The Struggle against Dogmatism: Wittgenstein and the Concept of Philosophy

THE sTRUGGLE AGAINsT DOGMATisM

Wittgenstein and the Concept of Philosophy

OSI(ARI KUUSELA

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS

Carnbridge, Massachusetts London, England

2008

Abbreviations

WORKS BY WITTGENSTEIN

The following abbreviations are used to refer to Wittgenstein's published works. BB

Preliminary Studies for the "Philosophical Investigations," Generally Knolvn as the Blue and BrOl0n Books, ed. R. Rhees (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958) .

CV

Culture and Value, rev. ed., ed. G. H. von Wright in collaboration with H. Nyman, rev. ed. A. Pichler, trans. P. Winch (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998).

LWi

Last Writings on the Philosophy ofPsychology: Prelirninary Studies jOl" Part II ofPhilosophical Investigations, ed. G. H. von Wright and H. Nyman,

trans. C. G. I-Juckhardt and M. A. E. Aue (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982). NB

Notebooks, 1914-1916, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1961).

OC

On Cel"tainty, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe and D. Paul (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).

PG

Philosophical Gramm,ar, ed. R. Rhees, trans. A. Kenny (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974).

PI

Philosophical Investigations, 2nd ed., ed. G. E. M Anscombe and R. Rhees, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997).

PO

Philosophical Occasions, 1912-1951, ed. J. Klagge and A. Nordmann (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993).

Abbreviations

XVI

PPO

Public and Private Occasions, ed. James C. Klagge and Alfred Nordmann (New York: Rowrnan & Littlefield, 2003).

PR

Philosophical RemaTks, ed. R. Rhees, trans. R. Hargreaves and R. White (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975).

RFM

Remarl~s on the Foundations ofMathematics, rev. ed., ed. G. E. M. Anscombe, R. Rhees, and G. H. von Wright, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978).

RLF

"Some Remarks on Logical Fonn," inJ. Klagge and A. Nordmann, eds., Philosophical Occasions, 1912-1951 (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993).

ROC

Rem,aTks on Colour, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe, trans. L. McAlister and M. Schattle (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978).

RPPi

Remarks on the Philosophy ofPsychology, vol. 1., ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980).

TLP

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. C. K. Ogden (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1951); trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961).

Z

Zettel, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967). WITTGENSTEIN'S NACHLASS

Wittgenstein's Nachlass: The Bergen Electronic Edition, ed. The Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

References to the Nachlass are by manuscript or typescript number followed by page number (as cited in the von Wright catalogue; see PO). LECTURE NOTES BY OTHERS, CONVERSATIONS, AND CORRESPONDENCE

AWL

Alice Ambrose, ed., Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge, 1932-35 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979).

CL

Ludrvig Wittgenstein, Cambridge Letters: Correspondence '{vith Russell, Keynes, Moore, Ramsey and StrafJa, ed. B. McGui~ness and G. H. von Wright (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997).

DC

M. O. C. Drury, "Conversations with Wittgenstein," in The Danger of Words and Writings on Wiltgenstein, ed. D. Berman, M. Fitzgerald, and J. Hayes (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1996).

Abbreviations

xvii

LFM

Cora Diamond, ed., Wittgenstein's Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, Cambridge, 1939: from the notes ofR. G. Bosanquet, Norman Malcolm, Rush Rhees, and Yorick Smythies (London: Harvester, 1976; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989).

LO

G. H. von Wright, ed., LetteTS to C. K. Ogden with Comments on the English Translation of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Oxford: Blackwell, 1973).

LR

G. H. von Wright, ed., Letters to Russell, Keynes and Moore (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974).

VW

Ludwig Wittgenstein and Friedrich Waismann, The Voices of Wittgenstein: The Vienna Circle, ed. G. Baker (London: Routledge, 2003).

WVC

Brian McGuinness, ed., Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle: Conversations Recorded by Friedrich Waismann, trans. Joachim Schulte and Brian McGuinness (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979).

In order to see rnore clearly, here as in coun tless sirnilar cases, we 111USt. focus on the details of what goes on; must look at t.hern front close to. -Wittgenstein, PhilosojJhir,allnvestigations

In troductioll

with philosophical doctrines, theses, or theories put forward by philosophers. This is also how an introduction to the subject often looks: one is provided with a list of names of philosophers and doctrines'associated with them. When one begins to study philosophy in a university context, emphasis is soon placed on the ability to philosophize as opposed to the knowledge of philosophy. One learns to construct and analyze argulllents, and it is not sufficient simply to know which views a philosopher held. Rather, one is expected to be able to understand why anyone would wish to hold such and such a view. That is, one learns to perceive philosophical doctrines and theses as proposed (perhaps competing) solutions to philosophical problems and becomes able to discern a point behind the tllings that philosophers say. But even if the activity of philosophizing thus takes the foreground, this activity is presumed to have a particular form. Philosophy is conceived as the search for answers to questions in the manner of the sciences; it is a research prograrn with .an unusually long history. A philosopher is expected to solve problems, many of which were already articulated SOine 2,500 years ago. Against such a background it may then appear alternately inconlprehensible and outrageous when someone comes along, as Ludwig Wittgenstein did in the first half of the twentieth century, suggesting that there are no doctrines, theses, or theories in philosophy, and that the questions that philosophers are trying to answer are based on misunderstandings. For if a philosopher's task is to present theses or theoPHILOSOPHY IS HABITUALLY IDENTIFIED

2

Introduction

ries, does -denying the existence of theses and theories not amount to abandoning philosophy? If having something to say in philosophy means having a thesis to present and defend, does the rejection of theses mean that one has nothing to say, that one holds no views about philosophical issues and has nothing positive to contribute? Or even worse: if taken seriously, does the view that there are no theses (and so on) in philosophy ilnply that we should abandon the fruits of the 2,500 and more years of labor by philosophers? But what could be more arrogant and foolish than to declare all these achievements worthless, as based on misunderstandings? Or alternatively, perhaps the claim that there are no theses is just a smoke screen for smuggling in another set of philosophical doctrines. Maybe this assertion really amounts to a declaration of the alleged superiority of its asserter's philosophical perspective, a contention that his views are somehow beyond dispute, not to be debated but simply to he accepted? This would make the claim that there are no doctrines, theses, or theories not only arrogant but dishonest. Such suspicions may be natural given the background from which they arise. Nevertheless, the conception that the only-or indeed the best-way to positively contribute to philosophy is to present doctrines, theses, Qr theories cannot be taken for granted. The fact that philosophers, unlike scientists, have not been able to reach any agreenlent about their doctrines, theses, or theories is already sufficient grounds to question this assumption. The purpose of this book is thus to examine, in the context ofWittgenstein's work, the possibility, meaning, and implications of an alternative approach to philosophy, one that does not involve philosophical doctrines, theses, or theories. The overall aim of the study might be described as that of rendering comprehensible Wittgenstein's approach to philosophy by shedding light on what motivates him to abandon philosophical doctrines, theses, and theories. For only when one sees the kinds of problems pertaining to the practice of philosophy to which Wittgenstein is trying to respond can one come to understand the nature of his response, i.e., the point of his conception of philosophy and the methods he articulates. And if, indeed, he is responding to certain identifiable problems, perhaps his work bears some kind of understandable relation to the philosophical tradition after all, even if his response does not constitute a philosophical thesis or theory.

Introduct.ion

3

Nlore specifically, the roots of Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy might be said to lie in his emphasis on the difference between true or false factual statements and expressions of exceptionless necessity. The failure to distinguish between these two types of statement constitutes, according to Wittgenstein, a fundamental confusion in philosophy, which gives rise to metaphysics as a study of necessary truths pertaining to reality. 1 Wittgenstein's early work, culminating in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, may be conceived as an attempt to develop a philosophical method that respects this distinction between factual statements and expressions of exceptionless necessity. What would be left of philosophy, if the Tractatus managed to accomplish what it seeks to accolnplish, would be a method of clarification, but no doctrines, theses, or theories. As Wittgenstein comes to realize later on, however, the nlethod of the Tractatus involves a committnent to philosopllical or metaphysical theses about the nature of language and philosophy. Thus his early work fails to achieve the aiIn of a philosophy devoid of doctrines, theses, or theories. This leads him once more to reconsider the status and function of philosophical statemen ts, and what philosophizing without doctrines, theses, or theories '''ould amount to. Here, a central goal is to avoid the doglnatism or injustice to which Wittgenstein thinks philosophical doctrines, theses, or theories lead, and to w"hich he fell into in his early philosophy. Or to put it more positively, the goal is to obtain flexibility in philosophical thought without loss ofrigor. Notably, this new approach also makes possible a novel use of philosophical tlleses. This means that although Wittgenstein's shift away from philosophical theses does constitute a shift away from metaphysical philosophy, his philosophy is not antimetaphysical, in the sense of being hostile to the metaphysical tradition of philosophy. It does not imply the outright rejection of what has been said in the course of the history of philosophy. But the differences between Inetaphysical philosophy and Wittgenstein's later philosophy remain significant. The latter constitutes a philosophy without theoretical presuppositions and without hierarchies of more and less fundalnental concepts-or so I will argue. Another way of characterizing the aim of this book is to say that it purports to clarify the relation between Wittgenstein's and lnore traditional approaches to philosophy by presenting the former as a modification, or a series of modifications, of the latter. (Again, it is itnportant

4

Introduction

that these modifications are motivated by certain specific problems relating to the practice of philosophy.) For instance, given that the search for definitions is one of the defining characteristics of the philosophical tradition in which we live, it should be possible to make Wittgenstein's approach comprehensible by focusing on his novel conception of t.he function of definitions, and on how it differs from more traditional conceptions of this function. Partly for such strategic reasons, I will emphasize the employment of rules among Wittgenstein's methods of clarification. Another point where Wittgenstein's methods make direct contact with "old ways of philosophizing" is the question of the role of examples in philosophy. At this point too, Wittgenstein is making adjustments to the deployment of a familiar philosophical tool. These points of contact create a space for clarifications that could help one see more clearly what it would mean (and not mean) to switch from the more traditional modes of philosophizing to Wittgenstein's mode of philosophizing. Consequently, one could decide for oneself the potential ofWittgenstein's new approach to philosophy. So far philosophers have not been very keen to take up the challenge that Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy poses to philosophyas it has been and continues to be practiced. There may be various reasons for this, but the result is that the potential his methods might have remains to a great extent unexplored. Yet it seems to nle that there is much to learn from what Wittgenstein says about philosophy and its methods, and that this could help one improve one's own philosophizing. As a result, he might be able to help one deal with one's own philosophical problems, regardless of whether these are problems that Wittgenstein discussed. Nevertheless, my purpose in this book is not to try to convince anyone that Wittgenstein is actually able to help improve one's philosophical skills. Rather, I wish to bring the reader to a position where she is able to take the possibility of such an improvement seriously.2 To make a brief remark about what kind of wider relevance the discussion of the methodology of philosophy in this book might possess outside philosophy, the novel conception of the status of philosophical statements Wittgenstein develops in his later philosophy could also prove helpful in thinking about certain methodological issues in the humanities, or perhaps even more widely in the sciences. In particular, this conception of philosophical statements might be applied in describing

Int.roduction

5

the status of methodological statenlents that constitute frameworks in the context ofwhich research is carried out. The suggestion, then, is that questions relating to the choice and justification of different methodologies and the relations between them could be addressed with enllanced clarity in the light of this conception of methodological statementCi). This would clarify what type of clailTIs or assumptions are made about the objects of investigation when, for example, a Marxist or psychoanalytic lllethodology is adopted in art history, or what it means to adopt a particular methodology. (Does that mean making a true/false clainl about the nature of the object of investigation? How does that relate to other sets of methodological claims? What does it nlean for the adoption of a methodology to involve a political choice? And so on.) Having said this, I must note that I will rarely be painting with such a broad brush as I have done up to now. (Nor will I explicitly address the issue of the status of methodological statements in the humanities or the sciences.) The focus will be on certain specific issues and questions. These include matters relating to the explication of various relevant Wittgensteinian notions, the justification of my interpretation, and the discussion and critique of interpretations put forward by other readers ofWittgenstein. Philosophy requires attention to detail, but this should not lead to the disappearance of the bigger issues from sight. Next, let me briefly provide a more specific context for the interpretation developed here.

Approaches to Reading Wittgenstein and the Interpretational Framework If anyone thing is characteristic of Wittgenstein's philosophy, it is his insistence throughout his philosophical career on not putting forward doctrines, theses, or theories. But for all the centrality of this insistence, what Wittgenstein nleans by not having theses in philosophy, or by philosophizing without theses, remains unclear. Some commentators and scholars contest Wittgenstein's selfunderstanding. An example is George Pitcller in The Philosophy ofvVittgenstein: "when Wittgenstein says ... that there are no philosophical theses or theories, he is overstating his case.... He does not mean certain statements about language and meaning; for about these, he himself most certainly puts forward theses ...."3 Similarly, Hintikka and Hintikka

6

Introduction

maintain that the "crucial role" or "primary function" of the notion of a language-game in Wittgenstein's philosophy "is theoretical not therapeutical,"4 its purpose being the articulation of a theory of meaning. Anthony Kenny also exemplifies this approach, attributing to Wittgenstein a "theory of meaning as use."5 Here Kenny's reactions seem particularly illustrative. For it is apparently not mere conviction or lack of effort to understand Wittgcnstein that leads Kenny to attribute to him a theory. Mter more than thirty years of work on Wittgenstein, he confesses: "Though I have tried my best to do so I do not believe that it is, in the end, possible to reconcile Wittgenstein's account of philosophy with the entirety of his philosophical activity in the Investigations."o A problem with interpretations of this kind, as Kenny recognizes, is that in maintaining that Wittgenstein puts forward theses, or in attributing theories to him, commentators and scholars describe Wittgenstein's philosophy as inconsistent. From their point of view, there is a conflict between Wittgenstein's denial that he puts forward theses and his actual practice. Accordingly, Kenny maintains, whoever wants to follow Wittgenstein is forced to choose between Wittgenstein's theories and his practice.? Now it might be, of course, that Wittgenstein's philosophy is inconsistent. But this cannot be accepted without further argument. That it is tempting to read Wittgenstein's statements as theses, and that it may be hard to see how else to construe them, does not mean that they should be read as theses-especially if this makes his philosophy contradictory. Some other commentators seem, at least at first glance, more cautious. For instance, Norman Malcolm consistently avoids saying that Wittgenstein has a thesis or a theory but instead talks about Wittgenstein's views and conceptions. 8 In a somewhat similar vein, Saul Kripke substitutes "picture" for "theory" in his discussion of Wittgenstein's view of language and meaning, suggesting that this way, his points would conform better to WittgensteinY Nevertheless, Malcolm and Kripke do not seek to clarify what would distinguish views, conceptions, or pictures from theses and theories. Thus even if these expressions, appropriately explained, might capture Wittgenstein's thought, it still needs to be spelled out in what sense this would be so. The view that it can be left undecided in what sense Wittgenstein's statements are not theses or theories suggests that the issue is not crucial or urgent. In effect, commentators who adopt this view are saying:

Introduction

7

"A philosophical statement is a philosophical statement; whether or not it is a thesis, and what it would mean for it not to be a thesis can be decided later." Hereby the inlplication is that Wittgenstein's statements can be grasped without understanding their status. The problem with this view seems obvious. It is comparable to saying that whether the statement ''You can count on my support" expresses a genuine commitment or is ajoke is irrelevant to understanding it. Hence, one Illight also assert, contrary to the above types of interpretation, that Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy is the key to his writings on particular philosophical topics-for instance, language and meaning. Understanding what purpose his statements serve, and that this purpose is not the articulation of theories or tlleses, is, one could say, a requirelnent for grasping what he says about particular issues. Only thus is it possible to avoid certain problems to which his statements, when read implicitly or explicitly as theses, will lead. (In this book, Kripke's interpretation is used here and there to illustrate such problems.) Adopting a point of view of this kind and emphasizing Wittgenstein's rejection of philosophical theses and doctrines, Cora Diamond writes: "I think that there is almost nothing in Wittgenstein which is of value and which can be grasped if it is pulled away from that view of philosophy."IO Similarly, Marie McGinn proposes that the question of how Wittgenstein could be understood as not putting forward a substantive philosophical theory, while still achieving something positive that recognizes the depth of philosophical problems, is "the central interpretative issue for the whole ofWittgenstein's philosophy."ll I agree with Diamond and McGinn on this point. But the agreement only makes it more urgent to ans,ver the question, How should one 11ndersta~ld Wittgenstein's shift away from theses? Notably, within this third group of scholars who explicitly address the issue of Wittgenstein's rejection of theses and try to explain what he means by this, there are also some who arguably relapse into philosophical theses in their explanations. Thus they end up covertly attrib11ting such theses to Wittgenstein. This, as I will argue, is the case with Baker and Hacker and with Hans:Johann Glock, for instance. Given that Baker and Hacker's very carefully thought-out interpretation ofWittgenstein constitutes the most detailed attempt to explain his philosophy, I ,,,,ill mostly take issue with them in this book-not because I particularly enjoy polemics, but because this contrast seems quite illuminating.

8

Introduction

A scholar whose interpretation of the later Wittgenstein comes closest to mine is the later Gordon Baker, who from the late 1980s onward was developing an interpretation that departs radically from the one presented in his work with Peter Hacker. Differences between Baker's interpretation and mine are probably a result of our focusing on different issues or reading Wittgenstein with slightly different concerns in mind. The significance of this should not be underestimated, however. As a consequence, we offer different elucidations of Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy. (Sometimes there may also be genuine disagreements about details.) Another reader of Wittgenstein whose interpretation (or aspects thereof) has affinities with the present work is Stanley Cavell. For example, when read in the interpretative framework constituted by my discussion of Wittgenstein's method, Wittgenstein seems to articulate a conception of language that largely agrees with the interpretation developed by Cavell from the 1960s on. Characteristically, in this conception the possibility of language is not seen as dependent on rules, contrary to many other interpretations of Wittgenstein, including Baker and Hacker's or Kripke's. But this is not merely a matter of someone being right and someone else wrong. Taking into account the interpretation of Wittgenstein's method presented in this book, it is not that these others are wrong to emphasize the rule-governed nature of language. Rather, their view is one-sided. Moreover, as I will explain, being one-sided or simplifying is not necessarily bad. Simplifications are part of Wittgenstein's method, but it is important to recognize simplifications for what they are. In recent years Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy has been discussed especially in connection with his early philosophy, as presented in the Tractatus. 12 Although some commentators have suggested that Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy remains constant throughout his career, it is a moot point to what extent this is SO.13 Accordingly, it is unclear what Wittgenstein's statements about the concept of philosophy in the Tractatus can tell us about his later views. The focus of this book is on Wittgenstein's later work, from the early 1930s onward, although I will also discuss his early philosophy as it finds expression in the Tractatus. 14 Roughly, I understand Wittgenstein's later philosophy as a novel attempt to achieve the aims of the

Introduction

9

Tractatus. Already in his early work he strives to articulate a conception of philosophy as devoid of doctrines or theories. I!) But the early philosophy fails to reach this goal. Thus the early and later philosophies are united by their aim while divided by how they try to reach it. -Naturally, however, one can talk about such shared aims only at a very abstract level. I do not wish to suggest that Wittgenstein's view of what exactly is the aim of his philosophy would relnain constant amid all the changes in his methodology. ~10st of all, the Tractatus'sfailure is of great interest, because it can alert one to the kinds of difficulties that lie in the way of attempts to break free from philosophical theses. In particular, there seelns to be a risk of repeating the Tractatus's mistakes in a new form in interpreting Wittgenstein's later philosophy (or in trying to apply Wittgenstein's ideas in the context of other philosophical debates). Consequently, Wittgenstein's later philosophy becomes a new set of theses about language, meaning, philosophy, and so on. Not unrelated to this is yet another risk. Knowing that according to Wittgenstein there are "grave mistakes" in the Tractatus,I6 one Inight be inclined to make its mistakes too obvious. This approach is represented in a radical form by Newton Garver, according to whom the Tractatus's failure is simply that it is nonsense, as Wittgenstein himself acknowledges at the end of the book. I7 This interpretation appears to make it unnecessary to pose any further questions about what Wittgenstein might have wished to achieve by ,vTiting a nonsensical book, and whether this had anything to do with his attempt to break away froIIl philosophical doctrines. But by lllaking the Tractatus's mistakes too obvious, one is also in danger of trivializing Wittgenstein's later philosophy, insofar as one seeks to understand it by way of contrast with the Tractatus, as Wittgenstein recommends. :F'rom the point of view of Garver's reading, practically anything would seem to count as an improvement on the Tractatus. Thus, there is nothing, or very little, to learn from the Tractatus's failure. A way to try to avert the risk of making the Tractatus's mistake too obvious is to distinguish between its aims ('J\Tittgenstein's intentions) and actual achievements. One might say that an attelnpt to understand the Tractatus's conception of philosophy is e~sentially an attempt to understand how Wittgenstein thought he could achieve its aim, how the Tractatus could be read as an articulation of a philosophy without doctrines. I8 In this respect, Wittgenstein's later critique of his early work

10

Introduction

might then not be the best guide to the reconstruction of the Tractatus's conception of philosophy. The later philosophy probably gives an accurate account of the Tractatus's shortconlings, and therefore of its actual achievements. But in his later philosophy Wittgenstein seems not particularly concerned with the Tractatus's attempt to break away from philosophical doctrines, to the extent that he thinks it was already on the right track. Rather, whatever was correct in the Tractatus seems incorporated in Wittgenstein's later philosophy. Thus, the articulation of what the Tractatus got right is now a part of the articulation of the later philosophy, and is not discussed separately. Wittgenstein hardly discusses the Tractatus's philosophy explicitly except when concerned with its failure. Accordingly, although one may accept Wittgenstein's statement that his early philosophy did involve a metaphysics of language, this does not seem a good reason for thinking that the Tractatus's aim was simply to state a doctrine of language-which then, paradoxically, is nonsense by its own lights. Rather, one must read .from the Tractatus (and perhaps other sources from that period) what it was trying to do. This way one can also set the stakes high for the interpretation of the later philosophy. One can arrive at an interesting and strong interpretation of the later philosophy through a reading of the Tractatus that challenges philosophical thought. The cycle is then completed when one comes to see what is wrong with the Tractatus even according to the most favorable account. This way one might force oneself to think more and harder by trying not to downplay the early philosophy. As regards the Tractatus, my objective is to arrive at an interpretation that would allow one to understand how Wittgenstein might have thought of the Tractatus as an articulation of a philosophy without doctrines. This gives more depth to his later account of how the Tractatus nevertheless fails in cutting itself loose from philosophical doctrines. Consequently, this account of the Tractatus's failure also allows me to shed light on how certain interpretations ofWittgenstein's later philosophy still remain tied to philosophical doctrines, despite appearances. Insofar as Wittgenstein's later philosophy enables one to grasp more clearly the Tractatus's failure, it seems the discussion of the Tractatus's conception of philosophy would benefit from being connected with the discussion of Wittgenstein's later conception of philosophy. This book aspires to extend the discussion on Wittgenstein's early conception of philosophy in this direction and to clarify the relation betw_~~~_~_i~_~~:~)'

_

Introduction

11

and later thought. For although several volumes devoted to either Wittgenstein's early or later conceptions of philosophy have been published in recent years, little has been published on the relation between them. 19 This means that Wittgenstein's later conception of philosophy has not yet received the kind of book-length treatment that Wittgenstein suggests would be optimal; Le., it has not been the subject of a detailed study that seeks to understand it by way of contrast with the Tractatus.

Outline of the Discussioll The following chapters atternpt to approach a set of problems relating to the concept and methods of philosophy from slightly different angles. l'hus, although the chapters develop a continuous line of argument, they can be seen as complementing each other in other ways too. What results is the description of a particular philosophical position, which I attribute to the later Wittgenstein. The first chapter addresses Wittgenstein's early and later conceptions of philosophical problems. The crucial difference between these conceptions (although other differences will be discussed) is that whereas the early Wittgenstein sees philosophy as centered around a fundamental problem, the solution to which contains the solution to all problems, the later Wittgenstein abandons the idea of the hierarchical organization of philosophy assumed in his early approach. This hierarchical organization, he Inaintains, nlakes it impossible to get rid of philosophical problems. I introduce here, but can only discuss preliIninarily, Wittgenstein's shift to a conception of philosoprlY according to which the task of philosophy is to solve particular philosophical problems. The second chapter examines Wittgenstein's early conception of philosophical clarification as logical analysis, as well as his later crit.ique of the view that there is only one complete analysis of a proposition, or more generally, an ultimate determination of the essential features of an object of investigation. This critique of the Tractatus's conception of logical analysis then provides the basis for a more detailed discussion of Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy as the clarification of particular philosophical problems and the wide-reaching implications of this conception for logical or philosophical investigation. The chapter also addresses Wittgenstein's notion of ordering knowledge of language use, which comes up in various connections in subsequent chapters.

12

Introduction

The third chapter constitutes the center of the argument of the book. It begins with a discussion of the concept of metaphysics and the concept of a philosophical thesis, as well as the Tractatus's relapse into such theses. Against the background of the Tractatus's failure and the problem of dogmatism, I propose an interpretation of Wittgenstein's later conception of the status of philosophical statements that aims to make plain the sense in which his statements do not constitute philosophical theses. I also explain how this conception of the status of philosophical statements is motivated by a desire to avoid dogmatism in philosophy. Special attention is paid to the role of examples, rules, and idealized logical models in philosophical clarification. The interpretation of the status of Wittgenstein's statements presented in Chapter 3 is further elucidated in Chapter 4 in connection with his remarks on the concepts of language and meaning. My purpose is to show how my interpretation ofWittgenstein's method fits together with these remarks and receives further support from them. In this context, I also try to clarify the advantages of reading Wittgenstein along the lines I suggest. I try to show that it not only dissolves certain anomalies regarding the interpretation of his writings, but also makes possible a more nuanced understanding of the concepts of language and meaning than seems available for someone committed to philosophical theses. Wittgenstein's method would thus increase the flexibility of philosophical thought without reducing its rigor. The fifth chapter plays a similar role to the fourth. It employs the results reached in Chapter 3 as a framework for the interpretation of Wittgenstein's relnarks on grammar, essence, and necessity. My interpretation contrasts with widely accepted conventionalist or constructivist readings that attribute to Wittgenstein a conception of essences and relevant kinds of exceptionless necessities as grammatical constructions. I argue that rather than putting forward a philosophical thesis about grammar or linguistic practices as the source of necessity, Wittgenstein avoids any commitment to such theses. Two key issues addressed are the relation of statements about essences and necessities to factual statements, and Wittgenstein's conception of the nontemporality of statements of the former kind. This discussion also allows me to clarify the relation between Wittgenstein's and certain more traditional views of essence and necessity. As in Chapter 4, I aim to show how Wittgenstein's method can lead beyond oppositions between

Introduction

13

philosophical parties (in this case Aristotelianism and Kantianism) to richer philosophical vie",Ts. In Chapter 6, I seek to further elucidate my interpretation by examining questions relating to the status of grammatical, clarificatory statements. Issues to be addressed include Wittgenstein's rejection of philosophical hierarchies, his concept of perspicuous presentation, whether one may be forced to accept a philosophical clarificatory statement, what the correctness of grammatical remarks means, and Wittgenstein's concept of agreement in philosophy. The notion of what I will call "lnultidimensional descriptions" of language use, which Wittgenstein's conception of the status of philosophical statements makes possible, is discussed. I also explain how Wittgenstein's later approach makes possible a new errlployment of philosophical or rnetaphysical theses and why worries about relativism are misplaced in the context of this account of philosophy's tasks. rThe seventh chapter concludes the book by addressing the question of whether Wittgenstein's approach to philosophy amounts to a doctrine about the essence of philosophy and examining his conception of the historicity of philosophy. I also discuss Wittgenstein's vie"T of the relation of philosophical language use to everyday language and seek to elucidate the sense in which there is, according to him, an ethical dimension to philosophy that pervades it in its entirety.

Notes on Source Materials and the Principles of Interpretation In this book I make wide use of Wittgenstein's Nachlass, Le., his notebooks, manuscripts, typescripts, and dictations (published as the Bergen Electronic Edition), as well as lecture notes taken by others. As Hilmy notes, this material constitutes an indispensable aid for reading the Philosophical Investigations: The main justification for our appeal to the NachlafJ is that one can best cut through the dense aphoristic quality of such a work as Philosophical Investigations by coming to grips with its fragments in their historical context (and genesis) within Wittgenstein's own development and by viewing these fragments not only within the context of the bed of remarks where they were first conceived, but also within whatever other

14

Introduction contexts Wittgenstein saw fit to place them during subsequent stages of revision. 20

As well as explaining its justification, Hilmy here outlines the principles of the method of investigation that I will also enlploy. Ultimately, that is, the Nachlass is only an aid in the interpretation of the Philosophical Investigations, the latter constitLlting the most polished and authoritative presentation ofWittgenstein's philosophy. Whatever views are attributed to the later Wittgenstein, they should, therefore, not be in conflict with the Investigations-although what counts as being in conflict with the Investigations is, of course, a matter of interpretation. As regards the use of the Nachlass, it is important that its employment not be a Inatter of "passage-hunting"21 or simply picking out remarks that best suit one's purposes without any attention to their context and other factors affecting their interpretation. In this regard it is important to note that there is an order to the Nachlass. Because Wittgenstein often wrote in notebooks while working at the same time on a manuscript or a typescript, it is possible to find in these notebooks different versions of a remark, or attempts to make a particular point that can also be found in a manuscript or typescript. These different versions may greatly facilitate the interpretation of Wittgenstein's views. 22 Similarly, it is also sometimes possible to find in the notebooks remarks that reflect discussions in his lectures of the same time. These may help in deciding between different interpretations of the lecture notes, as well as confirming what is recorded in these notes. In addition to such parallel versions of a remark, there are also successive versions that follow each other in time as Wittgenstein writes "his book." (Most manuscripts and typescripts may be characterized as work toward what became the Philosophical Investigations, although not all of them are drafts of the book or its parts, but may serve other purposes.) It may be revealing to follow these successive formulations of a remark, its wording sometimes changing almost completely as it makes its journey through the manuscripts and typescripts. Thus the first draft and the last version may be quite different from each other while still connected through various intermediary versions. Finally, as Hilmy notes, the different contexts in which Wittgenstein places a remark also offer useful hints for interpretation. For instance, the study of such different contexts allows one to come to understand connections between different

Introduction

15

remarks and ideas expressed in them. Again, this may help one to decide between different interpretations of the remarks in the Investigations. Where no translations have been published for remarks from the Nachlass, I provide my own. Occasionally, I have modified existing translations. Insofar as I think the modification is significant, this is indicated. In the case of the Tractatus, my translations are sOlnetimes formed by combining existing translations by C. K. Ogden and by D. F'. Pears and B. F. McGuinness. SOlnetilnes I use square brackets inside quotations to mark ways Wittgenstein has edited his text, for instance, to give an alternative wording. The same convention is adopted to indicate words that have no straightforward English translation or to alert the reader to the original German when relevant.

ONE

Wittgenstein on Philosophical Problems: From One Fundamental Problem to Particular Problems

Wittgenstein characterizes philosophical problems as arising from, or as the expressions of~ misunderstandings concerning language. Correspondingly, a leading idea of his thought throughout is that instead of rushing to find answers to the questions through which philosopllical problems are articulated, such questions themselves should be subjected to closer scrutiny. The attempts to answer these questions do not reach the roots of the intellectual disquietude they express, ultimately leaving one unsatisfied. Resolving philosophical problems, therefore, calls for a transformation of one's approach. To say that philosophical problems arise from misunderstandings, and require exanlination rather than ans,.vers, is to identify the task of philosophy as clarification. But to understand what exactly Wittgenstein means by clarification and what he believes it takes to resolve philosophical problems, it is imperative to comprehend what kinds of misunderstandings he thinks lie at their root. In this sense, his conception of philosophical problems constitutes an essential part of his conception of philosophy, offering a natural starting point for this study.l A grasp of certain differences between his early and later conceptions of philosophical problems is crucial for understanding the development of Wittgenstein's thought, his mature conception of philosophy, and the way his differs from more traditional modes of philosophizing. Tllese differences culminate in the following: whereas the Tractatus seeks to find a solution to all philosophical IN BOTH HIS EARLY AND LATER PHILOSOPHY,

18

Wittgenstein on Philosophical Problems

problems by solving what Wittgenstein perceives as a great fundamental problem or the fundamental problem, in his later philosophy Wittgenstein rejects this approach as based on a misconception. Rather than offering a way out of philosophical problems, this approach itself constitutes a source of problems and prevents philosophy from reaching its goal. As will become clearer later on, his rejection of this way of construing and posing philosophical problems is an aspect of a more pervasive attempt to rethink what philosophy is, intimately connected with his abandonment of a certain notion of conceptual unity and with it philosophical theses and hierarchies. Accordingly, this chapter serves as an important background for discussions in subsequent chapters of Wittgenstein's method and his conception of philosophy. I begin by discussing the Tractatus's conception of philosophical problems (1.1). From this I move (in 1.2) to a discussion of certain similarities and differences between Wittgenstein's early and later conceptions of philosophical problems. Subchapter 1.3 provides an overview of different characterizations Wittgenstein offers of philosophical problems as arising from misunderstandings. Subsequently, I discuss (in 1.4) his conception of philosophical problems as rooted in problematic tendencies of thinking and introduce his notion of philosophical therapy. Finally, in 1.5 I examine the contrast between Wittgenstein's early and later conceptions in terms of a distinction in the aim of philosophy: whether it is to solve the fundamental problem or particular problems.

1.1

The Tractatus on Philosophical Problems

The Tractatus is a laconic text. While some basic characteristics of its approach to philosophy and its conception of philosophical problems can be discerned readily enough, others might be understood in more than one way. Wittgenstein writes in the preface: "The book deals with the problems of philosophy and shows, as I believe, that the way these problems are posed rests on misunderstanding the logic of our language."2 He makes the same point later in the book and explains its implications: Most of the sentences and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical. Consequently we cannot give any answer to questions of this kind, but can only establish that they are nonsensical. Most of the propositions and questions of philosophers are based on a failure to understand the logic of our language.

Wittgenstein on Philosophical Problems

19

(They are of the same kind as the question ,,yhether the Good is more or less iden tical than the Beautiful.) And so it is not surprising that the deepest problems are really no problems. 3

According to these remarks, philosophical problcills-or at least the majority of them-depend on misunderstandings concerning the logic of language. Hence, they are merely illusory and cannot be answered or solved. They can only be cleared away by establishing the nonsensical nature of the questions through which they are expressed. As I explain in 3.1, Wittgenstein seems to have something quite specific in mind when he talks about the philosophers' misunderstandings of logic. These misunderstandings have to do with the concept of necessity, philosophy's aspiration to obtain knowledge of and make statements about what is not Inerely contingent and accidental but necessary. How such specific Inisunderstandings conle about, however, is explained in the Tractatus in terms of a more general and abstract account of logical confusions: In everyday language it frequently happens that the same word has different modes of signification-and therefore belongs to different symbols-or that two words that have different modes of signification are employed in propositions in what is superficially the same way. Thus the word "is" appears as the copula, as the sign of equality, and as the expression of existence; "to exist" as an intransitive verb like "to go"; "identical" as an adjective; we speak of something but also of the fact of something happening. (In the proposition "Green is green"-where the first word is a proper nanle and the last an adjective-these ,vords have not merely different meanings but are d~fJerent symbols.) In this way the most fundamental confusions are easily produced (the whole of philosophy is full of them). 4

Although philosophical problems do not arise only in connection with everyday language,5 Wittgenstein's examples spell out a particular picture of philosophical problems as based on misunderstandings of logic. This can be elucidated as follows. What Wittgenstein calls a "symbol" in the lractatus stands, one might say, for a logical type. A sYlnbol (in this sense) can be common to

20

Wittgenstein on Philosophical Problems

different propositions and is presented by a variable. 6 Thus, employing Wittgenstein's example "Green is green" (where the first word is a name of a person), the adjective "green" might be turned into a variable defined so as to take color names as its values. In this way a class of propositions such as "Green is black," "Green is white," and so on, is defined. According to the Tractatus's terminology, the words "green," "black," and "white" here have different meanings but "belong to the same symbol." Or as one might also say: according to the current definition of the variable, the signs "green," "black," "white," and so on signify in the saIne way. They have the same mode of signification. 7 It may happen, however, that, misled by the superficial appearances of language, one fails to distinguish between the different modes of signification of a sign or the differences in its logicosyntactical employment. 8 To sketch such an example: "Green" as the name of a person is not functioning as an adjective. As Wittgenstein says above, it not only has a meaning that is different from "green" as an acUective, but it is a different symbol. Accordingly, there is no such thing as the sign "Green" occurring in a proposition as a value of the variable that takes "green," "black," "white," and so on as its values, while simultaneously functioning in the capacity of the name of a person. An attempt (insofar as it could even be called that) to employ "Green" in these two mutually exclusive ways at once would not only result in a false sentence such as "Green is black" when Green is in fact white, it would result in a nonsensical combination of signs. It would be like attempting to say: "Miss Green has the color Miss Green," where the latter occurrence of "Miss Green" would function as the name of a person while "has the color" would be used in its normal sense. 9 A misunderstanding of this kind could be called a failure to use a sign according to the logical syntax or grammar of language, i.e., a failure to use it in a way that permits a syntactical description. The result of such a failure, however, is not an illegitimate, illogical symbol. A symbol is something whose syntax can be determined, while what does not have a logical syntax is not a symbol. A failure to use a sign according to logical syntax, therefore, is a failure to symbolize anything. One says something that one cannot construe as anything comprehensible or as satisfying what one was trying to say. 10 Wittgenstein expresses the \view that there are no illogical symbols as follows: _

Wittgenstein on Philosophical Problelns

21

Logic must take care of itself. Whatever is possible in logic is also permitted.... In a certain sense we cannot make mistakes in logic. 1 I [A] ny possible proposition is legitimately constnlcted, and, if it has no sense, that can only be because we have failed to give meaning to some of its constituents. 12

Although logic might take care of itself and it would not be possible to make mistakes in logic in a certain sense, this does not nlean that we need not pay attention to what we say_ Even though no symbol fails to symbolize, we may fail to synlbolize when using our signs. Thus we may end up asking questions that have no answers, confusing vvhat only seenlS like an expression of thought, or a lneaningfullinguistic expression, with what really is one. The preceding outlines Wittgenstein.'s account of the type of misunderstandings of logic from which "most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works" arise. Whether the words from the Tractatus (remark 4.003) quoted in the beginning of this subchapter are intended to leave room for genuine philosophical problems is somewhat unclear. The forillulation from the preface which I quoted before renlark 4.003 suggests they are not. (Here Wittgenstein says without any qualifications that he believes philosophical problems rest on misunderstandings of tlle logic of language.) 13 Wittgenstein's claim in the Tractatus, then, is that he has found a final solution to philosophical problems thus described. As he writes in the preface: "I am ... of the opinion that the problems have in essentials been finally solved."14 In what sense has Wittgenstein solved the problems of philosophy, or what sort of a solution is he offering? The claim that the illusory problems are based on misunderstandings of the logic of language suggests that his solution involves the clarification of such misunderstandings and is meant to enable philosophers to avoid thern in the future. Thus understood, his solution would be, ultimately, a methodological innovation. This seems corroborated by remark 4.0031, which, according to the Tractatus's numbering system, is to be understood as a COlument on 4.003 on philosophical problems, and which says: "All philosophy is 'Critique of language.' ..." For insofar as this remark is not merely a groundless statement of preference, it must

22

Wit.tgenstein on Philosophical Problenls

mean that Wittgenstein has established philosophy to be possible only as a critique of language. Presumably, the introduction of the notion of such a critique is then also meant to justify the claims he makes about the nonsensical nature of lnost philosophy. According to this reading, the justification of Wittgenstein's claim that most philosophical sentences are nonsense depends on the introduction of a conception of philosophy as a critique of language in such a way that his readers come to recognize this as the approach they should adopt and that philosophy cannot be practiced in the traditional way. To get a clearer grasp of Wittgenstein's conception of a critique of language and how he intends to introduce and justify it, let us return to the preface. I5 Having made his claim about the nonsensical nature of philosophy as it has been practiced, Wittgenstein says of his book: Its whole point could be summed up in the words: What can be said at all can be said clearly; and whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent. Thus the aim of the book is to draw a limit to thinking, or rather-not to thinking but to the expression of thoughts; for, in order to draw a limit to thinking we should be able to think both sides of this limit (i.e. we should be able to think whatever cannot be thought). The limit can, therefore, only be drawn in language and what lies on the other side of the limit will be simply nonsense. 16

Given that ideas about the method of philosophical inquiry (how to approach philosophical questions) form a central part of Wittgenstein's book, one may assume that "its whole point" includes the idea of philosophy as a critique of language. Therefore, the above explanation in the preface may apparently be taken as a clue to the interpretation of his conception of philosophy as a critique of language. And of course, as many interpreters have noted, Wittgenstein's statement that the book aims to draw limits or bounds to thought sounds very reminiscent of Kant's project of the critique of reason, which aims to draw bounds to knowledge claims. Only in contrast to Kant, Wittgenstein's critique draws bounds to the expression of thoughts. But the question is, how exactly is this analogy to be understood? At first it might seem tempting to read the preface as alluding to the Tractatus's notion of the general propositional form, or the essence of proposition, as constituting a general criterion of sense to be employed

Wittgenstein on Philosophical Problems

23

to draw the bounds of language. According to this conception of the essence of proposition, all propositions are contingent, true/false (re)presentations of states of affairs. Consequently, the possibility of making any statements about the necessary features of reality and language is excluded. I7 Read in this manner, Wittgenstein's method of setting up his conception of philosophy as a critique of language is to draw a bound to language and thinking by establishing a general criterion for what it makes sense to say. Hence, the analogy to Kant's critique would be that whereas Kant aims to draw a bound to knowledge claims by determining the necessary conditions of the possibility of knowledge, Wittgenstein aims to draw bounds to language by determining the necessary conditions of the expression of sense. 1R But the problem \vith this interpretation is that it assumes it possible to do precisely what Wittgenstein says one cannot do: to think about what cannot be thought. For insofar as it is of the essence of propositions that they are (re)presentations of contingent states of affairs, what is necessary cannot be expressed in langllage (in propositions) or thought about. But this means that the idea that propositions possess a general propositional form is itself not expressible in language or a possible object of thought. 19 To draw the bound to thinking by reference to the notion of the general propositional form as the limiting or conditioning principle would be to think, "I see, that cannot be thought about," where "that" is the bound or the limiting principle. Clearly, however, this would be already to think-or to imagine that one was thinking-what supposedly cannot be thought about. The problem with the above interpretation, therefore, is that it employs the concept of general propositional form as if it were nleaIlingful after all, i.e., could figure in a proposition with a sense, and as if one might draw a bound to language with the help of this notion. This problem comes to view clearly in Hacker's interpretation, according to which the Tractatus contains an argument and a general theory of representation that constitutes the basis for drawing a bOUlld to language, thus leading the reader to adopt a method of logical analysis outlined in the book. Apparently, such an argument would have to make sense, since otherwise it would not qualify as an argument to begin with. Yet, as Hacker construes the Tractatus, it follows from the arguInent of the book that its arguillent makes no sense. Thus, the book is entangled in a self-defeating paradox. 20

24

Wittgenst.ein on Philosophical Problenls

A way out of this problem is opened up by the distinction that Wittgenstein draws between thinking and the expression of thoughts when he says that the bound can "only be drawn in language" and that it concerns expression of thought rather than thought. According to this alternative, Wittgenstein's point would be that one can draw a bound to the expression of thought in language precisely because language, unlike thought, allows for nonsensical sign formations that look or sound like expressions of thought while not expressing thoughts. 21 A particular statement would now be nonsensical if it became apparent that what originally seemed to make sense does not make sense. Hence one would say, "I see, that cannot be said," where "that" would be merely a string of signs excluded from language. Here it is crucial that a bound would no longer be drawn with the help of a principle that, albeit nonsensical, expresses an important truth about language. Rather, certain expressions would be excluded from language through the understanding of language that the reader as a language user already possesses. (Linguistic ability may be taken to include the capability to tell what is a linguistic expression and ·what is not.) Thus, the bound would clearly be "drawn in language" while what is demonstrated to lie on the other side would be "simply nonsense," just as Wittgenstein says.22 Rather than ain1ing to put forward a theory or a thesis about the essence of language, and based on this a declaration that philosophy as it has been practiced is nonsense, the Tractatus may therefore be read as seeking to introduce a method of philosophy as critique of language by relying on its readers' pre- or non theoretical capacity to distinguish sense froln nonsense. Accordingly, when Wittgenstein says in the preface that the "whole point" of his book is summed up in the words "What can be said at all can be said clearly; and whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent," this need not be read as anticipating a thesis about the general criterion of sense or a doctrine of the bounds of language from which it follows that most philosophy is nonsense. Rather, the point is to characterize his new method by contrasting it with philosophy as it has been traditionally practiced: philosophyas a critique of language will make clear what can be said, allowing one to be silent about whatever cannot be spoken of. More precisely, philosophy will do this by providing reminders of something already known to language users in principle (even though they might on occasion get confused), not by putting forward (paradoxically

Wittgenstein on Philosophical ProblelIls

25

nonsensical) propositions about truths discovered by philosophy.23 As Wittgenstein says: Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a doctrine but an activity.... Philosophy does not result in "philosophical propositions," but rather in the propositions becoming clear. 24

Having made this rernark, he then goes on to characterize this conception of philosophy as clarification exactly in the same terms as in the preface. Philosophy limits the thinkable from within, or as he also says, "will signify what cannot be said by presenting clearly what can be said."25 Thus, drawing bounds is what philosophy as clarification and as a critique of language does. What Wittgenstein says about determining the bounds of language is intended as a description of a particular approach to philosophy. Consequently, the analogy between Wittgenstein and Kant, according to the interpretation suggested here, is less straightforward than from the point of view of, for instance, Hacker's interpretation. In the Tractatus, what corresponds to Kant's doctrine of the necessary conditions of knowledge is not a principle or doctrine that determines the bounds of sense. In place of a doctrin.e is a philosophical nlethod, a conception of philosophy as an activity of drawing bounds and unveiling nonsense. Notably, however, (as becolnes clearer in 2.1 and 3.1), already the very act of introducing this method constitutes the drawing of bounds to language. Already this act of introduction-the reader's coming to see Wittgenstein's methods as justified-excludes the more traditional approach of making statements about necessities. I do not. suggest, therefore, that the application of Wittgenstein's method will redeem his clairn about the nonsensicality of most philosopllY, as if the Tractatus were a promissory note about a future philosophical demonstration not yet given. The act of setting up the method of philosophy is itself already an act in the clarification of the logic of language and an instance of the critique of language. Wittgenstein's claim that he has solved the problems of philosophy "in essentials" can correspondingly be understood as the claim that he has found a method of dealing with tl1ese problems that makes possible their dissolution. According to this interpretation, by establishing this method he has solved the central or fundamental problem of

26

Wittgenstein on Philosophical Problelns

philosophy. The problem of correct method is central in the sense that its solution is thought to be the key to the solution of all other philosophical problems. When the method is established, all other problems are in principle already solved, and only the details remain to be worked out. What is left of philosophy after Wittgenstein's accomplishment is a method of philosophy as critique of language. Everything else, including all philosophical doctrines, dissolves. That the aim of Wittgenstein's new approach to philosophy is to unveil nonsense, however, need not be taken to mean that the outcome of philosophy is "merely negative"-that it simply demolishes nonsense produced by philosophers, leaving one no wiser than before those nonsensical utterances were made. After all, the point of clarification is to enable one to understand why what one said is nonsense, i.e., what was wrong with what one said, and to help one see things more clearly. Notably, Wittgenstein also says that as a result of understanding him, the reader "will see the world aright" (TLP 6.54), suggesting that philosophy offers a clearer view of the objects of thought. Only the way to achieve this clarity of vision, according to the Tractatus, is not by constructing philosophical doctrines. It does, therefore, not follow frOlll the fact that Wittgenstein declined to put forward a theory or doctrine of the essence of language that he would not have tried to clarify the essence and logic of language to his reader in some other way. As I will explain, the introduction of his method of philosophy as clarification or as the critique of language is intimately bound together with the task of clarifying the essence of language. Thus the fundamental problem of establishing a method of philosophy that dissolves the confusions plaguing it is at the same time a problem about the essence of language. (The question of method and the question about the essence of language seem best regarded as different aspects of one and the same question.)26 What'Wittgenstein understands by philosophy as clarification is discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. I also return to the Tractatus in 1.5 and in Chapter 3, where I discuss the metaphysical involvements of its method of philosophy. For although an interpretation along the preceding lines seems the best way to understand Wittgenstein's aims-his aspiration to get rid of philosophical doctrines-and therefore the conception of philosophy that the Tractatus propounds, this is not yet to say that the Tractatus would not ultimately be committed to any

Wittgenstein on Philosophical Problems

27

philosophical doctrines. Now, however, I turn to what Wittgenstein says about philosophical problems in his later philosophy.

1.2

Wittgenstein's Later Conception of Philosophical Problem.s

There is considerable continuity between Wittgenstein's early and later views of philosophical problems, although this does not mean that there are no important discontinuities. I introduce the similarities and differences between his early and later conceptions by summarizing certain central characteristics of the latter. The most important difference, however-Wittgenstein's shift away from the notion that there is a fundamental problem whose solution contains the solution to all problems-is not discussed until 1.5. In the following subchapters I also raise a number of questions concerning Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy that will be answered only in subsequent chapters. In his later philosophy, Wittgenstein continues to hold the view that philosophical problems result from misunderstandings concerning "the logic of language." Or, as he alternatively formulates it, they arise through the misinterpretation of our "forms of language" or "modes of expression" and from misunderstandings concerning "the uses of words" or "workings of language."27 As earlier, Wittgenstein thinks that philosophical problems are to be dissolved rather than answered positively, characterizing the task of his investigation as that of "clearing misunderstandings away."28 Or as he says in typescripts and manuscripts from the 1930s: "As I do philosophy, its entire task consists in expressing myself in such a way that certain problems disappear." And: "In philosophical thinking we see problems where there are none. And philosophy should show that there are no problems here."29 We are led to misunderstandings that give rise to philosophical problems because we lack a clear view of the use of language: "A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a clear view of the use of our words."30 Metaphorically, this situation may be described by saying that we get lost in language: "Language is a labyrinth of paths. You approach from one side and know your way about; you approach the same place from another side and no longer know your way about." And as he also says: "A philosophical problem has the form: 'I don't know my way about.' "31 Wittgenstein believes, however, that our getting lost in

28

Wittgenstein on Philosophical Problems

language is due not only to its labyrinthine character but also to philosophers' habits of thinking or ways of going about language. As he remarks in his lectures: "If I had to say what is the main Inistake made by the philosophers of the present generation ... I would say that when language is looked at, what is looked at is the form of words and not the use made of the form ofwords."32 Moreover, as I explain in 7.3, ultimately the sources of philosophically problematic inclinations of thinking might be sought in aspirations, fears, and desires rooted in the human form of life. What Wittgenstein means by being misled by language can be explained as follows. Lacking a perspicuous view of the use of words and being misled by forms of expression, one comes to say things one would not say if one fully understood what one was saying. As he explains: "The cases in which we particularly wish to say that someone is misled by a forIn of expression are those in which we would say: 'he wouldn't talk as he does if he were aware of this difference in the grammar of such-andsuch words, or if he were aware of this other possibility of expression' and so on."33 Importantly, this conditional forInulation "he wouldn't talk as he does, if he were aware..." implies that what counts as a confusion or a misunderstanding is not defined by reference to a criterion established, so to speak, from the olltside by the philosopher examining a person's language use. Rather, identifying a confusion requires acknowledgment from the speaker herself. The requirement of acknowledgment or consent is emphasized in the 1937 version of the Philosophical Investigations: "One of our most important tasks is to express all false trains of thought so characteristically that the other says, 'Yes that is exactly the way I meant it.' ... Indeed we can only convict someone else of a mistake if he acknowledges that this is really the expression of his feeling. For only if he acknowledges it as such, is it the correct expression."34 The question of why Wittgenstein thinks the interlocutor's acknowledgment of the description of the problelll is required and what this means, as well as the question of how Wittgenstein's early philosophy relates to his later philosophy at this point, will occupy us later (see especially Chapter 3 and 6.3 and 6.4). For now, the following truism must suffice: I can only be said to clarify your problem to you insofar as I really address a problem you have. Wittgenstein's idea that to describe a philosophical problem is to find an expression for a feeling also calls for attention. This is so especially because he recurrently characterizes philosophical problems as

Wittgenstein on Philosophical Problems

29

disquietudes, feelings of intellectual discomfort or perplexity. The passage above, therefore, is not an isolated example. 35 In particular, his depiction of philosophical problems as disquietudes and as a matter offeeling raises the question: is Wittgenstein denying that philosophical problems are cognitive problems? And does his view imply that dissolving philosophical problems is not an exercise of reason but (could be) mere manipulation of feelings, a matter of making certain feelings go away? The preceding observations readily suggest an answer to these questions, although in the absence of an explicit explanation by Wittgenstein for his choice of words, any interpretation has a degree of uncertainty. The simplest way to explain Wittgenstein's talk about philosophical problenls as disquietudes is by reference to his conception of such problems as based on lnisunderstandings. If a genuine problem is something that in principle has a solution, but philosophical problems arise from confusions to be dissolved, then philosophical problems are strictly speaking not problelns in the proper sense of the word, as already the Tractatus notes. 36 Similarly, Wittgenstein says in the Blue Book: "The very word 'problem,' one might say, is Inisapplied when used for our philosophical troubles. 1~hese difficulties, as long as they are seen as problems, are tantalizing, and appear insoluble.":37 Thus it might be more appropriate to talk about philosophical problelns as disquietudes, and this characterization of philosophical problenls may simply be understood as ailning to distinguish between genuine and apparent problems. Comprehended in this way, Wittgenstein's characterization of philosophical problems as a matter of feeling need not be takeIl to imply that philosophy would be mere manipulation .of feelings. Philosophy may be conceived as the clarification of apparent problems that present themselves to us as genuine ones, and in this capacity it may dispel feelings of disquietude and perplexity. BlIt there is no reason to think that this activity of dissolving misunderstandings and confusion could not be a perfectly rational activity, as opposed to the manipulation of the feelings of one's philosophical interlocutor. Moreover, not11ing suggests that, according to Wittgenstein, mere manipulation of feelings could do the job. The sense in which clarification is a rational activity will become clearer in subsequent chapters. As for the sense in which philosophical problelns mayor may not be characterized as cognitive problems, Wittgenstein writes: "the phenomena that now strike us so strange are

30

Wittgenstein on Philosophical Problems

the very familiar phenomena .... They don't strike us as strange until we put them in a peculiar light by philosophising."~8 This quotation indicates a difference between philosophical and scientific problems. Unlike scientific problems, philosophical ones arise from confusions, from things presented in a peculiar light, and signal not a lack of factual knowledge but a failure to make sense of facts that are already known. Or as Wittgenstein also says, a philosophical difficulty "arises when we look at the facts through the medium of a misleading form of expression ."~9 Consequently, from Wittgenstein's point of view philosophical problems might be described as noncognitive in the sense that their dissolution does not require the acquisition of new knowledge. Nevertheless, such a problem might still be described as cognitive in another sense: as expressing a difficulty making sense of what one already knows, rather than, for example, confusion about what one feels. But as these considerations make clear, there is no simple yes-or-no answer to the question of whether philosophical problems are cognitive problems. The answer depends on what one means by a cognitive problem.

1.3

Examples of Philosophical Problems as Based on Misunderstandings

The conception that philosophical problems arise from misunderstandings or confusions and are not factual, scientific problems is therefore common to Wittgenstein's early and later philosophy. It is significant, however, that whereas the Tractatus provides merely a sketch of philosophical problems in terms of the notion of the mode of signification, Wittgenstein's later views are almost always explained by reference to real, concrete examples. This brings up the nonprogrammatic character ofWittgenstein's later remarks on philosophy in contrast to those of the Tractatus. (I return to this point in 1.5 below and in Chapters 3 and 7.) In a manuscript from 1933, in the context of a discussion concerning the concept of philosophy, Wittgenstein makes this remark: "Let us consider a particular philosophical problem, such as 'How is it possible to measure a period of time, since the past and the future aren't present and the present is only a point?' The characteristic feature of this is that a confusion is expressed in the form of a question that doesn't acknowledge the confusion, and that what releases the questioner from his

Wittgenstein on Philosophical Problelns

31

problem is a particular alteration of his mode of expression."4o What is therefore distinctive about the problem of measuring time, according to Wittgenstein, is that it is an unrecogn.ized confusion. Accordingly, the difficulty with the question is not how to answer it but results from the questioner trying to answer a question that cannot be answered. Or as he remarks elsewhere: "When we approach philosophical problenls the first nlistake is the question we ask."41 But in what sense is the problem about time an expression of confusion? This problem might be described as arising froln one confusing different senses of "to measure" or different types of measurement. 42 The person entangled in the problenl about time is implicitly thinking about measuring time on the model of measuring length with a measuring tape, or as a matter of comparing two objects that are both present, one being the object and the other a means of measurement. But time is not present,in the manner of objects of spatial 11leasurement. In particular, if one conceives the present moment as a point between what is not yet and what is not anymore, this point appears to have no extension at all. There seems to be nothing that one could measure in the sense of laying a measuring tape against it. Consequently~ a host of problematic questions arise: what is it for a period to be short or long, and how do we know that today's hours are as long as yesterday's (and so on) ?43 The problem about tinIe, in other words, arises from a failure to 110tice that what is called "measuring" is not just one kind of activity, but a variety of activities, different types of nleasuring corresponding to different types of objects. ()ne might say that the word "measure" has different uses that make up what we call measuring. Accordingly, Wittgenstein maintains, the problem about time can be dissolved by pointing out the confusion on which it is based, that is, by comparing the uses of the word "measure," as in the case of lneasuring lengths versus Ineasuring time, and bringing to light the differences between these cases. This way the questioner is released from his problem through a particular alteration of his mode of expression, as Wittgenstein says in the passage above. 44 The point of clarification, thus, is to free a person from the inclination to express herself in a way that entangles her in the philosophical probleln (see 1.4 for further discussion). The problem of measuring time can be used as a basis for certain more general observations concerning philosophical problems. In the above

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example a philosophical problem arises from a failure to distinguish between different uses of an expression (the word "measure"). Failure to distinguish between different senses of a word in an argument, of course, constitutes a familiar fallacy. Accordingly, one might characterize the time example by saying that it draws attention to how confusions of this type may occur in noninferential contexts. Notably, however, similar mistakes may also occur in the case of sentences, and this class of problems is therefore even broader. Problems relating to confusion concerning the uses of sentences can be illustrated by reference to the notion of necessary truth, which, according to Wittgenstein, arises from mixing up sentences expressing logical and physical impossibility. On the one hand, one may be tempted to understand a proposition as a true or false statement about reality. On the other hand, however, one may want to ascribe to the sentence the necessity characteristic of a rule of language employed to determine what it makes sense to say, and which, in this capacity, cannot be in conflict with reality.45 What makes it easy to fall into confusion here is that it is often possible to use a proposition in both these ways. As Wittgenstein notes of a solipsist's statement that only one's own pain is real, this could be used as an empirical statement: "when he says 'only my pain is real pain,' this sentence Inight mean that the other people are only pretending."46 This, however, is not what the solipsist wants to say. He does not merely want to make a statement about the contingent fact that people whom he has observed are not really in pain. Rather, he wants to state that one can never say of the others that they too have pains. He wants to make a statement about the nature of pain that states something necessarily true. According to Wittgenstein, however, the solipsist is making a statement about the use of language: feeling dissatisfaction with the ordinary use, the solipsist proposes one he perceives as more appropriate: 47 "The man who says 'only my pain is real' doesn't mean to say that he has found out by the common criteria ... that others who said they had pains were cheating.... [He] objects to using this word in the particular way in which it is commonly used. On the other hand, he is not aware that he is objecting to a convention." "And it is particularly difficult to discover that an assertion which the metaphysician makes expresses discontentment with our grammar when the words of this assertion can also be used to state a fact of experience."48

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This point parallels the one made in the case of the problem about time: in order to avoid problems which the interlocutor's way of talking opens up, a distinction is to be drawn between the different uses of an expression (in this case a sentence). for notably, the last example should not be taken to suggest that it is inherently problematic, according to Wittgenstein, to propose to use language in a way that deviates from the normal or to invent new uses of language. 49 What is problematic in the solipsist's case is the failure to notice that a new use of the word "pain" (as something applicable only to oneself) has been introduced rather than a true/false factual statement about pain. :Failure to notice the novelty of the solipsist's use leaves hilll vulnerable to the unexamined and possibly unwanted consequences of the new usage. Failure to differentiate between different uses of an expression is not the only type ofnlisunderstanding that creates philosophical problems. According to Wittgenstein, philosophical problenls often arise from our misconstruing the use of expressions on the basis of some analogy to other expressions: "When words in our ordinary language have prima facie analogous gramlllars we are inclined to try to interpret them analogously; Le. we try to lllake the analogy hold throllghout."so Undoubtedly, one would not be inclined to adopt an analogy as the basis for characterizing a word's use if it did not seem illuminating. Despite such· apparently illuminating powers, however, analogies may become entangling. The analogy presents things as heing a certain way, seemingly allowing one to understand them. It Inay, however, make things incolllprehensible in other respects, bringing about a disquieting thought-cramp. As Wittgenstein says: "The effect of a false analogy taken up into langu.age. It causes, as it were, a constant cramp & disquietude."5l A polished version of the same remark in the Philosophical Investigations reads: "A simile that has been absorbed into the forms of our language produces a false appearance and this disquiets us. 'But this isn't how it is!'-we say. 'Yet this is how it has to be!' "52 The concept of meaning provides us with an example. A sign can be understood in many ways. Hence it seems that by itself it can mean anything or nothing. But how then does a sign acquire its meaning? A natural suggestion would be that a sign has meaning when somebody means something by it. B1.1t what is this "meaning something by it"? The verb "to mean" is used in sentences in very much the same way as

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"to say." We say "I mean this and that" or "I meant this and that" just as we say "I say this and that" or "I said this and that." Furthermore, there are also cases where we say that somebody says something and means it, that she says something but does not mean it, and that she means it but does not say it (and so on). These and perhaps other analogies between the uses of these expressions may create the impression that the verb "to mean" refers to an act of doing sometlling, like the verb "to say," or perhaps that meaning something is a process that accompanies saying. As Wittgenstein remarks: But what tempts us to think of the meaning of what we say as a process ... is the analogy between the forms of expression: "to say something" "to mean something," which seem to refer to two parallel processes. 53

Let us look more closely at the parallel between saying and meaning. If I say "Napoleon was a short man" and you ask, "Did you mean the man who was defeated at Waterloo?" my affirlnative answer, of course, does not mean that I must have consciously thought of Waterloo and Napoleon's defeat at the time of my utterance. But does the past tense then indicate that an unconscious act or process of meaning took place in which a connection was made between Napoleon and Waterloo-or in which everything that I understand by Napoleon was somehow present? After all, you could have asked something else about him, and insofar as this belongs to my concept of Napoleon, apparently it had to be present in the act or process of meaning him. To make the problem more apparent, let us change the example. If an act of meaning determines the meaning of the formula" x+ 2," does this mean that my mind somehow travels through the whole infinite series when I utter the formula and mean it this way? But how can the mind travel through such a series? Does the mind perhaps possess supernatural powers, allowing it to do sometl'ling no physical process could? Or is the meaning of the formula really indeterminate or determined only up to a point? Both options seem unattractive: I would like to say that I mean something definite by the series and would not like to say that the mind has supernatural powers. Worse still, it also follows from this account of meaning that no matter how a person whom I ask to continue the series x+ 2 understands the formula, I cannot say that

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she understands it correctly or incorrectly. For insofar as the meaning of the formula is determined by acts of meaning, the sign has the meaning this person gives to it. Hence, if she insists that she apprehends the formula the same way as I do, there is nothing further to say. According to the present account, "to understand the formula in the same way" lneans just what anyone takes it to mean. Consequently, whatever seems right is right and the distinction between correct and incorrect comprehension of meaning evaporates. But what now should be understood by "meaning something"?54 The path to take froln here, according to WittgeIlstein as I understand him, is not to start looking for a theory of meaning that explains all these peculiarities, providing an answer to the problems about meaning. Rather, in order to reach clarity about the concept of meaning one must first release oneself from th.e grip of the misleading analogy that leads one to ask questions such as "what kind of an act or process is meaning?" and "if the basis of meaning is not a mental act or process, what is it?"55 As Wittgenstein remarks: "To show a IIlan how to get out you have first of all to free him of the misleading influence of the question."56 Having done this, we may set out to find other more helpful ways of conceiving the use of the word "meaning" and the meaningfulness of signs. Another way to describe the problem of meaning is to say that one is nlisled by a particular picture of what meaning something consists of. (I will discuss shortly what Wittgenstein. lneans by a picture.) In the above case, the picture is based on an analogy between the use of "meaning" and "saying." Similarly, one might say that what creates the problem about time is a particular picture of measuring that presents measuring time as analogolls to measuring spatial objects. Such pictures may then come to stand in the way of one's atternpts to understand a phenomenon or the use of a word. As Wittgenstein writes in connection with another example: "What we deny is that the picture of the 'inner process' gives us the correct idea of the use of the word 'to remember.' Indeed, we say that this picture with its ramifications stands in the way of our seeing the use of the word as it is."57 Not all pictures need to be based on analogies, however. The Tractatus, for instance, operates with a particular picture of the determinacy of sense, according to which a proposition must have a precise meaning. 58

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This picture of propositions is not based on an analogy in any straightforward way. As for the more precise meaning of "picture" in Wittgenstein, a picture in the relevant sense can be characterized as a conception or a mode of presenting things or facts, including facts concerning language use. 59 A picture need not be detailed and carefully articulated, or based on any close examination of the issue at hand. Rather, it may be just a rough and ready conception that recommends itself to one-perhaps as a consequence of certain forms of expression that one uses. Thus a picture may "lie in our language," constantly imposing itself on us. 50 Although finding a picture that renders things understandable may require deliberate effort, a given picture may seem so natural that it becomes very hard not to think in its terms. This is the case, according to Wittgenstein, with the picture that consciousness is something behind or beside bodily states, which at best indicate the presence of consciousness but leave room for the possibility that we are always mistaken about its presence. "In this case," he remarks, "we already have a picture which forces itself on us at every turn."61 Rather than bestowing perspicuity upon the concept and phenomenon of consciousness, however, this picture involves us in philosophical difficulties: "[ the picture] does not help us out of the difficulty, which only begins here."62 Wittgenstein also writes about pictures while discussing the notion of sensations as inner objects of knowledge that everyone knows from their own case: " 'I know ... only from my own case.' ... When we look into ourselves as we do philosophy, we often get to see just such a picture. A full-blown pictorial presentation of our grammar. Not facts; but as it were illustrated turns of speech."63 Here the picture expressed by the words "I know ... only from my own case" suggests a particular conception according to which one knows sensations by way of inner observation of one's own case. Consequently, knowledge of others' sensations is indirect, based on the assumption that they have similar sensations to which they react in similar ways. Wittgenstein contrasts tllis picture with facts about the use of relevant expressions. Rather than reminding one of any such facts, the picture gives an interpretation of the facts, presenting them in a particular light. Part of this is the picture directing attention to certain kinds of examples-the first person's examination and reporting of her sensations-and suggesting

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that these are the central examples on which other cases are to be modeled. (I return to the problems with this picture below.) It is also characteristic of pictures in Wittgenstein's sense that they can function as the basis for more detailed accounts and grow into more sophisticated philosophical theories. Like an analogy, a picture can give an orientation to investigation, putting one on a certain path of thinking about the phenomena. fi4 The so-called Augustinian picture of language provides an example. Upon quoting Augustine, Wittgenstein writes: "These words, it seems to me, give us a particular picture of the essence of human language. It is this: the individual words in language name objects-sentences are combinations of such names.In this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands."65 If one accepts the Augustinian picture of language, it may function as a root for a philosophical theory according to which to be a word is to be something that has a meaning. To have a meaning, in turn, is to stand for an object. But although it may sometimes be unproblematic to say that a word stands for an o~ject, it is not always clear what such an object would be. What do words stand for, for example, in the case of negation or numerals? Some kind of abstract, Platonic objects, perhaps? But what then is the ontological status of such objects? At this point one runs the risk of being drawn into articulating ever more sophisticated theories about abstract objects, instead of examining more closely the assumed picture of meaning that creates the problem of referents. But if Wittgenstein is right, this will leave the source of the problem intact. The theories that are developed may simply serve to legitimize the problematic way of thinking about word-meaning and language by giving it a more respectable appearance. Thus rather than contributing to the solution of the problem about meaning and language, such theories may make it insoluble. Hence it is crucial, according to Wittgenstein, that one scrutinize the picture and not simply accept it as it stands. One must examine how the picture is to be applied to that which it purports to be a picture of and what it means to represent things this way. An unexamined picture can lead one in the wrong direction just as well as in the right one, and one can onlyjudge the value of a picture if its use is clear. Thus, the possession of a picture does not mark the end of the investigation, but

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might just as well mark its beginning. Or as Wittgenstein says, commenting on the picture of consciousness briefly described above: "The picture is there. And I am not disputing its validity in any particular case.-Only I also want to understand the application of the picture."o6 What, for instance, is the application of the picture of sensations as inner objects of knowledge? This picture suggests that the first person's observation and reporting of them is the foundation of the knowledge of sensations. According to Wittgenstein, however, this is misleading. The picture not only makes it impossible to understand what knowledge of others' sensations consists of, but it also renders incomprehensible what it is to talk about one's own sensations. 67 Nevertheless, to say this is not to dispute the validity of the picture in any particular case, as Wittgenstein says in the passage above. There may well be inner occurrences that are observed and reported. But the crucial question concerns the significance of such cases. Does modeling sensation-talk on them result in a comprehensible picture of our knowledge of sensations? Similar questions may also be raised about the Augustinian picture of the essence of language. What makes it easier to fall into confusion about language use is a feeling of meaningfulness that may accompany the use of expressions. Given one's familiarity with an established use of an expression, the expression may retain a feeling of meaningfulness when put in a new use, even if the novel use failed to make any sense. What remains is, so to speak, a familiar face of the expression and, because of this, an illusion of meaningfulness. (Similarly, a picture may have an air of recognizability, although closer scrutiny would reveal it incapable of presenting what it is meant to present.) Wittgenstein writes: "You say to me: 'You understand this expression, don't you? Well-l am using it in the sense you are familiar with.'-As if the sense were a halo accompanying the word, which it carried with it into every kind of application."68 Assuming that the meaning of a word is not a halo accompanying it, but has to do with how the word is used, it is not good enough just to say that one is using a word in its familiar sense. As an example, consider the expression "It is 5 o'clock on the sun" and the following explanation for its meaning: "You surely know what 'It is 5 o'clock here' means; so you also know

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what 'It's 5 o'clock on the sun' means. It means simply that it is just the same time there as it is here when it is 5 o'clock."69 Although the expression and its explanation might sound meaningful, it is not clear at all what they are supposed to mean and whether anything is explained. Wittgenstein continues: "The explanation by lneans of identity does not work here. For I know well enough that one can call 5 o'clock here and 5 o'clock there 'the same time,' but what I do not know is in what cases one is to speak of its being the same tilne here and there." In other words, although it is clear what "It is five o'clock" means on earth-that it is five hours past noon-it is not thereby evident what this Ineans when one says it about the sun. Since it can hardly mean five hours past the time when the sun is at its highest point, what does it mean? No sense has yet been given to the expression. And as vVittgenstein remarks, although one can imagine all kinds of things in this connection, for instance a clock on the sun pointing to five o'clock, this is just an image that does not by itself give an application to the expression. 70 Rather, at ITlOSt such images can conceal the meaninglessness of the expression. Alternatively, one can always define the expression by saying, for instance, "It is five o'clock on the sun when it is five o'clock Greenwich mean time on earth," thus explaining what sameness of time means here. But this is to redefine the expression and to discard the original "explanation by nleans of identity." Although there are no philosophical problems connected with the sun example, it maybe used to illustrate confusions behind philosophical problems. In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein uses it to explain the failure of the "analogy theory" as a solution to the problem of other minds, according to which my knowledge of others' sensations is based on the assumption of an analogy between me and them. Thus, one might say on the basis of the analogy theory: "Her pain is the saIne or a similar sensation as I sometimes have." Interestingly, this theory fails for exactly the same kinds of reasons as the explanation of five o'clock on the sun. What is lacking in the pain case, as in the sun exalnple, is a criterion of sameness for my and the other person's pain, which is required for the explanation "She has the same pain as I" to work. That is, assuming with the analogy theory that I know pain from my own case, my pain is the pain I feel. But can I then irnagine what it is for her to feel pain? At most I can itnagine myself in

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her position feeling pain. Yet, imagining that I am in pain evidently does not meet what the theory requires. The theory assumes I am able to imagine the other's pain as being similar to mine, not just myself being in pain in her place. Hence, failing to account for what it is to know the sameness of my and the other person's pain, the analogy theory cannot explain knowledge of others' pain. It only provides an illusion of an explanation. 7! Because "She has the same pain as I" does have a sense in the context of ordinary use (or so it seems anyway), it is easy enough to come to think that it has a sense in the context of the analogy theory's reconstruction of sensation-talk as well. The expression has an air of meaningfulness inherited from its everyday use. 'But the analogy theory's assumption of pain as an inner oqject of knowledge robs the expression of its means of functioning, leaving one with a meaningful-sounding but ultimately meaningless expression. 72 Again, however, Wittgenstein should not be read as suggesting that one must abide by ordinary ways of using language. To be sure, he makes the following remark directly after the passage quoted from §117 above: "If, for example, sonleone says that the sentence 'This is here' (whereby he points to an object in front of him) makes sense to him, then he should ask himself in what special circumstances this sentence is actually used. There it does make sense." But contrary to certain influential interpretations, it is not necessary to understand this as urging us to stick to the ordinary or everyday uses. 7g Rather, the purpose of examining the normal context of use is to clarify the functioning of the word and help get rid of confusions. Observations concerning the use of "This is here" do not determine how one must speak, but they may be used to dissolve problems that arise with philosophers' misleading reconstructions of the use of the expression. The above examples simplify matters considerably. Wittgenstein's view is not, for instance, that a philosophical problem always has a single clearly defined source. Rather than arising from a particular misunderstanding concerning a certain form of expression or from a particular misleading picture, philosophical problems, according to him, may be the result of many interconnected misunderstandings that support each other, creating a powerful net of appearances. As he writes (discussing the concept of pain):

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It is a comparison that misleads us. Of actually, a hundred misleading comparisons seem to meet here: one takes for an ostensive definition what is not one; & for a description ,,,,hat is not a description; & for a name what is not a name; and for knowing something which is not knowing.... A hundred misleading pictures meet here & that is what makes up the difficulty of the philosophical condition.... The "great" difficult problems of philosophy are not that because here we have an extraordinarily subtle and mysterious fact to investigate, but because a great many misleading forms of expression Ineet at this point. 74

SOIne key characteristics of Wittgenstein's conception of philosophical problems discussed above appear here as if summarized: the notion that philosophical problems arise from one's being misled by forms of expression or pictures, more specifically in this case by misleading comparisons. Accordingly, the difficulty of philosophical problems is not due to the mysteriousness of the object of investigation. Rather, one's misunderstandings Inake this object appear in a peculiar light and create philosophical difficulties. As the remark also nlakes clear, solving one philosophical problem may well require solving many others, and clarifying one particular point might not achieve much. Or as 'Vittgenstein also renlarks: "In philosophy one question is solved by posing a hundred others I by connecting it with I adding a hundred others."75 Similarly, it would be an oversimplification to think that Wittgenstein's approach to philosophy consists 11lerely in guarding us against misleading analogies, comparisons, pictures, and so on. Wittgenstein writes about analogies: "When we say that by our method we try to COllnteract the lnisleading effects of certain analogies, it is inlportant that you should understand that the idea of an analogy being misleading is nothing sharply defined. No sharp boundary can be drawn round the cases in which we would say that a man was misled by an analogy. The use of expressions constructed on analogical patterns stresses analogies between cases often far apart. And by doing this these expressions lnay be extremely useful. It is, in nlost cases, impossible to show an exact point ,\There an analogy starts to mislead us."76 Tllus, according to Wittgenstein, no general pronouncements can be made of an analogy's being false or misleading. The cases for which an analogy is apt cannot be determined generally, and the borderline between useful and I11isleading

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IIlay be blurred. Whether an analogy is helpful, therefore, has to be decided separately in each case. To give an exalnple, it might be helpful for certain purposes to compare language with a calculus. But whether this is helpful depends on which problems one is dealing with or which aspects of the concept of language one is trying to get into focus. For instance, the calculus analogy might be used to dissolve problems such as those mentioned above in connection with the account of meaning as a mental act or process. In contrast to such an account, the calculus analogy allows one to explain the meaning of the word "Napoleon" as determined by its specific role in the language of the speaker. This role is defined by the rules of the language just as the role of a sign in a calculus is defined by its rules. Speaking of Napoleon, one is then simply employing this word according to such rules. Consequently, there is no need to postulate special mental acts or processes as an explanation for the tneanings of words. On the other hand, however, the picture of language as a calculus, i.e., a static system governed by precise rules, may be misleading in other ways. Therefore, although it might be used to clarify certain problems, the analogy has its limits. 77 As the positive potential of the calculus analogy also illustrates, what Wittgenstein himself proposes to do is, alnong other things, to present analogies and pictures for purposes of clarification. Far from constituting merely a source of philosophical problems and possessing only negative significance, analogies and pictures have an important positive role to play in Wittgenstein's philosophy. They are used to render concepts perspicuous and to clarify language use. As he writes: "What is. it when the philosopher 'sees' something? That the correct grammatical fact occurs to him, the correct picture, i.e. that which organizes things in our mind, makes them easily accessible & relieves the mind through this."78 What more precisely it is to use such pictures for the purpose of clarification is discussed in Chapter 3. Analogies and pictures can, therefore, both mislead and illuminate. Accordingly, clarity about the kind of work a picture can do does away with the need to simply embrace or reject it. Wittgenstein remarks about the Augustinian picture of language: Augustine, we might say, does describe a system of communication; only not all we call language is this system. And one has to say this in

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many cases where the question arises "Is this a useful description or not?" The ans,ver is: ''Yes, it is useful, but only for this narrowly circumscribed region, not for the whole you were claiming to describe." It is as if someone were to say: "A game consists in moving objects about on a surface according to certain rules ..."-and we replied: You seem to be thinking of board ganles, but there are others. You can correct your explanation by expressly restricting it to those games. 79

Although the Augustinian picture rnay be misleading as a picture of the whole of language, there is a sense in which it is correct and innocuous. It is correct for a certain narrow region of language use bllt should not be stretched too far. Imposed upon the whole of language, the picture simplifies things in a detrimental way, and as Wittgenstein notes: "Countless philosophical problems arise from presenting the practice of our language in false simplicity."80 Again it is crucial, however, that what constitutes j'aJse simplicity is relative to the questions and problems that are at stake-or relative to the purposes the descriptions are meant to serve, as the remark just quoted on Augustine's picture of language suggests. Simplifying, that is to say, is not inherently problematic. To siInplify is to make things manageable and comprehensible, and clarification may involve simplification as an important element. As Wittgenstein writes about 11is work: "Different disquietudes of the understanding are settled by different means.... Many of your clarifications luake comparisons, many through sirnplifications."81 Techniques of clarification that involve simplification include the construction of "ideal languages" al'1d the use of simple language-games. 82 I return to these techniques in Chapter 3.

1.4

Tendencies and Inclinations of Thinking: Philosophy as Therapy

Wittgenstein often speaks of philosophical problems as the expressions of underlying tendencies of thinking. Remark §109 of the Investigations even speaks of an urge to misunderstand th.e workings of language. Such tendencies of thinking are not to be identified as another source of philosophical problems alongside misleading pictures, analogies, and so on, however. Rather, there may be, for instance, a tendellcy to think about meaning in terms of a certain picture. In this sense, talk

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about tendencies of thinking constitutes another level of description of the phenomenon of philosophical problems: it highlights another set of conceptual connections to which Wittgenstein wishes to draw attention. (At this level, philosophical difficulties may, for instance, be characterized as having to do with the will, with how one would like things to be and what kind of conceptions one is therefore inclined to adopt. Now philosophical problems emerge as not purely intellectual ones.)83 It is at this level of description that the notion of philosophical therapy enters the scene. The proper objects of philosophical therapy in Wittgenstein are the tendencies of thinking that lead to the adoption of philosophically problematic conceptions. They are not, however, to be taken as merely psychological peculiarities of individuals but as expressions of broader cultural dispositions embedded in human life. 84 Insofar as the dissolution of a philosophical problem requires the clarification of misunderstandings from which it arises, to achieve an understanding of the sources and the genesis of a philosophical problem is not to come to possess an additional piece of information alongside one's comprehension of the probleln in itself. Consider, for instance, the problem of other minds as described above. To get clear about this problem is to get clear about how knowledge of others' sensations becomes problematic, i.e., what conception of sensations and their identification makes knowledge of others' sensations look so puzzling. It is in relation to the genesis of problems that tendencies, inclinations, and temptations to use language in certain ways become relevant. The propositions that express such inclinations or temptations indicate the roots of philosophical problems. As expressions of the confusions from which the problems stem, these propositions are what require philosophical attention. Or as Wittgenstein says: "Whatwe 'are tempted to say' ... is, of course, not philosophy but its raw material ... something for philosophical treatment."85 To state that what we are tempted to say is "something for philosophical treatment" is to identify such temptations as the objects of clarification. Wittgenstein again: ''You say what you are inclined to say. And it has interest only because we too feel the same telnptation to say it. However, now it is not yet true nor merely probable, but the object of our investigation."86 Philosophy's task, according to Wittgenstein, is thus to scrutinize such inclinations (including their origins) and to explain how they mislead one. In this sense, philosophy should deal with the causes

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rather than the mere symptoms of the problems. Perhaps this is the point ofWittgenstein's comparison: "The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness."H7 For a physician, of course, is supposed to treat the causes of an illness, not just its symptoms, and to eliminate it. Less metaphorically, to deal with the sources of the problem is to track down one's reasons for thinking about a matter in a way that entangles one in difficulties. This is, among other things, to trace the misleading analogies one had assumed or to bring to light differences in the uses of expressions that one had missed. 88 Perceived in this way, clarification always begins from misunderstandings, or from the problematic tendencies of thinking that people have, proceeding to clarity through their treatment. Or as Wittgenstein puts it in a remark from the early 1930s: "One must start out with error and convert it into truth. That is, one must reveal the source of error, otherwise hearing the truth won't do any good. The truth cannot force its way in when something else is occupying its place."S!! This means that clarification is not merely a matter of establishing what would be the correct, non-misleading ways of thinking. Philosophy is not the correction of mistakes but is more like therapy. As Wittgenstein puts it in the Investigations: "There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies."\1() The objective of such therapies is to release a person from the grip of the misleading conceptions she has adopted, that is, from the misleading pictures that hold her thought in a cramp, causing disquietude and not allowing her to reach clarity about the matters at hand. Interestingly, in the manuscript (116) where the paragraph just quoted from the Investigations is first drafted, it immediately follows this remark: "It is always possible to reply to a philosophical question: the way you put it, it is insoluble.-We have to see how the question is to be put so that it can be dissolved. Having put it that way answering it will cause no difficulty."!!l This might be read as suggesting that in the process of philosophical therapy, a transition is made from an insoluble question to a question that is easy to answer, and that the purpose of the therapy is to release one from misleading ways of posing one's problems. Or as Wittgenstein also describes his practice of philosophizing: "The one who philosophizes is suffering from a languagecramp; & I look for a passage in the cramp-free position.... I look for the words that make up the way out of the position in which I appear to

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be captivated. I look for a linguistic exit from the cramp."92 Once released from a thought-cramp, one can then find answers to one's questions, as the example of time in 1.3 might be taken to illustrate. Wllat sort of an activity the pursuit of answers to Wittgenstein's modified questions is, and what sort of a modification of questions is at stake, is discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters. At this point, another important question concerning the interpretation ofWittgenstein's conception of philosophical therapy also remains unanswered. Given that Wittgenstein's philosophical therapy ainls at leading people who suffer from cramps in their thought or language to a cramp-free position, how are we to apprehend this notion? Is there a specific cramp-free state of language, a regrouping of our expressions that the therapy is meant to result in? Or is Wittgenstein's cramp-free position perhaps no particular position at all, but simply freedom from cramps and therefore an ability to philosophize well? As he says in a manuscript from 1929: "It is possible to philosophize well only when the thought cramp is released."93 1'his question cannot be resolved here, but the answer to it will emerge through discussion in subsequent chapters (see 2.32).

1.5

Wittgenstein's Notion of Peace in Philosophy: The Contrast with the Tractatus

Wittgenstein's characterization of philosophical problems as disquietudes stands in contrast with his notion of thoughts at peace, the latter marking the goal of philosophy. Philosophical problems are characterized by uneasiness, anxiety, or even torment, and the aim of philosophy is to eliminate these problems and find peace. As he notes: "Thoughts at peace. That is the longed for goal of the one who philosophises."94 But what does he mean by bringing peace to thoughts? As I will explain, this is not simply a matter of giving up philosophical thinking. To begin with, such an interpretation would contradict the preface to the Investigations, where Wittgenstein says that he should not like his writing "to spare other people the trouble of thinking. But, if possible, to stimulate someone to thoughts of his own." But how then are we to understand the notion of peace? Wittgenstein explains in the Investigations: "The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to.-The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer -------------------------

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tormented by questions which bring itselfin question.-Instead, we noW demonstrate a rrlethod by examples, and the series of examples can be broken off.-Problems are solved (difficulties eliminated), not a single problem."95 Arguably, he understands something quite specific by peace in philosophy and the connected notion of stopping doing philosophy when one wants to. This is best explained by contrasting his early and later philosophy. For although Wittgenstein throughout his career sees philosophy as the elitnination of problems that stem from linguistic misunderstan.dings, his perception of how to achieve this aim changes. As explained in 1.1, the central problem in the Tractatusconcerns the nature of philosophy and its method. This problem is central because its solution, i.e., the approach to philosophical problems that Wittgenstein develops, is seen as containing the solution to all philosophical problems "in essentials." The problem concerning the method of philosophy, however, also involves Wittgenstein in questions about the essence of language or propositions. For it seems that in order to Inake possible the elimination of problems arising from linguistic unclarities, the method itself must be based on or embody a correct understanding of the nature of language. Thus, the question concerning the essence of language becomes the fundamental problem of philosophy for Wittgenstein. This can be explain.ed in lnore detail as follows. The idea that the question about language constitutes the fundamental problem depends in important ways on Wittgenstein's views about philosophy. First, it is a consequence of his view that resolving philosophical fJ[oblems requires the clarification of linguistic confusions. Second, the specific form of the question about language in the Tractatus is intin1ately connected with certain assumptions about what the solution to the problern of the method of philosophy should look like. As I explain in 3.1, providing a universal deterlnination of the essence oflanguage that covers all possible linguistic expressions becomes a central part of Wittgenstein's task of establishing a method of philosophy because he thinks a satisfactory method must be such that it is applicable to any philosophical problem whatsoever. And only if the adjacent conception of language captures the essence of all language use is the nlethod's applicability to any linguistic unclarity ascertained. 96 On the basis of these presuppOSitions, the Tractatus assumes the form of an attempt to dissolve the problems of philosophy by solving what it perceives

48

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as the fundamental problem concerning the essence of language. As Wittgenstein writes in the pre- Tractatus notebooks: "My whole task consists in explaining the nature of the proposition."97 Thus, his early work boils down to solving one single problem instead of particular problems, the latter being characteristic of the approach outlined in the Investigations §133Ys But the Tractatus's approach involves a high risk. If the solutions to all philosophical problems depend on the solution to the fundamental problem, then all solutions are brought into question if this solution turns out to be problematic. Philosophy, because of its form or hierarchical structure, is in danger of becoming "tormented by questions which bring itselfin question." As he says, philosophy is an all-or-nothing business, where either everything is ready or nothing is ready.99 This threat to philosophy, its vulnerability to attacks directed at foundations, and Wittgenstein's notion of stopping in philosophy, can be further elucidated as follows. In the so-called Big Typescript (Ts213, Wittgenstein's 1931/32 attempt to compose a comprehensive typescript of his ideas) as well as in the 1936 and 1937 versions of the Investigations (Ms142 and Ts220), the remark that became Investigations §133 is followed by another remark that identifies this all-or-nothing approach as the ultimate source of disquietude in philosophy: "Disquietude in philosophy might be said to arise from looking at philosophy wrongly, seeing it wrong, namely as if it were divided into (infinite) longitudinal strips instead of into (finite) cross strips. This inversion in our conception produces the greatest difficulty. So we try as it were to grasp the unlimited strips and complain that it cannot be done piecemeal. To be sure it cannot, if by a piece one means an infinite longitudinal strip. But it may well be done, if one means a cross strip.-But in that case we never get to the end of our work!-Of course not, for it has no end."lOo Philosophy conceived as consisting of infinite longitudinal strips provides "once-and-for-all answers" to questions-for instance, "what is philosophy?" "what is language?"-with an aim to capture every possible case falling under the relevant concept. Philosophy thus strives to bring to light the essential (necessary, constitutive) features of its objects of investigation, the possession of which is a requirement for the classification of an individual case under a particular concept. According to this conception, philosophy indeed cannot be done piecemeal. Only an account that covers all cases falling under a concept qualifies

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as an account of an essence, philosophy being comprehended as a search for such once-and-for-all accounts. (Below I will also refer to this way of posing philosophical problems as a search for great answers to great problems.) 101 Furtherrnore, as exemplified by Wittgenstein's early philosophy, such determinations of essences tend to assume a hierarchical organization. If one conceives philosophy as the clarification of language use, a fundarnental question seems to concern the essence of language. 102 Thus, by adopting the conception of philosophy as a search for great once-and-for-all answers, one is led toward the notion that answering philosophical questions requires answering the fundamental question and that all philosophical questions must be answered at once. This notion that there is some fundamental problenl upon which everything turns seems to characterize very generally the tradition of Western philosophy (although I will not argue this claim here). An example is the Aristotelian concern with the question of being as the fundamental question of philosophy: if we know what being is, the reasoning goes, then we know what everything is, since everything tllat there is, is. I03 Comprehending its task as the solution of a fundarnental problelTI, the Tractatus may then be considered as representative of the philosophical tradition in this crucial respect, despite its attempt to distance itself from the tradition. Accordingly, to the extent that the Tractatus is representative of the philosophical tradition, Wittgenstein's later critique of his early work may also be conceived as a critique of this tradition, a further radicalization of the Tractatus's attempt to depart from it. Wittgenstein contrasts the conception of philosophy as a search for great answers with a conception of philosophy as consisting of limited cross-strips-that is, particular problenls to be solved one by one, or in larger groups, but not all at once. In the latter view, the aim is not to solve all philosophical problems concerning a certain su~ject through the determination of the subject's essence-nor is it the even bolder aim of solving every possible philosophical problem by solving the fundamental problenl. Rather, the idea is to find sollltions to paTticular problems and make quiet but steady progress. 104 These ideas come clearly into view in typescript 213, wllere the remark corresponding to §133 of the Investigations and the· remark on longitudinal versus cross-strips begin a new subchapter entitled "The methods of philosopllY. Possibility of calm progress."105 Here the possibility of calm progress, as well as

50

Wittgenstein on Philosophical Problerns

what Wittgenstein means by "the real discovery" (i.e., finding peace in philosophy and stopping when one wants to), is explained by reference to the movement from a single problem to multiple problen1s. As Wittgenstein says, clarifying the three sentences that subsequently form the beginning of §133 (see above): "But more correctly one would say: Problems are solved (disquietudesldifficulties eliminated), not a single problem."lo6 In the Investigations, the explanatory role indicated by "But more correctly ..." is no longer readily discernible. More specifically, the shift to particular problems makes peace and calm progress possible by eliminating the idea of a fundamental problem and a corresponding solution on which everything depends. Because the solutions to particular problems consequently do not rest on a solution to one fundamental problem, they cannot be undermined by difficulties pertaining to the solution of such a fundamental problem or to the groundwork of philosophy. Philosophy is relieved of the disquietude stemming from its being based on a fundamental thesis or theoretical foundation. Although philosophy, according to this view, has no end, the number of its questions being potentially infinite, particular problems can be (dis)solved and set aside. This transformation of the approach, Le., the turn to particular problems, is therefore plausibly interpreted as what Wittgenstein refers to in §133 as "the real discovery," "the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to." It is now possible to stop philosophizing precisely because not everything is at stake all the time. That is, there is no foundational conception or thesis (the solution to the fundamental problem) that provides the basis of one's philosophical approach and that must be defended to prevent everything based on it from collapsing. Consequently, a certain compulsion to continue doing philosophy disappears: problems can be dealt with on a case-bycase basis, and then, if one wishes, one can stop and rest satisfied. 107 Nevertheless, this does not mean abandoning philosophy altogether, as would be the case if one gave up one's chosen foundational thesis and with it the claim to any solutions to particular problems. Instead of relying on such a foundational thesis, Wittgenstein's later method, as he says in §133, proceeds by examples in a series that can be broken off. Crucially, the series can be broken off precisely because the demonstration of the method is not an attempt to determine once and for all what philosophy is-or must be. Accordingly, the programmatic aspect of the Tractatus's conception of philosophy disappears in

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Wittgenstein's later work. The latter, unlike the former, does not attempt to articulate a universally applicable program for philosophy.l08 A contrast can illuminate this point. To propose a once-and-for-all characterization of the nature of philosophy is to attempt to provide an account that covers all cases we would recognize as philosophizing. Similarly, to provide a once-and-for-all account of the nature of philosophical problems and to claim that one has found a method of dealing with theln is to take up the burden of proving that every possible philosophical problem fits this account and that all such problems can be handled by this Inethod. In this case, the series of examples can never be broken off. The philosopher will always have to be prepared to respond to potential counterexamples and challenges to her conception. It is similar in the case of any philosophical question: insofar as the philosopher offers a once-and-for-all answer to what something is, the number of examples that she undertakes to accolllmodate into her account-or alternatively, to explain as "inessential"-is in principle infinite. This shift from trying to solve great problems or a fundamental problem to dealing with particular problems constitutes, as I will argue, wllat Wittgenstein characterizes in. manuscript 116 lo9 as the modification of philosophical questions that renders theln easy to answer instead of impossible. Accordingly, his idea that finding peace in philosophy requires rnoving from great problems to particular problems may be recast by saying that finding peace in philosophy requires a shift from questions to be answered once and for all to such easy questions. I 10 To the extent that the movement to easy questions can be characterized as a therapeutic process, as suggested in 1.4, one may also say that the shift to the clarification of particular problems constitutes the core of Wittgenstein's philosophical therapy. His attempt to rid us of an obsession with what pllilosophy must be, that is, "the inversion of our conception"lll that philosophy must provide once-and-for-all answers, is a crucial constituent of his attelnpt to achieve and help us to find peace in philosophy. This is also the part that, according to him, "produces the greatest difficulty."112 Finally, Wittgenstein's shift from great problems to particular problems, when worked out more fully, explains the difference between his early and later philosophy, providing a key to understanding his later approach. This contrast between two approaches to philosophy can also be elucidated by reference to discussions in earlier sections in this chapter and

52

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to problems that might be raised in this connection. One might ask how we are to understand the status of Wittgenstein's remarks about philosophical problenls as quoted above and the role of the examples I have discussed. Are they to be understood as constituting a statement about how one must conceive philosophical problems, a once-and-for-all answer to a question concerning the nature of philosophical problems? The examples discussed in the earlier subchapters cannot carry the claim that philosophical problems must be understood as stemming from linguistic confusions. Four or five examples cannot establish such an assertion-nor could all the problems discussed in the Investigations. Adding other examples is of little help, as it is questionable whether the discussion of any number of examples would ever be enough to support a claim about what philosophical problems necessarily are. II3 Hence, insofar as one maintains that Wittgenstein is putting forward a statement about what philosophy must be, one faces the problem of how this statement is to be justified, which concerns the role his examples are intended to play. For as far as I know, the corpus ofWittgenstein's writings contains no attempts to argue "directly" that philosophical problems must be understood as the result of linguistic unclarities. The burden of proof, therefore, seems to fall on his examples. (Recall also the Investigations §133 on demonstrating method by examples.) And yet, it is unclear how a statement about what philosophy necessarily is could be extracted from these examples and justified with reference to them. Rather than posing the problem this way, however, we might take it as an indication that we should explain Wittgenstein's position differently.1l4 In this respect it seems significant that in typescript 213 (p. 421, quoted at the beginning of 1.2), for instance, Wittgenstein simply talks about philosophy "as I do philosophy." This formulation suggests (although it does not suffice to show) that his intention is to articulate a particular conception of philosophy or of philosophical problems, rather than to make a statement about how philosophy must be understood. 1l5 According to this reading, Wittgenstein's words are meant to state how he proposes to conceive philosophy, while allowing that philosophy might be perceived in different ways. This then releases him from the problem of the apparently poor grounds provided for his conception of philosophy. Insofar as his aim is to articulate a particular conception of philosophy, a few illustrative examples may suffice, granted that they succeed in making this conception comprehensible.

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But although this suggestion might solve the problem of the grounds ofWittgenstein's claim about philosophy, the solution may seem to come at an extremely high price. Does it not fatally weaken philosophy and make the choice of a conception of philosophy a mere matter of preference? The answer to this question, I will argue, is no. At this point, however, it must suffice to note the following. Wittgenstein's notion of how to approach philosophical problems is designed to release us from difficulties that arise in the context of philosophy as it is traditionally practiced. Insofar as not just any approach is capable of achieving this end, the choice of how to philosophize is not merely a matter of preference. From the point of view of the interpretation I suggest, Wittgenstein may, therefore, still maintain that others see philosophy wrongly, as he writes in the passage on infinite strips versus cross-strips. They see philosophy wrongly insofar as they would like to be released from their problems despite their approach to philosophy, which prevents them from achieving this goal. The question of whether Wittgenstein's conception (or my interpretation of it) leads to a weakened philosophy cannot be settled here. The subsequent chapters discuss Wittgenstein's shift away from great problems to the clarification of particular problems and elucidate the aims of this shift and what it can achieve. As will become clearer in due course, this issue of great problems and once-and-for-all solutions is nothing but the problem of philosophical theses, theories, and doctrines. Accordingly, my answer to the questions, What constitutes the justification of Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy? and What is the status of this conception? will emerge in the course of subsequent discussions.

TWO

Two Conceptions of Clarification

to clarify misunderstandings concerning language use with the purpose of dissolving philosophical problems? In this chapter I discuss Wittgenstein's early and later conceptions of clarification as well as his later critique of his early approach. This will shed light on his shift away from great problems to the clarification of particular problems and prepare the ground for a discussion Chapter 3 of his turn away from philosophical theses. I begin (in 2.1) by discussing the Tractatus's conception of clarification as logical analysis, its aspiration to introduce a logical notationa concept-script-to be used to analyze language use, and Wittgenstein's method of introducing this notation. (This may be read as a more detailed explication of the notion of the critique of language discussed in 1.1.) I then turn to his later critique of the Tractatus's approach to clarification, examining first (in 2.21) what he says about misunderstandings pertaining to the Tractatus's notion of the completeness of analysis and complete exactness. This is followed (in 2.22) by a discussion of problems connected with the granting of a privileged, fundamental status to a particular notation such as a concept-script, or in other words, with the idea of providing final once-and-for-all determinations of the essential logical features of language or particular concepts. The full significance of Wittgenstein's critique of his early conception of clarification, however, cannot be revealed without turning to his positive characterizations of his later approach to clarification. To

WHAT PRE CIS ELY ISIT

Two Conceptions of Clarification

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illuminate specific aspect'> of this critique, I first discuss (in 2.31) his later conception of clarification as the description of language and his shift from once-and-for-all determinations of concepts to the clarification of particular philosophical problems. Subchapter 2.32 then examines his characterization of clarification as bringing an order to the knowledge of language use. Here I also begin to discuss the contrast between my interpretation of Wittgenstein and that of Baker and Hacker by addressing whether there are, according to Wittgenstein, many such philosophical orderings of language or concepts, or only one. I will argue that the views Baker and Hacker attribute to the later Wittgenstein fail in certain important respects to move beyond views on language and philosophy that Wittgenstein already held in the Tractatus. Consequently, they remain in the target area of Wittgenstein's later critique of his early work, according to my interpretation of this critique. Finally, the discussions in 2.31 and 2.32 also allow me to answer certain questions raised in Chapter 1.

2.1

The Tractatus's Conception of Philosophy as Logical Analysis

In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein characterizes the task of philosophy as follows: Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity. A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. Philosophy does not result in "philosophical propositions," but rather in the propositions becoming clear. The task of philosophy is to clarify and delimit sharply thoughts which otherwise are, as it were, opaque and blurred. I At first sight, Wittgenstein's characterization might not look very illuminating. What else would the task of the clarification of thoughts be than to make opaque thoughts clear? This is a readily available but not very enlightening metaphor. However, something characteristic of the Tractatus's conception of clarification comes out in the last clause of this passage: philosophy delimits thoughts sharply. To grasp what Wittgenstein means by this, we must look at other things he says about philosophy, logic, and language.

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As explained in 1.1, philosophical problems, according to the Tractatus, arise from a failure to use language according to its logical syntax. One fails to observe some logical distinctions and is thus led to speak nonsense. As Wittgenstein explains, however, confusions of this kind can be avoided by using a sign-language or a notation that is governed by logical syntax or logical grammar and excludes logical errors-a concept-script (Begriffsschrift). He writes about avoiding logical errors (of the type discussed in 1.1): In order to escape such errors we must make use of a sign-language that excludes them by not using the same sign for different symbols and by not using in a superficially similar way signs that have different modes of signification: that is to say, a sign-language that is governed by logical grammar-by logical syntax. (The conceptual notation [Begriffsschrift] of Frege and Russell is such a language, which, however, does still not exclude all errors.)2 But what does Wittgenstein mean by a notation or concept-script governed by logical syntax? His claim is not that ordinary English, for example, does not conform to logical syntax, but that his notation does. A language is able to express something only insofar as it is logical, in accordance with logical syntax. In Wittgenstein's view, as we saw in 1.1, there is no such thing as an impossible or illegitimate symbol, although there may be signs that do not symbolize. He says of everyday language: "All propositions of our colloquial language are actually,just as they are, logically completely in order.":! The concept-script, then, is governed by logical grammar in the sense of having been designed in such a way that logico-syntactical distinctions are readily discernible in it. It is a logically perspicuous notation that has logical distinctions embodied, so to speak, in its signs. In the conceptscript, a sign is used to symbolize in only one way (unlike, for instance, the word "is" in ordinary English) and different modes of signification are kept clearly distinct. As a result, what makes sense and what does not is immediately recognizable in the concept-script. By being completely transparent to the logic underlying the use of signs, this notation excludes nonsensical sign formations and prevents logical misunderstandings. There is therefore no such thing as a grammatically well-formed but nonsensical proposition in the concept-script. As Wittgenstein notes, the concept-script would not allow, for instance, the formulation of the question, "Are there simple objects?" which, from the Tractatus's

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point of view, is nonsense. 4 Notably, given that according to section 3.325 of the Tractatus the criterion of adequacy for the concept-script is that it excludes all logical mistakes, an adequate concept-script must be able to make perspicuous every possible logical distinction that one might wish to draw-or that one could be unclear about. 5 But let us examine more closely the idea that a language or a system of signs can be governed or not governed by logical grammar, i.e., reflect logic with more or less faithfulness. It is characteristic of this idea that logic is not considered dependent on any particular language. Logical investigation, as conceived in the Tractatus, has no interest in the particularities of languages as such. It is concerned with the essential only, this being something common to all different expressions capable of having a certain meaning or a sense. Consequently, particular languages or expressions are of interest to the logical investigation only insofar as the essential-that which makes signification possibleis discernible in them. Such essential features are also universal in the sense that insofar as they are necessary to express a meaning, any expression that is capable of expressing a certain meaning must have these characteristics. As Wittgenstein writes: A proposition possesses essential and accidental features. Accidental features are those that result from the particular way in which the propositional sign is produced. Essential features are those without which the proposition could not express its sense.(j So what is essential in a proposition is what all propositions that can express the same sense have in common. And similarly, in general, what is essential in a symbol is what all symbols that can serve the same purpose have in common. 7 So one could say that the real name of an object was what all the symbols that signified it had in common.... 8 A particular mode of signifying may be unimportant but it is always important that it is a possible mode of signifying. And that is generally so in philosophy: again and again the individual case turns out to be unimportant, but the possibility of each individual case discloses something about the essence of the world. 9 Logic for the Tractatus is thus something very abstract. The logic of language is determined by the mutual translatability of linguistic expressions into each other, the essential logical features of an expression

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being those it shares with the other members of a class of mutually translatable expressions, as spelled out by a rule of translation. lo The logic of language, in this sense, is the essential core of all possible languages, leaving out everything accidental. Accordingly, the conceptscript, the notation that is governed by logical syntax or grammar, in contrast to the particular gramlnars of languages, is meant to exhibit the essential but not the accidental features of different languages. It brings to light the common core of all possible languages, revealing the logic of language, where "language" refers to languages in general. Or, one might say, this notation reveals the logic of thought, a particular thought being understood here as something that can find expression in different languages. ll The concept-script reveals concepts in their pure form, as they are behind their impure expression in different languages. Given that the concept-script contains in itself only what is essential to the expression of thought, it is free from all the features of language that might make one misunderstand logic. Thus, it would indeed be the ultimate instrulnent for the philosopher (and the scientist)-as Frege had conceived and Leibniz dreamt. 12 The creation and employment of the concept-script would mean reaching a new ultimate level of clarity in language use: by deploying this notation, all possible misunderstandings could be clarified and thereby every possible philosophical problem resolved! Moreover, although the concept-script would make logical forms, and thereby the essential features of language and reality, readily discernible, it would not constitute a doctrine about them. Insofar as one is able to use a language at all, for instance to make claims, one must already have a grasp-if only an implicit one-of its logic. The same applies to the concept-script. Crucially, however, because the conceptscript does not disguise logic, logical forms would be completely open to view in its elnployment. By deploying the concept-script one would not be making any statements about the logic of language-such stateInents could not even be formulated in the concept-script-but the design of this notation would silnply allow one to have a perspicuous view of the logic of one's statements, as one intended them. 13 In this sense the employment of the concept-script would result not in a doctrine, but in our propositions becoming clear, just as Wittgenstein characterizes the aim of philosophical clarification.

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* * *

But given this sketch of the general idea of a concept-script and the philosophical significance of its employment, does the Tractatus actually provide us with a concept-script? As I understand it, it provides at least an outline of such a notation. Itl I identify this outline as the Tractatus's conception that propositions are to be analyzed into truthfunctional combinations of elementary propositions, the latter being composed of simple nalnes. 15 The Tractatus's conception of clarifica~ tion as logical analysis and the concept-script it projects can be characterized in more detail as follows. Commentators often describe clarification with the help of the concept-script as the translation of the expressions of everyday language into the formulae of the concept-script. 16 More precisely, such translations are analyses of complex expressions in terms of definitions given in sim.pler expressions that determine the modes of signification of the conlplex expressions. As Wittgenstein says: "Every defined sign signifies via those signs by which it is defined, and the definitions show the way."17 Insofar as one wants to track down the ways in which a complex expression signifies, this is to be done by analysis, by definitions given in simpler expressions. As for the term "translation," this movenlent fronl complex expressions to simpler ones via definitions is, one might say, a special case of translation. For as Wittgenstein says of such definitions: "Definitions are rules for the translation of one language into another. Every correct sign language must be translatable into every other according to such rules." 18 Analysis, then, is translation in a specific direction: from complex to simple, where complexity and simplicity are the complexity or simplicity of the use of individual signs in terms of which analyses are given, not of signs (formulae) or sign systems. (Certainly, results of analyses in terms of a concept-script are likely to look more complex than the expressions of everyday language.) Given that finer distinctions are drawn in the concept-script than ill everyday language, translations from the latter to the former seem appropriately called "logical analyses." More specifically, as the conceptscript is nleant to embody in itself all logical distinctions (in the sense that all logical distinctions can be captured in its formulae), translation in the concept-script is ultimately analysis into what Wittgenstein calls "simple names," which constitute the end of analysis. I9 Once the simple names are reached, the analysis is complete in the sense that

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these symbols allow for no further logical distinctions. 20 Notably, although unclarities might sometimes be settled already before we reach the level of simple names,21 in other cases settling them might require further analysis. Ultimately there is, according to Wittgenstein, "one and only one complete analysis of the proposition."22 This is t.hen expected t.o contain the solut.ion to every possible unclarity t.hat might. arise wit.h regard to t.his proposition, including t.he problems whose solut.ion does not require cOlnplete analysis. In this sense the completely analyzed proposition is thought to contain everything essential for the cOlnprehension of the logic of the proposition in question. 23 In line with this characterization of logical analysis, I suggest interpreting what Wittgenstein writes about the truth-functional analysis of propositions and the so-called picture theory of propositions as the outline of his scheme of analysis or his concept-script. Thus, rather than a speculative doctrine of the nature of propositions,24 Wittgenstein's conception of propositions as pictures constitutes a part of the Tractatus's concept-script. It is characteristic of Tractarian logical analysis, that is to say, to treat propositions as analyzable into truthfunctional combinations of elementary propositions and ultimately into pictures of states of affairs, where such pictures consist of names that stand for the simple objects in the world and present a state of affairs through their arrangement in the proposition. 25 While the truthfunctional analysis of propositions then constitutes the "top level" of the Tractatus's scheme of analysis, the conception of propositions as pictures constitutes the scheme's "bottom level." (The conception of propositions as pictures is by no means an arbitrary addition to the idea of the truth-functional analysis of propositions. The analysis of complex propositions into truth functions of elementary propositions presupposes the notion of a proposition as something true or false, explicated by Wittgenstein with the conception of propositions as pictures, i.e., (re)presentations of states of affairs.) Under the interpretation I propose, the Tractatus then does not merely conceive the task of clarification as something to be undertaken in the future. The carrying out of the task of clarification is not to be identified with the future employments of the concept-script, as if Wittgenstein's book constituted merely a (metaphysical) prologue to this future philosophy. Rather, given that his concept-script is intended to be governed by logical syntax and, therefore, to reflect the logic of

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language without distortion, the introduction of the principles of this notation already counts as clarifying the logic of language. Certain logical problems may therefore be considered resolved simply through Wittgenstein's introduction of his concept-script. 26 The Tractat'lls is thus engaged in a double task: (1) the introduction of the principles of a notation designed to help us avoid logical mistakes in the future; and (2) the clarification of the logic of language through the introduction of the principles governing this notation. 27 The central impetus for the interpretation I propose concerning the role of the truth-functional conception of propositions and the "picture theory" is that this interpretation makes it possible to understand Wittgenstein's intention not to put forward any doctrines, while still allowing one to say that the Tractat'llS offers insights into the logic of language. Consequently, the interpretation avoids difficulties with both traditional and "purely therapeutic" resolute readings (for the notion of the purely therapeutic, see below). To begin \vith, to introduce a notation to be used for the purpose of logical clarification is certainly not to make a statement with a truthvalue. On the interpretation I propose, Wittgenstein therefore is not engaged in theoretical assertion in the sense of advancing a true/false theory of language, world, and so 011. Consequently this reading avoids problems arising in the context of traditional interpretations that take the nonsensicality of the statements of the Tractatus to be an implication of the theory of language that the book puts forward. 28 The principal probleln with such interpretations is that ultimately they result in a sterile paradox. Either the Tractatus's assertions articulate a theory, in which case they are not nonsense-or they are nonsense and do not articulate anything. The problem here is that rather than even appearing to have succeeded in articulating a conception of philosopllY as devoid of theories, such traditional readings result in a stalemate. Either the Tractatus has a theory or, if theoretical assertion is the only possible form of philosophizing, the book is of no more philosop11ical importance than any other piece of nonsense. The book's resolute readers, on the other hand, since they do not attribute a theory to Wittgenstein, avoid this paradox. 29 Nevertheless, insofar as they take the purpose of the Tractatus's nonsense to be "purely therapeutic," Le., to cure the reader of the tenlptation to put forward

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philosophical theories by making apparent their nonsensical nature, they face a difficulty in explaining how the Tractatus could contain-or give expression to-any insights into the logic of language (for example, concerning the non-representational character of logical constants). Accordingly, for example, Hacker blanles Conant and Diamond (rightly or wrongly) for throwing away the logical insights Wittgenstein expresses in connection with his critique of Frege and Russell: "Throwing away the ladder is one thing, throwing away the baby together with the bathwater is another."30 Moreover, purely therapeutic readings also leave it unclear why Wittgenstein should have spent almost ten years developing the "picture theory," and so on, if it was meant merely as an example of a nonsensical theory, and why he did not simply discuss nonsense produced by other philosophers. 31 The solution I propose to these difficulties with traditional and purely therapelltic resolute readings is essentially that the Tractatus's logical insights are to be seen not as "expressed" in terms of a paradoxically nonsensical theory, but as embodied in the notation Wittgenstein seeks to introduce. Thus there is indeed a way to read the Tractatus as an expression of logical insights, though not in terms of true/false theoretical statements. This alternative way to express philosophical insights is outlined by Wittgenstein in a notebook from 1929: "R[amsey] does not comprehend the value I place on a particular notation any more than the value I place on a particular word because he does not see that in it an entire way of looking at the object is expressed; the angle from which I now regard the thing. The notation is the last expression of a philosophical view."32 Although I do not cite this remark as evidence for Wittgenstein's views in the Tractatus (it would be at best inconclusive), it does, nevertheless, present us with a possible way of thinking about the expression of philosophical insights-one provided by Wittgenstein himself-that seems capable of solving the problems with both the traditional and therapeutic readings. This problem-solving capacity (and not an appeal to uncertain evidence from 1929) is the reason for adopting the interpretation I propose. 33 Consequently, if the Tractatus is read as suggesting the adoption of a notation to be used for purposes of clarification, the role of nonsense can be understood differently from what the traditional interpretation has assumed. Nonsense is not used to articulate a theory that provides a foundation for Wittgenstein's notation, providing it with a "nonsensi-

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cal justification," whatever that might be. Rather, although Wittgenstein does indeed deploy nonsense to introduce the Tractatus's notation, in so doing he relies solely on the reader's pretheoretical understanding of language and the distinction between sense and nonsense. The Tractatus, that is to say, seeks to draw the reader's attention to certain logical distinctions that she already recognizes in ller use of language but that are not clearly reflected in the ordinary symbolism, this synIbolism therefore being likely to lead to confusion. In this way, the book endeavors to guide its reader to mastery of the notation in which these distinctions are clearly reflected: the sign-language governed by logical syntax or the concept-script. To ease this transition to the concept-script, Wittgenstein also employs nonsense, i.e., phrases that point toward crucial distinctions and their expression in the conceptscript but are in the end to be recognized sitnply as nonsense. Hence nonsense plays, as Dialllond puts it, a transitory role. Its purpose is to lead one to the mastery ofWittgenstein's notation. 34 A central logical distinction to which Wittgenstein seeks to draw his reader's attention is the distinction between statements of fact and the expression of what is logically necessary and possible, which he describes in the transitory vocabulary as the distinction bet\\reen saying and showing. 35 An important goal of the introduction of his notation, that is to say, is to render perspicuous the difference between the factual and contingent on the one hand and the essential, i.e., the necessary and possible, on the other. 36 In the concept-script, no statements can be made about the essential, or even about the distinction between the essential and the contingent. Rather, by employing this notation one would simply be saying "what can be said."37 I will not go into the details of how exactly Wittgenstein seeks to make manifest the distinction between the factual and the essential. Nevertheless, from the difficulties of the "nonsensical theory interpretation" we may conclude that the distinction has to be elucidated by using examj]les, that is, with the l1elp of particular cases of language use where the distinction comes clearly into view. For, crucially, any general pronouncements about logic-that is, about logical necessities pertaining to language use-seem doomed to nonsense. Such statements treat the logical characteristics of language as if they were the object of contingent factual statements, thereby muddling the very distinction that Wittgenstein aims to clarify. As for examples used to explicate the

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factual-essential distinction, these might be of various kinds: cases where language is employed with sense, cases the Tractatus calls "senseless" (tautologies and contradictions), and, importantly, cases in which we are brought to see how something that seemed to make sense reveals itself as nonsense. 38 An advantage of the present interpretation is that it renders readily understandable what Wittgenstein means by saying that the Tractatus constitutes a ladder to be thrown away.39 To throwaway the ladder is not to throwaway a theory and with it whatever logical insights the theory might provide. Rather, the Tractatus's introductory nonsense is talk that Wittgenstein's concept-script excludes. Accordingly, the apparent statements of the Tractatus concerning the essence of the world and language will be discarded once one begins to look at things from the perspective of Wittgenstein's notation, or-what amounts to the same---adopts "the correct method of philosophy," as described in Tractatus 6.53. This rejection of the Tractatus's statements, then, is part of Wittgenstein's project of the critique of language, aiming to draw limits to the expression of thoughts, which, as Wittgenstein says, ends the exclusion from language and characterization as nonsense of certain statements previously regarded as significant. It is also interesting to observe that once one begins to examine Wittgenstein's text in the light of the reading proposed here, there is no shortage of forms of expression characteristic of someone introducing a notation rather than making metaphysical statements. (See for example the introduction of the notion of conlplete analysis of propositions beginning in Tractatus 3.2.) Despite having the appearance of a (paradoxically nonsensical) assertion about the essence of propositions, in the end the general propositional form itself is supposed to be nothing but "the description of the one and only general primitive sign of logic."40 It is the most general formal characteristic of language expressed in terms of a variable of which all propositions are values, that is, a logical constant, something common to every possible proposition. 41 Hence, what Wittgenstein says about the concept of general propositional form may be understood as an attempt to explicate a formal characteristic of language-with which language users are already familiar by virtue of being language users-by introducing a notation that makes this characteristic perspicuous. Nevertheless, I am not suggesting that the above interpretation could ultimately release the Tractatus from philosophical doctrines. Arguably,

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Wittgenstein's claim of the universal applicability of his scheme of analysis-the contention that all philosophical problems can be dissolved by analyzing propositions according to this scheme, or have been dissolved "in essentials" when the scheme is introduced-involves an iInplicit claim about the nature of language. One might therefore say that in the Tractatus, metaphysics dresses in the gown of methodology and takes refuge in the philosophical method that Wittgenstein spells out. As I explain in Chapter 3, there is a problem relating to the lractatus's use of examples and its attelTI.pt to establis11 a Inethod with the help of examples. Regardless of questions concerning the Tractatus's doctrinal involveInents, its conception of philosophy as clarification can now be summed up. Assuming the completion of the initial task of the clarification of the logic of language, through which the proper method of philosophy is established to be logical analysis,42 philosophy clarifies, by providing logical analyses, the logic of expressions that trouble us and entangle us in difficulties. Such analyses lnake perspicuollS the possible ways of using language by excluding nonsensical sign-formations. This is to show either how a proposition can be dissected into simple names or that it cannot be so dissected, being merely an illusory proposition. To return now to section 4.112 of the Tractatus, from which I started, this activity of analysis "aitns at the logical clarification of thoughts" in the sense that in a conlpletely analyzed proposition, the "elements of the propositional sign correspond to the objects of thought."43 Philosophy, therefore, aims to express thoughts clearly by revealing their simple elements, thereby clarifyin.g opaque and blurred thoughts and delimiting tl1em sharply. In this way, philosophical clarification releases thinking from the misleading influence of an everyday language not designed with logical perspicuity in mind. I revisit the Tractatus once more in Chapter 3 to discuss its doctrinal or metaphysical commitments. Let us now turn to Wittgenstein's later critique of the Tractatus's conception of clarification.

2.2 Wittgenstein's Later Critique of the Tractatus's Notion of Logical Analysis In the Investigations, Wittgenstein introduces and explains his conception of philosophy as clarification by contrasting it with his early

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approach. This involves detailed discussions of the unclarities and misunderstandings in the Tractatus's view of clarification. I will proceed to the "positive" attributes ofWittgenstein's later approach through a discussion of what he says about problems with the Tractatus. Wittgenstein writes in the Investigations about philosophy as the clarification of "misunderstandings concerning the use of words": "Many of them can be removed by substituting one form of expression for another; this may be called an 'analysis' of our forms of expression, for the process is sometimes like one of taking a thing apart."44 However, there is a danger of misunderstandings with regard to how we conceive the task of clarification: But now it may come to look as if there were something like a final analysis of our forms of language, and so a single completely resolved form of expression. That is, as if our usual forms of expression were, essentially, unanalysed; as if there were something hidden in them that had to be brought to light. When this is done the expression is completely clarified and our problem solved. It can also be put like this: we eliminate misunderstandings by making our expressions more exact; but now it may look as if we were moving towards a particular state, a state of complete exactness; and as if this were the real goal of our investigation. 45 More specifically, according to Wittgenstein, the pursuit of this state of complete clarity and exactness assumes here the form of a great problem concerning the essence of language to be determined once and for all. 46 As he says of the search for complete exactness in the immediately following remark: "This finds expression in questions as to the essence of language, of propositions, of thought. ... We ask: 'VVhat is language?,' 'VVhat is a proposition?' And the answer to these qllestions is to be given once and for all; and independently of any future experience."47 The question of how the Tractatus's philosophy comes to assume the form of a great problem is discussed in Chapter 3. Here I wish to discuss what Wittgenstein says about misunderstandings pertaining to the Tractatus's notion of the completeness of analysis and complete exactness, and then to take up problems associated with giving a privileged, fundamental status to a particular notation such as Wittgenstein's concept-script.48

Two Conceptions of Clarification 2.21

67

The Tractatus's Notion of the Completeness of Analysis and Complete Exactness

l'he idea of a complete analysis of an expression is the idea that there is an analysis that lays bare all the logical relations of an expression to other expressions, thus resolving all possible lllisunderstandings and philosophical problems relating to the expression. In the case of a Tractarian name, for instance, this is to lay bare all possible combinations of the name with other names. The result of such all analysis is a "completely resolved form of expression"49 in which the essential features of symbols are completely divorced from their accidental features. But as Wittgenstein explains, the notion of completeness assumed here is problematic: "Formerly I myself spoke about the 'complete analysis,' the idea being that philosophy should decolnpose all propositions once and for all, thus laying down clearly every connection and removing every possibility of Inisunderstanding. As if there were a calculus in which this decomposition were possible.... All of this was based on a mistakenly idealised picture of language and its use."50 Analysis, as conceived in the Tracta'tus, luay be understood as the codification (translation) of expressions in the formulae of the conceptscript with the purpose of determining the logico-syntactical rules according to which language is used. The problem, then, is that although one can tabulate rules for the use of an expression in order to prevent particular misunderstandings, there is no such thing as a complete list of rules that would remove every possible Inisunderstanding. Suggestive as the picture of such a complete list may be, it turns out to be devoid of sense upon closer exanlination. Or as Wittgenstein says in his lectures of 1932/33: "We might feel that a complete logical analysis would give the complete granlmar of a word. But there is no such thing as a completed granl1nar. However, giving a rule has a use if someone lllakes an opposite rule which we do not wish to follow."51 The problenl encountered in the notion of an ideally cOlnplete list of rules is explained in the 1937 version of the Investigations: How should we have to imagine a complete list of rules for the employment of a word?-What do we mean by a complete list of rules for the employment of a piece in chess? Couldn't we always construct doubtful cases, in which the normal list of rules does not decide? ...

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The regulation of traffic in the streets permits and forbids certain actions on the part of the drivers and pedestrians; but it does not attempt to guide the totality of their movements by prescription. And it would be senseless to talk of an "ideal" ordering of traffic which should do that; in the first place we should have no idea what to imagine as this ideal. If someone wants to make traffic regulations stricter on some point or other, that does not mean that he wants to approximate such an ideal.° 2 The analogy between the rules of language and the rules of traffic that Wittgenstein deploys here has certain limitations. If we assume the Tractatus's idea that what is logically possible coincides with what makes sense, there is no such thing as prescription in logic.5~ Nevertheless, there are also important similarities between the regulation of traffic and the clarification with which Wittgenstein is concerned. No ideal order of traffic or oflanguage-or as one might well say, no ideal, complete state of clarity-can be approximated by laying down rules, because no ideal has been determined. Just as in the case of traffic we have no conception of the totality of movements to be regulated, in the case of language we have no conception of the totality of misunderstandings to be removed. Hence the notion of an ideal system of rules lacks a definite sense. No criteria have been specified for what it would mean for a system of rules to meet this ideal. More specifically, assuming that its task would be to remove particular misunderstandings, a list of rules would be complete insofar as it removed those misunderstandings it was intended to remove. In this case, the criteria for the completeness of the list are specifiable, and the task of tabulating rules is a sensible one. What constitutes the class of every possible misunderstanding, however, is a different uestion. As Wittgenstein observes, there seems to be no limit to misunaerstandings that can be imagined. One can always imagine misunderstandings that are not covered by the rules one provides. Moreover, these rules themselves can be misunderstood. Consequently, the class of every possible misunderstanding is impossible to specify. But if it is impossible to determine which cases fall into the class of every possible misunderstanding, no criteria can be specified for the completeness of the list of rules needed to remove them. Thus in this case, the notion of a complete list of rules is devoid of sense, and there are no criteria for saying that the task of tabulating rules has been accomplished. M If language were a calculus operating according to clear and precise

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rules, it would be possible to talk about the totality of all rules and about a complete list of rules for the· use of an expression. Given a clearly defined systeln, such as a calculus, it is possible to list the rules that determine the possible employments of signs. This seems to be the sense in which the Tractatus aSSUllles an idealized picture of language, as Wittgenstein relnarks above in the quotation from manuscript 116. (As we have seen, the Tractatus conceives language as presentable in the [orIn of a calculus of simple names. Accordingly, it is plausible that the word "formerly" in the passage above refers to the Tractatus.) Nevertheless, even in this case misunderstandings concerning these rules of language are possible. Constitutive rules such as those defining a calculus cannot remove every possible misunderstanding. There is no notation that cannot be misunderstood, and tIle concept-script is no exception. The Tractatus's idea that logical analysis should aim to eliminate every possible unclarity is therefore confused. Conceived in this ,vay, clarification becomes an ilnpossible task. There is no such thing as an ultimate, final clarification that could remove every possible misunderstanding relating to an expression at once. Instead, clarifications are given when unclarities arise. They concern particular unclarities, and clarification requires no absolutely complete specification of the rules of language in the Tractatus's sense. Or as Wittgenstein says about the concept of explanation: "One nlight say: an explanation serves to remove or to avert a misunderstanding-one, that is, that would occur hut for the explanation; not everyone that I can imagine."55 Similar considerations apply to the notion of complete exactness. What it means for something to be exact as opposed to inexact is only deternlined in particular cases. For instance, what counts as exactness in measuring time in a laboratory and in the case of train arrivals is not the same. Accordingly, there is no general concept of exactness that would allow one to say that a complete exactness has been reached for every possible case. J11St as the idea of completeness of clarification in an absolute sense is confused, so is the idea of complete exactness in an absolute sense. 56

2.22

The Notion of a Fundamental Form of Expression

In the Tractatus, the complete· analysis of a proposition is envisaged as terminating in elementary propositions consisting of simple names that allow for no further distinctions, allegedly bringing to light all logical

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distinctions that could be drawn. But as Wittgenstein later explains, the conception of a fundamental forIn of expression that contains in itself everything that might be considered essential for the clarification of an expression is problematic. Not that some expressions could not be called "simple" (indefinable, not allowing for further distinctions, and so on) in contrast to "complex expressions." The problem lies in the idea that everything essential in our expressions could be captured through a reduction to a single particular form of expression. This can be elucidated as follows: As Wittgenstein points out, unanalyzability or simplicity is not characteristic of an object of investigation as such. For instance, given that logic investigates the uses of language, no use of a sign is simple per see W11at counts as simple or unanalyzable is relative to the assumed framework of analysis, or as one could say, to the mode of presentation employed. He writes: " 'Indefinable,' here one imagines something unanalysable; and in SUCh, a way as if there was an object here that is unanalysable (like a chemical element) .... -But the impossibility of analysis corresponds to a mode of presentation which we assume (lay dov?n)."57 There are thus no simples in an absolute sense, as Wittgenstein says in the Investigations §§47-48, where he seeks to clarify this point by discussing a few concrete examples, illustrating in this way the concept of simplicity. He asks what we would call the sirnple parts of a tree or a chair, for instance, and discusses a (fictional) language-game of describing certain cOITlbinations of colored squares, where the individual squares are called "simple" in contrast to their combinations ("language-game (48)"). These examples make manifest that what is called "simple" (in the sense of not consisting of parts) has to be specified in a particular case or context. The criteria for simplicity and compleXity need to be laid down, i.e., the way of conceiving things (Betrachtungsweise) or the mode of presentation has to be specified before it makes sense to talk about the "simple"(PI §47). That simplicity is relative to ways of conceiving things is exemplified, for instance, by the difference in what would count as the simple parts of a chair from the points of view of molecular physics and furniture design. Moreover, it seems that as regards logic, no mode of presentation (and no particular notion of simplicity) can be given a privileged status. Wittgenstein explains the point with the help of his invented example:

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Let us imagine language-game (48) altered so that names signify not monochrome squares but rectangles each consisting of two such squares. Let such a rectangle, which is half red half green, be called "U"; a half white a half green one "V"; and so on. Could we not imagine people who had names for such combinations of color, but not for the individual colors? Think of the cases where we say: "This arrangement of colors (say the French tricolor) has a quite special character." In what sense do the symbols of this language-game stand in need of analysis? How far is it even possible to replace this language-game by (48)?-It isjust anotherlanguage-game; even though it is related to (48).58

In this variation of language-game (48)-let us call it (48) *-what is taken as "simple" is different than in (48). In this example it would appear most natural to analyze (48)* in terms of (48), as the names U, V, and so on in (48) * stand for combinations of the monochrolne squares of (48). But as Wittgenstein points out, it is not necessary to understand (48) * in terlns of (48). One might treat nalnes in (48) * as not analyzable into and replaceable by names in (48). It is perfectly possible, logically, to treat certain color combinations as simple and basic instead of individual colors, and to have a notation in which color combinations are simple, that is, in which the particular character of a combination is treated as not further analyzable in terms of sinlple parts. And although one might be tenlpted to think otherwise, there are readily available examples of something like this, such as the French tricolor or the conlbination of red, blue, and white in the u.s. flag. Both games (48) and (48)*, one Inight say, have the same freedom, and neither is superior to the other. But to get a firmer grasp of Wittgenstein's point and its relevance to the notion of analysis, let us look at how he arrives at it through the remarks that precede §64. Here it is important to bear in mind that logical analysis is not, as it were, the analysis of mere signs, but of symbols-or signs with logicosyntactical employment, as one might say from the Tractatus's perspective. As regards philosophical problems with the concept of analysis, therefore, the phenomenon of ambiguity (Le., that a sign can be used in many ways and would be analyzed differently with respect to these different uses) is of no great interest. Rather, the interesting question concerns the analysis of a sign with a particular use, whether analysis in such a case could be said to have some one terminus-a definitive account of

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the use of the sign. That Wittgenstein is not concerned with mere ambiguity is evident from his example. In language-games (48) and (48)* different signs are used. Accordingly, the question concerning the analyzability of (48) * in terms of (48) is the question of whether the use of the signs in (48)* can and must be explained in terms of the use of the signs in (48). Insofar as the task of logical analysis is to distinguish the essential (logical) features of a symbol from its accidental features, the above question can be formulated as the question of whether there is only one possible way of sorting out the essential from the accidental in the use of a sign. Here Wittgenstein's answer is that it l1.eed not always be so. There need not necessarily be only one generally valid answer to the question, what is the point of a particular language-game with a sign? There need not be only one correct answer to the question, what are the important and central features of a game? and consequently to the question, what is essential in the game? Rather, what is essential in the gam~ depends on one's interests or concerns and may vary according to the point of view from which one looks at it. Put in another way, there need not be one single answer to the question of whether the uses of two particular signs are the same or different-that is, whether one could be translated in terms of the other (or replaced by it) or whether something important gets lost in translation. (Sometimes a translation is appropriate in some respects but problematic in others.) If there is no definitive and exclusive answer to these questions, there is no single answer to the question, what is essential in the uses of these signs? Wittgenstein discusses the issue with the help of a few examples. We could treat a proposition (a), which names the different parts of a chair and talks about chairs in this way, as an analyzed version of a proposition (b), which talks about chairs. Would we then say that ordering someone to fetch the parts of a chair is the same as ordering someone to fetch the chair? There are grounds for both an affirmative and a negative answer. Wittgenstein, imagining an interlocutor, writes: "But all the same you will not deny that a particular order in (a) means the same as one in (b); and what would you call the second one, if not an analysed form of the first?"-Certainly I too should say that an order in (a) had the same meaning as one in (b); or ... they achieve the same. And this means that if I were shewn an order in (a) and asked: "Which order in (b) means the same as this?" or again "Which order in

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(b) does this contradict?" I should give such-and-such an answer. But that is not to say that we have come to a general agreenlent about the use of the expression "to have the saIne meaning" or "to achieve the same." For it can be asked in what cases we say: "These are lnerely two forms of the same game."59 Suppose for instance that the person who is given the orders in (a) and (b) has to look up a table co-ordinating names and pictures before bringing what is required. Does he do the same when he carries out an order in (a) and the corresponding one in (b)?-Yes and no. You may say: "The point of the orders is the same." I should say so too.-But it is not everywhere clear what should be called the "point" of an order. (Similarly one may say of certain objects that they have this or that purpose. The essential thing is that this is a lamp, that it serves to give light;-that it is an ornament to the rooro, fills an empty space, etc., is not essential. But there is not always a clear distinction between essential and inessential.) 60

Depending on one's interests or point of view, one Inight adopt various conceptions of what is essential in the use of a sign. (Consider the contrasting viewpoints: "'"fhe function of a lamp is to give light" and "Only an extremely unsophisticated person thinks that lamps are only about light.") Depending on which aspects of the use of the sign one focuses on-for instance, the issue of which orders a particular order contradicts, or what exactly is involved in carrying it out-one may have different views of what is essential in it. Consequently, different analyses of the use of the sign-that is, explanations of ,,,,hat is essential in it-are possible. 6 ! Sinlilarly, it might be precisely the complexity of the expression that is regarded as essential to it. This might he the case, for instance, in language-game (48)*. Here tlle combination of colors might be treated as essential, not analyzable in terms of names for nl0nochrollle squares, as this analysis treats the combinations as merely accidental. Wittgenstein writes about the idea of the fundainentality of the analyzed form: "To say, however, that a sentence in (b) is an 'analysed' form of one in (a) readily seduces 11S into thinking that the foriner is the more fundamental form; that it alone she"vs "vhat is meant by the other, and so on. For example, we think: If you have only the unanalysed form you miss the analysis; but if you know the analysed form that gives you everything.-But can I not. say that an aspect of the matter is lost on you in the latter case as well as the former?"62

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Although an analysis of an expression may bring out something interesting that is not discernible in the unanalyzed form, it may at the same time conceal something else. The analysis emphasizes certain aspects of the expression at the cost of others, and something may get lost in the process of analysis. (The analyzed and the unanalyzed form are different, which, after all, is the point of the analysis. If there were no differences between the analyzed and unanalyzed expressions, what would be the point of analysis?) And although the features of the analyzed form olay be iOlportant to us for certain purposes, this may be true of the unanalyzed form as well. Hence, one simply begs the question if one says: "Some features may be lost in the analysis, but what is important is that the essential features remain." Consequently, according to the later Wittgenstein, it would be misplaced to maintain that one must regard some form of expression as the fundamental one, in the manner of translations into the conceptscript. There might not be any final once-and-for-all answer to the question, which features of the expression are essential? and it may be that no single particular form of expression encompasses all the features that could be considered essential to the expression. Rather, the same point we ended up with in the previous section emerges from Wittgenstein's discussion: clarifications-or logical analyses-are to be considered as relative to particular problems and questions. There are no ultimate analyses, no final renderings of what we say in a fundamental form that could clear away all misunderstandings concerning language use. Therefore, although translations in a concept-script such as the Tractat'llS proposes may be helpful sometimes, they may be unhelpful or misleading at other times. The formulae of a conceptscript cannot be treated as the fundamental form of expression. Arguably (to refer back to 2.21), the same applies to any tabulation of the rules of language: no particular determination of the rules for the use of an expression can be treated as the description of its use so far as the clarification of misunderstandings is concerned. But this last point requires further elucidation, and I return to it later. 03

2.3

Clarification in Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy

Read against the backdrop of the Tractat'lls, Wittgenstein's later conception of philosophy as clarification can be seen as designed to overcome

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problems that ultimately prevent the Tractatus from reaching its aim: philosophy without doctrines. (His early and later philosophy are, therefore, continuous, constituting a continuous attempt to spell out a certain kind of philosophical approach.) More specifically, as we have seen, Wittgenstein's critique of the Tractatus's conception of analysis is inforIned by the idea that a shift from once-and-for-all determinations of concept~ to the clarification of particular unclarities is required to eliminate the philosophical difficulties that plague the Tractatus. The following two subchapters seek to clarify further the idea of this shift by examining SOllle ofWittgenstein's positive characterizations of his approach.

2.31

Description of Language Use and the Clarification of Particular Problems

The construction of a concept-script and the analysis of language in its terms might be characterized as an attenlpt to bring to the fore the logic of language-the essential logical properties obscured by the graInmatical features of particular languages, which are considered accidenta1. 64 By contrast, Wittgcnstein's later philosophy understands logical or philosophical investigation as concerned with particular languages. l'he object of investigation of logic or philosophy, according to him, is not language in an abstract sense, but actual natural languages such as GerInan and English or specialist languages such as scientific languages, for instance, "the chemist's language."65 He writes: "Philosophy deals with existing languages and should not pretend that it must discuss language in an abstract sense."66 And in the Investigations: "The philosophy of logic speaks of sentences and words in exactly the same sense in which we speak of them in ordinary life wh.en we say e.g. 'Here is a Chinese sentence,' or 'No, that only looks like writing; it is actually just an ornament' and so on. [New paragraph] We are talking about the spatial phenomenon of language, not about some non-spatial, nontemporal phantasm."67 More specifically, philosophy seeks to dissolve philosophical probIeIns by describing language use. fiR As Wittgenstein says: "Philosophical problems are not solved by explanation blit by description."fi9 Accordingly, he now understands logical analysis, or clarification more generally, as an activity of describing language use: "Logical analysis. Who describes the use of a word clarifies the concept to us."70

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But at this point one might want to ask, does Wittgenstein's conception not make philosophy quite uninteresting? Insofar as philosophy is concerned with the description of languages in an ordinary, nonabstract sense, is it not concerned with the contingent and perhaps merely accidental? Of what philosophical interest could it be to investigate the contingent concepts or structures of a particular language? Perhaps it is this fear that has led commentators to insist that Wittgenstein is not concerned with mere particularities of actual languages but with something common to different human languages. For instance, Rush Rhees writes about Wittgenstein: "He is still interested in 'human language' rather than in the language or languages that people speak."71 Similarly Oswald Hanfling: "He was not concerned about the grammar of particular languages ... , but about logical features of what may be called human language (or human thought)."72 Arguably, however, this worry signals a misunderstanding of the point of Wittgenstein's descriptions of language. If so, Rhees's and Hanfling's attempts to respond to the worry are misplaced. Wittgenstein is not moving in his later philosophy from abstract philosophical or logical theses allegedly holding for every possible language 73 to observations concerning actually existing languages that claim a universal validity in Rhees's and Hanfling's sense. That is to say, the significance ofWittgenstein's descriptions of particular languages does not depend on his remarks somehow reaching beyond the merely particular to what is universally true of all languages. But this does not mean that, according to Wittgenstein, we must accept a weaker form of philosophy, i.e., that in his view the only available answers to philosophical questions about essences are historical statements about contingent conceptual determinations. 74 Rather than thinking about the significance of philosophy in these terms-and, consequently, either affirming or rejecting the claim about the universal significance of philosophy in a strong ahistorical or transhistorical sense-Wittgenstein sees the matter differently.75 The significance of philosophy is as great as the importance of having a clear comprehension of what one is saying. In this sense philosophy's significance depends on the importance of language for human beings and on the importance of the misunderstandings to be cleared away. As he remarks: "The problems arising through a misinterpretation of our forIns of language have the character of depth. They are deep disquietudes; their roots are as deep in us

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as the forms of our language and their significance is as great as the itnportance of our language." And: "The results of philosophy are the uncovering of one or another piece of plain nonsense and of bUlnps that the understanding has got by running its head up against the limits of language. These bumps make us see the value of the discovery."76 Apparently anticipating the above worries, Wittgerlstein also writes: That I have to use a full-blown language (and not some sort of preparatory, provisional one) in giving my explanations already shows that I can only adduce something external about it. Yes, but how can these accounts then satisfy us?-Well, your very questions were framed in this language; they had to be expressed in this language, if there was anything to ask! And your scnlples are misunderstandings. Your questions refer to words; so I have to talk about words. 77

This remark may be read as seeking to eliminate the troubling asymmetry, Le., the appearance that Wittgenstein is trying to answer questions that concern something transhistorical and universalitnmutable essences and structures-by investigating historically contingent concepts. The solution to the problem of historicism is not to claim a strong universal status for Wittgenstein's statements, as Rhees and Hanfling construe his remarks about language. 78 Rather, the solution consists in recalling that the questions that express philosophical problems are themselves articulated in some particular language or another. Philosophical questions are posed in the language or languages spoken by those involved in the philosophical discussion, and these languages have a historically contingent existence. Accordingly, insofar as clarification is needed to get clear about such questions and problelns, it will concern the expressions of the language(s) in which they were articulated. ''Your questions refer to words; so I have to talk about words." Or more specifically, to the extent that philosophical questions, claims, and hopes are formulated in everyday or ordinary larlguage, it is everyday language (as used by relevant persons) that must be examined. Consequently, one can bracket and put aside the question of whether philosophical statements concern something universal in the strong, transhistorical or ahistorical sense or instead 11ave more lilnited, perhaps merely "local" interest. The point is, first, that although

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one cannot assume philosophical concerns that find their expression in some particular language to be of universal and transhistorical relevance, this does not mean that they could not have such relevance either. This issue is not decided one way or the other by taking particular languages as the object of philosophical investigation. Second, it is important to notice that the idea that philosophy deals with immutable, universally relevant matters, and that this is what gives philosophy its importance, is itself an idea expressed in particular languages in particular historical contexts. This idea, therefore, is subject to logical or grammatical investigation just like anything else. It does not identify a requirement that philosophy must meet but that is beyond the reach of philosophical investigation as conceived by Wittgenstein. Accordingly, that Wittgensteinian clarifications might (sometimes) lack universal relevance does not yet constitute an objection to his approach. A point related to the one expressed in the Investigations §120 concerning Wittgenstein's approach is expressed in the following remark: "What is it that is repulsive in the idea that we study the use of a word, point to mistakes in the description of tllis use and so on? First and foremost one asks oneself: How could that be so important to us? It depends on whether what one calls a 'wrong description' is a description which does not accord with established usage-or one which does not accord with the practice of the person giving the description. Only in the second case does a philosophical conflict arise."79 As this remark makes clear, Wittgenstein's descriptions of language are not motivated by the assumption that some established linguistic practices-or a philosopher's description of them-should be accepted as a standard for how one is to speak and think. Deviation from established ways of using language-for instance, the practices adopted by the clarifier-is not philosophically problematic. Rather, philosophical problems arise from conflicts within a person's language use. The problem of other minds provides an example. By conceiving sensation-talk according to the model of statements about inner objects of knowledge, the philosopher is confronted with the difficulty of not being able to attribute sensations to others. so Here the root of philosophical problems is not that the philosopher's description of language use-her conception of sensation-talk-does not accord with the normal use of language. Rather, the roots of the problems lie in the conflicts that arise between the ways in which the philosopher herself

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wants to use language. On the one hand, she wishes to be able to attribute sensations such as pain to others; on the other hand, her conception of sensation-talk makes it impossible for her to account for the possibility of such attributions in a way satisfactory to her. It is in this sense that philosophical problems arise from unclarities about what one is saying and from conflicts within one's language use. HI Thus, a philosophical problem rnust be cleared up, so to speak, from the inside. Clarification, as Wittgenstein conceives it, is not a matter of imposing an alleged standard of correct language use on the interlocutor from the outside, but of clarifying the interlocutor's language use to her on the basis of 11er own criteria for what makes sense. In this sense, clarification is essentially a dialogue between the philosopher and her interlocutor. 82 Hence it wOll1d also be wrong to think that ordinary or everyday language, or a certain description of it, constitutes for Wittgenstein a standard of sense that he urges one to abide by, even though this is how he has often been interpreted. 83 As Savickey notes, Wittgenstein's philosophy would thus become "a form of intellectual constraint or censorship."84 In other words, Wittgenstein's point is not that philosophical questions must be answered in terms of everyday language, but that the intelligibility of the questions must be examined in the language in which the questions were formulated. 85 Let us now turn to another aspect ofWittgenstein's later conception of clarification as the description of language use. As explained in 2.21 and 2.22, Wittgenstein in his later philosophy problematizes the Tractatus's conception of clarification as an attempt to find final, once-andfor-all analyses of concepts. He thus departs from the idea of philosophy as an attempt to find great answers, i.e., to settle once and for all every possible unclarity relating to a concept through its final analysis. This means that in his later philosophy, Wittgenstein is not only dealing with particular, actually existing langllages but with particular, actual philosophical problems. As he says: "The task of philosophy (in my sense) is to point out actual mistakes."86 Tllis change in Wittgenstein's comprehension of the task of clarification has very important consequences for his conception of the role of descriptions of language use in philosophy, as I will explain. Wittgenstein characterizes the point of his descriptions as fo11o,,,,s: "The garne with these words, the use which is made of theln is more

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involved-the role of these words in our language other than we are inclined to believe. [New paragraph] It is this role which we must understand in order to dissolve philosophical paradoxes.... [New paragraph] We seek to find the meaning of a word only insofar as we describe this role. And we describe it only as far as is necessary for dissolving philosophical problelTIs."87 According to this, dissolving philosophical paradoxes requires comprehending the uses or roles of the relevant words in the language in question, the purpose of Wittgenstein's descriptions being to help one understand such uses or roles. With respect to present concerns, the last paragraph of the quotation is particularly interesting. Insofar as the task of philosophy is the clarification of particular, actual philosophical problems, the statement that the roles of words are described only as far as is required for dissolving philosophical problems may be read as a rejection of the idea that philosophical descriptions should provide once-and-for-all accounts of the words' roles. Rather than seeking to cover all uses of a word in the relevant meaning, and to settle every possible problenl relating to it, the descriptions only capture its uses to the extent required by the clarification of certain particular, actual problems. Wittgensteinmakes this point in his lectures as well: "The point of examining the way a word is used is not at all to provide an,other method of giving its meaning. When we ask on what occasion people use a word, what they say about it, what they are right to substitute for it, and in reply try to describe its use, we do so only insofar as it seems helpful in getting rid of certain philosophical troubles."R8 Thus, rather than examining the use of a word in the abstract with the purpose of providing an account of its meaning, Wittgenstein always focuses in his descriptions on the clarification of specific philosophical problems. Unlike the Tractatus's completed analyses, descriptions in Wittgenstein's later philosophy are not intended to cover all possible uses of the relevant terms in relevant contexts of their employment and to contain an answer to every possible unclarity that might arise. Rather, the completeness of a philosophical description is relative to particular philosophical problems. A description is complete insofar as it dissolves the problems it was intended to dissolve. 89 This point is expressed in the Investigations as follows: "It is not our aim to refine or complete the system of rules for the use of our words in unheard-of ways. [New paragraph] For the clarity we are aiming at is

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indeed complete clarity. But this sinlply nleans that philosophical problems should completely disappear...."90 No doubt complete analyses, as the Tractatus envisages them, would count as unheard-of refinelnents of the system of rules for the use of our words. The first sentence of the quotation can therefore be plausibly interpreted as referring to the Tractatus. 91 lVloreover, as regards the interpretation of this sentence, it is important that in the 1936 and 1937 versions of the Investigations it occurs as the first paragraph of the remark (quoted in 2.21) cOInparing traffic rules and the rules of language, thus problelnatizing the notion of a complete list of rules for the use of a word. 92 As explained in 2.21, this remark can be read as spelling out Wittgenstein's grounds for rejecting the aim of the cOlnpleteness of philosophical accounts as it is understood in the Tractatus. There is, according to him, no such thing as a complete account of the logical grammar of a word that exclu(les all possible misunderstandings relating to it. The remark quoted in 2.21 can, therefore, help us to understand the point in the Investigations §133 about not refining rules in unheard-of ways and Wittgenstein's later conception of the completeness of descriptions of language. Althoug-h complete clarity-ratller than lesser clarit)' of some sortcontinues to be the goal ofWittgenstein's later philosophy, his conception of this goal has been transformed. Now complete clarity is understood as the cOlnplete disappearance of particular philosophical problerns relating to problematic concepts, which does 110t require once-and-for-all accounts or "colnpleted gramlnars" of the relevant concepts. It is also significant that in the Investigations the paragraphs of §133 quoted above are followed by the part of this remark {liscussed in 1.5: "Problems are solved (difficulties eliminated), not a single problem." This confirms that Wittgenstein's shift away from great once-andfor-all solutions to th.e clarification of particular philosophical problems is, indeed, motivated by problems relating to the notion of the conlpleteness of philosophical analyses or aCCOllnts. The aim of philosophical clarification, according to the later Wittgenstein, is not completeness in an abstract sense, as he conceived it in the Tractatus. 93 But let us try to focus even lTIOre sharply on the contrast between the Tractatus's and Wittgenstein's later approaches and the precise sense in which his turn to the discussion of particular problems constitutes a turn away from once-and-for-all determinations of concepts. The quotations

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above from manuscript 121 and the lectures might seem to say merely that philosophical descriptions need not cover all uses of a word in a particular meaning and that it is enough for such descriptions to extend only as far as is necessary for the elimination of certain particular problems. According to this reading, Wittgenstein's point would be that in philosophy one can often do with less than a once-and-for-all account. But this interpretation is problelnatic. The problem is that the view thus attributed to the later Wittgenstein is also compatible with the Tractatus and thus obscures the difference between his early and later conceptions of the cOlnpleteness of clarifications. In particular, the interpretation creates a conflict between Wittgenstein's critique of the Tractatus and his positive characterizations of his later approach, bringing his later thought into the target area of the critique aimed at the Tractatus. As noted in 2.1, the Tractatus too allows for the possibility of dissolving philosophical problems before reaching the ultimate end of analysis. The idea of interrupting an analysis before its ultimate end, therefore, is perfectly compatible with the idea that there are ultimate analyses of concepts that contain solutions to all philosophical problenls relating to them, including those problems that do not require taking analyses to their ultimate end. Similarly with other descriptions of language use: the idea that one does not always need to describe the use of a word in all respects in order to solve a philosophical problem connected with the word is compatible with the idea of an ultiInate description that provides the solution to all problems with the word. Interpreted in the way just outlined, Wittgenstein's later approach therefore does not constitute a decisive shift away from philosophy as a search for great once-and-for-all solutions. It still leaves open the possibility of such solutions. As explained in 2.22, however, Wittgenstein's critique of the idea that there is a single, ultimate end to logical analysis rejects the whole notion of such once-and-for-all solutions. As he argues, it is possible to analyze the use of an expression in more than one way, and what counts as an appropriate analysis is relative to one's interests, where such interests may be specified by reference to the particular philosophical problems that are one's concern. What should then be said about the uses of a word-which logical distinctions must be drawndepends on which problems more specifically one aims to resolve. Accordingly, there might be different analyses of a concept or different

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descriptions of a word's use relative to different problems. The notion of a "description of the essential features of a concept" has no absolute sense, and there need not be a unifying, fundamental, once-and-for-all account that brings together all different analyses or descriptions. Taking these considerations into account, clarification emerges as essentially concerned with particular philosophical problems. That this interpretation, rather than the one mentioned before, captures Wittgenstein's later conception of the description of language is confirmed by the following remark, from a 1933 notebook:~14 "As my students set other examples against examples of the use of a word so as to demonstrate that the word is not used the way I think, the answer is always that these counter-examples are very useful but they do not demonstrate that I have not described the use correctly; for I did not want to say at all that my examples show the use of the word but only one way of using it. The mistake is the assumption that we wanted to illustrate the essence of, say, understanding with these examples and the counter-examples demonstrate that this has not been grasped correctly. As if our aim were to give a theory of understanding that would then have to explain all cases of understanding."95 Thus, according to Wittgenstein, his students misunderstand his purposes when they assume that his characterization of the use of a word-"understanding," in this example-with the help of certain examples is meant to account for all its uses (in the relevant meaning). Consequently, the students' counterexamples are beside the point. They may bring to view matters of interest about the use of the word in question. But they do not make Wittgenstein's description incorrect, because it was not meant to cover all the word's uses (in the relevant meaning) in the first place. Or as Wittgenstein says, his purpose is not to put forward a theory of the essence of understanding, where such a theory would provide an account of what all instances of understanding must be. 96 Rather, he only wants to describe, or clarify with his examples, a certain way or ways in which the word is used. Insofar as Wittgenstein's students' examples really are genuine counterexamples to Wittgenstein's account, they are not compatible with his description in the sense that when used to provide the basis for an account that is intended to cover all cases of the word "understanding," the students' and Wittgenstein's examples exclude each other. This means that insofar as the cases that Wittgenstein and his students

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bring up are all agreed to be genuine cases of understanding, and appropriately described (as Wittgenstein accepts in the remark), they cannot form a unified account. They cannot be consolidated into a once-and-for-all account of the use of "understanding" or the essence of understanding. But this lack of unity by no means makes these descriptions useless from the point of view of philosophical clarification, as conceived by the later Wittgenstein. Descriptions of the use of a word that focus on the different ways in which it is used, or on different aspects of its use, may be employed as reminders about these uses or aspects. Accordingly, such descriptions can enable one to dissolve particular philosophical problems that arise from confusions relating to those uses or aspects, or from ignoring them. As regards the interpretation of Wittgenstein's shift away from philosophical once-and-for-all accounts, the significance of the passage above then is that it provides us with a characterization of his method in which Wittgenstein explicitly denies that the aim of his descriptions is the composition of once-and-for-all accounts of the uses of words. 97 What I have said about the uniformity of philosophical accounts raises other questions about the status of Wittgenstein's later descriptions of language. If there are no once-and-for-all answers to philosophical problems, philosophy's task being the clarification of particular problems and the description of particular cases of language use, does this mean that philosophy becomes an empirical study of language? Does the task now become that of describing a multitude of different instances of language use, apparently an empirical task? Wittgenstein's reply to this question may be found in the following passage on the notion of the description of language, which rejects the idea of philosophy as an empirical study of language: "And this description gets its light, that is to say its purpose, from the philosophical problems. These are, of course, not empirical problems; they are solved, rather, by looking into the workings of our language, and that in such a way as to make us recognize those workings: in despite of an urge to misunderstand them. The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known."98 The point is that philosophical clarification is concerned with dissolving misunderstandings, not with informing anyone about language use as if

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she did not know how to use language or as if the purpose were to collect data abou t differen t ways of using language. Whereas an empirical study informs one about something one did not know (perhaps confirming a hypothesis about how things might be), philosophical descriptions are intended to dissolve confusions relating to something one already knows but has difficulties in understanding and explaining to oneself.'¥.l This difference comes to view in that whereas the correctness of an empirical investigation is judged on the basis of evidence for it (reports about language use need to be well documented, and so on), the criterion of correctness for a philosophical account, insofar as philosophical problems are based on misunderstandings, is the disappearance of the problem: the recognition that it has been resolved or dissolved. 100 Thus although Wittgenstein's shift away from unified once-and-forall accounts of concepts to the description of actual language use may create the impression that philosophy now becomes an empirical, case-by-ease study of language, this impression is misleading. Philosophy is concerned with describing language use because such descriptions can be used to dissolve misunderstandings and unclarities relating to language. But such descriptions concern something one is already familiar with as a competent user of the relevant expressions. They only serve to remind one of what one already knew. 101 In a similar vein, it would be misleading to think that descriptions of particular uses or aspects of language might be employed as a basis for aggregative descriptions combining depictions of individual cases into more comprehensive accounts-unless the aim of comprehensiveness is given a more precise characterization by reference to problems to be resolved. The aim of philosophical clarification cannot be the comprehensiveness of philosophical descriptions as such, in the sense that the descriptions should cover the different uses of words as widely as possible. Rather, comprehensiveness is to be understood in terms of the completeness of a philosophical account, as described above, an account being complete if it dissolves particular actual problems. 102 The foregoing discussion seems also to supply us with an answer to the question of what constitutes Wittgenstein's shift away from questions that are impossible to answer to questions that are easy to answer, as discussed in 1.2 and 1.5. Wittgenstein's "easy questions" concern the

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clarification of particular problems, in contrast to attempts to resolve every possible unclarity that might arise about a concept. They are questions concerning particular usages of words (or aspects ofwords' uses), a comprehension of which is required for the resolution of certain particular problems. The difficulty with this mode of clarification is in arranging what we already know about language use in such a way that problems are eliminated. As G. E. Moore reports from Wittgenstein's lectures, although Wittgenstein said "that he would only tell us 'trivial' things-'things which we all know already' ... the difficult thing was to get a 'synopsis' of these trivialities, and that our 'intellectual discomfort' can only be removed by a synopsis of many trivialities-that 'if we leave out any, we still have the feeling that something is wrong.' "103 This is a genuine difficulty not to be underestimated. Nevertheless, in contrast to the impossibility of reaching definite, once-and-for-all accounts of the grammar of the relevant words-"complete presentations of their grammar"-this difficulty is manageable in principle. Chapters 3 and 4 examine in more detail the method of clarification of particular problems outlined here. Now, however, I will discuss Wittgenstein's characterization of the task of philosophy as that of arranging or ordering knowledge of language use. This provides us with another way of explaining the difference between his early and later conception of philosophical clarification as well as an opportunity to further elucidate his conception of philosophy as the clarification of particular problems. Here I also begin to discuss the contrast between the interpretation of Wittgenstein's approach articulated in this book and the reading of Baker and Hacker.

2.32

Clarification as Arranging and Ordering

As well as depicting philosophy as the description of language use,

Wittgenstein characterizes its task as that of arranging or ordering. The task of philosophy is to bring an order to "our concepts," "the things," or "our knowledge of the use of language," as he alternately formulates his conception. He writes: "The philosophical problem is an awareness of disorder in our concepts, and can be solved by ordering them."104 And in the Investigations: "The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known."I05 A more detailed characterization is given in mantlscript 11 7:

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The expression ofa philosophical confusion: we don't know what to say about it. I don't know how to arrange things, what order to give to the concepts. I don't know, for example, ,vhether I should e.g. classify proofs as experiments, mathematics as a game, contradictions as confusions. Or whether I should say that the difference between Inathematical and experio1ental truths is that of a degree, whether I should say a new proof gives the proposition a new sense. I don't know my way about in the human actions, the techniques of using words, mathematical propositions, proofs. When I should describe them, I'm unable to have a perspicuous view of them. 106

One can say that arranging and ordering, as Wittgenstein conceives it, aims at making concepts (things or human activities) perspicuous. This is achieved by pointing out interconnections, similarities, and differences between different uses of a word-for example, different uses of "proposition"107-or also between the uses of different words. For example, one might ask with this purpose in mind how lnathematical truths relate to empirical truths discovered by way of experiment, whether mathematical proofs are to be understood as demonstrations of the truth of something, or are perhaps better understood as determinations of the sense of mathematical propositions, and so on. I08 As an activity of pointing out similarities and differences, arranging and ordering involves an important element of conlparison: pointing out analogies and so on. 109 Or as Wittgenstein puts it: "The investigation of language is a description and comparing of concepts, also with ad hoc constructed concepts."110 Similarly, he writes about philosophy as conceptual investigation, contrasting this with natural history: "What is it, however, that a conceptual investigation does? Does it belong in the natural history of human concepts?-Well, natural history, we say, describes plants and beasts. But might it not be that plants had been described in full detail, and then for the first time someone realized the analogies in their structure, analogies which had never been seen before? And so, that he establishes a new order alnong these descriptions. He says e.g. 'compare this part, not with this one, but rather with that!' .... He is saying 'Look at it like this' and that may have advantages and consequences of various kinds."lll

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The only example given in this rernark (in a part that I have not quoted) of the advantages and consequences of the activity of ordering is the possibility that it might give a new direction to scientific investigation. Nevertheless, it is clear that Wittgenstein regards the activity of ordering as also of philosophical significance. Establishing an order among things (by pointing out analogies, for instance, or by stating a rule) can turn a set of phenomena that is difficult to make sense ofsay, the different cases of the use of a word-into an orderly, perspicuous, and comprehensible whole. Similarly, it may be necessary to introduce a new order in the place of an old one if the old one creates philosophical problems, for instance, because it is based on misleading analogies. In this way, establishing an order may allow one to understand what was not understandable before. As an example of this procedure of reordering, consider Wittgenstein's suggestion that we regard utterances of pain as extensions of primitive, natural behavior such as cries of pain, rather than as statements about inner objects of knowledge. I 12 As a consequence of reclassifying expressions of pain together with such primitive behaviors, or comparing them with such forms of behavior, problems arising from the traditional conception of first-person utterances of pain as knowledge seem to dissolve. A cry or a moan is not a statement about anything, but an instance of expressive behavior. Through this reconceptualization of the relation of pain to its expression, the gap between them is eliminated and knowledge of others' pain becomes comprehensible. Now Iny knowledge of another person's pain is not seen as involving a problematic clailll about an inner oqject of knowledge to which I have no access. Rather, my knowledge of the other's pain is based on the perception of her pain through its immediate expression. 1l3 Thus, what figures in the old account as an "inner object" inaccessible to others is reclaimed and made accessible by Wittgenstein's account with the help of the notion of expressive behavior. For notably, although I may indeed doubt the genuineness of your moaning in individual cases-this uncertainty is characteristic of the "languagegame"1l4-it is a different thing to say that expressions of pain are therefore always doubtful. This inference presupposes an arguably problematic transition from each (individual) case to every case. 115 In the passage quoted above, the activity of ordering leads to a suggestion to look at things in a new way. Wittgenstein similarly describes or-

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dering as a matter of introducing ne,v pictures: "Wh.o brings abollt an order to where there was no order before, introduces a new picture." 11 6 Accordingly, he regards it as characteristic of philosophy to articulate and propose pictures or '\Tays of looking at things with the purpose of dissolving philosophical problelns. He writes: "The philosopher says: 'Look at it like this-.' 'Are you still puzzled by it?"']]7 Such a suggestion to look at things in a particular way may, for instance, be employed to release sonleone from the grip of a nlisleading picture and a thought-cramp.] 18 Importantly, however, the goal of philosophy is not, according to Wittgenstein, to establish anything like the only correct order of concepts. He writes in the Investigations: "We vvant to establish an order in our knowledge of the use of language: an order with a particular end in view; one out of many possible orders; not the order." )19 Discussions earlier in this chapter can be seen as suggesting that, according to Wittgenstein, there may be different philosophical orderings of concepts depending on ,vhich of their aspects one is concerned with. In order to solve certain philosophical problems, one might establish an order that highlights' certain conceptual connections-for instance, certain analogies and non-analogies between concepts-whereas in the case of other problems, one might concentrate on other features of the concepts in question, establishing a different order. But there need not be an ultimate order, or the order, that brings together all such different orderings. The orders are established, as Wittgenstein says in the passage above, "with a particular end in view," this being the solving of particular philosophical problems. However, Wittgenstein's wordillg in §132 leaves room for different interpretations. According to an interpretation put forward by Baker and Hacker, the different possible orders that Wittgenstein talks about are not different philosophical orders. Rather, Wittgenstein is contrasting his philosophical order with nonphilosophical orders-for instance, with an order established by a philologist. Baker and Hacker write about philosophy's task of ordering: "The order it seeks is not the only proper one. The gralnmarian or philologist arranges linguistic data quite differently, for quite different purposes. The order philosophy seeks to establish is guided by the purpose of resolving philosophical, or conceptual problems."120 Hence, although philosophy does not seek to establish the order of language for all possible purposes, it seeks

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to establish the philosophical order of language. Let us examine this suggestion in more detail. Baker and Hacker, of course, are right in saying that what distinguishes Wittgenstein's ordering of "linguistic data" from that of, say, the philologist's is its purpose-even if the borderline between these two undertakings might be unclear in some individual cases. Unlike the philologist's, Wittgenstein's investigations aim at resolving philosophical problems. 121 But that there are different kinds of orderings of language for different purposes does not yet decide the issue of whether there would be one or many specifically philosophical orders. The existence of different kinds of orders is compatible with both possibilities. Importantly, however, when considered against the background of Wittgenstein's critique of his early thought, problems begin to emerge with Baker and Hacker's view that there is a certain single, ultimate philosophical order of language. Given that the purpose of establishing a philosophical order among concepts or in the knowledge of language use is to resolve philosophical problems, Baker and Hacker's interpretation, in effect, amounts to the claim that there is a certain order oflanguage that contains the solution to all philosophical problems in the context of a relevant language, a region of language, or particular concepts. 122 On the basis of discussions earlier in this chapter, however, one should immediately be alarmed by how closely reminiscent this is of the Tractatus. Baker and Hacker's interpretation brings one right back to the idea that there is a certain definite logical order implicit in language, which logical investigation aims to make perspicuous and the comprehension of which leads to the dissolution of all philosophical problems. But then Baker and Hacker's interpretation appears to be in the target area ofWittgenstein's critique of his early work. Wittgenstein writes in the Tractatus about the notion of an implicit logical order of language and the task of determining it: "All propositions of our colloquial language are actually, just as they are, logically completely in order. That simple thing which we ought to give here is not the model of the truth but the complete truth in itself."J23 More specifically, as explained in 2.1, the Tractatus's aim was not to state truths about logic or to represent the logic of language in propositions. Rather, it was to allow the logical order of language to reveal itself through the construction and employment of a notation governed by logical syntax, in which logic was not obscured by misleading sur-

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face grammatical forms. Now, compare this with what Wittgenstein says in the early 1930s about the notion of a logical order of language and about the remark just quoted: "Was it not a Inistake from me (for that is how it seems to me now) to assume that anyone who uses language plays always a definite game? For was t11at not the meaning of my remark that everything in a proposition 'is in order'-however casllally it is expressed? ... But there is nothing either in order or disorder in that-it would be in order if one could say: this person too plays a game according to a definite fixed set of rules."124 A definite set of rules in the relevant sense is one through ,vhich all possible uses of a concept, for example, are determined. Rather than leaving anything open, such a set of rules provides a once-and-for-all definition or a complete grammar of the concept in the sense discussed in 2.21, charting all logical relations into which the concept fnay enter. 125 Here it is then crucial that although there may be important differences between Baker and Hacker's view of Wittgenstein's later conception of the philosophical order of language and that of the Tractatus,126 insofar as the purpose of tile philosophical order envisaged by Baker and Hacker is to provide the solution to all philosophical problems or unclarities relating to a concept or a set of concepts, this order clearly must amount to a complete gralnmar of the concept or concepts in the relevant sense. Problems with the notion of such a complete gramlnar were already discussed in connection with the Tractatus's notion of the completeness of analysis. How they reemerge in the context of Baker and Hacker's reading may be explained as follows. Given that new philosophical problerrls may always arise, the totality made up of such problems is indeternlinate not only in practice, but in principle. This, however, nleans t1lat the philosophical order of language postulated by Baker and Hacker is unspecifiable, too. As long as no determinate sense is given to the locution "all philosophical problems," no criteria have been determined for what counts as establishing the ultimate philosophical order of language that solves them. Hence, just like the Tractatus's complete analyses of concepts, the ultimate philosophical order postulated by Baker and Hacker is an unattainable ideal. By contrast, as I argue in Chapter 3, it is central to Wittgenstein's later outlook and his approach to philosophy that, rather than postulating a structure of rules of language use which constitutes philosophy's object of description, he conceives rules as a means of description and the clarification of particular philosophical problems. 127 T'his

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methodological move is motivated, on the one hand, by problems relating to the concept of necessity that arise when it is assumed that rules of language constitute philosophy's object of description. On the other hand, as Wittgenstein comes to realize, the logic or the possible uses of language are too complex to be captured in any particular set of rules or a formal notation such as the l'ractatus's concept-script. As I explain in Chapter 3, here one is threatened by a fall into dogmatism, and this threat leads Wittgenstein to rethink the issue of the role of rules in philosophical clarification. In postulating an underlying order of language that philosophy should describe, Baker and Hacker therefore fail to take into account what is arguably a key aspect of the development of Wittgenstein's conception of language and philosophy. In effect, they attribute to him a conception he abandoned in the early 1930s. Another problem with Baker and Hacker's interpretation is that from its point of view, Wittgenstein's introduction of his method of the description of language emerges effectively as a renewed version of the Tractatus's claim that philosophical problems have been solved "in essentials." For insofar as there is an order implicit in language that contains the solution to philosophical problems, and a method has been established for rendering this order perspicuous, then apparently all philosophical problems are already settled in principle. What remains is to work out the details. Thus Baker and Hacker's interpretation seems to involve a return to the kind of great programmatic claim the Tractatus makes about philosophy and its method, now attributed to the later Wittgenstein. But as I explain in 3.1, this programmatic aspect of the Tractatus is ultimately the source of its failure, i.e., its relapse into philosophical theses.] 28 These problems with Baker and Hacker's interpretation suggest that it does not correctly capture Wittgenstein's notion of establishing an order of language. His view is not that there is just one philosophical ordering of the knowledge of language use, but many such orderings. But leaving aside for the moment the rather complex philosophical questions touched upon here, let us next examine textual evidence for this alternative reading. In the quotation from manuscript 117 in the beginning of this subchapter, Wittgenstein mentions as an example of a philosophical

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unclarity the problem of whether mathetnatics should be classified anl0ng games or characterized as a game. Insofar as his purpose is to establish a definite conceptual order, one should apparently expect him to try to give a definite answer to this problem. Wittgenstein, however, rejects this aim in his lectures on the foundations of mathematics: "The thing is not to take sides, but to investigate. It is sometitnes useful to compare mathematics to a ganle and sometimes lllisleading."129 His approach is sitnilar in the case of whether a proof gives a new sense to a proposition. According to Wittgenstein, although one may sometinles characterize proofs in this way, the characterization does not fit all cases. And as he emphasizes, the important thing is to avoid dogmatism about this issue. 130 Although I cannot discuss Wittgenstein's philosophy of rnathematics here at any length, this suggests that the purpose of his cornparison between mathematics and games is not at all to establish the conceptual order and to provide a once-and-for-all answer to the question, what is mathematics? i.e., to determine the essence of mathematics or what all cases falling under the concept of mathematics must be. Rather, the purpose is to highlight a particular aspect of mathernatics. The same applies, mutatis mutandis, to the concept of a mathematical proof. Correspondingly, Wittgenstein's conception of the utterances of pain as instances of expressive behavior rather than statemellts abollt inner objects of knowledge is by no means meant to hold for all utterances of pain. There are also descriptions of pain in the· first-person case, as he is well aware, and the conception of utterances of pain as an extension of primitive behavior does not apply to such cases. (A cry of pain is not a description.) 131 The conceptual order established with the help of the comparison between utterances of pain and primitive expressions, therefore, is not 11leant as the order that allegedly determines how one must always think about the expressions of pain. Instead, it is a possible way of ordering the concepts designed, lllore specifically, to dissolve philosophical problems that arise when talk about sensations is understood on the model of knowledge claims. In his later work on Wittgenstein, Baker abandons the interpretation he propounded earlier with Hacker. Here he seems exactly right when he writes about Wittgenstein's descriptions of grammar: "A comparison which is illuminating for one purpose may be unhelpful or even obfuscating in another context, and a pair of seemingly inconsistent

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analogies may facilitate grasping different aspects of a single thing."I32 And as Baker also notes in this context, such characterizations with analogies and comparisons should not be assumed to be "additive." This ought to be readily understandable against the background of the preceding discussions in this chapter. There is no reason to think that descriptions of language in Wittgenstein's sense should be additive, insofar as they serve the purpose of clarifying particular problems. Arguably, this is also the case with the orderings of language use. They do not add up to a Great Order of Language, but serve to dissolve particular problems. There is also more direct textual evidence in support of the view that the contrast Wittgenstein draws in §132 is between different philosophical orders rather than between philosophical and nonphilosophical orders. Consider the 1937 version of the same remark: "As our aiIn is to break the bewitchment in which certain forms of language hold us, we want to establish an order in our knowledge of the use of language, ,,,hich makes this possible. I.e. an order with a particular end in view; one out of many possible orders."133 According to this formulation, the purpose of the ordering is to break the bewitchment that certain forms of language exert over us. But to say that the purpose is to defeat bewitchment by certain-rather than by some other-forms of language is to say that the purpose of ordering is to dissolve certain specific philosophical problems whose roots are in specific misunderstandings concerning the forIns of language. The order, then, is one out of many possible ones in the sense that it is designed to make possible the dissolution of these particular problems. Correspondingly, it is plausible that Wittgenstein's contrast in §132 is a contrast between different orderings for philosophical purposes, not between the philosophical order and different kinds of nonphilosophical orders. Interestingly, in the Investigations Wittgenstein also makes the following comment on classifying the expressions of a particular languagegame into different kinds: "how we group words into kinds will depend on the aim of the classification .... Think of the different points of view from which one can 'classify tools or chess-men."134 Apparently, this point about classification applies quite generally. How one should order concepts depends on the purposes the order serves. Thus, what is an appropriate philosophical order of COl1.Cepts depends on the unclarities one is trying to clarify and the problems ~_e_i~ ~ry~n_g_t9_r~s_o)~e_ _

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This seelns to settle the dispute concerning Wittgenstein's notion of ordering. Consequently, we also have an answer to the question raised in 1.4 as to whether by achieving a "cralnp-free position" Wittgenstein means SOlne specific state, a particular regrouping of the expressions of language, or only "freedom frOln thought-cramps." Insofar as his aim is not to establish the unique philosophical order of language, the "crampless position" cannot be identified with any particular ordering of our knowledge of language use. Philosopl1ical therapy for Wittgenstein does· not set out to establish any specific order for language use and thought but strives to release thought-cramps. By doing this it aims to enable on~e's thoughts to move more freely and allo,,, one to "philosophize well." 135 Next, we need to examine more closely Wittgenstein's conce}Jtion of philosophical descriptions of language in order to get a clearer grasp of his shift away froln great problenls and philosophical theories and theses. In the following chapter, I also seek to define the notion of a philosophical theory or thesis more precisely by discussing the concept of metaphysics or metaphysical philosophy, which is a mode of philosophizing that aspires to establish philosophical theses in the relevant sense, and with which Wittgenstein explicitly contrasts his approach. One key problem with Inetaphysical philosophy for him is the danger of dogmatism. Accordingly, his later approach to philosophy constitutes a strategy for avoiding dogmatism in philosophy.

THREE

From Metaphysics and Philosophical Theses to Grammar: Wittgenstein's Turn

in a notebook from 1938: "The greatest danger that threatens the mind in philosophizing comes from the metaphysical tendency that takes over it and completely topples the gramnlatical."l Evidently he wishes to distinguish his approach from tnetaphysical philosophy, but the question is, how exactly is this distinction to be understood? The Investigations employ the phrase "turning our whole examination around" to characterize a methodological shift in Wittgenstein's philosophy. I argue that this shift, Wittgenstein's turn, marks his break away from metaphysical philosophy and explains what he means by not having theses, doctrines, or theories in his later philosophy. The turn n'lay also be characterized as a passage from his early philosophy to his later philosophy, that is, to philosophy as conceptual or grammatical investigation. 2 Accordingly, an examination ofWittgenstein's turn can provide us with a more precise account of the shift outlined in earlier chapters from great problems to particular problems. I begin by discussing the Tractatus's attempt to disengage itself from metaphysical philosophy and its relapse into metaphysics and philosophical theses (3.1). I then proceed through what Wittgenstein says about metaphysical philosophy and his analysis of the Tractatus's failure (3.2) to an examination of the notion of conceptual investigation as tile description of language use. Having discussed the problem of dogmatism in connection with such descriptions, and how this problem emerges in the context of Baker and Hacker's interpretation of the later Wittgenstein (3.3), I examine the idea of the turn first in more

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general terIllS (3.4) and then specifically with regard to the role of rules in philosophical clarification (3.5 and 3.6). Finally, I address (in 3.7) some possible misunderstandings relating to the interpretation developed in this chapter, among these a question about the notion of the logic of language. In this chapter, Wittgenstein's turn is described as a response to the problem of dogmatism in philosophy as well as to problems relating to the concept of necessity. As explained in Chapter 6, the turn also leads to the dissolution of philosophical (conceptual) hierarchies.

3.1

Philosophical Theses, Metaphysical Philosophy, and the Tractatus

A philosophical thesis in the traditional sense is a thesis concerning an essence. Just as traditionally, essences have been the concern of metaphysical philosophy or Inetaphysics. Therefore, it seeins possible to clarify the notion of a philosophical thesis by examining the concept of metaphysical philosophy. I discuss here two characteristics of metaphysical philosophy and how tl'1ey manifest themselves in connection wit~ the Tractatus's program for clarification. My discussion of these two characteristics, however, is not meant to provide a definition of the concept of metaphysics valid for every possible case in ,vhich we might classify something as an instance of metaphysical philosophy. The characterization I offer is not meant as exclusive in this sense. Rather, I aim simply to draw attention to certain characteristics that seem central to the metaphysical mode of thinking, while leaving open the possibility that there might be other grounds for describing someone's thinking as lnetaphysical. (The characterization offered here is a definition to be used as an object of comparison in a sense to be explained later.) Metaphysical philosophy can be characterized as the pursuit ofkrlowledge or understanding of necessary truths or principles that govern what there is, or rather, what there could be. 3 Metaphysics, that is to say, is not just an inventory of empirically, contingently existing things. It puts forward theses-doctrines or theories 4-about the essence or nature of its objects of investigation. Such theses are intended to capture the necessary characteristics of these objects in contrast to what is accidental to them. Metaphysical theses, that is to say, state what something must be in order to be (or count as) whatever it is. Put in another way, such theses bring to

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view what things really are in contrast to what they might happen to be, or-from the point of view of epistemological concerns-might appear to be. As regards their generality, given that metaphysical theses concern characteristics necessary to the objects falling under a concept, all objects falling under that concept must have the relevant characteristics. Hence metaphysical theses, if correct, are universally valid for those objects. (If y is a necessary characteristic of an x, then anything, in order for it to count as an x, must have the characteristic y.) Although the concepts of universality and generality are not identical;" one might say that a metaphysical thesis applies to objects falling under a relevant concept with complete generality. The generality of such a thesis is qualitatively different from that of an empirical generalization. As for the Tractatus, as explained in 2.1, it might be understood as an attempt to move away from statements concerning essences and in this sense from philosophical or metaphysical theses. Instead, the necessary is to be elucidated in terms of the concept-script. Making plain the logic of expressions, this notation brings to the fore what is necessary and possible, thereby also excluding statements about the necessary and the possible. 1i Consequently, the concept-script would make clear the logical distinction between the elucidation of what is essential on the one hand and factual statements on the other. Any attempt to make a statement about the essential would be revealed as nonsensical through logical analysis, that is, translation into the concept-script. 7 The motives of Wittgenstein's attempt to clarify the distinction between the essential and the factual are evident. He is concerned with dissolving "the confusion, very widely spread among philosophers, between internal relations and (proper) external relations," where an internal relation is one that it is inconceivable for an object not to possess. s At the level of logic, the purpose is to get rid of "the confusion of formal concepts with proper concepts which runs through the whole of the old logic."9 Similarly, in a letter to Russell after the completion of the Tractatus manuscript, Wittgenstein characterizes the distinction between the factual and the necessary-or, expressed in the Tractatus's transitional vocabulary, the distinction between what a proposition says and what it shows-as his "main point" and "the cardinal problem of philosophy."10 Wittgenstein's distinction implies a shift in the methodology of philosophy. His idea that a concern with the essential is not a matter of making true/false statements about anything suggests an elemental difference

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beMeen philosophy and the sciences. Philosophy with its statements about essences is not a superscience that reaches an even higher level of generality than other sciences. Nor is it a more fundamental science that investigates what other sciences presuppose. Rather, philosophy is not engaged in theoretical assertion at all. Its task consists solely in the clarification or clear expression of what is said. II But although the Tractatus's distinction between a concern with truths and a concern with essences seems to make obsolete the central metaphysical notion of necessary truth, to draw this distinction as the Tractatus seeks to do arguably does not suffice to constitute a departure from metaphysical philosophy and philosophical theses. The problem pertains, in the first instance, to what Wittgenstein thinks it means to introduce a philosophical method in general (what sort of a claim this involves), and consequently to the Traclatus's conception of philosophy as logical analysis. More specifically, the Tractatus aspires to put forward a program for philosophy as logical analysis that is universally applicable to all philosophical problems. Any philosophical problem, Wittgenstein maintains, can be dissolved by means of the method introduced in the Tractatus-if it has not already been dissolved just by setting up this method. Accordingly, Wittgenstein seems to be in a position to claim that the Tractatus has solved all philosophical problems "in essentia!s."12 In effect, however, these methodological views constitute a thesis about the essence of philosophy, that is, about how one must philosophize or about the correct method of philosophy. That is, any method that can do the same job as the Tractatus's would apparently count as equivalent to it. With respect to their clarificatory power, such methods would be essentially identical, differing only in their accidental characteristics. But if so, then Wittgenstein's method is not just one among others, that is, a way in which one can solve philosophical problems. His method is how one must philosophize. This is the first sense in which the Tractatus puts forward a philosophical thesis. Moreover, by presenting the Tractatus's scheme of analysis or concept-script as one that can be applied to any philosophical problem what