The Problem of Love in the Middle Ages: A Historical Contribution (Marquette Studies in Philosophy, #24.)

THE PROBLEM OF LOVE IN THE MIDDLE AGES The Problem of Love in the Middle Ages A HISTORICAL CONTRIBUTION by Pierre...

Author: Pierre Rousselot | Pol Vandevelde

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THE PROBLEM OF LOVE IN THE MIDDLE AGES

The

Problem of Love

in the

Middle Ages A HISTORICAL CONTRIBUTION by

Pierre Rousselot Translated and with an Introduction by

Alan Vincelette Reviewed and corrected by Pol Vandevelde

Marquette Studies in Philosophy No. 24 Volume II of the Collected Philosophical Works of Pierre Rousselot Andrew Tallon, Series Editor Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data Rousselot, Pierre, 1878-1915. [Pour l’histoire du problème de l'amour au moyen âge. English] The problem of love in the Middle Ages : a historical contribution / by Pierre Rousselot ; translated and with an introdction by Alan Vincelette ; reviewed and corrected by Pol Vandevelde. p. cm. — (Marquette studies in philosophy ; no. 24) (Collected philosophical works of Pierre Rousselot ; v. 2) ISBN 0-87462-623-4 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Philosophy, Medieval. 2. Love—History—To 1500. 3. Love—Religious aspects—Christianity—History of doctrines—Middle Ages, 600-1500. I. Vandevelde, Pol. II. Title. III. Marquette studies in philosophy ; #24 B738.L68 R68 2001 177'.7—dc21 2001006105

Printed by kind permission of the Ascendorffsche Buchhandlung, Münster.

Author’s Dedication

Dedicated to the Memory of Camille Guy

Translator’s Dedication

To my wife Lisa who kindly reminded me that one does not become an expert on love through book-learning alone.

Contents Translator’s Introduction .................................................... 11 Summary of Rousselot’s Problem of Love in the Middle Ages .. 12 Patristic Theories of Love ................................................ 23 Author’s Preface ................................................................. 76 Part 1: The Physical or Greco-Thomist Conception of Love Chapter 1: Thomist Solution to the Problem of Love ...... 82 Chapter 2: Remarks on the Elements of the Thomist Solution in Greek and Medieval Thought .................. 105 Chapter 3: Two Mediæval Sketches of the Physical Theory ......................................................... 134 Part 2: The “Ecstatic” Conception of Love Chapter 1: First Characteristic: Duality of the Lover and the Beloved ................................................................ 155 Chapter 2: Second Characteristic: The Violence of Love ................................................. 169 Chapter 3: Third Characteristic: Irrational Love............ 189 Chapter 4: Fourth Characteristic: Love as the Final End ................................................. 197 Appendix 1: The Postulation of the Problem of Love in the First Scholastics .................................................... 212 Appendix 2: The Formal Identification of Love and Understanding in William of St. Thierry .................... 223 Translator’s Notes ............................................................. 235 Supplement: Church Declarations on Love ..................... 247 Translator’s Bibliography .................................................. 254 Index of Names ................................................................ 264 Index of Subjects .............................................................. 268

Author’s abbreviations in Latin citations Citing Thomas Aquinas: 3, d. 28 q. I a. 6 ad 2 = In 3 Sententiarum, distinction 28, quaestion I, article 6, ad secundum. (Commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences, book 3, distinction 28, question 1, article 3, on the second objection) 1, q. 28 a. 3 c. = First Part of the Summae theologiae, question 28, article 3, from the body of the article 3 CG. 50 = Summa contra Gentiles, book 3, chapter 50. Pot. = Quaestiones disputatae de Potentia.(Disputed questions on potency) Ver. = Quaestiones disputatae de Veritate. (Disputed questions on truth) Mal. = Quaestiones disputatae de Malo. (Disputed questions on evil) Car. = Quaestiones disputatae de Caritate.(Disputed questions on charity) Virt. Com. = Quaestiones disputatae de Virtutibus.(Disputed questions on the virtues in general) Quodl. 6 a. 4 = Quodlibetum 6, article 4. In Div. Nom. c. 4 l. 9 = Commentarius in librurn beati Dionysii de divinis Nominibus (Commentary on Blessed Dionysius’s book On the Divine Names, chapter 4, lesson 9.) Sometimes referred to as Pseudo Denis (or Pseudo-Dionysius) the Areopagite, Rousselot occasionally refers to him as the Pseudo-Areopagite and to his book on the divine names in French as Noms divins. S. Thomas is cited in the Fretté edition (Paris: Vivès) PL. et PG. (no italics) signify the Latin and Greek patrologies, Migne edition. Numbers refer to volume and column. Some abbreviations used in Appendix 2 are explained there. Other works are given their full titles.

Series Editor’s Note Rousselot italicized Latin quoted in the text (but not in his footnotes). Since this translation furnishes English versions of all the Latin and Greek quotations (Rousselot did not furnish French versions of them), to have italicized both Rousselot’s Latin and the English would have overloaded the text unnecessaily with italics. Perhaps inconsistently, short Latin phrases are italicized, with the English not; exceptions occur where Rousselot used italics for emphasis, in which cases the English is italicized. Rousselot did not use block quotations, even for long Latin passages, but did set them in smaller type. I have set all such passages as block quotations, with the Latin in smaller type. Presuming, however, that most readers will read the transltions and only consult the original Latin or Greek occasionally, the English is set in the same size type as Rousselot’s own words. The translator has occasionally supplied section headings where Rousselot had only Roman numerals; I have set these headings between square brackets. Numbers imbedded in the text in square brackets refer to the page numbers in the edition of the Beiträge sur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters. Texte und Untersuchungen. Herausgegeben vom Dr. Clemens Baeumker und Dr. George Freih. von Hertling. Band 6, Heft 6. Münster i. W. Aschendorffsche Buchhandlung. There is no date on the title page, but the last page (p. 104 of this Sonderdrück) has 1907 for the imprimatur. The date usually given for actual publication is 1908. Occasionally the translator placed a French word or phrase in square brackets in italics to alert readers that his translation may have involved some interpretation. Everything in square brackets is by the translator. His notes are indicated by capital letters and placed after Rousselot’s Appendix 2. Rousselot sometimes did not italicize book and treatise titles; to identify them consistently, they have all been italicized in the English while leaving the original Latin quotation as is. Rousselot had a short index of names. The translator has composed a subject index and bibliography for this edition. Rousselot had no bibliography.

Acknowledgments This work has been a labor of love in every sense of the phrase. It has been a great love and joy of mine to work on for the past five years. And it has been a lot of work. Among those who helped to lighten the load, special mention must be made of Dr. Andrew Tallon who suggested the idea of this translation and has continued to support the project throughout. Not only has he helped with difficulties in the French translation, he also secured the publication rights for this work and agreed to publish it. Also deserving of great thanks is Dr. Pol Vandevelde. Dr. Vandevelde read through and checked over the whole translation three different times and gave many suggestions that immensely improved its quality. My French translation has also benefited from discussions with Daniel Centurioni, Pierre Desrochers, Fr. Richard MacDonough, John Morse, and John Muesenberg on particular points. I must additionally thank Dr. Owen Goldin for his help with the Greek translations, Dr. Michela Montante and Dr. Gino Casagrande for help with the Italian, and Dr. Robert L. Jamison for help with the German. For the Latin translations it should be noted that Fr. Roland Teske, S.J. looked over all of the Latin translations and made many valuable suggestions. I also relied on the collective wisdom of Dr. James South, Dr. Mary Rousseau, Fr. Lawrence Herrera, S.J., Fr. Manuel Sanahuja, Fr. Luke Dysinger, and Dr. Andrew Tallon for additional help with the Latin translations and review of the text. I referred to the standard English translations of both Rousselot and the classical and medieval authors in order to guide and check my own: I am, however, responsible for the final translations. I have tried to produce as literal a translation as possible. However the writing style of Rousselot is often terse and elliptic. Thus in the interest of a smoother and more readable English I have occasionally added words that are implicit but left out by Rousselot. In doing so, however, I have tried to disturb the meaning and even the wording of the French as little as possible. So while I have taken some liberties with the French in the interest of a smoother English, the translation is on the whole more literal than not.

Introduction Contemporary American debates on Christian love have frequently taken Anders Nygren’s distinction between eros and agape as their point of departure.1 And Nygren’s contrast between a need-based and desire-based, egocentric, acquisitive eros and a spontaneous and unconditional, theocentric, self-giving and self-sacrificial agape was equally influential in Sweden and Germany. However, in France contemporary debates on Christian love were primarily inspired by Pierre Rousselot’s even earlier distinction between the physical and ecstatic conceptions of love as presented in his work The Problem of Love in the Middle Ages: A Historical Contribution [Pour l’histoire du problème de l’amour au Moyen Age].2 More1

Nygren states this distinction in his work Den kristna kärlekstanken genom tiderna. Eros och Agape, v. I (Svenska Kyrkans Diakonistylrelses Bokförlag, 1930); v. II (Ibid., 1936). The first volume was originally translated into English in 1932 and the second volume in 1938-39. A complete and unabridged edition was produced several years later (Agape and Eros, tr. Philip S. Watson, Westminster Press, 1953). For Nygren’s distinction between eros and agape see pages 44-48, 75-95, 115-23, 130-33, 175-81, 200-204, 235-58, 739-41, and especially pages 208-219. Nygren’s distinction between eros and agape has played a prominent role in such recent American writings on Christian love as those by Adams (1980); Andolsen (1981); Brümmer (1993); Grant (1996); Gudorf (1985); Hallett (1989); Harrison (1985); Harrison and Heyward (1985); Heyward (1989, 1996); Milhaven (1980); Outka (1972, 1992, 1996, 1997); Pope (1981, 1991, 1994, 1995); Post (1986, 1987, both articles of 1988, 1990, 1994); Vacek (1994, 1996); and Whittaker (1992). 2 First published in Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, VI, 6 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1908). It can be fairly said that Nygren’s work, as issuing from a Lutheran, has been the most influential Protestant account of love and the Jesuit Rousselot’s the most influential Catholic account of love. Besides the work of Rousselot, other important early influences in France were the works by Massoulié (1703); de Régnon (1892); Dublanchy (1902); and Coconnier (1904). For early reviews of Rousselot’s work see M. Jacquin, O.P., Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques 2, 1908, pp. 765-66; J.-M. Dario,

12

Love in the Middle Ages

over, as will be seen later, it is arguable that Rousselot’s distinction between the physical and ecstatic conceptions of love is better and more refined than Nygren’s similar distinction between eros and agape, and, for what its worth, allows for a view of love favored by contemporary philosophers. Regrettably, this important work of Rousselot’s has received only a modest amount of attention in the English-speaking world due to the absence of a translation. The present translation of Rousselot’s great work on medieval theories of love hopes to remedy that situation.

Summary of Rousselot’s The Problem of Love in the Middle Ages As indicated by the title, Rousselot in this work treats of what he calls “the problem of love.” This is the problem of whether a nonegoistic love is possible, and if it is possible “how the appetite of a being can tend toward that which is not its own good” (p. 76; numbers in bold refer to this text). “The problem of love” then is the perennial dilemma centered around egoism and altruism, self-interest and self-denial, self-centeredness and disinterestedness: it asks, what is the proper relationship between the love that one bears for oneself and the love that one bears for another human or for God? Or as the medievals would put it, what is the proper relationship between the love of desire (amor concupiscentiae), in which one desires some good for oneself, and the love of friendship (amor amicitiae), in which one wills a good for the sake of another? Is all love egoistic and others are loved merely for one’s own benefit, or can and should one love others solely for themselves; or, is there some way to harmoniously combine self-love and the love of others? The problem occurs in that on the one hand true love of others seems to require self-sacrifice and putting their interests above one’s Etudes 120 (1909), pp. 120-22; J. Gardair, L’Univers (April 10, 1909); A. Gemellio, O.M., Rivista de Filosofia Neoscolastica 1 (1909), p. 180; P. Petrovitch, Revue d’Apologétique (1909), pp. 454-55; H. Pinard, Revue de Philosophie 14 (1909), pp. 589-95; Maurice de Wulf, Revue Néoscolastique de Philosophie 16 (1909), pp. 137-39; H. Labrose, Le Moyen Age 23 (1910), pp. 343-44; and Margreth, Der Katholik, vierte Folge V (1910), p. 469.

Translator’s Introduction

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own. Indeed some have held that true love of other humans and God should be so pure that one completely disregards one’s own needs, wants, desires, happiness, perfection, and salvation. Yet on the other hand it seems that the more the sacrificial and disinterested nature of love is stressed, the less is love able to be good for oneself and bring one fulfillment. And this seems to render love either impossible or incapable of rational justification. For if loving others is not fulfilling for oneself, indeed if it demands the very sacrifice of one’s wants, desires, and happiness on behalf of those loved, it is hard to see what could motivate one to act in such a manner—a manner so damaging and harmful to oneself. Alternatively, it is much easier to understand what motivates one to love others if the joy and pleasure such love brings to oneself are stressed; yet this very joy and pleasure are worrisome as they open up the possibility that one is loving others purely for oneself, and not for themselves.3 The problem of love is thus whether and how there can be a self-denying and sacrificial love for others which is at the same time fulfilling and perfective of oneself. In order to resolve this dilemma about love, both Nygren and Rousselot introduce their famous distinctions. Nygren only admits two extreme forms of love which he claims are mutually exclusive. On the one hand we can love other humans and God with a love of eros in which we love them out of self-interest in order to acquire and possess them; or we can love others and God with a love of agape in which we reject all self-gain and interest and surrender ourselves to others and love them purely for themselves. Thus Nygren presents us with an unbridgeable dichotomy. Either we love others and God purely for ourselves in which case we do not really love them at all; or we love them for themselves with a true love in which case we act

3

Martin C. D’Arcy put this problem nicely when he said “The first [egoistic love] explains adequately why it is so natural to love oneself and seek one’s own happiness and perfection. But as it is so naturally self-centered, it does not explain so easily how a man can love another, even God, more than himself. The second kind of love [altruistic love], with its emphasis on self-sacrifice, did explain the love of one’s neighbor and of God and the contempt of self; but it in its turn seemed inadequate to justify selfperfection as an end” (1954, p. 11).

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against our own self-interest and happiness (ibid., pp. 30-34, 20919). 4 Rousselot, in a more nuanced manner, presents his own twofold, or actually threefold, distinction between forms of love. First he mentions a view that corresponds to Nygren’s eros in which we love others and God solely as a way of loving ourselves (p. 77). Here all love is reduced to the love of self, or the love of desire (amor concupiscentiae). Rousselot does not give this conception of love a name but we can call it the egoistic conception of love. According to Rousselot, the egoistic view of love in its blatant form, in which humans love God purely as a means to the love of self, was not encountered in the Middle Ages. However, he does note that at times Hugh of St. Victor came close to holding such a position. Second, Rousselot discusses the ecstatic conception of love (pp. 78-79, 133, 151-55, 169-70, 189, 193-94, 197, 210-11, 233) which corresponds roughly with Nygren’s agape. Rousselot describes the ecstatic conception of love as the view that severs all the connections linking the love of others to one’s egoistic inclinations (p. 79). Accordingly, under the ecstatic conception, love becomes a relationship between two terms of love that have no natural relation to each other. Here one’s love of another is not in accordance with one’s innate desires and drives; rather it is the free bestowal of one’s personal self to another in disassociation from or opposition to one’s wants and desires. That is why Rousselot says that the ecstatic conception of love is characterized by the predominance of the idea of person over the idea of nature (p. 152). Indeed, according to him, the ecstatic conception of love “places the ideal aim of love in the complete sacrifice of the lover’s personhood to the beloved’s personhood” (p. 151). The loving subject no longer considers its interests at all, but acts solely for the sake of the beloved, even to the point of sacrificing its own good for the beloved (p. 233). As a consequence, says Rousselot, in the ecstatic conception of love, the loving subject is placed “outside of itself ” (p. 79). Ecstatic love of others then only involves the love of friendship (amor amicitiae) and is free from the love of desire 4

C. S. Lewis similarly distinguishes between a Need-love and a Gift-love, although Lewis, unlike Nygren, holds that both of these loves can be good and that they are compatible with each other (1960, pp. 1-4, 17, 126-34).


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or self. If it so happens that one gains one’s own good in loving others this is unintentional and merely an incidental and not an essential feature of ecstatic love. It is for this reason that such a view of love has also been called the disinterested conception of love, a label which will also be used throughout this introduction.5 Rousselot finds that love under the ecstatic conception has four principal characteristics: it is dualistic, violent, irrational, and selfsufficient (or free). Such a love is dualistic because it involves a relation between two independent terms of love in which the lover gives itself to the beloved with complete disregard for its own good—in other words such a love involves two entities and is gratuitous and not given out of self-interest (pp. 79, 151, 155, 160). Such a love is violent because it ignores or even acts against one’s own natural inclinations (p. 152). This acting in opposition to the innate appetites results in ecstatic love being essentially wounding and mortifying (pp. 169-70).6 Indeed for the ecstatic school to love is “to lose one’s soul” (p. 169). The third characteristic of ecstatic love, its irrational5

See for example the article “Désintéressement,” in Dictionnaire de Spiritualité, ascétique et mystique (Paris: G. Beauchesne et ses fils, 1937-67); Stevens (1953), pp. 307-33, 497-541; Post (1986); and Sanderlin (1993). All of these authors speak of disinterested love as the love in which one completely disregards one’s own good in loving others, even to the point of willingly sacrificing one’s own good and happiness for them. I should caution that Rousselot also uses the term disinterested love but merely for a love in which one acts with total regard to the interests of others and not one’s own. This broader definition of Rousselot’s allows disinterested love to occur either in the physical conception of love, in which case one acts for the sake of others although one always finds one’s own good in doing so, or in the ecstatic conception of love, in which case one, in acting for the sake of others, may well give up one’s own good. Throughout this introduction I will use the term ‘disinterested love’ to refer to the first view in which one loves disinterestedly when one is willing to and often does give up one’s own good for the sake of others. 6 In presenting proponents of the essentially violent and wounding nature of love Rousselot quotes many medieval authors who assert that love is wounding and conquering (pp. 169-77). Yet it is often not clear whether such statements about love being wounding or conquering are intended metaphorically or literally and hence whether these authors truly consider love as harmful to the lover. Indeed many of these same authors readily speak of the joy and sweetness that is found in love elsewhere.

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ity, stems from its not being under the control of reason, and sometimes exceeding what is fitting or proper to reason. As a result, claims Rousselot, such love is egalitarian and ignores any differences between the nature of beings: all beings are to be loved equally regardless of their station in the hierarchy (pp. 189-94). Finally, love under the ecstatic conception is self-sufficient or free because it is chosen for itself alone: love finds its justification, ground, and end in itself (p. 197). Speaking of ecstatic love Rousselot says: Rather here love is both extremely violent and extremely free. It is free because no reason can be found for it other than itself, independent as it is from the natural appetites. It is violent because it runs counter to those appetites and tyrannizes them. Indeed it seems it could only be satisfied by the destruction of the loving subject, by its absorption in the object loved. Being such, love has no other aim than itself and everything in the human being is sacrificed for its sake, including happiness and reason (p. 79).7

Rousselot finds the ecstatic conception of love present in Richard of St. Victor; Albert the Great; Cistercians such as William of St. Thierry, Aelred of Rievaulx, Gilbert of Hoyland, Baldwin of Devonshire, and the later sermons of St. Bernard; Abelard; William of Auvergne; and Franciscan Scholastics such as Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, and Duns Scotus. In addition to the egoistic and ecstatic or disinterested views of love, Rousselot also presents the reader with his favored conception, the physical or Greco-Thomist conception of love (pp. 78-79, 133, 138, 151-52, 155, 233). This conception of love, which really has no parallel in Nygren,8 is also similar to the view of love favored by 7

Martin C. D’Arcy nicely captures Rousselot’s account of ecstatic love when he states: “In this ecstatic love, then, we are far from egocentric love. The lover has no other thought of himself, except that he would willingly give his all for the other. Secondly, this love is a dark passion; it is a fire and a wound; it is violent and sacrificial; it cares nothing for reason, because it is a madness and a rapture, and lastly it has no ulterior purpose; it seeks no reward; love is the end and consummation. Love, therefore, of this kind is above all; it looks outside itself to another person, and is beyond reason and nature,” (1954, p. 94). 8 Nygren admits that medieval theories of love attempted to blend selfcentered and other-centered loves, or eros and agape, into what he calls a


17

many contemporaries and makes Rousselot’s work on love quite pertinent and well-worth exploring. The physical conception of love holds that there is a fundamental identity between the love of self and the love of other humans or God. Hence the physical conception of love is characterized by unity, not duality as in the ecstatic conception of love (p. 155). Here humans find their own good in the love of other humans and God; they fulfill their nature in this way. Thus in the physical conception of love the love of desire and the love of friendship are in perfect continuity; the love of others is in accordance with one’s natural inclinations and tendencies. Indeed, the more one gives oneself to others, the more one finds and gains oneself (pp. 78, 169). So unlike the ecstatic conception of love, here self-love is a necessary feature of all true love and one ultimately finds one’s own good in the love of other humans and God. Yet unlike the egoistic conception of love, all love here is not motivated exclusively by the concern for one’s own good; indeed, one primarily loves others for the sake of themselves. This view of love consequently can also be called the harmonistic conception of love as it reconciles self-love and other-directed love. Rousselot detects the physical conception of love in Aristotle, Pseudo-Dionysius, Hugh of St. Victor, and in the early theoretical writings of St. Bernard. Yet for Rousselot it is St. Thomas Aquinas who is the proponent of the physical conception of love par excellence. This is because Aquinas holds that the love of self and the love of God are in perfect concord (p. 78). Aquinas according to Rousselot asserts that one loves other humans and God because one finds one’s own good in loving them. Aquinas does so because he combines the view of Aristotle, that self-love is the basis of our love of others, with the view of Augustine, that in all actions one seeks one’s happiness, to come up with his own physical conception of love (pp. 82-84, 109-12). This leads Aquinas to assert that a thing is loved to the extent that one attains one’s own good and fulfills one’s natural appecaritas-synthesis, but he thinks that all such attempts at harmonizing the two types of love are misguided (see ibid., pp. 55-56, 451-52, 465-75, 638-58). For him true Christianity, as found in the early Christians and Luther, is characterized by agape or a love of another completely free of self-love (see ibid., pp. 217, 681-91, 709-16, 720-21, 739-41).

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tites by loving it (In Div. Nom., c. 4, l. 9; 1a 2ae q. 28 a. 6; 2a 2ae q. 26 a. 13 ad 3; 3 CG. 17, 8). Now as Rousselot points out, Aquinas here does come close to holding the egoistic conception of love and claiming that we love other beings solely for the sake of ourselves. And Aquinas has occasionally been interpreted in this manner. Yet Rousselot argues that Aquinas goes beyond the egoistic conception of love and really advances the physical or harmonistic conception of love. This is because for Aquinas humans do not love others merely to benefit themselves; rather humans tend to the good of others just as spontaneously, naturally, and directly as they tend to their own good (p. 87). In other words, in acting, humans are not principally motivated by the desire to seek their own good but rather the desire to seek the good of other humans and God, which is as it happens in complete accord with their own natural desires and interest (pp. 89-95). Or, as Rousselot puts it: “Instead of reducing the love of God to a mere form of the love of self, it is the love of self that is reduced to a mere form of the love of God” (p. 94). Still, how is it that Aquinas can legitimately hold that the true way of loving oneself is to love God, or that in acting one’s primary concern is to love God for Himself but that in so doing one attains one’s own good? Rousselot argues that Aquinas can assert these things because he appeals to a principle of transcendental unity in which humans form a unity with God. In this way Aquinas establishes that unity rather than egoistic individuality is the ultimate basis and ideal of love (p. 78). Now this principle of unity is explicated by Rousselot in terms of three major theories of Aquinas. The first is the theory of the whole and the part. Rousselot points out that Aquinas states in several of his writings that natural parts willingly sacrifice themselves for the sake of the whole upon which their existence depends (3 d. 29 q. 1 a. 3; 3 CG. 24:3; Quodl. 1 q. 3 a. 8; 1 q. 60 a. 5; 1a 2ae q. 109 a. 3; 2a 2ae q. 26 a. 3).9 Moreover, this love of parts for their wholes is non-egoistic, for “The part does indeed love the good of the whole as something congenial to itself; not, 9

Rousselot recognizes that Aquinas here was probably influenced by views expressed by Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics (see pp. 105-13). Aquinas may also have been influenced by the statements of Paul that all


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however, as referring the good of the whole to itself, but rather referring itself to the good of the whole” (2a 2ae q. 26 a. 3 ad 2). Hence it follows that “the good of the part is for the sake of the good of the whole” (1a 2ae q. 109 a. 3). And with respect to humans, Aquinas goes on to assert that humans are parts of the larger whole that is God. So as parts humans tend more strongly to the good of the whole (i.e., God) of which they are parts than to their own private good. Indeed by a natural appetite, says Rousselot, every individual human loves its own proper good by loving God who is the common good of the whole universe (pp. 87-93, 111-13). Several quotes of Aquinas exemplify this view: And, therefore, because any part is imperfect in itself, as it has its perfection in the whole, it follows that by a natural love the part tends more to the conservation of the whole than of itself. Thus the animal naturally exposes its arm for the defense of the head on which depends the well-being of the whole. And hence it is even the case that particular humans expose themselves to death for the conservation of the community of which they are a part. Because therefore our good is found perfectly in God, as in the first universal and perfect cause of goods, the good which is in Him is naturally more pleasing than that which is in ourselves. And it follows that God is naturally loved with a love of friendship by humans more than themselves (3 d. 29 q. 1 a. 3). To love God above all things and more than oneself is natural not only for an angel and humans but also for any creature, according as it can love either sensibly or naturally. In fact natural inclinations can especially be discerned in these things that are done naturally, without deliberation. For in this way each thing acts in nature as it is naturally fitted to do. Now we see that each part by a certain natural inclination operates for the good of the whole, even with risk or damage to itself, as is clear when someone exposes a hand to a sword to protect the head, upon which the welfare of the whole body is dependent. Hence it is natural that each part in its own way should love the whole more than itself. Hence, both in accordance with this natural inclination and in accordance with political Christians are members of one body, and if one part suffers, all suffer with it (1 Cor 12:26-27; Rom 12:5; Col 1:17-18, 24; Eph 4:25; cf. Mt 5:2930) as well as views of the Stoics and Church Fathers that the individual human should act for the sake of the good of the whole community.

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Love in the Middle Ages virtue, the good citizen exposes him or herself to the risk of death on behalf of the common good. Now it is clear that God is the common good of the whole universe and of all its parts. Hence each creature in its own way naturally loves God more than itself: insensible beings, for instance, naturally, irrational animals sensitively, and the creature of reason through the intellectual love that is called dilectio (Quodl. 1 a. 8).

Here we see then that humans naturally love God more than themselves because as parts their true good is found in the larger whole which is God. Indeed Rousselot argues that for Aquinas humans are not just parts of God in the sense that they are portions of a larger whole (i.e., numerical or quantitative unity), rather they are parts of God in the sense that they are participations of God and derive their very being from Him (i.e., transcendental unity). This causes them to find their good in loving God all the more. As Aquinas states “because every creature, in terms of that which it is by nature, is derived from God, it follows that through natural love even an angel and a human love God to a greater extent and more primarily than themselves” (1 q. 60 a. 5). So ultimately, according to Rousselot, Aquinas asserts that humans naturally love their own good by loving God because they are parts or participations of God and as such are not just isolated individuals but members of a larger unity or whole.10 The theory of the whole and the part leads directly to the second major theory of Aquinas, that of the universal appetite of all things 10

Not everyone has been convinced that Aquinas’ theory of the whole and the part can safeguard an unselfish love of others. In the medieval period the Franciscan John Duns Scotus (1266-1308) was very critical of this theory. First he says that no creature is really a part of God as creatures and the Creator are distinct. Second he finds the whole notion that people sacrifice themselves for others because their private good is tied up with the good of the community as a whole to be blatantly egoistic. He argues that on such a view no sacrifice really occurs as one ultimately acts for one’s own good and not the good of others. Scotus’ own view is that individuals truly do give up their own good and sacrifice themselves for the good of the community. For example, he says that pagans with no hope of immortality act heroically and purely disinterestedly in sacrificing themselves for their community. They choose self-annihilation for the sake of a great good in which no part will be theirs. For by natural reason even pagans can see that the Supreme Good demands a supreme love even to the point of willing one’s own nonexistence (Ord. III dist. 27 q. 1 a. 3).


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for God (pp. 94-98, 117-21). Aquinas, as we have seen, holds that all creatures naturally desire to procure their own good. And as their good as parts is found in the good of God who is their whole, all creatures ultimately desire God above all things and love their own good for the sake of God, the common good of the entire universe (1a 2ae q. 109 a. 3; 3 CG. 24, 6). Thus all creatures, either consciously or unconsciously, have an appetite for God and tend toward His goodness. Lastly, says Rousselot, Aquinas appeals to the theory of the coincidence of the spiritual good with the good in itself to establish the claim of the physical conception of love that humans find their own good in the love of God—i.e., that self-love is in harmony with the love of God. Rousselot points out that for Aquinas “our good, in reality, cannot be distinguished from the good of God, because the good of God is our good, more so even than our own good itself ” (p. 98 n. 25). This is because the ultimate good of spiritual creatures More recently Max Scheler also criticized the whole-part analogy of Aquinas. Scheler agrees that we find our highest good in love. But he argues that love in its deepest sense does not consist in treating the other person as if he or she were identical with ourselves. For love is not a mere quantitative “extension of self-love.” Nor is it a relationship of parts within a whole whose collective exertions are devoted merely to their own egoistic self-maintenance, self-aggrandizement, and growth. Such views, claims Scheler, misrepresent the phenomena (The Nature of Sympathy, tr. Peter Heath, Hamden, Conn.: Anchor Books, 1973, p. 128). One defender of the view of Aquinas against such criticisms, however, was the Dominican Cajetan (1469-1534) who wrote that the reason the part exposes itself for the whole is not because of its identity with it. Rather, by its very nature and being the part is first and essentially for the whole and from the whole. Each creature therefore is a natural part of the universe and as a result naturally loves the universe more than itself. Furthermore, it naturally prefers to itself the universal or essential goodness of God which as first cause contains the good of the whole universe. Consequently, the part will expose itself to the point of destruction and losing its identity so that it may save the whole (as a hand for the body) (In 1 q. 60 a. 5). For different interpretations of the theory of the whole and the part in Aquinas and whether or not this theory of Aquinas is egoistic see Geiger (1952); Gillon (1946, 1951); Gilson (1940); Hamonic (1992); Hayden (1990); Nicolas (1956); Simonin (1931); and Wohlman (1981).

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such as humans is to intellectually possess God in the beatific vision (pp. 99-104, 114-30). Hence, though the love of God may call for certain sacrifices of oneself, such as sacrifices of one’s sensual goods, these sacrifices ultimately advance one’s own good as a spiritual being and lead to the beatific vision in the next life. Thus according to Aquinas the true good of humans is found on the spiritual plane, and so by sacrificing lower sensual goods out of love of God, one in the end gains higher spiritual goods (pp. 102-03, 133). The love of other humans and God on this view then harmoniously combine a love of friendship and a love of desire; by loving others for themselves, one finds fulfillment, happiness, and joy for oneself. Rousselot presents Aquinas’ physical theory of love in a particularly nice manner when he contrasts it with that of Hugh of St. Victor: This contradiction [between the love of self and the love of others] would have disappeared if Hugh of St. Victor could have looked upon each substance of the world as a member of one body, as a part that desires the good of the whole more than it desires its own good. If each particular being loves the infinite Being more than itself, and only loves itself because it loves the infinite Being, not only can its love of itself not be opposed to its love of God (since it cannot properly be distinguished from it), but even its love of God (which is achieved and aimed for through its love of itself) may be disinterested. This is something that Hugh of St. Victor did not comprehend: each particular being loves itself as part and it can therefore naturally be induced to sacrifice itself for the other parts if they are judged more necessary for the good of the whole. And this very sacrifice is founded on the love of self (pp. 142-43).


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Patristic Theories of Love Rousselot’s The Problem of Love in the Middle Ages deals primarily with medieval theories of love, although it does mention the views of a few of the Greek and Roman philosophers, and a few of the Church Fathers, where they influenced later medieval thought. As the Patristic debates on love formed the backdrop for medieval discussions of love, and as very little has been written about these Patristic debates,11 here presented for the reader is an account of the various Patristic debates on love. One may want to read what follows as a sort of prelude to Rousselot’s own work or alternatively skip this section and jump right into Rousselot’s text. Many ancient Greek and Roman philosophers rejected the view that one should be virtuous or love others for the sake of earthly rewards such as monetary gain or fame.12 And the Church Fathers unanimously agreed with the more disinterested pagans that one should not love one’s neighbor solely for any sort of temporal reward. That is, they held we are not to love others for the return of their love to ourselves, nor for any favors they can grant to us. This basic precept began with Jesus Christ himself (c. 4 B.C.–30 A.D.) who criticizes those who only love people who love them in return. He says “You have heard that it was said, ‘You shall love your neigh11

There are just a few scattered writings on Patristic theories of love (see Bibliography); only the views of Augustine and Pseudo-Dionysius have received detailed treatment. See Babcock (1993); Boularand (1972); Burnaby (1938); Cassidy (1992); Catry (1975); Collins (1979); Konstan (1996, 1997); O’Connor (1983); O’Donovan (1980); Osborn (1981); Osborne (1994); Pietras (1988); Pizzolato (1974, 1993); Rist (1964, 1966); and White (1992). 12 See the views of Pythagoras in Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers, VIII, 8; Plato, Euthyphro, 29d-30b, Lysis 211d-e, Republic, 347b; the Stoic Chrysippus in Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers, VII, 89; the Stoic Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, IV, 12, VII, 73; the Stoic Epictetus, Disc. III, 24, 3-4, Frag. 10, 83; the Stoic Seneca, On the Happy Life, 9-11, On Benefits, IV, 11-15; Ep. 9, 90; Cicero, De Finibus, III, 3639, 70-71, V, 61-74, On Friendship, 29-33, 51-59, 79-80, 100-101; and Plutarch, Mor. 495-96). Classic here is Aristotle’s view that the best kind of friendship is where one loves one’s friends for themselves and not for the pleasure or advantages one gets from being friends with them (Eth. Nic., 1156a10-24, 1167a13-18).

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bor and hate your enemy.’ But I say to you, love your enemies ... For if you love those who love you, what recompense will you have? Do not the tax collectors do the same? And if you greet your brothers only, what is unusual about that? Do not the pagans do the same? So be perfect, just as your heavenly father is perfect” (Mt 5:43-48; cf. Prv 3:27-8; Lk 6:27-36, 14:12-14; Acts 20:35; Jd 1:16). Jesus also warns us not to give alms to win the praise of other humans (Mt 6:14; 23:5; cf. Sir 4:31), and he complains of those who seek him only because of the loaves of bread he offers (Jn 6:26). Thus Jesus quite explicitly rejects an overly egoistic conception of love: we are not to love others merely to benefit ourselves. Such statements clearly influenced Christian thinking about love (agape). For example, Irenaeus (c. 130-200 A.D.) claims that a true Christian will show sympathy and compassion to others without asking for a fee or reward; he notes that just as Christians receive freely from God, so too should they minister to others (Against the Heresies, II, 31:3; II, 32:4). And Clement of Alexandria (c. 150-215 A.D.) says that we must make sure we do not love others out of mercenary motives and for the sake of worldly things. So when we do good to our neighbors the only reward we should seek is their salvation and not that of winning their favor (Stromata, I, 1; cf. II, 18-19; VII, 9). Lactantius (c. 250-325) follows the lead of these authors and says that we must not show mercy to other humans in hope of receiving mercy from them in the future, otherwise we wrongly benefit by lending at interest (Divine Institutes, VI, 12). Later Church Fathers expanded on these views. St. Ambrose (c. 339-97) writes that even when Christians cannot count on a return for their efforts, nonetheless they do not believe that it is fitting to abandon the practice of virtue. For friendship not a trade; it is bought with love, not money; it is achieved by competition in generosity, not by haggling over prices (Funeral Oration for Satyrus, II, 51; Duties of the Clergy, III, 22:134). Another later Church Father, St. Jerome (c. 340-420), harshly criticizes monks who give alms so that their generosity would earn them more in return from sympathetic onlookers. He says that this is more akin to hunting than charity as here one bestows on the poor out of hope that one will get back riches in return. Indeed he claims that people whose minds operate in this


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way are moved by self-pity rather than true mercy and are being merciful not to the beggar but to themselves (Ep. 52:9; cf. Homily 46 on Psalm 133 (134); Homily 86 on the Gospel of Luke 16:1931). Much the same, St. John Cassian (c. 365-435) states that true friendship is not due to connections of need or gain such as the bargains that can be found among a band of brigands, but instead due to the sharing of virtue (Conferences, XVI, 2-3, 28). Finally, St. Gregory the Great (c. 540-604) writes that one is truly holy and loving only if one is willing to love someone who will not love one in return (Hom. Gospels, 38; cf. Dialogues, I, 10). Thus people who love others for earthly advantages, honors, and temporal gain are mere hirelings and not true Christian shepherds (Hom. Gospels, 15, 19; cf. Jn 10:11-16). Clearly then for the early Christians it was important to examine the motives for one’s acts and to what extent they were free of selfinterest. Indeed this concern for the proper motivation of one’s behavior caused some Church Fathers to assign ranks to the various forms of love of other humans. Hence Julianus Pomerius [PseudoProsper] (fl. 498 A.D.) asserts that a particularly low form of love (but one which is natural and not without some honor) is to love other humans for the sake of some earthly gain, or out of hope of receiving something back from them (The Contemplative Life, III, 25; cf. III, 24:1-2). The truest form of love, however, occurs when one loves one’s friends freely and for the sake of God, wishing nothing for oneself from them (III, 25). Maximus the Confessor (c. 580662) gives even more rankings and says “on account of these five reasons men love one another whether to their praise or blame: for God’s sake, as when the virtuous person loves everyone and the one not yet virtuous loves the virtuous person; or for natural reasons, as parents love their children and vice versa; or out of vainglory, as the one who is honored loves the one who honors him; or for greed, as the one who loves a rich man for what he can get; or for the love of pleasure, as the one who is a servant of his belly or genitals. The first of these is praiseworthy, the second is neutral, and the rest belong to the passions” (Four Centuries on Charity, II, 9; cf. I, 72, 75; II, 36, 49). Summing up then, the early Christians held to the view of St. Augustine (354-430) and Caesarius of Arles (470-542) that our love

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of others must be gratuitous: others must be loved without recompense, for themselves and not for anything else. So we should not love others for what they might give to us in the form of gifts, money, or advantages, otherwise we do not really love other people for themselves but for what they offer (Caesarius, Serm. 21:3-4, 159:6; Augustine, Serm. 385:4). Still the Scriptures do contain some very egoistic-sounding statements about love (which is why some people have considered Jesus to be an ethical egoist) and it could even be argued that a new form of egoism is introduced by the Christians. For somewhat paradoxically, even though love of others for a temporal reward was condemned by all Christians, love of others for an eternal reward or to avoid eternal punishment was not so condemned. Jesus himself makes statements suggesting that if we love others we can gain a great good for ourselves in the next life, and if we do not hell awaits us. He counsels giving alms in secret in which case, while other humans will not notice, God, who sees in secret, will cover over our sins and repay us with a reward (Mt 6:1-4; cf. Tob 4:7-11, 12:8-9; Prv 10:12, 11:17-18, 16:6, 19:17; Dan 4:24; Sir 3:29-30; Lk 11:41; 1 Pet 4:8). Likewise Jesus claims that one who invites the poor, crippled, lame, and blind to a banquet may not be repaid by them, but will be repaid by God at the resurrection of the righteous (Lk 14:12-14; cf. Mk 9:41, 10:27-30). Indeed remarks about how almsgiving is very advantageous to oneself are quite common in the Scriptures. For instance, Jesus says “Give and gifts will be given to you ... For the measure with which you measure will in return be measured out to you” (Lk 6:38; cf. Mt. 19:17, 25:31-46; Jn 5:28-29; Rev 22:12; Prv 24:12). Moreover, he instructs us “Sell your possessions and give alms; provide yourselves with purses that do not grow old, with a treasure in the heavens that does not fail” (Lk 12:32-4; cf. Mk 10:21, Mt 6:19-21, 13:44-46).13 Finally we read that Christ says to a rich man “go, sell what you have and give to the poor, and you will have treasure in heaven” (Mt 19:21). Here then we see the intimation that while love and almsgiving incur losses in this world, the 13

Scriptural passages are from The New American Bible (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).


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rewards of God in heaven are great enough to compensate us for our losses. Even St. Paul (c. 5-67), who is often portrayed as being against the view that justification occurs through works, links loving other humans and God with eternal rewards. He advises us to not grow tired of doing good, for in due time we shall reap our harvest (Gal. 6: 710). And similarly he writes “By your stubbornness and impenitent heart, you are storing up wrath for yourself on the day of wrath and revelation of the just judgment of God, who will repay everyone according to his works: eternal life to those who seek glory, honor, and immortality through perseverance in good works, but wrath and fury to those who selfishly disobey the truth and obey wickedness” (Rom 2:5-8; cf. 1 Tim 4:8, 6:17-18). In fact, Paul goes so far as to call immortality a prize to be won just like the crowns athletes strive for in their tournaments (1 Cor 9:24-7; cf. 2 Tim 2:5). Accordingly, it seems evident that there is an egoistic strain, or what could be perceived as an egoistic strain, in the New Testament. Perhaps it could be argued that all that is advanced here is the view that there is a heavenly reward for love and good works, and that this by no means stipulates that one should be motivated to do such deeds for the sake of the reward as opposed to more disinterested reasons (which is just what some later Christians will argue). Still, at times it does seem that at least a partial motive for leading a life of love in the Scriptures just is our reward in the next life.14 14

A few passages of Scripture also suggest that there is legitimate love of oneself. One of these positive statements about self-love occurs in Ephesians where Paul recognizes that no one hates his or her own life (Eph 5:28-30; cf. Mt 10:39, 16:25-6; Jn 12:25). This would suggest that we should love our lives at least to some degree. And Jesus himself, following the Jewish tradition (Lv 19:18), tells us that we are to love our neighbor as we love ourselves (Mk 12:28-31), which seems to presuppose a basic love of self. It suggests that we are to love our neighbor in the same way that we already love ourselves, although this is controversial. Finally, and most pointedly, the Second Epistle of John at one point exhorts: “Look to yourselves that you do not lose what we worked for but may receive a full recompense” (2 Jn 1:8), and the Second Epistle of Peter reads “Conduct yourselves in holiness and devotion, according to his promise we await new heavens and a new earth in which righteousness dwells. Therefore

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The Love of Other Humans Egoistic Conceptions of Almsgiving and Good Works Such egoistic-sounding statements influenced many Christians to write that we should do good deeds and give alms to the poor in order to benefit ourselves, as in this way we gain great rewards in heaven. Indeed many Christians put forward the view that in giving alms to the poor we engage in, as it were, a sort of pious or heavenly usury, and not only are reimbursed for our gifts to the poor in the afterlife but additionally gain some interest as well. This conception evidently appeared quite early as according to the Didache (c. 80-100 A.D.) one should not hesitate to give to others for givers shall know who is the good paymaster of the reward (IV, 7). It makes its first explicit appearance, however, in St. Ignatius of Antioch (c. 35-110 A.D.) who using a great military metaphor writes that we should be pleasing to God as we are His soldiers and receive our pay from Him. Accordingly, he goes on to say, “For a shield take your baptism, for a helmet your faith, for a spear your love, and for body-armor your patient endurance; and lay up a deposit (deposita) of good works, so that one day you may draw the back-pay (accepta) that will be due to you” (Poly 6; cf. Mk 10:27-30; Mt. 25:26-29; Lk 19:11-27; Eph 6:13-17; 1 Thess 5:8-9).15 Another Apostolic writing, the Shepherd of Hermas (c. 154 A.D.), continues this line of thought by claiming that those bishops who give shelter to the needy will be given shelter by the Lord forever (III, 9:27; cf. Aristides, Apolbeloved, since you await these things, be eager to be found without spot or blemish before him [God], at peace” (2 Pet 3:14-16; cf. Rev. 3:11). Thus it appears according to the Scriptures that one can rightly be concerned with one’s life and salvation and possess a certain kind of selflove. 15 Ignatius here appeals to the fact that on certain occasions a Roman soldier received special bonuses over and above his standard pay. Half of these bonuses he was given immediately, while the other half was deposited in his name in a regimental savings bank, and handed to him upon the honorable completion of his services. Translations of the Apostolic Fathers are based upon the Early Christian Writings, tr. Maxwell Staniforth and Andrew Louth (New York: Penguin Books, 1968) and The Apostolic Fathers, 2 vols., tr. Kirsopp Lake (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1912-13).


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ogy, 15-16). Moreover, we also read here that when the rich give to the poor, they believe that what is done to the poor finds a reward with God. This is so because the poor person is rich in intercession and confession and will intercede with God on the rich person’s behalf (III, 2; cf. Acts 10:4; Irenaeus, Against the Heresies, IV, 18). Egoistic views are particularly prominent in the North African Church Fathers Tertullian and St. Cyprian. Tertullian (c. 160-225) encourages Christians to engage in repentance and obey the regulations of God because in this way they can profit themselves by avoiding eternal punishment in hell and being repaid with the reward of heaven (Against Marcion, I, 27; Apology, 18:3; On Repentance, 2, 12; Exhortation to Chastity, 2, 8, 13; To His Wife, I, 1, 3, 8; Testimony of the Soul, 4). He states “For God, never giving His sanction to the reprobation of good deeds, inasmuch as they are His own (of which, being the author, He must necessarily be the defender too), is in like manner the acceptor of them, and if the acceptor, likewise the rewarder. Let, then, the ingratitude of men see to it, if it attaches repentance even to good works; let their gratitude see to it too, if the desire of earning it be the incentive to well-doing: earthly and mortal are they each. … A good deed has God as its debtor, just as an evil has too; for a judge is a rewarder of every cause” (On Repentance, 2).16 Thus Tertullian suggests that good deeds should be done because they will secure a reward with God, and this is why he can say that in bestowing alms we lay down money for our soul (On Patience, 7).17 16

Translations of the later Church Fathers are from the Ancient Christian Writers series (Westminster, Maryland: The Newman Press), The Fathers of the Church series (New York: Fathers of the Church, Inc.), and The Ante-Nicene Fathers and The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers series (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company). 17 Tertullian, on occasion, does seem to qualify this extreme form of egoism. One passage in his essay On Repentance claims that repentance is to be practiced not only for the good it brings to humans but also because God commands it. Indeed, says Tertullian, the authority of God who commands is prior to the utility of those who serve. Thus he says it is not the fact that it is good for us which binds us to obey, but rather the fact that God has enjoined it. So God, according to Tertullian, both exhorts us to repent with commands and invites us to repent by offering the reward of

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St. Cyprian (d. 258) appeals to the notion of pious usury and says that those who give alms will lay up for themselves treasures in heaven “from the increase of divine interest” (The Good of Patience, 13; cf. Mk 10:27-30; Mt 25:14-30; Lk 19:11-27). Cyprian even wrote a book On Works and Alms wherein he argued quite explicitly that one should do works of mercy and give alms to be cleansed of one’s sins and to lay up heavenly treasure for oneself. In fact this whole work might as well have been subtitled ‘The Heavenly Benefits of Almsgiving,’ for in it we read “Have no fear when you bestow an alms; you are storing up for yourself a good reward for the day of necessity, for alms delivers from death and does not suffer one to go into darkness. Alms provides a great confidence for all who do it before the most high God” (On Works and Alms, 20; cf. On Works and Alms, 1-2, 5-7, 13-16; Treatise Against the Jews, III, 1). St. Anthony of Egypt (c. 251-356) is another Church Father who presents an egoistic view of good works. He writes in a letter that one who does good to one’s neighbor does good to oneself (Ep. 6:63). And in this same letter he exhorts: “let us raise up God in ourselves by spurring each other, and deliver ourselves to death for our souls and for one another, and doing this we shall reveal the essence of our own mercy. … Therefore we ought to love one another warmly, for one who loves one’s neighbor loves God, and one who loves God loves one’s own soul” (Ep. 6:66-67, 6:92).18 It should come as no surprise then when we read in the Life of Anthony by St. Athanasius (c. 295-373) that Anthony said we must not complain about having to give up wealth and earthly possessions as there is no benefit in

salvation (On Repentance, 4). Tertullian repeats these views in another work where he states that those who are unwilling to become martyrs must be first convinced that it is commanded by God and only then can they be told that it is profitable and useful in bringing them salvation (Scorpiace, 2). 18 Anthony does at one point qualify this statement with the remark “Not that we should become self-lovers, lest we come under the power of inconstancy” (Ep. 6:68). Yet he immediately adds “But one who is able to love oneself, loves all” (Ep. 6:71). Translations of Anthony are from The Letters of St. Anthony, tr. Samuel Rubenson (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990).


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holding onto those things which we cannot take with us to heaven. Furthermore, if we put on virtues such as love, concern for the poor, and hospitality we shall discover the poor we aid going ahead of us and preparing hospitality for us in the land of the meek. Therefore, he says, we should give up earthly possessions for virtue’s sake that we may inherit a kingdom (Life of Anthony, 17). A Church Father of particular interest is Lactantius (250-325) who, as we have seen, held that we are not to love other people for what we can get back from them in return. Yet Lactantius also explicitly rejects the view of that virtue and friendship are to be pursued for their own sake (Divine Institutes, III, 8, 27). He argues to the contrary that friendship and virtue are always pursued for the sake of an advantage to humans, albeit not a worldly advantage, but rather that of the reward of personal immortality. Consequently, he says that the only reason virtue is a great good is because it attains eternity for us (Divine Institutes, III, 12; V, 18; VI, 12, 18; VII, 9, 27; cf. Gregory of Nyssa, On the Christian Mode of Life). In a similar manner, St. Cyril of Jerusalem (c. 315-86) instructs catechumens to guard their own souls so that they can inherit everlasting salvation (Procatechesis, 16; cf. Catechetical Lectures, II, 20; IV, 28; VI, 7; XVIII, 4, 20, 28, 30). And to spur Christians on to virtue Cyril says “If you labor little, you will receive little; if you work hard, your reward will be great. You are running for yourself, so look to your own advantage” (Catechetical Lectures, I, 5; cf. II, 5). Thus according to Cyril if one properly cares for one’s souls, part of which involves doing good to others, one will attain the sweetest reward in the next life (Catechetical Lectures, IX, 13; cf. X, 7; Ps 119:103). Themes of pious almsgiving become commonplace in the fourth century and we find St. Basil (c. 330-79) in one homily instructing the rich to give to the poor since the Lord Himself will pay the interest for them (Hom. 12:5; cf. Homily on the Words ‘Give Heed to Thyself ’; Ep. 118; On Mercy and Justice; Long Rules, 7). St. Ambrose (c. 339-97) likewise remarks that those who are truly wise give to the poor because in this way they benefit themselves as their gift draws interest from the Lord’s eternal treasury which is never despoiled and whose gain is priceless (Ep. 37 (54)). Ambrose writes of this transaction “Here is a good loan made of something wicked, here is a blame-

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less lender, a praiseworthy usury ... Do not imagine that I begrudge you your profits then. Do you think that I would snatch away a debtor, a human being from you? I give you God, I substitute Christ, I provide you with one who will not be able to defraud you. Lend your money to the Lord, therefore, in the hand of the poor” (On Tobias, 16, 55; cf. On Faith, V, Prologue; Duties of the Clergy, I, 11:3839). So rather than trying to acquire wealth for oneself, one should use one’s money to do good deeds to others. For, as Ambrose puts it in a restatement of Scripture, “what does it profit humans if they gain the wealth of the whole world but defraud their own souls of the payment of eternal life?” (Ep. 2 (15); cf. Lk 9:25). Moreover, Ambroseis even willing to admit that with respect to good deeds humans are hirelings as the benefits of God are both the incentives and rewards of virtue (Ep. 41 (62); cf. Commentary on Psalm 118 (119), III, 2; The Prayer of Job and David, III, 7:19; Isaac, 8:65; but compare to this On Repentance, IX, 80-84). He proclaims “We, too, are hired men who work for a price and hope for the price of our labors from our Lord and God” (Ep. 2 (15); cf. Ep. 19 (35); Lev 19:13). Selfish notions of almsgiving become even further heightened in Christians such as St. Jerome (c. 340-420) who, though he criticizes those who give alms in hope of acquiring worldly advantages, sees no contradiction in holding that one should give alms in order to receive a heavenly reward. Indeed he declares that alms should be given as though the giver were the real recipient of the alms, for in return for giving the poor person bread we receive the kingdom of heaven (Ep. 120:1; Homily 46 on Psalm 133 (134); cf. Homily 16 on Psalm 83 (84); Comm. Eph., 5:1). And St. Peter Chrysologus (c. 349-407) is quick to encourage selfish motives for almsgiving. He notes that when a boss invites laborers to work he supplies not merely the bare necessities like food, but also extensively-prepared banquets. In this way the boss provides inducements that overcome the burden and toil of the work. Similarly, says Peter Chrysologus, God promises abundant heavenly rewards as a salary for almsgivers so that instead of living for ourselves we would work for Him and give to the poor (Serm. 170). Chrysologus, even calls God our most Pious Creditor and says that God repays almsgivers in heaven with a heavenly usury which is much better than any worldly usury (Serm. 25, 94; cf. Serm.


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8, 14, 22; Lk 7:41-42). Hence he encourages Christians to give alms by stating “give to yourself by giving to the poor” (Serm. 43; see also Julianus Pomerius, The Contemplative Life, III, 24:1-2). Finally, St. Leo the Great (c. 390-461), in a homily written to increase the Sunday collections, states that all of us benefit our own souls when we lend a hand to the needy person out of compassion. For when we feed the poor we store up treasure for ourselves in heaven through a special form of usury. Consequently, he advises us to take into consideration both the poor as well as ourselves and give exuberantly to the impoverished. In this way our generosity will be ready and willing once we realize that we give to ourselves what we provide to the poor (Serm. 6, 17). Yet it is St. Paulinus of Nola, Salvian of Marseilles, St. Valerian, and St. Maximus of Turin who are the most egoistic of the Church Fathers. St. Paulinus of Nola (c. 355-431) goes so far as to compare almsgiving to a business transaction (negotiatio) with God as one’s creditor. Paulinus makes it known that the Christian who gives to the poor banks at the exchange-counter (mensa) of the Heavenly Banker and applies God’s capital to purchase the treasure of eternal life (Ep. 34:1-5; cf. Ep. 44:1, 44:4). Thus by giving money to those in need we buy heaven for ourselves through the use of brittle earthly goods (Ep. 1:1; cf. Ep. 11:9; 23:21, 23:30-31; Poem 24:473-90). For this reason Paulinus claims “faith does not cast away as sacrilegious or cheap the riches we seem to scorn, but advises us to lend them to Christ our God, and have them stored in heaven. He has promised us more than we give, He has promised to pay back with abundant interest what we now scorn or rather lodge with Him. God will guard that sum without defrauding us, and as Debtor He will return it augmented to His creditors. With greater generosity He will with abundant interest restore the money which we spurned” (Poem 10:6080; cf. Ep. 5:3, 13:23, 23:46-47, 34:5-6). And what is of great interest is that whereas, as we shall see, those propounding disinterested theories of love hold we should imitate Christ in his selfless love, Paulinus expressly says that we cannot do so. He declares that humans can never match the love of Christ because they exchange the transient for the eternal, they sell land to buy heaven, while God purchased us at much higher cost. God donned the lowly likeness of

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a slave in order to free us from sin at the price of His precious blood (Poem 27:294-306).19 Hence Paulinus proclaims that Christians are hired laborers who are greedier than the keenest usurers of the world, for it is a more handsome transaction to purchase heavenly possessions with earthly ones. In fact, he complains that humans often act as though they were doing something of benefit to God rather than to themselves in showing charity to others. But this is not the case as they put out their money for the usury of Christ which brings them salvation (Ep. 32:18-21; cf. Ep. 23:2; Prv 11:17-18; compare this to Eph 5:5). Thus according to Paulinus we were created by God to be good for our own profit by giving money to the poor (Ep. 13:14; 34:5-8). Now with Salvian of Marseilles (c. 390-480) we know we are not dealing with a purely selfless individual when we read at the beginning of his book The Governance of God that he hopes to receive a great reward in heavenly gifts from the writing of this work which attempts to benefit others (Preface). Or as Salvian tells us elsewhere, he hopes that his books will be as profitable for his own salvation as they will be profitable to all for the love of God (Ep. 9). Such egoistic motivation clearly comes out in Salvian’s views about almsgiving. Salvian says we should give alms to others for by giving alms God will become indebted to us and we will lay up treasures for ourselves in the next life (To the Church, I, 2, 4-7, 12; III, 4, 16). Not only that, says Salvian, but “whatever is distributed to the poor is returned by God with interest” (To the Church, III, 1; cf. III, 4, 16-17). As a consequence, Salvian implores us to consult our own interests and offer alms to others in order to purchase the beatitude (To the Church, II, 11-12, 14; III, 4, 13-15; IV, 5). He writes “have no hesitation in giving on your own behalf ” (To the Church, III, 18). Salvian, moreover, is unapologetic about the egoistic nature of this love. He asks “Tell me, I beg you, all religious men, is there any person who has 19

Such themes also occur in St. Leo the Great (c. 390-461) who says that no kindness of ours is able to equal the love by which the Lord redeemed us, for it is one thing to die for the just when it will be necessary to die anyway and another to die for the wicked when no debt is owed to death (Serm. 85:1). Similar views also occur in the sixth century work Rule of the Master (Theme Pater).


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not his own salvation or at least some good in view when he does something? No one, I suppose. All are led to doing and desiring what is useful by the warning and instinct of their very nature. Therefore, soldiers seek their glory, businessmen their profit, and farmers what will increase their crops” (To the Church, II, 10; cf. II, 14). Accordingly, for Salvian we should give alms to others out of self-interest as in this way we gain the reward of heaven.20 In fact, Salvian’s self-centeredness seems to know no bounds when he warns parents not to prefer their children or relatives to themselves so that in providing goods for their kin on earth they are prevented from giving alms to the poor and acquiring their own salvation (To the Church, III, 2, 4, 13, 18-19; cf. St. Paulinus of Nola, Ep. 25). Salvian’s advise to such parents is as follows: love your children but in a degree second to yourselves. Love them in a such a way that you do not seem to have hated yourself. For you must not forget your salvation and souls in the midst of your care for your children (To the Church, III, 10). Accordingly Salvian writes “Nobody is a believer who prefers his wealth to be more profitable to others than himself. Nobody is a believer who is happy to buy happiness for others at the cost of misery to himself. Nobody is a believer who, in order that he may procure transitory pleasures for others, desires to undergo eternal poverty. Therefore, he who consults by his patrimony the interests of others more than his own interests does not believe that the things he gave to God will be of any profit to himself ” (To the Church, IV, 5; cf. II, 14). Thus Salvian’s position is that above all we must be out for ourselves and must take care not to let concern for others interfere with the seeking of our own good. Apart 20

There is one passage of Salvian’s that suggests a different viewpoint, if only in relation to death-bed conversions. Salvian advises a sinner who is on the point of death to give alms to redeem sins. Yet he says that such goods should be offered with compunction as they please not when offered as a purchase price but only in love. Thus he says that one who wishes one’s donations to be profitable must offer them not with the boldness of one who gives a gift but rather with the humility of one who pays a debt. Or as he puts it a bit differently, one must not offer one’s property to God with the confidence of buying redemption but from the duty of supplication. In this way the sinner, while not certain of achieving salvation, can at least hope for it (To the Church, I, 10, 12).

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from God then we are not to love anyone more than ourselves, nor to think anyone more dear to us than our own souls (To the Church, III, 18; cf. III, 3, 9).21 The third of our great egoists is St. Valerian (d. c. 460), Bishop of Cimiez, who makes heaven sound like a bargain to be purchased by humans through almsgiving. In pleading his case, Valerian instructs us that if someone were to offer us a very beautiful house at a discount we should try to gather the money to purchase it from every source. Similarly, he says “Look, possession of the kingdom of heaven is now offered to you, and for a very low price” (Hom VII, 4). This bargain-basement price is the price of giving alms to the poor and doing good works. Hence almsgiving is well worth it: “For if consideration is given to the fruits of your work and the tenderness of heavenly love, you receive far more than you give. Look, in return for feeding a poor man, the Gospels promise you the kingdom of heaven. ... If we compare heavenly things with earthly, it is evident that something very valuable is for sale at a rather low price (Hom. VII, 6; cf. II, 2-4; III, 1, 5; VII, 3). Valerian, like Salvian, is at times brutally egoistic about the nature of almsgiving. He says with respect to the giving of alms that “the dispensing of our resources is our gain. For, if you consider again the 21

Along the same lines is the tale of the Church Father Sulpicius Severus (c. 360-420) about a soldier who received the message of salvation from some holy hermits in the desert and, becoming a shining example of perfection in all the virtues, left the army and lived in the desert. However, this soldier then had the thought that he should return to his native country and try to save his son, wife, and household. He thought that it would be more acceptable to God to do this than to be content with his own escape from the world and that it would be a defect of charity for him to neglect the salvation of his own. Sulpicius, however, harshly states that such a thought is from the Devil and is a “false semblance of justice” (Dialogues, I, 22). Sulpicius then would definitely find fault with the view of St. Paul and other Church Fathers that we should be willing to delay or even give up our salvation for others. For Sulpicius, as for Salvian, love of self takes precedence over the love of others. Incidentally, it is this same Sulpicius who relates the famous tale of St. Martin of Tours in which Martin had a nocturnal vision of Christ being clothed in the same clothes that Martin had given to a beggar just the day before. In this vision Christ says “Martin, still only a catechumen, has clothed me in this garment” (Life of


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hope of future reward, whatever is given to the poor is reckoned as a profit” (Hom. VIII, 2; cf. Hom. VII, 1, IX, 1). He even says that the principle of great virtue is this: the more one works the greater the reward one gets (Hom. II, 4). So if one wants to act for one’s own benefit we should give money to the poor as frequently as possible (Hom. VIII, 1, 3; IX, 2). What is more, almsgiving has the further advantage that whatever is given to the poor is returned to oneself with interest in heaven (Hom. VIII, 2; IX, 5): “Whatever you give to the poor you do without doubt put out at interest. This interest will yield you its returns later on when the labors of every man will be evaluated and multiplied honor conferred” (Hom. XIII, 7). In fact Valerian calls the practice of good works the currency which acquires the benefits of the heavenly kingdom; it is a form of trading that doubles the yield of just profit (Hom. XI, 6-7). Valerian therefore is quite willing to state that to help the beggar is a great gain, for to clothe the poor person is to cover the nakedness of one’s own self (Hom. IX, 4). And of the commandment to love our enemies Valerian declares “Let no one think that by reason of this commandment one is conferring some benefit on one’s enemy. One who loves one’s enemy loves oneself ” (Hom. XIII, 4). This is something, says Valerian, that is good to keep in mind whenever the love of our enemies becomes too demanding. The last member of this egoistic foursome is St. Maximus of Turin (fl. 390-410). He also compares almsgiving to a business transaction (negotiatio) whose sole purpose is to gain interest for ourselves by giving alms to the poor. He writes: “But if we look at the matter correctly, our office is truly a business, and the exercise of the priestly ministry is a kind of exercise of spiritual transaction. For we expend earthly things in order to gain heavenly things; we give out the money of this world in order to acquire eternal riches; we feed others by our hunger, not so that our own sustenance may perish but that it may increase. For what does our feeding the poor, our covering the naked, our visiting the imprisoned have as its aim if not that money given out on their behalf not be lost but be increased, and that this St. Martin, 3). Thus there is the implication that the things we do for the poor are done to Christ and we will ourselves be rewarded in heaven for doing them (cf. Mt 10:40-42, 25:31-46).

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business, so to speak, gain interest for the giver? For a poor and hungry person is, as it were, a rich person’s treasure chest: he does not consume the alms given out but guards it ... See, then, if almsgiving is a business!” (Serm. 27; cf. Serm. 22, 96; Mt 25:26-27; Lk 19:110). He therefore notes that almsgivers, who give freely for their own salvation, should be praised for their ability to give their own wealth to themselves and acquire everlasting dominion through the bestowing of temporal property (Serm. 95). Or as Maximus remarks in another place “Clearly he deserves to receive who has so labored that he has acquired spiritual riches by his concern for his soul … Another person who is disposed to mercy ought to hear that the Lord will be merciful to him. And it is necessary that one who has weighed the stuff of this earth against the heavenly riches should, on hearing of the exchange of heavenly rewards, pursue the Lord’s work more readily and willingly and add the increase of liberality to the good of mercy that he has” (Serm. 42). Indeed in response to those who complain that they have no money with which to give alms due to heavy taxes and endless needs, Maximus says that almsgiving must come before taxation. For the need of salvation must supersede every other need, and this need is met not by paying taxes which profits someone else, but by giving alms through which the giver achieves his or her salvation. Almsgiving in fact is doubly blessed, says Maximus, as it both renews the recipient and rejoices the giver. For this reason it is better to give to God first by way of alms and other humans second by way of taxes (Serm. 71).22 In short, for many Christian authors the giving of alms is primarily for ourselves and not for the person to whom we give them as it secures for us a heavenly reward. Thus while censoring an earthly 22

Also of interest is St. Augustine’s notion of almsgiving. Augustine (354430), who can be very disinterested at times but is really the best Patristic example of the harmonistic conception of love, has a unique image of the poor as our porters (laturarii). He claims that the poor are able to carry our wealth for us from earth to heaven. So although it is difficult to find beasts of burden and ships to carry goods from the East to the West, by giving alms the poor we easily find a ladder from earth to heaven. For as the poor act as our porters, what we give them on earth will be returned to us in heaven (Serm. 38, 9; 60, 7, 7; cf. John Chrysostom, Hom. John, XXV).


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usury wherein we seek benefit from other humans for our gifts to them, they quite willingly allow for a heavenly or pious usury in which we give to others because God will reward us for such deeds in heaven.

Disinterested Conceptions of Almsgiving and Good Works Not all Christians though were happy with the view that one should give alms to others merely in order to inherit eternal life. They thought that such selfish motivations were not in accord with the purity of Christian love. Now they too could point to Scriptural passages to back up their claims. Jesus himself, they pointed out, speaks of the importance of denying oneself (Mk 8:34-38) and Jesus also states “If anyone comes to me without hating his father and mother, wife and children, brothers and sisters, and even his own life, he cannot be my disciple. Whoever does not carry his own cross and come after me cannot be my disciple” (Lk 15:25-33; cf. Jn 12:25). They also noted that Jesus himself said to God before his looming crucifixion: “Take this cup away from me, but not what I will but what you will” (Mk 14:36; cf. Jn 12:27-8). This disinterested notion of love, however, gets pushed the farthest in St. Paul. According to Paul true love contains no selfishness. He tells us: “Do nothing out of selfishness or out of vainglory; rather, humbly regard others as more important than yourselves, each looking out not for his own interests, but everyone for those of others” (Phil. 2:2-4). Indeed Paul states “No one should seek one’s own advantage, but that of one’s neighbor” (1 Cor. 10:24; cf. 1 Cor 7:3-4, 10:33; 1 Tim 5:6-10; Acts 18:3; 20:34-35). So instead of trying to please ourselves we should try to act for the neighbor’s good (Rom 15:1-4). Paul’s doctrine of love is summed up rather nicely in his famous Hymn to Love where we read: “Love is patient, love is kind ... Love seeketh not its own ... It bears all things ... endures all things” (1 Cor 12:31-13:13). Now Paul’s view of love proved quite influential on a number of Christians (as did influences from Greek and Roman thinkers). It caused many Christians to criticize the egoistic notions of almsgiving. One of these was Clement of Alexandria (c. 150-215) who writes

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that a person should give alms according to the principle of loving communication and not on account of a recompense, either from the one receiving the alms or from the Lord who has promised eternal life to His followers (Stromata, IV, 18). Moreover, as Clement notes, those who think that by the gift of what is perishable they shall receive immortality in exchange are in the parable of the two brothers called hirelings (Stromata, IV, 6; cf. Lk 15:11-32). Thus for Clement true Christians do so to others not for any advantages flowing to themselves but because it is right in itself to do good. Hence they do not do good for glory or reputation, nor for either a temporal or eternal reward, but purely to imitate the likeness of the Lord (Stromata, IV, 22).23 Cappadocians such as Gregory of Nazianzus (c. 329-90) also criticize those who give alms to others for self-interested reasons. Gregory holds that in the highest state of love, that of sonship, we give alms not to earn a reward but because it is a noble thing to do. Here we have compassion for one another as if caring for our own affairs, and so treat others as we are treated by God, giving to them as we receive (see Dorotheus, Directions on Spiritual Training, 14). And John Chrysostom (c. 349-407) expands on this conception by stating: Let no man follow after virtue as a hireling, no man as a senseless person, no man as after a heavy and burdensome thing. Let us pursue it then with a ready mind, and with joy. For if there were no reward laid up, ought we not to be good? But however, at least with a reward, let us become good. And how is this anything else than a disgrace and a very great condemnation? Unless thou give me a reward (says one), I do not become self-controlled. Then am I bold to say something: thou wilt never be self-controlled, no not

23

It is instructive to compare Clement of Alexandria’s account of his motive for writing books with that of Salvian’s. Clement, in explaining why he wrote his book Stromata, says that an author of a book writes not for gain, nor enslaved by fear, nor elated by pleasure, but only to reap the salvation of those who read it. Perfect humans then must not do any deed for the sake of recompense but instead imitate the Lord by giving freely of themselves (Stromata, I, 1). This, of course, is in marked contrast to the view of the egoist Salvian who, as we have seen, declared he wrote his book out of hope of attaining his own salvation.


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even when thou livest with self-control, if thou dost it for a reward. Thou esteemest not virtue at all, if thou dost not love it. But on account of our great weakness, God was willing that for a time it should be practiced even for reward, yet not even so do we pursue it (Hom. Hebrews, XIII, 9).

Hence while Chrysostom recognizes that one who gives alms to others will be repaid for it by God who will serve as one’s debtor, and thus that through benefiting one’s neighbor one also benefits oneself, he claims it is best if one does not act on such a basis. Chrysostom repeats these thoughts in other works. In one place he mentions that we do not purchase heaven with money but by disposition of mind and from a good motive. Still, he says, if our heart will not hear another reason, let us at least benefit others on the basis of self-interest (Hom. Phil., XIV). And he states: “Difficult is virtue; but let us cast around her form the greatness of the promises of things to come. Indeed those who are virtuous, even apart from these promises, see her beautiful in herself, and on this account go after her, and work because it seems good to God, not for hire; and they think it a great thing to be sober-minded, not in order that they may not be punished, but because God hath commanded it. But if any one is too weak for this, let him think of the prizes” (Hom. John, LXXVII, 4). These views of Gregory of Nazianzus and John Chrysostom influenced Dorotheus of Gaza (c. 506-560) who writes that when the best people give alms they give up their reward and lay up no treasure for themselves with God, since the aim they set for themselves is not to profit their souls. He recognizes that one who gives alms to be delivered from future punishments does indeed, in doing something for the good of one’s own soul, act according to God’s will. Nonetheless one does not do quite all that God wishes, for one is still in a state of servility and does not act freely of one’s own accord but out of fear of punishment. And one who gives alms out of hope of a heavenly reward acts from a still higher motive, but even this is not quite what God wants. For one has not yet acquired the sentiments of a son but rather those of a hired laborer: one merely does what one’s master wants in order to receive one’s wages and so one still acts for the sake of a gain. A true son of God, says Dorotheus, gives alms

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freely out of the goodness of his own heart (Directions on Spiritual Training, 14). St. Augustine (354-430) too seems to criticize an excessively egoistic account of compassion (although as we have seen he himself put forward some egoistic-sounding views as well). He follows Paul in claiming that charity at no point seeks its own interests (Enarr. in Ps. 122, n. 12) and so “when we take pity upon another person and care for him or her, it is for his or her advantage that we do so. Thus we do not care for others seeking to gain heaven” (On Christian Doctrine, I, 32, 28).24 Augustine also seems to reject the view of Tertullian, Ambrose, and Paulinus that God becomes our debtor for our acts of almsgiving and pays us back with rewards in heaven for our monetary losses. He says that God is made a debtor not by receiving something from us, but by promising us what He is pleased to promise. For, says Augustine, we sometimes say to another person ‘You owe me because I gave you something’ and at other times ‘You owe me because you promised me something.’ And it is only in the latter way that we can make a demand of the Lord and say ‘Pay what You promised because we did what You commanded’ (Serm. 158, 2). Similarly, Augustine claims that though God will pay out the crown to us humans and become our debtor we must ask why He is the debtor. Is it because He received something from us? Augustine replies in the negative and states that God made Himself a debtor not by receiving something but by promising something. Hence one does not say to Him ‘Pay for what you received,’ but instead ‘Pay what You promised’ (Enarr. in Ps. 83, 16). Thus for Augustine grace is given gratuitously and as such nothing of ours proceeds it for the sake of which we are receiving it. For, he remarks, if some good work of ours proceeded it, we would be as it were receiving a payment, not a gratuitous gift (Enarr. in Ps. 70, 2, 1; cf. Serm. 87, 6). 24

Still, Augustine continues, “somehow or other our own advantage follows by a sort of natural consequence, for God does not leave the mercy we show to him who needs it to go without reward. Now this is our highest reward, that we should fully enjoy Him, and that all who enjoy Him should enjoy one another in Him” (On Christian Doctrine, I, 32, 28) [here I believe Augustine anticipates the correct solution to the problem of love].


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Lastly mention should be made of Gregory the Great (c. 540-604) who cautions us that when we redeem sin by alms we must not suppose that the righteousness of God is for sale, believing that if we take care to give money for our sins we can sin with impunity (Pastoral Rule, III, 20; cf. Lactantius, Divine Institutes, VI, 13). This is because the gifts of virtue are not received for ourselves alone but for others as well, and so if we always meditate on our own and not another’s gain we forfeit the very benefits we desire (Pastoral Rule, I, 5; III, 4).25 Gregory the Great in fact went so far as to state that no one is strictly speaking said to have charity for oneself since charity only occurs when love does not turn inward but reaches out to others (Hom. Gospels, 17:1; cf. Aristotle, EE 1240a13-22; Augustine, The Trinity, IX, 2, 2).

Egoistic Conceptions of Sacrifice Going along with the egoistic views of almsgiving, there were also egoistic views of sacrificial love. Now sacrifice of self was a central tenet of Christian belief. And once again Jesus (c. 4 B.C.–30 25

Even some of the disinterested thinkers who condemn almsgiving for the sake of an eternal reward at times sound very egoistic about the giving of alms. For example, Clement of Alexandria (c. 150-215) on occasion encourages almsgiving by talking about the heavenly rewards in store for one who gives alms [although he probably does think that perfect, as opposed to ordinary, Christians are not motivated by the thought of reward when giving alms]. He says “Then to appoint such a reward for liberality, an everlasting habitation! O excellent trading! O divine merchandise! One purchases immortality for money; and, by giving the perishing things of the world, receives in exchange for these an eternal mansion in the heavens! Sail to this mart, if you are wise, O rich man! … Spare not perils and toils, that you may purchase here the heavenly kingdom” (On the Salvation of the Rich Man, 32; cf. Exhortation to the Heathen, 9; Stromata, IV, 7-8). See also Gregory of Nazianzus (Oration on St. Basil, 63; Exhortation to Martyrdom, 41; Oration on Holy Baptism, 13-14) and John Chrysostom (Hom. Titus, VI; Hom. John., III, VII, XXIII, LXXVII, LXXIII; Hom. Acts, XXV, XLIII; Hom. Phil., I, IV, XIV, XV; Concerning the Statues, Hom. XVI; Hom. Rom., VII, XXI; Hom. Hebrews, XIX, XXII; Hom. Eph., XXII; Hom. Col., I; Hom. Repent., III, VII, XVI, XXI-XXIII, XXVIII; Hom. 1st Cor., XXXII; Hom. 1st Thess., IV; Hom. Gen., XVII).

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A.D.) was the source of this view. He said “Whoever wishes to come after me must deny himself, take up his cross, and follow me. For whoever wishes to save his life will lose it, but whoever loses his life for my sake and that of the gospel will save it” (Mk 8:34-35; cf. Lk 15:25-33; Jn 12:25). Consequently Christians stressed the importance of being willing to suffer affliction for the sake of others. As the Gospel of Peter says, Christ suffered for us leaving an example for us to follow (1 Pet 2:18-21; cf. 1 Pet 3:13-18; Gal 4:15; Phil 1:29). And Paul in turn calls for Christians to imitate him in being a spectacle to the world, a fool on Christ’s account, going hungry and thirsty, poorly clad and roughly treated, homeless, in toil, ridiculed and persecuted (1 Cor 4:9-16). All of this suggested that one must do the will of God and love other humans no matter what the cost to oneself. As a matter of fact, giving up one’s life for another was held to be the supreme example of love. As Jesus stated “No one has greater love than this, to lay down one’s life for one’s friends” (Jn 14:15-15:17), and he also said that a good shepherd will lay down his life for his sheep (Jn 10:11-16; cf. Mt 26:35; Acts 21:13-14). And Paul takes things farther yet and writes that we must be willing to follow Christ who emptied himself, took the form of a slave, and became obedient to death on a cross for us (Phil. 2:2-21) [some of the Church Fathers even took Jesus literally when he said that if one wants to be his disciple one must hate one’s own life (Lk 14:26-27)]. Thus it became a commonly held truth among the Church Fathers that Christians must imitate Christ (Imitatio Christi) and be willing to suffer and die for others (cf. 1 Jn 3:16). Yet this very willingness to sacrifice oneself for others takes on a whole new light when we discover that in order to encourage martyrdom many Christian authors spoke of how one who suffers or gives up one’s life for others is sure to receive an eternal reward in heaven. Thus even the Christian doctrine of sacrifice can be reinterpreted in an egoistic manner. Additionally it can also be argued that such a view goes back to Jesus himself who says: “Amen, I say to you, there is no one who has given up house or brothers or sisters or mother or father or children or lands for my sake and for the sake of the gospel who will not receive a hundred times more now in this present age … and eternal life in the age to come” (Mk 10:27-30; cf. Mt 5:10;


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Lk 6:22-23). We also find Jesus in the gospel of John stating “One who loves one’s life, loses it; and one who hates one’s life in this world, keeps it unto life everlasting” (Jn 12:25; cf. Mt 10:39, 16:25-6). Ever faithful, St. Paul develops these views and tells us that while love calls us to sacrifice this is a momentary and light affliction which produces for us an eternal weight of glory beyond all comparison (2 Cor. 4:16-18; cf. 2 Cor 1:4-11, Rom 8:18). Indeed, Paul seems to have felt that sacrificing ourselves for others is only worth it if it leads to a reward in heaven. Thus he queries “why are we endangering ourselves all the time if there is no resurrection? Every day I face death; I swear it by the pride in you that I have in Christ Jesus our Lord. If at Ephesus I fought with beasts, so to speak, what benefit was it to me? If the dead are not raised let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die” (1 Cor. 15:30-32; cf. 1 Cor 15:19). According to at least some of the Scriptures then suffering and dying on behalf of others is worth doing because God will give us good things in return for our sacrifices. Not surprisingly, many of the Church Fathers themselves talked of the great rewards in store for those who give up life and limb for others. One such person was St. Ignatius of Antioch (c. 35-110 A.D.) who actively sought out his martyrdom. In his letters he expressed a great desire to suffer for Christ as is evident in his famous assertion “Here and now, as I write in the fullness of life, I am yearning for death with all the passion of a lover. My love (eros) [earthly passions] has been crucified;26 in me there is left no spark of desire for mundane things, but only a murmur of living water that whispers within me, ‘Come to the Father’ (Ep. Rom., 7; cf. Ep. Tral., 4). Yet as one reads on it becomes quite clear that the primary motivation for Ignatius’ seeking martyrdom is to achieve eternal life. He writes: “You must forgive me, but I do know what is best for myself. This is the 26

One of the main reasons for the fame of this passage is that it contains one of the earliest occurrences of the Greek word eros in Christian writings. In interpreting it, I side with the view that St. Ignatius uses eros here to refer to his earthly passions, echoing an earlier statement of St. Paul’s (Gal. 5:24). However later Christians such as Origen and Rufinus interpret it to be referring to Christ who is the Love (Eros) that has been crucified (see Origen, Hom. Cant., Prologue, 2). This will result in the usage of Eros to refer to Christ in Pseudo-Dionysius.

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first stage of my discipleship; and no power, visible or invisible must grudge me my coming to Jesus Christ. Fire, cross, beast-fighting, hacking and quartering, splintering of bone and mangling of limb, even the pulverizing of my entire body—let every horrid and diabolical torment come upon me, provided only that I can win my way to Jesus Christ!” (Ep. Rom., 5; cf. Ep. Rom., 2; Ep. Poly., 2). What is more, Ignatius displays indignation for his fellow Christians when they try to prevent his martyrdom at the hands of the Romans. He writes “all now depends on whether I can reach my goal and secure my inheritance without hindrance. But what fills me with fear is your own kindly feeling for me, and the disservice it may do me” (Ep. Rom., 1). And a little later on in this letter he likewise states “I must implore you to do me no such untimely kindness; pray leave me to be a meal for the beasts, for it is they who can provide my way to God” (Ep. Rom., 4). In this regard the Greek Apologists, such as St. Justin Martyr (c. 100-67 A.D.), are very interesting. For on the one hand, they, more than almost anyone else, tended to stress the sacrificial nature of love and how Christians should be willing to suffer and die for others. Yet on the other hand, they were among the most egoistic of the Christians and made it quite clear that the motivation for such sacrifices is precisely the meriting of one’s eternal life. Thus Justin Martyr tells us that as all Christians seek their eternal salvation they willingly sacrifice their lives for Christ (First Apology, 8, 11, 14, 39; Dialogue with Trypho, 46, 110). And he argues, along much the same lines as Paul, that as it would be bad to be deprived of life and pleasure, it only makes sense to suffer and die for Christ if there is a payoff in the next life (Second Apology, 11-12; cf. First Apology, 57). Besides the Apologists, the North Africans were also very egoistic as we have already seen. And they too presented an egoistic view of sacrifice. Hence Tertullian (c. 160-225) defends martyrdom in several of his writings by arguing that a martyr gains certain salvation and the coveted kingdom of heaven and is thus in no way a loser in the transaction. Moreover, just as those on earth are given promotions based on their merit, similarly God grants special rewards to those who undergo martyrdom. So what God gives in return balances all that love pays out (Scorpiace, 6, 11; To the Martyrs, 3-4; The


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Chaplet, 15; To Scapula, 1; On Patience, 11). And to further allay the fear of giving up one’s life for others Tertullian writes “So amply sufficient a depositary of patience is God. If it be wrong which you deposit in his care, he is an avenger; if a loss, he is a restorer; if pain, he is a healer; if death, he is a reviver. What honor is granted to patience, to have God as her debtor!” (On Patience, 15). Indeed Tertullian reminds the martyr “if you have missed some of the enjoyments of life, remember that it is the way of business to suffer some losses in order to make larger profits” (To the Martyrs, 2).27 The other egoistic North African, St. Cyprian, put into practice what he preached and is known to have died as a martyr in the year 258 A.D. And it is no wonder, given the great praises Cyprian lavishes on martyrdom. One poem about St. Cyprian attributes these words to him: “Light are the pangs when compared with the everlasting joy God Himself has promised to His intrepid soldiers. For pain is the price that we pay for the hope of the dawn of life eternal. And on the fleet wings of time every suffering soon will pass and vanish. Thus nothing is heavy to bear if the end brings us rest and crowning joy” (Prudentius, The Passion of Cyprian, 40-45). And in Cyprian’s own letters we find the claim that the quantity of our rewards in heaven will match the number of days we suffered for God (Ep. 76; cf. Ep. 58, 78; Exhortation to Martyrdom, 5:8, 5:12-13; Mortality, 17; Treatise against the Jews, III, 16-17; Rom 8:18; see also the works of Novatian, Ep. 1:4, 2:1-3, 3, and Athanasius, On the Incarnation, 21; Ep. 13:3-4, 28). The works of Lactantius (c. 250-325 A.D.) merit much study on this issue of sacrificial love. Lactantius goes even beyond St. Paul and holds that if there were no God or afterlife it would be foolish not just to die for another but also to spare the life of another to one’s own loss or consult the advantage of another more than one’s own (Divine Institutes, V, 17-18; Epitome, 35, 56-7). Contrary to the view of the Greek philosophers Democritus, Aristotle, and Epicurus, 27

Perhaps this is why Tertullian at times seems almost too eager to become a martyr and argues that martyrs should not flee from their captors but do their utmost to secure their death (To Scapula, 1; The Chaplet, 1; Flight in Times of Persecution, 1, 4, 9; but see his earlier works To His Wife, I, 1; On Repentance, 13).

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Lanctantius says that the act of having a pure conscience from engaging in noble deeds would not compensate us for the suffering such acts might cause or the loss of our lives. He feels it would be foolish to suffer so much for so little (Divine Institutes, III, 27; V, 18; VI, 9). Virtue then, with its call to much rejection of pleasure, self-denial, suffering, and even death, all in order to benefit others, only makes sense if done for a future eternal reward (Divine Institutes, III, 12; VI, 4; VII, 1, 5, 9-10; cf. 1 Cor 15:30-32; see also Athenagoras, On the Resurrection of the Dead, 18-20; A Plea for Christians, 12, 31, 33).28 It is in this way that Lactantius solves the moral dilemma involving the case of a shipwreck in which there is only one plank on which to float and this plank is being used by someone else—what can be called the plank problem.29 He agrees with Cicero that it is best if we not take the sole plank from another person but instead let ourselves drown. Lactantius, however, makes it clear that he is here not supporting any disinterested conception of love. For he goes on to argue that, despite appearances, one is even here acting for one’s own ad28

Lactantius states that even pagans who give their lives for their country do so for the immortality they will attain through the estimation of their fellow citizens (Divine Institutes, III, 12). He simply did not believe that one would voluntarily undergo death except out of hope of a future life of some sort. 29 This debate was started by the Greek Platonist Carneades (c. 214-129 B.C.) who, perhaps in response to some Stoic, had said that it would be foolish not to take a plank from a weaker person in the case of a shipwreck, or to push an injured countryman from a horse to escape from a battle (Lactantius, Divine Institutes, V, 16; see also Cicero, De Republica, III, 9), though this may have been purely a rhetorical point on his part. The Stoic Hecaton (Second to First Century B.C.) responded to Carneades by stating that one should not take away a plank from another person to save oneself from drowning at sea, and if two people were both near a plank the one whose life is less valuable for its own sake or for the sake of the country should give up the plank, or if their lives are equally valuable, who gets the plank should be decided by lot (see Cicero, De Officiis, III, 8990). The Roman author Cicero (106-43 B.C.) gave a somewhat similar reply to Carneades and stated that there are eternal laws of God that are valid in all times and places and which must never be broken. Furthermore, on the basis of these laws one must act on behalf of others and not just oneself and never cause injury to others even to save one’s own life (De Republica, III, 12, 33).


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vantage as there is an eternal reward set aside for those who give up their lives for others. Thus he says that Carneades is right to think that it would be foolish not to take the sole plank from a weaker person in the case of a shipwreck as long as there were no immortality in store for the virtuous. Yet as those who die for others gain the eternal reward of heaven it makes sense to let another person have the plank (Divine Institutes, V, 16-18; cf. Epitome 56-57; Tertullian, On Repentance, 4; St. Jerome, Ep. 117; Salvian, To the Church, II, 14). Lactantius then tries to present an alternative to the pagan theories of love known to him. He rejects the pure egoism of the Sophists and Cyrenaics that one should love others merely to attain physical pleasure or earthly goods. And he rejects the enlightened egoism of the Epicureans that one should love others and even undergo suffering for them in view of the higher mental pleasures one gains from such acts. However, he also rejects the purely disinterested view of the Stoics that friendship is to be pursued purely for its own sake. Instead, he offers up a twist on enlightened egoism wherein one forms friendships with others and sacrifices oneself for them not for any kind of temporal benefit, but for one’s eternal happiness and immortality. St. Cyril of Jerusalem (c. 315-86) is another who unabashedly sets forth egoistic views of sacrifice. He recognizes that at times the Christian is called to suffer for others. Yet he claims that this is quite wise “for your present sufferings are slight, while your rewards will be great; endure for a little while and you will be with the angels forever” (Catechetical Lectures, XVI, 20; cf. XVIII, 28). Hence according to Cyril “The root of all well-doing is the hope of the resurrection. The expectation of recompense strengthens the soul to undertake good works. Every laborer is ready to endure the toils if he foresees the reward of his toils; but when men weary themselves without return, their spirit soon fails along with their body. A soldier who expects rewards is ready for war; but no soldier serving an undiscerning King, who bestows no premiums for toils, is ready to die for him. So every soul believing in the resurrection is naturally solicitous for itself ” (Catechetical Lectures, XVIII, 1; cf. St. Ambrose, Ep. 35 (52); St. Jerome, Homily 16 on Psalm 83 (84); Homily 63 on Psalm 83 (84); Homily 41 on Psalm 119 (120); Homily 43 on Psalm 128 (129);

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Homily 86 on the Gospel of Luke 16:19-31; St. Peter Chrysologus, Serm. 22, 38, 133-34). This line of thought is continued by the great Christian egoists who defend martyrdom in the same egoistic manner as they do almsgiving. St. Maximus of Turin (fl. 390-410) makes no bones about declaring that when saints suffer they suffer both for themselves and for others. For while martyrs die for the sake of others, they also die for themselves as martyrdom opens up the gates of heaven to them (Serm. 12, 52). And here is how St. Valerian (d. c. 460) explains the value of being a martyr: “Look, as Scripture teaches, the possession of the heavenly kingdom awaits the victor. Clearly, how worthwhile it is to endure the executioner for one whose suffering is gaining a reward ... If so precious a gift of remuneration awaits a man, why should he not gaze on the flames without concern” (Hom. XVI, 2; cf. XV, 1-2, XVII, 2). No wonder then that so many Christian martyrs were eager to enter the fray (or in their case the fry, as they were often burned at the stake), for as Valerian says, it is not hard to enter a fight when you see that a victory has already been won (Hom. XVII, 4; cf. St. Paulinus of Nola, Ep. 13:15, 21, Poem 15:187-97; 18:138-53; 21:129-37). Clearly then for many Christians suffering and dying for others can only be justified if in this way one attains one’s salvation. Now such an explicit egoism really changes the nature of so-called Christian sacrifice. For it could be argued that in this case sacrifice is not really sacrifice at all, as one will ultimately be recompensed for whatever one gives up. Such a view therefore opens up the worry that one suffers and dies for others not out of concern for them but merely thinking of the good in it for oneself. Perhaps due to such worries some Christians presented much more disinterested accounts of sacrifice.

Disinterested Conceptions of Sacrifice Many of the early Christians believed that a true disciple of Christ must eliminate nearly all self-love and self-will. For these Christians we must place the interests of others above our own and love them even to the detriment of ourselves. Indeed some of the Church Fa-


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thers even make statements suggesting that a true Christian wholly rejects self-love and does not consider his or her interests at all in loving others (of course it is hard to tell how much of this is rhetorical exaggeration and how much is meant literally). Now because of these beliefs such Christians took sacrifice farther than anything found in the Greek and Roman authors who were all eudaimonistic to some degree. For they held that one must be willing to delay one’s eternal salvation for the sake of others. Accordingly out of love for others there will be occasions when one must temporarily abandon acting for one’s own happiness. Here the leader of the pack as usual was St. Paul (c. 5-67). In a great example of sacrifice Paul puts off his own salvation by delaying his execution at the hands of the Romans to remain on earth with his fellow Christians. He writes “I long to depart this life and be with Christ, for that is far better. Yet that I remain in the flesh is more necessary for your benefit” (Phil. 1:23-24). Now this action of Paul’s was greatly praised by many of the Church Fathers. It is perhaps the driving force behind the following statement in the Martyrdom of Polycarp (c. 150 A.D.) “This is surely the sign of a true and steadfast love, when a man is bent not on saving himself alone, but his brethren as well” (1). And this act of Paul’s is also alluded to by the Cappadocian St. Basil (c. 330-79). Basil states that the doctrine of the charity of Christ does not permit one to be concerned solely with private interests (Long Rules, 7; cf. Short Rules, 54, 138; Ep. 23); rather we ought to prefer all others to ourselves (Ep. 22; Morals, Rule 79, Cap. 22; Concerning Baptism, II, 12). Consequently, Basil admonishes a particular Bishop for not staying on in the flesh for the sake of his community, but instead leaping at the chance to die as a martyr in his desire to depart and be with Christ

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Clement of Alexandria also did not agree with those Christians who rush headlong into death and in haste give themselves up to the authorities. He says that such people banish themselves without being martyrs (Stromata, IV, 4). Clement, like Basil, seems to have had a problem with overly zealous quests for martyrdom such as those displayed by Ignatius of Antioch and Tertullian (for a similar critique see the Martyrdom of Polycarp, 4; cf. Mt 10:23).

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(Ep. 29). Basil holds that we should undergo martyrdom only when absolutely necessary (Morals, Rule 5; Rule 70, cap. 18).30 Another Cappadocian, Gregory of Nazianzus (c. 329-90), was one with his friend Basil in holding out Paul as an exemplar who sought not his own interests but those of his spiritual children. For, he says, in everything Paul neglected his own in comparison with the advantage of others. Because of this Paul was willing to put off his salvation and abide in the flesh for the sake of others (Oration in Defense of the Flight to Pontus, 54-55; cf. St. Ambrose, Ep. 15 (37)). St. John Cassian (c. 365-435) even gives this kind of love a name when he says that the greatest height of love is a pure apostolic love (no doubt named for the Apostle Paul) wherein one passes from slavery to adoption and does not seek one’s own profit but the things of others. So much is this the case, writes Cassian, that out of apostolic love one should imitate Paul who was willing to put off his salvation for his fellow Christians (Conferences, XXIII, 5; cf. XVI, 22). Lastly, John Chrysostom (c. 349-407) also commends the Pauline view that we are to love others above our own selves (Hom. 1st Cor., XXXII). And he is equally impressed with Paul’s decision to put off his departure to heaven in order to stay on earth and aid other humans (Hom. Phil., IV; Hom. Col., I; cf. Ambrosiaster, Comm. Phil., I, 26:2). Now even if it is possible that some of the Greek and Roman thinkers would have allowed for a temporary putting off of one’s eternal happiness [a similar teaching is also found in Mahayana Buddhism], it is doubtful that they would have gone along with those Christians who held that in the highest form of love one is willing to permanently give up one’s salvation, or even spend eternity in hell, for the sake of others. Such Christians find their prooftexts in Moses pleading to God on behalf of his people “If You would only forgive their sin! If You will not, then strike me out of the book that You have written [the list of God’s intimate friends]” (Exodus 32:32), and St. Paul (c. 5-67 A.D.) doing the same for his fellow Jews “For I could wish that I myself were accursed (anathema) and separated (apo) from Christ for the sake of my brothers, my kin according to the flesh” (Rom 9:3). Clement of Rome (Pope 92-101 A.D.) already praises the willingness of Moses to sacrifice himself for his people. He comments “What


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immeasurable love! Perfection beyond compare! A minister speaking up boldly to his Lord and demanding pardon for the multitude, or his own destruction for them along with them!” (53). Clement holds then that the highest love one can possess is a love in which one would willingly sacrifice one’s very life for others—one is ready to 31

It appears Clement of Rome interpreted the statement of Moses only as one of Moses being ready to give up his life for others, and not suffering in hell for eternity on their behalf. For Clement of Rome points out that such love is evidenced even among the heathen as over the course of history numerous kings, in times of pestilence, have offered themselves to death at the bidding of an oracle to save their subjects [this was a common example given by the Stoics as well]. Plus, he claims that many heathens have pronounced sentences of exile on themselves for the sake of allaying civil disturbances (54-55). This same interpretation may have also been that of Clement of Alexandria (c. 150-215) who said that Moses’ perfection was so great he wished to die together with his people rather than to be saved alone (Stromata, IV, 19). In this they were probably both correct. For Moses, when he said he was willing to be blotted out of existence for his people, most likely only meant that he was willing to give up his life and die for the sake of others. Indeed at the time the Pentateuch was written it is doubtful whether the Jews yet possessed the concept of a hell where sinners are punished or a heaven where saints are rewarded. And for that matter it is not exactly clear what Paul (c. 5-67 A.D.) meant when he professed a willingness to be anathema (i.e., accursed) and separated from Christ for the sake of the Israelites. Clearly Paul was willing to be contemptable to God and doomed to some sort of destruction. Yet scholars have disagreed on just what this destruction was, some having held that Paul showed a readiness to be cast out from the Christian community (1 Cor 12:1-3, 16:21-4; Gal 1:6-9, 3:13), others that he was willing to forgo his life (see Lev 27:28-9; Num 21:3; Deut 7:1-26; Josh 6:17-7:15, 20:20; Judg 1:17). And some have held, not without reason, that Paul was willing to undergo the loss of his soul or his reward of heaven and thus suffer temporary or perhaps permanent exclusion from fellowship with God. Still it does seem that Chrysostom and others go beyond the literal meaning of the text when they hold that Paul was willing to go to hell for others. Interestingly, some early commentators held that Paul here was not expressing a wish to be cut off from Christ, but only referring to his state before he became a Christian (see the Commentaries on Romans by Pseudo-Constantius and Pelagius). And some Renaissance writers followed Origen in holding that Paul for the sake of others was willing to be separated from God’s being in some way, perhaps even to suffer perpetually in hell, but not to lose God’s love or grace (see Origen, Comm. Rom., VII, 11; Issy Conferences).

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will one’s own destruction. Clement of Rome was followed by a later Clement, Clement of Alexandria (c. 150-215), both in name and in praising Moses for willing to be blotted out of the book of the living for the sake of his people (Stromata, IV, 19).31 The Cappadocian Father St. Basil (c. 330-79), even more explicitly, extols the virtues of Moses who wished his name to be stricken from the book of God out of love for his fellow Christians, and of Paul who dared to pray that he might be anathema from Jesus Christ for his brethren. He says that Paul wanted, following the example of Christ, to be an exchange for the salvation of all. Thus it appears that Basil understood Paul to be willing to give up heaven for the sake of others. Basil, however, tempers the harshness of this sacrifice when he informs us that Paul knew it was impossible to be separated from God by advancing through His grace and on account of the love of God Himself engaging in the most perfect practice of the greatest commandment. So Paul knew that he would receive much more than he gave (Long Rules, 3). Such themes are continued by Basil’s friend Gregory of Nazianzus (c. 329-90) who says that Paul displays true love for his brethren in that “He is ready, next to Christ, to suffer anything, even as one of the ungodly, for them, if only they be saved!” (Oration in Defense of the Flight to Pontus, 55; see also St. Augustine, Enarr. in Ps. 68, Serm. 2, n. 23; City of God, XXI, 15). Similar statements about how in true love we should be willing to give up our salvation for others also occur in Augustine (354-430), Isidore of Peluse (c. 355-440), Cyril of Alexandria (c. 374-444), and Victor of Vita (Fifth Century).32

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These more disinterested Christians also give less egoistic answers to the plank problem mentioned above (see n. 29). Ambrose (c. 339-97) says that a wise person must not take away another’s plank at sea in order to save his or her own life, even if that other person is more ignorant, for this would cause one to have a painful conscience and would be a violation of the law of nature which commands one to act for the good of all (Duties of the Clergy, III, 4:23-28). In fact Ambrose goes so far as to assert that even when our lives are threatened by an armed robber we should not kill him out of self-defense as this would stain our love toward our neighbors (Duties of the Clergy, III, 4:27; cf. Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will, I, 5).


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John Chrysostom (c. 349-407) goes even further. He praises Paul for his great love of others in that he would plunge himself into hell for them (Hom. Laud. Pauli, II; Hom. Acts, VI, XIX; Hom. Rom., V, XVI, XXVII; Hom. 2nd Thess., II; cf. Hom. Col., I, IV; Hom. Phil., IV; Hom. Hebrews, XIX). Thus he claims “He who loves, ought so to love, that if he were asked even for his soul, and it were possible, he would not refuse it” (Hom. 1st Thess, II; cf. Hom. 1st Cor., XXXII). In fact, Chrysostom, in explaining Paul’s love, says not only was Paul willing to be accursed to Christ on account of other humans, more than that, he wished it; so at the very moment he was about to rise up to heaven, Paul wished to go to Hell itself for the sake of other humans (Hom. Heb. XIX; Hom. Rom., XVI; cf. Hom. Laud. Paul, XII; Ad Stagyrum III, 11; Liber de Compunction, I; Hom. Repent. I, 10). Perfect humans therefore must emulate the truly great ones like Paul and only think of what would benefit other humans, not themselves. Such humans would choose to suffer ten thousand evils rather than see their beloved harmed (Hom. 1st Cor., IV, XXV, XXXII). For, as Chrysostom puts it, a love which is worthy of the name is always willing to suffer for others, and even if there were no other reward it would be recompense enough to endure great sufferings for the one who is loved (Hom. Eph., V, 1; Hom. Col., IV) [this view is directly opposed to that of Lactantius]. So whereas most humans are reluctant to endure pains to acquire virtue, even when rewards are on offer, Paul lovingly embraced pain without rewards. The only thing he feared was giving offense to God: his only hell was to be without the love of God. Likewise, the only pleasure he sought, present as well as future, was to be pleasing to God: his heaven, his present and future joy, was the possession of the love of Christ. As a consequence, the reason why Paul prayed to be separated from Christ for his brethren was because the loss of their salvation was more grievous to him than the loss of his own salvation. His ardent love and vehement desire was to be lost himself if they could be saved (Hom. Laud. Paul, II; see also the writings of the student of Chrysostom, Theodoret of Cyrus, On Divine Love, 7-8, 15-17 and elsewhere; Comm. Rom., VIII, 38-9, IX, 3; Comm. Cant., III; Ep. 21, 77). Paul then, for Chrysostom, not only was willing to give up heaven for others, he was willing to go to hell for them.

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St. John Cassian (c. 365-435) shares this view with Chrysostom and remarks that Paul out of apostolic love was willing to be subject not only to temporal, but even to perpetual punishment, if only all humans might enjoy the fellowship of Christ. Paul was sure the salvation of all would be better for Christ and for himself than his own salvation (Conferences, XXIII, 5; IX, 18). Many Christians thus criticized sacrificing for others purely for our own gain, even the gain of our heavenly reward. They held that to some degree we must display an other-regarding love and place the interests of others equal to or above our own. Indeed for some of these Christians we must completely disregard our own good and happiness when we love others. The test of such a pure love is that we would be willing to go to hell out of love of them. Now this is really the first time in history that a completely selfless view of love is put forward.

The Love of God Egoistic Conceptions of the Love of God Just as with the love of other humans, for Christians there were various recognized and appropriate motives for loving God, the most common of which were the fear of hell and the hope of heaven. One obeyed the commandments of God and showed love to Him in order to avoid burning in hell for all eternity and also in order to gain eternal joy in heaven. Such views seem to go back to Jesus (c. 4 B.C.– 30 A.D.) who states “If you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments” (Mt 19:17), and often spoke of the great rewards in store for those who follow God’s will and the great pains in store for those who do not. For example he says “the hour is coming in which all who are in the tombs will hear his voice [that of Jesus the Son of Man] and will come out, those who have done good deeds to the resurrection of life, but those who have done wicked deeds to the resurrection of condemnation” (Jn 5:29; cf. Mt 13:33-52; 23:13-33; 24:50-51; 25:29-46; cf. Ps 111:10; Prv 1:7, 9:10, 16:6; Sir 1:9-29). As before later Christians built on these thoughts, and in so doing their views could become very egoistic. For example, we find many Christians praising the ability of the fear of hell and the thought of heavenly reward to lead people to God. To take but a few ex-


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amples, the Shepherd of Hermas (c. 154 A.D.) instructs us to “Fear the Lord and keep His commandments. For by fearing the Lord you shall do all things well and this is the fear with which you must fear and be saved” (Mand. VII, 1-5). In this same work we also read that one who keeps the Lord’s commandments will be happy in this life, and in addition will receive the promise of eternal life to come (Sim. 1, 7-14; 10, 4, 1-5; cf. Lk 12:31; Clement of Rome, 21). The Greek Apologists also made much use of the declaration that those who love God and abide by His commandments will receive eternal glory in the next life to convert pagans to Christianity. Thus Aristides of Athens (fl. c. 140 A.D.) notes that Christians worship God, keep themselves from sin, and strive to be righteous out of hope of earning recompense in the world to come (Apology, 15-16). We even find in Aristides the prudential teaching that “it is profitable for you to worship God the Creator and to give ear to his incorruptible words, that you may escape from condemnation and punishment, and be found to be heirs of life everlasting” (Apology, 17). And St. Justin Martyr (c. 100-67 A.D.) often appeals to future punishments in hell and rewards in heaven to motivate people to become virtuous Christians. He proclaims that it is difficult to urge people to do what is right except by persuading them that the wicked and intemperate will be punished in eternal fire but the virtuous and those who live as Christ did will dwell with God free from suffering (Second Apology, 1, 9; cf. First Apology, 19, 52). In fact, he says that if wicked people only realized that their actions and thoughts cannot be hidden from God they would live an orderly life so as to avoid the threatened punishments of hell (First Apology, 12). Justin also speaks positively of a certain woman who became virtuous and converted to Christianity and who tried (unsuccessfully we find out) to persuade her husband to do the same by point out to him that there will be punishment in eternal fire inflicted on those who do not live temperately and in conformity with right reason (Second Apology, 2). Thus for Justin there seems to be the recognition that one should be virtuous and follow the commandments of God out of self-interest. As he states, it is not from a love of wealth, or of glory, or of pleasure, but because Christians fear a future judgment, that they strive to live in accordance with the Scriptures (Dialogue with Trypho, 82; cf. 116).

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The egoism of Justin Martyr especially comes out in a passage in which he writes of the Lord’s words that “they have in themselves such tremendous majesty that they can instill fear into those who have wandered from the path of righteousness, whereas they ever remain a great solace to those who heed them. Thus if you have any regard for your own welfare and for the salvation of your soul, and if you believe in God, you may have the chance, of attaining a knowledge of the Christ of God and after becoming a Christian of enjoying a happy life” (Dialogue with Trypho, 8; cf. 44). Similarly the North African Tertullian (c. 160-225) defends the propriety of fear of hell and hope of heaven as motives for serving God. For he feels that without fear of God humans are liable to be filled with every kind of lust (Against Marcion, I, 27; On Repentance 2, 4-7, 12; cf. Apology, 18:3, 45:7, 46:7, 47:12-13, 48; The Apparel of Women, II, 1; Exhortation to Chastity, 2, 8, 13; To Scapula, 1; Scorpiace, 9, 12). Interestingly, Tertullian, when commenting on the passage of John which says perfect love casts out fear (1 Jn 4:18), says that this means that love of God gives us the assurance that by suffering and dying for God we will receive recompense in heaven and that this removes all fear of suffering or dying at the hands of our tormenters (Scorpiace, 12; cf. Gregory Thaumaturgus, Metaphrase on Ecclesiastes, 16, 23, 39, 41, 57, 62). Our stalwart egoist Lactantius (c. 250-325) does not disappoint us here either and holds that one adores, worships, and labors on behalf of God both out of fear of punishment and desire to receive immortality in heaven. Thus he says religion is based upon the salutary fear of the Lord, and besides being loved as our Father, in that we are His children God should also be feared as our master, in that we are His slaves (Divine Institutes, IV, 4; VI, 9; VII, 6; On the Anger of God, 5). The last example we will give here is that of St. Paulinus of Nola (c. 355-431) whose writings tell of how God wishes to become the object of our fear, hope, and love. For he holds that both fear of punishment in hell and hope of reward in heaven are useful in motivating Christians to love and obey God (Poem 7, 8, 10:154-73, 10:294303, 20:167-79, 26:70-113; Ep. 1:2, 12:9, 29:4, 39:1-3, 39:6, 43:68, 44:4, 49:6). As he explains “For it is no small pleasure for believers mentally to anticipate in sweet reflection the blessings promised to


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the faithful, and to walk already in imagination the paths of paradise. A farmer takes pleasure in his cornfields in admiring the prospect of the harvest, whilst awaiting from the harvest the fruits of his labor; the eager desire of his prayers more easily bears the time of the delay if he feasts his eyes whilst hoping for what is to come. How much more pleasure can we obtain!” (Ep. 13:24-26).

Disinterested Conceptions of the Love of God Yet not all Christians were comfortable with these egoistic views of the love of God. Some of them came to believe that it is wrong to serve God out of fear of punishment in hell. They were especially influenced here by the saying of Jesus (c. 4 B.C.–30 A.D.) that perfect charity casts out fear because fear has to do with punishment. Rather, as Jesus goes on to say, we should love God because God first loved us (1 Jn 4:18; cf. Jn 13:34; 2 Tim 1:7). Here Jesus, as recorded in the gospel of John, seems to be further restricting the egoistic motives for love.33 Thus it is best to love God not from fear but from love (and hope). Origen (c. 185-254) is one of these Christians and asserts that it is best to cling to God not out of slavish fear but rather in the freedom of love (Comm. Gen., VII, 4). Accordingly, those who display per33

The gospel of John also shows its aversion to egoism by rephrasing the commandment to love other humans as we love ourselves to read: “I give you a new commandment: love one another. As I have loved you, so you also should love one another” (Jn 13:34; cf. Mk 12:31). The view that loving God is better than fearing God also echoes positions held by the Greek and Roman authors Critias, Democritus, Epicurus, Cicero, Plutarch, and the Stoics, who argued that virtue is best performed out of love rather than fear of punishment. For that matter it was also the belief of some Christians that it is best when a ruler’s subjects love their ruler from true love and not fear (see Ambrose, Jacob and the Happy Life, I, 2:7; Ep. 32 (5); Chrysostom, Hom. Tim., X). Finally it should be mentioned that the Alexandrian Jewish philosopher Philo Judaeus (fl. 20 B.C.–40 A.D.) also held that the love of God is better than the fear of God (Questions and Answers on Exodus, II, 21). This also appears to have been the view of the heretic Marcion (c. 85-160) who favors the God of love over the God of punishment (see Tertullian, Against Marcion, I, 27).

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fect love serve God not in fear with a spirit of bondage, but rather in love with a spirit of adoption (Hom. Josue, IX, 7; Hom. Cant., III, 10; Comm. Rom., IV, 4-5; VII, 2; see 1 Jn 4:18; Rom 8:14-15; Gal 4:1-7; 1 Cor 13:10-11). Another is St. Anthony of Egypt (c. 251-356) who, coming under the influence of Clement of Alexandria and Origen, declares that he does not fear God but loves Him, for love casts fear out of doors (Sayings of the Desert Fathers, Alphabetical Collection, Alpha, Anthony, 32). Anthony also says that everyone who fears God and keeps his commandments is a servant of God and in this service there is no fulfillment, although he admits it is just and a guide to adoption (Ep. 4:4-5; cf. Ep. 2:25-29; Rom 8:14-15; Gal 4:1-7; 1 Cor 13:10-11; Irenaeus, Against the Heresies, IV, 13-16; Novatian, The Trinity, 5). Putting all of this together then, he holds that rather than being a servant who fears God, it is better to attain the state of adoption wherein one loves God. This view became very widespread in the later Church Fathers. St. Ambrose (c. 339-97) claims that God prefers being loved to being feared, for the Lord exacts love, a servant fear. Hence a true believer must pass from slavish fear to love which is freely given (Ep. 68 (74); cf. Ep. 69 (75), 83 (73); Commentary on Psalm 118 (119), III, 2, XV, XVI, 19, XX, 56). And St. Jerome (c. 340-420) follows in the footsteps of those before him and states that serving God out of fear of hell is the way of neophytes while serving God out of love is the way of the perfect (Homily 6 on Psalm 66 (67), Homily 38 on Psalm 111 (112); cf. Homily 1 on Psalm 1, Homily 64 on Psalm 84 (85); Ep. 21:14, 82:3, 133:6). For according to Jerome God wants us to be His sons by adoption and to do good out of love. Still, if we cannot attain this level, remarks Jerome, let us at least be God’s servants and avoid sin through fear (Comm. Mal., I, 6).34 Even the grand egoist 34

Jerome additionally goes beyond most Church Fathers when he appears to hold that the fear of the Lord does not by itself remit sin and ensure salvation. According to Jerome, the person who fears hell and for this reason does not commit fornication will not receive as great a reward as one who serves the Lord faithfully through love. For the latter does not just do the bidding of God but ardently desires to accomplish God’s will (Homily 38 on Psalm 111 (112)). And Jerome even writes elsewhere that


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Salvian of Marseilles (c. 390-480) recognizes two paths to God, one for children and one for adults. He holds that children should be led to God out of duty and fear of Him, whereas their parents should lay treasures for themselves in heaven by doing good works (To the Church, fear as a motive for action is far from meritorious (Homily 1 on Psalm 1; cf. Homily 64 on Psalm 84). This is also the view of Gregory the Great (c. 540-604) who distinguishes between two kinds of compunction, one inspired by fear and fleeing punishment, and the other inspired by love and desire for eternal reward (In Ezech. II, Hom. 10, 20). He speaks of how the penitent thirsting for God first feels the compunction of fear, for when one considers one’s sins, one is initially overcome with tears because one fears eternal punishment. Yet soon, he continues, a feeling of security emerges from an assurance of forgiveness. And this results in the subsiding of one’s fear and the beginning of one’s burning with love for heavenly joys. Now the same person who formerly wept out of fear of punishment sheds abundant tears because the entrance into God’s kingdom is delayed. Thus according to Gregory we must distinguish between a compunction of fear in which one weeps out of fear of hell and a compunction of love wherein the thought of having no part in the joys of heaven makes one cry. Furthermore, Gregory makes it clear that the compunction of love is much higher in dignity and reward than the compunction of fear. He says that one who is zealous for good works may weep over past sins either through fear of eternal punishment or through longing for God’s kingdom, yet only in the latter way does the soul reach the upper pools of heaven (Dialogues, III, 34; Ep. VII, 26; Pastoral Rule, I, Intro). And like Jerome, Gregory seems to claims that justification cannot occur through the lower form of compunction by fear. He appears to hold this because he believes that if the fear of punishment is all that restrains one from doing evil then one possesses no liberty of spirit but is bound by fear. What is more, one who does good solely out of fear of torments might commit what is unlawful if such fears were removed. It is for such reasons, says Gregory, that the light of innocence is lost in those who repent due to the compunction of fear alone (Moralia, I, 26, IX, 40-41, XI, 55, 57, 59; Pastoral Rule, III, 13). Finally let us mention that Gregory’s views here anticipate the medieval distinction between attrition (imperfect compunction out of fear or hope of reward) and contrition (perfect compunction out of love). And in point of fact this distinction goes back to Clement of Alexandria who writes “And there are two styles of penitents. That which is more common is fear on account of what is done; but the other which is more special, the shame which the spirit feels in itself arising from conscience” (Stromata, IV, 6; cf. Stromata, II, 6-9; VI, 3).

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I, 4; cf. IV, 1). Still, the egoistically inclined Salvian makes it plain that he never did condemn love of God for the sake of eternal rewards. According to Salvian “If we do not give our wealth for the redemption of sins, let us give it, at least, for the purchase of beatitude … Even if we do not fear punishment, we are, however, seeking a kingdom” (To the Church, II, 12; cf. I, 10; II, 11; cf. St. Maximus of Turin, Serm. 71).35 Taking things one step further, many Christians came to believe that God must be loved entirely for Himself, rather than out of fear of punishment in hell, or hope of a reward. This could take one of two forms. First, some Church Fathers asserted that God should not be loved for the sake of temporal rewards but rather only for the sake of eternal rewards. Jerome (c. 340-420) seems to be a proponent of this view when he criticizes the Jews who kept the precepts of the law merely for the sake of worldly advantages. He claims that they were just and merciful not for the sake of these virtues themselves, but rather so that they could secure the rewards of fertility of the soil and a long life. In this way, he says, they resembled hired servants (Ep. 21:14-17; cf. Lk 15:15:11-32; Jn 10:11-16; 1 Jn 4:18). Jerome therefore says it is best to keep the commandments not because one is 35

Some Church Fathers also distinguish between an imperfect servile fear of God in which one fears God’s wrath and a perfect chaste fear of God in which God is revered as a father. For instance, Clement of Alexandria (c. 150-215) states that fear of God can be good, but this proper fear of God is not like the fear of a wild beast; rather it is like the fear of offending a father whom one both fears and loves at the same time (Stromata, II, 12). Or put slightly differently, the fear of God should be a fear resembling the reverence right-minded children show their fathers and not the hated of slaves who dread their masters (Instructor, I, 9). This is also the view of St. Athanasius (c. 295-373) who advises a Roman prefect not to fear God as a tyrant, but to fear Him because the prefect is loved by God without showing love in return (Ex. Ps. 13:5, 18:10). St. Jerome (c. 340-420) similarly says that in those who are perfect, fear is no longer a fear of hell but a reverence of God (Comm. Eph., 5, 32-33; Comm. Eccl., 12, 14). This distinction between a lower servile fear of God and a higher chaste (or filial and holy) fear of God also occurs in other Church Fathers such as St. Hilary of Poitiers (c. 315-67), St. John Cassian (c. 365-435), St. Augustine (354-430), St. Fulgentius of Ruspe (c. 476-532), Dorotheus of Gaza (c. 506-560), St. Gregory the Great (c. 540-604), St. John Climacus (560-649), and St. Maximus the Confessor (c. 580-662).


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compelled by fear of punishment, nor out of desire for a (temporal) reward, but instead because what is commanded by God is best (Ep. 21:14). Now as Jerome elsewhere encourages almsgiving and martyrdom so that one may go to heaven, it appears that for him it is wrong to love God out of fear of hell and hope of temporal rewards but not necessarily out of hope of eternal rewards.36 And some Christian authors went even further than this and held that it is best to refrain from loving God for any sort of reward, either temporal or eternal, for only in this way do we show that we love God for Himself. Now the earliest trace of this position occurs in a passage of the Second Letter of Clement (c. 120-70 A.D.). There we read: “None of the righteous has attained a reward quickly but waits for it; for if God should pay the recompense of the righteous speedily, we should be immediately training ourselves in commerce and not in godliness; for we should seem to be righteous when we were 36

Other Christians who, as we shall see, hold even stronger requirements for the purity of love also condemn love of God for the sake of temporal rewards. For instance St. Ambrose (c. 339-97) asserts that it is better to serve God out of a concern for future rewards rather than for present rewards or to avoid present pains (Duties of the Clergy, II, 1:1-3; cf. Explanation of David the Prophet, IV, 11; Commentary on the Gospel of Luke, XV, 7, 220). And St. John Chrysostom (c. 349-407) remarks that one cause of affliction is so that the saints might not be supposed to serve God from a hope of present prosperity. According to Chrysostom, God “being desirous to show, that it was not for reward that His saints serve Him, He stripped him [Job] of all his opulence; gave him over to poverty; and permitted him to fall into grievous disease” (Concerning the Statues, Hom. I; cf. Hom. Rom., XV). Thus Chrysostom says that only really carnal people are turned from sin out of fear of earthly punishment or desire of earthly rewards, instead of out of hope for eternal rewards (On Virginity, XLIX, 2-8). So too St. Augustine (354-430) holds that those who call upon God for the sake of worldly comforts and earthly goods, or in other words for the sake of their present life and happiness, show they do not really love Him (Ennar. in Ps. 53:7). Finally, Caesarius of Arles (470-542) follows Augustine in this as in most things and instructs: “Seek God, search for Him and do so freely; seek Him for His own sake, not yours. It is a true and chaste love which loves Him, not because He gives us some earthly good, but because He reserves Himself for us ... Therefore, love God and this will be your eternal happiness” (Serm. 137:2-3; cf. 159:6).

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pursuing not piety but gain” (20). Thus the suggestion is made that the desire for a reward is not to be our primary motive for love. For this reason it is better that a reward not be immediate so as to ensure that we do not love God and other humans merely for our own gain but out of true piety. Additionally this same Second Letter of Clement, like Paul and St. Ignatius (c. 35-110), compares immortality to a prize to be won in a military or athletic contest but in a new and disinterested light. As the author of this epistle says “So then brothers, let us contend knowing that the contest is close at hand, and that many make voyages for corruptible prizes, but not all are crowned, save those who have toiled much and contended well. Let us then contend that we may all be crowned. Let us run the straight course, the immortal contest, and let many of us sail to it, and contend, that we may also receive the crown, and if we cannot all receive the crown, let us at least come near to it” (7). Here quite remarkably we find the position that it is worthwhile to serve God even if one only comes close to the prize of immortality and does not ultimately attain it; so competing in the tournament, i.e., loving God and being virtuous, is valuable in and of itself apart from the reward. It was left however to Clement of Alexandria (c. 150-215) to make such a view explicit and he is really the first Church Father to uphold a purely disinterested view of the love of God. Indeed out of the blue we find many disinterested notions of love expressed in his writings for the first time [of course they may have had a quite extensive unwritten history]. According to Clement, one who avoids evil merely out of fear is not kind voluntarily but through coercion. This is proven by the fact that such a person would clearly do evil acts if he or she thought it was possible to get away with doing them (Stromata, IV, 22; here Clement was influenced by Epicurus). Fear therefore merely results in abstinence from what is evil and does not generate a positive disposition to do the good. Far better then are those humans who love God out of hope of heaven and not fear of hell. Yet more perfect still are those who do not even love God for the enjoyment to be found in eternal rewards. Such people are drawn solely by the love of God to practice piety and do not consider whether any lucrative gain or enjoyment follows to them at all (Stromata, IV, 13, 16, 18, 22-3; VI, 12; VII, 12; The Instructor, I, 7). These are the people who


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are truly and spontaneously good. For, notes Clement, the true disposition of people is revealed if both the threatened dread is canceled and the predicted promise taken away (Stromata, IV, 22). And only those who love God without thinking of what is in it for themselves will be good under all of these conditions. As Clement writes of these perfect Christians: “even if we were to suppose such people to receive from God leave to do forbidden things with impunity; not even if they were to get the promise that they would receive as a reward the goods things; not even if they could persuade themselves that God would be hoodwinked with reference to what they do (which is impossible), would they ever wish to do anything contrary to right reason, having once made choice of what is truly good and worthy of choice on its own account and therefore to be loved” (Stromata, IV, 22). Hence we find that for Clement worst off are those who reject the Lord or confess Him by mouth alone and not deed. And well off but not perfect are those out of fear of God or out of hope for salvation conform to God’s will. Yet the highest Christians have not just selfcontrol but also wisdom, and their righteousness does not just rest on civil contracts or on the prohibition of the law but flows forth from spontaneous goodness and the love of God (Stromata, IV, 9; VI, 15; VII, 11-12; cf. Stromata, II, 6-9; IV, 18). Clement develops his account of the of Christian perfection by distinguishing between the ordinary or imperfect Christian and the Gnostic or perfect Christian (Stromata, I, 13; IV, 13, 21-22; cf. The Instructor, I, 6);37 or, alternatively between one who has a simple, beginning, or common faith which admits of growth, and one who has a fully-developed and perfect faith or knowledge (gnosis) of God (Stromata, IV, 21-22; V, 1, 4, 10; VI, 14-15; VII, 12, 14). The ordinary Christian of common faith is the one who is moved to virtue out of fear of God or hope of eternal rewards (Stromata, I, 6; VI, 12). The Gnostic or perfect Christian, on the other hand, imitates God who is perfectly good 37

Clement of Alexandria uses the term ‘Gnostic’ here in the positive sense of a person with true wisdom, i.e., the perfect Christian who shares the wisdom of the Lord. In the writings of other Church Fathers, however, the word Gnostic takes on negative connotations and becomes associated with those who uphold the Gnostic heresy and require a special divine knowledge for salvation.

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and does not love for the sake of gain but only to please God (Stromata, II, 19; IV, 26; VII, 3, 7). The Gnostic as a consequence is moved to virtue not out of fear of hell or hope of reward but spontaneously out of love and on account of the good itself (Stromata, IV, 6; VI, 12; The Instructor, I, 8). Clement expresses all of this rather nicely when he writes: The man of understanding and perspicacity is, then, a Gnostic. And his business is not abstinence from what is evil (for this is a step to the highest perfection), or the doing of good out of fear ... Nor any more is he to do so from hope of promised recompense. For it is said, ‘Behold the Lord, and to every one according to his works; what eye hath not seen, and ear hath not heard’ ... But only the doing of good out of love, and for the sake of its own excellence, is to be the Gnostic’s choice ... Could we, then, suppose any one proposing to the Gnostic whether he would choose the knowledge of God or everlasting salvation; and if these, which are entirely identical, were separable, he would without the least hesitation choose the knowledge of God, deeming that property of faith, which from love ascends to knowledge, desirable, for its own sake. This, then, is the perfect man’s first form of doing good, when it is done not for any advantage in what pertains to him, but because he judges it right to do good; and the energy being vigorously exerted in all things, in the very act becomes good; not good in some things, and not good in others; but consisting in the habit of doing good, neither for glory, nor, as the philosophers say, from reputation, nor from reward either from men or God; but so as to pass life after the image and likeness of the Lord. And if, in doing good, he be met with anything adverse, he will let the recompense pass without resentment as if it were good, he being just and good ‘to the just and the unjust.’ To such the Lord says, ‘Be ye, as your Father is perfect’ (Stromata, IV, 22).

In Clement of Alexandria then we can clearly see a threefold classification of divine lovers (those who do good out of fear of punishment, those who do good out of hope of reward, and those who do good for its own sake). We also see the recognition that the true love of God may even involve a willingness to give up one’s own salvation if that is the only manner in which one can maintain a cognizance of God. As Clement says, if the Gnostic had to choose between the


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knowledge of God and salvation, the Gnostic would choose the former. Thus we see that for Clement of Alexandria we are most perfect if we do not love God for personal advantage, nor for glory or reputation, nor for fear of a great punishment whether human or divine, nor for a temporal or divine reward, but purely for God’s own sake (Stromata, IV, 22; VII, 11). Ambrose (c. 339-97) is also quite disinterested when it comes to the love of God. He says that mercenaries serve God for the sake of a salary, while sons of the Holy Spirit pursue what is good out of uprightness and are not attracted to virtue for their own profit (Commentary on the Gospel of Luke, XV, 7, n. 220; cf. Explanation of David the Prophet, IV, 11; On Repentance, II, 9). Ambrose accordingly writes of the serving of God “Therefore, possessing all things in Him, I seek no other reward, because He is the reward of all ... For one who follows Him is not led to perfection by the reward, but by perfection he is made perfect for the reward. For the imitators of Christ are not good by reason of hope, but for their love of virtue; for Christ is good by nature, not by reason of a desire for a reward. And, therefore, He suffered because it pleased Him to do good, and not because He sought an increase of glory from His passion. Thus one who desires to imitate Him does not do what is for his own advantage but what is for the advantage of others” (The Prayer of Job and David, III, 11:28; cf. Jacob and the Happy Life, I, 7:28-30; I, 8:35). To take one final example, St. Augustine (354-430) likewise holds that God must not be loved solely for an eternal reward. Or as he would put it, God must be loved gratuitously (gratis) and chastely, meaning that God is to be loved only for Himself and not on account of anything else. For, says Augustine, what is not loved for its own sake is not loved at all (Confessions, VII, 17; Enarr. in Ps. 19, n. 8-10; 53, n. 10; 55, n. 17; 72, n. 32; 79, n. 14; 104, n. 35; 134, n. 11; 149, n. 4; Sol. I, 13; Serm. 165:4, 178:11; 340:1; 385:4-5; City of God, X, 5).38 And in a definition which was to become classic in

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Augustine may have been influenced here by Clement of Alexandria who talks of a chaste charity that seeks the beauty of souls and not bodies (Stromata, IV, 18).

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the Middle Ages, Augustine declares that charity is the movement of the soul which seeks to enjoy God on account of Himself (On Christian Doctrine, III, 10, 16). Accordingly Augustine says “The heart was made chaste; God is loved by it freely; it seeks no other reward. Whoever seeks another reward from God and desires for that reason to serve God is making that which he wants to receive more dear than Him from whom he wants to receive it. What then? Is there no reward from God? None, except Himself. The reward from God is God Himself. This the heart loves, this it prizes. If it loves another, it will not be a chaste love” (Enarr. in Ps. 77, 32). Similarly he states that God is not to be loved for the reason that He gives us something besides Himself, but gratuitously and chastely because he gives Himself (Ennar. in Ps. 53, n. 7). In fact, in making clear what he means by this, Augustine says that even if, perish the thought, one had no hope of so great a good as the beatitude, one would persevere voluntarily in the difficulties of the present struggle rather than let vice dominate in oneself (City of God, XXI, 15). So God, for Augustine, is to be loved, not as this or that good, but as goodness itself (The Trinity, VIII, 3, 4).39

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Here too Augustine shows why, though he is sometimes quite disinterested about the love of God, he is the classic Patristic representative of the harmonistic position of love. For in speaking of what it means to love God for Himself, Augustine says that it means finding one’s joy, delight, and happiness in God. Thus true love of God is enjoyment of God for His own sake. True, in loving gratuitously the only reward we seek is God Himself but this is to say that God alone is to be our final end, the object of our happiness, the only thing we can rest in, enjoy, and which will satisfy us fully (On Christian Doctrine, I, 22, 3-5, 20-21; Confessions, VII, 17; Enarr. in Ps. 53, 10; Enarr. in Ps. 79, n. 14; 55, n. 17; 72, n. 32; Serm. 344:3; 331:4-5). Indeed Augustine may have held that the reason we would still love God, even if there was no eternal beatitude, is because as long as we love God we will still find great joy and happiness for ourselves. For it is doubtful Augustine ever abandoned the eudaimonism he inherited from the Greek and Romans. Still, as we shall see, even such a love of God for Himself in which we seek God alone as our final happiness and joy can be considered as selfish if pressed far enough. For we can still be accused of loving God to attain our own happiness, which is why Chrysostom will make the dramatic claims about perfect Christian love that he does.


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Now out of such views of the love of God, a quite common threefold hierarchy of divine lovers appeared in Christian authors. At the bottom are servants who love God for fear of punishment. Next up the ladder are mercenaries or hirelings who love God out of hope of reward. And finally at the highest and most perfect level are those who are adopted sons and friends of God and love God for His own sake. While certain Greek and Roman authors may have influenced the Christians in this regard,40 far more influential were certain passages of the Scriptures (not always interpreted in the intended sense). For we read in the Scriptures that perfect love casts out fear as fear has to do with punishment (1 Jn 4:16-21); that those who have a spirit of slavery fall back into fear but those who receive a spirit of adoption are children of God (Rom. 8:14-15; cf. Gal 4:1-7; 1 Cor 13:10-11); that friends are higher than servants (Jn 15:14-15; cf. Lk 12:4-5); that hirelings flee the sheep when wolves threaten and have no real concern for their flock (Jn 10:11-16); that hirelings and sons are to be distinguished (Lk 15:11-32); and that we are not to love only those who love us in return (Mt. 5:43-48). We can see such influences at work in the primitive form of the classification that occurs in Clement of Alexandria (c. 150-215). Clement distinguishes between those who slavishly fear God, those who serve him for eternal rewards, and those friends of God who love Him for Himself with a spirit of adoption (Stromata, VII, 1213). And likely through Clement’s own influence it also occurs in a primitive form in St. Anthony of Egypt (c. 251-356) who states that there are three kinds of souls. The first are reached by the Word of 40

As we have seen this threefold classification likely developed through the influence of pagans such as Critias, Democritus, Epicurus, Cicero, Plutarch, and the Stoics, who held that love of others based on fear of punishment is imperfect [Clement of Alexandria even quotes Epicurus on this point (Stromata, IV, 22)]. So too the ideas of Aristotle and the Stoics that virtue and friendship are to be pursued for themselves were probably also of influence. Indeed Pythagoras states that slavish people go hunting for fame or gain but the philosopher for truth (Diog. Laert., VIII; cf. Plato, Republic, 347b-c; Aristotle, NE, 1124b31-1125a2, 1127a7-10). Moreover, it is also known that the Stoic Chrysippus argued that the Platonic myths discussing rewards and punishments in the next life were inconsistent with the pursuit of virtue for itself.

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God through the law of promise and by the discernment of the good inherent in them from their first formation. Such souls are guided by the Spirit of God, and offer themselves to God in love through the law of the promise which is the natural and original law of love or covenant implanted in humans by God. The second kinds of souls are those who serve God after they hear the written law testify to all the pain and punishment prepared for the wicked and the blessed promises for those who progress in virtue. Lastly, the third kinds of souls are those whose hearts are hard from the beginning and who remain in sin. They only repent after God has sent afflictions and chastisements upon them (Ep. 1:2-17). Yet this threefold classification makes its first explicit appearance in the Cappadocian Fathers St. Basil (c. 330-79), St. Gregory of Nazianzus (c. 329-90), and St. Gregory of Nyssa (c. 335-95). Thus we find that Basil (c. 330-79) declares “To sum up, I note the following three kinds of disposition which necessarily compel our obedience: we avoid evil through fear of punishment and take the attitude of a slave; or, seeking to obtain the reward, we observe the commandments for our own advantage and in this we are like hirelings; or else, for the sake of the virtuous act itself and out of love for Him who gave us the law, we rejoice to be deemed worthy to serve a God so good and so glorious and we are thus in the disposition of sons” (Long Rules, Preface; cf. Sermon Seven, On Sin, 11). Basil holds that the first two dispositions are found in those beginning the life of piety, while for one who is no longer an infant but is able to be perfected, the third disposition wherein we love of God for Himself on account of His beauty is the best (Long Rules, q. 2, 4). St. Gregory of Nazianzus (c. 329-90) as elsewhere follows Basil in this and states “I know of three classes among the saved; the slaves, the hired servants, the sons. If you are a slave, be afraid of the whip, if you are a hired servant, look only to receive your hire; if you are more than this, a son, revere Him [God] as a Father, and work that which is good, because it is good to obey a father; and even though no reward should come of it for you, this is itself a reward, that you please your Father” (Oration on Holy Baptism, XL, 13; cf. Oration against Julian, IV, 60; XXI, 6; Oration XXXVI, 9; see the recasting of this by Dorotheus, Directions on Spiritual Training, 14).


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Similarly Gregory of Nyssa (c. 335-95) holds that there are three stages of love displayed by monks. At first the monk loves and serves God out of fear of punishment like a slave. Next, the service of God stems from the desire for a reward, like a hired hand. Finally the monk serves God out of friendship with God, from a pure love of God, as a child of God’s household. This last stage, says Gregory of Nyssa, is the stage of Christian perfection wherein one regards becoming God’s friend as the only thing worthy of desire (The Life of Moses, II, 320). In a particularly nice quote Gregory of Nyssa states: For God … shows the most perfect and blessed way of salvation here—I mean the way of love. For some there is salvation by fear: we contemplate the threat of punishment in hell and so we avoid evil. Further, there are those who, because of the hope of the reward held out for a life piously lived, conduct themselves virtuously. They do not possess the good out of love but by the expectation of a recompense. On the other hand, the person who is hastening to spiritual perfection rejects fear. Such a disposition is servile, and the person with this disposition does not remain with the master out of love. He does not run away out of fear of being scourged. Rather, the person seeking perfection disdains even rewards: he does not want to give the impression that he prefers the gifts to the One who bestows it. He loves with his whole heart and soul and strength not any of the things that come from God, but Him who is the source of all good things. This, then, is the attitude which He commands to the souls of all who listen to Him, for He summons to us to share His own life (Commentary on the Song of Songs, I, 15-16; cf. XV, 460-66).41

This doctrine was spread far and wide by St. John Chrysostom (c. 349-407) and his many disciples, such as Amphilochius of Iconium (c. 340-94), Mark the Hermit (d. c. 340), and Theodoret of Cyrus (c. 393-466). Indeed John Chrysostom (c. 349-407) explicitly condemns those egoists such as St. Justin Martyr, Tertullian, Lactantius, and St. Paulinus of Nola, who hold we should love God out of fear of

41

Translations of Gregory of Nyssa are from Commentary on the Song of Songs, tr. Casimir McCambley (Brookline, MA: Hellenic College Press, 1987).

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hell and hope of reward. Chrysostom holds that this is the second weakest kind of love (the weakest and indeed wrongheaded form of love being displayed by those who serve God and avoid sin for earthly rewards and fear of earthly punishment, Hom. Heb., XXVII; De Virg. XLIX, 2-8; cf. Hom. Phil., IV). 42 The best love of God, says Chrysostom, is one wherein we love God from goodwill and for Himself rather than as a servant for the threat of hell, or a hireling for the promise of heaven (De Compunct. Cordis, I, 7; II, 7; Hom. in Ps 7:6, 41:5, 111:1; Hom. Tim., I; Hom. Eph., XXII; Hom. Rom., IX, XV; To the Fallen Theodore, I, 12). A quote of his sets out this doctrine very clearly: “For men are not so much attracted by benefits as they are chastened by fear. But the admirable and great ones, and beloved of God, need none of these motives: men, such as was Paul. Not of the kingdom, nor of hell, made he account. For this is indeed to love Christ, this to be no hireling, nor to reckon it a matter of trafficking and trading, but to be indeed virtuous, and to do all for the love of God” (Hom. Rom., IX, 3; cf. Hom. Rom., V; Hom. Acts, VI). Additionally, like Clement of Alexandria, Chrysostom holds that we can be sure we are loving God for Himself if we should still love Him even if there were no reward for virtue or punishment for sin. He explains that while God threatens hell and promises a kingdom to draw humans to Himself, a true Christian is more distressed at having offended God than being punished for his or her sins; for such a Christian to offend God is more painful than hell. Thus one should be so disposed that even if there were no hell for those who sinned one should still readily choose to avoid sin and to do good 42

Chrysostom was too good a theologian to hold that loving God out of fear of hell or hope of reward was totally wrong. Accordingly he says that if fear were not a good thing Christ would not have expended such long and frequent discourses on the subjects of punishment and the vengeance to come (Concerning the Statues, Hom., XV; Hom. Repent., III, VII). He even encourages parents to start telling their children from the age of eight to ten stories about divine punishment and fifteen years or older about Hell in order to develop their faith in God (Addresses on Vainglory, 51; cf. Concerning the Statues, Hom., VII, XV; cf. Hom. Tim., XV; Hom. 2nd Thess., II; Hom. Tim., XVI; cf. Hom. Repent., VII, 27, VIII, 10).


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deeds (Hom. Rom., V, XIV). This is because being able to love the beloved is reward enough. Hence merely serving God is a sufficient reward and compensation for a saint and the saint will love God even if there is no heaven (Concerning the Statues, Hom., I; cf. Hom. John, XXXVI; De Compunt. Cordis, I). In short Chrysostom held that humans can avoid sin for various motives, the lowest being fear of enacted laws and love of reputation, slightly above this is fear of God, and higher still is hope of rewards, but the best is for God’s sake and out of love of virtue (Hom. Phil., IV; Hom. 2nd Thess., II). As we have seen then, according to this threefold (or really fourfold) classification of love, worst and wrong is to love God for the sake of temporal rewards or punishments, slightly better is to love God slavishly out of fear of hell, better yet is to love God as a hireling out of hope of reward, and finally the highest love is to love God as a son for Himself. This threefold classification, or something like it, is also found in Origen (c. 185-254) in a primitive stage, Eusebius of Emesa (c. 300-59), Ambrose (c. 339-97), Amphilochius of Iconium (c. 340-94), Theodore of Mopsuestia (c. 350-428), Augustine (354430), Leo the Great (c. 390-461), Theodoret of Cyrus (c. 393-466), Caesarius of Arles (470-542), Julianus Pomerius (fl. 498), St. Benedict (c. 480-543), Cassiodorus (c. 485-580), Pseudo-Macarius of Egypt (Fourth or Fifth Century A.D.), Maximus the Confessor (c. 580662), Bede (c. 673-735), and the Liber de libertate spiritus. It is especially common in the Eastern monks of the desert such as Evagrius of Pontus (c. 345-99) [ordained a lector by Basil and deacon by Gregory of Nazianzus], St. John Cassian (c. 365-435), Mark the Hermit (d. c. 430), Dorotheus of Gaza (c. 506-560), St. John Climacus (570649), Thalassios (Seventh Century), and Isaac of Nineveh (Seventh Century). Now up to this point we have seen that in loving God we are called to love God for Himself and not out of fear of hell or hope of reward. Indeed we must love God and follow his commandments even if there were no heaven. Still not satisfied with this, some Christians took the pure love of God to greater extremes and held we must love God even if this would result in our ending up in hell. The Church Father St. John Chrysostom (c. 349-407) is an advocate of this position and says we must never abandon the love of God, even if by

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loving God we were to go to hell, or if in giving up the love of God we could attain heaven. Our love then should resemble the love of St. Paul: For Christ he loved not for the things of Christ, but for His sake and things that were His, and to Him alone he looked, and one thing he feared, and that was falling from his love for Him. For this thing was in itself more dreadful than hell, as to abide in it was more desirable than the Kingdom ... And he out of desire of Him would take up with falling into hell, and being banished from the Kingdom, if the choice between the two were put to him: but we are not even above the present life. Are we worthy then to touch his very shoes, when we have come to be so far short of his largeness of mind? For he for Christ’s sake does not think anything even of a kingdom; but we think slightingly of Him, but things of His we make great account of” (Hom Rom., XV; cf. De Compunt. Cordis, I; Ad Stagyrum, III, 11; a similar remark occurs in St. Basil who says that separation from God is more unbearable than the punishment reserved for hell, Long Rules, q. 2, 4).

Much the same Chrysostom states that not even if a person were to threaten us with the future death to which there is no death, nor if he or she promised us life without end, would we agree to stop loving Christ. For we ought to be willing to endure countless deaths every day, or even hell itself, for the sake of seeing Christ coming in His glory and being enrolled in the company of the saints (Ad Theod. I, 11; Hom. Phil., IV) [here it appears the suffering in hell may only be temporary]. Chrysostom restates his strongly disinterested view of love in terms of a lovely familial metaphor when he says that a generous son who truly loves his father demands only to live in his company without worrying about anything else. Hence the son does not hold the father and his goods in equal estimation. Indeed every time the son considers his father he counts his father’s goods as nothing and he better loves being with him in torments and tortures than being separated from him in pleasures (Hom. Rom. XV). In sum, for Chrysostom even though we would receive nothing from God for loving Him, nay even if we were to suffer in hell for loving Him, it would still be worth it as the very conversing with God would be a blessing (Hom. Rom., IX, 3).


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The student of Chrysostom, Theodoret of Cyrus (c. 393-466), learned well from his teacher and says that he prefers longing for the Creator to all things seen and unseen together, and even if any other part of creation should appear greater and finer, this would not persuade him to give love in exchange for it. Indeed if someone offered him what is delightful but without love he would not except it, nor would he reject love if someone imposed what is melancholy along with this love. Hence he claims that hunger on account of love is more delightful to him than every luxury, persecution more pleasant than peace, nakedness more agreeable than a purple robe and cloth of gold, peril more sweet than every security, and violent death more to be chosen than every sort of life. This is because for the lover, suffering becomes the very consolation one accepts on behalf of one’s beloved (On Divine Love, 8, 15; cf. Comm Rom., VIII, 38-9; Comm. Psalms, CX, 10). Theodoret draws out the extreme consequences of this view when he writes that just to keep the flame of love within him he would gladly forego all present and future felicity and suffer and endure all kinds of pain (Ep. 21). For according to Theodoret, echoing Chrysostom, deprivation of love is more bitter than punishment in hell, and if forced to choose he would take the threatened punishment together with divine love rather than the promised kingdom of heaven without it (On Divine Love, 7-8). So for such Christians as Theodoret, even if no reward is offered, those who are truly religious gladly welcome all perils in God’s cause (Ep. 21). Such were the theories of love with which the medievals were acquainted. It was thus their task to make sense and reconcile these divergent views of love.


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[1]

Preface What is here called the “problem of love” could be formulated in abstract terms as follows: Is a love that is not egoistic possible? And if it is possible, what is the relation between this pure love of the other and the love of self that seems to be the basis of all natural tendencies? The problem of love is thus analogous to that of knowledge: regarding the latter we ask ourselves whether and how a being can be conscious of that which is not itself; regarding the former we ask ourselves whether and how the appetite of a being can tend toward that which is not its own good. In both cases an affirmative response seems more and more implausible once the notion of consciousness and the notion of appetite are more thoroughly studied. In the Middle Ages, the problem of love primarily arose in the following form: Utrum homo naturaliter diligat Deum plus quam semetipsum? [Whether humans by nature love God more than themselves?]1 Scholasticism, it seems, could not have focused this question into a more suitable formulation because none would have been both so concrete and so profound. For these people, God was, par excellence, the Real, Personal, Living Being and the question of His love was continually pressing and real. Moreover, this God, who is the object of the virtuous love commanded of free creatures, is at the same time the author of the natural appetites and the sole final end, uniting in Himself the totality of the Good. If therefore the reconciliation of self-love and the pure love of the other was possible, it seems that it had to be found in the love of God, and that the analysis of this love would consequently give the principles that would allow for the judging of the other “disinterested” affections. [2] As can easily be seen, however, the universal willingness to proclaim that God alone is the beatifying end of humans left the problem of love unresolved. Clearly everyone back then thought that the best way for humans to love themselves was to surrender themselves entirely to the love of God. Yet to assert, with respect to the eternal 1

For references to the first Scholastics see Appendix 1.

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life, the real convergence of the two loves (the love of personal happiness and pure love, i.e., the love of benevolence or friendship) was not to settle this speculative question: are the two kinds of love irreducible or can they be brought back to a common principle? I add moreover, in order to delimit the question as it then arose, that one of the most radical responses to the problem of love was unanimously rejected—that which would have consisted in making the love of God, purely and simply, a means to the love of self. Tradition said too loudly that one must love God for Himself and more than oneself.2 A And if such a love was commanded, it was therefore possible, and no Scholastic would have considered denying it. That is precisely what made the position difficult of those disciples of Augustine and Aristotle who defined the will of humans through the appetite for happiness. It was necessary for them to reconcile with this first principle the possibility of a love of God such that humans were prepared to sacrifice to this Being, who was distinct from themselves, all of their bodily and spiritual goods, indeed their happiness itself.3 2

It suffices to refer to the famous chapter of Saint Augustine on the fruenda [things that are to be enjoyed] and the utenda [things that are to be used]; this distinction, as is well-known, provided the Master of the Sentences [Peter Lombard] with the beginning and the division of his work. Note especially the assertion: “sed nec se ipso quisquam frui debet, si liquido advertas; quia nec se ipsum diligere, sed propter illum quo fruendum est ...” [but no one should enjoy oneself, if you take note clearly, because no one should love oneself except for the sake of Him who ought to be enjoyed (i.e., God) ...] (Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana, b. I, c. 22, n. 21; PL. 34, 26). Another text often cited is that of Pseudo-Prosper (Julianus Pomerius, De Vita Contemplativa, III, c. 25; PL. 59, 508): “si vero propter illa quae praestat amatur, non utique gratis amatur: quia iam illud propter quod diligitur, ei, quod dictu quoque nefas est, antefertur” [If, however, He (God) is loved for the sake of what He bestows, He is not loved gratuitously at all, because then that for the sake of which He is loved is preferred to Him, which is to say something wicked]. 3 The love of God, such as Christianity presented it, necessarily implied a certain contempt of self, a renunciation of oneself.B And this habit of Christian thought brought several authors to look upon sacrifice and suffering as the essential elements of all love (see Part 2, Chapter 2, of this work). For those who wanted to reconcile the love of God and the love of self, as long as this only concerned the sacrifice of temporal goods and the

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[3] Confronted with the problem thus defined, two conceptions of love divided the minds of the Middle Ages. We can call them the physical [physique] conception and the ecstatic [extatique] conception of love. Physical, it goes without saying, does not here signify corporeal. Even the most resolute advocates of this way of thinking regard sensible love [l’amour sensible] merely as a reflection, a feeble image of spiritual love. Physical here signifies natural and serves to designate the doctrine of those who base all real or possible loves on the necessary propensity of natural beings to seek their own good. For such authors, although hidden, there is between the love of God and the love of self a fundamental identity. Hence they are the twofold expression of one identical appetite, the deepest and the most natural of all, or better yet, the sole natural appetite. This way of thinking is, for example, that of Hugh of St. Victor in his treatise De Sacramentis [On the Sacraments] and Saint Bernard in the De Diligendo Deo [On Loving God]: it also finds very strong backing in the Neoplatonic doctrines of Pseudo-Dionysius. Finally, it is made precise and systematized by St. Thomas Aquinas. It is St. Thomas, inspired by Aristotle, who brings out its fundamental principle, showing that unity (rather than individuality) is the raison d’être, measure, and ideal of love. He reestablishes, as a result, the perfect continuity between the love of desire [l’amour de convoitise]C and the love of friendship [l’amour d’amitié].—The physical conception of love therefore could equallywell be called the Greco-Thomist conception of love. mortification of evil appetites, the task was not too difficult. As for the idea of a possible sacrifice of spiritual goods, this was not put forward in the Middle Ages as clearly as it was at a later date. Nevertheless, the most famous of these “impossible suppositions” that were debated during the period of Quietism, the one which consisted in offering to God the sacrifice of one’s personal beatitude, could not be completely ignored. This “impossible supposition” was in fact suggested by two passages of the Bible: Exodus 32:32 “Aut dimitte eis hanc noxam, aut dele me de libro tuo, quem scripsisti” [Either forgive them this sin, or erase me from Your book that You have written] and Romans 9:3 “Optabam .. ego anathema esse a Christo pro fratribus meis” [I wished ... that I was anathema to Christ for my brethren]. We see how it could appear difficult to reconcile the expressions of Moses and Saint Paul with the classical doctrine of the beatitude.

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The ecstatic conception of love, on the contrary, is especially pronounced in authors the more they exercise care in severing all the connections that seem to link the love of the other to egoistic inclinations. Love, for the supporters of this school, is all the more perfect, is all the more love, the more thoroughly it places [4] the subject “outside of itself.”4 It follows that a love that is perfect and truly worthy of the name calls for a real duality of terms [termes].D The paradigm of true love is no longer, as it was for the previous authors, the one that every natural being necessarily bears for itself. Rather here love is both extremely violent and extremely free. It is free because no reason can be found for it other than itself, independent as it is from the natural appetites. It is violent because it runs counter to these appetites and tyrannizes them. Indeed it seems it could only be satisfied by the destruction of the loving subject, by its absorption in the object loved. Being such, love has no other aim than itself and everything in the human being is sacrificed for its sake, including happiness and reason. This ecstatic conception of love has been set forth with infinite artistry, fervor, and subtlety by some of those mystics who had a passion for dialectics and who were the most original figures of the twelfth century. It is encountered in the school of SaintVictor, in the Order of Citeaux [the Cistercian monks], in the school of Abelard, and traces of it are recognizable in the Scholasticism of the Franciscans. The texts that we will cite and the logical connections that we will try to highlight are sufficient, we believe, to legitimize our classification of the medieval theories of love. It is clear, however, that this division into two groups, or according to two directions of thought, must not be looked upon as corresponding to an absolute partition. Still on the whole it is a true distinction, and one that can be a useful guide when studying individual thoughts so infinitely nuanced. Furthermore, we will find the same authors (Hugh of St. Victor and St. Bernard, for example), cited in succession as proponents of the physi4

It is in this sense that the Pseudo-Areopagite [Pseudo-Dionysius] calls love “ecstatic” (Noms Divins, c. 4, n. 13; PG. 3, 712). This expression moreover was accepted by writers from all of the schools; its originator himself in actuality conceives of love in the manner of the Neoplatonists [that is to say as physical] (see pp. 118-19 [herein]).

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cal conception and the ecstatic conception of love. Such a procedure is necessary when one studies the history of ideas in the twelfth century. In those times, when speculation was still entirely academic [scolaire], the defined concepts readily found themselves in disagreement with some profound intuitions. These intuitions, [5] while missing from the systematic treatises that were then initiated, did manifest themselves in powerful locutions in the very numerous sermons, meditations, confessions, and lyrical outpourings that this century has bequeathed to us. And the historian finds traces of them in later elaborated systems. It is therefore the historian’s right to seek for them in these poems taking the form of passionate prose, where they preexisted perhaps merely in a metaphorical and sentimental state. Only the obscure psychological labor of the contemplatives can explain (since this alone has rendered it possible) the clear conflict of ideas that is to follow.5 Besides, our ambition here was never to write a history of the two conceptions of love even if this only concerned the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the period to which the present work is restricted. Our intention was simply to assemble some material for those who 5

If one wanted, for example, to write a Philosophy of Saint Bernard, this study would naturally be divided into two parts: explicit Philosophy and implicit Philosophy. The first would be brief, dry, and in short, of little interest. It is the second that would allow St. Bernard to be assigned his true place in the history of Christian thought by isolating his original contribution. We further on cite several passages from the Sermons on the Song of Songs. The oratorical exaltation of these pieces is precisely what allows the metaphysics latent in the interior life of the author to find its expression in formulations of unexpected precision. These sermons have all the freedom of a solitary outpouring, while the presence of an audience stimulates the boldness of expression: consequently, the imparted, the conventional, the traditional, drops out insofar as it is not incorporated into the sermon. Here one speaks as one sees fit.—It is admittedly a difficult and delicate task to extract a “metaphysics” from all this lyricism, but it is a task necessary to the history of ideas. Thus, to take an example from the systematic conceptions of the following century, the idea of the real possession by love, so completely foreign to antiquity but which plays such a large role in the Franciscan theories of the will, has been rendered possible only through the continual usage of certain metaphors in the twelfth century (see Part 2, Chapter 4 of this work).

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would attempt such a study, and to shed some light on certain points involving the hidden logical relations that made these ideas converge or clash with each other. The results of our research have been divided up into two sections. The first part is dedicated to the physical conception of love. Here above all, we intend to clearly bring out what is original in the solution of St. Thomas. For this reason, after some [6] brief observations on the elements of this solution found in antiquity and in the Middle Ages, we examine the sketches of the physical conception made by Hugh of St. Victor and St. Bernard in the twelfth century. After such an investigation, we can better comprehend the role of the new principles taken from Aristotle in allowing St. Thomas to conceive of a love that is in perfect continuity with self-love, and yet in spite of that is truly disinterested. In the second part, with the aid of texts that we hold to be particularly significant, we highlight the principal characteristics of the “ecstatic” conception of love, and relate to them certain systematic speculations stemming from them in the philosophical or theological domain.

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[7]

Part 1 The Physical or GrecoThomist Conception of Love

Chapter 1 Thomist Solution to the Problem of Love I [Theory of the Whole and the Part] Amicabilia quae sunt ad alterum venerunt ex amicabilibus quae sunt ad seipsum [The friendly feelings that we bear for another have arisen from the friendly feelings that we bear for ourselves.] This statement of the Philosopher [Aristotle] in Book 9 of the Nicomachean Ethics,6 which could serve as the common motto of all the proponents of the “physical” conception of love, is open to two different interpretations. One can take the words in their immediate and su6

ta; filika; de; pro~ tou;~ fivlou~ .... e[oiken ejk tw`n pro;~ eJauto;n ejlhluqevnai [And the friendly feelings that we bear for our friends ... seem to have proceeded from the friendly feelings that we bear for ourselves] (Eth. Nic., IX, 4, 1166a1-2, ed. of Berlin). I cite, of course, the text of the Nicomachean Ethics that the Scholastics were acquainted with, that is, the translation of Hermann the German [Hermann of Carinthia].

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perficial sense, and say that self-love is only a necessary starting point, an occasional moving cause, that gives in all humans the first impetus to the power of love. Or, by digging deeper and searching not only for the first occasion, but also for the formal reason of love, one can maintain that an appetition7 is [8] conceivable only as a seeking of oneself. This not only makes the altruistic inclinations derive from self-love, but also reduces them to it, in a manner that remains to be clarified. If the first option is adopted, it is not too difficult to side 7

It is perhaps not without merit to recall that according to the common doctrine of the Middle Ages love is included and presupposed in every appetition. Aelred of Rievaulx distinguishes three things in the soul: memory, knowledge, “et amorem sive voluntatem” [and love or rather will] (Speculum Caritatis, PL. 195, 507). See William of St. Thierry: “Quantum enim ad animum, amore movemur, quocunque movemur” [For with respect to the soul, we are moved by love wherever we are moved] (Exp. in Cantica, c. I, PL. 180, 492). St. Thomas, In Div. Nom., c. 4, l. 9: “Est autem amor prima et communis radix omnium appetitivarum operationum, quod patet inspicienti per singula” [Now love is the first and universal foundation of all appetitive operations, which is evident upon inspecting each case] (Fretté, v. XXIX, p. 451). See, ibid., p. 452, and 1a 2ae q. 28 a. 6: “Omne agens agit propter finem aliquem ... Finis autem est bonum desideratum et amatum unicuique. Unde manifestum est quod omne agens, quodcunque sit, agit quamcunque actionem ex aliquo amore” [Every agent acts for the sake of some end ... Now an end is the good that is desired and loved by each agent. Therefore it is clear that every agent whatsoever performs every action out of a love of some sort]. See also 2a 2ae q. 125 a. 2. Love, taken in this broad sense, consists of even these transitory “predilections” [benevolences] which are distinct from love taken in the strict sense of a habitual and strong passion (stabilimentum voluntatis in bono volito [the fixation of the will in the good that is willed], St. Thomas, Pot. q. 9 a. 9; see 2a 2ae q. 27 a. 2, and col. 213 and 216 in the first editions of the Summa Contra Gentiles published by Uccelli, Paris, Migne, 1858). Love in the strict sense is, according to this doctrine, a special case wherein conditions favorable to amplification allow love in the broad sense to be more effectively studied.—It is love in the sense of a deep-seated passion in the soul that is the subject matter of the famous treatise of Andrew the Chaplain [Andreas Capellanus], as his definition shows: “Amor est passio quaedam innata procedens ex visione et immoderata cogitatione formae alterius sexus ...” [Love is a certain innate passion arising from the sight of and uncontrolled thinking about the form of the other sex ...] (De Amore Libri, III, ed. Trojel, Hauniae, 1892, b. I, c. 1, p. 3).

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with the proponents of “ecstatic” love. If the second is chosen, the altruistic affections, it seems, must be looked upon only as imitations or participations of the egoistic inclination. The love that a singular substance bears for itself then becomes the measure, model, and ground of all the other loves that can be found in it. And it is here that it becomes difficult to explain the facts that experience establishes or that dogma presupposes. It seems that the love of friendship [l’amour d’amitié] and the love of longing [l’amour de désir] or desire [convoitise] can be distinguished only as words. St. Thomas teaches that the tendency toward the final end specifies the will. Wherever the will is turned, it is the appetite for the final end that impels it to act. Now, this final end, this perfect good, this universal and necessary driving force [moteur] of the will, is happiness. In asserting this, St. Thomas only makes precise the Augustinian doctrine of beatitude, which fits quite naturally into his Peripatetic philosophy. [9] Necesse est quod omnia quae homo appetit, appetat propter ultimum finem ... ultimus finis hoc modo se habet in movendo appetitum, sicut se habet in aliis motionibus primum movens. Manifestum est autem quod causae secundae moventes non movent, nisi secundum quod moventur a primo movente; unde secunda appetibilia non movent appetitum nisi in ordine ad primum appetibile, quod est ultimus finis (1a 2ae q. 1 a. 6). Ultimus finis est beatitudo, quam omnes appetunt, ut Augustinus dicit (1a 2ae q. 1 a. 8 Sed Contra). Bonum perfectum ... est ultimus finis (ibid., a. 6). Ratio autem beatitudinis communis est ut sit bonum perfectum, sicut dictum est. Cum autem bonum sit obiectum voluntatis, perfectum bonum est alicuius quod totaliter eius voluntati satisfacit. Unde appetere beatitudinem nihil aliud est quam appetere ut voluntas satietur, quod quilibet vult (1a 2ae q. 5 a. 8).

[It is necessary that all that humans long for, they would long for for the sake of the final end ... In this way the final end in relation to the moving appetite is like the prime mover in relation to other movements. Now it is evident that secondary moving causes do not move except insofar as they are moved by the prime mover. Likewise secondary objects of the appetite do not move the appetite except as ordered to the primary object of the appetite, which is the final end] (1a 2ae


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q. 1 a. 6). [The final end is happiness, which all desire, according to Augustine] (1a 2ae q. 1 a. 8 Sed Contra). [The perfect good ... is the final end] (ibid., a. 6). [Now the ground of the common happiness is that it is the perfect good, as has been said. For since the good is the object of the will, the perfect good is that thing that wholly satisfies this will. Likewise to desire happiness is nothing other than to desire that the will be satisfied, which everyone wants] (1a 2ae q. 5 a. 8). (See, in addition the first questions of 1a 2ae, articles 1 and 2 of q. 10, and 1 q. 82 a. 1 and 2; Ver. q. 22 a. 5 and 6; Mal. q. 6 a. 4.) It seems merely to be drawing the legitimate conclusion of the texts just cited, to assert, as the author does elsewhere, that the love of self is the measure of all the other loves and surpasses them all. Finis ultimus cuiuslibet facientis, in quantum est faciens, est ipsemet; utimur enim factis a nobis propter nos; et si aliquid aliquando propter alium homo faciat, hoc refertur in bonum suum, vel utile vel delectabile vel honestum (3 CG. 17, 8). Unumquodque, ceteris paribus, plus se amat quam aliquid aliud; cuius signum est, quod quanto aliquid est alicui propinquius, magis naturaliter amatur (1 CG. 102, 3). Illud quod est potissimum in unoquoque genere est mensura omnium eorum quae sunt illius generis, ut patet per Philosophum in X Metaph. Potissimum autem in genere amoris hominum est amor quo quis amat se ipsum; et ideo ex hoc amore necesse est mensuram accipere omnis quo quis alium amat. Unde et in IX Ethic. Philosophus dicit quod “Amicabilia quae sunt ad alterum ...” etc. (Quodl. 5 a. 6; see In 9 Eth., l. 4). Amicitia proprie non habetur ad seipsum, sed aliquid maius amicitia, quia amicitia unionem quandam importat. Dicit enim Dionysius Div. Nom., c. 4, quod amor est virtus unitiva. Unicuique autem ad seipsum est unitas, quae est potior unione ad alium. Unde, sicut unitas est principium unionis, ita amor quo quis diligit seipsum est forma et radix amicitiae. In hoc enim amicitiam habemus ad alios, quod ad eos nos habeamus sicut ad nos ipsos; dicitur enim Ethic., 1. IX quod amicibalia ... etc. (2a 2ae q. 25 a. 4).

[The final end of any maker as a maker, is itself. For we use things made by us for our own sakes, and, if ever a human makes something for another, this has reference to his or her

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own good, either as useful, as delightful, or as good in itself] (3 CG. 17, 8). [All other things being equal, each individual loves him or herself more than someone else, a sign of which is that the closer a thing is to someone the more naturally it is loved] (1 CG. 102, 3). [And that which is highest in any kind is the measure of all those of that kind, as is made clear by the Philosopher in Metaphysics X. Now the highest in the kind of human love is the love by which one loves oneself. And so it is necessary to take from this love the measure of every love by which one loves another. Whence in Nicomachean Ethics IX the Philosopher says that “The friendly feelings that we have toward others ...”] etc. (Quodl. 5 a. 6; see In 9 Eth., l. 4). [Properly speaking, friendship is not had for oneself; rather friendship is something greater, because friendship implies a union with another. For Dionysius says in the Divine Names, c. 4, that love is a unifying power. But with respect to itself, each individual is a unity, which is something superior to union. Accordingly, as unity is the foundation of union, so too the love by which one loves oneself is the form and root of friendship. For we have friendship toward others insofar as we are related to them as we are to ourselves. For in Nicomachean Ethics IX it is said that the friendly feelings ...] etc. (2a 2ae q. 25 a. 4). Likewise 3 d. 28 q. 1 a. 6.8 It is in accordance with these notions that St. Thomas defines love: [10] Ex hoc ... aliquid dicitur amari quod appetitus amantis se habet ad illud sicut ad suum bonum. Ipsa igitur habitudo vel coaptatio appetitus ad aliquid velut ad suum bonum amor vocatur ... Unumquodque amamus inquantum est bonum nostrum (In Div. Nom., c. 4, l. 9, Fretté, v. XXIX, pp. 451-52).

8

St. Thomas also maintains that one can no more hate oneself (1a 2ae q. 29 a. 4) than one can hate the good or the beatitude (ibid.; see 1a 2ae q. 5 a. 8, q. 10 a. 2, etc.). The supernatural precepts are in agreement with the natural inclinations: humans must love themselves more than they love others (Quodl. 8, a. 8: Peccaret in ordine caritatis magis alium quam se diligens) [One would have sinned in the order of charity by loving another more than one loves oneself]. See Sermones Dominicales, Serm. 25), where one should love oneself more even than one’s spouse (2a 2ae q. 26 a.11 ad 2).


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[On account of this ... something is said to be loved to the extent that the appetite of the lover is related toward it as it is toward its own good. Thus the very relation or adaptation of the appetite toward something as toward its own good is called love ... We love each thing insofar as it is our good] (In Div. Nom., c. 4, l. 9, Fretté, v. XXIX, pp. 451-52).

For St. Thomas, accordingly, it is the coaptatio appetitus [adaptation of the appetite], connaturalitas [connaturality], or the sicut ad se [as to oneself ] that is the true definition of love. If he sometimes appears (3 CG. 90, 6, ibid., 153, 2; 4 CG. 21, 8; 1 q. 20 a. 1 ad 3) to place the last word on love in the velle bonum [willing of the good] (see Aristotle, Rhetoric, II, c. 4), this is only to assert the same thing in different words, since “the good” can be described in no other way than as the object of natural desires: id quod omnia desiderant [that which all desire]. (The discussion of the relation between love and the velle bonum in 2a 2ae q. 27 a. 2 sheds great light on this point, even though this discussion does not concern love in the broad sense). Now given all of this, how is it that humans can love God more than themselves? One response is simply that humans recognize in God a good more excellent than themselves, since their own being is only an imitation of the being of God and a gift of divine goodness. Yet to respond in this manner is to display a difference of intellectual assessment that can leave intact the primacy of the love of self. For if indeed we love this more excellent good for ourselves, friendship still remains reduced to desire.9 In order to avoid this reduction, one would need to find a principle that would bring humans to tend to the good of God just as spontaneously, just as naturally, just as directly, as they tend to their own good. Now, as has already been said, there is no other principle of direct and true love besides unity. It is precisely this concept of unity that St. Thomas utilizes in order to resolve this difficulty. Here is then how he responds to the decisive question: Does the created soul naturally love God more than itself? Diligere Deum super omnia plus quam se ipsum est naturale non solum angelo et homini, sed etiam cuilibet creaturae, secundum 9

Quodl. 1, a. 8. The solution mentioned is that of William of Auxerre (see Appendix 1).

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Part 1: The Physical or Greco-Thomist Conception of Love quod potest amare aut sensibiliter aut naturaliter. Inclinationes enim naturales maxime cognosci possunt in his quae naturaliter aguntur absque deliberatione; sic enim agit unumquodque in natura, sicut aptum natum est [11] agi. Videmus autem quod unaquaeque pars naturali quadam inclinatione operatur ad bonum totius, etiam cum periculo aut detrimento proprio: ut patet cum aliquis manum exponit gladio ad defensionem capitis, ex quo dependet salus totius corporis. Unde naturale est ut quaelibet pars suo modo plus amet totum quam se ipsam. Unde, et secundum hanc naturalem inclinationem, et secundum politicam virtutem, bonus civis mortis periculo se exponit pro bono communi. Manifestum est autem quod Deus est bonum commune totius universi et omnium partium eius; unde quaelibet creatura suo modo naturaliter plus amat Deum quam se ipsam; insensibilia quidem naturaliter, bruta vero animalia sensitive, creatura vero rationalis per intellectualem amorem, quae dilectio dicitur (Quodl. 1, a. 8).

[To love God above all things and more than oneself is natural not only for an angel and humans but also for any creature, according as it can love either sensibly or naturally. In fact natural inclinations can especially be discerned in these things that are done naturally, without deliberation. For in this way each thing acts in nature as it is naturally fitted to do. Now we see that each part by a certain natural inclination operates for the good of the whole, even with risk or damage to itself, as is clear when someone exposes a hand to a sword to protect the head, upon which the welfare of the whole body is dependent. Hence it is natural that each part in its own way should love the whole more than itself. Hence, both in accordance with this natural inclination and in accordance with political virtue, the good citizen exposes him or herself to the risk of death on behalf of the common good. Now it is clear that God is the common good of the whole universe and of all its parts. Hence each creature in its own way naturally loves God more than itself: insensible beings, for instance, naturally, irrational animals sensitively, and the creature of reason through the intellectual love that is called dilectio] (Quodl. 1, a. 8).


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This solution is repeated more than once by St. Thomas.10 It clearly shows that, in order to respond to the objections that are raised against the “physical” conception of love in the name of pure and disinterested love, he upholds in all its rigor the fundamental axiom of the doctrine of physical love, but he broadens the notion that this axiom presupposes. For while it remains established that a thing is loved insofar as it is one with the loving subject, this concept of unity must be scrutinized so as to not restrict it to the egoistical and closed unity of “individuals.”11 In order to grasp the full significance of this re10

In addition to the passage cited, taken from an article of the Quodlibeta that is titled: Utrum primus homo in statu innocentiae non dilexerit Deum super omnia [Whether the first human in a state of innocence did not love God above all things], one can look at 1a 2ae q. 109 a. 3 (which only concerns humans in statu naturae integrae [in a state of intact nature]) and 1 q. 60 a. 5 (which concerns angels).—Note that, in this last passage, the inclination of the good citizen to die for the homeland is not, as in the Quodlibetum, attributed to virtue and nature, but solely to virtue. And the author adds: “Et si homo esset naturalis pars huius civitatis, haec inclinatio esset ei naturalis” [And if the human had been a natural part of this community then that inclination would have been natural to him or her]. When writing about this topic in the Commentary on the Sentences (question 4 of distinction 3 of Book II), St. Thomas, who nonetheless rejects the response of William of Auxerre, also ignores the theory of the whole and the part. He instead always favors the idea of similitude and opposes one’s own to the good. He modifies his views in Book III d. 29 q. 1 a. 3 where the theory of the whole and the part is already very plain, although the defended opinion is only said to be “more probable” than that of William of Auxerre. See also 2a 2ae q. 26 a 3. 11 Individuum [Individual], in St. Thomas, is only said properly of material beings (1 d. 26 q. 1 a. 1 ad 3, etc.), but the formal unity of different individuals of the same species is no less real than the unity of the supposed singular. The interesting theological application of this theory to the dogmas of original sin and Redemption made by St. Thomas is wellknown. See, for original sin, 1a 2ae q. 81 a. 1; for Redemption, 3 d. 18 q. 1 a. 6, sol. 1: Homo singularis est minus dignus quam natura communis: quia divinius est bonum gentis quam bonum unius hominis. Et quia omnes homines sunt unus homo in natura communi, ut dicit Porphyrius, inde est quod meritum Christi quod ad naturam se extendebat, etiam ad singulos se extendere poterat [The individual human is less worthy than the common nature because the good of the human race is more divine than the good of one human being. And because all humans are one human in their common nature, as Porphyry says, it follows that the merit

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sponse, [12] the Thomist notion of the unity must be called to mind. Unity is not an indivisible attribute; it is one of those “transcendental” predicates that accompany all beings and that vary with being “analogically.” God is more unified [un] than anything;12 the angel is more unified than the human; a human is more unified than a stone. And the passages cited invite us to add that the whole universe is more unified than any of its parts. To consider the feeble unity of the part in isolation from the unity of the whole is therefore, according to St. Thomas, to stop at a fragmentary and incomplete view of unity (as we would say today, a disastrous “division”).E In fact, a thing is known well when it is known as it really is. And as St. Thomas says in the Summa upon returning to the present solution, in natural wholes, unumquodque ... secundum naturam hoc ipsum quod est, alterius est [each thing ... in terms of this very nature that it is, is derived from something else].13 One therefore should not consider the natural appetite of a “part” in isolation from the total appetite, much less oppose it to the total appetite. This would be to comprehend nothing about the essence of the object. Thus, it is natural that the hand imperils itself for the body; it is natural that an element is precipitated into a region that is not its own in order to spare the universe the disgrace of a void.14 But this solution does not hold solely in cases of juxtaposable parts. St. Thomas also applies it to cases of composition without spatial distinction. For example, in all beings composed of matter and form, sevof Christ could also extend to each individual because it extended to their nature]. And 3 q. 48 a. 1: Opera Christi hoc modo se habent tam ad se quam ad sua membra, sicut se habent opera alterius hominis in gratia constituti ad ipsum [The works of Christ in this way are related just as much to Christ himself as to his members, just as the works of another human constituted in the state of grace are related to this human him or herself]. See also 3 d. 20 q. 1 a. 2 ad 4; 2a 2ae q. 57 a. 4: patris ad filium non est comparatio sicut ad simpliciter alterum [the relation of a father to his son is not the same as his relation to another person without qualification], and finally 1a 2ae q. 96 a. 4 on the relations of humans and society. 12 13 1 q. 11 a. 4. 1 q. 60 a. 5. 14 This is an example cited by Duns Scotus when he mentions (so as to contest it) the Thomist theory of disinterested love (Opus Oxoniense, 3 d. 27 q. 1 n. 13).


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eral of which might belong to the same species, “nature” is not absolutely identical to the individual. Accordingly each individualF will here prefer the intimate principle that makes it specifically such as it is (but which it does not possess in all its fullness) [13] to its own limited individuality. And if “Plato” had spoken truly, and separated ideas were to exist, then each singular lion would prefer the Lion in itself to itself. Indeed humans, who conceive of the abstract idea of humanity, do prefer “humanity” to themselves. Now what St. Thomas says about parts, he holds even more regarding participations.15 G And this is why his solution accounts for the case of the love of God. God is not, for St. Thomas, the assemblage of the beings of the universe. He is the infinite separated Esse [Being] in whom all beings participate through imitation. When God is born in mind, it has to be said of every creature: hoc ipsum quod est, alterius est [this very thing that it is, is derived from something else]. The classical question will therefore be responded to as follows: quia omnis creatura naturaliter secundum id quod est, Dei est, sequitur quod naturali dilectione etiam angelus et homo plus et principalius diligat Deum quam seipsum [because every creature, in terms of that which it is by nature, is derived from God, it follows that through natural love even 15

1 q. 60 a. 5 ad 1: In illis quorum unum est tota ratio existendi et bonitatis aliis, magis diligitur naturaliter tale alterum quam ipsum, sicut dictum est quod unaquaeque pars diligit naturaliter totum plus quam se, et quodlibet singulare naturaliter diligit plus bonum suae speciei, quam bonum suum singulare [In cases of things in which one thing is the entire reason for the existence and the goodness of the others, such a thing is naturally loved more than the self. Just as it is said that each part naturally loves the whole more than itself and that each individual thing naturally loves the good of its species more than its own particular good]. The principle enunciated at the beginning of this sentence is only appropriate for God (tota ratio) [as the total ground]. In order to conclude from it, as St. Thomas does, the preference of the individual for the species, what we say in the text must be logically inferred. See ibid., ad 3: Natura reflectitur [in seipsam], non solum quantum ad id quod est ei singulare, sed multo magis quantum ad commune [Nature turns back toward itself, not only with respect to what is particular to itself, but much more with respect to what is has in common with other things]. This is why St. Thomas says elsewhere that the pleasures of generation are more intense than those of eating and drinking.

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an angel and a human love God to a greater extent and more primarily than themselves].16 Thanks to this analysis, it becomes clear that the love of friendship and the love of desire are no longer two entirely distinct phenomena that are brought together by some strange accident under the label of one identical name. On the contrary, they are rather in perfect continuity. Through the love of desire, I constitute an object as an instrument in relation to myself—as a part of myself, so to speak. I consider it only in reference to myself (so is it with the water that I drink, the bread that I assimilate, the flower that I inhale and that I discard when it no longer pleases me). Through the love of friendship, it is the self, the individual and limited self, that I now regard only in reference to the object loved. My natural love constitutes me as part of a vast assemblage that includes me, or [14] as a participation of a superior being who causes me to exist. See In. Div. Nom., c. 4, l. 9 (Fretté, v. XXIX, p. 452) and l. 10 (ibid., p. 457). When I desire a fruit or a flower, it is myself that I am loving in reality.17 In the same way, when I seek my pleasure and I believe that I am loving myself, in reality, more profoundly and more truly, it is God whom I love.18 H St. Thomas thus reconciles these two apparently contradictory assertions: 1) disinterested love is possible and even profoundly natural, and 2) purely “ecstatic” love, the love of pure duality, is impossible. “Were we to suppose,” he says, “that God was not the good of humans, humans would have no reason to love God.”19 And the ground on which these two assertions are harmonized is that a human is only unified as it is being, that is to say, only insofar as it is a deficient participation of God. It is therefore, so to speak, by means of a philosophical radicalism that St. Thomas succeeds in explaining the mystical soul to itself. Now this eminently reconciliatory solu16

1 q. 60 a. 5. 3 d. 29 q. 1 a. 3, Opusc. 2, De Perfectione Vitae Spiritualis, c. XIII (Fretté, v. XXIV, pp. 131-132). 18 See pp. 83-84 [herein] and what follows. 19 a ae 2 2 q. 26 a. 13 ad 3, and similarly 1 q. 60 a. 5 ad 2: “Non enim esset in natura alicuius quod amaret Deum nisi ex eo quod unumquodque dependet a bono quod est Deus” [For it would not have been in the nature of something that it loved God if not for the fact that everything depends upon the good that is God]. 17


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tion had a great theological significance because it came to reinforce a conception of the relations between nature and grace more Greek than Augustinian—and one still imperfectly understood in the West. Its philosophical significance could also have been very considerable if the author had taken a more bold approach to this critique of the concept of unity that his responses always imply but do not clearly enough express.20 20

On this point, he invariably confined himself to some veiled indications and some suggestive reminiscences. Regarding the mystery of the Trinity, he writes in one place: Idem et diversum sufficienter dividunt ens creatum [Identity and diversity sufficiently divide created being] (1 d. 4 a. 3 ad 1).—When one studies his theory of intellectual beings, one becomes convinced that immateriality, in the Thomist sense, could be defined by penetrability: Natura spiritualis est facta quantum ad secundum esse suum indeterminata, et omnium capax ... quodammodo ... et per hoc quod alicui adhaeret, efficitur unum cum eo; sicut intellectus fit quodammodo ipsum intelligibile intelligendo, et voluntas ipsum appetibile amando [A spiritual nature is created undetermined and capable of becoming all things with respect to its secondary act of being ... in some way ... And through this adhering to something it is made one with it; as the intellect in some way becomes the intelligible object through understanding, and the will becomes the appetible object through loving] (Ver. q. 24 a. 10). And one is tempted, in order to recapitulate this theory, to change a word in the preceding locution, and to say: Idem et diversum sufficienter dividunt ens materiale [Identity and diversity sufficiently divide material being].—Finally, when one penetrates his doctrine of love, one realizes that its principle cannot be completely elucidated without studying some emendations required by the notions of identity and diversity. Such notions, as delivered to humans by their experience of the sensible world, cannot be applied to the knowledge of things in the complexity of their esse [being] (that is to say: secundum quod alterius sunt) [insofar as they are derived from another]. One wishes that St. Thomas had written, like Adelard of Bath, a treatise De Eodem et Diverso [On Identity and Diversity] and had critiqued the Neoplatonic locution that he cites: omnia se invicem perambulant [all things run through each other]. Such a regret can at first sight appear inspired by some rather modern preoccupations, so foreign to Scholasticism. The truth is, however, that no study would more naturally have found its place in a metaphysics whose characteristic is to contrast the attributes of things “intelligible in themselves” to the impenetrable multiplicity of material substances. All the discussions of the Thomists with their opponents on the issue of Scholastic metaphysics can be reduced to this point: the Thomists accused their opponents of

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[15]

II [The Universal Appetite of All Things for God] This is not yet to give the last word on the Thomist solution to the problem of love. It is rather to show how, through the theory of the whole and the part, one can speak of a truly disinterested love and conceive that humans love God more than themselves, all the while remaining faithful to the physical conception of love. Certain expressions of St. Thomas clearly show that he goes farther and claims to get rid of even the apparent opposition between the love of self and the love of God, an opposition that is implied in the very expression ‘to love God more than oneself.’ His full response would aim at abolishing the problem by starting out from a principle directly opposite to the one mentioned, so as to rule it out, in the preface. Instead of reducing the love of God to a mere form of the love of self, it is the love of self that is reduced to a mere form of the love of God. St. Thomas in fact teaches that every being of creation, in each of its appetitions, desires God more profoundly than the particular object at which it is directed. Not only in every human action, including the most monstrous human sin, does the unconscious will of the sinner really tend toward God;21 but even the animals themselves, the plants, and beings deprived of life, “tend toward God” [16] and “each of them acquires God in its own manner” (ut ab ipso ipsummet suo modo consequantur, 3 CG. 18, 5). Nothing is estranged from God, all things endeavor to unite with Him: Intendit igitur unumquodque sicut ultimo fini Deo coniungi, quanto magis sibi possibile est [Accordingly each thing intends, as its final end, to be united with God as closely as is possible for it] (ibid., 25, 2). This “acquisition of God” consists, according to St. Thomas, in the understanding of God as He is in Himself for spiritual creatures, called by grace to the intuitive vision; and, for the other beings of nature, in the participation in the divine likeness according to the degree proper to each (see ibid., 19, 1-5). I do not know of any exposition on this doctrine that is judging of the “forms” (separated or immanent) as one judges of material substances (see St. Thomas, Virt. Com., a. 11). 21 Mal. q. 16 a. 3 ad 1, q. 8 a. 2; see 2 d. 5 q. 1 a. 2 ad 5.


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more extensive and better than the one in the third book of the Summa Contra Gentiles. It is there that we read the explicit assertion: Propter hoc igitur tendit ad proprium bonum, quia tendit ad divinam similitudinem, et non e converso [For this reason therefore it tends to its own good, because it tends to the divine likeness, and not conversely] (ibid., 24, 6). The whole Thomist doctrine of love is a consequence of this initial conception that defines the appetite for St. Thomas. The idea is moreover present in the Summa theologiae. In order to demonstrate this truth to those who have closely studied the text of this work, so polished, so precise in its details, it would suffice to observe the twofold expression of the solution already mentioned (1 q. 60 a. 5): principalius et magis ... plus et principalius [primarily and principally ... to a greater extent and more primarily]. Yet we also expressly read, in the article on the natural love [dilection] of humans (1a 2ae q. 109 a. 3): Diligere Deum super omnia est quiddam connaturale homini, et etiam cuilibet creaturae non solum rationali, sed irrationali, et etiam inanimatae, secundum modum amoris qui unicuique creaturae competere potest ... Manifestum est ... quod bonum partis est propter bonum totius; unde naturali appetitu vel amore unaquaeque res particularis amat bonum suum proprium propter bonum commune totius universi, quod est Deus

[To love God above all things is something connatural to humans, and even to any creature, not only rational but also irrational, and even inanimate, in accordance with the manner of love that best suits each creature ... It is clear ... that the good of the part is for the sake of the good of the whole. Hence by natural appetite or love every particular thing loves its own good for the sake of the common good of the entire universe, which is God]. This new response to the problem of love does not contradict the first, rather it expands upon it. It amounts to saying that, in a natural whole, a part has no individuality or unity that could form a group with [faire nombre]I the individuality or the unity of the whole, and consequently be “opposed” to it. When, precisely in the case of the love of God, experience shows that there is a possibility of conflict,

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St. Thomas finds the reason for this to lie in a contingent disorder of nature—original sin. Without original sin, humans would have yielded their “own” interests to those of God just as spontaneously as [17] the hand imperils itself for the safety of the face, or the female for its young. Bonum partis est propter bonum totius ... Unde homo in statu naturae integrae dilectionem sui ipsius referebat ad amorem Dei sicut ad finem, et similiter dilectionem omnium aliarum rerum, et ita Deum diligebat plus quam seipsum et super omnia. Sed in statu naturae corruptae homo ad hoc deficit secundum appetitum voluntatis rationalis, quae propter corruptionem naturae sequitur bonum privatum, nisi sanetur per gratiam Dei. Et ideo dicendum est, quod homo in statu naturae integrae non indigebat dono gratiae superadditae naturalibus bonis ad diligendum Deum naturaliter super omnia, licet indigeret auxilio Dei ad hoc eum moventis; sed in statu naturae corruptae indiget homo etiam ad hoc auxilio gratiae naturam sanantis (1a 2ae q. 109 a. 3).

[The good of the part is for the sake of the good of the whole ... Hence humans in the state of intact nature referred their love of themselves, and likewise their love of all other things, to the love of God as the end. And so they loved God more than themselves and above all things. But in the state of corrupted nature humans fail in this in terms of the appetite of their rational will, which, because of the corrupting of nature, pursues a private good unless it is healed by the grace of God. And so it has to be said that humans in the state of intact nature did not need the gift of grace superadded to their natural endowments in order to love God naturally above all things, although they needed the assistance of God stirring them for this. But in the state of corrupted nature humans also needs the assistance of grace healing nature for this] (1a 2ae q. 109 a. 3). It is worth noting in this response the restriction secundum appetitum voluntatis rationalis [in terms of the appetite of the rational will]. It is only in the rational and free life that the order of nature has been corrupted (see already in 2 d. 3 q. 4 ad ult., the opposition between esse naturae [natural being] and rectus ordo [right order]). St. Thomas


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says elsewhere that sinners themselves retain the natural and sovereign love of God (1 q. 60 a. 5 ad 5). He had to say this in order to be consistent with himself, since if this love, being the primordial basis of all the appetites, came to be lost, egoism itself would no longer exist.22 Hence there are in rational beings some two levels of appetition. Insofar as they are beings of nature (naturaliter), they love God more than themselves but do not know it. Insofar as they conceptualize and reason (rationaliter), they translate this appetite for God into an appetite for the “good in general” for their consciousness. And since the “good in general” is not a subsistent being and cannot be loved out of pure friendship,23 rational beings initially relate all of their desires to the restricted subsistent being that they themselves are. Their natural role was to procure the good of the whole [18] by procuring the good of the part that they themselves are. They now conceive of this part as existing in isolation from the whole and its good as opposable to the total good. They are thus tempted to subordinate the good of the whole to their “private” good. However, the indeterminate appetite for the good, which is first translated into egoism and loves of desire, is next translated, by a natural and imperceptible change, into loves of friendship.24 This is so because rational indi22

Therefore in the text cited from 1a 2ae q. 109 a. 3, naturaliter [naturally] must be understood as being opposed to supernaturaliter [supernaturally], as is moreover suggested by the context; whereas in 1 q. 60 a. 5 ad 5, it is opposed to rationaliter [rationally] or libere [freely]. Compare also Quaest. Disp. de Spe., a. 1 ad 9 (Fretté, v. 14, p. 288) where, after speaking of the universal love of God in animate or inanimate beings, St. Thomas adds: Sed iste naturalis amor Dei pervertitur ab hominibus per peccatum [But that natural love of God is perverted by humans through sin.] (He does not say: in hominibus post peccatum [in humans after sin]). 23 See In Div. Nom., c. 4, l. 10 (Fretté, v. 29, p. 456). 24 Thus, if we confine ourselves to the loves of the voluntas rationalis [rational will], it is perfectly true, for St. Thomas, that the love of self is simply a starting point and that we leave it in order to pass on to disinterested loves. St. Thomas expounds in this sense the often cited text of Aristotle, Eth. Nic., IX, c. 4 (3 d. 29 q. 1 a. 3 ad 3), and himself describes the passage from the love of self to the love of God (3 CG. 153, 2; 2a 2ae q. 27 a. 3). Yet this “associationist” account, through mechanical extension, cannot in his eyes represent a metaphysical analysis of love. Since all the phenomena of love are for him the expression of one identical natural reality (the will, the

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viduals do not necessarily conceive of themselves as a definite whole and unique end. They can imagine other wholes where they themselves play the role, either of the subordinate part, or of the equal partner [moitié]. Virtue accordingly consists in not proposing as an end any whole other than the complete assemblage of beings whose good coincides with the good of God Himself; and in always acting as though one had the intuition that the appetite for the “good in general” is only an expression, in conformity with the nature of rational animals, of the desire that affixes [suspend] every being to God.25 appetite), a real and permanent common foundation necessarily has to be found for them: now there is but one object that specifies love [i.e., God]. 25 We see how the account proposed here as the most adequate expression of the thought of St. Thomas differs from other formulations of this same thought that supplied the disciples of this saint with their theological solutions to the problem of love. These solutions rest on the distinction: 1) either between finis amoris and finis amati [the end of love and the end of the loved]; 2) or between subjectum cui and finis [the subject for which and the end]; 3) or between condicio amoris and finis amoris [state of love and the end of love]; 4) or finally between radix ontologica and ratio motiva [the ontological ground and the moving reason]. See Gonet, Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae, Tr. X. disp. IX. art. 2 § 2; Billuart, In 2am 2ae De Caritate, Diss. 4 a. 5; Suarez, De Spe., disp. 1 s. 3 n. 7, De Caritate, Disp. 1 s. 2 n. 6; Massoulié, Traité de l’amour de Dieu (1703), new edition of Brussels, 1866, p. 37; Mazzella, De Virtutibus Infusis, Romae, 1879, p. 687, etc. The commentators usually give too little attention to the theory of the whole and the part, and also to that of the universal appetite for God. An exception has to be made, however, for the case of Massoulié, loc. cit., pp. 74 et seqq.—All these distinctions, which are found moreover, explicitly or implicitly, in St. Thomas himself (3 d. 29 q. 1 a. 3 ad 2; ibid., q. 1 a. 4; 4 d. 49 a. 2 ad 3; 2a 2ae q. 27 a. 3, etc.), are valid in the order of the appetitus voluntatis rationalis [appetite of the rational will]. They suppose that the good of God is conceived of as capable of being distinguished from our own, of being opposed to it, of forming a group with it. However, according to St. Thomas, our good, in reality, cannot be distinguished from the good of God, because the good of God is our good, more so even than our good itself. And to consider the actual, permanent, and convergent interests of beings, rather than to distinguish the apparent oppositions of their interests according to the quantitative conceptions that these beings have of them, is to penetrate farther into the depths of things and to demonstrate more philosophical acumen. The anthropomorphic distinction that is the basis of these aforementioned solutions is the necessary condition of sin, perhaps even the necessary condition of


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[19]

III [Coincidence of the Spiritual Good with the Good in Itself] The case of the rational will seems to raise the problem of love once again, by reinstating the possibility of a conflict. Such as they appear to the human consciousness, the good of myself and the good of God can be opposed. Now doesn’t this simple observation reduce all of the preceding accounts to nothing, since by reestablishing the divergence of loves in rational and free beings, it reestablishes it in the only beings where the convergence would have true import? It would matter little that humans naturally love God more than themselves, and that it is principally God whom they love within themselves, if we discover when we get to the bottom of things that the true way of loving God is not to love oneself, but is actually to sacrifice oneself. Such a result would in fact be the collapse of the “physical” conception of love, and it would have been better from the start to conceive of love purely as an “ecstasy.” In order to respond to this difficulty according to the principles of St. Thomas, it must be said that to the extent that a being is a spirit there is an exact coincidence between its individual good and the good of God, but to the extent that a being is associated with matter the coincidence is looser. St. Thomas teaches indeed that the individuality of a spiritual nature has a definite value due to its capacity to attain God as He is in Himself, and to its affinity with [20] the whole.26 This is to say that the good of a singular spiritual creature is some progress in virtue, but since it is dependent upon our potential knowledge, it must disappear when one intends to define the true spiritual essence of the good. 26 See, in the third book of the Summa Contra Gentiles, chapters 112 and 113: Quod creaturae rationales gubernantur propter se ipsas, aliae vero in ordine ad eas,—Quod rationalis creatura dirigitur a Deo ad suos actus, non solum secundum ordinem ad speciem, sed secundum quod congruit individuo [That rational creatures govern themselves for the sake of themselves, while other creatures are governed in the order appropriate for them—That the rational creature is directed toward its actions by God, not only according to the order of the species, but also according to what suits the individual], and particularly the argument: “Deum ... sola

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not different from the good of the whole, and consequently from the good of God, because its nature consists in representing God and the whole according to an intensity determined by the intellectual life.— Or, in order to look at things from a different perspective, a spiritual creature’s role as a part of the universe is to possess God intellectually; that is to say to possess God through the operation “that has no contrary,” and that the other operations, be they different or similar, could not neutralize or diminish, because they are not “opposed” to it. Yet its beatitude as a singular being also consists in not being hindered in its intellectual operations, in always knowing, without impediment, according to the intensity that is appropriate for it.27 Therefore its perfection as a part and its beatitude as a singular being coincide. The spiritual good and the good in itself are the same thing. Let us apply this principle to the pure spirit and to the incarnate spirit—to angels and to humans. intellectualis natura consequitur in seipso ... Sola igitur intellectualis natura est propter se quaesita in universo” [God ... an intellectual nature alone acquires in Himself ... Therefore, an intellectual nature alone is required in the universe for its own sake] (112, 3), and also the place where St. Thomas, after recalling that the parts are ordered for the good of the whole, and not vice versa, adds: “Naturae intellectuales maiorem habent affinitatem ad totum quam aliae naturae; nam unaquaeque intellectualis substantia est quodam modo omnia, in quantum totius entis comprehensiva est suo intellectu” [Intellectual natures have a closer affinity with the whole than do other natures. In fact each intellectual substance is in some way all things, inasmuch as the entirety of being is comprehensible to its intellect] (112, 5). In species of animals other than humans, on the contrary, the good of individuals does not coincide with the good of the whole world, since the beauty of the universe is continuously obtained by their destruction. Yet St. Thomas finds nothing objectionable in this, because the brute cannot conceive of the good of the whole so as to oppose it to its own. Hence no conflict occurs. See 2 CG. 55, 13: “Desiderant esse ut nunc, non autem semper, quia esse sempiternum non apprehendunt; desiderant tamen esse speciei perpetuum absque cognitione, quia virtus generativa, quae ad hoc deservit, preambula est, et non subiacens, cognitioni ...” [They desire to exist as now, but not always, because they do not apprehend everlasting existence. Nevertheless they unknowingly desire the perpetual existence of the species, because the generative power, which devotes itself to this, is a precursor and not an object of knowledge 27 a ae 1 2 q. 3 a. 3, 4 and 5. ...].


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In pure spirits, in the natural order, the hypothesis of a conflict between self-love and the love of God is, according to St. Thomas, inconceivable. The reason for this is that the angel possesses from the start the intellectual perfection that is appropriate for it. From its creation, it maintains [21] its place in the universe beyond time: being wholly and perfectly itself, the angel is identical to the being that God has made it, to what God wants it to be.28 If in humans conflict is possible (at least in the state in which we observe them), the reason for this lies in the composition of their nature, and in the progressive potentiality that is implied therein. Firstly, because humans are not purely spiritual, what they can call “their own good” does not always coincide with the good in itself. The enjoyment of certain goods of the senses can be incompatible, in one case or another, with the acquisition of a higher perfection. Yet secondly, every sacrifice of a good of the senses to a good of the spirit, by being a sacrifice to God, is necessarily also a sacrifice for oneself. The spirit, indeed, is the human itself, more intimately and more truly than the body. Now it is not in virtue of an arbitrary and positive disposition of God, but rather according to a law founded on the very essence of the spirit, and as completely natural as the laws that govern the physical world, that to sacrifice one’s sensuality to the universal order, to the “Eternal Law,” is to gain oneself, to advance, 28

(Diabolus) non potuit appetere quod absolute non esset Deo subiectus ... et quicquid aliud dici potest quod ad ordinem naturae pertineat, in hoc eius malum consistere non potuit: malum enim non invenitur in his quae sunt semper actu, sed solum in his in quibus potentia potest separari ab actu, ut dicitur in 9 Metaphysicorum. Angeli autem omnes sic conditi sunt, ut quicquid pertinet ad naturalem perfectionem eorum, statim a principio suae creationis habuerint: tamen erant in potentia ad supernaturalia bona ... [(The devil) could not have desired that it not be absolutely subject to God ... And whatever else can be said that would pertain to the order of nature, his evil could not have consisted in this. For evil is not found in these things that are always in act but only in these in which potency can be separated from act, as is said in Metaphysics IX. Yet all angels were so constructed that whatever pertains to their natural perfection they would have had immediately from the beginning of their creation. Nonetheless they were in potency to the supernatural good ...] (Mal. q. 16 a. 3; see a. 5 ad 10, a. 6 ad 5).

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to enhance one’s spirit.29 [22] In the third place, since our life is temporal, certain operations of the spirit can happen to be incompatible with some other better act; or, since our soul is weak, they can be for us an occasion of moral disorder. Here the exercise of these operations may be justifiably prohibited.30 In these cases, the love of God will impose a real sacrifice on the love of the spiritual self. However, this sacrifice will be temporary. When, after our [earthly] state of wayfaring [l’état de voie], we come to exist beyond time, the per29

Cum in homine sit duplex natura, scilicet intellectiva quae principalior est, et sensitiva quae minor est, ille vere seipsum diligit, qui se amat ad bonum rationis; qui autem se amat ad bonum sensualitatis contra bonum rationis magis se odit quam amat, proprie loquendo, secundum illud Psalmi: Qui diligit iniquitatem odit animam suam. Et hoc etiam Philosophus dicit in 9 Ethicorum. Et secundum hoc amor verus sui ipsius amittitur per peccatum contrarium sicut et amor Dei [Since there is in the human a twofold nature, namely, the intellectual that is more primary, and the sensitive that is less; those people truly love themselves who love themselves for the good of reason. But those people who love themselves for the good of sensuality which is contrary to the good of reason, more hate themselves than love themselves. Speaking appropriately, according to that Psalm, one who loves iniquity hates one’s own soul (X, 6). And the Philosopher also said this in the Nicomachean Ethics IX. Indeed according to this text, true love of self is lost through the contrary sin as is the love of God as well] (Car. a. 12 ad 6). See 2a 2ae q. 25 a. 7; 3 d. 29 q. 1 a. 5 ad 3: Quod aliquis vitam propriam corporalem propter amicum ponit, non contingit ex hoc quod aliquis plus amicum quam se ipsum diligat, sed quia in se plus diligit quis bonum virtutis quam bonum corporale [That some people surrender their own bodily lives for the sake of a friend is not contingent upon the fact that some people love the friend more than themselves, but because they love in themselves more the good of virtue than the bodily good]. 30 Nobis melius est non cognoscere mala et vilia, in quantum per ea impedimur a consideratione aliquorum meliorum, quia non possumus simul multa intelligere, et in quantum cogitatio malorum pervertit interdum voluntatem in malum [It is better for us not to know evil and base matters inasmuch as through these things we are hindered from considering better things because we are unable to understand several things at once, and inasmuch as reflection upon worse things sometimes corrupts the will with evil], 1 q. 22 a. 3 ad 3. This view is given in more detail in 3 d. 35 q. 2 a. 3 sol. 3, and in 2a 2ae q. 167 a. 1. It is even better to know, on occasion, how to interrupt the contemplation of divine things, Car. a. 11 ad 6.


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ception of every truth cannot but be excellent in regard to its exercise, just as it always was in regard to its “specification.” Four hundred years after St. Thomas, there was much discussion among Catholic theologians as to whether, from the vantage point of the ultimate spiritual good, of the beatitude, the personal interest of humans could find itself opposed to that of God. A number of ascetics were fond of repeating that humans can conceive of the hypothesis wherein God had predestined them to a beatitude higher than the one that He will actually give them. These humans should therefore, the ascetics said, willingly sacrifice their eternal interest, and accept with joy the inferior role that God assigns to them ad pulchritudinem universi [for the beauty of the universe]. St. Thomas did not tackle this question that was, it seems, just about unknown in the ascetic literature of his time.3 J Let me merely note that in regard to the famous text where St. Paul seems to sacrifice his personal beatitude for the salvation of his brethren, and consequently for the glory of God, St. Thomas appears to prefer to understand this, not as a complete renouncement (through an “impossible supposition”) but as a temporary sacrifice.32 When he speaks of the goods of the moral order, that is to say [23] of the spiritual goods that can in no way 31

Albert the Great will indeed write, for example: “Caritas ad Deum vera et perfecta est, quando anima cum omnibus viribus suis ardenter se infundit Deo, nullum commodum transitorium vel aeternum quaerens in eo” [True and perfect charity toward God is when the soul with all its powers ardently pours itself out to God, not seeking any temporal or eternal advantage in Him], but in some lines further down he once again asserts the usual doctrine: “Qui autem diligit Deum, quia sibi bonus est, et propter hoc principaliter, ut sibi beatitudinem suam communicet, naturalem et imperfectam caritatem habere convincitur” [For the one who loves God, because He is good to him or her, and principally on account of the fact that He would impart His happiness to him or her, is shown to have a natural and imperfect charity] (Paradisus Animae, c. 1, ed. Borgnet, v. 37, p. 449). 32 He would have denied this hypothesis if he had been asked the same question concerning angels. For he believes “quod rationabile est quod secundum gradum naturalium angelis data sint dona gratiarum et perfectio beatitudinis” [that it is reasonable that the gifts of grace and perfect happiness have been given to the angels according to the degree of their natures], 1 q. 62 a. 6. On the text of St. Paul, compare Com. in Ep. ad Rom. c. 9 to 2a 2ae q. 27 a. 8 ad 1.

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disrupt the beatitude, since they are by definition the means to it, he merely declares that they cannot be loved too much: “Some goods are loved more than they ought to be; but this does not happen in the case of spiritual goods, because a person cannot love the virtues too much” (Car. a. 7 ad 13).33 This cursory resolution is characteristic of his way of thinking on a subject that he did not examine in depth. He confines himself to this general principle: the spiritual good is the aim of nature and is therefore inseparable from the will of God.

33

“ ... plus debito se ipsos diligunt: quod quidem non contingit quantum ad bona spiritualia, quia nullus potest nimis amare virtutes.” See the propositions condemned in the seventeenth century: Qui suum liberum arbitrium Deo donavit ... nec debet desiderium habere propriae perfectionis, nec virtutum [One who has given one’s free will to God ... neither ought to have a desire for one’s own perfection, nor for the virtues] (Molinos). Amor zelotypus efficit ... ne quis amplius sibi virtutem velit [Zealous love brings it about ... that no one any longer wants virtue for oneself] (Fénelon), (Denzinger, Enchiridion Symbolorum et Definitionum, n. 1099 [2212] and 1210 [2368]).

Chapter 2: Remarks on the Elements of the Thomist Solution

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Chapter 2 Remarks on the Elements of the Thomist Solution in Greek and Medieval Thought These principles of the solution were brought out by St. Thomas, whereas all of his Scholastic predecessors had neglected, it seems, to apply them to the problem of love (see pp. 133-34 [herein]). Nevertheless, they preexisted in the philosophical and theological literature accessible at that time. In the present chapter we would like to make some remarks that will contribute to the elucidation of this point. These remarks will concern first the theory of the whole and the part; next, that of the universal appetite for God; and finally, that of the identification of the good of spirits and the good in itself.

I The Theory of the Whole and the Part Aristotle, investigating friendship in Books Eight and Nine of the Nicomachean Ethics, expressly denies wanting to produce a “natural philosophy” [physique] [24] of love: ta; me;n ou\n fusica; tw`n ajporhmavtwn ajfeivsqw etc. [But those problems that belong to natural philosophy may be left alone] (VIII, 2, ed. of Berlin, 1155b8). He merely describes what happens among humans and states what should happen. He does not want to reexamine the problems treated with such brilliance and profundity in the Symposium of Plato. All the same, he couldn’t refrain from tossing out here and there some remarks touching on the matter from which he had abstained.

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And I believe that these scattered pieces of information have been of great help to St. Thomas. Aristotle, in Chapter 11 of Book 8, gives what resembles an initial sketch of the theory of the whole and the part. This initial account of what love is, still very general and superficial, could be called the theory of the community or the association [communication].K Reexamining a connection that he had already pointed out between friendship and justice, Aristotle observes that in every society or community one can speak of justice and of friendship. Here is the text of Hermann the German [Hermann of Carinthia]: In omni enim communicatione videtur aliquod iustum esse, et amicitia autem. Appellant igitur ut amicos connavigatores et commilitones, similter autem et eos, qui in aliis communicationibus. Secundum enim quantum communicant, in tantum est amicitia ... Et proverbium, communia quae amicorum, recte: in communicatione enim amicitia. Et his quidem plura, his autem minora; etenim amicitiarum hae quidem magis, hae autem minus (Eth. Nic., VIII, 11).

[For in every association there seems to be some justice and some friendship also. Accordingly they address their fellowsoldiers and fellow-voyagers as friends, and similarly those also who are in other associations with them. For according to the extent that they associate, to such a degree is the friendship ... And the adage “all things are in common to friends” is correct; for friendship is found in an association. And of course for some this involves more things, for others less. For of friendships, some are more so, others less so] (Eth. Nic., VIII, 11 {9}). The author continues by saying that all the communities or associations that could be enumerated, and which all have in view some particular utilities as their end, should apparently be looked upon as parts of the political society whose aim is the common interest. The very simple idea here pointed out by Aristotle has also been taken up by St. Thomas (2a 2ae q. 23 a. 1, etc.).34 34

St. Thomas gives a more-detailed account of this in the Commentary on the Ethics (In 8 Eth., l. 9, and what follows). He mentions, among other


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[25] However, St. Thomas had here only the initial beginnings of an account. The very indeterminacy of the idea suggested by Aristotle’s text35 invited some new inquiries. Moreover, apart from the text of Aristotle, his metaphysical doctrine of unity forbade him from assigning, as the final account of a harmony, a simple union or likeness between distinct beings. He needed to find an actual unity.36 He needed to show that a unique and real being is the supreme ground for every unity as well as for every appetite, in order to demonstrate that a love can be founded upon self-love and yet remain truly disinterested.37 It would therefore be a mistake to present the theory of things (l. 12), the communicatio “aethayrica” [association “of comrades”; ([eJtairikhv] of Aristotle)], the one wherein friends, he says, “communicant in nutritione” [share in a common upbringing]. Coconnier (Revue Thomiste, v. XIV, p. 8) believes that this concerns foster brothers. I do not think that St. Thomas has so badly misunderstood Aristotle. He instead means young comrades according to a sense of the word nutrire very common in the Middle Ages. See In 1 Metaph., l. 5: Erant nutriti in eorum (i.e., mathematicorum) studio [They had been brought up in the study of these things (i.e., mathematics)]. 35 Hermann always renders koinwniva as communicatio. The translation of Dionysius Lambin construes it sometimes as societas and sometimes as communio. 36 See, for example, 1 CG. 42, 7: Omnium diversorum ordinatorum ad invicem ordo ad invicem est propter ordinem ad aliquid unum; sicut ordo partium exercitus ad invicem est propter ordinem totius exercitus ad ducem. Nam, quod aliqua diversa ad invicem in habitudine uniuntur, non potest esse ex propriis naturis secundum quod sunt diversa, quia ex hoc magis distinguerentur ... [Among all the different orderings of things to each other, their order to each other is for the sake of their order to some one thing. Just as the order of the parts of an army to each other is for the sake of the order of the whole army to its general. For the fact that some different things are united to each other in some relation cannot come about from their own natures insofar as they are diverse things, since on this basis they would rather be distinguished from each other ...]— Similitude is a kind of multitude. Thus it does not provide, by itself, the ground for its unity. 37 It seems, because he did not carry his investigations as far, and because he dwelled too much on the notions of community and of likeness, that Coconnier, in his interesting articles on la [sic] Charité d’après S. Thomas d’Aquin (Revue Thomiste, v. XII, pp. 641-60; v. XIV, pp. 5-31; v. XV, pp. 117), did not succeed in establishing the relation of essential dependence between desire and benevolence, which unitesL them, we believe, in St. Thomas.

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the community as the ultimate foundation of the Thomist doctrine of love. Aristotle himself, in the Nicomachean Ethics, invites us to carry our investigation farther. After an apparent digression of two chapters, dedicated to diverse forms of political society, he returns to the principle of the koinwniva [community]. Political alliances, the relations between fellow tribesmenM and between sailing companions offer, he says, no difficulty, and they naturally display a certain concord. The same holds true for relations of hospitality. Yet what about the relations of family and of friendships proper? Is it not necessary to look upon them differently? For there is no community more closely united than the family. Such a community is rooted in a more perfect unity, in an individual identity. All the relations of kinship, whether they are strictly reciprocal (such as those between brothers), [26] or are disparate (such as those between grandfathers and grandsons), depend on the relations between father and son. Now—and this is what is important to us—the father loves his sons as a part of himself, and thus, in some manner, as himself.38 St. Thomas expounds Aristotle in this manner: Dicit quod parentes diligunt filios eo quod sunt aliquid ipsorum. Ex semine enim parentum filii procreantur. Unde filius est quodam modo pars partris ab eo separata. Unde haec amicitia propinquissima est dilectioni qua quis amat se ipsum, a qua omnis amicitia derivatur, ut in nono dicetur. Unde rationabiliter paterna amicitia 38

hjrth`sqai de; pa`ra (koinwniva suggevnikh; dokei`) ejk th``~ patrikh`~: oiJ gonei`~ me;n ga;r stevrgousi ta; tevkna wJ~ eJautw`n ti o[nta ... gonei`~ me;n ou\n tevkna filou`sin wJ~ eJautou;~ (ta; ga;r ejx aujtw`n oi|on e{teroi aujtoij tw/` kecwrivsqai) [But community between relations all seem to proceed from paternal affection. For parents love their children as being a part of themselves ... Parents, then, love their children as a part of themselves, for their offspring are a sort of other self in virtue of their separate existence] (VIII, 14, 1161b17-19, 27-29). The relations of kinship between brothers and cousins boils down to the identity of the common stock: hJ ga;r pro;~ ejkei`na taujtovth~ ajllhvloi~ taujtopoiei`: o{qen fasi; taujto;n ai|ma kai; rJivzan kai; ta; toiau`ta [For their identity with their parents makes them identical to one another. This is why people talk of “the same blood,” and “the same stock,” and so on] (ibid.; see 1162a2).


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ponitur esse principium. Filii autem diligunt parentes, in quantum habent esse ab eis, sicut si pars separata diligeret totum a quo separatur (In 8 Eth., l. 12).

[He (Aristotle) says that parents love their children in that they are something of themselves. For children are generated from the seed of their parents. Hence the son is in some manner a part of the father that is separated from him. Consequently this friendship is nearest to the love by which one loves oneself, from which all friendship is derived, as will be discussed in the ninth book. With good reason then paternal friendship is considered to be the foundation. However, children love their parents insofar as their existence comes from them, just as a separated part would love the whole from which it is separated] (In 8 Eth., l. 12). St. Thomas cites Book 9. We find there that the same actual doctrine is indeed repeated and generalized, but without the indication of any connection with the present theory of the family.39 Not only does the origin of all friendship lie in the love of self, (Amicabilia quae ad amicos ... videntur ex his quae ad seipsum venisse [The friendly feelings that we bear toward our friends ... seem to have come from those that we bear toward ourselves]), but what defines friendship, what consequently constitutes its essence, is the disposi-

39

ta; filika; de; ta; pro;~ tou;~ fivlou~, kai; oi|~ aiJ filivai oJrizontai, e[oiken ejk tw`n pro;~ eJauton eJlhluqevnai ... pro;~ de; to;n fivlon e[cein w{sper pro;~ eJautovn (e[sti ga;r oJ fivlo~ a[llo~ aujtov~) [And the friendly feelings that we bear for our friends, and the characteristics by which friendships are defined, seem to have proceeded from the friendly feelings that we bear for ourselves ... And good people are related to their friends just as they are to themselves (for their friends are other selves) ... But the friend, being another self ... ] (IX, 4, 1166a1-2, 30-32); to;n de; fivlon, e{teron aujto;n o[nta (IX, 9, 1169b6-7; see 1170b5). It is very remarkable that Aristotle, precisely where he lays down in principle that the love of self is at the origin of all friendship, also establishes on this same foundation the existence of the love of benevolence or disinterested love. See the logical consequence drawn in the first lines of this same Chapter Four of Book Nine, and compare what is said below about the coincidence of the good in itself with the good of the virtuous soul.

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tion that gives humans the same feelings for another as they have for themselves: Et dicit quod virtuosus se habet ad amicum sicut ad seipsum, quia amicus secundum affectum amici est quasi alius ipse, quod scilicet homo afficitur ad amicum sicut ad se ipsum. Videtur igitur quod amicitia in aliquo praedictorum consistat, quae homines ad se ipsos patiuntur; et quod illi vere sint amici, quibus praedicta existunt (In 9 Eth., l. 4).

[And he (Aristotle) notes that virtuous people are disposed to their friends as to themselves because friends are like other selves through friendly disposition; that is, because humans feel for their friends what they feel for themselves. Consequently, it seems that friendship consists in any of these characteristics that humans experience toward themselves; and that those are true friends in whom these characteristics are manifest] (In 9 Eth., l. 4). [27] It is well-known that Aristotle repeats this idea more than once. This idea is also very familiar to St. Thomas (1 CG. 91, 4; Car. a. 2 ad 6, etc.).—As for the preceding comparison, that between the whole and the part, it is impossible that he would have drawn no inspiration from it in composing the articles of the Summa that we cited (1 q. 60 a. 5; 1a 2ae q. 109 a. 3). Finally, in Chapter 7 of Book 9, in regard to an incidental question, Aristotle deliberately enters into the “natural philosophy” of love. This question concerns a well-known phenomenon, but one which at first glance never ceases to amaze: Why do benefactors love their beneficiaries more than the beneficiaries love their benefactors? Aristotle initially rules out a superficial account because he seeks one that is drawn from the very essence of things (dov x eie d j a] n fusikwvteron ei\nai to; ai]tion) [But the cause would seem to lie deeper in nature]. Here is the one that he proposes: “It is the same thing, he says, that we observe in artisans: all of them love their work more than they would be loved by their work if it came to life. It seems that this would be especially true of poets who have an excessive love for their poems and treasure them as their children. The same thing occurs with benefactors: their beneficiary is like their own


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work, and they love it more than the work loves the one who has made it ... Loving is a sort of acting.” To love one’s work, he says moreover, is to love one’s being, because we are by our activity, and everything loves being in act. The love in question is therefore natural.40 Now this response (which is obviously only the extension of a remark made in Book 8 regarding children and fathers)41 was naturally applied to the question of the love of God for the world that He has made [28] (see St. Thomas: “tanquam aliquid sui” [as it is something of Himself ], 2a 2ae q. 30 a. 2 ad 1). And above all, by explicitly assigning the abstract idea of the participation of being as the universal foundation of love, this response explains by the same principle the love of the world for God. Accordingly, St. Thomas did not have to seek elsewhere for the general idea that unifies his system. 40 41

IX, 7, 1167-1168. VIII, 14, 1161b21: ma`llon sunw/keivwtai to ajf j ou| ta/` gennhqevnti h] to; genovmenon tw/` poihvsanti: to; ga;r ejx aujtou` oijkei``on tw/` ajf j ou|, oi|on ojdou;~ h[ qri;x h] oJtiou`n tw/` e[conti: ejkeivnw/ d j oujqe;n to; ajf j ou|, h[ h|tton. [The progenitor has a closer bond with its offspring than the offspring with its producer, for the product belongs to the producer (as a tooth or hair or anything else to its owner). But the producer does not belong to the product, or belongs to it in a lesser degree]. St. Thomas says: “Genitum enim, sicut dictum est, est quasi quaedam pars generantis separata. Unde videtur comparari ad generantem, sicut partes separabiles ad totum, puta dens, vel capillus, vel si quid aliud est huiusmodi. Huiusmodi autem partes quae separantur a toto propinquitatem habent ad totum, quia totum in se continet ipsas, non autem e converso. Et ideo ad partes nihil videtur attinere totum vel minus quam e converso. Pars enim etsi sit aliquid totius, non tamen est idem ipsi toti, sicut tota pars concluditur in toto. Unde rationabile est quod, parentes magis filios diligant, quam e converso” [For the offspring, as was said, resembles a kind of separated part of the progenitor. Hence it seems to be comparable to the progenitor as separable parts to a whole, for instance, a tooth or a hair or some such thing. But such parts that are separated from the whole have an affinity for the whole because the whole includes them in itself, and not the converse. And for that reason the whole seems to not belong to the parts at all or to belong to them less than the converse. For although the part is something of the whole, nevertheless it is not identical to this whole, as every part is included in the whole. Consequently, it is reasonable that parents would love their children more than the converse] (In 8 Eth., l. 12).

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Has all the work therefore been done, and does St. Thomas only have to transcribe Aristotle in order for his metaphysics of love to be erected? To think so would be to misunderstand the complexity of the problems that he had to resolve and to misjudge the effort that his synthetic doctrine of the appetites required. In general, in order to assess the difference between the philosophy of Thomas and that of Aristotle, the place that the idea of God occupies in their thought must be considered. If we consider our particular theory of love from this vantage point, the contribution of Aristotle turns out to be very meager. It amounts to three words in the Metaphysics: kinei` wJ~ ejrwvmenon [it produces motion by being loved].42 Besides, these words are not directly intended for all beings, but only for the soul of Heaven or the prime sphere. In the Thomist doctrine of love, on the contrary, the role that the Supreme Creating, Actualizing, and Beautifying Nature plays is known to all. This primary difference brings about a complete inversion of vantage points. It is no longer free friendship that is key, rather it is necessary love. Love is first conceived of by St. Thomas as a natural appetite for self-perfection, as a tendency to actualization, and consequently unification. To use Aristotle’s term, it is a conception that lies in any case fusikwtevra [deeper in nature]. The paradigmatic affection, the one that serves as a measure for the others, is the one wherein the good of the lover depends wholly and exclusively on the beloved: it is the love of God. Now this vantage point is not only different from that of the Nicomachean Ethics, it is opposed to it. For, according to the principle of St. Thomas, which is here in perfect logical consistency with the rest of his philosophy, the worst position to take in order to construct a metaphysics of love, is precisely to look at things from the vantage point of egalitarian friendship. Egalitarian friendship only exists by accident, if it can even [29] exist at all. In order to judge the essence of love, it is necessary to substitute submission for equality, to take up the vantage point of the supreme inequality, the one which separates the Creator from the creatures, and to evaluate everything according to this universal prototype. Love should not be looked upon as a hypertrophy of friendship (see uJperbolh; filiva~ [friendship in excess], Eth. Nic., IX, 10), rather 42

Met. A, 7, 1072b3.


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friendship should be looked upon as a kind of love, as an accidental form (proper to the human world) of the fundamental and essential feeling that propels all beings toward God. The more a friendship is disparate, the closer it comes to the paradigmatic feeling. This is contrary to what Aristotle said.43 These few reflections are sufficient, we believe, to make evident the originality of the synthesis of St. Thomas, as synthesis, vis-à-vis the theories that are found in Aristotle. 43

This is a principle of St. Thomas’s metaphysics: each time two beings unite so as to form an assemblage that is truly unified [un], the relations between the two constituents are those of the determinant and the determined; one is as it were the matter and the other the form (4 d. 49 q. 2 a. 1; 2 CG. 53). This principle, already pointed out by Aristotle, Politics, II, 2, 1261a29: ejx w|n de; dei` e{n genevsqai, ei[dei diafevrei [But the constituents out of which a unity must form differ in kind] (this concerns the differences between summaciva [alliance] and povli~ [state]), logically connects up with the Thomist ideas about unity, quantity, and material multiplication. Because spatial juxtaposition is the contrary of unity, just like strict equality is the contrary of organization, it has to be concluded that perfectly egalitarian friendship is not desirable, is not possible, does not exist. As Plato would say, every friendship is “a daughter of the goddess Penia [Need]” [Symposium, 203b-c]. Every friendship is a form of those disparate friendships of which Aristotle stated: ejn pavsai~ de; tai`~ ajnomoeidevsi filivai~ to; ajnavlogon ijsavzei kai; sw/vzei th;n filivan [In all friendship between dissimilars proportion equalizes and preserves the friendship] (Eth. Nic., IX, 1, 1163b31-32). Therefore, between two individuals who can be roughly characterized as “equal,” equality of friendship will not be a quantitative and strict equality, but a proportional and reestablished equality. It is clear, moreover, even if we wish to retain the word “equality,” that the love we bear for ourselves will always retain an irreducibly original character. Even supposing that we loved our friends more than ourselves, we could not love them exactly as ourselves.—According to St. Thomas, we should always prefer ourselves to our friends (2a 2ae q. 26 a. 4). Albert the Great thinks otherwise: in amicitiae distantium [friendships between dissimilars], he states: “conceditur unicuique amare plus se ipsum quam alterum, et maiora bona sibi velle quam alteri: quod non contingit in amicitia quae vere amicitia est, et vere super aequale quantitatis fundatur” [it is granted that all individuals love themselves more than others and want the greater good for themselves rather than for others. Wherefore this does not arrive at the friendship that is truly friendship and is truly founded above the equality of quantity] (In 8 Eth., tr. 2, c. 1, n. 36).

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_______________ It is not inopportune here to recall an idea that is not in Aristotle, but which could have suggested to a philosopher of the Middle Ages the account of perfect love through the theory of the whole [30] and the part, such as St. Thomas set it forth. Still, we do not look upon the passages mentioned here as sources of St. Thomas’ doctrine. Our intention is only to show that this account, in which some tried to find a certain vague flavor of pantheism,44 far from scandalizing the thirteenth century, came to be readily accepted. For it is a doctrine of St. Paul (Rom. 12:5; Eph. 1:22; 1 Cor. 12:12 et seqq.) that all Christians, among themselves and with Christ, form just one single body. And even before St. Thomas, a good number of orators and commentators were inspired by this doctrine to extol charity. A number of St. Augustine’s thoughts on this subject have been collected in a sermon that can be found in the appendix to a volume of his works (Serm. 105 inter supposititios, PL. 39, 1949). He explains how, for example, when a member suffers, all the other members naturally hasten to bring it relief (l. c., n. 1; see Enarratio in Ps. 130, n. 6). He also declares that Christ is the head of the mystical body of the Church, and suffers in its members that are persecuted on earth (l. c. n. 3; see Enarr. in Ps. 86, n. 5). Yet all of this remains in the supernatural order, whereas the essence [le nerf] of the Thomist theory is the idea of a divine participation that every being possesses through the very fact of its creation (compare to these passages of St. Augustine those of Paulinus of Friuli [St. Paulinus of Aquileia], Liber Exhortationis, c. 52, in the appendix to the works of Augustine, PL. 40, 1066). We find elsewhere the concord of the saints in heaven compared to that of the members of the body. The celebrated Letter to the Brethren of Mont Dieu, for a long time attributed to St. Bernard,N employs in this regard the same comparison that St. Thomas will later use: 44

It is clear that, in a pantheistic system, the unitary physical conception of love, based on the relations between the whole and the part, can readily find its place. John Scotus Eriugena, citing Gregory of Nazianzus, calls the human pars Dei [a part of God] (De Divisione Naturae, b. 2, c. 1, PL. 122, 523 D).


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Omnia capiti serviunt et se pro illo periculis opponunt; ex quo manifestum est, omnia caput plus quam se veraciter amare ... Sic quoque in caelesti patria ... sicut tu a voluntate Dei non discrepas, sic ille tuae voluntati per omnia concordabit: caput enim a suo corpore discordare nequit (b. III, c. 3, n. 13, PL. 184, 360).

[All things serve their head and expose themselves to risk for it. From this it is clear that all things truly love their head more than themselves ... So too in the heavenly fatherland ... just as you are not at odds with the will of God, so He will be in harmony with your will in everything. For the head is unable to be at variance with its body] (b. III, c. 3, n. 13, PL. 184, 360). All of the blessed, continues the author, will be content with their stations and will not desire to exchange them for better ones. Things will be [31] just like in the human body, where neither the eye desires to be the nose, nor hearing to switch places with smell (ibid., n. 14, l. c., 360-361). Here again, leaving aside what is simply comparison, it is a matter of loves inspired by grace.45 Yet the difficulty consisted precisely in placing in agreement what was known to be required by grace—that is to say disinterestedness, sacrifice—with what seemed to be, in complete individuals, the necessary condition of the existence of a natural appetite; namely, that all the appetitions be ordered to the seeking of their own good. Hence it was necessary to say why the saints, in the supernatural state of 45

As for the comparison itself, the most striking expression of it that I know is found in Peter of Blois (Tractatus de Caritate Dei et Proximi, c. 37, PL. 207, 936): “Si manus oculorum obsequio vibratum in aliud membrum senserit gladium imminentem, ipsa suum minime discrimen attendens, plus alii quam sibi timens, gladium excipit: et, ut alii parcatur, ipsa non sibi parcit” [If by the service of the eyes the hand perceives a threatening sword swung at another member, without attending to its own danger, fearing more for the other than for itself, it intercepts the sword, and in order that the other might be spared, it does not spare itself]. See c. 17 (l. c., 915): “Consubstantiat se dilecto” [It identifies itself with the beloved]. See also St. Augustine in the Enarratio in Psalmum 86 cited above: Solet lingua dicere, calcato pede: calcas me [When the foot is stepped on, language often says ‘you stepped on me’] (PL. 35, 1105).

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grace or in the heavenly state of beatitude, no longer behaved as independent beings that were external to each other, but seemingly redescended to the apparently inferior state of substantial conditioning and of the intimate union which is that of being members of one identical body. Now it was through his theory of individuality—which can be looked upon as a critique of the notion of the “complete individual”—that St. Thomas responded to this question. He did away with the illusion of the “closed” individual.46 He showed that egoism, in its restrictive form, [32] is not a truly natural inclination, but an acquired inclination: one acquired by sin (1a 2ae q. 109 a. 3 body, end). Once his locutions have been penetrated: Socrates non est sua natura, angelus non est suum esse, nulla creatura est suum esse [Socrates is not his nature, the angel is not its being, no creature is its being], what the natural commensuration of the will [vouloir] is in being and in knowing can easily be comprehended. And it can also easily be comprehended that to love humanity, the universe, and God more than oneself, is, for St. Thomas, merely to follow nature.

46

This is what could not be achieved, even by those of his predecessors who had most insisted upon the concord and the “conspiracy” of all beings of nature, due to their lacking the clear idea of perfection implied by unity. However much they speak of pax [peace], societas [society], and unitas [unity], still they do not deal with the core of the problem. See for example Aelred of Rievaulx, De Spirituali Amicitia, b. 1 (PL. 195, 667). Aelred is a student of Cicero (l. c., 659). Not only is he inspired by him, but he takes his ideas (675) and even his sentences (692) from him. Now, there are no poorer theories of love than those which are set forth in the Laelius. Cicero, who rejects the utilitarian conception of friendship, that which is based on indigence (Laelius, c. 9, c. 13, etc.), and who wants friendship to be loved “for itself” (c. 9, c. 21), nevertheless appeals to the idea of cooperation. Yet he cannot do this without unconsciously falling back into the egoistic conception of indigence, because he does not possess the notion of an interest of the whole different from particular interests.


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II The Theory of the Universal Appetite for God The idea that the world desires God is Greek, and Peripatetic. In a book of the Metaphysics on which St. Thomas commented, he read the famous words: “Movet autem sicut appetibile et intelligibile ... movet autem ut amatum” [But it (the unmoved mover) moves as the object of desire and as the object of thought ... but it moves as what is loved].47 In this respect, the Neoplatonists were the true heirs of the thought of Aristotle. St. Thomas, who was acquainted with the Theology of Proclus and had commented on the Liber de Causis [Book of Causes], had not read the classical exposition on the appetite of all things for God that Plotinus gave in the Third Ennead. He would have found there some ideas that he had made his own.48 He pos47

to; ojrekto;n kai; to; nohto;n kinei` ouj kinouvmena ... kinei` de; wJ~ ejrwvmenon [And the object of desire and the object of thought move without being moved ... it produces motion by being loved] (Metaphysics L, 7, 1072a26 and b3; Commentary on the Metaphysics of St. Thomas, Book XII, lesson 5). 48 There is to begin with, naturally, the doctrine of the ontological priority of the love of the separated Beauty over all other appetition. According to Plotinus, we love sensible beauties only for lack of the archetypal essence of Beauty. We love them as images which in their material confinement contain a certain participation of this archetypal essence of Beauty: ejn eijkovsi kai; swvmasin, ejpei; mh; to; ajrcevtupon aujtoi`~ pavrestin, o{ ejstin ai[tion aujtoi`~ tou` kai; tou`de ejra`n ... ajgapa`tai tou`to wJ~ eijkwvn [Those that desire procreation here on earth are satisfied with beauty here on earth in images and bodies, since the archetype is not present to them, which is the cause even of their loving (beauty here on earth) ... (this beauty here on earth) is lovable as an image] (Enneads, III, tr. 5, n. 1, p. 207, 30-34, ed. H. F. Mueller). To the Thomist theory of universal love in which each part of the world is ordered to the good of the whole, we can compare: kaq j o{son de; eJkavsth (yuch;) pro;~ th;n o{lhn e[kei, oujk ajpotetmhmevnh, ejmperiecomevnh dev, wJ~ ei\nai pavsa~ mivan: kai; oJ e[rw~ e{kasto~ pro;~ to;n pavnta a]n e[coi. [And in as much as each individual soul holds to the Whole-Soul, never cut off from it but included within it so that all form a unity, so too does the individual love hold to the AllLove] (ibid., n. 4, p. 211, 29-31). Finally, the role that St. Thomas assigns in love to “connaturalitas” [connaturality] (1a 2ae q. 27 a. 4) can be compared to what Plotinus describes as the “principle” of love: th;n aujtou` tou` kavllou~ provteron ejn tai`~ yucai`~ o[rexin kai; ejpivnwsin kaiv

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sessed, on the other hand, the works of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite. Not troubled by the least doubt regarding their authenticity, he approached them with all the respect [33] due to a person who was the disciple of St. Paul. Accordingly he was willing to welcome and to incorporate the Dionysian conceptions into his philosophy. Now, he read in the fourth chapter of the Divine Names, very boldly expressed, the thesis of the universal love of God. The Pseudo-Areopagite 1) asserts in general terms that all beings of nature desire God;49 2) varies this appetition according to the natures of the different created beings;50 3) extends this appetition to “non-being”;51 and 4) extends it to the actions of demons,52 as well as to the sinful actions and vices of humans.53 Finally, 5) since this appetition is for him correlative to the participation of God, from which no being is excepted,54 it should be conceived of as the appetite itself for this participation, for this “communion” [communication] with God (pro;~ koinwnivan eJauth`~ [toward communion with Himself ], Cael. Hier., c. 6, n. 1): either the communion that the being can possess, although not yet possessing it, or the communion that it already possesses. Indeed, the author asserts in this sense that the love of God is the cause in nature, not only of the “hierarchical” suggevneian kaiv oijkeiovthto~ a[logon suvnesin [(The source of love) lies in the prior desire of souls for Beauty itself, and in a recognition, in a kinship, and in an unreasoned apprehension of closeness with it] (l. c., n. 49 Noms Divins, c. IV, n. 4, n. 10; c. X, n. 1. 1, p. 207, 14-16). 50 ou| ejfivetai pavnta, ta; me;n noera; kai; logika; gnwstikw`~, ta; de; aijsqhtika; aijsqhtikw`~, ta; de; aijsqhvsew~ a[moira th/` ejmfuvtw/ kinhvsei th`~ zwtikh`~ ejfevsew~, ta; de; a[zwa kai; movnon o[nta th/` pro;~ movnhn th;n oujsiwvdh mevqexin ejpithdeovpthti [(The Good is) what all things desire, intellectual and rational beings through knowing, sensible beings through sensing, living beings lacking perception through the innate motion of their desire for life, lifeless and merely existent beings only through their suitableness for participating in its existence] (ibid., n. 4). 51 Ibid., n. 3: ei; qemito;n favnai, tajgaqou` tou` uJpe;r pavnta ta; o[nta kai; aujto to; mh; o]n ejfivetai, kai; filoneikei` pw~ ejn tajgaqw/` kai; aujto; ei\nai. [If it is lawful to say this, even non-being itself longs for the Good that is beyond all being, and itself even somehow struggles to exist in the Good]. According to St. Thomas, “non-being” here signifies prime matter (see 1 q. 5 a. 2 ad 1; 3 CG. 20, 5; In Lib. de Causis, l. 4, etc.). 52 53 54 Ibid., n. 23. Ibid., n. 20, n. 31. Ibid., n. 7.


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loves that maintain each being in its place in the whole,55 but also of the love that maintains each being in its unity,56 in other words, of the love of self.57 Dionysius had been revealed to the West by John Scotus Eriugena, who had reproduced, among other things, his assertions on love.58 Yet [34] Eriugena, while absorbing all of this Neoplatonism, had not 55

di j aujto; kai; aujtou` e{neka, kai; ta; h{ttw tw`n kreittovnwn ejpistrevptikw`~ ejrw`si, kai; koinwnikw`~ ta; oJmovstoica tw`n oJmotagw`n, kai ta; kreivttw tw`n hJttovnwn pronohtikw`~. [Because of it and for the sake of it, inferiors love their superiors attractionally, equals love their equals communally, and superiors love their inferiors providentially], Noms Divins, l. c., n. 10. 56 kai; aujjta; eJautw`n e{kasta sunektikw`~ [And all beings (love) themselves sustainingly], n. 10. 57 One sentence of the De Caelesti Hierarchia in particular could have easily lead to a pantheistic interpretation of the author’s thought, if his uncompromising ideas on the impenetrable transcendence of God had not otherwise been known. This is the assertion of c. 4, n. 1: ta; me;n ou\n a[zwa pavnta tw/` ei\nai aujth`~ metevcei: to; ga;r ei\nai pavntwn ejsti;n hJ uJpe;r to; ei\nai qeovth~. [So then all non-living things participate in the being of It (the Being and Source of everything). For the Deity that is beyond being is the being of all things]. 58 Scotus Eriugena, De Divisione Naturae, b. 1, n. 74: “Primum igitur hanc amoris definitionem accipe: amor est connexio ac vinculum quo omnium rerum universitas ineffabili amicitia insolubilique unitate copulatur. Potest et sic definiri: amor est naturalis motus omnium rerum, quae in motu sunt, finis quietaque statio, ultra quam nullus creaturae motus” [First, therefore, take this definition of love: Love is a connection and a bond by which the totality of all things is joined in ineffable friendship and indissoluble unity. And it can be defined like this: love is the natural motion of all things that are in motion, and the end and peaceful abode beyond which there is no motion of a creature] (PL. 122, 519). After a citation of the Pseudo-Areopagite, the author continues: “Merito ergo amor Deus dicitur, quia omnis amoris causa est, et per omnia diffunditur, et in unum colligit omnia, et ad seipsum ineffabili regressu, totiusque creaturae amatorios motus in seipso terminat ... eum omnia appetunt, ipsiusque pulchritudo omnia ad se attrahit. Ipse enim solus vere amabilis est,” etc. [God therefore deserves to be called love since He is the cause of all love and is diffused through all things and gathers all things into a unity and to Himself in an ineffable return, and terminates the loving motions of the whole of creation in Himself ... all things desire Him and His beauty draws all things to Himself. For He alone is truly lovable], etc. (l. c., 519520).

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been able to maintain the substantial distinction between the finite and the infinite that orthodoxy required. Consequently he came to be condemned by ecclesiastic authority.—However, in another part of the world, the idea of the Neoplatonists had passed to the Arabs, who, due to their strict monotheism, had developed it in a manner much more acceptable to Christians than Eriugena had. In a treatise of Avicenna on love, which A. F. Mehren made known in 1886, we encounter a number of ideas that were later to become dear to St. Thomas. There innate love is presented as identical to the natural desire for perfection, and as a necessary condition of existence. If the object loved is absent, the lover desires it; if it is present, the lover identifies him or herself with it. And when a new degree of love is attained, it expands the capacity of the lover and renders it susceptible to a fuller manifestation of the beloved (see St. Thomas, 1a 2ae q. 33 a. 1). Hence we find that God “loves the creation that owes its existence to Him, and which in return yearns for His manifestation as the ultimate and most precious aim of its desire, despite the fact that only divine and chosen souls can arrive there.” The last degree of the revelation of the absolute to its zealous lovers is that of the real manifestation; this has been called union by the Sufis.59 (See the beatific vision in St. Thomas). Was St. Thomas acquainted with the opuscule in question? There is no evidence for this. Still he had at least read the Metaphysics of Avicenna, where the existence of pure and necessary Goodness is placed in logical relationship with the universal appetite for being, for perfection, for the good.60 And all of 59 60

A. F. Mehren, Vues théosophiques d’Avicenne (Louvain, 1886, pp. 5-10). Avicenna, Metaphysics, tr. VIII, c. 6 (Opera, Venice, 1500, fol. 99 and 100): “Necesse esse per se est bonitas pura, et bonitatem desiderat omnino quicquid est. Id autem quod desiderat omnis res est esse et perfectio esse inquantum est esse: privatio vero inquantum est privatio non desideratur nisi inquantum eam sequitur esse et perfectio. Id igitur quod vere desideratur est esse: et ideo esse est bonitas pura et perfectio pura: et omnino bonitas est id quod desiderat omnis res iuxta modulum suum, quoniam per eam perficitur eius esse” [Necessary being through itself is pure goodness, and whatever exists desires goodness absolutely. For that which all things desire is being, and the perfection of being as being. However, privation insofar as it is privation is not desired unless inasmuch as being and perfection follow it. Therefore that which is truly desired is being: and thus being is pure goodness and pure perfection. And goodness


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the essentials of the “physical” conception [35] of love reside in this linkage. He also knew the opuscule of Averroës “On the Beatitude of the Soul.” Finally, he most likely knew that his teacher Albert the Great had recourse, on this point, to the writings of the Arabs, and proclaimed in turn that all of creation desires God.61

_______________ One of the most remarkable extensions of the doctrine of the universal love of God, and the best principle for the solution to the problem of love that St. Thomas extracted from this doctrine, is the idea of the reduction of all the affections, even the perverted ones, and self-love itself, to the love of God. Now it is odd to encounter this conception in the very heart of the Latin Middle Ages, before the introduction of Aristotle and the Arabs, in a resolute disciple of St. Augustine and a personal friend of St. Bernard—[i.e., William of St. Thierry]. At first sight it seems that no idea should have been more disagreeable to a mind nurtured on Augustine than that of a universal and necessary love of God. For the abrupt separation of charity and cupidity seems to be the most salient feature of the Augustinian doctrine of love. Augustine, the former disciple of the Manicheans (who was also a pupil of Neoplatonism in his day), carves the world in two according to the two directions of the appetites and the pleasures. The supernatural instinct of the righteous propels them toward God, but natural desire pushes them away from Him. Here the attraction of creatures is distinguished from the attraction of God and opposed to it. There is a discontinuity between the fruenda [things which are to be enjoyed] and the utenda [things which are to be used]. There is, to speak in general terms, an opposition between the love of self and the love of God.62 is universally that which all things desire in accordance with their small measure since their being is perfected through it]. 61 Albert the Great, De Causis et Processu Universi, c. 1 and 14. 62 Even if Augustine did not intend to speak of so abrupt an opposition, there remains nevertheless this difference between him and St. Thomas. For Augustine, the love of God is the rational form of the love of beatitude, which is universal and primordial; for St. Thomas, the desire for beatitude

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[36] On the other hand, the doctrine of beatitude is an essential part of the psychology and moral philosophy of Augustine. As we have already reminded the reader, the doctrine of beatitude fits in remarkably with the doctrine of appetite that characterizes the GrecoThomist conception of love. Now suppose that during the period preceding the classical centuries of the Middle Ages an author attempted to write a didactic treatise on charity by drawing his inspiration particularly from St. Augustine. If we wanted to classify this author according to one of our two groups, we would not hesitate one instant and would surely place him among the predecessors of St. Thomas.63 St. Augustine constantly repeated that in everything we desire beatitude and that beatitude is only found in God. And from there it is only a short step to asserting that in everything it is God that we desire.

is the human form of the love of God, which is universal and primordial. The Thomist conception is more concrete. It is not to a notion, but to a being that the system of universal appetitions is affixed [est suspendu]. 63 In the book that Paschasius Radbertus devoted to charity (in his treatise on the theological virtues, which dates to 843), there is no trace of the subsequent idea of a sort of passion of God for our persons: “Idcirco totam spem meam in te posui, quia summum bonum tu es” [Therefore I have placed my whole hope in You because You are the highest good] (ch. X, PL. 120, 1477). We love God in order to find ourselves in Him, in order to take delight in Him: “ut in illo inveniamur, qui perditi eramus ... ut eo perfruamur bono, quod ipse est” [in order that we who had been lost might be found in Him ... in order that we might enjoy the good that He is] (ch. VI, l. c., 1470). We cannot love God gratis [gratuitously]; first of all because He has loved us first, next because love never goes without reward (ch. VI, 1469). Chapters V, VII, and VIII set forth the Augustinian ideas on the quatuor diligenda, quid fruendum quid utendum, de ordine caritatis [the four things to be loved, what is to be enjoyed and what is to be used, on the order of charity]. In the idea of a germanitas [natural brotherhood] (ch. IX, 1475; see XIII, 1486), we can find something resembling a beginning for the conception of the natural unity that founds love. Finally, a passage like Chapter 13, 1486 C, clearly shows in what sense a disciple of Augustine could readily admit the natural unity of all the appetites that the creator placed in the soul. Such a passage also clearly shows what repugnance he nevertheless must feel when hearing others speak of a legitimate and true “love” for sensible things.


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It does not appear to me that Augustine had ever taken this step himself. It is true that, in the sort of prayer taking the form of a litany that he placed at the beginning of his Soliloquies, he wrote at one point: Deus, quem amat omne quod potest amare, sive sciens, sive nesciens! [It is God whom everything loves that can love, either consciously or unconsciously!] (Solil., I, 1, PL. 32, 869). Yet was he clearly aware of the philosophical idea that this exclamation implied? Other passages seem to invite us to respond in the negative. They would lead us to believe that even if he conceives of all our tendencies as imitations (more or less felicitous) of the appetite for the divine, still he does not conceive of them as participations, restrictions, or deviations, of this appetite, in such a way that the love of God remains the formal reason [37] and as it were the heart [l’âme] of all our other loves.64 Now this point is certainly deserving of elucidation, and such a study would perhaps throw some light on the history of the idea of love in the Middle Ages. As for the relation between the appetite for beatitude and the love of charity as well as its opposite, cupidity, this cannot be determined without focusing on the manner in which Augustine understood the relations between nature and grace. Be that as it may for Augustine, one of his disciples of the twelfth century, William, abbot of St. Thierry, friend of St. Bernard, and his 64

Take, for example, the rare chapter of the Confessions (II, 6) that begins with these words: Quid ego miser in te amavi, o facinus illud meum nocturnum sexti decimi anni aetatis meae? [What did wretched I love in you, o nocturnal crime of mine, in the sixteenth year of my life?]. The idea that is developed in this chapter is that we cannot desire any good that is not found more purely in God and in this way all our appetites demonstrate that God has made us: Ita fornicatur anima, cum avertitur abs te, et quaerit extra te ea quae pura et liquida non invenit, nisi cum redit ad te. Perverse te imitantur omnes qui longe se a te faciunt ... sic te imitando indicant creatorem te esse omnis naturae [So the soul fornicates when it is turned away from You and seeks outside of You those pure and clear things that it does not find except when it returns to You. All imitate You wrongly who make themselves distant from You ... but even by thus imitating You they declare that You are the creator of all nature] (PL. 32, 681). It is to add to the text, to see there “quod Deus sit menti universalis ratio operandi” [that God is the universal pattern for the acting mind], as a Scholastic of the seventeenth century did (Juvenalis Annaniensis, Solis Intelligentiae Lumen Indeficiens, ed. of Paris, 1878, pp. 49-51).

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second in the fight for orthodoxy, has clearly elucidated the conception of the appetite of which we speak. The theory of William is especially worthy of attention as he resembles one of the classical Doctors of love of the twelfth century;65 and also because he is more removed, in expression, from the formulations in which Aristotelian Scholasticism will later couch the same ideas.66 For William of St. Thierry then divine love and perverted love, caritas [charity] and cupiditas [cupidity], so different as to their terminuses, are [38] only diverse forms of one identical power of the rational soul, and disclose a core of identical appetition. Love is the natural weight of the soul that carries it to its place, or toward its end. It is the vehement will that it has for its good. However, one who considers these things more closely realizes that this natural love tends, primitively and from itself, toward a single object, and that this object is God. Therefore, every time that the appetites pull humans in other directions, they should be regarded as “corruptions” of natural love. If caritas [charity] designated every love of the supreme Good, one would have to say that cupidities are only perverted and degenerate forms of charity. “(Affectus) qui amor in nobis dicitur ... corrumpitur saepius morbis animae a te et ad te creatae; ad te solum concreatus et concretus, et reluctans noster affectus legi naturali et reclamans, 65

We know the ideas of William on love not only through an Exposition on the Song of Songs and through some precious lyrical outpourings (Meditationes), but also through his De Contemplando Deo [On the Contemplation of God] (sometimes called the Liber de Amore Dei) and through the De Natura et Dignitate Divini Amoris [On the Nature and Dignity of Love], which a contemporary, alluding to Ovid’s Art of Loving, names the Anti-Naso [Anti-Ovid]. The works of William are found in volumes 180 and 184 of the Patrologiae Latina (PL.) of Migne. 66 William moreover is acquainted with Pseudo-Dionysius. See Aenigma Fideo, Conclusion (PL. 180, 440 B); Disp. adv. Abaelardum, c. 5 (ibid., 266 C). He admires Plato for writing that God created the world out of goodness (ibid., c. 7, 270, 271). And let us also note in William’s writings the idea dear to St. Thomas: “Quod naturale, hoc est quod virtutis est” [What is natural is what is from virtue] (Expositio super Cantica, c. II, l. c., 518; see De Natura Corporis et Animae, b. II, fin., l. c., 726 C).

Chapter 2: Remarks on the Elements of the Thomist Solution cogitur vocari gula, luxuria, avaritia, et his similia, qui incorruptus et in sua permanens natura ad te solum est, Domine, cui soli amor debetur ... amor enim, ut dictum est, et saepe dicendum est, ad te solum est, Domine” (De Contemplando Deo, V, 11, PL. 184, 373 A-B).

[(The disposition) that is called love in us ... too often is corrupted through the disorders of the soul that is created by and for You. Our disposition is created with and built into us only for you, but when it is resisting and crying out against the natural law, it is forced to be called gluttony, wantonness, avarice, and names similar to these. Yet when persisting uncorrupted and true to its nature it is for You alone Lord, to whom alone love is due. For love, as has been said, and as must often be said, is for You alone, Lord] (De Contemplando Deo, V, 11, PL. 184, 373 A-B). (See De Natura ... Amoris, PL. 184, 383 B: it receives the names of vice). “Amor ab auctore naturae naturaliter est animae humanae inditus ... Cum debito naturae ordine, spiritus ... naturali pondere suo, amore suo sursum ferri deberet ad Deum qui creavit eum; carnis humiliatus illecebris, non intellexit ... Cor ... ad concupiscentiae carnalis ignem degenere quandam mollitie liquescens, totum defluxit in ventrem ..., et de ventre in ventris inferiora, omnia confundens, omnia degenerans, omnia adulterans, amoris naturalem affectum pervertens in brutum quendam carnis appetitum” (De Natura ... Amoris, I, 2, ibid., 381 A-D).

[Love is naturally implanted in the human soul by the Author of nature ... Though by the due order of nature, the spirit ... by its natural weight, by its love, ought to move upwards to God who created it, being brought low by the enticements of the flesh, it did not understand ... The heart ... melting at the fire of carnal concupiscence into some degenerate softness, totally flows down into the belly ..., and from the belly into the parts below the belly, confusing everything, spoiling everything, adulterating everything, and perverting the natural disposition of love into some bestial appetite of the flesh] (De Natura ... Amoris, I, 2, ibid., 381 A-D).

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Part 1: The Physical or Greco-Thomist Conception of Love “Cum enim nihil ametur, nisi quia bonum est, aut bonum putatur, datur intelligi, quoniam soli summo bono omnis amor debetur, et totus amor: et ad ipsum recurrit semper, si non captivus ac vinctus alicubi tenetur, ubi falso bono decipitur. Amori vero nostro, affectui nostro illi naturali, sic est amor Dei, sicut corpori nostro anima sua est” (Speculum Fidei, PL. 180, 391 B).

[For since nothing is loved unless as it is good or is deemed to be good, we are given to understood that every love and all love is due solely to the highest good. And it always returns to this if it is not held captive or bound elsewhere, where it is deceived by a false good. But the love of God is to our love, to that natural disposition of ours, what the soul is to our body] (Speculum Fidei, PL. 180, 391 B). (See Expositio super Cantica, c. I, ibid., 490 D). “Libera a servitute corruptionis id quod tibi soli deservire debet in nobis, amorem nostrum. Amor enim est, qui cum liber est, similes nos tibi efficit ... Cum enim amamus quamcunque creaturam, non ad utendum ad te, sed ad fruendum in se, fit amor iam non amor, sed cupiditas vel libido, sive aliquid huiusmodi, cum damno libertatis perdens etiam gratiam nominis ...” (Expositio super Cantica, Preface, PL. 180, 473 C-D).

[Free from the servitude of corruption that thing in us that ought to serve You alone: that is our love. For it is love that, when it is free, makes us similar to You ... For when we love any creature, not in order to use it for You, but to enjoy it in itself, love ceases to be love but is cupidity or lust or something of the sort, losing with the loss of freedom even the courtesy of the name of love ...] (Expositio super Cantica, Preface, PL. 180, 473 C-D). [39] “O amor, a quo omnis amor cognominatur, etiam carnalis ac degener” (ibid., 481 B). See “Quantum enim ad animum, amore movemur quocunque movemur” (ibid., c. I, 492 B).

[O Love, from whom all love, even that which is carnal and degenerate, takes its name!] (ibid., 481 B). See [For with respect to the soul whatever is moved is moved by love] (ibid., c. I, 492 B).


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(The Word became incarnate) “ut amorem nostrum in terrenis dispersum et putrefactum beneficia pietatis exhibendo in se recolligeret, et in novitatem vitae reformaret, et abstractum et emundatum a faece earum rerum, quae cum ipso pariter amari non possunt, secum levaret sursum” (De Sacramentis, c. V, PL. 180, 351 D; see Disp., c. VII, 276 B).

(The Word became incarnate) [in order that by revealing the gifts of His devotion He might gather back to Himself our love that was spread out over earthly things and corrupted, and in order that He might reform it into a newness of life, and in order that He might lift it up with Himself, once it has been removed and cleansed from the refuse of those things that cannot be equally loved along with Him] (De Sacramentis, c. V, PL. 180, 351 D; see Disp., c. VII, 276 B).

III The Coincidence of the Good of Spirits with the Good in Itself It remains for us to inquire into whether, in the predecessors of St. Thomas, the notion of the coincidence of the spiritual good with the good in itself clarified, in some manner, the theory of love. Aristotle, in Book Eight of the Nicomachean Ethics, asks the following question: “Utrum igitur bonum amant, vel quod ipsis bonum? dissonant enim quandoque haec” [Whether therefore they love the good, or what is good for them? For these sometimes clash] (c. 2; see ed. of Berlin, 1155b21-22). In order to respond to this question, he distinguishes three types of friendship, and declares that those friendships founded on what is useful and what is agreeable are in the final analysis egoistic: the old man who loves out of self-interest and the young man who loves for his own gratification are only friends by accident (ibid., 3, 1156a1018). As for the friendship of the good, it is genuine, since it is “illorum gratia” [on account of others]. It is not accidental, but remains virtuous, and it is such that the two points of view distinguished above (the aJplw`~ [good that is lovable {absolutely}] and the eJkavstw/ [good

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that is lovable {for the individual}]) here perfectly coincide (ibid., 2, 1155b24-25): “Et uterque simpliciter bonus, et amico. Boni enim et simpliciter boni, et utiles ad invicem” [And each person is absolutely good and the good for the friend. For the good are both good absolutely and useful to each other] (ibid., 3, 1156b13-14; see c. 7 {5}, 1157b28).67 Here Aristotle, in a special application, only makes the very principle of which we speak specific: the good of the virtuous soul and the absolute good coincide.—The same intuition also guides him in Chapter 8 of Book 9, when he examines the idea of self-love (filautiva) and wonders “whether one has to love oneself more than others.” He grants that the wise person is “magis, maxime philautus” [more a lover of oneself ]. For the kind of self-love that is blameworthy, he says, is [40] the one that seeks the sensible and corporeal interest, the one that is in the service of the passions, sensations, and what is irrational in the soul. And the kind of self-love that is praiseworthy, is the one that is the most extreme, intimate, and autocentric so to speak, but at the same time is the least exclusive:68 “magis ... philautus. Tribuit enim sibi ipsi optima et maxime bona” [more … a lover of oneself. For (the wise person) assigns to him or herself the noblest and the highest good]. It gives everything to the nou`~ [intellect] which is most intimate of itself. What happens then to the idea of sacrifice? It is true, says Aristotle, that virtuous humans will sacrifice themselves; they will give up money, “honors,” indeed all the goods that are fought over. However, they will take for themselves the good, to; kalovn [the noble good]: “For they prefer a brief but intense delight [volupté] to long days spent in mediocre pleasures ... they prefer a single great and noble action to an infinity of minuscule actions. This is what must presumably be said of those who die for others ... they take for themselves a great good.” And again, more tersely: “for their friends, money; for themselves, moral greatness. 67

See also Eth. Nic., I, c. 9, 1099a13: toi`~ de; filokavloi~ ejsti;n hJdeva ta; fuvsei hJdeva. [But lovers of noble goods find pleasant the things that are pleasant by nature]. 68 prohvsetai ga;r ... ta; p e r i m av c h t a [sic] ajgaqav [For (the good person) will sacrifice ... the goods fought after (by humans)], l. c., 1169a20-21.


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They take for themselves the greatest good ... This is the kind of selflove that one must have”: ou{tw me;n ou\n fivlauton ei\nai dei` [So thus it is necessary (that the good person) love him or herself ].69 This brief but intense delight that results from the possession of the kalovn [noble good], which is both the good of the nou`~ [intellect] and the good in itself, counterbalances and overcomes, in virtue of its higher spirituality, all the pleasures of the sensations. It is of another order. Avicenna, a great disciple of Aristotle and separated from him by thirteen centuries, only extends the thought of his teacher when he uncovers, in animals themselves, under the appearance of a sacrifice, the subtle seeking of a more exquisite good: “The hunting dog,” he remarks, “despite being hungry, brings the game to its master without touching it itself. Females who are nursing prefer their young to themselves and risk their lives in order to defend them.” And why is this? On account of, he says, some interior enjoyments of the soul which exceed those of the body.70 Nothing, it seems to me, is more truly Peripatetic than this assertion which Aristotle [41] did not say himself. Since the brute has a “soul” it is not forever confined within the limits of its own matter. It is already “in some manner other beings,” and it is natural, consequently, that we would encounter a corresponding degree of love in it. Indeed the brute nearly achieves friendship and does go beyond vulgar desire, although free choice does not exist for it. We thus observe here the continuity between the two kinds of love. And we comprehend that the reason for their opposition lies in the more intimate and ostensibly more “detached” nature of the pleasures of the knowing soul, and not in some inexplicable heterogeneity between the natural order, where pure desire reigns, and the personal and free order, where pure friendship reigns. 69

See on p. 102 footnote 29 [herein] the text cited from St. Thomas (3 d. 29 q. 1 a. 5 ad 3) and also (ibid., in corpore art.): “Plura bona exteriora sunt impendenda amicis quam nobis ipsis, inquantum consistit in hoc bonum virtutis, quod est nostrum maximum bonum; sed de bonis spiritualibus plus nobis quam amicis impendere debemus et velle” [More external goods should be devoted to our friends than to ourselves, insofar as the good of virtue, which is our greatest good, consists in this. But concerning spiritual goods we ought to expend greater energy for ourselves than for our friends].

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Peripatetism elaborated in this way a notion of first importance for the solution of the problem of love: that of a seeking of the self founded in natural necessity, unavoidable even in the greatest sacrifices, but which nevertheless contains nothing but nobility and beauty. Now the Christian twelfth century hatched on its part another idea, at first sight very different and yet devised so as to absorb and complete the Aristotelian notion. Alcher of Clairvaux, Richard of St. Victor, and yet others had found the germ of this idea in certain memorable passages of St. Augustine. They took it up again in countless diverse forms, so diverse actually that we have trouble recognizing it at first. Reflection shows nevertheless that it formed the very basis of their theory of the spirit. This thought can be rendered in these very simple terms: “To find God, is to find one’s soul, even when one appears to lose it and to sacrifice it. To love God and to love oneself is one and the same.”O I find this idea, always identical in nature, in formulations as diverse as the following: St. Augustine: Qui se diligere novit, Deum diligit (De Trinitate, 14, 14, PL 42, 1050).

[One who knows how to love oneself, loves God] (De Trinitate, 14, 14, PL. 42, 1050). Nescio quo enim inexplicabili modo, quisquis se ipsum, non Deum, amat, non se amat; et quisquis Deum, non se ipsum, amat, ipse se amat (Tract. in Joannem, CXXIV, c. 21, PL. 35, 1968).

[For by some inexplicable way, I know not how: whoever loves oneself, not God, does not love oneself; and whoever loves God, not oneself, loves oneself] (Tract. in Joannem, CXXIV, c. 21, PL. 35, 1968).71 [42] Hugh of St. Victor: Si enim aliquid plus quam animam tuam diligis, idem ipsum profecto plus quam Deum diligere comprobaris (De Sacramentis, b. II, p. 13, c. 10, PL. 176, 537). 70 71

A. F. Mehren, Vues théosophiques d’Avicenne, p. 19. The two texts are cited by Jules Martin in his S. Augustin (Collection: Les grands philosophes, Paris, 1901, p. 243, 244). He rightly observes that passages of this sort have not received sufficient attention from those who have studied his Doctor [i.e., Augustine].


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[For if you love something more than your soul, surely you are also shown to love this same thing more than God] (De Sacramentis, b. II, p. 13, c. 10, PL. 176, 537). Aelred of Rievaulx: Cum enim secundum modum quo Deum diligit, sui dilectio metiatur, tunc solum minus diligit se ipsum, quando minus diligit Deum (Speculum Caritatis, b. III, c. 37, PL. 195, 615).

[For when love of self is assessed according to the measure by which one loves God, then one loves oneself less when one loves God less] (Speculum Caritatis, b. III, c. 37, PL. 195, 615).72 Baldwin of Devonshire [Baldwin of Ford, Archbishop of Canterbury]: “ ... toto corde tuo ... cor tuum nondum totum est tuum ... Si autem ... cor tuum ... Deo offeras, dans Deo, tuum facis: imo cui das, ille tuum non esse facit; nec potest esse tuum, nisi ille fecerit non esse tuum. Quantum autem dederis de corde tuo, tantum facit esse tuum” (Tract. III, De Dilectione Dei, PL. 204, 420).

[ ... your whole heart ... your heart is not yet wholly yours ... But if ... you offer your heart to God, in offering it to God you make it your own. In fact, He to whom you give it makes it not to be yours; nor can it be yours unless He makes it not be yours. But as much as you give of your heart, He makes that much to be yours] (Tract. III, De Dilectione Dei, PL. 204, 420). Among the damned on the contrary, “nullus amat Deum; sed nec ibi quisquam amat seipsum” [none love God; but neither does anyone there love oneself] (ibid., 423). Richard of St. Victor: In humano procul dubio animo idem est summum quod intimum ... per mentis excessum supra sive intra nosmet ipsos in divinorum contemplationem rapimur (De Gratia Contemplationis sive Beniamin Maior, IV, 23, PL. 196, 167). Fluit igitur (cor), sed non effluit, quia sic se derivat ad alios, ut a se aliquatenus non recedat ... neque etiam necesse est ut in his 72

See St. Thomas: Tantum enim quis diligit vitam animae, quantum diligit Deum” [For the extent to which someone loves the life of the soul is the extent to which someone loves God] (Opusc. 2, De Perfectione Vitae Spirtualis, c. 15).

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Part 1: The Physical or Greco-Thomist Conception of Love excessibus quibus humani spiritus lutosis sensibus divino munere avelluntur, extra se esse dicamus ... Ubi ergo sunt, inquis? In eo quod interius est sui, profundum est cor hominis et inscrutabile ... quodque et illuc ... castissimo complexu conveniant cum dilecto, et ibi melius secum sunt ... (De Gradibus Caritatis, c. 4, PL. 196, 1206).

[In the human soul there is no doubt that the highest coincides with that which is innermost ... through the departure of the mind above or within ourselves we are transported into contemplation of the divine] (De Gratia Contemplationis sive Beniamin Maior, IV, 23, PL. 196, 167). [Therefore (the heart) flows forth but does not flow out because it turns itself toward others so that it would not depart from itself to some extent ... nor is it yet necessary for us to say that in these departures in which human spirits are torn away from the filthy senses by a divine favor, they would exist outside of themselves ... Where then are they, you inquire? In that which is more interior to itself, profound and inscrutable is the human heart ... And because they meet there … with the beloved in a most chaste embrace, they are also better off there with themselves ...] (De Gradibus Caritatis, c. 4, PL. 196, 1206). (See the idea that Richard developed in the De Eruditione Hominis Interioris, b. I, c. 31, PL. 196, col. 1282-1283; see c. 24). William of St. Thierry: Totus quippe pene homo anima est; minima eius portio corpus est. Ideo cum diligit te, Domine Jesu, anima sponsae tuae ... tota sequitur te ... amans perdere semet ipsam in hoc mundo, ut in vita aeterna possideat se in te ... quae tam familiariter resolvitur in te ... in tantum diligit te in se, ut se ipsam in nullo diligat nisi in te (Expos. super Cantica, c. 1, PL 180, 490).

[The soul is of course nearly the whole person. The body is one’s least part. Therefore when the soul of your bride loves You, Lord Jesus, ... she follows You with her whole self ... loving to lose herself in this world, so that in eternal life she may possess herself in You ... since she abandons herself so intimately in You ... she loves You in herself insofar as she loves herself in no one save You] (Expos. super Cantica, c. 1, PL 180, 490).


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Idcirco enim videris tibi ignorare me, quia ignoras te ... Cognosce te quia imago mea es, et sic poteris nosse me, cuius imago es, et penes te invenies me. In mente tua, si fueris mecum, ibi cubabo tecum, et inde pascam te (ibid., l. c., 493-494).

[For this reason you suppose you are ignorant of Me, because you are ignorant of yourself ... Know yourself because you are My image, and thus you will be able to have known Me, whose image you are, and you will find Me within you. If you will have been with Me in your mind, there I will lie with you; and then I will nourish you] (ibid., l. c., 493-494). Quamdiu sum tecum, sum etiam mecum; non sum autem mecum, quamdiu non sum tecum (Meditativae Orationes, II, l. c., 208).73

[As long as I am with you, I am also with myself; but I am not with myself as long as I am not with you] (Meditativae Orationes, II, l. c., 208). [43] According to the “ecstatic” conception of love, to love God, is above all “to lose one’s soul.” According to the Thomist conception of love, it is “to regain it.” The passages that we have just cited, and the very great number that could have been added to them, demonstrate that the theory of St. Thomas represents less a reaction against medieval thought than an effort to render it more unified and more transparent to itself.

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The same William, in his collection of the thoughts of St. Ambrose on the Song of Songs, recorded the maxim: “Ille mecum est, qui intra se non est; quoniam qui in carne est, non est in spiritu; ille mecum est, qui ex se ipso egreditur ... “ [Those people are with me who are not within themselves; since people who exists in the flesh do not exist in the spirit. Those people then are with me who go out of themselves …] (PL. 15, 1907 D). Now holding to both of these assertions was not in the least bit worrisome to an intelligence of the twelfth century. They are not contradictory, since they are not secundem idem [(applicable) in the same respect]; for a human being is both flesh and spirit. The contradiction begins when the principles are taken in a strict sense and systematic conclusions are drawn from them.

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Chapter 3 Two Medieval Sketches of the “Physical” Theory of Love: Hugh of St. Victor and St. Bernard Lacking an understanding of the notion of “transcendental” unity as opposed to “numerical” unity, proponents of the physical conception of love saw two paths open to them. Either, in spite of the data coming from Tradition, they made desire the unique type of love; or, always under the sway of its quantitative conception of unity but scandalized by its consequences, they had to increasingly exhaust the unitary principle, and fall back, if necessary, on the ecstatic or dualistic conception of love that they were contesting. In their theoretical works, Hugh of St. Victor and St. Bernard provide us with excellent examples of this logical necessity of thought. Their accounts of pure love betray a lack of equilibrium that allows us to appreciate more adequately the original virtue of the Thomist solution.

I Hugh of St. Victor Hugh of St. Victor treats the problem of pure love in the second book of his treatise De Sacramentis Christianae Fidei [On the Sacra-

Chapter 3: Two Mediæval Sketches of the Physical Theory

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ments of the Christian Faith], written about 1135. He begins by declaring that love is one of the [44] two primordial emotions (motus cordis quibus anima rationalis ad omne quod facit agendum impellitur ... Sunt ergo duo haec (love and fear) quasi portae duae, per quas mors et vila ingrediuntur) [the movements of the heart by which the rational soul is impelled to do everything that it does ... There are then as it were two gates (love and fear) through which death and life enter].74 Love is, he continues, a movement of the soul that is naturally unified [un], and it receives different names according to its different modalities. When it is directed at the world, it is called cupidity; when it tends toward God, it is charity (ibid., c. 4). This manner of commencing from the physical identity of the two loves is characteristic of Hugh of St. Victor. This author will not make a breach in his principle. After indicating the genesis of the love of God, which is introduced by fear (c. 5), he tackles the question of its essence. Clearly, he says, one must love one’s neighbor for God, and God for Himself. But to say that God for us is lovable for Himself, is precisely to say that He is our good, our joy, our repose: “What is it to love God? It is to wish to have Him. And what is it to love God for Himself? It is to love Him in order to have Him Himself.” Deus autem idcirco propter se ipsum diligendus est, quia ipse est bonum nostrum ... ut gaudium ... ut requiem ... quid est Deum diligere? Habere velle. Quid est Deum diligere propter seipsum? Ideo diligere, ut habeas ipsum (l. c., c. 6, 528-529).

[Now God therefore is to be loved for the sake of Himself because He Himself is our good ... as joy ... as repose ... What is it to love God? To want to have Him. What is it to love God for the sake of Himself? To love Him for the reason that you would have Him] (l. c., c. 6, 528-529). What an absurdity, moreover, to claim to love God in order to give or do something good to Him, and not in order to receive from Him His mercy! (that is to say, what an absurdity not to identify fully, the love of desire and the love of friendship, when God is the terminus of 74

De Sacr., b. II, p. 13, c. 3, PL. 176, 527.

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our love). Those who believe they can separate, even in thought, these two things, the love of God and the desire of God for oneself, are “fools who do not understand themselves.” Ita putas tibi iuberi ut Deum tuum diligas, ut facias vel cupias illi bonum, et non potius ut cupias illum bonum? Non illum amas ad bonum suum, sed amas illum ad bonum tuum, et amas illum bonum tuum ... Itaque amas illum ad bonum tuum, ut ipse quem amas sit bonum tuum (l. c., c. 7, col. 533).

[Do you think that you love God in order that you may do or desire a good for Him, and not rather that you yourself desire that good? You do not love Him for His own good, but you love Him for your own good, and you love that good of yours ... And you so love Him for your own good in order that He whom you love may be your good] (l. c., c. 7, col. 533). But, they might interject (according to the common notion of love of “benevolence”): can I not desire the good for God? Supervacua pietate moveris, miserere potius tui. Ille satis habet (ibid.).

[You are moved by unnecessary piety. Pity yourself instead. He has enough] (ibid.). [45] Once again, to love is to want to have, and to love gratuitously is to want to have solely: Quid est diligere, nisi concupiscere et habere velle et possidere et frui? si non habetur, velle habere; si habetur, velle retinere . . . Quid est enim diligere, nisi ipsum velle habere? Non aliud ab ipso, sed ipsum, hoc est gratis (ibid., c. 7 and 8, col. 334).

[What is it to love but to desire and to want to have and to possess and to enjoy? If it is not had, to want to have it; if it is had, to want to retain it ... For what is to love except to want to have Him? Not anything from Him but (God) Himself, that is, gratuitously] (ibid., c. 7 and 8, col. 334).


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The response of Hugh of St. Victor to the problem of pure love consists, in short, in identifying in their very concept the love of desire and the love of friendship, by reducing the second to the first.75 Hugh takes the position diametrically opposed to that of Abelard, which he wanted no doubt to refute.76 The fact that his solution is unable to account for all of the data coming from Tradition places it straightaway among the unilateral and partial theories, and Bossuet did not show a very fine philosophical discernment when he thought he had recognized in it the doctrine of “all the ancient and modern Doctors.”77 Still it cannot be denied that this theory, which is at bottom Augustinian, is much closer to what St. Thomas will teach than to the view of Abelard. What therefore is missing from such a theory that would allow it to account for the facts, while maintaining the physical and unitary principle of love? This can rather easily be discerned by examining a logical inconsistency [illogisme] that Hugh of St. Victor’s theory contains. In Chapter 6, Hugh of St. Victor, explicates the love of the neighbor by employing the love of God. Now, if he remained absolutely faithful to his egoistical conception, he should recognize only one single reason that could have compelled humans to love their fellows: namely, the necessity [46] or usefulness of this love as a way of 75

The comparison involving honeycombs and honey (l. c., c. 6, col. 530) would have been a very natural occasion for Hugh of St. Victor to have explained his views, if he had reduced, like St. Thomas, the love of self to the love of God, desire to benevolence. 76 See Mignon, Les origines de la Scolastique et Hugues de S. Victor, v. II, pp. 104-5. We set forth below the theory of Abelard, in Part 2, Chapter 2, Section II, B. 77 Bossuet, Instruction sur les états d’oraison, Additions and Corrections, n. VIII (ed. Lachat, v. 18, p. 673).—The judgment of Bossuet is preceded by a very long citation of Hugh of St. Victor. In the article Charité in the Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, col. 2224, Dublanchy is also wrong to identify the overly simplistic distinction of Hugh of St. Victor between objectionable mercenary love and the love of charity with the one commonly adopted by theologians. Mignon has seen things more accurately (l. c., p. 101). The very passage of St. Thomas to which Dublanchy refers (3 d. 29 q. 1 a. 4) clearly specifies the three things that common opinion distinguishes, whereas Hugh of St. Victor can only see two of them.P

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achieving the enjoyment of the supreme good, which is God. In fact, he reasons differently and continually supposes in neighbors another lovableness, one which comes to them from their personal relations with God; and it is not the case that this lovableness is expected to facilitate the obtainment of God by ourselves. I should, he says, love the neighbor for the sake of God (“proximum autem propter Deum”), which means that God is our common good, for the neighbor and for me. Proximus autem ideo propter Deum diligendus est, quia cum ipso in Deo est bonum nostrum ... Istum diligimus ut cum ipso curramus, et cum ipso perveniamus. Illum (Deum) ut gaudium, istum ut gaudii socium; illum ut requiem, istum ut requiei consortem ... propter Deum, id est quia habet Deum; vel ... quia habiturus est eum; vel ut habeat eum (l. c., c. 6, col. 529).

[Now neighbors therefore are to be loved for the sake of God because along with them our good is in God ... We love these people that we may run with them and arrive with them. The one (God) as joy, the others (neighbors) as partners in joy; the one as repose, the others as sharers in repose ... for the sake of God, that is because they have God; or are to have Him; or that they would have Him] (l. c., c. 6, col. 529). Now there is a logical discrepancy between this explanation of the propter Deum [for the sake of God] and the propter se ipsum [for the sake of Himself ] understood in the sense of Hugh of St. Victor. If propter se ipsum [for the sake of Himself ] signifies ut habeam ipsum [that I may have Him]; that is to say, if God is only lovable for me insofar as He is my God, available to me, a possible acquisition of mine, then all love derived from the love of God will only be able to occur according to this availability, according to my desire for personal acquisition. The relation of others to God, if it is not a means for me, is completely foreign to my love. When Hugh of St. Victor says that the fact that God is present in another human is a reason sufficient to render this human lovable for me, he supposes that I can love the divine good in a way other than wanting it for myself. The thoughts that here crossed his mind show that his confused thinking, identical to that of most others, was less restrictive than his theory.


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Therefore his attempt at a speculative solution is a failure, and a satisfactory response to the problem of love, from the perspective of the “physical” theory, can only be given by discovering a necessary and intrinsic connection between the love of the neighbor and that love of self which is the basis of the love of God. Let us turn to Chapter Ten, where Hugh of St. Victor again takes up the question of the love of the neighbor so that its degree may be assigned. He follows Scripture when he says: Dilige proximum tuum sicut teipsum [Love your neighbor as yourself ], and explains that this commandment is fulfilled when we wish for our neighbor the same good as for ourselves. Yet does Scripture stipulate similitude [47] or equality, when it says: You shall love as yourself? The dialecticians of the period concerned themselves with a host of questions founded upon impossible suppositions, asking for example if humans should prefer the salvation of several others to their own salvation, so that in this way the glory of God may be increased. These problems are obviously onerous to our author and he regards them as harmful frivolities (Sic vadunt quaestiones hominum, et inquietant homines semet ipsos cogitationibus suis [In this way questions of humans arise and human beings disturb themselves with their thoughts]). He nonetheless responds to them, and, forced to make himself clear in regard to a new question, unwittingly indicates some fitting alterations to make to his previous theories. The love of self, he says in essence, is not a love commensurable with the love of the neighbor: these two terms cannot be substituted for each other as equivalents. The love of self is the necessary condition and as it were the form of the love of another. There is no question then of giving up the first in favor of the second. Si enim proximum suum sicit se ipsum diligit, quomodo proximum diligit cum se ipsum non diligit? ... Itaque se ipsum primum bene diligere debet, ut postea secundum se bene diligat et proximum suum ... nec totum mundum contra animam tuam diligere debes ... Dilige proximum tuum sicut te ipsum ... Cupit bonum, primum quidem sibi, deinde illi. Non enim amat illum sicut se, nisi prius amet se ... Nihil enim proximo debet nisi post illud et secundum illud quod sibi debet (l. c., c. 10, col. 537-538).

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[For if one loves one’s neighbor as oneself, how does one love the neighbor when one does not love oneself? ... And thus one should first love oneself well so that afterwards, according to oneself, one may love one’s neighbor well also ... you should not love the whole world against your own soul ... Love your neighbor as yourself ... One desires the good first indeed for oneself, then for another. For one does not love another as oneself, unless one first loves oneself ... For one owes nothing to the neighbor except after that and according to that which one owes to oneself] (l. c., c. 10, col. 537-538). Since the love of self is in this way the general condition of the love of others, it has the same magnitude as the love of God. Furthermore, as has already been shown, to love God is to want God for oneself. Therefore the legitimate love of self and the love of God are not only of equal extension, but are completely identical. And if no explicit precept of the love of self is to be found in Scripture, this is because this precept is contained elsewhere: not in the commandment to love other humans, but in the commandment to love God. Hugh of St. Victor repeats this idea on several occasions. Si enim aliquid plus quam animam tuam diligis, idem ipsum profecto plus quam Deum diligere comprobaris; quia animam tuam non diligis nisi in eo solo quod bonum illius, quod Deus est, diligis ... Distinxit ergo Scriptura ... primum praecipiens homini ut Deum diligat, intendens utique ut in eo ipso se ipsum diligat, quia diligere [48] se ipsum non aliud est quam bonum suum diligere ... Si enim tantum se diligit quantum bonum suum diligit, et tantum bonum suum diligit, quantum diligit Deum, consequens erat ut tantum diligeret proximum quantum Deum, si eum tantum diligeret quantum se ipsum. Propterea non illi dicitur ut illum tantum diligat, sed ut in eo in quo se diligit, illum diligat, et quod sibi cupit, illi cupiat ... Secundum hunc itaque modum non nisi duo sunt praecepta caritatis (l. c., c. 10, col. 537, 538, 539).

[For if you love something more than your own soul, surely you are proven to love this same thing more than God, because you do not love your own soul except in this alone, that you love its good which is God ... Therefore Scripture has made distinctions ... first ordering humans to love God,


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intending surely that they should love themselves in Him, since to love themselves is nothing other than to love their own good ... For if they love themselves as much as they love their good, and they love their good as much as they love God, it was fitting that they should love the neighbor as much as God, if they should love the neighbor as much as themselves. Therefore one is not told that one should love another to such an extent, but that one should love another in respect of the fact that one loves oneself, and that what one desires for oneself, one should desire for another ... And thus in accordance with this way there are only two precepts of charity] (l. c., c. 10, col. 537, 538, 539). The virtue of this chapter lies in it having perceived the quantitative error that was the basis of the opponent’s principle, and which plunged them into inextricable difficulties. In spite of all the artifices of language that are found in Scripture itself, Hugh of St. Victor comprehends that to love God is in some manner to love Him for oneself. In this particular case the huic [one for whom (we love)] and the illud [that which (we love)] coincide: and as Bossuet later came to put it, God “is Himself indivisibly both the persons whom we love, and the good that we love and seek in them.”78 He interprets the famous sayings of Moses and of St. Paul, so dear to the proponents of the impossible suppositions, as figures of rhetoric.79 However, the weakness of this same chapter, in comparison to the pages that St. Thomas will later write on the same subject, also derives from a quantitative illusion from which Hugh does not succeed 78

Bossuet, Seconde Instruction sur les états d’oraisons, ed. Levesque, Paris, 1897, p. 269. 79 When we cannot provide at the same time for the needs of the neighbor and for our own, says Hugh of St. Victor, let us begin with ourselves. He also writes: “De reliquo enim si deest effectus, sufficit affectus. Et fortassis propter hunc affectum ostendendum, Moyses de libro scripto deleri petiit, et Paulus pro fratribus anathema a Christo fieri concupivit ... affectus enim loquebatur ...” [For as to the rest, if result is lacking, disposition suffices. And perhaps in order to manifest this disposition Moses sought to be erased from the written book and Paul for the brethren desired to be made anathema to Christ ... For the disposition was speaking ...] (l. c., c. 10, col. 538).

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in freeing himself. Now the love of neighbor should not be placed on the same level as the love of self; it cannot form a group [fait … nombre] with it. Yet it cannot be subordinated to it either, since Hugh of St. Victor (in Chapter Six) has not managed to discover a necessary and intrinsic connection between these two loves. Indeed here, in Chapter Ten, even that connection which he attempts to ascribe to them is obviously superficial and accidental.80 Consequently, the author contradicts himself in this tenth chapter. He asserts on the one hand his egoistic formulation of the physical [49] principle: “Omnis qui diligit, sibi diligit; quia desiderat et habere cupit quem diligit” [All who love, love for themselves because they long for and desire to have the one whom they love]. Yet on the other hand he characterizes the sincere love of the neighbor as an exception to this rule: “Dilige ... proximum tuum sicit teipsum diligendo illi bonum quod diligis tibi. Hoc est enim illum diligere, bonum illi diligere. Nam bonum illius diligere posses etiamsi illi non diligeres. Posses enim tibi diligere aut alteri cuilibet et non illi; et ita illum non diligeres” [Love ... your neighbors as yourself by loving the good for them that you love for yourself. For to love your neighbors is to love the good for them. For you could love the good of your neighbors even if you did not love it for them. For you could love it for yourself or for someone else and not for your neighbors, and thus you would not love them] (col. 537). This contradiction would have disappeared if Hugh of St. Victor could have looked upon each substance of the world as a member of one body, as a part that desires the good of the whole more than it desires its own good. If each particular being loves the infinite Being more than itself, and only loves itself because it loves the infinite Being, not only can its love of itself not be opposed to its love of God (since it cannot properly be distinguished from it), but even its love of God (which is achieved and aimed for through its love of itself ) may be disinterested. This is something that Hugh of St. Victor did not comprehend: each particular being loves itself as part and it can therefore naturally be induced to sacrifice itself for the other parts if 80

Verum enim bonum cum caritate felicius possidetur [For the true good is possessed more happily with charity] (l. c., c. 10, col. 539). It is clear that this remark does not prevent the reduction of all love to a strict egoism.


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they are judged more necessary for the good of the whole. And this very sacrifice is founded on the love of self.

II St. Bernard St. Bernard stands in the first rank of the theoreticians of love in the twelfth century. Accordingly we must cite his sermons at length in our treatment of the “ecstatic conception” of love, which one could even be tempted to characterize as the “Bernardian conception” par excellence. It appear though that St. Bernard only gradually developed the ecstatic conception in proportion as his interior life deepened. In some of his early writings, which treat of love theoretically and ex professo [avowedly], the entirety of his principles and defined notions must be referred to the “physical conception” of love. Yet one already senses, in certain habits of language, that other principles, taking the form of implicit but powerful presuppositions, are dominant his thought and might one day steer him in a different direction. The doctrine that he sets forth is therefore not perfectly coherent. And the logical inconsistencies [50] that an analysis detects in it are well-suited for showing us the intuitions he lacked in order to integrate into the physical conception, as formulated by him, the new elements that his own interior life presented to him as facts. The doctrine that we are studying here is contained entirely in the treatise “De Diligendo Deo, ad Haimericum S. R. E. Cardinalem et Cancellarium,” [On Loving God] written about 1126 (PL. 182, 9731000). (It is best to commence the reading of this treatise with the last four chapters wherein the author reproduces a letter on charity that he had previously written to the monks of Chartreuse [the Carthusians]. This is the eleventh letter of the Migne edition, l. c., 110-115. Mabillon dates it to about 1125). All of the doctrinal framework that undergirds the treatise De Diligendo Deo [On Loving God] is “Greco-Thomist.” The author deals with both the foundation and the genesis of love. Now the foundation of love is, he says, the communication of the goods whose principle is God and whose terminus is humans. We should love God for the sake of what He deserves and for the sake of

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our advantage (merito suo, commodo nostro). And in order to develop the first of these two points, St. Bernard describes the gifts that God has given to us; in order to develop the second, he describes the gifts that He will give to us. From beginning to end, God is therefore looked upon as the good of humans. The goods of the natural order (such as “bread, sun, air” and “the dignity of human nature, knowledge, and virtue”—c. II) already demand the love of every rational creature. For reason tells all humans that they should love absolutely the one to whom they wholly owe their very selves. Meretur ergo amari propter se ipsum Deus et ab infideli, qui etsi nesciat Christum, scit tamen se ipsum. Proinde inexcusabilis est omnis etiam infidelis, si non diligit Dominum Deum suum ex toto corde, tota anima, tota virtute sua. Clamat nempe intus ei innata et non ignorata rationi iustitia, quia ex toto se illum diligere debeat, cui se totum debere non ignorat (II, 6, 978). Utquid enim non amaret opus artificem, cum haberet unde id posset? (V, 15, 983).

[Hence God deserves to be loved for His own sake even by non-believers who, although they are ignorant of Christ yet know themselves. Accordingly all people, including nonbelievers, are inexcusable if they do not love the Lord their God with all their heart, all their soul, and all their might. Assuredly a justice that is innate and not unknown to reason, cries interiorly to people that they should love absolutely the one to whom they are not unaware that they completely owe their very selves] (II, 6, 978). [For would a work of art not love its maker, if it has the ability to do so?] (V, 15, 983). Next come the gifts of grace: the Passion and Resurrection, the Incarnation and Glory. This is a communication of God Himself, added to the natural gifts, and which the author summarizes in this manner: [51] Illum non solum mei, sed sui quoque ipsius teneo largitorem (V, 15, 933).


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[I hold Him to be not only the giver of me, but also of Himself] (V, 15, 933). Turning (Chapter Seven) to the advantages that humans find in the love of God, St. Bernard can naturally only restate the same things in a new form. He thus explains that God alone, since He is the infinite spiritual good, can satisfy the appetite of humans. Inest omni utenti ratione naturaliter appetere potiora ... citra summum vel optimum quiescere non potest ... Benedic, anima mea, Domino ... ipse est quod desideras ... Ipse dat occasionem, ipse creat affectionem, desiderium ipse consummat ... Se dedit in meritum, se servat in praemium, se apponit in refectione animarum sanctarum, se in redemptione distrahit captivarum (VII, 18, 21, 22, 985-987).

[It is present in everyone who uses reason to naturally desire better things ... short of the highest or best such a one cannot be at rest ... Bless the Lord, my soul ... He is what you desire ... He offers the opportunity, He creates the proclivity, and He brings the desire to perfection ... He gave Himself for our merit; He keeps Himself as a reward; He serves Himself as a refreshment for holy souls, He sold Himself in ransom for captive souls] (VII, 18, 21, 22, 985-987). So much then for the foundation of love. As for its genesis, the idea that is dominant in the Letter to the Chartreuse, besides being dominant in the five chapters that precede it in the treatise De Diligendo Deo [On Loving God], is that there is a continuity between self-love and holy love, that love is a unified and continuous movement whose origin is egoistic. This is certainly a noteworthy idea, and an essential feature of the Greco-Thomist conception of love. Yet St. Bernard goes even farther than St. Thomas here, for the selflove that he places at the starting point is a narrow self-love, a perverted self-love, one that characterizes sinful nature: Quia carnales sumus et de carnis concupiscentia nascimur (see VIII, 23), necesse est ut cupiditas vel amor noster a carne incipiat; quae

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Part 1: The Physical or Greco-Thomist Conception of Love si recto ordine dirigitur, quibusdam suis gradibus duce gratia proficiens, spiritu tandem consummabitur: quia non prius quod spirituale, sed quod animale, deinde quod spirituale (XV, 39, 998).

[Since we are carnal and born of concupiscence of the flesh (see VIII, 23), it is necessary that our cupidity or love begin with the flesh; if this is arranged in the right order, this (love) advancing by its stages, led on by grace, will finally be brought to perfection in the spirit. For what is spiritual is not first, but what is animal, then what is spiritual] (XV, 39, 998). The degrees of love mentioned here are four in number, which are as follows: 1) homo diligit se ipsum propter se ipsum [humans love themselves for the sake of themselves]; 2) Amat iam Deum, sed propter se, non propter ipsum [Humans love God now, but for the sake of themselves and not for the sake of Him]; 3) Deum homo diligit, non propter se tantum, sed et propter ipsum [Humans love God not so much for the sake of themselves, but for the sake of Him]; 4) nec se ipsum diligit homo nisi propter Deum [humans do not love themselves except for the sake of God] (VIII, IX, X; see XV where the formulation of the third degree of love is: non iam propter se, sed propter ipsum [not now for their own sakes but for His]). In conformity with this way of thinking, cupiditas [cupidity] is conceived of by St. Bernard as the very basis of the natural appetite which caritas [charity] will preserve, though it will also direct it. There is therefore only a single stream of human appetition that has to be channeled. [52] Perfect love will consist not in the destruction, but in the proper subordination of the lower tendencies: the love of the body and physical goods; fear which makes the act of loving non sponte [non-voluntary]; and desire which makes the act of loving non gratis [non-gratuitous]. Bona itaque lex caritas et suavis ... servorum et mercennariorum leges ... utique non destruit, sed facit ut impleantur ... Nunquam erit caritas ... sine cupiditate ... ordinat cupiditatem ... Cupiditas tunc recte a superveniente caritate ordinatur, cum ... bonis meliora praeferuntur, nec bona nisi propter meliora appetuntur. Quod cum plene per Dei gratiam assecutum fuerit, diligetur corpus, et universa corporis bona tantum propter Deum, Deus autem propter se ipsum (XIV, 38, 997-98).


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[And so the law of charity is good and pleasant ... it, of course, does not destroy the laws of slaves and mercenaries, but brings it about that they are fulfilled ... Charity will never exist ... without cupidity ... but it orders cupidity ... Cupidity then is rightly ordered by the arrival of charity, when ... better things are preferred to good things, nor are good things desired except for the sake of better things. When this state is fully achieved by the grace of God, the body and all the good things of the body are loved only for the sake of God, but God for the sake of Himself] (XIV, 38, 997-98).

____________ In our exposition on the doctrine of the De Diligendo Deo [On Loving God], we have deliberately divested this doctrine of the oratorical and fanciful forms in which the author couched it. Less technical and more literary than the De Sacramentis [On the Sacraments] of the Victorine Hugh, the treatise of St. Bernard also more cleverly hides its logical inconsistencies, which, however, a careful observation will detect. A first logical inconsistency, rather glaring, is that of Chapter Seven which came to be invoked, during the conflict involving Quietism, both by Fénelon and by his opponents. For the manner in which the author, at the beginning of this chapter, speaks of the reward of love, leads the reader to believe that St. Bernard is going to treat of the rewards that are not God Himself. Indeed, the first paragraph could be summarized as follows: “I am going to demonstrate that the love of God is never without reward, although the one who loves truly seeks no reward other than God Himself.”81 Yet, in the course of this chapter, what is considered is only the satisfaction of the soul through God. One could therefore maintain, with equal plausibility, either 81

“Non enim sine praemio diligitur Deus, etsi absque praemii intuitu diligendus sit ... Verus amor ... habet praemium, sed id quod amatur ... Deum amans anima aliud praeter Deum sui amoris praemium non requirit” [For God is not loved without a reward, although He should be loved without regard for the reward ... True love ... has a reward, but this is the object of its love ... The soul that loves God looks for no other reward than the God whom it loves] (VII, 17, l. c., 984-85).

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that the author condemned as contrary to the purity of love the desire to possess God, or that he excluded this desire from his condemnations. The truth is that his thought is not in perfect conformity with itself. For once it is admitted [53] that the true lover desires the actual possession of the object loved, then it can no longer be set down with full logical rigor that: “Verus amor se ipso contentus est” [True love is content with itself ]. St. Bernard here combines the GrecoThomist notion of the essential indigence of love with the ecstatic notion of its complete sufficiency. Another deviation in the thought of St. Bernard is more difficult to follow and more interesting. It is remarkable that at the pinnacle of love (fourth degree), in the state “where one no longer loves oneself except for God” (X, 27, 990; XV, 39, 998), St. Bernard does not tell us that the love of self is especially intense, complete, and conscious, according as it is more enlightened and better ordered. On the contrary, we hear about the “forgetting,” “annihilation,” and “loss” of self. Amor iste mons est, et mons Dei excelsus ... Caro et sanguis, vas luteum, terrena inhabitatio quando capit hoc? Quando huiuscemodi experietur affectum, ut divino debriatus amore animus, oblitus sui, factusque sibi ipsi tanquam vas perditum, totus pergat in Deum ...? Te enim quodam modo perdere, tanquam qui non sis, et omnino non sentire te ipsum, et a te ipso exinaniri et pene annulari, caelestis est conversationis, non humanae affectionis (X, 27, 990; see XV, 39, 998).

[This love is a mountain, the lofty mountain of God at that ... When will flesh and blood, this vessel of clay, this earthly dwelling, grasp this? When will it experience such a disposition that, inebriated by divine love, having forgotten itself, and having become for itself like a broken vessel, the soul would wholly go to God ...? For to lose yourself in such a manner as one who does not exist, and not to experience yourself at all, and to empty yourself and nearly be annulled, does not come from human inclination but from heavenly intercourse] (X, 27, 990; see XV, 39, 998).


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Still one must not lay too much stress on these expressions, because in the elucidations that follow St. Bernard no longer employs these terms of destruction, but presents the supreme degree of love as a spiritualization of humans through their union with God.82 [54] These expressions have their importance, however, because they show that in the eyes of the author the individual personhood of 82

Manebit quidem substantia, sed in alia forma, alia gloria, aliaque potentia (X, 28, 991)—tota haec (cor et animam) ex toto ad Deum colligere, et divino infigere vultui (X, 29, 992)—ut iam nil de carne haberet cogitare, sed totus in spiritu memoraretur iustitiae Dei solius (XV, 39, 999) [No doubt, the substance will persist, though under another form, another glory, and another power] (X, 28, 991)—[to completely draw together for God all that one is (heart and soul) and to fasten it to the divine face] (X, 29, 992)—[such that one would no longer have to think of the flesh, but wholly in the spirit would be mindful of God’s justice alone] (XV, 39, 999). It is also very remarkable, from the Thomist perspective, that St. Bernard asserts the impossibility of the complete spiritualization before the soul has regained its body in the resurrection (X, 29; XI). This amounts to saying that one cannot fully possess God without fully possessing oneself, and that this proprium [personal trait] of which one must be ridded so as to arrive at the perfection of love (n. 28, 30, 31), is not the natural appetite. Instead it is a solicitude that hampers, diminishes, and suppresses the natural appetite (see 29, 992: huic fragili et aerumnoso corpori intenta et distenta [attentive to and occupied with this weak and miserable body]; 30, 993: quo vel modice intentio reflectatur [even if their attention is returned to it ever so slightly]). See the assertion of St. Thomas: “Vellet anima sic coniungi Deo, quod non separetur a corpore” [The soul would want to be united to God in such a way that it would not be separated from the body] (Quaest. Disp. de Caritate, a. 11 ad 8), and in general his conception of love as a tendency not so much toward the destruction of individuality or toward its mortification, as toward its submission, toward its being informed [information] by the Beloved. On love as forme [forme] of the lover, see 3 d. 27 q. 1 a. 1 and a. 3 ad 2; Ver. q. 26 a. 4; De Spe. a. 3, etc. St. Bernard arrives at the same idea when he refuses to see the ideal of love in the situation of the martyr who suffers for his or her God (X, 29, 992), but instead places it in “this decline of souls which is their perfect [and highest] state” (ille defectus animorum qui perfectus et summus est ipsorum status, XI, 30, 993), and which presupposes, as we have seen, the perfect possession of oneself. Glorification in this manner harmonizes perfectly with the Redemption, of which it was said: Ubi se dedit, me mihi reddidit [When He gave me Himself, He gave me back myself] (V, 15, 983).

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spirits seems to be an obstacle to the perfection of love. St. Bernard expresses himself as though the individual personhood vanished at the culminating point, the place where love is the most love, the most purified of every foreign element [mélange étranger]. Let us now return to the beginning chapters. St. Bernard, even in the case of God loving His creatures, conceives of the purity of love negatively, as an absence of personal seeking.83 Indeed he himself appears to be pained by not being able to love God “gratuitously,” without owing Him anything. To love otherwise does not appear to him to be loving in a dignified manner. He speaks as though the creature was stricken with regret over not being able to do as much of this as its creator, haunted by some dream of equaling Him.84 In short, we could say that he forgets what he has nonetheless repeated on three occasions, namely that humans derive their entire being from God (II, 6; V, 14; V, 15). And by excluding the very personhood of humans from this divine munificence, he thereby substitutes for the idea of creation, the idea of a free donation between two preexisting terms not united by any bond of nature, as the foundation of our love for God. 83

Et vera huius caritas maiestatis, quippe non quaerentia quae sua sunt. Quibus autem tanta puritas exhibetur? ... [And true charity of this majesty (i.e., God’s) is clearly not seeking those things which are its own. Now to whom is such purity shown? ...] (I, 1, 975). See in c. XII, 34, the opposition between the bonus mihi [the good for me] and the bonus in se [the good in itself] as in Abelard (see p. 184 [herein]), and also the exclusive expressions of X, 28. 84 Quid quod amor ipse noster non iam gratuitus impenditur, sed rependitur debitus? ... Deus meus, adiutor meus, diligam te pro dono tuo, et modo meo, minus quidem iusto, sed plane non minus posse meo: qui, etsi quantum debeo non possum, non possum tamen ultra quod possum [What about the fact that this love of ours is not now rendered in a gratuitous manner but in repayment of a debt? ... My God, my help, I shall love You for Your gift and to the extent that I can. Certainly this is less than is proper but clearly not less than I am able. You are the one who even if I cannot love as much as I ought, still I cannot love more than I am able] (VI, 16, 984). For each new benefit of God, the same question arises: “Quod si totum me debeo pro me facto, quid addam iam et pro refecto et refecto hoc modo?” [For if I owe my all for my having been made, what can I now add for both being made again, and being made again in this way] (V, 15, 983). See the sermon Quadruplici debito (De Diversis, Serm. 22, PL. 183,


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These remarks, which bear on manners of speaking and oratorical figures of speech, may seem quite insignificant at [55] first. There would actually be no reason to dwell on them if the whole literature on love in the Middle Ages was limited to the treatise of which we speak. However, the second part of our work will perhaps convince the reader that there is some interest in these minor details because a beginning or trace of the conception of love that we called “ecstatic” can be observed in them. This conception supposes at the origin of love two personal terms that it considers apart from their natural relations. And it places the ideal aim of love in the complete sacrifice of the lover’s personhood [personnalité] to the beloved’s personhood [personnalité]. To the extent that one shares this way of thinking, one is rendered less capable of accurately setting forth the “physical” solution. For the principles of St. Thomas are diametrically opposed to those of the ecstatic conception of love. St. Thomas holds: 1) that we love God as the infinite being, the source of all being; 2) that God, who is “pure form,” and cannot form a group with anything, is able, owing to His infinitely exquisite subtlety, to penetrate and “inform” created spirits so that the more they are possessed by Him, the more they “regain themselves.”[56]

595), where the regret over not being able to equal God in His love shows up even more naively.

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Part Two The “Ecstatic” Conception of Love The second conception of love, the “ecstatic” conception, is more difficult to define with precision than the physical conception of love, because it never came to be formulated into a complete system of doctrine. In truth, it is doubtful that the ecstatic conception was even capable of this, and whether to push it to its limits is not to drain it of all intelligibility. If, however, one wanted—which our medieval thinkers never did— to bring out its dominant principle, the best course of action to take would most likely be to characterize the ecstatic conception of love by the predominance of the idea of person over the idea of nature. It is because love is conceived of purely as tending from a person to a person that it is conceived of as ecstatic, as doing violence to innate inclinations, as ignoring natural dissimilarities [distances],Q as a pure affair of freedom. In St. Thomas, on the contrary, the individual personhood [personnalité] itself is conceived of as a participation of God, and in this way is part of nature.—It is the implicit idea of one’s personness [personnalité] as independent of the Divinity which has prevented the ecstatic conception of love from arriving at clear intellectual formulations: if this idea was taken as far as possible, it would have been found incompatible with dogma.85 85

On this question of personal love and natural love, one can look at the pages devoted to Richard of St. Victor and Alexander of Hales by Fr. de Régnon, S. J., in Volume Two of his Etudes de théologie positive sur le mystère de la Trinité (Paris, 1892), particularly pages 292-305 and 408-30. He emphasizes, in a suggestive manner, the idea of the free emanation of love in the Trinitarian doctrine of these two authors. However it is remarkable that his entire elucidation on the two types of love that he calls “irreducible”

Part 2: The “Ecstatic” Conception of Love

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[57] This explains the subsequent fortune of the ecstatic conception of love in the Middle Ages. Set forth in an oratorical or poetical (p. 303), (natural love, which is centripetal, and which is directed at “not persons, but natures appropriate for the individual nature of the loving subject” (p. 295), and the love of friendship, which is centrifugal, disinterested, and free, and which is directed at a person), it is remarkable, I say, that this entire elucidation presupposes a notion of personal unity completely different from that of St. Thomas. If we accept with St. Thomas that the unity of conscious beings comprises different degrees, it is no longer so startling to encounter this depiction of “personal” and disinterested love in the paternal love of brutes, that the proponents of complete discontinuity mention (de Régnon, p. 302) but are unable to explain. In other words, for St. Thomas all love is “centripetal,” but no created being acts, in its natural appetitions, as if it was the center of everything. The implicit idea of the equality of personhoods as such naturally suggests that of their native independence: consequently, the love that causes one person to submit to another appears to be a sacrifice, and the coexistence of several loves a conflict. We clearly see, in our authors of the twelfth century, some indications of this quantitative conception. St. Bernard, for example, seems to be amazed that though one’s love is wholly for God, one can still love angels: “Quid enim extra ipsum reliquit ceteris?” [For what has this person left behind for others?] (In Ps. Qui Habitat, Serm. 12, n. 7, PL. 183, 234). See the opponent cited by William of Auvergne, De Virtutibus, c. 9, t. I, p. 127, a, A; see 128 a, D.—Peter of Poitiers anticipates the Thomist solution, when he remarks: “Utrum autem magis sit diligendus Deus quam Deus et proximus simul ... videtur quidem incongrue dictum, quia non est diligendus proximus nisi propter Deum” [But whether God is to be loved more than God and the neighbor together ... this certainly seems to be oddly expressed, because the neighbor is not to be loved except for the sake of God] (Sententiarum, b. III, PL. 211, 1096). On the other hand, if we recall the ideas of St. Thomas on human individuality, and the restrictions that its material potentiality brings to its development as an intelligent being, we can comprehend that he would have no trouble making the ascetic doctrine of a St. Bernard his own. To the extent that a human’s individuality exerts constraints and clings to the bestial illusion that it has its own particular good, this individuality must be sacrificed. Yet since the soul is intelligent, that is to say, the potency for the whole [puissance du tout], to sacrifice one’s limits is to gain oneself. The doctrine of St. Thomas is only opposed to the ecstatic conception at the point where the latter ceases to be lyrical outpouring so as to become a theorem of ontology. St. Thomas agrees fully with the school of St. Bernard when it places the supreme perfection in the transition from the status rationalis

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form, it could scarcely fail to please; however, when analyzed philosophically it appears elusive and inconsistent. Quite naturally therefore, the very ones who, in the heat of inspiration, gave the most drastic and naive formulations of the ecstatic conception of love—a St. Bernard, a Hugh of St. Victor—were unable or unwilling to associate it with some strange consequences that were made known to them. And as systematic theoreticians of love they upheld some ideas completely different from those that had inspired their free effusions. The doctrine of [58] ecstatic love thus comes to us in the form of pieces and fragments. It is a “mentality” rather than a “theory.” On what basis then does the doctrine of ecstatic love figure in the history of medieval thought? The pages that follow will adequately respond, I hope, to this question. For not only do we attempt to describe the ecstatic conception of love there, by enumerating its four principal characteristics and analyzing each characteristic through a selection of texts that seem the most vivid; but in addition to the analysis of each of these features we also indicate the didactic speculations that, in the philosophical and theological domains, appear to be logically deduced from them. Now to mention mere oratorical and lyrical “motifs” in a history of ideas, whatever the favor that they might have enjoyed, could seem to lie outside of our topic. This is no longer the case, however, if we can trace the origin of clearly classified and defined doctrines to them.

[rational state] to the status spiritualis [spiritual state] (see the Letter to the Brethren of Mont-Dieu, PL. 184, 315 and ibid., pp. 407-10).


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Chapter 1 First Characteristic of Love: Duality of the Lover and the Beloved I In the physical conception of love, unity is the raison d’être and the ideal of love, as it is its end. Things are quite different in the ecstatic conception of love: there plurality, or at the very least duality, is presented as an essential and necessary element of perfect love. Egoistic love is essentially imperfect; it does not even deserve to be called love. Our writers themselves indicate for us where the source of this thought has to be sought, when they refer to the following dictum of St. Gregory the Great: Minus quam inter duos caritas haberi non potest. Nemo enim proprie ad se ipsum habere caritatem dicitur, sed dilectio in alterum tendit ut esse caritas possit (In Evang., Hom. 17, n. 1, PL. 76, 1139).

[It is not possible to have a charity between fewer than two. For strictly speaking no one is said to have charity for oneself; rather charity becomes possible when love tends toward someone else] (In Evang., Hom. 17, n. 1, PL. 76, 1139). St. Ildephonsus of Toledo can also be cited:

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Part 2: The “Ecstatic” Conception of Love Haec (caritas) a duobus incipit, vel ab homine et Deo, vel coram Deo ab homine et proximo. In uno enim experimentum dilectionis minime patet, quia cui se vel quid sibi quisque connectat, singularitas non [59] habet (De Itinere Deserti, c. 90, PL. 96, 192).

[This (charity) arises with regard to two: either from a human and to God, or, in the presence of God, from a human being and to a neighbor. For the experience of love in one individual is not the least bit evident, because a single individual does not have anybody to whom it would unite itself, nor anything that might unite anyone to oneself] (De Itinere Deserti, c. 90, PL. 96, 192). (See also Paschasius Radbertus, De Fide, Spe et Caritate, Lib. de Caritate, c. II, PL 120, 1462). The reader will notice that St. Gregory seems to make “caritas” [charity] (which requires a duality of terms) a particular species of the genus love. Some writers of the twelfth century share his opinion on this point: “Caritas est motus mentis ex fide procedens, quo diligimus Deum propter ipsum et proximum propter Deum quae ad minus inter duos habetur” [Charity, which occurs between at least two, is that movement of the mind proceeding from faith by which we love God for the sake of Himself and the neighbor for the sake of God] (Alexander III [Orlando Bandinelli], Sententiae, ed. Gietl, p. 315). St. Thomas restricts the application of the dictum of St. Gregory even further (2a 2ae q. 25 a. 4 ad 1). Others even demand that what St. Gregory said of charity be applied to every type of love. William of Auvergne mentions their opinion in his treatise De Virtutibus.86 He espouses it himself in his De Trinitate: Non enim congruit proprie, ut aliquis semet ipsum amare dicatur; amor enim omnis relatio est, et ad aliud se habet (De Trinitate, c. 21, Opera, Paris, Couterot, 1674, volume II, 2nd p., fol. 26a). 86

Mirabile autem et difficile videtur ad cognoscendum, utrum aliquis diligat se, an etiam diligere possit? dilectio enim vinculum est et ligatura, quomodo autem potest esse vinculum eiusdem ad semet ipsum aut ligatura? ... Amplius ... cum relatio sit, quomodo erit unius ad se? ... (his

Chapter 1: First Characteristic: Duality of the Lover and the Beloved 157 [For it is not really fitting that one should be said to love oneself; for all love is a relation and exercises itself in relation to another] (De Trinitate, c. 21, Opera, Paris, Couterot, 1674, volume II, 2nd p., fol. 26a).

The same conception stands out very clearly in a famous chapter of Abelard. Treating of the procession of the Holy Spirit, which he conceived of as “the divine lovingkindness,” he cites the text of St. Gregory and adds these words which came to arouse the indignation of the orthodox:87 rationibus) inducti sunt aliqui ad credendum, quod nemo potest diligere se [Now it seems extraordinary and difficult to ascertain whether someone loves oneself, or even if it is possible to love oneself. For love is a bond and a ligature, but how is it possible for there to be a bond of the same thing with itself, or a ligature? ... Furthermore ... with respect to the relation, how will it occur from a unity to itself? ... (by these arguments) some are led to believe that no one can love oneself] (De Virtutibus, c. 9, ed. cited in this text, p. 125). The author, however, prefers the opposite opinion here: “Melius autem ac rectius sciendum est, quod amor potest esse et est alicuius ad se” [But it is better and correct if it is known that love of someone for oneself can and does exist]. He distinguishes the love of desire and that of friendship, and concludes: “Unumquodque animal naturaliter diligit se ex diffinitione amoris, cum naturaliter sibi quaerat bona, vel utilia, atque salubria ... Iste amor non est quasi vinculum vel ligamen eiusdem ad se, sed magis substantiae in qua est et eorum quae sunt utilia vel salutaria eidem” [By the definition of love every animal naturally loves itself when it seeks its goods, utilities, or welfare ... Such love is not like a bond or a ligature between the same thing and itself, but is rather (a love) for the substance in what it is and for those things which are useful or salutary to it] (ibid., 126). 87 See William of St. Thierry, Disputatio adversus Abaelardum, c. 4 (PL. 180, 260): “Hic Theologus noster palam omnibus est quomodo carnem potius sapiat quam spiritum, hominem quam Deum. Moveri enim affectu, sive in aliquid extendi, quam inconveniens sit incommutabili Deo, luce clarius est ... Super quo, quod B. Gregorius de caritate videlicet proximi, hominis ad hominem, dicit, ipse ad Deum transfert, quasi ex hoc probans, quod caritatem Deus ad semet ipsum, sive in semet ipso non habeat, nec caritas Dei caritas sit, nisi per eam in aliud aliquid Deus se extendat” [It is evident to all how this theologian of ours is wise according to the flesh rather than according to the spirit, according to human beings rather than according to God. For it is clearer than light how inappropriate it is for the immutable God to be moved or stretched out toward something by


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[60] Procedere itaque Dei est, sese ad aliquam rem per affectum caritatis quodam modo extendere, ut eam videlicet diligat ac se ei per amorem coniungat.

[And so it belongs to God to proceed, somehow to stretch Himself out toward something through the disposition of charity, namely, in order that He would love it and unite Himself to it through love]. And further on: Dicitur ... Spiritus ... minime gigni, sed magis procedere, hoc est se per caritatem ad alterum extendere, quia quodam modo per amorem unusquisque a se ipso ad alterum procedit: cum proprie, ut dictum est, nemo ad se ipsum caritatem habere dicatur aut sibi ipsi benignus esse, sed alii. Maxime autem Deus, qui nullius indiget, erga se ipsum benignitatis affectu commoveri non potest, ut sibi aliquid ex benignitate impendat, sed erga creaturas tantum quae semper donis gratiae eius indigent. Quodam itaque modo a se ipso Deus ad creaturas exire dicitur per benignitatis affectum sive effectum, cum hoc ipsum quod benignus est aut benigne aliquid ex caritate agit, secundum affectum sive effectum quem in creaturis habeat dicatur. Tunc vero in se per benignitatem remaneret, si sibi benignus esse posset, aliquam in se beneficentiam exercendo (Theologia Christiana, b. 4, PL. 178, 1299-1300).

[The Spirit … is in no way said … to be born, but rather to go forth, that is, to stretch itself out toward another through charity, because in some way each person goes forth from oneself to another through love, since properly speaking, as was said, no one is said to have charity for oneself or to be kind toward oneself, but toward another. But above all, God, who needs nothing, cannot be moved by the disposition of lovingkindness toward Himself so that He grants Himself something out of lovingkindness, but only toward creatures inasmuch as they always need the gifts of His grace. And so a disposition … In addition, he transfers to God what blessed Gregory says of charity for the neighbor, that is, of one human for another human, as if to prove from this that God has charity for Himself, or does not have charity in Himself, or that the charity of God would not be charity unless through it God stretches Himself out toward something else].

Chapter 1: First Characteristic: Duality of the Lover and the Beloved 159

in a certain manner God is said to go out from Himself to creatures through the disposition or effect of lovingkindness, since the very fact that He is kind or does something kindly out of charity is said of Him in terms of the disposition or effect that He has in creatures. But He would then have remained in Himself through lovingkindness if He was able to be kind toward Himself, practicing some form of lovingkindness toward Himself] (Theologia Christiana, b. 4, PL. 178, 1299-1300). (The same passages are found, with some insignificant differences, in the Introductio ad Theologiam, b. II, c. 14, ibid., 1072-1073). We also find the idea of the necessary duality of the terms of love in a rather badly reasoned passage of Peter of Blois (Tract. de Caritate Dei et Proximi, c. 32, PL. 207, 931). Finally, this idea is implied by two locutions commonly used in the Middle Ages: love is a bond, and love is a gift.88 88

The metaphor of the bond of love, which, as has been shown on p. 157 n. 86 [herein], constitutes in William of Auvergne an argument in favor of the dualistic conception of love, is extremely common and classic. See St. Augustine, De Trinitate, VIII, 10, 14 (PL. 42, 960); Rabanus Maurus, Hom. 46, De Caritate (PL. 110, 86); William of Auvergne, De Trinitate, c. 43 (t. 2, 2nd pt., p. 55), De Virtutibus, c. 11, t. I, p. 135, De Retrib. Sanctorum, ibid., p. 323, De Moribus, c. 4, ibid., pp. 207, 208, 209, 210; William of Auxerre, Summa, b. I c. 6 q. 7 ad 3; Albert the Great, 1 p. q. 31 m. 2, 4 p. q. 12 m. 1 a. 1 § 3; Alexander of Hales 1 p. q. 43 m. 3 a. 3; St. Bonaventure, 1 d. 10 a. 2 q. 2, “Amor propriissime nexus est” [Love is most properly a joining]; St. Thomas, 1 q. 37 a. 1 ad 3, etc. The same holds true for the idea of gift: “Esse amorem est esse donum ... causari autem in quantum donum est causari alii, non sibi” [To be love is to be gift ... but to be caused as a gift is to be caused for another, not for oneself] (William of Auvergne, De Trinitate, c. 15). “Quid est amor habitus, nisi largitas, et amor actus, nisi donum? ... Largitas autem et datio non sunt unius ad se” [What is love as a habit but generosity, and what is love as an act but gift? ... But generosity and giving do not belong to one person with respect to him or herself] (Id., De Virtutibus, c. 9, t. I, p. 125, see ibid., 128; De Legibus, c. 19, p. 53; De Moribus, c. 4, p. 207, c. 8, p. 227; De Universo, II, c. 2, p. 123, 975; De Trinitate, c. 21, t. II, pp. 2728). This idea particularly owed its development to the theology of the Holy Spirit, who is called love and gift (see principally St. Augustine, De

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[61] And through the second of these locutions it is continued, in the thirteenth century, in the theory of the early Franciscan School, which makes “gratuitousness” or “liberality” the principal perfection of love.89 Trinitate, b. XV, c. 19, PL. 42, 1083; Alexander of Hales, 1 q. 43 m. 3 a. 2, a. 3; St. Bonaventure 1 d. 10 a. 1 q. 1 concl.; and St. Thomas 1 q. 38 a. 2: “Amor habet rationem primi doni, per quod omnia dona gratuita donantur. Unde, cum spiritus sanctus procedat ut amor, sicut iam dictum est, procedit in ratione doni primi” [Love has the nature of the first gift through which all gratuitous gifts are given. Since, therefore, the Holy Spirit, as was already said, proceeds as love, it proceeds in the nature of the first gift]. The idea of free donation, in the proponents of the ecstatic conception of love, is opposed to that of natural participation (as was stated on p. 150 [herein] regarding St. Bernard): “Spiritus sanctus in se ipso est donum. Amor enim donum et donabilis necessario est, nec est evidentis necessitudinis, sive pertinens ad ipsum donantem. Donum enim et donans nihil cognationis, nihil alterius attinentiae evidentis habere videntur ad invicem” [The Holy Spirit is in itself a gift. For love is necessarily a gift and capable of being given, but this is not from an obvious necessity, nor does it pertain to the one giving. For the gift and the giver seem to have no connection, no obvious relation to each other] (William of Auvergne, De Causis cur Deus Homo, c. 8, t. 1, p. 569). 89 William of Auvergne had already reached this conclusion: “Donum enim omne inde donum quia datur, et non mercedi tanquam praemium redditur. Solum igitur quod de benignitate gratis exeat donum est. Quod igitur maxime significat gratis, maxime donum” [For every gift then is a gift because it is given and not granted in exchange for a remuneration. Therefore, only what proceeds gratuitously out of lovingkindness is a gift. What then shows the most gratuitousness is most a gift] (De Trinitate, c. 21, p. 26). And further down: “tanto gratior, sive magis gratuitus ... et magis verus amor” [to the degree that it is more without recompense or more gratuitous ... the more true the love] (ibid.). See Alexander of Hales 1 p. q. 43 m. 3 a. 2 ad. 4: “Formaliter loquendo, omnis amor est gratuitus: quia quod ex amore impenditur, non ex debito, sed liberaliter impenditur” [Speaking formally, all love is gratuitous: because what is expended out of love, not out of debt, is freely expended]. This is followed by a quotation of Richard of St. Victor. See also St. Bonaventure 1 d. 10 a. 1 q. 2, and de Régnon, Etudes de théologie positive sur la Sainte Trinité, v. II, p. 330, 397, etc. Compare this conception to the custom of looking upon the gifts of God as gratuitous advances of divine goodness that are allocated in order to gain the love of a stranger, of a person who is still unattached [libre] (William of Auvergne, Sermon for the Feast of St. Barnabas, p. 3, t. II, 1st pt., p. 424 b); see Baldwin of Devonshire: “Amorem molitur


[62]

II Systematic Speculations Stemming from the First Characteristic of Love A. Abelardian Theory of Creation It seems to follow from the words of Abelard that creation has to be looked upon as a necessary outcome of the divine lovingkindness. If there is love in God, since love necessarily exhibits extension and duality, was it not necessary that God created? Abelard points out that this consequence of the principle of St. Gregory is not absolutely necessary if the Holy Spirit is looked upon as the mutual love of the divine persons. Yet, despite the authority of Jerome and Augustine, this account is evidently not the one that he prefers:

beneficiis extorquere” [(God) by His benefits strives to wrest love (from us)] (Tract. III, PL. 204, 421). Compare it also to the tendency to judge the mysteries of the Incarnate God—not more sublime—but more lovable than those of the glorious God: the Incarnation consists in something more “liberal,” more “gratuitous” (see St. Bernard, In Cantica, Serm. 20, n. 2, PL. 183, 867 and 621; see Gilbert of Hoyland, Serm. 21, 3, PL. 184, 110-111). St. Thomas proclaims: “Ea quae sunt divinitatis, sunt secundum se maxime excitantia dilectionem, ... sed ex debilitate mentis humanae ... ea quae pertinent ad Christi humanitatem, per modum cuiusdam manuductionis, maxime devotionem excitant” [Those things that concern the divine nature itself are in themselves the strongest incentive to love, … yet due to the weakness of the human mind … those things that pertain to the humanity of Christ most incite devotion, through leading us along by the hand as it were] (2a 2ae q. 82 a. 3 ad 2). Finally Peter of Poitiers ventured this rather nice subtlety: “Forte magis tenemur eum diligere, quia pro nobis passus, quam quia Deus: sed ... tenemur magis diligere quia Deus, quam quia passus“ [Perhaps we are more obliged to love Him because He suffered for us than because He is God: but ... we are obliged to love Him more because He is God rather than because He suffered for us] (Sententiarum, b. 3, PL. 211, 1103).

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Part 2: The “Ecstatic” Conception of Love Sunt autem nonnulli qui caritatem Dei non solum ad creaturas porrigi velint, verum etiam ab una persona in alteram, ut videlicet amor Patris in Filium vel Filii in Patrem Spiritus ipse sit. Quod aperte Augustinus ... astruit ... Hinc et illud est Hieronymi ... Quod fortassis ideo maxime dicendum videtur et tenendum, quod fortassis aliter videretur Spiritus sanctus posse non esse, ac per hoc non necessario esse ipsam Trinitatem.

[Now there are some who wish to extend the love of God not only to creatures, but also from one person to another, that is, so that the love of the Father for the Son or of the Son for the Father is the Spirit itself. Augustine clearly defends this ... On this there is also the statement of Jerome ... This therefore ought perhaps to be stated and held most of all because otherwise it would seem that the Holy Spirit could not exist and that, for this reason, the very Trinity would necessarily not exist]. Thus, after discussing the theory which relies upon the Fathers, the author proposes a response of his own devising: Fortasse cum creaturae ipsae ex necessitate non sint, quia scilicet quantum ad propriam naturam non esse possunt, amor tamen Dei erga illas ita necessario habet esse, ut absque illo Deus esse non possit omnino, cum videlicet ipse ex propria natura tam hunc amorem suum quam quodlibet bonum ita habeat, ut eo carere nullatenus possit, quem nullatenus aut minus bonum quam est aut maius bonum posse esse constat (Introd. ad Theol., b. II, c. 17, l. c., 1084; see Theologia Christiana, b. IV, l. c., 1311).

[Perhaps since creatures themselves do not exist out of necessity, that is, because in terms of their own nature it is possible for them not to exist, the love of God toward them, nonetheless, has existence so necessarily that apart from that love God could not exist at all; that is, since from His own nature God has this love of His as well as any good, so that He could by no means be without it, then it is evident that He can by no means be either less good or more good than He is] (Introd. ad Theol., b. II, c. 17, l. c., 1084; see Theologia Christiana, b. IV, l. c., 1311).


Abelard postpones until later the solution to this problem. And later when he comes to give his solution, he does not hesitate, as we know, to rely upon the goodness of God—this goodness of which He is, so to speak, “always aflame”—in order to assert the necessity of creation.90 [63] It seems to us therefore that we can consider as very likely the logical connection that links this heresy of Abelard to the conception of love that we have called “ecstatic.”91 90

Visum itaque nobis est Deum qui summe bonus est, nec in sua excrescere vel minui bonitate potest, quam naturaliter ac substantialiter ex se ipso non nostro modo per actus habet, ex ipsa sua et ineffabili bonitate, adeo semper, ut humano more loquar, accensum, ut quae vult necessario velit, et quae facit necessario faciat ... Qui itaque necessario tantum bonus est quantum bonus est, nec minui potest in bonitate, necesse est ut tam bene velit de singulis quam bene vult, et tam bene singula tractet quantum potest. Alioquin, iuxta etiam Platonem, aemulus esset, nec perfecte benignus ... Necessario itaque Deus mundum esse voluit ac fecit ... [And so it seemed to us that God, who is supremely good, and cannot increase or decrease in His goodness which He has as His nature and substance from Himself, not in our manner as an act, is always aflame, to speak in a human manner, from his own ineffable goodness, so that he necessarily wills what He wills, and necessarily does what He does … And so with one who is necessarily as good as He is good, and cannot decrease in goodness, it is necessary that He wills as well of individuals as He wills well, and that He conducts Himself well toward individuals as much as He can. Otherwise, as even Plato says, He would be jealous and not perfectly kind ... God, therefore, necessarily willed the world to exist and created it] (Theologia Christiana, b. V, ad fin., l. c., 1329-1330). 91 Pseudo-Dionysius himself, in the chapter where he calls love “ecstatic” (Noms Divins, c. 4, n. 10), also says: parrhsiavsetai dev kai; tou`to ei;pei;n oJ ajlhqh;~ lovgo~, o{ti kai; aujto;~ oJ pavntwn ai[tio~ di j ajgaqovthto~ uJperbolh;n pavntwn ejra/`, pavnta poiei` ... aujto;~ ga;r oJ ajgaqoergo;~ tw`n o[ntwn e[rw~, ejn tajgaqw/` kaq j uJperbolh;n prou>pavrcwn, oujk ei[asen aujto;n a[gonon ejn eJautw/` mevnein, ejkivnhse de; aujto;n eij~ to; praktikeuvesqai kata; th;n aJpavntwn genhtikhvn uJperbolhvn [And we may be so bold as to assert that even this is a true account, that even the cause of all things itself because of its superabundant goodness loves all things and creates all things ... For this good-producing love of beings, preexisting superabundantly in the Good, did not permit it to remain barren within itself, but moved it to be operative in the superabundant generation of all beings] (PG. III, 708).

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B. Richardian Theory of the Trinity A writer who was always regarded as very orthodox aspired, after Abelard, to apply this conception to a pursuit that could appear even more daring. Richard of St. Victor believed that he could rigorously deduce the Trinity of persons in divinis [in the divinity] while relying exclusively upon the notion of love.92 Not only does Richard of St. Victor explicitly profess that the perfection of love calls for a duality of terms, but this axiom is the very essence of his demonstration, as can easily be shown by examining the very clear exposition that he gives on it. It is true that he distinguishes love and charity, and seemingly accepts that ordinary love could withdraw into itself, whereas charity necessarily tends toward another. Yet if he did not believe that the perfection of the genus love excluded closed and egoistic love, but instead thought, like a disciple of Aristotle, that the ideal of love was in every respect unity, then he could not be convinced that he had demonstrated, without any possible refutation, the mystery of the Trinity. [64] Here are some of the texts wherein Richard of St. Victor has most clearly expressed his thought: Ubi ... totius bonitatis plenitudo est, vera et summa caritas deesse non potest. Nihil enim caritate melius, nihil caritate perfectius. Nullus autem pro privato et proprio sui ipsius amore dicitur 92

The Trinitarian doctrine of Richard of St. Victor is very original, and it is to give a very inaccurate idea of it, to say with Seeberg (Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, 1898, 2nd pt., p. 95) that this speculative effort “greift nicht über die Anregungen Augustins hinaus” [does not go beyond the suggestions of Augustine]. The two points of view are, in reality, completely opposite. Augustine, preoccupied particularly with divine unity, searches for comparisons in order to show how the personal processions have to be viewed so that their unity is not compromised. Richard of St. Victor on the other hand intends to prove conclusively that the Trinity of persons is necessary; he does not concern himself with the mode of the processions (see de Régnon, Etudes de théologie positive sur la Sainte Trinité, v. II).

Chapter 1: First Characteristic: Duality of the Lover and the Beloved 165 proprie caritatem habere. Oportet itaque ut amor in alterum tendat, ut caritas esse queat. Ubi ergo pluralitas personarum deest, caritas omnino esse non potest (De Trinitate, III, 2, PL. 196, 916).

[Where ... there is fullness of all goodness, true and supreme charity cannot be lacking. For nothing is better than charity; nothing is more perfect than charity. However, no one is properly said to have charity on the basis of one’s own private and particular love of oneself. And so it is necessary that love tend toward another for it to be charity. Therefore, where a plurality of persons is lacking, charity cannot exist at all] (De Trinitate, III, 2, PL. 196, 916). Proprium autem amoris est, et sine quo omnino non possit esse, ab eo quem multum diligis multum diligi velle. Non potest ergo esse amor iucundus si non sit et mutuus. In illa igitur vera et summa felicitate sicut nec amor iucundus, sic nec amor mutuus potest deesse. In amore autem mutuo oportet omnino ut sit et qui amorem impendat, et qui amorem rependat. Alter itaque erit amorem impendens, et alter amorem rependens. Ubi autem unus et alter esse convincitur, vera pluralitas deprehenditur. In illa itaque vera felicitatis plenitudine pluralitas personarum non potest deesse (III, 3, l. c., 917).

[However, it is a characteristic of love, and one without which it cannot possibly exist, to want to be loved much by the one whom you love much. Therefore, love cannot be pleasing if it is not also mutual. Therefore, in that true and supreme felicity, just as pleasing love cannot be lacking, so too mutual love cannot be lacking. However, in mutual love it is absolutely necessary that there be both one who offers love and one who returns love. Therefore one will be the offerer of love and the other the returner of love. Now, where the one and the other are shown to exist, true plurality is discovered. So in that fullness of true felicity, a plurality of persons cannot be lacking] (III, 3, l. c., 917). Si dixerimus in illa vera divinitate esse solam personam unam ... quaeso, ut quid hoc? ... si communicantem habere omnino nollet ... qualis quantusve esset iste benevolentiae defectus? ... Certe nil melius, nil certe iucundius omnino, nil magnificentius est vera, et

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Part 2: The “Ecstatic” Conception of Love sincera, et summa caritate, quae omnino esse non novit sine personarum pluralitate ... (III, 4-5 and see 17, l. c., 918-919, 926).

[If we had said that in that true divinity there exists only one person ... I ask, how could this be the case? ... if He would have been absolutely unwilling to have one sharing with Him ... what kind and how great of a defect of benevolence would this be? ... Certainly nothing is better, certainly nothing is altogether more pleasing, nothing is any more magnificent than true, sincere and supreme charity, which absolutely cannot be without a plurality of persons] (III, 4-5 and see 17, l. c., 918-919, 926). The second person of the Trinity is thus a terminus of love. It was necessary that it existed so that the Father could love someone other than Himself; and it was necessary that it was divine so that the Father could love it as much as Himself. Innascibilis condignum habere voluit, et pro voluntate habere oportuit, ut esset cui summum amorem impenderet, et qui sibi summum amorem rependeret (VI, 6, l. c., 971; and at greater length, III, 2, l. c., 916-917).

[The one who cannot be born (the Father) willed to have an equal, and in accord with His will it was necessary that He have an equal in order that there would be one upon whom He might pour out the highest love, and who would return the highest love to Him] (VI, 6, l. c., 971; and at greater length, III, 2, l. c., 916-917). As for the third person of the Trinity, it is love again that gives the reason for its existence. Richard of St. Victor expresses himself in this manner: Praecipuum videtur in vera caritate alterum velle diligi ut se: in mutuo siquidem amore, multumque fervente nihil rarius, nihil praeclarius quam ut ab eo quem summe diligis, et a quo summe diligeris, alium aeque diligi velis ... Summe ergo dilectorum summeque diligendorum uterque oportet ut pari voto condilectum requirat, pari concordia pro voto possideat. Vides ergo quomodo

Chapter 1: First Characteristic: Duality of the Lover and the Beloved 167 caritatis consummatio personarum Trinitatem requirit, sine qua omnino in plenitudinis suae integritate subsistere nequit (III, 11, l. c., 922-923; see III, 14, l. c., 924).

[In true charity it seems most excellent to want another to be loved like oneself. For in mutual love that is very fervent nothing is more rare, nothing is more splendid, than that you want another to be equally loved by the one whom you love most highly and by whom you are most highly loved … It is necessary therefore that each of those most highly loved and most highly loving require a common beloved by an equal desire, and possess this beloved in equal harmony in accordance with their desire. You see then how the perfection of charity requires a Trinity of persons without which it absolutely cannot exist in the integrity of its fullness] (III, 11, l. c., 922-923; see III, 14, l. c., 924). [65] Richard of St. Victor did not remain an isolated occurrence of this, since we can list Peter of Blois (Tr. de Caritate Dei et Proximi, c. 34, PL 207, 933), William of Auxerre (Summa, b. I, c. 2 § Alio modo potest), Alexander of Hales (1 q. 43 m. 5; 1. q. 45 m. 5), and Saint Bonaventure (1 d. 10 a. 1 q. 1) among those who adopted his account of the Trinity, along with the theory of love which it implied.93 St. Thomas, on the contrary, correctly saw that his unitary conception of love shook the argumentation of the Victorine to its very foundation:

93

This idea of Richard of St. Victor is also encountered in William of St. Thierry, but in a state that is, so to speak, pre-philosophical: “Non offendat Trinitas pietatem unum Deum quaerentis; non contristet substantiae unitas caritatem Patris et Filii dilectione gaudentis; in neutro conturbet solitudo vel pluralitas ...” [The Trinity does not disturb the piety of that person who seeks the one God. The unity of the (divine) substance does not dim the charity of that person who rejoices in the love between the Father and Son. Neither the singleness (of the divine substance) nor the plurality (of the Trinity) disturbs (this person) ...] (Meditativae Orationes, III, PL. 180, 214).


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Quod dicitur, quod sine consortio non potest esse iucunda possessio alicuius boni, locum habet quando in una persona non invenitur perfecta bonitas; unde indiget ad plenam iucunditatis bonitatem bono alicuius alterius consociati sibi (1 q. 32 a. 1 ad 2).

[The saying that the possession of any good cannot be pleasing without companionship applies when perfect goodness is not found in one person, and so one needs for the full goodness of the pleasure, the good of having someone else as a companion for oneself] (1 q. 32 a. 1 ad 2). We can compare Plotinus: to; me;n ou\n mh genna`n ejqevlon ma`llon aujtarkevsteron tw`/ kalw/. to; de; ejfievmenon poih`sai, kalovn te ejqevlai poiei`n uJp j ejndeiva~, kai; oujk au[tarke~ (Enneads, III, 5, 1).

[So thus that which does not wish to procreate is more content with beauty (alone). But that which aims at creating wishes to create beauty because of a lack and is not selfsufficient] (Enneads, III, 5, 1).

Chapter 2: Second Characteristic: The Violence of Love

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Chapter 2 Second Characteristic: The Violence of Love I If love is ecstatic and draws the subject outside of itself, it is naturally viewed as a destructive power, as an annihilating force. In the physical conception, love was the most profoundly natural thing in the world, the very expression of a thing’s essence through its tendencies. Yet here love indistinctly appears as contradictory to the innate appetites, as a movement first and foremost anti-natural. For the Greco-Thomist school, to love is to seek one’s good; it is accordingly “to find one’s soul.” For the ecstatic school, on the other hand, to love is “to lose one’s soul.” Love is here a violence; it is a “wound,” a “languor,” a “death.” [66] We immediately see what an ample supply of Scriptural and Patristic texts could be assembled by the proponents of this doctrine. What is more classical in Christianity than the necessity of renunciation, than the antithesis of self-love and the love of God? All of this seemed to them necessarily connected to their theory. Among so many other possibilities, it will suffice to cite this statement of St. Augustine: Ipsa caritas occidit quod fuimus, ut simus quod non eramus, facit in nobis quandam mortem dilectio (Enarr. in Ps. 121, PL. 37, 1628).

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[This charity destroys what we had been, so that we would be what we were not; love causes a certain death in us] (Enarr. in Ps., 121, PL. 37, 1628). Yet Augustine will always remain the theoretician of sin and the philosopher of beatitude. This passage itself indicates that the state of violence and death is temporary in his eyes; it is a transitory ordeal meant to purify corrupted nature. Our medievals are more daring: a true metaphysics of love is expressed by their metaphors. God Himself is not exempt from its law. Love has done violence to God, has conquered Him and wounded Him, because love is essentially violent, wounding, and conquering.94 We leave aside then the numerous passages where the sufferings of love and the languor of love are related to the absence of the object loved.95 The texts that interest us are those where it seems that this wholly natural idea has given way to the idea that love is essentially mortifying.96 94

St. Thomas himself writes regarding creation: “Fit extra seipsum (Deus) ... et quodam modo trahitur et deponitur quodam modo a sua excellentia ... ad hoc quod sit in omnibus per effectus suae bonitatis secundum quandam extasim” [(God) is brought outside of Himself ... and in a certain way is pulled and brought down from his excellence ... to the point that He is present in all things through the effects of His goodness according to a kind of ecstasy] (In Div. Nom., c. 4, l. 10, t. 29, 457-58). But his restriction immediately follows. 95 For example, Gilbert of Hoyland, Sermones in Cantica, XLVII, 3, PL. 184, 244: “Ubi viget amor, ibi viget languor, si absit quod amatur” [Where love thrives, there languor thrives, if the object of love is absent]. (In the same sermon, in number four, “liquefaction” is also conceived of as an excess of languor due to love being deprived of its object). 96 Hugh of St. Victor denies that love has to be thought of as laesivus [harmful] (Expositio in Hierarchiam Caelestem, PL. 175, 1044).—For William of St. Thierry, “languor” results from a disorder of love, although love necessarily has to pass through this state in order to progress (Exp. sup. Cantica, c. 2, PL. 180, 515). The languishing soul is incapable of bringing all the obligatory loves back to a unity, such that, “verus amor vel sui vel proximi non sit nisi amor Dei” [true love, either of self, or of neighbor, is nothing else but love of God]. There are in such a soul some inconsistencies and conflicts: “impetu amoris praevalente aliquando nescit amare vel se ipsum, vel proximum prae amore Dei” [when the impulse of love


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[67] Triumphat de Deo amor ... ut scias amoris fuisse quod plenitudo effusa est, quod altitudo adaequata est, quod singularitas associata est (St. Bernard, Cantic., 64, 10, PL. 183, 1088).

[Love triumphs over God ... in order that you might know that it is the mark of love that the full has been poured out, that the high has been brought low, and that the singular has been made a companion] (St. Bernard, Cantic., 64, 10, PL. 183, 1088). Magnam ergo vim habes, caritas, tu sola Deum trahere potuisti de caelo ad terras. O quam forte est vinculum tuum, quo et Deus ligari potuit, et homo ligatus vincula iniquitatis disrupit! Nescio si quid maius in laudem tui dicere possim, quam ut Deum de caelo traheres, et hominem de terra ad caelum elevares. Magna virtus tua, ut per te usque ad hoc humiliaretur Deus, et usque ad hoc exaltaretur homo. Considero Deum ex femina natum ... Respicio postea comprehensum, ligatum, flagellis caesum ... illic indigna, hic dira passum, et tamen cur vel illa dignaretur, vel ista pateretur si causam quaerimus, aliam praeter solam caritatem non invenimus. O caritas! quantum potes! si tantum invaluisti erga Deum, quanto magis erga homines! ... Sed fortassis facilius vincis Deum quam hominem, magis praevalere potes Deo quam homini, quia quo magis beatum, eo magis Deo est debitum a te superari. Hoc optime tu noveras, quae ut facilius vinceres, prius illum superabas; adhuc nos rebelles habuisti, quando illum tibi oboedientem de sede prevails, she (the soul) at times does not know how to love either itself or the neighbor because of the love of God] (ibid., 516; see 519: “Primo siquidem ingressu inordinata adhuc et ebria nititur facere plus quam potest” [In truth when she (the Bride) first enters into (the wine cellar of God), as yet disordered and inebriated, she strives to do more than she is capable of]).—William of Auvergne connects the idea of a wound of love to that of a passion in the philosophical and strict sense: “Apud nos ... amatum ... principium primum est amoris actione sua in amantem, primum in vim eius apprehensivam, deinde per illam in motiva: unde amor passio est illata ab amato, et vulnus plerumque dicitur amor ...” [Among us ... the beloved ... is the first principle of love by its action on the lover, first upon the lover’s apprehensive power and then through that upon the lover’s motive power. Thus love is a passion inflicted by the beloved and love is often called a wound ...] (De Trinitate, c. XXI, t. 2, p. 26). Hence he adds that love is not like this in God. This question “Utrum amor sit passio laesiva amantis” [Whether love is a passion that harms the lover] is again found in classical Scholasticism. See St. Thomas 1a 2ae q. 28 a. 5.

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Part 2: The “Ecstatic” Conception of Love paternae maiestatis usque ad infirma nostrae mortalitatis suscipienda descendere coegisti. Adduxisti illum vinculis tuis alligatum, adduxisti illum sagittis tuis vulneratum, amplius ut puderet hominem tibi resistere, cum te videret etiam in Deum triumphasse. Vulnerasti impassibilem, ligasti insuperabilem, traxisti incommutabilem, aeternum fecisti mortalem ... O caritas, quanta est victoria tua! unum prius vulnerasti, et per illum omnes postmodum superasti (Hugh of St. Victor, De Laude Caritatis, PL. 178, 974-75).

[Therefore you, charity, have great power. You alone were able to draw God from heaven to the earthly regions. O how strong is your bond by which even God could be bound, and when bound as a human burst the bonds of sin! I do not know whether I can say anything greater in praise of you, other than that you draw God from heaven and elevate a human from earth to heaven. Great is your power that through you God should be brought low to this point and that a human should be exalted to this point. Consider God being born from a woman ... Later I see Him arrested, bound, beaten with whips ... having suffered unworthy things in the one, terrible things in the other, and yet if we look for the reason either why He accepted those or suffered these, we do not find any other reason but charity. O charity! How powerful you are! If you were so mighty toward God, how much more mighty are you toward humans! ... But perhaps you overcome God more easily than humans and prevail over God more than humans, because it was owed to God that He be more overcome by you to the extent that He is more happy. You knew this very well since you surmounted Him first in order that you might overcome more easily. You still had us as rebels, when you forced Him, out of obedience to you, to even come down from the seat of the Father’s majesty to take up the weakness of our mortality. You drew Him bound by your chains, you drew Him wounded by your arrows, in order that humans would be more ashamed to resist you after they had seen that you triumphed even over God. You wounded Him who was incapable of suffering; you bound Him who was insuperable; you dragged Him who was immutable; you made mortal Him who was immortal … O charity, how great is your victory! You first wounded one human, and through Him


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you afterwards conquered all] (Hugh of St. Victor, De Laude Caritatis, PL. 178, 974-75).97 Richard of St. Victor assigns as the first characteristic98 of charity insuperabilitas [insuperableness], and describes it in these terms: [68] Fortis est ut mors, imo morte fortior, quae ipsam quoque mortem mori coegit in morte Redemptoris. O insuperabilis virtus caritas, quae ipsum quoque insuperabilem superasti, et cui omnia subiecta sunt omnibus quodam modo subiecisti, dum victus amore Deus humiliavit semet ipsum formam servi accipiens, factus non modo homo, sed opprobrium hominum et abiectio plebis! ... Et si contra Deum fortis fuit, quanto magis contra homines praevalebit? (Tractatus de Gradibus Caritatis, c. I, PL. 196, 1196).

[It (charity) is as strong as death, nay stronger than death for charity forced even death itself to die in the death of the Redeemer. O insuperable virtue of charity, which indeed conquered the insuperable Himself; and Him to whom all are subject, you in some way subjected to all, when God, overcome by love, humbled Himself, taking the form of a servant, and was made not only a human, but the reproach of humans and the castoff of the people! And if it was strong against God, how much more will it prevail against humans?] (Tractatus de Gradibus Caritatis, c. I, PL. 196, 1196). 97

The same thought and terms are again found in the Encomium Caritatis of Pope Innocent III (who died in 1216; PL. 217, 762-63). See also the Augustinian apocryphal writing “De Quatuor Virtutibus Caritatis” (PL. 47, 1133). 98 The treatise titled De Gradibus Caritatis [The Degrees of Charity] describes some attributes and qualities of love, rather than recounting the successive stages of it. See the different classification of the following treatise: “De Quatuor Gradibus Violentae Caritatis” [The Four Degrees of Violent Charity] (PL. 196, 1213).—These two opuscules are of great importance for the subject that concerns us. Let us especially note, in the second opuscule, the description of the fourth degree of love (insatiabilitas) [insatiableness] as the final stage of human passion. There madness, hatred, and love mutually stimulate each other, so that “amoris incendium magis exaestuat ex alterutra contradictione, quam invalescere posset ex mutua pace” [the fire of love blazes more from their reciprocal conflict, than it could have grown strong from their mutual peace] (l. c., 1213 C).

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And the continuator of the commentary of St. Bernard on the Song of Songs, Gilbert, abbot of Hoyland writes: Acutus et efficax, et vere violentus affectus ille est, qui tuum, Iesu bone, meretur et movet affectum. Magna et violenta est vis caritatis, ipsum affectum Dei attingens et penetrans, et velut sagitta iecur eius transfigens. Quid mirum, si regnum caelorum vim patitur? Ipse Dominus violenti amoris vulnus sustinet. Sed vide quibus iaculis vulneretur. Vulnerasti, inquit, cor meum in uno oculorum tuorum, et in uno crine colli tui. Ne parcas, Sponsa, talibus Sponsum telis appetere. Aspectibus piis quasi spiculis utere. Noli in hoc negotio remissius agere, noli contenta esse dilectum vulnerare semel, sed concide ipsum vulnere super vulnus ... reputa illum quasi signum positum ad tuas sagittas ... oculi tui semper ad Dominum, ut amoris tui nutibus capiatur, illaqueetur criniculis (Sermones in Cantica, 30, 2, PL. 184, 155-56; see Serm. 24, ibid., 127).

[Sharp and effective and truly violent is that affection, good Jesus, which moves and wins your affection! Strong and violent is the force of charity that reaches and penetrates the very affections of God and like an arrow transfixes one’s vital organs. What wonder if the kingdom of heaven suffers violence? The Lord Himself bears the wound of violent love. But see by what shafts He is wounded. You have wounded, he says, my heart with one of your eyes and with one hair of your neck. Do not hesitate, O Bride, to aim such weapons at your Spouse. Use devout glances as your darts. Do not act remissly in this engagement, do not be content to wound your Beloved once, but strike Him with wound after wound ... regard Him as a target erected for such arrows ... Let your eyes be ever upon the Lord, that He may be captured in the glances of your love, that He may be ensnared in your curls] (Sermones in Cantica, 30, 2, PL. 184, 155-56; see Serm. 24, ibid., 127). As the reader can see, the hallmarks [accents] of the famous canticles of St. Francis are here already evident.99 It may appear super99

In foco l’amor mi mise [Love put a fire inside of me] ... and particularly Amor de caritate, Perchè m’hai si ferito? [Love of charity, why have you wounded me so?]


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fluous, after citing these texts, to accumulate a great number of others on this topic in order to demonstrate the wounding and victorious force of love where creatures are concerned. Here, however, are some of the ones that seemed more significant: Amor languor est et infirmi animi passio. Ad quam veritatem asserendam si indigna et minus idonea videtur auctoritas poetae, qui dicit: “Hey mihi, quod nullis amor est medicabilis herbis,” apud religiosas mentes sufficere debet vox sponsae quae loquitur quod sentit, et dicit: Amore langueo. Videamus ergo an omnis amor languor sit. Est naturalis [69] amor ... Est socialis amor ... Est coniugalis amor ... Est incestus amor, vel alias impudicus ... Est vanus amor, amor huius mundi ... Est sanctus amor ... qui et ipse languor est (Baldwin of Devonshire, Archbishop of Canterbury, Tractatus, XIV, PL. 204, 539).

[Love is a languor and the suffering of a sick soul. The authority of the poet [Ovid], even though it seems unworthy and less suitable, affirms the truth of this, when he says: “Woe is me, for love can be cured by no herb.” But for religious minds, it should be enough that the voice of the bride states what she feels and says: “I am languid with love.” Let us consider, therefore, whether all love is a languor. Natural love is ... Social love is ... Conjugal love is ... Incestuous love is, as well as the other impure forms ... Vain love is, the love of this world ... Holy love is ... this too is a languor] (Baldwin of Devonshire, Archbishop of Canterbury, Tractatus, XIV, PL. 204, 539). Comparemus ergo mortem cum dilectione; et apparebit, quia fortis est ut mors dilectio ... Dilectio quoque, qua a nobis diligitur Christus, et ipsa fortis est ut mors, cum sit ipsa quasi quaedam mors, utpote veteris vitae exstinctio, et vitiorum abolitio, et mortuorum operum depositio .... Ut scias an vera sit dilectio, fortitudinem animi attende; quae enim fortis non est et ut mors, vera dilectio non est ... Vide et in caeteris quid possit mors, quid possit dilectio, ut scias quia fortis est ut mors dilectio. Mors dividit carissima nomina, foederaque iunctissima, dividit et dilectio ... Dividit mors animam et carnem, dividit et dilectio (Id., Tractatus, X, l. c., c. 513-15).

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[If, then, we compare love and death, it is clear that love is as strong as death ... The love with which Christ is loved by us is also strong as death, since it is like a certain death inasmuch as it is the extinction of our old life, the abolition of our vices, and an end to dead works .... But in order to know whether your love be true, consider the strength of your soul, for that love which is not as strong as death is not true love ... Consider also what death can do to others and what love can do, and then you will realize that love is as strong as death. Death separates those who are nearest and dearest and breaks the closest bonds; love too separates them ... Death separates the soul and body; love too separates them] (Id., Tractatus, X, l. c., 513-15). Yet the death that love gives is valuable and its wounds are desirable: Talia in me utinam multiplicet (Christus) vulnera a planta pedis usque ad verticem, ut non sit in me sanitas. Mala enim sanitas, ubi vulnera vacant quae Christi pius infligit aspectus (Gilbert of Hoyland, Sermones in Cantica, 30, 2, PL. 184, 156).

[May he (Christ) multiply such wounds in me, from the sole of my foot all the way to the crown of my head, that there may be no soundness in me! For no soundness is there where there is an absence of wounds inflicted by the holy glance of Christ] (Gilbert of Hoyland, Sermones in Cantica, 30, 2, PL. 184, 156). Felix, in quo sanctus amor languor est, non passio ... O male sanum, imo vere insanum cor, quod esse nescit hoc vulnere saucium! Vulnerata, inquit, caritate ergo sum. Non modo vulnerat, sed etiam necat: Fortis est enim ut mors dilectio. Denique Apostolus: Mortui estis ... (Id., Tractatus Ascetici, IV, 2, l. c., 267).

[Felicitous is the one in whom holy love is a languor, not a passion ... O falsely healthy is the heart, no indeed truly unhealthy is the heart that does not know how to be stricken with this wound! I am wounded, she (the bride) says, because of charity. Not only does it wound, but it also slays: For as stern


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as death is love. Indeed the Apostle says: You have died ...] (Id., Tractatus Ascetici, IV, 2, l. c., 267).

II Systematic Speculations Two well-defined and systematized theories, it appear to me, must be connected with the doctrine of anti-natural and annihilating love. One bears a relation to “the order of charity”; the other to the act of perfect charity.

A. Theory of the Order of Charity The question, classic in the Middle Ages, utrum debeamus magis diligere meliores quam nobis coniunctiores [whether we should love those who are better more than those who are more closely connected with us],100 is susceptible of two [70] solutions that clearly bring out the two conceptions of love that we are trying to define. The solution of St. Thomas is, if one can use this word, relativistic.101 He no doubt recognizes that for the one who is better and closer to God we should want a greater good, for charity cannot desire anything other than to see justice carried out. However, he adds that the intensity of the feeling of love should depend upon the more or less intimate rela100

The origin of this question occurs in a chapter of St. Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana, I, 28 (n. 29), PL. 34, 30. And when a person knew of the Nicomachean Ethics, the opinion of Aristotle could be cited on a very similar problem (Eth. Nic., IX, 2, 1164b). Indeed St. Thomas specifically refers to the solution indicated by Aristotle (2a 2ae q. 26 a. 8, and parallel passages). One also finds in the Scholastics some sprinklings [lambeaux] of Scriptural and Patristic texts that were cited by them regarding the same question, for example Proverbs 18, 24; Ambrose, De Officiis, I, 30, etc.; Julianus Pomerius (in c. XV, n. 2 of the De Vita Contemplativa, formerly attributed to St. Prosper, PL. 59, 497) clearly favors the solution of St. Bernard. 101 See the solution of St. Thomas given in 2a 2ae q. 26, and especially article 13 (Utrum ordo caritatis remaneat in patria [Whether the order of charity remains in heaven]), which represents a great advance over the solution of his Commentary on the Sentences (3 d. 31 q. 2 a. 3).

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tions that connect us to other humans. This response is in perfect agreement with the theory of the whole and the part, which we have set forth above: in order that perfect harmony as well as the ordered life be everywhere maintained, each entity [atome] must desire the good of the whole in its own way, and must continually endeavor to bring about this good within the compass of its own action. Now since the part retains its individuality as part, St. Thomas can say: “Caritas facit hominem conformari Deo secundum proportionem, ut scilicet ita se habeat homo ad id quod suum est, sicut Deus ad id quod suum est” [Charity causes a human to be conformed to God proportionally, that is to say, a human stands to what is his or her own, as God stands to what is His own] (2a 2ae q. 26 a. 7 ad 2). (Along the same lines he also says: Bonum totius diligit quidem pars secundum quod est sibi conveniens; non autem ita quod bonum totius ad se referat, sed potius ita quod se ipsum refert in bonum totius [The part does indeed love the good of the whole as something congenial to itself; not, however, as referring the good of the whole to itself, but rather referring itself to the good of the whole], 2a 2ae q. 26 a. 3 ad 2). It is this which no longer makes sense in the ecstatic conception of love: there is no longer any suum [one’s own self ]—the being is emptied of itself. Humans who love God are brought to the center of everything; they no longer have any inclinations other than those of the absolute Spirit; at any rate, they have to love what is better for they are as it were identified with pure Reason. Now this way of thinking forces one to respond to the problem of the order of love through a centralistic solution.—It will be readily granted that all humans should attend more to what concerns themselves, and not abandon their neighbors in order to rush to the service of strangers who are more holy. However this relates to the exhibitio operis [manifestation of the action], which is wholly distinct in caritas [charity] and in [71] dilectio [love]. It is only in the bare action [l’action sèche]R that one will be able to remember that one is oneself: the depth of the heart [le fond du coeur] should only adhere to creatures to the extent that they themselves adhere to God. This solution seems to have been common in the twelfth century.102 In fact, the school of Abelard is here in agreement with the school of Clairvaux:


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Utinam et in me Dominus Jesus tantillum ordinet caritatis quod dedit; ut sic mihi sint universa quae sunt ipsius, ut tamen quod mei potissimum propositi seu officii esse constiterit, ante omnia curem: sed sane ita id prius, ut tamen ad multa, quae mihi specialiter non attinent, afficiar amplius ... Nonne, verbi gratia, ex iniuncto incumbit mihi cura omnium vestrum? ... Quod si ante omnia quidem, ut debeo, huic intendo curae, non autem magis ad maiora gaudeo Dei lucra, quae per alterum fieri forte comperero, patet me ordinem caritatis ex parte tenere, ex parte nequaquam. Si vero me et ad id amplius, quod specialius incumbit, sollicitum, et nihilo minus ad illud quod maius est, magis affectum exhibeam, utrobique profecto invenior caritatis ordinem assecutus ... etc. (St. Bernard, Serm. in Cantic., 49, 6, PL 183, 1019).

[And would that the Lord Jesus would set in order in me the little stock of charity that he gave so that everything that concerns him would in that way concern me; but so that, nonetheless, I would take care of before all other things what he made to be the most important matter of my task or duty. But it is clear that this comes first in order that I may nevertheless also be affected more strongly by many things which do not pertain to me in particular … For example, is not the care for all of you incumbent upon me from this injunction? … Yet if I attend to this concern above all, as I assuredly ought, but do not rejoice more for God’s greater gains, which I discover perhaps are achieved through another person, it is clear that I observe the order of charity in one part, but not in another. But if I show myself more disposed and solicitous toward that which is especially incumbent upon me and not less toward what is greater, I am found in

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There are some exceptions. Aelred of Rievaulx, for example, proposes a more nuanced and quite original solution, which borders on the Thomist solution in one place (Speculum Caritatis, b. 3, c. 38: aut carne propinquior ... aut amicitia gratior ... [either closer in flesh ... or dearer by friendship ... (let such a one be closer to center in the abode of our heart)], PL. 195, 617; see De Spirituali Amicitia, b. III, PL. ibid., 697 D). He also takes care to distinguish, in regard to the order of love, between voluntary charity and the feelings that are not under our control (ibid., c. 19, l. c., 594). William of Auvergne (De Virtut., c. 9, t. 125 b, B) resolves the question in the same manner as St. Thomas.

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both cases to have truly achieved the order of charity ...], etc. (St. Bernard, Serm. in Cantic., 49, 6, PL. 183, 1019). Hic ... est ordo caritatis, et languentis legitimus terminus amoris ... cum omni homine secundum Deum foedus habendum naturae et bonae voluntatis, ad semet ipsum vero, et ad proximum sicut ad se ipsum affectus religiosi amoris, ut proximus sit quincunque domesticus est fidei et in proximis plus ille diligatur, ut propinquior, qui Deo, in quo proximus est et diligitur, vitae merito et pietatis affectu coniunctior invenitur ... Sic qui ordinatae caritatis est, diligit Dominum Deum suum, et in ipso se ipsum, et proximum suum sicut se ipsum, ipsa qualitate, ipsa quantitate. Nam etsi maior forsitan est perfectio caritatis in ipso quam in proximo, tantam utique in eo fore desiderat, quantam amplecitur in semet ipso. Si vero maiorem eam deprehendit vel aestimat apud proximum, dulcius eo in Deo fruitur, et plus eum, ut dictum est, observat, quam semet ipsum ... Hic est ordo caritatis a lege spiritus vitae ordinatus ... et in ipsa hominis ratione naturali quodam schemate a Deo deformatus (William of St. Thierry, Expos. in Cantic., c. II, PL. 180, 518-19).

[This ... is the order of charity and the rightful terminus of languishing love ... after (loving) God, a covenant of nature and good will must be established with every human; yet we must have a disposition of religious love for ourselves and for our neighbor as ourselves, so that whoever belongs to the household of the faith is a neighbor. And among the neighbors that one is to be more loved, as nearer to us, who by merit of life and disposition of piety is found to be more closely united to God in whom the neighbor exists and is loved ... Thus one whose charity is ordered loves the Lord one’s God, and oneself in Him, and one’s neighbor as oneself, with the same quality and amount. For even if perchance the perfection of charity is greater in oneself than in one’s neighbor, certainly one desires that it be as great in one’s neighbor as one holds in oneself. But if one observes or accounts charity greater in one’s neighbor, one enjoys the neighbor in God the more sweetly and, as we have said, honors the neighbor more than oneself ... This is the order of charity ordained by the law of the spiritual life ... and fashioned by God through a certain arrangement in the natural reason of humans] (William of St. Thierry, Expos. in Cantic., c. II, PL. 180, 518-19).


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Sic siquidem ordo in caritate servatur, ut pro meritis et pro convenientia cuiusque magis vel minus in diversis gradibus eos diligamus. [72] Notandum tamen quod cum talem ordinem in dilectione retinere debeamus, quod magis debeam diligere aliquem religiosum, quam patrem meum qui non est adeo religiosus, in exhibitione profecto caritatis aliter est faciendum, quia, si non possum utrique sufficere, illi sane subtraham et patri meo tribuam. Magis enim in exhibitione me ad eos, quorum curam gero, extendere debeo, nec tamen propter hoc tantum patrem meum quantum illum diligo (Epitome Theologiae Christianae, formerly attributed to Abelard, c. 32, PL. 178, 1749).

[So indeed order is preserved in charity such that in accordance with the merits or fittingness of each person we love them more or less in different degrees. However it is to be noted that although we ought to preserve such order in love that I ought to love some religious more than my father who is not such a religious, in the manifestation of charity, I, of course, should act otherwise. For, if I cannot satisfy both, I should by all means withdraw my love from the former and give it to my father. For in the manifestation of charity I ought to stretch myself out more to those of whom I have care, nor do I, nonetheless, on this account love my father as much as I love that other (the religious)] (Epitome Theologiae Christianae, formerly attributed to Abelard, c. 32, PL. 178, 1749). Quod ... dicitur: his potissimum esse subveniendum, qui sunt nobis coniuncti, etc., in eo casu loquitur, quando sunt fideles et iusti (Alexander III, Sententiae, ed. Gietl, Freiburg im Breisgau, 1891, p. 320).

[When … he says: we ought especially to help those who are close to us, and so on, he is speaking of the case in which they are believers and righteous] (Alexander III, Sententiae, ed. Gietl, Freiburg im Breisgau, 1891, p1. 320; this concerns the text of Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana, I, 28).103

103

See also the Summa Sententiarum attributed to Hugh of St. Victor, tr. IV, c. 7, PL. 176, 125.

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We are justified in seeing the agreement of these writers as something of significant worth, and in discerning here more than just an accidental correspondence or a proof that one borrowed from the other. The conception of the absolute value of well-ordered loves is also encountered elsewhere. It is, for example, what inspires the author [William of St. Thierry] of the Letter to the Brethren of MontDieu when he writes: Tuum parentem ... quem tu veraci et ardenti amore diligis, affectas ut omnes diligant, et non minore amore quam tu eum diligis. Idem ego de meo amico sentio, volo atque desidero; idem omnes alii de amicis suis (3, 3, 12, PL. 184, 360).

[You wish everyone to love … your parent, whom you love with a true and ardent love, and with no less a love than that with which you love him. I feel, want, and desire the same thing regarding my friend; all others do the same regarding their friends] (3, 3, 12, PL. 184, 360). This naive statement, so psychologically inaccurate, obviously supposes that lovableness is, for the author, an absolute quality. The Aristotelian distinction between the filhto;n tw/`de [that which is lovable for a particular individual] and the aJplw`~ filhtovn [that which is lovable absolutely] (which the thirteenth century will apply even to “ordered loves”) was not part of his academic experience, nor of his implicit thought.

B. Theory of Perfect Charity The question of perfect love and its relation to self-love, which was debated more than once in the Church, and which quite naturally evokes for the mind of French reader the names of Bossuet and Fénelon, already divided the minds of the twelfth century. Are the love of God and the love of self irreducible to each other? Or should we not rather say that they coincide, and that the love of God is not anything other than a well-directed and properly conceived love of self? These are the two extreme conceptions which can serve as a


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rough and provisional classification [73] of the theories on this subject matter. Two persons in the twelfth century exemplify the two different groupings, a dialectician and a mystic, Abelard and Hugh of St. Victor. It is the dialectician Abelard who requires a wholly disinterested love, and disregards any element of nature. The mystic Hugh of St. Victor, on the contrary, declares that a love of God separated from the love of self is inconceivable. He reduces these two tendencies, which the ascetic literature continually opposes, to a unity. If love is essentially dualistic, ecstatic, and annihilating, it is clear that its ideal is absolute gratuitousness. Abelard, a resolute advocate of the dualistic conception of love (see pp. 157-59 [herein]), is here in agreement with himself. He only writes briefly on the question that concerns us, but in a sufficiently clear manner. Admittedly, in the Introductio ad Theologiam (b. I, c. 1, PL. 178, 982-83), his assertions on this subject contain nothing shocking. However, he pushes the requirements of disinterestedness a great deal farther in a passage of the Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans. He begins by describing the disinterested love of Christ: Tam sincera enim circa nos Christi dilectio exstitit, ut non solum pro nobis moreretur, verum etiam in omnibus, quae pro nobis egerit, nullum suum commodum, vel temporale vel aeternum, sed nostrum quaereret; nec ulla propriae remunerationis intentione sed totum nostrae salutis desiderio egit (Expos. in Ep. Pauli ad Rom., l. 3 in ch. 7, PL. 178, 891).

[For Christ’s love for us stands out as so pure that he not only died for us, but also in all the things that he did for us he sought no advantage of his own, either temporal or eternal, but rather our advantage. He did not act for the purpose of any personal reward, but wholly out of desire of our salvation] (Expos. in Ep. Pauli ad Rom., l. 3 in ch. 7, PL. 178, 891). This is, says the author, how one must act: to behave otherwise, is to be “quasi mercennarius, licet in spiritualibus” [like a hireling, albeit in spiritual matters]. And this is no longer to have charity, but to submit oneself to God “through avarice and not through grace.” He cites several texts of Augustine extolling “gratuitous” love, and in this

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way presents the objection to his doctrine that these texts themselves suggest: At fortasse dicis quoniam Deus se ipso, non alia re, est remuneraturus, et se ipsum, quo nihil maius est, ut beatus quoque meminit Augustinus, nobis est daturus. Unde cum ei deservis pro eo quod exspectas ab eo, id est pro aeterna beatitudine tibi promissa, utique propter ipsum id pure ac sincere agis (l. c., 892).

[Yet you may say that since God will reward us with Himself and not with something else and will give to us Himself, that than which nothing is greater, as blessed Augustine also recalls. Hence, when you serve Him for that which you expect from Him, that is, for the eternal beatitude promised to you, you, of course, do that purely and sincerely for His sake] (l.c., 892). However, he rules out this explanation, and responds by once again asserting the necessity of a radical disinterestedness. He also refuses (l. c., 893) to give in to the Scriptural texts that can be pitted against him. He does not want to admit that since God Himself [74] is our reward we love Him for Himself in loving the reward. In short, he claims that if humans want to love purely, their will must be directed at a certain mysterious and intimate in se [in Himself ] in God. Here the divine nature is considered in isolation from every real or possible communication to finite spirits. God has to be loved “quia, quicquid mihi faciat, talis ipse est qui super omnia diligendus est” [because whatever He might do for me, He Himself is such that He should be loved above all things]. He is the “complete cause of love [dilection]” because “integre semper et eodem modo bonus in se et amore dignus perseverat” [He always remains both wholly good in Himself and in the same way worthy of love] (l. c., 892). To love Him because He loves us is to merit the sentence brought in the gospel against those who love out of self-interest (ibid.).S To love Him for His benefits, is to give to Him a love less noble than are certain of our affections even in the natural order (l. c., 893).—Abelard therefore eliminates and excises, as much as is possible, all the reasons to love God that have their bases in our nature and being. It


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seems to me that his doctrine sharply contradicts what we have heard St. Thomas proclaim: “If God was in no way the good of humans, humans would have no reason to love God.” As we have seen, Hugh of St. Victor, in the book De Sacramentis [On the Sacraments], likely gives an account of the opinion of Abelard in the exposition that he places in the mouth of some opponents (stulti quidam) [certain fools]: Diligimus Deum et servimus illi: sed non quaerimus praemium, ne mercennarii simus; etiam ipsum non quaerimus ... Pura enim et gratuita et filiali dilectione diligimus, nihil quaerimus ... Diligimus ipsum, sed non quaerimus aliquid, etiam ipsum non quaerimus quem diligimus (De Sacramentis, b. II, p. XIII, c. 8, PL. 176, 534).

[We love God and we serve Him, but we do not seek a reward, lest we be mercenaries; we do not even seek Him ... For we love with pure and gratuitous and filial love; we seek nothing ... We love Him but we do not seek anything; we do not even seek Him whom we love] (De Sacramentis, b. II, p. XIII, c. 8, PL. 176, 534). Yet Hugh of St. Victor did not succeed in eliminating the conception against which he fought. We meet with it again in the thirteenth century, in some authors who enjoy a perfect renown for their orthodoxy: William of Auvergne, Alexander of Hales, and St. Bonaventure. William of Auvergne first establishes the existence, in rational beings, of a love of gratitude that brings them to love their creator more than themselves, and which in this way is completely distinct from the simple love of desire. He then assert the possibility, and in nonfallen natures the actual presence, of a certain “gratuitous” love that disregards all the benefits [75] of God, and loves Him solely for the goodness that He has in Himself. (“Absolute in Deum, in eo quod Deus, vel in eo quod bonus” [Purely for God insofar as He is God, or insofar as He is good], and not “in eo quod Deus eorum, vel in eo quod bonus in eis” [insofar as He is their God, or insofar as He is good to them], De Virtutibus, c. 9, 128 b, C and A).

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Part 2: The “Ecstatic” Conception of Love Circumscriptis enim beneficiis non amaretur ut benefactor vel in eo quod benefactor ... ista dilectio esset gratuita, quoniam absque venalitate ulla, et nihil prorsus habens negotiationis ... esset etiam recta, id est nec habens curvitatem, nec deflexionem ... etiam esset gratia ab eo quod est gratis et esset donum veri nominis, et amor datus purissima ac sincerissima datione ... In spoliatis substantiis ... non dubitamus amorem huius modi et esse, et abundare (128 b, 129 a).

[For, if the benefits are kept out of consideration, He would not be loved as a benefactor or insofar as He is a benefactor ... this love would be gratuitous since it is without any venality, and certainly without anything resembling a business deal … it would also be straight, that is having neither curvature nor deviation … it would also be a donation because it is freely bestowed, and it would be a gift in the true sense, and love given with the purest and sincerest manner of giving ... In separated substances ... we have no doubt that this kind of love both exists and abounds] (128 b, 129 a).104 104

William is very eager to inculcate that a similar “gratuitous” love can be found outside the supernatural order: “Esset gratia ab eo quod est gratis ... Verum tamen non esset gratia ullo [illo?] modo, quae media est inter naturam et gloriam, et arra ipsius gloriae ... neque consequens est, si isto modo diligatur Deus super omnia et gratis, quod iste amor caritas sit, et gratuita illa dilectio, quae gratos Deo, atque acceptabiles, atque regno caelorum dignos facit” [Grace is derived from that which is gratuitous … That which is intermediate between nature and glory and is a pledge of glory itself would, nonetheless, not be grace in this [any?] sense … nor does it follow that, if in this way God is loved above all things and gratuitously, this love is charity and that gratuitous love which makes us pleasing and acceptable to God and worthy of His heavenly kingdom] (l. c., 128-29; see De Meritis, same volume, 311 a, C; De Virtutibus, c. 15, 169 b, A). Humans, after the occurrence of original sin, can no longer have this natural and gratuitous love for God (129 a, A), but they can experience it for certain lovable objects of the terrestrial world: “Quod autem dilectio grativa seu gratuita quaedam etiam naturalis sit, manifestum est a sensu: nullus enim hominum tanta est maligna perversus corruptione, ut bonum non diligat, bonum dico hominem cum ei innotuerit ... et generaliter verum est, quod ait sanctus et sapiens Augustinus, quia amor boni et notio eiusdem naturaliter nobis indita sunt” [But it is evident from observation that a certain gracious or gratuitous love is still natural: for no human is perverse with such great and wicked corruption that he or she


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Here is how he contrasts the three kinds of love: Iste amor est in creatorem, ut creatorem, et ut patrem, et ut datorem omnium bonorum ... et istum amorem vocamus, qui est prima species amoris, amorem debitum: iste igitur amor est sicut amor gratitudinis, et debitus, et redditus. Secundus amor, sive secunda species ... est amor venditus pretio ipsius amati, qualis est amor voluptatis, divitiarum, et honorum, et aliorum omnium, quae propter se solum quaeruntur. Tertius amor est deditus, seu donatus etc. ... qui est non vendens, sed donans, nec venditus, per quem non intenditur bonum amanti, sed amato (128 a, B-C).

[This love is for the creator as creator and as father and as giver of all goods ... and we designate this love, which is the first kind of love, owed love: therefore this love is like the love of gratitude, both owed and given in return. The second love, or the second kind of love ... is the love that is sold at the price of what is loved, such as the love of pleasure, wealth, and honor, and all other things that are sought for themselves alone. The third love is dedicated or given, and so on ... which is not a selling, nor sold, but a giving, and by this love one intends good, not for the lover, but for the beloved] (128 a, BC). Alexander of Hales adopts this threefold division as well. He says exactly the same thing but in fewer words: [76] Dilectio gratuita diligit summum bonum ponendo finem in illo; libidinosa diligit creaturam, sive mutabile bonum, ponendo finem in ea: unde diligit mutabile bonum propter se; dilectio vero naturalis diligit summum bonum, sed propter se, id est propter does not love the good. I mean a good human when it becomes known to him or her … and it is generally true, something that the holy and wise Augustine states, that the love of the good and the notion of the same are naturally implanted in us] (129 b, B, C).—It is not necessary to point out how naively these last words reveal the internal contradiction of the thought of William (see also 128 b, C: “si apprehenderet divinitatem, aut bonitatem ipsius” [if one apprehended the divinity or its goodness].— The very fact that a good can be perceived by us shows that it cannot be “foreign” to us).

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Part 2: The “Ecstatic” Conception of Love diligentem; unde ratio dilectionis constituitur in creatura ipsa intellectuali vel rationali (2 p. q. 30 m. 1 a. 2).

[Gratuitous love loves the highest good placing its end in this. Passionate love loves the creature or the mutable good placing its end in it; whence it loves the mutable good for the sake of itself. However natural love loves the highest good but for the sake of itself, that is for the sake of the lover. Whence the ground of love is established in the creature itself intellectually or rationally] (2 p. q. 30 m. 1 a. 2).

Chapter 3: Third Characteristic: Irrational Love

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Chapter 3 Third Characteristic: Irrational Love I Love quells and triumphs over everything in the soul. Its most marvelous victory therefore has to be the one which subjugates to itself what the twelfth century called “principale nostrum” [our chief part], namely, the intellect or the mind. Elucidations on the madness of love are frequent and characteristic in the authors with whom we are concerned. Love for them is irrational. This means in the first place that it is “unreasonable”: careless, rash, and disordered in the choice of means. It also means that it is “blind,” ignoring natures and the differences between beings, ignoring the “essential” order. St. Bernard in particular captures all of this with a definitive clarity and vigor: Confundis ordines, dissimulas usum, modum ignoras: totum quod opportunitatis, quod rationis, quod pudoris, quod consilii iudiciive esse videtur, triumphas in temet ipso et redigis in captivitatem (Saint Bernard, Serm. in Cant., 79, 1, PL. 183, 1163).

[You (love) confuse the orders; you pretend not to know the use; you are ignorant of moderation: you triumph over in yourself and take into captivity the whole that seems to belong to fittingness, to reason, to decorum, to counsel or to judgment] (Saint Bernard, Serm. in Cant., 79, 1, PL. 183, 1163).

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Part 2: The “Ecstatic” Conception of Love Non sum ingrata, sed amo. Accepi, fateor, meritis potiora, sed prorsus inferiora votis. Desiderio feror, non ratione ... Pudor sane reclamat, sed superat amor ... praeceps amor nec iudicium praestolatur, nec consilio temperatur, nec pudore frenatur, nec rationi subicitur (Id., 9, 2, l. c., 815).

[I am not ungrateful, but I love. I have received, I admit, better things than I have merited, but certainly lesser things than I have desired. I am carried off by desire not reason ... Propriety indeed protests, but love conquers ... headlong love does not wait for judgment, nor is it tempered by counsel, reined in by propriety, or subject to reason] (Id., 9, 2, l. c., 815). Amor vero, sicut nec odium, veritatis iudicium nescit (Id., De Gradibus Humilitatis et Superbiae, n. 14, PL. 182, 949).

[Indeed love, just as it does not know hatred, also does not know true judgment] (Id., De Gradibus Humilitatis et Superbiae, n. 14, PL. 182, 949). Feruntur effrenes in amoris abyssum ... quadam sana et sancta insania mente translati ... vehemens quippe vis amoris ratione non compescitur, quia, teste Apostolo, supereminet scientiae maiestate (Richard of St. Victor, Tractatus de Gradibus Caritatis, c. I, PL. 196, 1196).

[The unbridled are carried off to the abyss of love ... transported in mind by a certain sound and holy madness ... The vehement power of love, of course, is not quieted by reason, because, as the Apostle testified, it surpasses knowledge in majesty] (Richard of St. Victor, Tractatus de Gradibus Caritatis, c. I, PL. 196, 1196; compare Gilbert of Hoyland, who explains that “order,” when it is a matter of love, is inebriation, Serm. in Cant., 41, 9, PL. 184, 219). [77] Nec si ambules super pennas ventorum, subduceris affectui. Amor dominum nescit ... Per se satis subiectus est ... Olim mihi invisceratus es, non tam facile erueris. Ascende in caelos, descende in abyssos: non recedes a me, sequar te quocunque ieris ... Monebo te proinde, non ut magister, sed ut mater: plane ut amans. Amens

Chapter 3: Third Characteristic: Irrational Love magis videar, sed ei qui non amat, ei qui vim non sentit amoris (St. Bernard, De Consideratione, Prologue, PL. 182, 727-28).

[Not even if you walked on the wings of the wind, would you be rescued from the disposition. Love knows no master … By itself it has been made sufficiently subject ... Once you have become rooted in me, you will not so easily be removed. Ascend to the heavens, descend to the depths, you will not get away from me; I will follow you wherever you go ... Hence, I instruct you, not as a teacher, but as a mother: wholly as a lover. I may seem more insane, but only to one who does not love, to one who does not feel the power of love] (St. Bernard, De Consideratione, Prologue, PL. 182, 727-28). Amor reverentiam nescit. Ab amando quippe amor, non ab honorando nominatur. Honoret sane qui horret, qui stupet, qui metuit, qui miratur: vacant haec omnia penes amantem. Amor sibi abundat, amor ubi venerit, ceteros in se omnes traducit et captivat affectus. Propterea, quae amat, amat, et aliud novit nihil (Id., Serm. in Cant., 83, 3, PL. 183, 1182).

[Love knows no fear. Love, of course, receives its name from loving, not from showing respect. For one shows respect when one is awestricken, one is astounded, one is terrified, and one is amazed. But none of these occur in the lover. Love is more than enough in itself. Wherever love comes, it subjugates and renders captive to itself all of the other dispositions. Consequently one who loves, just loves, and does not know of anything else] (Id., Serm. in Cant., 83, 3, PL. 183, 1182). Sponsus est iste ... Multum illi cum terra ... In terra, inquit, nostra. Non plane principatum sonat vox ista, sed consortium, sed familiaritatem. Tanquam sponsus hoc dicit, non tanquam dominus. Quid? conditor est, et consortem se reputat! Amor loquitur, qui dominum nescit ... quos amat, amicos habet, non servos. Denique amicus fit de magistro: nec enim amicos discipulos diceret, si non essent.—Vides amori cedere etiam maiestatem? Ita est, fratres; neminem suspicit amor, sed ne despicit quidem. Omnes ex aequo intuetur, qui perfecte se amant, et in se ipso celsos humilesque contemperat; nec modo pares, sed unum eos facit. Tu Deum forsitan adhuc ab hac amoris regula excipi putas; sed qui

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Part 2: The “Ecstatic” Conception of Love adhaeret Deo, unus spiritus est. Quid miraris hoc? Ipse factus est tanquam unus ex nobis. Minus dixi: non tanquam unus, sed unus (Id., 59, 1, 2, l. c., 1062).

[He is the Bridegroom ... He has done many things for the earth ... In our land, He says. Clearly this voice does not sound like the voice of lordship, but of fellowship and familiarity. He is saying this as the Bridegroom not as the Lord. Why is this? He is the maker and yet He considers Himself one of us! For it is love that speaks, and love knows nothing of lordship ... And those whom He loves He regards as friends not as servants. Hence He changes from our Master to our Friend. For He would not have called His disciples friends unless they were really so.—Do you perceive how even majesty yields to love? So it is, my brethren. Love neither looks up to anyone, nor indeed looks down on anyone. It regards everyone equally who love one another perfectly, and it adapts high and low to each other in itself. Indeed, not only does it make them equals, but it even makes them one. Perhaps you still believe that God is an exception to this rule of love? Yet one who is joined to the Lord is one spirit. Why are you surprised at this? He has made Himself just like one of us. I have not said enough: for He has made Himself not just like one of us, but one of us] (Id., 59, 1, 2, l. c., 1062).105 Quid est hoc quod dicit: ille mihi et ego illi ... ? Tibi ille, tuque vicissim illi. Sed quid? Id ipsum ei tu, quod tibi ille, an aliud? ... Ita est: affectus locutus est, non intellectus, et ideo non ad intellectum ... Sponsa sancto amore flagrans, idque incredibili modo, ... non considerat quid qualiter eloquatur: sed quicquid in buccam venerit, amore urgente non enuntiat, sed eructat (Id., 67, 3, l. c., 1103-04).

[Why is it that she (the bride) says, “He (the Beloved) is mine and I am His ...? He is yours and you in turn are His. But why? 105

See Serm. 29, De Diversis, n. 3: “Nonne quodam modo stultum se fecerat, qui tradidit in mortem animam suam, et tulit peccata multorum, et quae non rapuit, tunc exsolvebat? Nonne ebrius erat vino caritatis, et immemor sui ...?” [Did not he (Christ) in a certain way make himself a fool as he handed over his life to death, and bore the sins of many, and then paid the debts that he did not incur? Was he not inebriated with the wine of charity and forgetful of himself ...?] (PL. 183, 621).


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Are you to Him what He is to you, or is there a difference? ... It is thus: affection has spoken, not the intellect. And consequently love has not spoken to the intellect ... The bride is aflame with a holy love, and she is so in an incredible way ... she does not consider the manner of her speech: but impelled by love she does not speak clearly, but bursts out with whatever has come into her mouth] (Id., 67, 3, l. c., 110304). Bona conscientia audet, et caritas ardet ... Magna vis amoris ... Semper amari se praesumit, quae amare se sentit. Denique non respectis aliis maiestatis nominibus, solum sponsa dilectum memorat, quae singulariter intus tolerat aestum amoris (Gilbert of Hoyland, Serm. in Cant., 1, 7, PL. 184, 16).

[A good conscience is bold and afire with love ... Great is the power of love ... It assumes that it is always loved, as it senses that it itself loves. Hence disregarding His other titles of majesty, the bride mentions only her Beloved, because in a special way she endures within the heat of His love] (Gilbert of Hoyland, Serm. in Cant., 1, 7, PL. 184, 16). The texts cited at the end of this list, and especially that of the sixty-seventh sermon of St. Bernard, are particularly remarkable. [78] Amicitia pares aut accipit, aut facit [Friendship either accepts or makes equals].106 In contrast with the Thomist conception, based entirely 106

This statement can be found in St. Jerome, Comm. in Michaeam, l. 2, c. 7, PL. 25, 1219, who adds: “Ubi inaequalitas est, et alterius eminentia, alterius subiectio, ibi non tam amicitia, quam adulatio est” [Where there is an inequality and the superiority of one thing and the subjection of the other, there is not so much friendship as flattery]. St. Jerome also cites Cicero, who had written: “Maximum est in amicitia, superiorem parem esse inferiori” [It is very important in friendship that superiors are equal to inferiors] (Laelius, c. 19). Compare Aelred of Rievaulx, De Spirituali Amicitia, b. III, PL. 195, 692; see 667; Id., Epist. ad Lundoniensem Episcopum, ibid., 361; William of Auvergne: “Iste amor est in praedicamento relationis aequiparantiae, et propter hoc, si fas est dicere, Deo quodam modo vel aequiparat eos in quibus est, id est amatores Dei. Amici enim, in quantum amici, pares sunt” [This love is found in the category of the relation of equality, and for this reason, if it is permissible to say this, it makes those in whom it exists equal in a certain way to God, that is lovers

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on the idea of the ajnomoeidh;~ filiva [friendship between dissimilars], (see pp. 112-13 [herein]) love, such as our authors conceive of it, is egalitarian. Or rather, it can be clearly seen that it would be, if these authors were able to pursue what is truly original in their thought to its logical conclusion. It would be egalitarian, because it would be purely personal; it is apt to be purely personal because it asserts that the differences of nature do not exist for love, that the dissimilarities [distances] perceptible to the mind are nonexistent for the heart. And this is to place face to face “persons” [“personnes”] stripped of everything, save their property of being able to be the origin of a movement of love. This movement itself, ultimately, and precisely because “natures” [“natures”] have disappeared, becomes absolutely inexplicable; and the theory, pushed to its limits, logically leads to the absurd exclamation that an impassioned writer [littérateur exalté]107 placed in the mouth of St. Augustine (he certainly could not have chosen more poorly):108 “My God, if I was God, and You were Auof God. For friends, as friends, are equals] (De Moribus, c. IV, p. 208). See, ibid., 209: “Quos hoc vinculo vinctos teneo, similiter et ipsi me vinctum tenent” [Those whom I hold bound by this bond in turn hold me bound] (This concerns God).—The application to the love of the Incarnate God arises quite naturally “quoniam tam copioso munere ipsa redemptio agitur, ut homo Deum valere videatur” [whereas the redemption is itself carried out by so bountiful a service that humans seemed to be equal to God] (Alcher of Clairvaux [?], De Diligendo Deo, c. VI, PL. 40, 853). 107 I do not know the name of this author. This sentence is often cited (for example by Massoulié, op. supra cit., p. 237), but always without a reference. 108 The leveling force of love is in no respect an Augustinian notion. Augustine always understands his love as a submission of the creature to the creator: the two terms are essentially the fruens [enjoyer] and the fruendum [enjoyed]. And even at the place where his lyricism soars the highest, love never carries the creature to the point of ignoring dissimilarities [distances].—And in the same way, speaking generally, Christ is not for him the friend, but only the mediator. 109 What is more, God elevates humans to His level. It is therefore, so to speak, His right to require from them a love that exceeds human powers. Compare, in certain authors of the twelfth century, the assertion that humans cannot love as much as they should (William of St. Thierry,


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gustine, I would rather have it that You were God, and I was Augustine.”109 [79] Our authors are, it is true, very far from committing these excesses which I only mention in order to reveal a principle of their implicit thought, a principle that prevented it from ever being developed into a complete and interconnected body of doctrine. Comprehension of the logical relationship between these ideas is here what matters to us.—Now, it would certainly be wrong to single out their exclamations in order to make theses out of them.110 For clearly these exclamations must be seen above all as outbursts of an admiration that feels forever inferior to its object. Indeed human reason, when it wants to talk about a thing that infinitely surpasses it, is always tempted simply to repudiate itself.—Yet it is no less certain that our authors take pleasure in translating and transposing these exclamations into “principles” [“principes”]. Not content with noting the fact that: Summus omnium factus est unus omnium [The greatest of all has become one of us all], they speak of a “law of love from which God is not exempt.” And this law, which if taken strictly would lead to some very strange consequences, turns out to be in perfect harmony with their ideas on ecstatic and destructive love.

II Systematic Speculation There also happens to be one author who “deduces” a mystery of the faith—the bloody Redemption—from this essential property of love: the leveling of those who love each other. This is William of Auvergne who expresses himself in the following way in his book De Causis cur Deus Homo: Speculum Fidei, PL. 180, 369; Baldwin of Devonshire, Tractatus Tertius, PL. 204, 420). See Gilbert of Hoyland, In Cantica, Serm. XIX, 2, PL. 184, 97; Richard of St. Victor, De Gradibus Caritatis, c. 2, PL. 196, 11991200.—See also St. Thomas 2a 2ae q. 27 a. 6. 110 Especially if the restrictions that they come to enunciate elsewhere are considered. St. Bernard, In Cantica, Serm. 83, 4, and 67, 8.

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Part 2: The “Ecstatic” Conception of Love Minus diligere et plus diligi, maiorem dilectionem exigere et minorem impendere, iniquitatis est, sicut in aliis donis et beneficiis se habet ... Amplius: amicitia aequiparantia est in praedicamento relationis: aequiparat enim et adaequat amicos: eodem ergo iure, eadem lege uti debet alter in alterum: igitur quicquid debet alteri alter ratione amicitiae, debent et reliqui illi. Si igitur ratione amicitiae debet genus [80] humanum Deo, ut moriatur pro illo, debet eodem iure hoc ipsum Deus eidem (op. cit., c.VII, t. I, p. 562).

[It is an injustice to love less and to be loved more, to demand more love and to expend less love, as is the case with other gifts and benefits ... In addition: equalizing friendship is in the category of relation: for it equalizes and sets friends on a par. One ought to use toward the other, then, the same right, the same law. Whatever, then, one owes the other by reason of friendship, those others also owe. If, then, by reason of friendship the human race owes it to God to die for Him, by the same right God owes the same to it (the human race)] (op. cit., c. VII, t. I, p. 562). The reader will notice that this argument is not part of a poetic discourse; rather it is part of a reasoned elucidation. On the same page the author raises the objection that the love of God is necessarily completely different from our own, since in God love occurs as essence, while in humans as participation and accident.—This proves only, he responds, that the “flow of love,” the “overflowings [redondances] of love,” and therefore the works of love, have to be at their maximum in God. Now the greatest among the works of love (as the Gospel asserts), is the “susceptio mortis” [undergoing of death]. God therefore had to die out of love for humans. This conception, so naively anthropomorphic, is wholly within the logic of the “ecstatic” theory of love.

Chapter 4: Fourth Characteristic: Love as the Final End

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Chapter 4 Fourth Characteristic: Love As the Final End I The wholly natural conclusion of the triumph of love over nature and mind, of its apparent triumph over God Himself, is the assertion of the transcendence, of the complete sufficiency, of the universal preeminence [précellence] of love. Love carries with itself its own justification, reason, and end. Is per se sufficit, is per se placet, et propter se. Ipse meritum, ipse praemium est sibi. Amor praeter se non requirit causam, non fructum. Fructus eius, usus eius. Amo, quia amo; amo, ut amem (St. Bernard, Serm. in Cant., 83, 4, PL. 183, 1183).

[It (love) is sufficient by itself, it pleases by itself, and for its own sake. It counts as merit to itself and is its own reward. Besides itself, love requires no motive and resulting fruit. Its fruit is its exercise of itself. I love because I love; I love in order to love] (St. Bernard, Serm. in Cant., 83, 4, PL. 183, 1183). Verus amor se ipso contentus est (Id., De Diligendo Deo, c. 7, n. 17, PL. 182, 984).

[True love is contented with itself] (Id., De Diligendo Deo, c. 7, n. 17, PL. 182, 984; cf. p. 147 [herein]). Vide quomodo totum tibi est dilectio, ipsa est electio, ipsa est cursus, ipsa est perventio, ipsa est mansio, ipsa est beatitudo (Hugh of St. Victor, De Laude Caritatis, PL. 176, 973).

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[See how love is everything to you: it is a choice, it is a journey, it is an attainment, it is an abiding, it is a happiness] (Hugh of St. Victor, De Laude Caritatis, PL. 176, 973). Solus igitur amor est quem a nobis Deus exigit ... Plenitudo legis est caritas, et legem continet et prophetas, quia quicquid divina lege indicitur, vel interdicitur, ad solum amorem reducitur. Solve tributum amoris, et Domino noveris satisfactum (Richard of St. Victor, De Gradibus Caritatis, c. III, PL. 196, 1202).

[Therefore love alone is what God demands from us ... The fullness of the law is charity, and it includes the law and the prophets, because whatever is commanded or forbidden by the divine law is reduced to love alone. Pay the tribute of love, and you will know that you have satisfied the Lord] (Richard of St. Victor, De Gradibus Caritatis, c. III, PL. 196, 1202).111 [81] Amor omni supereminet gratiae ... Caritas cumulus est, caritas fundamentum ... Illa in primis, illa in ultimis, illa in intimis: illa inchoat, illa consummat ... Media, inquit, caritate. Bene media, quae sic intima est. Plenitudo legis est caritas ... Amori nihil satis est, nihil minus se ipso. Amor se ipso satiari non potest, et tamen nisi se ipso pasci non potest: ipse sibi dulce satis est pabulm. Amor nil magis vult quam amare. Quam dabit homo commutationem pro amore? quam dabit vel quam accipiet? Nihil gratius amore impenditur, nil dulcius sentitur ... Vere dulcis amor, et solus dulcis amor; et omnis dulcis amor, sed non est amor ad amorem Christi (Gilbert of Hoyland, Serm. in Cant., 19, 1, 2, PL. 184, 96-97).

[Love towers above every grace ... Charity is the summit as charity is the foundation ... It is among the first things; it is 111

In his attempt at a demonstration of the Trinity (see p. 164 [herein]), Richard of St. Victor enunciates the principle: “Nihil caritate melius, nihil caritate perfectius” [Nothing is better than charity, nothing is more perfect than charity] (De Trinitate, III, 2), without bothering to prove its truth other than by the assertion: “Hoc nos docet ipsa natura, idem ipsum multiplex experientia” [Nature herself teaches us this; many experiences do the same] (ibid., III, 3). The reasonings concerning the Holy Spirit suppose furthermore that love is something good in itself, even when considered purified, so to speak, of all content: the communicatio [imparting] as such is something good, apart from all the other goods offered for communication (see ibid., III, 14; VI, 6).


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among the last things; it is among those innermost things. It is the beginning and it is the consummation ... Charity in the center, says the verse. It is aptly in the center, since it is so innermost. The fullness of the law is charity ... Nothing is enough for love, nothing less than itself. Love cannot be satisfied with itself and yet it can find nourishment only in itself; it is food sweet enough for itself. Love wants nothing more than to love. What will a human give in exchange for love? What will one give or what will one receive? Nothing is imparted more graciously than love, nothing is felt more sweetly ... Truly love is sweet and only love is sweet and all love is sweet, but no love can be compared with the love of Christ] (Gilbert of Hoyland, Serm. in Cant., 19, 1, 2, PL. 184, 96-97). We recognize here one of the most magnificent commonplaces of the medieval religious literature. Elucidations of this kind arose, as though on their own, on the basis of certain verses of Scripture that were cited with predilection: Song 8:7; 1 Cor 13:13; Rom 13:10; Mt 22:40. They also found some backing in many statements of the Fathers, and in particular in the famous dictum of Augustine: “Dilige, et quod vis fac” [Love and do what you will] (In Ep. Ioannis, 7, 4, 8, PL. 35, 2033). However, our authors necessarily went farther than the Fathers. Their assertion of a certain primacy of love, if this term can be used, was not only more intense, it was also more precise. Although still implicit, the presence of a metaphysics of love already influenced their minds, making its effects felt here. It unconsciously caused these lyrical writers to prejudge the solution to a very delicate speculative problem.

II Systematic Speculation The Essence of the Beatitude: The Possession by Love If love justifies through itself, if, as St. Bernard said, love “suffices wholly on its own,” then it is consequently the one necessity, [82] the final end, the end in itself (the propter se volitum [willed for its

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own sake], in Scholastic language). For humans living at that time, this was equivalent to saying that love is beatitude itself, and this is precisely what Hugh of St. Victor did say: “ipsa est beatitudo” [it is happiness].—However, beatitude was not conceived of otherwise than as the “possession of the supreme Good.” Therefore, the action of loving has to be conceived of as a formally possessing action. This conception which is very widespread in the twelfth century, had, if I am not mistaken, a significant influence on the development of Scholasticism. Indeed, the essential difference between Scotism and Thomism has to be sought nowhere else than in the notion of spiritual possession. According to St. Thomas, perceiving, for the intellect, is having and being. This is what Duns Scotus either never could comprehend, or never wanted to admit. As a profoundly logical mind, he accordingly completely reconstructed his theory of knowledge and his ontology. On this fundamental point, he could have easily believed that he was in agreement with the Patristic and medieval tradition.112 To begin with, here are some texts of the mystics of the twelfth century: Quid autem est absurdius uniri Deo amore, et non beatitudine? Beati enim vere et unice, et singulariter et perfecte beati, qui vere et perfecte amant te ... Quid enim est beatum esse, nisi non velle nisi bonum, et omnia habere quaecunque vult? Te igitur velle, et ... singulariter amare ... hoc demum est non velle nisi bonum, hoc est habere quaecunque vult omnia: quia habet te quis, in quantum amat te. (And further on): Licet ... nullus sensus cuiuslibet animae vel spiritus te comprehendat, tamen totum te, quantus es, comprehendit amor amantis, qui totum te amat quantus es (William of St. Thierry, De Contemplando Deo, c. 8, PL. 184, 375-76).

[But what is there more incongruous than to be united to God by love and yet not in beatitude? For those who truly and 112

“Ama et propinquabit: ama et habitabit. Dominus in proximo est, nihil solliciti fueritis. Vis videre quam si amaveris tecum sit? Deus caritas est” [Love and He (God) will draw near; love and He (God) will dwell in you. The Lord is nearby; you should not be worried about anything. Do you want to see what is with you if you love? God is charity] (Augustine, Serm. XXI, n. 2, PL. 38, 143).


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perfectly love You are truly and uniquely happy and exceedingly and perfectly happy ... For what is happiness unless it is to want only what is good and to have anything whatsoever that one wants? Then to want You, and ... to love You exceedingly ... this is ultimately to want only what is good, that is, to have whatever one wants. For one has You just insofar as one loves You]. (And further on): [For though ... no sense of any soul or spirit can comprehend You, the love of the lover, nonetheless, who loves the whole of You as great as You are comprehends the whole of You as great as You are] (William of St. Thierry, De Contemplando Deo, c. 8, PL. 184, 375-76). Amare iam tenere est; etiam assimilari et uniri est. Quidni, cum Deus caritas sit? (Gilbert of Hoyland, Serm. in Cant., 8, 6, PL. 184, 51).

[Now to love is to hold; it is also to become like and to be united (with another). And why not, since God is charity?] (Gilbert of Hoyland, Serm. in Cant., 8, 6, PL. 184, 51 ; see, however, the distinction between tenere [holding] and teneri [being held], ibid., 9, 2, 3; see 13, 6). Qui amat te, capit te; et tantum capit, quantum amat, quia ipse amor es, quia caritas es (Aelred of Rievaulx, Speculum Caritatis, [83] b. I, c. I, PL. 195, 505).

[Someone who loves You, captures You.113 And the more one loves, the more one captures, because You Yourself are love, You Yourself are charity] (Aelred of Rievaulx, Speculum 113

See the strange etymology of Andrew the Chaplain (who seems to have written about 1190): Dicitur autem amor ab amo verbo, quod significat capere vel capi. Nam qui amat, captus est cupidinis vinculis aliumque desiderat suo capere hamo. Sicut enim piscator ... ita vero captus amore ... totis ... nisibus instat duo diversa quodam incorporali vinculo corda unire vel unita semper coniuncta servare [Now love (amor) is derived from the verb amo, meaning to capture or to be captured, for those who love are captured by the bonds of desire and long to capture others on their hook. For just like an angler ... so also people ensnared by love ... with every effort ... strive to unite two separated hearts with an imperceptible bond, or once joined to keep them always together] (De Amore, b. I, c. 3, ed. Trojel, p. 9).T

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Caritatis, b. 1, c. 1, PL. 195, 505; on the same page, Aelred had called love: locus capax Dei [the place capable of (receiving) God]). Per caritatem apprehendis et frueris. Deus, inquit Ioannes apostolus, caritas est, et qui manet in caritate, in Deo manet, et Deus in eo. Qui igitur caritatem habet, Deum habet, Deum possidet, in Deo manet (Hugh of St. Victor, De Laude Caritatis, PL. 176, 973; see 975).

[Through love you apprehend and enjoy. God, says the Apostle John, is charity, and one who abides in love, abides in God, and God in this person. Therefore one who has charity, has God, possesses God, and abides in God] (Hugh of St. Victor, De Laude Caritatis, PL. 176, 973; see 975). (Deus) si amatur, habetur; si diligitur, gustatur: praesens est dilectioni (Id., De Sacramentis, b. II, p. 13, PL. 176, 534; see 535 B).

[(God) if He is loved, is had; if He is loved, is tasted. He is present for love] (Id., De Sacramentis, b. II, p. 13, PL. 176, 534; see 535 B).114 O bone Deus, quem amare edere est ... ad hoc ergo cibas, ut esurire facias ... amoris namque bona eo minus satiant, quo magis replent. Implevit bonus: quibus bonis? nolo a me quaeras quae sint bona caritatis; profecto illa esse aestimo de quibus dicitur: Oculus non vidit, absque te, quae praeparasti diligentibus te; et alio loco: Oculus non vidit, et auris non audivit, et in cor hominis non ascendit. Audis diligentibus praeparata, ut dilectionis bona fore non ambigas. In hac enim repositae sunt aeternitatis deliciae, et omnis caelestis suavitas (Richard of St. Victor, De Gradibus Caritatis, c. II, PL. 196, 1200).

[O good God, whom to love is to consume ... You are, then, food in order to make us hungry ... for the goods of love satisfy 114

This reasoning of such a naive logic perhaps has as its source a sentence of St. Augustine that occurs a few lines after the passage cited in footnote 112, p. 200 [herein]: “Deus caritas est. Dicturus es mihi: Putas quid est caritas? Caritas est qua diligimus” [God is charity. I in turn would reply: Do you recognize what charity is? Charity is that by which we love] (loc. cit.).


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us less to the extent that they fill us more. He who is good has filled us: with what goods? I do not want you to ask me what are the goods of charity; I certainly hold that they are those of which it is said: No eye has seen, without You, what You have prepared for those who love You. And in another place: No eye has seen, nor ear has heard, nor has it entered into the heart of a human being. You hear what is prepared for the lovers, so that you are not in doubt that there will be goods of love. For the delights of eternity and every heavenly sweetness have been deposited in it] (Richard of St. Victor, De Gradibus Caritatis, c. II, PL. 196, 1200).115 Let us next turn our attention to a more didactic author, who lived in the thirteenth century, and in whom we already encounter some Arabic locutions, although the fluidity of his style reminds us even more of the school of St. Bernard. This is William of Auvergne who also speaks of possessing love: far from critiquing or apologizing for this metaphor, he instead turns it into a systematic assertion. His language is at least very clear when he restricts the application of this principle to a kind of intentional possession or sympathetic communication of feelings. Yet some lyrical comparisons later gain the upper hand and his thought in its imprecision resembles that of the preceding authors. After recalling, according to the Areopagitic doctrine, that the lover becomes the object [la chose] of the beloved, he asserts that the reverse is also true: [84] Secunda laus et virtus eius est, quia quicquid tetigerit, suum facit amantis, quod multi ignorant ... bona et mala eorum quos amamus, nostra sunt per communionem quam supra prosecuti sumus ... Manifestum autem quod quicquid tangit amor noster, nostrum est per modum praedictum. Facillima ergo est nobis acquisitio omnium bonorum, dum solum huius modi tactu ea acquirimus, et nostra facimus ... Iste amor est velut accipiter rapacissimus, cuius rapacitatem nullum volatile effugit. Bona enim spiritualia ... volucres sunt ... Huius modi volatum atque rapacitatem vel ipse Deus haud fugit, aut evadit ... cum iste accipiter cum consequitur, et comprehendit, et ligatum tradit possessori suo ... 115

On the very original manner in which William of St. Thierry conceived of the possession by love, see Appendix 2 at the end of this study.

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Part 2: The “Ecstatic” Conception of Love statim cum amaveris, immo quam cito ipsum amas eundem capis et tenes ... Si vero aliquid quod contra eum (Deum) sit, amet ille (homo), se per vinculum amoris possidendum iam tradidit et tenendum, quem ad modum solet tradi equus vel asinus ei a quo possidendus est (William of Auvergne, De Moribus, c. IV, t. 1, pp. 207-08).

[The second glory and virtue of it (love) is that whatever it touches it makes the lover’s own, something many do not know ... the good and bad things of those whom we love are our own through the sharing that we examined above ... But it is evident that whatever our love touches is our own through the manner described. The acquisition, then, of all goods is most easy for us, since we acquire them merely by such a touch and we make them our own … This love is like a most rapacious hawk, whose rapaciousness no flying creature escapes. For spiritual goods … are birds … Even God himself scarcely flees or escapes such a flight and rapacity … since when this hawk pursues and seizes, and binds it hands the bird over to its owner … immediately when you love (God), in fact as soon as you love Him, you capture and hold Him ... But if they (humans) love something that is opposed to Him, they have already handed themselves over to be owned and held by a bond of love, just as a horse or a mule is often handed over to someone by whom it will be owned] (William of Auvergne, De Moribus, c. IV, t. 1, pp. 207-08). And further on the author has love speak: Ego sum fur fidelissimus, atque iustissimus, et innocentissimus, qui omnia bona aliena clam capio, mea facio, ac quaero (acquiro?): amando enim illa, atque inde gaudendo, nescientibus illis quorum sunt, clam illa rapio, mea facio, et acquiro (Id., 209).

[I am the most trustworthy, just, and harmless thief, who secretly captures, makes mine, and seeks (acquires?) all the goods of others: for by loving them and then rejoicing over them, I secretly seize them, make them mine, and acquire them, though their owners do not know this] (Id., 209).


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Finally, let us turn to the classical authors of the thirteenth century. Here is how the eclectic Albert the Great, who was the teacher of St. Thomas, expresses himself:116 116

St. Thomas denies that love formally brings about the real possession: “Coniungere secundum rem non est de ratione caritatis, et ideo potest esse habiti et non habiti” [To unite in reality is not part of the meaning of charity, and for this reason there can be a love of what one has and of what one does not have] (Car. a. 2 ad 6; see De Spe. a. 1 ad 11, and the articles where he treats the constituent elements of beatitude). Possessing, grasping, is, according to him, the lot of the apprehensive faculties, the principal one of which is the intellect. Consequently, it is the operation of the intellect that will beatify us by making us possessors of the divine Essence.—It is true that he has some assertions such as: “Notitia in actu est quodam modo ipsum cognitum, et amor in actu est quodam modo ipsum amatum” [Knowledge in act is in some way the object known and love in act is in some way the object loved] (De Anima, a. 12 ad 5; see 1 q. 37 a. 1, etc.), but he explains very clearly what he intends to convey by these manners of speaking. See 4 CG. 19, 4 and 10: “Quod amatur non solum est in intellectu amantis, sed etiam in voluntate ipsius; aliter tamen et aliter. In intellectu enim est secundum similitudinem suae speciei; in voluntate autem amantis est sicut terminus motus in principio motivo proportionato per convenientiam et proportionem quam habet ad ipsum; sicut in igne quodam modo est locus sursum, ratione levitatis, secundum quam habet proportionem et convenientiam ad talem locum ...” [What is loved is not only in the intellect of the lover, but also in the lover’s will, although in different ways. For it is in the intellect according to the likeness of its form (species); it is in the will of the lover, however, as the terminus of motion in a moving principle proportioned to it through the suitability and proportion that it has to it; just as in fire in a certain manner the terminus is a place above by reason of its lightness in accordance with which it has a proportion and suitability for such a place ...], “Amatum in voluntate exsistit ut inclinans et quodam modo impellens intrinsecus amantem in ipsam rem amatam ...” [The beloved exists in the will as inclining, and in some way inwardly impelling the lover toward the very thing loved …] (see also Comp. Theol., I, 45; 1 q. 27 a. 4; and 1a 2ae q. 16 a. 4, where St. Thomas adds “sic habere finem est imperfecte habere ipsum” [to have an end in this way is to have it imperfectly]). Hence, love does not give the beloved to the lover by communicating to it, as it were, another specimen of the same essence (which is the case with understandings per speciem [by way of (intelligible) species]), nor by communicating to it the real essence itself in its totality (which is the case with understanding per essentiam [by way of essence]). Rather love gives the beloved to the lover by subjugating the lover to the beloved’s principle of life, by taking away its private

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Part 2: The “Ecstatic” Conception of Love [85] Visio ... dicit conversionem super praesentiam tantum: comprehensio autem quae succedit spei, dicit adhaerentiam: sed amor eo quod est vitta stringens et acutum mobile, penetrans amatum, ut dicit Dionysius, dicit inhaerentiam ... Est enim duplex coniunctio, scilicet per meritum, et per quendam quasi contactum. Per meritum enim omnis virtus coniungit Deo: sed per contactum tripliciter accidit coniunctio, scilicet secundum praesentiam, et hic est cum intellectus attingit rem in sua essentia, sed non necessario tenet et habet eam: unde assimilatur quasi tactui mathematico, in quo ultima tangentia sunt simul tantum. Secunda est quasi per adhaerentiam et tentionem et habere, et hic tactus est eius quod succedit spei, et assimilatur quasi tactui compactorum. Tertia est per inhaerentiam, quando unum quasi ingreditur alterum, et contrahit impressiones et affectiones e natura eius: et hic est tactus amoris, et assimilatur tactui naturali, in quo tangentia agunt et patiuntur ad invicem, et imprimunt sibi mutuo suas proprietates. Et primus modus coniunctionis est ut materialiter dispositio ad

individuality in order to constitute it as part of a new whole. And if we can still speak here of likeness, it is “secundum quod potentia habet similitudinem ad actum ipsum” [insofar as potency has a likeness to the act itself] (1a 2ae q. 27 a. 3): indeed here it is not a question of a likeness between two equals, for the more love is love, the more the lover is totally subordinated to the beloved and informed by it (see pp. 112-13 [herein]). The doctrine of the amatum in amante [beloved in the lover] finds a theological application in the Thomist theory of grace (1 q. 8 a. 3 ad 4; 1 q. 43 a. 3; 4 CG. 23, 10): “It is through the love that it causes in us that the Holy Spirit is in us, and that we possess it.” Grace, this principle of divine nature, is entirely a tendency, a movement towards glory. This idea of a kind of possession through potential disposition is also found in certain authors of the twelfth century in regard to supernatural love: “Non habitus desiderari non posset” [If He (the Beloved) were not possessed, He could not be desired] says Richard of St. Victor (Expl. in Cant., c. I, PL. 196, 411). And in the same way, St. Bernard anticipates Pascal when he says: “Nemo te quaerere valet, nisi qui prius invenerit” [No one can seek you unless they have previously found you] (De Diligendo Deo, VII, 22, PL. 182, 987). (See also William of St. Thierry, PL. 184, 366). Certain elucidations on the “sharp” and penetrating “nature” of love that places “the object loved in the lover,” must be related not to the definitive possession, but to the potential disposition and to the tendency toward real union which this implies. See Hugh of St. Victor, Exp. in Hierarchiam Caelestem, PL. 175, 1037, and Albert the Great, De Adhaerendo Deo Liber, c. XII (ed. Borgnet, v. XXXVII, p. 536), who here is very close to the Thomist conception; see St. Thomas 1a 2ae q. 28 a. 2.


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fruitionem. Secundus autem et tertius propinque se habent: sed quartus est completivus: et hoc patet ex nomine eius quod est fructus, quia hic est gustus dulcendinis quietantis, et gustus ille non elicitur nisi ex interioribus [86] rei quae sunt de natura et complexione eius quo fruimur (In 1 d. l. B a. 12 ad qclam 1, ed. Borgnet, v. XXV, pp. 29-30).

[Vision … means a turning toward something present, but the comprehension that follows upon hope means an adherence. But love insofar as it is a binding clasp and moving dart that penetrates the beloved, as Dionysius says, means an inherence ... For there is a twofold union, that is, through merit and through a sort of contact. For all virtue unites one to God through merit, but union comes about in three ways. Through contact, that is, through presence, and this is when the intellect reaches a thing in its essence, but does not necessarily hold and possess it. Hence, it is likened to a mathematical touching in which the ends that touch are merely together. The second is like a possessing through an adhering and holding, and this is the touching that follows upon hope, and it is likened to a touching of things that have been conjoined. The third is by inherence when one thing, so to speak, enters the other, and takes on impressions and proclivities from its nature. And this is the touching of love, and it is likened to the natural touching in which the touching things act upon each other and are acted upon by each other and mutually impress their properties upon each other. And the first mode of connecting is like a material disposition for enjoying. And the second and third come close, but the fourth is perfective, and this is evident from its name, which is enjoyment, because this is the taste of calming sweetness, and that taste is elicited only from the interior parts of something which come from the nature and character of that which we enjoy] (In 1 d. l. B a. 12 ad qclam 1, ed. Borgnet, v. XXV, pp. 29-30). See In Cael. Hier., b. VI § 1: (affectio) “immediatius coniungit fini” [(the proclivity) more immediately joins with the end], and ad 3 (ibid., v. XIV, 159). Thus for Albert the Great possession, in spiritual beings, is not identical to understanding (intellectus attingit rem in sua essentia,

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sed non necessario tenet et habet eam) [the intellect reaches a thing in its essence without necessarily taking hold of and having it], which is a material disposition that precedes it. The penetration of love is also distinct from the possession: for it follows it and renders it more perfect. The penetration of love is itself followed by the fourth moment, fructus, gustus dulcendinis quietantis [enjoyment, the taste of calming sweetness], which corresponds to the delight [la délectation; delectatio] of the other Scholastics. Albert does not tell us to which power of the soul he attributes the second moment (possession, tentio [grasping], habere [having]), nor even if he attributes it to a power of the soul at all. St. Bonaventure distinguishes in the same way between visio, tentio, et fruitio [vision, grasping, and enjoyment]. And while he believes that possession is formally neither understanding (vision), nor enjoyment, he nevertheless declares that enjoyment, because it is a union of love, is the more unitive of these. Fruitio de sui generali ratione dicit amoris unionem, scilicet fruibilis cum fruente ... Si quis videt aliquid et habet, nunquam delectetur, nisi amet; aliter tamen requiritur visio quam amor. Nam visio disponit, similiter et tentio, sed amor delicias suggerit. Unde est quasi acumen penetrans, et ideo ei maxime convenit unire et per consequens delectare et quietare; ideo essentialiter, non dispositive est fruitio (1 d. 1 a. 2 q. un., sol. and ad 2).

[Enjoyment, from its general definition, means the union of love, that is, of what is to be enjoyed with the enjoyer ... If someone observes and has something, this person is never delighted unless he or she loves. Vision, however, is required in a different way from that in which love is. For vision arranges things—so too does holding—but love affords delight. Hence, it is like a penetrating blade, and for this reason it especially pertains to love to unite, and as a result, to delight and to calm. And for this reason love is essentially, not by way of disposition, enjoyment] (1 d. 1 a. 2 q. un., sol. and ad 2). Cardinal Matthew of Aquasparta in the same way teaches that:


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Principalis actus voluntatis est amare, qui est alius a desiderio et delectatione ... Et hoc actu voluntas pertingit ad finem et consequitur, unitur et adhaeret ei perfectius quam per intellectum ... Consecutio vel obtentus summi boni inchoatur in cognitione, sed perficitur in amore (Quaestiones Disputatae Selectae, q. 9, De Cognitione, ad 9, Quaracchi, 1903, pp. 407-08).

[The principal act of the will is to love, which is different from desire and delight ... And by this act the will arrives at and attains its end, is united to it and adheres to it more perfectly than through the intellect ... The attainment or reaching of the highest good begins with knowledge but is perfected with love] (Quaestiones Disputatae Selectae, q. 9, De Cognitione, ad 9, Quaracchi, 1903, pp. 407-08).117 And Duns Scotus came to say, with a greater technical precision: (Dicendum) beatitudinem essentialiter et formaliter consistere in actu voluntatis, quo simpliciter et solum attingitur bonum optimum [87] cuius fruitione est natura beatificabilis perfecte beata ... Concedo, actu desiderii, qui est absentis, non assequi finem, sed id evenire per alium actum, qui est amor rei praesentis; hoc enim obiectum beatificum assequitur primo, loquendo de primitate perfectionis, licet per actum intellectus sit aliqualis assecutio prior prioritate generationis ... Delectatio sequitur finis assecutionem, nedum primitate generationis, sed etiam perfectionis; sequitur enim actum diligendi finem visum, qui est vere actus elicitus voluntatis. Porro, omnino falsum est, voluntatem circa obiectum amabile sibi praesens non elicere actum aliquem, sed solum recipere delectationem et passionem (4 d. 49 q. 4).

[(We must say that) beatitude essentially and formally consists in an act of the will by which without qualification and alone there is attained the greatest good, by the enjoyment of which a nature capable of happiness is made perfectly happy ... I concede that by an act of desire, which is for something 117

In this same Question 9, the author also determines that rapture (raptus) is an elevation of the will even more than of the intellect (Loc. cit., p. 405; see Grabmann, Die philosophische und theologische Erkenntnislehre des Kardinals Matthaeus von Aquasparta, Vienna, 1906, pp. 163-72).


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absent, the end is not attained; rather, that comes about by another act, which is the love of something present. For it attains this beatified object first, if we are speaking of the primacy of perfection, though by an act of the intellect there is some prior attainment by a priority of generation ... Delight follows the attainment of the end, by a primacy not only of generation, but also of perfection. For it follows the act of loving the end that is seen, and this is truly an elicited act of the will. Further, it is completely false that the will does not elicit some act concerning a lovable object present to it, but only receives delight and an experience] (4 d. 49 q. 4). And elsewhere: Dei beatitudo non consistit in acquisitione finis secundum actum intellectus, sed primario et completive in possessione eiusdem per actum voluntatis ... (operatio voluntatis est) adductiva formaliter possessionis summi boni (4 d. 49 q. 3).

[The beatitude of God does not consist in the acquisition of the end according to an act of the intellect, but primarily and completely in the possession of the same end by an act of the will ... (it is the operation of the will that) formally brings about the possession of the highest good] (4 d. 49 q. 3). The reader will notice how strange such an outcome is, after hearing the proponents of the “ecstatic” conception proclaim that love is essentially mortifying and destructive.—This outcome was, however, unavoidable: for if love is conceived of as more powerful than all of the other natural inclinations, as exercising its tyranny over them— since our authors were moreover Scholastic and could not fail to believe in the harmonious finality of nature—then it was clearly necessary that the possession of the supreme good be attributed to that inclination of the soul which triumphed over all of the others. Vide quomodo totum tibi est dilectio! [See how love is everything to you!]. Thus by moving from poem to system, by intending to make a pronouncement on the essence of things, our authors had to formally attribute to love, after its role as the principal means [moyen principal] in the [earthly] state of wayfaring [l’état de voie], the immediate


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possession of the end [la fin] in the [heavenly] state of the terminus [l’état de terme].

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Appendix 1 The Formulation of the Problem of Love in the First Scholastics The question of the natural love of free creatures is not formulated by the compilers of Sentences [Sententiaires] with the same amount of clarity as it is by the Scholastics of the thirteenth century. “Charity” and “cupidity” split the world: this was what minds raised [nourri] on Augustine, but unskilled at distinguishing the domain of philosophy from that of dogma, took as the necessary starting point, the initial presupposition of any theory of love.118 This was a rather different presupposition than the Neoplatonic principle which proclaimed that all things have an appetition for God. Accordingly certain consequences ensued, if not very rigorously, at least very naturally. One such consequence was that between charity and cupidity 118

Pes cordis [animae], dicit Augustinus, amor est, qui si rectus est, dicitur caritas, si vero curvus, dicitur cupiditas” [The foot of the heart (soul), says Augustine, is love, which if it is straight is called charity, but if it is curved is called cupidity] (William of Auvergne, De Moribus, c. IV, t. 1, p. 207).—For the texts of Augustine that favor the theory of natural love, see Portalié in the Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, art. Augustin, col. 2436, and Jules Martin, S. Augustin (Collection: Les grands philosophes, Paris, 1901, pp. 205-06).—It is certain that Augustine, who on occasion was able to find in all of the appetites of nature some images of the love of God, and in this way comes close to Pseudo-Dionysius and Thomas, nevertheless asserts with predilection the antithesis of caritas [charity] and cupiditas [cupidity], the discontinuity between the fruenda [things that are to be enjoyed] and the utenda [things that are to be used]. The history of his conversion predisposed him to this.

Formulation of the Problem of Love in the First Scholastics

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there was an absolute antithesis. And as charity and grace are two equivalent terms, and as grace is opposed to nature, such thinkers were tempted, using the current language, to identify nature with cupidity. Cupidity, wholly base as it was, was regarded as the fruit itself of nature. These thinkers only saw an indistinct difference between these two terms—natural love and perverted love. Assuredly, the opposition which here concerns us was not, in [89] the Christian minds of that time, the marked and provocative Scholastic form that will later bring about its condemnation withU Baius.119 Rather the opposition was felt to be vaguely appropriate. And everywhere—in the sermons, ascetic treatises, letters of direction, and personal outpourings—grace was commonly characterized as the love of God in preference to oneself and nature as a narrow egoism.120 We can cite, among other formulations of this thought bequeathed to the Scholastic age by the Oratorical age, the one attributed to St. Bernard: Natura semper in se curva est [Nature is always curved in on itself ]. This remark readily shows how a theological idea could cause someone to prejudge the philosophical solution to the problem of love. Before this problem could even be formulated, it found its resolution through the negation of every natural affection that was not fundamentally egoistic. The question of the natural love of free creatures appears to me to have its Patristic origins in a sentence from a treatise of Fulgentius of Ruspe, attributed by the Middle Ages to St. Augustine:

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Omnis amor creaturae rationalis aut vitiosa est cupiditas, qua mundus diligitur, quae a Joanne prohibetur, aut laudabilis illa caritas, qua per Spiritum sanctum in corde diffusa Deus amatur [Every love of a rational creature is either sinful cupidity by which the world is loved and which is forbidden by John, or is that laudable charity by which God is loved through the Holy Spirit who is poured forth into the heart] (Denzinger, Enchiridion Symbolorum et Definitionum, n. 918 [1938]; see n. 914 [1934], and also the analogous propositions of the Synod of Pistoia, condemned by Pius VI, Denzinger, ibid., n. 1386-87 [2623-24]).V 120 See the chapter of the Imitation of Christ [by Thomas à Kempis]: De Diversis Motibus Naturae et Gratiae [On the Different Movements of Nature and Grace] (III, 54).

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Appendix 1 Superiores vero spiritus ... et aeternos creavit, et eis facultatem atque intelligentiam cogitandae, cognoscendae, diligendaeque divinitatis inseruit. Quos tamen ita creavit, ut etiam prae se ipsis illum diligerent, cuius se tales creatos opere cognovissent (De Fide ad Petrum, n. 31, PL. 40, 763).

[But He created the higher ... and eternal spirits, and placed in them the ability and intelligence to contemplate, know, and love the divinity. He, nonetheless, created them so that even before themselves they would love Him by whose work they knew that they had been created as such beings] (De Fide ad Petrum, n. 31, PL. 40, 763). Now here the author speaks of an initial love; one would not be able to assert that he speaks of a natural love. And similarly, in the early compilers of Sentences, two questions seem to coincide which later Scholasticism (see St. Thomas 3 d. 29 q. 1 a. 3) will take care to distinguish: “Was the angel (or human) created in the state of supernatural love, in the state of grace?”; “Did the angel (or human), from the first instant, love God, and love God more than itself?”—If the two questions are actually one and the same, then natural love of God is impossible and there is no middle ground between caritas [charity] and cupiditas [cupidity]. But then, what will become of rational [90] theology? How can the conclusion that nature is essentially bad be avoided? And even if only a natural love of God more than oneself is rejected, how can one avoid rendering gratuitous charity a contradictory concept? For it is hard to see how, in this particular case, what is naturally impossible could have been supernaturally possible, since it would not only be a matter of transforming the act by elevating it, by rendering it meritorious of Heaven, but indeed of causing the will to be determined in a manner contrary to its nature. The only way to extricate oneself from this obscurity is to broaden the Augustinian theory of grace through a more or less conscious return to the doctrine of the Greek Fathers: Nolumus exspoliari, sed supervestiri [We wish not to be stripped bare, but to be clothed from above]. Thus the notion of natural love is necessary. Now Peter Lombard and Peter of Poitiers are the first in whom the confusion vanishes.


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Hugh of St. Victor, in his De Sacramentis [On the Sacraments], does not deal with the precise point that concerns us here (but rather some closely related questions, b. I, p. 5, c. 5 and 19, PL. 176, col. 249, 254). Abelard, on the contrary, in his Dialogue of the Philosopher, Jew, and Christian (PL. 178, 1659) shows that he clearly felt the difficulty. How, says the Philosopher to the Christian, could God have created as good this rebellious angel “quem nunquam in veritate vel in dilectione Dei constitisse dicitis? ... Nullus quippe angelus sive spiritus aut etiam homo a dilectione Dei et vera caritate alienus, bonus recte dicitur, sicut nec malus, quamdiu peccato caret. Si igitur angelus ille neque cum peccato neque cum caritate Dei creatus est, quomodo bonus adhuc angelus vel malus creatus esse dicendus est?” [whom you say He never established in the truth or in the love of God? ... Indeed no angels or spirits or even humans who are estranged from the love of God and true charity are correctly called good, just as they are also not correctly called evil as long as they are free from sin. If, therefore, that angel was not created with sin nor with charity for God, how can that angel still be said to have been created either good or evil?]—In the compilers of Sentences who are under the influence of Abelard this problem is clearly formulated but crudely resolved. For instance, Rolando Bandinelli (Alexander III) holds that the angels have not been created in charity: “et tamen dicimus, quod boni, mundi et sancti fuerunt creati, non quia virtutem aliquam haberent, sed quia nulli vitio penitus subiacebant” [and we, nonetheless, say that they were created good, pure, and holy, not because they had any virtue, but because they were not inwardly subject to any vice]. Then he himself raises the very serious objection, which in the thirteenth century will bring about the victory of the classical solution: “Sciebat se creaturam esse et creatorem habere, quem sciebat diligendum fore: ergo aut diligebat eum aut non diligebat. Quod si diligebat, caritatem habebat ...” [He (the devil) knew that he was a creature and had a creator whom he knew was to be loved: therefore either he loved Him or he did not. But if he did love, he had charity]. And he responds: “A Diabolo ante confirmationem non exigebatur, ut Deum [91] diligeret” [The devil was not required to love God before he was confirmed (in grace)], just as a child, before the age of adulthood [discrétion], is not required to perform salutary works (Die

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Sentenzen Rolands, ed. Gietl, Freiburg-im-Breisgau, pp. 91-92, 90, 93). Now this is only a valid response here if the comparison is interpreted in a strict manner. Rolando Bandinelli would in that case mean that the act of loving God is physically impossible without grace. This is also, it seems, the thought of Omnebene [Omnibonus] (cited by Gietl, ibid, p. 93, n. 17): “Quaeritur etiam, si potuerunt amare (Angeli) sine apposita gratia ... Ad hoc videndum est, quia gratia omnibus fuit apposita, et per appositionem huius gratiae et bona naturalia poterant converti ad dilectionem Dei et sic pervenire ad visionem eius” [It is also asked whether they (the angels) were able to love without grace being bestowed ... Besides it must be seen that grace was bestowed upon all, and that through the bestowal of this grace even natural goods were able to be directed to the love of God and thus to come to the vision of Him]. The previous dictums exclude the idea of a purely natural love.— Peter Lombard grants to angels, at the moment of their creation, justice in the sense of innocence, but denies them justice in the sense of the exercise of the virtues (Sentences, 2 d. 3 n. 6, PL. 102, 658). Furthermore, he suggests at least the possibility of such a natural love: “Solet etiam quaeri utrum aliquam Dei vel sui dilectionem invicem habuerint, ut memoriam, intellectum et ingenium, qua Deum et se aliquatenus diligebant, per quam tamen non merebantur” [It is also often asked whether, as they had the memory, intellect, and capacity, they had some love of God or of one another by which they loved God and one another to some extent, through which, nonetheless, they did not earn merit] (ibid., n. 10, l. c., 660). However, he formulates this question without resolving it, and brings it up again later on only to skirt it.121 —Robert Pullen seems to conceive of grace as a necessary assistance in the order of the exercise (Sentences, b. II, c. 4, PL. 186, 720).—Peter of Poitiers goes even farther than Peter Lombard. Even though he denies that “virtue” occurs in the state of natural innocence (Sentences, b. II, PL. 211, 944), he clearly allows for, with a type of non-meritorious grace, a natural love of God in 121

2 d. 5 n. 4, l. c., 661: the angels needed grace not in order to cease being evil, since they were not such, but rather for its “assistance” in loving God “perfectly” and “more than anything else.” His thought thus remains open to a number of interpretations.


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that state (ibid., l. c., 945, 967, 971: “Diligere aequivoce dicitur de naturali dilectione et de caritate ... Potest enim dici quod tunc tenebatur Adam exhibere latriam Deo, non tamen ideo diligere caritate, sicut et de Angelis dicitur” [Loving is said equivocally of natural love and charity ... For it is possible to say that at one time Adam was obliged to show a worship of God, but not, however, for this reason to love Him with charity, as is also said of the angels].— See also in col. 949, 950, and 970, the presence of the notion of natural love in the objections: “Gratia qua naturaliter [92] Deum diligebat ...” [The grace by which he naturally loved God ...] and “Nemo adeo malus est in via qui non naturaliter Deum diligat ...,” etc.) [In this life no one is so evil that he does not naturally love God ..., etc.]. And to the difficulty arising from the knowledge possessed by Adam (“sciebat quod Deus erat constituendus principium et finis cuilibet actioni,” l. c., 970 [he knew that God should be made the beginning and end of every action]), he responds, more subtly than Rolando Bandinelli, by distinguishing an obligation that coincides with this knowledge, and an obligation that goes beyond it.—There are for him two kinds of moral goodness (l. c., 1037; see 944): this here is the fundamental distinction which allows grace to not be looked upon as a necessary extension of nature, and which makes possible a coherent theory of natural love.—Petrus Cantor [Peter the Chanter] plainly asserts the occurrence of natural love: “(Adam) innocens adhuc simplex dilectionem naturalem habuit, sed non saporem et flammam caritatis, quam non novit quis nisi per experientiam” [(Adam), when still innocent and simple, had a natural love, but not the taste and flame of charity, which one becomes acquainted with only through experience] (Verbum Abbreviatum, c. 95, De Caritate, PL. 205, 273). In regard to the question which concerns us, Gietl rightly draws our attention to a passage of Rupert of Deutz. This passage, however, does not appear to have had any influence on the compilers of Sentences. Rupert of Deutz denies that the devil ever had charity: his sin consisted precisely in rejecting it, even though he had been created capable of it (De Glorificatione Trinitatis et Processione Spiritus Sancti, III, 9, PL. 169, 60-61). Rupert of Deutz here reproduces a thought of St. Gregory the Great (Moralia, b. 32, c. 23, PL. 76, 66566).—St. Gregory is also the source of Gratian’s inspiration. Gratian,

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who begins withW a doubt analogous to that of Abelard, (“Quomodo bona esse potuit, si dilectione prorsus caruit?” [How was he able to be good if he utterly lacked love?]), concludes, without distinguishing natural love and the love of grace, that Lucifer, from the moment he was created, received the gift of the love of God (Decretum, in dict. ante, c. 45, Dist. 2, De Paenitentia; see St. Gregory, Moralia, b. 27, c. 39, l. c., 438). William of Auxerre does not dare reject the notion of natural love, but he again restricts its place. He acknowledges that “the act of natural love and the act of charity belong to the same highly special [spécialissime] type” (Summa, b. II, tr. 1, ch. 6). And he insists upon the convergence, once grace has been given, of true self-interest with the love of God. However, he refuses to grant that, in the natural state, the angel could have loved God more than itself with a true love of friendship. And yet, he says, in this the angel did not sin. Ruling out a twofold involuntary love and distinguishing a twofold [93] voluntary love, of which one is desire and the other friendship, he grants that, even in the state of pure nature the angel loves God with this twofold voluntary love. Yet if this is a matter of a love of desire, then this love is not distinguishable from the love that the angel bears for itself; and if it is a matter of a love of friendship, then this love is inferior to that which the angel bears for itself. Now the fundamental consideration that seems to have settled the matter for William of Auxerre, and counterbalanced in his mind the “innumerable objections” (ch. 4) provided by his opponents, is purely theological: if the angel, without grace, can love God more than itself, “sic iuste et sancte vivit ... quod est haeresis pelagiana” [then it (the angel) lives a righteous and holy life ... which is the Pelagian heresy] (ibid.). His opponents on the contrary started from as it were a principle asserting the necessary commensuration between the intellect and the will: since—as everyone acknowledged—the angel, free from error, clearly perceived that God is lovable above all things, how could it be denied the ability to love God more than all things, without thereby declaring that the natural inclination of its will is bad?— William of Auxerre, casting aside any notion of a fall or of original sin, instead takes the option of denying the natural commensuration between the intellect and the will: though the nature of created spirits


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is not bad, it is essentially powerless and incomplete. For what the understanding [l’entendement] can naturally conceive the will cannot naturally accomplish: Hoc praeceptum Diliges Dominum ex toto corde, etc. insitum est in corde hominis quantum ad scientiam, non quantum ad faciendi potestatem, quoniam haec est potestas solius gratiae ut per eam diligat homo Deum plus quam se, et ut levet se supra se ... Lex docet quid faciendum: gratia dat potestatem ... Illa dilectio (naturalis) non est iniusta aestimatrix Dei ... sed non est cuiuslibet rei iusta aestimatrix, quod si esset, esset caritas (ibid., ch. 4 and 5).

[This command, Love the Lord with all your heart, etc., was implanted in the heart of humans as knowledge, not as the power of acting, since this power comes from grace alone; for through it (grace) humans love God more than themselves, and are lifted up above themselves ... The law teaches what we should do: grace gives us the power (to do it) ... This (natural) love is not an unjust evaluator of God ... but it is not a just evaluator of everything, because if it were, it would be charity] (ibid., ch. 4 and 5). Among the opponents of the natural love of friendship, Praepositinus of Cremona is generally cited along with William of Auxerre. Albert the Great, while treating the problem that concerns us, calls their theory that of the “antiquiores” [ancients]. Nevertheless they found, in the very circle of their contemporaries, some resolute opponents. The assertions of William of Auvergne (Bishop of Paris from 1228 to 1249) are diametrically opposed to that of his namesake, William of Auxerre, and connect up with a completely different conception of the relations between nature and grace as well as a more advanced “natural philosophy of [94] love.” In conformity with this new way of thinking, grace does not come to supplement the deficiency of nature in the sense that it is an necessary addition in order that we may live humanly [humainement]: grace is more a participation in a new superior life which deifies us, without strictly speaking our nature calling for it. Let us therefore disregard grace: nature left to itself will have to form a harmonious whole and show itself capable of producing truly good works. The power of the will will have to be proportional to that of the intellect. Conse-

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quently, angels, and also Adam and Eve, “from natural love and since their beginning loved God more than themselves, and even now love Him in this way” (De Virtutibus, ch. 9, t. I, 127 b, D; see ch. XI, 136 b, F). Just like one can go outside of oneself through knowledge, so too one can go outside of oneself through love: “Nec magis est supra naturam, naturam diligere aliud plus quam se, quam naturam aliud cognoscere plus vel melius quam se” [Nor is it more above nature for nature to love something else more than itself, than for nature to know something else more or better than itself ] (128 a, D). And William of Auvergne makes this idea more precise and shows that while they loved God insofar as He was their benefactor, they nevertheless loved Him “for Himself ” in a true sense (129 a, C). For though the perception of God as benefactor can be said to be the cause of love, it does not follow that the benefits would be loved more than God. Indeed we are not dealing with a final cause here and the following axiom [of Aristotle] cannot be invoked: propter quod unumquodque tale, ipsum magis [that on account of which each thing is such, is itself more such]. Just as the scent of fruits stimulates the appetite and yet the animal does not love the fruit for its scent, in the same way says William “beneficiis ... creatoris, quasi quibusdam odoribus, sentitur bonitas ipsius necessaria, et salutaris, et ideo illis et per illa diligitur, non autem propter illa” [from the benefits ... of the creator, as if from certain scents, His goodness is perceived as necessary and salutary; and so He is loved in them and through them, but not for the sake of them] (128 b, B).122 This love of gratitude pen122

The idea of the “gratuitum ex parte causae finalis” [gratuitous from the side of the final cause] is also found in William of Auxerre, Summa , b. II, t. I, ch. 4 (along with the comparison between the child and its tutor that William of Auvergne uses, l. c., 129 a, C). It has been taken up by St. Thomas as well. However, the explanation that is drawn from it is not the most profound Thomist explanation: indeed this explanation retains the essential discontinuity between the love of self and the love of God, since the first is only an occasional cause of the exercise of the second. On account of this, the course taken by William of Auvergne’s thought is uncertain: before proposing the explanation through the final cause and the occasional cause, he seems to center the main part of his response wholly in the assertion: “Manifestum ... est Deus esse incomparabiliter utiliorem eis, quam ipsos sibi” [It is evident ... that God is incomparably more useful to them than they are to Him] (l. c., 127 a, C).


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etrates the [95] other affections of the creature and even the love that it bears for itself: the creature now loves itself only for the sake of God (118 a, D, and b, A). This love of gratitude is thus universal and powerful like nature: Cum nihil perversum vel habeat, vel doceat, vel operetur natura, utpote velut magisterio creatoris edocta ... impossibile est naturaliter ut aliqua substantia in amore vel dilectione Deo se praeferat, vel etiam aequet (127 a, D).

[Since nature neither has nor teaches nor produces anything perverse, inasmuch as it is as if it were instructed by the teaching of the creator ... it is impossible by nature that any substance in amorous desire or love would prefer itself to or even put itself on a par with God] (127 a, D). The contrast with William of Auxerre is striking. It becomes even more pronounced when we notice the contempt in which the Bishop of Paris [William of Auvergne] holds this love of desire that the other William [William of Auxerre] did not want to condemn (William of Auvergne declares that it is “simoniacal,” De Trinitate, c. 21, t. II, 2nd part, p. 26a; see De Meritis, t. I, p. 311b; William of Auxerre, Summa, b. II, tr. 1, ch. 4). If one were to read only the passages that we just cited, these authors might be thought to be very close to St. Thomas. However, this is not the case at all. And the elucidations in this same chapter on a certain “gratuitous” love, an idea which is obviously taken from Abelard (see pp. 184-85 [herein]), clearly show that, even though he admitted the existence of some intermediate terms between caritas [charity] and cupiditas [cupidity], still William of Auvergne was far from perceiving, in the theory of natural love, the profound coincidence of the love of self and the love of God. Alexander of Hales scarcely shows himself more capable of overcoming this problem. For he grants a power to the natural forces of the free will (2 p. q. 31 m. 3) that he elsewhere seems to deny, not only to the appetite that necessary follows understanding, but also to every created appetite that grace does not come to assist (2 p. q. 30 m. 1 a. 2 qc. 2 ad 2).—Albert the Great, in his Summa Theologiae, follows William of Auxere (2 p. q. 14 m. 4 a. 2, ed. Borgnet, v. 32, p.

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198). In his Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard and in his Summa de Creaturis, he distinguishes like Alexander of Hales the natural will and the rational will (the qevlhsi~ and the bouvlhsi~ of St. John of Damascus). And in this way he attributes the natural ability to love God more than oneself to intelligent beings, but to them alone (In 2 d. 3 a. 18, t. 27, p. 97; Summa de Creaturis, p. 1, tr. 4, q. 25, t. 34, pp. 487-89).


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[96]

Appendix 2 The Formal Identification of Love and Understanding in William of St. Thierry 123

William of St. Thierry interprets the ancient conception of the possession by love in a very original manner. When love possesses God, he formally identifies it with understanding. Love of an absent good, is, according to him, essentially imperfect even as love; one does not love perfectly without the enjoyment of the object loved. When the object loved is absent, the word desire seems to William of St. Thierry preferable to the word love: “Vehemens autem voluntas, vel quasi ad absentem, desiderium est; vel affecta circa praesentem amor est, cum amanti id quod amat in intellectu praesto est” [But a vehement will when directed to someone absent is desire, when concerned with someone present is love, since that which the lover loves is present in the understanding] (Exp. 499 C).124 123

The different works of William of St. Thierry are designated, in the references, in the following manner: Aen. = Aenigma Fidei [The Enigma of Faith]; Disp. = Disputatio adversus Abaelardum [Disputation with Abelard]; Exp. = Expositio super Cantica [Exposition on the Song of Songs]; Med. = Meditativae Orationes [Meditations]; Spec. = Speculum Fidei [Mirror of Faith]. The other titles are given in full. When the volume of the Patrologiae Latina (PL.) is not indicated, we refer to volume 180. 124 See Exp. 476 A, 479 A, 538 A, 545 A, 492 D. See Med. III, 212 B: “Non videtur sibi omnino amare te, nisi fruatur te” [(The soul) does not think that she loves You at all, unless she enjoys You]—and especially Med. XII, 246 A-B. William elsewhere proposes to call this actual love that is inseparable from the presence itself affectus [disposition]: “Sunt enim sibi fide, adsunt amore, vel amore sibi sunt, affectu adsunt” [For they (the Bride and the Bridegroom) belong to one another by faith, and they are

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Moreover, to possess God, whose nature is spiritual, is to see Him, to perceive Him with the mind. Thus these four terms—possession, enjoyment, understanding, and love—mean the same thing when they deal with the relationships of the soul to God: Hoc enim ibi est habere vel frui, quod intelligere vel amare (Med. XII, 246 D).

[For in this case to have or to enjoy is the same as to understand or to love] (Med. XII, 246 D). [97] While it is a commonplace assertion in the Middle Ages that the purification of the heart and the love of God are necessary conditions for the perception of certain truths,125 it is nevertheless surprising to see a writer at that time reduce the two notions of knowledge and appetite to a formal identity.—No doubt, the Augustinian psychology that denies the real distinction between the soul and its faculties was less resistant to this idea than Thomist Aristotelianism had been:126 yet there is a great difference between actually identifying the intellect and the will with the soul, and identifying conceptually, even for a particular case, the act of love and the act of understanding.

present by love; or they belong to one another by love, and they are present by affection] (Exp., c. 2, 536 B; see Med. XII, 248).—On the contrary, in the Exp. 475 B., love is instead “affectus tendentis vel ambientis” [the disposition of one who tends toward or surrounds] and “caritas, gaudium fruentis” [charity, the joy of one who enjoys]. 125 William like others says: “Ubi enim de affectibus agitur, non facile nisi a similiter affectis capitur quod dicitur” [For when dispositions are under discussion, it is not easy to grasp what is said unless one is similarly taken hold of by the disposition] (Exp., Praefatio, 475). 126 On this identity of the intellect, the will, and love with the substance of the soul, see De Natura Corporis et Animae, b. II, 720 B, 721 C. See however De Natura et Dignitate Amoris [On the Nature and Dignity of Love], c. II, PL. 184, 382 D.

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William of St. Thierry seems to have drawn his idea from a homily of St. Gregory the Great.127 He repeats it often, with an obvious predilection, and formulates it in very clear terms:

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He cites him, for example, in Disp., c. II, 252 C: “In huius modi etenim, sicut dicit B. Gregorius, amor ipse intellectus est” [In such (the Trinity), after all, as blessed Gregory says, love is itself understanding].—St. Gregory wrote: “Dum enim audita supercaelestia amamus, amata iam novimus, quia amor ipse notitia est” [For provided that we love the supercelestial things we have heard, we already know what we love, because love is itself knowledge] (Hom. 27 in Ev., PL. 76, 1207).—I also find, in an anthology of St. Ambrose put together by William, several thoughts which might have inspired him. For example, the thought that “Hoc est enim lumen cognitionis, habere caritatis perfectionem” [For to have the light of knowledge is to have the perfection of charity] (PL. 15, 1914 B), and especially the idea of the kiss of the Word being identical to an “infusion [infusion] of knowledge,” to a “transference [transfusion] of spirits”: “Osculatur nos Dei Verbum, quando sensum nostrum spiritus cognitionis illiminat ... Hoc est enim osculum Verbi, lumen scilicet cognitionis sacrae. Osculatur enim nos Deus Verbum quando cor nostrum et ipsum principale nostrum spiritus divinae cognitionis illuminat ... Osculum est enim quo invicem amantes sibi adhaerent ... Per hoc osculum adhaeret anima Dei Verbo, quod sibi spiritus transfunditur osculantis: sicut etiam hi qui se osculantur, non sunt labiorum praelibatione contenti, sed spiritum suum sibi invicem videntur infundere” [The Word of God kisses us when the spirit of knowledge enlightens our sense ... For this is the kiss of the Word, that is, the light of sacred knowledge. After all, God the Word kisses us when the spirit of divine knowledge enlightens our heart and our chief part (that is to say the “mens” [mind], see 1911 A-B, 1913 A) ... For a kiss is that by which lovers cling to each other ... By this kiss the soul clings to the Word of God because the spirit of the kisser is transferred to it; just as those also who kiss each other are not content with the initial touch of the lips, but are seen to pour out their spirits into each other] (PL. 15, 1855).—Finally a third source of William’s might have been his friend St. Bernard. See the sermon on the osculum [kiss] (In Cant., Serm. 8, n. 6, 9 and see the Commentatio ex Bernardo which is attributed to William with some plausibility, PL. 184, 413 B-C, 412 C, 413 A, 480 C) and also Serm. 10, De Diversis: “Ea (anima est) sine sensu, quae necdum habet dilectionem. Est ergo animae vita, veritas; sensus, caritas” [That (soul is) without sense which does not have love. The life of the soul then is truth; the life of the sense is charity] (PL.

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Appendix 2 [98] Deus est idipsum, quod cogitare et amare idipsum est (Spec. 394 D).

[God is the exact same, because to contemplate and to love Him is the exact same thing] (Spec. 394 D). Cognitio vero Sponsae ad Sponsum et amor idem est; quoniam in hac re amor ipse intellectus est (Exp., c. 1, 491 D).

[But the knowledge of the Bride for the Bridegroom is also the same as her love, because in this case love is itself understanding] (Exp., c. 1, 491 D). Vehemens autem voluntas, vel quasi ad absentem, desiderium est; vel affecta circa praesentem amor est, cum amanti id quod amat in intellectu praesto est. Amor quippe Dei ipse intellectus eius est: qui non nisi amatus intelligitur, nec nisi intellectus amatur, et utique tantum intelligitur quantum amatur, tantumque amatur, quantum intelligitur (ibid., 499 C).

[But a vehement will when directed to someone absent is desire, when concerned with someone present is love, since that which the lover loves is present in the understanding. For the love of God is itself understanding of Him—who, unless He is loved is not understood, and unless He is understood is not loved. And He is assuredly understood to the degree that He is loved, and loved to the degree that He is understood] (ibid., 499 C). Cum veneris in divitiis plenitudinis tuae et deliciis bonitatis tuae in pauperem tuum, et ostendere coeperis ei certa experientia in conscientia sua, quam vere Deus caritas es, quamque sit unum

183, 567). Here sensus [sense] refers to the sensitive life, and is opposed to vita [life] in the sense of the vegetative life; yet, in the remainder of his sermon, St. Bernard does compare the five types of love to the five senses (an idea that has also been taken up by William of St. Thierry, De Natura et Dignitate Amoris, c. 7, PL. 184, 391). It is noteworthy that in the opuscule of Richard of St. Victor, De Quatuor Gradibus Violentae Caritatis (PL. 196, 1207-24), the four “degrees of love” are in reality four stages of contemplation.


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Deus et amor suus, gaudium in Spiritu sancto, et Spiritus sanctus, suavitas amandi et initium fruendi, amor ipse et intellectus eius ... (ibid., c. II, 524 D).

[When You will have come into Your poor servants clad in the riches of Your fullness and the delights of Your goodness, and will have started to show them by an unmistakable experience in their consciousness how You, God, are truly charity, and how God and His love are one; joy in the Holy Spirit and the Holy Spirit; the sweetness of loving and the beginning of enjoying; love itself and the understanding thereof...] (ibid., c. II, 524 D).128

A. First Account When William of St. Thierry explains himself at greater length, he teaches that the soul can only attain God through a kind of transformation that renders it deiform. And in order to explain this he appeals to the psychological theory of sensation: Numquid homo videt Deum sicut Filium Pater, vel Patrem Filius: quibus, sicut dictum est, alium alii videre, hoc est non esse aliud et aliud, sed unum Deum? Sic omnino, sed non per omnem modum. Quod ut aliquantum nobis dilucidius pateat, de visu et naturali eius potentia videndum est, quid habeat physicus intellectus. Omnis sensus corporeus, ut sensus sit et sentiat, oportet ut quadam sensibili affectione aliquo modo mutetur in id [99] quod sentit: visus scilicet in hoc quod ei fit visibile, auditus in audibile, sicque de reliquis. Alioqui, nec sentit nec sensus est. Nisi enim, rem sensam sensu rationi renuntiante, anima sentientis quadam sui 128

A great number of passing references, even if they do not throw light on this theory, at least show that the idea was familiar to the author and that we are not mistaken in seeing there something other than a figure of speech. See Disp., c. 7: “ipse ei amor intellectus est, qui sensum Christi habet” [love is itself understanding for one who has the sense of Christ] (272 B; see 273 A and B; Spec. 372 B, 373 A, 382 D, 387 C, 395 D, 396 C).—Note also Exp. 492 D: “Amor vero fruentis totus in luce est quia fruitio ipsa lux amantis est,” [But the love of one who enjoys is wholly in the light because enjoyment is itself the light of the lover], etc.

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Appendix 2 transformatione mutetur in rem vel rei qualitatem quae sentitur, nec sensus est, nec sentire potest. Ideoque si sentit, amore qui sensus suus est, Deum bonum, et amat quia bonum: non hoc potest, nisi boni ipsi affectu communicans, et ipsa bona efficiatur ... Sensus enim animae amor est: per hunc, sive cum mulcetur sive cum offenditur, sentit quicquid sentit. Cum per hunc in aliquid anima extenditur, quadam sui transformatione in id quod amat transmutatur: non quod idem sit in natura, sed affectu rei amatae conformatur, utpote non bonum aliquem amare potest, quia bonus est, nisi et ipsa in ipso bono bona efficiatur (Med. III, 213, A-C).

[But does a human see God as the Father sees the Son, or the Son the Father, Who see each other, as was said, in such a way as to be not separate beings, but One God? This is the case admittedly, but not in every respect. In order that this might be somewhat clearer for us, we must see what a natural scientist’s understanding holds concerning sight and its natural power. In order that every bodily sense be a sense and sense something, it must be changed in some way by a certain sensible modification into that which it senses; for example, sight must be changed into that which becomes visible to it, hearing into that which becomes audible to it, and so on with all the rest. Otherwise it does not sense nor is it a sense. The sense, then, is not a sense, nor can it sense, unless, when the sense reports to reason the object sensed, the soul of the one sensing is changed by a certain transformation of itself into the object that is sensed or a quality of the object.129 If, therefore, it senses that God is good, by means of the love that is its proper sense, and loves Him for His goodness, such a thing is not possible unless it is made good itself through sharing His good by disposition ... For the sense of the soul is love; through this it senses whatever it senses, either when it is pleased or when it is displeased. When the soul reaches out through this to anything, it is transformed into what it loves by a certain transformation of itself. It is not that it

129

On the manner in which William understands this transmutation [immutation] in sensation, see also De Natura Corporis et Animae, b. 1, 706-07.


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becomes the same in nature, but by disposition it is conformed to the object loved. For it cannot love a good person because he or she is good, without itself being made good by the same good person] (Med. III, 213, A-C). This first passage identifies amor [love] with sensus animae: per hunc [the sense of the soul: through this], says the author, sentit quicquid sentit [it senses whatever it senses]. Love and perception therefore, in the human soul, should always be identical.

B. Second Account Other accounts, however, restrict the identity between love and perception to the case in which we perceive God. Amat enim, et amor suus sensus suus est, quo sentit eum quem sentit, et quodam modo transformatur in id quod sentit; non enim eum sentit, nisi in eum transformetur, hoc est nisi ipse in ipsa, et ipsa in ipso sit. Etenim, sicut se habet sensus exterior corporis ad corpora et corporalia, sic est interior ad similia sibi, id est rationabilia ac divina, vel spiritualia. Interior vero animae sensus, intellectus eius est. Maior tamen et dignior sensus eius, et purior intellectus, amor est si fuerit ipse purus. Hoc enim sensu ipse Creator a creatura sentitur, intellectu intelligitur quantum sentiri vel intelligi potest a creatura Deus. Sensus enim vel anima hominis cum se movet ad sentiendum sentiendo mutatur in id quod sentit ... Sic mens pro sensu habet intellectum, eo sentit quicquid sentit. Cum sentit rationabilia, ratio in ea progreditur: qua renuntiante, mens in ea transformatur, et fit intellectus. In eis vero quae sunt ad Deum, [100] sensus mentis amor est: ipso sentit quicquid de Deo secundum spiritum vitae sentit (Spec. 390 D-391 A).

[Now she (the soul) loves and her love is her sense whereby she senses the one whom she senses; and she is somehow transformed into what she senses, for she does not sense him unless she is transformed into him, that is, unless he is in her and she in him. For indeed just as the outer sense of the body is related to the body and bodily things, so too the inner sense is related to things like itself, that is, to rational and divine things, or spiritual things.

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Yet the inner sense of the soul is its understanding. However, a greater and worthier sense and a purer understanding of her is love, if love is pure. For by this sense the Creator Himself is sensed by the creature; by the understanding He is understood insofar as God can be sensed or understood by a creature. For the sense or the soul of a human, when it undertakes to sense, is by this sensing changed into what it senses ... So too the mind has the understanding for its sense; by this it senses whatever it senses. When it senses rational things, reason goes out to them; when reason reports them, the mind is transformed into them and becomes understanding. Yet in those things that pertain to God, [100] the sense of the mind is love. By this it senses whatever it senses of God, according to the spirit of life] (Spec. 390 D-391 A).130 The restriction contained in the previously cited words is perfectly clear. Love is here conceived of by William of St. Thierry as the proper faculty of the divine, as the sense of God, and this way of thinking is in perfect conformity with the doctrine of his other works.131

C. Third Account Nevertheless the restriction is not yet sufficient: since, as experience shows, one can think of God without loving Him, every relationship of the soul to God is not identical to a relation of love. William of St. Thierry makes further remarks about this in his Speculum Fidei [Mirror of Faith]. Nimirum Deus est id ipsum, quod cogitare et amare id ipsum est. Ipsum dico, non de ipso. De ipso enim multi cogitant, qui non amant, ipsum autem nemo cogitat et non amat (Spec. 394-395). 130

See Exp., c. 1, 506 A: “In visione Dei, ubi solus amor operatur, nullo alio sensu cooperante” [In the vision of God, where love alone is operative without the cooperation of any other sense]. 131 See PL. 184, 366, 378, 390. When speaking elsewhere of the role of love in experiences other than those that have God as their object (PL. 180, 506, Spec., ibid., 391), William only makes it a powerful aid to perception.


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[Surely God is the exact same, because to contemplate Him and to love Him is the exact same thing! I say Him and not about Him. For many contemplate about Him who do not love Him; but no one contemplates Him and does not love Him] (Spec. 394-95). Therefore love and understanding converge, not in every knowledge of God, but in a more intimate perception, in a special affectionate knowledge of God. William of St. Thierry distinguishes two forms of this affectionate knowledge, the imperfect and the perfect form. The perfect form is that of heaven, and it alone is properly called knowledge coming from love. Why is it formally love and formally understanding? Because it causes God to be attained “sicut ipse cognoscit semet ipsum” [as He knows Himself ]. Now, the mutual knowledge of the Father and the Son is identical to their common will, to their common love, that is to say, to the Holy Spirit who is God. Therefore the reason for the identity of love and understanding in the elect, who see God as He is in Himself, must be sought in the simplicity of the divine essence. And if through grace humans on earth sometimes experience a certain union with their God wherein love and understanding coincide, this “knowledge coming from faith,” which is an imperfect form of knowledge coming from love, must be explained as a less pronounced impression of the same Holy Spirit, as an imitation of the true knowledge coming from love, that of the glory. [101] The perfect form is described by William of St. Thierry as follows: Ea vero cognitio quae mutua est Patris et Filii, ipsa est unitas amborum, qui est Spiritus sanctus ... Hac vero cognitione “nemo novit Patrem, nisi Filius; et nemo novit Filium, nisi Pater vel cui ipsi voluerint revelare ...” Aliquibus ergo revelant, scilicet quibus volunt, quibus innotescunt, hoc est, quibus largiuntur Spiritum sanctum, qui communis notitia, vel communis voluntas est amborum ... Quibus ergo revelat Pater et Filius, hi cognoscunt, sicut Pater et Filius se cognoscunt, quia habent in semetipsis

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unitatem amborum, et voluntatem vel amorem, quod totum Spiritus sanctus est (ibid., 393; see Aen. 399 C).

[But that knowledge of the Father and the Son which is mutual is the very unity of both, which is the Holy Spirit ... Yet in this knowledge “no one has known the Father except the Son and no one has known the Son except the Father and anyone to whom he has chosen to reveal Him ...” Hence they (the Father and the Son) reveal this to certain persons, namely to those to whom they will, to those to whom they make it known, that is, to whom they impart the Holy Spirit, who is the common knowledge or the common will of both ... Those therefore to whom the Father and the Son reveal themselves apprehend them as the Father and the Son apprehend each other, because they have within themselves the unity of both, and their will or love; all that the Holy Spirit is] (ibid., 393; see Aen. 399 C). He speaks in these terms of the imperfect form: Non quod sit similitudo aliqua phantasmatis, sed aliquis affectus pietatis: qui, ex fidei forma conceptus et commendatus memoriae, quoties redit ad experientiam recordantis, suaviter afficit conscientiam cogitantis (392-93).

[Not that it bears some likeness to an image but rather it bears the definite disposition of piety: which, having been conceived from the form of faith and committed to memory, sweetly affects the consciousness of the thinker as often as it returns to the experience of the one recalling it] (392-393).

_______________ Here is, it seems, the essence of the thought of William of St. Thierry on knowledge coming from love; here are the three forms of this thought that analysis can distinguish. And the words of the author have enough didactic precision to clearly show that we have here something completely different from an oratorical manner of expression. Yet his thought was also too imperfectly established for it to be


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always in agreement with itself. Additionally, in the very frequent restatements of his favorite idea—in the fleeting allusions, lyrical descriptions, and psychological explanations that he sketched out— the details of his phraseology teem with logical inconsistencies. Sometimes he seems to speak of vision as simply a necessary condition for the perfect exercise of love: Quia intellectui deerat lumen suum, amor in fruendo nequaquam poterat invenire gaudium suum (Exp., c. 1, 499 B; see De Contemplando Deo, I, 4, PL. 184, 369 A).

[Because its light was lacking to the intellect, love was in no way able to find its fulfillment in joy] (Exp., c. 1, 499 B; see De Contemplando Deo, I, 4, PL. 184, 396 A). At other times, love is preparatory to vision, which is its end and reward: Inchoatur enim hic (visio) ... ubi amor meretur visionem, cum creditur, speratur ac diligitur, quod non videtur; perficienda [102] ibi, ubi visio pascet amorem (Aen. 407 A-B; see Exp., c. 1, 492 D, and c. 2, 526 D). [For this (vision) is initiated ... where love merits vision, when what is not seen is believed, hoped for, and loved; it will be brought to perfection where vision feeds love] (Aen. 407 A-B; see Exp., c. l, 492 D, and c. 2, 526 D).

On other occasions, finally, he seems to relate the indistinctness of understanding and love when God unites with the soul, to an inability of the soul to analyze itself, instead of explaining it through a formal identification (for example, Aen. 433 D; see Med. XII, 246 D; Spec. 379 D). However, in spite of its imperfection, the theory sketched out by William of St. Thierry deserves to attract our attention. It is, if one may say so, located at one of the two poles of the philosophy of love of the Middle Ages. The Thomist doctrine of love is characterized by the perfect reconciliation of the interests of spiritual realities (the good of humans is identical to the good of God) and by the enduring

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opposition between the formal notions (knowledge and love are irreducible to each other). The “ecstatic” doctrine of love on the one hand led to the idea of sacrifice as an essential element of love; that is to say, it declared that the interests of the lover and the beloved were irreconcilable. Yet on the other hand, the ecstatic doctrine of love came to identify love and vision, that is to say, love and beatitude. And these two opposite conclusions were derived from a unique principle, that of the unconditional primacy of love.

Translator’s Notes

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Translator’s Notes A. (p. 77) Rousselot here means that according to Christian Tradition we cannot look upon the love of God as merely a way of loving ourselves; we cannot love God purely for our own sake. In addition to the figures Rousselot cites we can add St. Gregory of Nyssa (335395 A.D.) who said that true Christian perfection is not to avoid an evil life because we fear punishment or to do good because we hope for reward, but rather to disregard all those things because we regard becoming God’s friend as the only thing worthy of honor and desire (The Life of Moses, II, 320, tr. by Abraham J. Malherbe and Everett Ferguson, Paulist Press, N.Y., 1978). See pp. 59-75 of the Introduction for more references. B. (p. 77, n. 3) Jesus Christ himself stated that one must hate one’s own life to be his disciple (Lk 14:26; cf. Mk 8:34-36; Mt 6:25; Jn 12:25). And then there is the famous remark of Augustine that a member of the earthly city loves the self and has contempt for God, but a member of the heavenly city loves God and has contempt for the self (City of God, XIV, 28). C. (p. 78) For the medievals, although the love of desire (amor concupiscentiae) tended to refer to a selfish, desirous, and sensual love, it could also be used in a broader sense to refer to an ardent desire for a temporal or corporeal good such as money. Indeed at times it could be used to refer to a desire for anything whatsoever. Thus some medievals spoke positively of a love of desire for God; for this reason I have translated the cognate French expression ‘l’amour de convoitise’ as ‘the love of desire’ and not ‘the love of concupiscence’ which carries negative connotations. The above usage of the ‘the love of desire’ resembles the way in which Augustine uses the word cupiditas in his On Free Choice of the Will (I, 3-4, 13-15; III, 17-18). For the word cupiditas is sometimes used by Augustine to refer to an inappropriate love of temporal goods, yet it is also used by him to refer to any sort of passionate desire be it

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good or bad, including the praiseworthy desire of eternal goods. Likewise Bernard of Clairvaux held that all love begins in carnal self-love and so even charity does and should contain elements of cupidity (On Loving God, VIII; XIV, 37-38; Ep. 12). In this regard Thomas Aquinas has created confusion and has often been misinterpreted because when he contrasts the love of desire (amor concupiscentiae) with the love of friendship (amor amicitiae) in the Summa theologiae he states that in the love of desire our love is directed at the good thing desired for a friend, while in the love of friendship our love is directed at the friend him or herself (1a 2ae q. 26 a. 4). Thus it has been said that for Aquinas both the love of desire and the love of friendship are directed toward others and not ourselves. Yet this is not necessarily the case. For in his earlier writings Aquinas says that in the love of desire our love is directed at what is desired as a good for ourselves (In Div. Nom., IV, 9), and this same point of view even comes out if his Summa theologiae is examined more closely. For instance, Aquinas writes in his masterpiece that in the love of desire we want a good thing for someone, either ourselves or someone else (1a 2ae q. 26 a. 4) and he notes “Now it is stated above that in the love of desire lovers are really loving themselves as they want that good that they desire” (1a 2ae q. 27 a. 3). Finally we find the key statements “For when one loves something inasmuch as one desires that thing, one sees it as contributing to one’s well-being. Likewise when one loves someone with the love of friendship, one wants good things for him or her as one wants good things for oneself ” (1a 2ae q. 28 a. 1; cf. 2a 2ae q. 23 a. 1). Thus the love of desire may be directed either at other people or at ourselves for Aquinas, and indeed the latter is the normal form of the love of desire. What Aquinas is really distinguishing then in his Summa theologiae is a love of friendship in which a being that is a substantial good (in this case one’s friend) is loved for itself, versus a love of desire in which an object that is an accidental good is loved for the sake of something else (either oneself or another person). So Aquinas can view the love of desire either as a egoistic love wherein one seeks to possess an object for oneself, or as a desire directed at a good that is willed for the sake of others (see 1 q. 20 a. 1 ad 3; 1 q. 60 a. 3; 1a 2ae q. 26 a. 4; 1a 2ae q. 27 a. 3; 1a 2ae q. 28 a. 3-4). Similarly, while in the


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Summa theologiae Aquinas holds that in the love of friendship we love others for themselves, he can also speak of a love of friendship for oneself elsewhere (Commentary on the Divine Names, IV, l. 9-10; cf. Sent. III d. 28 q. 1 a. 6; 2a 2ae q. 25 a. 4). Some scholars have even suggested that for Aquinas all love contains an element of desire and an element of friendship, for in every love we wish some good (desire) for some person’s sake (friendship) whether this be ourselves or others. It is a tougher question whether for Aquinas love, particularly in the form of charity, contains an element both of self-interest (selffocused satisfaction) as well as of disinterest (other-focused friendship or benevolence). Aquinas does state in many places that in charity we love God for Himself and not to benefit ourselves (Sent. III d. 34 q. 3 a. 2; 1a 2ae q. 107 a. 1; 2a 2ae q. 23 a. 1; 2a 2ae q. 23 a. 6; 2a 2ae q. 26 a. 3 ad 2-3; 2a 2ae q. 27 a. 1 ad 2-3). However, there are other passages in his works suggesting that charity for God can contain a love of God as our own good especially as the provider of our eternal beatitude, at least as a secondary motive or legitimate accompaniment of charity (Sent. III d. 29 q. 1 a. 4 sed contra; On Hope, a. 1 ad 9; On Charity, a. 8; 1a 2ae q. 27 a. 2; 1a 2ae q. 65 a. 5 ad 1; 1a 2ae q. 109 a. 3 ad 1; 2a 2ae q. 17; 2a 2ae q. 23 a. 4; 2a 2ae q. 23 a. 8 ad 3; 2a 2ae q. 26 a. 2; q. 26 a. 3; 2a 2ae q. 27 a. 3). On these points see Simonin (1931), pp. 262-66; Burnaby (1938); Faraon (1952); Johann (1966); Cain (1976); Wohlman (1981), pp. 228-30; Hamonic (1992), pp. 24345; Vacek (1994); and Pieper (1997). A similar view is found in Bonaventure (1218-74) who at times says that in a love of desire we wish a good for ourselves, and at other times says that we wish a good for others. These acts are both classified as loves of desire because there is an element of wishing or desiring something for someone, versus a love of friendship in which we directly will the good for another, loving the person for his or her own sake (Sent. II d. 3 p. 2 a. 3 q. 1; III d. 26 a. 2 q. 3; III d. 27 a. 1 q. 2; III d. 28 a. 1 a. 5; III d. 29 a. 22). It is for this reason that Bonaventure can say that we love the virtues properly when we do not love them for themselves with a love of friendship, but for God with a love of desire wherein we desire them for God’s sake (Sent. I d. 1. a. 3 q. 2).

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It was only with later thinkers such as the Beguines, the New Devout, the German Dominicans Eckhart, Tauler, and Suso, the Italian mystics Catherine of Genoa and Catherine of Siena, the Reformers, the Jansenists, and the Quietists that there was an almost complete divorce between the love of desire and the love of friendship, or cupidity and charity (see the condemned propositions of Eckhart, the Reformer Luther, the Jansenists, and the Quietists in the Supplement). Indeed some of these thinkers went so far as to say that the purest love is arid and dry and either makes us suffer or brings us no joy, for in this way we can be sure we are loving our beloved and not ourselves. D. (p. 79) Besides using the word terme to refer to a spoken or written term or word, Rousselot uses the word terme here and elsewhere to refer to the two terms or constituents of a relation of love. Thus to say that love calls for a real duality of terms means that in love there must be two related terms or persons involved in the relation. To further complexify things, Rousselot also uses the word terme to refer to the terminus or end of love, in which case it is translated as such. E. (p. 90) Rousselot here and in other places contrasts the Thomistic view of ‘transcendental unity’ with the view of ‘numerical’ or ‘quantitative unity.’ He argues that Aquinas views unity not just as the oneness that allows us to individuate objects from each other and which is not shared between things (numerical unity), but also and more importantly as a transcendental attribute which all beings share and which varies analogically between them. Rousselot argues that this latter notion of transcendental unity allows beings to form unities larger than themselves. More specifically, it allows humans, who are participations of God, to form a whole with God and find their good in the unselfish love of Him as He is the whole from which they derive their being and goodness (see pp. 134, 141, and n. 11, 25, 26, 43, and 85 of the main text). This point has not been appreciated enough by some of the critics of Rousselot. For example, Gilson criticizes Rousselot’s account of Thomistic love by stating that while it is true that the hand is really and literally a part of the body, and in this case the relation of the particular to the general good is the relation of a part to its whole,


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this no longer applies when we compare humans to God. Gilson states “God is not a whole of which man is a part; man is not a part of which God is the whole; the universal here in question embraces the particular in quite another manner than that in which the body contains the hand and exposes itself for its defense, and, as a necessary consequence, the love by which man naturally loves God more than himself is very different from the mere brute instinct that moves the hand to protect the body … (Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, 1940, pp. 284-85). Gilson therefore argues that the true reason humans find their own good in the love of God is because they are made in the image of God; as analogues of God they find their good in loving the original in whose image they are made (Ibid., pp. 285-87, 30203). Yet once we recognize that for Rousselot humans are only parts of God in the transcendental sense that they are participations of God and derive their being and goodness from Him, the positions of Gilson and Rousselot no longer seem that far apart. For more critical discussion of Rousselot’s views see Alszeghy (1946); Cowburn (1967); D’Arcy (1954); Descoqs (1925); Dumeige (1952); Faraon (1952); Garrigou-Lagrange (1929), pp. 83-124 and (1965); Geiger (1952); Gillon (1946), pp. 322-29, (1948), pp. 3-17, (1951), pp. 205-23; 346-62; Gilson, The Mystical Theology of Saint Bernard (1940); Hamonic (1992), pp. 239-266; Johann (1966); Kulesza (1925); Kunz (1969); McDermott (1983); Nicolas (1956), pp. 5-42; Roland-Gosselin (1924), pp. 162-72; Simonin, (1931), pp. 174-276; Wohlman (1981), pp. 204-34. F. (p. 91) Reading ndividu as individu to match the word in the previous discussion. G. (p. 91) Rousselot also writes on this theme in his L’Intellectualisme de Saint Thomas (see Intelligence: Sense of Being, Faculty of God, tr. Andrew Tallon, Marquette University Press, 1999, pp. 47-48): The whole can be, as in love of passion, an individual coequal with the lover, whom the lover arbitrarily (under the influence of sensitive subjectivity) considers superior to the lover and to whom by disorder and immorality the lover subordinates himself or herself. When it is a matter of social feelings, it is the wider group to which we belong—one’s homeland, above all humanity—that weprefer naturally to ourselves, as actualizing more fully our own

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Love in the Middle Ages nature. Thus all lions, if “Plato” spoke truly, would prefer the Ideal [Separated] Lion to the participation in lionhood each one possesses of it. Let us now consider the group of things that participate commonly in this attribute: being. Everything, according to Thomas, prefers unparticipated, subsistent, Ideal [Separated] Being to the limited and deficient being in which it participates. Angel and humans, even irrational beings, in their way, naturally love God more than their own essence (see 1 q. 60 a. 5, 1a 2ae q. 109 a. 3). Now this important and very explicit doctrine resolves the apparent contradiction that in the peripatetic doctrine seems to vitiate the very concept of “pure love”; and in the same way it reconciles Thomas’s rigorously intellectualist theory of perfection with the supremacy of love affirmed by the Fathers. It suffices to distinguish between human persons as isolated in their individualities and as they ought to be envisaged as part of the universe, or, better, as analogical participations of God.

H. (p. 92) Rousselot couches this idea in slightly different words in his L’Intellectualisme de Saint Thomas (see Intelligence: Sense of Being, Faculty of God, tr. Andrew Tallon, Marquette University Press, 1999, p. 47): In the love of desire, I subordinate the object loved entirely to myself, I destroy its own individual finality and I constitute it as instrument in regard to me: it is no longer for itself, but as a part of my being, subordinated to me entirely. It is in this way that we love the rose we pluck, or the water we drink. In the love of benevolence, on the contrary, I subordinate myself, as instrument and part, to the object loved, no longer placing my end in my beatitude, but in the other’s. Love is then in me a principle of activity for an end placed outside of myself, in a whole that includes me, subjects me, transcends me. To take an example dear to Thomas, it’s the way the hand, on its own puts itself in front of the body in order to safeguard it from sudden danger, naturally and spontaneously sacrificing its own good for the good of the whole to which it is ordered.

I. (p. 95) Rousselot here uses the French expression faire nombre (form numbers or a group) to suggest that a part has no individuality of its own and could not be considered as something that could be added to the whole, and hence as something separate from the whole.


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In other words a part and a whole cannot be added together or form a group because the part has no separate existence and thus no unity and individuality apart from the whole. Rousselot will later use the same expression to stress that God is pure form and is irreducibly distinct from all other beings and so cannot be added to them. God in other words is a member of another species, or indeed as the Scholastics would say God transcends the notions of species and genus altogether and is pure act, and thus cannot be counted alongside other objects. In general then when Rousselot says that one thing cannot be added to another or join itself with another he means that they are either not members of the same class and cannot be added together, or that one of them has no individuality apart from the other (see pp. 142, 151, and n. 25 of the main text). J. (p. 103) Rousselot is here referring to the views of the Quietists, such as Fénelon and Madame Guyon, who held that if God somehow demanded that we give up our salvation out of love of Him that is just what we should do. It is somewhat surprising that Rousselot claims that this idea was just about unknown in the ascetic literature of the time of Aquinas. For as is detailed in the Introduction (see pp. 50-55), the idea that a human might be called upon to give up his or her salvation for God or for another person was first spoken about by Clement of Alexandria, Gregory of Nazianzus, John Chrysostom, Theodoret, John Cassian, and others in the Patristic Era. And such a question was much discussed by Abelard, Richard of St. Victor, Gilbert of Hoyland, the Beguine Mechthild of Magdeburg, Bonaventure, Hugh of St. Victor, and Aelred of Rievaulx who lived just before or concurrent with Aquinas. The first five of these favored giving up one’s salvation for love of others, as did many later mystics, but the last three questioned the propriety of this to some degree (see Aquinas, Comm. Rom., IX, 3; 1a 2ae q. 96 a. 4; 2a 2ae q. 26 a. 1-5; q. 27 a. 8 ad 1; q. 182 a. 2; Abelard, Comm. Rom., III, 892-3, Richard of St. Victor, Four Degrees of Love; Gilbert of Hoyland, Comm. Rom., V, c. 9, n. 1; Bonaventure, Sent. III d. 29 q. 3 ad 6; Mechthild of Magdeburg, Revelations, I, 5, II, 3, V, 1, VII, 48; Hugh of St. Victor, On the Sacraments of the Christian Faith, II, 13, c. 10; Aelred of Rievaulx, Mirror of Charity, III, 14, 37). In truth Rousselot shows himself elswehere to be aware of at least some of these debates.

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In his L’Intellectualism de Saint Thomas Rousselot goes into more detail on Aquinas’ views about whether or not one can give up one’s beatitude for others: Yet the more certain and more immediate end of the part is to be good as a part, to subordinate itself as much as it can to the end of the whole, and insofar as this end is unknown to keep itself in expectant readiness. Could not God require from me the sacrifice of my beatitude —ad decorem universi? [for the beautification of the universe?] The distinction between these two cases permits us to distinguish between perfection and beatitude. This is how saints have acted in their “impossible suppositions.” They argued with themselves thus: “Did God place my partial perfection (as a loving being) elsewhere than in my beatitude (perfection of the individual), which would I choose, happiness or love?” And they opted for love. But in Thomas’s thought this distinction belongs only to the order of ideas, and these suppositions are impossible. Not only has God, intelligent cause, created each specific nature such that it brings itself perfection in general by a specific action, but God upholds and governs intellectual creatures with a care so particular that no one could so escape nature as to bring perfection to the universe by definitively sacrificing or annihilating oneself (See 3 Summa Contra Gentiles, c. 112 and 113). As we shall say later, the good of the intellectual creature, at least when it is not considered by being subject to successive duration, is the good pure and simple, without restriction or possible objection. Hence the perfection God wills for us is identically our beatitude. God’s creative and almighty conception of humanity would negate itself if it posited the will as a perpetual tending toward no final end outside itself. The logical disjunction of the impossible supposition is really due to our lack of intuition of the divine plan for us. Up to a certain point it may be natural for a spirit seeing everything through the prism of the quantitative to find it easy to regard the hierarchy of duties as a possibility of bifurication. But in reality and precisely because we exist and are individuals only insofar as we are participate in God, the duality disappears for one who sees things in the first truth. In heaven, logical artifices will cease: we will see that what God wills for us overlaps or rather formally identifies with what unites us with God, possession by participation (see Intelligence: Sense of Being, Faculty of God, tr. Andrew Tallon, Marquette University Press, 1999, pp. 48-49).


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K. (p. 106) Rousselot here uses the French word communication in its older Latin sense of communicatio as used by Aquinas—a sharing in common or a joining together in common, in other words an association between commons, an association between people with common interests or a common upbringing (i.e., a commune). See also n. 34. For discussions of the various meanings of the term communicatio in Aquinas see Johann (1966), pp. 99-100 and II, n. 35; III, n. 57; Bobik (1986), pp. 1-18; Gillon (1948), pp. 3-17; and Josef M. Keller, O.P., “De virtute caritatis ut amicitia quadam divina” in Xenia Thomistica II (1925), pp. 233-76. L. (p. 107, n. 37) The French text here uses the plural form (unissent) of the verb unir meaning to unite. However as the subject of this verb is ‘la relation’ the singular form of this verb should have been used instead. I therefore take Rousselot’s intent here to be the third person singular form of the verb in the present tense (unit) and translate it accordingly. It could have also possibly been the imperfect tense of the third person singular (unissait) that Rousselot meant to use. M. (p. 108) Rousselot here coins the word tribules through analogy with the Latin word tribulis (pl. tribules) which means a fellow tribesman. This is also the meaning of the Aristotelian word fuletikaiv in this context (Eth. Nic., VIII, 12, 1161b14). N. (p. 114) This is now usually attributed to William of St. Thierry. O. (p. 130) The original inspiration for this idea is the saying of Jesus that those who wish to save their lives will lose them, but those who lose their lives for Jesus’ sake and the sake of the gospel will save them (Mk 8:34-35; cf. Jn 12:24-26). P. (p. 137, n. 77) What Rousselot means here is that Hugh of St. Victor, in setting forth what it means to love God for Himself, actually reduces this doctrine to an egoistic notion. Hugh of St. Victor thinks it is wrong to love God with a mercenary love in the sense that for Hugh we should not love God for something He can give us other than Himself. Yet Hugh of St. Victor thinks that if we love God Himself as our goodness and take delight solely in Him then we have freed ourselves from egoism. However, this was unacceptable to many other theologians. They held that such a love is still tinged with egoism. For these theologians only if we love God without any thought

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of a reward, disregarding our eternal salvation and even any joy to be found in loving Him, can we be sure we are loving God in a pure manner. See Introduction pp. 62-75. Q. (p. 152) Rousselot here uses the term “distances” which normally meant what its cognate means in English but in French could also mean the differences of value between two things or persons due to an inequality of development, station, age, or condition. The latter is the meaning wanted here and the English word ‘distance’ less readily takes this meaning. I have accordingly translated this word as “dissimilarities.” R. (p. 178) It is not absolutely clear what Rousselot means by the terms l’action sèche. He is probably means to speak of the bare action, that is the pure action itself, the action isolated from anything else. Alternatively, he could be talking about an action which is dry or arid in the sense that it is barren of affection—in other words it is dispassionate and lacking any feeling. S. (p. 184) In the gospels Jesus complains of those who only love others in order to receive love in return or to receive public praise (Mt 5:43-48; cf. Mt 6:1-4, 23:5; Jn 6:26). See Introduction, pp. 2324. T. (p. 201, n. 113) Let me caution that Andrew the Chaplain may not have meant this etymology to be taken seriously. It should always be remembered in interpreting the thought of Andrew that his writings about love take place in the context of a dialogue involving a lover who is willing to say anything to gain the affections of a beloved. It is a weakness of many interpreter’s of Andrew the Chaplain, although I am certainly not accusing Rousselot of this, that they don’t take this into account. U. (p. 213) Reading ches as chez. V. (p. 213, n. 119) Rousselot is here speaking of the condemnation of the errors of the Jansenist Synod of Pistoia set forth in Auctorem Fide by Pius VI in 1794. Here we read that: The doctrine of the synod about the twofold love of the dominating cupidity and of the dominating charity, states that humans without grace are under the power of sin, and that in that state, through the general influence of the dominating cupidity, they taint and corrupt all their actions. For it insinuates that in humans,


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while they are under the servitude or in the state of sin, destitute of that grace by which they are freed from the servitude of sin and are constituted a son of God, cupidity is so dominant that by its general influence all their actions are tainted and corrupted in themselves; or that all their works which are done before justification, for whatsoever reason they may be done, are sins; as though in all their acts sinners are slaves to the dominating cupidity:—false, dangerous, leading into the error condemned by the Tridentine Council as heretical, again condemned in Baius, art. 40 (Denz. 2623). In this part, indeed, no intermediate affections are placed between the dominating cupidity and the dominating charity, implanted by nature itself and worthy of praise because of their own nature, which, together with love of the beatitude and a natural inclination to good “have remained as the last outlines of the traces of the image of God” (from St. Augustine, De Spirit. et Litt., c. 28); just as though “between the divine love which draws us to the kingdom, and illicit human love which is condemned, there should not be given a licit human love which is not censured” (from St. Augustine, Serm. 349, De Car., ed. Maurin):—false, elsewhere condemned (Denz. 2624).

Other condemned errors of the Jansenist Synod of Pistoia concern fear of hell as a motive for the love of justice. Thus we read: The doctrine which in general asserts that the fear of punishment “cannot be called evil insofar as it at least prevails to restrain the hand”; just as though the fear itself of hell, which faith teaches must be imposed on sin, is not in itself good and useful as a supernatural gift and a motion inspired by God preparing for the love of justice:—false, rash, dangerous, injurious to the divine gifts, elsewhere condemned, contrary to the doctrine of the Tridentine Council ... (Denz. 2625).

And we also find quoted the view of the Synod of Pistoia that: ... false conversions taking place through attrition are not usually efficacious or enduring and thus the pastor of souls ought to insist on unmistakable signs of a dominant charity before admitting his penitents to the sacraments. The pastor must deduce a lasting quitting with sin and a fervor in good works ... this fervor of charity ... should precede absolution (Denz. 2636).

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The above article goes on to state that this view is condemned if it implies that, for a person to be readmitted to the sacraments, not only imperfect contrition or attrition is required (even if it is joined with a love whereby one loves God as the source of all justice), but also contrition occurring through the fervor of dominant charity. See n. 34 in the Introduction. W. (p. 218) Reading portant de (bearing) as partant de (beginning with).

Supplement: Church Declarations on Love

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Supplement Church Declarations on Love In what follows I list for the reader the significant condemnations of the Church involving love:

Condemnations of Peter Abelard (Council of Sens, c. 1140) Condemned: 1) That the spirit of the fear of the Lord was not in Christ (Denz. 731). 2) That even chaste fear is excluded from the future life (Denz. 735).

Condemnations of Meister Eckhart (In Agro Dominico, Pope John XXII, 1329) Condemned: 1) Also one who seeks anything here or there seeks evil and badly because one seeks the denial of the good and the denial of God, and one prays that God will be denied to oneself (Denz. 957). 2) In those humans who do not aim at material things, or honors, or utility, or interior devotion, or sanctity, or reward, or the kingdom of heaven, but who have renounced all these things even that which is their own, God is honored (Denz. 958). [Eckhart replies to this charge by claiming that God alone is the reward of the soul. Thus the perfect person relies on no reward or gift of God but on God Himself (Defense, IX, 35)]. 3) Recently I have considered whether I would want to receive or to desire anything from God; I want to deliberate exceedingly well about this, because when I was receiving from God, then I was under Him or below Him, as a servant or slave, and He was as a master in giving, and thus we ought not to be in eternal life (Denz. 959).

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4) Good humans so ought to conform their wills to the divine will that they themselves want whatever God wants. Because God wants me to have sinned in some way, I would not wish that I had not committed sins, and this is true repentance (Denz. 964).

Condemnations of Nicolas Serrurier (Ad Hoc Praecipue, Pope Martin V, 1420) Condemned: 1) Charity is to God and to neighbor but not to oneself.

Condemnations of Martin Luther (Exsurge Domine, Pope Leo X, 1520) Condemned: 1) To one on the point of death imperfect charity necessarily brings with it great fear, which in itself alone is enough to produce the punishment of purgatory, and impedes entrance into the kingdom (Denz. 1454). 2) Contrition, which is obtained through discussion, collection, and detestation of sins, by which one reflects upon one’s years in the bitterness of one’s soul, by pondering over the gravity of sins, their number, their baseness, the loss of eternal beatitude, and the acquisition of eternal damnation, this contrition makes one a hypocrite, indeed more a sinner (Denz. 1456).

Council of Trent (1545-1563) (Canons Concerning Justification, 1547) Canon 8: If anyone says that the fear of hell (Mt 10:28; Luke 12:5), whereby, by grieving for sins, we flee to the mercy of God or abstain from sinning, is a sin or makes sinners worse, let him be anathema. Canon 26: If anyone says that the just ought not for the good works done in God to expect and hope for an eternal recompense from God through his mercy and the merit of Jesus Christ, if by doing well and by keeping the divine commandments they persevere to the end (Mt 24:13), let him be anathema. Canon 31: If anyone says that one who is justified sins when one performs good works with a view to eternal commodities, let him be anathema.


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Condemnations of Michael Baius (Ex Omnibus Afflictionibus, Pius V, 1567) Condemned: 1) Perfect and sincere charity, which comes from a pure heart and a good conscience and unfeigned faith, can be present in catechumens as well as in penitents without the remission of sins. Charity, which is the fullness of the Law, is not always joined with a remission of sins (Denz. 1931; cf. 1932, 1970) 2) That distinction of a twofold love, namely a natural one by which God is loved as the author of nature, and a gratuitous one by which God is loved as one who blesses, is vain and false and devised to ridicule the sacred literature and most of the testimonies of the ancients (Denz. 1934). 3) Every love of the rational creature is either faulty cupidity by which the world is loved and which is forbidden by John, or is that laudable charity by which God is loved through the Holy Spirit which is poured forth into the heart (Denz. 1938). 4) As long as there is something of carnal concupiscence in the lover, one does not fulfill the precept: ‘Love the Lord God with all of your heart’ (Denz. 1976; cf. 1951, 1974-75).

Condemnations of Berengar of Montfaucon (Condemned by the Archbishop of Taragan, 1585) Condemned: 1) All good should be done for pure love of God and not for an other end, neither hope nor eternal recompense (Nololau Eimeric, Directorium Inquisitorum, Rome, 1595, p. 223).

Condemnations of the Quietist Miguel de Molinos (Caelestis Pastor, Pope Innocent XI, 1687) Condemned: 1) A soul should consider neither reward nor punishment nor paradise nor hell nor death nor eternity (Denz. 2207). 2) One who gives one’s free will to God should care about nothing, neither about hell, nor about heaven; neither ought one to have a desire for one’s own perfection, nor for the virtues, nor for one’s own sanctity, nor for

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one’s own salvation, the hope of which one ought to remove (Denz. 2212). 3) It is not seemly that one who is resigned to the divine will, ask anything of God; because asking is an imperfection, since the act is of one’s own will and election, and this is wishing that the divine will be conformed to ours, and not that ours be conformed to the divine. And that claim of the Gospel, ‘Seek and you shall find,’ was not said by Christ for interior souls who do not want to have a will; nay indeed, souls of this kind reach this state, that they cannot seek anything from God (Denz. 2214; cf. 2213, 2215). 4) One who desires and clings to sensible devotion does not desire or seek God, but rather oneself, and one acts badly when one desires and tries to have it ... (Denz. 2227; cf. Denz. 2216, 2230, 2233). 5) Tedium with respect to spiritual things is good since through this one is purged of self-love (Denz. 2228). 6) It is a good sign when the innermost soul, feeling no fervor in itself, remains cold and disdains discourse with God and the virtues (Denz. 2229). 7) Two laws and two desires (one of the soul, and the other of self-love) endure as long as self-love endures; wherefore, when this is purged and dead, as occurs through the interior way, those two laws and two desires are no longer present, nor is any lapse incurred further, nor is anything felt more, not even venial sin (Denz. 2256). 8) The soul, when it arrives at mystical death, cannot wish for anything more than what God desires, because it no longer has a will as God has taken this away from it (Denz. 2261).

Condemnations of Quietist Pietro Matteo Petrucci (Decree of the Holy Office, 1687, Innocent XI; see Cum sicut Accepimus, Innocent XI, 1689) Condemned: 1) A purely gratuitous love is free from the desire for reward. 2) A soul that has abandoned itself to God does not ask whether God loves it.


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Condemnation of Certain Jansenist Errors (Decree of the Holy Office, 1690, Pope Alexander VIII) Condemned: 1) All deliberate human action is love of God or of the world. If of God it is the charity of the Father, if of the world it is carnal concupiscence which is bad (Denz. 2307). 2) The intention, whereby one detests evil and pursues good merely to obtain heavenly glory, is neither right nor pleasing to God (Denz. 2310). 3) Whoever serves God with regard to even eternal commodities, if such a person lacks charity, is not lacking in vice, so often as such a person operates with regard to the beatitude (Denz. 2313). 4) Fear of hell is not supernatural (Denz. 2314). 5) Attrition, which is conceived from fear of hell and punishments, without a love of benevolence of God for His own sake, is not a good and supernatural disposition (Denz. 2315).

Condemnations of the Quietist François Fénelon (Cum Alias ad Apostolatus, Pope Innocent XII, 1699) 1) There is a habitual state of love for God, which is pure charity without any admixture of the motive of self-interest. Neither fear of punishments nor desire of recompense have a part in it any longer. God is no longer loved for the sake of the merit, nor for the sake of the perfection, nor for the sake of the felicity to be found in loving Him (Denz. 2351, cf. 2373). 2) In the state of the contemplative or unitive life every interested motive of fear or hope is lost (Denz. 2352). 3) In the state of holy indifference, a soul no longer has voluntary and deliberate desires for the sake of its interest, with the exception of those occasions on which it does not faithfully cooperate with the whole of its grace (Denz. 2354). 4) In the same state of holy indifference we want nothing for ourselves, but all for God. We do not want that we be perfect and happy for the sake of self-interest, but we wish all perfection and happiness only insofar as it

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pleases God to bring it about that we want these things by the impression of His grace (Denz. 2355). 5) In this state of holy indifference we no longer seek salvation as our own salvation, as our eternal liberation, as a payment for our merit, as the greatest of all our interests; rather we want it with our whole will as the glory and good pleasure of God, as the thing which He wants and which He wants us to want for the sake of Him (Denz. 2356; cf. 2358, 2361). 6) Dereliction is nothing other than the abnegation or renunciation of oneself, which Jesus Christ requires from us in the Gospel, after we have left all external things. This abnegation of ourselves is only with regard to our own interests … The extreme trials in which this abnegation or dereliction of oneself must be exercised are the temptations by which a jealous God wants to purify love, by holding out to it no refuge, nor any hope for its own interest, even eternal (Denz. 2357; cf. 2360). 7) In this sense it can be said that a passive and disinterested soul no longer wants love itself insofar as it is its perfection and felicity, but only insofar as it is what God wants of us (Denz. 2369). 8) In confession transformed souls must detest their sins and condemn themselves and desire the remission of their sins, not as their own purification and liberation, but as a thing which God wants and wants us to want for the sake of His glory (Denz. 2370).

Condemnations of the Jansenist Paschasius Quesnel (Unigenitus Dei Filius, Pope Clement XI, 1713) Condemned: 1) There are only two loves from which all of our volitions and desires arise: the love of God which does everything for the sake of God, and which God rewards, and the love by which we love ourselves and the world, which does not refer to God what should be referred to Him and for this very reason becomes bad (Denz. 2444; cf. 2445-46). 2) As there is no sin without love of ourselves, so there is no good work without love of God (Denz. 2449). 3) If fear of punishment alone animates penance, the more fierce this is, the more it leads to despair (Denz. 2460).


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4) Fear merely restrains the hand, while the heart is attached to sin so long as one is not motivated by love of justice (Denz. 2461). 5) One who only abstains from evil through fear of punishment, commits that evil in one’s heart, and is already guilty before God (Denz. 2462; cf. 2463-65). 6) One who wants to draw near to God should not come to Him with brutal passions nor be led by natural instinct or through fear as beasts, but through faith and love as sons (Denz. 2466; cf. 2467). [Translations based on H. Denzinger, The Sources of Catholic Dogma, Tr. Roy Deferrari (St. Louis: Herder, 1957) and Mark Knoll, Confessions and Catechisms of the Reformation (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1991).]

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Bibliography WORKS TREATING ROUSSELOT’S DOCTRINE OF LOVE Kunz, Erhard, Glaube, Gnade, Geschichte: die Glaubenstheologie des Pierre Rousselot (Frankfurt a.m.: J. Knecht, 1969). Lavalette, Henri de, S.J., “Le théoricien de l’amour,” Recherches de Science Religieuse 53:3 (1965), pp. 462-94. McCool, Gerald, S.J., The Neo-Thomists (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1994). ———. From Unity to Pluralism: The Internal Evolution of Thomism (New York: Fordham University Press, 1989). McDermott, John, Love and Understanding: The Relation of Will and Intellect in Pierre Rousselot’s Christological Vision (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1983).

CONTEMPORARY WORKS TREATING THE PROBLEM OF LOVE Adams, Robert Merrihew, “Pure Love,” Journal of Religious Ethics 8:1 (1980), pp. 83-99. Allen, Vaugh Steven, Self-Love, Other-Regarding Love, and Mutuality: A Debate in Contemporary Christian Ethics (Brown University Dissertation, 1996). Andolsen, Barbara H., “Agape in Feminist Ethics,” Journal of Religious Ethics 9:1 (1981), pp. 69-83. Bobik, Joseph, “Aquinas on Communicatio, the Foundation of Friendship and Caritas,” Modern Schoolman 64 (1986), pp. 1-18. Bogliolo, L., “L’Amour-Sui come Fondamento della Morale,” Sapienza 28 (1975), pp. 263-87. Brümmer, Vincent, The Model of Love: A Study in Philosophical Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). Cain, John J., Self-Love and Self-Donation: A Study in Aquinas’ Concept of Love (Hales Corners, WI.: Priests of the Sacred Heart, 1976). Capdevila Montaner, Vincente-Maria, El amor natural en su relacion con la caridad segun la doctrina de santo Tomas (Gerona: 1964). Carpentier, René, “Le primât de la charité en la vie morale,” Nouvelle Revue Théologique 83 (1961), pp. 3-24.

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———. “Le primât de l’Amour-Charité comme méthode de théologie morale,” Nouvelle Revue Théologique 83 (1961), pp. 492-509. “Charité” and “Désintéressement,” in Dictionnaire de Spiritualité, ascétique et mystique (Paris: G. Beauchesne et ses fils, 1937-67). Charland, T., O.P., “Ni Bossuet, ni Fénelon, mais S. Thomas,” Revue Dominicaine 39 (1933), pp. 257-74. Coconnier, Marie-Thomas, O.P., “La charité d’après S. Thomas d’Aquin,” Revue Thomiste 12 (1904), pp. 641-60. Cowburn, John, S.J., The Person and Love: Philosophy and Theology of Love (Alba House, Staten Island, N.Y.: 1967). Crowe, Frederick, “Complacency and Concern in the Thought of St. Thomas,” Theological Studies 20 (1959), pp. 1-39, 198-230, 343-95. D’Arcy, Martin C., The Mind and Heart of Love (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1954). ———. The Spirit of Charity (New York: Benzinger Brothers, 1929). De Ferrari, Teresa Mary, The Problem of Charity for Self: A Study of Thomistic and Modern Theological Discussion (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Dissertation, 1962). De Finance, Joseph, “La Motion du bien,” Gregorianum 39 (1958), pp. 542. ———. Etre et Agir dans la Philosophie de Saint Thomas (Paris: Beauchesne et Ses Fils, 1945). De Guibert, J. “Charité parfaite et désir de Dieu,” Revue d’Ascétique et de Mystique 7 (1926), pp. 225-50. De Régnon, Théodore, S.J., Etudes de théologie positive sur la Sainte Trinité (Paris: Victor Retaux et Fils, 1892). Deman, Théodore, “Eudémonisme et charité en théologie morale,” Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses 29 (1953), pp. 41-57. Descoqs, Pedro, Institutiones Metaphysicae Generalis (Paris: Beauchesne, 1925). Diggs, Bernard James, Love and Being: An Investigation into the Metaphysics of St. Thomas (New York: S. F. Yanni, 1947). Dowey, Edward, “Love and Sacrifice,” Christianity and Crisis 13:5 (1953), pp. 38-39. Dublanchy, Edmond, “Charité,” in Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1902). Faraon, M.J., O.P., The Metaphysical and Psychological Principles of Love (Dubuque, Brown: The Aquinas Library: 1952). Gagnebet, R., “L’amour naturel de Dieu chez saint Thomas et ses contemporains,” Revue Thomiste 48 (1948), pp. 394-446; 49 (1949), pp. 31-102. Garrigou-Lagrange, Reginald, O.P., “Le problème de l’amour pur et la solution de S. Thomas,” Angelicum 6 (1929), pp. 83-124.

256


———. The Love of God and the Cross of Jesus, tr. Sister Jeanne Marie (St. Louis: Herder, 1965). ———. “De Amore uro secundum sancti Thomae Principia,” Angelicum 7 (1930), pp. 3-16. ———. De Virtutibus Theologicis (Torino, Italy: Roberto Berruti & Co., 1949). Geiger, Louis-B., O.P., Le Problème de L’Amour chez Saint Thomas D’Aquin (Paris: Librairie J. Vrin, Paris: 1952). Gilleman, Gérard, The Primacy of Charity in Moral Theology (Westminster, MD.: Newman, 1959). Gillon, L.-B., O.P. “A propos de la théorie thomiste de l’amitié,”Angelicum 25 (1948), pp. 3-17. ———. “L’argument du tout et de la partie après saint Thomas d’Aquin,” Angelicum 28 (1951), pp. 205-23; 346-62. ———. “Genèse psychologique de la théorie thomiste de l’amour,” Revue Thomiste 46 (1946), pp. 322-29. ———. “Béatitude et désir de voir Dieu au Moyen Age,” Angelicum 26 (1949), pp. 3-30, 115-42. Gilson, Etienne, The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, tr. A. H. C. Downes (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1940). ———. The Mystical Theology of St. Bernard, tr. A. H. C. Downes (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1940). Grant, Colin, “For the Love of God: Agape,” Journal of Religious Ethics 24:1 (1996), pp. 3-21, 43-6. Grieco, Eileen, Love and Knowledge in Modern Thomism (Peter Lang Publishing, 2000). Gudorf, Christine E., “Parenting, Mutual Love, and Sacrifice,” in Women’s Consciousness, Women’s Conscience, ed. Andolsen, Gudorf, and Pellauer (Minneapolis: Winston Press, 1985), pp. 175-91. Guitton, Jean, Human Love (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1966). Hallett, Garth L., Christian Neighbor-Love (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1989). Hamonic, Thierry-Marie, “Dieu peut-il être légitimement convoite?” Revue Thomiste 92 (1992), pp. 239-266. Hanfling, Owsald, “Loving My Neighbour, Loving Myself,” Philosophy 68 (1993), pp. 145-57. Harent, Stéphane, S.J., “La question de l’amour pur,” Etudes 127 (1911), pp. 178-96; 349-63; 480-500; 745-68. Harrison, Beverly W., “The Power of Anger in the Work of Love,” in Making the Connections: Essays in Feminist Social Ethics, ed. Carol Robb (Boston: Beacon Press, 1985), pp. 3-21. Harrison, Beverly W. and Carter Heyward, “Pain and Pleasure: Avoiding the Confusions of Christians in Feminist Theory,” in Christianity,

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———. “Communion and True Self-Love,” Journal of Religious Ethics 16:2 (1988), pp. 345-62. Roland-Gosselin, M.-D., “Le désir du bonheur et l’existence de Dieu,” Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques 13 (1924), pp. 162-72. Scheler, Max, The Nature of Sympathy, tr. Peter Heath (Hamden, Conn.: Anchor Books, 1973). Schwarz, B. V., “Dietrich von Hildebrand on Value,” Thought 24 (1949), pp. 655-76. Simonin, H.-D., O.P., “Autour de la solution thomiste du problème de l’amour,” Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge 6 (1931), pp. 174-276. Somme, Luc, “L’amour parfait chasse-t-il toute crainte? Le role joué par l’expression timor filialis dans l’oeuvre de saint Thomas d’Aquin,” Ordo Sapientiae et Amoris, ed. Carlos-Josaphat Pinto de Oliveira (Fribourg, 1993), pp. 303-20. Stevens, Gregory, O.S.B., “The Disinterested Love of God,” Thomist 16 (1953), pp. 307-33, 497-541. Stott, John R. W., “Am I Supposed to Love Myself or Hate Myself?,” Christianity Today 28:7 (1984), pp. 26-28. ———. “Must I Really Love Myself?,” Christianity Today 22 (1978), pp. 34-35. Tallon, Andrew, “Love and the Logic of the Heart,” Listening: Journal of Religion and Culture 18 (1983), pp. 5-22. ———. “Love in the Heart Tradition,” in Phenomenology and the Understanding of Human Destiny, ed. Stephen Skousgaard (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1982). Toner, Jules, The Experience of Love (Washington, D.C.: Corpus Books, 1968). ———. What is Love? (Washington, D.C.: Corpus Books, 1968). Vacek, Edward Collins, S.J., Love, Human and Divine: The Heart of Christian Ethics (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1994). ———. “Love, Christian and Diverse,” Journal of Religious Ethics, 24:1 (1996), pp. 29-34. Veatch, Henry, “Modern Ethics, Teleology, and Love of Self,” Monist 75 (1992), pp. 52-71. Von Hildebrand, Dietrich, Das Wesen der Liebe (Stein am Rhein: Christina, 1971). Walsh, Lincoln J., “Self-Love and the Love of God,” Homiletic and Pastoral Review 89 (1989), pp. 58-62. Whittaker, John, “Selfishness, Self-Concern, and Happiness,” Journal of Religious Ethics 8:4 (1980), pp. 149-59. ———. “Agape and Self-Love,” in The Love Commandment: Essays in Christian Ethics and Moral Philosophy, ed. Edmund N. Santurri and

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THE DOCTRINE OF LOVE IN THE BIBLE AND THE PATRISTIC PERIOD Babcock, William S., “Cupiditas and Caritas: The Early Augustine on Love and Human Fulfillment,” in Augustine Today, ed. Richard John Neuhaus (Grand Rapids, MI.: W. B. Eerdman’s, 1993). Boularand, E., “L’amitié d’après saint Ambroise dans le ‘De officiis ministrorum,’” Bulletin de Littérature Ecclésiastique 73 (1972), pp. 10323. Burnaby, John, Amor Dei: A Study of the Religion of St. Augustine (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1938). Cassidy, E., “The Recovery of the Classical Idea of Friendship in Augustine’s Portrayal of Caritas,” in The Relationship Between Neoplatonism and Christianity, ed. T. Finan (Dublin: 1992, pp. 127-40). Catry, Patrick, “Desir et amour de Dieu chez saint Gregoire le Grand,” in Recherches Augustiniennes 10 (1975), pp. 269-303. Collins, James J., “The Primacy of Love in St. Gregory of Nyssa’s Theology,”’Diakonia 14:1 (1979), pp. 29-40. Ferguson, Everett, “Love of Enemies and Nonretaliation in the Second Century,” in The Contentious Triangle, ed. Rodney Petersen and Calvin Pater (Kirksville, MO: Thomas Jefferson University Press, 1999), pp. 8195. Furnish, Victor P., The Love Command in the New Testament (Nashville: Abingdon, 1972). Giet, S., “De saint Basile à saint Ambroise: La condamnation du prêt à l’interêt au Ive siècle,” Recherches de Science Religieuse 32 (1944), pp. 95128.

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Garrison, Roman, Redemptive Almsgiving in Early Christianity (Sheffield, England: Journal for the Study of the New Testament Press, 1993). Joly, R., Le Vocabulaire Chrétien de l’amour est-il Original? Philein et Agapan dans le Grec Antique (Brussels: 1968). Konstan, David, “Problems in the History of Christian Friendship,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 4 (1996), pp. 87-113. Maloney, R.P., “The Teaching of the Fathers on Usury: An Historical Study on the Development of Christian Thinking,” Vigiliae christianae 27 (1973), pp. 241-65. Michaels, J. Ramsey, “Almsgiving and the Kingdom Within: Tertullian on Luke 17:21,” Catholic Biblical Quarterly 60 (1998), pp. 475-83. Moffatt, James, Love in the New Testament (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1929). O’Connor, William, “The ‘Uti/Frui’ Distinction in Augustine’s Ethics,” Augustinian Studies 14 (1983), pp. 45-62. O’Donovan, Oliver, The Problem of Self-Love in St. Augustine (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980). Osborn, Eric F., “The Love Command in Second-Century Christian Writing,” Second Century 1:4 (1981), pp. 223-43. Osborne, Catherine, Plato and the God of Love (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). Perkins, Pheme, Love Commands in the New Testament (New York: Paulist Press, 1982). Petré, H., Caritas: Étude sur le Vocabulaire Latin de la Charité Chrétienne (Louvain: 1948). Pietras, H., L’Amore in Origene (Roma: Institutium Patristicum ‘Augustinianum,’ 1988). Pizzolato, L. F., “L’amizicia nel’De officiis di Sant’ Ambrogio e il Laelius di Cicerone,” Archivio Ambrosiano 27 (1974), pp. 53-67. ———. L’idea di amicizia nel mondo antico classico e cristiano (Turin: 1993). Ramsey, B., “Almsgiving in the Latin Church: The Late Fourth and Early Fifth Centuries,” Theological Studies, 43 (1982), pp. 226-59. Rist, John M., “Eros and Agape in Pseudo-Dionysius,” Vigiliae Christianae 20 (1966), pp. 235-43. ———. Eros and Psyche: Studies in Plato, Plotinus, and Origen (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964). Spicq, Ceslaus, Agapè dans le Nouveau Testament, 3 vols. (Paris: Gabalda, 1958-60). White, C., Christian Friendship in the Fourth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

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THE DOCTRINE OF LOVE IN THE MEDIEVAL AND RENAISSANCE PERIODS Alszeghy, Zoltan, S.J., Grundformen der Liebe: Die Theorie der Gottesliebe bei dem heiligen Bonaventure (Rome: Analecta Gregoriana, 1946). Aumann, Jordan, “Thomistic Evaluation of Love and Charity,” Faith and Reason 12 (1986), pp. 105-23. Bougerol, Jacques-Guy, La Théologie de l’espérance aux xii et xiii siècles, 2 vols. (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1985). De Letter, P., “Hope and Charity in St. Thomas,”Thomist 13 (1950), pp. 204-48, 325-52. Drost, Mark, “In the Realm of the Senses: St. Thomas Aquinas on Sensory Love, Desire, and Delight,” Thomist 59 (1995), pp. 47-58. Dumeige, Gervais, Richard de Saint-Victor et l’idée chrétienne de l’amour (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1952). Fiske, A. M., Friends and Friendship in the Monastic Tradition (Cuernavaca, Mexico: Cuaderno 51, 1970). Glenn, Mary, “A Comparison of the Thomistic and Scotistic Concepts of Hope,” Thomist 20 (1957), pp. 27-74. Goré, Jeanne-Lydie, La notion d’indifférence chez Fénelon et ses sources (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1956). Guilloux, P., “L’amour de Dieu selon saint Bernard,” Revue des sciences religieuses (1926), pp. 499-512; (1927), pp. 52-68; (1928), pp. 69-90. Jones, Gregory, “Theological Transformation of Aristotelian Friendship in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas,” New Scholasticism 61 (1987), pp. 373-99. Kulesza, Eugéne, La doctrine mystique de Richard de Saint-Victor (SaintMaximin: 1925). Langelaan, James S., The Philosophy and Theology of Love according to St. Francis de Sales (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1994). Leclercq, Jean, Monks and Love in Twelfth Century France (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979). Letter, P. de, “Hope and Charity in St. Thomas,” The Thomist, 13 (1950), pp. 204-48, 325-52. MacDonald, Scott, “Egoistic Rationalism: Aquinas’s Basis for Christian Morality,” in Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy, ed. Michael Beaty (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), pp. 327-54. Malet, A., Personne et amour dans la théologie trinitaire de Saint Thomas d’Aquin (Paris: Vrin, Bibliothèque Thomiste, 1956). McEnvoy, James, “Amitié, attirance et amour chez S. Thomas d’Aquin,” Revue philosophique de Louvain 91 (1993), pp. 383-408.

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264

Index of Names Abelard, 16, 79, 137, 150, 157-159, 161-163, 164, 178, 181, 183-185, 215, 218, 221, 223, 241, 247 Adelard of Bath, 93 Adam, 217, 220 Aelred of Rievaulx, St., 16, 83, 116, 131, 179, 193, 201-202, 241 Albert the Great, 16, 103, 113, 121, 159, 205-208, 219, 221 Alcher of Clairvaux, 130, 194 Alexander III [Rolando Bandinelli], 156, 181, 215-217 Alexander VIII, 251 Alexander of Hales, 16, 152, 159160, 167, 185, 187, 221-222 Ambrose, St., 24, 31-32, 42, 49, 52, 54, 59-60, 63, 67, 73, 133, 177, 225 Amphilochius of Iconium, 71, 73 Andrew the Chaplain [Andreas Capellanus], 83, 201, 244 Anthony of Egypt, St., 30-31, 60, 69 Aristides of Athens, 29, 57 Aristotle, 17-18, 23, 43, 47, 69, 7778, 81-82, 87, 97, 105-110, 112114, 117, 121, 127-129, 164, 177, 220 Athanasius, St., 30, 47, 62 Athenagoras, 48 Augustine, St. [Bishop of Hippo], 17, 23, 26, 38, 42-43, 54, 62-63, 67-68, 73, 77, 85, 114-115, 121123, 130, 159, 162, 164, 170, 177, 181, 183-184, 187, 194, 199200, 202, 212-213, 235, 245 Avicenna, 120, 129 Baius, Michael, 213, 245, 249

Baldwin of Devonshire [Baldwin of Ford; Archbishop of Canterbury], 16, 131, 160, 175, 195 Basil, St., 31, 43, 51, 54, 70, 73-74 Benedict, St., 73 Berengar of Montfaucon, 249 Bernard of Clairvaux, St., 16-17, 7881, 114, 121, 123, 134, 143-151, 153-154, 160-161, 171, 174, 177, 179-180, 189, 191, 193, 195, 197, 199, 203, 206, 213, 225-226, 236 Billuart, Charles René, 98 Bonaventure, St., 16, 159-160, 167, 185, 208, 237, 241 Bossuet, Jacques Bénigne, 137, 141, 182 Caesarius of Arles, St., 26, 63, 73 Cajetan, 21 Carneades, 48-49 Cassiodorus, 73 Chrysippus, 23, 69 Cicero, 23, 48, 59, 69, 116, 193 Clement of Alexandria, 24, 39-40, 43, 51, 53, 60-62, 64-67, 69, 72, 241 Clement of Rome, St. [Clement I], 52-53, 57 Clement, Second Letter of, 63-64 Coconnier, Marie-Thomas, 11, 107 Critias, 59, 69 Cyprian of Carthage, St., 29-30, 47 Cyril of Alexandria, St., 54 Cyril of Jerusalem, St., 31, 49 D’Arcy, Martin C., 13, 16 De Régnon, Théodore, 11, 152, 160, 164 Democritus, 47, 59, 69

Index Denzinger, Heinrich Joseph, 104, 213 Didache, 28 Dorotheus of Gaza, 40-41, 62, 70, 73 Dublanchy, Edmond, 11, 137 Duns Scotus, John—see John Duns Scotus Eckhart, Meister, 237-238, 247 Epictetus, 23 Epicurus, 47, 59, 64, 69 Evagrius of Pontus [Evagrios], 73 Eusebius of Emesa, 73 Fénelon, François, 104, 147, 182, 241, 251 Francis of Assisi, St., 174 Fulgentius of Ruspe, St., 62, 213 Gietl, Ambrosius, 156, 181, 216217 Gilbert of Hoyland, 16, 161, 170, 174, 176, 190, 193, 195, 198199, 201, 241 Gilson, Etienne, 21, 238-239 Gonet, Jean Baptiste, 98 Grabmann, Martin, 209 Gratian, 217 Gregory the Great, St., 42-43, 6062, 155-158, 161, 217-218, 225 Gregory of Nazianzus, St., 40-41, 43, 51, 54, 70, 114, 241 Gregory of Nyssa, St., 31, 70-71, 235 Gregory Thaumaturgus, St., 58 Hecaton, 48 Hermann the German [Hermann of Carinthia], 82, 106-107 Hilary of Poitiers, St., 62 Hugh of St. Victor, 14, 17, 22, 7879, 81, 130, 134-143, 147, 154, 170, 172-173, 181, 183, 185, 197-

265 198, 200, 202, 206, 215, 241, 243 Ignatius of Antioch, St., 28, 45-46, 51, 64 Ildephonsus of Toledo, St., 155-156 Innocent III, 173 Innocent XI, 249 Irenaeus of Lyons, St., 24, 29, 60 Isidore of Peluse, 54 Isaac of Nineveh, 73 Issy Conferences, 53 Jerome, St., 24, 32, 49, 60-62, 161162, 193 Jesus Christ, 23-24, 26-27, 32-34, 36-37, 39, 43-46, 50-59, 67, 72, 74, 78, 90, 114, 132, 141, 144, 161, 174, 176, 179, 183, 192, 194, 199, 227, 235, 243-244, 247248, 250 John Cassian, St., 25, 52, 55-56, 62, 73, 241 John Chrysostom, St., 38, 40-41, 43, 52-55, 59, 63, 68, 71-75, 241 John Climacus, St., 62, 73 John Duns Scotus, 16, 20, 90, 114, 119, 200, 209-210 John, Gospel of, 44, 58-59, 202, 213, 249 John of Damascus, St., 222 John Scotus Eriugena, 114, 119-120 John XXII, 247 Julianus Pomerius [Pseudo-Prosper], 25, 33, 73, 77, 177 Justin Martyr, St., 46, 57, 71 Juvenalis Annaniensis, 123 Lactantius, 24, 31, 43, 47-49, 55, 58, 71 Lambin, Dionysius, 107 Leo the Great, St., 33-34, 73 Leo X, 248 Lewis, C. S., 14

266


Liber de libertate spiritus, 73 Luther, Martin, 17, 238, 248

Petrus Cantor [Peter the Chanter], 217 Philo Judaeus, 59 Mabillon, Jean, 143 Pistoia, Synod of, 213, 244-245 Marcus Aurelius, 23 Pius V, 249 Mark the Hermit, 71, 73 Pius VI, 213, 244 Martin, Jules, 130, 212 Plato, 23, 69, 91, 105, 113, 124, Martin of Tours, St., 36-37 163, 239 Martin V, 248 Plotinus, 117, 168 Martyrdom of Polycarp, 51 Plutarch, 23, 59, 69 Massoulié, Antoine, 11, 98, 194 Porphyry, 89 Matthew of Aquasparta, 208-209 Portalié, Eugène, 212 Maximus of Turin, St., 33, 37-38, Praepositinus of Cremona, 219 62 Proclus, 117 Maximus the Confessor, St., 25, 62, Pseudo-Dionysius [The Areopagite], 73 17, 23, 45, 78-79, 86, 118-119, Mazzella, Camillo, 98 124, 163, 207, 212 Mehren, August, 120, 130 Pseudo-Macarius of Egypt, 73 Mignon, Armand, 137 Pseudo-Prosper—see Julianus PomMolinos, Miguel de, 104, 249 erius Moses, 52-54, 71, 78, 141, 235 Pythagoras, 23, 69 Novatian, 47, 60 Nygren, Anders, 11-14, 16

Quesnel, Paschasius, 252

Rabanus Maurus, 159 Richard of St. Victor, 16, 130-132, 152, 160, 164-168, 173, 190, 195, 198, 202-203, 206, 226, 241 Pascal, Blaise, 206 Robert Pullen, 216 Paschasius Radbertus, 122, 156 Rolando Bandinelli—see Alexander Paul, St., 18-19, 27, 36, 39, 42, 44III 47, 51-55, 64, 72-73, 78, 103, Rousselot, Pierre, 9-23, 235, 238114, 118, 141 244 Paulinus of Friuli, St. [Paulinus of Rupert of Deutz, 217 Aquileia], 114 Paulinus of Nola, St., 33-35, 42, 50, Salvian of Marseilles, 33-36, 40, 49, 58, 71 61-62 Peter Chrysologus, St., 32, 49 Scheler, Max, 21 Peter Lombard, 77, 214, 216 Seeberg, Reinhold, 164 Peter of Blois, 115, 159, 167 Seneca, 23 Peter of Poitiers, 153, 161, 214, 216- Sens, Council of, 247 217 Serrurier, Nicolas, 248 Petrucci, Pietro Matteo, 250 Shepherd of Hermas, 28-29, 56 Sulpicius Severus, 36 Omnibonus [Omnebene], 216 Origen, 45, 53, 59-60, 73

Index Tertullian, 29-30, 46-47, 49, 51, 5859, 71 Thalassios, 73 Theodore of Mopsuestia, 73 Theodoret of Cyrus [Theodoret of Cyr], 55, 71, 73-75, 241 Thomas Aquinas, St., 17-22, 78, 81, 83-122, 124, 127, 129, 131, 133, 137, 141, 145, 149, 151-154, 156, 159-160, 167, 170-171, 177-179, 185, 195, 200, 205-206, 212, 214, 220-221, 236-238, 240-243 Thomas à Kempis, 213 Trent, Council of, 248-249 Uccelli, Pietro Antonio, 83 Valerian, St. [Bishop of Cimiez], 33, 36-37, 50 Victor of Vita, 54 William of Auvergne, 16, 153, 156157, 159-160, 171, 179, 185-187, 193, 195-196, 203-204, 212, 219221 William of Auxerre, 87, 89, 159, 167, 218-221 William of St. Thierry, 16, 83, 121, 123-124, 132-133, 157, 167, 170, 180, 182, 195, 201, 203, 206, 223-233, 243

267


268

Index of Subjects Acquisition of God, 13, 94, 99-100, 138, 204, 210 Adam, 217, 220 Adoption, state of, 52, 59-60, 69, see Sonship, state of Advantage(s), 23, 25-26, 31-32, 37, 40, 42, 47-48, 52, 62, 66-67, 70, 103, 144-145, 183 Agape, 11-14, 16-17, 24 Almsgiving, 26-43, 50, 62 —disinterested view of, 39-43 —egoistic view of, 28-39, 43 Amor, 12, 14, 83, 85-86, 97, 229 Amor concupiscentiae, 12, 14, 235236 Amor amicitiae, 12, 14, 236 Annihilation, 20, 148, 169, 177, 183, 242 Angel(s), 19-20, 49, 88-92, 100-101, 103, 116, 153, 214-218, 220, 240 Apostolic love, 52, 55 Appetite(s), 12, 15-17, 19, 21, 7679, 84, 87, 90, 94-98, 105, 107, 112, 115, 117, 120-125, 145-146, 149, 169, 212, 220-221, 224 —natural, 16-17, 19, 76, 78-79, 95, 112, 115, 146, 149 —universal appetite for God, 21, 94-98, 105, 117-127 Apologists, Greek, 46, 57 Association, 106-107, 243 Attrition, 61, 245-246, 251

Beloved, 14-15, 28, 55, 72, 112, 115, 120, 132, 149, 151, 155, 157, 159, 161, 163, 165, 167, 171, 174, 187, 193, 203, 205207, 233, 238 Benefactor, 110, 186, 220 Benefit, 12, 18, 24, 28, 30-34, 3738, 41, 43, 45, 48-49, 51, 55, 72, 150, 161, 184-186, 196, 220, 237 Bride, 132, 171, 174-176, 193, 223, 226 Bridegroom, 192, 223, 226 Buddhism, Mahayana, 52

Charity, 24-25, 34, 36, 42-43, 51, 59, 67, 86, 103, 114, 121-124, 135, 137, 141-143, 146-147, 150, 155-156, 158-159, 164-167, 170, 172-174, 176-183, 186, 192, 198203, 205, 212-215, 217-219, 221, 224-225, 227, 236-238, 241, 244246, 248-249, 251 Chaste love, 63, 67-68, 132 Christianity, 11, 17, 24, 39, 43-45, 53, 57, 77, 80, 130, 169, 213, 235 Christians, 17, 19, 24-28, 31-34, 3840, 43-46, 50-52, 54, 56-59, 6263, 65, 68-69, 73, 120 Church Fathers, 19, 23-25, 29-31, 33, 36, 44-45, 51, 60, 62, 64-65, 73 Coincidence of the spiritual good with the good in itself, 21-22, 99104, 127-133 Beatitude, 34, 68, 78, 84, 86, 100, 103-104, 116, 121-123, 170, 184, Communication, 39, 106, 143-144, 184, 198, 243 199-200, 205, 209-210, 234, 240, Communion, 118 242, 245, 248, 251

Index Community, 19-20, 51, 53, 89, 106108, also see Society Compassion, 24, 33, 40, 42 Concupiscence, 125, 146, 235, 249, 251 Connaturality, 87, 95, 117 Contrition, 61, 246, 248 Creature(s), 19-22, 76, 88, 91, 9495, 99-100, 112, 116, 119, 121, 126, 144, 150, 158-159, 162, 175, 178, 188, 194, 212-213, 215, 221, 229-230, 242, 249 Creation, 74, 94, 101, 114, 119121, 150, 161, 163, 170, 216 Creator, 20, 57, 74, 112, 122-123, 150, 185, 187, 194, 215, 220221, 229 Cupidity, 123-124, 126, 135, 146147, 212-214, 221, 236, 244-245, 249 Cyrenaics, 49 Death (die), 19-20, 30, 34-35, 4451, 53, 74-75, 88-89, 135, 169170, 174, 176-177, 192, 196, 248-250 —love as causing our death (ecstatic conception), 169-170, 176-177, 250 Debt(s), 34-35, 150, 160, 192 Debtor, God as, 29, 32-34, 41-42, 47 Degrees of love, 27, 35, 94, 120, 129, 139, 146-149, 160, 173, 181, 226 Dilectio, 20, 88 Delight, 68, 122, 128-129, 208-210, 243 Demons, 118 Desire(s), 11-14, 17-18, 22, 45, 51, 55, 58, 60, 62-63, 67, 70, 74, 78, 83-85, 87, 92, 97-98, 104, 107, 115, 117-121, 129, 134-138, 157, 167, 185, 190, 201, 209, 218,

269 221, 223, 226, 235-238, 240, 250, 252 Destruction of Self, 16, 21, 52-56, 79, 100, 149, 170, 240 Devil, 36, 101, 215, 217 Disposition, 41, 64, 70-71, 101, 110, 125-126, 141, 158-159, 180, 191, 206-208, 223-224, 228, 232, 251 Dissimilarity, natural, 113, 152, 194, 244 Disinterest, 12-16, 20, 22-23, 27, 33, 38, 39-43, 48-56, 59-76, 81, 90, 92, 94, 97, 109, 115, 142, 153, 183-186, 252 Duality of love (ecstatic conception), 15, 17, 79, 92, 134, 155-168, 183, 238, 242 Ecstatic conception of love, 11-12, 14-17, 78-80, 84, 92, 133-134, 143, 148, 151-211, 233-234 Egoistic conceptions of ethics and love, 12-14, 16-18, 20, 21, 24, 26-39, 42-50, 54, 56-59, 76-77, 79, 84, 89, 97, 116, 127, 136137, 142, 145, 155, 164, 213, 236, 243 End of love, final (ecstatic conception), 16, 47, 68, 76, 83-85, 94, 96-98, 119, 124, 155, 188, 197211, 217, 233, 238, 240, 242, 249 Enjoyment, 64, 68, 101, 138, 207209, 223-224, 227 Equality, 56, 74, 98, 112-113, 139, 153, 166-167, 193-194 Egalitarian, 16, 112-113, 194 Eros, 11-14, 16, 45 Eternal life and rewards, 26-27, 31, 32-33, 37, 39-40, 43-49, 51, 52, 56-57, 60-65, 67, 68-69, 77, 103, 132, 183-184, 203, 237, 244, 247, 248-249, 251

270


Evil, 29, 55, 61, 64, 66, 70-71, 78, Gift(s), 14, 26, 28, 31, 34-35, 38, 42, 101-102, 215-217, 235, 245, 247, 71, 87, 144, 150, 159-160, 186, 251-252 196, 247 Glory, 25, 27, 35, 39-40, 45, 57, 66Faith, 28, 32-33, 65-66, 72, 135, 67, 70, 74, 103, 139, 144, 149, 156, 180, 195, 223, 230-232, 241, 161, 186, 204, 206, 231, 251-252 245, 249 —glory of God, 103, 139, 144, 149, Fear, 30, 40-41, 46, 56-66, 68-73, 161 115, 135, 146, 191, 235, 245, God, 12-14, 17-22, 24-30, 32-36, 247-252 38-42, 44-48, 52-78, 87-92, 94—chaste, 62, 247 105, 111-126, 130-131, 133, 135—of God, 41-42, 55-74, 135, 146, 153, 156-163, 167, 169-174, 247 177-180, 182-186, 192, 194-198, —of hell, 56-74, 235, 245, 248, 251 200-202, 204, 207, 210, 212-231, —of punishment, 29, 41, 57-63 66, 233, 235-251 68-75, 235, 245, 249, 251-252 —disinterested love of, 12-17, 22, —servile, 62, 71, see also Slave 59-75, 90, 92, 142, 153, 183Final end, love as, see End of love 186, 237 Forgetting of self, 148, 192 —egoistic love of, 12-14, 17-18, 20Form, 83, 90, 113, 149, 151, 205, 21, 56-61, 71, 76-79, 84, 89, 97, 241 116, 127, 136-143, 145, 155, 164, Free creatures (Free will), 14, 76, 96213, 236, 243-244 97, 99, 104, 112, 129, 150, 152, —harmonistic love of, 12-22, 38, 160, 212-213, 221, 250 42, 68, 76-78, 81-155, 178, 233, Freedom of love, 15-16, 59, 79, 126, see also Physical Conception of 152-153, 160-161, 186, 245 Love Friendship, 12, 14, 17, 19, 22-25, —love of God for Himself, 18, 6231, 49, 69-70, 77-78, 86-87, 92, 63, 67-70, 72-73, 77, 135-136, 97, 105-106, 109-110, 112-113, 138, 145, 147, 150, 156, 184116, 119, 127, 129, 135, 137, 185, 220, 237, 243, 247, 251 153, 157, 179, 193-194, 196, 218- —nature of, 76, 87-88, 91, 98, 112, 219, 236-238 117-120, 145, 151, 173, 184, 196, —disinterested view of, 23-25, 31, 201-203, 231, 241 44, 49, 69, 86, 97, 127-129, 182, Good(s), 12-15, 17-22, 26, 29-33, 193 34-35, 38-39, 41, 45, 50, 54, 56, —egoistic view of, 23, 25, 31, 49, 82, 60-71, 74, 76, 78, 83-88, 91-92, 86, 102, 106-107, 109-110, 113, 95-105, 109, 112-113, 115, 117116, 127, 129, 193 118, 120, 122-124, 126-129, 135—equalizing (egalitarian), 112-113, 136, 138-147, 150, 153, 157, 193-194, 196 162-163, 168-169, 177-178, 184—friend of God, 69-71, 192, 235 185, 187-188, 198, 200-204, 209Fulfillment, 13, 17, 22, 60, 233 210, 215-216, 218, 223, 228, 233, 235-240, 242, 245, 247-251 —bodily, 77, 101-102, 146-147

Index —earthly, 23, 25, 30-31, 33, 34, 3637, 63, 71, 127, 247 —eternal, 236 —God as the good of humans, 1722, 68, 76, 87-88, 92, 95-104, 120, 122-124, 135-136, 138, 140141, 144-145, 185, 187, 200, 202, 209, 210, 227-228, 233, 237-239, 242-243 —good in itself, 21, 86, 99-101, 109, 127, 129, 150, 198 —spiritual, 21-22, 38, 71, 77-78, 99-105, 127-133, 145, 204, 233 —temporal, 77, 235 Good deeds and works, 24, 27-30, 32, 36-37, 39-40, 49, 56, 61, 72, 219, 245, 248 Goodness, 21, 41, 65, 68, 87, 91, 120, 124, 160, 163, 165, 168, 170, 185, 187, 217, 220, 227228, 238-239, 243 Gnostic, 65-66 Grace, 42, 53-54, 90, 93-94, 96, 103, 115-116, 123, 144, 146-147, 158, 183, 186, 198, 206, 212219, 221, 231, 244-245, 251 Gratuitous love, 15, 26, 42, 67-68, 77, 122, 136, 146, 150-151, 161, 183, 185-186, 188, 214, 221, 249250 Greeks, 23, 39, 47, 48, 51-52, 59, 68-69, 93, 117 Group, forming a, 95, 98, 142, 151, 240-241 Happiness, 13-17, 22, 35, 49, 5152, 56, 58, 63, 68, 77, 79, 85, 103, 172, 198, 200-201, 209, 242, 251 Heaven, 26, 28-33, 35-39, 41-42, 44-47, 49-50, 52-58, 61, 63-64, 72-73, 75, 112, 114, 172, 174, 177, 214, 231, 242, 247, 250 —hope of heaven, 56, 58, 64

271 Hell, 26, 29, 52-65, 71-75, 245, 248-250 —fear of hell, see under fear —willingness to go to hell out of love of other humans, 54-56 —willingness to go to hell out of love for God, 73-75 Hierarchy of divine lovers, threefold, 66, 68-73, 137 Hireling, 25, 32, 34, 40-41, 62, 6870, 72-73, 183, see Mercenary Holy Spirit, 67, 69, 157-162, 178, 198, 206, 213, 227, 231-232, 249 Hope, 20, 24-25, 32, 35-36, 40-41, 47-49, 56-59, 61-68, 71-73, 122, 154, 207, 235, 237, 248-251, see also hope of reward Identity, 17, 21, 66, 78, 91-93, 97, 101, 108, 111, 116, 120, 124, 135, 140, 207, 224-225, 229-233, 242 Immateriality, 93 Imitation, 65, 87, 91, 123, 231 —of Christ, 33, 40, 44, 67 Immortality, 20, 27, 31, 40, 43, 4849, 64, 172 Incarnation, 144, 161 Inclination(s), 14-15, 19-20, 83-84, 86, 88-89, 116, 148, 152, 178, 210, 218, 245 Indifference, state of, 251 Individual, 19-20, 34, 79, 86, 89-92, 99-100, 108, 115-117, 128, 149150, 152-153, 156, 163, 182, 239240, 242 Individuality, 18, 78, 91, 95, 116, 149, 153, 178, 206, 240-241 Innocence, state of, 61, 89, 216-217 Insuperableness of charity, 172-173 Intellect, 93, 100, 189, 193, 200, 205, 207-210, 216, 218-219, 224, 233

272 Intellectual, 20, 87-88, 93, 100-102, 118, 152, 242 Interest, monetary, 28, 30-31, 3334, 37 Interest, personal, 12-15, 18, 24, 3435, 39, 42, 50-52, 56, 96, 98, 103, 106, 116, 128, 233, 243 —self-interest, 13-14, 25, 35, 40, 57, 127, 184, 218, 237, 251 Irrational beings, 20, 88, 95, 240 Irrationality of love (ecstatic conception), 15, 189-196 —Ecstatic conception, 12, 14-17, 78-80, 84, 92, 133-134, 143, 148, 151-211, 233-234 Jansenist, 238, 244-245, 251-252 Joy, 10, 13, 15, 22, 40, 47, 55-56, 68, 103, 135, 138, 224, 227, 233, 238, 244 Knowledge, 58, 65-66, 76, 83, 93, 99-100, 144, 190, 200, 205, 209, 217, 219-220, 224-226, 231-233, 254 —imperfect form, 231-232 —of God, 66, 231-232 —perfect form, 231-232 Languor, 169-170, 175-176, 180 Liberality of love, 160-161 Life, 22-23, 25-28, 30-34, 36, 3940, 44-49, 51, 53-54, 56-59, 6263, 66-67, 69-71, 74-75, 77, 80, 94, 96, 100, 102, 110, 118, 123, 127, 129, 131-132, 135, 143, 176, 178, 180, 192, 205, 217-219, 225226, 230, 235, 243, 247 —eternal, 27, 32-33, 39, 44-46, 57, 77, 132, 247 —sacrifice of life for others, 19-20, 34, 44-53, 88-89, 102, 128-129, 196, 243 Loss of self, 148

Love in the Middle Ages Love —conquering (triumphant) nature of (ecstatic conception), 15, 170173, 189-190, 197, 210 —disinterested conception of, 1516, 20, 33, 39-43, 48, 50-56, 5975, 103-104, 183-185, 241-245, 247-252 —ecstatic conception of, 11-12, 1417, 78-80, 84, 92, 133-134, 143, 148, 151-211, 233-234 —egoistic conception of, 12-14, 1718, 20-21, 24, 28-39, 43-50, 5661, 71, 76-79, 84, 89, 97, 116, 127, 136-143, 145, 155, 164, 213, 236, 243-244 —Greco-Thomist conception of, 16, 78, 82-154, 169 —harmonistic conception of, 18, 38, 42, see also entry under God and Physical Conception of Love —imperfect, 61, 65, 103, 155, 223, 246, 248, 250 —natural, 13, 19-22, 25, 69, 76, 7879, 86-88, 90-92, 95-97, 99, 101103, 114, 119-120, 124-126, 130, 142-143, 152-153, 157, 169, 175, 186-188, 212-222, 239-240, 249 —of benevolence, 77, 107, 109, 136137, 237, 240, 251 —of desire, 12, 14, 17, 22, 77-78, 84, 87, 92, 97, 107, 134-137, 148, 157, 185, 218, 221, 235238, 240 —of friendship, 12, 14, 17, 19, 22, 77-78, 87, 92, 97, 135, 137, 153, 157, 218-219, 236-238, see also love of benevolence —of neighbor, 137-142 —of other humans, 12-15, 17-18, 20, 22, 25-26, 28-56, 67, 69, 90, 126-127, 129, 137-142, 177-182, 204, 236, 241

Index —of self, 13-14, 17-18, 22, 27, 36, 43, 76-78, 85, 87, 94, 97, 102, 109, 119, 121, 131, 137, 139140, 142-143, 148, 170, 182-183, 220-221, see also self-love —perfect, 24, 40, 43, 52-55, 58, 6061, 64-69, 71, 79, 103, 114, 146, 149-150, 155, 160, 163-167, 177, 180, 182-188, 192, 198, 201, 207210, 216, 223, 225, 233, 235, 242, 247, 249 —perverted, 97, 124-125, 213 —physical conception of, 11-12, 1518, 21-22, 78-155, 169, 233 —problem of, 11-13, 23, 42, 76-77, 94-95, 98-99, 105, 121, 130, 134, 137, 139, 178, 212-213 —supernatural, 97, 114-115, 121, 186, 206, 214

273 Motive, 13, 17-18, 24-25, 27, 32, 34, 39-41, 43, 45-46, 56-60, 63, 72-73, 197, 237, 245, 251 Mystery of faith, 93, 161, 164-168, 195-196

Natural, 13-21, 25, 42, 69, 76, 7879, 86-92, 95-97, 101, 103, 105, 110, 112, 115-116, 119-122, 124126, 129-130, 137, 144, 146, 149, 151-153, 160, 169-170, 175, 180, 184, 186, 188, 197, 207, 210, 212-214, 216-222, 228, 242, 245, 249 —appetite, see under Appetite —love, see under Love Nature, 13-17, 19-21, 34-36, 46, 50, 54, 67, 76, 88-94, 96-102, 104, 110, 112, 116, 118, 123125, 128-130, 144-145, 150, 152Martyrdom, 30, 44-47, 50-51, 149 153, 160-163, 170, 180, 183-184, —criticism of those too readily seek186, 194, 197-198, 206-207, 209ing martyrdom, 51 210, 212-214, 217-221, 224, 228, Matter, 90, 99, 113, 118, 129 239, 242, 245, 249 Materiality, 89, 93-94, 113, 117, 153 Object, 16, 68, 76, 79, 84-85, 87, Medieval(s), 12, 15-16, 20, 23, 43, 90, 92-93, 98, 117, 120, 124, 61, 79, 105, 133-134, 152, 154, 147-148, 170, 186, 203, 205-206, 170, 199-200, 235, 239 210, 223, 228, 230, 236, 238, Mercenary, 24, 67-68, 137, 147, 185, 240 243 Order of charity, 86, 122, 177-182 Mercy, 24-25, 30-31, 38, 42, 135, 248 Pagan(s), 20, 23-24, 48-49, 57, 69 Merit, 42, 46, 60, 90, 145, 180-181, Part, 18-22, 74, 82, 88-92, 94-98, 190, 197, 207, 214, 216, 233, 100, 105-117, 142-143, 152, 178, 248, 251-252 206, 238-242, see also under Mind, 25, 41, 123, 132-133, 156, whole, theory of the whole and 161, 189-190, 194, 197, 224-225, the part 230 Participation(s), 20, 84, 91-92, 94, Mortifying nature of love (ecstatic 111, 114, 117-118, 123, 152, 160, conception), 15, 78, 149, 170, 196, 219, 238-240, 242, see also 210 Imitation Patristic theories of love, 23-75

274 Perception, 118, 220, 224, 229, 231, see also Sensation Perfection of self, 13, 19, 100, 101, 103-104, 112, 116, 120, 153-154, 207, 210, 233, 240, 242, 250-252 Person(s), 14, 16, 21, 25, 29, 32-34, 37-40, 42, 48-49, 54, 60-61, 6465, 71, 76, 90, 104, 122, 128129, 132, 141, 151-153, 15-162, 164-168, 179, 181, 194, 202, 208, 228, 232, 236-238, 241, 244, 246246, 251 —idea of the person, 14, 16, 152153, 194, 238 Personhood, 14, 149-153 Personal, 14, 78, 103, 129, 138, 150153, 164, 183, 194 Physical conception of love, 11-12, 15-18, 21-22, 78-155, 169, 233 Plank problem, 48-49, 54 Pleasure(s), 13, 23, 25, 35, 40, 46, 48-49, 55, 57-59, 74, 91-92, 121, 128-129, 168, 187, 197, 251-252 Poor, love of the, 24, 26, 28-38, 44, 227 Possess, 13, 22, 71, 100, 118, 132, 136, 142, 148-149, 151, 167, 202203, 206-207, 223-224, 236 Possession, 36, 50, 80, 129, 148149, 168, 199-211, 223-224, 242 Principle of love, 117, 137, 171 Private, 19-20, 51, 96-97, 165, 206 Punishment, 26, 29, 41, 53, 55, 5763, 66, 68-75, 235, 245, 248-249 —fear of, see under fear Pure love, 56, 70, 73, 76-77, 134, 137, 240, 249

Love in the Middle Ages Reason, 15-16, 20-21, 31, 37-38, 41, 53, 55, 57, 60, 63, 67-68, 79, 81, 83, 88, 91-92, 95-98, 101102, 109, 111, 123, 129, 133, 135, 137-138, 144-145, 151, 162, 166, 172, 178, 180, 185, 189190, 194-197, 205, 208, 217, 228, 230-231, 235, 237, 239, 245 Recompense, 24, 27, 39-40, 49, 55, 57-58, 63, 66, 71, 160, 248-249, 251 Redemption, 35, 61, 89, 145, 149, 195-196 Reward(s), 16, 23-24, 26-32, 34-46, 48-50, 53, 55-58, 60-69, 70-73, 75, 122, 145, 147, 183-185, 197, 233, 235, 243, 247, 249-250, 252 —eternal, 26-27, 29, 31-34, 37, 3940, 43-49, 51-52, 56-57, 60-65, 67-69, 77, 103, 132, 183-184, 236-237, 244, 247-249, 251 —hope of reward, 20, 24-25, 32, 3437, 40-41, 47-49, 56-59, 61-68, 71-73, 235, 248-250 —temporal (earthly), 23-26, 32, 49, 62-63, 67, 71, 73, 103, 183 Rich, 25-26, 29, 31, 38, 43 Riches, 25, 33, 37-38 Roman(s), 23, 28, 39, 46, 48, 51-52, 59, 62, 68-69

Sacrifice, 11-16, 18, 20, 22, 43-56, 77-79, 101-103, 115, 128-130, 141-143, 151, 153, 169-188, 233234, 237-238, 240, 242 —disinterested views of, 12-16, 20, 50-56, 77-79, 103, 115, 141, 151, 153, 169-188, 233-234, 237-238, Quietism, 78, 147, 238, 241, 249242 252 —egoistic views of, 20, 43-50, 56, 129, 141-143 Rational, 13, 95-99, 118, 121, 124, —harmonistic view of (physical con135, 144, 154, 185, 213, 222, ception), 18, 22, 101-103, 128229-230, 249 130, 141-143, 153, 240

Index —sacrificing one’s life out of love of other humans, see under life —self-sacrifice, 11-13 Sacrificial love, 13, 43, 47 Salvation, 13, 24, 28, 30-31, 34-36, 38, 40, 43, 46, 50-52, 54-56, 58, 60, 65-66, 71, 103, 139, 241242, 244, 250-252 —delaying one’s salvation out of love of other humans, 51-52 —giving up one’s salvation out of love of other humans, 52-56, 78, 103, 141 —giving up one’s salvation out of love of God, 77-79, 103, 241-242 —hope of, 35, 40, 65 Scholastics, 16, 76, 82, 177, 208, 212-213, 215, 217, 219, 221, 223 Scholasticism, 76, 79, 93, 124, 171, 200, 214 Self-interest, see under Interest Self-love, 12, 17, 21, 27-28, 30, 50, 76, 81, 83, 101, 107, 121, 128129, 145, 169, 182, 250, 252, see also love of the self Selfless love, 33-34, 56 Self-sufficiency of love (ecstatic conception), 15-16, 79, 197-211 Sense(s), 20, 101, 132, 193, 201, 225-230 —sense of the soul, love as the, 225, 227-230 Sensual [sensible, sensitive], 22, 78, 88, 93, 101-102, 117-118, 122, 128, 228, 235, 239 Sensation, 128-129, 227-228 Separated Substances, 91, 117, 186 Sin, 34, 42-43, 52, 57, 60, 63, 7073, 78, 89, 94, 96-98, 102, 108, 116, 170, 172, 186, 215, 217218, 244-245, 248, 250-252 —original, 89-90, 96, 186, 218 Singular being, 84, 89-91, 99-100, 124, 156, 163, 167, 171

275 Slavery (Servants; Servile), 40, 5860, 62, 68-70, 71-73, 147, 192, 247 —God (Christ) taking the form of a slave, 33, 44, 173 Society, 90, 106, 108, 116 Sonship, State of, 40-41, 60, 67, 6970, 73-74, 245, 252 Sophists, 49 Soul(s), 15, 29-33, 35-36, 38, 41, 49, 53, 55, 58, 61, 67, 69-71, 83, 87, 92, 102-103, 109, 112, 117118, 120-126, 128-133, 135, 140, 144-145, 147-149, 153, 169-171, 175-176, 189, 201, 208, 210, 212, 223-225, 227-230, 233, 245, 247251 Species, 89, 91, 99-100, 156, 187, 205, 241 Spirit (spiritual), 49, 61, 93, 99-102, 105, 125, 127, 130, 132-133, 146, 149-151, 154, 157-162, 178, 180, 183-184, 192, 198, 200-201, 206, 213, 224-225, 227, 229-233, 239, 242, 245, 247, 249 —human, 101-105, 132-133, 215 —pure (angels), 100-101, 215 Spiritual beings, 22, 93-94, 99-100, 207 Spiritualization, 149 Spontaneous love, 11, 18, 64-65, 87, 96, 146, 240 Stoics, 19, 23, 48-49, 53, 59, 69 Subject, 14, 16, 79, 89, 98, 153, 169, 239 —subject placed outside of itself, 14, 16, 79, 132, 169-170, 220, 240, 242 Subjugation (submission), 101, 112, 149, 153, 173, 183, 189-191, 193194, 205, 240 Substance(s), 22, 84, 93-94, 100, 142, 149, 157, 163, 167, 186, 221, 224

276


Supernatural, 86, 101, 114-115, 121, 186, 206, 245, 251 Supposition, impossible, 78, 103, 139, 141, 242 Sweetness, 15, 31, 58, 75, 180, 199, 203, 207-208, 227, 232

—transcendental, 18, 20, 89-90, 97100, 113, 134, 141, 153-154, 238239, 242 Usury, 28, 30, 32-34, 38 —earthly (worldly), 32, 38 —pious, 28, 30, 32-34, 38

Temporal, 23, 25-26, 38, 49, 55, 6263, 67, 73, 77, 102-103, 183, 235 —good, see under Good Tendency, 12, 17-19, 21, 76, 84, 87, 94-95, 112, 123-124, 135, 146, 149, 152, 155, 164-165, 169, 183, 206, 224, 242 —Propensity, 78 Term of love, 14-15, 79, 150-151, 156, 159, 164, 194, 238 Terminus of love, 119, 135-136, 143, 166, 180, 205, 211, 238 Thomism, 16, 78, 82, 90, 93-95, 105, 107-108, 112-114, 117, 122, 133-134, 143, 145, 148-149, 153, 169, 179, 193, 200, 206, 220, 224, 233, 238 Trinity, 43, 60, 68, 93, 161-162, 164-167, 198, 225, 231-232

Vice(s), 25, 68, 100, 118, 125, 176, 215, 251 Violence of love (ecstatic conception), 15-16, 79, 152, 169-188, 226 Virtue(s), 20, 24-25, 31-32, 36-37, 40-41, 43, 48, 54-55, 59, 62, 65, 67, 69-70, 72-73, 88-89, 98-99, 101-102, 104, 108, 122, 124, 129, 134, 141, 144, 173, 204, 207, 215-216, 237, 250 Vision of God (beatific vision), 22, 94, 99-104, 116, 120, 207-208, 216, 230, 233-234, see also Beatitude Voluntary, 48, 64, 68, 146, 179, 218, 251

Union, 86, 107, 116, 120, 149, 206208, 231 Unity, 17-18, 20, 78, 86-87, 89-90, 93, 95, 107-108, 113-114, 116117, 119, 122, 134, 137, 153, 155, 157, 164, 167, 170, 183, 201, 205, 208-209, 231-233, 238, 241 —numerical (quantitative), 20-21, 89-90, 97-100, 113, 134, 141, 153-154, 238-239, 242 —of love (physical conception), 1718, 20, 78, 86-87, 89-90, 93-95, 107-108, 113-114, 116-117, 119, 122, 134, 137, 153, 155, 164, 167, 205, 238, 241-242

Whole(s), 18-22, 30, 32, 44, 71, 79, 82, 88-91, 94-100, 105-107, 109111, 114, 116-117, 119, 122, 131132, 140, 142-143, 151, 153, 178, 189, 201, 206, 219, 238-242 —whole and the part, theory of, 1822, 82-93, 94-98, 105-117, 142143, 178, 206, 238-242 Will, 12, 15, 20-21, 24-35, 37-39, 41-42, 44-45, 47-54, 56-58, 60, 63, 65-66, 68, 72, 77, 79-80, 8385, 91, 93-94, 96-99, 102-105, 109, 113-116, 124, 128, 133, 135, 137-138, 141, 144, 146-149, 151, 154, 156-157, 165-166, 169-170, 173, 176, 178, 180, 182, 184, 191, 196, 198-200, 203-205, 209210, 213-215, 218-219, 221-224,

Index 226-227, 231-233, 235, 237, 241243, 247-248, 250 —natural, 96-99, 222 —rational, 96-99, 222 Wounding nature of love (ecstatic conception), 15-16, 169-172, 174-176

277

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