The Post-Cold War International System: Strategies, Institutions and Reflexivity (New International Relations)

ii

RUNNING HEAD

1111 2 3 4 5111 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 44111

The Post-Cold War International System

The end of the Cold War has opened up a ‘real world laboratory’ in which to test and refine general theories of international relations. Using the frameworks provided by structural realism, institutionalism and liberalism, The Post-Cold War International System examines how major powers responded to the collapse of the Soviet Union and developed their foreign policies over the period of post-Cold War transition. The book argues that the democratic peace has begun to generate powerful socialization effects, due to the emergence of a critical mass of liberal democratic states since the end of the Cold War. The trend this has produced is similar to a pattern that classical realists have interpreted as ‘bandwagoning’ within a unipolar power structure. Case studies of Germany, China and Japan – identified as key states with the potential to challenge US dominance – provide evidence to support the assessment of international change. The author concludes by exploring the implications of September 11 for the analysis developed. This important volume argues that the end of the Cold War was a major historical turning point in the development of world politics with fundamental implications for the basic way in which the dynamics of the international system are conceptualized. It will interest all students and researchers of international politics. Ewan Harrison is the Hedley Bull Junior Research Fellow at St Anne’s College, University of Oxford.

1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

The New International Relations Edited by Barry Buzan, London School of Economics and Richard Little, University of Bristol The field of international relations has changed dramatically in recent years. This new series will cover the major issues that have emerged and reflect the latest academic thinking in this particular dynamic area. International Law, Rights and Politics Developments in Eastern Europe and the CIS Rein Mullerson The Logic of Internationalism Coercion and accommodation Kjell Goldmann Russia and the Idea of Europe A study in identity and international relations Iver B. Neumann The Future of International Relations Masters in the making? Edited by Iver B. Neumann and Ole Wæver Constructing the World Polity Essays on international institutionalization John Gerard Ruggie Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy The continuing story of a death foretold Stefano Guzzini International Relations, Political Theory and the Problem of Order Beyond international relations theory? N.J. Rengger War, Peace and World Orders in European History Edited by Anja V. Hartmann and Beatrice Heuser European Integration and National Identity The challenge of the Nordic states Edited by Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver Shadow Globalization, Ethnic Conflicts and New Wars A political economy of intra-state war Dietrich Jung Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research Edited by Stefano Guzzini and Dietrich Jung Observing International Relations Niklas Luhmann and world politics Edited by Mathias Albert and Lena Hilkermeier Does China Matter? A Reassessment Essays in memory of Gerald Segal Edited by Barry Buzan and Rosemary Foot European Approaches to International Relations Theory A house with many mansions Jörg Friedrichs The Post-Cold War International System Strategies, institutions and reflexivity Ewan Harrison

1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

The Post-Cold War International System Strategies, institutions and reflexivity Ewan Harrison

1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

First published 2004 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2004. © 2004 Ewan Harrison All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Harrison, Ewan, 1973– The post-Cold War international system: strategies, institutions, and reflexivity/Ewan Harrison. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. International relations. 2. World politics – 1989– I. Title. JZ1305.H37 2004 327′.09′049–dc22 2003026280 ISBN 0-203-36623-9 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-67118-X (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0–415–32836–5 (Print Edition)

1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

For if by good fortune one powerful and enlightened nation can form a republic (which by its nature is inclined to seek perpetual peace), this will become a focal point for federal association among other states. These will join up with the first one . . . and the whole will gradually spread further and further through a series of alliances of this kind. Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*

* Reiss, H. (ed.) (1991) Kant’s Political Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 104.

1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Contents

List of illustrations Series editor’s preface Preface Acknowledgements List of abbreviations 1

Introduction

ix x xiii xix xxi 1

Theoretical framework 4 Operationalizing liberal predictions 14 Chapter structure 22 2

Reassessing the logic of anarchy: rationality versus reflexivity

28

The neorealist model 30 The institutionalist model 33 The liberal model 36 Towards a general synthesis 40 Conclusions 48 3

German foreign policy after the Cold War

50

Neorealism 51 Institutionalism 57 Liberalism 1: domestic variation 61 Liberalism 2: Germany’s choices 65 4

Japanese foreign policy after the Cold War Neorealism 70 Institutionalism 76 Liberalism 1: domestic variation 79 Liberalism 2: Japan’s choices 83

70

viii Contents 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

5

Chinese foreign policy after the Cold War

91

Neorealism 91 Institutionalism 97 Liberalism 1: domestic variation 100 Liberalism 2: China’s choices 106 6

Conclusions

112

International relations theory after the Cold War 113 General patterns of institutionalized activity 121 Foreign policy adjustments 128 Postscript: September 11, 2001 and its aftermath

137

Bibliography Index

149 166

1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Illustrations

Figures 2.1 2.2 6.1 6.2

The linear model The triangular model Reflexivity in the international system (Part A) Reflexivity in the international system (Part B)

41 42 118 134

Tables 1.1 2.1 6.1 6.2

Summary of theories and predictions Summary of theoretical framework General patterns of institutionalized activity State strategies 1989–1999

23 40 121 128

1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Series editor’s preface

It is generally acknowledged that almost all theorists and practitioners were taken by surprise not only by the speed with which the Soviet Union and its empire in Eastern Europe collapsed at the end of the twentieth century, but also by the relatively peaceful transfer of power when the established communist regimes gave way to the emergent post-communist regimes. Experts on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union completely failed to anticipate these dramatic events that precipitated the end of the Cold War, but so too did theorists in international relations. To the extent that there had been any previous discussion of a Soviet collapse in the field of international relations, the fear was that the demise of the Soviet system would be accompanied by an irrational nuclear strike on the West. As the Cold War recedes into the past, however, international systems’ theorists are starting to make sense of what happened at the end of the Cold War, and to get a grasp on subsequent developments in the postCold War era. But the discipline of international relations has still not come to any consensus about either the theoretical or the practical implications of the ending of the Cold War. And it is not likely to do so in the near future because the discipline is so deeply divided on theoretical, normative and policy fronts. Realists and institutionalists have developed two broadly competing positions. From the theoretical perspective of the institutionalists, the end of the Cold War and the elimination of the Soviet Union left the structure and character of the international system essentially unchanged because during the course of the twentieth century a wide array of multilateral institutions came into existence that had crucial and system defining consequences. The survival of these institutions into the post-Cold War era has ensured that this crucial feature of the international system remains unaltered. Realists, however, start from a very different theoretical perspective, and argue that the essentially bipolar world that prevailed throughout the Cold War has given way to a radically different unipolar world in the post-Cold War era. But although most realists agree on this basic position, they are then sharply divided between those who argue that this unipolar world is inherently unstable and will eventually give

Series editor’s preface xi 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

way to a multipolar world and those who insist that there are a variety of factors that are likely to ensure that unipolarity will persist for some considerable time. In this book Ewan Harrison draws on these divergent positions in the process of articulating a liberal theoretical perspective. Although he builds on the work of previous theorists, this is the most developed and sophisticated attempt yet made to articulate a distinctive liberal approach to systemic theorizing and it enables him to throw new light on systemic developments in the post-Cold War period. In the process of developing the theory, moreover, Harrison makes a number of important moves that allows him to position the liberal approach at the centre of any attempt to theorize about the international system. In the first instance, the debates surrounding Waltz’s neorealism are used as a springboard for developing this liberal systemic theory. Contrary to mainstream interpretations, Harrison insists that neorealism eschews rationality and instead relies on the reflexive processes associated with emulation and socialization. But whereas neorealists assert that these processes necessarily push states to adopt balancing strategies, Harrison accepts Wendt’s constructivist argument that a change in the prevailing identity of states in the international system can affect the process of socialization within the international system and give rise to a change in system outcome. If it is accepted, for example, that after the end of the Cold War, a critical mass of liberal democratic states has come to dominate the international system, then the end of the Cold War can also be associated with a major system change, but a very different kind of change to the one highlighted by the realists. Having established the theoretical framework, Harrison goes on to apply the theory to the foreign policies of three key states – Germany, Japan and China – during the first decade of the post-Cold War world. It reveals that all three states have had difficulty adjusting to the changes in the character of the international system. But he also looks at these case studies through realist and institutionalist lenses and reveals their strengths and weaknesses for understanding the foreign policies of these states in systemic terms. One of the many strengths of this book is the way that Harrison strives to find links between the different approaches, using them all as building blocks, that allow us to develop a more comprehensive picture of the post-Cold War international system. Harrison, however, is also very aware that he is shooting at a moving target and that much has happened in the international system since the time period examined in this book. In a very illuminating postscript, rather than attempting to bring the case studies up to date, he draws on his liberal theory in conjunction with realism and institutionalism to reflect on the implications of the US responses to the events of September 11, 2001, and, in particular, the attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq. Harrison frankly acknowledges that both realism and institutionalism can be drawn upon to

xii 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Series editor’s preface

provide interesting accounts of what has happened since 2001. But he also argues that what the liberal model suggests is that, like Germany, Japan and China, the United States has also had difficulty adjusting to the changes in the international system associated with the ending of the Cold War. Whether the failure of a hegemonic state to adjust will cause the international system itself to regress remains to be seen. Richard Little

1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Preface

It is often remarked that although Stephen Walt’s balance of threat theory was intended as a refinement of Kenneth Waltz’s balance of power theory, it actually served to undermine it. Conventional balance of power theory associated with neorealism assumes that balancing behaviour emerges in response to the distribution of material resources amongst states in the international system (Waltz 1979). In an anarchic context, units that are more powerful will pose a threat to others. States will consequently have no choice but to ‘assume the worst’ and balance against more powerful rivals in order to maintain their independence and autonomy. Paradoxically, therefore, the chronic insecurity of the international system is such that it encourages states to join the weaker rather than the stronger coalition of forces that it faces. Walt sought to elaborate on this account of alliance formation by incorporating a role for geographic proximity, offensive capabilities and, most significantly perhaps, offensive intentions into Waltz’s structural framework (Walt 1984). Walt therefore blurred the rigid unit-structure distinction at the core of Waltz’s system level argument, and introduced a significant role for unit level variables in influencing the decisions of states to balance or bandwagon. Walt’s ideas were the first in a long line of literature reviving the classical realist perspective, a theoretical movement frequently referred to, perhaps somewhat inelegantly, as ‘neoclassical realism’ (Brown et al. 1995b; Rose 1998). However, constructivists have subsequently noted that if identity based influences are indeed systematic determinants of state behaviour, then this weighs heavily in favour of Wendt’s argument that anarchy is ‘what states make of it’ rather than being inevitably characterized by vigorous competition for security and/or power. The observation that Walt’s balance of threat approach has potentially revolutionary implications for systemic theory is often made, but has seldom been developed in a systematic fashion. This book may be read as a comprehensive attempt to pursue this line of inquiry in relation to the grand strategies pursued by the major powers over the post-Cold War period. It develops the argument that with the collapse of the Soviet Union, a critical mass of liberal states has emerged at a global level. The

xiv 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Preface

democratic peace has consequently begun to generate powerful socialization effects that encourage states at the margins of cultural change to adopt shifts in their identity. This feeds back into the properties of the system by strengthening the dominance of the liberal core. A selfperpetuating positive feedback loop is created that locks in progressive change and opens up a permissive space in which further development is encouraged. At this stage, the system thus achieves reflexivity, defined by Wendt as a capacity for critical self-reflection and cultural change on the part of units. This theoretical framework is utilized to account for the way in which three major powers responded to the collapse of the Soviet Union and developed their foreign policies since the end of the Cold War. Behaviour interpreted by classical (or ‘neoclassical’) realists as bandwagoning within a unipolar structure is better interpreted in terms of the norm cascade generated by the emergence of a stable core of liberal democratic states within the international system. Whilst socialization pressures are subject to domestic cultural and institutional variation, the historical momentum generated by systemic trends is encouraging each of the major powers to adjust their domestic political structures and internalize cultural change. An argument is therefore made that the end of the Cold War may be understood as reflecting a major historical turning point in the development of world politics, and as having fundamental implications for the basic way in which the dynamics of the international system are conceptualized. The empirical focus is on the initial decade of the post-Cold War transition between 1989 and 1999. This historical juncture presents a logical, if inevitably somewhat arbitrary, cut off point for the project. The decision to end the research project at the close of 1999 has been further complicated by the course of recent international history. The events of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent US military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq have presented major global crises that have impacted in very important ways on the dynamics of the international system that has been emerging since the end of the Cold War. In particular, the great power bandwagoning trend that characterized the first decade of postCold War transition has appeared to wane, and structural conflicts of interest between the major states have resurfaced as a much more predominant feature of international affairs. Neorealists will no doubt use this turn of events to make their case that structural pressures encouraging great power balancing will inevitably surface given enough time. Despite the significance of recent developments for the underlying argument of this book, the decision to take 1999 as the cut-off point for the project remains reasonable and appropriate. It is sometimes noted that international crises are like trams in the sense that they pass regularly and often. Recent events may have generated much interest and debate, but given hindsight any time frame chosen would quickly become outdated. Thus although the close of the first decade after the end of the Cold War

Preface xv 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

is a somewhat unsatisfactory point of closure, it nonetheless represents as good an historical perspective as any from which to survey the features of the post-Cold War order. At the very least it provides an extended period during which the major powers had an opportunity to adjust to the ‘systemic shock’ posed by the Soviet collapse and adjust their grand strategies accordingly. Nevertheless, a postscript considering the major events that have occurred in the international system in the period since 1999 has been provided in order to provide a provisional assessment of their significance for the thesis developed in the book. The postscript discusses two specific issues. First, it analyses the extent to which September 11 may be considered comparable to the collapse of the Soviet Union in terms of its significance for the study of international relations. The book develops the argument that the Soviet collapse has fundamental implications for how the dynamics of the international system are conceptualized, and some commentators have made the parallel argument that September 11, 2001 should be understood in these terms. However, on inspection it is not clear that this analysis stands scrutiny. If the 9/11 attacks are understood as a response to the residual elements of unipolarity in the post-Cold War world, there are clear precedents for this pattern of events in conventional realist understandings of the international system. The postscript also reflects on the significance of the apparent breakdown of the bandwagoning trend that characterized the first decade of post-Cold War transition. It interprets the resurgence of power politics in the period since September 2001 as reflecting an instance of failed learning by the United States within the permissive post-Cold War international environment rather than as an inevitable product of America’s default status as the world’s sole remaining superpower. In particular, recent trends reflect ‘blowback’ generated by the decisions made by the United States to maintain a Cold War defence posture in the post-Cold War world. The asymmetrical costs imposed on the United States by this blowback are likely over the longer term to encourage it to adjust its grand strategy in more fundamental ways to meet the demands of the post-Cold War era. This line of reasoning develops the argument put forward by institutionalists that a ‘boomerang effect’ will encourage the United States to return to multilateral channels because of the risk of overstretch associated with pursuing a hegemonic strategy. However, it locates the cause of overstretch in US domestic politics and its foreign policy choices since 1989, rather than in terms of a functional logic about the costs of system management for the hegemon. It therefore presents a more volunturist account of the dilemmas currently facing American foreign policy than that associated with institutionalist theory. This book draws heavily on constructivist theory to develop an argument about the distinctive character of the international system in the post-Cold War period. One of the major criticisms of constructivism is

xvi 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Preface

that it has been unsuitable for use in the empirical analysis of world politics. An initial wave of constructivist literature has sought to respond to this claim by demonstrating the utility of constructivist theory in illuminating specific aspects of international relations (Katzenstein 1996). Nevertheless, to date constructivism has failed to challenge realist arguments about overall patterns of alliance formation in the international system. This book seeks to engage directly with this limitation by drawing on the affinities that exist between classical/neoclassical realist analyses of great power adjustments to the end of the Cold War and constructivist arguments. Developments in the international system since 1999 have underscored the necessarily provisional nature of this assessment of postCold War international relations. However, unless and until constructivist scholars seek to challenge core realist claims about the dynamics displayed by the international system, constructivist thinking will remain unnecessarily marginalized within the field. A related point regarding the constructivist literature concerns the recent interest of constructivists in state socialization and international norm dynamics. Alexander Wendt’s Social Theory of International Politics (1999) was published in the period after my Ph.D. was complete. Nevertheless, his account of the three cultures of anarchy and the problem of structural change in the international system, as well as his discussion of reflexivity, were extremely useful in refining my own thinking on these matters. Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm life cycle model has also stimulated much interest within the field (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Finnemore and Sikkink developed their life cycle to apply to the operation of a variety of humanitarian regimes. However, their claims coincide neatly with the international norm dynamics that this book postulates may be associated with the democratic peace. Realists claim that security interests trump humanitarian interests because states must conform to the survival imperative, and thus the norm life cycle model may be problematic when carried over into the security sphere. Yet strong affinities exist between the norm cascade or ‘norm bandwagoning’ associated with the second stage of Finnemore and Sikkink’s life cycle and the patterns of alliance formation that classical realists have identified as a central feature of great power relations in the post-Cold War world. A final salient theme of this book is its attempt to extend liberal arguments about the democratic peace to the system level by linking them to constructivist insights. The democratic peace literature emerged in direct response to the success of neorealist theory in developing systemic level analyses of international politics. It was overtly reductionist in the sense that it stressed the importance of the domestic level as a casual determinant of state behaviour. Somewhat paradoxically, however, today both proponents and opponents of the democratic peace both accept the basic terms on which the debate takes place. Essentially, the debate between realists and liberals revolves around whether a ‘separate peace’ exists

Preface 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

xvii

between democratic regimes that share the same regime type. Nevertheless, this consensus may inhibit the emergence of deeper questions about the possibility of a more general relationship between liberalism and peace. Narrowing the scope of its claims has made the democratic peace argument remarkably robust in the face of criticism. Yet it also forecloses more fundamental questions about realism’s dominance as a general account of the international system. Ironically, proponents of the democratic peace are tacitly supporting a structure of research within the discipline as a whole that does not favour the liberal school. Given the promise demonstrated by the democratic peace proposition as a means of gaining a foothold against the hegemony of realist theory, this seems an unfitting culmination to the research programme that it has generated. Rather than accepting realism’s gambit, a better way of sustaining momentum in the democratic peace research agenda is for its proponents to push the debate onto terms more favourable to the liberal paradigm. One way of achieving this might be to begin to challenge realist arguments on the ‘high ground’ currently occupied by the system level. In the short term, this approach involves moving away from the relative safety provided by a rigid defence of the narrow proposition associated with the separate peace claim. However, in the longer term it holds out the promise of extending research into the democratic peace into a second generation by greatly increasing its scope and significance. Indeed, analyses extending arguments about the democratic peace to the system level have become an important and growing part of the literature in the field in recent years (Huntley 1996; Ray 2000; Russett and Starr 2000; Cederman 2001; Russett and O’Neil 2001; Harrison 2002; Mitchell 2002). As with the constructivist literature on socialization and norm dynamics, much of this research has been published while the work was being conducted for the present study. Nevertheless, it resonates strongly with the broad theoretical line of inquiry being pursued, and it is therefore to be hoped that this book stimulates further debate in this important area. My interest in the academic study of international relations was very much the product of reading Robert Keohane’s edited volume Neorealism and its Critics as an undergraduate at Bath University in the early 1990s (Keohane 1986a). Although I discovered this book relatively late in my studies, it did provide me with a foothold on the methodological problems and issues that underpin the contemporary theoretical literature. Aside from the quality and sophistication of the debates between the contributors, what interested me about this book was that, although the various authors disagreed fundamentally, I sympathized in different ways with all the sides in the argument. The same summer I had also developed my interest in Kant’s political theory, and it struck me that Kant’s thought might provide a framework within which the different contributions to the Keohane edited volume could be synthesized. The presence of both Nick Rengger and Richard Little meant that Bristol

xviii 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Preface

University proved an ideal place in which to develop this admittedly rather unorthodox line of inquiry, and the results were eventually published in the Review of International Studies (Harrison 2002). Nevertheless, my interest in the debates over neorealism has continued, and this book in many ways may be considered as an attempt to both develop and apply more extensively the framework I set out in my article in the Review. In the acknowledgements to Neorealism and its Critics, the editor expressed the sentiment that some readers might respond to reading the collection of essays by making contributions to the debate themselves in the future (p. x). It is to be hoped this book makes a further modest contribution to the ongoing discussions that have been stimulated by Keohane’s volume.

1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the staff and research students of the Department of Politics at Bristol University between 1996 and 1999 for providing a congenial environment within which to develop my ideas, and for their interest in my research. Roger Eatwell, my undergraduate tutor at Bath University, also deserves particular thanks for his early interest in my work, and for his encouragement since. At Bristol University, Nick Rengger, Molly Cochran and Richard Shapcott were especially helpful in the early stages of my research, and their influence was essential in further stimulating my interest in the study of international relations. Mark Wickham-Jones kindly took time out of his schedule to provide me with support that proved absolutely crucial as I entered a competitive academic recruitment market. Amongst the graduate students, Lucas Blasco, Piers Robinson and Chris Armstrong each provided particularly important feedback, support and criticism. Many people and several institutions have supported me in the period since my postgraduate study ended. At Birmingham University, I especially appreciated the encouragement and company provided by Fiorella Dell’Olio, Elke Krahmann, Matthew Watson and Steve Buckler. At Edinburgh University, I accumulated debts to Kim Hutchings, John Ravenhill, Sally Cummings, and especially Luke March and Cas Mudde for their advice and mentoring. Tony McGrew of Southampton University was also extremely supportive during this period, for which I am most grateful. It was also at this time that Patrick James of the University of Missouri showed an interest in my work. His general feedback and guidance since has been invaluable. However, I have found our discussions of realism, neorealism and systems theory especially helpful, and he therefore deserves particular credit for the development of my thinking. At Oxford University it was my privilege to be appointed the Hedley Bull Junior Research Fellow, a position based at St Anne’s College during the period of my tenure. Aside from the great honour of being associated with one of the most prominent international relations theorists of the twentieth century, this fellowship has allowed me the ultimate academic privilege by providing three consecutive years of post-doctoral study during

xx 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Acknowledgements

which time my principle responsibility has been to reflect, research and write in complete independence. This period has been invaluable in many ways, but in particular it has provided me with time for my ideas to develop and mature. I would therefore like to express my thanks to the Governing Body at St Anne’s and the managers of the Cyril Foster Funds who have administered and financed this post during my occupancy. I would also very much like to thank David Williams, my immediate predecessor, for his encouragement, guidance and discussions while I have been at Oxford. The influence and support of both Neil Macfarlane and Nigel Bowles at St Anne’s has been greatly appreciated, and Amrita Narlikar, Alan Renwick and Rochana Bajpai have proved good colleagues and friends. At Routledge, Heidi Bagtazo and Grace McInnes deserve particular thanks for their expertise in helping me turn the completed manuscript into book form. To them, and the rest of the publishing team involved in the production process, I am extremely grateful. My greatest intellectual debt is to my former Ph.D. supervisor, Richard Little, for his consistent support and his commitment to the very highest professional standards. This was available to me not just during my enjoyable stay at Bristol University, but also over the whole of the subsequent period. I have been privileged to benefit not just from his experience, patience and pragmatism, but also from the sheer volume of time he has generously made for me. Finally, I have been extremely fortunate to receive constant advice and encouragement during the entire period I have worked on this book from my parents and also from my sister Fiona. Without their unfailing personal support, this book would not have been possible. I therefore dedicate the finished product to them with my deepest thanks. Ewan Harrison St Anne’s College, Oxford October 2003

1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Abbreviations

ADB APEC ARF ASEAN ASEM AWACS CAP CDU CFE CFSP CSCE CTBT EAEG EBRD EEC/EC EFTA EMU ERM EU FDR G7 GATT GDP GDR IFOR IGC IMF KFOR LDP MDB MFN MST MTCR

Asian Development Bank Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation ASEAN Regional Forum Association of South East Asian Nations Asia-Europe Meeting Airborne Warning and Control Systems Common Agricultural Policy (EU) Christian Democratic Union (Germany) Conventional Forces in Europe (Treaty) Common Foreign and Security Policy (EU) Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty East Asian Economic Grouping European Bank for Reconstruction and Development European Economic Community European Free Trade Association European Monetary Union Exchange Rate Mechanism (EU) European Union Federal Republic of Germany Group of Seven General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Gross Domestic Product German Democratic Republic Implementation Force (UN) Inter-Governmental Conference (EU) International Monetary Fund Kosovo Force (UN) Liberal Democratic Party (Japan) Multilateral Development Bank Most Favoured Nation (GATT) US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty Missile Technology Control Regime

xxii 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Abbreviations

NACC NATO NDPO NPT ODA OECD OSCE PfP PHARE PKO PLA PRC QMV SDF SDP SFOR SII TACIS TMD UN UNSC WEU WTO

North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NATO) North Atlantic Treaty Organization National Defence Program Outline Non-Proliferation Treaty Overseas Development Assistance Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe Partnership for Peace (NATO) Poland and Hungary Aid for Economic Reconstruction Peace Keeping Operations (UN) People’s Liberation Army (PRC) People’s Republic of China Qualified Majority Voting (EU) Self Defence Force (Japan) Social Democratic Party (Germany) Stabilization Force (UN) Structural Impediments Initiatives (talks) Technical Assistance to the CIS Theatre Missile Defence United Nations United Nations Security Council Western European Union World Trade Organization

1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

1

Introduction

The collapse of the Soviet Union provided an historic opportunity to examine how key states respond to large-scale change in the international system. Between the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the aborted August coup that preceded the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, the international system witnessed the disintegration of the bipolar structure of power that characterized the post-1945 international order. Few, including the majority of experts, anticipated the dramatic changes that took place during this period. Furthermore, the ‘systemic shock’ associated with the demise of the Cold War order provides a unique context within which to test and refine theories of international relations. The end of the Cold War has therefore opened up questions about the overall nature of international change at the turn of the twentieth century. The ‘real world laboratory’ provided by the end of the Cold War can now be used to assess the structural realist, institutionalist and liberal models of the international system. Since 1989, the preconditions for these theories to make a discrete set of predictions about the overall nature of postCold War change have been present. In line with the neorealist model, the collapse of the Soviet Union has brought about a major shift in the global balance of power. In line with the institutionalist model, there are variations in patterns of economic and institutional interdependence across the international system. In line with the liberal model, since 1989 a relatively stable core of liberal democratic states now dominates the international system. Moreover, over a decade has now passed since the end of the Cold War. States have been provided with a prolonged period to respond to the dramatic changes that began to take place in the late 1980s. If the system within which they interact with others affects the behaviour of states, the incentives and constraints this has generated ought to be beginning to exert their influence on outcomes observed. Using the opportunity presented by the close of the first ten years of the post-Cold War period, an examination is made of how major powers have responded to the changes which have taken place in the international system since the end of the Cold War. By applying general theories of international relations to the strategies of major states between 1989 and 1999, the

2 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Introduction

aim is to identify the overall nature of change in the international system after the Cold War. The decade following the end of the Cold War posed a particularly interesting puzzle for conventional wisdom regarding international relations. Unlike other major shifts in the balance of power, the end of the Cold War was not accompanied by a great power war. Moreover, peaceful adjustment extended through the first decade of the post-Cold War transition. Of course, in many parts of the world the power vacuum left by the end of the superpower conflict led to brutal outbursts of violence. Yet tragic though these wars were, unlike earlier historical periods they failed to generate a system-wide international conflict. It was only natural that the general public in the West would assume that the relatively benign situation they faced was the logical consequence of the crumbling of Soviet power. However, in the context of both international history and international relations theory, this outcome was highly unexpected. Historically, the twentieth century has been characterized by continuous great power conflict on an unprecedented scale. Theoretically, it is acknowledged that the international system has a powerful anti-hegemonial quality. The end of the Cold War left the United States in a position of unchallenged preeminence. However, contrary to established theory, this has not led to a period of instability and great power conflict. The Soviet Union acquiesced peacefully in the collapse of its empire without mounting a final counter-hegemonial backlash. Moreover, there has been an absence of great power security balancing against the US which conventional wisdom in the early post-Cold War period had anticipated. Indeed, it is only really in the first years of the new millennium – some twelve or so years after the end of the Cold War – that concerns about the significance of American power have re-emerged prominently in public and policy debates for the first time since prior to the Soviet collapse. Viewed in historical and theoretical perspective, that it has taken such an extended period for these questions to surface is truly remarkable. What explains this era of great power stability? Even approaching a decade and a half after the end of the Cold War, this question continues to present a major anomaly for established conceptions of international relations. Yet its importance for understanding the nature of the global order cannot be under-estimated. The close of the first decade of the post-Cold War period has presented a unique context in which to systematically examine this puzzle to shed light on both the character of the emerging international system, and the way its dynamics are best conceptualized. In applying theories of the international system to understanding the strategies of major powers in the post-Cold War period, the template provided by two collaborative projects carried out at Harvard University during the 1990s is followed. The first is the Keohane et al. edited volume After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe 1989–1991 (Keohane et al. 1993). This book, published shortly

Introduction 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

3

after the end of the Cold War, examines how the US and the major European powers used international institutions in adjusting to the changes taking place. The findings draw conclusions about the relative merits of the neorealist, institutionalist and liberal models in explaining international outcomes during this critical period. The second book is the more recent Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War (Kapstein and Mastanduno 1999). This differs from the Keohane et al. volume in two ways. First, it examines realist theories rather than debates across competing schools. Hence it focuses on strategies of the major powers, rather than on the nexus between institutions and strategies. Second, it examines post-Cold War state strategies at a global level, rather than focusing on a European context. Following Keohane et al., evaluation of competing theoretical paradigms is provided, requiring examination of the nexus between international institutions and state strategies. Following Kapstein and Mastanduno, state strategies are analysed at a global level. Nevertheless, commonality exists with both the Keohane et al. and Kapstein and Mastanduno projects in that the aim is to use theories as frameworks to analyse how major states have responded to the changes in the international system since 1989. To provide points of reference with the two projects discussed the definitions of ‘the end of the Cold War’, ‘state strategies’ and ‘international institutions’ are compatible with their use in these books. Following Keohane et al., ‘the end of the Cold War’ refers to the withdrawal of Soviet power from Central Europe, and the reunification of Germany that resulted (Keohane et al. 1993: 1–2). The end of the Cold War is therefore viewed as predating the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, referring to the period from 1989 during which the disintegration of the bipolar distribution of military power became apparent in the global international system. ‘State strategies’ refers to the ways whereby states deploy their material and diplomatic resources to pursue their national interests. Following the pattern set out in both the Keohane et al. and Kapstein and Mastanduno projects, the focus of the analysis is upon grand strategies, rather than detailed aspects of foreign policies. Finally, following the conventional definition of an international regime, ‘international institutions’ are understood as sets of principles, norms, rules and operating procedures around which states orient their expectations (Krasner 1983: 2). This provides a broad definition of an international institution, encompassing not only formal but also informal aspects of institutionalization. The general aim is to investigate the overall nature of change in the post-Cold War international system. It is therefore necessary to specify the terms in which this change can be measured. The ‘overall nature of change’ in the international system is defined in terms of variation along three dimensions derived from the theories utilized. The theories generate radically different predictions about: (1) the key variable affecting great power behaviour; (2) the general pattern of institutionalized activity

4 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Introduction

between major states; and (3) the foreign policy adjustments made by individual powers to the end of the Cold War. Following Kapstein and Mastanduno, the purpose of analysing the overall nature of international change is both theoretical and empirical (Kapstein and Mastanduno 1999: 1–2). At a theoretical level, an examination is made of whether it is possible to make any general statements about patterns of behaviour observed. At an empirical level, the grand strategies of important actors are analysed to account for how they have adjusted to the end of the Cold War. By so doing, a contribution will be made to the assessment of competing theoretical paradigms, and conclusions drawn about the trajectory of change as the international system enters the twenty-first century. The introduction is organized into three sections. The first section sets out the theoretical framework by outlining the different models, and provides key definitions. It also identifies the predictions made by neorealism and institutionalism about the post-Cold War international system. However, because liberalism is the least developed of the three theories the first section of the introduction focuses solely on the redevelopment of the liberal model. It is left until the second section to deal with methodological questions relating to the operationalization of empirical hypotheses for the liberal model. This section draws upon the template provided by Unipolar Politics to develop two criteria to facilitate the measuring of liberal predictions. The final section of the introduction sets out the organization of the book, explaining the purpose of the theoretical chapter and its relationship to the case studies.

Theoretical framework A theoretical approach to international relations is adopted in this book. The study seeks to be clear about the assumptions underpinning it, and to apply these to examining the nature of change in the post-Cold War international system. The promise of a theoretical approach is that it moves beyond a descriptive analysis by offering generalizable explanations of international behaviour (Waltz 1979). However, following Keohane et al. it is necessary to recognize that existing theories are too imprecisely specified to permit the rigorous testing of hypotheses. Keohane et al.’s prescription of using theories to devise frameworks for the construction of more sophisticated empirical investigations is therefore adopted (Keohane et al. 1993: 7). Also following Keohane et al., the neorealist, institutionalist and liberal models are utilized (Keohane et al. 1993: 3–6). Kenneth Waltz (1979) systematically formulated the structural or neorealist model. Waltz distinguishes between the structure of domestic and international political systems. Domestic systems are hierarchical because they have a central agency capable of enforcing law and imposing political stability. By

Introduction 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

5

contrast the international system is decentralized and anarchic. States must make provisions for their own security to ensure survival. They will do so until equilibrium is reached in the balance of power. It follows that the distribution of material capabilities between states is the structural determinant of international behaviour, constraining the behaviour of actors regardless of their internal attributes or preferences. This material structure is provided by the system’s polarity, which reflects the number of great powers. International systems can be unipolar (containing a single hegemon), bipolar (containing two superpowers) or multipolar (containing three or more great powers). Bipolar systems are likely to be the least prone to great power conflict. Under unipolarity, the anti-hegemonial nature of the international system will encourage other major states to balance against the dominant state to preserve their independence and autonomy. Multipolar systems are more complex and harder to manage than bipolar systems because there are a greater numbers of actors in the balance of power, and because states can switch allegiance within alliances (on collective action see Olson 1971; Sandler 1992). The emphasis on the international system as motivating state behaviour distinguishes neorealism from earlier ‘classical’ realist approaches which account for war and the balance of power in terms of nature of particular states or policy makers (Keohane 1986a). In the early 1990s, neorealists used their theory to make predictions about the emerging international system (Mearsheimer 1990; Layne 1993; Waltz 1993; for the most recent statement see Mearsheimer 2001). With the end of the Cold War, the system had shifted from bipolarity to unipolarity. Neorealists predicted that this structural change would generate tensions in the alliance systems that had emerged under bipolarity. During the Cold War, the US developed a strong defence presence in both Western Europe and East Asia. This was reflected in its key alliances, namely NATO (1949) and the Mutual Security Treaty with Japan (1954). Through these institutions, America undertook security guarantees aimed at protecting the independence of Western Europe and Japan against a Soviet conventional or nuclear attack. The containment strategy pursued by the US also led to the emergence of a range of economic institutions in global trade (GATT) and finance (the IMF and the World Bank), and fostered the development of European reconstruction through the EEC. Neorealists argued that this system of cooperation would come under pressure after the Cold War because, regardless of the diplomatic face it presents, the US’s pre-eminence would be perceived as undesirable. In the absence of a clear Soviet threat, conflicts of interest between the major powers would surface. Secondary states would be encouraged to engage in balancing strategies, targeted principally at America. Neorealists explicitly identified Germany or a unified European state, Japan and China as candidates for major power status. These countries had the potential capabilities to challenge American dominance, and for them to forgo the greater influence

6 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Introduction

this promised would present a structural anomaly. The US would have strong incentives to roll back its security presence in both Europe and East Asia, and rely instead on offshore balancing in these key regions. The resurfacing of indigenous rivalries in Europe and East Asia would provide a more effective way of containing challenges to America’s position in the absence of a common external threat. Overall, neorealists predicted that unipolarity would yield to a more complex and less stable multipolar balance of power reminiscent of that of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Positional competition and a concern with relative capabilities would increasingly characterize great power politics, and war between the major states would be more likely than during the Cold War. By the end of the 1990s a consensus emerged among realists that the trends towards great power balancing against the US had not been the predominant feature of the international system since the end of the Cold War. This led to William Wohlforth’s prominent attempt to salvage the structural realist framework by refining Waltz’s argument about unipolarity (Wohlforth 1999). Wohlforth offered an elaboration of the structural realist model compatible with hegemonic stability theory. He argued that unipolarity is compatible with a stable structure of great power relations given the very high concentration of US capabilities within the international system. Wohlforth’s claim about the stability of unipolarity had two central components. First, he argued that America’s dominance in terms of its material resources is historically unprecedented, much greater even than Britain’s lead in the nineteenth century. America’s military and economic strength exceeds by a remarkably wide margin any other country or set of countries combined, and this makes the costs associated with balancing against its global hegemony prohibitive. The US is the only major state to maintain a genuinely global power projection capability after the Cold War, and by devoting only three per cent of its GDP to defence it greatly outspends all the other powers combined. Second, Wohlforth points to the way in which local security dynamics in key strategic regions also lock in the stability of a unipolar world. In Europe and East Asia, serious attempts to balance against the US by countries such as Germany, Russia, Japan and China would first trigger regional security anxieties. These regional security dynamics would check local powers much more than they would the US. Thus attempts to balance US hegemony by secondary states would prove counterproductive and are unlikely to be attempted. By developing these various arguments for the stability of an international system overwhelmingly dominated by the US, Wohlforth has sought to modify the orthodox neorealist model whilst retaining its structuralist and materialist logic. However, Wohlforth’s modified formulation of neorealism shall not be evaluated for two related reasons. First, his argument runs against the basic logic of Waltz’s theory. Wohlforth claims that a high concentration

Introduction 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

7

of capabilities on the part of the hegemon can foreclose the possibility of great power balancing within a unipolar international system. By contrast, conventional Waltzian neorealism indicates that a high concentration of capabilities with the hegemon will, if anything, increase the structural incentives that exist for secondary states to balance against their more powerful peer rival. Indeed, this explains why there was such a strong consensus among prominent neorealists so early on in the post-Cold War period about the shape of the emerging international order. Neorealists were drawing on the distinctive ability of structural theory to highlight general patterns of behaviour, and were using this powerful tool to cut through confusion by making strong predictive statements. A second and related reason why Wohlforth’s variant of neorealism shall not be operationalized is that this perspective is vulnerable to the criticism that it offers a post hoc rationalization of the predictive failures associated with the conventional neorealist model. Neorealists themselves have acknowledged that the emerging international system presents an ideal opportunity to test their predictions against patterns of behaviour as they emerge. For neorealists to subsequently move away from this position in such a way as to salvage their central theoretical analysis allows neorealism to compete against other perspectives on a playing field that is skewed heavily in its favour. Wohlforth’s argument could become more coherent and persuasive if it was able to draw upon more comprehensive and rigorous epistemological foundations. In particular, it might benefit by being linked up more explicitly to an elaborated structural realist model which systematically integrates a continuum of capabilities-based elements into the conventional Waltzian framework (James 2002). However, the development of an elaborated structural realist model along these lines is a relatively recent occurrence, and not all theories can be accommodated and tested within the scope of a single study. For these reasons, the conventional Waltzian version of neorealism and its associated predictions are operationalized in the present analysis. The institutionalist model identifies the distribution of interdependence and international institutions as a variable affecting state behaviour. Institutionalism asserts that cooperation between states is possible even in the absence of a centralized authority at the international level. Although the lack of an enforcement agency increases incentives for states to cheat on agreements, cooperation under anarchy is possible given pre-specified conditions. Where there is scope for joint gains, a small number of actors, and repeated interactions over a long-term time horizon, international institutions can take on instrumental value to states in pursuing their national interests. Institutions can facilitate cooperation by reducing the costs of diplomacy, decreasing uncertainty and shaping states’ expectations. Institutionalists recognize that interdependent relations are an important precondition for international cooperation. Well-developed patterns of economic interdependence are crucial, because they increase scope for joint

8 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Introduction

gains as well as the range and frequency of contacts between states. Thus institutionalists recognize that their framework best models patterns of cooperation between advanced industrialized states. Institutional interdependence can also help facilitate cooperation between states in the institutionalist framework. International institutions are difficult to set up in an anarchic environment. However, once in place they can become functional for states, and may persist even when structural conditions alter. Thus institutional inertia may lead to ‘path dependent’ change in which cooperation established during an initial period affects behaviour at subsequent stages. Typically, institutions emerge under the auspices of a hegemon. Alternatively, they initially reflect alliance commitments under a particular distribution of power. In general, however, institutionalists view cooperation as reflecting the pursuit of national interests rather than altruism (Keohane 1984). Institutionalists responded to neorealist predictions about emerging multipolarity. In so doing they have predicted continuity in the post-War multilateral arrangements between the major states. Institutionalists point to the dense network of alliances and international institutions that developed between the Western powers under bipolarity. These multilateral frameworks helped stabilize diplomatic relations between the industrialized states, and proved useful in pursuing economic gains. Now that Cold War bipolarity has disintegrated, the functions these institutions perform will continue to be useful for their members, and should tend to persist despite the shift in the balance of power. This would result in the consolidation of institutional frameworks that had been established in the early post-War period. Whilst incremental change may take place reflecting adaptations to the post-Cold War world, more fundamental change is unlikely. Moreover, the post-War institutions also provide a stable platform for the engagement of Russia and China, and the integration of these states into international society. The most prominent exponent of this argument was Joseph Nye in his influential book Bound to Lead (Nye 1990). Nye argued that the emerging structural conflict predicted by realists was unlikely to materialize. Instead, a ‘layer cake’ system would emerge, with the US maintaining hegemony in the military sphere, and secondary states specializing in the supporting of systems of governance to manage economic and ecological interdependence. Nye’s argument fed heavily into Hans Maull’s related claim that Germany and Japan had become ‘civilian powers’, orientating themselves away from military force, and gearing themselves towards the management of multilateralism and interdependence (Maull 1991). Thus, in contrast to neorealism, institutionalist analysis stresses continuity rather than change after the Cold War. However, institutionalists acknowledge that the status of their predictions varies across Europe and East Asia. A West European context is ideally suited to institutionalist analysis because well-developed patterns of economic and institutional interdependence are present (Keohane et al. 1993:

Introduction 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

9

6). German unification and the problems generated by enlargement of the European Union and NATO may have distributional consequences that could increase the complexity of multilateral negotiations. Nevertheless, a change in institutional frameworks under these conditions is likely to be marginal because actors retain incentives to cooperate (Keohane 1993). By contrast, East Asia presents a harder case for institutionalism. Structural realists were quick to identify that East Asia appeared ‘ripe for rivalry’ in the aftermath of the Cold War (Buzan and Segal 1994; Friedberg 1994; more recently see Friedberg 2000). In addition to America and Russia’s presence, East Asia encompasses Japan and China. Both these states are identified by neorealists as serious candidates for polar status within the international system. Furthermore, patterns of economic and institutional interdependence are much less well-developed than in Western Europe. Whilst Japan is integrated into Western multilateral systems, China’s emergence as a major military power in the wake of Russia’s decline might well encourage a regional security rivalry. In turn, an increasingly assertive Japan could loosen its involvement in the multilateral structures. In his capacity as Assistant Secretary of State for Defense in America in 1994–1995, Nye oversaw the most important review of America’s post-Cold War security policy in the region. This remained the corner-stone of US policy over the 1990s. It recommended that America should maintain its forward defence presence in East Asia. Although this would not substitute for well-developed interdependence, a benign hegemon could provide some of the preconditions necessary for the development of multilateralism after the Cold War (Nye 1995; Office for International Security Affairs 1995). The liberal model focuses the interaction between domestic political systems and the international system. However, liberalism is the least well specified of the three models. Traditionally, liberalism is viewed as providing a ‘bottom up’ perspective in which the internal characteristics of states explain state behaviour. Understood in these terms, liberalism inverts structural realism’s emphasis on the constraints imposed on state behaviour by the international system. This, for example, is the version of liberalism operationalized by Keohane et al. (1993: 4). It is also the formulation of liberal theory used to explain the ‘democratic peace’. The democratic peace refers to the apparent absence of war between constitutionally secure liberal democracies over the past two centuries. In the eighteenth century, Immanuel Kant first postulated the relationship between liberal republics and a zone of peace (Reiss 1991). However, it was only in the late twentieth century that empirical research by political scientists subjected this proposition to empirical scrutiny. Michael Doyle was the most prominent contemporary analyst to point to systematic evidence supporting Kant’s predictions (Doyle 1983). Whilst the democratic peace thesis remains disputed, it has nevertheless emerged as one of the most robust findings produced by the modern discipline (Brown et al. 1995a). Drawing on Kant’s three ‘Definitive Articles’ (or preconditions)

10 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Introduction

of peaceful interstate relations, Doyle accounted for the democratic peace in terms of the institutional, cultural and commercial features of liberal democracies. Constitutional checks and balances, a shared culture of respect for mutual legitimacy, and the material incentives provided by transnational social and economic contacts between liberal polities coincided to tightly constrain the ability of constitutionally secure republics to go to war with one another. Doyle also qualified his argument by noting the ways in which the very same factors that underpinned peaceful relations within the zone of peace exacerbated conflicts between liberal and non-liberal regimes. Nevertheless, he identified that over the last two centuries an informal ‘pacific federation’ between liberal states has consolidated and expanded (Doyle 1983). As a result of Doyle’s research, the view that liberalism stresses the international consequences of internal structure has become widespread. Indeed, a recent codification of liberal theory by Moravcsik generalizes this claim, setting out a model of international relations that highlights the causal significance of domestic preferences (Moravcsik 1997). Notwithstanding this consensus, however, there remain problems with such a formulation of liberalism. Re-evaluations of Kant’s political writings have led to a ‘second generation’ research agenda in which the democratic peace is understood as a systemic proposition (Huntley 1996; Ray 2000; Russett and Starr 2000; Cederman 2001; Russett and O’Neal 2001; Harrison 2002; Mitchell 2002). This line of enquiry has pursued two related ideas. First, it has investigated the role that the international system itself plays in constructing the domestic structure of states through longterm processes of cultural selection. Cultural selection generated by an anarchic environment favours more liberal states which will tend to outperform authoritarian systems in extended rivalry. Thus over the historical long term, the international system itself will foster the spread of liberal democracy. Second, it has explored the possibility that changes in the proportion and relative weight of democratic states within the international system will cause the effects of the democratic peace to vary over time. One line of reasoning has proposed that once a critical mass of states approximating to liberal democratic ideals exists the democratic peace will replace the balance of power as the international system’s equilibrium tendency (Harrison 2002). The socialization effects generated by the liberal core encourage states at the margins of cultural change to adopt shifts in their political identity. In turn, this feeds back into the properties of the system by further strengthening the liberal core. Overall, the socialization dynamics envisaged by the liberal model postulate the existence of powerful homogenizing forces in the international system encouraging its longterm convergence around the democratic peace. Individual states may, of course, resist pressures to engage in cultural change being generated by the system. Thus, as Moravcsik’s formulation of liberalism stresses, domestic variation is built into socialization dynamics because of the

Introduction 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

11

influence of embedded political and economic coalitions and social identities. Nevertheless, particularly once the norms of the democratic peace are entrenched in the system, socialization pressures will encourage states to internalize shifts in their identities through a powerful mixture of both normative and material incentives. There are affinities between such a formulation of liberal theory and the ‘constructivist’ approach to international relations. Following Wendt, constructivists argue that the cultural rather than the material structure of the international system is the crucial systemic determinant of state behaviour. Neorealism and institutionalism presuppose egotistical cultural norms established through their prior encounters with other units. Rather than assuming states seek to maximize their interests, constructivists examine the way in which states construct their interests through processes of socialization within the international system. In this view, self-help and power politics are not necessary features of an anarchic environment, but instead reflect the internalization of particular identities by actors. It follows that the international system is at least potentially open to transformation away from a logic of self-help through changes in the culture of the units that populate it (Wendt 1992). A problem with this line of reasoning is that constructivists have been unclear about the mechanisms capable of bringing about a systemic shift of this nature. Wendt has responded to such criticisms in his recent Social Theory of International Politics by providing a general account of how patterns of socialization within the international system might vary historically. Wendt claims that the states system has reflected a Lockean culture embodying the behavioural tendencies associated with neorealism. Today this system is being transformed into Kantian culture due to a critical mass of states predisposed to interdependence and the norms of the democratic peace (Wendt 1999). Not all constructivists follow Wendt, and there is no necessary affinity between constructivist and liberal arguments. Nevertheless, distinct complementarities between Wendtian constructivism and the insights of the sociological strand of the liberal tradition have been underscored by Wendt’s book. Wendt’s insights are therefore utilized to produce a more systemic formulation of liberal theory than is available in orthodox formulations of the democratic peace. Whilst acknowledging that socialization dynamics are subject to domestic variation, this formulation views systemic norms as capable of trumping internal political structure as a causal variable once the system is overwhelmingly dominated by a stable liberal core. The concept of reflexivity is central to the socialization dynamics modelled by liberal theory. Wendt defines reflexivity as reflecting a capacity for critical self-reflection and cultural change on the part of units (Wendt 1999: 375). Reflexivity as a property of the international system pre-supposes that states are reflexive actors capable of internalizing cultural norms and deploying these in conducting their foreign policies. However, reflexivity cannot be reduced to this generic feature of social action, and should be

12 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Introduction

understood as reflecting very specific historical circumstances. In particular, reflexivity is associated with social systems experiencing a shift in the trajectory of socialization within them. The liberal model postulates that once a critical mass of liberal states emerges, the democratic peace will replace the balance of power as the international system’s dominant tendency. This will result in a spillover or cascade effect being generated in which socialization pressures dynamically encourage the diffusion of liberal norms. A self-reinforcing positive feedback loop emerges in which the spread of liberal norms strengthens the dominance of the liberal core, thereby further enhancing momentum within the system (Huntley 1996; Cederman 2001; Harrison 2002; Mitchell 2002). A system characterized by reflexivity is marked by two distinctive properties. First, units within it achieve increased latitude for autonomous action. This reflects the way in which the effects of persuasion and demonstration create a permissive space that allows actors to voluntarily engage in cultural change. Second, a system characterized by reflexivity is distinctive in terms of the structure of interaction it embodies. This condition is satisfied by the emergence of a stable liberal core that overwhelmingly dominates patterns of interaction within the international order. Through a potent combination of coercive and economic incentives and cultural appeal, the core encourages states to comply with the norms of the democratic peace. This same structure of material and normative dominance also locks in progressive change, ensuring that any general reversal of the positive spiral is extremely difficult. Liberal theory has traditionally suffered from the weakness that it offers an idealistic perspective on international politics. This was a criticism made in particular of the Wilsonian liberalism of the 1920s associated with the notion that a general system of collective security could form the basis for the international order. E.H. Carr exposed the weaknesses of such arguments, and since Carr’s critique liberalism has been sidelined as a tradition of thought within the discipline (Carr 2001). Carr’s criticisms of the utopian strands of liberal thought still resonate today, and any attempt to revive the liberal tradition must be able to respond persuasively to realist arguments. The version of liberal theory operationalized in the present study is one that disavows the utopian elements of this tradition of thought. It is instead influenced by Keohane’s attempt to develop a ‘sophisticated liberalism’ which takes into account the constraints imposed by international anarchy and the competitive character of the states system (Keohane 1991). Ironically, Keohane’s attempt to formulate a sophisticated version of liberalism led him to focus on the problem of cooperation under anarchy, and in so doing marginalizes both domestic preferences and processes of state socialization from his theoretical perspective. For this reason, he has subsequently acknowledged that his theoretical perspective is better labelled institutionalist rather than liberal. By contrast, the version of liberalism operationalized in the present study offers a route to achieving sophisticated liberalism on terms different to

Introduction 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

13

those set out by Keohane himself. Keohane has interpreted realism as a rationalist theory and this has encouraged him to develop the institutionalist critique. However, realism may alternatively be understood as containing a strong reflexive dimension due to its focus on processes of selection and socialization arising from the generative consequences of anarchy. This opens a second line of critique of realism that has much closer affinities with a formulation of liberal theory influenced by constructivism. As has been noted, liberal theory as operationalized in the present study prioritizes systemic processes of socialization over the role of domestic preferences, although it accepts that domestic variation plays a strong role in mediating socialization dynamics. It therefore differs from Moravcsik’s specification of the liberal model. Nevertheless, it does share in common with Moravcsik’s reformulation the notion that liberalism may be understood as a non-utopian, non-ideological social scientific theory of international relations which is analytically co-equal in status to both realism and institutionalism (Moravcsik 1997: 513). Drawing on the affinities that exist between sociological liberalism and Wendtian constructivism contains potential pitfalls, however. One of the criticisms of Wendt’s approach is that it relies upon theoretical terms that are difficult to define (Keohane 1989b; Keohane 2001). A recent study by Alderson has, however, engaged a conceptual ‘mine sweeping’ exercise that facilitates the application of constructivist concepts to empirical analysis (Alderson 2001). Alderson defines ‘socialization’ as the internalization of norms. He notes that approaches to socialization differ over the conditions favourable to internalization, the causal mechanisms through which its effects are produced, and whether normative or material factors are more important. However, by defining socialization as an outcome rather than a process he provides a definition of socialization that is capable of subsuming all of these potential uses. As long as the outcome is that the norms are internalized, then this can legitimately be encompassed by the label socialization (Alderson 2001: 417). This raises the question of the definition of internalization. Internalization reflects institutionalization of international norms. Institutionalization occurs through the state, and will be mediated by domestic social, political and economic coalitions. By the same token, however, internalization shapes the internal identity of a state, biasing it in favour of compliance with international norms. Also contained in Alderson’s definition of socialization is a definition of international ‘norms’. According to Alderson, norms can reflect shared expectations about behaviour which are adopted because they are either instrumentally valuable for states or because they reflect shared cultural standards of legitimate behaviour. Thus the defining feature of state socialization is the outcome of internalization rather than its normative content (Alderson 2001: 418–423). Definitions are also required relating to the cultural norms associated with democratic peace. The notion of the democratic peace as a set of

14 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Introduction

international norms reflecting the shared institutional, commercial and cultural predispositions of liberal republics is well established. The first two of these predispositions reflect tangible institutional or economic variables that are more straightforward to operationalize. However, the cultural strand of the democratic peace argument reflects a diffuse and informal set of international norms. Thus it is essential to define these norms and specify the behavioural effects with which they may be associated. Following Wendt, culture refers to shared ideas about legitimate behaviour (Wendt 1999: 141). Applying this definition to the sociological strand of liberal theory highlights the respect for mutual legitimacy that constitutes the core of the pacific union. However, this raises the question of what constitutes a ‘democratic state’. Orthodox formulations of democratic peace theory associated with Doyle draw a distinction between constitutionally secure liberal republics and illiberal regimes. This distinction is normally inferred empirically with respect to a variety of institutional characteristics associated with liberal democracies. This distinction breaks down, however, when liberal theory is reformulated as a macro-historical or systemic tendency that transcends any particular state (Cederman 2001; Harrison 2002). On this view, states exist along gradual continuum, and any one state can at best approximate liberal ideals. Expressed in Wendt’s terms, liberal democracies are not pure Kantians. Systemic forces therefore act on all units along the core-periphery spectrum regardless of their formal political status. Thus even states that have a constitution that is formally liberal may adopt preferences that reflect either competitive security practices or a mercantilist economic orientation. Similarly, states that are formally non-liberal in orientation may behave in accordance with the norms of the democratic peace. Liberal culture is therefore best measured empirically by examining domestic preferences as they are revealed in the grand strategies of states. It follows that ‘cultural change’ may be said to have taken place when preferences alter due to shifts in internal social, political and economic coalitions. When cultural change reflects socialization, a causal link will exist between normative and material pressures encouraging the internalization of international norms and domestic restructuring. Having outlined the theoretical framework and provided definitions of key terms, it is necessary to examine the issue of the predictions about behavioural trends in the post-Cold War order generated by the liberal model. This raises methodological questions related to operationalizing liberal predictions.

Operationalizing liberal predictions Huntley has argued that reformulating the democratic peace in systemic terms allows liberal theory to offer distinctive predictions about the postCold War international system. In particular, it makes it possible to view

Introduction 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

15

the end of the Cold War in terms of a major historical turning point in the development of world politics. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, powerful forces exist which are capable of facilitating the dynamic spread of peaceful relations between the major powers globally. A systemic formulation of liberal theory therefore predicts a form of great power ‘bandwagoning’ in the post-Cold War era (Huntley 1996: 70). Bandwagoning refers to flocking to the dominant state and is conventionally contrasted to balancing, which involves joining the weaker coalition. Balancing is typically viewed as the more common strategy because bandwagoning carries with it the risk of exploitation by the stronger side. Nevertheless, bandwagoning has occurred historically, and is extensively discussed in the literature (see Walt 1984). Huntley compares the bandwagoning he associates with liberal predictions to both the balance of power configuration predicted by neorealism and the institutional inertia relied upon by institutionalist analysis. The liberal approach provides much stronger grounds for optimism about the future of world politics than either of these perspectives, suggesting ‘an unprecedented potential . . . for general great power peace’ (Huntley 1996: 70). The notion that the democratic peace will spread and produce a general pacification of great power relations strongly parallels the argument that with the end of the Cold War the democratic peace will generate socialization effects beyond a certain stage in the development of the international system. Moreover, both the bandwagoning and socialization metaphors suggest a spillover effect in which change generates a self-reinforcing cycle of progress. Thus a ‘dialectical causal loop’ emerges in which feedback produced by the international system enhances the spread of liberal norms (Huntley 1996: 59). On the basis of his argument that liberalism provides distinctive predictions about world politics, he proposes that the end of the Cold War provides a historic opportunity to test liberal arguments against systemic claims put forward by competing paradigms. However, he also acknowledges that a more systematic application of his ideas to the emerging international system would be desirable. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) provide another precedent indicating affinities between socialization dynamics and bandwagoning. Rather than being influenced by the literature on the democratic peace, Finnemore and Sikkink draw on constructivism. However, their arguments shadow themes in a systemic formulation of liberal theory (Mitchell 2002). Finnemore and Sikkink argue that the influence of norms may be understood in terms of a three-stage process: norm emergence; norm acceptance (the norm cascade); and norm internalization. The characteristic mechanism of the norm emergence stage is norm entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurs attempt to convince a critical mass of states to embrace new norms. In the second stage, the norm ‘cascades’ through the population through pressures to conform or the desire to enhance legitimacy. The final stage of the cycle is norm internalization, during which norms acquire a taken for granted quality. Finnemore

16 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Introduction

and Sikkink point out that not all norms reach the second stage. Only after a critical mass of states accepts a norm does it reach a ‘tipping point’ that sets in motion a cascade. In their discussion of the life cycle, Finnemore and Sikkink suggest that ‘norm bandwagoning’ may be used interchangeably with ‘norm cascade’ to depict the pattern of behaviour during the stage in the cycle at which the tipping point is reached (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998: 893). They apply their life cycle to various international regimes, typically those associated with humanitarian concerns. Nevertheless, their framework might plausibly be applied to the cultural structure of the international system. This way of fusing liberal and constructivist insights indicates that once a critical mass of democratic states has emerged, a process of norm bandwagoning will be set in motion (Harrison 2002; Mitchell 2002). It is possible to use the affinities between bandwagoning and socialization as descriptive metaphors to highlight behavioural tendencies in the post-Cold War international system compatible with liberal predictions. Recent research has indicated that between 1989 and 1999 the major powers bandwagoned within a unipolar power structure. The most comprehensive attempt to document overall patterns of behaviour by major states during this period has been provided by Kapstein and Mastanduno’s Unipolar Politics (1999). Whilst maintaining a commitment to the realist tradition, this study breaks with the structural realist framework that held prominence in the initial aftermath of the end of the Cold War. The contributors are influenced heavily by classical realism, taking a perceptual approach to power rather than relying on structural logic. Their central argument is that through diplomatic engagement and reassurance, America has encouraged other major actors to support its hegemonic position. While they stress that the emerging order contains elements of positional competition, Kapstein and Mastanduno explicitly argue against core structural realist claims. In particular, they ‘find little evidence of military balancing by the major powers of Europe and Asia against the world’s only superpower’ (Kapstein and Mastanduno 1999: 4). Kapstein and Mastanduno’s argument about bandwagoning may be broken down into two discrete dimensions along which this trend may be measured. The first dimension concerns general patterns of institutionalized activity among the major powers. The second dimension concerns the foreign policy adjustments made by individual states to the end of the Cold War. Along these dimensions, the trends documented by Kapstein and Mastanduno pose major anomalies for both structural realism and institutionalism. Neither neorealism nor institutionalism is able to account for the general pattern of institutionalized activity documented by Unipolar Politics. The argument that major powers have bandwagoned with the US since the end of the Cold War suggests that trends in the international system have been the reverse of those anticipated by structural realists. America has successfully used diplomacy to assuage other powers, and convince them

Introduction 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

17

of the benign character of its dominance. Rather than balancing against America, other major states have acquiesced in its predominance because it is perceived as relatively unthreatening. This has been reflected in three trends. First, rather than disentangling itself from its enormous Cold War security commitments, the US has maintained and extended a strategy of deep engagement. It has sought to preserve the status quo in its relations with Germany and Japan, locking these states into a subordinate role within US dominated structures. Second, with former Cold War adversaries, the US has pursued a strategy of engagement and integration rather than confrontation. This is in order to dissuade Russia and China from challenging American hegemony. Even NATO expansion may be seen as a way of restraining a unified Germany, and has also been accompanied by a variety of efforts to make it politically acceptable to Russia. Finally, the US has also adopted a preference for multilateralism because this allows it greater leverage to legitimize its power (Kapstein and Mastanduno 1999: 151–157). The pattern documented by Kapstein and Mastanduno also poses puzzles for institutionalist predictions about general patterns of institutionalized activity. In particular, the bandwagoning trend indicates that patterns of international cooperation have been more encompassing geographically than institutionalists anticipated. In terms of geographic scope, bandwagoning provides a much more robust framework for peaceful transition between the major powers than institutionalist logic. Rather than relying on patterns of economic and institutional interdependence, which are uneven across the international system, bandwagoning relies on benign policing and engagement by the hegemonic power. Thus the general pattern of institutionalized activity within the bandwagoning model is more extensive than institutionalist theory anticipates. Both neorealism and institutionalism are also faced with anomalies in terms of the pattern of foreign policy adjustments identified by Unipolar Politics. In addition to its general claims, Kapstein and Mastanduno’s study provides valuable accounts of the ‘grand strategies’ of the major powers during a period of flux. The results indicate that the end of the Cold War has led to a remarkably wide diversity of strategies being pursued by important actors. This reflects the way domestic preferences have had a key role in shaping responses to the Soviet collapse. The editors interpret this as indicative of bandwagoning within a unipolar structure. The constraints imposed on the major powers by the system are relatively weak, allowing domestic coalitions a high degree of influence on foreign policy formulation. Structural realists might make the qualification that their theory is designed to explain international outcomes, rather than foreign policies of particular states (Kapstein and Mastanduno 1999: 10; see also Waltz 1996). Yet, as Kapstein and Mastanduno highlight, if none of the major powers are balancing against the US, this does pose a cumulative puzzle for neorealism. Institutionalism also faces difficulties in

18 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Introduction

explaining the foreign policy adjustments documented by Unipolar Politics. Institutionalism finds it difficult to account for the degree to which cooperative frameworks within the international system have been internalized by the major powers. Institutionalism relies on the instrumental benefits of cooperation for states. By contrast, Unipolar Politics records the way in which the major powers accepted the legitimacy of American dominance. Whilst major states have attempted to maintain some independent capacity for action, their strategies accept and even presuppose acquiescence in American hegemony. Of course, there is a general case that the domestic level is a factor explaining international behaviour. However, Unipolar Politics documents the way each of the major powers has pursued strategies that strongly reflect the influence of behavioural tendencies built up under bipolarity. This path dependency suggests that the effect of domestic factors on foreign policy have varied dramatically across the end of the Cold War. Thus the generic problem for neorealism and institutionalism posed by the foreign policy adjustments documented by Kapstein and Mastanduno is the systematic influence of domestic variables on the grand strategies of the major powers. However, given the potential affinities between bandwagoning and socialization dynamics, Unipolar Politics may also provide useful insights into the behavioural tendencies associated with systemic liberal theory. Points of similarity between hegemonic bandwagoning and liberal socialization may be identified in relation to both the general pattern of institutionalized activity between the major powers and the foreign policy adjustments of individual states. In terms of general patterns of institutionalized activity, both classical realist and liberal models indicate that a peaceful structure of great power relations will emerge at a global level in the post-Cold War period. In the classical realist account, bandwagoning reflects benign perceptions of American dominance. In the liberal model, this reflects the socialization effects generated by the emergence of a stable core of liberal democratic states. However, the outcome is the same across both models. The second similarity between the two models concerns individual foreign policy adjustments. Both classical realism and liberalism predict a high degree of domestic cultural and institutional variation in the strategies of major states in the post-Cold War international system. In the classical realist account, this reflects relative autonomy from tight structural constraints. In the liberal model, this variation reflects an ‘internalization lag’ during which domestic institutions adjust to socialization pressures and internalize cultural change. In this account, domestic variation is a direct reflection of socialization pressures, and the dialectic produced when these pressures interact with embedded coalitions within states. Indeed, one of the contributions to Unipolar Politics explores connections between classical realist and liberal hypotheses. Deudney and Ikenberry provide the only contribution to the collection of essays that is informed by

Introduction 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

19

liberal rather than realist theory. Following the thrust of Kapstein and Mastanduno’s study, it is argued that stability is locked into the post-Cold War international system. However, Deudney and Ikenberry diverge from other contributors by explaining this continuity in terms of what they refer to as ‘structural liberalism’, or the institutionalization of a system of consensual relations among Western states. Deudney and Ikenberry specify that the key features of this system reflect security ‘co-binding’ through the use of mutually constraining security institutions (notably NATO and the Mutual Security Treaty with Japan), extensive levels of interdependence which imbue American hegemony with a ‘penetrated’ and open character, self-imposed constitutional constraints on the use of force by key secondary states (notably Germany and Japan), structural economic openness and civic rather than ethnic national identities (Deudney and Ikenberry 1999: 105–123). However, a problem with this formulation of liberal theory is that it is so similar to classical realism as to be over-determined. Deudney and Ikenberry’s argument reflects the way benign perceptions of American power have enabled other actors to internalize a supportive role within a unipolar international structure. Thus Kapstein and Mastanduno are quick to draw attention to the way in which the system described by Deudney and Ikenberry ‘remains remarkably Washington centred. American hegemony is so essential to the maintenance of the system that it is built in to their definition of its essential features’ (Kapstein and Mastanduno 1999: 15–16). Essentially, Deudney and Ikenberry view American hegemony as a necessary but not a sufficient condition for states to become socialized to a liberal international order (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990). As a result, the international system they envisage remains highly asymmetrical, with the US taking on a disproportionate share of rights and responsibilities for maintaining the international order. In practice, therefore, they concede significant ground to realist arguments. The over-determined character of Deudney and Ikenberry’s version of liberal theory raises the question of whether it is possible to reformulate liberalism to separate its predictions about patterns of institutionalized activity more clearly from those provided by both institutionalists and classical realists. One criterion useful for this purpose is to examine more closely the type of institutionalized activity predicted by the two theories. In a more genuinely liberal international order, hegemony would not provide a necessary condition for socialization to liberal norms. Instead, the major powers would take on equal status within the system, sharing rights and responsibilities on a symmetrical basis. In this view, a critical distinction between hegemonic bandwagoning and liberal socialization is the degree of symmetry in institutionalized relationships between the major states. This pursues a line of inquiry initiated by Buzan (1993). Buzan argues that rather than being opposites, the concepts of international system and international society are symbiotic. The latter naturally evolves out of the former such that system and society are linked in a

20 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Introduction

developmental sequence. A Waltzian balance of power is incorporated or ‘folded into’ a broader institutionalized structure of norms and rules. Extending Buzan’s argument further and connecting it to the framework provided by Wendt (1999), a Kantian culture might be viewed as a well developed Lockean international society. Understood in this way, it is not necessary to define a Kantian culture ambitiously as a partial and spatially limited collective security system as Wendt does. Instead, it is better regarded as a highly developed balance of power system in which concert diplomacy is premised on recognition of mutual equality of status by the major states. This in turn might be viewed as a natural progression of Doyle’s proposition that respect for mutual legitimacy and sovereign equality is at the core of the liberal pacific union. Such a system of great power balancing is so sophisticated that ‘balance of power’ ceases to be the most appropriate label to refer to the pattern of organization produced because the risk of great power war has effectively been eliminated. Instead the term ‘pacific union’ is more suitable, and it remains meaningful to refer to the democratic peace displacing the balance of power as the dominant system-wide equilibrium once a Kantian critical mass has emerged. This approach to distinguishing between hegemonic bandwagoning and liberal socialization may be operationalized empirically by examining adjustments in burden sharing arrangements within central multilateral frameworks. Central in this regard are America’s key alliance commitments in Europe and East Asia, and the status of secondary states within these regimes. According to Deudney and Ikenberry, for example, the semi-sovereignty and partial great power status of Germany and Japan will remain important features of the emerging international order. They claim that this reflects liberal features of the international system, specifically self-imposed constitutional constraints on the use of force abroad and the integration of Japan into wider security and economic institutions (Deudney and Ikenberry 1999: 104–105). However, it may instead be argued that asymmetrical features of the relationship of Germany and Japan with the US actually inhibit a more liberal pattern of security cooperation based on greater equality in terms of burden sharing arrangements. An international order structured along such lines would reflect a qualitatively different pattern of cooperation than that envisaged by Deudney and Ikenberry. Thus burden sharing arrangements between the major powers emerge as a key qualitative test of general patterns of institutionalized activity that have emerged in the post-Cold War period. Debates about burden sharing are frequently framed in terms of a costbenefit framework amenable to institutionalist analysis. In this view, such debates reflect concerns over gains through cooperation. Thus the emergence of a more equal structure of great power relations might conceivably be better accounted for using institutionalist rather than liberal theory. However, two points may be made against this argument. First, in practice institutionalists have manifestly not anticipated major changes in terms

Introduction 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

21

of burden sharing relationships between the major powers. Their overwhelming emphasis has been on continuity within post-War international society, in contrast to the emerging multipolar system envisaged by neorealism. Indeed, this focus follows logically from institutionalism’s stress on the path dependent nature of institutional adjustment. This implies that the end of the Cold War is seen as producing incremental change, rather as a qualitative turning point in the institutional development of the international system. Second, bargaining over the distribution of costs and benefits within multilateral institutions also occurs within a framework in which perceptions of legitimacy are important. For example, Kapstein and Mastanduno suggest that the perception of America as a benign hegemon eases its ability to sustain patterns of cooperation within the international system. In the liberal model, respect for mutual equality of status can be viewed as having a similar functional effect. Moreover, it is perfectly possible for cost driven behavioural logic to reinforce a framework of political legitimacy once that structure has become embedded. Instead of the causal process behind institutionalized activity, the key indicator should therefore be the international outcomes produced. If signs of change are incremental, this should favour institutionalist predictions. Indications of a more fundamental qualitative shift in the structure of institutionalized great power relations, however, will weigh in favour of liberalism. Over-all, the degree of symmetry in the pattern of institutionalized activity in the international system since the end of the Cold War provides a viable criterion for evaluating the competing predictions of different theories. A second criterion for distinguishing between hegemonic bandwagoning and liberal socialization is the impact of systemic pressures on the preferences of the major powers. Kapstein and Mastanduno hold that the domestic variation they record reflects the way the impact of structural forces encouraging balancing is relatively weak. The major powers ‘cross a tightrope’ as they negotiate the tensions between unipolar politics and positional competition built into the emerging order. They ask whether or not they can cross these tightropes without falling, and find ‘that the contemporary order may be stable for the time being, but the walk will continue to be a delicate one’ (Kapstein and Mastanduno 1999: 6). The critical factor determining the durability of the current order will be the diplomatic prowess displayed by the major powers. In this view, the autonomy of action that states have acquired is compatible with the coexistence for perhaps an indefinite period of a remarkably wide variety of strategies by key states. In the liberal model, a degree of domestic cultural and institutional variation is built into the socialization dynamics generated by the liberal international order because of the existence of an internalization lag. However, as the system develops, it might be expected to generate mounting pressures for the major powers to adopt ‘liberal’ strategic preferences. This encompasses participation in a peaceful system of diplomatic concert,

22 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Introduction

and acceptance of broad equality of status with other major powers in the international system. It also includes an economy that is relatively open to international trade and a predisposition towards interdependence. Such criteria rule out strategies reflecting a competitive security tendency (including participation in asymmetrical alliance systems) and/or a mercantilist economic orientation. The impact of systemic pressures on the strategic preferences of states provides a test through which to examine the predictions of the classical realist and liberal hypotheses. If socialization towards a liberal core is taking place, homogenizing tendencies within the system will encourage convergence around liberal preferences. In summary, the operationalization of liberal predictions about change in the post-Cold War international system has been developed in three stages. First, structural similarities between the behavioural metaphors suggested by bandwagoning and socialization were identified. Second, this was linked to empirical research in Kapstein and Mastanduno’s Unipolar Politics. Two parallels between the behavioural trends associated with hegemonic bandwagoning and liberal socialization were identified. First, both predict a peaceful and densely institutionalized structure of great power relations will emerge at a global level. Second, both predict domestic variation will be built into the responses made by major powers to the Soviet collapse. The way these trends pose serious empirical anomalies for the neorealist and institutionalist models was noted. Finally, a more fine-grained discussion distinguishing hegemonic bandwagoning and liberal socialization yielded distinct criteria against which liberal predictions might be measured. Using these criteria should enable liberal predictions about the behaviour of major states over the post-Cold War period to be evaluated against those of neorealism and institutionalism. Table 1.1 summarizes the predictions associated with the three theories operationalized with respect to the post-Cold War international system.

Chapter structure The remainder of the introduction outlines the organization of the book, and considers its contribution to the literature. A theoretical chapter is followed by three case chapters examining the foreign policies of Germany, Japan and China between 1989 and 1999. The purpose of the theoretical chapter is summarized before addressing the organization of empirical research. The theoretical chapter considers the implications of the end of the Cold War for the way in which the international system is conceptualized. Neither the Keohane et al. nor the Kapstein and Mastanduno projects link their analysis of trends since 1989 with an assessment of the causes of the Soviet collapse. The implication of this is that the causes and consequences of the end of the Cold War are treated as discrete units of inquiry. There are, however, costs involved in framing research in these terms.

Introduction 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

23

Table 1.1 Summary of theories and predictions

Neorealism

Variable

General pattern of institutionalized activity

Foreign policy adjustments

Major change in global balance of power

1

Balancing trend globally Conflictual structure of great power relations Weakly instututionalized

Domestic variation low

Great power stability in Western Europe Great power conflict in East Asia Incremental changes in post-1945 multilateral frameworks

Domestic variation low

2 3

Institutionalism

Cross regional variations in economic and institutional interdependence

1 2 3

Liberalism

Emergence of ‘critical mass’ of broadly liberal states

1

2 3

‘Norm Domestic bandwagoning’ variation towards liberal high core Stable structure of great power relations globally Non-incremental change towards greater symmetry in burden sharing

In particular, the unexpected nature of the end of the Cold War raised questions about the way in which the international system’s long-term tendencies are modelled theoretically. For this reason the theoretical chapter seeks a reassessment of established theories of international relations, and the way in which the relationship between them is conceptualized. The aim of the chapter is to achieve a new synthesis of the insights of neorealism, institutionalism and liberalism that is capable of linking a coherent overall account of the end of the Cold War with an analysis of trends in relations between major powers during the subsequent period of post-Cold War transition. Thus, unlike other studies, this book seeks to provide an assessment of the underlying causes of the Soviet collapse as a pre-requisite to the analysis of trends in relations between the major states.

24 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Introduction

During the 1980s and 1990s, the dominant theories of the international system were neorealism and institutionalism. These approaches have been perceived as relying upon the assumption that states act rationally in pursuit of their national interests, thus ‘black boxing’ the internal characteristics of states (Baldwin 1993). During the same period, liberalism was viewed as adopting a reductionist perspective. Neorealism and institutionalism have therefore tended to be regarded as being more compatible with one another than with the liberal approach in virtue of their systemic orientation. The theoretical chapter challenges the established consensus over the relationship between the three approaches, arguing that it has inhibited a new synthesis of their insights suited to the post-Cold War world. This argument develops in two stages. First, the conventional rationalist interpretation of neorealism is re-evaluated. It is proposed that the neorealist model does not require the assumption of actor rationality for it to produce explanations of international behaviour. Instead it may be interpreted as relying on a selection logic in which units that fail to respond to the imperatives of the balance of power are punished or eliminated as significant actors. In this account, competitive processes socialize units to adopt an egotistical identity, and then ensure this is reproduced over time. The second stage in the argument is to reinterpret the conventional, reductionist account of liberal theory through constructivist insights about socialization. The emergence of a constructivist school over the 1990s has facilitated the process of linking the democratic peace to system level analysis. Rereading both neorealism and liberalism in this fashion places the issue of socialization much more firmly in the centre of debates than the earlier consensus around rationalism. Debates between neorealism and institutionalism focused on the problem of cooperation under anarchy. By contrast debates between neorealists and liberals concern the overall trajectory of identity construction and socialization in the international system. This new axis of contention as a focus for contemporary debate offers two distinct theoretical advantages. First, a focus on socialization dynamics is more amenable to integrating questions about the causes and consequences of the Soviet collapse than the rationalist consensus. It raises the possibility that the collapse of the Soviet Union reflected long-term selection processes operating through socialization mechanisms at the international level. A second advantage of this approach is that it opens up the possibility that the end of the Cold War may be viewed as reflecting a shift in the trajectory of socialization generated by the international system. The neorealist model has a narrow view of socialization because it implies that systemic tendencies encourage the simple reproduction of a Waltzian balance of power. However, reformulating the liberal model indicates that socialization dynamics at the international level could be more complex than neorealism envisages. Once a critical mass of liberal states emerges, the democratic peace may displace the balance of power

Introduction 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

25

as the dominant equilibrium tendency within the international system. Debates between neorealists and liberals over processes of state identity construction and socialization in international relations therefore suggest the possibility of subsuming the insights of neorealism and also of institutionalism within a broader synthesis compatible with viewing the end of the Cold War as a major historical turning point in world politics. Case studies are examined in individual chapters. The universe of possible cases is drawn from candidates for great power status in the international system. Thus the countries are drawn from the critical states that have been identified by neorealists: the US, Russia, Germany, Japan and China. The Middle East is, of course, a key strategic region and a site for much potential and actual great power rivalry and competition. However, because it contains no major power potentially capable of directly challenging US hegemony, the universe of possible cases does not extend to this area. Case selection within the list of polar states identified by neorealists follows logically from the theories under examination. In particular, cross-regional variations in patterns of economic and institutional independence are useful in structuring research because their presence allows each of the theories being tested to make discrete predictions. The neorealist model predicts a universal trend towards a conflictual, multipolar international system characterized by great power balancing. In particular, a unified Germany, Japan and China have each been identified by neorealists as ‘rising powers’ within the emerging structure of international politics. These states find themselves at the margins of change within the system, and therefore will pose critical tests of neorealist assessments. The institutionalist model is prepared to challenge this prediction in Western Europe, where patterns of economic and institutional interdependence between states are well developed. In East Asia, however, these preconditions are lacking. By contrast, the liberal model challenges neorealist claims in both Western Europe and in East Asia, and predicts the emergence of a peaceful structure of great power relations at a global level. Overall, cross-regional variations in patterns of interdependence mean that analysing the foreign policies of the major powers in both Western Europe and East Asia should test the predictions made by competing models. The time frame covered is the decade between 1989 and 1999. Neorealists might argue that this does not necessarily allow a long enough period for balancing tendencies to develop properly. This argument was deployed recently, for example, by Mearsheimer (2001). Indeed, this claim has gathered significant weight since the important developments that have occurred in the international system after 1999. In the wake of the September 11 crisis, as well as the subsequent US interventions in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the argument has increasingly been made that neorealism is growing in relevance. Robert Kagan’s recent assessment of the ‘power divide’ emerging between the US and secondary powers, for

26 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Introduction

example, may be read in the light of neorealist predictions (Kagan 2003). The issue of the extent of the time period needed to adequately test neorealist predictions about the emerging international system does draw attention to neorealism’s indeterminacy as a tool of foreign policy analysis. Nevertheless, having acknowledged this fundamental problem with neorealism, the exclusive focus on the 1989–1999 transition may also be justified on methodological grounds. First, a decade already constitutes an extensive time frame in which to analyse neorealist predictions. Any study of the nature of the post-Cold War order at the present historical juncture can provide at best a provisional survey of trends. However, a decade does allow an extended period during which the major states have been exposed to the incentives and constraints generated by patterns of interaction among them. Moreover, the close of the first decade of the post-Cold War transition provides a logical, if inevitably somewhat arbitrary, cut-off point for the analysis. Extremely important developments have recently occurred, particularly the September 11 attacks and subsequent crises. In analysing the impact of the major crises of the post-1999 period, however, the methodological problems posed by the lack of available evidence, literature and historical perspective are particularly acute. Nevertheless, in recognition of the importance of these more recent developments and their significance for the key themes in the book, a postscript considers September 11, 2001 and its aftermath. The aim of this postscript is not to achieve a comprehensive and systemic extension of the framework of the book to cover the period since 1999. Instead, it seeks to draw attention to the increased importance of the project engaged in by the book in the light of recent trends, and point to how current events may be interpreted given its overall argument. The case study chapters are organized into four sections. The first two sections analyse the predictions of the neorealist and institutionalist models respectively. Liberal predictions are then dealt with in the two subsequent sections. The third section assesses if there is evidence of domestic cultural and institutional variation in the grand strategies of the major powers. This might pose anomalies for both neorealist and institutionalist predictions, and would indicate an ‘internalization lag’ of the sort anticipated by liberal theory. Thus even if states are pursuing non-liberal strategies, at this stage in the analysis this remains perfectly compatible with a liberal account of socialization dynamics within the international system. During this section, extensive use is made of empirical research in both the Kapstein and Mastanduno, and Keohane et al. projects to identify the distinctive foreign policy preferences articulated by individual countries. The fourth section considers the strategic choices faced by each of the major powers, analysing the direction in which their foreign policies have been developing over the 1989–1999 period. This section considers whether the state in question is coming under systemic pressure to adjust its domestic culture by internalizing the norms of a Kantian culture. It discusses the

Introduction 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

27

extent to which the strategy adopted by the state in question is sustainable, or whether it is facing pressures to adjust its orientation. If there are pressures for change, they are assessed in relation to the criteria distinguishing hegemonic bandwagoning from liberal socialization. It is considered whether there are indications of the state altering its approach to burden sharing so as to adopt a more equal role with the US, and if there is evidence of pressures to internalize cooperative norms across both security and economic issues. The conclusions draw out the three central themes of the book. First, the future of international relations theory after the Cold War is considered. The implications of the collapse of the Soviet Union for the way in which the international system is conceptualized are discussed, and the prospects for a new theoretical synthesis suited to the post-Cold War world are evaluated. Second, an assessment is made of general patterns of institutionalized activity in the international system that emerged over the 1989–1999 period. This section considers overall trends in terms of the relationships between the major powers since the end of the Cold War. Finally, conclusions are drawn about the individual foreign policy adjustments made by major states to the Soviet collapse, and whether they have come under pressure to become socialized to the norms associated with a concert of democratic states. Overall, a systematic evaluation is provided of theories of the international system through comparative study of state strategies during the first decade of the post-Cold War period. At the present time, global trends remain opaque and are difficult to extrapolate. However, the information and analysis contained in this study should prove useful in understanding the historic changes that took place in the international system over the 1989–1999 period. In turn this knowledge can be brought to bear on the grand theories that shape our understanding of the emerging international system (Keohane et al. 1993: 19).

1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

2

Reassessing the logic of anarchy Rationality versus reflexivity

Drawing on the insights of constructivism and recent attempts to develop a liberal model of international relations, this chapter compares neorealism, institutionalism and liberalism in terms of their competing conceptualizations of the composition and dynamics of the international system. The argument is made that prominent institutionalists have mistakenly interpreted neorealism as a rationalist model of the international system in order to develop their own arguments countering its central propositions. Rather than relying on rational actor assumptions, neorealism instead adopts a reflexive logic focusing on processes of identity construction and socialization arising from the generative consequences of anarchy. Thus whilst neorealism and liberalism differ fundamentally in terms of their assessment of the nature and long term consequences of anarchy, they may actually be closer to each other in terms of their conceptualization of system composition and dynamics than neorealism and institutionalism. On the basis of this argument, a ‘linear’ understanding of the relationship between neorealism, institutionalism and liberalism in which institutionalism is seen as providing the point of synthesis on a spectrum that runs between neorealism and liberalism is disputed. Instead, a ‘triangular’ understanding of the relationship between these three models is proposed in which the debates between neorealists and institutionalists constitute its rationalist leg, and debates between neorealists and liberals constitute its reflexivist leg. Understood in these terms, liberalism’s focus on the overall trajectory of identity construction and socialization within the international system is likely to prove more productive in the search for a general synthesis of competing theories of international relations than attempts by institutionalists to refine rationalist models. All three theories agree that anarchy is constituted through the interaction of units. However, they identify two different mechanisms through which this interaction occurs. One mechanism is that states are rational actors which seek to maximize their national interests through their international behaviour. Units which behave rationally ‘possess consistent, ordered preferences, and . . . calculate the costs of benefits of alternative

Reassessing the logic of anarchy: rationality versus reflexivity 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

29

courses of action . . . to maximise their utility in view of these preferences’ (Keohane 1984: 27). Rationalist approaches take the self-interested state as the starting point for their analysis, and therefore exogenize the internal characteristics of units. An alternative means through which units can interact is on the basis of reflexive behaviour. Reflexive actors act on the basis of the cultural meanings that they ascribe to either material objects or the actions of others (Wendt 1992: 396–399). In this view, ‘national interests’ cannot exist independently of a shared cultural context for action. Interests are not given exogenously, but ultimately reflect cultural identities that states have internalized through processes of socialization within the international system. A second important distinction is between the reflexive behaviour on the part of units and ‘reflexivity’ as a property of social systems. In a system that has achieved reflexivity, actors acquire an ability to think self-consciously about which behavioural practices to adopt (Wendt 1999: 375). Cultural change becomes pervasive as a result of the process through which actors are internalizing new identities. In turn, this reflects a shift in the overall trajectory of socialization within the international system. The achievement of reflexivity presupposes that actors are capable of reflexively monitoring the context in which they interact with others. However, reflexivity as a property of social systems cannot be reduced to reflexive monitoring of action on the part of units. It is perfectly possible to have a social system in which units interact on the basis of reflexive behaviour, but which has not achieved reflexivity. Within such a system, socialization dynamics define a negative feedback loop that discourages cultural change from taking place, and the identities of units will remain stable over time. It is argued below, for example, that the international system envisaged by neorealism may be interpreted as operating in precisely this fashion. Thus reflexivity as a feature of social systems under specific historical circumstances must be distinguished from reflexive monitoring as a generic feature of social action. The neorealist, institutionalist and liberal models are reviewed respectively. Each theory’s assumptions about the nature of anarchy are analysed to highlight differences in its ontological status across them. The way in which the theories conceptualize the constitution of the international system is also examined to identify whether a rationalist or a reflexivist logic is adopted. A fourth section considers the relationship between the three models and the possibilities for a general synthesis of their insights. This section sets out the linear and triangular views of debates between systemic theories, and discusses the implications of these theoretical concerns for the structure of research programmes within the field after the Cold War. Conclusions then summarize the theoretical arguments discussed and their implications for the study of international relations in the post-Cold War period.

30 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Reassessing the logic of anarchy: rationality versus reflexivity

The neorealist model The key variable identified by neorealism is the polarity of the international system, defined in terms of the distribution of material capabilities between states. This conclusion is drawn from the specification of neorealist theory. Waltz sharply distinguishes the structure of domestic and international systems. Domestic political systems are centralized and hierarchical, whilst the structure of the international system is anarchic due to the absence of a centralized law enforcement agency. Due to its anarchic organization, the international system becomes a self-help one, and a balance of power will consequently emerge as a result of the efforts of states to achieve security. This balance will reflect a structural equilibrium in the distribution of capabilities within the international system (Waltz 1979). As Dessler identifies, neorealism relies on a positional model of structure focusing on a unit’s placement within a given arrangement of actors (Dessler 1989: 449; also Wendt 1987: 341). Thus the system Waltz envisages has a reproductive character. Unintended consequences of interaction cause patterns of behaviour to reoccur even against the wishes of the system’s members. Waltz does allow scope for the transformation of the international system if its ordering principle shifts to hierarchy, although this is unlikely because of the anti-hegemonial nature of the balance of power. However, despite the reproductive role of structure in neorealism, the model retains a dynamic or ‘generative’ quality. Structure acts as a selector, and over time eliminates units that fail to respond to the imperatives of the system. This leads Waltz to emphasize the ‘pervasive’ importance of competition and socialization. Socialization is a process of emulation, and competition a process of elimination. States face strong structural incentives to emulate the effects of the most successful and become ‘socialized’ to the international system. If they fail to do so, competition will tend to eliminate them. This has internal and external consequences for states. Internally, they will adopt equivalent organizations. Externally, states will adopt structurally similar repertoires of behaviour. Competition and socialization encourage the homogenization of units such that they are functionally alike, and promote convergence of the system around a balance of power equilibrium (Waltz 1979: 74–77). Waltz’s suggestion that anarchy is generative has important implications for the way that he conceptualizes the role of the state. Waltz is conventionally interpreted as assuming states are rational actors. Keohane, a prominent institutionalist, adopts this understanding of neorealism (Keohane 1986b: 167). However, in making this claim Keohane knowingly counters Waltz’s own assertion that his theory ‘requires no assumptions of rationality . . . on the part of . . . the actors. The theory simply says that if some do relatively well, others will emulate them or fall by the wayside’ (Waltz 1979: 118; see also Keohane 1986b: 201 fn 15).

Reassessing the logic of anarchy: rationality versus reflexivity 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

31

Waltz does hold that his theory requires the assumption that at least some states seek to survive. However, he does not assume that they pursue this strategy rationally. Hence Waltz stresses the importance that he attaches, and which Keohane denies, to the process of selection that takes place in competitive systems (Waltz 1986: 331; James 2002: 122). Buzan et al. have argued that implicit in Waltz’s model is a ‘top down’ theory of the state. Once states are co-acting in a competitive environment, anarchy does have a bearing on their development. For this reason, Waltz observes the importance of the imitation of successful practices within the international system. In turn, the ability to engage in imitation implies cultural selection through the spread of shared ideas rather than natural selection relying on material incentives. Reasoning along these lines, Buzan et al. argue that the international system modelled by neorealism may be understood as operating through reflexive self-regulation on behalf of units rather than through rational action. On this account, patterns of behaviour are perpetuated not because of rational calculations of interest, but because shared knowledge has been internalized by states (Buzan et al. 1993: 107 and 117–118). Dessler makes the same point when he notes that the structure envisaged by neorealism implicitly generates rule following activity on the behalf of units. Thus ‘[r]ules, which give shape and meaning to rationality and thereby make survival possible, are a necessary (if theoretically suppressed) component of structure in the neorealist model’ (Dessler 1989: 461). Distinguishing empirically between rational action and reflexive self-regulation is difficult because the outcomes may be identical. However, these theoretical considerations do affect the way central features of the international system envisaged by neorealism are conceptualized. For example, one way of viewing the balance of power is that states rationally respond to the incentives generated by their relative position. However, the balance of power may instead be understood in terms of negative feedback produced through the international system. In this conception, ‘the balance is systemic in that the norms have been internalized through socialization as the actors watch and interact with their peers’ (Jervis 1997: 136). The most compelling examples of reflexive self-regulation within the international system have occurred when major states have behaved apparently ‘irrationally’. Important actors have occasionally been eliminated as significant units because of their failure to imitate the practices of rivals. A specific case is the Anglo-Dutch conflict of the seventeenth century. Although Holland survived as a sovereign entity, the failure of the Dutch to prepare for war led to their defeat and elimination as a major power. On a rationalist interpretation of neorealism, Dutch behaviour is difficult to accomodate. Although the ‘rational’ option of developing its military capabilities was open, Holland failed to take this course. However, understood in terms of the system’s capacity for reflexive self-regulation through selection and socialization, the outcome

32 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Reassessing the logic of anarchy: rationality versus reflexivity

of the Anglo-Dutch conflict is easily accounted for by neorealism. Moreover, as Waltz appreciates, even a small number of cases such as the one discussed provide an important example for other units. They are therefore extremely effective in ensuring the reproduction of a competitive environment. Thus Waltz is quick to recognize that the neorealist model is all the more powerful if it relies on imitation arising from the generative consequences of anarchy rather than the assumption of rational behaviour. Waltz’s account of socialization is not without problems, however. Early on in the debate over neorealism, Ruggie recognized that system structure was not fully generative for Waltz (Ruggie 1986: 135–136 and 148–152; Waltz 1986: 328). Wendt has subsequently identified the ways in which Waltz’s account of socialization is underdeveloped. Wendt accepts the view that neorealism is committed to a rationalist account of the state. However, in order to understand both when and how the assumptions underpinning neorealism operates, it is necessary to expose the social theory that remains implicit in Waltz’s formal model. Wendt identified that Waltz is committed to both individualist and materialist assumptions. Neorealism is individualist because structure is generated only through interaction of pre-existing units. Neorealism is materialist because it is the distribution of capabilities between states that motivates state behaviour under anarchy. Wendt argues that as a result of these assumptions neorealism’s account of socialization is truncated. Socialization can have two distinct objects, behaviour and properties, and neorealism’s account focuses exclusively on the former. Waltz’s individualist premises ensure that neorealism’s account of socialization permits only homeostatic reproduction within the system. Moreover, Waltz’s materialism ensures that his account of socialization is a ‘thin’ one that reduces norms and rules to patterned behaviour on the part of units. Thus the normative content of Waltz’s account of socialization is so insignificant as not to be meaningful (Wendt 1999: 98–102). To provide a fully developed account of state socialization, the international system must be understood in terms that are holist (structure affects properties not just behaviour) and idealist (structure defined in cultural rather than material terms). Thus Wendt has revealed that once the philosophical assumptions underpinning neorealism have been properly exposed, it is ultimately a distortion to claim that its account of the international system operates through reflexive selfregulation. Indeed, neorealism’s ambiguity at a philosophical level has fed directly into its problematic status as a model capable of explaining the activities of states. In particular, Waltz is unclear about the extent to which units have autonomy from the pressures generated by system structure. Waltz asserts that neorealism can explain foreign policy only when external pressures dominate the internal disposition of states. However, if the international system is not fully generative then the question becomes how

Reassessing the logic of anarchy: rationality versus reflexivity 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

33

to explain variation in the influence of system structure over time. The relative influence of unit and structure on behaviour is therefore fundamentally ambiguous in neorealism (Elman 1996a; see also Elman 1996b). This practical problem associated with applying neorealism ultimately stems from weaknesses in his underlying philosophical premises, as Wendt has identified. Neorealism is vague about the extent to which structure may be viewed as fully generative. Yet whilst at a philosophical level Wendt’s critique of neorealism is penetrating, it is also important to recognize the historical context in which Waltz formulated his model. Wendt has the advantage of the hindsight provided by two decades of sustained critical reflection on Theory of International Politics. It is entirely unsurprising, therefore, that the account of socialization developed by Waltz is not fully specified. A fairer evaluation of neorealism, given the context from which it emerged, is that Waltz’s model of socialization within the international system is simply underdeveloped. Understood in these terms, it seems more appropriate to conclude that the status of the state in neorealist theory remains somewhat unclear. This, for example, is the position adopted in one recent analysis (James 2002: 122). Neorealism has a thin conception of socialization that makes it amenable to a rationalist interpretation. Nevertheless, whilst neorealism’s conception of socialization is truncated, the stress that Waltz places on its role does indicate that it is not unreasonable to interpret his model in reflexivist terms. In summary, two aspects of the neorealist model have been highlighted. First, it relies upon a positional model of structure. It thereby takes on a reproductive character and has a homeostatic bias. Second, neorealism is not necessarily, as is widely supposed, committed to the assumption that states are rational actors. Neorealism can be read in this way, as Keohane has proposed. Yet neorealism might also reasonably be viewed, as Waltz himself would prefer, as relying on the selection and socialization produced by the system’s generative consequences. Waltz’s account of anarchy is not fully generative, and his model of state socialization is ambiguous. However, neorealism can be interpreted as relying on a reflexive logic because it does provide an incipient theory of state identity construction within the international system.

The institutionalist model The key variable identified by the institutionalist model is the distribution of information and institutions within the international system. By focusing on the systemic impact of information and institutions, institutionalists seek to demonstrate that international cooperation is possible from the same assumptions about the international system as neorealism. The essence of the institutionalist argument is that neorealism’s conclusions do not follow from its premises.

34 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Reassessing the logic of anarchy: rationality versus reflexivity

Two qualifications should be made about the version of institutionalism to be presented. First, the account draws principally on Keohane’s formulation of institutionalist theory (see especially Keohane 1984). Keohane’s work has now generated a wide secondary literature. Nevertheless, it remains the most comprehensive statement of the theory from which this literature ultimately derives. This perspective is often referred to as ‘neoliberal institutionalism’. However, following Keohane’s explicit preference, the label institutionalism is adopted because it distinguishes institutionalism from the liberal model. A second qualification is that the account of institutionalism below has a narrow methodological foundation premised on rational choice analysis. Sociological and historical strands of institutionalist theory also exist as middle range theories within political science (Hall and Taylor 1996). However, they have not been formulated into a general theory of the international system in the way that Keohane’s rational choice institutionalism has. Similarly, rational choice institutionalism has a very particular assessment of the operation of international regimes. The account of regimes that follows therefore does not deny the existence of alternatives drawing on constructivism and variants of realism. However, it does focus on the rational choice approach to regimes because this perspective makes an attempt at providing a paradigmatic alternative to neorealism. These qualifications make it possible to avoid the problems that might be associated with inappropriately comparing grand systemic theories with middle range theories when the relationship between neorealism, institutionalism and liberalism is analysed in the final section. Institutionalists purport to accept neorealist claims about the impact of anarchy on state behaviour. However, they also presuppose the existence of complex patterns of interdependence that create extensive common interests amongst industrialized states. They therefore suggest that the problem of cooperation between these states can often be modelled in terms of a Prisoner’s Dilemma. Within such a game, two participants could benefit from cooperation but fail to do so due to the incentives generated by the structure of interaction that exists between them. Drawing on theories of rational choice, Keohane suggests that whether defection is the dominant strategy within a Prisoner’s Dilemma depends on the number of times the game is played. If the game is played only a small number of times, defection will dominate. However, if the game is played on an iterative basis, cooperation can rationally emerge if the participants value future rewards and practice specific reciprocity. This is because the repeated playing of the game generates a shadow of the future (Keohane 1984: 65–85; Axelrod and Keohane 1993). Keohane also holds that international regimes can play a functional role in facilitating cooperation among rational egoists. First, regimes reduce transactions costs or the costs of negotiating, monitoring and enforcing agreements. Second, regimes reduce uncertainties and provide information that shape states’ expecta-

Reassessing the logic of anarchy: rationality versus reflexivity 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

35

tions of future behaviour. Under anarchy, regimes will be difficult to create since it is difficult for states to establish legal liability through regimes. However, once brought into existence they will be functional for states and therefore tend to endure (Keohane 1984: 85–109). Keohane also explores the implications of assuming ‘bounded rationality’ and of limited redefinition’s of actor interests away from egoism. However, he is also clear that these move beyond a functional theory of regimes. Keohane therefore acknowledges that ‘rationalist theories contain no endogenous dynamic (because) . . . preferences are assumed to be fixed’ (Keohane 1989b: 171). There is a body of literature reviewed comprehensively by Hasenclever et al. that attempts to endogenize preference formation within a rational choice framework (Hasenclever et al. 1997: 139–154). In particular, dynamic rationalist models incorporate a role for changes in state preferences and feedback from context. Within such a framework, regimes are capable of acting as ‘autonomous variables’ that over time are able to alter states conceptions of their interests (Krasner 1983). Nye’s assessment of the non-proliferation regime during the Cold War has been one of the most influential studies of this kind. Nye’s analysis of the regime indicates that through their ongoing interactions, US and Soviet policy makers rationally responded to new information signalling the dangers associated with the use of nuclear weapons by adjusting their conceptions of their interests. The superpowers went beyond ‘simple learning’ in which they adjusted means without adjusting their deeper goals, and engaged in ‘complex learning’ in which they altered their preferences as a result of new information. New norms within the regime consequently emerged associated with the operation of deterrence reflecting the way in which the two superpowers had altered prior beliefs about their usage of nuclear weapons in a first strike capacity. Moreover, once in place, feedback helped reinforce the norms that emerged through the process of complex learning. For example, regimes established regular diplomatic contacts that ‘locked in’ new information about the value of stable deterrence by changing standard operating procedures and the attitudes of participants in negotiations (Nye 1987: 382–401). Attempts to endogenize preference formation have demonstrated that rational choice analysis can be versatile. However, Keohane acknowledges that this approach to analysing state preference formation privileges a rationalist framework by requiring justifications for deviating from its assumptions without symmetrically demanding that rationalism justify the interests and identities of the actors with which it begins its analysis (Keohane 1996: 473). Hasenclever et al. make a similar point when they note that attempts to endogenize preference formation within a rational choice framework reflect ‘weak’ rather than ‘strong’ cognitivism. A focus on interest formation is used to complement rationalist approaches by supplying an account of how interests may change as the result of

36 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Reassessing the logic of anarchy: rationality versus reflexivity

new knowledge being acquired by actors. However, these approaches do not systemically consider the way in which national interests are first defined by the prior socialization of states (Hasenclever et al. 1997: 155). Thus the account of complex learning and identity change provided is limited in two ways. First, the central problematic remains that of cooperation under anarchy. Anarchy is viewed as reproductive rather than transforming, and as providing a constraining rather than an enabling environment. As a result, institutionalism lacks a systematic account of the way in which cultural selection may be encouraged by the international system itself. Second, institutionalism also lacks a systematic account of the conditions under which the international system might allow scope for cultural change resulting from the exercise of voluntary agency on the part of units. Such change remains viewed as merely reflecting residual domestic variance that will be constrained by systemic conditions (Keohane 1986b: 193). Thus attempts to endogenize preference formation within a rationalist framework leaves open a space for a more fully developed account of socialization dynamics in which cultural selection and cultural change play a more prominent role. In summary, two aspects of the institutionalist model have been highlighted. First, like neorealism, institutionalism takes on an essentially reproductive rather than a transformative view of the logic of anarchy. Second, unlike neorealism institutionalism remains unambiguously committed to the assumption that states behave as rational actors. This framework is compatible with explaining a degree of complex learning on the part of units. However, because the rationalist framework has a reproductive orientation it may underestimate the scope for cultural change within the international system.

The liberal model This section reformulates liberal theory in the light of constructivism. The most prominent recent attempt to develop a liberal model of the international system has been made by Moravcsik. In agreement with Moravcsik, the approach set out here assumes that liberalism can be identified as a distinct systemic theory that makes general statements about international behaviour (Moravcsik 1997: 515–516). However, this formulation of liberal theory reverses Moravcsik’s injunction that the domestic preferences of states take causal priority over the cultural structure of the international system. It draws upon constructivist insights to argue that Moravcsik overlooks an important systemic dimension that is central to the sociological strand of the liberal tradition. However, the label ‘constructivism’ is eschewed in favour of terminology that acknowledges the liberal normative content of socialization dynamics. In particular, this formulation of liberal theory hypothesizes that the cultural norms associated with the democratic peace may generate socialization effects that encourage

Reassessing the logic of anarchy: rationality versus reflexivity 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

37

their spread through the international system. Advocates of both liberalism and constructivism have acknowledged the close affinities that exist between these positions (Wendt 1992: 394; Moravcsik 1997: 539–540). Whilst influenced by Moravcsik’s attempt to systemize liberalism, this account draws upon constructivism to set out a modified formulation which gives more prominence to the role of socialization dynamics and cultural change within the international system. Due to its focus on the cultural structure of the international system as the key variable affecting state behaviour, the status of anarchy in liberal theory differs fundamentally from the neorealist and institutionalist models. Liberalism relies upon what constructivists have referred to as a transformational model of structure in which anarchy is viewed as potentially open to transformation through changes in the culture and identity of the units that populate the international system (Dessler 1989: 452–454). However, a liberal model moves beyond this general claim by specifying a set of determinate historical and sociological dynamics that encourage the emergence and perpetuation of this trend. In particular, Huntley has suggested that anarchy may have a self-transforming logic. Huntley proposes that an interpretation of Kant’s writings that focuses only on the domestic sources of the democratic peace overlooks the role that is played by anarchy in its emergence and spread. Kant suggested that over the long term, the effects of competition and socialization within the international system encourage convergence and homogenization around the liberal state form and thus the expansion of the liberal pacific union. Understood in these terms, the democratic peace becomes an equilibrium position around which the international system will gradually tend to approximate. Thus although a liberal model adopts the same modalities of system reproduction suggested by neorealism – competition, socialization and equilibrium – it understands these characteristics in very different terms (Huntley 1996: 57–63; Harrison 2002: 148–154). The notion that anarchy may have generative consequences of a transformative nature raises important questions about how the composition and dynamics of the international system are conceptualized. Within the liberal model, the international system is viewed as operating through long-term cultural selection processes. Anarchy is therefore understood as having a reflexive logic in which states internalize cultural identities through socialization pressures generated by the international system. The transformation of the international system can be viewed as being brought about through both unintended and intended consequences of interaction. In terms of unintended consequences, Huntley identifies that during longterm competition liberal states will tend to out-perform non-liberal states. Similarly, in the context of an anarchic environment, the distinctive capacity of liberal states to be trusted casts a long shadow on the future that unwittingly socializes them to the democratic peace (Huntley 1996: 57–58). This shadow must be sharply distinguished from that discussed

38 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Reassessing the logic of anarchy: rationality versus reflexivity

by institutionalists, in as much as it emerges as a result of the collective identity adopted by liberal states rather than the interaction of rational egoists. In Wendt’s terminology, it reflects the constitutive rather than behavioural effects of interdependence (Wendt 1999: 344–349). However, the most distinctive element of a liberal model of the international system is its stress on the role of cultural change in the operation of competition and socialization. Unlike the unintended effects of anarchy, cultural change involves the exercise of voluntary agency. States will freely choose to join up with the democratic zone of peace, thereby facilitating its further expansion. As such, cultural change is particularly important at the margins of development within the international system. Over the historical long term, the intentional choices of states reinforce the unintended cultural selection effects generated by international anarchy (Harrison 2002: 151–152). As Wendt identifies, states can internalize the norms of a Kantian culture to different degrees (Wendt 1999: 302–307). They may be coerced into complying with its norms, or adopt them instrumentally because they recognize the material advantages of so doing. Wendt refers to this as internalization to the first and second degrees respectively. For example, states in the periphery will simply lack the capabilities to pursue effective balancing strategies against states within the liberal core. Similarly, states may comply with a Kantian culture for the economic benefits this brings, for example in terms of access to international trade with and investment from the liberal core. States that fail to comply with the system’s dominant norms will fall behind others in terms of overall performance, and risk punishment or elimination as significant actors. States may also internalize a Kantian culture to the third degree reflecting a situation in which they comply with its norms because they recognize them as legitimate. Traditionally this mechanism of ensuring compliance with international norms has been seen as weak given the absence of effective enforcement agency in the international system. However, within a Kantian culture the most powerful states will already have internalized a broadly liberal identity. The cultural norms of the democratic peace will therefore have achieved a taken-for-granted status amongst the dominant units. Individual states may resist selection processes. Nevertheless, paradoxically, the stronger the potential challenge a state may pose to the core, the more constrained by the system it will be. In order to maintain the high levels of performance necessary to maintain great power status, actors will be exposed to intense pressures to adopt the behavioural practices of the core. There are, therefore, powerful background pressures within the international system encouraging states to comply with the norms of the democratic peace. However, despite the existence of these powerful background pressures, a focus solely on compliance does not fully capture the complex dynamics encouraging the spread of liberal norms. This is because the socialization

Reassessing the logic of anarchy: rationality versus reflexivity 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

39

effects generated by the democratic peace can open up a permissive space that allows them to engage in cultural change through the exercise of voluntary agency. Huntley indicates ways in which competition and socialization generate a ‘dialectical “causal loop”’ of self-reinforcing feedback (Huntley 1996: 59). The socialization effects developed by the liberal core encourage states at the margins of cultural change to adopt shifts in their identity. This in turn feeds back into the properties of the system by strengthening the dominance of the liberal core. Under these conditions, the cultural choices made by units will greatly affect the degree of progressive momentum being generated by historical forces. The system will achieve reflexivity, defined by Wendt as ‘a capacity for critical selfreflection . . . that helps . . . [actors] overcome a false sense of determinism’ (Wendt 1999: 375). At this stage, units acquire the autonomy of action necessary for them to freely accept cultural change. Thus built into the liberal model of socialization is a theoretical account of the general conditions under which voluntary cultural change on the part of units is possible within the international system. Of course, units may use their heightened autonomy of action to resist pressures to engage in cultural change. Socialization dynamics will therefore be subject to cultural and institutional variation related to the impact of domestic preferences on systemic norms. Moravcsik claims that for this reason states domestic preferences should take causal priority in the liberal model (Moravcsik 1997: 539–540). However, under these circumstances the powerful background pressures in the international system capable of generating compliance with liberal norms will exert their influence. Thus, at least once these background pressures become well developed within the international system, Moravcsik’s argument may be qualified. To appropriate Wendt’s language, under these conditions there is ‘reason to think that states will alter their identities over the course of an interaction’ (Wendt 1999: 367). After this stage, a period of lagged transition can be expected as states adjust to the norms of the liberal core and internalize cultural change. Overall, the trajectory of change within the system becomes irreversible. In part this is due to the sunk costs involved in resisting the dominant norms of the liberal core. It is also partly due to the way in which the cultural norms of the core are internalized by actors and are widely accepted as legitimate. However, the strongest reason why regression is not likely is because of the snowballing generated by the system. In a system that has achieved reflexivity, a situation emerges in which structural and cultural change become mutually reinforcing. In summary, two aspects of the liberal model have been highlighted. First, liberalism adopts a transformational model of structure. Anarchy is understood as recursively drawn into an ongoing process of cultural development within the international system. Second, due to its focus upon socialization dynamics, it is legitimate to argue that liberalism postulates a conception of the state as a reflexive rather than a rational actor. Like

40 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Reassessing the logic of anarchy: rationality versus reflexivity

neorealism, liberalism provides a theory of state identity construction and socialization within the international system related to its conception of the generative consequences of anarchy. Whilst socialization dynamics will be subject to domestic variation, the international system defines a selfreinforcing positive feedback loop encouraging long term convergence of the international system around the democratic peace. Having outlined the three models, Table 2.1 summarizes their central attributes.

Towards a general synthesis Having analysed the three models, the relationship between neorealism, institutionalism and liberalism and the prospects for a general synthesis of their insights can be considered. The discussion is framed around a comparison of the ‘linear’ and the ‘triangular’ conceptualizations of the relationship between the three theories. Each of these conceptualizations suggests the possibility of a general synthesis. However, they differ over the terms on which such a synthesis can be achieved. In turn, this has important implications for the content of research programmes within the discipline after the Cold War. Keohane has characterized institutionalism in terms of a mid-point between the two extremes of neorealism and liberalism. He argues that ‘institutionalists accept a version of liberal principles that eschews determinism and that emphasises the pervasive significance of international institutions without denigrating the role of state power’ (Keohane 1989a: 11). Understood in these terms, institutionalism is uniquely positioned to subsume the best features of both the neorealist and liberal perspectives. On the basis of his understanding of neorealism, Keohane reasons that neorealism and institutionalism share rationalist assumptions. By contrast, although institutionalism and liberalism have a common concern with international institutions, their approaches differ because the former is rationalist and the latter reflectivist. This suggests the intuitively plausible argument that neorealism is closer to institutionalism in terms of its understanding of the composition and dynamics of the international system than are neorealism and liberalism. Keohane’s argument might be syncretic

Table 2.1 Summary of theoretical framework

Neorealism Institutionalism Liberalism

Key variable

State-as-actor

Status of anarchy

Material structure Institutional structure Cultural structure

Ambiguous

Reproductive

Rational

Reproductive

Reflexive

Transformative

Reassessing the logic of anarchy: rationality versus reflexivity 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

NR

I Rationalism

41

L Reflectivism

Figure 2.1 The linear model

rather than synthetic in as much as it could be understood as proposing a choice between either rationalist or reflectivist approaches to the study of world politics. Yet this seems unlikely because the statement from Keohane quoted above clearly claims that institutionalism incorporates the most persuasive elements of both the neorealist and liberal perspectives. By modelling cooperation on the basis of rationalist premises, Keohane seeks an institutionalist middle way. Such an analysis implies a ‘linear’ conceptualization of the relationship between neorealism, institutionalism and liberalism. Institutionalism is seen as providing the point of synthesis on a spectrum that runs between neorealism and liberalism as depicted in Figure 2.1. Keohane’s opinions on the relationship between schools of thought have led directly to his assertions on future research within the discipline. He suggests that future research should attempt to refine rationalist models. Theoretical debates should focus on the conditions under which states will be concerned about relative and absolute gains. Empirically, researchers should test neorealism against institutionalism in the emerging post-Cold War international system (Keohane 1993: 273–291). With the end of the Cold War, neorealists have anticipated that the tendency of the international system to encourage states to pursue balancing strategies will mean that a phase of US led unipolarity will revert to a more complex multipolar order prone to great power conflicts and even war. Major secondary states identified as the unified Germany, Japan and China are likely to seek to restore equilibrium in the balance of power by bringing US power into check (Mearsheimer 1990; Layne 1993; Waltz 1993; Mearsheimer 2001). Institutionalists have responded that the presence of well-developed patterns of economic and institutional interdependence between states in a West European context means that neorealism and institutionalism develop divergent hypotheses about international change (Keohane 1993: 272–273). Thus Western Europe provides the most fruitful context in which to test competing rationalist theories. By contrast, in East Asia there are candidates for polar status whilst patterns of economic and institutional interdependence inherited from the Cold War era are less well developed. In this regional context, the logic of institutionalist arguments indicates that it is less able to challenge neorealism’s pessimism about the future (Buzan and Segal 1994: Friedberg 1994; Friedberg 2000; Mearsheimer 2001). However, it is possible to question the interpretation of neorealism put forward by Keohane. Instead of making rational actor assumptions,

42 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Reassessing the logic of anarchy: rationality versus reflexivity

neorealism may be understood as providing an incipient theory of state identity construction and socialization related to its conception of the generative consequences of anarchy. Understood in this way, neorealism adopts a reflexive logic and is closer to liberalism than it is to institutionalism’s rational choice framework. Rather than conceiving of the relationship between neorealism, institutionalism and liberalism in terms of a linear spectrum, it becomes possible to conceptualize the relationship in triangular terms. Within such a conceptualization, debates between neorealists and institutionalists constitute the rationalist leg of the triangle because neorealism’s commitment to a positional model of structure means that it can be viewed as amenable to a rationalist interpretation. By contrast, debates between neorealists and liberals about the generative consequences of anarchy and the overall trajectory of identity construction and socialization within the international system constitute the reflexivist leg of the triangle. The triangular model of the relationship between neorealist, institutionalist and liberal theories is illustrated in Figure 2.2. Such a conceptualization calls into question the validity of Keohane’s claim that institutionalism provides the strongest basis for subsuming the research programmes of competing approaches. It suggests that liberalism’s focus on the generative consequences of anarchy and the overall trajectory of socialization within the international system is likely to be more productive in the search for a general synthesis of competing theories than attempts by institutionalists to refine rationalist models. Liberalism’s most important characteristic in this regard is its ability to provide an account of how patterns of socialization within the international system might vary historically. The account of variation in socialization offered by liberalism may be described as follows. In the early stages of development, the international system will operate within the ranges predicted by neorealism. The distribution of material capabilities will be the dominant factor motivating state behaviour, and institutional density will be limited. The system

NR

Rationalist (Rational choice)

I

Figure 2.2 The triangular model

Reflexivist (Identity construction/ socialization)

L

Reassessing the logic of anarchy: rationality versus reflexivity 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

43

will be characterized by regular wars and the recurrent formation of balances of power. Institutional density will rise as the effects of competition and socialization become entrenched and there is cultural change within the system. Assuming that competition and socialization encourage cultural change at a constant rate over time, institutional density will rise gradually within the system. A modification to the basic liberal model is possible that incorporates the insights of institutionalism. In this scenario certain levels of functional cooperation are considered a prerequisite to the emergence of a relatively stable core of liberal democratic states. Once this point has been reached, socialization effects generated by the democratic peace can begin to operate and institutional density will rise more rapidly. The overall trend produces a ‘kinked’ pattern of development in which the rate of cultural change within the system speeds up dramatically beyond a certain stage of maturity. Incorporating institutionalist insights sequentially into an account of the historical development of the international system highlights the leg of the triangle that links institutionalism with liberalism. As SterlingFolker identifies, to separate out functional and cultural explanations on the grounds that the former is rationalist and the latter is reflexivist creates a crude and ultimately unnecessary ontological divide between them. Arguments about functional institutional efficiency can complement constructivist insights if it is recognized that environmental circumstances are in a process of evolution. Over time, functional logics can generate selection effects in which the organizational forms that survive are the product of an efficient history. Similarly, institutionalist arguments contain a role for identity transformation because any self-interested actor’s choice is always embedded in a larger set of social practices and identities. Successive acts of cooperation can through feedback create effects which otherwise would be inexplicable if interests were held constant. Rather than drawing a rigid divide between the two logics, the choice instead ‘amounts to explaining short term, behavioural cooperation in the moment or its development into communal cooperation and systemic transformation in the future’ (Sterling-Folker 2000: 113). Similar themes have emerged in the debates between Buzan and Little. Buzan has drawn on the functional logic associated with neorealism to show how states locked into a competitive international system and lacking a common culture will eventually be pushed into developing a basic international society. Little has argued that there is no reason to expect that this process cannot work the other way around, with states from an outer sector of international society only being permitted to join the inner sector once states in the outer sector have accepted their cultural norms (Buzan 1993; Little 1995). Overall, the triangular conception of the relationship between neorealism, institutionalism and liberalism provides a potential framework for integrating different forms of explanation into a single coherent account of the overall historical development of the international system.

44 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Reassessing the logic of anarchy: rationality versus reflexivity

The modified scenario also provides a useful supplement to the account of structural change developed by Wendt. Wendt has identified four ‘master variables’ capable of driving transformation in the cultural structure of the international system: interdependence, homogeneity, common fate, and self-restraint. Each of these factors will be present in an international system characterized by a strong convergence of liberal preferences. However, Wendt also recognizes that although these master variables are necessary conditions for structural transformation, they are not sufficient ones. This is because transformation requires ‘not just that identities change, but that their frequency and distribution cross a threshold at which the logic of the structure tips over into a new logic’ (Wendt 1999: 365). The existence of such a threshold supplies the ‘missing link’ in Wendt’s account by highlighting the significance of a point of criticality in a developmental sequence of change in the international system. Criticality may be identified as a point at which a system’s emergent properties switch, resulting in a dramatic change in patterns of alignment within it. The system effects that are envisaged by the liberal model are therefore different to those identified by neorealism. The neorealist model envisages linear effects, in which negative feedback promotes homeostatic reproduction. By contrast, system effects in the liberal model are nonlinear because there is ‘a disproportion between the magnitude of the cause and the results, which will depend on the system as a whole’ (Jervis 1997: 146). After the point of criticality, what were initially small and insignificant changes within the system suddenly produce an enormous change in its overall characteristics. A ‘cascade’ or ‘catastrophe jump’ is triggered as the system’s old equilibrium condition becomes unstable and is replaced by a new one (Rosenau 1984: 262; Nicholson 1989: 170–171; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 901). An example from the physical world is the type of spinning top designed so that once it reaches a certain velocity its centre of gravity shifts and it flips to spin on its head. Such a point is provided by the emergence of a stable core of liberal democratic states. Until this stage, the existence of democratic states may have some effect on international behaviour, but does not result in a fundamental shift in the emergent properties of the system. After this point, however, the structure of interaction within the system alters. Reflexivity is achieved as the socialization effects generated by emergence of the core begin to transform overall patterns of alignment within it. It seems plausible to hypothesize that an obvious point of historical reference for the emergence of a critical mass of liberal democratic states is provided by the recent collapse of the Soviet Union. Liberalism is uniquely positioned to both explain this development, and account for why it might constitute a point of enormous significance for the overall course of historical change in world politics. First, the liberal model could plausibly claim to provide an endogenous account of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Exponents of neorealism and institutionalism have both

Reassessing the logic of anarchy: rationality versus reflexivity 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

45

argued that the sudden and unexpected end of the Cold War is best viewed as an exogenous shock to the international system. According to Waltz, the Soviet collapse was a unit level development that has produced structural effects, thus accounting for the collapse of the Soviet Union is beyond the purview of systemic theory (Waltz 1993: 49). Keohane has likened the event to the impact of a meteor strike in the study of palaeontology. It is not, therefore, a development which social scientists ought to have been expected to have predicted (Keohane 1996: 463). By contrast, the liberal model is capable of viewing the Soviet collapse as itself being symptomatic of overall historical trends within the international system. In particular, this development may be understood as reflecting cultural selection processes arising from the long-term effects of competition and socialization under anarchy. This does not imply that the Soviet Union’s successor state, Russia, has itself become a fully liberal democratic republic. However, it does reflect the way in which rigidity of the Soviet political system simply proved unable to keep pace with the more adaptable liberal states of the West. In this view, the collapse of the Soviet Union, one of the most important developments in world politics in the second half of the twentieth century, was not merely an isolated development reflecting a peculiar conjunction of forces in a particular historical context. Instead, the demise of Soviet communism is perfectly compatible with the long term patterns of change in international politics postulated by liberalism (Huntley 1996: 65–72; Harrison 2002: 156–161). Moreover, liberalism may shed light on the wider historical significance of the collapse of the Soviet Union for the development of world politics. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, it seems plausible to hypothesize that the international system is now overwhelmingly dominated by a stable core of liberal democratic states for the first time in world history. There have been theoretical debates about the extent of norm convergence required to push the international system beyond the point of criticality. Finnemore and Sikkink estimate that at least one-third of total states would have to adopt a given norm before a tipping point is reached. However, they also acknowledge that attempts to quantify the tipping point are likely to prove elusive because not all states have equal weight within the system (Finnemore and Sikkink 1999: 901). Wendt takes a more sophisticated approach that recognizes the open-ended nature of the critical threshold. He proposes that criticality should simply be viewed as being ‘multiply realisable’, by which he means that it may be realized by different combinations of states that have internalized different cultural norms to different degrees. There is thus no one necessary route that must be taken to achieve it (Wendt 1999: 342–343). However, one of the frequently commented upon features of the post-Cold War order is the emergence of a relatively stable cluster of liberal states at its centre. Goldieger and McFaul have proposed that a core-periphery formation has displaced polarity as the international system’s dominant structural feature

46 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Reassessing the logic of anarchy: rationality versus reflexivity

(Goldieger and McFaul 1992: 467–491). Robert Cooper provides a threetier model of structure divided into a ‘postmodern’ centre, a ‘premodern’ periphery and a ‘modern’ semi-periphery (Cooper 1998). Buzan suggests a continuum, arguing that patterns of uneven development are likely to produce concentric circles of commitment to the norms of a core as the international system matures (Buzan 1993: 349). Each of these approaches provide a strong precedent in the literature that is entirely compatible with the hypothesis that the collapse of the Soviet Union reflects one route on a multiply realizable path to change in the cultural structure of the international system. Viewing the collapse of the Soviet Union as symptomatic of a shift in the cultural structure of the international system generates a much broader research programme than that proposed by the debate which has taken place between neorealists and institutionalists. Huntley draws on liberal insights to hypothesize that in the post-Cold War era powerful systemic forces exists which will encourage the spread of a peaceful structure of great power relations in world politics. In particular, he argues that liberalism anticipates that a form of ‘bandwagoning’ behaviour will emerge between the major states. This contrasts with the balance of power configuration anticipated by neorealism, and unlike institutionalism relies on more than institutional inertia to anticipate an alternative future (Huntley 1996: 70–71). Huntley’s bandwagoning metaphor suggests a strikingly similar pattern of development to the notion that the democratic peace may have begun to generate powerful socialization effects that are encouraging its world-wide spread. Two features serve to distinguish such a pattern empirically from the trends envisaged by both neorealism and institutionalism. The first relates to the geographic scope of the spread of peaceful relations between the major powers. Liberalism predicts that a peaceful structure of great power relations will emerge at a global level, even in regions such as East Asia where there are candidates for polar status but patterns of economic and institutional independence are poorly developed. This reflects the socialization effects arising from the liberal core and their effect on the system’s periphery. A second distinctive feature of liberal predictions is the stress it places on the impact of systemic forces on the domestic political structure of the major powers within the international system. Liberalism anticipates that a period of lagged transition will emerge during which key states will come under sustained pressure to internalize the norms of the democratic peace. The pattern of change in the internal identity structure of states therefore also generates a set of predictions about behavioural tendencies within the international system that is discrete to the liberal model. Overall, liberalism offers a research agenda that is both more extensive geographically and penetrates more deeply into domestic-international interactions than that which has resulted from debates between neorealist

Reassessing the logic of anarchy: rationality versus reflexivity 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

47

and institutionalists. This agenda is able to separate predictions of liberal theory from competing theoretical perspectives, and also indicates a potential set of behavioural criteria through which these predictions may be measured. Viewed in this way, the end of the Cold War has opened up a unique historical context in which to comparatively assess the predictions of different theoretical models of international politics (Huntley 1996: 72). In summary, it is possible that prominent institutionalists have misconstrued the nature of the relationship between neorealism, institutionalism and liberalism, and in so doing underestimated the possibilities for a general synthesis of their insights. Keohane has proposed a linear conceptualization of the relationship between the three schools. Understood in these terms, attempts to refine rationalist models provide the most fruitful way forward for the discipline. The research programme that follows from this focuses on a relatively narrow range of theoretical issues, and moreover on a European rather than a global context. It also implies that theories of the international system developed during the Cold War do not have to be revised fundamentally in the light of developments in international politics over the post-Cold War period. However, it is possible to dispute the validity of such a research agenda by questioning the interpretation of neorealism as a rationalist theory. Instead, neorealism might be viewed as adopting a reflexive logic focusing on selection and socialization arising from the generative consequences of anarchy. This implies a triangular conceptualization of the relationship between the three theories in which debates between neorealists and institutionalists constitute its rationalist leg, and debates between neorealists and liberals constitute its reflexivist leg. Understood in these terms, liberalism’s focus on the generative consequences of anarchy and long term socialization dynamics in the international system is likely to be more productive in the search for a general synthesis of competing theories of international relations than institutionalists’ attempts to refine rationalist models. This is because of the ability of liberalism to offer a fully generative model of the international system providing an account of how socialization dynamics within it may vary historically. These conclusions indicate that the collapse of the Soviet Union may have more profound implications for the international system than institutionalists anticipate. In concluding his recent book, Wendt suggests that the central question faced by the field today is ‘can the states system achieve reflexivity . . . and what are the implications if it does?’ (Wendt 1999: 375). Liberalism hypothesizes that with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a critical mass of liberal states, the international system has achieved reflexivity. In turn, this has resulted in a dramatic shift in the pace of cultural change and the overall trajectory of socialization within it.

48 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Reassessing the logic of anarchy: rationality versus reflexivity

Conclusions One of the most distinctive features of debates within international relations over the past quarter of a century has been the attempt to develop systemic theory. Systemic theory offers parsimonious, general explanations of patterns of behaviour in international politics, and promises the discipline the logical rigour and explanatory insight that its status as a modern social science demands. However, debates that have taken place between neorealists and institutionalists have become increasingly unproductive, both theoretically and empirically. Even major contributors to the debate have long recognized that it has ‘tended to obscure rather than clarify’ (Powell 1994: 313 and 344). Yet the reason for this failure is not that the attempt by institutionalists to criticize neorealism on its own terms is misconceived. A more sophisticated approach might be to recognize that Keohane and subsequent institutionalists have relied upon an uncritical understanding of the relationship between schools of thought. They have adopted a linear model of the relationship between neorealism, institutionalism and liberalism in which institutionalism is seen as providing the point of synthesis on a spectrum that runs between neorealism and liberalism. As such it is viewed as the model that is most able to reconcile the competing claims of alternative positions. Whilst superficially plausible, such a view of the relationship between schools of thought underestimates the significance of similarities between neorealism and liberalism. Indeed, it is possible that it has been institutionalism’s commitment to rationalism that has actively blocked the development of a model of the international system compatible with liberal insights. A more nuanced approach proposes a triangular understanding of the relationship between the three models, with debates between neorealists and institutionalists constituting its rationalist leg, and debates between neorealists and liberals constituting its reflexivist leg. Such a conceptualization allows a fuller appreciation of the complex linkages that exist between the three schools. Moreover, it highlights the way in which liberalism’s focus on the generative consequences of anarchy allows it to subsume the combined research programmes of neorealism and institutionalism. Finally, these theoretical considerations have important implications for the content of research programmes within the discipline in the post-Cold War period. Proponents of neorealism, institutionalism and liberalism have identified that the collapse of the Soviet Union provides an historic opportunity to test their competing theoretical claims. Neorealists have developed a pessimistic analysis of the nature of systemic change after the Cold War, predicting a return to conflictual multipolarity on a global scale. The responses derived from institutionalism and liberalism varies considerably. On the basis of their preference for refining rationalist models, institutionalists have suggested that the discipline should focus on testing a relatively narrow range of propositions about the conditionality of relative

Reassessing the logic of anarchy: rationality versus reflexivity 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

49

gains seeking, and to do so primarily within a European context. In making these claims, however, institutionalists have not fully considered the way in which the collapse of the Soviet Union, one of the most significant developments in world politics over the past half-a-century, was not predicted by either neorealist or institutionalist international relations theory. As such, they do not give enough consideration to the possibility that the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a relatively stable body of liberal democratic states has raised fundamental questions about the long-term historical dynamics embodied by the international system. By contrast, the liberal model is capable of both accounting for this development in terms of the long run effects of anarchy, and of providing a richer and more challenging agenda for research into the nature of postCold War international change. International relations specialists can and must learn from the debates between neorealists and institutionalists that have taken place over the last two-and-a-half decades in order to revitalize systemic theory for the post-Cold War period. However, to do so they need to engage critically with what have become deeply ingrained theoretical assumptions, and think imaginatively about the overall trajectory of international political change at the turn of the century.

1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

3

German foreign policy after the Cold War

The reunification of Germany was one of the most striking manifestations of the changes in the European order associated with the end of the Cold War. This event, perhaps more than any other, symbolized the withdrawal of Soviet power from Eastern Europe and the collapse of the bipolar international system that had dominated world politics since the end of the Second World War. Yet grounds for optimism about this development were also tinged with a re-emergence of more traditional anxieties about the future of the European order. Unification reopened the issue of Germany’s effects on the stability of the international system. From 1870 to 1945, the European order had been plagued by the so-called ‘German Question’, stemming from Germany’s emergence as a major state and the consequences of this for the balance of power. After the Second World War, however, Germany’s division offered a temporary solution to this problem. During this period, the Federal Republic of Germany became a ‘semi-sovereign’ state in the sense that the predominant interpretation of Article 24 of the Federal Republic’s constitution precluded the Bundeswehr’s involvement in anything other than ‘self-defence’ activities. In addition, West Germany became firmly locked into patterns of economic interdependence and international institutions, notably NATO and the European Economic Community, which emerged under the shelter provided by the bipolar Cold War international system. As a result, the traditional geopolitical problems associated with the management of German power in Europe were suppressed by the overwhelming imperatives of superpower rivalry. With the sudden collapse of the Soviet bloc, however, the German problem suddenly and unexpectedly re-emerged as a central issue. This chapter applies neorealist, institutionalist and liberal models of international relations to analysing the strategies adopted by Germany over the 1989 to 1999 period. On the basis of this discussion, conclusions are drawn about the nature of Germany’s response to the end of the Cold War, and the strategic choices it faces in the emerging international system.

German foreign policy after the Cold War 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

51

Neorealism Despite differences in emphasis, prominent neorealists have arrived at broadly pessimistic conclusions about the role a united Germany will play in the emerging structure of international politics (Mearsheimer 1990; Layne 1993; Waltz 1993; Mearsheimer 2001). Mearsheimer predicts a return to multipolarity within Europe, whilst the emphasis of Layne and Waltz is on the emergence of multipolarity at a global level, with Germany, Japan and China rising to balance US power. However, there are underlying similarities between their predictions about German foreign policy. Each sees unification leading Germany to seek much greater prominence within the international system. Moreover, each recognizes that in the absence of a strong Soviet threat there is much less need for Germany to remain tied to the security guarantee provided by NATO. Germany is therefore likely to become more assertive in defence of its national interests, and act more independently in pursuit of its foreign policy objectives. A more moderate position compatible with a modified version of neorealism that retains affinities with neorealist arguments has been offered by a number of analysts (Baring 1994; Garton Ash 1994; Gillessen 1994; Joffe 1994; Schollgen 1994; Schwarz 1994; Bluth 1995; Otte 2000). Whilst such analyses have a different emphasis to neorealism’s starker predictions, they do support the neorealist claim that changes in the international system will encourage Germany to behave more independently within multilateral institutions than it has in the past. Neorealists could identify various aspects of the unification process as reflecting their predictions about Germany’s post-Cold War strategies. First, the Kohl administration failed to consult Anglo-French opinion on the issue of German unification before making this policy a stated objective. Second, negotiations over unification with the Soviet Union and Poland were conducted bilaterally. The Germans negotiated with the Soviets independently before taking the agreed conditions for unification to be ratified within the Two-Plus-Four framework. In the case of Poland, Kohl apparently hesitated to guarantee the Oder-Neisse as a permanent eastern border (Horsley 1992: 230–232; Muller 1993: 129 and 146–150). These events point to a refusal of German statesmen to contemplate use of multilateral decision-making frameworks in cases of decisions where vital interests may be at stake, and a willingness to contemplate violation of existing international law when this conflicts with potential future German territorial gains. They also illustrate just how quickly sloppy diplomatic conduct could unintentionally re-establish traditional security anxieties in a European context. Regardless of Germany’s actual intentions, countries such as Britain, France and Poland suffered considerable worries about German behaviour during this period. Further evidence in support of neorealist hypotheses comes from German behaviour in international crisis situations in the early post-unification

52 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

German foreign policy after the Cold War

period. In December 1991, on the eve of the Maastricht summit, Germany announced that it would formally recognize Slovenia and Croatia by the end of the year even if this meant doing so unilaterally. This promoted EC recognition of these countries in January 1991, and Germany had used the threat of unilateral action to prompt a change in the European line (Muller 1993: 152). By contrast, it is Germany’s apparent weakness during the Gulf crisis that may be cited as evidence of a reluctance to pursue multilateralism. The German government contributed over DM16 billion to the coalition, and made limited deployments in Turkey and in the Eastern Mediterranean (Muller 1993: 138; Otte 2000: 93). However, it was unwilling to commit ground forces to the area of action, unlike Britain, France and Italy. Salmon has noted that Germany is one of ‘a number of states [which] have fairly consistently maintained their freedom of manoeuvre’ in the crises in the former Yugoslavia and the Gulf. He argues that both crises illustrate ‘that while consensus might readily be achieved . . . on second order problems, on matters of first order importance . . . [there arose] forced fissures in policy and actions’ by EC countries, including Germany (Salmon 1992: 235 and 248). This argument implies that Germany has shown a pronounced tendency to place its own interests over a common international response, and ‘free-ride’ on other states if this reduces the risks it faces. As the 1990s progressed Germany showed a growing tendency to engage in the use of military force outside of the NATO area in return for substantial gains in influence. This became acutely apparent to German statesmen in the light of the weakness of their diplomacy in the Gulf conflict and the early stages of the Yugoslav crisis. As a result, during the first half of the 1990s the German government began an incremental process of adjustment in its participation in multilateral institutions. After the Gulf War the government began to authorize deployment of Bundeswehr technical and medical support groups, most notably in Cambodia and Somalia in 1992 to 1993. Participation of German crews in AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control Systems) flights deployed to enforce the UN authorized ‘no-fly zone’ in Bosnia between 1993 and 1995 also played a major role in the government’s step-by-step preparation of public opinion for an out of area role for German forces. Participation in interventions in Somalia and Bosnia led to a series of debates in the Federal Constitutional Court over the legality of this behaviour in the light of Article 24. These debates were finally resolved by a July 1994 ruling, which made it clear that German forces could participate in military operations outside the NATO area as long as they took place under UN auspices and were approved by the Bundestag (Hyde-Price 2001: 145–147). During the first half of the 1990s Germany also undertook a major reorientation of defence planning to deal with multilateral crisis management by allowing more flexible responses to international crises and to increase its capacities to project the use of military force outside of the NATO area (Linnenkamp 1993: 100; Gutjahr 1995: 311; Otte 2000: 112).

German foreign policy after the Cold War 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

53

During the second half of the 1990s the trend towards a more active German military role became more pronounced. The massacre in Srebrenica in 1995 was a major catalyst for change on the part of the German left, leading many within the SDP and Greens to shed their traditional pacifism. The result was that by the mid-1990s a new cross-party consensus had emerged amongst the German elite around the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. This underpinned authorization of 4,000 non-combat troops to participate in the post-Dayton IFOR peace implementation force in Bosnia (Lefebre and Lombardi 1996). When SFOR took over from IFOR in 1996, Germany’s contingent including combat forces and troops were regularly stationed in Bosnia itself. However, the most significant shift in Germany’s policy with respect to the use of force abroad came in 1999 during the Kosovo crisis. Germany participated in air strikes during NATO’s Operation Deliberate Force, and contributed some 8,000 ground troops to the subsequent KFOR peace implementation force (Baumann and Hellmann 2001: 67 and 75). The sheer scale of the operation and the extent of German military forces deployed in an offensive capacity constituted major developments in German foreign policy. However, Germany’s involvement was even more remarkable in two respects. First, the intervention took place despite a major shift in government to an SDP-Green coalition. It therefore demonstrated the extent of the emerging elite consensus with respect to the issue of Germany’s involvement in the use of military force in an out of area capacity (Otte 2000: 196). Second, air strikes carried out by NATO took place without a clear UN mandate, and in the face of strong opposition from Russia. They therefore moved well beyond previous steps in this direction (Hyde-Price 2001: 158–159). Overall, a case can be made that during the 1990s Germany has undergone a ‘return to normality’ in its foreign policy (Heilbrun 1994: 48). In line with neorealist predictions, it has shed many of its constitutional and political misgivings on this matter in the light of the weaknesses of a purely diplomatic response to international crises. Neorealists might also point to German efforts to strengthen European defence integration over the 1990s, and the problems this generates for its participation in NATO. In the run-up to the Maastricht Treaty, Germany was a leading actor pushing for closer defence integration. Negotiations with the French over the 1990–1991 period formed the basis of the provisions for a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) that were contained in the eventual Treaty On European Union. Whilst instruments for achieving a common defence policy could not be agreed, Germany advanced negotiations bilaterally with France outside of the formal EC framework during the same period. This culminated in October 1991 when the two countries announced the creation of a European corps (‘Eurocorps’) for the Western European Union (WEU) that would become operational in 1995. In June 1992, the announcement of the Petersberg Tasks specified that the function of the Eurocorps was to defend the territory of NATO and WEU

54 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

German foreign policy after the Cold War

allies, provide humanitarian assistance and conduct peacekeeping and peacemaking operations in an out of area context. However, the ambitious scope of the Eurocorps proposal caused anxiety in Britain and the United States, with both expressing concerns that Germany intended the measure to weaken NATO (Horsley 1992: 235; Muller 1993: 156). In the run-up to the Amsterdam IGC, Germany pushed for and achieved integration of the Petersberg Tasks into the CFSP. It also aimed for Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) to be partially extended to CFSP in order to facilitate the creation of ‘coalitions of the willing’ conducting missions under EU auspices, and pressed for the appointment of a High Representative For Foreign Policy in the EU. The Kosovo crisis gave further impetus to the development of the CFSP, including agreement on incorporation of the WEU into the EU framework, and establishment of a 60,000 strong rapid reaction corps capable of conducting EU-led missions autonomously from NATO (Hyde-Price 2001: 196). However, these developments have again created complications for Germany’s transatlantic relations. While the Clinton administration was supportive of efforts to strengthen the ‘European Pillar’ of the Alliance, it remains concerned about the emergence of an EU caucus within NATO, and the sequencing of European and NATO-led operations (Hyde-Price 2001: 198). Neorealists might plausibly interpret these diplomatic difficulties as reflecting nascent tensions in German diplomacy, and the emergence of a more multipolar international structure in which America and its key European allies pursue conflicting objectives. From this perspective, Germany is using European defence cooperation to pursue its interests separately from an Atlantic framework and as a diplomatic vehicle with which to develop a more active military dimension to its foreign policy. Indeed, neorealists might cite other evidence in favour of Germany having weakened its ties to NATO. Whilst it has generally favoured internal reform and expansion of the alliance over the 1990s, this strategy has not been pursued without costs. With the dissolution of the Soviet empire in East Europe and the unification of Germany, the Federal Republic has acquired a considerable range of new security interests in the East-Central European area (Drake 1997). In addition, the decline in the immediate threat of an invasion by Russia from the East means that it has less need to remain firmly anchored to the security guarantee that NATO provides. Neorealists therefore argue that it is now more likely for Germany to be predisposed to developing favourable relations with Russia than it was during the Cold War (Otte 2000: 181). Germany’s participation in NATO activities over the 1990s has, however, generated strains in its relations with Russia, and this has led German elites into a series of significant internal debates. The tensions between the unified Germany’s interests in developing its relations with Russia and participation in NATO first became apparent in debates over NATO enlargement in the early 1990s. Disputes emerged in the early to mid-1990s between Defence Minister

German foreign policy after the Cold War 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

55

Ruhe who favoured enlargement and Foreign Minister Kinkel who objected to it on account of Russian concerns. These were eventually resolved by Chancellor Kohl who came down in favour of enlargement in the face of US aims at the 1994 Brussels summit (Tewes 2001: 12–16). Germany has engaged in initiatives designed to placate Russian fears over NATO expansion. German support for further institutionalization of the CSCE and its transformation into the OSCE became one of Germany’s foreign policy priorities in the second half of 1994. Moreover, as a result of an intense flurry of diplomatic visits to Russia by Kohl in 1996 to 1997, Germany played a central role in the negotiation of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, a consultative body that came into being in 1997 to strengthen NATO’s ties with Russia (Tewes 2001: 18–19). However, both the OSCE and NATO-Russia agreement are institutionally weak, and may be viewed as at best papering over underlying divergences in Germany’s interests in NATO. Similarly, although Germany participated in intervention in Kosovo, in diplomacy preceding the crisis Germany placed emphasis on achieving a negotiated settlement, and during the conflict maintained close diplomatic connections with Russia (Hyde-Price 2001: 158–159). Again, this may be interpreted by neo-realists as reflecting the loosening of Germany’s Atlantic ties and the emergence of a multipolar constellation of interests in the European security order. Aspects of Germany’s economic diplomacy since 1989 are also amenable to a neorealist interpretation. Germany’s role in the GATT during the early to mid-1990s revealed tensions between its obligations to France as its key partner in European integration and its commitment to the broader international economic order. France and the US came into dispute in negotiations over subsidies to agriculture and audio-visual production. The German government lent their support to France (at some economic cost to themselves), thus forcing American concessions (Wood 1995: 229–231). Whilst this did not prevent conclusion of the Uruguay Round, it did highlight tensions in Germany’s relations with the US and Europe. Moreover, by the end of the 1990s Germany was taking a much more forceful role in negotiations over agricultural trade liberalization with France (Rittberger 2001: 249). Germany’s trade relations with Japan in the early 1990s were not smooth, the automobile industry being particularly sensitive for both countries (Sato 1993: 378). Furthermore, in the summer of 1992 the Bundesbank raised German interest rates in response to inflationary pressures arising from the impact of unification. This caused serious economic difficulties in southern European states, including France, and most dramatically forced Britain’s exit from the ERM. This greatly strained the Franco-German relationship, and also made Germany vulnerable to the accusation that it was using its position in European currency markets to impose the costs of unification on its neighbours. This is supported by the failure of German politicians to heed the advice offered by the Bundesbank, which cautioned against rapid German Economic

56 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

German foreign policy after the Cold War

and Monetary Union (Lippert and Stevens-Strohmann 1993: 41). German politicians seemed willing to suspend the imperatives of the Bundesbank where the vital national interests were at stake, but not subsequently where the interests of other ERM members were at risk. In support of neorealist claims, therefore, there is evidence that Germany’s trade and financial diplomacy has become more assertive and narrowly self-centred than in the past. With regard to Germany’s economic diplomacy within the EU, Heilbrun goes as far as to propose that Germany is losing interest in deepening European integration with France, and is instead attempting to achieve hegemony over Eastern Europe. Heilbrun suggests: Germany is using the widening of the EU as a means of emancipating itself from France. The new EU members will allow Germany to create a Northern bloc, whose new members are acutely aware of their debt to Germany and they may look to Berlin rather than Paris for direction. (Heilbrun 1994: 46) Kirschner (1996: 169) also recognizes this possibility. With regard to EMU, differences of emphasis emerged in negotiations between Germany and France over the so-called Stability Pact agreed in 1996 to facilitate convergence of European economies prior to the launch of the Euro. These disputes culminated in acrimonious disputes over the French desire to have a Frenchman as head of the European Central Bank. Germany has also taken a much firmer role in pushing for reductions in its contributions to the EU budget, and in routine budgetary battles in Brussels (Anderson 1999: 49–52; Otte 2000: 149–151). Finally, Germany has become increasingly sensitive to the tension between broadening and deepening the EU arising from the problems associated with extension of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and structural funds in the event of enlargement. However, a further reason why enlargement threatens Franco-German relations is the way in which the admission of new members may unravel consensus within the EU. France is now wary about extension of QMV and the power of the European parliament, which have been traditionally supported by Germany. France fears they would increase the relative power of the unified Germany within the EU, and shift its focus away from France and towards CentralEast European states (Hyde-Price 2001: 186–187). These developments may be viewed by neorealists as reflecting tensions in the traditional Franco-German entente within the European Union. On a neorealist interpretation, this development places growing strains on the general process of integration and reflects the beginning of the breakdown of the international cooperation within Europe that emerged under the shelter of the Cold War.

German foreign policy after the Cold War 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

57

Overall, a range of developments may be interpreted in terms favourable to neorealist predictions about German strategies since 1989. Significant aspects of Germany’s behaviour point to the emergence of a more aggressively unilateral stance in international institutions. There are also signs of incompatibilities of interest between a united Germany and the US, as well as Germany’s European partners. This has been highlighted in aspects of the unification process, Germany’s growing military role in out-of-area missions, conflicts of interest within NATO over the WEU and CFSP, the crisis within the ERM, and the issue of German influence over Eastern Europe. These could point to splits within the Atlantic Alliance, or the beginnings of a German hegemony in Europe. They therefore weigh in favour of neorealist analysis of a united Germany’s role in the international system after the Cold War.

Institutionalism Germany may reasonably be assumed to be locked into a complex pattern of interdependent relations with the other advanced industrial democracies, and participates in a dense web of multilateral frameworks established over the post-War period. Institutionalism predicts that, under these conditions, international institutions can take on instrumental value for states in pursuing their national interests. Where international cooperation brings net benefits for states in terms of enhancing their security or welfare within the international system, states will pursue institutionalized activity. However, where institutionalization imposes net costs on states, requiring considerable accommodation and adjustment on their behalf, they are likely to reject institutional options. Institutionalists can present a significant body of evidence to support their predictions with respect to Germany’s strategies since 1989. First, it is not clear that a neorealist interpretation of the unification process is entirely satisfactory. Kohl expressly intended unification to be anchored within both the EC and NATO. In the first quarter of 1990 alone, there were 29 meetings on German unity at head of state and ministerial level with Germany’s European partners. Although Germany did not consult Britain or France before negotiating with the Soviets, it did receive US backing (Muller 1993: 128). Furthermore, the terms for unification reflect a multilateral orientation. They ensured continued German membership of NATO, limitations on the size and character of the Bundeswehr, and generous economic and technical assistance to the Soviets (Macardle-Kelleher 1993: 20; Schlor 1993: 49). Germany became a signatory of the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty in which it limited the size of the Bundeswehr to 370,000 (Linnenkamp 1993: 95). Kohl took the further step of renewing Germany’s commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It is also possible that a neorealist interpretation of the Polish Border incident is inaccurate. Muller proposes that Kohl’s hesitation had little to do with

58 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

German foreign policy after the Cold War

strategic posturing, but instead reflected domestic electoral considerations (Muller 1993: 145–147). Thus the argument that negotiations over unification were conducted bilaterally oversimplifies the extent to which this process was heavily institutionalized. Indeed, Muller points out that ‘given that the highest national interests were at stake, the unification process was embedded in an astonishing web of consultations and mutual adjustments’ (Muller 1993: 129). Germany’s post-unification strategies may also be interpreted in the light of institutionalist theory. Over the 1990s Germany continued to display very strong and continuous support for NATO (Otte 2000: 157). Hyde-Price argues that the Alliance serves important functions for Germany. NATO provides it with a firm security guarantee, offers a visible demonstration of continuing integration with the West, ensures a US commitment to European security, and represents a tried and tested institutional framework. Germany’s support for NATO expansion may also be understood with reference to the stabilizing effect this could bring to its eastern border. Expansion has occurred through direct NATO enlargement to include Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary (HydePrice 2001: 153). It has also occurred indirectly through the formation in October 1991 of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), now the Partnership for Peace (PfP). Finally, Germany has also consistently supported the CSCE/OSCE process itself over the post-Cold War period. Although Germany does not see either NACC/PfP or the CSCE/OSCE as a substitute for NATO, they do complement it in various ways (Hyde-Price 1996: 187–188). From an institutionalist perspective, Germany’s commitment to European security institutions reflects the functional benefits they bring. The evolution of Germany’s attitudes towards the use of force outside the NATO area may also be interpreted as reflecting institutionalist predictions. Maull has argued that the united Germany will remain a ‘civilian power’, displaying a strong commitment to multilateralism and ‘the concentration on non-military, primarily economic, means to secure national goals’ (Maull 1991: 92). Maull’s analysis is compatible with institutionalism’s prediction that the multilateral frameworks in which Germany has participated since the 1950s will continue to have value for it after the Cold War. Maull suggests that Germany’s behaviour in both the Bosnia and Kosovo crises supports his view that Germany adopts a civilian power strategy. He argues that Germany’s low profile in the crisis in no way suggests a decisive move away from Bonn’s post-War foreign policy orientation (Maull 1995; Maull 2000). Meiers identifies the benefits of such a strategy, noting ‘when Germany takes a stronger policy line it raises suspicions amongst its allies. To prevent misconceptions . . . [Germany is able to] pursue its policies . . . within the Euro-Atlantic framework’ (Meiers 1995: 96–97). Furthermore, Germany’s civilian power status provided it with a continued security guarantee, and limited the financial expenditure

German foreign policy after the Cold War 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

59

and human costs associated with increased military involvement. Thus it may be argued that Germany has strong net incentives to continue to make heavy use of established multilateral institutions with respect to the use of force abroad. Germany’s strategies towards economic regimes at both global and regional levels may also be seen as supporting institutionalist claims. Since unification, the German government has displayed a commitment to the GATT/WTO, the IMF and the World Bank, and the G7/8. Despite tensions between French and American interests over agricultural and audio-visual trade liberalization, Germany managed to broker a compromise agreement (Wood 1995: 231). Sato identifies that growth in trade and investment between Germany and Japan are grounds for continued optimism about their economic relationship (Sato 1993: 367–375). Germany’s role in the resolution of the conflict over Japanese aid to the Soviet Union in 1991 may also be interpreted as indicating that Germany appreciated its interest in brokering this diplomatic process. Katzenstein reflects this reasoning when he notes that Germany’s willingness ‘expresses the awareness that substantial Japanese aid would help to stabilise conditions in Russia and enhance German security’ (Katzenstein 1993: 79). Germany has also continued to provide both political and economic support for Russia over the period since German unification, both through multi-lateral forums such as the G7, the EU and GATT, as well as on a bilateral basis (Zhurkin 1996: 212–216). Again, institutionalists may interpret this as reflecting a functional logic. Thus important aspects of Germany’s economic strategies at a global level are potentially compatible with institutionalism’s prediction that Germany, as a state with strong incentives to use international economic institutions, will tend to rely heavily upon them. Aspects of Germany’s support for European integration may also favour an institutionalist interpretation of its strategies. Since the end of the Cold War, Germany has encouraged the deepening of European integration. With France and the European Commission, it pushed for two Intergovernmental Conferences on economic, monetary and political union (Le Gloannec 1993: 260). These began in December 1990, and culminated a year later in the agreements reached at Maastricht in 1991, most notably on pursuit of European Monetary Union (EMU). An implicit deal had emerged between France and Germany on the conditions of reunification. France traded acceptance of unification for its long sought after goal of EMU, which it saw as a means to contain German power (Rice and Zelikow 1995: 123; Otte 2000: 46). In the event, the agreement on the IGC on Political Union was largely of symbolic value because France discouraged Germany from pursuing further political integration in order to maintain its own sovereign autonomy. Nevertheless, France’s bargaining over unification and EMU may be viewed as an example of the cooperation for mutual gains modelled by institutionalist theory. At the Amsterdam IGC in 1997, Germany proposed weakening the Commission’s capability for

60 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

German foreign policy after the Cold War

legislative initiative, favouring strengthening of an inter-governmental role through the European Council (Frenkler 2001: 41). Nevertheless, it did maintain its commitment to strengthening QMV on all areas except asylum and immigration. It also supported strengthening the European parliament’s role in the legislative process (Rittberger 2001: 198–202). Institutionalists might view the combination of incremental hardening of Germany’s diplomatic stance with persistence of a generally favourable attitude towards deepening European cooperation across a wide range of issues as reflecting the way in which it finds use of European institutions instrumentally valuable in the pursuit of its national interests. Germany has also been a leading proponent of the expansion of the EU to include EFTA states and countries in Eastern Europe. This has included spearheading the establishment of the PHARE and TACIS assistance funds for East European states established by the EU (Anderson 1999: 53). Widening the European Union helps the process of stabilizing East-Central Europe, and offers Germany large gains from its comparative advantage in trade with this region (Otte 2000: 141–145). Thus in line with institutionalist predictions, there are tangible benefits for Germany in pursing this policy. Also in accordance with institutionalist theory, Germany’s trade and aid policies in the Central and Eastern European region are strongly multilateral in character because they are carried out within the EU framework (Katzenstein 1997: 22). However, there remain aspects of German strategies that are difficult to correlate with institutionalism’s predictions. Whilst Germany does have strong incentives to either broaden or deepen the European Union, it is less clear that it is in its interest to pursue both objectives simultaneously. The contradictions involved in pursuit of such a policy have become increasingly apparent because of the increases in the size of the EU budget that would occur if the CAP and structural funds were extended to new members (Tewes 1998: 123). Institutionalism highlights the instrumental value of institutions. Where commitment to institutions creates considerable costs for states, they will reject institutional options. Thus the kind of behaviour predicted by institutionalism would be the advocacy by Germany of either some form of ‘core Europe’, or alternatively, a ‘wider Europe’ (Gutjahr 1994; Hellmann 1996). The former envisages a core of West European states pushing ahead with monetary and political union as provided for in the Maastricht Treaty. The latter involves extension of the EU eastwards as a free trade area. The instrumental logic of institutionalist analysis therefore implies that Germany should be making clearer choices between broadening and deepening the EU. Overall, the institutionalist model offers plausible explanations of many aspects of German strategies since 1989. This includes aspects of the unification process, its commitment to Atlantic security institutions, its apparent reluctance to take on military commitments abroad, its participation in the global international economic system, and dimensions of Germany’s

German foreign policy after the Cold War 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

61

strategies towards European integration. Whilst institutionalism suggests that Germany is beginning to face important choices in its integration strategies, there is evidence of significant continuity in Germany’s use of international institutions over the post-Cold War period.

Liberalism 1: domestic variation Liberalism predicts that domestic cultural and institutional variation will be built into the dynamics displayed by the emerging international system. The process of internalizing liberal norms will be affected by domestic coalitions within states reflecting embedded social identities, economic interests and political institutions. For this reason, domestic preferences play a critical role in explaining international behaviour and outcomes in the liberal model. Liberalism also anticipates that states that adopt preferences that reflect a competitive security orientation or mercantilist economic tendency will come under pressure to internalize a liberal identity. This prediction will be assessed in the final section addressing the strategic choices faced by the unified Germany. First, however, it is necessary to establish that domestic factors may plausibly be viewed as playing a more autonomous role in shaping Germany’s foreign policy over the post-Cold War period than anticipated by either neorealism or institutionalism. Important aspects of Germany’s behaviour during the unification process may be viewed as reflecting a distinctive set of foreign policy preferences. First, the sheer generosity of the terms of unification agreed within the Two-Plus-Four framework belies an interpretation of these measures as an instrumental function of Germany’s interests. Under circumstances in which pressures for unification had become virtually unstoppable, Germany could have taken advantage of the intense uncertainty surrounding events to push for a less onerous set of preconditions. Instead, however, it consulted extensively with other major powers and agreed generous terms that offered substantive benefits to both the US and France. Moreover, it did so at considerable cost to the new German state’s sovereign rights. Thus Katzenstein concludes that during the negotiations surrounding unification the ‘political reassurance that Kohl and Genscher could offer indicated . . . that the West German political leadership had . . . internalised the norm of peaceful international cooperation’ (Katzenstein 1993: 76). Moreover, in the diplomacy surrounding unification Germany both reaffirmed and deepened considerably its support for NATO and other broader Euro-Atlantic security institutions. The terms in which German politicians were thinking suggests that their use of NATO in this period reflected not merely the instrumental value of its preservation, but a fundamental policy reflex. Anderson and Goodman identify that there is no evidence of elite reappraisal of Germany’s membership in NATO occurring as a result of the prospect of unification. Instead, ‘the question posed by German politicians was not whether to remain in the Atlantic Alliance

62 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

German foreign policy after the Cold War

but rather how to adapt the alliance . . . to the rapidly changed circumstances on the continent’ (Anderson and Goodman 1993: 29). Thus German strategies during the unification process may plausibly be viewed as reflecting a deeply embedded preference for operating within the Atlantic security framework. Similarly, during the 1989–1990 period Germany actually deepened considerably its support for the process of European integration, even at potential risk to its future economic stability. In April 1990, Kohl announced a willingness to waive Community structural fund assistance for the former GDR, although the EC later refused to accept Kohl’s offer. Furthermore, ‘[i]n the face of domestic concerns about the . . . risks of EMU, voiced principally by the Bundesbank and the Ministry of Finance, the Chancellor committed his country to accelerated progress toward . . . economic and political reform in the EC’ (Anderson and Goodman 1993: 32 and 33). Even given the risk of losing the economic stability and credibility associated with the Mark, Germany was prepared to make a major concession on EMU in order to signal reassurance to France. Thus in 1993 Katzenstein pointed to the way in which ‘despite German unification, the expectations about the extent of political, economic and monetary integration far exceed those held when the EC92 process was launched . . . in 1987–1988’ (Katzenstein 1993: 77). Overall, increased German use of both European integration and NATO during the unification period indicates that its support for these institutions was not merely instrumental. Anderson and Goodman have argued that during this period: institutions . . . restructured and remolded German interests, so that, in the eyes of German political elites, institutional memberships were not merely instruments of policy but normative frameworks for policy making. The development of reflexive support for institutions . . . has played an important role in shaping German interests since unification. (Anderson and Goodman 1993: 24) Drawing on Anderson and Goodman’s analysis, Keohane et al. have characterized Germany’s foreign policy preferences between 1989 and 1991 as ‘reflexively institutionalist: its institutional ties were viewed as intrinsic to the German’s view of themselves’ (Keohane et al. 1993: 10 emphasis added; see also Katzenstein 1993: 75). Germany’s foreign policy over the post-1991 period has displayed a pattern of development that may be viewed as remaining broadly compatible with Anderson and Goodman’s initial characterization of its preferences. This has been clearly expressed in Germany’s policies with respect to EuroAtlantic security institutions. As has been noted, Germany has maintained strong support for the development of NATO over the post-Cold War period. At the same time, however, it has been among the leading states pushing for the development of a European defence identity, and has also

German foreign policy after the Cold War 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

63

played a central role in the development of the NACC/PfP and CSCE/OSCE. As Duffield identifies, this ‘across-the-board’ approach to developing international security institutions poses a significant anomaly for institutionalist theory. Germany has attempted to develop a range of different institutional forms simultaneously, despite the way in which these forums may be of limited instrumental value (as in the case of the PfP/OSCE), or may actually be dysfunctional (as when Germany’s partners have criticized such an approach for being contradictory or even counter-productive) (Duffield 1999: 143). Similarly, Germany has attempted to use new institutional initiatives, even if they are of minimal instrumental value, to reassure its key partners about its established institutional commitments. Thus Schlor identified the way in which the real significance of NACC to German statesmen was not so much in its security benefits for Eastern Europe, but in its Atlantic connection: ‘NACC demonstrates Germany’s commitment to NATO and can be used to deflect criticism about its involvement with the CSCE and West European defence integration’ (Schlor 1993: 47). Overall, Germany’s approach to developing international security governance in Europe can be viewed as reflecting a distinctive national security culture and an ingrained national preference for multilateralism. Many commentators have argued that Germany’s stance towards the issue of the use of force in out of area activities may be viewed in terms of its foreign policy culture (Berger 1998; Banchoff 1999; Duffield 1999). These commentators follow Maull and Meiers in arguing that the changes in Germany’s attitudes towards the use of force over the 1990s have changed only incrementally, and should not be viewed as representing a fundamental shift in its attitudes. However, rather than explaining a civilian power orientation in terms of incentives such as the signal this sends to key allies, it is located in Germany’s distinctive foreign policy identity and preferences. From this viewpoint, Germany remains strongly affected by a ‘culture of restraint’ arising from the impact of its role in the Second World War on its domestic political system. This is widely understood within Germany as providing it with special responsibilities pertaining to the use of force, and placing a particular obligation upon it to adopt a low military profile. Some commentators have even extended this reasoning by making the argument that Germany’s non-military orientation and focus on economic and European institutions has been a major source of power for it. Germany’s power is over constitutive politics (the power to shape the overall framework of international cooperation) rather than over its regulative politics (specific policies within international institutions) (Bulmer 1997: 50). For example, Markovitz and Reich hold that: armed forces are not the basis of Germany’s . . . power. Power lies in the prominence of the German economy, the Deutsche Mark’s strength; the Bundesbank’s role as de facto central bank for all of Europe; the volume and profitability of German exports; the size of

64 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

German foreign policy after the Cold War German foreign investment; and varied forms of foreign ‘subsidies’. The costs and benefits are palpable. Germany makes the most, Germany pays the most – and on balance Germany wins. (Markovitz and Reich 1997: 180–181)

Others have highlighted equally distinctive features of Germany’s preferences over European integration during the post-Cold War period. Contrary to institutionalist predictions, these analysts see no necessary contradiction between Germany making commitments to both broaden and deepen the EU simultaneously. Again, the notion of constitutive power is used to explain why this may be so. On this account, the close correspondence between German and European political institutions grants it an indirect influence within the EU that is greater than that which it could achieve through the use of its tangible resources. Germany’s integration strategy pursues a loose set of ‘milieu’ goals aimed at shaping the general character of the integration policy rather than bargaining for specific issues on a case-by-case basis. Bulmer and Paterson identify prominent areas of integration policy that indicate how Germany has been able to shape the preferences of other states involved in the integration process. The best example is EMU, which ‘exports’ German domestic norms and institutions abroad, whilst leading other states to ‘import’ German monetary rigour. This externalization of Germany’s internal characteristics through its foreign policy allows Germany to mobilize institutional bias in favour of institutions that suit its own interests. Germany’s pursuit of enlargement of the EU also reflects an explicit attempt at shaping the regional milieu. Enlargement facilitates the further expansion of European institutions which closely match Germany’s domestic institutions. It has also encouraged a wide range of domestic actors within Germany to interact heavily with Central-East Europe, thereby encouraging these countries to structure their domestic political institutions and economy in accordance with those that exist in Germany. Finally, export of Germany’s ‘milieu shaping’ approach to foreign policy decision-making feeds back to generate a virtuous circle in which other actors become predisposed towards continuing participation on the European integration process. Once Central and East European states enter the EU, therefore, pressures to quicken the pace of integration are likely to accelerate rather than slow down. Overall, Germany’s constitutive power is likely to facilitate its general strategy of broadening and deepening the EU simultaneously (Bulmer and Paterson 1996: 129–135; see also Bulmer, Jeffery and Paterson 2000; Pond and Schoenbaum 1996; Bulmer 1997). Overall, there is a case to be made that Germany’s preferences have encouraged it to remain committed to a more deeply internalized pattern of institutionalized activity than predicted by either neorealism or institutionalism. Between 1989 and 1999, both the Atlantic security framework and European institutions took intrinsic rather than instrumental value as

German foreign policy after the Cold War 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

65

normative frameworks for German policy makers. This view is compatible with Anderson and Goodman’s characterization of Germany’s preferences during the unification period. However, this assessment hinges heavily on the validity of the thesis that Germany has acquired considerable constitutive power over the structure of European governance. It therefore remains possible that the costs involved in Germany’s pursuit of reflexive multilateralism are high enough to place considerable pressure on Germany to abandon its distinctive orientation. The final section of this chapter therefore addresses the strategic choices faced by Germany at the close of the first decade of the post-Cold War period.

Liberalism 2: Germany’s choices In terms of their assessment of the sustainability of Germany’s foreign policy, there are important limitations in the position taken by both institutionalist analysts and those who have explained Germany’s post unification strategies with reference to its ‘constitutive power’. Both neorealists and historians have highlighted compelling arguments that major changes have taken place in Germany’s strategic orientation over the 1990s. Those who have adopted civilian power arguments have underestimated the significance of important changes in Germany’s security policies over the 1990s. Germany’s attitudes towards security institutions have shifted through the upgrading of its support for European defence cooperation, and in terms of its stance towards the use of military force abroad. Similarly, in the latter half of the 1990s Germany has taken very seriously the potential costs of pursuing a strategy of both broadening and deepening the EU simultaneously. These changes indicate that there has been a major shift in the manner in which Germany has pursued its foreign policy over the 1990s. The benefits brought by institutional memberships have simply not prevented it from making important choices about its institutional commitments. Nevertheless, the changes should not be understood as verifying neorealist predictions about Germany’s foreign policy. This is because it is equally apparent that the changes in Germany’s strategies over the 1990s have not just preserved but strengthened its commitment to the multilateral frameworks within which it operates. This points the way towards the analysis presented by a liberal model of the international system. Smith argues explicitly that the development of Germany’s stance on the issue of the use of force in out of area activities may be viewed as reflecting its reflexive multilateralism. Germany changed its approach only when it perceived that ‘multilateralism in general and Germany’s support for it in particular could be at risk’ (Smith 1996: 50). Moreover, to achieve its aim Germany has over-ridden its traditional pattern of participation in NATO, and exposed itself to increased financial costs and human risks. However, by upgrading its institutional commitments, Germany sought to

66 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

German foreign policy after the Cold War

sustain and enhance the Atlantic Alliance. Thus it oversimplifies to interpret these developments in the utilitarian terms suggested by institutionalist analysis. Only a focus on the intrinsic value of NATO captures the norm-governed character of the evolution of Germany’s attitudes regarding the use of military force. Baumann and Hellmann have refined such an analysis in the light of trends revealed during the Kosovo crisis. They identify two interpretations of the development of Germany’s attitudes with regard to out of area activities. One is that Germany remains dominated by a ‘culture of restraint’, but this account cannot adequately explain significant shifts in Germany’s position. A second view is that German elites used ‘salami tactics’ to gradually shift public opinion towards ‘normalization’ and acceptance of involvement in military operations. This explanation is compatible with discontinuity, and stresses the agency of German policy makers. However, it does not capture the way in which shifts in Germany’s position were motivated by a desire to strengthen multilateral security cooperation. Baumann and Hellmann suggest that a more adequate approach is that strategic culture was not a passive constraint on German policy makers, but instead actively drove the process of foreign policy adaptation. In this way, the distinctive German self-image led to a pattern of intervention that more instrumental calculations of interests might have refused (Baumann and Hellmann 2001: 62–66 and 79). A similar pattern of institutional change may be identified with respect to Germany’s European integration strategies. Anderson, who originally characterized Germany’s orientation towards multilateralism as reflexive, has identified tensions in Germany’s European policies in three areas: competition policy, the CAP, and structural funds (Anderson 1997; Anderson 1999). He argues that between 1990 and 1992, the German government submitted to established procedures despite the huge costs they imposed on domestic actors. However, since then the German government has paid more attention to issues of distribution and redistribution. Anderson does note continuity in one area, specifically trade policy. Thus he concludes that whilst [u]nification did not precipitate a major domestic revaluation of Germany’s role in Europe . . . [t]o describe the united Germany’s relationship towards Europe in terms of seamless continuity would be inaccurate. . . . [Overall] what emerges is a mixed pattern of change and continuity. (Anderson 1997: 104–105) Tewes similarly acknowledges that German statesmen have been addressing the potential tensions in their involvement in both deepening and widening the EU. This first surfaced in proposals for a ‘variable geometry’ Europe in which the ‘precondition for the enlargement towards the East was a tightly integrated core’ (Tewes 1998: 127). Janning has put

German foreign policy after the Cold War 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

67

forward the related concept of ‘differentiated integration’. He notes that such a strategy ‘would lead to the concentration of leadership roles on those member states which are actively involved in . . . sectoral deepenings. . . . [In turn this would] open up new possibilities for active participation and a higher density of integration’ (Janning 1996: 41). The ultimate aim of a variable geometry strategy is that by pursuing institutional flexibility Germany should prove able to sustain its strong commitment to European integration. By adjusting policy instruments, Germany has therefore attempted to pursue broadening and deepening integration simultaneously. As Tewes notes, to understand the mix of continuity and change in Germany’s integration strategies ‘one . . . has to look first at . . . German identity and at the way it shaped foreign policy culture’ (Tewes 1998: 130; see also Letourneau and Rakel 1997: 122–125). A liberal analysis of Germany’s post-Cold War foreign policy suggests that an emphasis on Germany’s distinctive identity as an actor is not wholly misplaced. Nevertheless, it must also be developed and refined. Germany’s commitment to multilateralism has not been a passive policy reflex inherited from the post-1945 period. Instead, Germany played an active and reflexive role in adjusting the rules and procedures through which it participated in key international institutions in order to preserve and extend their underlying normative framework. As Harnisch and Maull recognize, ‘identities are not fixed preference orders but thick and sticky cognitive structures that are often confirmed but sometimes challenged and changed’ (Harnisch and Maull 2001: 148). The latter implies an understanding of socialization that places a much greater emphasis on the voluntary nature of change on the part of actors, and the capacity for agency on the part of states. Instead of emphasizing the ‘constitutive’ aspects of German power, it stresses what Bertram terms its ‘generative’ nature. On this view: the real problem for German power . . . [is] not how to constrain it but how to generate ways to use it, how to get Germans to think of their contribution as essential for the common good, and how to get them to accept responsibility for leadership as the major power in West and central Europe. (Bertram 1994: 61 and 104–105) Wallace makes a similar point when he argues that today’s Germany requires a more sustained and active approach to building partnerships than has been evident in the past (Wallace 1995: 63). Thus, shifts in Germany’s approach to multilateralism over the 1990s need not necessarily dilute its participation in international cooperation, or reflect the essentially unsustainable nature of its reflexive orientation towards multilateralism. Instead, Germany’s active approach to adapting patterns of international cooperation may be viewed as revealing the great extent to which Germany has internalized multilateral norms.

68 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

German foreign policy after the Cold War

There have been two generic ways in which Germany has sought a more prominent role in patterns of multilateral institutions over the 1989–1999 period. The first is that it has shifted from what Anderson refers to as a ‘policy taker’ to a ‘policy maker’ role (Anderson 1997: 105). Second, Germany has increased the degree of equality reflected in burden-sharing arrangements between itself and its major partners. In the context of NATO, these procedural adaptations have led to Germany exposing itself to the increased costs and risks associated with military involvement abroad. Germany has also attempted to take on burden-sharing responsibilities in the security arena by pushing for security cooperation within the EU. In terms of its economic diplomacy, Germany has increasingly argued that its asymmetrical contribution to EU finances must be changed. Nevertheless, whilst the pattern of costs and benefits for Germany varies across issue areas, the underlying trend is the same. Germany is increasingly demanding equality of status with other major actors, approaching institutional bargaining with the expectation of making contributions proportionate to its size and capabilities. The concern for Germany’s partners is, of course, that this reflects the re-emergence of a unilateralist foreign policy. Anderson notes that the risk ‘is not the return of the Third Reich, but the re-emergence of yet another UK in Europe – a second awkward partner, sceptical and often unconstructive on the European stage’ (Anderson 1999: 209; see also Otte 2000 for a similar assessment). However, a greater role for Germany and Europe in security affairs enables it to contribute more effectively to both managing international crises and international burden sharing. Similarly, a more sustainable level of contributions to the EU budget enables Germany to continue to play a major role in sponsoring the integration process. Anderson may therefore draw a false analogy by heralding the emergence of ‘another Britain’ in Europe. It is equally possible that Germany may actually strengthen its relations with its major partners, and increase the density of networks of cooperation within which it participates. The process of identity transition which has led to changes in Germany’s approach to foreign policy had been driven by the emergence of a strong cross party consensus within the state elite (Stuth 1992; Voigt 1996; Baumann and Hellmann 2001). By contrast to the relatively smooth and transparent evolution of the views of the elite, however, the wider public debate in Germany about its changing foreign policy orientation has inevitably raised deeper questions about German national identity. Policies over the use of military force, or how far to proceed with European integration, profoundly affect the mass of its populace. During the Cold War, Germany’s position in the bipolar power structure sheltered it from having to make decisions on such matters. Correspondingly, Germany developed a conception of itself as having a ‘post-national’ identity linked to its distinctive strategic orientation. Adjustments made during Germany’s transition in the post-Cold War period have therefore forced it to face issues that had been largely suppressed in the pre-unification era.

German foreign policy after the Cold War 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

69

Germany’s crisis of national identity has been reflected most acutely in the controversy caused by the huge public debate over Germany’s use of military force abroad (Meiers 1995: 84; Hellmann 1996: 20; Smith et al. 1996: 11; Dorff 1997: 60–65). However, it is also reflected in the intense public discussion of Germany’s future role in European integration. Germany’s conception of itself as an actor within the international system is therefore in a process of profound change. Yet without reclaiming a conception of itself as an actor with a legitimate sense of its national identity, Germany will be unable to play the full role in the international system that its new status demands. Debates between realists who suggest that Germany is becoming a normal actor and those who see Germany as still far from normal because of its internalized commitment to multilateralism set up a false dichotomy. As Dorff suggests, ‘the two theses are not really mutually exclusive . . . . [because] what we understand normalcy to include . . . may be changing’ (Dorff 1997: 66–67). Germany’s ‘normalization’ is an essential precondition for the continuation of its deep commitment to multilateralism, not its antithesis. Germany is therefore undergoing a ‘reinventing’ of its sense of national identity in the light of its changing foreign policy (Glees 1996: 279). However, over the 1990s the German political elite showed considerable skill in managing this process of identity transition. Unlike the political establishments in either Japan or China, they have taken some significant steps towards finding workable solutions to the problems being generated for them in the emerging international system. Over the 1989–1999 period, Germany has therefore begun a process of purging the historical legacy it inherited from its role in the conflicts of the first half of the twentieth century. This legacy caused Germany to take on a distinctive policy reflex favouring cooperation in Euro-Atlantic multilateral institutions. Since the end of the Cold War, signs of discontinuity in German foreign policy have emerged. Whilst these shifts are very important, they should not be interpreted as heralding a return to the Germany of old. Instead, they reflect procedural adjustments that actually upgrade Germany’s contribution to sustaining established frameworks for cooperation. Making these adjustments provides Germany with a stable platform with which to continue its active role in the development of international cooperation on a wide range of issues, and has encouraged it to play a more prominent part in diplomacy over burden sharing issues. In so doing, Germany is playing a crucial role in the consolidation of both regional and global multilateral structures. Today, a reunited Germany has been presented with an unprecedented opportunity to break decisively with its turbulent past. This process has not been simple or without anxiety, and the ‘Berlin Republic’ needs confidence in its own judgement if it is to use its increased power to make up for the errors of its past history. Yet Germany shows signs that it has begun to establish a new foreign policy suited to the challenges of the post-Cold War era.

1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

4

Japanese foreign policy after the Cold War

Just as the end of the Cold War led to a re-emergence of the German Question in Europe, in Asia it reopened the Japanese Question. Unlike Germany, Japan had not been physically divided into East and West because of the Soviet Union’s late entry into the Pacific conflict during the Second World War. Nevertheless, the problem of containing Japanese power was resolved through similar means. Article 9 of Japan’s constitution was generally interpreted as renouncing its sovereign right to declare war. For its security, Japan relied instead on guarantees provided through the Mutual Security Treaty (MST) signed in the early 1950s with the United States. During the Cold War, Japan’s foreign policy was based upon the Yoshida Doctrine, a strategy that had both political and economic components. Politically, it accepted a limited military role, in line with Japan’s constitutional commitments. In economic terms, it was underpinned by economic nationalism oriented towards Japan’s post-War rehabilitation. However, the end of the Cold War has thrust the issue of Japan’s role within the emerging international system to the forefront of contemporary debates. With the removal of the threat of a direct attack from the Soviet Union, Japan’s anchor to the alliance with the US has become open to question in a way that was previously not the case. This in turn raises the broader possibility that the Yoshida Doctrine has itself become anachronistic as a basis for Japan’s foreign policy. This chapter applies neorealist, institutionalist and liberal models of international relations to analysing the strategies adopted by Japan over the 1989–1999 period. On the basis of this discussion, conclusions are drawn about the nature of Japan’s response to the end of Cold War, and the strategic choices it faces in the emerging international system.

Neorealism A number of analysts have used the neorealist model to make predictions about the behaviour of Japan in the post-Cold War international system (Layne 1993; Waltz 1993; Layne 1996; Mearsheimer 2001). These commentators anticipated that the end of the Cold War will lead to

Japanese foreign policy after the Cold War 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

71

structural pressures for change in Japan’s relations with other major powers. In the absence of the Soviet threat, the US is less likely to wish to maintain a costly and risky defence presence in East Asia as part of the policy of guaranteeing Japan’s security. In turn, this will generate pressures for Japan to become more independent and assertive in pursuit of its national security. The removal of the suppressing influence of the Cold War power structure will lead to the resurfacing of indigenous security rivalries in East Asia, and fuel growing security rivalries between Japan and China. Overall, Japan will come to play its role in a more conflictual, multipolar order within East Asia and in the wider international system. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, it was widely presumed that Japan had acquired the capability to become a serious geopolitical challenger to the US (Buzan 1988: 558; Waltz 1993: 55; Layne 1996: 71). By the late 1990s, the situation had changed significantly as a result of the impact of the East Asian financial crisis on Japan’s economy. In 1999 Japan’s per capita GDP dropped to seventh place in the world, after attaining first place in both 1993 and 1994. Moreover, the difference between Japanese and US GDP increased from 10 per cent in 1990 to 20 per cent in 1999 (Funabashi 2001: 78). Neorealists can view Japan’s current economic difficulties as further increasing its incentives to pursue a more independent and assertive foreign policy in order to increase its relative influence. The turn around in Japan’s economic fortunes should not, therefore, be viewed as undermining the significance of neorealist predictions, which rely on Japan’s structural incentives to balance against America’s dominant position. There have been indications that Japan’s status as a potential rival to the US has led to tensions in the US-Japan security alliance. The Gulf War was the most important event highlighting the ‘politics of burden-sharing’ with the US (Pharr 1993). Japan’s contribution came in the form of a dispatch of minesweepers and a $13 billion contribution to allied efforts paid in a number of instalments. According to Lincoln, this response was made because ‘Japan would be severely criticised by the United States if the nation did nothing’. Japan’s ‘cheque book diplomacy’ provoked criticisms of freeloading from the US, and of American ingratitude from the Japanese side (Inoguchi 1993: 253; Lincoln 1993: 233; Sasae 1994: 30). In the Gulf conflict, it was Japan’s failure to contribute militarily that lay behind disputes with the US. However, there are also signs of strains in the US-Japan relationship arising from increased Japanese assertiveness. Japan has adopted an increasingly independent stance towards North Korea in response to indications that it is moving towards nuclear weapons capability (Hughes 1996b; Jung-Hoon and Moon 2002). This has frustrated the attempts by the US to orchestrate sanctions against North Korea to help reduce the possibility of nuclear proliferation in the region (Yahuda 1996a: 251). In 1995 the rape of a Japanese schoolgirl by US soldiers stationed at the major US military base on Okinawa island caused considerable local resentment.

72 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Japanese foreign policy after the Cold War

Furthermore, by the late 1990s Japan had become concerned that American engagement with China would begin to supplant Tokyo’s privileged role as the key American interlocutor in the region. Thus Japan resented the way in which President Clinton failed to affirm the importance of the US-Japan alliance in talks with Jiang Zemin in 1998. This has led Japan to consider seriously what it should do to refashion its own relations with China (Funabashi 2001: 75–76; see also Wang 2002; Drifte 2003). Developments such as these can be interpreted from a neorealist perspective as reflecting emerging tensions in relations between Japan and the US. With the decline of the Soviet threat, other priorities will emerge in the calculations made by these countries, and their interests will gradually diverge. In turn, this will inevitably weaken the alliance between the US and Japan which existed during the Cold War. However, the most significant tensions in US-Japan relations over the 1989–1999 period emerged in the late 1990s during the East Asian financial crisis. Japanese diplomacy during the late 1990s revealed fissures in relations with the US. The responses of the US and Japanese to the crisis were very different. Tokyo favoured an initiative to create an Asian Monetary Fund funded largely by Japan, a more generous policy that was popular among governments in the region. By contrast the US favoured an IMF programme to avoid problems of moral hazard and encourage economies in the region to undertake structural reform. As the crisis deepened, the US began to blame Tokyo directly for its failure to reform its own economy and play a greater role in leading the East Asian economy out of recession. In turn, these conflicts reflect fundamental differences of opinion over the causes of the crisis (Johnstone 1999: 125–130). Japan has responded to this situation by pushing for The Manila Framework Group to operate under the aegis of APEC. This forum is to provide a regional framework for consultation for finance ministers. Although the Group will supplement and not supplant the IMF it has been viewed as an attempt by Japan to develop regional economic cooperation rather than relying exclusively on the US and global institutions (Drysdale 2002: 69). The acrimony of the disputes surrounding the crisis reveals a pattern reminiscent of Japan’s response to the Gulf War. The Japanese used gaitsu to force through policy changes, whilst the US made intrusive demands upon Japan. Various analysts have recognized that this dynamic is unsustainable and that it could fundamentally weaken the US-Japan alliance (Johnstone 1999; Rapkin 2001; Kirschner 2003). Furthermore, changes in US-Japanese relations will rebound on Japan’s relations with other regional powers. Buzan and Segal identified the reduction in US forces in East Asia in the early 1990s as being at the root of a significant arms build-up in the region (Buzan and Segal 1994: 7). Alternatively, by the late 1990s the problems associated with Japan developing its local relations largely through the prism of the US alliance were becoming apparent, leading it to pursue a more autonomous regional

Japanese foreign policy after the Cold War 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

73

policy (Inoguchi 2002; Drifte 2003). Sino-Japanese relations are central to this regional dynamic, and indeed there have been signs of tensions between these countries. These have been most apparent over Chinese nuclear testing, China’s moves towards blue-water naval capability, and growing support in Japan for closer ties with Taiwan (Calder 1996: 144; Green and Self 1996: 36–37; Garrett and Glaser 1997: 397). Tensions between Japan and China also interact with the question of policy towards the two Koreas, particularly in response to indications that North Korea is moving towards nuclear weapons capability. Moreover, there are indications that Japan’s attempt to normalize relations with North Korea in order to secure a more independent political influence in the region has strained relations with South Korea (Ahn 1993: 270–272; Drifte 2003: 161). These trends may all be interpreted by neorealists as arising as a result of the withdrawal of Cold War overlay. On the other hand, there are anxieties in China about the continuation of the US-Japan security arrangement. In the light of the April 1996 US-Japan Joint Declaration that renewed their commitment to the MST for the post-Cold War period, the Chinese have become increasingly concerned that the alliance is aimed at ‘checking’ China. The possible acquisition by Japan of a Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) system that may allow it to neutralize China’s nuclear deterrence capability has also caused alarm (Garrett and Glaser 1997: 384 and 392–394). These developments may be viewed by neorealists as signalling that the end of the Cold War has caused China to reassess the value of the US-Japan security framework. Local rivalries within Asia reinforce incentives for Japan to become involved in the regional arms dynamic. Japan is in dispute with China over the Senkaku Islands and Russia over the Kurile Islands. Relations over these issues have both shown signs of deterioration over the 1990s. Indeed, until Germany brokered a compromise, Japan was reluctant to participate in the IMF’s assistance package to the Soviet Union in 1991 because of this issue (Berton 1993: 32–42; Saito 1993: 278; Garrett and Glaser 1997: 397). There are also sources of geopolitical dispute within the region that have had indirect implications for Japan. Closer Japanese ties with Taiwan have become a source of tension with China, and Chinese manoeuvres in the Taiwan Straits in 1995 and 1996 have heightened concerns in Japan. The prospect of Korean unification is a source of concern to Japan, particularly given the possibility of nuclear proliferation in this area (Yahuda 1996a: 250; Pyle 1998: 133). The launch of a North Korean rocket across Japanese territory in August 1998 dramatically highlighted the need for Japan to develop a more robust defence capability. Nuclear testing by India and Pakistan has also profoundly shaken Japan’s adherence to a non-nuclear orientation (Funabashi 1998a; Jain 2002). Disputes between China and ASEAN members over the Spratly Islands also have implications for Japan through its vulnerability to its oil supply from the Middle East and precedents set in international law.

74 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Japanese foreign policy after the Cold War

Some analysts suggest that this lies behind Japan’s attempt to broker SinoAmerican tensions over China’s erection of structures on Mischief Reef in 1995 (Calder 1996: 144; Er 1996: 998–1001 and 1005). Furthermore, the complexity of disputes is reinforced by the legacy of Japanese imperialism, notably in China and the Koreas (Buzan and Segal 1994: 4). This could be understood as lying behind the outstanding issue of Japan’s failure to formally apologize for the atrocities committed under its imperial rule. The number as well as the historical and geopolitical complexity of emerging tensions between Japan and other regional players may be cited by neorealists as evidence of problems resulting from the change in the distribution of power in the international system. Since the early 1990s Japan has also displayed an inconsistency towards the UN that suggests it places its own policy-making autonomy over the wishes of the international community. Since 1994 Japan has made demands for a permanent Security Council seat (Itoh 1995: 283). However, unlike Germany, Japan has not yet reinterpreted its constitution so as to allow Self Defence Forces (SDF) participation in the multilateral use of force in an international context. In 1992, Japan did establish a law allowing SDF participation in non-combat UN Peacekeeping Operations. Since that time it has participated in a number of such activities, notably in Cambodia (Itoh 1995). However, George identifies that the proposal was not ‘a unilateral, . . . unprompted gesture . . .; the Gulf War dictated its timing, while external pressures largely shaped its content’ (George 1993: 563). Akaha recognizes the contradiction in Japan’s stance to the UN, noting that ‘[t]here is a near consensus among the Japanese that they deserve . . . [permanent UNSC] status. . . . However, there is widespread concern that this would be contingent on Japan’s willingness to participate in . . . combat activities’ (Akaha 1995: 68). Such views fit the neorealist prediction that Japan will seek the benefits of UNSC membership (the veto and the prestige) whilst avoiding associated costs. Moreover, it is not contradictory for neorealists to interpret Japan’s PKO legislation as a first step on the road to Japan’s remilitarization, as well as a reluctant response to external pressures. Japan may be pursuing both these strategies, using brinkmanship to maximize its interests whilst minimizing its commitments. Economic dimensions of Japan’s strategies also provide indications that favour neorealist predictions about its foreign policy. There have been tensions emerging in US-Japan relations since 1989. Gilpin has consistently identified the cause of these tensions as Japan’s status as a political and economic rival to the US. Whilst the conflicts generated by the USJapan trade imbalance were muted during the 1990s because of the US economic recovery, underlying conditions have remained ripe for structural conflict (Gilpin 1991; Gilpin 2003). Conflicts that may be interpreted in this light are: the unilateral Super 301 provision of the 1989 US Trade Act; the bilateral Structural Impediments Initiatives (SII) talks in 1990;

Japanese foreign policy after the Cold War 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

75

and disputes over the co-development of the FS-X fighter; and increased tensions over trade in automobiles and semi-conductors (Sasae 1994: 22–23; see also Mastanduno 1991; Bhagwati 1996; Hook et al. 2001: 109–113). Throughout the 1990s there has also been a tendency for the Japanese to open their markets only in response to ‘gaitsu’ or foreign pressure. In a study of a key sector, Mulgan notes that ‘the consensus amongst analysts of Japan’s agricultural trade policy is that foreign pressure (particularly US pressure) has been the single most important factor accounting for market opening’ (Mulgan 1997: 171; see also Bullock 2000). Japan’s economic relations with the EEC/EU also provide significant evidence in favour of neorealist predictions. Relations between Japan and Europe in the early 1990s were troubled by disputes over trade, industrial competition being particularly fierce over automobiles (Inoguchi 1991; Lehmann 1992). Developments in relations between Japan and Europe have further corroded US-Japanese relations. A tacit alliance between the Europeans and the Japanese emerged during the US-Japan car parts dispute (Nuttal 1996: 120). Similarly, Europeans undercut the US in the development of the FS-X, selling advanced technology cheaply to Japan (Inoguchi 1993: 80). Tensions in economic relations with the US and Europe may be cited as evidence of emerging structural conflict within the international system. Furthermore, Japan’s economic strategies with respect to East Asian countries have displayed strong mercantilist tendencies. Its policies towards foreign investment, Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), and multilateral development banks (MDBs) reflect this pattern. In the 1990s, policies emerged involving close business-government cooperation and the use of private investment to help Japanese multinationals build vertically integrated production networks throughout Asia (Pyle 1998: 128). This strategy has been supported by Japan’s use of ODA and its role in the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Japan’s aid policy, one of the largest in the world over the 1990s, has a ‘strongly commercial orientation’ and is donated largely on a bilateral basis (Lincoln 1993: 111 and 118). Japan plays a low-key role in both global and regional multilateral development banks, with the exception of the ADB, within which it plays a leading role. Such behaviour has also attracted criticisms that Japan is attempting to establish a regional hegemony in Asia. Accusations became particularly strong in the wake of Malaysia’s call in 1991 for an East Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG) to be led by Japan. Unlike other regional economic institutions, the proposal would have included Japan but excluded the US. In the event, Japan distanced itself from the proposal (Buzan 1998: 82–83). Nevertheless, Japanese government officials talked openly in the early 1990s about emerging regionalism under Japan’s leadership. Hall is suspicious that the Japanese have been very much behind Malaysia’s proposal, and have avoided offence to America by ‘letting others do the talking’. He sees this as part of Japan’s ‘cultural gap’ ploy to foster an image as

76 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Japanese foreign policy after the Cold War

an Asian leader (Hall 1994: 22). Further evidence for such a ploy is provided by Japan’s human rights policies in Asia. Arase identifies that a ‘pattern of Japanese effort to shield Asian governments from Western pressure emerges when one examines Japanese responses to . . . flagrant violence against unarmed civilians demonstrated by East Asian regimes’ (Arase 1993: 945). Overall, although no firm evidence exists for Japan’s involvement with the EAEG proposal, or a wider ‘cultural gap ploy’ aimed at regional hegemony, these remain distinct possibilities. Thus Japan’s economic strategies in East Asia could plausibly be interpreted as favouring neorealist predictions. Overall, there are significant trends indicative of a neorealist assessment of Japan’s strategies between 1989 and 1999. Tensions first began to emerge in the early 1990s when Japan’s cheque book diplomacy during the Gulf War came under severe criticism from allied powers, and when Japan become involved in a regional arms dynamic with China. During the late 1990s disputes between the US and Japan were brought to a head by the effects of the East Asian financial crisis and Japan’s strongly mercantilist economic orientation. Important aspects of Japan’s behaviour during this period therefore revealed tensions in its relationships with other major powers, and indicate that it has begun to consider pursuing a more assertive role in international affairs.

Institutionalism According to institutionalist theory, international institutions can take on instrumental value for states. Where institutions are useful for states in pursuing their national interests, they will be utilized. However, where institutionalization imposes net costs on states, requiring considerable accommodation and adjustment on their behalf, they will reject institutional options. The conditions under which institutions can become valued by states are where there are complex patterns of interdependence and/or a well-developed body of pre-existing international institutions. Japan’s relations with states in North America and Western Europe may be regarded as fitting broadly within this pattern. However, Japan’s integration into the world economy varies across the regional and global levels and reverses Germany’s situation. Japan is more tightly integrated into the US and the global economy than it is in a regional context (Grieco 1999: 326; see also Gangopadhyay 1998: 14). Moreover, unlike Europe, East Asia did not inherit from the Cold War period a well-developed body of international institutions (Buzan and Segal 1994: 15–17). Indeed, institutionalists have themselves recognized that the conditions for their predictions to hold do not exist between most states in an Asian context. Joseph Nye, in his capacity as Assistant Secretary of State for Defense in 1995, recommended that the US maintain a strong forward defence presence in East Asia as a basis for developing multilateralism in the region

Japanese foreign policy after the Cold War 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

77

(Office for International Security Affairs 1995; see also Nye 1995). Whilst not fully substituting for a more mature pattern of interdependent relations in Asia, Nye argues that such a strategy can provide some of the preconditions necessary for international institutions to take on value for key states, particularly Japan. Aspects of Japan’s strategies between 1989 and 1999 are amenable to an institutionalist interpretation. The MST has shown signs of endurance in the post-Cold War period. US commitment to Japan was made concrete by the 1995 Department of Defense report. Moreover, Garret and Glaser identify that despite the anxieties caused by the 1996 Joint Declaration on the US-Japan security framework, ‘Beijing has not yet reached the conclusion that the alliance . . . pose[s] a threat to China’ (Garrett and Glaser 1997: 392; see also Christensen 2001; Christensen 2003). Institutionalists have explicitly linked the continuation of the MST framework to debates over the status of Japan as a ‘civilian power’ in the post-Cold War international system (Maull 1991; see also Funabashi 1991, 1992 and 1995; Nye 1992). The 1995 National Defence Program Outline (NDPO), published shortly after the Nye report, indicates no significant change in Japan’s long-term defence planning strategy. This does suggest that strengthening Japan’s theatre missile defence capabilities, as has been noted, has caused some alarm in China. However, remarkably it suggests a possible reduction in the level of its SDF personnel from the current 180,000 to 150,000 (Sasae 1994: 17). Notwithstanding neorealist predictions, Japan has actually approached the issue of permanent UNSC status very cautiously over the post-Cold War period, and eschews any significant departure from established policy (Drifte 2000). Thus institutionalists can identify significant evidence that, despite some ‘transitional’ tensions in the post-1989 US-Japan relationship, its underlying centrality to both countries remains intact. This would support Nye’s claim that by continuing the US security guarantee and maintaining Japan’s civilian power orientation, there can be a strong US-Japanese relationship even in the absence of the Soviet threat (Nye, 1992: 113–115). Institutionalists could also point to Japan’s involvement in regional security institutions in East Asia, notably the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The ARF was founded in 1994 as a forum for the discussion of security issues pertaining to the East Asia region (Mak 1998: 116). Its membership is broad, including India, the European Union and the US, Japan and China. Japan played an instrumental role in the establishment of the ARF. The ‘preventive diplomacy’ aims of the institution are modest, and the ARF has been criticized for its vulnerability, particularly to China (Segal 1998: 325). Nevertheless, institutionalists could identify Japan’s support for the ARF as indicating that its wider global commitments are tempering its response to emerging tensions in East Asia. Such arguments are supported by Japan’s involvement in European regional security institutions through its acquisition of observer status in NATO and the

78 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Japanese foreign policy after the Cold War

CSCE/OSCE in the early 1990s (Inoguchi 1992: 83–84). ‘Civilian power’ arguments could, in principle, be extended to explaining constitutional debates within Japan over its military role. Japan has shown extreme reluctance to revise the dominant interpretation of Article 9 of its constitution limiting the SDF involvement in overseas conflicts, and this has been reflected in its non-military involvement in the Gulf conflict and its stance with respect to UNPKO. Institutionalists can supplement their arguments with evidence from Japan’s economic strategies since 1989. Central here has been Japan’s use of international economic institutions. At the global level, Japan has continued its membership in major bodies such as GATT/WTO, the G7 and the OECD (Hook et al. 2001: 331–338). Inoguchi argues that Japan’s role in international trade, money and technology transfers is essentially that of a ‘supporter’ (Inoguchi 1993: 58–62). This accords with institutionalist claims that the presence of international institutions can facilitate international cooperation. Such arguments may be augmented by examining Japan’s recent role in regional economic institutions in East Asia, notably its involvement in Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC). Established in 1989, APEC is the dominant regional international institution with an economic focus. As with the ARF, Japan, together with the US, was instrumental in bringing this institution into being. Like the ARF, its status as merely a forum for discussion makes it relatively weak, and it is overshadowed by GATT/WTO. Nevertheless, at APEC’s first meeting in 1989, ministers issued a declaration stressing their firm commitment to timely completion of GATT’s Uruguay Round (Soesastro 1995: 480). Japan’s formal resistance to the EAEG proposal takes on particular significance in this regard because it determined the failure of this option. This could be interpreted as signalling Japan’s commitment to an open East Asia within the global trading system. In 1996, the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) was also established because of the exclusion of the EU from APEC. Japan’s participation in ASEM since its inception provides a further broad indication of Japan’s commitment to economic multilateralism (Hook et al. 2001: 250–252). Such developments bolster the institutionalists’ case that Japan’s integration into the global economy has encouraged it to adopt a ‘trading state’ function in the international system. Finally, it is possible for institutionalists to offer an interpretation of Japan’s aid and investment policies. Inada has argued that political considerations are not the only factor behind the provision of aid. Japan’s own desire to maintain good relations with the country in question and to demonstrate its readiness to fulfil its political responsibilities also comes into play (Inada 1989: 412). With regard to overseas investment, Japan has shown signs of increased involvement with MDBs at the global and extra regional levels. Its share of voting rights in both the IMF and the World Bank increased in the early 1990s. In 1989, Japan announced its decision to join the then newly established European Bank

Japanese foreign policy after the Cold War 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

79

for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) (Lincoln 1993: 133–134; Yasutomo 1993: 330). Finally, at least one analyst has attempted to argue that the significance of the US-Japan disputes during the East Asian financial crisis was not great, either for the future of financial cooperation in the area or for the US-Japan security alliance more generally (Holt-Dwyer 2000). From an institutionalist perspective, these developments might support the view that Japan is responding to growing incentives for it to cooperate internationally on economic issues. Overall, there is significant evidence that Japan’s use of international institutions reflects the way in which its interdependence varies across regional and global levels. At a global level, Japan makes extensive use of international security and economic institutions. At a regional level, its use of institutions is weaker, but still significant. Indeed, in important respects, the account offered by institutionalism is more convincing than that offered by the neorealist model. Whilst neorealism can highlight signs of tensions in Japan’s relationships with other powers, institutionalists could respond by arguing that its commitment to global international institutions would appear to remain strong on the basis of its post-Cold War behaviour.

Liberalism 1: domestic variation Liberalism predicts that domestic cultural and institutional variation will be built into the dynamics displayed by the emerging international system. The process of internalizing liberal norms will be affected by domestic coalitions within states reflecting embedded social identities, economic interests and political institutions. For this reason, domestic preferences play a critical role in explaining international behaviour and outcomes in the liberal model. Liberalism also anticipates that states that adopt a competitive security orientation and/or mercantilist economic tendency will come under pressure to internalize a liberal identity. This prediction will be assessed in the final section addressing the strategic choices faced by Japan. First, however, it is necessary to establish that domestic factors have played a more autonomous role in shaping Japan’s foreign policy over the post-Cold War period than anticipated by either neorealism or institutionalism. There are indications that Japan’s post-Cold War strategies have influenced its foreign policy in a way which poses anomalies for both neorealist and institutionalist predictions. Heginbotham and Samuels identify that Japan’s failure to remilitarize is problematic for neorealism. As the NDPO indicates, ‘there is little evidence that Japanese planners are thinking seriously about a defence strategy independent of US forces’ (Heginbotham and Samuels 1999: 193). According to neorealists, Japan finds itself in a regional context in which instability looms large. For Japan to pursue a ‘free-riding’ strategy with regard to potential direct threats to its security requires it to

80 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Japanese foreign policy after the Cold War

run definite risks. To some extent, the conclusions of the Nye report could help persuade Japanese policy makers that there is still a strong US commitment to East Asia. However, as Buzan recognizes, ‘this raises the possibility that the guarantee . . . would not be honoured if Japan got into difficulties with a regional neighbour’ (Buzan 1995: 33). Under these circumstances, Japan’s tight interpretation of Article 9 of its constitution is no longer a convenient diplomatic fig leaf, but becomes a liability. Thus Japan’s failure to revise its defence planning commitments in 1995 makes it difficult for neorealists to sustain an overall interpretation of Japan’s strategies. However, according to Heginbotham and Samuels, ‘[p]erhaps the oddest thing from the perspective of structural realism. . . . has been the Japanese failure to exhibit a sensitivity to the relative distribution of gains that have accrued to China from its economic relations with Japan’. China is Japan’s strongest potential military rival in the East Asia region. Yet: Japan has competed vigorously for a major investment presence in China. The Japanese used their influence in the Asian Development Bank and elsewhere to argue actively for the early lifting of the sanctions imposed on China after the suppression of the Tiananmen demonstrators in 1989, and Japanese business leaders visited China within months to reform the commercial relationship. Today, more Japanese ODA goes to China than to any other country. As a partial consequence of Japanese . . . investments, the Chinese economy has grown at a double digit pace for over a decade. (Heginbotham and Samuels 1999: 195) This has enabled China to modernize its navy and airforce. Furthermore, in the face of the signs of increased Chinese assertiveness in East Asia, Japan’s 1991 announcement that in future Japan’s ODA would be tied to China’s military behaviour has proved hollow (Heginbotham and Samuels 1999: 195). Such behaviour runs heavily against the grain of neorealist predictions about Japan’s behaviour within the post-Cold War international system. Japan’s economic diplomacy poses equally significant problems for institutionalist predictions. Institutionalist arguments overlook Japan’s troubled economic relations with industrialized states, and the significance of gaitsu. As has been noted, this has been visible in Japan’s trade relations with the West over the 1990s. It became particularly acute in the East Asian financial crisis, where external pressure from the US caused considerable acrimony before Japan yielded to reform. This pattern is hardly characteristic of the cooperative relationship anticipated by institutionalists. Institutionalist arguments also suffer from the limitation that Japan’s aid and investment strategies are strongly bilateral and oriented in favour of Japanese business interests. Indeed, the degree of politicization of Japan’s investment through the ADB is so strong that Wan has interpreted it as

Japanese foreign policy after the Cold War 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

81

evidence that it has taken on intrinsic rather than instrumental value for Japanese policy makers. He insists that Japan’s behaviour ‘cannot be explained away simply as a coincidence of what Japan wants and what the ADB wants. . . . Japan defines what it wants in the light of what the bank wants’ (Wan 1995: 527). Wan’s argument remains unconvincing because Japan’s use of the ADB is highly distinctive when compared with its use of all other regional and global MDBs (Yasutomo 1993). Nevertheless, his account does identify the limitations of an institutionalist account of its economic strategies in East Asia, highlighting Japan’s distinctive preferences over investment policies. Heginbotham and Samuels have developed a characterization of Japan’s strategic orientation capable of explaining the anomalies faced by neorealism and institutionalism. They argue that Japan’s strategies reflect ‘mercantile realist’ preferences. Mercantile realism shares common elements with other forms of realism, including the assumption that states are the most important actors in world politics, that states seek to maximize their power, and that states are in competition for relative gains (Heginbotham and Samuels 1999: 198). However, unlike other forms of realism, mercantile realism stresses the primacy of techno-economic strategic goals in the making of foreign policy decisions. Importantly, a state with mercantile realist preferences may pursue techno-economic interests at the expense of politico-military interests. It will define its strength in the international system in terms of its wealth and technology, and its position in terms of its industrial structure. As a result, mercantile realists will balance against wealthy states endowed with strong, technology-intensive industries, and will not see states with different industrial structures as threatening (Heginbotham and Samuels 1999: 200; see also Kawasaki 2001 for a similar account). A mercantile realist characterization of Japan’s preferences can explain the distinctive features of its behaviour since 1989. Japan’s low political and military profile fits well into a mercantile realist explanation of its strategies. From a mercantile realist perspective, it reflects the priority Japan gives to techno-economic rather than politico-military priorities in the formulation of its national interests. This explains why Japan does not appear to be particularly concerned about the political risks involved in pursuing such a strategy. It is not that Japan is ‘free riding’ on US politico-military capability, but rather that politico-military risks simply do not receive a high priority in terms of its techno-economic foreign policy decision making calculus. Furthermore, the concept of mercantile realism can also explain aspects of Japan’s relations with China which are anomalous to neorealism. Unlike the US and Japan, China and Japan have very different industrial structures, and so from a mercantile realist perspective may develop a complementary relationship. Mercantile realism also explains why there are also anomalies in using Japan’s failure to remilitarize in interpreting its strategies in institutionalist

82 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Japanese foreign policy after the Cold War

terms. The concept of mercantile realism shares with institutionalism the prediction that states will give highest priority to their economic interests. In this sense they both predict that Japan will adopt a primarily nonmilitary response to the end of the Cold War. However, institutionalism cannot explain the manner in which Japan has gone about pursuing a nonmilitary strategy. Japanese economic relations with Asian states fit poorly with the predictions of the institutionalist model because they are highly politicized. Yet it is precisely such tendencies that fit well with a mercantile realist strategy. The tendency of Japan’s economic relations with its Asian neighbours to have been good, whilst those with Western powers continue to be troubled, again fits the pattern of behaviour suggested by mercantile realism. States with mercantile realist preferences will balance against rivals with similar industrial structures, whereas institutionalism will predict that states sharing advanced industrial structures will be encouraged to cooperate. Thus, unlike both neorealism and institutionalism, a focus on Japan’s mercantile realist preferences can develop a single consistent account of the characteristic way in which Japan prioritizes techno-economic over politico-military goals. From a mercantile realist perspective, these aspects of Japan’s strategies are not only more amenable to an overall explanation, but are also mutually reinforcing. Indeed, other specialists on Japan’s foreign policy have also identified these general characteristics of its strategies over the post-Cold War period (Blaker 1993; Pyle 1998). More fundamentally, ‘mercantile realism’ displays remarkably strong affinities with the Yoshida Doctrine. As Katzenstein and Okawara note, the breakup of the Soviet Union has ‘elicited no sharp changes’ in Japan’s security policies. They conclude that ‘[w]hen international structures change . . . rapidly . . . Japanese policy makers have defined the objectives and modalities of their political strategies partly in response to the cues that domestic structures provide’ (Katzenstein and Okawara 1993: 116–117; see also Macleod 1997; Inoguchi and Jain 2000; Katzenstein and Okawara 2001). Despite the end of the Cold War, Japan has continued to articulate the strategic preferences that it developed during the early post-War period. Overall, a strong case can be made for the predictions of the liberal model, although this is not to claim that Japan has articulated a broadly liberal set of strategic preferences. Instead, Japan’s foreign policy behaviour falls outside the ranges predicted by both neorealism and institutionalism due to the influence of its domestic identity on its international behaviour. A mercantile realist characterization of Japan’s foreign policy provides the most consistent overall account of patterns of behaviour which are anomalous to both neorealist and institutionalist models, notably the way it combines a non-military, non-political orientation with strong elements of economic nationalism. Moreover, it enables otherwise contradictory elements of Japan’s foreign policy to be understood as mutually reinforcing aspects of a single underlying strategy. This strategy, which

Japanese foreign policy after the Cold War 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

83

has its origins in the Yoshida Doctrine, strongly reflects domestic structures that developed during the Cold War, and in this sense Japan’s post-Cold War foreign policy has been marked by a high degree of continuity. However, such a conclusion merely raises the deeper issue of the extent to which this strategy is sustainable.

Liberalism 2: Japan’s choices In 1989, Van Wolferen attempted to refute the argument that fundamental changes are in store for Japan’s political system. He argued that what the ‘Japan at the crossroads’ thesis failed to take into account was that ‘[t]he systematic deprivation of choice in practically all realms of life bearing on the political organisation of Japan is essential for keeping the [Japanese] System on an even keel’ (Van Wolferen 1990: 409). Notably, he identified absence of choice in the Japanese party system, and in its integrated, keiretsu-dominated economy. Van Wolferen concluded that despite the changes forecast by many in the late 1980s, fundamental domestic reform was not likely for Japan in the foreseeable future. More recent developments in Japan call into question Van Wolferen’s assessment of the prospects for continuity in the Japanese ‘System’ in the face of international change. Two have been particularly important: changes in Japan’s party system, and changes in the structure of its domestic economy. Whilst these changes have roots that may be traced to at least the early 1970s, they only came to fruition in the years since 1989. In 1993, Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) found itself unable to form a government for the first time since it was founded in 1955. Pyle has identified that ‘[a]lthough issues of electoral reform were the proximate cause of the vote of no confidence . . . the primary motive force was change in the international system’ (Pyle 1996: 149). Specifically, it reflects mounting pressure for a decisive move away from the Yoshida strategy arising from the end of the Cold War: The fundamental issue was defining a new national purpose for Japan in the post Cold War world and making the institutional changes required for such a transformed role. . . . In the face of . . . criticism [of Japan’s role in the Gulf War], a new generation of assertive political leadership in the LDP demanded abandonment of the Yoshida strategy, reinterpretation of the constitution, and the accommodation of the new realities of the post Cold War international system. (Pyle 1996: 151–152) Moreover, a fluid situation in Japanese party politics continued throughout the 1990s (Jain 1997; Akikiko 2000; Park 2001). Changes in Japan’s economy have been more recent, but equally dramatic. After years of slow down, Japan’s economy went into recession in 1998. Japan’s economic

84 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Japanese foreign policy after the Cold War

problems have raised serious questions about its basic system of economic management (Funabashi 1998a: 28). In combination, these dramatic changes have challenged the aspects of the Japanese ‘System’ identified by Van Wolferen in 1990 as so durable. Such developments have important implications for the viability of Japan’s mercantile realist strategies. Citing the precedent of fifteenthcentury Venice, Heginbotham and Samuels argue that skilful use of diplomacy may allow Japan to prosper in its pursuit of mercantile realist axioms (Heginbotham and Samuels 1999: 208). Indeed, Tadokoro identifies a high degree of domestic support in Japan for a ‘conservative’ position whose adherents are reluctant to change Japan’s existing stance on foreign policy and domestic economic policy. However, he also recognizes that conservatives in Japan face severe problems because their approach would perpetuate the difficulties that Japan faces (Tadokoro 1994: 1011; see also Blaker 1993: 31). A classic example of the problems posed by a conservative response to Japan’s current crisis is the way in which successive LDP governments have responded to the need to reduce Japan’s rapidly accumulating public debt. Budgetary stimulus has been used as a means to bring about economic recovery, justified in terms of the need for injections of demand into the economy. In practice, however, these enormous expenditures serve the pork-barrel politics of the LDP by keeping in employment thousands of inefficient construction companies and employees engaged in government-funded public works (Funabashi 2001: 78). More generally, however, Japan’s political elite has proved extraordinarily reluctant to provide the leadership necessary to initiate radical reforms. This has only resulted in continued stagnation for Japan and further underscored the urgent need for major changes (Schoppa 2001: 76). In summary therefore, the political and economic changes taking place within Japan have undermined the basis of the Yoshida strategy, which presupposed that political passivity and economic nationalism could be pursued simultaneously. These pillars of Japanese foreign policy have been undermined, and at least one of them must give. Institutionalists might interpret the changes taking place in Japan as evidence that Japan is being pushed in the direction of a civilian power strategy. This would require it to undertake significant domestic political and economic adjustments. It must ‘evolve into a wholly new type of power that helps furnish international public goods . . . and also exercise leadership’ across a wide variety of non-military issues (Funabashi 1992: 37; see also Funabashi 1995; Lincoln 1993: 258–266). This might allow Japan to respond to international pressures for it to play a larger political role in the world whilst not engaging in remilitarization that would stimulate fears by its Asian peers. It would also mean a move away from economic nationalism. Institutionalists could argue that Japan’s economic difficulties suggest that it cannot continue its position as a global economic power while maintaining a keiretsu-organized domestic economy. Institutionalists could also

Japanese foreign policy after the Cold War 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

85

identify a significant group of civilian power advocates within Japan (Nye 1992: 108; Inoguchi and Jain 1997: 3–4; see also Tadokoro 1994: 1013). However, an institutionalist interpretation of the domestic changes taking place in Japan faces a crucial limitation. Specifically, advocating a civilian power strategy plays directly into the hands of conservatives who oppose fundamental change in Japan’s foreign policy. As Pyle notes, post-War diplomats were careful to stress a commitment to internationalist goals as a pretext for their more genuine concern with the pursuit of economic nationalism (Pyle 1996: 122). Indeed, presenting a more respectable image to the outside world is an integral aspect of mercantile realist diplomacy. Japanese statesmen have deliberately placed a benign gloss on their policies in public whilst, as has been noted, in practice they have consistently pursued other objectives. Critical here is the impact of the US on Japan’s behaviour over the 1990s, since a security guarantee is central to mercantile realism. As Pyle has identified, adherents to the Yoshida strategy were elated by the Nye report (Pyle 1996: 172). Moreover, a civilian power stance also leads Japan to become ‘caught in the triangular vortex’ of Sino-US-Japanese relations. This term is used by Drifte to capture the negative and counter-productive results of pursuing the engagement of China through the vehicle of the security alliance with the US. Particularly concerning for Japan is China’s gradual distancing from its previous acceptance of the MST as the lesser of two evils (Drifte 2003: 162–173). Thus an institutionalist interpretation of the direction in which Japanese foreign policy is evolving is internally contradictory. Any attempt to develop Japan as a civilian power actively discourages it from adopting the more internationalist orientation that such a strategy seeks to achieve. A third possible interpretation of domestic change in Japan might be offered by neorealism. Neorealists could interpret the dramatic domestic changes in Japan as signalling that it is being edged towards abandoning Cold War constraints. As has been discussed, Japan has shown some signs of greater political assertiveness in its post-Cold War strategies, causing alarm in other states. Moreover, Japan’s current economic difficulties have left it exposed and vulnerable within the international economy. These may threaten the viability of the US-Japanese security relationship. Neorealists could suggest that these pressures are likely to lead to increased incentives for the pursuit of mercantilism and closed regionalism by Japan. Contrary to mercantile realism, this would mean that Japan’s aid and investment strategies with respect to China would become tighter. In turn, these economic developments would reinforce Sino-Japanese rivalries. Finally, a move towards a strategy in line with neorealist predictions would play to a definite domestic constituency within Japan – that of ‘traditional nationalism’ (Tadokoro 1994: 1014). Although this is not a position that has gained much popularity amongst reformers, neorealists could argue that support for such a political standpoint is likely to grow in the future.

86 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Japanese foreign policy after the Cold War

Nevertheless, the most influential domestic constituency within Japan pushing for political reform is neither the traditional nationalists nor the advocates of a civilian power role for Japan. Instead it is proponents of Japan as a ‘normal state’ (Tadokoro 1994: 1012). The emergence of this group of reformists has been widely interpreted as a direct response to the ‘mounting external pressures and internal demands that Japan contributes more fully to the multilateral solution of regional and global problems’ (Inoguchi and Jain 1997: 10, emphasis added; see also Fukushima 1996: 55). It is important to consider the possibility that the emergence of the ‘normal nation’ school represents a response to pressures arising from the international system. This implies a third interpretation of the international sources of domestic changes in Japan since 1989 to counter those put forward by both institutionalists and neorealists. Indeed, a consensus has emerged in a large body of prescriptive literature of Japan’s post-Cold War foreign policy that indicates that the debate between neorealists and advocates of a civilian power role for Japan set up a false dichotomy. The critical issue identified in this literature is the implication of shifting Japan’s attitudes with respect to the use of military force. Many commentators have concluded that by altering its stance on this vital issue, Japan could strengthen its alliance with the US, provide a more coherent framework for the engagement of China, and encourage Japan to take a more responsible stance on issues of economic diplomacy and internal reform. In an extensive recent study of the US-Japan security relationship, Mochizuki outlines his ‘liberal vision’ for its future. He advocates removal of US combat forces from Okinawa by 2003 (leaving air-force, naval and logistical units), reinterpretation of the Japanese constitution to allow it to participate in collective self-defence, and cooperative US-Japanese research into TMD. This would imply major shifts from the current US strategy through a significant reduction in its forward defence posture in East Asia. Mochizuki identifies that through this reduction the overall threat to China’s security posed by the MST would be decreased without weakening its overall deterrent capabilities. Such measures would also strengthen the US-Japan security relationship, making it a ‘more reciprocal partnership’, and encouraging Japan to become an ‘active ally’ rather than a ‘passive partner’ (Mochizuki 1998: 7 and 8). Pyle similarly concludes that a comprehensive revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty based on ‘a more equal and reciprocal alliance’ presents Japan with a stronger alternative to either a global civilian power approach or a balance of power strategy (Pyle 1996: 174–177). Buzan proposes the need for Japan to adopt a ‘non-offensive defence’ strategy containing the following four ingredients: a robust capacity for self-defence; a high sensitivity to the concerns of neighbours; a capability to play a significant role in international aid and peacekeeping; and a capability for recessed deterrence (Buzan 1995: 40–41). Advocating such a strategy challenges the assumption of automatic mistrust of a Japan that moves away from a civilian

Japanese foreign policy after the Cold War 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

87

power orientation, and points to the benefits for Japan and its key allies in shifting Japan’s attitudes with respect to the use of military force abroad. Overall, it is possible that a more equal US-Japanese relationship might also help Japan develop more stable relations with China than it would otherwise be able to. As Johnson and Keehn propose, a United States that continues to distrust Japan’s ability to act as a true ally could and even should be considered a greater threat to security in East Asia than a rising China (Johnson and Keehn 1995: 110; see also Johnstone 2000; Drifte 2003). The same principles may also be extended to the political economy of Japan’s relationships with other major powers in the international system. Sato has noted that greater equality in the US-Japan relationship might also facilitate a more consistent set of principles for China’s engagement. It would enable the West to convey a more consistent diplomatic message to China, and reduce China’s scope to play off the US and Japan against one another to achieve its own objectives (Sato 1998). The beneficial nature of Japan negotiating its relationship with other major powers on the basis of equality is also illustrated in cases where it has itself suffered as a result of failing to pursue this course. Perhaps the best example is provided by Japan’s dispute with the Soviet Union over the Kurile Islands in 1991. On the surface, Japanese intransigence might conceivably be construed as confirming neorealist predictions of emerging multipolarity. However, a recurrent theme in the literature is that Japan’s response was shaped more by its dependent relations with the US than by structural conflict with the Soviet Union. On this account, Japan’s response reflects the increasingly outdated focus of the US-Japan security alliance on the containment of Russia (Carlile 1994: 415; Menon 1996: 74; Hasegawa 2000; Rozman 2002). This pattern highlights the way in which Japan’s response was not structurally determined, but rather reflects its preference for a low political profile. Thus Japan might strengthen its relations with Russia by developing them on a more independent footing, facilitating more flexible negotiations on the Kuriles issue. Johnstone develops an interpretation of Japan’s diplomacy during the East Asian financial crisis that highlights its reluctance to engage in internal economic reforms. He sees the tensions that emerged between the US and Japan in this period as symptomatic of the general corrosion of the USJapan relationship in the absence of a clear Soviet threat. Johnstone recognizes that to some extent emerging structural conflict has been mitigated by the Nye defence initiative, and that continued close cooperation between the US and Japan on security issues has reduced tensions in the US-Japan relationship. However, this only serves to underscore the limited and narrow scope of cooperation between these two states (Johnstone 1999: 133–135). Indeed, it is plausible that the asymmetrical character of the current US-Japan security relationship actively contributes to the emerging economic tensions between these countries. In the context of

88 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Japanese foreign policy after the Cold War

general patterns of behaviour in Japan’s foreign policy, the government’s reliance on gaitsu to push through reform during the crisis would seem symptomatic of its mercantile realist strategy. In turn, this strategy presupposes reliance on the US security umbrella. Paradoxically, therefore, US security policy makes it very hard for it to encourage Japan’s cooperation over economic issues. Whilst the US was critical of Japan’s response to the East Asian crisis, America fails to acknowledge that its own policies in the security arena are encouraging Japan to pursue this pattern of behaviour. By enabling Japan to take a more independent stance on foreign affairs, the US could encourage a more responsible and robust Japanese leadership on issues of economic management. By the same token, however, the US would need to reduce its tendency to dictate policy to Japan, and allow it a greater say in managing the world economy. Overall, it is possible to question the prevalent assumption that growing political independence in Japan’s foreign policy would reflect a neorealist analysis of its post-Cold War strategies. Indeed, the most likely scenario is for Japan to increase its capacity for defence within a restructured USJapan security framework. Fears that this would spark destabilizing security anxieties amongst Japan’s partners do not necessarily follow if Japan’s defence posture is predominantly non-offensive, and this is combined with a limited withdrawal of the US forward presence in East Asia. Similarly, this strategy could enhance Japan’s sense of responsibility and willingness to cooperate more generally in the international arena. Thus ‘normal nation’ school of reformers have a strong case that Japan should make a more active contribution to the international community in both economic and political terms. This conclusion implies that Japan finds itself in an emerging international context that is encouraging it to shift away from its mercantile realist orientation. Japan must today play a more active role in negotiating and sustaining a more equal structure of great power relations. Such an analysis is in line with the predictions of liberal theory about the general pattern of institutionalized activity emerging in the post-Cold War international system. In turn this raises important questions about what Buzan refers to as ‘Japan’s relationship with itself’ (Buzan 1995: 38). Pressures arising from the international system are presenting major challenges to the mercantile realist stance that Japan has adopted over the 1990s. These have already had a dramatic bearing on developments in Japan’s party system and its system of economic management. However, perhaps the clearest expression of the crisis of transition being experienced by Japan has been the severe difficulties it has experienced in coming to terms with the atrocities it committed during its imperial past. This has raised acute problems for Japan in terms of the way in which its government has handled issues such as dealing with its defence capabilities or apologizing to the victims of its wartime aggression. Berger traces Japan’s extreme reluctance to remilitarize since 1989 to its domestic politics, in particular its ‘anti-

Japanese foreign policy after the Cold War 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

89

military culture’ (Berger 1993: 131). Japan’s refusal to face its recent history even affects mundane aspects of daily life in Japan such as the content of school textbooks on Japanese history (Ienaga 1993). Furthermore, deeply ingrained attitudes persist, even when this means that Japan itself pays the highest price of all for failing to address the issues they raise. Mukae characterizes Japan’s failure to apologise for its wartime atrocities as a symbolic manifestation of the ongoing identity crisis in the Japanese political system today. This crisis persists, he identifies, even when this means that it is Japan itself that pays the highest price of all for failing to address the issues raised. For example, rather than manifesting its current difficulties, Japan’s failure to apologize for its wartime atrocities in the Diet Resolution on the fiftieth anniversary of the Pacific War ‘might instead have been a rare opportunity to turn . . . that very crisis [around]. . . . In that sense, the Japanese government failed not only other nations but also its own’ (Mukae 1996: 1030). At the source of this crisis of identity transition is a search for a legitimate Japanese nationalism and a new, non-exclusively economic role in the world. Japan is ‘divided and confused about what its national selfimage should be and how it should project its identity into the international system’ (Buzan 1988: 561). Similarly, Pyle suggests that the domestic adjustments taken within Japanese politics represent a search for a new sense of national purpose appropriate for Japan in the post-Cold War period. He notes that: assertions of Japan’s inability to play a broader role in the international community are now losing much of their persuasive power as a result of changes in the international system. Japan’s emergence as an economic power and the end of the Cold War have . . . raised questions about Japan’s future national purpose, its policies towards collective security arrangements, and its capacity to change from a country intent solely on its own mercantilist aims to one capable of international leadership. (Pyle 1996: 121) Pyle’s diagnosis for Japan requires it to begin the process of building a new sense of national identity better suited to the post-Cold War world to that which developed in the post-1945 period. To achieve this, Pyle proposes, Japan must become more self-reliant, breaking fundamentally with the deference that characterized the Yoshida strategy. The Japanese political system, which less than ten years ago Van Wolferen identified as characterized by ‘the systematic deprivation of choice’ in almost all arenas, is now faced with the task of making decisions that will enormously affect the future well being of its citizens. This involves Japan confronting a diversity of possibilities that it has not previously faced, and presents it with both dangers and opportunities. Japan must break with established

90 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Japanese foreign policy after the Cold War

patterns of behaviour, or run the risk that its relationships will become brittle and at some point might break down. On the other hand, by actively confronting the situation in which it finds itself, Japan has the opportunity to conduct its diplomacy with others on the basis of independence and equality rather than dependency. More fundamentally, this has implications for Japan’s ability to trust itself. In the words of one major reformist politician, ‘Japan’s most pressing need is a change in the consciousness of our people. Let us begin by removing the fences and educating the people to their own responsibility for themselves’ (Ozawa cited Stockwin 1997: 75). Until Japan has learned to develop its strategies on a more autonomous basis, it will not be able to achieve a true sense of security within the emerging international system.

1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

5

Chinese foreign policy after the Cold War

The consequences of ‘the rise of China’ as a major power has been one of the most prominently discussed issues of post-Cold War international politics. The origins of this debate, however, may actually be traced back to trends that began in earnest considerably earlier. During the mid- to late 1970s there emerged a change in China’s attitude towards interdependence with the West following the death of Mao Tse Tung and his replacement by Deng Xioping. Under the new regime, China began to foster economic ties with the wider world in order to underpin economic growth and modernization. These events coincided with the gradual stagnation of the Soviet Union, further enhancing the shift to multipolarity and China’s growing relative status within the international system. Between 1989 and 1991, China witnessed the culmination of these two long-term trends. First, the Tiananmen Square demonstrations in 1989 led to the realization by the Chinese elite that economic interdependence and modernization that China had pursued under the post-Mao regime had significant political implications. Second, the collapse of Soviet communism led to the dismantling of the USSR’s Pacific fleet. This left China as an emerging power capable of filling the vacuum left by the decline of Russian influence in East Asia. The period that saw the end of the Cold War therefore raised important questions about China’s future role in the international system in the wake of these major changes. This chapter applies neorealist, institutionalist and liberal models of international relations to analysing the strategies adopted by China over the 1989–1999 period. On the basis of this discussion, it draws conclusions about the nature of China’s response to the end of the Cold War, and the strategic choices its faces in the emerging international system.

Neorealism Waltz, Layne and Mearsheimer have used the neorealist model to make predictions about the behaviour of China in the post-Cold War international system, identifying it as a ‘rising power’ within the international power structure (Waltz 1993; Layne 1996; Mearsheimer 2001). Indeed,

92 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Chinese foreign policy after the Cold War

Dibb identifies the general consensus that China can sustain growth rates implying a doubling of its GDP every eight to eleven years, a development which would ‘herald the emergence of a new international power (Dibb 1995: 27). Other major analysts echo this view (Roy 1994: 149; Layne 1996: 69; Bernstein and Munro 1997: 18; Nye 1997: 70; Pumphrey 2002). Neorealists predict that China’s position within the emerging structure of international politics will encourage it to define its interests according to its rising relative capabilities. Outcomes compatible with this behaviour are a move to conflictual multipolarity within East Asia and in the wider international system. Indeed, neorealists could identify that over the 1990s China’s rising economic status has been accompanied by the modernization of its military. Estimates of increases in China’s defence expenditures over the 1990s vary widely. Some have suggested that trends in China’s defence expenditure should not be over-estimated (Nathan and Ross 1997: 146–148; Karmel 2000). Yet others have cautioned against too sanguine an interpretation of China’s military modernization. Nye warns ‘even after stripping away the hyperbole . . . the rise of the Chinese military . . . power must be taken seriously as a new factor in the [East Asia] region’ (Nye 1997: 70). There is evidence that China is moving from a strategy of ‘minimum’ to ‘limited’ nuclear deterrence. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been dramatically downsized and qualitatively upgraded (Godwin 1996: 482; Godwin 1998: 179). The navy and air force are increasing their power projection capabilities. As well as establishing military bases in the South China Sea, fleets of major surface combatants and submarines are undergoing generational change. This has been supplemented by purchases of advanced fighter aircraft, dieselelectric submarines and destroyers from Russia, and reports of future deals over aerial refuelling and Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft (Ji 1997: 79 and 80; Godwin 1998: 181). Bernstein and Munro argue that ‘China is now engaged in one of the most extensive and rapid military build-ups in the world’ (Bernstein and Munro 1997: 25–26). Whilst such claims might be exaggerated, there is certainly evidence that China’s rapid economic rise has encouraged it to pursue an increasingly significant military strategy. Buzan and Segal note that ‘China feels it is fully within its rights to change the territorial status quo [within East Asia]’ (Buzan and Segal 1994: 6; see also Dibb 1995: 26). Tow relates this to the way ‘Chinese analysts have concluded that the original bipolar pattern [of global security politics] is being replaced by a multipolar one’ in which it plays a more influential role (Tow 1994: 146; see also Jisi 1997: 14). Whilst dating from the Sino-Soviet split in the 1970s, neorealists could argue that this pattern has persisted and become exaggerated in the 1990s. In particular, concern over the need to balance against US unipolarity in the wake of the Gulf War was a strong factor influencing China’s defence

Chinese foreign policy after the Cold War 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

93

modernization programme (Robinson 1994: 597). China’s rising power is generating regional anxieties, especially combined with the lack of transparency in Beijing’s strategic planning (Hughes 1996b: 241; To 1997: 252; Godwin 1998: 186; Roy 1998a: 149). Neorealists might also draw attention to emerging tensions between China and other states. Difficulties in China’s relations with the United States first became apparent in the wake of the Tiananmen Square massacre in June 1989. The US led economic sanctions against China, which were lifted only gradually over three years. This was a clear signal that ‘[t]he end of the Cold War . . . ended the special exception from human rights criticism that China had enjoyed as a prospective US ally against the Soviet Union’ (Roy 1998a: 150). China’s abstention with regard to UN Security Council Resolution 678 sanctioning the use of force against Iraq during the Gulf conflict must be understood in the context of its postTiananmen isolation. During the conflict China managed to extract maximum payoffs from the US with minimum support (Kim 1994: 423). This is compatible with a neorealist analysis of its behaviour. Moreover, America has continued to maintain an explicit or implicit linkage between human rights and China’s trade status. China has viewed this as interference in China’s internal affairs (Wan 1997: 240–242; Seymour 1998: 221). In line with neorealist logic, therefore, the collapse of bipolarity has increased tensions between the US and China over human rights. Important security issues have also affected Sino-US relations. In August 1992, China re-established full diplomatic relations with North Korea, viewing it as a significant buffer between itself and South Korea and implicitly the US (Kim 2001: 371). Bernstein and Munro note that the prospect of Korean unification could be an important factor in changing China’s attitude to the US military presence in Northeast Asia (Bernstein and Munro 1997: 30). Such a shift would be in line with the neorealist prediction that China will be increasingly brought into conflict with the regional status quo. However, the future of Taiwan is considered by Beijing to be the major issue between the US and China. The PRC’s 1993 ‘White Paper’ on China’s reunification publicly reiterated its claim to sovereignty over Taiwan (Gu 1996: 199). Moreover, in March 1996, just prior to Taiwan’s first presidential elections, the PRC carried out large-scale offensive military exercizes, including test-firing live missiles in Taiwan’s coastal waters. This resulted in the US dispatching two aircraft carrier battle groups to the area. Friedman even draws parallels between China’s behaviour during the Taiwan missile crisis and Germany’s behaviour in the inter-war period (Friedman 1997: 233). Thus there are signs that China’s growing power is encouraging it to challenge the regional status quo as suggested by neorealist logic. There have been parallel developments in relations between China and Japan. In the wake of the 1996 ‘revitalization’ of the Mutual Security Treaty, the Chinese have become increasingly concerned that the alliance

94 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Chinese foreign policy after the Cold War

is aimed at containing China. A particular point of tension for China is the possibility that the US could encourage Japan to deploy a theatre missile defence system that may undermine China’s deterrence capability (Garret and Glaser 1997: 384 and 392). More general indications that Japan is becoming more assertive have caused concern in China. Significant have been: the freezing of Japan’s aid grant to China in response to its nuclear testing in 1995; Japan’s toleration of extremist activities on the Diaoyo/ Senkaku islands in 1996; growth of backing in Japan for closer ties with Taiwan; increases in Japan’s defence expenditure; and Japan’s participation in UNPKO. China’s worries about Japan are similarly reflected in Japanese anxieties over China’s reiteration of its ownership of the Senkaku Islands, and the expansion in China’s power projection capabilities. Prior to its response to China’s nuclear testing, Japan had also expressed concern over China’s possible acquisition of in-flight refuelling technology and it publicly warned it against purchasing an aircraft carrier (Segal 1993: 30; Roy 1994: 163). Trends such as these may be identified as supporting neorealist predictions about emerging structural conflict between Japan and China. China’s role in wider geopolitical dynamics within Asia reinforces a neorealist interpretation of its post-Cold War strategies. China has displayed a zero-sum view of its sovereignty over Hong Kong and Macao in negotiations with Britain and Portugal. Moreover, it has been insistent that negotiations over these territories are conducted bilaterally (Hinton 1994: 353; Neves 1995; Yahuda 1996b: 14). China’s policies over the disputed Paracel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea also provide evidence of China’s growing assertiveness. In 1992 China passed a Law on Territorial Waters and their Contiguous Areas that formalized its claim to sovereignty over these territories, as well as the Senkaku Islands disputed with Japan. Furthermore, it granted an oil concession in the Paracels, pledging to protect rights to the concession with force. In 1995, shortly after the withdrawal of US military forces from the Philippines, Chinese structures were discovered on Mischief Reef. These developments have heightened concerns about China’s intentions in the area (Leifer 1997: 160; Godwin 1998: 176). China has refused to discuss solutions to competing territorial claims within the region, fudging its 1995 agreement that the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea would form the basis for the resolution of conflicts. The possibility that large deposits of oil and gas lie beneath the South China Sea increases the incentive for China to stake a territorial claim to this area because of China’s growing dependence on oil imports (Salameh 1995: 133; Valencia 1995: 13–16; Foot 1998: 433). Furthermore, this series of territorial rivalries is exacerbated by the historical animosities that have developed between China and other states in the region (Buzan and Segal 1994: 4). The number and complexity of the disputes in which China finds itself embroiled in East Asia may be cited by neorealists as symptomatic of deeper structural tensions resulting from China’s rising power.

Chinese foreign policy after the Cold War 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

95

Developments in China’s relations with Russia, India and Pakistan, and states in Africa over the 1990s are also amenable to neorealist explanation. With the decline of the Russian threat, Sino-Russian relations have improved dramatically in a number of areas (Goo 1993: 293; Garver 1998: 119–129). Sino-Russian détente could be seen in terms of the effects of an emerging multipolar structure ‘in which a “continental” RussianChinese bloc balances a “maritime” American-Japanese bloc’ (Garver 1998: 131; see also Bilveer 1998). China’s relations with states in South Asia reinforce neorealist claims. Sino-Indian relations thawed in the early 1990s, culminating in an agreement over their disputed Himalayan border in 1993. However, this improvement occurred in the wake of Beijing’s diplomatic isolation after the Tiananmen Square massacre. Underlying geopolitical tensions remain between the two powers in South Asia. The collapse of the Soviet Union, India’s traditional ally against China and Pakistan, provides incentives for India to acquire a nuclear deterrent (Malik 1995: 346). Tibet has continued to complicate the Sino-Indian relationship (Roy 1998b: 171). Finally, China’s relations with traditional clients in Africa have changed in line with shifts in international structure. In the aftermath of Tiananmen, China engaged in a major diplomatic offensive in Africa. However, with China’s continued economic modernization, these contacts have become obsolete (Snow 1994: 320). The overall pattern of China’s relations with Russia, India and Pakistan, and African states may therefore be understood in terms of neorealist predictions. China deals favourably with these states when marginalized, but as its marginalization wanes its policies reflect interests derived from its changing capabilities. In line with neorealist analysis, China’s behaviour with respect to UN peacekeeping strongly reflects a concern with sovereignty. In October 1991 China participated in a UNSC authorized deployment of a force to oversee elections in Cambodia, and brought pressure on the Khmer Rouge not to disrupt the peace-process. However, these actions coincided with the cessation of Soviet aid to Vietnam leading to Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia (Tow 1994: 151; Yahuda 1996a: 214). Moreover, China rejected the suggestion of bringing the perpetrators of Cambodian genocide to an international tribunal to avoid creating awkward legal precedents (Seymour 1998: 229). Over the first half of the 1990s, China has upheld the principle of sovereignty with regard to intervention and consistently opposed non-traditional aspects of peacekeeping. China’s stance reflects the way in which the Chinese leadership fears that multilateralism ‘may limit China’s diplomatic leverage or even directly challenge China’s claims over Taiwan and the South China Sea’ (Fravel 1996: 118). This stance culminated in China’s objections to the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999, which turned into heavy criticism after a US warplane bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, killing three Chinese citizens (Miles 2000). China’s complaints about the marginalization of the UN during the crisis

96 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Chinese foreign policy after the Cold War

reflected their own concerns over diminished influence in determining the terms on which intervention took place. This diplomatic marginalization, combined with local interests arising from the geographic proximity of the conflict, contributed to the emergence of a softer approach to negotiations over Security Council authorization of an Australian led international force in East Timor, during which China offered no public critique of UN actions. However, China’s behaviour was primarily motivated by concerns about its influence, rather than by a fundamental shift in its attitudes towards sovereignty (Gill and Reilly 2000: 50). Thus China’s behaviour with respect to international intervention over the 1990s was compatible with neorealist predictions. China’s stance with regard to the non-proliferation regime may be interpreted as reflecting behaviour compatible with neorealism. China acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1992, to the NPT extension in 1995, to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1994. In 1995 China also cooperated with the US in exerting pressure on North Korea over the issue of nuclear proliferation. However, these developments may be explained in a manner consistent with neorealist theory. As a nuclear power within the regime, the NPT and the 1995 NPT extension in no way constrained China’s ability to develop its nuclear weapons (Godement 1997: 103). China’s actions to control North Korean proliferation are entirely compatible with neorealist predictions because of its interest in taking such measures. Moreover, China did not endorse economic sanctions imposed by the UNSC, but insisted on bilateral action. It thereby made its efforts contingent upon American concessions on human rights and upon unconditional extension of the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) trading arrangement (Gu 1996: 312). China’s decision to join the MTCR may seem surprising because this was targeted at China after allegations that it provided missile technology to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iran and Syria. However, China only joined when the US agreed to rescind sanctions in the high-technology area, and has stressed its pledge is by no means irreversible (Godement 1997: 102). Moreover, allegations have continued to be made that China is violating the rules of the regime (Mullins 1995: 138). Thus in line with neorealist predictions, the MCTR is either so weak that it imposes no real constraints on China’s missile transfers, or the regime is likely to be ineffective. Finally, aspects of China’s economic strategies provide evidence that supports neorealist arguments. China’s trade surplus with the US has been significant, and China has come under increasing pressure from the US to cut trade barriers and increase the transparency of its legal system (Levine 1998: 104–105). Over the 1990s, China’s attempts to gain admission to GATT/WTO were blocked by the US on the grounds that China needed to liberalize its economy more extensively, a problem complicated by China’s desire to join this organization with developing country status. It has been argued that the US has covertly discriminated against China.

Chinese foreign policy after the Cold War 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

97

Finally, Harris identifies that over the 1990s the US was the one major trading country not unconditionally applying MFN treatment to China because its ability to do so was limited by the Jackson-Vanik amendment (Harris 1997: 147; Feeny 1998: 257–259). Between 1992 and 1994, the Clinton administration linked MFN to China’s progress on human rights (Levine 1998: 106). China views this as unfair trade competition. Furthermore, China uses mercantilist strategies to encourage trade and investment competition both between Europe, Japan and the US, and amongst European states (Cable and Ferdinand 1994: 255; Moller 1996; Maull 1997; Klein 1998). Such behaviour could be understood in terms compatible with the emerging structural conflict anticipated by the neorealist model. Overall, there is a significant body of evidence favouring a neorealist interpretation of China’s strategies between 1989 and 1999. In line with its rising economic power, China has modernized its military capabilities, and pursued an increasingly revisionist agenda over the post-Cold War period. This has brought China into conflict with both Japan and the US, particularly over unresolved territorial disputes in East Asia. China’s relations with other states in the international system have changed in line with its relative capabilities, and its attitudes towards intervention and the non-proliferation regime, and joining the WTO all show indications of patterns of behaviour that may be associated with neorealist predictions.

Institutionalism According to institutionalist theory, international institutions can take on instrumental value for states. Under certain conditions states will be encouraged to institutionalize aspects of their inter-relations when this facilitates the pursuit of national interests. However, where institutionalization imposes net costs on states, requiring considerable accommodation and adjustment on their behalf, they will reject institutional options. The conditions under which institutions can become valued by states are where there are complex patterns of interdependence and/or a well-developed body of pre-existing international institutions. In terms of absolute levels of interdependence, China’s economy has indeed developed important ties. Over the last twenty years, China’s economic interdependence with the world has risen dramatically in terms of trade and foreign investment. However, in terms of its distribution, China’s economic interdependence with the outside world is highly uneven across both geographic regions within China and industrial sectors (Funabashi 1994: 35–36; Segal 1994: 34–52; Robinson 1998: 204–210). Moreover, unlike Europe, East Asia did not inherit from the Cold War period a well-developed body of international regimes across a variety of issue areas (Buzan and Segal 1994: 15–17). Indeed, institutionalists have themselves recognized that complex

98 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Chinese foreign policy after the Cold War

patterns of economic and institutional interdependence may not be said to exist between many states in an Asian context. Joseph Nye, in his capacity as Assistant Secretary of State for Defense in 1995, recommended that the US maintain a strong forward defence presence in East Asia as a basis for developing multilateralism in the region. Whilst not fully substituting for a more mature pattern of interdependent relations in East Asia, Nye suggests that such a strategy can provide some of the preconditions necessary for international institutions to take on value for states such as China (Office for International Security Affairs 1995; see also Nye 1995). Aspects of China’s strategies are amenable to an institutionalist interpretation. Institutionalists could identify evidence that China has moderated its international behaviour significantly, even in core areas of its security strategies. There are signs that China has tolerated the US-Japan MST because it checks an expansion in Japan’s military role. In Nye’s words, ‘[i]n the absence of other institutions, Washington’s presence in East Asia provides stability. As long as the US exercises its power reasonably so that other countries (including China) continue to benefit from its stabilising influence . . . no country or coalition is likely to challenge it’ (Nye 1997: 77; see also Christensen 2001; Christensen 2003). Thus institutionalists could argue that the MST has moderated China’s behaviour and significantly reshaped its security expectations. Institutionalists could also argue that the MST means that the use of force by China to settle regional disputes entails major hazards. Gallagher applies this logic to the Spratly’s dispute. Segal concludes from China’s failure to resort to its threats of unilateral action over Hong Kong that Chinese behaviour was to some extent constrained (Gallagher 1994; Segal 1996: 21). Similar arguments can be made with respect to Taiwan. The PRC’s future economic vitality is linked closely to its extensive and rapidly growing trade and investment links with Taiwan. Invading or blockading Taiwan would also be extremely risky militarily given the continuation of the US military presence (Nye 1997: 75–77; Roy 1998b: 205–206; see also Shinn 1996: 75). Institutionalists might therefore downplay the significance of rising Chinese assertiveness in East Asia. China’s involvement in regional multilateral security arrangements may be used to bolster institutionalist claims. Notable here is China’s participation as a founding member in the ARF since 1993 (Yahuda 1996a: 215). China uses the ARF as a purely consultative institution (Garrett and Glaser 1994: 21). Nevertheless, Foot identifies a number of specific achievements it has made. First, it has encouraged Chinese officials to make public statements that have reiterated their government’s commitment to peaceful settlement of disputes within the region, except over Taiwan. Second, discussion within the ARF has led to China’s acceptance that some level of transparency does contribute to security. Finally, working within the ARF does impose constraints on China’s international actions because the image

Chinese foreign policy after the Cold War 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

99

costs associated with any transgression of embryonic norms or obstructionist behaviour are gradually increasing. Thus there are indications that the ARF has moderated China’s strategic expectations, albeit in a limited fashion. Institutionalists could also construct counter arguments to neorealist claims about China’s use of the non-proliferation regime. The NPT can reduce the likelihood that China’s neighbours will acquire nuclear weapons, thereby mitigating China’s need for deterrence (Garrett and Glaser 1995: 76). With regard to the MTCR, Rynhold suggests that ‘[t]he Chinese appear to perceive the proliferation issue as a bargaining chip . . . to smooth over the relationship [with the US], or to extract concessions on more vital matters such as Taiwan’ (Rynhold 1996: 109; see also Wallerstein 1996: 64). Such behaviour reflects tacit recognition of MTCR norms. China’s accession to a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in June 1996 potentially provides even stronger evidence in favour of institutionalist predictions. Whilst China did carry out a nuclear test in 1995, the acceptance of a zerolevel CTBT has frozen China’s nuclear capabilities. Commentators have explained China’s acceptance of the CTBT by pointing to the way in which it sees ‘security gains . . . in a test ban that further discourages nuclear proliferation, freezes the gap in nuclear weapons development between China and India, and prevents the gap between Russia and the US from widening’ (Garrett and Glaser 1995: 76; see also Mak 1998: 106). China’s incentives to freeze this gap were increased greatly because it had conducted its own nuclear test in May 1995, and indeed it had delayed the CTBT process to allow it to complete its nuclear modernization programme (Roy 1998b: 151). However, adhering to the CTBT also requires China to risk proliferation in South Asia, as has indeed recently occurred. In line with neorealist theory, Carpenter suggests that any attempt to lock India into the CTBT furthered India’s incentives to close the gap between its nuclear capabilities and those of China (Carpenter 1998: 2–3). China’s accession to the Treaty is therefore notable from an institutionalist perspective, especially if it continues to abide by it in the light of recent developments (Gill 2001: 261). Finally, over the 1990s China has made important adaptations to the norms of the major economic international regimes. In 1994 and 1996 China took major steps to comply with IMF exchange rate procedures and has been highly successful over the 1990s in gaining World Bank financial assistance for its modernization programme. China was insulated from the effects of the East Asian financial crisis because speculation against its currency was difficult given its lack of convertability for capital account transactions. Nevertheless, it resisted the temptation to devalue despite the immediate term benefits this might bring. It did so partly to prevent contagion of the crisis and partly because of its reputation as a cooperative member of the international financial order (Moore and Yang 2001). China has also pushed throughout the 1990s for membership of

100 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Chinese foreign policy after the Cold War

GATT/WTO, progressively lowering tariffs and adjusting to standards on economic transparency, despite Taiwan’s ‘customs territory’ status within this institution (Harris 1997: 139–140; Feeny 1998: 245–248; Roy 1998b: 92–94). In November 1999, China had signed an agreement with the US that guaranteed bilateral market access and committed it to meeting most of the difficult issues raised by WTO accession (Pearson 1999: 337). China’s involvement in APEC since 1991 also provides evidence in favour of institutionalist predictions. As well as enhancing China’s status, China views APEC as a means of pursuing its WTO accession objectives, and especially to put pressure on the US with respect to non-discrimination. APEC commitments ‘have been less specific than for the WTO but they have generally required constructive and co-operative participation’ (Harris 1997: 142). This has involved China in routine dialogue with APEC members, again implicitly including Taiwan (Funabashi 1994: 44; Yahuda 1996a: 215). China’s extensive use of and adaptation towards the norms of international economic regimes over the 1990s could be interpreted as supporting institutionalist’s predictions about its behaviour. Overall, however, general qualifications must be made concerning the strengths of an institutionalist interpretation of China’s post-Cold War strategies. The case for institutionalism relies on the negative argument that whilst China has shown signs of increasing assertiveness, this has been tempered by institutional frameworks. As has been discussed, there is available evidence that international institutions have affected important aspects of China’s foreign policy since 1989. However, it is difficult to make a convincing positive case that international institutions shaped underlying features of China’s post-1989 foreign policy.

Liberalism 1: domestic variation Liberalism predicts that a high degree of cultural and institutional variation will be built into the dynamics displayed by the emerging international system. This is due to the way in which the process of internalizing liberal norms will be affected by domestic coalitions within states reflecting embedded social identities, economic interests and domestic political institutions. For this reason, domestic preferences play a critical role in explaining international behaviour and outcomes in the liberal model. Liberalism also anticipates that states adopting a competitive security orientation and/or mercantilist economic tendency will come under pressure to internalize a liberal identity. This prediction will be assessed in the final section addressing the strategic choices faced by China. First, however, it is necessary to establish that domestic factors have played a more autonomous role in shaping China’s foreign policy over the post-Cold War period than anticipated by either neorealism or institutionalism. There is considerable evidence that neorealism and institutionalism fail to account for important dimensions of China’s post-Cold War strategies.

Chinese foreign policy after the Cold War 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

101

Neorealism and institutionalism share a focus on the way in which a state’s foreign policy is driven by external developments that can enhance a country’s relative or absolute status. By contrast, liberalism draws attention to the way in which China’s foreign policy may be influenced by domestic considerations. Kim, for instance, comments that the ‘defining feature [of China’s foreign policy] . . . is the high level of internal threats to the government’s security and legitimacy. External events . . . are seen primarily in terms of how they affect the state’s internal stability and legitimacy’ (Kim 1998: 19). His analysis suggests that China’s concern with its status had yielded to more immediate anxiety about its internal cohesion as a source of motivation for its international behaviour. In terms of its internal political organization, China faces profound economic, social and ideological changes that threaten to undermine its domestic regime. In economic terms, China’s pursuit of an export-led growth strategy has been associated with the devolution of control over the economy and foreign trade from central ministries to provincial, municipal and even county levels. In consequence, the Chinese executive has lost much of its authority over core areas of economic planning such as taxation and controlling the money supply (Segal 1994: 12–14; see also Kitano 1994: 154). Wider social changes have also seriously undermined the Chinese state. China is undergoing a general transition to a new generation of civilian and military elites. This has been accompanied by a rise in political mobilization reflecting increased ability and desire of social groups to influence domestic and foreign policy issues (Swaine 1995: 1). These developments have impacted on core areas of security concern to the Chinese state. Most obviously, they affected succession politics surrounding the death of Deng Xioping in 1996. Deng’s successor, Jiang Zemin, had to rely primarily on instruments of power other than personal authority such as his position within the executive and support from bureaucratic groupings, notably the PLA. Yet the PLA itself is no longer the cohesive entity it once was because corruption and its extensive involvement in non-military sectors of China’s export economy have severely undermined discipline and professionalism (Segal 1994: 26; Joffe 1997: 56). In combination, therefore, economic change and social modernization within China threaten core aspects of the regime’s internal sovereignty. A third challenge to the Chinese state is the threat to the legitimacy of Communist ideology brought on by economic and social change. Analysts have depicted this development in terms of the ‘legitimation crisis’ or a ‘crisis of faith’ in Communism. Levine identifies a shift from formal ideology Communism to ‘informal ideology’ in the form of a generic Chinese nationalism (Harding 1993: 38; Hamrin 1994: 94; Levine 1994: 43). However, even here Chinese authorities are facing mounting problems. First, it is difficult for Chinese authorities to bridge the gap between Communism and nationalism

102 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Chinese foreign policy after the Cold War because for forty years the party has been denouncing just about every feature of Chinese culture as a feudal abomination that should be obliterated. [Moreover] . . . it is not easy to articulate what exactly are the Chinese qualities that should be defended . . . [except] the belief that leaders have a claim to moral superiority as the defenders of the moral order, even if this means acting in . . . arbitrary ways. (Pye 1991: 63)

Second, the Communist Party’s attempt to appeal to nationalism is troubled by the emergence of a severe nationalities problem, particularly in China’s outer provinces. Separatist disturbances in Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia have been widespread, and have been taken very seriously indeed (Segal 1994: 30–31). Overall, China’s state elite faces an ideological vacuum at the heart of its attempts to consolidate its sovereignty. Many of the pressures on the Chinese regime have their roots in the liberalization that began in the 1970s. However, only after the developments in Tiananmen Square in 1989 did the scale of the challenges that the Chinese state faced become apparent. After June 1989: CCP hardliners attempted to address the accumulated ideological problems of the past decade. Unfortunately, no ready solution was at hand. Having drained the fouled oil of Maoist identity from the crankcase of Communist power, Deng and his associates had nothing to replace it with. So . . . they poured the oily sludge back in, hoping the engine would still run. (Levine 1994: 32) Tiananmen forced the Chinese elite to recognize the problems that modernization posed to their own legitimacy. Yet, in so doing it only made them aware of the necessity of continuing this strategy. In the wake of the Beijing massacre, many observers expected China to back away from economic reforms but Deng Xioping instead sped up economic reform to reinforce the legitimacy of the Communist Party (Segal 1994: 13). Furthermore, given the scope of the changes taking place in China, there is no easy way out of its predicament without widespread political upheaval affecting the whole of Chinese society. As Segal notes, ‘this is not just a crisis of the regime; it has important elements of a crisis of national identity’ (Segal 1994: 62; see also Kim and Dittmer 1993: 257). One major analyst has attempted to relate China’s internal political crisis to its international behaviour. Johnston argues that China has adopted ‘identity realist’ preferences. Identity realism suggests: Chinese leaders believe the primary dangers in their environment come from . . . challenges to the cohesiveness of internal order. The Chinese

Chinese foreign policy after the Cold War 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

103

leadership has tried to intensify popular identification with the regime and the nation-state, with the result that we have seen a . . . hardening of realpolitik discourse and behaviour. (Johnston 1999: 263–264) According to Johnston, the concept of identity realism is drawn from research into group identity formation and conflict. This literature holds that the creation of in-group identities leads directly to the devaluation of out-groups. This in turn leads to competitive interpretations of the relationship with the out-group. It is important to recognize that the in-group does not resent or distrust the out-group because of some tangible threat to in-group interests as neorealism/realism posits. Rather it is socialized and learned whether or not a tangible threat exists. Thus the causal arrow runs the other way to the direction suggested by neorealism because identity construction determines anarchy and how much fear and competition results. Under these circumstances, ‘the group needs to provide arguments about the competitiveness of the environment in order to reinforce ingroup identification. This is what realpolitik as ideology does’ (Johnston 1999: 288–291). Johnston argues that ‘efforts to increase the intensity of identification with the Chinese state – while never absent in post-1949 history, of course – picked up . . . after June 4, 1989’. Tiananmen ‘provided information to Chinese leaders that suggested more work needed to be done to intensify ingroup identification’ (Johnston 1999: 293–294). Johnston is clear that the critical shift in the intensity of ingroup identification occurred after the Tiananmen incident rather than in response to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. It is not, therefore, a product of structural changes associated with the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, Johnston also recognizes that the end of the Cold War has been extremely important for China’s crisis of identity. This is because the end of the Cold War has ‘reinforced information about ingroup-outgroup differences that were made especially apparent with June 4th’ by reducing US incentives to downplay political differences with China’ (Johnston 1999: 295). Moreover, the demise of the Soviet Union has dramatically reduced China’s vulnerability to direct invasion, such that for the first time in the history of the People’s Republic of China does not face an identifying or pressing external threat. As Segal notes, under these circumstances central government has more difficulty appealing to the myth of national unity (Segal 1994: 10; Shambaugh 1994: 48). Thus, paradoxically, the relatively benign systemic context poses a threat to the domestic legitimacy of the ruling elite. In this way, the close coincidence of the Tiananmen incident and the collapse of the Soviet Union had mutually reinforcing effects. Together they starkly revealed the fragility of the regime’s legitimacy so that, within the space of a few years, Chinese elites dramatically changed their perception of the strength of their political authority.

104 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Chinese foreign policy after the Cold War

The literature on China’s foreign policy frequently develops themes that resonate strongly with the motivational logic suggested by the concept of identity realism. Johnston points out that although China’s defence modernization drive ‘persists under near unipolarity, . . . Chinese assessments describe the post-Cold War period as the most benign period in Chinese strategic security since at least 1949’ (Johnston 1999: 263). Other analysts propose that China’s aggressive stance in the South China Sea reflects the way in which ‘economic reforms . . . . have put China’s conservatives on the defensive, and they are using nationalistic issues, like sovereignty over the Spratly’s, to assert themselves’ (Valencia 1995: 18; see also Segal 1994: 45). Austin argues that it is China’s public order crisis which lies behind increasingly assertive Chinese rhetoric over its disputes concerning Taiwan and Hong Kong and with Japan (Austin 1995: 15). More generally, Shambaugh comments that ‘[t]he end of the Cold War and the absence of an overt threat . . . belies a complex picture. China still feels insecure despite an unprecedented peaceful national security environment. This gives rise to an increasingly assertive nationalism and military build-up’ (Shambaugh 1994: 55; see also Shambaugh 1992: 89). Overall, identity realism suggests that domestic pressures have led China to pursue a foreign policy that, whilst superficially resembling neorealist behaviour, is actually underpinned by a very distinctive kind of political realism. Identity realism is capable of providing a consistent overall explanation of apparently contradictory features of China’s post-Cold War foreign policy behaviour. Whilst China has displayed a pronounced tendency towards a predominantly ‘realist’ foreign policy, it has also made significant use of international institutions over the 1990s. Goldstein argues that China pragmatically combines a subtle realpolitik effort at developing national capabilities with a level of diplomatic and economic engagement designed to maximize the benefits from interdependence (Goldstein 2003). However, a problem with this ‘neo-Bismarckian’ view of China’s grand strategy is that a mix of pragmatic acceptance and functional incentives has not motivated China’s significant use of institutional frameworks as institutionalism postulates. As Yahuda identifies: it is not that the entanglement with the outside world has tied [the regime’s] hands . . . or taught them the value of co-operative approaches to security, but rather that the harsh realities of the problems of maintaining their rule at home has persuaded China’s rulers of the imperatives of deepening economic engagement with the outside world. (Yahuda 1997: 7; see also Roy 1998b: 104) In line with identity realist behaviour, the overriding concern of the ruling elites with their internal sovereignty has led them to participate in inter-

Chinese foreign policy after the Cold War 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

105

national institutions. Moreover, the professionalization, pluralization and decentralization of the foreign-policy establishment has introduced uncertainties and incoherence into the policy-making process. Commentators have identified that policy uncertainty has lead to a reactive stance, and explains the somewhat opaque nature of China’s posture on many key issues such as the future of Taiwan or Korean unification. It also helps account for the anomalously high levels of its participation in some multilateral frameworks, for example the CTBT (Gill 2001; Kim 2001; Lampton 2001; Swaine 2001). An identity realist explanation of China’s post-Cold War foreign policy therefore reveals structural tensions at the core of China’s management of its interdependent relations. Whilst the elite have become reliant on engagement with the outside world for their legitimacy, this very interdependence poses a threat to its authority. Under these circumstances, the regime adopts realpolitik discourse and behaviour as the only means available to them to strengthen in-group identification. In turn, however, this generates structural policy incoherence and deep problems in China’s relations with the West. Johnston identifies the contradictions that lie at the core of China’s diplomatic conduct. He notes that: China’s self-identification has undergone . . . a blurring. The traditional sovereign-centric, autonomous major power identity . . . has been uneasily linked to a newer identity . . . [associated with responsible] participation in institutions. . . . This linkage has created a tension in diplomacy between China’s desire to show itself as an active, involved participant in international institutions . . . , and the desire to minimise commitments and constraints that are required by this participation. (Johnston 1998: 77) Similarly, Robinson recognizes that as China’s interdependence has risen: Beijing’s foreign policy could only become highly interactive, participatory and co-operative. But these attitudes by themselves did not spell interdependence. Rather a complex mix of dependence, autonomy (termed independence by the leadership), and interdependence ensued. (Robinson 1998: 40) This mix of inconsistent motivations is impossible to capture through a focus on China’s relative or absolute status as neorealism and institutionalism suggest. As Beylerian and Canivet conclude, the real preoccupation of the Chinese regime over the 1990s was not with status but with identity (Beylerian and Cavinet 1997: 222). Thus, unlike neorealist and institutionalist alternatives, identity realism neatly captures the distinctive way in which China’s foreign policy reflects the complexity of the

106 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Chinese foreign policy after the Cold War

relationship between its regime’s domestic authority and its external environment. Overall, a convincing case can be made for the prediction of the liberal model with respect to China’s post-Cold War strategies. This is not to claim that China has articulated a broadly liberal set of strategic preferences. Instead, China’s foreign-policy behaviour falls outside the ranges predicted by neorealism and institutionalism due to the strong influence of its strategic preferences on its international behaviour. China’s realist diplomatic conduct arises because of the distinctive way in which its ruling elite is both deeply reliant on the benefits of interdependence and fears its consequences. The concept of identity realism is able to explain apparently contradictory elements of China’s behaviour as consistent dimensions of a single underlying strategic orientation. However, this raises the deeper question of the extent to which China will be able to continue along its present path.

Liberalism 2: China’s choices The ‘engagement-containment debate’ has provided the most prominent way of framing the discussion about China’s political choices in the postCold War international system. This debate is concerned with how the US and the West more generally should conduct relations with a ‘rising China’. The engagement school follows institutionalist logic in advocating enmeshing China in international regimes in order to maximize the smooth integration of China into the international order. By contrast, the containment school follows neorealism in regarding conflict with China as likely in the face of its rising capabilities. They see China as a threat to the international system, and advocate balance of power tactics to deter or contain China (Shambaugh 1996: 184–185; see also Layne 1996; Shinn 1996). As a way of discussing China’s strategic options, the engagementcontainment debate is highly problematic. However, apparently polarized the positions are, in practice they are difficult to distinguish. Segal identifies that the debate is ‘often unsophisticated’, suggesting that although containment can work, China’s neighbours and powers further afield need to appreciate that they must use elements from a strategy of engagement as well (Segal 1996: 134). Similarly, on Shinn’s formulation, it is necessary to pursue a strategy of ‘conditional engagement’ as a more sophisticated alternative to unconditional engagement and pre-emptive containment (Shinn 1996: 3–4). What this blurring reflects is that in the absence of information about China’s intentions, its response to Western polices is difficult to anticipate. Advocates of either position must therefore qualify their prescriptions by making them in some way dependent or ‘conditional’ on certain types of behaviour. As Shambaugh identifies: [o]ften missing in the [engagement-containment] debate . . . is a consideration of China’s potential responses to these polarised policies and

Chinese foreign policy after the Cold War 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

107

. . . of the domestic variables inside China that will condition its external orientation. . . . The Western debate . . . treats China as a static entity that will simply have to adjust to whatever policy the other nations pursue. (Shambaugh 1996: 182; see also Sato 1998) Johnston provides an alternative framework for analysing China’s choices that is more amenable to consideration of internal factors. He distinguishes between learning and adaptation as different responses China could make to its changing international environment. Learning occurs: if change in policy is due to shifts in the central paradigm held by the policy makers . . . as new information about the external environment is internalised by the decision-makers. In contrast, in the adaptation model, a change in policy is due to tactical adjustment to changing external conditions. We should therefore expect to see no change in paradigm but rather a re-evaluation of the costs and benefits of previous tactics . . . as exogenous conditions change. (Johnston 1996: 31) Some proponents of engagement have made the argument that China has engaged in foreign-policy learning. For example, Harris argues that in the economic realm China did undergo a learning process. Chinese policy thinkers abandoned many deeply rooted assumptions and came to accept and internalize the need for economic cooperation. This provides evidence that China has engaged in ‘socialization’ towards liberal norms (Harris 1997: 150–151). However, such a view is rather simplistic because it presumes a relationship between China’s use of economic institutions and change in its underlying preferences. Pearson adopts a more cautious assessment. While noting that there are some indications that economic engagement has shaped China’s domestic political and economic coalitions in line with the norms of international economic regimes, she also points out that compliance was strongest when international regimes coincide with domestic commercial interests, thus weakening the argument for engagement having a socializing influence. Johnston and Evans similarly note that there are very few, if any, cases of security institutions altering China’s conceptions of its interests (Johnston and Evans 1999; Pearson 1999: 229). Even where there are limited signs of socialization, this reflects the growing disjointedness and incoherence of the foreign policy-making process and the policy uncertainty this has generated, and is not indicative of fundamental cognitive change (Gill 2001; Lampton 2001; Johnston 2003). Wang concludes that the argument that China is becoming socialized to the norms of multilateral institutions through its policy of engagement lacks plausibility. The norms these institutions embody ‘are far from being

108 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Chinese foreign policy after the Cold War

internalised . . . and are nowhere near being taken-for-granted’ by Chinese elites (Wang 2000: 486). These commentators are more sophisticated in their evaluation of the effects of China’s engagement because they recognize the way Chinese elites have ultimately embraced interdependence only in order to preserve their domestic authority. Indeed, China has adopted policy discourse and practices compatible with realism to compensate for the way in which interdependence poses a threat to its regime’s legitimacy. Thus China’s behaviour must be understood in terms of adaptation rather than learning. However, it is possible to develop a more sophisticated version of the argument that China today faces systemic pressures to fundamentally change the central paradigm held by foreign policy makers. On this formulation: interdependence is a predicament countries must deal with rather than a worldview or foreign policy strategy, and what matters most is China’s behaviour coping with this predicament, not whether its behaviour reflects learning or adaptation. (Moore and Yang 2001: 226) From this perspective, it is China’s distinctive inability to fully appreciate the consequences of its interdependence with the outside world that lies behind its deep crisis of national identity. One possible response the Chinese elite could make to this predicament is a shift towards ‘neo-conservatism’. Whilst a neoconservative revival in China may encourage it to adopt a more hard-line version of realpolitik, it should not be understood in neorealist terms. Rather, neoconservatism may be seen as a response to the intensification of China’s crisis of national identity since the late 1980s. Fewsmith notes that in the post-Tiananmen era, neoconservatism must be seen as a reaction to the way in which ‘the question is not so much whether to reform as how to hold on in the face of reform’ (Fewsmith 1995: 635). Neoconservatism shares the orientation of traditional conservatism towards maintaining cohesion in Chinese society. However, it is characterized by an acceptance of a much broader and more important role for market forces than traditional conservative thinking ever contemplated. Similarly, neoconservatism suggests that a patriotic appeal would be more effective than traditional socialist ideology in providing social integration. However, neoconservatism has important limitations as a viable political course for China because it has not yet presented any convincing arguments to address effectively the problems in Chinese society that it has identified. . . . [N]eoconservatives have not explained how their sense of nationalism can match China’s evident need to continue importing capital and exporting goods. (Fewsmith 1995: 649)

Chinese foreign policy after the Cold War 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

109

A neoconservative shift would therefore only exacerbate China’s current problems and speed up the process of regime transition. For this reason, the neoconservative option is perhaps not the most likely for China. A second course for the Chinese regime would be to continue with its present stance. Such an approach would be characterized by incremental responses to the challenges faced by the Chinese state, rather than the acceptance of fundamental political change. This strategy should therefore be seen as a form of ‘muddling through’ or adaptation, rather than in terms of learning. However, as with the neoconservative course, there are question marks about the sustainability of such an approach. Harding uses the term ‘decay’ to describe this direction for China (Harding 1993: 36; see also Harding 1994). The case of the handover of Hong Kong to China provides a useful indication as to why this is the case. Yahuda notes that how China handles the handover ‘will not only determine the fate of the former British colony . . . , but it will also shape the evolution of China’s political identity and its integration into the international community’ (Yahuda 1996b: 1). He identifies that there are strong functional incentives for China to demonstrate a commitment to the rule of law in Hong Kong. It would ease China’s entry into the WTO, and provide a strong precedent for a ‘one country, two systems’ approach to the integration of Taiwan into the PRC. However, he also stresses that: the return of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty will pose many problems to China itself. If the actual process of the transfer of sovereignty could be successfully managed, Hong Kong could then pose further challenges to the Chinese Communist government . . . as an attractive model for all those . . . who seek the benefits of a greater legality and an increased democratic accountability. (Yahuda 1996b: 4) Thus the handover of Hong Kong represents a ‘turning point’ for China. It points up the limitations of China accepting adaptation without addressing the more fundamental political issues this raises for the Chinese state. An alternative course to either neoconservatism or pragmatic adaptation would be for China to adopt a basic change in the cognitive framework informing its policy choices. This response would represent learning rather than adaptation by China. Once again, Hong Kong’s handover exemplifies China’s predicament. Whilst Hong Kong poses a major threat to the sovereignty of the Chinese regime, the problems it poses arise because the elite is reluctant to recognize processes of decentralization. Accepting a federal solution could be of great benefit to China, although as Segal identifies, at present ‘it is unlikely that . . . [it] will adopt a formally federal structure’ (Segal 1994: 63). As has been noted, there are important functional incentives for China to accept a ‘one country, two systems’ approach to the integration of Hong Kong. More fundamentally, however, such a

110 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Chinese foreign policy after the Cold War

solution would provide a more sustainable framework through which to enhance the legitimacy of the Chinese state. Whilst the regime would risk greatly increased separatist demands, pressures for decentralization are unlikely to wane unless a viable framework to accommodate them can be found. By acknowledging some decentralizing trends, Chinese authorities might make a formal break-up of China less likely. In this way, ‘[t]he recovery of Hong Kong . . . is occurring at a time when it could play an exceptional role in easing China’s painful transition’ (Yahuda 1996b: 14; see also Segal 1994: 64). If China were to adopt a learning response to its ongoing identity crisis, this could provide a more stable framework from which to engage other major powers, and might also promote China’s equality of status with them. China’s realist self-identification currently encourages it to behave in a confusing and inconsistent manner towards Western powers seeking engagement with it. At the same time, the debate over engagement versus containment of China in the West reflects uncertainties about China’s strategic intentions (Abramowitz 1998: 40; Funabashi 1998b: 53). By shifting towards an identity that allows China to articulate a more consistent set of priorities favouring engagement, it could facilitate this process and benefit accordingly from the economic benefits that flow from this. Furthermore, a change in the cognitive framework informing China’s foreign policy could promote its equality with other major powers. This is because China could reciprocally demand that Western powers develop more coherent policies towards engagement than they have to date. The 1996 Taiwan Straits missile crisis provides a suitable case in point. There are strong reasons to believe that incoherence in US policy rather than Chinese assertiveness lay behind this incident. US policy towards China had been poorly defined and sent ambiguous signals about the US’s intentions (Shinn 1996: 14; Lampton 1997: 1102). The US has subsequently clarified its policies through the publication of the conditional engagement strategy. Nevertheless, as a whole the West’s engagement policy remains fundamentally inconsistent. The unequal nature of the US-Europe and the US-Japan relationship has sent confusing messages to China. In the short term, this allows China to play off Western states against one another to achieve its own objectives (Moller 1996; Maull 1997; Sato 1998). However, it also inhibits China’s full participation in the international system, preventing China from developing its relations with both the US and Japan at the same time. Sato notes the ways in which an engagement strategy based on a more symmetrical US-Japanese relationship would reduce the threat to China’s security posed by the forward US defence presence, and allow China a greater role in shaping trilateral relations (Sato 1998: 14–20). The key principle is that by adopting a learning response to interdependence, China can more effectively demand reciprocity in the clarification of the West’s engagement policies (Jisi 1998: 22–23).

Chinese foreign policy after the Cold War 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

111

However, only a response involving a basic shift in the central paradigm held by Chinese policy makers – or learning – would provide it with a cognitive framework fully consistent with engagement with the outside world. Thus whilst the West can take significant steps to facilitate China’s integration into the international system, it is ultimately China itself which must make the most crucial decisions about its future international role. Since 1989, China’s political future has been radically open. The current elite’s stop-gap approach is unsustainable in the long term. Overall, ‘signs that China is changing shape are increasingly clear. A closer look at its national identity reveals fissures and pressures that have long been masked by an official determination to uphold the myth of national unity’ (Segal 1994: 54). In the face of this predicament, China could move in any one of a number of different directions. Both a shift towards neoconservatism or a compete break-up of China should not be ruled out. Ultimately, the fate of China will depend critically on how the Chinese manage their reforms. The elite’s distinctive political identity is currently the major obstacle preventing China from adopting a ‘learning’ response to the challenges it faces. Whilst the elite continues to block off fundamental change, the probable path in the medium term will be a continuation of pragmatic adaptation. As Segal recognizes, ‘[t]he most likely outcome is a prolonged crisis of identity, where changes short of a complete collapse have an important impact on the lives of the Chinese and its neighbours’ (Segal 1994: 62). Overall, the Communist regime is facing the problem that its ideology is no longer able to provide China with the national purpose it was once able to supply. Under these circumstances, China must be prepared to confront the way in which its existing political identity is no longer able to deal with the new challenges it faces. This requires the state elite to accept fundamental political change. However unlikely in the short term, China’s failure to take this course can only exacerbate its sense of insecurity within the international system. China’s identity crisis reflects the way in which the state lacks a stable ontological foundation in the sense that Communism has not been replaced by an ideology able to restore a stable sense of national cohesion. In an external environment full of changes the Chinese regime is preoccupied by possible risks to its existence, and finds itself paralyzed in terms of practical action. Moreover, the Chinese regime has become morally ‘empty’, and lacks legitimacy because it is unsure about the basis for its existence. Under these conditions it has difficulty formulating a coherent foreign policy, and consequently subjects its behaviour to constant scrutiny. Indeed, the essence of China’s identity crisis is that, paradoxically, the intensification since 1989 of its traditionally realist foreign policy orientation lies at the root of its deep sense of unease with the world. Until the regime comes to recognize this, China will continue to face structural problems in managing the transition to the post-Cold War world.

1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

6

Conclusions

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War generated both major opportunities and important problems for the study of international politics. Whilst these developments opened up extraordinary new avenues for research within the field, they have also been deeply unsettling for widely held assumptions. The period of post-Cold War transition has presented a historic context in which to test and refine competing theories of international relations. The preconditions are present for each of the three dominant perspectives on the international system to make a discrete set of predictions about the emerging international order. In line with structural or neorealism, the end of the Cold War has brought about a major shift in the global balance of power. In line with institutionalism, patterns of economic and institutional interdependence vary widely across key strategic regions. In line with liberalism, a stable core of liberal democracies overwhelmingly dominates the emerging international system for the first time in world history. Thus students of international relations have been presented with a situation that genuinely approximates a ‘real world laboratory’ for the evaluation of their central conceptual frameworks. Paradoxically, however, the end of the Cold War has placed enormous strains on the contemporary discipline. More than a decade on, the larger historical significance of the changes that took place in the international system between 1989 and 1991 is still far from clear. It remains wide open to debate, for example, why the Soviet Union came to such an abrupt end during this period, despite having been widely assumed to be stable throughout the Cold War. Similarly, the consequences of the disintegration of the Soviet empire for the emerging international order continue to be highly uncertain. The situation in which the international system finds itself today is not necessarily entirely new. Yet the unexpected nature and enormous scale of the changes associated with the end of the Cold War have added weight to the argument that the international system may be undergoing a transformation that established perspectives are poorly equipped to comprehend. Ambivalence about the significance of the end of the Cold War for research within the field has given rise to difficulties. In particular, there

Conclusions 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

113

has been a paucity of attempts to systematically address the conceptual problems raised by the failure to predict the collapse of the Soviet Union, and to use the resulting framework to analyse trends in the emerging international order. By confronting directly the full range of theoretical and empirical issues raised by the end of the Cold War, the present study has attempted to address this gap in the literature. The theoretical chapter addressed the issue of reconceptualizing the international system for the post-Cold War period. It scrutinized the conventional understanding of the relationship between neorealism, institutionalism and liberalism, and evaluated the prospects for a new synthesis of their insights. This new synthesis sought to both integrate the collapse of the Soviet Union into a conception of overall historical tendencies within the international system, and generate a broader research agenda into the nature of postCold War order than that produced by debates between neorealists and institutionalists. Case studies of the foreign policies of major states over the period between 1989 and 1999 were then examined in the light of the theoretical models. Studying the responses of these countries to the end of the Cold War provided indications of empirical trends in the emerging international system. The conclusions summarize the theoretical and empirical findings of the study in three sections. The first section reflects on the implications of the Soviet collapse for systemic approaches to international relations, and sets out the implications of liberal theory for research programmes within the field after the Cold War. It highlights the distinctive capacity of liberalism to synthesize the insights offered by competing schools of thought, and the importance of the concept of reflexivity. The remainder of the conclusion summarizes the empirical findings with respect to the nature of change in the post-Cold War international system. The second section focuses on general patterns of institutionalized activity in relations between the major powers. The third section discusses foreign policy adjustments between 1989 and 1999. The book concludes by reflecting upon the methodological status of the knowledge about the post-Cold War international system that it has produced. In particular, consideration is given to the relationship between knowledge about changes in the international system it contains, and the reflexivity in the international system documented.

International relations theory after the Cold War The collapse of the Soviet Union raised important questions about the way in which long term dynamics within the international system are conceptualized. This was dramatically revealed by the failure of established theories to predict this development. The publication of Waltz’s Theory of International Politics in 1979 placed the concept of the ‘international system’ in a position of central importance in the discipline. Systemic approaches promise generalizable explanations, and offer strong

114 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Conclusions

predictive statements. Thus failure to predict perhaps the most important geopolitical development in world politics during the second half of the twentieth century ought to be of particular concern. The most prominent exponents of systemic theory have suggested that this development should be understood as an exogenous shock in international relations. Waltz himself argues that the Soviet collapse should be viewed as an event with unit level causes, but as generating structural consequences. Keohane has similarly argued that a development of the magnitude of the Soviet collapse is simply beyond the purview of systemic theory to either predict or explain, and likens this event to the impact of a meteor strike in the study of palaeontology. Yet the irony in these judgements ought to be clearly apparent from the logic of systemic arguments. It is precisely the ‘few big and important things’ that occur in international politics that systemic theory is uniquely positioned to identify. Thus neither Waltz nor Keohane give enough consideration to the possibility that conceptions of the international system established during the Cold War were simply too narrow to adequately capture overall historical tendencies within it. Limitations of the debates between structural realists and institutionalists are also reflected in the research programme they have proposed for the post-Cold War period. Debates between these schools have suggested that attempts to refine rationalist models provided the most fruitful agenda for research in the field after the Cold War. Theoretically, research should focus on the conditionality of relative gains-seeking behaviour. Empirically, research should focus on the interaction between international institutions and state behaviour within Western Europe. As a region where patterns of economic and institutional interdependence are well developed, realism and institutionalism offer divergent hypotheses about the nature of international change. Indeed, an important body of research has emerged from these theoretical controversies. This has provided a preliminary assessment of the way in which the major powers in Europe used international institutions in adapting to the changes of the 1989–1991 period (Keohane et al. 1993). However, a limitation of this research programme is its remarkably narrow nature, with the result that it excludes major arenas of inquiry. For example, realists have identified that in East Asia there are clear candidates for major power status, but patterns of economic and institutional interdependence remain under-developed. In the absence of the preconditions for peaceful change identified by institutionalists, realist predictions about growing instability in this region after the Cold War remain unchallenged. Keohane acknowledges that the end of the Cold War has added a dialectic between theory and practice to that between competing schools (Keohane 1993: 297). Nevertheless, the research programme put forward by realists and institutionalists clearly implies that theories of the international system established during the Cold War do not need to be revised fundamentally in the light of developments in international politics over the 1990s.

Conclusions 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

115

William Wohlforth has attempted to reformulate the neorealist model so as to make it compatible with a broader research agenda that includes the prospect of great power stability at a global level (Wohlforth 1999). According to this argument, the concentration of American capabilities within the international system is so great that it prohibits systematic attempts at counter-balancing by secondary states. However, there are various problems faced by this variant of hegemonic stability theory. First, like orthodox neorealism and institutionalism it cannot provide an endogenous account of the collapse of the Soviet Union in terms compatible with the orthodox neorealist model. Wohlforth has developed a sophisticated classical realist account of the end of the Cold War that takes account of the way in which the Soviet Union was a declining challenger rather than a declining hegemon. This historical contingency can, Wohlforth proposes, help realism explain the timing and peaceful character of the end of the Cold War (Wohlforth 1995). However, as Wohlforth fully acknowledges, this approach dilutes systemic logic in the attempt to broaden realism’s explanatory power. Second, as was noted in the introduction, Wohlforth’s argument about the stability of the unipolar world is not compatible with the essential logic of orthodox neorealist theory despite its structuralist and materialist orientation. Orthodox neorealism associated with Waltz holds that a high concentration of capabilities with the hegemon will, if anything, further encourage lesser countries to balance against the most powerful actor within the international system. The hegemon’s disproportionate power will generate structural conflicts of interest to emerge between it and secondary states, and the hegemon will also be tempted to abuse its unchecked power. Thus the concentration of capabilities within the system will gradually ‘wash out’ as the global balance of power is restored. Wohlforth’s modification of neorealist theory is therefore open to the criticism that it provides a post hoc rationalization of the predictive failures associated with conventional neorealism’s account of the emerging structure of international politics. For this reason, Wohlforth’s modified structural realist argument for the stability of a unipolar world has not been operationalized and tested within the scope of the present study. Instead, the debates between orthodox neorealism and institutionalism have been taken as the key points of reference for system level theory. Clark has argued that more than a decade’s theoretical debate in the field has failed to provide an overarching framework for the analysis of the post-Cold War order. He therefore eschews this approach in favour of a historically informed analysis (Clark 2001: 36). If correct, this represents a damning indictment of debates that have taken place in international relations theory over the past two decades. Systemic approaches imply that the end of the Cold War should have provided as close as is possible an ideal situation in which to test and refine competing theories. An alternative view, however, is that patterns of change since 1989

116 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Conclusions

necessitate a more thoroughgoing reassessment of theories of the international system than has been put forward to date. Contrary to the claims of realists and institutionalists, systemic theory must be comprehensively revised in the light of the end of the Cold War. First, theories of international relations must be able to offer an endogenous account of the Soviet collapse. This development cannot be considered as simply a reflection of internal processes particular to the Soviet Union at a specific historical juncture. Instead, it must be integrated into a coherent account of long-term tendencies within the international system. Second, theories of the international system developed during the Cold War must be thoroughly overhauled if they are to adequately capture the dynamics of the emerging international order. The end of the Cold War should be seen as marking a fundamental shift in the overall trajectory of socialization generated by the international system. This shift has affected the structure of relationships between all the major powers, and has radically altered the prospects for peaceful change in the international system on a global scale. It therefore requires a much broader agenda for research than that put forward by established theories. The starting point for this alternative approach is to question institutionalism’s interpretation of neorealism. Prominent institutionalists have developed the argument that neorealism relies on the assumptions that states act rationally in pursuit of their national interests. In turn, institutionalists use their interpretation of neorealism to develop their own critique of its central arguments. Drawing on rational choice analysis and theories of market failure from microeconomics, institutionalists seek to demonstrate that international cooperation is possible even in the absence of a centralized enforcement agency in the international system. However, on closer examination institutionalists may have distorted neorealism’s character. Waltz has consistently rejected the view that his theory relies on the assumption of rational behaviour. Instead, he insists it relies on selection effects generated by interaction in a competitive environment. Viewed in this way, neorealism should be understood as focusing on processes of identity construction and socialization arising from the generative consequences of anarchy. In this sense it relies on a reflexive logic and is therefore closer to liberalism in terms of its conception of system composition and dynamics than it is to institutionalism. Of course, the account of state socialization provided by the neorealist model is a truncated one. Neorealist assumptions about the nature of anarchy commit it to the reproduction of a competitive environment organized around the balance of power. For this reason, neorealism remains possible to view through rationalist lenses. Nevertheless, this should not detract from neorealism’s reflexive quality, and Waltz’s preference for relying on socializing feedback within the international system. On the basis of this interpretation of neorealism, it is possible to reject a linear understanding of the relationship between neorealism, institu-

Conclusions 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

117

tionalism and liberalism in which institutionalism is seen as providing the point of synthesis on a spectrum that runs between neorealism and liberalism. Instead, the relationship between the three models should be understood in terms of a triangle, with debates between neorealists and institutionalists constituting the triangle’s rationalist leg and debates between neorealists and liberals constituting its reflexivist leg. This view of the relationship between the three models also implies a reformulation of current orthodoxy on liberal theory. The current consensus is that liberalism focuses on the international consequences of domestic structure. Moravcsik (1997) has recently generalized such a framework to develop a liberal model granting casual priority to the domestic preferences. However, drawing on Wendt’s constructivist research, it is possible to produce a more systemic formulation of liberal theory in which the international system is regarded as having a self-transforming logic. Understood in this way, liberalism’s focus on the generative consequences of anarchy and the overall trajectory of socialization within the international system is likely to prove more productive in the search for a general synthesis of competing theories of international politics than institutionalists’ attempts to refine rationalist models. This view of contemporary debates shifts the emphasis away from refining rationalist models by opening up more fundamental questions about how patterns of socialization within the international system might vary historically. In so doing, it points the way forward to a new synthesis in which the democratic peace is viewed as generating socialization effects once a critical mass of liberal democracies has emerged at global level. Prior to this stage, institutionalization may occur within the narrow ranges specified by institutionalist theory, but the dominant equilibrium will continue to be provided by a Waltzian balance of power. After this stage, however, there is a shift in the trajectory of socialization away from the balance of power and towards the democratic peace. Institutional density will therefore increase more quickly reflecting a shift in the system’s cultural structure. Thus the distinctive ability of liberalism to provide a general account of variation in socialization promises to subsume the insights of neorealism and institutionalism into a much broader account of the historical development of world politics. The concept of reflexivity has been identified as central to a liberal model of socialization. Following Wendt, reflexivity is defined in terms of a capacity on the part of units for critical self-awareness and cultural change (Wendt 1999: 375). A system that has achieved reflexivity is experiencing a major shift in the overall trajectory of socialization within it. Under these conditions, a permissive space is opened up which encourages actors to voluntarily adopt shifts in their identity. Once a critical mass of liberal states emerges, this produces a shift from a Lockean to a Kantian culture as the dominant structure of interaction within the system. This change is associated with a switch in the underlying trajectory of

118 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Conclusions

socialization away from a Waltzian balance of power and towards the democratic peace. The overwhelming strength of the states approximating liberal norms within the system’s core means that a wide range of functional and material incentives also exist to engage in cooperation and interact commercially with states within the core. However, a system that has achieved reflexivity will also open up a space for states to exercise voluntary agency and freely choose to join the core. Individual states may resist this trend, but over the longer term great powers will not have this option because in order to maintain a high level of performance they require extensive and routine engagement with more liberal states. Domestic coalitions reflecting embedded domestic political institutions, cultural identities and commercial interests will mediate the socialization pressures generated by the system. Thus a high degree of domestic cultural and institutional variation is built into the socialization dynamics modelled by liberal theory. Nevertheless, the system will allow a space for units to engage in cultural change and punish through cultural selection processes those that fail to do so. Over time, therefore, a range of systemic forces encourages the emergence of a growing normative consensus around the democratic peace. This consolidates the dominance of the system by a core tending towards liberal cultural norms, thereby further enhancing reflexivity within the system. The system as a whole begins to snowball as progressive change gathers historical momentum through the creation of a self-reinforcing positive feedback loop. This process is illustrated in Figure 6.1. It seems plausible to hypothesize that an obvious point of historical reference for the emergence of a critical mass of liberal democratic states is provided by the recent collapse of the Soviet Union. Liberalism is distinctively positioned to offer a plausible explanation of this development, and

Increased unit autonomy (capacity for critical self-reflection)

Socialization pressures (internalization, subject to domestic variation)

Identity construction (cultural change)

Reinforced structure of interaction (strengthened liberal core)

Figure 6.1 Reflexivity in the international system (Part A)

Conclusions 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

119

account for why it may constitute a point of enormous significance for the pattern of development in world politics. Rather than understanding the end of the Cold War as an exogenous shock, as prominent neorealists and institutionalists have argued, the Soviet collapse may instead be understood as reflecting cultural selection processes within the international environment. In this view, highly illiberal regimes lack flexibility and will be eliminated as significant actors in long-term competition with more open societies. This is a systemic argument that does not rest on claims about the particular political status of Russia as the Soviet Union’s primary successor state. Instead it posits a transformative logic produced by cultural processes that are deeply embedded in overall tendencies contained within the international system. Viewing the Soviet collapse in these terms allows it to be understood as symptomatic of general forces at work in world politics rather than being understood as a contingent occurrence reflecting a peculiar conjunction of forces unique to a particular state at a specific juncture. It therefore facilitates the incorporation of one of the most important occurrences in international affairs in the second half of the twentieth century into a coherent overall picture of global historical change. Moreover, liberalism is uniquely positioned to identify the wider historical significance of the collapse of the Soviet Union for the subsequent development of world politics. With the end of the Cold War, the international system may plausibly be viewed as having achieved the extent of norm convergence required to push it beyond a point of criticality. Once the tipping point has been reached, the democratic peace begins to generate powerful socialization effects that will affect great power relations on a global scale. Following Wendt, it is acknowledged that changes in the cultural structure associated with the achievement of criticality should be viewed as being multiply realizable. Different combinations of states that have internalized different cultural norms to different degrees may realize different cultural structures. There is thus no single a priori route by which a critical mass of liberal states may be brought into existence. Given difficulties in quantifying precisely the tipping point, a more sensible approach is to hypothesize the existence of a critical mass and test the behavioural predictions that this implies against the empirical record. Indeed, one of the most distinctive and persistently commented upon features of the post-Cold War order is the replacement of polarity with a core-periphery formation as its dominant structural feature. In many parts of the world, such as the Middle East, states tend to diverge heavily from the norms of the liberal core. However, it remains plausible in the post-Cold War period to argue that enough great powers approximate to membership of a liberal pacific union to push the system as a whole beyond criticality. Following this precedent, it becomes reasonable to pursue the hypothesis that the Soviet collapse does indeed represent one path on a multiply realizable route to structural change in the international system. This hypothesis is, of course, open to falsification. It

120 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Conclusions

would only be confirmed if the prediction that the democratic peace has begun to generate socialization effects can be substantiated with evidence drawn from empirical trends in post-Cold War international relations. In Social Theory of International Politics, Wendt proposes that it is possible that the international system may be in transition from a Lockean culture organized around the balance of power to a Kantian culture in which the norms of the democratic peace define the dominant socialization tendency. Wendt’s book already has attracted sustained critical attention. In a prominent response, Keohane has argued that whilst Wendt provides a penetrating theoretical framework, his approach fails to connect theoretical themes with identifiable empirical trends (Keohane 2000: 126). Wendt responds that the framework he sets out does contain definite hypotheses of use in framing empirical research. However, he is forced to concede that his own book ‘does not adduce much empirical evidence’ to support his theoretical claims (Wendt 2000: 174). The applied component of the present study directly addresses the empirical questions raised by Wendt through a systematic study of the strategies of major states between 1989 and 1999. Embarking on such an endeavour inevitably raises methodological questions about the measurement of the theoretical predictions offered by liberalism. If the democratic peace has replaced the balance of power as the dominant trajectory of socialization in the international system, there is a need to identify a set of criteria capable of identifying this empirical trend. It has therefore been proposed that the socialization pattern envisaged by liberal theory may be compared with trends that Kapstein and Mastanduno have associated with bandwagoning within a unipolar power structure (Kapstein and Mastanduno 1999; see also Huntley 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Harrison 2001; Mitchell 2002). Using Unipolar Politics as a template for research design provides a convenient springboard for the identification of two discrete and operationalizable points of comparison between these empirical trends. The first point of similarity between hegemonic bandwagoning and liberal socialization concerns the general pattern of institutionalized activity that occurs in the international system. Both trends predict the emergence of a peaceful structure of great power relations on a global scale. Hegemonic bandwagoning and liberal socialization may be distinguished by examining the type or quality of institutionalized relations which emerge between major states. A liberal international system will be characterized by a more equal structure of great power rights and responsibilities than within a hegemonic system. Nevertheless, the overall outcome of a peaceful global structure of great power relationships is common to both trends. The second point of comparison between liberal socialization and hegemonic bandwagoning concerns the foreign policy adjustments made by individual states to the collapse of the Soviet Union. In terms of this criterion, both trends envisage that there will be a wide degree of domestic cultural and institutional variation in the strategies pursued by the major

Conclusions 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

121

powers. In the bandwagoning model, this reflects the weakness of systemic pressures encouraging balancing, whereas in the liberal model this is viewed as indicative of an internalization lag during which states are exposed to systemic pressures encouraging them to engage in cultural change. Thus examining closely the long-term viability of the foreign-policy adjustments of major states over the period of post-Cold War transition should provide an indicator with which to assess the predictions of the liberal model. The following two sections of the conclusions summarize the empirical findings of the three cases examined in this study in terms of the two behavioural indicators specified.

General patterns of institutionalized activity The Cold War has now been over for more than a decade, providing an extended time frame in which to test the predictions of general theories of the international system. If the environment in which major powers interact with others does significantly affect their behavior, the tendencies that this is giving rise to ought to be apparent. Indeed, each of the three theoretical frameworks under assessment is useful in explaining the dynamics of great power relations during the period under examination. However, general patterns of institutionalized activity between major states also pose significant puzzles for both neorealist and institutionalist predictions. Anomalies for neorealism and institutionalism combine to provide evidence of the type of qualitative shift in the structure of institutionalized great power relationships predicted by liberal theory. Table 6.1 summarizes the findings of the book with respect to this criteria for measuring change in the post-Cold War international system. Both neorealism and institutionalism are useful in explaining aspects of great power activity in the international system that emerged between 1989 and 1999. Neorealism does appear to account for some dimensions of German strategies. Parts of the process of unification, the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, the ERM crisis, and concerns over the EU budget

Table 6.1

General patterns of institutionalized activity

Country

Restructuring of institutionalized activity

Germany

Shift from ‘policy taker’ to ‘policy maker’ role within NATO and EU (particularly shift to use of force abroad in support of the former). Incoherence of Yoshida Doctrine; mounting pressures to make an independent contribution to major security and economic regimes. Engagement of China on the basis of its growing equality of status with the US and Japan.

Japan China

122 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Conclusions

all caused significant tensions with Germany’s major partners. Japan’s relations with both the United States and China have shown signs of strain, and this has increased anxieties about security in the East Asia region. In line with neorealism, China’s rise as a major regional power has certainly raised alarms about the effects of its revisionism on the balance of power. Institutionalism also provides a useful lens with which to examine aspects of the strategies of the three countries. Germany’s behaviour towards major multilateral frameworks such as NATO, the EU as well as global economic regimes has certainly been heavily influenced by functional incentives to engage in cooperation. Japan has participated in regional multilateral institutions, and its role in major global regimes can broadly be characterized as supportive. Despite China’s rising capabilities, it has been drawn into at least a tacit acceptance of cooperative security and economic regimes at both global and regional levels. This partly reflects the benefits that China stands to accrue through participation in such institutions. It is also the case that some combination of neorealist and institutionalist explanations may be required to understand trends within specific issue areas. Coherent accounts of the operation of the non-proliferation regime in East Asia can be constructed using either neorealism or institutionalism. Similarly, economic diplomacy between the major powers is characterized by both high levels of cooperation and also exhibits concerns over relative gains. However, the overall pattern of institutionalized activity that has emerged does not fit well into the predictions offered by neorealism and institutionalism. Within this debate, neorealists predicted discontinuity in key multilateral frameworks, and interpret signs of discontinuity as favouring the emergence of a conflictual multipolar international structure. Institutionalists responded to neorealist arguments by anticipating continuity in the post-War structure of multilateral arrangements between the major powers. Changes would occur, but these would be of an incremental nature. East Asia provides a difficult case for institutionalist predictions in the absence of well-developed patterns of economic and institutional interdependence. However, following Nye’s assessment of security considerations in the region, institutionalists argued that if the US acts as a benign hegemon then this could provide a basis for the development of multilateralism. The problem faced by neorealism and institutionalism is that it is not clear that these models adequately capture the underlying trend. Contrary to neorealism, trends between 1989 and 1999 appear to have consolidated a peaceful and cooperative structure of great power relations at a global level. Contrary to institutionalism, there are signs of discontinuity in the basic structure of relations between the great powers. Problems for both neorealism and institutionalism are particularly acute in East Asia, where there are indications that the US security presence may actually be an obstacle to a peaceful structure of relations between the major states.

Conclusions 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

123

Between 1989 and 1999 there was evidence of considerable restructuring in general patterns of institutionalized activity between the major powers across both Europe and East Asia. In a European context, the most notable shift has been Germany’s attitude towards the use of force in a non-self-defence capacity. Pressure for change began to mount as far back as the Gulf War, when Germany was accused of relying upon chequebook diplomacy. In the wake of the Yugoslav crisis, Germany reinterpreted its constitution so as to allow its armed forces to take part in interventions outside the NATO area. The Yugoslavia crisis further galvanized the emerging view within the German elite that military contributions were required to support NATO/UN interventions. By the time of the Kosovo crisis, Germany accepted a major role in the bombing campaign during Operation Deliberate Force. This was despite a change in administration from the CDU to an SDP-Green coalition. Moreover, during this period the US encouraged growing German military involvement in out of area NATO activities. Although it remained anxious about the potential implications of this shift for the division of responsibilities between NATO and European institutions, the US appeared to accept the principle that the Cold War status quo on security burden sharing should alter. Overall, therefore, the first decade of the post-Cold War period led to important shifts in the division of responsibilities within key multilateral security frameworks on the part of both Germany and America. The unified Germany also came to play a more active role in the development of European integration than it had done during the Cold War period. This was as a result of the costs imposed by German unification, and the constraints imposed on German financial contributions to the EU by simultaneous enlargement and deepening of integration. The first steps in this process became apparent in the early 1990s when increases in German interest rates in the wake of the economic problems posed by unification caused strains in relations with other European states. By the latter half of the 1990s, Germany was showing signs of a definite shift in its attitude towards European integration. In key areas relating to its budgetary contributions to the EU, Germany had shifted from a policy taker to a policy maker orientation. This reflected Germany’s concerns that its disproportionate contribution to the European budget would become unsustainable if the EU was to expand to the east. Strains between Germany and France also began to emerge over voting rights and QMV within the European Council and over issues such as the nationality of the chair of the European Central Bank. Thus there are indications that Germany’s increased size and population has upset the traditional post1945 Franco-German entente. However, Germany’s overall commitment to sponsoring the European integration process increased dramatically during the 1990s. It is therefore also possible to view the changes that have taken place as indicating that Germany is increasingly moving towards equal negotiating status with other major powers within the EU. On this

124 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Conclusions

account, changes in Germany’s stance reflect a maturing of its relations with its key European partners that parallels the shift in its relations with the US within security institutions. In the case of Japan, elites have been slower to accept changes in the status quo. Like Germany, Japan adopted a civilian power orientation during the Cold War, and came under pressure in the wake of the Gulf conflict to make direct military contributions. Yet it has subsequently proved extremely reluctant to participate even in non-combatant peacekeeping activities within a UN framework. In 1992 it did alter its constitution so as to allow SDF participation in these activities, although it did so in the face of intense external diplomatic pressure. Japan’s National Defense Planning Outline in 1995 actually made provisions for a significant reduction rather than an increase in Japan’s defence capabilities, indicating an intention to continue to rely on American security protection. Nevertheless, the reactive character of the development of Japan’s attitudes with respect to the use of force abroad is indicative of the incoherence of its stance. There is a growing consensus that the current structure of US-Japanese security relations is unsustainable. Sheltering Japan under the US security umbrella discourages it to contribute more to the maintenance of international security, and invites American criticisms of free-riding. A reduction in the US’s defence presence in East Asia therefore would provide a means of strengthening the Mutual Security relationship. Only in this way will it be possible to encourage Japan to make a more active military contribution than it does at present. This would require a comprehensive change in the present structure of US-Japanese security relations. A more equal structure of rights and responsibilities for maintaining international security between the two powers represents a more viable and sustainable option for both countries than attempts to either preserve the current status quo or pursuit of power balancing. Japan faces a parallel set of issues in terms of its economic diplomacy. Over the 1990s Japan continued with an economic strategy that had a distinctly mercantilist character. It used a variety of economic levers of statecraft in pursuit of this objective. On trade policy, Japan was slow to engage in liberalization, and frequently did so only in response to gaitsu. Japan also used extensive aid donations and its leading role in the Asian Development Bank to lever open foreign markets for Japanese firms. However, the inadequacy of this strategy was exposed during the East Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s. The crisis exposed the way in which linkages between economic and security dimensions of its grand strategy created tensions for Japanese diplomacy. During the crisis, relations between the US and Japan deteriorated significantly. For Japan, it exposed the acute vulnerability it faced by remaining dependent on the US military guarantee for its security. In times of economic difficulty, this gave America a hugely exaggerated influence over Japan’s economy. For the US, the crisis revealed the extent to which the security umbrella it

Conclusions 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

125

provides has fostered a passive Japanese political role that favours mercantilist economic priorities. It also highlighted the way that ‘civilian power’ arguments are open to manipulation by domestic elites wishing to present a benign diplomatic face to the outside world whilst in reality focusing on narrower nationalist objectives. The effects of the crisis on US-Japan relations can be understood as reflecting latent conflicts that are resurfacing in the post-Cold War period. In the absence of a clear Soviet threat, economic priorities are emerging as a potential source of dispute between the two countries. However, an equally plausible assessment is that the two countries are being pushed towards a more balanced and mature relationship across a range of economic and security issues. Japan is being encouraged to adopt a more liberal stance on issues of economic diplomacy, whilst the US is likely to face a Japan that adopts a more active political role in managing its external relations with key partners. The engagement of China also appears to be driving considerable restructuring in relationships between the major powers. An engagement strategy is an important prerequisite to locking China into peaceful relations with other key actors. However, if engagement is to be successful it is important that it occurs on the basis of broad equality of status between China and other major states. The continued American defence presence in East Asia is viewed as threatening by China. Restructuring the US security relationship with Japan and reducing the American military presence in the region is therefore likely to provide an effective means of enhancing regional stability. Moreover, assertive behaviour by China should not always be viewed as arising from aggressive Chinese revisionism. US policy can also send confusing messages to Beijing and generate a negative reaction, implying that America must also shoulder some responsibility for periods of poor relations. It is highly plausible, for example, that the 1996 Taiwan Straits missile crisis was a result of the unclear diplomatic messages sent by an inexperienced US administration. Inequities in the relationship between the US and Japan as well as the US and Europe also undermine the effectiveness of engagement because differences between the policies of Western states generate contradictory sets of incentives and constraints for China. This also allows it to play different partners off against one another to achieve its own objectives. This is a particular issue in US-Japan engagement with China, where US diplomacy on human rights and security issues is frequently undermined by Japanese economic diplomacy. Finally, China too stands to benefit from promoting its equality of status with other major powers rather than seeking regional hegemony. By accepting equality with other major powers, it can more reasonably expect to both reduce the US security presence in East Asia, and facilitate more consistent treatment by Western states. It can in this way build the most stable long-term platform to ensure extensive engagement and sustain continued economic growth. Across all three cases, it is important to emphasize the complexity of the linkages that exist between diplomacy on security and economic issues.

126 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Conclusions

In particular, institutionalists tend to view these components of diplomacy as discrete when there are actually close connections between them. This follows logically from the argument that there will be underlying continuity in the structure of post-War relations between the major powers. The structure of multilateral relations inherited from the Cold War is skewed heavily in favour of security agreements that are strongly asymmetrical because they presuppose US military hegemony. They therefore imply a functional division of labour involving horizontal stratification within the international system. Within this ‘layer cake’ arrangement, secondary states take on civilian power roles, and specialize in support systems of governance to manage economic and ecological interdependence. This allows institutionalists to counter structural realist claims about emerging positional great-power competition. However, this way of framing the debate over the nature of change in the post-Cold War international system fails to recognize the possibility that the asymmetrical structure of multilateral frameworks that developed during the Cold War may actually inhibit the overall development of international cooperation between the major powers. It can encourage Cold War allies to adopt a passive role and foster dependency on the US. With former Cold War adversaries, extensive security involvement in key strategic regions by the US is seen as threatening and complicates the diplomacy underpinning economic engagement. Overall, the dominant trend in the international system appears to be producing a more symmetrical structure of rights and responsibilities between the great powers across both security and economic issues. This implies a vertically stratified division of labour structured around growing functional equality between the major powers. Moreover, this pattern is apparent in both Europe and East Asia, despite wide variations in patterns of economic and institutional interdependence across these regions. In general, there are indications of major discontinuities in the general pattern of institutionalized activities between the great powers over the first decade of the post-Cold War period. There are pressures on the US to reduce the military involvement in Europe and East Asia that it built up during the Cold War. There are also pressures on secondary states in these regions to upgrade their contributions to multilateral security and economic institutions, and also exert their own influence on a more autonomous basis than in the past. These discontinuities pose anomalies for institutionalist predictions of continuity in the structure of post-1945 multilateral agreements after the Cold War. However, neither do they fit well with neorealist hypotheses. While elements of positional greatpower competition are present in the emerging international order, the dominant tendency actually appears to be towards a qualitative shift in the density and structure of multilateral relations between the major powers. This is visible in two pronounced trends. First, patterns of change in relations between the major powers have been peaceful, and this has

Conclusions 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

127

been the case on a global scale. It has occurred not only in Western Europe, but critically also this trend is equally well developed in East Asia. Thus the scope of pacification in great power relations within the international system has a global geographic extent, operating in all strategic regions in which there are serious candidates for polar status. Second, there is a general trend towards growing equality of status between the major powers within multilateral institutions. This distinguishes the overall trend observed from bandwagoning within a unipolar power structure. The US is being encouraged to downgrade its commitments in key strategic regions, and renegotiate multilateral frameworks between the other major powers. This is leading to a shift in the structure of burden-sharing arrangements between the major powers that are affecting diplomacy on both security and economic issues. Indeed, equalization of rights and responsibilities in the security arena facilitates a parallel change in the economic arena because of the dependencies fostered by America’s military hegemony. Thus the quality or type of institutionalization within the international system is increasingly symmetrical. Together these two trends combine to highlight the way in which anomalies for neo-realism and institutionalism are compatible with the predictions made by liberal theory. The causal mechanisms underlying this pattern are broad, and vary across the continuum from the core to the periphery. There is a powerful range of material incentives for major states to establish their relations with other great powers on a peaceful basis. Of the cases examined, China appears to be responding most heavily to this set of incentives. China simply lacks the material capabilities to pursue an effective strategy of balancing against the liberal core, and stands to gain enormously from extensive economic engagement with them. Alternatively, states can be predisposed towards voluntarily accepting liberal norms of conduct. Germany appears to fit more clearly within this pattern of adjustment than Japan. Germany has adopted a much more pro-active role in restructuring its relations with other major powers on the basis of growing equality of status. This has been apparent in both its role in taking on direct military responsibilities for the maintenance of European security, and its shift to a more autonomous contribution to policy debates within the European integration process. It has probably also been assisted by the way in which on the basis of past practices German policy elites were heavily inclined to approach global economic regimes more favourably on questions of economic liberalization. By contrast, Japan has tended to resist altering the pattern of institutional commitments that it had built up during the Cold War. It was more inclined to engage in free-riding in major security and economic regimes, even when this had the effect of leaving it acutely vulnerable to exploitation by the US. The reason why Germany has been able to adopt a more active role in restructuring its multilateral diplomacy is probably to do with the way in which its preferences during the Cold War were a better

128 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Conclusions

‘match’ with current trends than those of Japan (Cortell and Davies 2000: 73–81). As a result change has been easier to internalize domestically. Nevertheless, it seems clear that only the pace of change appears to be affected by the fit between previous orientation and current trends. However closely existing strategies match post-Cold War tendencies, all the major powers analysed were encouraged to adopt significant changes in their orientation towards multilateralism over the first decade of the postCold War period. The complexity of institutional dynamics in the post-Cold War international system underscores the insight that the emerging order can be viewed as a distinctive hybrid that reflects an aggregate composite of many different trends and tendencies (Buzan 1993; Wendt 1999). Nevertheless, this should not detract from the way in which a strong underlying trend emerges from this aggregate that indicates a qualitative shift in general patterns of institutionalized relations between the major powers. This has increased the prospects for peaceful change on a global scale, and is working towards a more equal structure of burden-sharing rights and responsibilities within the emerging international order. The general trend observed has been associated with a complex mixture of continuity and change that poses major anomalies to the predictions of both neorealist and insistitutionalist theory. By contrast, it is compatible with the ranges of behaviour associated with the liberal model.

Foreign policy adjustments Over the first ten years of the post-Cold War period, Germany, Japan and China each pursued strategies that reflect a distinctive set of strategic preferences. These preferences fall outside of the ranges of behaviour anticipated by either the neorealist or the institutionalist models. Whilst posing anomalies to established frameworks, this pattern may be understood as reflecting an ‘internalization lag’ of the kind predicted by liberal theory. The preferences articulated by the states analysed are summarized in Table 6.2. The preferences articulated by the unified Germany have been characterized by Anderson and Goodman as reflexively institutionalist. As it adjusted to the post-Cold War transition, ‘institutions . . . restructured and remoulded German interests, so that, in the eyes of the German political

Table 6.2 State strategies 1989–1999 State

Strategic preferences

Analyst(s)

Germany Japan

Reflexively institutionalist Mercantile realist

China

Identity realist

Anderson and Goodman Heginbotham and Samuels Johnston

Conclusions 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

129

elites, institutional memberships were not merely instruments for policy but normative frameworks for policy making’ (Anderson and Goodman 1993: 24). Although Anderson and Goodman’s characterization was developed through an analysis of Germany’s strategies in the initial post-unification period, it may legitimately be extended to its behaviour throughout the 1990s. Contrary to neorealism, the united Germany did not begin to relax its major institutional commitments within NATO and the European Union. Contrary to institutionalism, Germany’s use of institutions reflected not only instrumental calculations about its interests but the way in which institutional commitments had reshaped its foreignpolicy preferences. Thus there is evidence to indicate that Germany had extensively internalized cooperative norms associated with key multilateral institutions within the international system. Following Heginbotham and Samuels, it is possible to characterize Japan’s preferences over the 1990s as mercantile realist (Heginbotham and Samuels 1999). Mercantile realism combines economic nationalism with a low political profile. Contrary to neorealism, Japan consistently prioritized techno-economic over politico-military interests, defining its strength in terms of wealth and technology and its position in terms of its industrial structure. This has been most notable in its pronounced tendency to continue to free ride on the US for its security over the 1990s, in particular during the Gulf War and in the 1995 National Defence Planning Outline. It has also been apparent in its close economic relations with China over the 1990s, which according to neorealist theory should be a major potential military rival for Japan. Contrary to institutionalism, Japan’s economic relations with other states have been strongly mercantilist in orientation. This has been reflected in the character of its aid and investment strategies in Asian countries, and in its troubled economic relations with Western economies. In line with mercantile realist behaviour, Japan is cooperating economically with Asian states with complementary industrial structures (notably China) whilst balancing against advanced industrialized states. Thus, as with Germany, the distinctive preferences articulated by Japan over the 1990s are not compatible with either neorealist or institutionalist predictions. Instead they strongly reflect the influence of domestic economic and political coalitions built up over the post-1945 period. Following Johnston, China’s preferences since 1989 may be characterized as identity realist. Identity realism suggests that Chinese leaders believe that the primary dangers from their security environment come from challenges to the cohesiveness of internal order, and under these circumstances use realpolitik discourse and behaviour to prop up regime legitimacy (Johnston 1999). China’s identity realism has its origins in the regimes’ realization in 1989 that pursuit of a strategy of developing interdependent relations with the West as a key to modernization had major domestic ramifications. In turn this was magnified by the reduction of a direct external threat to China since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

130 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Conclusions

As with the other two cases analysed, the preferences articulated by China over the 1990s are anomalous to both neorealism and institutionalism. Contrary to neorealism, the intensification of Chinese realpolitik discourse and behaviour since 1989 has been largely symbolic, and has been tempered by tacit acknowledgement by the ruling elite that engagement with the West is necessary to sustain the high growth rates required for continued regime legitimacy. Contrary to institutionalism, the Chinese elite’s deep sense of unease with the effects of increased interdependence on its domestic politics results in foreign policy practices with a strongly realist orientation. The consequence is an inconsistent mix of motivations underlying Chinese foreign policy that highlight the underlying concern of the regime with identity rather than its relative or absolute position. In terms of the content of their strategies, Germany, Japan and China have responded very differently to the changes that have taken place in the international system since 1989. However, it remains possible to generalize about the foreign-policy behaviour of these major states over the 1990s. Each of these states has acquired a wide latitude for autonomous action in the international system. Their distinctive strategic preferences fall outside the ranges predicted by both neorealism and institutionalism. This is because of the combined influence of domestic social identities, economic interests and political institutions on their foreign policies. This finding conforms to the predictions offered by a liberal model of the international system. As has been stressed, a liberal account of socialization anticipates a period of lagged adjustment during which states achieve a wide latitude for independent action. This reflects their increased capacity for critical self-reflection and cultural change. By extension, however, this also allows considerable scope for states to articulate a variety of preferences reflecting the influence of domestic coalitions. Neorealists and institutionalists might object that they could accept that, in particular instances, the domestic preferences of states might influence their international behaviour. However, three responses may be made to this argument on the basis of the cases examined. First, these findings apply in relation to the behaviour of three major states that neorealists have identified as candidates for polar status within the international system. Such states ought to find themselves exposed to the full force of pressures arising from the international system. Second, Germany, Japan and China operate within radically different circumstances in the sense that there are wide variations in patterns of interdependence faced by each of the three states. Yet across all three, domestic preferences have heavily influenced international behaviour. Third, the cases have been examined over a tenyear time frame. Thus, preferences have been a consistent factor in influencing foreign policies. It cannot be suggested that, in the cases examined, preferences have influenced foreign policies in an ad hoc fashion. Rather, they decisively shaped their grand strategies throughout the 1990s. It is difficult for neorealists and institutionalists to suggest that

Conclusions 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

131

these consistent patterns of behaviour across three major states that operate in very different circumstances represent temporary anomalies to the patterns of behaviour their theories predict. By contrast, the pattern observed can be explained with reference to the liberal model. A further general trend may also be identified in terms of the pattern of foreign policy adjustments across the three cases. In particular, Germany, Japan and China each face a major crisis of identity transition in the face of the changes that have taken place in the international system since 1989. This may be interpreted as reflecting pressures to internalize liberal norms and engage in cultural change. Germany’s crisis of identity reflects the way in which, as the 1990s progressed, many of the institutional commitments that had underpinned its strategies in the past became unsustainable. In the initial period of adjustment between 1989 and 1991, Germany continued to pursue strategies compatible with the distinctive orientation that it had developed over the post-1945 period. However, the institutional commitments this involved have proved impossible for the unified Germany to maintain. This was felt most acutely in relation to Germany’s participation in the use of military force outside the NATO area, and the economic pressures placed on it by the costs of unification and the further development of European integration. These have raised fundamental questions about the viability of Germany’s grand strategy over the 1990s. In redefining its role within NATO and the EU, Germany has consequently adopted a more active approach to managing its international affairs than in the past. Germany has made major changes in the way in which it participates in these international institutions, and this has raised uncomfortable questions about its ‘normalization’ as an actor. However, through this process of change Germany has actually strengthened its commitment to multilateralism. By altering the terms of its participation in international institutions, Germany has increased its role and functions within these frameworks. Its preference for multilateralism has therefore evolved in a norm-governed fashion. Whilst Germany has altered the procedures through which it participates in international institutions, it has done so precisely in order to preserve its normative commitment to them. Japan’s predicament mirrors the one facing the unified Germany in the sense that the distinctive strategies it developed after the Second World War have proven increasingly inappropriate to its position within the international system. The preferences that Japan has articulated during the 1990s reflect the central tenets of the Yoshida Doctrine, originally developed in the 1950s. As the 1990s progressed, the domestic underpinnings of the Yoshida strategy were rapidly eroded in response to the changes that have taken place in the international system. Two major developments made this trend increasingly apparent. The first came in 1993, with the demise of the Liberal Democratic Party as the party of government for the first time since it was founded in the 1950s. Although

132 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Conclusions

the proximate cause of this development was electoral reform, the primary motive force was pressures for Japan to play a more active political role in the international system. The second came in 1998, when recession meant that structural problems with Japan’s system of economic management became evident. Taken together, these changes indicate the extent to which Japan’s mercantile realist strategy is increasingly out of line with the trajectory of change in the international system. They have therefore raised questions about the way in which Japan defines its identity as an actor within the international system. At the root of this crisis is a search for a legitimate Japanese nationalism and a new, non-exclusively economic role in the world. China’s crisis of identity has been reflected directly in the distinctive foreign policy it has pursued. It follows from Iain Johnston’s analysis that the Chinese regime’s intensification since 1989 of its ‘realist’ foreign policy orientation lies at the root of its deep sense of insecurity in the world. Identity realism is not a coherent reaction to China’s strategic problems because it is not capable of resolving any of the difficulties it faces in any structural sense. This is due to the way that China remains dependent on a high level of engagement with the outside world if it is to ensure its survival as an important actor in the international system. During the 1990s, China has intensified realist foreign policy discourse and behavior in response to the threat posed to its political regime by growing interdependence. The initial impetus to this process came after the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, when the Chinese elite first came to realize the extent of the challenge to its political authority posed by domestic changes begun in the mid-1970s. However, the relatively benign international context China has faced since the end of the Cold War is equally important in explaining China’s realpolitik behaviour. China uses a revisionist foreign policy orientation to foster internal political cohesion. However unlikely it seems in the short term that China will adopt a shift in its grand strategy, its ongoing identity crisis provides evidence that pressures are mounting for it to do so. Ultimately, if China fails to embrace change, then this identity crisis threatens to culminate in disintegration arising from engagement with the West and the impact of globalization on its domestic political structure. Many of the pressures for change facing Germany, Japan and China today have origins that may be traced back to the early 1970s or even earlier. Debates over Germany’s role in both NATO and the EU took place prior to the unification. In Japan, the issue of burden sharing and pressures for economic liberalization may be traced back for decades. In the case of China, the process of economic and social liberalization that culminated in pressures for decentralization began as far back as 1976. However, in all three cases, 1989 to 1991 proved to be a decisive period of transition. For Germany, the costs imposed by unification and its more prominent position in the European international system decisively

Conclusions 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

133

constrained its ability to pursue its traditional foreign policy. In the case of Japan, the end of the Cold War dramatically altered the context in which it sustained its relations with the US. Specifically, the removal of the Soviet threat made the principles of the Yoshida Doctrine fundamentally anachronistic. Finally, for China the 1989–1991 period proved crucial in altering the way that the ruling elite perceived the consequences of interdependence. Thus although pressures for change were present in each of the cases examined prior to the end of the Cold War, the 1989–1991 period crystallized their crises of identity transition in each instance. Discontinuities arising from these pressures could, of course, be interpreted as reflecting neorealist predictions. In this view, these pressures reflect latent trends towards a more conflictual multipolar order in which secondary states adopt a more assertive orientation than has been the case over the period under examination. However, in each of the three cases it seems more likely that trends actually reflect the need for these countries to internalize a more liberal strategic orientation. In the case of Germany, change has underscored the extent to which elites have internalized the norms of key multilateral frameworks. In Japan, the need to move away from the Yoshida strategy reflects pressures to liberalize its economy and play a more prominent role in burden-sharing arrangements in the security arena. A lurch in a more genuinely hostile direction by China would risk severely eroding the domestic political basis of the Chinese elite by stemming economic flows deriving from engagement. China’s crisis of identity transition in the post-1989 period is intimately bound up with its failure to abandon its realist foreign-policy. Overall, the pattern of foreign policy adjustment may be viewed as reflecting the way in which the system as a whole has achieved reflexivity. Units have acquired wide latitude for independent action that reflects their increased capacity for critical self-reflection and cultural change. The international system therefore can be said to be in a period of lagged transition in which states internalize liberal norms through a process of socialization. This cyclical process is summarized in Figure 6.2. If it is reasonable to conclude from the foreign-policy adjustments observed that over the first decade of the post-Cold War transition the international system has indeed achieved reflexivity, this opens up a complex set of questions about the nature of the knowledge provided by this book. It has been argued that achievement of reflexivity is associated with a shift in the overall trajectory of socialization within the international system away from the balance of power and towards the democratic peace. This behavioural trend has been identified and measured in relation to a set of pre-defined empirical criteria. Thus a set of positive social scientific hypotheses has been verified as reflecting a plausible assessment of the empirical properties of the post-Cold War international system. The conclusion that the system has achieved reflexivity, however,

Japan: Pressures to abandon Yoshida Doctrine China: Engagement and growing equality of status with Western powers

Japan: Resistance to military role and economic reform

China: Contradictory nature of realpolitik discourse and behaviour

Figure 6.2 Reflexivity in the international system (Part B)

China: Need to sustain interdependence

Japan: Need to increase burden-sharing contributions

Germany: Deepening participation in multilateralism

Germany: Shift from ‘policy-taker’ to ‘policy-maker’ role

Germany: Resistance to military role and economic reform

Strengthened liberal core

Identity construction and cultural change

Internalization subject to domestic variation

China: Identity realist preferences

Japan: Mercantile realist preferences

Germany: Reflexively institutionalist preferences

Increased unit autonomy

1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Conclusions 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

135

logically implies that a purely descriptive and explanatory approach cannot adequately capture what is perhaps its most distinctive historical feature. As Wendt identifies, once reflexivity exists in a system ‘then collectives become aware of the social . . . [structures] they are constituting, and [become able to] move to change them’ (Wendt 1999: 76). Two points follow logically from Wendt’s assessment of reflexivity. First, the research embodied in this book must itself be understood as part of the reflexivity in the international system that it identifies. The knowledge provided about trends in post-Cold War international relations therefore represents an explicit and formal social scientific articulation of the very process of critical self-reflection that the study seeks to document. Conversely, the book must also be viewed as part of the reflexivity that it identifies. If actors become aware that the system is in a process of transformation, then this can actively contribute to the pattern of foreign policy adjustments that is taking place within it. Knowledge about the existence of a permissive international environment that encourages states to internalize cultural change may in principle become a powerful input into the self-reinforcing positive feedback loop that the system embodies. In this way, it may help create a self-fulfilling prophesy in which the expectation of future change itself is a major factor in realizing it. These theoretical issues about the nature and purpose of social scientific enquiry have a very direct impact upon the knowledge contained within the present study. If the conclusions that have been reached are that the international system has indeed achieved reflexivity, then it follows that this study has a very different methodological status to the bulk of research being conducted within the contemporary field. Like the majority of research, this study does make a series of positive claims about empirical trends in the international system over the 1989–1999 period. However, it also explicitly acknowledges that the knowledge it has generated is both a reflection of and contribution to the reflexivity in the international system it documents. It therefore adopts an overtly critical orientation that recognizes the way in which social scientific research is itself constantly drawn into the patterns of behaviour that it seeks to account for. This point is not a trivial theoretical aside, but rather serves to draw out fully the significance of the conclusions reached by this study. As Wendt has recognized, a feature of reflexivity as a property unique to social systems is that it ‘gives us perspective on our social environment and . . . opens up the possibility of thinking self-consciously about what direction to go in’ (Wendt 1999: 375). The dramatic and largely unexpected nature of the changes which have taken place in the international system since 1989 have opened up fundamental questions about the overall trajectory of the international system at the turn of the century. In a remarkably short period, the apparently immutable structure of the superpower conflict disintegrated. After a period of uncertainty, the contours of the new international order are now becoming discernable. The trends

136 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Conclusions

that are becoming apparent provide good reasons to believe that the emerging international system is in the midst of a historic process of transformation. Under these circumstances, critical thinking takes on heightened historical significance. Powerful background forces that are at work within it will foster transformation regardless of the foreign policy adjustments made by any individual great power. However, the speed of change will very much depend on how aware key actors are of emerging trends, and the extent to which they are able to incorporate this knowledge into their grand strategies. Thinking differently about international relations after the Cold War may itself contribute knowledge that plays an important role in facilitating the historic transition taking place in the emerging international order.

1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Postscript September 11, 2001 and its aftermath

Since 1999 the international system has been rocked by a series of major global crises that have arguably been on a scale not witnessed during the first ten years that followed the Cold War. The attacks launched on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001 were closely followed by American dominated military campaigns directed at regime change in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Developments such as these inevitably have important consequences for an analysis of the shape of the emerging international order, and it is therefore appropriate to reflect upon their significance for the nature of post-Cold War international change. The methodological constraints faced in analysing the post-1999 period are even greater than those raised in examining the first decade of the postCold War transition. The aim, therefore, is not to provide a comprehensive extension of the framework for the book to the period after 1999. Instead, some preliminary reflections are offered on the implications of recent events for global trends. A brief summary of the series of crises that have occurred in world politics in the period since 1999 is first provided. The extent to which the underlying causes of the September 11 attacks can be understood with reference to conventional accounts of the international system is then considered. The scale and unexpected nature of the systemic shock posed by the attacks has raised parallels with the events surrounding the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is therefore appropriate to debate the extent to which it may be legitimate to understand September 11, 2001 in similar terms to the end of the Cold War. The implications of developments since 1999 for the character of the emerging international system are also discussed. The events of September 11, 2001 and their aftermath have generated important questions about whether the great power bandwagoning trend that characterized the initial decade of post-Cold War adjustment is sustainable. Arguably recent developments reflect a shift back towards international instability and great power balancing that have long been anticipated by neorealists. The extent to which the apparent breakdown of great power bandwagoning can be understood as reflecting neorealist predictions about the emerging post-Cold War order will therefore be examined.

138 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

September 11, 2001 and its aftermath

In the period immediately after September 11, 2001, commentators were quick to note that the crisis constituted the first large-scale direct attack on the homeland of the United States since the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941. For this reason alone, there is a strong prima facie case for its immediate strategic significance for all the major powers and the international system being directly comparable to a development on the scale of the collapse of the Soviet empire. Furthermore, the events of September 11, 2001 were followed by a series of other major international developments. In responding to the attacks, the US and its allies launched a large-scale military intervention aimed at toppling the rule of the Taliban in Afghanistan. By spring of 2002 this had been achieved, although in pursuing its aims the US also relied significantly on local resistance. Unlike the 1991 Gulf War, the Afghanistan intervention was not carried out under the auspices of a United Nations Security Council resolution authorizing action against an identified threat to international peace and security. The US did achieve an important string of UNSC resolutions condemning terrorism. However, within international law the US justified its actions in terms of self-defence in the face of a perceived act of aggression. In an unprecedented step, NATO invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty in response to 9/11, despite the way in which the attack was on the US homeland rather than on Western Europe. Again, however, the US preferred to act outside multilateral frameworks by assembling a ‘coalition of the willing’. The year 2003 saw a third major international crisis, with the US pursuing a policy of ‘pre-emptive’ intervention and regime change in order to depose Saddam Hussein’s rule in Iraq. Again, this US-led military intervention proved successful in achieving its immediate military objectives in a remarkably short period of time. In contrast to its intervention in Afghanistan, the US attempted to seek approval for its actions from the UN Security Council. However, the threat of permanent member veto from France ultimately forestalled the attempt to reassemble the UN coalition formed in response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1991. The US justified its 2003 intervention in Iraq in terms of alleged attempts by Saddam Hussein’s regime to acquire nuclear and broader weapons of mass destruction capabilities, rather than the threat posed by international terrorism and the Al-Queda network. Senior US officials made attempts to link international terrorism with the issue of WMD proliferation. However, it is open to debate whether the intervention in Iraq would have taken place regardless of whether September 11 had occurred. A case could be made that the George W. Bush presidency was committed to a policy of regime change in Iraq prior to the terrorist attacks. It is certainly possible that the September 11 attacks actually delayed any potential plans for action on the Iraq question. One major set of questions raised by September 11 relates to the underlying causes of the attacks. Due to the magnitude and unexpected nature of the crisis, 9/11 has been compared by some experts directly to the end

September 11, 2001 and its aftermath 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

139

of the Cold War, not only in the sense that it provided a major global shock to which all significant actors would have to respond, but also more fundamentally in that it has challenged core conceptions about how the international system operates. On such an account, September 11 has heralded a new era of world politics in which the basic principles that had previously been taken for granted about its operation altered dramatically. In the case of September 11, however, there are good reasons to be sceptical about whether the attacks did represent a new category of events. In stark contrast to the peaceful end of the Cold War, the events of September 11 followed a very old and familiar pattern that is entirely compatible with well-established conceptions of international relations. In particular, they may be viewed as reflecting a response to the residual elements of unipolarity that remain a significant feature of the post-Cold War international system. Notwithstanding widespread claims of the ‘new world order’ ushered in by 9/11, students of international relations have long been aware that one of the most fundamental features of the international system is that it is inherently anti-hegemonial. The US seems very likely to have been attacked because since the Gulf War it has stationed large numbers of troops in the Middle East to ensure Kuwait’s independence and protect its perceived regional security interests. This has, unsurprisingly, been intensely controversial and has led many local actors in the region to view America as an aggressive and imperial power. There is a dramatic contrast between this pattern and the events surrounding the end of the Cold War. The disintegration of the Soviet Union is much less amenable to a conventional system-level explanation. Prominent structural realists, including Waltz himself, have explicitly accepted that this development is best understood as a domestic collapse with purely unit level origins. Of course, the end of the Cold War may be viewed as a consequence of the relative decline of the Soviet empire under the weight of imperial overstretch. However, it has long been recognized by realists that this explanation faces the anomaly posed by the peaceful character of the 1989–1991 transition (Wohlforth 1995). Thus the events of 9/11 are qualitatively different from those surrounding the end of the Cold War in the sense that only the causes of the former are broadly compatible with conventional accounts of the international system. Moreover, on close inspection September 11, 2001 represents nothing like the kind of predictive failure posed by the Soviet collapse. Dramatic though the events of September 11 were, the real question they have raised is how and why so many analysts failed to apply one of the most basic principles of history to the emerging international order. Writing in 1999, Kapstein and Mastanduno were confident enough to argue that American hegemony remained largely unchallenged for the foreseeable future. Thus although one could envisage threats to America on the horizon, such as Islamic fundamentalism, ‘presumably . . . [such threats] would test other countries as much if not more than the United States’ (Kapstein and

140 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

September 11, 2001 and its aftermath

Mastanduno 1999: 22). The September 11 attacks have exposed the limits of this benign assessment of America’s global reach. They ought to have reminded students of international relations of a lesson that the end of the Cold War perhaps made them forget. What is anomalous to the emerging order is less the September 11 attacks, and more the continued American dominance in the international system that tended to prevail over the 1990s. Other commentators have, however, been less sanguine about the consequences of unipolarity. It is relatively straightforward to find references in the extant literature maintaining that a direct terrorist attack on the US homeland of the sort that occurred on September 11 was a distinct possibility. By contrast, the end of the Cold War was genuinely and universally unanticipated. Even the most careful search of the available literature prior to the late 1980s would not reveal a single prediction of the imminent demise of the Soviet empire. Thus whilst it is trivially true to note that both September 11 and the end of the Cold War presented major predictive failures for the majority of analysts and commentators, the deeper and more interesting issue is whether these developments fall into the broad ranges of behaviour that may be associated with established conceptions of the international system. In the case of the former event, there are clear precedents in established debates within the field. With the latter development, this is not so. It is therefore much more persuasive to argue that the end of the Cold War rather than September 11 presents a fundamental challenge to the way in which the long-term dynamics of the international system are conceptualized. The consequences of September 11, 2001 and its aftermath for the international system has also generated considerable debate. In particular, these developments have placed enormous pressures on the bandwagoning trend that classical realists have argued has characterized the structure of great power relations since the end of the Cold War. In different ways, September 11, the Afghanistan intervention, and the invasion of Iraq have all exposed the latent contradictions and problems for the US in attempting to maintain its unipolar status. In the initial wake of September 11, the responses of the major powers appeared to fit remarkably well into the analytical framework put forward by Kapstein and Mastanduno. In managing the crisis, all the major states bandwagoned with the US whilst maintaining some capacity for independent action. The US took the lead in providing a direct military response in Afghanistan, with states in Europe and to a lesser extent Japan playing a supportive role. Most remarkably of all, Russia and China accepted direct intervention by the US in an area they both consider their sphere of influence. NATO did suffer a major setback when the US declined to respond to 9/11 under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, despite the unprecedented nature of its invocation. Nevertheless, if viewed as a statement of diplomatic support by the European members of NATO for the US rather than a firm military commitment, this development too may be viewed as a form of band-

September 11, 2001 and its aftermath 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

141

wagoning. Neorealists, however, have remained sceptical about the prospects of maintaining a broad international consensus in tackling such a wide-ranging and complex issue as ‘international terrorism’. Kenneth Waltz observed in the period immediately after 9/11 that although the US-led coalition was a mile wide it was only an inch deep (Waltz 2002). Indeed, within a year of the Afghanistan intervention, US pre-emptive action in Iraq led to extremely divisive disputes between the major powers over the management of the non-proliferation regime. The latest intervention in Iraq has highlighted the way in which by maintaining its vastly superior military capabilities, the US encourages serious conflicts of interest to emerge between it and other secondary states. In his recent and influential book, Robert Kagan refers to the existence of a ‘power divide’ between the US and other countries. He argues that divisions between the US and European countries over how the Iraq crisis was managed do not reflect a lack of diplomatic skill or competence on either side of the Atlantic. Instead, they are symptomatic of differences in power between the US and other major actors in the international system. The US defines threats very differently to European states partly because of its uniquely vulnerable position as the world’s hegemon, and partly because as hegemon it has the capabilities to use military force to counter these threats (Kagan 2003). The salience of these arguments in the period since 9/11 has decreased the relevance of Kapstein and Mastanduno’s argument about the bandwagoning trend that apparently characterized the international system since the end of the Cold War. Conversely, Kagan’s analysis has made a major impact on current debates because it strongly echoes the logic of structural realist theory. Kagan’s book was directed at the broader policy-making rather than at an academic audience. However, readers with even a cursory familiarity with the available theoretical literature will immediately recognize that Kagan’s analysis fits well with neorealist predictions. Like the neorealists, Kagan acknowledges the way in which unipolarity generates structural conflicts of interest between the US and other major states. Thus a neorealist assessment of the nature of the emerging post-Cold War order has gained some currency as a consequence of the major developments that have occurred in the international system in the period since 1999. If hegemonic bandwagoning is proving unsustainable, an alternative and more optimistic scenario for the future might be offered by institutionalist theory. The logic of institutionalist arguments would tend to indicate that the risk of hegemonic decline and overstretch which is intrinsic to the US’s unipolar status will, at least over the longer term, encourage it to rely heavily on multilateralism. This theoretical perspective relies on rational choice methodology and a functional logic of cooperation. On the issue of international terrorism, institutionalist logic would identify that the threat posed by terrorist networks is not only potentially very great for

142 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

September 11, 2001 and its aftermath

the US, but that use of military power alone is likely to provide a very crude instrument in tackling the problem. To deal with international terrorist activities effectively, the US will need to cooperate heavily with other actors on a wide range of issues connected to low politics such as immigration, policing, and the pooling of intelligence. In the case of unilateralism and pre-emptive intervention, institutionalists might identify the long-term costs for the US associated with consistently behaving in this way. Such actions are likely to generate what Keohane terms a ‘boomerang effect’ in which the US is subsequently encouraged to return to multilateral channels and instruments to achieve its goals, or sets precedents that it subsequently finds costly or awkward when dealing with other situations (Keohane 2002). Thus a ‘shadow of the future’ may emerge in which the hegemon has long-term incentives to restrain its behaviour so that it can then encourage and demand reciprocity in the future from others. Overall, institutionalism is more optimistic about the prospects for a stable international order, with the post-1945 system of multilateral institutions being the key to maintaining this stability. East Asia’s short history of multilateralism and poorly developed structure of international interdependence arguably remains vulnerable to the resurgence of great power rivalries and conflicts. However, to date the ‘war against terrorism’ has had Central Asia rather than East Asia as its key focus, and major powers such as China and Russia have strong domestic incentives to be reluctant in directly sponsoring terrorist activities directed at the US, at least in the short to medium term. The issue of nuclear proliferation, of course, is much more problematic in the East Asian context, especially with respect to North Korea but also including China and potentially Japan. Nevertheless, institutionalists could offer a more optimistic scenario for the post-9/11 world based on their arguments about the costs of system management for the hegemon, and the long-term advantages for it in utilizing multilateral diplomacy. Arguably, however, the difficulties faced by the US run much deeper than the functional logic utilized by institutionalist theory indicates. In his influential book Myths of Empire, Jack Snyder attempts to integrate domestic and systemic levels of analysis to explain why it is that historically over-extension has been much more common for hegemonic powers than under-extension and appeasement (Snyder 1991). His ideas may be suggestive in probing the more fundamental implications for American foreign policy of the events of September 11, 2001 and their aftermath. According to Snyder there is no a priori reason to suppose that systemic factors can explain the tendency of powerful states to over- rather than under-deploy their resources given that territorial expansion can often be counter-productive and actually decrease the security of a state. In order to explain the tendency to over-expand, he proposes that the domestic political context and the role of ideas in the foreign policy process must be considered. Political elites under pressure to consolidate their own

September 11, 2001 and its aftermath 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

143

internal power-base often unintentionally initiate a complex process of domestic institutional logrolling in which they make rhetorical commitments that play up the risk posed by external threats to foster national cohesion and solidarity. This ‘myth of empire’ subsequently spirals out of control of the ruling elite due to the activities of parochial imperialist and military lobby groups that are able to hijack the state. Eventually the state elite even comes to believe its propaganda through unintended consequences generated by commitments that were initially purely rhetorical. The result of this complex interaction of domestic institutional and international political dynamics is that the state in question eventually comes to find itself seriously over-committed abroad. The political rhetoric emphasizing external threats generates ‘blowback’ for the ruling elite by initiating a process leading to severe over-extension. Snyder’s argument is a classical (or ‘neoclassical’) realist one which draws upon the role of domestic politics and the role of ideas in the policy-making process to refine neorealism’s failure to explain the frequency of over-extension. However, it is possible to extend this argument a stage further than Snyder himself has done by moving beyond classical realism’s attempt to supplement structural realist theory. This may be achieved by locating the origins of blowback and over-extension not just in a domestic institutional context emphasizing the role played by political myths and logrolling, but in a domestic identity transition undergone by the state arising from the interaction between domestic and international politics. This line of inquiry serves to further underscore the affinities that exist between the classical/ neoclassical realist literature and insights drawn from systemic liberal theory. Chalmers Johnson has provided an account of American foreign policy compatible with such a perspective (Johnson 2002). He argues that the foreign-policy dilemmas currently faced by the US are not the inevitable consequence of its material preponderance. Instead they reflect the failure of the US elite to adjust their foreign-policy goals in fundamental ways to reflect the end of the Cold War. Thus the underlying causes of the current war on terrorism as well as the increased stress on unilateralism and preemptive intervention actually stem from the long-term fall out generated by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Specifically, the US did not use the opportunity presented by the Soviet collapse to scale back the global military presence it has developed since 1945 during its struggle with the Soviet Union. According to Johnson, continuation of a Cold War defence posture in a post-Cold War world has resulted in the US today facing severe ‘blowback’ arising from the way in which attempts to shore up its national security interests are increasingly counter-productive. Blowback shares family resemblances with imperial overstretch, but its effects are likely to be more acute because they will be associated with a powerful backlash in the international system. In the blowback scenario, the declining hegemon does not attempt to adjust to its declining power but instead responds

144 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

September 11, 2001 and its aftermath

to this situation by seeking to consolidate an exploitive hegemony. A classic example of blowback in action is, of course, the September 2001 attacks. Johnson can legitimately lay a claim to being one of the few commentators who identified that a major terrorist attack on the US homeland was to be expected when his book was first published in 2000. He also recognized, prior to the emergence of the George W. Bush presidency, the difficulties that America’s overwhelming military superiority posed for US engagement with both former Cold War allies and adversaries alike (Harrison 2004). Johnson concludes that in the opening years of the twenty-first century the US is likely to face severe blowback arising from its decision to maintain a Cold War defence posture in the post-Cold War world. He therefore concurs with the logic of Snyder’s position that over-extension is more likely to be a problem for the world’s remaining superpower than the risk of under-extension. However, Johnson does not see this issue as simply a result of domestic institutional logrolling. Rather, the situation reflects a broader crisis of national purpose arising from the legacy of the end of the Cold War. Johnson’s account of dilemmas in US foreign relations therefore provides a much more voluntarist assessment of the recent series of international crises the country has faced than that offered by commentators, who assume that America’s current dilemmas have resulted simply from its position as the world’s sole remaining superpower. To Johnson, its predicament ultimately arises from the very specific way that the US foreign-policy establishment has chosen to respond to the enormous latitude for action that the US has acquired in the post-Cold War world. Johnson’s assessment of the dilemmas facing US foreign policy is one which is compatible with an instance of failed learning within the systemic version of liberal theory that has been operationalized in this book. Johnson does not believe that a logic of violent conflict is an inevitable feature of the post-Cold War world. Instead, instability arises from blowback and is the product of a series of strategic choices made by the US since the end of the Cold War. Johnson is not necessarily a revisionist who believes that everything the US has done internationally since 1945 has been fundamentally flawed. Rather he believes that the Cold War has distorted the foreign-policy making process in the US, and that America needs to recover a sense of perspective in its foreign policy in the post-Cold War world. If it does so, it may come to recognize that it could achieve much more to promote global stability and prosperity if it did much less in terms of global ‘engagement’. Alliances and structures of multilateral cooperation between the US and other major powers would be much healthier if they are predicated on the basis of greater equality of status rather than being asymmetrically organized, and this would also enhance the prospects of the peaceful integration of Russia and China into the international system. This would, of course, require a major reduction in the US forward military deployments in both Europe and Asia. Moreover Johnson’s voluntarism and his stress on the importance of the strategic choices made by the US

September 11, 2001 and its aftermath 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

145

may be understood as indicative of the way in which reflexivity has become a pervasive feature of the post-Cold War international system. Once the system has achieved reflexivity, a permissive space is opened up in which actors achieve a heightened capacity for critical self-reflection and cultural change. What individual actors do with this space is largely a matter for choice, and this allows for and even systemically generates scope for instances of failed learning. There is no reason to expect that the US should have any less difficulty in adjusting to the post-Cold War world than Germany, Japan or China, each of which have felt enormously the strains of this external shock on their domestic political systems. Like these other major powers, domestic political inertia has led the US to seek to adjust to the end of the Cold War by broadly continuing the defence strategies it pursued prior to 1989. However, it too is finding that the new international context is very different and that this has major implications not just for its grand strategy, but also for the organization of its domestic political system. Johnson remains profoundly sceptical about the prospects for a stable international order in the opening years of the twenty-first century, which he asserts will be defined by a reaction against America’s imperial presence. In this sense there is a different emphasis from the relatively optimistic scenario for a peaceful and liberal international order centred on the democratic peace presented in the present volume. To accommodate this research by Cederman into the possibility of both ‘maturity effects’ and ‘epochal effects’ their role in the spread of the democratic peace should be considered (Cederman 2001). Cederman has argued that the democratic peace is best understood as a macro-historical learning process rather than a static historical condition. Maturity effects reflect a growth in socialization pressures and increased momentum within the international system, and are associated with a period of accelerated learning and cultural change. Epochal effects allow for dialectical reversals and periods of slowed historical progress that are caused by failed learning and reactions against the overall macro-historical trends. Interestingly, the concept of reflexivity allows for the possibility that maturity effects and epochal effects may actually operate in tandem within one another during the same historical juncture. Once the international system has achieved reflexivity, the norm cascade produced opens up space for actors to voluntarily accept cultural change. Since this critical space is a permissive one, failed learning is also a systematic possibility and this may stall the overall pace of historical progress. Nevertheless, considerable systemic pressures exist for the state engaging in failed learning to adopt changes in their identity. In the case of the US, this may take the form of the effects of blowback and overstretch generated by the attempt to maintain its global military hegemony. As long as this blowback does not result in a general collapse of the international system, there remains considerable latitude for the actor involved to adjust its foreign policy. Indeed, the US is a relatively open and liberal

146 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

September 11, 2001 and its aftermath

society that over the long term probably has the domestic flexibility to adjust to the demands on its political institutions generated by blowback and the associated systemic constraints on its foreign policy. Once blowback has taken its toll on the ability of the US to maintain its global hegemony, therefore, the progressive underlying dynamic may begin to operate again with full force, and even gather further momentum. Of course, it remains distinctly possible that the US will not suffer severe blowback from pursuit of its hegemonic post-Cold War grand strategy. If reliance upon benign diplomatic engagement is breaking down, the US may instead simply draw upon its sheer military and material dominance in the international system to maintain its primacy. Indeed, if anything, events since September 2001 have been interpreted by most commentators as reflecting a period of untrammelled American superiority within the international system. Paul Kennedy, who famously identified a post-War trend towards America’s relative decline in the late 1980s, has now openly conceded that his assessment at that time should now be revised (Kennedy 2002). Writing in the Financial Times in February 2002, Kennedy has expressed the extent to which he was impressed at the ability of the US to project its military power to respond effectively to the challenge posed by the Al-Queda attacks. In its response to the 9/11 attacks in Afghanistan, the US had demonstrated an incredible, and historically unprecedented, capacity to use its power resources to effectively police the international system whilst drawing on diplomatic support by secondary powers in Europe and Asia which was at best of token significance. The theoretical logic underpinning Kennedy’s new assessment of world politics strongly reflects William Wohlforth’s modified structural realist argument about the stability of a unipolar world, and indeed this perspective has become increasingly fashionable (Wohlforth 1999). Nevertheless, whilst it has gained in purchase in the wake of recent developments, at the very least it is important to recognize that this theoretical stance presents an extremely bold empirical prediction. Historically, no hegemon has ever proved capable of maintaining its dominant position in the international system indefinitely. Moreover, ironically Wohlforth’s argument about unipolarity has gained widespread popularity in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks despite the way in which it is difficult to imagine a more vivid symbol of the fragility of America’s primacy than the collapse of the twin World Trade Center towers captured live on all the major global television networks. For the foreseeable future, the US will remain extremely exposed to such attacks. Despite and perhaps even because of the doctrine of pre-emption now being pursued by the US, these attacks may well in future involve weapons of mass destruction. The domestic and international costs associated with taking counter-measures to deal with international terrorist threats will also surely impact on the ability of the US to maintain its global position in future. Arguments for the stability of unipolarity such as those provided by Kennedy and Wohlforth are

September 11, 2001 and its aftermath 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

147

therefore questionable, and open to the charge that they too heavily discount short-term US military successes over the longer-term domestic and international difficulties that are likely to be faced in sustaining this strategy. Ironically, this argument has actually been made with reference to the post-9/11 world by none other than Paul Kennedy himself. Writing in the immediate wake of the September 2001 attacks rather than in the triumphal period that followed US intervention in Afghanistan, Kennedy’s assessment of America’s place in the emerging international system was much less sanguine. Indeed, the conclusions of his contribution to a prominent collection of essays discussing the strategic implications of the new ‘age of terror’ express sentiments that capture clearly the long-term necessity for the US to begin to reflect in more fundamental ways on its current grand strategy. The ultimate question raised by 9/11, Kennedy suggested, may be that the strategy of America preserving its ‘Number 1’ status is itself called into doubt: what if a younger generation of Americans . . . favour the diffusion of power and responsibility and burden, and a voluntary alteration of America’s role from being the hegemonic policeman to being the senior partner in a world of democratic states that work out global problems through shared international structures and policies? This sounds fanciful in our present age of terror and war . . . [but] even those Americans hostile to the very notion of sharing global power and of the US becoming a ‘normal’ country may sooner or later have to accept that it is unavoidable, and is in fact going to happen anyway because of the very sort of liberal and open society we are. The terrorists threat, committed within our own borders though planned from thousands of miles away, has shown that we need the rest of the world and cannot ignore it. We cannot ignore making diplomatic compromises, and we can no longer shun or scorn international organisations. Above all, we cannot stop long term shifts in economic and strategic balances, because by our social and economic policies we are the very artificers of those future changes. . . . Whether we accept that transformation gracefully and manage the relative change in America’s world position with adroitness – or instead, resent and combat this secular trend, insisting that the US is exceptional – may be the biggest strategic question of all. (Kennedy 2001: 77–78) Kennedy continued by recognizing that for the present time the US probably does have the resources to effectively manage the international system using its primacy, and thus these issues are not yet at the forefront of current debate. Yet it does seem significant that so prominent a proponent of hegemonic stability theory is prepared to recognize the longer term possibility – and indeed inevitability – of alternative futures.

148 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

September 11, 2001 and its aftermath

If the events of September 11, 2001 have underscored one salient feature of the post-Cold War international system it is the chronic uncertainty that plagues understandings of the world that has been emerging since 1989. Ultimately, even specialists cannot be sure of what the future will bring and what the underlying trend in international relations will be. It does seem, at least for the time being, as though the bandwagoning pattern that classical realists identified as characterizing the first decade of the post-Cold War transition is breaking down. If so, the US may be moving towards relying less on benign perceptions of its power, and more on its sheer material dominance to regulate the international system. If it is successful in pursuit of such a strategy, then perhaps the theoretical position adopted by Wohlforth may prove tenable. Alternatively, it may transpire that the neorealists were correct in the pessimistic predictions about the future of the international system that they made in the initial period after the euphoria surrounding the fall of the Berlin Wall. Given the overwhelmingly conflictual nature of international history and the demonstrated tendency of the modern Westphalian system to collapse into unstable multipolarity and neorealist-style great power balancing, this bleak future for world politics would surely not be entirely surprising. However, it is also possible that the breakdown of hegemonic bandwagoning may simply be indicative of the way in which the least stable features of the post-Cold War international system have been precisely those elements that have been unduly supported by unipolarity, and the most stable elements those predicated on a broadbased system of great-power concert. Conducting its international diplomacy from a position of superior military strength, however benign in intent this may be, was never likely to provide an effective long-term platform for the development of a coherent post-Cold War grand strategy by the US. Alliances founded on inequality may endure for a period and even consolidate, but sooner or later both the disproportionate costs and risks of such a strategy for the hegemon and the problems this generates for the states that are the object of US ‘engagement’ will surface. This will tend to produce transitional difficulties within the international system and lead to a period of restructuring of great-power rights and responsibilities. Yet if the international order proves able to survive such a period without a major-power war occurring, then it may conceivably emerge as more robust and mature as a result of this process of change. Precisely what the future holds nobody can truly be certain. As professional social scientists, international relations scholars have a responsibility to apply their theoretical models and predictions to the patterns that are emerging. They also need to remain open-minded about how the evidence fits their theoretical frameworks. Only if these professional obligations are fulfilled will researchers truly be able to capitalize on major opportunities offered by unfolding the ‘real world laboratory’ that continues to confront them.

1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Bibliography

Abramowitz, M.I. (1998) China–Japan–US: Managing the Trilateral Relationship. Tokyo: Japan Centre for International Exchange. Ahn, B. (1993) ‘Japanese Policy Towards Korea’. In G.L. Curtis (ed.) Japan’s Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping with Change pp. 263–273. London: East Gate Publishers. Aikiko, F. (1999) Japanese Foreign Policy: The Emerging Logic of Multilateralism. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Akaha, T. (1995) ‘Japan’s Security Agenda in the Post-Cold War Era’. The Pacific Review 8: 45–76. Akikiko, T. (2000) ‘Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy’. In T. Inoguchi and P. Jain (eds) Japanese Foreign Policy Today: A Reader pp. 3–17. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Alderson, K. (2001) ‘Making Sense of State Socialization’. Review of International Studies 27: 415–435. Anderson, J.J. (1997) ‘Hard Interests, Soft Power, and Germany’s Changing Role in Europe’. In P.J. Katzenstein (ed.) Tamed Power: Germany in Europe pp. 80–107. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Anderson, J.J. (1999) German Unification and the Union of Europe: The Domestic Politics of Integration Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Anderson, J.J and J.B. Goodman (1993) ‘Mars or Minerva? A United Germany in a Post Cold War Europe’. In R.O. Keohane, J.S. Nye and S. Hoffman (eds) After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe 1989–1991 pp. 23–62. London: Harvard University Press. Arase, D. (1993) ‘Japanese Policy Towards Democracy and Human Rights’. Asian Survey 33: 935–952. Austin, G. (1995) ‘The Strategic Implications of China’s Public Order Crisis’. Survival 37: 24–43. Axelrod, R. and R.O. Keohane (1993) ‘Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions’. In D.A. Baldwin (ed.) Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate pp. 85–115. New York: Columbia University Press. Baldwin, D.A. (1993) ‘Neoliberalism, Neorealism and World Politics’. In D.A. Baldwin (ed.) Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate pp. 3–28. New York: Columbia University Press. Banchoff, T. (1999) The German Problem Transformed: Institutions, Politics, and Foreign Policy, 1945–1995. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

150 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Bibliography

Baring, A. (1994) ‘Germany: What Now?’ In A. Baring (ed.) Germany’s New Position in Europe pp. 1–20. Oxford: Berg. Baumann, R. and G. Hellmann (2001) ‘Germany and the Use of Military Force: “Total War”, the “Culture Of Restraint” and the Quest For Normality’. German Politics 10: 61–82. Berger, T.U. (1993) ‘From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan’s Culture of AntiMilitarism’. International Security 17: 119–150. Berger, T.U. (1998) Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Bernstein, R. and R.H. Munro (1997) ‘The Coming Conflict with America’. Foreign Affairs 76: 18–32. Berton, P. (1993) ‘Russia and Japan in the Post Cold War Era’. In J.C. Hsiung (ed.) Asia Pacific in the New World Politics pp. 21–48. London: Lynne Rienner. Bertram, C. (1994) ‘The Power and the Past: Germany’s New International Loneliness’. In A. Baring (ed.) Germany’s New Position in the Centre of Europe pp. 91–105. Oxford: Berg. Beylerian, O. and C. Canivet (1997) ‘China: Role Conceptions After the Cold War’. In P.G. Le Prestre (ed.) Role Quests in the Post-Cold War Era: Foreign Policies in Transition pp. 187–224. London: McGill Queens University Press. Bhagwati, J. (1996) ‘The US-Japan Car Dispute: A Monumental Mistake’. International Affairs 72: 261–279. Bilveer, S. (1998) ‘East Asia in Russia’s Foreign Policy: A New Russio-Chinese Axis?’ Pacific Review 11: 485–503. Blaker, M. (1993) ‘Evaluating Japanese Diplomatic Performance’. In G.L. Curtis (ed.) Japan’s Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping with Change pp. 1–42. London: East Gate Publishers. Bluth, C. (1995) ‘Defining the National Interest’. The World Today 51: 51–55. Bridges, B. (1992) ‘Japan and Europe: Rebalancing a Relationship’. Asian Survey 32: 230–246. Brown, M.E., S.M. Lynn-Jones and S. Miller (eds) (1995a) Debating the Democratic Peace. London: MIT Press. Brown, M.E., S.M. Lynn-Jones and S. Miller (eds) (1995b) The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security. London: MIT Press. Bullock, R.W. (2000) ‘Market Opening in Japan: Deregulation, Re-regulation and Cross Sectoral Variation’. In G. Curtis (ed.) New Perspectives on US-Japan Relations pp. 39–81. New York: Japan Centre for International Exchange. Bulmer, S.J. (1997) ‘Shaping the Rules? The Constitutive Politics of the European Union and German Power’. In P.J. Katzenstein (ed.) Tamed Power: Germany in Europe pp. 49–79. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Bulmer, S.J. and W.E. Paterson (1996) ‘Germany in the European Union: Gentle Giant or Emergent Leader?’ International Affairs 72: 9–32. Bulmer, S.J., C. Jeffery and W.E. Patterson (2000) Germany’s Regional Diplomacy: Shaping the Regional Milieu. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Buzan, B. (1988) ‘Japan’s Future: Old History Versus New Roles’. International Affairs 64: 557–574. Buzan, B. (1993) ‘From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School’. International Organisation 47: 327–352 Buzan, B. (1995) ‘Japan’s Defence Problematique’. The Pacific Review 8: 25–43.

Bibliography 151 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Buzan, B. (1998) ‘The Asia Pacific: What Sort of Region in What Sort of World?’ In A. McGrew and C. Brook (eds) Asia Pacific in the New World Order. London: Routledge. Buzan, B. and G. Segal (1994) ‘Rethinking East Asian Security’. Survival 36: 3–21. Buzan, B., C. Jones and R. Little (1993) The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism. New York: Columbia University Press. Cable, V. and P. Ferdinand (1994) ‘China as an Economic Giant: Threat or Opportunity?’ International Affairs 70: 243–261. Calder, K.E. (1996) Asia’s Deadly Triangle: How Arms, Energy and Growth Threaten to Destabilise Asia-Pacific. London: Nicolas Brealy. Carlile, L.E. (1994) ‘The Changing Political Economy of Japan’s Economic Relations with Russia: The Rise and Fall of Seikei Fukabun’. Pacific Affairs 67: 411–432. Carpenter, T.G. (1998) ‘Roiling Asia: US Coziness with China Upsets the Neighbors’. Foreign Affairs 77: 2–6. Carr, E.H. (2001) The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919–1939 (third edition). London: Palgrave. Cederman, L.E. (2001) ‘Back to Kant: Reinterpreting the Democratic Peace as a Macro-Historical Learning Process’. American Political Science Review 95: 15–32. Christensen, T.J. (2001) ‘China, the US-Japan Alliance and the Security Dilemma in East Asia’. International Security 23: 49–80. Christensen, T.J. (2003) ‘China, the US-Japan Alliance and the Security Dilemma in East Asia’. In G. John Ikenberry and M. Mastanduno (eds) International Relations Theory and the Asia Pacific pp. 25–56. New York: Columbia University Press. Clark, I. (2001) The Post Cold War Order: The Spoils of Peace. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cooper, R. (1998) The Post Modern State and the World Order. London: The Foreign Policy Centre. Cortell, A.P. and James W. Davies (2000) ‘Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms: A Research Agenda’. International Studies Review 2: 65–90. Dessler, D. (1989) ‘What’s at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?’ International Organisation 43: 441–474. Deudney, D. and J. Ikenberry (1999) ‘Realism, Structural Liberalism and the Western Order’. In E. Kaspetin and M. Mastanduno (eds) Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War pp. 103–137. New York: Columbia University Press. Dibb, P. (1995) Towards a New Balance of Power in Asia. Adelphi Paper 295, London: Brasseys. Dorff, R.H. (1997) ‘Normal Actor or Reluctant Power? The Future of German Security Policy’. European Security 6: 56–69. Doyle, M. (1983) ‘Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs’ (Parts 1 and 2). Philosophy and Public Affairs 12: 205–235 and 323–353. Drake, G.C. (1997) ‘German Security and Central Europe’. European Security 6: 72–85. Drifte, R. (2000) Japan’s Quest for a Permanent Security Council Seat: A Matter of Pride or Justice? Basingstoke: Macmillan. Drifte, R. (2003) Japan’s Security Relations with China Since 1989: From Balancing to Bandwagoning. London: Routledge.

152 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Bibliography

Drysdale, P. (2002) ‘Beyond East Asia’s Economic Crisis: Development Paradise Lost’. In T. Inoguchi (ed.) Japan’s Asian Policy: Revival and Response pp. 55–80. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Duffield, J. (1999) World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy After Unification. Stanford, CA: University Press. Elman, C. (1996a) ‘Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?’ Security Studies 6: 7–53. Elman, C. (1996b) ‘Cause, Effect, and Consistency: A Response to Kenneth Waltz’. Security Studies 6: 58–61. Er, L.P. (1996) ‘Japan and the Spratly’s Dispute: Aspirations and Limitations’. Asian Survey 36: 995–1010. Feeney, W.R. (1998) ‘China and Multilateral Economic Institutions’. In S.S. Kim (ed.) China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium pp. 239–264. Oxford: Westview Press. Fewsmith, J. (1995) ‘Neoconservatism and the End of the Dengist Era’. Asian Survey 35: 635–651. Finnemore, M. and K. Sikkink (1998) ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’. International Organisation 52: 887–917. Foot, R. (1998) ‘China in the ASEAN Regional Forum: Organisational Processes and Domestic Modes of Thought’. Asian Survey 38: 425–440. Fravel, M.T. (1996) ‘China’s Attitude Toward UN Peacekeeping Operations Since 1989’. Asian Survey 36: 1102–1121. Frenkler, U. (2001) ‘Germany at Maastricht: Power Politics or Civilian Power?’ In S. Harnisch and H.W. Maull (eds) Germany as a Civilian Power: The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic pp. 26–48. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Friedberg, A.L. (1994) ‘Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia’. International Security 18: 5–33. Friedberg, A.L. (2000) ‘Will Europe’s Past be Asia’s Future?’ Survival 42: 147–160. Friedman, E. (1997) ‘The Challenge of a Rising China: Another Germany?’ In R.J. Lieber (ed.) Eagle Adrift? American Foreign Policy at the Turn of the Century pp. 215–245. New York: Longman. Fukushima, K. (1996) ‘The Revival of “Big Politics” in Japan’. International Affairs 72: 53–72. Funabashi, Y. (1991) ‘Japan and the New World Order’. Foreign Affairs 70: 58–74. Funabashi, Y. (1992) ‘Japan and America: Global Partners’. Foreign Policy 86: 24–39. Funabashi, Y. (1994) An Emerging China in a World of Interdependence. New York: The Trilateral Commission. Funabashi, Y. (1998a) ‘Tokyo’s Depression Diplomacy’. Foreign Affairs 77: 26–36. Funabashi, Y. (1998b) ‘Thinking Trilaterally’. In M.I. Abramowitz, W. Jisi and Y. Funabashi China-Japan-US: Managing the Trilateral Relationship pp. 47–60. Tokyo: Japan Centre For International Exchange. Funabashi, Y. (2001) ‘Japan’s Moment of Truth’. Survival 42: 84. Funabashi, Y. (ed.) (1995) Asia Pacific Fusion: Japan’s Role in APEC. Washington DC: Institute For International Economics. Gallagher, M. (1994) ‘China’s Illusory Threat to the South China Sea’. International Security 19: 169–194.

Bibliography 153 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Gangopadhyay, P. (1998) ‘Patterns of Trade, Investment and Migration in the Asia-Pacific Region’. In G. Thompson (ed.) Economic Dynamism In The AsiaPacific pp. 20–54. London: Routledge. Garrett, B.N. and B.S. Glaser (1994) ‘Multilateral Security in the Asia-Pacific Region and its Impact on Chinese Interests: Views from Beijing’. Contemporary Southeast Asia 16: 14–34. Garrett B.N. and B.S. Glaser (1995) ‘Chinese Perspectives on Nuclear Arms Control’. International Security 20: 43–78. Garrettt, B.N. and B.S. Glaser (1997) ‘Chinese Apprehensions about Revitalisation of the US-Japan Alliance’. Asian Survey 37: 383–402. Garton Ash, T. (1994) ‘Germany’s Choice’. Foreign Affairs 73: 65–81. Garver, J.W. (1998) ‘Sino-Russian Relations’. In S.S. Kim (ed.) China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium pp. 114–132. Oxford: Westview Press. George, A. (1993) ‘Japan’s Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations: Radical Departure or Predictable Response’. Asian Survey 33: 560–575. Gill, B. (2001) ‘Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: The Dynamics of Chinese Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Policy-making in an Era of Reform’. In D.M. Lampton (ed.) The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform pp. 257–288. Stanford, CA: University Press. Gill, B. and J. Reilly (2000) ‘Sovereignty, Intervention and Peacekeeping: The View from Beijing’. Survival 42: 41–59. Gillessen, G. (1994) ‘Germany’s Position in the Centre of Europe: The Significance of Germany’s Position and Misunderstandings about German Interests’. In A. Baring (ed.) Germany’s New Position in the Centre of Europe pp. 21–34. Oxford: Berg. Gilpin, R. (1991) ‘Where Does Japan Fit In?’ Millennium 18: 329–342. Gilpin, R. (2003) ‘Sources of American-Japanese Economic Conflict’. In G. John Ikenberry and M. Mastanduno (eds) International Relations Theory and the Asia Pacific pp. 273–298. New York: Columbia University Press. Glees, A. (1996) Reinventing Germany: German Political Development Since 1945. Oxford: Berg. Godement, F. (1997) ‘Does China Have an Arms Control Policy?’ In D.S.G. Goodman and G. Segal (eds) China Rising: Nationalism and Interdependence pp. 90–106. London: Routledge. Godwin, P.H. (1996) ‘From Continent to Periphery: PLA Doctrine, Strategy and Capabilities Towards 2000’. China Quarterly 146: 464–484. Godwin, P.H. (1998) ‘Force and Diplomacy: China Prepares for the Twenty-First Century’. In S.S. Kim (ed.) China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium pp. 171–192. Oxford: Westview Press. Goldieger, J.M. and M. McFaul (1992) ‘A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post Cold War Era’. International Organization 46: 467–491. Goldstein, A.J. (2003) ‘An Emerging China’s Emerging Grand Strategy: A NeoBismarckian Turn?’ In G. John Ikenberry and M. Mastanduno (eds) International Relations Theory and the Asia Pacific pp. 56–106. New York: Columbia University Press. Goo, X. (1993) ‘China’s Policy Towards Russia’. Aussenpolitik 44: 288–297. Green, M.J. and B.L. Self (1996) ‘Japan’s Changing China Policy: From Commercial Liberalism to Reluctant Realism’. Survival 38: 35–58.

154 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Bibliography

Grieco, J.M. (1999) ‘Realism and Regionalism: American Power and German and Japanese Institutional Strategies During and After the Cold War’. In E. Kapstein and M. Mastanduno (eds) Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War pp. 319–352. New York: Columbia University Press. Gu, X. (1996) ‘Taiwan: Time Bomb in the Far East’. Aussenpolitik 47: 197–206. Gutjahr, L. (1994) German Foreign and Defence Policy After Unification. London: Pinter. Gutjahr, L. (1995) ‘Stability, Integration and Global Responsibility: Germany’s Changing Perspectives on National Interests’. Review of International Studies 21: 301–317. Hall, I.P. (1994) ‘Japan’s Asia Card’. The National Interest 38: 19–27. Hall, P.A. and R.C.R. Taylor (1996) ‘Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms’. Political Studies 34: 936–957. Hamrin, C.L. (1994) ‘Elite Politics and the Development of China’s Foreign Relations’. In T.W. Robinson and D. Shambaugh (eds) Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice pp. 70–114. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Harding, H. (1993) ‘China at the Crossroads: Conservatism, Reform or Decay?’, In Adelphi Paper 275 Asia’s International Role in the Post Cold War Era Part I pp. 49–57. London: IISS/Brasseys. Harding, H. (1994) ‘“On the Four Great Relationships”: The Prospects for China’. Survival 36: 22–42. Harnisch, S. and H.W. Maull (2001) ‘Learned its Lesson Well? Germany as a Civilian Power Ten Years After Unification’. In S. Harnisch and H.W. Maull (eds) Germany as a Civilian Power: The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic pp. 128–156. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Harris, S. (1997) ‘China’s Role in the WTO and APEC’. In D.S.G. Goodman and G. Segal (eds) China Rising: Nationalism and Interdependence pp. 34–155. London: Routledge. Harrison, E. (2002) ‘Waltz, Kant and Systemic Approaches to International Relations’. Review of International Studies 28: 143–162. Harrison, E. (2004) ‘Empire or Engagement? American Power and the International Order’. International Affairs 80(3). Hasegawa, T. (2000) ‘Why did Russia and Japan Fail to Achieve Rapprochement in 1991–1996?’ In G. Rozman (ed.) Japan and Russia: The Tortuous Path to Normalization pp. 167–198. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Hasenclever, A., P. Mayer and V. Rittberger (1997) Theories of International Regimes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Heginbotham, E. and R.J. Samuels (1999) ‘Mercantile Realism and Japanese Foreign Policy’. In E.B. Kapstein and M. Mastanduno (eds) Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War pp. 182–217. New York: Columbia University Press. Heilbrun, J. (1994) ‘Tomorrow’s Germany’. The National Interest 36: 44–53. Heilbrun, J. (1996) ‘Germany’s New Right’. Foreign Affairs 75: 80–98. Hellmann, G. (1996) ‘Goodbye Bismarck? The Foreign Policy of Contemporary Germany’. Mershon International Studies Review 40: 1–39. Hinton, H.C. (1994) ‘China as an Asian Power’. In T.W. Robinson and D. Shambaugh (eds) Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice pp. 348–372. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Bibliography 155 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Holt-Dwyer, J. (2000) ‘US-Japan Financial Market Relations in an Era of Global Finance’. In G. Curtis (ed.) New Perspectives on US-Japan Relations pp. 82–129. New York: Japan Centre for International Exchange. Hook, G., J. Gilson, C. Hughes and H. Dobson (2001) Japan’s International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security. London: Routledge. Horsley, W. (1992) ‘United Germany’s Seven Cardinal Sins: A Critique of German Foreign Policy’. Millennium 21: 225–241. Hughes, C. (1996a) ‘Japan’s Subregional Security and Defence Linkages with ASEANs, South Korea and China in the 1990s’. The Pacific Review 9: 229–250. Hughes, C. (1996b) ‘The North Korean Nuclear Crisis and Japanese Security’. Survival 38: 79–103. Huntley, W.L. (1996) ‘Kant’s Third Image: Systemic Sources of the Liberal Peace’. International Studies Quarterly 40: 45–76. Hyde-Price, A. (1996) ‘ “Of Dragons and Snakes”: Contemporary German Security Policy’. In G. Smith, W.E. Paterson and S. Padgett (eds) Developments in German Politics pp. 173–193. London: Macmillan. Hyde-Price, A. (2001) Germany and European Order: Enlarging NATO and the EU. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Ienaga, S. (1993) ‘The Glorification of War in Japanese Education’. International Security 18: 113–133. Ikenberry, J. and C. Kupchan (1990) ‘Socialization and Hegemonic Power’. International Organisation 44: 283–315. Inada, J. (1989) ‘Japan’s Aid Diplomacy: Economic, Political or Strategic?’ Millennium 18: 399–414. Inoguchi, T. (1991) ‘Japan and Europe: Wary Partners’. European Affairs 20: 54–58. Inoguchi, T. (1992) ‘Japan’s Role in International Affairs’. Survival 34: 77–87. Inoguchi, T. (1993) Japan’s Foreign Policy in an Era of Global Change. London: Pinter Publishers. Inoguchi, T. (2002) ‘Japan Goes Regional’. In T. Inoguchi (ed.) Japan’s Asian Policy: Revival and Response pp. 1–34. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Inoguchi, T. and P.C. Jain (1997) ‘Introduction’. In T. Inoguchi and P.C. Jain (eds) Japanese Politics Today pp. 1–10. Melbourne: Macmillan. Inoguchi, T. and P.C. Jain (eds) (2000) Japanese Foreign Policy Today: A Reader. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Itoh, M. (1995) ‘Extending Japan’s Role in the United Nations’. The Pacific Review 8: 283–302. Jain, C. (1997) ‘Party Politics at the Crossroads’. In T. Inoguchi and P.C. Jain (eds) Japanese Politics Today pp. 11–29. Melbourne: Macmillan. Jain, P. (2002) ‘India’s Calculus of Japan’s Foreign Policy in Pacific Asia’. In T. Inoguchi (ed.) Japan’s Asian Policy: Revival and Response pp. 211–236. Basingstoke: Palgrave. James, P. (2002) International Relations and Scientific Progress: Structural Realism Reconsidered. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press. Janning, J. (1996) ‘A German Europe – A European Germany? On the Debate Over Germany’s Foreign Policy’. International Affairs 72: 33–41. Jervis, R. (1997) System Effects: Complexity in Social and Political Life. Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press.

156 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Bibliography

Ji, Y. (1997) ‘A Blue Water Navy: Does it Matter?’ In D.S.G. Goodman and G. Segal (eds) China Rising: Nationalism and Interdependence pp. 71–89. London: Routledge. Jisi, W. (1997) ‘The Role of the United States as a Global and Pacific Power: A View From China’. Pacific Review 10: 11–18. Jisi, W. (1998) ‘Building a Constructive Relationship’. In M.I. Abramowitz, W. Jisi and Y. Funabashi China-Japan-US: Managing the Trilateral Relationship pp. 21–36. New York: Japan Centre for International Exchange. Joffe, E. (1997) ‘How Much Does the PLA Make Foreign Policy?’ In D.S.G. Goodman and G. Segal (eds) China Rising: Nationalism and Interdependence pp. 53–70. London: Routledge. Joffe, J. (1994) ‘German Grand Strategy After the Cold War’. In A. Baring (ed.) Germany’s New Position in the Centre of Europe pp. 79–89. Oxford: Berg. Johnson, C. (2002) Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire. London: Time Warner. Johnson, C. and Keehn, E.B. (1995) ‘The Pentagon’s Ossified Strategy’. Foreign Affairs 74: 102–114. Johnston, A.I. (1995) ‘China’s New “Old Thinking”: The Concept of Limited Deterrence’. International Security 20: 5–42. Johnston, A.I. (1996) ‘Learning Versus Adaptation: Explaining Change in Chinese Arms Control Policy in the 1980s and 1990s’. The China Journal 35: 27–61. Johnston, A.I. (1998) ‘International Structures and Chinese Foreign Policy’. In S.S. Kim (ed.) China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium pp. 55–87. Oxford: Westview Press. Johnston, A.I. (1999) ‘Realism(s) and Chinese Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Period’. In E. Kapstein and M. Mastanduno (eds) Unipolar Politics: Realism and States Strategies After the Cold War pp. 261–318. New York: Columbia University Press. Johnston, A.I. (2003) ‘Socialization in International Institutions: The ASEAN Way and International Relations Theory’. In G. John Ikenberry and M. Mastanduno (eds) International Relations Theory and the Asia Pacific pp. 107–162. New York: Columbia University Press. Johnston, A.I. and P. Evans (1999) ‘China’s Engagement with Multilateral Security Institutions’. In Alistair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (eds) Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power pp. 235–272. London: Routledge. Johnstone, C.B. (1999) ‘Strained Alliance: US-Japan Diplomacy in the Asian Financial Crisis’. Survival 41: 121–138. Johnstone, C.B. (2000) ‘Redefining the US-Japan Alliance’. Survival, 42: 73–180. Jung-Hoon, L. and C. Moon (2002) ‘Responding to Japan’s Asian Policy: The Korea Calculus’. In T. Inoguchi (ed.) Japan’s Asian Policy: Revival and Response, pp. 137–166. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Kagan, R. (2003) Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order. London: Atlantic. Kapstein, E.B. and M. Mastanduno (eds) (1999) Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War. New York: Columbia University Press. Karmel, S.M. (2000) China and the People’s Liberation Army: Great Power or Struggling Developmental State. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Katzenstein, P.J. (1993) ‘Taming of Power: German Unification, 1989–90’. In M. Woo-Cumings and M. Loriaux (eds) Past as Prelude: History in the Making of a New World Order pp. 59–82. Oxford: Westview Press.

Bibliography 157 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Katzenstein, P.J. (1997) ‘Germany and Mitteleuropa’. In P.J. Katzenstein (ed.) Mitteleuropa: Between Europe and Germany pp. 1–39. Oxford: Berghahn. Katzenstein, P.J. (ed.) (1996) ‘The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics’. New York: Columbia University Press. Katzenstein, P.J. and N. Okawara (1993) ‘Japan’s National Security: Structures, Norms and Policies’. International Security 17: 84–118. Katzenstein, P.J. and N. Okawara (2001) ‘Japan and Asian-Pacific Security: Regionalization, Entrenched Bilateralism and Incipient Multilateralism’. Pacific Review 14: 165–194. Kawasaki, T. (1997) ‘Between Idealism and Realism in Japanese Security Policy: The Case of the ASEAN Regional Forum’. The Pacific Review 10: 480–503. Kawasaki, T. (2001) ‘Postclassical Realism and Japanese Security Policy’. Pacific Review 14: 221–240. Kennedy, P. (2001) ‘Maintaining American Power: from Injury to Recovery’. In S. Talbott and N. Chanda (eds) Age of Terror: America and the World After September 11 pp. 53–80. Oxford: Perseus Press. Kennedy, P. (2002) ‘The Eagle Has Landed’. The Financial Times, 2–3 February. Keohane, R.O. (1984) After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Keohane, R.O. (ed.) (1986a) Neorealism and its Critics. New York: Columbia University Press. Keohane, R.O. (1986b) ‘Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond’. In R.O. Keohane (ed.) Neorealism and its Critics pp. 158–203. New York: Columbia University Press. Keohane, R.O. (1989a) ‘Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics’. In R.O. Keohane International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory pp. 1–20. London: Westview Press. Keohane, R.O. (1989b) ‘International Institutions: Two Approaches’. In R.O. Keohane International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory pp. 158–179. London: Westview Press. Keohane, R.O. (1991) ‘International Liberalism Reconsidered’. In John Dunn (ed.) The Economic Limits to Modern Politics pp. 165–194. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Keohane, R.O. (1993) ‘Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War’. In D.A. Baldwin (ed.) Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate pp. 269–300. New York: Columbia University Press. Keohane, R.O. (1996) ‘International Relations: Old and New’. In R.E. Goodin and H.D. Klingemann (eds) A New Handbook of Political Science pp. 462–478. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Keohane, R.O. (2000) ‘Ideas Part-Way Down’. Review of International Studies 26: 125–130. Keohane, R.O. (2002) ‘The Globalisation of Informal Violence: Theories of World Politics and the Liberalism of Fear’. In R.O. Keohane Power and Governance in a Partially Globalised World pp. 272–287. London: Routledge. Keohane, R.O., J.S. Nye and S. Hoffman (eds) (1993) After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989–1991. London: Harvard University Press. Kim, S.S. (1994) ‘China’s International Organisational Behaviour’. In T.W. Robinson and D. Shambaugh (eds) Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice pp. 401–434. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

158 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Bibliography

Kim, S.S. (1998) ‘Chinese Foreign Policy in Theory and Practice’. In S.S. Kim (ed.) China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium pp. 3–33. Oxford: Westview Press. Kim, S.S. (2001) ‘The Making of China’s Korea Policy in the Era of Reform’. In D.M. Lampton (ed.) The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform pp. 371–408. Stanford, CA: University Press. Kim, S.S. and L. Dittmer (1993) ‘Whither China’s Quest for National Identity?’ In L. Dittmer and S.S. Kim (eds) China’s Quest for National Identity pp. 237–290. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Kirschner, E.J. (1996) ‘Germany and the European Union: From Junior to Senior Role’. In G. Smith, W.E. Paterson and S. Padgett (eds) Developments In German Politics pp. 156–172. London: Macmillan. Kirschner, J. (2003) ‘States, Markets and Great Power Relations in the Pacific: Some Realist Expectations’. In G. John Ikenberry and M. Mastanduno (eds) International Relations Theory and the Asia Pacific pp. 273–298. New York: Columbia University Press. Kitano, M. (1994) ‘The New China: Dynamism and Vulnerability’. Pacific Review 7: 153–161. Klein, D.W. (1998) ‘Japan and Europe in China’s Foreign Relations’. In S.S. Kim (ed.) China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium pp. 133–150. Oxford: Westview Press. Krasner, S.D. (1983) ‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables’. In S.D. Krasner (ed.) International Regimes pp. 1–22. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Lampton, D.M. (1997) ‘China and Clinton’s America: Have They Learned Anything?’ Asian Survey 37: 1099–1118. Lampton, D.M. (2001) ‘China’s Foreign and National Security Policy Making Process: Is It Changing and Does It Matter?’ In D.M. Lampton (ed.) The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform pp. 1–38. Stanford, CA: University Press. Layne, C. (1993) ‘The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise’. International Security 17: 5–51. Layne, C. (1996) ‘Less is More: Minimal Realism in East Asia’. The National Interest 43: 64–77. Le Gloannec, A.M. (1993) ‘The Implications of German Unification for Western Europe’. In P. Stares (ed.) The New Germany and the New Europe pp. 251–278. Washington DC: Brookings. Lefebre, S. and B. Lombardi (1996) ‘Germany and Peace Enforcement: Participating in IFOR’. European Security 5: 564–587. Lehmann, J.P. (1992) ‘France, Japan, Europe, and Industrial Competition: The Automotive Case’. International Affairs 68: 37–53. Leifer, M. (1997) ‘China in Southeast Asia: Interdependence and Accommodation’. In D.S.G. Goodman and G. Segal (eds) China Rising: Nationalism and Interdependence pp. 156–171. London: Routledge. Letourneau, P. and M. Rakel (1997) ‘Germany: To Be or Not To Be Normal?’ In P. Le Prestre (ed.) Role Quests in the Post-Cold War Era: Foreign Policies in Transition pp. 111–130. London: McGill Queens University Press. Levine, S.I. (1994) ‘Perception and Ideology in Chinese Foreign Policy’. In T.W. Robinson and D. Shambaugh (eds) Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice pp. 30–46. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Bibliography 159 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Levine, S.I. (1998) ‘Sino-American Relations: Practising Damage Control’. In S.S. Kim (ed.) China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium pp. 91–113. Oxford: Westview Press. Lincoln, E.J. (1993) Japan’s New Global Role. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution. Linnenkamp, H. (1993) ‘The Security Policy of the New Germany’. In P. Stares (ed.) The New Germany and the New Europe pp. 93–125. Washington DC: Brookings. Lippert, B. and R. Stevens-Strohmann (1993) German Unification and EC Integration: German and British Perspectives. London: Pinter. Little, R. (1995) ‘Neorealism and the English School: A Methodological, Ontological and Theoretical Reassessment’. European Journal Of International Relations 1: 9–34. Macardle Kelleher, C. (1993) ‘The New Germany: An Overview’. In P. Stares (ed.) The New Germany and the New Europe pp. 11–54. Washington DC: Brookings. Macleod, A. (1997) ‘Japan: A Great Power Despite Itself’. In P. Le Prestre (ed.) Role Quests in the Post Cold War Era: Foreign Policies in Transition pp. 88–110. London: McGill-Queens University Press. Mak, J.N. (1998) ‘The Asia-Pacific Security Order’. In A. McGrew and C. Brook (eds) Asia-Pacific in the New World Order pp. 88–120. London: Routledge. Malik J.M. (1995) ‘China-India Relations in the Post-Soviet Era: The Continuing Rivalry’. China Quarterly 142: 317–355. Markovitz, A.S. and A. Reich (1997) The German Predicament: Memory and Power in the New Europe. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Mastanduno, M. (1991) ‘Do Relative Gains Matter? America’s Response to Japanese Industrial Policy’. International Security 16: 73–113. Maull, H.W. (1991) ‘Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers’. Foreign Affairs 69: 1–106. Maull, H.W. (1995) ‘Germany in the Yugoslav Crisis’. Survival 37: 99–130. Maull, H.W. (1997) ‘Reconciling China with International Order’. Pacific Review 10: 466–479 Maull, H.W. (2000) ‘Germany and the Use of Force: Still a Civilian Power?’ Survival 42: 56–80. Mayer, H. (1997) ‘Early at the Beach and Claiming Territory: The Evolution of German Ideas on a New European Order’. International Affairs 73: 724–737. Mearsheimer, J.J. (1990) ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War’. International Security 15: 5–56. Mearsheimer, J.J. (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. London: W.W. Norton. Meiers, F.J. (1995) ‘Germany: The Reluctant Power’. Survival 37: 82–103. Menon, R. (1996) ‘Japan-Russia Relations and North-East Asian Security’. Survival 38: 59–78. Miles, J. (2000) ‘Chinese Nationalism, US Policy and Asian Security’. Survival 42: 200–230. Miskinnon, A.J. (2001) ‘Recasting the European Bargains: Germany, European Security and the Transatlantic Relationship’. German Politics 10: 61–82. Mitchell, S.M. (2002) ‘A Kantian System: Democracy and Third Party Conflict Resolution’. American Journal of Political Science 46: 749–759.

160 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Bibliography

Mochizuki, M.M (ed.) (1998) Toward a True Alliance: Restructuring US-Japan Security Relations. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution. Mochizuki, M.M. and M. O’Hanlon (1998) ‘A Liberal Vision for the US-Japanese Alliance’. Survival 40: 127–134. Moller, K. (1996) ‘Germany and China: A Continental Temptation’. China Quarterly 147: 706–725. Moore, T.G. and D. Yang (2001) ‘Empowered and Restrained: Chinese Foreign Policy in the Age of Economic Interdependence’. In D.M. Lampton (ed.) The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform pp. 191–229. Stanford, CA: University Press. Moravcsik, A. (1997) ‘Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics’. International Organisation 51: 513–553. Mukae, R. (1996) ‘Japan’s Diet Resolution on World War Two: Keeping History at Bay’. Asian Survey 36: 1011–1030. Mulgan, A.G. (1997) ‘The Role of Foreign Pressure (Gaitsu) in Japan’s Agricultural Trade Liberalisation’. The Pacific Review 10: 165–209. Muller, H. (1993) ‘German Foreign Policy After Unification’. In P. Stares (ed.) The New Germany and the New Europe pp. 126–176. Washington DC: Brookings. Mullins, R.E. (1995) ‘The Dynamics of Chinese Missile Proliferation’. Pacific Review 8: 137–157. Nathan, A.J. and R.S. Ross (1997) The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China’s Search for Security. London: W.W. Norton. Neves, M.S. (1995) ‘Towards a Common China Policy: A Portuguese Perspective’. In R.L. Grant (ed.) The European Union and China: A European Strategy For The Twenty-first Century. pp. 75–88. London: Royal Institute for International Affairs. Nicholson, M. (1989) Formal Theories of International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nuttall, S. (1996) ‘Japan and the European Union: Reluctant Partners’. Survival 38: 104–120. Nye, J.S. (1987) ‘Nuclear Learning and US-Soviet Security Regimes’. International Organization 41: 371–402. Nye, J.S. (1990) Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power. New York: Basic Books. Nye, J.S. (1992) ‘Coping with Japan’. Foreign Policy 89: 96–115. Nye, J.S. (1995) ‘The Case for Deep Engagement’. Foreign Affairs 74: 90–102. Nye, J.S. (1997) ‘China’s Re-emergence and the Future of the Asia-Pacific’. Survival 39: 65–79. Office for International Security Affairs (1995) ‘United States Security Strategy for The East Asia-Pacific Region’. Department of Defense, Washington DC: US Government Printing Office. Olson, M. (1971) The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Otte, M. (2000) A Rising Middle Power: German Foreign Policy in Transformation, 1989–1999. New York: St Martins Press. Ozawa, I. (1994) Blueprint for a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation. London: Kodansha International. Park, C.H. (2001) ‘Factional Dynamics in Japan’s LDP Since Political Reform: Continuity and Change’. Asian Survey 41: 428–461.

Bibliography 161 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Pearson, M.M. (1999) ‘The Major Multilateral Economic Institutions Engage China’. In Alistair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (eds) Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power. London: Routledge. Pharr, S.J. (1993) ‘Japan’s Defensive Foreign Policy and the Politics of Burden Sharing’. In G.L. Curtis (ed.) Japan’s Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping with Change pp. 235–262. London: East Gate Publishers. Pond, E. and D. Schoenbaum (1996) The German Question and Other German Questions. London: Macmillan. Powell, R. (1994) ‘Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The NeorealistNeoliberal Debate’. International Organisation 48: 313–344. Pumphrey, C. (ed.) (2002) The Rise of China in Asia: Security Implications. Carlisle, CA: Strategic Studies Institute. Pye, L.W. (1991) ‘China: Erratic State, Frustrated Society’. Foreign Affairs 69: 50–54. Pyle, K.B. (1996) The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era (second edition). Washington DC: AEI Press. Pyle, K.B. (1998) ‘Restructuring Foreign and Defence Policy: Japan’. In A. McGrew and C. Brook (eds) Asia-Pacific in the New World Order, pp. 121–138. London: Routledge. Rachman, G. (1996) ‘Containing China’. Washington Quarterly 19: 129–139. Rapkin, D.P. (2001) ‘The United States, Japan and the Power to Block: The APEC and the AMF Cases’. Pacific Review 14: 373–410. Ray, J.L. (2000) ‘Democracy: On the Levels, Does Democracy Correlate with Peace?’ In John A. Vasquez (ed.) What Do We Know About War? pp. 299–318. Oxford: Rowan and Littlefield. Reiss, H. (ed.) (1991) Kant’s Political Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rice, C. and P. Zelikow (1995) ‘Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft’. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Rittberger, V. (ed.) (2001) German Foreign Policy Since Unification: Theories and Case Studies. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Robinson, T.W. (1994) ‘Chinese Foreign Policy From the 1940s to the 1990s’. In T.W. Robinson and D. Shambaugh (eds) Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice pp. 555–602. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Robinson, T.W. (1998) ‘[In][ter]dependence in China’s Post-Cold War Foreign Relations’. In S.S. Kim (ed.) China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium pp. 193–216. Oxford: Westview Press. Rose, G. (1998) ‘Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy’. World Politics 51: 144–172. Rosenau, J.M. (1984) ‘A Pre-theory Revisited: World Politics in an Era of Cascading Interdependence’. International Studies Quarterly 28: 245–305. Roy, D. (1994) ‘Hegemon on the Horizon? China’s Threat to East Asian Security’. International Security 19: 149–168. Roy, D. (1998a) ‘Restructuring Foreign and Defence Policy: The People’s Republic of China’. In A. McGrew and C. Brook (eds) Asia-Pacific in the New World Order pp. 137–157. London: Routledge. Roy, D. (1998b) China’s Foreign Relations. London: Macmillan. Rozman, G. (2002) ‘Russia’s Calculus and Japan’s Foreign Policy in Pacific Asia’. In T. Inoguchi (ed.) Japan’s Asian Policy: Revival and Response pp. 167–192. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

162 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Bibliography

Ruggie, J.G. (1986) ‘Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Towards a Neorealist Synthesis’. In R.O. Keohane (ed.) Neorealism and Its Critics pp. 131–157. New York: Columbia University Press. Russett B. and H. Starr (2000) ‘From Democratic Peace to Kantian Peace: Democracy and Conflict in the International System’. In Manus I. Midlarsky (ed.) Handbook of War Studies II pp. 93–128. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Russett, B. and J.R. O’Neal (2001) Triangulating Peace: Democracy Interdependence and International Organisations. London: W.W. Norton. Rynhold, J. (1996) ‘China’s Cautious New Pragmatism in the Middle East’. Survival 38: 102–116. Saito, M. (1993) ‘Japan’s “Northward” Foreign Policy and the Yoshida Doctrine’. In G.L. Curtis (ed.) Japan’s Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping with Change pp. 274–302. London: East Gate Publishers. Salameh, M.G. (1995) ‘China, Oil and the Risk of Regional Conflict’. Survival 37: 133–146. Salmon, T.C. (1992) ‘Testing Times for European Political Co-operation: The Gulf and Yugoslavia 1990–1992’. International Affairs 68: 233–253. Sandler, T. (1992) Collective Action: Theory and Applications. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Sasae, K. (1994) Rethinking Japan-US Relations: An Analysis of the Relationship Between Japan and the US and Implications for the Future of Their Security Alliance. Adelphi Paper 292, London: IISS/Brasseys. Sato, H. (1993) ‘Implications of German Unification for Japan’. In P. Stares (ed.) The New Germany and the New Europe, pp. 365–386. Washington DC: Brookings. Sato, H. (1998) ‘The Political Economy of US-Japan Policy Co-ordination: The Case of China’, Paper presented at the International Studies Association Convention, Minneapolis, USA. Schlor, W.F. (1993) German Security Policy. Adelphi Paper 277, London: IISS/Brasseys. Schollgen, G. (1994) ‘National Interest and International Responsibility: Germany’s Role in World Affairs’. In A. Baring (ed.) Germany’s New Position In Europe: Problems and Perspectives pp. 35–49. Oxford: Berg. Schoppa, L.J. (2001) ‘Japan: the Reluctant Reformer’. Foreign Affairs 80: 76–90. Schwarz, H.P. (1994) ‘Germany’s National and European Interests’. In A. Baring (ed.) Germany’s New Position in the Centre of Europe pp. 107–130. Oxford: Berg. Segal, G. (1993) ‘The Coming Confrontation Between China and Japan?’ World Policy Journal 10: 27–32. Segal, G. (1994) China Changes Shape: Regionalism and Foreign Policy. Adelphi Paper 287, London: IISS/Brasseys. Segal, G. (1996) ‘East Asia and the “Constrainment” of China’. International Security 20: 107–135. Segal, G. (1998) ‘Asia Pacific: What Kind of Challenge?’ In A. McGrew and C. Brook (eds) Asia-Pacific in the New World Order pp. 316–331. London: Routledge. Seymour, J.D. (1998) ‘Human Rights in Chinese Foreign Relations’. In S.S. Kim (ed.) China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium pp. 217–238. Oxford: Westview Press.

Bibliography 163 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Shambaugh, D. (1992) ‘China’s Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era’. Survival 34: 88–106. Shambaugh, D. (1994) ‘Growing Strong: China’s Security Challenge to Asian Security’. Survival 36: 43–59. Shambaugh, D. (1996) ‘Containment or Engagement of China? Calculating Beijing’s Responses’. International Security 21: 180–209. Shinn, J. (ed.) (1996) Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press. Smith, G. (1996) ‘The Party System at the Crossroads’. In G. Smith, W.E. Paterson and S. Padgett (eds) Developments in German Politics pp. 55–75. London: Macmillan. Smith, G., W.E. Paterson and S. Padgett (1996) ‘Introduction’. In G. Smith et al. (eds) Developments in German Politics pp. 1–13. London: Macmillan. Smith, M.E. (1996) ‘Sending the Bundeswehr to the Balkans: The Domestic Politics of Reflexive Multilateralism’. German Politics and Society 14: 49–67. Snow, P. (1994) ‘China and Africa: Consensus and Camouflage’. In T.W. Robinson and D. Shambaugh (eds) Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice pp. 283–321. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Snyder, J. (1991) Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Soesastro, H. (1995) ‘ASEAN and APEC: Do Concentric Circles Work?’ Pacific Review 8: 475–493. Sterling-Folker, J. (2000) ‘Competing Paradigms or Birds of a Feather: Constructivism and Neoliberal Institutionalism Compared’. International Studies Quarterly 44: 97–119. Stockwin, J.A.A. (1997) ‘Reforming Japanese Politics: Highway of Change or Road to Nowhere?’ In T. Inoguchi and P.C. Jain (eds) Japanese Politics Today pp. 75–91. Melbourne: Macmillan. Stuth, R. (1992) ‘Germany’s New Role in a Changing Europe’. Aussenpolitik 43: 22–32. Swaine, M.D. (1995) China: Domestic Change and Foreign Policy. Santa Monica: RAND. Swaine, M.D. (2001) ‘Chinese Decision Making Towards Taiwan 1979–2000’. In D.M. Lampton (ed.) The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform pp. 257–288. Stanford, CA: University Press. Tadokoro, M. (1994) ‘The End of Japan’s Non-decision Politics’. Asian Survey, 34: 1002–1015. Tewes, H. (1998) ‘Between Deepening and Widening: Role Conflict in Germany’s Enlargement Policy’. West European Politics 21: 117–133. Tewes, H. (2001) ‘How Civilian? How Much Power? Germany and the Eastern Enlargement of NATO’. In S. Harnisch and H.W. Maull (eds) Germany as a Civilian Power: The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic pp. 10–25. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Thorgersen, S. (2002) ‘Challenges to the Party-state’. In K.E. Brodsguard and B. Heurlin (eds) China’s Place in Global Geopolitics: International, Regional and Domestic Challenges pp. 164–180. London: Routledge. To, L.L. (1997) ‘East Asian Assessments of China’s Security Policy’. International Affairs 73: 251–262.

164 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Bibliography

Tow, W.T. (1994) ‘China and the International Strategic System’. In T.W. Robinson and D. Shambaugh (eds) Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice pp. 115–157. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Valencia, M.J. (1995) China and the South China Sea Disputes: Conflicting Claims and Potential Solutions in the South China Sea. Adelphi Paper 298, London: IISS/Brasseys. Van Wolferen, K. (1990) The Enigma of Japanese Power (second edition). London: Macmillan. Voigt, K. (1996) ‘German Interest in Multilateralism’. Aussenpolitik 47: 107–116. Wallace, W. (1995) ‘Germany as Europe’s Leading Power’. The World Today 51: 62–164. Wallerstein, M.B. (1996) ‘China and Proliferation: A Path Not Taken?’ Survival 38: 58–66. Walt, S. (1984) The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Waltz, K.N. (1979) Theory of International Politics. New York: Random House. Waltz, K.N. (1986) ‘Reflections on “Theory of International Politics”: A Reply to my Critics’. In R.O. Keohane (ed.) Neorealism and its Critics pp. 322–346. New York: Columbia University Press. Waltz, K.N. (1993) ‘The Emerging Structure of International Politics’. International Security 18: 44–79. Waltz, K.N. (1996) ‘International Politics is not Foreign Policy’. Security Studies 6: 54–57. Waltz, K.N. (2002) ‘The Continuity of International Politics’. In K. Booth and T. Dunne (eds) Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order pp. 348–353. London: Palgrave. Wan, M. (1995) ‘Japan and the Asia Development Bank’. Pacific Affairs 68: 509–528. Wan, M. (1997) ‘Human Rights and Sino-US Relations: Policies and Changing Realities’. Pacific Review 10: 237–255. Wang, H. (2000) ‘Multilateralism in Chinese Foreign Policy: The Limits of Socialization’. Asian Survey 40: 475–327. Wang, J. (2002) ‘Adjusting to a “Strong-Strong Relationship”: China’s Calculus of Japan’s Asian Policy’. In T. Inoguchi (ed.) Japan’s Asian Policy: Revival and Response pp. 103–136. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Wang, Q.K. (1994) ‘Towards Political Partnership: Japan’s China Policy’. The Pacific Review 7: 171–182. Wendt, A.E. (1987) ‘The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory’. International Organisation 41: 335–370. Wendt, A.E. (1992) ‘Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics’. International Organisation 46: 391–425. Wendt, A.E. (1999) Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wendt, A.E. (2000) ‘A Response to my Critics’. Review of International Studies 26: 165–180. Wendt, A.E., R.L. Jefferson and P.J. Katzenstein (1996) ‘Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security’. In P.J. Katzenstein (ed.) The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics pp. 33–68. New York: Columbia University Press. Whyte, M.K. (1992) ‘Prospects for Democratisation in China’. Problems of Communism 51: 58–70.

Bibliography 165 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Wohlforth W. (1995) ‘Realism and the End of the Cold War’. In M.E. Brown, S.S.M. Lynn-Jones and S. Miller (eds) The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security pp. 3–41. London: MIT Press. Wohlforth, W. (1999) ‘The Stability of a Unipolar World’. International Security 24: 5–41. Wood, P.C. (1995) ‘The Franco-German Relationship in the Post-Maastricht Era’. In C. Rhodes and S. Mazey (eds) The State of the European Union: Building a European Polity? pp. 221–230. Boulder, CO: Longman. Yahuda, M. (1996a) The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific 1945–1995. London: Routledge. Yahuda, M. (1996b) Hong Kong: China’s Challenge. London: Routledge. Yahuda, M. (1997) ‘How Much Has China Learned About Interdependence’. In D.S.G. Goodman and G. Segal (eds) China Rising: Nationalism and Interdependence pp. 6–26. London: Routledge. Yasutomo, D.T. (1993) ‘The Politicisation of Japan’s Post-Cold War Multilateral Diplomacy’. In G.L. Curtis (ed.) Japan’s Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping with Change pp. 323–346. London: East Gate Publishers. Zheng, Y. (1994) ‘Perforated Sovereignty: Provincial Dynamism and China’s Foreign Trade’. Pacific Review 7: 309–321. Zhurkin, V. (1996) ‘Russia and Germany: From Enemy to Partner? A Contradictory Relationship’. In B. Heurlin (ed.) Germany in Europe in the Nineties pp. 210–221. London: Macmillan.

1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Index

ADB see Asian Development Bank Afghanistan 25, 137, 138, 140, 141, 146, 147 Africa 95 Akaha, T. 74 Alderson, K. 13 Al-Queda 138, 146 Amsterdam IGC 54, 59 anarchy 7–8, 10, 11, 13, 28–49, 116, 118 Anderson, J.J. 61–2, 65, 66, 68, 128–9 APEC see Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation appeasement 142–4 Arase, D. 76 ASEAN see Association of South East Asian Nations ASEM see Asia-Europe Meeting Asia-Europe Meeting 78 Asian Development Bank 75, 80, 124 Asian Monetary Fund 72 Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation 72, 77, 78, 100 Association of South East Asian Nations 73; Regional Forum 77, 98–9 Austin, G. 104 Australia 96 balance of power 1, 10, 12, 15, 20, 30, 31, 43, 112, 116, 117, 118, 120, 137 bandwagoning 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 46, 120–1, 127, 137, 140–1, 148 Baumann, R. 66 Berger, T.U. 88–9

Berlin Wall 1, 148 Bernstein, R. 92, 93 Bertram, C. 67 Beylerian, O. 105 bipolarity see polarity blowback 143–4, 145–6 Bosnia 52, 53, 58 Britain, Anglo-Dutch conflict 31; ERM 55; German reunification 51, 57; Gulf War 52; nineteenth-century 6 Brussels summit (1994) 55 Bulmer, S.J. 64 burden sharing 20–1 Bush, George W. 138, 144 Buzan, B. 19–20, 31, 43, 46, 72, 80, 86, 88, 92 Cambodia 52, 74, 95 Canivet, C. 105 Carpenter, T.G. 99 Carr, E.H. 12 Cederman, L.E. 145 CFE (Treaty) see Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty China 5, 9; Afghanistan 140; Africa 95; air force 80, 92; APEC 100; ARF 77, 98–9; ASEAN 73; Belgrade embassy bombed 95; Cambodia 95; Cold War ends 145; Communist ideology 101–2; Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 99, 105; cultural life 100–6; defence expenditure 92; Diaoyo/Senkaku islands 73, 94; domestic variation 100–6; East Asian financial crisis 99; East Timor 96; economy 91, 101, 132; European

Index 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

investment 97; foreign policy (1989–99) 91–111, 128–36; GATT 96, 99–100; GDP 92; Gulf War 93; Hong Kong 94, 98, 104, 109–10; human rights 93, 96, 97; identity realism 102–4, 129; identity transition 131–3; IMF 99; India 95; Inner Mongolia disturbances 102; institutionalized activity 121; interdependence 91, 97, 108, 132, 133; Iran 96; Japan 71, 73, 77, 80, 81, 85, 86, 87, 93–4, 97, 98, 104, 122, 129; Khmer Rouge 95; Korean unification 105; Kosovo 95–6; Law on Territorial Waters and their Contiguous Areas 94; Macao 94; major powers and 127; Mischief Reef 74, 94; modernization 91, 101; Most Favoured Nation status 96, 97; MTCR 96, 99; multipolarity 51; nationalism 101–2; navy 73, 80, 92; neoconservatism 108–9; Non-Proliferation Treaty 96, 99; and North Korea 93; nuclear programme 73, 94, 96, 99, 142; Pakistan 95, 96; Paracel and Spratly Islands 73, 94, 98, 104; peaceful integration 144–5; PLA 92, 101; political choices 106–11; Russia 95; sanctions against 80, 93; Saudi Arabia 96; socialization 107; South China Sea 104; Soviet Union 92, 129; Syria 96; Taiwan 93, 94, 98, 100, 104, 105, 109; Taiwan Straits crisis (1996) 110, 125; Tiananmen Square 80, 91, 93, 95, 102, 103, 108, 132; Tibet disturbances 102; UN 93, 95; United States 6, 17, 41, 74, 79, 85, 93, 96, 100, 125; World Bank 99; WTO 96, 99–100, 109; Xinjiang disturbances 102 Clark, I. 115 Clinton, Bill 54, 72, 97 Cold War, end of 1, 2, 3–4, 15, 18, 21, 41, 45, 103, 112, 113–21, 137, 138–9, 140, 143–5; defined 3 collective security 12 Communism 101–2

167

competition 30–2, 38–9, 43 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 99, 105 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 55, 58, 63, 78 constructivism 11, 13, 15, 28, 36, 118; see also liberal model of the international system; socialization Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (1990) 57 Cooper, Robert 46 Croatia 52, 121–2 CSCE see Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe CTBT see Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty culture: cultural change 29, 38, 43, 118, 119; cultural identity 29; defined 14 Czech Republic 58 democratic peace, the 9–10, 11, 12, 13–14, 15, 36, 37, 38, 43, 117, 118, 119, 120, 145 Deng Xioping 91, 101, 102 Dessler, D. 30, 31 Deudney, D. 18–19, 20 Diaoyo Islands 73, 94 Dibb, P. 92 domestic and international systems distinguished 3–4, 4–5, 30, 36 Dorff, R.H. 69 Doyle, Michael 9–10, 14, 20 Drifte, R. 85 Duffield, J. 63 EAEG see East Asian Economic Grouping East Asia: US military presence 5–6, 9, 71, 72, 76–7, 80, 93, 98, 110, 122, 124, 125, 126, 127 East Asian Economic Grouping 75–6, 78 East Asian financial crisis 71, 72, 76, 79, 80, 87, 88, 99, 124 East Timor 96 EBRD see European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

168 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Index

EFTA see European Free Trade Association epochal effects 145 ERM see Exchange Rate Mechanism EU see European Union European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 78–9 European Central Bank 56, 123 European Commission 59–60 European Council 5, 60, 123 European Free Trade Association 60 European Union: Afghanistan 140; ARF 77; ASEM 78; budget 56, 60, 121–2, 123; CAP 56, 60, 66; CFSP 53, 57; competition policy 66; EMU 56, 59, 62, 64; enlargement 9; ERM crisis 55–6, 57, 121–2; Eurocorps 53–4; European Parliament 60; expansion 60, 64, 65, 66; Germany 50, 57, 59, 64, 68, 122, 129, 131, 132; High Representative for Foreign Policy 54; Japan 75; QMV 54, 56, 60, 123; rapid reaction corps 54; structural funds 60, 62, 66; Treaty on European Union 53; United States 5–6, 125 Evans, P. 107 Exchange Rate Mechanism 55–6, 57, 121–2 Fewsmith, J. 108 Financial Times, the 146 Finnemore, M. 15–16, 45 Foot, R. 98 foreign policy adjustments 16, 120–1 France: EMU 56; European Central Bank 56, 123; European Council 123; European integration 59; Germany 51, 55, 57, 59, 61, 123; Gulf War 52; Iraq 138; QMV 123; Stability Pact (1996) 56; United States 55, 59 Friedman, E. 93 FS-X fighters 75 G7 see Group of Seven Gallagher, M. 98 Garrett, B.N. 77

GATT see General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 5, 55, 59, 78, 96, 99–100; Uruguay Round 55, 78 Genscher, Hans Dietrich 61 George, A. 74 ‘German Question’ 50 Germany 5; Amsterdam IGC 54, 59; AWACS flights 52; Berlin Wall 1, 148; Bosnia 52, 53, 58; Bundesbank 55–6, 62, 63; Bundeswehr 50, 52, 57; Cambodia 52; CAP 56, 60, 66; CDU 123; CFSP 53, 57; ‘civilian power’ 8; Cold War ends 145; constitution 19, 50, 52, 123; Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (1990) 57; Croatia 52; CSCE/OSCE 58, 63; domestic variation 61–5; Eastern Europe, German influence over 57; economic problems 123; EMU 56, 59, 62, 64; ERM crisis 55–6, 57, 121–2; EU budget 56, 60, 121–2, 123; EU competition policy 66; EU expansion 60, 64, 65, 66; EU structural funds 60, 62, 66; Eurocorps 53–4; European Central Bank 56, 123; European Commission 59–60; European Council 60, 123; European integration 59, 62, 64, 66, 67, 123, 127; European Parliament 60; European security 62, 127; Federal Constitutional Court 52; foreign policy (1989–99) 50–69, 128–36; France 51, 55, 57, 59, 61, 123; G7 59; GATT/WTO 55, 59; Greens 53, 123; Gulf War 52, 123; identity transition 131–3; IFOR 53; IMF 59; institutionalized activity 121; Japanese trade relations 55; KFOR 53; Kosovo 53, 55, 58, 66; Maastricht Treaty 52, 53, 59, 60; major powers 127–8; military activity outside NATO 52, 57, 58, 63, 65, 68, 123, 131; Ministry of Finance 62; multilateralism 67, 68; multipolarity 51; NAAC/PfP 58, 63; NATO 50, 51, 53, 54, 57, 58, 61,

Index 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

62, 63, 65–6, 68, 122, 129, 131, 132; Non-Proliferation Treaty 57; Oder-Neisse border 51; Operation Deliberate Force 53, 123; Petersberg Tasks 53–4; PHARE and TACIS funding 60; Polish Border incident 57–8; political choices 65–9; QMV 54, 56, 60, 123; reflexively institutionalist 62, 128; reunification 3, 9, 50, 51, 54, 57, 59, 61, 121–2, 123; Russia 54, 59; SDP 53, 123; SFOR 53; Slovenia and Croatia 52, 121–2; Somalia 52; Srebrenica massacre 53; Stability Pact (1996) 56; status 20; Treaty on European Union 53; United States 6, 20, 41, 57, 61, 123, 124; Western European Union 53–4, 57; World Bank 59; Yugoslav crisis 52, 123 Gilpin, R. 74 Glaser, B.S. 77 Goldieger, J.M. 45–6 Goldstein, A.J. 104 Goodman, J.B. 61–2, 65, 128–9 Group of Seven 59, 78 Gulf War 52, 71, 72, 74, 76, 78, 83, 92, 93, 123, 124, 129, 138, 139 Hall, I.P. 75–6 Harding, H. 109 Harnisch, S. 67 Harris, S. 97, 107 Harvard University 2–3 Hasenclever, A. 35–6 hegemony 146; hegemonic stability theory 6, 113–21; US 8, 17, 18, 21, 122, 126, 139, 141, 142, 145–6 Heginbotham, E. 79, 80, 81, 84, 129 Heilbrun, J. 56 Hellmann, G. 66 Hoffman, S. 2–3, 4, 9, 22, 26, 62, 114 Holland: Anglo-Dutch conflict 31 Hong Kong 94, 98, 104, 109–10 Hungary: and NATO 58 Huntley, W.L. 14, 15, 37, 39, 46 Hussein, Saddam 138 Hyde-Price, A. 58

169

identity: construction 28, 42; realism 102–4, 129; transition 143 Ikenberry, J. 18–19, 20 IMF see International Monetary Fund imitation 31 imperial overstretch 143–4 Inada, J. 78 India: ARF 77; China 95; nuclear testing 73, 99 Inner Mongolia 102 Inoguchi, T. 78 institutionalist model of the international system 1, 3, 4, 7–8, 11, 12; China 97–100, 130; defined 24, 40, 57, 76, 97, 101; Cold War ends 112, 114; foreign policy adjustments 17–18; Germany 57–61; institutionalized activity 121; international change 41; international terrorism 141–2; Japan 76–9, 81, 82, 84–5; key variable 33; ‘linear’ relationship with neorealism and liberalism 28, 40, 41, 48, 113, 116–17; logic of anarchy 33–6; neoliberal institutionalism 34; rationality 117; synthesis with neorealism and liberalism 40–7; theoretical framework 40; theories and predictions 23; ‘triangular’ relationship with neorealism and liberalism 28, 40, 42, 43, 117 institutionalization 16, 121–8; defined 13; reflexive 62 internalization 13 international and domestic systems distinguished 3–4, 4–5, 30, 36 international institutions: defined 3 International Monetary Fund 5, 59, 72, 73, 78, 99 Iran 25, 96, 138, 141; Kuwait invaded 138, 139; regime change 137, 138, 140, 141; weapons of mass destruction 138 Islamic fundamentalism 139 Italy: Gulf War 52 Jackson-Vanik amendment 97 Janning, J. 66–7

170 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Index

Japan 9; ADB 75, 80, 124; Afghanistan 140; AMF 72; APEC 72, 77, 78; ASEM 78; Cambodia 74; car parts dispute 75; China 71, 73, 77, 80, 81, 85, 86, 87, 93–4, 97, 98, 104, 122, 129; ‘civilian power’ 8; Cold War ends 145; constitution 19, 70, 74, 78, 80, 86, 124; CSCE/ OSCE 78; Diet Resolution 90; EAEG 75–6, 78; domestic variation 79–83; East Asian financial crisis 71, 72, 76, 79, 80, 87, 88, 124; EBRD 78–9; economic strategy 124; EU 75; failure to remilitarize 79, 80, 88–9; foreign investment 75; foreign policy (1989–99) 70–90, 128–36; FS-X fighters 75; G7 78; gaitsu 72, 75, 80, 88, 124; GATT/WTO 78; GDP 71; Gulf War 71, 72, 74, 76, 78, 83, 124, 129; human rights 76; identity crisis 90; identity transition 131–3; IMF/World Bank 72, 73, 78; imperial past 88–9; institutionalized activity 121; integration of 20; kieretsu 83, 84; Korean unification 73; Kurile Islands 73, 87; LDP 83, 84, 131–2; low political and military profile 81, 82, 88–9; major powers 127–8; Manila Framework Group 72; mercantilism 75, 76, 81, 85, 88, 129, 132; MST 19, 70, 71, 73, 77, 79, 85, 86, 87, 88, 93–4, 98, 124, 125, 129; multilateral development banks 75, 78, 81; multipolarity and 51; National Defence Planning Outline (1995) 77, 79, 124, 129; NATO 77; North Korea 71, 73; nuclear programme, potential 142; OECD 78; oil supply 73; Okinawa 86; overseas aid 75, 80, 124; party system 83, 88; Pearl Harbor 138; PKO 74, 78; political choices 83–90; post-War rehabilitation 70; rape of Japanese girl 71; recession (1998) 83–4; SDF 74, 77, 78, 124; Senkaku Islands 73, 94; SII 74; South Korea 73; status 20; Taiwan 71; Taiwan Straits 73; TMD 73, 77, 86; trade relations with West 80; UN 74, 77;

United States 5, 6, 20, 41, 71, 72, 74–5, 77, 80, 85, 86, 87, 122, 124–5, 133; US-Japan Joint Declaration (1996) 73; Yoshida Doctrine 70, 82, 83, 84, 85, 90, 131, 133 Jeffery, C. 64 Jervis, R. 44 Jiang Zemin 72, 101 Johnson, C. 87, 143–5 Johnston, A.I. 102–4, 105, 107, 129, 132 Johnstone, C.B. 87 Jones, C. 31 Kagan, R. 25–6, 141 Kant, Immanuel 9–10, 11, 14, 20, 26, 37, 38, 117, 120 Kapstein, E.B. 3, 4, 16–19, 21, 22, 26, 120, 139–40, 141 Katzenstein, P.J. 59, 61, 62, 82 Keehn, E.B. 87 Kennedy, P. 146–7 Keohane, R.O. 2–3, 4, 9, 12–13, 22, 26, 28–9, 30, 33–5, 40–2, 45, 47, 48, 62, 114, 120, 142 Khmer Rouge 95 Kim, S.S. 101 Kinkel, Klaus 55 Kirschner, E.J. 56 Kohl, Helmut 51, 55, 57–8, 61, 62 Kosovo 53, 54, 55, 58, 66, 95–6 Kurile Islands 73, 87 Kuwait: Iraq invades 138, 139 ‘layer cake’ system 8 Layne, C. 51, 91 Levine, S.I. 101, 102 liberal model of the international system 1, 3, 4, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14; China 100–6, 106–11; Cold War ends 112; defined 24, 61, 79, 101; Germany 61–5, 65–9; institutionalized activity 121; Japan 79–83, 83–90; ‘linear’ relationship with neorealism and institutionalism 28, 40, 41, 48, 113, 116–17; logic of anarchy 36–40; predictions 14–22; socialization 130; Soviet collapse

Index 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

118–21; synthesis with neorealism and institutionalism 40–7; theoretical framework 40; theories and predictions 23; ‘triangular’ relationship with neorealism and institutionalism 28, 40, 42, 43, 117; see also socialization Lincoln, E.J. 71 Little, R. 31, 43 Locke, John 11, 20, 117, 120 Maastricht Treaty 52, 53, 59, 60 Macao 94 McFaul, M. 45–6 Malaysia 75 Manila Framework Group 72 Mao Tse Tung 91, 102 Markovitz, A.S. 63–4 Mastanduno, M. 3, 4, 16–19, 21, 22, 26, 120, 139–40, 141 master variables 44 maturity effects 145 Maull, H.W. 8, 58, 63, 67 Mayer, P. 35–6 Mearsheimer, J.J. 25, 51, 91 Meiers, F.J. 58–9, 63 mercantile realism 81–2, 85, 88, 129, 132 Middle East 119 Mischief Reef 74, 94 Mochizuki, M.M. 86 Moore, T.G. 108 Moravcsik, A. 10, 13, 36, 37, 39, 117 Mukae, R. 89 Mulgan, A.G. 75 Muller, H. 57–8 multipolarity see polarity Munro, R.H. 92, 93 NACC see North Atlantic Cooperation Council national interests 29 NATO see North Atlantic Treaty Organization neorealist model of the international system 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 141; ambiguity 32; Berlin Wall 148; China 91–7, 130; Cold War ends 112, 114; defined 24, 41–2, 101;

171

foreign policy adjustments 17–18; Germany 51–7; institutionalized activity 121; international change 41; international terrorism 141; Japan 70–6, 81, 82, 85; key variable 30; ‘linear’ relationship with institutionalism and liberalism 28, 40, 41, 48, 113, 116–17; logic of anarchy 30–3, 36, 37, 40; overextension 143; polarity 6, 8; rationalist model 28; reflexive logic 28; September 11, 2001 137; Soviet collapse 139; synthesis with institutionalism and liberalism 40–7; theoretical framework 40; theories and predictions 23; ‘triangular’ relationship with institutionalism and liberalism 28, 40, 42, 43, 117; unipolarity 146 New York 137–48 Non-Proliferation Treaty 57, 96, 99 norms 13; cascade 15–16, 145 North Atlantic Cooperation Council 58, 63 North Atlantic Treaty Organization 5, 9, 19; Czech Republic 58; enlargement 17, 54–5, 58; Germany 50, 51, 53, 54, 57, 58, 61, 62, 63, 65–6, 68, 122, 129, 131, 132; Hungary 58; Japan 77; NATORussia Joint Permanent Council 55; Poland 58; Russia 55; September 11, 2001 138; Washington Treaty 140–1 North Korea 71, 73; China 93; nuclear programme 71, 73, 96, 142; US sanctions 71 NPT see Non-Proliferation Treaty nuclear proliferation: China 73, 94, 96, 99, 142; India 73, 99; Japan 142; North Korea 71, 73, 96, 142; Pakistan 73 Nye, J.S. 2–3, 4, 8, 9, 22, 26, 35, 62, 76–7, 80, 85, 87, 92, 98, 114, 122 Oder-Neisse border 51 OECD see Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Okawara, N. 82 Okinawa 71, 86

172 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Index

Operation Deliberate Force 53, 123 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 78 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 55, 58, 63, 78 OSCE see Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe over-extension 142–4 pacific union 20 Pakistan: and China 95, 96; nuclear testing 73 Paracel and Spratly Islands 73, 94, 98, 104 Partnership for Peace 58, 63 Paterson, W.E. 64 ‘path dependent’ change 8 Pearl Harbor 138 Pearson, M.M. 107 Petersberg Tasks 53–4 PfP see Partnership for Peace PHARE see Poland and Hungary Aid for Economic Reconstruction Philippines 94 Poland: Border incident 57–8; German reunification 51; NATO 58; Oder-Neisse border 51 Poland and Hungary Aid for Economic Reconstruction 60 polarity 5; bipolarity 5, 8; multipolarity 5, 6, 8, 148; unipolarity 5, 6, 115, 139, 140, 147 Prisoner’s Dilemma 34 Pye, L.W. 102 Pyle, K.B. 83, 85, 86, 89 rationality 28–49 reflexivity 11–12, 13, 28–49, 113, 116, 117–18, 133–5, 145; defined 39 regime change see Afghanistan; Iraq Reich, A. 63–4 Rittberger, V. 35–6 Robinson, T.W. 105 Ruggie, J.G. 32 Ruhe, V. 54–5 Russia 45, 119; Afghanistan 140; China 95; East Asia 9; Germany 54, 59; international society 8; Kosovo

53, 54; Kurile Islands 73; NATO 55; peaceful integration 144–5; terrorist activities 142; United States 6, 17; see also Soviet Union Rynhold, J. 99 Salmon, T.C. 52 Samuels, R.J. 79, 80, 81, 84, 129 Sato, H. 59, 87, 110 Saudi Arabia 96 Schlor, W.F. 63 Second World War 50, 63 Segal, G. 72, 92, 98, 102, 103, 106, 109, 111 Senkaku Islands 73, 94 September 11, 2001 25, 26, 137–48 Shambaugh, D. 104, 106–7 Shinn, J. 106 Sikkink, K. 15–16, 45 Slovenia 52, 121–2 Smith, M.E. 65 Snyder, Jack 142, 144 socialization: the liberal model 10–11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 28, 29, 30–2, 33, 36, 38–9, 42, 43, 47, 116, 118, 119, 120–1, 130, 145; defined 13, 30 Somalia 52 South China Sea 73 South Korea 73 Soviet Union: August coup (1991) 1; collapse of 1, 2, 3, 15, 17, 24, 27, 44, 45, 46, 47, 49, 50, 54, 82, 91, 103, 112, 113–21, 125, 129, 137, 138, 139, 140, 143–5; German reunification 51, 57; IMF package 73; Kurile Islands 87; Pacific Fleet dismantled 91; Second World War 70; Sino-Soviet split 92; stagnation 91; Vietnam aid ended 95; withdrawal of power from Central Europe 3; see also Russia Srebrenica 53 state strategies: defined 3 Sterling-Folker, J. 43 structural realist model of the international system see neorealist model

Index 1111 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 4 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111

Syria 96 systemic theory 48, 114 TACIS see Technical Assistance to the CIS Tadokoro, M. 84 Taiwan 71, 93, 94, 98, 100, 104, 105, 109 Taiwan Straits 73; crisis (1996) 110, 125 Technical Assistance to the CIS 60 Tewes, H. 66, 67 Tiananmen Square see China Tibet 102 Tow, W.T. 92 Two-Plus-Four 51, 61 UN see United Nations under-extension 142–4 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics see Soviet Union unipolarity see polarity United Nations 93, 95; Conference on the Law of the Sea 94; Gulf War 138; Implementation Force 53; Japan and 74, 77; Kosovo Force 53; Stabilization Force 53 United States of America: Afghanistan 146, 147; APEC 78; ARF 77; blowback 145–6; China 6, 17, 41, 74, 79, 93, 100, 125; ‘coalition of the willing’ 138; Cold War ends 2, 143–5; containment strategy 5; dominance 6, 16–17; East Asian military presence 5–6, 9, 71, 72, 76–7, 80, 93, 98, 110, 122, 124, 125, 126, 127; Europe 5–6, 58, 126, 127; foreign policy dilemmas 144, 146; France 55, 59; GDP 6; Germany 6, 20, 57, 61, 123, 124; Gulf War 52, 71, 72, 74, 76, 78, 83, 92, 93, 123, 124, 129, 138, 139; hegemony 8, 17, 18, 21, 122, 126,

173

139, 141, 142, 145–6; Iraq 137, 138, 139, 140, 141; Japan 5, 6, 20, 41, 71, 72, 74–5, 77, 80, 87, 122, 124–5, 133; military capabilities 141; overstretch 145–6; Pearl Harbor 138; Philippines withdrawal 94; pre-emption 146–7; Russia 6, 17; Sino-US-Japanese relations 85; Soviet Union collapses 143–5; TMD 86; Trade Act (1989) 74; unipolarity 41, 92, 140, 141 Van Wolferen, K. 83, 84, 89 variation 33 Vietnam 95 Wallace, W. 67 Waltz, K.N. 4–7, 20, 30–3, 45, 51, 91, 113–18, 139, 141 Wan, M. 80–1 Wang, H. 107–8 Washington, DC 137–48 Washington Treaty 138 Wendt, A.E. 11, 13–14, 20, 32–3, 38–9, 44–5, 47, 117, 119–20, 135 Western European Union 53–4, 57 Westphalia, Treaty of 148 WEU see Western European Union Wilson, Woodrow 12 Wohlforth, W. 6–7, 115, 146–7, 148 World Bank 5, 59, 72, 73, 78, 99 World Trade Center, New York 137–48 World Trade Organization 55, 59, 78, 96, 99–100, 109 WTO see World Trade Organization Xinjiang 102 Yahuda, M. 104, 109 Yang, D. 108 Yugoslav crisis 52, 123