THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF AYATOLLAH MURTAZA MUTAHHARI: AN IRANIAN (Routledgecurzon Bips Persian Studies Series)

THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF AYATULLAH . M U R T A Z A M U T. A H H A R I

. Ayatullah Murtaza Mut.ahhari was a significant figure in the movement that brought into being the Islamic Republic of Iran. Mut.ahhari, a particularly close student of Ayatullah Khomeini, is considered one of the most prominent intellectual figures among Iranian and Shi‘ite scholars of his time. This book presents the life and works of this philosopher, jurist, preacher and writer, who was educated in the Qum Seminary and worked in Tehran. It describes how Mut.ahhari became familiar with Marxism and secularism, and how he responded to the challenge of these two movements. It demonstrates how he gradually represented himself as a major theorist, offering ideological analyses of Islam. The book highlights Mut.ahhari’s non-radical, non-violent way of action. Mahmood T. Davari is uniquely qualified to write about this influential man, having been one of Mut.ahhari’s students, as well as the student of Mut.ahhari’s lifelong friend, Ayatullah Montazeri. Drawing upon firsthand reports, notes and interviews with Mut.ahhari’s family and friends, the author highlights less-documented parts of the political trends in contemporary Iranian society. This book will appeal to scholars and students interested in modern Iranian politics and those with an interest in representations of Islam and Shi‘ism. Mahmood T. Davari is Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Qum.

ROUTLEDGECURZON/BIPS PERSIAN STUDIES SERIES Editorial Board Professor C.E. Bosworth, Dr V.S. Curtis, Dr R.M. Gleave, Dr V.A. Martin In this series, RoutledgeCurzon in association with the British Institute of Persian Studies (BIPS) publishes scholarly books in the social sciences and humanities on Iran. Such works include: original research monographs; suitably revised theses; specially planned books deriving from conferences; specially commissioned, multi-authored research books and translations. 1. Iranian History and Politics The dialectic of state and society Homa Katouzian 2. The Making of Modern Iran State and society under Riza Shah 1921–1941 Edited by Stephanie Cronin 3. Reformers and Revolutionaries in Modern Iran New perspectives on the Iranian left Edited by Stephanie Cronin 4. Religion and Society in Qajar Iran Edited by Robert Gleave . 5. The Political Thought of Ayatullah Murtaza Mut. ahhari An Iranian theoretician of the Islamic state Mahmood T. Davari

THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF A . YATULLAH M U R T A Z A M U T. A H H A R I An Iranian theoretician of the Islamic state

Mahmood T. Davari

First published 2005 by RoutledgeCurzon 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by RoutledgeCurzon 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” RoutledgeCurzon is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group © 2005 Mahmood T. Davari All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN 0-203-33523-6 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0–415–34159–0 (Print Edition)

DEDICATED TO THE EVERLASTING AND TREASURED MEMORY OF AYATULLAH . SHAHID MURTAZ A MU T. AHHARI (MAY HIS SOUL REST IN PEACE)

CONTENTS

1

Acknowledgements

ix

Introduction

1

The period of education

6

From a clerical family 6 The Mashhad Seminary: centre of traditionalism 7 Reza Kha¯n and the religious seminaries 9 The uprising of the Gauharsha¯d Mosque 12 With the family again 13 Move to the Qum Seminary 14 Finding the second ideal man 15 A classmate and a friend for life 16 In search of the third ideal figure 17 Higher education 18 A close friend of Fada¯i¯ya¯n-i Islam 20 Fear of the Tu¯dih Party 24 Unsuccessful efforts at reform 29 2

Academic works and political activities An architect of modern Islamic theology 31 A desirable chair for the young philosopher 32 An active speaker at the Islamic associations 34 At the core of the political arena 35 A theorist of the Islamic coalition groups 38 Epic of the righteous, stories for moralists 40 H . usainiyih-i Irsha¯d, the unfulfilled expectations 41 A debate with the secularists on women’s rights 50 vii

31

CONTENTS

A debate with traditionalists and secularists on women’s veils 51 Islam and Iran, a debate with the nationalists 55 A harsh attitude towards the Marxist guerrillas 61 A message to the Muslim activists 67 A bridge between shifting time and permanent Islam 69 A debate with a poet about H . a¯fiz.’s gnosticism 70 Return to Qum 72 Debates with Muslim leftist guerrillas 74 A key figure in the Islamic Revolution 84 3

Economic perspectives

86

Writings on economics 86 What does ‘Islamic economics’ mean? 89 Principles 97 The state and economics 115 4

Political views

121

A glance at the past 121 The necessity of having a ruler 127 Relationship between ruler and ruled 129 Islamic rule 130 A reconsideration of the different interpretations of the theory of Islamic rule 142 Conclusion

161

Notes Bibliography Index

167 186 195

viii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank the Ministry of Sciences and High Education of Iran for a grant which enabled me to do research in Manchester. I owe very special thanks to the late Mulla¯ Asghar-Ali, Muhammad-Ali Taskhiri, MuhammadMahdi Muvah.h.idi, Ja‘far Hadi-Hasan, Farha¯d and Farrukh Sekalishfar, Muhsin Tava¯ngar, Muhammad Mu¯savi Bahreini and the late John Cooper for their support in a variety of ways. I am most grateful to Paul Luft, Vanessa Martin and Muhammad Legenhausen for their scholarly comments. My thanks also go to Jonathan Price, Dorothea Schaefter, Joe Whiting, Zoe Botterill, James Cooke, Frances Nugent and other members of the editorial team for their valuable co-operation. I thank and pray for my son Entez. ar who assisted me whenever I needed him.

ix

INTRODUCTION

The manifestations of Islamism are quite visible, today, not only in the Islamic world, but also in the West among Muslim minorities. Islamic practices, such as wearing the Islamic veil (h.ija¯b), growing a beard, consuming Islamically slaughtered (h.ala¯l) meat, non-alcoholic drinks, etc., are all familiar to Western people. These rituals are currently observed, not only in traditional and ordinary Muslim circles, but also by enthusiastic top Muslim academics and political activists who have been educated in wellknown Western universities. While most Islamic societies were under the influence and severe pressure of (state-) secular ideologies such as Marxism, socialism and nationalism for almost half a century, the tendency towards Islamism rose and gradually expanded in reaction to those state-propagated ideologies. At first, the Islamist movements were relatively limited and local; however, they progressed and intensified, covering the vast majority of people, influencing their lives and ideals, mobilizing them towards independence and selfreliance. Thus an international network was established after the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979) that has become a source of hope even for many non-Islamic movements. This revolution undoubtedly played a role in promoting Islamic feelings and consciousness among the Muslim masses around the globe. The Islamists, regardless of their differences in policy, adopted Islam as their identity, their way of living and their strategy. However, they may be classified into three groups: (i) the rigid, extreme, superficial; (ii) the moderate, logical and truthful; and (iii) the liberal, pragmatist and compromising. All three share the view that Islam holds the key to their present and future problems. This present massive tendency towards Islamism or, in my own words, an Islamic type of living, among Muslims, is indeed the result of several lifetime endeavours by Muslim theoreticians and political activists, including Ayatullah Mut.ahhari. His role is more visible than others, perhaps, in rendering Islam an up-to-date comprehensive social-political ideology compatible with modern times and present needs. His writings are still widely distributed and massively read in Islamic groups and Shi‘ite communities. As 1

INTRODUCTION

a distinguished Islamic leader, he played a very important role, particularly in the case of Iran’s Islamic Revolution. Therefore, he can be considered as a major force behind present-day Islamism and Islamic movements, especially in its Shi‘i branch. . Ayatullah Ha¯jj Shaikh Murtaza Mut.ahhari Farima¯ni (1920–79) was from a clerical family, a pupil of Ayatullah Khomeini, a university Professor of Philosophy and a Mujtahid (jurist) in Islamic law at the Shi‘ite seminary. He is highly regarded among the most distinguished and respected scholars, not only in the Islamic world, but also by Islamologists in the West. He has been described and praised with words and phrases that are rarely used for others, such as ‘the Son of the Time’,1 ‘one of the most prominent contemporary intellectual figures among the Iranian clergy’,2 ‘a powerful intellectual force for almost a quarter of a century’,3 ‘one of the principal architects of the new Islamic consciousness in Iran’,4 ‘a scholar who best delivered the Islamic ideology from the very depths of the Islamic sacred history, and rendered it a legitimate historical updating of the Muslim doctrinal self-understanding’,5 ‘an outstanding political theorist, reformer and radical activist’,6 ‘a high ranking thinker, philosopher, jurist, and a rare Islamologist’,7 ‘a reformist of Islamic thought in modern times’,8 ‘a guardian of the frontiers of the Islamic ideology’,9 ‘a theoretician of Islamic rule’10 and ‘the ideologue of Islam-i fiqa¯hati [an interpretation of Islam which maintains that only Mujtahids are authorized to interpret the Islamic texts and rule the people]’.11 The then President (and present leader) Khamenei¯ stated that ‘Mut.ahhari’s views have formed the theoretical foundations of our (Islamic) Republic’.12 Hence, the importance of Mut.ahhari for understanding modern Islamic social and political philosophies, the Islamic movement and Islamic Iran, is indisputable. The importance of Mut.ahhari’s works is based, first, on their comprehensiveness and complexity. Similar to Marxist totalism, they cover almost all parts of human social-political issues, including theology, philosophy, history, sociology, ethics, education, the law, economics and politics. Simultaneously challenging traditionalism, Marxism, secularism and monarchism, Mut.ahhari presents an alternative total Islamic system, Islamic world view and social political ideology. Second, Mut.ahhari offers a unique type of analysis. He neither builds his arguments by means of reason (‘aql) alone – as does the liberal – nor does he limit himself to a literal understanding of religious texts – as do conservatives. Supporting his arguments with religious texts, Mut.ahhari prefers rational interpretations. While referring to the Islamic texts, he does not neglect man’s intellectual achievements. Although a number of articles and books concerning Mut.ahhari’s life and views have been published in the West and in Iran after his assassination, nevertheless, owing to the unsatisfactory nature of the sources, no major comprehensive study of his life and socio-political philosophy has yet appeared. In his ‘Introduction’ (1985), Hamid Algar deals only with 2

INTRODUCTION

Mut.ahhari’s biography, not his works and philosophy.13 Michael J. Fischer and Mehdi Abedi’s Debating Muslims (1990) deals with Mut.ahhari only as a part of their anthropological studies on dialogues about postmodernity and tradition within Muslim communities.14 Apart from their brief biography of Mut.ahhari, they restrict themselves to Mut.ahhari’s Islam va Iran and his views about Iranian nationality. Farhad Nomani and Ali Rahnema’s analysis of Mut.ahhari’s political thought (1990) is part of their post-Revolution Iranian studies. However, they did not mention the events of Mut.ahhari’s life. Further, they deal mainly with some less important aspects of his political views and economic philosophy. Mut.ahhari’s milestone books on economics, Naz.ari bi Niz.am-i Iqtisa¯di-yi Islam and Mas’alih-yi Riba¯ and also his views on the theory of Vila¯yat-i Faqih are not discussed in their studies.15 Although J. G. J. Haar’s interesting article on Mut.ahhari’s life and thought (1990–2) does not leave out any major event of Mut.ahhari’s life, it is concerned with three subjects of his works and academic activities: namely, Iranian nationality, the Islamic veil and the Islamic Revolution. Although Haar refers to a considerable number of Persian publications about Mut.ahhari, he does not use Va¯thiqi Ra¯d’s collection, which is regarded as the main source about Mut.ahhari’s life in Persian literature.16 Hamid Dabashi’s scholarly study on Mut.ahhari (1993) is part of his research on the ideological foundation of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Although he discusses almost all political aspects of Mut.ahhari’s Islamic ideology, his book does not include much in the way of discussion of the economic dimension of this ideology, failing to mention two of Mut.ahhari’s major economics books.17 Vanessa Martin’s interesting analysis of Mut.ahhari’s political philosophy (2000) constitutes a part of her book on Ayatullah Khomeini’s ideology of the Islamic state, although it does not include Mut.ahhari’s social work and political activities.18 The Ya¯d-na¯mih-yi Usta¯d-i Shahid Murtaz.a Mut.ahhari, edited by ‘AbdulKarim Suru¯sh in 1360/1981, is in fact the first publication in Persian about Mut.ahhari. It includes statements by various personalities from all over the world after his assassination. Apart from two articles written by Montazeri and Va¯‘iz.-za¯dih about Mut.ahhari’s life, the rest includes different theological and philosophical articles presented by Mut.ahhari’s friends, in his memory.19 M. H. Va¯thiqi Ra¯d’s two-volume Mut.ahhari: Mut.ahhar-i Andishih-ha¯ (1364/1985) is regarded as a major source for Mut.ahhari’s life. It is mainly a collection of statements, interviews and articles issued and published by Mut.ahhari’s teachers and friends after his death, but it also includes a considerable number of valuable documents about him. Although it deals to some extent with the socio-political background of some of Mut.ahhari’s works, it does not assess them, in particular his philosophical analysis.20 These two volumes were republished in 1379/2000 under the title of Mus.lih-i Bida¯r with a different structure. The Jilvih-ha¯-yi Mu‘allimi-yi Usta¯d (1364/1985) is another collection of interviews and statements made by 3

INTRODUCTION

Mut.ahhari’s friends and students about his life and works, and includes a number of articles about his social philosophy.21 The Sairi dar Zindiga¯ni-yi Usta¯d Mut.ahhari (1370/1991) begins with an article written by H . ujjat alIslam Hashemi Rafsanjani about the role of Mut.ahhari in Iran’s Islamic movement, and continues with a relatively comprehensive analysis of Mut.ahhari’s personality, his way of thinking, his academic works and his political activities.22 It is particularly useful for some unpublished letters by Mut.ahhari about the H . usainiyih-i Irsha¯d and Dr Ali Shariati. The twovolume Sarguzasht-ha¯-yi Vizhih az Zindigi-yi Usta¯d-i Shahid Murtaz.a Mut.ahhari (1375/1996) is another collection of interviews with the friends and students of Mut.ahhari,23 which is full of information concerning his life and political activities. They provide some background information to Mut.ahhari’s works and activities in Qum and outside the clerical establishment, and end with a number of documents about him, including Ayatullah Khomeini’s letters to him before the Islamic Revolution. However, they do not deal with Mut.ahhari’s own works and views. Ali Ba¯qi Nas. r-a¯ba¯di’s scholarly book, Sairi dar Andishih-ha¯-yi Ijtima¯‘i¯ -yi Shahid Ayatullah Mut.ahhari (1377/1998) has provided a relatively comprehensive study of Mut.ahhari’s social and historical philosophy, but it does not deal with his political philosophy and Islamic ideology. Usta¯d-i Shahid bi Riva¯yat-i ¯ VA ¯ K’s reports on Asna¯d (1378/1999) provides a unique collection of SA Mut.ahhari’s political views and activities. The seven-volume Ya¯d-da¯sht-ha¯yi Usta¯d Mut.ahhari (1378/1999–1382/2003) is also a very useful collection of Mut.ahhari’s notes, comments and unpublished manuscripts. This study aims to introduce Mut.ahhari to Western readers. To draw a clearer picture of his unique role as a major theoretician of the Islamist movements and a main architect of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the study takes a comprehensive form and covers almost all major aspects of Mut.ahhari’s works, political activities and social-political philosophy. To enable the reader to gain a better understanding of Mut.ahhari’s life, a biography of him, in chronological order, is provided in Chapter 1. This covers the period between his childhood and his move to Tehran to work in 1951. Throughout this chapter, the major sociological elements surrounding Mut.ahhari and influencing his life, feelings and personality, including his family, friends, education, religious seminaries, his charismatic teachers and mentors, as well as some relevant political events and movements, are discussed. To provide a better image of his times, the discussion goes behind the political events, sketching a wider panorama for the reader. The second chapter focuses on Mut.ahhari’s academic works and political activities. This part is indeed a sort of sociology of the intellectual, explaining the mutual exchange between Mut.ahhari and his times, demonstrating the reflection of the communal political needs on his works, and also the influences he left on his society. It covers the period from the beginning of his employment at Tehran University to his assassination in 1979. While 4

INTRODUCTION

clarifying Mut.ahhari’s influence on Muslim activists and the Islamic movements, the chapter draws an overall picture of the formation of these militant groups and religious associations. The well-known Islamic Associations of Teachers, Engineers and Physicians, the Islamic Coalition Groups (Haiat-ha¯yi Mu’talifih-yi Islami), the Institute of H . usainiyih-i Irsha¯d, the Society of the Militant Clergy (the Ja¯mi‘ih-yi Ru¯h.a¯niyat-i Muba¯riz), the Qum Seminary (the H . auzih-i ‘Ilmiyih-i Qum), as well as the Muslim leftist guerrillas (Muja¯h.idin-i Khalq and Furqa¯n) are discussed in this section. The chapter also covers discussions of non-religious groups including Marxist activists and guerrillas. Moreover, it deals with Mut.ahhari’s philosophical works on a variety of issues relating to man, religion, society and history. The focus of Chapter 3 is on Mut.ahhari’s analysis of the Islamic economic system, in contrast with the two main economic theories of capitalism and socialism. Mut.ahhari’s two major economic writings, Mas’alih-yi Riba¯ and Naz.ari bi Niz.a¯m-i Iqtis.a¯di-yi Islam are examined carefully. To present a theoretical foundation for an ideal Islamic banking system, Mut.ahhari’s attention is directed, in the first book, to the analysis of the baselessness and unlawfulness of usury; whereas the second book provides his socialist view on ‘machine’ as the main characteristic of modern capitalism. While trying to stand between capitalism and socialism, Mut.ahhari’s analysis tends, eventually, towards a preference for a state economic system. However, this chapter benefits, from time to time, from S.adr’s Iqtis.a¯duna¯ and his economic analysis. Chapter 4 covers Mut.ahhari’s political perspectives from his earlier writings and later interviews and lectures, around the time of the Islamic Revolution. It puts his ideas within the framework of previous interpretations of the theory of Islamic rule (Vila¯yat-i Faqih), beginning with Muh.aqqiq Karaki (d. 1533), and focusing on particular issues relating to questions of authority, sovereignty and legitimacy – such as the necessity of having a ruler or the nature of the state, the ideal type of relationship between ruled and ruler, what kind of Islamic rule: rule only by enforcement of Islamic law (Shari‘at) or rule also by a just and well-qualified jurist (vali¯ -yi faqih). This part also reflects Mut.ahhari’s views on the role of the clergy in politics, secularism (Islam minha¯-yi Ru¯h.a¯niyat), his analysis of the consistency between Islam and republicanism, and the need to protect the Islamic Republic from secularists and imperialists. The transliteration system will mainly follow that used in the Journal of Islamic Studies (published by Oxford University Press) with the diacritical marks. However, where proper names have an established spelling in Englishlanguage texts, that has been preferred to the transliterated version.

5

1 THE PERIOD OF EDUCATION

From a clerical family Nearly one year before Reza Kha¯n’s coup d’état (22 February 1921)1 . Ayatullah Murtaza Mut.ahhari2 was born into a clerical family on 2 February 1920 (13 Bahman 1298/12 Jama¯di I, 1338) in Farima¯n,3 a town 75 kilometres south-east of Mashhad,4 one of the famous centres of Shi‘ite pilgrimage and learning in the east of Iran. His grandfather Muhammad Ali, the author of Vaqa¯yi‘a al-ayya¯m, was born in Za¯bul, a city in Sista¯n where he received most of his education. He continued his secondary education at Mashhad Seminary. As a local Mulla¯, he settled in ‘Abdul-a¯ba¯d, a small village outside Turbat-i H . aidariyih and took up preaching. Ha¯jj Muhammad Husain, Mut.ahhari’s father (d. 1972 at the age of 102),5 was one of four children in the family. He was primarily educated by his father Muhammad Ali, then went to Iraq to start his higher religious studies in Najaf.6 After finishing higher studies, Muhammad Husain returned to his family in ‘Abdul-a¯ba¯d but did not find satisfactory employment.7 At the beginning of the Constitutional Revolution (1905), he moved to Qalandar-a¯ba¯d, a suburb of Turbat-i H . aidariyih, leaving after a short time for Farima¯n, at the invitation of some of his friends. As the city’s main scholar, he carried out normal clerical duties as well as giving religious lessons at the elementary level. Being a traditionalist and externalist (z.a¯hirgira¯) he was much attracted by ‘Alla¯mih Mulla¯ Muhammad Ba¯qir Majlisi’s (d. 1699) ethical writings.8 But no books or articles have been ascribed to him, nor any political activities reported about him. Mut.ahhari described him, in the preface of his Da¯sta¯n-i Ra¯sta¯n, which is dedicated to him, as follows: ‘For the first time, his belief, piety, good deeds and truthfulness introduced me to the right path.’9 Muhammad Husain had seven children: five boys and two girls. His third . child – the second son – was named Murtaza. There are some stories reported from Mut.ahhari’s childhood which indicate how strongly he was attracted by religious rituals and how much he was striving to gain knowledge. It is said that when he was three years old Mut.ahhari took his mother’s jacket 6

THE PERIOD OF EDUCATION

(using it as a cloak (qaba¯)), went to an empty room and started praying;10 similarly, when he was about six or seven years old, early one morning, he put on a mantle and went to the Maktab Kha¯nih (traditional primary school), sitting down behind the door until the school was opened.11 After he had finished his elementary education at the Maktab Kha¯nih, Mut.ahhari was introduced to elementary religious studies by his father. When he was 12, he moved, together with his elder brother Muhammad Ali, to Mashhad to start the formal religious curriculum.12

The Mashhad Seminary: centre of traditionalism At that time, the H . auzih-yi ‘Ilmiyih-i Mashhad (the traditional educational centre of Mashhad) was famous among the ‘ulama¯. In academic terms, it was considered to be on the same level as Najaf and Qum;13 because of its eminent religious teachers (mudarrisin), it attracted students from all over the ¯ qa¯ Buzurg country. Shaikh Muhammad Taqi Adib Naisha¯bu¯ri (d. 1976),14 A . 15 Shahidi Razavi known as ‘H . akim’ (d. 1936) and his son, Mirza¯ Mahdi (d. 1936),16 Mirza¯ Mahdi Isfahani (1885–1946),17 Ha¯jj Muhammad Kafa¯i¯ ¯ qa¯-za¯dih’ (d. 1937)18 and Ha¯jj A ¯ qa¯ Husain Qumi (d. Khura¯sa¯ni known as ‘A 19 1946) respectively taught Arabic literature, ethics and philosophy, theology and jurisprudence. A new hermeneutical theory in religious studies had emerged, which soon became a powerful and dominant movement in the seminary. The theory, later called Maktab-i tafkik (segregationism),20 defends the independent understanding of Quranic knowledge (ma‘a¯rif-i Quran) from allegorical and rational inferences from Islamic texts, and firmly rejects Islamic philosophy and mysticism. Muhammad Reza H . akimi, a distinguished Iranian Islamologist, has described this theoretical approach as follows: The aim of this school [of thought] is the purification of Quranic knowledge, to remain unmixed and to be understood clearly, without using any ta’vil [allegory] and mixing with other thoughts and schools, without using tafsir-i bi ra’y [interpretation by personal opinion] and analogy, to protect revealed facts and the principles of true knowledge from mixing and being tainted with human thought and talent.21 According to this theory, the Quran has its own language, logic and method of interpretation which can only be understood by using the exegeses of members of the Prophet’s family. Therefore, pure Islamic knowledge is not knowledge based upon Greek philosophy, Indian gnosticism, Aristotelian logic, analogical method, rational argumentation or esoteric intuition. On the contrary, it is a knowledge acquired through systematic research into the sayings, deeds and writings of the Shi‘ite Ima¯ms. Hence, for them, all rational 7

THE PERIOD OF EDUCATION

Islamic sciences, namely logic, philosophy and gnosticism, were alien to Quranic teachings.22 Although there appears to be a difference between this movement and Akhba¯rism (traditionalism) there is, in fact, none in its basic assumptions and methods.23 Akhba¯rism opposes Us.ulism (rationalism) in the field of fiqh (jurisprudence), while the tafkiki doctrine in theology is in contrast to philosophy and mysticism. The forerunner of this school was Mirza¯ Mahdi Isfahani, a Najafgraduated Mujtahid (a religious student who reached to the degree of Ijtiha¯d), who probably came to Mashhad in 1921–2. Although he was a student of Mirza¯ Muhammad Husain Na¯i¯ni (1860–1936)24 and was therefore supposed to have been a firm supporter of Us.ulism, he had clearly moved in the opposite direction. His anti-rationalistic opinions were found attractive by almost all traditionalist ‘ulama¯ and soon became a dominant movement in the Mashhad Seminary. Therefore, the adherents of the rational sciences lost their academic positions and respectable status.25 This intense climate did not, however, overwhelm the young Mut.ahhari; instead, it prepared a useful ground for his philosophical outlook: Regarding my spiritual development, as far as I can remember, from the age of 13, an urge developed in me and I encountered an intense sensitivity relating to theological issues. The questions [about those issues] of course, in relation to the mental level of that age, were one by one crowding my mind.26 After his arrival at Mashhad, Mut.ahhari settled, together with his elder brother, in the Abda¯l-Kha¯n school and continued his introductory religious education there.27 As a first step, Mut.ahhari evaluated various intellectual trends and academic orientations, as well as looking at the eminent personalities in the fields of religious and secular sciences, in order to select the most distinguished branch of knowledge and the most prestigious personality: I remember that from the beginning of my religious education, when I was studying the elementary Arabic language in Mashhad, the views and works of philosophers, mystics and theologians – although I was not familiar with their thoughts – preoccupied my mind and exerted their influence on me with greater profundity than other great scholars, inventors and explorers had done. It was purely for this reason that I considered them to be the heroes in the field of thought. I clearly remember that at the age of 13 to 15, among all the . ‘ulama¯, learned people [fuzala¯] and high-ranking teachers of the Mashhad Seminary, there was one person who captivated and attracted the attention of my mind more than the others, [namely] ¯ qa¯ Mirza¯ Mahdi Shahidi Raz.avi a teacher [mudarris] of the late A 8

THE PERIOD OF EDUCATION

divine philosophy in that seminary. I liked to look at his face, sit in his presence, consider his facial expressions and movements, and hoped that I could, one day, attend his lessons. That hope was not realized because, sadly, the great man passed away in 1355q/ 1936–7.28 Mirza¯ Mahdi originated from a famous clerical family – the Shahidis – who had held the reins of spiritual authority in the Mashhad Seminary for ¯ qa¯ Buzurg H many decades.29 His father, A . akim, a philosopher, was teaching Mulla¯ S.adra¯’s philosophy and enjoyed, for his spiritual character, a high reputation among his students.30 Mirza¯ Mahdi himself was lecturing on Mulla¯ Ha¯di Sabzava¯ri’s philosophical poem, Sharh.-i Manz.u¯mih,31 and was well known for his fluent explanations, proficiency in philosophical texts and rationalism. Before he reached his fortieth year, Mirza¯ Mahdi passed away. Unfortunately, no notes or scripts illustrating his views have survived, nor any transcripts of his influential mystical sermons.32 However, what made Mirza¯ Mahdi a great figure in the eyes of the young Mut.ahhari was apparently his professional integrity and personal character. Mut.ahhari had found his preferred academic field and also his spiritual ideals in the young theosopher Mirza¯ Mahdi. With no understanding of any philosophical terminology, he often went to Mirza¯ Mahdi’s lectures and benefited from his teachings.33 At this period, Mut.ahhari was seeking to clarify his future. He eventually recognized his academic aspirations and field of research. Henceforth, he preferred the rational and analytical sciences to other Islamic sciences.

Reza Kha¯n and the religious seminaries As an aid to understanding the state–religion relationship, it is appropriate here to give a brief description of Reza Kha¯n’s relations with the religious authorities and clerical seminaries. It has been asserted that Reza Kha¯n’s position, vis-à-vis the phenomenon of religiosity and religious institutions, varied during his political career, and generally passed through three stages.34 The first period, 1921–5, was the period after the coup d’état, when he was appointed Minister of War and then (in 1923) became Prime Minister and Commander of the Army. At the beginning of this time, the Qum Seminary was re-established by 35 Shaikh ‘Abdul-Karim H . a¯’iri Yazdi (d. 1937). The institution of the marj‘a-i taqli¯ d (the foremost cleric in respect of religious knowledge who was a source of imitation)36 was, after the demise of Mirza¯ Muhammad Taqi Shira¯zi (d. 1920)37 divided between three prominent Mujtahids, one in Iran and two in Iraq: Shaikh ‘Abdul-Karim H . a¯’iri, Mirza¯ Muhammad Husain Na¯i¯ni (d. 9

THE PERIOD OF EDUCATION

1936)38 and Sayyid Abul-Hasan Isfahani (d. 1946).39 The seminaries in Najaf, Karbala¯, Qum and Mashhad not only enjoyed the traditional veneration of the people but were also respected by the regime during these years. It has been said, for instance, that Ahmad Sha¯h went to Qum to 40 congratulate H . a¯’i¯ri on the re-establishment of the seminary and later, after the expulsion of Na¯i¯ni and Isfahani from Iraq by British mandatory authorities, the monarch, accompanied by Reza Kha¯n and Vusu¯q al-daulih and other officials paid a flying visit to Qum and warmly welcomed the great Mujtahids.41 At this time, Reza Kha¯n was trying to present himself as a person who showed an interest in religion and religious manifestations by organizing religious ceremonies and going on pilgrimages to the Holy Shrines. He was seeking to draw the ‘ulama¯’s favourable attention to himself. In this respect, some incidents are quite remarkable. In June 1922, he organized a public mourning for the Ima¯m Husain, in a mosque in Tehran. Then, on ‘A¯ shu¯ra¯ 1341q/1922, he organized a religious demonstration by his military staff.42 Later, during his premiership, Reza Kha¯n went to Iraq and visited the Holy Shrines of Karbala¯ and Najaf.43 Lastly, in his meeting with the ‘ulama¯ in Qum, he reaffirmed his loyalty to Islam and to the Islamic leaders and accepted their request not to propagate republicanism.44 The second stage of the relationship between the ‘ulama¯ and Reza Sha¯h started in 1925, after the latter’s accession to the throne. During the early years of the Pahlavi Monarchy (that is from 1925 to 1927), state–religion relations were mutually respectful. Reza Sha¯h was keenly aware that his position was not secure as long as the ‘ulama¯ remained powerful. However, he had only recently ascended the throne and his authority had not yet been sufficiently strengthened. Naturally, he needed support from religious officials. For this reason, he performed royal observances such as attending religious ceremonies, visiting holy places and showing loyalty to Islam. During this period he never indicated that he had plans to challenge and diminish the position of the ‘ulama¯.45 In the third stage, namely from 1927 onwards, the regime clearly moved towards secularization and modernization. The state bureaucracy altered the whole military, legal, judicial, educational, economic and administrative sectors of society, creating a totally new structure. The policy was seemingly aimed at destroying the foundation of the ‘ulama¯ ‘s power and the base of their influence. In the light of these measures, the natural follow-up was an increase in hostility towards religious leaders, thus darkening forever the previously peaceful relations and mutual respect. This change has been described in the following way: One can say that modernization in Iran sought to achieve two explicitly and implicitly basic goals. On the one hand, it sought to transform the country’s primitive agricultural economy into a semiindustrialized and commercialized agricultural system. On the other 10

THE PERIOD OF EDUCATION

hand, it aimed at expanding the power of central government over all segments of society, with the purpose of administrative and economic centralization and political unification.46 The first major clash between the government and the ‘ulama¯ occurred with the introduction of the compulsory military service law in 1927.47 According to the law, the clergy and the tulla¯b (students of religious studies) were only exempt from it after passing an examination before an official board. Although the government had announced that the examination was aimed purely at improving the academic position of the tulla¯b, nevertheless the matter was a source of suspicion among the ‘ulama¯. The law was a military measure for the government, but for the ‘ulama¯ it represented a clear interference in their area of authority. It also fulfilled the government’s plan to unify the education system and to gradually open a way for the regime’s influence on religious seminaries, eventually bringing them under its control. In effect, it permitted the state to draft into military service those elements among the ‘ulama¯ whom it felt were acting against the regime’s policies.48 As a result, it drastically reduced, if not terminated, the ‘ulama¯’s power and authority over state and society. However, as a counter-measure, a number of leading ‘ulama¯ took sanctuary in the Holy Shrine of Qum and sent a telegram to the Majlis (the Consultative Assembly), demanding a modification of the conscription law.49 In order to prevent further conflict, Reza Sha¯h temporarily retreated from his position and sent the Prime Minister, Mahdi Quli Hida¯yat (Mukhbir al-Salt.anih), and the Minister of Court, ‘Abdul-Husain Taimu¯rta¯sh to Qum, and then a delegation to Najaf, to give the ‘ulama¯ the assurance they sought.50 Although guarantees of exemption and promises of amnesty were granted to the ‘ulama¯ and the conflict was peacefully resolved, nevertheless this incident marked the beginning of a new hostile era which never really came to an end until the abdication of the ruler.51 From this incident onwards, Reza Sha¯h, regardless of the opposition of religious leaders, gradually introduced his modernizing projects. These included the reorganization of the judicial system by replacing the religious courts led by Mujtahids with those chaired by judges who had graduated in a modern nonreligious educational system.52 Certain measures were taken – such as putting auqa¯f (religious endowments) and all income arising from the Holy Shrines, which were previously under the ‘ulama¯’s mandatory control, under government authority.53 The expansion of a modern educational system aimed at reaching all parts of the country, whilst limiting religious teachings,54 and finally unifying the external appearance of society by the compulsory uniformization of men’s dress and the removal of women’s veils.55 Whilst these major developments which were fateful for the position of the religious establishment were taking place, the young Mut.ahhari was, as mentioned before, thinking about his future and his spiritual desires. It was 11

THE PERIOD OF EDUCATION

during this formative phase in his life that the uprising of the Gauharsha¯d Mosque occurred.

The uprising of the Gauharsha¯d Mosque The violent uprising of the Gauharsha¯d Mosque occurred on 11 July 1935, almost two years after Mut.ahhari had come to the Mashhad Seminary, but before he had finished the primary levels (Sut.u¯h).56 The uprising started when the high-ranking clerics of the Mashhad Seminary began demonstrating against the government’s radical law of 27 December 1928 on the uniformization of men’s dress and the abolition of the veil for women. It is worth mentioning that among the clerics only the Mujtahids and their wives were exempted in this bill, while everyone else, namely the large component of the clerical stratum, had to have exemption certificates from a governmental board.57 Soon after the passing of the law, the police forced women to remove their veils and men to change their dress. This included the traditional clothes worn by the clerics. One incident happened following the objection by Shaikh Muhammad Taqi Ba¯fqi Yazdi, to the Queen entering the Holy Shrine in Qum without a veil, which angered Reza Sha¯h and caused the programme for the removal of the veil (Kashf-i h.ija¯b) to become violent.58 A great deal of pressure, therefore, was put on the religious establishment by a number of ‘ulama¯ all over the country, calling upon the Grand Ayatullah H . a¯’iri Yazdi to take action against the government programme. Although he sent a telegram to the Sha¯h asking for the modification of the law, the monarch did not pay attention to his request.59 This situation has been described by Ayatullah Sult.a¯ni Tabatabai¯, a prominent Mudarris of the Qum Seminary, as follows: As a result of Reza Kha¯n’s pressures and machinations, the situation of the h.auzih became very difficult. The problems started from the time of the removal of veil and the uniformization of the Iranians. [As a result] the number of tulla¯b residing in religious schools decreased to 300. They [the police] arrested the tulla¯b and at the police station they cut their [traditional] clothes in half with scissors. Enduring these difficulties was very hard. One night, they rushed . into the Faiziyih Seminary and announced: from tomorrow, nobody in his clerical dress is permitted to go outside the school. As a consequence some tulla¯b hid in the gardens and in the outer quarters of Qum during the daytime, returning to the school at night. Life in the gardens and in the outer quarters was very hard [due to the shortage of facilities]. But the pressure increased and decreased, depending on the situation. When a new instruction had been issued, the officials were quite severe. Then, after a few days, the situation began to improve. However, it was a tiring situation.60 12

THE PERIOD OF EDUCATION

The situation in Mashhad was no better than that in Qum. Prominent Ayatullahs, hoping for a change in the law, gathered, a few days before the Gauharsha¯d Mosque incident, at the house of Sayyid Yunus Ardibili61 and ¯ qa¯ Husain Qumi, to Tehran to decided to send a delegation, headed by Ha¯jj A discuss the law with the government. Shortly after arriving in Tehran, the head of the delegation was seized, in the area of Sha¯h ‘Abdul-‘Az. im, and placed under house arrest.62 This act, understandably, led to an immediate reaction among the ‘ulama¯ and their followers in Mashhad. They took sanctuary in the Gauharsha¯d Mosque, requesting the release of Qumi and the cancellation of the dress law. The preacher, Shaikh Muhammad Taqi Buhlu¯l, was in fact the key figure on the scene and his emotional speeches stirred up the feelings of the gathering protesters.63 The authorities were not able to restore order for two days, and only when Reza Sha¯h sent one of his elite regiments did the military attain the upper hand. The regime ordered the military forces to scatter the crowd in the mosque. As a result, the process ended with much violence, many were killed and many more injured.64 Soon after this event, almost all the leading ‘ulama¯ of the city were ¯ qa¯ Husain Qumi and Mirza¯ Muhammad A ¯ qa¯-za¯dih were sent arrested. Ha¯jj A 65 into exile to Najaf and Yazd respectively. Religious schools were closed and the tulla¯b were forced to change their clerical dress. All religious sermons and mournings were prohibited and the continuity of religious studies became dependent on the permission of the government. As a consequence, almost all the academic activities of the Mashhad Seminary were cancelled. At this time, Mut.ahhari was not present in Mashhad, as he had gone home to Farima¯n.66 After learning of the event, he returned immediately to Mashhad. Although it was too late to participate, he probably wanted to observe the aftermath of the uprising and make his own judgement about it.

With the family again It was just a few days after his return to Mashhad that further disturbing news arrived from home: his father had been arrested by the police and forced to abandon his traditional clothes. At the same time, their house was destroyed in a major project of the administration to rebuild the city. To share the family’s sorrow, therefore, he returned to Farima¯n. His father, at this time, remained at home, because of the shame of appearing as a mukalla¯ (a man without traditional dress) in public. As a result, his older brother Muhammad Ali gave up for ever his religious training as a cleric and commenced farming to support the family. Despite his mother’s insistence on his staying with the family, in 1937–8, after the young Murtaz. a had spent more than a year with his parents, he decided to move to Qum with his cleric uncle, as the Mashhad Seminary no longer enjoyed its previous status and position.67 It was at this time that Ayatullah Sayyid Hasan Mudarris 13

THE PERIOD OF EDUCATION

(d. 1937), the famous Shi‘i politician, was assassinated by the regime during his exile in Ka¯shmar.68 It is strange, indeed, that this event, the first major political incident of his life, has not found any reflection in Mut.ahhari’s prolific writings and lectures. Once, while expressing his interest in religious studies, he referred only in general terms to the events in Khura¯sa¯n: While I was a child, in 1314–15/1935–6 I was living in Khura¯sa¯n. If some individuals, especially those who were living in Khura¯sa¯n after those events, can remember them, they know that there were no more than two or three mu‘ammam [clergy with traditional clothes] in the whole of Khura¯sa¯n. Old men in their eighties and Mulla¯s in their sixties and seventies, Mujtahids and Mudarrises all became mukalla¯. The doors of religious schools were all closed and nearly all the functions in the mosques had stopped. Seemingly, nobody believed religion could revive again. At the time, when I was 15 or 16 years old, I thought about everything and was not satisfied except through studying the religious sciences.69 Perhaps, as suggested by some of his close friends, he gradually become a man of thought, interested in research and academic discussions and was therefore probably not inclined to express and show his political views and activities openly.70

Move to the Qum Seminary When the 17-year-old Mut.ahhari arrived in Qum, Shaikh ‘Abdul-Karim H . a¯’iri, the reconstructor of the Qum Seminary and marj‘a-i taqli¯d of his time, had been dead for a year (January 1937). Although the seminary had been seriously damaged by modernizing projects, it had not been totally dismantled or closed, like the Mashhad Seminary. Perhaps H . a¯’iri’s cleverness and moderate policies played a major role in its survival and continuity.71 In other words, as some scholars have mentioned, with his patience, prudence and wisdom he protected the religious establishment.72 At that time, the seminary in Qum was considered by tulla¯b and Mudarrisin as Iran’s most important religious establishment. Its authority and reputation were, after H . a¯’iri, mainly upheld by three prominent Ayatullahs: Sayyid Muhammad Taqi Khunsa¯ri (d. 1951),73 Sayyid Muhammad 74 75 H . ujjat (d. 1952) and Sayyid S.adr al-Din S.adr (d. 1953). At the same time, Sayyid Abul-Hasan Isfahani (d. 1946) was generally considered to be the most important figure in the Shi‘ite communities in the Najaf Seminary. In fact, each of the three Mujtahids had his own character and followed his own course of action. It has been said that H . ujjat was a man of dignity, order and discipline,76 S.adr was a free-minded person with great organizing ability, 14

THE PERIOD OF EDUCATION

supportive of the internal reformist activities and political movement of the tulla¯b, albeit seeking no explicit confrontation with the regime,77 while Khunsa¯ri was considered a Mujtahid (a religious champion) and political activist. During the Iraqi independence movement, together with his life-long friend Sayyid Abul-Qa¯sim Kasha¯ni (d. 1962),78 he opposed the British authorities and was therefore sent into exile to India. He had an obviously revolutionary and uncompromising stance.79 When he entered Qum, Mut.ahhari had not yet finished the preliminary religious curriculum, which is mainly devoted to the learning of Arabic. The previous spiritual climate no doubt still had a dominant influence on his soul and mind. He describes this stage in the following manner: In the early years of my move to Qum, when I had not yet finished preliminary Arabic classes, I was so overwhelmed by the ideas [of philosophical matters] that they provoked in me the intense desire for seclusion. I could not tolerate [even] the presence of a room-mate . . . I was learning preliminary Arabic, jurisprudence and canonic fundamentals [fiqh and us.u¯l]as well as topics of logic for the purpose of preparing, gradually, to analyse the thoughts of the great philosophers.80

Finding the second ideal man In order to fulfil his strong spiritual desires, Mut.ahhari then attended Ayatullah Khomeini’s weekly ethical lessons and became fascinated by his mystical teachings and spiritual course of action. He himself has described this situation: At the beginning of my move to Qum . . . the ethical lessons delivered by the figure I adored [each Thursday and Friday] made me inebriated. The lessons were, in reality, lessons of divine knowledge [ma‘a¯rif va sairu sulu¯k] and not only ethical lessons in the narrow technical sense. These lessons, without exaggeration, caused me to become so ecstatic that I was conscious of little else until the following Tuesday.81 ¯ qa¯ Ruh.ullah Mu¯savi Khomeini (1902–89)82 was a Mudarris of Ha¯jj A philosophy at that time and had not yet started teaching jurisprudence and canonic fundamentals (fiqh and us.u¯l). In order to improve the moral principles of the religious students, he was also teaching Islamic ethics – which he presented in gnostic form and content – each Thursday and Friday. Perhaps this was the reason why these lessons were attracting a lot of students who were highly appreciative of them.83 15

THE PERIOD OF EDUCATION

A classmate and a friend for life During his studies with Ayatullah Sayyid Muhammad Muh.aqqiq Da¯ma¯d in 1941–2, Mut.ahhari met his close friend Husain Ali Montazeri Najaf-a¯ba¯di (the prospective successor of Ayatullah Khomeini between 1985 and 1989).84 Ayatullah Da¯ma¯d had been teaching the first volume of Kifa¯yat al-us.u¯l (a reference book in us.u¯l al-fiqh, written by Akhu¯nd Mulla¯ Muhammad Ka¯z. im Khura¯sa¯ni). Although, in the beginning, Montazeri refused to discuss his daily lessons with Mut.ahhari, he finally agreed, at the latter’s insistence, to establish a discussion session. Despite their different ages (Mut.ahhari was a few years older than Montazeri), they soon established a close friendship. Montazeri also, at Mut.ahhari’s request, moved from Madrasah-yi Ha¯jj . Mulla¯ Sa¯diq to Madrasah-yi Faiziyih. Therefore, the two friends were both living in the same school, attending the same lessons and discussing them daily, consulting on important philosophical and political matters and travelling to each other’s regions during holidays and vacations.85 As neither was financially well-off, they shared each other’s money and possessions. Montazeri considered his new friend to be intelligent, talented, hardworking, ambitious, pious and traditionalist.86 Although their teachers were the same and their basic education was similar, their academic desires were different. Mut.ahhari concentrated mainly on philosophy, while Montazeri continued with jurisprudence. They were in favour of reform of the religious establishment. Therefore they were jointly in charge of the reformist programme on behalf of the Grand Ayatullah Buru¯jirdi, in the Qum Seminary.87 In fact, both were in favour of an Islamic government,88 supporting the political activities of young Islamic fighters, namely the Fada¯i¯ya¯n-i Islam89 and opposing monarchic rule, but their courses of action in political events were, as was later revealed, different. Montazeri was a dedicated, fearless, political activist and when Khomeini was sent into exile in Iraq he was considered to be the leader of the militant ‘ulama¯, whereas Mut.ahhari was regarded as an Islamic theoretician who chose a cautious position, and did not reveal his political views. Despite their different approaches, they were never critical of one another. Once, remembering his close 12-year fellowship with Montazeri, Mut.ahhari praised him as a great Mudarris and Mujtahid of the Qum Seminary.90 His campaign for Montazeri’s release in 1977 is notable. When the latter was sent into exile in 1975, his location remained unknown. Mut.ahhari cancelled his philosophical lectures in Qum and visited the authorities of the seminary, namely Sayyid Muhammad Reza Gulpa¯yiga¯ni (d. 1991), Sayyid Ka¯z. im Shari‘atmada¯ri (d. 1985) and Sayyid Shaha¯b al-Din Najafi Mar‘ashi (d. 1990), requesting that they take the initiative in securing Montazeri’s release. In statements and interviews issued after Mut.ahhari’s assassination, Montazeri described in detail his 12-year partnership with Mut.ahhari, praised his academic achievements and acknowledged the significant role he

16

THE PERIOD OF EDUCATION

played in the Islamic Revolution and in the introduction of Shi‘ite seminaries. He also justified Mut.ahhari’s political approach and commemorated him as a Mujtahid and Usta¯d in Islamic sciences.91 In the summer of 1941, in order to avoid the hot weather in Qum, Mut.ahhari travelled to Najaf-a¯ba¯d, the homeland of his friend, and from there they both visited an eminent Mudarris in Isfahan who afterwards became Mut.ahhari’s third spiritual guide.92 It is appropriate, therefore, to ascertain who this Mudarris was and what Mut.ahhari learned from him.

In search of the third ideal figure ¯ qa¯ Shira¯zi (d. 1957) was a Mudarris at the Madrasih-yi S.adr in Mirza¯ Ali-A Isfahan. He has been described as a theologian, jurist, physician and literary critic.93 Besides his expertise in Islamic studies, he was proficient in traditional medicine and therefore sometimes taught Ibn Sina’s Qa¯nu¯n. As a pious Mulla¯ his preachings influenced many tulla¯b. Hence, he was widely respected within clerical circles.94 Mut.ahhari attended his lessons at the Madrasih-yi S.adr, where he was teaching from Nahj al-bala¯ghih, one of the major textbooks of Shi‘i teaching. His clear expressions and emotional style, sometimes mixed with tears, attracted Mut.ahhari and led him to establish a close relationship later on with the Shaikh. Whenever he came to Qum, he was a guest of Mut.ahhari, who highlighted the significance of this Mudarris in his life in the following words: I always consider his lessons a precious part of my life that I am not prepared to exchange for anything else. He is always in my mind and I always remember his good company. I dare to say that he was truly a Divine scholar.95 The Sairi dar Nahj al-bala¯ghih was, in fact, written as a result of those ¯ qa¯ lessons. In the preface to it, Mut.ahhari has written that Mirza¯ Ali-A introduced him, for the first time, to the unknown world of the Nahj al¯ qa¯ was not a man of politics and bala¯ghih.96 However, Mirza¯ Ali-A Mut.ahhari’s ideal world was that of political activities. The world of Nahj albala¯ghih, according to Mut.ahhari, is not solely a world of worship, prayer, preaching and ethics, it is also a world of jiha¯d, social justice and politics.97 An ideal man, for him, therefore, was a man who could gather within himself both religious moral principles and socio-political activities, a man, that is, of prayer at night and of jiha¯d during the day.98 Therefore he implicitly stated that he was not politically influenced by the Shaikh. Before Mut.ahhari had finished his undergraduate education (daurih-i sat.h.) the country was occupied by the Allied forces, in World War Two, on 25 August 1941. Reza Sha¯h consequently abdicated the throne and a major 17

THE PERIOD OF EDUCATION

socio-political crisis developed within Iran.99 It is quite surprising to see that the Qum Seminary kept completely silent and aloof at that time.100 Perhaps this was due to the damage which the religious establishment had suffered during the last decade and it was now looking towards a new era. Although Sayyid Abul-Qa¯sim Ka¯sha¯ni commenced opposition to the British after a short time, and was therefore sent into exile, his activities did not have any clear impact on the seminary.101 Mut.ahhari and his friend Montazeri finally reached the last stage of their undergraduate curriculum by attending the jurisprudential lessons of Ayatullah Sayyid Muhammad Muh.aqqiq Da¯ma¯d (d. 1968) in 1941–2 and prepared themselves to enter higher education (darsi kha¯rij).102

Higher education This period, the most important part of Mut.ahhari’s theological training, lasted almost ten years, from 1942 until 1952. It is during this time that Mut.ahhari strengthened his academic mind. He benefited from three well¯ qa¯-Husain Buru¯jirdi (d. 1961), Ha¯jj A ¯ qa¯ Ruh.ullah known teachers: Ha¯jj A Khomeini and Sayyid Muhammad Husain Tabatabai¯ (d. 1981)103 in fiqh, us.u¯l al-fiqh and falsafih. Although he later came under the influence of other prominent teachers, he undoubtedly gained much more from these three than from the others.104 In December 1944, when Grand Ayatullah Buru¯jirdi was invited by some teachers, Khomeini included, to stay in Qum, as the head of the seminary, Mut.ahhari was studying us.u¯l al-fiqh with the latter. They were both attending Buru¯jirdi’s classes when he started to teach jurisprudence. Perhaps he became close to Buru¯jirdi when the Grand Ayatullah appointed Khomeini as the Chief of Staff of his office. In an article which he wrote after Buru¯jirdi’s death, Mut.ahhari summarized Buru¯jirdi’s achievements and praised his reformist role in the religious establishment.105 His moderate approach – between Akhba¯rism and Us.u¯lism – in jurisprudence; his unremitting efforts for more convergence between Shi‘i and Sunni leaders against sectarianism; his programme for sending a missionary delegation to propagate Shi‘ism in Europe and America; his positive attitude towards a modern educational system and his order to establish an office for calculating and controlling religious taxes were some of Buru¯jirdi’s positive services.106 Mut.ahhari also mentioned that he learned many other things from Buru¯jirdi during the eight years he spent as his disciple, but he wished that the situation (probably inside the religious establishment) had been open enough to have allowed him to take a critical view of Buru¯jirdi’s works and achievements.107 Regarding his philosophical studies (‘ulu¯m-i ‘aqli), Mut.ahhari first attended Khomeini’s philosophy lessons in 1944 and was introduced to Mulla¯ Ha¯di Sabzava¯ri’s and Mulla¯ S.adra¯ Shira¯zi’s philosophies.108 Khomeini was the only Mudarris of philosophy at that time, but after his arrival in Qum 18

THE PERIOD OF EDUCATION

in 1946, Tabatabai¯ remedied this. Those lessons, which lasted almost until the end of that decade, fostered many students who later became distinguished teachers in this field.109 Mut.ahhari implicitly praised Khomeini many times in his books and speeches. Once, remembering his past and describing what he learned from Khomeini, Mut.ahhari mentioned that Khomeini shaped his philosophical mind: I remember the time that, when I was studying in Qum, one day I evaluated myself, my studies and the direction which I had chosen for my life. I asked myself whether it might not be better to pursue a branch of modern [Western] education in place of these traditional studies. With regard to my feelings and the importance of faith and spiritual knowledge to me, the first thing that came to my mind was to question my spiritual and mental situation at that time. I thought: now I believe in the principles of unity of God, prophethood, resurrection, ima¯mat and so on and they are intensely dear to me. What would have been my situation had I been studying in a branch of natural, mathematical or literary sciences? I told myself that believing in those principles or basically being a true scholar does not depend on being a student of traditional [Islamic] sciences . . . At that time I had just become familiar with Islamic philosophy. I was learning it from a teacher . . . who had really tasted Islamic theology and understood its deepest ideas and was explaining it with the sweetest expression. The pleasure of those days, especially the deep, delicate and sweet expressions of the Usta¯d, is one of the unforgettable memories of my life . . . In short, a fundamental pattern was formed in my mind which was a basis for solving my problems in a broad world view . . . I realized at that time that if I had not studied Islamic philosophy and had not benefited from the graceful presence of the Usta¯d, I might have had everything better, as is the case now, be it material or spiritual; all the things which I have now I would have, also, or at least at the same level and probably even better than this, except this pattern of thinking [t.arh.-i fikri] and the results of it [which I got from him].110 In order to understand Khomeini’s opinion of Mut.ahhari, it might be useful to look at the statements issued by Khomeini after Mut.ahhari’s assassination. Undoubtedly Khomeini remembered him very positively, giving him laudatory titles which he reserved exclusively for Mut.ahhari, such as ‘my very dear son’, ‘a part of my flesh’, ‘a fruit of my life’, ‘a strong supporter of religious seminaries’, ‘a rare Islamologist’, ‘a high-ranking thinker, philosopher and jurist’, ‘a great martyr’, and so on.111 To study Ibn Sina¯’s philosophy, Mut.ahhari attended Tabatabai¯’s private and general lessons and soon became one of his well-established students: 19

THE PERIOD OF EDUCATION

In 1329/1950–1, I attended the general lessons in philosophy of the great Usta¯d Alla¯mih Tabatabai¯. He had arrived in Qum only a few years previously, and was not well known [among the ‘ulama¯]. I learned about Ibn Sina¯’s philosophy from him and also attended his private lessons about materialism.112 When Tabatabai¯ came to Qum in 1946, the remaining Soviet troops had just left the country. As a result of the new situation, people again started to discuss political questions in public and became involved in political movements of all kinds. Royalist, nationalist, leftist and religious groups renewed the political activities which had been dormant for the last 20 years. The struggle for the reins of power became more intense. The main issue at the centre of their heated discussions was the nationalization of the oil industry.113 It is interesting to see what the impact of this new situation was on the Qum Seminary and the religious authorities there.

A close friend of the Fada¯¯iya¯n-i Islam Despite the popularity of the Fada¯i¯ya¯n-i Islam (1945–55) – the only organized group of religious activists at that time – among the religious students and some religious leaders, such as Sayyid Abul-Qa¯sim Ka¯sha¯ni in Tehran, Sayyid Muhammad Taqi Khunsa¯ri in Qum, Sayyid Muhammad Ha¯di Mila¯ni in Mashhad and ‘Abdul-Husain Amini (the author of Al-Ghadir) in Najaf, their aims and activities always remained suspicious in the eyes of Ayatullah Buru¯jirdi. The Fada¯i¯ya¯n-i Islam was established in May 1945 by a young and not very well-educated cleric called Sayyid Mujtaba¯ Mirlauh.i, better known as Navva¯b S.afavi. He was born in Tehran in 1924 or 1925 in a religious family of a lower socio-economic status. He graduated from the German Technical High School in Tehran and moved to Iraq for religious studies. Although he spent more than two years in Najaf Seminary, pursuing Islamic studies, he did not attain a high level of education (dars-i kha¯rij).114 From a small religious gathering in southern Tehran, his ideas rapidly attracted numerous members and supporters from among the lower class and urban poor and also from the religious middle class, some wealthy bazaar merchants, shopkeepers and influential figures among the clergy. Their leading figures, such as Sayyid ‘Abdul-Husain Va¯h.idi, Sayyid Ha¯shim Husaini, Sayyid Muhammad Ali Lava¯sa¯ni, Sayyid Husain Ima¯mi, Khalil T.ahma¯sibi and Hamid Dhulqadr, were all from religious lower-class backgrounds. It has been mentioned that, at the peak of its popularity and strength, Fada¯i¯ya¯n-i Islam had some 7000 regular members.115 The Fada¯i¯ya¯n was an independent, self-inspired religious political organization. The movement was initially religious, challenging Ahmad Kasravi’s theological notions, but later became more political. In their first statement, after their unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Kasravi 20

THE PERIOD OF EDUCATION

on 28 April 1945, the leaders totally focused their attention on individuals who were causing divisions between Muslims.116 Then they used the more orthodox and heroic ideas of Islam, largely in protest against domestic tyranny, foreign influence and domination and all ideas coming from the West. The most important point about them is that they resorted to violent methods and armed activities to achieve their purposes. They finally assassinated Kasravi on 11 March 1946; ‘Abdul-Husain Hazhir, the Minister of the Court, on 4 November 1949; and the Premier Ali Razma¯ra¯ on 7 March 1951. They also attempted to kill Dr Husain Fat.imi (editor of the newspaper Ba¯khtar-i Imru¯z, the political assistant and later Foreign Minister of Dr Musaddiq) on 14 February 1952, and the Premier Husain ‘Ala¯ on 16 November 1955, but these attempts ended in failure. During the negotiation period of the nationalization of the oil industry (1949–51) they acted as allies of Musaddiq and the nationalists, and as an instrument for Ka¯sha¯ni. They were propagating Ka¯sha¯ni’s views and collecting votes for his candidates during the election periods.117 Their disagreement with Musaddiq and Ka¯sha¯ni became obvious when they demanded that Islamic law be put into operation in the country, after the oil industry had been nationalized on 20 March 1951. In their manifesto, Ra¯hnama¯-yi h.aqiqat, issued during Razma¯ra¯’s premiership in 1950–1, they sought to clarify their foreign and domestic policies, but their ideas about Islamic rule (h.uku¯mat-i Islami) remained rather ambiguous. To disseminate their ideas, the Fada¯i¯ya¯n later published a weekly magazine called Manshu¯r-i Bara¯dari which only continued for 14 weeks, owing to the disagreements between the editor and the others. Generally, their programme may be divided into the following principles: 1

2 3 4 5

application of Islamic law, especially prohibition of alcohol, drugs, prostitution and Western movies; use of the veil for women and separation between male and female in educational and working environments; reform of state administration; struggle against ignorance, disease and vice; struggle for the liberation of Iran and the entire Islamic world from foreign dominance and domestic tyranny; unification of all Muslims of the world by bridging the gap between and among different sects within Islam.118

On the one hand, the Fada¯i¯ya¯n insisted that the Sha¯h and his government must rely on the Constitution, which originated from Islamic bases. On the other hand, they explicitly declared that Iran was an Islamic country, and therefore Islamic law must be implemented in it; the Sha¯h was the usurper of Islamic rule and the government was illegitimate; the usurper of Islamic rule must be killed and the illegitimate government banished.119 Although it is 21

THE PERIOD OF EDUCATION

true that in his writings, Navva¯b S.afavi does not always spell out the incompatibility of the monarchical system with a state in which Islamic law has been made mandatory, he offers no explanation as to who the true legitimate alternative Islamic ruler might be.120 In regard to their assistance for Musaddiq and Ka¯sha¯ni, the Fada¯i¯ya¯n expected more sympathy for their h.uku¯mat-i Islami when the former was in power. However, their ideas were unacceptable to Musaddiq who was in favour of a reformed secular order. Perhaps Ka¯sha¯ni considered that the time was not appropriate, as there was no highly educated figure among the Muslim activists. The relationship between the Fada¯i¯ya¯n and Premier Musaddiq worsened when the latter arrested Navva¯b S.afavi on 4 June 1951. He was accused of inciting the people of Sa¯ri – by his emotional speeches – to destroy the liquor shops. The unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Dr Husain Fat.imi on 14 February 1952 finally brought the precarious relationship between the Fada¯i¯ya¯n and the nationalist groups to an end. Although Navva¯b S.afavi was released from jail on 5 March 1953, he did not renew his alliance with Musaddiq. After the royalist coup of 19 August 1953, Navva¯b S.afavi was visited by the Ima¯m Jum‘ih (the chief cleric for Friday prayers and ceremonies) of Tehran, Dr Sayyid Hasan Ima¯mi, who, as the representative of the Sha¯h, offered him the highly respected post of Superintendent of the . Shrine of Ima¯m Reza (Tauliyat-i A¯ sta¯n-i Quds-i Razavi) in Mashhad. 121 Navva¯b S.afavi did not accept it. After the unsuccessful attempt to kill the then Premier, Husain ‘Ala¯, on 16 November 1955, and also because of their outright opposition to the Baghdad Pact – signed by Iran, Pakistan, Turkey and Iraq against communism and supported by America and the United Kingdom – he and seven of his colleagues were arrested on 22 November 1955. The military court finally condemned three of them, including Navva¯b S.afavi, to death. Accordingly, they were executed on 17 January 1955. It is appropriate now to have a closer look at the relations between the Fada¯i¯ya¯n and the authorities of the Qum Seminary. Their vision of Islamic rule, which they called h.uku¯mat-i Islami, was undoubtedly attractive to a number of young ‘ulama¯, but not to Buru¯jirdi. In his opinion, the Fada¯i¯ya¯n did not explain who would ultimately be the ruler in their ideal Islamic society. Was it to be Buru¯jirdi or another marj‘a-i taqli¯d, or the leader of the Fada¯i¯ya¯n, Navva¯b S.afavi, or one of his men? It was clear that Buru¯jirdi’s neutral policy towards the state authorities, during various events, was not acceptable to the Fada¯i¯ya¯n activists. They wanted him to do more. In their manifesto, without mentioning his name, they heavily criticized him and accused him of doing more for his leadership than for the survival of the Shari‘at in the country.122 Their clerical members in the Qum Seminary, such as Sayyid ‘Abdul-Husain Va¯h.idi and Sayyid Ha¯shim Husaini, or even Navva¯b S.afavi himself, sometimes spoke after . . prayers in the Shrine of H . azrat-i M‘asu¯mah and in the Madrasih-yi Faiziyih, criticizing the Sha¯h and the government but also the religious leadership. 22

THE PERIOD OF EDUCATION

Neither was their attack against the Sha¯h and the government tolerated by the police, nor their criticism against the religious leadership acceptable to Buru¯jirdi’s companions. Therefore, this sometimes caused conflict between the two sides in Qum. The situation was not helped by the fact that it was repeatedly reported to Buru¯jirdi that the Fada¯i¯ya¯n had been collecting religious taxes by threatening rich people.123 Initially Buru¯jirdi had taken a gentle, fatherly and admonitory position towards the Fada¯i¯ya¯n, and had even sometimes privately sent considerable sums of money to Navva¯b S.afavi. Nevertheless, over time, he had altered his standpoint.124 He sought to keep the Holy Shrine and the Qum Seminary clear of any political conflict and as far as possible free from any trouble with the police. Hence the Fada¯i¯ya¯n’s political activities in these places were not acceptable to him.125 Once, in one of his lessons, while justifying his neutral position towards the political events, Buru¯jirdi pointed out that the failure of the ‘ulama¯’s efforts in the Constitutional Revolution was a guideline for his course of action.126 Once again, perhaps during the period of the nationalization of oil, he pointed out that he would not take part or support any movement if he was not familiar with it, did not know its beginning and end, and could not anticipate its future.127 Although Mut.ahhari was not a member of the Fada¯i¯ya¯n group, he was a close friend of Navva¯b S.afavi and its other clerical leaders. He was supportive of their political views but was not in favour of their violent course of action. He tried to act as a mediator between Buru¯jirdi and the Fada¯i¯ya¯n, making the latter more lenient and closer to the marj‘a-i taqli¯d. As a result of his close friendship with them (which has been acknowledged in his prolific writings and speeches in one place only – Pira¯mu¯n-i Inqila¯b-i Islami, p. 177), and following his advice, the Fada¯i¯ya¯n-i Islam began to teach among their . members Buru¯jirdi’s Tauzih al-masa¯il.128 They went even further. In a meeting with Buru¯jirdi they expressed their loyalty to the leader of Islam and the Muslimin.129 However, this short period of a closer relationship between the Grand Ayatullah and the radicals did not seem to have altered his fundamental mistrust of them and their activities. When eight of the leading figures of the Fada¯i¯ya¯n were arrested by the government, shortly after making their unsuccessful attempt on the life of the Premier Husain ‘Ala¯, and were put to death, he kept silent and did not seem to have considered intervening on their behalf. Even Khomeini’s mediatory efforts could not change the Ayatullah’s refusal to take steps to prevent their execution and turn the situation in favour of the young activists.130 His position was justified by some of his companions who maintained that he was sure, or had been assured by members of his staff, that the government would never execute the Fada¯i¯ya¯n. If he had known of the government’s plan, he would almost certainly have taken steps to prevent their execution.131 After the execution, however, he cancelled his daily activities because of deep sadness.132 23

THE PERIOD OF EDUCATION

Fear of the Tu¯dih Party The relations between the clergy and the left, namely the Tu¯dih Party, were even worse. Despite similarities between the clergy and the Tu¯dih Party in their struggle against British imperialism, the senior religious authorities never trusted members of the party and were always in fear of the growing impact of their Marxist–materialist views on the people. Since this party is considered to be the first Marxist group in the country, and since its Marxist ideology has been constituted as a major lifetime challenge to Mut.ahhari, it is appropriate to look more closely at its origins and activities, and then see what reaction the young philosopher made in response to the increasing activities of this movement. The Tu¯dih Party had been founded in September 1941, immediately after the abdication of Reza Sha¯h, by 27 of the famous 53 Marxists imprisoned in 1937. Their spiritual founder, Dr Taqi Ara¯ni, had died in prison three years earlier. Ara¯ni, the son of a minor official in the Finance Ministry, was born in Tabriz and had graduated in Tehran with first-class honours from the Da¯r alFunu¯n and the Medical College. While studying for a doctorate in chemistry at Berlin University, he had immersed himself in the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin, taking a keen interest in European left-wing movements.133 After Ara¯ni had returned to Iran in 1930, when teaching at Tehran University, he formed student discussion groups, and with former colleagues from Europe founded a highly theoretical journal called Dunya¯. In a series of articles entitled ‘Historical materialism’, ‘Knowledge and the elements of matter’, ‘The materialist concept of humanity’, ‘Women and materialism’ and ‘The material basis of life and thought’, he explained for the first time to a Persianreading public the academic Marxist approach to contemporary problems in the social sciences. In his most explicitly political work, the ‘Materialist concept of humanity’, Ara¯ni summarized Engel’s Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, and stressed that society’s economic structure determined its institutional, ideological and political superstructure.134 Those intellectual gatherings were terminated by the police in 1937, after Ara¯ni’s group had distributed a May Day manifesto on the university campus and had established links with a few veteran trade unionists. He stressed at his trial that ‘If you wish to adopt Western clothes, Western styles, Western institutions, Western technology and the Western way of life, you must also adopt Western political philosophies.’135 He received the maximum sentence of 10 years in solitary confinement and died in a prison hospital 16 months later. The Tu¯dih Party, however, published its provisional programme in late February 1942. The programme stressed the need to protect constitutional laws, civil liberties and human rights. To avoid attacks from the ‘ulama¯, the Tu¯dih initially kept Marxist demands out of its programme. Although they were Marxists (and, as later events showed, staunch supporters of the Soviet

24

THE PERIOD OF EDUCATION

Union) they did not call themselves ‘communists’.136 In an article entitled ‘H . izb-i Tu¯dih chi madhhabi da¯rad’ in the party’s journal Rahbar they explained their attitude towards religion in general and Islam in particular: ‘The Tu¯dih Party has sincere faith in the true religion of Islam. Most of the members of our Party are Muslim by background and believe the religion of Muhammad. We shall never divert from the straight path of Islam.’137 Again, in a manifesto called Dar ba¯rih-i Islam, addressed to the ‘ulama¯, the Tu¯dih stated that: Not only is the Tu¯dih Party not against religion in general, but we feel a particular allegiance and deep respect towards Islam. We do not see any contradiction between the teachings of Islam and the principles that our party is advocating. We follow the same path and struggle for the same objectives. We hope that the ‘ulama¯ of Islam join us in this holy struggle and assure them of our loyalty to the true faith.138 Their most notable success was with organized labour. Despite their progressive popularity among workers, artisans, craftsmen, university students and intellectuals, the Tu¯dih failed to attract middle-class proprietors and bazaari shop-keepers. This failure was explained partly by the economic conflicts between employees and employers, and partly by the ideological differences between Islam, as interpreted by the ‘ulama¯, and the secular radicalism espoused by the Marxist Tu¯dih Party.139 In the elections for the fourteenth Majlis, in mid-1943, they were able to send eight members to parliament. They reached the zenith of their strength in August 1946, when the Prime Minister Qava¯m al-Salt.anih allocated three cabinet ministries to the Tu¯dih Party. Although the party was scattered and persecuted by the government after the unsuccessful assassination attempt against the Sha¯h on 4 February 1949, it re-emerged during the premiership of Ali Razma¯ra¯ (1951–2). The election of Musaddiq helped them to return to the political forum, because the new Prime Minister accelerated the pace of liberalization and realized that he needed all the public support he could muster in order to oust the British from the oil industry and expel the Sha¯h from politics.140 It was during his government that the Tu¯dih Party established an impressive array of newspapers and front organizations, each with a periodical openly propagating its Marxist demands and ideology. The Tu¯dih published the daily Bisu¯-yi A¯ yandih as their official paper. In order to give themselves a new and broader-based appearance, they founded a number of societies such as the Society of Democratic Youth, the Society of Democratic Women, the Society to Help Peasants, the Society to Fight Illiteracy, the Society for a Free Iran, the Coalition of the Workers’ Syndicates of Iran, the National Society of Democratic Journalists, the National Society against the Imperialist Oil Company, the Iranian Society of Peace Partisans, the Organization of High 25

THE PERIOD OF EDUCATION

School Students, the Society of Democratic Lawyers and numerous occupational associations such as the Union of Teachers, the Union of Engineers and the Union of Government Employees. With the formation of these organizations, the Tu¯dih Party established themselves as a major political force in the country.141 However, in spite of the previous statements from the Tu¯dih Party that they were sincere in their attitude towards what they called ‘the true religion of Islam and Islamic teachings’, the ‘ulama¯ remained generally suspicious of their sincerity. The period of the movement for the nationalization of the oil industry may be considered as the most peaceful time in the relationship between the two sides. A day before the forced resignation of Premier Qava¯m (21 July 1952) the Tu¯dih appealed to all anti-imperialist groups to establish a society for the struggle against imperialism and specifically requested Ka¯sha¯ni to take the initiative towards this goal. When Ka¯sha¯ni sent an appeal to the working and youth members of the Tu¯dih Party, the Tehran press reported that an alliance had come into being between the‘ulama¯ and the Iranian Communist Party. This was welcomed enthusiastically by the Tu¯dih Party. The alliance with the ‘ulama¯ and with the nationalists not only gave the Tu¯dih an opportunity to revive the party, it also prepared the ground for the rapidly growing influence and popularity of the party, as it gave their activities a patriotic, and not a communist colouring.142 The day after Qava¯m’s resignation, Ka¯sha¯ni sent a public letter to the pro-Tu¯dih organizations thanking them for their invaluable contribution toward the national victory.143 But, in an interview held at that time with a French reporter, Ka¯sha¯ni made it quite clear that despite the ‘ulama¯ ‘s association with different political organizations (i.e. the Tu¯dih Party) the country would never turn towards an alien ideology such as communism because of the ‘ulama¯’s loyalty to, and defence of, Islam.144 This short-term alliance between the religious, nationalist and communist groups against British imperialism and Qava¯m’s provisional government had a positive result, but it did not continue when the relationship between Musaddiq and Ka¯sha¯ni broke down. The conflict between the Court and Musaddiq in February 1953 (owing to his request for full authority) and Ka¯sha¯ni’s switch to supporting the Court, resulted in a new alliance between the Tu¯dih Party and the government. In fact, the‘ulama¯’s shift of loyalty to the Court can be explained by their growing fear of communist influence and the increasing reliance of Musaddiq’s government on the Tu¯dih Party. It is interesting to note that although initially the party leadership was clearly divided – due to its support/non-support for the Musaddiq administration – it became completely united against Ka¯sha¯ni when his alliance with Musaddiq came to an end.145 From February 1953, until the coup d’état in August the cordial relations between the Tu¯dih and the government continued to develop. The Tu¯dih supported Musaddiq in his confrontation with the Court over the constitutional interpretation of the Sha¯h’s authority (‘the monarch must 26

THE PERIOD OF EDUCATION

reign not rule’), in the Premier’s demand for the extension of his plenary power and in his debates with the parliament, and finally in Musaddiq’s referendum to dissolve the Majlis in July 1953. These manoeuvres contributed both to the growth of communist activities and the rise of the Tu¯dih’s influence and power. Musaddiq brought three of the Tu¯dih’s sympathizers into the cabinet and publicly announced that the party was an integral part of the Iranian nation. By July, the Tu¯dih was the strongest and most organized political force in the country. Its strength reached the point that it could exert pressure on the government and openly demand that the government recognize communist China, legalize the Communist Party of Iran and expel American military advisers from the country.146 When Stalin died in March 1953, the Tu¯dih mobilized its members and sympathizers and held massive marches around the country. On 16 August 1953, as the Sha¯h fled from the country, Tu¯dih crowds poured into the streets, destroying royal statues, demanding a republic and criticizing Musaddiq for not acting decisively enough. In some provincial towns, Tu¯dih demonstrators occupied municipal buildings and raised red flags. It appeared then as if the royalist defeat had become more of a communist than a nationalist victory.147 Ka¯sha¯ni, however, accused Musaddiq of suppressing the opposition, restricting political activities and the freedom of speech of his opponents, whilst simultaneously giving the Tu¯dih Party a free hand to spread unrest. He warned Musaddiq that these attitudes would drive Iran toward the edge of a communist revolution. The reaction of the Tu¯dih to these attacks and charges was angry, and followed immediately. Demonstrations were arranged in support of Musaddiq, while communist newspapers began to attack Ka¯sha¯ni and other leading ‘ulama¯ as reactionary and backward elements.148 A number of incidents occurred during these months which intensified the opposition against the Tu¯dih Party among the clergy. Among such incidents were the disorders at the Masjid-i Sha¯h in the bazaar of Tehran, in late 1952. One of the country’s most popular preachers, Shaikh Abul-Qa¯sim Falsafi, was allegedly prevented from speaking and was set upon by a crowd of leftist demonstrators, whom he only narrowly escaped.149 A book called Niga¯h-ba¯na¯n-i Sih.r va afsu¯n (‘Guardians of magic and conjuration’) was published in the summer of 1953, attacking the clerics, using humour and satire. Reportedly the Tu¯dih supporters, whilst riding bicycles, snatched and rode away with the turbans of some ‘ulama¯ in the streets of Tehran.150 Perhaps the most important of these incidents was the Burqa‘i¯ affair in Qum, in January 1953, which deeply affected Buru¯jirdi and his companions. Sayyid Ali Akbar Burq‘ai¯ a modernist cleric, who had a reputation as a leftist and who had openly campaigned for the Iranian branch of a front organization, the International Partisans of Peace Movement, during the Musaddiq years, arrived in Qum after he had attended a peace conference in Vienna and was warmly welcomed by the members and supporters of the Tu¯dih Party. A demonstration by a number of tulla¯b and 27

THE PERIOD OF EDUCATION

other religious groups followed immediately, condemning the Sayyid and his connection with the Tu¯dih Party. Insults were allegedly directed against Buru¯jirdi by Burq‘ai¯’s partisans and this led ultimately to the intervention of Premier Musaddiq.151 Although the demonstration ended peacefully after the Prime Minister and his police forces had intervened, nevertheless the leading ‘ulama¯ considered the event as a threatening sign in their own realm – that the enemy had entered the Qum Seminary and had begun to influence some of its students. The clerical distrust towards the Tu¯dih Party was not only based on the fact that the latter advocated Marxism but also because it attracted the support of anti-clerical intellectuals, such as Sadiq Hida¯yat, and espoused secularism, equal rights between Muslims and non-Muslims, coeducational schools and the discarding of the veil. Understandably, the growth of the Tu¯dih Party’s influence in society, their possible access to power, and the uncertain future of the religious establishment under their government, were not easy or simple matters for the religious leadership. All these disturbing events happened during Musaddiq’s short-lived government. Thus this fear and worry seemingly pushed Buru¯jirdi and Ka¯sha¯ni, as the two main religious leaders, into a position in which they felt they could no longer support Musaddiq and his Nationalist Party, at a time when they themselves were confronting the Sha¯h and his royalist groups. Indeed, as their telegrams to the Sha¯h after the coup of 19 August 1953 prove, they were ultimately in favour of the Court and the monarchy.152 In this critical situation, however, as a response to the propagation of the Tu¯dih Party’s so-called scientific philosophy, ‘Allamih Tabatabai¯ organized regular private weekly sessions, lecturing on the characteristics of Islamic philosophy in comparison to Marxist epistemology and methodology. These lectures, which were accompanied by students’ questions and criticism were then followed up by Mut.ahhari’s detailed footnotes and commentaries. His book Us.u¯l-i Falsafih va Ravish-i Realism (‘The principles of philosophy and the method of realism’, 5 vols), which has become a main source and a major reference work for modern Islamic philosophy during recent decades, was in fact Mut.ahhari’s first academic contribution to the field. This work, written jointly with Tabatabai¯, which continued until his assassination, also proved Mut.ahhari’s academic credentials. The first volume was published in 1953–4, followed gradually by volumes 2, 3 and 5; however, the fourth volume remained incomplete and was not published until 1985. Although Mut.ahhari criticized some of Tabatabai¯’s philosophical views in his books, their close relationship never became overshadowed by these differences.153 Perhaps it was as a result of Mut.ahhari’s influence that Tabatabai¯ organized weekly team working sessions with his senior students, including Mut.ahhari and Sayyid Muhammad Beheshti (head of the Revolutionary Council, 1978–81),154 discussing the matters concerning the situation of various religious movements and answering the questions they had received from different parts of the world. This close relationship between 28

THE PERIOD OF EDUCATION

the two men was also evident in more personal matters. When, in 1977, Tabatabai¯ needed urgent medical treatment in England Mut.ahhari made the necessary arrangements. In an interview after Mut.ahhari’s assassination, Tabatabai¯ praised not only his piety and great intelligence but remembered him also as a man who had his own views (s.a¯h.ib-naz.ar). When he emotionally described his memories of his previous student, Tabatabai¯ mentioned that he felt he wanted to dance for sheer happiness when Mut.ahhari came to his lessons because Mut.ahhari did not miss anything of the lessons and understood everything he taught.155 In 1951, however, when the struggle for the nationalization of the oil industry ended successfully, the demand for comprehensive reform within the clerical establishment came to the fore.

Unsuccessful efforts at reform In response to the expectations of young ‘ulama¯ for reform, two senior ¯ qa¯ Ruh.ullah Khomeini and Mudarris of the Qum Seminary, namely Ha¯jj A . Ha¯jj Shaikh Murtaza H . a¯’iri Yazdi (the elder son of Shaikh ‘Abdul-Karim H a ¯ ’iri Yazdi), who were close to Buru¯jirdi, took the initiative and prepared a . plan for a comprehensive change within the clerical administration. Although Buru¯jirdi had previously appointed a group of his colleagues including Khomeini and H . a¯’iri as the Governing Council (Haiat-i H . a¯kimih) for the tulla¯b ‘s daily affairs at the Qum Seminary, their achievements did not go far enough for the two teachers.156 By taking advantage of Buru¯jirdi’s unique position, they proposed to reorganize the seminary much more in line with the needs of the time. Presumably, some junior teachers of the seminary, such as Mut.ahhari, were behind these steps towards reorganization. The first draft of the reform plan was signed by the members of the Governing Council at a night session and was sent to Buru¯jirdi for his final approval the same night. Although this was never published, it covered, as a close companion of Buru¯jirdi revealed, all aspects of the future religious organization: education, finance, administration, ceremonial, missions and leadership.157 The first draft, surprisingly, was received with scepticism by Buru¯jirdi. It made him suspicious about the intentions of Khomeini, H . a¯’iri and Mut.ahhari. Buru¯jirdi realized that he had no significant power left in the planned new structure. All his authority concerning decision-making in the seminary was to be divided up between several officials and executed through separate committees. Although he convened a meeting with the Governing Council, in order to question their intentions, their explanations were unable to change his attitude towards the ‘ulama¯ involved in drawing up the scheme. Khomeini and H . a¯’iri consequently resigned from their positions as members of the Council. The relationship between Buru¯jirdi and Mut.ahhari became definitely cooler, and the plan for comprehensive reform 29

THE PERIOD OF EDUCATION

ended in failure. In a letter to Buru¯jirdi, Mut.ahhari tried to explain his aims and to show his loyalty to his teacher, but Buru¯jirdi did not accept his letter.158 After this incident, the possibility of studying or teaching in Qum was understandably no longer bearable for Mut.ahhari. His poor financial situation, which had become worse after his marriage in 1950–1, was increasingly putting pressure on him. Therefore, he desperately needed to leave Qum and find new employment. In this respect, perhaps the relatively comfortable life of his two fellow citizens in Tehran, Husain Ali Ra¯shid and ¯ yati, attracted him to move to the capital city.159 Muhammad Ibra¯him A

30

2 ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

An architect of modern Islamic theology Mut.ahhari preferred to be generally known as a philosopher, but his works and tasks seem to be more those of a modern theologian. The term ‘modern Islamic theology’ covers a branch of the Islamic sciences which deals with social and political matters. It is concerned with the new problems raised by modern developments within Islamic societies. On the other hand, it deals, as a part of Islamic theology (‘Ilm-i kala¯m), with the questions advanced by the modern scientists and philosophers about the function of religion and the truth of religious principles. As Mut.ahhari pointed out, it argues, explains, and defends the Islamic belief system and Islamic ordinances and edicts as its main task.1 Although the roots of modernity and the extent of modernization are completely different in Western countries and Islamic societies, yet because of similarities in its philosophical and theological consequences, modern Islamic theology is in some ways very similar to that of modern Western theology, which deals fundamentally with theoretical issues.2 On the other hand, it is similar to Latin America’s liberation theology in particular, which is largely concerned with justifying the struggles against the social and political problems of that area.3 In this respect, evidence from his academic works and political activities, which is presented in this and the following chapters, clearly supports the aforementioned view about Mut.ahhari: From about twenty years ago, when I took a pen and started to write an article or a book, the only thing that I was always considering, as the purpose of all my writings, was to solve problems or respond to questions propounded on the subject of present Islamic theological issues. Some of my writings are related to philosophy and others to ethics, jurisprudence, history and social phenomena. Although the subject matter of each of these writings is completely different, nevertheless, they all spring from one common factor, which is the fact that Holy Islam is an unknown religion. The reality of this

31

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

religion has gradually become misrepresented to the people. The essential cause of the people’s estrangement [from Islam] is due to false teachings which occur under the heading of ‘Islamic teachings’. This religion is at present harmed more by persons who claim they are defenders than by any other group. The pressure of Western colonialism, with its visible and invisible agents on the one side, and the shortcomings and faults of many Mulla¯s claiming to be defenders of Islam on the other, has caused Islamic thought to be regularly under attack for its different principles, be they primary or secondary. It is for these reasons that I see it as my duty to act responsibly, in so far as I am capable, in this area.4 For almost three decades, Mut.ahhari’s speeches, teachings and writings had constantly targeted materialist, Marxist, secularist, traditionalist and pro-Westernization movements. Initially, his academic works were concerned mostly with issues of a more ethical, religious and philosophical nature; however, they gradually shifted towards topics relating to sociology, economics and politics.

A desirable chair for the young philosopher After his move to Tehran between 1952 and 1953, Mut.ahhari was, while interpreting the Quran in a weekly session held by a factory owner called Ha¯jj Muhammad Hasan Ku¯sha¯npour, invited by the authorities of Madrasih-yi Marvi, to teach philosophy at the seminary. His lessons on Ibn Sina and Mulla¯ Ha¯di Sabzava¯ri’s philosophy continued over a period of almost 25 years. The books Sharh.-i ‘Arabi-yi Manz.u¯mih and Dars-ha¯-yi Ila¯hiya¯t-i Shifa¯ were published posthumously and were the outcome of these lessons. Although his employment at the Madrasih, and some financial assistance he received from the factory owner, clearly eased his critical financial problems, he often seemed unhappy. The collapse of his relationship with Buru¯jirdi and his feeling of disappointment about his departure from the Qum Seminary were not simple matters for him. No doubt he was also concerned about the political divisions which had intensified among the nationalist and religious leaders during these years, notably the division between Musaddiq and Ka¯sha¯ni, Buru¯jirdi and the Fada¯i¯ya¯n-i Islam, and between the Fada¯i¯ya¯n and Musaddiq and Ka¯sha¯ni; or rather he was generally worried by the disputes within the religious establishment with respect to the major political affairs of the country. At this time, he became occupied with composing commentaries on Tabatabai¯’s philosophical articles.5 On 29 February 1955, Mut.ahhari applied to the Da¯nish-kadih-yi M‘aqu¯l va Manqu¯l of the University of Tehran for the advertised post of associate professorship in Islamic philosophy and theology.6 After being successful in a formal examination, he was employed by the Faculty of Theology as a 32

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

mu‘allim (associate lecturer) of philosophy from autumn 1955. It is worth mentioning that although a chair was finally given to Mut.ahhari in spring 1974, he had never been properly acknowledged by the university’s authorities as a distinguished academic. The regime was always suspicious of him and eventually, in 1977, after a heated dispute with Amir Husain ¯ rya¯npour, a Professor of Modern Western Philosophy in the Faculty of A Theology, they forced him into retirement.7 Undoubtedly his status at the university opened up a unique opportunity for Mut.ahhari to gain access to the intellectual circles of society. He could also gain benefit from well-known scholars, educated students and up-to-date books which were easily accessible to him at the university. Therefore his achievements must be partly attributed to this chair at the university. It is interesting to note that many Ph.D. theses by well-known figures such as Muhammad Taqi Shariati (a contemporary religious writer), Muhammad Java¯d Ba¯hunar (Prime Minister, 1981) and Sayyid Muhammad Beheshti (Head of the Revolutionary Council, 1979) were supervised by Mut.ahhari.8 Many students who later became senior officials of the Islamic Republic were also taught by him. It would be appropriate, therefore, to learn who was behind the scenes in encouraging him to take up a university career. Although none among Mut.ahhari’s friends or biographers have alluded to this point, it may be ascribed to his close friendship with the two eminent professors in the Faculty of Theology ¯ yati. at that time, namely Husain Ali Ra¯shid and Muhammad Ibra¯him A Ra¯shid was also a well-known speaker on religious matters on Radio Tehran and it was most probably as a result of his influential position that Mut.ahhari’s speeches were broadcast on the radio for almost two years. The Bist Gufta¯r is in fact a compilation of those speeches he delivered from 1959 to 1961.9 The speeches, however, did not continue, because they were followed by criticism damaging his reputation. He was accused by some ¯ yati, the two had activists of co-operating with the regime. Regarding Dr A had a close friendship since the days at the Mashhad Seminary. He was probably Mut.ahhari’s oldest friend. In his introduction to the book Dah Gufta¯r, Mut.ahhari praised him as follows: The first seven discourses were delivered during monthly meetings in Tehran from Mihr 1339 to Mihr 1341. These meetings were held in a house near Zha¯lih Square, attended by hundreds of people of different backgrounds. They were organized by the Anjuman-i Ma¯ha¯nih-i Dini [Monthly Religious Association], and continued for two and a half years. Thirty lectures were given there by different scholars. During the thirty months that the Association was active, ¯ yati the late, great scholar and researcher Dr Muhammad Ibra¯him A was more co-operative and helpful than others with respect to the current issues of the Association.10

33

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

In fact, the Anjuman-i Ma¯ha¯nih-i Dini was one of the important religious ¯ yati, associations established in the capital city. Besides Mut.ahhari and A many well-known ‘ulama¯ like Ta¯liqa¯ni, Beheshti, Musa¯ S.adr and Gulza¯dih Ghafu¯ri were lecturing. The books Gufta¯r-i Ma¯h (three vols) and Gufta¯r-i ‘A¯ shura¯ are the results of their lectures at the Association. These books deal partly with the current affairs of the Muslim world but mostly concentrate on theological and moral issues. Mut.ahhari’s speeches included Taqva¯, Amri bi M‘aru¯f va Nah-yi az Munkar, As.l-i Ijtiha¯d dar Islam, Ih.ya¯-yi fikr-i Dini, . Fariz ih-yi ‘Ilm and Rahbari-yi Nasl-i Java¯n.11

An active speaker at the Islamic associations It has lately been disclosed that, after the royalist coup d’état of August 1953, some Islamic dignitaries of the capital city, including Mahdi Bazarga¯n (Prime Minister of the Provisional Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran after . January 1979) and Murtaza Mut.ahhari, decided to clarify their policy towards the new situation and to establish a programme for their activities in the future.12 The programme, abbreviated to MAT‘A¯ (Maktab-i Tarbiyati, Ijtima¯‘i¯, ‘Amali) was basically aimed at improving the religious understanding and practice of the younger generation. According to the programme, new publications needed to be produced, scholarly teachings of Islam expanded and the activities of pro-religious supporters with academic backgrounds co-ordinated. Evaluating contemporary religious literature, Mut.ahhari stated: Religious publications are provoking disorder. Some writings are even fundamentally harmful and shameful. Moreover, our useful ones are produced without previous evaluations: that is, without a calculation of their requirements and the orderly arrangement of their necessities. Each person, according to his taste, writes and publishes everything which he considers useful. There are many areas in which nothing has been written, whilst other subject matter has been over-published.13 In order to fulfil this programme, four well-known religious associations of contemporary Iran – namely, Anjuman-i Islami-yi Muhandisin (the Islamic Association of Engineers), Anjuman-i Islami-i Pizishka¯n (the Islamic Association of Physicians), Anjuman-i Islami-i Mu‘allimin (the Islamic Association of Teachers) and Anjuman-i Ma¯ha¯nih-yi Dini (Monthly Religious Association) – were established during this decade. The first was founded in 1957–8 by Mahdi Bazarga¯n, Must.afa¯ Katira¯i¯, Ali-Akbar Mu‘infar, Sa¯lu¯r, Shakibniya¯, T.a¯hiri, ‘At.a¯i¯, Zanginih and Lava¯sa¯ni. The second was ¯ li, ‘Abba¯s established in 1958–9 by Ka¯z. im Yazdi, Ibra¯him Yazdi, Husain ‘A H . a¯’iri, Ka¯z. im Sa¯mi, Muhammad Maulavi and Pishbin. The third was 34

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

organized, probably in 1960–1 by Mut.ahhari, Bazarga¯n, Yadullah Sah.a¯bi, Ghula¯m ‘Abba¯s Tavassuli and Muhammad Ali Raja¯i¯. And the fourth was formed at the same time in 1960 by two merchants – Ahmad Ali Ba¯ba¯i and his partner, Navid.14 Many of Mut.ahhari’s lectures were given at these associations. As a result, a great number of their members who later became members of the Islamic governmental establishment were under his influence. The books Mas’alih-yi H Riba¯, Khadama¯t-i . ija¯b, Masalih-yi . Mutaqa¯bil-i Islam va Iran, Islam va Muqtaz iya¯t-i Zama¯n, Ima¯mat va Rahbari, Fit.rat, T‘alim va Tarbiyat dar Islam, and the articles on Bimih, S.ulh.-i Ima¯m H . asan, Mas’alih-yi Vila¯yat-‘ahdi-yi Ima¯m Reza, Khit.a¯bih va Manbar were Mut.ahhari’s contributions to the activities of the first three associations. Moreover, another relatively well-known group, Anjuman-i Islami-yi Da¯nishjuya¯n (the Islamic Association of Students) must not be forgotten. This association was in fact the earliest foundation of the religious students at Tehran University and was established in 1942–3 by a number of medical students who were against the Tu¯dih Party. Among their number were ¯ li, A ¯ za¯dih Bidukhti and ‘Abba¯s Nikufar. It Husain Mans. u¯r-baigi, Husain ‘A was later expanded by a group of technical students and benefited largely from Bazarga¯n’s lectures in their sessions. After the royalist coup of August 1953, following the scheduling of future activities by MAT‘A¯ , the Anjuman-i Islami-yi Da¯nishjuya¯n reorganized themselves and moved their weekly sessions to the Shaiba¯ni Library. Then they joined with the Islamic associations Anjuman-i Islami-yi Muhandisin, Pizishka¯n and Mu‘allimin after the former (the Islamic Association of Students) graduated from university. They . finally established a new political movement in May 1961, called Nihz at-i 15 ¯ Aza¯di-yi Iran (the Liberation Movement of Iran). The first three associations held joint annual congresses in Tehran in the years 1962 and 1963 and chose Mut.ahhari as a permanent member of their secretariat, but surprisingly he did not attend either of the two congresses. As Va¯‘iz. -za¯dih, a close friend of Mut.ahhari explained, he was aware of the political environment of the congresses and liked to act more cautiously, in particular as Bazarga¯n openly and heavily criticized the Sha¯h and his government during his speeches.16 To improve their understanding of Islamic philosophy, ¯ philosophical Mut.ahhari invited them to attend his lessons on Tabatabai’s articles at the Marvi School in 1954–5.17 They also invited Mut.ahhari – in order to increase their Islamic knowledge – to their weekly sessions to comment on the Quran. Hence, they regularly benefited from his knowledge.

At the core of the political arena On 30 March 1961, when Grand Ayatullah Buru¯jirdi passed away and as a new religious authority had not yet been well established in Iran, the regime took advantage of the situation, and took steps which finally led to the 35

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

violent uprising of 5 June 1963. Indeed, the Sha¯h’s telegram of condolence to Ayatullah Sayyid Muh.sin H . akim (d. March 1970) in Najaf (and not to the leading Ayatullahs of Qum) after the demise of Buru¯jirdi, was considered as a clear indication that he preferred to keep the religious authority outside the country. On 6 October 1962, when Asadullah ‘Alam was the Prime Minister, the government ratified a bill which angered the Iranian religious authorities. It is worth mentioning that although his predecessor Ali Amini had previously announced his programme for the land reforms on 10 January 1961, nevertheless the programme remained inoperative owing to his disagreement with the Sha¯h, which ended in his resignation on 18 July 1961. For this reason, the programme did not raise any visible opposition among the leading Ayatullahs.18 The bill, however, called La¯yihi-yi Anjuman-ha¯-yi Iya¯lati va Vila¯yati (the Bill of the Regional and the State Associations), was aimed at altering the law governing elections. The conditions for both the electors and the elected, according to articles 7 and 9 of the governing local councils’ regulations, were previously as follows: that they believe in Islam, that they take an oath on the Quran and that they be male; whereas the new bill required only that they believe in one of the revealed religions; that they take an oath on one of the revealed books; and allowed that they could also be female. After the news of this modification was published by the press on 16 Mihr (7 October), four leading Ayatullahs of Qum – Khomeini, . Gulpa¯yiga¯ni, Shari‘atmada¯ri and Murtaza H . a¯’iri Yazdi immediately sent a telegram to the Sha¯h on 17 Mihr (8 October), demanding the cancellation of the bill. They argued that the bill violated the Constitution and had also not been approved by the Majlis, due to its enforced closure. Perhaps their discontent was due to their fear of the growth of the power of religious minorities in the state apparatus and the legislation that women must be unveiled in public. Although the government insisted on the operation of the bill, they were forced to cancel it on 28 November 1962, because of the enormous pressure applied by the religious establishment.19 On 9 January 1963, the Sha¯h declared his ‘White Revolution’ and pointed out that he would hold a referendum on it. His programme consisted of six articles which included: land reform, nationalization of the forests, selling state factories, giving shares to factory workers, electoral law reform and establishing a Literacy Corps.20 After consultation with each other, the religious authorities of Qum and Mashhad separately issued statements forbidding the referendum and arguing that there was no basis for it in the Constitution. Presumably they feared that it might become the norm for the Sha¯h’s secular intentions in the future. The Sha¯h did not pay any attention to their request. Instead, on his visit to Qum on 24 January 1963, which was not welcomed by any of the religious authorities, he angrily labelled them ‘the Black Reaction’ (Irtija¯‘a-i Siya¯h) who were supported by Egypt. Although he announced his victory in 36

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

the referendum two days later, the outcome was not acceptable to the clerics. In protest, Khomeini issued a statement declaring that the believers should not celebrate the New Year. Following this, two violent incidents intensified the situation. These occurred on 22 March 1963, when mourning ceremonies for the anniversary of Ima¯m S.a¯diq’s martyrdom were held in the Madrasih-yi . Faiziyih in Qum and the Madrasih-yi T.a¯libiyih in Tabriz. Police attacked the mourners attending the seminaries whilst the speakers were openly criticizing the government’s policies. Consequently, a number of people were killed and many were injured.21 Again in May 1963, coinciding with the holy month of Muh.arram, Khomeini issued guidelines for the preachers, asking them to speak about the political events in the country. In his famous speech of 5 June 1963, Khomeini directly criticized the Sha¯h, condemned his strategy together with his internal and foreign policies.22 Subsequently, at midnight on that same day, he was arrested by the police and put into a military prison in Tehran. This incident was followed by massive protests and demonstrations held by the religious circles in Qum, Tehran, Vara¯min, Mashhad, Shira¯z and elsewhere. As a result, many were killed and injured in Vara¯min; in addition, ¯ qa¯-Hasan Qumi from Mashhad, two well-known Ayatullahs, namely Ha¯jj A and Baha¯ al-Din Mah.alla¯ti from Shira¯z, were arrested and imprisoned in Tehran; furthermore, the city of Tehran itself was put under martial law. Although the two Mujtahids were freed on 2 August 1963, Khomeini was placed under house arrest in Tehran. Soon after his release on 6 April 1964, another major incident disturbed the religious leaders. On 13 October 1964, the Premier Hasan-Ali Mansur passed a bill, entitled La¯yihi-yi Capitulasion (the Bill of Capitulation) in the parliament, offering diplomatic immunity to American military servicemen in Iran. A copy of the detailed discussions of members of the parliament was secretly sent to Khomeini by one of his followers. Khomeini delivered his famous speech on the capitulation on 26 October 1964. According to him, by taking a loan from the USA to pursue his military aims, the Sha¯h had sold the country’s sovereignty and independence. He also condemned the Sha¯h’s close friendship with America and Israel, characterizing the government and the parliament as treacherous to the nation.23 The speech was immediately distributed all over the country. It has been mentioned that almost 40,000 copies were handed out all over Tehran by 500 members of the Hai’at-ha¯-yi Mu’talifih-yi Islami (the Islamic United Groups) in less than an hour.24 Thereafter, large numbers of telegrams and letters were sent by the ‘ulama¯ and religious groups to the government and the parliament, condemning the approval of the bill and demanding its cancellation. The government did not pay attention to the protests; instead, they arrested Khomeini at midnight on 4 November 1964 and exiled him directly to Bursa (Turkey). Then, in October 1965, after spending 11 months in Bursa, he was sent to Najaf (Iraq).25 During those years, Mut.ahhari played the major role in propagating Ayatullah Khomeini’s views and distributing his statements and cassettes in 37

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

Tehran.26 During the night of ‘A¯ shura¯ (5 June 1963) he was arrested by the ¯ VA ¯ K (the Secret Police) and put in jail. In prison, he wrote his first and last SA poem in which he complained about his separation from Khomeini, expressing his affinity towards him:27 The companions have no knowledge of the beloved’s abode The song of the bell [of the caravan] is heard from a far distance Oh zephyr, for a moment carry our message to the spirit of God [Tell him] that his memory is our companion in this cage day and night Despite the enemy’s attempt, our relations will not be ruptured so long as we breath Oh heart, you do not deserve to live in the corner of the prison It is appropriate if we constantly shed blood from both eyes The porch of the eye is prepared for your arrival Be generous and kindly accept our invitation The whole Iranian nation is looking forward to your arrival We do not fear anyone in the cause of freedom and justice. After 43 days he was finally released from prison. When he met his wife again, he expressed his gratitude for a clever act she had performed on the night of his arrest. When Mut.ahhari asked her to bring him his tunic before leaving his home for prison, she had chosen a different tunic to the one he had been wearing on the day of his arrest, thus preventing the disclosure of Khomeini’s statements to the security forces.28 Soon afterwards, he and a number of his associates together formed a clerical society, later called Ja¯mi‘ih-yi Ru¯h.a¯niyat-i Muba¯riz (the Society of Combatant Religious Scholars) in Tehran, not only with the aim of organizing but also coordinating various political activities which later played an important role in the Islamic Revolution.29

A theorist of the Islamic coalition groups In 1963, after the events of 5 June, three small religious groups in Tehran announced a new coalition entitled Hai’at-ha¯-yi Mu’talifih-i Islami or Jam‘i¯yat-ha¯-yi Mu’talifih-i Islami. These groups were influenced by Navva¯b S.afavi and were mostly, like the Fada¯i¯ya¯n-i Islam, from non-academic but – unlike the Fada¯i¯ya¯n – from middle-class backgrounds. Before the coalition, they had been separately, and without knowing each other, visiting Qum and had been accepting Khomeini’s guidance and orders for their political activities. Khomeini introduced them to each other and expressed his

38

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

confidence and trust toward each of them.30 The central committee of the Mu’talifih consisted of 12 members who were all bazaarmen. Some of them, such as Ha¯jj Mahdi Iraqi, H . abibullah ‘Asgar-Aula¯di, Muhammad Sa¯diq Islami, Sa‘i¯d Ama¯ni and Asadullah La¯jivardi, who had established a closer relationship with Khomeini, were put in charge of governmental matters after the Islamic Revolution. With a five-man clerical committee, namely Ali Gulza¯dih Ghafu¯ri, Muhammad Maula¯i¯, Muhyi al-Din Anva¯ri, Sayyid Muhammad Beheshti and Mut.ahhari, this union found credibility among the ‘ulama¯ and religious circles. The distinguishing characteristic of the union was that they were totally pro-clerical groups, propagating Islam as interpreted by the ‘ulama¯. They considered themselves as the followers (muqallid) of the religious authorities. Besides distributing Khomeini’s statements and propagating his ideas as their first immediate priority, the Mu’talifih announced guidelines for expanding Islamic ideology at their first meeting in Tehran. Supported by Ayatullah Mila¯ni from the Mashhad Seminary, they established classes in Tehran and Qum to teach Islamic principles to their members and supporters. Then, they organized a new branch called Jam‘i¯yat-i Tarbiyat-i Sukhangu¯ (the Group for Training Speakers) for training speakers and teachers for the new members and supporters.31 Although there are no reliable statistics about the number of Mu’talifih’s members and supporters, it can be said that they reached the zenith of their popularity among the religious people when they started to organize their sympathizers into semi-secret 10-person groups, to teach them Islamic ideology. It was precisely after Khomeini’s exile to Turkey in November 1964 that their Central Committee decided, despite Mut.ahhari’s disagreement, to establish a military branch for targeting the regime’s socalled anti-Islamic figures. It is interesting to note that despite the existence of this militant component in the union, Mut.ahhari was consistently opposed to any military action. Although he was not excluded from imprisonment when the Mu’talifih were disbanded in March 1965, after the assassination of Prime Minister Hasan Ali Mansu¯r by a member of this union called S.a¯diq Ama¯ni, Mut.ahhari apparently preferred cultural and educational solutions.32 He expressed the view that religious thoughts and dogmas had not yet been logically and reasonably presented to the people. A great number of believers were not properly taught and trained by reliable Islamic sources. Therefore, to insist on violent ways to construct an Islamic society, before presenting its ideological foundations, was not considered fruitful by him: ‘Every social movement must be backed by a theoretical and cultural movement, otherwise it will be caught up in [social] currents which will benefit from it and will modify its path.’33 The Insa¯n va Sarnivisht is a compilation of Mut.ahhari’s lectures which were presented regularly to the members of this Union. It was used as a core text for the Mu’talifih’s training programme and repeatedly taught by their teachers to members and supporters. In this book, he mainly concerns 39

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

himself with issues relating to the sociology of the backwardness of contemporary Muslim societies. Although he mentions some purely sociological theories, such as Western imperialism, he deliberately moves towards the internal causes and the cultural hypotheses.34 In his analysis, Mut.ahhari examined different hypotheses to ascertain which doctrine was responsible for the retrograde situation and finally concentrated on the theory of fatalism (mashiyatgira¯i¯). He asked whether belief in God’s will and the theory of mashiyatgira¯i¯ had caused the social decline or whether it was rather a case of misrepresenting and misunderstanding theory. According to Mut.ahhari, Muslim backwardness arose as a result of a particular illusory notion belonging to a school of thought that acquired dominance in the history of Islamic theology – namely the Asha¯‘irih’s anti-rationalist doctrine whose predominance in the minds of the Muslim communities owed itself to Sunni pro-Asha¯‘irih monarchs. Therefore, for Mut.ahhari, it was the false representation of fatalism which was at fault, rather than the doctrine itself. If a Muslim believes that God, according to his knowledge, predestined man’s and society’s future, should he consider applying any socio-political modification? Mut.ahhari’s answer here is positive. By justifying the belief in divine knowledge and also in being an activist in the matter of making one’s own destiny, Mut.ahhari sought to construct, with the aid of theological, historical and philosophical arguments, a new vision about the theory of mashiyat. The core of his arguments in this book and his message to the young audience at the Mu’talifih can be summarized as follows: changing a destiny and hence making a new destiny is necessarily the destiny of human beings and it is this which is predestined by God’s will and which is in harmony with divine knowledge.35

Epic of the righteous, stories for moralists For improving people’s deeds and visions, tales and stories are always considered as effective instruments. In this respect, Mut.ahhari’s contribution is remarkable. Again in 1964–5, when he was analysing the question of destiny for the young activists, the second volume of his anecdotes, Da¯sta¯n-i Ra¯sta¯n, was published. The stories, 125 in all, had a strong influence on the readers because of their realism. Their significance spread beyond the borders of Iran, being declared ‘Book of the Year’ by UNESCO (1964–5). Thereafter, it was frequently broadcast on national radio, in the form of plays.36 The stories’ international recognition made Mut.ahhari known abroad; however, it did not protect him from some of his associates’ criticisms. They maintained that the collection was useful and instructive, but argued that the project did not fit in with his social status as a jurist, philosopher and university professor. Mut.ahhari alluded to these remarks in the preface to the book and referred to them as portraying a regrettable attitude evolving into a social illness. He explained: 40

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

If this type of conduct had been attributed to one or to a few persons, I wouldn’t have raised the issue. However, unfortunately, this behaviour, which is nothing but a social anomaly and a grievous deviation from superior Islamic teachings, has become widespread in our society . . . It is for this very reason that today, as far as the availability of beneficial books is concerned, especially those with a religious content, we are too impoverished. Each one claims to be knowledgeable in this field; writers are willing to spend ten or more years just fabricating a mixture of fact and fiction into a scientific compilation – with their name honourably inscribed on the front cover – which does not contribute to any profitable use for society. Furthermore, they fail to compile a useful piece of work due to the lack of simplicity in their approach – something which does not harmonize with their status. As a result, the essential and needed writings are not produced, while irrelevant, superfluous works are constantly printed, one after the other.37 His sense of duty towards the moral education of the younger generation, who would eventually take over the reins of government in his ideal Islamic society, motivated him to write such moral fables with enthusiasm. In the preface to Da¯sta¯n-i Ra¯sta¯n, he elucidated his reform policies and how they differed from others. He argued: It is a wrong notion, generally adopted by some partisans of social changes, that one should start with the higher echelons of the upper classes. However, [historical] experience has taught us that any such approach, instead of providing beneficial guidelines to society, presents propaganda and demagogy.38 In short, Mut.ahhari’s theory is that any social reform must originate among the masses and not emerge via the minority dominant upper classes. In order to achieve this, public culture and the people’s style of living has to be modified by programmes which include publishing tales and stories.

H . usainiyih-yi Irsha¯d, the unfulfilled expectations From about 1964, Islamism was on the increase and religious awareness grew amongst university graduates. It appeared that the old-fashioned religious centres such as the mosque, the Takiyih and the H . usainiyih, with their lack of facilities, were not very attractive to the educated younger generation. Although the Islamic Associations of Engineers and Physicians seemed to provide suitable arenas for theological-political discussions, in fact, due to the lack of space and materials, they were not the ideal locations for a large-scale religious movement. It was probably due to an incident in 41

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

1965 that the ground was prepared for Mut.ahhari and his associates, Muhammad Huma¯yu¯n, a factory owner, Abdul-Husain Ali-a¯ba¯di, a physician, and Na¯sir Mina¯chi, a lawyer, who joined together to establish a modern cultural complex, equipped with up-to-date audio-visual facilities.39 Mut.ahhari was the founder, Huma¯yu¯n the financial supporter, Dr Ali-a¯ba¯di the general adviser and Mina¯chi the secretary and legal adviser. A ten-daylong session of a mourning ceremony was held by Huma¯yu¯n and Mina¯chi (his financial assistant) at a garden (under a marquee) in Qulhak, during the holy month of Muh.arram 1965. Many well-known religious speakers of the country, including Mut.ahhari, were preaching there. Surprisingly, also, a great number of people with academic backgrounds attended the ceremony, demanding its expansion. Subsequently the ceremony continued until the following month of S.afar. In order to present Islamic principles with modern techniques, the above-mentioned individuals decided to establish a new Islamic institute called Mu’assasih-yi Tah.qiqa¯ti va T‘alima¯ti-yi H . usainiyih-i Irsha¯d (the Husainiyih-yi Irsha¯d Institute for Research and Education). Although, eventually, this Institute did not meet Mut.ahhari’s expectations, it played a major role in the religious movement of young activists before the Islamic Revolution. Hence, it is appropriate to see what measures he thought should be adopted at the Institute and what factors ultimately forced him to resign in 1970–1. Virtually everything concerning his short-term relationship with the Institute may be found in letters which remained unpublished until recent years: My objective is to use this Institute as an organization for disseminating and researching Islam at a high level, in order to respond to the theoretical needs of the present volatile society. I want this Institute to be shaped in such a way as to provide a true picture of Islamic ideology, in contrast to the current ideologies of the present world. Naturally, I believe the message which will be transmitted from this Institute, be it in writing or in a lecture, must be based on logical reasoning and not on emotions.40 Mut.ahhari’s approach was completely different from that of Mina¯chi (the Minister of Islamic Guidance during Bazarga¯n’s Provisional Government of 1978–89). As the letters reveal, Mut.ahhari sought to put the Irsha¯d Institute under the guidance and leadership of ‘the Senior Clergy Council’ as a foundation for studies of and research into Islam, devoid of left- or rightwing influences.41 Normally, any programme had to be approved and confirmed by the Mujtahids of the Council – a similar approach to that being followed by the Mu’talifih, although Mina¯chi, as the head of Irsha¯d’s board of directors, was strongly opposed to this. Gradually, he was able to bring the departments for employment, administration, finance and media matters under his control, thus preventing the formation of a clergy council.42 It is 42

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

worth mentioning that in November 1967, when Mut.ahhari was a member of the board of directors, he sent a letter to Dr Ali Shariati (1933–77), who was then a lecturer in Persian history at the University of Mashhad, asking him to contribute to a book to be published by the Institute about the life of the Prophet Muhammad. It was later entitled Muhammad Kha¯tam-i Paya¯mbara¯n.43 Soon afterwards, Shariati was also invited to lecture at the Institute. His lectures were delivered with emotion, firing his audience with enthusiasm and were warmly welcomed by the young students. His teachings, too, had a major influence among the older men and women students. This eventually turned the Irsha¯d Institute into the most attractive religious centre of the country. In a letter to the consultative council of the H . usainiyih-yi Irsha¯d, Mut.ahhari mentioned that initially, whilst searching for a proper location for the Institute, he never anticipated such publicity: ‘[The Institute] became so popular during the four years that it exerted an influence on all groups of the country from the Grand Ayatullahs to the government officials.’44 An important point should be noted here. Mina¯chi, with his liberal view regarding the ‘ulama¯, considered himself to be more a colleague than a follower of Mut.ahhari. Formerly, he had not shown much interest in becoming involved with Mujtahids who were respected by Mut.ahhari and had seemingly attempted to make the Institute primarily a centre for nonclerical religious lectures. For this purpose, Shariati, who was educated at the Sorbonne and who held a vision totally opposed to that of Mut.ahhari’s conceptions, seemed the ideal man. As a result, Shariati’s progressive influence and authority, which was fostered by his emotional speeches and his immense knowledge of Persian history and literature, and above all his novel method of explaining Islam, had reduced Mut.ahhari’s power and efficiency to a minimum. As Mina¯chi recently revealed – in a private interview in August 1993 – he and Shariati had come to a secret agreement when the latter moved to Tehran.45 They agreed to render the Institute more attractive to the younger generation by changing its appearance from an academic quietist religious centre to a politically revolutionary institute. In order to achieve this, Shariati presented more sociologically and politically orientated speeches. Indeed, Mut.ahhari had been aware of Mina¯chi’s policies and intentions for some time; hence, in a letter after his resignation in 1970–1, he referred to it as a ‘coup’.46 Furthermore, he remarked: In every religious institution, the presence of a fully qualified cleric of supreme legal rank is necessary and, moreover, eliminates any notion that the institute is not in need of the ‘ulama¯ . . . On the other hand, these gentlemen [Mina¯chi and his companions] are not prepared to tolerate the presence of even five virtuous, intellectual, well-educated ‘ulama¯ in an institute entitled Islamic; thus the situation becomes problematic and arouses suspicion.47 43

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

Shariati’s view of the clerical establishment is notable. In his early lectures, while analysing the foundations of Western civilization, he repeatedly praised the affirmative function of the Protestant movement and hoped that such a movement might be formed in contemporary Islamic societies: If we had considered the value of the works of such Western reformers as Luther and Calvin and of the Protestant movement for religious reform which rescued Christianity from the petrified, dull and decadent framework of Catholicism, and if we had known to what extent this movement had contributed to the awareness and progress of the foundation of power and civilization in contemporary Europe, we would come to the conclusion that our Islamic, petrified, sleepy society is in need, before anything else, of such Protestant reformers, that is of protesting reformers who are familiar with Islam, with the society and with the needs and deficiencies of the age.48 As he clarified his view, by giving the example of Muhammad Iqba¯l La¯hu¯ri, it was apparent that Shariati’s protestant reformers were entirely from the intelligentsia (Raushanfikra¯n-i A¯ ga¯h) and not from the clerical establishment. This attitude, which was termed and propagated by his students ‘Islamic Protestantism’ and ‘Islam-i Minha¯-yi Ru¯h.a¯niyat’ (Islam without clergy) created an intense anti-clerical environment among Shariati’s followers and raised questions among the traditionalist ‘ulama¯ about Mut.ahhari’s friendship with Shariati and his contribution to the Irsha¯d Institute as an anti-clerical centre. But it can be argued that Shariati probably chose a different strategy to attract the Tehran middle class. In his late interviews and lectures, although Shariati sought to modify his views and present an affirmative image of the ‘ulama¯ by mentioning their revolutionary and anti-imperialist role in contemporary Islamic movements and their exclusively clerical methods of education, he was not able to resolve the difficulties.49 In a letter to Ayatullah Khomeini in 1977–8, Mut.ahhari described the situation as follows: It is a matter of fact which is not deniable that the only issue which the different groups – from the regime’s officials to the communists, the Muna¯fiqin-i Khalq [Sa¯zma¯n-i Muja¯hidin-i khalq] and some seemingly religious groups who are pro-Shariati – all share is the same desire, that is, to damage fundamentally the cleric and to remove this obstacle from the scene. Of course, each group has its own purpose . . . As a consequence of his [Shariati’s] teachings, a cleric [Ahl-i ‘Ilm] is, in the eyes of a youth of today, worse than a security officer.50

44

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

As has been mentioned, Mut.ahhari was, from the time of his education in Qum, in favour of a comprehensive reform of the clerical establishment.51 His view, however, was that reforms had to originate from inside the clerical system, through a leading Mujtahid or a group of leading Mujtahids and not from outside, through the intelligentsia. Clearly, this aim was completely different from that of Shariati and was also unacceptable to Mina¯chi. Therefore, he left the Irsha¯d Institute with unfulfilled expectations. Mut.ahhari’s departure from the Irsha¯d Institute led ultimately to the disintegration of the Islamic forces. This was a development much welcomed by the secular government and may, in fact, have diverted the direction of the struggle away from the Pahlavi regime to the Muslim community itself. Nevertheless, he declined to target the Irsha¯d Institute and to criticize its lecturers explicitly. During all this time, he never publicly mentioned the Irsha¯d incident and never disagreed with Mina¯chi or Shariati in public. Once, in a private letter addressed to the consultative board of the H . usainiyih-yi Irsha¯d (1971–2), whilst reporting the situation of various religious groups in the country, he, very generally and implicitly, emphasized his reactions towards Shariati’s theoretical and practical procedures: Fortunately, at present, a new class [of religious intellectuals] has developed – being educated in the modern Western culture and simultaneously having interests in Islam and Islamic studies. They represent Islam with a modern style which is normally welcomed by the young generation who are naturally Muslims but who have become attracted to this Western culture. People have repeatedly asked my views concerning this latest religious group which is expanding every day. Therefore, it is necessary for me to express my opinion in respect of their connection with the Husainiya, for they are becoming a social issue. Although there exist two extremist viewpoints [among the people], nevertheless I agree to employ them as speakers but only under certain conditions. In the past, the Irsha¯d Institute benefited from them under my proposals and agreement. This new group can be a mediator between Western and Islamic cultures, but with the condition that their lectures and programmes are supervised by persons who were trained in the Islamic culture and who have had expertise in Islamic sciences including tafsir, fiqh, us.u¯l-al fiqh, kala¯m, philosophy, and literature. If there is no serious and precise supervision, the harm of their programmes outweighs the benefits.52 It is clear that Mut.ahhari insisted that Shariati’s writings on Islamic theological issues should be supervised by well-educated ‘ulama¯. He considered Shariati’s views generally as a summary of those of his teachers at

45

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

the Sorbonne: Professor Louis Massignon (1883–1962) in Islamic studies, Professor Georges Gurevitch (1894–1965) in sociology and Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–80) in philosophy:53 It is not enough that we mix some chosen elements of foreign philosophies, such as Marxism and existentialism or similar philosophies, with our philosophy and then disguise them with a superficial Islamic stratum in order to guide our revolt towards the path of Islam. We must collect the philosophies of ethics, history, politics, economics and religion through perspectives which are inspired by Islamic texts.54 Therefore, his mode of religious and Islamic apprehensions was unaccept¯ zar able to Mut.ahhari, as he asserted in a joint letter with Bazarga¯n (23 A 1356/14 December 1977): Since his culture and higher education were Western and he had not found a suitable opportunity to study Islamic sciences sufficiently, he remained unaware of some of the indisputable facts of the Quran, sunnat, ma‘a¯rif [gnostic knowledge] and fiqh – although, he was gradually, with many endeavours, increasing his information in this area – [and] he has made many mistakes on Islamic issues, even in principles.55 Now, what were those suggested mistakes? Perhaps, for Mut.ahhari, Shariati’s most significant errors were the application of the Marxist methodology of dialectical and historical materialism in his analysis. As Acton pointed out in his articles entitled ‘dialectical materialism’ and ‘historical materialism’, the view of the world as a whole is called ‘dialectical materialism’, a title devised by the Russian Marxist G. V. Plekhanov, and the view of human society is called ‘historical materialism’, the name bestowed upon it by Friedrich Engels.56 The Marxist philosophers regard dialectical materialism as the basis of their philosophy and generally begin comprehensive expositions of that philosophy with an account of it. It might be said that dialectical materialism constitutes the logic, ontology and epistemology of Marxism-Leninism and historical materialism its ethics, politics and philosophy of history. Sometimes, however, the term dialectical materialism is used for the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism as a whole. When dialectical materialism is addressed, the natural sciences are the working-out of dialectical materialism in the non-human sphere, and historical materialism is the working-out in the sphere of human society. The dialectical method, as explained by Hegel, consists of three phases: thesis, antithesis and synthesis, whereas the historical method, as explained by Karl Marx,

46

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

consisted of five stages, these being the original state of primitive communism, the ancient slavery system, feudalism, capitalism and communism. In his well-known book on Islamshina¯si, Shariati interpreted all theological issues concerning God, man, society, history and Islam with the help of the above-mentioned methods. When examining the story of Adam, he defined the human being as a combination (synthesis) of two contradictory elements – the spirit of God (thesis) and putrid clay (antithesis).57 Then, some of the most important human philosophical issues like sin, rebellion, loneliness, freedom and love are analysed by Shariati in an existential manner.58 In his sociological approach, Shariati was in favour of the Marxist style of classification, based on the dichotomy of society into the ruler and the ruled. He started to interpret various Quranic social verses in a similar manner. According to his analysis, only the ruled pole – which consisted of the people (al-na¯s) – is monotheist, whilst the other, the ruling pole – composed of three outwardly different powers, namely political, economic and religious – is polytheist:59 These three manifestations are referred to in the Quran as mala’, mutraf and ra¯hib, meaning, respectively, the avaricious and brutal, the gluttonous and the overfed, and the official clergy, the longbearded demagogues. These three classes are constantly engaged in, respectively, dominating, exploiting and deceiving the people.60 Shariati’s three distinct illustrious expressions, ‘the despondent trinity of king [malik], owner [ma¯lik], and clergyman [Mulla¯]’,61 were rapidly dispersed throughout the country and treated by the public as a joke aimed against the clergy. Moreover, this method was also used by Shariati when elucidating political developments in the primordial history of Islam.62 His analysis on the history of man’s collective life is quite remarkable: History, like man, consists of a dialectical process. The contradiction begins with the killing of Abel by Cain. Abel represents the age of a pasture-based economy, that of primitive socialism which preceded ownership, whilst Cain represents the agricultural system and that of individual or monopolistic ownership. Thereafter, a permanent war began so that the whole of history became the stage for a struggle between the party of Cain, the killer, and Abel, his victim, or, in other words, the ruler and the ruled.63 According to Shariati, history began with an economically classless society and will ultimately end with the same. Hence, the promised ideal society (ummat) which would appear at the end of history’s evolution is that of a classless society which will abolish private property:64

47

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

The story of Cain and Abel depicts the first day in the life of the sons of Adam on this earth [their marriage with their sisters] as being identical with the beginning of contradiction, conflict and ultimately warfare and fratricide. This confirms the scientific fact that life, society and history are based on contradiction and struggle, and that, contrary to the belief of the idealists, the fundamental factors in all three are economics and sexuality, which come to predominate over religious faith, brotherly ties, truth and morality.65 It is noteworthy that this format of historical analysis (which considers that the nature and the motor of history have a materialistic entity, and explains all human historical struggles, uprisings and revolutions – including religious and non-religious ones – by the theory of economic contradictions, with the old and rich versus the new and poor classes) was totally contrary to Mut.ahhari’s theory of fit.rat (nature). According to Mut.ahhari, although man’s history has outwardly consisted of wars and contradictions between the poor and the rich, or the ruling and the ruled classes, they were inwardly between right and wrong, good and evil. He argued: Does Islam accept the theory of historical materialism? Is the Quranic logic based on historical materialism regarding the interpretation and analysis of historical events? There is a group of people who claim that historical materialism was put forward by the Quran at least one thousand years before Marx. Dr Ali al-Vardi, a Shi‘i scholar in Iraq and author of several controversial books including one entitled Mahzalat al-‘aql al-Bashari [The Comedy of Human Intellect], is most probably the first to raise this issue. It has become a fashion among a group of contemporary Muslim writers to analyse history in Islamic phraseology from this point of view, which is considered a mark of being an intellectual. But in our view those who think in this way either do not correctly understand Islam or historical materialism, or both.66 According to Mut.ahhari’s letter to Khomeini, mentioned above, he repeatedly invited Shariati to take part in a debate, but the latter did not accept his request. He also mentioned that Shariati, in the last months of his life, finally agreed to modify his writings, and in a letter to Muhammad Reza H . akimi (when Shariati decided to move to Europe in May 1977) committed 67 his writings to H . akimi and asked for his criticism. Mut.ahhari praised Shariati’s courage when he became aware, at a private meeting, that Shariati was intending to visit Mut.ahhari in Europe to consult him about the modification of his writings. Whilst Mut.ahhari was travelling with ‘Alla¯mih Tabatabai¯ to London for urgent medical treatment, Shariati was simul-

48

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

taneously dying of a heart attack in Southampton, on 19 June 1977. Therefore, the two eminent scholars found no opportunity to rebuild their previous friendship. In early 1970, the Irsha¯d Institute sent a delegation – including both Mut.ahhari and Shariati – to the Ha¯jj and arranged a meeting with the Palestinian delegation in Mecca. After his return, under the influence of this meeting, Mut.ahhari gave a lecture on Zionist aggression and the necessity for national support for the Palestinians, on the night preceding ‘A¯ shu¯ra¯ (10 Muh.arram). This ended with his arrest by the police.68 He then published a . joint declaration with ‘Alla¯mih Tabatabai¯ and Ayatullah Sayyid Abul-Fazl Zanja¯ni proposing to open a special bank account in order to collect donations in financial support of Palestinian refugees. The police arrested him for a second time in less than a year.69 Nevertheless, his position in political matters was sometimes strongly criticized by both traditionalists and leftists, and as a consequence he lost his influence among young Muslim activists. Mut.ahhari was accused by traditionalist clergymen of propagating a Western kind of lifestyle and culture in his writing and discourses and of alienating the Muslims from their original Islamic rites and customs.70 By contrast, the radicals among the youth were referring to him as a nonrevolutionary thinker, not interested in keen socio-political debates.71 Rumours and propaganda concerning him had their effect on his standing in the eyes of the public. Thus his lectures and writings did not receive much publicity at the end of this period. He therefore turned towards more academic work, like commentary on the Quran, and lecturing to a limited number of students, at the Al-Java¯d Mosque. The government’s laissez-faire policy did not last long. The political activities of the young Muslims ended the government’s tolerance of them. Consequently, they closed the Al-Java¯d Mosque, arrested Mut.ahhari and eventually suspended the academic and political activities in the H . usainiyihyi Irsha¯d (10 November 1972).72 During a period of nearly five years with the Irsha¯d Institute (1965–71) Mut.ahhari gave many lectures on issues which, in the words of Hamid Dabashi, have been classified as the ‘Theology of Discontent’. The books Ja¯dhibih va Da¯fi‘ih-yi Ali, ‘Adl-i Ila¯hi, Khatm-i Nabuvvat, Kha¯tamiyat, Niz.a¯m-i H . uqu¯q-i Zan dar Islam, Mas’alih-yi H . ija¯b, Sairi dar Nahj al¯ za¯dibala¯ghih and Khadama¯t-i Mutaqa¯bil-i Islam va Iran, and the articles ‘A ¯ yi ‘Aqidih’, ‘A za¯di-yi M‘anavi’, ‘Ih.ya¯-yi Tafakkur-i Islami’, ‘‘Iba¯dat va Do‘a¯, Taubih’, ‘Buzurgi va Buzurgva¯ri-yi Ru¯h.’, ‘‘Uns. ur-i Amr-i bi M‘aru¯f va Nah. yi az Munkar dar Nahzat-i H . usaini’, ‘D‘avat-ha¯-yi Sih-bu‘adi’, ‘Muaj-i Islami’, ‘Mushkila¯t-i Ali’, ‘Khira¯fih-yi Sizdih’, ‘Mu¯jiba¯t-i Shiha¯dat-i Ima¯m Mu¯sa¯ Ka¯z. im’, ‘‘Adl-i kulli, Mahdi-yi Mu‘aud’, ‘Tah.rifa¯t dar Va¯qi‘ih-yi Karbala¯’, ‘H . ama¯sih-yi Husaini’, ‘Khila¯fat va Vila¯yat’ and ‘Kita¯b Su¯zi-yi Iran va Mis. r’, are included among these lectures.

49

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

A debate with the secularists on women’s rights In relation to the phenomena of Westernization, particularly those based upon liberal sexual relationships, nakedness and hedonism, Mut.ahhari published seven articles in the religious journal Maktab-i Islam in 1965–6. His Akhla¯q-i Jinsi dar Islam va Jiha¯n-i Gharb is in fact a reflection of those articles. The articles mainly deal with Bertrand Russell’s (1872–1970) sexual doctrine as explained in his book Marriage and Morals.73 Russell’s concepts of sex had been based on two essential principles, both originating from other philosophers. His notion on liberal sexual pleasure had been influenced by Freudianism, and his ‘Racial Reformation of Mankind’ – which means the legal right of reproduction being exclusively restricted to men and women who possess superior inherited physical abilities – had emanated from Plato’s Republic. Both principles reflected Christian ethical views which are based upon the sanctification of sexual mortification, celibacy and the prohibition of divorce – currently defended by Western churches, in particular Roman Catholicism. According to Mut.ahhari, these ideas differ from Shi‘i ethics concerning sex, which are founded on the sanctification of legal sexual relationships – whether permanent or temporary, single or numerous – the liberty of divorce and society’s disapproval of celibacy.74 During this time, in 1966–7, the modification of Iran’s civil codes and the desire for the introduction of further Western legal norms became an explosive social issue in the press. A vigorous debate developed in public. Ibra¯him Mahdavi Zanja¯ni, a judge, wrote 40 articles asserting his approval for this modification. This matter disturbed the religious authorities and impelled them to react. Undoubtedly, Mut.ahhari, as an eminent jurist, appeared to be the most suitable candidate for this task and so all hopes were pinned upon him. He has meticulously described the current social movements and also made clear his role in the introduction to his book, Niz.a¯m-i H . uqu¯q-i Zan dar Islam, published in 1974–5, in which all his discussions with Judge Zanja¯ni were made known.75 The judge’s defence of his proposals was printed in a series of articles, page by page, in the journal Zan-i Ru¯z, and Mut.ahhari’s arguments, supporting the continuation of Islamic civil laws, were on the opposite side of the page. These discussions became a major issue of the day and attracted the attention of many readers. Mut.ahhari’s reasoning, explanations and thorough knowledge of Islamic jurisprudence placed the judge in a difficult position. However, after only six weeks, the debate was ended by the sudden death of the judge from a heart attack.76 Although Mut.ahhari’s response to the views of the judge should have ceased as a mark of respect for Zanja¯ni’s death, their publication continued with the remaining 33 issues, due to numerous requests from the public and the editor of the magazine. The Niz.a¯m-i H . uqu¯q-i Zan dar Islam is a collection of these articles (1974–5) presenting a comparative study of Islamic family rights from a philosophical and sociological viewpoint. This

50

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

book (whilst not mentioning the government’s Westernizing policy), was written as a clear response to the infiltration of the Western customs and values so ardently supported by the monarchy. The flaws in government policy became indirectly clear. The large number of devoted readers which the book attracted was a clear sign of how well the religious argument was received in public.

A debate with traditionalists and secularists on women’s veils During the early years of the H . usainiyih-yi Irsha¯d (1968–9), Mut.ahhari’s lectures on the question of the Islamic veil, and on the criticisms with regard to the edict on the ‘Removal of the Veil’ (kashf-i h.ija¯b, 7 January 1936), had, surprisingly, angered the traditional clergy and their devotees. This critical attitude against him in this respect continues to this day. The abolition of the veil during Reza Sha¯h Pahlavi’s rule had changed the appearance of women, giving them a more Westernized image. This action led to great psychological pressure on pious women which gradually gave rise to a more extreme position on their part. The women from clerical backgrounds still wore the traditional clothing, namely the cha¯dur va ru¯band (a large veil covering the whole body and a white or black piece of cloth just covering the face). This slowly made an impact on the mind of religious communities who began to accept this particular mode of veil as the correct dress for Muslim women. Consequently those female employees, students and academics wearing other forms of the Islamic veil, the scarf and manteau, for example, came under pressure from two extremist stances: one rejected this ‘modern’ clothing as improper, while the other, the Westernized view, referred to them as fanatics. The use of the traditional Islamic dress in professional and educational areas was mocked and derided by the country’s Westernized people and caused women much trouble in various fields of life, at universities for instance. Wearing the scarf and manteau encountered fewer difficulties. However, these moderately dressed women came under pressure from the more traditionally minded women, in particular when entering holy places, namely H . usainiyihs, shrines and mosques. They were made to feel that they did not maintain the high standards of Islamic veiling and that this affected their religious conscience. There was no simple solution to this problem, save intervention by someone whose knowledge and personality were respected by the religious authorities. Mut.ahhari, again, was the ideal person to deal with this situation. In his Mas’alih-yi H . ija¯b he maintained that such shortsightedness would cause the formation of a hypocritical group in Islamic society which would eventually ‘open the path to imperialism’. He pointed out: Whatever folly may be abundant, the concept of hypocrisy will become more intense. Struggle with simple-mindness and foolishness 51

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

is also struggle with hypocrisy, for a fool is the hypocrite’s puppet; and so naturally, conflict with folly is a hypocrite’s disarmament.77 It was naturally felt by the leading ‘ulama¯ that Mut.ahhari alone could handle such a controversial case. Although there were more well-known ‘ulama¯ in the country, they either lacked education in this field, or they were not prepared to deal with such a problem which they considered an incorrect passion of the pious and simple-minded. Mut.ahhari, on the other hand, had put to discussion the issue of Islamic veiling at one of the most distinguished religious associations at that time, namely that of the physicians. He criticized, with theological and historical arguments, Will Durant’s theory on the Islamic veil, which was that this mode of veiling is an imported phenomenon which originated in the customs surrounding menstruation in ancient Persia, namely being veiled and leading a sequestered life. In his The Story of Civilization, Will Durant maintained that In the time of the Prophet [Zoroaster] the position of woman in Persia was high, as ancient manners went: she moved in public freely and unveiled; she owned and managed property, and could, like most modern women, direct the affairs of her husband in his name, or through his pen. After Darius, her status declined, especially among the rich. The poorer women retained their freedom of movement, because they had to work; but in other cases the seclusion always enforced in the menstrual periods was extended to the whole social life of woman, and laid the foundations of the Muslim institution of purdah [ = pardih]. Upper-class women could not venture out except in curtained litters, and were forbidden to see even their nearest male relatives, such as their fathers or brothers.78 While describing the position of women in Islam, he stated that The Muslim male, separated from women before marriage by purdah, and surfeited with them after marriage by the harem, fell into irregular relations; and women, secluded from all men but relatives, slipped into similar perversions. The contact with Persia promoted both pederasty and purdah in Islam. The Arabs had always feared, as well as admired, woman’s charms, and had revenged themselves for instinctive subjection to them by the usual male doubts about her virtue and intelligence. ‘Consult women’, said Omar I, ‘and do the contrary of what they advise’. But the Muslim of Muhammad’s century had not secluded their women; the two sexes exchanged visits, moved indiscriminately through the streets and prayed together in the mosque . . . Under Walid II 52

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

(743–4), however, the harem and eunuch system took form, and purdah developed with it. Harim, like h.ara¯m, meant forbidden, sacred; the seclusion of women was originally due to their being tabu because of menstruation or childbirth; the harem was a sanctuary.79 Mut.ahhari answered: Is the reason for the presence of the Islamic veil among Muslims linked to the rough regulations that were carried out against menstruant women? We all know that such precepts have never existed in Islam. Women, during menstruation are excused, according to Islamic jurisprudence, from various obligatory acts of worship such as prayer and fasting. Also, sexual intercourse is not permitted during the menstrual flow. However, there isn’t any prohibition from the point of view of associating with others which would thus bring about her seclusion. If it means that Muslims’ customary veiling is a custom conveyed by the Iranians to other Islamic regions after the former’s acceptance [of Islam], this is also a wrong notion; for the Quranic verses relating to h.ija¯b had been revealed before the Persians’ conversion to Islam.80 Although Mut.ahhari acknowledges that the custom of veiling was in existence before Islam, among Jews, Iranians and Indians, and that Arab women were unveiled at that time, he does not agree with Will Durant’s historical analysis. He believes that veiling in Islam originated from the Quranic verses. However, he agrees that the Islamic veil moved towards extremism when the Arabs communicated with the new Muslims from other nations. Supporting his view, Mut.ahhari refers to a h.adith (saying) from ¯ yishih (the wife of the Prophet). She repeatedly praised the women of ‘A Ans. a¯r: Well done the women of Ans. a¯r! When the verses from the Su¯rah alNu¯r [:27–31, relating to the veiling] were revealed, none of the women were seen going outside in the same fashion as before. They covered their heads with black scarves, as if black crows were sitting on their heads.81 Analysing different hypotheses about the function of Islamic veiling, Mut.ahhari then explained that the Islamic veil had emanated from a general ethical principle governing social relations between Muslim men and women and being consistent with Islam’s social philosophy: Veiling in Islam arose from a more general and essential principle, namely that it desired to confine all forms of sexual pleasure, be they 53

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

visionary, manual or of a different nature, to family life and legal marriages. Communal relationships must revolve exclusively around work and activities. Thus, contrary to the contemporary Western system which mixes work and daily activities with sexual hedonism, Islam wants to totally separate these two environments from one another.82 On collecting evidence from the Quran, h.adith and fatwa¯s, Mut.ahhari clearly illustrated the restrictions of Islamic veiling.83 Although he did not comment on which version of the veil should be worn, he indicated that women wearing the traditional cha¯dur and ru¯band did not have a monopoly on piety. Consequently he endorsed the newer type of religious veiling – the scarf and manteau – which became increasingly popular with the working and educated women. This encouraged many of the country’s unveiled ‘Westernized’ women to adopt this more up-to-date Islamic dress. Furthermore, Mut.ahhari revived the practice of religious life in the minds of many non-religious women. Nevertheless, the book encountered opposition from two sides – one being that of the Westernizing movement which was in favour of women being bareheaded and normally in disagreement with any form of Islamic veiling; the second comprising the pious formalists who did not recognize the new style of veiling as Islamic. This latter traditionally minded movement had organized intense propaganda against Mas’alih-yi h.ija¯b and towards the end of this period (1970–1), they wrote strong criticisms against it – to which Mut.ahhari neatly responded. Later, all these arguments were jointly published in one volume.84 In 1971–2, the nonreligious part of society, led by the house of Pahlavi, produced a film entitled Muh.allil (‘Mediator’) which mocked the sexual relations of religious families and questioned the piety of religious institutions.85 Although this film was broadcast throughout the country, nevertheless it could not suppress the increased propensity of the people towards a religiously based lifestyle. The film’s scenario was founded on some comical concepts. First, mosques were portrayed as meeting places for some professional mediators, receiving high salaries for their jobs. Second, the country’s religious men were shown as having no trust in their wives, like the European knights of the Middle Ages who, before leaving their homes, locked their spouse’s chastity belt, taking the key with them. Third, the film suggested that it was permitted, according to Islamic law, for a man to divorce his wife three times at one session, and a few hours following the third to be able to remarry her, just by paying money to a muh.allil. Being the only clergyman who wrote an article against the film, Mut.ahhari considered it mainly as a propaganda exercise which did not reflect any of the realities in regard to religious families and Persian society. According to him, the chastity belt was unknown to Persian society. Moreover, among those people who went to the mosque one never heard of a specific person or group 54

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

known as muh.allils. Last, this system of divorce was discordant with Shi‘i jurisprudence and never occurred, due to the people’s intense antipathy towards such action.86 Mut.ahhari did not see the film but he had read the transcript. He then published his critical views in Ru¯z-na¯mih-yi Kaiha¯n during the same year, under the heading Film-i Muh.allil. He stated: The duty of a film director is to display and criticize real affairs, not to produce some totally imaginary picture, falsely accusing his society and thus creating misleading notions in relation to it. This movie is a perfidy from both the Islamic and the national point of view.87

Islam and Iran, a debate with the nationalists During the period 1968–9, when the question of the veil was under discussion at the Association of Islamic Physicians, another important philosophical and historical case was under debate at the Association of Islamic Engineers. Further talks took place in the H . usainiyih-yi Irsha¯d, which were published under the title Khadama¯t-i mutaqa¯bil-i Islam va Iran, in 1970–1. The discussions included a philosophical theme – that is, the relationship between two consciences: one being religious and Islamic, the other Persian and patriotic – and two sociological issues relating to the history of Islamic civilization, namely the services of Islam to Iran and vice versa, and totally against the idea of pan-Iranianism and Persian nationalism. These much-needed discussions, which were strengthening the abilities of young Muslims in arguing and reasoning against secular and antireligious groups, were welcomed on a large scale. In the preface of his book, Mut.ahhari asserted that common acceptance of these discussions was unparalleled. None of his lectures had ever received such publicity;88 although a résumé of these arguments had previously been published (1966–7) in three articles in Maktab-i Islam, then a well-known monthly religious journal, they had hardly created any publicity and did not have any special significance. Mut.ahhari argued: We, as followers of a spiritual path and ideology named Islam, in which race and nationalism are non-existent, cannot be neutral towards certain movements which are opposed to this ideology and practise under the headings of nationalism and ethnicism. We all know that in recent years a widespread struggle has been generated in opposition to Islam, under the pretext of the defence of Iranian nationalism and ethnicism, insulting the sanctity of Islam in the name of anti-Arabism. The reports of this conflict [with Islam] which we observe in Persian books, newspapers, journals and 55

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

so forth, point out that this struggle is not of an accidental or occasional nature but rather a component of an overall plan, with a clearly defined purpose. The growth of Zoroastrianism which is becoming more and more fashionable, is an organized political activity. Everybody knows that the present Iranian people will never return to Zoroastrianism. Al-Muqann‘a, Sandba¯d, Ba¯bak Khurramdin and Ma¯ziya¯r can never replace Ali ibn Abi-Ta¯lib, Husain ibn Ali or even Salma¯n. Everybody is aware of these facts. However, these may stimulate the ethnic, racial and national prejudices and the emotions of naive, ignorant young people who may then, as a result, cut their relations with Islam.89 Indeed, the restoration of Iran’s ancient inheritance, which was emphasized at various gatherings such as the Ra¯msar Educational Conference (1966–7) and the International Congress of Iranologists (1966–7), possessed two important social functions for the Pahlavi dynasty (1920–79) and thus gave them two political achievements. First, sanctity was conferred upon the monarchy as an institution deeply rooted in the country’s history, with the Pahlavis as the legal and legitimate heirs to the throne. Second, the Arab invasion, with its introduction of Islam, was presented as the ultimate cause of the downfall of the splendid and magnificent ancient empire of Persia and consequently was responsible for the lack of progress and the social problems characteristic of present Persian society. Therefore, these nationalist events implicitly created suspicion as to the sincerity and truth of present religious movements, thus hindering the latter’s growth and influence. With the support of the monarchy, a powerful cluster of academic men and women – writers, poets, men of letters, historians, linguists, philosophers, artists, anthropologists and sociologists – redefined different branches of Persian history and culture such as literature, language, poetry, religion and philosophy, all from nationalistic perspectives. Such views, which quite often neglected or even ignored the role of Islam in Iran’s culture and history, on the grounds that it had originated in a foreign land and was imposed by force, were naturally criticized by the ‘ulama¯ including Mut.ahhari. In fact Mut.ahhari was not opposed to ‘relative nationalism’ – emphasizing the positive aspects of national culture serving as a basis for international relations. According to him, it was in accordance with the Islamic universal doctrine.90 However, he was firmly against nationalism in its absolute sense, believing it to be the cause of humiliation for other nations, and of creating racial conflicts. Simultaneously, he considered it contrary to Islamic and humanitarian ideals.91 Hence, with great compassion, he delivered sociological explanations concerning both Islamic fundamentalism and Persian nationalism. According to his arguments, Islam is in harmony with the people’s mentality, paving the way for common unity and displaying a positive discouragement of external imperialism. On the other hand, 56

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

nationalism is an imperialistic and reactionary philosophy which causes the segregation of Islamic territories. In this respect he argued: Occasionally, nationalist thoughts and feelings may create some useful and positive results in terms of national independence, but rather than having good results, they have caused separation between Islamic countries. These nations have passed from this stage – nationalism – and have been advancing to a further level – namely that of Islamic universalism – in their development for many centuries. During this time, Islam has produced a unity based on thought, faith and ideology. In the course of the twentieth century Islam has shown its explicit role towards anti-colonial struggles. Yes, these nations have proven for many centuries that they are capable of establishing unity and rising with a motivation founded on thought, faith and ideology rescuing themselves from the claws of colonialists. In truth, such forcing of the people towards nationalistic feelings can only be described as reactive [irtija¯‘a].92 Clearly, Mut.ahhari was rejecting the criteria generally adopted in the socio-political sciences when determining what constitutes a nation – namely race, geography and language. Moreover, he was neither seeking Iranian identity in the Aryan race, in the ancient Persian language nor in customs exclusive to Persia. Why? According to him, Islam and ideology apart, the Aryan race, the Pahlavi language and the Iranian traditions had ceased to exist in reality. The Aryan race in Iran had become mixed with Turk, Mongol and Arab races, thus making racial separation, or even distinction, impossible.93 The Persian language, whether literary or scientific, has become strongly blended with the Arabic language; different areas of prose and poetry, calligraphy, fables and even science are full of Arabic diction. Thus the idea of cleansing Persian literature of Arabic terminology was a vain hope and futile. Moreover, Islamic customs and rites had extended throughout all echelons of society such that only a vestige of ancient Persian tradition remained, of which Jashn-i Nauru¯z (the first day of the Persian year and the national festival of Iran) continued to be popular. However, these traditions were still influenced by many Islamic rites such as du‘a¯ (prayer), ghusl (ritual ablution), infa¯q (making donation) and s.ilih-i rah.im (strengthening the ties of kinship). Others, such as cha¯ha¯rshanbih su¯ri (the custom of jumping on fire in the last Wednesday before Nauru¯z) and sabzih bastan (the custom of tying up grass on the thirteenth day of Nauru¯z) were less common. Now, with regard to the above-mentioned changes, one may ask what the Persian nationalists were hoping for, and what was their real purpose? As mentioned before, Persian nationalism was seen as having two political aims for the royal family. These, in addition to sanctity and legitimacy, were providing an appropriate cultural environment for their political 57

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

propagandist aims – that is the reconstruction of Persepolis, together with the imperial festivals and the substitution of the H . ijrat calendar by the monarchical calendar in 1976–7, which seemed to be useful weapons for confronting growing Islamic movements in times of need. Mut.ahhari totally rejected the popularity of this movement and explicitly argued: What factor caused the Iranians’ affinity towards Islam, centuries after the decline of Arab political supremacy? Is there one, but that of the attraction of Islam and its harmony with the Iranian spirit? . . . The Iranians were capable of freely restoring their ancient customs and rites after their independence but, on the contrary, they discarded the old traditions and consented to Islam. Why was that? Because they saw Islam as compatible with their thoughts, wisdom and natural will. They never considered the idea of a renewal of old customs and rites which had caused them spiritual pain for so many years. According to history, it is a fact that during the 14 centuries Islam has been present in Iran, it has always remained stable. If you observe a few persons at present or in the past who speak about the renewal of old customs and rites, it must not be attributed to the nation of Iran.94 Among the nationalist writers who were heavily criticized by Mut.ahhari was Ibra¯him Pour-Da¯vu¯d, Professor of Literature at Tehran University. Mut.ahhari referred to him with very harsh words.95 In books, most criticisms were directed against Muhammad Mu‘in’s Mazd-yasna¯ va Adab-i Parsi (‘Mazdaism and Persian Literature’). Dr Mu‘in was an eminent Professor of Persian Language at the University of Tehran. During the years before his death, Mut.ahhari developed a good relationship with him, describing him as fair and interested in Islam, and thus excused his work, Mazd-yasna¯ va Adabi Parsi, on the grounds that he was still under the influence of his mentor, Ibra¯him Pour-Da¯vu¯d, during his youth. Thus, whilst showering him with harsh criticisms, at the same time Mut.ahhari was requesting forgiveness for him.96 Later on, in 1977, he expressed a similar regret in a letter to his teacher Ayatullah Khomeini, with regard to Shariati’s articles on the subject of milliyat-i Irani (Iranian nationality).97 In this letter, he reported that Shariati was in favour of the 2500-year-old Persian culture and considered that the Arab invasion of Iran was more destructive than those of the Macedonian Alexander the Great or the Mongol Chenghiz Kha¯n; moreover, he praised the . Nihz at-i Shu‘ubiyih (the nationalist movement), considered Shi‘ism as ‘Persian Islam’ and considered Iranian Muslim philosophers and scholars to be the followers of Persian culture (not Islamic culture). On this point, he actually joined the line of Persian nationalists. Furthermore, Persian nationalists argued that the continuance and survival of Farsi, and not Arabic, indicates that Muslim rites were being 58

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

imposed on the Iranians.98 Mut.ahhari raised the question that if the revival of Persian as the main language was solely for the struggle with Islam or the Arabic language, the Iranians must have at least restrained themselves from circulating or developing their enemy’s language; so, why did they spend a great deal of time and energy on the maintenance of Arabic terminology, syntax, rhetorics and philology, choosing it as their scientific language?99 Persian nationalists declared Shi‘ism to be a Persian innovation for the protection of their national independence and ancient mores.100 Their reasoning was that since Ima¯m H . usain married Shahrba¯nu (the daughter of Yazdgird III, Persia’s last monarch before the advent of Islam), as a result, his children and grandchildren are all related to the magnificent Persian dynasty, which will ultimately provide the continuance of Persian domination and glory.101 However, the reality of this marriage was very much doubted by Mut.ahhari on the grounds of historical evidence.102 There was a Byzantine slavegirl among the wives of the Shi‘ite Ima¯ms, called Narjis Kha¯tu¯n (the mother of the Hidden Ima¯m) whose honour and reputation, amongst the Iranians, is much more than that of the Persian princess.103 Furthermore he argued that even if this reasoning were true, and the respect towards the Prophet’s family was due to their relationship with the Persian monarchs, then the Ummayyad dynasty (41–132/661–750) must be revered by Iranians ¯ farid, married Walid ibn since one of Yazdigird’s granddaughters, Sha¯h A ‘Abdul-Malik Ummayyid (86/705) and gave birth to Yazid ibn Walid. Therefore, according to the reasoning of these nationalists, Yazid ibn Walid must be counted as a prince of Persia worthy of utmost respect, whilst in fact he is practically unknown.104 Thus, the mystery of Iranian Shi‘ism must be studied from a different angle: In truth, the reason for Iranian Shi‘ism and for Iranians becoming Muslim is the same. An Iranian person found his/her spirit harmonious with Islam and discovered his/her missing ideals within it. The people of Iran were naturally intelligent, possessing culture and civilization, more than that of any other nation and, in addition, were enamoured of Islam, bestowing services upon it. They, more than any other race, paid full attention to the soul and the significance of Islam; for this reason their deference to the Prophet’s household was unmatched and so Shi‘ism had found much more efficacy amongst the Iranians for they discovered the soul and meaning of Islam through the Prophet’s progeny. The one factor which mostly attracted the Iranians’ thirsty spirits towards Islam was Islamic justice and equality. The Iranians had suffered privation for many centuries and had been waiting for such an ideology. They observed that the people who paid extreme attention to Islamic justice and equality, with no trace of prejudice, were of the Prophet’s 59

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

household. The Prophet’s household was the centre for Islamic justice, particularly for non-Arab Muslims.105 The nationalists, those in agreement with Sir John Malcolm,106 called the eras from the Arab invasion of Iran until the establishment of some independent Persian governments – AH 50–250 – ‘two silent centuries’;107 whereas Mut.ahhari argues that these two centuries were full of vigour, uproar and speeches containing the views of the ordinary people, namely the sons and daughters of cobblers and potters and not those of the monarchy or of other ruling classes, because it was during these centuries that the Iranians became familiar with the humanitarian, universal and supra-racial ideology of Islam, accepting its language as the language of revelation and preferring it to their native tongue when they were forced by an order of the caliph ‘Abdul-Malik in 78/697 to use only Arabic in official and academic use. Their liberated potential was concentrated in the spheres of literature and science. Among them were many great figures, such as Sibivaih, Abu‘Ubaidih Zamakhshari, Abu-H . anifih, Al-Naubakht and Al-Sha¯kir, who became literary, scientific and religious leaders of various (Muslim) communities, a unique occurrence in Iranian history.108 In regard to the social function of Islam in Persian society, Mut.ahhari also argued that Islam gathered people under the flag of religious unity, thus preventing the influence of Christianity which was spreading towards the East, and, in general, the rise of other medieval civilizations surrounding the area. Islam abolished the social restrictions on relationships between classes, opening Iran’s door to other ‘nations’ and making its people familiar with other cultures. Consequently, these phenomena helped to develop the spiritual acuity of the Iranians and promoted many of their personalities to religious leadership in other regions of Islamic civilization:109 The services of Islam to Iran and Iranians were not restricted to the first Islamic century. From the time Islam came to this country, it buried every dangerous event the country faced. It was Islam which absorbed the Mongols; changed these murderers and cannibals into patrons of learning, created Muhammad Khuda¯-bandih from the Chengiz family; Ba¯ysunqur and Amir Husain Ba¯yqara¯ from the Taimu¯r generation. It is Islam that, even today, resists destructive and exotic philosophies and is the source of dignity, glory and independence for its people. Today, that of which the nation of Iran can be proud and boast to others is the Quran and Nahj al-bala¯ghih, not the Zand and Avista¯.110 Mut.ahhari then started to explain extensively the services the Iranians had rendered to Islam in practice and thought, namely art, science, philosophy and mysticism.111 It was his belief that all these were signs indicating the 60

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

Iranians’ true fidelity to Islam, maintaining that scientific and artistic masterpieces are created by love and faith; compulsion or money could never produce such outstanding achievements. In general, it is possible to use force in order to make a nation obedient, but not in order to create movement, motivation, love and faith.112 As is usually the case, this book, Khadama¯t-i Mutaqa¯bil-i Islam va Iran, like Mut.ahhari’s lectures on this subject, was welcomed by the majority of educated people. It was reprinted yearly in increasing numbers (the eighth reprint being published in 1978, the last year of his life, with a new preface and many footnotes added) and now, after more than two decades it is still the most important book presented by the religious faction when dealing with the subject of Islam and Iran. It is understandable now that this book granted strength to the Islamic groups and exonerated them from any political accusations.

A harsh attitude towards the Marxist guerrillas In 1971–2, whilst Mut.ahhari was keeping his distance from the Irsha¯d Institute, and started interpreting the Quran amongst a limited number of his students, a new book of his was published, which had been briefly discussed in the Anjuman-i Islami-yi Da¯nishjuya¯n-i Da¯nish-sara¯-yi ‘A¯ li (the Islamic Association of Students of the Teachers’ Training College). This work, named ‘Ilal-i Gira¯yish bi Ma¯ddigari (‘reasons for the turn to materialism’) was written in opposition to the Marxist-materialist guerrillas called Sa¯zma¯n-i Chirik-ha¯-yi Fada¯i¯-yi Khalq-i Iran (the Organization of the Iranian Popular Guerrillas) who had a strong influence upon the university students of that time. The Fada¯i¯ organization, which adopted its name in March 1971, was formed from two separate groups. The first group had been established in late 1963, by five Tehran University students: Bizhan Jazani, ‘Abba¯s Surkhi, ¯ shtiya¯ni and Hamid Ashraf. Jazani, Ali-Akbar S.afa¯i¯ Faraha¯ni, Muhammad A the intellectual father of the Fada¯i¯ organization, was a student of political science who had been in and out of prison since the mid-1950s. He was born in Tehran in 1937 and completed higher education in his home town. He was active in the youth section of the Tu¯dih Party, later leaving the party and forming his own secret group. In later years, while serving a 15-year prison sentence, he wrote a series of pamphlets for the Fada¯i¯ organization, among them Nabard ba¯ dicta¯turi-yi Sha¯h, Ta¯rikh-i Si¯ Sa¯lih-i Iran and Chigu¯nih Muba¯rizih-i Musallah.a¯nih Tu¯dih-i¯ Mishavad. Four years after the group had ¯ VA ¯ K arrested 14 members including Jazani, but Ashraf been formed, SA avoided arrest and kept the group alive. Jazani was kept in prison until April 1975, when he was shot trying to escape.113 The second group, which was established in 1967, was led by two university students who had come to Tehran from Mashhad. Mas‘u¯d Ahmad-za¯dih 61

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

and Amir Parviz Pu¯ya¯n were both from religious families. During his education at high school in Mashhad, Ahmad-za¯dih, the more prominent personality, formed an Islamic student club, joined the National Front and participated in demonstrations against the Sha¯h. While studying mathe¯ rya¯mihr Industrial University in Tehran during the midmatics in the A 1960s, he turned toward Marxism, and in 1967 formed a secret society to discuss the works of Che Guevara, Regis Debray and Carlos Marighella, the Brazilian revolutionary who developed the theory of urban guerrilla warfare. In 1970, Ahmad-za¯dih wrote one of the main theoretical works of the Fada¯i¯ organization, a pamphlet, entitled Muba¯rizih-i Musallaha¯nih. The Ahmadza¯dih group, many of whom were from the National Front, insisted on the role of mass spontaneity and heroic activities, whereas the Jazani group, whose leaders were mainly former Tu¯dih members, stressed the importance of establishing a viable organization. The two groups merged in 1970, with the first group constituting its rural team and the second its urban one.114 The Fada¯i¯ ’s central thesis was simple: guerrilla warfare. Taking its example from the victories of Castro, Giap and Mao, as well as the Latin American guerrillas, they criticized the other political organizations in Iran. They dismissed the National Front and the Liberation Movement as ‘petty bourgeois paper organizations’ still preaching the false hope of peaceful change. They also accused the Tu¯dih Party of blindly following Soviet policies, of hastily denouncing Stalin, and of underestimating the country’s ¯ zarba¯ija¯n and Kurdista¯n. They made preparations integrity – especially in A for guerrilla warfare and sent the rural team to Gila¯n to establish a base in the mountains there. The plan, however, was revealed in early February 1971 when a Fada¯i¯ sympathizer was arrested by the police in the village of Siya¯hkal. Afraid that torture would be used to extract vital information, the Fada¯i¯ guerrillas attacked the police station to release their colleague. After a massive manhunt lasting three weeks, the military authorities announced that the whole guerrilla band had been eliminated and its 13 members executed. Later, the Fada¯i¯ organization divided into two factions. The majority, headed by Hamid Ashraf until his death in mid-1976, insisted on continuing the armed struggle, whereas the minority faction argued in favour of avoiding armed confrontation, an increase in political activities, especially among factory workers, and the forging of closer links with the Tu¯dih Party.115 Mut.ahhari considered ideological dispute with the Fada¯i¯ organization, or any other Marxist-materialist group, as his duty as an Islamic theologian. This domain, as he pointed out in the preface of the book, was always considered to be one of the important branches of his work during his life. In this respect he stated: From 1323/1944–5 when I commenced my formal studies in speculative sciences, I always felt I was familiar with the logic and thought 62

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

of materialists and could communicate with the views and opinions in their books . . . I carefully read every book written by Dr Taqi Ara¯ni . . . constantly reading, taking notes and observing . . . to such an extent that his sentences were imprinted in my mind . . . In 1329/ 1950–1, I began attending the classes held by my eminent teacher, ‘Alla¯mih Tabatabai¯ . . . about Ibn Sina¯’s philosophy and his fruitful special lessons on materialism. Us.u¯l-i Falsafih va Ravish-i Rialism, which has played a key role in the presentation of the philosophical baselessness of materialism during the past 20 years in Iran, originated from these faithful sessions . . . the years in Qum made me firmly conclude that materialism is, in my understanding, not truly a philosophy.116 Mut.ahhari’s understanding of Marxism was based on various Persian and Arabic secondary sources. He was reading Taqi Ara¯ni’s books, the translations published by the Tu¯dih Party, some Arabic translations published in Egypt, the translation of Georges Politzer’s Principes élémentaires de la philosophie and the translation of Andre Peter’s Marx and Marxism – the latter two being simplified Marxist views of philosophy. It is worth mentioning that Marxism, like imperialism and capitalism, was considered by Mut.ahhari as the more explicit enemy. He was opposed to any kind of silence vis-à-vis leftist ideologies and did not even accept the establishment of a united front or incorporation with the Marxist groups against the Pahlavi monarchy. In this respect he once opposed Dr Shariati at a private session, who viewed Marxism as the competitor rather than the enemy – the latter being imperialism and capitalism.117 Understandably, these two visions produced two different religious ideological positions, giving rise to two different socio-political results. The group under Mut.ahhari’s guidance considered Marxist groups as najis (impure) and as atheists, and continuously abstained from collaborating with them; while the other, under Shariati’s training, never refused to co-operate or communicate with the Marxists. This issue caused a considerable division between the militant ‘ulama¯. Therefore, a delegation was sent to Najaf requesting a judgement from Ayatullah Khomeini.118 They asked Khomeini to tell them what strategy they should follow vis-à-vis the political activities of nonreligious groups in their fight against the Pahlavis. Was it correct to make an alliance with the Marxist activists and be silent about their atheist ideology, or was it necessary to separate oneself from the left wing and speak out about their ideology? Although Khomeini took a cautious position and did not issue a statement, he privately supported Mut.ahhari. In ‘Ilal-i Gira¯yish bi Ma¯ddigari, Mut.ahhari sought to discover the causes for the wide dissemination of materialistic ideas during the last century and to ascertain the ‘mystery’ behind its attraction. In other words, he was trying to find out why materialism, as an intellectual vision rooted in the history of 63

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

human thought, had suddenly arisen in the twentieth century, after centuries of stagnation, as the most alluring philosophical school and powerful sociopolitical movement in the West. How did it spread around the world, like a violent storm, conquering many minds and causing so many political uprisings? Had some special cultural conditions in Europe caused this phenomenon, or had materialism used new propaganda techniques? In reply to these questions he tested many hypotheses. First, he asked whether the Marxists’ claim that materialism’s sudden popularity was due to progress in science and the scientific achievements in the twentieth century contained any truth. He answered: This claim is more of a joke than a truth. Philosophical materialistic interests have existed from the ancient eras until today, among both scholars and the ignorant classes. One observes people believing in materialism in all classes of society, as one similarly observes, among all classes, especially scholars, much interest in theism, spiritualism and metaphysics. If the materialists’ claim is true, one must find an increase in materialistic interests among scholars with the progression of science; and as the individuals’ knowledge grows, their materialism must extend; however, this is not borne out by the facts.119 According to Mut.ahhari, neither the weakness of Christian theology, nor the rigidity of the churches, nor the inspection of religious notions, nor the shortcomings of Western philosophical concepts in metaphysical issues, nor the antilogy between theism and Darwin’s biological evolutionism, nor the putative relationship between theocracy and political dictatorship, all on the one side, nor atheism and democracy on the other, nor the spreading of moral corruption in the West, may solely or jointly be an adequate and reasonable cause for modern materialistic tendencies around the world. However, these could have provided favourable environments for the growth of atheism during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Although the aforementioned factors disseminated materialism throughout Europe, they did not bring about the same effect elsewhere in the world and had not initiated any historical transformations. Thus there must exist other reasons involved in this expeditious diffusion of materialism. In this respect, Mut.ahhari inferred: Today, it is more or less established in the minds of youth that one must either be a theist – a peacemaker, complacent, calm, motionless, neutral – or a materialist – active, rebellious, opposed to colonialism, exploitation and despotism. Why has such an idea infiltrated the minds of young people? . . . From whence have these qualities in materialism and theism been extracted? The answer to 64

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

these questions is quite clear! It is not necessary for the young to study all the characteristics of materialism and theism in order to draw logical conclusions. Young people do not deal with this kind of logical deduction. They only see one aspect and that is enough to arrive at a result. They observe that it is just the supporters of materialism who lead uprisings, revolutions, battles and struggles, while theists are mostly static and neutral. For the youth, this is sufficient to judge and condemn the theists, and support the materialists. At present, the majority of heroic struggles against despotism [and exploitation] are guided by persons with more or less materialistic feelings. Undoubtedly, to a high extent, they have occupied the heroic trench.120 So, according to him, the propagation of materialism employed a new, attractive technique and also coalesced with socialism – a popular social theory at the time – thus penetrating the thoughts of the oppressed and the lower classes, resulting in revolts. Materialism’s present status and dignity therefore are, to some extent, dependent on false precepts earned by socialism (= Marxism). Mut.ahhari was considering theists in general, and Muslims in particular, as the true historical heirs of the previously mentioned propagating technique; and to provide evidence for his view he alluded to the history of the Prophets’ struggles and pointed to some Quranic verses on the subject of jiha¯d (holy struggle) and shaha¯dat (martyrdom). Therefore, he seriously regretted the fact that such an important legacy was snatched from the hands of the believers by the enemy, through meagre and unconstrained means. Now who was responsible for this great indolence and treachery? Mut.ahhari answered: The church, more than any other organization, is liable because, as we mentioned before, there were some unreasonable images regarding God, Jesus Christ and eschatology which were not acceptable to free minds. That which was presented as divine philosophy was also church-dependent; gradually, some artificial connections took shape – between faith in God and the legitimacy of despotism and strangulation from the one side, with atheism, national sovereignty and the struggle for people’s rights from the other – creating social reforms rejecting the concept of God, spirituality and the like, thus inclining towards materialism. Little by little, their enamoured followers, from the social viewpoint of life, conjectured that perhaps such a miracle [revolutionary behaviour] is due to materialism which is creating such contending persons; while, in fact, it was materialism which benefited from the spirit, credibility and dignity of individuals and not vice versa.121 65

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

Now on the subject of Islamic countries, especially Iran, which party could be held responsible for this tragedy? Mut.ahhari stated: When the morale of self-indulgence was raised amongst those who claim they were religious leaders, this [revolutionary] front fell from the hands of theists. In more precise terms, this phenomenon occurred when extravagant and mammonish people sat in the place of Prophets and true religious leaders. Their morale was unlike the morale of Prophets, Ima¯ms and the persons who had trained them. If there were to be a similarity, it would be only in their shape and clothing! But people erroneously regarded them as the representatives and successors of Prophets and Ima¯ms. They supplied interpretations of religious texts that wouldn’t involve any [political] duty for themselves, thus not colliding with their self-indulgence. Whether they knew it or not, they altered the significance of religious concepts impugning religion itself.122 In the conflict with such powerful enemies (such as materialistic Marxism) and the struggle for the restitution of the historical heritage to Islamic societies, who should make the first move? And how must one go about it? The ‘ulama¯, Mut.ahhari answered. They must first endeavour to represent religious concepts as being both logical and rational to the intellectual and educated groups; and, second, they must distinguish religion and its role within other sections in society, for example politics and economics. In other words, those in confrontation with Marxist and secular ideologies must provide the masses with a new religious doctrine, one in which it is necessary to revitalize Islamic epic terms like jiha¯d and shaha¯dat: ‘Of course it requires an intellectual, verbal . . . and practical jiha¯d.’123 Mut.ahhari invites his readers very explicitly, but without any further explanation, to practise jiha¯d. If one adjoins the above quotation to his other discourses at that time (1970–1), namely, Ima¯mat, Khila¯fat va Vila¯yat, Jiha¯d, and Hijrat va Jiha¯d, plus his notes concerning leadership (in Islam), one can clearly conclude that, during this period, he was seriously considering practical methods for political action. But it does not necessarily mean that he changed his view and accepted armed struggle. He recommended the religious scholars to use quarrels, criticisms and jiha¯d events in their speeches. But why did he only approve of ‘ulama¯ and clerical speakers? Probably the sad experience during his career at the Irsha¯d Institute influenced him, for he had lost his confidence forever in non-clerical intellectuals. Perhaps he thought that these non-clerical speakers would use the propagandist weapon, unskilfully, against themselves and their associates rather than against the enemy.

66

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

A message to the Muslim activists A substantial section of Mut.ahhari’s lectures was allocated to man, ethics and education. In the three books of Fit.rat, Insa¯n dar Quran and Insa¯n va I¯ma¯n he was seeking to elucidate his philosophical views, comparing them with those of Western and Eastern philosophers. Nietzsche, Marx, Feuerbach, Russell, William James and Sartre were among the Western philosophers addressed and criticized by him.124 Among Muslim scholars, Muh.yi al-Din ‘Arabi, Maulavi and S.adr al-Din Shira¯zi (Mulla¯ S.adra¯) were also regularly referred to by Mut.ahhari.125 It is worth mentioning that his understanding of Western philosophy came through Persian translations, but he was able to understand the ideas, sometimes even better than the translator.126 He constantly referred to the Quran and h.adith as the criteria for the verification or falsification of each theory. For instance, the theory of fit.rat, which in his view is the basis of Islamic philosophy and the key to understanding man, society and history, is deduced from the Quran.127 The term fit.rat, according to Mut.ahhari, is one of the exclusively Quranic expressions portraying man for the first time in human philosophical literature. It signifies all the special potentialities and characteristics which human beings possess by creation and which distinguish them from other subjects, namely inanimate bodies and animals. Some of these special attributes are related to consciousness, understanding and knowledge. This category is named idra¯ka¯t-i fit.ri. Others are in the category of will, desire and feeling, called gira¯yisha¯t-i fit.ri. The search for truth, excellence and beauty, inquisitiveness, creativity and love are the important human fit.ri desires which establish the most essential branches of human knowledge: that is, science, philosophy, ethics, art, technology, mysticism and religion, resulting in man’s social evolution in history. In this respect he argued: Man has some special characteristics which make his social life evolutionary. One of these characteristics and talents is memorizing and collecting experiences. Man guards and puts as a base for his future experiences all that he learns by experience and acquisition. The second is the ability to learn through explanations and the pen. He also transfers the experiences of others to himself via speech and on a higher level through handwriting. One generation’s experiences fill up and remain for the next generation through conversation and writing. For this reason, the blessings of speech, pen and writing have particular importance in the Quran . . . The third feature is Man’s being equipped by intellect and innovation. Man has the power of creativity and initiative by these mysterious forces. He is the manifestation of divine creativity and initiative . . . There exists neither the disposition of creation and initiative which are the

67

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

functions of rational faculties, nor the intense desire for innovation, in other animals. It is for this reason that animals remain constant while Man advances.128 Many aspects of different ethical systems such as Hinduism, Marxism, existentialism and evolutionism were considered by Mut.ahhari in his ethical discussions and were later published under the titles Falsafih-yi Akhla¯q and T‘alim va Tarbiyat dar Islam. In these books, he deals with Plato, Kant, Darwin, Marx, Sartre, Ghazza¯li, the Sufis and Asha¯‘irih (anti-rationalism) and is in favour of the Mu‘atazilih (pro-rationalism). Therefore he is among those few ethical philosophers who are searching for the roots of man’s ethical values – social or individual – in his rational faculty. In this respect, he was in favour of rationalism, but against the schools of ethical empiricism including scientific, naturalistic, positivistic, evolutionary and the Asha¯‘irih theological school of ethics. According to him, all human values such as justice, liberty, equality and honesty are sacred for mankind, simply due to the fact that they emanated from the transcendental reality of man, namely intellect, and not because they were praised by divine religions or circulated in the natural world or accepted by human societies. Naturally, this means that the criterion for all good and evil, permission and non-permission, ugliness and beauty, values and anti-values, is man himself and not nature, society or history. According to his argument, the system of Islamic ethics revolves on the axis of man’s honour and dignity and, consequently, religious teachings must concentrate on deeds and habits which will eventually liberate the believers’ character from any personal or social inferiority, alienation, abjectness and captivity: Around thirteen years ago [1338/1959–60], on the third day of Sh‘aba¯n [the birthday of the third Ima¯m], I was invited to lecture at ¯ li. I remember speaking there under the the Da¯nish-sara¯-yi ‘A heading ‘The question of selfness in ethics’. Since then, a new thought has entered my mind and whatever I have studied since, I have become much stronger in this opinion which is that, in Islamic ethics, the pivot . . . is the honour and magnanimity of the soul.129 At the time of the above-mentioned discussions (during the 1970s) which were simultaneous with the growth of religious interest among young people, Mut.ahhari’s ethical theory had a clear message for young activists: that the judgement of the secular ruling class or the approval of leftist groups are not, and should not be, the real criteria for the rightness or wrongness of their behaviour. It was probably this kind of theoretical approach which prepared the ground for their being more decisive in choosing a religious lifestyle. The message is repeated again in the Sayri dar Sirih-yi Nabavi, Sayri dar Sirih-yi A’immih and Insa¯n-i Ka¯mil. In these books Mut.ahhari is seeking to present 68

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

his educated audience with an ideal picture of a real Muslim. His definition of a real Muslim of course, as mentioned before, depended much on imitating a learned Mujtahid.

A bridge between shifting time and permanent Islam In 1966–7, when the growth of religious practice became visible in the young generation, a fundamental question arose among the Islamist activists. The question was whether Islam – according to Muslim beliefs – is an eternal and non-abrogatable religion, whereas man’s needs, which Mut.ahhari termed ‘the demands of the age’, are alterable and modernizable matters. How can the immutable religion harmonize with those temporary, changing requirements? In other words, the relationship between Islam and the necessities of time is similar to that of two opposites – one being permanent and nonevolutionary in its nature, the other indeterminate and evolutionary. Therefore, how can these two naturally opposite subjects harmonize with one another? Either the permanent religion must surrender itself to the unstable desires of time and accept these developments or the necessities of time and the demands of the age must remain stable and be proportionate to divine law: ‘It must be admitted that it is a difficult matter and the right answer can not easily be presented.’130 The question was discussed for a month in the Ittifa¯q Mosque during the winter of 1966 and then continued at meetings of the Association of Islamic . Physicians in 1972–3. The book Islam va Muqtaz iya¯t-i Zama¯n (two vols) is Mut.ahhari’s contribution to this issue. In his justifications, he first of all denies the common understanding of Islam and time: Neither is Islam absolutely permanent, having no changes in its laws, nor are the conditions and necessities of the age of such a form that is usually pictured as being a requisite of a time in which everything must change. There are some fixed and some temporary matters in Islam as there are in time.131 Then he argued that the proper answer to this problem must be sought in two terms, namely Ijtiha¯d and Vila¯yat-i Faqih.132 According to Mut.ahhari, there are some matters in the Islamic Shari‘at called ah.ka¯m-i avvali¯yih (primary ordinances) which are not changeable by Ijtiha¯d in any situation, whereas the others, called ah.ka¯m-i tha¯naviyih (secondary ordinances), are changeable by Ijtiha¯d, according to different circumstances. For instance, zaka¯t (obligatory alms) is one of the primary rules which is fixed for all time and for all societies, but the kind of crops and products which zaka¯t is taken from, belonging to the secondary rules, are changeable from one society to another, from one period to the other. Therefore, according to Mut.ahhari, it is the secondary rules that Ijtiha¯d can be operated in and in which the Islamic 69

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

ruler (vali¯-i faqih) has the authority to make law. The Islamic ruler’s base for the fixed matters is the Kita¯b (the Quran) and Sunnat and for changeable matters he refers to ‘aql (reason); for the Quran and h.adith, as two sources of Ijtiha¯d, are always permanent whilst the other source, namely ‘aql, is based on improvement and evolution.133 Indeed, the ‘aql of the Mujtahid, as the legitimate ruler of Shi‘ite society, is the ultimate solution that Mut.ahhari presented to the question above. He explained furthermore: Islamic rules are based on the mas.a¯lih va mafa¯sid [worldly interests and corruptions relating to Man] which can be discovered by ‘aql and ‘ilm [science]. On the other side, the Islamic legislative system is framed in general terms (in which every h.ukm [ordinance] is universal and does not refer to the specific). These two matters provide Mujtahids with numerous possibilities for announcing different fatwa¯s under different conditions of time and place; and, indeed, to discover that a thing may be h.ala¯l [lawful, permitted] at one time and h.ara¯m [unlawful, prohibited], or va¯jib [obligatory], or mustah.ab [recommended] at another.134 It is interesting to see that Mut.ahhari’s views are quite similar to those of Khomeini. In a letter from Khomeini, dated 16.10.1366/6.1.1987, in which he explained his interpretation of the theory of Islamic rule, he presented similar views on these subjects which had already been discussed by Mut.ahhari some 20 years earlier.135 The role of zama¯n va maka¯n (place and time) in Islamic law, and the broad authority of a Mujtahid as the legitimate ruler of Islamic society, which Khomeini pointed out in his letter, were precisely as explained in Mut.ahhari’s lectures. He argued: These options are transmitted from the Prophet to the Ima¯ms, and from the Ima¯ms to the Muslims’ lawful leader. Many of the prohibitions and permissions offered by our fuqaha¯ – with which all [Mujtahids] are in accordance today – are based on this principle. With whose lawful permission did Mirza¯ Shira¯zi temporarily forbid tobacco? If tobacco was prohibited [h.ara¯m] it would have been prohibited for ever. So why did he say ‘it is prohibited today’? Yesterday is the same as today. Why, after a period, did he himself grant permission? It is because Mirza¯ Shira¯zi knew that the Islamic legitimate ruler [h.a¯kim-i shar‘a] has some options which can be exercised in times of necessity.136

A debate with a poet about H . a¯fiz. ’s gnosticism In 1975–6 a book introducing H . a¯fiz. was published by the contemporary poet Ahmad Sha¯mlu¯, which prepared the ground for major discussions between 70

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

religious and non-religious scholars over H . a¯fiz. ’s vision of reality. For the ‘ulama¯, the significance of Sha¯mlu¯’s work lay in his courageous interpretation of H . a¯fiz. ’s poems in a materialistic way, presenting an atheistic picture of the celebrated Persian-speaking poet who was commonly termed lisa¯n alghaib (Tongue of the Unseen). Sha¯mlu¯ explicitly stated: H . a¯fiz. is a mystery. Who, indeed, is this qalandar [dervish], ascetic blasphemer who – during the darkest periods of the hypocritical rulership, at the table of the wily ones and in an era where even the proud, cannibalistic executioners like Amir Muba¯riz al-Din and his son Sha¯h Shuja¯‘a based their government on giving lashes, breaking wine jars, nah-yi az munkar and religious wars – solely denies the promise of resurrection, considers God as love and Satan as reason, while passing, jumping around and dancing, he is chanting: This cloak of mine better given in pawn for wine, And this register of nonsense better drowned in pure wine. Or, H . a¯fiz. , openly admits that he does not believe in religious covenants, for instance: I, who can already gain Paradise today why should I believe the za¯hid’s promise of tomorrow?137 It is worth mentioning that Sha¯mlu¯ had set foot on the path of other writers who had recently given an atheistic interpretation of Persian history, culture and literature. For example, Ih.sa¯n T.abari, one of the main theoreticians of the Tu¯dih Party, wrote Barkhi barrisi-ha¯ dar ba¯rih-i jaha¯nbini-ha¯ va junbish-ha¯-yi ijtima¯‘i¯-yi Iran (‘Brief research into world visions and social uprisings in Iran’), denying the spiritual personalities of 138 Maulavi, H . a¯fiz. , Qut.b al-Din Shira¯zi and Kha¯jih Nas. ir al-Din T.usi. A journalist called Ali Mir-Fat.ru¯s published H . alla¯j, presenting a materialistic picture of that outstanding mystic.139 Mut.ahhari discussed the issue at the conferences held in the Faculty of Theology. His ‘Irfa¯n-i H . a¯fiz. consists of five lectures which he presented at those conferences: Recently, the Iranian materialists have had recourse to strange things. This illustrates their philosophy’s poverty and weakness more than before. One of these recourses is the distortion of personalities. They attempt, via the distortion of respected figures, to bring to the attention of the public their ideology and philosophy.140 Sha¯mlu¯, by referring to the outward appearance of some of H . a¯fiz. ’s mystical poems, described the poet as an atheist, an infidel and a denier of religious

71

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

beliefs.141 Mut.ahhari maintained that this rationale was not sufficient because: With mysticism, apart from its own special expressions, as with any other science, its language is symbolic. The mystics themselves, in some of their books, have presented the key to these mysteries. After becoming acquainted with the key to these mysteries many of the errors and ambiguities will disappear.142 Needless to say, a number of poems written by Shi‘ite fuqaha¯ – such as . those by Mulla¯ Muh.sin Faiz Ka¯sha¯ni,143 Mulla¯ Ahmad Nara¯qi,144 Muhammad Husain Isfahani (Kumpa¯ni)145 and Ruhhullah Khomeini146 – are replete with mystical language. Therefore, these materialistic interpretations seemed strange to Mut.ahhari. He pointed out that the apparent meaning of some poems will never reveal the depth of their authors’ personality, because, as is the case with H . a¯fiz. , their works are full of paradoxes and seeming inconsistencies. H a ¯ fiz . . was described by his schoolmate, who had collected his poems after his death, as m‘adan al-lat.a¯’if al-ru¯h.a¯niyah (the mine of delicate spirituality) and makhzan al-ma‘a¯rif al-subh.a¯niyah (the treasure of divine knowledge). H . a¯fiz. did not succeed in collecting his ghazalliya¯t (lyrical poems) by himself, owing to the fact that he was quite engrossed in giving Quranic lessons and in his theo-ethical duties.147

Return to Qum It has now become clear that in 1971–2, when Khomeini was in exile in Najaf and Montazeri was not often in Qum (because of being temporarily in exile or even in prison), a number of Khomeini’s younger students in Qum decided to invite Mut.ahhari to teach modern philosophy. In addition, and probably at the same time, Khomeini, in a letter to his son-in-law, asked Ha¯jj Shaikh Shaha¯b Ishra¯qi to prepare facilities for Mut.ahhari’s teaching at the Qum Seminary.148 It is worth mentioning that Mut.ahhari gradually came to feel that the university was not the appropriate place for him. Once, when giving a consultation to a friend, he mentioned that he thought his time was wasted at the university because he believed that 90 per cent of students attended lessons only in order to gain a degree or to pass examinations (not for academic reasons or the lessons themselves) whereas the tulla¯b attended lessons in the seminary primarily in order to gain knowledge. Furthermore, he would be a free Mudarris in Qum, while in the university he was considered by some people as a government-paid professor.149 Perhaps his breaking off relations with the H . usainiyih-i Irsha¯d furthered this conclusion. He welcomed the invitation to go to Qum, and regularly spent three days a week (from Wednesday evening to Friday evening) there, teaching one private and one general class. In his private lessons, which were attended by a 72

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

number of well-known ‘ulama¯ such as Muhammad Mu’min, the previous director of the H . auzih-yi ‘Ilmiyih-i Qum, and Husain Mudarrisi Tabatabai¯, now a professor at the University of Princeton, Mut.ahhari taught the philosophy of history, comparing Islamic views to those of Hegel. He also gave philosophy lectures on the subject of movement and time in his general lessons, comparing the views of Islamic philosophers with those of Western philosophers. At this time, Dr Beheshti, who had previously served in the capacity of ¯ VA ¯K director of Hamburg’s Mosque (1965–70, 71), was prohibited by SA from leaving the country after his arrival in Iran in 1349/1970–1. Then, together with several of his friends (among them Ali Quddu¯si, the State Prosecutor between 1979–81), he was able to establish a modern, wellorganized religious school, known as Madrasih-yi H . aqqa¯ni, in the Qum Seminary. He managed to teach Western philosophy, and also established a course in the comparative study of religions. The H . aqqa¯ni School had a unique educational system and was renowned all over the country for its academic progress, intellectuality and political activities. A number of tulla¯b from this school were strongly influenced by Dr Ali Shariati and were trying to propagate his idea of Islam-i inqila¯bi (revolutionary Islam) inside the Seminary. Undoubtedly, the arrival in Qum of these two eminent Ayatullahs, with their vast academic knowledge, was considered as a blessing by the young clergy and seemed to prepare the ground for a comprehensive reform of the clerical establishment. At that time, Mut.ahhari’s influence in Qum was much wider than Beheshti’s and much more far-reaching in terms of influential students. Mut.ahhari opened the debate about Andre Peter’s Marx and Marxism – a relatively comprehensive collection of Marxist ideology and world vision – in his weekly private sessions.150 These meetings continued until 1977 and the details of the discussions were published under the title Naqdi bar Marxism (‘Criticism on Marxism’). The issue of zama¯n va h.arakat (time and movement) was also brought under discussion at his weekly general sessions. These meetings continued until 1978. The H . arakat va Zama¯n is, in fact, Mut.ahhari’s explanations on the subject from his general lessons. Another general seminar about Islamic ideology and world vision, called Ma‘a¯rif-i Quran (‘Gnostic knowledge of the Quran’), was held in Qum, probably in 1977. This continued for little more than a year, because of the Revolution. On the other hand, when Mut.ahhari was invited to Qum in spring 1971, new lectures were organized at the Faculty of Theology under the heading A¯ shna¯i¯ ba¯ ‘ulu¯m-i Islami (‘An introduction to Islamic sciences’) for the purpose of teaching the general principles of Islamic sciences, namely logic, philosophy, kala¯m, ‘Irfa¯n, fiqh and us.u¯l-i fiqh. These lectures were all given during the first year of the academic bachelor’s degree. Before long, these ¯ rya¯mihr Technical lessons were repeated at other universities, including the A 73

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

University (now Sharif Technical University), the centre of anti-regime activities, and were repeated many times.151 In 1976, the Sha¯h changed the Iranian Solar Calendar to a royal one, starting with the coronation of Cyrus II. When Mut.ahhari, together with a large number of ‘ulama¯ from Qum, Mashhad and Tehran protested ¯ VA ¯ K from vehemently against this change, he was prohibited by the SA 152 lecturing. In the same year, he went to Iraq and visited Ayatullah Khomeini in Najaf.153 Although he left no reports about this meeting, his subsequent enhanced presence at the Qum Seminary probably reveals that he was instructed by his teacher to be more involved with the seminary’s daily affairs and academic matters.

Debates with Muslim leftist guerrillas In June 1977, Mut.ahhari wrote an article which finally caused his assassination in May 1979. In this article, entitled Ma¯tirya¯lism dar Iran (‘Materialism in Iran’), while introducing the recent materialistic interpretations of Islamic texts and of Muslim academic figures, he heavily criticized some Islamic groups who were influenced by the Marxist methodology: We have noticed a group who really depend on other schools, especially materialistic schools. Since they know that they are less able to attract the Iranian youth with materialistic symbols and slogans, they present foreign ideas with Islamic emblems. It is evident that if Islam influences the youths’ mind through materialistic content and solely possesses Islamic cover, then this will be rejected swiftly. And also, we observe – which is more dangerous – that some Muslims, unfamiliar with Islamic sciences and enamoured of foreign schools, are writing about ethics and propagating these writings in the name of Islam; however, these are foreign ethics. Similarly, they write on the subjects of the philosophy of history, philosophy of religions, prophethood, world vision and Quranic interpretations. As a responsible individual, with responsibility from God, I warn all great Islamic authorities (all of whom I respect – and I am performing my duty which is between Almighty Allah and myself) that these external influential ideas under the pretext and banner of Islam are a danger that threatens the influence of Islam – whether they be ill-intentioned or not.154 Among all Muslim activists, two radical groups, namely the Sa¯zma¯n-i Muja¯hidin-i Khalq-i Iran (the Organization of the Iranian Popular Religious Fighters) and the Guru¯h-i Furqa¯n (the Furqa¯n Group) were the core targets of Mut.ahhari’s criticism. The first group, the Muja¯hidin-i Khalq was established in 1965 by 74

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

Muhammad H . anif-nizha¯d (the group’s chief ideologue), Sa‘i¯d Muh.sin (its chief organizer) and Ali-As. ghar Badi‘a-za¯diga¯n (its main arms expert); they were all students at Tehran University. They were raised in religious families and were active in religious organizations such as the Anjuman-i Islami-yi . Da¯nishjuya¯n and Nihz at-i A¯ za¯di-yi Iran, but had broken with them because they did not consider them to be revolutionary enough. They praised the uprising of 15 Khurda¯d 1342/5 June 1963 as ‘a turning point in Iranian history’ and were, like the Mu’talifih in favour of armed struggle, but unlike the Mu’talifih, they did not consider themselves as the followers (muqallid) of Ayatullah Khomeini or any other religious authority (marj‘a-i taqli¯d). In their view, one did not need a cleric or the clerical method of Islamic studies for the understanding of Islam.155 After graduation from the university in 1963, they spent the next two years doing their military service. On 6 September 1965, they established a secret discussion group to explore contemporary issues, with some 20 trusted friends. This group, and the date they first met, are now regarded as the beginnings of the Muja¯hidin. The discussion group continued to meet regularly for the next three years and gradually established smaller groups in Qazvin, Tabriz, Isfahan, Shira¯z and Mashhad. Their main focus, however, was to study religion, history and revolutionary theory. They read the Quran, the Nahj al-bala¯ghih, the works of Bazarga¯n and T.a¯liqa¯ni, literature on modern revolutions in Russia, China, Cuba and Algeria, and studies on major critical events in Iranian modern history. They also adopted Ammar Quzegan’s Le meilleur combat as their main handbook. At that time, this book was the main theoretical guide of the Algerian FLN. It had been written by a former communist-turned-nationalist who argued that Islam was a revolutionary, socialistic creed and that the only way to fight imperialism was to resort to armed struggle and appeal to the religious sentiments of the masses. After three years of study, the group set up a central committee to work out a revolutionary strategy and assembled a team of ideologues to provide the organization’s own theoretical handbooks. The central committee included, besides H . anif-nizha¯d, Muh.sin and Badi‘aza¯diga¯n, nine others who were also from religious, academic (except Ahmad Reza¯i¯) backgrounds: Mahmood As. ghar-za¯dih, ‘Abdul-Rasu¯l Mishkin-fa¯m, Ali Mihan-du¯st, Mas‘u¯d Rajavi, Ahmad Reza¯i¯, Na¯sir S.a¯diq, Ali Ba¯kiri, Muhammad Ba¯zarga¯ni and Bahman Ba¯zarga¯ni. The ideological team consisted of nine members: six from the central committee (H . anif-nizha¯d, Muh.sin, As. ghar-za¯dih, Mihan-du¯st, Rajavi and Bahman Ba¯zarga¯ni) and three others with religious backgrounds: Reza Reza¯i¯, Husain Ru¯h.a¯ni and 156 Tura¯b H . aqshina¯s. The ideological team prepared a series of pamphlets: Taka¯mul and Shina¯kht, discussing the theory of evolution and the theory of knowledge; Iqtis.a¯d bi Zaba¯n-i Sa¯dih, a free translation of Marx’s Wage, Labour and Capital; Mut.a¯li‘a¯t-i Marksisti, a brief summary of the materialist conception of history and society; Chigu¯nih Quran Biya¯mu¯zim, a two-volume 75

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

. introduction to Quranic studies; Ra¯h-i Anbiya¯, Ra¯h-i Bashar and Nihz at-i H . usaini, two major works in which the history of the Prophets and Ima¯m Husain were interpreted as a class struggle between rich and poor, ruled and ruler. As later explanations revealed, the ideology of the Muja¯hidin was in fact a combination of Islam and Marxism: Our original aim was to synthesize the religious values of Islam with the scientific thought of Marxism . . . for we were convinced that true Islam was compatible with the theories of social evolution, historical determinism, and the class struggle . . . we say ‘no’ to Marxist philosophy, especially to atheism. But we say ‘yes’ to Marxist social thought, particularly to its analysis of feudalism, capitalism and imperialism.157 It seems that the Muja¯hidin’s ideology was fundamentally similar to that of Shariati. They both considered Shi‘ite Islam as an inherently radical movement opposed to feudalism, capitalism and other forms of classstratified society. Both were socialists – in fact, if not in name – borrowing heavily from Marxist literature while at the same time rejecting the label of Marxism. Both were anti-clerical, viewing the intelligentsia as the true exponents of Islam, and calling for a Muslim renaissance and reformation. And, finally, both viewed the ‘dialectical method’ as the key to understanding the scriptures: sociology and political economy were more important than traditional theology. Despite these similarities, Shariati and the Muja¯hidin differed in some views. Shariati insisted that the countries of the Third World could find a third way to development – one that would be neither capitalist nor socialist, whereas the Muja¯hidin stated that these countries had only two choices: a capitalist road towards stagnation or a socialist road leading to economic development. The Muja¯hidin also argued that Islam could not offer a third road. There were also differences in their political outlook. Whereas Shariati often attacked vulgar Marxism and international communism, especially in the Soviet Union, the Muja¯hidin were eager to build political alliances, and therefore were willing to mute their criticisms of the international communist movement in general, and of the Soviet Union in particular.158 To obtain Ayatullah Khomeini’s public support, the Muja¯hidin sent two members of its ideological team, Ru¯h.a¯ni and H . aq-shina¯s (both became Marxists in 1975) to Najaf in 1972. It has been said that the delegations visited Khomeini with letters of introduction from T.a¯liqa¯ni, Montazeri (whose son Muhammad at that time sympathized with the Muja¯hidin) and Mut.ahhari who had met some of the Muja¯hidin through the H . usainiyih-yi Irsha¯d.159 Khomeini listened to the delegations’ explanations about their ideology, in a series of secret audiences (probably 24 sessions). He also tried to test their religious beliefs by asking them some questions on theological 76

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

issues, but they failed to present satisfactory replies. Furthermore, he urged them to change their views about Marxism and international communism, as well as about the ‘ulama¯ and the clerical establishment. Although he avoided issuing a statement of public support for the Muja¯hidin guerrillas, he wrote private letters to some of his followers in Iran asking them to help the families of those recently executed by the Sha¯h. But after the Islamic Revolution, and after Mut.ahhari had been killed, in a public speech on 25 June 1980, entitled ‘A hypocrite [muna¯fiq] is worse than an unbeliever [ka¯fir]’, Khomeini referred to these Najaf visits. He explained that he had agreed to meet with ‘these gentlemen who claim they are Muslims’ only because some respected ‘ulama¯ in Tehran had asked him to do so in a letter. He then disclosed that the Muja¯hidin representatives had come with a mouthful of dangerous lies, claiming to champion Islam but all the time planning secretly to use their ‘irresponsible talk of armed struggle’ to destroy Islam and the ‘ulama¯. He concluded his attack by mentioning that he had not been fooled by these compulsive liars, for he had kept in mind the old parable of the recent Jewish convert in Hamada¯n who incessantly quoted the Quran without having the faintest notion about Islam.160 Immediately after the events in Siya¯hkal on 8 February 1971, the Muja¯hidin organization had decided to start its military activities. To disrupt the festivities to celebrate the anniversary of 2500 years of the monarchy in August 1971, they planned to blow up the main electrical plant in Tehran and thus throw all the festivities into darkness. Searching for dynamite, they approached a veteran communist with whom they had shared a prison cell during the 1963 uprising. However, since he had meanwhile turned police ¯ VA ¯ K arrested 69 of the Muja¯hidin leaders and members, a few informer, SA days before the scheduled bombing. In April and May 1972, when the Muja¯hidin delegations had been in Iraq, the regime executed nine of its leading figures, including three of the founding leaders.161 In mid-1975, when the Muja¯hidin had created a nationwide reputation for its organizational efficiency, revolutionary fervour and religious martyrdom, after some internal bloody conflict, they published a vehemently anti-Islamic manifesto . entitled Baya¯niyih-i I‘ala¯m-i Mava¯zi‘a-i I¯diuluzhik-i Sa¯zma¯n-i Muja¯hidin-i Khalq-i Iran (‘Statement about the ideological stand-points of the SMKI’) which deeply shocked the ‘ulama¯ and the religious opposition. The manifesto declared that the organization was henceforth discarding Islam in favour of Marxist-Leninism, because Islam was a mass opiate and at best petit bourgeois, a utopian ideology, whereas Marxist-Leninism was the real scientific philosophy of the working class and the true road to the liberation of mankind: At first we thought we could synthesize Marxism with Islam and accept historical determinism without dialectical materialism. We now realize that this is impossible . . . We have chosen Marxism 77

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

because it is the true road to the emancipation of the working class.162 Although a number of the Muja¯hidin, who called themselves the ‘Muslim Muja¯hidin’ and managed after the Islamic Revolution to fully re-establish the original title, remained religious, they were unable to regain their previous position among the leading ‘ulama¯ such as Mut.ahhari and Montazeri. According to Mut.ahhari, the real explanation for this incident lay partly in the materialistic methods which the Muja¯hidin adopted when studying Islam, society and history; partly because of the lack of religious publications which could reasonably and logically present the Islamic ideology and world view; and also owing to the Muja¯hidin’s open friendship with the left wing, especially with the Chirik-ha¯-yi Fada¯i¯ -yi Khalq. In order to prevent more conversions to Marxism, Mut.ahhari established a number of discussion sessions in Tehran and wrote a series of books and articles. He began to teach Islamic philosophy in a weekly session which was attended by a number of young scholars such as Hamid Enayat, Manuchihr Buzurg-mihr, Ghula¯m Ali ¯ dil, Sayyid Jala¯luddin Mujtabavi, Reza Da¯vari, Da¯ryush A ¯ shuri, Hadda¯d-‘A Ahmad Jala¯li. The Sharh.-i Mabsu¯t-i Manz.umih (four vols) is the result of those lessons. In other private sessions for discussion about the philosophy of history, various sections of translated books – Pleasures of Philosophy, written by Will Durant; E. H. Carr’s What is History, and Andre Peter’s Marx and Marxism – were read by students under Mut.ahhari’s supervision. These discussions led to the writing of his Naqdi bar Ma¯rksism and Falsafih-i Ta¯rikh. In his Qiya¯m va Inqila¯b-i Mahdi az Didga¯h-i Falsafih-yi Ta¯rikh, Mut.ahhari undertook a philosophical analysis, in order to explain the doctrine of Messianism according to Quranic historical views, criticizing communism as the Marxist ideal community. Again, in his H . aqq va Ba¯t.il, while rejecting the Marxist socio-economic classification, he theorized about the typology of Quranic social classes by classifying the sociological terms used in the Quran. Despite the interdiction on lecturing from 1974, Mut.ahhari put the philosophical issue of ‘understanding’ – in the context of the Marxist theory of knowledge – under discussion in Ka¯nu¯n-i Tauh.id in ¯ VA ¯ K.163 The Mas’alih-yi 1977, which was followed by his arrest by the SA Shina¯kht is a compilation of these lectures. To present a sociological analysis of the latest Muslim uprisings, he prepared a lecture entitled Barrasi-yi . Ijma¯li-yi Nihz at-ha¯-yi Islami dar S.ad Sa¯lih-i Akhir (‘A short review of Islamic movements in the last hundred years’) for a public conference, but was cancelled by the police. Finally, in response to the requests of Ayatullah Beheshti and Dr Ba¯hunar, Mut.ahhari began to write about the characteristics of the Islamic world view. The series of five volumes, entitled Muqaddamih-i¯ bar Jaha¯nbini-yi Islami (‘An introduction to the Islamic world vision’) (Insa¯n

78

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

va I¯ma¯n, Jaha¯n-bini-yi Tauh.idi, Vah.y va Nabuvvat, Insa¯n dar Quran and Ja¯mi‘ih va Ta¯rikh) presents his final philosophical considerations about man, society and history. The most important book of the series, Ja¯mi‘ih va Ta¯ikh – a criticism of the Marxist theory on society and history and an explanation of Mut.ahhari’s views on the philosophy of history – remained unfinished.164 There is no mention of the Sa¯zma¯n-i Muja¯hidin-i Khalq-i Iran in Mut.ahhari’s writings, save two concise special points, one being explicit the other implicit. In a letter to Ayatullah Khomeini in 1977–8, Mut.ahhari reported the situation of Iranian politico-religious groups and explained his opinion on the Muja¯hidin organization (describing them as the muna¯fiqin-i khalq, hypocritical people), but stated that his sources were collected indirectly: The second movement which is idiomatically named Muja¯hidin, was in the beginning a political group, but they are gradually becoming a religious sect just like the Kha¯rijis [a political sect of early Islamic history] whose movement, in the beginning, was of a political nature, but later became a religious movement with a series of primary and secondary principles. Their [the Muja¯hidin’s] most simple innovation is that they have, according to themselves, attained selfsufficiency in [matters of] religion and thus reject any clerical official and religious authority. All the others may be understood in a similar manner. Another [of their innovations] is that – whilst expressing their loyalty to Islam – in their view, Karl Marx is just as sacred and respected as Ima¯m Ja‘far S.a¯diq [the sixth Shi‘i Ima¯m]. Although my sources are indirect, nevertheless there are some wise, good believers who have spent many years with them in prison whom I believe your excellency must ask – all of them, and not only one – to write individually and send their observations and opinions [concerning the Muja¯hidin] to your presence. It is surprising that there still exist some of our friends and your sincere followers who justify and account for their [the Muja¯hidin’s] works.165 With regard to Mut.ahhari’s second piece of writing about the Muja¯hidin-i Khalq, there is a phrase criticizing their famous slogan, Bi Na¯m-i Khuda¯ va bi Na¯m-i Khalq-i Qahrama¯n-i Iran (‘In the name of God and in the name of the heroic people of Iran’), by stating: In the Islamic tauh.idi method, every work must be started in the name of God (and no-one else). To start an act in the name of people [khalq] is idolatry and in the name of both God and khalq this becomes dualism and idolatry; but, only in the name of God is it tauh.id and monotheism.166

79

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

The second group, namely the Guru¯h-i Furqa¯n, was probably formed in 1975, when the Muja¯hidin announced their conversion to Marxism. The number of its members reached, at the peak, some 60 persons. Akbar Gu¯darzi, the Furqa¯n’s founder and leader, who was born to a religious farming family in Aligu¯darz, was only 20 years old when he was executed in 1979 for his terrorist activities. While still at high school, he had attended the Islamic primary lessons at the religious seminaries in Khunsa¯r, Qum and Tehran. He spent some three to four years learning Arabic, logic, fiqh and us.u¯l al-fiqh. While his first level of religious education (daurih-i sat.h) remained unfinished, he left the seminary and with it traditional education.167 As he mentioned in an interview after his arrest in 1979, he read the Quran, the Nahj al-bala¯ghih, the writings of Ayatullah T.aliqa¯ni, Shariati, and a few Muja¯hidin-i Khalq leaders such as Sa‘i¯d Muh.sin, H . anif-nizha¯d and the Reza¯i¯ brothers.168 At the age of 16, Gu¯darzi started to teach the Quran to a small number of young people in Tehran. During these three to four years, he gradually chose new members from participants at the Quranic sessions. Furqa¯n termed these three or four years preceding the Islamic Revolution the ‘period of assembling its ideology’. It also stated that the group achieved its tauh.idi ideology solely through collective discussions and not by studying and being educated in the religious seminaries. Initially, these Quranic lessons were published in pocket-sized booklets which soon developed into a book, mentioning neither author, publisher nor date of publication. The Us.u¯l-i Tafakkur-i Qura¯ni (‘The principle of Quranic thinking’) is in fact a compilation of these booklets. In it, Gu¯darzi described God as absolute evolution (not absolute perfection); .sala¯t as the connection between party members; ghaib and shaha¯dat (the invisible and visible worlds) as two hidden and overt stages of struggle and revolution; and a¯khirat (the world after) as a socio-political system of a higher world.169 By the theory of class antagonism and class struggle, (terms which he borrowed from Shariati and the Muja¯hidin’s literature) he started to interpret the Quranic historical verses. Finally he came to the conclusion that ownership is basically nothing more than a colonial phenomenon.170 Mut.ahhari, however, considered the ideology of the Furqa¯n as much more dangerous than that of other groups who were in favour of dialectical materialism: In the past two years, materialism has approached Iran with a new stratagem which is much more dangerous than the distortion of [Islamic] personalities; that is, the distortion of Quranic verses, together with the materialistic expositions of the verses’ content (using these terms, in their works). This technique is a new ruse, which has been alive in Iran for less than two years.171

80

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

Needless to say, the Furqa¯n’s mode of exegesis had no similarity to the spiritual approaches of the traditionalists. Indeed, in Mut.ahhari’s view, this was a conspiracy in order to attain the metamorphosis of peoples’ religious feelings, and the theoretician of the Furqa¯n group was contributing to this, willingly or unwillingly, by supporting the materialistic and secular movements.172 He argued: I am aware of the point that reflection on the Quran is the right of each Muslim and is not restricted to any individual or any group. I am also aware of the fact that [our] approach, whether it be devoid of personal interest or not, does not come to the same conclusions. Each person may have a particular view. He has the right to reflect on the Quranic verses with regard to his understanding of the conceptions of the [Quranic] terms, his expertise in the style of the Arabic language and in the particular form of the Quran; with regard to the occasions of revelation of the verses, and the history of the early years of Islam; with regard to the traditions we received from the Ima¯ms about the exegesis of the Quran; and with regard to the developments in science . . . But we know that some views presented by the Ba¯t.iniyih [esoterics], and others – from the past – cannot be considered as [the Quranic] approach or exegesis. They are metamorphosis and distortion rather than approach and exegesis.173 Mut.ahhari also mentioned that owing to the several signs and points of ‘rawness’ and illiteracy he had seen in the Furqa¯n publications, he preferred to describe its materialistic method of interpreting the Quranic verses as ‘gullible materialism’ (Ma¯tirya¯lism-i Ighfa¯l Shudih). If the group continued its deviational way after this notification, he would declare its materialistic method to be ‘hypocritical materialism’ (Ma¯tirya¯lism-i Muna¯fiq).174 He then addressed the academics thus: Here, I am inviting all eminent people and the learned scholars of the country – who are of good intentions – to examine carefully and impartially everything I am about to say. If they really feel that I am mistaken, [they should] inform me and in a logical way prove my faults. I call God to witness that I am ready to admit my own errors openly.175 The Furqa¯n declared that it considered the Pahlavi regime, clergy and communists as the three fundamental elements, dominant over the Iranians’ destiny which must be destroyed by armed struggle.176 Although they were repeatedly speaking of armed struggle, they did not call for any military

81

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

action during the Pahlavi regime. In order to prepare guns and a location for the group, it committed several bank robberies.177 Attempting to realize their vision of an Islam without institutionalized religious leadership (Islam-i minha¯-yi ru¯h.a¯niyat), the Furqa¯n begun to assassinate a number of the leading ‘ulama¯ and Iranian officials after the Islamic Revolution. On 23 April 1979 they assassinated General Muhammad Vali¯ Qarani, the first Chief of Staff of the Iranian armed forces after the Revolution. On 1 May they . murdered Ayatullah Murtaza Mut.ahhari, and three weeks later they made an attempt on the life of Hujjat al-Islam Hashemi Rafsanjani. On 26 August they assassinated Ha¯jj Mahdi Iraqi, a close associate of Ayatullah Khomeini and a leading member of the Mu’talifih-yi Islami. On 1 November the . Furqa¯n murdered Ayatullah Qa¯zi Tabatabai¯, the Ima¯m Jum‘ih of Tabriz and the representative of Khomeini for northern Azarbai¯a¯jan. On 18 December they also assassinated Ayatullah Dr Muhammad Mufattih, the head of the Faculty of Theology. In a statement issued after the assassination of General Qarani, the Furqa¯n had threatened that its next target would be a cleric. When he read the Furqa¯n’s statement in a newspaper, in the house of Hujjat al-Islam Muh.aqqiq Da¯ma¯d, a close student of Mut.ahhari and a senior lecturer in the Faculty of Law at Shahid Beheshti University, Mut.ahhari remarked that he would become their next victim.178 The Furqa¯n had indirectly threatened him before when Mut.ahhari published the article ‘Ma¯tirya¯lism dar Iran’. Giving reasons for Mut.ahhari’s assassination, the Furqa¯n accused him of being a leading member of the ruling clerical regime and the man who had labelled the Furqa¯n group ‘hypocritical materialists’.179 In his preface to Shariati’s Marxism and other Western Fallacies, Algar has mentioned that it is probable that the Furqa¯n was ultimately under the command of persons owing their allegiance to the former regime, and possibly also to the American patrons of that discredited tyranny. He considered the interest of American officials in the ‘anti-clerical’ work of Shariati, and also in the destabilizing activities of the Furqa¯n, as remarkable.180 However, Mut.ahhari’s assassination on the night of 1 May 1979 was followed by worldwide condemnation and condolences. The following day he was buried in the Holy Shrine of Qum, and later on the day of his martyrdom – 2 May – was officially declared by the government as ‘Teacher’s Day’. It appears that what influenced the young left-wing Iranians to a considerable degree was, in some part, a result of the rejection of the clerical organization and their educational system. The Ru¯h.a¯niyat did not see any benefit in an up-to-date educational system. Religious writings were often blended with superstitions, lacking logic and rationale. Religious lectures were empty of political criticisms and emotions. Religious places had been impoverished during the previous decades and had therefore become completely unattractive to the younger generation. Hence, it may be

82

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

asked whether Mut.ahhari’s views on the revolutionary groups were too harsh and extreme, and whether he put too much pressure upon those militants who were not interested in the clergy’s opinions. The response of some well-known radical ‘ulama¯ like Anva¯ri was affirmative. They objected to Mut.ahhari’s course of action and considered the theoretical challenges to the Muslim activists as a damaging influence on the anti-regime movements, and ultimately not in accordance with the interests of the Revolution. Nevertheless, they reconsidered their views later, when the ideology of those activists became clearer and also when terrorism appeared on the scene.181 However, Mut.ahhari was justifying his course of action which were later named the line of iltiqa¯t.-zuda¯i¯ (purifying of eclecticism), emphasizing the necessity for the separation of political directions in theory and in practice between Islam and Marxism during anti-regime revolutionary activities. He was certainly aware of all the shortcomings mentioned which existed in clerical organizations and criticized them in his lectures, articles and books; he was also constantly reminding the religious authorities of their responsibility vis-à-vis the younger generation. He went to Qum and gave many lectures to prepare the ground for change in the religious educational system; he had even publicly admitted the shortcomings of the religious establishment in his book: ‘It is we, the ‘ulama¯ who are responsible; we haven’t presented enough up-to-date books in various Islamic spheres. If we had supplied adequate pure refreshing water, they [young people] wouldn’t have headed towards the polluted water.’182 Nevertheless, he was not absolutely in favour of radical changes in the clerical establishment; or in favour of any exciting revolutionary youth movement which would heat the furnace of the Islamic Revolution with leftist conceptions and literature: Surprisingly, it has been claimed that we want to transform the Islamic culture into a revolutionary culture. Is Islamic culture’s being revolutionary and/or, in your view, becoming revolutionary, based on taking its spiritual content and replacing it with a materialistic one? Are revolutions only confined to the stomach, and originate from privation and class system? Didn’t the Prophet of Islam establish a revolution in head, spirit and heart? Does not this type of understanding of a revolution, consciously or unconsciously, benefit materialism?183 Mut.ahhari was in favour of Islam-i fiqa¯hati and on the subject of (the priority of) struggle, he did not perceive any difference between the right’s conservative monarchical regime and the left’s desired consultative system. According to him, imperialism and communism are similar to the blades of a

83

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

pair of scissors which are apparently opposite to each other, but in reality move in unison to cut one root.184

A key figure in the Islamic Revolution ¯ qa¯ Mus. t.afa¯, the son of Suddenly, after the mysterious death of Ha¯jj A Ayatullah Khomeini, on 23 October 1977 in Najaf, the operations of the Islamic Revolution intensified. In order to guide the Revolution, the Ja¯mi‘ihyi Ru¯h.a¯niyat-i Muba¯riz reorganized itself with the senior ‘ulama¯ of Tehran, namely Ayatullah Dr Muhammad Mufattih, Ayatullah Muhammad Reza Mahdavi-Kani (Prime Minister, 1981), Ayatullah Dr Sayyid Muhammad . Beheshti and Ayatullah Murtaza Mut.ahhari. It has been said that all the political announcements of the Ja¯mi‘ih-yi Ru¯h.a¯niyat were issued under Mut.ahhari’s guidance, and all demonstrations were organized under his supervision.185 On 4 October 1978, Ayatullah Khomeini left Iraq for France and Mut.ahhari was able to travel to Paris in order to visit him. It was during this visit that the foundation for the first political centralization of the future regime, that is the Revolutionary Council (Shu¯ra¯-yi Inqila¯b), was planned, and Mut.ahhari, as its first member (the others were Beheshti, Ba¯hunar, Mu¯savi Ardibili, Mahdavi Kani, Khamenei¯, Hashemi Rafsanjani), was appointed to nominate the members of the future cabinet, in consultation with some of the above-mentioned ‘ulama¯. Hashemi Rafsanjani mentioned that Mut.ahhari had a peremptory influence on the Revolutionary Council’s policies before the victory of the Revolution. Since he was the only one informed of Ayatullah Khomeini’s intentions and programmes, he had the final word in the collective decisions of the Revolutionary Council.186 In protest at the ban on Ayatullah Khomeini’s revival to Tehran by Prime Minister Sha¯hpour Bakhtiya¯r, the Jami‘ih-yi Ru¯h.a¯niyat, at Mut.ahhari’s suggestion, took sanctuary in the mosque of Tehran University on 27 January 1979. The official welcoming text which was read at Mihrabad airport at the time of Khomeini’s arrival in Tehran (1 February 1979), was written by Mut.ahhari.187 Although, after the victory of the Islamic Revolution on 11 February 1979, he had not taken any post in the temporary government under Bazarga¯n, nevertheless, owing to Khomeini’s total confidence in him, he was still counted as an influential member of the Council. Many officials were appointed as a result of his proposals. The numerous political activities during those days exhausted him and he personally would have preferred to return to academic work. Hence he did not attend the Revolutionary Council regularly.188 During these months he gained, in his interviews and lectures, an opportunity to draw a general picture of the future Islamic society. Three of Mut.ahhari’s books, namely . Barrasi-yi Ijma¯li-yi Nihz at-ha¯-yi Islami dar S.ad Sa¯lih-i Akhir, Pira¯mu¯n-i Inqila¯b-i Islami (‘About the Islamic Revolution’) and Pira¯mu¯n-i Jumhu¯ri-yi 84

ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

Islami (‘About the Islamic Republic’), contained his ideas on the subject of the nature, aim and future of the Islamic Revolution, political liberty, the rights of the minorities, the authority of religious leaders and the position of women in the Islamic Republic, all of which were collected from those interviews and lectures. Finally, his television interviews, prepared by AbdulKarim Suru¯sh, represented the later stages in his political thinking.

85

3 ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES

Writings on economics Some years before the Islamic Revolution in Iran, theoretical research on Islamic economics and the principles distinguishing it from capitalism and socialism had been commenced by a number of well-known scholars. For instance, Ayatullah Sayyid Mahmood T.a¯liqa¯ni wrote Ma¯likiyat dar Islam, Ima¯m Musa¯ S.adr published Iqtis.a¯d dar maktab-i Islam, Ayatullah Sayyid Muhammad Ba¯qir S.adr compiled Iqtis.a¯duna¯, while Ayatullah Sayyid Muhammad Beheshti established a clerical discussion group for analysing Karl Marx’s Das Kapital. In response to the question of why Mut.ahhari started work on economic studies, Ayatullah Mu¯savi Ardibili maintained that it was rather to be expected of him, as a distinguished Islamologist, to take this initiative and put to discussion a subject of such widespread interest as economics.1 Perhaps the visible lack of interest in the field of economic studies by the majority of the fuqaha¯ and ‘ulama¯ drove Mut.ahhari to do so. Or it might be more probably considered to be a part of his anti-Marxist academic activities. Katouzian, however, argued that because Marxism appeared to be the main alternative, Shi‘i writers developed a dual attitude toward it: on the one hand, they tended to argue their own case through refutations of Marxism, while, on the other, they tried to interpret Islamic laws and traditions as being no less revolutionary, just and so on, than Marxist ideals. In fact, even the attacks on capitalist economics seem to be part of the attempt to prove to the Marxists that Shi‘ism is not a capitalist system.2 From 1973 onwards, Mut.ahhari began to research, lecture and write about issues relating to the Islamic economic system. First, he put the issue of insurance (bimih) under discussion at the Association of Islamic Physicians, and explained its justification based on the Islamic jurisprudential method. Insurance, as a well-established phenomenon of modern civilization, originated in the Western economic system and had no formal example in Islamic history; therefore, it could well have caused a problem in regard to the legality of the people’s economic activities. This was a new case for the fuqaha¯ and a convenient subject for Mut.ahhari’s economic analysis. Its 86

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES

lawfulness was conditioned in conformity with Islamic jurisprudential regulations. According to Shi‘ite jurisprudence, each of the two parts of any transaction is to be totally clear.3 In insurance, the premium the insured must pay weekly, monthly or yearly is definite, whilst the dividend the insurer will pay, in the event of an accident or damages, is indefinite. Mut.ahhari, in reply to this, and to the question of ‘What lawful interest may this transaction have?’, argued: That which makes bimih such a lawful and reasonable act is only the insurer’s guarantee. In insurance, the insurer undertakes that he/she will compensate or pay such and such an amount of money in the event of an accident or any damages. Such a guarantee from the insurer is useful for the insured, because if such a guarantee did not exist, the insured would continuously be in a state of uncertainty . . . Thus, the insurer provides the insured with security [t’amin] and peace of mind. The importance of the insurer’s cover lies not in the amount of money which he/she may have to pay in future. Therefore, one cannot say that the transaction is void, since the amount of money (which the insurer will pay in the future) is unknown.4 Also, in response to the question of whether insurance has any equivalent in Islamic law, he replied: ‘The nearest jurisprudential case to the issue of . . . insurance is the issue of guarantee [z ima¯n and Kita¯b-i z ima¯nat] for z ima¯nat is 5 an undertaking.’ It is clear that this jurisprudential analysis distinguished the issue of bimih from any false and forbidden agreements such as usury (riba¯) and gambling (qima¯r), provided a lawful foundation for it in Islamic law, removed the theoretical problems obstructing the Muslim practitioners’ path in financial activities, and finally signalled to revolutionary activists that they were able to form their Islamic society with a modern style of life (albeit with those elements of modernity viewed as beneficial) and not as a completely free society. Again, the Association of Islamic Physicians arranged some important conferences in 1975 on the subject of ‘Riba¯ in Islam’ and invited Mut.ahhari, Beheshti and Bazarga¯n to speak. Mut.ahhari’s lectures at these conferences, together with his lessons on this issue at the Marvi School, were published, after his assassination, under the heading Mas’alih-yi Riba¯. This issue will be discussed later in the chapter. However, from 1976 onwards, a more organized and advanced form of the economic studies mentioned was carried out weekly in Mut.ahhari’s home, with the participation of a group of his students including Husain Nama¯zi (Professor of Economics at the University of Shahid Beheshti and the Minister of Finance 1981–5).6 At these weekly sessions Mut.ahhari taught from a translated and summarized book on Marxist economic views entitled 87

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES

Us.u¯l-i ‘Ilm-i Iqtis.a¯d. Abdul-Husain Nushin, the translator, was an actor and a member of the Tu¯dih Party who escaped to Russia after the collapse of Musaddiq’s cabinet and later settled in the German Democratic Republic. The Us.u¯l-i ‘Ilm-i Iqtis.a¯d consisted of five parts: value, additional value, wage, theory of profit and the cost of production, commercial capital and commercial profit. The title of the original book and its writer is not mentioned. Although Nushin refers to a second volume of the book, this volume was apparently unpublished. It is not clear, however, why Mut.ahhari preferred teaching from this secondary source of Marxist economic literature to working from an authentic one, such as Marx’s Das Kapital, translated into Persian by Ih.sa¯n T.abari. Perhaps it was due to the book’s simplicity and fluent style of writing. Because of the Revolution, these economics lessons remained unfinished, but a collection of Mut.ahhari’s notes has remained. These notes, first entitled Barrasi-yi Ijma¯li-yi Maba¯ni-yi Iqtis.a¯d-i Islami, were published in November 1982 by Husain Ghaffa¯ri, a member of the discussion group. Major discussions started across the country, especially among the clerical establishment, immediately after the distribution of the book. One group believed that this book should not be attributed to Mut.ahhari because it consisted of his uncompleted writings in long-hand, whilst another insisted that it certainly contained Mut.ahhari’s views, for it accorded with his social philosophy and sociological perspectives. A few months after publication, two well-known Ayatullahs, Mahdavi Kani and ¯ dhari Qumi, visited Ayatullah Khomeini to request that the circulation of A the book should be limited to the academic centres, so that it would not be accessible to the public. They argued that before publishing his writings, Mut.ahhari used to take advice from some of his close friends by sending them a copy in long-hand. This, clearly did not happen in the case of this book. Khomeini accepted their request, and therefore the book was no longer sold to the public. In this respect an interesting incident happened a few years later. Celebrating Labour Day in May, the newspaper Ittila¯a¯t published a part of the book relating to labour. However, the page on which it appeared had been excluded from the copies of Ittila¯a¯t which were distributed in the Jamaran area, where Ayatullah Khomeini was then living. While reading the newspaper, Khomeini realized that a page was missing. Searching for the missing page he quickly found out the story. Therefore, the newspaper was placed under interdiction, but the ban was lifted a day later. The similarity between Khomeini’s views and those of Mut.ahhari about state ownership and governmental authority in economic fields became quite evident when the former issued a series of statements (from November 1987 onwards) in response to the letters of the Council of Guardians (Shu¯ra¯-yi Nigahba¯n) and the Minister of Labour.7 The Majlis speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani, declared that Mut.ahhari’s economic views would be published very soon. Finally, the notes were rearranged with a few alterations and published in spring 1989, under the heading Naz.ari bi Niz.a¯m-i Iqts.a¯di-yi 88

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES

Islam. The book consisted of an introduction and eight parts, concerning: the definition of economics and economic terms; ownership from the philosophical point of view; value; additional value; capitalism and socialism from the Islamic point of view; economic articles (land ownership from the Islamic point of view, the issue of inheritance, socialism from the viewpoint of philosophy of history); notes on Islam and economics; and theoretical notes on the Islamic economic system. Besides the Us.u¯l-i ‘Ilm-i Iqtis.a¯d, Mut.ahhari also refers in his notes to some Islamic sources (Quranic verses, quotations from Traditions and classical jurisprudential books) and writings on liberal and Marxian economics: Islam va Ma¯likiyat written by Sayyid Mahmood T.a¯liqa¯ni; Al-Madhhab al-Iqtis.a¯di . bain al-Shuyu¯‘iyih va al-Islam by Sa‘i¯d Ramaza¯n; The History of Economic Thought, written by Louis Baudin and translated by Hu¯shang Naha¯vandi; The Thoughts of the Greatest Economic Scholars, written by George Henry Saville and translated by Husain Pirniya¯; Capitalism and Socialism written by Felician Jalet and translated by Ghula¯m Husain Zirak-za¯dih; Socialism, written by George Bourgeon and Pierre Rimbert and translated by Mans. u¯r Mus. lih.i; Anti-Dühring written by Friedrich Engels and translated by Ih.sa¯n T.abari; and An Introduction to Philosophy, written by Oswald Kolpe and ¯ ra¯m. translated by Ahmad A

What does ‘Islamic economics’ mean? As an aspect of a more fundamental difference between Sunni and Shi‘i approaches to economic issues, Sunni writers tend to assume that contemporary Muslim societies and the past civilization from which they evolved are – even with important qualifications – Islamic, whereas generally Shi‘i views assume that – apart from the short periods of Muhammad’s and Ali’s rule – the true Islamic state and political economy have no precedent in history. Many of the strengths and weaknesses of the specifically Shi‘ite economic literature arise from this basic point of departure.8 The Shi‘i jurists have recently made great efforts to present a clear picture about the term ‘Islamic economics’. To prevent any confusion and misunderstanding about the term, they immediately recognized two types of economic thought. The first was economics as an empirical science (‘ilm-i iqtis.a¯d, or iqtis.a¯d-i ‘ilmi, or iqtis.a¯d-i tah.lili) which particularly concerns itself with those causal relations which modern economics treats as objective and scientific laws and tendencies. It explains economic life and the links between economic facts and the causes and factors which determine them. In this sense, there is no meaning to the term Islamic economics, just as there is no meaning to Islamic physics for instance. Second, economics was seen as a theo-philosophical science (maslak-i iqtis.a¯di, or madhhab-i iqtis.a¯di, or maktab-i iqtis.a¯di, or niz.a¯m-i iqtis.a¯di, or iqtis.a¯d-i tashri‘i¯, or iqtis.a¯d-i barna¯mihi¯ ) which is essentially prescriptive.9 It demonstrates the way to 89

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES

follow in the economy, and does not explain the way economic events occur. In this sense, Islam’s teachings affect economics in two ways: directly and indirectly. Islam directly affects economics owing to its having a series of economic regulations concerning ownership, exchanges, taxes, prohibitions, inheritance, donations, charities, bequests, fines for financial wrong-doing, and so on. Thus a major part of Islamic jurisprudence consists of kita¯b albai‘a, kita¯b al-ija¯rih, kita¯b al-vika¯lih, kita¯b al-rahn, kita¯b al-irth, kita¯b alhibih, and kita¯b al-vaqf. The indirect effect of Islam on economics is to be seen in its moral ordinances. Islam recommends people to be trustworthy, just, pure, benevolent and generous. It also tries to prevent them from practising bribery and robbery or even committing treacherous acts. All these moral concepts are undoubtedly linked (more or less) to the exchange of wealth.10 The Islamic jurists explicitly and repeatedly state that wherever they apply the term ‘Islamic economics’ in their discussions or writings, they mean this second type of economics. For instance, Muhammad Ba¯qir S.adr, a leading Shi‘i jurist, stated that ‘Islamic economics is not a science of political economy. Rather, it is a revolution (that is, a revolutionary ideology) for changing the corrupt reality, and turning it into a pure one. It is clearly not an objective analysis of existing reality.’11 Hence it can be said that Islamic economics deals with social and economic problems on the basis of Islamic values/principles and with analytical techniques derived from Islamic texts and traditions. In other words, it is constituted from economic doctrines originating from or referring to, those Islamic ordinances, injunctions and prohibitions relating to the people’s social and economic life. Therefore, Islamic economics is not really economics as a branch of the modern intellectual sciences; rather it is an ideology, like Marxism and capitalism, yet based on Islamic texts. In fact, it is a theo-philosophical or philosophicaljurisprudential science that deals with general principles of economic activity in Muslim societies. Subject, method and goal While modern economic theory tries to explain the economic behaviour of secularized man, who seeks to secure his livelihood and maximize his happiness and pleasure, Islamic economic doctrine is established to guide both mu’mini¯n (believers) and the Islamic ruler towards its worldly and divine aims. It has been argued that Islamic economic theory is different from neo-classical or Marxian economic theory because the Islamic man’s nature is believed to be part man-made and part divinely determined. This volatile combination of real and ideal, human and divine, secular and sacred, worldly and other-worldly, presents a problem in terms of predictable behaviour.12 90

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES

But Islamic jurists consider the problem to be, rather, a shortcoming in the present scientific method than in Islamic man’s mixed characteristics. A believer (a mu’min), according to the Quranic verses, is a person who believes in Allah and the Last Day and works righteously (‘amal-i .sa¯lih) (Ma¯idih: 69); who believes in what has been revealed to the Prophet and what was revealed before him, and who establishes regular prayer (s.ala¯t) and practises regular charity (zaka¯t) (Nisa¯: 162); who, when Allah is mentioned, feel a tremor in his heart and when he hears His signs rehearsed, finds his faith strengthened, and puts all his trust in his lord (tavakkul); spends (freely) out of the gifts He has given him for sustenance (infa¯q) (Anfa¯l: 2–3); humbles himself in his prayers; avoids vain talk; is active in deeds of charity; abstains from sex, except with those joined to him in the marriage bond (Mu’minu¯n: 2–6); has never since doubted, but has striven with his belonging and his person in the cause of Allah (jiha¯d) (H . ujura¯t: 15). The mu’min, according to a Tradition relating to Ali ibn Abi-T.a¯lib, divides his time into three periods: the period when he is in communion with his lord; the period when he manages for his livelihood; and the period when he is free to enjoy what is lawful and pleasant. It does not behove a wise person to be away (from his house) save for three matters: namely for purposes of earning, or for something connected with the next life or for enjoying what is not prohibited (Nahj al-bala¯ghih, H . ikmat: 390). Islamic economists believe that, to produce Islamic economic theory, economic hypotheses have to be based on assumptions derived from the Shari‘at. The validity of a theory is not simply obtained by measuring it against empirical evidence; first, it has to be put to the ultimate test of compliance with Islamic axioms and criteria found in the Shari‘at. Any theory put forward by a human being is tested against these Islamic criteria and if there is a clear and undeniable contradiction the theory is rejected immediately without further examination.13 This complicated methodological process of testing hypotheses, which is called Ijtiha¯d or ravish-i Ijtiha¯di is based on having a comprehensive knowledge of the Islamic sources, namely Kita¯b (Quran), Sunnat (Prophet’s or Ima¯ms’ sayings, deeds and acknowledgements), ijma¯‘a (consensus of the fuqaha¯), ‘aql (reason), and si¯rih (the conduct of wise people or the conduct of Muslims).14 According to Dar-a¯madi bar Iqtis.a¯d-i Islami, a recent book on economics, published in the Qum Seminary, The Islamic economic system has legislated not only for providing people’s material requirements namely food, clothing, housing, hygiene, defensive instruments and so on, but it also covers people’s cultural and psychological needs. It provides for people’s welfare and comfort in regard to production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services. Although this goal seems very general, because there is no specific limitation for taking benefit from or 91

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES

having comfort by material blessings, the Islamic moral system plays a sensitive, dominant role in directing such unlimited desires towards their ultimate moral perfection. In this sense, the goal of the Islamic economic system will be changed by the Islamic moral system. It means that welfare and comfort would be recommendable only to such an extent as to provide [what this book called] eternal happiness and open a path towards man’s ultimate perfection.15 It is clear that Mut.ahhari presented another position concerning this issue. He maintained that the possibility for the growth of wealth is one of the primary principles of a healthy economy, and a healthy economy is a primary condition of a healthy society. A healthy economy is a self-subsistent economy, not dependent on another. From the Islamic point of view, Islamic ideals cannot be attained without a healthy economy. To present a clearer picture of what he meant by a ‘healthy economy’, Mut.ahhari went on to explain three points: first, Islam wants to see that the non-Muslim has no influence and no dominance over Muslims. This goal is attained when a Muslim nation is self-sufficient in its economy and does not beg from a nonMuslim nation, because being in need, is in fact equal to captivity and slavery. He then refers to a Saying narrated from Ali ibn Abi-T.a¯lib: ‘If you ask a man for something you will be his prisoner; if you rely on yourself you will be equal to him; if you do a man a favour, you will be his master.’ Second, Islam is in favour of a middle and moderate (economic) way and opposed to the two poles of extremism (ifra¯t. va tafrit.). One pole basically fails to understand the value of having a healthy economy and is in favour of poverty, dreaming that poverty is not a fault in a society, just as it is not a fault in a person. The other, understanding the value of the economy, considers human interests and the people’s demands (whatever they might be) as a driving force for gain. The pro-capitalist economists believe that everything must be offered if the demand for it exists, even if it is a danger or weakening to society. But an ill society demands toys and luxury items, like a sick person with an appetite for something which is harmful for him. It is for this reason that in Islam there are prohibited transactions (maka¯sib-i muh.arramih). Third, as wealth must not be earned illegitimately, the economic system must not be of such a form as to prevent growth and progress (in economic activities). Hence, the Marxist doctrine of the financial stage in human development, the classless society ‘from each according to his ability, to each according to his need’ is not acceptable, because it prevents people’s enthusiasm for economic activity. People enjoy work when they know that the results of their work return to themselves not to others.16

92

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES

How is the Islamic economic system to be understood? In order to understand the Islamic economic system, Shi‘ite jurists agree that the way to proceed is to start from fiqh, and from the operation of fiqh develop the mechanisms of the economic structure. To achieve this objective, some jurists started to present a clear definition of the term ‘ownership’ (ma¯likiyat) by analysing the Quranic verses and the Traditions relating to the term. Others began to interpret verses and Traditions concerning the term ‘wealth’ (tharvat) and ‘property’ (ma¯l).17 According to Mut.ahhari, ‘When we want to see what kind of economic system the Islamic economy is, we have to see first what kind of perspective is expressed by Islam about wealth and property [ma¯l]’. One might imagine that wealth is fundamentally to be rejected, refused, and regarded as unclean in Islam. So a matter which is characterized as dirty, rejected and prohibited is not in a position to have regulations and laws. In other words, any school of thought which considers a particular thing as prohibited, cannot have a regulation about that matter. The only regulation might be not to produce it, not to touch it, not to exchange it, not to use it. An example of such a regulation existed (among Islamic Traditions) about wine: ‘Allah has cursed whoever sells it, buys it, uses its price, serves it, or drinks it.’ But the reply to this supposition is that it is a big mistake. Property and wealth have never been considered as base in Islam, neither their production, nor their exchange of goods, nor their consumption; rather all of these are recommended and emphasized, and conditions and regulations are provided for them. From the Islamic point of view, wealth is never considered as something to be thrown away; rather it is absolutely forbidden to throw it off because that is squandering (isra¯f), . dissipation (tabdhi¯r), and wasting of property (taz i¯ ‘a-i ma¯l). Mut.ahhari then formulated his analysis as follows: Islam condemned money-worshipping, but never condemned wealth itself, because the production of wealth by agriculture, animal husbandry and craftsmanship are recommended in Islam; the exchange of wealth, namely commerce and transaction, is recommended; using wealth and property for personal needs without engaging in luxury and squandering is recommended; squandering, dissipation and wasting of property are prohibited. Intense penal and judicial regulations concerning waste, stealing and treachery have been enforced; defending personal property is considered by Islamic Traditions similar to waging holy war (jiha¯d), and someone killed protecting property is considered a martyr (Shahid); some rights in Islam have legislated against man, but in favour of property; and wealth itself is explicitly termed good (khair) in the Quran (Baqarih: 180).18 On this subject S.adr, however, has chosen a more complicated methodology. He initiated his analysis with the notion that

93

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES

One of the fundamental differences between Islamic economic doctrine and those of capitalism and Marxism is that the Islamic economic system must be discovered through jurisprudential and Traditional sources, whereas those of capitalism or Marxism are formulated and constructed by Western economists. Hence, the task of an Islamic researcher is to recognize the Islamic economic system in its true colours, to define its general structure, to discover its theoretical principles, to express its main distinguishing features and to purge it of every phenomenon gradually added through time.19 In doing so, S.adr then explained, the scholar must begin his study first at the superstructure level. This research includes: studying the Islamic legal system (that is, civil law); studying Islamic financial ordinances; studying the dominion of the Islamic ruler; and studying Islamic economic terms and concepts such as ma¯likiyat and tija¯rat. The researcher must then deepen his study at the infrastructure level. At this stage, the researcher chooses and collects, from amongst all he has studied before, those key concepts, regulations and ordinances which could harmoniously represent the whole body of the economic system. Showing the result of his analysis, S.adr explained that the concepts of h.ala¯l and h.ara¯m in Islam are present in all walks of life. They cover different types of human behaviour in various circumstances: the relations between ruler and ruled; seller and buyer; tenant and proprietor; worker and jobless. For every one of these relations is either h.ala¯l or h.ara¯m, and at the next stage is either justice or oppression. Therefore, through the idea of prohibited and permissible actions, it is possible to discover the details of the doctrine of the Islamic economic system.20 Islamic economics is a part of the Islamic social system As S.adr pointed out, it would be incorrect to analyse the Islamic economy as an independent entity, separate and distinct from the other principal components of the Islamic system, such as the social and political domains,21 because Islam presents itself as a well-integrated, comprehensive and universal whole which possesses the means of solving man’s basic problems. As an all-embracing ideology, it does not seek to influence single aspects of life but life in its totality. It does not intervene in people’s lives, since it is itself the clay of which the people in the system are moulded. Since the objectives of the Islamic system are incompatible with those of economic man, the practical success of Islamic economic theories hinges on the emergence and universalization of Islamic man’s outlook. Islamic economics is, therefore, based on the internalization and total incorporation of the Islamic valuesystem by all members of the Islamic community (ummat). This requires the development and prevalence of an Islamic individual and social psychology. This in turn is dependent upon a conducive social environment, the creation 94

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES

of which necessitates an Islamic state capable of promoting and upholding the Islamic value-system. The Islamization of society, and consequently the economic system, therefore hinges on the establishment of an Islamic state capable of enforcing the Shari‘at. The Islamic state established by believers is charged with the transformation of all Muslim members of society into believers with an Islamic economic outlook. Ultimately, the prevalence of such an outlook leads to the creation of an Islamic economic system. The behaviour of the mu’min, or the Muslim as laid down in the Shari‘at, constitutes the basis of any theory of Islamic economic behaviour.22 According to S.adr, the interrelation between Islamic economics and other Islamic systems is illustrated in eight areas: first, the interrelation between Islamic economics and the Islamic belief system, which forms Islamic economics as an ideological and value-based system and provides a spiritual protection for it. Second, the interrelation between Islamic economics and those philosophical terms such as private ownership and utility. These terms must be understood as Islamic concepts by using the particular style of interpretation which is applied by Islam. Third, the interrelation between Islamic economics and those moral feelings and sensations such as common brotherhood which Islam creates in society. Fourth, the interrelation between Islamic economics and the financial policies of an (Islamic) government, which must be considered as a part of the Islamic economic system. Fifth, the interrelation between Islamic economics and the Islamic political system. This means that studying the (Islamic) economic system separately from the (Islamic) political one inevitably leads to misunderstanding, because the ruling body has a wide-ranging economic authority and owns considerable economic resources, and can therefore bring about economic changes on the basis of Ijtiha¯d. Sixth, the interrelation between the prohibition of usury and other (Islamic) ordinances relating to the issues of . partnership (muz a¯ribih), public co-operation, and social balance. If the prohibition of usury were to be considered separately, it would cause many problems in the economic system. Seventh, the interrelation between some ordinances about private ownership and the ordinances relating to holy war (jiha¯d), since, for instance, the Islamic ruler is permitted to take the property of prisoners of war as spoils of war and distribute it between the fighters as their private property. Eighth, the interrelation between Islamic economics and Islamic criminal law. This means that Islamic law can only be applied in the economic sphere where Islamic economics is applied in the framework of an Islamic society.23 Is there a single Islamic economic system? Despite the general consensus that Islamic economics has to be based on Islamic jurisprudential sources, there is a controversial debate among Muslim jurists about which type of Ijtiha¯d is capable of resolving all present 95

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES

economic problems. Opinions on this issue can be broadly divided into two categories. First are the traditional jurists, who argue that Islamic economics, like any other aspect of life in an Islamic society, has to be deduced from divine laws with the minimum of human discretion. Since Islamic law has been laid down for all times and places, it is not in need of adaptation and updating and is, therefore, capable of addressing all present and future economic problems. Second are the rationalist jurists, who argue that the primary Islamic sources concerning transactions (mu‘a¯mila¯t) do not contain sufficient information for the construction of an integrated economic system capable of resolving all present-day economic problems. Subsequently, a considerable part of Islamic economics has to be based on human reasoning. In an attempt to salvage the essential particularity of Islamic economics, namely its divine base, they immediately acknowledge the fact that human discretion has to be based on (or must not be contradictory to) the principles laid down in the Quran or the Traditions.24 As an adherent of this second opinion, Mut.ahhari maintained that it is not true that all Islamic ordinances are fixed and unchangeable. Islam, as a comprehensive system, has two types of ordinances: primary principles (ah.ka¯m-i avvali¯yih) which are permanent and unchangeable; and secondary principles (ah.ka¯m-i tha¯naviyih) which are non-permanent and changeable. Reason (‘aql) as a permanent source of Islamic jurisprudence is, in fact, the main source for deducing non-permanent ordinances. Giving an example, Mut.ahhari first raised a question, which was Modern medicine is largely based on anatomy, including autopsy, whereas autopsy of a dead Muslim is prohibited by some primary sources. According to Islamic jurisprudence, a Muslim’s dead body must be washed and prayed over and buried as soon as possible. Now how can medicine be improved in Islamic countries with this kind of ruling? In response to this question, he then maintained that although the dead body of a Muslim is accounted respectable and its immediate burial is considered obligatory for each person (va¯jib-i kifa¯i¯ ) by Islam, the improvement of medicine in Islamic society, and everything which the progress of medicine is dependent on, is also considered obligatory by Islam. Therefore, there are two obligatory ordinances: one of them important – which is the respect to the body of a Muslim, and the other more important – which is the progress of the science of medicine which serves Islamic societies. There is no doubt that in these circumstances the dissection of a dead Muslim’s body would be permissible.25 According to Mut.ahhari’s analysis, the existing economic problems can only be resolved by a rationalist Mujtahid who by his reasoning has 96

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES

the ability to deduce new ordinances from Islamic primary and secondary sources. However, it has been said that the difficulty of presenting a generic Islamic economic system lies in the different conceptions of what an Islamic economic system should be. Varying interpretations of the different characteristics that constitute an economic system have found their reflection in different Islamic subsystems. Even though all subsystems accept and utilize the common features of the Islamic value-system, each has searched for and provided references and proofs for its particular view of what constitutes Islam’s socio-economic position.26 Generally, four causes can be identified to explain the absence of a distinct, integrated and coherent theoretical construction of an Islamic economic system. First, the subjectivity of different Islamic jurists, in their study and analysis of the primary sources, leads to different interpretations of the same texts. Second, the existence, in the primary sources, of disparate and even contradictory positions and injunctions, on a single economics-related issue, such as the permissible extent of accumulating wealth, enables different subsystems to use different texts within the primary sources as proof of their particular position. Third is the lack of Traditions, in the primary sources, relating to modern economic relations and institutions. Fourth, the prevalence of different secondary sources (ah.ka¯m-i tha¯naviyih) allows for the pronouncement of unprecedented religious edicts by Islamic jurists, which in turn affect and influence the economic system.

Principles The general characteristics of the Islamic economic system can be formulated in the following principles: diverse ownership, limited economic freedom, prohibition of usury and social justice. Diverse ownership According to Mut.ahhari, Islam (in contrast to capitalism which believes in private property as its basic (unique) principle, and also in contrast to socialism which considers communal (ishtira¯ki) ownership as its fundamental principle), acknowledges simultaneously three forms of ownership. These are: individual (fardi, which refers to ownership by the individual in relation to factors outside the means of production) (it seems Mut.ahhari deliberately prefers this word to private property (khusus.i, which alludes to private sector ownership in relation to means of production)), public (‘umu¯mi), and governmental (h.uku¯mati).27 Natural resources like wastelands, pasture lands, forests, rivers, lakes, mines, and fuels are counted as anfa¯l or governmental properties. Public property includes mosques, shrines, schools, religious seminaries, roads, bridges, gardens and places devoted to the use of the public. 97

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES

Mut.ahhari’s position here is much closer to that of state capitalism than one based primarily upon private ownership. There is no limit, on the one hand, to the amount of legitimate individual property. Although there is a Saying from Ali ibn Abi-T.a¯lib that ‘Ten thousand dirhams cannot be gained in a legitimate way’, this certainly belongs only to that particular period. According to Mut.ahhari, it means that legitimate income cannot be earned from every kind of financial transaction. However, if it is gained in a lawful way, it must not be collected by the government. He then continued that it is wrong to put a ceiling on people’s property.28 On the other hand, the rights for using individual property are not unlimited. An individual cannot use his property in prodigality and in a dissipating way – for example, an instruction in a will that one’s bequeathed property should be spent on a dog. This is considered as a nonsensical act, and is not recognized as an owner’s right by Islam.29 However, Mut.ahhari’s most important contribution to this debate is undoubtedly related to his analysis of the nationalization of machines or means of production. Hence, it is appropriate to see what kind of analysis he presented and the responses it drew from other Islamic jurists. Maxime Rodinson believed that, the partial orientation of Muslim societies towards socialism has nothing to do with the precepts of Islam . . . And the alleged fundamental opposition of Islam to capitalism is a myth, whether this view be put forward with good intentions or bad. On the theoretical plane, the Muslim religion presents no objection to the capitalist mode of production.30 In contrast, Mut.ahhari maintained that modern capitalism is a new phenomenon which has no example in the past, and therefore must be separately analysed as a new jurisprudential issue (Mas’alih-yi mustah.dathih) by the fuqaha¯. Although Islamic jurists have recently discussed some new issues relating to banks, insurance, cheques and bank drafts, they have failed to realize that capitalism itself is the most important of those modern issues. This is because it has been mistakenly imagined by the Islamic traditional jurists that capitalism is a pre-modern issue of economic relations about which Islam has already legislated. They think that trade, rent, landed . property, companies, investment partnership (muz a¯ribih), contracts for . agricultural purposes (muza¯ri‘ih and musa¯qa¯t) are all capitalist relations which are regulated and legalized by Islam, regardless of how much the amount of capital might be. Mut.ahhari argues that this idea is incorrect, because modern capitalism, like modern trade, is a totally new phenomenon and has no example in the past. Therefore, it must be independently considered by a separate Ijtiha¯d.31 The general characteristics of capitalism (and capitalist society) are 98

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES

described, although in a rather unsystematic fashion, by Mut.ahhari as follows: individual property; inherited property; individual differences in wealth and ownership; the gaining of wealth by the possession of means of production or making profit by possessing capital; earning wealth by the employment of labour or by the system of employee and employer; owning through usury; the legalization of establishing cartels and trusts and therefore the legalization of the exploitation of producer and consumer; control over all economic activities in the capitalist society by a small number of people; the legality of ownership of means of production, whether it be movable or immovable property; the legality of usury; the purpose of production being for individuals’ profits rather than the public’s best interests; and no relation between wealth and work. In other words, earning of profit without being involved in work; the amount of a worker’s wage being practically determined by the employer; one group’s fortune being due to another’s misfortune; slavery and servitude being practically the result of capitalism; the dominance of wealthy men in politics and national sovereignty; raising conflict for profit; competition for making more money.32 These characteristics (institutions and mentality) are better formulated by Rodinson in the following principles: private ownership of the means of production, free enterprise, striving for profit as the chief motive force in economic activity, production for the market, money economy, the mechanism of competition, rationality in the conduct of an enterprise.33 According to Mut.ahhari, the main characteristic of modern capitalism is not ‘additional value’, as socialists claim. Instead, it is machinery which makes modern capitalism a unique phenomenon in human history. Although this term (machinery) is thought to be at the centre of Mut.ahhari’s economic thinking and caused major discussions among the ‘ulama¯, it is not clearly explained in his notes and writings. However, it is clear that Mut.ahhari meant industrial capitalism. In order to get a better understanding of this term, it is appropriate to consider Mut.ahhari’s philosophical analysis. Machinery, the main characteristic of modern capitalism In his analysis of the difference between past and present economic systems, Mut.ahhari argued that In the past, a rich man was merely buying the ability of a worker, giving him a simple tool and then selling his output, whereas at the present time, the owner of capital buys a machine which has the ability to produce a hundred times more than a worker, and thus man has been replaced by machinery. Machinery is a metallic man and has the power to produce additional value, and the value of hundreds of times as much as the work which was used in its production. Machinery is a legitimate slave of human society . . . It is the 99

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES

main characteristic of modern capitalism that the owner of capital can bring machinery with its great power under his control, whereas he is not the creator of the machine, nor its inventor, but only the buyer and the owner.34 The socialist view is that: the main characteristic of modern capitalism is that the owner of the capital buys the ability of labour only for sale, not because he is personally in need of it. He owns the profit which belongs to labour. It is labour that creates additional value (the difference between the real cost of production and the market price). Therefore, the modern capitalist system is in fact exploitation of labour. In response Mut.ahhari argued that this cannot be considered the main characteristic of modern capitalism. Large carpetmaking factories, textile factories, dressmaking and shoemaking factories, factories for making the tools for carving, and for the goldsmith’s or the silversmith’s trade all existed in the past. These factories were all employing workers, giving them a definite amount of wages, and carrying out transactions and trade with the products of their workers. Although this phenomenon was largely expanded in the modern age (the age of machinery), the quantitative expansion and development cannot singly change the nature of a matter as long as it does not cause the qualitative transformation:35 In our view, the main characteristic of capitalism, which makes it a new subject for fiqh and Ijtiha¯d, is the mediation of machinery [between its owner and labour]. Machinery is not simply the expansion of means and tools of production which improve man’s work; rather, it has taken man’s place. Machinery is the manifestation of man’s thought, will and power. It is the manifestation of man’s social evolution, the embodiment of man’s historical civilization, and the outcome of thousands of years of great human intellectual endeavours. Machinery is the successor of the human being, not his tool or means. It is an artificial human . . . It does every thing which man was doing by his direct consciousness.36 It seems that Mut.ahhari’s words about the phenomenon of invention are rather contradictory. On the one hand, he maintained that nobody can be singly considered as the inventor or innovator of machinery, because it is the manifestation of the evolution of society (not of the individual). The products of machinery cannot be considered to be the indirect output of the capital owner; rather it is the indirect output of the intelligence and the

100

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES

genius of the inventor. Products of intelligence and genius cannot have a personal owner. A machine is in fact a human with metallic hands, run by electricity and steam power. It is in reality the talent of the inventor who works with tools. It is the manifestation of the inventor’s talent and thought or, in other words, it is the manifestation of the mind and the evolution of society. It represents man’s replacement in work, not simply an instrument for production. The invention of machinery is, in fact, creating a source for the creation of labour, not only the creation of labour which is saleable. In this respect, it is different from handmade instruments, art products, books and poetical works. Therefore it belongs to the public, not to an individual, not even to its inventor, because the inventor himself is a product of the progress of society. It cannot come under private ownership and cannot be owned by the capitalist. Hence, if an owner of capital who possesses a machine does not exploit either producer or consumer, he is still able to gain enormous profits, because he has brought under his control a social output which is creative and productive. This is why the origin of modern capitalism is illegitimate. In the modern capitalist system, the owner of capital can buy and bring under his control a product which is not buyable and sellable. It belongs to society and must come under public control.37 Yet, on the other hand, while attacking the socialist theory of ‘value = labour’, he expressed the view that people’s different abilities, talents and innovations are not considered in this theory. Are the values of writings, paintings, calligraphies, inlaid works, the making of glazed tiles dependent on the amount of the work spent on them? Had H . a¯fiz. and S‘adi, for instance, wished to profit from their compilation fees and gain enormous wealth, would it have been due to the amount of their labour [compiling their books] or would it have been due to their innovation and inspiration?38 It can be deduced from the explanations above that ‘machinery’, in Mut.ahhari’s analysis, does not simply mean every invention which could improve the ability of personal production. Instead, it is every means of production which could produce outputs or provide services at the public level and could be attributed to society. This kind of invention can, in fact, be termed the manifestation of society or the manifestation of man’s evolution in history. Owing to its nature, this kind of machine cannot, according to Mut.ahhari, come under the control of the private sector; therefore it must be in public or state ownership. In more detail, the invention of modern machinery means the introduction of those big industries dependent on water, electricity and oil, such as the car industry, railways, ships, airplanes, radio and television, which, historically, started almost two centuries ago,

101

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES

and which were developed and improved during the last 100 years. In other words, it means all major industries, basic factories and big technologies which created industrial capitalism and are generally termed ‘means of production’ in the economic literature. It is worth mentioning that when Ayatullah Beheshti, as Deputy Speaker of the First Majlis-i Khubriga¯n (The Assembly of Experts) was involved in drafting the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, he was successful in making Mut.ahhari’s conclusions into law. As a result, all large-scale and basic industries were declared to be State property. However, he did not agree with Mut.ahhari’s philosophical analysis.39 Beheshti argued that: it has been said that society as a whole is creative but that is no more than a joke. Creativity is usually connected to one individual or a number of individuals who share some common work. Not all humans are creative and innovative. If they are, their initiatives are not the same. Therefore, each individual has his own special share in these different forms of creativity.40 ¯ dhari-Qumi, a distinguished Mudarris of the Qum Seminary Ayatullah A became generally known as the main opponent of Mut.ahhari’s economic view. According to him, there is no limit to having legitimate private property in Islam, and nationalization of industries, trade and mines turns the government into a big monopolist manager and leaves the nation as hired workers. Although a faqih has the authority to nationalize the basic industries, this is only possible when he comes to the conclusion that this privatization might cause a loss for and corruption to society, or when the private sector is not able to run basic industries efficiently because of a lack of facilities.41 It is interesting to note that, while Shariati considers the distinguishing features of the Islamic economic system to be basically anti-capitalist, socialistic and egalitarian, Mut.ahhari categorizes it as fundamentally different from socialism. Shariati‘s ideal society (ummat) is based on equity and justice, public ownership, equality, human brotherhood, and a classless society. His ideal Muslim, Abu-Dhar Ghifa¯ri – a companion of the Prophet – is (according to Shariati) a socialist, but a believer in God, who has spent his life struggling against a class-based society, discrimination, injustice and the unequal distribution of wealth among the people. But Shariati concludes that his socialism must be considered as a principle of the Islamic vision of reality rather than a goal in itself, in contrast to Western socialism.42 Mut.ahhari, however, does not deny being a socialist. But his socialism is not absolute egalitarianism, mainly based on shared income (of communal work) and common/public property. Hence, it is appropriate to see what kind of analysis he offered for his position. 102

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES

Seeking to stand between capitalism and socialism The general characteristics of socialism (and a socialist society) were described by Mut.ahhari as follows: denial of individual ownership of means of production; condemnation of wealth-based class differences, as such differences bring oppression and injustice; economic power, like political power, to be under public control; property to be inherited; no profit to be made on unearned property; prohibition of usury; illegality of establishing trusts and cartels; the goal of production to be to give the profits to society rather than to individuals; owning natural resources prohibited; the priority of the work of the hands over the work of the brain; the principle of work for work’s sake, rather than for competition; the principle of work for all or for each according to his ability, and to each according to his needs, which means all share each other’s work (income) and gain the same share; necessity of employment for all people; common ownership of property.43 Mut.ahhari then compared the general characteristics of an Islamic economic system to those of capitalism and socialism in order to find out similarities and differences. He maintained that individual property, related to those things produced by the owner him/herself, is acknowledged by all three systems, the Islamic, the capitalist and the socialist. However, in the capitalist system the deceased owner of property still has the absolute authority over it – that is, the same as when he was alive – while in the Islamic system, his authority only continues over one-third of his property, and the rest must be divided between his heirs. Socialists only acknowledge the inheritance of children. Differences in wealth, no matter how great, are considered by the capitalist system as natural phenomena. These are considered, in Islam and also in socialism, as oppression and exploitation, if these differences cause poverty among people, even through unemployment or a low-wage system. It is no problem in Islam (or in socialism) to gain wealth by using tools of production without employing labour, just as it poses no problem in employing workers for non-productive projects. Gaining wealth by employing labour and using means of production (basic industries) is permitted only in the capitalist system. Usury is clearly prohibited in Islam (and also in socialism), whereas it is permitted in the capitalist system. Islam (and also socialism) does not consider it legal to establish a monopoly in order to bring production and sale of a particular commodity under exclusive control. Only in the capitalist system is the formation of a cartel permitted. Co-operation between persons, companies and institutions is not prohibited by Islam, unless the purpose of co-operation is to create a monopoly, in which case it is prohibited. But it is legal in the capitalist system. In that system, individuals are in principle free to produce everything they want, but their production is restricted in the socialist system to products which society is in need of. Although individual ownership is respected by Islam, individuals are not permitted to produce harmful or useless commodities

103

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES

(maka¯sib-i muh.arramih). The dominating position of a few individuals, who possess capital, over society’s economic relations, is permitted in capitalist societies, but not in Islam nor in a socialist system, because it concerns the best interests of society and negates ultimately the liberty of the public. The socialist principle of an exact accord between wealth and work is not completely acceptable to Islam. Although inheritance, gifts, donations, awards and prizes are not generated by work, yet they are permitted in Islam.44 In addition, Mut.ahhari considered two things as important in order to prevent the growth of wealth in society: one is the accumulation of capital by a small number of people (which is permitted in capitalist societies), as according to the Islamic view the sources of wealth must be free (from monopoly) and attainable by all people; the second is the socialist principle of ‘From each according to his ability, to each according to his need’, as a result of which every individual’s work must be respected. Islam does not teach that every adult has to work and that the output of their work by necessity belongs to society. People can work jointly and communally, but their share must be definite.45 Regarding the first of these two views, it is clear that the present capitalist societies have demonstrated that the accumulation of capital cannot be considered as a barrier for the growth of wealth, although it might be a barrier for the growth of social balance and social justice. In conclusion, Mut.ahhari went on to maintain that private ownership of natural and industrial (machine) resources is not permitted in Islam (nor in socialism) and they must remain in public ownership. Common ownership of (output of) work is also unacceptable in Islamic law, just as it is alien to the capitalist system. Yet if common property (ishtira¯k-i sarma¯yih) is considered the main characteristic of socialism, Islam can be thought of as a socialist system (maslak-i ishtira¯ki), although it must be remembered that individual property is also simultaneously acknowledged by Islamic law. But if communal work (and sharing each other’s output) is regarded as the main characteristic of socialism, Islam is not a socialist doctrine.46 It is worth mentioning that although Mut.ahhari did not deny being a socialist, he is clearly not supportive of an egalitarian or classless society. Criticizing the socialist view that inheritance is unearned property for the heir and would reinforce differences between classes in society, he argued that there is no problem in the mere existence of different classes in society, as there is no problem in people’s living in different and unequal situations, provided the law is equally enforced for all people and the differences are generated by the merit and activities of oneself or one’s ancestors.47 Although Mut.ahhari has no faith in a flat model of equality and acknowledges the function of the existence of different classes in society, yet he does not believe in intense class differences based on wealth. The goal of 104

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES

the Islamic economic system is, according to Mut.ahhari, to reduce class differences, not to wipe them out. Even the philosophy of Islamic taxes such as zaka¯t, khums, and those special taxes which the Islamic ruler has been authorized to legislate and collect in times of need, is the prevention of intense class differences, and the creating of social balance.48 Had Mut.ahhari been questioned about what solution he would provide for class modification when the wealthy were able to change the attitude of the political establishment to suit their interests, he would probably have replied that Islam does not permit, for two reasons, the economic destiny of society to be shaped by a small number of capitalists. From the viewpoint of people’s democratic rights, it cannot be justified that a small number of individuals gains authority over the destiny of others. And from a practical viewpoint, those few people would surely work for their own benefits, against that of others.49 Therefore, their capital or property must be nationalized. Limited economic freedom Although there is no limit to the amount of legitimate wealth, possessing an infinity of private property has two limitations. The first of these is a subjective one, and derives from the moral values of wealth-sharing taught by Islam. These values cannot be quantified and are independent of state coercion. Islamic sources (i.e. the Quran and Traditions) encourage Muslims to share their wealth generously with those who are poor, needy or orphans, to make donations and self-sacrifice, and to refrain from prodigality and the accumulating of wealth. It is said that the existence of many charitable works and activities in Islamic societies – such as feeding the poor, endowing properties, caravanserais, public baths, schools, clinics, hospitals, libraries and orphanages, special bank accounts offering loans without interest . (s.andu¯q-i qarz al-h.asanih) to people who are in need and so on, are, in fact, the results of these moral teachings.50 The second limiting action is objective and carefully defined by law, and functions on two levels. The first includes those limitations which originate from the prohibition of a set of economic transactions and social activities that are generally called, in Islamic jurisprudence, ‘maka¯sib-i muh.arramih’, such as the prohibition on producing, buying and selling idols and items used in other religions (such as the cross), statues (of living beings), alcohol, drugs, gambling equipment, deviant books, immoral films, and gold and silver dishes. Included in the prohibition are also usury (riba¯), fraud (ghishsh), bribery (irtisha¯’), monopolies (ih.tika¯r), extravagance (isra¯f ) and consumption of luxury (tajammul).51 The second level contains the two types of obligatory taxes: the fixed and the eternal ones, khums and zaka¯t; and the indeterminate and occasional ones imposed 105

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES

when necessary by the Islamic ruler with the aim of creating social justice.52 Article 49 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Chapter IV) can be considered as a reflection of this principle. According to the article The government has the responsibility of confiscating all wealth accumulated through usury, usurpation, bribery, embezzlement, theft, gambling, misuse of endowments, misuse of government contracts and transactions, the sale of uncultivated lands and other resources subject to public ownership, running corrupt companies and institutions, and other illicit means and sources, and restoring it to its legitimate owner; and if no such owner can be identified, it must be entrusted to the public treasury. This rule must be executed by the government with due care, after investigating and providing the necessary evidence in accordance with the law of Islam. Social justice According to Mut.ahhari, the term ‘adl (justice) has been used in four different senses in Quranic verses: justice in creation, ethical justice, justice in law and social justice. Justice in creation means that the universe and its components are well balanced and well proportioned. Each part of nature is in harmony with all others. If it were not so, no order and no mathematics would exist in the world. According to the Quranic verses (A¯ l-i ‘Imra¯n: 18 and Al-Rah.ma¯n: 7), justice and harmony constitute the criteria on which God created the world. The Prophet is reported to have stated that ‘Heaven and earth are established on the basis of justice’. Although the existence of differences and discrimination between creatures is not deniable, these are necessary for the balance and equilibrium of the world as a whole. Mut.ahhari then concludes that the opposite of this meaning of justice is being unbalanced and lacking harmony, rather than oppression.53 Ethical justice refers to educating the just man. The Islamic ideal man must be just and fair in his relations with others. There are a number of verses in the Quran concerning the just man (Ma¯idih: 95 and T . ala¯q: 2), who gives testimonies and judgements (on the basis of fairness and honesty).54 Justice in law (tashri‘a) refers to the principle of justice being the guiding light illuminating all Islamic injunctions in the Shari‘at. Islamic ordinances have been called justice (qist.) in some Quranic verses (A‘ara¯f: 29 and Baqarih: 282). Prophets were sent to people to establish just societies. According to the Quran (H . adid: 25), in past times God sent His messengers with clear signs (by which right and wrong are differentiated) and sent down with them the book and the balance that men may stand forth in justice, and sent down iron (in order to punish the transgressors).55 Justice in law, on the other hand, means that people, regardless of their class, race and gender, must be treated equally by the laws, and the laws must also be implemented 106

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES

equally to them. The opposite of this concept of justice is injustice and oppression. Finally, it is upon social justice that the Quran focuses most attention, and therefore it can be argued that its realization is of the greatest importance in forming an ideal society.56 In contrast to ethical justice, which is a private concern, social justice is a social obligation. To establish social justice, the precept of ‘giving a fair share to whom it is due’ has to govern society. While ethical justice can be attained passively, social justice requires an active commitment against injustice and oppression, a commitment that may even lead to martyrdom, as it did in the case of Ima¯m Ali.57 Noting the importance of the principle of justice in Islamic teachings, Mut.ahhari refers to a Saying of Ima¯m Ali, who was asked ‘Which of the two is preferable; justice or generosity?’ Ali replied: ‘Justice puts things in their places whereas generosity takes them out of their place; justice is the general caretaker [guiding line for all time] while generosity is a particular benefit [at occasional events]; consequently, justice is superior and the more distinguished of the two.’ To justify the Saying, Mut.ahhari then maintained that one may at first sight think that generosity is, from the viewpoint of individual ethics, better than justice, because he might imagine that justice is defined as only regarding and not invading the rights of others, while generosity is explained as giving one’s own rights (on property) to others, or dispensing with one’s own rights in favour of the others. But from the viewpoint of social ethics, Mut.ahhari continued, this is unacceptable because justice means regarding everybody according to his actual and natural capability, whereas generosity is showing munificence to somebody regardless of his actual and natural ability. While justice puts everything in its natural place, generosity removes it from that place. The role of justice in society can be likened to the foundation of a building and the role of generosity as the painting and decorating of it. It is evident that people can live in a building with a strong foundation even if not painted and decorated, yet they cannot live in a building that has a weak foundation no matter how well it is painted and decorated. society cannot be governed by charity and generosity; rather it must be ruled by justice. Therefore, justice must be adopted as a general principle for all times, whereas generosity must be considered as an exceptional principle for occasional situations.58 On the socio-economic implications of Islamic social justice opinions differ amongst Islamic theoreticians. Moderate Islamic theoreticians have interpreted a just Islamic society as one which would abolish discrimination and provide equal opportunity for all, so that each would be rewarded according to his ability. Radical Islamic theoreticians, however, have interpreted Islamic social justice as a call for revolutionary change and the creation of a classless society based on the absolute equality of income, wealth and even consumption.59 The different definitions and explanations of social justice can be traced back to different deductions from the Islamic sources. Commenting on Shariati as a radical, Nomani mentioned that the radical 107

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES

interpretation of social justice takes a hard line against the capitalist system and the market allocation of resources. The market system is condemned, since it gives free rein to exploitation and increases injustices by rewarding those who already possess more than their share. It is ultimately viewed as the mechanism which polarizes society into the rich and poor, thus preventing the establishment of a classless monotheistic (tauh.idi) society. However, it should be noticed that tauh.idi generally means, in its theological sense, the unity of the community in worshipping one God. Based on the argument that in Islam the real ownership of all God’s creations on earth belongs to Him and is only left to man in trusteeship (ama¯nat), it is argued that all men should share equally in the bounties of God. This argument is further supported by reference to the Quran which explicitly states that the poor have a share in the wealth of the rich (Dha¯riya¯t: 19 and Ma‘a¯rij: 25). The proponents of this interpretation of social justice argue that the only form of property ownership compatible with Islam is a social or collective one, since it prevents the polarization of wealth and poverty. A certain type of class analysis is also used in their methodology. They maintain that when Islamic social justice prevails in society, the relentless war between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’ will come to an end in favour of the disinherited and the poor, thus realizing the socio-economic aspect of tauh.id.60 Presenting Mut.ahhari and Maudoodi as moderate Islamic modernists, Nomani also mentioned that: the moderate Islamic modernists believe that the Islamic concept of social justice expresses distributional equity rather than equality. Equity means fairness. Differences in human capability, effort, aptitude, dexterity, work habits and entrepreneurship should be rewarded. Mut.ahhari argues that the system of reward on the basis of differences in capability is not discriminatory, since God introduced such differences among men in the act of creation. In this interpretation, justice requires a system of reward according to varying individual contributions. Rewarding different contributions equally would actually constitute an act of injustice. Perfect equality of money incomes would be as unjust as, if not more unjust than, the glaring inequalities that afflict many a society in the world today. This concept of Islamic social justice places great emphasis on equality of all before the law and equality of opportunity for members of the Islamic community. Maudoodi emphasizes the point that equity rather than equality constitutes the basis of the Islamic economic system. He says: Islam does not envisage equal distribution of economic resources among individuals at all.61 It is worth mentioning that Mut.ahhari’s definition of social justice is not constant in his writings and can sometimes be conceived as an egalitarian 108

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES

concept. For instance, while formulating the general characteristics of the Islamic promised society (Ja¯mi‘ih-yi Mahdi-yi Mau‘u¯d), he briefly mentioned that ‘a perfect equality [musa¯va¯t-i ka¯mil] between people in wealth would be established in that society’.62 However, this phrase has to be understood in the context of his other writings. Explaining the two egalitarian and nonegalitarian concepts of the term ‘Islamic classless society’, Mut.ahhari maintained that ‘An Islamic classless society must be understood as a society which has no discrimination, a society in which base and nonsensical privileges are invalidated, not a society which compulsorily abolishes [people’s personal] aptitudes, capabilities, privileges, and acquired properties.’63 Furthermore, he maintained that the real meaning of social justice is that of observing people’s rights and priorities, because people find some kind of rights and preferences in relating to each other and in comparison to each other. For instance, a person who produces an output with his effort, normally finds some kind of prior right to his output. This priority originates from his work and activity. Therefore, oppression means violating the other’s priority, taking possession of the other’s right and committing aggression against the other’s boundaries. If by social justice is meant [absolute] equality, in the sense of giving the same share to all and distributing a similar amount to each, without observing different capabilities [i‘ata¯-yi bi al-saviyih], it is exactly oppression. If it means observing [absolute] equality wherever are found equal capabilities, this meaning can be accepted.64 Indeed, two different interpretations of the issue of social justice, each leading to different and opposed socio-economic and political policies, can be readily identified. From the radical interpretation, one can derive the blueprint for the construction of a classless society, while on the basis of the more traditional interpretation one can construct a modern class-divided market economy. Even though both positions derive their legitimacy from Islamic sources, the rift between them as to what constitutes ‘true Islam’ seems unbridgeable.65 Prohibition of usury The Islamic jurists generally agree that usury is prohibited in Islam and economic activities must not be based on the principle of usury. Although one can find differences between Shi‘i and Sunni jurists in some cases, these differences arise from whether those cases are to be regarded as usury or not. The prohibition of riba¯ which etymologically comes from the root verb raba¯, yarbu¯, and means ‘increase’, ‘more’, ‘extra’, and ‘growth’, can be traced back to the earliest Islamic sources. The Quran states that 109

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES

Those who devour usury will not stand except as stands one whom the evil one by his touch has driven to madness. That is because they say: trade is like usury, but Allah has permitted trade and forbidden usury . . . Allah will deprive usury of all blessing, but will give increase for deeds of charity . . . O you who believe, fear Allah, and give up what remains of your demand for usury if you are indeed a believer. If you do it not, take notice of war from Allah and His messenger, but if you turn back, you shall have your capital sums; deal not unjustly and you shall not be dealt with unjustly. (Baqarih: 276–80) . There is also a h.adith by Ali ibn Mu¯sa¯ al-Reza¯, the eighth Shi‘ite Ima¯m, that the reason for prohibiting riba¯ is because of the decrease of good deeds, the decrease of wealth, the desire of people to win and their abandonment of lending [without interest], while lending leads to good deeds, and because it [riba¯] will result in corruption, injustice and the vanishing of wealth.66 In order to explain the reason for the prohibition of usury, Mut.ahhari began examining six existing hypotheses. According to the first hypothesis, usury is prohibited so as to improve humanitarian feelings among Muslim communities. To achieve this goal, interest-free lending is, on the one hand, recommended (not obligated) by Islam. On the other hand, usury is prohibited, while an annual tax (zaka¯t) is mandatory upon accumulated money. Mut.ahhari argued that this theory could not be accepted in its entirety. Although in some cases this justification for the prohibition of usury is valid, such as when lending to people who are in need for their necessary requirements, it cannot justify other cases such as the prohibition of usury in lending to people who borrow in order to expand their economic activities.67 According to the second hypothesis, usury is prohibited because lending with the condition of interest is economically harmful and leads to economic recession. This theory is also criticized by Mut.ahhari. He maintained that if it meant that it would eventually lead to recession because the usurer takes the capital out of circulation by storing it, this is not true, as in fact he puts it into circulation. And if the usurer himself indulges in laziness and a parasitic life, and does not develop his natural capabilities, and improve his humanitarian feelings, that is true, but the principle is equally violated by the permitted . property in land and the investment partnership (muz a¯ribih) (for those who give land and capital to their agents and partners for a share of the profits without any work).68 While these two hypotheses are based on moral principles, the third and fourth views emerge from principles of social justice. This third hypothesis arises from the view that wealth generally must be earned by labour. Since the usurer’s profit is not attained by his work and 110

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES

effort, it is unjust, illegitimate and religiously forbidden (h.ara¯m). Mut.ahhari mentioned that in response to the question of leased and landed property (where there does not seem to exist a relation between wealth and labour), the supporters of this view consider the properties as equating with the accumulated and solid works of its owner, and the profits as equivalent to the gradual deterioration of the property which is missing in usury. Rejecting this view, Mut.ahhari stated that the relation between wealth and labour as a general principle for all economic activities is not approved in Islamic jurisprudence. Wealth which comes from inheritance and gifts is legitimate and religiously permitted (h.ala¯l), even though not earned through labour. The profits which the owner of a property earns from the lease often vary from the actual amount of depreciation, whereas according to this view it must be exactly the same. Furthermore, in some cases there is no connection between benefiting from hired property and its deterioration, because there is no deterioration such as in the case of hiring an animal. Even the owner of capital in an investment partnership receives profit (from the agent) although he does not share the work. Finally, receiving money in return for the cancelling of legal rights is permitted, as it cannot be considered an economic activity.69 According to the fourth hypothesis, usury is prohibited because it would intensify class differences among people and would eventually lead to the destruction of society. Mut.ahhari rejected this view on the grounds that although discrimination in law is not acceptable, class differences which originate in people’s different natural abilities, capabilities and activities are acceptable, would be just and would actually lead to a strengthening of society. The intense class differences and destruction of society by an economic system based on usury could be avoided through government supervision over the rate of interest, and also by putting taxes on wealth.70 The fifth hypothesis maintains that usury is prohibited because it is based on the effort to make money productive, whereas money is barren and unproductive. Aristotle states that money is unproductive. In other words, usury can be regarded as a legitimate economic system only when money itself is productive. However, the main function of money (besides being used in economic transactions) is to be a mediator in economic dealings, while being the medium of exchange in economic dealings does not create any additional value for the money itself. Therefore money itself is not productive and usury which is based on the productivity of money is illegitimate. Rejecting this hypothesis, Mut.ahhari stated that the prohibition of usury in the Islamic economic system is not because of the infertility of money, for usury is totally h.ara¯m in Islam whether with money or through other means.71 Finally, deducing the sixth theory from Quranic verses, Mut.ahhari . explained that the reality of usury is lending (qarz ) and lending as an independent transaction within Islamic jurisprudence must not be profitable. 111

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES

In fact, lending as the reality of usury is not like trade (bai‘a) which is profitable; rather they are two different types of economic activity. Bai‘a is a transaction which consists of the exchange of two different commodities, whereas lending is not an exchange of two things. It is simply investing the possessory rights of the lender in the borrower, against a guarantee. The borrower only gives a guarantee to return the same amount of money or a similar commodity at the agreed time. As a result, the lender does not share with the borrower in the loss or profit of the loan, because by his loan the lender transferred all his possessory rights to the borrower. In contrast to an . investment partnership (muz a¯ribih), where the owner of capital shares with his partner in any loss or profit, and in a lease where only the proprietor not the lessee is responsible for possible loss, the provider of a loan does not share any loss or profit with the borrower. This is because the owner of capital in an investment partnership and the lessor in a lease are still considered, after the agreement, to be the owners of their capital or property, whereas the lender of a loan is not considered after lending to be the owner of it. For this reason he can only ask for repayment of the amount of the loan, not the interest. Therefore, lending is unproductive in its nature and cannot produce profit. As a consequence, usury is an unnatural and prohibited transaction, whereas lending is a non-profit transaction. The usurer consistently earns a fixed profit by it without any risk of loss.72 According to Mut.ahhari, two types of economic activities are generally . termed ‘usury’ by the Islamic jurists. First, lending usury (riba¯-yi qarz i or riba¯ al-nasiah) is the classical form of usury which entails – as in a loan – a fixed increase in the amount of money over a time period. This act is also divided into two types, namely taking interest by lending to persons who are in need . for their personal requirements (qarz -i istihla¯ki), and receiving interest through lending to those who need the loan for the development of their . business (qarz -i istinta¯ji). Mut.ahhari mentioned that although some Egyptian theoreticians have forbidden usury only in the case of lending money for personal needs, Shi‘i jurists declare both types of usury to be . unlawful.73 Second is exchange usury (riba¯-yi mu‘a¯mili or riba¯ al-faz l), which is defined by the majority of Shi‘i jurists as a contract of sales of two similar products which are usually traded by volume (kail) or weight (vazn), when there is an increase in the terms of exchange themselves. For instance, trading a pound of wheat for two pounds of wheat, or trading a pound of lowquality dates for a pound of high-quality dates, is considered as usury and prohibited.74 A h.adith from the Prophet mentioned that gold for gold, silver for silver, wheat for wheat, barley for barley, dates for dates, salt for salt, each kind for each kind, in hand: he who increases or asks for an increase commits usury, alike whether he gives or takes.75

112

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES

Consequently, they (the majority of Shi‘i jurists) believe that there is no prohibition in the exchange of two countable things, like bank-notes, with increase. Criticizing the view, Mut.ahhari mentioned that there is nothing special in the case of kail and vazn in usury, as they are two examples of quantity, and measuring all measurable products and outputs, including countable things, must be considered as cases for possible usury.76 Regarding the usury in bank-notes (iskina¯s), he stated that it is a new case for Ijtiha¯d as it had no history in the past. Although bank-notes, like gold and silver coins in earlier times, serve as a mediator in economic activities, they are not exactly the same as coins. While gold and silver coins kept their natural value after being replaced by other coins, bank-notes lose all value after being withdrawn as currency by a government. It is merely a document like a stamp which is given its value by a government. It can also be measured by counting. Since property or a commodity, not their documents, are put forward for selling or hiring, bank-notes as official documents which are mediated for economic activities cannot be traded or hired. Receiving an additional amount above the value of the bank-notes of the same currency through trading, not exchanging two different currencies, is usury and therefore prohibited (h.ara¯m).77 However, two cases are regarded in Islamic jurisprudence as being exempt from the prohibition. One is the usury between wife and husband, and the other is usury between son and father. Justifying these cases, Mut.ahhari maintained that the philosophy for the prohibition of usury does not in reality exist there. Usury between people, even between two brothers, might eventually lead to class differences, and would ‘make one fortunate and the other unfortunate’ – for example, advantage one and disadvantage the other – whereas usury between son and father or wife and husband is in reality bringing money from one pocket and putting it in the other of the same person. They share their life and are considered as one.78 Banking without usury The question of usury represented for Islamic economic philosophers like Mut.ahhari, as well as S.adr and Beheshti, the main obstacle to legalizing the modern banking system in Islamic countries. For them, the premise was that usury simply meant interest and therefore loans based on paying interest – one of the fundamentals of banking operations – could not be accepted. The question revolved around the possibility of having a bank, as in Western capitalist countries, which lends its money, but makes profits without charging interest on these loans, and attracts deposits from its clients without rewarding them with fixed interests. In theory, the answer was relatively . clear. The key concept was investment partnership (muz a¯ribih), and the contract of investment partnership was to replace the loan and the deposit

113

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES

for interest. Shaikh Muhammad ‘Abduh, an eminent Egyptian jurist and philosopher had already given an answer on this issue at the turn of the century.79 Hoping for the realization of the theory, S.adr wrote a treatise on an interest-free bank, Al-Bank al-la¯rabavi fi al-Islam, following a query by the Kuwaiti Ministry of Endowments (auqa¯f). Later, Beheshti and Mut.ahhari, apart from their separate lessons about Islamic economics, organized jointly with Bazarga¯n a conference on the question of riba¯ in Islam in the Anjuman-i Islami-yi Muhandisin, in 1975. Beheshti’s Riba¯ dar Islam and Mut.ahhari’s Mas’alih-yi Riba¯, which were published after their assassinations, are in fact the collections of their public and private lectures on the issue. Although Beheshti and Mut.ahhari shared the view that the existing Iranian banking system was, like the Western capitalist banking system, in principle based on usury, they differed as to the extent people might benefit from its non-usury facilities and services. While Beheshti insisted that benefiting from the facilities and services should be totally restricted to the time of severe need, Mut.ahhari did not share this view. According to Beheshti, all Western types of banking are based on usury. Therefore all its functions and services, even those which are not related to loans, trading and selling, are regarded as h.ara¯m and illegitimate. Receiving interest which banks regularly pay to their customers and collecting the prizes which banks occasionally distribute by lottery to account holders, are prohibited. Even opening a savings account, not for receiving interest but for safety, is permitted solely in the time of necessity when an Islamic bank is not available.80 However, Mut.ahhari maintained that customers’ intentions can change the matter. If the purpose of putting money in a bank account is only for safety or for benefiting from its non-usury facilities, the interests or awards which banks give regularly or occasionally to its customers cannot be considered as h.ara¯m and illegitimate as it is not clear whether the money which banks give to their customers is collected from usury or not. If the money were put into a bank account in order to benefit from its fixed interest or usury facilities such as loans and mortgages, then the interest and usury contracts are illegitimate. Opening an account in a usury bank cannot itself be regarded as a prohibited action, nor can receiving prizes from the bank be called a forbidden deed, because it is not clear that those prizes were paid from the usury money.81 It is interesting to note that, in his lectures about banking and usury, Mut.ahhari came to another conclusion. Besides investment partnership, which was also mentioned by the other Islamic jurists as the solution to a non-usury banking system, Mut.ahhari realized that if he could prove, on the basis of Islamic sources, that the government could be considered as the father of the nation, and the relation between government and people could be regarded as being similar to the relation of a father and his son, the problem of usury and fixed interest would then be solved, because, as 114

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES

mentioned before, the usury between a father and his family is accepted by the Islamic law. Although he supported this view by legal analysis and also by fatwa¯s from some recent fuqaha¯ like Ayatullah Buru¯jirdi, Husain Qumi and Abul-Qa¯sim Khui¯ about state ownership, he did not use any h.adith or Quranic verses.82 Whereas a private or state bank in a secular system should not be permitted, according to Mut.ahhari and Beheshti, to lend its money and make profits by charging interest on these loans, nor to attract deposits from its clients by rewarding them with a fixed interest, the nationalized banks in a legitimate Islamic system are authorized to do so. It is because the reason for the prohibition of usury does not exist there. As Mut.ahhari mentioned, the usury activities of nationalized banks, namely making profits by charging interest on loans, would not create a higher class and would not intensify class differences in society. In reality, the profits which are made by nationalized banks would go to the government’s treasury and would return in another way to the people.83 However, the conference ended with a practical proposal that local . Islamic banks (S.andu¯q-ha¯-yi Qarz al-H . asanih-yi Islami) must be established and expanded by religious groups. These local interest-free institutions would be permitted to charge their customers for their current expenses (ka¯rmuzd). Then, two significant practical developments ensued. In the first place, a number of Islamic banks were established all over the country. Second, as a result of Beheshti’s efforts, the Iranian banking system was declared as nationalized in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran (1979). Recently, some Islamic countries have started examining the possibility of replacing their whole banking system with interest-free institutions. Yet, almost three decades after this proposal, the debate about riba¯ is still open in clerical circles. The gulf between theory and practice remains significant, but it would be difficult for institutions and countries which are concerned either with the civil legislation or the establishment of Islamic banks to ignore the jurists’ opinions on this question.

The state and economics The role of the state in the economic field has always been a matter of dispute among Islamic social scientists and jurists. While some scholars consider state intervention as a major obstacle to economic growth, others regard it as a necessary means to the fulfilment of social justice in society. It may be mentioned here that about 600 years ago the Islamic philosopher and historian Ibn-Khaldu¯n (d. 1406) had already given his views on the subject, being against the intervention of the state in the economic life of the private citizen. In his historical analysis on the rise and fall of nations, Ibn Khaldu¯n insists that state intervention is even more tyrannous to people than forced and unpaid labour. In a section of his Muqaddamih entitled 115

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES

‘Commercial activity on the part of the ruler is harmful to his subjects and ruinous to the tax revenue’, he argues that this is because farmers and merchants will find it difficult to buy livestock and merchandise and to procure cheaply the things that belong to farming and commerce. The subjects have [all] the same, or approximately the same, amount of wealth. Competition between them already exhausts, or comes close to exhausting, their financial resources. Now, when the ruler, who has so much more money than they, competes with them, scarcely a single one of them will [any longer] be able to obtain the things he wants, and everybody will become worried and unhappy. Furthermore, the ruler can appropriate much [of the agricultural products and the available merchandise], if it occurs to him. [He can do it] by force, or by buying things up at the cheapest possible price. There may be no-one who would dare to bid against him. Thus, he will be able to force the seller to lower his price. He is also able to force the merchants to buy from him. He will be satisfied only with the highest prices and more. [The merchants and farmers] will exhaust their liquid capital in such transactions . . . The trouble and financial difficulties, and the loss of profit which it causes the subjects, takes away from them all incentive to effort, thus ruining the fiscal [structure].84 Of course, this analysis refers to a period which is in socio-economic terms completely different from our modern industrial societies, but it reflects the centuries-old dispute about the role of authority in the private of life of the subject. Beside the socio-historical analysis, pro-free-market Islamic scholars hold the view that subject to restrictions on the exchange of certain goods – such as wine, pork, gambling instruments, icons, gold or silverware and musical instruments which are generally in Islamic jurisprudence termed as maka¯sib-i muh.arramih – Islam accepts the market as the basic co-ordinating mechanism of its economic system. The principle of freedom of exchange, private property and the security of contract, which constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions for the operation of a market system, can all be deduced from the primary sources of Islam. There are several direct references to the significance of the freedom of exchange and trade in the Quran. Believers are enjoined to engage in trade based on mutual goodwill (Nisa¯: 29). Rejecting the contention that trade, like usury, leads to the accumulation of wealth or capital, and is therefore prohibited, the Quran emphasizes that exchange or trade is different from usury (riba¯) since exchange (bai‘a) is permitted and usury forbidden (Baqarih: 275). Many Traditions of the Prophet can be cited which provide further proof for the position that the market mechanism should be the basic co-ordinator 116

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES

of the Islamic economic system. Before his Prophethood, Muhammad had managed Khadija’s commercial affairs and was thus familiar with the operation of the market. He had traded on her behalf between Mecca and Damascus and had proved himself an astute, honest and capable merchant. The Prophet is reported to have said: ‘Welfare and blessedness are composed of ten parts, nine-tenths of which is attained through trade.’85 Even though government intervention in the market is tolerated and even encouraged under specific circumstances, it can be argued that perfect competition, operating through its own self-adjusting automatic mechanism, should constitute the primary co-ordinating mechanism of the Islamic economic system, providing it fulfils the Islamic system’s first-order priorities. Numerous general guidelines can be found in the primary sources which guarantee a free market, under normal conditions. First, Islam prohibits price fixing by a handful of buyers or sellers who have cornered the market. It encourages exchange in a market characterized by numerous buyers and sellers, in which none possesses a controlling share. In the days of the Prophet, it was customary in the city of Medina for small groups of merchants to rush out of the city to meet the agricultural producers of the surrounding countryside, once they were informed of their arrival, in order to buy their whole crop. The agricultural goods were later sold at a higher price within the city limits. A small group of merchants also undertook the transportation and sale of town-produced goods to the rural population, again at a price set by the seller. The fact that a small number of buyers could meet with producers created a quasi-monopoly situation, in which the few buyers could bid down the price below what it could have been in an open market, where producers could meet the majority of consumers. Furthermore, the provision of town-produced goods to the rural areas by a handful of suppliers created a monopoly situation where the sellers could set prices higher than those that would have prevailed had numerous producers, each possessing a small share of the market, met with the consumers. The Prophet is reported to have condemned this custom and called upon Muslims to refrain from such business practices, since they caused injury and loss to the weaker party in the transaction. His argument can be interpreted to mean that a contrived price established under conditions of imperfect competition causes damage and loss to the weaker party in the transaction, be they consumers or producers. Second, the above-mentioned traditions can also be put forward as evidence for the position that the Islamic market is characterized by free information. Meeting producers outside the city of Medina denied the producers access to information about the prevailing demand conditions inside the city. The fact that their source of information became confined to a handful of merchants, whose interest was to buy cheap and sell dear, led producers to exchange their goods at a price lower than their free-market price. Third, according to numerous Traditions of the Prophet, hoarding, which 117

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES

decreases supply and thereby causes artificial price increases, is categorically condemned in Islam. The act of hoarding has the same impact on market supply, and therefore price, as erecting barriers to the entrance of potential producers. Both measures seek to prevent market supply from increasing and the price of the goods under consideration from decreasing. The Prophet is reported to have said ‘Whoever hoards food for forty days to sell it at a higher price has distanced himself from God and shall be detested by Him.’ It is reported that when the Prophet saw someone bringing large quantities of a commodity to the market and selling it at a price lower than the prevailing one, the Prophet asked him the reason for his behaviour. The seller told him that he was doing it for the sake of God’s pleasure. The Prophet is then reported to have said ‘Those who increase the supply on the market are similar to those who fight for the cause of God and those who hoard in the Islamic market are similar to apostates and unbelievers.’ Fourth, based on the Prophet’s Traditions, it can be argued that, in the ideal Islamic market, consumers should have access to homogeneous or nondifferentiated goods. In the Islamic market, as in a perfect competitive market, consumers would be indifferent as to the source of their goods, since all the goods offered by producers would be identical in quality. The Prophet is reported to have prohibited the sale of good-quality wheat mixed with bad-quality wheat at a given price. Although this and similar injunctions are primarily aimed at discouraging fraudulent practices, they indirectly support the aim of a homogeneity of goods in a perfectly competitive market.86 Finally, as long as there is mutual consent between the buyer and the seller, interference with the market mechanism to enforce a set price is discouraged in the Islamic market. According to Maka¯rim Shira¯zi, a contemporary Ayatullah at the Qum Seminary, even though under exceptional circumstances, such as the protection of public interest, where the pursuit of private interest undermines social well-being or for reasons of state, government intervention is justified and even promoted by Islam, and non-interference by the government is considered as a primary ordinance which should be respected and upheld under normal conditions.87 Furthermore, numerous verses in the Quran can be cited to show that inequalities in wealth and income, resulting from the operation of market forces, are not considered as anomalous and reprehensible in the Islamic economic system, since they reflect God’s will and His view of the ideal Islamic socio-economic organization (An‘a¯m: 165, Nah.l: 71, Nu¯r: 38, Zukhruf: 32). A socio-economically stratified society, characterized by differences in rank, wealth and income, is therefore compatible with the Islamic social order. Based on the primary sources cited, any interference with the outcome of market operations – for instance, prices and legitimate incomes – may therefore be considered as meddling with God’s intentions. Any attempt to place a ceiling on incomes in an Islamic economic system may therefore be considered as a violation of divine optimality. The price-signalling device, functioning through what in 118

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES

part resembles a perfectly competitive market system, is therefore held, according to one interpretation, to represent the Islamic economic system’s major co-ordinating mechanism. However, in the planned economic system, scholars argue, the fact that certain primary sources explicitly designate the market as the legitimate arbiter between producers and consumers does not prove that only an Islamic market economy can be deduced from the Shari‘at. It would be premature and inaccurate to conclude that all the evidence indicates that the Islamic economic system is simply a morally constrained replica of the capitalist economic system. It can be convincingly argued that the spirit of the Shari‘at is governed by a strong sense of social justice, fraternity, equality and co-operation. If the promotion of social justice is positioned as a firstpriority objective, then all factors, institutions and arrangements hindering the attainment of such an objective have to be replaced. Where market forces, left to their own self-regulation mechanisms, fail to attain social justice as recommended by the Quran, intervention, regulation and planning by the Islamic state become imperative. Particular national levels of capital accumulation, rates of growth, disparities in wealth and income distribution, and levels of absolute and relative poverty, among other factors, determine the duration (short-run or long-run) and degree (partial or complete) of state intervention in the market.88 As Nomani has mentioned, the whole argument of the proponents of the Islamic planned economy rests on the Quranic verses, which (i) recommend the fulfilment of the poor’s basic needs; (ii) prompt the rich to ensure the realization of this recommendation by giving away their surplus wealth for the needy; (iii) remind the rich of their financial responsibility by arguing that the poor possess a divine and social right in their wealth; and (iv) warn the rich that if they treasure their wealth, which really belongs to the poor, they will go to hell and there they shall be branded.89 In his Vila¯yat al-faqih, Montazeri considers that it is a duty of the Islamic ruler to care about justice and equality in the distribution of wealth in society. In doing so, he must confiscate all illegitimately earned money and property. The Islamic ruler must also care for the poor, needy, orphans, and those who are not able to care for themselves. To provide proper jobs to protect the honour of those who are poor and needy, the government and its administration have to prepare different plans and arrangements, because it is better than giving them alms and charity.89 The proponents of the free market, however, argue that even though the provision of basic needs is a Quranic recommendation, its fulfilment is not obligatory through the appropriation of the surplus of the rich. The rich are only obliged to pay zaka¯t and khums, while all other types of recommended charity are voluntary. Maka¯rim Shira¯zi maintained that the suppression of the market system could be legitimately justified as long as the basic needs of a social group were not provided for, and the rich refused to help the poor. 119

ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES

Once essential basic needs are provided for all, and a mechanism is put into place to assure its continuation, then the market system and the security of private property would have to be reinstituted; obligatory injunctions, primary ordinances and the explicit letter of the Shari‘at cannot be suspended indefinitely in favour of ethical recommendations, secondary ordinances and the equitable spirit of the law. How can one claim that Islam is a universal and eternal religion while, in an Islamic planned economy, the majority of its economic laws would be based on extraordinary ad hoc injunctions based on tertiary sources? The indefinite suspension of the letter of the law would only prove that primary Islamic laws are incomplete and incapable of securing the felicity of man.91 It seems that Mut.ahhari’s views on this subject are also contradictory. On one hand, he maintained that, for the fulfilment of social justice in society and greater public benefit, a powerful Islamic government that keeps all major sources of national wealth and income (including natural and industrial) under its control is authorized to make plans at national level, is permitted to fix rates on taxes and other impositions, and is even authorized to confiscate the wealth and property of those capitalists whom the government fears will dominate the economic market.92 On the other hand, he maintained that A healthy economy, which could increase national wealth and multiply the national ability for the acquisition of materialistic products and spiritual life, is conditioned by two things: first, the sources of wealth must be free in it and not be banned or have ceased. Second, economic activity must be free and respected, which means that the result of everyone’s activity must be returned to himself (not to others).93 He also mentioned that the basic principle is that the sources of wealth be movable and useable, the force of labour be free and active, and private ownership be respected, but a complete supervision of the legality of types of income must be applied, which means that the economic system must be shaped to a form in which no-one can exploit another by force or under necessity [need].94 Furthermore, Mut.ahhari criticized the Marxist principle of ‘From each according to his ability, and to each according to his need’ because he believed that this principle would destroy the free field of economic competition and would prevent the growth of economic activities. As he explained ‘The principle of freedom must be protected, not only in society and politics, but also in economics.’95 Now it is appropriate to ask how these economic ideals can be achieved by the state. 120

4 POLITICAL VIEWS

It is useful to note first that this chapter encountered a specific obstacle, i.e. Mut.ahhari did not have the opportunity to develop his political philosophy separately and systematically. What he left in this regard are a variety of rough and general political ideas which, in turn, make this chapter essentially different from the others. Two of the three of his major works on political issues namely Pira¯mu¯n-i Inqila¯b-i Islami (‘About the Islamic Revolution’) and Pira¯mu¯n-i Jumhu¯ri-yi Islami (‘About the Islamic Republic’) are in fact collections of his articles, notes, speeches and interviews about the nature of . Islamic authority and Islamic revolution. The third, namely Nihzat-ha¯-yi Islami dar S.ad Sa¯lih-yi Akhir (‘Islamic movements in the last one hundred years’) was a draft of a public lecture in 1978 which was cancelled by the ¯ VA ¯ K. These were all published after his assassination in 1979, but do not SA form a well-developed, comprehensive, cohesive, and integrative work about the Islamic political system or Islamic political ideology. They must be regarded as the result of an urgent need at the beginning of the Islamic Revolution in Iran for presenting an alternative political theory. At that time Mut.ahhari was fully engaged in revolution and the eventual structure of the Islamic Republic was not clear yet. First, an explanation of the jurisprudential traditions and previous theories within which Mut.ahhari was brought up in and belonged to will be provided in this chapter. Then their influences on him and his views on each political issue will be pointed out at the end of a comparative discussion.

A glance at the past Although Shi‘i political thought has not yet been gathered together in a major collection, it can be studied in books relating to Quranic exegeses and the pronouncement of the Ima¯ms; in parts of the philosophical literature relating to practical philosophy, including books entitled Siya¯sat-na¯mih, Andarzna¯mih, and Siya¯sat-i mudun; in parts of the theological publications relating to the issues of nubuvvat, ima¯mat and ghaibat (occultation); in historical reports, particularly those relating to the ‘ulama¯’s actions when confronting 121

POLITICAL VIEWS

monarchs and governors, as well as major political events of their time; and also in different areas of jurisprudence. However, those parts of the fiqh in which the fuqaha¯’s political views were presented are numerous.1 It is remarkable that in the Shi‘ite jurisprudential literature there did not exist any independent parts relating to the issues of vila¯yat, ima¯rat or siya¯sat before the 1850s. Most parts of fiqh consisted of ordinances and commandments concerning individuals rather than the public or the state. Issues relating to the government or state were usually explained in a normative form such as ‘who should be the ruler, what qualifications he must possess, or what are to be his duties’. This fact can be explained partly by the absence of a favourable environment for the development of literature. Throughout history, the Shi‘ite have lived mostly as a minority under regimes which denied them basic freedom. Therefore, they were kept in fear and far away from power. Yet it has been argued that the absence of freedom was less important than the absence of the social and political conditions which should precede or accompany the emergence of any democratic system, such as the development of commerce and industry, and connected with it the rise of an autonomous bourgeoisie.2 However, this objection raises a host of issues which are not always related to political thought as an independent and distinct branch of intellectual activity, which anyway is a fairly recent addition to Islamic culture. Apart from political and social factors, there is also a theological reason for the absence of an independent political section in Shi‘i jurisprudence. It seems that Shi‘i law was gradually influenced by the doctrine of the ‘Infallible Ima¯m’ as the legitimate ruler. Since temporary rule was considered as illegitimate, the fuqaha¯ saw no need for developing the theory of the rule of the illegitimate ruler in their writings.3 Notions such as ‘infallibility is a condition for the ruler’, or ‘any uprising during the period of occultation is raising the flag of deviation’,4 and discounting a long-lasting occultation by the fuqaha¯, are among the elements responsible for the stagnation of Shi‘i political law.5 Consequently, idealism and living at a distance from the social-political reality became the hallmarks of Shi‘i jurisprudence. However, two social matters have been traditionally placed at the . forefront of the fuqaha¯’s considerations. They are: qaz a¯vat (making legal 6 judgement) and umu¯r-i h.isbiyih (or h.isbih). The latter was a suitable issue for developing a political theory, so that a theory of Islamic government as an institution whose function is to be in charge of the umu¯r-i h.isbiyih, could be concluded from the expansion of these matters. But it was not developed until the period of the Constitutional Revolution. The contribution of the fuqaha¯ towards the improvement of Shi‘i political thought has passed through four historical stages, as follows. The first stage includes the period from the beginning of the Short Occultation (Ghaibat-i s.ughra¯, Rabi‘a I, 260/874) until the establishment of the S.afavid dynasty in Iran in 1501. This stage was the period of formation, 122

POLITICAL VIEWS

development and progress of Shi‘i jurisprudence relating to individuals. Matters concerning the public, government and basic rights had not yet been considered in fiqh. Neither internal nor external conditions were ready for an open discussion of these issues, and nor were the minds of the fuqaha¯. Although words such as h.a¯kim-i shar‘a, sult.a¯n and Ima¯m with defined duties, like fulfilling some aspects of amr-i bi m‘aru¯f (calling people to good things) and nah-yi az munkar (prohibiting people from doing evil), making legal judgement, implementing punishments, collecting and distributing religious taxes (khums and zaka¯t), saying special prayers, declaring the beginning of particular months for fasting and religious festivals, preparation for Ha¯jj ceremonies, guardianship of people who do not have guardians, and some special marital problems which cannot be solved by a local judge were seen as part of the fuqaha¯’s responsibilities. Yet this does not necessarily mean that when the fuqaha¯ accepted these matters (as their general duties) they saw themselves as the sole legitimate Islamic rulers. Although some political ideas might be deduced from the passages in the Al-Muqni‘ih of Shaikh Mufid or Al-Khila¯f of Shaikh T.u¯si, yet no political theory about the rule of a faqih or a just ruler can be derived from these nor from other jurisprudential works of this period.7 The second stage covers the period between the S.afavids and the rise of the Constitutional Movement in the later era of the Qa¯ja¯r dynasty. The formalization of Shi‘ism as the national religion of Iran and the growth of the fuqaha¯’s power are the distinguishing signs of this period. For the first time a number of pamphlets about the land tax (Risa¯lih-yi Khara¯jiyih), the Friday Prayer, and jiha¯d were published during the period of the S.afavids and the Qa¯ja¯rs.8 These must be seen as the primary steps taken by the fuqaha¯ towards involvement in social and political affairs. It has been said that Muh.aqqiq Karaki (d. 1533), a distinguished Mujtahid of the S.afavid period, is the faqih who set forth explicitly, although only briefly, the theory of the ‘Vila¯yat-i Faqih’ for the first time in Shi‘ite jurisprudence.9 In his thesis about the Friday Prayer, Muh.aqqiq Karaki argued that: Our Shi‘i scholars fully agree that a just Ima¯mi faqih who possesses all conditions necessary for giving fatwa¯s, and who is called Mujtahid in understanding religious ordinances, is the deputy [na¯yib] of the Ima¯ms in all aspects which involve the position of deputyship during the time of the Occultation. However the fuqaha¯ probably excluded [from the authority of the faqih] those matters which related to killing and punishment [h.udud]. Pleading to them for justice and submitting to their judgement is obligatory [for everybody]. He [faqih] is authorized to sell in times of need, the property of a [sentenced] person who refuses to settle his debt. He has authority [vila¯yat] over the properties of vanished people, orphans, the insane, financially irresponsible people [safih] and 123

POLITICAL VIEWS

bankrupt businessmen. He can put under his authority the property of those people who are prohibited by a judge to use their properties . . . It means that a faqih who possesses certain qualifications is appointed by the Ima¯ms in all areas in which a deputyship is possible.10 It is not clear whether Karaki had been thinking of establishing an Islamic rule by a faqih or not. His later move to Iraq, after his disagreement with the S.afavid ruler (Sha¯h T.ahma¯sb) might be considered as a positive sign on this point. However, the influence of the ‘ulama¯ in society and the political establishment reached its height at this period when a monarch of the Qa¯ja¯rs (Fath.-Ali Sha¯h) received permission for his sovereignty from a well-known Mujtahid (Shaikh J‘afar Ka¯shif al-Ghit.a¯), and set off for a (Russo-Persian) war after the faqih had granted him permission.11 While the traditional religious matters remained the responsibility of the fuqaha¯, the ruler as the administrator of the common matters (umu¯r-i ‘urfiyih) was still in charge of worldly affairs at this period. Mulla¯ Ahmad Nara¯qi (d. 1832), a distinguished Mujtahid of the Qa¯ja¯r era, is the man who formulated a more detailed theory of Vila¯yat-i Faqih and presented it as an independent jurisprudential matter. In his ‘Ava¯’id alayya¯m, Nara¯qi pointed out that for the first time in the history of Shi‘ite jurisprudence it is a duty of the fuqaha¯ to manage and organize people’s worldly matters.12 This is certainly the first stipulation about the fuqaha¯’s political duty. Although he explained in detail the traditional duties of the fuqaha¯, he did not specify what he saw as the fuqaha¯’s duties concerning people’s worldly requirements. Yet he considered among the tasks of the fuqaha¯ all the duties which a ruler (sult.a¯n) must carry out for his people. Needless to say, this was a big step towards concluding a political theory from the jurisprudential analyses. While accepting the theory of Vila¯yat-i Faqih, Muhammad Hasan Najafi (d. 1850), a contemporary faqih of Nara¯qi argued in his Java¯hir al-kala¯m that ‘This theory was not fully discussed among the ‘ulama¯. Therefore, many questions about it remained unanswered.’ Giving an example, Najafi mentioned that ‘no clear discussion had taken place concerning particular sources of the faqih’s authority in the theory of the Vila¯yat-i Faqih. If his authority was due to the expansion of the umu¯r-i h.isbih, why was his authority preferred to the authority of a just, believing ruler? And if it was not the case, was the authority granted to him by God, and the Ima¯ms who appointed him for this position? Should his position be considered as deputyship (niya¯bat) of the Ima¯ms or as representation (vika¯lat)?’13 . In his Kita¯b al-Bai‘a, Shaikh Murtaza Ans. a¯ri (d. 1864), a well-known student of Nara¯qi, offered a brief discussion of the theory and presented a critical view of his teacher’s arguments.14 Ever since, the discussion about the 124

POLITICAL VIEWS

theory of Vila¯yat-i Faqih has continued in the classes of the fuqaha¯ to concentrate on the issues of selling and buying (Kita¯b al-Bai‘a). In short, this period can be considered as the beginning of the rise of the political doctrine of the Shi‘i fuqaha¯. The third stage started from the time of the Constitutional Revolution and continued until the Uprising of 4 June 1963. At this stage, the fuqaha¯ were confronted with a number of new social and political problems but also became more familiar with political concepts beyond their area of competence. Concepts such as the rights of people, freedom, social justice, division of powers, equality, attorneyship, guardianship, arbitrary rule, voting, legislation and constitution were used by the fuqaha¯ in their debates and discussions. Therefore, the Constitutional Movement resulted in two different approaches by the fuqaha¯. The traditional one was absolutely against any changes in the political structure of society, and the other, the modernists’ approach, was in favour of changes and of formulating a compromise between the Shari‘at and the Constitution. In fact, the political dispute between two eminent Mujtahids in the Constitutional Movement – namely Mirza¯ Muhammad Husain Na¯i¯ni (1860– 1936), the author of Tanbih al-Ummah va Tanzih al-Millah, and Shaikh . Fazlullah Nu¯ri (1843–1909), the author of Tadhkirat al-Gha¯fil va Irsha¯d alJa¯hil – is considered as an important phase in the improvement of the Shi‘i political doctrine.15 According to Na¯i¯ni, an Islamic rule cannot only be legitimized by a faqih, but also through the supervision of the fuqaha¯ over the legislative body. He argued that in a constitutional regime, where a faqih is not able to establish a government, the legitimacy of the regime can be achieved through the supervision of the just Mujtahids over the parliament (Majlis). Surely, he argued, the just Mujtahids will keep the laws in accordance with the Shari‘at. Na¯i¯ni’s endeavours to provide a jurisprudential basis for the political rights of people and democratic institutions such as the Constitution, Majlisi Shu¯ra¯ (the parliament) and ‘Ida¯lat Kha¯nih (modern judiciary) under Islamic rule which was based on Shari‘at and religious orders is remarkable. Although he developed and expanded Shi‘i political literature, his endeavours were not acknowledged by his successors and were not continued. Perhaps the execu. tion of Shaikh Fazlullah by the supporters of constitutionalism prepared the ground for this discontinuance. Later, even the theory of Vila¯yat-i Faqih itself faced severe criticism from a number of fuqaha¯. However, Ayatullah Buru¯jirdi’s contribution to this issue, at the end of this stage, is of some interest. Although he rejected the jurisprudential arguments for the theory of the Vila¯yat-i Faqih, he accepted the theological base for the theory. While rejecting secularism, he argued that religion is not separate from politics. He pointed out that it is the duty of a faqih in an Islamic society to manage social matters and political affairs.16 Evidently, these political views were not confirmed by his own courses of action when 125

POLITICAL VIEWS

he became Grand Ayatullah and the Marj‘a-i taqli¯d for all Shi‘i communities in the world. As mentioned before, he did not support the Fada¯i¯ya¯n-i Islam in their demand for the establishment of Islamic rule. The fourth stage commences with the political views of Ayatullah Khomeini. He is the only faqih in Shi‘ite history who was able to establish an Islamic government. His political views about the necessity of establishing Islamic rule and his opposition to the monarchy were secretly published in Iran in 1970, when he taught Kita¯b al-Bai‘a in Najaf. He applied for the first time the term ‘h.uku¯mat-i Islami’ in fiqh and was clearly influenced by the arguments of Nara¯qi.17 Beside Kita¯b al-Bai‘a, Khomeini’s other publications, such as Kashf al-Asra¯r, al-Rasa¯i¯l, Tah.rir al-Vasilih, S.ah.ifih-yi Inqila¯b and the series of S.ah.ifih-yi Nu¯r, also cover his political thinking.18 His doctrine was based on four principles: first, it is necessary to establish a government for operating Islamic laws in society; second, establishing Islamic rule and preparations for its establishment, including opposition to oppressive rulers, are obligatory upon the just fuqaha¯. It is also obligatory for people to help the fuqaha¯ and obey their orders. Third, h.uku¯mat-i Islami means the vila¯yah (custodianship) by the just fuqaha¯ who are appointed by the Prophet of Islam in all the areas in which the Prophet and the Ima¯ms have the right of custodianship. Fourth, h.uku¯mat-i Islami and the governmental ordinances are considered as the primary rules (ah.ka¯m-i avvali¯yih) which must be regarded prior to all other secondary ordinances. Therefore, preserving the whole Islamic system is obligatory by the Shari‘at for everybody, whether clerics or ordinary people.19 The first principle of Khomeini’s political doctrine is in fact a development of Buru¯jirdi’s view of the combination of religion and politics. The second principle is regarded as the theological basis for the Iranian Islamic Revolution, whereas the fourth principle must be seen as the theological foundation for its continuity. The answer to the question of why the Islamic Revolution was led successfully by Khomeini, whereas other forms of social change (the Constitutional Revolution led by the fuqaha¯ of Najaf and Tehran, and the industrialization of oil movement led by the fuqaha¯ of Tehran and Qum) all failed, certainly lies in the second principle. His particular understanding of the issue of amr-i bi m‘aru¯f (calling people to good things) and nahyi az munkar (prohibiting people from doing evil) played a key role in this movement. Khomeini believed that calling the government to do good things and prohibiting them from doing evil ones, especially in important matters relating to the dignity of Islam and the destiny of Muslims, were obligatory for everyone no matter what the result might be, even the loss of life and property or being faced with difficulties. The existence of a T . a¯ghu¯ti (a most immoral transgressive regime) in an Islamic society was a great evil, and co-operation with this government was creating an even greater evil.20 Furthermore, the silence of the ‘ulama¯ was prohibited in such a situation if it strengthened the oppressive regime. 126

POLITICAL VIEWS

Protesting about and declaring hatred of oppressive persons are obligatory upon the ‘ulama¯, even if it does not remove their oppression.21 On the other hand, Khomeini considered the establishment of Islamic rule to be the most important step in order to call people to do good. As a result, Khomeini, unlike the other fuqaha¯, was able to develop some jurisprudential argumentation for the Islamic Movement in Iran and he led the Revolution not only to victory, but to the establishment of an Islamic government. This was certainly not within the jurisprudential capacity and professional ability of the other fuqaha¯. Perhaps the most categorical difference between Khomeini and the other fuqaha¯ who believed in the Vila¯yat-i Faqih, is the former’s view about the preparations for establishing the rulership of a faqih. While they believed that rulership is obligatory for a faqih when the situation is prepared, Khomeini went a step further when he maintained that preparations for the rulership of faqih are also obligatory upon all Muslims. Montazeri’s Vila¯yat al-Faqih (four vols) is generally regarded as the best jurisprudential text that the Shi‘ite fuqaha¯ have ever published on this matter. Perhaps his position as the speaker of the Assembly of Experts (Majlis-i Khubriga¯n) for the codification of the constitutional law in 1979 provided him with an opportunity to analyse the issue in more detail. Like Khomeini, he supports the rulership of the faqih, yet his interpretation differs from that of his teacher.22

The necessity of having a ruler As in the writings of a number of Shi‘i fuqaha¯ such as Na¯i¯ni, S.adr, Montazeri and Khomeini, the necessity for establishing a government appears in the writings of Mat.ahhari as an indisputable proposition.23 He first recognizes two types of discussions, namely sociological – which describe different types of political structures which have existed and continue to exist – and philosophical, which explain the nature and the function of the institution of governance. It deals with questions such as ‘What is the ultimate justification for the existence of any form of government?’ Preferring the second type of discussion, he argued, although in a rather unsystematic fashion, that Each society is in need of having a ruler, legislation, enforcement of law, preference for the general interests of society against those of individuals, unity, provision of social facilities, defence of its subjects from foreign attacks, preventing people’s aggressive acts against each other, protecting people’s freedom and security, management, judiciary and settling hostilities, education, health care and protecting the cultural inheritance.24 He then concluded that 127

POLITICAL VIEWS

rulership can be, in fact, regarded as the manifestation of the power of society against foreign attacks, the manifestation of justice and internal security, the manifestation of law inside the country, and the manifestation of collective will in respect to foreign relations.25 Considering the issue to be self-evident, Khomeini pointed out that The necessity of having a government in order to spread justice and expand education in society, to protect society and to guard the frontiers, to prevent oppression and foreign aggression, is regarded as self-evident. There is no difference in this matter between the time of the presence of an Ima¯m or the time of [his] occultation.26 Montazeri also saw it as an absolute necessity to have a ruling authority, no matter what its origins might be, whether it was formed rightfully by election, or wrongfully by usurpation or by force or by inheritance. He argued that despite its evil and corruption, an aggressive government is eventually better than sedition and chaos. Montazeri then supported his view with a Tradition from Ali ibn Abi-T.a¯lib, who said ‘The most tyrannous and oppressive ruler is better than ever-lasting sedition’. It is also reported that when Ali ibn Abi-T.a¯lib heard the cry of Kha¯rijites that ‘The verdict is only that of Allah’ he said: The sentence is right but what [they think] it means, is wrong. It is true that the verdict lies alone with Allah, but these people say that [the function of] governance is only for Allah. The fact is that there is no escape for men from rulership, good or bad. The faithful person performs [good] acts in his rule while the unfaithful enjoys its [worldly] benefits . . . Through the ruler, tax is collected, the enemy is fought, roads are protected and the right of the weak is taken from the strong till the virtuous enjoy peace and are allowed protection from [the oppression of] the wicked.27 As so often happens, Mut.ahhari’s main concern is again the Marxist theory about the origin of rulership. According to the Marxist analysis, after the stage of primitive communism, the phenomenon of government appeared immediately after the formation of ownership in history, merely to protect the interests of the owners by force, against the interests of the exploited class. Rulership will only disappear in the classless society after passing the stage of socialism at the end of history. In his criticism, Mut.ahhari argued that justice is not fulfilled and crime does not disappear by itself in a classless society. For its internal security it is in need of a centralized power. Communist society is also in need of national defence, foreign relations, enforcement of law and punishment. If the Marxists reply that there is no 128

POLITICAL VIEWS

need for force and government because man will be united in future, and therefore no external enemy, no foreign relations and no Defence Ministry will exist, and if there is also no need for judiciary or security forces, because the origins of all crimes and violence, namely ownership, will disappear in the communist classless society, Mut.ahhari argues that the question of whether government will disappear or not still remains unanswered, because the new requirements which are created by the evolutional development in civilization demand an office for direction, guidance and management at the final stage. Therefore, the need for the institution of government and rulership as the manifestation of that demand will exist at that era.28 Another point which the fuqaha¯ stress is that, since it is normal and indispensable to have a ruler, reason demands that the Islamic community should not be left without any instructions regarding rulership. Consequently, the Prophet could not, by any means, have died without appointing a ruler as his successor. From this reasoning emerges the Shi‘i doctrine of the Ima¯mat and the Ima¯m’s function as ruler.29

Relationship between ruler and ruled In order to approach the Islamic view about the type of relationship between ruled and ruler, Mut.ahhari deals with the question of whether Islam considers the ruler to be the master and the owner of people, and the ruled his slaves and servants, or regards the ruler as the attorney, representative and trustee of his subjects and the ruled as the true holder of rights. Rejecting the first notion, Mut.ahhari explained that the Ima¯m and the ruler are considered, in the Islamic texts, as the trustee who is the guardian of the rights of people and responsible to them. He argues that the position of rulership is regarded in the Quranic verse (Nisa¯: 58) as God’s Trust (ama¯nat-i Ila¯hi) to people. Therefore it must be occupied by a reliable and honest person who can maintain the rights of the people and not violate them. However, the rights of people are not explained in his writings. Confirming his view by giving a terminological analysis of the two well-known words in Islamic political literature, ‘ra‘i¯yat’ and ‘ra¯‘i¯’ which are applied to the ruled and the ruler, Mut.ahhari argued that these two words originated from ‘ra¯‘i¯ ’ which means protecting and guarding. Therefore, ‘ra¯‘i¯ ’ means protector and guardian and ‘ra‘i¯yat’ a protected and guarded person. These two words were applied by the Prophet for the first time in the meaning of ruler and ruled. It is reported from the Prophet that he said: ‘All of you are regarded as guardians [ra¯‘a] and all of you are considered responsible. So, the Ima¯m [the ruler] is guardian and he is also responsible.’30 Then, Mut.ahhari seeks to highlight the mutual rights of the ruled and the ruler. He refers to a saying from Ali ibn Abi-T.a¯lib, delivered at the Battle of S.iffin, that So now, Allah has, by placing me over your affairs, created my right 129

POLITICAL VIEWS

over you, and you too have a right over me like mine over you. A right is very vast in description but very narrow in equitability of action. It does not accrue to any person unless it accrues against him also, and right does not accrue against a person unless it also accrues in his favour. If there is any right which is only in favour of a person with no [corresponding] right accruing against him, it is solely for Allah, and not for His creatures.31 Mut.ahhari continues: ‘It is also reported from Ali ibn Abi-T.a¯lib that he stated: “It is a duty of the Ima¯m to rule [the society] in what Allah has revealed and to perform the Trust (ama¯nat) to people. If he does that, it would be the duty of the people to listen to him, and obey him and respond when he calls them”.’32 However, although Mut.ahhari did not clearly explain what the relationship between ruled and ruler should be in a situation when the ruler turns to aggression and oppression, he briefly pointed out that if one of the two (ruled and ruler) must be condemned for the benefit of the other, it is certainly the ruler, not the ruled.33

Islamic rule Despite his enthusiasm about h.uku¯mat-i Islami, it is not clear why Mut.ahhari did not develop the theory independently. He became familiar with the theory during his friendship with the Fada¯i¯ya¯n-i Islam in Qum. Once, during his education in Qum, together with his classmate Montazeri he went to Ayatullah Khomeini and asked him to discuss the issue. As a member of Ayatullah Buru¯jirdi’s office, Khomeini referred the request to Buru¯jirdi, the head of the Qum Seminary. However, Buru¯jirdi was not interested in openly discussing the issue.34 In 1962, Mut.ahhari supervised a BA thesis about the issue, entitled ‘Vila¯yat-i Faqih’. The 68-page thesis, which is still kept unpublished in the Faculty of Theology of the University of Tehran, was written by Muhammad Java¯d Ba¯hunar, later a member of the Revolutionary Council and the Prime Minister in 1981. This thesis stresses two points. First, Ba¯hunar rejected the arguments which were presented by the supporters of Vila¯yat-i Faqih, among them Khomeini, namely that a faqih as a legitimate Islamic ruler gains his political authority through appointment by the Ima¯ms (Naz.ari-yi nas.b). He argued for the first time that a faqih should gain his political authority solely from the people through elections (Naz.ari-yi intikha¯b). Second, Islamic rule, he maintained, does not consist of only one permanent and fixed form of political structure. As a result, Vila¯yat-i Faqih is not necessarily the only form of the legitimate Islamic ruling system. Islamic rule is a unique type of ruling. It might be considered similar to democracy in the form of the republic, because its ruling group and those who are in charge of the legislative system 130

POLITICAL VIEWS

must be elected by the people. But it differs from the republican system in three ways: it is based on the Islamic law and fatwa¯s of a Mujtahid or a group of Mujtahids; the aim of governing is fulfilling the real interests of the people, not their carnal desires; and the ruling group must be chosen from among pious people.35 Therefore, each Islamic society, having regard to its own situation and interests, can have its own particular form of political structure, whether it is headed by a faqih or not. The Islamic character of a society can be completely achieved through operating the Islamic laws and electing a pious ruler, whether he is a faqih or not. Indeed, it is exactly the same idea that the Fada¯i¯ya¯n-i Islam were seeking to implement. . In his Islam va Muqtaz iya¯t-i Zama¯n (two vols) on which he lectured during 1967–72, Mut.ahhari is talking about the wide-ranging authority of a legitimate ruler (h.a¯kim-i shar‘i¯ ), who gains his authority through a position recognized by the Ima¯ms and the Prophet. The legitimate ruler who is in charge, according to Mut.ahhari’s h.uku¯mat-i Islami, is certainly a Mujtahid or a faqih, not simply a pious ruler.36 In fact, it is exactly the same view that was presented by Ayatullah Khomeini at about the same time (January 1970) in Najaf. However, in his notes on the issue of rulership which were published after his assassination, Mut.ahhari explained that the Islamic ruler must be chosen from within the framework of Shi‘i law, from among those who are qualified with justice and fiqa¯hat. The people are the electors. They choose either directly as in the selection of a marj‘a-i taqli¯d or indirectly by electing a group of fuqaha¯ who will eventually determine the Islamic ruler.37 In this book, Mut.ahhari’s approach to the issue is jurisprudential, not political. When he was questioned on how Islam, as an eternal and nonabrogatable law, can provide answers for the broad number of complicated modern issues, he replied that not all Islamic laws and regulations are fixed and permanent. Some of them are temporary and changeable. A faqih as the legitimate Islamic ruler (h.a¯kim-i shar‘a) has a wide-ranging authority to legislate new laws and regulations or abrogate old ones for the benefit of society.38 In June 1978, Mut.ahhari was invited to lecture about the recent Islamic movements at a conference in Tehran. Although the conference was cancelled by the police, the lecture was published soon after under the title . Barrasi-yi Ijma¯li-yi Nihz at-ha¯-yi Islami dar S.ad-Sa¯lih-i Akhir. The first part of the book comprises Mut.ahhari’s analysis of recent Islamic reformers such as Sayyid Jama¯l al-Din Asad-a¯ba¯di, Shaikh Muhammad ‘Abduh, Shaikh ‘Abdul-Rah.ma¯n Kava¯kibi and Muhammad Iqba¯l. He then highlights briefly the role of the Shi‘i ‘ulama¯ in the recent political movements (in Iran and Iraq) such as the Tobacco Uprising, the Constitutional Revolution and the Iraq Revolution.39 The second part of the book, the more important one, relates to the Islamic Revolution of Iran. Mut.ahhari deals, at the beginning of this chapter, with the question of how the nature of an uprising could be 131

POLITICAL VIEWS

recognized. He replied ‘Through different ways: from the groups and the people who carry out the uprising; from the causes which prepared the ground for the uprising; from aims that the uprising follows; and from the slogans which mobilize and drive the uprising’. In his analysis, Mut.ahhari argued that the Iranian Revolution does not belong to a particular class or part of the people. It belongs neither to workers, nor farmers, nor students, nor intellectuals, nor the bourgeoisie. Rich and poor, man and woman, citizen and villager, religious and non-religious student, peddler and artisan, cleric and teacher, literate and illiterate are contributing similarly to this uprising. He then continued A statement from the eminent Grand Ayatullahs who are leading the uprising has the same echo among all classes around the country. Its echo in the city is the same as its echo in the village. Its sound in the ¯ zarba¯ija¯n is the same as its sound farthest parts of Khura¯sa¯n and A between the Iranian students in the furthest cities of Europe or America. It excites the oppressed, deprived and exploited as well as the exploiter . . . It is an uprising of the same type as the Prophets’ uprising, namely raised from the depth of human nature, from God-consciousness [Khuda¯ a¯ga¯hi] or God self-consciousness [khud a¯ga¯hi-yi Ila¯hi].40 Mut.ahhari then asked why the Revolution happened. He explained: The reason for this uprising must be sought in the incidents which happened in Iran during the recent half-century. These incidents were opposite to the Islamic sublime purposes and against the ideals of the Islamic reformers of the recent century. Normally, it could not continue forever without any reaction’. He reasoned: The wild and rough despotism, and the negation of freedom; the influence of modern colonialism, namely the unseen and dangerous form of colonialism, whether political, economic or cultural; secularism, namely removing religion from the political arena; the search for the restoration of ancient Iran and the revival of the Magian slogans and the destruction of the Islamic customs: that is, the substitution of the Hijrat calendar by the Magian calendar; distortion of the valuable heritage of Islamic culture and falsifying 132

POLITICAL VIEWS

the evidence for this culture as Iranian [superstitious] culture; propagating state Marxism, namely the atheistic part of Marxism without its social and political sections; cruelly killing people and dishonouring the blood of Iranian Muslims, and also imprisoning and torturing political opponents; discrimination and intensified class division in spite of the claimed reforms; the dominance of nonMuslims over the governmental apparatus; the clear violation of the Islamic laws, whether directly or indirectly, in the form of propagating corruption; cleansing Islamic-Persian literature, which is the guardian of the Islamic spirit in Iran, under the pretext of combating foreign terminologies; cutting relations with Islamic countries, and establishing relations with non- or probably anti-Islamic countries, such as Israel. Such things as these have wounded the religious conscience of our society for half a century, and driven it to the point of explosion.41 Mut.ahhari’s type of analysis is remarkable. As mentioned before, he always seeks to explain a given social phenomenon (such as revolution) with certain cultural and psychological elements or with its roots in human nature. His theory is called the theory of fit.rat, and is considered by him as the key to understanding the Islamic view about human social history.42 He also refuses to analyse a social fact merely through social elements; therefore he never turns to a mere sociological theory. Unlike Shariati, he never uses in his analyses the Marxist theory based on class division and class struggle. However, the issue of leadership, in and after the Revolution seems to be the centre of the second part of the book. Brushing aside non-clerical leaders such as Shariati and Bani-S.adr (the first President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1981), Mut.ahhari argues that a movement which is Islamic in its nature and has an Islamic objective is in need of a leadership knowledgeable about the ideology of Islam, and its moral, social and political philosophy. He maintained: It is evident that only those who have been brought up and are steeped in an Islamic culture and who are thoroughly familiar with the Quran, the Sunnat, fiqh, and ma‘a¯rif-i Islami, can occupy the position of leadership and thus it is only the ru¯h.a¯niyat [clergy] who can lead such an Islamic movement.43 Mut.ahhari’s view about Abul-Hasan Bani-S.adr is interesting. While discussing the issue of the leadership in the Revolution, Mut.ahhari mentioned that he was encouraged by a friend to read an article entitled Dar Ravish. He also mentioned that he had not yet visited the writer of the article, who had been living in Europe (France) for many years, but that he was sincerely disposed towards him and recognized him as a Muslim with good 133

POLITICAL VIEWS

intent. In this article Bani-S.adr had criticized the traditional leadership of the ‘ulama¯ (rahbari-yi sunnati). Bani-S.adr argued that The traditional leadership who are the guardians of the [petrified] cultural frames can do nothing, because all areas of [their creative] thinking were (and are still) dried out. Occasionally, the resistance of this leadership works, but eventually surrenders. Of course, Sayyid Jamal, Mudarris . . . and Khomeini belong to this kind of leadership. They were (and they are) incapacitated by the traditional leadership before they became disabled by the enemy. They are friends. Help should be given to them and should be taken from them.44 Mut.ahhari first acknowledges that a progressive social (cultural) movement may sometimes lose its vital function and change to a series of non-effective mores and ceremonies. Nevertheless, he denies that the old Islamic culture, which was guarded by the traditional leadership such as Sayyid Jama¯l, Mudarris, T.a¯liqa¯ni and Khomeini, is the same as the dead and petrified mores and customs: ‘Which type of [modern] leadership [led by the intelligentsia] could create such a wave and movement [in society] in the manner of the traditional leadership?’ He argues Which type of non-traditional leadership (left or right) could generate only one-tenth of the movements generated by the traditional leadership during this century, which coincidentally has been the period in which intellectuals have travelled to Europe and been modernist and anti-traditional.45 Without naming anybody, Mut.ahhari then mentioned that other individuals had discussed in different ways to that of Bani-S.adr, the necessity of removing the leadership of the Islamic movement from the ru¯h.a¯niyat to the intelligentsia. Criticizing the view in a caustic passage, he stated: Those honourable intellectuals have unfortunately woken up a bit late, since the old guardians and custodians of this huge reservoir of energy and force [Islam] have already demonstrated [during the Revolution] that they are well aware of how to tap and make use of this source. Then he concluded that the ru¯h.a¯niyat will not allow anyone else to expropriate it. These dear intellectuals, who wake up with the hope of the shift of power every morning, and who [sleep with the] dream of expropriating [it] every night, would be better thinking of another job and another service to 134

POLITICAL VIEWS

humanity. It is better that they let Islam and Islamic culture and the sources of the mental force generated by Islam remain under the authority of the same custodians who have been trained in the same environment, and whose words and intentions are better known by the people.46 Furthermore, Mut.ahhari envisaged an Islamic society with the ‘ulama¯ as the ultimate decision-makers and was alarmed and distressed at the possible political ascent and domination of Islamic intellectuals. Even though the Revolution placed the ‘ulama¯ in the position of leadership, Mut.ahhari warns against the possibility of the intellectuals taking over the leadership and predicts that if this happens, after one generation, Islam will undergo a metamorphosis and become completely distorted and mutilated.47 Mut.ahhari’s concern with the leadership of the ‘ulama¯ and his misgivings about Islamic intellectuals are shared by Ayatullah Khomeini who uses the same terminology as Mut.ahhari when he attacks the concept of an Islam without clergy (Islam-i minha¯-yi ru¯h.a¯niyat). Mut.ahhari calls it a ‘colonialist thesis’ and points out that nothing can replace our clergy. Ayatullah Khomeini maintained: Islam without the clergy is treason. They want to do away with Islam, so first they have to do away the clergy. First they say we want Islam but we do not want the clergy. If the clergy is excluded, there will be no Islam left. Islam has reached this point owing to the hard work of the clergy . . . This thesis denies Islam. Beware, I warn you, of this great danger.48 In order to stress his point that the Revolution is in danger from the elements which might derail its course, Mut.ahhari turns to biological theory and makes a comparison between social phenomena and living creatures. In the final part of his book, he shows how movements (revolutions), like all other living phenomena, can be infected by pests and diseases: It is a duty of the leader of the movement to take measures for the prevention or eradication of such pests. The movement would certainly become infertile, or change its aims, with adverse results, if the leader fails to pay attention to those pests or acts sluggishly in their treatment.49 Six elements are generally considered by Mut.ahhari as being threats to the Islamic Revolution. They are as follows: the influence of alien thoughts (ideologies); the blind acceptance of modernity; penetration by opportunists of the Islamic movement; ambiguity in planning the future; turning towards temporary purposes and intentions; leaving the Revolution unfinished. 135

POLITICAL VIEWS

Regarding the last point, Mut.ahhari explains that Unfortunately, the history of Islamic movements in the present century displays a [particular] deficiency in the ‘ulama¯ ‘s leadership. It is that the ‘ulama¯ led a number of movements successfully, but they left the scene soon after the victory. Therefore, the result of their endeavours was gained by others and probably by the enemies. Giving examples, he maintains that The Revolution of Iraq succeeded due to the resistance of the Shi‘i ‘ulama¯, but the result was not put into operation by them. Now we see its consequences [in Iraq]. The Constitutional Revolution in Iran succeeded owing to the efforts of the ‘ulama¯, but they did not continue their efforts after the victory and did not benefit from the results. Later, a rough dictatorship came on the scene and there remained nothing of constitutionalism, except the name. Gradually, people became suspicious and thought that the dictatorial regime was better than the constitutional order and constitutionalism was a sin. It is much to be regretted that the ‘ulama¯ considered their task as finished at the time of the Tobacco Uprising after the cancellation of the Tobacco Concession. They could have benefited from the people’s readiness and put into operation a real Islamic regime. In respect of the Islamic Revolution, he pointed out that The Islamic Revolution of Iran is presently at the stage of refusal and negation . . . Certainly the stage of fulfilment and reconstruction is much harder than the stage of negation and protesting. Now the intelligent people are worried whether the ‘ulama¯ will leave their task uncompleted again.50 In his interviews with the press, held after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, Mut.ahhari made it clear that he does not mean that the ‘ulama¯ must necessarily hold the governmental posts and become a part of the state apparatus. But they should continuously lead the Revolution and guide the nation: Vila¯yat-i Faqih does not mean that a faqih should put himself in a position as the head of government and govern practically [the society]. The position of a faqih in an Islamic country, whose people accepted Islam as their ideology and are committed to it, is the position of an ideologue, not the position of a governor. The task of an Islamic ideologue is to watch carefully that the Islamic ideology is 136

POLITICAL VIEWS

implemented correctly. He considers and confirms the suitability of persons who want to be the head of the Islamic government and enforce the laws.51 Proposing the return of the ‘ulama¯ to their traditional centres (mosques) for continuing their traditional tasks as the spiritual guides of the people, Mut.ahhari warns that they should not leave the political arena. They should keep their other role as the controller of governments and the challenger of their corruption. Furthermore, he also expressed his wishes that those ‘ulama¯ who occupied governmental posts because of the necessity of the Revolution should leave them as soon as possible. He did not mean that each clergyman, even if he was considered to be a suitable person for a particular post, must be prohibited from any governmental post because of his clerical position.52 In order to see how much the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran was influenced by Mut.ahhari’s political views, it is appropriate to consider the passages and articles concerning the issues of Islamic governance and the authority of the leader. According to part of the preamble of the 1979 Constitution entitled ‘Islamic Government’, The plan of an Islamic government based upon Vila¯yat-i Faqih, as set forth by Ima¯m Khomeini at the height of the period of repression and strangulation practised by the despotic regime, created a new, distinct and consistent motive for the people, opening up before them the authentic path of Islamic ideological struggle. This in turn caused militant and committed Muslims to intensify their struggle both within the country and abroad. Another part of the preamble entitled ‘The form of government in Islam’ maintains that In creating, on the basis of ideology, the political institutions and organs that are the foundation of society, the righteous will assume the responsibility for governing and administering the country, in accordance with the Quranic verse ‘Verily My righteous servants shall inherit the earth’ [Anbiya¯: 105]. Legislation setting forth regulations for the administration of society will be established on the basis of the Quran and the Sunnat. The exercise of meticulous and painstaking supervision by just, pious, and committed scholars of Islam [al-fugaha¯ al-‘udu¯l] is an absolute necessity. The importance of the office of a qualified faqih for the establishment of the Islamic Republic was also explained in another part of the preamble entitled ‘Governance of the Just Faqih’, as follows: 137

POLITICAL VIEWS

In keeping with the principles of governance [Vila¯yat al-amr] and the permanent necessity of leadership [Ima¯mat], the Constitution provides for the establishment of leadership by a faqih possessing the necessary qualifications [ja¯mi‘a al-shara¯yit.] and recognized as leader by the people. This is in accordance with the h.adith ‘The conduct of [public] affairs is to be in the hands of those who are learned concerning God and are trustworthy guardians of that which He has permitted and that which He has forbidden. Such leadership will prevent any deviation by the various organs of government from their essential Islamic duties. Although the Constitution was approved in a referendum held throughout Iran on 2–3 December 1979, nevertheless after a decade of sweet as well as bitter experiences of the Revolution, Ayatullah Khomeini realized that it was necessary to make certain amendments to it. The confusion, associated with the lack of clarity in delineating responsibilities and in the assignment of duties in the state machinery, had a direct impact on the functioning of the state, particularly in the sectors which had sprung from the Revolution and the birth of the Islamic Republic. The ambiguity over the role of the President (which had been evident during the political struggle between President BaniS.adr and Prime Minister Raja¯i¯ in 1980–1), and the differences between the Council of Guardians and the Consultative Assembly over legislation, for example, were two areas needing urgent attention. So, on 24 April 1989, on Ayatullah Khomeini’s instruction, a 25-member Constitution Review Panel (Shu¯ra¯-yi Ba¯znigari-yi Qa¯nu¯n-i Asa¯si) was set up to discuss the reform of the Constitution. The main areas which needed further clarification were: the issue relating to the qualification of the leader; the centralization of the executive power; the centralization of judicial power; refinement of Article 64 of the 1979 Constitution, about the membership rights and number of Deputies elected to the Majlis from the recognized minorities in Iran; the centralization of management of the radio and television services; and the clarification and formalization of the duties and rights of the Expediency Council (Majm‘a-i Tashkhis.-i Mas.lah.at). By 11 July, the final amendments to the Constitution had been made and, while Khomeini had passed away, it was put to a referendum on 28 July 1989 and was ratified by the majority of the people. Regarding the issue of leadership, the 1989 amendments proposed changes, particularly to the sections relating to the selection and administrative responsibilities of the leader. Some five alterations to the 1979 Constitution addressed the status of the leader and his role and duties. Articles 5, 107 and 109–11 deal with these matters. Article 5 of the amended Constitution is particularly important, as it erases an important qualification clause present in the 1979 version which stated:

138

POLITICAL VIEWS

During the Occultation of the Vali¯-i ‘As.r (may God hasten his reappearance) the vila¯yat and leadership of the ummat devolve upon the just and pious faqih, who is fully aware of the circumstances of his age; courageous, resourceful, and possessed of administrative ability; and recognized and accepted as leader by the majority of the people. In the event that no faqih should be so recognized by the majority, the leader, or the Leadership Council, composed of fuqaha¯ possessing the aforementioned qualifications, will assume these responsibilities in accordance with Article 107. Article 107 (of the 1979 Constitution) deals with the procedure for electing the leader or the Leadership Council and maintains: Whenever one of the fuqaha¯ possessing the qualifications specified in Article 5 of the Constitution is recognized and accepted as marj‘a [the source of imitation] and leader of the people by a decisive majority – as has been the case with the exalted marj‘a-i taqli¯d and leader of the Revolution, Grand Ayatullah Ima¯m Khomeini – he is to exercise governance and all the responsibilities arising therefrom. If such should not be the case, experts elected by the people will review and consult among themselves concerning all persons qualified to act as marj‘a and leader. If they discern outstanding capacity for leadership in a certain marj‘a, they will present him to the people as their leader; if not, they will appoint either three or five marj‘a possessing the necessary qualifications for leadership and present them as members of the Leadership Council. The qualifications and conditions for the leader or members of the Leadership Council were described in Article 109 (of the 1979 Constitution) as follows: ‘a. suitability with respect to learning and piety, as required for the function of mufti and marj‘a; b. political and social perspicacity, courage, strength, and the necessary administrative abilities for leadership’. However, Article 107 of the amended Constitution refers to the appointment of the leader as being the task of the experts [in Islamic sciences] elected by the people, who will review and consult among themselves concerning all the fuqaha¯ possessing the qualifications specified in Articles 5 and 109. If in the event they find one of them better versed in Islamic regulations, the subjects of the fiqh, or in political and social issues, or possessing general popularity or special prominence for any of the qualifications mentioned in Article 109, they shall elect him as the leader. Otherwise, in the absence of such a superiority, they shall elect and

139

POLITICAL VIEWS

declare one of them as the leader. The leader thus elected by the Assembly of Experts shall assume all the powers of the Vila¯yat alamr and all the responsibilities arising therefrom. Then Article 109 of the amended Constitution describes the essential qualifications and conditions for the leader as follows: a. scholarship, as required for performing the functions of mufti in different fields of fiqh; b. justice and piety, as required for the leadership of the Islamic ummat; c. right political and social perspicacity, prudence, courage, administrative facilities and adequate capability for leadership. In case a multiplicity of persons fulfil the above qualifications and conditions, the person possessing the better jurisprudential and political perspicacity will be given preference. It is clear that A. Ehteshami’s argument that ‘The proposed changes, published after Ayatullah Khomeini’s death, finally removed the position of faqih as the most powerful single authority in the land’, is not true.53 It is exactly the position of marj‘a-i taqli¯d in Article 107 which was replaced by faqih or experts in the amended Constitution. Undoubtedly, these experts have also to be Mujtahids in fiqh and other Islamic sciences. While many of the functions of the leader under the new amended Constitution remained the same as under the old, there were certain instances where his powers were subject to re-examination. His supervisory role was expanded, and a new consulting body, as the ultimate decision-maker at times of disagreement between the Islamic Consultation Assembly and the Council of Guardians, was proposed. In spelling out the functions and duties of the leader, Clause 1 of Article 110 reads as follows: ‘Delineation of the general policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran after consultation with the Nation’s Expediency Council [Majm‘a-i Tashkhis.-i Mas.lah.at]’. No such provision existed during Ayatullah Khomeini’s leadership. This Article also lists eleven functions and authorities for the leader, ranging from making appointments to religio-political and military establishments to declare war or peace and mobilize the armed forces, (Clause 5). By contrast, the 1979 Constitution listed six ‘functions and authorities’ of the leader, including the above clause. The 1989 amendments removed the leader’s power to dismiss the President. This can happen only at the suggestion of the Majlis when endorsed by the judiciary. The final draft of the amendments also dropped a reference to the leader’s constitutional right to dissolve the Consultative Assembly under certain circumstances. Encountering strong opposition from the Majlis Deputies, the new leader instructed the Constitution Review Panel to erase this clause altogether. In order to ensure continuity in the political establishment, the amended 140

POLITICAL VIEWS

Constitution made specific provisions, in the events of the death, resignation or removal of the leader. Article 111 states that Till the appointment of the new leader, a council consisting of the President, head of the judiciary power, and a faqih from the Guardian Council, upon the decision of the Nation’s Expediency Council, shall temporarily take over all the duties of the leader. The 1979 Constitution required only that provision should be made for the experts to be convened for the purpose of studying and implementing this Article. Although the highest official of the Islamic Republic, namely the leader, must, according to both Constitutions, be chosen from the high-ranking officials of the clerical establishment, nevertheless there is no restriction concerning his ethnic origin or his nationality; he does not, therefore, need to have Iranian nationality. As can be deduced from Article 109, which relates to the qualifications and attributes of the leader or members of the Leadership Council, there is no mention of Iranian origin or Iranian nationality among the required qualifications. The most significant constitutional development was the abolition of the office of the Prime Minister. Article 60 of the new Constitution stated that ‘The functions of the executive, except in the matters that are directly placed under the jurisdiction of the leadership by the Constitution, are to be exercised by the President and the Ministers.’ Article 60 of the 1979 Constitution had proclaimed: ‘The exercise of the executive power is by means of the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, and the Ministers, except for matters directly assigned to the leadership by this Constitution.’ However, the Iranian Constitution considers the President of the Islamic Republic as the second official of the country. According to Article 113 (Chapter IX) of the Constitution, After the office of leader, the President of the Republic is the highest official position in the country. His is the responsibility for implementing the Constitution, ordering relations among the three powers, and heading the executive power, except in matters pertaining directly to the leadership. Although the President must be of Iranian origin and also an Iranian national, there is no mention of being a cleric. Article 115 of both Constitutions states that The President of the Republic must be elected from among religious and political personalities possessing the following qualifications: Iranian origin; Iranian nationality; administrative and managerial 141

POLITICAL VIEWS

capacities; a good past record; trustworthiness; piety; convinced belief in the fundamental principles of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the official madhhab [religion] of the country. Another significant amendment is to be found in the Constitution’s treatment of the judiciary. First, it abolished the five-member Judicial High Council as the highest judicial authority in the Republic and replaced it with a single appointment (made by the leader), to be known as the Head of the Judiciary (Chief Justice). Article 157 maintains that In order to fulfil the responsibilities of the judiciary power in all the matters concerning judiciary, administrative and executive areas, the leader shall appoint a just Mujtahid, well versed in judiciary affairs and possessing prudence and administrative abilities, as the head of the judiciary power for a period of five years, who shall be the highest judicial authority. Second, that the leader appoints instead two Mujtahids as the chief of the Supreme Court and the Public Prosecutor-General (as was the case under Article 162 of the 1979 Constitution); the appointments are to be made by the head of the judiciary. Finally, it can generally be concluded that, consistent with the procedures regarding the presidency of the Republic and that of the choice of the leader, the 1989 amendments moved towards the centralization of the structure of power. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, two interpretations of Islamic rule (h.uku¯mat-i Islami) have existed among Iranian Islamist groups and scholars. According to one interpretation, Islamic rule can be achieved by operating Islamic laws in society, without regard to whether the ruler is a Mujtahid or simply a just (non-clerical) individual. The second interpretation defines Islamic rule not only in terms of Islamic laws, but also in terms of an Islamic ruler. Hence, it is not enough for an Islamic ruler to be simply a just politician able to implement the Islamic laws; he must be, rather, a jurist able to deduce the needed laws and regulations systematically from the Islamic sources. Such a ruler can only be a Mujtahid, a faqih. Mut.ahhari was clearly in favour of the second interpretation. His legitimate ruler (h.a¯kim-i shar‘a) is granted broad authority which was explained in detail in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

A reconsideration of the different interpretations of the theory of Islamic rule The establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran clearly played an important role in the development of Shi‘ite political doctrine. Soon after the Islamic Revolution, discussions about the theory of the Vila¯yat-i Faqih emerged in 142

POLITICAL VIEWS

clerical seminaries in Iran, Iraq and Lebanon as a matter of immediate concern. Existing interpretations of the theory were clarified with further explanations, and a number of new interpretations appeared. A major characteristic which these interpretations and theories have in common is that they all belong to the class of mainstream classical political theories, in that they can be defined, roughly, as offering advice aimed at achieving an ideal society. One of the most difficult and perplexing questions in political philosophy is: ‘Who should rule?’ Almost all the classical theories have dealt with this question and they can all be classified according to how they attempt to answer it. A person who holds that ‘the people should rule themselves’ is advocating democracy; one who advocates ‘one-man rule’ may be a monarchist, or a supporter of an Islamic rule in the form of the Vila¯yat-i Faqih. As opposed to such classical theories, modern theories are based on ‘philosophical analysis’, with the purpose of clarifying given political or achieved advice towards the attainment of an ideal society, and the terms used in political discussions. Thus such questions as ‘What is meant by the phrase “universal human rights” as this appears in the Charter of the United Nations?’, are discussed, and ‘What is the correct analysis of the word “state”?’ and so forth. The fuqaha¯’s interpretations of Islamic rule can be divided into five groups: (i), interpretations which regard the fuqaha¯ as collectively appointed custodians of the people (Vila¯yat-i Intis.a¯bi-yi Faqih); (ii), interpretations which limit the authority of the fuqaha¯ to particular social matters, which are generally called umur-i h.isbih; (iii), the interpretation which maintains that the fuqaha¯ should have a supervisory role only, and leave politics for the people (Niz.a¯rat-i Faqih va Khila¯fat-i Mardum); (iv), interpretations which regard an elected faqih as being the custodian of the people (Vila¯yat-i Intikha¯bi-yi faqih); (v), interpretations which see any ruling fuqaha¯ merely as the representatives of the people (Vika¯lat-i Faqih). Regardless of their specific interpretations of the theory of Vila¯yat-i Faqih, all Shi‘i fuqaha¯ are in agreement with the Shi‘i theologians (mutikallimin) in five principles: first, that absolute sovereignty over the world and man belongs to God, and that it is He who has placed man in charge of his social destiny, so that the establishment of rulership without His permission or approval is illegitimate; second, that in the era of the Infallible Ima¯ms’ presence, it was they who were the most preferred persons for the task of the political leadership of society; third, that the institution of government is a necessary element for the existence of society; fourth, that government must be humble before the religious teachings, that laws and regulations must not be repugnant to the Islamic ordinances, and that a suitable environment for the improvement of religious social objectives must be established; fifth, that being Muslim and a believer, trustworthy and just, a manager and experienced are six fundamental qualifications of an Islamic ruler.54 The theories mentioned above have in common that the three specific areas of giving fatwa¯s, making legal judgements, and directing matters 143

POLITICAL VIEWS

generally (called umur-i h.isbih) should be regarded with certainty as parts of the fuqaha¯’s authority. They also agree that people’s personal interests, beliefs and property are totally excluded from the fuqaha¯’s authority.55 This principle is fully reflected in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic. According to Articles 22–3 of Chapter III (the Rights of the People): The dignity, life, property, rights, dwelling, and occupation of the individual are inviolable, except in cases sanctioned by the law. The investigation of individuals’ beliefs is forbidden, and no-one may be molested or taken to task simply for holding a certain belief. In Article 25 it is mentioned that The inspection of letters and the failure to deliver them, the recording and disclosure of telephone conversations, the disclosure of telegraphic and telex communications, censorship, or the wilful failure to transmit them, wiretapping, and all forms of covert investigation are forbidden, except as provided by law. Similarly, Article 28: ‘Everyone has the right to choose any occupation he wishes, if it is not opposed to Islam, the public interest, or the rights of others’. Articles 32 and 33: No-one can be arrested except in accordance with judgement and the procedure established by law. No one can be banished from his place of residence, prevented from residing in his preferred location, or compelled to reside in a given locality, except as provided in law. According to Articles 37, 38 and 39, Innocence is to be presumed, and no-one is to be regarded as guilty unless his guilt has been established by a competent court. Any form of torture for the purpose of extracting confessions or gaining information is forbidden. It is not permissible to compel individuals to give testimony, make confessions, or swear oaths, and any testimony, confession or oath obtained in this fashion is worthless and invalid. Punishments for the infringement of these principles will be determined by law. All affronts to the dignity and honour of persons arrested, detained, imprisoned or banished in accordance with the law, whatever form they may take, are forbidden and liable to punishment.

It is now interesting to look more closely at each of these five interpretations. The first of them, in which the fuqaha¯ are regarded as appointed custodians 144

POLITICAL VIEWS

of the people (Vila¯yat-i Intis.a¯bi-i Faqih) is the interpretation presented by Ayatullah Khomeini which is based upon four major pillars: vila¯yat, vila¯yat-i mut.laqih, intis.a¯b, and fiqa¯hat. The first, vila¯yat, etymologically derived from valiya (nearness, closeness), is used in several different meanings such as closeness, assistance, kindness, principality, domination, sovereignty and a city over which a ruler dominates.56 It is the usage of vila¯yat in its senses of principality, domination and sovereignty that are important in understanding the Islamic political texts. Turning first to the Quranic verses, that God is the master (vali¯ ) of those who have faith (Baqarih: 257); the Prophet is closer (aula¯) to the believers than their own selves (Ah.za¯b: 6); wrongdoers stand as protectors (auli¯ya¯) of each other but Allah is the protector (vali¯ ) of the righteous (Ja¯thiyih: 19); the believers, men and women, are also protectors (auli¯ya¯) of each other (Taubih: 71), for the Quran commands the believers not to take for friends and helpers (auli¯ya¯) unbelievers rather than believers (A¯ l-i ‘Imra¯n: 28); while the authority (vila¯yat) of unbelievers and oppressors over believers is seen as the authority of Satan and T . a¯ghu¯t (the most immoral transgressive) (Taubih: 71).57 With regard to Tradition, it is widely reported in the famous Tradition of al-Ghadir, that upon his Farewell Pilgrimage, the Prophet broke his journey at a place called Ghadir-i Khum, and addressed his companions thus: ‘Who is your protector [vali¯ ] and closer (aula¯) to you than yourselves?’ They all said: ‘Allah and his messenger.’ Then the Prophet stated: ‘He whose master [maula¯] I am, his master is [also] Ali.’58 Similarly the Fifth Shi‘i Ima¯m, alBa¯qir, is reported as having said to Zura¯rih, one of his companions: ‘Islam is based on .sala¯t [prayer], zaka¯t [alms tax], h.ajj [pilgrimage to Mecca], .saum [fasting], and vila¯yat [accepting the Ima¯ms’ authority].’ Zura¯rih is said to have asked him: ‘Which one is the preferred?’ The Ima¯m said: ‘Vila¯yat is the preferred, since it is the key to the others, and the vali¯ [ruler] is the guide to the others.’59 In Shi‘ite theology, vila¯yat and Ima¯mat, vali¯ and Ima¯m have the same meaning. Apart from the position of prophethood, which came to an end with the Prophet Muhammad, the Ima¯ms share the other positions with him. They are interpreters of the book of God (the Quran), judges among Muslims, and also the Ima¯ms and vali¯s of their society.60 In fiqh, Vila¯yat means ‘having authority over others and being in charge of their affairs’. For instance, the heirs of a victim are seen as authorized (having vila¯yat) to retaliate, forgive or take compensation (blood-money).61 In his jurisprudential lessons on the theory of Vila¯yat-i Faqih, Khomeini argued that All political and governmental matters which were placed under the authority of the Prophet and the Ima¯ms, are to be laid, with no difference, under the authority of a just faqih. This is because the 145

POLITICAL VIEWS

Islamic ruler, whoever he might be – the Prophet, the Ima¯ms, or the fuqaha¯ – is positioned to operate the Shari‘at and God’s orders, and to collect Islamic taxes and distribute them in the interests of Muslims. Therefore, if the Prophet and the Ima¯ms punished an adulterer with a hundred lashes, or collected religious taxes following a particular procedure, a faqih must operate [in the position of an Islamic ruler] the same procedure. If a faqih issues, anywhere or any time, orders that accord to the extent of his authority, it is obligatory upon all to obey these orders.62 Second, Vila¯yat-i mut.laqih, or Vila¯yat-i ‘a¯mmih, means that the authority of a competent faqih is not restricted to the matters which are generally called umur-i h.isbih. Instead, all public, social, political, governmental and state matters are placed under his authority. Although the fuqaha¯ ’s authority over governmental and state affairs (umur-i sult.a¯ni) was seen by Ayatullah Khomeini as being unlimited, it is in fact conditioned upon the interests of the Islamic society. Consequently, the fuqaha¯ are not authorized to take any major decision without determining the interest of the nation.63 Ayatullah Khomeini argued that The right of custodianship [vila¯yat] for the fuqaha¯ has been established by the Shi‘i Ima¯ms in all areas in which they were authorized by their Ima¯mat over the ummat. All the authorities which were approved for the Prophet and the Ima¯ms regarding their rights of sovereignty and vila¯yat over the people can also be claimed for the fuqaha¯. The fuqaha¯ have authority in all governmental matters, and their orders, concerning the general interests of Islamic society, are to be obeyed.64 While explaining his understanding of the full authority (Vila¯yat-i mut.laqih) of the legitimate Islamic ruler, in his well-known letter to the then-President Khamenei¯ on 5 January 1988, Khomeini argued The issue of governance, which is regarded as a part of the Prophet’s full authority, is one of the primary ordinances [ah.ka¯m-i avvali¯yih] which has to be considered as being prior to all secondary ordinances [ah.ka¯m-i far‘i¯yih] such as prayer, fasting and h.ajj. The Islamic government is authorized to cancel unilaterally all legal contracts held with the people, when these contracts are shown to oppose Islam and the interests of the country. The Islamic government can prevent the practice of any affair related to worship or non-worship, as long as it is considered to oppose the interests of Islam. I say explicitly that all that has been rumoured, that some . Islamic economic agreements such as muza¯ribih and muza¯ri‘ih 146

POLITICAL VIEWS

would be removed by the view of the full authority of the Islamic government, is not true. Had it been so, it would be among those issues placed under the discretion of the government. There are some other issues about which I do not like to disturb you.65 A number of contemporary Grand Ayatullahs such as Sayyid Muhammad Reza¯ Gulpa¯yiga¯ni (d. 1993) and Sayyid ‘Abdul-A‘ala¯ Sabzava¯ri (d. 1994) are regarded, although with some minor differences, as being among the supporters of this interpretation.66 However, it has been argued that although the authority of the faqih, as the ultimate decision-maker of Islamic society, is restricted to the interests of Islamic society, nevertheless that authority is not, according to this interpretation of Islamic rule, subject to constitutional law. Since the legitimacy of the constitutional law is due to the ratification of the faqih, this law cannot put restrictions on his authority.67 Perhaps the establishment of the nation’s Expediency Council (Majm‘a-i Tashkhis.-i Mas.lah.at) for solving problems relating to the legislative power, in February 1988 in Iran, is the best example of this point. While it had not been mentioned in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, Ayatullah Khomeini ordered the formation of this Council, and appointed its members. Similarly, by his order of 24 April 1989, a number of experts were appointed to amend the constitutional law on a number of issues, including the authority of the leader. Their conclusions were put to a referendum on 28 July 1989 and were ratified by a clear majority. According to Article 57 of the amended Constitution: The powers of government in the Islamic Republic are vested in the legislature, the judiciary, and the executive, functioning under the supervision of the full authority of the faqih [Vila¯yat-i Mut.laqih-yi Faqih] in accordance with the forthcoming Articles of this Constitution. These powers are independent of each other. Section 8 of Article 110 of the amended Constitution, which is about the duties and powers of the leadership, removed the problem of illegality on the acts of such a fully authorized faqih in the future: ‘Resolving those problems which cannot be solved by conventional methods through the Nation’s Expediency Council’ are henceforth placed under the duties of the leadership. In response to the objections to the apparently unconditional nature of the faqih’s authority and power, and its superficial resemblance to dictatorship, Khomeini relies on the moral qualifications of the Islamic ruler: since the vali¯-i faqih must meet the condition of being qualified with ‘ada¯lat [justice], dictatorship is excluded, according to the doctrine of Vila¯yat-i mut.laqih-yi faqih, because the faqih would immediately be dismissed by himself (due to his failing to meet the qualification), if he practised dictatorship.68 147

POLITICAL VIEWS

However, the Assembly of Experts is posited by the Constitution of the Islamic Republic as the means of determining whether the leader still possesses the qualifications for the position of leadership or has failed. According to Article 111 of the Amended Iranian Constitution: Whenever the Leader becomes incapable of fulfilling his constitutional duties, or loses one of the qualifications mentioned in Articles 5 and 109, or it becomes known that he did not possess some of the qualifications initially, he will be dismissed. The authority of determination in this matter is vested with the experts specified in Article 108. Intis.a¯b (appointment), the third foundation of Ayatullah Khomeini’s theory, means that the fuqaha¯ were appointed generally (nas.b-i ‘a¯mm) by the Ima¯ms as the custodians (vali¯ ) of the Shi‘ite communities. This is exactly the same in substance as the appointment of the first Ima¯m, Ali ibn Abi-T.a¯lib, although his was a particular appointment (nas.b-i kha¯s.), made by the Prophet at Ghadir-i Khum in 633 as his successor and as the vali¯ of Islamic society. A number of examples of this view can be found in Khomeini’s writings and speeches. For instance, ‘The faqih is “appointed” by the Infallible Ima¯ms for the purpose of making legal judgement, Vila¯yat and h.uku¯mat, in all aspects which the Muslims need for organizing their lives and businesses.’69 In his order to Mahdi Ba¯zarga¯n of 3 February 1979, authorizing the establishment of a Provisional Government, he stated that I appointed him as the governor [h.a¯kim] because of the authority [Vila¯yat] I hold by the holy Shari‘at. His orders must be obeyed [va¯jib al-ittiba¯‘a]; his governing is a Shar‘i¯ rule, not an ordinary one; opposing this government is opposing the Shari‘at.70 This idea is also repeated in his statement for the confirmation of the presidency of Muhammad Ali Raja¯¯i, on 1 August 1981.71 However, it seems that he eventually changed his view and adopted the theory of vila¯yat of an elected faqih, which was presented by Ayatullah Husain Ali Montazeri after the establishment of the Islamic Republic. In his letter of 9 Urdibihisht 1368/28 April 1989, to Ayatullah Ali Mishkini, head of the Constitution Review Panel (Shu¯ra¯-yi Ba¯znigari-yi Qa¯nu¯n-i Asa¯si), Ayatullah Khomeini argued that Concerning the issue of leadership, it is obvious that we cannot leave the Islamic society without a custodian [sarparast]. We must ‘elect’ a person who can defend our Islamic prestige in the world of politics and fraud. If people vote for experts to choose a just Mujtahid for leading their government, and then the experts choose somebody (a 148

POLITICAL VIEWS

Mujtahid) for the position of leadership, he would necessarily be accepted by the people. In this situation, he would be considered as the ‘elected’ custodian [vali¯-i muntakhab] of the people and his orders should be obeyed.72 Needless to say, a Mujtahid considers himself, according to the doctrine of the appointment, as the general deputy (na¯yib-i ‘a¯mm) of the Ima¯m and gains the legitimacy for his leadership and rule (vila¯yat) from the Shari‘at, whereas the legitimacy and legality of his political authority, according to the doctrine of vote and election, originate with the people. While the Assembly of Experts represents the people in discovering among the qualified Mujtahids who is to be the appointed custodian, it then hands over, on the people’s behalf, their right of sovereignty to the chosen Mujtahid. The major characteristics of the doctrine of ‘general appointment’ can be described as follows: first, it is not so much that a particular person is chosen and appointed; it is his qualifications or titles such as fiqa¯hat and ‘ada¯lat that are in fact chosen and appointed respectively. Second, it is possible that there might exist no-one suitable at a particular time, and at another a number of qualified persons. Third, all such qualified persons are actually appointed, and no-one is, in this respect, preferred to the others. Fourth, no such qualified person is permitted to oppose another competent individual, if he is able to implement his authority before the others.73 Consequently, it can be concluded that: all just fuqaha¯, rather than a particular just faqih, have vila¯yat over the people; should there be a number of just fuqaha¯, all of them are considered as appointed; all just fuqaha¯ have an actual, rather than a merely potential, vila¯yat over the people; if a just faqih finds the opportunity to practise his vila¯yat, the other just fuqaha¯ must respect his authority, and are not permitted to challenge him. Fourth is fiqa¯hat. Although the Islamic ruler must be qualified on a number of conditions, including being a Shi‘i, born legitimately, male, just, and a competent manager, he must definitely be a faqih, a Mujtahid. It is because of the importance of this condition that the theory is termed Vila¯yati Faqih. Khomeini argues that according to a letter from the Twelfth Ima¯m, the Shi‘i communities are permitted to refer their major affairs (h.ava¯dith-i va¯qi‘ih) solely to those who narrate the sayings of the Ima¯ms (ruva¯t-i h.adith).74 Needless to say the fuqaha¯ are regarded by Khomeini as the true narrators of the sayings of the Ima¯ms. Consequently, establishing a political regime in a Shi‘i community without the authority of a faqih is considered by this theory as an aggressive (T . a¯ghu¯t) and illegitimate government.75 Ayatullah Khomeini’s understanding of the importance of fiqh among the Islamic sciences differs from that of the traditionalist fuqaha¯. While the traditionalists continue to concentrate mostly on personal matters, for Khomeini fiqh mostly concerns political and governmental issues: 149

POLITICAL VIEWS

A Mujtahid should have a comprehensive understanding of his era. Rulership [h.uku¯mat] is regarded by a true Mujtahid as the practical reason for the whole of fiqh in all aspects of human life. Government is the guide for the practical aspects of fiqh in its confrontation with all social, political, military and cultural problems. Fiqh is the factual and comprehensive theory for directing man and society from cradle to grave. The essential objective is to see how we want the firm principles of fiqh to be operated and practised by the individual and society, and how we want to combat the problems.76 It can be concluded, therefore, that Khomeini sought to discern solutions for all social, political and cultural problems, not by modern intellectual sciences, but solely by Shi‘i jurisprudence. It has been said that he was in favour of establishing a type of management based on fiqh, rather than using a scientific one.77 Undoubtedly his latest jurisprudential initiative for solving the country’s social and governmental problems by ‘orders’ (h.ukms), rather than mere fatwa¯s, is regarded as a new phase in Shi‘i jurisprudence in its adaptability towards temporal matters. While a fatwa¯ is general (kulli), an h.ukm is specific (juzi¯ ). Fatwa¯s are deduced from the Islamic jurisprudential sources (Quran, Traditions, reason and consensus) whereas h.ukms are addressed to the Mujtahid’s understanding of his time and place (zama¯n va maka¯n). While all fuqaha¯ are positioned to make fatwa¯s, only a faqih in authority over the people’s governmental matters is permitted to issue an h.ukm. In giving a fatwa¯, a Mujtahid has no need to consult with others, whereas the vali¯ -yi faqih issues his orders in consultation with the experts. While a Mujtahid issues his fatwa¯ on the supposition that the fatwa¯ is for the benefit of whoever implements it, in the position of the Islamic ruler he issues governmental orders (ah.ka¯m-i h.uku¯mati va sult.a¯ni) after being assured, following consultations with the experts, that his order is in accordance with the public’s interests. However, these orders are similar to fatwa¯s and the Islamic ordinances in that they are regarded as obligatory and must be obeyed by the public.78

Turning to the second group of interpretations, two distinguished contemporary Ayatullahs, Sayyid Abul-Qa¯sim Khui¯ (d. 1992) and Shaikh Muhammad-Ali Ara¯ki (d. 1994) were considered among those who supported the idea that a faqih is authorized to direct those particular social matters which are generally called umur-i h.isbih. Khui¯ argued The position of Vila¯yat is exclusively delegated to the Prophet and the Ima¯ms. During the time of absence [of the Twelfth Ima¯m], this position cannot be confirmed by any reasoning for the fuqaha¯. Although two traditional positions of the fuqaha¯, namely making 150

POLITICAL VIEWS

legal judgements and giving fatwa¯s, can be addressed to the sayings of the Ima¯ms as one source of Ijtiha¯d, the fuqaha¯’s state authority [vila¯yat] over people’s lives and properties cannot be proven by any jurisprudential argumentations. However, a number of specific matters which are generally called the umur-i h.isbih were put by the Shari‘at under the fuqaha¯’s authority. Cases such as looking after the affairs of orphans, the insane and the financially irresponsible [safih], lost and bankrupt persons, are considered as such areas. The vila¯yat on these matters does not mean that the fuqaha¯ or their agents are granted the authority of the state over the lives and properties of these people; rather that they are permitted by the Shari‘at merely to look after and direct their affairs for the benefit of these people’.79 Providing more explanations, Ara¯ki maintained that the position of a suitably qualified faqih is to enforce the punishment laws, issue fatwa¯s, make legal judgements, and organize the affairs of disappeared and abnormal persons (gha¯yib va qa¯s.ir) who cannot do so for themselves. The reasons presented for the necessity of Islamic rule – that is, protecting the territory of Islam, safeguarding the people’s lives, their reputation and properties, and preventing the aggression of non-Muslims against the Muslim frontiers – are general and do not apply to a particular group. There is no particular basis in Shi‘i texts for the argumentation that people’s worldly matters must be exclusively directed by the fuqaha¯. If a non-faqih ruler is able to implement the above-mentioned duties, and is ready to submit his sovereignty to the Twelfth Ima¯m (until his reappearance), his rulership cannot be counted as aggressive and illegitimate.80 The establishment of the Islamic Republic influenced the debate further. This became visible in the argumentation about the theory of h.isbih in particular, when a supporter of this theory, Ayatullah Shaikh Java¯d Tabrizi, added a new argument to those already stated. Tabrizi argued that It is evident that the Shari‘at does not accept a corrupt and oppressive person to be in charge of the daily affairs of Muslims. If a faqih or a person authorized by a faqih takes charge of the people’s daily matters, others (including the other fuqaha¯) are not permitted to weaken him. It could be argued that submission to his rule concerning matters relating to the order of society is obligatory. However, his authority does not exceed protecting the territory of Islam and the Muslims’.81

The third set of interpretations – that the fuqaha¯ have a supervisory role but must leave politics for the people (niz.a¯rat-i faqih va khila¯fat-i mardum) – was 151

POLITICAL VIEWS

best presented by Ayatullah Sayyid Muhammad Ba¯qir S.adr (d. 1980) in a series of pamphlets generally entitled Al-Islam Yaqu¯d al-H . aya¯t (‘Islam, the guide to life’) at the time when the Islamic Revolution was successful in Iran. These pamphlets were presented by S.adr as a gift to the Islamic Republic. The first pamphlet was entitled Lamh.a Tamhidiyih ‘an Du¯stu¯r al-Jumhuriyih alIslamiyih (‘An introduction to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic’); the second and also the third, Khut.u¯.t Tafs.iliyih ‘an Iqtis.a¯d al-Mujtam‘a al-Islami (‘Detailed discussion about the economy of Islamic society’); the fourth, S.u¯rah ‘an Iqtis.a¯d al-Mujtam‘a al-Islami (‘A form of economics for Islamic society’); and the fifth, Mana¯bi‘a al-Qudra fi al-Daulah al-Islami (‘The sources of the Islamic state’s power’). His views can be described in the following principles: first, God is regarded as the origin of all powers, and true vila¯yat belongs exclusively to Him; man is created free and no particular individual or group is granted dominion (siya¯dat) over him. Second, the Islamic Shari‘at is the source for the legislation of the Islamic Republic. Islamic ordinances are of three types: (i), ordinances on which all Mujtahids share the same view, and which are regarded as the permanent part of the laws; (ii), ordinances on which Mujtahids do not share the same view, where the legislators are free to choose whichever ordinance they prefer; (iii), and cases which have no permanent ordinances and are left to Muslims themselves, though legislation in these matters must not oppose the Constitution and should be in accord with the interests of society. The third of S.adr’s principles, namely the position of the deputyship of the Twelfth Ima¯m (niya¯bat-i ‘a¯mmih) is generally granted to the suitably qualified Mujtahid who is considered as the true successor of the Ima¯ms and the Prophet. A marj‘a or a suitably qualified Mujtahid has three general duties to perform: protecting religion; interpreting God’s ordinances; and safeguarding people’s sovereignty and the purity of their society (taking measures to prevent social deviations). Although the qualifications for the position of the marj‘a (such as fiqa¯hat and ‘ada¯lat) are mentioned in Shi‘i sources, and were not left to the people, the discernment of these qualifications in a particular Mujtahid is left to the people. The fourth of S.adr’s principles is that the right of governing (khila¯fat-i ‘a¯mmih) has been left by God exclusively to the people. The people are the holders of God’s trust, in that the institution of ruling is considered the ama¯nat-i Ila¯hi to the people and they are responsible to God for the accomplishment of this trust. They fulfil this task under the supervision of a marj‘a and on the basis of the principle of consultation (shu¯ra¯). The President is elected by them from amongst those candidates introduced by the marj‘a. They also elect the members of a consultative assembly. For their decision, the people are only responsible to God. They are equal before the law, and have freedom of (political) speech, of political activities, and in practising their religious rites and ceremonies. Despite his supervisory role, however, 152

POLITICAL VIEWS

the marj‘a is regarded as the first man of the country and the commander of the whole armed forces. Thus he has the following duties: introducing candidates for the election of the President; giving fatwa¯s concerning new governmental issues; signing the decree of the laws and regulations passed by the legislative power; making legal judgements. He carries out his duties through consultations with an assembly of ‘ulama¯ and specialists including at least 10 Mujtahids.82 It seems that S.adr is inconsistent in some parts of his interpretation. While he seeks to define a supervisory role for the marj‘a, his marj‘a is in fact entrusted with a broad range of executive authority. Despite S.adr’s notion that the right of governing is exclusively left to the people, their right must always be confirmed by the marj‘a. The first person in the executive power, the President, is to be elected from among those candidates whose candidacies were confirmed by the marj‘a. The ratified laws of the legislative power elected by the people must also be confirmed by the marj‘a. Similarly, S.adr does not clarify how or indeed whether his powerful marj‘a is responsible to the people. He also leaves unclear the mechanisms for choosing a marj‘a in a situation where there are a number of fully qualified Mujtahids to choose from. Although S.adr is clearly influenced by Na¯i¯ni in drawing a supervisory role for the fuqaha¯, his departure from Na¯i¯ni in placing the fuqaha¯ at the command of the military, and as the leader of society, is undeniable. S.adr’s niz.a¯rat-i faqih is similar to Khomeini’s Vila¯yat-i Faqih, in which no laws and major decisions can be operated without the approval of the just faqih. However, they are different in three cases: first, according to S.adr’s interpretation, the faqih has only a dispossessive (salbi) role in society, whereas according to Khomeini’s explanation he has both dispossessive and affirmative (i¯ja¯bi) roles. Second, the faqih has no executive role in S.adr’s theory, and cannot therefore appoint any official, whereas he is able, according to Khomeini’s theory, to appoint or dismiss officials. Third, in S.adr’s view, the government’s condition of being ‘Islamic’ is achieved by the supervision of Mujtahids over the state apparatus, whereas in Khomeini’s view it can be achieved solely by the fuqaha¯’s authority over all aspects of society. However, the importance of S.adr’s gift (the pamphlets) to the Islamic Republic, or more precisely to the Assembly of Experts for the codification of the constitutional law (3 August 1979 – 15 November 1979) cannot be denied when the period of publishing these pamphlets is being reconsidered. These were certainly the first explanations about the Islamic rule which the Shi‘i fuqaha¯ had published in such detail until that time. The fourth set of interpretations, which seeks custodianship for an elected faqih (Vila¯yat-i intikha¯bi-yi faqih), was presented by Ayatullah Husain Ali Montazeri. Following the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the completion by the Assembly of Experts (Majlis-i Khubriga¯n) under Montazeri, which had the task of codifying the constitutional law, he 153

POLITICAL VIEWS

expounded the theory of the Vila¯yat-i Faqih in his lessons at the Qum Seminary, and discussed in detail different aspects of the theory. In these jurisprudential lessons, which lasted nearly five years (from 25 December 1985 to 16 September 1989) the terms Vila¯yat, Ima¯mat and h.uku¯mat are used as synonyms, as are their derivatives valí, Ima¯m and h.a¯kim. An Ima¯m, for Montazeri, is a person who is followed or obeyed by people, not merely spiritually but politically. Therefore the office of Ima¯m (as well as vali¯ or h.a¯kim) is regarded as the ultimate office for resolving people’s difficulties.83 Agreeing with Khomeini in according a governmental authority to the fuqaha¯, Montazeri argues that besides possessing the essential qualifications – such as considerable intellect, faith, justice, ability to manage several affairs, masculinity, purity of birth, and moral virtues – the Islamic ruler must be qualified by deep knowledge of Islam and fiqa¯hat. While a Mujtahid who knows the Islamic ordinances by his own discretion (Ijtiha¯d) is present among the people, the rule of an ordinary ruler who is not trained in Islamic law or is knowledgeable only through imitation (taqli¯d), is not legitimate. In confirming this view he refers to a number of h.adith and ¯ nus: 35) states: ‘It is Allah Who Quranic verses. One such Quranic verse (U gives guidance towards truth. Is then He who gives guidance to truth more worthy to be followed, or he who finds not guidance [himself] unless he is guided?’ On this basis Montazeri maintained that since the ruler is to be followed and obeyed by people, those scholars who are guided to truth by themselves are to be preferred for this position.84 Similarly, it is narrated from Ali ibn Abi-T.a¯lib that: ‘The caliph of the ummat should be the most learned of them in the book of God [Quran] and the Traditions of the Prophet.’ Further, is also reported that Ali ibn Abi-T.a¯lib said: O people, the most rightful of all persons for this matter [the caliphate] is he who is most competent among them to maintain it, and he who knows best Allah’s commands about it. If any mischief is created by a mischief-monger, he will be called upon to repent. If he refuses, he will be fought.85 Montazeri differs from Khomeini in the matter of whether the fuqaha¯ are appointed by the Ima¯ms. Montazeri argues that this notion is theoretically unthinkable, for if in a society in which five fully qualified Mujtahids exist at the same time, all of them are actually, not merely potentially, regarded as the appointed rulers, so that their different orders should be obeyed by the people simultaneously. This, for Montazeri, is inconceivable, and in that it would undoubtedly result in anarchy and the disintegration of society, it is unacceptable for practical reasons.86 Montazeri further argued that the notion is jurisprudentially not approvable. Although the infallible Ima¯ms were, according to Shi‘i theology, ‘appointed’ by the Prophet as his successors, for Montazeri, the fuqaha¯ were not ‘appointed’ by the Ima¯ms as 154

POLITICAL VIEWS

the rulers of the people. And while the texts (h.adiths) which were presented by the Shi‘i theologians for the appointment of the Ima¯ms are considered authentic, the sayings of the Ima¯ms relied upon by the supporters of the Doctrine of Appointment (Muh.aqqiq Karaki, Najafi, Nara¯qi and Khomeini) do not prove their case. The Traditions that support the Shi‘i theologians clearly indicate the appointment of the Ima¯ms, but the h.adiths used to confirm the appointment of the fuqaha¯ do not indicate that they were ‘appointed’ and entrusted with the governmental authority during the time of Occultation. Rather, they guide and recommend the Shi‘i communities to ‘choose’ their rulers from among those who are known as ‘fuqaha¯’, ‘ruva¯t-i h.adith’ (the narrators of the sayings of the Prophets and the Ima¯ms) and ‘a¯rif bi h.ala¯l va h.ara¯m’ (aware of the permitted and the forbidden).87 Montazeri goes on to argue that a government can be established by the appointment of God, by force (qahr) or by choice and election, and that since the first two methods cannot be supported by the jurisprudential sources, the third method remains valid. Considering the phenomenon of rulership (h.uku¯mat) as a mutual agreement (mu‘a¯qidih) between ruler (vali¯ ) and ummat (people), Montazeri maintained that this agreement cannot be achieved without the people’s direct or indirect choice and election.88 In support of this view he refers to a number of Quranic verses and the sayings of the Ima¯ms. According to one such Quranic verse (Shu¯ra¯: 38) the believers conduct their affairs (amr) by mutual consultation (shu¯ra¯). Montazeri argues that the word ‘amr’ in Quranic terminology usually refers to the issue of rulership (h.uku¯mat) and political affairs, and that, as a consequence, people must be consulted, according to the Quranic verse, for the establishment of government.89 He also cites Ali ibn Abi-T.a¯lib as having said: As an obligatory matter for Muslims by God’s order and by the Islamic law [Shari‘at], they must do nothing, start nothing, and move nowhere, after their ruler [Ima¯m] has died or been murdered, until they ‘choose’ for themselves a chaste, learned, pious ruler who is familiar with Tradition [sunnat], law and judgement, and able to direct their affairs.90 However, although this interpretation acknowledges the people’s right of sovereignty, the people are not permitted to choose any ruler they wish. They should choose solely a well-qualified Mujtahid as their leader (vali¯-yi faqih). It seems that Montazeri’s elected Mujtahid, like Khomeini’s appointed faqih, enjoys full-ranging authority. Although the terms Vila¯yat-i mut.laqih or Vila¯yat-i ‘a¯mmih are not used in Montazeri’s books, and he does not state that the Islamic ruler is authorized to hold full-ranging authority, nevertheless he puts all three powers – the executive, the legislature and the judiciary – under the authority of the ruler. Montazeri’s elected faqih, in opposition to S.adr’s chosen Mujtahid, holds not only a supervisory role, but is regarded as 155

POLITICAL VIEWS

the highest official in Islamic society, in charge of protecting people’s prestige and dignity, and directing their affairs. The heads of the three powers are considered by Montazeri as the ruler’s aides and assistants.91 In his private discussions with some of his students, Montazeri acknowledged that the people are recognized by the Shari‘at as being sovereign, and can therefore limit the authority of the Islamic ruler, even electing a well-qualified Mujtahid for a temporary period rather than for his full life-time, yet these ideas were not published.92 According to Montazeri, Islamic rule differs from Western democracy in two matters. While people in a democratic system are supposedly free to elect any person as their ruler, in a Shi‘i society Muslims may not choose any other ruler except a just faqih. In a democratic society, people are free to legislate any law according to their collective wishes, whereas in an Islamic regime the legislation must be in accord with Islamic laws and ordinances. Therefore, according to Montazeri, Islamic rule is essentially different from democracy in the West.93 Finally, the fifth interpretation of the Islamic rule is that presented by Dr Mahdi Ha¯’iri Yazdi, a former student of Ayatullah Khomeini and a Professor of Islamic Philosophy at Tehran University. This interpretation is called Vika¯lat-i Ma¯lika¯n-i Shakhs.i-yi Musha¯‘a (representation of private, joint owners), and is the latest interpretation presented by the Shi‘i fuqaha¯ on Islamic rule. In his H . ikmat va H . uku¯mat (‘Philosophy and governance’) which was published in London in 1995, Ha¯’iri deals fundamentally with the theory of the Vila¯yat-i Faqih. Although he prefers to refer to Nara¯qi, rather than addressing himself to Khomeini or Montazeri, he openly criticizes the Islamic Republic of Iran as a realization of Nara¯qi’s theory.94 His main arguments can be summarized in the following principles. First, the term ‘h.uku¯mat’ is defined in two senses. On the one hand, it is generally applied by the Islamic philosophers to the technique for governing a country, fairly and thoughtfully taking measures for directing and organizing the internal and external affairs of the citizens of a territory. This meaning is derived from h.ukm (definite decision) and h.ikmat (wisdom), and is regarded as a branch of practical philosophy. On the other hand, it is used for authority (h.a¯kimi¯yat), dominion (salt.anat), the ordering of subordinates, and even for custodianship (Vila¯yat) and guardianship (qaimu¯mat) of people. This meaning is applied by politicians and has no relation to h.ikmat and practical philosophy.95 Second, people’s affairs must be managed only by consultation, not by revelation or God’s messenger.96 Third, a territory which is occupied by its inhabitants belongs, like an inherited property, to each and every one of its occupants. As an inherited property is regarded as private property and belongs jointly to all its heirs, so the territory belongs jointly to each and 156

POLITICAL VIEWS

every one of its occupants (ma¯likiyat-i shakhs.i-yi musha¯‘a). The occupants of a territory are regarded as the private, joint owners of that territory (ma¯lika¯n-i shakhs.i-yi musha¯‘a).97 Fourth, society is philosophically considered to be a union of each of its citizens, not a whole or a collection (va¯h.idi jam‘i¯ ) of its parts.98 Fifth, the citizens of a territory possess equally the right of sovereignty over their land. Their individual personalities, independence, free will, beliefs, speech, and the reasonable deeds of each of them are regarded as the sole valid source and reliable criteria for the establishment of a government. This is similar to an agreement or a contract (qararda¯d-i vika¯lat) held between an agent or an attorney (vakil) and the joint heirs to a property. Consequently, governance is no more than a power of attorney granted by the true owners of the country, namely the citizens. Since such representation is, according to Islamic law, revocable and dispensable (‘aqd-i ja¯yiz va ghair-i la¯zim al-vafa¯), it can unilaterally be resolved or cancelled by the clients whenever they so decide. Similarly, the clients have the right to replace the attorney or representative with any other person or persons they prefer, while an agent or a representative has no authority wider than the limitations set by his clients. He should do his best for the benefit and interests of his clients.99 The sixth point Ha¯’iri makes is that the Prophet and the Ima¯ms were merely sent by God to improve the morality and spirituality of the people; establishing a government was not part of their mission. Although the Prophet established a government in Medina, it was due to his objective of establishing a centre for his mission. The political leadership of the Prophet and also of Ima¯m Ali was confirmed by the bai‘at (allegiance) of the people.100 Seventh, Ha¯’iri argues that the principle of ‘Calling people to good and prohibiting them from evil’, must be interpreted as a moral principle, with the purpose of reminding people to deliberately do good things and to warn them from doing evil deliberately. It does not mean that people must be forced to do good things and to avoid evil. Therefore, there is no justification for the argument that Islamic government should be established due to the principle of ‘calling people to good things and prohibiting them from doing evil’.101 Eighth, Muslims are left free by Islam to establish their favoured form of political structure. As a result, there exists in Islamic sources no particular form of political system. Although the Prophet and Ima¯m Ali held a governmental office, they did not introduce or recommend any particular form of Islamic governance. People are ordered to choose the most perfect (akmal) and most suitable (as.lah) person of their society as the ruler of their country.102 Ninth, while the position of Ima¯mat does not depend on the choice and allegiance of the people, the office of caliphate does need to be accepted by the people. While the Ima¯mat is, like prophethood, regarded as a spiritual and transcendental position, the caliphate is considered a worldly office. An Ima¯m is positioned to explain the principal features of religion (ma‘a¯lim al-din), whereas a caliph is to be in charge of people’s social and 157

POLITICAL VIEWS

political affairs.103 Tenth, Ha¯’iri maintains that the term Vila¯yat is essentially and conceptually different from h.uku¯mat and political authority. Vila¯yat means that the guardian (valí-yi amr) of persons (muvalla¯ ‘alaih) who are either immature or insane or whose financial position is precarious, or who are bankrupt businessmen, is charged with the management of their personal and private affairs, whereas h.uku¯mat means that the h.a¯kim is placed in charge of the affairs of a country. While a valí (or qayyim) is granted by Islamic law absolute mandate over his subordinates, an Islamic ruler, as a representative (vakil) of the people, holds only the authority granted to him by his clients. Technically, Vila¯yat cannot therefore be used for political and governmental matters. Historically, too, Vila¯yat was never used in Shi‘ite fiqh for government before Nara¯qi.104 Eleventh, according to Ha¯’iri, the Traditions used by Nara¯qi for the theory of Vila¯yat-i Faqih, though they grant some degree of authority to fuqaha¯ over public affairs, do not support his argument. Although the ‘ulama¯ and fuqaha¯ are highly honoured in those Traditions, yet they were not granted a governmental office. Moreover, the words ‘ulama¯ and fuqaha¯ have spiritual meanings and are to be interpreted as those who were morally well trained and achieved a high degree of transcendental knowledge. They cannot be simply interpreted as the common concepts of those who have just graduated from a clerical seminary.105 The twelfth point which Ha¯’iri makes is that Nara¯qi’s argument that ‘a faqih is preferred to other categories, as a ruler’ has no basis in reason (‘aql). While a faqih is a specialist in fiqh and his main concern is with jurisprudential issues, executive power needs a manager possessing the necessary qualifications for directing the country’s daily affairs. The necessary qualifications of a ruler, for Ha¯’iri, are as follows: the ability to direct people’s affairs, experience of governmental matters, the ability to understand the situation of time and place (zama¯n va maka¯n), decisiveness, bravery, trustworthiness.106 Thirteen, since it is possible that advantage will be taken of the religious feelings of the people by those fuqaha¯ who have taken a governmental office, they should be seriously prohibited from involvement with political sectors and executive matters.107 However, the fuqaha¯’s position as guardians of the constitutional law is considered a manifestation of democracy and of the people’s rights to their sovereignty.108 Fourteen, the relation between the two terms ‘Islamic Republic’ and ‘Vila¯yat-i Faqih’ is paradoxical, for while a republican system is based on the will and sovereignty of the people, a political structure established on the theory of Vila¯yat-i Faqih refers ultimately to the sovereignty of a Mujtahid.109 Ha¯’iri’s theory appears to be a combination of the second and the third theories. His acknowledgment of the authority of fuqaha¯ upon matters generally known as umur-i h.isbih lays him among those traditionalist fuqaha¯ such as Khui¯ and Ara¯ki who seek to keep the ‘ulama¯ away from the political arena. His support for the role of guardianship of the constitutional law for the fuqaha¯ puts him in line with those moderate Mujtahids such as Na¯i¯ni and S.adr who see the 158

POLITICAL VIEWS

fuqaha¯ as the guardians (na¯z.irs) for operating Islamic law in society. His theory of ‘representation of private, joint owners’ is similar to Rousseau’s theory of ‘social contract’. Although he explained that both the Prophet and Ima¯m Ali formed their rulerships by the allegiance of the people, he does not clarify whether they were, as the rulers of Islamic society, considered solely the representatives of the people or more as the vali¯ of the people. While Khomeini and also Montazeri’s discussions are totally jurisprudential, Ha¯’iri’s analysis is predominantly philosophical. While Khomeini and Montazeri constantly refer to the Quran, the Prophet and the Ima¯ms, Ha¯’iri addresses himself mostly to Plato, Aristotle, Locke, Hobbes, Rousseau and Montesquieu.110 It seems also that his dislike of the doctrine of Vila¯yat-i Faqih forced him to neglect most of the arguments provided by Montazeri for this doctrine. He does not even mention those Sayings of the Ima¯ms used by proponents of the doctrine of fiqa¯hat in the Islamic ruler. Although Mut.ahhari should undoubtedly be regarded as a supporter of the doctrine of Vila¯yat-i Faqih, nevertheless his interpretation concerning the origin and also the type of authorities of the fuqaha¯, seems inconsistent. In . his earlier writings – such as Islam va Muqtaz iyat-i Zama¯n – Mut.ahhari supports Khomeini’s interpretation of the vila¯yat of an appointed faqih, and argues that the Islamic ruler is granted by Islam a wide-ranging authority. This authority was exercised by the Prophet during the time of his rule, and was granted by him to the Ima¯ms after he passed away. It was also granted by the Twelfth Ima¯m to the office of his general deputy [na¯yib-i ‘a¯mm] during the time of his Occultation.111 However, in his later writings and interviews on the theory of Islamic rule, Mut.ahhari presented an interpretation which can be regarded a combination of the third and the fourth theories listed above, which were later explained in detail by S.adr and Montazeri. In an interview with Iranian television, after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, Mut.ahhari maintained: Vila¯yat-i Faqih does not mean that a faqih himself is to be established as the head of government to actually run the country. The position of a faqih in an Islamic country, whose people have accepted the ideology of Islam and are committed to it, is the position of an ideologue, not that of a ruler [h.a¯kim]. The duty of an ideologue is to watch [niz.a¯rat] how correctly that ideology is operated in society. He considers the suitability of a person who wants to be the head of government. Vila¯yat-i Faqih is in fact an ideological authority, and the faqih is to be elected by the people. This is exactly the same as democracy. It would be against democracy if an appointed faqih 159

POLITICAL VIEWS

were to appoint the following faqih. But it is clear that a marj‘a-i taqli¯d is also chosen by the people through consultation.112 In his notes on issues relating to governance, entitled ‘Masa¯yil-i h.uku¯mat’, Mut.ahhari argues: A ruler is a person who is legitimately [willingly], not by force, obeyed. He can legitimately be obeyed in two ways: by vila¯yat and also by vika¯lat [representation]. However, the discussions between the fuqaha¯ in fiqh are about the [source of] vila¯yah of a ruler, not the vika¯lah of a ruler.113 He continued: The right of choosing a ruler is left to people during the time of Occultation. The ruler must be, according to Shi‘i law, qualified with justice and fiqa¯hat. However, the electors of the ruler are to be either the fuqaha¯ or, as with the choice of a marj‘a-i taqli¯d, the people. The first can be regarded as a kind of aristocratic rule, the second a type of democracy.114 Mut.ahhari sees no contradiction between the two terms, ‘Islamic’ and ‘Republic’. According to him, a political structure based on the republican system equates theoretically as well as practically with an Islamic system. He argues that the term ‘republic’ explains the political framework or structure of a given society, whereas the term ‘Islamic’ defines its content. In other words, the word ‘Islamic’ means that the government must rule the country with the Islamic laws and regulations. The ambiguity may have originated, according to Mut.ahhari, from the notion that a democratic system cannot meet with any religion-based system, and that to be considered a democratic structure (or a democratic person) it is necessary to be free from any religious practice and regulation. Rejecting this notion, Mut.ahhari argues that the principles of democracy do not require that the political and social structures of a given society should necessarily be free from ideology and religion. If a nation accepts consciously an ideology or a religion, demand for implementing the ideology and operating the religious laws in society should be regarded as a result of their democratic rights. The right of sovereignty of a given nation requires that their demand for operating their political system should be acknowledged. Giving an example, Mut.ahhari concludes that at the period of the Constitutional Revolution the Iranian people never thought that adding the principle that all legislation must be in accordance with Islamic laws, or that accepting the authority of five Mujtahids over the legislative power, would detract from their democratic rights and their right of sovereignty.115 160

CONCLUSION

Today most people in the West are familiar with the Islamic Revolution of Iran, and have some idea about the Sha¯h, the Pahlavi regime, Ayatullah Khomeini and the Islamic Republic. The Islamic Revolution was a popular movement which started in June 1963 and succeeded in February 1979 with the collapse of the Sha¯h’s regime. From the beginning of the Revolution, a particular type of Islamic ideology –Vila¯yat-i Faqih or Islam-i Fiqa¯hati – rose, gradually strengthened, and eventually dominated the Revolution and formed a unique type of political system which has been constitutionalized under the title of Islamic Republic. Many Islamic activists, thinkers and theoreticians were undeniably behind this Revolution, including Mahdi Bazarga¯n, Ali Shariati, Sayyid Mahmood . T.a¯liqa¯ni, Ruh.ullah Khomeini, Husain-Ali Montazeri, Murtaz a Mut.ahhari, and Sayyid Muhammad Beheshti. However, no-one could deliver that ideology from the very depths of the Islamic original texts and render it a legitimate historical updating of the Muslim identity except Ayatullah Mut.ahhari. It has been revealed throughout the previous chapters that Mut.ahhari enjoyed four achievements which collectively made him unique among his contemporaries. First, he was always considered among the top ten students during his education in Qum, where he benefited from the most distinguished teachers: the Grand Ayatullah Burujerdi, Ayatullah Ima¯m Khomeini and Allamih Tabatabai¯. He also benefited from prominent mystics such as Mirza¯ Mahdi ¯ qa¯ Shira¯zi and Shaikh ‘Abba¯s Qucha¯ni. With the Shahidi, Mirza¯ Ali-A assistance of these great instructors, Mut.ahhari improved his mental abilities and refined his moral sensibilities, acquired the necessary educational qualifications for his future and guaranteed his position as a young Mudarris and Mujtahid. He successfully became educated in Islamic studies – jurisprudence, philosophy, mysticism and history – became fully familiar with the Islamic texts and sources – the Quran and H . adith – and presented himself as a well-qualified Islamologist. Second, Mut.ahhari was familiar with modern Western philosophers and scientists. He deals with Darwin, Hegel, Freud, Comte, Marx, Durkheim, 161

CONCLUSION

Russell, and Will Durant. Therefore, he always includes comparative discussions in his works between the Islamic philosophers and their Western counterparts. This comprehensiveness made Mut.ahhari attractive to different classes of people. For a number of distinguished university professors such as Nasr, Reza and Enayat, Mut.ahhari seemed a well-educated scholar, a good example of the combination of past and present. For a great many young Muslim activists, such as the three Islamic Associations of Teachers, Physicians, and Engineers, Mut.ahhari was an example of a devoted intellectual, who knows his time, his society and his responsibility towards his people. For most religious authorities, Mut.ahhari was seen as a powerful forerunner, defending Islam and Islamic doctrines. This element undoubtedly helped Mut.ahhari to acquire a unique position in the eyes and hearts of his colleagues, students, friends, teachers, readers, audiences, adherents and followers. Third, Mut.ahhari’s works seem unparalleled, even today two and a half decades after his assassination. This is for three reasons: (i) his works, even the most professional ones such as Us.u¯l-i Falsafih va Ravish-i Realism, have been written for the public not solely for experts. They are, generally, clear, plain, unfussy and well developed; (ii) similar to Marx, Mut.ahhari’s works are comprehensive and cover a vast variety of subjects and issues, from personal ethical matters to communal sociological issues; (iii) his method of analysis is typically unique, consisting of arguments based on rational, religious (referring to the Quran and H . adith) as well as historical evidence. These three elements, collectively, make Mut.ahhari’s works different from his counterparts. Fourth is his high and leading position at the Islamic Revolution. During the Revolution, Mut.ahhari was considered a chief assistant and main representative of Ayatullah Khomeini in Iran. During this period, he was regarded as the chief adviser of Ayatullah Khomeini, and was appointed as the head of the Revolutionary Council, the highest political body of the country at that time. Undoubtedly he played a very definite role in the Islamization of Iran’s political structure. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic was, then, composed under the clear influence of his views and visions. Therefore, evidence supports the view that Mut.ahhari is the main theoretician or major architect of Islamic Iran. Mut.ahhari’s life covered the period between the rise and the fall of the Pahlavis (1921–79). He naturally dealt with the major movements of his time, such as secularism, Westernization, Marxism, nationalism, traditionalism and Islamism. But, as has been shown throughout this book, his main lifetime challenges were secularism and Marxist-materialism, i.e. the movements which should also, according to Mut.ahhari, be regarded as the main threats to the Islamic movement and the Islamist groups in the future. Mut.ahhari’s anti-Marxist stand can be traced back to his early education in Qum where he was studying Islamic philosophy. The Iranian Marxist parties 162

CONCLUSION

such as the H . izb-i Tu¯dih and the Chirik-ha¯-yi Fada¯i¯-yi Khalq were, for him, a fundamental threat to the religious socialization of young Muslim activists. His first publication, Us.u¯l-i Falsafih va Ravish-i Realism, deals with Marxist epistemology, while his last-published work, Ja¯mi‘ih va Ta¯rikh, tackles Marxist sociology and historical philosophy. A considerable number of his other books were written in refutation of Marxist ideology. He opposed Shariati as well as the Muslim leftist groups, such as the Muja¯hidin-i khalq and the Furqa¯n, as soon as he considered them to be influenced by Marxist ideology, and as presenting Islamic ideology with materialistic interpretations. However, Mut.ahhari’s anti-secularist scripts became more important after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the decline of Marxist movements in Iran, as well as in the other parts of the world. Today, a number of his anti-liberalist and anti-secularist works such as Jumhu¯ri-yi . Islami, Nihz at-ha¯-yi Islami dar S.ad Sa¯lih-yi Akhir, Mas’alih-yi H . ija¯b and Niz.a¯m-i H uqu ¯ q-i Zan dar Islam have again been found at the centre of . attention of Islamist groups, not only in Iran but also in other Muslim societies and communities around the globe. His writings, which were translated into most of the principal languages of the world, are increasingly being published in Iran and are still broadly distributed among the younger generation of Muslim populations. However, it is useful to note here that to present Mut.ahhari as still the most relevant philosopher for the present theoretical problems of Islamic societies and communities, an international conference, entitled H . ikmat-i Mut.ahhar (‘purified wisdom’), was held by his students in Tehran on 25–8 April 2004 (the anniversary of his assassination in 1979), when Mut.ahhari’s achievements were reviewed. To provide a more comprehensive understanding of Mut.ahhari for the reader, the first two chapters of this book concentrated on other parts of his personality. It has been argued that Mut.ahhari was a rationalist. It was during his primary education in Mashhad Seminary that his attraction to philosophy was first awoken. Although a theological current called Maktabi Tafkik was dominant in the seminary in Mashhad at that time, he did not follow it, but took an independent position in favour of the rational method of interpreting religious texts. While the Tafkiki ‘ulama¯ insisted that Islamic principles must be exclusively interpreted on the basis of Islamic sources, Mut.ahhari argued that they should be rationally interpreted and presented in rational ways. Furthermore, Mut.ahhari was a moralist. He believed that human beings can find the answers to their philosophical questions not only through formal education, but also through moral qualifications such as piety. Three scholars who were considered by Mut.ahhari as his role models, . ¯ qa¯ Ruhhullah Khomeini and Mirza¯ AliMirza¯ Mahdi Shahidi Razavi, Ha¯jj A ¯A qa¯ Shira¯zi, were all well known for the depth of their moral and spiritual characters. It has also been disclosed in these two chapters that Mut.ahhari seems to 163

CONCLUSION

shift from time to time between traditionalism and reformism. While the traditional ‘ulama¯ were mainly concerned with personal matters in religion, Mut.ahhari was mostly engaged with social and political issues. His support for reform in the seminaries in Qum, caused him the loss of the Grand Ayatullah Buru¯jirdi’s confidence. As a consequence, he was forced to leave the seminary and move to Tehran University. The critical situation of the religious institutions of the country, and the increasing demands for their updating, forced him to take the initiative in establishing the Husainiyih-i Irsha¯d as a role model for the modernization of the whole religious system. This albeit unsuccessful effort, in addition to his proposal for a reform in the wearing of the veil by women, which angered many traditionalist ‘ulama¯, can be seen as a part of his reformist plans and activities. However, he was not entirely against traditionalism. While Shariati and the Muslim leftist activists chose a radical approach towards the clerical establishment and called for Islamic ‘Protestantism’, Mut.ahhari supported the traditional view in favour of the survival of the clerical hierarchy. He wanted to be a part of the clerical structure. Mut.ahhari’s support for traditional law in the judiciary, as opposed to the Westernization process, was also evident when the modification of Iran’s civil codes, heralding the introduction of further Western legal norms, became an explosive social issue in the press in 1966–7. To provide the reader with a more detailed image of his economic perspectives, Chapter 3 focused on Mut.ahhari’s economic analysis. It has been argued that Mut.ahhari attempted to take a position between capitalism and socialism. He finally came to support what is called ‘state capitalism’. To decrease the gap between classes, Mut.ahhari preferred to put all the major economic resources of the country, under the control of the governmental sector. His philosophical analysis of the ‘machine’ (basic industries) as a product of collective intellect made him unique among Islamic economic theoreticians. He did not recognize the ‘machine’ as the property of the private sector; rather it must be located under the control of the Islamic state. An individual, even a very religious, pious and good-tempered one, is not immune from favouring his own interests and doing harm to the public. The economy of an Islamic society (whether in production or trade or public services) must eventually come under the authority of a just, public, caring state, not under the monopoly of self-protecting economic elites. These ideas were fully reflected, if not directly realized, by Ayatullah Dr Beheshti in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic (1979), and were put into operation by the then Prime Minister Mu¯savi, in almost a decade. This economic part of the Constitution was left unchanged at the first amendment of the Constitution in 1989. Surprisingly, Mut.ahhari’s economic views have not worked out in practice, and they gradually lost their practicality after a decade. The then President Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989–97) prepared the ground for the policy of privatization, and President Khatami is seriously pursuing this policy today. 164

CONCLUSION

Some ambiguities can be seen in Mut.ahhari’s political perspectives. Although his political views are clear and harmonious in principles, they are not elaborated and well-developed in detail. This was probably due to his ¯ VA ¯ K) during the regime of the Sha¯h, and the fear of the security forces (SA lack of opportunity at the time of Revolution. Chapter 4 provided, however, a clearer view of Mut.ahhari’s political ideology. Similar to Ayatullah Khomeini, Mut.ahhari was opposed to monarchism and secularism. He was a supporter of Islamic rule not in the form of the rulership of a just ruler, but the rule of a well-qualified jurist (Vila¯yat-i Faqih). He envisioned a powerful centralized government for his ideal Islamic society. However, it is not clear whether, like Muhammad Ba¯qir S.adr, he sought a supervisory role for a faqih, or whether, like Ayatullah Khomeini, he proposed full authority for a Mujtahid. He did not comprehensively develop the theory. However, this theory has been formally legalized in the political section of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and even more strengthened with the full authority of the Vali¯-i Faqih as the ultimate decision-maker of the country during the amendment of the Constitution (1989). This part as well as other parts of the Constitution, which have been composed under the visible influences of Islamic doctrines, are today challenged by non-Islamist groups, including nationalists, liberals, secularists, republicans and all those who support a democratic non-Islamist republican system. Again, Mut.ahhari’s political writings today constitute a major source to which anti-Islamic ideology is addressed and is referred to by young Islamist activists. Mut.ahhari was, like Fada¯i¯ya¯n-i Islam, a supporter of Islamic universalism. He criticized the then rampant Persian nationalism as a philosophy propagated by the agents of the imperialist countries, as a result of which Iran would be separated from other Islamic societies. He acknowledged, however, some positive aspects of which he called moderate nationalism – ‘love your country without humiliating other nations’. Article 11 of Chapter I of the Constitution reflected this idea as follows: In accordance with the Quranic verse ‘This your nation is a single nation, and I am your Lord, so worship me’, all Muslims form a single nation, and the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has the duty of formulating its general policies with a view to the merging and union of all Muslim peoples, and it must constantly strive to bring about the political, economic, and cultural unity of the Islamic world. Mut.ahhari was a moderate political activist. The Marxist and Muslim leftist guerrillas believed in praxis and held the view that action is prior to thought. They were also in favour of armed struggle. Mut.ahhari, by contrast, believed in the priority of thought over action or the priority of education over armed struggle. He assumed that the prime strategy for an undeveloped 165

CONCLUSION

or developing country like Iran, most of whose people were illiterate and uneducated, rested on cultural and educational measures, not on semimilitary practices. Although he was a friend and also a teacher of a number of Muslim activists who were practising armed struggle, such as the Fada¯i¯ya¯n-i Islam and the Mu’talifih-yi Islami, he never recommended armed struggle to them. In this respect he was visibly influenced by his teacher, Ayatullah Buru¯jirdi. Another characteristic of Mut.ahhari’s course of action is that he never agreed to campaign with the Marxist groups against the regime of the Sha¯h. Unlike Shariati (and some Muslim groups), who considered the Marxist groups as competitors and the Sha¯h and American imperialism as the real enemy, Mut.ahhari stated his well-known phrase that ‘Both imperialism and communism are similar to the blades of a pair of scissors which are apparently opposite to each other, but in reality move in unison to cut one root.’ To summarize his achievements in a few words: following the leadership of Ayatullah Khomeini, Mut.ahhari was able to develop an alternative ideology to the Sha¯h’s monarchism, and to the Marxists’ socialism. He theorized an Islamic world view and ideology, improved the argumentation of the Islamist groups, expanded the tendency towards an Islamic way of living among educated Muslim activists, and played a definite role in the victory of the Islamic Revolution and the empowerment of those Islamist groups. Iran’s Islamic system was formed under the visible influence of his views and he has been positioned as one of the main theoreticians of the country. His works are still attractive to the public and are regarded as a major source for the Islamic way of life. The anniversary of his martyrdom is officially remembered in Iran as ‘Teacher’s Day’.

166

NOTES

INTRODUCTION . 1 Bazarga¯n, Mahdi, in Mut.ahhari’s memorial speech, Abul-Fazl Mosque, Tehran, 5.2.1359/1980. 2 Nomani, Farhad and Rahnema, Ali, The Secular Miracle, London and New Jersey, 1990, p. 38. 3 Fischer, Michael and Abedi, Mehdi, Debating Muslims, Madison, 1990, p. 181. 4 Algar, Hamid, ‘Introduction’ (to Mut.ahhari’s life) in: Murtaz. a Mut.ahhari, Fundamentals of Islamic Thought, trans. R. Campbell, Berkeley, 1985, p. 9. 5 Dabashi, Hamid, Theology of Discontent, New York and London, 1993, p. 148. 6 Martin, Vanessa, Creating an Islamic State, London and New York, 2000, p. 75. 7 See the statement of Ayatullah Khomeini on 12.2.1358/1.5.1979, in: n.a., S.ah.ifih-yi Nu¯r, Vol. 4, Tehran, Bahman 1361/1983, p. 104. 8 Suru¯sh, ‘Abdul-Karim, ‘Mut.ahhari: Ih.ya¯-kunandihi¯ dar ‘Asr-i Jadid’, in: ‘AbdulKarim Suru¯sh, Tafarruj-i S.un‘a, Tehran, 1366 (1987–8), p. 366. 9 See an interview with Ayatullah Sayyid Ali Khamenei¯ on 12.2.1360 (1981) in: M. H. Va¯thiqi Ra¯d, Mut.ahhari: Mut.ahhar-i Andishih-ha¯ , Vol. 1, Qum, Urdibihisht 1364 (1985), p. 222. 10 Va¯thiqi Ra¯d, Mut.ahhari, Vol. 1, p. 143. 11 See interviews with H . ujjat al-Islam Hashemi Rafsanjani on 12.2.1360 (1.5.1981) and 11.2.1361 (30.4.1982), in: Va¯thiqi Ra¯d, Mut.ahhari, Vol. 1, pp. 127 and 131. 12 Quoted from Va¯thiqi Ra¯d, Mut.ahhari, Vol. 1, p. 415. 13 Algar, Hamid, ‘Introduction’, pp. 9–22. 14 Fischer and Abedi, Debating Muslims, pp. 181–211. 15 Nomani and Rahnema, The Secular Miracle, pp. 38–51. . 16 Haar, J. G. J., ‘Murtaza Mut.ahhari (1919–1979): An Introduction to his Life and Thought’, Persica, 1990–2, Vol. XIV, pp. 1–20. 17 Dabashi, Theology of Discontent, pp. 147–215. 18 Martin, Creating an Islamic State, pp. 75–99. 19 Montazeri, Husain-Ali, ‘H . akim-i Farza¯nih’ in: n.a., Ya¯ d-na¯ mih-yi Usta¯ d-i Shahid Murtaz. a Mut.ahhari, Tehran, Shahrivar 1360 (1981), Vol. 1, pp. 171–3; Muhammad Va‘iz. -za¯dih Khura¯sa¯ni, ‘Sairi dar Zindigi-i ‘Ilmi va Inqila¯bi-yi . Usta¯d-i Shahid Murtaza Mut.ahhari’ in: n.a., Ya¯ d-na¯ mih-yi Usta¯ d, pp. 319–80. 20 Va¯thiqi Ra¯d, Mut.ahhari: Mut.ahhar-i Andishih-ha¯ (2 vols), Qum, Urdibihisht 1364 (1985). 21 N.a., Jilvih-ha¯ -yi Mu‘allimi¯-yi Usta¯ d, Tehran, Spring 1364 (1985). 22 N.a., Sairi dar Zindiga¯ ni-yi Usta¯ d Mut.ahhari, Tehran, Urdibihisht 1371 (1992). 23 N.a., Sarguzasht-ha¯ -yi Vizhih az Zindigi-yi Usta¯ d-i Shahid Murtaz. a Mut.ahhari (2 vols), Tehran, summer 1370 (1991).

167

NOTES

1 THE PERIOD OF EDUCATION 1 For Reza Kha¯n’s coup d’état, see S. A. Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown, Oxford, 1988, pp. 59–68; H. Makki, Ta¯ rikh-i Bist Sa¯ lih-i Iran, Tehran, 1358 (1979–80), Vol. 1; S. J. Madani, Ta¯ rikh-i Siya¯ si-i Mu‘a¯ sir-i Iran, Qum, Mehr 1361 (1982), Vol. 1, pp. 96–128; E. Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions, Princeton, 1982, pp. 102–49; H. Sabahi, British Policy in Persia, London, 1990, pp. 157–200. 2 For the biography of Mut.ahhari see M. H. Va¯thiqi Ra¯d, Mut.ahhari: Mut.ahhar-i Andishih-ha¯ (2 vols), Qum, Urdibihisht 1364 (1985); n.a., Sairi dar Zindiga¯ ni-i Usta¯ d Mut.ahhari, Tehran, Urdibihisht 1371 (1992); M. Va¯‘iz. -za¯dih Khura¯sa¯ni, . ‘Sairi dar Zindiga¯ni-i ‘Ilmi va Inqila¯bi-yi Usta¯d Shahid Murtaza Mut.ahhari’ in: Ya¯ d-na¯ mih, ed. ‘Abdul-Karim Suru¯sh, Tehran, Shahrivar 1360 (1981); n.a., Jilvih-ha¯ -yi Mu‘allimi-yi Usta¯ d, Tehran, Spring 1364 (1985); n.a., Sar guzashtha¯ -yi Vizhih az Zindiga¯ ni-i Usta¯ d-i Shahid Murtaz. a Mut.ahhari (2 vols), Tehran, Summer 1370 (1991); S. H. J. Mu¯savi, Sima¯ -yi Usta¯ d dar A¯ yinih-i Niga¯ h-i Ya¯ ra¯ n, Tehran, Urdibihisht 1371 (1992); A. Dava¯ni, Kha¯ tira¯ t-i Man az Usta¯ d-i ¯ ba¯n 1372 (1993); H. Dabashi, Theology of Shahid Mut.ahhari, Tehran, A Discontent, New York, 1993, pp. 147–215; M. Fischer and M. Abedi, Debating Muslims, Madison, 1990, pp. 181–211; Hamid Algar, ‘Introduction’ (to Mut.ahhari’s life) in: M. Mut.ahhari, Fundamentals of Islamic Thought, trans. R. Campbell, Berkeley, 1985, pp. 9–21; A. Rahnema and F. Nomani, The Secular . Miracle, London and New Jersey, 1990, pp. 38–51; J. G. J. ter Haar, ‘Murtaza Mut.ahhari (1919–1979): An Introduction to his Life and Thought’, Persica, 1990–1992, Vol. XIV, No. 14, pp. 1–20. 3 This date is in accord with a note written by Mut.ahhari about his birth date. The document can be seen in n.a., Lam‘aa¯ ti az Shaikh-i Shahid, Tehran, 1st edn, 1370/1991–2, p. 8. However, it has been mistakenly reported by a number of Mut.ahhari’s biographers that he was born on 13 Bahman 1299 or 12 Jama¯di II or 13 Jama¯di I 1338 or 2 February 1919. See Va¯thiqi Ra¯d, Vol. 1, p. 18, Fischer and Abedi, pp. 182–3, and Haar, p. 2. 4 The distance between Farima¯n and Mashhad is, according to Hamid Algar in his ‘Introduction’ to Fundamentals of Islamic Thought, p. 9, and Fischer and Abedi, Debating Muslims, p. 183 about 60 kilometres and according to Dabashi in Theology of Discontent, p. 148, some 90 miles. 5 The date of his death is mistakenly mentioned as 1359 in Va¯thiqi Ra¯d, Mut.ahhari, Vol. 1, p. 18. 6 Personal interview with Muhammad Ali, Mut.ahhari’s oldest brother, in summer 1993. He is presently a farmer and living in Farima¯n. 7 It is said that Ha¯jj Muhammad Husain had also travelled to Egypt and Saudi Arabia. See Va¯thiqi Ra¯d, Mut.ahhari, Vol. 1, p. 18. 8 For information about ‘Allamih Mulla¯ Muhammad Ba¯qir Majlisi, see C. P. Turner, ‘The Rise of Twelver Shi‘ite Externalism in Safawid Iran and its Consolidation under Allamih Muhammad Baqir Majlisi’, Ph.D. thesis, University of Durham, 1989. 9 See M. Mut.ahhari, Da¯ sta¯ n-i Ra¯ sta¯ n, Tehran, Winter 1370 (1992), Vol. 2, Introduction. He also mentioned his father’s mystical character in H . aqq va Ba¯.til, Tehran, Autumn 1370 (1991), p. 173. 10 Va¯thiqi Ra¯d, Mut.ahhari, Vol. 1, p. 19. 11 Ibid., p. 20. 12 N.a., Sairi dar Zindiga¯ ni-i Usta¯ d, p. 31. But Va¯thiqi Ra¯d in his Mut.ahhari, Vol. 1, p. 20, mentioned that Mut.ahhari moved to Mashhad when he was 13 years old. However, the formal religious curriculum consists basically of two periods:

168

NOTES

13 14 15 16

17 18

19 20 21 22 23

24 25 26 27

the first (Daurih-i Sat.h), which lasts almost eight years, includes three stages: Introductory, Stage One and Stage Two. The three years Introductory Stage provides lessons on Arabic language and literature. The two-year Stage One, consists of courses on logic, theology, fiqh and us.u¯l al-fiqh. The three-year Stage Two provides lessons on fiqh, us.u¯l al-fiqh, tafsir, Hadith, Rijal, Dirayih, and Islamic philosophy; the second, the period of Ijtiha¯ d (Daurih-i Kha¯ rij) presents Islamic education at the high level. It offeres free courses on fiqh, us.u¯l al-fiqh, Akhla¯ q, falsafih and ‘Irfa¯ n. It lasts almost 20 years and students come to the state of Ijtiha¯ d at the end of this period, and become Mujtahid practising their own views. For further reading see: Sa¯fi Gulpa¯yiga¯ni, Sair-i Hauzih ha¯ -yi ‘Ilmiyih-i Shi‘ih, Qum, Daftar-i Intisha¯ra¯t-i Islami, 1379/2000; Muhammad Maliki, A¯ shna¯¯i ba¯ Mutu¯n-i darsi-yi Hauzih ha¯ -yi ‘Ilmiyih-i Iran, Qum, Muassasih-yi Intisha¯ra¯t-i Da¯r al-Thaqalain, 1376/1997; Sayyid Ali-Reza Sayyid Kiba¯ri, Hauzih ha¯ -yi ‘Ilmiyih-i Shi‘ih dar Gustarih-yi Jiha¯ n, Tehran, Amir Kabir Publication, 1378/1999. For the seminary of Mashhad see A. Khamenei¯, Guza¯ rishi az Sa¯ biqih-i Ta¯ rikhi va Kunu¯ni-i Hauzih-yi ‘Ilmiyih-i Mashhad, Mashhad, Tir 1365 (1986). For the biography of Adib Naisha¯bu¯ri, see n.a., Ya¯ d-na¯ mih-i Adib-i Naisha¯ bu¯ri, ed. Mahdi Muh.aqqiq, McGill Institute of Islamic Studies, Tehran branch, 1365 (1986–7). For the biography of the family of Shahidi see Hasan H . abib’s introduction to Diva¯ n-i Mirza¯ H . abibullah Khura¯ sa¯ ni, Tehran, n.d. Unfortunately nothing can be found in the Persian or in the Arabic literature . about Mirza¯ Mahdi Shahidi Razavi. The information about him is based on my interview with Shaikh ‘Abdullah Nu¯ra¯ni (from the University of Tehran, Faculty of Theology) and Shaikh Muhammad Va¯‘iz. -za¯dih Khura¯sa¯ni (from the University of Mashhad, Faculty of Theology) in spring 1994. For the biography of Mirza¯ Mahdi Isfahani, see Kaiha¯n-i Farhangi, No. 12, Isfand 1371 (1993), pp. 28–33; Khamenei¯, Guza¯ rishi, p. 26. ¯ khu¯nd Mulla¯ Muhammad Ka¯z. im Khura¯sa¯ni (d. 1329/ He is the eldest son of A ¯ qa¯1911) one of the religious leaders of the Constitutional Revolution. For A za¯dih’s biography see Khamenei¯, Guza¯ rishi, p. 26. For information about the Constitutional Revolution see H. H . a¯’iri, Shi‘ism and Constitutionalism in Iran, Leiden, 1977; E. G. Browne, The Persian Revolution 1905–1909, London, 1966; Mangol Bayat, Iran’s First Revolution, Oxford, 1991. Khamenei¯, Guza¯rishi, p. 25. N.a., Kaiha¯n-i Farhangi, No. 12, Isfand 1371/1993 (Special issue for maktab-i tafkik). Ibid., p. 6. Ibid., p. 5; Khamenei¯, Guza¯ rishi, pp. 26–7. For information about Akhba¯ rism see Andrew Newman, ‘The Nature of the Akhbari/Us. u¯li Dispute in late Safawid Iran’, Parts I and II, University of London, School of Oriental and African Studies Bulletin, 1992, Vol. 55, pp. 22–51 and 250–61; Hosain Modarrissi, ‘Rationalism and Traditionalism in Shi‘i Jurisprudence’, Studia Islamica, 1984, Vol. 49, Paris; Robert Gleave, ‘Akhbari Shi‘i Jurisprudence in the writings of Yusuf b. Ahmad al-Bahrani’, Ph.D. thesis, University of Manchester, 1996. H . a¯’iri, Shi‘ism, pp. 109–49. Khamenei¯, Guza¯ rishi, pp. 26–7. Mut.ahhari, ‘Ilal-i Gira¯ yish bi Ma¯ ddigari, Tehran, Autumn 1370 (1991), p. 9. For the curriculum in hauzih ‘Ilmiyih, see Khamenei¯, Guza¯ rishi, pp. 60–76; M. Fischer, Iran from Religious Dispute to Revolution, Harvard, 1980, pp. 61–86; R. Mottahedeh, The Mantle of the Prophet, London, 1987.

169

NOTES

28 Mut.ahhari, ‘Ilal, pp. 9–10. 29 Hasan H . abib’s introduction to Diva¯ n-i Mirza¯ H . abibullah Khura¯ sa¯ ni, Tehran, n.d. 30 For the biography and philosophy of Mulla¯ S.adra¯, see Fazlur Rahman, The Philosophy of Mulla¯ S.adra¯ , Albany, 1975. 31 For the biography and philosophy of Mulla¯ Ha¯di Sabzava¯ri, see Sharh-i Manzu¯mih, trans. Mehdi Mohaghegh and Toshihiko Izutsu, Tehran, 1969. 32 Personal interview with Shaikh ‘Abdullah Nu¯ra¯ni on 19 April 1994 and Muhammad Va¯‘iz. -za¯dih Khura¯sa¯ni on 14 April 1994. 33 Personal interview with Muhammad Ali Mut.ahhari in April 1994. 34 Faghfoory, M. H. ‘The Role of the ‘ulama¯ in Twentieth Century Iran’, Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1978, pp. 58–60. In this respect see also M. H. Faghfoory, ‘The ‘ulama¯–State Relations in Iran: 1921–1941’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 1987, Vol. 19, pp. 413–32; Shahroukh Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran, New York, 1980, pp. 25–59. 35 For the biography of Abdul-Karim H . a¯’iri see A. H. H . a¯’iri, Encyclopedia of Islam, Supplement 5–6, p. 342; A. H. H . a¯’iri, Shi‘ism, pp. 136–8; Akhavi, Religion, p. 27. 36 For Marj‘a-i taqli¯d see H . a¯’iri, Shi‘ism, pp. 62–5; J. Calmard, Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd edn, Vol. 6, pp. 548–56. ¯ qa¯-Buzurg Tehrani 37 For the biography of Mirza¯ Muhammad Taqi Shira¯zi, see A T.abaqa¯ t al-A ‘ala¯ m al-Shi‘ah, Najaf, 1954, Part 1, pp. 261–4. 38 For the biography of Mirza¯ Muhammad Husain Na¯¯ini, see A. H. H . a¯’iri, Shi‘ism, pp. 109–49. 39 For the biography of Sayyid Abul-Hasan Isfahani, see H. Algar, Encyclopaedia Iranica, London, 1988, Vol. 1, p. 302. 40 H . a¯’iri, Shi‘ism, p. 137. 41 Ibid., p. 139; Akhavi, Religion, p. 29, albeit slightly different. 42 Faghfoory, Role, p. 61; H. Makki, Ta¯ rikh, Vol. 1, p. 272; H . a¯’iri, Shi‘ism, pp. 146–47. 43 Makki, Ta¯ rikh, Vol. 2, p. 344; Akhavi, Religion, p. 30; H . a¯’iri, Shi‘ism, pp. 142–3. 44 Faghfoory, ‘Role’, p. 68; M. M. Milani, The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution, Boulder and London, 1994, p. 32. 45 Faghfoory, ‘Role’, pp. 69–72. For the state–religion relationship during the period of modernization see M. H. Faghfoory, ‘The Impact of Modernization on the ‘ulama¯ in Iran, 1925–1941’, Iranian Studies, 1993, Vol. 26, No. 3–4, pp. 277–311. 46 Faghfoory, ‘Role’, p. 57. 47 Ibid., p. 70; Akhavi, Religion, p. 37. 48 Akhavi, Religion, p. 37. 49 Faghfoory, ‘Role’, p. 71. 50 Maliki, Husain, Daulat-ha¯ -yi Iran dar ‘As.r-i Mashru¯.tiyat, Tehran, 1370 (1991– 2), Vol. 1, p. 222; Sayyid Mahdi Farrukh, Kha¯.tira¯ t-i Siya¯ si-i Farrukh, Tehran, Bahman 1347 (1969), p. 225. 51 Faghfoory, ‘Role’, p. 71. 52 Ibid., pp. 73–5; Akhavi, Religion, pp. 37–40. 53 Akhavi, Religion, pp. 55–6. 54 Ibid., pp. 32–40; Faghfoory, ‘Role’, pp. 75–92. 55 For the removal of women’s veils see n.a., Va¯ qi‘ih-yi Kashf-i H . ija¯ b, Tehran, 1371 (1992–3). 56 For the Gauharsha¯d event see Sina¯ Va¯h.id, Qiya¯ m-i Gauharsha¯ d, Tehran, Isfand 1361 (1983); Husain Maliki, Daulat-ha¯ -yi Iran, pp. 232–4.

170

NOTES

57 58 59 60

Akhavi, Religion, p. 43. Ibid., p. 42; Faghfoory, ‘Role’, p. 79. Akhavi, Religion, p. 44. Interview with Ayatullah Sulta¯ni Tabatabai¯ in: n.a., Majallih-yi Hauzih, Qum, 1370 (1991–92), No. 43–4, p. 47. 61 Ibid., p. 201. 62 Sina¯ Va¯h.id, Qiya¯ m, p. 48. 63 Ibid., p. 224. In this respect E. Abrahamian in his Iran between Two Revolutions, p. 152, has mentioned the case as follows: The upheavals of 1935–1936 were sparked by the unveiling of women and the introduction of the international hat. On July 10, 1935, the anniversary of the Russian bombardment of the Mashhad shrine in 1911, the main preacher at the shrine took advantage of the emotional occasion to denounce the heretical innovations, the high consumer taxes, and the prevalence of corruption in high places. The following day, a massive crowd from the bazaar and the neighboring villages flocked to the mosque, shouting ‘Ima¯m Hussein protect us from the evil Sha¯h’. Finding that the city policemen and the Khurasan army contingents refused to violate the sanctity of the shrine, the local authorities were unable to act for two full days . . . The situation changed drastically on the third day, however, as army reinforcements arrived from Azerbaijan and promptly moved to clear the shrine. In the subsequent confrontation, nearly two hundred suffered serious injuries, and over one hundred, including many women and children, lost their lives. In the following months, the shrine custodian was executed.

64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82

Ibid., p. 49. Khamenei¯, Guza¯ rishi, pp. 25–6. Personal interview with Muhammad Ali Mut.ahhari, 6 June 1994. Ibid. Maliki, Daulat-ha¯ , p. 225. For the biography of Mudarris see H. Makki, Mudarris: Qahrama¯ n-i A¯ za¯ di, Tehran, 1358 (1979–80). N.a., Jilvih-ha¯ -yi Mu‘allimi-yi Usta¯ d, p. 21. Va¯‘iz. -za¯dih, Sairi, pp. 350, 363, 374. Ibid., p. 334. H . a¯’iri, A. H., in: Encyclopaedia of Islam, new edition, Supplement, 5–6, pp. 342–3. ¯ khu¯nd Khura¯sa¯ni, see Majallih-yi Nu¯r-i ‘Ilm, Qum, No. 6, For the biography of A p. 98. For the biography of Ayatullah Hujjat, see ibid., No. 10, p. 85. For the biography of Ayatullah S.adr, see ibid., No. 7, p. 74. Va¯‘iz. -za¯dih, Sairi, p. 336. Ibid. For the biography of Ayatullah Ka¯sha¯ni see Faghfoory, ‘Role’, pp. 115–36; n.a., Fas.l-na¯ mih-yi Ta¯ rikh va Farhang-i Mu‘a¯ sir, special issue, Qum, 1372 (1993–4), No. 6 and 7. Va¯‘iz. -za¯dih, Sairi, p. 336. Mut.ahhari, ‘Ilal, p. 9. Ibid., p. 10. . For the biography of Ayatullah Khomeini see Majallih-yi H . uz u¯r, Tehran, Khurda¯d 1370 (1991), Vol. 1, pp. 5, 56–61; n.a., Fas.l-na¯ mih-yi Ta¯ rikh va Farhang-i Mu‘a¯ sir, No. 3.4, Qum, Spring and Summer 1371 (1992), pp. 9–25; Hamid Dabashi, Theology of Discontent, New York, 1993, pp. 409–84.

171

NOTES

83 Va¯thiqi Ra¯d, Mut.ahhari, Vol. 1, p. 388. 84 For the biography of Ayatullah Montazeri see Mus. t.afa¯ I¯zadi, Faqih-i ‘A¯ liqadr, Tehran, Khurda¯d 1361 (1982). 85 Montazeri, Husain Ali, ‘H . akim-i Farza¯nih’ in: n.a., Ya¯ d na¯ mih-yi Usta¯ d-i . Shahid Murtaz a Mut.ahhari, ed. ‘Abdul-Karim Suru¯sh, Tehran, Sha¯hrivar 1360 (1981), Vol. 1, pp. 171–3. 86 Va¯thiqi Ra¯d, Mut.ahhari, Vol. 2, pp. 675–6. 87 For the biography of Ayatullah Buru¯jirdi see A. Dava¯ni, Zindiga¯ ni-i Za‘im-i Buzurg-i ‘A¯ lam-i Tashayyu‘a Ayatullah Buru¯jirdi, Tehran, Autumn 1371 (1992); Majallih-yi H . auzih, Qum, Spring 1370 (1991), No. 43 and 44; Majallih-yi Nu¯r-i ‘Ilm, Qum, 1364 (1985–6), No. 12, p. 85; Hamid Algar, in: Encyclopaedia Iranica, Vol. 4, pp. 376–9. 88 In a personal interview with Ayatullah Montazeri, in spring 1994, he mentioned that once he and Mut.ahhari visited Ayatullah Khomeini to discuss with him the jurisprudential bases of the theory of Islamic rule. 89 For information about the Fada¯ i¯ya¯ n-i Islam, see Fagfoory, ‘Role’, pp. 167–88; N.a., Na¯ guftih-ha¯ : Kha¯.tira¯ t-i Shahid Ha¯ jj Mahdi ‘Ara¯ qi, Tehran, 1370 (1991– 2); Majallih-i Ya¯ d, Tehran, 1366 (1987–8), No. 6 and 7; Fas.l-na¯ mih-yi Ta¯ rikh va Farhang-i Mu‘a¯ sir, Qum, Winter 1370 (1992), No. 2, pp. 7–41 and No. 3.4, Spring–Summer 1372 (1993), pp. 36–58; Sayyid Husain Khushniyat, Sayyid Mujtaba¯ Navva¯ b S.afavi: Andishih-ha¯ , Muba¯ riza¯ t va Shiha¯ dat-i Au, Tehran, Isfand 1360 (1982). 90 Va¯thiqi Ra¯d, Mut.ahhari, Vol. 1, p. 24. 91 These statements and interviews are all to be found in ibid., Vols 1 and 2. 92 This case was mentioned by Mut.ahhari as follows: In 1320 [1941], I travelled, for the first time, to Isfahan to visit my dear classmate. We had discussed our lessons with each other for 11 years. He who is now a great Mujtahid and Mudarris of the Hauzih-i ‘Ilmiyihyi Qum suggested then to me that there was a great scholar who was teaching Nahj al-bala¯ ghih in the Madrasih-yi S.adr. He suggested that we should go to his lessons . . . I accepted his suggestion because it was my classmate’s proposal and it was also the holiday time when I had no homework to do.

93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104

Quoted from n.a., Sarguzasht-ha¯ -yi Vizhih az Zindigi-yi Usta¯ d-i Shahid . Murtaz a Mut.ahhari, Tehran, Summer 1370 (1991), Vol. 1, pp. 330–1. ¯ qa¯ Shira¯zi, see Mut.ahhari, Sairi dar Nahj alFor the biography of Mirza¯ Ali-A bala¯ ghih, Tehran, Autumn 1370 (1991), pp. VII–XV; Va¯‘iz. -za¯dih, Sairi, p. 333. Mut.ahhari, Sairi dar Nahj, p. 12. Ibid., p. 10. Ibid., p. 8. Ibid., pp. 99–135. Ibid., pp. 26–31. For the occupation of Iran by the Allied Forces see Makki, Ta¯ rikh, Vol. 7; Madani, Ta¯ rikh, Vol. 1, pp. 129–55; Miron Rezun, The Iranian Crisis of 1941, Cologne and Vienna, 1982. Personal interview with Ayatullah Montazeri, summer 1994. Faghfoory, ‘Role’, p. 208. Va¯thiqi Ra¯d, Mut.ahhari, Vol. 2, p. 675. For the biography of ‘Alla¯mih Tabatabai¯, see n.a., Ya¯ d na¯ mih-yi Mufassir-i Kabir Usta¯ d ‘Alla¯ mih Sayyid Muhammad Husain Tabatabaí, Qum, Tir 1361 (1982); Majallih-i Nu¯r-i ‘Ilm, Qum, 1368 (1989–90), No. 9, p. 44. Mut.ahhari’s other teachers at this level are mentioned as follows: Mirza¯ Mahdi

172

NOTES

105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144

¯ shtiya¯ni, Sayyid Muhammad Hujjat Ku¯h-kamarai¯, Sayyid Muhammad A Muh.aqqiq Da¯ma¯d, Sayyid Muhammad Taqi Khunsa¯ri, Sayyid Ahmad Khunsa¯ri, Sayyid S.adr al-Din S.adr, Sayyid Muhammad Reza Gulpa¯yiga¯ni. See Va¯‘iz. -za¯dih, Sairi, p. 329. . This article has been recently republished in: Murtaza Mut.ahhari, Taka¯ mul-i Ijtima¯ ‘i¯-i Insa¯ n, Tehran, Spring 1370/1991, pp. 191–211. Ibid., pp. 196–211. Ibid., pp. 194–5. Mut.ahhari, ‘Ilal, p. 10. Some of these students are: Husain Ali Montazeri, Reza S.adr and Mahdi H . a¯’iri Yazdi. See Va¯‘iz. -za¯dih, Sairi, p. 326. Mut.ahhari, ‘Adl-i Ila¯ hi, Tehran, Murda¯d 1370/1991, pp. 99–101. N.a., S.ah.ifih-yi Nu¯r, Tehran, Bahman 1361/1983, Vol. 4, p. 104, Vol. 6, p. 106 and Vol. 7, p. 183. Mut.ahhari, ‘Ilal, p. 11. For the nationalization of the oil industry see n.a., Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism and Oil, ed. Bill and Roger Louis, London, 1988, pp. 143–304; Fagfoory, ‘Role’, pp. 217–43. Khushniyat, S. H., Navva¯ b S.afavi, Tehran, Esfand 1360 (1982), pp. 15–17. Faghfoory, ‘Role’, p. 167. Khushniyat, Navva¯ b S.afavi, pp. 21–3. Ibid., p. 47. Ibid., pp. 60–78. Ibid., pp. 76 and 118. Rahnema, Secular Miracle, p. 76. Khushniyat, Navva¯ b S.afavi, p. 129. Ibid., p. 77; Navva¯b S.afavi, ‘Barna¯mih-yi Inqila¯bi-yi Fada¯i¯ya¯n-i Islam’ in: Rahnema, Secular Miracle, p. 86. Majallih-yi H . auzih, No. 43–4, p. 37. Ibid., pp. 98–9; Va¯‘iz. -za¯dih, Sairi, p. 339. Majallih-yi H . auzih, No. 43–4, p. 38. Ibid., p. 228. Ibid., p. 36. ¯ ba¯n 1372 Dava¯ni, Ali, Kha¯ tira¯ t-i Man az Usta¯ d-i Shahid Mut.ahhari, Tehran, A (1993), pp. 22–3. Majallih-yi H . auzih, No. 43–4, p. 229. Ibid., p. 37; Rahnema, Secular Miracle, pp. 86–7. Ibid., p. 38. Ibid., p. 98. Rahnema in the Secular Miracle, p. 87, maintains that the Sha¯h might have commuted the death sentence if Buru¯jirdi had pleaded for clemency. Abrahamian, Ervand, Iran between Two Revolutions, Princeton, 1982, pp. 156–7. Ibid., p. 157. Ibid., p. 162. Ibid., p. 282. Faghfoory, ‘Role’, p. 273. Ibid., p. 274. Abrahamian, Iran, p. 372. Ibid., pp. 318–19. Ibid., p. 319. Faghfoory, ‘Role’, pp. 274–6. Abrahamian, Iran, p. 320. Faghfoory, ‘Role’, p. 277.

173

NOTES

145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

Abrahamian, Iran, p. 321. Faghfoory, ‘Role’, pp. 277–8. Abrahamian, Iran, p. 324. Faghfoory, ‘Role’, pp. 278–9. Akhavi, Religion, p. 64. Khushniyat, Navva¯ b S.afavi, p. 112. Majallih-yi H . auzih, No. 43–4, p. 226; Akhavi, Religion, p. 65; Abrahamian, Iran, p. 373. Majallih-yi H . auzih, No. 43–4, pp. 100–2; Akhavi, Role, p. 92. See, for instance, Naqdi bar Marxism, Tehran, Farvardin 1363 (1984), p. 198; Us.u¯l-i Falsafih va Ravish-i Realism, Vol. 4, Tehran, Spring 1368 (1989), pp. 161–260. For the biography of Dr Sayyid Muhammad Husaini Beheshti, see Ali Qa¯imi, Zindigi va Guzidih-i Afka¯ r-i Shahid-i Maz.lu¯m Ayatullah Beheshti, Qum, 1361 (1982–3); N.a., Au bi Tanha¯ i¯ Yik Ummat Bu¯d, Tehran, Tir 1361 (1982). See an interview with ‘Alla¯mih Tabatabai¯, in: Va¯thiqi Ra¯d, Mut.ahhari, Vol. 2, pp. 686–7. See an interview with Ayatullah Sulta¯ni Tabatabai¯ in: Majallih-yi H . auzih, No. 43–4, p. 44. Ibid. Personal interview with Ayatullah Montazeri, April 1994. For the biography of Husain Ali Ra¯shid see Batu¯l Ra¯shid, ‘Zindigi-na¯mih-yi Da¯nishmand-i Faqid Hujjat al-Islam Shaikh Husain Ali Ra¯shid’, Ettila¯ a¯ t, 9.8.1368 (30.10.1990); Muhammad Java¯d Hujjati Kerma¯ni, ‘Niga¯hi bi Shakhs. iyat-i Marh.u¯m Husain Ali Ra¯shid’, Ettila¯ a¯ t, 7.8.1369 (28.10.1991); ¯ shna¯i¯ ba¯ Zindigi-na¯mih, Zindigi-i Farhangi, A ¯ tha¯r va Mas‘u¯d Java¯diyan, ‘A Fara¯z-ha¯i¯ az Sukhana¯n-i Ra¯shid’, Ettila¯ a¯ t, 6.8.1371 (27.10.1993). For the ¯ yati, see Iraj Afshar, ‘Zindigi na¯mih-yi biography of Dr Muhammad Ibra¯him A ¯ yati’ in: M. I. A ¯ yati, Ta¯ rikh-i Paya¯ mbar-i Islam, Tehran, Muhammad Ibra¯him A Khurda¯d 1361 (1982), pp. d–v.

2 ACADEMIC WORKS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES Mut.ahhari, A¯ shna¯¯i ba¯ ‘Ulu¯m-i Islami, Tehran, Summer 1368/1989, Vol. 2, p. 15. For the academic background of modern theology in the West, see Ian G. Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion, London, 1972. For information about liberation theology, see James V. Schall, Liberation Theology in Latin America, San Francisco, 1982. Mut.ahhari, ‘Adl-i Ila¯ hi, Tehran, Murdad 1370/1991, p. 14. Personal interview with Ayatullah Muhammad Reza Mahdavi Kani, July 1995. Va¯thiqi Ra¯d, Mut.ahhari, Vol. 2, pp. 820–906. See an interview with Dr Mahdi-za¯dih, in: Va¯thiqi Ra¯d, Mut.ahhari, Vol. 1, pp. 364–5. . N.a., Ya¯ d-na¯ mih-yi Usta¯ d-i Shahid Murtaz a Mut.ahhari, ed. Abdul-Karim Suru¯sh, Tehran, Shahrivar 1360/1981, Vol. 1, p. 553. Personal interview with Muhandis Ali-Akbar Mu‘i¯nfar (the Minister of Oil in the Provisional Government after January 1979), Summer 1993. Mut.ahhari, Dah Gufta¯ r, Tehran, Autumn 1369/1990, pp. 11–12. Ibid., pp. 14 and 222. Personal interview with Ali-Akbar Mu‘i¯nfar, Summer 1993. Mut.ahhari, ‘Adl-i Ila¯ hi, pp. 8–9.

174

NOTES

14 The date is, in Dr Beheshti’s autobiography, 1338. Ittila¯ a¯ t International, No. 279, 28 June 1995. . ¯ za¯di-yi Iran, see Hamid Dabashi, Theology of 15 For the biography of Nihzat-i A Discontent, pp. 335–8 and 354. 16 Pesonal interview with Mu‘i¯nfar, Summer 1993. 17 Va¯‘iz. -za¯dih, Sairi, pp. 348 and 364. 18 Rauha¯ni, Sayyid Hamid, Barrasi va Tah.lili az Nihz. at-i Ima¯ m Khomeini, Tehran, Bahman 1360/1982, Vol. 1, pp. 115–40. 19 Ibid., pp. 142–216. 20 Pahlavi, Muhammad Reza, The Sha¯ h’s Story, trans. Teresa Waugh, London, 1980, p. 73. 21 Rauha¯ni, Barrasi, Vol. 1, pp. 334–49. 22 Ibid., pp. 456–60. 23 Ibid., pp. 716–26. 24 Ibid., p. 728. 25 Ibid., pp. 706–44. 26 See an interview with Anva¯ri, in: Va¯thiqi Ra¯d, Mut.ahhari, Vol. 1, p. 106. 27 N.a., Sar Guzasht-ha¯ -yi Vizhih as Zindigi-yi Usta¯ d-i Shahid Mut.ahhari, Tehran, Summer 1370/1991, Vol. 2, p. 160. 28 Va¯thiqi Ra¯d, Mut.ahhari, Vol. 1, p. 47. 29 Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 49. 30 See an interview with Anva¯ri in: Va¯thiqi Ra¯d, Mut.ahhari, Vol.1, p. 106; Asadullah Ba¯da¯m-chiya¯n, Haiat-ha¯ -yi Mu’talifih-yi Islami, Tehran, Tir 1362/ 1983, p. 35. According to Ba¯da¯m-chiya¯n three religious groups established the Mu’talifih, whereas according to Anva¯ri it was four or five groups. 31 Va¯thiqi Ra¯d, Mut.ahhari, p. 108; Ba¯da¯m-chiya¯n, Haiat-ha¯ , pp. 36–7. According to Ba¯da¯m-chiya¯n the clerical commitee consisted of Mut.ahhari, Beheshti, Anva¯ri, Ba¯hunar, and Hashemi Rafsanjani. 32 Ibid., pp. 108–9. . 33 Mut.ahhari, Barrasi-yi Ijma¯ li-yi Nihz at-ha¯ -yi Islami dar S.ad-Sa¯ lih-i Akhir, Tehran, Bahman 1370/1992, p. 74. 34 Mut.ahhari, Insa¯ n va Sarnivisht, Tehran, Autumn 1370/1991, p. 13. 35 Ibid., p. 64. 36 Mut.ahhari, Da¯ sta¯ n-i Ra¯ sta¯ n, Tehran, Winter 1370/1992, Vol. 2, Preface. 37 Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 16. 38 Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 15. 39 Personal interview with Reza Isfahani (August 1993), the Minister of Agriculture in the Provisional Government of Bazaga¯n. 40 N.a., Sairi dar Zindiga¯ ni-yi Usta¯ d Mut.ahhari, Tehran, Urdibihisht 1371/1992, p. 104. 41 Ibid., pp. 121 and 126. 42 Ibid., p. 101. 43 This letter is printed in: Majallih-yi Suru¯sh, third year, 1360, No. 102. 44 N.a., Sairi dar Zindiga¯ ni-yi Usta¯ d Mut.ahhari, p. 115. 45 Personal interview with Dr Na¯s. ir Mina¯chi, August 1993. He furthermore stated that despite those letters his friendly relationship with Mut.ahhari never changed, because it was Mut.ahhari who introduced him to Ayatullah Khomeini as the Minister of Islamic Guidance. 46 N.a., Sairi dar Zindiga¯ ni-yi Usta¯ d Mut.ahhari, p. 111. 47 Ibid., pp. 112–13. 48 Shariati, Ali, Majmu¯‘ih-yi A¯ tha¯ r, Tehran, 1357/1979, Vol. 5, p. 104. 49 Shariati, ‘Islam va Ru¯h.a¯niyat’ in: n.a., Fas.l-namih-yi Ta¯ rikh va Farhang-i Mu‘a¯ .sir, No. 3 and 4, pp. 400–11.

175

NOTES

50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85

N.a., Sairi dar Zindiga¯ ni-yi Usta¯ d Mut.ahhari, pp. 82–3. Mut.ahhari, Ru¯h.a¯ niyat, Qum, Urdibihisht 1365/1986, pp. 13–144. N.a., Sairi dar Zindiga¯ ni, p. 120. Ibid., p. 128. Mut.ahhari, Barrasi-yi Ijma¯ li, p. 74. N.a., Sairi dar Zindiga¯ ni-yi Usta¯ d Mut.ahhari, p. 79. Acton, H. B., ‘Dialectical Materialism’ in: The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards, London and New York, 1967, Vols 1, pp. 389–97 and 4, pp. 12–21. Shariati, Ali, On the Sociology of Islam, trans. Hamid Algar, Berkeley, 1979, pp. 70–95. Ibid, pp. 70–95. Shariati, Ali, Islamshina¯ si, Tehran, 1350/1971–2, pp. 90–2. Shariati, On the Sociology of Islam, p. 115. Shariati, Islamshina¯ si, pp. 90–1. See Shariati, Majmu¯‘ih-yi A¯ tha¯ r, Vols 7 and 28. Shariati, On the Sociology of Islam, p. 98. Shariati, Islamshina¯ si, pp. 97–8. Ibid., p. 77. Mut.ahhari, Society and History, trans. Mahliqa¯ Qara¯¯i, Tehran, 1985, p. 102. N.a., Sayri dar Zindiga¯ ni, pp. 83 and 128. Ibid., p. 73. Ibid., p. 75. N.a., Pa¯ sukh-ha¯ -yi Usta¯ d bar Naqd-ha¯¯i bar Kita¯ b-i Mas’alih-yi H . ija¯ b, Tehran, Spring 1370/1991, p. 72. Hashemi Rafsanjani, Akbar, Interview with Jumhuri-yi Islami, 14.2.1362/ 4.5.1983. Va¯thiqi Ra¯d, Mut.ahhari, Vol. 1, p. 56. Russell, Bertrand, Marriage and Morals, London, 1930, pp. 237–50. Mut.ahhari, Akhla¯ q-i Jinsi dar Islam va Jaha¯ n-i Gharb, Tehran, Bahar 1370/ 1991, p. 77. Mut.ahhari, Niz.a¯ m-i H . uquq-i Zan dar Islam, Tehran, Summer 1370/1991, pp. 26–8. Ibid., p. 28. Mut.ahhari, Ja¯ zibih va Da¯ fi‘ih-yi Ali, Tehran, Urdibihisht 1371/1992, pp. 189– 90. Durant, Will, The Story of Civilisation, New York, 1954, Part I, p. 375. Ibid., Part IV, pp. 220–21. Mut.ahhari, Mas’alih-yi H . ija¯ b, Tehran, Summer 1370/1991, p. 23. Ibid., p. 25. Ibid., p. 83. Ibid., p. 181. See Pa¯ sukh-ha¯ -yi Usta¯ d bi Naqd-ha¯¯i bar Kita¯ b-i Mas’alih-yi H . ija¯ b, and interview with Dr Muhammad Baqir Hujjati, in: n.a., Sar Guzasht-ha¯ -yi Vizhih, Vol. 2, pp. 73–5. It is worth mentioning that muh.allil, according to Shi‘i law (see Khomeini, Tah.rir al-Vasilih, Kita¯ b al-T.ala¯ q, Beirut, 1985, Vol. 2, p. 333) is an emotional factor preventing a third divorce. In Shi‘ite jurisprudence, each divorce is followed by a definite waiting period, called ‘iddih (waiting until the third menstrual cycle); the separated couple may not reunite or remarry until this period ends. However, in cases where the man, for example, has divorced his wife for a third time, he cannot return to the wife (even after ‘iddih) unless she has married, in wellintentioned permanent marriage, and then has been divorced or widowed, thus

176

NOTES

86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97

98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125

entitling her to be free to remarry her first husband. This intermediary man is labelled the muh.allil. Therefore, if three divorces are declared in one session or if marriage with the muh.allil was a temporary marriage, as the film portrayed, this fourth marriage, i.e. between the original couple, is unlawful and false. . Mut.ahhari, ‘Film-i Muh.allil’ in: Murtaza Mut.ahhari, Imda¯ d-ha¯ yi Ghaibi dar Zindigi-yi Bashar, Tehran, Autumn 1370/1991, pp. 191–203. Ibid., p. 193. Mut.ahhari, Khadama¯ t-i Mutaqa¯ bil-i Islam va Iran, Qum, Bahman 1362/1984, p. 6. Ibid., pp. 36–7. Ibid., p. 44. Ibid., p. 38. Ibid., pp. 35–6. Ibid., p. 43. Ibid., pp. 88–9. Ibid., pp. 229, 232–3. N.a., Sayri dar Zindiga¯ ni Usta¯ d Mut.ahhari, p. 80. Shariati’s articles were published in Ru¯z-na¯ mih-yi Kaiha¯ n in two series: first, the series entitled Marxism z. idd-i Islam from 26.11.1354/30.1.1976 to 24.12.1354/14.3.1976 in 23 numbers; second, the series entitled Ba¯ zgasht bi khishtan from 2.2.2535/21.4.1976 to 1.4.2535/21.6.1976 in 46 articles. Mu‘i¯n, Muhammad, Mazd-yasna¯ va Adab-i Pa¯ rsi, Tehran, 1338/1958–60. Mut.ahhari, Khadama¯ t, p. 96. Sa¯nii¯, Parviz, Qa¯ nu¯n va Shakhsiyat, Tehran, 1344/1965–6, p. 157. Mu‘i¯n, Mazd-yasna¯ , Introduction, n.p. Mut.ahhari, Khadama¯ t, p. 108. Ibid., p. 108. Ibid., p. 109. Ibid., pp. 112–13. Sir John Malcolm, The History of Persia, London, 1815, Vol. 1, p. 277. Zarrinku¯b, Abdul-Husain, Du Qarn Suku¯t, Tehran, 1355/1976–7. Mut.ahhari, Khadama¯ t, p. 602. Ibid., p. 313. Ibid., p. 325. Ibid., pp. 365, 596. Ibid., p. 597. Abrahamian, Iran, pp. 483–4. Ibid., pp. 484–5. Ibid., pp. 486–8. Mut.ahhari, ‘Ilal, pp. 9–11. See an interview with Ayatullah Ali Khamenei¯ in: n.a., Sarguzasht-ha¯ -yi Vizhih, . Vol. 1, p. 73; Shariat Razavi, Pu¯ra¯n, T.arh.¯i az yik Zindigi, Tehran, 1374/1995– 6, p. 17. See an interview with T. a¯hiri Khurram-a¯ba¯di in: n.a., Sarguzasht-ha¯ -yi Vizhih, Vol. 2, pp. 95–7. Mut.ahhari, ‘Ilal, p. 64. Ibid., pp. 238–9. Ibid., pp. 246–7. Ibid., p. 244. Ibid., p. 257. Mut.ahhari, Fit.rat, Tehran, Spring 1370/1991, pp. 98, 99, 104, 145, 146, 169, 206; Mut.ahhari, Insa¯ n dar Quran, Tehran, Autumn 1370/1991, p. 68. Mut.ahhari, Fit.rat, pp. 48, 107, 120, 163.

177

NOTES

126 Personal interview with Hasan S.adr Va¯thiqi, a contemporary lawyer, Spring 1371/1992. He mentioned that once Hamid Enayat, a Professor of Politics at the University of Tehran, asked him to arrange a meeting with Mut.ahhari. He realized during the meeting that he could benefit from Mut.ahhari. Then he regularly attended Mut.ahhari’s private lessons on Islamic philosophical issues. Once, during his lessons, Mut.ahhari stated that Hegel was an essentialist (not existentialist). Enayat asked for his reference about the view. Mut.ahhari referred him to a phrase from Enayat’s translation of Hegel. Suprisingly, Enayat admitted that he did not realize the point when he was translating the book. 127 Mut.ahhari, Fit.rat, pp. 18, 33, 244; Mut.ahhari, Ja¯ mi‘ih va Ta¯ rikh, Tehran, Spring 1370/1991, p. 248; Mut.ahhari, Naqdi bar Marxism, Tehran, Farvardin 1363/1984, pp. 74–80. 128 Mut.ahhari, Ja¯ mi‘ih va Ta¯ rikh, pp. 49 and 248; Mut.ahhari, Taka¯ mul-i Ijtima¯ ‘i¯yi Insa¯ n, Tehran, Spring 1370/1991, pp. 17–29. 129 Mut.ahhari, Falsafih-yi Akhla¯ q, Tehran, Bahman 1370/1992, pp. 147–8. 130 Mut.ahhari, Islam va Muqtaz. iya¯ t-i Zama¯ n, Tehran, Autumn 1370/1991, Vol. 1, p. 13. 131 Ibid., p. 137. 132 For information about the doctrine of Vila¯yat-i Faqih, see Husain Ali Montazeri, Vila¯ yat al-Faqih (4 vols), Qum, 1409–11q. 133 Mut.ahhari, Islam va Muqtaz. iya¯ t, Vol. 2, pp. 36–40. 134 Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 31. 135 N.a., S.ah.ifih-yi Nu¯r, Vol. 20, 1369/1990–1, pp. 170–1. 136 Mut.ahhari, Islam va Muqtaz. iya¯ t, Vol. 2, pp. 91–2. 137 Sha¯mlu¯, Ahmad, H . a¯ fiz.-i Shira¯ z bi Riva¯ yat-i Ahmad Sha¯ mlu¯, Tehran, 1354/ 1975–6, p. 25. 138 T. abari, Ih.sa¯n, Barkhi Barrasi-ha¯ dar Ba¯ rih-yi Jiha¯ nbini-ha¯ va Junbish-ha¯ -yi, Ijtima¯ ‘í dar Iran, Tehran, 1348/1969–70. 139 Mut.ahhari, ‘Ilal, pp. 14–15. 140 Mirfat.ru¯s, Ali, H . alla¯ j, Tehran, Urdibihisht 2537/1979. 141 Sha¯mlu¯, H . a¯ fiz.-i Shira¯ z, p. 20. 142 Mut.ahhari, ‘Irfa¯ n-i H . a¯ fiz., Tehran, Spring 1370/1991, p. 21. . 143 Faiz Ka¯sha¯ni, Kulliya¯ t-i Ash‘a¯ r, Tehran, 1354/1975–6. 144 Nara¯qi, Mulla¯ Ahmad, Mathnavi-yi Ta¯ qdis, Tehran, 1362/1983–4. 145 Isfahani, Muhammad Husain, Diva¯ n-i Kumpa¯ ni, Tehran, 1338/1959–60. 146 Khomeini, Ruh.ullah, Diva¯ n-i Ima¯ m, Tehran, Khurda¯d 1372/1993. 147 Mut.ahhari, ‘Irfa¯ n-i H . a¯ fiz., p. 6. 148 See an interview with T.a¯hiri Khurram-a¯ba¯di in: n.a., Sarguzasht-ha¯ -yi Vizhih, Vol. 2, p. 93. 149 See an interview with Khusrau-Sha¯hi in: n.a., Majallih-yi Ta¯ rikh va Farhang-i Mu‘a¯ sir, Vols 3 and 4, pp. 369–70. 150 Peter, Andre, Marx va Marxism, Persian translation by Shuja¯‘a al-Din Ziya¯i¯ya¯n, Tehran, 1354/1975–6. 151 Mut.ahhari, A¯ shina¯¯i ba¯ ‘Ulu¯m-i Islami, Tehran, Winter 1370/1991, Vol. 1, p. 10. 152 Va¯thiqi Ra¯d, Mut.ahhari, Vol. 1, p. 58; However, the date is 1354. See n.a., Sairi dar Zindiga¯ ni-yi Usta¯ d Mut.ahhari, p. 68. 153 Ibid., p. 57. . 154 Mut.ahhari, Barrasi-yi Ijma¯li-yi Nihzat-ha¯-yi Islami Dar S.ad Sa¯lih-i Akhir, Tehran, 1370, p. 89. 155 Abrahamian, Radical Islam, pp. 86–7. 156 Ibid., pp. 88–9. 157 Ibid., p. 92.

178

NOTES

158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188

Ibid., pp. 122–5. Ibid., p. 149. N.a., S.ah.ifih-yi Nu¯r, Bahman 1361/1983, Vol. 12, pp. 197–9. Abrahamian, Radical Islam, pp. 128 and 135. Ibid., p. 145. Mut.ahhari, Mas’alih-yi Shina¯ kht, Tehran, Spring 1368/1989, p. 8. Ba¯hunar, Muhammad Java¯d, ‘Sair-i Ta¯rikhi-yi Iltiqa¯t.i va Shakhs. iyat-i ‘Ilmi-yi Usta¯d’ in: Va¯thiqi Ra¯d, Mut.ahhari, Vol. 1, pp. 377–84. N.a., Sairi dar Zindiga¯ ni, p. 81. Mut.ahhari, Jaha¯ nbini-yi Tauh.idi, Tehran, Spring 1370/1991, p. 83. Va¯thiqi Ra¯d, Mut.ahhari, Vol. 1, p. 200. Ibid., p. 203. A number of phrases from these booklets are mentioned in Mut.ahhari’s article . on ‘Ma¯tirya¯lism dar Iran’ in: Murtaza Mut.ahhari, ‘Ilal-i Gira¯ yish bi Ma¯ ddigari, pp. 33–43. Qa¯simi, Da¯vu¯d, Us.u¯l-i Tafakkur-i Qurani, n.d., n.p., p. 209. Mut.ahhari, Ma¯ tirya¯ lism dar Iran, pp. 29–30. Ibid., p. 31. Ibid., p. 32. Ibid., p. 31. Ibid., p. 32. Va¯thiqi Ra¯d, Mut.ahhari, Vol. 1, p. 201. Ibid., pp. 204–5. See an interview with T. a¯hiri Khurram-a¯ba¯di in: n.a., Sarguzasht-ha¯ -yi Vizhih, Vol. 2, p. 97. Va¯thiqi Ra¯d, Mut.ahhari, Vol. 1, p. 204. Algar, Hamid, preface to: Shariati, Marxism and other Western Fallacies, trans. R. Cambell, California, 1980, p. 9. See an interview with Anva¯ri in: Va¯thiqi Ra¯d, Mut.ahhari, Vol. 1, p. 109. Mut.ahhari, Barrasi-yi Ijma¯ li, p. 89. Mut.ahhari, Ma¯ tirya¯ lism dar Iran, p. 43. Mut.ahhari, Pira¯ mu¯n-i Inqila¯ b, Tehran, Spring 1370/1991, p. 124. Ba¯hunar, Muhammad Java¯d, Sair-i Ta¯ rikhi, p. 384. See an interview with Hashemi Rafsanjani in: Va¯thiqi Ra¯d, Mut.ahhari, Vol. 1, p. 58. It is published in: Mut.ahhari, Pira¯ mu¯n-i Inqila¯ b, p. 15. Va¯thiqi Ra¯d, Mut.ahhari, Vol. 2, p. 622. 3 ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES

1 Personal interview with Ayatullah Sayyid Abdul-Karim Mu¯savi Ardibili, Summer 1993. 2 Katouzian, Homa, ‘Shi‘ism and Islamic Economics’, in: Religion and Politics in Iran, ed. Nikki R. Keddie, London, 1983, p. 147. 3 Khomeini, Ruh.ullah, Tah.rir al-Vasilih, Beirut, 1985, Vol. 1, p. 515. 4 Mut.ahhari, ‘Bimih’ in: Mut.ahhari, Mas’alih-yi Riba¯ , Tehran, Summer 1370/ 1991, p. 281. 5 Ibid., p. 282. ¯ dil, the present head of the 6 Personal interview with Ghula¯m-Ali H . adda¯d-‘A Iranian Academy of Persian Language and Literature, 11.12.1995. Muhammad Naha¯vandiya¯n, Mans. u¯r Pahlava¯n and Dr S.a¯lih.khu¯ were the other members of this group. 7 N.a., S.ah.ifih-yi Nu¯r, Vol. 20, 1369/1990–1, pp. 155, 163, 165, 170, 171.

179

NOTES

8 Katouzian, Shi‘ism, p. 145. 9 Mut.ahhari, Naz.ari bi Niz.a¯ m-i Iqtis.a¯ di-yi islam, Tehran, Spring 1368/1989, pp. 32–3 and 238–9; S.adr, Iqtis.a¯ duna¯ , Beirut, 1977, pp. 290–94 and 335–46; Gulza¯dih Ghafu¯ri, Khut.ut.-i As.li dar Niz.a¯ m-i Iqtis.a¯ di-yi Islam, Tehran, n.d, pp. 6–9; Mu¯sa¯ S.adr, Iqtis.a¯ d dar Maktab-i Islam, Tehran, Day 1350/1971, pp. 4–5; n.a., Dar-a¯ madi bar Iqtis.a¯ d-i Islami, Qum, Summer 1372/1993, pp. 9–14. 10 Mut.ahhari, Naz.ari, pp. 16–17. 11 S.adr, Iqtis.a¯ duna¯ , p. 291. 12 Nomani, Farhad, Islamic Economic Systems, London, 1994, p. 21. 13 Ibid., p. 43. 14 N.a., Dar-a¯ madi, pp. 55–76. 15 Ibid., pp. 44–5. 16 Mut.ahhari, Naz.ari, pp. 21–6. 17 For the first group, see Gulza¯dih Ghafu¯ri, Khut.ut.-i As.li, p. 19; n.a., Dar-a¯ madi, p. 90; Beheshti, Iqtis.a¯ d-i Islami, Tehran, Autumn 1368/1989, Vol. 1. p. 13. And for the second group see Mut.ahhari, Naz.ari, pp. 17–20 and 233–6. 18 Mut.ahhari, Naz.ari, pp. 17–20. 19 S.adr, Iqtis.a¯ duna¯ , p. 346. 20 Ibid., p. 341; Mallat, Chibli, The Renewal of Islamic Law, Cambridge, 1993, pp. 122–3. 21 S.adr, Iqtis.a¯ duna¯ , p. 269. 22 Nomani, Islamic Economic Systems, p. 44. 23 S.adr, Iqtis.a¯ duna¯ , pp. 272–77. 24 Nomani, Islamic Economic Systems, p. 45. 25 Mut.ahhari, Islam va Muqtaz. iyat-i Zama¯ n, Vol. 1, pp. 250–2. 26 Nomani, Islamic Economic Systems, p. 46. 27 Mut.ahhari, Naz.ari, pp. 59, 154. 28 Ibid., p. 25. 29 Ibid., p. 159. 30 Rodinson, Maxime, Islam and Capitalism, trans. Brian Pearce, London, 1974, pp. 155 and 181. 31 Mut.ahhari, Naz.ari, pp. 112–13. 32 Ibid., pp. 221–4. 33 Rodinson, Islam, p. 4. 34 Mut.ahhari, Naz.ari, p. 137. 35 Ibid., p. 135. 36 Ibid., p. 136. 37 Ibid., pp. 58, 138 and 143. 38 Ibid., pp. 79 and 124. 39 According to the First (and also Amended) Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Chapter IV, Article 44, The economic system of the Islamic Republic of Iran is to consist of three sectors: state, cooperative, and private, and is to be based on orderly and correct planning. The state sector is to include all large-scale and basic industries, foreign trade, major mineral resources, banking, insurance, energy, dams and large-scale irrigation networks, radio and television, post, telegraphic and telephone services, aviation, shipping, roads, railroads and the like; all these will be publicly owned and administered by the state. 40 Beheshti, Iqtis.a¯ d, p. 25. ¯ dhari Qumi, Ahmad, Ma¯ likiyat dar Islam, Qum, n.d., pp. 57–9. 41 A 42 Shariati, Islamshina¯ si, Vols 1 and 2, p. 97.

180

NOTES

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92

Mut.ahhari, Naz.ari, pp. 224–5. Ibid., pp. 229–331. Ibid., pp. 241–2. Ibid., pp. 143–4. Ibid., p. 174. Ibid., p. 175. Ibid., p. 223. N.a., Dar-a¯ madi, pp. 257–8; Mallat, Renewal, p. 114. Mut.ahhari, Naz.ari, pp. 240–1. Nomani, Islamic Economic Systems, pp. 47–8. Mut.ahhari, ‘Adl-i Ila¯ hi, pp. 35, 55 and 56. Ibid., p. 37. Ibid., p. 36. Ibid., p. 37. Mut.ahhari, Bist Gufta¯ r, p. 10. Ibid., pp. 12–17; Mut.ahhari, Sairi dar Nahj, pp. 110–12. Nomani, Islamic Economic Systems, p. 37. Ibid., pp. 38–9. Ibid., p. 37. Mut.ahhari, Qiya¯ m va Inqila¯ b-i Mahdi, p. 60. Mut.ahhari, Bist Gufta¯ r, p. 136. Mut.ahhari, ‘Adl-i Ila¯ hi, pp. 56–7. Nomani, Islamic Economic Systems, p. 38. Mut.ahhari, Mas’alih-yi Riba¯ , Tehran, Summer 1370/1991, p. 247. Ibid., pp. 163–4. Ibid., p. 165. Ibid., pp. 166–70. Ibid., pp. 170–1. Ibid., pp. 171–8. Ibid., pp. 70–2 and 178–80. Ibid., p. 55. Ibid., pp. 41–2. Mallat, Renewal, p. 158. Mut.ahhari, Mas’alih-yi Riba¯ , p. 78. Ibid., pp. 42 and 76; Beheshti, Riba¯ , pp. 87, 89 and 119. Ibid., pp. 120–1. Mallat, Renewal, p. 165. Beheshti, Riba¯ , pp. 148–9 and 186–8. Mut.ahhari, Mas’alih-yi Riba¯ , pp. 143–8. Ibid., p. 139. Ibid., pp. 116–22. Ibn Khaldu¯n, The Muqaddamih, trans. Franz Rosenthal, New York, 1980, Vol. 2, pp. 93–5. Nomani, Islamic Economic Systems, p. 56. Ibid., pp. 56–8. Maka¯rim Shira¯zi, ‘Khut.ut.-i As. li-i Iqtis. a¯d-i Islami’ in: Va¯‘iz. -za¯dih Khura¯sa¯ni, Majmu¯‘ih-yi Maqa¯ la¯ t-i Fa¯ rsi-yi Avvali¯n Majmu¯‘ih-yi Barrasi-ha¯ -yi Iqtis.a¯ d-i Islami, Mashhad, 1369/1990–91, p. 110. Nomani, Islamic Economic Systems, p. 59. Ibid., p. 63. Montazeri, H. A., Vila¯ yat al-Faqih, Qum, 1409q, Vol. 2, pp. 669–700. Maka¯rim Shira¯zi, Khut.ut., p. 113. Mut.ahhari, Naz.ari, pp. 156–7, 222–40.

181

NOTES

93 Ibid., p. 206. 94 Ibid., p. 215. 95 Ibid., p. 208. 4 POLITICAL VIEWS 1 These parts of the fiqh are as follows: Kita¯ b al-Amr bi al-M‘aru¯f va al-Nahyi ‘an . al-Munkar, Kita¯ b al-Qaz a¯ , Kita¯ b al-H . udu¯d, Kita¯ b al-Jiha¯ d, Kita¯ b al-Khums, Kita¯ b al-Bai‘a, Kita¯ b al-H . ajr, Kita¯ b al-Nika¯ h., Kita¯ b al-T.ala¯ q, Kita¯ b al-S.aum, Kita¯ b al-S.ala¯ t, and Kita¯ b al-H . ajj. 2 Enayat, Hamid, Modern Islamic Political Thought, London and Basingstoke, 1982, pp. 2–3. 3 Kadivar, Muh.sin, ‘Naz. ariyih-ha¯-yi Daulat dar Fiqh-i Shi‘ih’ in: Fas.l Na¯ mih-i Ra¯ hburd, No. 3, Autumn 1373/1994, pp. 2–4. ¯ mili, Vasa¯ il al-Shi‘ih, Oum, 1371/1992–3, Vol. 15, pp. 50–6. 4 H . u¯rr ‘A 5 Kadivar, Muh.sin, Naz.ariyih-ha¯ -yi Daulat, 2nd edn, p. 2. 6 Umu¯r-i h.isbih means matters which usually no-one takes cares of, and which cannot be left to themselves, such as protecting those who do not have protectors, and directing public endowments. However, Ayatullah Khomeini considers matters such as ‘guarding the frontiers of the Islamic lands’, ‘protecting young Muslims from deviation and wrong doing’, and ‘preventing anti-Islamic propagation’ as cases of umu¯r-i h.isbih which require the establishing of a just rule. See Khomeini, Shu’u¯n va Ikhtiya¯ ra¯ t-i Valí-yi Faqih, Tehran, Autumn 1369/ 1990, p. 79. 7 See Mufid, al-Muqni‘ih, Qum, 1372/1993–4, pp. 810–12, and Shaikh T.u¯si, Khila¯ f, Tehran, 1382q, Vol. 1, pp. 226, 359, 452, 458–9, 620–1, and also Vol. 2, pp. 30, 130, 477, 492–93, 500, 507, 513. 8 For a bibliography of Rasa¯i¯l-i Khira¯jiyih see n.a., al-Khira¯ jiya¯ t, a collection of . . Muh.aqqiq Tha¯ ni, Muh.aqqiq Ardibili, Fa¯ z il Qat.ifi and Fa¯ z il Shaiba¯ ni, Qum, 1413q; for a bibliography of Risa¯lih-ha¯-yi Nama¯z-i Jum‘ih see Rasul J‘afariya¯n, Din va Siya¯ sat dar Daurih-i S.afaviyan, Qum, 1370/1991–2, pp. 152–82; for a bibliography of Rasa¯il-i jiha¯diyih see Abdul-Hadi H . a¯’iri, Nakhustin Ru¯ya¯ ru¯¯iha¯ -yi Andishihgara¯ n-i Irani, Tehran, 1367/1988–9, pp. 374–83. 9 Kadivar, Naz.ariyih-ha¯ , 2nd edn, p. 2. 10 Muh.aqqiq Karaki, ‘Risa¯lah fi al-S.ala¯t al-Jum‘ah’ in: n.a., Rasa¯ il al-Muh.aqqiq Karaki, ed. Muhammad H . assu¯n, Qum, 1409q, pp. 142–3. 11 Algar, Hamid, Religion and State in Iran, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1969, p. 56. Quoted from Muhammad b. Suliyma¯n Tunka¯buni, Qis.as. al-‘ulama¯ , Tehran, 1304q, p. 141. 12 Nara¯qi, Mulla¯ Ahmad, ‘Vila¯yat al-Faqih’, a part of ‘Ava¯ id al-Aiya¯ m, ed. Sayyid Ya¯sin Mu¯savi, Tehran, 1410q, pp. 60–72. 13 Najafi, Muhammad Hasan, Java¯ hir al-Kala¯ m, Beirut, 1981, Vol. 16, p. 180. . 14 Ansa¯ri, Shaikh Murtaza, Al-Maka¯ sib, Tabriz, 1375q, pp. 153–5. 15 For Na¯i¯ni’s and Nu¯ri’s views see Abdul-Hadi H . a¯’iri, Shi‘ism and Constitutionalism in Iran, Leiden, 1977, pp. 152–64. 16 See Montazeri, Al-Badr al-Za¯ hir, Qum, 1362/1983–4, pp. 52–3. 17 Khomeini, Shu’u¯n, p. 23. 18 Kashf al-Asra¯ r (pp. 186–238) reflects Ayatullah Khomeini’s views on the concept of Islamic rule, Vila¯ yat-i Faqih, and the political role of the ‘ulama¯ in society. Al-Rasa¯ il (pp. 94–120) provides his jurisprudential argumentation and analysis on the issue of Vila¯ yat-i Faqih and the extent of his authority. Tah.rir alVasilih (vol. 1, pp. 472–83) provides Ayatullah Khomeini’s particular vision on the issue of Amr-i bi M‘aru¯f va Nahyi az Munkar as the only legitimate way to

182

NOTES

19 20 21 22 23

24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49

establish of the Islamic rule. The 21-volume S.ah.ifih-yi Nu¯r is indeed a collection of the Ayatullah’s statements, messages, interviews, orders and letters. These reflect his views on a vast variety of political issues, including the constitutional monarchy, the Pahlavi regime, the necessity for establishing a just Islamic rule, the vast authority of the faqih, the necessity for the involvement of the ‘ulama¯ in politics, Islam as a religion full of politics, the function of Islamic rule for oppressed people, religious minorities in an Islamic state, the improvement of women’s rights in Islamic society and so on. These books were revised by the Mu’assasih-yi Tanz.im va Nashr-i A¯ tha¯ r-i Ima¯ m Khomeini, and republished in 1378/1999, in 22 volumes, in addition to 2000 new documents. S.ah.ifih-yi Inqila¯ b, Ayatullah Khomeini’s political testament, reflects his last judgements about the Islamic Republic, Islam and politics, external interventions, internal fears, cultural transformation, the rights and the role of the people over the Islamic state and so on. See Kita¯ b al-Bai‘a, Vol. 2, pp. 461–72; Tah.rir al-Vasilih, Vol. 1, pp. 472–83; S.ah.ifih-yi Nu¯r, Vol. 20, pp. 170 and 176. Khomeini, Tah.rir, Vol. 1, p. 482. Ibid., p. 473. Montazeri, Vila¯ yat al-Faqih, Qum, 1049q, Vol. 1, pp. 425–511. About Na¯i¯ni’s view see Abdul-Hadi H . a¯’iri, Shiism and Constitutionalism in Iran, pp. 165–70; for Muhammad Ba¯qir S.adr’s view, see Mahmood Taqizadih Davari, Ta¯ rikh Tafakkur-i Ijtima¯ ‘i¯ dar Islam, Tehran, 1363, Part 2, p. 138; for Montazeri’s view see Husain Ali Montazeri, Vila¯ yat al-Faqih, Qum, 1409q, Vol. 1, p. 4; for Ayatullah Khomeini’s view see Khomeini, Shu’u¯n, p. 24. Mut.ahhari, Pira¯ mu¯n-i Jumhu¯ri-i Islami, p. 150. Ibid., p. 151. Khomeini, Shu’u¯n, p. 24. Montazeri, Vila¯ yat al-Faqih, Vol. 1, p. 4. Mut.ahhari, Pira¯ mu¯n-i Jumhu¯ri-yi Islami, pp. 151–2. Mut.ahhari, Ima¯ mat va Rahbari, Tehran, Spring 1370/1991, pp. 50–71. Mut.ahhari, Sairi dar Nahj al-bala¯ ghih, p. 128–9. Ibid., p. 124. Ibid., p. 130. Ibid., p. 128. Personal interview with Ayatullah Montazeri, 11 April 1994. Ba¯hunar, Muhammad Java¯d, ‘Vila¯ yat-i Faqih’, BA thesis, Faculty of Theology, ¯ ba¯n 1341/1962, p. 68. Tehran, A . Mut.ahhari, Islam va Muqtaz iya¯ t, Vol. 2, pp. 62–4. . These notes are published in: Murtaza Mut.ahhari, Pira¯ mu¯n-i Jumhu¯ri, p. 154. . Mut.ahhari, Islam va Muqtaz iya¯ t, Vol. 2, pp. 86, 91–2. . Mut.ahhari, Barrasi-yi Ijma¯ li-yi Nihz at-ha¯ , pp. 13–58. Ibid., pp. 63–4. Ibid., pp. 65–7. Mut.ahhari, Ja¯ mi‘ih va Ta¯ rikh, pp. 41–3 and 86. . Mut.ahhari, Barrasi-yi Ijma¯ li-yi Nihz at-ha¯ , p. 71. Quoted from Mut.ahhari, Barrasi-yi Ijma¯ li-yi Nihz. at-ha¯ , pp. 76–7. For the biography and views of Bani-S.adr see Hamid Dabashi, Theology of Discontent, pp. 367–408. Mut.ahhari, Barrasi-yi Ijma¯ li-yi Nihz. at-ha¯ , pp. 80–1. Ibid., p. 83. Mut.ahhari, Pira¯ mu¯n-i Inqila¯ b-i Islami, p. 184. N.a., S.ah.ifih-yi Nu¯r, Vol. 6, Bahman 1361/1983, p. 269. . Mut.ahhari, Barrasi-yi Ijma¯ li-yi Nihz at-ha¯ , p. 87.

183

NOTES

50 51 52 53 54 55 56

57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66

67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89

Ibid., pp. 92–3. Mut.ahhari, Pira¯ mu¯n-i Inqila¯ b-i Islami, p. 85. Mut.ahhari, Pira¯ mu¯n-i Jumhu¯ri, pp. 26–7. Ehteshami, A., After Khomeini, London, 1955, p. 37. Kadivar, Naz.ariyih-ha¯ , 2nd edn, p. 12. Ibid., p. 15. Although the other derivatives of this word, such as vali¯ (a person who has superiority over another), vali¯ (governor), auliya¯ (plural of vali¯ ), muva¯ la¯ t (friendship), tauliyat (superintendence of a pious foundation or shrine), tavalla¯ (friendship), mutavalli (custodian), isti¯la¯ (domination), aula¯ (prior), maula¯ (master and also servant), have different meanings, they all have some sense of spiritual or material closeness. For the meanings of Vila¯ yat see Mut.ahhari, Vila¯ -ha¯ va Vila¯ yat-ha¯ , Tehran, Autumn 1370/1991, pp. 13–16; Kadivar, Naz.ariyih-ha¯ , 2nd edn, pp. 19–30. Kulaini, Al-Us.u¯l min al-Ka¯ fi, Beirut, 1981, Vol. 1, p. 295. Ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 18–19. Mut.ahhari, Ima¯ mat va Rahbari, pp. 45–109. Khomeini, Tah.rir al-Vasilih, Vol. 2, p. 533. Khomeini, Shu’u¯n, p. 35. Kadivar, Naz.ariyih-ha¯ , 2nd edn, pp. 45 and 49. Khomeini, Shu’u¯n, pp. 65–6. N.a., S.ah.ifih-yi Nu¯r, Vol. 20, 1369/1990–1, p. 170. For Ayatullah Gulpa¯yiga¯ni’s view see Ahmad S.a¯biri Hamada¯ni, Al-Hida¯ yah ila¯ man lahu al-Vila¯ yah, Qum, 1383q, pp. 46–7; for Ayatullah Sabzava¯ri’s view see Sayyid ‘Abdul-A‘ala¯ Sabzava¯ri, Muhazzab al-Ah.ka¯ m, Najaf, n.d., Vol. 1, p. 121 and Vol. 16, p. 402. Kadivar, Naz.ariyih-ha¯ , pp. 53–4. N.a., S.ah.ifih-yi Nu¯r, Vol. 9, Bahman 1361/1983, p. 183. Subh.a¯ni, J‘afar, Tahzib al-Us.u¯l, Qum, n.d., Vol. 2, p. 149. N.a., S.ah.ifih-yi Nu¯r, Vol. 5, Bahman 1361/1983, p. 31. Ibid., Vol. 15, Bahman 1361/1983, p. 76. Ibid., Vol. 21, 1369/1990–1, p. 129. Kadivar, Naz.ariyih-ha¯ , p. 62. Khomeini, Shu’u¯n, p. 45. N.a., S.ah.ifih-yi Nu¯r, Vol. 9, Bahman 1361/1983, p. 253 and Vol. 17, Bahman 1364/1986, p. 103. Ibid., Vol. 21, 1369/1990–1, p. 98. Kadivar, Naz.ariyih-ha¯ , p. 72. Ibid., 49–51. Khui¯, Abul-Qa¯sim, Al-Tanqih., ed. Mirza¯ Ali Gharavi Tabrizi, Qum, 1410q, Vol. 1, p. 424. Ara¯ki, Muhammad-Ali, Kita¯ b al-Bai‘a, Qum, 1415q, Vol. 2, pp. 13–24. Tabrizi, Shaikh Java¯d, I¯.sa¯ l al-T.a¯ lib ila¯ al-T‘aliq ‘ala¯ al-Maka¯ sib, Qum, 1411q, Vol. 3, pp. 36–40. S.adr, Muhammad Ba¯qir, Lamh.a Tamhidiyah ‘an Mashru¯‘a Du¯stu¯r alJumhuriyah al-Isla¯ miyah, Qum, 1399q, p. 19–22. Montazeri, Vila¯ yat al-Faqih, Vol. 1, pp. 73–81. Ibid., p. 301. Ibid., pp. 302–3. Ibid., pp. 409–17. Ibid., pp. 426–92. Ibid., p. 493. Ibid., pp. 497–9.

184

NOTES

90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115

Ibid., p. 508. Ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 51–55. Personal interview with Ayatullah Montazeri, spring 1989. Montazeri, Vila¯ yat al-Faqih, Vol. 1, pp. 9–10 and 538–40. H . a¯’iri Yazdi, Mahdi, H . ikmat va H . uku¯mat, London, 1995, pp. 215–19. Ibid., pp. 54–7. Ibid., p. 82. Ibid., 103–5. Ibid., p. 109. Ibid., pp. 119–21 and 132. Ibid., pp. 151–3. Ibid., p. 143. Ibid., pp. 167–70. Ibid., p. 172. Ibid., pp. 177–8. Ibid., pp. 179–92. Ibid., pp. 193–207. Ibid., pp. 81 and 144. Ibid., p. 218. Ibid., pp. 215–220. See Mahdi H . a¯’iri Yazdi, H . ikmat va H . uku¯mat, pp. 55–134. Mut.ahhari, Islam va Muqtaz. iya¯ t, Vol. 1, p. 175 and Vol. 2, pp. 63–4, 91. Mut.ahhari, Pira¯ mu¯n-i Jumhu¯ri, pp. 85–6. Ibid., p. 150. Ibid., p. 154. Ibid., pp. 80–3.

185

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abrahamian, Ervand, Iran between Two Revolutions, Princeton University Press, 1982. Abrahamian, Ervand, Khomeinism, London, I. B. Tauris, 1993. Abrahamian, Ervand, Radical Islam, London, I. B. Tauris, 1989. Acton, H. B., ‘Dialectical Materialism’ in: The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards, London and New York, Collier Macmillan, 1967, pp. 389–97. ¯ dhari Qumi, Ahmad, Ma¯likiyat dar Islam, Qum, Mu’assasih-yi Mat.bu¯a¯ti-yi Da¯r A al-‘IlM., n.d. ¯ yati’ in: M. I. A ¯ yati, Ta¯rikh-i Afsha¯r, I¯raj, ‘Zindigi-na¯mih-yi Muhammad Ibra¯him A Paya¯mbar-i Islam, Tehran University Publication, Khurda¯d 1361/1982, pp. d–v. Akhavi, Shahroukh, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1980. Akhavi, Shahroukh, ‘The Role of the Clergy in Iranian Politics, 1949–1954’ in: n.a, Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism and Oil, London, I. B. Tauris, 1988, pp. 91–117. Algar, Hamid, ‘Borujerdi’ in: Encyclopedia Iranica, London and New York, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1990, Vol. 1, pp. 376–9. . Algar, Hamid, ‘Introduction (to Mut.ahhari’s Life)’ in: Murtaza Mut.ahhari, Fundamentals of Islamic Thought, trans. R. Campbell, Berkeley, Mizan Press, 1985, pp. 9–22. Algar, Hamid, ‘Isfahani, Sayyid Abul-Hasan’ in: Encyclopedia Iranica, London and New York, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1988, Vol. 1, pp. 302–3. Algar, Hamid, ‘Preface’ in: Ali Shariati, Marxism and Other Western Fallacies, trans. R. Cambell, California, Mizan Press, 1980, pp. 7–14. Algar, Hamid, Religion and State in Iran 1785–1906, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1969. . Ans. a¯ri, Shaikh Murtaza, Al-Maka¯sib, Tabriz, Cha¯p-i Sangi, 1375q./1955–6. Ara¯ki, Muhammad-Ali, Kita¯b al-Bai‘a, Qum, Mu’assasih-yi Dar Ra¯h-i H . aqq, 1415q./1994–5, Vol. 2. Arjomand, Said Amir, The Turban for the Crown, Oxford University Press, 1988. Ba¯da¯mchiya¯n, Asadullah, Haiat-ha¯-yi Mu’talafih-yi Islami, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i Auj, Tir 1362/1983. Ba¯hunar, Muhammad-Java¯d, ‘Sair-i Ta¯rikhi-yi Iltiqa¯t.’ in: Va¯thiqi Ra¯d, Mut.ahhari: Mut.ahhar-i Andishih-ha¯, Qum, Daftar-i Tabligha¯t-i Islami, Urdibihisht 1364/ 1985, Vol. 1, pp. 377–84.

186

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ba¯hunar, Muhammad-Java¯d, Vila¯yat-i Faqih, BA thesis, Tehran, Da¯nishkadih-i ¯ ba¯n 1341/1962. Ila¯hiya¯t, A Ba¯qi Nas. r-a¯ba¯di, Ali, Sairi dar Andishi-ha¯-yi Ijtima¯‘i¯-yi Shahid Ayatullah Mut.ahhari, Qum, Intisha¯ra¯t-i Daftar-i Tabligha¯t-i Islami, 1377/1998. Barbour, Ian G., Issues in Science and Religion, London, SCM Press, 1972. Bayat, Mangol, Iran’s First Revolution, Oxford University Press, 1991. Beheshti, Sayyid Muhammad, Iqtis.a¯d-i Islami, Tehran, Daftar-i Nashr-i Farhang-i Islami, Autumn 1368/1989. Beheshti, Sayyid Muhammad, Riba¯ dar Islam, Tehran, Daftar-i Nashr-i Farhang-i Islami, Spring 1369/1990. Browne, E. G., The Persian Revolution 1905–1909, London, Frank Cass, 1966. Calmard, J., ‘Marj‘a-i Taqlid’ in: The Encyclopedia of Islam, new edn, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1991, Vol. 6, pp. 548–56. Dabashi, Hamid, Theology of Discontent, New York University Press, 1993. Dava¯ni, Ali, Kha¯.tira¯t-i man az Usta¯d-i Shahid Mut.ahhari, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i ¯ ba¯n 1372/1993. S.adra¯, A Dava¯ni, Ali, Nihz. at-i du Ma¯hi-yi Iran, Qum, Cha¯p-i H . ikmat, 1341/1962–3. Dava¯ni, Ali, Zindiga¯ni-yi Za‘i¯m-i Buzurg-i ‘A¯ lam-i Tashayyu‘a Ayatullah Buru¯jirdi, Tehran, Nashr-i Mut.ahhar, 2nd edn, Autumn 1371/1992. Dihnavi, Qiya¯m-i Khu¯nin-i 15 Khurda¯d 1342, Tehran, Mu’assasih-yi Rasa¯, 1360/ 1981–82. Durant, Will, The Story of Civilisation, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1950. Durant, Will, Lazza¯t-i Falsafih, trans. ‘Abba¯s Zarya¯b, Tehran, Sa¯zma¯n-i Intisha¯ra¯t ¯ mu¯zish-i Inqila¯b-i Islami, 7th edn, 1371/1992–3. va A Ehteshami, Anoushiravan, After Khomeini, London and New York, Routledge, 1995. Enayat, Hamid, Modern Islamic Political Thought, London and Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1982. Faghfoory, M. H., ‘The Impact of Modernization on the ‘Ulama¯ in Iran, 1925–1941’ Iranian Studies, 1993, Vol. 26, No. 3–4, pp. 277–312. Faghfoory, M. H., ‘The Role of the ‘Ulama¯ in Twentieth Century Iran’, Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1978. Faghfoory, M. H., ‘The ‘Ulama¯-State Relations in Iran, 1921–1941’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 1987, Vol. 19, pp. 413–32. . Faiz Ka¯sha¯ni, Diva¯n-i Ash‘a¯r, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i Kita¯b-Kha¯nih-yi Sana¯i¯, 1354/ 1975–6. Farrukh, Sayyid Mahdi, Kha¯.tira¯t-i Siya¯si-yi Farrukh, Tehran, Amir Kabir Publication, Bahman 1347/1969. Fazlur, Rahman, The Philosophy of Mulla¯ S.adra¯, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1975. Fischer, M., Iran from Religious Dispute to Revolution, Harvard University Press, 1980. Fischer, M. and Abedi, M., Debating Muslims, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1990. Gellner, Ernest, Postmodernism, Reason and Religion, London, Routledge, 1992. Gleave, Robert, ‘Akhbari Shi‘i Jurisprudence in the Writings of Yusuf b. Ahmad alBahrani’, Ph.D. thesis, University of Manchester, 1996. Gulza¯dih Ghafu¯ri, Ali, Khut.u¯.t-i As.li dar Niz.a¯m-i Iqtis.a¯d-i Islam, Tehran, Fajr, n.d.

187

BIBLIOGRAPHY

. Haar, J. G. J. ter, ‘Murtaza Mut.ahhari (1919–1979): An Introduction to his Life and Thought’, Persica, 1990–2, Vol. XIV, pp. 1–20. H abib, Hasan, ‘Muqaddamih’ in: Diva¯n-i Mirza¯ H . abibullah Khura¯sa¯ni, Tehran, . n.p., n.d. H . a¯’iri, Abdul-Ha¯di, Shi‘ism and Constitutionalism in Iran, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1977. H . a¯’iri, Abdul-Ha¯di, ‘H . a¯’iri, ‘Abdul-Karim’ in: The Encyclopedia of Islam, new edn, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1982, Supplement 5–6, pp. 342–3. H . a¯’iri, Abdul-Ha¯di, ‘Buru¯jirdi’ in: The Encyclopedia of Islam, new edn, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1981, Supplement 3–4, pp. 157–8. H . a¯’iri, Abdul-Ha¯di, Nakhu¯stin Ru¯ya¯ru¯¯i-ha¯-yi Andishihgara¯n-i Irani ba¯ du Ru¯yih-yi Tamaddun-i Burzhu¯a¯zi-yi Gharb, Tehran, Amir Kabir Publication, 1367/1989– 90. H . ikmat va H . uku¯mat, London, Intisha¯ra¯t-i Sha¯di, 1995. . a¯’iri Yazdi, Mahdi, H H . ujjati Kirma¯ni, Muhammad Java¯d, ‘Niga¯hi bi Shakhs. iyat-i Marh.u¯m Husain Ali Ra¯shid’ in: Ittila¯a¯t 7.8.1369/28.10.1991. ¯ mili, Muhammad ibn al-Hasan,Vasa¯’il al-Shi‘ih, Qum, Mu’assasih-yi A ¯ l alHurr ‘A Bait, 1371/1992–3, Vol. 15. Ibn Khaldu¯n, The Muqaddimah, trans. Franz Rosenthal, New York, Pantheon Books, 1980, Vol. 2. Isfahani, Muhammad Husain, Diva¯n-i Kumpa¯ni, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i Da¯r al-Kutub al-Islamiyih, 1338/1959–60. I¯zadi, Mus. t.afa¯, Faqih-i ‘A¯ liqadr, Tehran, Suru¯sh Publication, Khurda¯d 1361/1982. J‘afariya¯n, Rasu¯l, Din va Siya¯sat dar Daurih-i S.afaviya¯n, Qum, Intisha¯ra¯t-i Ans. a¯riya¯n, 1370/1991–2. Kadivar, Muh.sin, ‘Naz. ariyih-ha¯-yi Daulat dar Fiqh-i Shi‘ih’, Fas.l-Na¯mih-yi Ra¯hburd, Autumn 1373/1994, No. 3, pp. 1–41. Katouzian, H., Musaddiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran, London, I. B. Tauris, 1990. Katouzian, H., ‘Shi‘ism and Islamic Economics’ in: Religion and Politics in Iran, ed. Nikki R. Keddie, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1983, pp. 145–65. Khamenei¯, Ali, Guza¯rishi az Sa¯biqih-yi Ta¯rikhi va Kunu¯ni-i H . auzih-yi ‘Ilmiyih-yi Mashhad, Mashhad, Kungirih-i Jaha¯ni-yi Ima¯m Reza, Tir 1365/1986. Khomeini, Ruh.ullah, Diva¯n-i Ima¯m, Tehran, Mu’assasih-yi Tanz. im va Nashr-i ¯ tha¯r-i Ima¯m Khomeini, Tehran, 1st edn, Khurda¯d 1372/1993. A Khomeini, Ruh.ullah, Kashf al-Asra¯r, Qum, Intisha¯ra¯t-i Paya¯m-i Islam, n.d. Khomeini, Ruh.ullah, Kita¯b al-Bai‘a, Qum, Intisha¯ra¯t-i Isma¯‘i¯liya¯n, n.d., Vol. 2. Khomeini, Ruh.ullah, Al-Rasa¯il, Qum, Intisha¯ra¯t-i Isma¯‘i¯liya¯n, 1385(q.)/1965. Khomeini, Ruh.ullah, S.ah.ifih-yi Inqila¯b, Tehran, Sa¯zma¯n Cha¯p va Intisha¯ra¯t-i Viza¯rat-i Farhang va Irsha¯d-i Islami, n.d. Khomeini, Ruh.ullah, Shu’u¯n va Ikhtiya¯ra¯t-i Vali¯-yi Faqih, Tehran, Sa¯zma¯n-i Cha¯p va Intisha¯ra¯t-i Viza¯rat-i Farhang va Irsha¯d-i Islami, 3rd edn, Autumn 1369/1990. Khomeini, Ruh.ullah, Tah.rir al-Vasilih (2 vols), Beirut, Da¯r al-Muntaz. ar, 1985. Khui¯, Sayyid Abul-Qa¯sim, Al-Tanqih, ed. Mirza¯ Ali Gharavi Tabrizi, Qum, Maktabih-yi Ayatullah Mar‘ashi, 1410q./1989–90, Vol. 1. Khura¯sa¯ni, Mirza¯ H . abibullah, Diva¯n-i Sh‘ir, with introduction by Hasan Habib, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i Zavva¯r, n.d. Khushniyat, S. H., Sayyid Mujtaba¯ Navva¯b S.afavi: Andishih-ha¯, Muba¯riza¯t va

188

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Shiha¯dat-i Au, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i Manshu¯r-i Bara¯dari, 1st edn, Isfand 1360/ 1982. Kulaini, Muhammad ibn Y‘aqu¯b, Al-Us.u¯l min al-Ka¯fi (2 vols), Beirut, Da¯r alTa‘a¯ruf, 1981. Madani, Sayyid Jala¯luddin, Ta¯rikh-i Siya¯si-i Mu‘a¯sir-i Iran, Qum, Daftar-i Intisha¯ra¯t-i Islami, Mihr 1361/1982. Maka¯rim Shira¯zi, Nas. ir, ‘Khut.u¯t.-i As. li-i Iqtis. a¯d-i Islami’ in: Va¯‘iz. -za¯dih Khura¯sa¯ni, Majmu¯‘ih-yi Maqa¯la¯t-i Fa¯rsi-yi Avvali¯n Majmu¯‘ih-yi Barrasi-ha¯-yi Iqtis.a¯d-i ¯ sta¯n-i Quds-i Raz.avi, 1369/1990–1. Islami, Mashhad, Intisha¯ra¯t-i A Makki, Husain, Ta¯rikh-i Bist Sa¯lih-i Iran, Tehran, Amir Kabir Publication, 1358/ 1979–80. Makki, Husain, Mudarris: Qahrama¯n-i A¯ za¯di, Tehran, Bunga¯h-i Tarjimih va Nashr-i Kita¯b, 1358/1979–80. Makki, Husain, Musaddiq va Nut.q-ha¯-yi Ta¯rikhi-yi Au, Tehran, Sa¯zma¯n-i Intisha¯ra¯t-i Ja¯vida¯n, 1st edn, Spring 1364/1985–6. Malcolm, Sir John, The History of Persia, London, John Murray and Longman, 1815. Maliki, Husain, Daulat-ha¯-yi Iran dar ‘As.r-i Mashru¯.tiyat, Tehran, Nashr-i Isha¯rih, 1370/1991–2. Mallat, Chibli, The Renewal of Islamic Law, Cambridge University Press, 1993. Martin, Vanessa, Creating an Islamic State, London and New York, I. B. Tauris, 2000. Milani, M. M., The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution, Boulder and London, Westview Press, 1994. Mir-Fat.ru¯s, Ali, H . alla¯j, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i Niga¯h, Urdibihisht 2537/1978. Modarrissi, H., ‘Rationalism and Traditionalism in Shi‘i¯ Jurisprudence’, Studia Islamica (1984), Vol 49, pp. 141–58. Montazeri, Husain-Ali, Al-Badr al-Za¯hir, Qum, Nashr-i Tafakkur, 1362/1983–4. Montazeri, Husain-Ali, ‘H . akim-i Farza¯nih’ in: n.a., Ya¯d-na¯mih-i Usta¯d-i Shahid Murtaz. a Mut.ahhari, ed. Abdul-Karim Suru¯sh, Tehran, Sa¯zma¯n-i Intisha¯ra¯t va ¯ mu¯zish-i Inqila¯b-i Islami, Shahrivar 1360/1981, Vol. 1, pp. 171–3. A ¯ lami li alMontazeri, Husain-Ali, Vila¯yat al-Faqih (4 vols), Qum, Markaz al-‘A Dira¯sa¯t al-Islamiyih, 1409–11q./1988–91. Mottahedeh, R., The Mantle of the Prophet, London, Penguin Books, 1987. Mufid, Muhammad ibn Nu‘ma¯n, Al-Muqni‘ih, Qum, Mu’assasah al-Nashr alIslami, 1372/1993–4. Muh.aqqiq Karaki, ‘Risa¯la fi S.ala¯t al-Jum‘ah’ in: n.a., Rasa¯il al-Muh.aqqiq Karaki, ed. Shaikh Muhammad H . assu¯n, Qum, Maktaba-yi Ayatullah Mar‘ashi, 1409q./ 1988–9. Mu‘i¯n, Muhammad, Mazd-yasna¯ va Adab-i Pa¯rsi, with an introduction by Ibra¯him Pour-Da¯vu¯d, Tehran, Tehran University Publication, 1338/1959–60. Musaddiq, M., Kha¯.tira¯t va Ta’alluma¯t-i Dr Muhammad Musaddiq, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i ‘Ilmi, n.d. Mu¯savi, S. H. J., Sima¯-yi Usta¯d dar A¯ yinih-i Niga¯h-i Ya¯ra¯n, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i S.adra¯, 1st edn, Urdibihisht 1371/1992. Mut.ahhari, M., ‘Adl-i Ila¯hi, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i S.adra¯, Tehran, 5th edn, Murda¯d 1370/1991. Mut.ahhari, M., Akhla¯q-i Jinsi dar Islam va Jaha¯n-i Gharb, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i S.adra¯, 5th edn, Spring 1370/1991.

189

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Mut.ahhari, M., A¯ shna¯¯i ba¯ ‘Ulu¯m-i Islami, Vols. 1 and 2, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i S.adra¯, 9th edn, 1368–1370/1989–92. Mut.ahhari, M., Barrasi-yi Ijma¯li-yi Maba¯ni-yi Iqtis.a¯d-i Islami, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i H . ikmat, 1361/1982–3. Mut.ahhari, M., Barrasi-yi Ijma¯li-yi Nihz. at-ha¯-yi Islami dar S.ad Sa¯lih-yi Akhir, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i S.adra¯, 15th edn, Bahman 1370/1992. . Mut.ahhari, M., ‘Bimih’ in: Murtaza Mut.ahhari, Masalih-yi Riba¯, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i S.adra¯, 3rd edn, Summer 1370/1991, pp. 273–341. Mut.ahhari, M., Bist Gufta¯r, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i S.adra¯, 7th edn, Autumn 1370/ 1991. Mut.ahhari, M., Dah Gufta¯r, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i S.adra¯, 6th edn, Autumn 1369/ 1990. . Mut.ahhari, M., ‘Dar Pira¯mu¯n-i Muh.allil’ in: Murtaza Mut.ahhari, Imda¯d-ha¯-yi Ghaibi dar Zindigi-yi Bashar, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i S.adra¯, 5th edn, Autumn 1370/ 1991, pp. 191–203. Mut.ahhari, M., Da¯sta¯n-i Ra¯sta¯n (2 vols), Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i S.adra¯, 15th edn, Winter 1370/1992. Mut.ahhari, M., Falsafih-yi Akhla¯q, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i S.adra¯, 9th edn, Bahman 1370/1992. Mut.ahhari, M., Falsafih-yi Ta¯rikh, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i S.adra¯, 2nd edn, Autumn 1370/1991, Vol. 1. Mut.ahhari, M., Fit.rat, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i S.adra¯, 2nd edn, Spring 1370/1991. Mut.ahhari, M., Gufta¯r-ha¯-yi M‘anavi, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i S.adra¯, 9th edn, 1370/ 1991–2. Mut.ahhari, M., H . aqq va Ba¯.til, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i S.adra¯, 11th edn, 1370/1991–2. Mut.ahhari, M., H . arakat va Zama¯n dar Falsafih-yi Islami, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i ikmat, 3rd edn, Winter 1369/1990–1. H . Mut.ahhari, M., ‘Ilal-i Gira¯yish bi Ma¯ddigari, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i S.adra¯, 12th edn, Autumn 1370/1991. Mut.ahhari, M., Ima¯mat va Rahbari, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i S.adra¯, 12th edn, Spring 1370/1991. Mut.ahhari, M., Insa¯n dar Quran, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i S.adra¯, 4th edn, Spring 1370/ 1991. Mut.ahhari, M., Insa¯n va Sarnivisht, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i S.adra¯, 10th edn, Autumn 1370/1991. Mut.ahhari, M., ‘Irfa¯n-i H . a¯fiz., Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i S.adra¯, 8th edn, Spring 1370/ 1991. Mut.ahhari, M., Islam va Muqtaz. iya¯t-i Zama¯n (2 vols), Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i S.adra¯, 6th edn, Autumn 1370. Mut.ahhari, M., Ja¯mi‘ih va Ta¯rikh, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i S.adra¯, 3rd edn, Spring 1370/ 1991. Mut.ahhari, M., Ja¯dhibih va Da¯fi‘ih-yi Ali, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i S.adra¯, 12th edn, Urdibihisht 1371/1992. Mut.ahhari, M., Jiha¯d, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i S.adra¯, 5th edn, Autumn 1370/1991. Mut.ahhari, M., Jaha¯nbini-yi Tauh.idi, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i S.adra¯, 4th edn, Spring 1370/1991. Mut.ahhari, M., Khadama¯t-i Mutaqa¯bil-i Islam va Iran, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i S.adra¯, 17th edn, Bahman 1370/1992.

190

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Mut.ahhari, M., Mas’alih-yi H . ija¯b, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i S.adra¯, 35th edn, Bahman 1370/1992. Mut.ahhari, M., Mas’alih-yi Riba¯, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i S.adra¯, 3rd edn, Summer 1370/1991. Mut.ahhari, M., Mas’alih-yi Shina¯kht, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i S.adra¯, 3rd edn, Spring 1368/1989. Mut.ahhari, M., ‘Ma¯tirya¯lism dar Iran’ in: Mut.ahhari, ‘Ilal-i Gira¯yish bi Ma¯ddigari, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i S.adra¯, 12th edn, Autumn 1370/1991, pp. 7–43. Mut.ahhari, M., Nihz. at-ha¯-yi Islami dar S.ad Sa¯lih-yi Akhir, Qum, Intisha¯ra¯t-i S.adra¯, n.d. Mut.ahhari, M., Naqdi bar Marxism, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i S.adra¯, Tehran, 1st edn, Farvardin 1363/1984. Mut.ahhari, M., Naz.ari bi Niz.a¯m-i Iqtis.a¯di-yi Islam, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i S.adra¯, 1st edn, Spring 1368/1989. Mut.ahhari, M., Niz.a¯m-i H . uquq-i Zan dar Islam, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i S.adra¯, 15th edn, Summer 1370/1991. Mut.ahhari, M., Pira¯mu¯n-i Inqila¯b-i Islami, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i S.adra¯, 6th edn, Spring 1370/1991. Mut.ahhari, M., Pira¯mu¯n-i Jumhu¯ri-yi Islami, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i S.adra¯, 6th edn, Spring 1370/1991. Mut.ahhari, M., Qiya¯m va Inqila¯b-i Mahdi az Didga¯h-i Falsafih-yi Ta¯rikh, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i S.adra¯, 11th edn, Autumn 1370/1991. Mut.ahhari, M., Ru¯h.a¯niyat, Qum, Daftar-i Tabliqa¯t-i Islami, Urdibihisht 1365/ 1986. Mut.ahhari, M., Sairi dar Nahj al-Bala¯ghih, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i S.adra¯, 8th edn, Autumn 1370/1991. Mut.ahhari, M., Sairi dar Sirih-yi A’immih-yi At.ha¯r, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i S.adra¯, 6th edn, Autumn 1370/1991. Mut.ahhari, M., Sairi dar Sirih-yi Nabavi, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i S.adra¯, 9th edn, Autumn 1370/1991. Mut.ahhari, M., Sharh.-i Mabsu¯.t-i Manz.u¯mih (4 vols), Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i H . ikmat, 6th edn, Winter 1369/1991. Mut.ahhari, M., Society and History, trans. Mahliqa¯ Qara¯i¯, Intisha¯ra¯t-i Sa¯zma¯n-i Tabligha¯t-i Islami, Tehran, 2nd edn, 1985. Mut.ahhari, M., T‘alim va Tarbiyat dar Islam, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i S.adra¯, 19th edn, Spring 1371/1992. Mut.ahhari, M., Takamul-i Ijtima¯‘i¯-yi Insa¯n, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i S.adra¯, 6th edn, Spring 1370/1991. Mut.ahhari, M., Us.u¯l-i Falsafih va Ravish-i Rialism, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i S.adra¯, 4th edn, Spring 1368/1989, Vol. 4. Mut.ahhari, M., Vila¯-ha¯ va Vila¯yat-ha¯, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i S.adra¯, 6th edn, Autumn 1370/1991. N.a., Au bi Tanha¯¯i yik Ummat Bu¯d, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i Va¯h.id-i Farhangi-yi Bunya¯d-i Shahid, Tir 1361/1982. N.a., Dar-a¯madi bar Iqtis.a¯d-i Islami, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i S.amt, Summer 1372/ 1993. N.a., Fas.l-na¯mih-yi Ta¯rikh va Farhang-i Mu‘a¯sir (Spring and Summer 1371/1992), Qum, No. 3 and 4.

191

BIBLIOGRAPHY

¯ mu¯zish va N.a., Jilvih-ha¯-yi Mu‘allimi-yi Usta¯d, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i Viza¯rat-i A Parvarish, 1st edn, Spring 1364/1985. N.a., Al-Khira¯jiya¯t, Qum, Mu’assasah al-Nashr al-Islami, 1413q./1992–3. N.a., Lam‘a¯ti az Shaikh-i Shahid, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i S.adra¯, 1st edn, 1370/1991– 92. N.a., Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism and Oil, ed. James A. Bill and W. M. Roger Louis, London, I. B. Tauris, 1988. N.a., Na¯guftih-ha¯: Kha¯.tira¯t-i Shahid Ha¯jj Mahdi Iraqi, Tehran, Mu’assasih-yi khadama¯t-i farhangi-yi Rasa¯, 1st edn, 1370/1991–2. . N.a., Nigarishi Ku¯ta¯h bar Nihz at-i Milli-yi Iran, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i Sa¯zma¯n-i ¯ ba¯n 1358/1979. Muja¯hidin-i Inqila¯b-i Islami, 2nd edn, A N.a., Pa¯su¯kh-ha¯-yi Usta¯d bar Naqd-ha¯-yi bar Kita¯b-i Mas’alih-yi H . ija¯b, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i S.adra¯, 3rd edn, Spring 1370/1991. ¯ tha¯r N.a., S.ah.ifih-yi Ima¯m (22 vols), Tehran, Mu’assasih-yi Tanz. im va Nashr-i A Ima¯m Khomeini, Autumn 1378/1999. N.a., S.ah.ifih-yi Nu¯r (21 vols), Tehran, Sa¯zma¯n-i Mada¯rik-i Farhangi-yi Inqila¯b-i Islami, Bahman 1361–9/1983–91. N.a., Sairi dar Zindiga¯ni-i Usta¯d Mut.ahhari, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i S.adra¯, 2nd edn, Urdibihisht 1371/1992. N.a., Sar-guzasht-ha¯-yi Vizhih az Zindiga¯ni-i Usta¯d-i Shahid Murtaz. a Mut.ahhari (2 vols), Tehran, Mu’assasih-yi Nashr va Tah.qiqa¯t-i Dhikr, 6th edn, Summer 1370/ 1991. N.a., Va¯qi‘ih-yi Kashf-i H . ija¯b, Tehran, Sa¯zma¯n-i Mada¯rik-i Farhangi-i Inqila¯b-i Islami, 1371/1992. N.a., Usta¯d-i Shahid bi Riva¯yat-i Asna¯d, Tehran, Markaz-i Asna¯d-i Inqila¯b-i Islami, 1378/1999. N.a., Us.u¯l-i ‘Ilm-i Iqtis.a¯d, trans. Abdul-Husain Nu¯shin, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i Naupa¯, 3rd edn, 2536/1977–8. N.a., Ya¯d-da¯sht-ha¯-yi Usta¯d Mut.ahhari, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i S.adra¯, 1378/1999 – 1382/2003. N.a., Ya¯d-na¯mih-yi Adi¯b Naisha¯bu¯ry, ed. Mahdi Muh.aqqiq, Tehran branch of McGill Institute of Islamic Studies, 1365/1986–7. N.a., Ya¯d-na¯mih-yi Mufassir-i Kabi¯r Usta¯d ‘Alla¯mih Sayyid Muhammad Husain Tabatabai¯, Qum, Intisha¯ra¯t-i Shafaq, Tir 1361/1982. N.a., Ya¯d-na¯mih-yi Usta¯d-i Shahid Murtaz. a Mut.ahhari, Part 1, ed. Abdul-Karim ¯ mu¯zish-i Inqila¯b-i Islami, Shahrivar Suru¯sh, Tehran, Sa¯zma¯n-i Intisha¯ra¯t va A 1360/1981. Najafi, Muhammad Hasan, Java¯hir al-Kala¯m, Beirut, Da¯r al-Ih.ya¯ al-Tura¯th alArabi, 1981, Vol. 16. Nara¯qi, Mulla¯ Ahmad, Mathnavi-yi T. a¯qdis, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i Amir Kabir, 1362/ 1983–4. Nara¯qi, Mulla¯ Ahmad, ‘Vila¯yat al-Faqih’, a selected part of Ava¯’i¯d al-Aiya¯m, ed. Sayyid Ya¯sin Mu¯savi , Tehran, Munaz. z. amah al-A‘ala¯m al-Islami, 1410q./1989– 90. Newman, A., ‘The Nature of the Akhbari/Us. u¯li Dispute in Late S.afavid Iran’, University of London, SOAS Bulletin, 1992, Vol. 55, University of London. Nomani, Farhad and Rahnema, Ali, Islamic Economic Systems, London and New Jersey, Zed Books, 1994.

192

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Nomani, Farhad and Rahnema, Ali, The Secular Miracle, London, Zed Books, 1990. Pahlavi, Muhammad Reza, The Sha¯h’s Story, trans. Teresa Waugh, London, Michael Joseph, 1980. Peter, Andre, Marx va Marxism, trans. Shuj‘a¯ al-Din Ziya¯¯iya¯n, Tehran University Press, 1354/1975–6. Qa¯’imi, Ali, Zindigi va Guzidih-yi Afka¯r-i Shahid-i Maz.lu¯m Ayatullah Beheshti, Qum, Intisha¯ra¯t-i Shafaq, 1361/1982–3. Qa¯simi, Da¯vu¯d, Us.u¯l-i Tafakkur-i Qurani, n.p., n.d. Ra¯shid, Batu¯l, ‘Zindigi-na¯mih-yi Da¯nishmand-i Faqid Hujjat al-Islam Shaikh Husain Ali Ra¯shid’, Ittila¯a¯t, 9.8.1368/30.10.1989. Rezun, Miron, The Iranian Crisis of 1941, Cologne and Vienna, Bohlau Verlag, 1982. Rodinson, Maxime, Islam and Capitalism, London, Allen Lane, 1974. Ru¯h.a¯ni, Hamid, Barrasi va Tah.lili az Nihz. at-i Ima¯m Khomeini, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i Ra¯h-i Ima¯m , 11th edn, Bahman 1360/1982, Vol. 1. Russell, Bertrand, Marriage and Morals, London, George Allen and Unwin, 3rd edn, 1930. Sabahi, Houshang, British Policy in Persia, London, Frank Cass, 1990. S.a¯biri Hamada¯ni, Ahmad, Al-Hida¯yah ila¯ man lahu al-Vila¯yah, Qum, Mat.ba‘ah al‘Ilmiyah, 1383q./1963–4. Sabzava¯ri, Mulla¯-Ha¯di, Sharh.-i Manzu¯mah, trans. M. Muhaqiq and T. Izutsu, Sa¯zma¯n-i Cha¯p-i Da¯nishga¯h-i Tehran, Azar 1348/1969. Sabzava¯ri, Sayyid ‘Abdul-A‘ala¯, Muhazzab al-Ah.ka¯m, Najaf, Mat.ba‘ah al-Adab, n.d., Vols 1 and 16. S.adr, Muhammad Ba¯qir, Al-Bank al-La¯rabavi fi al-Islam, Beirut, Da¯r al-Ta‘a¯ruf li al-Mat.bu¯‘a¯t, 1978. S.adr, Muhammad Ba¯qir, Iqtis.a¯duna¯, Beirut, Da¯r al-Kita¯b al-Lubna¯ni, 1977. S.adr, Muhammad Ba¯qir, Lamh.a Tamhidiya an Mashru¯‘a Du¯stu¯r al-Jumhu¯riyah alIslamiyah, Qum, Mat.b‘ah al-Khayya¯m, 1399q./1978–9. S.adr, Mu¯sa¯, Iqtis.a¯d dar Maktab-i Islam, Tehran, Shirkat-i Saha¯mi-yi Intisha¯r, Day 1350/1972. S.a¯ni‘i¯, Parviz, Qa¯nu¯n va Shakhsiyat, Tehran University Press, 1344/1965–6. Schall, James V., Liberation Theology in Latin America, San Francisco, Ignatius Press, 1982. Sha¯mlu¯, Ahmad, H . a¯fiz.-i Shira¯z bi Riva¯yat-i Ahmad-i Sha¯mlu¯, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i Murva¯rid, 2nd edn, 1354/1975–6. Shariati, Ali, Islamshina¯si, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i Husianiyih-yi Irsha¯d, 1350/1971–2. Shariati, Ali, On the Sociology of Islam, trans. Hamid Algar, Berkeley, Mizan Press, 1979. Shariati, Ali, ‘Ravish-i Islamshina¯si’ in: Majmu¯‘ih-yi A¯ tha¯r-i Dr Shariati, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i Husianiyih-yi Irsha¯d, 1357/1978–9, Vol. 28. Shariati, Ali, ‘Shi‘ih’, in: Majmu¯‘ih-yi A¯ tha¯r-i Dr Shariati, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i Husianiyih-yi Irsha¯d, 1st edn, 1357/1978–9, Vols 5 and 7. . Shariat Razavi, Pu¯ra¯n, T. arh.¯i az yik Zindigi, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i Cha¯pkhu¯sh, 1st edn, 1374/1995–6. Subh.a¯ni, J‘afar, Tahdhib al-Us.u¯l, Qum, Mu’assasih-yi Intisha¯ra¯ti-yi Isma¯‘i¯liya¯n, n.d., Vol. 2. Suru¯sh, ‘Abdul-Karim, ‘Mut.ahhari: Ih.ya¯kunandih-yi dar ‘As. r-i Jadid’ in: ‘Abdul-

193

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Karim Suru¯sh, Tafarruj-i S.un‘a, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i Suru¯sh, 1st edn, 1366/1987– 8, pp. 366–95. T.abari, Ih.sa¯n, Barkhi Barrasi-ha¯ dar Ba¯rih-yi Jaha¯nbini-ha¯ va Junbish-ha¯-yi Ijtima¯‘i¯ dar Iran, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i H . izb-i Tu¯dih, 1348/1969–70. T.abari, Ih.sa¯n, Kazh-Ra¯hih: Kha¯.tira¯ti az Ta¯rikh-i H . izb-i Tu¯dih, Tehran, Mu’assasihyi Intisha¯ra¯t-i Amir kabir, 1st edn, 1366/1987–8. Tabrizi, Shaikh Java¯d, I¯s.a¯l al-T. a¯lib ila¯ al-T‘aliq ‘ala¯ al-Maka¯sib, Qum, n.p., 1411q./ 1990–1. Taqiza¯dih Davari, Mahmood, Ta¯rikh-i Tafakkur-i Ijtima¯‘i¯ dar Islam (2 parts), Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i Da¯nishkadih-yi ‘Ulu¯m-i Ijtima¯‘i¯, Autumn 1363/1984. Taqiza¯dih Davari, Mahmood, Sairi dar Andishih-yi Ijtima¯‘i¯-yi Muslimin, Tehran, ¯ zar 1368/1989. Intisha¯ra¯t-i Amiri, A ¯ Tehrani, A qa¯-Buzurg, T. abaqa¯t al-A‘ala¯m al-Shi‘ah, Najaf, Mat.ba‘ah al-‘Ilmiyih, 1373q./1953–54. Turner, C. P., ‘The Rise of Twelver Shi‘ite Externalism in S. afavid Iran and its Consolidation under ‘Allama Muhammad Baqir Majlisi’, Ph.D. thesis, University of Durham, 1989. T.u¯si, Muhammad ibn al-Hasan, Khila¯f (2 vols), Tehran, Mat.ba‘ih-yi Ta¯ba¯n, 1382q./1962–3. Va¯h.id, Sina¯, Qiya¯m-i Gauharsha¯d, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i Viza¯rat-i Irsha¯d-i Islami, Isfand 1361/1983. Va¯‘iz. -za¯dih Khura¯sa¯ni, M., ‘Sairi dar Zindiga¯ni-i ‘Ilmi va Inqila¯bi-yi Usta¯d-i Shahid . Murtaza Mut.ahhari’ in: n.a, Ya¯d-na¯mih, ed. ‘Abdul-Karim Suru¯sh, Tehran, ¯ mu¯zish-i Inqila¯b-i Islami, 1st edn, Shahrivar 1360/1981, Sa¯zma¯n-i Intisha¯ra¯t va A pp. 316–80. Va¯thiqi Ra¯d, M. H., Mus.lih.-i Bida¯r (2 vols), Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i S.adra¯, 1379/2000. Va¯thiqi Ra¯d, M. H., Mut.ahhari: Mut.ahhar-i Andishih-ha¯ (2 vols), Qum, Daftar-i Tabligha¯t-i Islami, Urdibihisht 1364/1985. Zarrinku¯b, ‘Abdul-Husain, Du Qarn Suku¯t, Tehran, Intisha¯ra¯t-i Ja¯vida¯n, 1355/ 1976–7.

194

INDEX

Abda¯l-Kha¯n School 8 ‘Abdul-a¯ba¯d 6 ‘Abdul-Malik 59, 60 Abel 47, 48 Abu-H . anifih 60 Adam 47, 48 ¯ dhari Qumi, Ah.mad 88, 102, 180 A Adib-Naisha¯bu¯ri 169 Ahmad-za¯dih, Mas‘u¯d 61, 62 ‘Ala¯, Husain 21, 22, 23 Alam, Asadullah 36 Algar 2, 82, 167, 168, 170, 172, 176, 179, 182 Algeria 75 Al-Ghadir 20, 145 Al-Java¯d 58 Al-Muqann‘a 56 Ali-a¯ba¯di, ‘Abdul-Husain 42 Ali-gu¯darz 80 Ali ibn Abi-T. a¯lib 56, 91, 92, 98, 128, 129, 130, 148, 154, 155 Ali ibn Mu¯sa¯ al-Reza¯ 110 Allah 74, 91, 93, 110,128, 129, 130, 145, 154 ‘Alla¯mih 6, 20, 28, 48, 49, 63, 161, 168, 172, 174 Allied Forces 17, 172 Ama¯ni, Sa‘i¯d 39 America 18, 22, 31, 37, 132, 174 American imperialism 166 Amini, ‘Abdul-Husain 20 Amini, Ali 36 . Ansa¯ri, Murtaza 182 Anva¯ri, Muh.yi al-Din 39 ¯ qa¯-za¯dih, Muhammad 13 A Arabi, Muh.yi al-Din 67 Ara¯ki, Ali 150, 184 ¯ ra¯m, Ah.mad 89 A

Ara¯ni, Taqi 24 Ardibili, Yunus 13 Aristotle 7 ¯ rya¯npour, Amir-Husain 33 A Asad-a¯ba¯di, Ja¯mal al-Din 131 ’Asgar-aula¯di, H . abibullah 39 As.ghar-za¯dih, Mahmood 75 Ashraf, H . amid 61 ¯ shtiya¯ni, Muhammad 61, 173 A Avista¯ 60 ¯ yati 30, 33, 34, 174 A Ayatullah 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 12, 13, 15, 16, 18, 20, 23, 35, 36, 37, 39, 44, 49, 58, 63, 74, 75, 76, 78, 79, 80, 82, 84, 86, 88, 102, 115, 118, 125, 126, 130, 131, 135, 138, 139, 140, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 151, 152, 153, 156, 161, 162, 164, 165, 166, 167, 171, 172, 174, 175, 177, 179, 182, 183, 184, 185 ¯ yishih 53 ‘A ¯ zarba¯ija¯n 62, 132 A Ba¯ba¯i¯, Ah.mad-Ali 35 Badi‘a-za¯diga¯n, Ali-Asghar 75 Ba¯fqi Yazdi, Muhammad 12 Baghdad 22 Ba¯hunar, Muhammad-Java¯d 33, 78, 84, 130, 175, 179, 184 Bakhtiya¯r 84 Ba¯kiri 75 Bani-S.adr 133, 134, 138, 183 Baudin, Louis 89 Ba¯yqara¯, Amir-Husain 60 Bazarga¯n, Mahdi 34, 35, 42, 46, 75, 84, 87, 114, 148, 161, 167 Bazarga¯ni, Muhammad 75 ¯ za¯dih 35 Bidukhti, A

195

INDEX

British authorities 10, 15, 18, 24, 25, 26, 168 Buhlul, Muhammad-Taqi 13 Burqa‘i¯, Ali-Akbar 27 Bursa (Turkey) 37 Buru¯jirdi 16, 18, 20, 22, 23, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 35, 36, 115, 125, 126, 130, 164, 166, 172, 173 Buzurg-mihr 78 Byzantine 59 Calvin, John 44 capitalism 5, 47, 63, 76, 86, 89, 90, 94, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 164, 180 Castro, Fidel 62 Chenghiz Kha¯n 58 China 27, 75 Chirik-ha¯-yi Fada¯i¯-yi khalq 61, 78, 163 Comte, Auguste 161 Constitution 6, 21, 23, 24, 26, 36, 102, 106, 115, 122, 123, 125, 126, 127, 131, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 144, 147, 148, 152, 153, 158, 160, 161, 162, 164, 165, 169, 180, 182, 183 Consultative Assembly 11, 43, 45, 83, 138, 140, 152 Court 11, 21, 22, 26, 28, 142, 144 Cuba 75 Dabashi, Hamid 3, 49, 167, 168, 171, 175, 183 Da¯nish-sara¯ 68 Da¯r al-funu¯n 24 Darius the Great 52 Darwin, Charles 64, 68, 161 Dava¯ni, A. 168, 172, 173 Debray, Regis 62 Dhulqadr, H . amid 20 Durant, Will 52, 53, 78, 162, 176 Durkheim, Emile 161 Ehteshami, A. 140, 184 Enayat, Hamid 78, 162, 178, 182 Engels, Friedrich 24, 46, 89 England 29 Europe 18, 24, 44, 48, 54, 64, 132, 133, 134 Fada¯i¯ya¯n-i Islam 20, 23, 32, 131, 165, 172, 173 . Faiz Ka¯sha¯ni, Muh.sin 72, 178

. Faiziyih Seminary 12, 16, 22, 37 Falsafi, Abul-Qa¯sim 27 faqih 3, 5, 69, 70, 102, 119, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 130, 131, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 153, 154, 155, 156, 158, 159, 160, 161, 165, 172, 178, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185 Farima¯n 6, 13, 168 Fa¯t.imi 21, 22 Feuerbach 67 France 84, 133 Freud, Sigmund 161 fuqaha¯ 70, 72, 86, 91, 98, 115, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 129, 131, 139, 143, 144, 146, 148, 149, 150, 151, 153, 154, 155, 156, 158, 159, 160 Furqa¯n (the Furqa¯n Group) 5, 74, 80, 163 Gauharsha¯d Mosque uprising 12, 13, 170 German 20, 88 Ghadir-i Khum 145, 148 Ghaffa¯ri, Husain 88 Ghazza¯li 68 Ghifa¯ri, Abu-Dhar 102 Giap, V. Nguyen 62 Gila¯n 62 Grand Ayatullah 12, 16, 18, 23, 35, 43, 126, 132, 139, 147, 161, 164 Greek philosophy 7 Gu¯darzi, Akbar 80 Guevara, Che 62 Gulpa¯yiga¯ni, Muhammad-Reza¯ 16, 36, 147, 173, 184 Gulza¯dih Ghafu¯ri 34, 39, 180 Gurevitch, Georges 46 ¯ dil, Ghula¯m-Ali 78 Hadda¯d ‘A h.adith (saying) 53, 54, 67, 70, 110, 112, 115, 138, 149, 154, 155, 161, 162, 169 H . a¯fiz. 70, 71, 72 Haiat-ha¯-yi Mu’talifih-yi Islami 5, 37, 38, 175, 186, 101, 178 H 9, 12 . a¯’iri Yazdi, ‘Abdul-Karim . H . a¯’iri Yazdi, Murtaza 29, 36 H . a¯’iri Yazdi, mahdi 156, 173, 185 H . akim 36 h.ala¯l 1

196

INDEX

H . alla¯j 71, 178 Hamada¯n 77 Hamburg 73 H . anif-nizha¯d 75, 80 H . aqqa¯ni School 73 H . aqshina¯s, Tura¯b 75, 76 Hashemi Rafsanjani 4, 82, 84, 88, 164, 167, 175, 176, 179 H . auzih-yi ‘ilmiyih 5, 7, 73, 188, 169, 172 . H . azrat, Shrine of 22 Hegel, G. W. F. 46, 73, 161, 178 Hida¯yat, Mahdi-Quli 11 H . ikmat-i Mut.ahhar 163 Hobbes, Thomas 159 holy shrines 10, 11, 12, 23, 82 H . ujjat, Muhammad 173 Huma¯yu¯ n 42 Husaini 20, 22, 49, 174 Husainiyih-i Irsha¯d 42, 164 Ibn Sina¯ 17, 19, 20, 32, 63 Ibn-Khaldu¯n 115, 181 Ima¯m Husain 10, 76 Ima¯m Khomeini 137, 139, 161 India 15, 53 Iqba¯l, Muhammad 44, 131 Iran 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 12, 14, 18, 21, 22, 24, 25, 27, 34, 35, 37, 40, 49, 50, 53, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 66, 71, 73, 74, 75, 77, 79, 80, 81, 82, 86, 106, 114, 115, 121, 122, 123, 126, 127, 131, 132, 133, 136, 137, 138, 140, 141, 142, 143, 147, 152, 153, 156, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 177, 178, 179, 180, 182, 183 Iranian Marxist parties 162 Iraqi, Mahdi 39, 82 Irsha¯d Institute 42, 44, 45, 49, 61, 66, 76 Isfahani, Abul-Hasan 10, 14, 170 Isfahani, Mahdi 7, 8, 169 Isfahani, Muhammad-Husain 72, 178 Ishra¯qi, Shaba¯b 72 Islam 1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 21, 23, 25, 26, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 39, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 66, 68, 69, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 81, 82, 83, 86, 87, 89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 95,

96, 97, 98, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 108, 109, 110, 111, 114, 116, 117, 118, 120, 126, 129, 131, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 144, 145, 146, 151, 152, 154, 157, 159, 162, 163, 166, 170, 171, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 183, 185 Islam-i Fiqa¯hati 2, 83, 161 Islam-i minha¯-yi Ru¯ha¯niyat 5, 44, 82, 135 Islami, Muhammad-S.a¯diq 39 Islamic: activists 161; doctrines 162, 165; ideology 2, 3, 4, 39, 42, 73, 78, 136, 161, 163, 165; Iran 2, 162; movements 1, 2, 5, 44, 58, 78, 121, 131, 136; philosophers 73, 156, 162; philosophy 7, 19, 28, 32, 35, 67, 78, 156, 162, 169; Protestantism 44, 164; Republic 2, 4, 5, 33, 34, 85, 102, 106, 115, 121, 133, 137, 138, 140, 141, 142, 144, 148, 151, 152, 153, 156, 158, 161, 162, 164, 165, 180, 183; Revolution 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 17, 38, 39, 42, 77, 78, 80, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 121, 126, 131, 135, 136, 142, 152, 159, 161, 162, 166, 170; rule 2, 5, 21, 22, 70, 124, 125, 126, 127, 130, 142, 143, 147, 151, 153, 156, 159, 165, 172, 182, 183; ruler 22, 70, 90, 94, 95, 105, 106, 123, 130, 131, 142, 143, 146, 147, 149, 150, 154, 155, 156, 158, 159; societies 1, 31, 44, 66, 96, 105, 163, 165; sources 39, 89, 91, 96, 105, 107, 109, 114, 142, 157, 163; state 3, 89, 95, 119, 152, 164, 167, 183; studies 5, 17, 20, 45, 46, 75, 161, 169; texts 2, 7, 46, 74, 90, 129, 161; universalism 57, 165 Islamism 1, 2, 41, 162 Islamist: activists 69, 165; groups 142, 162, 163, 165, 166 Islamization 95, 162 Islamologist 2, 7, 19, 86, 161 Israel 37, 133 Jala¯li 78 Jalet, Felician 89 Jama¯ra¯n 88 James, William 67 Ja¯mi‘ih-yi Ru¯h.a¯niyat-i Muba¯riz 84 Ja¯mi‘ih va Ta¯rikh 79, 163, 178, 183 Jazani, Bizhan 61

197

INDEX

Jesus Christ 65 Jumhu¯ri-yi Islami 152, 176, 184 jurisprudence 7, 8, 15, 10, 18, 31, 50, 53, 55, 87, 90, 96, 105, 111, 113, 116, 122, 123, 124, 150, 161, 169, 176 Kafa¯i¯, Muhammad 7 Kant, Immanuel 68 Karaki 5, 123, 124, 155, 182 Karbala¯ 10, 49 Ka¯sha¯ni, Abul-Qa¯sim 15, 18, 20, 21, 22, 26, 27, 28, 32, 72, 171, 178 Ka¯shif al-ghit.a¯, J‘afar 124 Ka¯shmar 14 Kasravi, Ahmad 20, 21 Kati¯ra¯i¯ 34 Katouzian 86, 179, 180 Kava¯kibi, ‘Abdul-Rah.ma¯n 131 Khamenei¯, Sayyid Ali 2, 84, 146, 167, 169, 171, 177 Khuda¯-bandih 60, 79, 132 Khui¯, Abul-Qa¯sim 115, 150, 158 Khomeini, Ruh.ullah 2, 3, 4, 15, 16, 18, 19, 23, 29, 36, 37, 38, 39, 44, 48, 58, 63, 70, 72, 74, 75, 76, 77, 79, 82, 84, 88, 126, 127, 128, 130, 131, 134, 135, 137, 138, 139, 140, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 153, 154, 155, 156, 159, 161, 162, 163, 165, 166, 167, 171, 172, 175, 176, 178, 179, 182, 183, 184 Khunsa¯ri, Muhammad-Taqi 14, 15, 20, Khura¯sa¯n 14, 132, 171 Khura¯sa¯ni, Muhammad-Ka¯z. im 16, 169 Khurramdin, Ba¯bak 56 Kolpe, Oswald 89 Ku¯sha¯npour, Muhammad-Hasan 32 Kumpa¯ni 72 Kurdista¯n 62 Kuwait 114 La¯hu¯ri, Iqba¯l 44 La¯jivardi, Asadullah 39 Lava¯sa¯ni 20, 34 Lenin, V. I. 24 Locke, John 159 London 48, 156, 167, 168, 169, 170, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 179, 180, 182, 184, 185 Luther, Martin 44

‘machine’ 5, 98, 99, 100, 101, 104, 164 Madrasih 32 . Madrasih-yi Faiziyih 22, 37 Madrasih-yi S.adr 17, 172 Mah.alla¯ti, Baha¯ al-Din 37 Mahdavi Kani 84, 88, 174 Mahdavi Zanja¯ni 50 Majlis (the Consultative Assembly) 11, 25, 27, 36, 88, 102, 125, 127, 138, 140, 153 Majlisi, Muhammad-Ba¯qir 6, 125, 168 Maka¯rim Shira¯zi 118, 119, 181 Maktab-Kha¯nih (traditional primary school) 7 Maktab-i tafkik (segregationism) 7, 163, 169 Malcolm, John 60, 177 Mans.u¯r Baigi, Husain 35 Mao Zedong 62 Mar‘ashi Najafi 16 Marighella, Carlos 62 Martin, Vanessa 3, 167 Marvi 32, 35, 87 Marx, Karl 24, 46, 48, 63, 67, 68, 73, 75, 78, 79, 86, 88, 161, 162, 178 Marxism 1, 2, 28, 46, 62, 63, 65, 66, 68, 73, 76, 77, 78, 80, 82, 83, 86, 90, 94, 133, 162, 174, 177, 178, 179 Marxist: ideology 24, 73, 163; materialism 162 Mas’alih-yi H . ija¯b 35, 49, 51, 54, 163, 176 Mashhad 6, 7, 8, 10, 13, 20, 22, 36, 37, 43, 61, 62, 74, 75, 163, 168, 169, 171, 181 Mashhad Seminary 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 33, 39, 163 Masjid-i-Sha¯h 27 Massignon, Louis 46 Maulavi 34, 67, 71 Ma¯ziya¯r 56 Mecca 49, 117, 145 Medina 117, 157 Mihan-du¯ st 75 Mihr-a¯ba¯d 84 Mila¯ni, Muhammad-Ha¯di 20, 39, 170 Mina¯chi 42, 43, 45, 175 Mir-Fat.ru¯s, Ali 71 Mirlauhi, Mujtaba¯ 20 Mirza¯ 7, 8, 9, 13, 17, 70, 125, 161, 163, 169, 170, 172, 184 Mishkinfa¯m, ‘Abdul-Rasu¯l 75

198

INDEX

Mishkini, Ali 148 modernization 10, 31, 164, 170 Mongols 57, 58, 60 Montazeri, Husain-Ali 16, 18, 72, 76, 78, 119, 127, 128, 130, 148, 153, 154, 155, 156, 159, 161, 167, 172, 173, 174, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185 Montesquieu, Baron de la Brède et de 159 mosque 10, 12, 13, 14, 41, 49, 51, 52, 54, 69, 73, 84, 97, 137, 167, 171 Mu‘atazilih 68 Muba¯riz al-Din, Amir 71 Mudarris, Sayyid Hasan 13 Mudarrisi Tabatabai¯, Husain 73 Mufattih, Muhammad 82, 84 Mufid 123, 182 Muh.aqqiq Da¯ma¯d, Muhammad 16, 18, 82, 173 Muh.aqqiq Karaki 5, 123, 124, 155, 182 Mu‘i¯n, Muhammad 58 Mu‘i¯nfar 34 Muja¯hidin-i Khalq 5, 44, 74, 77, 79, 80, 163 Mujtabavi 78 Mujtahid 2, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 37, 42, 43, 45, 69, 70, 96, 123, 124, 125, 131, 140, 142, 148, 149, 150, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 158, 160, 161, 165, 169, 172 Mukhbir al-Salt.anih 11 Mulla¯ S.adra¯ 9, 18, 67, 170 Mu’min, Muhammad 73 Muna¯fiqin-i Khalq 44, 79 Mu¯savi, prime minister 164 Muslim 1, 2, 3, 5, 21, 22, 23, 25, 28, 34, 40, 45, 48, 49, 51, 52, 53, 55, 58, 59, 60, 65, 67, 69, 70, 74, 76, 78, 81, 83, 87, 89, 90, 91, 92, 95, 96, 98, 102, 105, 110, 117, 126, 127, 133, 137, 143, 145, 146, 148, 151, 152, 155, 156, 157, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 182 Muslim leftist activists 164 Muslim leftist groups 163 Muslim leftist guerrillas 5, 74, 165 . Mut.ahhari, Murtaza 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 23, 24, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63,

64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 92, 93, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 120, 121, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 142, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185 Mu’talifih 5, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 75, 82, 166, 175 Naha¯vandi, Hu¯shang 89 Na¯i¯ni, Muhammad Husain 8, 9, 10, 125, 127, 153, 158, 170 Najaf 6, 7, 10, 11, 13, 14, 20, 36, 37, 63, 72, 74, 76, 77, 84, 126, 131, 155, 170, 184 Najaf-a¯ba¯d 17 Najafi Mar‘ashi, Shaha¯b al-Din 16 Nama¯zi, Husain 87 Nara¯qi, Ahmad 72, 124, 126, 155, 156, 158, 178, 182 Narjis Kha¯tu¯n 59 Na¯s.ir, S.a¯diq 75 Nas.r 162 nationalism 1, 55, 56, 57, 162, 165, 173 Naubakht 60 Navva¯b S.afavi 20, 22, 23, 38, 173 Nietzche, Friedrich Wilhelm 67 . ¯ za¯di-yi Iran 175 Nihzat-i A Niku¯far 35 Nomani 3, 107, 108, 119, 167, 168, 180, 181 . Nu¯ri, Fazlullah 125 Nushin, ‘Abdul-Husain 88 Omar 52 Pahlavi 10, 51, 54, 56, 57, 63, 175 Pahlavi dynasty 56, 63, 162 Pahlavi regime 45, 81, 82, 161, 183 Pakistan 22 Palestinian 49 Paris 84, 169 Persia 3, 43, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 63, 67, 71, 88, 124, 133, 169, 178, 179; nationalism 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 165

199

INDEX

Peter, Andre 63, 73, 78 Pirniya¯, Husain 89 Pishbin 34 Plato 50, 68, 159 Plekhanov, G. V. 46 Politzer, Georges 63 Pour-Da¯vu¯d, Ibra¯him 58 praxis 165 President 2, 133, 138, 140, 141, 146, 152, 153, 164 Prime Minister 9, 11, 25, 28, 33, 34, 36, 39, 84, 130, 138, 141, 164 privatization 102, 164 Puya¯n, Amir Parviz 62

Reza khan 6, 9, 10, 12, 35, 168 Reza Sha¯h 10, 11, 12, 13, 17, 24, 51 Reza¯i¯ 75, 80 Rimbert, Pierre 89 Rodinson, Maxime 98, 99, 180 Roman Catholicism 50 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 159 Russell, Bertrand 50, 67, 162, 176 Russia 75, 88

Qa¯ja¯r 123, 124 qalandar (dervish) 71 Qalandar-a¯ba¯d 6 Qa¯nu¯n 17 Qarani, Muhammad 82 Qava¯m al-Salt.anih 25, 26 . Qa¯zi Tabatabai¯ 82 Qazvin 75 Quddu¯si, Ali 73 Queen, entering Holy Shrine without veil 12 Qulhak 42 Qum 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 36, 37, 38, 39, 45, 63, 72, 73, 74, 80, 82, 83, 91, 102, 118, 126, 134, 154, 161, 162, 164, 167, 168, 169, 171, 172, 174, 176, 177, 178, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184 Qumi, Husain 7, 13, 115 Quran 7, 32, 35, 36, 46, 47, 48, 49, 54, 60, 61, 67, 70, 73, 75, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 91, 93, 96, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 116, 118, 119, 133, 137, 145, 150, 154, 159, 161, 162, 177 Quranic verse 53, 65, 80, 81, 89, 91, 93, 106, 111, 115, 119, 145, 154, 155 Quzegan Ammar 75 Raja¯i¯, Ali 35, 138, 148 Rajavi 75 Ramaza¯n, Said 89 Ra¯msar Educational Conference (1966–7) 56 Ra¯shid, Ali 30, 33, 174 Razma¯ra¯, Ali 21, 25 Reformism 164 Revolutionary Council 28, 33, 84, 130

Sabzava¯ri 9, 18, 32, 147, 170, 184 S.a¯diq 16, 28, 39, 79 S.adr, Mu¯sa¯ 34, 86, 180 S.adr, S.adr al-Din 14, 173 S.afa¯i¯ Faraha¯ni 61 S.afawids 168, 169 Sah.a¯bi, Yadullah 35 Salma¯n 56 Sa¯lu¯r 34 Sa¯mi, Ka¯z. im 34 Sandba¯d 56 Sa¯ri 22 Sartre, Jean-Paul 46, 67, 68 Satan 71, 145 ¯ VA ¯ K 4, 38, 61, 73, 74, 77, 78, 121, SA 165 Saville, George Henry 89 Sayyid 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 20, 22, 27, 28, 33, 36, 39, 49, 78, 84, 86, 89, 131, 134, 147, 150, 152, 161, 167, 169, 170, 172, 173, 174, 175, 179, 182, 184 secularism 2, 5, 28, 125, 132, 162, 165 Sha¯h 10, 11, 12, 13, 17, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 35, 36, 37, 51, 59, 62, 71, 74, 77, 124, 161, 165, 166, 171, 173 Sha¯h ‘Abdul-‘Az. im 13 Shahr-ba¯nu¯ 59 Sha¯h Shuj‘a¯ 71 . ¯ qa¯-Buzurg 7 Shahidi Razavi, A Shaiba¯ni Library 35 Shaikh 2, 7, 9, 12, 13, 14, 17, 27, 29, 72, 114, 123, 124, 125, 131, 150, 151, 161, 168, 169, 170, 174, 182, 184 Shakib-niya¯ 34 Sha¯kir 60 Sha¯mlu¯, Ahmad 70, 71, 178 Shariati, Ali 4, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 58, 63, 73, 76, 80, 82, 102, 107, 133, 161, 163, 164, 166, 175, 176, 177, 179, 180

200

INDEX

Shariati, Muhammad-Taqi 33 Shari‘atmada¯ri, Sayyid Ka¯z. im 16, 36 Siya¯hkal 62, 77 Shira¯z 37 ¯ qa¯ 17, 161, 163, 172 Shira¯zi, Ali A Shira¯zi, Muhammad-Taqi 9, 70, 170 Shira¯zi, Mulla¯ S.adra¯ 18, 67 Shira¯zi, Qut.b al-Din 71 Sibivaih 60 Sista¯n 6 socialism 1, 5, 47, 65, 86, 89, 97, 98, 102, 103, 104, 128, 164, 166 Soviet Union 24, 76, 163 Stalin, Joseph 27, 62 state capitalism 98, 164 Sult.a¯ni Tabatabai¯ 171, 174 Surkhi, ‘Abba¯s 61 Suru¯sh, Abdul-Karim 3, 85, 167, 168, 172, 174 T. abari, Ih.sa¯n 88 Tabatabai¯ 12, 18, 19, 20, 28, 29, 32, 48, 49, 63, 73, 82, 161, 172, 174 Tabriz 24, 37, 75, 82, 151, 182, 184 Tafkiki ‘ulama¯ 163 T. a¯hiri Khurram-a¯ba¯di 178 T. ahmasb 124 T. ahmasibi, Khalil 20 Taimu¯rta¯sh, ‘Abdul-Husain 11 T. a¯liqa¯ni 34 Tehran 4, 10, 13, 20, 22, 24, 26, 27, 30, 32, 33, 35, 37, 38, 39, 43, 44, 58, 61, 62, 74, 75, 77, 78, 80, 84, 126, 130, 131, 156, 163, 164, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184 traditional ‘ulama¯ 164 traditionalism 2, 7, 8, 162, 164, 169 Tu¯dih Party 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 35, 61, 62, 63, 71, 88 Turbat-i H . aidariyih 6 Turk 57 Turkey 22, 37, 39

T.u¯si, Nas.ir al-Din 71 ‘ulama¯ 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 34, 37, 39, 43, 44, 45, 52, 56, 63, 66, 71, 73, 74, 77, 78, 82, 83, 84, 86, 99, 121, 124, 126, 127, 131, 134, 135, 136, 137, 153, 158, 163, 164, 170, 182, 183 United Nations 143 Us.u¯l-i Falsafih 28, 63, 162, 163, 174 Us.u¯l al-Fiqh 16, 18, 45, 80, 169 Us.u¯lism (rationalism) 8 Va¯h.idi, ‘Abdul-Husain 20, 22 Va¯‘iz. -za¯dih 3, 35, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 175, 181 Vali¯-yi Faqih 5, 150, 155, 182 Vara¯min 37 Vienna 27, 172 vila¯yat (authority) 39 Vila¯yat-i Faqih 178, 183 Vusu¯q al-daulih 10 Walid 52, 59 West, the 1, 2, 21, 64, 156, 161, 174 Western philosophers 67, 73, 161 Westernization 32, 50, 162, 164 Yazd 13 Yazdgird 59 Yazdi, Ibra¯him 34 Yazdi, Ka¯z. im 34 Yazi¯d 59 Za¯bul 6 Za¯hir-gira¯ 6 Zamakhshari, Abu-‘Ubaidih 60 Zand 60 . Zanja¯ni, Sayyid Abulfazl 49 Zha¯lih Square 33 Zionist 49 Zirak-za¯dih, Ghula¯m Husain 89 Zura¯rih 145

201