, and issued 37 presidential statements. It also held 239 consultations, lasting 511 hours, and handled 90 SG reports and 1,437 other documents.

Since the content of the Council reports is exclusively the prerogative of the Council under the Charter and the secretariat has no formal or informal input into format and substance of this annual document submitted to the General Assembly, the figures provided in the ten years of Council practice under review here convey a fascinating picture about what the members themselves see as pertinent and worthy of mentioning to a wider interested public. It is especially remarkable for the observer to see how much time is spent in the crucial consultation phase of the Council. Of course, quantity does not necessarily translate into quality. But there is no denying the fact that the membership on the Council is immensely labor intensive and time consuming. It also offers strong

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testimony that while inevitably there have been fluctuations in the number of meetings and formal decisions, one cannot detect any waning of the Council’s engagement in seeking to fulfill its significant mandate in the maintenance of international peace and security. The commitment that is required to make a meaningful and constructive contribution to the Council’s work is especially daunting for small member states without the necessary diplomatic staff and substantive support from their foreign ministries back home. In many cases, the diplomatic mission to the UN in New York consists of one or two more junior diplomats in addition to the permanent representative heading the mission. Looking at the hours alone of required meetings and the massive documentation to be read and analyzed, even larger missions will be hard put to bring the necessary capacities to the Council duties while maintaining their usual load of formal and informal business in and around the UN and their constant connection with their governments and foreign ministry colleagues. Even a cursory look at the blue book containing all missions at the New York headquarters of the world organization documents the severity of this problem for many member states.7 Trying to match the Council’s investment in time and decision output with the rise and decline of the Council’s political standing during the 1990s leads to the realization that the alleged decline in the Council’s impact on internationally important conflicts and other emergencies at the end of that decade is apparently not reflected in terms of the frequency or relevance of the Council’s formal decisions. The upswing in numbers of meetings and hours of consultations indicates a growing immersion in the necessary diplomatic interactions out of which resolutions and presidential statements emerge. This sharp increase in time set aside for consultations of the whole—any other informal talks and inquiries are not counted under this rubric—together with the huge documentation put before the members for their processing reflects a busier and more conscientious intergovernmental body than had existed during the cold war and at the onset of the post-cold war era. Due to this strong evidence of the Council’s diligence and sincerity it warrants a much more detailed careful inquiry into particular cases and the string of debates and decisions composing the Council’s dealings and deliberations around these agenda items. Another salient feature of the post-cold war Council that has been noted in recent academic work on the UN is the dramatic rapid decline in the number of vetoes cast by any of the five permanent members. Over a whole decade, the number of substantive vetoes altogether comes to less than ten. Several of these were exercised by the United States, China, and the Russian Federation. The rarity of these veto applications illustrates strikingly the stability and pervasiveness of the basic accord and unanimity that the overwhelming majority of Council members have shown in the acclaim of the fundamental principles of the Char-


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ter and in their compliance with these norms in the exercise of their functions as Council members. The political and ideological diversity among the nonpermanent members, as well as among the P-5, as the permanent members are referred to, is still sufficiently large that the adoption of unanimous decisions by show of hands or by prior agreement is not a foregone conclusion. One can surmise that the enormous number of hours spent in consultations of the whole in 1998 and 1999 must have been necessary in order to arrive at a consensus on what to do in a pending matter. It deserves mentioning that consultations of the whole do not serve the purpose of empty rhetoric or unproductive polemics, since the interested public is not there to listen, nor are there open windows through which the speakers would address their own communities. As the proceedings are closed, whatever is said serves the purpose of responding to the colleagues and advancing the search for a generally acceptable consensus that promises to tackle the crisis at hand. Throughout the period under study and reaching even farther back into the years of the cold war, the call for decisive reforms in the workings of the Council has not stopped. The insistence that a largely secret process at the heart of the Council had to be opened up was a demand by many developing countries in the UN that felt excluded from the policy making of the Council, and was taken up by major states members, including especially France in the 1980s and more recently. The language utilized raised questions of transparency and openness and conveyed the stark impression that the deliberations behind closed doors covered up the illicit efforts at manipulation and coercion by the so-called “Great Powers,” in particular the US delegation. Throughout the years since 1984 to the present day, attempts have been made to lift the veil of secrecy and to invite outside parties to share in the debates and informal contacts around the many sessions of the Council in action. Special mention should be made of the evolution of what came to be known as the “Arria” formula involving inofficial and nonbinding contacts of Council members with outside groups and individuals requesting an opportunity for exchange of information and dialogue with interested states members of the Council. Making themselves available for these encounters and briefings provided a significant concession and led to a clear mitigation of the clamor for immediate and extensive change in Council proceedings. This formula also became very helpful in permitting Council members to reach out to engaged forces on humanitarian and human rights issues and on peacekeeping matters and other relevant concerns and in this fashion to promote the political thinking process out of which Council decisions were likely to evolve.8 This outreach function was similarly brought to affect the crucial relationship between the Council and the somewhat amorphous but proactive group of the troop-contributing countries (TCC). For many years, troop contributors that

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had been able to articulate concerns and publicize their side of the UN peacekeeping arguments within the framework of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations bitterly complained about lack of access to Council deliberations and binding decisions on the establishment and functioning of these important operations. In the mid-1990s, the Council finally bowed to the unending pressures from the troop contributors and agreed to arrange routinely and periodically for special sessions of the whole Council with the respective troop contributors participating in an ongoing or a planned complex peacekeeping and peace-building operation of the post-cold war era.9 This fundamental procedural reform was most welcome to the affected troop-contributing states and led to a much smoother and more focused process in connection with the numerous operations undertaken throughout the last ten to fifteen years. The effect of this improvement in understanding and cooperation has been felt in the manner in which the mandates were drafted and in which logistics and troop availability were successfully handled. Another crucial change in the conduct of Council meetings was the increased frequency of public and open formal meetings. Many of the principal debates in the second half of the 1990s were held in public session and with the active participation of interested non-Council member states in the course of the proceedings. Hereby, a major demand by the wider UN membership has been taken up and elegantly satisfied as the walls around the Council chamber have indeed become more transparent and porous as far as the multilateral dialogue in the UN is concerned. The constant pressure for such opening and transparency was clearly successful in bringing about the shift in the procedural practices of the Council and the commitment of its members to enhance the public image of the Council as the guardian of international peace and security.

Chapter Two


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aving looked at a number of important procedural matters dealt with by the Council during the time under review, I now turn to a more general analytical treatment of the Council at work and of its approach to the principal mandates given to it under the Charter and to the numerous difficult items taken up by the organ as a result of requests by affected or interested parties or of informal agreements by Council members, regional groups, or ad hoc alignments of states and non-state actors. In this review, material from many of the ongoing deliberations will be included in the consideration of the subject matter in order to relate the conclusions or arguments put forward here as closely as possible to the actual conduct of the Council’s business.1 It also will allow the identification of certain trends and developments shaping the record of the Council’s engagement and thus give quite a bit more firmness to the underlying propositions in regard to the active and growing place of the Council in matters of international peace and security. While the evaluation is focused on the last decade of the twentieth century, the reach backward will entail a few agenda items and their treatment in the Council dating from the mid-1980s, the point in time when the Council’s consensus on the meaningfulness of the Charter and the significance of its own mandate began to emerge, replacing the division and hostility of the cold war years. The Gorbachev factor responsible for this sea change only needs to be recalled here without going once again into a more detailed narrative on this most beneficial evolution. The underlying intent is directed toward bringing out the steadily evolving constellation in the Council’s work, reflecting the enormous range of its growing agenda and the recurring presence of highly divisive issues revealing lingering polemical matters breaking the newfound unity of purpose and restoring for brief moments old friction and antagonism. But while in the past these bones of contention paralyzed the Council’s decision making, the

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“new” Council started to deal with these clashes in a patient, professional matter, without giving rise to new hurdles in its responsibility for peace and security. This bifurcation between consensual and conflictual elements in the Council’s bearing is especially well illustrated in the handling of complicated matters arising from the violent and costly war between the new Iranian state and its Iraqi neighbor that had been raging since September 1980, when an Iraqi invasion started the violent encounter. The full story of the UN’s handling of that brutal struggle until it was finally ended through a cease-fire agreement negotiated by the Council and the secretary-general and at last accepted by both warring parties cannot be told in the context of this book.2 However, it should be underlined that only at the end of the cold war did the Council seize the opportunity to find the proper mix of reprimanding, prodding, and complimenting that would persuade Iraq and Iran, the latter being much more reluctant to trust the Council, to accept the accord and its application for the restoration of peace. What is especially remarkable in this case is the simultaneous discussion of a specific complaint by Iran against the United States that was openly and bitterly deliberated in a public Council meeting, with the then US vice president occupying the seat of the US representative. Had the basic mood of the Council not been as agreeable and collegial, the clash of the United States and theocratic Iran would have defeated any attempt at resolving the sharp tension. But the two sets of deliberation and consultation reveal in startling clarity the prevalence of the basic sense of unity and mandate that helped lead the antagonists away from confrontation and toward sufficient levels of cooperation, binding the Council’s endeavors and the implementation of unanimous decisions by the parties together. On 4 July 1988, a letter (S/19979) from the Iranian foreign minister had been transmitted to the secretary-general alleging that on July 3 the United States had shot down an Iranian civilian airliner over international waters, killing all 290 people on board. A day later, the representative of Iran requested (letter S/19981) a meeting of the Council to take up this matter. In response, the Council considered the issue from 14–20 July 1988, during its 2,818th to 2,821st meetings. In addition to Iran, several more member states sought and received invitations from the Council to attend its meetings on the Iranian complaint. The extensive declaration by the foreign minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran set forth the detailed accusations against the United States and described how the civilian airliner had been attacked and shot down by American patrol boats in the Gulf area. The downing of the plane also was to be condemned as it was over Iranian territorial water, outside the declared war zone. The full exposé, replete with references to the Charter and key principles of international law, clearly depicted the action of the US naval ship as illegal and refuted American countercharges as false and untenable.


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The reply by the US vice president speaking for the American delegation sought to rebut the Iranian charges and accused Iran of continually refusing to comply with the Council’s resolution 598 (1987), to negotiate an end of the war with Iraq, and to cease its acts of aggression against neutral shipping in the Gulf. He combined this harsh accusation with expressing his government’s respect for Iran’s right to air its grievances. But he insisted that Iran could not simultaneously complain to the Council and defy it. Having said this, the vice president conceded that the circumstances surrounding the downing of the airliner were still unclear, and he noted that the United States was currently investigating the issue. Despite repeated disclaimers regarding US guilt, the vice president also announced that his country shared the grief of the families of the victims and had decided to provide a voluntary ex gratia compensation to the families of those who had died, while maintaining the stance that his government was exclusively concerned with maintaining freedom of navigation and protecting its forces. Subsequent deliberations of the Council brought understated support for the US position by the British and French delegates as far as resolution 598 (1987) was concerned. The Soviet and Chinese representatives took more detached positions that mentioned the importance of finding peace through resolution 598 (1987) but gave credence to the Iranian allegations. After further statements and exchanges, the Council unanimously adopted a draft resolution that had been prepared in consultations, as resolution 616 (1988), showing the successful search for consensus by the Council on this somewhat difficult problem. Reflecting the delicate consultation period leading to the given consensus, the resolution in its key provisions deplored the fact of the airplane’s downing but did not assign blame to the alleged perpetrator of this unwarranted attack. It furthermore drew attention to investigations to be undertaken by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and welcomed the US announcement to cooperate with that international effort to shed light on the incident. In conclusion, the resolution also reiterated the Council’s full support for a rapid implementation of the provisions of resolution 598 (1987) relating to a cease-fire and peace process in the war between Iraq and Iran. The coincidence of the outcome of this debate culminating in the adoption of resolution 616 (1988) and the breakthrough in the pursuit of an effective cessation of fighting under resolution 598 (1987) explain the conciliatory manner with which the direct clash between the United States and Iran was treated. In this case, one can already observe the powerful impact of the new era of goodwill and cooperation between the two superpowers of the fading cold war world and its direct effect on given controversies in international security. Nevertheless, one should note that the US government saw no need to drop its own sharp criticism of the alleged belligerent behavior of the Iranian party. The decisive difference between the earlier years of stalemate and paralysis and the new period of comprehensive

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understanding and cooperation is the opening of many new ways of dealing with grave political crises and the elaboration of successful frameworks and formulae resulting in effective peace processes in the dawning post-cold war era. A brief comment is justified regarding the context and dynamic leading to the adoption of resolution 598 (1987) and, more importantly, to its realization in the summer of 1988 and beyond. One must recall the most complex context of the onset of the war between Iraq and Iran in September 1980, reflected in the key fact that the United States was extremely hostile to Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran and refused to view the dyadic confrontation of the two neighboring Gulf states in a fair and an impartial fashion but instead took the Iraqi side in order to hurt the Iranian foe. Out of this awkward beginning, the door to any multilateral or traditional diplomatic initiative for peace was closed for years after the war started with a sudden military invasion by Saddam Hussein’s armies hinting at territorial ambitions and the grab for petroleum-rich areas. The undeniable fact that Iraq had initiated the military conflict was never openly acknowledged by the important members of the international community, and it took six years before, in a nonaligned draft resolution before the Council, the first operative paragraph had the Council “deplore the initial acts which gave rise to the conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq and deplore the continuation of the conflict.” This draft was unanimously adopted at the 2,666th meeting on 24 February 1986 as resolution 582 (1986). The crucial importance of this big step forward by the Council was underlined by the dispatch of a letter (S/17864 and Corr. 1) by Iran following the adoption of resolution 582 (1986), in which the Iranian foreign minister stated that the Council had finally come to realize that it needed to consider the aggression of Iraq. While he called the resolution still unbalanced, he saw it nevertheless as a positive step toward the condemnation of Iraq and as a just conclusion to the war. In this connection he emphasized Iran’s full support for the mediation efforts of the secretary-general. Through this message, which was warmly welcomed by the members of the Council, the next steps were clearly made easier in the search for an opening in this entrenched war, although the focus on the question of war guilt as a precondition for any accommodation was bound to also exacerbate the matter. In the subsequent path of Council utterances it should be noted that the mention of the cause of the war, namely, Iraqi aggression, started to emerge as the key criterion for an end to the fighting. Cutting short the brief review of the Iran-Iraq war, the story moves up to the drafting and adoption of resolution 598 (1987). As often reported, this resolution was the result of a special effort of the five permanent members together with the secretary-general who, in the newfound harmony and unanimity of the two superpowers and their friends and allies, had declared their readiness to facilitate after more than seven years of bloody fighting involving even the use of


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chemical weapons primarily by Iraq and severe human rights violations on both sides the cessation of fighting and the inception of a mediated peace process. In the Council’s 2,750th meeting on 20 July 1987, at which the resolution was unanimously adopted, the statements of several nonpermanent members—among them the foreign ministers of the Federal Republic of Germany and of Italy—on the one hand praised the draft submitted to the nonpermanent members by the veto powers but on the other took exception with the highly unusual procedure that had been used by the five permanent members. Still, the decisive aspect of this crucial decision leading to its formal acceptance by Iraq and several months later by Iran was the catalogue of key provisions constituting the Council’s blueprint for peace. The conditions listed in operative paragraphs 1 through 8 were part of a package that could not be broken up. But paragraph 6 highlighted the request to the secretary-general “to explore, in consultation with Iran and Iraq, the question of entrusting an impartial body with inquiring into responsibility for the conflict.” The delicate wording itself reveals the precarious nature of a measure that had to be acceptable to Iraq as well as to Iran. The trail of this particular element in the peace package can be traced back to early 1985, when the secretarygeneral reported to the Council that the issue of the war guilt was a conditio sine qua non for the Iranian party. Although the full case and its comprehensive context provided significantly more impediments to the third-party attempts at launching some process to obtain an end to the fighting and possibly a bit of a peace accord restoring at least a modicum of normalcy and stability in the Gulf region, it would appear from a detailed analysis of the Council’s involvement in the matter that the war guilt feature was the catalytic focus out of which the parties finally reached the end point in their violent confrontation. To rephrase what has been said, the role of the Council in this regional conflict that benefited directly from the waning of the bipolar rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union deserves closest attention. Whereas initially in 1980 Iran refused totally to associate itself in any form or shape with the institution and role of the Council explaining its anger by reference to biased Council decisions taken after the war had started and only dealt with Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar, following Waldheim’s personal fiasco over the grave crisis arising from the illegal detention of US diplomats in post-Shah Tehran, the change of the international situation in the mid-1980s, largely owing to the previously mentioned rise to power of Gorbachev in the Soviet Union, must be estimated to have been decisive in breaking the ice over the Iran-Iraq war and restoring to its full authority and active involvement the Council as a factor in the search for peace. This does not mean that the Council and the secretary-general were the only actors in that prolonged search, but other international organizations, both regional and functional, namely, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Non-Aligned

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Movement, and less actively also the European Community, were engaged in numerous intensive approaches, feelers, and concrete offers to open up the fierce battle to attempts at mitigating, transforming, or resolving the intractable conflict. In the end, the central place of the Council emerges in the totality of thirdparty initiatives and recommendations as the pinnacle of these activities. It has been shown in the two Iran-related items that the overall amicable atmosphere in the “new” Council calmed the proceedings and affected the positive outcomes in both deliberations. Not even a year later, the Council had to take up a very angry request by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (S/20364), seconded by Bahrain (S/20367) in its capacity as chair of the Group of Arab States, in which the United States was accused of downing two Libyan reconnaissance aircraft over international waters. These two requests, dated 4 January 1989, seeking an urgent meeting of the Council, clearly touched upon the extremely hostile relationship between the United States and Libya, which had led to severe clashes in the 1980s over matters of terrorism and the long-standing Libyan position as a rejectionist state against the state of Israel. The issue between the world’s leading power and the little though oil-rich Libya was, of course, clearly stacked against the Libyan side. Still, at a time where the leading members of the Council had largely reconciled and begun to collaborate eagerly and to great effect, the Libyan leadership and many governments in the Arab world and in the Non-Aligned Movement felt that the US-Libyan controversy belonged by right in the Council, despite conceivable misgivings on the part of the US government or other Western states. Thus they sought the Council’s attention, aware of the foreseeable negative outcome. Herein lies another demonstration of the Council’s role as a protector of the small and weak in the modern international system. The Libyan case is of considerable interest also because it constitutes a rather striking parallel to the case involving the Iranian airliner. In both the charge that the United States had downed the planes was not contested by the accused party, but in both cases the United States put forth the legal argument that its ship and planes were the target of hostile attacks in international waters and airspace and exercised the right to self-defense under international law. In the Iranian case, the US representative forcefully rebutted the adversary’s charges but agreed to a compromise resolution, including the US gesture toward recompensation of the victims. However, in the Libyan item, the United States not only set out its position, but it strictly refused any reconciliation with the Libyan adversary. This basic difference between the two cases indicates to the interested observer that in the new cooperative proactive Council of 1989 room was still available for the verbal battles arising out of a sharp contrast between irreconcilable parties and the blunt airing of their clashing perspectives. It should, of course, not come as a surprise that the Libyan party was absolutely outspoken and provocative in its statements confirming earlier and later policies of this Arab state.


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Needless to say, this Libyan item resulted in a series of polemical and factual statements extending over, altogether, six public meetings (2,835th–2,837th and 2,839th–2,841st) from 5–11 January 1989. This lengthy “shouting match” was reflective of the wide gap in the positions of the two direct parties and of the conviction of the nonaligned debaters that they could achieve a favorable outcome insofar as they brought the tense encounter into the wide open of the international community. Although the verbatim record does not reveal whether Libya and its supporters and sympathizers had any hope to sway the United States to accept a compromise, it stands to reason from the given constellation that neither side expected anything tangible to come out of this deliberation. Still, the Libyan party saw this as an opportunity to resist the mighty dominance of the United States on the international stage. As to the American side in this Council deliberation, it was very clear that even at this point in the rapidly changing international atmosphere the US administration saw no reason to be in any manner conciliatory and willing to show an open mind regarding the Libyan charges. Recalling the troublesome events in the bellicose relationship between Libya and the United States throughout the 1980s, one would find not the slightest reason to expect anything but immense hostility prevailing between the two antagonists. The record of the Council’s meetings confirms the bleak evaluation of the prospects for that round of fruitless statements. It proves to be quite illuminating to examine the formal declarations made in the public sessions, as they do not convey the harsh atmosphere of the cold war years, but to detect the warmth of collegiality prevailing even in the context of a sharp clash over alleged events and their legality or illegality in light of codified and customary international law. Although the two principal parties did not hold back in their rhetoric, most of the other speakers avoided shrill language and extreme assertions and placed the emphasis on the positive aspects of refraining from further violations and complying especially with the key norms of the Charter. The text of the draft resolution was fully reflective of this tendency toward moderation and common sense, in that sense rendering the rejection of the draft politically more unpalatable. The emphasis on constructive initiatives and reasonable steps was especially striking in the statements by the Soviet Union (2,836th meeting) and China (2,837th meeting), who appealed in particular to the United States to defuse the tensions with Libya and change the direction of its policy toward dialogue and negotiation and thus promote a peaceful solution to the crisis. Similarly, the representatives of the United Kingdom (UK) (2,841st meeting) and France (2,839th meeting) also kept the level of their formal statement very low and free of accusations as they explained to the Council and the other interested states that they would join the United States in opposing the draft resolution as presented, since it could be interpreted as restricting

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the legal principles of freedom of movement, maritime and in the air, in international areas. The UK delegate further underscored the inherent right to selfdefense as spelled out in Article 51 of the Charter and forcefully argued in the given case by the United States. The contested phrases of the draft resolution leading to the triple veto of the United States, the UK, and France and a negative vote by Canada were basically operative paragraphs 1–3 deploring the downing of the two Libyan reconnaissance planes; calling upon the United States to suspend its military maneuvers off of the Libyan coast; and calling upon all parties to refrain from resorting to force, and so on. As indicated already, the language of these disputed provisions was greatly controlled and smoothed. But the United States, feeling totally innocent in this quarrel, obviously had been completely unwilling to see that kind of language flow into a formal decision of the Council. Thereby, the Council’s deliberations can be judged to have ended in a draw between the two contestants. Libya was allowed to state its case and express its complaint about the United States “bullying” smaller states at will. It was able to gain a hearing and some sympathy from other members of the international community, and it might even have secured some protection against further US threats and pressures. The United States, on the other hand, stood its ground and rallied explicit support from its main allies in the Council but managed similarly to keep the channels of communication wide open with its other partners in the emerging beneficial international political climate. The continued amity and warmth in the Council’s political process in the following years verify this outcome of the US-Libyan controversy. The start of the period being evaluated here shows quite well that the agenda of the Council in the years during the waning of the bipolar world and the decade of the 1990s was not only immense but also of great diversity, thus giving rise to a wide range of policy options for the fifteen Council members. The gap between conciliatory interaction and unbending stubborn insistence that emerges in two of the cases touched upon earlier, though in varying measure, occasionally disrupts the general atmosphere of goodwill and cooperation throughout the years until the millennium.

Chapter Three

The Phase of the Resurgence of the UN Security Council

T

he period 1990–1992 stands out as the critical moment in the history of the UN Security Council in which, after decades of limited involvement, the Council members were suddenly confronted with a rapidly growing accumulation of grave international crises that amounted to enormous challenges for the revitalized central peace organ in the world organization. The year 1990 saw the start of the war of Iraq against Kuwait, a huge item that cost a lot of time and much aggravation, and the subsequent year pulled the UN, and especially the Council, into the Yugoslavia quagmire from which to be extricated required years of international efforts by the Council and numerous governments as well as some regional organizations. Suddenly the Council saw itself pressed by so many international crises and emergencies that the attention to basic matters relating to the Charter and its own Rules of Procedure was lagging, and important reform initiatives could not be advanced with the care they deserved. As indicated earlier, the sheer number of formal meetings grew rapidly, and the hours of consultations spent before the formal gatherings also increased by leaps and bounds. A brief overview of the Council’s reports for the period June 1990–June 1992 reveals in a glance the huge agenda of the Council and the immense complexity of most of the items before it. Together with the perennial questions of the Middle East and Cyprus, one finds listed in the period 1990–1991 the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, Central America, efforts toward peace, Cambodia, and Angola, Western Sahara, and Liberia. In the period 1991–1992, numerous Yugoslavia-related agenda items and the question of Haiti, Libya, Somalia, and Nagorno-Karabakh were added to the steadily increasing load of items before the Council. The newly revitalized body of fifteen members saw itself compelled to hold daily meetings and engage in hour-long consultations and deliberations to come to grips with the controversial disputes

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and endless arguments presented by the parties themselves and by a considerable number of interested states as third parties. The impressive record of the Council’s achievement in those years when it was center stage in world politics is clear testimony to the resurgence of the UN and its main organs during the period of opportunity after the collapse of the old bipolar order of the cold war. In view of the intense workload of the Council, it is even more remarkable that the members found time to commit themselves in a very stunning fashion to the values and norms of this revitalized world organization. The occasion for this rededication to the principles and goals of the UN was the first time ever meeting of the Council at the level of heads of state and government on 31 January 1992. This central event in the early 1990s has been mentioned many times, but for the present purpose, it behooves the observer and analyst to take another look at this gathering and its profound consensus declaration at its conclusion. Opening the special 3,046th meeting on 31 January 1992, the British prime minister serving as president made brief introductory remarks. He identified four important purposes that the high-level gathering was to serve. First, he saw the presence of the heads of state and government in the Council as marking a turning point in the world and at the UN. Second, the Council should reaffirm its attachment to the principle of collective security and to the resolution of disputes in accordance with the principles of the Charter. Third, the members should consider anew the means to uphold collective security, that is, preventive action, peace making, and peacekeeping. Fourth, Council members should pledge to uphold international peace and security through reinforced measures of arms control for which not only the Council but also the whole Organization had to play an increasingly important role. In conclusion, he made mention of the concerns for economic development and prosperity, which were needed to achieve lasting peace and stability. Among the weighty declarations offered at that remarkable meeting, some deserve special attention in that they reflect the enormous expansion of the Council’s mandate and agenda occurring during the early 1990s and thus radically changing the pale and withdrawn posture characterizing this Charter body in the bygone era of bipolarity and the cold war. French President Mitterand offered thoughts and suggestions, stressing the need for comprehensive, universal action for the guarantee of collective security and for the creation of new forms of solidarity. He referred specifically to economic issues, to the questions of the environment and of human rights, and he emphasized the key role of UN peacekeeping for which his government pledged to have 1,000 troops ready for UN deployment within forty-eight hours. It is quite noteworthy that the president of Ecuador impressed through his eloquent and highly focused address dealing with several key issues afflicting the spirit of modern humanity, as he called it. The first issue was the global preva-


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lence of violence in all of its forms and manifestations. The second issue was identified as the limitation of power, again comprehensively circumscribed. Third, the protection of the environment was highlighted as an expression of solidarity with the coming generations. Last, the speaker mentioned human development embracing a broad range of tangible and intangible values and possessions determining the quality of a people’s life. In a world where aggressive intentions, inferiority complexes leading to violence, and misanthropy in the minds of certain political leaders persisted, where racial and religious fanaticism, senseless nationalism, and xenophobia threatened the harmonious coexistence of peoples, the UN had been lending valuable services to mankind. The Ecuadorian president remembered his call for the pope’s arbitration in an old territorial dispute between Peru and Ecuador. In summing up his significant comments, he enthusiastically endorsed the initiative for a global summit on social development, as poverty still was a serious problem giving rise to threats to the peace; for his government and people, human development was clearly the most important problem of the day, since in the marginal countries there was more poverty, more unemployment, and more social instability than ten years earlier. Speaking for the newly established Russian Federation, President Yeltsin reviewed the main goals and policies of the re-born Russian state and joined previous speakers in emphasizing the guarantee of all human rights and freedoms as the top priority of governments throughout the world. He mentioned with justified pride that there were no prisoners of conscience in free Russia anymore following the presidential pardon of the remaining political prisoners a few days ago. Welcoming the increased efforts of the UN to strengthen global and regional stability and to build a new democratic world order based on the equality of all states, he shared the view of the French president, that a special rapid-response mechanism should be set up for expeditious deployment in areas of crisis, and he promised his country’s fullest collaboration in these efforts. President Bush, speaking for the United States, stressed the challenge and opportunity to advance the momentous movement toward democracy and freedom and expand the number of countries committed to human rights and the rule of law. Looking back to the joint military action reversing the Iraqi aggression against neighboring Kuwait, the American president informed the other dignitaries about far-reaching steps taken by the United States to reduce nuclear weapons and expressed eagerness to generate international cooperative action regarding weapons of mass destruction. He called the moment another crossroads offering the chance to make the Charter strong and sturdy through increased dedication and cooperation. The federal chancellor of Austria similarly described the daunting tasks of the member states in close cooperation with the secretary-general to strengthen the UN in peace making and peacekeeping, to make progress in disarmament

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and arms control, to promote human rights, minority rights, and democratic processes for development, prosperity, and peace, and to take effective measures against poverty for stability and security in international relations. He specifically underlined the urgent need for preventive diplomacy by the Council and secretary-general and advised the Council to take a fresh look at disarmament matters, as indicated in Articles 26, 43, and related implicit provisions in the Charter. He concurred with other speakers that democracy and human rights were endangered in conditions of poverty, and that no political system had ever been able to ensure peace and security in the absence of social justice. The prime minister of Belgium identified the three most important tasks before the international community: (1) cooperation and coordination between the UN and international regional organizations; (2) extension of the powers of initiative and inquiry of the secretary-general and the Council; and (3) the greatest possible efficiency of the UN peacekeeping operations. The prime minister of Cape Verde welcomed the new era of cooperation and called upon the UN, through its Council, to act as the guardian of the security of nations, especially small countries, and as a catalyst for the promotion of the primacy of the rule of law in international relations. He stressed that the Council’s role in promoting a safer and more stable climate needed strengthening and mentioned here in particular the implementation of the collective security system envisaged in the Charter. The premier of the State Council of China also acknowledged the turning point in history and declared that the world was moving in the direction of multipolarity. He warned that the gap between the North and the South continued to widen, and that this condition, if allowed to continue, would lead to fresh disturbances or even regional conflicts. He submitted that the new international order should be established on the basis of the core principle of noninterference in each other’s internal affairs and added that human rights and fundamental freedoms of all human beings should be universally respected. The prime minister of India added his voice in warning that the UN could not function usefully or harmoniously while humankind continued to be riddled with ever-increasing disparities and while the world’s natural resources, which were really humanity’s common heritage, were quickly being depleted by thoughtless acts of overexploitation and environmental degradation. He drew the Council’s attention to India’s action plan to eliminate nuclear weapons altogether and ventured to suggest that, going beyond that plan, the target date for a nuclear-weapon-free world should be advanced to the end of the twentieth century. Japan’s prime minister on his part expressed serious concern that the current trend toward world peace could not endure unless the peace dividend were shared by all, but especially the peoples of the South suffering from famine,


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poverty, disease, and other hardships. In this connection he proposed that concrete ways should be sought to strengthen the role of the UN in facing nonmilitary threats to the future security and prosperity of the world population, including those relating to the environment, refugees, and poverty. The minister for foreign affairs of Hungary stressed that the transition to democracy and a free economy in Central and Eastern Europe would be very difficult and would require a close watch. He referred here to the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, which could plunge the world into a critical state, and to the actual explosion in what was Yugoslavia, a serious threat to international peace and security and full of grave implications. The foreign minister of Zimbabwe spoke about ominous developments that threatened to suffocate the fragile positive trends recently seen and pointed to conflicts and tensions of a new nature erupting in regions that had been spared instability earlier. He called for reexamining the Charter as a way to construct a new world order, rectifying flaws and gaps and updating obsolete provisions. He cautioned against hasty resort to the application of Article 42 involving international enforcement action and urged more use of Article 41 authorizing collective measures not involving the use of armed force, such as economic sanctions and other nonmilitary measures. The impact of especially comprehensive economic sanctions on third countries should be eased under the provision of Article 50, which should be further clarified to determine assistance and resource mobilization for affected states. He offered specific suggestions to strengthen Article 46, giving a role to the Military Staff Committee as well as widening its membership, and he recommended that the rule that a party to a dispute abstain from voting should be applied to Chapter VII so that veto powers could not block the imposition of sanctions or any other collective enforcement action where they were party to a conflict. Following earlier steps by Zimbabwe and other nonaligned states subscribing to the principle that general and complete disarmament could only be achieved in the multilateral forum of the Council, the meeting was urged, in light of the General Assembly’s decision to set up the Arms Transfer Register, to seek to boost multilateral disarmament by use of relevant provisions of Articles 26 and 47 (1) empowering the Council to put into place a system for the regulation of armaments. Taking the floor at the end of the extensive and inspiring round of declarations and speaking in his capacity as British prime minister, the president looked back at the most recent decisions of the Council and wondered what the actual meaning was of preventive diplomacy or crisis prevention as well as peace making and peacekeeping in the new world situation. While the UN had a collective security system, it was clear that it could be further improved, and for that reason the Council’s meeting could set this process in motion in order to exploit the unrealized potential of the Charter.

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In conclusion, the president read the statement (S/23500) that he had been authorized by the members to make on their behalf. This lengthy seminal declaration reflecting the consensus of the assembled heads of state and government reveals in a dramatic fashion the change and breakthrough that the world had experienced in the prior years and sets out the radical new agenda of a revitalized Council in the post-cold war era. The Council’s fervent emphasis on the new world situation and the proactive call for an energetic effort to address effectively the novel threats to peace and security constituted a clarion call to the world community to rally behind a newly strengthened and revitalized instrument of global governance, the UN as a whole and the Council in particular. The significance of this stellar moment in the history of global governance cannot be overstated. It claimed a lofty role for the Council and an enormously widened conception of international peace and security. The full scope of this awesome step in the creation of a new universal order can only be grasped in the complete text of the presidential statement of 31 January 1992 (fully reproduced in the Appendix). Out of this new awareness of paradigmatic changes in international relations ending decades of paralyzing cold war rivalry, the request was issued to the secretary-general to elaborate the inspiring ideas of a new international peace order sketched out in the visionary statement of the British Council president. It was reliably reported at the time of this first-time Security Council summit that the presidential statement had been drafted in the UK foreign ministry and had been quietly consulted and agreed to by all fifteen members, thus representing indeed the collective vision of the assembled leaders. Compared to the audacious phrasing of the presidential statement, the “Agenda for Peace” report was markedly more cautious and realistic, reflecting the political limitations placed upon the secretariat and especially on the secretary-general as its head. For the purposes of this critical analysis no detailed summary of the considerations and suggestions of the secretary-general is needed, as the focus is on the views of the Council and its members. What is highly significant, however, is the reaction of the Council to the recommendations of the SG. The attention and care shown by the Council members are displayed in the careful and painstaking manner with which the Council took up the various aspects of the SG’s study and its concrete ideas for application in UN activities in conflict prevention as well as peace making and peacekeeping. As the Council stated in its first of a long series of formal statements on the Agenda for Peace report, it had decided to devote at least one meeting a month to the consideration of this important document, beginning at the end of October 1992 and running through May 1993. In the subsequent thematic survey over the peacekeeping dossier as dealt with by the Council, several of these monthly examinations have been included. But the remainder is touched upon and succinctly summarized in


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order to give expression to the Council’s strong support for the restructuring and improvement of the peace and security work carried out by the UN in numerous crises and emergencies. On 30 November 1992, following consultations of the Council, the president issued a statement on fact-finding on behalf of the members of the Council (S/24872), which contained inter alia the following views: The Council welcomed the proposals on fact-finding in the SG’s report and held that an increased resort to fact-finding as a tool of preventive diplomacy could result in the best possible understanding of the objective facts of a situation that would enable the SG to meet his responsibilities under Article 99 of the Charter and facilitate the Council’s deliberations. The Council members further invited the SG to consider appropriate measures necessary to strengthen the capacity of the secretariat for information gathering and in-depth analysis and recommended the engagement of experts and eminent persons to share the difficult assignments, including fact-finding missions. The Council also welcomed the positive role of regional organizations in fact-finding within their areas of competence and favored close coordination between their efforts and those of the UN. Moreover, the Council saw great merit in the idea that in some cases fact-finding missions could help defuse a dispute or situation in that they conveyed to those concerned that the UN and the Council were actively aware of the matter as a threat to the international peace. To illustrate the greater use of fact-finding missions, the Council mentioned specifically recent missions to Moldova, Nagorny Karabakh, Georgia, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, all new conflict areas in the former Soviet Union. At the end of the next month, December 1992, the Council held informal consultations regarding another aspect of the report entitled “An Agenda for Peace,” namely, the very contentious question of whether other states that were confronted with special economic problems when sanctions in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter were imposed on a state, for example, Iraq in 1990, and had a right under Article 50 to consult the Council, could be given appropriate consideration. The presidential statement (S/25036) was issued at the end of the 3,154th meeting on behalf of the Council; herein, the Council took note of the question raised by several states claiming economic losses due to their compliance with nonmilitary sanctions imposed by the Council. Handling this difficult question in a most cautious manner, the Council members expressed agreement to consider such submissions under Article 50 and invited the secretary-general to pursue his own suggestion and to discover to what extent international financial institutions and other components of the UN system could be brought to bear on this difficulty. Pending a further more specific report by the secretary-general, the Council members assured the claimants that the Council would continue to examine this critical financial matter.

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While the Council merely acted to move the process forward in regard of Article 50, it addressed during the next month in great detail the principal issue of UN cooperation with regional arrangements and organizations, a subject matter of central significance in the Agenda for Peace report. Responding to a forceful argument by the SG on that aspect of the evolving framework of international cooperation, the Council members, through the presidential statement (S/25184), began their long declaration with a reaffirmation of their basic determination that the post-cold war world constituted a new phase in international relations. It further suggested that the close interrelationship between the UN and the regional organizations would conform to the letter and spirit of the Charter, especially Chapter VIII, and would promote a more stable international system. Within this broad conception, the regional partners were invited to pay special attention to their potential contributions in preventive diplomacy, factfinding, confidence building, good offices, peace building, and, where appropriate, peacekeeping. The Council’s statement further advanced a comprehensive list of venues and opportunities through which the closer bonds between the UN and the regional organizations and arrangements could be further strengthened and thus would deepen their joint responsibility in the fulfillment of the core Charter mandate in international peace and security. Moreover, the members of the Council advised states that belonged both to the UN and to regional organizations to play constructive roles in both and especially to help coordinate the activities of both organizations. In this connection the Council issued an appeal to all regional bodies to formally associate with the UN and obtain observer status at the UN. Special mention was made of the specific recent decision of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to consider itself a regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of the Charter and to examine the practical implications of this step. A similarly extensive and careful statement (S/25344) was issued a month later, on 26 February 1993, at the 3,178th meeting, on the most urgent matter of humanitarian assistance in its relationship to peace making, peacekeeping, and peace building. Here too the Council members spoke with one voice after consultations of the Council and started out with a fundamental endorsement of the SG’s assessment that the impartial provision of humanitarian assistance would be critically important in preventive diplomacy. Connecting humanitarian assistance with fact-finding, the Council recommended that the humanitarian dimension be incorporated in the planning and dispatching of fact-finding missions. Noting with concern the frequency of humanitarian crises, including mass displacements of population, which created and aggravated threats to international peace and security, the Council members underscored the importance of including humanitarian considerations and indicators within the context of early-warning information capacities mentioned in the SG’s report. The Council referred


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specifically to the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, which played a key role in coordinating humanitarian agencies and functional offices of the UN, and believed that this capacity should be applied systematically to a pre-emergency phase to facilitate planning for action to help governments avert crises that could destabilize international peace. The Council further commended ongoing collaboration between the UN and regional partners in addressing humanitarian emergencies in order to solve them in a manner specific to each specific situation. It praised in this context the important role played by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in humanitarian emergencies and urged the SG to examine the possibility to strengthen the UN capacity with the help of these NGOs. The Council expressed dismay about the increasing deliberate obstruction of delivery of humanitarian relief and violence against humanitarian personnel, as well as misappropriation of humanitarian assistance, as found in the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Somalia, to name just three main cases, and it stressed the urgent need for adequate protection of humanitarian personnel. The members of the Council held that humanitarian assistance should help enhance stability through rehabilitation and development, emphasized the need for adequate planning, and noted that humanitarian considerations might become or continue to be important during periods of transition from relief to development as peace making and peacekeeping efforts began to be consolidated. In that sense, the Council viewed coordinated humanitarian assistance as a basic peace building tool available to the UN SG and the organization as a whole. After devoting the March 1993 presidential statement (S/25493) to the topic of safety of UN forces and personnel deployed in conditions of strife, a subject matter dealt with later under the peacekeeping heading, the Council took up the crucial theme of postconflict peace building during April 1993 and issued its statement (S/25696) at the 3,207th meeting on 30 April 1993. Again, the Council took painstaking care in examining this new topic and offering its views to the international community at large. Following its prior consultations, the Council, through its president, expressed its conviction that peace building was decisive for building strong foundations for peace in all countries and regions of the world and added that equal emphasis should be placed on UN objectives in respect to economic cooperation and development as on its commitments in political and security matters. In examining the question of postconflict peace building, the Council expressed its wish to highlight the urgency of the UN work in development cooperation, without prejudice to the recognized priorities for the UN as defined by the competent bodies. The Council endorsed the very wide definition and conception of peace building as proposed by the SG and added activities, such as disarming and demobilization of belligerent forces and their reintegration into society, electoral assistance, the restoration of national security through formation of national defense and police forces and mine clearing, where appropriate, which

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would strengthen national political structures and enhance institutional and administrative capabilities, thus restoring a sound basis for sustainable peace. Referring to its role in the prevention of breaches of peace and in the resolution of conflicts, the Council encouraged coordinated action in the UN system to remedy the underlying causes of threats to peace and security. It further took up the need for adequate financial resources that would make peace building effective and appealed to all member states and financial and other UN bodies and agencies as well as other organizations outside the UN system to make the necessary funding available for specific projects, such as the earliest possible return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes of origin. As the organ having primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the Council fully recognized that social peace was as important as strategic or political peace, and it seconded the SG’s view that technical assistance was a new requirement for these purposes. The brief survey over the Council’s specialized comments on the key aspects of the programmatic content of the Agenda for Peace demonstrates startlingly the success with which the Council members took up and handled the challenging new dimensions of the wide-ranging action program set forth in these well-formulated principal declarations of the Council in dialogue with its counterpart, the SG. The sum total of these statements pulled together in a final summary statement issued on 28 May 1993, at the 3,225th meeting (S/25859) amounted to a framework of basic mandates and functions complemented by guidance in what steps would be advisable and conceivable to construct the instrument of global governance in the “new” UN. The Council and its dynamic process of deliberation and decision making had offered a fine example to emulate in grasping the novelty of the emerging international relations and adjusting the perspectives and responses of the UN as the central organization to the transformed world around it. In the following years of the decade of the 1990s, the Council returned to the Agenda for Peace item only one more time, leaving out the instances mentioned earlier when peacekeeping aspects were considered under that overarching thematic cover. This other occasion was devoted to the grave matter of demining that had been viewed by the then secretary-general in 1992 already as a priority concern on humanitarian as well as on peacekeeping grounds. Asking initially the newly created Department of Humanitarian Affairs to include this difficult question in its challenging mandate, the secretary-general and his team of close aides realized soon enough that the peacekeeping work of the organization also was directly affected by the scourge of antipersonnel land mines in most if not all conflict zones where the UN was engaged in this postconflict role. By early January 1995, when the secretary-general submitted as a supplement to the Agenda for Peace a position paper on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of


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the UN (S/1995/1), international attention to the global land mines crisis resulting from the many sites of violent conflict and human suffering had reached a high level and was included in the secretary-general’s assessment as to what was changed in the international situation and where a change of direction or a new emphasis was called for. Herein included was a prominent reference to the demining challenge and what the littering of about 100 million antipersonnel land mines in about sixty-five countries meant for the fulfillment of the UN’s peace and security mandate. Responding to the reflections and suggestions of the secretary-general, the Council members issued an extensive presidential statement (S/PRST/1995/9) that contained a brief reference to the land mines problem, expressing support for international measures to curb the spread of these dreadful mines, welcomed a set of recent resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly on the matter, and in view of the tremendous humanitarian problems caused by the presence of these mines and other unexploded devices to the populations of mine-infested countries emphasized the need for increased mine-clearing efforts by the countries concerned and with the assistance of the international community. This brief comment was greatly expanded on the occasion of a very comprehensive examination of the whole de-mining issue that the Council undertook at the 3,689th meeting on 15 August 1996, and at the 3,693rd meeting on 30 August 1996, when the Council members through their president, presented their timely and focused decision regarding the deepening land mines crisis. The first part of this close look at the global land mines epidemic took place in an open public meeting of the Council running over the full day on 15 August and giving an opportunity to all members of the Council and numerous outside parties, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, to address this pressing political, military, and humanitarian concern. The long session of thoughtful and informative statements brought the terrible effect of these vicious small weapons home to all participants in the Council’s deliberations. A large number of speakers represented countries infested by huge numbers of the insidious antipersonnel mines in nonmarked areas throughout former conflict zones, requiring many years of dangerous work of mine detection and clearance. The long deliberation on de-mining as it affected UN peacekeeping gave rise not only to numerous recommendations and opinions about the manner in which UN peacekeepers were affected by the unknown danger of the killing land mines in areas of their deployment and what and how they could be protected or better protect themselves against this present danger; similar views also were expressed in many statements regarding the deadening impact of undetectable land mines ending the lives of innocent children and maiming countless adults walking in fields and meadows met by the terrible fate of an exploding mine or other type of ordnance.

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The long discussion of this universal scourge in the chamber of the world’s highest organ for the maintenance of international peace and security spelled out the full range of misery and pain inflicted by millions of unmarked antipersonnel mines around the world on many thousands of innocent human beings whose future would be inextricably shaped by that fateful encounter with a weapon crippling its victims. It was encouraging to see the representatives of powerful states view the phenomenon of a mine-plagued world in as somber a tone as the delegates of the many states in the third world and of states in conflict and press for energetic and well-targeted steps to fight the plague of mines and to seek to ban them completely and for all times. Reflecting the momentum of a global campaign to ban antipersonnel land mines, the representative of Canada expressly drew the attention of the Council to his government’s invitation for an international conference to be held in Ottawa in October of the same year in order to discuss and hopefully finalize a draft convention toward such a comprehensive global ban. He made special mention of the key role of a large NGO coalition that had been instrumental in the pursuit of this big objective and would be a key actor at the Ottawa gathering. Such a confluence of governmental and nongovernmental drive had proven to be able to overcome powerful resistance from major powers and foreshadowed a crucial breakthrough in the area of small arms disarmament. The New Zealand representative added his voice to the growing chorus of fervent advocates for a swift and total prohibition of land mines altogether and described in compelling language his own government’s systematic policy of denouncing the use of mines, rallying support domestically and internationally, especially through the UN, to rush toward decisive action in this critical matter. The astonishing impetus in this widening campaign was further documented in the statement of the representative of Ireland speaking on behalf of the twenty-three countries of the European Union and associated countries and providing a wide-ranging account of the multiple efforts of the European states to make material and ideational contributions to the target of ridding the world of the land mines plague. Especially noteworthy were the declarations of the permanent observer of Switzerland to the UN and of the head of the delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross to the UN offering a detailed description of the vital role played by the Swiss state and community in advancing on that goal in view of its massive destructive impact on the essential humanitarian activities carried out under the auspices of the International Red Cross and the Swiss people. The total of forty statements that together represented the full range of the de-mining problem and covered most conceptual and policy-related aspects that would affect the decision to be taken by the Council and the foreseeable course of action in the accelerating international anti-land mines campaign cannot be


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summarized in this review. It constitutes, however, a persuasive explanation for the subsequent Council utterance in the form of a presidential statement issued at the 3,693rd meeting on 30 August 1996. Without further statements and in accordance with prior consultations of the Council, the president made the following statement on behalf of the Council (S/PRST/1996/37), which read inter alia as follows: . . . The Council, bearing in mind its responsibilities with regard to UN peacekeeping, notes that the widespread indiscriminate use of anti-personnel mines in areas of UN peacekeeping operations poses serious impediments to such operations and to the safety of UN and other international personnel. Against this background, the Council states the following: 1. Operational demining should be, wherever appropriate, an important element and an integral part of peacekeeping mandates. . . . 2. The early deployment of mine clearance will often be important to the effectiveness of a peacekeeping operation. The Council encourages the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations to examine options for achieving such early deployment. . . . 3. The tasks of, on the one hand, operational mine clearance during peacekeeping operations, . . . , and on the other hand, longer-term humanitarian mine-clearance activities, . . . , are different. The Council is, however, aware of linkages and complementarities between different elements of conflict resolution as well as of the need to ensure a smooth transition from demining as a peacekeeping requirement to demining as part of peace building in a follow-up phase. The Council, thus, is of the opinion that coordination and delineation of responsibilities between the two departments (DPKO and DHA) as well as with regard to other UN agencies dealing with demining could be further improved. . . . 4. The primary responsibility for demining in the context of UN peacekeeping lies with parties responsible for the laying of mines. Parties to a conflict must desist from further mine laying once a peacekeeping operation is established. They are also obliged to facilitate humanitarian and military demining efforts by providing detailed maps and other relevant information on those mines that have already been laid by them and by contributing financially or otherwise to their removal. 5. The international community should intensify efforts to assist parties in mine clearance and related activities and contribute to the newly established UN Voluntary Trust for Demining. . . .

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6. Demining activities should, as much as possible, make use of the appropriate modern mine clearance technologies and specialized equipment. . . . The Council is of the view that the elements outlined in this statement are not exhaustive. The Council will thus keep this issue under review in the context of the establishment of peacekeeping operations and the consideration of specific mandates.

The extensive Council statement, in conjunction with the richly argued and highly knowledgeable debate in the Council, offers once more powerful testimony to the professionalism and political acumen of the Council and its members in handling the Charter-set duties and functions. Viewing de-mining under the progressive label of the Agenda for Peace enables the observer to render fair judgment about the decision-making capability of the Council enhanced by the thorough consideration of the particular item on its agenda and on the careful and malleable consulting and weighing of options for action before arriving at the consensus uniting the diverse views and aims of the fifteen members and the outside groups and movements to which respective members are linked. At a time where doubt about the Council’s effectiveness and relevance had been on the rise, the de-mining debate is a proud reassertion of the Council’s paramount position in the architecture of global governance. In preparation for the UN’s fiftieth anniversary in 1995, the secretary-general used the occasion to review the Agenda for Peace report in light of the experience of the years since its issuance. His position paper (S/1995/1), dated 3 January 1995 gave rise to a new Council debate that was held at the 3,492nd meeting on 18 January 1995, and at the 3,503rd meeting on 22 February 1995. At the latter meeting, following consultations of the Council, the president made a statement on behalf of the Council (S/PRST/1995/9) in which the Council commented in great detail and very carefully on the views and recommendations of the secretary-general and reaffirmed its strong conviction that everything should be done to enable the Council and the UN as a whole to better fulfill its Charter-given tasks. The extensive comments paid special attention to the general issues of conflict prevention, rapid deployment, and standby capacity of peacekeeping troops for UN missions, postconflict peace building, and economic sanctions. The Council members also renewed their clear endorsement of increased responsibilities in peace and security tasks for regional and subregional organizations. Addressing newly arising questions relating to the Agenda for Peace report, the Council continued to take positions in the subsequent years. Thus on 19 December 1995, at the 3,609th meeting, in connection with a new report of the secretary-general on standby arrangements for peacekeeping, the president made a statement (S/PRST/1995/61) on behalf of the Council in which states


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not yet participating in such standby arrangements were strongly encouraged to do so and thereby enhance the capacity of the UN for the planning, rapid deployment, and reinforcement and logistical support of its peacekeeping operations. Following up from this meeting and statement, a large number of states requested a formal meeting of the Council to continue their dialogue on the urgency of regular and intensive consultations between the Council and the troop-contributing countries. That meeting was held on 20 December 1995, the 3,611th meeting, at which numerous representatives addressed this important question without yet taking a formal decision. On March 28, 1996, at the 3,645th meeting, the council took up the issue again and authorized the president to make a statement (S/PRST/1996/13) on its behalf in which the Council set out clear procedures for regular and frequent meetings between Council members, troop-contributing countries, and secretariat personnel. This significant document expressed the Council’s deepening involvement in central aspects of the organization’s enlarged role in peacekeeping, especially handling complex emergencies. Further important policy positions were developed and announced by the Council in the next months and years. As mentioned earlier, a major debate on de-mining in the context of UN peacekeeping was held in August 1996. Similarly, at the 3,750th meeting on 12 March 1997, the Council members instructed the president, through statement S/PRST/1997/13, to convey the Council’s grave concern at the attacks against UN and other personnel in UN operations and issued an urgent appeal to the international community to promote and protect the security of this international personnel. In pursuit of various aspects of the continuing Agenda for Peace debate, the Council considered once again on 19 June 1997, at its 3,790th meeting, the pressing problem of how to increase the protection for humanitarian assistance to refugees and others in conflict situations. In accordance with the understanding reached in prior consultations on the previous day, the president made a long statement on behalf of the Council (S/PRST/1997/34), in which the Council expressed its grave concern at the rise in attacks against refugees and other civilians and once again urged those concerned to comply strictly with the relevant rules of international law and international humanitarian law. The growing international outcry over the special predicament of children in armed conflicts was the reason for the Council’s consideration at its 3,896th and 3,897th meetings on 29 June 1998. On the basis of a thorough descriptive statement by the secretary-general’s special representative for children and armed conflict, Council members and other representatives expressed their deepest dismay about the brutality and abuse inflicted on innocent small children and juveniles and indicated willingness to engage in concrete steps to counteract these horrible conditions. The presidential statement (S/PRST/1998/18), at the

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3,897th meeting, summarized the commonly shared outrage at the cruel treatment of these helpless children, condemned their humiliation, brutalization, and sexual abuse, as well as their forcible recruitment and use in armed conflicts, in violation of international law. The Council’s attention to this serious condition was further illustrated by the fact that at its informal consultations of the whole on 25 March 1999, the Council members received a special briefing by the special representative on his field visits to Burundi, Rwanda, and the Sudan, some of the worst sites of this violent practice. Under a new agenda item entitled “Maintenance of peace and security and postconflict peace building,” the Council returned to the consideration of a key topic emerging in the Agenda for Peace debate. It took up this item at the 3,954th meeting, on 16–23 December 1998, and the 3,961st meeting, on 29 December 1998, providing for a full airing of this crucial concern and resulting in a lengthy presidential statement on behalf of the Council (S/PRST/1998/38), setting out the full consensus elaborated in consultations prior to and during the formal meetings. It documented once again the persistent proactive attitude of the Council’s fifteen members with regard to the undiminished need for international support for long-term peace building in many of the world’s trouble spots. In line with its recent trend to take up general questions cutting across the particular disputes and situations, the Council turned to the problem of international humanitarian activities at its 3,968th meeting on 21 January 1999. Under the agenda item “Promoting peace and security: humanitarian activities relevant to the Security Council,” the Council heard a briefing by the UN under-secretary-general for humanitarian affairs and emergency relief coordinator, following which all members offered their comments on the briefing and on the wider humanitarian challenges. This resumed discussion did, however, not lead to a formal decision, resolution, or presidential statement. It should be recalled that in early 2000, the Council devoted another session to the humanitarian difficulties, thus validating the sincerity and urgency of its attention to this aspect of the post-cold war world. A related topic, namely the “Protection of civilians in armed conflict,” was on the Council’s agenda from 12–22 February 1999. This discussion ran over several meetings, 3,977th, 3,978th, and 3,980th meetings, on 12–22 February 1999, and brought the heads of UNICEF and the International Committee of the Red Cross as well as the secretary-general’s special representative for children and armed conflict to the debate on the unmitigated malaise concerning the situation of civilians in armed conflict. During the three public meetings, many delegations took the floor and expressed their deep anguish over the pervasive conditions of insecurity for civilian populations. At the 3,978th meeting, on 12 February 1999, the president made a statement on behalf of the Council (S/PRST/1999/6), in which the Council expressed its grave concern, reaffirmed the relevant obligations


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under the Conventions of the Hague, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and their Additional Protocols of 1977, as well as other international legal norms, and in particular asked the secretary-general to submit a report containing concrete recommendations to the Council by September 1999 at which time the Council would resume its consideration of this difficult subject. This cursory overview over the Council’s meticulous and insightful followup from the 1992 Agenda for Peace reform program makes it very clear that the momentum from that brief euphoric high point in multilateralism has not completely vanished. In the midst of a pressing agenda, the Council has taken the time to give careful consideration to the overall global developments and specifically to look after the legal, humanitarian, and socioeconomic aspects, oftentimes neglected, of the volatility and turbulence due to massive internecine violence in many troubled and dysfunctional human communities. The Council’s numerous articulations on these generic issues deserve much closer examination. But it is sufficient for the present inquiry to simply sketch in broad strokes the commitment of the Council members to the overall strengthening of the Council in the manifold facets of its Charter-based peace mandate.1

Conclusion Since this chapter is part of the larger book, tentative elements of a conclusion will be touched upon merely in telegram style. Many critical evaluative remarks are interspersed in the text of the narrative. But the gist of these randomly distributed markings and evaluations points to the following main findings and propositions: 1. As a forum for the complete airing of arguments, conflicts, and allegations, the Council continues to be indispensable. The fact that an injured party can seek satisfaction by going for an encounter before the Council is still a major element of bringing about a reduction of tension. Of course, states have the freedom not to come to the Council, but oftentimes it only means that they will arrive later when much blood has been spilled. In that sense, the Council has been and continues to be important for peace in the world. 2. The institutional and procedural changes over the period under review have been limited. But as the discussion in this chapter has demonstrated, the Council has steadily evolved in the direction of a more open and transparent organ and at the same time has taken major decisions to enhance the potential of the Council as an active agent of global politics by, on the one hand, deploying high-level missions of inquiry and fact-finding into the field and, on the other, reaching out to the world of global civil society and its many nongovernmental actors and lobbying groups in pursuit of the widest possible

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consultations and effectiveness for its own decision making. The additional firm arrangement for the constant collaboration with the troop contributing states has helped complete the range of necessary reforms strengthening the readiness of the Council and its members to engage and contribute to the resolution of many and widely diverging problems brought to its attention. 3. While long-standing obstacles disallowing the full equality and democracy of the Council’s procedures have not been removed, the Council has managed to work around some of these impediments and intensify its involvement and determination. This result has been facilitated by the demonstrated capability of representatives, regardless of the size and strength of their respective member states, to move the Council members and provide catalytic strength and dynamics to prod the Council to show innovation and flexibility in its proceeding. Proactive Council presidents and engaging Council members have achieved unusual results in advancing positive changes in the way the Council has worked. The evidence of this ingredient, “charismatic leadership,” will be pointed out throughout this entire book. Thus the human input needs to be assessed at the proper central level in the approach to the Council’s work in the ten years after the end of the cold war.

Chapter Four


Introduction

A

detailed analytical narrative is offered here dealing with a side issue of the Middle East problem, namely, the separate agenda item entitled “The situation in the occupied Arab territories.” The reason for this choice is twofold: First, the Council has taken up this matter throughout nine out of ten years of the period under review, thus it should offer a good insight into the fluctuations of politics within the Council and without. Second, the issue itself has evolved dramatically from wide rejection of the Palestinian claim for statehood in the mid-1980s to acceptance and near fulfillment of its authentic and legitimate aim for a national home, within the framework of a comprehensive peace accord between the Israelis, the Palestinians, and eventually the Arab states. In a situation where the United States has been the dominant third party engaged in the complicated and treacherous politics of the Middle East, indeed a key threat endangering international peace, it is especially noteworthy how the Council as a whole has persistently sought to play a meaningful role in fulfillment of its lofty mandate under the Charter. The trajectory of the Council’s treatment of this controversial issue helps improve our understanding of the rich decisionmaking process out of which Council action arises and of the varying contributions of the fifteen actors to the final decision on the matter. Only such a detailed review will enable skeptical outside observers to grasp the full scope of the phenomenon of the closed proceedings that have prevailed since the early 1970s surrounding the Council with the necessary aura of confidentiality and discretion to do its work.1

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The Security Council and the Situation in the Occupied Arab Territories: A Close Look By the late 1980s, the situation in the Middle East had not yet begun to ease. The relationship between the state of Israel and its Arab neighbors continued to be tense and often gave rise to strife and bloody clashes. Since the onset of the intifada in 1987, the Israeli-Palestinian problem had worsened greatly, and the hope for some accommodation between the two sides had further receded as the violent confrontation seemed to find no end. Efforts to provide some reduction of tension and an initiation of even a minimal dialogue ended in futility. While the UN reminded the Israeli side of its obligations under the Geneva conventions, the United States saw to it to nurture its close bond with the Israeli government and viewed with suspicion and alarm the furious eruption of Palestinian anger, coming largely from the male youth of the camps and settlements housing the stateless Palestinian families. Nevertheless, the clear sign that the Palestinian community was no longer willing to accept silently the Israeli occupation and that the hopeless young generation rose against the mighty Israeli military and police despite the danger to their lives and limbs started a process of rethinking and listening to the Palestinian side of the Middle East argument. Slow changes also had begun moving the Palestinian National Congress out of its rigid ideological convictions, creating at last openings for Israeli peace advocates in the similarly hardened political atmosphere within the Jewish community. Altogether, the situation was very serious, but not totally hopeless, although the day-to-day experience frequently documented only gloom and bleakness.2 The narrative of the Council’s involvement with the side issue of the occupied Arab territories, an item that had lent itself to rhetorical posturing and demagoguery, picks up in mid-year 1989—conforming to the Council’s reporting period running from 16 June through 15 June twelve months later. In line with the regular practice of the Arab community, the current chair of the group at the UN, the Syrian Arab Republic, approached the Council by letter (S/20709) on 30 June 1989, requesting an immediate meeting on the occupied territories item in view of a major Israeli violation of the rights of the Palestinians. The Council’s 2,870th meeting was convened on 6 July 1989, in order to consider the Arab request. Before the Council took up the substantive aspect of the item, the president had to deal with a procedural matter, namely, the request by the observer of Palestine that, in accordance with the Council’s past practice, an invitation be extended to him to participate in the discussion on the item. The president then added that the request was not made pursuant to rule 37 or rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Council, but that if it was approved, the Council would invite the observer of Palestine to participate not under rule 37 or rule 39 but with the same rights of participation as under rule 37.3


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As on earlier occasions, the representative of the United States requested to take the floor on this Palestinian request and expressed his government’s strong disagreement with the request and the envisaged procedure giving the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) representative de facto the same rights as any representative of a regular member state. He argued that resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on the Palestinian issue were not binding on the Council, and that his delegation considered such an invitation appropriate only under rule 39. As required, a procedural vote was taken on the Palestinian request, which was approved by eleven votes in favor (Algeria, Brazil, China, Colombia, Ethiopia, Finland, Malaysia, Nepal, Senegal, USSR, and Yugoslavia), to one against (United States), with three abstentions (Canada, France, and the United Kingdom). It goes without saying that this US action sent a very hostile signal to the Palestinian leadership and community and offered them little hope for a major policy change in Washington. The concrete issue before the Council was a bitter protest by the Palestinians against new deportations of Palestinians captured by the Israeli authorities. The PLO denied that these people were terrorists and denounced the cruelty and arbitrariness shown by the occupation authorities. In an extensive counterargument by the representative of Israel, these expulsions were presented as a humane response to ruthless Palestinian terrorists, and an attempt was made to offer a legal basis in the Hague conventions of 1907 for the deportation measure. The US representative also took part in this debate stressing, on the one hand, that the United States was strongly opposed to such expulsions as violations of Article 49 of the fourth Geneva convention and saw them as unnecessary for public order and simply adding further tension in a troubled situation. On the other hand, however, the United States was fully sympathetic to Israel’s complicated position, further aggravated by the continuing intifada. A key priority of the US administration at that moment was to promote efforts to bring the parties to the negotiating table. For that reason, the US delegation would abstain in the vote on the draft resolution, which had been introduced. The draft resolution (S/20710), which had been submitted by Algeria, Colombia, Ethiopia, Malaysia, Nepal, Senegal, and Yugoslavia—all members of the nonaligned movement and current nonpermanent Council members— was referred to by the president at the beginning of the meeting. Subsequently, at the 2,870th meeting, it was put to the vote, received fourteen votes in favor, to none against, with one abstention by the United States, and was adopted as resolution 636 (1989). This tame text was a suitable and fair response of the Council to a case in which the responsibility of both parties was unmistakably set out and where proper remedies were listed. The three operative paragraphs read as follows:

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1. Deeply regrets the continuing deportation by Israel, the occupying Power, of Palestinian civilians; 2. Calls upon Israel to ensure the safe and immediate return to the occupied Palestinian territories of those deported and to desist forthwith from deporting any other Palestinian civilians; 3. Reaffirms that the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, is applicable to the Palestinian territories, occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem, and to the other occupied Arab territories;

In a nearly exact replay of the previous occasion, the Council convened on 30 August 1989, at its 2,883rd meeting to consider the letter of 29 August 1989 by Qatar, requesting on behalf of the group of Arab states, an urgent Council meeting. The meeting began again with a US statement and a procedural vote on the invitation of the Palestinian representative. After that procedural prelude, the president drew attention to the text of a draft resolution (S/20820) submitted by the six nonaligned Council members. The issue before the Council was another round of Israeli deportations of Palestinian civilians. The Israeli spokesman divided his statement between a forceful denunciation of Palestinian terrorism and a legalistic defense of Israel’s drastic punitive action. The US representative explained that his delegation would abstain, as in the earlier case of resolution 636 (1989), because it was once again a case of illegal deportations by Israel. The Council then proceeded to vote on the draft resolution, which again received fourteen votes in favor, to none against, with one abstention (United States) and was adopted as resolution 641 (1989). The preambular and operative parts of the resolution were word for word nearly the same as for resolution 636 and were welcomed by the Palestinian spokesman as evidence of the UN’s role in the search for a peaceful solution in the Middle East. The story of the Council’s treatment of the issue of the occupied Arab territories took an unexpected turn in early November 1989. The representative of Kuwait, in his capacity as current chairman of the group of Arab states, requested in a letter dated 3 November 1989 (S/20942), an immediate Council meeting. The Council convened on 6 November 1989, at its 2,887th meeting and considered the item at the 2,887th to 2,889th meetings, on 6–7 November. At the beginning of the 2,887th meeting, following the issuance of several routine invitations, the Council was again obliged to go through the procedural vote regarding the invitation of the Palestinian representative. Right at the onset, the president also drew to the Council’s attention the text of a draft resolution (S/20945) submitted by the six nonaligned members of the Council. The new developments in the occupied territories, and especially a new Israeli


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raid against Palestinian Beit Sahur, caused many statements by Arab friends and neighbors castigating the unrestrained domination by Israel of the territories occupied since July 1967 and condemning the escalation in the harsh Israeli rule. Other representatives from the nonaligned group, from the Western group, and from among the permanent members raised questions about where to go in the ever-more-urgent search for some peaceful end to these periods of friction and violence. The draft resolution before the Council envisaged not just references to the Geneva conventions but emphasized the ultimate goal of comprehensive, just, and lasting peace in the area and sought on-site monitoring by the UN secretary-general of the current situation in the Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem. Evidently, as a result of further consultations outside of the formal Council sessions, the sponsors presented to the Council before its 2,889th meeting on 7 November a slightly revised version (S/20945/Rev.1) of their initial submission. The most important change in the wording was a clear softening of the language from (the Council) “demands,” in former paragraph six, to “urges,” in new paragraph three, most likely a concession to the US delegation. At the same meeting, the revised draft resolution received fourteen votes in favor to one vote against (United States) and was not adopted, owing to the US veto. Following this unfortunate defeat of a consistent and moderate response to a clearly deteriorating situation in the occupied territory, the US delegate reiterated his government’s preference for the peace process and voiced objections to what he called one-sided resolutions, and to a permanent monitoring role of the secretary-general in the area. The US government would, however, welcome occasional visits of the secretary-general. It also had taken up the recent events in Beit Sahur directly with the Israeli authorities, conveying to them the critical attitude of the United States. At the conclusion of the third meeting, the Palestinian representative explained how upset he and his people were about the US veto but renewed emphatically the Palestinian desire for peace. When the Council returned to the issue of the occupied Arab territories on 15 March 1990, the approach and venue had changed considerably. In a letter dated 12 February 1990, the representative of the Soviet Union had requested the convening of a Council meeting. At its 2,910th meeting on 15 March 1990, the Soviet letter was included in the agenda under the item “The situation in the occupied Arab territories.” After the normal procedural moves, the Soviet representative explained his government’s request for a meeting because it wished to focus on the unacceptable Israeli settlement policy in the Palestinian territories. What was especially disturbing was the settlement of Russian Jews in occupied areas. The blatant discrepancy of the evolving practices in the occupied territories from the principles of the Middle East peace as spelled out in Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) required the Council’s attention.

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Leading off an unusually large number of statements over several meetings, the Palestinian representative underlined the extreme urgency of a comprehensive peace between Israel and the Palestinian people. He mentioned most favorably the recently established US-Palestinian contacts geared toward the advance of the peace efforts and appealed to the United States to pursue this new policy. At the 2,910th and 2,911th meetings, on 15 March 1990, the 2,912th meeting, on 27 March 1990, the 2,914th meeting, on 28 March 1990, the 2,915th meeting, on 29 March 1990, and the 2,920th meeting, on 3 May 1990, Arab states, nonaligned states, and intergovernmental organizations, as well as several Western countries, presented their diverging views on the controversial tendencies in the Israeli settlement buildup and on the need, and opportunity, for an eagerly awaited opening for a general peace in the region, to be achieved with the help of the UN and regional organizations. While these deliberations were continuing, the nonaligned members of the Council tried to formulate a text for a draft resolution that would enjoy unanimous support in the Council. On 12 April 1990, they sponsored a draft resolution in provisional form (S/21247) that provided inter alia for the Council deploring the Israeli settlement policy that was in violation of the fourth Geneva convention, calling upon Israel to desist from this illegal policy and upon all other states not to assist Israel in this activity, and requesting that the secretary-general keep the situation under close review and to report to the Council on the implementation of the resolution by 31 May 1990. The language and spirit of this draft were moderate and pragmatic, listing the points that seemed to encompass the attitudes of all members including, in particular, the United States. But by the time the next meeting devoted to the occupied territories was convened, nearly three weeks had gone by, but the few statements presented at the 2,920th meeting on May 3, 1990 did not give any hint as to the fate of the nonaligned draft resolution. It is likely that it was quietly abandoned because of unmistakable evidence of US opposition to this modest attempt to block Israeli settlements in the Palestinian West Bank. Throughout these weeks, the exchange of letters to the Council president or the secretary-general from the parties to the Palestinian issue was quite intense, reflecting the restlessness on the part of the Arabs and Palestinians in promoting their peace-related aims. In the midst of these frequent communications, the representative of Bahrain, as chairman of the Arab group, sent a letter dated 21 May 1990 (S/21300), requesting an immediate Council meeting. The next move came in two notes from the Council president, both dated 22 May 1990 (S/21309 and S/21310), informing the other Council members that consultations among them about Bahrain’s request had resulted in the agreement to hold the first meeting on the matter at Geneva at the UN office on 25 May 1990, at 3 p.m. to continue until the speakers list was exhausted. This highly unusual


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and dramatic decision to move the Council’s operations across the Atlantic to the Palais des Nations building at Geneva was due to the unrelated fact that US immigration authorities were unwilling to issue on short notice, if at all, a visa for Yasser Arafat, the Palestinian leader, to come to UN headquarters in New York. It should not be a surprise that the meeting at Geneva was largely a rhetorical exercise in which the sober goal to find a solution to the given critical situation was overshadowed by the desire to impress the Council members and the numerous state and organizational representatives in attendance. Arafat opened the debate with a long and comprehensive statement illustrating the great suffering of the Palestinian people, Israel’s heavy-handed role as occupying power, and the precious chance for both sides to explore the options for a peaceful solution, in close cooperation with the UN. Israel was represented by then Ambassador Netanyahu, who delivered a sharp, uncompromising attack on Palestinian terrorism and refused to make any concession on the Israeli strategy and its current policies. The polemical tone was replicated by spokesmen of more radical governments that saw little justification to abandon the armed struggle against the Israeli oppressor. But in general an attitude of goodwill and political restraint prevailed, placing proper emphasis on nonviolent approaches to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Throughout the previous round of meetings in New York and at the Geneva deliberations, the United States did not take the floor a single time. This silence on the part of the biggest member of the Council had to be viewed with great concern, and it did not bode well for any upcoming occasion of collective decision making. The Council continued its consideration of the item at its 2,926th meeting on 31 May 1990, in New York. The president drew attention at the beginning of the meeting to a new draft resolution (S/21326), submitted by the seven nonaligned members (Colombia, Cote d’Ivoire, Cuba, Ethiopia, Malaysia, Yemen, and Zaire), which envisaged the establishment of a three-member Security Council Commission to be dispatched immediately to examine the policies and practices of Israel in the occupied Palestinian areas. Prior to the vote, a few statements were made, including a sharply worded rejection by the Israeli representative of the draft resolution and the proposed commission in particular. Following a very brief suspension, the Council proceeded to the vote. The nonaligned draft received fourteen votes in favor to one against (United States) and was not adopted, owing to the US veto. After the vote, the US representative explained that his delegation was strongly opposed to the dispatch of a Security Council Commission, while it would be agreeable to occasional visits of the secretary-general. The Soviet representative who had initiated the examination of this complex issue since the 2,910th meeting expressed regret that the United States had not been able to give its consent to the very moderate suggestion for the employment of a Council mission.

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In a small postlude after the failed spring initiative, on 19 June 1990, following consultations, the president issued a statement on behalf of the members of the Council (S/21363) in which the Council strongly deplored an incident on 12 June 1990, in a UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) clinic located in the Gaza Strip in which an Israeli officer had thrown a tear gas grenade into the building and wounded innocent women and children; the Council expressed its dismay that the penalty imposed on that officer had been commuted and reaffirmed the applicability of the Geneva conventions to the Palestinian territories. The swift reaction to this incident reflected the Council’s unanimity regarding the event and the mode in which the criticism was issued. Here the United States joined the other fourteen members in the censure. Digressing from the annotated narrative for a moment, it should be stressed that during the Council’s reporting period, June 1989–June 1990, the world had undergone a fundamental change, starting with the end of Soviet rule over Eastern Europe and the demise of Communism in all of Eastern Europe. The standing of the USSR itself had begun to weaken significantly, and the role of the United States emerging from forty years of bipolarity and the cold war had been strengthened greatly. While these global changes were occurring, one observes in the Council over the Middle East issue a hardening of the US attitude hewing more closely to the harsh stand of the Israeli government and disallowing the application of essentially peaceful methods coming from the UN, including a limited monitoring role for the secretary-general and a Charter-based Council role in investigating the critical situation in the area. One is left a bit puzzled over why the only superpower in the evolving international order appeared unwilling to involve itself in an inevitably leading role in the new modes of global governance through the instruments of multilateralism available in the provisions of the Charter. The next moves on the Palestinian issue came only after the great divide, namely, the Iraqi aggression of August 1990, which resulted in large-scale global changes and also had a noticeable impact on the central facets of the Middle East problem. The change in the Palestinian fortune is doubly surprising if one remembers that Arafat, in his anger and despair, had voiced loud support for Saddam Hussein’s tirade against Arab meekness and American duplicity. Based on the request by the letter dated 26 September 1990 (S/21830), by Yemen for a Council meeting, the Council, at its 2,945th meeting on 5 October 1990, took up the matter again. The Palestinian spokesman emphasized that the question before the Council was the future of Palestine. Yemen announced that it planned to propose a draft resolution for the Council’s attention. The Israeli representative emphasized the Iraqi threat and sought to link Yemen and the PLO to the Iraqi aggressor. The debate continued through the 2,946th and


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2,947th meetings, on 8–9 October 1990, respectively, with numerous statements reflecting the wide range of political positions on the Middle Eastern question. On the day of the 2,947th meeting, the seven nonaligned members submitted a draft resolution (S/21851) that revived the suggestion for a three-member Council mission to examine in particular the new incidence of violence in the Al Haram Al Shareef precinct in Jerusalem. The Council returned to the consideration of the item at its 2,948th meeting on 12 October 1990. At the beginning, the president drew attention to a new draft resolution (S/21859), submitted by Canada and the United Kingdom, subsequently joined by Cote d’Ivoire, Finland, France, the USSR, and Zaire as sponsors. In the subsequent discussion, the Palestinian representative alleged that the United States had stalled on the draft resolution, which was before the Council, because it was not satisfied with the initial text. The president stated that, as agreed in prior consultations, the Council should proceed to vote on draft resolution S/21859. He also clarified that, according to his understanding, the reference to “the territories occupied by Israel since 1967” included Jerusalem. The president then made a statement in connection with the draft resolution in which he pointed out that in the informal consultations leading to the consideration of the pending draft resolution, the secretary-general had explained that the purpose of the mission that he would send out would be to look into the circumstances surrounding the recent tragic events in Jerusalem and other similar developments in other parts of the Palestinian territory and to submit by 24 October 1990, a report with findings and recommendations. The Council thereafter proceeded to the vote: the draft resolution received fifteen votes in favor and was adopted unanimously as resolution 672 (1990). This resolution, representing the unanimous view of the full Council, expressed alarm at the violence that took place in several holy places and caused the death of over twenty Palestinians and the injury of more than 150 people, condemned the acts of violence committed by Israeli security forces, called upon Israel to abide by the applicable provisions of the Geneva conventions, and requested, in connection with the decision of the secretary-general to send a mission to the region, that he submit his report by the end of October 1990. This brief summary of the resolution, an important step forward in the evolution of US policies in the Middle East, makes clear that the earlier unwillingness of the United States to join in draft resolutions less critical of the Israeli role as occupying power had nothing to do with the substance or the spirit of the texts in question but reflected a combination of powerful domestic considerations and a nearly blind support for the Israeli leadership and security forces. With resolution 672 (1990), one can argue, the US administration had corrected its course relating to the Middle Eastern policy problems and embarked on a new journey

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seeking to balance its overall approach and to be as evenhanded as the international situation demanded. One of the most interesting aspects of this story line of the occupied Arab territories is the fact that the US position ever so often undergoes temporary shifts or derailments over the years of dealing with the issue until the end of the 1990s. The first test of the newly found consensus in the Council came on 24 October 1990, at the 2,949th meeting, where the president drew attention to the text of a draft resolution (S/21893), submitted by Colombia, Cuba, Malaysia, and Yemen. The subsequent statements revealed a very heated atmosphere in which the Palestinians expressed their deep frustration and the representative of the Sudan supported by several nonaligned delegations called for strong punitive measures, including measures under Chapter VII of the Charter in response to the defiance shown by the Israeli government. The Israeli representative dismissed these attacks and argued that resolution 242 (1967) and resolution 660 (1990) against Iraq were not comparable. In the subsequent vote, the draft resolution was adopted unanimously as resolution 673 (1990). Under this resolution, the Council deplored the Israeli refusal to receive the secretary-general’s mission to the region, urged the Israeli government to reconsider its decision and to comply fully with resolution 672 (1990), and requested that the secretary-general submit the report under resolution 672 (1990). On 7 November 1990, at the 2,953rd meeting, the Council resumed consideration of the item and included also the secretary-general’s report under resolution 672 (1990) (S/21919 and Corr. 1 and Add. 1, 2, and 3) in the agenda. The detailed and circumspect report of the secretary-general offered an explanation why his mission had not been able to visit the troubled sites in the Palestinian territories and what Israel had put forward to justify its noncooperation with the Council and the secretary-general. In reviewing the whole situation, the secretary-general concluded that only a satisfactory answer to the legitimate Palestinian goals and grievances would eventually lead to a comprehensive solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Whereas the Palestinian spokesman praised the secretary-general’s report and applauded the sentiment that only the full satisfaction of the Palestinian demands would help bring a peaceful solution, other speakers offered more radical thoughts. The discussion carried over into the 2,954th meeting on 9 November 1990, at which the representative of Palestine also showed a video of the clash between Palestinians and the Israeli security force. Searching for an appropriate response to the Israeli obstruction, four nonaligned Council members (Colombia, Cuba, Malaysia, and Yemen) submitted on 15 November 1990, a draft resolution subsequently revised (S/21933/Rev. 3). Aside from the regular preliminary references and operative stipulations, the draft specifically welcomed the idea of convening a meeting of


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the high contracting parties to the fourth Geneva convention and suggested seeking the advice of these on how to ensure Israel’s respect for the convention under all circumstances. At the 2,957th meeting, on 16 November 1990, the item was further debated. But nothing was said or done about the nonaligned draft. Following another hiatus, the item was taken up again at the 2,965th meeting, on 5 December 1990. The statement by the representative of Palestine revolved around current suggestions on how to approach the search for peace, on the proposal for a peace conference, and on Article 49 of the Geneva conventions. The 2,966th meeting on 8 December 1990, was opened by the Soviet request for a suspension of the formal meeting. The subsequent procedural debate brought out a rather angry argument by several nonaligned members about the abuse of the rules of the procedure for hidden political purposes and about the inexcusable waste of time. Their views were countered by the Canadians, the UK, and the United States; the American delegate favored the suspension of the meeting to give more time for consultations on the nonaligned draft. By a procedural vote of nine in favor to four against, with two abstentions, the proposal for suspension was adopted. The 2,967th meeting on 10 December 1990, and the 2,968th meeting on 12 December 1990, were similarly suspended. At the 2,970th meeting (Part I), on 19 December 1990, the representative of Finland reported on intensive efforts to resolve outstanding differences regarding the intended Council decision. Once more, in order to gain further time, the UK representative proposed yet another suspension, which was adopted by nine votes in favor to six against. At the 2,970th meeting (Part II), on 20 December 1990, the president referred to draft resolution S/22022 prepared in the course of the Council’s consultations. He then made a statement on behalf of the members of the Council (S/22027) in which the members reaffirmed their determination to support an active negotiating process for the Middle East peace, and agreed that an international conference, at an appropriate time, properly structured, should facilitate efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement and lasting peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Following two statements before the vote, the draft resolution was adopted unanimously as resolution 681 (1990). This long and comprehensive resolution spelling out the goals for peace in the Middle East and the tools to work toward that lofty goal constituted a milestone in UN involvement in the whole issue area. Taking its cue from the secretary-general’s report, the resolution picked up the reference to the presidential statement concerning the method and approach for comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace, and then expressed grave concern over Israel’s rejection of resolutions 672 and 673 (1990), deplored the resumption of deporting Palestinians, urged Israel to accept the de jure applicability4 of the fourth Geneva convention to all occupied territories, requested the secretary-general, in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red

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Cross (ICRC), to develop further the idea expressed in his report, of convening a meeting of the high contracting parties to the said convention and to discuss possible measures to be taken by them to secure full compliance with the provisions of the convention, and also requesting the secretary-general to monitor the situation in the occupied areas and to draw upon UN and other personnel and resources present in the wider area needed to accomplish this task and to keep the Council informed. After the vote, most of the Council members explained their vote and expressed their pleasure at the Council’s unanimity. Among them, the US delegate used the occasion to remark on the wider context of the envisaged renewed peace process. This decision by the Council can be viewed as the true turning point in the way the United States and the UN dealt with the Middle East question. At last, the United States had made the decisive move and reached out to invite the Palestinians to join the others in the international community. The former terrorists and fanatics were welcomed as legitimate partners in the planned collective peace making under the UN auspices as well as under the special tutelage of the United States as leading designer and operator of the scheduled peace conference. The distance traveled by the United States from total rejection to warm embrace and goodwill must be acknowledged and appreciated. Looking at this specific development, one cannot help but point out that after the condemnation of the Iraqi aggressor and the buildup of an international coalition to reverse the annexation of Kuwait, the United States had to redefine its political strategy to become attractive and inviting to Arab states and governments that feared the Iraqi threat but needed some powerful protection to join in the anti-Iraq campaign. For that reason, the United States had to make important concessions to the Palestinian party, as an integral part of the Arab community. These forces ultimately were responsible for the sea change in US policy in the Middle East, including its UN component. In the following three years, the United States maintained its new course of fairness and impartiality pleasing to the Palestinians and at the same time bearable to the Israelis and proved in its voting behavior on the occupied Arab territories that it was eager to be consistent in its own political dealings. On six occasions, the basic issue brought to the Council was the continued use of deportations by the Israeli authorities against Palestinian activists and suspects. The Council restated its clear disapproval of the Israeli measures on these occasions and reminded in each case the Israeli government of its legal obligations under the Geneva conventions. These instances were the presidential statements of 4 January 1991 (S/22046), 27 March 1991 (S/22408), and 4 April 1992 (S/23783), as well as Council resolutions 694 (1991) of 24 May 1991, 726 (1992) of 6 January 1992, and 799 (1992) of 18 December 1992. All of these decisions were arrived at in prior consultations among the members, and the resolutions were


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adopted unanimously. They all were based on the fundamental text of resolution 681 (1990), which had been instrumental in clearing the road to the multidimensional peace process centered around the authority and influence of the United States as a key peace promoter. The next large-scale confrontation over the conditions in the occupied Palestinian areas erupted over what is universally referred to as the “Hebron massacre,” committed in the early morning hours of 25 February 1994, by Jewish extremist settlers against defenseless Palestinian citizens while they were praying in the Ibrahim mosque in Hebron. The worldwide outrage against this brutal attack was met by deep sorrow and contrition on the part of the Israeli government and people who vowed to restrain and punish those extremist elements. When the Council convened at its 3,340th meeting, on 28 February 1994, the progress in the Arab-Israeli peace process was strikingly demonstrated by the United States finally dropping its objection to the specific invitation formula used for the representative of Palestine.5 Since the United States no longer opposed the Palestinian request, no procedural vote was required, and the invitation was extended “with the consent of the Council.” The Palestinians had advanced in their international standing in the UN and, more importantly, in their relationship with the United States, the sponsor and key supporter of the Palestinian hopes for the ultimate durable peace. The large number of statements took four sessions (3,340th–3,342nd, and 3,351st meetings, on 28 February, 1 March, 2 March and 18 March 1994). While the many speakers from all over the world voiced their distress and anger about the bloody event in Hebron in the public meetings, quiet efforts were pursued behind closed doors to unite the Council members behind a carefully phrased censuring draft resolution that would not jeopardize the Israeli-Palestinian peace process that had made extraordinary progress in the past few years. The results of that patient and persistent endeavor emerged finally at the 3,351st meeting, on 18 March 1994, as the end of the speakers list was reached. At the beginning of this crucial meeting, the president drew attention to the text of a draft resolution (S/1994/280), submitted by Djibouti, on behalf of the nonaligned members of the Council (Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, and Rwanda), as well as of France, Russia, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The president further pointed out that a paragraph-by-paragraph vote on the draft resolution had been requested. In this series of votes, all paragraphs except the second and sixth preambular ones were adopted unanimously. The two exceptions were adopted by fourteen votes in favor to none against, with one abstention (United States). Following these separate votes, the draft resolution as a whole was adopted without vote as resolution 904 (1994). Before the resolution as a whole is summarized, it is quite revealing to consider the two preambular paragraphs that incurred the US abstention. The second

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preambular paragraph (“Gravely concerned by the consequent Palestinian casualties in the occupied Palestinian territory as a result of the massacre, which underlines the need to provide protection and security for the Palestinian people”) and the sixth preambular paragraph (“Reaffirming its relevant resolutions, which affirmed the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 to the territories occupied by Israel in June 1967, including Jerusalem, and the Israeli responsibilities thereunder”) do not in and of themselves strike the impartial observer as being especially harsh and objectionable, especially as they reiterate, slightly differently phrased, earlier resolutions and other decisions agreed to by the United States. In this connection it is worth mentioning that after the vote, the US representative (on this occasion, Mrs. Albright) explained that the US delegation had accepted the text in order to save the Middle Eastern peace process, despite what she called some objectionable phrasing. This wording offers at least a glimpse of the long and laborious wrangling in the intra-Council consultations in search of a general consensus. Offering very strong language describing the massacre and the unfortunate ramifications in the preamble, the operative part of resolution 904 (1994) is much more moderate and oriented toward the active resumption of the peace process. In the first three paragraphs, the Council strongly condemns the Hebron massacre and its aftermath, calls upon Israel to continue to take measures, including confiscation of arms, in order to prevent illegal acts of violence by Israeli settlers, and asks for measures to guarantee the safety of the Palestinian civilians in the occupied territory, including a temporary international presence, provided for in the Declaration of Principles (S/26560), in the context of the ongoing peace process. The fourth and fifth paragraphs speak specifically to the peace process, requesting the cosponsors of the peace process, the United States and Russia, to continue their efforts to invigorate the peace process, and reaffirms its support for the peace process and calls for the implementation of the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles of 13 September 1993, issued in Washington, D.C., without delay. Despite the courteous reference to Russia as cosponsor of the peace process, the reality behind this phase of the Council’s dealing with the unsettled matter of the occupied territories points to the United States as the key actor in any and all aspects of the Middle East dynamic. The severity of the Hebron massacre forced the United States and Israel to concede important points to the Palestinians and their sympathizers in the Arab community and in the developing world. The Israeli government launched a major campaign to mitigate the fallout from the brutal settler attack on devout Moslems in the Hebron mosque. The United States as the driving external force for an undiminished pursuit of the elusive, but feasible, comprehensive peace in the Middle East needed to entice the Palestinian party with small favors, such as the end to the procedural


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game and with the slightly bigger concession of joining the other Council members in an unwelcome, but unavoidable, rebuke of the Israeli authorities over the recurrence and apparent escalation of anti-Palestinian violence. The delicate balance that the United States tried to maintain throughout these paradoxical developments was a difficult act to perform, especially if all of this is placed against the background of the deeply divided domestic politics in America. For these and related reasons, one must pay close attention to the unmistakable warning issued by the US representative about words and deeds seen as intruding and interfering in the intensive and discrete measures of facilitation provided by the United States in the multifaceted elements of the ongoing peace process. At the next occasion, in early 1995, when the Palestinians again came to the Council in order to complain about the continuation of the Israeli policy to expand settlements in the occupied territories, the debate provided some clarification, however not in the way the Palestinians had wanted it. Various Council members, especially the United States, but also the UK and some other spokesmen, saw a disadvantage in the Council’s being convened in that the contentious nature of the Council argument would possibly sour the atmosphere in the ongoing talks in the peace process. The search by the Palestinian party for concrete political support of its viewpoint was not successful, in that after a prolonged exchange of accusations and various supporting declarations, the Council did not take a position or adopt any type of decision and simply adjourned. Still, the somewhat impatient lecturing on the part of main Western powers gave a warning not to be ignored by the Palestinians and their supporters. The rift between the pro-Palestinian faction and the United States widened dramatically during the Council’s 3,536th and 3,538th meetings, from 12–16 May 1995. The subject matter was a major complaint by the Palestinians about the Israeli confiscation of fifty-three hectares of land in East Jerusalem, traditionally home of the Arabs. The Council was asked to put a stop to the Israeli practice of illegal territorial annexation, since the Israeli government refused to accede to the Palestinian protests and legal charges. The Israeli viewpoint, though most carefully laid out, was not shared by any other participant in this deliberation. But while the UK and France chastised Israel severely for this new provocation and illegal breach, the United States reacted quite differently: it admonished the Israeli side most gently and deplored mostly what it described as a divisive debate. At the beginning of the 3,538th meeting, on 17 May 1995, the president referred to draft resolution S/1995/394, submitted by Botswana, Honduras, Indonesia, Nigeria, Oman, and Rwanda, and put it to the vote. The draft resolution obtained fourteen votes in favor to one against, with no abstentions, and it was not adopted, due to the US veto. Explanations of the vote before and after the actual voting offered a good insight into what had gone on in the informal

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consultations in order to bridge the wide gap between the overwhelming majority of members and nonmembers and the US holdout dissenting from the broad consensus on the issue. The US representative declared quite firmly that its veto had been cast out of principle. It viewed direct talks between the parties as the only path to a final peace. In the US view, the Council had improperly sought to declare itself on a matter that was specifically reserved for the permanent-status talks between Israelis and Palestinians, but it was essential that there would be no interference with the parties on that question. It is remarkable that the Western partners of the United States expressed great regret at the US opposition and pointed to the goodwill and readiness to compromise that had pervaded the prior informal explorations and detailed negotiations. This negative turn in the UN’s ability to affect to a certain degree the rather volatile swings and setbacks in the Middle East peace process and the widening gap between the United States as leading world power and the Council in its capacity as guardian of international peace resulted from the Council’s repeated failures in Middle Eastern matters. The period of political harmony and effective cooperation in the Council lasting from 1990 to 1994 on the occupied Arab territories item confirmed the optimistic expectations about the potential for meaningful engagement of the Council in global and regional conflict situations and exemplified the convergence between multilateral and unilateral diplomacy in the post-cold war world. The next few years document the renewed split between the collective approach and the preference of the world power to go it alone in the Middle East and in other global problems. Nearly a year later, in April 1996, another round in the consideration of the occupied Palestinian territories took place. While the 3,652nd meeting on 15 April 1996, did not usher in any type of Council decision, it could serve as a barometer of growing frustration and resentment among the members and the interested immediate parties. The Palestinian spokesman expressed appreciation for the actual holding of the public meeting without failing to state his deep disappointment about the lack of action. The representative of Egypt raised the troubling question as to the legitimacy—or the lack of it—of the Council’s standards applied to different types of aggression and viewed this as evidence of a double standard, a charge that only the more radical governments had so far raised. The US delegate expressed great annoyance about the particular discussion taking place and spoke “against endless debate in New York,” displaying the deepening American disenchantment with the political processes in and around the UN. It was purely accidental that the next urgent complaint from the Arab side came in late September 1996, at the time of the opening of the fifty-first regular session of the UN General Assembly. The letter, dated 26 September 1996, by Saudi Arabia conveyed the position of the Arab group with regard to “the


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action taken by the Government of Israel in opening an entrance to the tunnel extending under the Western Wall of the Al-Aqsa Mosque in East Jerusalem” and requested an immediate meeting of the Council. On the same day, the observer of Palestine requested such a meeting (S/1996/791) and the representative of Egypt, a Council member, supported the Saudi Arabian request and also called for the immediate convening of the Council (S/1996/792). Several other communications on the same incident signified a high level of tension in the Arab community. The result of the coincidence mentioned earlier was that the 3,698th meeting, on 28 September 1996, was held at a very high level: most of the attending representatives were of foreign minister rank. The debate was opened by the de facto foreign minister of the embryonic Palestinian state who leveled harsh accusations against Israel as occupying power and listed the grave casualties suffered by the Palestinian community (86 dead, with more than 1,000 injured). He also explained to the Council that the opening of the tunnel at the holy Islamic site was a big provocation and needed to be rescinded. The escalating difficulties with Prime Minister Netanyahu’s Likud government made it necessary for the Council to issue a clear condemnation of the Israeli measures and to send a fact-finding mission to the site for further clarification of the situation. Despite the strenuous as well as dismissive rebuttal statement by the Israeli representative, the main tenor of the following interventions by foreign ministers and other dignitaries was full of empathy for Palestinian suffering and stressed at the same time that the peace process between the two sides should be completed as soon as possible. The US representative (at the ambassadorial level) appealed to the parties to stop the violence, restore calm, and resume the forward movement of the peace process. At the same time, efforts were under way to find common ground among the Council members for a positive decision regarding this latest PalestinianIsraeli clash. At the second resumption of the 3,698th meeting, on 28 September 1996, the president referred to draft resolution S/1996/803, which had been prepared in the course of the Council’s prior consultations. The draft resolution received fourteen votes in favor to none against, with one abstention (United States), and it was adopted as resolution 1073 (1996). The text of this resolution provided the implicit explanation for its most evident moderation and pragmatism, otherwise, the United States would not have abstained but would have wielded a negative vote. In the preamble, the Council expresses its deep concern about the tragic events in Jerusalem and the areas of Nablus, Ramallah, Bethlehem, and the Gaza Strip, and also states its concern about developments at the holy places of Jerusalem; and, in the operative part, the Council calls essentially for the cessation of all injurious acts and for immediate resumption of negotiations within the Middle East peace process.

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Considering the graveness of the bloody clashes between Israeli security forces and Palestinian civilians, it can only be described as a miracle reflecting the realism, free of false hopes and illusions, of the Palestinians and their Arab friends and supporters that such a toned-down text was acceptable to them. They got little satisfaction, but they knew that nothing more could be extracted from Israel’s main patron, the United States. In a way, this September debate constituted a basic surrender to the unmistakable fact that the United States had taken over exclusive control of the peace process and the concretely available options for the achievement of the ultimate peace accord. Despite their bleak assessment of their chances for a fair hearing in the Council as currently constituted, the Arabs sought recourse once again to the involvement of the Council in response to a new, even graver Israeli provocation in the occupied areas. Launching a massive new housing project in a historically Arab section of East Jerusalem, the government of Israel was ruthlessly creating new facts on the ground and seeking to make the many changes irreversible. This new step was taken in blatant violation of international law and of relevant Council and General Assembly resolutions on the subject matter. Due to the explosive nature of the confrontation, the Arab group and sympathizers in the UN sought in early March 1997 another Council debate. In reaction to that clear demand, the Council reached an understanding in prior consultations to accede to the request and to convene the 3,745th meeting, on 5 March 1997. With the Palestinian representative setting out the new damaging developments in East Jerusalem, in Jabul Abu Ghniem, involving plans for some 6,500 housing units and about 25,000 new settlers, and appealing to the Council to affect the Israeli behavior, and with the representative of Israel dismissing the Palestinian charges as unfounded and describing the new projects as part of a municipal program to deal with the needs of a vibrant growing community, the dimensions of the latest crisis were sharply delineated. The subtext of the given argument was, however, in evidence in numerous statements by Council members. The first to raise that underlying issue was the representative of Egypt, who saw a clear breach of the principle of the sanctity of pacts and insisted that Israel had to abide by international law, including binding Council decisions. The British delegate stressed the seriousness of the incident and considered it not reasonable to ask the Council to ignore this dangerous turn of events. Others similarly emphasized the role of the Council in connection with the examination of such contentious situations in the Middle East and with the principal endorsement of the peace process. The extended debate widened by the statements of many nonmembers carried over into the afternoon of 5 March and into the next day. When the Council returned for the 3,747th meeting on 7 March 1997, the president referred to


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draft resolution S/1997/199, submitted by France, Portugal, Sweden, and the UK, and declared that the Council was ready to vote on it. The draft resolution received fourteen votes in favor to one against (United States), with no abstention, and it was not adopted, owing to the US veto. In statements before and after the vote, explaining the votes, the basic contrast between the United States and the other fourteen members in the handling of the issue before the Council was clearly spelled out. While the majority deeply regretted the US veto, it felt that the draft cosponsored by the four West European members was fully reflective of the sense of the Council in unanimously backing pursuit and fulfillment of the Middle Eastern peace process. In opposition to that attitude and action, the US representative claimed that the Council’s draft would not have nurtured trust and confidence among the two parties in negotiation for a mutually beneficial peace agreement. The American ambassador went so far as to argue: “Members have heard our views on the appropriateness of outside interference in the direct negotiations between the parties. We have never believed, . . . , that it [the Council] is an appropriate forum for debating the issues now under negotiation between the parties. It is not.” He also claimed that the draft resolution made “sweeping statements concerning the legal status of Israeli settlements” and added, moreover, that Council action to blame one or the other party or to interject itself into permanent-status issues was not “the right way to go about this.” This painful setback for the Palestinian cause was revisited only two weeks later when, at the request of Qatar, on behalf of the Arab League, the Council convened the 3,756th meeting on 21 March 1997. At the beginning of the meeting, the president referred to draft resolution S/1997/241, submitted by Egypt and Qatar, and added that the Council was ready to vote on the text. Prior to the vote, the representative of Egypt explained that the Council had been convened to vote on a draft resolution calling for an end to the construction of the Jabul Abu Ghniem settlement project and all other settlements in occupied territories. Israel should stop using settlements as an instrument for imposing a fait accompli. The critical question was whether the Council would be able to play its Charter role and stop Israel’s erroneous policies. Responding to the probing Egyptian question, the US delegate reiterated the position taken at the 3,747th meeting and insisted once more that neither the Council nor the General Assembly should insert themselves into issues to be settled by the parties in permanent-status talks; in his government’s judgment, the public debate in the Council just exacerbated the tensions. Following the voting procedure in which the draft received thirteen votes in favor to one against (United States), with one abstention (Costa Rica), and was not adopted owing to the American veto, other Council members offered their

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views on the new defeat of meaningful Council action and restated their firm belief in the importance of further steps on the road to peace. The Palestinian spokesman shared his disappointment with the Council and addressed specifically the United States: “The bitter reality is that this veto has been cast to shield Israel from the will of the international community and to exempt Israel from the provisions of international law and of the Charter of the United Nations.” He further affirmed the supremacy of international law over the issues pending in the peace process and also restated the Palestinian and Arab commitment to the peace process, to the agreements reached, and to the need to work for their implementation. The Israeli representative presented a radically different perspective in which terrorism was the dominant concern and where the anti-Israeli bias of the UN and its principal organs was something that the government and people of Israel could not easily forget. He shared with the US representative the aversion against the Arab practice of dragging the UN bodies into matters to be dealt with by the immediate parties and of misusing these organs for political warfare against his country. The last word in this 3,756th meeting was spoken by the Egyptian representative: “I cannot accept a statement made in the Security Council that says that bringing to the Council a matter relating to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Middle East—at any time— would be a blatant misuse of the Security Council. We fifteen members, regardless of how we voted today, are acting on behalf of the membership of the United Nations. We are members of the Security Council—whether we are permanent members or nonpermanent members, whether we were elected or were accepted in 1945 as permanent members. The Council is vested with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Council is entitled to look at any issue relating to peace and security anywhere in the world. The Middle East is not an exception.” This striking cri de coeur offers in a nutshell the principal issue at hand in the Council’s stand on the Palestinian grievance. The double bill of the vetoes at the 3,747th and 3,756th meetings revealed in stunning clarity the deep cleavage separating the lone world power from the other fourteen members of the Council, key Charter instrument for international peace and security: whereas the other members of the Council and, beyond that, probably the total UN membership value the given tools as legally based and politically sound for peace and security matters of concern to the Council as the latter decides on a case-by-case basis, the United States looks askance at the multilateral institution and is torn between acting unilaterally and working within the framework of the UN and other international organizations. The desire to exercise its leading role through the skillful use of the UN machinery is compatible with the other movements in multilateral diplomacy, but the denial of the right of these bodies to carry out their Charter-based functions and tasks cannot be tolerated or condoned by the


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other members of these global organizations. In that sense, Egypt spoke for everybody else in insisting on the principles of equality and universality for collective bodies and their state members. Although the confrontation and sharp delineation of the opposed positions at the 3,747th and 3,756th meetings encourage seeing these meetings as the climax of the Council’s handling of the occupied Arab territories item, there is something of an epilogue in 1998, the last year of the decade considered here in which the agenda item was taken up by the Council. Again, the Palestinian party, through a letter from Sudan, dated 23 June 1998 (S/1998/558), came to the Council to complain about yet another enormous violation of the existing legal provisions regulating the status of Jerusalem and other contested locations. As the Palestinian submission explained, the new fait accompli generated by the Israeli plan to expand the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem would nullify the special status of the city, which the UN had assigned after the 1967 war. The Palestinian people had come to seek the Council’s help in their struggle to prevent the continuing illegal annexation of Palestinian land. The Israeli representative countered the charge by denying the alleged annexation plot and accused the Palestinian side of large-scale noncompliance with the Israeli-Palestinian peace-related agreements. The subsequent exchanges reflected rather general disdain about the newly created conditions in and around Jerusalem and urged the Israelis and the Palestinians to return to the path of peace and to resume the implementation of the agreed-upon next phases. The critical reaction to the new scheme of an “umbrella municipality,” as described by the Israeli government, was shared by the US representative who viewed this new ploy to change the Jerusalem situation with concern and urged the parties to go back to the pursuit of the peace process. Following the lengthy sequence of statements in the 3900th meeting extended into the afternoon, the Council returned to the item on 13 July 1998, at the 3,904th meeting, where the president stated that he had been authorized by the Council to make a statement on behalf of the Council (S/PRST/21). In this declaration, the Council emphasized the importance of the special status of Jerusalem, called upon the parties to avoid actions that might prejudice the outcome of the permanent-status negotiations, considered the decision of the Israeli government on 21 June 1998, to take steps to broaden the jurisdiction and planning boundaries of Jerusalem a serious development, and appealed to the government not to proceed with that decision, and expressed support in several paragraphs for US efforts to bring the peace process back on track. In a certain manner, the presidential statement ending the last round of charges, denials, and observations serves as a perfect ending to the somewhat meandering and convoluted course on which the issue of the occupied Palestinian territories has traversed nearly ten years since 1989. The achievement of the

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consensual statement of 13 July 1998, is due to the underlying unspoken agreement that neither of the two main antagonists would stir the calm of the temporary cease-fire. After the immense endeavor to breach the wall of US rigidity and stubbornness in 1996 and 1997 had ended in failure merely leading into deadend streets going nowhere, the principal parties and the other players decided to seek a materially beneficial compromise. The road to Palestinian statehood in a condition of peace and stability would be longer and more difficult bowing to the US-imposed outline, but the Palestinians and the Arabs realized that the only concrete alternative available to them then and in the foreseeable future would be to restart the armed struggle and to try to overcome in that way the Israeli adversary, a hopeless proposition. It also enlightens the interested student of UN matters and of the Council that certain facts of life cannot be overlooked in the political reality of these intergovernmental bodies. The harsh lesson of the case that has been studied in some detail is unmistakably clear: the practice of UN organs, here especially the Council, differs from the Charter theory. The representative of Egypt gave expression in his concluding remark, after a disillusioning experience with the United States exercising unhesitatingly its power of the negative vote to block a Council action to which it was opposed for tactical international and domestic reasons, to the basic principle and applied rules of the Council’s place in international governance. Still, the counterforce of the independent political will of the United States set up a barrier that the combined power of the other fourteen was unable to conquer or dismantle. The time line of the occupied Arab territories narrative reveals that the force undergoing major changes and fluctuations in this particular story—and probably for many others—has been the United States, the lone superpower, more enticed by the lures of unilateralism and hegemonial strength than any other contemporary major state. This fickleness of the foremost power in the current international system serves as a reasonable explanation for the mercurial effect the United States has had in global politics. Looking back over these nine or ten years, fair-minded analysts would concede that the Council has actually risen to the challenge of the complex Middle Eastern problem and given serious attention to the individual complaint and the overall development of the critical situation. One also can vouchsafe for the Council’s astute and circumspect understanding of the ingredients of the case at hand and demonstrated mastery of the larger political implications. The Council, through these years, has relied on precedents, has linked past positions with new decisions, and has adjusted to the exigencies globally as well as locally. The substantive contributions and the procedural accommodations have helped promote the exogenously driven peace process, enhancing wherever possible, the progress of the US peace plans.


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Conclusion Since this chapter as a case study is part of the larger work on the Council in the 1990s, tentative elements of a conclusion will be touched upon merely in telegram style. Many critical evaluative remarks are interspersed in the text of the narrative. But the gist of these randomly distributed markings and evaluations points to the following main findings and propositions: 1. As a forum for the full display of conflicts and allegations, the Council continues to be indispensable. The fact that an injured party can seek satisfaction by going for an encounter in the Council is still a major aspect of bringing about a reduction of tension. How often would the Middle East have exploded had the recourse to the Council or General Assembly not existed? That is still true today. Of course, states have the freedom not to come to the Council, but oftentimes it only means that they will arrive later, when much blood has been spilled. In that sense, the Council has been and continues to be important for peace in the world. 2. The role, functions, and mandate of the Council enjoy an undisputed legitimacy. Its decisions may not always be perceived as legitimate, but the exercise of its Charter-based role is per definitionem legal and legitimate. It also can bestow legitimacy upon state parties and other actors and on particular conditions or outcomes. The defiance of the Council by big states and small states and more so by nonstate actors, such as rebels and secessionists or civil war parties, is well known and frequently blatant. Here the tools of “peace enforcement,” as the Charter calls it, would need to be engaged to bring these defiant challengers to heel. But to do so, the Council must be united and willing to act forcefully. That, unfortunately, is still an unfulfilled dream.6 3. The biggest challenge for the UN, and especially the Council, in this most complex issue is the dichotomy of unilateralism and multilateralism. As argued earlier, the clarification of the role of the United States as partner in multilateralism or as unilateral actor is most urgent if the undiminished potential of the Council is to be realized. As long as that has not been done, the Council will be hampered and only partially effective and successful. If the future world will bring about the rise of new regional powers and develop into a more multipolar system, then the relevance of the Council as a global peace guarantor is bound to rise. A limping and an inactive Council could not handle the new threats to the peace that might emerge.7 4. While the direct impact of the Council often leaves much to be desired, its indirect strength cannot be overlooked. The fact of its existence and the need for its authorization in many international situations and procedures, including the Middle East conflict, move it for all practical purposes back into the

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center where the Charter had envisaged it. Here, the vision of that January 1992 Council statement should be recalled. What was said then has not been revoked nor amended. It maintains its timeliness in the twenty-first century and stabilizes the foundation on which the Council, with all of its shortcomings and flaws, rests. The capacity of the Council as an intergovernmental body to address these new challenges is guaranteed in the current state of affairs. It will be up to the member states and the engaged nonstate actors to improve the constitutional and financial underpinnings of the global peace instrument and enlarge the pool of norms and tools to protect the peace and security of the international community.

Chapter Five


Introduction

A

fter the euphoria in response to the end of the cold war, the years since the Somalia debacle have shown a significant ebbing of the initial enthusiasm expressed in the rhetoric of the “New World Order” and have negatively affected the popular views about world politics and global governance. Numerous voices have been raised in systematic efforts to weaken the reputation and authority of the multilateral instruments of the UN system as well as of regional and functional intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). The charge has been incessantly repeated that the activity and effectiveness of these tools of global governance left far too much to be desired, and that ultimately only the strength and commitment of the most powerful states could contain the complex and intractable conflicts devastating many struggling developing countries, including the new entities that emerged after the collapse of the Communist bloc. The supporters of the contemporary architecture of IGOs cannot overlook the trend of marginalization that has hampered the work of these organizations and must reckon with the likely exacerbation of the disregard and distrust of their critics and adversaries. Some people have gone so far as to predict or suggest the eventual disappearance of the global machinery for deliberation and decision making. If nothing else, they belittle the political processes of the international bodies and organs and dismiss the results of those engagements as inefficient and futile. In a world where the use of armed force has recently regained respect and legitimacy, the calm and balanced voice emerging from the consensus procedures of the multilateral assemblies can oftentimes only be heard with great difficulty. Since consequently the general public knows little about the realm of IGOs and is exposed to a flood of mixed messages regarding the irrelevance or utility of the many

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intergovernmental bodies in the modern world, it goes without saying that those possessing inside knowledge about the structures and processes shaping multilateral action have a clear duty to share their insights with the wider community of scholars and other interested groups. Only a careful and close look at the practices of states engaged in these international fora will help bridge the deepening gap between the diplomats and international staff within and the uninformed general public on the outside.1 The purpose of this chapter is indeed to offer a critical and an analytical account of two important intractable conflict situations that were on the active agenda of the UN Security Council throughout the latter half of the 1990s and reveal the strengths and weaknesses of this intergovernmental body designated as the guardian to maintain international peace and security under the UN Charter. The presentation consists of two succinct narratives dealing with the Tajikistan and Sierra Leone cases. Focusing on the inner workings of the Council and using the enormous documentation surrounding the political processes of the Council,2 much light can be shed on the seemingly impenetrable walls of what ultimately flows into the formal decision making and public articulation through resolution or presidential statement. For this chapter, the measures of success and failure are based on the judgments of the political actors and those directly present in their functions as staff or correspondents. However, what may overtly be rated as a failure by political representatives needs to be further probed to find out whether the so-called “failure” may not amount to a limited “success” in the ongoing search for a constructive solution. The issue of success or failure is revisited in the concluding assessment. The chapter as a whole should be subjected to a thorough critical examination as to salience and strength of argument.

The Tajikistan Crisis Viewing the Tajik situation from the vantage point of the millennial year 2000, the opportunity arises to approach the complicated story in a retrospective mode of tracing it back to its beginnings in the immediate aftermath of the demise of the Soviet Union. The overall duration of the multifaceted process searching for a fair and comprehensive solution to the chaos and bitter strife in post-Soviet Tajikistan has so far come to nearly a decade, and it is not quite clear whether the recent breakthrough will hold up. Still, in 2000, the mood of the Council was festive and nearly jubilant as the international community could look back over years of effort and note with tremendous appreciation the successful outcome of the internal pacification of a troubled community. At the 4,140th meeting on May 12, 2000, the members of the Council were able to accept and evaluate the most recent report of the secretary-general regarding the situation in Tajikistan (S/2000/387) in which the key message was


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the recommendation to terminate the long-term presence of the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT). This significant step could be taken because the extended efforts by the UN, regional organizations, and ad hoc groups of states and nonstate actors, as well as the main Tajik parties to the inner conflict and to the peace-making activities involving all of these interested third parties, had finally borne fruit through the realization, in many parts, of a crucial peace accord of 1997. The secretary-general’s report and the ensuing deliberation in the Council at its 4,140th meeting offer testimony to the immense commitment and endeavor over many years by the direct parties and especially by the slightly more detached outside actors and groups. The milestone that had been reached in Tajikistan was the successful conduct of democratic elections for the two chambers of the Tajik parliament and the start of the first sessions of both chambers. This new phase in Tajik politics was a most encouraging sign that the deep division of the general population and of the political elites was beginning to be overcome, and that violence of earlier armed conflict in a civil war condition was giving way to peaceful debate and legislative procedures. The chance for an encompassing sociopolitical accommodation had been generated, allowing especially the outside partners in the international community and in the wider region to anticipate a calmer, more assuring period in the Tajik peace process. The secretary-general’s report was brief and to the point offering clear arguments for the replacement of the observer mission by a peace-building office in Dushanbe, the Tajik capital, if the Council was agreeable to such a next step. In an overall assessment, the SG recalled the dangerous situation in January 1993 when UNMOT had been set up as a small political office in the capital city, following independence in 1991 from the Soviet Union and the immediate outbreak of civil war. The intra-Tajik confrontation had expanded across its borders and threatened to engulf the whole Central Asian region. With a very early role taken by the UN and steered and coordinated by the Council in close cooperation with the SG, successive special envoys of the SG undertook strenuous efforts to bring about an agreement among the opposing Tajik forces on a cease-fire and to initiate methods of peacefully resolving problems through political dialogue. These undertakings began to bear fruit in 1994 involving the first round of interTajik talks in Moscow, followed by a second round in Tehran. Close cooperation with key governments accompanied the intensifying political process, which had been set in motion. A contact group of guarantor states and international organizations eventually formed to assist in overcoming the setbacks encountered in the search for a stable peace. At the first round of the inter-Tajik talks, a complete agenda was drafted and adopted, consisting of three clusters of issues related to a political settlement, a solution of the problem of refugees and internally displaced persons, and consolidation of the statehood of

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Tajikistan. With the signing of a temporary cease-fire agreement and the subsequent deployment of UN military observers, the UN was able to deal directly with local actors to advance the political process. Earlier, peacekeeping forces of the post-Soviet Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) had already been stationed on Tajik soil, albeit without any mandate relating to the conflict between government and the opposition forces. The SG underlined the excellent rapport between UNMOT, the CIS forces, and the Russian border forces in the new country. The inter-Tajik talks, at the heart of the prolonged peace process, endured many crises, deadlocks, and setbacks as the direct parties stalled in seeking more opportune moments in the political and military development of the crisis. After more than a year without serious fighting since the cease-fire of 1994, violent conflict broke out again in July 1995 as opposition forces entered the country from Afghan territory. In early 1996, an offensive was started by the opposition, and by July 1996 the cease-fire had almost collapsed. Although the political dialogue was preserved throughout this period with the help of Russia and Iran, only the signing in December 1996 of the Khudesh Agreement between President Rakhmonov and Mr. Nuri effectively revived the cease-fire accord, paving the way for rapid progress and culminating in the signing of the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord on 27 June 1997. The decisive support of the Council had permitted UNMOT to carry out its mandated function during these difficult months. As the timetable of twelve to eighteen months for the implementation of the peace agreement was rather ambitious and could not be fulfilled, much of UNMOT’s work involved helping the parties fine-tune the operational details. The timing was largely dependent on a delicate balance between the military and political aspects of the peace accord protocols, but in the end the date of the parliamentary election as dictated by the new constitution became the ultimate deadline for the parties. In the conclusion of the report, the SG summed up the characteristics of the UN engagement in the conflict in the following manner: the early engagement in the crisis; sustained political support of the Council and various affected regional states; cooperation with other organizations, in particular, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); effective crisis management; and, crucially, the strong will of the Tajik people to end the war and pursue a political outcome. The main points of the SG report were orally expanded upon at the 4,140th meeting by the last serving special representative of the SG and head of the mission in Tajikistan, Ivo Petrov from Bulgaria, who elaborated on the positive outcome of the peace process and the three factors leading to this success: first, UN involvement from the beginning of hostilities; second, the strong support of eight neighboring states, foremost among them Russia and Iran, that later


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became guarantors of the General Agreement and members of the contact group; and third, the political will of the two Tajik parties and their leaders to resolve differences through peaceful dialogue. He emphasized the UN’s instrumental assistance in the negotiation process, based on a clear mandate by the Council for UNMOT and the steady support and guidance by the Council. A very elaborate mechanism and process was required to keep the negotiations and consultations going and to ensure their efficiency. The special representative assigned great significance to the contribution of the contact group of guarantor states and international organizations, which conducted more than 130 meetings and played a key role as a crisis management mechanism. He stressed that the contact group had maintained throughout the transition period very close active relations with all parties involved in the implementation of the provisions of the peace accord, including the Tajik government, the Commission on National Reconciliation, and a number of international organizations. The principal objective of the contact group was always the promotion of the peace process. The special representative highly praised the contribution of the Tajik parties and called the contribution of the government and of the opposition most decisive for the successful peace process. The fact that it took them thirty-two months rather than twelve to eighteen months, as stipulated in the agreement, to implement the provisions of the accord ought in his judgment not to detract from their achievement, in view of the adverse affects of five years of bitter civil strife. The special contribution of President Rakhmonov and opposition leader Mr. Nuri in advancing a comprehensive peace agreement was highlighted. In the Council’s debate, it is especially noteworthy that the members of the Council and several representatives of nonmembers were unanimous in their judgment that the Tajik crisis had at last been brought to a point at which a peaceful solution became feasible and attainable through primarily the steady and strong support and engagement of the Council. This favorable viewpoint of the Council’s eminent role as guardian of international peace must be specially recorded as it helps redress the biases and imbalances of the polemical and often sharply negative claims about the Council’s inactivity or inefficiency. The unanimous attitude taken by the Council members throughout the full period of its consideration of the Tajik item since late 1992 speaks for itself and provides a strong foundation for the eventual positive results of the Council’s involvement. The statement of the Russian representative deserves special attention as it mirrors a consistent and strikingly constructive posture of the former Soviet authority in regard of the uncertainties and irregularities of the first tentative steps into political independence of Tajikistan as a sovereign state. The Russian ambassador described the Council meeting and the concluding presidential statement as unusual events in that they summed up the many UN “peacekeeping” efforts in

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Tajikistan and reaffirmed the unswerving support of the international community for the Tajik people on the road to national reconciliation and peace. He praised the implementation of the main provisions of the General Agreement of 1997 as an important achievement of the Tajik society and of the UN and included the contact group in his praise. The ambassador also described in some detail the steady and thorough active role played by Russia throughout the entire time dealing with the intractable crisis, and he emphasized the role of key guarantor the Russian Federation was playing to ensure the final durable success. He further firmly supported the suggestion of continuing UN involvement in the areas of peace building, economic rehabilitation, and technical and financial assistance. The lengthy session brought statements by all Council members and also heard the representatives of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan, as well as Iran, Pakistan, and other interested governments. The common tenor of these presentations was unanimous applause for the persistence, patience, and skill of the UN’s role in the Tajik crisis and the acknowledgment that the conflict could not have been eased and resolved without the indispensable engagement of the UN system together with the regional organizations and an ad hoc group of activist and committed state actors. Only a few speakers expressed mild disappointment about the irregularities that had blemished the conduct and results of the parliamentary elections in Tajikistan. The representative of Tajikistan used the occasion to offer an extensive account of the more than eight years of efforts, gains, and setbacks out of which the eventual peace accord was assembled and endorsed. His praise was unrestricted regarding the unstinting help provided by the UN and the care and positive dynamic of the Council’s involvement as overseer and ultimate political and legal authority for the various steps in the Tajik peace process. He placed the international dimension of the crisis in conjunction with the internal movements for which the Tajik leadership under President Rakhmonov and the United Tajik Opposition headed by Mr. Nuri served as key factors shaping the scope and range of the comprehensive agreement for a new Tajik community. The Tajik spokesman used the opportunity to press once more for essential assistance to overcome the human and material losses and to begin to recover some of the devastating losses that had set back the land and the people by generations. Only if the material foundations for a new Tajikistan were laid could the process of building a modern democratic state of law with a social market economy begin and advance adequately. In a mood of celebration and gratitude, the Tajik representative mentioned all of the helpers and friends who had rushed to assist the troubled land and had given all they had to offer to put Tajikistan back on track and accompany it on the difficult road to reconciliation and recovery. He pleaded that the next stretch of the road to a durable peace also should be traveled with the UN as partner, and that the idea of the postconflict peace-building


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office in Dushanbe was indeed critical for the continued building of a viable state, society, and economy on Tajik soil. Together with the UN, other international organizations were mentioned as having made crucial contributions to the healing of Tajikistan. The representative singled out the OSCE and the Organization of the Islamic Conference and referred with special gratitude to the extraordinary peacekeeping role of the Commonwealth of Independent States, which served in that capacity from 1993 to the present to protect Tajikistan from infiltration from neighboring Afghanistan and to stabilize the internal situation in the country. Especial mention also was made of the complementary involvement of the eight members of the contact group, consisting of Russia, Iran, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Pakistan, and pre-Taliban Afghanistan, in which Russia played the preeminent role. In an emotional conclusion to his long statement in celebration of the Tajik progress, the ambassador presented the following reflection: The people and the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan are overjoyed and highly elated that, with the support of the entire international community, it has been possible for us, at the turn of a new millennium, to break the vicious circle of fratricidal enmity and to channel the development of our State and our society into a civilized course of peace, democracy and a flourishing society.

During the 4,140th meeting, the representatives of Portugal and Austria, speaking on behalf of the European Union and of the OSCE, respectively, added their congratulations and comments to the chorus of joy and applause. The unison acclaim of a solid success in peacekeeping, peace making, and peace building under the auspices of the Council reflects startlingly the momentous occasion of this milestone in the trajectory of Tajikistan’s return to the international community. This turn of events is more remarkable in light of the miserable situation that prevailed when the Tajik entity, like a waif or an orphan, was confronted with the necessity of going it alone in the volatile world after the fall of the Soviet empire. It would appear appropriate to go back to the beginning of the Tajik emergency, the moment in the post-cold war world, when the Soviet Union fell apart into its formal fifteen component republics. What had been covered up in the time of the Communist multiethnic megastate became now obvious and revealed suddenly the untenable conditions of the resulting new states. A major example of the incongruity of what had now emerged from the Soviet party state is indeed Tajikistan, which had never existed as an independent political community and harbored in its boundaries severe cleavages and contradictions. In terms of population, Tajikistan shows a mixed ethnic composition, with 64.9% Tajik, 25%

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Uzbek, 3.5% Russian, and 6.6% other. An overwhelming majority adheres to the Islamic faith, namely, 80% Sunni and 5% Shi’a. The atheistic nature of the Soviet society was obviously anathema to a substantial portion of the Tajik society, both during Soviet times and in particular after the collapse of the Communist order. Tensions flared quickly, and civil war ensued. By October 1992, the turmoil reached such heights that Tajikistan’s leadership and neighboring governments in their dismay decided to turn to the UN, which they had joined as new member states directly after the dissolution of the USSR. In individual letters to the president of the Council or to the UN secretarygeneral (S/24699, S/24692, S/24725), the representatives of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and the Russian Federation urged the Council to consider the deterioration of the social, political, and economic situation in Tajikistan and the swelling stream of refugees and other displaced persons as well as to send a peace-making mission and to provide expeditiously humanitarian aid to the people afflicted in this upheaval. The Russian representative issued a grave warning that the local crisis could have catastrophic consequences for the security of the whole Central Asian region. The first measure in response to these urgent appeals was, with the concurrence of the Council, the dispatch by the secretary-general of a fact-finding and good-offices mission to Tajikistan and other regional states (see S/24739), and following these visits, the consideration by the Council in informal consultations of the issue before them. As has long been customary, the Council issued on 30 October 1992, at its 3,131st meeting, through its president, a presidential statement (S/24742) in which it expressed its very grave concern about the deteriorating situation in Tajikistan, called on all parties to the conflict to end the fighting and to enter into a political dialogue with a view to reaching a peaceful settlement, welcomed the efforts by CIS member countries to help resolve the crisis, welcomed the SG’s decision to send a goodwill mission, including a humanitarian assistance mission to Tajikistan and Central Asia, and called upon all parties to the conflict and the neighboring countries to facilitate the work of the SG’s mission and to ensure the safety of its personnel. The ensuing sequence of UN deliberations, decisions, and measures is richly documented and cannot be covered in this limited chapter. What should be drawn from that abundant pool of telling data and reports is merely the broad path of policy making under the auspices of the Council devoted to the ultimate implementation of the basic goals set out in the initial presidential statement. The volume and intensity of the Council’s immersion in the Tajik case is strikingly illustrated by the thirteen resolutions and sixteen presidential statements constituting the decision output over the roughly eight years under review. These figures in and of themselves depict the attention and care of the Council as guardian of the global peace and circumscribe the range of ideas and recommen-


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dations emerging from the confidential deliberations of the Council members. The fact that all decisions were adopted unanimously speaks for the common perspective and common determination that brought the members closer as they exercised the Charter-based rights and prerogatives of the Council. This extended but concentrated consideration of a major post-cold war flash point in the strategically significant Central Asian region demonstrates the modus operandi of the Council in its principal Charter function. The views and arguments are openly expressed in the closed consultation meetings, but they are geared toward the elaboration of a consensus decision that every Council member and important outside parties can embrace. The striking feature of the Tajik case is the intrinsically logical lead role taken by Russia’s representatives, who managed throughout the whole period to act as an equal partner and player in the Council’s political process, gaining the trust and agreement of the other members for the strategic and tactical moves in pursuit of an elusive goal of stable peace. A telling proof of that highly constructive approach applied by the Russian party to the issue is the full acquiescence by the United States in the chain of decisions adopted by the Council. Such successful collaboration in the Council is not always given. In the Tajik crisis, there is little doubt that the smooth and well-informed participation of the Council in shaping a successful outcome is due to a large degree to the especially harmonious atmosphere of the Council’s handling of this complicated case. To take the full measure of the Council’s evident success, it appears useful to examine in some greater detail the presidential statement (S/PRST/2000/17) that was issued after the extended debate of the 4,140th meeting. At the 4,141st meeting, which followed right after the earlier session, only allowing brief consultations among the members before holding the brief formal meeting, the president made the following statement on behalf of the Council: The Council welcomes the success achieved in the peace process in Tajikistan with the completion of implementation of the main provisions of the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan signed in Moscow on 27 June 1997 under the auspices of the United Nations. It expresses its appreciation for the sequential and persistent efforts of the President of the Republic of Tajikistan and the leadership of the Commission on National Reconciliation in this regard. The Council acknowledges the significant achievement of the Tajik parties which have managed to overcome many obstacles and to put their country on the path to peace, reconciliation and democracy. It joins the Secretary-General in hoping that these achievements will be consolidated in the further strengthening of the institutions in the country with a view to the democratic, economic and social development of Tajik society.

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The Council notes with satisfaction that the United Nations has played a successful and important role in the peace process. It highly appreciates the efforts of the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan, supported by the Contact Group of guarantor States and international organizations, the Mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the collective peacekeeping forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States, in assisting the parties in the implementation of the General Agreement. The Council expresses its appreciation to the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran and other interested Member States for their sustained political support for the peace efforts of the United Nations in Tajikistan, for assisting the parties to maintain political dialogue and to overcome the crises in the peace process. It encourages the members of the former Contact Group to continue to support Tajikistan in its further efforts to consolidate peace, stability and democracy in the country. The Council notes with satisfaction that UNMOT maintained excellent relations with the peacekeeping forces and the Russian border forces, which contributed to the success of the mission and helped to support the political process on the ground. The Council emphasizes that the continued support of the international community in the post-conflict phase will be crucial in allowing Tajikistan to sustain and build on the achievements of the peace process, and in helping to lay a durable foundation for a better life for its people. In this regard, the Council expresses its appreciation to the SecretaryGeneral for his intention to inform the Council about the modalities of the establishment and functioning of a post-conflict peace-building office of the United Nations in Tajikistan in order to consolidate peace and promote democracy.

In this statement, summing up a long period of waiting and searching, the Council sets out in succinct language the goals of the lengthy efforts and identifies the key players acting in the pursuit of the commonly shared objectives. It displays a sense of circumspection regarding the recognition of important contributions by state actors and regional organizations and places the UN role squarely in the center of the whole peace process. It makes clear the time-consuming process and that the parties are multiple which, in close cooperation and allowing enough time, pursue patiently the distant aim that is the only assurance that success may be possible. The shared credit for a most cumbersome peace process and peace accord reflects the joint enterprise by all of the participants in the Tajik search for reconciliation and democracy. Only a detailed examination of the full Tajik story could do justice to its complexity and volatility. A more general assessment of the Tajik case in light of


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the overarching question posed in this chapter will follow after the description and analysis of another terribly difficult case before the Council, namely, the “Situation in Sierra Leone,” as it is blandly but objectively labeled on the Council’s agenda. The two cases will complement each other and thus offer an even sharper and deeper understanding of the functioning of the Council, here including its limitations as well as its undiminished potential as the central organ for peace and security in the contemporary world.

The Sierra Leone Tragedy Whereas the Tajikistan case emerged in the early 1990s, the Sierra Leone situation is of more recent origin, but it is shaped and affected by historical antecedents reaching far into the colonial past and the years since its formal independence in 1961. The political development since national independence is characterized by instability, military rule, and preciously little in democratization, despite the noble language of the initial constitution and the recurrent promises of mainly power-hungry, ruthless strong men and other unelected leaders. Over recent years, Sierra Leone has undergone further shocks and violent turmoil, demonstrating to the entire world the immense obstacles faced by a disillusioned, tortured population and its weak and misguided political and military leadership. Sierra Leone continues to be one of the lowest-ranking states in the world in economic development and, more disturbingly, in human development as measured annually by the UN Development Programme (UNDP). At the same time, the country has considerable natural resources, including diamonds that are found in parts of the country and have brought legal as well as illegal trade in raw diamonds. It comes as not much of a surprise that the control over these diamond areas and the related diamond trade has served as a key bone of contention in the many power struggles that have been fought on the backs of the common people of the country. The recent stalemate pitting the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) against the political and military leadership of Sierra Leone endured as the fight over possession of the diamonds industry was carried out. The vicious armed conflict in Sierra Leone began in 1991, when about 100 fighters based in Liberia crossed the border into Sierra Leone in an attempt to overthrow President Momoh, who had been supporting a Nigerian-led West African peacekeeping force, known as the Economic Community of West African States Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), which was preventing Liberia’s Charles Taylor from capturing Monrovia. These fighters invading Sierra Leone eventually called themselves the RUF and included Sierra Leonean dissidents and Liberian followers of Taylor. They were led by Foday Sankoh, a former photographer and an ex-army sergeant, who allegedly had spent time training in Libya with Taylor. The next few months engulfed Sierra Leone in a

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military confrontation between government and ECOMOG troops on one side and RUF and Liberian forces on the other, revealing the inevitable link between developments in the two neighboring countries. From that initial constellation it seemed evident that the RUF under Sankoh acted in collusion with Taylor and his fighters. This dismal setting provides the background against which the deepening involvement of the UN through its secretary-general and especially its Council must be perceived and understood. The first detailed report by the SG to the Council, dated 21 November 1995 (S/1995/975), describes in careful formulations the efforts and difficulties that have made the provision of the good offices most cumbersome and frustrating. With instability and upheaval in government and on the battlefield, attempts to launch a campaign of democracy building and to prepare for a free and fair national election were gravely hampered and brought only little improvement for the general public in the cities and throughout the countryside. The overall situation continued to be conflicted and volatile, persuading yet another military ruler, Chairman Strasser of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), to request the continued good offices of the UN’s SG to bring the government and the RUF to negotiations, with the UN as an intermediary in the process. Maintaining the pattern of its initial conduct, the RUF continued to boycott invitations and offers from the UN representatives and thereby unduly delayed most urgent steps in healing the social fabric and repairing the political institutions and processes in Sierra Leone. Throughout the period of this SG report, the attitude of the RUF leadership was totally erratic and gyrated wildly between stalling and seemingly conceding. In the end, the RUF always withdrew to a position of noncooperation, which was realized by refusing to receive the UN intermediaries or by rejecting any and all offers for compromise. The SG report made it absolutely clear that the projects for democratization, for improving the security and economic situation, and for alleviating the dismal humanitarian condition, with close to half the population forcibly displaced and suffering severely, were all negatively affected by the central confrontation between the government and the RUF. For these reasons, the SG impressed upon the members of the Council the growing urgency of dealing with the dreadful conditions prevailing in the West African state and applying available measures to address the serious concerns. This appeal was especially geared to providing the necessary financial and institutional support for the preparation against all odds of proper democratic elections in the country. The first signal of the Council, through the presidential statement of November 27, 1995 (S/PRST/1995/57), contained a rather mild message. It expressed deep concern over the conflict and the suffering resulting from it, in particular, that of the nearly 2 million internally displaced Sierra Leoneans, and it


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called for an immediate end to the fighting. The Council further expressed appreciation to the SG for his offer of good offices and urged the RUF to take advantage of that offer, thus enabling both parties to enter into negotiations. The Council also emphasized that the international effort to alleviate the deplorable humanitarian situation should be carefully coordinated and welcomed the program of transition to democratic constitutional rule set by the Sierra Leone government. With this decision, the Council had stepped in as key actor and as the highest international authority and declared that the internal situation in Sierra Leone was a legitimate issue for it to be engaged in. With all of the difficulties and despite the obstinate and brutal attitude of the RUF, no party in Sierra Leone or on the outside has ever doubted or challenged the right of the Council to deal with the civil war and its aftermath in that country. The following years showed a rapid intensification of the Council’s involvement with Sierra Leone and the growing willingness to apply stronger measures to affect the behavior of the fighting or competing parties and to promote a peaceful comprehensive solution for the nightmarish problems afflicting the land and its people. In the next decision of the Council, in the form of a presidential statement (S/PRST/1996/7), the members warmly welcomed the steps taken toward the holding of democratic elections and underlined the critical importance of free and fair elections to Sierra Leone’s transition to democratic constitutional rule; it warned groups and individuals in the country not to attempt to disrupt the electoral process and explicitly commended the SG for efforts to monitor these elections. The second presidential statement, issued a few weeks later, on 19 March 1996 (S/PRST/1996/12), welcomed the successful parliamentary and presidential elections and congratulated the people on their courage and determination, noting that the joint international observer group was impressed by the overwhelming desire of the people to exercise their democratic right in casting a ballot for the parties and candidates of their choice. In both statements, a special appeal was directed at the RUF, urging the group to participate fully and to accept the outcome of the election and enter into a full dialogue for peace. The next moment in this case history is actually a high point as far as the basic aim of peace and democracy in Sierra Leone was concerned. After several setbacks in the political and military realms, the long talks between the rival groups and factions bore fruit in the “Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the RUF of Sierra Leone,” which was signed at Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire, on 30 November 1996. This lengthy agreement, consisting of twenty-eight articles and an annex (issued as S/1996/1034), was to foster mutual confidence and trust and promote just and durable peace as well as common purpose and patriotism in the country, and it envisaged several bodies and functions to fulfill the noble phrases and principles of the accord. The UN was directly affected by the peace agreement in that

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the parties requested that the organization provide neutral international observers to monitor the peace in Sierra Leone. Shortly thereafter, on 4 December 1996, through another presidential statement (S/PRST/1996/46), the Council took note with delight of the peace accord, which apparently ended the bitter conflict. It commended in particular the role played by the government of Cote d’Ivoire and also praised the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Commonwealth, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which had acted in close coordination with the SG’s special envoy. The Council further paid attention to the need for national reconciliation and reconstruction, for a successful process of demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, and for an international effort to alleviate the humanitarian situation in the country. This complimentary view from the Council reflected the relief and optimism among its members that the worst of the crisis in Sierra Leone was behind them. But the RUF did not fully keep its commitments, and it raised new questions about the provisions of the peace accord and the manner in which these were to be carried out. As stated by the SG in his comprehensive report on Sierra Leone, issued on January 26, 1997 (S/1997/80), despite initial assurances given by Sankoh for RUF, major delays were incurred as a result of the RUF’s stalling tactics. Therefore, the peace process timetable had to be left open-ended until all parties were in agreement on how to proceed. The turbulence of earlier times returned with full force when in March 1997 Sankoh was arrested on an arms charge in Nigeria. Two months later, another military coup forced the democratically elected President Kabbah to flee and brought Major Johnny Paul Koroma to power. He suspended the constitution, abolished political parties, and set up the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), including members of the Sierra Leonean army. Looting followed, and chaos erupted. Foreign troops headed by Nigerian military sought in vain to oust the Koroma junta. At this juncture, the Council convened a meeting (3,781st meeting) at the news about the military coup. Having considered the new deteriorating situation in Freetown and the country as a whole in informal consultations, the Council spoke once again through a presidential statement (S/PRST/1997/29), in which the Council members expressed deep concern about the military coup d’etat in Sierra Leone, especially with the UN assisting the process of reconciliation, and strongly deplored the attempt to overthrow the democratically elected government. Furthermore, the Council condemned the violence inflicted on local and expatriate communities and called for an end to the looting of premises and equipment belonging to the UN and international aid agencies. Koroma defied international pressure and the UN rebuke. In June, he invited the RUF to join the junta. In the meantime, Kabbah was seeking to


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return to power through schemes of a counter-coup. While Sierra Leone was thus sinking into a new period of anarchy and bloodshed mostly directed against hapless civilians, the Council turned once again to the critical situation and met in informal consultations and in a formal meeting to address the deterioration of the country. The 3,797th meeting on 11 July 1997, was mostly devoted to a long declaration by the foreign minister of Nigeria speaking for and on behalf of the members of ECOWAS, currently chaired by Nigeria. The foreign minister presented a vivid picture of the waste of human life, the disruption of civil society, and the destruction of property and infrastructure, which had erupted following the seizure of power on 25 May 1997, by Koroma and his faction of the country’s military force. The impact of the disturbances convulsing the tortured land and its inhabitants was so severe that the greatest concern about wider regional ramifications was fully justified. The selfishness and brutality of the insurgents and of the marauding RUF irregulars made it totally clear that none of them was at all interested in the fate of the country and the well-being of its citizens. In view of the terrible situation spreading through Sierra Leone and the immediate environs, with Guinea a major target and victim of the paralysis of Sierra Leone, the ECOWAS members, the OAU, and numerous African states joined in the urgent approach to the Council for swift and forceful action to stop the violence and to interdict the gruesome record of massive human rights violations committed on a daily basis. The Nigerian foreign minister proposed a combination of three measures to deal with the malaise: dialogue, imposition of sanctions and embargo, and the use of force. Although ECOWAS members had stated reservations about the use of military force, they had acknowledged that some force could not be avoided in the imposition and implementation of harsh sanctions. For these reasons, further intensive consultations with the UN and OAU were conducted in order to establish a common international front in the face of daily barbarous atrocities terrorizing innocent people. The stirring statement by the Nigerian foreign minister was echoed and amplified by the representative of Zimbabwe, who transmitted the full and unreserved support by the OAU and its current chairman for the peace initiative of the four foreign ministers of ECOWAS. He further stated that Africa stood unreservedly behind President Kabbah and the elected government of Sierra Leone and called upon the Council and the international community to support ECOWAS and OAU in seeking the nonrecognition and demise of the military regime and in working for the restoration of the democratically elected government. At the 3,798th meeting, on the same day and in immediate succession to the 3,797th meeting, the president made a statement on behalf of the Council (S/PRST/1997/36), in which the Council expressed concern about the grave crisis

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in Sierra Leone and its possible impact on the Liberian peace process; strongly supported the decision adopted by the OAU assembly of heads of state and government in Harare on 4 June 1997, in which it appealed to the leaders of ECOWAS and the international community to help the people of Sierra Leone to restore constitutional order in that country; welcomed the mediation efforts initiated by ECOWAS; and stated its readiness to consider appropriate measures if constitutional order was not restored in Sierra Leone. With this clear and unmistakable declaration, the Council delivered a message that further “appropriate” measures were definitely under consideration if the rebels and marauders were not ready to abandon their illegal operations and did not return to the path of constitutional order and civil peace. Less than a month later, the Council was briefed about further steps taken by the ECOWAS Committee of Four in pursuit of the stated aims and decided, in informal consultations of the whole, to issue another presidential statement (S/PRST/1997/42), on 6 August 1997, in which the Council again condemned the overthrow of President Kabbah’s government, called upon the military junta in Sierra Leone to bring about the unconditional restoration of that government; and underlined the need to implement the Abidjan Agreement, which continued to serve as a viable framework for peace, stability, and reconciliation in Sierra Leone. Having been regularly briefed by senior secretariat officials about the rapidly changing situation in Sierra Leone and the difficulties in restoring the constitutional order in the country, the Council was fully aware of the need for tougher measures from the UN and convened for the purpose of a public debate and the consideration of a suitable draft resolution. At the 3,822nd meeting on 8 October 1997, the unresolved political situation in Sierra Leone was the subject matter of the deliberations and resulted in numerous statements from members and nonmembers alike. The president referred at the outset to the text of a draft resolution, which had already been prepared in the course of the Council’s prior consultations. The first speaker in this important debate was Mr. Jonah, the representative of the ousted government of President Kabbah and former UN under-secretary-general, who expressed gratitude to the Council and the delegation of the UK for giving this much attention to the plight of Sierra Leone. He spoke very favorably about the strong draft resolution to be adopted, and he extended cordial thanks to the African members of the Council for helping make its meeting possible on that day. He stated the fervent hope that the military junta in Freetown would finally take seriously what would happen at the meeting of the Council and draw the appropriate consequences. Then the representative of Nigeria presented significant details of the intensive efforts that had been carried out by ECOWAS as a whole and in particular by its Committee of Four in exploring all options for a resolution of the


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Sierra Leone stalemate, and the most recent recognition that only the toughest measures might break the resistance of the illegal rulers in Freetown. ECOWAS wanted to emphasize three main considerations: First, the situation in Sierra Leone was a clear threat to international peace and security; second, the subregion would want to avoid another costly and long, drawn-out engagement, causing humanitarian tragedies, similar to the experience in Liberia; third, while ECOWAS was sufficiently seized of the matter, the support and endorsement of the UN were needed. The Nigerian representative also applauded the inclusion of an enabling authorization to ECOMOG in the Council’s draft resolution as it documented the closeness of ECOWAS to the situation on the ground. In the subsequent part of the 3,822nd meeting, most of the members of the Council offered their own comments regarding the adoption of mandatory sanctions against the military usurpers and their followers. The representative of the UK, the former colonial power in Sierra Leone, identified the major milestones in the recent history of Sierra Leone, including the democratic elections, the peace agreement, and the grievous setback when the RUF refused to go along with the UN proposals for a military observer force and, shortly thereafter, the military overthrow of the civilian authority. Together with ECOWAS, the OAU, and other enraged states and groups, the UK was appalled by the turn of events. Beyond mere condemnation, the African states, the UK, and the international community as a whole had finally rallied around a stern approach, establishing an international arms and oil embargo and visa restrictions on junta members, thereby making it clear to the illegal regime in Freetown that the whole world was committed to reversing the military coup and restoring the democratic government. The sentiments of a unanimous Council were well summarized in the declaration of the Egyptian representative, who suggested that the Council exercise on that day its responsibilities under the Charter to maintain international peace and security and to protect legitimacy. He also pointed out that the adoption of a unanimous position by the OAU members vis-à-vis the Freetown coup represented an important turning point in modern Africa, a position that should be bolstered by the UN. In addition, he viewed the draft resolution as a practical framework for cooperation between the UN and the regional and subregional organizations in the context of Chapters VII and VIII of the Charter. Following these favorable statements documenting a united and dynamic front in the Council’s membership, the Council adopted unanimously the draft as its resolution 1132 (1997), a seminal act to bring about positive change in the troubled land. By this resolution, the Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, demanded that the military junta relinquish power and make way for the restoration of the legitimate government; imposed travel sanctions against members of the military junta and adult members of their families; further decided to

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ban the sale or supply to Sierra Leone of petroleum and petroleum products and arms and related materiel of all types, including arms and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for those items; acting under Chapter VIII of the Charter, authorized ECOWAS, cooperating with the democratically elected government of Sierra Leone, to ensure strict implementation of the resolution; and requested ECOWAS to report every thirty days to the Sanctions Committee established under the resolution. With this important resolution, the Council had tightened the grip emitting from its Charter-based authoritative mandate and put the military junta on notice that the patience of the international community was wearing thin. The deepening engagement at that crucial moment in 1997 showed a proactive, unanimous body of fifteen states and their representatives taking their duty most seriously. The debate and resolution of that date also reflect quite directly a growing trend in global governance matters, namely, the formation of ad hoc multilateral action coalitions consisting of various intergovernmental organizations at the global, regional, and subregional levels with frequent involvement of internationally based NGOs and other groups and occasionally of individuals. Through this innovative arrangement the international community manages to be more effective in applying its plans and actions to the targeted problem or emergency situation. The further development of that new international coalition type requires careful observation and assessment. The thrust of resolution 1132 (1997) was taken up and restated in a new presidential statement (S/PRST/1997/52) of 14 November 1997, which expressed once more the Council’s support for the efforts of the ECOWAS Committee of Five, welcomed the peace plan agreed on at Conakry on 23 October 1997, between the ECOWAS committee and the military junta, and reminded all states of their obligation to comply with the embargo and other measures imposed under that resolution. When the Council again convened on the situation in Sierra Leone on 26 February 1998, the situation in the country had dramatically changed after the victorious military operation by ECOWAS troops against the forces loyal to the junta and RUF fighters. The Council, through another presidential statement (S/PRST/1998/5), welcomed the rule of the military junta being brought to an end, further demanded that the democratic government of President Kabbah should be restored, declared readiness to terminate the sanctions against the country, and expressed the wish to see the speedy resumption of the UN activities to assist national reconciliation and political dialogue. In a letter dated 9 March 1998 (S/1998/215), the representative of Sierra Leone notified the Council about the ouster of the illegal military junta and the return of President Kabbah as head of state on 10 March 1998. In consequence of that event, the Council was asked to consider lifting the sanctions imposed


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under resolution 1132 (1997). The letter stressed the urgency of that step in order to enable the restored government to function smoothly. The Council responded positively to the Sierra Leonean request and adopted, following prior informal consultations, at the 3,861st meeting, unanimously a draft resolution submitted by Kenya and the UK as resolution 1156 (1998). The key provisions of the resolution were the immediate termination of the prohibitions on the sale or supply to Sierra Leone of petroleum and petroleum products referred to in paragraph six of resolution 1132 (1997), and the decision to review the other prohibitions referred to in the same resolution in light of developments and further discussion with the government of Sierra Leone. The events of the next few months revealed the murkiness of the local conditions and the contradictions entailed in the continuing civil war and the bloody terror inflicted by the RUF and other bandits across the land. The Council’s reactions were manifold but characterized by its unhesitating, activist attitude whenever new messages or initiatives were brought to its attention. In rapid succession, the Council issued on the basis of unanimous votes several resolutions (1162 [1998], 1171 [1998], 1181 [1998], and a few presidential statements [S/PRST/1998/13, S/PRST/1999/1]) as the slowly stabilizing conditions in Sierra Leone mandated. While allowing itself to be somewhat guided by the experiences and insights conveyed to the Council by ECOWAS, OAU, and the most interested parties, including the UK, the Council’s decision-making processes illustrated again and again the sovereign and authoritative manner with which the Council exercised its prerogative under the Charter. Thus in response to a new report by the SG (S/1998/249), and taking note of an urgent submission (S/1998/295), dated 3 April 1998, from the restored Sierra Leone government asking for sanctions under resolution 1132 (1997) not to be lifted, the Council adopted on 17 April 1998, a draft resolution that had been prepared in the course of the Council’s prior consultations, as resolution 1162 (1998), by which the Council authorized the deployment, with immediate effect, of up to ten UN military liaison and security advisory personnel to Sierra Leone for a period of up to ninety days, to work under the authority of the special envoy of the SG, to coordinate closely with the government of Sierra Leone and ECOMOG, to report on the military situation in the country, to ascertain the state of and to assist in the finalization of planning by ECOMOG for future tasks, such as the identification of the former combatant elements to be disarmed and the design of a disarmament plan, and to perform other related security tasks as identified in the SG report. Obtaining steady updates on the highly volatile situation in Freetown and the rest of the country, the Council was scandalized and deeply shocked by the wave of mass killings and terrorizing carried out by the members of the RUF and the deposed military junta and the impunity with which these vandals and

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murderers went about committing unspeakable atrocities against the fearful civilians. The presidential statement (S/PRST/1998/13), issued on 20 May 1998, at the Council’s 3,882nd meeting, sharply condemned these brutal acts, including widespread rape, mutilation, and slaughter as gross violations of international humanitarian law, and called for an immediate cessation of all violence against civilians and expressed grave concern about reports of military support being provided to the rebels, and asked all states to observe strictly the provisions of resolution 1132 (1997) and to avoid any action that might further destabilize the situation in Sierra Leone. This declaration of outrage showed the Council’s helplessness in the face of absolute evil. The frank language of the presidential statement naming the atrocities by their name and openly identifying the culprits made up for the given inability of the Council, with just a few interlocutors and observers on location, to directly interfere in the ongoing campaign of terror and to put a stop to it. But it stands to reason that the Council members were completely aware of the given predicament and that sooner or later they had to come to terms with either removing themselves from the tragic situation in Sierra Leone or immerse themselves directly in the crisis using the tools available to them under the Charter. The events of the summer of 1998 probably were decisive in confronting the Council with that fundamental choice. The prolonged agony of Sierra Leone and the actions chosen by the Council until that day offer powerful evidence that the Council members chose the option of forceful and effective action to finally break the spell of doom over Sierra Leone and to set it on the track of slow but perceptible recovery. A first correction of the Council’s policy toward Sierra Leone came with its resolution 1171 (1998), which also was prepared in the course of prior consultations and adopted unanimously at the 3,889th meeting on 5 June 1998. This decision provided the full cancellation of the sanctions under resolution 1132 (1997) as far as the restored government was concerned, and the shifting of the same set of sanctions imposing them on the rebel forces of the ousted military junta and of RUF so that the legitimate authorities would have a fair chance to begin the longoverdue process of economic, political, and social recovery. The prospects for that one-sided punitive thrust to succeed appeared rather promising as Foday Sankoh was still detained in Nigeria rendering the group apparently leaderless. The next important step in augmenting the role of the UN and setting up a viable UN presence in the West African country came on 13 July 1998, at the 3,902nd meeting, when the Council continued its consideration of the situation with a very detailed, action-oriented report of the SG, dated 9 June 1998 (S/1998/486), before it. The fifth SG report on Sierra Leone contained a highly informative, up-to-date account of where the restoration of public order and a functioning socioeconomic system stood and what kind of assistance had been


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made available from a wide range of helpful organizations, states, and nongovernmental actors in the immense rush to rehabilitate the mistreated community. The key recommendation in the SG’s report was the proposal for the Council to set up a larger peacekeeping observer mission composed of unarmed military personnel. The report gave a detailed plan of action with the duties to be assigned and the specific deployment elaborated. This strengthened UN presence would assist the restored government and ECOMOG to take greater strides in repairing the human and material destruction and start on the long path of reconciliation. The Council’s debate at the 3,902nd meeting brought out once more the common perspective and confluence of determination characteristic of the core UN organ in its finest hours as all members spoke invariably in very positive words about the wisdom of increasing the UN presence and applying the multifaceted services that the international community was capable of delivering, including humanitarian relief, demilitarization and demobilization of soldiers, and protective arrangements for children in armed conflict situations. The sequence of speakers was indicative of the enduring collaboration of global, regional, and subregional organizations in that Austria spoke for the European Union, the UK took the floor as a former colonial power and clearly committed friend, and Nigeria addressed the Council as the leading member of ECOWAS and central contributor to the ongoing security function of ECOMOG in Sierra Leone. The speakers were unanimous in praising the merits and potential of this assertive multilateralism and expressed delight at its application for a second time in black Africa. The unanimous adoption of resolution 1181 (1998) at the end of the meeting made the importance of this moment in the tortuous course of the Sierra Leonean situation unmistakably clear. By resolution 1181 (1998), the Council decided to establish the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) for initially six months; further decided to include up to seventy military observers as well as a medical unit, with equipment and civilian support staff; and decided that UNOMSIL should be deployed when the security arrangements and the status-of-mission agreement had been concluded. Progress reports by the SG on UNOMSIL (the first one issued on 12 August 1998, as S/1998/750) gave a clear impression of the slow but systematic buildup of the recommended UN force and of the onset of important assistance functions by the respective units of the steadily growing observer mission. At the end of the year, on 18 December 1998, the Council resumed consideration of the situation in Sierra Leone with the third progress report of the SG on UNOMSIL (S/1998/1176) on its agenda. The meeting was held in a new fashion in that at the request of the Council members, the head of the UN Peacekeeping Operations Department (DPKO) and the chairman of the Sierra Leone Sanctions Committee were invited to brief the Council on the various aspects of

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the multidimensional role of the UN and especially of UNOMSIL and thus give the representatives a better understanding of a highly complex and foreverchanging situation. The SG’s progress report put forth a detailed, well-balanced account of the activities of UNOMSIL and the wider context in which this UN team had to operate. While he was able to report a successful overall impact generated by the UNOMSIL soldiers and civilians, he explained quite bluntly that the persistent anarchic and strife-torn condition in the country had made it impossible for the UN team to obtain the minimum level of security that would allow them to venture out in rebel-held or contested parts of the land or to anticipate the feasibility of a larger, more effective UN deployment. These impeding factors also served as a reason the number of UNOMSIL military observers had reached merely forty out of the intended total of seventy so far. Much of what the UN under the Council’s resolutions was instructed to do could either not be carried out due to lack of personnel or because the overall situation in Freetown and the rest of the country did not permit such active engagement. Still, in order to address growing demands on the ground, the SG proposed a modest expansion of the civilian staff of UNOMSIL. The 3,957th meeting was devoted to the two briefings, adding significant details over and beyond the SG report and enabling the Council members to enter into an active dialogue with the senior UN official and the chairperson of the Council’s own subsidiary organ. The briefings offered an in-depth perspective on the gap between what the UN role in Sierra Leone was supposed to be and what it could be under the given obstacles and limitations. Nevertheless, both speakers stated their conviction that the UN presence was absolutely crucial for the eventual victory over the bitter fratricidal confrontation disrupting the country and frightening the general population, and that the potential for a stronger and more lasting effect of international aid was undiminished. The UN, together with ECOWAS, OAU, and other international organizations, was the most likely agent for positive change in the still-messy conditions of the prolonged crisis over the area. The subsequent Council discussion showed once again an astounding agreement across the political spectrum of the fifteen Council members, fully endorsing the further extension of the UN mandate and raising a variety of practical questions dealing with the full deployment of UNOMSIL, the collaboration between the UN and the other international organizations, and the prospects for the eventual accommodation and pacification of the local community. Not a single voice was raised objecting to or doubting the continued role of UNOMSIL, and the discussion reflected in addition a wider agreement on the enlargement of the UN operation. Although the Council did not take a formal decision at the 3,957th meeting, the approval of the SG’s recommendation to extend the UNOMSIL mandate


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was stated in very clear terms. Unexpected setbacks and turmoil in Sierra Leone gave rise to the urgent return to the item in early 1999 when the Council, at its 3,963rd meeting on 7 January 1999, issued another presidential statement (S/PRST/1999/1) in which the Council expressed grave concern at the attacks by armed rebels of the former junta and RUF in the capital of Sierra Leone, and the resulting suffering and loss of life; condemned the unacceptable attempt by the rebels to overthrow by violence the democratically elected government of Sierra Leone and the rebels’ continued campaign to terrorize the population of Sierra Leone, especially the atrocities committed against women and children; demanded that the rebels lay down their arms immediately and cease all violence; and reiterated several earlier appeals in regard of support for President Kabbah and his government, the continued sanctions and compliance with them; welcomed efforts by President Kabbah to resolve the conflict within Sierra Leone; and supported the ECOWAS approach on Sierra Leone, as set out in an end-of1998 communique. Five days later, the Council took up once again formally the case of Sierra Leone and in accordance with the understanding reached in prior consultations, unanimously adopted, at its 3,964th meeting on 12 January 1999, resolution 1220 (1999). This decision, taken in light of the severe turnaround in the military and political situation in the country, illustrated powerfully that even in such difficult circumstances the collective will of the Council’s members could not be weakened or fractured. The Council, in its resolution 1220 (1999), decided to extend the UNOMSIL mandate until 13 March 1999; took note of the intention of the SG, as set out in paragraph 37 of his special report on UNOMSIL (S/1999/20), to reduce the number of military observers in UNOMSIL and to retain in Conakry a small number who would return to Sierra Leone, when conditions permitted, together with the necessary civilian substantive and logistical support staff under the leadership of the special representative; and requested the SG to keep the Council closely informed on the situation in Sierra Leone and to submit a further report on the future deployment of UNOMSIL and the implementation of its mandate by 5 March 1999. What the Council did on this occasion can be rated as a slight tactical withdrawal—accepting the SG’s proposal to remove the UNOMSIL temporarily to safety in Guinea’s capital—but a strategic strengthening, namely, renewing UNOMSIL’s mandate and announcing its determination to build it up and intensify the pursuit of a peaceful end to the nightmarish agony of Sierra Leone’s land and people. The UN and its Council decided to stand their ground against the defiant and barbaric band of rebels. Such confrontation has happened in the post-cold war era many times, as insurgents and rebels usually refuse to abide by international legal and ethical norms and disobey the decisions of the main instruments for peace and security in the contemporary international system. Moral persuasion or legal

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pressure usually do not sway these obstinate and defiant elements, but the Council has shown in the Sierra Leone case as in several others an iron determination and persistence to resist and finally overcome these irregular and lawless bands and, through peaceful and forcible measures, to advance the aims of the international community and to promote a global peace order. The next two years confirmed the interpretation and conjecture offered here. The UN and its Council would not be intimidated or deterred in their firm determination to restore calm and a semblance of peace in Sierra Leone. Over the next few months, extending to October 1999, the Council maintained a very tight schedule based on the SG’s frequent progress reports on UNOMSIL, in extending the UN presence to the largest degree possible, despite the unending turbulence in the military and political situation in the country. From March 1999 through early October of the same year, the Council adopted unanimously three resolutions (1231, 1245, and 1260) and issued one presidential statement (S/PRST/1999/13), extending UNOMSIL, adjusting its mandate and specific assignments, and viewing it in the wider context of the internal and external dimensions of the conflict. Of primary importance to the Council were the first indications of a willingness on the part of the rebels to meet with the government of President Kabbah and with the mediatory services of the Gambia and the Cote d’Ivoire, and the tremendous and unpredictable fluctuations in the eventual realization of that slim hope. It was brutally clear that the chance for peace depended on the willingness of the RUF and other rebel factions to enter into the dialogue to search for a restoration of a functioning political process. As the seesaw situation reached its climax and a breakthrough was obtained, resulting in a peace agreement between the government and RUF, the need as well as the opportunity for a larger, more effective UN operation arose. Having been thoroughly informed throughout the previous months about the many facets of the excruciatingly slow movements to overcome the distrust and uncertainty on both sides, the Council members knew that the presence of UNOMSIL had to be terminated and that the UN force also should reflect the new beginning in the condition of the Sierra Leonean community. In planning for this important step in the handling of the crisis by the UN, the Council had before it the eighth report of the SG on UNOMSIL (S/1999/1003). The 4,054th meeting on 22 October 1999, gave rise to a longer debate before the Council actually voted on the draft resolution prepared in the course of prior consultations, and adopted it unanimously as resolution 1270 (1999). This mammoth resolution that primarily established the new UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) set forth a detailed catalogue of functions to be exercised by the new force and included a variety of provisions that were targeted on aspects of the peace accord, on the role of ECOMOG and the responsibilities assigned to the Sierra Leone authorities. The new level of involvement was expressed by the


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number of troops to be deployed in Sierra Leone, namely, 6,000, and that all personnel and equipment of UNOMSIL should be taken over by UNAMSIL. As this Council decision was widely assessed as a milestone in the history of this organ, it would appear rewarding to just skim an extended, rich discussion so that the sentiments of the state representatives can be appreciated. The mood of the meeting was set by the compelling statement of Mr. Olara Otunnu, the SG’s special representative for children and armed conflict, invited under rule 39 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, who reported about a recent visit to Sierra Leone and identified key measures needed for the protection and welfare of children in the aftermath of war. He mentioned that the people of Sierra Leone had two key preoccupations, namely, the final end of the civil war and the reestablishment of a credible level of security in the country; above all, that meant disarming the combatants. He offered a grim account of the suffering of the 3 million Sierra Leoneans displaced by war within and outside their country, more than 60 percent of them children. The trauma that these victims had suffered was pervasive and would take a long time to heal. In view of the brutality and severity of the atrocities committed, a special agenda for action was required and had been drafted for discussion and operationalization. The special representative proposed further suggestions with regard to a comprehensive program for the main victims, mostly women and children, and pointed out that the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) were taking the lead on these relief and rehabilitation issues. He shared with the Council his vivid impressions of the savvy of the citizens and young people in the region and appealed to the members of the Council not to betray the trust placed by these people in the UN and its authority, not to let them down by again adopting a wait-and-see attitude. Following the stirring appeal of Mr. Otunnu, the representative of Sierra Leone impressed upon the Council the fact that the people of his country were anxiously but patiently awaiting the decision by the Council to approve the establishment and deployment of a full-fledged UN peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone. This would help mute the fear of the people about whether the Council had relegated their concerns to the bottom of its agenda. He underscored his government’s strong commitment to the safety of the people, especially innocent children. While he lauded the role of UNOMSIL in the recent months, he made clear that the Lome peace agreement between the government and the RUF could not be monitored sufficiently unless the new force was in place. He further focused on the critical contribution of ECOWAS and especially ECOMOG in the persistent pursuit of stability and security in the country. The Sierra Leone government was very eager to keep ECOMOG directly present and active and to see the new UN force rapidly deployed and in full. The representative highlighted the special requirements

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for disarmament and demobilization that his government hoped to see launched and sustained by the UN and gave it key importance in the recovery of the country. Further declarations by Nigeria, the UK, the United States, and most of the remaining Council members depicted the new UN operation as a test case for the ability of the UN in African emergencies. They also agreed on the value of the cooperation and synergy of the various international organizations and placed great emphasis on the significance of such global coalitions in confronting severe fights and massive human rights violations in different parts of the world. They all joined in stressing the crucial opportunity for the West African region to find calm and peace and reaffirmed their belief and confidence in the tools available to the UN and applied by the Council in this crucial measure. To demonstrate the extraordinary expansion of the nature of UN “peacekeeping” operations, it appears quite instructive to list here the identified elements of UNAMSIL’s mandate as established under resolution 1270 (1999, paragraph 8): (1) to cooperate with the government of Sierra Leone and the other parties to the peace agreement in the implementation of the agreement; (2) to assist the government of Sierra Leone in the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration plan; (3) to that end, to establish a presence at key locations throughout the territory of Sierra Leone, including at disarmament/reception centers and demobilization centers; (4) to ensure the security and freedom of movement of UN personnel; (5) to monitor adherence to the cease-fire in accordance with the cease-fire agreement of 18 May 1999, through the structures provided for therein; (6) to encourage the parties to create confidence-building mechanisms and support their functioning; (7) to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance; (8) to support the operations of UN civilian officials, including the special representative of the SG and his staff, human rights officers and civil affairs officers; and finally (9) to provide support, as requested, to the elections, which are to be held in accordance with the present constitution of Sierra Leone. If one realizes that the main drafting of this authorizing resolution was done by the UK, several African countries, and furthermore in varying degrees other Council members, it emerges quite impressively that the scope, range, and depth of UN operations in the very recent past have grown substantially and can no longer be compared to similar earlier missions under the same heading “peacekeeping.” This evolution contradicts those observers and analysts who have depicted the UN as going backward, reducing its involvement, or cutting back on meetings, issues, and actions. The Sierra Leone case, over time and at the juncture of this seminal resolution, reveals just the opposite impression: the Council is engaged, proactive, responsive, and willing to increase pressure and augment the incentives as well as the penalties when target states and other actors are reticent or otherwise lagging in compliance or cooperation.


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With a date of October 1999 we can safely argue that the Council in this and other cases has indeed increased its involvement, attention, and willingness to act forcefully and effectively. The subsequent developments in the unfinished “Sierra Leone tragedy” do not negate or discredit the steady expansion of the Council’s authority and policy making. This trend is truly revealing, as it goes against the opinion of many people on the outer circles who either do not know enough or misinterpret the indicators as they see them. The high hopes of October 1999 were harshly disappointed, and the good prospects of the new beginning were reversed or at least set back when the RUF fighters started new cease-fire violations in early 2000 and brashly detained hundreds of UN peacekeepers when they felt threatened in their control of the rich diamond areas in the north of the country. As is still well known, the Council, when provoked by this brazen violation of the Lome peace agreement and the elaborate cease-fire provisions, decided not to give way but to resist and increase the political and financial backing for a more effective UN force in the country. After some reflection and arguments between the Council, the member states, and the UN secretariat, it was decided to augment the number of military peacekeepers and to boost them through logistical support, assured financing, and consistent endeavors to improve the defence capacity of the military forces loyal to the government in power. The UK in particular went quickly and decisively to help in this new crisis and was able, through its visible and skillful action, to strengthen the backbone of the legitimate authority and turn the situation on the ground slowly around. After the initial shock and outrage, the other Council members rallied to the cause and demonstrated their newly gained determination by debating on numerous occasions the Sierra Leone case and by adopting several resolutions and issuing a few more presidential statements in order to make its political presence felt, to shape the further development of a long emergency such as Sierra Leone, and to exercise the Charter-given leadership in important peace and security matters around the world. Without giving the story its due, this chapter will conclude with a brief reference and summary of the most recent moves at the end of 2000. Special mention should be made of three important documents illustrating the unyielding front put up by the Council in response to the defiant and ruthless attitude again and again displayed by the unruly and unprincipled bandits and robbers from the RUF. After the unrest and disarray caused in early 2000, the Council decided to dispatch a large mission consisting of its members to Sierra Leone and neighboring countries to take their own measure of the conditions at the time and prospects for an eventual peaceful solution. Eleven of the fifteen members went on the mission, including all five permanent members and Bangladesh, Canada, Jamaica, Mali, the Netherlands, and the Ukraine. The extensive and thorough report, which they submitted after their return on 14 October 2000 (S/2000/992),

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offers a fascinating impression of the circumspection, care, and appreciation shown by the Council visitors. A very full schedule of visits and tours enabled them to make up their own minds about how to deal with the difficult issue and what to consider for future Council actions. The diplomats who came back were even more committed to staying the course and completing the process of recovery and peace making. The two key recommendations referred to better coordination among third-party actors in and around Sierra Leone and the continuation of a credible military presence in the troubled land. This was brought out and endorsed in the presidential statement (S/PRST/2000/31) issued at the 4,216th meeting on 3 November 2000. Having considered the eighth report of the secretary-general on UNAMSIL, dated 15 December 2000 (S/2000/1199), updating his frequent reports again and offering a balanced but skeptical account of the developments in the country and the chances for an effective outcome any time soon, the Council expressed continuing concern; took note of another attempt at a viable cease-fire between the RUF and government; restated the main objectives of UNAMSIL; commended the SG for his continued efforts and urged states to consider contributing peacekeeping forces to the UN operation; expressed its intention to respond promptly to specific recommendations made by the SG on UNAMSIL force strength and tasks; and decided to extend UNAMSIL until 31 March 2001. This last clear signal in 2000 documents a straight, unbroken line of engagement, determination, and persistence by the Council on another protracted crisis not only with clear implications for the immediate region but reaching even wider as a threat to international peace. The Council’s drive in this case did not slow down in the months that followed. The increase of troops up to 21,000 men set a sign for the unbending will of the international community to free the people of Sierra Leone from the scourge of rape, murder, and mutilation, enabling them to rebuild their political order and rehabilitate their lives once the nightmare of civil war ended. Although the UN effort and the Council’s attention may have been less than adequate in the past, a fair, observant critic at present cannot and must not overlook the fact that the Council indeed rallied and responded to the “cri de coeur” from the victims of the long civil strife and chaotic world in which they barely survived.

Conclusion: Findings, Assessments, and New Questions The two cases have not been completely settled, and the Council continues to deal with them as the review and renewal of existing UN operations demand or the given situation evolves. The long and often frustrating chase of an elusive peace has offered dramatic evidence that even the most powerful international coalition built around the UN as guardian of international security has not been able to


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impose a solution or a framework for constructive interaction upon local foes or the deliberate spoilers. In the Tajik case, the decades of Soviet rule entailing the systematic suppression of the Islamic faith to which most citizens adhere, at least formally, produced such deep-seated suspicion and resentment among the activist Islamic groups that the extensive, highly discrete, and gentle process of bridging the chasm between post-Soviet secularists and the newly emerging Islamic faithful as they were gearing up to play an active part in the new politics of Tajikistan has not yet been completed. Had force been tried, it would have been totally counterproductive and would have ruined the multiple, prolonged approaches and suggestions arising from the skillfully calibrated UN mediation process. Similarly, as mentioned in the Sierra Leone case narrative, the extremely negative role played by the RUF and its vicious comrades in arms was most likely launched and manipulated by Liberia’s Charles Taylor, before and during his rise to the position of elected president of his own country, whose main interest so far has turned out to be the desire to control the regional diamond mining and processing to enrich himself and his buddies and to ensure his political and military rule over the people in the whole region. Throughout the recent years of the Council’s involvement in Sierra Leone it has become steadily clearer that only superior military force requiring thousands of well-trained and armed troops could defeat the warlords and rebels in the West African theater. Such a mighty intervention has been unthinkable and will remain so in the years to come. For this and other reasons, the only reasonable alternative is the multifaceted and skillfully vetted complex operation within which a wide range of tasks and assignments is carried out. The constant danger that yet another show of stubborn provocation by the irregular fighters around the RUF could set back the currently favorable momentum in Sierra Leone’s slow rebuilding renders premature celebrations in that crisis most precarious. The driving impulses of the rebels are bitter hatred and selfish greed. They do not feel for their fellow citizens and show pure disdain for ideas of community and the public good. What blocked the repair of Sierra Leone’s social fabric in the beginning is still holding up at present the international campaign to enable the country to start the cure of renewal. What does all of this tell us about the standing of the Council? Instead of a Council in decline, we observe a vibrant, politically astute, and activist organ whose fifteen members display a fine sense of the potential and capabilities inherent in the Council’s place in the Charter framework. Although in each of the two cases Russia and the UK, respectively, played a lead role in the treatment of these difficult items, it should be underscored that the sense of commitment and active involvement is shared by all members of the Council and the input into the Council’s policies reflects that joint search for meaningful answers. The busy calendar of the Council’s consultations and meetings reflects the needs and concerns of a highly complex world where the many issues cutting across national

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lines call for multilateral approaches and cooperative modes of interaction. As the high-level meeting of the Council in September 2000 showed, even the heads of state and government assembled at UN headquarters confirmed the centrality of the UN institutions and instruments for the purposes of a stable global peace and the satisfaction of major aims in human development. Despite all of the gloomy reporting about the UN in crisis by journalists and other shapers of public opinion or the cynical belittling of these activities by those clinging to the images of a world of sovereign states, the Council has displayed surprising strength and resilience and has fully validated the uses of the intergovernmental process shaping its bearing. Moreover, the Council has systematically moved in the direction of setting up and joining multiactor ad-hoc coalitions as the preferred tool of management and transformation of the many pressing issues on its agenda. The two cases of Tajikistan and Sierra Leone perfectly document that rising trend in diplomatic practice and in other areas of global governance. This current constellation of international action bodes well for the emerging multilateral arrangements and their employment in the future challenges in international peace and security. That widening phenomenon in today’s international relations ultimately will further strengthen the place held by the Council in such a world. A few other trends should be mentioned in passing. The Council’s agenda has been widening over the last two decades. In addition to the situations brought to the Council’s attention or taken up on its own initiative, the Council has turned to so-called “generic” issues, such as “maintenance of peace and security and post-conflict peace building,” “promoting peace and security: humanitarian assistance to refugees in Africa,” items relating to international tribunals, “children in armed conflict,” “protection of civilians in armed conflict,” “small arms,” “role of the Security Council in the prevention of armed conflicts,” “general issues relating to sanctions,” “threats to peace and security caused by terrorist acts,” “protection for humanitarian assistance to refugees and others in conflict situations,” and “demining in the context of UN peacekeeping.” The list expanded to include further generic issues (e.g., AIDS), and items dealing with a whole region (e.g., Africa). If the Council was marginalized and in steady decline, it would not display this pattern of including a large number of new issues relating tangentially to the country-specific items but deserving separate consideration in a crosscutting manner. In recent years, the Council has embraced new ideas and concrete steps to improve the transparency of an organ that works mostly in closed sessions. What had been started by France more than ten years ago has by now taken clear shape and removes or mitigates a perennial irritant for the states and representatives on the outside. The Sierra Leone case especially demonstrates the recent tendency to reverse the previous habit to conduct business in secret and instead to bring


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the debates back out into the public domain. Among the new practices, one could name the briefing of Council members by secretariat officials, hearings of nongovernmental organizations and other outside groups and lobbies, and the president’s habit of speaking to the media representatives outside of the Council area after each meeting, formal as well as informal. Much of this can be identified quite strikingly in numerous extensive sessions of the Council on the Sierra Leonean situation. The vitality of the Council can be measured by other indicators. The competition for nonpermanent seats goes on undiminished; the candidates are campaigning actively and plan far ahead to ensure a successful run for a precious seat at the table. Furthermore, the Council has taken up a fundamental examination of how the Charter mandate in prevention can be activated and operationalized by the Council. Similar basic reviews have been started with other central issues, for example, contemporary peacekeeping and how to update and improve it. The Council also has a role to play regarding the International Criminal Court. Here the responsibility for the financing and control of the international tribunals enters into consideration. One key criticism uttered in the more distant past must be reviewed and modified: It was said that the Council was reactive rather than active in its peace and security mandate. The last few years have shown a slow but perceptible change in this respect. The Council, through its various actions and articulations, has frequently taken the initiative before a complaint was officially submitted. This tendency to get involved earlier can often not be noticed, since the matters come up in the informal consultations. Still, this trend is visible. Moreover, with the governments usually keenly interested, the consensus to take up a particular matter may be arrived at in the busy communications flow between home offices and the New York missions before the matter itself emerges in the Council’s own dealings. As long as the Council, like all international intergovernmental bodies, remains a process of active states and their instructed ambassadors, the question of who controls the Council’s policy process and decision making does not have to be posed as it is clearly immaterial and of no interest. The argument here thus posits that the Council is not at all in decline and actually is alive and well, acting more frequently and more directly and thus in part fulfilling the lofty mandate assigned to it in the Charter.


Chapter Six

The UN Security Council at Work Peacekeeping, Terrorism, and Nonproliferation

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he start of the period that has been evaluated in earlier chapters shows quite well that the agenda of the UN Security Council in the years during the waning of the bipolar world and the decade of the 1990s was not only immense but also of great diversity, thus giving rise to a wide range of policy options for the fifteen Council members. The gap between conciliatory interaction and unbending stubborn insistence that emerges in two of the cases touched upon earlier, though in varying measure, occasionally disrupts the general atmosphere of goodwill and cooperation throughout the years until the millennium and beyond. As the effort is pursued to evaluate the Council’s practice and its effectiveness, it has appeared especially advantageous to advance chronologically so that the thrust of the Council’s evolution can be displayed. At the same time, this procedure is further circumscribed by the deliberate decision on the author’s part to examine lesser agenda items and to try to pay attention to the handling of substantive policy matters of the generic type by the Council in these years. A quick review of the Council’s agenda shows a noticeable increase in the consideration of these substantive questions, such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and the condition of civilians, women, and children in armed conflict. The plain fact that the Council in the 1990s increasingly dealt with these thematic issues in consultations, formal meetings, and resolutions and presidential statements testifies to members’ sincerity and commitment to the grave problems at hand. In turning to these aspects of the Council’s role and work, the evaluation will seek to bring out the dynamic of the treatment of each of these issues over the period of this study. Considering that much public criticism laments the inactivity or decline of the Council as the main organ for international peace and security, it

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should be of special interest to establish how the Council’s performance actually ranks and whether there is any sign that the relevance and contribution of this organ is lagging and falling short of a reasonable standard applicable to such an eminently political body.

The UN Security Council and Terrorism In the chronology of the Council’s agenda, the next item to be examined is indeed of greatest importance, namely, the many facets of the scourge of international terrorism. Experts know that the Council had been given little occasion in the decades of the cold war to sincerely delve into this grave disruption of international stability. Still, a search of the earlier decades will indicate several highly fractious and ideological exchanges over hijacking and other terrorist incidents, especially in the chronic Middle East conflict, mostly between Palestinians and Israelis. Following the slight increase in such charges in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, it had become clear that the results of the Council’s involvement were minimal, while the political fallout from this tense argument turned out to be unquestionably damaging. Therefore, the question, looking at the next twelve years, would have to be whether the utility of discussing international terrorism in the Council would show a gain over time. The unexpected result of this specific review of terrorism before the Council is the clear finding that the Council’s attention has steadily increased and peaked in 1999, when a whole public session was devoted to the general terrorism problem and led at its end to a weighty and lengthy resolution that amounted to a valiant effort at codifying some basic norms on this plague on behalf of the international community. To get to this crowning achievement, the Council did not choose a straight line of detailed and substantive data gathering and assessment, but as it is wont to do, turned to those issues as they arose in the previous years. For this survey, the beginning was made on 14 June 1989, when obviously at the initiative of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Council, the UN Security Council placed on its agenda the item “Marking of plastic or sheet explosives for the purposes of detection.” This unusually technical subject matter had been considered in prior consultations; the informal exchange resulted in the text of a draft resolution that was put to the vote at the 2,869th meeting on 14 June 1989, and unanimously adopted as resolution 615 (1989). Stating its deep concern about all acts of unlawful interference against international civil aviation and taking note of the relevant ICAO Council resolution of 16 February 1989, the UN Security Council specifically urged the ICAO and all states to devise an international regime for the marking of plastic or sheet explosives for the purpose of detection, thereby contributing to eliminating all acts of terrorism, especially in the field of aviation security.

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Although the Council held no debate in the public meeting and restricted the necessary action to adopting the resolution, the unanimity and professionalism of the Council’s decision, while taking four months to respond to the ICAO request, display a proactive posture of the Council’s members. The “new” spirit putting an end to the cold war stalemate is quite marked on this occasion, when the Council paid attention to an obscure technical subject matter but was first willing to take it up and second eager to see practical results of the discussions in the ICAO and among UN Security Council members. This exercise in constructive and action-oriented collaboration did bode well for new challenges on the terrorism front. The next occasion came a mere six weeks later, on 31 July 1989, when the UN Security Council convened its 2,872nd meeting and included the question of hostage taking and abduction in its agenda. Following understandings arrived at in prior consultations, the meeting opened with a statement from the president, who spoke on behalf of the Council, in which the members expressed their deep dismay at the cruel reports about Lieutenant-Colonel Higgins, who served the UN on the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and who had been abducted and possibly murdered. The president remarked on the tragic irony that the Council’s efforts to formulate and adopt a resolution on hostage taking and abduction coincided with the grave event of Higgins’s abduction. Hope was expressed that the unanimous view of the Council would serve to deter such unlawful acts in the future. After this formal statement, the draft resolution submitted by Canada and Finland was adopted unanimously as resolution 638 (1989). In the text, the Council inter alia recalled two earlier resolutions on terrorism, condemned unequivocally all acts of hostage taking and abduction, demanded the release of hostages and abducted persons, and urged that all states become parties to several international conventions dealing with several aspects of terrorism and cooperate in finding effective measures to prevent, prosecute, and punish all acts of hostage taking and abduction as manifestations of terrorism. The tone of this important Council decision conveys the growing distress and impatience among its members in regard to serious violations of international standards and worsening incidents of terrorism. The explicit and detailed listing of all relevant international antiterrorism conventions emerging from political and legal proceedings ushering into formal adoption by the General Assembly establishes the frame for future action by the Council and the community of states in their joint fight against the undermining of newly found international stability. The text of the resolution also confirms the Council’s prior declaration that the case of Higgins plainly coincided with its own completion of the deliberative process aiming to establish some basic parameters for future cases of terrorism demanding forceful international attention.

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A further declaration on the evil of terrorist action arose from a heinous attack on a Jewish religious center in Buenos Aires, Argentina, on 18 July 1994, with great loss of human life. At a time when the Council’s plate was overflowing with extremely difficult humanitarian emergencies, it found the time in consultations to consider the terrible incident in Buenos Aires and to formulate a statement (S/PRST/1994/40) that the president issued on 29 July 1994, on behalf of the members. Referring to the 31 January 1992, Council Summit statement (S/23500), the Council condemned the attack in Buenos Aires and two other assaults of a similar nature in London on 26 and 27 September 1994, and added the demand for an immediate end to such attacks and stressed the need to strengthen international cooperation so that all forms of terrorism could be prevented, combated, and eliminated. As is clear from the brief summary, the presidential statement on this occasion reaffirmed earlier views but did not in any way go beyond previous declarations. It can be assumed that the brevity of the statement and the absence of any public debate did not reflect the insignificance of the attacks. Moreover, it is very likely that due to lack of time for informal talks and formal meetings, the attention was kept at this low level. Nevertheless, the Council’s policy had not weakened, and the members had done what was humanly required, thus fulfilling at least the symbolic function assigned to the Council by the authors of the Charter. Four years later, the Council was once again seized with a terrorist attack, this time coming in the form of powerful bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The assaults had occurred on 7 August 1998, at noontime in the busiest locations of Nairobi and Dar-as-Salaam, resulting in many fatalities and casualties, with the death toll continuing to rise. The number of the wounded reached into the thousands, indicating that the attacks had a devastating impact on these communities. After two sessions of consultations of the whole, the Council convened its 3,915th meeting on 13 August 1998, and included the item entitled “Threats to peace and security caused by international terrorist acts.” The afflicted parties, Kenya as a nonpermanent member and Tanzania, invited under the provisions of the Charter and the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, were present at the brief meeting. The Council first expressed deep sympathy to the governments and people of Kenya, Tanzania, and the United States and condemned the barbaric attacks against innocent civilians. It then adopted unanimously the draft resolution prepared in the Council’s prior consultations as resolution 1189 (1998). As the agenda item itself conveys, the Council viewed these murderous actions against diplomatic missions and large numbers of totally innocent civilians as “threats to peace and security” in line with the language of Article 39 of the Charter. This determination represented the gravity of the terrorist strikes and was indicative for the attention given by the Council to the event and its


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aftermath. The three brief statements by the representatives of the countries that had been targeted by the perpetrators gave succinct descriptions of what had happened on that day and stated appreciation for the unanimous condemnation of these terrorist activities by the international community, underscoring the urgent need for common measures to track down and punish the perpetrators, in accordance with the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons. Still, the Council’s endeavor was centered on the rather detailed resolution 1189 (1998), which consisted of a lengthy preambular part referring specifically to General Assembly resolution 52/164 of 15 December 1997, the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, and of six operative paragraphs offering the strong condemnation of the terrorist bomb attacks on 7 August 1998, expressing deep sorrow to the families of the innocent victims, calling upon all states and international institutions to cooperate with, and support, the investigations in the three affected countries, expressing appreciation for assistance by states, international institutions, and voluntary organizations in the reconstruction of infrastructure and disaster preparedness, and calling upon all states to adopt effective and practical measures for security cooperation, for the prevention of such acts of terrorism, and for the prosecution and punishment of their perpetrators. While the resolution as adopted hewed closely to the actual incidents without issuing general principles relating to the unbroken chain of terrorist acts and their prevention or suppression, the Council paid close attention to the cost of this dastardly attack and the burden of the painful and long aftermath arising from it. It should be pointed out in this context that the main legal work on terrorism had been carried out by the General Assembly and its Sixth Committee, and that the Council so far had gotten involved in concrete instances of terrorist acts. One can observe clearly the widening dismay of the international community as shown in the Council in the face of terrorist challenges and the rising determination to at least contain this dreadful disruption of civilized life. This element of restlessness appears to have worked on the Council members and resulted in another close look at terrorism, but the occasion for the new examination of the phenomenon of terrorism was not tied to another such attack. Instead, the Council members under Russia as that month’s president deliberated on the problem in four consultations of the whole held between 13 and 19 October 1999, before the debate moved to the regular public meeting on 19 October 1999. This 4,053rd meeting of the Council was distinguished from all of the previous ones considering the terrorism question by the fact that no terrorist attack had incited the Council to deal with it. The Council looked at the whole question as a universal problem and sought to draw some general lessons and insights from that sweeping review. The enormous nature of this basic discussion is best

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demonstrated by the verbatim record of that meeting giving the full transcript of lengthy principal statements on the subject matter and its wider ramifications by fourteen out of fifteen Council members. Only the representative of the Gambia, a small West African state, did not take the floor to address the Council on this occasion. For those who see the Council as inactive and in decline as a major international voice, the meeting should come as a big surprise. Not only did the Council members devote themselves diligently to the informal exploration of the issue and its best handling in the four consultations, but they also took this complex matter into a regular public meeting stating their views fully and unanimously and adopting at the end a long, generic resolution to top it all off. Although the full coverage of the whole sequence of careful statements of policy would go beyond this survey, it is worth looking at the record itself in order to get a sense of the significance of the occasion on October 19, 1999. The first speaker, the representative from Brazil, reviewed major milestones of the UN’s involvement in the terrorism debate and argued quite cogently that terrorism was the antithesis of democracy and thrived on fear and hatred. He recognized that the central responsibility lay with the General Assembly, and that nevertheless the Council could make an important contribution to reinforce international cooperation in combating terrorism. The representative from Argentina recalled the grave attack of July 1994 and his foreign minister’s appeal then that the action of the UN against terrorism should be as intense as the action taken against other grave international crimes. He took note of the ideological confrontation of the cold war that had blocked effective measures by the organization against terrorism and welcomed the changed international context and the new initiatives that augured well for a more effective future response. He ensured the Russian Federation of his country’s cooperation in working toward the conclusion of a draft convention to suppress acts of nuclear terrorism. The delegate from Slovenia pointed out the comprehensive approach taken by the Council on this occasion, diverging clearly from the consideration of the terrorist attacks in Kenya and Tanzania. He presented an extensive overview of the more than thirty years of UN involvement in legal as well as political approaches to counteract the worsening spread of terrorist practices and underlined the progressive development of international law also in this area of concern. Stressing that the General Assembly should continue to take the lead in the normative legal aspects of the fight against terrorism, he added that the Council had to play a major role in identifying those situations involving acts of terrorism as threats to international peace and security and to act accordingly. Such a focus was difficult to maintain, but the Council had gained valuable experience in the Lockerbie and Union des Transports Aériens (UTA) cases and in its dealings with the Afghanistan situation. He suggested that if terrorist acts were compara-


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ble with the use of force prohibited by the Charter, then the question of lawful countermeasures might arise: available options should be evaluated on the basis of customary criteria, such as necessity and proportionality of response. A development along these lines would further complicate the task of the Council in the efforts against terrorism. He viewed the draft resolution to be adopted as a suitable summation of the UN’s experience, giving enough attention also to the responsibility of the secretary-general, and he emphasized that cooperation among all UN member states would enhance the effectiveness of the international struggle against terrorism. The representative from Canada reminded the Council of its resolute action a week earlier to bring an alleged international terrorist (Bin Laden, resolution 1267 (1999)) to account and recalled the loss of many Canadian citizens who perished in 1985 on an Air India flight that crashed as a result of a terrorist attack. He stated his government’s support for the important principles drawn up by the UN and other multilateral forums and welcomed the multiplicity of international efforts to fight terrorism as a reflection of the importance attached to this issue by the international community. Canada was especially grateful that the Council’s definition of a threat to peace and security included terrorism, thereby combining threats against people and against states, an important contribution to human security. In joining the other members in the strongest endorsement of the joint fight against terrorism, seen as the most pressing contemporary concern, the representative from the Netherlands pointed to the numerous terrorist attacks all over Europe in recent years and remarked on the degree of sophistication and the increasingly globalized character of this terror. The US representative added his voice in thanking the Council president for holding this important meeting and offered detailed information on the American steps in the fight. He further underlined the unanimous embrace of the US-sponsored Council resolution 1267 (1999), imposing tough sanctions on the Afghan Taliban regime in order to go after the supporters of international terrorists as well. He viewed the unanimous action by the Council as a significant example of international cooperation and referred to the French initiative regarding a convention for the suppression of terrorist financing, which the United States supported and whose adoption was planned for by the General Assembly in December of the same year. This new convention would be an important addition to the existing eleven international conventions against terrorism. Accepting the initiative of the Council president to declare that acts of terrorism could constitute a threat to international peace and security, the representative from France looked back over the occasions in recent decades when the Council took up the subject of terrorism, reflecting the Council’s continuing commitment to the fight against it. He suggested in a pointed manner that the

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Council’s involvement was to replace the General Assembly in its role of defining the principles to guide the struggle against terrorism. He suggested that the fight against its financing was a priority objective of the campaign against international terrorism and restated his government’s fullest support for the UN’s pivotal role in this urgent matter. Similarly, the representative from the UK denounced the dreadful impact of terrorists on the lives of innocent civilians and on the authority of the states on whose territory terrorist acts are committed, for example, the Lockerbie tragedy. His government welcomed the initiative to look at the problem in a comprehensive fashion and wished to reprimand those states that were not yet ready to condemn all such acts, regardless of the underlying motive. The UK was bound by rule of law and international obligations and had ratified ten international terrorism conventions and signed the eleventh, which together laid the foundation of the international community’s response. The delegate warmly welcomed ongoing efforts to suppress terrorist financing by means of another convention and invited the member states to move beyond the mere condemnation of terrorism and take up the task of finding practical ways to combat the continuing threat. The representative from China held that the draft resolution before the Council provided a comprehensive overview of the various aspects of the fight against terrorism and was of great relevance for enhancing international cooperation in antiterrorist activities, and for these reasons announced his delegation’s support for the draft resolution. Malaysia’s representative noted the lack of a definitive definition of the term terrorism and proposed to see it as deliberate acts of violence, with the intent to hurt, kill, or destroy innocent civilians, without scruples or mercy, for purposes of coercion and intimidation, and serving the particular purposes of the terrorists. Although these actions might be inspired by “higher principles,” their cruel and ruthless commission robbed them of any redeeming quality and had to be strongly condemned. But the delegate cautioned that based on principal UN declarations reaffirming the right to self-determination, terrorism should be clearly differentiated from the legitimate struggle of peoples under colonial or alien domination and foreign occupation for self-determination and national liberation. He further expressed full agreement with the position of the nonaligned movement, as stated in the Durban Declaration, that international cooperation to combat terrorism should be conducted in conformity with the principles of the Charter, international law, and the relevant international conventions, and he thanked the Slovenian representative for having raised the notion of proportionate response. Following equally favorable words by the representative from Gabon, the representative of Bahrain urged that the international community should tighten


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the noose around terrorists, depriving them of safe havens and of the necessary financing. He drew attention to the phenomenon of state terrorism, which had been witnessed in Kosovo and also in the occupied Arab territories in the Middle East. He pointed out that his government supported the convening of an international conference on the definitions of terrorism and the establishment of machinery for the exchange of relevant information. The representative from Namibia mentioned that terrorists buried themselves within their surrounding communities, indistinguishable from ordinary, law-abiding citizens, but at the appropriate moment, they would emerge from the shadows to strike, before fading again into anonymity. Thereby, terrorism undermined the confidence in the ability of the government to protect law and order by spreading fear among the citizens. The result would often be a spiral of escalating violence involving terrorist assaults and harsh countermeasures by the authorities. For all of these reasons, Namibia attached great importance to major UN declarations and saw the draft resolution as a further contribution to the effort to eliminate terrorism. The president, speaking in his capacity as the representative of the Russian Federation, expressed sincere gratitude to all other Council members for supporting the idea to hold the public meeting and underlined that Russia was guided by a deepening awareness of the global threat inherent in terrorism, an evil that had to be fought with an uncompromising struggle by the international community. He joined others in highlighting the UN record of several decades in condemning terrorism and establishing global interaction to eradicate it. In his delegation’s view, the draft resolution to be adopted was an anti-terrorist manifesto establishing priority areas for international interaction, setting out the respective roles of the General Assembly, the Council, and the secretary-general. After this extensive exchange among Council members, the last task left was the vote on the draft resolution, which was unanimously adopted as resolution 1269 (1999). In view of the special attention given by all Council members to this discussion and the extremely careful manner in which the text was prepared and put into its final form, it is worthwhile to closely review the full text as adopted in order to identify the durable elements of this comprehensive decision of the Council. In the preambular part of resolution 1269 (1999), the Council offers the customary elements of its decision, including the condemnation of terrorism, stressing the significance of international cooperation and of international legal frameworks in the fight against the terrorist operations, but adds as the last of the preambular paragraphs the reaffirmation that the suppression of acts of international terrorism, including those in which states were involved, was an essential contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security. In the essential operative part of the resolution, the Council inter alia unequivocally condemned all acts, methods,

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and practices of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of their motivation, and in the path-breaking fourth paragraph, it called upon all states to take, in the context of international cooperation and coordination, the following appropriate steps: To cooperate with each other to prevent and suppress terrorist acts, protect their nationals and other persons against terrorist attacks, and bring to justice the perpetrators of such acts; To prevent and suppress in their territories through all lawful means the preparation and financing of any acts of terrorism; To deny those who plan, finance, or commit terrorist acts safe havens by ensuring their apprehension and prosecution or extradition; To take appropriate measures in conformity with the relevant provisions of national and international law, including international standards of human rights, before granting refugee status, in order to ensure that the asylum-seeker has not participated in terrorist acts; To exchange information in accordance with international and domestic law, and cooperate on administrative and judicial matters in order to prevent the commission of terrorist acts; and, in the following paragraph, asked the secretary-general, in his respective reports to the General Assembly, to pay special attention to the need to prevent and fight the threat to international peace and security resulting from terrorist activities. The trajectory of treatment of this item of terrorism by the Council portrays a slow, item-specific, largely formal manner of dealing with the rather new cancerous growth in international relations. As mentioned, the division of functions under the Charter would make the General Assembly or one of its subsidiary bodies the logical organ to take up that new phenomenon as a constitutional as well as a political matter. The occasions that brought the Council into the center of international attention were frequently occurring plane hijackings and other disruptions, mostly in connection to the long-standing Middle East problem, especially the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s (PLO) role. At the point where the aforementioned review picks up, this regional conflict no longer gives rise to specific instances of terrorism, but other problems crop up. For those reasons, the Council’s involvement was mostly intermittent. As the 1990s arrived, one observes, however, a sharp increase in the number of terrorist actions and in the level of violence committed. While giving rise to norm-setting endeavors in the framework of the General Assembly, the attention of the Council was similarly climbing. By the end of the period, one can clearly state that the Council itself had proven its mettle as guardian of peace and security in that it not only dealt energetically with the problem of Bin Laden in Afghanistan, following his indictment for the bombings in Nairobi and Dar-esSalaam, but far more significantly, devoted substantial time and effort to look at terrorism in a comprehensive manner as a global problem endangering international peace and security. The crowning achievement of resolution 1269 (1999) offers compelling proof for the vitality and practical relevance of the Council’s activity in this area of widespread concern. The balanced and outreaching set of


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statements completes an exhausting round of informal exchanges and consultations of the whole to weigh available policy options and to find the common optimum for the highly diverse members of the Council and, in an outer circle, the full membership of the UN. In the highly complex and controversial subject matter of international terrorism, one can thus ascertain a steep rise in salience and effectiveness as far as the Council’s capabilities and actions are concerned. This finding bodes well as the analytical and evaluative survey turns to less controversial items.

The UN Security Council and Peacekeeping At the opposite end of the scale, measuring what is good or bad in the international arena, one would safely place the role of UN peacekeeping, a crucial tool in the unending search for a more stable and peaceful global order. The academic community has paid an enormous amount of attention to the record of peacekeeping during the decades of the cold war and to the sea change in this regard setting in with the unexpected collapse of the system of bipolarity in the turbulent months of 1989 and 1990. One of the key results of that political turnaround was the rapid resolution of so-called “regional conflicts” that had been immune to time-consuming but futile attempts in earlier years. The main cases on that list were the Afghanistan conflict, the Iran-Iraq war, the question of Namibia, the Cambodia issue, and the Central American emergency. The full list is remarkably longer and depicts once again the paralyzing impact of the bipolar stalemate. For this analytical survey, the starting point for the review of UN peacekeeping in generic terms is given with a brief meeting of the Council on 30 May 1990, following especially the successful completion of the transition of Namibia to full independence, that was devoted to the agenda item entitled “United Nations peacekeeping operations.” In line with the Council’s customary procedure, the 2,924th meeting did not contain any formal declarations by Council members but was restricted to the president’s statement on behalf of the Council, resulting from its prior consultations. Of special importance were the first two paragraphs, giving expression to the consensus of the Council as witness to the extraordinary events of the recent months, as follows: The members of the Security Council note with satisfaction that the United Nations has in recent years played an increasingly important and active role in restoring and maintaining international peace and security. The peacekeeping operations of the United Nations have become a valuable instrument facilitating the settlement of international disputes. Recent successful peacekeeping operations have for their part contributed to the enhanced standing and effectiveness of the United Nations.

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The members of the Security Council express their deep satisfaction with the growing support of the international community for United Nations peacekeeping and, in particular, with the participation of a growing number of Member States in the operations.

The presidential statement offered, in the remaining text of the six-paragraph document, praise to the secretary-general and his staff, and to the peacekeeping forces; raised once again the urgent concern for adequate resources; appealed to all member states for adequate political support and reminded them of the temporary nature of peacekeeping never to be construed as a substitute for negotiated settlements; addressed the host countries and what they had to do to contribute to the fulfillment of the UN mandates carried out by the peacekeeping forces; and, in conclusion, reaffirmed the Council’s readiness to work with the secretary-general for the prevention and resolution of international conflicts and to launch new peacekeeping operations as necessary. The short summary of this principal statement underscores once more the thoughtfulness and topicality of the Council’s decisions. Council members show full awareness of the positive effects of the ongoing “rapprochement” between the former antagonists and the consequent flourishing of a variety of UN functions initiated by the Council and other organs in the endeavor to revitalize the spirit of the Charter and to apply the available instruments to the promotion of increased world peace. At the same time, the Council also displays a highly pragmatic restraint viewing peacekeeping not as a panacea but simply as a means to the central aim of maintaining international peace and security. Altogether, the statement shows a very high level of agreement and commitment to expand the potential of the UN and to aspire to give the organization its legitimate place in the international community. Within just two months, the world encountered a cruel breach of the new atmosphere of the post-cold war era, when the Iraqi government launched a massive attack on its small neighbor, Kuwait, and announced its annexation to a stunned world community. The following year brought not only the military operation led by the United States to restore the sovereignty and independence of Kuwait, but it saw the outbreak of the fratricidal struggle within the borders of the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that resulted in new levels of brutality and genocidal mass murder challenging the international community and the UN in unexpected ways. These shocking events and images must be included in the background canvas before which the Council held its high-level meeting of January 31, 1992. The concluding statement of the president, speaking for all Council members, reflecting the paradoxes of this historical moment, on the one hand, the resurgence of the UN as a global instrument, and, on the other, the spread of new conflagrations between and within sovereign states, also provided


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brief but cogent references to peacekeeping in the new world situation. Thus the Council applauded “the valuable contribution being made by United Nations peacekeeping forces now operating in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Europe.” It further noted that “UN peacekeeping tasks have increased and broadened considerably in recent years,” and that “election monitoring, human rights verification, and the repatriation of refugees have . . . been integral parts of the Security Council’s effort to maintain international peace and security,” and that the Council welcomed these developments. In response to all of these new conditions and processes, the Council announced its decision to request from the secretary-general his analysis and recommendations on ways of making more efficient the capacity of the UN for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking, and for peace keeping. This report should cover the need for adequate resources and draw on lessons learned in recent UN peacekeeping missions to recommend ways of making more effective secretariat planning and operations. Noticing the very practical tone of the questions posed about peacekeeping, it becomes clear that Council members had grappled with, and clearly understood, the main stresses and shortcomings of peacekeeping as it had been conducted in the past. The members of the organ, which usually made use of the peacekeeping instrument, realized that in view of the existing challenges there would be a need for more and better troops and support staff if all of the crises were to be adequately responded to. In connection to the evaluation of the secretary-general’s report, “An Agenda for Peace,” submitted on 17 June 1992, the Council exercised great care in examining the findings and recommendations contained in the seminal document and held a series of consultations of the whole to address all important elements from the report and to give its response in extensive statements from the president, subdividing the content into several categories of relevance to the work of the organization. The reaction to what the secretary-general had to say about peacekeeping was offered in the first substantive statement delivered at the 3,128th meeting on 29 October 1992 (S/24728). This sequence made clear that for the Council the conditions affecting UN peacekeeping were uppermost on the minds of its members and placed them at the top of important questions. From proposals relating to this area of concern, Council members picked two specific aspects relating to the greatly increased number and complexity of recently authorized operations. These included the question of whether member states were willing to provide forces or capabilities to the UN for peacekeeping operations, and the need as stated by the secretary-general for augmenting the strength and capability of the military and civilian staff in the secretariat. As for the second issue, the Council actually invited the secretary-general to consider the establishment of an enhanced peacekeeping planning staff and an operations center and urged member states to make available experienced military and civilian personnel.

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These priority items in peacekeeping were complemented in another statement of the president on behalf of the members of the Council (S/25493), delivered at the 3,190th meeting on 31 March 1993, which raised the difficult matter of the safety of UN forces and personnel deployed in conditions of strife. Here the Council went to great lengths to underscore a most pressing concern that UN peacekeeping would be immensely impaired if the safety of its personnel could not be secured or at least improved. The Council further emphasized that thorough debate was necessary also in the General Assembly and its subsidiary bodies to get closer to a fundamental answer to this worsening problem. The gravity of the whole matter had been documented in an earlier statement of the president issued on 2 December 1992 (S/24884), expressing outrage about increasing assaults on UN personnel serving in various peacekeeping operations (UN Angola Verification Mission II [UNAVEM II], UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia [UNTAC], and UN Protection Force in Yugoslavia [UNPROFOR]). The fact that these incidents occurred ever more frequently at a time when the Council’s willingness to involve itself proactively was especially high explains why, at the end of March 1993, the Council went on record with a full statement on the safety question seeking to find an appropriate reply to this malaise. The thrust of the Council’s involvement with the safety issue prevailed over the coming months. The occasion for the next full discussion of the agenda item was created by the secretary-general’s report in response to the request contained in the presidential statement of 31 March 1993. The report, dated 27 August 1993, provided a detailed survey of the safety problem and suggestions for the Council’s consideration. The Council, as customary, took up the report in consultations and decided thereupon to consider it in a formal meeting. At the 3,283rd meeting, on 29 September 1993, the report was included in the agenda and considered. Prior to the adoption of the draft resolution, which had been prepared during the Council’s consultations, the deputy prime minister for foreign affairs and trade of New Zealand took the floor and presented a comprehensive overview regarding the deepening emergency in regard to UN peacekeeping personnel as well as humanitarian staff in numerous conflicts around the world. The increase in casualties and fatalities had become alarming, and the troop-contributing countries were increasingly dismayed about the loss of life in the service of UN operations dispatched by the Council in the name of the international community. The minister suggested that host countries should be legally obligated to carry out their duty to protect this foreign personnel, and that the perpetrators of violent attacks on UN personnel in conflict zones could be prosecuted legally and brought to justice on the basis of valid international law. To promote these goals, the government of New Zealand would submit to the upcoming session of the General Assembly a motion for the drafting of such a legal convention.


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The representative of Pakistan echoed the sentiments expressed by the New Zealand foreign minister and reported to the Council the bitter facts about Pakistani peacekeepers being attacked and killed by illegal bands and marauders. He emphasized that his government was not willing to risk the lives of its military personnel joining the important work in matters of peace and security and appealed to the Council and all member states to cooperate to gain the protection of the peacekeeping forces. The unanimous adoption of resolution 868 (1993) on 29 September 1993, put the Council on record with a forceful manifesto on the key topic of the security of UN operations. Following the preamble invoking basic principles, praising the secretary-general’s report, and condemning acts of force against UN personnel, the operative part set forth clear guidelines for host countries to observe in meeting their obligations with regard to the safety and security of UN personnel and hinted at appropriate measures if these countries did not cooperate, and specifically determined that the Council would require that the host countries take all appropriate steps, that security and safety arrangements would extend to all persons engaged, and that agreements on the status of the operation be negotiated speedily and come into force as near as possible to the outset of the operation. After the adoption of this trend-setting resolution, most of Council members strongly affirmed the principles spelled out in the resolution and stressed the need for improvements in the treatment of UN personnel as soon as possible. The only difference one could detect among the speakers was the call for legal standards and tools to punish those who put the lives of UN personnel in danger. Taking exception to that proposal, the representatives from China and Japan in particular expressed a clear preference for political measures to improve the safety of UN military and civilian staff. In continuing pursuit of the themes addressed in “An Agenda for Peace,” the secretary-general issued, as requested by the Council, a report on improving the capacity of the UN for peacekeeping, dated 14 March 1994 (S/26450 and Add. 1, and Add. 1/Corr. 1, and Add. 2). At this time, while the Council was very active and especially occupied with the Rwandan massacre, the comprehensive report by the secretary-general was exclusively considered in consultations. The form of decision chosen by the Council was the presidential statement (S/PRST/1994/22), which was delivered at the 3,372nd meeting on 3 May 1994, and amounted to a detailed and thorough assessment of the overall condition of UN peacekeeping and contained crucial standards for future operations to be established. In that sense, the Council’s decision had far-reaching importance in regard to the core activity of the organization in issues of peace and security. The opening section of the statement retraced the thread leading back to the Agenda for Peace and related the Council’s deliberations to recommendations

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coming from the General Assembly and its Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. The second section, “Establishment of Peacekeeping Operations,” confirmed that the Council was conscious of the need for political goals, mandates, costs, and, where possible, the estimated time frame of UN peacekeeping operations to be clear and precise and of the requirement for the periodic review of their mandates. The Council proposed the following factors for the establishment of these operations: whether a situation exists the continuation of which is likely to endanger international peace and security; whether regional or subregional organizations and arrangements exist ready and able to assist in resolving the situation; whether a cease-fire exists, and whether the parties have committed themselves to a peace process intended to reach a political settlement; whether a clear political goal exists, and whether it can be reflected in the mandate; whether a precise mandate for a UN operation can be formulated; and, whether the safety and security of UN personnel can be reasonably assured, in particular, whether reasonable guarantees can be obtained from principal parties or factions in this regard. The Council added that it should be provided with an estimate of projected costs for the initial ninety days of the operation and the first six months, as well as for the resulting increase in total projected annualized UN peacekeeping expenditures, and should be informed of the likely availability of resources for the new operation. In the remaining sections of this key document, the Council addressed the important question of effective communications and consultations with troopcontributing countries and other members of the UN, and it reaffirmed procedural improvements to satisfy this critical need. Furthermore, the Council expressed its vivid interest in improvements concerning standby arrangements and capabilities and urged the secretary-general to actively pursue this significant objective. Similarly, the Council members agreed with the secretary-general in seeking to strengthen the participation and full integration of civilian personnel, especially civilian police in UN operations. Comments on the need for training of peacekeepers, on the matter of command and control, including the request for a special report by the secretary-general, and on basic financial and administrative issues impinging on the organization’s ability to set up these operations also were included. The inevitably abridged summary of this pivotal Council document makes clear how much learning had taken place in that organ and by its members and what kind of expertise and acumen the representatives and their respective governments had gained to revisit their own role in establishing and monitoring the UN operations and articulating relevant principles to facilitate new decisions of this kind. The presidential statement enhances the standing of the Council in peacekeeping matters and restores its central place in the UN framework for the maintenance of international peace. If one takes into consideration the enormous


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complications that the UN and its Council encountered during these earlier years, namely, the Yugoslav, Somali, and Rwandan catastrophes, to name just the major ones, then it is even more remarkable that the leading diplomats, speaking for their countries in the UN deliberations, kept a cool head and avoided regressing in the presence of these huge obligations and ramifications. Their commitment to a proactive and dynamic role of the Council in tackling the coming challenges and in bringing the assets of the UN system to the multiple emergencies in many parts of the world needs to be registered and applauded. It validates oftentimes the role assigned to the Council under the Charter. In the following months the Council gathered more information from the secretary-general on the main themes of its own principal statement. The next occasion for an utterance of the Council came in July 1994, when the Council took up a follow-up report on the standby arrangements with member states in the context of UN peacekeeping operations. The Council issued another presidential statement (S/PRST/1994/36), which welcomed the new efforts by the secretary-general and specifically the comprehensive database of the offers made. It also took up the related question of, namely, whether the necessary equipment would be available for standby forces if available. For these issues, the Council requested another progress report from the secretariat. A few months later, the Council included in its agenda at the 3,448th meeting, held on 4 November 1994, a letter dated 15 September 1994, from the representatives of Argentina and New Zealand, addressing various communications-related issues in peacekeeping matters. To improve these communications between Council members and troop-contributing countries, the Council, through another presidential statement (S/PRST/1994/62), instituted the following procedures: Meetings should be held between Council members, troop-contributing countries, and the secretariat, jointly chaired by the Council presidency and a secretariat representative nominated by the SG, to facilitate the exchange of information before the Council would take decisions on the extension or termination of mandates or on significant changes in these mandates. Among the procedural instructions given in the statement, the circulation by the secretariat of an informal paper, including topics to be covered and referring to relevant background information, was especially noteworthy, as it documented the painstaking quality of the Council’s decision at this juncture. The Council had clearly determined that in view of the importance of its role in peacekeeping, it was more than overdue that it looked after the required procedures and documentation so that its decisions would be solid enough to withstand the scrutiny of the other member states and the turmoil in the respective conflict zone. At the 3,449th meeting, held on the same day, this major step in reforming the practices of the Council was overwhelmingly applauded. In a meeting

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that brought many non-members to the Council chamber to address the fifteen members on basic aspects of the working methods of the Council, it became apparent that the Council had indeed moved substantially forward in opening up its procedures and in widening the group of state actors in numerous decisions relating to the many UN operations being carried out in far-flung corners of the earth. Altogether, thirteen representatives of non-Council members requested permission to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council’s agenda. The debate was opened by the representative from France, who lauded the significant progress indicated. He stressed that his delegation entirely supported the decision to regularize the presence of troop-contributing countries in meetings dealing with the respective UN operations in preparation or actually deployed. He noted that this did not prejudice the Charter principle that the Council remained the sole master of its decisions. He added that his government was still eager to see more progress in the general problem of transparency in the Council’s activities and renewed the recommendation that the Council should meet in public unless it decided otherwise, and that the nonpublic work should be limited to the absolute necessary in order to reach broadly acceptable decisions as speedily as possible. The representative from Argentina drew attention to the nearly two months of intense consultations following the presentation of the joint letter from New Zealand and his own government that had finally borne fruit. Argentina, as a main contributor to UN peacekeeping operations, was very pleased with the new mechanism that would engage the Council members, the secretariat, and the troop-contributing countries in a constructive dialogue about all of the aspects of successful peacekeeping. His delegation viewed this new procedure as being fully in accordance with the spirit of Article 44 of the Charter. The recent increase in operations dealing with the numerous international conflicts had shown the Council centrally engaged in peace and security work, but it also had exposed limitations of the current system of collective security. The new procedures, as indicated in the presidential statement, served to make the Council more efficient and its activity more transparent, thereby also strengthening its legitimacy. The representative from New Zealand also expressed his delegation’s satisfaction at the Council’s decisive action to establish a system of institutionalized consultation with troop-contributing countries, for which it had fought for more than a year. He reminded the Council of his delegation’s proposal to set up a subsidiary body under Article 29, an idea that was firmly opposed by some Council members. His government had agreed to drop the idea as long as consultation would be systematized even without a new institution. The adoption of the new procedure by consensus was most welcome to his government, which had been quite disappointed about initial opposition to this innovation, even including the


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secretary-general. The argument boiled down to one point: that the acceptance of the Argentina-New Zealand initiative would result in a shift of power away from the secretariat and the Council and in favor of the wider UN membership. However, his delegation had merely wished to strengthen the application of the Charter provisions, especially fulfilling the spirit of Article 44, putting aside technical arguments against its applicability. The founders of the Charter had clearly envisaged that troop-contributing countries would participate in the respective operational decisions of the Council. Having gained this important advance, the government of New Zealand would actively seek with other member states to revitalize the Council and to arrive at a condition of transparent political accountability of the Council overcoming the inadequate practices of the first four decades. Fundamental reform of the Council in the reinvigorated UN was the ultimate goal of the New Zealand delegation. The remainder of the 3,449th meeting was filled with another twenty-five formal statements by most Council members and thirteen member states, requesting the right to participate in the consideration of the item. The praise for the new mechanism was unanimous, and most speakers felt that this reform was long overdue and bound to improve the Council’s working methods and open it up to more democratic transparency. All delegates insisted that the new arrangements should be carried out systematically, without exception, so that members contributing troops to UN operations would always be fully informed and consulted in establishing, monitoring, and changing the mandates of UN field operations requiring military personnel. By the judgment of the direct participants and according to the quality of the unanimous decision rendered by the Council, this moment in the Council’s handling of the central peacekeeping dossier should be seen as a great milestone in the organ’s history during the 1990s. The progress that had been achieved within merely five years was remarkable indeed and further stabilized the foundations on which the Council was engaged in seeking to fulfill the lofty mandate given to it under the Charter of the UN. The steady pace of progress in handling the task of peacekeeping in its full range is documented in renewed attention by the Council late in 1995, when it reacted to another report by the secretary-general on standby arrangements for peacekeeping (S/1995/943). This submission that came under the item “An Agenda for Peace,” was taken up at the 3,609th meeting on 19 December 1995, and commented upon by the Council in a statement of the president on behalf of the Council, in which the members warmly endorsed the update on standby arrangements and issued another appeal to member states to participate in these arrangements and especially identify components, including logistic support elements and sea/airlift resources, that could be made available to the UN; the Council also called upon states ready to provide equipment and other support to

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seek to establish partnerships with those countries that needed such equipment for units to be provided to the organization (S/PRST/1995/61). On 20 December 1995, the Council continued its consideration of the peacekeeping item, in response to a letter dated 8 December 1995, by thirty-four member states (S/1995/1025) at its 3,611th meeting. The representative from Argentina reminded other Council members that a year ago New Zealand and Argentina had conveyed to the Council their ideas related to consultations between Council members and troop-contributing countries. The mechanism that was set up as a result of that initiative had now been in operation for nearly one year and should be reviewed to check on, and improve, the efficiency, effectiveness, and representativeness of these consultations. Following earlier informal contacts among interested parties, altogether thirty-six member states had agreed to submit their specific ideas to the Council’s attention. The strengthened mechanism should include inter alia the following features: (1) Each consultation should be held between the Council members and the troop contributors for specific peacekeeping operations, assisted by the secretariat; (2) When the Council considered establishing a new operation, it should consult potential troop contributors already approached by the secretariat; (3) The existing practice of inviting these member states, which made special contributions to peacekeeping operations other than troops (i.e., trust funds, logistics, and equipment), should be continued; (4) The mechanism of consultations should be chaired by a Council member specially appointed every year, assisted by one or more Council members; (5) The meetings should be held in good time for the Council’s decision to extend, modify, or terminate the mandate of a particular peacekeeping operation, and they should be convened in the event of unforeseen developments; (6) Background documentation and a clear agenda, as well as substantive information available, should be provided by the secretariat and/or the presidency or the chairman to all participants well in advance; (7) The chairman of the mechanism should report to the Council the views expressed by participants at each meeting with troop contributors. On behalf of all cosponsors, the Argentine representative expressed the hope that the Council would take into account these ideas for strengthening the mechanism and thus helping improve the cooperation between troop-contributing countries and the Council itself. The subsequent exchange in the 3,611th meeting showed near-unanimous agreement to the detailed reform proposals. The only major difference of opinion revolved around the proposal to set up a formal subsidiary body in accordance with Article 29 of the Charter. Opposition by various Council members, including the UK, led the sponsors to give up the idea and leave the mechanism as an ad hoc arrangement. The representative from France cautioned against making troop contributors an abstract category of member states, which always would


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have the right to participate in the Council’s decisions, and suggested instead to establish the consultation procedures on a case-by-case basis, thereby avoiding the emergence of a new class of membership. The representative from Germany remarked that the troop-contributing countries had hoped for a greater political impact on Council decisions and had lost interest in the mechanism because that goal had not yet been achieved. The Czech representative added that the consultations had amounted to less than a genuine dialogue and tended to be briefings for troop contributors. The representative from Botswana invoked Article 44 of the Charter and deplored that the consultations had not done justice to the spirit of that article. Following a lengthy series of complimentary and constructive statements reflecting the intense interest in these aspects of peacekeeping and a desire to see this tool serving the promotion of international peace being further strengthened, the representative from Argentina summarized the confluence of ideas and suggestions; reiterated the sponsors’ belief that a subsidiary organ would indeed be appropriate for these consultations and invoked both Articles 29 and 44 of the Charter; and joined the other speakers in endorsing maximum transparency of the Council’s work and hoped that the newly gained openness would advance the search for an agreed framework, considerably improving the use and benefit of the mechanism and creating close links between the Council and the troop contributors. The Council president voiced his confidence that the views expressed during the 3,611th meeting and during other relevant discussions on related agenda items at the fiftieth session of the General Assembly would be taken into account by the Council when it would resume its consideration of the question of consultations with troop contributors. The actual result of the extensive debate at the 3,611th meeting emerged in a statement of the president on behalf of the Council issued at the 3,645th meeting on 28 March 1996 (S/PRST/1996/13), in which the continuing consultations of Council members were mentioned and reference was made to the prior formal deliberations in the Council and in relevant fora of the General Assembly. Although the key sponsors of the reform efforts had in the meantime ended their term as nonpermanent members and had left the Council, the presidential statement adopted the full range of the agreed positions and recommendations discussed at the 3,611th meeting. Through the Council’s formal action of a consensus statement, the improvements in the consultations with the troopcontributing member states were now included in the rules and procedures of the Council. Recalling a remark by the Argentine representative at the 3,611th meeting, the progress in handling the substantial arrangements and obligations in connection to the multifaceted peace operations in conflict zones and humanitarian emergencies was indeed remarkable and assured a much higher level of efficiency and effectiveness in these activities of deployment and oversight.

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After the peak of the Council’s attention to peacekeeping matters in the first half of the decade of the 1990s, the subsequent period brought only sparse and intermittent involvement with follow-up concerns or new aspects of the farreaching and multiple phenomenon of international deployment of military and relief personnel in crisis areas. The emerging framework of the Council’s interrelationships with other global and regional bodies and with the large number of participating member states had become so rich and dynamic that most actors around the focal point of the Council were more appreciative of the new openness and transparency characterizing at least some of the Council’s deliberations and decision making. Still, in July 1997, the Council got involved in intensive consultations between 8 and 11 July focusing on the issue of civilian police in peacekeeping operations. The immense, often painful, experience in former Yugoslavia had resulted in extensive learning in that special element of international deployment. Other conflict zones had taught the same lesson that oftentimes the international staff should be civilian police in order to address questions of public order without becoming an irritant or a provocation to local parties to the conflict. At the moment when the Council took up this special matter, enough experience had accumulated to enable the Council to issue a principal directive for the future utilization of civilian police. In this situation, the Council members once again made use of a presidential statement (S/PRST/1997/38) to convey their unanimous understanding of this new component of peacekeeping. The lengthy statement pointed to the indispensable functions performed by civilian police in monitoring and training national police forces and to a future role, through assistance to local police forces, in restoring civil order, supporting the rule of law, and fostering civil reconciliation; it envisaged an increasingly important role for civilian police in contributing to the building of confidence and security between parties and among local populations, in order to prevent conflict, to contain conflict, or to build peace in the aftermath of conflict. Having offered this comprehensive vision of the uses of civilian police, the Council further touched upon several practical consequences dealing with the availability of such civilian police contingents and their special training required for international deployment. Herein were included references to standby arrangements, the use of female staff members, and the recommendation that their training and deployment should be done in closest cooperation with the other partners in complex peace and humanitarian operations. Only a week later, on 22 July 1997, the Council convened the 3,802nd meeting and, following extensive prior consultations, adopted resolution 1121 (1997) in connection to the agenda item “United Nations peacekeeping: Dag Hammarskjold Medal.” This resolution showed in a quiet manner the sad effects


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of peacekeeping in dangerous sites of violent conflict and mass suffering: the Council decided herein that a medal would be awarded posthumously as a tribute to the sacrifice of those who had lost their life as a result of service in UN peacekeeping operations. As the resolution spelled out, more than 1,500 individuals from eighty-five countries had died as peacekeepers, a high fatality figure considering that UN peacekeeping during the cold war had incurred no significant loss; whatever number had accumulated by 1997 was overwhelmingly the bitter legacy of the turbulence of the post-cold war era. The Council’s solemn tribute, a gesture of respectful gratitude, to the valiant fighters for international peace should serve as a counterpoint to the earlier public recognition of the growing need for military and civilian personnel, soldiers, and relief as well as police contingents to provide the crucial assistance to people in need in the many sites around the world where the UN has been engaged. Reviewing this strand of peacekeeping-related deliberations and decisions by the Council throughout the 1990s, it emerges strikingly how engaged the Council members were in all of these years, affirming again and again that their responsibility for the dispatch, monitoring, and termination of specific UN operations was fully understood and exercised in a most sincere manner. Despite several setbacks on African soil and in the heart of Europe, to name the two biggest cases, the Council, in its constantly changing membership, never deviated from the course taken in the late 1980s and early 1990s, namely, to view the mandate and tasks of the UN in active terms of direct involvement and physical presence through the deployment of UN peacekeepers. The Council furthermore received with great appreciation the help offered by other organs, especially the General Assembly and its respective subsidiary bodies, as well as the office of the secretary-general and regional organizations around the world. The capacity to learn grew as the global challenges intensified and expanded dramatically. Council members realized during these years that they had to bring down the walls of seclusion and confidentiality and reach out to willing organs and states to improve on the effectiveness and efficiency of expensive and labor-intensive complex operations in afflicted areas of the world. Nevertheless, the Council demonstrated its determination and ability to make the necessary decisions based on careful and flexible discussions to respond to a cry for help and to launch the required assistance mission under its Charter-based authority. The biggest deplorable handicap of the Council as a policy-making body was its financial dimension. As is well known, the financially strongest parties have too often refused to commit themselves and thereby either blocked or weakened the field presence of the UN setting it up, willingly or unwillingly, for failure. Adjusting to the stark realities in this respect, Council members refrained from justified criticism or any insinuations in order to avoid a fractious mood among its members and further weaken its capacity to act in critical situations. The recent cases of

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East Timor, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Ethiopia-Eritrea war offered compelling evidence for the unhesitating willingness of Council members to apply the instrument of peacekeeping vetted through years of trial and success in hot spots and crisis areas in the modern world. The Council has thus validated its central place in the scheme of global governance.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty before the UN Security Council As is well known, the UN Charter also foresaw a disarmament-related role of the Council in the post-World War II world. Article 26 of the Charter, rarely invoked and used, makes the Council responsible for “formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Article 47, plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.” A large number of member states have raised the legitimate question of why the Council never made a consistent effort to exercise this important right to shape new frameworks and structures for disarmament and arms control. The lack of Council involvement was frequently deplored as an abdication on the part of this key organ from the crucial mandate assigned to it by the founders of the world organization. It is once again indicative for the resurgence and euphoria of the early 1990s that as the situation arose that would call for the Council’s engagement in disarmament and arms control matters, Council members grasped the challenge and took up the specific question of the noncompliance of North Korea with the obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and, in particular, its intention to withdraw from the treaty. Under long-standing arrangements, the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been responsible for the monitoring of the provisions of the NPT and specifically the implementation of the safeguards agreements concluded between the IAEA and the respective governments. This function is carried out in the form of periodic reports and on-site inspections in order to verify that there is no diversion of nuclear materials required to be safeguarded under the terms of the relevant agreements. It was envisaged that if the IAEA and a particular signatory government disagreed, then the IAEA would be authorized to turn to the Council and seek its involvement, as the matter could endanger international peace and security. While the end of the cold war had resulted in far-reaching political changes around the world, it had not really penetrated the walls of the secretive Communist system of North Korea. However, in 1985, at the suggestion of the major powers, North Korea had signed the NPT and concluded a safeguards agreement with the IAEA to verify its full compliance with the provisions of the


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NPT. As the wider international community was eyeing with certain misgivings the specter of North Korean secretiveness and obfuscation on the critical issue of nuclear capacity for military applications, the IAEA became increasingly alarmed that the regime was trying to hide from international inspection the secret work on nuclear facilities and military applications. After several unsuccessful appeals to the North Korean authorities and surprise inspections in the country, the IAEA director-general brought to the attention of the UN secretary-general information regarding given discrepancies in the North Korean case. As requested, the secretary-general informed the Council about the IAEA charges regarding the North Korean violations (S/25445). As a first step, the Council took up the matter in informal consultations and considered the issue in light of significant public interest and official dismay about the seeming deliberate provocation and defiance by North Korea against the prevailing international position seeking to prevent any further proliferation of the nuclear menace. These deliberations resulted in a brief statement by the president on behalf of the members of the Council, issued on 8 April 1993 (S/25562), in which they took note of oral and written reports by the IAEA director-general and of an earlier letter of the representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) on the issue; they emphasized the importance of the NPT, welcomed the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and welcomed all efforts, in particular, those of the IAEA aimed at resolving the situation and effecting a constructive settlement of the nuclear verification question in the DPRK. It is worth noting that despite the novelty of the Council’s involvement in a key element in the search for disarmament and arms control, the members acted as if it was the most mundane subject matter before them. They implied that the nonproliferation problem was clearly a peace and security concern, and that the Council had taken up the item as a matter of course. They hereby asserted quietly, but unmistakably, that the intention of the Charter was indeed to assign a vital place in disarmament matters to the Council. Although the Council’s message was gentle and restrained, it made clear to the addressed state party that its behavior was under international scrutiny, and that deviant behavior in nuclear nonproliferation would not be tolerated. Within a little more than a month, based on further alarming reports from the IAEA about DPRK noncompliance with its safeguards obligations, the Council resumed consideration of the difficult issue and took its discussion into a public formal meeting of the Council. Although the agenda did not reflect the very tense and escalating controversy and blandly listed a letter by the DPRK and a communication from the UN secretary-general to the Council president, the 3,212th meeting, on 11 May 1993, gave rise to an open clash between the representatives of the two Korean states and the strong support by nearly all Council

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members for a forceful extensive resolution issuing clear instructions and warnings to the leadership of the DPRK. The draft resolution to be voted upon (S/25745) had been submitted by France, Hungary, Japan, New Zealand, the Russian Federation, Spain, the UK, and the United States at the onset of the public meeting and revealed the solid and strong position of the majority of Council members. Starting the debate, the representative of the DPRK offered a detailed and forceful defense denying the right of the UN to deal with the DPRK’s withdrawal from the NPT, accusing the United States, a “belligerent party to the DPRK,” of having made up the “inconsistency in principle” and “suspicious sites” that were actually caused by mistakes in the IAEA calculating methods and as a result of misleading satellite information from the United States. The representative accused the IAEA of having violated its impartiality and having allowed itself to be manipulated by the United States for its own purposes in Korea. He furthermore charged that as long as the United States meddled militarily in Korea, having initially introduced nuclear weapons to the Korean peninsula, his government would not be able or willing to remain an active non-nuclear signatory state of the NPT. The DPRK needed to defend its sovereignty and for that reason would reject the Council’s involvement and specifically the draft resolution sponsored by the United States and certain to be adopted by the Council. Emphasizing the central place of the NPT in the global security system, the representative from the Republic of Korea (i.e., South Korea) also addressed the Council at length, reviewing many relevant aspects of the deeply antagonistic Korean division and appealing to his counterpart to change policy and join the international community in the efforts to secure a world no longer menaced by nuclear weapons. Whereas the North Korean regime wanted to exclude the UN from the resolution of the outstanding issues in Korea, the southern government was especially eager to see the UN involved in this NPT question as in all other peace and security concerns and expressed hope that the Council would be able to resolve any suspicion about the DPRK’s nuclear development. The US representative sharply rejected the DPRK accusations against her country and stressed that the disputes before the Council concerned international agencies and not any single country. With the United States, like several other countries, providing information and technical support to the IAEA, the agency arrived at its own conclusions about whether states were complying with safeguards requirements. The IAEA had on its own identified discrepancies in North Korea’s declarations and brought this irregularity to the Council’s attention. The resolution to be adopted reflected the concerns of a number of countries. But the representative underlined that charges that the United States posed a nuclear threat to the DPRK were totally unfounded and referred once more to clear policy statements issued by her government.


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Following a further accusatory intervention by the DPRK delegate, the Chinese representative expressed his principal objection to the Council taking up this nuclear issue, which was strictly a matter between the DPRK and the IAEA, between the DPRK and the United States, and between the DPRK and the ROK, and therefore should be settled directly between them. China was opposed to the practice of imposing pressures. The rest of the Council’s debate revolving around the vote on the draft resolution and its adoption involved Japan, France, Hungary, the UK, Brazil, Venezuela, New Zealand, Spain, Pakistan, and the president speaking in his capacity as representative of the Russian Federation. It is quite remarkable that none of the speakers, other than the DPRK delegate, made an effort to support or to excuse the attitudes and actions of the North Korean regime. While some, especially China and Pakistan, were somewhat reluctant to reprimand the DPRK, no voice was raised placing doubt on the suspicions by the IAEA or rejecting the determined position taken by an overwhelming majority in the Council. The Council’s judgment was spelled out in great detail in its resolution 825 (1993), which was voted upon at the 3,212th meeting on 11 May 1993, and adopted with thirteen votes in favor, none against, and two abstentions, by China and Pakistan. Setting out the particulars of the exchanges and viewpoints presented so far and invoking a relevant statement by the depositaries of the NPT, the Council urged the DPRK to reconsider its announcement of the intention to withdraw from the NPT and to honor its obligations under the NPT, requested the director-general of the IAEA to continue to consult with the DPRK with a view to resolving the pending issues and report to the Council in due time, and called upon all member states to encourage the DPRK to respond positively to the Council’s resolution and encourage them to facilitate a solution. The comprehensive review of the DPRK-IAEA dispute by the Council in May 1993 reflects a high sense of purpose and even a legal obligation as felt by the Council’s members in the face of an act of brazen defiance against a key instrument for maintaining international peace and security, the NPT as cornerstone of nuclear disarmament. The choice of language for the resolution proves beyond a doubt the mastery in law and diplomacy typical for the members of the august body. Balancing the brief reference to actions and developments leading to the Council’s being seized with the issue and the carefully weighted phrases of admonishment, reprimand, and instruction constituting the Council’s specific decisions, the members of this diplomatic body make it crystal clear that the nuclear issue did indeed belong in the new Council. This tendency is further enhanced by the evidence that the accused and the interested hasten to appear before the Council and argue their case. Their appearance at the Council’s formal public meeting demonstrates to anybody interested to know that they recognize

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the political standing and legal authority of this body and seek to account for their respective policies before its members. In that sense the Council becomes a tribunal, and its members fulfill the role of judges or arbiters. Nearly a year later, the Council returned to the issue of the NPT and the recurrent question of whether the DPRK was serious about new commitments made concerning the safeguards agreement of the IAEA. By March 1994, an active exchange of letters between the DPRK, the UN secretary-general and the Council, and several major member states of the organization and Council had resulted in the suspension of the DPRK’s decision to withdraw from the NPT and the consequent readiness to deal with the IAEA on necessary steps to demonstrate full compliance with the strict standards of the IAEA inspections and to advance on the goal of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula as agreed with the Republic of Korea (ROK). Once again, the Council was consulted and accepted the renewed request by the directorate of the IAEA to consider the North Korean dithering regarding being compliant, on the one hand, and reverting to defiance, on the other. As in the previous year, the matter came to the Council through the secretary-general, who forwarded, in two notes (S/1994/254 and S/1994/322), relevant information from the IAEA as to its inability to conclude its testing whether there had been either diversion of nuclear material or reprocessing or other operations at the designated North Korean sites. The Council took up this disconcerting development in consultations and met in a public meeting, the 3,357th meeting, on 31 March 1994, to issue in the required form the statement of the president that had resulted from the informal consultations. Although representatives from Japan and the ROK were invited to participate in the meeting, no debate ensued. Instead, the president announced that he had been authorized to make a statement on behalf of the Council (S/PRST/1994/13). Herein, the Council reviewed carefully the steps recently taken by the DPRK, after successful negotiations with the United States in the months earlier and renewed contacts with the IAEA board of governors and its director-general, to amend its previous refusal to cooperate and to set in motion the regularization of its standing in terms of the NPT principles, and spelled out in restrained but clear terms where the DPRK was falling short and what its lagging response meant in terms of the needed compliance with the safeguards agreement. The Council welcomed the DPRK’s decision to maintain its NPT adherence but admonished the DPRK leadership that the requirements set by the IAEA and its inspectors could not be dismissed or averted. In this spirit, the Council underlined its strong determination to remain seized with the subject matter until the IAEA-DPRK safeguards agreement would have been fully implemented. Two months later, on 30 May 1994, the Council returned to the question at its 3,383rd meeting, in accordance with the understanding reached in prior


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consultations. Including a note by the secretary-general transmitting a letter dated 27 May 1994, from the IAEA director-general (S/1994/631) on its agenda, the Council again invited the Japan and ROK representatives to participate in the discussion. But as before, no debate took place. The president announced that he had been authorized to make another statement on behalf of the Council (S/PRST/1994/28). In this declaration, the Council invoked its earlier decisions and took note of the fact that the IAEA had finally been enabled to inspect the agreed North Korean sites. Emphasizing the critical importance of IAEA safeguards in the implementation of the NPT, the Council expressed its grave concern that “if the discharge operation at the five megawatt reactor continues at the same rate, the IAEA’s opportunity to select, segregate and secure fuel rods for later measurements in accordance with IAEA standards will be lost within days.” In the most urgent language, the Council called upon the DPRK to do whatever was required to preserve for IAEA inspectors the technical possibility of the necessary fuel measurements, requested the IAEA to maintain its inspectors at the site to be monitored, and underscored anew its determination to remain actively seized of the matter in order to achieve full implementation of the IAEA-DPRK safeguards agreement. The trajectory of the DPRK-IAEA confrontation and its treatment by the Council provides strong support for the assessment that the Council in the post-cold war era was no longer shying away from highly divisive subjects and indeed exercised its Charter mandate dealing with the regulation of armaments. As mentioned earlier, the pursuit of the NPT determination not to permit any significant proliferation of nuclear weapons capability beyond the group of the powers already possessing this weapon of mass destruction is centrally evident in the North Korean sequence. If one recalls that in the spirit of the new era the two Korean states were admitted as new members to the UN, then it makes eminent sense to connect the numerous endeavors to defuse the tense situation between the two hostile halves of Korea with the movements in and around the Council to obtain at last from the DPRK a firm pledge of adherence to the norms and principles of the “civilized world” and thus hopefully to set in motion its gentle opening to the international community and its legal and political foundations. What is of special significance here is not even the strenuous search for ways and means to bring North Korea into the fold of the world but the steady and emphatic focus by the Council and its full membership on the fulfillment of a previously neglected key purpose conveyed in the Charter, namely, to promote peace and security through systematic and effective procedures of complete disarmament and of needed arms control. The consistent view to getting North Korea and its secretive regime into the procedure for inspections of nuclear installations under the NPT and through the IAEA demonstrates quite strikingly the sincerity and commitment of the

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Council membership to exercise the duties flowing from its lofty mandate. The IAEA did not consider it necessary for a long time to approach the Council as the highest authority to press a recalcitrant party to fully comply with the safeguards, as in the crisis in 1993 and 1994. A year later, the Council again turned to aspects of the NPT, but it was not engaged in some unresolved tension between the IAEA and a state adhering to the treaty. The issue in this treatment in a formal public Council meeting was of the highest political significance, as it dealt with a central obligation of the nuclear-weapon states under the NPT to provide adequate security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon states having joined the NPT since its adoption in 1968. As the verbatim record of the 3,514th meeting makes clear to the attentive reader, the next review conference of the NPT, held every five years, was due to open within a week from the date of the Council meeting on 11 April 1995. The five nuclear-weapon states (NWS) acted in the last moment in order to obviate a major clash at the review conference itself. While the record does not offer confirmation of the alleged connection between submission by the five permanent members of the Council and the approaching review conference, the fact that the Council met in a public meeting and that a significant number of states not currently Council members sought to exercise their right to participate in the Council’s decision reflected the urgency and political sensitivity of the key matter at stake in the NPT as implemented so far. With the agenda item innocuously labeled “Proposal by China, France, the Russian Federation, the UK and the US on security assurances,” the uninitiated observer of the Council’s work would not have had any clue as to what was the issue to be resolved. Only the careful reading of the full verbatim record could provide a way to comprehend what was going on in the Council chamber. The opinions that were presented in a diplomatically courteous and restrained manner divided into two large groups, one welcoming the initiative of the P-5, the other sharply rebuking the same as the NWS for failing to carry out what had been firmly promised in 1968 and for offering too little too late. From the total set of statements, only a few will be looked at in some detail in order to set forth the arguments presented and the controversy thereby made visible. Presenting a very long, involved argument, the Egypt representative offered a sharp critique of the actions of the NWS and of the assurances as formulated by them to satisfy the expectations of the non-nuclear-weapon states. Calling the draft resolution insufficient in both form and substance, he carefully argued his case in a lawyer-like fashion and demonstrated point by point the shortcomings of the P-5 document. Applauding the Council’s discharge of its responsibility under Article 26, he reminded the members that the Charter had been conceived before the nuclear era began, and he suggested that measures commensurate with the threats posed by nuclear weapons were therefore absent


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from its language. However, this new phenomenon of the atomic bomb fundamentally altered the environment in which the UN had to function and firmly established the elimination of nuclear weapons as the primary concern pertaining to the survival of life on the earth. Within this context, it was clear that the P-5 as NWS had to offer to the non-nuclear-weapon states guarantees that nuclear weapons would not be used against them. In this connection, the Egyptian representative reviewed the NPT of 1968 and found it wanting in terms of ironclad guarantees against the use of nuclear weapons. He called Council resolution 255 (1968) from the outset defective and disappointing, as it provided neither positive nor negative assurances to the non-nuclear states. He continued that his delegation had sought in the 1990 review conference to expand the security assurances and elaborate them in an international legally binding instrument that would ensure an automatic response by the Council in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter to any attack or threat of attack against a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT. In view of the fact that the Council’s response would be to a nuclear threat, it should undoubtedly be beyond the scope of application of the veto in order to ensure its credibility. The delegate also stressed the elements of deterrence, protection, and assistance in regard of the draft resolution dealing with security guarantees and summarized the missing principles in the text as follows: first, a prior determination that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons constituted a threat to international peace and security; second, a trigger mechanism to ensure Council response to threats or attacks by nuclear weapons; third, a commitment by the Council “to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace.” The Egyptian representative furthermore charged that the rush of the sponsors to secure adoption of the draft resolution one week before the start of the NPT review and extension conference no doubt aimed at tilting the balance toward their most preferred outcome for the conference. He underlined that a wide-ranging consultation among the full UN membership should have been held, as this decision had a direct bearing on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all non-nuclear-weapon states. He deplored that this situation would not dispel the wide skepticism about the credibility of the draft resolution and remarked that the crux of the security assurances was not who issued the assurances but what their contents were. In the end, as he suggested, the only assurance against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was their total elimination. Much of what the Egyptian representative had criticized was equally targeted by several other delegations, in particular, those of India, Iran, Algeria, Pakistan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Botswana, and Indonesia speaking for the nonaligned

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movement (NAM). The other side consisted of a smaller group of states that welcomed the P-5 draft resolution and regarded the new initiative as a sign of the changed international atmosphere in the post-cold war world and as a good omen for the hoped-for, indefinite extension of the NPT at the upcoming review conference. It became clear that the delegations favorably inclined toward the P-5 submission were fully aware of still-existing shortcomings and weaknesses in the protection of the non-nuclear-weapon states but apparently felt that nothing more could be extracted from the NWS as concessions for the time being, and that it would be better to accept the limited gain than to risk a reversal and failure in the pursuit of a nuclear-weapon-free world. This moderate realistic attitude was shared by a very diverse group of states, some Council members, others nonmembers, among them the Ukraine, Hungary, Romania, Italy, Germany, Argentina, Oman, Honduras, and the president speaking in his capacity as representative of the Czech Republic. The delicate nature of this engagement is well reflected in the little procedural detail that the NWS, with the exception of China, took the floor only after the vote on the draft resolution, at the end of the public meeting. The China representative offered his statement prior to the actual vote and unanimous adoption of Council resolution 984 (1995) and explained that as a NWS his government supported the goal of a legally binding, international instrument providing adequate assurances for non-nuclear-weapon states and nuclear-weapon-free zones against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. He reiterated his government’s principal position on security assurances and made the following four points: First, complete and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons to usher in a nuclear-weapon-free world was the fundamental guarantee for ridding all countries of the threat of nuclear war. Second, it was the right of non-nuclearweapon states to acquire security assurances to free themselves from any nuclear attack or nuclear threat. Third, an unconditional commitment by all nuclearweapon states not to be the first to use nuclear weapons was one of the effective measures to avoid nuclear war and to reduce the nuclear threat. Fourth, China fully understood and supported the reasonable demand of the vast numbers of non-nuclear-weapon states for security assurances. The other four NWSs spoke briefly reflecting a wide agreement among them, after the vote had been taken. All four representatives referred in strong terms to the historic nature of the Council’s decision adopting the offer of security assurances from the NWS and mentioned in the same context the respective unilateral explanations issued in separate Council documents to address issues and aspects apparently not considered sufficiently in the joint draft resolution. In varying ways, they also stated their fervent wish that the review conference, on the basis of this Council decision, would feel enabled to decide on the indefinite extension of the NPT.


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The text of resolution 984 (1995) barely reflected the strong objections voiced by the states belonging to the NAM and instead depicted the agreement among the nuclear powers in terms of how far they were willing to accommodate, if at all, the requests formulated by the large group of non-nuclear-weapon states, mostly aligned within the NAM, as to the evolution of the NPT and especially its universal range as well as fairness. While the preambular part of resolution 984 (1995) spoke of recognizing the legitimate interest of the Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) to receive security assurances and claimed that the resolution constituted a step in this direction, the operative part did not spell out too concretely what the improvements were. The resolution stated in paragraph three that in case of aggression with nuclear weapons against a NNWS any state could bring the matter immediately to the Council’s attention and appropriate supportive action. The following paragraphs offered nothing further than advisory remarks that an investigation could be conducted and suitable measures could be determined, as well as that appropriate measures could be taken to provide technical, medical, scientific, or humanitarian assistance in case of such an attack. The possibility of compensation under relevant norms of international law also was mentioned. As a last remedy, the Council referred to the inherent right, under Article 51 of the Charter, of individual and collective self-defense if an armed attack occurred against a UN member state, until the Council took up the issue. Altogether, the resolution that was obtained at the “last minute” before the NPT review conference would open was indeed only a minimal gesture to the large group of NNWS parties to the NPT and left them totally dissatisfied on the fundamental grievances and pleas that the public meeting had aired so eloquently. On that count, the review of the NPT and its effects on the nuclear weapons scene was unquestionably deeply disappointing and reaffirmed severe doubts on the part of many affected governments and states.

Conclusion From this rather “heated” exchange of arguments about the fairness and equity (or the lack of them) of the NPT system one can deduce that the Council served again as a magnet for the attraction of key participants in a larger, enduring debate about the impact of the nuclear weapons in the international system since the end of World War II and even more after the end of the cold war. The Council chamber served as the stage on which fundamental differences in the evaluation of the threat of nuclear war were stated and discussed. It is reassuring that those who felt ignored and disregarded by the privileged NWS, holding at the same time the position of permanent members in the Council, were at least given a chance to state their case and to be heard. For the impartial student of their respective positions and reasons in formulating their views, it would appear that

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the thinking of the defenders of privilege was less persuasive than the justified complaints of the countries not possessing the nuclear arsenal and feeling unprotected against potential threats or blunt aggression. At least, on the forum of the Council, all parties can be heard and thereby help shape an evolving thought process encompassing the state members and their spokespersons in the search for new and better answers to core questions of international peace and security. Despite all of the shortcomings of the Council’s handling of its rights as well as duties under Article 26 of the Charter, one should still concede that on the occasions when the members of the Council undertook relevant consideration falling under this Charter provision, they acted not only perfunctorily but gave the respective matters all of the time and attention required to arrive at a well-reasoned political decision. The P-5 strategy to withhold concessions as much as possible and to resist the forceful pressures from the NAM members and others to “level the playing field” in the nuclear domain should not come as a surprise to anyone, since the whole complex of nuclear weapons capability has remained a highly controversial and contested question in the post-World War II international relations. It should indeed be rated as newsworthy that in the postcold war era and following the extraordinary high-level Council meeting on 31 January 1992, the Council began to emerge from its previous self-imposed exclusion in disarmament matters and to tackle issues as they came to its attention. In these cases, one can gather clearly that the Council stood in the center of a much larger network of links and contacts that together constituted the complex political process typical for events and developments in global governance.

Chapter Seven

The UN Security Council at Work Peace Building, Refugees, and Humanitarian Assistance

Aspects of Humanitarian Assistance to Refugees before the UN Security Council

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he UN Security Council’s agenda took a new turn since the mid-1990s, as the conflict situations coming before the Council began to reflect the worsening of global turbulence and the unending stream of internal strife and ethnic clashes requiring the political forum and the diplomatic finesse centered in the membership of the Council. New strands of ever-more-complex political issues began to capture the attention of the Council and its state members, offering reiterated confirmation of the expanded authority and global reach of this organ for international peace and security. Reflecting the well-known fact that the human level of conflicts and emergencies had begun to claim international attention at the highest political levels, the Council turned, in May 1997, to the agenda item entitled “Protection for humanitarian assistance to refugees and others in conflict situations.” Diverging somewhat from the long-standing practice of the Council, the agreement to take up this specialized topic was obtained in prior consultations, but the initial meeting was conducted as a regular public meeting, the 3,778th meeting on 21 May 1997, and it did not result in the adoption of either a resolution or presidential statement at the meeting or immediately thereafter. Instead, the session was devoted to a large, wide-ranging debate allowing many delegations outside of the Council to be heard and to help shape the parameters of a slowly maturing consensus view of how to deal with such complex subject matter. The manner in which this long exchange of principal views and claims was carried out proved unfailingly the sense of purpose and

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commitment by the member states and their representatives as far as the mandate of the Charter and its application to issues of the post-cold war world was concerned. Consisting of thirty-six statements by representatives of member states and four presentations by spokesmen for the humanitarian community, the deliberations ranging over morning and afternoon sessions provided a panoramic view of the field of humanitarian relief practice in numerous field situations and demonstrated the clear determination of the participants in the Council’s debate to come to grips with an involved complex of questions and requirements. The origin of the idea for such a debate and its skillful realization was well described in the statement of the Council’s president, speaking in his capacity as the foreign minister of the Republic of Korea, in the morning section of the debate. He started from the basic premise that the prevalent intra-state conflicts since the end of the cold war posed a new type of threat to international peace and security entailing massive flows of refugees and internally displaced persons, and he argued further that refugees were no longer just an unintended effect of conflict but were intentionally created by the warring parties themselves. He emphasized that with disturbing frequency innocent civilians were being targeted by combatants and subjected to atrocities and gross violations of international humanitarian norms. He mentioned that his government was deeply concerned about the consequences deriving from this new problem for international peace and had therefore taken the initiative to hold an open debate on the issue. While the Council’s practice so far had involved a good amount of trial and error, the ROK welcomed the trends toward greater engagement by the Council and believed that the involvement in the protection of humanitarian assistance could be handled with greater consistency, effectiveness, and efficiency. In light of this basic disposition, the ROK, through the foreign minister, presented several specific ideas. First, if the Council decided that a humanitarian crisis involving refugees required a peacekeeping operation, then the Council should make sure that no mismatches existed between the operation’s mandate and capabilities and the expectations invested in it, as had been the case in Sebrenica. Second, closer coordination among the various UN bodies and agencies involved, as well as between them and other agencies and regional organizations, would strengthen the capability of the international community to protect and assist refugees and other civilians in any given crisis. The Council should seek to instruct the head of such an operation and give adequate political guidance for the discharge of the tasks in the field. Third, further efforts should be undertaken to combat the prevailing culture of impunity breeding disregard for humanitarian law, including the establishment of ad hoc international criminal tribunals that should be given the power to enforce their decisions and the strengthening of the legal framework to protect the safety of peacekeeping and

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humanitarian personnel. Fourth, the Council should place greater emphasis on improving its preventive capacity with the help of early-warning systems and fact-finding missions and even preventive deployment. Lastly, the ROK believed that the Council should improve its ability to react rapidly to humanitarian crises as they erupted. It stressed the great need to devise a comprehensive response to the new international challenges posing massive threats to the security of people. In closing, the foreign minister expressed his appreciation to all of the participants in this fundamental review of how to ensure protection for humanitarian assistance to people in flight from conflict. Throughout the long deliberations, on 21 May 1997, most speakers expressed their appreciation for the South Korean initiative to devote a full public meeting to the core question of how to secure the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the people in need. In one case, the nature of the South Korean role in this whole matter was even more clearly revealed when the representative of Poland referred to so-called “guidelines” issued by the ROK delegation prior to the debate. Thus the credit for the broad treatment of a significant pressing question for the Council as a decision-making body can without doubt be ascribed to the sponsors of the ROK mission. The fact that the foreign minister himself grasped the opportunity to launch his government’s initiative during the ROK presidency and to attend the meeting personally reflects the importance attached to the issue and the venue by the South Korean political leadership. This also was further made clear by the unanimous endorsement of the whole event by the permanent members, none of whom claimed any responsibility for bringing about the meeting. The gravity of the subject matter was fully spelled out in the extended chain of fundamental declarations from the morning session to the adjournment at 7 p.m. Due to the fact that despite differences in wording the sentiment in favor of a greatly strengthened UN role in the protection of humanitarian assistance was generally shared by relief operators, Council members, and many other member states, the coverage of this seminal moment in the history of the Council will be limited to a few representative declarations, with the suggestion that a more detailed review of the debate could best be undertaken by a direct examination of the verbatim record of the 3,778th meeting. Taking his cue from the opening remarks by the Under-Security-General (USG) for humanitarian affairs, that in redefining protection needs one was in effect redefining threats to the peace, and that security concerned mainly the well-being of people, which was not of lesser value than the security of the states, the spokesman for the UN High Commissoner for Refugees (UNHCR) set out an integrated approach to crisis management in which all dimensions—humanitarian, developmental, and political—were addressed in a mutually reinforcing manner. He emphasized that the interface between human security and national

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and international security had to be recognized. He identified several shortfalls in the contemporary response to humanitarian crises, among them, first, the fact that millions of persons forcibly displaced within their own countries were still neither protected nor assisted; second, humanitarian action did not only entail relief, such as food, water, and shelter but also physical protection bringing safety to people rather than people to safety; third, the primary responsibility for the survival and protection of refugees and other victims lay with whoever was in control, state or non-state actor; fourth, humanitarian organizations should not be left alone to resolve refugee situations clearly politicized or militarized; fifth, there was a worrisome trend to force refugees back into conditions that were neither safe nor viable. These basic concerns were somewhat enlarged by the forceful warning by the UNHCR that staff security, unrestricted access to people in need, and respect for the impartiality and integrity of humanitarian operations were under attack. In this connection, the spokesman underlined the need to reaffirm existing legal norms and to expand them to civilian humanitarian staff of the UN and non-UN agencies. These practice-derived remarks were expanded by statements by the UNICEF deputy executive director, who reviewed the humanitarian front with a special focus on the plight of children, stressing the impact of economic sanctions, the scourge of land mines in many conflict zones and the special tragedy of the child soldiers, and lastly by the ICRC delegate to the UN, who reaffirmed the long-standing tradition of the Swiss humanitarian organization to sharply distinguish between humanitarian and political action, since humanitarian relief should never become a tool to mask the absence of appropriate political action, and appealed once again to all humanitarian operators to coordinate their crucial relief action in the closest possible manner. Starting the round of statements by state representatives, of which there were thirty-six altogether, the representative from Egypt, a nonpermanent Council member, affirmed his government’s fullest agreement with the prevailing sentiment that the provision of humanitarian assistance had reached a critical condition resulting from the significant transformations of the international political system and the changing nature of conflicts addressed by the Council. Pointing to the ongoing change from interstate to intrastate conflicts, to the increasing disregard by conflict parties of standards of international law, in particular, humanitarian law, and to the deliberate targeting of innocent civilians in armed conflicts, the Egyptian representative proposed four factors for the Council’s consideration in drafting mandates for complex emergencies involving a military dimension: first, the Council should consider the crisis from a comprehensive perspective and in an integrated manner; second, a distinction should be drawn between the responsibility, nature, and objectives of peacekeeping, on the one hand, and of humanitarian assistance, on the other; third, the mandate should


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include special provisions and arrangements for the voluntary return of refugees and their resettlement and compensation for loss of property; fourth, the rules of engagement of peacekeeping operations should be subjected to a thorough overall review, especially in light of the painful experience in Bosnia, where UN personnel were injured and humiliated by local armed bands who pushed the international troops aside and intruded into “safe areas” established under Council resolutions, and by a similar disarray in Somalia and in the Great Lakes region. For the Egyptian government, these deplorable occurrences highlighted the problems faced by international aid workers as well as peacekeepers and persuaded its leading officials to seek protection for these workers and their headquarters, convoys, and transports. Egypt considered it urgent for the Council and the General Assembly to assume a greater role in responding to these crises and placed a special emphasis on respect by all parties for all international instruments relating to refugees and international humanitarian activities, in particular, the fourth Geneva convention of 1949 and the 1951 UN convention relating to the status of refugees, especially the nonrefoulement of refugees. Another nonpermanent member of the Council, Costa Rica, used the occasion of the open meeting for a principal comprehensive statement. Its representative welcomed the Council meeting as an important step on the road toward transparency and openness and recalled the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of refugees in the Great Lakes region of Africa, and, in particular, the tragedy of the Rwandan refugees in eastern Zaire. This bleak setting was used to focus on the stark reality of central Africa and the desperate efforts of humanitarian organizations to save as many lives as they could. Drawing attention to the legacies of the cold war, the delegate depicted a world of localized wars and the confrontations of the major powers banishing the human dimension from international politics. While the contemporary world was still subject to geopolitical discussions, Costa Rica viewed this as morally wrong, because it disregarded legal commitments and reduced the noble goals of the UN to a game of empty and meaningless words. Although there was much talk of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights, and development assistance, the reality still showed dictatorial repression and unsanctioned violations of basic rights as well as economic models prejudicial to the inhabitants of the developing world. Since the post-cold war era was marked by economic inequality between North and South, it was no wonder that the world’s present conflicts were erupting and festering primarily in the third world, the arena of confrontation between the major powers. Costa Rica looked at this transitional world as the search was directed toward new ways to deal with the large masses of refugees and internally displaced persons, and favored equitable treatment of all displaced people. The delegate underscored the urgent need for a new international vision of the management of international conflicts, discarding strategic considerations and exclusive military concerns. The

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critical shift should be carried out to cover the humanitarian aspects of current conflicts and to broaden the horizon in order to establish ways for preventive humanitarian action. Similarly, the focus should be shifted to undertaking valuable peace-building activities once conflicts had ended. The total reconstruction of the affected societies was in the end the only way to create new economic opportunities and social solidarity. These dramatic changes in the approach of the international community to the humanitarian challenge could be achieved if the political will to overcome legal ambiguities and procedural excuses were given. While Costa Rica did not yet foresee the opportune moment where the international community would turn in the direction of this new crisis management, it held that such a redirection of the engagement of the principal UN organs, especially the Council, was most urgently required. The Chilean representative pointed out that his government as a nonpermanent member of the Council for 1996 and 1997 was attempting to foster an awareness of the interrelationship between conflict and humanitarian tragedy. Frequently, the relief organizations were closest to the conflicts dealt with by the Council. For these reasons, in February 1997 his delegation helped take a new approach in which Council members were able to meet with representatives of nongovernmental humanitarian organizations with a substantial presence in the area of a particular conflict, in this case regarding the situation in the Great Lakes region. With the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, on the initiative of a Council member, issuing the invitations and presiding over the meeting, Council members heard the comments of OXFAM, Medecins sans frontieres, and Care on that African emergency. This event enabled the Council to expand considerably the scope of consultations with humanitarian actors. The representative from China was the only speaker during the meeting who advocated a somewhat restrained methodology to deal with humanitarian activities. His government took the firm stand that in the UN humanitarian action and the settlement of political and security-related issues should be clearly distinguished. The promotion of the peaceful settlement of regional conflicts and the protection of refugees and humanitarian assistance through peacekeeping operations merited an in-depth study. His delegation warned especially against the frequent invocation of Chapter VII of the Charter, or even the authorization of the use of force. The Chinese government did not favor this approach and wanted to use force, if it was required in some humanitarian emergencies, restricted to self-defense. Instead, the UN should emphasize prevention and seek to identify the root causes of regional conflicts and humanitarian crises to suit the remedy to each case and select solutions to the cause. While “preventive deployment” was being much talked about, it would be more useful to consider “preventive development,” that is, to eradicate the root causes of the refugee situation by encouraging national unity and stability and promoting economic development.


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The limited number of statements given more detailed coverage does not reflect the enormous diversity of participating member states and of their specific views on the increasingly challenging issue of how to protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance in the many flash points around the world. Nevertheless, several main findings can be distilled from the flow of so many lengthy statements presented in the Council chamber. Procedurally, the Council had moved significantly forward, opening up to outside experts and relief operators and thus breaking down the high walls of confidentiality around its decisionmaking processes. The hearings in the Council during the 3,778th meeting must be seen in conjunction with the meetings of Council members and humanitarian NGOs outside of the Council venue and in a largely unstructured setting. These two practices have done more to improve the Council’s transparency and openness than numerous exchanges and decisions of the Council in the past years demonstrating so-called “goodwill” but clinging to the traditional status quo in practice. In terms of substance, one can establish as a fact that the Council has strikingly reclaimed its past role as a public forum for principal debates. The extended deliberations around the plight of refugees and other displaced people advanced tremendously the conceptual understanding and the practical application of the newly gained expertise. The course of the first large debate on the humanitarian theme, taking up where the Agenda for Peace discourse had ended, displayed a honest intention to listen to as many voices as possible and to formulate subsequently a joint perspective within the Council as to how to proceed with the legal and political problems arising from the multifaceted ramifications of deploying humanitarian personnel in zones of violent conflict. The noteworthy feature of this opening debate is the implicit willingness of the Council members to learn and to benefit from this widening of their horizon in regard to reaching out to the pitiful victims of war and destruction and at the same time to devise new methods to provide effective protection for the relief personnel dispatched to look after the people in dire need. The willingness of all participants to listen with open minds and to gain insight through their collective “brainstorming” exercise offered renewed and compelling evidence for a dynamic and proactive Council. Although the 3,778th meeting was adjourned without any formal statement when the speakers list came to its end, the gestation of the ideas created before, during, and after that inaugural debate brought results within less than a month. At the 3,790th meeting, on 19 June 1997, the representative from Sweden, in his capacity as president of the Council, made a statement on behalf of the Council, which contained the gist of what the members had selected from the rich harvest of the opening public session. Referring to the debate on 21 May 1997, the Council labeled the massive displacement of civilian populations in violent conflicts a serious challenge to international peace and security and

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underlined the importance of pursuing a coordinated and comprehensive approach in seeking protection for humanitarian assistance to refugees and others. The Council expressed grave concern over the increase in attacks or use of force against refugees and other civilians as well as against UN and other personnel associated with UN operations and personnel of humanitarian organizations and urged all states to protect the victims and the relief workers. The Council reminded all states and others concerned of the need to bring to justice those who violated international humanitarian law and, in this context, recalled GA resolution 51/207 of 17 December 1996, on the establishment of an international criminal court. Furthermore, the Council underlined the importance of ensuring clear, appropriate, and realistic mandates to be implemented in an impartial manner as well as adequate resources for UN peacekeeping operations. Moreover, it stressed the importance of ensuring closer coordination between the relevant UN bodies and other international agencies, with a view to providing or protecting humanitarian assistance to those in need. It also endorsed once again the principles of humanity, neutrality, and impartiality of humanitarian assistance as guidelines for the important work of the humanitarian organizations. Last, the Council emphasized crisis prevention, including addressing the root causes of such crises, and it encouraged the secretary-general and all states to enhance the UN capacity and capability in this regard (S/PRST/1997/34). The carefully drafted and worded presidential statement represents a fine extract from the long debate at the 3,778th meeting. Examining the full text in detail, one observes quickly the skillful inclusion, implicitly and sometimes explicitly, of specific demands by individual states or groups of States. Thus the statement guards the limits of the Council’s Charter-based authority in outlying concerns about non-UN humanitarian organizations. The strong emphasis on clear mandates also responds to complaints and grievances in earlier UN operations, and the same emphasis on the basic principles of humanitarian assistance is designed to prevent misuse or excess in the actions taken in the actual conflict situations. The concluding invocation of the goal of crisis prevention should be seen in light of what China and other delegations had pointed out as priorities in the tasks assigned to UN organs, member states, and the agencies and organizations in the UN system. Seen as a whole, the presidential statement offers a conclusive and highly pragmatic declaration establishing the road on which the Council could travel in future years. The Council had proven its sense of duty and skill, distilling many views and expectations and managing the confluence of relevant ideas into the decision taken by its members in the weeks from 21 May through 19 June 1997. Fifteen months later, the Council resumed consideration of the question and placed on its agenda a report from the secretary-general on protection for humanitarian assistance to refugees and others in conflict situations


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(S/1998/883). As the debate at this meeting made clear very quickly, the initiative for a renewed consideration of this issue came from the Swedish delegation holding the presidency during September 1998. The availability of a specific report by the secretary-general was definitely a factor in bringing about the resumption of the earlier exchange and review. Still, as in the previous instance, the push for Council involvement in this subject matter, somewhat removed from the principal concern for international peace and security, came clearly from a nonpermanent member of the Council expressing special interest in the whole humanitarian assistance field. Once again, the venue selected by the Council for review of the issue was in an open public meeting, thereby reaffirming its visible place in the architecture of global governance. The urgency of the discussion was demonstrated by the oral briefing by the deputy secretary-general, who presented the secretary-general’s report at the start of the 3,932nd meeting on 29 September 1998. This document, which had been requested by the Council, set out the challenges and obstacles encountered by humanitarian agencies working in dangerous conditions. The precarious nature of humanitarian action was worsened by the growing trend of targeting civilians in their communities and terrorizing and killing innocent people, forcing them to abandon their homes and communities in fear of armed violence and to flee and become refugees or internally displaced. The deputy SG stressed the enormous scale of atrocities and the horrendous cost in human suffering and referred to recent events in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo as examples of the current catastrophe. She placed strong emphasis on the conclusion that humanitarian action was inevitably limited when the killing, maiming, and expulsion of civilians constituted the principal objective of the attackers. For these reasons, there was clear agreement that “humanitarian action” in war zones had to be rethought and a new understanding needed to be formulated regarding the safeguarding of the well-being of civilians. The report had been drawn up in close consultation with the relevant offices and agencies dealing with humanitarian assistance and identified unmistakably the need to focus on the safety of the relief personnel in zones of violent conflict and on the equivalent requirement to strengthen respect for basic humanitarian norms under conditions of the changed nature of warfare. Recalling the recent deaths of UN civilians and military personnel killed in the line of duty, the deputy SG drew the Council’s attention to specific measures to enhance the protection of refugees and pointed in particular to the establishment of the international criminal court as being central to eventually ending the culture of impunity. She mentioned the SG proposal to hold combatants financially liable in case civilians were the deliberate target of aggression, including the suggestion to set up a trust fund for reparations to victims. She shared with the Council the appreciation of humanitarian agencies for the active interest shown

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by the Council in their severe dilemma and underscored once more that conflicts with terrible humanitarian consequences were increasing in number, duration, and severity, rendering the Council’s consideration of the topic a most welcome opportunity to affect positively the calamity in relief operations and to reduce the statistics of human misery. The subsequent general debate involving statements by most Council members and by a good number of other representatives conveyed a far-reaching general agreement that the growing danger for the safety of humanitarian personnel in conflict areas was no longer acceptable and demanded forceful international action based on the joint understanding and decision by the Council, whose right to deal with this complex of questions was beyond any doubt. Specific proposals were presented that were geared toward the establishment of a framework and a set of rules guiding the realm of relief operations in cases of direct UN involvement. Reflecting the important lessons learned from past conflicts before the organization, it was pointed out by several delegates that much greater caution and circumspection were called for in current circumstances when planning to use force on humanitarian grounds, and that recourse to Chapter VII of the Charter should be taken much less frequently, as it could even lead to increased violence against international personnel. The diplomats were united in their insistence that the protection of humanitarian assistance involved primarily a question of compliance by all actors—state and non-state actors alike—with the instruments of international law and international humanitarian law, and that the Council should take a firm stand on any violations of these fundamental provisions. No longer a member of the Council, the representative from the Republic of Korea under whose presidency the 1997 debate had been held, provided a brief overview of the developments since that first fundamental examination of the complex matter the year before and expressed special gratitude to the SG and to the UNHCR for having prepared the substantive report in response to the Council’s request in 1997. He furthermore stated his full concurrence with the presidential statement to be issued at the end of the current discussion with its firm affirmation of the Council’s indispensable involvement in the protection of humanitarian assistance in conflicts. He also called for the separation of armed combatants from bona fide refugees and displaced populations, appealed to the Council to employ the useful leverage of arms embargoes in conflict zones in order to ease the plight of the displaced people, stressed the need to ensure universal respect for international humanitarian principles as a precondition for restoring a safe environment for relief efforts, and urged the expansion of the scope of personnel covered by the UN convention to include the local staff of humanitarian organizations. The 3,932nd meeting was concluded with three humanitarian briefings by the spokespersons for UNICEF, the International Committee of the Red Cross,


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and the UNHCR. All three underlined the message of urgency conveyed by the SG and reported new incidents reflecting the growing difficulties experienced by the highly motivated professional personnel active in the midst of ongoing conflict and in fragile cease-fire arrangements. The representative of the ICRC in particular provided new information on criminal elements in battlefields and refugee camps targeting refugees and humanitarian personnel for theft and robbery, often becoming violent in dealing with their victims, and drew the Council’s attention to a further problem, namely, civilians becoming the main target of armed hostilities and increasingly turning into an integral part of political and military strategies. All three representatives reiterated their conviction that humanitarian action and peacekeeping should be kept apart as much as possible, and that the Council had an important role to play in the protection of humanitarian assistance in conflict situations. While in 1997 the time between the public debate and the Council’s issuance of the statement of the president had lasted nearly six weeks, the Council was this time immediately ready to move to its decision on the subject matter, again in the form of a presidential statement. On the same day, on 29 September 1998, the president of the Council made the following statement on behalf of the Council (S/PRST/1998/30), which reads inter alia as follows: Recalling the statement of 1997, the SG report and some recommendations from the SG report on Africa (S/1998/318), the Council reaffirmed the importance of pursuing a coordinated and comprehensive approach in improving protection for humanitarian assistance to refugees and others in conflict situations; the Council condemned the attacks or use of force in conflict situations against refugees and other civilians; the Council likewise condemned all attacks or use of force against UN and other personnel associated with UN operations as well as personnel of humanitarian organizations, in violation of international law and recalled in this context the Convention on the Safety of UN and Associated Personnel adopted by the GA on 9 December 1994; and finally, the Council affirmed its intention to review thoroughly and promptly the recommendations of the SG and noted the views expressed in the debate at its 3,932nd meeting. Although the new statement was rather brief in comparison to the earlier one from 1997, one can perceive another gigantic step forward in the Council’s willingness and ability to deal with such an unusual and immensely complicated matter as the need to protect not only the civilians in their plight of persecution and displacement but also the many helpers deployed to provide assistance and protection to the innocent victims of violent conflict and civil strife in many locations around the world. The Council’s extensive review of the evolving humanitarian scene also arrives at a new level of understanding and commitment at which the members of the august body acknowledge their Charter-based obligation in matters of peace and security to extend to the margins of humanitarian

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operations as part and parcel of the involvement of the international community through the UN. The intensifying dialogue between the Council and its main partners has by now opened up and includes the humanitarian operators from within the UN system and on the outskirts as well as many humanitarian and human rights organizations. The Council members not only accede to these voices being heard but actually reach out and seek the encounter with them, similarly to the manner with which the Council in an earlier move set up a regular dialogue with the troop-contributing countries in matters relating to peacekeeping. Although the Council’s formal decisions are still taken in the quiet of its closed consultations room, the members have changed direction quite dramatically and are seeking publicity and transparency, thereby affecting the international domain much more than in earlier years. Moreover, the Council demonstrates its drive to become proficient in matters on its agenda. There is a clear learning curve between the first articulation in response to the SG’s Agenda for Peace, the lengthy and profound 1997 debate, and the 1998 review. The last paragraph in the presidential statement of 29 September 1998, affirmed the Council’s intention to review “thoroughly and promptly” the recommendation of the SG. As the Council took up the agenda item on protection for humanitarian assistance at its 3,942nd meeting on 10 November 1998, it stood to reason that it would fulfill its commitment to review and assess the SG proposals contained in that specific report. The careful reading of the deliberations at the 3,942nd meeting should enable the critical observer to make a considered judgment on that aspect of the continuing debate. At the outset, the president, the US representative, announced certain understandings regarding the format of the public meeting of the Council. He expressed appreciation for the Brazilian suggestion to hold the briefing by the UN high commissioner for refugees in a public meeting, thereby documenting again the Council’s will to enhance the transparency of its working methods, but he noted the further agreement to confine interventions in the debate to Council members in order to maintain the session’s utility and out of respect for time constraints, thereby facilitating a productive exchange between the head of the UNHCR and the Council members. Recalling the extraordinary interest shown by non-Council members at previous sessions on this urgent issue, it must be rated rather unusual that this important conversation with Mrs. Ogata was not opened to the views and questions of the wider UN membership. Referring to her previous appearance before the Council in April 1998, Mrs. Ogata, the high commissioner for refugees, drew the Council’s attention to the disturbing fact that UNHCR staff were increasingly exposed in their work to conflict situations or to situations immediately following the end of conflicts, and that meant to security threats. She gave the case of a French official, the head of


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the UNHCR suboffice in Vladikavkaz, in the Russian Federation, who had been kidnapped in January and had been held for more than nine months as a hostage. His case demonstrated most tellingly the need to better ensure the protection of humanitarian operations. The flight of civilians in these conditions slowed down the relief work and sometimes blocked solutions to refugee problems. The blurred lines between peace and war and the necessity to reach out to the victims of forced displacement across these lines had made the protection of refugees, including returnees, a more complex exercise than ever before. To illustrate the severity of the existing dilemma, she pointed out the enormous difficulties encountered in the Kosovo situation where the UNHCR work took place right next to the OSCE-operated Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission, subsequently renamed the Kosovo Verification Mission, and where the security of the relief personnel required increased deployment of OSCE observers in the conflicted area. Only the closest collaboration between the political and relief workers would facilitate the return of refugees and displaced people and might help create favorable conditions for a lasting political settlement. While the organized political support in Kosovo was a significant factor for the performance of UNHCR tasks, the same could not be obtained in most other crises, thereby diminishing the ability of humanitarian agencies to help refugees, returnees, and other victims of conflict. Mrs. Ogata reviewed major hot spots and focused especially on the key emergencies in the African continent, especially Sierra Leone and the Great Lakes crisis. Offering a detailed exposé of these protracted violent conflicts, she provided powerful evidence for the huge numbers of people in need and the range of challenging tasks handled by UNHCR staff and associated humanitarian personnel. Summarizing the main features of the overview of the deplorable situation in Africa, the UNHCR head presented a few concluding reflections in light of the terrible reality in the field: First, the complexity of war and the fragility of peace in many parts of the world meant that new flows of refugees and other displaced people could happen at any time, a factor that the Council should not overlook. Second, attention should be focused on the relationship between security problems and humanitarian situations: in this regard, proposals were under active consideration to develop a “ladder” of options from national capacities to international peacekeeping solutions, a matter that the Council should take up and further develop. Third, more attention should be paid to postconflict situations that frequently were most precarious and provided at best a very fragile peace; here the emphasis should be placed on creating conditions for the peaceful coexistence of divided communities and for the restoration of the intercommunal dialogue. After the comprehensive and sobering overview by Mrs. Ogata, Council members made use of the unusual opportunity to involve the high commissioner in a question-and-answer period and thereby to seek to clarify the immense

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complexities surrounding humanitarian assistance in conflict situations and other emergencies and adequate support expected from the Council in this area. The questions posed by the Council members ran the whole gamut from basic conceptual issues to case-specific matters involving more detailed accounts of the given situation in the field or raising critical points about perceived failures or shortcomings and advocating endeavors to remedy these flaws. Among these, a general concern was expressed about the recent trend to turn to unilateral armed intervention, without the prior agreement by the Council. Another serious issue related to the difficulties encountered by humanitarian agencies in territories where there were already hundreds of thousands of refugees. Several representatives took up the principal question of the interrelationship between security matters and humanitarian questions and addressed specific remarks on the underlying factors or on some of the crisis areas in their attempt to elicit further advice or insights from the high commissioner. The range of the remarks and questions was clearly centered on the continuing difficulties encountered in the former Yugoslavia and very recently specifically over the future of Kosovo, and several African sites, with attention being directed mostly toward the Great Lakes region. Despite the gravity of the concerns expressed, all Council members stated in various ways their delight over the fact that this dialogue with Mrs. Ogata was carried out in a public session of the Council, thus responding to the frequent criticisms about the perceived secretiveness and privileged nature of the Council’s deliberations. The extraordinary quality of this public “hearing” was further underlined by the conclusion of the 3,942nd meeting at which the high commissioner provided detailed answers to all of the questions and comments made by the Council’s membership. She opened her responses with a more expanded discussion of the urgent need for actions or mechanisms that would simplify or preferably prevent unnecessary complicated and prolonged processes of human displacement. She lamented that there was a dearth of instruments to affect the dreadful conditions in the various places of mass displacement and pointed to a few earlier cases of managing long-term mass displacement situations, for example, in Central America with the International Conference on Central American Refugees (CIREFCA). In this specific instance, the attempt was successful to promote refugee return, peacemaking, and development, although it required more time than initially thought. Taking up the Great Lakes region, Mrs. Ogata acknowledged that the international approach to the crisis area had suffered from missed opportunities and many other errors and omissions and reemphasized the principal humanitarian imperative dealing with the survival and protection of the victim populations under conditions of undiminished violent conflict raging across the region as a whole. She also stressed the whole complex of postconflict peace building and the specific role of the UNHCR and associated humanitarian agen-


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cies in that phase of international involvement. As the distinction between war and peace was significantly blurred in current crises, it mattered greatly that everything be done to move the situation toward peace, through education, community building, and working with development agencies. She underscored forcefully the urgency of multifaceted coordination between humanitarian and development agencies, assisted by the governments concerned and by the international community. Speaking about Kosovo, Bosnia, and the former Yugoslavia, she listed a number of pending concerns and unfinished activities, all of which would decide the eventual outcome in the troubled region. Summing up, she emphasized the decisive importance of staff security, a requirement that had to be negotiated in each case but could be enhanced through the ratification and realization of the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel. She appealed to the Council and its members and to the wider UN membership to deal on an most urgent basis with the question of how to get involved politically and militarily in these violent conflicts and thus offer the necessary protection to the affected civilian populations and to the humanitarian workers who were in harm’s way in the service of the international community. The impressive quality of this public briefing by the UN high commissioner for refugees can be gathered from this brief and inevitably cursory overview given here. It must be noted, however, that the thrust of this extensive and dynamic exchange was not translated into a Council decision but evidently ended without further action on the matter or on the agenda item as a whole. Therefore, one should assess the significance of this engagement in the extensive problem of protecting humanitarian assistance for refugees and others in conflict situations more in terms of the Council’s evolving procedures and working methods: through the open manner in which the briefing by the UNHCR head was handled by the Council membership acting by consensus regarding this format, the Council really took a gigantic step forward in removing the walls of confidentiality from the airing of a critical international concern. Although the decision was taken to restrict the right to put questions to Mrs. Ogata to members of the Council only, holding this extraordinary exchange in the public limelight at least guaranteed to everybody the chance to follow the debate and to form judgment based on that knowledge. Hereby, the long-standing call for democracy and transparency was partially responded to. The prospects for further opening the Council’s policy-making procedures to the questioning or even skeptical world public brightened as a result of the way in which the 3,942nd meeting was conducted. What emerges furthermore from that historic session is the clear demonstration of the Council’s intense wish to find or develop improved methods of dealing with the increasingly violent conflicts flaring up in too many places around the world and in particular to gain in saving and protecting the lives of

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the victimized populations subject to the brutalities of war and violence and of the humanitarian workers deployed in these war zones in order to carry out their selfless task of aiding the many people in need. As the Council’s consideration of this agenda item faded from public view for the time being, the next periods of UN activity showed unmistakably that the general issue of protection for humanitarian assistance reappeared as several subitems responding to new and highly specific needs arising from the field situations. In looking back over the treatment of the general item, one can firmly extrapolate from the available documentary evidence that the Council proved once again its learning capacity and similarly its eagerness to tackle the enormous challenges placed before it. This reflects the volatile nature of the international developments during the mid1990s to the end of the 1990s and reveals the solid legacy of the Council in these turbulent times.

Maintenance of Peace and Security and Postconflict Peace Building Reflecting the growing number of generic issues coming before the Council, the new agenda item entitled “Maintenance of peace and security and postconflict peace building” showed a certain similarity in thrust and wording to earlier items on the Council’s agenda. The series of meetings occurring on a few occasions over a period of nearly three years had been started at the 3,954th meeting on 16 December 1998, as the result of prior consultations among the members of the Council. Thus the meeting was not convened in response to a specific request or a report or note by the secretary-general but apparently constituted the result of the Council’s ongoing informal dialogue. It must be emphasized at the start of this specific review that the main part of the Council’s deliberations was once again conducted in public meetings, deepening the reformist trend in its proceedings from its first ephemeral beginnings. As the debate in the 3,954th and resumed 3,954th meeting indicates, the initiative for the consideration of this important peace-related theme had come from the president in December 1998, the representative from Bahrain. This small fact in itself speaks loudly about the significant role played by representatives of small and medium member states in principal organs of the UN. The public debate on the new agenda item was held in two Council sessions, the 3,954th meeting on 16 December 1998, and the resumed 3,954th meeting on 23 December 1998. The time gap of a full week between the initial and resumed parts of a formal meeting is highly unusual in the Council’s practice, but the reason for this situation briefly emerged in a few statements during the resumed session, although the full explanation was not provided in the public meeting. The number of invited speakers, all member state representatives,


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came to altogether twenty-three, showing in a startling manner the enormous interest among the wider UN membership in this generic topic. The brief overview in this study cannot do justice to the scope and depth of the arguments offered in the numerous presentations. But in a succinct summation, the attempt will be made to encompass the gist of what the participants in this fresh discussion contributed to the clarification of the question posed. The unusual nature of this review is even indicated by the fact that the representative from China took the floor as the first speaker. Reaffirming China’s strong commitment to the principles and purposes of the UN Charter and acknowledging the profound changes in the world at the turn of the century, the representative highlighted the special needs of Africa and turned to the increasing trend in the Council’s practice to get involved in the internal conflicts of some countries. China emphasized that it was essential that such interference should not be carried out without the consent or request of the country concerned, and that especially the pretext of alleviating humanitarian crises or the frequent wielding of military threats or interventions under Chapter VII of the Charter must be avoided by all means. The representative added that consolidation of peace after conflict required enormous efforts and endorsed the active involvement of the UN in postconflict peace building. This task should, however, be implemented in a fair and an equitable manner, as there was evidence that certain conflicts were relegated to the end of the list, and others were unduly given preferential treatment. Moreover, the international efforts should be in line with the will of the country concerned, and priority attention should be given to the most pressing needs, funding, and technical assistance for rehabilitation and development. Here the full potential of the UN system should be brought to bear on the delivery of these critical services in economic development and adequate material and financial assistance. The representative from the Russian Federation addressed the Council as the second speaker. Invoking the fundamental norms of the UN Charter as a binding guideline for the Council, the representative underlined his delegation’s unwavering conviction that force should only be used under extreme circumstances, as a last resort. He further pointed out that enforcement operations could only be launched through a Council decision and under the tight operational control of the Council. Against this background, the representative expressed grave misgivings about ongoing North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) attempts to draw up a new strategic concept that would permit taking enforcement actions based on its assessment and sidestepping the Council. This tendency would destroy the entire international system, which was founded on the primacy of the UN and on international law. The representative further stressed the need to strengthen the UN role in peacekeeping. Here his delegation supported efforts to enhance the UN’s potential

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in the area of rapid response and to expand the resource base for peacekeeping operations. While the practice of postconflict peace building raised many serious questions, it had become clear in recent years that without effective efforts in this area it would be impossible to reliably establish necessary conditions for the nonresumption of conflicts. He proposed a list of peace-building tasks, such as disarmament and the demobilization and reintegration into peaceful life of armed parties in conflicts and de-mining, and he mentioned that those and others were sometimes included in the mandates of multifunctional peacekeeping operations under Council auspices. In this fashion, a smooth transition from peacekeeping to peace building had been gained, but he remarked that postconflict peace building represented a fully independent aspect of the complex peacekeeping strategy and usually entailed the implementation of large-scale, long-term, and often expensive projects, exceeding the bounds of peacekeeping operations. These new tasks addressing social, economic, and humanitarian concerns fell largely within the sphere of competence of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the specialized agencies of the UN system that must work closely with other international financial, economic, and humanitarian organizations to advance the peacebuilding agenda. In this connection, the Russian delegate made mention of the Charter-based relationships between the Council and the other organs, including the General Assembly, and suggested that the key economic, social, and humanitarian priorities should be handled in that inter-organ network of relationships. Pointing to the recent prominence of internal destabilizing crises, the US representative referred to the highly unusual new assignments given to UN peacekeeping missions, for example, providing security, monitoring police, preparing for elections, and monitoring for human rights, and he also mentioned that the composition of these missions involved increasingly civilian personnel, among them especially noteworthy large numbers of civilian police. He saw here the stepless transition from peacekeeping to peace building and indicated that this link needed to be better understood and managed. He identified three sets of concerns: the division of labor between peacekeeping and peace building, resources, and coordination. Elaborating on these concerns, the US representative emphasized the equivalence of funds provided for peacekeeping and peace building and the need for effective and tight coordination among UN system representation in the field and interaction with heads of government, financial institutions, and private sector and nongovernmental organizations in the pursuit of the large-scale, peace-building mandates. Taking the floor in the last month of a two-year term as a nonpermanent Council member, the representative from Costa Rica used the occasion to deliver a principal address on the given agenda item. He opened his statement with an explicit acknowledgment of the timeliness of the president’s initiative in view of the fact that a wide-ranging discussion of postconflict peace building had become


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essential to its basic function of maintaining international peace and security. Looking back at the developments since 1989, the representative argued that peace building had become a deep-rooted concept with sufficient juridical and political legitimacy that warranted the attention of the UN and particularly of the Council. In a systematic analysis, the Costa Rican representative proposed that peace building was part of a set of realities and a link in the long chain of the maintenance of international peace and security and presupposed that the military phase of an armed conflict had already been brought to its end. Truly effective peace building required solid agreements of lasting peace. The commitment of the conflict parties had to be genuine. Further, agreements must include effective efforts at political and diplomatic negotiations, as multilateral organizations have proven to be the ideal forums for addressing and overcoming these crises (e.g., in Central America, Namibia, and Mozambique). The acknowledged need for comprehensive agreements had given rise to multidisciplinary involvement by the various elements of international organizations and by nongovernmental organizations. Summing up, the representative put forward a few points as “food for thought”: Peace building was a political concept within the broader perspective of the maintenance of international peace and security; peace building had to be viewed from an integral perspective; peace building, as an integral and integrating concept, required broad, multidisciplinary involvement by the international community; peace building required the acceptance and inclusion of specific areas for action by multilateral organizations on questions that were once reserved for domestic jurisdiction with respect to bolstering the state based on the rule of law; and peace building also required the acceptance of special treatment for societies that had recently overcome armed conflicts and had to reconstruct their basic infrastructure. These concepts should be incorporated into the agenda and practice of the UN and the Council in particular. The representative from France drew the line from the initial mentioning of peace building in “An Agenda for Peace” in 1992 through the Council endorsement in April 1993 and the resumption of the consideration of this fundamental new norm in September 1998 in connection with the SG report on Africa [S/1998/318] and setting forth three major categories of peace-building activities. These included, first, the strengthening of confidence and national reconciliation, which frequently covered the return and reintegration of refugees, the demobilization and reintegration of combatants, and the development of dialogue between the former parties to the conflict, as well as respect for human rights; second, economic reconstruction often containing humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation or establishment of economic and social infrastructure, incorporating the educational system and de-mining; and, third, the recreation of political institutions with the intent to achieve good governance through free and democratic elections and the reconstruction and strengthening of state structures

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in such sectors of sovereignty as justice and the police. Recent experiences had demonstrated that there was also a need to attach specific importance to appropriate disarmament measures. Special mention was made of the welcome decision of the SG to focus on the problem of light weapons and small-caliber weapons and their illegal trafficking, especially in Africa. These ideas led the French representative to stress once again the need to anticipate at the outset of conceiving of a peacekeeping operation the peacebuilding activities to follow so that the member states obtained a general overview and developed ideas of the necessary financing. Warning about three stumbling blocks in engaging in peace building, the delegate concluded his assessment with the basic advice that the activities of peace building had to be taken into account and planned for in advance by the Council. The representative from Portugal recalled his delegation’s first presidency in April 1997 when it raised the issue of peace building in a peacekeeping context. Although it had recommended at that time a discussion of the Council on this linkage, based on valuable work done by Germany in helping to define problematic areas, it was not possible to hold the discussion then. Therefore, his delegation wholeheartedly welcomed the realization of this fundamental debate during the present meeting, which would help the UN trace major lines of current thinking on the interplay between peace-building activities and the immediate task of maintaining or restoring international peace and security. Offering a comprehensive listing of activities under the label “peace building,” the delegate mentioned the example of Mozambique and the work of the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) as the best illustration in recent years of the multidimensional bundle of relevant activities. He underscored that peace building was essential already in the peacekeeping phase, as it was postconflict but not postpeacekeeping, thereby assuring that the transitional gap between the withdrawal of peacekeepers and the effective functioning of development activities addressing the long-term causes of conflict would be bridged. He greeted with pleasure the increased attention given to the important dynamic of these complex peace operations by the SG, who played a key role in ensuring the effective coordination on the ground of all of the activities of the various components of the operations so that they functioned in a complementary fashion, thereby contributing to the consolidation of the peace process. He furthermore spoke about the recent emergence of an appropriate division of labor with regional organizations, as foreseen in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, and he welcomed this new relationship promoting more successful peace building around the world. The representative from Brazil approached the role of the Council in peace-building matters somewhat reluctantly as it seemed to distract the Council from its central function under the Charter. Like other speakers, he also thought that other UN organs should be brought into these engagements accord-


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ing to their respective appropriate competencies. While the impact of the Agenda for Peace putting forth a new vision of world system founded on justice and democracy, with the UN Charter at its center, should be recognized, it had become clear that at the end of the millennium, in-depth reflection was needed to draw all lessons from the past period of intense Council activity. The representative stressed that in view of the perplexing changes in the international system it was fundamental to preserve the Council’s authority to act in the maintenance of peace and security, which was to be seen as the litmus test for innovative ideas and policies. At a time of transition, true multilateralism on a global scale remained the best model for international cooperation in the future. In this connection, the Brazilian delegate referred to the report Words to Deeds, dealing with the issue of the UN enforcement capabilities, and endorsed the conclusions of the international panel reaffirming the primacy of the Council and viewing the use of force only as the last resort and to be done through multilateral means. Referring to numerous actions of doubtful conformity with existing rules, the representative from Brazil stated uneasiness regarding overt violations of sanctions regimes or armed interventions by regional actors with Council authorization, and he emphasized that such enforcement interventions lacked moral authority and could not find world opinion approval. The delegate also expressed concern about the absence of a satisfactory intergovernmental mechanism for dealing with countries coming out of conflict. He praised efforts by the SG and lauded the explicit reference by the SG to Article 65 as a basis for better coordination between the Council and ECOSOC in dealing with many of the new situations that had been placed on the Council’s agenda. In these cases, economic rehabilitation and reconstruction constituted the tasks facing governments and civil society, for which significant international assistance, beyond the Council’s capacity, was needed. In light of its recent experience, the Council should return to a simple and direct approach to its responsibilities and focus on three broad areas: (1) diplomacy, or what was called “pacific settlement of disputes” in Chapter VI; (2) the establishment of parameters for peacekeeping operations; and (3) the question of enforcement, wherein the importance of harmony between regional initiatives and the universal collective security regime should be underlined and, as regarding postconflict situations, the Council should develop approaches permitting a gradual disengagement of the Council and a progressive engagement of other intergovernmental deliberative agencies. Citing the increased involvement of the Council in issues of postconflict peace building, the representative from Slovenia expressed special appreciation to the Council president for scheduling this debate. He viewed the link between peace building and the maintenance of international peace and security as obvious, as he emphasized that peace and security would not be fully ensured without establishing durable peace after a military conflict. He defined peace as more

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than the absence of active military conflict and described it as the necessary minimum of political stability and security to be achieved through postconflict peace-building activities. As an example of an unrealized peace, he picked the case of Angola, where after tentative steps toward peace matters deteriorated due to nonimplementation of relevant commitments by the National Union for the Total Independency of Angola (UNITA). This bitter experience documented the importance of total international devotion in promoting peace-building measures. The truth of that assessment was supported by the arguments proposed in “An Agenda for Peace” by the SG. In subsequent remarks, the Slovenian representative turned specifically to mine action consisting of de-mining, assistance to mine victims and the creation of mine awareness in the public at large, as a priority in peace building. Another set of priorities related to the need to strengthen peace through justice and protection of human rights. This line of action might even involve retributive justice as an ingredient of peace building. A third important task related to institution building, which had been part of several operations recently authorized by the Council. These and other peace-building activities should engage all relevant UN organs and agencies as partners in a cooperative manner, specifically the ECOSOC and also the General Assembly. The representative from Kenya explicitly endorsed a wide-ranging comprehensive understanding of postconflict peace building and argued that the relevant activities were within the proper scope and mandate of the Council because they, like all other Council functions, had the same objective of preventing conflict. Following several more interventions by Council members, all responding favorably to the suggested link between peace building and peace and security, the president, speaking in his capacity as representative of Bahrain, expressed his appreciation at hearing such valuable thoughts in the Council meeting and reiterated his strong conviction that the Council should continue this dialogue about this most important topic. Postconflict peace building called for intensified efforts to address the root causes of conflicts. Mentioning main components of peace building, the president underlined the time factor and urged that no time be lost between peacekeeping and peace building. He also stressed that peace building required solid foundations for development. The multidimensional process of peace building called for tremendous efforts and effective coordination by the international community. The suspended 3,954th meeting scheduled for 3 p.m. on the same day was actually held a week later, on 23 December 1998, at 3:30 p.m., due to an unforeseen crisis relating to the situation in Iraq. The resumed session offered the opportunity to non-Council members to take part in this first exchange on the key question of the interrelationship between peace and security and postconflict peace building. While the main positive tenor was largely maintained during this


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long second session, a few statements will be looked at more closely in order to measure the specific level of agreement among member states on the issue itself and on its practical implications for UN organs and agencies. This review will help put the issue into the wider context of the Council’s involvement with themes and issues foreshadowing the likely evolution of the body and its articulations in the future. Opening the deliberations, the representative from Canada recalled the 1996 peace-building initiative by his government, which served the purpose of supporting local endeavors to build durable peace in conflict areas. The objective was to aid and supplement peacekeeping efforts through active diplomacy, by setting up coalitions with governmental and nongovernmental partners, and by making carefully targeted funding available for innovative peace-building projects. The government of Canada learned from this initiative that effective peace building must encompass the security of individuals, including that of women and children. After conflict, people required a basis upon which to rebuild their lives and renew hope for the future. The Canadian delegate remarked in this connection that peace building was not the exclusive province of the Council, but the Council had to play a crucial role in seeing to peacekeeping mandates anticipating, to the extent possible, the needs of postconflict peace building and reconstruction. The mandates should incorporate provisions: to deal with the issue of antipersonnel land mines in activities geared toward reconstruction; to address disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants, including child soldiers; and to counteract the destabilizing impact of small arms. Following these suggestions, the delegate invoked the urgent requirement for full engagement and coordination of other UN agencies and programs, as well as the international financial institutions, bilateral aid programs, international NGOs, and the private sector to ensure the attainment of a sustainable and lasting peace. Nevertheless, the main burden of the responsibility for reconstruction and reconciliation in conflicted societies fell upon the countries themselves emerging from violent conflict. The special representatives of the secretary-general could play a pivotal role by encouraging effective collaboration among the various stakeholders in a given country. Moreover, the peace-building efforts must include attention to the fundamental human rights of conflict victims in the attempt to overcome the culture of impunity. Summing up, the representative reiterated once again the fundamental responsibility of the Council in the maintenance of peace and security and underscored the Council’s role as catalyst for the efforts of the international community to build genuine and lasting peace. The representative from Egypt began with the reference to the fundamental purpose of the maintenance of international peace and security and held that while the Council had only in a few cases made use of the Charter provisions

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allowing the use of military force, there were more instances where peacekeeping operations were set up; still these operations had proven not to completely satisfy peace-building requirements. Peace building as a process required the UN to play an integrated, multifaceted, and more action-oriented role so the goal of political and economic stability could be reached. The importance of peace building had been emphasized by former SG Boutros-Ghali in “An Agenda for Peace” and the subsequent “Supplement to an Agenda for Peace,” and the Council had responded in several presidential statements to the SG report. Efforts within the GA to further develop and refine this new concept were thwarted in 1997 due to one delegation’s opposition to the formulation that the GA had the key role in postconflict peace building. The Egyptian representative added that his government saw an integral relationship between maintenance of international peace and security, on the one hand, and peace building, on the other. The Council could play a strong, supportive role to the primary role of the GA in peace-building activities. His delegation saw here a smooth transition from peacekeeping operations, under the Council’s premises, to postconflict peace building under GA supervision. In principle, the UN should remain the focal point for both facilitating and coordinating peace-building activities, with the help of outside actors such as the World Bank and other institutions. Speaking on behalf of the European Union and the associated countries, the representative from Austria described the evolution from UN peacekeeping to multifaceted peace building, which demonstrated the UN’s potential to meet new demands. To respond to these difficult challenges, the UN required an integrated, coordinated approach with regard to a variety of actions addressing the many factors of conflicts. In this regard, the delegate praised specifically the strategic framework concept developed by the Administrative Committee on Coordination, which offered a foundation for coherent strategies to handle all aspects of external support for countries in conflict. He further referred to the initiative “Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures” initiated by one EU member state and cosponsored by all fifteen EU members, integrating a wide variety of aspects from disarmament to peacekeeping matters, and thus lending assistance to conflict resolution and postconflict rehabilitation. The Austrian delegate further remarked that international peace and security currently had to signify much more than the mere absence of war between states, and suggested that peace, security, sustainable development, human rights, and good governance were interdependent, and that contemporary crises were mostly intrastate, triggered by a range of factors, including social, ethnic, or religious strife, the violation of human rights, poverty, inequitable distribution of resources, environmental degradation, large-scale migration, organized crime, and terrorism. While these conditions demanded strong measures, peace build-


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ing entailed projects and programs with long-term stabilization as the goal, significant for nonviolent situations, including postconflict situations. He referred here to conclusions adopted on 30 November the same year, by the Council of the EU restating inter alia that the EU approach to peace building, conflict prevention, and resolution should be extended from the African continent to all developing regions, and that full use should be made of the potential of development cooperation to promote peace, democracy, and stability. This demonstrated the proactive policy of the EU on conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and peace building. He then took up the complications arising in attempts to address the root causes of violent conflicts in the pursuit of postconflict peace building and listed the priorities of the EU in this regard. Protecting human rights and promoting transparency and accountability in public administration were, as stressed by the SG, prerequisites for building peace and promoting development. Here he drew the Council’s attention to a recent EU resolution emphasizing the involvement of several organizations and their member states in complementary and mutually supportive contributions. Offering a few practical thoughts on peacekeeping and peace building, the Austrian delegate pointed out that modern peacekeeping provided an indispensable basis for further peace-building efforts: The start and continuation of peacebuilding programs depended on the presence of peacekeeping operations, and similarly, ongoing effective peace building could provide for conditions for peacekeeping missions to wind down and be completed once peace had become sustainable. The EU felt that there was no comprehensive peace-building design, and that it might not even be useful seeking to define it. Furthermore, the EU members supported the SG’s view that peace building did not replace ongoing humanitarian relief and development in countries emerging from crisis but aimed at building on or reorienting such activities with a view to reducing the risk of a resumption of conflict and helping to promote reconciliation, reconstruction, and recovery. Peace-building measures would have to be shaped and implemented accordingly. Taking a much more critical stance on the issue of peace building than most of the other speakers in this debate, the representative from India started out asserting a far-reaching lack of agreement on the concept of peace building and further demanded that the GA should be assigned the key role for postconflict peace building, as strongly endorsed by the NAM summit in Durban. It followed in his government’s opinion that the Council should not mandate peacebuilding activities until the GA had laid down policy on peace building through universal intergovernmental deliberations. Comparing the Council to a home ministry in a national government, exercising an “enlightened policing function,” but not mandated to launch economic and social programs required for the longterm cure, he argued that the Council was a purely political body. Its blueprint

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for peace would either reflect the ideology of dominant members or amount to a hodgepodge where conflicting views had to be reconciled. He juxtaposed to this confusion the definition of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, in 1997, which identified three core needs essential to peace building, namely, security, well-being, and justice. Of these, the Council, in India’s judgment, could legitimately address the first. He then cited the commission’s view on the three main sources of insecurity, which were the nuclear threat, the possibility of conventional war, and internal violence, and then proposed that since the permanent members of the Council were the ones possessing and refining the nuclear arsenals, they would not be capable to formulate any conception of true peace building. Continuing his critical analysis, the delegate of India wondered what development paradigm the Council members would follow in defining and promoting well-being. The imposition by the UN, on the Council’s instructions, of a particular paradigm would not only be resented, but it could exacerbate economic and social tensions and lead to a new cycle of violence. Biased aid would fuel conflict and not build peace. Touching upon the attack launched against Iraq during the previous week, the Indian delegate stated that this unilateral action by some SC members raised fundamental problems that had to be addressed. It appeared beyond a doubt that the views of the international community about peace in Iraq and its neighborhood did not find the deserved receptivity among the Council members. This situation could have two possible consequences: either the Council would be unable to act, or its action would not conform to the situation or to the wishes of the international community. A further risk was the continuing danger of the Council being bypassed on the grounds that its authorization was not needed. Looking further at the validity or usefulness of sanctions against Iraq, the Indian representative suggested that the sanctions, used in Iraq as tools for peace building, to disallow the regime stockpiles or the production of weapons of mass destruction, at the same time clearly thwarted the objective of peace building (i.e., failed to meet the needs of the affected populations). Here the Council was again challenged to assert its authority and take practical decisions on sanctions that would truly build peace, or it might find impaired its ability to lead the international community. The reports by UN agencies about the humanitarian effects of sanctions made clear that the Council needed closure with both Council resolutions and the human dignity of the people of Iraq. In summary, the Indian delegate called upon the Council to carry out responsibilities with a critical bearing on peace building in regions of conflict and to avoid being suspected of serving agendas other than international peace and security. The first phase of the deliberations about the link of peace building with international peace and security, which brought together many speakers from outside the Council to take part in this basic review, offered once more strong


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proof of the Council’s readiness and eagerness to address fundamental issues of legal and conceptual significance and to undertake these debates in public sessions removing the screens of secrecy from some of its proceedings. The positive reaction by most member states was clearly expressed in the unanimous praise for the Council president’s initiative to conduct a series of public meetings. It also offers an illustration of the Council’s nearly systematic endeavor to take up a full set of priorities and new challenges in dealing with the political and legal necessities of a rapidly changing world. While some of the new thematic considerations overlap to a certain degree with questions previously examined, one can notice clearly that the new knowledge gained constitutes more than the insights acquired in earlier instances. Thus the capacity for learning and adjustment is very striking in the pursuit of these types of issues in the Council’s work. Following the two extended meetings on 16 and 23 December 1998, the Council members met again in consultations and sought to find a consensus base on which to formulate its position on the new agenda item. As a result of these consultations, the Council briefly met at the 3,961st meeting on 29 December 1998, to continue the consideration and to allow its president to make a lengthy statement on its behalf (S/PRST/1998/38), in which the Council inter alia reaffirmed its primary responsibility under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security; stressed the need to prevent the resurgence or escalation of conflict; encouraged the SG to explore the possibility of establishing postconflict peace-building structures as part of efforts by the UN system to achieve a lasting peaceful solution to conflicts, including to ensure a smooth transition from peacekeeping to peace building and lasting peace; agreed with the SG that relevant postconflict peace-building elements should be explicitly and clearly identified and could be integrated into the mandates of peacekeeping operations; noted that peacekeeping operations might include military, police, humanitarian, and other civilian components; and requested the SG to make recommendations to the Council to the effect whenever appropriate and make recommendations to the appropriate UN bodies concerning the transitional period to the postconflict peace-building phase when recommending the final drawdown of a peacekeeping operation. At the 4,020th meeting on 8 July 1999, the Council resumed the consideration of the item entitled “Maintenance of peace and security and post-conflict peace-building,” focusing on the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants in a peacemaking environment. In the chair as president was the foreign minister of Malaysia, whose delegation had prepared this round of deliberations on the agenda item. The Council decision to consider specifically the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants affected the conduct of the debate and the depth of attention giving the lengthy proceedings of the 4,020th meeting and of the resumed 4,020th meeting an atmosphere of life

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and reality and introduced into the discussion numerous country-specific case histories of either succeeding or failing postconflict endeavors to return former soldiers to a civilian existence. In that sense, the second phase in the treatment of the agenda item was quite distinct from the first more abstract line of argumentation. The debate was opened by the deputy secretary-general, who offered an overview of the urgency of the question at hand and of suitable responses and techniques dealing with the notorious and vexing problem. She mentioned the sharp increase in internal conflicts and the easy availability of light arms, including land mines to be used in these violent situations. The situation was further exacerbated by the conscription of child soldiers in many parts of the third world. In view of this complexity and volatility, the task of helping afflicted countries find the path of peace presented an enormous challenge. Within this task, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration were distinct, but overlapping, and had to be viewed as part of an integrated peace-building process. Although the UN had been mandated to undertake disarmament in peacekeeping operations in Africa, Central America, South East Asia, and the Balkans, some general insights could be garnered from these diverse experiences. These related to the meaning of disarmament, the respective responsibilities for the disarmament of civilians, the effect of buyback programs in accelerating the return of weapons, the need for gainful employment for demobilized combatants, and the long duration of reintegration processes. She appealed to Council members to consider several critical concerns to ensure success in these endeavors. The disposal of arms and ammunition should be included within peace agreements. Predictable financing was critical, including other sources than just voluntary contributions. The special needs of child soldiers, among them girl soldiers, should be seen as a crucial element of peacekeeping mandates; here the Council could play a very special role in authorizing future operations. Furthermore, follow-on political missions to be deployed after the termination or withdrawal of a peacekeeping operation could be useful to avoid setbacks and relapses into insecurity. Last, but not least, a rigorous media and publicity campaign should educate and mobilize popular support for this element in peace-building activities. Taking the floor as the first Council member, the representative from Bahrain who had convened the first round of meetings on this issue began his statement praising the Malaysian delegation for bringing the important question of disarmament and reintegration into the society of ex-combatants before an open Council meeting. Addressing the obstacles on the way to a peaceful and largely disarmed world, the representative lamented over the increase in illegal weapons flows in recent years and made weapons exporters responsible for the exacerbation of conflicts seeking UN engagement to reduce through sanctions and other means the incidence of small arms and light weapons, especially in


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Africa. He applauded strongly the growing role of the UN in peacekeeping as well as in peace building and endorsed especially the intention to set up peacekeeping forces in Haiti and in Guinea-Bissau. Turning to the issue of disarmament of ex-combatants and their reintegration into society, the delegate of Bahrain divided this process into separate but complementary sequences, first the disarmament and second the reintegration. This order of priority resulted from the frequent realization that ex-combatants will not reintegrate unless they have abandoned their weapons and have no access to them. Mentioning the attention of the media to the role of child soldiers, the disarmament process was decisive to wean ex-soldiers from their use of the weapons and to guide them securely on the path to full reintegration into their societies. He regretted that the UN, for all of its efforts, had only rarely succeeded in these difficult assignments, evidently due to its inability to deal with the huge power of the arms trade to exacerbate ongoing conflicts and incite new ones. In view of the significance of the open debate on this issue, his delegation supported the presidential statement proposed by the Malaysian delegation for issuance at the end of the debate. The representative of the UK expressed concern, in regard to the crisis in Sierra Leone, that half measures would do little to contribute to lasting peace. He hoped that the results of the Council’s debate on the issue of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration would be tested in concrete action in a possible deployment in Sierra Leone. Following this line of thinking, the delegate spelled out a few priorities for effective action. First, high priority must be given to this aspect in peace agreements. Second, effective international coordination was essential. Third, these programs must be well funded and custom tailored to the specific society. Fourth, the specific problem of child soldiers had to be addressed. Fifth, collected weapons had to be stored securely. Sixth, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration would not be effective if new weapons were flowing into the target area. On reintegration, the last and most complex part of that peace-building process, the UN experience was mixed. The successful case of Mozambique and the failure of Angola were the best instances of that difference in outcome. The representative from the Russian Federation also paid much attention to the complexities of this important process. The debate confirmed the relevance of the disarmament of ex-combatants and the collection and destruction of their weapons as conditions for normalizing regional crisis situations. The representative warned against taking good decisions on paper without ever implementing them and referred to the grave effects of failed efforts in Angola where UNITA was the main culprit in ruining the chance of the peace accord by failing to carry out its commitments under the agreement. Another example of potential failure was the Kosovo situation where the Kosovo Liberation Army

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was not demobilizing fast enough and where the Kosovo Force (KFOR) NATO contingents were not moving ahead on the matter, but Russia stood ready to ensure the success of the mandated operation. Yet another example was the situation in Tajikistan. Here, the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) was obligated under the peace accord to disarm and dismantle its military units. The UN observer team could have played a more active role. It was clear that the whole process needed to be carefully monitored by the UN team, and that adequate financial and material support was required in order to complete the transition. He agreed with previous speakers, that disarming and demobilizing ex-soldiers was intimately linked to the uncontrolled spread of small arms and light weapons, and proposed that arms embargo regimes imposed by the Council should be strengthened. In view of the Malaysian submission, he felt that the focus of the debate was on implementing the principles and approaches without allowing violations of Council resolutions. The representative from Slovenia emphasized that ending the diverse conflicts of recent years represented a major challenge in the maintenance of peace and security and spoke emphatically about the difficulty of transitioning from a state of war to a situation of peace. Fully aware of the urgency of progress in this field, he quoted Erasmus, who explained in 1508 that “the most disadvantageous peace is better than the most just war.” The maxim of the European philosopher was relevant and pointed out that the struggle for the basic values of humanity began when the war had ended. Building on this insight, the representative argued that postconflict activities often started on the basis of an imperfect peace. Still, the steps mentioned, including those related to child soldiers, should be pursued. He talked about the successful operations in Mozambique and all of the details needed to bring about the completion of that peace-building process. Mine action was one of the elements of this multifaceted operation, a cause of great significance and requiring much more attention legally and politically. He addressed the question that the objective of demobilization and disarmament was the restoration of normality and the reintegration of all segments of society. To achieve a stable peace without impunity, the prosecution of perpetrators was necessary. A particular priority in the reintegration process had to be given to children, in particular, to child soldiers, who suffered devastating consequences in contemporary armed conflict. Concluding his statement, the delegate from Slovenia drew the Council’s attention to the general need to curb illicit arms trafficking, including the spread of small arms, and pointed to important contributions in this area from the UN Disarmament Commission and from regional efforts pursued by the Organization of American States (OAS), the EU, and the OAU. Deploring the tragic fact of the modern time, that in many places where it was impossible to find food, education, or health care, it was easy to find machine guns, grenades, and antipersonnel mines, the representative from Argentina


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warned that if this trend continued, hope for development, peace, and growth would vanish in many countries. He made weak governments, economic uncertainty, lack of security, and abuse of minorities responsible for conflicts within states, but he added that access to substantial quantities of small arms and light weapons was the common element giving rise to armed conflict. War thus had become a way of life for combatants. He argued that consideration of the issue before the Council required reexamination of the concept of security and the ways of making it a reality. While the UN Charter spoke about the need to maintain international peace and security, in the current context there was no doubt that the focus was on maintaining the security of the human being. Human security and peace building, broadly defined, were complementary concepts: strengthening democratic institutions, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, good governance, and sustainable development were prerequisites for achieving human security. He further suggested that the proliferation of small arms constituted a threat to human security in general and to those societies seeking to rehabilitate themselves. Applauding the initiative of the presidency, the Argentine delegate underscored the importance of restoring the confidence and well-being of the societies affected and viewed disarmament, demobilization, and the reintegration of ex-combatants as a step in the right direction. In conclusion, he emphasized once more that peace making, peacekeeping, and peace building were vital, interrelated elements of the building of a lasting peace that would ensure human security in all societies. Invoking the message of the president’s aide-memoire in preparation for the Council meeting, the representative from Brazil cited the suggestion that the Council was to address the subject of the culture of violence and intimidation brought about in the numerous internal conflicts in the post-cold war period. Those conflicts indeed thrived in an environment where small arms and light weapons were readily available, a matter that the Council had addressed in connection to the SG report on the causes of conflict . . . in Africa. He also recalled the presidential statement (S/PRST/1998/38), which was issued after the open debate held in December 1998 on the same agenda item entitled “Maintenance of peace and security and post-conflict peace-building,” calling for close cooperation and dialogue between relevant bodies of the UN system. In this connection, he referred to the highly pertinent guidelines on conventional arms control/limitations and disarmament adopted by consensus at the 1999 substantive session of the Disarmament Commission, which contained practical measures relating to the collection, control, disposal, and destruction of arms—especially small arms and light weapons—and the demobilization and integration of former combatants, and he urged the Council to avail itself of this important contribution. His delegation fully endorsed a comprehensive conception encompassing disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration as steps

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toward promoting peace, prosperity, and stability, and he stressed that this process could not be carried out successfully without the solid commitment by the parties involved, supplemented by the support of the international community, in particular, of the ECOSOC. The impact of such remedial steps explained the success in peace building in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Mozambique, and their lack condemned Angola to fall back into renewed violence and combat. The delegation of Brazil joined the other SC members in inviting the SG’s observations and recommendations on this important subject matter within a period of six months. Affirming his delegation’s strong interest in the subject matter before the Council, the representative from France used the Guinea-Bissau case to illustrate that it was not sufficient to recover and to stock the weapons, but that it was necessary to actually destroy them to prevent their being used again. For that reason, Council decisions should contain explicit provisions along these lines, and peace agreements should similarly commit the parties to such a radical approach. The destruction of these weapons should go hand in hand with the effective reabsorption of ex-soldiers into civil life. Moreover, the international community should extend help in restructuring the armed forces in order to avoid the return of the militias and in providing economic assistance to rebuild a stable and vibrant society. The validity of this general approach of peace building could be demonstrated by considering a good number of recent internal conflicts that had managed to enter a path of healing and rebuilding with effective external aid, and others, that had incurred total failure and severe setbacks due to the unwillingness and ineptness of repairing the societal structures. This overview contained both Angola as the blatant failure and Kosovo as the current challenge, documenting the enormous difficulties in designing and implementing successful peace building. Joining the other delegations in applauding the Malaysian initiative, the US representative began by restating the truism that the political will of the parties in conflict to abide by a peace agreement and disarm could not be overemphasized and mentioned the case of Angola as the glaring example of a potential success turned into failure. Touching upon several other contemporary cases on all continents, he stressed the crucial role of effective disarmament and demobilization and made mention of valuable reflection and action from various UN bodies and departments. He agreed with other speakers that attention to the problem of small arms and light weapons was long overdue and reported about the recent US initiative, through the secretary of state, for an international convention against illicit trafficking of these weapon categories. He shared with the Council his delegation’s view that a distinction should be made between disarmament and demobilization, clearly under the Council’s purview, and postconflict peace building or development, falling into a gray area between relief and


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development, which involved inter alia ECOSOC and some of its subsidiary bodies. Mentioning specifically the child soldier problem in today’s armed conflicts and using the Sri Lanka case, he urged inclusion of this issue in UN deliberations and operations. At the end of the morning session of the 4,020th meeting, the president, in his capacity as foreign minister of Malaysia, addressed the Council. He started out underlining his country’s belief that the Council should not be preoccupied with the specific conflict situations on its agenda but should, from time to time, take up thematic issues or get orientation briefings on crosscutting issues that would enable the Council to make decisions that would ultimately bring about positive results. The discussion of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants in a peacekeeping environment was a contribution to that thematic approach. Scanning the context of the recent international developments, the foreign minister acknowledged the global crisis of human suffering as a result of violent conflict and mass flight and displacement. The alarming use of child soldiers had further escalated the volatile condition requiring urgent and specific attention. Malaysia was fully aware that disarmament alone was not sufficient in these brutal confrontations and that effective demobilization of former soldiers and their timely and peaceful reintegration into society was decisive. To achieve this elusive goal, it was necessary to have both the full commitment of the parties and the strong support of the international community. Thinking of his own country’s lengthy struggle to fight insurgency and the financial cost involved, the foreign minister called upon colleagues and governments to strengthen the international efforts in that critical area and to make use of relevant contributions from other UN organs and member states. He encouraged the Council to engage in thematic deliberations on this issue on a regular basis and viewed the requested SG report as an important tool in the Council’s further discussions of these matters. The 4,020th meeting was resumed in the afternoon and offered the opportunity to the few remaining Council members and many invited states members from the wider UN membership to speak to the issue on the agenda. The first speaker was the representative from Namibia, who offered his country’s case as a successful example of postconflict peace building, despite the fact that the government, after nine years, was still dealing with challenges of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. Seeing ex-combatants as former enemies, the Namibian authorities had to be very persistent in pursuing the goals of rebuilding in spite of the counterproductive moves from that somewhat hostile faction. This situation made it absolutely essential to implement and coordinate the peace-building programs and pursue them with determination. For these reasons, the Namibian delegation underscored the president’s initiative and welcomed the much-needed debate on one of the most salient

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issues of peace building. Reciting a paragraph from the draft presidential statement, the delegate raised the question of what a secure and safe environment entailed and insisted that the exact opposite was the condition out of which conflict, hunger, and malnutrition emerged. He quoted extensively from the earlier report by the SG on the situation in Africa (A/52/871) in which the interlinked components of effective peace building had been detailed. Drawing again on the Namibian experience, he argued that employment for ex-combatants was a priority if postconflict stability was to be gained. He warned against premature withdrawal of a peacekeeping force as well as inadequate responses by the Council, which could delay and complicate postconflict stability. He concluded that peace building was a multidimensional problem that needed to be addressed in a comprehensive, impartial manner to succeed. The representative from China expressed the view that the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants would contribute to the implementation of peace agreements, the prevention of the recurrence of conflicts, and the maintenance of social stability. He emphasized that the UN should follow also in these activities the principles of noninterference in internal affairs and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. In cases without a legitimate government, measures should only be taken once a peace accord had been reached and the conflicting parties had pledged their support for these operations. Joining other delegations, the Chinese representative also supported the involvement of the numerous UN bodies, agencies, and departments in carrying out these tasks and drew attention to the pertinent guidelines for disarmament measures in postconflict situations, which had been adopted by the UN Disarmament Commission in April 1999. He also made mention of the centrality of the goal of development, the fulfillment of which would effectively address the root causes of conflict and war. The representative from Canada started from the core assumption that disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) was a key component of the human security dimension of peacekeeping operations. He welcomed that the Council was given an opportunity in this debate to issue clear, comprehensive guidelines grounded on the collaboration of bodies, agencies, and member states. He warned, as did the speakers before him, about the serious risk that if DDR failed, the situation might relapse into war and civil strife. Canada felt strongly that DDR should be in place from the beginning to the end of a mission of peacekeeping and peace building. He further proposed that the population most affected by the conflict had to play its part in the DDR mechanism and that local, national, and even regional capacities would be enhanced through their consultation, engagement, and participation in all aspects of the program. He recalled in this connection the effective cooperation between the UN, the OAS, and the parties to the Central American conflict. He then turned to the topic of the role and


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responsibilities of the Council and reiterated that the Council was indeed occupying the central position in matters relating to new peacekeeping operations, including DDR, for which clear regulations were required. He emphasized that ex-combatants had to feel secure before effective demobilization could begin. The Council might have to deploy civilian police, human rights observers, and military observers to do justice to the tremendous difficulty of that process. The success also necessitated that reintegration be placed into the center of operational concern and on the fundament of the rule of law, democracy, and human rights. Canada looked with great misgivings at the dreadful, unresolved problem of the child soldiers, for whom special provisions had to be made. The number of open questions and unresolved discussions established the urgent need for the comprehensive assessment by the SG, and the Canadian delegation fully shared with other Council members the desire for such a report from the SG. Following the statements of Council members, the representative from Finland, speaking on behalf of the EU and the associated Central and Eastern European countries, welcomed the Council’s debate on the DDR issue. She gave prominence to the EU’s distress about the growing involvement of child soldiers in the complex conflicts of recent years. She made reference to UN success in resolving several conflicts involving also DDR measures and to cases where the UN had not been successful, and she argued that both cases should be studied for lessons learned. Taking up the exacerbating presence of small arms and light weapons in many conflicts, she emphasized the EU’s contribution to this field and mentioned specifically a 1997 EU decision to set up a program for preventing and combating illicit trafficking in conventional arms. In pursuit of this program, the EU had begun to involve itself in arms collection, disposal, and destruction and was funding in particular such a project in Albania. In this connection, the relevant deliberations and decisions of the UN Panel of Government Experts on Small Arms deserved mentioning. The Finnish delegate also referred to the April 1999 consensus decision of the UN Disarmament Commission regarding conventional arms control/limitation and disarmament as major step forward and expressed interest in the work of the Lessons Learned Unit of the DPKO and welcomed initiatives of the group of interested states, which served as a forum for information exchange. Among the ongoing conflicts in the world, the EU was especially interested in the African emergencies and crises and was pursuing several separate initiatives to address DDR-related aspects. Another focal point for EU involvement was Central America, where activities had revolved around the successful reintegration of former soldiers into the economic and social life of their respective communities. Looking back over the whole complex issue area, the Finnish representative submitted several suggestions on behalf of the EU for the Council’s attention. First, the Council should include DDR properly in peace agreements. Second, it

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should make sure that enabling UN resolutions integrated DDR as part of a peacekeeping mandate, with adequate and proper implementation follow-up. Third, it should consider the DDR issue on a regular basis, together with the review of peacekeeping operations. Moreover, the Finnish representative added that DDR needed a third D, namely, development, and that the Council should endorse an integrated, proportionate approach to security and development. A key objective in such an approach had to be the rebuilding of the administrative capacity and infrastructure in a process of conversion from a culture of war to a culture of peace. The representative from Guatemala welcomed the opportunity in an open Council meeting to give a brief account of the DDR process in Guatemala. He provided an overview of the peace process and the involvement of parts of the UN to arrive at the outcome and to assist in implementing the transition process. A mixed Commission for Reintegration played an essential role in establishing the best possible conditions for incorporating opposition members into the life of the country and enabling them to exercise fully their legal rights and duties as citizens. This transition was completed with the official registration of the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union (URNG) opposition as a political party, which in alliance with three other parties would participate in the general elections scheduled for November 1999. He underlined the full success of the difficult transition process and the essential contribution by the UN in ensuring the hoped-for outcome of this tense period. The remainder of the resumed 4,020th meeting was taken up for further statements by non-Council states seeking to take part in the open discussion of a central concern in peace building. Among the speakers, most endorsed the Malaysian initiative and joined the previous speakers in stressing the critical impact of successful DDR measures on the long-term stability of war-torn societies. The debate was significantly enriched by several narratives on concrete cases involving UN participation and diverse outcomes that helped evaluate the fit of the DDR measures for the specific conflict situation. The statement by Mozambique was especially welcome, as it brought out crucial aspects of a very successful transition process and the ensuing political stability of the country. Similarly, the representatives from El Salvador and Croatia offered strong testimony about the work done on DDR for former fighters and their welcome return into their civilian communities. The representatives of Australia and New Zealand added their views on the evolution of the Papua New Guinea crisis and the obstacles incurred and breakthroughs achieved in moving this troubled community to a condition of strengthening peace and social harmony. Each speaker tried to draw lessons from what had happened or what they had been able to observe so that at the end of the afternoon session a wide range of constructive viewpoints and recommendations had been brought out into the open and thereby strengthened the impact of the presidential statement, drafted in consultations prior to the meeting and


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revised and amended in the course of the actual deliberations, which was formally adopted and issued at the 4,021st meeting on 8 July 1999, following directly after the adjournment of the long, open 4,020th meeting. The presidential statement (S/PRST/1999/21) was an unusually long one, encompassing the large number of specific insights and conclusions that had emerged out of the prior consultations and the elaborate public discussion and were incorporated into the body of resolutions and decisions of the Council. Summarizing the text succinctly, the Council inter alia emphasized that in order to achieve settlement, parties to a conflict must work toward the successful disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants, including child soldiers, whose special needs should be seriously addressed; noted with appreciation the serious efforts by the SG, UN bodies, member states, and other international and regional organizations aimed at developing general DDR principles and guidelines in a peacekeeping environment; underlined the need to address the issue on a regular basis; and requested the SG to submit to the Council, within a period of six months, a report containing his analysis, observations, and recommendations, in particular, those relating to principles and guidelines, as well as practices, experiences, and lessons learned, to facilitate its further consideration of the matter. Looking back at the first and second phase of the Council’s consideration of postconflict peace building and the maintenance of peace and security, it can be seen once again that in the treatment of thematic agenda items the learning capability of the Council as a collective policy-making body is quite remarkable. The depth of questioning and the critical quality of the dialogue in the second phase are noteworthy alone from the brief selective summary presented. The Council’s decision to seek recourse to an in-depth report requested from the SG also illustrates its wish to pursue the matter and to equip itself with the knowledge and acumen to judge more effectively in comparison the record of the numerous UN missions that have been deployed or will be dispatched in the future. Furthermore, the debates offer ample proof that the dynamic energy for the consideration of these complex questions and for clarification of the Council’s collective will stems not from the P-5 or from any one of them but apparently is oftentimes launched by nonpermanent Council members acting alone or in groups. This dispersion of the political will has been a long-standing pattern in the Council’s bearing and underlines frequently the advantage of its composition in its (admittedly inequitable) current membership. The pertinent fact, that the second phase was largely driven by a major Malaysian policy initiative, as the first round was initiated by the representative of Bahrain, who was certainly fully instructed by his home base on this move, proves the point about the highly uncertain and widely variable role of catalyst from within the Council membership. Having received the requested report of the SG on the role of UN peacekeeping in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (S/2000/101) on 11

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February 2000, the Council met on 23 March 2000, at its 4,118th meeting to take up the subject matter as planned. The detailed SG report offered a very comprehensive picture of the practices of UN peacekeeping and the significant developments and refinements UN involvement in postconflict situations had undergone. The SG’s account paid special attention to the grave problem of child soldiers and their rescue from the horrors of their servitude in the hands of bandits and illicit rebels and the clear need for subsequent efforts to return them to social healing and economic development. The SG illustrated much of his argumentation with relevant examples from UN field service and sought to deepen the impact of his reforming message. In the conclusion of the long report, the SG summarized his narrative and findings and suggested that UN operations might bring key advantages of impartiality, legitimacy, security, political momentum, and resources to a DDR process, and that past experience also highlighted the unique ability of a peacekeeping operation to coordinate simultaneous efforts in many different areas. More specifically, he indicated that if a process of DDR was to succeed, then the basis for it should be provided in a peace agreement, with the international community’s advocacy ensuring its inclusion. Further, he suggested that the disarmament process might require a provision of expertise and resources that would allow the peacekeeping operation to offer incentives to combatants, to undertake destruction of weapons, and to monitor and help control arms traffic in the region; it also might be necessary to focus upon the economic dimension of arms flows. He added with regard to demobilization that a review of past peacekeeping experience also showed the importance of a strong political role and ample resources for peacekeeping operations, including occasionally a deterrent capacity; furthermore, it had sometimes been useful to provide some funding within the assessed peacekeeping budget to allow this process to start. He continued that a peacekeeping operation might make direct contributions to reintegration and assist in fostering an appropriate political and socioeconomic framework; however, additional efforts were required to enhance the UN’s access to the skills and resources required in this regard; the peacekeepers’ ability in this respect could be strengthened through better institutional coordination within the international community. By promoting the inclusion of child protection within peace agreements and by integrating it, where appropriate, into the staffing and mandates of UN peacekeeping operations, the international community could amplify the response to the needs of children in the conflict area; but it was essential that donors adopt a holistic and long-term view of the demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers, which also included social healing and economic development: the measures included the provision of separate encampment for children, speedy family reunification, and long-term psycho-social assistance, with significant staffing and adequate resources; real progress would necessitate sustained political, moral, and financial support by both the secretariat and member states. The SG acknowledged that such forceful engagement


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placed enormous conceptual and practical demands on the international community, but he also noted that the community’s strong support for the DDR process was essential if it was to obtain real returns on its peace investment. He stressed as well that the principle of geographic consistency should be applied when considering the potential of peacekeeping operations to support DDR wherever they might occur. Finally, he underlined that the ultimate success of the DDR process might demand efforts long after the withdrawal of a UN operation and suggested that deployment of a follow-on mission might help support advances made. At other times, political missions, for which relevant skills covered expertise in legal issues, disarmament, human rights, and issues related to child soldiers, might achieve progress. He remarked in the end that the role of a peacekeeping operation in postconflict DDR was grounded in and fed into a broader search for peace and development. Within this framework, the international community could make a meaningful contribution to the success of a process of DDR. With this rich presentation of analysis, observations, and recommendations by the SG before the Council, it should not come as a surprise that the long public debate at the 4,118th and resumed 4,118th meeting did not go much beyond the scope of the SG’s submission. Throughout the hours of deliberations, the trend of the statements was to endorse fully the SG’s message and to reiterate several principal points reflecting the particular delegation’s political priorities. Nevertheless, the tenor of the statements was reflective of the period of debate and dialogue from the first round initiated by the delegate of Bahrain serving as president at the 3,954th meeting on 16 and 23 December 1998, through the 4,020th meeting on 8 July 1999, and reaching the deliberations of the 4,118th meeting and depicting the growth and depth of understanding that Council members and the interested member state representatives had demonstrated throughout. The SG’s report, based on the exchanges in Council debates, had been lifted to a level of analytical precision and circumspection, lending itself to the conceptual clarification in the Council process and to the operational application in the next postconflict situation to be taken up by the Council. Two main themes also stood out in the last round of declarations, the 4,118th meeting, namely, on the one hand, the malaise surrounding the intolerable problem of child soldiers, including especially the pressing pain and suffering inflicted upon underage girls and young women and, on the other, the general assessment that for the range of international tasks to be handled under DDR procedures the Council should reach out and involve to the fullest extent other UN organs and offices and appropriate regional counterparts in order to strengthen the joint effort, to intensify the pressure for compliance by the affected parties, and to augment the flow of financing to underwrite the significant costs of the multifaceted engagements in the field situations over the long time required to secure a final success in the process of DDR.

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This decision-making machinery of the Council has stood the test of time and has managed in this case to arrive at a conceptual clarity and policy relevance that flowed into the so far last articulation by the Council on the postconflict peace-building item, with special emphasis on the DDR process in peacekeeping and peace building, through another presidential statement (S/PRST/2000/10), made at the 4,119th meeting, following the end of the resumed 4,118th meeting on 23 March 2000. In this extensive commentary and response to the SG’s report, the Council welcomed the report, underlined that DDR of ex-combatants were mutually supportive, and that the success of the process was dependent on the success of each of its steps; stressed that the political commitment of the parties involved in a peace process was a precondition for the success of DDR programs; recognized that the mandates of peacekeeping missions increasingly included oversight of DDR as one of its functions; further recognized the importance of incorporating, as appropriate, within specific peace agreements, with the consent of the parties, and on a case-by-case basis within UN peacekeeping mandates, clear terms for the DDR of ex-combatants, including the safe and timely collection and disposal of arms and ammunition; welcomed the initiative of the SG to include within all peacekeeping operations personnel with appropriate training in international humanitarian, human rights, and refugee law, including child- and gender-related provisions; welcomed also the inclusion of a child protection advisor in some of the recent peacekeeping operations; and encouraged the SG to include such personnel in future operations, as appropriate. The selective summary of the presidential statement offers striking support for the full reception of the SG’s ideas by the Council and the translation of the newly gained insights into relevant legal provisions to guide future UN action, in particular, the bearings of the Council itself.

Conclusion The postconflict peace-building theme that dominated Council discussions during this period considered serves as yet another example of the remarkable adaptability of the Council as a body to new developments, insights, and exigencies in the handling of international crises in the post-cold war era. The learning capacity also emerges as noteworthy and demonstrates to the objective observer that the application of greatly refined and modified lessons in field operations happens at a fast clip and as a result of an open, focused policy process in the Council’s consultation process. Once again, we can demonstrate and document that the Council has displaced a keen sense of the challenges posed by the particular crisis at hand and has shaped its own response in a flexible, parsimonious manner.

Chapter Eight

The UN Security Council at Work Miscellaneous Thematic Issues

Humanitarian Aspects of Issues before the UN Security Council

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s the number of thematic issues before the UN Security Council is shrinking in this overview, the group of Council deliberations dealt with in the following segment combines three agenda items that were separately adopted but are thematically closely related as they cover central humanitarian matters taken up in the late 1990s by the Council. The wording of the three items differed from one another, but all treated the humanitarian agenda of the UN and its Council in a direct manner. These three sessions also were distinguished by the presence of high UN officials, whose task it was to update the knowledge of Council members and to enter into a dialogue with them so that their joint efforts could be promoted more effectively. These meetings, comparable to the hearing style known from democratic systems, responded thereby to the public demands for the Council to open its doors to interested member states and nongovernmental organizations and thus to enhance the transparency of the Council’s policy-making process as much as was feasible. The account of these timely meetings must, by necessity, be extremely brief, but this chapter will seek to convey the gist and principal findings or conclusions of these public sessions. The first meeting was convened by the Council on 21 January 1999, at the 3,968th meeting, and the item entitled “Promoting peace and security: Humanitarian activities relevant to the Security Council” was included in the Council’s agenda. The main partner for this meeting was the UN under-secretary-general for humanitarian affairs and emergency relief coordinator, Mr. Sergio Vieira de Mello, who opened the session with an extensive briefing on humanitarian

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activities relevant to the Council, in the context of promoting peace and security. In his presentation, he described human rights violations as a direct threat to peace and security and offered detailed suggestions on how to strengthen humanitarian assistance in these extremely difficult circumstances. The US representative showed strong support for the USG’s stance and endorsed a broad definition and mandate regarding assistance toward peace building. The representative from China also expressed support for humanitarian assistance but warned against politicizing humanitarian crises, using them for undue interference, and applying a double standard between the Yugoslav and African crises. He also showed a very cautious attitude toward the role of sanctions in the UN practice. Holding that the concept of peace and security was broader today and invoking justice, social well-being, and peace as fundamental human goals, the representative from Argentina argued that the Council should take up economic and social factors as much as political issues. He stressed that fieldwork in dangerous places should not be the victim of impunity, and that everything should be done to counteract such abuses. He complained especially that deliberate attacks were launched against civilian populations. The representative from Bahrain, who had been instrumental in launching the first meeting devoted to peace building, strongly endorsed the proximity and importance of peace and security to humanitarian assistance and emphasized in particular the need for protection of humanitarian workers and deplored the delay in UN efforts. Adamantly insisting upon exclusive Charter-based Council authority to authorize the use of force, the representative from the Russian Federation saw the Council’s role and the humanitarian role as separate and in need of coordination. He strongly criticized the recent trend to use force and to intervene in any country in a major humanitarian crisis and suggested that such use of force lacked legitimacy under the UN Charter. The representative from the Netherlands was impressed with the dominant role of humanitarian issues on the Council’s agenda and expressed great concern over the increase in attacks on humanitarian workers, as the number of violent conflicts had risen in the last decade. In his judgment, Rwanda showed that humanitarian action could not serve as a substitute for political action. He further offered in some detail a more integrated approach to crises and listed six steps to achieve a fully integrated approach. The representative from Canada saw the USG’s statement as pointing to the Council’s potential in measures to protect civilians in armed conflict. He used the Sierra Leone crisis as a case of the extreme harm suffered by individuals there and as a true microcosm of conceptual challenges in terms of protection. The

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safety and security of needy groups and relief was as important as the delivery of assistance. In his delegation’s view, the protection of civilians in armed conflict was a factor widening the dimensions of “security.” The representative from Namibia also expressed outrage that often women, children, and the elderly were especially targeted and deprived of their most basic right, the right to life. He was greatly disturbed that children were especially targeted by warring factions and deplored increased violence against relief workers. He appealed to the Council to discuss humanitarian activities in the proper context and pointed out that the ECOSOC was responsible for the technical aspects of humanitarian coordination. The representative from Slovenia pointed out the gap between the impressive body of humanitarian law and the ignorance, or deliberate violation, of the norms of humanitarian law. He felt that the Council had to be consistent in investigating and punishing crimes in order to prevent the prevalence of a culture of impunity. He agreed that contemporary conflicts produced very serious humanitarian consequences, and that the Council should pay special attention to the problem of child soldiers. He warned that humanitarian action was no substitute for political action. He recommended a focus on prevention, addressing a threat to peace at an early stage. He held that the Council must be able to distinguish between the genuine protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity of states and the use or abuse of these principles as quasi-justification for the commission of crimes against humanity and threats to international peace. The representative from the UK expressed wide-ranging agreement with the USG’s briefing and the tenor of the debate. He understood the accent placed on the effect of conflict on civilians. He wondered since the gulf between norms and respect for them was so wide, how the Council could ensure higher humanitarian standards and fulfill Charter obligations. He asked what the overriding priority was in that constellation. He emphasized the plight of children in armed conflict, the inadequate condition in many refugee camps, and the dangers surrounding relief workers. The representative from the Gambia pointed out that women and children, the most vulnerable groups, were targeted for physical elimination and abuse. The situation was even more difficult when the Council dealt with armed groups that had no regard for the sanctity of life. He underlined the need to stress access to and fight against impunity. The representative from Malaysia similarly underlined that the prevailing culture of impunity had to be brought to an end, and that violators of humanitarian law had to be brought to justice. The representative from France emphasized the reversal in casualties, from 90 percent among combatants to now 90 percent among innocent civilians. He stressed the fundamental principle of the protection of refugees and displaced

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persons, and he argued that humanitarian disasters leading to large flows of refugees and displaced persons threatened international peace and security. He posed the question to the USG of whether new standards of international law needed to be introduced in view of the fact that the civilian population had become the main target and victim, and that the distinction between civilians and combatants was becoming increasingly blurred. The president, speaking in his capacity as the representative from Brazil, offered a long, principal statement on the need for the Council to act on morality based on responsibility. Humanitarian interventions needed a political strategy. He warned against hastened recourse to force and to a biased perspective in regard to moral principles. The US representative remarked that in cases such as Kosovo or Iraq, the international community must be willing to act to protect civilians against the depredations of their own governments, and he deplored that arguments about sovereignty were used to excuse repression. In response to the focused and highly relevant statements by Council members, the USG summed up his presentation by calling for zero tolerance for violations of human rights and humanitarian law, and agreeing that there was no a priori need for new laws. It must be noted that in an exceptional manner the debate in that session did not usher in any sort of Council decision. Neither a resolution nor a presidential statement resulted from the lively exchange that ensued from the precise and well-focused opening remarks by the USG for humanitarian affairs. Nevertheless, the full discussion reveals an atmosphere of goodwill, a high level of inquisitiveness, and a readiness to apply the new insights to the subsequent treatment of conflict-specific meetings. In a way, one can subsume that there was evidently no need for new norms and laws relating to humanitarian assistance in conditions of armed conflict, but the emphasis was placed by the USG for humanitarian affairs on the implementation of the numerous decisions of the Council itself and of other UN organs. Under the humanitarian cover, the Council, at its 4,025th meeting on 26 July 1999, took up a slightly different theme, namely, “Promoting peace and security: Humanitarian assistance to refugees in Africa.” Apparently the meeting was convened in accordance with the understanding reached in prior consultations for the purpose of hearing Mrs. Sadako Ogata, the UN high commissioner for refugees, whom the Council decided to invite under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure. In her detailed overview, the high commissioner offered an extremely critical picture demonstrating the enormous dangers under which humanitarian personnel were active in so many conflict zones in Africa. She deplored the lack of adequate funds for the numerous assignments set to be fulfilled and pointed inter alia at the calamities in Sierra


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Leone, where the armed conflict had been raging furiously, resulting from the long stalemate in the Liberian civil war. She also addressed the equally severe situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where the living conditions had deteriorated in recent years and access by humanitarian agencies was most difficult to gain. Especially for the UNHCR mandate, the DRC prospects looked dismal, as the huge numbers of refugees and displaced persons flooded all parts of that huge expanse. The conundrum of the aftermath of the Rwandan tragedy of 1994 affected all of Central Africa, as groups of long-displaced victims as well as perpetrators had taken residence outside of Rwanda in fear of suffering personal harm if they returned to their traditional communities. These disasters and many other crises offered to Mrs. Ogata the opportunity to underline to the Council the fundamental importance of de facto consolidating peace after peace agreements had been signed. If the intent of restoring stability was indeed given, then it was absolutely necessary to provide to the humanitarian agencies the long-term financing enabling them to operate for the prolonged time that was required to achieve calm and stability in a formerly wartorn society. If that condition were met, then the UNHCR and associated humanitarian organizations would be empowered to play a key role in central parts of the peace-building processes. The high commissioner further shed light on the still-raw and heated postwar situation in Kosovo, where thousands of people had not yet completed their return home, and where standards of equity between Albanians and Serbs were difficult to achieve and maintain in the eminently hostile atmosphere in the region since the end of active fighting. Tremendous needs existed in reconstruction, which the UNHCR was not able to meet due to lacking funds and thus staff. It was hoped that matters would improve as a result of current plans in promoting stability in Southeastern Europe. In conclusion, the high commissioner made reference to recent movements in the reform of the African Union and detected hopeful signs of African governments and communities rising in joint endeavors to achieve some advance through self-help. She viewed especially favorably the steps to strengthen conflict prevention and conflict mitigation on the African continent and vowed to bring her office’s capabilities and services to the evident needs of refugees and other displaced persons everywhere in Africa and in other parts of the world. In the subsequent debate, all Council members responded to the high commissioner’s account and plea and indicated in varying form their strong commitment to improve the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the many displaced people on African soil. They endorsed the call for increased financial outlays and for closer attention to ensuring effective long-term peace building on the basis of serious peace accords. Many speakers made reference to the 1998 SG

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report on emergencies in Africa and acknowledged that not enough had been done to overcome these festering wounds on African soil. Responding at the end of the 4,025th meeting on 26 July 1999, to the statements and questions of Council members, the high commissioner restated her principal points and offered assurances that if the Council and the regional organizations could restore sufficient stability in the hot spots, then the UNHCR would be willing and ready to carry out its enlarged mandate to help refugees find asylum, to return home, and to reestablish a decent existence after prolonged war and exile. She also offered specific comments on detailed matters relating to specific crisis situations and indicated her availability to follow up on a bilateral basis after the meeting. Although this meeting did not usher in a formal Council decision, it is noteworthy that several months later, on 13 January 2000, the Council met once again, at its 4,089th meeting, to take up the agenda item entitled “Promoting peace and security: Humanitarian assistance to refugees in Africa.” Again the meeting was opened by Mrs. Ogata, the UN high commissioner for refugees, who characterized the situation in Africa for many of its people as a struggle to survive in misery and fear. This bleak image pervaded her briefing as she reviewed the current state of affairs in the various conflict zones throughout the African continent. She pointed out that the pattern of refugee crises had undergone significant changes. While many continued to seek asylum in safer countries, others increasingly sought refuge as internally displaced persons in safer parts of their own countries. She cited in this connection the rate of 20 percent of the Angolan population who had fled both outside and inside the borders of the country. Here she emphasized the difficulty of assisting civilians in their own country, as the government in question simply might refuse access to the people in need. Examples of this dilemma abounded. Furthermore, in too many cases, the host countries of many current refugees were severely destabilized by the arrival of refugee streams but carried out their task of lending a helping hand to these masses in flight. Taking up the US call for quicker solutions to the refugee crisis, the high commissioner joined these calls for speedy action but admonished the international community that such demands were in vain as long as peace was not reestablished in the zones of conflict. As long as the rulers were seeking wealth, controlling diamonds, oil, wood, and other goods, and fighting rebels and insurgents over the spoils, the chance for quick and effective answers to the refugee and displacement problem was idle. Offering another careful review of the main African crises, the high commissioner reiterated that unless clearer, more decisive action was taken by governments, which the Council had a responsibility in inspiring, designing, and leading, refugee crises could not be resolved. The root causes of conflict and human displacement had to be dealt with first, otherwise


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the search for peace would be futile. In view of this predicament, the high commissioner stressed the significance of the “African” month and placed the plight of Africans on the doorsteps of the Council, thereby underscoring the central role that the promotion of peace and security by the Council could play in advancing the enormous effort to assist and protect the displaced people in Africa. In the following exchange, the urgent message of the high commissioner was picked up and amplified by most of the speakers. The context of humanitarian assistance was specifically emphasized, and its relevance in particular for Africa was stressed. The interplay between politics, greed, and disregard for human well-being was mentioned by most Council members, and promises for much enhanced support for refugees and displaced persons were voiced. The presence of the high commissioner helped answer many points raised by Council members. The end result of the prolonged public deliberations was the affirmation of the fullest agreement for the position taken by the high commissioner and her warnings to the Council about the consequences of wrong action or no action. The focus on Africa enabled the Council as a whole and its individual members to get a much closer look at the dismal conditions of helpless victims of war and bloodshed in the familiar zones of violent conflict in south Sahara Africa. The gist of the debates during the two meetings devoted to humanitarian assistance to refugees in Africa was summarized in the presidential statement (S/PRST/2000/1) that was made at the end of the 4,089th meeting on behalf of the Council. Herein, the Council inter alia underlined the importance of taking measures aimed at conflict prevention and resolution in Africa; stressed the need to address the root causes of armed conflict in a comprehensive manner in order to prevent those circumstances that led to internal displacement and the outflow of refugees; noted with concern that the majority of refugees, returnees, and internally displaced persons and others affected by the conflict were women and children and stressed the need to intensify efforts to meet their special protection needs, including vulnerability to violence, exploitation, and disease, in particular, HIV/AIDS; condemned the deliberate targeting of civilians and practices of forced displacement; expressed its grave concern that alarmingly high numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons in Africa did not receive sufficient protection and assistance; noted that refugees were protected under the 1951 convention and the 1967 protocol relating to the status of refugees, the OAU convention governing the specific aspects of refugee problems in Africa in 1969, and other relevant initiatives in the region; invited states that had not already done so to consider ratifying the relevant instruments of international humanitarian, human rights, and refugee law; reaffirmed the responsibility of states hosting refugees to ensure the security and civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements in accordance with existing international standards and international refugee, human rights, and

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humanitarian law; underlined the unacceptability of using refugees and other persons in refugee camps and settlements to achieve military purposes in the country of asylum or in the country of origin; underlined the importance of safe and unhindered access, in accordance with international law, of humanitarian personnel to civilians in armed conflict, including refugees and internally displaced persons, and the protection of humanitarian assistance to them, and recalled the responsibility of all parties to conflict to ensure the safety and security of such personnel; and condemned recent acts of deliberate violence in Africa against humanitarian personnel. The careful study of the verbatim record of the two meetings devoted to African refugee issues and the parallel reading of the presidential statement summarized earlier reveal quite strikingly the determination and realization of the Council to pay full attention to the unfinished agenda of relief and protection for refugees and displaced persons in Africa and to improve its own record and the achievements of the international community in addressing the many difficulties and needs in the African emergencies. The readiness of Council members to follow the warning voice of the SG and turn to the “dark continent” is clearly noticeable and deserves to be recorded in the evaluation of the Council as a policy-making organ of highest visibility and import. A look at another humanitarian discussion will close the circle as far as the consideration of humanitarian issues is concerned. Only a few months later, on 9 March 2000, the Council held its 4,109th meeting and devoted the session to yet another humanitarian subject matter; the agenda item was loosely entitled “Maintaining peace and security: Humanitarian aspects of issues before the Security Council.” While on earlier occasions Council members had benefited from the detailed testimony of key UN officials handling humanitarian issues, the 4,109th meeting opened with a personal statement by the SG himself, reflecting the importance that the UN secretariat attached to this third round of the humanitarian debate. It also should be remarked that the openness and transparency of this meeting were especially crucial, as the discussion turned out to revolve to a significant degree around the controversial question of humanitarian interventions. As the debate proved, there was not only no agreement on the legal and political foundation of humanitarian interventions, but there existed also a strong animosity among members of the large nonaligned movement against the operations authorized by the small and unrepresentative Council or undertaken outside of the UN Charter context altogether, basing the mandate and execution upon the dubious norms and capabilities of regional structures of a military orientation. The lengthy deliberations exceed by far the limited frame of the current review and assessment, but an effort is made to convey at least the sense of the discussion. In his opening statement, the SG drew the line from the first Coun-


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cil meeting in January 1999 on humanitarian concerns and expressed the hope that the current round would build on the progress of the first session. He noted that humanitarian action held both greater promise and greater peril than any other part of UN work. Despite the fact that humanitarian action could save lives, it had to be realized that it could be abused by parties unwilling to observe humanitarian norms and determined to subvert such action to advance their brutal inhumane policies. Pointing to the Mozambican crisis, he was encouraged that the Council had shown a willingness to take up the plight of the people there. Looking at many contemporary emergencies, he drew the Council’s attention to the bleak reality that these emergencies seemed to grow in horror and in pain, dramatizing the need for effective humanitarian assistance. He recommended that the Council and other UN organs ask themselves whether enough was done to help the people in need, and whether the aid was appropriate to the ongoing crisis. He also wondered whether the dilemma of aid also being available to the perpetrators of the violence, for example, in the Bosnian war, could in some way be alleviated and thus help the crisis be brought to an end. In line with his basic thinking, the SG emphasized three major issues facing humanitarian action: first, how such action could contribute to maintaining peace and security; second, how the UN partners could make progress in integrating humanitarian and political-military elements of peace operations; and third, how the UN community could ensure respect for the legal and principled basis of humanitarian action. Briefly discussing these points, the SG turned to the fundamental problem of inadequate funding of humanitarian measures, often resulting in sharply adverse effects undoing the earlier positive results. He urged the Council to tackle the financial gap directly and consistently and thus to achieve major improvements in the conduct of peace operations and the simultaneous delivery of vital humanitarian supplies and services. All of these recommendations served the purpose of encouraging the Council to fully integrate humanitarian concerns into its endeavors to promote peace and security. The brief but serious words of admonishment and advice by the SG gave rise to a very long and rich debate among Council members and non-members invited to share their views with the Council in the public format of the 4,109th meeting. Only a complete study of all statements over the morning and afternoon parts of the meeting could encompass the thrust and controversy characterizing this free-for-all general debate. Still, following the earlier meetings dealing with other facets of the humanitarian agenda, one can indeed notice a growth in openness and accord on what should be done to further strengthen the provision of humanitarian relief in these complex emergencies. From among the many statements at the 4,109th and resumed 4,109th meeting, which amounted to a far-reaching favorable response to the introductory remarks of the SG, two should be highlighted in that they presented diverging

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perspectives and articulated alternative considerations revealing severe fissures in the attitudes of the international community. The first of these interventions was the statement by the representative from India, who opened his remarks with caustic words about the inability of Council members to agree on the wording of the agenda item, specifically the deletion of the term humanitarian action from the final version adopted at the onset of the meeting. Arguing that a definition of humanitarian action was still lacking, he pointed out that some such actions turned out disastrously, while others, though self-serving, might have provided benefits. He expressed, however, a much more fundamental viewpoint, namely, that according to the UN Charter, the Council had no legal mandate to authorize or conduct humanitarian action. Furthermore, he suggested that the humanitarian laws codified in the Geneva conventions did not contain a single reference to the UN or the Council. Recent gatherings seeking to update the legal norms relating to humanitarian law and human rights law specifically barred linkages between human rights and peacekeeping. Going further in the legal analysis, he proposed that it was the sovereign right of a state to determine whether it needed humanitarian assistance or not. The Council could not coerce such an unwilling state as the coercion or the use of force was prohibited under Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter. As a general rule, there was no provision in international law for humanitarian intervention, an interpretation validated in important legal documents of recent years. The Indian representative warned that Council action under Chapter VII, binding upon all states, would have to be complied with, even if it violated current international law. Moreover, the Council’s unrepresentative composition made it even more inopportune to impose action on the other UN member states that would be highly controversial and widely rejected. Again, he offered a few poignant examples to support his blunt reasoning. He pointed to the military operation against Serbia over the situation in Kosovo and reaffirmed his viewpoint that such action was not only imprudent but also illegal. If such deviations from international law were copied by other actors, then the result would be chaos and lawlessness in interstate relations. In view of all of these objections and concerns, he advocated that the Council stay clear of supposed humanitarian action and permit the return to relief that was seen as apolitical, neutral, and impartial, and offered at request, in line with General Assembly Resolution 46/182. Efforts by the Council to involve itself in humanitarian activities tended to end disastrously, as the Somalia debacle all too well illustrated. Deploring the role of the media creating pressure to deal with specific disasters, he recalled the SG’s report to the 54th session of the General Assembly in which the SG had launched a lively debate on humanitarian intervention, and the categorical rejection of any right of humanitarian intervention by the meeting of the NAM foreign ministers on 23 September 1999, a


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viewpoint that the Council would do well to pay heed to. In conclusion, the Indian delegate argued that the horns of the dilemma could not be avoided. He warned that proper peace building took much time and required large funds, and he was skeptical whether the Council would be able to improve its track record in humanitarian operations sufficiently to benefit the suffering populations and to ensure the healing of divided societies. The representative from the Islamic Republic of Iran started his statement with a reference to several humanitarian crises in 1999, especially in Kosovo and East Timor, which had helped intensify the discussion of how the international community should handle humanitarian catastrophes. In the face of such severe upheavals, it was the consensus that immediate action was needed to stop grave crimes, such as ethnic cleansing. He also thought that the world community could not stand by and allow thousands of people to suffer gross and systematic violations of their fundamental rights. Such decisive action could only emanate from the UNSC, provided it acted strictly in accordance with the letter and spirit of the UN Charter. In the Iranian view, there was no other universally accepted legal basis for responding to unjustifiable acts of violence. It was up to the Council to overcome political limitations and to take prompt and early preventive action to ensure that potential and actual crises were dealt with by peaceful means. Any efforts to engage in interventions outside of the UN framework might lead to opening a Pandora’s box, as there would always be some tendencies to cover sinister designs for expansion through the use of force under the pretext of humanitarianism. In resisting such a tendency, UN members had to remain vigilant against a growing trend toward undermining the principle of national sovereignty, a cardinal norm of the UN Charter. Summing up his delegation’s views, the Iranian delegate urged the Council to perform its tasks within the framework of its Charter obligations, that is, to intervene in cases where international peace and security were threatened, and deal within this framework with specific issues, such as providing civilians who were targeted access to humanitarian assistance. He also issued a call to rid the UN community of double standards in upholding international humanitarian law. He expressed dismay that the Council, acting on behalf of the international community, had at times been tardy in reacting to the conflicts in Africa and some other areas and inadequate in taking measures and offering resources that it had authorized to address these problems. If financial considerations influenced Council decision making, then it would distort and weaken the response to clear threats to peace and security. The Iranian government believed that a more credible and representative Council would be better equipped to carry out its important mandate. The Council should be more transparent, more democratic, and more accountable to the broader membership. As long as the Council was not giving more representation to developing countries, more efforts were

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required to streamline the Council’s decision-making process to avoid the paralysis that frequently resulted from differences among the permanent members. The extensive and comprehensive discussion of key humanitarian concerns involving twenty-seven representatives hailing from all continents showed two main trends: on the one hand, the insights gained about improving the Council’s practice in this area of concern were quite remarkable and displayed the improved skill of the Council as an organ to look back and learn from past mistakes in order to perform more dynamically and synergistically in the future. On the other hand, the debate reaching out to the full membership brought out severe fissures and major differences of opinion on the key question of whether and under which conditions the Council could take intrusive action in conflict zones with massive humanitarian casualties. As illustrated especially by the Indian statement, and echoed on some fundamentals by the Iranian delegate, the basic consensus on full cooperation and peaceful interaction was adhered to by all members, with no exception. Such a resounding affirmation of the commitment to the Charter and its principles and purposes offered a strong balancing component in the lengthy deliberations about humanitarian issues before the Council. As in the previous case, the dialogue in the 4,109th meeting resulted in the adoption and issuance of another presidential statement (S/PRST/2000/7) that was read at the 4,110th meeting, held following the adjournment of the 4,109th meeting, on 9 March 2000, by the president. Herein, the Council inter alia recalled its primary responsibility under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security and reaffirmed the purposes and principles of the Charter; it reaffirmed as well its commitment to the principles of the political independence, sovereign equality, and territorial integrity of all states; recognized the importance of the humanitarian dimension to the maintenance of international and security and to its consideration of humanitarian issues relating to the protection of all civilians and other noncombatants in situations of armed conflict; recognized that humanitarian crises could be both causes and consequences of conflicts, and that they could affect the Council’s efforts to prevent and end conflicts, and to deal with other threats to international peace and security; affirmed that timely consideration of the following humanitarian issues would contribute to the prevention of escalation of conflicts and to the maintenance of international peace and security: access for UN and associated personnel, other humanitarian personnel and humanitarian supplies to the war-effected civilians, humanitarian components in peace agreements and peacekeeping operations, coordination between the Council and the relevant UN organs and agencies and regional bodies, and resource constraints; reaffirmed its concern for the wellbeing and rights of war-affected civilians and reiterated its call to all parties to a conflict to ensure safe and unimpeded access in accordance with international law by humanitarian personnel to such civilians; emphasized the importance of the


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inclusion of humanitarian elements in peace negotiations and agreements, including the issue of prisoners of war, detainees and missing persons, and others protected by international humanitarian law; invited the secretary-general to encourage the early consideration of such humanitarian elements in peace negotiations sponsored or supported by the UN, as appropriate; noted that in some instances the integration of humanitarian components into peacekeeping operations would contribute effectively to their carrying out their mandate; encouraged the secretary-general to continue to include the humanitarian situation in his regular briefing to the Council on countries under review, including the funding status of UN-consolidated appeals, where appropriate; and further requested the secretary-general to ensure that his regular country reports would continue to include a substantive, analytical section on humanitarian issues and their impact on international efforts to implement UN-mandated activities.

Small Arms With the UN General Assembly and its subsidiary bodies carrying out a primary responsibility in disarmament matters, one should not forget that Article 26 assigns a limited function in disarmament issues to the Council. The text of the article refers specifically to “the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments” for which the Council is mandated to develop plans to be submitted to the members of the UN. In the decades of the cold war, it was not surprising that the Council was totally paralyzed and inactive on this question, and for that reason, the world public largely forgot about the Charter-based role of the Council in disarmament and arms control. Nevertheless, in the post-cold war environment, the security fears of the former superpowers began to fade, and the much larger agenda and the new proactive thrust of the Council created a new constellation of which issues would be taken up by the Council in light of its Charter function. In addition, in order to understand the inclusion of the item on small arms on the Council’s agenda, a closer look must be taken at the wider context of UN activities and at the origins of the attention to the rise and prevalence of small arms and light weapons in many new internal conflicts of the 1990s. The former SG Boutros-Ghali, in his 1995 update and review of the 1992 Agenda for Peace, had made mention of the new scourges of small arms and antipersonnel land mines and invited the General Assembly in particular to take a look at the two concerns and deliberate on them. In response, the General Assembly, at its 50th session, requested a report from the SG on the subject matter of small arms, employing a panel of governmental experts, with a view to formulating basic policy ideas and concrete suggestions about managing and diminishing this new menace. The requested report was issued under the aegis of the new SG in 1997

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(A/52/298) and contained basic definitions and descriptions of what was understood as falling under the category “small arms”; it also included the panel’s recommendation that the UN should consider convening an international conference on illicit arms in all of its aspects. Between this critical date in 1997 and the actual convening of the international conference at UN headquarters in New York on 9 July 2001, the Council meeting took place. The meeting was not a routine session but was given special significance in that the meeting was held on 24 September 1999, during the regular 54th session of the General Assembly, and attended by all but two delegations at the level of foreign minister, whose presence during the Assembly’s general debate was made use of for this important opening Council discussion. Moreover, as was appropriate, the SG attended the session in person and made the opening statement setting, so to speak, the stage for this opening argument. In this fashion, the Council took up a new important issue at the foreign minister level in order to bring it into the system-wide dialogue on the scourge of small arms and to express strong support and endorsement for the leading role of the UN on this new frontier. This emphasis is strikingly displaced in the most careful and prolonged preparation for the high-level discussion. From background information about the meeting, it is clear that the preparations started already in August 1999, under the Namibian presidency, which conducted a consultation of the whole on 18 August, and was continued and intensified by the Netherlands presidency in September 1999 involving two consultations of the whole, on 2 September and on 23 September, wrapping up the arrangements for the formal open meeting. On Friday, 24 September 1999, in the morning, the Council met at its 4,048th meeting and adopted the agenda item entitled “Small arms.” The SG opened the ministerial meeting on the question of small arms in the context of the challenges facing the international community in that regard. He saw the matter as a key challenge as small arms and light weapons were primary tools of violence in the modern world and stressed that the proliferation of small arms, ammunition, and explosives also had aggravated the violence associated with terrorism and organized crime. The small arms, in their pervasiveness, even undermined the stability of societies not beset by civil war. The brutal nature of these weapons was made crystal clear in that small arms often were recycled from one area of conflict to another by unscrupulous arms merchants frequently taking advantage of legal loopholes or to exploit inadequate national monitoring and enforcement structures. When human rights violations were no longer ignored in silence, the UN was dedicated to address the supply-and-demand aspects of the trade in small arms. The SG mentioned the occasions at which the UN system had taken up the issue of small arms and recalled especially in the Council the discussions on


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his report on Africa, followed by concrete measures taken in Angola and in connection to the items of children and armed conflict and the protection of civilians in armed conflict, where the Council focused on the need to reverse the proliferation of small arms if any of these issues were to be satisfactorily resolved. Further, the SG reminded the Council of his advice dealing with the protection of civilians, that the control of small arms was a prerequisite for a successful peace-building process as it was for conflict prevention. Additionally, the SG pointed out some developments in the struggle against small arms proliferation, particularly illicit arms trafficking. He referred here especially to an ECOWAS moratorium, to preparations for a regional conference by the OAU, various relevant activities by the EU in conjunction with the UNDP and the UN Disarmament Affairs Department, and a legal convention adopted by the OAS in November 1997. He listed also a civil society initiative setting up an International Action Network on Small Arms that helped sharpen public focus on small arms. In view of all these moves, he felt that the international community had to seize the opportunity provided by the international conference in 2001 to demonstrate its will to reverse the global proliferation of small arms, and he urged the Council to show leadership sustained by the active efforts of the UN members in this global struggle of limiting the tools of war and violence. The statements by the foreign ministers of Council members were begun by the Minister Delegate for Cooperation and Francophone of France. Applauding the president for his initiative and thanking the SG for his important statement, the minister remarked that the SC had studied this phenomenon for some time and, in view of the fact that small arms had taken many more victims than weapons of mass destruction, called for strong action to deal with the problem. This approach had to be multifaceted and integrated and required activities on the global, regional, and national levels. He suggested several types of measures and started out with the need to tighten arms embargoes so that the flow of the small arms could be stemmed. The second measure would involve strengthening national legislative and regulatory frameworks regarding transfers of small arms and light weapons. This could be paired with regional codes of conduct or voluntary moratoriums of these transfers, along the lines of the recent moratorium adopted by ECOWAS and the 1998 EU initiative for joint action against the destabilizing accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons. Last, he proposed the conclusion of the protocol on the manufacture and illicit traffic in firearms, ammunitions, and other related material that would equip the international community with the instrument with which to struggle against a disturbing form of criminality. Stressing the French expectations and focus regarding the 2001 international conference on the illicit trade in arms and light weapons, he pointed out that the management of postconflict situations was another side

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of the struggle against the effects of the destabilizing accumulation and spread of small arms. He underlined the need for adequate human, technical, and financial resources and stated that voluntary contributions could not be the sole source of financing. He also made reference to the plight of the child soldiers and reiterated that the small arms problems were found in many parts of the world, far beyond the severe ravages in Africa taken up by the Council in its resolution 1209 (1998). The British foreign minister seconded much of what his French colleague had put forward. He moved that three main areas should be the focus of the Council’s work and listed impounding and destroying the firearms, regulating and rendering more transparent the official trade in firearms, and driving out of business the illicit traffic in firearms. He offered figures about the huge size of the problem, emphasized the finances required, and listed legal and political instruments that could be useful in banning the arms trade. The meeting lasted more than three hours, offering the opportunity for all Council members to address the scourge of small arms and light weapons and to emphasize the combination of political and legal efforts under way or in the planning stage, as well the widening search for proper financing to carry out various regional and subregional campaigns and to plan for the projected 2001 international conference. The commitment on the part of all of the high officials to the new fight against the tools for internal conflicts and other violent struggles was unanimously expressed and provided a strong base for the forthcoming steps in the UN’s system to place the issue high on the international agenda. From among the statements, two more should be specifically referred to, the statement by the Chinese foreign minister and the declaration by the US secretary of state. The Chinese foreign minister conveyed his government’s complete agreement with the efforts to solve the problems caused by small arms. He expressed, however, certain reservations about the role of the Council in this area and urged that the Department for Disarmament Affairs and the General Assembly First Committee be primarily engaged with the matter. Furthermore, in handling this issue, the international community should respect the sovereignty of the countries concerned and should refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of countries in conflict regions. The legitimate selfdefense and security needs of countries should be given due consideration. In the UN peacekeeping and postconflict peace building processes, mandates concerning the confiscation and disposal of weapons should be strictly implemented, and agreements reached by the parties concerned should be fully observed. Last, as the arms issue involved many diverse aspects, the root causes and symptoms of the problem should be analyzed on a case-by-case basis, not mechanically. In conclusion, the Chinese foreign minister mentioned in some detail his country’s actions in recent years on gun control and the export of mil-


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itary material, and he renewed China’s willingness to join international efforts to speedily tackle the problem of small arms. As the last speaker before the Council president, the US secretary of state joined the previous speakers in expressing her government’s solidarity with the international campaign against illicit arms. She made reference to her public statements in American venues and promised to raise her voice on her upcoming trip to Africa. The United States held that an integrated comprehensive response had to be developed by the international community. The secretary of state further pledged that the United States would refrain from selling arms to regions of conflict not already covered by arms embargoes, and she stated her hope that negotiations on a firearms protocol to the UN convention against transnational organized crime could be finished by the end of 2000. She also praised Canada’s important role in working aggressively on the underground economy fed by gemstones, precious metals, and narcotics, which fueled the civil war in Sierra Leone. The United States, as the world’s largest dealer in the gemstone market, recognized that it had to help end illegal transactions. She called for arms transactions to be kept transparent, for tightened border controls, and for driving illegitimate traffickers out of business. The president, speaking in his capacity as foreign minister of the Netherlands, concurred with the other Council members and stressed the need for a coherent approach to addressing the issue of small arms proliferation. He proposed the formation of a group of friends of the conference in order to advance work on the 2001 planned meeting and recommended as a first strategy voluntary moratoriums on arms exports to tension zones and conflict regions; he also endorsed the suggestion of full implementation of Council arms embargoes and focused on the very bad effect of small arms on the DDR process for former combatants. To wrap up this important high-level meeting, the president made a presidential statement (S/PRST/99/28) on behalf of the Council, in which the Council inter alia recalled its primary responsibility under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security, in view of which its attention was drawn inevitably to small arms and light weapons as the most frequently used weapon in the majority of recent armed conflicts; noted with grave concern that the destabilizing accumulation of small arms had contributed to the intensity and duration of armed conflict, and also noted that the easy availability of small arms could be a contributing factor to undermining peace agreements, complicating peace-building efforts and impeding political, economic, and social development; acknowledged in that regard that the challenge posed by small arms was multifaceted and involved security, humanitarian, and development dimensions; recognized that small arms were traded globally for legitimate security and commercial considerations; bearing in mind the considerable volume of

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that trade, it underlined the vital importance of effective national regulations and controls on small arms transfers; emphasized that the prevention of illicit trafficking was of immediate concern in the global search for ways and means to curb the wrongful use of small arms, including their use by terrorists; welcomed the various initiatives currently under way, globally and regionally, to address the issue; emphasized the importance of regional cooperation in tackling the issue of illicit trafficking in small arms; welcomed the initiative by the secretary-general for coordinating action on small arms, designed to ensure a coherent and coordinated approach to the small arms within the UN system; requested the secretarygeneral to specifically include the humanitarian and socioeconomic implications of the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons, including their illicit production and trade, in relevant studies he was undertaking; called for the effective implementation of arms embargoes imposed by the Council in its relevant resolutions; requested the secretary-general to develop a reference manual for use in the field on ecologically safe methods of weapons destruction in order to better enable member states to ensure the disposal of weapons voluntarily surrendered by civilians or retrieved from former combatants; invited member states to facilitate the preparation of such a manual; and welcomed the recommendations of the group of governmental experts on small arms (A/54/258), including the convening of an international conference no later than 2001, noting the offer by Switzerland to host the conference. The careful phrasing of the elaborate presidential statement demonstrates quite well the importance of the Council’s deliberation on the issue as a step in the longer process of putting an issue on the global agenda. The confluence of regional and global initiatives at the juncture of this high-level gathering reveals once again the network of moves and actions out of which effective international action is created. The unanimous support of the recommendation to seize the new issue and to begin with a multidimensional program of preparation and limited fieldwork made clear that the policy item had reached full maturity. Timely and competent Council discussion provides evidence for this maturing process.

Role of the UN Security Council in the Prevention of Armed Conflicts Close to the end of the ten-year period covered by this analytical survey, the Council turns to a most crucial opening debate on the place of prevention in the work of the body. The scope and length of this opening public deliberation is of such huge dimension that a short summary would simply not do justice to the extraordinary quality of this occasion. The importance of the gathering, at the 4,072nd meeting on 29 November 1999, is further emphasized by the presence of the SG and his availability for an opening statement, setting forth the policy


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agenda for the area of prevention. Moreover, the attraction of this crucial moment in the history of the post-cold war era Council is further demonstrated by the invitation of an additional twenty-two representatives of member states to address the Council meeting on the issue. This number may be one of the highest in terms of outside member states seeking to take part in an initial principal exploration of a core principle of the Council’s work. This first round in discussing prevention ushered into a very long and detailed presidential statement, setting out the main themes of the lengthy debate and shaping the agenda for forthcoming debates on the issue. A closer reading of this statement must suffice to cover the gist of the deliberations and entice the reader to follow up and consult the original verbatim records of this important exploration. To bring out the prominent role of the SG, a short overview of his opening statement is provided in the brief coverage of the Council’s session. In opening the deliberations at the 4,072nd meeting, the SG expressed his appreciation to take part in this vital meeting dealing with one of the greatest challenges facing the UN and one that he had made a priority of his work. Stating the evident centrality of prevention in the organization’s political work, the SG offered detailed information on recent endeavors in the secretariat to strengthen the capacity for preventive diplomacy, preventive disarmament, preventive deployment, and both preconflict and postconflict peace building. Here he referred to attempts to improve early warning and analysis capabilities; improve coordination between the various departments, funds, and agencies; and intensify cooperation with governments as well as with regional organizations and nongovernmental organizations. As to the Council’s involvement, he suggested certain steps, including greater use of fact-finding missions at much earlier stages of disputes, encouraging states, which became aware of potential conflict within or among their neighbors, to bring the issue promptly to the Council’s attention, giving urgent attention to the problems of states, which suffered acute economic, environmental, and security strains, with consequent risks to their stability, because they were hosting large refugee populations from neighboring countries, establishing an informal working group or subsidiary organ to study early warning and prevention issues and report back, and instituting regular meetings on prevention, at which the Council would choose areas that required urgent preventive action. The SG added that in the longer run it was even more important to address the deep-rooted causes of conflicts, which often lay in the social and economic sphere. Among the long-term causes of conflict were poverty, repression, and undemocratic government, endemic underdevelopment, weak or nonexistent institutions, and political and economic discrimination between ethnic or religious communities. Ultimately, what mattered was the responsibility of every

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member state to prevent conflict by practicing good governance. That required the rule of law, protection of the rights of minorities, and ensuring that elections would be free and fair. The SG also suggested that healthy and balanced development was the best form of long-term conflict prevention. Voicing support for the special tribunals and for the international criminal court, he recalled the effective Council decisions over the Gulf crisis and emphasized his conviction that a clear demonstration that decisive action would be taken by the Council when faced with crimes against humanity would constitute the best deterrence against conflict. The following long debate, divided into two extensive sessions, brought out the views of altogether thirty-seven member states on the agenda item of prevention and its application by the Council. The statements, which took over eight hours, presented a multiple mix of voices responding to the strong appeal by the SG to embrace this Charter-based mandate for the Council at the threshold of the new century with its new challenges. The dialogue between the representatives and the SG and among themselves proved to offer a deep insight into what prevention was to mean for the international community and into which specific tasks and assignments it would have to be broken up to move from the verbal exchanges on this subject matter and to delve into concrete steps designed to avert new collisions and rifts in the web of international relations around the world. It was remarkable how many excellent ideas were brought forward and what kind of warnings also were issued to protect the fundamental principles of sovereign equality as the Council was engaging in proactive measures in its processing of incoming early warning information and shaping approaches therefrom. One also could observe a tremendous level of goodwill and trust, handing over substantial responsibility to the SG and the secretariat in realizing a new campaign of conflict prevention. After the presentation of views by about one fifth of the current UN member states, presided over by the Slovenian representative, whose delegation had prepared this enormous review, an exercise that ran into a resumed 4,072nd meeting on the morning of 30 November 1999, the Council held a brief 4,073rd meeting immediately following the adjournment of the 4,072nd meeting on the afternoon of 30 November, at which the president made a statement on behalf of the Council (S/PRST/1999/34), in which the Council inter alia having considered, within its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, its role in the prevention of armed conflicts, emphasized the need fully to respect and implement the principles and provisions of the Charter and norms of international law, in particular, in that context those related to prevention of armed conflicts and settlement of disputes by peaceful means; recognized the importance of building a culture of prevention of armed conflicts and the need for a contribution from all principal organs of the UN in that regard;


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stressed the importance of a coordinated international response to economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian problems, which often were the root causes of armed conflicts; recognized the need for the development of effective long-term strategies and emphasized the need for all UN organs and agencies to pursue preventive strategies and to take action within their respective areas of competence to assist member states to eradicate poverty, strengthen development cooperation and assistance, and promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; recognized that early warning, preventive diplomacy, preventive deployment, preventive disarmament, and postconflict peace building were interdependent and complementary components of a comprehensive conflict prevention strategy; underlined the importance of the settlement of disputes by peaceful means, in accordance with Chapter VI of the Charter and expressed its intention to support, with appropriate follow-up action, efforts to prevent conflict by the SG through such tools as fact-finding missions, good offices, and other activities requiring action by his envoys and special representatives; emphasized the important role of the SG in the prevention of armed conflicts; expressed its readiness to consider appropriate preventive action in response to the matters brought to its attention by states or the SG, which it deemed likely to threaten international peace and security; invited the SG to present to the members periodic reports on such disputes, including, as appropriate, early warnings and proposals for preventive measures; encouraged the SG to improve further his capacity to identify potential threats to international peace and security and invited him to indicate any requirements to fulfill those capacities, including the development of the secretariat’s expertise and resources; considered other preventive measures, such as the establishment of demilitarized zones and preventive disarmament; would also take appropriate measures in situations of postconflict peace building aimed at preventing the recurrence of armed conflicts, including, through adequate programs, the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of excombatants; recognized the link between the prevention of armed conflicts, the facilitation of the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the promotion of security for the civilian population, in particular, the protection of human life; underlined that the existing international criminal tribunals represented useful instruments to combat impunity and could, by helping to deter crimes against humanity, contribute to the prevention of armed conflicts; acknowledged the historic significance of adoption of the Rome statute of the international criminal court; recognized the important role that regional organizations and arrangements were playing in the prevention of armed conflicts, including the development of confidence- and security-building measures and also emphasized the importance of supporting and improving regional capacities for early warning; stressed the importance of cooperation between the UN and regional organizations in preventive activities in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter; and welcomed meetings

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between the UN, including the Council, and regional organizations, and encouraged participants to continue to focus those meetings on issues related to the prevention of armed conflicts. Taking up the second round in the basic consideration of prevention as a Council mandate, the Council convened its 4,174th meeting on 20 July 2000, and resumed the consideration of the item entitled “Role of the SC in the prevention of armed conflicts.” Reflecting the great importance attached to this continued public dialogue, the foreign minister of Jamaica served personally as president of the Council. As in the first large-scale review, the SG again addressed the Council on the issue at the beginning of the meeting. On this occasion the SG sought to convey to the Council members and the invited other member states—all of thirteen—new developments in the analysis of this complex issue. He began by emphasizing the multidimensional nature of prevention and stressed that putting into place mechanisms such as early warning, diplomacy, disarmament, preventive deployment, or sanctions was not enough. Referring to a recent UN University (UNU) study, which concluded that so-called “horizontal inequality” was especially explosive, that is, when power and resources were not equally distributed between groups that differed by race, religion, or language, he warned that conflicts were far more likely in such situations. He further proposed that democracy, good governance, human rights, justice, and the rule of law were not claimed as rewards at the end of the development process but were essential ingredients of development itself. It had become clear that poverty was not the only sufficient cause of conflict, but it was not accidental that the majority of current wars were fought among the poor. He offered then an overview of new steps taken to better equip the UN for prevention-related tasks and mentioned first of all the designation of the Department of Political Affairs as a focal point for conflict prevention in the UN system. In this connection, he had established a framework for coordination to improve interdepartmental and interagency links, and he mentioned that cooperation with regional organizations had been intensified. Furthermore, some 400 staff from throughout the system had attended a new training course in prevention and early warning organized by the UN Staff College in Turin. He planned further measures to strengthen the information gathering and analysis capacity of the secretariat and looked forward to a systematic exchange with the Council on ways to implement this aim. He noted with gratitude that the Council also had played its part in prevention and mentioned the case of unlicensed diamonds and the groundbreaking investigation by a Council group led by the Canadian ambassador. This important case presented to him evidence for the stark possibility that greed was a driving force behind some contemporary armed conflicts. Building on his earlier statement at the first round on prevention, he provided several new ideas of what the Council could do in advancing prevention in


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the UN processes. A major suggestion was holding periodic meetings at the foreign minister level, as provided under Article 28 of the Charter, to deliberate on thematic or actual prevention issues. Furthermore, the matter of prevention could be put on the agenda of the monthly meeting between the presidents of the Council and of the General Assembly, and the Council might get specific information from the ECOSOC, under Article 65, and request advisory opinion on any legal question from the international court of justice, according to Article 96. He wondered whether the Council could make greater use of the court’s capacity to move conflicts from a potential battlefield to peaceful arbitration rooms. Similarly, the Council could explore ways of interacting more closely with nonstate actors that have knowledge and capacity in prevention and could make a contribution. In closing his strong appeal for forceful measures in conflict prevention, the SG renewed the call for increased financial support from member states to underwrite the many dimensions of a renewed focus on prevention. The SG’s statement once again gave rise to a large-scale, in-depth debate among Council members and invited non-Council member states that ran throughout the morning and afternoon and involved twenty-eight statements altogether, constituting a fine opportunity to deepen the understanding from the first phase of the review and to increase the practical angle of the whole subject matter. The sessions offered an impressive image of the Council’s learning and its steady ambition to sharpen its tools and strengthen its perspective on the volatile situation in the global system. Council members and other speakers stressed the outstanding tasks in the different regions of the world and reiterated or voiced suggestions and demonstrated their collective will to work together on the incomplete global agenda. Although the Council was focused on African problems, the speakers in attendance all realized that in a restless world suffering from massive inequalities and shortcomings, the trigger for new explosions also could go off and exacerbate the situation in such a way that the campaign for international peace and security would be set back again and again. Nevertheless, one can marvel over the intensity of the Council’s learning exercise being undiminished from the November 1999 sessions to the July 2000 deliberations. Moreover, it became clear that the Council in consultation, had already hatched a plan to accelerate and intensify the search for proper remedies in the large complex of prevention by putting another big challenge to the SG and his staff. Resuming the format of the first round, the Council concluded the second round of the 4,174th meeting with a very long statement of the president (S/PRST/2000/25). In this statement, the Council inter alia underlined the overriding humanitarian and moral imperative as well as the economic advantages of preventing the outbreak and escalation of conflicts; highlighted the need to create a culture of prevention; reaffirmed its belief that early warning, preventive diplomacy, preventive deployment, and postconflict peace building

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were interdependent and complementary components of a comprehensive conflict prevention strategy; emphasized its continuing commitment to address the prevention of armed conflicts in all regions of the world; recalled the essential role of the SG in the prevention of armed conflicts in accordance with Article 99 of the Charter and expressed its willingness to take appropriate preventive action in response to matters brought to its attention by states or the SG, which it deemed likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security; invited the SG to present to the Council reports on such disputes, including, as appropriate, early warning and proposals for preventive measures; encouraged the strengthening of modalities of cooperation between the UN and regional organizations and arrangements, including early warning and mutual exchange of information; recognized the need to enhance the capacity of the organization of African unity, in particular, its mechanism for conflict prevention, management, and resolution; recognized the importance of effective postconflict peace-building strategies in preventing the reemergence of conflicts; recognized the need for close cooperation among bodies of the UN system and with other organizations and arrangements in the area of postconflict peace building and expressed its willingness to consider ways to improve such cooperation; highlighted the importance of preventive deployment in armed conflicts and reiterated its willingness to consider the deployment, with the consent of the host country, of preventive missions in appropriate circumstances; welcomed and encouraged efforts to prevent and combat the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of and illicit trafficking in small arms; invited the SG to submit to the Council, by May 2001, a report containing an analysis and recommendations on initiatives within the UN, taking into account previous experience and the views and considerations expressed by member states on the prevention of armed conflict; and recalled the statement of its president of 30 November 1999, and reaffirmed its willingness to consider the possibility of a meeting at the level of foreign ministers, during the millennium assembly, on the issue of the prevention of armed conflicts. In line with the underlying format and purpose of this study, the emphasis of the analytical narratives always has been to bring out the capability of the Council as a collective organ of the highest order to manage itself and to establish and maintain a clear pattern of the issues and questions on its agenda and the difficult additional question of the implementation of its decisions. The steady need to learn new aspects of a rapidly changing world situation and to shape its tools, methods, and techniques accordingly has been the central focus of this study. The immense endeavor of the Council to comprehend the new issue of conflict prevention in its manifold aspects has been shown vividly in the review of the first two phases of its consideration of the agenda item. The follow-up of this process takes the observer to 7 June 2001, when the SG presented the man-


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dated report “Prevention of Armed Conflict” (A/55/985-S/2001/574), offering an in-depth review and assessment of prevention in conceptual, managerial, policy, and operational terms and presenting to the Council a revised set of concrete proposals and suggestions for its attention. In two further meetings, the 4,334th meeting, on 21 June 2001, and the 4,360th meeting, on 30 August 2001, the Council took up the agenda item, specifically the SG’s report. The reaction of the Council to the ideas and reflections of this report was formulated in the resolution it adopted at its 4,360th meeting as document S/RES/1366 (2001). While the long resolution cannot properly be summarized within the framework of this study, its key provisions should be given to show what the Council, at the end of the years-long process, accepted and in which form it so did. Following eighteen preambular paragraphs, the Council, in the operative part inter alia: (1) expressed its determination to pursue the objective of prevention of armed conflict as an integral part of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security; (2) stressed that the essential responsibility for conflict prevention rested with national governments, and that the UN and international community could play an important role in support of national efforts for conflict prevention and could assist in building national capacity in this field and recognized the important supporting role of civil society; (5) expressed its willingness to give prompt consideration to early warning or prevention cases brought to its attention by the SG, and in this regard encouraged the SG to convey to the Council his assessment of potential threats to international peace and security with due regard to relevant regional and subregional dimensions, as appropriate, in accordance with Article 99 of the Charter of the UN; (6) undertook to keep situations of potential conflict under close review as part of a conflict prevention strategy and expressed its intention to consider cases of potential conflict brought to its attention by any member state, or by a state not a member of the UN or by the General Assembly, or on the basis furnished by the ECOSOC; (10) invited the SG to refer to the Council information from within the UN system on cases of serious violations of international law, including international humanitarian law and human rights law, and on potential conflict situations arising inter alia from ethnic, religious, and territorial disputes, poverty, and lack of development and expressed its determination to give serious consideration to such information and analyses regarding situations it deemed threatening to international peace and security; (11) expressed its intention to continue to involve the office of the UN emergency relief coordinator and other relevant UN agencies to brief its members on emergency situations it deemed threatening to international peace and security and supported the implementation of protection and assistance activities by relevant UN agencies in accordance with their respective mandates; (18) supported the enhancement of the role of the SG in conflict prevention, including increased use of UN interdisciplinary

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fact-finding and confidence-building missions to regions of tension, developing regional prevention strategies with regional partners and appropriate UN organs and agencies, and improving the capacity and resource base for preventive action in the secretariat; (19) endorsed the call of the SG for support to the follow-up processes launched by the third and fourth high-level UN regional organizations meetings in the field of conflict prevention and peace building, and to provide increased resources for the development of regional capacities in these fields; and (23)—the last paragraph—decided to remain actively seized of the matter. A careful review of this enormously rich and proactive resolution shows the Council in a central position within the UN decision-making system but reaching out to all relevant partners in matters relating to early warning and conflict prevention. One can state that the lengthy period of debates and exchanges brought maturity to the way the Council tackled this fundamental task in peace and security. The ability of the Council as a collective body and the commitment of many of its members, including those hailing from small states, are evident in the care and thrust of the formulation of the operative paragraphs of this core resolution on prevention. Built on a cautiously nursed political consensus of the Council through the years, it demonstrates the newly gained confidence and strength of the Council as a major actor in international relations. Moreover, its disposition to handle its role responsibly bodes well for the handling of many severe crises and difficult challenges in the decades to come. In these long debates and extensive decisions, one can detect the skill and sincerity of the members of this illustrious international body. It also identifies the steep learning curve of the Council’s engagement in the many charges of its mandate.

Protection of UN Personnel, Associated Personnel, and Humanitarian Personnel in Conflict Zones In seeking to complete the overview of thematic and generic issues taken up by the Council, the protection of international personnel under UN auspices is considered just for the sake of completeness. Throughout the 1990s, the UN and the Council struggled with this staff-related matter and tried to find suitable answers to the growing dilemma of international relief. The casualties among relief personnel rose significantly in the last decade of the twentieth century. Earlier efforts through an international convention proved not to be comprehensive enough. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that in early 2000 the Council took up this critical issue. Once again, the Council engaged in a lengthy, open debate involving officials representing humanitarian agencies and the deputy SG as the official handling the responsibility for staff security and protection. Again, many non-Council member states sought access to speak to the matter in the Council as they either were affected as recipients of UN and other international assistance


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or had concerns as providers of humanitarian personnel for field service. The long debate running into the afternoon found a wide consensus among the speakers about the tremendous urgency of the issue and the strong acclaim and praise of the frequently heroic efforts made by these staff members. To give an impression of the debate, the statement of the president issued at the end of the resumed 4,100th meeting on 9 February 2000, is here summarized. In the statement (S/PRST/2000/4), the Council inter alia expressed grave concern at the continued attacks against UN and associated personnel, and humanitarian personnel, in violation of international law, including international humanitarian law; noted with satisfaction the entry into force of the convention on the safety of UN and associated personnel of 1994, recognized its importance for addressing the security of such personnel, and recalled the relevant principles contained therein; urged states and nonstate parties to respect fully the status of UN and associated personnel and to take all appropriate steps, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter and the rules of international law, to ensure the safety and security of UN and associated personnel and humanitarian personnel, and underlined the importance of unhindered access to populations in need; stated that it would continue to stress in its resolutions the imperative for humanitarian assistance missions and personnel to have safe and unimpeded access to civilian populations and, in that context, was prepared to consider taking all appropriate measures at its disposal to ensure the safety and security of such personnel; welcomed the inclusion as a war crime in the Rome statute of the international criminal court of attacks intentionally directed against personnel involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission as long as they were entitled to the protection given to civilians under the international law of armed conflict, and noted the role that the court could play in bringing to justice those responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law; recognized the importance of issuing clear, appropriate, and feasible mandates for peacekeeping operations to ensure that they were applied in a timely, efficient manner, and to ensure that all new and ongoing UN field operations included appropriate modalities for the safety and security of UN and associated personnel and humanitarian personnel; underscored that UN personnel have the right to act in self-defense; encouraged the SG to complete the process of conducting a general and comprehensive review of security in peacekeeping operations, with a view to elaborating and undertaking further specific and practical measures to increase the safety and security of UN and associated personnel and humanitarian personnel; considered it important that a comprehensive security plan be developed for every peacekeeping and humanitarian operation, and that during early elaboration and implementation of that plan member states and the secretariat cooperate fully in order to ensure inter alia an open, immediate exchange of information on security issues; and, bearing in mind the need to reinforce the

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responsibility of the host state for the physical security of UN and associated personnel, also underlined the importance of including in each a status-of-forces agreement and status-of-mission agreement specific and practical measures based on the provisions of the convention on the safety of UN and associated personnel of 1994.

General Issues Relating to Sanctions Coming to the end of the assessment of thematic issues dealt with by the Council in the 1990s, a period of resurgence and renewal, the sanctions topic needs little more than a very brief note of summary and referral to a whole web of UN and non-UN activities around the highly contentious matter of whether and how to impose sanctions, if at all, in view of the collateral damages suffered usually by the civilian populations of the targeted states. The occasion of the Council’s look into this subject matter was actually linked to a prior decision it took to establish an ad hoc working group with the mandate to consider issues related to UN sanctions. The catalytic role of the Canadian government must be mentioned in this connection. Due to the initiative of the Canadian delegation and the country’s foreign minister, Mr. Lloyd Axworthy, the Council’s open meeting came about. The occasion was marked quite visibly through the presence of the Council presidency of the foreign minister himself. His statement, coming in the middle of the long afternoon session of the 4,128th meeting on 17 April 2000, set the framework for the Council’s new reexamination of the place of sanctions as a principal tool of the Council in maintaining international peace and security. Thanking the under-secretary-general for political affairs and the secretariat for work well done, the Canadian foreign minister started with the acknowledgment that sanctions were a very potent means to promote peace, but that after a decade of unprecedented recourse to this instrument, the record of its use and effect was decidedly mixed, and that successes as well as shortcomings were well known. The flaws of sanctions were due to hasty or ambitious design, a loose commitment to implementation, inadequate monitoring, and lax enforcement. Most of all, the costs in human terms were often too high, and the harmful impact of sanctions on innocent civilians, while unintended, was no less damaging for those feeling the effects. The consequence of this malaise was the risk to the legitimacy, credibility, and utility of this key tool of Council action, thus the challenge for UN members was to maximize the effectiveness of sanctions while minimizing the harm to civilians. The Canadian foreign minister proposed five considerations to getting sanctions right. If agreed, they could help set some framework and reference for the work of the group that had been set up by the Council. First, there had to be a strategy integrating sanctions into a broader Council strategy of prevention


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and resolution. Second, the Council had to look at its targets, which should center on changing the behavior of wrongdoers, to deprive them of the wherewithal to wage war and to brutalize the innocent. This meant a shift in focus of sanctions against abusive national decision makers, but also against terrorists, rebel movements, modern-day warlords, and other nonstate actors profiting from human suffering. The effective use of arms embargoes in particular required special attention by the Council: more rigorously drafted texts, more closely monitored implementation, and greater Council support for other efforts would go a long way toward better handling the very destructive flow of small arms to conflicts. Targeted sanctions should be linked creatively to targeted incentives. A third area of concern was engagement. If sanctions depended on the will of the international community to implement them, then they must well reflect the will of the community at large and not just the interests of the most powerful members. The burden should be shared more equitably. This related specially to those states close to the conflict, which often suffered the most but could least afford it; for them, the Council should be accessible for appeals under Article 50. Here, donor-country conferences to address the needs of particular member states adversely affected might be a useful measure. Fourth, the Council had to address the issue of capacity: here the question was whether the secretariat needed to be strengthened to upgrade its abilities in sanctions-related matters. While the needed expenses were not insignificant, it should be clear to all concerned that the cost was not too high compared to the costs of military intervention or prolonged sanctions regimes. Fifth, the Council needed a framework. While the acquired experience in the use of sanctions was vast, sanctions had little, or only controversial, standing in international law. Perhaps the time had come to consider the development of a legal regime for the purpose of codification of legal standards. This idea should be examined closely in order to make sanctions more effective. The Canadian foreign minister closed his remarks with an appeal to all interested parties, that everything should be done to help in the success of the working group’s deliberations and conclusions, and he expressed his pleasure that the group would seek outside advice in its work. The Canadian government planned to convene a conference of experts to develop a legal regime to govern the use of sanctions, including standardized policy guidelines and operational principles. The experience of the past decade of sanctions, good and bad, needed to be applied to ensure that the powerful tool of sanctions be used correctly, creatively, and coherently so the result would not diminish but rather advance human security. The extensive argument and exchange of the 4,128th meeting fulfilled its intended purpose, in that the cumulative insights provided a fair reflection of the range of views held in the international community on the past record of

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nonmilitary sanctions and on the future application of this important tool in a continuously turbulent international system. This rich outcome of the Council’s debate was meant to be of benefit to the newly established working group, which would continue to wrestle with the complex issue and in due time equip the Council with improved guidance and a new framework for the use of sanctions under Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter.

Conclusion It is symptomatic that the review of the Council’s many thematic issues would end on a tone of both criticism and hope, showing the Council in its enduring role as the main peace organ for the world community and foreshadowing decades of reflection and engagement. In that role, certain features of the Council’s work deserve to be summarized: • The Council was reaching out to its partners in the UN system and in the NGO community. • The Council displayed a newly gained confidence as an international actor. • The Council’s collective ability was pertinent throughout its work. • The skill and sincerity of Council members should be noted. • The Council showed in all of these issues a steep learning curve. • The frequency of open debates underpinned the Council’s newly gained transparency and openness. • The catalytic role of various Council members and their governments was striking. • The presidency of the Council was more often held on special occasions by the foreign minister or another high government official. All of these points highlight the insights gained in the detailed review of new themes and issues examined by the Council. That foundation offers a strong grounding for the relevance and capability of the Council as an instrument for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Conclusion

F

ollowing a rather long account and analysis of the UN Security Council’s practice in the period under review, the initial question can be taken up once again. What is the practical effect of the Council’s existence for the maintenance of international peace and security? Is a world in which new challenges and dangers have recently emerged still benefiting from the existence and continued functioning of the fifteen-member organ at the heart of the UN system? The views of journalists, academics, politicians, and other interested people diverge widely, and it oftentimes seems as if no loose agreement on the advantages as well as disadvantages of such an instrument could ever be reached. It needs to be mentioned once again that the location of the UN headquarters and its Council in New York City, on North American soil, has played a major role in intensifying the unending debate about whether the UN is salient and useful or whether it serves mostly as an irritant for major states resenting the restrictions placed upon their freedom of diplomatic and strategic movement. In all of this, one must remember that the organization and its procedures have been part of the global scene for altogether sixty years, thus offering significant evidence for its palpable utility for many governments in the international community. Aside from a general judgment about the significance of the Council, certain significant conclusions have emerged from the historical accounts presented earlier. The following points constitute an attempt to pull together the insights gained from the case studies and the overview of the Council’s thematic orientation in the second part of the study. 1. As a global forum for the full airing of conflicts and complaints, the Council continues to be indispensable. The fact that an injured party can seek satisfaction by going before the Council is still a major part of bringing about a

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reduction of tension. How often would the Middle East have exploded had the recourse to the Council or the General Assembly not been available? That is still true at present. Of course, states have the freedom not to come to the Council, but oftentimes it only means that they will arrive later, when much blood has been spilled. In that sense also, the Council has been and continues to be important for peace in the world. 2. The role, functions, and mandates of the Council enjoy an essentially undisputed legitimacy. Its decisions may not always be perceived as legitimate, but the exercise of its Charter-based role is per definitionem legal and legitimate. It also can bestow legitimacy on state parties and other actors and on particular conditions or outcomes. The defiance of the Council by big states and small states and even more so by nonstate actors, such as rebels and secessionists or civil war parties, is well known and frequently blatant. Here, the tools of “peace enforcement,” as the Charter calls it, would need to be applied to bring these defiant challengers to heel. But to do so, the Council must be united and willing to act forcefully. That, unfortunately, is still an unfulfilled aspiration. 3. While the direct impact of the Council leaves much to be desired, its indirect strength cannot be overlooked. The fact of its existence and the need for its authorization in many international situations and operations move it for all practical purposes back to center stage, where the Charter had envisaged it. Here, the vision of the January 1992 Council statement should be recalled. What was said at that time has not been revoked or amended. It maintains its timeliness in the twenty-first century and stabilizes the foundations on which the Council, with all of its shortcomings and flaws, rests. The potential of the Council as guardian for peace and security remains as high as ever. Its capacity as an intergovernmental body to address new challenges and crises is assured in the current state of affairs. It will be up to the member states and to supportive nonstate actors to improve the constitutional and financial underpinnings of the global peace instrument and enlarge the pool of norms and tools to protect the peace and security of the international community. 4. The cases as described do not show the Council in decline but as a vibrant and politically astute and activist organ whose fifteen members display a fine sense of the potential and capabilities inherent in its place in the Charter’s framework. Although in numerous cases Council members have taken the lead in the treatment of the respective difficult matters, it should be underscored that the sense of commitment and active involvement is shared by all Council members, and the input into Council policies reflects that joint search for sensible measures and suggestions. The busy calendar of Council consultations and formal meetings reflects the needs and concerns of a highly complex world where the many issues cutting across national boundaries call

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for multilateral approaches and cooperative modes of interaction. As the high-level Council meeting in September 2000 showed, even the heads of state and government assembled at UN headquarters confirmed the centrality of the UN institutions for the purposes of a stable global peace and the achievement of major goals in human development. Despite all of the gloomy editorializing about the UN in crisis by journalists and other shapers of public opinion or the cynical belittling of these activities by those clinging to the outdated notion of a world of sovereign states, the Council has displayed surprising strength and resilience and has fully validated the uses of the intergovernmental process shaping its bearing. 5. Moreover, the Council has systematically moved in the direction of setting up and joining multiactor ad-hoc coalitions as the preferred tool of management and transformation of the many pressing issues on its agenda. The case histories clearly document that growing trend in diplomatic practice and in other domains of global governance. This current constellation of international action bodes well for the evolving multilateral arrangements and their deployment in future challenges to peace and security. This widening phenomenon in today’s international relations ultimately will further strengthen the place held by the Council in such a world. 6. A few other trends should be briefly mentioned. The Council’s agenda expanded enormously over the last decade. That included not only new complex crises and conflicts but also numerous so-called “generic” issues, which have been dealt with in the overview here. If the Council was indeed marginalized and in irreversible decline, then it would not display such a pattern of steadily adding new items to its overcrowded agenda relating only tangentially to the country-specific items but requiring separate consideration in a crosscutting manner. Furthermore, in recent years, the Council has embraced new ideas and concrete steps to improve the transparency of an organ that previously had mostly worked in closed sessions. This move had been started by France more than a decade ago and helped remove or at least mitigate a perennial irritant for the states and their representatives on the outside. The Sierra Leone case especially demonstrates the recent tendency to reverse the previous habit to conduct business in secret and instead to bring the debates back out into the public domain. Among new practices in this direction, one should name the briefing of Council members by secretariat officials, hearings of nongovernmental organizations and other outside groups and lobbies, and the Council president’s recent practice of speaking to the media representatives outside of the Council area after each meeting, formal or informal. 7. The Council’s vitality can be measured by other indicators. The competition for nonpermanent seats continues undiminished. The candidates campaign

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actively and plan far ahead to ensure a successful run for a precious seat at the table. Furthermore, the Council has taken up a fundamental examination of how the Charter mandate in prevention can be activated and operationalized by the Council. Similar basic reviews have begun with other central issues (e.g., contemporary peacekeeping and how to update and improve it). 8. One key criticism, namely, that the Council was reactive rather than active in its peace and security mandate, must be dealt with. The last few years have shown a slow but perceptible change in this respect. The Council, through its various actions and articulations, has frequently taken the initiative before a formal complaint was officially submitted. This tendency to get involved earlier often cannot be noticed as matters come up in informal consultations, but it is visible. Moreover, with the governments usually keenly interested, the consensus to take up a particular matter may be arrived at in the busy communications flow between home offices and the New York missions before the matter itself emerges in the Council’s own dealings. As long as the Council, like all international intergovernmental bodies, remains a process involving active states and their instructed ambassadors, the question of who controls the Council’s policy process and decision making does not have to be posed, as it is clearly immaterial and of no interest. 9. The Council’s record in most of the cases considered offers the best testimony for the superiority of seeking peaceful settlements through a united Council. While the friction between principal members sometimes impedes joint initiatives by the Council, it is noteworthy, as seen in the Kosovo conflict, that in the end the members of the Council manage to adopt a common position and thereby to utilize all opportunities available to it through the complementary strengths and capabilities of various members. Specifically, what should be highlighted is the crucial role of Russia as a significant intermediary in the final settlement between Milosevic and the NATO alliance following the long air war against Serbian targets. It needs to be underscored that nonpermanent Council members and many other member states have felt strongly that the role of the UN Charter and the place of the Council as guardian of international peace should be not only maintained but further enhanced in order to enable the organs of the UN and their members to address the inevitable crises and challenges of a rather volatile and turbulent world. 10. With all of the reservations about the current role of the UN and the Council, the manner with which the Council accepted the challenge and took up a new and difficult task focused on “human security” and going far beyond the range of the cold war period and how it succeeded in rising to the level of practical policies and effective decisions in many emergencies while establishing a new dimension in its widening agenda for a world in turmoil is convincing evidence of its impressive vitality and dynamism. The Council

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underwent this transformation of its mandate and agenda and demonstrated in its tracking record its aptitude for learning. The exploration and adoption of new ways of addressing important international emergencies is proof of the strength and flexibility of the Council as political actor. The innovations over the last fifteen years or so are a remarkable record of distinction for the collective body of the Council. The contributions by numerous member states, many serving only on a nonpermanent basis, deserve to be heralded. This shows also in the fact that quite a few members of the informal human security network have served on the Council or have taken part in its proceedings during the period of gestation for the new agenda item. The new evidence supports the viewpoint that initiative and guidance in the Council often comes from smaller temporary members. That condition underpins the reaffirmation of the continuing viability and utility of the instrument of the Council for purposes relating to peace and security, including the central obligation to ensure the security of the individual human being in the constantly evolving world. 11. In the end, the major problem for the UN and especially for the Council is the profound dichotomy of unilateralism and multilateralism. As has been argued on many occasions, the clarification of the role of the United States as partner in multilateralism or as unilateral actor is most urgent if the full potential of the Council is to be realized. As long as that has not been done, the Council will be somewhat hampered and only partially effective and successful. If the future world will eventually bring about the rise of new regional powers and develop into a more multipolar global system, then the relevance of the Council as a global peace guarantor is bound to rise. The Council experienced an enormous boost in the early 1990s. It is critical that those years of resurgence and renewal be retained for years to come and that the Council in the future will build its actions and practices on that elevated platform erected on the pillars of tremendous commitment by the member states and of the vision of the Agenda for Peace, which helped shape the period of growth and stability.


Appendix

UN Security Council S/23500 January 31, 1992

Original: English Note by the President of the UN Security Council At the conclusion of the 3,046th meeting of the UN Security Council, held at the level of heads of state and government on January 31, 1992, in connection with the item entitled “The responsibility of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security,” the president of the Council made the following statement on behalf of its members. “The members of the Security Council have authorized me to make the following statement on their behalf. “The Security Council met at the Headquarters of the United Nations in New York on January 31, 1992, for the first time at the level of Heads of State and Government. The members of the Council considered, within the framework of their commitment to the United Nations Charter, “The responsibility of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security.” The meeting was chaired by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as the President of the Security Council for January. Statements were made by His Excellency Dr. Franz Vranitzky, Federal Chancellor of Austria, His Excellency Mr. Wilfried Martens, Prime Minister of Belgium, His Excellency Dr. Carlos Albert, Wahnon de Carvalho Veiga, Prime Minister of Cape Verde, His Excellency Mr. Pi Peng, Premier of the State Council of China, His Excellency Dr. Rodrigo Borja-Cevallos, Constitutional President

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of Ecuador, His Excellency Mr. Francois Mitterrand, President of France, His Excellency Dr. Giza Jeszenszky, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Personal Emissary of the Prime Minister of Hungary, His Excellency Mr. P. V. Narasimha Rao, Prime Minister of India, His Excellency Mr. Kiichi Miyazawa, Prime Minister of Japan, His Majesty Hassan II, King of Marocco, His Excellency Mr. Boris N. Yeltsin, President of the Russian Federation, His Excellency the Rt. Hon. John Major, MP, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, His Excellency Mr. George Bush, President of the United States of America, His Excellency Dr. Carlos Andres Perez, President of Venezuela and His Excellency Dr. Nathan Shamuyarira, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Personal Emissary of the President of Zimbabwe, as well as by the Secretary-General, His Excellency Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali. “The members of the Security Council consider that their meeting is a timely recognition of the fact that there are new favorable international circumstances under which the Security Council has begun to fulfil more effectively its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. “A time of change “This meeting takes place at a time of momentous change. The ending of the Cold War has raised hopes for a safer, more equitable and more humane worId. Rapid progress has been made, in many regions of the world, towards democracy and responsive forms of government, as well as towards achieving the Purposes set out in the Charter. The completion of the dismantling of apartheid in South Africa would constitute a major contribution to these Purposes and positive trends, including to the encouragement of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. “Last year, under the authority of the United Nations, the international community succeeded in enabling Kuwait to regain its sovereignty and territorial integrity, which it had lost as a result of Iraqi aggression. The resolutions adopted by the Security Council remain essential to the restoration of peace and stability in the region and must be fully implemented. At the same time the members of the Council are concerned by the humanitarian situation of the innocent civilian population of Iraq. “The members of the Council support the Middle East peace process, facilitated by the Russian Federation and the United States, and hope that it will be brought to a successful conclusion on the basis of Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). “They welcome the role the United Nations has been able to play under the Charter in progress towards settling long-standing regional disputes, and will work for further progress towards their resolution. They applaud the valuable contribution being made by United Nations peace-keeping forces now operating in Asia, Africa, Latin America and Europe.

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“The members of the Council note that United Nations peace-keeping tasks have increased and broadened considerably in recent years. Election monitoring, human rights verification and the repatriation of refugees have in the settlement of some regional conflicts, at the request or with the agreement of the parties concerned, been integral parts of the Security Council’s effort to maintain international peace and security. They welcome these developments. “The members of the Council also recognize that change, however welcome, has brought new risks for stability and security. Some of the most acute problems result from changes to state structures. The members of the Council will encourage all efforts to help achieve peace, stability and cooperation during these changes. “The international community therefore faces new challenges in the search for peace. All Member States expect the United Nations to play a central role at this crucial stage. The members of the Council stress the importance of strengthening and improving the United Nations to increase its effectiveness. They are determined to assume fully their responsibilities within the United Nations Organization in the framework of the Charter. “The absence of war and military conflicts amongst States does not in itself ensure international peace and security. The non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security. The United Nations membership as a whole, working through the appropriate bodies, needs to give the highest priority to the solution of these matters. “Commitment to collective security “The members of the Council pledge their commitment to international law and to the United Nations Charter. All disputes between States should be peacefully resolved in accordance with the provisions of the Charter. “The members of the Council reaffirm their commitment to the collective security system of the Charter to deal with threats to peace and to reverse acts of aggression. “The members of the Council express their deep concern over acts of international terrorism and emphasize the need for the international community to deal effectively with all such acts. “Peacemaking and peace-keeping “To strengthen the effectiveness of these commitments, and in order that the Security Council should have the means to discharge its primary responsibility under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security, the members of the Council have decided on the following approach: “They invite the Secretary-General to prepare, for circulation to the members of the United Nations by July 1, 1992, his analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the framework and

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provisions of the Charter the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peace-keeping. “The Secretary-General’s analysis and recommendations could cover the role of the United Nations in identifying potential crises and areas of instability as well as the contribution to be made by regional orqanizations in accordance with Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter in helping the work of the Council. They could also cover the need for adequate resources, both material and financial. The Secretary-General might draw on lessons learned in recent United Nations peace-keeping missions to recommend ways of making more effective Secretariat planning and operations. He could also consider how greater use might be made of his good Offices, and of his other functions under the United Nations Charter. “Disarmament, arms control and weapons of mass destruction “The members of the Council, while fully conscious of the responsibilities of other organs of the United Nations in the fields of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation, reaffirm the crucial contribution which progress in these areas can make to the maintenance of international peace and security. They express their commitment to take concrete steps to enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations in these areas. “The members of the Council underline the need for all Member States to fulfil their obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament; to prevent the proliferation in all its aspects of all weapons of mass destruction: to avoid excessive and destabilizing accumulations and transfers of arms; and to resolve peacefully in accordance with the Charter any problems concerning these matters threatening or disrupting the maintenance of regional and global stability. They emphasize the importance of the early ratification and implementation by the States concerned of all international and regional arms control arrangements, especially the START and CFE Treaties. “The proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security. The members of the Council commit themselves to working to prevent the spread of technology related to the research for or production of such weapons and to take appropriate action to that end. “On nuclear proliferation, they note the importance of the decision of many countries to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and emphasize the integral role in the implementation of that Treaty of fully effective IAEA safeguards, as well as the importance of effective export controls. The members of the Council will take appropriate measures in the case of any violations notified to them by the IAEA. “On chemical weapons, they support the efforts of the Geneva Conference with a view to reaching agreement on the conclusion, by the end of 1992, of a universal convention, including a verification regime, to prohibit chemical weapons.

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“On conventional armaments, they note the General Assembly’s vote in favour of a United Nations register of arms transfers as a first step, and in this connection recognize the importance of all States providing all the information called for in the General Assembly’s resolution. In conclusion, the members of the Security Council affirm their determination to build on the initiative of their meeting in order to secure positive advances in promoting international peace and security. They agree that the United Nations Secretary-General has a crucial role to play. The members of the Council express their deep appreciation to the outgoing Secretary-General, His Excellency Mr. Javier Perez de Cuellar, for his outstanding contribution to the work of the United Nations, culminating in the signature of the El Salvador peace agreement. They welcome the new Secretary-General, His Excellency Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, and note with satisfaction his intention to strengthen and improve the functioning of the United Nations. They pledge their full support to him, and undertake to work closely with him and his staff in fulfilment of their shared objectives, including a more efficient and effective United Nations system. “The members of the Council agree that the world now has the best chance of achieving international peace and security since the foundation of the United Nations. They undertake to work in close cooperation with other United Nations Member States in their own efforts to achieve this, as well as to address urgently all the other problems, in particular those of economic and social development, requirinq the collective response of the international community. They recoqnize that peace and prosperity are indivisible and that lasting peace and stability require effective international cooperation for the eradication of poverty and the promotion of a better life for all in larger freedom.”


Notes

Introduction 1. For a recent review of the eternal reform squabble, see Benjamin Rivlin, “The UN Reform Conundrum,” American Foreign Policy Interests 27 (2005): 365–84. By the same author, see the earlier essay “UN Reform from the Standpoint of the United States,” UN University Lectures 11 (Tokyo: United Nations University, 1996). See also “Reforming the UN,” Peace Watch 11:2 (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, August–September 2005) on a major US contribution. 2. For a journalistic view on the contradictions surrounding the role and effects of the UN organs, in particular, the Council, see James Traub, “Who Needs the UN Security Council?,” New York Times Magazine (November 17, 2002), 46–51. 3. For a very forceful demarche about the decline of the Council, see Michael Glennon, “Why the Security Council Failed,” Foreign Affairs 82:3 (May–June 2003), 16–35. See also critical ratings provided by David Malone, ed., in The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004), in the Introduction and Conclusion. Malone is much fairer and more balanced in his criticism than Glennon. 4. See Shashi Tharoor, “Why America Still Needs the United Nations?,” Foreign Affairs 82:5 (September–October 2003), 67–80, for a cogent argument in favor of the undiminished relevance of the UN for the world, including the United States. 5. For a fresh account of the Council in the wider web of the UN, see Courtney B. Smith, Politics and Process at the United Nations (Boulder, CO, and London: Lynne Rienner, 2006), especially part 2.

Chapter 1 1. These introductory chapters are followed by several selected case histories of items before the Council and an analytical account of the Council in the 1990s covering

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a variety of smaller and thematic issues on the Council’s agenda during this period. The underlying assumption is that the Council’s effectiveness and efficiency are higher than publicly perceived, and that only a thorough description of its ten-year record will permit a fair and an objective definitive judgment on its viability and relevance. 2. Javier Perez de Cuellar, Pilgrimage for Peace: A Secretary-General’s Memoir (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), offers an excellent complementary account of the years of global change from the late 1980s to the early 1990s. 3. The general evaluative description is based on Council reports and other Council documents, which are indicated directly in the text. The author’s long work experience in the secretariat department dealing with the Council also is reflected in the argument developed. 4. The central purpose of the total manuscript is the reexamination and revalidation of the Council as a key component of the current global governance system in terms of effectiveness and relevance. 5. The most visible aspects of the Council’s place and work in world affairs have been dealt with in numerous monographs, collected volumes, articles, and research reports. The Global Governance journal and memoirs, such as the ones by Perez de Cuellar and Boutros-Ghali, also should be listed as prime resources. 6. A basic sketch of this consultation procedure in its infancy is contained in Paths to Peace: The UN Security Council and Its Presidency, edited and with an Introduction by Davidson Nicol (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981), especially chapter 1. 7. The role of small states as nonpermanent members of the Council is clearly a lacuna in academic or policy research. A recent unpublished paper by a Slovenian diplomat and scholar has shed light on that neglected dimension of diplomatic work in and around the Council. Such a new focus would help counter the tendency to regard only the large powers, including the five permanent members. An existing imbalance in political and academic attention could be at least somewhat corrected. 8. For a brief reference and description to the “Arria” formula, see this author’s “The Security Council,” in The United Nations at the Millennium: The Principal Organs, ed. Paul Taylor and A. J. R. Groom, 61–99; here p. 92 (London and New York: Continuum, 2000). 9. For the announcement of the new procedures, see the presidential statement (S/PRST/1996/13), dated March 28, 1996.

Chapter 2 1. Since the intention is to hew closely to the Council process of deliberations and decisions, there will be little referencing to secondary literature, unless required or advisable. 2. See here especially the very fine account in Javier Perez de Cuellar, Pilgrimage for Peace: A Secretary-General’s Memoir (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997).

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Chapter 3 1. The remarkable “Agenda for Peace” series of presidential statements underlines the importance of this type of Council decision. It helps to understand that resolutions and presidential statements are, for all practical purposes, equivalent and viewed in this fashion by UN members.

Chapter 4 1. The agenda item of the situation in the occupied Arab territories is seen as critically important and salient for the development of the overall Middle East problem both as far as the UN is concerned and as it relates to US foreign policy. 2. The brief sketch of the general developments in the Middle East serves only as a background for the close and detailed look at the Council’s handling of the occupied territories item. 3. This formula for the Palestinian invitation to the Council meetings was unique in UN history and, formally speaking, quite improper. This case demonstrates that the Council is the “master of its own procedures” and not bound by past practice. 4. The emphasis on the de jure applicability was crucial, as Israel had claimed de facto acceptance but firmly rejected its applicability on a de jure basis. 5. The political nature of the initial US objection is fully demonstrated by the fact that the legal basis of the Palestinian request had not changed, but the political context had, and therefore the United States abandoned its position. 6. This short statement just touches upon the author’s basic view on the “legitimacy” problem. Recent initiatives raising questions and concerns about legitimacy and democracy “deficits” in contemporary governmental and intergovernmental institutions and processes require a broader and more probing separate argument. 7. For the key US-UN relationship, see Edward C. Luck, Mixed Messages: American Politics and International Organization, 1919–1999 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999). This book is an important contribution to the political and academic discourse.

Chapter 5 1. Since the purpose of this chapter on the Council is its practice, and more general aspects of the debate on the UN and international organizations have been touched upon in other parts of this manuscript, general reference is here made to a few relevant writings in the bibliography. 2. As in previous papers, many individual references to the exceedingly rich UN documentation have been mostly avoided, but important sources are marked in parentheses in the text, thus enabling the reader to check these UN documents on their own. It is indeed remarkable how much of the relevant material about a contemporary complex emergency is found in documents issued by the organization.


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Index

Abidjan Agreement, 74 act of aggression, 42 ad hoc groups of states and non-state actors, formation of, 61, 76, 84, 86, 88 Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC), 148 strategic framework concept developed by, 148 Afghanistan conflict, 101 pre-Taliban, 65, 96 under Taliban, 100, 133 Africa, 103, 113, 130, 137, 138, 141, 143, 152, 153, 155, 158, 159, 166, 169, 170–171, 175, 179, 180, 181, 187, 188 African States, 75, 84 African Union, 169 Agenda for Peace, secretary-general (SG) report, 22, 24, 26, 30, 31, 33, 103, 109, 131, 136, 143, 145, 146, 148, 199 supplement to an Agenda for Peace, 148, 177 Agenda of the UNSC, xi, 4, 16, 17, 18, 22, 32, 60, 88, 91, 92, 93, 94, 115, 117, 120, 136, 140, 165, 168, 172, 174, 177, 178, 189, 190, 197 generic issues, 88, 197 increase in substantive items, 91, 197

items, 2, 4, 6, 9, 17, 32, 117, 120, 140, 165, 168, 172, 177, 178, 189, 190 aggression, 19 Air India, plane crash due to terrorism, 97 Albanians, 169 Albright, Madeleine, Ambassador, 48 Algeria, 37, 121 Angola, 17, 146, 153, 156, 170, 179 Arab States, 38, 40, 52 Arab territories, situation in the occupied, x, 35–58, 99 Arafat, 41, 42 Argentina, 96, 107, 108, 110, 111, 122, 154–155, 166 armed force, use of, as last resort, 59, 73, 87, 97, 130, 132, 141, 145, 148, 166, 168, 174, 175 armed intervention, unilateral trend seen, 138, 145 arms control, 18, 20, 119, 155, 177 Asia, 103 assistance, technical and financial, 64 Australia, 160 Austria, 19–20, 65, 148 Axworthy, Lloyd, Canada’s Foreign Minister, 192, 193, 194 Bahrain, 14, 40, 98–99, 140, 146, 152–153, 161, 163, 166

215

216

Index

Balkans, 152 Bangladesh, 85 Beit Sahur, 39 Belgium, 20 Bin Laden, Osama, terrorist, 97, 100 bipolar world, waning of, 16, 18, 91, 101 Bosnia, 129, 139, 173 Botswana, 49, 111, 121 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, former SG, 148, 177 Brazil, 37, 96, 117, 136, 144–145, 155, 168 breach of the peace, 26 Burundi, 32 Cambodia, 17, 101 Canada, 16, 27, 37, 43, 85, 97, 147, 158–159, 166–167, 192 Conference in Ottawa on de-mining announced, 28 Conference of experts to develop a legal regime for the use of sanctions, to be convened, 193 Cape Verde, 20 Care, 130 Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflicts, 150 definition of peace building, 150 view on the three main sources of insecurity, 150 cease-fire, vii, viii, 10, 11, 13, 61, 62, 84, 105 Central Africa, 169 Central America, 138, 143, 152, 158, 159 Central American crisis, 101 Central Asian region, 61, 66, 67 charismatic leadership, 34 Charter of the UN, vii, 17, 18, 19, 30, 35, 54, 142, 145, 166, 167, 174, 175, 176, 184, 196 Chapter VI, 185 Chapter VII, 121, 134, 141, 174 China warning against frequent invocation by UNSC, 130, 141

maintenance of international peace and security, 8, 10, 18, 22, 23, 26, 28, 32, 33, 50, 54, 60, 63, 66, 69, 75, 85, 86, 99, 100, 101, 102, 117, 126, 133, 135, 143, 144, 145, 173, 176, 181, 184, 189, 194, 195, 196 child soldiers, 31–32, 128, 147, 152, 153, 154, 157, 161, 162, 163, 167, 180 UN SG Special Representative for children and armed conflict, 31, 32 See also under Otunnu, Olara children in armed conflict, 179 Chile, 130 China, 6, 11, 15, 20, 37, 98, 105, 117, 122, 130, 132, 141, 158, 166, 180–181 insisting on strict distinction between humanitarian action political and security issues, 130 objecting to the UNSC taking up the nuclear issue, 117 coexistence of peoples, 19 Cold War, ix, x, 7, 9, 10, 11, 17, 18, 42, 114, 129, 176, 198 Collective security, 18, 20, 21 Colombia, 37, 41, 44 common heritage, 20 Commonwealth, 72 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 62, 65, 66, 68 peacekeeping forces of CIS, 62 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), 24 confidence-building, 24, 190 confidentiality, 4, 35, 67, 88, 113, 131, 139 conflict causes of, 182–183, 185, 186 greed, 186 mitigation, 169 prevention, 22, 30, 89, 146, 149, 167, 169, 171, 175, 179, 182, 185, 188 resolution, 26, 29, 101, 129, 148, 149, 171, 185, 198 situations, 60 Congo, Democratic Republic of, 1, 41, 43, 114, 133, 169

Index

consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures, 148 consultations in the UNSC, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 17, 23, 25, 30, 31, 34, 39, 40, 45, 46, 48, 50, 51, 66, 67, 73, 74, 77, 78, 82, 87, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 101, 104, 115, 118, 119, 130, 140, 151, 160, 168, 187, 196, 198 consultations process, 3, 4, 6, 7, 94, 95, 103, 178 informal, 4, 6 contact group of guarantor states and international organizations, 61, 63, 64, 67 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, 95 Convention on the Safety of UN and Associated Personnel of 9 December 1994, 135, 191, 192 cooperation, 19, 20, 25, 75, 94, 97, 145, 176, 182, 183, 188 cooperation between the UN and regional organizations, under Chapters VII and VIII of the Charter, 75, 84, 182, 188 coordination, 20, 25, 29, 126, 132, 142, 144, 147, 153, 162, 166, 183 Costa Rica, 53, 129–130, 142–143 Cote d’Ivoire, 41, 43, 70, 72, 82 crimes against humanity, 167, 184 crisis management, 127–128 crisis prevention, 21 Croatia, 160 Cuba, 41, 44 culture of impunity, to be fought, 126, 133, 147, 166, 167, 185 culture of prevention of armed conflicts, needed, 184, 187 Cyprus, 17 Czech Republic, 111, 122 Dar-es-Salaam, 100 decision-making in the UNSC, xi, 2, 9, 10, 26, 34, 64, 67, 70, 84, 87–88, 99, 108, 113, 176, 185, 188

217

debates, 6, 10, 27, 42–43, 63, 66, 74, 78, 88–89, 98, 108, 109–111, 123–124, 125–127, 131, 144, 151–152, 168, 169–170, 173–176, 186–187, 190–191 new practice of openness and transparency, 89, 108, 113 decisions of the UNSC, viii, 1, 4, 6, 10, 66, 176, 186, 188 compliance with, 11 consensus, x, 4, 7, 9, 11, 18, 22, 48, 56, 59, 67, 111, 125, 139, 151, 175 draft, 4, 12, 15, 43, 47, 49, 51, 53, 82 effectiveness, 100 formal, 6 implementation, viii, ix, 10, 40, 168 mission of the Security Council to Sierra Leone, 85–86 presidential statements, viii, 2, 4, 5, 6, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29–30, 31, 32–33, 42, 45, 46, 55, 60, 63, 66, 67–68, 70, 72, 73–74, 76, 77, 78, 81, 85, 86, 91, 93, 94, 101, 104, 107, 112, 115, 118, 119, 131–132, 135, 148, 151, 155, 160–161, 164, 171–172, 181–182, 183, 184–186, 187–188, 191–192 report of the Mission to the UNSC, 85–86 recalling the SG role in prevention in accordance with Article 99 of the Charter, 188 resolutions, viii, 2, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 37, 38, 43, 46, 47, 51, 60, 66, 75, 77, 78, 82, 85, 91, 92, 93, 94, 99–100, 105, 112–113, 117, 123, 189 salience, 100, 195 suspension, 41 unanimity, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 42, 46, 47, 67, 75, 78, 82, 92, 97, 99 voting on draft resolutions, 37, 38, 39, 41, 47, 92, 117, 161 decolonization, 3 demagoguery, 36, 146, 154

218

Index

de-mining, 25, 26, 27–30, 31, 142, 143, 147, 152 anti-personnel land mines, 26 role of large NGO coalition, 28 democracy, 19, 20, 70, 139, 159, 175, 186 democratic elections, 70, 143 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), 114–119 intention to withdraw from NPT, 114 suspension of intention to withdraw, 118 question of noncompliance with NPT, 114, 119 development, 18, 19, 20, 25, 69, 130, 144, 146, 148, 149, 150, 155, 158, 181, 184, 185 human development, 69 diamonds, 69, 87 disarmament, 19, 21, 114, 115, 119, 144, 148, 155, 156, 157, 158, 162, 177, 178, 179, 180–182 according to Charter Articles 26 and 43, 47, 20, 21, 114, 119, 177 nuclear, 19 small arms and light weapons, 144, 147, 152, 154, 155, 156, 162, 177–182 illegal trafficking, especially in Africa, 144, 152, 154, 179, 182, 188 US proposal for international convention on arms trafficking, 156 proposal for an international conference on illicit arms, 178 recommendations of a group of experts on small arms welcomed by UNSC, 182 voluntary moratoriums on arms exports to tension zones, recommended, 181 disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating belligerent forces (DDR), 25, 72, 84, 142, 143, 147, 151, 153, 154, 155–156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162–163, 164, 181, 185

Djibouti, 47 documentation, 5, 6 Durban Declaration, 98 early warning and analysis, 127, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 189 East Timor, 114, 175 Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 142, 145, 146, 156, 157, 167 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 72, 73, 75, 76, 77, 81, 83, 179 committee of Four, 74 committee of Five, 75 Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), 69, 70, 75, 77, 82, 83 ECOWAS moratorium, 179 economic rehabilitation, 64, 143, 145 Ecuador, 18–19 Egypt, 50, 51, 52, 53, 56, 75, 120–121, 128–129, 147–148 election monitoring, 103 El Salvador, 156, 160 enforcement action under Article 42, 21, 141, 145 environment, 18, 19, 21 degradation, 20 Erasmus, 154 Ethiopia, 37, 41 Ethiopia-Eritrea war, 114 Europe, 103, 113 Central, 21, 159 Eastern, 21, 159 Southeastern, 169 European Union (formerly Community), 14, 28, 65, 148, 149, 154, 159, 160, 179 Council of the EU, 149 fact-finding, 23, 24, 33, 183 missions, 23, 24, 51, 66, 127, 183, 185, 190 missions of inquiry, 33

Index

fanaticism, 19 financial institutions, 142, 147 financial resources, 26, 113, 152, 153, 163, 168, 173, 175, 180 Finland, 37, 43, 159–160 France, 7, 11, 15, 18, 37, 43, 49, 53, 97, 108, 110–111, 116, 117, 143–144, 156, 167–168, 179–180, 197 freedom of movement, principle of, 16 freedoms, 19, 20 Gabon, 98, Gambia, 82, 167 Gaza Strip, 51 General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord, 62, 63, 64, 67 general issues relating to sanctions, 192–194 Geneva Conventions, 33, 36, 37, 38, 39, 42, 45, 46, 48, 129, 174 additional Protocols of 1977, 33 meeting of the High Contracting Parties suggested, 45 Georgia, 23 Germany, Federal Republic of, 13, 111, 122 global civil society, 33 Global Forum, 33, 54–55, 57, 131, 143, 195–196 Global governance, viii, 1, 2, 22, 26, 57–58, 59, 114, 124, 133, 199 good governance, 148 Gorbachev, 1, 9, 13 Great Lakes region of Africa, 129, 130, 137, 138 Group of Arab States, 14, 38–56 passim Guatemala, 160 Commission for Reintegration, 160 Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union (URNG), 160 Guinea, 73 Guinea-Bissau, 153, 156 Gulf crisis, 184

219

Hague Conventions, 33, 37 Haiti, 17, 153 Hammarskjold Medal, 112–113 Hebron massacre, 47, 48 Israel severely rebuked over massacre, 49 Hezbollah, viii Higgins, Lt.Col., abducted, 93 Honduras, 49, 122 hostage taking and abduction, 93 human development, 19, 88, 197 humanitarian assistance, 30, 31, 32, 66, 72, 127, 128, 132, 143, 165–166, 168, 169, 173, 174–175, 181, 182, 191 endorsing principles of, 132, 133, 134, 167, 171 preventive humanitarian action, called for, 130 humanitarian crises, 24, 25, 126, 133, 134, 168–169, 176, 189 mass displacement of population as, 24, 169, 170 humanitarian intervention, contested, 172, 174–175, 176 humanitarian issues, 7, 24–25, 31, 33, 149, 165, 166, 173, 175, 176–177 misappropriation of humanitarian assistance, 25 relief to development transition, 25, 156–157 human rights, 7, 18, 19, 20, 31, 100, 134, 143, 146, 147, 148, 155, 159, 168, 175, 185, 186, 191 gross violations of (rape, mutilation, slaughter), 78, 84, 168, 175 verification, 103 violations, 13, 73, 126, 166, 168, 178, 189 minority rights, 20 human security, 127, 128, 155, 158, 167, 193, 198 Hungary, 21, 116, 117

220

Index

India, 20, 121, 149–150, 174–175 Indonesia, 49, 121 inequality, horizontal, identified by UNU study as principal cause of conflict, 186, 187 inferiority complex, 19 Informals. See consultations in the UNSC intergovernmental organizations, 40, 59–60, 88, 89 internal conflicts, UNSC tendency to get involved in, 141 internally displaced persons, 61, 66, 126, 129 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 114–120 authorized to seek UNSC involvement in case of disagreement, 114, 115 implementation of safeguards agreement, 114 on-site inspections, 114, 115 monitoring the provisions of the NPT, 114 International Action Network on Small Arms, 179 International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 11, 92 investigation, 11 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 27, 28, 32, 45–46, 128, 134, 135 International Conference on Central American Refugees (CIREFCA), 138 International Conference on Illicit Arms in all aspects convened in 2001, 178, 179, 181 formation of a group of friends, proposed, 181 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 95 International Criminal Court, 89, 133, 184, 185, 191 Rome statute for the, 185, 191 international financial institutions, 23 international security, 128, 167 international tribunals, 89, 126

invitations to non-SC member states. See under procedures of the UNSC Iran, 1, 10, 11, 62, 64, 68, 121, 175–176 letters to the SG, 10, 12 request for a UNSC meeting, 10 Iran-Iraq war, 1, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 101 Iraq, vii, 10, 11, 12, 13, 17, 19, 25, 102, 150, 168 aggression against Kuwait, 2, 3, 4, 19, 102 invasion of Iran, 10, 12 use of chemical weapons, 13 war against, vii Ireland, 28 Israel, vii, 35–58 conflict with Lebanon, vii, viii opening of entrance to tunnel under Western Wall of Mosque, charged, 51 settlement policy, challenged, 39, 40, 49, 52, 55 territorial annexation, charged, 49, 55 Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles, 48, 55 Italy, 13, 122 Jamaica, 85, 186 Japan, 20–21, 105, 116, 117, 118, 119 Jewish Center in Buenos Aires, Argentina, attacked, 94 Jewish Community, 36 Jerusalem, 38–55 passim Jonah, James, 74 Kabbah, president of Sierra Leone, 72, 73, 74, 76, 81 ousted, 72 Kazakhstan, 64 Kenya, 77, 94, 96, 146 Khomeini, Ayatollah, 2, 12 Khudesh Agreement between President Rakhmonov and Mr. Nuri, 62 Koroma, Johnny Paul, Major, leader of military regime, 72 Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), set up by Koroma, 72

Index

Kosovo, 99, 133, 138, 139, 153–154, 156, 168, 169, 174, 175, 198 Liberation Army, 153 Force (KFOR), 154 Kuwait, 4, 17, 19, 38 Kyrgyzstan, 65, 66 Latin America, 103 League of Arab States, 13, 53 Lebanon, vii conflict with Israel, vii, viii legitimacy of UN action, 57, 70, 75, 196 legitimacy of UNSC action, questioned, 50 double standard charged, 50 Liberia, ix, 17, 69, 87, 168–169 Liberian forces, 70 Liberian peace process, 74 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 14, 15, 17, 69 complaint, 14 Lockerbie, airplane bomb, 96, 98 logistics, 8, 31, 109 Maintaining peace and security: Humanitarian aspects of issues before the UNSC, 172–177 Maintenance of Peace and Security and Postconflict Peace Building, 138, 140–164 Malaysia, 37, 41, 44, 98, 121, 151, 152, 154, 157, 161, 167 Mali, 85 Medecins sans frontieres, 130 meetings of the UNSC, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 21, 37, 38, 183 away from Headquarters, requested, 40 away from Headquarters, decided, 40–41 closed session, 3, 35 formal public meeting, 4, 8, 10, 15, 27, 31, 32, 42, 43, 47, 50, 53, 60, 62, 66, 72, 73, 77, 86, 87, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 101, 103, 104, 112, 115, 117, 118–119, 125, 131, 133, 134, 136, 138, 140, 151, 157, 161, 162,

221

163, 168–169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 176, 178, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 186, 189, 190, 191, 192, 196 high-level meeting, 18, 22, 51, 102, 124, 178, 180–182, 197 regular UNSC meetings on prevention, suggested by SG, 183, 186 to meet at the level of foreign minister, under Article 28 of the Charter, 186 requested, 36, 38, 39, 40, 42, 51, 66 Member States, 85, 146, 196 small states, 20 Members of the UNSC, 5, 9, 196 African Members, 74 alignments, 2 competition for membership, 89, 197–198 group representation, 2, 3 Communist, 3 nonaligned, 3, 37, 38, 39, 40, 47 nonaligned debaters, 15 Western, 3, 39, 40, 50 mission to the UN, 6 nonpermanent, x, 3, 7, 13, 37, 111, 130, 133, 140, 161, 197–198, 199 permanent, x, 3, 7, 12, 13, 38, 123, 124, 149, 161 quality of representation, 34, 174, 196 small member states, 6, 140, 199 Middle East, vii, x, 17, 35–58, 92, 100 Middle East peace conference, suggested, 45 Military Staff Committee, 21, 114 strengthening under Articles 46 and 47, 21, 114 Milosevic, 198 misanthropy, 19 Moldova, 23 Monoh, president of Sierra Leone, 69 Mozambique, 143, 144, 153, 154, 156, 160, 173 multilateralism, viii, 33, 50, 54, 57, 59, 145, 197, 199 multipolarity, 20, 199

222

Index

Nagorno-Karabakh, 17, 23 Nairobi, 100 Namibia, 2, 99, 143, 157–158, 167, 178 question of , 101 National sovereignty, Charter norm affirmed, 175, 180 National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), 146, 153 nationalism, 19 national liberation, 98 natural resources, 69 Nepal, 37 Netanyahu, as Ambassador, 41 as Prime Minister, 51 Netherlands, 85, 97, 166, 178, 181 New Zealand, 28, 14, 105, 107, 108–109, 110, 116, 160 proposal for a subsidiary body under Article 29 of the Charter, 108, 109–111 Nicaragua, 156 Nigeria, 47, 49, 69, 72, 73, 84, 121 Nigerian military fighting in Sierra Leone, 72 Nonaligned Movement (NAM), 13–14, 21, 40, 98, 121–122, 123, 124, 149, 172, 174–175 meeting of NAM Foreign Ministers on 23 September 1999, 174–175 non-governmental organizations, 33, 142, 143, 147, 183, 194 meetings of humanitarian organizations with UNSC members, 130, 131 noninterference in internal affairs, 20, 141, 158, 166, 180 nonmilitary threats to security, 21 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 114–124 obligation of Nuclear-Weapon States to provide security assurances, 120–124 review conference, 120 indefinite extension of the NPT hoped for, 122

non-state actors, 9, 196 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 141, 198 North-South gap, 20, 21, 129 North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, 115, 118 nuclear capacity for military applications, 115 nuclear issue on UNSC agenda, 117, 123–124 Nuri, leader of Tajik opposition, 62, 64 Ogata, Sadako, UNHCR, High Commissioner, 136–139, 168–169, 170–171 question-and-answer period with UNSC, 137–139 Oman, 47, 49, 122 on-site monitoring, 39 openness, 4, 7, 108, 112, 129, 131, 139, 151, 165, 194 order, principle of, vii Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 62, 65, 68, 137 Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission, 137 renamed Kosovo Verification Mission, 137 Organization of African Unity (OAU), 72, 73, 75, 77, 154, 188 enhancing its capacity in prevention, 188 OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, 74 OAU convention governing the specific aspects of refugee problems in Africa, 1969, 171 Organization of American States (OAS), 154, 158, 179 convention adopted by OAS in November 1997, 179 Organization of the Islamic Conference, 13, 65

Index

Otunnu, Olara, SG Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, 83 report about Sierra Leone to the UNSC, 83 Oxfam, 130 Pakistan, 47, 64, 65, 105, 117 Palestine, 35–58 Intifada, 37 Palestinians deported, 37, 38, 45, 46 Palestinian terrorism, charged, 37, 38 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 37, 42, 100 Palestinian National Congress, 36 Papua New Guinea, 160 peace, defined, 146, 148, 155, 160, 169, 171, 181, 196, 197 peace agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF of Sierra Leone, 71 peace accord noted by UNSC, 72 peace building, 8, 24, 25, 26, 29, 30, 32, 61, 64–65, 68, 130, 140–164, 166, 169, 175, 179, 183, 185, 187, 188 lack of agreement on definition, alleged, 149, 180, 181 peace dividend, 20 peacekeeping, 7, 8, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 29, 30, 31, 63, 65, 84, 85, 101–114, 126, 128, 141–142, 144, 148, 155, 164, 173, 180 augmenting military and civilian staff in secretariat, 103 civilian police, fully integrated, 105, 112, 142, 151 electoral assistance, 142 forces, 101 human rights monitoring, 142, 164 improving capacity for peacekeeping, SG report, 105 military liaison and security advisory personnel deployed, 77, 151 multifunctional peacekeeping, 142, 144, 146, 151

223

operations center, suggested, 103 planning staff, suggested, 103 rapid response mechanism, suggested, 18, 19, 30, 31 safety of UN forces and personnel, 104, 136–137, 190–192 outrage about assaults on UN personnel, 104, 191, protection of personnel called for, 105, 192 SG report, 104 standby capacity, 30, 105 SG report, 107 status-of-forces agreement and statusof-mission agreement needed, 192 peacemaking, 11, 12, 13, 15, 18, 19, 21, 22, 25, 39, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 54, 55, 61, 62, 63, 65, 66, 68, 74, 86, 87, 102, 103, 105, 144, 155, 184 getting parties to negotiations, 37 Petrov, Ivo, special envoy of SG for Tajikistan, 62 Poland, 127 policy-making of the UNSC, ix, 3, 7, 150–151, 157, 161, 164, 171, 174, 175, 176, 179, 180, 181, 182, 187, 188, 190, 194, 195–199 Pope, 19 Portugal, 53, 65, 144 Post-Cold War era, 102 poverty, 19, 20, 21, 183, 185, 186 presidential statements. See under decisions of the UNSC preventive action, 18, 130, 185–186 capacity, 127 deployment, 127, 130, 183, 185, 186, 187, 188 development, 130 diplomacy, 20, 21, 23, 24, 103, 183, 185, 186, 187, 188, 198 disarmament, 183, 185, 186 monthly meeting between the Presidents of the UNGA and the UNSC, 186

224

Index

private sector, 142, 147 procedures of the UNSC, ix, x, xi, 4, 17, 36, 111, 168 adjournment, 4, 49, 176, 184 Arria formula, 7 commission of UNSC, proposed, 41, 43 invitations of non-SC member states, 4, 8, 94, 183, 186, 190 invitation of Palestinian representative, 36, 37, 38, 47 participation of non-SC member states, 8 procedural debate, 37 procedural vote, 37, 38, 45 reforms, 8 rules for invitations, 36, 168 suspension, 4, 45 promoting peace and security: humanitarian activities relevant to the UNSC, 165–168 humanitarian assistance to refugees in Africa, 168–172 prosperity, 18 protection for humanitarian assistance to refugees and others in conflict situations, 125–140 of civilians in armed conflict, 32, 166–167, 168, 171, 176, 179, 185, 191 of UN personnel, associated personnel, and humanitarian personnel in conflict zones, 190–192 Qatar, 38, 53 quality of life, principle of, 19 Rakhmonov, president of Tajikistan, 62, 64 reduction of tension, 36 refugees, 21, 31, 61, 66, 126, 129, 131, 157, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171–172 repatriation, 103, 170

return and displaced persons, 26, 129, 170 targeted by combatants, 126, 128, 133, 135, 166, 167, 171 regional conflicts, 2, 13, 20, 101, 130 regional groups, 9 regional organizations, 20, 24, 61, 105, 113, 144, 161, 185, 186, 190 called upon to formally associate with the UN, 24 conforming to Chapter VIII of the Charter, 24, 144 UN cooperation with them intensified, 186 regulation of armaments, 114 Republic of Korea (South Korea), 115–118, 126–127, 134 attendance of Foreign Minister during ROK Presidency, 127 resolution of disputes, according to Charter, 18, 19, 198 resolutions. See under decisions of the UNSC resource depletion, 20, 148 Revolutionary United Front (RUF), 69, 70, 72, 73, 76, 81, 85 rhetoric, 36 role of the UNSC in the prevention of armed conflicts, 182–190, 198 Romania, 122 rule of law, 19, 20, 159, 184, 186 Russian Federation, 19, 48, 62, 63–64, 65, 68, 87, 95, 99, 116, 117, 137, 141–142, 153–154, 166, 198 lead role in Tajikistan case, 67, 87 Russian border forces, 62 Rwanda, ix, 3, 32, 47, 49, 106, 166, 169 refugees in eastern Zaire, 129, 169 Rwandan massacre, 105 Saddam Hussein, 42 safety of UN forces and personnel, 25, 126–127, 131, 133, 134, 139, 166–167, 171, 190–192 Sankoh, Foday, RUF leader, 69, 70, 72

Index

sanctions under Chapter VII, Article 41, 21, 30, 44, 73, 75–76, 97, 145, 150, 152, 186, 192–194 ad-hoc working group on issues related to UN sanctions, set up by UNSC, 192, 193, 194 impact on innocent civilians, 192, 193 impact on third countries under Article 50, 21, 23, 24, 193 lifting of sanctions requested, 77 request not to lift sanctions, 77 revamping of comprehensive sanctions, 78, 192, 193 considerations to get sanctions right, 192–194 Sanctions Committee, 76, 79 Saudi Arabia, 50 Sebrenica, 126 secretariat, ix, 22, 31, 74, 85, 107, 113, 172, 184, 185, 192 proposals requested for informationgathering and analysis, 23, 24, 185 training of staff in prevention and early warning, 186 secretary-general (SG), viii, 10, 12, 13, 15, 18, 20, 22, 99, 102, 113, 115, 172, 177, 178, 182, 184 addressing the UNSC, 172–173, 178, 182–184, 186–187 briefings by Deputy SG to UNSC, 133–134, 152, 190 financial support from member states for prevention efforts, 186 communication to the UNSC, 115 good offices, 12, 24, 66, 70, 185 interaction with NGOs on prevention, 186 inviting the UNGA to consider small arms and landmines problems, 177 Perez de Cuellar, 13 position paper of 1995, 30 referring to Article 65 for better coordination between UNSC and ECOSOC, 145, 186

225

reports, 5, 22, 44, 60, 73, 75, 77, 78–79, 80, 82, 86, 103, 104, 105, 107, 132–133, 155, 161–163, 169–170, 174, 177–178, 189 report on prevention of armed conflict issued on 7 June 2001, 189 report to the 54th session of the UNGA on humanitarian intervention, 174 requested to issue reports, 13, 22, 33, 43, 156, 158, 161, 177, 185, 191 alerting UNSC to potential threats to peace and security, 189 conducting comprehensive review of security in peacekeeping operations, 191 request by UNGA for report on small arms, 177 responsibilities under Article 99 of the Charter, 23 special envoys, 61 suggestion for monthly prevention meetings between Presidents of UNGA and UNSC, 186 suggestion that the UNSC seek advise from the ICJ under Article 96, 186 Waldheim, 13 self-defense, right to, 14, 16, 123, 130, 180, 191 under Article 51, 16, 123 self-determination principle, 98 Senegal, 37 Serbia, 169, 174, 198 Sierra Leone, x, 60, 69–87, 88, 137, 153, 166, 168–169, 197 National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), 70 Strasser, 70 UN observers to monitor the peace in Sierra Leone, requested, 72 Slovenia, 96–97, 98, 145–146, 154, 167, 184 small arms, 177–182 social justice, 20 solidarity, 18

226

Index

Somalia, ix, 2, 17, 25, 59, 106, 129, 174 South East Asia, 152 Spain, 116, 117 specialized agencies of the UN system, 142 Sri Lanka, 157 stability, 19 Sudan, 32, 55 sustainable peace, 26 Sweden, 53, 131, 133 Switzerland, 28, 182 Syrian Arab Republic, 36 Tajikistan, x, 23, 60–69, 87, 88, 154 Commission on National Reconciliation, 63, 67 mixed ethnic composition, 65–66 religious factor, 65, 87 United Tajik Opposition, 64, 154 Tanzania, 94, 96 Taylor, Charles, rebel and former President of Liberia, 69, 70, 87 technical assistance, 26 Terrorism, 14, 54, 92–101, 148 agenda item, 92–101 definition of terrorism, proposed, 98 support for an international conference, 99 draft convention to suppress acts of nuclear terrorism, 96, 97, 99 suppression of terrorist financing, efforts, 98 UNSC attention, increase in 1990s, 92 third-party initiatives, 14 threat to peace and security, under Article 39, 21, 22, 23, 24, 35, 75, 86, 94, 96, 97, 100, 121, 126, 166, 167, 175, 176 transparency, xi, 7, 88, 108, 112, 129, 131, 136, 139, 149, 165, 175, 194, 197 troop-contributing countries, 8, 31, 34, 105, 107–109, 136 consultations with the UNSC, in accordance with Article 44 of Charter, 108–111 (see also Meetings of the UNSC)

strengthening UN peacekeeping forces, 109–110 troop availability, 8 Turkmenistan, 65 Ukraine, 85, 122 unemployment, 19 unilateralism, viii, 50, 54, 56, 57, 150, 199 Union des Transports Aeriens (UTA), airplane shot down, 96 United Kingdom, 11, 15, 18, 21, 22, 37, 43, 49, 52, 53, 74, 75, 77, 84, 85, 87, 98, 110, 116, 153, 167, 180 UN Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II), 104 UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, 181 negotiations on a firearms protocol, 181 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951, 129, 171 1967 protocol relating to the status of refugees, 171 UN Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA), 179, 180 UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 25, 26, 29, 130, 189 UN USG for Humanitarian Affairs, 32, 127, 165, 168, 189 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), 29, 79 Lessons Learned Unit, 159 UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA), 186, 192 designated as focal point for prevention in UN secretariat, 186 framework for coordination, established, 186 UN USG for Political Affairs, 192 UN Development Programme (UNDP), 69, 179 UN Disarmament Commission, 154, 155, 158, 159

Index

UN General Assembly, 21, 26, 37, 50, 53, 57, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 104, 113, 129, 135, 142, 146, 148, 149, 178 first committee charged with disarmament questions, 180 request at the 50th session for SG report on the subject matter of small arms, 177 resolution 46/182 on humanitarian assistance, 174 resolution 51/207 of 17 December 1996 on establishment of ICC, 132 setting up the Arms Transfer Register, 21 Sixth Committee, 95 Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 8 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 83, 127, 128, 134, 135, 136–137, 168–169, 170 UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), 93 UN military observers, 62 UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), 82, 83, 84, 86 UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT), 61, 62, 68, 154 UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), 79, 80, 81, 82, 83 UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), 144 UN Panel of Government Experts on Small Arms, 159 UN Protection Force in Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR), 104 UN reform, viii, 109 reform of the UNSC, 3, 7, 109 UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), 42 UNRWA clinic attacked, 42 UN Staff College in Turin, 186

227

UN system, 59 UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), 104 UN University (UNU), 186 UN Voluntary Trust Fund for De-mining, 29 UNICEF, 32, 83, 128, 134 USSR, 1, 6, 11, 13, 15, 23, 37, 42, 43 disintegration, 21, 42, 59, 60, 65, 66 United States of America, 2, 6, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 19, 35, 37, 38, 39, 41, 46, 47, 49–56, 67, 84, 97, 102, 116, 136, 142, 156–157, 166, 168, 170, 180, 199 US diplomats illegally detained, 13 US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, bombed, 94 Uzbekistan, 23, 64 Venezuela, 117, veto, 3, 6, 15, 16, 21, 39, 41, 49, 53–54 reform of right of veto proposed, 21 Vienna, 114 Viera de Mello, UN USG for Humanitarian Affairs, 165 voting in the UNSC, 3, 6, 15, 16, 49 war guilt, 13 weapons of mass destruction, 12–13, 19 elimination of nuclear-weapons, called for, 20, 120–121 Western Sahara, 17 World Bank, 148 world order, 21, 59, 145 world peace, xi, 2, 18, 20, 88, 196, 197 xenophobia, 19 Yemen, 41, 42, 44 Yugoslavia, ix, 3, 17, 21, 25, 37, 102, 106, 112, 138, 139, 166 Zaire. See Congo, Democratic Republic of Zimbabwe, 21, 73


SUNY series in Global Politics James N. Rosenau, editor List of Titles American Patriotism in a Global Society—Betty Jean Craige The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International Relations—Brian C. Schmidt Power and Ideas: North-South Politics of Intellectual Property and Antitrust—Susan K. Sell From Pirates to Drug Lords: The Post—Cold War Caribbean Security Environment—Michael C. Desch, Jorge I. Dominguez, and Andres Serbin (eds.) Collective Conflict Management and Changing World Politics—Joseph Lepgold and Thomas G. Weiss (eds.) Zones of Peace in the Third World: South America and West Africa in Comparative Perspective—Arie M. Kacowicz Private Authority and International Affairs—A. Claire Cutler, Virginia Haufler, and Tony Porter (eds.) Harmonizing Europe: Nation-States within the Common Market—Francesco G. Duina Economic Interdependence in Ukrainian-Russian Relations—Paul J. D’Anieri Leapfrogging Development? The Political Economy of Telecommunications Restructuring—J. P. Singh States, Firms, and Power: Successful Sanctions in United States Foreign Policy—George E. Shambaugh Approaches to Global Governance Theory—Martin Hewson and Timothy J. Sinclair (eds.) After Authority: War, Peace, and Global Politics in the Twenty-First Century—Ronnie D. Lipschutz Pondering Postinternationalism: A Paradigm for the Twenty-First Century?—Heidi H. Hobbs (ed.) Beyond Boundaries? Disciplines, Paradigms, and Theoretical Integration in International Studies—Rudra Sil and Eileen M. Doherty (eds.) International Relations—Still an American Social Science? Toward Diversity in International Thought—Robert M. A. Crawford and Darryl S. L. Jarvis (eds.) Which Lessons Matter? American Foreign Policy Decision Making in the Middle East, 1979–1987—Christopher Hemmer (ed.) Hierarchy Amidst Anarchy: Transaction Costs and Institutional Choice—Katja Weber Counter-Hegemony and Foreign Policy: The Dialectics of Marginalized and Global Forces in Jamaica—Randolph B. Persaud

229

230

List of Titles

Global Limits: Immanuel Kant, International Relations, and Critique of World Politics—Mark F. N. Franke Money and Power in Europe: The Political Economy of European Monetary Cooperation— Matthias Kaelberer Why Movements Matter: The West German Peace Movement and U. S. Arms Control Policy— Steve Breyman Agency and Ethics: The Politics of Military Intervention—Anthony F. Lang, Jr. Life After the Soviet Union: The Newly Independent Republics of the Transcaucasus and Central Asia—Nozar Alaolmolki Information Technologies and Global Politics: The Changing Scope of Power and Governance— James N. Rosenau and J. P. Singh (eds.) Theories of International Cooperation and the Primacy of Anarchy: Explaining U. S. International Monetary Policy-Making After Bretton Woods—Jennifer Sterling-Folker Technology, Democracy, and Development: International Conflict and Cooperation in the Information Age—Juliann Emmons Allison (ed.) Systems of Violence: The Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia—Nazih Richani The Arab-Israeli Conflict Transformed: Fifty Years of Interstate and Ethnic Crises—Hemda Ben-Yehuda and Shmuel Sandler Debating the Global Financial Architecture—Leslie Elliot Armijo Political Space: Frontiers of Change and Governance in a Globalizing World—Yale Ferguson and R. J. Barry Jones (eds.) Crisis Theory and World Order: Heideggerian Reflections—Norman K. Swazo Political Identity and Social Change: The Remaking of the South African Social Order—Jamie Frueh Social Construction and the Logic of Money: Financial Predominance and International Economic Leadership—J. Samuel Barkin What Moves Man: The Realist Theory of International Relations and Its Judgment of Human Nature—Annette Freyberg-Inan Democratizing Global Politics: Discourse Norms, International Regimes, and Political Community—Rodger A. Payne and Nayef H. Samhat Landmines and Human Security: International Politics and War’s Hidden Legacy—Richard A. Matthew, Bryan McDonald, and Kenneth R. Rutherford (eds.) Collective Preventative Diplomacy: A Study of International Management—Barry H. Steiner International Relations Under Risk: Framing State Choice—Jeffrey D. Berejikian Globalization and the Environment: Greening Global Political Economy—Gabriela Kütting Sovereignty, Democracy, and Global Civil Society—Elisabeth Jay Friedman, Kathryn Hochstetler, and Ann Marie Clark

List of Titles

231

United We Stand? Divide and Conquer Politics and the Logic of International Hostility— Aaron Belkin Imperialism and Nationalism in the Discipline of International Relations—David Long and Brian C. Schmidt (eds.) Globalization, Security, and the Nation State: Paradigms in Transition—Ersel Aydinli and James N. Rosenau (eds.) Identity and Institutions: Conflict Reduction in Divided Societies—Neal G. Jesse and Kristen P. Williams Globalizing Interests: Pressure Groups and Denationalization—Michael Zürn (ed., with assistance from Gregor Walter) International Regimes for the Final Frontier—M. J. Peterson Ozone Depletion and Climate Change: Constructing A Global Response—Matthew J. Hoffmann States of Liberalization: Redefining the Public Sector in Integrated Europe—Mitchell P. Smith Mediating Globalization: Domestic Institutions and Industrial Policies in the United States and Britain—Andrew P. Cortell The Multi-Governance of Water: Four Case Studies—Matthias Finger, Ludivine Tamiotti, and Jeremy Allouche, eds. Building Trust: Overcoming Suspicion in International Conflict—Aaron M. Hoffman Global Capitalism, Democracy, and Civil-Military Relations in Colombia—Williams Avilés Complexity in World Politics: Concepts and Methods of a New Paradigm—Neil E. Harrison Technology and International Transformation: The Railroad, the Atom Bomb, and the Politics of Technological Transformation—Geoffrey L. Herrera The Perils and Promise of Global Transparency: Why the Information Revolution May Not Lead to Security, Democracy, or Peace—Kristin M. Lord Global Liberalism and Political Order: Towards a New Grand Compromise?—Steven Bernstein and Louis W. Pauly, eds. Well-Oiled Diplomacy: Strategic Manipulation and Russia’s Energy Statecraft in Eurasia— Adam N. Stulberg Cooperating Rivals: The Riparian Politics of the Jordan River Basin—Jeffrey K. Sosland When Leaders Learn and When They Don’t: Mikhail Gorbachev and Kim Il Sung at the End of the Cold War—Akan Malici [ January 2008] Water Resources and Inter-Riparian Relations in the Nile Basin: The Search for an Integrative Discourse—Okbazghi Yohannes [April 2008] Who Gets What? Domestic Influences on International Negotiations Allocating Shared Resources—Áslaug Ásgeirsdóttir [August 2008]


POLITICAL SCIENCE / HISTORY

The United Nations Security Council in the 1990s Resurgence and Renewal Juergen Dedring “I found this analytical history of the Security Council to be exceedingly informative. It is of great importance that more people—journalists, government officials, politically active people, and indeed all other people—understand the evolving decision-making procedures in the Security Council and the widening array of participants in the process. It is equally important that more people become aware of the ever-widening agenda of the Security Council. This volume very effectively provides this information.” — Chadwick F. Alger, author of The United Nations System: A Reference Handbook

A volume in the SUNY series in Global Politics James N. Rosenau, editor

SUNY P R E S S

The United Nations Security Council in the 1990s: Resurgence and Renewal (Suny Series in Global Politics)

The United Nations Security Council: A Primer (Global Institutions)

The United Nations and Global Security

Debating the Global Financial Architecture (Suny Series in Global Politics)

After Authority: War, Peace, and Global Politics in the 21st Century (Suny Series in Global Politics)

Globalization, Security, And The Nation-State: Paradigms In Transition (Suny Series in Global Politics)

The United Nations In Action

The United Nations and International Politics

The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council (Studies in International Law)

After anarchy : legitimacy and power in the United Nations Security Council

The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945

The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945

Mediating Globalization: Domestic Institutions And Industrial Policies In The United States And Britain (Suny Series in Global Politics)

Global Capitalism, Democracy, and Civil-Military Relations in Colombia (Suny Series in Global Politics)

The United Nations General Assembly (Global Institutions Series)

Complexity in World Politics: Concepts And Methods of a New Paradigm (Suny Series in Global Politics)

Identity And Institutions: Conflict Reduction In Divided Societies (Suny Series in National Identities)(SUNY Series in Global Politics)

You and the United Nations

You and the United Nations