The Transcendental How: Kant's Transcendental Deduction of Objective Cognition (Stockholm Studies in Philosophy)

THE TRANSCEND

ACTA UNIVERSITATIS STOCKHOLMIENSIS STOCKHOLM STUDIES INKant's PHILOSOPHY 13 transcendental deduct

Markku Lep

THE TRANSCENDENTAL HOW Kant's transcendental deduction of objective cognition

Markku Leppakoski

ALMQVIST & WIKSELL STOCKH

ALMQVIST & WIKSELL INTERNATIONAL STOCKHOLM

judgments possible a priori?" If transcendental granted, the possibility of there being synthetic follows. There is also another sense of the questio Doctoral Dissertation 1993 to establish or justify §ynthetic judgments a priori? Department of Philosophy be seen as parallel to Kant's distinction between tw UnIversity of Stockholin that- and how-questions. The aim of the present s S-106 91 Stockholm how Kant thought that transcendental philosophy c how he in fact tried to accomplish his task. Kant's philosQphical reasoning in some cen Abstract Critique oJ Pure Keason is examined. The general is first philosophy presented, and including Kant's doctrine This is a study of Kant's theoretical itsdistinguish grounds. The philosophIcal transcende system of transcendental philosophy makesproofs. up the To condItions of the transcendental IJrOOfS is inevitaole in order to g ~ossibility of objective cog:Q.ition and establishes itsSome boundaries. Transcendental Deduction. main factors det concept of 'transcendental', which ObjectivIty' is embedded in Kant's of the Deduction are considered. The categories a contains a reference to an object. Thus, establishing the system of (functions) as the logical fonns of judgments, b transce.ndental phi~osophy . i~ differently: tantamounttotodetermIne giving athetranscendental manifolo of a given i deductIon of ObjectIve cognItIon. 'objective' are two crucial and disputed concepts. Kant summarized his studyterms in one question: "How are synthetic are understood is important not only for the If transcendental idealism is taken for judgments possible a priori?" Transcendental Deduction out for the entire transce being synthetic ju~d~ments a priori granted, the possibility of thereSynthetic judgments"!row presuppose intuition (act of the question: is it possible follows. There is also another sense of pure (lormal) Kant's re to establish or justify §yntheticrole judgments a priori?" TheintuItIon two sensesincan emphasized. A demystified intefQretation be seen as parallel to Kant's distinction between two kinds of questions: of form schemata of tlieir Kant's reasonin that- and how-questions. The aim of the and present study role is to in investigate schemata are formal intuitions but as determined i how Kant thought that transcendental philosophy can oe established, and concepts. how he in fact tried to accomplish his task.The~ are what Kant calls "the third t ~ch~~ata ~re also pur~ intuitions are not use of the Kant's 'philosQphical reasoning in some central passages they IntuItIons mathematIcs. Critique oj Pure Keason is examined. TheIn general conce:Rtual framework

is first presented, including Kant's doctrine of aefinitions and Key words: Kant, I, history of philosophy, tra philosophIcal proofs. To distinguish transcendental deductions from transcendental transcendental ]Jroofs is inevitaole in orderdeduction, to grasp schematism, the role of pure the intuitio Transcendental Deduction. Some main factors determIning the structure (c) 1993 Markku Leppakoski of the Deduction are considered. The91-22-01560-4 categories are the same concepts ISBN (functions) as the logical fonns of judgments, but they are employed ISSN 0491-0877 differently: to detennine the manifolo of a given intuition. 'Object' and 'objective' are two crucial andComposing: disputed concepts. How different object Ord terms are understood is important not by only for ocb the Grafik understanding Akademitryck Abidealism. 1993 of the Printed Transcendental Deduction out for the entire transcendental Edsbruk Synthetic judgments presuppose intuition (actual or possible). The role of pure (tormal) intuItIon in Kant's reasoning is strongly emphasized. A demystified intefQretation of formal intuition and the schemata and of tlieir role in Kant's reasoning is presented. The schemata are formal intuitions but as determined intuitions they are also concepts. The:x are what Kant calls "the third things". Aliliough the ~ch~1Vata ~re also pur~ intuitions they are not used in the same way as IntUItIons In mathematICS.

Key words: Kant, I, history of philosophy, transcendental idealism, transcendental deduction, schematism, pure intuition (c) 1993 Markku Leppakoski

ISBN 91-22-01560-4

ISSN 0491-0877

Composing: Ord och Grafik Printed by Akademitryck Ab 1993 Edsbruk

from its mere possibi

1. The transcendental deduction of INTRODUCTION

2. Meta-critique 3. Kant and the de tion of philosophy 4. The classical 5. Kant's conception of language concepts 6. The faculties and pretation" 7. Some clues for, inte "To cognize anything a priori is to cognize it patterns of thought and key-concepts from its mere possibility." (MAN 470) Transcendental Deduction 10. The st

1. The transcendental deduction of objective cognition 2. Meta-critique 3. Kant and the de-transcendentaliza1. The transcendental deduction of objec meta-critical debate tion of philosophy 4. The classical 5. Kant's conception of language; the primacy of This is a study of Kant's theoretical ph concepts 6. The faculties and the "logical interHistorically it is limited to around the time pretation" 7. Some clues for, interpretation 8. The ofinterpret the Critique second edition 9. To the of Pure Reas patterns of thought and key-concepts deals with two different, although Transcendental Deduction 10. The structure of the study not unrelat

task as a critique is to draw the boundaries o part is devoted to establishing the system of of fundamental concepts an that the system 1. The transcendental deduction ofis, objective cognition makes up the conditions of the possibility This is a study of Kant's theoretical philosophy and its grounds. establishes its boundaries. Although these Historically it is limited to around the time of the publication of the related to the subject of cognition, the poi second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason.! In the Critique Kant endeavour is to try to show that they, simu deals with two different, although not unrelated philosophical tasks. The validity. Thus cognition, in the sense investig task as a critique is to draw the boundaries of reason. However, a major take it for granted - but also argue for it - th part is devoted to establishing the system of transcendental philosophy, meaning of 'referring to objects' or 'havin that is, the system of fundamental concepts and propositions. The system objects'. This notion of objectivity is em makes up the conditions of the possibility of objective cognition and concept 'transcendental' which contains a establishes its boundaries. Although these "epistemic conditions" are related to the subject of cognition, the point of Kant's philosophical 1 CPR for short. See "A note on literature and transla endeavour is to try to show that they, simultaneously, have objective validity. Thus cognition, in the sense investigated by Kant, is objective. I take it for granted - but also argue for it - that 'objective' has the basic meaning of 'referring to objects' or 'having an origin or ground in objects'. This notion of objectivity is embedded already in Kant's concept 'transcendental' which contains a reference to an object. 1 CPR for short. See "A note on literature and translation" below.

judgments possible a priori?" If transcendental ide INTRODUCTION , the possibility of there being synthetic j granted questio of the for sense another Objectivity in the sensefollows of intersubjectivity universal validity all n: . There is also or , in other a priori?" ntsoutset ic judgme subjects of cognition is toeither taken for granted at the or appears h synthet establis occasionally as a derivative notion. le to know or justify synthetic judgme nts a prio .possib ion betw distinct Kant'sare l to "How as paralle !(ant summarized his in one question: synthetic be seen canstudy The . estions that- and how-qu judgments possible a priori?" If transcendental idealism is taken forgener questions: lity of sy s the possibi explain idealism ndental granted, the possibilitytransce of there being synthetic judgments a priori nts, bu be such there can "How , that the question: is judgme it possible follows. There is also another sense of priori, namely ntsit of t justify e to in to establish synthetic judgments a priori?", otherspecific words: judgme "How is how it is possibl n in the answer the did nota priori?" synthetic judgments Thequestio two senses possible to know or justify that Kant notable had f himsel he h way, althoug to Kant's distinction between two kinds ofdecl can be seen as parallelstraight forward ise. Becaus enterpr his whole questions: that- and central how-questions. general framework ofe Ka question ofThe which itions ndentalofpropos transcendental idealism explains possibility synthetic judgments are a sy transce system ofthe concerns questio theit does thatbut it follows priori, namely, that therepriori can be- such judgments, notnexplain metho the Indeed philosophy ndentaljudgments how it is possible to justify specific of itself. that kind. It is most transce transc of establis method the in phy notable that Kant did notphiloso answer themeans question the second sensehing in any referenc always implies endenta hadl' declared it as thea most straightforward way, although he himself itself. 'Transc ndental philoso transce system of enterprise. Kant's philosophy is a ph central question of his whole hing the Because establis of objective on judgments ndental system of transcendentalgiving propositions - which arededucti synthetic a co a transce never was that Kant of co priori - it follows that the question concerns the possibility sometimes claimed sly not correct obviou This is of method transcendental philosophy itself. Indeed the .method transcendental ndental transce of Method" l Doctrine philosophy philosophy means the method transcendental "Transcendenta theestablishing CPR, of the framew ways to- isobjects. itself. 'Transcendental' unsatis alwaysfactory impliesin amany reference Thus,ork

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ood. is tantamount to establishing the system Critiqu of transcendental philosophy e should be underst study isIttohasfollow the present giving a transcendental deduction cognition. been how The aim ofofobjective and ho hed,the can be establis phyconcerned claimed sometimes that Kant wasphiloso never with ndental transce some ing of examinpart That means transcendental method. This is obviously not correct. The second lish his task. accomp difficul and ersial s are controv CPR, the "Transcendental Doctrine of Method" - although brief and t e The passage CPR. is not so concer n necessary.inMy selectio unsatisfactory in many ways - is the framework which then whole a lot of highly re are they h Critique should be understood. arguments as such - althoug philos s ofthat the pattern - butKant wayhow interpre studytedisintosome follow thought The aim of the present method a view the point words, transcendental philosophyother can be established, andofhow he is in fact tried ologic to eless, Neverth more. once n questio answer accomplish his task. That meansKant's examining some central passages in a CPR. The passages are controversial and difficult enough, which makes a lot of selection necessary. My concern is not so much with particular arguments as such - although they are highly relevant and must be interpreted in some way - but the patterns of philosophical reasoning. In other words, the point of view is a methodological one. I will try to answer Kant's question once more. Nevertheless, a reader might find it

inevitable. Certainly in the secondary li interpreted radically differently.13One ca INTRODUCTION way of reasoning without taking a posi strange that the aim of the study is said to be methodological. It turns out kind of idealism Kant argues for. that the major part of the actual discussion concerns how to interpret methodological examination without m some of Kant's key-notions. This mixing of different points of view is supposed to be presented or argued for. M inevitable. Certainly in the secondary literature many vital notions are am convinced that the transcendental m interpreted radically differently. One can hardly throw light on Kant's from other philosophical methods by it way of reasoning without taking a position, say, in the question what What makes the difference are the questi kind of idealism Kant argues for. One cannot go on with a the matters discussed, and the basic con methodological examination without making clear what it is that is for granted. supposed to be presented or argued for. Moreover, even after this work I Kant's point of departure was his cr am convinced that the transcendental method cannot be distinguished deductivistic metaphysics. He was convi from other philosophical methods by its fonnal or logical procedures. difference between the methods of ma What makes the difference are the questions put, the philosophical tasks, was a theme to which he frequently retur the matters discussed, and the basic concepts and presuppositions taken point of view, Kant seems to have adher for granted. only apodictic cognition as proper cog Kant's point of departure was his cryticism of the Leibniz-Wolffian made up purely of cognition a priori. deductivistic metaphysics. He was convinced that there is a fundamental difference between the methods of mathematics and philosophy. This 2. Meta-critique was a theme to which he frequently returned. However, from the modem Questions concerning patterns of p point of view, Kant seems to have adhered to the same ideal of the regarding called meta-philosophical, or meta-critic only apodictic cognition as proper cognition. Philosophy is a science made up purely of cognition a priori. and background against which I have c most of my conclusions and theses are goal has been to prepare tools for such a 2. Meta-critique the title meta-critique has been u Questions concerning the patterns of philosophical reasoning are often Historically, meta-critical questions ha called meta-philosophical, or meta-critical. They make up the motives Kantian context. They refer to some sile and background against which I have chosen to study Kant. However, transcendental philosophy. most of my conclusions and theses are not directly meta-critical. My L.W.Beck has renewed the notion goal has been to prepare tools for such an investigation. What goes under "Towards a Meta-critique of Pure Rea the title meta-critique has been understood in different ways. "There are knowledge claims made an Historically, meta-critical questions have a special denotation in the Critique of Pure Reason; there are Kantian context. They refer to some silently accepted presuppositions of demonstrated.." (Beck 1978/2,24) Kant transcendental philosophy. intuition available to us is sensible. How L.W.Beck has renewed the notion of "meta-critique" in his essay "Towards a Meta-critique of Pure Reason" (reprinted in Beck 1978). "TI1ere are knowledge claims made and used in the arguments of the Critique of Pure Reason; there are others that are mentioned and demonstrated.." (Beck 1978/2,24) Kant claims for example that the only intuition available to us is sensible. How does he know that? No proof is

priori, it should be proved. It seems discovered aposteriori, a judgment whi 14 INTRODUCTION There are plenty of examples to the po critical philosophy, but What presuppositions attempted in CPR, and is denied by many other philosophers. is the reason" "an investigation of the notpure to be a well-fonned judgment status of this claim? It seems even of one) analytic of the knowledge claims It is be neither nor synthetic, according to the standards of CPR. can Reason." (ibid 25) of Kant, synthetic, yet justified a and if it belonged to the favourite class opens fact up the priori, it should be proved. It seems Meta-critique to be a contingent butquestion not generally. Nobody can start discovered aposteriori, a judgment which is factual but not empirical. wit with? point. They aretonotstart results of Is theit ju There are plenty of examples to thepresuppositions philosophical get at the be of it. Beckcards calls we "meta-critique critical philosophy, but presuppositions differences between philosophical of pure reason" "an investigation of the nature and justification (if theresyste cardsused werein shuffled at the outset? the Critique of Pure can be one) of the knowledge claims philosophical system without using jud Reason." (ibid 25) formed very system of theaccording beginningtoofthe philosophy Meta-critique opens up the question metameta-questions has presuppositions generally. Nobody can start without presuppositions. Which There are manyofproblems s chance involving which presuppositions to start with? Is it just a question insurmountable which of the and game? Docould the be c philosophical cards we get at the be beginning endeavours to give an account differences between philosophical systems depend merely on how of ourall co the Isaccount itself togiven? Because t cards were shuffled at the outset? it possible establish a significance in the new framework, we philosophical system without using judgments which must be not wellaccount begins thethink new significanc formed according to the very system? Even to with try to these significance is used to tell what it is all metameta-questions has presuppositions of its own. because the point ofwhich the story There are many problems involving self-referenciality seem is to to untenable. Is there anyasother be insurmountable and which could be called meta-critical well.possibility Kant some basic which remain In concepts which framework is co endeavours to give an account of allbecognition. thosecrucial of pre-reflective the account itself given? Becausebe the concepts experience? get new C of transcendental idealism, but par significance in the new framework, we cannot presuppose that the very transcendental idealism in if thethe transcend old account begins with the new significance. On the other hand, would not be anymust argument against significance is used to tell what it is there all about, everything collapse become obvious - I hopeis- tha tellwill that the old significance because the point of the story is to It of conc not than restrict the meaningful usetllUst untenable. Is there any other possibility to suppose that there as categories However, the categories be some basic concepts which remain constant? Must the basic concepts be those of pre-reflective experience? Certainly Kant's framework is that of transcendental idealism, but paradoxically, he must describe transcendental idealism in the transcendental realist language. Otherwise there would not be any argument against transcendental realism. It will become obvious - I hope - that Kant's theory of concepts does not restrict the meaningful use of concepts to the limits of experience. However, the categories - as categories - function only as concepts of

commonplace to criticize Kant for bounds of conceivability. I will bri hope that later on possible ways 15 INTRODUCTION dilemmas will become clear. objects generatim2 within the framework of experience. They do not TEMPORALIT Y and SPATIALI have any detennining meaning at all outside of this framework. act. Quid juris examine The the legality o same goes even more for the forms of intuiting: space and time. It is a notion immanent in experience. Ho of crossing his own commonplace to criticize Kant for being guilty the process of cognition without tem obvious cases. I also bounds of conceivability. I will briefly list some and 'aposte riori' make sense witho hope that later on possible ways of responding many of these raised bytospatiali ty. It is said that te dilemmas will become clear. 'numerically different'. Does this he TEMPORALITY and SPATIALITY. Cognition is basicly a kind of the concep t 'numerically different' act. Quid juris examine the legality of this act.concep For Kant temporality is a t 'outsid e'? notion immanent in experience. How could and should we understand CAUSA LITY. The most familia the process of cognition without temporality?notion Do the concepts 'a priori' of causality. Things in thems and 'aposteriori' make sense without temporality? Similar doubts are appearences. Does Kant not step ove be understood as raised by spatiality. It is said that temporality should The very questio n of his Copernica 'numerically different'. Does this help? Isn'tthat it the other way that presentationsround are caused by obj the concept 'numerically different' cannot subject be understood without the of cogniti on. Again, how concept 'outside'? causality without any temporality w Kant concern his CAUSALITY. The most familiar objections moralitto y is outside the domain of em notion of causality. Things in themselves are understood as causes of moral agents quite obviously cause so appearences. Does Kant not step over his own MODA limits of conceivability? LITY. The categories of m The very question of his Copernican Revolution to presuppose appliedseems merely within empirical co that presentations are caused by objects orimporta objectsntare caused by the for Kant that the laws of subject of cognition. Again, how shouldThus we necessi understand noumenal ty, like other modal con causality without any temporality whatsoever? The whole of of all frameworks domain and before an accou morality is outside the domain of empirical cognition. Still the Kantian THING. It is the result of Kant moral agents quite obviously cause something with experietheir nce' deeds. is understood in a n MODALITY. The categories of modality, like other are concerning ancategories, object have their sourc applied merely within empirical cognition.include But scertainly it is most even differen tiating and indi important for Kant that the laws of the understanding are necessary. sense to talk about a thing as it is itse Thus necessity, like other modal concepts, has been understood outside of all frameworks and before an account of that very concept. 2 After long hesitation I made up my mind t that object of pt. 'Gene THING. It is the result of Kant's examination generatim for the 'an German ilberhau note on literature and translation". experience' is understood in a new way. All epistemic notions concerning an object have their source in the subject of cognition. That includes even differentiating and individuating things. How can it make sense to talk about a thing as it is itself, when whatever we now refer to 2 After long hesitation I made up my mind to follow Schwarz in using the latin word generatim for the German ilberhaupt. 'Generally' in English is misleading. See "A note on literature and translation".

can it make any sense at all? EXISTENCE. Existence is one of the categ INTRODUCTION objects of cognition. They are given in intui is outside of all criterion of thinghood? Moreover, to talk about a thing 'same' objects exist independently of any as it is in itself presupposes that it is in some way in itself; that is, that it categorial concepts have no determinate mea is determined in some way. What could that determination mean, taking the domain of the objects of experience. H for granted that all determination of objects has its source in the subject outside of the framework of existence? Lik of cognition? It certainly cannot have any cognitive meaning for us, but known conclusion that we can neither prove can it make any sense at all? of God. Should he not say instead that the qu EXISTENCE. Existence is one of the categories. We do not create the God has no meaning at all? But certainly tha objects of cognition. They are given in intuition. That means that the deprive philosophy of all its legitimacy. 'same' objects exist independently of any cognition. But again, the NON-HUMAN COGNITION. Kant contr categorial concepts have no determinate meanings whatsoever outside cognition with the divine mode. What makes t the domain of the objects of experience. How could anything exist Why should a creative act be called an intelle outside of the framework of existence? Likewise, it is Kant's well'intuition' mean in that case? Is it consistent to known conclusion that we can neither prove nor disprove the existence of cognition with something which is not cog of God. Should he not say instead that the question of the existence of creative act be understood outside any spatio-t God has no meaning at all? But certainly that answer, for Kant, would not 'creation' mean that something appears w deprive philosophy of all its legitimacy. before? How to say or understand 'creatio NON-HUMAN COG·NITION. Kant contrasts the human mode of 'present' and 'before'? cognition with the divine mode. What makes this contrast relevant at all? In short, many of Kant's accounts prompt t Why should a creative act be called an intellectual intuition? What does conceivable as a 'story', but is it not t 'intuition' mean in that case? Is it consistent to contrast the human mode inconsistent as a philosophical explanation? of cognition with something which is not cognition at all? How could a critique is highly interesting and at the s creative act be understood outside any spatio-temporal framework? Does Evaluating Kant's relevance to contemporar not 'creation' mean that something appears which has not been present meta-critical procedure of disentangling the before? How to say or understand 'creation' without any temporal philosophy. We have to have a fair understa 'present' and 'before'? critique can begin. It is also notable that cr In short, many of Kant's accounts prompt the question: An account is ground if interpretational disputes are unsettled conceivable as a 'story', but is it not totally inconceivable and inconsistent as a philosophical explanation? It is obvious that meta3. Kant and the de..transcendentalization critique is highly interesting and at the same time most difficult. on calls academic philos Evaluating Kant's relevance to Contemporary contemporary attacks problems for the Rorty, may the alsopresuppositions be called meta-criticaL The K meta-critical procedure of disentangling of critical philosophy. We have to have a fair understanding of Kant before any critique can begin. It is also notable that criticism cannot get off the ground if interpretational disputes are unsettled.

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3. Kant and the de..transcendentalization of philosophy Contemporary attacks on academic philosophy, like that of Richard Rorty, may also be called meta-criticaL The Kantian transcendental way

overt or covert transcendentalism, the gradual criticism of its ow INTRODUCTION philosophy to underm 17 ine its own endtheoretical . This challen of philosophizing is taken as a paradigm of all philosophy byty - and ge of Ror was what initi Rorty in his description of our philosophical situation asally a movement "woke me up fro I take it for towards the "de-transcendentalization" of modem philosophy, grantedmost that Rorty imp ortant The notably in his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. role. characteristic His influence goe recogniz ed. By this feature of the western epistemologically oriented philosophy has, been of couitsrse, it i important. overt or covert transcendentalism, viz. Kantianism. According to Rorty, Talking like Kant about strange forhas the gradual criticism of its own presuppositions modled em analytical philosophers. H strict fonnal philosophy to undennine its own ground; aphilosophy hassens come to tanare con e, wha ng tophilosophers othertryi modem - phic end. This challenge of Rorty - and of somethan give philoso Wittgenstein, slumber". was what initially "woke me up from my metaphysical who explicitly empha phy. Anyhow in oso emphasizing Kant's I take it for granted that Rorty is rightphil , whaallt is, say, h than anthan attempt important role. His influence goes much farther whatedispro usually of of the privatel Moalone thaty?Kant has been recognized. By this, of course, it is not meant reover, according Wit tgen stein'ssounds important. Talking like Kant about philosophical proofs result certainly seems to be a Eve isnnot in porar strange for modem philosophers. However,prio if ri. proof if understood many contem possibi lity of necessa a strict fonnal sense, what are contemporary philosophers doing other ry judg ments a their own than trying to give philosophical proofs? Take thes anis example like are merely conting his merely private therapeutic language argu Wittgenstein, who explicitly emphasized the role of ment is va languag e speakers philosophy. Anyhow, what is, say, his "private language argument" other . Neither did he m impossibilit of y.following a rule than an attempted proof of the impossibility Likewise, Quine ha e are conting privately? Moreover, according to lang the uag Kantian classification, ent and could be My goal in the Wittgenstein's result seems to be a synthetic judgment and end justified a is a very am paradigm, to promptly deny the priori. Even if many contemporary philosophers throw som e light on osowould phy, the they hardly possibility of necessary judgments a priori,phil natuadmit re of that philosoph philosophy. The their own thesis are merely contingent. Wittgenstein did not mean that nature or essence i kindfor , but just how his private language argument is valid only present communities typically of the dom phil oso phe rs since Kan language speakers. Neither did he mean a logical impossibility, but ta real have un everthat , in his the pres impossibility. Likewise, Quine hardly How means theses ent about study this real ized a verylanguage language are contingent and could be otherwise forinother explicit users. way. My goal in the end is a very ambitious one: by taking Kant as a paradigm, to throw some light on the understanding of the nature of philosophy, the nature of philosophical arguments, the possibility of philosophy. The nature or essence is not supposed to be of an eternal kind, but just how typically the dominant or most influential western philosophers since Kant have understood their own undertaking. However, in the present study this goal - like meta-critique - is not realized in a very explicit way.

of Kant like Hamann, Herder, Jacobi, Eberhard, M INTRODUCTION Schulze and others. Ironically, the present day deb largely ignorant of those early critics. 3 4. The classical meta-critical debate The notion of meta-critique was first used by The present-day dispute about the possibility of transcendental Metakritik uber den Purismum der reinen Vernunft w philosophy - and of philosophy quite generally - seems to ask very much publication of Kant's First Critique (1783-4). Its conte the same meta-critical questions which were asked by some early critics Herder and Jacobi although it was not published u of Kant like Hamann, Herder, Jacobi, Eberhard, Maimon, Reinhold, 1987, 38) "Hamann did not publish his Metacritique Schulze and others. Ironically, the present day debaters seem to be Reason with the attempt at reduction ad absurdum largely ignorant of those early critics. 3 pure Reason out of respect and gratitude to Kant, who The notion of meta-critique was first used by Hamann in his livelihood as a minor official in the customs house a Metakritik uber den Purismum der reinen Vernunft written just after the his son to attend his lectures gratis." (Beck 1969,378) publication of Kant's First Critique (1783-4). Its content was familiar to The most obvious meta-critical question concerns Herder and Jacobi although it was not published until 1800. (Beiser the criticism of reason itself. The critique of reaso 1987, 38) "Hamann did not publish his Metacritique of the Purism of ability of reason to acquire objective knowledge. Do Reason with the attempt at reduction ad absurdum of the Critique of means exactly to proceed without a prior criticism of pure Reason out of respect and gratitude to Kant, who had secured him a critics of Kant accuse him of dogmatism concerning livelihood as a minor official in the customs house and who permitted transcendental philosophy. Kant had asked "How his son to attend his lectures gratis." (Beck 1969,378) possible?" and offered his critique of reason as an answ The most obvious meta-critical question concerns the possibility of now "How is the critique itself possible?" the criticism of reason itself. TIle critique of reason investigates the What is at stake is the question of the authority o ability of reason to acquire objective knowledge. Dogmatism for Kant purism of reason" Hamann means hypostasization means exactly to proceed without a prior criticism of reason itself. The independent faculty. Kant took for granted a univers critics of Kant accuse him of dogmatism concerning the possibility of disinterested reason, that is, that reason as purified transcendental philosophy. Kant had asked "How is metaphysics experience, tradition and language. Hamann understoo possible?" and offered his critique of reason as an answer. His critics ask reason as a Platonic entity existing in the noumenal w now "How is the critique itself possible?" that the critical philosophy cannot be u~derstood othe What is at stake is the question of the authority of reason. By "the phenomenal faculty it would not have the necessity so purism of reason" Hamann means hypostasization of reason as an But language certainly is phenomenal. Hamann claims independent faculty. Kant took for granted a universal, ahistorical and only in particular activities. (Beiser 1987, 39) Reason disinterested reason, that is, that reason as purified is independent of all. He asks Kant to justify the reason-language con experience, tradition and language. Hamann understood Kant's faculty of Hamann it is not a problem, because reason is noth reason as a Platonic entity existing in the noumenal world, and claimed 3 The cannot beginning the post-Kantian era in philosophy is told that the critical philosophy beofunderstood otherwise. If it were a i book by Beiser (1987). phenomenal faculty it would not have the necessity so essential to Kant. But language certainly is phenomenaL Hamann claims that reason exists only in particular activities. (Beiser 1987, 39) Reason is not a faculty at all. He asks Kant to justify the reason-language connection, while for Hamann it is not a problem, because reason is nothing apart from its

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3 The beginning of the post-Kantian era in philosophy is told in a highly instructive book by Beiser (1987).

Hamann and Herder critizised Kan tb of language. Kant examined the rela tion INTRODUCTION took for granted the necessity 19of conce linguistic appearances. Language - and mea by implication ns for Kantreason: that conrationality cepts precede lan - is a contingent matter dependent on any the traditions customs of the language. and Hamann claims that trans culture. Hamann's relativization of reason has deprived reason of prove that there are necessaall ry of laws of r its claims to universality. from the beginning. Thus Kant doe s no Hamann and Herder critizised Kantque bystio emphasizing the contingency n by presupp osin g that which Hum of language. Kant examined the relation of thought and language but 5. Kan Hypostasization reason took for granted the necessity of concepts. t's conception of of lang uage; the means for Kant that concepts precede language and are independent Meta-critique has mainly dealtofwith two any language. Hamann claims that transcendental does not philosophy of philosophy mind and philosophy of lang prove that there are necessary laws can of reason takes it for granted hardlybut talk about Kan t's from the beginning. Thus Kant doespres not answer Hume, but begs theo the ry of ent one. Anyhow, there are some cr question by presupposing that which Hume rather doubted. easily be shown to have been pres u also are easily misunderstood. Exa ctly th 5. Kant's conception of language; the primacy of concepts conspicuous·by the early critics of Kan t, an Meta-critique has mainly dealt with two, not the unrelated topics: Kant's muc h of modem criticism as we philosophy of mind and philosophy ofsim language. Theis difficulty is that we plification great in mak ing explicit w can hardly talk about Kant's theoryand ofwhi meaning, because he edid ch he may never hav callnot ed in ques present one. Anyhow, there are some Man crucial assumptions which can y of the meta-critical que stions ha rather easily be shown to have beencon presupposed by Kant - but which cepts are used by Kan t in contexts w also are easily misunderstood. Exactly theseacco assumptions weret'smade meaning rding to Kan own stand andntthey seemabo toutbe underlying conspicuous·by the early critics of Kant, importa fact Kan t's conceptio Ofin course, the are risknotof much of the modem criticism as invewell. stigated philosophy made bu is only implicit in Kant, simplification is great in making explicit establiswhat h new concepts, althoug h he cer and which he may never have called emp in question. loyments of them. The idea of esta blish feature, Many of the meta-critical questions Kant. have Whatahecommon does is to explicaviz., te how thes given where concepts are used by Kant in contexts seem lack - are tothey be prop erlytoana lyzeany d and used meaning according to Kant's ownway standards. Thismpl indicates a most s. This is exe ified by man y claims w old fashioneof important fact about Kant's conception Concepts d to language. a modem read er, but which Indeed,but investigated in philosophy are not made given. Kantt of does notofever from the poin view mod em an establish new concepts, althoughnex het to certainly suggests some incomprehensible. This new doctrine o establishing concepts is alien to employments of them. The idea of con cepts" is new not clea rly put by Kan t. Any Kant. What he does is to explicate how these concepts - taking them as given - are to be properly analyzed and used. There are right and wrong ways. This is exemplified by many claims which might sound hopelessly old fashioned to a modem reader, but which have to be taken seriously. Indeed, fronl the point of view of modem analytical philosophy they are next to incomprehensible. This doctrine of the "unchangeability of concepts" is not clearly put by Kant. Anyway, it is a presupposition

conditions of their application". (Strawson 1966, 16 20 INTRODUCTION accepted interpretation, although partly illuminating, is o and as such misleading. It suggests Kant which can be abstracted fromextremely his work. Thus, however muchthat Kant of meaning. That is exactly what verificationist theory anticipates the positivistic doctrines, he also radically differs from them. diddetermine Kant evertheir thinkmeanings. that concepts are conventions does not The use of conceptsNeither conditioned, but exactly the opposite:of concepts (not all, Strawson found what he calls "Kant's principle significance": ahistoricalorand given. Kant's theory of meaning is realist "there can be no legitimate, even meaningful employment of ideas or theorynot of relate cognition is to verificationist. makes a m concepts which does them empirical orThat experiental difference. Kant distinguished what 16) can This be thought conditions of their application". (Strawson 1966, widelyfrom cognized. (Bxxvi) means detennination accepted interpretation, although partlyCognition illuminating, is only a half-truth of of concepts. given under the guidance and as such extremely misleading. It suggests that Kant had Accordingly, endorsed a domain of the given, is possible, of meaning. Thatnois cognition exactly what he did that not is, do.con verificationist theory employed to concepts determine any object,orbut only "pr Neither did Kant ever think that are conventions historically of Nevertheless, that does not deprive concepts conditioned, but exactly the opposite: concepts (not all, of course)their are ori but Kant's only of theory their cognitive significance. of meaning is realistic, whereas his ahistorical and given. What is correct in Strawson's view that important Kant certain theory of cognition is verificationist. That makes a is most to show that the boundaries of cognition from coincide what canwith be the difference. Kant distinguished what can be thought the empirical. It is also true that Kant frequently cognized. (Bxxvi) Cognition means detennination of the intuitively w categories ofhave no meaning (Sinn) outside the doma concepts. Accordingly, of the given under the guidance experience. Thatisdoes not legitimate the conclusion that t no cognition possible, that is, concepts cannot be domain of the given, all concepts are limited to that domain, although their employed to determine any object, but only "problematically". ob Wenot have to keepconcepts in mind of thattheir the categories are very sp original meaning, Nevertheless, that is. does deprive viz. the concepts employed to detennine intuition. but only of their cognitive significance. cannot usedKant where no intuition is to b in Strawson's view be is that certainly endeavoured What is correct categories of experien Concepts of cancognition be empty outsidewith the the domain to show that the boundaries coincide boundaries of means that no matter is given to them. Their meanings the empirical. It is also true that Kant frequently writes that the re theymeaning are a "mere play of imagination". They categories have no (Sinn) outside the domain of denote possiblelogi possibilities. A verificationist theory of meaning of no experience. That does not legitimate the conclusion that the meaningshas "meretoplay imagination". Whatobjective Strawson's princi all concepts are limited that of domain, although- their validity is as Strawson himself points out (p.17) - high ideas is. We have to keep in mind that the categories are very special concepts, aim isto todetennine show thatintuition. we are bound to use viz. the conceptsKant's employed For sure, the cer ideas of is reason, the idea to bealthough determined. categories cannot principles be used based where onnotheintuition

Concepts can be empty outside the domain of experience, but empty means that no matter is given to them. Their meanings remain, although they are a "mere play of imagination". They denote logical but not real possibilities. A verificationist theory of meaning has no room for the "mere play of imagination". - What Strawson's principle says about ideas is - as Strawson himself points out (p.17) - highly misleading. Kant's aim is to show that we are bound to use certain regulative principles based on the ideas of reason, although the ideas have not and

the empirical must be eliminated, bec necessity. Philosophical cognition 21 is INTRODUCTION cannot be based on empirical concep cannot have any objective validity. The ideas transcend the domain of Leibnizi an predecessors. However, his experience. that cognition based on mere concep t It is axiomatic for Kant that philosophypos cannot be based on empirical sibilities. Philosophy has to be pu evidence; it cannot be of "historical origin". Everything descending from The Humean ingredient in Kan the empirical must be eliminated, becausegen it would never yield universal t's ph uine cognition requires not only co necessity. Philosophical cognition is based mere concepts, but it giveson the factual or material componen cannot be based on empirical concepts. In that Kant follows closely his the possibility of experience (intuition Leibnizian predecessors. However, his break with the Leibnizians means it wou ld not be about the real. that cognition based on mere concepts tellsWh only about logical, not real at Kant does in his transcendent possibilities. Philosophy has to be pure, Leib albeit not without real content. nizian spirit. He is convinced that The Humean ingredient in Kant's philosophy is his contention that all of the emp irical basis of all cognition genuine cognition requires not only concepts, but intuition. Intuition conditionsalsogov erning the rece gives the factual or material component to cognition. Even in philosophy ptiv tran scendental philosophy is all the possibility of experience (intuition) must presupposed. Otherwiseabout i what be follows from them. In fact, that it would not be about the real. hardly argued at all. To explain how th is very much in the What Kant does in his transcendentalup philosophy the main bod y of Kant's work. Leibnizian spirit. He is convinced that - notwithstanding the requirement Empirical concepts are made, mathe of the empirical basis of all cognition - bythere are necessary intellectual exhibiting a priori the concept in an conditions governing the receptivity of the empirical. What are neit her made nor constructed. How transcendental philosophy is all about isfran to disclose these conditions and kly admit.that I cannot explain une what follows from them. In fact, that there are necessary conditions is thought. Kant claims that the understan hardly argued at all. To explain how theHow conditions are necessary makes the other concepts of philosop up the n1ain body of Kant's work. 'freedom', 'obj ect' , 'contradiction' Empirical concepts are made, mathematical concepts are constructed etc ideas they are not. Aposteriori by exhibiting a priori the concept in anexp intuition. Philosophical concepts, one lain neit her the intersubject are neither made nor constructed. Howcon arecept they given to us? I have toivity no s. Anyhow, for philosophy to b frankly admit that I cannot explain unequivocally how Kant might have there is no othe r possibility than that its thought. Kant claims that the understanding its pure concepts. are notgenerates contingent like the empirically gi How the other concepts of philosophy, say 'reason', 'moral law', How should we answ er the obje a mystery; innate ctio 'freedom', 'object', 'contradiction' etcthan areis given possiblise acco rding to his own ideas they are not. Aposteriori, oneour would suggest, but that would stan standard s of meaning. There is no d explain neither the intersubjectivity nor the unchangeability of these

concepts. Anyhow, for philosophy to be a science justifiable a priori, there is no other possibility than that its concepts must be given, but they are not contingent like the empirically given concepts. How should we answer the objection that Kant seems to say more than is possible according to his own standards? The impression is due to our standards of meaning. There is no defence against the criticism that

philosophy. Kant's conception of 'a priori', 'the 22 INTRODUCTION ion and many other principal doctrines would distinct ts. The pri concep given y of or the primac osing Kant takes concepts topresupp precede language. Right wrong, Kant's - con ted to be a priori predica notions implies conception of language also is one of histhat most important presuppositions. If sen in a special be underst to made nts - haveand Kant is "saved" from thisjudgme presupposition more ood presentable to a ons concepts,forcogniti are not theymuch that of modem reader, he is means deprived of actual the rationale his 'a priori' see Chap ones.the(Onanalytic-synthetic the 'aactual forms of of philosophy. Kant's conception priori', aposterior e only possibl course, are nts, ofdoctrines judgme distinction and many other principal would collapse without words of our co some learned we have g before anythin presupposing the primacy of given concepts. The primacy of concepts also implies that notions predicated to be a priori - concepts, cognition or l interpr etation " "logica and thesense. 6. The facultie judgments - have to be understood in a sspecial Being a priori to answ ly is a key means that they are not actual concepts, cognitions or judgments but tions serious these implica Taking of the forms of the actual ones. (On ing 'a Kant's priori' hyposta see Chapter All mind. actualThat K sization1.) concern and that judgments, of course, are possible aposteriori. We ecannot say his utput machin input-o ndentalonly transce more anything before we have interpre learned ted some of our contingent language.plausi is, I think, sense a logical in words thought. Unfortunately, the analogy of empirical inp 6. The faculties and the tes much of Kant-interpretation. Kant dominainterpretation" still"logical how the emp clearly shows which n is a case intuitio Taking these implications seriously is a key to answering the criticism t, that is, exh a concep cting Constru alL mind. at the not work of concerning Kant's hypostasization That Kant did not reify a an image. The ing should n is underst intuitio transcendental input-output machine and ood that ashisgenerat theory be off its chara reading and than the image scannin interpreted in a logical sense is, gI through think, more plausible is usually does not down. Kant upsideinput-output theory Kant's of put analogy thought. Unfortunately, the empirical machine in a is given image of eye. Notheory ce to any mind'sKant's still dominates much ofreferen Kant-interpretation. pure an image. generating forempirical urethe a proced or shows intuition is a case which rule clearly how analogy does The w someth is, that ure, is a general intuitio not work at all. Constructing a nconcept, that proced is, exhibiting it in a pureing concept. a schema t; it isThe certain concep intuition is understood asa generating an image. mind's of eyethat is then Clearly or procedure. This is to, it do actcharacteristics. the its is off constru scanning through the image and ction reading a procedure. sees slightest eye the the mind's to think sense put Kant's theory upside down. Kantthat does not make r only "we conside in an empiric concep reference to any mind's eye. No timage is givenalinintuitio a purenintuition, but a B742) 'Intuiti on' m (A714/ ct the rule or a procedure for constru generating an concep image.t".The content of a pure h Kant says t , althoug al analogy empiric anyis, withoutthat intuition is a general procedure, something which corresponds to merely a rec simplyis and means isWhat thisconcept. . What a certain concept; it is asensible schema of that crucial in lars - is particumuch intuitin as does e - it given. Sensibl construction is the act orasprocedure. Clearly, notg make capaciti infinite n of a 'mind' intuitio intellec sense to think that the mind's eyetual sees a procedure. Also with constructing a concept in an empirical intuition "we consider only the act whereby we construct the concept". (A714/B742) 'Intuition' must be understood without any empirical analogy, although Kant says that all intuitions are sensible. What this means is simply and n1erely a reception of something as given. Sensible - as intuiting particulars - is contrasted with the intellectual intuition of a 'mind' with infinite capacities; viz., creation.

point is to see how it is compa faculties meant are the empirica emp irical mind. There23 neither INTRODUCTION faculties No rescue is needed ei There is hardly any way of rescuing Kant from his. faculty-talk. No fonnal conditions of these fac doubt he himself held the faculty-talk as essential to his undertaking. The entities. There are no such enti point is to see how it is compatible with the logical interpretation. The machine either. It is another que faculties meant are the empirical faculties of the mind. The mind is the the faculty-talk mind in thenor way Ka empirical mind. There neither exists· any transcendental putting it should be preferred. A faculties. No rescue is needed either, while Kant's doctrine concerns the ld totallytranscendental dispense with the fa formal conditions of these faculties and notcou different sign ifica nt abo ut the human mode entities. There are no such entities and no transcendental input-output machine either. It is another question whether it is correct to adhere to 7. e clue s forway inteor rpre tati the faculty-talk in the way Kant did or whether Som some other is a contingent putting it should be preferred. Anyhow, it seemsItinconceivable howmat oneter that Eng lish -spe saygsomething could totally dispense with the faculty-talk and be able toakin literature. Look significant about the human mode of cognition.or so, there is no doubt that Str making by renewing the genera "transcendental arguments" - sta 7. Some clues for interpretation have had similar effects. This deb It is a contingent matter that my influences come mainly from the and mispresentation of Kant. An English-speaking literature. Looking backwards over the last thirty years Kant's general motivation. This or so, there is no doubt that Strawson's Bounds of Sense was epochwrong a resu lt ofabout a too narro making by renewing the general interest in Kant.and The debate roots. There is nothing or very litt "transcendental arguments" - starting with the criticism of Strawson those transcendental arguments. W of much confusion have had similar effects. This debate is also a source the role played is a question I been taken as and mispresentation of Kant. Answering scepticism ithas were at that time other writings, Kant's general motivation. This - I will try to show below - is flatly more faithful picture of Kant; jus of Kant's historical wrong and a result of a too narrow understanding (1966) which has remained relativ roots. There is nothing or very little transcendental - in Kant's sense - in Buc hl's deep-going analysis fro those transcendental arguments. Why Strawson'shda book happened to gain of science, or L.W. Bec k's historica the role it played is a question I leave to speculation. There certainly A kind of anti is to Stra were at that time other writings, which in many respects thes presented a wson Allison, most notably his "defense more faithful picture of Kant; just to mention Dryer's monstrous book that Stra ted today, save Kan (1966) which has remained relatively unknown upwso to nthewan present thought, that is, by clearing Kant Buchdahl's deep-going analysis from the point of view of the philosophy Allison's of science, or L.W. Beck's historically oriented works.claims amount to, is th Transcendental idealism should be u A kind of antithesis to Strawson's interpretation is the work of Henry Allison, most notably his "defense of Kant" from 1983. It is well-known that Strawson wanted to save Kant by deleting "the dark side" of his thought, that is, by clearing Kant of his transcendental idealism. What Allison's claims amount to, is that Strawson's Kant is a strawman. Transcendental idealism should be understood as fonnal idealism, not in

to the critique of reason. 'Empirical' and 'transcen different points of view. As Prauss has emphasized, ' · 24 INTRODUCTION abbreviation of 'thing considered as it is in itself'" interpretation Kant is flatly wr the sense of Berkley's phenomenalistic material idealism as Strawsonofhas maintained. adhere subjective but objective a distinct The distinction between the to things of experience andidealism; the things in understood. It isbetween the reaction the i themselves is not an properly ontological distinction two against kinds of philosophers hasmerely strongly objects, but between twoanalytically-minded perspectives on same objects. Itwhich belongs interpretation. to the critique of reason. 'Empirical' and 'transcendental' denote two great initial influence," PraussAllison's has emphasized, 'thing in itself' my is anopin different points of view. AsDespite some important from~ (Prauss those of1971) Allison. as it details is in itself' The In abbreviation of 'thing considered chosen toofpresent viewswrong. explicitly against Alliso Kant my is flatly Kant did not phenomenalistic interpretation a major idealism; outcome of Kant's Copernican Revolutio adhere to subjective butasobjective a distinction which is seldonl of an object. "An objec radically newagainst conception properly understood. It itisa the reaction the interpretation of the as whatever conforms to our knowledge ... is b analytically-minded philosophers which has strongly influenced my own something represented." (Allison 1983, 30) I am go interpretation. the differ correct thatinitial a conceptual is nottoday Despite Allison's great influence,"change my opinions in wa concept 'object' of Allison.No In new many cases of I have some important detailsCopernican from thoseRevolution. new conception, a new 'super-fact', viz., that it chosen to present my views explicitly against Allison's. Allison takes object mere appearances. Although I that do it not agreewith with A as a major outcome of Kant's Copernican Revolution brings important the"An issue is byis no clear-cut. of anpoint, object. object nowmeans understood it a radically new conception here: Allison's becomes as whatever conforms Gestalt-switch to our knowledge ... is byrabbit its very naturesom versa without anyI clear reasontofor the change something represented."vice (Allison 1983, 30) am going argue below - o simultaneous that a conceptual change is not reasons. the correct way to describe the The distinction theislogical and the concept between of 'object' introduced but transc a Copernican Revolution. No new be stressed crucial matter which I think should new conception, a new 'super-fact', viz., that objects of experience are Kant's on ownthis transition differently does.Allison mere appearances. Although I dothan not Allison agree with allthe istranscendental certainlyThere the nerve of his important point, the issue by no means isclear-cut. is a kind of re scendental is 'derived' the logical. Gestalt-switch here: Allison's rabbit becomesfrom sometimes my Thus duck the or mi transcen) definitions --> expositions --> deductions --> are concepts, it is obvious that (transcendental) proofs. These are also contrasted with the more rigorous definitions must be highly releva notions of mathematics. definitions at A728/B756ff, in Log VIII, and also in the Prize Essay.) T 4. Concepts and definitions fundamental for his whole philoso Because the items, which are in the centre Kant's investigations, manyofunclarities. For the underst concepts and are concepts, it is obvious that Kant'sanalytic accounts andof synthetic judgments, it definitions must be highly relevant. (Kant explains his theory of are related to the essencies of conce definitions at A728/B756ff, in Logic .§99-§109 Introduction sec. little that realand definitions have very are, furthermore, quite VIII, and also in the Prize Essay.) These accounts sense (that is, understood always fundamental for his whole philosophy, though they- although seem to defining contain conc definitions many unclarities. For the understanding toofreal thethings. distinction Thus between real definition analytic and synthetic judgments, it is especially crucial how definitions Kant's adherence to the distinction beconle nonnally clear, I hope, are related to the essencies of concepts. It will realalso definitions play mer definitions in the modernIn the that real definitions have very little to do with found only in mathematics. sense (that is, understood always as nominal definitions). Kant's real definitions - although defining concepts - refer to possible things, that is, to real things. Thus real definitions define real predicates. In spite of Kant's adherence to the distinction between real and nominal definition, real definitions nonnally play merely a regulative role. They can be found only in mathematics. In the domain of morality, real definitions

·

"Defining, as the word itself expresses it, means an the complete concept of a thing within its l 74 CHAPTER 2 'Completeness' means clarity and sufficience of c are also used. How that is explainable offers difficulties of its own.that Here, means precision, and 'original' means this dete like elsewhere in this study, not matters relatedand to morality passed by. of a pr derivative thereforearestill in need It is notable that a definition for Kant always is, a 'definition', th according to is this strictintensional, notion of that clarification of the contentsatisfied (=intension) of few a concept. (Logic §98ff) rem only by concepts. 'Definition' "Defining, as the word itselflogical expresses it, means anexample, original exhibiting perfection. For empirical of ~oncepts the complete concept of all a but thing its limits." can within only be made explicit.(A727/B755) 'Completeness' means clarity Kant and sufficience of characteristics, 'limits' the divides concepts into two classes: means precision, and 'original' means that this determination of limits is gro concepts. Definitions are divided into two not derivative and thereforesynthetic still in definitions, need of a proof. No wonder and nominal versusthat real def according to this strict notion 'definition', the the conditions canbut bealso th givenof concepts' he means categories satisfied only by few concepts. 'Definition' remains only an idea of other philosophical concepts. Empirical concepts a logical perfection. For example, empirical ~oncepts be defined at attai It could be thought thatcannot definitions can be all but can only be made explicit. analysis or by synthesis. That is how Kant thoug Kant divides concepts into twoyield classes: the givenwhich and the madethe st cannot definitions satisfy concepts. Definitions are accordingly divided into analysis two groups: analytic versus yields only nominal de synthetic definitions, and nominal versus realconcepts definitions. By 'abepriori expositions. Given can only defined thr given concepts' he means the categories but makes also theaideas of reason and synthe § 100) Analysis concept distinct, other philosophical concepts. Empirical concepts concept. (Logic, 69) are given aposteriori. It could be thought that definitions cancan be be attaine~ way of Concepts made either either by a priori or apos analysis or by synthesis. That is howbelong Kant thought, although concepts to the first class,analysis whereas em cannot yield definitions artificially which satisfy conditions,concepts and made,thethatstrict is, stipulated be accordingly analysis yields only nominal definitions, or better, Stipulated concepts have definitions, or better de expositions. Given conceptsconcepts can only are be defined through analysis. (Logic also made, but under the guidance o § 100) Analysis makes a concept distinct, synthesis makes a distinct artificially. However, although empirical concept concept. (Logic, 69) cannot have synthetic definitions, because they nev Concepts can be made either a priori or aposteriori. Mathematical completeness. Empirical concepts, tha level of designates, differ from personconcepts to person.andThe w concepts belong to the first class, whereas empirical as a designation, a concept. Th artificially made, that is, regarded stipulatedonly concepts belong tonot theas second. thus nothingorbut a nominal determination [Wortbe Stipulated concepts have definitions, better declarations. Empirical There is thus no point concepts are also made, butsynthetic under thedefinition guidanceatofall. experience, not in is required for they communic concept more precise thanare artificially. However, although empirical concepts synthetic, cannot have synthetic definitions, because they never reach the required level of completeness. Empirical concepts, that is, what a word designates, differ from person to person. The word is more properly regarded only as a designation, not as a concept. The alleged definition is thus nothing but a nominal determination [WortbestimmungJ, and not a synthetic definition at all. There is no point in making an empirical concept n10re precise than is required for communication. Instead, we try

concept refers. They serve the purpos 75 as much as is necessary for KANT'S PHILOSOPHICALword METHOD necessarily anymore. In a nominal de to specify what falls under empirical concepts, that is, their extension. of a concept are exhibited. It is manife (Logic §102) of a concept is synonymous or near Nominal definition means enumeration of those predicates which are That is exactly how it is used by Kan adequate for the recognition or identification of the objects to which a presentation of that which belongs t concept refers. They serve the purpose of detennining the meaning of a (Logic § 105) A concept is made d word as much as is necessary for ready communication, but not Aesthetic Kant distinguished betwee necessarily anymore. In a nominal definition some of the characteristics dental exposition. An exposition is m of a concept are exhibited. It is manifest that to give a nOlninal definition which exhibits the concept as given a of a concept is synonymous or nearly synonymous with 'exposition'. means "the explanation of a concept, That is exactly how it is used by Kant too. By 'exposition' Kant means may be gained into the possibility of o presentation of that which belongs to a concept (found by analysis). (B40) Later on Kant quite clearly refe (Logic §105) A concept is made distinct by an exposition. In the transcendental deduction of space and Aesthetic Kant distinguished between a metaphysical and a transcenuse of 'exposition', it is worth notic dental exposition. An exposition is metaphysical when it contains that "principles of exposition of appearanc which exhibits the concept as given a priori. A transcendental exposition Mathematics is the only science w means "the explanation of a concept, as a principle from which insight which Kant always means real definit may be gained into the possibility of other synthetic cognitions a priori". of mathematical concepts are first (B40) Later on Kant quite clearly refers to both of them together as the exhibited in a corresponding intuition transcendental deduction of space and time. (A87/B119) (Concerning the intuition, that is, constructing a conce use of 'exposition', it is worth noticing that cardinal propositions are (A730/B758, PC 145) In other words, "principles of exposition of appearances." (A247/B303)) is, exhibiting a priori an intuition whi Mathematics is the only science which has proper definitions - by to giving a real definition of that con which Kant always means real definitions. It is not so that the definitions the same time. "For when I make a of mathematical concepts are first given and then the concepts are parts and proceed from these, to the w exhibited in a corresponding intuition. On the contrary, exhibiting in an present here; I obtain them first by sy intuition, that is, constructing a concept is the synthetic act of defining. definitions of mathematics can never (A730/B758, PC 145) In other words, the construction of a concept, that through the definition. Mathematics s is, exhibiting a priori an intuition which corresponds to it, is tantamount definitions are never more than exp to giving a real definition of that concept. The very concept is made at analyzes (confused) given concepts the same time. "For when I make a distinct concept, I begin with the definitions. Analytic definitions of ph parts and proceed from these, to the whole. There are no characteristics be unsatisfactory, for example just be present here; I obtain them first by synthesis." (Logic, 70) Thus synthetic definitions of mathematics can never err, because the concept is given through the definition. Mathematics starts with definitions. Philosophical definitions are never more than expositions. (A730/B758) Philosophy analyzes (confused) given concepts and ends with analytic (alleged) definitions. Analytic definitions of philosophy can err in many ways, and be unsatisfactory, for example just because they can never be complete.

the thing, not the name", the real essence instead o Only a real definition defines predicates of a thing 76 CHAPTER 2 ontological sense. Other definitions define words or ood as referrin In philosophy concepts are made clear, whereas in mathematics clearg to a be underst should 'Real' sense. of a ination determ concepts are made. is, a synthetic predicate as a a real defi predicate. In "must [Sach-Erkliirungen] Real definitions or material ce), not to a logical referenexplanations definiti A real contain everything that is possible thinge itself". must "defineon is object.111ey possibl refers toinathe

the thing, not the name", the realnt. essence instead of the logical essence. judgme substit merely notreal ofona -thing which in the Only a real definition defines"..real predicates doesare which definiti but words, ible ontological sense. Other definitions define words or concepts in a logicalconta intellig more thing other object(-G) sense. 'Real' should be understood referring real predicate that(defin thea defined which to [Merkmal]asby makes which a determination of a y,thing objective th is, a synthetic predicate as and(with d with certaint cognize tion would explana reference), not to a logicalservice predicate. In applica a real definition expression tion. Real the able in its objective refers to a possible object. realonly definition is always a synthetic t but also the concep clearA not judgment. explanations which present the object in intuition, i (A242n "..real definition - whichconcep does not merely for the name)of"Real a d latter kind." of thissubstitute t, are of the ob on marker thing other more intelligible but contains a clear nt for cogniti are sufficie which words, possibility the always forth can [Merkmal] by which the defined object(G) (definitum) be of t by setting detenninations quotati these As cognized with certainty, charact and which explained concept on ." (Logicthe§106) eristicsmakes ons of definiti be than that any which makes serviceable in application. definiti Real explanation would richer ons are much a part of it. (Beck clear not only the conceptnot butonly alsotools its objective on, but Mathematical of cognitireality. derived be with explanations which presentreal the definiti object in intuition, in conformity the. 2 can on other predicates ts of synth (A242n) "Real definitions .. are those concept, are of this latter kind." ons are produc definiti e all real Becaus the oth On which are sufficient for becognition of theonsobject as tologic. its inner in general any real definiti in math e only of inner detenninations by setting forth thereal possibility of the out possibl areobject definitions above, regulati merelyreal characteristics." (Logic § 106) quotations logic is show, ndental clearly in transce rolethese their As definiti mere real words. Theyons arenor a definitions are much richer itthan any definitions neither because of is exactly deducti ts require it. (Beck 1984a, 294) From a ons. not only tools of cognition,metaph but a ysics, part ofthat its concep theo his 2 ing concern also real definition other predicates can ons be derived. is instructive definiti too comm allcannot the metaph Because all real definitions are products of synthetic acts,or, there clearly that shows an imag ing inspect eye" as mentioned be any real definitions in general themind's other hand, "the re, ofOn literatulogic. above, real definitions are possible only in mathematics. Accordingly, 2 'Real' must not be confused with 'real' in the modern se their role in transcendental logic is merely regulative. It willabout turnanout thatthing, actual not say anything n does real definitio actual. See "Logi or possible possibleare either which is nor a thing it is exactly because neitheris,real definitions axioms in possibility" in the next chapter. metaphysics, that its concepts require deductions. Kant's theory of real definitions is instructive also concerning his theory of pure intuition. It shows clearly that the metaphor, all too common in the secondary literature, of "the mind's eye" inspecting an image is beside the point, 2 'Real' must not be confused with 'real' in the modern sense as 'true' or 'really'. A real definition does not say anything about an actual thing, but about a real thing, that is, a thing which is either possible or actual. See "Logical possibility versus real possibility" in the next chapter.

content of a pure intuition generat e cannot be an image at all. 'Pur e int as a kind of confrontation with som 77 KANT'S PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD connection to some psychological (o and more than so, seriously misleading. Taking for granted that the 5. Discursof concept, content of a pure intuition generates the real definition iveavers us intuititive cog cannot be an image at all. 'Pure intuition' should be understood merely From the modern poin t of view, as a kind of confrontation with something und which given, without any erstis anding Kan t is to see how de connection to some psychological (or physiological) ideal of sensing. cognition dominates Kan mathematics and philosophy are cl 5. Discursive versus intuitive cognition what Kant call s rational cognition MA N 469 From the modem point of view, one of the greatest in, for Ka ) Irondifficulties ically enough othe r way round:or mathematical understanding Kant is to see how deeply the to 'apriorist' poin t out how ph of mathem ideal of cognition dominates Kant's thought. In other words, how philoso atics, that is, how mathematics and philosophy are closely the related. both ups does. sameThey way as matmake hematic reasons for that thes what Kant calls rational cognition [Vernunfterkenntnis]. (A714/B742, is. He him self s mathem MAN 469) Ironically enough, for Kant himself theatic problem was njust the al cognitio acco rding to other way round: to point out how philosophy follow thelemethods syntcannot hetic but verifiab a priori. In fac more and of mathematics, that is, how philosophy cannot verify ings to moritse judgments accurate thin s the same way as mathematics does. It is phil instructive examine Kant's osophy. to "Me taphysic s rests on reasons for that thesis. He himself startedmat byhem giving new account oftion to atics,a on thei r applica goo d fortune to ente mathematical cognition according to which mathematical judgments aresecure p r upo n the Philosophy synthetic but verifiable a priori. In fact, it sometimes seems has rdance procthat eedKant s in acco stateme more and more accurate things to say about mathematics about nts are grouthan nded on intuitio constructedalone philosophy. "Metaphysics rests on concepts not,n inlike , that is,- give intuitions, analyzed mathematics, on their application to intuition.. ..it has not yet had . Tha t is declare d the e.g. in a of nitio science." (Bxiv) good fortune to enter upon the secure pathcog n is reas on's cognition out of is reason's cog Philosophy proceeds in accordance with concepts while, nitimathematical on out of the constru t means to exh statements are grounded on intuition; con in cep mathematics concepts are ri the i ibit a prio concept constructed, that is, given in intuitions, while in philosophy, concepts . Thus for the construare ction of a will bestatement: required, "Philosophical analyzed. That is declared e.g. in a famous which, as intuition, i none themathematical less, as the con cognition is reason's cognition out of concepts; cognition struction of a c mus t in the pres To construct is reason's cognition out of the construction of concepts. enta tion exparess ge intuition s whicorresponds concept means to exhibit a priori the intuition which ch fall undtoerthethe sam Cha pteras non-empirical 7. and 8. whereintuition concept. Thus for the construction of a concept these topics wi The differenobject(O), and yetis that o will be required, which, as intuition, is a particular ce just explained syntheti none the less, as the construction of a concept (acgeneral presentation), it s is i judgmen ts. Mathematic must in the presentation express general validity for all possible intuitions which fall under the same concept." (A713/B741) (See Chapters 7. and 8. where these topics will be elaborated.) The difference just explained is that of different methods of arriving at synthetic judgments. Mathematics is intuitive. To justify a synthetic

Mathematics can conside r a concep t in concreto, present a general concep t in a corresp onding pure o · 78 CHAPTER 2 and accordingly, to cognize what are the propert ie phy alw s philoso Wherea 749) are (e.g. A721/B concep judgment I must go beyond thet. properties which contained in the abstra to, that is,totothe in abstracaccording concep concept. That means that general an object has tot only be detennined ce differen 62) The(A718/B746) betw 734/B7 lar case. particu either pure(Aor empirical. conditions of an intuition; the d ount to to tantam atics phy and in mathem concreto, thatis is, concretely Mathematics can considerphiloso a concept 719/B (A employ ment. versus its intuitiv intuition, present a general concept of inreason a corresponding pure ore empirical intuition~ of the on based ofpure atics the object of the and accordingly, to cognize Mathem what are the isproperties ac that t though be might It time. and concept. (e.g. A721/B749)space Whereas philosophy always has to consider a on definiti a this: likegeneral from a nt goesthe mathem atical that judgme is, to abstract general concept only in abstracto, which is made nt judgme A n. intuitio in a pure offollo particular case. (A734/B762) The difference between the methods "follow how this nceemployment t. It is of crucial concep philosophy and mathematics is tantamount to the importa discursive Kant r whethe ce a differen(A719/B747, Pr §7)is underst ood makes of reason versus its intuitive employment. propert ie n those betweeof made must beof distinct Mathematics is based on pureion intuition~ the forms sensibility: to belong and whichtojustKant, thingaccording t of athat in the beconcep thought a space and time. It might words, co in other same distinct make or to of aion concept is given mathematical judgment goes like this:the a definition §98) If (Logic t. the concep ed under versusiscontain in a pure intuition. A judgment made which follows directly from that the concep t of contain ed inis the which a propert yhow concept. It is of crucial importance thisis"following" understood; it that of cogniti on) - A is to the object is equal which or misunderstood. makes a difference whether Kant is understood a concep exhibit disclos ed by is properties states what those which are ing contained distinction must be made between Kant. That- mea ng to is analytic y just certainl which belong accordi to a thing (A718/B746) in the concept of a thing and of synthet very The is acquire knowleindge in idea the concept or to make the same distinction other words, d. contained contain ed is not ted,If which predica y is(Logic concept. §98) a judgment predicates versus contained under thepropert In synthe . to the subject yet belongs , but subject in the concept of the subject (of a sentence, a property which is contained t of the in the concep contain what -isthat beyond goof cognition) is, ifed a judgment merely which is equal to the object ways: eit in two thingthe y cana belong A propert states what is disclosed by exhibiting conceptto -a then judgment or nec iori; aposter nts no ampliative judgmethat of synthet is a case to Kant. Thaticmeans certainly is analytic according und priori. In order nts a judgments ic judgme synthet of very idea of synthetic is thattoa knowledge is acquired. The und to crucial it is a priori, possibl e in judgme property is predicated, which is nts notare contained the concept of the being thing, a to belong rily wenot must subject, but yet belongs to can the necessa subject. In synthetic judgmentsyet tha stressed be must also t. Itsubject. its concep essence go beyond what is contained in theofconcept of the (A718/B746) ty, logical necessi be, contingently cannoteither not,in and A property can belong to aisthing two ways: - that of Kant's teac the very heart is necessarily ndental. It or transce is a case of synthetic judgments aposteriori; - that is a case Chapte r 8 (See do. not will alone necessi logical In of synthetic judgments a priori. orderty to understand how synthetic judgments are possible a priori, it is crucial to understand how a property can necessarily belong to a thing, yet not being a part of the (logical) essence of its concept. It must also be stressed that necessity in this case is not, and cannot be, logical necessity, but could be called transcendental. It is the very heart of Kant's teaching that the notion of logical necessity alone will not do. (See Chapter 8.)

not unequivocally, Kant s distinction between being contained under a concept. This latter distinct ion tained in) of a concept79 KANT'S PHn..OSOPHICAL (con METHOD versus the under). (Logic §7) That which is con What is the difference between the properties which are contained in a logical essence. Thus to disclose th concept of a thing versus the properties which belong to a thing? procedure resulting in an analytic j Although not unequivocally, Kant seems to take this as equal to the property which belongs synthetical ly distinction between being contained in a concept and being contained analytically. Normally, only synthes is under a concept. This latter distinction is clearly that between the content presentation of the analytic-synthet ic (contained in) of a concept versus the extension of a concept (contained with the contain-metaphor. Kant also under). (Logic §7) That which is contained in a concept is part of its judgment is always thetic. Thus it logical essence. Thus to disclose the logical essence is ansyn analytic analytic-synthetic distinction is noth in procedure resulting in an analytic judgment. On the other hand, a intensionally clarifying - analytic property which belongs synthetically to a thing cannot be disclosed amplifying - synthetic judgments. analytically. Normally, only synthesis can disclose it. The 'canonical' It is plain that a judgment stating a presentation of the analytic-synthetic distinction (A6/BIO) is made just the extension of a concept is a synthet ic with the contain-metaphor. Kant also explicitly said that an existential judgments a priori? Are they also e judgment is always synthetic. Thus it is legitimate to conclude that the claimed in a transcendental proposit ion? analytic-synthetic distinction is nothing, else than a distinction between say 'cau se' has some properties whi ch intensionally clarifying - analytic judgments and extensionally from its essence, belong to it. The clai m amplifying - synthetic judgments. is claimed that to the concept of subj It is plain that a judgment stating aposteriori an object belonging to necessarily bound, although they are n the extension of a concept is a synthetic judgment. What about synthetic concept of 'bod y'. In summary, a thin gc judgments a priori? Are they also extensional judgments? What is 1) those which belong (necessarily ) to claimed in a transcendental proposition? It is not claimed that a concept, that is, to its concept. 2) do not belo ng to say 'cause' has some properties which necessarily, albeit not deriving necessarily to a thing. 3) belong con tinge from its essence, belong to it. The claim is extensional, a subsumption. It

is claimed that to the concept of subject ('body') causal relations are 6. Axioms, demonstrations and pro o the necessarily bound, although they are not in any way derived from "the exa ctne ss of mathematics rests kind of predicates: concept of 'body'. In summary, a thing can have three dem ons trati ons .. non e of thing, these .. can b 1) those which belong (necessarily) to the logical essence of the pher."essence, (A727/Bbut 755belong ) Kant adhered that is, to its concept. 2) do not belong tophil theoso logical method ch presupposed the apodictic necessarily to a thing. 3) belong contingently to awhi thing.

words, an axiomatic system for Kan t is shows what follows, if the axioms 6. Axioms, demonstrations and proofs are tr axioms could always be true with out

"the exactness of mathematics rests upon definitions, axioms and demonstrations .. none of these .. can be achieved or imitated by the philosopher." (A727/B755) Kant adhered to the conception of axiomatic method which presupposed the apodictic truth of the axioms. In other words, an axiomatic system for Kant is not just a formal play, which shows what follows, if the axioms are true. How is it possible that the axioms could always be true without any possibility of error? The

ri. certain synthetic propositions a prio ain. (A cert ly error, their truth is apodictical 80 CHAPTER 2 ause it is i possible only in mathematics, bec ms, Lhe certain of the axio ic certaint apodictaxioms answer is simply that for Kant arey intuItIve fundamental . The requirement of guaranteed is synthetic is, renc theyesare judgments a priori, propositions [Grundsiitze], thatinfe ly. The inference is eralare inference gen cal intuitions. to logi given, or better, generated through pure They immediately ascertained. isses is the premthere truth ofBecause certain synthetic propositions the a priori. is no room for on' in a strict tation of 'ded ucti interpre certain. (A732/B760ft) Axioms are error, their truth is apodicticallyThe criticism - correc~ly heavy (ibid). such n under possible only in mathematics, bee because it is intuitive Given the understood as mere 's n bee es etim som e hav apodictic certainty of the axioms, 'lhe certainty of the conclusions of proofs for Kan t a truth. All farther fromofthe inferences is guaranteed. The requirement apodictic certainty applies apodictic certainty - pr rences yiel infeinference to logical inference generally. The is ding not allowed to start unless Kant, philo certain. However, according to the truth of the premisses is ascertained. its demonstrations an atics insense hemlogical imitate in amat strict has recently The interpretation of 'deduction' to imitate mathemat like not ld wou t Kan that been under such heavy criticism - correc~ly - that even Kant's proofs - but his po like to docould he wouldNothing what 'stories'. ctlymere exaas be have sometimes been understood cannot do it. In we , fact of ter mat a farther from the truth. All proofs for Kant are meant to be syllogistic in intuition, and ac that is, give constructed inferences yielding apodictic certainty - ,provided then premisses are ilable.. In philosophy rilnde] are ava eisgphilosophy certain. However, according to[Bew Kant, is not allowed to ts are not given in is, concep available, that imitate mathematics in its demonstrations and proofs. The reason is not otherwise given. or are the intellec-t on from that Kant would not like to imitate mathematics the contrary, that is e a distinction betw ee Kanist mak How hisdid point that, unfortunately, as exactly what he would like to do - but mere concepts, was based on do chit.clea In rlymathematics concepts are a matter of fact, we cannot whi based on philosophic which was secure phyaccordingly, philoso constructed, that is, given in intuition, and premisses e concepts a based ontomer osophy also [Beweisgrunde] are available In phil philosophy, no recourse intuition is t is indeed wha t Kan ursive? Tha ely disc mer available, that is, concepts are not given in intuition, but either descend som e em is just empty unless it is given. from the intellect or are otherwisesyst au bec ty was emp metaphysics metaphysics, uctivisticdeductivistic Dedbetween How did Kant make a distinction tely from mere conc edia immhis the real and which clearly was based on mereofconcepts, new transcendental ty play of concepts, unles would be an emp philosophy which was based on philosophical proofs? Is transcendental ctive reality. Kan t's metaphysic give it obje as Kant so often says? Is itinal p philosophy also based on mere concepts ediately. Discursive card imm merely discursive? That is indeed but whatnot Kant means. However, the whole whic of the concepts from deduction anchored in intuition. system is just empty unless it prio is rsomehow scendental propositions can not tran ds, wor Deductivistic metaphysics was empty because it tried to obtain cognition s. concept of the real immediately from mere concepts. Likewise mathematics would be an empty play of concepts, unless empirical intuition were to give it objective reality. Kant's metaphysics is based on mere concepts, but not immediately. Discursive cardinal propositions always require a prior deduction of the concepts from which they are derived. In other words, transcendental propositions cannot be derived immediately from concepts. 0

the pure concepts is the task of T significance of some of the pure con chapter the "System of all Cardin 81 al P KANT'S PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD of the pure concepts are given (pr The task of the part of the Analytics, preceding the systematic possibi lity of experie nce is involved presentation of cardinal propositions, is toclear show how the concepts how and inpure what phase that pr are anchored to intuition. To establish thenot objective reality of presentvalidity alreadyor in TD? Transcen the pure concepts is the task of TD. Inrules the for Schematism the sensible the synthesis of empirical i significance of some of the pure conceptsofis experie exhibited - and lastly in the nce is relevant and neces chapter the "System of all Cardinal Propositions" son1e application-rules [transcendental proposition] is called of the pure concepts are given (proved). In transcendental proofs the and not a theorem [Lehrsatz] - notw possibility of experience is involved as a premiss. It is important to make because it has the peculiar proper clear how and in what phase that premiss is introduced. Is that premiss experience, possible in the first place not present already in TD? Transcendental propositions to be proved are it." (A737/B765) (See Chapter 8.) rules for the synthesis of empirical intuition. That is why the possibility This achoring to intuition makes of experience is relevant and necessary as a presupposed premiss. "It double sense. Firstly, transcende proposition [Grundsatz] [transcendental proposition] is called a cardinal experience. However, for Kant this and not a theorem [Lehrsatz] - notwithstanding that it must be proved doubt that it does not in any way because it has the peculiar property of making its proving ground, Hypotheses are not allowed in the t experience, possible in the first place and must always be presupposed in the transcendental propositions are a it." (A737/B765) (See Chapter 8.) of experience. Nothing factual is cla This achoring to intuition makes the all whole system conditional in a cognition a priori is cognition of th double sense. Firstly, transcendental proofs presuppose possible The problem for Kant is how t experience. However, for Kant this seems to ben. so much beyond any cognitio Contrary to what is so doubt that it does not in any way make his ed reasoning hypothetical. explain in detail - Kant does not Hypotheses are not allowed in the transcendental Secondly, reasoning. reasoning. What is new are question the transcendental propositions are a priori conditions of the possibility answers - a new argumentative strateg of experience. Nothing factual is claimed. Kant so pertinently says, He As relies heavily on the syllogistic l all cognition a priori is cognition of the mere possibility. much more perfect than anybody wou The problem for Kant is how to attain certainty in philosophical view. For Kant, the only binding cognition. Contrary to what is sometimes claimed - although not (syllogistic) logic. However, as alrea explained in detail - Kant does not present any logically new ways of Kant's criticis m against his rationalis new ways of searching for reasoning. What is new are questions and cogniti on is possible merely from con answers - a new argumentative strategy -tonot any new procedures. show, howlogical metaphysical cognition He relies heavily on the syllogistic logic of his day, and took it to be The problem amounts to finding se much more perfect than anybody would admit from the modem point of view. For Kant, the only binding and secure proofs are those of (syllogistic) logic. However, as already mentioned before, the heart of Kant's criticism against his rationalistic predecessors is that no genuine cognition is possible merely from concepts. Accordingly, Kant's task is to show, how metaphysical cognition nevertheless is possible a priori. The problem amounts to finding secure premisses a priori, that is,

clearly saw - unlike his predecessors, and m philosophers - that taking logical inference 82 CHAPTER 2 of arguing cannot lead to any growth of kno concepts which can be shown not to be empty concepts. In that case does not result in cognition of the real. The p inferences would not have only logical grounds, but real grounds as well. follow some logical laws, but rather to fin - Kant's new argumentative strategy is a result of his criticism of the such logical inferences. Indeed, the hea deductivistic way of arguing. Despite Kant's heavy reliance on logic, he something new is introduced in an intuition. clearly saw - unlike his predecessors, and modem scientifically minded new, viz. a synthetic premiss, makes the wh~l philosophers - that taking logical inference as the only acceptable form is how Kant thought that mathematics is synt of arguing cannot lead to any growth of knowledge at all. Formal logic The term which Kant is using to denote a does not result in cognition of the real. The 'Deduction' problem of arguing is not 'deduction'. is also used intoa non follow some logical laws, but rather to find or establish premisses of justification quite generally. Already this ind such logical inferences. Indeed, the kind heartof of syntheticity thathas not any deductive proofis- as something new is introduced in thought. an intuition. Thistointroducing something as a lo Indeed, take a 'deduction' wh~le procedure synthetic. That new, viz. a synthetic premiss, makes the notion upside-down. The reason why deduc is how Kant thought that mathematics synthetic. that inisthose cases Beweisgrunde neither f The tenn which Kant is using to denote a justification of a concept proofs are available, which wouldis di 'deduction'. 'Deduction' is alsojustifications. used in a non-technical sense to denote a de Or to put it in another way, justification quite generally. Already indicates a 'deduction' is no no realthis definitions arethat available. The most not any kind of deductive proof as has often and mistakenly been of course, the Transcendental Deduction thought. Indeed, to take a 'deduction' as aislogical is to put deduction neededproof to justify theKant's concept notion upside-down. The reasontranscendental why deductions are needed, is exactly proofs, that is, the proofs of t that in those cases Beweisgrunde neither for intuitive nor for logical establish "the objective validity of the conc proofs are available, which would directly yield the desired their a priori synthesis" is the task execu justifications. Or to put it in another way, deductions are required where Deduction. no real definitions are available. The most notable case of a deduction is, While 'deduction' for Kant is a general of course, the Transcendentalconsequent Deductionalthough of the misleading Categories. for Thathim deduction is needed to justifydeductions the concepts which are to be used as well. But 'transcendentalinproo the cardinal propositions. To jus transcendental proofs, that is, the in proofs a strictofsense for a certain kind of establish "the objective validitypropositions. of the concepts and the possibility of That a deduction accomplis their a priori synthesis" is theindicated task executed by "Whenever, the Transcendental by Kant: therefore, a Deduction. synthetically added to the concept of a thing While 'deduction' for Kant not is aproof, general tenn for justification, it islegiti at least a deduction of the consequent although misleading forbehim to talk about proofs as is supplied." (A233/B286) The task should deductions as well. But 'transcendental proof' is used most importantly in a strict sense for a certain kind of justification of transcendental propositions. That a deduction accomplishes less than a proof is indicated by Kant: "Whenever, therefore, a detennination a priori is synthetically added to the concept of a thing, it is indispensable that, if not proof, at least a deduction of the legitimacy of such an assertion should be supplied." (A233/B286) The task is to consider in more detail,

7. Transcendental proofs according

83 AsMETHOD is the case with many other con KANT'S PHILOSOPHICAL

used by Kant both in a general and a m what Kant means by 'deduction' and by the conditions he set for generally - and that is his most com transcendental proofs. "attempted independently of empirical the proofs of the traditional metaphysi 7. Transcendental proofs according to Kant metaphysica specialis belong to this c As is the case with many other concepts, is the one used proof' in the present s which is'transcendental 3 used by Kant both in a general and a more technical sense. He means means a proof of a transcendental (f is generally - and that is his most comnlon use makes - a proof, which sometimes Kant's discussion c "attempted independently of empiricaltranscendental principles". (A614/B642) Thus proofs in the general generalis (ontology), the proofs of the traditional metaphysica notoffeasible. attempted proofs which areand metaphysica specialis belong to this category. In atranscendental technical sense proposition proofs of the study - a 'transcendental which is the one used in the present the understanding, that is, proof' transcendent proposition. What Howe means a proof of a transcendental (fundamental) are the ones which are feasible. sometimes makes Kant's discussion confusing is that heother deals withof attem effort to discussing kinds transcendental proofs in tlle generalonsense, that is including also that the concepts of reason itself, Kant's teaching is that-only the attempted proofs which are not feasible.'something transcendent or transcenden based on the pure concepts of proofs of the transcendental propositions attempted to be proved. These proofs of the understanding, that is, transcendental proofs in the technical sense, to illusion only, because no real Bewe are the ones which are feasible. However, devotes considerable course,Kant is Kant's main criticism of rati effort to discussing other kinds of attempted proofs, namely those proofs will conditions of transcendentalbased on the concepts of reason itself, that more is, thedetailed ideas of reason. In fact, how tran examination of something transcendent - or transcendental in the pre-Kantian sense - isexperie and what is the role of 'possible attempted to be proved. These proofs ofproofs, traditional can lead willmetaphysics be postponed until Cha to illusion only, because no real Beweisgriinde are available. This, of next s deduction will be examined in the course, is Kant's main criticism of rationalistic metaphysics. General Much has already been said about be examined inproofs. this section. The the s conditions of transcendental proofs willtranscendental To establish proofs are possible, more detailed examination of how transcendental priori, called cardinal (or fundamental) or of pure intuitions in theseHoweve and what is the role of 'possible experience' of transcendental philosophy. 8. cognition Kant's conception proofs, will be postponed until Chapter synthetic a priori are of transcen deduction will be examined in the next section. It should keptand in mind Much has already been said about4 the needbefor the that aimallofproofs ar higher faculty of inference and has the unders transcendental proofs. To establish the system of synthetic propositions a in the Kant refers to 'transcendental proofs' A615/B643, A629/B657, and in priori, called cardinal (or fundamental) propositions, is the ultimate goalthe Tra A786/B814, A787/B815, A788/B816, A789/B8 of transcendental philosophy. However, not all proofs resulting in synthetic cognition a priori are transcendental. The other kind of proofs 4 It should be kept in mind that all proofs are the proofs of reason. Reason is the

higher faculty of inference and has the understanding as its object. (A643/B671ff) Kant refers to 'transcendental proofs' in the Dialectic: A591/B619, A614/B642, A615/B643, A629/B657, and in the Transcendental Doctrine of Method: A786/B814, A787/B815, A788/B816, A789/B817

priori - because philosophy cannot exhi has to accomplish its proofs in two step 84 CHAPTER 2 concept on which a transcendental prop are mathematical demonstrations. 'empty' Philosophy has but nohasrecourse concep~, objectivetovalid demonstrations. (A734/B762) Unlike philosophy cannot themathematics, proof of a transcendental proposit conditions which every transcende proceed directly from concepts to some establish synthetic propositions a these isitsexactly thatinthe first step always priori - because philosophy cannot exhibit concepts intuition - but is to show has to accomplish its proofs in two steps. The first step proof. any transcendental The that firstastep concept on which a transcendental proposition to be based is nota anprelim Although aisdeduction is only or reality. The itsecond 'empty' concep~, but has objective validity transcendental proof, seemsstep to beis so th introduced the proof of a transcendental proposition. of CPR Kant causedexplicitly much more trouble and some conditions which every transcendental proof has to satisfy. One ofan im themselves. Accordingly, it creates these is exactly that the first step always has toconcern be accomplished priorjust to som the main and the proofs any transcendental proof. The first step The is called a "deduction". need by forKant transcendental proofs, o step inofaccomplishing a Although a deduction is only a prelimin~ry a direct derivation o the impossibility transcendental proof, it seems to be soput that the Transcendental Deduction several times in the same way, e.g. of CPR caused much more trouble and work for Kant than the proofs pure reason, in its merely speculative themselves. Accordingly, it creates anfound impression, the Deduction a single that synthetic judgment is direct the main concern and the proofs just something subsidiary. we have shown, ideas cannot fonn the The need for transcendental proofs, or - have what objective amounts to the same which validity. Through of transcendental is car the impossibility of a direct derivation reason does, indeed,propositions, establish secure put several times in the same way, e.g.: "Now in concepts the wholealone, domain directly from but of always pure reason, in its merely speculative employment, is not to altogeth be of these conceptsthere to something found a single synthetic judgment directly derived from concepts. For, experience." (A736/B764) Kant as though we have shown, ideas cannot fonn the basis of isany synthetic judgment experience taken for granted the pro of understanding pureof a which have objective validity. Through concepts as in mathematics, although certain reason does, indeed, establish secure cardinal propositions, not however In the section "The discipline of pure directly from concepts alone, but always indirectly throughKant relation The only Doctrine of Method explains of these concepts to something altogether contingent, namely possible are needed: "What distinguishes the pro experience." (A736/B764) Kant thought that when propositions fromthe all possibility other proofsof whic experience is taken for granted the proofs certainty; as priori isyield that, apodictic in the case of the fonner, a different certain as in mathematics, although ofmeans of itskind. concepts, directly to the ob In the section "The discipline of pure reason validity in regardoftothe its proofs" conceptsofand objective The Doctrine of Method Kant explains why transcendental synthesis." (A782/B810) deductions He also sets for are needed: "What distinguishes the aproofs of transcendental transcendental proof. Thesynthetic criterion is: propositions from all other proofs which yield a synthetic cognition a priori is that, in the case of the former, reason may not apply itself, by means of its concepts, directly to the object, but must first establish the objective validity of the concepts and the possibility of their a priori synthesis." (A782/B810) He also sets forth a criterion and three rules for a transcendental proof. The criterion is: "Proofs of the assertions of pure

the proof is of such a kind that it leg 85 The rules are as follows (A786/B814): rule; the necessity of reason are not to be conducted in a way 1st leading straightway to the thededucti Prior to any proof the sources of desired predicate but by means of the principle of the possibility of is based them." must be refle expanding our given concept a priori towhich ideas the andproof of realizing expect success our inferences. (A785/B813) In other words, one must first examine andinmake sure that The of proof. "..not to try a for the the proof is of such a kind that it legimately cankind 'extend our concept'. The rules are as follows (A786/B814): preceding reflection and justification o will be taken, viz. the c of the Beweisgrund: 1st rule; the necessity of the deduction propositions are to be propositions based, and with Prior to any proof the sources of theproofs fundamental on what inferences." which the proof is based must be reflected upon: with what right we may 2ndhave rule;tothe a proof expect success in our inferences. The sources beuniqueness legitimate of just There is andproofs can without be only one for the kind of proof. "..not to try any transcendental proposition. A transcendental proposit preceding reflect'ion and justification of, from what sources the cardinal and predicates theonsynthetic conditio propositions will be taken, viz. the cardinal propositions which the according to this concept. "The proofs are to be based, and with what right we.may expect success in our proof the detennination of an object gene inferences." which also is one only." (A788/B816) 2nd rule; the uniqueness of a proof has troubled many commentators - si There is and can be only one proof for each transcendental rule merely to employ concept in q proposition. A transcendental proposition correct starts with onethe concept 3rd rule: proofs must never be apag and predicates the synthetic condition of the possibility of the object "Thecan direct or ostensive proof, in according to this concept. "The proof therefore contain nothing but which joins conviction of the truth wit the detennination of an object generatim according to this concept, the apagogic proof can -produce which also is one only." (A788/B816) Accordingly, uniquesness which certa themeans truth in respect its nexus has troubled many commentators - simply that there of is only one with apagogic proof has a logical fonn of correct rule to employ the concept in question. Anbut inference is drawn from the falsity 3rd rule: proofs must never be apagogic, always ostensive. of the proposition to the falsity "The direct or ostensive proof, in every kind of cognition, is thatitself. The into reason why a transcendental p which joins conviction of the truth with insight its sources; whereas direct could be stated simply th the apagogic proof can produce certaintyalways but not comprehensibility of logic the principle of bivalence "eve the truth in respect of its nexus with the grounds of its possibility." An is not valid. 36ff) Pre apagogic proof has a logical fonn of an -indirect proof (Brittan (modus 1978, tollens). the distinction between the principle An inference is drawn from the falsity of a consequence of a proposition contradiction, namely "a judgment to the falsity of the proposition itself. KANT'S PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD

The reason why a transcendental proof must never be apagogic, but always direct could be stated sin1ply that in the domain of transcendental logic the principle of bivalence - "every judgment is either true or false" - is not valid. (Brittan 1978, 36ff) Presumably Kant did not see clearly the distinction between the principle of bivalence and the principle of contradiction, namely "a judgment cannot be both true and false".

they were lacking a definite truth-value. (in the Ant To put it in2 another way: a transcendental proof 86 CHAPTER proof, because in the domain of transcendental log (Brittan, ibid.) However, he notand putthe thefalsity matterofina this way. On the falsity s imply premis truth thedid contrary, he takes all judgments to be either true or false. (A503/B531) give could proof ic still in another way: an apagog Anyhow, Kant called transcendental logic the logic of truth. In case the where presuppositions of the conclusion were lac presuppositions of truth and falsity were not satisfied he claimed that conclusion is maintained to be objectively ,valid, sayingive thatvalid both a judgment and its contradiction are can false,only instead haveofsubject of the premiss they were lacking a definiteexampl truth-value. the Antinomies, in the Dialectic ic proofs areibid) apagog es of (in To put it in another way:lead a transcendental mies. cannot be an apagogic to the Antinoproof of the transcendental logic in some cases both s sy proof, because in the domain In concern ise "as enterpr transcendental premiss falsity consequence. Or asse the truth and the falsity of acannot justify one's ed at ofalla to permitt be imply still in another way: an apagogic proof could give a conclusion in a case opposite [as do apagogic proofs]. For either this re conclusion For example, where presuppositions of the t of the a oppo of the conflic ation lacking. presentwere a mere be objectively ,valid, although predicate conclusion is maintained tosubject lity by o hensibi comprethe ons of ive conditi of the premiss can only have subjective validity. Kant's prominent contributes nothing to a rejection of the matter its in the Heined shows how theyand examples of apagogic proofs arewhat tively affinna been mainta has Dialectic. both lead to the Antinomies. is false, and apagogically, through the refutatio In the transcendental enterprise "as concerns synthetic propositions, it cannot arrive at a cognition of truth." (A792/B820 cannot be pennitted at all gogic to justify assertions by refuting necess izing the the s to emphas amount proofsone's opposite [as do apagogic proofs]. For either this refutation is nothing but t dental deduction: "everyone must conduc his ca conflict the opposite opiniondeducti with the a mere presentation of thelegal on of t transcendental proofofthrough subjective conditions of comprehensibility by our reason and it thus that one can see what speaks in favor of his claim or both ... , r contributes nothing to a rejection of the matter itself.../.. the structu aboutsides dispute porary contem In the of the object both what has been maintained affirmatively and negatively Deduction some writers frequently refer to this ru is false, and apagogically, throughntheagainst refutation the opposite, one s (like Amerik thoseof who objectio truth." (A792/B820) Thus, forbidding apacannot arrive at a cognition of Deduction is a regressive argument in the sens a prior transcengogic proofs amounts to emphasizing necessity for gran is taken , but provedof is not experience the dental deduction: "everyoneKant's must conduct histhat case by means of proofs a directmust ndental transce statement of the grounds of proof, so ive legal proof through transcendental deduction regress a be exactly that the Deduction cannot that one can see what speaksainmisund favor of his claims." better, a lack of und ing (or(A794/B822) erstand In the contemporary dispute about the structure of the Transcendental l Deduction endenta dimensions: 1) the Transc an or Deduction some writers frequently thisof rule. It isbut presented a prelimiasnary Kant, sense the to proof inrefer objection against those who (like Ameriks 1978) claim that the Deduction is a regressive argument in the sense that the possibility of experience is not proved, but is taken for granted. It is claimed that Kant's statement that transcendental proofs must not be apagogic, means exactly that the Deduction cannot be a regressive argument. Now, this is a misunderstanding (or better, a lack of understanding) of multiple dimensions: 1) the Transcendental Deduction is not a transcendental proof in the sense of Kant, but a preliminary or preparatory step of such

regressive manner. But apagogic-/o distinctions are widely different, an 87 KANT'S PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD belongs to formal logic and conc inferen a proof. Thus the 3rd rule is not applicable to ce, it. (See whilenext the section latter concern below.) 2) Maybe it is Kant's talk about argume ostensive proofs which hasThus a ntative examination. ion of the mislead commentators to regard them asconvict progressive (synthetic) truth withininsight as well. Kant's sense and consequently apagogic proofs asInproceeding a fact other inlogical sy es of this. 3) the Transcenden regressive manner. But apagogic-/ostensiveexampl and regressive/progressive argume nt in the sense distinctions are widely different, and unrelated distinctions. The of former Ameriks. (S belongs to fonnal logic and concerns the logical form of a logical 8. What is a (transcinendent inference, while the latter concerns the order of exposition any al) de argumentative examination. TIlus an ostensiveToproof that which joins state what a transcendental d sources been - could be regressive conviction of the truth with insight into its already said of deductions ab as well. In fact other logical syllogisms exept modus tollens justific ation; not a rigorouare s proof, examples of this. 3) the Transcendental Deduction is indeed Kant's word for aa regressive logical deduction argument in the sense of Ameriks. (See Chapter below.) (See 4transla tor's note to §30 in CJ. proof or a logical inference could f 8. What is a (transcendental) deduction? typically syllogistic inferences are 'deduct To state what a transcendental deduction is, ion' is to is repeat has dedu not what a logical justific ation has general sense a legal heavily already been said of deductions above. The beenis recently Henrich justification; not a rigorous proof, and not a logical deduction 1989b) That is either. also put so cl Kant's word for a logical deduction in thedifficul modem is eAbleitung. t to sense conceiv how Kant coul point. being more rigorous, a (See translator's note to §30 in CJ.) However, It has a deduction too. of In contem fact, pora proof or a logical inference could function as been a thesis the only typically syllogistic inferences are parts that of Kant's deductions. acceptableThat argument argume 'deduction' is not a logical deduction but ants.less rigorous legal Despite the fact that I pe that the thesis justification has been recently heavily emphasized by many writers., I(e.g. is correct cannot any by Kant (A84/B 116), it is first p Henrich 1989b) That is also put so clearly could have emerge d that at the difficult to conceive how Kant could haveserious beenlymisunderstood on this by many philoso phers. T inferences, is a fundamental featu point. everybody. minded It has been a thesis of contemporary scientifically philosophy How could it then be nts are that the only acceptable arguments areargume strictly logically logicalldeductive y deductive? W morepresumably comprehensive arguments. Despite the fact that I personally once general believed premiss conclus ion? This conceive how would this illusion that the thesis is correct, I cannot any longer mean that could have emerged at the first place and could have been taken seriously by many philosophers. That truth is preserved in logical inferences, is a fundamental feature of fonnal logic accepted by everybody. How could it then be claimed that the only acceptable arguments are logically deductive? Why should we be forced to accept a more comprehensive general premiss first in order to accept a particular conclusion? This would mean that it is impossible to argue for any

as one of his assumptions. predecessors was objection against his rationalistic cognition. 88 CHAPTER procedu2res cannot amount to real logical introduction of premisses. Thi t is the although argumenalready, anysomehow novelties at all, or that we implicitly, are in me ant feature of argu that unimport but not for Certainly trivial possession of all possible knowledge. the point of most how - say Hume - simp ements which ous stat Kant's tovari disputes is to get the antagonist accept something is not counted correct conclusions, is exa opinion, in Kan ain,has certAs as one of his assumptions. beent'snoted repeatedly, Kant's main ial 'fac ts'. (e.g. A767/B n to some cruc pay attentio objection against his rationalistic predecessors was exactly that mere ts are logic~l deducti ing argumen bindcognition. logicall logical procedures cannotonly amount to yreal A crucial point of t has to be logically bind ry argumen follow thatofeve any argument is the introduction premisses. This seemingly rather s than to accept n for noveltie to argu no other way trivial but not for that unimportant feature of earguments is exhibited by l. - simply did not come to as wel men- tssay Kant's various statementsargu how Hume cal inferences een logi inction betw The dist certain, in Kant's opinion, correct conclusions, is exactly that he did not een logical distinctionOfbetw Kant's us to (e.g. analogo pay attention to some crucial 'facts'. A767/B795) course the do not bring an inferencesBut Logicaldeductions. possibility. it does not only logically binding arguments are logic~l em philosophers, Kant thi mod e Lik on. ussi disc follow that every argument has to be logically binding. Indeed, there is s an licit in the concepts. Thu t isto imp lose wha no other way to argue for disc novelties than accept non-logically binding ts. K judgmen taken as a judgment, is an analytic arguments as well. ments. What makes ju thetic judgand r, is syn howeve The distinction between logical inferences deductions is ng new is introduced. An introd somethi exactly that analogous to Kant's distinction between logical possibility and real whe or by an exposition, ition anything either by possibility. Logical inferences do an notintu bring new to the of intuition is somehow sibility nition - the pos discussion. Like modem cog philosophers, Kant thinks that they only ter deduction is to justify a of a any purposeThus e, the plac the concepts. logical inference, disclose what is implicit in r on. in a proof late be usedjudgments. analytic Kant's main concern, taken as a judgment, is anis to k? What is the uctions worsynthetic t's dedjudgments Kanmakes How do however, is synthetic judgments. What is these general questions pre er answ To ? ons ucti ded exactly that something new is introduced. An introduction can take place uction'. In tran sense of- 'ded of the widewherein either by an intuition or bec by ause an exposition, to attain real . W concepts is established of certaininbedded. cysomehow legitimais theintuition cognition - the possibility of In the first eral answer is available, no agen mean? isAga place, the purpose of a deduction to in, justify term or a concept which ted to a certain domain. is to be used in a proof laterlegi on. timacy is rela keep in mind Kan t's division iveistothe is instruct How do Kant's deductions Itwork? What general procedure of right. To prove the latter is t those of precisely fact andquestions is not possible deductions? To answer theseofgeneral arly that something is the case is Cle ) 116 4/B (A8 because of the wide sense of 'deduction'. In transcendental deductions te (legally obtained) is fact is legitima how that is established. What does 'legitimacy' the legitimacy of certain concepts has to be preceded by int deduction because s eveisryavailable, mean? Again, no general Thu answer in each case legitimacy is related to a certain domain. It is instructive to keep in mind Kant's division of questions into those of fact and those of right. To prove the latter is the task of deductions. (A84/B 116) Clearly that something is the case is a question of fact, and how that fact is legitimate (legally obtained) is the question of right. Thus every deduction has to be preceded by introducing somehow the

case in point. No reasons are presented wh 89 forms of sensibility, which are in need of a the the other hand, the section preceding th concept to be dealt with, and conversely, task of a indeduction is never concepts, calledcases "the this Metaphysic is pure the case. In some to establish the fact that somethingthe great deal of trouble to show that the introduction is done without any explicit reasons why just this concept is concepts he isoflooking after. the appropriate one. The transcendental deduction space and time is a nearly commentators case in point. No reasons are presented Many, why just theseall concepts are the take it doubt that TD, or any transcendental ded forms of sensibility, which are in need of a transcendental deduction. On transcendental proof. deduction (for a notable exc the other hand, in the section preceding the transcendental of 'Transcendental proof' could now be taken the pure concepts, called "the Metaphysical Deduction", Kant takes a which the categories are has just something the pure to do great deal of trouble to show that justification However, I do not see any point of doing concepts he is looking after. suchita for clear conception of further what a proof Many, nearly all commentators take granted without used - whereas 'proof' is not is a- in a doubt that TD, or any transcendental deduction for that matter, justification. Here I mean and take comme transcendental proof. (for a notable exception see Seebohm 1982) sense discussed 'Transcendental proof' could now beexactly taken asina Kant's label generally for any above. deduction is not a transcen justification which has something transcendental to, do with the 'transcendental'. it matter we call ahad transcende doing Does so, when Kantif himself However, I do not see any point of sense. It certainly does, because it determines wh such a clear conception of what a proof is. 'Deduction' is sometimes proofs are applicable to or not. B used - whereas 'proof' is not - in a loose sense to denoteit any misunderstanding on too this- apoint, justification. Here I mean - and take commentators to mean proof I will repetitions my major reasons exactly in Kant's sense discussed above. It seems to be clear thatwhy a a dedu as transcendental transcendental deduction is not a transcendental proofproof. in that technical 1) The deduction first pointa proof to be or made not? is alrea sense. Does it matter if we call a transcendental proofs for Kant are strictly logical It certainly does, because it determines whether Kant's requirements for proofs striving for. A there proof is cannot get off the g so much proofs are applicable to it or not. Because premisses to start with. Kant's rationale fo misunderstanding on this point, I will list - although with some to not justify premisses. Thi repetitions - my major reasons why aintroduce deductionand should be regarded justification cannot be strictly logical; if i as transcendental proof. any mentioned reason to present deduction, bu 1) The first point to be made is been already severala times: have been employed On proofs for Kant are strictly logical proofs. At least that isfrom whatthe he outset. is logical proofs inside a deduction is not in a striving for. A proof cannot get off the ground unless there are secure two for keypresenting passages ofdeductions TD are logical premisses to start with. Kant's rationale is to inferen and the third section of§26. (See Chapter 4 introduce and to justify premisses. This kind of introduction and KANT'S PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD

1

justification cannot be strictly logical; if it were, there would not have been any reason to present a deduction, but the logical procedure could have been employed from the outset. On the other hand, the use of logical proofs inside a deduction is not in any way excluded. In fact, the two key passages of TD are logical inferences: the five sentences of §20 and the third section of§26. (See Chapter 4.)

transcen to the object but first must prove the objectiv the possibi 90 CHAPTER 2 lity of their synthesis a priori". (A7 what was said above under 1): a deduction is n 2) It is required by Kant that prior to any transcendental proof, the A transcendental deduction is exactly that kind be shown. In proofs objective validity of the relevant concepts has to transce proof,ofbut ndental must precede any transcendental propositions "reason is not allowed to apply itself directly transcendental proof. In fact, if a transcen concepts to the object but first must prove thendental objective validity the re ngly and accordi proof and of transce (A782/B810) This amounts to the possibility of their synthesis a priori". to validity of concepts should be applied the is needed to justify a premiss. what was said above under 1): a deduction impossible. A transcendental deduction its~lf of preliminary step which A transcendental deduction is exactly that, kind of validity and the categories are the ultima itself a case of a must precede any transcendental proof, but is not admit of any further explanation. transcendental proof. In fact, if a transcendental deduction were a 3) A transcendental proof is not based m transcendental proof and accordingly the requirementtransce of showing proofs ndental the necessary premiss of all validity of concepts should be applied to the very deduction. But that is does introduce this premiss, although exp impossible. A transcendental deduction its~lf is that kind of explanation Schematism: the categories as detenninations not is t of validity, and the categories are the ultimate any concepts, proof ndentaldo transcewhich 4) The aim of admit of any further explanation. synthetic proposition a priori, viz. a cardina merely on concepts, but a 3) A transcendental proof is not based But TD is not a proof of any proposition at a necessary premiss of all transcendental proofs isconcep possible experience. TD l at stake. Certain ts is reality of certain does introduce this premiss, although explicitly stated first in the linguistic form like the sentence: "the categ Schematism: the categories as detenninations of time. possibility of experience and are valid a p 4) The aim of any transcendental proof isBut to prove thea correctness of a tio cardinal proposi it is not experience" synthetic proposition a priori, viz. a cardinal proposition [Grundsatz]. empirical judgme nts'; thus not a transcende But TD is not a proof of any proposition at all. The objective validity or further discussion of the status of this kind of the result must be put in a reality of certain concepts is at stake. Certainly be omitted here.) linguistic form like the sentence: "the categories are conditions of the 5) The peculiarity of transcendental proof a priori also of all objects of possibility of experience and are valid proposition there is only one proof, becaus experience" But it is not a cardinal proposition in a sense of a 'schema of always based on a certain concept. This re empirical judgments'; thus not a transcendental proposition at all. (A sense if TD were a case of transcendental pr further discussion of the status of this kind of metameta-propositions will concept. Moreover, it could hardly be maint be omitted here.) Kant that only one deduction is possible, wh proofs is that for every cardinal 5) The peculiarity of transcendental on deducti in the B-edition in a totally revise a transcendental proof is proposition there is only one proof, because the deduction in the Prolegomena. always based on a certain concept. requirement not ion makeand an exposit on is would A deducti 6) This sense if TD were a case of transcendental TD is notlves based on one but con proofs themse are not Definitionsproof. concept. Moreover, it could hardly be maintained very convincingly by Kant that only one deduction is possible, when he himself presented the deduction in the B-edition in a totally revised manner - not to mention the deduction in the Prolegomena. 6) A deduction is an exposition and thus a kind of definition. Definitions are not themselves proofs but constituents of proofs.

uncritically that a presentation can r affected by it. Kant had 91 also a KANT'S PHILOSOPHICAL way METHOD can present things as they are in 9. Establishing transcendental philosophy Copernican Revolution is exactly th an object being When Kant wrote the First Critique he already hadwithout the results of affected his Inaugural Dissertation of 1770 at his disposal. Some ofwas the ideas of started CPR by revolution already - especially those concerning space and time - are already there. time as the merepresent fonns of intuiting. A famous letter to Marcus Hertz, February 1772how bears to prese to 21, explain the witness intellectual in the quite bow he is accusing himself for assuming priori. At Dissertation the same time Kant be which presentations refer a priori uncritically that a presentation can refer to an object without being in any of presentations cognition must way affected by it. Kant had also assumed boundaries that intellectual experience. can present things as they are in themselves. The beginning of the how task of explaining Copernican Revolution is exactly the idea thatThe a presentation can refer to pure objects, to given Dissertation the a an object without being affected by it. Thus in is thetantamount concepts. In·the Dissertation revolution was already started by establishing the status of space and the in 'categories'; Kantofhad the task CPRnot wasyet the time as the mere forms of intuiting. What remained deduction pr to explain how the intellectual presentationsmetaphysicical as well can refer to objects was a Dissertation that Kant, f to priori. At the same time Kant became convinced thatproves the objects convinced there are pure which presentations refer a priori cannot be things inthat themselves. The conc understandable why inofCPR t the boundaries boundaries of cognition must coincidealsowith question: that there are pure conc experience. The task of explaining how pure intellectual canthe refer to conc viz.,presentations to explain how pure the pure objects, is tantamount to given a transcendental deduction of pure of concepts is flatly possibility concepts. In·the Dissertation the intellectual presentations are project not called of estab In CPR Kant's No corr 'categories'; Kant had not yet the clue for findinginto the different categories. divided stages metaphysicical deduction was present either. The reasons existenceindicated of the befo tasks (for Dissertation proves that Kant, for moreomitted than ten years, had been here). Naturally, true to h mirrorsa these convinced that there are pure concepts acquired priori.tasks: That makes it also understandable why in CPR the problem is not to answer a thatquestion: that there are pure concepts, but to answer a how-question, viz., to explain how the pure concepts can refer to objects. In CPR the possibility of pure concepts is flatly stated several times. In CPR Kant's project of establishing transcendental philosophy is divided into different stages corresponding to different philosophical tasks (for reasons indicated before, the Transcendental Dialectic is omitted here). Naturally, true to his architechtonics Kant's disposition mirrors these tasks:

are presented; what follows a priori from these co 2. Transcendental Logic: 2.1. Transcendental Analytic: CHAPTER 2 2.1.1. Analytic of Concepts: 1. Transcendental Aesthetic:- The Metaphysical Deduction of the pure concep of space and time: their of ontological status - the Metaphysical Exposition the understanding - how the pure concepts as subjective fonns of intuiting. employment of the understanding versus the tran space and time: how space and time - the Transcendental Exposition of theofunderstanding. are presented; what follows a- priori from these concepts. The Transcendental Deduction of the catego 2. Transcendental Logic: categories are the necessary conditions of exper 2.1. Transcendental Analytic:of experience. 2.1.1. Analytic of Concepts: 2.1.2. Analytic of Cardinal Propositions: - The Metaphysical Deduction of the pure concepts the understanding: - The Schematism of theofpure concepts of the und - how the pure concepts of understanding areoffound: theconcepts. logical thethe sensible significance the pure employment of the understanding versus the transcendental employment - The System of Cardinal Propositions: transcend of the understanding. the cardinal propositions. the categories: show thatofthe - The Transcendental Deduction In theoffollowing chapterstothe stages the A categories are the necessarysome conditions of experience and of all objects details. These stages presuppose and make of experience. Aesthetic. Major premisses of the whole task are: 2.1.2. Analytic of Cardinal Propositions: 1) The transcendental difference between sensi concepts of theintuitions understanding: to establish - The Schematism of the pure matter and fonn; and concepts. pure concepts. the sensible significance of the 2) The distinction between general logic and tran - The System of Cardinal Propositions: transcendental proofs of some of the cardinal propositions. In the following chapters the stages of the Analytic are inspected in some details. These stages presuppose and make use of the results of the Aesthetic. Major premisses of the whole task are: 1) The transcendental difference between sensibility and the intellect; matter and fonn; intuitions and concepts. 2) The distinction between general logic and transcendental logic.

CHAPTER 3

1. The principle of sufficient

FROM GENERAL LOGIC real possibility 3. General log Logic, truth, and objective TO TRANSCENDENTAL4. LOGIC

6. The Metaphysical Deductio Metaphysical Deduction 8. logic

The discipline - or "science" as K 1. The principle of sufficient reason 2. Logical versus establish the concepts and fundamen real possibility 3. General logic and transcendental logic philosophy is categories called transcendental l 4. Logic, truth, and objective validity 5. The transcendental logicofthat 6. The Metaphysical Deduction 7. The argument the Kant goes in Metaphysical Deduction 8. Allison on transcendental Analytic. There are, however, two m logic topics which both lead directly to tra closely relate Kant to the philosophica of task sufficient reason, which K The discipline - or "science" as Kant principle says - the of which is to two principles. It has to be interpreted establish the concepts and fundamental propositions of transcendental principle. What by thisintroducing amounts to are philosophy is called transcendental logic. It is exactly versus real (or material) possibility. transcendental logic that Kant goes into the tasks of the Transcendental between domains of Analytic. There are, however, two more distinction fundamental and notthe unrelated logic. topics which both lead directly to transcendental logic and in fact more

closely relate Kant to the philosophical tradition. The first is the classical of sufficient 1. The principle of sufficient reason, which Kant insists hasprinciple to be separated into reas two principles. It has to be interpreted eitherItashas a logical as a emphasized material alreadyorbeen th of possibility: logical phi principle. What this amounts to are twothe notions Leibniz-Wolffian rationalistic versus real (or material) possibility. This is of tantamount notina tum source cognition,tobutthea funct andstart: transcendental distinction between the domains of general makes logic a new sensibility is se logic. cognition. The transcendental differen 1. The principle of sufficient reason It has already been emphasized that Kant was heavily influenced by the Leibniz-Wolffian rationalistic philosophy. Sensibility for Leibniz is not a source of cognition, but a function to limit human cognition. Kant makes a new start: sensibility is seen as an independent source of cognition. The transcendental difference between the two faculties, viz.,

que natural scien of sufficient reason as a principle of of suffici 94 CHAPTER How to 3understand the principle Wolffian trad prominent issue in the Leibnizthe sensibility and the understanding, is a ground to many other ntal fundame sufficient reason was taken as a important distinctions in the Critical Philosophy. One nal of the crucial thought. (cp. B metaphysics or eve n all ratio questions - where Kant totally changed his mind - concerns the principle presented g and Vleeschauer 1962, 10) It was of sufficient reason as a principle of natural science. (Onon" 193ff) principle wa must have a sufficient reas . The How to understand the principle of sufficient but reason was a most reachin had also farmetaphysics generally prominent issue in the Leibniz-Wolffian tradition.dete The principle of ?-g be ythiI ever rmine consequences: Did God sufficient reason was taken as a fundamental principle underlying all ible for our d free will? Are we morally respons 1987,the221, metaphysics or even all rational thought. (cp. Beiser was m that th clai83-84 the Wolffian philosophy and Vleeschauer 1962, 10) It was presented generally das:from "Everything the principl reason can be demonstrate must have a sufficient reason". The principle was not onlyed significant forlff, B by Wo demonstrations were attempt e.g. metaphysics generally but had also far-reaching theological and moral positive to (Pr 270, On) Initially Kant was consequences: Did God determine everythi1?-g beforehand? Do we haves,a or a osophical principles from logical one phil free will? Are we morally responsible for our deeds? A central tenet ofons. trati ons a prominent opponent of these dem the Wolffian philosophy was the claim that the principleedin of gsufficient CPR by two Kan t's new insight - prec Such reason can be demonstrated from the principle of contradiction. on of vati original for Kant - was that the deri demonstrations were attempted e.g. by Wolff, Baumgarten and Eberhard. n is an imp reason from the law of contradictio (Pr 270, On) Initially Kant was positive to these and attemps to ciple as a s the prinderive Pr 368) He now underst philosophical principles from logical ones, or at least he critized Crucius, as a princip mus t have its reason". He takes it a prominent opponent of these demonstrations. (Treash 1981, 63)1 g is that it h In fact the crux of Kan t's reasonin Kant's new insight - preceding CPR by two decades, and in no way osition merely logical principle: "Every prop of sufficient original for Kant - was that the derivation of the principle , all view of t 194) Seen from his new poin reason from the law of contradiction is an impossible task.Wo (A783/B811, lffians, in the e analytic. According to the Pr 368) He now understands the principle as a material one: "Every thing ulation contradictory. It was the loose form judgments. must have its reason". He takes it as a principle of synthetic for the Wo reason", which made it possible In fact the crux of Kant's reasoning is that it has tomat beeria separated a per ".. men l sense. from logical sense to the merely logical principle: "Every proposition mustosit have (Onwn were kno ionsa reason". fundamental prop 194) Seen from his new point of view, all Wolffian judgments are, for a take contradiction. This was a great mis analytic. According to the Wolffians, in the end all false judgments are contradictory. It was the loose formulation "Everything must have a l ambiquity here which sh tenninologica is a Wolffians 1 Ther reason", which made it possible for ethe to switch suffi from t reason cienthe In mod em literature the principle of g material pri ndin espo corr the and ciple logical sense to the material sense. ".. men persuaded themselves that the prin logical a materia ciple of sufficient reason is taken as the prin well of. 'Cau fundamental propositions were known from the principle as t Kan by used to be the sense most often understood in a ve is y' salit 'cau ided prov it, for l contradiction. This was a great labe mistake, for a synthetic proposition can 1 There is a tenninological ambiquity here which should not confuse the issue itself. In modern literature the principle of sufficient reason is sometimes taken as a merely logical principle and the corresponding material principle is called causality. Here the principle of sufficient reason is taken as a material principle, which, to me, seems to be the sense most often used by Kant as well. 'Causality' might be used as another label for it, provided 'causality' is understood in a very ~eneral sense.

exhibited by his repudiating the Wolffian c attain the same kind of certainty as mathema Kant's great interestLOGIC in the principle of FROM GENERAL LOGIC TO TRANSCENDENTAL 95 obvious why the principle of causality bec indeed be comprehended accordingwhy to the principle contradiction, butdogmat Hume couldof wake him from his only by presupposing another synthetic proposition from which causality, in the Humean language,itis for also A200/ follows, but never in and by itself."principle (Pr 268) of Kant's new position sufficient reason.is (cp. exhibited by his repudiating the Wolffian claims that metaphysics can Hume he did not find a new subject-matter, attain the same kind of certainty as mathematics. in the same familiar problems of philosophy. Kant's great interest in the principle sufficient reason makes it Thereofare only two explicit references t becomes so central to him and obvious why the principle of causality reason in CPR. Fortunately one of them occ why Hume could wake him from his"The dogmatic slumber. The principle of is th principle of sufficient reason causality, in the Humean language,experience, is for Kant a version of the same that is, objective cognition of ap principle of sufficient reason. (cp. A200/B246) Kant(A200/B246) 'found' relation in orderWhen of time." T Hume he did not find a new subject-matter, but he found Hume engaged hardly be read otherwise than that Kan in the same familiar problems of philosophy. sufficient reason and the second Analogy, There are only two explicit references theleast principle of sufficienthave n causality.toAt some philosophers them occurs in the Second Analogy. under reason in CPR. Fortunately one of of sufficient· reason] occurs explicitly "The principle of sufficient reason thus the the is principle of ground causalityofinpossible the Second of appearences in respect of experience, that is, objective cognition 532n3, cp. Treash 1981 and Buttstheir 1984, 254) relation in order of time." (A200/B246) Taken why in itssocontext, it can One reason many difficulties an of hardly be read otherwise than that Kant equates the principle with the interpretation of the Second An sufficient reason and the second Analogy, that is, Kant's principle of principle of causality is misleading. Especial causality. At least some philosophers have noticed this: "It [the principle - "Everything that happens (begins to be) p of sufficient reason] occurs explicitly under this name as a synonym for - is f which it follows according to a rule" Second Analogy." (Buchdahl 1969, the principle of causality in the causality in the modern sense, but is a genera 532n3, cp. Treash 1981 and Butts 1984, 254) It is in fact a formulation of the principle o One reason why so many difficulties and confusions are connected understood by many of the participants in Analogy is that calling it the with the interpretation of the Second principle. (cp. Beiser 1987, 83) Compared w principle of causality is misleading.principle Especially A-edition formulation of the sufficient reason as a material - "Everything that happens (beginshave to be) something ifupon its presupposes reason", the similarity, not equali which it follows according to a rule" is far from being a principle of of suf in Kant's conception of the principle causality in the modem sense, but isboth a general of detennination. wants principle to limit its applicability to the o It is in fact a forn1ulation of the principle of sufficient reason as it was prove its necessity in experience. That is a understood by many of the participants in the dispute concerning that as "un about things as they are in themselves principle. (cp. Beiser 1987, 83) Compared with Kant's formulation of the principle of sufficient reason as a material principle: "Every thing must have its reason", the similarity, if not equality, is manifest. What is new in Kant's conception of the principle of sufficient reason is that he now both wants to limit its applicability to the objects of experience and to prove its necessity in experience. That is also indicated by Kant's talk about things as they are in themselves as "unconditioned objects".

no particular causal laws can be derived from must be based on experience. The underlying 96 CHAPTER 3 the Second Analogy and an empirical causal la It should be uncontroversial - although the list who The the Sall1e senseo in philosophers ty of le of causali princip have misunderstood Kant on this point long that according Kant An Second to the to to -conform lawishas causal be derived from the Second Analogy, but le no particular causal laws can empiric ive princip is a regulat keness allawli 50 1969, hl must be based on experience.ofThe underlying, fundamental fact is that Buchda (cp. the understanding be called should lawAnalog do notyeven employ the the Second Analogy and an empirical Second law, thecausal causa of satz] principle of causality in the SaIl1e senseo fonn every particular itionof[Grund propos ental The fundam of the Sec9n the Buchda Secondhl-Allis Analogy, but ing the concept of causal law has to confonn to the on-read event-someempiricallawlikeness is a regulative principle of reason, a principle "everyh is the not to establis supposed of the understanding (cp. Buchdahl 1969, 229) 5OOff)'Causa Morel properly than sa mu law' contain 1983, 216, e the c be ing called thengcausal maxim, or the law, the Second Analogy should becaus to a rule", accordi "follow formu Kant fundamental proposition [Grundsatz] of causal laws. Taking for granted that d effect". It could be objecte "All change of the tly Sec9nd Analogy Kant sistake the Buchdahl-Allison-reading differen on: what in the B-editi (AllisonThat supposed to establish is the "every-event-some-cause-principle". of the connection of cause and effect". e the very p becaus 1983, 216, 229) 'Causal law'formula contains more something ingthan is mislead tion much 'effect' . Notwithstand "following according to a rule",concep because claim and is "same-cause-samets ofthe'cause' despite the d on - Analogy effect". It could be objected that Kant formulates the Second B-editi the the long proof in differently in the B-edition: "All changes take theA-editi law on same as intothe is the according le -place princip very underst the n of the connection of cause and effect". That is, ofce course, betweetrue but the a differen From the fonnulation is misleading because ther very proof does ions not elaborate the follows: general distinct of other numbe ndenta Notwithstanding two initial sections, concepts of 'cause' and 'effect'.logic, the transce versus the logical the (po ion opposit the long proof in the B-edition logical - despite the different fonnulation of the real versus opposition the A-edition. very principle - is the same as inversus real (transcendental) necessity. The nts is paralle From the difference betweenanalytic the understanding the sensibility a l to judgme and syntheticand les: the principl logic transcendental number of other distinctions follows: princip twoversus s of the domaingeneral The fonner logic, the logical versus the princip transcendental (material, metaphysical), nt reason. le of sufficie is, refers to logical opposition versus real opposition (possibility), logical necessity that l, materia is whereas the latter n deductiv versus real (transcendental) necessity. very distinction between the Wolffia m of criticis Kant's The them g analytic and synthetic judgmentsbest is parallel to the distinction between the of accusin expressed in Kant's 'real'. domains of the two principles:bounda the principle contradiction andthethe 'logical' and ry betweeofn the 0

0

principle of sufficient reason. The fomler principle is merely formal whereas the latter is material, that is, things. real possibility Logicatol versus 2. refers Kant's criticism of the Wolffian'Real' deductivistic philosophy perhaps as inte tly used byis Kant is frequen them of confusing or ignoring the best expressed in Kant's accusing'transce ndental'. He claims that no rea or boundary between the 'logical' and the 'real'. 2. Logical versus real possibility 'Real' is frequently used by Kant as interchangeable with 'material' or 'transcendental'. He claims that no real or material cognition is

that the concept does not contradic things (namely, tha possibility ofLOGIC FROM GENERAL LOGIC TO TRANSCENDENTAL 97 concept) can deceive and leave possible entirely out of logical or conceptual grounds. Cognition must be (A244/B302) Of several statements based on the real ground. He distinguishes between logical and real clearest is in the section "Of the Im possibility. "To substitute the logical possibility of the concept (namely, God's Existence": "A concept is that the concept does not contradict itself) for the transcendental [real] contradictory. This is the logical c possibility of things (namely, that an object(G) corresponds to the the object(G) of the concept is disti concept) can deceive and leave satisfied only the simple-minded." But it may none the less be an empt (A244IB302) Of several statements concerning this distinction one of the of the synthesis through which clearest is in the section "Of the Impossibility of an Ontological Proof of specifically proved; and such proof God's Existence": "A concept is always possible if it is not selfprinciples [Prinzipien] of possible contradictory. This is the logical characteristic of possibility, and by it [Grundsazt] of analysis (the law o the object(G) of the concept is distinguishable from the nihil negativum. against inferring directly from the p But it may none the less be an empty concept, unless the objective reality possibility of things (real)." (A596/B of the synthesis through which the concept is generated has been The distinction is also referred to specifically proved; and such proof, as we have shown above, rests on object(G) I must be able to prove it principles [Prinzipien] of possible experience, and not on the principle as attested by experience, or a prior [Grundsazt] of analysis (the law of contradiction). This is a warning whatever I please, provided only th against inferring directly from the possibility of concepts (logical) to the something more is required befor possibility of things (real)." (A596/B624n) objective validity, that is, real p The distinction is also referred to in a note to Bxxvi: "To cognize an merely logical. This something mor object(G) I must be able to prove its possibility, either from its actuality theoretical sources of cognition; it m as attested by experience, or a priori by means of reason. But I can think What is at stake is not so much whatever I please, provided only that I do not contradict myself.... But possibility predicated of two kinds something more is required before I can ascribe to such a concept itself (this should not be confused w objective validity, that is, real possibility; the former possibility is we have no other way to refer to a merely logical. This something more need not, however, be sought in the possibility of a concept simply m theoretical sources of cognition; it may lie in those that are practical." Accordingly, any concept is logic What is at stake is not so much two conceptions of possibility, but logical predicate provided only tha possibility predicated of two kinds of items: concept of a thing or a thing Logical possibility is not objective itself (this should not be confused with 'thing as it is in itself'). Of course is always an objective possibility. (O we have no other way to refer to a thing than by its concept. The logical The real possibility of a concep possibility of a concept simply means an absence of contradiction. that a possible object corresponds Accordingly, any concept is logically possible and may be used as a either by proving the reality of the logical predicate provided only that no contradiction is brought about. Logical possibility is not objective (A7 5IB 101), whereas real possibility is always an objective possibility. (On 'objectivity' see Chapter 6.) The real possibility of a concept - that is, the possibility of a thing: that a possible object corresponds to the concept - has to be justified, either by proving the reality of the corresponding synthesis, that means,

predicate is a determination of a thing. thinkable (cognizable) or presentable an intuition. CHAPTER 3 Without intuition only logical 98 Real predicates as determining predicates a that the concept confonns to the cardinal propositions of experience, or to a concept of a thing, thus they are pred by an empirical intuition of the thing proving its actuality, and by The real possibility of a thing means the po implication, its possibility. A concept which can be used as a real experience. "The possibility of a thing can predicate is a detennination of a thing. (A598/B626) Real is always the fact that its concept is not self-contra thinkable (cognizable) or presentable and requires possible sensible being supported by some corresponding intuition. Without intuition only logical possibility remains. (B302n) can also be possible because something Real predicates as determining predicates are something which are added possibility is given as a consequence t to a concept of a thing, thus they are predicates in synthetic judgments. Distinguishing the logical and the real im The real possibility of a thing means the possibility of being an object of thing can be opposed, but not logically experience. "The possibility of a thing can never be proved merely from contradiction. the fact that its concept is not self-contradictory, but only through its Kemp Smith's translation of CPR is seri being supported by some corresponding i~tuition." (B308) Something sometimes both wirklich and real as can also be possible because something else is actual, that is, its completely ignoring Kant's distinction betw possibility is given as a consequence through some other existent unfortunately, followed by many modem w Distinguishing the logical and the real implies that two predicates of a fact that the modem meaning of 'real', w thing can be opposed, but not logically, that is through the law of with 'true' or 'actual', is far from Kant's m contradiction. more serious than it seems. The focus of K Kemp Smith's translation of CPR is seriously flawed by his rendering cognition at all; it is frequently completely sometimes both wirklich and real as 'real' in English and thus possibility of the actual objective c completely ignoring Kant's distinction between 'actual' and 'real'. He is, comprehends both actual and possible. For unfortunately, followed by many modem writers who are unaware of the (res), which is or can be "the matter which fact that the modem meaning of 'real', which is roughly synonymous and because the system of transcendenta with 'true' or 'actual', is far from Kant's meaning. The mistake is even conditions of the real, Kant calls "real pos more serious than it seems. The focus of Kant's inquiry is not on actual possibility". (like quoted above: A244/B302 cognition at all; it is frequently completely ignored. The focus is on the It is no doubt one of Kant's most famous possibility of the actual objective cognition. 'Real' cognition a priori of a possible experience gener comprehends both actual and possible. For Kant 'real' refers to 'the real' conditions of the possibility of objects (res), which is or can be "the matter which correspondence to sensations" conditions of a possible experience are ce and because the system of transcendental philosophy makes up the real objects. This rather naturally suggests conditions of the real, Kant calls "real possibility" also "transcendental which becomes defined or limited by these possibility". (like quoted above: A244/B302) common view, is to put upside-down Kant' It is no doubt one of Kant's most famous slogans that "The conditions a priori of a possible experience generatim are at the same time conditions of the possibility of objects of experience". (AlII) The conditions of a possible experience are certainly also the conditions of real objects. This rather naturally suggests that the 'real' is exactly that which becomes defined or limited by these conditions. That, although a common view, is to put upside-down Kant's whole reasoning. It is not so

'real' - the aim of the whole transcende summa rized as endeavLOGIC ouring to give an e FROM GENERAL LOGIC TO TRANSCENDENTAL 99 cognition of the 'real' - the conditions of rea that the 'real' is attained as a resultinquiry of reasoning. Onisthe contrary, Kant's . The crux that these conditi ons are n of the possibility of experience procedure was to find out the conditions conditions of the cognition of real objects. valid thus the and to prove that they are objectively conditio ns. and In additio n tocorresponding intellectual conditio concepts have real reference. In other words Kant's starting is e) thethrough sensibl e intuitio n (actual orpoint possibl transcendental philosophy could 'real' - the aim of the whole Analog ously, the concepts of objectibe ve validit an exhaustive of theons summarized as endeavouring tobygive no means defined account by the conditi of real objects are results of his cognition of the 'real' - the conditions grantedof from the beginni ng. It is also inquiry. The crux is that these conditions are necessary but not sufficient 'objectivity' and 'reality ' are intimately re conditions of the cognition of real objects. They are only the formal Indeed, in the passage quoted above, Bxxvin conditions. In addition to intellectual conditions, cognition also requires validity ' with 'real possibility'. is claimed given. - that sensible intuition (actual or possible) through which thetoreal Kant is usually said have ex Analogously, the concepts of objective validity and objective reality are Kant This is misleading and may indicate that experience, but taken by no means defined by the conditions all. Kant'sofclaim is more exactly thatfor existence granted from the beginning. course, It is also emphasizing that existenworth ce, as any other non-co ntradicto 'objectivity' and 'reality' are intimately related for isKant. a logical predica te. concepts Kant's point the claim, Indeed, in the passage quoted above, Bxxvin, equates 'objective in to the usual Kant distinct ion betwee n things and validity' with 'real possibility'. obviously, is no real predicate, that is, a conce thattoexistence is tnot Kant is usually said to have claimed be added the concep of aa predicate. thing. ... In lo This is misleading and may indicate that of Kant not been understood at copula a has judgme nt." (A598/ B626) It is that existence is not Of all. Kant's claim is more exactly Existen ce [Dasein ] aisreal onepredicate. of the categor ies be used as course, existence, as any other non-contradictory modal categoriesconcept, it can can be used only as a a logical predicate. Kant's point predica is the claim, doesenlarge not fit the tes do that not existence in the least co things and their in to the usual distinction between attache d. "They only predicates. express the "Being, relation of the obviously, is no real predicate, that is, adge." concept of something that may knowle (A219/ B266) Reality [Realiti it] be added to the concept of a thing. ... iesInoflogical it isitmerely the a "cate categor qualityuse . Thus is indeed It is [real] merely positing thing. h]. copula of a judgment." (A598/B626) Kant's 'real' with 'actuala' [wirklic (S categories of modality. Like other Existence [Dasein] is one of the is a pre-eminent paper on this matter. ) modal categories it can be used only as a logical predicate. Modal to transce which they arel logic predicates do not in the least enlarge the concept 3. Genera l logic and ndenta attached. "They only express the relation of the concept to the faculty of Kant's criticism of the Leibniz-Wolffian [Realitlit] in tum belongs to the knowledge." (A219/B266) Reality introdu ce a new logic: the transcendental logic categories of quality. Thus it is indeed a "category-mistake" to confuse Kant's 'real' [real] with 'actual' [wirklich]. (See Seigfried 1982, which is a pre-eminent paper on this matter.)

3. General logic and transcendental logic Kant's criticism of the Leibniz-Wolffian philosophy led him to introduce a new logic: the transcendental logic. His insight is that there

principles as well.) The old principles of gener mented3 with new principles. However, comple CHAPTER 100 sensibility and understanding is not sufficient as su are not only fonnal principles a priori general logiction but isalso principles , viz. that needed assump further A of on logic. which are transcendental (material, that is, concerning real objects) priori o in something which has formal conditions aand fonnal at the same time. (Moreover, there priori is Kant logic as a science thatareformathematically It is notable of general logic be in an principles as well.) The facultie old principles is not logic to eless have Neverth s of the mind. complemented with newcertaint principles. However, the separation of K priori. a totally y of logic must be sensibility and understanding is not to have anyoneffect l