B
B EDITED BY JEREMY BLACK
CONTEN TS
Mughal army ar thefirsr barrieof Panipar, 1526.
Hopliresoldiersled rhe Greek...
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B
B EDITED BY JEREMY BLACK
CONTEN TS
Mughal army ar thefirsr barrieof Panipar, 1526.
Hopliresoldiersled rhe Greeks rovicroryar Mararhon, 490BC.
Contents
Medieval World Intr od ucti on
46
9
Poiti ers (732)
49
10
Lechfeld (9S5)
51
8
11
Hasti ngs (1066)
54
World map
10
12
Manzikert (1071)
58
Int rodu cti on
12
13
Hatti n (1187)
61
14
Liegnitz (1241)
65
15
Hakata Bay (1281)
69
16
Bannockburn (1314)
71
17
Crecy (1346)
74
18
Ankara (1402)
78
19
Agi ncourt (1415)
81
Contributors
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www .thamesandhudson.com 0 200 5 Thames &Hudson ltd . london Design : Thomas Keenes AllRights Reserved. No part of thispublicationmay be reproduced or transmitted in any formor by anymeans. electrook or mechanical. includingphotocopy, recordingor anyother informattonstorageand retrievalsystem. without prior permission in writing from the publisher. BritishLibrary Cataloguing-in-Publicabon Data A cataloguerecordfor thisbook ls avaitable fromthe BritishLibrary
2 0 The Fall of Constantinople (1453)
85
21
89
Bosworth (1485)
Sixteenth Century
Ancient World
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Introduction
16
Marathon (490 BC)
19
22 Flodden (1 513)
95
Salam is (480 BC)
23
23 Tenochtitlan (1521)
98
Gaug amela (331 BC)
27
24 Pavia (1525)
103
Cannae (216 BC)
32
25 Panipat (1526)
107
Gaixia (203 BC)
36
26 Moh acs (1 526)
110
Act ium (31 BC)
38
27 Lepanto (1571)
113
Teuto burg Fore st (AD 9)
42
28 The Armada (1588)
118
Adrianopl e (378)
44
ISBN-l3, 97B-G-500-2S12S-6 ISBN-10: 0-500-25125-8
Printedandbound in China
ArCrecy, 734 6, Englisharchersthen knighrs slaughrered rheFrench.
Half-t itle RedArmy soldiersgo on rheorrock during Operari on Baqrato», tbeSoviet summer offensive of 7944 . Title page ThebarrieofWo rerloo, 78June 7875.
92
Introd uct io n
CON TE NTS
CON TENTS
US Sherman tank entering StL6in the Battle for Normandy, 1944.
Prince Eugenedefeats the Turks at the battl e of Belgrade, 1717.
Ninet eent h Century
Seventeenth Century
29 30 31 32 33 34
Intr oduction
122
Sekigahara (1600)
125
Breitenfeld (1631)
129
Nor dlinqen (1634)
133
Shanhaiguan (1644)
136
Naseby (1645)
138
Vienna (1683)
142
44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53
Int roduct io n
180
Trafalgar (1805)
183
Leipzig (1813)
188
Waterloo (1815)
193
Ayacucho (1824)
198
Mexico City (1847)
200
Inkerm an (1854)
203
Antietam (1862)
206
Gettysburg (1863)
210
Sadowa (1866)
215
Omdurman (1898)
218
Modern Times
Eighteenth Century
35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43
Relief of thesiegeof Vienna, ' 683.
Introduction
146
Blenheim (1704)
149
Poltava (1709)
153
Belgrade (1717)
156
Rossbach (1757)
159
Plassey(1757)
163
Quebec (1759)
165
Saratoga (1777)
169
Yorktown (1781)
173
Jemappes (1792)
177
Thebattleaf Trafalgar, lB05.
54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70
Introduction
222
Tsushima (1905)
225
Tannenberg (1914)
229
Jutland (19 16)
232
Verdun (19 16)
236
The Western Front (19 18)
240
Battle of Britain (1940)
245
Battle for Moscow (1941)
250
Stalingrad (1942-43)
255
Midway (1942)
260
Battle of the Atlantic (1940-43)
264
Battle for Normandy (1944)
268
Operation Bagration (1944)
273
The American Air Attack on Japan (1945)
276
Huai-Hai (1948-49)
279
Dien Bien Phu (1953-54)
282
The Tet Offensive (1968)
284
The Iraq War (2003)
287
Further Reading
291
Sources of Illustrations
297
Sources of Quotations
298
Index
298
CONTRIBUTORS
Contributors
Camb ridg e and as an aut hor. His
incl ude TheOriginsofrheAmericanCivil
publicat ions incl ude Chronicleofthe
War (1996), TheAmerican Civil Warand the
the aut ho r of Medieval ChineseWarfare,
RomanRepublic (2003), TheEnemiesof
WarsoftheIndustrial Revolution (1999) and
300-900 (2002) and co-editor of A Mili tary
Rome(2004) and TheSonsofCaesar
Robert E. Lee:Icon for a Nation (2005). He is
HistoryofChina (2002). 4
(fort hcoming). 1,3,5,7,8
an elected Trustee of the US Society for Military History. 48 ,50
Jeremy Black is Professor of History at the
widely on many aspects of military history
Naval Muriniesoftne TwentiethCenrury: An
University of Exeter . Born in London, he
but specialize s in air power, the interwar
Inrernarionol Perspective, edited with
Ross Hassig isan historica l
Charles Messenger served in the Royal
was edu cated in Cambr idge and Oxford
era and World War II. His publications
Christopher Bell (2003). He is currently
ant hropo logist specializing in
Tank Regiment for 20 years before
Lawrence Sondhaus is Professor of
before teaching at the University of
include Air Pawer in the AgeofToral War
wo rking o n both a China history t extbook
Precolumbian and colonial Mexico. His
becoming a full-time military historian
History at the University of Indianapolis,
Durham. He received an MBEin 2000 for
(1999) and BririshArmour in tbe Normandy
and an edited book on naval blockades
pub licat io ns include Trade, Tribute, and
and defence analyst. He has wr itten
where he also serves as Director of the
services to stamp de sign. Professor Black
Campaign 1944 (2004). 59 , 63 , 66
wi t h S.C.M. Paine, as well as a naval
Transportation: TheSixteenth-Cenrury
numerous books , mainly on 20th -century
Institute for the Study of War and Diplomacy. His latest books are Naviesof
has appeared frequent ly on television and
hi story of China. 67
rad io, and has lectured in th e USA,
Bruce Coleman is a member of th e
Canada, Australia, New Zealand , Japan,
Department of Histo ry at the Univer sity of
Political Economy ofthe Valley of Mexico
warfare, and among his recent
(1985), Aztec Warfare:Imperial Expansion
publications are The D-Day Arias (2004)
Europe, 1815-2002 (2002) and Naviesin
Charles J. Esdaile has a Personal Chair at
and Political Control (1988), War and
and Call ro Arms (2005), an in-de pt h stud y
Modern World History (2004). 54 , 56, 62
Denmark, Germany, Italy, Spain and
Exeter. His w ork on 19th-eentury Briti sh
the School of History in the University of
Society in Ancienr Mesoamerica (1992),
oft he Brit ish Arm y 19 14- 18. 60 ,61 , 64,
France. His many bo o ks include War:
history incl ude s TheIdea ofrhe City (1973)
Liverpool. A leading expert on t he
Mexico and theSpanish Conquest (1994)
65
Tim Travers is Professor Emeritus at th e
Past, Presenr and Furure (2000), World War
and Conservatism and the Conservarive
Napoleonic Wars and , in particular,
and Time, History, and Belief in Aztecand
University of Calgary . He is the author of
Twa (2003) and RerhinkingMilirary Hisrory
Party (1988). 49, 53
Colonial Mexico (2001). 23
(2004). 33, 35, 39, 40, 41,42
Napoleonic Spain, he is the author of many books and art icleso n t he period
Michael Neiberg is Professor of History at
three books on World War I: The Killing
the United States Air Force Academy. His
Ground (1987), How the War Was Won (1992) and Gallipoli 1915(2001);a nd is co-
Philip de Souza is Lecturer in Classicsat
including The Wars of Napoleon (1995), The
Harald Kleinschmidt is Professor of the
recent books include Warfareand Society
Gabor Agoston is Associate Professor in
University College Dublin, specializing in
Peninsular War: A New Hisrory (2002) and
Hist ory of Int ernational Relat ions at the
in Europe, 1898 to the Presenr (2003) and
author of World History of Warfore (2002).
t he Department of History , Georgetown
Greek and Roman history. He is th e aut hor
Fighring Napoleon: Guerrillas, Bandits and
Uni versity ofTsukuba, and Profe ssor of
Fighting the Great War:A Global History
Currently he is w rit ing a history of piracy .
Advenrurersin Spain, 1808-1814 (2004) . 46
European St ud ies at the University of
(2005). 4 7, 52, 55, 57
58
University, Washin gton, DC, w here he
of Piracyin theGraeco-Roman World
teaches cour ses on th e Ottoman Empire
(1999), Seafaring and Civilizarion: Maririme
and the Mi ddle East. His research interests
Perspecrives on World Hisrory (200 1), The
John France is Professor of Med ieval
Geschichteder intemati onolen
Gervase Phillips is Princ ipa l Lectu rer in
Spencer T. Tucker retired in 2003 aft er 36
include Ottoman history , early mod ern
Peloponnesian War 43 1-404 BC(2002) and
History at the Univ ersity of Swan sea,
Beziehungen (1998), TheNemesis ofPower
History at Manchester Met ropol it an
years of university teaching , t he last six as
Islami c and Euro pean w arfare and the
TheGreek and Persian Wars 499-386 BC
w hose special fiel ds of interes t are
(2000), Unders randing theMiddleAges
University. He is th e author of TheAnglo-
holde r of t he John Bigg s Chair in Mi litary
comparative study of t he Ottoman,
(2003). 2, 6
crusad ing histo ry and medieval warfare .
(2000, reissue 2003), Menschen in
Scots Wars 1513-1 550 (1999) and has
History at th e Virginia Military Inst it ute. He
His Vieroryin tbe Easr (1994) is a st udy of
Bewegung (2002), Fernweh und
contributed art icles to academic j ournals
is curr ently Senior Fellow in Milita ry
recent publication is Guns forrhe Sultan:
Michael Duffy is a Reader in British
the m ilitary history ofthe First Crusade,
Grossmachtsuchr.Ostasienim
including TheJournal ofMilitary History,
History for ABC-CLIO Publi shing , and is the
Milirary Pawer and tne WeaponsIndusrry in
History and Director of th e Centre for
while Wes rern Warfarein the Ageof the
europaischen Weltbild der Renaissance
War and Society, Warin History, The
author or editor of two dozen books of
the Orroman Empire (2005). 18, 20, 26, 27,
Maritime Histor ical Studie s atthe
Crusades 1000- 1300 (1999) analyzes the
(2003), People on theMove (2003) and
Scottish Historical Review and Technology
military and naval hi story , most recently
34,37
University of Exeter. He is also Vice
develo pm ent of Europ ean wa r asa w hole.
Charles V. TheWorld Emperor (2004). 15, 29
and Culture. 21 , 22 , 24, 25
President of the Navy Records Society . His
His lat est book, TheExpansion ofCarholic
Habsburg and Russian empires. His mo st
Tokyo. Among his many publicat ions are
th e fiv e-volum e Encyclopedia ofWorld War
II (2004) and Stephen Decatur: A LifeMost
Charles R. Bowlus is Profes sor Emerit us of
recent pub licat ions include TheGlorious
Christendom , 1000-1714 (2005) brings
Peter Lo rg e teaches Chin ese histo ry and
Michael Prestwich is Professor of History
Histo ry at t he University of Arkansas at
FirsrofJune:A Naval Battleand irs
together the themes of warfare and
film at Vander bil t University. He
at t he Unive rsity of Durham . His research
crusadi ng . 9, 11, 12, 13, 14
specializes in t he military and political
int erestscentre on 13th - and 14th -cent ury
Peter Wilson is Professo r of Early Modern Hist ory at th e Univ ersity of Sunderland.
Bold and Daring (2004). 51 , 68, 69 , 70
Little Rock and has published more t han
Aftermarh (2002), TheNaval Miscellany vol.
forty art icles in Eng lish and German on
6 (2003) and articles on t he battl e of
histo ry of 10t h- and 11th- cent ury China,
England . His books include TheThree
Medieva l Central European Histo ry. His
Trafalg ar in Mariner'sMirror and Journal for
Jan Glete is Professor of History at
and is the author of Warand Politicsin
Edwards (1980), Edward I (1988), Armies
His recent bo oks include Absolutism in
mo st im portant boo k is Franks, Moravians
Maririme Research (2005). 44
Stockholm Unive rsity . Among his recent
EarlyModernChino, 900-1 795 (2005). His
and Warfarein theMiddle Ages: TheEnglish
Central Europe (2000) and From Reich to
publicat ionsare Navies and Nations:
next project is a hi sto ry of th e effects of
Experience (1996) and Planragenet England
Revolution: German History 1558-1806
Danube (1995). His mo st recent study is
Bruce A. Elleman is an Associat e
Warships, Naviesand SrareBuilding in
g un pow der o n Asian wa rfare and society.
1225- 1360(2005). 16, 17, 19
(2004). He is curr ently w riti ng a history of
Augusr 955. The BarrieofLechfeld and rhe
Professor in th e Maritime History
Europeand America, 1500-1860 (1993),
32
EndofrheAgeofM igrarionsin the Wesr (in
Department oft he USNaval War Coll eg e,
Warfareor Sea 1500-1 650: Maririme
press 2005). 10
focu sing o n Chin ese naval, milita ry and
Con fliersand the Transformation ofEurope
Philip Ma tyszak studied ancien t history
Am erican Hist ory and Mi litary Institutions
diplo mat ic hist ory. Recent boo ks include
(2000) and Warand the Statein Early
at Oxford Unive rsity wh ere he received his
and Head of th e Depart ment of War
and Magyars. TheSrruggle far rheMiddle
8
Dav id A. Graff is Associate Professor of History at Kansas State Unive rsity. He is
th e Thirt y Years War. 30, 31, 36, 38 , 43, 45 Brian Holden Reid is Professor of
John Buckley is Senior Lect urer in War
Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989
Modern Europe: Spain, the Dutch Republic
doct orat e on the senate of the Lat e
Stud ies at King 's College, London. He has
Stud ies at t he University of
(2001). Wilsonand China: A RevisedHisrory
and Sweden asFiscal-Military States,
Roman Republ ic. He currently works as a
written extensively on American history in
Wolverhampton, UK.He has published
ofrhe 1919 ShandongQuesrion (2002), and
1500-1650 (2002). 28
computer systems administrator in
the mid-19th century, and his books
9
,.
...
60 Battle for Mo s ow
:; y
.
61 Stalmgrad
63 Battl e of the At lantic 41 Saratoga /
54 Tsushima
.\ 62 Mid way
" I
•'.
)
65 Operat .ion Bagration \.
47 Ayacucho
V I A1
1/
28 The Armada
y)
W~terlOo
19A9i n CO~ ~?/. i 3~Bl5 enh:~m
I
17 Crecy 64 Battle for Normandy 58 The Western Front
/-
,
t
•
.,
/
57 Verdun 43 Jemappes 10
I·
9 Poit iers
..
1
55 Tannenberg 7 Teutoburg Forest 33 Naseby 30 Breitenfe ld 59 Battl e of Britain / 14 Liegnitz 1 Hastmgs / . •• • 46
31
r li~j1
36 Poltava
\.
INTRODUCTION
Introduction
I
n th is collect ion, distingu ished scholarsseek to
give shape to th e chaos of war at its climactic moments. The boo k covers land and sea battles, aswell as sieges and campaigns in the air. Our range isglobal. We include not only the major and familiar battles such as Waterloo (1815) and 5talingrad (1942), but also less well-known but still very important battles. These include Hakata Bay (128!), in which a Mongol invasion force based in China was defeated when it sought to invade Japan. This ensured that Japan, unlike
Korea, would remain outs ide the orbit of the Chinese (then ruled by t he Mongols), and thu s that it would follo w a different course. 5ekigahara (1600), anoth er batt le included in this collection, was crucial in the consolidat ion of Japan at the close of the protracted civil warfare of the 16th century. This helped ensure in the long term that a united Japan would be in a position to retain its independence from Western control, whereas more divided areas found it difficult to do so. Another neglected battle, Panipat (1526) in India, led to the Mughal ascendancy of Hindustan , and thus created th e basic political unit in South Asia for two centuries. In discussing the nature of battle from ancient times to the present - itscauses, cour ses and con sequences - the contributors are reminding us not only that fighting is the crucial element of mil itary history, but also that battle hasbeen far fro m constant in character. Fighting is not some result of the corruption of human kind by society: it is integral to human society. From the outset, hum ans comp eted wi th other animals, and fed and protected themselves as a result of th ese strugg les. Yet, even the facts of death and mutilation have meant very different th ings to people in contrast ing cultures . From the physical immediacy of the hand -to-hand warfare between Greeks and Persiansat Marathon (490 Be) to the distancing of death in much (but by no means all) modern warfare, we are also reminded of the very different waysfighting hasoccurred.
Armoured
horsemen, such as this Turkish example of th e 15th century, were
prominent in late medieval warfare
inwestern and centralAsia.
12
Difference extends to the frequency of battle. In terms of large-scale engagements for which reliab le sources exist, battle has not been spread evenly across the world. Instead, part icular areas and cultures have engaged in battle, while for others, such as the Aborig ines of Australia, conflict was on a smaller sca le and is difficult to recover from the available sources.
Choice of battles Any select ion of batt les of course involves debate, and part of th e interest of reading t his boo k is decidi ng how you would have cho sen differently. We have been gu ided by a number of factors,among which reliable sources is very signifi cant: for certain important battles, there are no such sources. We have also sought to use the selection to indicate changes in the nature of war - some of these changes can be presented as developments in the art of war. Certainly, the greater complexity that stemmed in t he 19th cent ury from needing to respond to rail-borne tro ops and, in the 20th century from mechanized, aerial and submarine warfare, created problems for commanders. We have also sought to con-
sider key batt les that dete rmined the fate of peop le and affected the distribution of power, fo r example Quebec (1759), which ensured t hat French power and culture would not dominate
The defeat of the Spanish Arm ada
North America. The drama of these clashesvaried great ly, but all of them were crucial events in history. It is more difficult to assess what happened on
bottles in hista ry, leadi ng ul timately to English
in 1588wos one of the most
crucial naval
ascendancy at sea.
a battlefield than is generally appreciated. When several sources exist, the need to reconcile them suggests the problems (of omission ) facing scholars when they have on ly one source upon which to rely. When it is possible to move from a single source to consider several, there is a welcome deepening of understanding. This underlines the drawback of work that seeks to rely on a lim ited
13
INTRODUCTION
I NTRODUCTION
set. As a result, Weste rn forces were deplo yed at great distances, for example by the British (successfully) to Plassey in Indi a in 1757, and by the Russian fleet (unsuccessfully) to Tsushima in 1905.Thiswas clearly warfare acrossthe world . This fo rce projection, the n, did not necessarily entail success. Instead, t he abili ty to force a path along particular routesand to gain control of individual sites did not mean t he subjugation of a society. What was crucial was t he willingness to accommodate (even acculturate to ) conquerors. This has varied greatly, and will continue to do so, ensuring that battle has to be understoo d as an aspect of a wider process. For example, the Spanish conquest of the Aztec and Inca em pires in 1519-21 (see Tenocht itlan p. 98) and 1S31 respectively was follo wed by the arrival of colonists and th eir livestock, by Christian pro selytization and th e destruction of rival religious rit uals,by th e int roducti on of Spanish admi nist ration st ruct ures, and yet, also, by a degree of Spanish acceptance of local elites as well as of local adaptation to the Spaniards. As will be made clear in this book, each batt le, however small, has contributed to the state of today 's world and will continue to influence our ever-changing reactions to conflict. The so-called 'Bottl e of the Nations' at Leipzig, 14-19 Octo ber IBI3, marked the beginning of the collap se of the
Napoleonic empire since it fed to the expulsion of
Frenchforcesfrom Germa ny.
14
range of material, a point made by Hans DelbrOck (1848-1929), a key figu re in th e develo pme nt of German mili tary history, w ho em phasized th e value of the critical examinat ion of sources. This is also true for more recent battles , A paper on t he tank strength of German armoured divisions in 1942-43 produced for the official British histories of World War II argued that casualties and fluctuating replenishment priorities were important factors in variations and commented: 'It shows how misleading formal establishments can be compared with the actual - and
rabbits out of hat s, as an adj utant a long time ago!' Tank strength was a particular issue because,asCaptain BasilLiddell Hart pointed out,
wh ich conta ins discussion of battles that were im portant to the period and also indi cated key aspects of warfare. The organizat ion of th e
'To deduce correct lessons it is necessary, above all, to determine the tank strengths on either side in any important operations: Reconciling sources involved addressing issues such as how best to distinguish those tanks that were fit for action ,
volume - Ancient World, Medieval World , and the n a section each for 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th centuries and Modern Times, the last extend ing to includ e th e Iraq War of 2003 - reflects both the greater frequency of key battles over the last half-
and also the treatment of light tanks that were on ly appropriate for reconnaissance duties. This serves to underline some of the problems wi t h explaini ng what happened . To state that the con tributors have do ne their best is th erefore high
millen nium and the availability of sources. This greater frequency was in part due to the expansion in power projection stemming not only from the development of oceangoing ships, but also
fluctuati ng - establish ment of a divis ion, and illu stratesth e importa nce of keepi ng thi sfactor in min d. It doubtless applies to all armies at one time or another in their war careers: Brigadier C. 1. C. Molony added, 'I am apt to turn a rather jaundiced eye on strength returns -
Organization ofthe book
from the will ingness to use such vessels in order to create transoceanic maritime empires - a met hod particularly seen with the weste rn European powers, whose ships first circumnavigated the globe. Philip II of Spain (reigned 1556-98), after wh om th e Philippines were named, was th e
perhaps because of vague memories of conjuring
The book is divided into seven part s, each of
ruler of th e first emp ire on which the sun never
praise. These scholarly contr ib utions hig hlight what can be done in throwi ng ligh t on crucial episodes in world history,
Aerialcombat was a key innovation of20th-ce ntury
war. During the Battle ofBritain, summer 1940, the Spitfire figh ter
planeproved more than a match for the German
Messerschmitts.
15
-
.. . '.
Ancient
World erman nationalists in the 19th century
G
raised a great statue in 187Sof Arminius, a German tribal leader, wielding the sword
of vengeance to celebrate his victory in AD 9 over the Romans at Teutoburg Forest. This captured the continued resonance of the great battles of antiquity in the modern world. In 1914, German strategists planned to repeat, at the expense of the French, Hannibal 's victory over the Romansat Cannae (216 BC). Greek triumphs over the invading Persians, especially at Marathon and Salamis (490 and 480 BC respectively), are still used to indicate that larger forces could be defeated by those who were more 'civilized', although the depiction of the Persiansis often unduly harsh. We also consider other major battles in this open ing chapter. Gaixia (203 BCl. a key event in the rise of the longstanding Han emp ire in China, is a reminder that crucial clashesdid not occur onl y in Europe; while
"
Octavian's victory over Mark Antony and Cleopatra at Actium (31 Be) draws attention alongside Salamis to the key role of naval power. It led to Rome's dominance of the eastern Mediterranean. The batt les of antiqu ity present considerable difficu lties forthe historian, but new insightshave come from a variety of sources. For example , an increase in archaeological evidence makes it possible to cast fresh light on batt les such as that between Sparta and th e Persian invaders of Greece at Thermopylae, the prelude to the more major engagement at Sa lamis later in the year. Other insights come from study ing weapons and martial equipment. Thus, an assessment of the properties of galleys has proved very important
Theheavily armed Greek hoplite infantrymen - seen here in a Corinthian black-figure vase ofc. 625 Be- became the standard by which other soldiers were m easured in antiquity.
Marathon Date: August 490 BC Location: Attica , Greece At M ara thon we stood alone against Persia. And our courage in that mighty endeavour defeated the men of46 nations. (THEATHENIANSCLAIM THEPLACE OFHONOURAT PLATAEA) HERODOTUS9.27
arat hon was a batt le of opposites.
M
A tiny democ~atic city-state op~osed. a despotic empire hundreds of times ItS
size. One army was almo st entirely composed of armo ured infantrymen, the other of horsemen and archers.Thisclash of cult ures was profound ly to Full-scale reconstructionof
a trireme. the Olympias. The necessity for ma npo wer to propel the ship greatly limited the cruisingrangeof such ships, as rhey had ro srop to rake
on morewaterand food.Across the world, thiswasa
majorlimitation to oared warships, whethertriremes
orthe warcanoes of, in particular, thePacilic.
18
L
affect
the
subsequent
developm ent
of
fo r unde rstanding options and choicesat Salamis and Actium. Similarly, understanding of eques-
army based on th e adu lt males of the farmi ng popu lation, and this provided huge reserves of
Western civilizatio n. For the city-state was Athens, where a func-
trian factors has helped lead to questions about whether chariots charged en masse and were
manpower. The Romans used these against Carthage and also in the conquest of Greece. Alongside warfare with similar regular forces, the armies of th e more settled states fo und t hemselves in confl ict wit h nomadic forces.Thus, aft er
tioni ng democracy had been created just two decades previously. The previous ruler of Athens, Hippi as, had fled to the court of Darius I (521-486
t herefore really deadly in battle.The net impact of research has been to offer greater depth to knowledge currentl y stemming fro m a simple reliance on literary sources. For examp le, in con-
BC), king of Persia, whose empire stretched from the Aegean Sea to th e banks of th e Indus. Until they were conqu ered by Persia, the Greek colo nies in Asia Minor had been independent.
sidering Cannae, it is important to amplify the Classical historian Polybius's account in order to
the Han gained po wer in China in th e civil war, they were challenged by the Xiongn u confede ration of nomadic tribes, while the Romans were
move beyond a schematic depiction of the battle. The battles of antiquity are frequently discussed in terms of the 'great man' approach of
put under increasing pressure in the late 4th century, with the emperor Valens defeated and killed by the Visigoths at Adrianople in 378.
Unsurprisingly, they felt a greater affinity with their former homeland of Greece than with their ruler thousan ds of miles away in Persia. The Greeks of Asia Minor rebelled against the Per-
history, wi th commanders such as Alexander th e Great at Gaugamela in 331 BC, Hannibal at Cannae, and Armini us at Teutobu rg Forest. This
The major series of attacks between AD 250 and 500 known as th e 'barbarian' invasions th at
sians,and were assisted by Athenian soldiers w ho captured and burn ed Sa rdi s, the capital of Lydia,
destr oyed or weakened the empires in Eurasia and brought down the western Roman empire was, in fact, another stage in a longstanding
in 498. Herodo tus the histo rian te lls us:
approach frequen tly overlap ped with the literary genre of the epic and with the style of the romance, thus treating battle as theatre. A focus on great men is fascinating and - in each of the cases above - their generalship made a key difference to the battle, but it can ensure that second-rank commanders, or simply those over-
series of struggles and complex diplomacy between such empires and tribes. These invasions were also aspects of major migrations. Some of the invasions were mounted by cavalry, which is oft en held to have become more effec-
might p unish them ", ond he set a slave to tell him
shadowe d by th e more flamboyant or apparently noteworthy, are generally neglected. This makes it harder to evaluate command skills, let alone other factors in success. For example, the Romans, like the Han in China, believed in a mass
tive as a result of the stirrup in Central Asia, the region where the horse had first been domesticated. Not all 'barbarians' employed cavalry, but many of the most effective raiders and con querors we re horsemen .
'Darius enquired who these Athenians were, and on being to ld ... he prayed "Grant to me, God, that I three times as he sat do wn to dinne r "Master, remem ber the Athenians".'
Preparations for battle Accordingly, aft er crushing the rebellion in Asia Min or, in 490 BC a Persian invasion force landed at Right Persian infan trymen shown an a polychrome brickfaced wall in the royal polaceorSusa(fran). Theirprincipol weapon was the bow, which they used with deadly effect.
19
• MARATHON
A NC I EN T WO RLD
Marathon, some 32 km (20 miles) east of Athens. Modern research has moved the date of this landing to Aug ust from the trad itional date in early September. The size of the invading force is uncertain, with some estimates as high as 100,000 men. Probably there were about 20,000 men, including oarsmen and cavalry. Marathon was chosen because it was sufficiently far
Right Mosrof rhe Greek soldiersor Marathonwere bophtes, tbeir large circularshields offeringprotection and support ro
from Athens for an orderly disembarka tio n, and because the flat gro und suited the Persian cavalry, which outma tched t he Greek horse. Hippias, the former tyrant of Athens, accompanied the invaders. It was hoped that his presence
soldiers on their left. Bronzesrarue.
might inspire a coup by the conservat ive aristocrats of Athens and bring about a bloodless surrender. The rest of Greece was cowed into neut rality.
Belo w In tbe initio! srageof rhebarrIe on tneplain of Mararhan the
Atheniancentre movedforward firsr, carching tbe Persians by
Even th e Spartans,th e foremost mi lit ary power in Greece, discovered a number of pressing religious rituals which would keep them occupied
surprise.
for the duration of the crisis. Only Plataea, a tiny
marsh
depen dency of Athens, sent reinforc ements to the Athenian force which mustered before the plain of Marathon, in an area called Vrana betwee n the hills and the sea. The Athenians had about 7,200 men. They were mostly hop lites, a term which comes from the hop/on, the large circular shield which they carried. Each shield also offered support to the soldier on the shield bearer's left, allowing this man to use his protected right arm to stab at the enemy with his principal weapo n - t he long spear. The Persian infantry preferred the bow, and were fearsomely adept with it. They fired from behin d large wicker shields which protected them from enemy bowfire, but were of doubtful value against attacking infantry. Miltiades, th e At henian leader, knew his enemy, for he had once served in the Persian army. Now he had to convince a board of ten fellow generals that his plan of atta ck would succeed. Eachgeneral commanded for one day in
turn and, though they ceded that command to Milt iades, he still waited until his allotted day before ordering the attack. This delay was probably for military rather than political reasons. To neutralize the superior Persiancavalry the Athen ians might have needed to bring up abatis, spiky wooden defences, to guard the ir flanks. Or they might have waited for the Persian cavalry to consume their available supplies and be forced to go foraging. Or Datis, t he Persian commander, might have broken the deadlock by ordering a march on Athens. The Athenians deployed most of their strength on the wings , perhaps to buffer a cavalry thrust, or so that they could extend their line to counter a Persianenvelo pment. This left the centre dangerously weak, especially as the toughest of the Persian troops were deploye d against it. The engagement To min imize their exposure to enemy bowfire, the Athenians did someth ing unprecedented for a
Below ln rhe barrIe'sfinal srages, alrhough tne Persians had broken rhraugh in the centre. on the wingsthe Arhenianswheeled
inwards, crushing theenemyand forcing the Persians to flee.
marsh
:~,
G)~~~~:~=~~~~ ttlrowsthe Persiansoff balanceby advancing at a run.
20
21
• ANCI ENT WORLD
hop lit e army: the y charged down th e slight downhill slope at a run. The start led Persians misj udged the speed of th e Athenian advance, and
Salamis
many of the ir arrows sped over the hopli tes' headsand landed harmlessly behind them .
Date: Sept ember 480 Be Location: between Attica and the Peloponnese, Greece
Though caught off balance, the Persians were tough and resilient fighters. They bro ke th e Athenian cent re and drov e through to wards Athen s. But the hoplite force destroyed th e
At first the Persian lin e withstoad the attack; bu t quick ly The channel was cro wded with our ship s, and they Could not aid each o ther. Soon th eir armou red pro ws
wing s, and rolled them up in disorder before turning on th e Persian regula rs w ho had broken their centre . The fight boiled through th e Persian
Were crashing inta friendly hulls and sheari ng off the Ban ks of oars, while the Greek ships skilfully circled Round th em and attacked from all sides.
camp as the Persians struggled to regain their ships, with those who failed being driven into th e marshes behind the camp.
A ESCHYLUS, THEPERSIANS, LINES 412-1
8
The Athenians captured only six ships perhaps because the Persian cavalry belatedly reappeared. Nevertheless, it was a stunning victory. Over 6,000 Persians lay dead for the loss of 192 on the Athenian side.
Above right Attic red-figure pelike showing fight ing between Greek infantry and o Perslan cavatryman.
But there was no time for self-congratulation. The Persian fleet then started heading down the coast to where Athen s lay undefended. In th e subsequent race between the army on land and the army at sea the Athenians were again victorious. On seeing the Athenian army mustered to oppose the ir landing, the Persians hesitated briefly, then sailed away_ Outcome
Below Ancient Greekfunerary
tumuJusat Marathon today.
Without a Greek victory at Marathon, Athen s might never have produced Sophocles, Herodot us, Socrates, Plato or Aristotle. The world
n 480 BC the Persians again invaded Greece, King Xerxes leading a hug e army across from Anatolia, shadowed by a fleet of about 1,200
I
might never have known Euclid, Pericles or Demosthenes - in short, the cultural heritage of Western civilization would have been profoundly altered. Nor would a young runner called Phaedippides have brought news of the victory to Athens. Phaedippides had earlier gone to Sparta asking for help, and now his heart gave way under th e strain of his exerti on s. But a run of 41 km (26 mi les) is still named aft er the battl e from w hich he came - a marathon.
..------J"'fOM BATANTS'----.. Greeks • 10,000 men, of w hich 7,200 were Ath enian hop lite infant rymen • Commanded by M ilti ades and Callimachu s • 192 dead
Persians • 25,000 men • Commanded by Datis • 6,400 dead (accordinq to the Greeks)
22
Fifth -century BC lapis lazuli head of a young Persian prince, possibly representing XerxesI. son of DariusI.
warships. Many of the sout hern Greek city -states banded togeth er under Spartan leadership to resist him by land and sea. Coordinated attempts to block the advance of his army in th e narrow pass of Thermopylae and hold up his fleet at Artemision failed w hen the Greek land forces were outflanked and forced to withdraw. A small Spartan and Thespiaean rearguard resisted heroically, but wasoverwhelmed. The combined Greek fleet moved to the island of Sa lamis, abandoning th e citie s of Thebes and At hens to the enemy. A prophecy urging the Athenians to put their faith in a wooden wall caused some of them to fortify th eir Acropo lis wit h ti mber, but the major ity agreed wit h th e elected general Them istocles that the ir best hope lay in th e city's 200 wooden, trireme warships, the largest contingent in th e Greek fleet. After the evacuation of the Atheni ans to Salami s had been completed, the Greek fleet assembled in th e bay on the easte rn side of the island. When th e news came that t he Acropol is of Athens had been occupied , the Spartan commander Eurybiades ordered his captains to wi thdraw under cover of darkness to a more defensible position on th e Isthmu sof Corinth, but he changed his mind later that night and the Greeks sailed out to conf ront the Persians the
next morn ing. Herodot us claims th at Themistoc1es sent a secret message to warn Xerxesthat the Greeks were about to w it hdraw, causing him to send ships around Salamis to cut off the Greeks' retreat and forcing Eurybiadesto risk a battle. This story is a highly dubiou s one, assuming as it does th at King Xerxes and his commanders would tru st such a message, and that Them istoc1es would have thought it advantageous to provoke a Persian attack. It is more likely that th e Persians planned to surround the Greeks, as they had att emp ted once before at Artem ision. Their aim would have been to drive th e Greek ships northward s and westward s out of th e narrow
23
• 2
2
AN CIE NT WO RLD
channel between Salamisand th e mainland , into the open water s of th e Bay of Eleusis, and attack I.
th em from two sides. For th is purpose Xerxes despatched 200 Egyptian ships in the early evening to sail right round Salamis and come at the Greeks from the direction of Eleusis. He also sent a flotilla to cruise th e waters around the sout hern end of th e island, w hile his main fleet (around 600 ships) moved into posit ion at the eastern approaches to the narrow straits, ready to advance at dawn . The Greekswere made aware of these manoeuvres by Aristeides, an exiled Athenian politician who had returned to join in the fight against the Persians and had probably been sent on a scouting mission to determine whether the escape route to the west was clear. His news was greeted with dismay in the Greek camp, but the commanders resolved to sail out at dawn and take the Persians on in the narrows between Salamis and the mainland, hoping that the superior numbers of the enemy would count for less in such confined spaces. Th e ba ttle A Roman copyofa portrait bust of Themistocles from Ostia, possibly basedon a 5th·
centuryBeoriginal from Athens.
In eager anticipati on of a magn ificent victory, King Xerxes posit ioned himself opposite Salamis wit h a good view of the small island of Psyttaleia, where a detachment of Persian troops had been landed during th e night. But instead of wi t nessing his fleet 's fina l triumph over the Greeks, Xerxes saw a naval di saster unfo ld before his very eyes. The various ethnic cont ingents of the Persian fleet were lined up several rows deep across the narrow channel w it h the Phoenicians on the right w ing, nearest to Xerxes's position, and the lon ians on the left, nearest to Salamis. As they moved further into the channel their ships became so compacted and confused that they found it impossible to keep in formation. The crews were tired and to make matters worse a strong swell developed, making it even harder for the ships to make headway. Themistocles had anticipated th is and seemsto have persuaded the other Greek
24
commandersto delay engag ing t he Persians unt il they were clearly in disorder. With the Athen ian ships leadi ng, the Greeks rowed out from th e shore and turn ed to wards the enemy. On a given signal their fresh crews surged forward and broke through the Persian lines to ram individual ships asthey struggled to manoeuvre. The Persians would have been expecti ng the Greeks to flee before their superior force, according to the plan worked out the previous day. But, like all ancient battles, once the action had started it was impossible to keep to a specific plan, and the captains of the individual ships were forced to make decisions on the spot. The main decision made by many of Xerxes's captains was to turn away from the attacking Greeks, causing confusion as they encountered more of the ir own ships try ing to advance. In the resulting
chaos th e Greek captains urged on thei r much fresher crews and pressed the attack w it h great success. It is impossible to describe th e full course of the battle in detai l. Our main source, the writer Herodotus, offe rs on ly a series of anecdotes about various groups of combatants. It was claimed that 70 Corinthian ships under Adeimantos turned and fled towards th e Bayof Eleusis.lt is likely that this supposed cowardly northward retreat, which Herodotus presents asan Athenian slander against the Corinthians, may have been a deliberate move to engage the Egypti an squadron and prevent it from attacking the Greek rear. The Corinthians maintained that the ir ships did not encounter the Egyptians but returned to th e battle and acquitted themselves as well as any of the Greeks. One of the most colourful
anecdotes concerns Artemisia, the ruler of Herodotus's home city Halicarnassus, which was subject to the Persians. She was in command of her own shi p and in the front line of the Persian
A watetcolour ot thesea bailie of Salamis. This
fleet. When an Athenian tr ireme bore down on her she tr ied to escape, but found her path blocked by other Persian ships. In desperation she ordered her helmsman to ram on e of them ,
vividly conveysthe chaotic natu re of thebailiein the straits.
imaginative
reconstruction
wh ich sank with the lossof all its crew. The pursuing Athen ian captain assumed that Artemisia 's ship was on his side and changed course towards another Persian vessel. Xerxes and his advisors saw the incident and recognized Artemisia's ship by its ensign, but their belief that she had sunk a Greek trireme then earned her the king 's admira tion . Xerxes is also said to have remarked at this point, 'My men have acted like women and my women like men:
25
•• Z
ANC IENT WORLD
Gaugamela
Yetanother victory for the Greeksas thePersian tteet is
N 0
to Corinth
t
Adeiman to s then hea dsjjorth with
rouredand
70 CorinthianShips (whether a scouring mission or through pure cowardice is debatable), but shortly
GREEC E (A It ic a )
defea ted by nigh tfall.
- Megara
Bayof Eleusis
,...........,
,.J
~
,J
toA thens
'----, \ - - " - ,
®
L..,
posmon of (e. 200 Athenia n ~nd Spa rta n~ "~es ~ _ shlpsl ed by Themost ociesand --,.a..: 11 ~ '--..............r' Eurybiades) ~ -
V
-?
Sa~a -r>f1llS ~
At dawn the two 3
0
v-
Location : Mesopotamia (modern Iraq)
The Persian fleet
r,P l.....,.. Peiraieus •
Psyttaleia ~O
fleetsmeet in the__..., narrowchanneljust
Island of Salamis
BC
Alexandersaidthat Darius had relievedany anxietyhe might have had by bringinghismassed forces together so that in one day everythingcouldbe decided, and they would be spareda lang periodof difficulty and danger. D IODORUS Sicuius, BIBlIOTHECAH ISTORIA, 17.56.1
-~
sets off from the Bayof Phaleron the night before thebartle
r'
/1.
Saronic Gulf
Date : 1 October 331
GREE C E (A ttica)
'< ~
~ ~
c:::,
3 miles
0
;turnS baCk ta r~~ h e ma," fleet 4 ( / ~a
~
5km
1 - - - - - - - 11 1-
_ ... ~ PersIan Shl S
O
Persian guards of the king in flu ted hots . They hel d the centre of the
was comma nded by Darius III, king of kings,
Persian infantry
and master of all between the Euph rates and
line at Gaugamela. The elite Persian
n 1 October 331 BC two armies met in
Mesopotamia to decide the fate of an
north of Psyttaleia c;- ~
empire. The larger by fat of these armies
Afgha nist an. Once, his domains had reached
infantrywere
t he Med ite rranean, but these lands had been
known as th e 'tmm ort als'. The
conq uered by the invading Macedonians of
ceremonial dress
Alexander the Great. Darius had offered Alexan-
here was probably replaced wi th
Another story concerns the Persian sold iers on
Along the coast of Salamis, other Persians who
der a huge bribe in a desperate effort to secure
the island of Psyttaleia. They were placed there in
managed to get ashore from their foundering
peace. Parmenio , one of Alexander's generals ,
morepractical
anticipation of the bulk of the Greek fleet being
ships w ere killed or captured. Towards the end of
had comment ed, 'I wo uld take it if I were you :
driven north and westwards away from the
clothing on the battlefield. As well
the day the Persian fleet retreated in confusion to
and Alexander had replied sharply , 'Yes, I would, if
as spears with a
island . Instead they were isolated from their own
the Bay of Phaleron, having lost more than 200
ships and left vulnerable to attack from the
'pomegranate' counter-weight, likemost Persian
ships and having failed in its ob jec tive of forcing
I w ere you: His offer rejected , Darius collected a massive
nearby shores of Salamis. Right before Xerxes's
the Greeks away from Salamis. The Greeks had
army of about a quarter of a mil lion men, includ-
eyes his elite troops, includi ng three of his own
lost only about 40 ships and sent the enemy back
ing Scythians from th e shores of the Black Sea and
neph ew s, were slaughtered by th e Ath enians.
to t heir anchorage in disarray.
Bactrians from the foo thi lls of the Him alayas. He
infantry men th ey
also carried bows.
also recruited 6,000 Greek mercenaries as a per-
COMBATANTS
26
Afte rmath Xerxes took the rema ins of his fleet and much of his army back to Anatolia, leaving his general
so nal bodyguard. Darius chose his battlefield carefully. At Issusin 333 BC the terrain had not allowed him to use his
Gree ks
Mard onius wi t h a substantial army in central
superior numbers.This time, he chose the plain of
• Over 300 ships
Greece. The following year a Greek army led by
Gaugamela, near Irbil in modern Iraq. (The Greek
• Commanded by Euryb iades (Spa rta n). Themistocles (At he nia n). Ade ima nt os (Corinthian)
the Spartan king Pausanias defeated them at
histo rian Plutarch says that Gaugamela meant
Plataea, north of Athens , effectively free ing main-
'camel's home', being named after the beast that
land
had once taken a refugee king to safety th ere.)
· 40 ships lost
domination . Themistocles was hon oured by the
Darius's cavalry ranged from horse arche rs to
Spartans fo r his part in t he victory, but his own
armoured catap hract s, and was hi s main striking
helmets , but probably fo ught shieldless, needing
Persians
cou ntrymen seem to have t urned against him,
force. The wide plain gave his cavalry a good
bo th hands to control their long corn el-wo od
•c. 800 ships
chance of overwhelming Alexander 's ho rse.
spears (called sarissae). The cavalry who fought
• Commanded by King Xerxes
eventually fo rcing him to t ake refuge with the Persians. Xerxes's son Arta xerxes I made him gov-
Tho ugh the latter were superior in quality, they
alongsi de Alexandet we re called the 'Compan-
• Over 200 ships lost
ernor of Magnes ia on the Maeander River, where
numbered 7,000 against Darius's 40,000. The
he died around 4S9 Be,
Macedo nian cavalry wore body armour and
ions'. The hist orian Arrian put s the Macedonian
Greece
from
the
threat
of
Persian
27
• 3
ANCIENT WORLD
GAUGAM ELA
infantry at some 40,000 men, a fraction of Darius's host. But the Persian foot were mostly poorly
• I.
armed and almost untra ined, whereas Alexander was leading hardened veterans accustomed to victory. Some Macedon ians were conventionally armed hypaspist: (shield-bearers), but the backbone of the infantry were phalangites. These
Below Darius chose a battlefield in which he hoped
hischariots would disrupt th e
Mocedonian infantry, all owin g his huge
superiorityin numbers to swamp th e invaders befor e they could rally. Alexander counte red by refusing to attock his enemy headon, and moving his
force everfunher to the flank asthe
two sides closedin.
fought in ranks up to eight deep, yet every man could bring his immensely long pike to bear. When lowered, these pikes presented the enemy with a hedge of spearpoints . This 'phalanx' was formidable only if it retained its formation. If disordered , it could be overwhelmed and, to do this, Darius had scythed chariots. These chariots had two weaknesses. They were vulnerable to cavalry and they required the smoothest of terrain, since the ir huge scythes made any loss of forma tio n catastrop hic. Darius relied on his cavalry to protect hischariots, and on the battlefield he carefully prepared a number of obstacle-free runs to take the chariots into the heart of Alexander's infantry. There may have been a few elephants to follow up the chariots, and after the cavalry had broken up the phalanx yet further, the Persian infantry would fin ish the job with sheer weight of numbers.
3
.......-.......I' COM BATANTS ........_ _ Macedon ians
Left Porr of o
Macedonian phalanx in battle array. Themain funetionof
• 7,000 cavalry, 40,000 in fan try • Commanded by Alexa nder t he Great ' 300 dead
Alexander's ph alanx w as to pin the enemy forces un til the cavalry could exploit any
Persians • 120,ooof250,ooo me n, including 40,000 cavalry
• Commanded by King Darius III Artashata
weaknessesin the
• 35,000 dead
enemy's tine.
Belo w The angled
Macedonian
On the battlefield Alexander was soon on his way, He had taken an eclipse of th e moon earlier in the month as a sign presaging victory. Establi shing his main camp by the River Bou lemus, he pushed on with his men carrying only battle gear and a few days' supplies. The Macedonians reached Gaugamela in the early afternoon of 30 September and discovered the king 's army drawn up, with its batt le front extending kilometres across the plain . Alexander wanted to rush immediately into battle, but Parmenio urged restraint. This probably saved the
Macedonianarchers and javelinthrowers
Right flank guard, cavalry, javelin throwersand archers
army, since Alexander then took the time to scout and discovered the chariot runs of Darius's trap,
advanced, but obliquely and towards the Persians' left. This crabwise att ack to ok them away
But Alexander refused to countenance Parmenio's idea of fight ing at night, whe n darkness would mitigate t he Persian advantage of num bers.'I will not steal victory', declared Alexan-
from Darius's chariot runs and fo rced the Persian king to extend t he left wi ng of his army. Darius had to launch his chariot s earlier tha n
der haughtily, This forced Darius to keep his troops standing to all night j ust in case, while the Macedonians gained a night's rest. At dawn , Alexander's army formed up with parade-ground precision , slightly to the left of the Persian centre where Darius was stationed . They
planned. As they closed in, t he chariots were met by javelins and arrows, When the remnants reached the phalanx, the files opened smoothly and they passedharmlessly through. As Darius had planned, the phalanx was now vulnerable, But his chariots had attacked too soon, and the cavalry intended to exploit the
Alexander's discovery of the chariot runsfoilsthe surpriseattackof the Persians'main weapon:their scythed chariotsare stopped by Macedonian archersand spearmen.
advancemade Da rius launc h his chario ts early, and his cav alry force had to gallop from th edistant right flan k befor e th ey coul d engage. By
this time, Alexander ha d already hi t the opposite flank. and
wascutting through towards the centre and Darius himself.
Alexander strikes the charioteer behindDarius. triggeringa rout as the Persiansmistakenlybelieve their king hasbeen killed.
Persian cavalry
DARIUS'S ARMY
The Macedonianflank guardsmove to engage advancingPersian cavalry.
l
ALEXANDER'S ARMY
Left flank guard
andcavalry The Persian cavalryon the far sid e of the plainadvanceto join the action.
28
29
3
A NCI ENT WORLD
G A U G A M EL A
open ing of the phalanx was blocked by a counter-attack from Alexander's lancers. Hastily Darius ordered the cavalry on the right wi ng to
3
Alexander, as depicted an a
sarcophagus now in Istanbul. The
join the battle, but these had considerable ground to cover before the y reached the Macedon ian left, commanded by Parmenio.
sarcophagus WQS probably of the
Persiannoble Mazaeus, whom
Alexander jo ined th e battle personally, leading his Compan ions against the left w ing of the Persian infantry. According to Plutarch, 'The
Alexa nd er appoin ted ta govern Babylon
afterhisvictoryo t
barbarians were starting to scatter. Alexander followed up strongly, driving the enemy into the midst of the battle, and to where Darius was command ing at the centre of his line.'
Gau gam ela.
The batt le was finely balanced. Darius's chariots had failed, but his cavalry was pressing back the lancers.On the right flank, the Persiancavalry had struck the Macedonian left, which was fraying fast. If the cavalry could get among the phalangites and disorder them, Darius coul d smother the remnants with his infantry. What had been a generals' battle broke into a confused melee. The cavalry had created huge clouds of dust, blinding everyone from all but their own corner of the field. Alexander was too busy with his style of hands-on leadership to see the whole picture, wh ile Darius was hampered by the bulk and inexperience of his army.
Darius aga inst Alexande r Consequently, when the Persian cavalry broke through the Macedon ian left, they believed that victory was imm inent and charged on to take Alexander's camp. Meanwhile the Macedon ian right hit the left flank of the Persian army, following Alexander who wasintent on reaching Darius. As w it h chess, if the king was taken the game was won. The Sicilian historian Diodorus Siculus believed that Darius fought well :
The Persianking me t the Macedon ian attack on his chariot. raining javelins on his enemies, with his bodyguard at his back. As the two kings closed the range between them, a javelin hurled by Alexander missed Darius, but im paled the chariot driverstanding behind him, knocking him off the chariot. A shout went up at this from the Persians around Darius, and those further away from the scene thought their king had been brought do wn. These
30
people were the first to flee, and then those beside them, and so on until the ent ire Persian army disintegrated. With the enemy no w on both flanks, the king became worried. He drew back, and this was the signal fora general rout.' Alexander's biographers - Arrian, Curtius Rufus and Plutarch - have Darius fleeing at the mere sight of Alexander, but these accounts are not contemporary. A laconic account from a Babylonian astronomical calendar supports Diodorus's suggestion that Darius's army deserted him rather than vice versa.
Aft ermath News of Alexander's success was slow to reach the Macedonian left, where Parmenio was having a torrid ti me. He had swung his reserves about to cover the rear of the army, and was almost surrounded on th ree sides. Receiving Parmenio's call for help, Alexander promptly rushed to the rescue. But by the time he reached Parmenio's side, a spirited charge by the Thessalian cavalry, combined w ith bad news from the rest of the battlefield, had already caused the Persians to ret reat.
Alexander led a brutal chase towards the city of Arbela, slaying tens of thousands of fleeing Persians. He was haunted by the thought that Darius would raise another army with the se men and that he would have to fight again. But in fact Darius was later assassinated by Bessus, the general who had commanded the left wing of the Persian army here at Gaugamela. With the death of his rival, Alexander became und isputed lord of the Persian empire, and Greek influence stretched from its ancient homeland almost to th e Himalayas. 31
CAN N A E
Cannae Date: 2 August 2 16 Be Location: modern Cannosa, southeast Ita ly On the next day, w hen he had command, Varro did as expected an d, witho ut consulting his colleague in any way at all, ordered the men to p repare for battle. He th en dr ew up th e legions and marched them acrossthe river. Paullus fo llo wed, despite his deep disqu iet a t what was being done . (THE ROMAN COMMANDERS BEFORE CANNAE,
216 BC) LIVY 22.45
4
chain mail and carried sligh tly oval shields. Their main weapons were a heavy th rowing spear, th e pi/um, and a deadly short sword called th e gladius. The legionaries foug ht in close form ati on, almost shoulder-to-shou lder, stabbing und erarm wi th their gladii. Most of th eir opponents fought with longer swords and needed a greater
frontage so as to slash effective ly. This almo st guaranteed th e legionaries local superiority on t he battlefield, no matter w hat the overall odds, since the Romans could put th ree men against their enemies' tw o. Hannibal commanded a rag-bag of nationali ties. He had Lusitan ians and Celtiberians from
Right TheCapua bust. p resumed ta be of Hannibal. The Romans imagined Hann ibal to be vindictive and inhumanlyaue/, qualities which this artist ha scaptured well.
T
he Second Punic War (218-202 BC) is sometimes, quite just ifiably, called 'Hannibal's War'. Hannibal 's desire to avenge the defeat of Carthage in the First Punic War (264- 24 1 BC) inspired him to gather an army in
Spain, Gauls from the Alpine passes, recruits from Italy itself, a hard core of Libyan infantrymen, and cavalry from Numidia in north Africa. It is a testament to Hannibal's quality as a leader that in
Spain and, in one of the most famous marches in history, take that army over the Alps into Italy.
all the years he was in Italy the different components of his army remained well disciplined and completely under control. Only soldiers with
This invasion had a political aswell asa military objective. Hannibal hoped that once his army was on Italian soil the peoples of Italy would rise against Rome. This was realistic, for the Samnites of cent ral Italy had only recently been conquered.
complete faith in their commander could have carried ou t Hannibal's plan at Cannae. Hannibal could guess that Rome's formidable infantry would drive straight at his line, confi dent ly expecti ng to break it. Livy's reports of disagreements bet ween the Roman consuls about thi s tactic are probably to shift blame from
Many Greekcities in the south, such asNaplesand Taranto , chafed under Roman rule, and the Gauls of northern Italy were both unconquered and hostile .
th e patri cian consul Aemiliu s Paullus. The other consul was the plebeian Terentius Varro. Normally each Roman consul commanded his own army, fo r the consulship was the top political and
Though the Gauls floc ked enthusiastically to Hannibal's bann er, the rest of Italy remained unconvinced . Hannibal defeated the Romans at
32
once and for all and had mustered 16 legions,
In 216 Hannibal tried again, capturing Roman stores at Cannae (modern Cannosa) and positioning his army across the Roman supply lines, from where he dared them to dislodge him . Hannibal felt it necessary to resort to this because Fabius Maximus ('the Delayer') had adopted the tactic of
together with support ing auxiliaries and cavalry. This represent ed 80,000 infantry and a furth er 6,000 cavalry. To pu t this into perspect ive, 300 years later when Rome's power st retched from Britain to Mesopotamia, the empire had in total about 25 legions.
stalking Hannibal 's army - never offering battle, but never drawing off to allow the Carthaginians to forage unhindered.
The antagon ists To add to Hannibal 's problems, the Roman legion
However, unknown to Hannibal, Roman policy had changed . Rome had resolved to destroy him
was beyond doubt the finest fighting force in antiquity. At this time the legionaries fought in
Libyans, who wore mostly Roman armour won in earlier victories , and were an obvious choice to take th e first shock of the Roman charge. But instead Hannibal placed his Gallic and Spanish troops in th e centre , with the Libyans in t wo solid blocks on right and left behind the front line. The battle began wit h Hannibal's heavy
Part of tne reliei ofDomitius Ahenobarbus shawing soldiers
wearingchain moil and with shields.Note thar theseshields were longer and more avalrhan legionary shields in the empire. In the
cavalry breaking the Roman horse of Paullus wi t h a savage charge. This would not have surprised the Romans. Hannibal's superior ity in cavalry had
legions the arm our
better-known
commanding on alternate days.
been known ever since an action at the River Ticinus near Pavia in 218, w hen the Roman commander Publius Scipio (fat her of the great general
The day of battle
Scipio Africanus) had been wounded. Sowhile Terentius Varro led his cavalry against
At Cannae on the morning of 2 August 216 BC, Aemilius Paullus led the cavalry on the Roman right, facing the Spanish and Gallic heavy cavalry
Maharbal's Num idian horse, Paullus abandoned his routed troops and rejoined the main body of the army as it crashed into the Carthaginian line.
between the River Aufidius (the modern Ofanto) and the left flank of Hannibal 's infantry. On Hannibal's other flank was t he Numidian cavalry unde r Maharbal, a dashing commander with a string of
This bowed under the impact, starting slowly to
successful engagements to his name. Hannibal and his brother Mago commanded
and urging on his men. Hannibal, who had been in
the centre where the main blow would fall, and
exactly the same.'
mi litary posit ion in Rome. But so huge was th is Rom an army that both con suls were present, and
Trebb ia in 2 18, and again crushingly at Lake Trasimene in 217, but there was no general upr ising against Rome.
where total precision was required . Perhaps the most reliable of Hannibal 's troops were the
Oorica hamata) was eventually replaced by the 'Iabster plate'
armour (1orica segmentata), butir continued
;nuseamongthe auxiliaries.
give way. Polybi us tells us: 'Paul/us threw himselfinto where the fighting was fiercest in the centre of the line, smiting the enemy that place since the start of the battle, was doing
33
4
CA N N A E
A NCIE N T WO RLD
was close. The Carthaginian centre
For Hannibal it was crucial that his centre gave ground wi thout
was buckling . Roman reserves poured into the breach, bending the ir batt le line into a blunted
breaking . In ancient warfare, most casualties we re suffered when a battle line broke and th e routers were cut down.
Right Helmer worn by a Roman
cavalryman. This typeofhelmer was called Boeotian', presumablyafter rhecavalrymenof Thebes in Greece who developedit.
V.At the point of the V the Gauls and Spaniards were at the ir last gasp. But on each side were t he
When a line did break, those with the best chance of survival were t hose who ran fir st, so morale and discip line were essenti al in holdi ng a lin e under pressure and goi ng backwards. The Gauls and Spaniards, despite their reputati on for indiscipline, did
Belo w TheRoman
weakness in cavalrywasmore
exactly as Hann ibal required. Behind th e Romans, developments became ominous. The Carthaginian heavy cavalry rallied from its pursuit of th e Roman horse, and rod e across the back of the battle line to fall on Varro's
than compensated for by tne superior strengrh and numbersof legionariesin the Romancentre./r was rhisvery superiority thar Hannibal planned to useagainst the
cavalry. Attacked from two sides, the Roman cavalry bolted, leaving thou sandsof Carthaginian cavalry unchecked behind the Roman infant ry. The Roman comm anders still felt that victory
Romans.
Libyan infant ry, and before the Rom ans cou ld reorg anize, these Libyans turn ed and fell on th e Roman flanks. At t hat mom ent , th e Carthagin ian cavalry atta cked th e rear of the Roman batt le line.
Massacre
fought with the stubbornness that was the hall, mark of their republic. The slaughter, 'butchery
Hannibal remained in Italy for another 14 years, he never achieved another victory like Cannae or
rather than batt le' as Livy called it, lasted t he
l akeTrasimene. Eventually, Hannibal was recalled to Africa and was defeated at the battle of Zama in 201 BC. Fifty years later, Roman vengeance saw Carthage demo lished and salt sown on the foun -
entir e afternoon. When the victory waswo n, the plain of Cannae was a charnel house of some 60,000 corpses (including t hat of Aemilius Paullus, though Terenti us Varro escaped). Hannibal's advisors urged him to march immediately on Rome. But Hannibal's army was exhausted. The Carthaginians had
dations to prevent the city ever rising again. Belo w After driving off tne Romancavalry, rheCarthaginian
no siege equipment to use against Rome's walls and, in any case, Hannibal expect ed th at such massive defeat would finally force Rome to terms. Or if not, her allies and subjects in Italy would
horseswept into rhebock of tbe
Carthaginian.
Romanlines. This complered
• 50,000 men
the encirclement
• Commanded by Hannibal
surely now abandon Rom e?To Hannibal's object ions, t he exasperated Maharb al replied, 'No general is completely talented . You, Hannibal ,
• 8,000 dead
pered by the ir own numbers. Experienced infantry mig ht conceivably have fought the ir way out of the trap , but many of.the Roman legionaries were new recruits, fighting their very first
can wi n batt les, but you do not know how to use
• 86,000 men
your victory: He was rig ht. Rome neither sued for peace nor lost many of th e alliances which she had built as
• Commanded by Terenti us Varro, Aemilius
battl e. Though in a hopeless situation, th ey
durably as her roads. Rome rallied, and though
It was a classic envelopment manoeuvre. The Romans were surrounded , disordered and ham-
4
begun when tne Libyan infanrry closed like a viceon the disorganized Romans as rhey pushedrhrough rhemiddleof rhe Carthaginian barrieline.
Romans
Paulius ·50,000 dead
-' Spanish and Gallic cavalry (Hasdrubal)
"
"
, ..
.
CA1Qtm .. f.. •.-,-, - .... ,
....
CD
11111\11
INNI mill
1Ill1l1 1l1li m 1If11111l Spanish and Gallic heavy cavalry (Hasdrubal)
Libyans
Infantry is fronted by Celtiberiansand Gauls (Hannibal and Mago)
' ,
Numidian cavalry (Maharbal or Hanna)
.,
.'
.'
®
®
Numidian cavalry (Maharbal or Hanna)
o:NNA't -,. .. ..· .--, _
Libyan s
Q) Roman infant ry,joined now by Paullu s. burstthrough centr e o f Carthag inian infantry. which retreat in organizedfashion without routing.
,.'
...
.
strong cavalryto charge'theRemans.
@
34
,.
CD Hannibal opens·i hea etion ~Y sending ~is famously
.....
The weakerGallicand-Spanish. nfant;Ygive qrc end under the Roman legionaries. forming.the first part of Hannibal's plan.
infantry..
.
.. . .
~
-..
-
'.
. @
Gallic and Spanish
•
•
Carthaginian heavy cavalry rout Vano'shorse a n~ are noJ-'in a strong position behindthe Roman soldiers.
® P owerfu l lib yan infantJ'ton both fla~ks anack -" • the Romans, "9Wenveloped on all Sides.
..
..
,
.,
" "
. .. "
'.
35
Gaixia Date: 203
BC
Th e Chu- Han struggle After securing th e hig hland region around Xianyang, Liu Bang moved east to contest Xiang
Lo cat io n: near modern Guzhen, Anhui p rov ince, China
Hecalled hisenterprisethat ofa Hegemon King. intending to manage the world by meansof mighty compaigns. Afterfiveyears, hefinally lost hisstate and died himselfat Tung-ch'eng l Dongcheng),yet even then hedid not come to hissensesand blamehimself. What error! (A BOUT X IANG Yu) SIMA Q IAN, THEG RANOSCRIBE'SRECOROS, C. 100 BC
Right Thispainted pottery figurine of a cavalryman, Q Western Han burial abject. reflectsthe
transition fromthe useofchariots to the useofcavalry and infantryasthe main force in batt le.
Belo w Liu Bang pursuedXiong Yu
eastwardsacross the North China Plain to Goixia, where theChu army was trapped by the convergenceof threeother Han forces.
T
he batt le of Gaixia was th e fin al engagement of the pro tracted str uggl e between the rival generals Liu Bang and Xiang Yu for dom inance over China, follow-
valley kingdom of Chu, commanded t he most powerfu l mili tary fo rce and th e allegiance of most of the other leaders. But it was the wi ly Liu Bang, a former Qin functionary of humble birth, whose troops had
ing the collapse of the short-lived Qin dynasty . This encounter marked one of t he most significant turning points in
captu red the Qin capital Xianyang (near toda y's Xian). Xiang Yu assigned kingdoms to eighteen of th e rebel leaders, reserving fo r him self a posi-
Chinese history, w hen disun ity and internal strife gave way to a lasting imperial order. The contenders Soon after the death of the First Emperor in 210 BC, the harsh rule of the Qin dynasty was challenged by a series of rebellions . Two men eventually emerged as preeminent among th e rebel leaders. The fierce and impetuous Xiang Yu, scion of a line of hereditary generals in the Yangzi
tion as first among equals with the title Hegemon King of Western Chu. He compelled Liu Bang to evacuate the capital region and move his forces southward into t he Han River valley where he would assume the title of King of Han. A few months later, in th e summer of 206 BC, Liu Bang took advantage of Xiang Yu's distract ion elsewhere to reoccup y t he territory around Xianyang, precip itating the war betw een Chu and Han.
...---1 COMBATANTS '------. Han forces
• c. 300,000 soldie rs • Commanded by Liu Bang N
•
• Unknown casualt ies
I
- . Hanphase 1 - - . - Hanphase2 - -> Hanphase3 - . Chuphase t -r-e-, - - . - Chu phase2 - -> Chu phase3
o I
HuaiRiver"...,
~~
l 00 km I
o SO~iles ==--
Yangzi River
Chu forces
•c. 100,000 soldiers • Co m mand ed by Xiang Yu
•c. 80,000 dead
Yu's rule over th e Nort h China Plain. For two and a half years, t he two sides battled for contr ol of a series of forti fied posit ions at Xingyang, Chenggao and Gongxian, just south of the Yellow River in today's Henan province. While Xiang Yu focused on atta cking th ese Han posit ions fro ntally wi th his superior forc es, Liu Bang sent his best general, Han Xin, to defeat th e Hegemon King's allies nort h of the Yellow River, suborned another key Chu ally in the Yangzi valley, and set his ow n ally Peng v ue to work harassing the supply linesthat stretched eastward to Xiang Yu's home base in the modern prov inces of Jiangsu and Anhui. By th e autu mn of 203 BC, th e success of this mult i-pronged st rategy had left Xiang Yu's main army weakened, dispirited and short of provisions. At t his point Xiang Yu reached an agreement to divide the empire with his rival, and wit hdrew
eastward to wards
his capital
at
Pengcheng. The final battle Liu Bang's advisors now persuaded him to break the agreement and set out in pursuit of th e Chu army. Overtaken at Guling, Xiang Yu struck at his pursuers and thre w them on t he defensive. As armies led by Han Xin, Peng v ue and ot her Han allies converged on the area, however, the odd s against Xiang Yu became overw helming and his army was encircled at th e to wn of Gaixia, about 32 km (20 mil es) east of today's Guzhen, Anhui. There he gave battl e wi t h 100,000 men against a combined Han force of 300,000. The Han army deployed in three echelons, with Han Xin commanding from the cent re of the first echelon. The Han general's opening t hrust was repulsed, but the Chu counter-att ack was stalled by the divisions on his left and right flan ks, giving him the opportunity to return to the offen sive and defeat the Chu army. Surround ed in his camp at Gaixia and hearing th e sound of Chu songs from th e Han lines, Xiang Yu believed that his entire kingdom had been overrun. In despair, he broke out of th e encirclement with an escort of
36
800 horsemen and fled southwa rds, but was soon brought to bay near th e north bank of the Yangzi River. There he slit his own throat. Consequences The elimi nati on of Xiang Yu cleared the way fo r Liu Bang to take the imperial throne and establish th e Han dynasty. Where Xiang Yu had favoured a loose confe derat ion of autonomous regional kingdoms, Liu Bang and his heirs laboured to construct a more central ized imperial state. The
Painted pott ery figurinesoffight ly armoured Wes tern Han infantrymen burial objectsfrom a 2nd-<entury Be lomb near Xian. Theseare
representative of the mossinfantry armiesof Han China.
dynasty t hey created did not fall unti l AD 220, and the imperial system of government in China survived until AD 1912.
37
...
AC TIUM
Actium Date: 2 September 3 1 Be Location : nea r the island of Levkas,western Greece On one side Augustus Caesar, high up on the poop, is leading The Italians into battle, the Senate and People with him... On the other side with barbaric wealth and motley equipment, Is Antony, fresh from his trium phs in th e East, by the shores of the Indi an Ocean; Egypt, the power s of the Orient and uttermost Baetra Sail with him; also -
a shameful thing - his Egyptian wi fe.
VIRGIL, THEA ENEID, VIII,678-88
I
n 44 BC the assassination of the dictator Julius Caesar sparked off a lengthy seriesof civil wars that engulfed the whole of the Roman world.
By 32 BC it had boiled down to a contest between two powerful Roman aristocrats and the ir followers. Caesar's heir, Gaius Julius Caesar Octavianus, (known to modern historians as Octavian) faced Caesar's former right-hand man, Marcus Antonius
islands. His fleet was laid up at Actium, at the entra nce to the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf, a large bay that was closed by a very narrow channel lessthan half a mile in width. Early in the sprin g of 31 BC Octavian managed to establi sh his army on the northern headland of thi s channel w hile his fleet, ably commanded by Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa , defeated Antony's squadrons on the islands and gradually cut off the supply routesto Acti um. Antony and Cleopatra brought their army up to the northern headland in an attempt to forc e Octavian into a decisive battle, while their fleet remained at Actium. There the unhealthy, marshy conditions, poor supplies and dw indling morale encouraged widespread disaffection among their commanders and w holesale deser-
(or Antony ashe is usually called). Octavian, based in Italy, dom inat ed th e western half of the Roman empire. Antony controlled most of th e eastern half of the empi re, wi th the aid of his ally and wi fe Cleopatra VII, ruler of th e Hellenistic kingdom of Egypt. The decisive confrontation between them came in 31 BC on the western coast of Greece.
while Ant ony led half his army inland, hop ing to draw Octavian away from th e area in pursu it; he probably inte nded to link up with Sosius on the eastern coast of Greece. Sosius defeated th e
Achieving naval superiority was essential for both sides in this campaig n; wi thout it Octavian could not hop e to bring supplies and reinforce-
squadron of ships that was bloc kading the entrance to th e gulf, but Agr ippa brought the rest of the fleet up in pursuit and routed Sosius, forcing him to turn back.
The bulk of Antony's army was at Patrai in the Gulf of Corinth, with garrisons at strategic points around the Peloponnese, and naval squadrons Marble portrait head from a statue ofOctovian, e. 30-25 Be. He was the sonofJulius Caesar'snieceand wasadopted by Caesarin his will.
38
dispersed throughout th e nearby
tions by the rower sof the ir warships. By midsummer th e posit ion had become desperate. Antony 's principal admiral , Gaius Sosius, attempted to break out by sea,
ments from Italy, or stage a potentially decisive invasion of Egypt. Antony for his part needed to be able to sever Octavian's lines of commun ication and cross the Adriatic to invade Italy, w hilst maintaining his own link s with Egypt and the eastern provinces.
6
News of th is defeat caused Antony to return to his camp, where a debate raged over whether to abandon th e fleet altogether and head north for Macedo nia,where allies might still be found, or to man as many of the warships as possible with his best soldiers and attempt another break-out by sea. If the latter was successfu l, Antony could head fo r Egypt and perhaps assemble another army. Anto ny was not an experienced naval com mander, but the arguments for a sea-fight , advocated also by Cleopatra, were sound. Even if
he did manage to lead his army away intact, by giving up his fleet he would cut himself off from the legions that were still loyal to him in Syria and Cyrenaica.
Abo ve left Greenbosalr busrprobably representing Mark Antanye. 40-30 Be. He marr ied
Octavian'ssister, but divorcedher in
Preparations for battle
32sc.
On 2 September Antony burnt his spare ships, mo stly tr oop transports, to deny Octavian thei r use. He th en embarked his best soldiers on th e
Above ri ght Marble portrait of
remaining warships,which were fully crewed.The exact strength of each fleet is impossible to establish, but Antony was heavily outnumbered. Octavian had over 400 warships available, while
Cleopatra VII,
e. 50-30 Be. She had a son byJulius
Caesarand three children by An rony.
Antony's effective battle fleet , depr ived of the ships stationed around the coast and islands, and further reduced by sicknessand desertion among his crews, numbered around 230. Ancient warships were powered by oarsmen seated on up to three levels. The rati ngs applied to such ships vary from 'twos' to 'sixteens'. They refer not to the number of men pulling each oar, but to the total number of men in each vertical group of oarsmen. Hence a 'five' would have oars
39
•
6
ANC IENT WORLD
at onl y three levels, but on th e top two levels the oars were each pulled by two men, Right Romon silver coin minted in 168C, showing th e go d Apollo
ofAcrium moking a sacrifice ona plotform decorated with the prows ond anchors of
captured warships. Octavian adopted this version of Apollo as his divine
patron. Belo w Ma rble
relieitrom Praenesteshowing warship, c. 40-30 sc. The ship ha s two ban ks of oa rs ond is p ro bobly Q
'four'.
w hile the lowest level had one man to each oar. The ships in Octavian's fleet ranged from the triremes, rated as 't hrees', that carried about 200 soldiers and oarsmen, to 'sixes', that could take in excess of 500 men.
batt les, but Antony's plan was to head out to sea and, as soon as his ships had a favourable wi nd, to set sails and head south, round the Peloponnese and on to Egypt. In addi tion to the warships there were numerous merchant vessels which carried few troops and had no rams or
••••• '406 sh ips
Lucius Arruntius • Unknown casua lt ies Octavian's camp
Ant o ny (Ma rcu s Anton ius) and Cleopatra VII • 230s hip s • Comma nd ed by Pub lius Can idius Crassus, Gaius Sosius. Lucius Gellius Publicola and Ma rcu s Octavius
alongside an enemy vessel, attack it with missile weapons, including small catapults , then grapple and attempt to board.
away. The squadron of warships detailed to escort them included Cleopatra's own flagship.
•c. 150 ships destroyed
Antony had similar vessels, plus a few larger ships rated up to 'n ines' and 'tens', which were floating fortresses with towers at bow and ste rn for archers and hundreds of soldiers on t heir
The engagement
fast 'liburnian' ship. In order to increase the
Octavian's aim was simply to block the exit from the Ambr acian Gulf wi th a do uble line of war-
chances of breaking th rough the enemy lines, Antony ordered the ships on his ext reme rig ht
ships. Marcus Agri ppa comma nded the left wing of his fleet , Lucius Arruntius the centre, while Octavian himself was on the right wing in a small,
and left w ings - under the command of Lucius Gellius Publicola and Gaius Sosius respectively to try to move away from the centre, forcing the enemy to move with them and away from the
broad decks. His ships were carrying their sails, whi ch was not normal practice in an ancient sea
Octavian'sfleet
(400 warships) Antony's fleet (230 warships) directionof wind
• Com ma nded by Marcu s Vipsan ius Agrippa and
catapults , but bore the treasure chests conta ining Antony and Cleopatra's war funds. It was vital that these ships got
They were equipped with rams on the ir pro ws, but the ir princ ipal tactic was to come
•••••
Oet a v ia n (Ga iu s J u liu s Caesar Oetavianus)
Ionian Sea
o
On the left wi ng of Octavian's fleet Agrippa 's ships defeated Publicola and drove on towards Antony and the t hird, central squadro n under Marcus Octavius. Antony's own flagship had become inextricably bound up with several other vessels in the fierce fighting on the rig ht wing , so he had to transfer to another, smaller ship and follow after Cleopatra's squadron . He was chased by some of Octavian's lightest and fastest vessels. By the time they caught up with him he had transferred again to Cleopat ra's flagship and the pursuers were driven off. In all he managed to save about seventy warships. After mat h Octavian created a hug e victory monument on t he site of his own camp, deco rated with rams fro m captured enemy ships. He also fou nded a city there which he called Nikopolis (Victory City). Contemporary poets such as Virgil and Horace
..
"T"'
r-;»
"9.
centre of the ir own lines. This caused a gap to develop through which it was possible for Cleopatr a's squadron to sail with the heavily laden merchant ships.
40
6
ACTI UM
\~
Ambrac ian
later city of Nikopolis
Gulf
~
Marcus
Agnp~ ~~~I~~OJ£ \1
'50-
F~"Y.
0
ACTIUM
\~ ~\' \\%...,'v Antony's camp
lucus Arruntius
'- _
.~a l u
/:
o~
~;;1
Q-'
r
N
t
Octavian Ionian Sea
hailed t he battl e of Actium as the beg inning of a golden era for Rome. It was not so much the naval defeat as the abando nment of th eir army th at spelled the end for Antony and Cleopatra, and t heir chances of ever defeating Octavian. Although the army began a nort hward wi thdrawal from Actium towards Macedon ia, under the command of Publius Canidius Crassus, as soon as Octavian's forces caught up with th em th e veteran legions stopped and negotiated a change of sides. Their sense of loyalty to Ant ony was not po werfu l enough to make th em ignore the realit ies of th e sit uation. The doomed couple were pur sued to Alexandria by Octavian. Both comm itted suicide rather t han submit to t he new ruler of th e Roman world. Octavian returned to Rome, renamed him self Aug ustu s Caesar and inaugurated t he line of Rom an emp erors that lasted for 500 years.
o I o
Skm
I
3 miles
Publicola and
Sosiustriedto dra w Ag ripp a 's
and Octavian's ships away from
Antony'scentre. thus creatingan opening for Cleopatra.
Sosius retreated from Octavian, while Publicola's
squadron was deieatedby Agrip p a. who th en engage d th e
centre.Antony stru gg led to break
clear of Arruntius's ships, but Cleopatra sailed thro ug h, followed eventually by An tony.
41
TE UT OB UR G F OREST
Teutoburg Forest Date: autum n AD 9 Locat ion: Kalkriese, Germany
7
on the edge of th e Wiehen hills north of OsnabrOck, Armin ius had prepared an ambush. Here, t he forest extended almost to the edge of an imp enetrabl e marsh. The Roman army was caught on th e narrow stretch of land betw een th e tw o w hen th e
In the tield, th e bones of the sotdierslay scattered about, each w here he ha d fallen either standing his gro und or trying to flee. There w ere bits ofw eapons, and the bones ofhors es amongst them, and human heads had been na iled to the trun ks ofth e surroundi ng trees. TACITUS, ANNALS, 1.61
Germansatt acked. The Romans were penned in by a wall at the forest edge. This was part -rampart, but mostly a fence woven with branches between the trees, of a type that the Germans used to stop th eir catt le from straying. The Romans were probably split into pockets by the first attac k and unable to co-
n the early years of the 1 st century AD the
Right Derailofthe iron point of a lance.Some German warriors merely used firehardened wooden speartips. Belo w Reconstruction of polisade. The building ofthis poiisade is indicative of Arminius'scareful planning, aswas hisuseof terrain to nullify thesuperior equipment and training ofthe
Romans.
I
emperor Augustus tried to bring Germany under his control. An unconquered Germany was uncomfortably close to Italy, and Augu stus may have felt th at a defensive line along the Elbe was easier to maintain than the current one along the Rhine. By AD 9 Germany seemed sufficiently conquered fo r Augustus to send a governor whose main concern was the Romanization of the province. This was Quintilius Varus, former governor of Syria and husband of August us's great- niece. Varus comma nded three legion s - th e XVII, XVIII and XIX. Also, some of the many tribes of Germany were allied with the Romans. Among the young German aristocrats who served wi th
the Roman legions for military experience was Arminius, son of a chieftain of the Cherusci tribe. Varus was unaware t hat the despoiling of his nat ive land had made Armi nius a bitter enemy of Rome. From the moment Varus arrived in Germany, Arminius plotted to unite the tribes and bring about the Roman leader'sdo wnfa ll. These tr ibes sent to Varus and asked for garrisons to be stationed with them . Varus agreed readily and sent detachme nts, thus weakening his main force. Finally, in AD 9 Armi nius arranged for reports of t rouble in a distant part of the prov ince to reach Varus. It was no w autumn, and Varus seemsto have decided to move his whole camp and deal wi t h the problem on his way to winter quarters . Another German leader, Segestes, pleaded passionate ly w it h Varus
ordi nate th eir efforts. In confused skirmishes and a running batt le lasting several days, the trapped Romanswere steadily worn down. Outcom e Varus was eit her killed or fell on his sword. Others followed his example, for the Germans had a grisly way with prisoners. In the end, not one single Roman survived. What we know of the battle is
discovered very recently by Major Tony Clunn, an amateur archaeolog ist. He found Roman metal artifacts wh ich suggested a batt le, and profes-
from reconst ruct ions, the first by the Romans the mselves, w ho returned to the scene a few years
sional archaeolog ists confirmed that th is was the site of the Varussch/ocht - where Varus's legions
later.They foun d places w here senior Roman offi cers had been messily sacrificed, and t he bones of
had been destr oyed. Arminius's victory ensured th at north west
the dead scattered whe re th ey had fallen. Gradually th e sit e of the disaster was forgot-
Europe had a Germanic rather th an a Latin culture. This in turn profound ly affected subse-
ten. A massive monument to the batt le was eventually erected at Hiddesen, south of Detmold. This was some SO km (31 miles) from t he actual site of Teutoburg Forest, w hich was
quent European history, and thus the history of
not to trust Armin ius, but he was ignored.
the wo rld.
Ab ove Raman facehelmet from the Teutaburg Forest barriesite. Belo w Theyellow
patines ofricher archaeological finds suggestthat
the Romans twice attempted to break through the palisadesbefore their forcewas brokenand the survivorshacked down .
modern Kalkriese
Action Armin ius's guides led the Romans astray. Then
42
_
_
the Germans attac ked. Init ially these attack swere pinpricks - ambuscades which melt ed at t he first sign of seriou s resistance, and th e thr eat seemed mino r. The Romans had armour, equ ipment and training, while many Germans fought naked.
Germ ans
Though some warriors had swords, ot hers had merely a crude spear (t he frameo ), someti mes with only a fire-hardened wooden point. But the Romans were uncomfortable in the dense forest, and we re made more miserable by a series of thunderstorms. Near modern Kalkriese,
Romans
.I"
COMBATANTS
•c. 35,000 men • Commanded by Armi ni us • Unknown casualt ies
• 20,000 men
Wiehenhills
• Commanded by Publius Qu intilius Varus legions XVI I, XVIII, XIX . . . • 20,000 dead, plus c. 3,000 civilians
Osnabruck
hills
German advance ...."
palisade
-
archaeo logical finds
43
..
ADRIA NOPl E
8
Adrianople Dat e: 9 August AD 378 Locati on: modern Edirne, Turkey Then the two li nes ofba ttle threw them sel ves against the other. Like the p ro ws of ships dri ving into each other, they w ere tossed back and forth li ke waves ofthe sea. Our left wing had advan ced right up to the wagons, and w ould ha ve p ushed on still further ifproperly supp orted. But the rest of the cavalry abandoned the m to it. They were hard p ressed by th e sup erior numbers ofthe enem y, overwhelmed, an d beaten do wn li ke the ruin s of a great rampart. A MMIANu s M ARCELLINUS 3 1.12
I
n AD 376, the eastern Roman emperor Valens gave permission for the Goths to cross the Danube and settle within the Roman emp ire. The Goths were seeking refuge from the Huns sweeping westward from Central Asia, while the
Despite tbe stubbo rn Gothic defence of their hillrop wogon ton,
the Romans were confidem of victory untttthe
Romans hop ed that abandon ed areas would be repopulated with taxpaying peasant s who could supply the ir army wi th recruits. The greed and extortion of t he Roman offi cials in charge of th e
unexpected arrival ofa massive Gothk: cova lry force.
Gothicencampment _
Gothic wagons
c=J
Gothiccavalry ~ Roman infantry _ Roman cavalry ~
resettlement instead provoked the Goths into war wit h the empire. Two years later, wit h the Goths st ill unsubdued, Valens set out to fini sh the war personally. He took w it h him about 40,000 veteran infantry, and a mixtu re of heavy cavalry, hor se archers and Arab scouts, making about 20,000 in tot al. In early Augu st, Valens found th e Goth s in Thrace, near the city of Adrianop le. Valen s was encouraged by reports of victories against th e barbarians from Gratian, em peror in th e West, and his general Sebastian. Furthermo re, his scouts reporte d far fewer enemy t han expected -
to prot ect th e line de ploy
....---- COMBATANTS Goths • 60,000 men, compri sing 50,000 cavalry
o
oI 44
Romans
' 60,000 men
® Goths encirclethe , km '
O.S;"iles
outclassed Romans, who are routed and
• Commanded by Emperor Valens • 40,000 dead, including Valens
slaug htered
to Adrianople \
fire to the fields around the hill to further delay the Romans. Finally, the Roman infantry, frustrated by th e delay, seem to have taken matters into their own hands and attacked. This first uncoordinated assault was a failure,
apparent. The Goth ic heavy cavalry had been away, w het her raiding or forag ing is unclear. But now, in a devastating blo w to Roman morale,
• Estimate of 2,000 dead
t
ment of wagons, or laager, lay on a hilltop several hour s' march away. The Goths att empted further negotiations, and set
about 10,000 in all, and th ese mostly infantry. As if to confirm their weakness, t he Goth ic leader Fritigern sent to Valens, asking fo r peace.
• Commanded by Fritig ern
N
engage the enemy as soon as possible. On 9 August 378 Valens marched from Adrianople to where the Gothic encamp-
but th e veteran Romans briskly re-organ ized and pressed forward again, still confident of victory. At thi s point in the battle, the reason for the Gothic att empts at delay became suddenly
CD Roman cavalrytries while the legions
Confident of victory, Valens spurned Fritigern's offer. Though Valens's advisors urged him to wait for further reinforce ments, t he emperor was determined to
t hey returned - aIlSO,OOO of them . The totally outclassed Roman cavalry were swept away in the first charge. The infantry were caught off-balance by the new threat. Their retreat down the hill turned into rout as the Gothic infantry attacked from the wagons even as the cavalry closed in. Amm ianus Marcellinus tells us:
quent impacts, so that they resorted to using their swo rds. These they thrust in to the massed ranks of the enem y. They w ere suicidally brave, since they now ha d no hope of saving themselves. They were sli thering on ground saturated with rivu lets of blood, as they tr ied to sell the ir li ves as dearly as possib le....At the last w herever one looked there w as
and Romans. TheRoman on horseback in tne
too righr corner wi rh ourflung
The general Sebastian was killed try ing to rally his men. Legend has it that Valens was pursued
arm hasbeen identihed wi rh Hasrilian. son of
by Goth ic cavalry into a farmhouse and the Goths, not knowing whom they had at the ir mercy, secured the cottage and burned it and all within. We cannot tell if this is indeed the truth, but cer-
rheemperor Decius who died in AD251.
tainly Valens perished either in the battle or immediately afterwards . It was 'the end of all human ity, the end of the wo rld', lamented St Ambrose. Ammian us says
th ey had neither strength left to fight, nor the will to plan anything; the ir sp ears were broken by the fre-
empire was never to recover.
were exhausted by exertion and danger, until at last
Sarcophagus showing battle between Germans
no thing but heaps ofthe sla in and li felesscorpse s.'
that only a third of the army escaped, so Roman casualties were in the order of 40,000 men. It was the greatest Roman military disaster since Cannae (see p. 32), and one from wh ich the
'Am idst all the uproar and confusion our infantry
Above The iudovisi
me
Above left Sil ver medallion from
Trier, showing portraitof Volens from AD 367- 75. Volens was the yo unger brother of
the emperor
vateminionI, and a berter finan cial managerthan he was a soldier.
4S
Medieval World he most dynamic military forces of this
T
period, in terms of territory and people conquered, were not the feudal cavalry of western Europe - who won in wars within Europe at Hastings (1066), losing at Bannockburn (1314), Crecy (1346) and Agincourt (1415) - but the newly Islamic Arab armies of the 7th century, as well as the 13th-century Mongols. The Arabs conquered Egypt, Syria, Mesopotamia, Persia, North Africa and most of Spain, only to be stopped at Poitiers (732) in western France; the Muslims never again raided as far north. The impact of these Muslim advances can still be felt today. The Mongols conquered not on ly China, but also Persia, Mesopotamia and southern Russia. Advancing into eastern Europe, they were victorious at Liegnitz (1241) at the expense of a German-Polish army. The horns of the more numerous Mongol deployment outflan ked the ir opponents, who were hit hard by archers from the flank. The following year, the Mongols turned back in Europe when news arrived that the Great Khan had died. In 1260, another Mongol force captured Aleppo and Damascus in Syria, but was defeated by the more numerous Egyptian-based Mamluks at Ain Jalut, southeast of Nazareth. In Japan, the Mongols were defeated in Hakata Bay (1281). Modelling himself on the Mongols, Timur the Lame (1336- 1405, later called Tamerlaine), overran Central Asia, sacked Delhi, captured Damascus and Baghdad and, in 1402, with rumours circulating of his plans for global conquest, smashed the Ottomans at Ankara. In comparison, the attempts by western Europeans to expand their power were restricted to In thisfamousscenefrom the 8ayeux Tapestry,KingHarald of Englandstands mortally wounded. and the bailie ofHastings ( ' 066) is last to the Norman invaders.
M EDIE VAL W ORLD
Poitiers Date: c. 732 Locat ion: midwestern France With Christ's help he [Charles Martel] overran their tents, foll ow in g hard after them in the battle to gr ind them small in th eir overthro w, and w hen 'Abd ar-Rahnan perished in the battle he utterly destroyed th eir armies, sca tteri ng th em li ke stu bble before the fury of his onslaught; and in the po wer of Christ he utterly destroyed them. THECHRONICLEOF FREDEGAR, e. 732
n this battle Charles Mart el, Mayor of the Palace (e. 688-741 ) of t he Frankish king dom , defeated a Muslim army and killed its leader,
Muslims began raiding across the Pyrenees. In 720/2 1 Eudo defeated a major Muslim army at the batt le of Toulouse, but was unable to prevent
'Abd ar-Ra hnan al Ghafiqi, governor of Muslim
Muslim raids on Aut un in 72S, and the fall of Carcassonne and Nim es th e follo wing year. Eudo t ried to exploi t differences between th e Berber and Arab conq uerors of Spain, marrying his
I
Page from the Trier
Apocalypse, 8th-9th century, showi ng early medieval soldiers. Alongside the Raman legacy, rulerswere dependent on the retinuesof their most prominent vassols (sworn follo wers). Compared to the Romans, military forcesweresmall, less well trained and frequently
'privotized' expressionsof social pow er, rather than public
expressions of state power. Furtberm ore. as
troops were not paid cash, campaigning only really 'worked' if it produced land to distribu te or plunder.
. 48
eastern Europe and the Mediterranean and, in the latt er, the Crusaderswere beaten at Hattin (1187) by another of the Muslim emp ires: th e Kurdish general Saladin (1138- 93) too k over Egypt, Syria and most of Pa lestine, while his generals advanced to Yemen and into modern Sudan and Tunisia. If Palestine could not be preserved by the Crusaders, Byzantium - the eastern Roman emp ire - was also unable to hold its positi ons. Manzikert (1071) was a spectacular defeat at the hand s of the Seljuk Turks, and t he process culminated with the fall of Con stanti nople in 14S3. Ottomans had already overrun Greece, Bulgaria and much of Serbia, wit h crucial victories at Nicopolis (1396) and Varna (1444). The western Europeans were more successful in hold ing onto their core areas: th e Magyars were defeat ed at Lechfeld, Germany, in 955, the heavy cavalry of the Germans playing a key role. As was characteristic of western European warfare, th is cavalry relied not on archers but on weapons for close combat, principally swords. With in Europe, the Frankish development of knights, castles and siege techniques enabled those rulers w ho were able to employ them in some quantity to extend the ir power, both against domestic opponents and on their fron tiers. Infantry also played a major role in
siegecraft and th e defence of castles, and also an important part in battle. The significance of infantry wasdemonstrated at Hastings (1066). Far from being a walkover victory by an advanced mil itary system - Norman cavalry easily defeating English infantry - t he batt le was a hard-fought struggle bet ween two effectiv e systems, and its outcome was far from certain. Harold cho se a strong defensiv e posit ion on the slopes of a hill, thus offer ing protection against th e Norman cavalry. Eventually, the shield-wall of th e English housecarls was disrupted by advances designed to exploit real or feigned retreats by the Normans and, at last, the English position was bro ken. Infantry too k a more prom inen t part wi th the develop ment of pikemen, victorious at Bannoc kburn (131 4), and archers, victorious at Crecy and Agincourt. These confl icts we re at once civil wars and battles between prot o-nati ons: Scots fo ught for and against Edward II of England and Frenchmen for and against Henry Vof England, w ho also claimed the French throne. In such civil wars, pol itica l factors played a major role, as seen with the defeat of Richard III at Bosworth (148S). Command skills were also important in battle. At Bannockburn , th e Engl ish handled the ir archers very badl y while Scottish pikemen on wellchosen ground routed the English cavalry.
Spain or al-Anda lus. The Franks we re a Germanic people who, under th e kings of t heir Merovingi an royal house, had settled between th e Rhine and the Loire since the Sth centu ry and dominated the surrounding lands. Warfare amon gst the Merovingian rulers had weakened the ir power, which was then usurped by great nob les calling themselves Mayors of the Palace. The Muslims had seized Spain in 711 in t he greattide of Islamic conquest that swept around the Mediterranean aft er the death of the Proph et in AO 632. Our sourcesfor thi s period are poor and even th e year of t he battle is uncertain . Spanish Muslim sources written cent uries later indicate 732, but the contemporary Spanish Christ ian Chron icle of 754 suggests late 733 or 734, prob ably in October. The cam pai g n and context ofthe battle Charles Martel was the latest in a sequence of Arnulfing clan mem bers who had managed to seize the position of Mayor of the Palace and impose himself as de fact o ruler of the Frankish heart lands, relegat ing th e Merovingi an Theuderic IV (721-37) to an honorific role. The bitter power st ruggles dur ing th e Arnulfing family 's accession had weakened Frankish dom inion over peripheral areas wh ich th ey had tr aditi onally ruled. Duke Eudo held wealth y Aquitaine and was able to defy Charles until 720, when t he Spa ~ i s h
daugh ter to Mun nuza, a Berber chief who led a major but unsuccessful rebell ion. In retaliati on the Arab leader 'Abd ar-Rahnan led a major raid into Aquitaine, probably in 733, which forced Eudo to seek help from Charles. The battle Charles gath ered a large army, most of wh ich was Frankish, but included Burgund ians, and confronted 'Abd ar-Rahnan as he marched north from Poit iers to wards Tours. Both
sides
estab-
Light cavalry,like thismounted
bowman,werean element in Islamic armies, but most of
those at Poitiers probably fought on foot like their Frankish enemies.
9
MEDIEVAL WORLD
Th e Mu slim a tt ackers certai nly raided the
Christian
Franks
co unt ryside, but if they had ach ieved
• Comm anded by Charles Mart el
Q
Date: August 955 Location: near Augsburg, southern Germany
majorvictory
Arabs
over the Franks it cou ld have op ened the way to
conquest.
•
Atlantic Ocean
~ '-!4. N·Ir::S
• Commanded by 'Abd ar-Rahnan (Muslims and Berber army from Spain)
Those who came to the river crossings were p itched into th e wa ter by ou r m en manning
Numbers un know n. Both sides probably fought mainly on foot wi t h substan tial numb ers of horsem en in t he ranks but prob ably not used in any system ati c way. The Franks are said to have stood as if frozen again st t he enemy assault , but nothing is know n ofthe battle at all forcertain. Even the place and year of the battle are contested.
were slaugh tered by th e m en who w atched th e shores.
• Tou lo use
anne - •
Marseille e
Narb onn e {
o I
o
..
.
5
Muslims ...Charles'Mart el -
Barcelona . ,./
their ret reat t o Spain. Mo reover , Charles still failed
th e ferries, the rest were cut down. Those who did manage to reach the oppos ite ban k
GERHARDOF AUGSBURG, THELiFEOFSAINT U LRICH. c. 985
n mid- Aug ust 955 the forces of th e Germ an
I
Date and place of the ba ttle
Left Otto I in a contemporary sculp tu re in Magdeburg.
king. Otto I. annihilat ed a huge army of Hun-
Because of a reference t o St Lawr ence Day in th e
garians (also know n as Magyars), w ho w ere
conte mpo rary Annals ofS t Gall, th e battle of l.ech-
predat ory mo unted archers. Their semi-no madic
feld is dated 10 Aug ust. But tw o reliable
way of life and mili tary tactics resem bled th ose of
contem pora ries, th e mon k Widu kind of Corvey
Below Hunga rian
to subdue Aq uitaine or t he sons of Eudo, and o nly
Huns, Avars and (later) Mong ols.They had settled
and cleric Gerhard of Augsburg . concur wi th a
und er Charlemagn e (768-81 4) was Arnulfi ng rule
on the plains of the Carpathia n Basin (c. AD 900),
anoth er reference in th e Annals in recording th at
warrior equipped with composite bow fully strung in
fin ally secure in th is area. The Muslims never
whe nce they launched pill agin g exped it ions into
th e annihilatio n of th e Magyars occurr ed after
a waterproof case.
lished fortified camps, but fru strat ingl y we know
again raided this far north. However, th ey contin-
west ern Euro pe. Although German y and north-
numerou s skirmishes o n the days that foll owed.
not hing of how the y fought in th is first clash
ued to establish th em selves in Provence w here
ern Italy suffered most from these depredation s.
This catastroph ic defeat therefore could not just
betw een a Mu slim forc e and a major north Euro-
their rule w as firmly fo unded upon cont rol of Nar-
the Magyars' highl y mobile forces occasionally
have taken place on St Lawrenc e Day o n the
pean po wer. The quotation from Fredeg ar's
bonn e and th e coastal cit ies. Charlesattacked t he
reached France, sout hern Italy and once even
Lechfeld, th e broad pl ain of th e Lech River, but
continuation shows th e west ern vi ew, w hile the
area in 737 and again in 739 with little success.
Spain, but their catastr ophic defeat in 955 ended
rat her th e decisive action must have occurred
Chro nicle of 754 adds little except that th e Franks
Earlier generat ion s saw the battle of Poit iersas
the se incursions. The leaders of th e expedition,
as the Magyars fled eastwards through Bavaria in the dir ection of th eir homeland.
sto od firm against the invade rs. Franki sh armi es
th e turning po int w hen Islam was halted and
Bulksu and Lei, w ere captu red and hang ed, and
in th is period seem to have centred on w ell-
west ern Christendom saved, a point reinforced
most of th eir men w ere killed in the fighting .
armed and usually mo unted retinues of th e Lord s
by the failure of the last Arab att ack on Constan -
Build-up to the battle
figh ting on horseback or foot with spear, swo rd
t inople in 718. Mor e recently the Arab exped it ion
The
and bow, supporte d by larger forc es of poorl y
of732/ 733 has been seen asa me re raid that w ith-
summe r. Taking advantage of insur-
equipped infantry. The late 19th -century German
drew at th e first sign of seriou s opposition, and
rect io ns in Germany, they hoped to
w rite r Brunn er suggested that th e Arabs wer e a
the decisive str ugg le w as th en fought out in pro -
engage Otto's fo rces in a deci sive battle.
largely cavalry army and that Charles owe d his
tr acted and o bscure wars fo r control of Provence.
The invaders sw ept through Bavaria south
victory to the development of heavy cavalry,
But th e tid e of Islamic invasion had alway s prof-
of th e Danub e, crossed the Lech and
knights and 'shock' tactics, but mod ern histor ians
ited from th e di visions and we aknesses of th eir
pressed on to th e Iller River in the neigh -
do not believe that the se emerged befor e th e
enemies as much as from th eir own st rengt h. In
bouring duchy of Swabia. Then, falling
early 10th century. While it is certa inly tru e tha t
Provence th e Arab s enj oyed the support of Mau-
back. the y devastated a strip of terri-
Arab light cavalry was impo rtant in th e armie s of
rontus, Duke of Marseille and an enemy of the
to ry 100 km (60 miles) w ide and laid
Hun garians
invaded
in
mid-
at-Andalus, infantry w asalso a key element, so the
Arnulfing hou se, and an Arab vict ory at Poiti ers
siege to Aug sburg. an ep iscopal
two armies w ere not radically different.
could have continued thi s pattern. It should be
centre
remembered th at th is was a strong Mu slim army
Ulrich . Gerhard . the bi shop 's hagiog-
led by the Muslim governor in person . Charles
rapher, describes his heroic defence
The significance ofthe battle
50
Lechfeld
presided over by Bishop
Fredegar suggests that Charles enjoyed a deci -
was mer ely a struggli ng wa r-lo rd, but in 732 he
of the city. a factor in Ulrich 's later
sive victory but, although 'Abd ar-Rahnan was
defeat ed a Mu slim attack w hose vict ory could
canonization . Meanwhi le. Otto con -
killed, the Mu slim army ravaged systemat ically on
have had th e most serio uscon sequenc es.
centrated his forces in Ulm and 51
10
LECHF E LD
MEDIEVAL WORLD
Widukind N
t
o 10km I----.--' o Smiles
perspect ive. Although he stood on the ramparts of Augsburg , he could not see the encounter 8 km (5 miles) west of the city. He heard the clash of
00/
arms and then witnessed the Hungar ians riding back towards Augsburg in good order. Their movements conveyed the impression that the Magyars were returning to resume the siege.
f
" Ulm~
Hungarian camp
r ' \ Augsb
Breslau ~ POLAND
liegni};,e
Bohemians to suppo rt him resrify to thesuccessof
,
thisfeint, even before barrie was joined, because only two day s after Liegnirz, on 11 April, Subedei
destroyed the
Hungarians at Mohi.
68
N
400km
f'------j/
.
250miles
~
----'
CRIMEA
BULGARIA
- Sofia
Black Sea
CaspianSea
l eft The Japa nese warrior Takezaki
Suenagaattacks Mongol bowmen, rhough his horse is wounded. A bomb
explodesinthe air
atcentre.
69
15
MEDIEVAL WORLD
Bannockburn
In eottempted invasionsofJapan. 1274 and 1281.
KO R EA cBun'ei Campaign (1274) - ,.,
Northern fleet (1281) - Southernfleet (1281) - -
Japanese o
Details unknown
Date: 23-24 June 131 4 Location : near Stirling, Scotland Mongols
" Tsushima
o
c. 170.000 men
o
Commanded by Kubilai Khan
o famous race unconquered through the age s, w hy do you,
(including Korean and Chinese auxiliaries) on 4.500 ships
w ho used to conquer knigh ts, flee from mere footmen? VITAEDWARDI SECUNDI, 1326
-c, 140,000 dead
~g-.
N
t o I
o
f\:
;.,::::;;~B~
Buze..
• Hakata
X
. Oazaifu
Kyushu
-'>. J A P A N ~ I • Chiku
tions with the continent, so dispatched men to guard and fortify ports of perceived military significance, and built coastguard flotillas . The centrepiece of a long line of defence was the port town in Hakata Bayon the northern coast of Kyushu.The line proved strong enough to hold
then wrought havoc among the ships. many of which sank. The expedition lost approximately 13,200 men, but Kubilai was determined to try
the invaders in check until mid-August, allowing Japanese small vessels to penetrate the ranks of the now-combined Northern and Southern Fleets
again. By 1281, after the failure of subsequent Mongol diplomatic missions, he assembled even larger fleets ready for a further expedition. This time, Kubilai Khan could not merely rely
and destroy some vessels. While neither side appears to have made any leeway, another storm arrived from the north during the night of 14/15 August 1281, pushing the Mongol fleet,jammed
on Korean auxiliaries, but had to recruit a large contingent of men from southern China (Fukien). The so-called Northern Fleet, composed of about 70,000 Mongol and Korean warriors on about 1,000 vessels, set sail in the spring of 1281 while
and disorderly, into Hakata Bay. Apparently, some 12,000 Korean and probably 30,000 Mongol warriors were killed , while the Southern Fleet lost most of its 100,000 men.
the Southern Fleet, comprising 3,SOO ships and 100,000 men, was not yet ready. The Northern Fleet began landing, again in northern Kyushu,
Outcome
on 23 June 1281, and details of their movements between then and August of the same year remain obscure. But it does seem that the invasion was aimed at rolling up Japanese coastal defences from inland rather than attacking directly from the sea, as Japanese warriors in Kyushu had stepped up their defence efforts after 1274. The archipelago was then under the rule of elite warriors whose leaders had established their headquarters in the provincial town of Kamakura, near modern Tokyo, over 1,000 km (621 miles) away from the war zone. The Kamakura rulers were aware of the strategic vulnerability of north70
ern Kyushu, the traditional hub of Japan's rela-
Disastrous as this second expedition had been, Kubilai Khan gave orders for the construction of another fleet, but a rebellion in 1286 forced him to postpone building. Kubilai's successor TImur eventually abandoned the plan. Even though the Kamakura warriors soon afterwards plunged into domestic warfare - to last intermittently into the early 17th century - no further invasion of Japan was attempted until the 19th century. As the Yuan dynasty was replaced by t he Ming dynasty in 1344, the new imperial government reverted to a less war-prone foreign policy towards its eastern neighbours. In the 14th century, friendly diplomatic relations between Japan and China prevailed and the bilateral trade grew .
T
he Wars of Independence between England and Scotland began in 1296. Initially the English were successful, with the
sack of Berwick, the defeat of the Scotsat Dunbar, and the removal from the throne of John Ballio!. English defeat at Stirling Bridge in 1297 was coun tered by Edward l's triumph at Falkirk in the following year. By 1304, Scotland was conquered. Then, in 1306, Robert Bruce seized the Scottish throne, and the war reopened . Edward II, who came to the throne in 1307, was incapable of providing the determined leadership that his father had exercised. The English position became increasingly difficult. One of the most important of the castles in English hands was Stirling, w hich commanded the route northwards into the Highlands . In the spring of 1314 it was besieged by King Robert's brother Edward. An agreement was reached that if no relieving force had arrived by midsummer, then the castle would be surrendered to the Scots (it was long th ought that this agreement was made in 1313, but th is is now acknowledged to have been a mistake by Bruce's biographer, John Barbour). The English could not ignore this challenge . Military preparations were already underway; th e news from Stirling galvanized Edward II into action . His force was substantial . A feudal summons had been issued, a signal t hat this was to be a major campaign , on a similar scale to those conducted by Edward I in Scotland. The army probably numbered some 2,000cavalry and 15,000 infantry, many of whom would have been longbowmen. Edward and his advisers were well aware of the terrain where the Scotswere likely to
challenge them , and orders went out that the troops should prepare for an enemy established in the boggy ground near the River Forth. There is little evidence about the composition of the Scottish army. Probably it numbered between 7,000 and 10,000 men, of whom no
A sratue of Robert Bruce was added
to tbe Edinburgh
castleentrance in 1929. lr shows how
hewasenvisaged by a m uch later generation.
more than about 500 wou ld have been mounted. The Scottish cavalry were not equipped in the same way as the heavily armoured English knights; they would have been light horsemen , good for skirmishing and reconnaissance, but not suitable for charging enemy lines. The infantry would have had axes, swords and pikes, wi th few bowmen among them .
The battle The account of the batt le by John Barbour, Robert Bruce's biographer, written much later in the 14th century, suggests that the English advanced on Stirling in ten divisions, or battles, but this is unlikely. The precedents of other English armies, such as those of 1298 and BOO, suggest that there would have been no more than four battles at the most.The Scotswere probably in three divi sions, prepared to fight in 'schiltroms', strong defensive circles of men, bristling with pikes. The battle was unusual in that it was fought over two days; most medieval conflicts were short -lived, lasti ng only a few hou rs. On 23 June two English cavalry forma tions advanced. The vanguard under the earls of Gloucester and Hereford encountered a body of Scots. Among them was none other than Bruce him self, and the celebrated single combat took place between him and Henry de Bohun, Hereford 's neph ew. Bohun 71
16
MEDIE VAL WORLD
BANNOCKBURN
attempted to charge Bruce, and when the two passed side-by-side, the Scott ish king
In the night, English force s crossed the stream
COMBATANTS
Scot scavalry charge led by Sir Robert Keit h.
split
known as the Bannock Burn and established th eir
The English response to the Scotsadvance was
Bohun 's head w ith his axe. Fighting between the
position in a plain beyond it. Alexander Seton, a
a charge by th e Earl of Gloucester. The earl w as a
Scot s
two sides followed . This relatively minor engage-
Scottish knight in Edward II's service, deserted the
young man, w hose career up to this po int had
o
ment showed that the English cavalry were far
English camp and went to tell Bruce of th e low
been marke d by sense and moderation, but w ho
from invulnerable. The other English cavalry
morale of the English and to encourage him to
now squabbled wi th the Earl of Hereford over
force , under Robert Clifford, advanced on the
attack. The Scots duly advanced out of the woods
whi ch one had the right to lead the vanguard into
opposite flank . They came up against a schiltrom
of the New Park early the next morning, encour-
batt le. He had also argued with the king that
commanded by Thomas Randolf, Earl of Moray.
aged by inspirational words from their king. The
battle sho uld be postponed; Edward accused him
Clifford and his men withdrew in confusion,
English archers should have been able to counter
of cow ard ice. This, perhaps , goaded Gloucester
unable to break the Scottish formation.
the Scots advance, but they were neutralized by a
int o his fat al charge. Few accompanied him , and
o
the English were pushed back and ground down
Unknown numbers, perhaps 7,000--10,000, including c. SOO light horsemen; infant ry with axes, swords and bowmen Commanded by Robert Bruce
• Unknown casualt ies
Bannockburn was Eng lis h o
once he reached the Scottish lines he was soon surrounded and killed . The fight soon became general, and gradually
16
o
fough t in boggy
Perhaps 15,000-20,000, including 2,000 cavalry and 15,000 infantry
terrainclose to the River Fonh over
Commanded by King Edward 11; Earl of Gloucester; Earl of Hereford; Earl of Pemb roke
exact siteis
two days. The
im passible to
determine; that
• Unknow n casualties
shown;sthe most probable.
by the Scots in their schiltroms. The cavalry was hemmed in and surrounded, and as the English pu lled back, so t hey found it increasingly impossible to manoeuvre. The fighting was horrific. As
Cambuskenneth
Barbour put it, 'There was such a din of blows as
Abbey
weapons struck on armour, and a great breaking of spears, and such pushing and thrusting, such snarling and groaning.' The English were unable
Abov e An early 14th -cenrury
to ho ld the ir formations, and broke ranks. As it became clear that the English had lost,
t
those wi th Edward II decided that he must be led
o
away from the disaster. When Edward wa s safe,
a
o ne kni ght, Giles de
memorialbrass
declared that he w as not accustomed to flee, and turned round to make one final charge into the
largely ofmail, typical ofwhat English kn ights
wore at Bannockburn.
RiverForth
G) Gloucester and Hereford's
I
® ®
Argentine, hero ically
laf Roger de Trumpingtan),
showing armour
N
attackon 23 June Clifford 's attackon 23 June
English position on 24 June~ before generalfighting ~
ranksof th e Scot s, only to die on their spears. Conclusion Although the accounts of the battle are not all
New Park
con sist ent one wi th another, the reasons for the
o ~
o
Scottis h tr iumph are plain. The Scots had been Right Thispage
able to est ablish a strong position on ground
from the early 14th -cenrury Halkham Picture Bible Book shows knightly wa rfa re in th e upp er pan el, while com mo n soldiers fig ht below.
w hich favoured them. They had a charismatic
(24 June 1314 )
r:
~
leader, and a w ell-thought-out plan of action. The
Bannock Burn
O f 0·lqhtlnq . ~ fArea
I
English lacked any coherence in command . Chivalro us actions such as those by the Earl of Gloucester and Giles de Argentine proved to be suicidal. The defeat opened the north of England to vicio us Scotti sh raids. It was not until 1332 and 1333, with English victories at Dupplin Moor and Halidon Hill, that th e course of the war w as once
/
o
Scottish 'schilt roms ' (defensive circles) Gloucester and Hereford
c:::J Englishforces
c=J
arrangedin divisions
Snabhead •
again reversed. 72
73
CRECY
Crecy
vided an ideal site for the English to establish a strong defensive position. The valley below was defined by a steep bank on the opposite side,
Date: 25 -26 August 1346 Location: Picardie, northwestern France
making it hard for the French to manoeuvre . The bank partially enclosed what would become a
The archers shot so marvellously that when the harses felt the barbed arraws some
savage killing ground. Did Edward deliberately seek out battle with
would not go forwards. Some would leap into the air as if maddened, some bucked horribly, and others turned their rumps towards the enemy, regardless of their masters, because ofthe arrows they felt. (ABOUT THE FRENCHCAVALRY) J EAN LE BEL, TRUE C HRONICLES, C. 1352
17
the French. or was he placed in a position by them in wh ich he had no option other than to fight, caught in a trap ? This has been much debated. English royal propaganda was clear; Edward wanted to fight his rival Philip in battle. However, he could have faced Philip at an earlier stage in the campaign, and surely he need not have
he Hundred Years War between England and France began in 1337. The initial phase
T
saw the English construct a grand alliance of princes in the Low Countries. When in 1339 they and their allies confronted t he French, neither side had sufficient stomach for battle and none took place. The conflict appeared indecisive and inconclusive until 1346, when the course of the Hundred Years War was transformed by an extraordinary campaign led by Edward III, wh ich culminated in the first great battle of the war Crecy.
The English had landed, quite unexpectedly, in western Normandy on July 12 1346. This was probably deliberate, but it may be that contrary winds meant that the fleet could not make its intended voyage south to Gascony. Resistance was ineffective; even the city of Caenfell with sur-
prising ease to the English, who relished the plunderthey took there .The plan was to continue to march northwards, but the River Seine presented a major obstacle. The French destroyed the bridges, and Edward's army was forced to march upstream , until it approached Paris. Challenges to fight Philip VI of France came to nothing. At Poissy, the English were able to repair the bridge, and marched rapid ly northwards. The next obstacle was the Samme, which the army forded at Blanquetaque, aided by local knowledge. At Crecy, Edward III halted and prepared to fight. Crecy lay in the county of Ponthieu, an English possession since 1279 but current ly occupied by the French. There was a moral advantage in fighting on what might be regarded as home ground. More importantly, the ridge that lay between the villages of Crecy and Wadicourt pro-
avoided the French by crossing the Seine at Poissy, then making his way northwards at some speed? Certainty is not possible, but it is hard to dismiss the contemporary evidence that Edward wanted to fight the French. There was no better way to prove his casethat he was the rightful king of France, by inheritance through his mother Isabella of France. The batt le The sizeof the English army is not known for sure, but it probably numbered about 15,000, of whom almost 3,000 were knights and men-at-arms. This was a paid force, in whic h many served th eir lo rds in accordance with formal indentures, or contracts, previously agreed upon. Chroniclers' descriptions of the way in which the English drew up this army for battle are not consistent one with another. There was a circu lar formation of carts at th e rear, defending the baggage. It was probably here that they had a small number of guns, inef-
Thelongbow. with itsropid rate of
shooting, was a decisive weapo n at Crecy. Volleys of arrowswould
terrify menand horsesalike.These English archersare shown with their quivers, each of which would hold two
dozenarrows.
fective but noisy. There were three main divisions in the army, but whether they were draw n up one behind the other, or along a long front, is not so clear. The Prince of Wales, with the earls of Nort hampton and Warwick, commanded the first division, the king himself the second, and probably the earls of Arun del and Hunting don, with others, the third. The English knights and men-at arms dismounted to fight, as they had learned to do in the Scottish wars. There has been much argument about the archers, described by the chronicler Froissart as drawn up en berse, pro ba-
bly meaning triangular formations. They flanked the main English force, and were ideally positioned to cause havoc as the French advanced on 25 August. The French forces were undoubtedly far more nume rous than those of the English, but they were infinitely lesswell led. There was much confusion among the French, and argument as to whether to wait to fight on the following day. Finally rashness overcame wisdom. The French flew their celebrated war banner, the Oriflamme.
An imaginary scene, in which the young Edward 11/ receiveshisshield, showing three leopards, from St George. Both figures bear aillettes,
rectangular shoulder-pieces displaying their
arms.
75 74
17
MED IE VAL W OR L D
C RE CY
and ord ers were issued on both sides that no quarte r was to be given.
Righ tThe Pembridge helm, an English helmet of the later 14th century. This type
to have consisted of repeated French attacks on the English lines of dismounted men-at-arms. Perhaps at one point th e French even forced Edward Ill's men back
Genoese crossbowm en were sent fo rward; they did not even have all the ir equipment since
wasincreasingly tournamentmore than ba ttle, where helme ts with
lacked their large shields, or
movable visors
pavises. According to later accounts, their
werepreferred.
bowstring s became damp in a rainstorm, rendering their weapons less effective. The English longbows, on the other hand, could not have
the fighting, and twice the prince was broug ht to his knees as th e French attacked . Froissart famously told th e story of how the king refused to send assistance, saying that the boy should be allowed
been more potent. The Genoese were savaged, and forced back, only to be cut down by French cavalry as they advanced.
to win his spurs. The othe r celebrated incident came in the closing stages of the battle, when the blind king of Bohemia, John of Luxembourg,
Accounts of th e battle as it proceeded are inevitably confused and cont radictory. It appears
demanded that he be led into the figh ti ng so that he could strike one blow wit h his sword. His men t ied their horses together in a ring, and th e following morning John was found dying, and his
Below At Crecy the English ha d a
cleartactical advantage, for
their position
wasona slope overlookin g a wi de valley.
English archers
men dead. French casualties in the battle were very heavy. Many were killed in the sheer crush of men on the battlefield, suffocated in th eir armour as men piled up over them . It was claimed that a total of nine princ es, 1,200 knights , and 15,000-16,000 others were lost. Few were taken prisoner; German troops figh ting for Edward III compla ined at the lossof potential ransoms.
Genoesecrossbowmen
French mounted men-at-arms
Creer
The battle had begun late in the afternoon, and by the time it wasover, it wasdark.There was,
ther efore, no exten sive rout and pu rsuit, th ough fig hti ng did reach as far as Watteglise, some way
COMBATANTS
to the northwest of Wadi court. On the next day ther e was some alarm at the possib ility of further French troops renewing th e fight, but th ey
Wadicourt
Engl ish
V
I
I Prince of Wales
V
V
I
I Arundel
• Co 15,000 men
V
• Commanded by King Edward III; Edward , Prince of Wales; Thoma s Hatfi eld , Bishop of Durham • estimated at few er t han 100 Fren ch N
t o 76
TheEnglish, on th e tett, in bottle against the French on the right. The French king is shown prominently, with his insignia of the I/eur-de -Iys, as is the English royal ba nner beari ng the three leopa rds.
to the defensive encampment in the rear. The div ision of Edward , Prince of Wales, bore the brunt of
there had not been t ime to unpack it. In particular, they
used for
17
• At least 30,000 men • Commanded by Philip VI;John, king of Bohemia ; Charles, Count of Alencon • 1,542 men -at-arms (by one estimate) and an unknown number of infantry
turne d out to be peasant militiamen, belatedly makin g th eir way to th e battl efield. The English massacred them in a final cruel blow. Sum m ary The reasons fo r the English t rium ph were several. The English chose th eir posit ion well. The longbow was important: a skilled archer could shoot thr ee or four times as quickly as a crossbowman, and horses were soon maddened by the arrows that came on them in massive storms. The tacticsw hereby th e knightsand men-at-arms fought on foot had been develop ed in Edward Ill's Scottish wars, and again proved highly effec-
tive. Int angi ble facto rs, such as th e quality of th e king's leadership, undoubtedly had their part to play. As fo r the French, th eir Genoese crossbowm en were no match fo r th e English archers. French tactics had not been developed to take account of the way in which the English fought. Philip VI may have fought bravely, but he did not have the charisma as a leader that Edward III possessed. Uncertainty among the French com mand ers at th e start of the battle wasfollow ed by confu sion during the course of it. The battle of Crecy did not win th e war for the English, but had Edward been defeated , it would surely have marked the end of his ambitions in France. As it was, it enabled th e English army to mov e on to Calais, w hich wascaptur ed in the next year. The victory led to th e foundation of th e Order of the Garter. In many ways it was the foundat ion of Edward Ill's fame.
77
ANK ARA
Ankara
18
sacked Aleppo, Damascus and Baghdad in 1400 and 1401, he spent the winter of 1401 in Karabag h in the Caucasus. In early summer 1402 he left his winter head quarters and marched int o
Date : 28 July 1402 Location: capital of modern Turkey
Asia Minor via Erzurum and Erzincan to recapture Bayezid
the disp uted fo rtre ss of Kemah, w hich controlled He [Tim ur] reached Angara [Ankara] early in July, and an the 20th [i n fact, an th e 28 th] of
the upper Euphrates and had recent ly been
that month the fateful battle was fought. At Angora the Ottoman Turks were totally
seized by Bayezid from Taharten, lord of Erzincan .
defeated by Timur's Tatars, and [ th e Ottoman sultan] Bayazid, a cap tive, is said
to ha ve
been carried eastward wi th his canqueror in an iro n cage. Bayaz id died misera bly in March 1403, and Constantinople for the next halfcentury w as th us spar ed to Christendom. Ru y GONZALES DECLAVlJO, EMBASSYTO TAMERLANE, 1403-06