The Political Economy of Scotland

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Author: Gregor Gall

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00 Prelims political economy of Scotland.qxd

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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SCOTLAND

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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SCOTLAND Red Scotland? Radical Scotland?

GREGOR GALL

UNIVERSITY OF WALES PRESS CARDIFF 2005


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© Gregor Gall 2005

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN 0-7083-1944-0 (hardback) 0-7083-1973-4 (paperback)

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without clearance from the University of Wales Press, 10 Columbus Walk, Brigantine Place, Cardiff CF10 4UP www.wales.ac.uk/press

Printed in Great Britain by Cambridge Printing, Cambridge


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Dedicated to the memory of Joe Strummer, 1952–2002

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Contents

Forewords Bill Speirs, General Secretary, STUC Tommy Sheridan MSP

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Preface

xv

Acknowledgements

xvii

Abbreviations and Acronyms

xviii

Tables

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Introduction

1

1

Manufacturing Scottish ‘Industrial’ Mythology

6

2

Strike Activity in Scotland in a British Context

16

3

Union Membership, Union Recognition and Collective Bargaining

43

4

Worker Attitudes and Union Policies

67

5

Distinctive Economic, Employment and Social Characteristics within Scotland

84

6 7

Aspects of Association: The Scottish Nation and the Red Thread

110

More Latterly, Going in a Separate Direction?

142


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Comparisons with Wales: Uniting the ‘Red Dragon’ and the Red Flag?

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164

Conclusion: A Red and Radical Scotland?

175

References

187

Index

209

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Foreword BILL SPEIRS, GENERAL SECRETARY, STUC Scotland is a place of many myths and legends, some of which contain much truth – and some of which don’t. One legend which radical and red Scots like to believe in is that of a radical and red Scotland. Some of it – for example, the battle of the Upper Clyde Shipbuilders workers and their families and communities – is undoubtedly true. Some of it – for example, the welcoming, non-racist ‘all Jock Tamson’s bairns’ vision of Scotland – isn’t (the first STUC Congress in 1897 debated a motion calling for a ban on all immigration into the country – the good news is that it was withdrawn in the face of strong opposition, led by the miners). And of course, only one political party has ever won over 50% of the popular vote in Scotland in a General Election – the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party in 1955. What is certainly significant is that so many Scots want to believe that our country is welcoming, tolerant and radical. This book by Gregor Gall is a very important contribution to the ongoing analysis of Scotland’s reality, how it has been shaped by the past and what it may mean for the future. It is thoroughly researched, very readable and a touch controversial, which is just what should be expected of a volume from one of Scotland’s foremost analysts and commentators. Going back to that point about Scots wanting to believe that they – and especially their unions – are radical, the words of the song that Professor Brian McNeill wrote to mark the STUC’s centenary are particularly appropriate, not least in linking Scottish identity with the ideal of workers’ solidarity: Then raise the banner high, let us all march behind, Let Scotland be the first to draw a new union line – Young and old, true and bold

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Sell your labour, not your soul Solidarity’s our goal – Join the union!

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Foreword TOMMY SHERIDAN MSP, SCOTTISH SOCIALIST PARTY Although I would encourage citizens to read Red Scotland? Radical Scotland?, I have to confess my conclusions are critical in relation to the central thesis and the terminology and methodology applied. Karl Marx cautioned us to remember that the philosophers have interpreted the world: ‘the point, however, is to change it’. Readers of this book will hopefully either already be involved in the struggle for socialism in Scotland and throughout our globe, or will be inspired to sign up to help us deliver the ‘new Scotland’ Gregor refers to in his analysis of the SSP. Essentially underpinning this work is an outdated and redundant British left analysis of Scotland. Annoyingly throughout, Scotland is referred to as another ‘region’ of Britain. Our nation state is reduced to comparison with the ‘rest of Britain’ or with ‘other regions of Britain’. When evidence of radicalism industrially in relation to strikes and union density is produced, it is simultaneously diluted by breaking Britain into regions to better undermine the existence of radicalism in Scotland. Scotland is not a ‘region’ of Britain. It is a small country with a developed national identity and distinct legal and education systems. Its current Parliament lacks the powers of a normal adult legislator but the journey to independence and the break-up of the British state is definitely underway. Socialists should not mourn the break-up of the British state but assist in its demise. It has been at the reactionary heart of imperialist plunder and exploitation for centuries. Its funeral will be a time for socialists to rejoice. When evidence is produced to indicate a greater radicalism in relation to social attitudes to wealth redistribution, public ownership and the role of the rich in society, Gregor again dilutes the outcomes by artificially reducing Scotland to a region of Britain. Yorkshire, Merseyside, and the North East are regions of England. Wales is a country too and xi


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deserves nation-state status even though national identity and support for independence is not as strong as exists in Scotland. Put simply, if Scotland is identified as a distinct nation and subjected to Gregor’s interesting analysis it undoubtedly emerges as red and radical in relation to trade unionism and support for socialist ideas. Such a conclusion does not indicate that individual Scottish citizens are more acutely predisposed to socialist, radical or progressive ideas than English citizens; it is merely that Scotland’s size, culture, tradition and working-class history fuse to produce a positive environment for such ideas to flourish and, within the new Scottish political system, find political expression in growing support for radical forces such as the SSP, the Greens and the Independents. Gregor makes too much of the electoral system explanation for the growth of the SSP not being matched by a similar formation in England or Wales. Wales also has a proportional representation system, though slightly less kind than Scotland’s. The left has not managed to take advantage yet, although hopefully that will change soon. In England, the Greater London Assembly elections are conducted under a form of proportional representation as are the European elections. Yet the left has failed to come together to take advantage of these undoubted opportunities on the electoral front. Even worse, from a socialist perspective, is the electoral performance of the fascist and racist British National Party. Even without proportional repesentation it has out-performed the left in several working-class areas. The socialist movement in England must tie its ropes together and ditch the pathetic rivalry and squabbling under the 80-20 principle. They can agree on 80% of policies and tactics. That is sufficient to come together organizationally. They must also get to grips with English national identity. The tradition of the Tolpuddle Martyrs and Chartists is the radical English identity to counter the bastardization fermented by the BNP thugs in relation to hate, division and chauvinism. The SSP was formed in February 1999 in the Parish Halls, Glasgow. From the 46,000 and 2% of the vote achieved in the May election of that year we recently secured almost 120,000 first votes and just under 130,000 second votes in May 2003. From 2% to 7% on the basis of a very radical socialist programme. Gregor unfortunately does not lend enough analysis to our pro-public ownership, nuclear disarmament, wealth redistribution, and anti-war activities. Our xii


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FOREWORD

results in the face of gutter press distortion, lies and slander from the Daily Distort [Daily Record], under former editor Cox, is surely evidence of at least the potential for Red and Radical Scotland to exist. Read this book but don’t stand aside from the socialist struggle. Help us realize the red and radical potential that exists in Scotland to deliver a socialist republic that plays its role in promoting a new socialist world based on need not greed, and people not profit.

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Preface

The purpose of this work is to help contribute to our knowledge and understanding, through evidence, argument, debate and discussion, of the nature of contemporary society in Scotland by examining the under-studied and under-researched area of trade unionism and industrial relations within Scotland. This contribution is, thus, concerned with the labour or workers’ movement in Scotland and the contexts in which it operates. Whether viewed as a central part of a class imbued with the potential to transform society in a revolutionary way, the ballast of present day social democracy, a movement representing over 600,000 workers, or just a significant social actor, the labour movement in Scotland is worthy of study. Despite these and other possible reasons, there has been a paucity of studies of the labour movement in Scotland over the last twenty to thirty years. We have had plenty of comment in one guise or another in recent years but no serious or sustained analysis. This work aims to provide an overview of the subject, largely using secondary data sources, from which further extensive and detailed studies and explorations may hopefully fill out much of the necessary detail that this present study is unable to provide. This would entail research in labour history as well as industrial relations, industrial sociology and social psychology. To do so will require a deliberate and collective effort by academics, writers and researchers on a par with that milieu around the Scottish Labour History Society (and its journal Scottish Labour History), which between the late 1980s and mid-1990s examined ‘Red Clydeside’ of 1910–45. More specifically, the purpose of this work is to connect with and relate to three, sometimes interlocking, readerships in regard of interest in, and analysis of, the labour movement in Scotland. First, the members, but particularly the activists, of trade unionism within Scotland, ranging from politically conscious shop stewards to full-time officers. Secondly, the milieu of left wing and radical xv


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thought in Scotland. This means engaging with the memberships of the Scottish Socialist Party and the platforms within it (inter alia, the International Socialist Movement (ex-Militant in Scotland/ Scottish Militant Labour), the Socialist Worker Platform, Republican Communist Network (Scotland), the Scottish Republican Socialist Movement, the CWI in Scotland (International Socialists)), the left wing of the Scottish National Party, the left wing of the Scottish Labour Party (such as the Campaign for Socialism), the Communist Party of Britain in Scotland, the Democratic Left Scotland, the readership of Scottish Left Review and those of the aforementioned organisations’ journals and newspapers (for example Scottish Socialist Voice, Frontline, Socialist Worker/Socialist Review, Morning Star, Citizen, Perspectives). Thirdly, those academics interested in researching various aspects of contemporary Scottish society. Of course, and lastly, this book also wishes to address those of no party-political affiliation, students studying Scottish society and any of the counterparts of the above three groups outwith Scotland. Most, if not all, of the political groupings and organizations have sister organizations outside Scotland and these take a keen interest in developments in Scotland, given the experiment of devolution, proportional representation and the realignment of the left. The point is to engage and debate with these four different ‘categories’, in order to bring about a more considered consensus on the issues at hand. This is not a dry and dusty academic tome. From this engagement, it is to be hoped that the labour movement will be better understood by itself and others in a way that is fruitful to expanding its numbers and influence as not merely a civilizing and democratizing agent for society in Scotland but also one that is capable of delivering either on its own, or in conjunction with other social forces, radical and far-reaching change in the way in which our society is presently organized and the purposes for which it is organized.

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Acknowledgements

I would like to express my gratitude to those who took time to comment on the initial draft of the manuscript; Rob Duncan, John Foster, Alex Law, David McCrone and Alan McKinlay. The usual disclaimer applies – they are in no way responsible for the analysis contained in Red Scotland? Radical Scotland?, particularly where upon reflection, I drew selectively on their comments. I would also like to thank the following libraries: the Scottish library in Edinburgh Central Library, the University of Stirling library, the Mitchell library in Glasgow and the National Library of Scotland in Edinburgh for being so well stocked with the material under the class marks for industrial relations, labour history, Scottish history and Scottish politics that made much of the writing of this book possible. Thanks also to WordPower, the independent radical bookshop in Edinburgh, for being a useful source of contemporary material. Thanks are also due to Bill Speirs and Tommy Sheridan for taking the time to write Forewords that engage with the material and arguments contained herein. In regard of Tommy’s Foreword, I leave it to the reader to form a judgement on the relative merits of the contrasting arguments, other than to say that there is a certain sense of déjà vu with the ensuing debate over Neil Davidson’s Discovering the Scottish Revolution (Verso, 2003), primarily in the Scottish Socialist Voice (20, 27 June, 4, 11 July 2003) where there was a fair measure of shadow boxing and inaccurate representation, and I will return to these issues in books on Tommy Sheridan and the SSP (Gall 2006, 2007). This work has been carried out in an independent manner, without support, financial or otherwise, from any source or group.

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACAS AEEU AUEW ASLEF COHSE CP/CPGB CSEU CWU EEPTU

Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service Amalgamated Electrical and Engineering Union Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen Confederation of Health Service Employees Communist Party/Communist Party of Great Britain Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions Communication Workers’ Union Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunications and Plumbers’ Union EIS Educational Institute of Scotland FBU Fire Brigades’ Union FTO Full-time officer GMB General, Municipal, Boilermakers’ and Allied Trades Union; Britain’s general union ILP Independent Labour Party IPA Involvement and Participation Association ISM International Socialist Movement (ex-Scottish Militant Labour) NAFTHE National Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education; the University and College Lecturers’ Union NUJ National Union of Journalists NUM National of Mineworkers OILC Offshore Industry Liaison Committee PCS Public and Commercial Services Union RMT National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers SML Scottish Militant Labour (Militant in Scotland) SNP Scottish National Party SDF Social Democratic Federation SSP Scottish Socialist Party STUC Scottish Trades Union Congress SWP Socialist Workers’ Party xviii


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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

TGWU TUC Unison USDAW

Transport and General Workers’ Union Trades Union Congress Britain’s public sector union Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers

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Tables

2.1 Components of Union Militancy and Moderation 2.2 Days not Worked per 1,000 Workers: Regional Breakdown, 1982–2004 2.3 Strikes in Scotland as Percentage of Strike Activity in Britain, 1975–2004 2.4 Rankings of Strike Measures out of 11 Regions, 1977–2004 2.5 ACAS Collective Conciliation (Completed Cases) 1974–2004 – Cases in Scotland as a Percentage of Cases in Britain 2.6 Unofficial Strikes as a Proportion of All Strikes 2.7 Regional Distribution of Unofficial Strikes (Percentage of Total Frequency) 2.8 Regional Distribution of Threatened/Actual Ballots for Industrial Action, 2000–2 2.9 Days ‘Lost’ per 1,000 Workers in Ten Other European Economies, 1982–2003 3.1 Union Density 1989–2004: Regional Breakdown 3.2 Union Density in Nine European Countries, 2000 3.3 Union Recognition by Region for the Private Sector (Manual, Non-manual) and Overall Contraction, 1980–90 3.4 Union Recognition in 1998: Regional Variations 3.5 Regional Distribution of New Recognition Agreements, 1999–2002 3.6 Regional Distribution of Union Recognition Campaigns, 1995–2002 3.7 Scope and Structure of Collective Bargaining, 1978 and 1985 3.8 Scope and Structure of Collective Bargaining for Manual Workers, 1984 and 1990 3.9 Extent of Collective Bargaining and Consultation over Pay and Conditions, 1998 xx

17 22 24 25 30 32 33 34 35 47 48 50 51 52 53 56 57 58


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TABLES

3.10 Percentage of Workers Covered by Collective Bargaining, 2001 60 3.11 Regional Distribution of Partnership Agreements 1995–2002 63 3.12 Regional Distribution of Instances of Employer Opposition to Union Recognition, 1995–2002 64 4.1 Attitudes to Trade Unions in 1983 (% agreeing) 68 4.2 Policy Preferences in 1997 (% agreeing) 69 4.3 Attitudes to Industrial Democracy, 1974–97 (% agreeing) 69 4.4 Attitudes to Issue of Social Priorities and Social Justice in 1988 and 1995 71 4.5 Attitudes to Issue of Social Priorities and Social Justice in 2000 and 2002 72 4.6 Sunday Herald ‘The Way We Think’ Poll, 2002 73 4.7 Percentages Identifying Themselves as ‘Working Class’ 74 4.8 Percentages Identifying Themselves as ‘Working Class’ in Scotland 74 4.9 Percentages of ‘Working Class’ Voters that Vote Labour 74 4.10 Socialist and Laissez–faire Values, 1997 75 5.1 Occupational Distribution (Scotland, England/Wales, 1980, 1997) 87 5.2 Socio-economic Group of Economically Active Heads of Households, 1991 87 5.3 Social Group and Voting Behaviour by Percentage, Scotland and Rest of Britain, 1997 88 5.4 Movements in Employment in Regions in Britain, 1979–94 90 5.5 Levels of Unemployment in Scotland and Britain, 1982–94 91 5.6 Unemployment Rates in the Regions of Britain 92 5.7 STUC-affiliated Membership 104 6.1 National Identity in Scotland and England from Choices, 1992–2001 113 6.2 Forced-choice National Identity in Scotland and England, 1979–2001 114 6.3 National Identity by Social Class (Registrar-General’s) in Scotland, 1997 114 xxi


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6.4 Social Attitudes by National Identity in Scotland and England, 2000 6.5 Industrial Attitudes and National Identity, 1997 6.6 Overall Class Association and Identification, 1997 6.7 Class Association and Identification by Social Group, 1997 6.8 Class Identity and Social Attitudes, 2001 6.9 Occupational Group and Social Attitudes, 2001

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115 116 116 117 117 118

01 Main text political economy of Scotland 1.qxd

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Introduction There are two central themes of both intellectual and popular interest concerning trade unionism and industrial relations in Scotland and the trade unionism and industrial relations of Scotland. These concern the past, the present and the future. First, and given the influential weight of past history in Scotland on the present, an array of questions exists around the issues of whether the labour movement in Scotland is more radical than its counterpart(s) in the rest of Britain. For example, Hearn (2000:152) has argued: ‘Many would argue that there is a distinct and separate myth of a socialist and radical Scotland.’ Thus, some salient issues are; is the labour movement more radical in Scotland than the labour movement in England and Wales or more radical than those in south Wales, Merseyside, Yorkshire and north-east England? If it is, how much more radical is it, and, what is meant by the terms ‘radical’ and ‘radicalism’? It might be suggested that ‘radical’ does not merely equate with socialist leanings, however broadly defined, but also, inter alia, with left wing social democracy, an agenda of ambitious demands over pay and conditions, a willingness to campaign on wider political issues rather than just ‘economic’ ones, and evidence of collective mobilizations of members in industrial action, strikes and demonstrations. If the labour movement in Scotland is more radical, how can we explain this? Is it because of the fusion of national identity and social democracy, the more proletarian character of society in Scotland, greater immiseration of workers or the industrial structure of the economy in Scotland? Secondly, there is a set of issues which revolve around whether there is any sense in which institutions and processes of trade unionism and industrial relations in Scotland have any distinct ‘Scottish’ features, and whether there is anything about trade unionism and industrial relations in Scotland which is significantly different or distinct compared to that found in other areas of 1

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Britain. These questions attempt to investigate whether any link exists between national identity and national consciousness on the one hand and forms of social organization and expression on the other, and whether, setting aside national identity and national consciousness, any particular and different social relations exist within the geographical area that constitutes Scotland, compared to other regions in the rest of Britain. From this second theme a number of secondary other questions arise. Is there such a social group as ‘Scottish workers’ or should ‘workers in Scotland’ be regarded as merely and exactly that? Are there any analyses or arguments that seek to establish whether there are any distinctive features of labour and organized labour in Scotland? All the preceding questions revolve around the implicit and widely held notions that different nations and societies will have different, if not distinctive, cultures and social processes and outcomes, and that Scotland is a nation and society, separate, different and distinctive from that found elsewhere in Britain. In Scotland, there is a sharp and accentuated notion of popular and worker radicalism that is closely bound up with national identity. In the most contemporaneous sense, all these issues can be held in regard of the political process that delivered a devolved settlement – especially the period from 1995–9 when it became clear that Labour would win the forthcoming general election and legislate for devolution – and of devolution itself, from 1999 onwards. The processes of gaining devolution, devolution itself and associated outcomes open up the possibility, but not necessarily probability, that a different socio-political trajectory evolves or is pursued in Scotland from that which exists in the rest of Britain. The possibility of such a trajectory would revolve around two salient aspects; first that devolution itself (the political settlement and its institutions) constitute radicalism and difference and, second, that devolution allows the space for existing and new differences of radicalism to emerge from, and into, the body politic (civic society and the parliamentary political process). For workers and trade unions in Scotland, this may allow, inter alia, greater and more effective representation of worker and trade union interests within politics, public policy and society, greater and more effective access to facilitate this representation of interests and new forms and structures of representation and access to representation. So, in 2


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light of recent developments since the mid-1990s, the question ‘What makes Scotland distinctive or different?’, can also be posed in a stark and immediate way. These two themes, radicalism and distinctiveness, and the many issues and questions which flow from them, are the central concerns of this work. Indeed, radicalism may be the difference and the difference may be radicalism. The book is organized in the following way to logically and sequentially make an examination of the salient issues. At the core, the book examines three aspects of society in Scotland: attitudinal – the views and beliefs of workers and trade unionists; behavioural – the actions and activities of workers and trade unionists; and institutional – the way in which workers and trade unionists are organised in associations and how these interact with other organizations in the social and political spheres.

Chapter structure Chapter 1 considers the popular impressions and informed views which hold that there is some positive association between ‘Scottishness’, the labour movement in Scotland and radicalism, and why, paradoxically, there is also a dearth of studies on the labour movement in contemporary Scotland. Chapter 2 examines the relative position of Scotland compared to other regions of Britain concerning various aspects of strike activity. The strike position of Scotland is also assessed by virtue of comparison with other European countries. Chapter 3 carries out the same task with regard to union membership, density and coverage of union recognition and collective bargaining. Again, a comparative European analysis is made. Chapter 4 considers the social attitudes of workers in Scotland and their associated manifestations in union policies. This is a necessary task as only so much can be concluded from relatively bald statistics on strike activity and so on. Chapter 5 examines the presence and degree of influence of a number of specific features of trade unionism, industrial relations and employment in Scotland to assess their relative significance. The question poised is ‘Do they mark out Scotland as being distinctive or different?’ 3

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Chapter 6 evaluates the influence of national identity and the unit of society called Scotland on the way in which issues of trade unionism and industrial relations are framed and perceived in Scotland and the rest of Britain. It also provides a consideration of the intellectual arguments which provide some sustenance directly and indirectly for the notions and interpretations of the radicalism and difference of organized labour in Scotland. The period since the late 1990s is assessed in Chapter 7. It seeks to investigate whether recent developments, like that of devolution and the actions of the Scottish Parliament, have led to departures from the dominant British-wide trajectories in trade unionism and industrial relations and a further embedding of the social democratic hegemony in Scottish society which in turn impacts on trade unionism in Scotland. A comparison of trade unionism and industrial relations in Scotland with those existing in Wales is found in Chapter 8. This comparative exercise is conducted to offer the possibility of further insights into the subject matter at hand in Scotland on the basis of a number of similarities between the Scottish and Welsh experiences of trade unionism and industrial relations. The conclusion, Chapter 9, brings together the deductions and inferences of the preceding chapters to make a synthesis of whether workers and their trade unions in Scotland are ‘red’ and ‘radical’, and in doing so, whether they provide a foundation for society in Scotland being regarded as ‘red’ and ‘radical’. The conclusion also looks to the further tasks of investigation and analysis that are needed for studying the issues. Throughout this book, the dimensions of, and accompanying explanations for, these processes, institutions and outcomes in Scotland are examined. Within the analysis, consideration is also given to whether it is sensible to view Scotland as a homogeneous entity and whether militancy and class consciousness can be ‘read off’ such indicators. It will also become apparent that in studying trade unionism and industrial relations in Scotland, this inextricably becomes bound up with perceptions of trade unionism and industrial relations in Scotland which are heavily influenced themselves by notions of past and present popular radicalism as well as by that of Scottish national identity. Thus, in analysing one aspect of society in Scotland, others are also examined, and in doing so, powerful images of ‘ourselves’ are studied. This orientation 4


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on totality is as it should be for it is artificial and erroneous to try to consider trade unionism and industrial relations without taking account of the perceptions of workers and others actors (trade union leaders, employers, politicians, commentators) about themselves and their relationships within trade unionism and industrial relations. However, care must be taken to ward against allowing the impact of this process going too far, whereby a distance opens up between the reality of how workers view themselves and how certain currents of thought view them, a trait that is common amongst more journalistic writings where stereotypes are created and replicated. The approach that is thus adopted in this book can broadly be defined as radical political economy. Here, the intellectual perspective is one of totality and dialectical interplay whereby a historical approach is taken that integrates developments in political, social and economic spheres so that interdependence and mutual conditioning are recognized with a view to creating a transformative project for society.

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1 Manufacturing Scottish ‘Industrial’ Mythology Introduction Starting with an examination of the ‘myth’ of Scottish radicalism and the premise that that is what makes Scotland different may seem an odd starting point. Is there not enough prima facie evidence to justify and substantiate the alleged myth? Indeed, is not the ‘myth’ actually a reality? Myths, to be myths, must always have something to them. They have no credibility or sustainability unless they have at least a kernel of ‘truth’, ‘reality’ and ‘evidence’ to underpin them. But myths are not amenable to definitive examination for they exist above and beyond attested ‘fact’, reason or logic. Neither do they have genuine (sic) explanatory powers. They cannot be disproved for their veracity is in the minds of the beholders where their role is to interpret social reality. They are ‘self-evident truths . . . a collection of symbolic elements assembled to account for and validate a set of social institutions’ (McCrone 2001a:91) as well as validate processes and outcomes. They ‘draw selectively from the past . . . [and] in doing so, myth[s] become . . . a contemporary and active force providing, in most instances, a reservoir of legitimation for belief and action’ (McCrone 2001a:91). Without at this stage trying to prejudge or prejudice the outcome of the examination of ‘red’ or ‘radical’ Scotland, this is true for the myth of Scottish radicalism. What makes the myth not only ‘mythical’ but also so persuasive and forceful is the fusion of some tangible evidence of worker radicalism with that of Scottish identity, and, writ large, the association of radicalism with the Scottish people and Scotland. This chapter, therefore, begins by examining the popular impressions about, and the more serious analyses of, workers and trade unionism in Scotland by commentators and writers within and without Scotland. From this, an irony exists in that despite considerable and lengthy discussion of Scottish workers, there has been a lack of detailed, serious and rigorous examination 6


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and analyses of workers and trade unionism in Scotland for the period of the last twenty to thirty years. The second part of the chapter outlines this very situation and considers reasons for why this has come to be.

Popular impressions: hegemony of left wing consciousness and action? Workers in Scotland are often popularly seen by others workers, and portrayed by the media, as being more ‘left wing’, more ‘radical’ and more ‘militant’ than their counterparts in many other parts of Britain. A necessary corollary to this is that workers in Scotland are also believed to be more strongly organized in union terms than those in many other parts of Britain. For example, Finlay (2004: 351) writes of the 1980s: ‘There was a growing sense among many Scottish trade unionists and activists that the English working class had sold the pass’, while Hassan (2004b:9) argued: ‘One of the defining narratives of Scottish Labour has been seeing itself as [a] more radical, real . . . and more authentic expression of Labour politics than British Labour.’ Similarly, McLean (2004:148) commented: ‘At different times, but especially the eras of “Red Clydeside” (1914–31) and now, it has been commonplace to argue that Scottish Socialism is well to the left of British socialism.’ At a superficial, journalistic level, it is not hard to find evidence of workers in Scotland being more ‘left wing’ and ‘militant’ (see also Gall and Jackson (1998:98)). In addition to the dominance of the Labour Party in Scotland throughout the Conservative governments of 1979–97, there are many Scots who are, or were, leading trade union officers (see Herald, 22 March 1999, 15 September 2000). In the era of Thatcherism, when trade unions became the key opponents of the government, this seemed significant because of the perception of disproportionate Scottish presence. Moreover, many of these union leaders who were Scottish also appeared to be among the most ‘left wing’ and ‘militant’. Mick McGahey (miners), Ken Cameron (firefighters), Jimmy Knapp (rail workers), Jimmy Airlie (engineers), and Jimmy Reid (engineers) lead the roll-call here. The perception of radicalism based on the visibility of union leaderships rested on another visible manifestation of ostensible 7

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radicalism, that being the many high-profile industrial disputes in Scotland that became causes célèbres throughout the union movement in Britain. Upper Clyde Shipbuilders (1971–2), the Glasgow refuse collectors (1975), Caterpillar (1987), Timex (1993), Glacier (1996) and the nursery nurses (2003–4) are obvious examples. A third foundation of the perception of radicalism stems from the phenomenon of ‘Red Clydeside’ of the periods 1910–24 and 1970–80 (see Chapter 6). A fourth rests on the relatively stronger historical presence of the Communist Party and Trotskyist organizations in the greater Glasgow area and in Scotland compared to other areas within Britain (Foster 2002:477, Knox 1992:132, McIlroy 2000, 2001, McIlroy et al. 1999: chapters 8 and 9, Seifert 1987:4, Thompson 2001:92, 158–9, cf Aitken 1997:264, Williamson 1978:62, 67 for different viewpoints). Indeed: ‘Till the Seventies, roughly a quarter of the entire membership of the British Communist Party was concentrated in the greater Glasgow area. While the CP was almost non-existent in that other bastion of Labourism, the English north-east, in Scotland the CP was powerful in the unions, shop stewards committees, and latterly, in the STUC’ (Kerevan 1983:27, see also Harvie (1993:109) and Irvine (2004:220)) while ‘the CPGB became numerically stronger and ideologically more influential in Scotland than anywhere else in Britain’ (Young 1998:119). Alternatively, but not dissimilarly, the Communist Party’s 6,000 members in Scotland in the 1970s constituted a fifth of the membership in Britain (Williamson 1978: 63). McIlroy and Campbell (1999) also show the Communist Party Liaison Committee for the Defence of Trade Unions was well supported in Scotland from its launch in 1966, albeit it declined fairly uniformly throughout Britain after 1972 (see also Troup (1999)). The ISM (2000a, 2000b) has also argued: ‘Unlike most of the other major European countries, Marxism has never been a mass force in Britain, even if in certain areas of Scotland it had stronger roots than elsewhere’ and ‘Nor does the Socialist Party [ex-Militant] in London [or elsewhere] have anything approaching the strength and influence that the Scottish Militant Labour accumulated in ten years of high-profile campaigning [circa late 1980s-late 1990s].’ Scottish Militant Labour in the 1990s had begun contesting local, parliamentary and European elections with some success in terms of votes won and councillors elected (Taaffe 1995). 8


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This multi-faceted historically based impression then reproduces in more recent times in the following way. The media (and newspapers, in particular), keen to play to or reinforce stereotypes, pick up on any developments that seem to confirm these earlier or existing characteristics. This is an amalgam of veiled attacks, the perspective of regionalism, lazy journalism, and strikes and conflict being deemed ‘newsworthy’. Thus, for example ‘Scots top industrial strike league’ was the story headline in the Herald(10 June 2000) for the publication on the annual strike figures for 1999, while it also greeted an industrial relations survey with: ‘Scots shunning partnership approach . . . Scotland remains an industrial relations “blackspot” according to a new survey detailing big improvements in workplace relationships throughout most of the UK’ (8 September 2000). Another example is from the Herald (10 September 1999): ‘Scotland is the only part of Britain where trades unions do not enjoy good relationships with employers, according to a survey by one of the UK’s largest company lawyers.’ Other such recent instances can be found, for example, in Scotland on Sunday (11 December 2000, 16 May, 5 September 2004), the Herald (8 October 2004), Sunday Herald (1 August 2004), STV’s Scotland Today (26 June 2004), Labour Research (April 2001) and the Scotsman (12 February 1997, 6 May 2004). Consequently, the view of many workers in south-east England in the 1980s and 1990s was that Scotland was ‘some kind of socialist republic’ akin to the ‘Socialist Republic of South Yorkshire’ of the 1980s, as recounted by a member of the National Executive of the CWU from south-east England. Indeed, the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS) (1995:6) thus commented: ‘The ghost of Red Clydeside has not yet been laid [to rest] in some commentators’ perceptions of Scottish industrial relations.’ This kind of popular view has been reinforced more recently by the considerable and growing profile of the Scottish Socialist Party, compared to that of the (now defunct) Socialist Alliance and Respect Unity Coalition in England and Wales. But the popular impression of radicalism and militancy has far deeper roots than journalistic musings and reportage. Commentators and writers such as academics, public-policy analysts and political activists have also come to such conclusions. Marxists Smith and Brown (1980:287, 304) wrote: ‘From 1960 onwards . . . a move 9

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towards more radical action [was made] by organized labour in Scotland’ and ‘[F]rom the mid 1960s onwards, there was an important move towards more radical action and policies by the labour movement in Scotland,’ while more recently Hassan (2002a, 2002b, 2003) considers Scotland to continue to be more ‘old’ Labour than elsewhere in Britain and Tomkinson (2001:10) argued: It would be wrong to portray Scottish workers as qualitatively different from their English counterparts. However, it is hard to deny that there are major differences between the two countries, in terms of the structure and consciousness of the working class. In Scotland four-fifths of the population live in the central belt. This concentration is due to the migration of workers from rural areas of Scotland and from Ireland who sought employment at the turn of the 19th century. Rapid industrialisation brought together a population that was overwhelmingly workingclass and became unionised and strongly influenced by the ideas of socialism. Indeed John MacLean, the first Scottish political leader to demand a Scottish Workers’ Republic, was the son of poor Highland immigrants who came to seek work in Glasgow, where MacLean’s political development took place. An environment was created where workers’ struggles were closely linked and experiences shared. In recent times the central belt has experienced major job losses and an increase in poverty and deprivation. However, working-class identity is still strong and support for socialist ideas remains firm. The class composition of Scottish society makes it more open to socialist ideas than England. Furthermore, for reasons that are beyond the scope of this article, historically, Scotland as a whole has a more radical tradition than England. This tradition exists even in areas that are not especially working-class, such as the Highlands, and helps to explain the progress of the SSP outside the central belt.

Reporting on the findings of academic research, the Sunday Herald (20 February 2000) stated: ‘Scotland is also . . . more supportive of the role of organisations such as strong trade unions in defending workers’ rights.’ Here, 63% of people questioned in Scotland, compared to 50% in England, agreed with the statement: ‘There is no need for strong trade unions to protect workers’ conditions and wages.’ McCrone (2001a:78), arguing that ‘Scotland’s history can largely be written in terms of class conflict and class politics’, states: ‘Scotland has always seemed to generate disproportionate support 10


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for socialist parties and movements’ (see also Milligan (1999)) and that: ‘some even spoke of the country as a class in and of itself . . . [that] Scotland and class seem to go together [and that this] thesis . . . still retained a political and rhetorical force in the 1990s’.1 Brown et al. (1998:138) write: ‘In Scotland generally, the proliferation of leftist parties was . . . a sign of the strength of socialist ideology.’ Earlier, Maxwell (1976:5) argued: ‘Scottish Socialism [propounds] . . . the myth that the Scottish working class has an instinct for radical if not revolutionary Socialism lacking in its Sassenach counterpart.’ From a different political perspective, Fry (1991:227), in a rather scornful tone, argued: ‘The Scots began to believe the myths preached to them for fifty years: that since socialism was inevitable, its supremacy was natural and inevitable.’ Bambery (1997:20) characterized this collective type of view as an ‘image painted by left nationalists . . . of the red north, full of militant workers and a beleaguered population who have braved it out against the Tories in isolation from the rest of Britain.’ Elsewhere, Bambery (1990:30) argued: ‘[s]ome socialists argue that Scotland is naturally more left wing than England and this is a reason to champion independence’ while Davidson and Gluckstein (1990:107, 2001:22) also argued that most on the left in Scotland believe that ‘Scotland . . . is generally more radical than England’ and that: ‘[people in Scotland] are comparatively more democratic and socialist than people in England and Wales’. Thus, what Hunter (1985:178) wrote about the period 1950–1980 still holds true today: ‘It is perhaps a common view that Scottish workers are among the more militant in the UK.’ But these views and perspectives are not without contention and debate. Some on the left have sought to dispel the ‘myth’ of radicalism propounded by others on the left who are deemed to be seduced by nationalism. For example, Bambery (1989:25, 1990:30, see also Bambery (1997:15), (1999a)) tends to argue the reverse of the Scottish radicalization thesis: examining the period from Chartism to New Unionism, the Great Unrest, the General Strike and the 1984–5 miners’ strike, he concluded: ‘Neither is it true that Scottish workers are more militant’ and: ‘Nor is it true to suggest the Scottish working class is more radical than its English or Welsh counterparts.’ This, he argued, was related to the view that: ‘There is in Scotland a pessimism about the ability of the working class to 11

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fight back. The scars of the defeats of the 1980s remain. This has led many on the left to embrace nationalism’ (Bambery 1999b:34). Bambery (1990, 1997, 1999b:16), Davidson (1999:121–2) and Davidson and Gluckstein (1990:128), amongst others, go further by arguing that nationalism is a force which has weakened, not strengthened, trade unionism in Scotland since 1979. So it is clear that whatever the merits and demerits of the respective arguments and perspectives, journalistic, academic or activist, and whatever the reality of the matter, the widespread phenomenon of workers in Scotland being more radical than workers elsewhere does exist as a, if not the, social construct in the analyses of workers in Scotland.2 This provides a credible touchstone by which to examine workers in Scotland.

An area deserving of, but lacking, attention Although of much intellectual and popular interest, particularly where workers have examined, discussed and reflected upon their own activities and histories in their unions and political organizations, little academic attention has actually been given over to examining the themes of radicalism and distinctiveness in the labour movement and industrial relations in Scotland, especially concerning the period since 1945. ‘Red Clydeside’ of the periods 1910–24 and 1939–57 has been studied in some depth, albeit only relatively recently. The work of Duncan and McIvor (1992), Kenefick (2000), Kenefick and McIvor (1996), Knox and McKinlay (1995), Melling (1990), McKinlay (1996), McKinlay and Morris (1991), McLean (1983) and McShane and Smith (1978) does this with varying foci and conclusions. A number of key disputes and strikes in Scotland have also been studied by Foster and Woolfson (1986, 1989, 1999), Miller and Woolfson (1994), and Woolfson and Foster (1988). To a lesser extent, so too have a number of aspects of the (political) labourist tradition of trade unionism in Scotland by Brown (1975), Donnachie et al. (1989), Gallagher (1982) and Macdonald (2000). Of those remaining works that spring to mind such as those by Dickson (1980b, 1982b), Findlay and McKinlay (2004), Knox (1992), McDougall (1978) and Tuckett (1986), none cover the more recent period since the mid-1970s in any depth. 12


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While Knox’s (1999) treatment of the period since the 1970s is more fulsome, it remains nonetheless limited in scope and depth. Collectively, these works then leave huge holes in our knowledge and understanding of the subject matter under consideration. Indeed, it would be more accurate to see them as small black dots on an otherwise blank canvass. Knox (1992:108) makes a similar observation, and the situation has not changed so dramatically in regard of the study of trade unionism and industrial relations in Scotland since Whyte (1978:18) wrote: ‘Compared with England, there is a dearth of recorded Scottish labour history’ and Dickson (1980a:9–10, 1982a:1) lamented the dearth of primary research on Scottish history and particularly that concerning workers. Therefore, Red Scotland? Radical Scotland? attempts to lay out the broad lines of investigation and provide some tentative analysis and conclusions. It does so using mainly secondary data and the writings of various academics and authors. In only a handful of instances, it is based on primary data specifically generated for the purposes of investigating the themes and questions outlined previously. Therefore, further research and debate will be required to assess the analysis here as well as flesh out many of the points raised. Before moving on, it is worth pausing to consider why it is that this paucity of writing and research on organized labour in Scotland since the 1970s exists and why this is ironic, given the rise of Scottish nationalism since then and the voluminous production of writings on Scotland and ‘Scottish-ness’ with both a nationalist and progressive bent. For example, one might have reasonably expected such issues to have been dealt with often, and at considerable length, in the pages of Liberation, Radical Scotland, Scottish Affairs, Scottish Economic and Social History, Scottish Historical Review, Scottish Journal of Sociology, Scottish Labour History Journal, Scottish Trade Union Review and the Scottish Marxist amongst others or in some chapters of the many books published on politics and history in Scotland. Without exception, these writings take the perspective of examining history in Scotland rather than the history of Scotland with regard to organized labour. Thus, many and various aspects of organized labour have been studied as sub-units of society in Scotland without widening the scope of investigation to consider how, or if, the subject matter 13

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relates to Scotland as a society and unit of analysis. The explanation for this absence revolves around four factors. First, much of the emphasis of the case for ‘Scottish-ness’ and distinctiveness rests upon cultural and social products and artefacts. In these debates about culture and society, organized labour in Scotland, rather than just the STUC, has neither been an active participant nor a central concern. Secondly, the devolution and independence projects have not included matters of employment relations or industrial democracy, with the Scottish Parliament having arguably few direct bearings upon work, industrial relations and trade unionism. Thus, Hassan and Warhurst (2000) do not mention trade unions at all while in Hassan and Warhurst (1999), trade unions and industrial relations are given little treatment. This relates to the third factor, namely that national consciousness in Scotland to date has been accommodated either within the Scottish National Party or the Scottish Labour Party, both being parties that have not considered workplace and employment relations to be of importance for state intervention. Those concerned with the social and cultural phenomena have, paradoxically, assumed the separate interests of organized labour that have been represented through the Scottish Labour Party, particularly as the SNP has never sought to win trade-union support for its policies and project. Finally, the Scottish economy has been fully integrated into those economies of Britain, Europe and the globe, so potentially removing much of the economic basis for Scottish distinctiveness. Indeed, Knox (1992:108) provides a pertinent comment when he suggests that the neglect of these issues may arise for the reason of the ‘decreasing distinctiveness of Scottish labour institutions’. One may be able to add to this the decreasing distinctiveness of Scottish labour-market institutions (see Chapter 5).

Conclusion Two main points arise from the discussion in this chapter. First, there is a fairly widespread notion of worker radicalism in Scotland, indeed, of Scottish-worker radicalism. Secondly, and despite this, there is a lack of research and study of the attitudes and behaviour of workers in Scotland. Indeed, this may result from the belief that we already know much about the main characteristics of the 14


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attitudes and behaviour of workers in Scotland. Nonetheless, the view or impression of Scottish-worker radicalism can usefully be deployed as a prism with which to examine the nature and characteristics of trade unionism and industrial relations in Scotland. It provides a reference point for analysis or a quasi-hypothesis which can be investigated not only for workers in Scotland but also for those in the rest of Britain. Notes 1

2

However, McCrone (1996:104) also noted the existence of the rightof-centre nationalist view of Scotland as a ‘classless society’ where class is an alien and English import (see Chapter 9 for similarity with Wales). Other writers have also identified the tendency to associate ‘class’ with ‘nation’. Law (2001b:8) noted that: ‘Nation can also become a surrogate for class politics’ while Hearn (2000:152) reported on the use of the term ‘“the English class system”, as though class were a particular English invention or cultural trait’. The ballast of Glasgow to this construct is significant (see later, and Cousins (n.d.)).

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2 Strike Activity in Scotland in a British Context Introduction Given the heritage of ‘Red Clydeside’ involving militant strikes and the positive association of frequency of striking with militancy, strikes are a useful starting point to consider the relation of Scotland to the rest of Britain with regard to radicalism, difference and distinctiveness. But more importantly than that, if workers in Scotland in industrial terms are more radical, indeed more militant, than their counterparts elsewhere in Britain, one would expect, and certainly require that, this tendency would be apparent in their strike behaviour. Strikes, in this guise, would be indications of mobilizations based on collective power at the points of production, distribution and exchange. Moreover, given the belief amongst the left that strikes are significant by virtue of their transformative power to develop collective consciousness (sectional, class) amongst workers directly and indirectly involved, strikes ever more move towards becoming the sine qua non for examining worker radicalism. In an earlier period of the late 1960s and early 1970s, it would have been somewhat erroneous to assume that (actual) striking was synonymous with militancy. The power of organized labour was such then that some groups of workers could gain their demands and compel management to backtrack by merely threatening action. In the period under examination, that of since the mid-1970s, this phenomenon of merely threatening action has been slight and declining despite the slight fillip represented by the mandates arising from the legal compulsion to ballot for industrial action since the mid- to late 1980s being used as bargaining chips in disputes. Therefore, we are on fairly safe ground for the moment in making a positive correlation between strike and militancy or radicalism.

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STRIKE ACTIVITY IN SCOTLAND IN A BRITISH CONTEXT

What is militancy? Before moving to examine the data on strike activity, an understanding of what constitutes industrial or trade union radicalism, for example militancy, is needed. Militancy is often viewed simply as a high propensity to strike or a high propensity to strike for ambitious demands, following from Allen (1966, 1981). While a useful starting point which takes us in the right direction, this definition is too simple and collapsed to give much purchase. Kelly (1996) provides a much more developed model of ‘union militancy’, recognizing that Allen’s work has little to offer on unions’ powerresources and ideologies. Therefore, he breaks militancy (and moderation) down into its constituent parts, positing that union militancy is characterised by tendencies towards extensive goal-setting and resistance, membership mobilization, and superordination underpinned by a ideology of conflicting interests between employers and workers (see Table 2.1). The processes of shifting from more militant positions to those of moderation are denoted in brackets. Kelly argues that militancy is based on widespread membership mobilization with the intention of confronting the employers/state as a collective body in order to impose costs on them. Although represented in a table, militancy and moderation are best represented as two ends of a spectrum (Kelly 1996:81, see also Kelly (1998:61)). Kelly stresses that given the wider environment in which unions operate, compromising the market, employers and the state, strict connections between intention to act in a militant or moderate manner and actual militant or moderate behaviour should not necessarily be made. Thus, interaction between the various actors may prevent intentions to act militantly from resulting in militant action and militant acts may not necessarily result from militant intentions. Table 2.1 Components of Union Militancy and Moderation Components

Militancy

Moderation

Goals

Ambitious demands of scale and scope, with few concessions

Moderate demands with some or many concessions (Accommodation)

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Table 2.1 (cont) Components

Militancy

Moderation

Membership resources

Strong reliance on mobilization of union membership Reliance on collective bargaining and/or unilateral regulation Frequent threat or use of industrial action Ideology of conflicting interests

Strong reliance on employers, third parties or law (Demobilization) Willingness to experiment with/support non-bargaining institutions (Subordination) Infrequent threat or use industrial action Ideology of partnership (Incorporation)

Institutional resources Methods Ideology

Source: Kelly (1996:80).

The strength of Kelly’s model is that it is more fulsome and nuanced than Allen’s definition, in that it moves beyond equating militancy largely with strike action, or even strike action in pursuit of ambitious goals. In particular, Kelly looks at ideological considerations and implies that consideration of a historical dimension is necessary. Nonetheless, in focusing upon union militancy, Kelly concentrates again on institutional or (national) organizational union militancy, and this has a tendency to exclude consideration of both labour and worker militancy (see Gall (2003b) for a full elaboration of this critique). The term labour militancy is used to denote behaviour of a sub-national nature over sub-national concerns – largely, but not exclusively, workplace-based action and behaviour over workplace concerns. The important dichotomy is between local unionism and national unionism. Obvious examples are workplace walkouts and strikes over immediate concerns such as victimizations and sackings. The distinction is important because if national union militancy is to exist, it would presumably in some way be the product of the ascendancy of aggregated local militancy. However, if the focus on labour militancy is not extended, the perspective would be unduly narrowed because the concerns of labour militancy are largely workplace-based and therefore have a tendency to be more ‘economic’ whereas worker militancy would encompass wider, more political attitudes and actions on, for example, 18


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women’s rights. The issue of wider attitudes and beliefs is salient in that workplace trade unionism with an anti-sexist perspective is more likely to be able to forge greater, overall workplace unity among a mixed-sex workforce. It is also more likely to support women’s equality and liberation campaigns which originate outside the workplace but which can impact back on the workplace attitudes, increasing unity. In focusing upon union militancy, Kelly also makes it hard to differentiate between intra-union groups, sections and factions, that is to examine union ‘political’ militancy at national and subnational union levels. Thus, there is no room to accommodate for differences between union leadership and sections of members, vis-à-vis one being more or less militant than the other. Similarly, there is no room for certain sections of the leadership and membership, acting in concert as a militant grouping, aligning themselves against the more moderate elements in the leadership and membership. Furthermore, Kelly displays a related tendency to place undue emphasis on the formal statement of what is or is not union policy with regard to the five components and not examine the possible gulf between this and practice. As importantly, notions of conflictual or co-operative ideologies or worldviews also require further elaboration to take account of important intra-variations. Although left reformism or social democracy, Stalinism and Trotskyism all stress degrees of conflict of interest between workers and employers, their expression in labour movements show that their impacts can lead to very different outcomes. Sectional or trade union consciousness can also result in different actions from those based on world views of class conflict or antagonism. Gramsci (1978) makes a similar type of distinction in his schema of sectional, corporate and hegemonic consciousness. Elsewhere, Kelly (1988) acknowledges these points but does not integrate them into his schema. Another problem, following from this, is the unresolved potential conflation of militancy, or the highest level of militancy, with the forces of revolutionary socialism. Despite considerable overlap, the two should not be equated with each other given some of the main differences are the presence of a revolutionary party, which contains more than just the most ‘militant’ workers, and the goal of the abolition of wage labour rather than the gaining the highest price for wage labour. Nonetheless, and with these caveats 19

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in mind, Kelly’s conceptualization of militancy provides a useful foundation for analyzing the behaviour of workers and trade unions in Scotland with a view to examining the thesis of the ‘red, radical Scotland’. This chapter now moves to examine strike in Scotland and Britain.

Strikes and strike propensity A useful proposition to test with regard to strikes is the following argument and counter-argument concerning the militancy of workers in Scotland: Many Scots are justly proud of the militant traditions of the Scottish working class . . . The workers’ movement in Scotland has often been in the forefront of the fight against employers and government. . . . The Thatcher years have brought bitter defensive battles in Scotland . . . Through[out] such struggle, the Scottish working class has retained its place in the front rank of the British labour movement. (Hume and Owen 1988:39, 65) In the past 20 years . . . the argument that workers’ militancy in Scotland has been in advance of the rest of the UK has not been borne out by reality . . . What emerges is not a picture of greater militancy on the part of the Scottish working class. Rather it is one of a class fighting in unison with its brothers and sisters to the south. It is of a class which tends to display the same strengths and weaknesses as in Yorkshire, Manchester or London. (Bambery 1990:33)

Tables 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 make it clear that Scotland from the mid1970s to the early 1980s onwards has had a fairly high level of strike activity and one that is proportionately higher than one might expect given the workforce in Scotland has been around 9% (see Table 2.5) of the total workforce in Britain (see also Gall and Jackson (1998)). The tables also indicate that strike activity in Scotland has been higher than the average for Britain and for many regions within Britain. Table 2.2 uses the most accurate measure of days ‘lost’ per thousand workers. This takes into account the varying size of the labour market (those deemed to be eligible to be ‘economically active’). As of mid-2003, Scotland had 9% of the 20


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Britain-wide total of economically active people, London 13%, south-east England 14%, south-west England 9%, north-east England 4%, north-west England 11%, the Midlands 16%, Yorkshire and Humberside 8%, east England 9%, Wales 5% and northern Ireland 3% (Labour Market Trends 2003). The position of workers in Scotland as elsewhere over the whole period is heavily influenced by the miners’ strike of 1984–5. Tables 2.3 and 2.4 indicate variation across the three measures for workers in Scotland although there is some upward drift. To examine and explain this phenomenon in some detail, two steps can be taken. First, one can look at the period prior to the mid-1970s to gain an understanding of how past traditions may have influenced later practice and how perceptions may have been formed. Secondly, one can consider whether the particular industrial structure of industry in Scotland is the main explanation, in light of Gilbert’s (1996a:181) comment that: ‘To a considerable extent the geography of strike activity reflects changes in the nature of industrial relations in particular industries and changes in the geography of industrial structure [emphasis added].’ Prior to the 1970s The following section considers the period before the 1970s for the reasons that past industrial practice such as high strike propensity may establish a ‘living tradition’ which possibly influences workers thereafter as workers develop consciousness through engaging in struggle; and the legacy of the past can influence perceptions of subsequent time periods on the part of various commentators and opinion formers. Martin et al. (1996:129) show that between 1888 and 1893, Scotland recorded the highest number of trade disputes along with the region of north-west England/Yorkshire. Following this, Knowles (1952) disaggregated strike activity in Britain between 1911 and 1945 for industrial structure and found Scotland to be more strike prone than the national average but not by much. Furthermore, south Wales was the most strike-prone area. Durcan et al. (1983) demonstrated that from 1946 to 1973, by way of subdivisions of time in this period, Scotland had a higher strike propensity than the national average. However, south Wales and the west Midlands had higher propensities. 21

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Year

18 51 60 24 7 16 13 13 85 17 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a

16 6 36 4 4 4 1 2 40 2 8 15 33 19 69

East South Anglia West 11 4 26 11 6 2 11 5 47 3 9 4 9 50 32

13 7 32 8 1 2 1 0 51 6 12 3 2 6 13

West Mids

East Mids

23 8 41 33 20 1 7 7 56 24 15 11 17 8 87

20 6 50 8 5 1 1 3 44 9 5 2 3 11 21

Yorks & Humber 37 8 44 24 4 11 1 7 46 17 10 13 25 29 46

North North West East 19 10 76 32 20 5 9 7 56 41 19 5 15 104 298

33 2 119 12 6 3 9 38 86 27 8 20 44 75 70

Wales

28 9 74 17 6 4 2 3 62 15 14 21 10 20 91

N Britain Ireland 99 101 34 1 33 10 6 23 35 9 9 29 15 32 35

34 19 51 20 20 10 12 10 57 19 13 30 24 34 83

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160 39 54 29 136 22 25 26 60 36 8 57 28 62 62

London Rest of SE Eng


22

2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990

Scotland


Table 2.2 Days not Worked per 1,000 Workers: Regional Breakdown, 1982–2004

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Scotland

23

1990 62 1989 276 1988 106 1987 225 1986 165 1985 348 1984 1210 1983 162 1982 328 Total 3624 Ave 151 Ranking 6th

London Rest of SE Eng n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 304 13 n/a

69 125 130 148 41 67 1522 138 174 2604 108 8th

East South Anglia West 32 109 55 106 38 60 87 86 163 934 39 11th

13 105 74 128 39 56 393 58 113 1123 47 10th

West Mids 87 203 185 150 88 142 1368 152 243 2889 120 7th

East Mids 21 137 121 126 39 333 2908 140 222 4215 176 4th

Yorks & Humber 46 179 132 188 138 1179 9354 236 322 12050 502 1st

North North West East 298 299 198 166 172 169 1381 331 414 3846 160 5th

70 288 762 182 216 859 4211 232 407 7709 321 2nd

Wales

91 313 130 235 90 1035 3357 395 314 6245 260 3rd

N Britain Ireland 35 71 108 236 67 87 52 170 216 1478 62 9th

83 182 164 163 89 298 1283 180 252 3047 127 n/a

Source: Department of Employment Employment Gazette/Labour Market Trends (various).

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Notes: Equivalent data not available prior to 1982. In 2000, some 80,000 Unison local government workers in Scotland took three one-day strikes over pay. 'Days not Worked' does not include days not worked as a result of 'sickies' but only those resulting from strike action.

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Year


Table 2.2 (cont.)

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Table 2.3 Strikes in Scotland as Percentage of Strike Activity in Britain, 1975–2004 Year

No. strikes Scotland/UK

No. of workers involved (’000s) Scotland/UK

No. of days not worked Scotland/UK

2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 1984 1983 1982 1981 1980 1979 1978 1977 1976 1975

20 11 24 13 14 16 15 14 21 14 12 16 13 12 10 8 9 8 11 12 13 12 13 12 14 12 12 12 15 21

13 7 5 10 51 15 12 34 9 15 9 6 12 17 10 11 12 7 17 14 12 10 12 11 13 11 9 10 11 10

40 18 9 12 58 18 17 22 9 17 6 17 10 16 6 13 5 12 16 10 8 8 12 13 9 11 9 9 12 12

Source: Calculated from Department of Employment Employment Gazette/Labour Market Trends (various).

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Table 2.4 Rankings of Strike Measures out of 11 Regions, 1977–2004 Year

2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 1984 1983 1982 1981 1980 1979 1978 1977

No. strikes

5th 3rd 1= 4th 3rd 3rd 2nd 2nd= 2nd 3rd 3rd 2nd 3rd 3rd 5th 5th 5th 5th 3rd 4th n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a

No. of workers involved

2nd 4th 9th 3rd 1st 2nd 2nd 1st 3rd 2nd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 4th 3rd 5th 2nd 2nd 3rd 5th 3rd 3rd 4th 4th 4th 4th

No. of days not worked (’000s) 1st 2nd 4th 4th 1st 2nd 1st 1st 3rd 2nd 6th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 3rd 6th 2nd 2nd 4th 5th 4th 3rd 3rd 3rd 4th 4th 4th

Days not worked per 1,000 workers 1st 3rd 5th 3rd 1st 1st 1st 2nd 4th 2nd 8th= 1st 3rd 3rd 4th 4th 9th 3rd 3rd 4th 5th 7th 2nd n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a

Source: Calculated from Department of Employment Employment Gazette/ Labour Market Trends (various). Note: Figures prior to 1977 not available.

Unfortunately, this analysis was not disaggregated for industrial structure but it did allude to its effect. In terms of the coal industry in the period 1946–73, Scotland, along with south Wales and 25

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Yorkshire, was the most strike prone. In a path-breaking study, Smith et al. (1978) showed, in an analysis which was disaggregated for industrial structure and sub-divided within regions, that between 1968 and 1973 Merseyside, Glasgow, Furness, Coventry, and western south Wales were (in descending order) the most strikeprone areas in Britain. With regard to Scotland, they also stressed the predominance of the Central Belt and certain factories. Furthermore, Smith et al. (1978) suggested that in addition to geography not being synonymous with industrial structure, after disaggregating for industrial structure and considering factors such as earnings growth, plant size and female employment, these latter factors are not sufficient in themselves to explain the remaining differences in strike propensity. Consequently, they suggest that local traditions and cultures are also important to determining strike propensity (see below on ‘communities of collectivism’). Finally, Gall and Jackson (1998:99) commented that in the period 1951–70 workers in Scotland had a higher than expected strike propensity per 1,000 workers, with this being the highest in the 1950s. We can thus summarize these various studies as indicating that from the late 1880s to the early 1970s, Scotland had a high level of strike propensity, although far from the highest, and the causes of this phenomenon, as in other regions, are manifold. It is reasonable to speculate that, irrespective of the reasons for its creation, the practice of strike action in these periods may have built up certain traditions which influence subsequent behaviour, that is increased strike propensity because it is seen as normal behaviour. The 1970s and after Moving to the more recent period, Hunter (1985:179) demonstrated that for the period 1952–80, ‘Scotland had a worse record than would be predicated on a purely proportional basis . . . Yet before accepting this conclusion, we have to take into account a number of factors [such as industrial structure].’ He finished by commenting: ‘Thus, although the prima facie evidence suggest there is an element of truth in the allegations of Scottish labour force militancy and aggression, there is good reason for drawing any conclusion very cautiously, if at all.’ He adds that the perception of 26


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greater strike-proneness amongst workers in Scotland may to ‘some extent . . . be a reflection of the “Red Clydeside” image of earlier’ (Hunter 1985:178). This shows the problem of simply concluding that: ‘Scotland has become the battle ground [emphasis added]’ of industrial struggle as Cowe (1975:15) did from looking at merely the location of strike activity. Finlay (2004: 235) argued: [F]rom 1952–1980, the number of working days lost as a result of industrial disputes was 55 per cent higher [in Scotland] than the UK average . . . However, many of these strikes were initiated at a British level, and it could be argued that the figures show not a greater tendency to strike in Scotland, but rather a greater predominance there of those industries whose workers tended to strike . . . If the figures for the period from the mid-sixties to mid-seventies are examined, what emerges is that Scottish strike activity follows broadly British patterns, although the number of days is still a good deal higher . . . If the number of workers involved in strike activity is calculated, as opposed to days lost through strikes, the Scottish figure is 40 per cent above the UK average.

while Jackson (1988:107) wrote of the years 1965–85, in terms of the number of strikes, that: The immediate general impression is that broadly the trends have moved in the same direction. The highpoint of strike activity in Scotland, 1970, was also the highpoint for the UK. Similarly the lowest figure was recorded in Scotland in 1985 and the lowest figure for the UK was recorded in the same year. However, it is also clear . . . that throughout the period . . . the number of strikes has been running at a higher rate than that for the UK as a whole [emphasis added] but that gap has been narrowing. For example [from] 1965–1969 the rate in Scotland was twice as high as that for the UK, whereas between 1981 and 1985 the rate in Scotland was only 25% higher than that in the UK.

A similar pattern was detected by Jackson for the number of workers involved, the number of days lost, the size of strikes and the duration of strikes. In searching for an explanation for the difference in trends between Scotland and Britain, Jackson discounted such factors as industrial structure, the predominance of male-dominated, large-scale workplaces, the influence of coal mining 27

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and that of changes in relative earnings. In this he concurred with the Department of Employment (1987) which cautioned against this simplistic approach of using industrial structure alone to explain varying regional strike propensities. However, he did not suggest an alternative, other than to propose that credible factors used to explain the convergence he detected could include the disproportionate closure of workplaces in engineering and metal working and the faster feminization of the workforce in Scotland compared to the rest of Britain. Martin et al. (1996:138–141) showed of the period 1966–93, where they disaggregated for that industrial structure and employment size, that there were significant regional dimensions to the decline in strike activity. Within the fall from 457 days ‘lost’ per thousand workers on average per year from 1966 to 1979 to 250 days ‘lost’ per thousand workers on average per year between 1980 and 1993, south-east and south-west England have consistently the lowest levels, while Scotland, Wales and the north of England (centred on the north east) and Yorkshire/Humberside have consistently the highest. However, Scotland’s position falls while that of Yorkshire-Humberside increases. Looking at the period 1990– 93, Martin et al. (1996:145) question whether, with further falls in strike activity, it remains meaningful now to talk of regional differences in strike propensity. Gall and Jackson (1998:101), comparing Scotland to the national average from the mid-1970s, show that Scotland’s position in the regional strike league fell in the mid-1980s then widened again in terms of number of strikes and days ‘lost’ but not workers involved. (This is believed to reflect the complex situation of differential falls of employment in coal, manufacturing and changing strike propensities, particularly with regard to the faster growth in female employment). Tables 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 (not disaggregated for industrial structure) indicate that in the period of the late 1990s this is broadly still the case. Tables 2.2 and 2.4 (last column) use days lost per thousand workers as the most reliable measure, and in particular emphasize the relative strike propensity within Scotland which suggests Scotland is now preeminent in the most recent years. Dibb Lupton Alsop (2000, 2001) indicated similar standings for the regions previously identified as most strike prone. Thus, and particularly with the impression of ‘Scottish radicalism’ 28


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still abounding where prima facie evidence shows Scotland to be amongst the most strike prone, it is still meaningful to examine regional variations. But the impact of industrial structure along with other important factors indicates that Scotland’s relative strike propensity is heavily related to features within Scotland rather than of Scotland, and that these features are also found elsewhere in a small number of regions of England and Wales. Strike activity within Scotland A further important avenue of investigation is to ask whether the picture built up for Scotland is true of all of Scotland. Smith et al. (1978:54) found during the (all-Britain) strike wave between 1971 and 1975 that 95% of manufacturing plants were completely free of stoppages and that the 5% that experienced strikes contained 30% of the workforce. Equally, the specific sub-regions and cities identified above by Smith et al. (1978) continue to be the location of most strike activity. Focusing on Scotland, it becomes clear that the concentration of strike activity is to be found in the Central Belt and, in particular, in Strathclyde and the Greater Glasgow area (Gall and Jackson 1998:104–5, see also Findlay (2004:325) and Socialist Worker 18 January 2003). From 1986 to 2001, of the fiftysix strikes in Scotland that were not part of Britain-wide strikes and where more than 5,000 days were lost, thirty-three occurred in Strathclyde. This does not include the thirteen strikes where Strathclyde was involved as part of wider actions within and across Scotland.

Industrial disputes Data from ACAS, where it provided conciliation for collective industrial disputes in which industrial action may or may not have taken place, indicates that Scotland provides more than its expected number of disputes on a proportional basis and that after 1994 this markedly increases. Again, this takes no account of industrial structure but it is not clear that industrial structure could alone easily explain the recent proportionate increase unless

29

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1974 –5

30

Scottish cases as 13.0 % British cases % workforce n/a in Scotland Year

1990

1977

1978

1979 1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988 1989

13.7

12.6

15.1

13.9

13.8

13.6

10.6

12.7

14.5

13.9

13.7

13.5

10.9 10.5

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

9.3

9.3

9.3

9.3

9.3

9.3

9.2

8.8

8.7

1991

1992

1993

1994 1995

1996

1997

1998

2001 –2

2002 –3

2003 –4

16.7

19.6

19.0

19.0

18.4

19.0

17.3

15.6

17.2

16.8

9.4

9.2

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

Scottish cases as 11.0 10.1 10.8 13.6 % British cases % workforce in 8.8 9.0 9.1 9.3 Scotland Source: ACAS Annual Reports (1974–2004).

1999 2000 –2000 –1

8.8

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1976


Year


Table 2.5 ACAS Collective Conciliation (completed cases) 1974–2004 – Cases in Scotland as a Percentage of Cases in Britain

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other areas of Britain have seen a greater decline in the industries relative to those in Scotland which are traditionally more strike prone. This then may provide some further evidence for difference within Scotland, as well as compared to other regions. However, north-east and north-west England also exhibit the same broad pattern as Scotland does, indicating the declines in traditionally strike-prone industries are greater in other areas such as the Midlands. Other relevant issues concern the standing of ACAS in different regions; notwithstanding the general level of disputes, ACAS may be more or less involved in dispute resolution in some regions rather than others.

Unofficial strikes While examining strikes per se is an important way of assessing the position of Scotland in relative terms, another particularly useful tool of investigation is that of considering the nature of the strikes by virtue of whether they are official or unofficial strikes. The premiss here is two-fold. Unofficial strikes are more radical and militant because they represent initiatives by ordinary members in an independent manner to take control of determining their terms and conditions of work. They are also the most militant form of strike action, being not only against management but also in contravention of union leaderships because unofficial strikes are defined as being outside agreed union procedures and union-management procedures. The premiss is not wholly correct, for unofficial strikes are far from being simple social phenomena with regard to intraunion bargaining, union-employer bargaining and legal restrictions (see Gall (2003b), Hyman (1984)). Furthermore, the extent to which unofficial strikes are strikes taken in direct contravention of union officials and national unions is relatively small. Nonetheless, the premiss is sufficiently well-founded for unofficial strikes to be a useful measure of the presence or absence of militancy. Table 2.6 shows that unofficial strikes are still a significant phenomena within overall strike activity, contra Edwards (2001:3) who states they are a ‘rarity’. Indeed, in the 1990s the percentage of strike activity accounted by unofficial strike activity is greater across all three measures than in the 1980s. Table 2.7 indicates that 31

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Scotland is relatively more strike prone vis-à-vis unofficial strikes than all other regions apart from London in terms of average frequency, and by computing annual rankings, on a par with regions such as north-west England or Yorkshire and Humberside across the period. Given that this data is not disaggregated for workforce size or industrial composition/industrial structure, Scotland’s position is most likely further accentuated in this regard of unofficial strike proneness. Table 2.6 Unofficial Strikes as a Proportion of All Strikes Year

1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

No. of No. of unofficial known strikes workers involved

127 97 127 153 155 160 57 101 76 99 95 116 78 82 93 162 114 56 43

107,760 52,062 78,164 193,710 69,719 127,240 19,338 28,097 17,643 48,922 48,893 33,940 65,457 47,531 47,001 36,023 77,173 39,778 62,147

No. of Unofficial known strikes as a days ‘lost’ % of all strikes

456,483 134,560 196,632 1,560,278 218,335 179,195 25,766 46,275 45,621 88,827 88,827 54,087 96,193 162,842 63,307 85,345 81,045 41,250 127,827

20 13 16 26 28 30 15 40 36 48 39 47 36 49 45 80 59 38 32

Source: Gall (2004c).

32

Workers involved in unofficial strikes as a % of all workers involved in strikes

13 10 10 34 12 46 11 19 5 48 28 9 50 51 33 20 43 3 41

Days lost in unofficial strikes as a % of all days ‘lost’ in strikes

9 10 6 46 6 15 3 9 7 32 21 4 41 58 26 17 15 4 26

London

1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Ave.

16 13 9 12 6 10 12 15 17 8 22 38 16 18 17 18 10 23 16

2 19 12 17 28 28 21 37 27 36 25 30 35 21 23 20 20 17 23

Rest of SE Eng 11 11 9 13 14 8 18 2 5 9 7 13 16 18 8 13 16 9 11

East Anglia South- Midlands Yorks & Humber West 0 0 0 0 6 2 2 1 0 1 2 0 1 0 0 4 5 0 1

0 4 8 4 4 5 4 0 7 3 9 1 3 3 12 7 9 10 5

13 6 12 17 16 17 7 3 5 9 5 6 4 9 18 12 10 4 10

24 23 14 10 5 10 11 8 11 11 5 3 5 6 8 8 7 4 10

North- NorthWest East 16 13 14 14 10 7 18 16 18 14 18 4 11 4 10 9 11 11 12

11 6 10 12 2 3 3 12 8 2 2 4 4 12 2 4 6 2 6

Wales

N Ireland

5 4 12 0 3 9 4 4 2 7 5 1 3 8 1 2 2 4 4

0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 3 3 15 2

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Source: Gall (2004c). Notes: The data in the table covers unofficial strikes only where the location is known. It also excludes national or inter-/multi-region unofficial strikes. Because of this and incomplete data for some of the remaining unofficial strikes, percentages for workers involved and days lost in unofficial strikes by region have not been computed for the data is not sufficiently complete to justify this.

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Scotland


33

Year


Table 2.7 Regional Distribution of Unofficial Strikes (Percentage of Total Frequency)


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Ballots for industrial action Since the mid- to late 1980s, balloting for industrial action has become increasingly frequent following the legal requirement for the protection of industrial action from civil prosecution for damages. Around 1,000 may take place in any one year. Threats of balloting for industrial action have also become more frequent. Table 2.8 provides the only known data on the regional distribution of threatened and actual ballots for industrial action (strikes and action short of a strike) for the period 2000–2. It indicates that workers and their unions in Scotland are amongst the more ‘militant’ regions in threatening or staging ballots for industrial action, although no data exists on the regional distribution of the proportion of ballot mandates that were implemented (leading to action). For the slightly longer time period of 1997–2002, the Dibb Lupton Alsop (DLA 1997–2002) surveys indicate that there are greater levels of threatened and actual ballots for industrial action in the north than in the south of Britain. Table 2.8 Regional Distribution of Threatened/Actual Ballots for Industrial Action, 2000–2 Year

2002 2001 2000

Scotland London & south east 50% 71% 70%

50% 45% 41%

South west

Midlands

North west

North east

73% n/a n/a

59% n/a n/a

48% 64% n/a

53% 59% 68%

Source: Dibb Lupton Alsop (2000, 2001, 2002). Notes: The surveys record the percentage of employers reporting threatened and actual ballots for industrial action. N/a = not available. For other regions in Britain, no data was reported.

Strike activity in Scotland by European standards Table 2.9 below shows the days not worked through strike action per 1,000 workers in ten other European economies between 1982 and 34

Scotland Britain Belgium Denmark France Germany Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden

35

n/a n/a 47 8 8 28 13 48 33 24 18 65 22 34 44 66 n/a n/a 45 n/a n/a n/a 35 42 29

23 79 24 51 38 1,317 42 32 85 33 50 27 30 42 23 41 59 40 1,040 60 40 50 156 142 170

n/a n/a 83 114 72 52 43 58 304 39 48 37 47 66 50 69 55 59 50 80 80 130 77 69 85

5 10 1 0 2 1 2 3 8 7 18 47 5 14 4 2 1 1 1 260 0 0 19 29 9

26 124 15 311 82 66 72 59 168 62 32 40 69 84 110 137 132 65 27 238 68 236 217 180 97 195 258 342 62 300 177 226 324 319 378 390 510 270 470 610 380 980 500 1,280 207 304 315 491 98 117

2 35 6 1 11 5 2 1 115 8 8 15 17 37 4 2 11 9 20 10 30 50 18 19 17

59 379 152 296 139 127 190 171 163 728 248 701 486 283 417 1,399 632 300 480 890 590 370 438 585 291

164 0 3 0 22 0 7 17 177 15 54 7 5 191 101 199 4 171 130 10 10 0 56 82 30

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Source: Department of Employment Employment Gazette/Labour Market Trends (various). Notes: Bottom three rows are averages. n/a = not available.

15 29 12 11 20 29 25 16 20 30 25 58 39 45 127 67 40 137 100 100 230 170 65 105 25

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19 51 21 20 10 12 10 57 19 13 30 24 34 83 182 164 163 89 298 1,283 180 252 147 272 22

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2003 39 2002 54 2001 29 2000 136 1999 22 1998 25 1997 26 1996 60 1995 36 1994 8 1993 57 1992 28 1991 62 1990 62 1989 276 1988 106 1987 225 1986 165 1985 348 1984 1,210 1983 162 1982 328 1982–2001 186 1982–1990 294 1991–2001 43


Year


Table 2.9 Days ‘Lost’ per 1,000 workers in Ten Other European Economies, 1982–2003


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2003 for all recorded strikes (official, unofficial). Unfortunately, complete data for relatively strike-prone Greece were not available. From the table, Scotland appears to be relatively strike prone by European standards, ranking fourth highest by average among the twelve countries over the period 1982–2001 for the number of working days not worked through strikes, with only Ireland, Italy and Spain being higher. Within this time period, for 1982–1990 Scotland is also fourth with only Ireland, Italy and Spain being higher. However for the period 1991–2001, Scotland falls to sixth position, with Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy and Spain being higher. What significance can we attach to this? The relative differences are noteworthy but they must be held in regard of an overall decline in strike activity throughout the twelve economies. Furthermore, and echoing the earlier discussion, the means are not available to disaggregate the data for the influence of industrial structure. Just as importantly, disaggregation cannot be carried out for the influence of national industrial relations systems, particularly in continental European economies. This has a number of aspects involving micro-corporatist systems of relatively centralized collective bargaining, attendant traditions of industrial action strategies, provisions for the intervention of state bodies in dispute resolution and greater regulation of industrial action. In addition to these factors, in many countries there is a multiplicity of unions and union confederations, requiring greater inter-union coordination to take effective industrial action. The relative absence or insignificance of local or decentralized collective bargaining in many of the countries helps explain the ‘paucity’ of localized action, that is the ‘lack’ of informal or formal bargaining structures at a local level, dealing with localized or local issues, provides an obstacle to such mobilization because terms and conditions of employment are determined at other (higher) levels. Elsewhere, the presence of robust and cohesive structures of centralized, national or regional bargaining, as the parallel to the paucity of local bargaining, has led to forms of industrial action designed to feed into these macrobargaining structures. Consequently, there is a tendency for many unions to engage in supra-local (i.e. regional or national) strikes where these strikes (‘warning’ or ‘token’ strikes) are based on limited mobilization and are aimed at feeding into long-established 36


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forms of national bargaining. Here, the likelihood of longer or allout strikes is, thus, lower. This means we cannot read worker radicalism straight off this data, accepting the earlier caveats about the relationship between strikes and more generalized attitudes and behaviours, because of this extra dimension of national differences in industrial systems. That said, the utility of this comparative exercise is not entirely unproductive, for the relative rankings do display some reflection of differences in worker mobilizations with regard to ideas of opposition to the status quo within the realm of workplace relations. Thus, Scotland ranks fairly, although not spectacularly, high in this exercise.

Industrial tactics Kerevan (1983:30) observed that ‘From Lee Jeans to Timex, Scots workers continue to show a traditional syndicalist reflex for direct action which is absent south of the border,’ while Damer (1990: 199) noted that ‘[The UCS work-in] provided the direct model for numerous other work-ins [such as Lee Jeans and Caterpillar]’. Considering the longer period of 1970–2004, these observations do not hold up to examination. Occupations, flying pickets and mass picketing are not statistically more common or significant amongst workers in Scotland than amongst workers in other parts of Britain such as Wales, the north-east and north-west of England.1 While the Glacier nine-week occupation in 1996 was successful and was characterised by the STUC as ‘the greatest trade union victory since the Upper Clyde Shipbuilders struggle of 1972’ (in Scottish Socialist Voice 10 January 1997), it stands out almost as a lone case of occupation in the late 1990s in Scotland. Those cases that have taken place represent a (tiny) minority tendency in the traditions of trade unionism throughout Britain, of at most two or three per year. This compares starkly to some of the more ‘spontaneous’ direct traditions of workers in France, Italy and Spain. When these tactics have been relatively more common in Scotland (the early 1970s, the early 1980s), this has been true of other regions in Britain (see, for example, Findlay (1987:70) and Levie et al. (1984), cf. Salmond (1982)). The only component of workers’ behaviour in 37

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Scotland that supports Kerevan’s contention for the subsequent period concerns unofficial strikes. Here, workers in Scotland appear to be more militant. However, care needs to be taken for the majority of these strikes were concentrated in several sectors (engineering, health, local government, postal service) and in the Strathclyde area. Examining another facet of industrial behaviour, Foster (2002:476, 484) argued that Scotland became the location where trade unionism became most politicized in Britain by dint of the twenty-one political strikes between 1969 and 1983. However, he also stressed the limitations of these strikes in terms of the participation rate by workers and that the strikes were overwhelmingly part of all-Britain movements. Similarly, the period since the late 1980s throughout Britain has been marked by a commonly uniform pattern of industrial action and industrial tactics, comprising use of ballots for industrial action as bargaining chips, ‘cut-price’ action (industrial action short of a strike), less all-out strikes, more one-day (or series of one-day) strikes and selective involvement of groups of workers. In all, caution and selfrestraint have become the hallmarks of trade unionism throughout Britain in recent times.

Communities of collectivism When we turn to try to explain the higher strike propensity of workers in Scotland, as well as those in Wales, north-east England and Yorkshire/Humberside, the most convincing explanation focuses on the notions of ‘communities of collectivism’ and ‘communities of collective action’. These refer to political and industrial traditions and patterns of attitudes and behaviours that are more predisposed to collectivism and oppositionalism, and in particular, the construct of ‘communities’ is used to denote spatially bounded communities which can initiate and sustain the social relations upon which collective action depends (see also Fantasia (1988)). These communities most obviously refer to union densities, political voting patterns, popular cultures and membership of political parties and currents within these as well as social organizations (such as cooperatives, whether production or retail, and social clubs). Over the years, their presence has been developed such that 38


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workers look at the world and their personal experiences of the world in a particular way that is conducive to workers acting collectively in assertive and combative ways. For example, Martin et al. (1996:144) argued that the more strike-prone regions are more strike prone for reasons other than the effects of ‘structure’ and ‘area’. The former refers to the employment structure of a region and the latter to features such as firm size, occupational composition, gender division of labour and workplace industrial characteristics. Thus, they point to political and cultural factors. In particular, Martin et al. (1996:119) stressed how such traditions reproduced themselves through time even where the patterns of employment change. Similarly, Gilbert (1996b:149, 151, 152) emphasized that local political and industrial traditions influences strike activity: a greater persuasiveness of collectivism, despite a decline in strike activity, still leads to a higher level of strike activity. A question arises with regard to Scotland and Wales (although to varying degrees), namely whether the existence of progressive selfheld notions of national identity add further supportive material to this thesis of ‘communities of collectivism’ (see Chapters 6 and 8). Notwithstanding this, Bean and Stoney’s (1986) analysis of the strike proneness of Merseyside is instructive for further understanding the processes occurring within Scotland. Covering the period 1974–83, Bean and Stoney clearly demonstrated the area’s very high level of strike activity compared to the average for Britain. This remains the case once disaggregated for industrial structure but this disaggregation also serves to emphasize the concentration of strike activity within a limited number of industries (car manufacturing, ports and shipbuilding) and, in particular, large workplaces. After having analysed a number of variables used by other authors, they suggest that, although hard to pin down, the trade union, industrial and political principles, attitudes and loyalties of the workforce and community have an important part to play in explaining the above average strike propensity. The import of the preceding discussion is thus twofold. Strike activity is higher in Scotland than in some other regions but it is higher for the same reasons that explain the higher strike propensity of other regions (of high strike activity). This suggests there is nothing particularly ‘Scottish’ about this phenomenon.

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Conclusion On the basis of considering strike activity as one component among a number (in Kelly’s model) for judging militancy amongst workers in Scotland, there is some evidence for suggesting militancy exists in the post-1970 period. In this respect, the degree of union mobilization in Scotland is paralleled by that in a number of other regions in Britain such as north-west England. Whilst there are no data available with which to examine variations in bargaining objectives across and between different regions in Britain, it appears from general observation that the demands of workers engaging in strikes are no more or less militant or moderate in Scotland compared to elsewhere. The same is true with regard to the outcomes of striking – specific data do not exist but, again, from general observation, strikes are no more or less successful in Scotland than elsewhere. Indeed, since the mid-1970s, whether of a local or national manner, strikes have been, by and large, defensive, cautious and economistic throughout Britain. In the 1980s, continuous (indefinite or extended) action was the hallmark throughout Britain. Since the late 1980s, discontinuous (one-day or a series of one-day actions) strikes have been the hallmark throughout Britain. The results of strikes have been varying degrees of compromise on a spectrum from victory to defeat. In the 1980s, these compromises tended more towards defeat, while in the 1990s, the compromises were more located in the centre of the spectrum. This means, other things being equal, workers in Scotland are no more or less inclined compared to elsewhere to desist from taking further strike action. In terms of tactics, in only one respect do workers in Scotland stand out, namely concerning the preponderance of unofficial strikes. To summarize the overall position so far, workers in Scotland may seem more radical and militant than workers elsewhere in Britain when analysing strike activity if the comparison is between workers in Scotland and those in the rest of Britain. This difference is not maintained when the strike activity of workers in Scotland is compared to those in similar regions in terms of industrial structure such as north-west England. That said, a number of important qualifications and caveats are in order. First, using the unit of analysis of ‘Scotland’ masks significant internal 40


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differences. When talking of Scotland, we are really talking of the Central Belt and, in particular, Strathclyde. Secondly, although differences can be identified between regions of Britain, these are differences within the compass of significant decline in strike activity. Thirdly, most strike activity is now located in the public sector and is thus not a marked feature across the whole economy. Fourthly, the differences between regions are maintained in the period of decline. When we come to examine the reasons why Scotland and some other regions are relatively more strike prone, the impact of the industrial structure on each region on strike activity needs to be recognized. Here the argument runs that relative preponderance of industries and sectors of the economy, such as manufacturing and the public sector, provides higher strike propensities as a result, inter alia, of generating a greater number of larger workplaces and larger numbers of manual workers. Taking this a bit further, it is argued that these conditions enable stronger, more combative trade unionism to exist. Recognizing this influence is important but it represents a rather mechanical way of thinking for the association of larger workplaces and manual workers with strikes does not actually explain why workers in large workplaces or manual workers are more strike prone. The key issue is not just why there are higher concentrations of these conditions in the regions identified as strike prone and the association of larger workplaces and manual workers with strikes as two quasi-separate exercises. Rather, a unified approach is needed, and this can be found in the approach of the ‘communities’ of collectivism and collective action. Although such facets of industrial composition are acknowledged, this approach focuses on the social process of the establishment of political traditions that aid the construction of trade unionism and the mobilization of strike activity. Other aspects and components of the model of militancy put forward by Kelly (1996, 1998) will be examined in subsequent chapters so any final judgement on workers in Scotland must await the conclusions of these chapters. If, however, the less specific and less tightly defined categorization of ‘radicalism’ is used as the benchmark, then workers in Scotland may be said to show evidence of radicalism along with workers in the same regions as identified above, albeit even ‘radicalism’ requires an examination 41

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of some other aspects of workers’ behaviour. Finally, the notion of radicalism or militancy as difference has some validity because of the strength of national identity in Scotland (see Chapter 6). Notes 1

Of the UCS work-in, several studies (see, for example, Johns (1973), Wollman (1988)) have questioned the alleged radicalism of the struggle, in terms of its method, aim and demands (cf. Foster and Woolfson (1986)).

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3 Union Membership, Union Recognition and Collective Bargaining Introduction Union membership, union recognition and collective bargaining, as measures of union strength, are often widely assumed to be not only more prevalent and persuasive in Scotland than elsewhere in Britain but the outcomes flowing from them are believed to be more favourable than those found elsewhere. For example, the playwright McGrath (in Harvie (1998:167)) believed that the Scottish working class was ‘one of the strongest in Europe, with a considerable experience of struggle and great maturity as a result’, while Hobsbawm (1969:308) argued for the early part of the twentieth century that ‘the Scots labour movement not only took a serious hold on its working class, but established a sort of hegemony over the English’. Later, Ferry (1975:98), AUEW Glasgow District Secretary and later leader of the CSEU, argued: ‘While it is true that workers in other parts of the United Kingdom have earned their own place in history, no one could deny that the individual and collective leadership shown in Scotland in the past has paved the way for a positive movement to greater Industrial Democracy and eventual Workers’ Control in the not too distant future.’ Young (1990:67) also argued for the considerable strength of trade unionism in Scotland in a comparative context: [O]rganised labour [in Scotland] today is numerically strong . . . Although there have been important changes in the occupational composition of Scottish trade union membership since the ravages of alien Thatcherism began to weaken the traditional heavy-industry based economy in 1979, organised labour [in Scotland] simply cannot be ignored or written off . . . By contrast, the English trade union movement has been more severely weakened by Thatcherism than its Scottish counterpart. Although unemployment and deindustrialisation have not yet gone as far in England as in Scotland, English trade union membership has suffered much more dramatically. 43

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This chapter examines the ‘record’ of workers in Scotland on a range of issues to consider the cases for militancy, radicalism and distinctiveness. First, union membership, and specifically union density, with a European comparative dimension. Secondly, union recognition and collective bargaining, in terms of changes and patterns therein over the last twenty years, again with a European comparative dimension. Thirdly, the extent of ‘partnership’ agreements and ‘partnership’ working to give an indication of the relative persuasiveness of militancy and moderation in the relationships and collective bargaining between unions and employers. Fourthly, the extent and distribution of employer opposition to union presence and organization.

Union membership and union density Workers in Scotland have recorded traditionally high, although far from the highest, union density compared to other regions in Britain from the mid-1890s to the mid-1970s. Thus, regions such as Wales, Yorkshire and Humberside, the east and west Midlands and northwest and north-east England have had consistently as high, if not higher, densities (Martin et al. 1996: chapter 3). In the period of the 1980s, using the 1984–90 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey data set, union density among full-time workers in Scotland was the sixth highest in 1984 relative to the national average while by 1990 it was the fourth equal highest (Martin et al. 1996:57). Table 3.1 shows that between 1989 and 2004 Scotland, relative to other regions, has remained one of those with the highest union density (around the third or fourth highest) and it is usually some 6% higher than the national average. However, the regions of Wales and north-east and north-west England are as high, if not higher, although the east and west Midlands slipped out of the ‘top table’ and Northern Ireland registers as highly unionized. Martin et al. (1996:56) are struck by a ‘clear division between a more unionized north and a less unionized south . . . and east’. ACAS (1995b:8) suggested that the higher propensity to unionization in Scotland may be related to ‘Scottish workplaces being in the public rather than private sector and a lower incidence of manufacturing establishments in Scotland’ and the ‘proportion of 44


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UNION MEMBERSHIP, RECOGNITION AND BARGAINING

manual workers [being] higher in Scottish workplaces’ (ACAS 1995b:7). The same is true of other regions with high union density. In making these comments, ACAS alluded to the important role that employers have, both historically and currently, in encouraging and sustaining union membership and density by the personnel policies they adopt such as facilitating union recruitment by disclosing staff lists, operating check-off and so on. Employers that encourage union membership do so for reasons of self-interest such as the efficiency of dealing with a single representative of workers rather than workers individually and the legitimacy that accrues from this. However, as with strikes, union density overall and throughout all regions has fallen considerably from 55% in 1979 (13.5 million members) to 29% (7.42 million members) in 2004, although proportionately less so in Scotland than the national average in the 1980s (but not in the 1990s). The persuasiveness of national patterns of decline is true also for the relative maintenance of high union density in the public sector (59% in 2001) compared to low and falling density in the private sector, both in terms of manufacturing and services (19% in 2001) (Brooks 2002). Scotland does not vary in this regard any more than similar regions such as Wales and northeast and north-west England. For example, unionization in hotel and catering employment in Scotland is as low as it is elsewhere in Britain (Aslan and Wood 1992, Macaulay and Wood 1992a, 1992b). What is also striking is that those regions with the highest union densities in the late 1970s are also those with the highest levels of unemployment and lowest levels of employment growth. Despite this, they remain the regions with the highest densities by 2003. Conversely, those with the lowest union densities in the late 1970s and the highest levels of employment growth remain the regions with the lowest union densities. These key differences are more credibly explained by reference to the notions of ‘communities of collectivism’ above. Although no data are available to confirm the following proposition, it is likely that the distribution of union membership within Scotland closely resembles the pattern found for the internal distribution with regard to strikes. Thus, where most employment is found, where workplaces are large, and where most public sector and manufacturing employment is found, all coalesce around the Central Belt, and Strathclyde, in particular. This again emphasizes 45

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the limitations to considering Scotland as a single unit and stresses the internal heterogeneity. Comparing union density in Scotland and the other regions of Britain with that found in other countries in Europe for 2000 (see Table 3.2), Scotland and the other regions of Britain are all at the lower end of the range of union densities, with France being exceptionally low for mainland Europe. Scotland ranks with Italy at fifth equal while Wales (and north-east England) rank between Italy and Ireland. Union density in Scotland ranks above Germany, the Netherlands and Portugal. What can we deduce from this? Union density in Scotland is reasonably well placed in this comparative context but the reasons for this measure of the strength of trade unionism are quite varied, making straight comparisons extremely difficult. As with the consideration of comparative strike activity in Chapter 2, the varied influences of the different national systems of industrial relations are such that there are specific reasons which explain, for example, the extremely high levels of union density in Denmark and Sweden. These reasons concern the existence of corporatism, social democracy and union role in social security systems, rather than just simple notions of inherent union strength in these countries (see Ferner and Hyman (1998)).

46

2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989

33 (5th) 35 (4th) 34 (4=) 35 (4th) 35 (3rd) 35 (3rd) 35 (4=) 36 (5th) 36 (5th) 39 (3=) 39 (4th) 41 (4th) 41 (4th) 43 (3=) 45 (3=) 46 (4th)

25 26 25 26 25 27 25 27 27 30 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a

Rest of East South SE Eng Anglia west 23 21 21 22 23 22 22 21 23 23 27 28 29 30 30 31

25 23 23 22 n/a n/a 25 25 25 26 27 29 29 28 28 29

26 26 26 26 26 26 27 27 28 27 28 30 31 32 33 33

West Mids

East Mids

28 29 30 30 30 31 31 31 32 33 36 35 38 40 41 43

27 29 28 28 30 30 29 29 32 32 32 36 35 39 39 40

Yorks & Humber 31 32 32 31 32 34 33 34 35 35 36 38 40 42 42 45

North North west east 35 34 34 34 26 34 35 37 38 39 40 42 43 43 45 47

35 38 38 39 40 40 40 40 42 42 43 45 46 51 52 53

Wales

NI

37 38 40 39 40 39 40 43 41 44 46 46 43 46 48 48

39 39 41 40 n/a n/a 40 42 41 39 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a

Britain

29 29 29 29 29 29 29 30 31 32 33 35 35 37 38 39

12:21

Source: Labour Market Trends/Employment Gazette (various). Notes: Prior to 1995 data for London are not available when it was calculated as part of south-east England. Data not available prior to 1989 as the Labour Force Survey did not include a question on trade union membership. Data for Northern Ireland not available prior to 1995.

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Scotland Greater London


47

Year


Table 3.1 Union Density 1989–2004: Regional Breakdown

Page 47

Scotland

40%

69%

87%

France

9%

Germany Ireland

30%

Source: EIRO (2001:3) save Scotland and Wales (see Table 3.1). Note: Figures for Germany and Italy are for 1998.

44%

Italy

35%

Netherlands- Portugal Spain

27%

30%

15%

Sweden

79%

48

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35%

Wales Belgium Denmark


Table 3.2 Union Density in Nine European Countries, 2000

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Union recognition and collective bargaining Union recognition and collective bargaining can be used as reasonable, although far from perfect, measures of union strength and credibility with employers. This is because employers also recognize unions for their own business purposes such as ease of communication, consultation and negotiation, and the legitimacy given to decisions arrived at by the involvement of representatives of the workforce. Union recognition comprises rights of information, consultation and representation. It may or may not include collective bargaining. Using the data from the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey for manual and non-manual workers in the private sector between 1980 and 1990, workers in Scotland were covered by these processes to a greater degree than the national average but to a lesser extent than workers in Wales, Yorkshire and Humberside, the east and west Midlands and north-west and north-east England (Martin et al. 1996:54–5). However, between 1980 and 1990 the relative ranking of union recognition coverage for manual and non-manual workers in the private sector in Scotland increased compared to that in other regions (see Table 3.3). The last column in Table 3.3 shows the degree of contraction in the coverage of union recognition between 1980 and 1990. It indicates the considerably greater resilience of union recognition structures in Scotland, Wales and north-west England. While this is reflective of union strength, it is not wholly indicative of union strength for employer choice and philosophy are important factors in determining the extent of union recognition. These tend to vary according to employer size, industry sector and plant age, reflecting the importance of traditions established over previous years.

49

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50

London Outer South East East Anglia South West East Midlands West Midlands Yorks-Humberside North West North (east) Wales Scotland Britain

M 1980 76 70 82 79 93 91 87 89 92 86 85 84

M 1984

M 1990

N-M 1980

N-M 1984

N-M 1990

% Contraction

68 49 50 64 63 86 86 85 85 73 67 70

41 43 41 56 60 62 62 64 65 69 62 57

55 44 68 67 74 68 57 69 72 73 63 61

40 43 39 51 65 59 56 67 65 72 47 52

29 36 47 36 52 50 43 55 54 42 52 41

46.5 28.4 39.8 37.7 32.0 29.1 26.6 24.1 27.1 21.0 22.2 32.5

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Source: Martin et al. (1996:54–5, 93). Notes: ‘M’ denotes manual workers, ‘N-M’ denotes non-manual workers. Figures denote percentage of employees in workplaces with union recognition (columns 2–7). Column 8 shows the degree of contraction in the coverage of union recognition by employees.


Area


Table 3.3 Union Recognition by Region for the Private Sector (Manual, Non-manual) and Overall Contraction, 1980–90

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Using the data from the latest Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (Table 3.4), Scotland’s relative ranking and position remains broadly similar to the overall position from 1980 to 1990. Table 3.4 Union Recognition in 1998: Regional Variations Region

East Anglia London Rest of SE Eng South west East Midlands West Midlands Yorks/Humber North west North (east) Wales Scotland Average

Workplaces recognized

25% 35% 26% 44% 43% 45% 34% 54% 39% 47% 42% 39%

Employees in recognized workplaces 51% 50% 41% 56% 63% 67% 52% 65% 70% 64% 69% 57%

Workplaces Workplaces recognized: recognized: private sector public sector 20% 15% 12% 34% 19% 28% 17% 29% 21% 19% 22% 21%

53% 97% 84% 100% 87% 100% 90% 100% 100% 94% 100% 93%

Source: Wills (2001:37). Note: Workplaces of fewer than 10 workers are excluded so this has the effect of overstating the extent of union recognition.

Data from the 2003 Labour Force Survey (Palmer et al. 2004:35) shows that Scotland ranks fifth highest (behind, and in descending order, Northern Ireland, the north east, Wales and the north west) in terms of the percentage of employees whose pay is affected by collective agreements. In Scotland, this figure is 41.2% (see also Paterson et al. 2004:55, 170). Data from the 2004 Labour Force Survey (Grainger and Holt 2005:37) shows that Scotland ranks third highest (at 40.2%, and behind Northern Ireland and Wales) for the percentage of employees whose pay is determined by collective agreements. Another indication of the ranking of Scotland compared to the other regions of Britain can be found from examining the recent tranche of new recognition agreements signed in the wake of the 51

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statutory union recognition provisions of the Employment Relations Act 1999 and the spread of the ‘organizing culture’ among trade unions (see Table 3.5). Table 3.5 Regional Distribution of New Recognition Agreements, 1999–2002 Region

1999 n=175

2000 n=323

2001 n=482

2002 n=205

Average

Scotland London East Anglia Rest of SE Eng. South west Midlands Yorks./Humber North west North east N. Ireland Wales [National]

16% 16% 2% 12% 13% 11% 3% 8% 5% 9% 4% [358]

13% 12% 1% 18% 3% 17% 9% 8% 13% 1% 5% [525]

13% 9% 4% 15% 7% 15% 10% 9% 8% 5% 5% [668]

9% 14% 6% 13% 8% 12% 8% 11% 7% 7% 6% [351]

13% 13% 3% 14% 8% 14% 7% 9% 8% 5% 5% [1902]

Source: Data from Gall (2004a). Notes: Agreements that are of a national (with many locations) or multi-site (several locations) nature are excluded, as are those whose location could not be identified. The number of these is the total number of agreement minus the ‘n’ number.

This indicates that trade unions in Scotland have registered a fairly high level of success in securing new recognition agreements, and one that is greater than might be expected given the size of the workforce in Scotland. This ‘punching above its weight’ may reflect, inter alia, relatively high levels of union density and collective bargaining that provide a foundation for trade unionism in Scotland to secure a disproportionate number of new agreements.

52

53

1995–9 (n=192) 2000 (n=110) 2001 (n=166) 2002 (n=46) Average

Scotland

London

14%

Midlands Yorks & Humber

North west

North east

Wales

Northern Ireland

National

8%

9%

8%

4%

4%

12%

20%

4%

6%

7%

5%

5%

18%

3%

13%

8%

8%

7%

3%

2%

20%

9%

4%

11%

4%

11%

2%

11%

4%

13%

10%

4%

14%

6%

8%

6%

6%

4%

16%

South east

South west

9%

12%

6%

14%

12%

12%

8%

4%

10%

14%

12%

13%

17%

12%

13%

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Source: Author’s unpublished research. Notes: The data is based on campaigns of known location that had not by early 2003 gained union recognition. Each campaign is recorded by its year of commencement. Although some were ended after defeat, the majority of campaigns remain ongoing. National refers to campaigns where the employing organization has a number of sites throughout Britain. Many campaigns are not recorded as their regional location is unavailable. The period since 1999 is examined in light of the increase in union recognition campaigns in anticipation of the statutory union recognition provisions coming into force on 6 June 2000.

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Year


Table 3.6 Regional Distribution of Union Recognition Campaigns, 1995–2002

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Another indication of relative union strength across the regions in Britain can be gained by examining the regional distribution of union recognition campaigns. The genesis of recognition campaigns is primarily the result of workers or union members approaching a union and asking it to help unionize the workplace and gain recognition, rather than unions, without any such worker initiative, targeting workplaces from cold. The willingness of unions to then take up the opportunity or challenge represented by the request largely determines whether campaigns for recognition are created. These two aspects give some insights into the varying strengths of trade unionism throughout Britain in terms of worker confidence, union resources and orientation on organizing. If Table 3.6 is viewed alongside Table 3.5, another issue can also be examined, which is to say that some indication of the relative success rates of recognition campaigns by region can be gained. Putting the number of campaigns and the number of new agreements together and then dividing them by the number of new agreements gives a rough measure of success. In terms of the number of campaigns run, Scotland is among the four most active but, like most other regions, it has a fairly high ‘hit rate’ for the total number of campaigns run (Scotland – 70%, London – 68%, south east – 76%, Midlands – 69% compared to Yorkshire and Humberside – 74%, north east – 74%, north west – 71% and Wales – 71%). Nonetheless, the overall picture is one of decline in the extent and coverage of union recognition and collective bargaining throughout and in every region of Britain, for reasons associated with factors of industrial sector, workplace size and occupational structure (Martin et al. 1996:95–6). Martin et al. (1996) argued that the continuing higher propensity for workplaces within the aforementioned regions to remain recognized, despite overall decline in union recognition, again relates to established traditions and communities of collectivism. Tables 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9 show the levels (i.e. scope and structure) at which collective bargaining is conducted in the regions of Britain. Table 3.7, covering the period 1978–85, indicates a universal fall in the extent of the percentage of workers whose pay is determined by national bargaining (supplemented by top-up, i.e. local, bargaining) but from different base levels. This then accounts for the slight increase in national-only bargaining. The extent of local 54


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bargaining remains broadly stable. Within these changes, Scotland, Wales, north-east and north-west England and the Midlands are the areas where collective bargaining by this measure is most entrenched. Put differently, despite contraction, the stronger areas continue to remain so. Because Table 3.7 only covers the period 1978–85, the data presented in Table 3.8 are necessary to cover some of the more recent subsequent period. However, the data here are only available for manual workers. That said, some of the same broad patterns for 1978–85 are identifiable for 1984–90. Thus, the fall in the extent of coverage of multi-employer bargaining is marked throughout the regions. However, there are both increases and decreases in single-employer bargaining where only increases might have been expected following the ending of multi-employer bargaining being replaced by those organizations then engaging in single-employer bargaining. The same variation is true for plant bargaining, whereby the reduction in single-employer bargaining might have been expected to lead to more plant-level bargaining but both increases and decreases are recorded. In this period, the stronger areas continue to remain so despite the uniform downward trend. In neither 1978–85 nor 1984–90 does Scotland stand out as particularly pre-eminent in terms that would support notions of greater union strength such as the maintenance of national bargaining and higher levels of overall collective bargaining compared to other areas. Of greater note is the fall in the coverage of collective bargaining and the disorganization of trade unionism consequent upon the decentralization of bargaining.

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Table 3.7 Scope and Structure of Collective Bargaining, 1978 and 1985 Area/Percentage whose pay is determined by

South-east London Outer south east East Anglia South west West Midlands East Midlands YorkshireHumberside North west North (east) Wales Scotland Britain

National agreement with supplementary

National agreement only

District, company or local agreement

No collective agreement

1978 1985

1978 1985

1978 1985

1978 1985

15.3 9.3 13.5 8.8 17.4 9.8 17.7 12.2 21.0 11.7 16.7 15.9 23.6 15.6 24.9 17.0 23.9 16.1 25.5 18.9 23.1 13.7 18.3 13.1 20.3 13.2

36.3 37.0 37.2 38.6 35.4 35.6 38.7 37.2 42.4 42.9 34.7 36.8 40.9 43.3 40.1 42.6 38.0 38.6 43.4 44.1 46.6 50.3 44.6 45.0 39.2 40.3

10.7 9.9 10.2 9.0 11.2 10.6 10.4 10.2 8.0 10.9 12.1 13.1 8.6 11.4 8.7 9.7 13.5 13.6 11.3 11.1 9.9 9.6 9.7 9.8 10.6 10.7

37.7 43.9 39.3 43.6 36.1 44.2 33.1 39.7 28.6 34.5 29.2 34.2 27.0 32.1 26.2 30.6 24.6 31.6 20.1 25.9 20.4 26.3 27.5 32.2 30.0 35.9

Source: Martin et al. (1996:168).

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Table 3.8 Scope and Structure of Collective Bargaining for Manual workers, 1984 and 1990 Area/Percentage whose pay is determined by

London South east East Anglia South west East Midlands YorkshireHumberside North west North (east) Wales Scotland Britain

MultiEmployer bargaining

Singleemployer bargaining

1984 1990

1984 1990

1984 1990

1984 1990

42.8 21.5 41.2 30.3 41.6 24.9 59.2 22.5 59.6 24.0 55.3 40.0 54.8 23.0 58.8 43.9 55.7 44.7 61.4 33.4 52.6 33.4

37.7 30.1 20.8 21.4 22.1 15.9 21.4 20.7 18.0 21.8 35.3 25.5 25.6 24.8 24.9 12.6 32.7 22.2 19.7 26.4 27.0 23.4

18.9 10.9 17.6 13.8 19.6 12.0 13.9 22.0 42.5 28.2 18.7 20.1 27.3 27.3 22.4 24.5 27.2 30.3 14.0 16.7 25.8 22.6

20.8 43.4 28.2 44.7 30.4 50.6 18.6 39.7 19.1 33.6 7.5 30.0 7.1 33.9 5.8 29.4 13.7 21.5 12.8 29.1 20.1 37.4


57

Plant bargaining

None

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Table 3.9 Extent of Collective Bargaining and Consultation over Pay and Conditions, 1998 Region

Negotiated

East Anglia London Rest of SE Eng South west East Midlands West Midlands Yorks/Humber North west North (east) Wales Scotland Average

12 46 31 30 19 25 16 20 26 28 61 29

Consultation 4 14 13 6 23 21 22 4 17 28 11 23

Informed 58 12 25 38 19 8 7 36 17 28 11 23

None of these 27 28 32 27 39 46 55 40 40 18 25 35

Source: Wills (2001:38).

Table 3.9 highlights the robust nature of collective bargaining in Scotland compared to other regions, where it has not been marginalized by consultation (i.e. non-negotiation) or employer unilateralism. This is particularly marked when compared to regions such as Wales, north-west England and Yorkshire and Humberside which have shown similarities to Scotland in other areas previously discussed. This echoes the findings of ACAS (1995b:10, 11), which reported there were more mechanisms of joint consultation and less of the Human Resource Management-inspired and unilateralist ‘employee involvement’ in Scotland compared to England and Wales. But this unhelpfully focuses on England as a single region. It is likely that the same regional pattern identified by Martin et al. (1996) above on recognition and collective bargaining would be true for the employee involvement and HRM initiatives.

Scottish-only features? Another aspect of union recognition and collective bargaining is worthy of consideration, namely whether they have any Scottishonly features. Certainly under the decentralization of collective 58


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bargaining that took place from the late 1960s onwards, the potential for Scottishness to exert itself has existed. However, this has not been the case. There are a number of Scottish industrywide collective bargaining agreements such as those between the print union (the GPMU) and the Scottish Print Employers’ Federation or that covering Scottish local authority workers but they remain few and far between (although because of the location of many such agreements in the public sector they account for substantial numbers of workers). This issue is returned to in Chapter 7. In a similar vein, ACAS’s (1995b:14) assessment of the relationship of industrial relations in Scotland to those in the rest of Britain stresses the contingent and non-inherently Scottish nature of the processes: These factors [higher proportion of public sector establishments and manual workforces] do not account for the Scottish variation. Nor, since workplaces in Scotland were no less likely to have been established in the eighties, did it reflect differences in organisational maturity. We consider that much of the distinction . . . must be attributed to a greater adherence to traditional pluralistic patterns of industrial relations among employers in Scotland. These patterns, apparently in decline elsewhere in Great Britain, have proved more resilient in Scotland.

Thus, the nature of the interaction between employers and unions in Scotland based on a particular perspective is distinctive according to this analysis. Pluralism is obviously not any more or less Scottish than its opposite, unitarism, but the question remains why it may be more common in relative terms in Scotland than in some other regions in Britain. Similarly, Findlay (1999, 2003), Leopold (1989) and Warhurst (2002), despite concentrating specifically on trade unionism, industrial relations and employment in Scotland, did not find any ‘Scottish’ paradigm in these. While there is a labour market in Scotland, it is one created by geographical constraints of travel-to-work areas and desires to remain within established communities, not because of Scottishness. It is of the same basic nature as those other regional labour markets found in Yorkshire/Humberside, north-west England and so on. In these, as with that in Scotland, variations within the labour markets in terms of differences between cities such as Edinburgh and Glasgow, Leeds and Sheffield, and Liverpool and Manchester are important. So too are whether 59

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the regional labour markets conform to the ‘north’ or ‘south’ in the so-called ‘north-south divide’, whereby northern regions in Britain suffered more during the recession of the early 1980s as a result of the nature of their industrial base, were slow to benefit from the economic recovery of the mid- to late 1980s and not so badly affected by the early 1990s recession, compared to regions in the south of Britain.

The European context Comparison with the situation in Europe is useful to some extent. The extent of collective bargaining coverage in Scotland and Britain as a whole is the lowest of all the countries (see Table 3.10). However, the figure of 36% may underestimate the actual extent because it does not include coverage of managerial staff, which is not insignificant. The other discrepancy is that the higher figures for Scotland and Britain are for 1998 and not 2001, so the former ‘exaggerate’ the extent of coverage a little. What do the figures indicate? The routinely high extent of coverage indicates much about the nature of the collective bargaining structures within corporatist-influenced systems of industrial relations in the countries of mainland Europe, that is the extent of the existence of multiemployer industry-wide bargaining, the results of which are applied uniformly through extension mechanisms, rather than the strength of unions per se (see EIRO (2002), Ferner and Hyman (1998)). Table 3.10 Percentage of Workers Covered by Collective Bargaining, 2001 Scotland Britain Britain Belgium Denmark France

69% 57% 36% 90% 83% 90%

Germany Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden

67% 88% 87% 75% 90%

Source: EIRO (2002:3). Notes: Figures for first two rows from Table 3.4 are for union recognition for 1998, the closest comparator for collective bargaining. The second figure for Britain is from EIRO (2002). The figure for Portugal is for 1999.

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Partnership agreements Following from the discussion of militancy in Chapter 2, the extent of existence of ‘partnership’ agreements is a useful way of gaining an indication of the degree of moderation and cooperation among trade unions and within industrial relations. In this way, the situation in Scotland can be compared to that elsewhere in other regions of Britain. A ‘partnership’ agreement can be defined as a formal union-management recognition agreement which meets the definitions of the Involvement and Participation Association (IPA) or the Trades Union Congress (TUC). These agreements can arise in two ways; either existing traditional union recognition agreements are turned into new ‘partnership’ agreements or new union recognition agreements are signed as ‘partnership’ agreements. Using the TUC’s definition, a ‘partnership’ agreement comprises: joint union-management commitment to the success of the enterprise; joint recognition of each party’s legitimate interests; commitment to employment security; focus on the quality of working life; transparency in joint union-management relationships; and mutual gains. Taking this definition, around eighty ‘partnership’ agreements are known to have existed in late 2002 (Waddington 2003:347). However, using the TUC definition, that of the IPA and instances where one or either of the parties to the agreement (union, management) describe their agreement as a ‘partnership agreement’, the frequency of partnership agreements by region in Britain can be established (see Table 3.11). All the partnership agreements, save those in the final column, are union-management agreements as opposed to agreements between management and non-union staff bodies. Excluding those partnership agreements that are of a national nature, that is they cover many sites within a single organization and these sites are located throughout Britain, Scotland has a higher than expected complement of partnership agreements on two counts. First, in proportionate terms, Scotland with circa 10% of the workforce may have been expected to have circa 10% of the partnership agreements (where no weighting is given to the impact of industry effects). Removing the national partnership agreements and those of an unknown location, this would equate to seventeen 61

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agreements, but the actual number is approaching nearly twice that. Secondly, if the alleged heritage of conflictual industrial relations in Scotland was still persuasive, one would expect to find far less than twenty-eight agreements. By contrast, regions such as Wales, with strong union membership but relatively low levels of strike action, being two of the most likely required resources for partnership agreements, appears to have less partnership agreements than one would have expected. Therefore, the location and frequency of partnership agreements that are specific to particular regions in Britain confounds expectations, suggesting Scotland is, on this evidence, either a region that is not ‘militant’, oppositional or adversarial in its industrial relations or that ‘militancy’ and ‘moderation’ can co-exist within the economy of a region, whereby some organizations and sectors ‘behave’ in their industrial relations more in one way than another.

Employer opposition to union organisation Foster and Woolfson (1986) argued that employers in Scotland were more anti-union than those found elsewhere in Britain in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Although the Employment in Britain surveys (Gallie and White 1993, Taylor 2002) measured employer opposition to union membership, they have not done so on a regional basis. Consequently, the best available evidence to hand is that concerning employer opposition to campaigns for union recognition, employers attempting to renege on newly signed recognition agreements and employers’ attempts to derecognize trade unions. The former concerns situations whereby a union is campaigning to gain recognition for the first time or to regain recognition after derecognition by the employer and it is met by tactics ranging from union suppression (such as victimization of union activists, threats of job cuts) to union substitution (such as establishing nonunion company councils and increasing pay rates). Reneging concerns attempting to undermine and negate the new agreement by ‘badfaith’ bargaining (i.e. not engaging in bargaining) while derecognition concerns situations whereby employers are attempting to end existing or long-standing union presence and union recognition. Table 3.12 indicates that the incidence of anti-unionism has increased as 62

63

1 5 8 5 1 2 2 2 1 1 28 9

4 3

2 6 5

2

1

1 1 1

10 3

16 5

South Midlands Yorks & North North Wales N. I. National Location Non-union Humber west east west not known (location not known) 1 1 13 1 2 4 1 1 1 13 7 3 1 1 3 32 12 1 2 15 2 2 1 6 8 5 1 2 1 2 16 1 2 1 2 2 12 1 2 1 2 2 5 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 8 7 6 3 2 2 3 5 11 1 9 1 3 3 16 5

31 10

15 5

24 7

14 4

12 4

6 2

125 39

6 2

19 6

Source: Gall (2004b) Note: National refers to an employing organisation with more than one site located in more than one region. These are evenly spread across Britain, although London is probably under-represented as a result.

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2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 Pre-1995 Year not known Total % (/323)

Scotland London South east


Year

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Table 3.11 Regional Distribution of Partnership Agreements 1995–2002

Page 63

Year

13 10 16 12 4 1 3 3 62 15

London South east 18 13 10 13 4 3 3 3 67 16

16 8 9 5 2 2 3 1 46 11

South west 7 7 7 2 2

25 6

Midlands

Yorks & North Humber west

10 10 5 6 4 1

11 9 5 4

36 8

31 7

13 6 3 5

2

27 6

North East

Wales

N. I.

National

Totals

9 7 8 3

2 1 2 2

1

3 5 5 4 1 1

28 7

19 4

7 2

16 13 25 5 4 6 3 4 76 18

118 89 95 61 21 17 12 11 424

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Source: Author’s unpublished research based on various secondary sources andpress coverage. Notes: National refers to an employing organization with more than one site located in more than one region. Instances refer to employing organizations using one or more anti-union tactic. Further instances exist but their geographical location could not be identified.


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2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 Total %/424

Scotland


Table 3.12 Regional Distribution of Instances of Employer Opposition to Union Recognition, 1995–2002

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employers prepared for union organizing attempts using the statutory union recognition provisions of the Employment Relations Act 1999 (effective from 6 June 2000). Within this, Scotland, London and south-east England have experienced the highest concentrations of employer anti-unionism. Instances of union derecognition were scarce in the period so the majority of cases concern employer opposition to campaigns for union recognition. A number of conclusions could be inferred, inter alia; there are more organizing and recognition campaigns in Scotland, London and south-east England than elsewhere so that simply on this basis more resistance is encountered or that employers in Scotland, London and south-east England are more anti-union than their counterparts elsewhere. Attempting to exclude the influences of size of regional workforce and number of recognition campaigns, the extent of anti-unionism in Scotland may be related to the above-average incidence of ‘marginal employers’ (Beck (2002) and see Chapter 5), that is employers operating on the margins of profitability and therefore more likely to resist unionisation and union recognition given the positive impact of trade unionism on increasing wages and conditions (known as the ‘union mark-up’). These kind of employers may see resisting trade unions as the difference between staying in business and going out of business. In this a similarity may be found with Cornwall: the TUC in southwest England claimed employers in Cornwall were among the most anti-union in Britain and this was believed to be linked to the greater preponderance of low wages in the region than elsewhere (Western Morning News, 9 February 1999). However, there is no easy or obvious method of explaining the high ranking of London and south-east England for these regions did not experience an above-average incidence of ‘marginal employers’.

Conclusion Generally speaking, the evidence in this chapter suggests that workers in Scotland are more ‘radical’ and ‘militant’ than many other workers in Britain where union membership, union recognition and collective bargaining are concerned. But workers in Scotland are not any more radical and militant than the most radical or 65

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militant workers in the rest of Britain – these being found in Wales and the northern regions of England. Higher union membership indicates higher levels of collective and trade union consciousness (with implications for levels of class consciousness) as do higher levels of union recognition and collective bargaining coverage. However, because it is difficult to disaggregate for the influences of employer action (derived from self-interest) on union membership, union recognition and collective bargaining accruing, a straight correlation between densities and coverage on the one hand and union strength, radicalism and militancy on the other cannot easily be made. The need to recognize this degree of complexity is reinforced by consideration of how Scotland fares with regard to partnership agreements and employer anti-unionism. Moving to the tighter definition of militancy provided by Kelly (1996, 1998), when we come to consider the degree of reliance on collective bargaining and membership resources (i.e. union density), workers and their unions in Scotland, notwithstanding the influence of employers, show high levels of support for, and ability to maintain, union membership, union recognition and collective bargaining. But again, this is not any higher than for workers and their unions in Wales and the northern regions of England. While there are no data available with which to examine variations in collective bargaining objectives across and between different regions in Britain, it appears from general observation that the demands of workers are no more or less militant or moderate in Scotland compared to elsewhere. The same is true with regard to the outcomes of collective bargaining – specific data do not exist, but again, from general observation, the outcomes are no more or less successful in Scotland than elsewhere. As with the analysis of strike activity in Chapter 2, the evidence of ‘radicalism’ and ‘militancy’ here may be taken as some evidence of difference but only when ‘Scotland’ is compared against the rest of Britain. Similarly with strike activity, the overall context of what has happened to union membership, union recognition and collective bargaining in the last twenty years cannot be ignored in discussing regional differences. First, all three have declined considerably throughout Britain. Secondly, the disproportionate influence of the public sector means that non-unionism is now a major problem in the private sector. Thirdly, the differences between regions have been maintained during a period of decline in union presence and bargaining. 66


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4 Worker Attitudes and Union Policies Introduction Identifying patterns of worker industrial behaviour through deploying data on strike activity, union membership and union recognition is useful for considering the issues of radicalism and difference which are the concerns at hand. However, there are dangers in coming to conclusions solely based on examining only these data. It is poor social science to directly impute workers’ values and beliefs from them. For example, striking is unlikely to reflect all that makes up a worker’s industrial weltanschauung while there are various reasons for joining, and remaining in, a union, ranging from, inter alia, individual instrumentalism to ideological collectivism. The extent of union recognition may also reflect employer preference and strategy. Consequently, there is a need also to consider a wider array of attitudes and behaviours in order to provide a more rounded examination of the presence or absence of radicalism and difference. The first part of this chapter looks at the attitudes of workers to a number of social issues in an attempt to identify their value systems or orientations, while the second part considers union policies with regard to work and extra-work issues as well as the composition and orientations of union personnel, for example the milieu of union activists and that cadre within the milieu that is politically motivated. Consideration of the latter part is premised on the expectation that the dominant perspective among workers’ attitudes would find expression and representation within union policy and among its elected and appointed union personnel. Thus, for example, the domination of radical perspectives among workers in Scotland would be expected to flow through to more radical union policies and mobilization to secure the attainment of consequent objectives. As a result, we can compare these processes with those occurring in other regions in Britain.

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Industrial attitudes The term ‘industrial attitudes’ is used to refer to issues concerning the workplace, work and employment in distinction to wider ‘social’ attitudes (see below). Unfortunately, little data exists that specifically measure workers’ attitudes in areas that are likely to have a resonance with the issues of trade unionism and industrial relations. (Certainly, none exists that ask workers as workers about issues of control, power and democracy with regard to workermanagement and union-management relations.) That which does exist comprises a series of data sets that examine public attitudes in Britain, that is worker and non-worker, across time periods. However, given that most of those interviewed for the fieldwork would likely be workers because of the preponderance of workers in society as the numerically dominant social group, these data can be taken to be reasonably strongly indicative of prevailing attitudes among workers. However, these data seldom constitute time-series data using the same questions asked at regular intervals. Rather, they present more of a series of snapshots. Nonetheless, the data are of some use, where these caveats are borne in mind. Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 show that ‘industrial’ attitudes of workers in Scotland are among the most radical or left wing in Britain. This is clear when these attitudes in Scotland are compared to those in England or the rest of Britain, although the difference is not always great. This is not the case when these attitudes in Scotland are compared to those in Wales. Table 4.1 Attitudes to Trade Unions in 1983 (% agreeing) Scotland/ Wales Trade unions have: too much influence about the right amount too little influence

North/ Midlands

49 40 10

57 35 5

Source: Harrison (1984:57).

68

Greater London

57 34 5

South east/ South west

67 28 2


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WORKER ATTITUDES AND UNION POLICIES

Although no specific data are available, from general observation there is no evidence to suggest that workers’ attitudes in Scotland as a result of striking are any more radical or militant than those of workers involved in striking elsewhere in the rest of Britain. That said, because strikes may only have this radicalizing potential under conditions of ‘mass strikes’ (Kelly 1988, 1996, 1998), it is unlikely to be expected that such an impact would be made. The only strike that approximates to a ‘mass strike’ in the last twenty years was the 1984–5 national miners’ strike. And here there is no evidence of varying regional effects of striking on workers’ attitudes. Table 4.2 Policy Preferences in 1997 (% agreeing) Policy Preference

Scotland Wales

Government should introduce stricter laws to regulate the activities of trade unions Government should give workers more say in the running of the places where they work British government should sign up to the Social Chapter so British workers have the same rights as everyone else in Europe The law should set a minimum wage so that no employer can pay their workers too little There should be more nationalization of companies by government

England

32

31

35

74

78

73

44

42

39

76

76

67

35

39

26

Source: Brown et al. (1999:97).

Table 4.3 Attitudes to Industrial Democracy, 1974–1997 (% agreeing) Policy Preference

1974 1979 1987 1992 1997

Scotland: Government should give workers more say in the running of the places where they work Rest of Britain: Government should give workers more say in the running of the places where they work Source: Brown et al. (1999:106).

69

59

49

76

78

74

57

55

76

76

74

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Social attitudes Given the paucity of data on the views of workers on a range of trade union and industrial relations issues, the social attitudes of workers in Scotland in comparative terms provide another means by which to examine the issues of the presence or absence, and degrees therein, of radicalism and distinctiveness within trade unionism and industrial relations in Scotland. (Chapter 6 also examines these issues albeit from a different approach.) Social attitudes may be inferred to directly and indirectly feed into, influence, and secure representation among industrial attitudes, industrial action behaviour and trade unionism, and thus influence the overall nature of industrial relations. For example, an existing predisposition to oppositionalism to the status quo generally may feed through to the challenging of the managerial prerogative at work and thus industrial disputes and industrial action. The available data generally indicate the considerably more left wing inclined nature of views on social issues in Scotland compared to the rest of Britain (see Tables 4.4 and 4.5). Paterson et al. (2001:125) and Paterson (2002:201) misrepresent the extent of difference between Scotland and England when they say that: ‘Scottish views tend to be to the left of English views . . . but usually only by a few percentage points’ and ‘the Scottish centre [ground] is indeed somewhat to the left of the English centre [ground], although not by much’. Rather the differences seem greater (see data in Paterson et al. (2001) and Paterson (2002)). However, their characterizations contrast starkly with the finding that when Scotland is compared to the sub-units of England, i.e. its regions, social attitudes are more ‘radical’ but much less so compared to other similar areas such as the north of England, the Midlands and Wales (see Table 4.4). For example, McCombes and Curran (2001:8) acknowledge: ‘In some regions of England, including Merseyside, Tyneside and Yorkshire, public opinion is also to the left of New Labour.’ In the one set of data which is longitudinal (Table 4.4), some interesting developments have taken place. In both 1988 and 1995, social attitudes in Scotland are among the most radical, if not the most radical. Furthermore, the extent of radicalism, that is the numbers agreeing with statements, increases in Scotland, as they do in a number of other regions. Here we find similarities 70

Wales

Midlands

London

S. England

1988 1995

1988 1995

1988 1995

1988 1995

1988 1995

1988 1995

78 77

77 70

75 63

69 72

72 72

68 65

68 75 68 70

68 73 68 71

74 73 74 65

62 74 62 67

64 68 64 62

58 66 58 59

59 66

55 61

60 58

50 63

45 59

45 56

54 60

50 61

55 48

42 48

41 51

37 43

% agreeing that

71

Unemployment should be a higher priority than inflation There is one law for the rich and one for the poor Ordinary people do not get their fair share of the nation’s wealth Big business benefits owners at the expense of workers Government should redistribute income from the better off to the less well off

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N. England


Scotland


Table 4.4 Attitudes to Issue of Social Priorities and Social Justice in 1988 and 1995

Source: Curtice (1988:134, 1996:9). 12:21 Page 71


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with the preceding analysis on strike activity in terms of trends across regions and time. Nonetheless, and either way, Scotland can be shown to be the most radical but the ‘devil’ is in the detail of relativities. Table 4.5 Attitudes to Issue of Social Priorities and Social Justice in 2000 and 2002 % agreeing/strongly agreeing that Government should redistribute wealth Big business benefits owners Working people do not get their faire share One law for the rich and one for the poor Management tries to get the better of employees

Scotland

England

50 61 71 77 62

38 55 61 63 60

Source: Paterson (2002:200).

A set of questions related to more recent issues of work and employment (corporate social responsibility, PFI and the firefighters’ dispute) and drawn from a wider survey in 2002 (Johnston 2002) on social attitudes in Scotland presents a similar picture of left-ofcentre views (Table 4.6), but again unfortunately without any comparative element. Finally, the lower preponderance of cooperatives (worker, producer or consumer) in Scotland compared to other European countries (Scottish Executive 2004) would imply that supportive attitudes towards a more socialized economy are no more advanced in Scotland than in other European countries. Unfortunately, no evidence was presented for the situation of the frequency of co-operatives in England or Wales. A further aspect of social attitudes surrounding voting in elections can be considered to supplement this rather meagre available data, although again care must be taken in its usage for the purposes at hand here (see Tables 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9). First, the percentage of the population identifying itself as (subjectively) ‘working class’ is higher in Scotland than in England. Secondly, members of working-class social groups in Scotland have identified themselves as consistently and largely ‘working class’. Thirdly, those who identify themselves as ‘working class’ are more likely to vote Labour in Scotland than those in England. 72


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The results of data drawn from a study by Bennie et al. (1997) are confirmed by another similar study of the 1997 general election (the ‘Scottish Election Survey’) by Brown et al. (1999:62, 65) but unfortunately no data were presented regarding how ‘Scotland’ compares to the regions that comprise England (cf. Brown et al. 1999:99). The study by Brown et al. (1999:53, 76–8, see also Brown (1998)) concluded, inter alia, that the relationship between voting and class was more pronounced in Scotland than in the rest of Britain and that the political values of ‘Scotland’ are more ‘socialist’ (read social democratic) than those of the rest of Britain by region where only ‘Wales’ was more ‘socialist’. Within Scotland, west central was far more ‘socialist’ than east central or the north east. Table 4.6 Sunday Herald ‘The Way We Think’ Poll, 2002 Statement/Percentages

Companies in [the] UK are doing enough to embrace corporate responsibility and their duty to the environment Public-private Partnership deals for schools cost too much and benefit the private companies that run them more than the taxpayer Public service workers should never go on strike

Strongly Agree Agree

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

2.7

2.7

58.9

28.8

39.7

32.9

16.4

4.1

12.3

26.0

43.8

12.3

Source: Johnston (2002). Note: Similar findings were reported in the BBC Scotland poll on social attitudes in Scotland (see Herald, 10 April 2005).

In addition to Table 4.9, Labour voters in Scotland are more left wing than Labour voters in England (Brown et al. 1999:85–6). Finally, using a socialist (social democratic)/laissez-faire value scale, Scotland is more left wing than all other areas in Britain apart from Wales (Table 4.10).

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Table 4.7 Percentages Identifying Themselves as ‘Working Class’ Year

Scotland

England

1974 1992

68 72

65 57

Source: Bennie et al. (1997:102).

Table 4.8 Percentages Identifying Themselves as ‘Working Class’ in Scotland Group

1974

1979

1983

1987

1992

24 70

20 73

21 74

29 67

23 72

10 88

9 81

14 83

13 84

11 86

Routine non-manual Subjective middle class Subjective working class Working class Subjective middle class Subjective working class Source: Brand et al. (1994:218).

However, north-west England and Yorkshire/Humberside are also markedly ‘socialist’ inclined. Within Scotland, the west coast, that is Strathclyde, stands out as particularly noticeable in its left inclination. Table 4.9 Percentages of ‘Working-Class’ Voters that Vote Labour Year

1974

1979

1983

1987

1992

Scotland England

84 78

78 77

89 76

83 78

87 78

Source: Bennie et al. (1997:104).

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Table 4.10 Socialist and Laissez-faire Values, 1997 Scotland Britain

14.51 15.52

Scotland West Central East Central North East Outlying

13.59 15.02 15.64 14.58

Wales

14.28

England North North west Yorks/Humber West Midlands East Midlands East Anglia South west South east London

15.62 14.58 14.99 15.58 15.79 15.47 15.74 16.13 15.83


Nationalist attitudes There are few overt instances of (Scottish) workers in Scotland, as trade unionists concerned with trade union matters, expressing nationalist attitudes. Such attitudes would most obviously be manifested in attitudes and behaviours that pose the interests of workers in Scotland/Scottish workers against those of workers in England/English workers in a competitive and sectionalist manner. Far more common, although not particularly so, are instances of workers expressing grievances and demands through the prism of, and using the language associated with, nation, nationalism and national identity which are not competitive or sectionalist. Several examples in the period 1970–2004 highlight the nature of this perspective. At the beginning of the UCS work-in in 1971, the co-ordinating committee issued the following leaflet: The position of the UCS workers is clear – WE ARE GOING TO FIGHT. But then it is not just our fight alone. One in nine males are already unemployed in the west of Scotland, and as shipbuilding is so interwoven with the economy of Scotland, the loss of this industry on Clydeside would have repercussions that would be widespread and shattering. We believe that this is the crunch in the fight against unemployment, redundancies and closures. To lose this, and this is unthinkable, we are heading for the circumstances of the ’30s. To win

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would be to reverse the trend for all workers and the community as a whole. We ask for, and confidently expect, the support of ALL Scots men and women. We appeal to all our brothers and sisters in the trade union movement for HELP. We appeal to all business people and shopkeepers for HELP. We appeal to all the clergy of all denominations for HELP. We appeal to everyone for HELP. HELPING us is HELPING yourself. Let the voice of the Scottish people be heard. No more closures – no more redundancies – no more unemployed. DEMAND THE RIGHT TO WORK! (Foster and Woolfson 1986:183–4, capitalization in original.)1

At the beginning of the work-in to campaign against the closure of the aluminium smelter at Invergordon in 1982, the 900 workers decided, in the words of Archie McCreevy, union convenor: We will continue our action until such time as the Government can be persuaded that the continued operation of this plant is essential to the Highlands of Scotland and to the nation . . . The country cannot afford to lose [this smelter]. (Glasgow Herald 7, 8 January 1982)

Mick McGahey, leader of the NUM in Scotland, agreed to a deal during the 1984–5 miners’ strike to safeguard deliveries of coal to the Ravenscraig steel plant as being ‘in the interests of Scotland’s industrial future’ (Davidson 1999:121) despite representing a breach of the attempt to make the strike as effectual as possible. Jamie Webster, longstanding GMB convenor at the reprieved Kaeverner Govan shipyard, accused MSPs in the Scottish Parliament of ‘putting the interests of their parties before the interests of Scotland’ when interviewed during the 2003 election campaign (BBC Six O’clock News, 15 April 2003). Finally, at the 2003 Scottish Trades Union Congress, Frank Whitelaw, USDAW divisional officer, described the proposed closure of the Boots factory in Airdrie as: ‘yet another economic blow to both the community and our Scottish manufacturing sector’ (Herald, 16 April 2003) while the Morning Star (16 April 2003) reported: Delegates at the Scottish TUC conference called for a new strategy for Scottish manufacturing yesterday. Conference expressed concern at Scottish manufacturing bosses’ poor investment record and stressed

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that workers must be involved in formulating future plans for the industry. STUC general council member Andy Baird . . . said Scottish workers were disadvantaged by the fact that ‘strategic operational decisions were taken without reference to the workers they concern’.

These statements portray the common thread of the ‘interests’ of Scotland and the Scottish nation being to the fore, albeit to different degrees. Social formations are of ‘Scotland’ rather than just merely in Scotland. ‘Scotland’, ‘the Scottish people’ and so on are invoked as both communities and means by which to define and further workers’ interests in contra-distinction to those of the immediate employer and immediate government concerned. However, this formulation also has a tendency to define workers’ interest in crossclass terms against irrationality and inhumanity, as opposed to notions of working-class self-interest and solidarity against the capriciousness of capitalism. Nonetheless, throughout the period, expressions of grievances and demands by workers and workers on strike (as opposed to union activists and FTOs) have most commonly been formulated in terms of economism (cost of living, job security), communitarianism (damage to the social fabric of the community) and notions of anti-managerialism without recourse to discourses of national identity. This suggests that nationalism and national identity among (Scottish) workers in Scotland is most closely connected with certain types of issues and struggles of political and industrial democracy and those concerning industrial production and economic activity that are viewed as being central and strategic to Scotland or the ‘Scottish’ economy (see also Chapter 6). In other regions of Britain (save Wales), these issues and struggles are couched in terms of appeals to reason and economic and political illogicality and irrationality – ‘it’s not good for the economy/ national interest’ or ‘it’s undemocratic’ – because of the absence of a subordinate nationalism (see Chapter 9).

Union policies and associated actions The nature and content of union policies and actions over a range of issues provide another important means by which to analyse 77

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whether trade unionism in Scotland is more radical than, or in any way distinctive from, that found elsewhere in Britain. Potential radicalism or distinctiveness may manifest itself in the following ways; Scottish unions and Scottish regions of British unions having left wing or more left wing policies on a range of significant issues spanning employment, welfare provision, redistribution of wealth and so on; Scottish unions and Scottish regions of British unions having policies of supporting/demanding independence or greater autonomy for Scotland; personnel from Scottish unions and Scottish regions of British unions being the leading left wing forces in trade unionism throughout Britain; and mobilizations in pursuit of, or related to, the above in the form of balloting for and taking industrial action, demonstrations and lobbies, and membership participation in unions being greater in Scotland than elsewhere. The evidence that would support these propositions would most obviously take the form of radical branch, regional and national union policies being established by union regions in Scotland and by Scottish lay activists/FTOs, which would then be followed by the taking of significant and widespread membership mobilization in pursuit of these. An adjunct to this would also see broad lefts and oppositional movements within unions led by predominately by Scottish personnel and broad lefts and oppositional movements being strongest in Scotland. Available evidence provides little positive and exclusive support for any of these propositions. There is no consistent pattern to Scottish unions, Scottish regions of all-Britain unions, and Scottish lay activists/FTOs being the prime movers in any of the areas under examination, or relatively more so the prime movers than other regions of trade unionism, other than for that concerning devolution and greater autonomy for Scotland. This is hardly surprising given that trade unionism in other regions would not prioritize such an issue. Moreover, that these other regions have not so consistently and strenuously campaigned for greater regional autonomy within and outwith union affairs is testament to the much weaker development of the approximate parallel to Scottish identity, namely, regional identities. Thus, the support expressed for industrial democracy by GMB Scotland organizer Richard Leonard (2003) is not out of keeping with those attitudes held by other union FTOs in England. 78


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More importantly, not only have Scottish unions, Scottish regions of British unions, and Scottish lay activists/FTOs not particularly been at the forefront of radical demands and movements within unions, but the extent to which they have has not been any greater than that for similar regions elsewhere in Britain such as London, Merseyside and the Midlands. This is because the socialist and social democratic traditions that have dominated unions in Scotland have also dominated a large number of other regions of trade unionism in Britain. Taking the Communist Party as one measure, its strength was found both in certain unions and in certain regions, so that while it was strong, relatively speaking, in Scotland by virtue of Glasgow/Clydeside, it was also strong in Birmingham, London and Sheffield, and within Scotland, it was strong, relatively speaking, in certain unions such as the engineering, construction, and technical unions, rather than among all unions. More recently, the locations of substantial presence of the far left such as the Militant/Socialist Party and SWP follow the same pattern but their overall influence has been far weaker than that of the Communist Party. In terms of union personnel, it has already been noted (see Chapter 2) that many Scots were leading lights in the union movement and that these were left-wingers. But, as before, the significance has come to be exaggerated as a result of the social construction of the close association between Scottish identity and radicalism. Furthermore, and with regard to the Communist Party, Thompson (1991) observed that while many union leaders in Scotland from the late 1970s onwards were party members, this did not imply that they had a base of party members and sympathizers in their respective unions. Rather, as these party members had risen to become leading union officials, party membership and activity within trade unions had imploded. These leaders led a declining band of followers. This left wing image, cum exaggeration, must also be held in regard of another union formation, namely that of the ‘right’ in Scotland. The right has also been influential by virtue of the leadership of the engineering union by Sir Gavin ‘Give-in’ Laird promoting inward investment and partnership (before it was called such), the leadership of the health workers’ union COHSE by Hector MacKensie, the conciliatory role of the Scottish NUM leadership in the 79

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1984–5 strike, and the absence of effective or sustained resistance to the closure of many large workplaces such as Chrysler Linwood, Leyland Bathgate or Gartcosh steelmill. This milieu of union leaders represented the previous generation. The last five years has witnessed the retirement or removal of this generation and its replacement by a new generation. Of the newly elected members of the so-called ‘awkward squad’ of left wing trade union leaders (Bob Crow – RMT, Kevin Curran – GMB, Jeremy Dear – NUJ, Andy Gilchrist – FBU, Billy Hayes – CWU, Paul Mackney – NAFTHE, Dave Prentis – Unison, Mick Rix – ASLEF, Mark Serwotka – PCS, Derek Simpson – Amicus/AEEU, Tony Woodley – TGWU) none are Scottish, although members in Scotland as elsewhere voted in equal proportions for these candidates against their opponents. ‘Scotland’ is only represented by Janice Godrich, president of the PCS union, John Keggie, former deputy-general secretary of the CWU, Alan Ritchie, general secretary of UCATT, and Ruth Winters, president of the FBU. Thus, the material basis of the perception of Scottish radicalism in this regard no longer holds. Less senior, if nonetheless well-known, activists within Scotland, such as Carolyn Leckie (now MSP) of North Glasgow Unison health branch, Derek Durkin of Scotland No2 CWU branch or SWP member ‘red’ Roddy Slorach of the Glasgow Unison social workers, do not make up this shortfall. When we turn to consider the SSP’s influence and activity within trade unions, it cuts a much reduced figure compared to its general profile and standing (see Chapter 5). Although the SSP has members in the leading positions in a number of branches and higher level union bodies in Scotland and in Britain such as the CWU, EIS, PCS, RMT and Unison, and not withstanding its significant involvement in the Glasgow hospitals strikes in 2002, the firefighters’ dispute of 2002–3 and the nursery nurses’ strikes of 2003–4 and close relationships with the leaderships of the FBU, PCS and RMT, most of its trade union members are neither active as trade unionists nor activists in trade unions. This means the SSP is not as yet a particularly influential organized force across the (whole) union movement (see Herald, 15 April 2003, Scotsman, 5 February, 30 June, 3 July 2003, SSP (2002)). It organizes only a small number of caucuses in unions such as the CWU, EIS, FBU, PCS and Unison. Its presence in unions that operate largely in the private sector is 80


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very partial. That said, this level of influence is greater than that of the Socialist Alliance, the Socialist Party or SWP individually and, probably, collectively but historically, it is still well behind that of the Communist Party in the post-Second World War period (albeit this was when participation in and affiliation to political parties was considerably greater than it is today). For example, by 2004 the SSP’s ‘Make the Break’ campaign to democratize the political fund has made relatively little headway. The decision by the RMT to allow its branches to ask that the RMT executive consider their request to affiliate to political parties such as the SSP, Greens and Plaid Cymru with the result that seven branches and the Scottish region have done so, the possibility that the FBU may do similarly and the attempt by the CWU Scotland No 2 branch, do not ‘transform political relations in Scotland’ nor do they ‘represent a watershed in modern working class politics’, as the SSP believes they do (SSP 2004: 12, 11). It would be fairer to say that these moves give the SSP ‘a credibility and respectability it has [previously] lacked’ (Thomson 2004). This limited presence and influence is largely attributable to the relatively low priority the SSP routinely gives to its trade union work (see Burton (2002), McCombes and Curran (2001:10), Sheridan and McCombes (2000), SSP (2003a)). It now faces a renewed challenge from the Labour left as the majority of ‘awkward-squad’ leaders attempt to reclaim Labour for ‘old Labour’ policies. Therefore, the SSP does not as yet constitute a significant development for trade unionism and industrial relations in Scotland, though it may add weight to the perception of Scottish radicalism. It states that it represents ‘a rebirth in the traditions of Red Clydeside’ (Scottish Socialist Voice 24 January 1997). But its relatively large size and cohesiveness, compared to similar formations in Britain, is attributable to the newly created unity of the left in Scotland and the strength of the sizeable radical-cum-social democratic current of thought fusing with a type of national identity and finding representation in a devolved Scotland. As outlined in Chapters 2 and 3, analysis of Scotland in relation to other regions of Britain must be wise to the differences within Scotland, particularly those of a geographical dimension. In this regard, the importance of the Central Belt vis-à-vis the rest of Scotland was noted. Here the emphasis is slightly different. A study of the relatively strike-prone postal workers in Scotland (Gall 81

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2001) identified considerable differences between the trade union attitudes and behaviour of the two branches based on Glasgow and Edinburgh. In this case, the branch based on Edinburgh was considerably more strike-prone, ‘militant’ and oppositional than that in Glasgow, a conclusion which jars with the popular perception of ‘West Coast’ militancy outstripping that of the ‘East Coast’. The explanation for this marked difference was found to lie in the different types of branch leaderships, one based on an oppositional perspective, the other on a more moderate and cooperative perspective, where both had considerable support for their positions among their respective memberships. This example is used as a reminder of the existence of considerable internal differences within Scotland among different unions and between branches of the same union, notwithstanding any particular trends or trajectories that might be identified for trade unionism within Scotland as a whole. The example is also used to bring to our attention that such, broadly speaking ‘left’ – ‘right’, differences among trade unionism are marked on a Britain-wide scale, indicating the presence of a cross-Britain phenomenon and cross-Britain processes in Scotland.

Conclusion There is some evidence for ‘industrial’ and social attitudes of workers in Scotland generally being to the left of those found among workers elsewhere in Britain. Thus, there is some truth to the following statements: ‘Left-wing socialism remains a powerful force in Scotland’ and that there is: ‘an ingrained influence of socialism in Scotland’ (McCombes 1995b:13, 1996:5). However, this difference is much less marked when these attitudes are compared to those of workers in other regions. In the case of workers’ attitudes in Wales, this difference often evaporates and is sometimes reversed. In terms of Kelly’s model of militancy, these attitudes are one of the means by which to judge the nature of workers’ ideology and their weltanschaung. In Scotland, as in Wales and the northern regions of England, workers display tendencies towards militancy rather than moderation. These provide the wellsprings for the ‘communities of collectivism’ thesis. 82


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That said, there appears to be a possible disjuncture between the prevalence of relatively radical ideas among workers in Scotland and the absence of their representation among appropriate trade union bodies. If we accept for the sake of ease of analysis that this is largely the case, why does this situation exist? One explanation may be that the representation of radicalism among workers in Scotland is catered for by that representation which results from the radical views of workers in other regions. Another might be that the level of participation of grassroots members is insufficient to generate representation, where incumbent leaderships are able to use the levers of office to maintain sway. A further possible explanation might be that the radicalism among Scottish workers, such that it exists, finds an easier path to representation in the STUC than among cross-Britain unions because the STUC’s focus is ‘Scotland’. Nonetheless, these are speculative thoughts. One recent process might possess some merit in accounting for why workers’ radical views in Scotland did not provide the basis for a stronger left current in trade unions in Scotland. Historically, and despite the strong presence of the Communist Party in Scotland, the collapse of the Scottish Labour Party of 1975–6 may have been a historic set-back for the milieu of non-communist, non-Trotskyist left in Scotland, thus impacting on the left in Scotland as a whole (Wainwright 1987:146, 149). This is then argued to have made the Labour left in the 1980s smaller and more cautious in Scotland than in England. Kerevan (1987) makes the same argument (see also Harvie (2002:511)). That is to say that the mechanism by which the radical views of workers, given their own usually low participation in union structures, normally gain representation – the wider milieu of activists of the left in unions – was not present in a way that it was in England. Note 1

See also the comments of UCS shop stewards and work-in leaders, Jimmy Reid and Jimmy Airlie, on the work-in (Johns 1973:39, 55).

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5 Distinctive Economic, Employment and Social Characeristics within Scotland Introduction An investigation of difference and radicalism of trade unionism and industrial relations in Scotland vis-à-vis that found elsewhere in the other regions of Britain must not only consider the evidence of difference and radicalism but also the possible reasons for this difference and radicalism. Any radical social scientist would look to investigate the material basis of society in Scotland as a prime cause of explanation. This may take the form of a hypothesis that the immiseration of workers is positively related to that of industrial radicalism or that different levels of immiseration throughout Britain would lead to different levels of industrial radicalism, where workers in Scotland have suffered greater immiseration than elsewhere, producing greater radicalism. Another hypothesis might be that the concentration of heavy industry and manufacturing, given the associations with strong trade unionism and high strike propensity, is positively related to that of industrial radicalism, or that different degrees of concentration of heavy industry throughout Britain would lead to different degrees of industrial radicalism. Thus, workers in Scotland overall would have produced greater radicalism through experiencing greater concentrations of heavy industry producing greater radicalism. In previous chapters, a number of causal contexts and influences (workforce size, industrial structure) and the notion of ‘communities of collectivism’ were examined as ways of providing explanations for the persistence of consistently higher levels of worker collectivism. This chapter is unable to thoroughly examine these hypotheses because of the paucity of necessary data, but it is, nonetheless, able to consider various aspects where ‘Scotland’ and its economy and industrial relations may be considered to be different or ‘quasi-distinctive’ to the rest of Britain. These aspects are social structure, economic performance, 84


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ECONOMIC, EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS

the regional distribution of unemployment, the predominance of certain sectors of economic activity (oil industry, electronics and call centres) in the ‘Scottish’ economy, the health and safety regime in Scotland, and a number of Scotland-specific organizations, the Scottish Trade Union Congress (STUC) and some ‘Scottish-only’ unions, the Scottish National Party (SNP) and the Scottish Socialist Party (SSP).

Class and social structure A common view exists that society in Scotland is more proletarian by composition than society in the rest of Britain. This was, in part, linked to the belief that the consequence of Scotland becoming a ‘branch-plant’ (of foreign multinationals) economy was that the workforce was becoming less skilled and de-skilled. Payne (1977), analysing Scotland vis-à-vis England and Wales in the period 1921–71, argued that Scotland had proportionately fewer highly skilled workers, and had lost more lowly skilled workers, thus losing many desirable occupational jobs within a process of the same broad movements in occupational change throughout the three ‘countries’. Concluding, Payne (1977:33–34) stated: Clearly, Scotland has become more working class and its population less skilled vis-à-vis England than at any time since the First World War . . . This suggests that an inter-country economic relationship which benefits the south at the expense of the north has been the outcome of the unified economic policy.

This conclusion and explanation was not left unchallenged. In a reply to Payne (1977) through reassessing the data he used, Jones (1977:399–400, 405) argued: [I]t is clear that – even in Payne’s terms – Scotland has become less ‘proletarian’ and enjoyed an increase in the proportion of the more desirable SEG’s [occupations], albeit at a slower rate than for Great Britain as a whole . . . [F]or men at least, it appears that Scotland’s relative excess of ‘undesirable’ jobs has been, in the recent past, due as much to the internal structure of her industries as to the industrial distribution of the

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labour force . . . By confusing the relative argument he himself makes by introducing a polemical point about Scottish ‘proletarianisation’, Payne therefore flies in the face of the evidence of his own data.

Looking only at the post-war period (and of that the more recent post-war period), society in Scotland has experienced the same broad changes which have taken place throughout the rest of Britain in terms of the decline in manual workers and the increase in non-manual or white-collar workers and professional employees (McCrone 1992, 1996, 2001a). Yet, in Scotland some differences are evident, whereby compared to England/Wales or Britain as a whole, there are more manual workers and less non-manual workers and employees (see Tables 5.1 and 5.2). Therefore, there is some evidence from society in Scotland having been more working class or proletarian by composition than England/Wales or Britain but this has declined significantly since 1945 (McCrone 1996, 2001a), reflecting a pattern of industrial convergence of other regions towards the situation found in Scotland (McCrone 1992:72). In terms of social mobility, there is nonetheless a great deal of similarity with England and Wales (McCrone 1996:111–12). However, it is likely – for the data do not exist – that if ‘Scotland’ was compared to other similar regions of Britain such as north-west England with similar industrial structures on class or occupational groups as in Table 5.1, the differences identified above in comparison with England/Wales or Britain would decline very sharply or disappear altogether. This, as before, serves to emphasize similarity and convergence not difference and divergence. Turning to voting patterns related to social and class groups, comparative analysis is made a little difficult by the presence of the SNP in Scotland. Nonetheless, it is first worth noting that since 1959 the Conservatives’ share of the vote in England has been consistently higher than in Scotland while Labour’s share of the vote has been consistently higher in Scotland than in England (McCrone 2001a:108). Moving to class or socially based voting, McCrone (1996:118) noted: the weak appeal of the Conservatives north of the border is spread throughout all social classes [and] Labour does better in Scotland among all classes, with the exception of unskilled manual workers [and professionals].

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Table 5.1 Occupational Distribution (Scotland, England/Wales, 1980, 1997) Fathers (1980, 1997)

Respondents (1980, 1997)

Class Scotland England/ Wales Service class – higher grade professionals, administrators and managers (I) Subaltern service class – lower grade professionals and administrators (II) White-collar labourforce: routine non-manual employees (III) Petite bourgeoise: small proprietors, self-employed (IV) Blue-collar labourforce: supervisors and lower grade technicians (V) Skilled manual workers (VI) Semi-skilled and unskilled workers (VII)

Scotland England/ Wales

5.2 12.3

7.3 13.3

9.8 10.9

13.6 14.3

4.9 10.5

5.9 10.5

11.9 14.7

11.5 17.4

7.4 3.0 12.3 13.4 9.1 15.0 29.7 18.8 31.3 27.1

7.3 4.2 14.1 15.6 11.5 15.5 27.5 17.1 26.4 23.8

9.1 23.2 8.3 6.8 11.2 8.7 21.7 9.1 28.1 26.6

9.2 21.6 9.4 9.1 11.6 6.7 21.2 9.1 23.5 21.8

Source: McCrone (1992:108, 2001a:84).

Table 5.2 Socio-economic Group of Economically Active Heads of Households, 1991 Class Middle (employers, managers, professionals) Intermediate Manual working Source: McCrone (1996:111).

87

Scotland

Britain

31 24 41

37 23 36

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Bennie et al. (1997:104) reported, using a simplified class-group model, that Labour supporters in Scotland were more working class and less middle class than Labour supporters in England. Table 5.3 shows this difference for the general election of 1997, which saw the return to office of Labour through a landslide victory over the Conservatives. Again, the differences are posed starkly by comparing Scotland to the rest of Britain. Useful though this is, if Scotland was compared to other regions of Britain that are similar in industrial/economic sector activity and social group composition, the differences are likely to be far less stark. Compared to Wales or north-west or north-east England, the differences would be expected to be slight or non-existent. However, and unfortunately, such data do not exist to prove this definitively. Table 5.3 Social Group and Voting Behaviour by Percentage, Scotland and Rest of Britain, 1997 Behaviour/ Group

Did not vote S: Rest of Britain: Conservative S: Rest of Britain: Labour S: Rest of Britain: LibDem S: Rest of Britain: SNP S: Rest of Britain: Other S: Rest of Britain:

Salariat Routine Petty Manual Working non-manual bourgeoisie foremen and class technicians 14 13 22 33 28 33 19 18 14 n/a 2 3

14 19 9 27 47 37 12 14 17 n/a 1 3

28 22 18 34 30 28 12 13 12 n/a 0 3

Source: Brown et al. (1999:53). Note: S – Scotland.

88

17 19 7 15 51 48 7 14 17 n/a 0 4

18 24 2 14 54 49 7 11 18 n/a 1 3


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General economic performance and economic structure The relatively poor growth and performance levels of the economy in Scotland vis-à-vis other major advanced economies in the Western world in the post-1945 period are matched in very similar terms by those of Britain as a whole (Ashcroft 2002, Bell 1984). With regard to the industrial or sectoral structure of the economy, Payne (1996:24) states: ‘In the last three decades, Scotland’s industrial structure has come to resemble that of Great Britain as a whole’. McCrone (1996:106, 108) argued: . . . a review of the industrial structures of Scotland – that is, the industries people worked in – as well as for those in the rest of the UK shows quite clearly that Scotland was not a deviant case . . . Perhaps the rather widespread assumption that Scotland did have a fairly specialised economy, based on heavy industries, textiles and engineering, reflects the propensity of economic historians to write the history of Scotland as a whole in terms of that of west-central Scotland. Scotland was not a specialised region of the UK but one that had a very similar profile to Britain as a whole.

Looking at the shifts in the location of employment (Table 5.4) provides another means by which to consider Scotland’s comparative position. Between 1979 and 1994, Scotland experienced a contraction in employment in production industries that was on a par with that of many other regions of Britain. While it experienced a high degree of contraction, this was far from being the most severe of those experienced by other regions. Similarly, the degree of growth of employment in the service sector is on a par with that of other regions such as Wales. Overall though, the degree of total contraction in employment was far from being the most severe.

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Table 5.4 Movements in Employment in Regions in Britain, 1979–94 Area/Employees in each sector-percentage change

Production

London South East East Anglia South West East Midlands West Midlands Yorks-Humberside North West North (east) Wales Scotland Britain

–46.2 –39.5 –22.4 –32.7 –33.5 –43.6 –43.1 –46.4 –43.1 –37.4 –39.2 –41.2

Services

0.0 21.3 40.3 28.7 29.3 19.7 21.3 9.3 12.9 16.7 16.9 15.8

Total

–16.2 +5.3 +12.2 +5.9 –3.3 –13.1 –8.9 –15.2 –13.1 –7.1 –6.7 –7.7


Regional aspects of unemployment The Proclaimers’ ballad ‘Letter from America’ of 1987 with its refrains of ‘Bathgate no more . . . Linwood no more’ powerfully represented the notion that Scotland had been ‘raped’ by the destruction of deindustrialization and Thatcherism in the 1970s and 1980s. Part of this notion was that Scotland has suffered disproportionately from the ravages of unemployment compared to England. Thus, Young (1999:78) comments on: ‘Our historic preoccupation with unemployment rates substantially and consistently much higher than Great Britain as a whole – at times sixty or seventy per cent higher . . .’. Table 5.5 shows that, compared to the average for Britain, this kind of perception had some kind of basis for the 1980s, although thereafter Scotland’s position fell below the national average. Yet data for the period 1991–9 indicates that the average annual rate of unemployment saw the positions reversed: Scotland – 8.8%, the national average 8.2% (Star 2002:52, see also Bell (2002:72)). Again, some basis is provided for the perception of disproportionate suffering. 90


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However, using more detailed data, the position is more complex, although unfortunately data for the whole period 1970–2004 is not available. The advantage of the more detailed data is that Scotland is not being compared to the national average, this being a rather blunt exercise. From Table 5.6, Scotland (Strathclyde and rest of Scotland) has experienced higher levels of employment than many other areas and regions of Britain, and particularly southern England. However, these levels have not been any higher than for comparable areas/regions (in terms of workforce size and industrial composition of these economies) such as north-west and north-east England. It can also be inferred that the Strathclyde area accounts disproportionately for the perception that Scotland was ravaged by unemployment – though this should come as no surprise given that it comprises both the greatest concentration of population and economic activity liable to deindustrialization in Scotland. The experience of Strathclyde finds a parallel in the experience of Merseyside or Tyne and Wear. Table 5.5 Levels of Unemployment in Scotland and Britain, 1982–94 (percentages) Year

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

Scotland Britain

13.0 12.1

13.8 11.7

14.0 11.7

14.2 11.8

14.5 10.6

14.1 9.4

Year

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

Scotland Britain

11.8 8.4

9.4 6.4

8.1 5.8

8.7 8.1

9.5 9.8

9.9 10.4

9.3 9.4

Source: Scottish Trade Union Review (various)

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Rest of North East

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

12.0 10.7 7.9 7.3 8.7 10.7 10.2 10.0 8.8 8.5 7.7 7.4 7.4 6.5 5.8

11.1 11.9 9.5 8.1 9.8 10.5 11.2 11.9 10.2 9.1 8.0 7.9 7.9 7.1 7.0

17.9 15.1 9.9 10.7 12.2 12.1 12.9 11.7 11.2 11.3 10.1 9.0 9.1 8.4 8.2

12.1 9.5 8.2 7.2 7.1 8.7 8.4 7.9 7.3 7.0 6.7 6.5 6.1 5.4 5.3

13.6 13.1 10.3 8.7 10.0 13.2 13.3 12.0 11.4 10.6 10.3 9.2 7.8 7.0 5.8

9.3 8.2 6.8 6.1 7.4 8.3 9.8 9.2 7.8 8.3 6.7 6.9 5.8 6.1 5.2

9.9 10.1 6.4 6.1 5.9 8.1 9.0 8.5 7.5 7.3 6.6 6.4 6.3 5.3 4.9

16.4 15.0 11.0 9.0 12.6 12.4 15.3 14.3 12.7 11.8 10.0 11.5 9.4 8.2 7.3

11.5 10.6 8.9 8.1 9.0 11.3 11.2 10.3 9.4 8.1 7.1 6.6 6.5 5.1 5.3

9.0 8.4 6.8 5.5 7.4 7.8 8.5 7.9 7.2 6.1 5.9 5.4 4.8 4.3 4.3

15.5 14.0 11.6 12.0 11.2 14.1 13.8 11.6 12.1 11.3 10.5 9.8 10.2 10.0 7.7

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Wales Tyne and Wear


92

Year Strathclyde Rest of South Rest of West Rest of Merseyside Greater Scotland Yorkshire Yorkshire Yorkshire Manchester North and West Humber


Table 5.6 Unemployment Rates in the Regions of Britain

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93

14.4 10.1 8.0 7.7 11.4 14.5 14.7 12.2 11.3 10.6 8.6 8.4 8.6 8.3 7.4

Rest of East West Midlands Midlands 9.2 5.8 5.7 4.3 6.5 9.3 8.8 7.2 6.8 6.5 5.3 4.9 5.0 4.4 3.8

9.6 7.3 5.9 5.7 6.8 8.3 8.8 8.4 7.4 6.9 5.6 5.2 5.5 4.9 4.8

Northern Ireland

East Anglia

14.0 13.3 11.6 11.1 11.6 12.6 12.8 11.8 11.0 10.0 8.4 7.6 7.3 6.3 6.2

8.1 5.0 3.6 4.1 5.4 8.6 8.8 7.8 7.1 7.1 6.5 4.9 4.2 4.3 4.0

Inner London

12.1 11.2 8.9 9.3 10.8 15.8 17.3 16.1 16.4 14.8 12.4 10.0 9.9 9.3 8.9

Outer London

6.5 5.2 4.5 4.5 7.4 10.7 12.0 10.5 9.1 9.0 7.2 6.7 6.1 5.8 5.4

Rest of South East

6.4 4.4 3.2 3.7 5.6 8.8 8.6 7.6 6.9 6.0 5.0 4.4 3.9 3.3 3.5

South West England

7.7 5.8 4.4 4.3 6.9 9.1 8.8 7.9 7.6 6.5 5.4 4.8 4.5 4.1 3.7

Source: Computed by Elizabeth Roberts (Department of Economics, University of Stirling) from the Labour Force Survey.

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1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

West Midlands Metropolitan


Year

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Table 5.6 (cont.)

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Two main points emerge from the preceding consideration of unemployment and industrial restructuring. First, although the economy in Scotland has experienced significant unemployment and substantial contraction of employment in traditional industries along with considerable growth in service industry employment, these have been far from the most severe experienced by other regions in Britain. Secondly, and following from this, it is reasonable to suggest that this experience of relatively moderate unemployment, contraction and growth has probably helped maintain the degree of union density and strike-proneness which ‘Scotland’ has experienced. Something similar can be said of Wales with regard to union density, although the influence of tradition and the ‘communities of collectivism’ referred to in Chapter 2 are also influential here. Regions such as north-east and north-west England as well as the Midlands and Yorkshire/Humberside have, overall, experienced greater dislocation in the areas under discussion and greater falls in union density and strike activity. Relative quiescence is apparent in some of these regions. Thus, the thesis of immiseration leading to radicalism finds no support in this period across the regions in Britain. It can, therefore, be reasonably contended that had the economy in Scotland experienced greater degrees of dislocation, its trade union base would have been further weakened and considerably so. Finally, and more generally, studies of the nature and state of the labour market in Scotland (Bell 1983, 1984, 2002) have not found compelling and significant evidence of difference or distinctiveness compared to regions elsewhere.

Oil, electronics and call centres In the 1970s and 1980s, concerns were expressed over the increasing dominance of foreign, and particularly US, capital in the Scottish economy by various commentators. This focused on the notion that Scotland was becoming a ‘branch plant economy’ whereby decisions concerning production and workplaces were taken overseas in the headquarters of foreign transnational companies. Bound up with the issue of control was the recognition that the Scottish economy was witnessing a contraction in the extent of indigenous ownership of firms and companies. The salience of this 94


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for the purpose at hand is that in the late 1970s/early 1980s ‘Scotland’s economy [wa]s losing its distinctiveness’ (Scott 1982:173) in terms of its structure, composition, control and ownership. On this basis, the foundation for industrial relations in Scotland displaying the potential for difference and distinctiveness was considerably reduced. Nonetheless, there are three sectors of activity, regardless of the patterns of ownership, which are sufficiently concentrated and pronounced within the Scottish economy to warrant consideration. The offshore oil industry in its widest sense (research, exploration, drilling, support and transportation services) is largely based in Scotland (north and north-east Scotland, waters off Scotland) and it draws a large percentage of its workforce from within Scotland. That said, significant portions of the industry are also based outside Scotland (London, Teeside and the east of England) as are the workforce (for example, Tyneside and Merseyside). However, the key feature of this industry for our purposes concerns the low levels of unionization, union organization and union recognition. These centre around the virulent anti-unionism of the employers, the complex web of sub-contracting, inter-union competition and the inadequacy of trade union strategy. In particular, the operators are US companies who have proscribed unions in their own operations and those of their contractors. Despite the thirty years of attempts at organizing by established unions (AEEU, TGWU, GMB, RMT), the ‘summers of discontent’ in 1989 and 1990 and the emergence of the rank-and-file OILC, little progress had been made by the late 1990s (Gall 2003a). However, with the imminence and now presence of the Employment Relations Act 1999’s provisions for statutory union recognition, a number of new agreements have been signed (for example those with the Offshore Contractors’ Association and UK Drilling Contractors Association). It remains to be seen whether these deals turn out to be ‘sweetheart agreements’ as the excluded OILC alleges. In electronics, a picture of relatively low levels of union density and recognition again emerges, albeit higher than expected and higher than in the oil industry but lower than in manufacturing and the public sector (see, for example, Findlay (1993), MacInnes and Sproull (1989)). This situation arises for some similar reasons – employer policy of substitution and suppression, and inter-union 95

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competition but also because of workplace size and composition of the workforce (younger, female, ‘green’ labour) (see, for example, Findlay (1993), Knox and McKinlay (1999)). Compared to union presence and recognition in the comparable electronics sector in south Wales, ‘Silicon Glen’ is weaker (Aitken 1992:284). Compared to south Wales, this is also true for the other main loci of electronics (‘Silicon Fen’ and the ‘M4 corridor’). This is largely attributable not to inherent weaknesses on the part of trade unions in Scotland and inherent strength on the part of trade unions in Wales, but rather the predominance of US transnational companies in Scotland compared to the predominance of Japanese transnationals in Wales. The former have been more anti-union, and prepared to expend considerable resources on union substitution while the latter are not anti-union as such – they have been willing to recognize unions but only on their terms through the selection of single union ‘sweetheart deals’ established via ‘beauty contests’ among the contending unions. However, recruitment of workers in Japanese electronic companies has been easier than in Scotland as a result of an agreement between the Wales TUC and the Welsh Development Agency to allow trade unions some access to the companies prior to the establishment of production. Consequently, gaining recognition is made that bit easier. By comparison, Locate in Scotland is believed to have marketed Scotland on its competitive advantage by virtue of the need not to recognize unions. Nonetheless, some recent advances in union recognition in ‘Silicon Glen’ have been made, although questions can be posed about the robustness of the agreements and trade unionism there. Turning to call centres, the Central Belt (but greater Glasgow, in particular) is one of the main centres of location in Britain ((IDS 1998–2002, Taylor and Bain 1997, 2000). Other clusters exist in and around, for example, Cardiff and Leeds. In terms of regions, most call-centre jobs were founding in north-west and south-east England then Scotland and Yorkshire and Humberside (TUC 2001). Moreover, in terms of call-centre jobs as a proportion of total employment per region, Scotland was seventh out of twelve (TUC 2001). Coverage of union recognition and collective bargaining across call centres in both absolute and relative terms is higher than is usually assumed (IDS 1998–2002), although it remains lower than in other sectors such as manufacturing or 96


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finance and is disproportionately influenced by a small number of large operations in which union recognition is granted such as the operations of British Telecom and high-street banks. Where recognition exists it is usually due to the transferral of recognition from existing operations into business’s new call-centre operations. That said, what explains the extent of the concentration in Scotland? As with other areas, and for electronics, the abundant supply of cheap labour that is poorly organized and has appropriate technical and social skills, along with investment packages, goes along way to explain this. Following the establishment of a critical mass, a cluster effect has taken place that has encouraged further companies to locate here. In turn, however, the tightening of the local labour market, consequent upon this ‘success of concentration’, may serve to increase labour costs, leading to the erosion of this competitive advantage. The significance of the presence of these three sectors in Scotland, no matter their pre-eminence in the Scottish economy compared to other regions within Britain, is that they are part of industries that are Britain-wide, trans-national or multinational in ownership and part of globalized economic activity. Flowing from this it is not surprising to find that neither the workers nor their unions nor the industrial relations of these sectors have any ‘Scottish’ or ‘Scotland-specific’ features. Their relative strengths and weaknesses, and the processes of industrial relations that they work under, are expressions of wider patterns of employment relations, as are the challenges of the capitalist economy that they face (for example redundancy, pay rises, new work practices). Consequently, the same challenges face workers in north-east England, the Midlands and so on. The same basic point is also true of the presence of foreign (or international) direct investment within Scotland. Although space does not permit an elaboration of this, we can state that despite higher than average levels of such inward investment, employment relations in these firms or in others (through a demonstration effect) do not depart from the general characteristics of those found in the rest of Britain. One partial exception may exist. The preponderance of investment from the United States (as opposed to Germany or Japan) in Scotland does mean that these companies have a higher tendency to be non- and anti-union. That said, the search for ‘Scottishness’ 97

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in work and employment draws a blank (see Craig (2003), Findlay (1999), Leopold (1989) and Warhurst (2002)). All that McIlvanney (2003) can identify is a search for notions of ‘community’ (see discussion on ‘communities of collectivism’ in Chapter 2).

The health and safety regime in Scotland Woolfson and Beck (1999) have shown that the levels of industrial accidents and fatalities in Scotland are considerably higher in relative or proportionate terms than other areas in Britain (see also Paterson et al. 2004:54, 170). They characterize this as the ‘Scottish anomaly’ and offer a number of possible explanations; rapacious employers, weak regulatory regime, high levels of unemployment and trade union decline. While these features are found elsewhere, they argue that separately and cumulatively these features are of a greater magnitude than in other regions in Britain, producing the higher rates of incidence. Beck (2002) later developed this by arguing that Scotland has a higher proportion of ‘marginal’ employers than elsewhere – these employers operating on the margins of profitability are more likely to ignore and downgrade health and safety prevention and protection.

The STUC and trade unionism in Scotland The STUC is the only major example of a ‘Scotland’ or ‘Scottish’only trade union organization, with the following observation by Kellas (1980:150) being unremarkable but very pertinent: Most trade unions in Scotland are affiliated to the British TUC as well as the STUC, and over the years top level industrial negotiations have increasingly been undertaken by British unions on behalf of Scottish members. . . . The number of Scottish unions has diminished, as more merge in[to] British organisations. In this way, separate negotiations for Scottish members get fewer.

Apart from the period 1900–10, the STUC has never faced the prospect of being subsumed with all-Britain TUC (Keating and 98


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Bleiman 1979:44). Today, the only other examples of Scottish-only unions are those of the Educational Institute of Scotland (52,000 members), the Scottish Secondary Teachers’ Association (8,000), the Scottish Further and Higher Education Association (1,000), the Scottish Carpet Weavers’ Union (500) and the newly founded Scottish Artists’ Union (450), and these examples are minor ones. In the 1940s, there were 125 Scottish-only unions (Knox 1992:122): by 1987, there were only six (Leopold 1989:84). Another way of looking at the fall in Scottish-only unions is to examine the number of Scottish-only union affiliates to the STUC; these were 30 in 1898, 22 in 1911, 22 in 1938 and 10 in 1978 (Harrison 1978:2). In 1892, two-thirds of all union members in Scotland were members of Scottish-only unions (Knox 1992:122). This fell to 39.8% by 1924 and to 15.1% by 1947 (Dickson 1980:281). In 2002, this figure stood at 9.9%. Both the fall in the number of Scottishonly unions and the fall in the proportion of all union members in Scotland in these Scottish-only unions reflect the growth of national, cross-Britain unions. However, the process of amalgamating Scottish unions with those in England and Wales was encouraged by the STUC for the tactical purposes of securing wider political representation in Britain and gaining the affiliation of Britain-wide unions (Paterson 1994:112–13). Where there were separate Scottish unions previously, these have merged or amalgamated with, or to form, British-wide organizations. In a number of cases (AUT, GMB, TGWU, Unison) their organization in Scotland is suffixed by ‘Scotland’ but mostly in these and other unions, union organization in Scotland is seen as the region for Scotland in the same way as for elsewhere. However, the STUC is not part of the TUC and the TUC has little role in Scotland, although the two bodies co-operate to some degree. The reason for considering the STUC in this context is that it has played a different and wider role in Scotland than the TUC has traditionally played in England and Wales or nationally. Thus, the position of the STUC (and to some extent trade unions more generally) in public life and public policy formulation in Scotland marks out Scotland as quasi-distinct from other areas of Britain. Put simply, the STUC occupies a more influential position in public life in Scotland, leading, inter alia, Paterson (1994:122) to note the STUC’s closer links with the CBI in Scotland than those of the 99

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TUC with the CBI in England. In this it has taken up, and has positions on, a greater number of social issues such as housing, Palestine, nuclear weapons and gay rights (see Christie 1997). It appears more ‘left wing’ – ‘The STUC is more to the left than the TUC’ (Kellas 1989:187) – and, more importantly, albeit within broader political processes rather narrower industrial relations issues. It is neither ‘new realist’ nor ‘new Labour’. The STUC’s left nature and corresponding image can be dated back to its creation. It was established after a disagreement with the TUC, dominated by conservative craft unions, over the representation of the left-leaning Trades Councils within TUC structures (Aitken 1992:280, 1997:9, 12, Dickson 1980b:270, Harvie and Jones 2000:34, Foster and Woolfson 1986:147, Woolfson and Foster 1988:23, Young 1975:287). This disagreement was also synonymous to some extent with representing the interests of organised labour in Scotland (Aitken 1997:9, 12, Knox 1999:158, cf Knox 1992:122, Leopold 1984). McKay (1997:74) comments: ‘The STUC is often portrayed as more red that its sister organization south of the border’ and Wainwright (1987:149) characterizes the STUC’s policies and actions as being ‘far to the left of the TUC’, which she argues derive from its origins: The distinctive lifeblood of the STUC flows from its origins as a federation of trades councils and small Scottish-based union, brought together at the turn of the [nineteenth] century by socialists in the ILP, SDF and other political groups. It is the outcome of relations between trade unionism and political activists quite opposite to those at the core of the Labour Party. Whereas in England the TUC created a political party as far as possible in its own image, in Scotland it was the other way round: politics – the politics of radical socialists – led the trade unions to form a united (Scottish) organisation based on local trade-union organisations, especially trades councils . . . On result of this is that, on the whole, the STUC has a less corporatist, more campaigning character than the TUC. (Wainwright 1987:150)

However, the more recent period since the 1960s has deepened and extended this after an interregnum by the right in the 1940s and 1950s, with consecutive general secretaries being of a left persuasion compared to the TUC and other union leaderships (see Aitken (1992)). 100


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An important part of this reputation has been the STUC’s support for, and association with, the UCS work-in, the miners’ strike of 1984–5, the Caterpillar occupation and the fight against the ‘Social Contract’ and ‘new realism’. Furthermore, the STUC has campaigned for a Scottish Parliament since 1966, long before the Labour Party adopted this as policy and engaged in a form of corporatism under the Thatcher era (e.g. the Standing Commission on the Scottish Economy). The STUC has been markedly internationalist in a way in which the TUC has not, ranging from cultural and social links with the ‘communist’ countries of Eastern Europe to support for the Palestinians (Aitken 1997, Graham and McGrath 1991). Finally, the degree of Communist Party influence in the STUC was made apparent by Jimmy Milne being the deputygeneral secretary from 1971 to 1975 and then the general secretary from 1975 to 1986. In this regard, Keating and Bleiman (1979:159) argued that the Communist Party prioritized its industrial and political work in the unions and trade councils in Scotland because it lacked an effective electoral platform. All these provided the basis for the STUC having a ‘more radical tradition [than the TUC]’ (Marr 1992:48): indeed, this replenished the earlier image. Many of the aforementioned examples are also related to the greater role and influence of lay activists and officials from affiliates compared to the TUC. Simply put, the STUC is less bureaucratic as an organization. While agreeing with the broad thrust of this, Kerevan (1984) suggests that the STUC is not as left wing as it has been painted, with regard to political positions and mobilizations. Indeed, in 1977 the STUC grudgingly accepted the continuation of wage restraint under the then Labour government while the TUC voted to reject it (Knox and Wilson 1977:139), ushering in the ‘Winter of Discontent’ strike wave of 1978–9. Further, Leopold’s (1984:21) comment that ‘the STUC has always had a reputation of being to the left of the TUC in its attitudes and policies’ may hint at the difference between reality and reputation. There is, however, another important dimension here, which is that during the Thatcher years the STUC was the centre and organizer of an anti-Conservative government coalition involving a broad political spectrum (trade union, Labour, SNP, Liberals, church, unaligned opinion formers, small businesses and, sometimes, 101

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dissident Tories). The fulcrum of this coalition was a coming together of various political mindsets that rejected Thatcherism on the basis that Scottish values/values in Scotland were more civilized, socialized and progressive and Thatcherism was inimitable to these. This coalesced a stage further in support for devolution as a way of providing a way forward to concretize and give form to these values. Without at least some notion of Scottishness, whether of nationalism or regionalism, this mobilization would have not been possible. Aitken (1997:245), in this context, argued that the STUC had ‘synthesis[ed] nationalism and collectivism’, to which one could add ‘community-ism’. In doing so, the STUC projected itself successfully as the civic voice, or the tribune, of ‘Scotland’. It embodied the process of the fusing of social demands with, and through, devolution, and became the spokesbody for the nation comprised of Scotland’s working people. However, the emergence of such anti-Conservative government coalition lay in defeat – not only in the 1979 election and the subsequent Labour defeats in 1983, 1987 and 1992 but also in terms of the many large strikes in the 1980s. These coalitions also experienced defeat, for example, Ravenscraig. Nonetheless, the redemption here was seen to be that it was better to have fought the ‘good fight’ (by these methods) than not at all. Sitting alongside these was the increasing Labour domination of Scottish Westminster MPs as an indication of the rejection of Thatcherism (the so-called ‘Feeble Fifty’ of 1987 and the Tory wipe-out of 1992). But their inability-cumunwillingness to provide effective resistance to Thatcherism in Scotland pointed to the need for extra-parliamentary activity as an additional form of opposition to the so-called ‘south-east England agenda’. The STUC-organized coalitions provided a vehicle for this. The idea of such a ‘cross class’ or ‘popular alliance’ has origins in the influence of the politics of the Communist Party and its ‘British Road to Socialism’ (1978, and earlier versions) with its focus on building ‘broad democratic alliances’ as the vehicle to socialism (see also Chapter 6). The central notion here is to encompass all those interests and groups fighting for democratic and progressive causes into not only a more powerful single bloc against the monopoly capitalists but also one where in being brought together their horizons and aims are broadened out (Communist Party 1978:17). Aitken’s assessments of these coalitions are pointed: 102


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Retrospection yields the dispiriting, and somehow surprising, realisation that almost none of the Eighties issue coalitions achieved their primary objectives . . . Yet, in a broader sense, the coalitions were remarkably successful in distilling and sustaining the extraordinary mood that settled in Scotland against the Thatcher upheaval. The electorally deadly impression of Conservatism as an alien malevolence, suppressing Scotland’s will, stemmed in large measure from the consensus the STUC and its allies were able to portray. (1997:295) [T]he STUC’s stylish Eighties role as a builder and convenor of issue coalitions is universally acknowledged as an inspiration. Cool retrospection tells you that the coalitions nearly all failed, but that was hardly the point. They created a camaraderie of civic resistance, eventually exploited to effect by the Scottish Constitutional Convention. (Scotland on Sunday, 16 June 2002)

Davidson (1999:122) argued that the all-class, pan-Scottish alliances failed in their objectives because they necessarily could not countenance industrial action, for fear of breaking the alliance apart. Thus, it was stated: ‘Of these campaigns, only the first at Upper Clyde Shipbuilders achieved any kind of success, and that because it was accompanied by a militant occupation which took place in the context of the great upturn in British working class struggle of the early 1970s’ (Davidson 1999:122). However, some refinement is necessary here. Subsequent alliances against closure – Singer (Clydebank), Carron Iron Works (Falkirk), British Leyland (Bathgate), Corpach paper mill (Fort William), Invergordon smelter, Chrysler (Linwood), Caterpillar (Uddingston), Ravenscraig steel – many lead by or prominently supported by the STUC, did feature industrial action in so far as workers took action (strike, occupation) and thereafter support was sought, whereupon alliances were constructed to support the battles against closure. Therefore, the absence or presence of industrial action is important, being ‘necessary’ but not ‘sufficient’ to explain the paucity of tangible success. What constitutes the ‘sufficient’ is a heavier emphasis given to the context of those struggles, that is the extended period of retreat and defeat of the labour movement which is often characterized as a ‘downturn’ or ‘downswing’ in class struggle and what role union leaderships may have been able to play in 103

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rebuilding and exercising combative traditions. This casts some doubt on Davidson’s (1999:123) belief that: It was not until the Timex workers in Dundee fought back in 1993 [against restructuring and redundancies] that this strategy was effectively challenged, and not until the victory of the Glacier RPB workers in Glasgow [through a 106-day occupation against restructuring] that this cycle of disaster was broken, although there is no sign that the STUC have learned any lessons from this experience.

The lower-level involvement of ‘alliances’ in these two strikes may have reflected the greater initiative and different, more combative traditions of the workforces as well as the issues not centring entirely on closure. The STUC’s support was nonetheless evident and important. Part of the debate surrounds a belief on the part of some that if leaders organized action, workers would participate in sufficient numbers and in a sufficiently vigorous way. This may not always be the case, emphasizing the importance of context. These arguments aside, the phenomenon of coalition building through the vehicle of the STUC has been more extensive and pronounced in Scotland than in others parts of Britain. Similar coalitions based around notions of national identity and the rationale of defending the interests of the British economy have been constructed, but the persuasiveness and strength of national identity in Scotland by comparison helps explain this marked difference. Notwithstanding any differences, the STUC-affiliated membership has fallen quite dramatically as Table 5.7 demonstrates: Table 5.7 STUC-affiliated Membership Year

Membership

Year

Membership

1980 1981 1984 1985 1987 1996

1,093,056 1,090,839 980,220 938,142 913,186 670,632

1997 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005

659,871 634,797 626,816 628,274 627,478 628,721

Source: STUC.

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The Scottish National Party One expected proponent of, and indeed creator of, ‘Scottish exceptionalism’ in terms of trade unionism and industrial relations would be the Scottish National Party (SNP). In 1946, the SNP adopted a social democratic perspective on workers’ rights, trade unions and industrial relations. This is not particularly notable given the dominant perspectives of the period. However, the SNP also argued that: The risk of neglect of the special needs of particular groups of workers in Scotland who have little influence on the central organizations of the present Trade Unions must be obviated by the emergence of purely Scottish Trade Unions with a powerful Scottish Trade Union Congress which will play a leading and effective part in the new Scotland and take its proper place in international labour affairs. (Hanham 1969:225–6)

Yet, this did not lead to much in the way of party or membership agitation or mobilization around this demand. The same is true for the party’s trade union work in general, despite the establishment of the Association of Scottish Nationalist Trade Unionists (see Brand (1978:283–7)). Furthermore, what little work was done met with little success (Brand 1978:283–7), save the brief period of the ’79 Group activity (see Salmond (1982)). More recently, in matters of employment and industrial relations, the SNP has not expounded any perspectives or policies that are distinctly Scottish. In the mid-1970s, it argued: The SNP looks on management and work people not as hostile opponents, but as partners who must learn to cooperate for their own and the common good . . . [B]asic rights . . . must be available to every person of employment age . . . [W]ealth and control of our industry [must be] more evenly distributed (SNP 1976:1).

Craigie (1976) argued that while the SNP believes class conflict cannot be completely abolished, it can be significantly reduced. From this it put forward a set of left-of-centre demands vis-à-vis workers’ rights and participation and involvement through employee 105

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councils, employee directors and unions. However, this was balanced by the requirement of workers ‘to accept the need for change’ (SNP 1976:1). While more ‘radical’ than subsequent policy, this perspective followed the dominant approach of the 1970s in Britain and Europe, that is formally social democratic. In the 1990s, the SNP followed a traditional, non-Scottish-distinct, leftof-centre programme on employment matters and workers’ rights (see McNair (1996)).1 In only one area, that of institutions, has the SNP recently argued for a separate trajectory for Scotland, namely the establishment of a Scotland-based Tripartite Economic Council to determine an incomes policy; a bipartite Employment Research Unit; and a Procedural, Conciliation and Arbitration Board. The potential importance of this is diminished by virtue of such cross-Britain institutions already existing at the time and by mobilization to achieve these institutions being insignificant. Furthermore, the spirit of the proposals was very corporatist, that is not for workers’ control. More importantly, the SNP despite some earlier attempts (see Lynch (2002a), (2002b), Marr (1992:186), Smith and Brown (1980:314)) has never regarded work among trade unions and their members as being central or consistent parts of its political project. The SNP, by a number of its members rather as a party, has only shown serious interest in trade union struggles in the early 1980s around a series of factory closures (Lynch 2002b, Marr 1992:186, Mitchell 1990). Consequently, any forces for separatism among workers in trade unions have never been identifiable. One particular, but more general, reason for this has been that Scottish nationalism and national identity have been imbued with social democratic leanings which at the least do not project notions of independence and separatism because of the acknowledgement of common interests among workers either side of the border. The reason for the paucity of SNP activity in trade unions is attributable to two factors. First, the party’s political complexion is predominantly influenced by non-working-class activists, many of whom are without significant experiences of trade union work. Secondly, Scottish nationalism, as opposed to Scottish identity, does not specify a place for trade unionism within its ranks in a positive and meaningful way. This arises because trade unionism gravitates towards an all-Britain 106


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project that tends to stress class or social group divisions within society in Scotland, and in spite of the social democratic tradition of the SNP in the last twenty years.

The Scottish Socialist Party Following the consideration of the STUC and the ideas associated with it, it is also salient to examine a high profile but much less influential organization, namely, the SSP, for two reasons. As a significant social formation with some involvement in trade unionism in Scotland, it is largely a ‘Scottish-only’ phenomenon, and it exerts some influence on the trade union scene in Scotland. Examining the phenomenon of the SSP, the salient questions are the following: is the SSP more left wing than other left groups and parties in Britain, is it stronger than these other left groups and parties, and is it more implanted and influential among trade unionists than these other left groups and parties? If the answer to any of these questions is ‘yes’, what are the reasons for this? Established in 1998 from the Scottish Socialist Alliance, the SSP is a pluralist, left wing party, with both revolutionary and reformist currents within it. Its programme is a mixture of both. The leadership of the SSP is provided by the International Socialist Movement (ex-Militant/Scottish Militant Labour), which proclaims itself to be Marxist and revolutionary. The vast majority of SSP members are not members of this platform but agree with the programme put forward, which is populist, radical, and implicitly transitionalist. The two come together in agreement upon a set of immediate objectives and a further aspiration of socialism (however conceived) through independence. To any serious extent, it is no more or less left wing than its counterparts in the rest of Britain. It is, however, a larger formation than its counterparts elsewhere in both absolute and proportionate terms, having around 3,000 members and 500 activists. An equivalent organization in England would have around 30,000 members and 5,000 activists. The SWP claims between 9,000 and 10,000 members, while the Socialist Party claims 1,500 (Taaffe 2002). They have probably around 2,000 to 3,000 and 500 active members respectively. Yet the vast majority of SSP members are relatively inactive, although this is again not dissimilar to other 107

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contemporary counterparts. In terms of wider public support, judged by electoral support and voting intentions, it is again a larger formation than its counterparts elsewhere in both absolute and proportionate terms. Indeed, on this measure, it is considerably larger (see Chapter 8). It is interesting to note that the SSP – de facto the ISM – has adopted a similar analysis of Scotland to that of the Communist Party and Foster and Woolfson (see Chapter 6) to support its political perspectives (see McCombes (2001a), (2001b:16), Tomkinson (2001)). But it is noticeable that both the SSP and ISM do not go very far down the path of Scottish nationalism per se – rather the issue is one of strategy and tactics in terms of relating to and accommodating national identity where social democracy is often couched in terms of national identity (see McCombes (1995a), (1998a), (1998b), Scottish Militant Labour, 23 June 1995, and Chapter 7). But although the SSP is relatively influential in electoral terms, most of its trade union members are not active and the SSP is not an influential organised force within trade unionism in Scotland (see SSP 2002 and Chapter 4). Therefore, while the SSP constitutes a significant political development, it does not (as yet) constitute a significant development for trade unionism and industrial relations in Scotland, though it may add weight to the perception of Scottish radicalism.

Conclusion This chapter has considered a number of areas in which the evidence for distinctive features or characteristics within the society, economy and employment of Scotland vis-à-vis England and Wales was examined. In terms of social-group and social-class segmentation, Scotland appears more working class and less middle class than Britain as a whole. However, it is unlikely that compared to other similar regions such as the north of England and Wales, this would remain significant. The same is true of voting patterns save the existence of the SNP. Indeed, given the considerable size of the SNP vote throughout all classes or social groups including the working class, it is noteworthy that the working-class association with Labour remains as strong as it does. This provides a backdrop and 108


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basis for some claims to the more working-class character of society in Scotland compared to that which exists elsewhere in Britain (see Chapter 9 for a discussion of this). In terms of unemployment and economic restructuring, the experience in Scotland has not been significantly worse than that in other comparable regions in the rest of Britain. Consequently, this has not been a wellspring for radicalism, alleged or otherwise. While there are a small number of features (the oil industry, electronics, health and safety) which mark out employment relations as being distinctive, these are relatively minor aspects. The presence and activities of both the SNP and SSP do not create or amount to significant developments for, and in, employment and industrial relations in Scotland. The only phenomenon in Scotland that does is the STUC. However, it does so in certain and specific ways. Directly, the STUC does not constitute much of an influence on industrial relations given that its affiliates are independent, sovereign bodies as well as Britain-wide bodies. For example, although it may assist, it does not engage in collective bargaining, union organizing or industrial action. However, if the focus of attention turns to the advocacy and representation of the political and economic interests of trade unions and their members in Scotland through a number of forums, then the STUC does play a major role and does so in a left wing way that marks it out as relatively radical, influential and different compared to the TUC and the regional TUCs in England (on Wales, see Chapter 8). Therefore, with the exception of the STUC, Smith and Brown (1980:296–304) do not make a convincing case for their argument of organized labour in Scotland, in comparative terms, being particularly distinctive or radical. For the future, it remains to be seen whether the SSP carves out for itself a genuinely influential role akin to the Communist Party of the period 1960–80. Note 1

The joining of the SNP by Jimmy Reid, former leader of the UCS work-in, at the 2005 STUC Congress (Herald, 21 April 2005) came about fifteen or twenty years too late to have a sizeable impact on the SNP’s trade union presence.

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6 Aspects of Association: The Scottish Nation and the Red Thread Introduction For the notions of popular and industrial radicalism in Scotland to carry more social weight than they might strictly merit and for the convincing association of radicalism per se and Scottishness to be made as seems to be the case from the evidence of the previous chapters, intellectual ballast to these claims and constructions has been required. Not surprisingly, the centre of gravity to this intellectual ballast has come from a number of left wing and Marxistinfluenced opinion informers and theorists such as leading trade unionists, politicians, commentators, writers and academics. This chapter examines the nature, construction and underpinnings of these associations to explain why among many, including trade unionists themselves, a positive, indeed self-reinforcing, association is made between the evidence of industrial radicalism and Scottishness as well as why this positive association of radicalism and Scottishness has a salience among wider society in Scotland. Consequently, a number of areas are considered, beginning with the compass of national identity in Scotland, the smallness of community in Scotland and the dominance of the Central Belt within Scotland. With this basic layout, the chapter then moves to examine a set of historical associations which colour and contextualize various writers’ analyses and interpretations. These are the legacy of ‘Red Clydeside’, the heritage of Scottish radicalism and a materialist analysis of Scottish capitalism. These can be collectively termed the ‘red thread’.

Scottish national identity and the society known as Scotland Scottish national identity has provided one of, if not, the most persuasive means by which the majority of people within Scotland 110


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ASPECTS OF ASSOCIATION

have sought to identify themselves and distinguish themselves from others in Britain (see McCrone 2001a, 2001b)) and elsewhere, as well as supplying an important instrument and unit of social analysis. Therefore, the development of Scottish national identity has arguably provided the most important unit of social distinctiveness by which to classify human behaviour within the boundaries of the landmass of what is known as ‘Scotland’. This has been strengthened by the use of the counter-reference of ‘England’ and ‘Britishness’. National identity both as a social construct and as an instrument/unit of analysis represents simplistic, and thus powerful, social categorizations by virtue of providing a unifying motif which makes no provision for internal differences and distinctions. The most potent non-unionist intellectual challenge to this perspective of analysis of social structuration in Scotland has been that of Marxist-inspired class analysis, but its weakness indicates, inter alia and ironically, the weakness of far-left forces in Scotland. Of particular pertinence to our purposes here is the impact of Thatcherism. The dominant social democratic impulse was projected in, and refracted through, the anti-Thatcherite alliance of Scottish nationalism and Scottish identity. Thus, national identity, with all its ramifications, continued and deepened its purchase. The contemporary foundations of the relatively easy marriage of Scottish identity and popular radicalism in Scotland can be traced to the phenomena whereby a) most Scottish working-class people in Scotland see themselves as Scottish not British or more Scottish than British, b) social attitudes in Scotland are markedly progressive by comparison with those attitudes found elsewhere in Britain and c) those who identify themselves predominantly as Scottish are more radical than those who do not. Taking each of these phenomena in turn, the supporting survey evidence can be examined. a) Scottish workers are more Scottish than British Notwithstanding some caveats concerning comparisons with other forms of identity (see Bond and Rosie (2002:2, 3), Rosie and Bond (2003:122–3)), Tables 6.1 and 6.2 indicate the salience of Scottish identity by virtue of its strength with a comparator provided in the form of national identity in England. The degree of ‘Scottishness’ (‘Scottish not British’/’more Scottish than British’) is not only 111

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strong but has increased over recent time: from 59% in 1992 to 68% in 2000, and from 57% in 1979 to 80% in 2000 respectively (Tables 6.1 and 6.2). This may be helped by an increasing sense of ‘Englishness’ too (see Table 6.1). With a breakdown by social class, McCrone (2001a:166), using data from the Scottish Election Survey, concludes: ‘there is a stronger sense of being Scottish among the working class’ (see also Brown et al. (1999:62)). Table 6.3 shows this in full, where between 68% and 72% of the working class consider themselves at least more Scottish than British. b) ‘Radical Scotland’ Chapter 4 demonstrated that across an array of ‘industrial’ and social attitudes, people in Scotland have adopted relatively more radical positions than those elsewhere, where ‘elsewhere’ equates to the average in the rest of Britain. However, this difference was less marked when regional breakdowns are used to compare Scotland to other regions within the rest of Britain. Moreover, because these regionalized data were not disaggregated for the influence of social class or industrial structure, care needs to be taken even here in trying to read relative degrees of radicalism straight off these data. c) ‘Scottish Radicalism’ Tables 6.4 and 6.5 demonstrate two points. First, that those people in Scotland who see or define themselves as ‘Scottish’ are more left wing than those in Scotland who see or define themselves as equally Scottish or British or predominantly British or those in the rest of Britain who define themselves as British. Secondly, that those people in England who see or define themselves as ‘English’ are more left wing than those in Scotland who see or define themselves as equally Scottish or British or predominantly British. Relatedly, those who identify themselves as Scottish are less likely to vote Conservative (McCrone 2001a:166)

112

Year/% choosing Scotland

1992

1997

1999

2000

2001

n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a

7 17 45 14 9 5

17 15 37 11 14 3

19 14 34 14 12 5

17 13 42 9 11 n/a

England 19 40 33 3 3 1

23 38 27 4 4 2

32 35 22 3 4 3

37 31 21 3 4 4

36 30 24 3 3 4

English not British More English than British Equally English and British More British than English British not English Other

113

Sources: Bond and Rosie (2002:3), Rosie and Bond (2003:119) and Curtice and Seyd (2001:236).


Scottish not British More Scottish than British Equally Scottish and British More British than Scottish British not Scottish Other

1992 1997 1999 2000 2001


Table 6.1 National Identity in Scotland and England from choices, 1992–2001

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Table 6.2 Forced-choice National Identity in Scotland and England, 1979–2001 Year/% choosing 1974

1979

1992

1997

1999

2000

2001

65 31

57 39

72 25

72 20

77 17

80 13

77 16

n/a n/a

n/a n/a

31 63

34 59

44 44

41 47

n/a n/a

Scotland: Scottish British England: English British

Sources: Bond and Rosie (2002:1), Rosie and Bond (2003:118) and Curtice and Seyd (2001:237).

Table 6.3 National Identity by Social Class (Registrar-General’s) in Scotland, 1997 Identity Scottish not British More Scottish than British Equally Scottish and British More British than Scottish British not Scottish

I and II

IIIn-m

13 36 33 7 8

19 41 26 4 4

Source: McCrone (2001a:166)

114

IIIm 32 40 21 4 1

IV and V 31 37 26 3 1

All 23 38 27 3 3


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Table 6.4 Social Attitudes by National Identity in Scotland and England, 2000 Scotland

Predominantly Equally Scottish Scottish/ British

% who say the government should definitely be responsible for ensuring everyone has a job % who agree the government should redistribute income from the better off to the less well-off % who agree there is one law for the rich and one law for the poor England

53

40

33

52

43

43

70

60

44

Predominantly English

% who say the government should definitely be responsible for ensuring everyone has a job % who agree the government should redistribute income from the better off to the less well-off % who agree there is one law for the rich and one law for the poor

Predominantly British

Equally Predominantly English/ British British

43

37

37

41

38

35

70

63

65

Source: Curtice and Seyd (2001:239).

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Table 6.5 Industrial Attitudes and National Identity, 1997 Policy Preference/% agreeing by group that The British government should sign up to the Social Chapter so British workers have the same rights as everyone else in Europe The law should set a minimum wage so that no employer can pay their workers too little There should be more nationalization of companies by government

Rest of Britain (not Scottish)

Scotland Scotland (not Scottish) (Scottish)

39

48

42

62

69

77

27

34

35


That said, Table 6.6 indicates that notions of positive association between members of the same class in Scotland and those in England have fallen significantly since 1979, while notions of positive association between members of different classes and the same class have also increased but not by the same extent as the decline. In terms of the working class, this has implications for (same) class sympathy and solidarity with workers in England. It is reasonable to infer that a significant part of this change results from the strengthening of cross-class identification following from the increase in ‘Scottishness’. As Table 6.7 indicates class association and identification ‘across the border’ is weaker among the manual working class and working class (as a whole) than it is among the salariat and middle class. Table 6.6 Overall Class Association and Identification, 1997 Association/Year

1979

1992

1997

1999

2001

Same class, English Opposite class, Scottish Same class, Scottish

44% 30% 38%

27% 45% 45%

23% 46% 46%

24% 41% 43%

25% 40% n/a

Sources: McCrone (2001a:167) and Rosie and Bond (2003:120).

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Table 6.7 Class Association and Identification by Social Group, 1997 Association/Year

All

Salariat

Same class, English 24% 27% Same class, Scottish 43% 41%

Middle Class

Working Class

Manual Working Class

22% 45%

22% 43%

19% 47%

Source: McCrone (2001a:168). Notes: ‘Salariat’ and ‘manual working class’ refer to social class by employment. Middle class and working class are self-ascribed categories.

When we turn to examine attitudes by class and occupational groups (Tables 6.8 and 6.9), ‘lower’ social occupations and the working class in Scotland are more left wing than those in England in most respects. However, these same degrees of differences are evident for all class identities and occupational groups in Scotland compared to those in England. Table 6.8 Class Identity and Social Attitudes, 2001 %/class identity

Middle class: Scotland England

Working class: Scotland England

No class:

54 49 54 47

77 66 70 72

66 55 57 57

59 60

66 63

63 59

% who agree there is one law for the rich and one law for the poor % who disagree that ordinary people receive their fair share of the nation’s wealth % who agree the government should increase taxes and spend more Source: Surridge (2003:144, 147).

117

Scotland England

Page 117

%/occupation

Source: Surridge (2003:145).

Intermediate

Supervisors/ technicians Scotland England

Semi-routine/ routine Scotland England

Scotland England

Selfemployed Scotland England

58 48

67 58

63 48

75 65

76 64

54 53

70 57

59 47

67 66

60 66

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% who agree there is one law for the rich and one law for the poor % who disagree that ordinary people receive their fair share of the nation’s wealth

Managers/ Professions Scotland England


Table 6.9 Occupational Group and Social Attitudes, 2001

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d) Cumulative Effects Controlling for the influence of social structure and by way of a summary of the data presented above, Brown et al. (1999:80) found that people in Scotland adopt positions that are more left wing than those adopted by people in England. They state: ‘Scotland’s apparent left wing position can be explained in part by social structure but also by a sense of national identity’ (Brown et al. 1999:81) where, it needs to be stated, national identity is more progressive compared to England and English-ness. Nonetheless, this assessment is then modified when the move to the left by the SNP since the 1970s and the SNP’s and the left’s (broadly defined) close relationships to national identity are taken into account. Brown et al. (1999:83) argue that this explains much of the difference, where there are no equivalent phenomena in England. But this conclusion does not detract from the reality that social-group and social-class structures in Scotland, compared to England, have helped produce the predominance of left wing hegemony whereupon national identity becomes cast in these ‘red’ colours leading to a fusion of left wing-ness and Scottishness. This is particularly true among the Scottish working class in Scotland but also true among the middle class, although in a less marked way vis-à-vis Scottishness and radicalism. Thus, Brown et al. (1999:83) conclude: ‘Scotland in the last twenty years has witnessed information supporting Scottish national identity and left wing values reach[ing] a new intensity, and so it is unsurprising that mass political values have moved in this direction.’

Smallness of community The recognition and influence of the particular social configuration of national identity, Scottishness and radicalism, in both explicit and implicit means, is facilitated by the smallness of the size of community in Scotland. This is not so much in the size of the population (around 5 million, with most of this located in the Central Belt) although this is a contributing factor, but rather in the closely overlapping, often interlocking, dense set of institutions of state, government and civil society which have generated a highly 119

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identifiable and tightly delineated public community. Thus, the public representations of Scotland and Scottishness are mostly easily identified through these institutions. Here trade unions, the STUC, the Labour Party, predominantly Labour Scottish MPs and many academics and journalists have punched above their weight by collectively creating a social democratic dominion that has won hegemony in public life in Scotland, which itself has been largely concerned with issues in Scotland and issues of self-government. This trajectory has been added to, and deepened by, the establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1999. Thus, a simple but powerful form of national identity exists for the majority of people within Scotland that is closely overlain by associations with left wing weltanschaunng because of the ascendancy of social democracy in public life. This is sharpened and solidified by the de facto dominance of public life in Scotland by that which exists in the Central Belt of Scotland. One aspect of this is worth dwelling on, namely, that the news media in Scotland is largely defined by a tight concentration of (Scottish) national outlets. This consists of three sets of newspapers (Herald/Sunday Herald, Daily Record/Sunday Mail, Scotsman/ Scotland on Sunday), one radio station, BBC Radio Scotland (with Good Morning Scotland, in particular) and two television programmes; the BBC’s Reporting Scotland and Scottish Television’s Scotland Today. Alongside this, people in Scotland read more newspapers per head of population than elsewhere in Britain and those newspapers that are read are the predominantly native Scottish press (MacInnes 1992, Meech and Kilborn 1992: 255, Smith 1994). Taken together with the focus of the Scottish media or media in Scotland, because of its raison d’être, necessarily concentrating on issues and events within Scotland, often to the marginalization of events elsewhere, a powerful and persuasive ‘goldfish-bowl’ effect of narrowed horizons has been created. Instances can become elevated into traits and stereotypes disseminated. For example, Law (2001a) argued that, for the press in Scotland, a form of persuasive and pervasive banal nationalism exists, this being at one and the same time superficial, deeply embedded and influential in reinforcing and replicating national community, national identity and Scottishness. Between the media, the journalists are a relatively delimited group, which often moves 120


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back and forth between them, reinforcing a high degree of introspection. Consequently, the impression of radicalism in Scotland is easily created through a specific focus on events within Scotland and their relationship with national identity where strikes and conflict, as opposed to quiescence and peace, are deemed to be noteworthy and thus are given coverage. Cases in point are a series of highprofile, non-all-Britain industrial disputes, ranging from Timex (1993) to Glacier (1996) to the north Glasgow hospital workers (2002).

Industrial radicalism and national identity How does this discussion relate to that of the evidence of industrial radicalism? With the dominant ethos of social democracy projected through national identity, and indeed strengthened by it, manifestations of industrial radicalism have been assumed to fit with, or have gravitated towards, the traditions of social democracy. Indeed, they have been assumed to confirm and support these traditions. The latter are then associated with and projected through national identity, providing the last link in the chain. The radicalism of Scottishness, as outlined, is replenished and reconfirmed for many by the evidence of industrial radicalism. To help understand this process further, we can take the equally well-entrenched traditions of social democracy in Merseyside, Greater Manchester/ Lancashire, Tyne and Wear, and South Yorkshire. With a weaker form of identity, that is, a regional rather than a national one, supported by less well-defined public institutions distinct to those regions, the association with radicalism for those populaces within their geographical confines are often not so sharp or deep-seated. Merseyside may be the exception here because of genuinely more pronounced industrial radicalism (see Darlington (1994:chapter 3), Lane (1987), Smith (1984), Taaffe (1995), Taaffe and Mulhearn (1988)).

Aspects of association There are three aspects of history in Scotland and historical analysis of Scotland which require examination to help understand 121

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why many people in contemporary Scotland who favour and campaign for radical social change look to the past to inform the present and the present to confirm the past. These are the legacy of ‘Red Clydeside’, the association of Scotland with radicalism, and the Communist Party interpretation of Scottish history. Howell (1991:204), writing about the Independent Labour Party, argued: Left-wing factions . . . claim a commitment to the radical remaking of society, but they are also creatures of tradition. They look to their predecessors both for inspiration and for tactical lessons . . . If the idea of invention of tradition can be applied to nations, it can also be applied to parties of the left.

Calder (2002:163) refers to the ‘myth of origin’, with regard to radicalism in Scotland, as a means by which the present is supported by the past and the past is brought forward to the present. Craig (2003:ix, 171) argues that a ‘utopian streak’ has permeated society in Scotland, made possible by preponderance towards collectivism of different hues. Similarly, Kerevan (2003) suggests that the SSP, as with the ILP (primarily based in Greater Glasgow), is part of a longstanding tradition of ‘romantic Scotland’. All four writers help create an understanding of why both legacies of ‘red’ and radicalism are so potent. They represent a lens through which many look at the labour, political and social history of contemporary Scotland. The legacy of ‘Red Clydeside’ and John MacLean The meaning and legacy of ‘Red Clydeside’ has been keenly studied and fought over in the last thirty years. It still continues to be so (see, for example, McIvor (2004)). Marr (1992:58) commented: ‘In the 1980s and 1990s there has been a lot of learned argy-bargy about whether “Red Clydeside” was an overblown myth or whether there really was a potential revolution waiting to occur’, while Harvie (1981a:31) argued: ‘The legend [of Red Clydeside] has taken over’, and Melling (1983:112) contended: ‘the “Red Clydeside” era . . . passed into the realm of contemporary legend before the ink was 122


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dry on the biographies of its leading lights’. Others speak of the ‘Red Clydeside myth’ (Pittock 2003:261) and the ‘legend of Red Clydeside’ (Lynch 2001:424). Indeed, debate over the heritage of ‘Red Clydeside’ has run like a fault line through much writing about political economy and history in Scotland, linking, in different ways, the period before, during and after the First World War with that of post-Second World War Scotland, and particularly the period since the 1970s. That we can talk of a continuing debate about ‘Red Clydeside’ is some indication of its perceived relevance to society in Scotland over seventy years later; for example, Scotland on Sunday (4 May 2003) reported that Tommy Sheridan was seen by some ‘as symbolic of the spirit of Red Clydeside in the new Scottish Parliament’. The salience of ‘Red Clydeside’ to the study of industrial relations and trade unionism in post-Second World War Scotland lies in the related propositions that a) the behaviour and activities of workers of 1910–24 have influenced those of workers in the post1945 period; b) that lessons drawn from the period 1910–24 have a ‘positive role’ to play in shaping our understanding of the post1945 period; and c) that contemporary left wing union activists, political activists and thinkers seek inspiration and sustenance from 1910–24 to mobilize themselves and others in campaigns and struggles. That there is little direct evidence of the first proposition is no great surprise. Neither does ‘history’ repeat itself, nor do the ripples from events remain strong and tangible, not least because of intermediate and intervening social processes and outcomes. Of course, that does not preclude influence on the popular psyche or on the construction of traditions. By contrast, there is considerable evidence of the latter two propositions. Fry (1991:4) stated: ‘There is a persistent devotion to a figure like John MacLean’, and Harvie and Jones (2000:32) observed: ‘Red Clydeside is still iconic for British socialism’, reminding us that Jim Sillars and Alex Neil of the SNP called themselves the ‘new Clydesiders’ in the late 1980s (Harvie and Jones 2000:32, 156), albeit of the Maxton and Wheatley ilk. Moving to the third proposition, a considerable number of writers explicitly consider the issues at hand. McKay (1996:86) asked and argued: 123

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Why is the issue of the ‘Red Clydeside’ still so important? The answer is that those of us who study ‘labour history’, not just as a subject for academic research, but as a living continuity at the centre of our lives, look to those past struggles of our class to find inspiration and hope, so as to find the way forward out of this capitalist prison.

Ripley and McHugh (1989:1) commented: The past twenty years have witnessed a remarkable revival of interest in the political career of John MacLean. To some extent this is due to the revival of nationalist sentiment in Scotland, where the figure of MacLean provides a talisman and inspirational force for socialists seeking again to find a synthesis between Marxist and nationalist political forces. Intellectual bankruptcy in the Labour Party and the fading appeal of the Communist Party have stimulated the search for new departures and ‘old gods’ to personify them.

Howell (1986:157, 158) stated: [M]artyrdom . . . can improve the chances of posthumous political influence, but its direction depends heavily on who establishes control over the legacy . . . Radical revisions of such images and verdicts have been fuelled not simply by further historical research, but also by more immediate political concerns. The failures of Labour Governments in the sixties, the decay of Labour’s Scottish organisation, the growth of the Scottish National Party; together these could facilitate a growing belief within some sections of the Scottish Left that a concern with national independence was relevant to socialist strategy. Such an emphasis inevitably generated interest in possible precursors. MacLean was an obvious candidate. The British context provided another inducement to reconsider MacLean. Disillusion with both Labourism and orthodox Communism provoked quests for suppressed options free from the stultifying compromises of one, and the moral degeneration of the other. Once again MacLean could be presented as a significant figure, marginalised in those vital post-1918 years when arguably the basic structures and strategies of the modern British Left had been established. Now that the failures of these dominant strategies were apparent, why not return to the politics of someone who had stood out against such developments.

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Damer (1984:201), reviewing Iain McLeans’s The Legend of Red Clydeside, stated: [John MacLean’s] writings are an inspiration to young Scottish revolutionary socialists, many of whom think that MacLean’s notions of a Scottish Workers’ Republic are on the political agenda in 1984. He has always been an inspiration to Scottish socialists. John MacLean is deeply embedded in the political culture of Clydeside working people.

McLean (1994:98) commented that: ‘A quarter of a century on, I am pleased that my [The Legend of Red Clydeside] still excites controversy’ and argued (McLean 2000:2), on the publication of a revised, second edition of this book: ‘The legend of Red Clydeside is hanging on grimly in modern Scottish life, even – or perhaps especially – in our brave new moment of Scottish democracy.’ (see also his article in the Sunday Herald (30 January 2000)). Law (2002:273, 274) posited that: Ideological struggles continue over the legacy of the Red Clyde. A native sense of Scottish distinctiveness is mixed into this potent stuff by various sections of the Scottish Left, extending from tiny groups of Scottish republicans to as far in the other direction as the current Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown . . . [T]he left-nativist tradition in Scotland . . . seeks to fill in historical time with ‘unique’ Scottish labour content and the historically ‘progressive’ nature of Scottish nationalism.

Finally, Hearn (2000:45, 46) argued: ‘In Scottish left lore, for which [Red Clydeside] is central, Bolshevism was indeed on the threshold . . . and MacLean is a major icon of, and martyr to the cause of socialist nationalism.’ Elsewhere, Brotherstone (1988:17–19, 1989a:112, 1989b:115–16, 1992:65, 74) argued that the issues that John MacLean grappled with and the results of this practical and intellectual grappling have a resonance with the contemporary problems facing socialists in Scotland (and elsewhere). In sum, he argues for a link of then and now. Young (1987:chapter 4, 1988:chapter 1, 1992:chapter 9) argues a similar case, sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly. Of the former, Young (1998:121) argued: ‘The real importance of 125

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MacLean for 1998 is that he offered people a radical vision of a better world to come.’ Sherry (1998:58–9) contended: ‘Today a new generation are attracted to MacLean the revolutionary . . . His appeal is more relevant than ever. It cannot be allowed to rest passively in the history books’ (see also Scottish Socialist Voice, 30 November 2001, 27 August 2004). Smith (1984:32) stated the claim that, in terms of Glasgow, understanding this past helps inform an understanding of processes and outcomes thereafter (see also Mitchell (2005)). Unfortunately, Foster (1992a) does not take the opportunity to examine these kind of possible linkages and relations between interpretations of past events and contemporary popular psyche in Scotland despite the title of his chapter being ‘Red Clyde, Red Scotland’ in a volume called The Manufacture of Scottish History. The International Socialist Movement (1999:3), the de facto leadership of the SSP, argued that the story of Red Clydeside . . . does offer us a message of hope and a glimpse of what we can achieve. Red Clydeside does not belong to some dead past but to the living present. It is our responsibility to pick up the mantle left by the heroes and heroines of that time and to honour their memory by ensuring that their vision becomes a reality.

Tommy Sheridan (1994, 2002) made clear, in his autobiography and foreword to the republished Nan Milton biography of her father, his political allegiance to MacLean as a figure of inspiration and guidance (see also Scottish Socialist Voice, 6 June 1997, 4 December 1998, Sunday Herald, 23 February 2003).1 Speaking at a 20,000 strong anti-poll tax rally in Glasgow in 1990, he declared: ‘We are building a new Red Clydeside in Scotland that will not pay the poll tax’ (in Taaffe 1995:349). Even an unsympathetic observer such as Harvie (1981a:31) noted: ‘MacLean has become an inspirational presence behind Left-wing Scottish nationalism, the Scottish Connolly.’ Of course, these particular approaches and conclusions are not in themselves uncontested, either explicitly by Harvie (1981b, 1993) or more implicitly by McLean (1983, 2000) and Melling (1990). Harvie (1998:75, 133) states: ‘“Red Clydeside” was more legend than reality’ and ‘the legend of the red Clyde was just that’ although he talks about ‘red Scots’ elsewhere (see, for example, Harvie (1998:190)). 126


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In a number of aspects, John MacLean’s belief that workers in Scotland were politically more advanced than their counterparts in England (see Bambery (1990:34), Calder (1994:48), Fry (1991:164)) provides another aspect of the link between the legacy of ‘Red Clydeside’ and the wider imputation of a positive association between Scotland and radicalism. The interests of the Communist Party and the New Left and their subsequent perspectives on (and practice in) Scotland, Scottish identity and Scottish nationalism also underpinned this link (see Harvie (1998:164–7)). So too did the notion of cultural ‘Clydesidism’ (Calder 1994:230, McCrone 1989:168, 2001a:139) as the basis for a legitimate Scottish national culture, as opposed to the unhealthy and backward ‘Tartanry’ and ‘Kailyardism’ (see McCrone (1989)). McCrone (1989:168) defines ‘Clydesidism’ as the ‘search . . . for a national culture which will speak to people in their own terms, an integrated discourse which will connect with political and social realities in Scotland’. In conclusion, ‘Red Clydeside’ and John MacLean are important facets in understanding how many conceive of workers, trade unionism and industrial relations in Scotland in the post-war period. One aspect of this is shown by the considerable number of statements and comments by a number of largely politically engaged writers and academics. ‘Red Clydeside’ and John MacLean act as a prism through which many look at the issues at hand where a clear reference point is provided, whereby the past is projected forward to the present and the present is projected backwards creating a time line. This process not only influences the analysis of many but also their behaviour. Within the media in Scotland, what can be termed rather sloppy and unthinking journalism uses the stereotype of Red Clydeside to denote more recent events, often hooking these on to national identity (see, for example, Observer, 16 February 2003, Sunday Herald, 24 November 2002, 9 February 2003). Thus, the comment by Brown et al. (1998:140) that: ‘it is important not to underestimate the real and symbolic significance of Red Clyde’ remains true for a period much later than the immediate post-1918 period they were writing about. Thus, Hume and Owen (1988:40) concluded: ‘The dramatic history of Red Clydeside has helped create the impression that Scotland has always been more radical than England.’

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Scotland and radicalism For others, a wider positive association or causal connection of radicalism ‘then’ and radicalism ‘now’ is made, either as historically attested ‘facts’ or as guides to action. These associations between aspects of Scottish history and aspects of contemporary Scotland are most often found in the writings of politically engaged writers of the left, or as Fry (1991:143) calls them: ‘the Scottish school of fighting radicalism’. This is underpinned by a more widely held belief that Scotland is a more egalitarian, more inclusive, less hierarchical and less deferential society than England. A large part of the latter is attributable to the Scottish education system, where meritocracy and justice are believed to be strong (see Fry (1991) and McCrone (2001a)). To some extent this set of beliefs and values is encapsulated in the common Scottish phrase ‘we’re a Jock Tamson’s bairns’, meaning ‘we’re all the same, with the same interests’. Another aspect of this association and connection lies in the ‘complex crossovers between religion and politics [producing] a version of “socialism” that is sentimental and pragmatic [and which] still dominates the political map of Strathclyde’ (Calder 1994:157). In terms of labour history and trade unionism, this current of association and connection sees, for example, Young (1979, 1982, 1990, 1994) make continual, if implicit, associations between Scotland or workers in Scotland and radicalism, while paradoxically observing and criticizing ‘the persistence of the myth that “Scotland has always been a radical country”’ (Young 1975: 282). Young (1987:chapter 4, 1988:chapter 1, 1992:chapter 9) also makes sometimes implicit, sometimes more explicit historical links between radicalism of the past and present.2 Bambery (1999b:34) has argued: [T]here is a tradition which runs from the Radical Wars of the 1820s, through the crucial years of Red Clydeside and John MacLean, through the militancy of the Fife coalfield in 1926 to the great battles of the early 1970s, the fight against the poll tax and that at Timex in Dundee in the late 1980s and the 1990s. That tradition does not belong to the heritage industry. It is alive, pointing the way forward.

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From the perspective of the Scottish Committee of the Communist Party of Britain (1994a:19, 20, 22, 26), workers in Scotland were argued historically to be more radical than their counterparts in the rest of Britain by forming a party of labour in 1888 and a body of working-class unity (the Scottish Workers’ Representation Committee), in pursuing extra-parliamentary perspectives between 1915 and 1920 and over the universal suffrage in 1918. The Scottish Committee (1994a:59) believed that ‘the great tradition of democratic struggle [has lain] at the heart of Scottish society’. Fallow (1992, 1998, 1999:chapters 4 and 5) gives the same impression through the consistent and continual focus on radical and antiestablishment struggles. Cairns (2000) argued something similar, referring to: ‘the Scottish radical tradition’. Logan (2000:2), referring to many of the same catalogue of struggles outlined above, wrote that ‘[a]s a country we have a radical history that dates back many centuries . . . we in Scotland have a tradition of fighting against injustice which rivals that of any country on earth’. Something similar can be found in Kerevan (1983:29), Currie (2001), Smout (1986:275) and Williamson (2003). The SSP celebrates the Upper Clyde Shipbuilders work-in not only in itself but also as a continuation of the ‘red thread’, going back here to ‘Red Clydeside’ (see, for example, Scottish Socialist Voice, 17 August 2001). In the minds of left-inclined nationalists or nationalist-inclined leftists, these approaches often provide sustenance to positive associations of Scotland and radicalism in terms of dominant traditions and the majority of working people. Consequently, Cowan (1977:4) argued: ‘It seems to be that some on the left (including Dr [James] Young) are intent upon . . . creating the myth of the proto-Socialist Scotland.’ Elsewhere, Calder (1994:32) comments that Young, inter alia, did ‘not want to present history in [a] way . . . that will prejudice causes dear to themselves’ but that he also falsified the subject matter of MacLean and socialists in Scotland by ahistoricism and decontextualization (Calder 1994:49). Indeed, Young (1996a:10, 1996b:304) talks of a ‘militant socialist Scottish nationalist consciousness’ and that in ‘[t]he decade of the 1980s: Scotland remains radical’. In reviewing Ascherson’s Stone Voices: the search for Scotland, Lloyd (2003) makes a similar point, which focuses on a prior 129

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period, when he criticizes Ascherson. Thus: ‘To view the English barons as oppressors and the Scots as liberators is to confer on the latter a kind of retrospective social-democratic nationalism which is hard to sustain’ (Lloyd 2003:v). This kind of perspective would then make much for the current period of the revelation, under the ‘thirty-year rule’ making available previously unseen government papers, that government ‘officials were . . . terrified of further industrial unrest at the Upper Clyde Shipbuilders’ (Scotsman, 1 January 2003) if substantial government aid was not forthcoming at the time (1972), and that the Heath government explored the possibility of Scotland directly benefiting from oil revenues because of ‘a backdrop of major industrial unrest and growing nationalist sentiment north of the border’ (Herald, 1 January 2003). Although differing in hue, many of the aforementioned writers can be characterized as belonging to the school of ‘Scottish socialism’, where varieties of radicalism, left social democracy and socialism are fused with republicanism, national identity, progressive nationalism and internationalism. Historically, Scottish socialism begins with Keir Hardie et alia in the late nineteenth/early twentieth centuries and is continued through with John MacLean (of 1921–3), Maxton, the ILP and the works of pamphleteers such as Oliver Brown (Brown 1941, 1943, see also Bryan 1984:89–90), Burns (1940) and Ferguson (n.d.) up to the late 1940s. More recently, and notwithstanding important differences, the writers that fall into this ‘school’ are Gordon Brown (of The Red Paper (1975) and Maxton biography (1986) eras), Angus Calder, Owen Dudley Edwards, the George Kerevan of the early 1980s (see Kerevan (1983)), Stephen Maxwell, Tom Nairn of the pre-1990s, Jimmy Reid, Jim Sillars (founder of the Scottish Labour Party of 1976–8 (see Drucker (1978)), Tommy Sheridan and Billy Wolfe (see Wolfe (1973)). To conclude here, there is substantial evidence of the perceived association between on the one hand, Scotland, Scottishness and Scottish identity, and on the other, radicalism and socialism. The extent to which this has happened has led to a situation whereby it seems there actually is a positive association between the two poles. Consequently, Gonzales (2003:21), in light of a perspective which claims to stand against Scottish nationalism and separatism, has argued: 130


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The . . . [assertion] is that the Scottish working class [is] more advanced than the English and Welsh, and therefore capable of achieving socialism more quickly. In fact, this was only true of the 1820 Scottish general strike, which had no equivalent in England; since then, Scottish and English workers have fought side by side in every major struggle, and it is by no means the case that Scottish workers have always been the most radical.

Radicalism within Scotland The association of radicalism with the unit of society known as Scotland often obscures considerable intra-Scotland differentiation. And, of course, much of the image and reality of Scottish radicalism in historical terms is derived from Glasgow and Clydeside. Mostly obviously there is a rural-urban divide in terms of industrial, political and social cleavages. As noted earlier in Chapter 2, Strathclyde (particularly Greater Glasgow) is pre-eminent within Scotland as the major location of strike action. Without disaggregating for the influences of such factors as industrial structure, the west coast of the Central Belt rather than the east coast of the Central Belt, that is Glasgow/Strathclyde compared to Edinburgh/ Lothians, is generally regarded as being pre-eminent within the trade unionism in, and of, Scotland. Running alongside this, there are important connotations and overtones with (and between) Glasgow3 as the radical, proletarian city (see Damer (1990) and Mitchell (2005)) and Edinburgh as the moderate, middle-class city. Both have been expressed recently, for example, by writer Kevin Williamson (Scottish Socialist Voice, 28 October 2002, 28 March 2003). The connotations have some material basis in as much as the political and economic development of the two cities has been markedly different – Glasgow as the industrial city and Edinburgh as the centre of administration and finance. But these connotations of the radicalism and moderation vis-à-vis Glasgow and Edinburgh are derived far more from distant historical processes and analyses of them, albeit contemporary developments also influence analysis and perception. The election of Tommy Sheridan to the Scottish Parliament in 1999 as a SSP MSP from the Glasgow list constituency is the most obvious example but this should not preclude a recognition that, on the one hand, the socialist vote in the Lothian 131

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list constituency equated to the election of a MSP but was split between the SSP and the Arthur Scargill-led Socialist Labour Party, and on the other, Robin Harper was elected as a Green MSP from the Lothian list constituency on a relatively left wing platform. Again this type of balance was evident in the 2003 elections to the Scottish Parliament: two SSP list MSPs were elected from Glasgow but only (just) one from the Lothians list, while for the Greens, two list MSPs were elected from the Lothians but only one from the Glasgow list constituency, again on a left wing platform (see Scotsman, 6 May 2003).

Intellectual sustenance of radicalism and difference: the Communist Party The Communist Party pioneered a particular interpretation of Scottish history, the intellectual framework of which is best articulated and provided by Foster and Woolfson (1986, see also Foster (1992) and Woolfson and Foster (1988)). Dickson (1980b) and Smith and Brown (1980) also put forward a similar Marxist analysis while Wollman (1988) provides a critical review of Foster and Woolfson’s thesis. Given its role and activity in Scotland, particularly working with other progressive forces, this perspective came to be used and endorsed by a number of others writers outwith the Communist Party’s own ranks. Among these were the theoreticians of the Labour left in Scotland, the SNP left as well as the independent and ‘New Left’ dating from the mid-1950s. This section examines not merely the intellectual perspective of the Communist Party on the history of society in Scotland, its dynamics, processes and outcomes, but also the application of this perspective to political activity. Herein lies a paradox echoing Marx’s dictum of not only interpreting the world but also trying to change it, for the application of such a perspective helped materially to contribute to, or deepen, the semblance or existence of the perspective that was already argued to exist in society in Scotland. Therefore, the following considers theory and practice of what can be termed ‘radicalism as difference’. Foster and Woolfson (1986) argued that the structure of capital and capital-labour relations, and thus trade unionism and industrial 132


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relations, are different in Scotland than elsewhere in Britain. Their emphasis varies from the subject matter (capital, labour) in Scotland to the stronger tones of Scottish capital or Scottish labour. Their argument briefly runs as follows: the particular nature and configuration of indigenous industrial and financial capital in Scotland, allied to the particular structure of indigenous capital in Britain and the former’s relationship to the latter, under the phase of state monopoly capitalism, has resulted in a political situation more conducive to the left and progressive causes. This historical political situation in Scotland comprised a configuration of six interrelated factors. First was the more acute crisis for indigenous capital than elsewhere, based as it was primarily on declining heavy industry (see also Baird et al. 2004). Allied to this was the declining political influence of Scottish capital within the British state. Second was a heightened sense of national identity, often focusing on antimonopoly and class-based issues. The third comprised the political and social basis of the Conservatives especially, but also that of the Labour Party, being more seriously undermined than elsewhere in Britain. The fourth consisted of more strongly developed unofficial and independent trade union and political structures (primarily in the form of the shop stewards movement, the Independent Labour Party and the Communist Party). This phenomenon stemmed historically from the harsher conditions in which trade unionism in Scotland emerged and consequently the lack of purchase of ‘reformist conservatism’ (Woolfson and Foster 1988:23, see also CPB (1994a:21)). Fifth, Scottish society had had some prior experience of ‘class alliances’ and sixth, the coming together of these factors created more openings and space for socialist ideas as a consequence. The context of the 1960s and 1970s, bringing together this six-faceted configuration, saw attempts to use both the state and then the market (through ending state intervention) to restructure and rationalise heavy industry and encourage the electronics industry. In essence, Foster and Woolfson (e.g. 1988:24) argue that the national question in Scotland could be used as a vehicle not only to force the Tories out of office but also to end the hegemony of the right wing in Labour and the trade unions by creating a wider popular struggle out of trade union issues in ways that transcend the immediate ‘economic’ issues. The most obvious case of this 133

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was the UCS work-in whereby, using certain language and tactics, Communist Party-led and influenced stewards shaped and maintained control over a significant grass-roots campaign (see also Foster and Woolfson (1999)). A weaker version was played out in the case of Caterpillar (Woolfson and Foster 1988). The critical point to note about this sophisticated argument, whatever its wider merits and demerits, is that it did not, in the main, emphasize ‘Scottishness’ per se, even where the argument is much condensed and strengthened (see Foster (1992:232–5)). Rather it emphasized the contingent nature of class structures, class relations and class dynamics within Scotland. This did not mean that such proposed class alliances needed to be founded upon ‘nationalism’ per se but upon an identification of differing ‘common’ and ‘compatible’ interests throughout and among different groups in Britain (see Communist Party (1978) and Foster and Woolfson (1988)). Occasionally, Foster and Woolfson’s argument borders on a quasi-nationalist sentiment where it characterizes what may have been true in terms of political consciousness for some workers in Central Scotland as that for all workers in Scotland and for all of Scotland, and where it couches social processes and events in terms of Scottishness (Woolfson and Foster 1988:38,236, 279). That said, this perspective’s adoption, and political practice stemming from it, by the Communist Party and others did not stand on quite such fine distinctions (e.g. CPB 1993, 1994a, 1994b, 1996, 2000). The Communist Party (CPB 1993:24, 1994a:59, 63–4, 1994b:3, 6, 66) emphasized Scotland’s longer and more consistent democratic tradition of struggle for progressive ends, viewing this a prerequisite for socialism. And in this way, the Foster and Woolfson thesis recalled that the idea of ‘popular alliances’ originated from earlier Communist Party work, with the focus on building ‘broad democratic alliances’ as the vehicle to socialism. Consequently, the popular and public face of this perspective manifested itself, as Aitken suggests above in the case of the STUC, in both a perception and an analysis that workers in Scotland, allied to what went before in terms of impressions of radicalism, were more advanced and left wing in their organization and consciousness than their counterparts elsewhere in Britain. This type of argument came to be a cornerstone of left wing nationalism and nationalist labourism in Scotland. 134


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It is also important to note not only the tensions in and weaknesses of this ‘popular alliance’ as a strategy, which Foster and Woolfson (1986, Woolfson and Foster (1988)) do, but also its failure to secure long-term advances or gains (see, for example, Aitken (1997:295) and Wollman (1988)) as well as to recognize the specificity of the time period of UCS, that is a high point in class struggle in post-war Britain (Darlington and Lyddon 2000, McIlroy, Fishman, and Campbell 1999). Woolfson and Foster (1988:264, 284–5) do acknowledge this latter point but do not offer any comment on whether their chosen strategy still holds the same validity or is negated by this more recent change vis-à-vis changed industrial and labour market conditions, union retreat, and the decline of the forces of social democracy and socialism. Weaker versions of the UCS campaign, the ‘all singing, all dancing coalition’ (Aitken 1997:286) of the STUC, were deployed on many subsequent occasions with meagre results over the steel industry and plant closures. The Foster and Woolfson thesis constitutes the most convincing and credible analysis of ‘difference as radicalism’ and ‘radicalism as difference’ for the labour movement and society in Scotland visà-vis those found in England and Wales. It has a certain affinity to the notions of ‘communities of collectivism’ and ‘communities of collective action’ referred to earlier in Chapter 2. Whatever serious over-arching criticisms can be made of the Foster and Woolfson thesis, it resonates with the recognition that there is a considerable element of specificity to society in Scotland and there is evidence of radicalism and militancy in Scotland. However, what makes it controversial for many on the far left is that its application to political practice and the political practice following from it, and specifically the uses it has been put to by the Communist Party, the Labour left and others, has moved away from the thesis’s generally careful argument to become a fairly blunt instrument. Thus, what were set out as contingent and relational processes and outcomes have become something akin to iron laws and tablets cast in stone of Scottishness: Scottish workers, not workers in Scotland, Scottish society, not society in Scotland and so on. In a sense, the potency of national identity and progressive nationalism made this more than a distinct possibility. The evaluation of outcome of the cross-class alliances is another matter, and here the gains were meagre. To 135

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engage momentarily in counter-factual, there seems little doubt that robust and traditional independent class struggle would have delivered more, but the crucial questions hang around regarding whether such mobilizations could indeed be constructed. But it should be noted that to engage in mere substitutionist exhortation of calling on ‘leaders’ actually to lead does not take us that far down the road of answering these questions.

Four consequent manifestations To give an idea of the potency and impact of these three intellectual associations of national identity and radicalism, four areas are examined as both manifestations of the association and evidence of the associations. Nationalism in the Labour movement Progressive nationalism and national identity in the labour movement in Scotland has furnished another long-standing link between radicalism and Scottishness, often through the forces of the progressive anti-Tory alliance (see Chapters 5 and 7). This link was most commonly manifested in the belief in the 1970s and 1980s among many leading trade union leaders that a Scottish Parliament would be dominated by, and be for, the working class of Scotland. Thus, the STUC general secretary of the early 1970s expressed this as follows: ‘I am all for a Scottish parliament because – wait for it – there is not the slightest doubt that it will be a workers’ parliament’ (in Foster 2002:478, see also Marr (1992:134)) while McLevy, AEEU regional secretary in Scotland argued: ‘a [Scottish] Parliament, enjoying the support of the Scottish people, would become a fortress of resistance to exported Tory policies’ (1993:10, see also McLevy (1985)). Socialists in the SNP The presence of socialists in the SNP in the last thirty years, as a variant of ‘Scottish socialism’, has helped further cement the association and connection. Many have stood in the SNP under the 136


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rallying cries of ‘for independence, socialism and republicanism’ (Mitchell 1990:54) or ‘Join the Scottish resistance!’ of the early 1980s (see Marr (1992:107)). More latterly, the journals Radical Scotland and Liberation carried this platform. It is salient here to ask why some socialists are to be found in the SNP when it is not an avowedly left wing party and has few links with the organized working class. Whether of an organized variety like the ‘79 Group’ (see Lynch (2002:168–177), Marr (1992:chapter 5)) or just a collection of individuals (see Burnett (1975)), the explanation hinges on three elements. First, the perspective of Labour having ‘failed’ to deliver on its ‘promise’ of radical social change when in office (1964–70, 1974–79) and, in the 1980s and 1990s when out of office, of drifting to the right and accommodating to a Thatcherite agenda, as well as being too ‘unionist’ and British nationalist. Secondly, what the SNP offers is a party to the left of Labour and it offers a vehicle that can be won further to the left. Thirdly, that the prospect of creating socialism in Scotland is greater than any other part of Britain because radicalism, national identity and nationalism in Scotland can be married together into a powerful force to create an independent, republican and socialist society in Scotland. For these reasons, some on the left have joined the SNP, giving it a veneer or complexion of radicalism, and providing another link in the chain tying radicalism and Scottishness together. Cultural radicalism in Scotland In various cultural forms, the perspective of association and connection of radicalism and national identity is well represented in contemporary popular art, film and literature in the works of Ken Currie, Alasdair Gray, James Kelman, Peter Mullan, Liz Lochhead, William McIlvanney and John McGrath among others. This lineage can be traced back to the 1930s with Lewis Grassic Gibbon’s trilogy A Scots Quair, the work of Hugh MacDiarmid and James Burke’s Major Operation. As with before, there has been no serious attempt to analyse this representation of association, its roots and dynamics in cultural journals in Scotland such as Cencrastus, Chapman and the New Edinburgh Review/Edinburgh Review. Within these, the association and connection is both general and specific. In the above, Scottish people and society are 137

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predominantly radical while workers in particular are radical, often as part of ‘Clydesidism’. The Guardian (14 July 2001), emphasizing the connection of many contemporary writers and artists to the SSP, characterized this as ‘Scotland’s red rebellion’. The view from outside Scotland The view of worker and populist radicalism in Scotland is particularly forceful when it is confirmed or supported by credible commentators outside Scotland, and particularly by those from England. For example, the Guardian (7 April 2003), observing on the 2003 Scottish Parliament elections, commented: ‘Scotland is different, of course . . . Scotland has a tradition of high profile rebels, going back to the Red Clydesiders like MacLean and Maxton.’ More importantly, leading left-winger and now former Labour MP, Tony Benn, regarded trade unionism in Scotland as quintessentially left wing. He argued: There is a strong, socialist, Marxist influence in Scotland. The STUC has in many ways been more effective than the British TUC in fighting for the Scottish trade union movement. (In Young 1990:74) The Scottish movement was always to the left of the English movement. (Scottish Socialist Voice, 8 March 2002)

Referring to the dispute concerning the building of Ford’s proposed car plant in Dundee in 1988 outwith the national ‘Bluebook’ agreement with its trade unions, he commented: I could not believe that the Scottish labour movement with its tradition of struggle would be pleading with a multinational company to allow that company to dictate which union to recognise. (Financial Times, 20 April 1988)

Other authoritative figures such as Hobsbawm and Thompson (see, for example, Hobsbawm (1969) and Thompson (1980)) would probably also subscribe to this type of view. Subsequent to this, other commentators subscribed to this kind of line of thinking (see Chapter 7) adding to the weight of the view from outside Scotland. 138


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Conclusion A certain number of features in society in Scotland (primarily social democracy, national identity, progressive nationalism, size of society, the national press, previous instances of radical formations among workers) have been so configured by a number of social forces such as intellectuals, journalists, union activists and officials, radicals and socialists to create not only the ‘red thread’ as an interpretation of history in Scotland but also as a living ‘reality’ in the more contemporary period. Thus, the cumulative impact of the association of Scotland, Scottishness and national identity with radicalism and militancy, if not socialism, is a manifest phenomenon among and for many in Scotland. Red Clydeside and John MacLean have become part of the heroic iconography on the left in Scotland not only in terms of ‘image’ (for example the red flag in George Square, MacLean as dominie) but also as history. The Tories’ years of office (1979–1997) solidified and deepened the links of the anti-Tory left opposition with national identity and nationalism. Operating in particularly hostile environs – the most widespread and sustained offensive by the ruling class since the 1920s – those of the left looked back to the past to help inform their present and guide their future. The result was a fusion of radical and social democratic politics with national identity and nationalism in a renewed and stronger way. The ‘red thread’ covers many aspects of workers’ attitudes and behaviours (industrial, political, social). Because of the strength of national identity, the chosen unit of analysis is predominantly ‘Scotland’, with any radical phenomenon in the geographical area of Scotland having a tendency to be shoehorned into not only Scottishness but also the mantle of Red Clydeside. Where the association is most contentious or implausible – at the level of Scotland as a nation or society – the unit of ‘another Scotland’ is used to privilege radicalism above other images and components of Scotland to confirm the radical credentials. A certain circularity is created. This ‘other Scotland’ is primarily the Central Belt, which itself is heavily reliant upon Strathclyde. For those on the left, this association is intellectually and practically necessary for sustenance and inspiration. It inclines 139

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leading activists such as Wood (1993) and Curran and Smith (2000:8) to argue respectively that the left is bigger and more left wing in Scotland than in England and that ‘in Scotland . . . the workers’ movement had strong traditions of struggle’. While it is always easy to point to examples, they do not make a tradition akin to ‘two swallows do not make a summer’. The strength of the perspective of association is such that although there is not the remotest hint of left nationalist or nationalistic socialist perspectives, it is hard to imagine that tales of class struggle in Scotland (see, for example, Flynn (1978), MacDougall (2000)) will not be read by many as giving sustenance to or confirming the notions of Scottish radicalism (as opposed to radicalism in Scotland). Nonetheless, no evidence can be found that the representations of workers in Scotland as more radical or workers in Scotland having more radical views have led to obvious and tangible influences on their industrial behaviour such as striking or industrial tactics. However, the ‘red thread’ exists for workers and intellectuals, over and above being an inspirational resource. For workers on the left, it provides a model to conform to behaviourally and for both, it provides a way, if not actually an ideal-typical model, by which to analyse workers’ behaviour. Put another way, a ‘subjective’ interpretation has almost become an ‘objective’ condition: it has moved outwith specific areas to become a totality and heavily conditions how many workers see themselves and how they define themselves. Notes 1

2

The SSP celebrates the anniversary of the death of MacLean (see, for example, Scottish Socialist Voice, 30 November 2001, 7 December 2001, 29 November 2002, 6 December 2002). Nan Milton’s (1973) biography of her father John MacLean was republished in 2002 by the John MacLean Society, supported by the SSP and the Scottish Republican Socialism Movement. The SWP has also held meetings on ‘Red Clydeside’ every year at its annual ‘Marxism’ summer school since the early 1980s. Of note too is that the ‘Red Clydeside’ is also celebrated by the recent play and CD by Alistair Hulett and Dave Swarbrick. This type of perspective would make much of the first general strike in the world being in Scotland in 1820 and not that which took place predominantly in England in 1842 (see Davidson (2003) on this 1820 general strike). 140


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3

Glasgow’s contemporary reputation has been aided by the Workers’ City project to reclaim and promote the city’s working-class heritage to counter the official and sanitized ‘Glasgow: city of culture’ brand (see McLay (1988), (1990)).

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7 More Latterly, Going in a Separate Direction? Introduction Analyses of the present, no less than those of the future, are riskladen undertakings because large degrees of distance and dispassion from the events and processes at hand are usually required to construct robust analysis. But if the future is to be shaped in the present, then such undertakings become necessary. This has never been more so the case than with the concerns of organized labour and the socialist project. If carried out in an informed and cautious manner, these undertakings can be productive. The issue of ‘Scotland: more latterly, going in a separate direction?’ revolves around the creation of more radical and progressive developments with regard to trade unionism and industrial relations following the establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1999 and the possibilities opened up thereupon for a separate and distinctive trajectory to politics and society in Scotland. This may take the form of, inter alia, the strengthening of national identity and nationalism among workers and their attitudes, the strengthening of the way in which social processes and outcomes in Scotland are seen as being particularly ‘Scottish’, the growth of the forces of the left as a result of proportional representation for elections to the Scottish Parliament, and the development of a separate path in economic and employment matters under the direction of the Scottish Executive and Parliament. There are two principal ‘voices’ on the left which venture that both (separate and progressive trajectories) are possible and likely, namely the voices of the STUC and SSP. This chapter thus assesses a broad range of developments that may potentially influence workers, trade unionism and industrial relations in Scotland in the current period, with implications for future practice and behaviour in these areas. As an aside, it is worth recalling that when the thirty-year bar on government papers for 1974 expired, senior civil servants in Scotland were shown (in reports prepared for Labour PM Harold Wilson) to have been 142


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MORE LATTERLY, GOING IN A SEPARATE DIRECTION?

concerned that under devolution Scotland would become a ‘left wing . . . state’ (Herald, 1 January 2005).

The nature of politics in Scotland today To begin, an understanding of the contemporary nature of politics is Scotland is needed so that the developments considered in this chapter can be properly contextualized. McCombes (2001a), then editor of the Scottish Socialist Voice and chief theoretician for the ISM and SSP, has argued that the centre of gravity of politics is further towards the left in Scotland than elsewhere in Britain as a result of domination by Labour, the marginalization of the Conservatives and the attacks on Labour on social issues from the left by the SNP. Allied to this, McCombes (1999a:20, 2001:16) has also argued: There is a powerful class dimension to the national question in Scotland and at the same time there is a powerful national dimension to class politics in Scotland. In Scotland there is a strong class dimension to the national question and there is also an important national dimension to the class struggle.

This appears to be a convincing broad sweep characterization of the current dynamics, sometimes overt, sometimes underlying, of politics in Scotland. The import of this is that it potentially provides the basis for the actuality of, and inspiration for, manifest difference and radicalism in different spheres of society in Scotland vis-à-vis society in England. But the extra weight of real and imagined radicalism in Scotland in the most recent period can in large part be traced to the ramifications of the proportional representation mechanism (the eight regional list constituencies) for election to the Scottish Parliament. The Guardian (7 April 2003), for example, observed: For anyone who remembers marching in the seventies, even the banners and socialist stars bring back memories – never mind the brave talk of independent socialist republics, class struggle and promises to ‘tax the fat cats’. This is as old left as political language gets. So how come it is

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also the language of a young, new party that expects to win seats in the next election? The answer is that they are Scottish parliamentary seats, not Westminster ones. So far the Scottish Socialist party has a single MSP, the handsome, perma-tanned and beetle-browed former poll tax rebel Tommy Sheridan. After May 1 he expects to be joined by up to eight colleagues, making the SSP the only real socialist party with significant representation anywhere in Britain. The possibility of it holding the balance of power is not outlandish.

However, the actual process is more complex than this observation suggests. The realignment, regroupment and uniting of the left in Scotland into the Scottish Socialist Alliance and then the SSP was largely predicated and stimulated in the mid- to late 1990s by the prospect of gaining representation in the Scottish Parliament because of the agreement of the hegemonic pro-devolution forces on the use of proportional representation (alongside first-pastthe-post) for elections to the Parliament. Representation in the Parliament was not seen as an end in itself by the SSA/SSP but as a means to gain a wider audience for socialist ideas and to help develop extraparliamentary struggles. The success of this strategy in the election of Tommy Sheridan as a Glasgow list MSP in 1999 has been a huge boon to the process of increasing the support for socialist ideas and policies. Sheridan has shown himself to be a very able popularizer and propagandist for socialist ideas. Although the SSP is not ‘a one man band’, Sheridan has spoken tirelessly in towns and cities through Scotland, reaching a considerable audience, in addition to that which he has reached through the mainstream media in Scotland. The SSP has stood a wide array of candidates in local, European and Westminster Parliament elections with reasonable results. SSP membership has grown to around 3,000 in around 80 branches. This provided the basis for the extensive and forceful 2003 election campaign. Prima facie, this would suggest relative radicalism in a comparison of ‘Scotland’ against ‘England’ or ‘Wales’ as the Guardian (7 April 2003) suggested. Clearly, the left in Scotland needed to be large enough and organizationally sufficiently united to set in train the process outlined above. The comparison with Wales here is apposite. Facing the same prospect in 1999 of elections to the Welsh Assembly using the constituency and list seats with the same voting methods, the left in Wales was sufficiently weak and disunited to be 144


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unable to take advantage of the opportunity. But most importantly, what has happened from 1997 is that the left in Scotland (the SSP) has existed within an environment where there has been the credible opportunity to express socialist sentiment with the likelihood of a meaningful outcome, that is representation, in the electoral arena. This situation has not existed in England. Although it is counter-factual, it is worth considering whether the left in England (the Socialist Workers’ Party, the Socialist Party, the Socialist Alliance, the Communist Party of Britain and so on) would have reached the critical mass that the SSP has reached if it were presented with the opportunity of gaining election to the Westminster Parliament as a result of the partial use of proportional representation. In order to set in train the process of growth and profile, a critical threshold regarding size and unity would be required. Thereafter, some of the fruits of further profile and stature might ensue to create further organizational growth and influence. The point of raising this particular issue here is to say that we cannot simply conclude ‘Scotland’ is more radical than ‘England’ because of the growth of the SSP for in large part the SSP’s growth has been due to opportunities in Scotland that are not available in England. It is unclear, as of mid-2005, whether the relative advance of respect in the 2005 general election will come to represent a ‘breakthrough’ for the left in England. Of course, this should not detract from recognizing the ability of the SSP to take advantage of the situation as a comparison with Wales indicates. Here the SSP’s orientation on community and popular struggles has paid dividends. Nonetheless, it was a wishful, if exuberant, exaggeration to state, as McCombes (1999c:7) did, following the 1999 Scottish Parliament elections that ‘The stage is now set for a titanic and protracted battle over the future of Scotland in which the forces of socialism and Marxism can ultimately play a decisive role’, and just before the 2003 election that ‘Even three or four Scottish Socialist MSPs would have an electrifying effect on the new parliament and would set the SSP on course to become a genuine mass party of tens of thousands of members’ (Scottish Socialist Voice, 25 April 2003). A further rider can be added. If one looks outside the SSP to the rest of the ‘left’, in Scotland, there is sparse evidence of a growing, self-confident and innovative left milieu. For example, the writings of SNP MSP Kenny MacAskill (2005a) and the collection of various writers and commentators he 145

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edited (MacAskill 2005b) do not indicate resurgence or radicalism. The same can be said for the collections edited by Hassan and Warhurst (1999, 2000 and 2002). Consequently, there is a danger of over-estimating the degree of current radicalism in Scotland if the ‘lens’ of the SSP is over-relied upon.

The economy, employment and parliament: avenues for difference? STUC General Secretary, Bill Speirs (2001), has recently argued that the dominant social democratic tradition in Scotland, of which trade unions are a crucial component, will allow, through the mechanism of the Scottish Parliament, public policy in Scotland to develop in such a way that will be relatively more favourable to trade unionism than in England. Part of this argument concerns the high standing and worth of trade unionism in Scotland, its Parliament and Executive. Speirs (2001) contends that unions are seen as ‘good things’ in Scotland. Moreover, Speirs (2001) argued that despite employment and employment law being a reserved area for the Westminster Parliament, the Scottish Parliament has the power to influence inward investment through regulation (for example through grants) and employers more generally through engendering a distinct (industrial) cultural turn to create different employment relations. To this one could add that as the Scottish Parliament/Scottish Executive is paymaster in health, education, the civil service and local government, it has the ability to influence the industrial relations of these sectors. From a different starting point, McCombes (2001a) argues that distinctive features of industrial relations are emerging in Scotland. First, most trade unionists in Scotland now work for Scottish employers: All of these changes together mean that the vast majority of Scotland’s 650,000 trade unionists work for Scottish employers, including the Scottish Parliament, local government and Scottish companies such as Scotrail, Scottish Power, the Bank of Scotland, the Royal Bank of Scotland, and others. (McCombes 2001a:10)

although the implications of this are not spelt out. But this 146


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would seem to link with his earlier argument (McCombes 1999b) that industrial conflict will become ‘more fragmented’ compared to the ‘Britain-wide trade union struggles of the 1960s, ‘70s and ‘80s’. Secondly, and more importantly, McCombes (2001a:10, see also McCombes (1999b)) argues that there is a Scottish trajectory in trade unionism: But from the 1980s onwards, a combination of the general collapse of traditional industry, the privatisation programme of the last Tory government and the creation of a devolved Scottish Parliament have led to a breaking down of the all-Britain structures of employment that have prevailed from the 1940s onwards . . . While there are important exceptions . . . the changes are likely to lead to a loosening of the ties between trade unionists north and south of the border. In the future there could arise a powerful mood in certain unions in favour of much greater autonomy, especially if national bureaucracies begin to act as a brake on action by their members in Scotland. Instead of trying vainly to turn back the calendar, socialists have to be prepared to face up to the changes that are taking place. In particular, we should support moves towards increased autonomy for Scotland within unions such as Unison, as part of the general struggle for greater rank and file control over the apparatus of the trade union movement. That doesn’t mean arguing for the break-up of the trade union movement along national lines; there are battles that still have to be fought at UK level, for example against the anti-trade union laws, and on issues such as the level of the national minimum wage. There will also be local struggles which will generate solidarity across the UK and internationally. But the general pattern of trade unionism is likely to alter in the future, reflecting the wider changes underway in society as a whole.

To McCombes (2001:10) these are significant given the trend towards the unification of the trade union movement on an allBritain scale (see also Dickson (1980b:269–71, 281), Hanham (1969:116)).

Examining developments for difference What is the evidence to support these propositions and perspectives advanced by Speirs and McCombes? 147

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The Scottish Parliament The major development here is the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the STUC and the Scottish Executive on 15 April 2002. Prior to this, tensions existed between the STUC and the Executive over the impact on workers’ wages and conditions of private sector involvement in the public sector known as the ‘twotier workforce’ (see, for example, Scotsman, 4 April 2002, Sunday Herald, 14 April 2002). The Memorandum of Understanding formalizes, normalizes and deepens an existing relationship covering 1999– 2002, which saw the STUC vastly increase its role in consultation on matters relating to Scotland. First Minister Jack McConnell MSP commented on the Memorandum of Understanding: ‘What matters to us is making a difference to people’s lives and the trade unions have a key role to play in improving the lives of Scottish people’ (BBC News Online, 15 April 2002). McConnell argued that the Scottish Executive would work with trade unions in Scotland because it shares their values (Morning Star, 15 April 2003). Specifically, the Memorandum of Understanding provides further avenues for the STUC to influence Executive policies and guarantees at least twice-yearly meetings between the First Minister and the STUC General Council and the possibility of other ad hoc ones over and above the existing consultation and dialogue of the period 1999–2002. The Memorandum of Understanding agreed common objectives of economic development in Scotland, modernization of public services and social partnership (accessible at <www. scotland.gov.uk/library5/government/stucmu-00asp>). It follows on from a similar agreement reached between the STUC and the Scotland Office (under Scottish Secretary Helen Liddell MP) in September 2001. The Memorandum of Understanding was characterized by Speirs as one of ‘historic change in the relationship between organised labour in Scotland and government in Scotland’ (Scotland on Sunday, 21 July 2002) with the Sunday Herald (21 July 2002) arguing: ‘Scotland, . . . as in so many other ways, is a different country. The STUC . . . is currently enjoying the closest relationship it has ever had with government’. How significant is the Memorandum of Understanding? Aitken (Scotland on Sunday, 16 June 2002) reminds us that it is about talking not agreeing, and 148


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that the Executive has similar compacts with the voluntary sector and local government. Immediately after its signing, the STUC stated it was confident that the number of PFI deals in Scotland would be lessened as a result while McConnell stated that the Executive would continue using the private sector – indeed it has the highest number of PFI deals of any region in Britain (Sunday Herald, 10 November 2002, see also Labour Research (April 2002)). Following the Memorandum of Understanding, in November 2002, the STUC and the Executive signed a protocol which commits future PFI deals to provide at least the same wages and conditions to staff in the private sector as those available in the public sector. (See Speirs (2002) and Watson (2003) for further details. The protocol can be accessed at <www.unisonscotland.org.uk/briefings/ protocolapp1.html>.) Several points are of note here. Such increased costs may lessen the appeal to private companies. Existing staff under PFI schemes are unaffected, except where the deals come up for renewal, and the protocol does not cover staff under competitive tendering. Lastly, the protocol neither stops the STUC from campaigning against PFI, nor the Scottish Executive from continuing with its usage. Nonetheless, the protocol was signed in advance of that in England (Financial Times, 13 February 2003) for local government workers, with much greater ease, and it has resulted in a number of transfers of groups of workers from the public sector to private sector being rescinded or dropped (Morning Star, 21, 27 December 2002, Socialist Worker, 22 June 2002). Watson (2003:4), Unison’s Scottish organizer, characterized the protocol: Perhaps the most distinct Scottish aspect of the Protocol is that it covers all Public Service Organisations (PSOs) in Scotland who enter into a Public Private Partnership contract. Similar discussions south of the border tend to focus on particular services. Once again this demonstrates the strengths of the devolution settlement and our ability to tackle cross cutting issues effectively.

However, the protocol for local-government workers England is regarded as being stronger than that for Scotland in that it covers not only the terms and conditions of existing workers taken on by companies providing contracts on ‘fair and reasonable’ terms which are ‘overall no less favourable’ to those under the local authority but 149

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this formula also covers new joiners (Financial Times, Herald, 14 February 2003, GMB Press Release, 11 March 2004). The STUC (Herald, 14 February 2003) commented: ‘This agreement will be helpful for us. This is something we would want to replicate in Scotland.’ Following this development in England, the STUC successfully lobbied the Scottish Executive to strengthen its protocol on PFI (Sunday Herald, 9 March 2003). Speirs believed that the signing of the protocol was: ‘a welcome early demonstration of the benefits to be obtained through the memorandum of understanding’ (Morning Star, 14 April 2003), although the TGWU still criticized the PFI/PPP projects that were still going ahead (Morning Star, 2 April 2003). It should also be noted that the extension of the agreement to end the ‘two-tier’ workforce to all public-sector workers in England was not accomplished by the trade unions until mid2004. Another instance of the use of the Memorandum of Understanding concerns the fire service in Scotland. The Scottish Executive attempted in December 2002 to insert an amendment into the Local Government Bill which sought to repeal section 19 of the Fire Services Act 1947 which guarantees consultation over proposed station closures. This attempt was defeated in a vote in the Scottish Parliament (Herald, 8 January 2003). Following this breach of the spirit of the Memorandum of Understanding, its role in the matter was reasserted following talks between the Scottish Executive and the STUC affiliate, the FBU (Herald, 21 January 2003). Although of little comfort to the firefighters, and save Richard Simpson MSP’s comments about ‘fascist . . . bastards’, the approach of the Scottish Executive in the firefighters’ national dispute has been less critical and abrasive in tone than that of the British government (for example, in November 2002 and January 2003). However, over the issue of the possible imposition of a pay increase for firefighters in Scotland which would require legislation similar to the Fire Services Bill for England, Wales and Northern Ireland, the First Minister stated that the unwillingness to set in train the legislative process in November 2002 arose for practical rather than policy reasons and that he would be prepared to impose an increase if the FBU did not accept the current offer (Herald 9, 10 May 2003). Generally speaking, a similarly less zealous approach has been taken by the Scottish Executive over the ‘modernization’ agenda for public services. 150


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Of note are also the settlements awarded to the teachers following the (Gavin) McCrone Report and that to Scottish civil servants. While trade unionists may have relevant criticism of these agreements, their salience here is that they mark out industrial relations in their particular sectors as quasi-distinct from that which is happening to the sister sectors in England, either by being in advance of, or different from, parallel developments in England. Finally, the STUC has also agreed with the Scottish Executive to investigate, with a view to beginning, a formal and permanent social partnership approach. Venton (2002:8), the industrial organizer for the SSP, characterized the Memorandum of Understanding and the social partnership approach as ‘[an] attempt to create a Scottish Third Way . . . rooted in a more radicalised political situation’ of pressure from the left in Scotland. Others, such as Davidson and Gluckstein (2001:23), would arguably see such measures as constituting ‘a series of discrete token gestures rather the beginning of a golden age of reformism’. The Memorandum of Understanding and its derivatives are significant given the freezing out of trade unions under the Conservative governments and the, at best, arm’s length relationship with the ‘new’ Labour governments. They indicate important change in institutional relationships. However, they are of limited impact on wider trade unionism and industrial relations in Scotland. They change conditions at the margins. Put another way, the changes involve creating a role for trade unions as one particular social agent, among many other social agents (for example business, voluntary sector, quangos) which engage at a societal level in dialogue and consultation. This is not a collective bargaining role where unions can exert traditional forms of influence by dint of membership mobilizations directly to influence terms and conditions of employment in the workplace. This greater role may lead in time to a form of social partnership between unions in Scotland and the Scottish Executive (Scotland on Sunday, 17 February 2002). Certainly, the STUC is keen to become a social partner (Boyle 2004: 14), although its ability to do so is severely restricted by its small resource base (see Speirs (2000)). If so, this is likely to be predicated on a basis quite different from that in the Republic of Eire and more like that which exists in continental Western Europe. In Eire, a series of economy-wide agreements between the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) and Irish 151

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governments in the 1970s and since 1987 have lead to social pacts which, like the Social Contract in Britain under Labour (1975–9), put a ceiling on wage rises to ‘benefit the economy’, that is to increase the rate of capital accumulation. In Europe, what was called corporatism in Britain in the 1970s continues to exist where organized labour, capital and the state engage in a form of social and strategic dialogue and consultation which results in varying but less tightly defined agreements. The path in Scotland is more likely to follow the latter because there is no will on the part of any party to have social contracts, much less is there the ability to do so with collective bargaining decentralized and Britain-wide. Therefore, the social partnership will exist at the macro-level with relatively little and direct bearing on workplace industrial relations. But definitive judgement must await developments here. Another means by which to gauge the influence of trade unionism within Scotland over politics and society since devolution is to examine the numerical preponderance of former trade union FTOs and senior lay union officers as MSPs within the Scottish Parliament. Over and above formal mechanisms such as bilateral STUC-Scottish Executive meetings and dialogue, consultation exercises and the work of the Parliamentary Trade Union Group among MSPs, trade unions might expect to exert additional influence as a result of the presence of former officials and officers in the Parliament through having a milieu of unofficial lobbyists and standard-bearers. They might also expect to cement or more easily facilitate the exercise of that influence through this medium. However, this is not to make a positive and tight association between numerical presence, political process and political outcomes. The continued centrality of the British government, the coalition government at Holyrood, the establishment of a lobbying system for private interests therein (Schlesinger et al. 2001) and the decomposition of the social democratic project embodied in the Labour Party, inter alia, mean that securing trade union influence within the political process in Scotland is a fraught exercise. The presence of trade unions within the Scottish Parliament, judged by the election of former trade union FTOs and senior lay union officers as MSPs, is considerably lower than one might have expected, given the high-profile involvement of trade unions in creating a devolved settlement. At the beginning of the first session 152


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of Parliament in 1999, only 12 of the 129 MSPs (9%) were former union officials and officers compared with 23 of 72 (23%) among the MPs for Scotland (Shepherd et al. 2001: 95). Similarly, trade union membership was higher among MPs and Labour MPs (53% and 49% respectively) than among MSPs and Labour MSPs (36% and 24% respectively) (Shepherd et al. 2001: 93, 94). By the beginning of the second session in 2003, and calculated from The Scotsman Guide to Scottish Politics (Spicer 2004), there were 8 MSPs (6%) with such a background compared to 11 MPs (15%). In the case of the MSPs all in 1999 and 2003 were Labour MSPs, save Carolyn Leckie MSP of the SSP. The relatively low presence of former union officials and officers as MSPs suggests a number of points. First, that the trade union movement in Scotland under devolution has had difficulty maintaining its former institutionalized means of influence within the ranks of elected representatives per se and, specifically, among those within the Labour party. This contrasts with the more long-standing parallel form of representation within the Westminster Parliament. Secondly, between 1999 and 2003 (or between the first and second sessions of the Scottish Parliament), the trade union presence in the Scottish Parliament fell, as it also did in the Westminster Parliament. Thirdly, the professions (education, law, media, social work) have increasingly come to dominate the occupational background of MPs and MSPs. Overall, these trends in the make-up and background of parliamentary personnel conform to previously identified trends within parliamentary representation of declining organized working-class representations per se and the decomposition of the social democratic project, embodied by the Labour Party, where trade unions hitherto provided not merely personnel but also policy that heavily influenced political action. This analysis concurs, but only to a limited extent, with that of Laffin et al. (2004: 22), who argued: In neither Cardiff nor Edinburgh have Labour ministers encountered major problems in securing acceptance of their policy agenda within their parties, with the noteworthy exception of PFI in Scotland where concessions have been made to the unions over employment rights. The unions are also more important actors in Scottish and Welsh Labour than in national Labour and both administrations have proved more willing to accommodate union pressure than their national counterpart.

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Indeed, the Scottish Executive’s intention under First Minister Jack McConnell is to be more ‘radical’ in its public sector reform with regard to cost-savings, reorganization and numbers employed than much of that which is proposed by the British government under Blair for its parallel reforms in these areas (Financial Times, 2 September 2004, Scotsman, 3 September 2004). Trade Unionism in Scotland Today It is difficult to find evidence for the developments that McCombes identifies or that they have any consequential significance. First, the existence of ‘Scottish’ employers does not stand up to examination. All the major private sector employers such as Scotrail (National Express), Scottish Power, the Bank of Scotland (Halifax), and the Royal Bank of Scotland (NatWest) are part of companies that are all-Britain organizations (see also Barid et al. (2004)). Only in the public sector is there a case for what McCombes argues. Although the Scottish Parliament employs very few workers directly, it is the paymaster for many more (education, local government, social services, hospitals). One would have to surmise that the significance of this for McCombes is that the resulting focus of these workers’ attention on Edinburgh (Labour dominated) rather than on Westminster (Labour controlled) generates the possibility of industrial struggles that could produce a process of political generalization to the left and for independence. But, to date, there is little or no evidence for this. Secondly, there is little or no evidence for the battle for full or further autonomy inside cross-Britain unions in Scotland at present, and battles over pay do not inherently lead to support for independence and/or socialism. The battle for greater autonomy has been largely fought and largely won in institutional terms at least. It is hard to see it going any further unless there is independence or further devolution of powers to the Scottish Parliament given the implications of these for political, trade union and legal structures. While Unison has the most advanced form of organizational autonomy for its Scottish region, events in the GMB and TGWU in 2003–4 suggest that their Scottish regions now have de facto less autonomy. Indeed, the possibility (as opposed to probability) of Scottish-only bargaining and Scottish-only unions may result in the weakening of the bargaining power of workers in Scotland, as McCombes (1995b:7) 154


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acknowledged.1 Thirdly, and casting the net a bit wider, trade unionism in Scotland has shown no greater degree of militancy or combativity in recent years than other regions within Britain. For example, the Daily Record (14 November 2002) reported: ‘Scotland is the heartland of the FBU, producing many of its most active and militant members and giving strongest support for the strike of any area in the UK.’ The Guardian (22 March 2003) commented: ‘A senior fire service source suggested hostility [to settling] was lower in parts of Wales and north-east England and highest in London and Scotland, with the West Midlands considered a bellwether area.’ Later the Daily Record (11 June 2003) reported: Scottish firefighters have given overwhelming support to the latest pay offer from employers, signalling an end to the long-running dispute. Seven of the eight brigades north of the Border have come out in favour of the deal . . . Only Central Fire Brigade rejected the offer in Scotland, although the result in Strathclyde was close, 52 per cent in favour to 48 per cent against.

Meanwhile regions such as London and Merseyside voted against the settlement in 2003. Moreover, while the Strathclyde region of the FBU was one of the leading exponents of disaffiliation, it was merely one of several throughout the FBU. This illustrates the pattern identified earlier, namely that ‘Scotland’ is often but not always among the more ‘militant’ regions of Britain. Turning to wider dimensions, a number of developments appear to be of greater significance for workers within Scotland than those discussed above. First, Knox (1999:295) concluded his survey of workers and trade unionism in Scotland in the twentieth century by arguing: [I]n a relatively short space of time, the Scottish working class went from being one of the most highly organised working classes in the history of industrial capitalism, to a fragmented one as yet barely able to defend its economic and political interests.

Although arguably a little exaggerated in regards of both strength and weakness, the direction of the thread of the analysis that trade unions in Scotland, as the clearest embodiment of workers in 155

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Scotland defending their interests, have been and have become significantly weakened remains true. This must serve to influence heavily any assessment of the strength and vitality of trade unionism in Scotland. Secondly, the dominant pattern of strike behaviour in Scotland in recent years (that is since devolution in 1999) has been of strikes being part of a British-wide phenomenon. Strikes by hospital workers (medical secretaries, porters, cleaners), rail workers, bus workers, further education lecturers, and local government workers in Scotland find their counterparts in England and Wales, as part of a Britain-wide trend of relative re-awakening of organized labour. They are not Scottish strikes per se. However, some of these strikes took place in Scotland in advance of their counterparts in the rest of Britain but that is not necessarily to imply that those strikers were in the vanguard of their colleagues in England and Wales. Thirdly, the growth of the left in the unions, judged by the capturing of a series of senior positions (see Chapter 4), is a significant and Britain-wide development. Nonetheless and without decrying this, contextualisation is needed: it remains the case that strike activity as a measure of worker combativity and the size of the milieu of union activists in Britain is at historically low levels. Fourthly, the influence of the European Union social model is of increasing importance in employment relations. In particular, the Information and Consultation Directive which will take force in 2005 in a staged manner by organizational size, no matter its weakening through interpretation by the Labour government, offers the prospect of a method of opening up space to increase workers’ rights. As such this is a Britain-wide development and may suggest some convergence in employment terms throughout the European Union.

The onward march of Scottish socialism Scottish socialism can be defined primarily in terms of being a radical populism heavily imbued with notions of Scottish national identity. Taking the radicalism first, the world view is of, on the one hand, a predominant tendency towards ‘socialism’ as social democracy as opposed to socialism per se, and on the other hand, a predominant tendency towards reformism, gradualism and parliamentarianism 156


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as opposed to a revolutionary rupture whereby workers seize control of the state and capital and remake society in their own image by running it in their interests. Parliament in the former exists as the major though not sole focus for change (through legislation and public opinion-forming) while in the latter Parliament is viewed primarily as a means to develop extra-parliamentary struggles with a view of a revolutionary seizure of power. Taking the populism, the concern is predominantly of the people of Scotland, contra people in Scotland, workers in Scotland and, even more starkly, workers within the society in the socio-geographical unit known as Scotland. Scotland assumes the formation of a social group, unconcerned with workers as a distinct social group. This multi-faceted weltanschauung has become ever more persuasive with the rise of the SSP. The election of six MSPs for the SSP to the Scottish Parliament in 2003 reflected an increase in their list votes from 46,000 (2%) in 1999 to 128,000 (7.7%) in 2003 alongside gaining at least 5% of the vote in forty-six constituency seats out of seventy contested (representing 118,000 votes or 6%, compared to 24,000 votes (1%) in eighteen constituencies in 1999). Moreover, the SSP has gained extensive and often non-hostile coverage given to this electoral advance in the media in Scotland, and the national press (mainstream and left wing) throughout Britain. Nonetheless, the mainstream press (Scottish and Britainwide) commonly made the point of identifying the SSP as ‘hardleft’, ‘far left’, ‘militant’, ‘left-wing’ and ‘Trotskyite’. We can first examine the issue of Scottishness, by considering the following statements: We want Scotland to be independent from poverty, independent from racism and independent from nuclear weapons. Our new Scotland will be democratic and therefore a republic, independent from monarchy and inherited privilege. (Tommy Sheridan, Weekly Worker, 24 April 2003) The Scottish Socialist Party – Scottish workers’ voice (SSP leaflet at Scottish Trade Union Congress, Inverness, 15 April 2003, as opposed to ‘the voice of workers in Scotland’).

Similarly, the SSP’s 2003 Scottish Parliament manifesto and address (SSP 2003a, 2003b) and its newspaper (Scottish Socialist Voice, 11 157

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April 2003) spoke in terms of creating ‘a new Scotland’ and ‘another Scotland is possible’. Immediately after the 2003 election, Tommy Sheridan declared: What is happening is a new political force is being born in Scotland and that force believes the wealth of Scotland belongs to the people of Scotland. ((Glasgow) Evening Times, 2 May 2003) The wealth of Scotland should belong to the people of Scotland. (Radio Scotland, 2 May 2003)

and The people of Scotland actually believe in redistribution of wealth, they believe in trade union rights. We have shown that socialism is alive and kicking within Scotland. (Guardian, 3 May 2003)

In being sworn-in in 2003, Sheridan stated: I and my party colleagues were elected on the clear, honest commitment to an independent socialist Scotland – a socialist republic, a Scotland of citizens, not a Scotland of subjects. We will continue to fight for such a Scotland. (Morning Star, 8 May 2003)

This was very similar to his 1999 allegiance protest, where he stated with clenched fists: Before making this affirmation, I would like to declare that as a democratically elected socialist my vision for Scotland is it being a democratic socialist republic where supreme sovereignty lies with the people of Scotland and not an unelected monarch. (Herald 6 May 2003)

Other SSP MSPs were sworn-in to Parliament with an oath of allegiance to the Queen using the ‘under duress’ formula using Burn’s ‘A Man’s a Man for a’ That’, allegiances to ‘the people’ and references to ‘Jock Tamson’s bairns’ (Herald, Scotsman, 8 May 2003). The issue of a predominant tendency towards gradualism, reformism and parliamentarianism as strategies rather than tactics, that is to say a limit to the degree of radicalism, may be evidenced by 158


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considering the following statements. In the run-up to the 2003 election, the SSP stated: After May [2003], the Scottish Socialist Party will have a team of MSPs and an even bigger effect on the legislation passed by the Parliament. Quite simply, the SSP will campaign for the interests of the Scottish people rather than the big business fatcats who hold sway with all the mainstream parties. (Scottish Socialist Voice, 24 January 2003, see also Scottish Socialist Voice, 22 November 1996)

Upon being elected, Frances Curran SSP MSP argued that the SSP would: take the struggle off the streets and take the needs and rights of local communities into parliament . . . We’re going to open the door to the Scottish parliament and say ‘Come in, it belongs to us’. (Herald, 3 May 2003)

and work in the parliament is just one aspect, albeit a very important aspect, of our work as a party . . . we also need to build strong community bases and build organised support throughout the trade unions.(Curran 2003)

Alan McCombes explained: We don’t believe in violent behaviour, we believe in using the ballot box and backing it up with peaceful action and street protests to change the way Scotland thinks. Socialism in Scotland is about standing up for those who are less well off. (Sunday Times, 4 May 2003)

And Tommy Sheridan argued: What we’re saying is that in a future independent, socialist Scotland, we want to work on training, on skills. We want to offer a very high-skilled economy, a motivated workforce for big business. If that can work in places like Germany and France, where they have higher wages, better standards, and produce better products, why can’t that work here in

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Scotland? . . . I don’t think there’s a need to nationalise Tesco right now. What I think there’s a need for is to impose on Tesco proper wages and employment conditions . . . What we would be doing is regulating business. You don’t have to own it, you just regulate it . . . We very much believe in a mixed economy . . . we are very small business-friendly. (Herald, 30 April 2003)

Several points are salient in these statements and the values and perspective which underpin them. First, the ISM and SSP as political organizations cannot be credibly be characterized in any form, crude or otherwise, of being nationalist or Scottish nationalist (cf. Weekly Worker, 24 April 2003). There is no evidence of competitive national identity or competitive nationalism, where subjugation or hostility (as opposed to equality or solidarity) are pronounced. Rather there is evidence of progressive aspirations expressed often through national identity, where the ISM and SSP recognize this as an arguably more relevant currency than appeals to socialism in the abstract. Secondly, the use of the term ‘people’ is in part a recognition that those who the SSP seeks to appeal to and those who support the SSP are not all workers, some being middle-class professionals. Thirdly, there may have been some tactical tendency in the election campaign to be unwilling to be more open about the more full-blown aspects of the programme and policies of the SSP for fear of the electoral consequences, that is, voters being scared off. Fourthly, not all sentiments are expressed in terms of ‘the people of Scotland’ or the parliamentary path (see Scottish Socialist Voice, 9 May 2003). Fifthly, it should not be assumed that as a relatively young and new party, the SSP has come to a definitive judgement on many of the issues raised, particularly in the new environment in which it exists, that is, operating with not insignificant influence and carrying the aspirations of many. Lastly, the absence of spelling out exactly what the SSP believes socialism would be like (see SSP (2003a)) other than either as social democracy or as an implicitly but as yet unrealized transitional stage means that the degree of radicalism embodied by the SSP cannot be easily or fully evaluated. For the moment, it is worth noting that the ISM is a proponent of the orthodox Trotskyite strategy of a transitional programme, where SSP demands and activities (propaganda, agitation) are set at a level that is viewed as being relatively ambitious but not too far 160


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ahead of the majority of workers’ economic and political demands as to become abstract. The full programme is only articulated once the transitional demands (the basic programme) have served their purposes of a) producing reforms that deliver material gains; b) emboldening workers’ self-confidence; and c) highlighting the limitations of reform under capitalism. In this the ISM argues that a) independence can be used as a means by which to strike a blow against the British state and capitalism in Britain; b) the Scottish Parliament can be used as a platform from which to further the critical extra-parliamentary struggle; and c) the move to a ‘mixed economy’ is a necessary part of creating a socialized economy, that is socialist society.2 But these caveats accepted, the strength and consistency of the language over many years is still palpable and indicates the hold of, or presence of, what has been termed ‘Scottish socialism’. Social democracy as socialism seems to be manifest in the present. What is of particular salience here, given the SSP’s success in the 2003 election and notwithstanding that some of its support might be transient protest or contingent support (see Scotsman, 3 May 2003), is that the SSP has simultaneously and successfully tapped into and deepened the sense of Scottishness as radicalism documented in Chapter 6. Thus, the SSP has helped reinforced the basis for and perception of greater relative worker radicalism in Scotland vis-àvis the rest of Britain.3

Conclusion Examined from the stances of ‘difference’ and ‘radicalism’ in trade unionism, employment and industrial relations, the recent developments in Scotland arising from economic and political changes provide relatively weak indications, no matter how much the commentaries of others may suggest otherwise (see, for example, The Times (15 May 2003): ‘New coalition deal widens policy divide with England’). Arguably, judgement may need to be held in suspension for a further number of years to examine whether the potential that some expect of, and hope for, the Scottish Parliament in employment relations can be realised. Such a judgement will consider credible expectations, the nature of devolution (‘devolved’ 161

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versus ‘reserved’ matters) and results of legislation and public policy. In any case, similar developments have already been set in train in Wales (see Chapter 8). Nonetheless, the eyes of many in England have been closely watching political developments in Scotland. For example, Mark Serwotka, general secretary of the Public and Commercial Services Union, told a SSP election rally: ‘What you are doing in Scotland acts as a genuine beacon of hope for England and Wales’ (Scottish Socialist Voice, 11 April 2003) and argued: In Scotland I think the [socialist] project is far ahead of the rest of the UK. The success of the SSP is startling. It nails the lie that there can’t be any alternative outside of the Labour Party. They have six MSPs and a fairly good base across Scotland attracting support from trade unionists. I think that is a particularly positive development. In England we have the Socialist Alliance, and that is a project I support. But I think it’s also reached a stage where it has to seriously examine the way forward. (Socialist Worker, 5 July 2003)

Ken Loach, the left wing film director, made the same observation at an Edinburgh election rally while Bob Crow, RMT general secretary, stated: ‘Why should my members continue to support a party that mugs workers? The SSP is the now the best party as far as the RMT is concerned’ and ‘Certainly in Scotland the policies of the SSP are in line with what we would say are our policies . . . My point of view is that they should affiliate to the SSP’ (Scottish Socialist Voice, 25 April, 11 July 2003). Following the election in May 2003, various writers and commentators of different persuasions such as Mark Ballard MSP, John Bulaitis, Jeremy Hardy, John Marek AM, John McAllion, Dave Osler, Asad Rehman, Hilary Wainwright and Nick Wrack (respectively Morning Star, 5 June 2003, Socialist Resistance, June 2003, Scottish Socialist Voice, 6 June 2003, Red Pepper, July 2003, Morning Star, 5 June, 17 July 2003, Weekly Worker, 8 May 2003, Socialist Worker, 14 June 2003, Guardian, 27 May 2003, Guardian, 12 August 2003) have looked at the success of the SSP as providing lessons, if not a model, for how the left in England and Wales can be strengthened through unity and growth.4

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Notes 1

2 3

4

It is interesting to note here the SSP’s position on trade unionism and collective bargaining in Scotland (Venton 2003b). It is neither for the creation of separate trade unions for Scotland nor the creation of separate collective bargaining for Scottish workers where this involves the destruction of Britain-wide institutions for reasons of undermining collective strength (see SSP (2000)). The SSP does believe that such a situation may not always be the case, either as a result of political developments such as significant moves towards independence or as grassroots struggles against union leaderships. It does advocate further autonomy for the Scottish regions of trade unions as a way of increasing democracy and participation. These issues are more fully examined in forthcoming works (see Gall (2006, 2007)). Of interest is that the anti-war movement in Scotland was no more radical than that in England and Wales and not proportionately any bigger, judged by the size of the demonstrations on Saturday 15 February 2003. More recent developments in the SSP have somewhat taken the shine off its star (see Gall (2005) for an analysis of this). See also Foster (2003) for an analysis of the shrunken forces of ‘communism’ in Scotland.

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8 Comparisons with Wales: Uniting the ‘Red Dragon’ and the Red Flag? Introduction There are a number of salient reasons for examining the case of workers, trade unionism and industrial relations in Wales in order to provide the scope to produce some comparative insight into the issues of radicalism and difference in Scotland. The two ‘countries’ are of relatively similar population sizes and geographical spreads with relatively similar histories, in terms of relations with England and Britain-wide governments, composition and trajectories of their economies, prevalence of national identity, nationalism and nationalist parties as well as presence of significant social democratic and communist milieux. Nationalism and radicalism have also fused within, and without, the Labour Party. As in Scotland, there has been a certain fusion in political, if not organizational, terms of the Communist Party with the Welsh Labour Party. Wales has also had its socialist, working-class heroes, by birth or residence (Keir Hardie, Aneurin Bevan, A. J. Cook, Arthur Horner and Will Paynter). Plaid Cymru and the SNP have usually attacked Labour from the left but both have only made limited electoral penetration into the urbanized and industrial belts of Wales and Scotland. Given the importance of perceptions as well as representations of workers, comparable to ‘Scottish socialism’, the phenomenon of ‘Welsh socialism’ also exists (see, for example, McAllister (2001)). Moreover, Smith (1999) outlines the search in Wales for an authentic and socialized national identity, tinged with socialism and social democracy, in the context of keenly felt injustice, deprivation and grievance. Furthermore, society in Wales, as in Scotland, also has a number of institutions specific to Wales, inter alia, the Wales TUC, the Welsh Office, the Welsh Development Agency, the Welsh Assembly and national media organizations such as BBC Radio Wales, Wales on Sunday and the Western Mail. Finally, the dominance of south Wales in the 164


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COMPARISONS WITH WALES

economic and political public life of Wales, akin to that of the Central Belt in Scotland, provides another close parallel. Together these make the exercise in comparison sufficiently worthwhile, notwithstanding significant dissimilarities in terms of the particular configurations in the phenomena mentioned above. By contrast, comparisons with Scandinavian countries such as Denmark and Sweden may be interesting but the extent of known differences with Scotland in terms of longer and dominant traditions of social democracy, state intervention, workplace co-determination and so on make the exercise less fruitful, compared with doing so with Wales. Given that some of the relevant material with regard to strikes, union membership, union recognition and collective bargaining for Wales has already been presented in previous chapters, this chapter will focus primarily on representations of radicalism in Wales. This process of constructing representations of labour radicalism and union militancy is aided by the existence of the activity of the Welsh Labour History Society and its journal Llafur1 (Labour), akin to that which exists in Scotland (Scottish Labour History Society/Scottish Labour History). Various aspects of labour history and radicalism in Wales have also been reasonably well covered by the Welsh History Review, established in 1960. But as in Scotland, both Llafur and the Welsh History Review (and other studies) have not examined the relationship between, and often fusion of, militancy and radicalism on the one hand and national identity and nationalism on the other.

The mythology and past reality of Red, Radical Wales Much of the mythology and past reality of Wales as a location of hegemonic radicalism is similar to that of Scotland. Both had ‘little Moscows’ in the coalfields in the early to middle part of the twentieth century, and ‘Red Clydeside’ in Scotland is paralleled by the period between 1910 and the 1930s in Wales (see, for example, Morgan (1981), Williams (1985)). Indeed, Thompson (1992:179) writes of Wales and Scotland being ‘the old heartlands of British communism’ while Hinton (1983:105) commented: ‘By the end of the [first world] war unofficial [union] movements had a powerful presence in South Wales and in Scotland.’ Furthermore, Rhondda 165

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West has been the safest Labour seat in the whole of Britain (Morgan and Stead 1995:287). Left wing activists in Wales have also attempted to unite ‘the red dragon with the red flag’ (Keir Hardie 1911 in Morgan (1995:74)), producing ‘Welsh socialism’, akin to the process and outcome surrounding ‘Scottish socialism’. Republicanism, socialism and nationalism have also been united into fringe political groupings but the ideas behind the groups have a much wider resonance (see Adamson (1991:chapter 6), Griffiths (1985), McAllister (2001:chapter 6)). Evidence of past radicalism could be taken to provide current sustenance to those of a left nationalist romantic persuasion: ‘As early as 1891, 5½ per cent of the Welsh were members of trade unions, as opposed to fewer than 4 per cent in England and fewer than 3 per cent in Scotland’ (Williams 1985:242) and ‘The Welsh labour movement, the very stronghold of proletarian solidarity for so many years’ (Morgan 1981:345). The style of writing on Welsh labour and social history conveys the same kind of political engagement as that found for Scotland (see Smith (1980a, 1980b), Williams (1980, 1985:chapter 12)). Other similarities exist in the perspectives and perceptions of Wales as those for Scotland. Thus, the theme of ‘class as nation’ is also detectable in some writings. For example, Williams (1985:265) writes that ‘The Working Class seemed to have become an organizing principle for a Welsh people’. Elsewhere, the areas of south Wales and Glamorgan have exerted the same kind of pull on ‘Wales’ as the Central Belt and Clydeside/Strathclyde have done on ‘Scotland’, whereby the former also became elevated, indeed writ large, to the unit of society in many accounts and commentaries. These areas of Wales were also referred to as the ‘red belt’ (Jenkins 1992:364). The use of the term ‘militancy’ as a rather glibly used characterization of union attitudes and behaviour has also been prevalent (see, for example, Jenkins (1992:421)). Finally, the same process of many of the earlier radical labour traditions being perceived to have found a home in the Labour Party and labourist traditions exists (see Jenkins (1992:364)), as it has for Scotland. All these mean that there are striking similarities with Scotland. This can best be illustrated by Jenkins (1992:347) who writes, under the chapter heading ‘“Red Wales” – the Socialist Tradition’:

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For most of this century, Wales has been regarded as an extremely radical part of the British Isles, the home of militant [trade] unionists, of socialist or communist activists. The stereotype is composed of several different images, including the Tonypandy riots of 1910, the hunger marches of the 1930s and the career of Nye Bevan. The story of ‘Red Wales’ has been as richly productive of myths as anything in the development of puritanism or nonconformity. Not even his popularity as national war leader could diminish the perception in Wales that Winston Churchill was fundamentally an enemy, the man who sent in troops to fire on the miners of Tonypandy. The years from 1909 to 1914 play a role in the traditions of Welsh labour akin to that of the Great Revival in nonconformist memories: both movements have their saints and demons.

However, this perspective or interpretation is not without challenge. For example, Adamson (1988:7) argues: ‘Here in Wales, the connection between class and politics has always been difficult to decipher. A fundamental aspect of nationalist ideology has been the maintenance of the myth of a classless gwerin: a people united by culture and language, regardless of their economic position and status’ and Kimber (1999:5) states: ‘The history of all countries is surrounded by myths. But Wales suffers particularly badly. The greatest myth is that Wales is a land of harmony where classes do not really exist. Instead, we are told, there is a warm unity embracing the businessman and the unemployed single mother in Glyncorrwg.’ However, Kimber (1999) then proceeds to lay the basis of the ‘red thread’ running through and dominating society in Wales for much of the early part of the twentieth century. Again, like some writers on Scotland, the intention is not to support one myth or another but the effect is potentially the same nonetheless.

Still a Red Dragon today? Turning to the ‘reality’ of contemporary trade unionism and industrial relations in Wales, a number of issues are noteworthy. While both union membership/density and the extent of union recognition in Wales continue to exceed those levels found in Scotland (Tables 3.1, 3.2), in the 1990s the level of strike activity has 167

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been markedly lower (see Tables 2.2, 2.7). From the early 1980s to the early 1990s, there were a disproportionate number of single union, ‘no-strike’ deals called ‘new style agreements’ in Wales as a result of the batch signed by the AUEW and EEPTU unions in south Wales (see Wilkinson et al. (1993)). This tradition of moderation does not seem to have been transferred into a preponderance of ‘partnership’ agreements (Chapter 3) as might have been expected but this is not to suggest a move towards militancy. In terms of social attitudes (see Chapter 4), those in Wales are not the most radical. Rather they are among the most radical but there is a noticeable fall in relative and absolute terms between 1988 and 1995 (Table 4.2). The Wales TUC has not been such a significant player in society in Wales as the STUC has in society in Scotland. Nor has it played exactly the same kind of role the STUC has played. Established relatively late (in 1974)2 as an autonomous part of the TUC whence before it was a region of the TUC, the Wales TUC has, similar to the STUC, acted as a coalition builder and the spokesperson for progressive forces but its influence has not been so persuasive in this regard compared to that of the STUC. This is largely attributable to the differing configuration of politics and civil society whereby the nationalism and national identity of the aggrieved nation at the hands of a foreign (English, overseas) state and capital is not so marked. But just as importantly, the Wales TUC has acted as a major component of the ‘pro-growth coalition’ (England (2004), Morgan and Sawyer (1988:185)) comprising the Welsh Office, the Wales CBI and the Welsh Development Agency to attract inward investment of foreign capital by offering, inter alia, ‘sweetheart deals’ of single-union, no-strike terms. Indeed, the Wales TUC promotes itself as the guardian of orderly, dispute-free industrial relations as well as a player in transforming the economy in Wales from coaland steel-based to ‘high-tech’-based industries (see Wilkinson et al. (1993)). It plays a ‘practical’ and ‘pragmatic’ role. England (2004) attributes this to the impact of the defeat, and retreat, of the trade union movement in Wales in the 1980s, and WTUC’s search for a role in the context of its predicament of declining membership and divisions among affiliates. However, he offers no explanation for the difference between the WTUC and STUC where, by contrast, the STUC has been more active in preventing divestment and giving 168


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support to unions in dispute, alongside its role in wider social campaigns (for devolution, against racism and so on).3 These different kind of perspectives were played out in the ‘manifestos’ of the Wales TUC and STUC in the Welsh Assembly and Scottish Parliament elections in May 2003. The former concentrated on ‘making Wales healthier, wealthier and smarter’ (Wales TUC Press Release, 7 April 2003) through something approximating to a New Labour perspective while the STUC took a more social democratic approach. Therefore, it is not unexpected that the creation of a social partnership model in Wales has predated that created in Scotland. The Welsh Development Agency in the 1980s and 1990s had a standing agreement with the Wales TUC for the latter to become involved at an early stage in the process of attracting and establishing ‘foreign direct’ or ‘inward’ investment which, inter alia, allowed the Wales TUC to gain union recognition in most new plants as well as access to recruit these workers, albeit under certain terms alluded to above. This was part of a ‘growth coalition’ to provide employment through a structural transformation of the economy. In 1999 the Business Partnership Council was established, comprising the Welsh Assembly Government, Assembly Members, the Wales TUC and various business organizations. This was taken a stage further in early 2003, when the Wales TUC and the Welsh Assembly Government signed a Memorandum of Understanding entitled ‘Working Together’ (<www.tuc.org.uk/ the_tuc/tuc–6248-f0.cfm>) which sets out the commitments, roles and responsibilities of each party to one another, the benefits to accrue and a programme of Cabinet-level meetings. The Wales TUC and the Welsh Assembly Government also agreed five priorities: economic development in Wales, improved levels of education and training, modernization of public services, promotion of equal opportunities and social partnership. The Mirror (5 February 2003) believed: ‘The agreement will allow unions to help develop public policy and have a strong influence on the policies and practises of all the Labour-led Assembly’s departments and its agencies’. In signing the agreement, the First Minister emphasized: ‘the important role trades unions play in sustaining effective democracy . . . [and that] fair employment practises are a key to economic competitiveness and social justice’ (Mirror, 5 February 2003) while the general secretary of the Wales TUC argued: ‘This landmark agreement is 169

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significant because it cements the relationship between the trade union movement in Wales and the Welsh Assembly Government (TUC Press Release, 4 February 2003). The leader of the TGWU in Wales went further, characterizing the Memorandum of Understanding as ‘a community-socialist charter’ (Mirror, 5 February 2003). The similarity to the Memorandum of Understanding signed between the STUC and Scottish Executive is striking. Indeed, they are identical save the changes of names (STUC/Wales TUC, Scottish Executive/Welsh Assembly Government). The same can be said for the comments of the First Ministers, trade union leaders and commentators. Furthermore, the Welsh Assembly Government has also signed a series of similar agreements with business, the voluntary sector and local government as in Scotland. Finally, Rhodri Morgan made clear the positive role that trade unions have to play in Welsh society (Morning Star, 6 June 2003) in the same way that Jack McConnell did for Scotland. A number of points can be drawn from the discussion of the composition and complexion of trade unionism and industrial relations in Wales. The first is the seeming disjuncture between the high union density in Wales and the nature of trade unionism there. For example, union membership in the Japanese electronics plants is in excess of 60% on average yet the nature of the trade union presence is severely constrained (Wilkinson et al. 1993). But as Morgan and Sawyer (1988:179) comment: South Wales was still perceived by managers as ‘one of the most heavily unionized regions in Western Europe’ where belonging to a union is ‘as natural as breathing’ . . . [A]lthough this may legitimately be read as an index of the persistence of a labourist culture, little more can be read from unionization per se (e.g. ‘militancy’, ‘activism’).

The relative absence of militancy and the relative presence of moderation (low strike activity, ‘sweetheart deals’, the Wales TUC, etc.) are indicative of wider social and political processes that are not reducible to or explicable by data on union membership and strike activity. Rather, the latter are indicative and reflective of wider processes and at a distance (historically, spatially). Thus, for example, Adamson (2001:102) has argued: 170


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The South Wales region has continued to fuel a radical working-class politics expressed in trade unionism throughout the twentieth century culminating in the fierce resistance to the pit closure programme which triggered the year long Miners’ Strike of 1984–85. However, the closure programme which followed that strike marked the final chapter in the long decline of the industrial base which had given rise to the organised industrial work force of the region. The last two decades have seen the virtual elimination of trades unions as agents in politics and culture in the region.

Turning to wider political developments, Plaid Cymru trade unionists argued for the creation of a Welsh Parliament (contra the Welsh Assembly) as the way to defend workers’ rights by establishing Welsh laws and ways (Morning Star, 15 January 2003), echoing similar arguments in Scotland. Plaid has also attacked some unions for being too uncritical of Labour in the Assembly, offering a more radical approach (Liverpool Daily Post, 5 March 2003). In late 2002/ early 2003, the notion of ‘clear red water’ was promulgated by First Minister Rhodri Morgan AM as a way to distinguish Wales and the Labour Party in Wales from ‘new’ Labour in the run-up to the Assembly elections of May 2003 (see, for example, Financial Times, 26 February 2003, Guardian, 27 February 2003). Based on different policies and outcomes on a range of education and welfare issues, this concept reinforced the notion of popular radicalism in Wales. In conjunction with Plaid Cymru moving to the centre ground on many social and economic issues (Guardian, 14 May 2003), the ‘clear red water’ played some part in explaining how the Labour Party in Wales succeeded in gaining the ability to govern without the aid of the Liberal Democrats in a coalition. This can be contrasted with a broadly divergent path pursued by the Scottish Labour Party where Labour lost seats and was compelled to renew the LabourLiberal Democrat coalition to gain a majority government. Of course, the rise of the parties to the left of Labour in Scotland (SSP, Greens and the independents) also played a part here, and doubts have been cast on how ‘red’ the water really is in Wales (Socialist Worker, 5 July 2003, cf. Morning Star, 2 June 2003). Finally, it is worth noting the election to the Welsh Assembly of independent John Marek in the constituency election (with 38% of the vote). He also won 6% on the list election. Marek is a left wing, 171

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former Labour MP who contested the election following his deselection for the Wrexham seat where he was the sitting Assembly Member. Marek and his supporters have made clear their interest in developing close links with the SSP in order to ‘learn the lessons’ of building a successful socialist party in Wales (see Red Pepper, July 2003). Marek held a conference in August 2003 in Wrexham, attended by 70 to 80 people, to begin the process of forming a leftof-centre party in Wales. Tommy Sheridan was the key speaker. This process culminated in late 2003, with the founding of Forward Wales, a left wing, radical political party. Based in north Wales around Wrexham, Forward Wales has gained the support of the RMT union and has been joined by former Welsh Secretary, Ron Davies. To become like the SSP, Forward Wales needs to develop a cross-Wales presence as well as gain further elected positions in the political structure. So far, it has one local councillor in Wrexham.

Conclusion The purpose of this chapter has been to provide, by way of comparison with a broadly similar society, insight and contextualization of the issues of radicalism and difference in Scotland. The chapter has shown there are sufficient similarities both historically and currently between Wales and Scotland in terms of trade unionism, labour movements and industrial relations to make comparisons productive. The reality of the extent and nature of radicalism among workers in Wales is historically on a par with that found for workers in Scotland. More latterly, there are some marked differences in the extent of industrial conflict, albeit within a trajectory of overall cross-Britain decline where ‘militancy’ in Wales has fallen away. Along with the extent of new style and partnership agreements and the behaviour of the Wales TUC, organized labour could be characterized as ‘less militant’ or ‘more moderate’ than organized labour in Scotland. In sum, and put another way, the extent and nature of radicalism amongst workers in Scotland holds up well to this scrutiny with Wales, suggesting there is some material basis for claims of radicalism and militancy with this comparator.4 172


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However, if we change the terms of reference slightly, and look at the perceptions of, and perspectives on, radicalism, greater similarity between Wales and Scotland emerges. Viewed through the prism of national identity and nationalism, as many do, the ‘reality’ of radicalism transmutes into a stronger, more tangible and persuasive phenomenon and at a larger and higher unit of analysis (south Wales to Wales, some workers to all workers), again similar to the situation found in Scotland. This tends to mean that both the working classes and societies in both countries in their entireties become imbued in many minds (activists and non-activists) with the characteristics of redness and radicalism by virtue of comparison to the rest of Britain, and England in particular. What is significant here is that the strengths of national identity and nationalism are both generally weaker in Wales than they are in Scotland. Moreover, in Wales national identity and nationalism are more strongly located outside the main centres of population and employment than in Scotland, making them less working class by composition. The explanation for this potency may be found in the contextualization of the dominant type of national identity and nationalism as progressive by dint of its mobilization in the post-war period as ‘Wales against the unfettered operation of the market’ and in the post-1979 period as ‘Wales against the Tories’. In this there is a very close affinity with what took place in Scotland. Both currents of this radicalism in Wales and Scotland drew on the radical traditions of their pre-Second World War periods. Thus, Hobsbawm’s observation (1969:309) that both Scotland and Wales ‘had . . . tended to express their national separateness and aspirations through the radical and labour movement and parties . . . whose character was certainly affected and partly transformed by them’ retains its saliency thereafter. However, the outcome of the interaction of these phenomena has not been quite as strong and tangible in Wales as it has been in Scotland in terms of a positive association between radicalism and national identity. This principally arises because nationalism and national identity in Wales are not such potent forces as in Scotland for the reason that Welsh nationalism is found to be disproportionately located outwith the major areas of population compared to that equivalent situation in Scotland. For example, Williams (1985:302) 173

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argued: ‘The General Election of June 1983 exposed the myth that Wales, or to be more precise, south Wales was still some kind of “heartland of Labour”’. Nothing comparable can be found for Scotland. Notes 1. Llafur was established in 1972, seven years later than Scottish Labour History. 2. England (2004) provides an account of the process by which the WTUC emerged. Pressure for a WTUC developed as a response from grassroots union members and activists and local and regional union FTOs to generate a higher degree of autonomy and control in a period of heightened working-class consciousness and confidence, while at the same time more appropriately react to the localized, that is Welsh, aspects of general problems such as industrial restructuring and unemployment. This was carried out in the face of stiff opposition from the TUC. In the process, (Welsh) national identity was relatively prominent. 3. It is a reasonable inference that the explanation for the difference in trajectories between the WTUC and the STUC can be provided by the greater degree of embeddedness of left wing ideas in the Labour movement in Scotland than in Wales and, in turn, the greater degree of embeddedness of the STUC in the fabric of civil society in Scotland compared to that of the WTUC in Wales. 4. Broader contemporary political developments in Wales and Scotland may provide, in the eyes of some commentators, further evidence for such an analysis by virtue of the changes in welfare policies. In Wales, for example, the abolition of the ‘11 plus’ test for children and the scrapping of prescription charges are ‘matched’ in Scotland by the introduction of free personal care for the elderly and an end to student top-up fees.

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Conclusion: A Red and Radical Scotland? Introduction This book has examined two central issues, namely, whether workers and their unions in Scotland are more militant and radical in industrial and political terms than their counterparts in the rest of Britain, and related to this, whether industrial relations, broadly defined, in Scotland are distinctive or different from those that exist elsewhere in Britain. This dual task has been carried out because there are relatively widespread and credible popular and academic beliefs and assessments across the political and intellectual spectrums that suggest both questions can be answered in the affirmative. Therefore, the book has been as much about examining the attested facts about strike activity, union membership and so on in Scotland in a comparative manner, as it has been about examining the varying representations and interpretations of these ‘facts’ by a number of writers and commentators as ‘representatives’ of different strands of thought, many of which have particular weltanschauung and political projects. The arguments surrounding the latter have been particularly keen given a number of debates about workers and trade unions as agents for social change, workers and trade unions as agents for creating socialism, the struggle for Scottish autonomy, independence and self-determination, and the fusion of socialist and nationalist aspirations. This concluding chapter seeks to summarize and synthesize the conclusions of each of the preceding chapters in order to bring them together to form an end point. But as intimated at the outset, these conclusions must be regarded as relatively cautious ones for they only set out the issues in broad measure. Further extensive and detailed research and investigation are needed to examine and flesh out many of the issues. This would be centred round assessing whether there are important differences in strike activity, union membership and so 175

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on within Scotland along the axes such as different sectors of economic activity, different regions, employment status (permanent/ temporary, full-time/part-time), gender, and religious background. The purpose would be to assess whether it is sensible to talk of society in Scotland or Scotland itself being characterized as a single entity or how sensible it is to talk of society in Scotland or Scotland being such. All the time, these exercises would have to be carried out in a comparative way to assess the parallel situations and processes in other regions of Britain. Another task would be not merely to measure and chart changes in attitudes and views but also explain why people in Scotland hold certain views. Only by doing so would it be possible to carry out analysis within, between and across the different regions of Britain. With this, debate and discussion could be more fully informed. That said, this book has had to work with the materials currently available. What are the main conclusions that can be drawn about the two central issues at hand? These will be examined around analysis of the ‘hard’ data, the impact of Scottish national identity on interpreting the data, distinctive employment systems, the influence of Scottish socialism, the devolutionary process and the significance of potential future developments.

The evidence basis for worker radicalism A number of chapters, or parts thereof, have shown that there is some material basis for the perception or belief that workers and their unions in Scotland are more ‘militant’ and ‘radical’ in industrial, political and social terms than their counterparts in the rest of Britain (Chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7). The process that allows this perception to be formed involves taking what happens with ‘Scotland’ and comparing it to ‘England’ or an average for the rest of ‘Britain’. Thus, the unit of analysis is one society or nation set against another, where consideration of Scottish national identity and Scottish nationalism, implicitly or explicitly, consciously or unconsciously, are to the fore. Arguably this is not the most sensible or logical means by which to establish comparisons. If, however, Scotland as a unit of analysis is compared to other regions of Britain, it is more strike prone and so on than a number of regions such as south-west and south-east England and the east Midlands. But it is 176


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CONCLUSION: A RED AND RADICAL SCOTLAND?

not any more so compared with Wales and north-west and northeast England on a consistent basis across the issues and indicators examined. Furthermore, it can be reasonably questioned whether even comparing regions with regions is indeed the only or most productive method of comparison for significant internal regional differences are likely to exist. So there is a basis for the view of ‘Scottish worker radicalism’. But at the same time, it must be recognized that this arises because of the way the data are interpreted, that is, using a certain framework (national identity) and in a certain context (the fusion of social democracy and national identity). The ‘communities of collectivism’ thesis offers the most convincing explanation for oppositional tendencies within trade unionism within Scotland and a number of other regions of Britain, albeit this does not suggest homogeneity throughout these regions. The reason why Scotland, rather than other areas, takes on a noticeable ‘radical veneer’ is because of the fusion of national identity and consciousness with this oppositionalism. It is the missing ingredient that other regions either do not have or do not have so strongly.

Worker radicalism refracted through national identity What is special and different about Scotland is that this evidence of radicalism and militancy is associated and conflated with national identity in such a way that is not possible for other ‘left’ regions because of the strength of Scottish identity. The ‘community of collectivism’ in Scotland is more often than not ‘Scotland’, that is both the national identity and the unit of society known as Scotland. The lens of Scottishness is so strong and potent that it becomes difficult to be dispassionate and objective, particularly as Scottishness has often been used as a method of identification and mobilization contra Thatcherism and neoliberalism. Events and processes are telescoped into this narrow vista. This elevates the stature of the evidence to a higher level. Regionalism and regional identity of whatever hue such as ‘Yorkshireism’ are no match for Scottish national identity.1 In the case of Wales, while there is a parallel process of association and conflation, its outcomes are weaker than those concerning Scotland because the evidence basis for making 177

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the claims of radicalism and militancy is less consistent and less strong and the strength of Welsh identity and Welsh nationalism is also weaker. It is also apparent that there is a conflation of the Central Belt with the unit of society, that is Scotland, and in regard of strikes, a conflation of Strathclyde with Scotland. The Strathclyde/ Clydeside area, given its earlier legacies, has been able to maintain to some extent the material basis for this perception of radicalism. But why does national identity manifest itself in such a way? Why does ‘it’ seek to claim this evidence of radicalism and previous mantles of radicalism for itself? National identity is not an impersonal force. Rather it is a social force or construct that is contained within people’s psyche and weltanschauung, itself the result of the process in which they choose to, or are led to, interpret themselves and others in certain ways. What we are dealing with here is not Scottish national identity per se, but obviously a certain manifestation or type of Scottish national identity which is of a progressive, radical and social democratic bent, for the other form of national identity in Scotland is conservative and reactionary. (Of course, there maybe other types of Scottish national identity.) Put more precisely, the ‘progressive’ Scottish national identity contains within it many strands ranging across the spectrum from socialist to social democratic, revolutionism to reformism. Critical here are four factors. First, that ‘progressive’ Scottish national identity is the one that is either dominant in Scotland, or at the very least a powerful form of Scottish national identity. This is the case. Secondly, that ‘progressive’ Scottish national identity, because of its ‘radicalism’, requires that Scottish workers are radical vis-àvis their counterparts elsewhere, stressing radicalism as difference. This is the case. Thirdly, that ‘progressive’ Scottish national identity places a premium on the existence of workerist and populist notions of working-class Scotland and Clydeside-ism. This is also the case. Fourthly, that workers and the working class are believed to be central to achieving the goals of ‘progressive’ Scottish national identity, that is creating a Scotland of fairness, liberty, community and solidarity. This is again the case. Collectively, these factors have helped create: . . . systems of meaning in Scotland which act as prisms through which structures [and processes] are refracted to provide alternative explanations for similar structural [and processual] changes. (McCrone 1996:106) 178


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Yet four other important but different processes have taken place to allow this association and conflation of exaggerated militancy and national identity to exist. The first is that no or very little significance is attached to overall trends in strike activity, union density and collective bargaining coverage. Thus, it appears somewhat immaterial that since the late 1970s there has been a substantial downward trend in levels of strike activity, union density and collective bargaining coverage both within Scotland, other regions and Britain as a whole. Indeed, it may be reasonable to infer that as these declines have taken place, themselves constituting a significant component of the hostile environment which Thatcherism and neo-liberalism brought about, some refuge may have been sought by those of a progressive Scottish national identity bent (as well of those on the left) in demonstrating and believing in Scotland to be different – more strike prone, of higher union density and so on despite the declines. The second process is that of using a quite loose, if not populist, set of definitions of militancy, radicalism and leftwingness by which to judge attitudes and behaviours of workers in Scotland. If the model of militancy advanced by Kelly (1996, 1998) is used, then the militancy of workers and trade unions in Scotland is either weak or not present in any significant way. Some may think this is too exacting a measure. That view is likely to reflect ahistoricism and relativism. Widespread and significant militancy has existed in Scotland and elsewhere in Britain in previous periods, characterized by rising levels of class struggle such as 1968–74. To argue that those who take the highest levels of strike activity in any given period are militant risks having a very narrow definition of militancy as well as one that means even in periods of very low strike activity, there will always be some workers who are more militant than others. This means downgrading the meaning of militancy and lowering the thresholds, rendering the concept of far less purchase. The vagueness of definitions – radicalism, left wing – lend themselves to elasticity so that they become difficult to pin down. But any rigorous method of examining their presence among workers in Scotland and elsewhere in Britain would require these definitions to become theoretically informed concepts (as Kelly has performed with militancy). Thirdly, the process of concentrating on the interesting, eventful and non-peaceful times inevitably leads to an exaggerated notion of the extent of worker radicalism. Moreover, little account is taken of 179

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the importance of the more widespread periods and traditions of deference and quiescence. That no attempt is made to investigate why most workers throughout Scotland and throughout different periods have not been militant or radical indicates that those investigating worker consciousness and behaviour may be examining the issues from the wrong direction and asking the wrong questions. Chapter 6 provided evidence which suggests that the activist and politically engaged bent of many writers and commentators helps explain this tendency (see also below). Fourthly, little attempt has been made to disaggregate the historical and contemporary influence of industrial structure and its impact on the formation of occupational and social groupings, strike activity, union membership and so on from Scottishness. This is not to suggest that having carried out such an exercise, there may be nothing left that is distinctive about workers in Scotland in terms of Scottishness. But it is to suggest that it might be much less than it appears to be at present. Moreover, if the same disaggregation of influences was carried out for all the regions within Britain, it would help further extend our understanding of the concept of communities of collectivism and collective action, whereby the qualitative (nature) and quantitative (frequency) aspects of the presence and configuration of a number of social processes and outcomes could be far better understood.

Difference and distinctiveness Is Scotland different from the rest of Britain in the matters of trade unionism and industrial relations under investigation? In both historical and contemporary terms, there is little deep-seated or widespread difference between Scotland and other comparable regions of Britain as Chapter 5 indicated. That said, the strength of Scottish national identity is such that it can never be entirely discounted so that because it is believed by many (workers and nonworkers alike) that workers in Scotland (or Scottish workers) are more radical than those elsewhere, this has a salience because it becomes not a ‘reality’ as such but a significant socially constructed phenomenon for many. Thus, the most convincing sense in which Scotland is different and distinctive is through this type of self180


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ascribed radicalism. At present the most significant development concerns the Scottish Parliament. Some might argue that it is too early to make a judgement on the potential for change through this means. However, the strength of the Parliament at present is too insignificant across a range of measures (quite apart from the political will in Parliament) to make a difference. The question of whether industrial relations, broadly defined, in Scotland have the potential to become materially distinctive in the future will be addressed below.

The influence of the left on national identity: Scottish socialism It is evident that the forces of Scottish socialism have, sometimes consciously, sometimes unconsciously, created a ‘red thread’, putting a premium on the combative traditions of some workers in Scotland. Like lefts in other countries, the Scottish left has looked back to its past, that is ‘Scotland’s’ past, for inspiration, sustenance and guidance. No such premium has been put on explaining the considerable periods of quiescence amongst workers in Scotland or the hold of mild types of reformist and labourist traditions so that this is often unaccounted for (save, for example, McKinlay and Morris (1991), McLean (1983)). But this does not explain why the forces of socialism in Scotland mostly transmuted into the forces of Scottish socialism. Arguably, this was not because of the strength of the forces of socialism but their relative weakness, requiring that they relate to the more omnipotent forces of Scottish national identity and Scottish nationalism in an accommodating way that accepts much of the latter’s foundations as a way of trying to extend socialism’s influence and support. Part of this weakness in relating to national identity and nationalism in a way that does not dilute revolutionism rests on the numerical weakness of the forces of classical or revolutionary Marxism in Scotland (see Kerevan (1981), Maxwell (1983), Williamson (1978)) which may be regarded as offering a more conditional and critical approach. Nonetheless, and paradoxically, Scottish socialism has, over time, helped influence the composition of contemporary Scottish national identity and Scottish nationalism, leading McCombes (2001a) to be 181

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able to argue that the relative strength of the left in Scotland has resulted in national identity and nationalism becoming a predominantly left wing phenomenon. Thus, for example, Curran and Smith (2000:10) argued: Scottish nationalism is only marginally characterised by a crude antiEnglish sentiment. It is rather more the expression of the profoundly democratic aspirations of the Scottish people to control their own destiny. Historically this aspiration has always been championed more by the left and the workers’ movement than by the right and today support for independence is stronger among the working class and youth. It is, therefore, natural to fuse this democratic aspiration with the aspiration for social transformation. In this fusion is found the key to every project for emancipation in Scotland.

In political practice, workers and people in Scotland, among this the influential left of Scottish socialism, are fused together in a populist-cum-quasi-national identity and quasi-nationalist way. In turn, the impact of this process is to further fuse perceptions of national identity and radicalism together. The prominent association of radicalism with workers comes today mostly from the SSP, for as Venton (2003a:8) comments the left inside the Labour Party in Scotland (the Campaign for Socialism) is today weaker than it has been for many years and is weaker than the left inside the Labour Party in England (the Campaign group). Hassan (2003, 2004a) argued that Labour in Scotland is a hollow shell in membership and activists, as did John McAllion (Morning Star, 12 June 2003), while the Sunday Herald (12 August 2001) reported: In Scotland the activist base has, by all accounts, almost disappeared. The Labour Party seems to consist almost exclusively of elected members, councillors, MSPs and their staff. Real Labour membership in Scotland must be a few thousand at best.

McCombes and Curran (2001:7) believe that ‘the forces of genuine socialism have been able to make a far greater impact in Scotland than in England. The SSP is almost five years ahead of the Socialist Alliances in England in terms of both organisation and general influence.’ 182


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The devolutionary process A specific aspect of Scottish socialism has been its support for home rule and its involvement in the devolutionary process. Although the issue of devolution was apparent well before 1979, the attractiveness of the idea was magnified subsequently along the following lines. As a result of decline in strike activity, particularly successful, offensive strike activity, and the hegemony of Thatcherism and employers, reflecting a downturn in working-class struggle throughout Britain, militant oppositionalism appeared less able to oppose the attacks on workers and their interests. Consequently, alongside the nature of the drive to return the Labour Party to government called ‘new realism’, trade unions in Scotland also looked to the creation of home rule or devolution (an Assembly or Parliament). Through this means they sought to oppose Thatcherism by giving voice and effect to what they saw as the radical tradition of Scotland. But given their weakness, partly resulting from their inability-cum-unwillingness to construct and mobilize a powerful workers’ movement in Scotland and or elsewhere, this project of devolution necessitated the creation of a cross-class alliance to garner support. The banner of this alliance was ‘Scotland’ and the ‘Scottish people’ seeking representation of the ‘settled will of the Scottish people’. The salience of this for the issues at hand here is that the fusion of national identity and radicalism among workers through their trade unions was strengthened, reinforcing the view that workers in Scotland are more radical than workers elsewhere. Arguably, the degree of potential radicalism had to be tempered to sustain this alliance. But as alluded to earlier, this contention rests on the view that widespread and sustained militancy was possible in a downturn (as opposed to the cusp of a downturn becoming an upturn).

What of the future? For significant, but far from absolute, difference(s) to emerge in the industrial relations in and of Scotland (contra England or the rest of Britain), a number of features and processes would have to come into play. At present, there is little or no significant evidence of 183

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separate employment systems or patterns to these, potentially through either a significant milieu of Scottish employers or indigenous capitalists who act in a ‘Scottish’ manner or non-Scottish employers who are compelled by cultural norms or by employment law to act in a ‘Scottish’ manner (see also Baird et al. (2004)). Furthermore, the economy in/of Scotland is sufficiently well integrated into those of Britain, Europe and the international ‘world’ economies to erode any potential basis for economic Scottishness. The fundamental material basis of economic life for the majority of the population in Scotland is not sufficiently different from that of their counterparts elsewhere in Britain. However, political aspirations and processes in Scotland have operated on an increasingly Scottish basis, culminating in the creation of the Scottish Parliament. This is partly a result of the progressive reaction against Thatcherism as both wicked and alien, as well as the unit of the nation state and society being ‘Scotland’. We can speculate that the conditions of development towards difference would need to revolve around the following. Firstly, matters that are presently reserved business at Westminster such as employment and employment law become matters of devolved business at Holyrood. Secondly, that the Scottish Parliament/ Executive can afford to pay for ‘difference’, either through using its additional tax-raising powers and/or ‘generous’ settlements from the Treasury, predicated on economic growth as opposed to recession. Both of these scenarios would be dependent on substantial political change in Scotland and Britain witnessing the ascendancy of left wing and/or nationalist forces far more so than is the case in 2005. Thirdly, and in tandem with these, a powerful movement for greater autonomy, or even independence, emerges within the trade unions where the desire for further autonomy or independence arises because it corresponds to material changes, that is the first and second conditions. Even then significant cross-Britain patterns and rhythms in components of industrial relations would remain: union membership, strike activity, union politics and legal restrictions on industrial action. This does not mean that society in Scotland cannot continue to develop in a different and distinctive way from society in the rest of Britain, and especially England, for politics and culture are not produced in a tight-fitting and mechanical way from the economy 184


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and the employment relationship. As McCrone (2001a) argues, lying in between structure and behaviour is consciousness. That is to say that while society in Scotland may have the same or similar economic structures as elsewhere in Britain, the social and political outcomes can be different from elsewhere in Britain because of distinctive patterns of consciousness which act as the key mediating process. Politics and culture, as a human activity of creating representations for interests, can operate at a distance from economic processes and this distance allows them to float to some extent above work and employment, similar to the distance between the financial markets and the ‘real’ economy.

Concluding remarks That ‘workers’ do not comprise ‘society’ in Scotland, or for that matter anywhere else, is important for some of those on the left to recognize when constructing analyses. ‘Scotland’ cannot be ‘red’ or ‘radical’ by dint of workers alone for Scotland as a society is larger than a single group or class. Despite these words of caution, one of the main inferences to be drawn from the preceding discussion is that the radicalism in, and of, the mind in Scotland is no less real for the way in which it has been created as a view and interpretation. This ‘subjectivity’ becomes potent for it can help transform the ‘objective’ in a conscious way. This is reminiscent of Marx’s (in Callinicos (1995:99)) dictum that: ‘The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living.’ While not the subject of consideration per se, questions salient to constructing radical social democratic or socialist projects do obviously spring from the preceding chapters, given that they concern workers’ self-organization and consciousness. What can be said in regard of Scotland is that the evidence of radicalism as it exists, as well as the way in which the evidence is perceived and deployed, does indicate that the currents and culture of left thought are well implanted within certain milieux in Scotland, making it a relatively fertile soil for the future growth of the forces of radical social democratic or socialist projects. This is to suggest that the existence of national identity and low-level nationalism as they exist in Scotland currently are not retrograde forces. But that is also not to 185

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say that they would remain so, for many social phenomena are contingent phenomena. Notes 1

The strongest version of regionalism may be found on Merseyside. Being a smaller area which is relatively more homogeneous compared to, for example, Yorkshire, allows the Liverpool Daily Echo (13 March, 8, 25, April, 2 June 2003) to make a positive association between Merseyside and radicalism in regard of current union leaders (Debbie Coulter, deputy general secretary, GMB, Brendan Barber, general secretary, TUC, and Tony Woodley, general secretary, TGWU). This builds on previous well-known national union leaders such as Jack Jones (TGWU) and David Basnet (GMB) originating from Liverpool.

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Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS) 9, 29, 31, 44, 45, 58, 59 Allen, Vic 17, 18 attitudes 3, 15, 19, 38, 39, 40, 68, 69, 70, 72, 75, 78, 82, 101, 111, 115, 116, 117, 118, 138, 143, 164, 166, 172, 179 Bambery, Chris 11, 12, 127, 128 ballot 16, 34, 155 balloting 34, 78 ballots 34, 38 Britishness 111 Broad Left 78 call centres 85, 96 Cardiff 96 class 4, 10, 11, 16, 19, 20, 43 , 66, 72, 73, 77, 85, 86, 87, 88, 102, 103, 105, 107, 108, 111, 114, 116, 117, 119, 131, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 140, 141, 143, 155, 164, 166, 171, 178, 179, 183, 185 class consciousness 4, 39, 66 collective bargaining 3, 43, 49, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 60, 66, 96, 109, 151, 152, 163, 179 collectivism 26, 38, 41, 45, 54, 70, 82, 98, 102, 122, 139, 177, 180 combativity 39, 40, 104, 155, 156, 181 Communist Party 8, 79, 81, 83, 101, 102, 108, 109, 122, 124,

127, 129, 132, 133, 134, 135, 145 compromise 40 conditions 1, 60, 65, 72, 135, 145, 148, 149, 160, 184 consciousness 2, 8, 10, 14, 16, 19, 21, 36, 40, 129, 134, 177, 180, 185 Curran, Frances 70, 81, 140, 159, 182 Darlington, Ralph 121, 135 Davidson, Neil 11, 12, 76, 103, 140, 151 defeat 40, 102, 103 devolution 2, 14, 78, 102, 148, 152, 155, 161, 169, 183 difference 2, 3, 16, 28, 29, 41, 42, 65, 66, 68, 69, 70, 71, 81, 85, 94, 102, 104, 115, 119, 132, 135, 143, 146, 148, 161, 164, 172, 175, 177, 179, 180, 181, 183 Edinburgh 59, 82, 131, 137, 153, 162 electronics 85, 94, 95, 96, 105, 133, 170 England, 1, 10, 11, 13, 21, 28, 29, 31, 38, 40, 43, 44, 46, 49, 55, 58, 59, 65, 66, 68, 70, 72, 73, 74, 78, 82, 83, 85, 86, 88, 90, 91, 95, 96, 99, 100, 102, 108, 109, 111, 112, 113, 114, 116, 117, 118, 119, 127, 128, 131, 135, 138, 140, 143, 144, 145, 149, 150, 151, 155, 161, 162, 163, 164, 173, 176, 177

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Englishness 112, 119 Foster, John 8, 12, 38, 62, 76, 100, 108, 126, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136 Full-time official (FTO) 78, 79 Gall, Gregor 7, 18, 20, 26, 28, 29, 31, 52, 81, 95 Glasgow 7, 10, 26, 29, 43, 59, 79, 80, 82, 96, 104, 121, 122, 126, 131, 132, 141, 144, 158 Grassroots 83 Harvie, Christopher 8, 48, 83, 100, 122, 123, 126, 127 Hassan, Gerry 7, 14, 182 Hyman, Richard 31, 46, 60 industrial action 1, 16, 17, 27, 29, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 69, 79, 103, 109, 184 International Socialist Movement 8, 108, 143, 160, 161 Kelly, John 17, 18, 19, 20, 40, 41, 66, 69, 82, 179 Kerevan, George 8, 37, 38, 83, 101, 122, 129, 130, 181 labour militancy 18 Labour Party 7, 8, 10, 14, 19, 73, 74, 81, 83, 86, 88, 101, 102, 107, 108, 120, 122, 124, 130, 132, 133, 135, 137, 142, 152, 153, 154, 156, 162, 164, 165, 166, 169, 171, 172, 182 Law, Alex 15, 120, 125 Leckie, Carolyn 80, 153 left wing 1, 7, 11, 70, 72, 78, 79, 82, 83, 100, 105, 106, 110, 112, 119, 120, 123, 126, 132, 134, 138, 139, 157, 162, 171, 179, 182, 184

Liverpool 59, 170, 186 London 8, 20, 21, 32, 34, 51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 63, 64, 65, 68, 75, 79, 90, 93, 155 MacLean, John 10, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 138, 139, 140 marginalization 120, 143 McCombes, Alan 70, 81, 82, 108, 143, 145, 147, 154, 159, 182, 184 McCrone, David 6, 10, 15, 86, 87, 89, 112, 114, 116, 117, 128, 178, 184 McKinlay, Alan 12, 96, 181 McLean, Ian 12, 125, 181 Merseyside 1, 26, 39, 70, 79, 91, 92, 121, 155, 186 Midlands 21, 31, 33, 34, 44, 47, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 63, 64, 68, 70, 71, 75, 79, 90, 93, 94, 97, 155 militancy 4, 9, 16, 17, 18, 19, 27, 31, 40, 42, 44, 61, 62 , 66, 82, 123, 135, 139, 155, 165, 166, 168, 170, 172, 178, 179, 183 militant 7, 11, 16, 17, 18, 19, 31, 38, 40, 62, 65, 66, 71, 82, 103, 128, 155, 157, 167, 172, 175, 177, 179, 180, 183 Militant, the organization 8, 79, 107, 108 mobilization 17, 36, 40, 43, 67, 77, 102, 105, 106, 123, 169, 178, 183 moderate 17, 40, 66, 82, 94, 131, 172 moderation 17, 18, 44, 61, 62, 82, 132, 170, 171 Morning Star 76, 148, 158, 170 national identity 2, 4, 39, 42, 75, 77, 81, 104, 106, 107, 110, 111,

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119, 120, 121, 127, 130, 133, 135, 136, 137, 139, 156, 160, 164, 165, 168, 173, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 185 nationalism 11, 75, 77, 102, 106, 121, 125, 129, 134, 135, 136, 143, 160, 164, 165, 166, 168, 173, 178, 181, 185 oil 85, 95, 109, 130 oppositionalism 38, 62, 70, 78, 82, 177, 183 ordinary members 31 pay 1, 19, 47, 48, 49, 50, 55, 60, 83, 100, 108, 129, 130, 131, 155 picketing 37 political consciousness 134 radicalism 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 14, 16, 28/, 38, 40, 41, 66, 67, 70, 78, 79, 80, 83, 94, 106, 107, 108, 109, 112, 119, 121, 122, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 143, 145, 156, 158, 160, 164, 165, 167, 171, 172, 173, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 185 rank and file 147 Red Clydeside 7, 9, 11, 16, 27, 81, 110, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 138, 139, 140, 165 redundancies 75, 104 resistance 17, 65, 80, 102, 103, 137 right wing 133 sackings 18 Scottish National Party 14, 85, 86, 101, 105, 106, 108, 109, 119, 123, 124, 132, 136, 143, 164

Scottish nationalism 13, 106, 108, 112, 125, 129, 130, 178, 181, 182 Scottish Parliament 4, 14, 76, 120, 123, 131, 136, 138, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 152, 153, 157, 158, 159, 161, 169, 181, 184 Scottish socialism 130, 136, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 165, 176, 181, 182 Scottish Socialist Party 9, 80, 85, 107, 108, 109, 122, 126, 129, 131, 132, 138, 140, 142, 143, 144, 145, 147, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 172, 182 Scottish Socialist Voice 37, 81, 126, 129, 131, 138, 140, 143, 145, 157, 159, 160, 162 Scottishness 3, 59, 111, 112, 119, 120, 121, 130, 134, 135, 136, 139, 157, 161 Scottish Executive 142, 146, 148, 149, 150, 151, 170, 184 Sheridan, Tommy 70, 105, 108, 112, 113, 123, 133, 134, 135 socialism 8, 9, 17, 71, 88, 92, 106, 110, 111, 112, 115, 117, 119, 125, 130, 132, 134, 135, 136, 139, 140,148, 153, 154 Socialist Worker 149, 162, 171, 187 Socialist Workers’ Party (SWP) 79, 80, 107, 140 solidarity 77, 116, 146, 160, 166, 178 Speirs, Bill 146, 147, 148, 149 strike 1, 3, 9, 11, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 45, 61, 66, 69, 72, 75, 76, 77, 80, 81, 82, 94, 101, 102, 121, 131, 140, 155, 156, 165, 170 strike action 17, 27, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 41, 62, 94, 131, 175, 176, 179, 180, 183, 184

211

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unofficial strikes 31, 32, 33, 38, 40

strike activity 3, 17, 20, 21, 22, 24, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 66, 69, 72, 156, 167, 170, 175, 176, 179, 183, 184 STUC 8, 14, 37, 76, 83, 85, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 107, 109, 120, 134, 135, 136, 142, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 168, 169, 170

Venton, Richie 151, 182 victimizations 18, 65 victory 37, 40, 88, 104

The right 79 TUC 61, 65, 76, 96, 98, 99, 100, 101, 109, 138, 168, 169, 186 unemployment 43, 45, 76, 85, 90, 91, 98, 109 union consciousness 19, 66 union density 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 52, 66, 94, 95, 167, 180 union membership 3, 43, 44, 45, 62, 65, 66, 67, 153, 165, 167, 170, 175, 180, 184 union militancy 17, 18, 19, 165 union recognition 3, 43, 44, 49, 51, 52, 54, 58, 60, 61, 62, 65, 66, 67, 95, 96, 97, 165, 167, 169

wages 10, 65, 148, 149, 159, 160 Wales 1, 4, 11, 15, 21, 26, 28, 29, 38, 44, 45, 46, 49, 51, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 63, 66, 68, 70, 72, 73, 75, 77, 82, 85, 86, 88, 89, 96, 99, 108, 109, 135, 155, 156, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 177, 178 Wales TUC 96, 164, 168, 169, 170, 172 Woolfson, Charles 12, 42, 62, 98, 108, 132, 133, 134, 135 worker militancy 18 Yorkshire 9, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26, 28, 32, 33, 38, 44, 47, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 57, 64, 70, 75, 90, 91, 121, 186 Young, James 8, 43, 90, 100, 125, 128, 129, 138

212

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