The Political and Social Theory of Max Weber: Collected Essays

丁he Political and Social Theory of Max Weber

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Library of Congress Cata!oging-in-Public在 tion Dat在 Mommsen, Wo!悖吨].， 193 0幽 The polirical and social theory ofMax Weber:collected essays / Wolfgang J. Mommsen. p. cm. lndudes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0- 2. 26-53398-0 (alk. paper) 1. Weber, Max , 1 龄4- 1 9 20 … Conrribmions in polirical scÎ encè. 2. Weber, Ma x, 1864-19却叫翩。Conrriburions in sociology. l. Tide. ]C263.W42M66 1989 88-3岳95 0 3 0岳 '.2咄.dc 1 争

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Pref二ce

PAR丁 IPOLI丁ICS

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Acknowledgements Bibliographical Note and A七七reviarions

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AND SOCIAL 丁HEORY

Politics and Scholarship: τhe Two Icons in Max Weber's Life Z 丁he Antinomical Structure of Max Weber's Political 丁hought 3 Max Weber's Theo町 ofLegitimacy Today 1

PAR丁 II

3 24 44

MAX WEBER ON SOCIALISM AND PO口丁ICAL RADICALISM

4 Capitalism and Socialism: Webe室's Dialogue wi也 Ma~ S Joining the Underdogs? Weber's Critique of the Social Democrats in Wìlhelmine Germany 6 Roberto Michels and Max Weber: Moral Conviction versus the Politics ofResponsibility

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87

PAR丁1Il THEDEV卫LOPMENT

OF MAX WEBER'S TH芜ORETICAL IDEAS

7 Max Weber on Bureaucracy and Bu苦恼lcratization: 丁hreat to Liberty and Instrument of Cre主tive Action 8 Ideal T ype and Pure 丁ype: Two Variants ofMax Weber's Ideal-typical Method

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Contents

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9 Rationalization and Myth in Weber's Tho吨k 10 The Two Dimensions ofSocial Change in Max Weber's Sociological T扯。巧 PARTIV 丁过且 REDISCOVERY 11

Max Weber in Modern Soci在l 丁hought

Notes Index

133 145

OF MAX WEBER 16 9 197 21 9

铲队

Preface

In tl始 spring .of 198 S 1 was invited by Pr.ofess.or Anth.ony Giddens t.o give a lecture c.ourse .on Max Weber in the Facu坷。f S.ocial and P.olitical Sciences at Cambridge Universi叩. Thus 1 w在s enc.ouraged to present Max Weber's views .on p.olitical and s.ocial the。可 in a sezi岱.of lecrures dev.oted t.o the main themes .of his p.olitical and s.ocial 出.ought. Weber's views .on liberalism and c.onstituti.onal dem.ocracy, .on Marxism and Wilhelmine S.ocÍal Dem.ocrats, .on bureaucratizati.on as a p.otential threat t.o liberal society but als.o as a t.o.ol .of effective g.overnment, and lasr1y his the.ory .of legitimate d.ominati.on and charismatic leadership, are inrrinsically linked with .one 在n.other. P.olitics, s.ocial the。可 and 主ist.ory cann.ot be separated neatly in his th.ought; rather they must be seen as aspects .of .one and the same reali町， and n.one .of these aspects can be analysed in iS.olati.on. This was the message 1 wished t.o七ring acr.oss t.o the students in my Cambridge lectures. 丁汝 material included in 出is book far exceeds the .original series .of1ectures, ampli马ing the ideas 1was able t.o devel.op there. It is based in part .on essays which have already been published but which have been th.or.oughly revised and updatedf.ort比ìs publicati.on. The fìrst part, 'P.olitics and S.ocial 丁he.ory'， is dev.oted 抬出.e intimate relati.onship between p.olitics and s.ocial research in Weber's pers.onal career. The 自rst essay, .on ‘P.olitics 在nd Sch.olarship', dem.onstrates 也at Weber's pa划onate p.olitical en伊gement and his sch.olar与 activities cann.ot be simply divided int.o separate c.omp缸tments. H.owever much Weber himself str.ovef.or .o乌jectivity in his sch.olarly w.ork, many .ofits fundamental features were derived 丘.om his p.olitical experience. Certainly he did n.ot wish his academic w.ork t.o be diluted by p.olitical partisanship; yet it was certainlyinfluenced by the insights int.o the nature .of p.olitica1 rule and the exercise .of p.ower which he acquired whi1e being actively engaged in c.ontemp.orary p.olitics.

V1ll

P咕ce

In his political views Max Weber never followed narrow pa町 lines. Even though he considered himself a liberal and in 1919εven embarked upon active election campaigning for the German Democratic Party, in his political theo巧 主εaccommodated altogether different political viewpoints. In doing so , however, Max Weber did not look for easy compromises or for pragmatic, commonsensical solutions. On the contrary, in a J飞-Tietzschean manner he attempted to follow alternative lines ofinquiry at the same time, pursuing each political position to its ultimate conceivable conclusion so that he eventually arrived at what may be called antinomical positions of a mutua l1y exclusive character. This is also re f1 ected in his views on contemporary politics in 且lsown t1 me, m p盯ticular his ambivalent attitude towards li检ral democracy. His 出 eory oflegitimate domination tries to steer clear of conventional views; with a sortofice偷….cold reasoning he tends to describe legitima艺e domination primarily in terms of acceptance of effective leadership, rather than in any kind of valueoriented terms - a position whïch is certainly at variance with conventional notions of democraC}几 Tne second part, 'Max Weber on Socialism and Po1itical Radicalism', is devoted to Max Weber's attitude towards socia1ism and radical呻democratic thought. 丁he essay ‘ Capitalism and Socialism: Weber's dialogue with Marx' is concerned with the relationship between Weber and Marx on a theoretical level; while Weber objec时 stro吨ly to Marx's po1itical views, none the less there seem to be substantial parallels between himself and Marx in the analysis of the capitalist system‘ However, Web盯 considered Marx's account ofhow the a1ienation of the workers under capitalism might eventually be overcome to be not only wrong but positively dangerous for the survival of a 1iberal social order. Weber's vìews on the Social Democrats in Wilhelmine Germany, which are discussed in the essay Joining the Underdogs?' , 在窍， however, remarkably ambivalent. While in principle he took sides with the Social Democrats against 出eir bourgeois adversaries , whose fear of the so-called ‘ Red Peril' he regarded as rather ridiculous, if not abhorrent, he blamed them for their mere verbal radicalism, accompanied by timidity and petty-bourgeois attitudes. He had considerable respect for radical politics, provided that its proponents were pr守在red to accept th

Pr价ce

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demonstrates perhaps best his person在 vlews 边out the insoluble tension between an ethically oriented lifιconduct 在nd instrumental他rational social acnon. The third part，寸he Developmem of Max Weber's Theoretical Ideas', deals with key aspec衍。fMax Weber's sociological thought. In his sociological theo町 the political perspectives we encountered in Weber's political thought are turned into theoretical guidelines according to which he chose to analyse the fabric of society. 丁his is particularly the case with Weber's theory of bureaucranzation, the theme of 也εfirst essay in this part. Weber saw in bureaucracy both a potential danger to individual li七erty and an effective instrument in the hands of grε主t personal leaders who are thereby ena七led to give new impulses to an existing soci注 system. This essentially aminomical conception of the social functions of 七 ureaucracy provides a key for understanding Weber's political' and social thought alike. It certainly had a significant inf1 uence on his theories of1 egitimate domination and charismatic leadership. Similarly Weber's notion of rationality bears testimony to the antinomical structure of his reasoning. He was not j 飞1St the prophet who heralded the modern age of modernity and instrumental rationalization; instead we observe a gradual change in his usage of the notion of rationalitγ， which eventually comes to encompass comple始ly differem types of rational social conduct 睛也ose oriemed 与 instrumental-rational considerations, and those oriented 七y substantìve values ofvery different sorts. Al ongside this goes a tendency towards a more 也rmalized use of the idωl-typical method, as is demonstrated in detail in the essay on ‘Ideal 丁ype and Pure 丁ype: two variants of Max Weber's ideal呻typical method'. In the later years ofhis life Max Weber (U med his back on those varieties of social reasoning wlω1 were mere与 concerned with formal ratìonali可 and instrumental-ratìonal social action. Pursuíng the idea of 'disenchantment' through the progressive formal rationalization of 在11 spheres of social interac泣。几 he came close to redíscovering myth (although noVl{ within a thoroughly institutionalized world) as a source of ìndividual lifestyles at variance with evèryday life. He pointed to the eternal struggle between totally irreconcilable world• TÍews that was now re-emergìng in modern bureaucratic society, if on

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largely indebted to liberal individualism, and i泣 some respects to Nietzschean ideas too; acωrdin革 to Weber , the individual , if oriented towards strin在ent '0 therworldl)户 ideas， may give new impulses to 出 course ofhistorical events - a notion eventual1y conceptualized in the 出eoηof charismatic au thority 由 but he reconciled this radic址ly indìvidualistic conception with a sociological 出eory of social change which emphasizes the independent role of social and economic forces which operate accordingω 出eir own inherent laws (Eigengesetzlichkeiten ), a position 汉宜。ngly reminiscent of Karl M在rx and the Anglo-Saxon empiricist tradition. τ如 final part，寸he Rediscovery of Max Weber', tells the variegated sto叮 of howMaxWeb的 ide在s were gradually taken up 均 social 主nd political thinkers in the West. Strangely enou掉， in the inter-war period his work was largely neglected , if not forgotten , perhaps with the exception of his famous thesis on The Protestant Ethic and the Spi宿吃fCapitalism. During the 1930S his intellectual heritage found a tempor在巧， home in the United States, while in Germany under Hitler his sociology was r飞jected as 在 typical expression of ìate-bourgeois li怡ralism which National Socialism allegedly was about to overcome for good. It was only after the Second World War that Max Weber's work was rediscqvered again，在lthough sometimes(at a町 rate in the early years) 岛t 出e wrong reasons. The astounding renaissance ofhis thought whìch we experience tod句 throughout the whole world , including the countries of the communist bloc, tells us perhaps more about ourselves t扭扭均out Ma..x Weber. His social 也eo叩 isem七edded in a notion of universal 主istory which is informed above all by one key question - namely, how the individualistic life峭conduct of the personality, inherited from the age ofliberalis m, may be preserved in our own highly bureaucratized and thoroughly rationalized Western culture. This is certainly an Ìssue which is still very much with us, however widely our answers may differ from Max Weber's own. 1 wish to express my sincere thanks to Anthony Giddens for his encouragement and unswervin在 support without which this 七ook would not have come about. 1 am also greatly indebted to Gary T. Mille玄， who undertook the arduous task of translating the essays on 'PoHtics and Scholarship' and ‘R在tionalizatÏon and Myth in Weber's Thought' from the German original, as well as editing the text throughout. Wolfgang J. Mommsen Düsseldor f, March 19 部

Acknowledgements

Chapter 1 was originally presented as part of a series oflectures on Max Weber at the Istituto-Germano-Ita1ico at Trent, and in a revised version at the Conference of the Deutsche Soziologische Geselleschaft at Kassel in 1986. This translation is by Ga巧 T.Miller. Chapte门 was fìrst p吟lished in Historische Zeitschrijt , 233 (198 斗'Pp.35 -64， 飞机也 the title 'Die antinomische Struktur des politischen Denkens Max Webers飞It is repub 1ished here in the English versÎon, translated by José Ca始时 nova, which originally appe在red in Scott G. McNa l1 (ed.), Current Per.宇 ectives in Social Theory: A 1之必earch Annual , vol. 4 (GreenwicλConn.， and London, 1983), PP.253- 88 . Chapter 3 was fìrst presented as part of a series of broadca汉s for the Open University in 1985. Chapter 4 was frrst published as 'M在x Weber als Kritiker des Marxismus' in ZeitschrijtfürSoziologie , 3 (1974), pp. 256-饵，蒜nd was then inc1uded under 出e 位le ‘Kapita1ismus und Sozialismus: die Auseinandersetzung mit Karl Marx', in Wolfga吨 J. Momms钮， Max Weber: Gesellschajt, Politik und Geschichte (Fra球fur飞 1974)， pp. 144-8 1. It is here published wi也 m苦。主囚odifìcations using the English version translated by David 技err with 出e co-operation of Gerd Schroeter and Robert An tonio, which appeared in 民。如rt J. Antonio and Ronald 悦 Glassman (e钩， A ~的ber-Marx Dialogue (Kansas Uni附SI可 Press， 1985), pp. 234-61. An earlier En在lish version was published under the title ‘Max Weber as a Critic of Marxism' in Ca nadian journal 吃fSociology , 2 (1977), pp. 373~98. Chapter 5 was 如st presented 孟s part of a series of lectures at Cambridge U出versity in June 1985Chapter 6 was fìrst pu悼边.ed in Wol屯在ng J. Mommsen and Jü吨en Oster-

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was translated 七y Erica Carter and Chris Turner. A German version appeared in Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Wolfga吨 Schwentker (eds), Max Weber und sei时 Zeítgen俗剧 (Göttingen， 1988). Chapter 7 was first presented as part of a series of lectures at Cam七ridge Universi可 in June 1985. Chapter 8 was first pu七lished under the title ‘ Idealtypus und reiner 丁ypus: Zwei Varianten der idealtypischen Methode Max Webers' , in Wol每吨 Küttler (ed.), Marxístische Tj伊拉rung und idealtypische Methode in der Geschichtswisse阳d拚 Studien zur Geschichte , vo1. γ， Ak ademie der Wi削lschaften der DDR. Ze ntralinstitut für Geschichte (Berlin, 1986). Chapter 9 was first published undet the title ‘Ra tionalisierung und Mythos bei Max Weber' , in Ka rl HeinzBohrer (ed.), MythosundModerne: B号rifFund Bild eíner 1之ekonstru缸ion (Fra出furt， 1983), Pp.382吨。4. This translation is by Gary T. Miller. Chapter 10 is in large part based on a presentation at the Congr!主s Inter忡 national des Sciences Historiques in Stutt萨rt in 1985. A German version was pubHshed in Jürgen Kocka (ed.), Max Webe巧 der Historiker (Göttingen, 1986), pp. 51 阳'72. However, it has 七een thoroughly revised and extended. Earlier versions of essay 11 were presented at the Institut d'Histoire Contemporaine, Paris, in May 1985 and at Princeton University in April 1986.

Bibliographical Note and Abbreviations

References to quotations from Max Weber and to my Max Weber und díe deu位he Politik are given, wherever possible, in both the German version and the published English translation. However, as a rule, my own translations are used in the text. 乓β'SP

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Ma础 x Weber,

Economy and Society: An

Outline 吃f Interpretive

Soâol，吻， ed. Günther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkel町，

Los Angeles and London, 1977) 五ldridge

Max Weber: The Interpretation 电f Social 反eali亨， ed. J. E. T.

GARS

Eldridge (London, 1971) Max Weber, Gesammelte Att弄ätze zur Rel告ionssoziol，哩 ie ， vol. 1 (丁übingen， 1920), vol. 2 (Tübi鸣饵， 1921), vo l. 3

GASS

(丁übingen， 1921) Max Weber, Gesa n:附lte Au向阳 zur Soziol，号 ie

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politik , ed. Marianne Weber (τübingen， 1924) Max Webe宜， Gesammelte Politische Sc占4仰， 3rd edn

und Sozial-

(Tübi吨en， 1971) κZSS

Lebensbíld

Kölner Zeitschrift {ür Soziol，哩ie und Sozialpsychologie Marianne Weber, Max Weber: Ein Lebensbild (Tübingen, I 如6)

MWG

Max

Webeμ Gesamtau气ga纭， ed. 罚。rst Baier, M. Rainer

Leps邸， Wol电ang J. 她 M4岛 圳 O mm 脂sen 吼 认， Wolf毡毕艺 a gan 吨 gρSch 趾灿灿过由山 l且川 u1川ch眩 叫 and 扣 j oha lann 邵 口ne 部s Win 旧 ck ，扣划 伽 .elr i扭ma 阳 undl反之ed， 命en κ f仁:

vol. 112: Die rämische Agrargeschichte in ihrer Bedeutungfür das Staats- und Privatrecht , ed. Jürgen Deininger (Tübingen, 19 86)

List l?fAbbreviations

XIV

voL 1/3 (in two parts): Die Lage der Landarbeiter im ostelbischen Deωu 创t阳 M础 sωκd chl 臼 i

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Zur

Rt仰 ω ~s. ssi衍 Sχd协 1沱ε♂ e附础n吉

Revolutíon von 1905: Schriften und

Reden 1905-1909 , ed. Wolfgang J. Mommsen in col四 la七orarion with Dittmar Dahlmann (Tübingen, 1989) (forthcoming) 叫 III

s: Zur Politik im Weltkri，号: Schr.拼'en und Reden 1914时

1918 , ed. W olfgang J. Mommsen i在 collaborarion wi白 Gangolf 在检inger (Tübingen, 1984)

MommsenγMax

跻乍ber Mom白棋泣， Max

1-4'eber , English

vol. Ih6: Zur 炖uordnung Deutschlands: Schriften und Reden 1918-1920 , ed. Wolfgang J. Mommsen in collaborarion with Wolfgang Schwentker (丁能ingen， 1988) Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Max Weber Utωíe deuts，伽 PoUti走 1 890-1920 ， 2时 edn (丁ühingen， 1974) Wol每ang J. Mommsen, Max ~仇ber

and German Politics 1890 1920. trans. M. Steinberg (Chicago, 198 s) >

edn

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Neue PoUtisclte Literatur Max Weber, 1之echtssoziol咽i马 aus dem Manuskript herau.铲跚 geben und ei咆eleitet von Johannes Winckelmann， 二nd edn (N创wied， 叩 1 96甘 7) d Ma础 xWeb 如如快阳 e倪E巳 矶， Ge.仰?附 l'时'eAψd阳 zurWi仪必搅enschak 价 ω 凶 d 也创 sl lehr，屹 3抖 edn (σTü凸ib 阮11吨 1唱 ge 岱 n， I96 8 ) Max Weber, Wí邸haft und Gesellschaft: Grundri.五s der ve严

stehenden Soziologie , sth edn, ed. Johannes Winckelmann (T出ingen， 1978)

PARTI

Politics and Social Theo巧

I

Politics and Scholarship: The Two Icons in M在x Weber's Life

Max Weber was a deeply committed political personality throughout his life. From his early year当 right up to 1920 he was passionately involved in the politics ofhis day and he always reacted extremely forcefully to political events, even if thís frequen tIy never penetrated beyond his circle of closer 在cquaintances. Karl jaspers found in hindsight that 毛1s thought represented the r臼1ity of someone who was political to the core, a will to act ín the 挺立飞rÌce of the. historical 口loment."

丁heview h邵阳n put forward repeatedly，七y Reínhard Bendix and Günther

Roth, for example，出.at Max Weber's scholarship could be clearly separated 台om his po1irics.且 Here the opposite 飞new 认rill be advanced 阳 thatcontemporary polirics exerted a great influence on Max Weber's academic work without 也ereby detracring from its scienrifìc character. Even where he w龄 not dealing expressly wi由 polirical matters 出e po1irical dimension of his analysis can be traced just beneath 也e 豁出.ce. 1t can be shown, for example, ín his work on 在e Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism' that this is concemed with an ethos specifìc to the bourgeoísie as an autonomous social class which has nothing in common with the feudalist fundamental ideals of tradirional aristocracy. Hence the 七ourgeOlsle must not accommodate ítself to the insidíous process of feuda1izàrion that could be 0七served in Imperial Germany. With such deep-rooted polirical concems it is little wonder that Max Weber repeatedly found himself confronted 与 the quesrion of whether or not he should move over into prac位cal polirics. As early as 1894 the opportuníty arose to take on a candidature in M在nnheim for the Reichstag (the Imperial Diet). His rapid academic promorion 出en reduced his inc1 inarion to change over into acrive po1irics. Furthermore, in 1899 illness rendered serious work in any fìeld impossible for some years, and especially so in acrive polirics. However, from

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1906-7 onwards Max Weber ~cted as political adviser to the Freisinnige V盯dnisungtibml union)(wHch iaterkcamtl1e Fomc;mtliche Voiksm partti (Progressive Popular party))through tk iatezcession ofFriedrick Nau;nann (wh;se role in party politics has recent~y been clearly delineat_ed for the 6rst time bv Peter TIleiaer斗 and Ernst Mu拮 lell 丑le←山且 M艇制 4仕甜 el 创灿 i灯nin the maior decisions of the 五iberals， partic由向 duri吨 the period of the socalled 主ülow bloc 仕om 1906 to 吟吟吟ich consisted of a 拟出what unnatural coalition of 也e Liberal and Conservative parties, w部 undoubtedly restricted in scope but should not be underestimated. Weber's insistence on 出e adoption of a g;nuim paEliammEγsys在em and the curtail附挝 of the so-calIed ‘ personal re 2:ime' ofWilhelm 11 did no t 血deed have any direct effect in the years leading UD to the Fi rst World War , but on the 咄 0出 tlhe世主 ha 叩 ar时 ld 让 i the 忧elped 句 gradu 叫 d 阳 a址11伊 严 yr吁to bri 民i吨 ……nd 艺由}且le P吨邸SlV罚e Liberals to a firm political stan风 especially on constitutional issues:~ Mter the outbreak of the first World War Max Weber did his utrnost to fìnd some opening for himself in politics so 出at he could at least perform some sort of service to ilie nation once armed service had been denied to him on health I!l"ounds. However, no suitable role could be found for him and especia1ly not under 也e conditions of the ‘ domestic truce' which aimed to curb if not to suspmzd completely aii intemai pddcaiho$dides;undd 血。se circumstances a m矶 with his-volat:Üe temper and his habit of spe这ing the plain truth was really not in demand. The oppor划nity to take up a post in Brussels as specialist adviser on the staff of Governor-General von Bissing, who was in chargεofthe German rnilitarv adrninistration of Belgium duri鸣曲 First 宙orld War, 均ich suddenly'presented it~elf in 1915 prov甜llusory in 吐也啦 1怒e 创时 1址 d. It ω ∞出邮 i由 吨 n gbe臼C革泯剧刷 山 u IS罚e the imperia1 goverm挝旧 did notshow 出点ghtesti附rest i气 having an independent ‘ brain trust' in Brussels working for the annexatio号 of Bellri~m and therefore stifled von Bissi吨's plans right at the outset 明 for­ mJLteiy enough, one mighz add in 主etrospec飞 for 出is saved Weber from a potenti均 da~aging collaboration with 由 ofldalwr m句olicy. From ~916 o;wa~ds Weber played a leading role in Friedrid王 Naumann's Arbeitsausschuss für Mitteleuropa (Working Par可 on Central Europe), a comrnittee founded early in 1伊 6 to promote .the idea of a central European economic union. Weber joined the comrnittee in the belief that it would be 在le to produce some solid groundwo

Politícs and Scholarship

5

be. Certainly the government of Bethmann Hol1weg pursued a po1icy of annexationism; but it preferred indirect means of extending imperial Germany's hegemonic status to large呻scale annexations. However, it dared not fight openly for 也is somewhat more moderate line; not only did it not support the Ar beitsausschuss für Mitteleuropa, but it looked upon it as an inconvenience by whose activities the government might be discredited , bec在use it was afraid of being blamed as weak - and this despite 由e fact that decisions in 主his arωhad always fallen under 也e de focto if 1以 the de jure competence of the joint chie位。f staff under Hindenburg and Ludendorff. In the end and in utter frustration Max Weber deliberately sought refuge in academic work far removed from 也.e busde of politics by devoting himself to his studies on E王induism and Buddhism. In Oct。如 1918， with the unexpected appointment of Prince Max von Baden as imperial chancellor，在e initially vague prospect now presented itself of his attaining some public function in politics after al1. Matthias Erzberger, who had 社come a key figure in the new government and who was soon to become chief negotiator in the armistice negotia∞ns， tried to win Max Weber ove主 in early November 1918ωjoin a group to launch a publicity campaign in support of Prince Max von Bad钮's government, and indeed, it appears , Max Weber was inclined to take u p 也e offer. The I飞evolution 也en swept away the last imperial government under Prince M栋 and accordingly nothing was to come of this oppor阳出ty. The Revolution，主owever，。岳red Max Weber surprising new chances for an active role in politics. In the second week in November the Council ofPeople's Delegates (Rat der Volksbeau缸agten) consid世ed appointing Max Weber Secretary of State for the Interior and commissioning him to draft 出e fìrst version of a parliamentary constitution fo室出.e whole Reich. Eventually, 忌。，wever， Hugo Preuss, one of the few liberal constitutional lawyers in Germany, was appointed Seαetary ofSt在te instead, and for his part he initially intended to encrust Max Weber with responsibi江ty for constitutional questions even if only as D守uty Secret在ry of State. Just as 1itde came of this in the end as of 也e proposal by Conrad Haussmann and Ludo Moritz 挂在rtmann that Max Weber should be appointed envoy of the German republic in Vienna, which would have been a politically signi主cantapp。由tment in 飞riew of the fact 出at 也e 时ue of an Austrian Ansch

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acrive in the Deutsche Den∞krarische Partei (German Democratic Pa时). He was elected to the party executive. More important, he took on extensive electoral work for 出e DDP in the campaign for the elections to the National Assembly which began in early December 1918. The degree of Max Weber's commitment to the DDP during those weeks was considera七le and has not been given suffìcient attention up to now in the literature on the su专ject. 6 But 1在tein November Weber's candidàture in the Reichstag constituency of Hessen/ Nass在u failed among other reasons because the way in which he had spoken out too openly in the initial stages of the electoral campaign in favour of co棚 operation with the Social Democrats and for a partial nationalization of the economy made him appear suspect to many of the delegates. Compared to this, Weber's political involvement in the Heidelberg时 Vereinigung für Politik des Rechts (Heidelberg Association for Legal Policy) was much more detached. The Heidelberg Association planned to launch a public campaign in defcnce of Germany, primarily directed abroad, against the almost universal condemn在tion of Germany for her conduct in the war in the Al lied as well 豁出e neutral countries. It aimed at improving the moral position of the Reich government at the impending peace negotiations. The Heidelberg Associ础。no专jected especially to the 'war guilt' accusarion, to Al lied propaganda 在hout German atrocities during the war and to misuse of the League of Nations for the purposes of 在 policy of sul才ecring Germany to a harsh peace settlement. ln 也is respect it was indeed an advantage that M揣冒出er could speak out on these issues 仕om the independent standpoint of a scholar of intern在 tional standi吨. Partly at Prince Max's suggestion Max Weber was eventually mVl拟1 by 出e GermanFo把ign Minister GrafBrockdorff-Ran泣au 邸 take p在主τ in the Versailles peace negori在柱。ns as an expert adviser. The purpose behind this move, however, was to use Max Weber's great prestige to promote Brockdorff-Rantzau's policy on the quesrion of war guilt rather than to al10w him or the other specia1ist advisers a genuinely independent influence over the handling either of the war guilt problem or, more especially, of the issue which parricularly preoccupied Max Weber: whe也er Germany should sign the Peace Treaty at all or rather, as he thought 齿，比ject it, even 就 the risk of the possible occuparion of parts of the Reich 问r Al lied troops. lnde

Politics and Scholarshi学

7

drawal from politics which he undertook at 出at time, and which he rounded off afterwards 七y resigning from his executive seat in the DDP and even giving up his membership , would rea l1y ever have been fìna l. There is much to suggest 艺he opposite view, in line with his dedaration on the occasion of disturbances at Munich Universi可 ov位 the possible reprieve of Count Arco (who in May 1919 had received a death sentence for the assassination ofKurt Eisner), towards the end ofwhich 坠e said: 'The reason why 1 am no longer in politics, as you know, is bec在use it is impossible to have politics in Germany so long as it is possible for madmen of the right and left to peddle their madness.'7 In other words, even then he still considered bis wiihdrawal from po1i tics to be by no means permanent, but tempora巧 on1y. Undoubtedly Max Weber would have been 如ck in the politic在1 arena 妆品re long, had he been allowedωlivc: longer. He once said to Mina 丁。七ler tha主‘politics . . . had always been his secret love' and th挝 、hesεpeople . . . [i.e. the radìcals on 七oth the right and left] destroyed all that one held dear卢 MaxW捡破 never succeeded in completely renouncing 出IS ‘ secret love' , no matter how hard he tried at times to distance himself from everyday politics, not the least in order to ensure his spiritual survival. We must therefore condude that Max Weber stood on 出e threshold between politics and science all his lif己 He endeavoured to be of ser飞rice to bo也就 the same time, no matter how diffìcult this could be. Even if he re在lly never crossed the threshold into active political 挂fe， this was not just because of political circumstanccs at the time or because he was misunderstood by the ‘politicians without a vocation'9 but also because ofhis personal atticude to politics: he wanted to give a lead to politics, not to become tangled up in the tactical machinations of the everyday political struggle, although according to his own understanding this 岛rmed part of the politician's job. With the 0吨T real exception of the period 如tween 1898 and 1905 Max 唱reber always f与llowed up the po挂tical events of his day with journalism i往 powerfully wor'叶 d叫 a盯rti 缸创 cles 岱s in 出t:he F:仰盼附r Ze 昼i郎 t幻u拟 咯 H 应i吉萨♀ and 也eM，郎 初 :;t 阶 n1 Net 仰 uε 衍'Sten 创 Nach 巾htet彷1 ， m vanous pu七 lic statements and in works of an academic character but 飞Nith apolitical orientation. Many ofhis writings on political suι jects are derived from articles which were written in response to current politi

8

Politics and Social Theory

form, as he himself sa埠，‘its character as political polemic should not be suppressed, for that is what i艺 still is and 出at is what it should be.'10 Yet cruci在i elements of his sociology of domination are to be found in this text. Exactly the same w在s claimed 品r the article written at the end of 1918 on 'Germany's future form of government' ('Deutschlands künftige Staatsform') - namely, that wha艺 we are dealing with here is ‘ occasional writing of a political character without any claim to "scientifìc" validiry'.11 Finally, even his great speech 'Politics as 在 vocation'， which arose from a p在rticular historical situation and which is unmistakably directed against the paci自st tendencies of the time警 con由 tains fundamental statements 动。ut the nature of politics that are still valid to this day, even thou在电r.J eber himself only found the text ‘ very mediocre' when he revised it for publication. Contrary to customa可 opinion， Weber in no way thought it inappropriate for science to fìnd its inspiration in passionate involvement in political events and vice versa. What he could not tolerate was the uncritical admixture ofboth spheres, especially in the form of using the lecture to propagate political value明 judgements. 丁'wo condi艺ions were absolutely necessa巧:在rs飞 to declare or泣's own standpoint as openly as possible; and, second, to distinguish consistently between scientifìc analysis and political premises and deductions. Values and scienti在c deductions were to be examined for their validiry on a separa优 basis， 出e former on 在.e basis of personal preferences, the latter on the grounds of rational cri祀ria. Yet in no w町 did 汝岱reby want to support a purely positi飞ristically understood conception of sciènce as ‘value-free' or even in the radical sense as 'v址时才udgeme曰"台ee二 that is , far removed from politics or values. T坠e principl部 of this position are alrωdy clearly formulated in the Freiburg 检er sharplyr拮 命 e 怡 bl 咏 u1或 捡 k ed those 协 hi沁stor位 i立ca 址i inaugural address of 1895. Al ready he主跄e 飞Web pos公iti ∞ ons wl挝协垃凯 rich

C ons ∞ 附艺tit惚 山t时 b u 忡 7 由 O与e 倪ct巾 i如 ve proce仍ss of 兑1u 山 挝汕 i沁s沉tor 阳巧 y its 岱附时忧 sel五 Instead he forcefully emphasi和d thaτin politic在1 economy there are no scientific standards of value

of an objective 阳ure which are consequent on its su专jectmatter 一 for instance. such possible standards 豁出e goal of achieving maximum productiviry or 出e principle of social justice or the idea that there should be a permanent socia

Po /i tics and Scholarshíp

9

never shied away from openly declaring to his audience his own valuepreferences. One only has to think of his severe critique of the ‘ passion for bureaucratization', which led him to despair, his bitter polemic against the 于民 udo-…cons tÎ tutionalism' of Imperial Germany and the ‘ personal regime' of Wilhelm Il in the debates of the Verein für Sozialpolitik (Social Policy Associatio时 t 3

Certainly Weber later defined his position on this point more precisely in the sense of logically di他rentiating between ‘ value-judgement' and ‘value叩 rel在tion\In scientific analy山 value宁电ements have to give way to valuerelated judgements, which elevate certain values to 出e point of re岳rence for analyses in political and social science, withOllt asserting anything abollt theiï validity as such. Values as such, according to 飞"f，feber, are not capable of scientifÌ c validation; 七ut on the other hand thcre is also in principle no poSS在ility of restricting the theoretic在lly endless spectrum of value-positions or eliminating certain ext主eme value相orientatÎons in favour of a realis tÎc orientatÎ on by scìenrific means , such as in the way Jürgen Kocka spoke of a range of empirically acceptable theorerical positions. The decision to consider certain values as personally binding on oneself and to arrange OI妃's life叩conduct strict1y accordingly belongs to the autonomous s庐盯e of p时sonality， accordi..'1g to Weber. 丁hus political value-decisions are in principle inaccessible to scienrific verification or disproof no matter how understood. On the other hand science is indeed quite capable of eluçidating the possible or probable cons吨uences of ce扫毒in decisions 如 concrete situarions in the light of the re唔ective ideal values governing an individual's actions or even of competing ideal values and so of rarionalizing value-decisions to the extent that the achievement of the highest ideal values of the individual is given optimal chances. In the so瑞called ‘valueτjudgement controversy' conducted in the Verein 也r Sozialpolitik from 1908 onwards W出er never succ优ded in gaining accept在nce of his views. Originally he had taken 0拟 this fight above all 飞Nith a 飞riew to countering the prevaili吨 influence of 出.e 'old-conservative' tendency as repre… sented by Gustav von Schmoller, the Grand Old Man of the German historicìs主 school of nationa.l. econornics a丘er a 丘ontal assault had failed to r，εpel it. Schmoller in Weber's vie

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Weber was concerned on the contrary to bring bo也 spheres into relation with each other in such a way that on 也e one hand their transparεncy was consisten t1y maintained and on the other the ground w在s taken from under the 会et of all lectern demagoguery once and for al1. This should not me在n， however, that the political viewpoints which form the impulse of scientifìc research and flow into the formulation of the questions which guide scientifìc reseaτch should not be decl缸ed openly. This meaning can be discerned throughout Max W伦er's 飞λrork. Essεntial elements of his sociology of domination and 岱pecially his theory of democr就ic rulεare owed direc t1y or indirec tIy to insights he had gained in 出e contemporary political stru时倍。f his day. And the sociology of domination in its turn is oriented 在round 出e central issue of how freedom, however understood , may be possible under different social conditions, and in particular in the condïtions of highly bureaucratized capitalist societies. Max Weber was extremely irritated by the political arrangements in Imperial Germany. He diagnosed 豁出e chief characteristic of the existing political system that it had left 击e politicalleadership t，。在 civil service 也在twas well-m岱ning but incapable of political leadership and f二←sighted political judgement. From the point of view of consti部tional policy, in Weber's opinion it was a case of a pseudo-constitutional system that posscssed all the di advantages but none of the advantages of parliamentary forms of government. 14 Imperial Germany was led by good civil servants, even olltstandingly good civil servants, but it lacked po1iticians - not just great politicians but politicians in the ordinary sense of the word. Accordingly he ascri忧d structural leader1ess明 ness 抬出e political system.τhis condition was additional1y made worse by the ‘ personal regime' of 职 Wil如 挝讪 he 1泛elm 对吟衍 m 孜1 11, 也that 也汪 山 i总S 岱t 』祉e 让1 玄芷r岱 essp 严 O往挝 nSl 况ib 桂怆 le 伊 gov! 呢 仅Eτ.τ'nm C 时e盯n汉t垃ionism of 也 V the mona 盯rch 仨1 in all 百1 poli让tica 址1 dec 岱 i岱SI抬 ∞孜扣咄ma O 球支i扫 吨 η g， especially foreign policy. ln Weber's view this was rooted in social conditions and in the mental disposition of the leading classes of the nation. The existing bureaucratic regime was above all concerned to preserve the traditional polìtical and social pr eminence of the big landowning aristocracy, although this dass had lapsed in 也e meantime int

•

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Politics and Scholarship

II

was , as Weber perceived 泣， partlya result ofBismarck's imperious rule 吨lC坠 h在d represented the exact ‘ opposite of the political education of the nation\15 Web叫 udged the working dass sc在rcely less 如ou地ly. It was pushing to get into powe室， without 主aving any concrete ideas ofhow it could achieve this , not to mention to w主挝 use it should 怡 put. Weber charged the German Social Democrats wit且在双 apolitical attitude, lack of a sense of power and a pettγ……· bourgeois mentalitγ. Instead of pursuing a sensible policy of reform inωm operation with the progressive elements of the bourgeoisie, it confined itself to a ‘ revolutionizing of minds\ Its appearance in the political arena had 由e effect of a ‘ shot in the arm for the existing order'. Max Weber used the British example here as a counterfactual model , although idealizing it in many respec也 InBrit在in there was a parliamentary monarchy w乞ich assigned to the monarc且 在 great deg附 of de focto political influe缸C 在ltho吨h constitu∞时ly the monarc且 was confined to representative functions. In Britain it was a matter of a 'kingdom ofinfluence二 not， as in the case of the Wilhelmine empire, of ‘ mere pretence飞 InBritain there w在s a powerful parliament which, precisely because it was not just relegated to purely negative polìtics, had always brought forward great political leaders. And these politicians had known how to pursue a thoroughly successful imperial policy and to achieve the mostly volunta巧 subordination of the colonial peoples to British domination. Moreov缸， the world power status ofBritain had had positive effects on the attitude ofBritish labour: unlike their German counterparts 在eB主iti边 wo室主ers poss臼sed a welldeveloped sen忧也主 issues involving political power第 Quite 在part from that，也ey pu主sued 主配在listic strategy as re军在rds the promotion of their concrete class interests, instead of adhering to a stratεgy of mere verbal radicalism. This highly critical diagnosis of the structural defects of the German political system, developed with British conditions in mind, became intensified during the First World War. In Weber's opinion not on1y was the outbreak of the war under circumstances that were extremely unfavour动le to Imperial Germany a consequence of these failings , but f口rthermore they increasingly reduced Germ主ny's chances of survi飞ring the war ièlatively unscathed. The superio技巧 of the parliamentary systems of the West over 也e German ‘ seml-

12

Politics and Social Theory

the interests of increasing the power status of the nation., but that policy had to be carried out with a sense of reality and proportion. 丁his was precisely w坠挝 appeared to 七e less and less assured. The decision in favour of unrestricted su乞marine warfare in the summer of 1916 he considered to be the fìrst extreme of absolute arrogance, which was then to be followed with a secónd in the conclusion of the imposed peace of Brest-Litovsk. In view of these hopeless conditions, which he 在ttributed to the 1在ck of a genuinely responsible political leadership, he could see only one effective solu位on: the parliamentarization of Imperial Germany. A policy of effective domestic r~forms， associa艺ed with the introduction of a genuinely parliamenta均可stem of government, was 动。ve all to achieve the following: 1 S佼佼19thening the political cons~nsus of the na~o_~ and its readiness if necessary t~ do its utmost to survive the war successfully, 2 secunn只 an etIective politicalleadership, which, precisely because it would be based on democratically formed rr吨jorities. would be in a position to pursue a realistic , well-judged policy, with the goal of safeguarding the. ?ower positionofImpdai G出many in the world ìn the 10吨怯rm， well hevonl the foreseeable end of the w矶 3 connected 飞的th this , putti吨 an end to the irresponsible 唱itation for extreme and increasingly utopian war aims; 4 the effective elimination of the persistent interventionism of the military hierarchy in political decisions. Against this current political background Max 百'eber gradually developed his 击eory of democratic rule of the parliamentary 句pe. Essentially here he

started from the classical model of representative democracy as it had developed in western Europe, namely a parliamentary system on the basis of the 、 1ib盯al-model of índividual self-determin在tion protected from state despotism 问 basic rights in the context of a constitutional order. However, Weber saw hlmself compelled under the in fI uence of contemporary events to place special emphasis on the need for politicalleadership. In accordance with contemporary ide~s， he thus described the productionof gr它在t political leaders as the most ímportant function of parliamentary democracy and in a way the most impor阳门。盯ce of its legitimacy. Weber's model of derr肌ratic rule , in view of its conscious emphasis on the dominant role of political leaders within the parliamentary process of policy f

Polítiιs. and Scholarsh争

13

The political cìrcumstances in Wilhelmine Germany induced Max Weber to develop his theoIγof democratic rule not from the premises of individual selfdetermination and popular sovereignty - although indeed hints of this can be found in his work - but rather from the superior perfo主mance of parliamentary democracies. In concrete situations, however , this meant 纪lying particularly on their ability to produce a truly effective leadership. Weber in principle adhered to the basic precepts of a liberal conception of democratic rule: personal liberties, the idea of representation and the requirement that all democratically responsible action necessitates t挝e polirical consensus of actively involved cirizens. But increasingly he emphasized by contrast the opposite principle: that great politicians must crεate their political following on the strength of their personal charismaric qualifìcarions; in other words, that the formarion of polirical opinion f10ws essentially 丘。m the top downwards and not from the base upwards to the elected leader, whether 七y the principle of delegation or by the con岳重ring of a polirical mandate. Deeply convinced of the need for great po1irical leadership under the contemporarypolitical circumstances in Germany, which were thre在tening to endanger the very existence of the Reich, Max Weber had no reservations about pushing the idea of the po1iticalleader's personal responsibi1ity to its utmost conceptual limits, although thereby he brought himself into diametrical opposìrion with the classical precepts of 1iberal democtacy户 ln this context at least the legal and consritutional po1irical norms of democraric rule are treated merely as formal precondirions for the rise of great leader fìgures who have gained their positions of power exclusively 0祭 出e strength of their personal charisma 响也就 is， on the s佼ength of the be1ief of the masses in their capacity f与r leadership. At the same rime 由e gradual unfolding of this posirion, which was to receive i ts most radical expression in the 出eo可 of 子lebiscitarian leader democracy二 must be seen against the background ofWeber's universal占istorical theory of Western rarionalizarion as an essenrially irreversible process of increasing formal rarionalizarion of every aspect oflif七 and of the progressive 各ureaucrat­ ization of all institurional forms. From this point of view, ple七iscitarian lead盯 democracy appearecl to b

14

Polítics and Socíal Theory

all other institutional forms of domination in society. From the point of view of the effìciency, sta七ili ty and relia己ility of its app主ratus of rule, this 可pe of 七ureaucratic domination was f红 superior to all other known forms of domination in 仨istory. 丁here seemed to be no rurning back from 在is organizational form of domination at least in the historical situation in which Weber found himsel f. The triumph of bureaucratic forms of the exercise of domination seemed to be merely a question of time. Even in 也e USA, which for a long time had known only the ‘ spoils system' and a purely amateur administration, since the Americans looked upon a bureaucratic organization of state admini汉ration with the deepest suspicion, it was only a matter of time before administration by bureaucrats according to the European model would 岱tablish itsel f. In Web的 estimation， however, bureaucratic machines belonged to those social instirutions that were the most difl在cult of all to d部位oy. AlI the same, bureaucratization seemed to be on the advance across the globe , not only in state and local administrations but also in the economic sphere and in sociallife and not least in the fìeld of party organization. Relying on studies by James Bryce and Maurice Os役。gorski， and with reference to American and British ex在mples， especial1y Chamberl公正$ ‘ caucus' as fìrst practised in Bir扭扭gham， and the party machines of the major American cities, M a..x We ber predic优d 出e replacement of the 守严 of honori在c pa叫r (Honoratorienpartei) characteristic in particular of traditional 1iberalism by tighdy organized bur'εaucratic mass喃membership parties. Social democracywas the ffiost obvious example of this new type on his own doorstep. Unlike Roberto Michels, Weber did not consider the rise of mass 各ureaucratic parties and the associated oligarchization ofinternal party strUcruresωbe a disaster, or the b吃inning of the end of 在enuine party democracy and thus of democracy in general, but saw this development as inevitable under the circumstances of t且e advanced industrial state of t且，e capitalistic 可pe，l7 Indeed , he even saw positive aspects in this , for bureaucratic party machines could help to increase the s优ial dynamism of the capitalist syste m, which had taken a regressive trend aft时 the formation of monopolistic strucrures. 丁he party appararuses functioned so to speak as a reinforcement for the initiatives of the leadership and enabled the latter to impleme

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sighted po 1icy capable of innovarion and [hUS of an indirect increase in social dynamism. This was of the greatest importance. In the course of the de呢lop­ ment of the institution在 l-bureaucratÌc state in large parts ofEurope, there arose an increasing lack of political leadership, especially in the pseudo-consritu四 tional system o fI mperial Germany which preserved the undiluted autocracy of a bure在ucratic pówer elite. In Weber's view the main thi吨 was to opposεthis trend , initially in the interests of national power po1itics, but in general also in 出e interests of the preser飞ration of the liberal order itselE Considerarions of this sort led Max Weber to highlight most emphatically the contrast 快tw优n politician and bureaucrat in his sociology of domination, not only f云。m the point of view of practical politics but also in purely theoretical terms. Bureaucrats must act strictly in accordance with instrucrions, Wl也in the bounds of rigidly defìned competences, without personal considerations but above all without revealing their personal convictions and ideals. That is why bureaucratic apparatuses are capable of achieving maximum effìcíency and, almost more importan t1 y, why they can serve a主主eliable and predictable instruments in the hands of whoever controls them. Precísely because their code of beh剖riour is prescribed and decisively influences their lif汪叫onduct， which is oriented to the dispassionate and impartial fulfìlment of the instructions given to them, bureaucrats are unsuÎted to politicalleadership. However, for the politicians at the head of these bureaucratic machines who are responsible for giving them 0专Jec的es and directio认 other laws apply. By contrast with bureaucrats, politicalleaders must possess exact1 y the opposite 气ualities， in particular the capadtyωpursue their own 。同jectives，可stematically and stubbornly, at whatever cost to themselves and with relentless personal engagement. Their duty is not to adapt to pre惆existing conditions but to fìght for something they personally 益。ld to be an important value. But leading politicians must create a following for themselves as wel1问 m达ing use of their demagogic skills. ln this, however, they must not simply appear as 出e representatives of the interests of their followers or electors, but rather the reve主se: they must supply them with their poHtical 0悖c巾es. Ultimately these 吨jectives will be derived 仕om their

16

Po /i tics and Social Theory

which then took on its general form in the theoretical requirement of charismatic leadership qualifications even for the democr就ic politician, Weber's theory of democratic domination necessarily came into conflict with generally accepted conceptions of democracy, which view the pòliticalleader primari1y as the representative if not just the mandatorγof the el机torate. Max weber indeed does not especially dispute this. For him it was self-evident that small groups of politicians always determine political action. However, he distanced himself from democratic elite theories of the sort propounded by Gaetano Mosca or Wilfrido Pareto essen出lly 也roug主 his individua1istic model of political 则ion. Weber's sodology of domination'does not involve leading elites or classes diri注eantes ， but alw:巧s some outstanding pe主sonalities who of course are in constant competition with one anoth挝 for the voters' favour 我nd who thereby have to assure themselves of the political consent of the citizens. The latters' political maturity functions as a negative condition for the securing of genuine charismatic leadership; and in this respect the democratic selection of leaders can be realized on1y in democratic political systems which put into practice the prindple of 也e 鸣uality of every cÌtÎzen in the state and of 吨ual rights of partidpation. From this point of 飞lÌew it fo l1ows that Max W，出er found it neces始巧 to restate the classical theory of democracy. In his view, the natural-law justification of democratic domination 叫 even if he did not expressly 时 ect it, but rather emphasized its significance in the creation of modern democratic 叩stems 叩 had lost all its concrete relevance for the present day. Democratization had , as he once said, if ‘ any precise meaning at all, then on1y that of the "minimalization" 。f the domination 与 "professional civil se押在nts" in favour of the most direct possible dominion of the people, which in pr在ctice means ofits respective pa古ty leaders\J 8 One can view this as an inappropriate 必ridgement of the concept of democratic rule. Yet Max Weber considered the prindple of fr优 leadershlp selection to be the essence of democratic rule under whatever circumstances. In so far as the unqualified adoption of this principle succeeded, cliat was ‘ notso insignificant' an achievement. For fundamentalist justifications of democracy, on the other ha时， he reserved only contempt. From this p

Po /i tics and S.εholarshíp

17

embellishing it with elements 击。m German political tradition. In comparison with other contempora巧 types of democratic rule, such as the American presidential system in particular, but also the SwÍss system of direct democracy and an extremely weak executive, the parliamentary system for him seemed to be the best suited to securing a maximum of political dynamism and optimal political leadership under conditions of incre础ing bureaucratization in all spheres of social interaction. Not least because of the unrestricted right of m弓uiry assigned to it 七y constitution过 law， parliament was sti11 best 必le to keep in check the bureaucratic governmental appar矶路， which had at its disposal an incrcasing amo剧。f 叫ertise in the exercise of power (H仰胁" wissen). In addition, par1 iament's primary function is to select politicalleaders. Yet it can fulfìl this only if it carries political responsibi1 ity and if it has unrestrlcted participation in the politica1 deçision-making processes 叩 in other words, in so far as it is a working par1iament and not just an arena 岛r ideological debate. Max Weber exemp1i6.ed this wi出 the case of the British par1iament, which again and again had brought forth outstanding political leadership fìgures of a high qua1i可. while the same could not be said of the German Reichstag precisely because it was condemned to pursue a merely negative form of par1iamenta巧 po1itics. As argued 七y Weber, parliament functions chieflyas a proving ground for po1iticians with a vocation for politicalleadership but at the same time as an organ of control whic主 brings a七out the retirement of statesmen and po1iticians &om positions of r岱ponsibility wheneve主 they have forfeited their leadership qualities. With the rise of plebiscitarian democracy, political initiative had transferred to the respective par可 leaders or s组tesmen who with the support of their following in par1iament directed their po1itical appeal primarily at the broad mass of the electorate in order to e1icit from it the necessa叮 consensus for their policies. Democratic leader棚rule 也us cannot do without a powerful parliament. Only in the antagonistic interplay between 出εtwo institutions of govemment and parliament can fìrs rate po1iticalleadership develop. ln spite of its de1iberately antinornically arranged strucrure，也Îs model of democratic rule does not evade 也e dang臼 of a functionalistic abridgement of par1iament's role in the democraric-constitutiona

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18

Politics and Social Theory

very encouraging experiences with the DDP (Ge rman Democratic Party) party organìzation in Hessen/N在ssau， but was basically derived from his conception of politicalleadershìp which in tum originated in his philosophical view, here influenced by Nieαsche， that in practice only outstanding individuals have any chance of putting forw时 objectives for and giving new directions to society by virtue of their personal charisma. Max Weber's theory of democratic domination emph在sÌzes onesidedly the process of policy formation from the top downwards and the significance of the leading politician, while the great majority of citizens as such tend to recede into the background. This is at le在st in part a result of the climate in which Max Webe主 developed his sociology of domination. At the time the enemies of freedom almost uniformly seemed to be on the side of the bureaucratic machines. The precept of individual self.喃determination remained for Max Web自由e ideally suited measure of democratic systems; yet it had lost its direct relevance in 出e conditions of developed bureaucratic societies. Only with the help of charismatic skills and only by using special techniques for winni吨 over followers and for exercising domination by way of 七ureaucratic organizarlon did the ìndividual stil1 have any chance, in Weber's opinion, of really bringing his or her influence to bear in 出e political sphere. 丁'he apparent top-heaviness of the structure of politicalleader-吼Ile in parlìamenta巧 democracy as it appears here should certainly not be mistaken as authoritarian. For the taking to extremes of the principle of the po1iticalleader's personal responsibility is m就ched by the requirement that great po1itical leadership can only emerge within a genuinely democratic system and that it is bound 问r the necessity of continual self-legitimation wi也in the 仕ameworkof the democratic process of policy formation. Thus a democratic constitutional framework and, even more importantly, a democratically constituted society in which the precept of individu在1 selιdetermination is recognized as a basic structural principle at eve巧r level of 出e state order represent indispensable preconditions for the functioni吨 of ‘ charismatic leader democracy'. For Weber this goes without saying; 如cause of the aforementioned reasons arising 台om the contemporary political clìmate and conditioned by the historical situation, he stressed t

Politics and Scho缸 rshíp

19

not only a democratic constitution but also a politically self-conscious citizenship. On the other hand, the achievement of 且检r可 in whatever sense of the word - and 出us also the realizatìon of the principle of individual self二 determination in constitutional practice - can only be secured under conditions of charismatic political leadership, because this alone can prevent a gradual petrificatìon of modern bureaucratic societies in sheer 主outine and still preserve a sphere of liberty for the individual. A 纪conciliation of 出e principle of individual self-d佼佼mination and the principle of charismatic leader-rule is theoretica l1y unattainable; rather，由ey possess the quality of antinomiεs‘ Only in practicallife-conduct does the possibility arise of giving preference to one or the other in a particular context of action. Not the least becausc of this ìs the model of par1 iamentary democracy, as we find it in Weber's work, presented in a bipolar structure. According to whether the problems of democratic rule are formulatεd 告。m the point of view of individual self-determination and self-括在lization or 去。m the point of view of political leadership, díffering conclusions result. They are reconciled if at all only in the prescriptive ídea 出 at everything must be done in the conditions of the bureaucratic state so as to ensure a maximum of 1iberty 主nd opportunity f己r creative political actlon. The bipolarity of this model of democratic government is reflected in the field of political ethics. Max Web时， as is well known, distinguished two forms of polirical ethics, the ethics 吃f convictíon 革nd the ethícs of responsibilíty. Ethics based on conviction make the pu主suit of certain valuεs or ideals an i恕peratìve duty for an individual, no matter how great the chances 也r the achievement of these ideals in the current social situation may be and no matte主 what direct or indirect, intentional or unintentional, forms m在.y be adop时 by the þolitical acrion that is committed ωthese ultimate values. In the final analysis, for the actor it. is chiefly a matter of con直rming the validity of or 'preserving' those values he or she holds to be absolute; the actor feels duty叩bound to comply with them even in the most adverse circums岱nces and even if necessary by sacri在c­ ing his or he主 own life, as in the case of the syndicalist or the anarchist. Ethics de岳飞ring from a sense of responsibility, on the other ha时， requi

Politics and Social Theory

20

rational science. Furthermore, indeed, great political 拴在dership always contains an element of conviction ethics, by imposing certain objectives on its respective supporters 讪ich are to be absolutely binding. Weber thus in principle viewed both ethics as e可ual1y valid. Wolf毕艺驴伊 a缸.n吨 19μsd挝过由 u汇咄 ch阳 位 tτ垃 创ied 归 t ode 缸 e白mo t出 he 臼et副 hicωsofr挝 r创 ess甲 ponsl 岱峙$必i怡 bbi1丑1i均 t叩 ycor红re 仍s咱 呻 严 P ondst阳 oMa 揣 xWe 油 ber'spe 盯 ers 臼son 凶叫 l注 1冶 ali挂it可 yl挝 de 岱 eal 过1， whic主

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requires a rational 1i6 conduct in keeping with ultimate values which constitute the stuff of personality in the 在rst place, and that it must therefore be seen as an essentially superior e出iC. 21 Without doubt the concept of responsibility ethics contains elements of a material ethic of values. Yet for fundamental reasons Weber 剖 not permit himself to follow such 在 èourse; for this would have resulted in a dilution of the respecòve ultimate valu decisions, wheth盯 on the basis of pragmatic or scientifìc criteria. But this is precisely what Weber considered neither practically desirable nor theoreticalIy feasible. Moreover, it is true of both variants of po1itical e出lC 出at 也可 maintain an insolubly tense relationship with 也.e precepts of all religiously founded ethics, for 出.e simple reason 也就 force and the exercise of force represent their specifìc mode of action. In his emphasìs on force as an autonomous i室主educible category of politics Max Weber follows in the tradition of Niccolò Machiavelli. According to Weber，‘legitimate 飞riolence气。r 出e exercise of domination 恃 mωIS of force 如y a re窑ime accepted or recognìzed as legitimate 衬 tho忧 who are ruled, also stands in an antinomical r e1ationship of insoluble tension to the principles of al1 religious ethics but especially to Christian ethics. Here as wel1 the mutually competing or even opposing positions involved are pushed to their respective conceptuallimits in a Nietzschean s巧rle of reasoning which tries to express the antinomies immanent in politics in the purest possible form instead of opting for a middle course and justi斗ing it p吨matical1y or m优al1y. The essential incompatibili咛 of politics and ethics as we fìnd it in Weber's sociology of domination is re f1 ected in the theory of the three pure types of legitimate domination. 丁he antinomical structure of the political as an autonomous sphere of values is 在gain much in evidence here. The way in which Weber tried to determine the legitimacy of

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Po /i tics and Scholarsh伊

21

state power. Max Weber's sociological theo巧r oflegitimacy instead started from the factual observation of how much consent to legitimacy is given by the ‘ ruled' , that is in tl时 mpirically discernible willingness to s吨ject themselves to a particular system of domination and to accept its norms as persona11y bindil唱­ Seen from this perspective, for Max Weber 'illegitimate domination' could not exist at all as a type , but there could only ever be a greater or lesser degree of empirically extant consent to legitimacy. As is well known. Max 在reber distingui边ed three different pure 叩pes of legitimate domination: legal domination , in which the beHefin the legality oflaw which is posited in the correct form and according 旬出.e usual procedural rules is the basis oflegitimacy, quite irrespective of the question as to which su如tan­ tive legal principles are respectively at issue thereby; traditional domination , in which custom or precedent 甲 in other words，于投scriptive law' 叩 is the foundation of legitim在巧; and fìnally charismatic domination , which possesses or may make legal claim to legitimacy on the strength of the beHef in che charismatic qualifìcation of the leader in question and thus also ìn the lawfulness, indeed the absolutely binding force , of the valu岱， norms and goals laid down by 坠1m. Thus it is not normative criteria of a moral or ethical nature 也at dedde the legitimacy of a s严tem of domination but t怆 su与ective disposìtion of its su专jects in practice to accept 由e authority in question. 丁his comprehensive typology claims to take into consideration 在11 forms ofle哥timate domination at one fell swoop and to be 在pplicable in theo巧 to every system of domination known to us in history. Furthermore, this model also displays an antinomical structure. Inasmuch as legitimacy ought to be more than just the acceptance of the i部mutability of a s严tem of rule on the basis of 也e existence in practice of dominatio n, it always ultimately origin在tes in one single form , namely the charismatic foundation of political au白ority. Legal domination, on the other hand , surVi ves chiefly on the strength of what in practice exists. Legal domina白兔. as Weber emphasizes, owes its legitimacy f位 the most part to the routineness of the rules 住在t take effect 也rough it. Compared wit且也is the conceptually feasible model of a value-oriented legal order fades into insignifìcance. On 也eother hand 现feber presume革命at legal dominati

22

Politics and Social Theory

original1y intended,22 but categorized it as a variant of charismatic legitimacy, 在nd in fact as 在 version of charismatic rule supposedly 'free of domination\In Economy and Socie号I this is expressed with admirable clarity: "毛plebiscit盯lan democracy" 叫 the most important type of"leader democracy" - is in i岱 genume sense a type of charismatic rule which is concealed behind a type of1 egitimacy that is formal午始ived from and persists as a result of the will of the ruled.'23 These comparatively late p在ss在ges from part 1 of Economy and Society must be read in association wi出 the formulations in ‘Politics 在s a vocation', which were written at roughly the same time, about the necessi巧1 of a ‘ leader democracy with a machine' ，出at is，由e necessity of a combination of charismatical1y based leadership au出ority and bureauc主atic techniques of domination. 24 Even if Weber did not develop this new conception any more systematically, it does represent his fìnal answer to the question of how democratic au也ori巧r is still possible in an age of increasing bureaucratization and howmaximum social dynamism and individual freedom , however understood , can be achieved. In a way these remarks léad us back to where we started. Max Weber's theoretical ideas on ‘ plebiscitarian democracy' reflect his political opinions during 时 found在tional phase of the Weimar Republic. In the debates about the new imperial constitution in 1919-20 he supported systematically and with powerful rhetorical contributions constitutional solutions which pointed in just this direction, in particular by his insis主ence on a popularly elected presι dent; 七y virtue ofhis direct links wi出 the wil1 of the masses the Reich学räsident was to be an opening for the rise of political leaders over and above party machines and parliaments. In this way Weber hoped to assÎst a ‘ leader democra，巧， to come to the fore i口 G衍many， in which charismatical与 qualifìed politicians with a sense of foresight but also with a sense of proportion are at the h e1 m, instead of a ‘ leaderless democr在cy of professional politicians without a vocation'. Political science has viewed these suggestions of M在x Weber with a certain scepticism，。主 has taken them up in diluted 岛rm which leaves the problematic elements of his theo巧 mostly untouched. In the 1950S and 1960s especial1 y there were only a few political scientists who were really wil1ing to give their unconditional acceptance to Weber's conception of exceptional political leade

Politícs and Scholarsh伊

23

tended to reduce the ‘rime申bound' elements ofhis theory , above all the elirist bias ofhis conceprion of politicalleadership, to a pragm就ically acceptable level , to say nothing about his underlying narionalisric inclinations. Only rarely did anyo时 completely follow Max Weber's theory, with ìts explicit anrinomies and its extreme radicality of thought, which had so little in common with the empìricist modes of thought prevailing at the rime. Nowadays this has changed. Max Weber is agaìn attracring great interest as a thinker who strove to base political theory and polìtical acrion on fundamental valu atritudes which related to a definite image of humanìty. Indìvìduals, who must find their own way in a world increasingly dominated by anonymous forces, are thrown back upon themselves and their personal value-attitudes; given the lack of ìmperarive objective norms they 在re confronted with more and morεnew decisions for which no easy way out can be found in polirical reality. With some jusrificarioh, wilhelm 日ennis recently pointed out that Max Weber has nothing in common with that version ofliberalism which attempted to replacc the dominarion of ìndividuals over other indi世duals with the admìnist古arion of 出ings and thus assumed 也在t it could suppress strife and violence once and for all. 寸o force the individual into polìrical arrangements , to make him participate in the responsibiliries and the risks of出ese arrangemen怨， and ìf necess在ry even deliberately to submit these arrangements to external and internal risks, in oth仅 words not to exclude strife by institurional provision，岛ut rather in f羊ct to provoke it' - that is, according to Henr血， at t坦e centre of political theo巧合om Machiavel1i and Rousseau right 哼 as far as Max Weber. 25 丁his ìs parricularly 位ue of Max Weber飞往eo巧。f democratic dominarion. Tl出 was constructed of antinomies precisely because he did not want 怡然e 也eidea of stri公 eliminated; he wanted, on the contrary, to see it properly accentuated. The special advantage of parliamentary democracy lay not in the fact 也就出e struggle between polirical tendencies 在nd philosophies could be mediated through it but much rather that the w畔。fconducring 出is struggle could be perfected within the parliamentaIγconsriturional system. However, it does not follow from this that Weber was no liberal at all, as Hennis would have it. On 出e con衍a巧， there c在n be no doubt about Max Weber's polirical stance. He was a liberal who was no longer sarisfie

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2

TheA旦tinomical

Structure of Max weber's Political Thought

Once in the midst of 如is discussion wi出 Heidegger， Karl ]aspers spoke of M揣 在!eber's ‘qu臼tions of great world-historical import whic h, though answerable in part through concrete critical re始arch， become，刽 questions， ever greater and more unanswerable\i Referring to Weber's philosophical and sociological work， ]aspe岱 lS saymg that in 出e concrete process of research it leads to 出εvery 坦mits of knowledge and 也就 the partial empirical solution to the 电uestions posed only raises new, t二r more complex questions. The .same can be said particularly of Max Weber's political thought. His probing questions led again and again to the very limits of the political positions which he held to be valid, laying bare the insoluble conflict between alternative ideal values in ultimatεsituations. This chapter will examine this phenomenon more closely in a particular area of Weber's political 也ought， namely, his basic attitudεtowards liberal democracy. Politically, Max Weber belonged to the tradition of German NationalLiberalism of the post-Bismarck era. Very early on, however, he began to commit himself to the left wing ofliberalism. He belonged to the group of German thinkers who, already before the turn of the centu巧， consistently demanded the parliamentarization of Imperial Germany. Yet his support for the liberalization of German society was tied to an impassioned nationalism which, already in the 1 890s, meant a commitment to German world politics on a large scale. 2 Within the context of the German po1itics of his time, Max Weber can best be characterized as a prominent representative of the kind of cultural imperialism 出at became fashionable in 出e late 1 890s in German intellectual circles, especially among university professors. The question whether his liberal convictions were self叫sustaining or rather just a means of enhancing the internal cohesiveness of the nation在1 power state is notωsy to answer. Yet there

The Antínomical Structure 吃fWeber 's Thought

25

can be no doubt that, for W出er， a strengthening of German liberalism was thinkable only ìn conjunction with vigorous natìonal power politìcs. Authors such as Jü吨en Kocka , David Beetham and Amho町 Giddens J have 。同jected to this interpretatìon, arguing that even 品。ughMaxW伦er may have made some important concessions on this point to the spirit of the age he was none the less fundamentally a true liberal, and thus his natìonalìst views are to be rated only as seconda可 lt would seem that there was a然 inherent comradictìon manifest in Weber's thought which has to be dealtwith as such and which is i孜孜eed ofbeing fur也er investìgated. This points to one of the parameters ofhis thinking in which the contradictìons betwcen alternatìve val的-positìons stand out sharply. It is true 也就 Max Weber did not alw咛s present his nationalistìc goals as emphatìcally 在s in the 1890s, but in principle the ideal of a strong natìon-state remained a dominent leitrnotiv in his political thought throughout his 1if己 冒出er pointed out explicitly and repeatedly that in his personal 且ierarchy of V在 lues 也e natìonal idea took precedence over questìons of a 1iberal constìtutional order: 'The arguments advanced here 机11 not influence those who do not hold, in principle, the historical tasks of the G盯man na柱。n as h主vlllg precedence over all other questìons concerning the form of government nor will t是巧 influence those who view these t部ks in a fundamentally different light.'5 Elsewhere Weber formulated this issue even more sharply:‘ For me, "demoi 如en an end in itsel f. My only interest has been and remains the cracy" has nev假 po娘拉li巧r of implementìng a realistic 豆豆在∞nal po坦cy of a stro吨， ex时m过与 oriented Germany.'6 Such a positìon does not lend itself to facile compromise. E飞.ather one has to take as one's point of departure the 在ct that Weber was a natìonalist as well as a 1iberal, even though 七。也 positìons are not readily compatible with one ano出创. We are confronted here 飞的.th an antìnomy in Weber's politìc在1 thought which will not simply disappear by way of compromise; it can be resolved only with坦白e framework of a systèmatìc interpretation. 丁he conflict which emerges here between two different ideal values appears to be symptomatìc of an important feature ofWeber's thinking. 暂伦er always advanced the ratìona1izatìon of a given position in the 主ght of certain ultìm在te ideals to the outermost limits, in 也is case, the ide址。f a strong German natìonstate on the one

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26

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evident.8 Such a position brings Max Weber together with Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche had already maintained the basic principle that out of intellectual honesty one always had to follow any issue to the most consis优nt position thinkable , which should then become the yardstick for one's 出ink­ ing, regardless of the consequences for oneself, even when this could ultimately lead to selιdestruction. In this absolute unconditionality of the will to knowledge 乳reber had much in common with Nietzsch已 One can also find certain analogies in their lives. Max Weber's attitude towards 1i岳 has often been aptly described as 也在to俨heroic pessimism', an atritude characterized by an inherent conf1ict 社tw优n antagonistic value-posirions in contraιlisrincrion to the abandonment of self to comfort主ble everyday resolurions. Max Weber used the expression ‘ 1 want to see how much 1 can endure.' This statement is to be understood fu l1 y in 出e Nietzschean sense. Yet in the case ofWeber this fundamental atritude of 'heroic pessi~sm' also take on a rarionalisric form. Like the' Puritan who conducted his li岳飞NÌth iron discipline, orienring it towards certain normarive values whose origins were outside everyday life and rarionalizing it to the utmost, Weber saw it as the duty of every individual to face the problems and conflicts with which one was confronted in complete sobriety and without any illusions and to reduce the givell oprions to the underlying fUlldamental problems of valu俗， without paying heed to the dominant opinions of the d句· Hence 也ere are great similariries between W丛er's alld Nietzsche's basic structure of 也inking.Bo出 men always traced the concrete problem back to the level on which the value-quesrions which were normally hidden emerged to fu l1 view. It is true that one rarely finds Nietzsche being explicitly quoted in Weber's sociological work, even though he is quoted, and not by chance, precisely in those places where Weber addresses fundamental ideological problems or world占istorical perspectives, as is the case at the end of The Protestant Ethic or in ‘ Sciellce as a vocarion'. In any case, there can 七e no doubt that Weber was profoundly influe附d by Nietzsche, although it m巧 be going too far to interpret Weber's work as the result of a permanent dialogue between Nietzsche and Marx , as has been suggested by BaumgartenY Weber shared with Nietzsche the conviction 出at only the individual, as a rule only the outstallding individ

The Antinomical Structure 吃fWeber's Thought

27

analogous light. He alone, on the basis of person在1 convictions which are not simply a reflection of given conditions, but 在re rather rooted in fundamental value响。ríentations， is in 在 position to give society the force needed to go beyond the routine of everyday life. 气万eber explicitly r飞jected， however, the extreme consequence of an aristocracy of the spirit which Nietzsche derived 丘。m thís fact , namely, the notion that only the outstanding individual had the calling and the capaci咛 to establish new values. Weber did not s且are Nietzsche's dislíke for the masses (die Vielzuvielen). Nietzsche's view that ‘ the meaning of world history resides exclusively in its highest exempl革rs' was even less acceptable to him. On the contrary, only those indíviduals who are able to induce the masses to follow them voluntarily are truly great and capable of creative and form在tive politics. In contrast to Nietzsche's ethic of the master which culminated in the outright 尺jection of all democratic politícs , Weber adhered to the fundamental principles ofli七eralism which hold sacrosanct the dignity of the indivídual 在nd aspire to see society organized in such a way that all individuals may preserve a maximum of free initiative. At 也e same time, however, Weber 在pproached with 主 Nietzschean radicalism of thinking the 守lestion how far the classicalliberal theory still maintained its inner consistency and stringency under mode主n conditions. In certain areas and with a lirnited purpose Weber brought about a reformulation of the content of liberal the。可 in a way which could de是nitively be comp在red wi也 Nietzsche's postulate of ‘出et主ansvaluation of all values'. Progre然ively，部 part of his endeavour to formulate a defìnitive conception of parliamenta巧呻 democratic dornination which would correspond to the times，枪 击lt the 附d to discard or rather reformulate in the process generally accepted liberal conceptions: Once again, positions which had originally coexisted in 在n unclear relationship started progressively to diverge unti4 fìnally，也巧 took on an antinornical structure. The unconditionality of Weber's 出inking， which the latter owed to Nietzsche, and the clear appreciation of the power character of all social relations, w孟ich he learned f云。mMa抠， led him fìnally to abandon the framework of classicalli七eral the。可 and to search for new, more solid founda明 tions for liberal postulates. This 权treme radicalization of alte

28

Politiιs and Social

Theory

the moment the ideal values which come into play are pushed to the limits of their validity. Let us fìrst examine the question how it was possible for Weber to 怡 atthe same time a resolute liberal and a rugged nationalist, one for whom it was imperative that Imperial Germany conduct vigorous world po1irics, even to the point of not excluding the option of war, if necessa吓 From our present..:.day perspective it beωmes clear 出at b。在 these ideals stand in contradiction to one anoth优 Indeed， the principle of'individual self.嗣determination' is hardly com巾 p就ible wi出 a 'world politic矿 which had as its objective the es的 li边ment ofa hegemonic supremacy o fI mperial Germany over the European conrinent vis-à抽 vis 白e smaller nations. 丁here are some valid grounds forassuming that Max Weber advocated a v埠。rous German imperialism primarily for tacrical reasons; 也就 is to say, that he saw the inauguration ofGerman imperialism primarily as a means to achieve a fundamental liberalization of German socie可. As it were , Web盯 propagated the imperial idea in order to 主讲t the conservarives with their own weapons. A consistent imperialist policy implied a恕。prion for the industrial state; 也e latter, however, was 在t the same time directed, at least indirec t1y, against the traditionally pre-eminent posirion of the agrarian conservatives in state and society. A rarional imperialist policy called for the modernizarion of German sociery; on the one hand, to provide the necessary material resources and, on the othεr hand, to m在ke possible the kind of in衍rnal national unity needed for such a policy. In this sense，由e imperialist idea could serve precisely as a kind of ideology of emancipation directed against the hegemony of the Prussian aristocracy in German society, thereby leading to a liberalization of the political system. Weber 出ought that in this way liberalism would take up again a new positive task and receive new momentum as the carrier of a grand programme oriented towards 也e future. However, irrespective of these primarily tactical points of view which permitted him as 在 liber在1 simultaneously to propagate imperialist policies, Weber was an imperialist out of conviction. He thought that in an age of imperial power conflicts it w在s simply 也e duty of the German Reich to assert itself as a world power if only in order to 硝sure a place on e孟rth fo军 German culture in the centuries to come. Apparently, even in 1911 , when Weber was for a time actively supporting

The Antinomical Str础

29

a川sa叼ym 艺d 也 he decis剑lOn.绸精唰栅翩帽嗣斗唰 i均 i电 ght 扰t of the avail 过la均 ble data one cannot but ∞ c O双盯cl抬 udeε t巾 hat ~品 or Ma以 x 京审leεeb 忱e盯r an activ 吮e German impe主n毒过li沁stic $汉 policy was mo 伺芷re 也 tha付 ust a clever strategy to give new life to German liberalism. He passionately supported in纪rnal reforms at home , moreov忧 as a necessary counter-measure to the policy of pursuing a vigorous course in politics abroad. In any case it was also more than just a tactical means of enhancing the power of the G世man nation-state, even though ìt was frequencly expressed in such a manner as to suggest such a conclusion. Indeed，也e ques功on which of the two hierarchies of values, the nationalist or the liber泣， had pre阳eminence for Weber cannot be answered unequÍvocally. Rather one has to proceed fro豁出e assumption 出at one is dealing with an anrinomy of a fundamental nature in 百eber's thinking. In fact, one could say that for the most part W论er scorned facile compromise or middle positions. Even though 如e recognized in principle the need for pragmatic solutions in politics, he did not admit of such solutions when dea1in在 wl也 conflicts of fundamental values. He repeatedly pointed out 也就 it was the fate of modern m毒n to have to deal simultaneously wi也 different ideas and valu orientations which were in conflict with one anothe主 in his own h悦汉. This appears to be particularly the case as regards his political attitude, which w却在t once that of 孟 convinced 凶er过 and 出at of a re单位rely moderate German nationalist. None the less, it is possible to trace 出ese two apparently incompati是le positions 弘ck to a common fundamental premise. Max Weber's point of departure was the conviction that sodetywas threatened in its basic elements by the universal' processes of bureaucratization 在nd rationalization of all spheres of 1ife. It was therefore necess缸y to preserve at alllevels of socialli五 amax1mum of dynamic forces or to promote them wi也 all the means available. In 在 certain sense, We七位 wanted to maintain as unr指出cted as possi峙， even under the conditions of mass industrial socie可， the dassic principle of competition, that 15，也.e struggle between the various individuals and groups in societyfor their ideal 0主 material intere吉思 Thus he called for a liberalization of the cons岳 阳tional system at home which would at once set 金时也.e spontaneous activities of groups and organizations wi也m 出e social system. Weber viewed the exis

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30

PoUtics and Social Theory

Once Ìt became clear to him 袖er the outbreak of the First World War that 出e heyday of the au tonomous narion-state had passed and that a 岳w hegemonic power structures would come in rime to replace the many sovereign nationstates of va巧ring rank, Max Weber wanted 也就cure a hegemonic position for Germany within Europe. This hegemonic posirion, which}妃， for one, wished to be restric泛d to inf与rmal methods of domination, was necessary in order to guarantee the narion加states of central Europe above all a proper and secure place within the system of wo主ld powers that was in the process of 七eing formed. A plurality of narional power scates and a system of powers in whic兑 the individual polirical and social systems would confront one another in permanent contest seemed to him to be 在 precondition for the pres~rvation of a hig是 degree of freedom and dynamism within the socie巧r ofEuropean and even world powers. In 也is respect 出ere is a link between Weber's advocacy of a comparatively moderate German imperialism and his liberal ideas, a link which is able partially to bridge the above. menrioned contradiccion between both positions. The competitive stru韶le of the superpowers within the international system and the tensions between the different social structures and social orders were not merely a 也reat to peace. 丁hey also had a positive func柱。n， even. though Weber himselflamented 也在ct that the European states were forced to invest a far 丘。m insignificant part of their gross narional product in the relatively unproducrive arms race. In Weber's theoretical statements on 也e nature of democracy and the lib盯al order, one can also find thεsame tendency to balance out posirions which are diametrically opposed. Weber was convinced that, given the social conditions which emerged in the advanced industtial societies of the West, classicalliberal ideas had largely lost their concrete power of expression or, at least, their unequivocal meaning. For him líber主1 consriturional rights had become either truisms or et主lPty formulas which as such could not offer any orientarion although, like daily bread, one could not do without them. 12 Weber recogl让zed the m号。r historical relevance of the theory of natural rights as it was first developed by the Levellers, but he believed that under modern conditions the theo巧 had progressively lost its significance and was being replaced by posiri飞ristic， formal-legal norms. Thu ……

The Antínomical Structure 电fWeber's Thought

31

Weber soon realized that，也llowing the emergence of late capitalism, farre在ching transformarions had also appeared in the character of the decisionrn在king processes and the types of policy formarion within liberal socieries. 丁he rise of ple七iscitary dernocracy , together with the ernergence of modern, bureaucraric party organizarions, had radically transforrned the condirions under which the individual could srill have an influence upon polirical events , thereby fundamentally transforming the p纪rnises of democraric politics. Max Weber's conception of parliamentary democracy had little in common with the fundamentalist jusrifìcarions of democratic authority which had customa主ily been part of the ideological tradirion of theW，仪 since Rousseau. One has to admit that it is not easy to reconstruct precisely Max Weber'旷i前e liberal' posirion. He was in agreementwith the 1iberal tradition in assuming that a free socie巧i had in principle to grant al1 its cirizens 在 maximum of selι determinarion and , therefore, of parriciparion in all polirical decisions. Ye挝t for him this was a SriPl时 1过la 扭 rion wl挝 1让ich ， given modern con址 diri ∞ 10ns队， 挝 1lad los红tp 严ract忧 i北 C孟a l1亏 Y all 时 it岱s me 创 a 刽mt rions the people as a whole were in 革 posirion tωode岱rm 双1让ine their own polirical destiny rhrough free elecrions. 丁he only trait disringuishing consriturional democracies from other forms of dorninarion was the fact that the former had 孟 system of ‘ formally free' elecrions of their leaders; in other words, the people themselves selected 也elr own ‘rulers飞 while in other 斗机ems the selecrion of the politicalleadership was always made from a more or less closed ruling class. Once Max Weber expressed this posirion most empharically when addressing Ro berto Michels: ‘ How much more resignarion will you srill have to endure? Conceprs such as "popular 轨rill"， and genuine will of the people do not exist fo主 me any more.τ如y are fìcrions.'13 Diverging from the classical foundarion of democracy in naturallaw, constiturional democracies are disringuishable from other forms of dominarion primarily by the faαthat the people are in a posrion to choose in a formally 丘ee way those leaders who appear more suited tha l1 others to represent their interests and their goals. Yet, according to Weber,14 and from the perspecrive of 出.e ìndividuals making up the masses, this fact did not me

•

32

Poli始ti，￥ iα cssa ω m宫 d Social Th化化e树yF

persons, should act out of their own free initiative and should never be subjected to external determination. There is, on the oth时 hand， the insight that all social relations are ultimately relations of domination and that even the difl岳rent 可pes of democracy do not basically overcome domination, that is, the external determination of individuals 均 other individuals事 At best democracy can create the optimum conditions in which the individ叫's own initiative is 吨jected to the least possible restrictions. Max Weber's reflections on the best possible form of democratic domination moved within the area of tension between these two fundamental principl邸， that is，如tween the principle of individual selfdetermination as the formal condition for the possibility of freedom in general, and the principle of domination as th们naterial precondition for a social order in which a maximum of freedom is possible in the 6rst place. The postulate that democratic domination should always be based on the conse挝 ofthesu战jects was for Weber 部 obviousωitw部 trivial.飞Jndεrmodern conditions this was materially inevitable. According to Weber~ if democratization was to have a precise meaning at all, it could only be that of ‘ a minimalization of the power of the civil servants in favour of the most "direct" rule of the "demos" that was possíble, and in practice that means the rule of its party leaders."5 Thus Weber wanted to reformulate the da始cal 1iberal demand fo主 the selιdetermination of the people to mean the right of the people to choose their own leaders in a formally 丘ee way, together with institutional arrange.…· ments which guaranteed 出e resignation or the replacement of their leaders whenever they had lost the trust of the masses. From a realistic perspective, according to 暂eber， democracy can at best mean domination 均 freelyelected leaders, who are then in a position to proceed essentially at their own discretion. It can never mean the superseding of domination by a system of policy formation 丘om the bottom up. Ifm创sured according to the dassic críteria of democratic authori巧，‘the right to free election ofleader矿 is insu f6cient as such. y，时留eber was convinced that this was ‘ not so insignificant', rather that it was actually the very substance of democratic domination. 1ó In contrast to the formal basis of democratic domination in the consensus of the people who elect their legislators for the running of the state apparatus, Weber introduces the i

The Antinomical Structure 吃fWeber兰 Thought

33

qualities of those who have the calling to lead and to rule. Through the use of theìr personal charìsma and their - in the posìtive sense of the word demagogìc capabiliti臼， the leaders procure for them忧lves a following from among the people whom 出ey need in order to achieve their own personal ends. Throughout 出is process the people play merely a passive role. For Weber, at least in the mode i:n mass states穿白必 personal plebiscitarian form of establishing political authority and , with it, individually 在ccountable domination was simply inevitable. Only under the conditions of small geographical areas like the Swiss cantons did Weber conceive of dìrect forms of politic在1 policy 如ma阳 tion from the bottom up as a practical possibìlit)几 We are faced here with yet another antinomical position ìn Weber's conception of democracy. On the one hand, the prìnciple of individual selι determìnation was to be guaranteed by the principle of the formally free，由atlS， subs也 ntially unrestricted choice of the respective leaders，础 well as by the addi呻 tional support of elections 也rough parliamentary institutions. On 也e other hand , democratic leadership is in principle a variant of c也rismatically 民sed authority which, as suc坛， derives 丘。m and is legìtimized by the wil1 of the ruled only in form but not in su七stance. Accordin在 to Weber，由e leaders rule excluslve忡忡吭rtue of their own p臼sonal responsibility. In a盯 case， they are not to be viewed substanti在lly or materially as executors of 出e wil1 of the electorate. Moreover, their ruling au出ority is based largely, if not exclusively, on the emotional belief of the voters and of their supporters in 出eir formal qualifìcation for leadership. The substantive issues, meanwhile, recede into the background and have a direct inf1uence upon the relations between the leaders and their followers only in extremeωses. AccordingωWeber， only in this way, thanks to the extraordinary ideals ofωmmìtted individuals, could leadership be ensured. Weber advanced 由is position wi出 the utmost rigour to its utmost conceptual limìts precisely because under 也e ìnfluence of the developments ta挝吨 place in Germany after 1918 he was convinced that an effective democratic order and, in a broader sense, a free society were simply not possible without great leaders who would act out of 出eir own sense of personal responsibility. 丁hus 如 was being thoroughly consÌstent when, in the context 0

34

Politics and social Theory

lt is here tha艺 the antinomian structure of Weber's theo巧， of democracy emerges most clearly. The demand for the strongest possible personal plebiscitary rulership and the postulate of the self-determination of the ci tÎzens as guaranteed through a parliamentarian system of representation are in what at fìrst 在ppears to be an insoluble antinomical relationship. Yet, at the same time, they are complementa巧 elements of an efficient parliamentary democracy. In Weber's conception, the logical consequence of the second principle, namely, the Untεstrained enforcement of the will of the masses vis-à翻山 the state rulers, together with the demand for the greatest possible ‘ minimalízation of the domination of man over man\would lead to the emergence of 在 'leaderless democracy' (拚声拗hre巾牛 one cha阳t忧e巾ed 均 byd检 1泛eru 盯川 ule of politi 让 itieωi 丛在缸 阳双汩 m 1S who 盼 o did noωO 1 』缸 a阿 ve those int忧ern 残1在过1 cha 盯n总smacic qualities w虽汩ich 揽 rE双1在众 ke the leade臼r.户8 ln such a s叮 ystem， politics becomes mere routine wi也 no room for creative political acts. From a universal-historical perspective Weber saw in this form of democratic domination a serious danger for the continued existencεofindependentand free stuctures in the Western world. By cont主ast， he regarded as comparatively negligible the danger that the democratic rule of the F'ührer , legitimated through personal plebiscite, could turn into a dict在torial (or even fascist) regime, even though he 1由附lfl叫 pointed out that in general 'leader democracies'were 筝characterized' by a highly emotional 叩pe of devotion to and ttust in the leader and that 出is accounted for a tendency ‘ to follow as a leader the rype ofindividual who is most unusual, who promises the most or who employs the most effective propaganda m也sures'.I l vis-à-vis all 艺raditional societies progressively weakened in the course of time, there arose a real danger that 出Ìs society's f主te might be the same as had befallen late antiquity. This being said, it should be noted that 出is was perhaps not the whole of Max Weber's message. Certainly his views about the developmental pa出 of world history, or at any rate of the histo巧T of the West, must not be pressed into a unilinear evolutionist model , regardless of whether this follows the tracks which are determined by ‘ ideal interes

15 8

The Development ofWeber's Theoretica

the backcloth of wor1 d history in a linear manner, with rationalization providing the thread of this teleological scheme and modern industrial society the fìnal goal. This was done in a solid , if not always convincing manner, for instance by Günther Abramowski. 18 Friedrich Tenbruck suggested an alternative approach, namely to give proper attention to the key role which Weber assigned to religious beliefs and religious wo r1 d-views in the process ofhistory. Al l the same he shares the view that Weber, once he had discovered that progressive ‘ disenchantment' was the decisive feature ofWestern history, developed a comprehensive analysis of processes of rationalization in all spheres oflife. 19 Wolfgang Schluchter is far more circumspect in his own attempt, to reconstruct Weber's universal-historical thought as a ‘ developmental history of the West'. He postulates neither a deterministic nor a strictly cOlltinuous evolutionary process towards modernity. Even so , in his view Weber's sociology reaches its culmination in a the。可 ofourown rational wor1 d civilization. It was the result of many different evolutionary steps forward , a process in which religious wor1 d-views had played an important role, though within the context of particular socio-economic structures. 20 Paradoxically, however, nowhere in Weber's work do we fìnd a systematic exposition of his views on the history of Western culture, although he constantly refers to bureaucratization and rationalization as its central theme. He presented his views regarding the future of the individualist societies of the West only in segmented form. Nor was he consistent on these matters. But it was certainly not his aim to develop yet another evolutionist model of the history of Western civilization or, indeed, of universal history, adding one further example of this specimen which had been abundantly represented in European literature ever since Hegel. Admittedly, in his ea r1 y work Weber had stiU been strongly influenced by the copious nineteenth-century literature employing models of social evolution of various sorts, but in his own methodological writings he had worked hard to steer clear of all the evolutionary theories enumerating various stages of the development of human society which had been current at the time. This is illustrated by his devastating critique ofStammler,21 and also his uncompromising rejection of, for example, Lam

了'he

Two Dimensions ofSocial Change

1 S9

Society , notably the chapters on the sociology of domination and the sociology oflaw, are organized according to a teleological model of the historical process pointing towards an even greater dominance of rationality and formallegality. A1 though this teleological model is introduced with reservations which quali f)r it as hypothetical, it is 附verthel岱s prese忧d in a quasi-objec的e manner. Acζording to this l110del , l11agic ‘W曰ld-view骂， and charismatic or patriarchal forms of dOl11ination 叩 political， religious or ideological- were predominant in theearl 均句 ystage 伊￠销sofknow白u 旧缸 Ena仙i总s船栩E叮y. As time went on, they were s吨jected to routiniza tÎ on and demagification. Eventually they 伊ve way to modern rational and bureaucratic for l11 s of domination which are based upon a purely formal legal system which can be reconstructed at will and enlists the support of rational science. If this developmental path is projected into the foreseea七le future , the overwhelming pressure of advancing bureaucrati剧ion wi11, or at least might, result in a petrifaction of modern culture. In such co附xts Weber did not always avoid the trap of formulating the uniqueness ofWestern culture in such a way as to let it appear in a fatalistic ligl役， with a ring of finality. 气X7eber's intensÌve studies of the great world religions other 出an Christianity, which he had el11 barked upon by 1915 with enormous vìgour and passionate interest, helped him to transcend this vaguely evolutionist notion of universal history which，且owever tentatively he had presented his respective findings , inevìtably created a misleadir屯 impression of unilinearity and teleologicalωnceptualization. Initially he had turned to the study of the great oriental world religions in order to further corroborate his 出eSls on 也e origins of capitalism and to demonstrate even more strongly the singularity ofWestern indivìdualist culture. However, a more thorough and more intimate study of Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism soon carried him far beyond his original intention, even though its 丘amework was never fully deared away, not even when he prepared the Collected Essays on the Socíol也lofRel告ion for publication early ìn 1920, s如ortly before his death. For one thing, Max Weber ful忖 recognized the gr创刊eligious achievements of As ian and, in particular, of Indian religious thought throughout the centuries: 'There. will be found but 岳w ideas bey

160

The Development 吃fWeber's Theoretical Ideas

and superstition, but one of radically di的rent modes of rationalization. In fact, Weber was far from simply discardi吨 Hinduism and Buddhism as irrationalist and backward religious creeds. On the contra巧， he was fascinated to fìnd that Hinduism and Buddhism were in fact thoroughly rational systems of thought. if judged according to their own ethical premises. A1 though Hinduism represented an absolute contrast to the innerworldly ethics of Protestantism. it was, on its own terms, a consistent value-rational system of thought; during the course of many centuries its ethico-religious principles had 七优 n transformed 七y the bràhmin caste into a rational doctrine which was both coherent and strin在ent if seen from 出e vantage-point of the 豆rst principles of Hi双duism. Weber admired brahminism for its immanent rationality. by the standards of its own premises. and he emphasized the fact 也at it shunned all irrational ways of s恍如11革命e salvation of the sou1. In 坠IS Opl出on， the doctrine ofkarma had been successful throughout Asia precisely because of the rational manneri双飞~hich it had answered the etemal 电uestion ofhow t，。在nd peaceand salvation for the individual，岛y preaching contemplation and 'otherworldly' ascehclsm. In principle. the p拭tem of social change 也iti主ted 与 ideal impulses operated here also , although the practical consequences were acquiescence in the conditions of life as the ultimate path to individual salvation. Strong ‘non甲 everyday' belief与 induce the individual to adopt a particular lífe-conduct which, if taken up by larger groups and exercised for generations, eventually accumulates enough strength to serve as the basis for a new world civilization. It is only in contrast to the perennial restlessness of the Puritans that these orienèal religions appear to be agents of social stagnation per se. Certainly they Z在tionalízed the lífe如conduct of their followers in such a翩 way as to lead them away from restless economic activity. But all the same they represent typical C在ses of social change of signifìcant dimension being induced by ‘ otherworldly' beliefs. In view of th岱e fìndings it would appear advisable to exercise caution in assigning to West，εm civilization a qualitatively hi拉er s锦tus than to the FarEastern culrures. Admittedly Weber put special emphasis 哼∞ the singulari巧r ofWestern development, in compa丘son with 出at öf the Far-E梢tern cultures, and he did so even in very la ,

万le

Two DímensÎons ofSocíal Change

161

signifìcant'户 This remark obviously referred to the fact that Western civilíza-

tion was a已out to conquer the whole world. But the usual c在veat is not absent here either: 'at any rate as we ourselves would like to 出nk'.28 In Weber's texts such statements (wruch can 如 sustained only in the context of a su己stantive p弘losophy ofhistory) are always clearly marked as meta-scientifìc. However, it would certainly not be possible to argue that Weber considered the Western and the oriental cultures in principle to be 叫ual. His personal choice was unequivocal: he identifìed unreservedly with the Western cultural tradition. He repeatedly pointed out 出at rus aim was to establish the distinctive character of Western culture by comparing it with other world religions (wruch, incidental峙， he intended to supplement with analyses of Egyptian, Mesopotamian, Zarathustrian and Christian religious creeds).29 However，刘s study of the Prote阳lt ethic is by no means merely a contra但吨 model against wruch rus theories about the origins of capitaHsm and the Western type of rationalization might be verifìed and described in more precise terms商As has been shown above, he discovered here patterns of rationalization oflife….conduct on religious grounds which corroborated rus view that social change m巧 spring fÍ'om such ‘ ideal' sourc白， though in practice they become effective only in conjunction with ‘ material interests' that often take on institutionalized form. Furthe主more， in his studies of the oriental world religions W伦er became more and more aware of the fact that rationalization can mean very different things in different contexts. Rationalization was by no means absent or insig刷 出ficant in the Fa卜Eastern civilizations, yet it operated from entirely different prernises and accordingly it had a totally different impact upon the social fa如ic. Up to 白白， Weber had talked，血 comparanvely objecnve terms，站。川 the process of rationalization wruch，。叫吨 to the dynarnic of mature capitalism and the advance of 讪reaucratization associated with it, as well as the progressive intellectualizanon of all ‘world-views二 was a七out to dorninate more and more spheres of life. Now he began to quaHfy trus observation; it was ∞t ‘ rationa1ity' but 布rmal rationali町'which w.在s the decisive element in the ‘ lron cage of future serfdom飞 which appeared to be the eventual fate of Western civilizatÍon so long as there were no countervailing forces to prevent it. At about the same time Weber began to distinguish sha

162

The Develop附们fWeber's Theoretíca1 Ideas

on the given situation; this implies, however, that there exists - or at any rate there can exist - not just one but a plurali可 of ‘ rationalization processes' în history. This was clearly Weber's own view. He pointed out that ‘ rationalizations of the most varied character have existed in various spheres of life and in the most diverse sectors of culture'. However, he considered it decisive ‘ which particular sectors are rationalized , and what direction this process will take'.31 It could be argued that for Weber the differentiation between various types of rationalization, depending on difi岳rent value-orientations, was not an altogether new departure. Al ready in The Protestant Ethíc it is said that ‘ life can be "ratiollalized" from altogether different "ultimate" viewpoints and in altogether different directionsY However, in 1905 this statement carried no particular weight , inasmuch as the singularity of the 可pe of ‘ rationalization' stemming from Puritan religiosity appeared to be beyond doub t; surely it was there to stay, whereas the other varieties of ‘ rationalization' were inevitably receding into the background. When Weber re-edited the essays on The Protestant Ethíc in 吵吵， he found it necessa叮 to add a 尺joinder which emphasized the importance of this statement (which in the 1905 version had been rather a marginal comment, but which by now had gained a new signifìcance): ‘All studies devoted to "rationalization" ought to begin wi出 this plain sentence卢3 Weber had good reason for doing so; for by then he had arrived at a more differentiated position which distinguished between 'formal' and ‘ substantive' rationality. Western culture did not rep时sent the only case of rationalization of all spheres of life , but rather a special varie可 of rationalization, although of the greatest cultural signifìcance, namely ‘ formal rationality' (it could also be said to be ‘ technical rationali可" al出ough nownere does Weber use this term). Therefore he now considered it necessa可 to emphasize the antinomical character of the concept of ‘rationali町" and to point out that ‘ rationali町， is a meaningful term only if it is related to a particular vantagepoint. With hindsight he ascribed to the essays in The Protestant Ethíc and the Spirit of Capitalism above all the intention 'to demonstrate that "rationality", although it appears to be an unequivocal concept, may in fact mean ve町 diι ferent 仙19S'.34 Certainly this had not been his orig

The Two Dimensions 吃fSocial Change

16 3

gready importa抵 to advise c革ution with regard to applying the concept of ‘ rationality' to social phenomena without any prior investigation of its actual meaning in a given context 在nd in relation to a given system of ‘ ultimate' ideal valu也

丁he distinction between 也rmal and su七stantive rationality shows up also in

the Soω哩'y of Law , as applied to the difi岳阳lt legal sys优ms to be found in history. However, as is indicated by the heading of section S -‘ Formal and suι stantive rationalization of law: theocratic and secular law' (in Economy and Society this heading is only incompletely reproduced) - they were stiìl related to different historical formations. 35 Substantive forms of legal proceedings and accordingly substar泛ive rationalization oflaw are described as 可pical f出tures of theocratic law in its various historicalvariants. With the triumph ofRoman i在w， however, substantive law and substantive leg主1 proceedings 主ppeared doomed, even though Weber was prepared to concede that even today [he ut巾ersal advance of formal law had been slowed down at times 句 demands for su七stantive justice on the grounds of class interests and idωlogy飞36 丑utthe trend of the rime pointed in the opposite direction. 'Inevitably the notion must expand 出at the law is a rarional technical apparatus , w且ich is continually transformable in the light of expediential consider在rions and devoid of all sacredness of content.>37 In 在r eber's view, this was 气mavoida七le des出ly'. NowWebεr considered that the evolurionist resolurion of the antinomy 如 tween substantive and formallaw suggested in the Sociol，咄， of La w was no longer tenable. He beg革n to emphasize more and more strongly that 出e antinomy between formal and substantive rarionality cannot 七e dissolved into a sequence ofhistorical sta驴s; it is a fundamental antinomy which exists in all societal 岛rmations， even the modem bureaucraric ones. In the context of a passage discussing different 句pesofmarke←oriented money economies written in 1920, Weber made this point unequivocally clear:‘ Formal and substanrive rationality, by whatever standard the latter is measured , are always in principle separatεthings， even if in ma可 (and theorerically, al邸吨h on totally unreal premises, even in all) cases 出ey may coincide empirically.'38 Any inψiry into SOCl在1 institurions and 主istorical developments will have to take account of七oth these aspects of rarionality which may be conditioned

16 4

The Development ofWeber's Theoretical Ideas

appeared to be the ultimate stage in world histo ry; it was bound to triumph over all its rivals. Now this proposition had to be reformulated , namely as the progressive accumulation of乒rmal rationali叩. This was all-important, inasmuch as formal and substantive rationali叩 were governed by entirely different principles. On account of the fundamental dichotomy between formal and substantive rationali叩 which did not lose its momentum in the course of time , the notion of the process of Western development had to be seen in a new light. The discovery of the fundamental antinomy of formal and substantive rationali叩39 relativized thc theoretical model of rationalization which had served as a theoretical backbone to Weber's universal-historical studies. It cleared the way for a wider, comparatively more differentiated notion of universal history. Now history was the embodiment of a plura1ity of competing processes of rationalization, directed either by the immanent dynamic of material conditions and institutional structures, or by ideal interests which draw their energy from otherworldly and subjectively absolutely bin.ding ideal values anchored in particular world-views which have found a concrete base in the 1ife-conduct of social groups. These world-views are in a perennial struggle with one another. This was true for rational Western civilization ofWeber's own day just as much as for former historical formations. Let us recapitulate. We 自nd two different dimensions in which rationalization of social systems operates. On the 自rst plane rationalization is governed by material interests; for this reason it is usually steered into the realm of formal rationality, because instrumental-rational adaptation to the regularly recurring circumstances of given reali叩 is likely to be the most effective form of social conduct. On another plane, however, rationalization is governed by ideal interests which in turn are determined by otherworldly, that is to say ‘non-eve巧day'， ideals which may be so stringent as to induce individuals to adopt a methodical 1ifestyle in order to live up to these ideals as well as they can. In other words , this second 可pe of rationa1ity is governed , in Weber's terminology, by substantive considerations which usually are at variance with the principles of formal rationality. In Weber's opinion substantive and formal rationalization can coexist for long periods of time , but in principle they are in insoluble con f1 ict with one another. 40 The very fact that they have entirely different roots guarantees that in principle there exists at any given moment in history a plura1ity of potential developmental paths. To put it another way, universal history is in principle open, notwithstanding the prediction that, under given circumstances, formal rationalization and bureaucratization are likely to be triumphant. But the possibi1ity that at some point in the future substantive rationality might provide sufficient social energies to give a new

The TwoDimeηsíons ofSocial Change

16S

turn to the developmental path of 立lestern civilizatÍon could no longer 七c entirely ruled out.

PARTIV

The Rediscovery ofMax Weber

11

Max Weber in Modern Social Thought

In his famous treatise La Soâologie allemande contemporaine Raymond Aron stated that Max Weber was certai均 the most important German sociologist of his time. 1 丁oday this would appear to be an obvious thing to s呵， as there is 在 worldwide resurgence of interest in his wo此.2 At the time, however，也is was anything but an estab 1ished fact. Certainly he was acclaimed by the German sociological profession, and 检yond it by historians , social scientists and philosophers, as a thinker of great originality and intellectual power. Yet it is a matter of considerable dispute whether he had a substantial intellectual following among the still fairly smal1 group of sociologists during 也e Weimar period. It should be remen由ered that 在t that time sociology had not yet 妆en fully accepted aS an independent fìeld of inquiry 飞Nithin the academic system. Certainly it is faÎr to say that during his lifetime Max Weber had not esta七lished a ‘ school: in the classic sense, even though he had been one of the founders of the Deutsche Ge sellschaft fiir Soziologie and had exercised consider边le influence upon its operations in its early years. 1t may 在Iso be said that he had no direct heirs among the sociologists of the 1920S and the early 193悦， although men like ]oseph Schumpeter, Karl LöwensteÎ泣， K在主1 Mannheim or Karl ]aspers continued to be strongly influenced 七y his ideas. So far we h在ve few satisfactory 在ccounts of the development of the social sciences in Germany either in the 1920S or under National Socialism, except, perha严， Georg Lukács's rather onesided account Die Zerstörut理 der Vernu桥， fìrst published in 19巧 .3 All we have is a great v盯iety of essays and personal recollections , whereas sys优matic research Îs stiU in its initial stages. 4 甘lere are but a few monographic studies or general assessments. 5 So far Ra严nond Aron's account written in 1935 and reprinted in 1950 (a much needed German edition wasp由lished three years late斗 has not yet been surpassed.6 This circumstance

170

立在e Rediscove守吃fMaxWeber

makes it somewhat difficult correct1y to assess the influence of Max Weber 0双 social thought in Germany in the period preceding Hitler' s rise to pow悦。ne point, however, can no longer be disputed. Contrary to a 飞Nidely held view, during the Weimar Repub 1i c Max Weber was the most cited a时， if this criterion is used, the most influential sociologist in Germany.7This may, however, lead to false conclusions, inasmuch as there are almost no attempts at a systematic reconstruction of the major themes of his sociological work. It should also be realized that, since much of his work was published only posthumously, the time span for a proper reception of his ideas has been ve巧齿。rt indeed, as Rainer Lepsius pointed out recently.a 丁he common belief that Max Weber had found no sig出主cant fo11o飞Ning at all in his own time, after his premature d锦th inju挝 1920， was, in part, a myth which was perhaps unintentionally produced 己y the Heidelberg Circle which had gathered around Marianne Weber and Karl jaspers in the 1920S. Both MarianneW检er and Karl jaspers，在e latter in a most influential and impressively written book Max Weber: Politi.阳~ Forscher, Philosoph fìrst published in 193 卒， described Max Weber as a persona1i可 of outstanding rank who never found the acclaim which he deserved , eìther among his fe110w academics or from the public at large. jaspers put this in rather lofty terms: ‘After Nìetzsche, man had found , at any rate Up to now, his last and defìnite personifìcation in MaxWeber.'(咀r hat seine vorläufìg letzte grosse Gestalt in Max Weber gehabt, die Gestalt unserer Welt, die in so reissendem Tempo sich verwandelt, dass die besonderen Inhalte der Weberschen Welt trot乞食r Kürze der Zeit schon vergangen sind.')9 Injaspers's view there were few, if any, other thinkers around who were worthy of and equal to this great man. In fact, Weber's work received considerable 革ttention 抬出飞iVÏthin professional sociology and in 飞jacent fìelds. As late as 1934, according to a sUrvey conducted 七y the American sociologist Earle Edward Eubank, he was rated one ofthe 萨岱t， if not the grεatest， sociologist by his col1eagues in Germany.IO In this respect，剖 least， he was certainly no olitsider, as conventional wisdom would have it. 丁he impressive number of scholars who contributed to the Erinnerungsgabe für Max Weber , published in 1923 by Melchior Pal抖 in two volumes, also indicates that Max Weber certainly was not forgotten，讪t wasat any rate for the time being - a key fìgure

Max Weber in Modern Social Thought

17 1

attention and explìcit evaluation in m呼 or studies by scholars in neighbouring disciplines. Al ready in 1928 Bernhard Pfister had wrÍtten a major study of Weber's theo巧。f ideal types , wl让ch cor阳句 asses时 the latter's 11叫时。甲 logical position as an attempt to build 在 bridge between formal sociology, as represented by Karl Menger, and historicism, as represented by Gustav Schmoller.'2 Others followed suit. Al exander von Schelting published in 1934 his analysis of what he called Max Weber's Wissensch价lehre (theory of scientific knowledge) , a term which, though unsatisfactory, is still in common usage. 1J Joachim Wach incorporated Weber's contribution to the theo叩 of understanding into his pioneering study Das Verstehen. 14 Karl Löwith wrote a masterful account of Max 京Teber's relationship to Karl Marx; he found that Marx's theory of alienation had a direct equivalent in Weber's idea of dis叫 enchantment, that is to say the increasing isolation and insignificance of the personality in a world full ofbu舵在ucracies. 1S Likewise Siegfried Landshut drew attention to the points of coincidence between Marx's and Weber's theories , strongly regretting, however, that the latter, in retaining a dubious stance of o与制lVl巧， had 岳iled to draw adequate conclusions from his fìndings by opposm怒也e capitalist order directly as a system whìch ought to be superseded by a new order of society.l 在 Carl Schmitt took Weber's theories of parli mentary government and charismatic leadership 龄在 point of departure for his own political theory which, however, pointed in an altogether different direction. 17 SchmÌtt's functionalist conception of parliamentary politic趴 在ssociated with his preference for personal-plebiscitarγrule， was directly based on premises to be found in Weber's writings. However , deviating from Weber's own intentions, he used this to substantiate a radical refutation of liberal democracy. His theo巧 of decisionism also owed a great deal to W丛er ， although it negated the essential ethical premis臼 of Weber's thougl扰， in particular the moral 0剖igation to choose between di能rent values in a rational manner and with the utmost degree ofhonesty. Among historians Otto Hintze ought to be mentioned as one who adapted Weber's ideal-typical method to historiographical usage. His universal书istorical studies of European constÌtutional history since the seventeenth century match Weber's thought bo也 ln s

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The Rediscovery 吃fMaxWeber

types and, later, pure 号rpes， often arranged like formulae in a systematic mann时. with .historical analysis. all of these approaches being informed and brought together by a particular notion of the universal-historical process which may wel1 be called a subst在ntÎve theo巧 of histo町. albeit with the status of a hypothesis疆 It Îs otherwor1d与 views which inaugurate social change of signifìcant dimensions either through religious wo r1 d-views or through value…beliefs which are established by charismatic individuals，如 they prophets or leaders of 咄w}坠la拭E衍 础 仰v C 时 州e盯r门s阳 t，命。吨h 白白 on th巧r are subjected to routinizaωn and rationalization which eventually always gain the upper hand. However, Weber 主 lways steadfastly refused to state this theo巧r in explicit terms in篇由 much as this would lead straight into the realm of unsú.bstantiated valuejudgements鑫 Thus he succeeded in developing a sys纪m of social thought which focused upon the key problems of the modern age, that is to say the embattl叫 position of the individual in the face of the seemingly alrnig且可 twin forces of bureaucr主tization and f与rmal rationalization. He did so by interpredng the empirical data against the backclom of univer铅1 history. German sociology in the I920S had been, for the most part, un飞机lling to accept this programme in its entirety. Instead it tended to emphasize modelbuilding, or empirical social researc坠， or explicit philosop如cal-historical theorizing. None of Weber's fellow social scientÌsts succeeded in combining these approaches in an acceptable scholar1y manner, let alone with the grand10Sεvision which had inspired Web优 ln addition, more 在en挝al factors wi1l also have to be taken into consider杂 tion. The intellectual climate in the 1920S was incompatible wit坠 mostofwhat Max Weber had stood for. Undoubted忖 Weber's ideas were fìrmly rooted in the German idealist tradition, much as those of his fellow social scientists in G臼many. He had been influenced perhaps more thoroughly than others not only hy Karl Marx but also by Fried白h Nietzsche. It is reported by Eduard Baumgarten that he once said to one of his students (presumably Baumgarten 主imsel 夺 that only mose who had engaged themselves in a thorough study of the thought of these two thinkers could be considered capa七le of understanding the major problems of the age. 19 However, Weber's acceptance of Nietzsche had always heen qualifìed. While he shared Nietzsche's fear that

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he sympathized with Nietzsche's aristocratic individualísm as far as it could be reconciled with his liberal notion of a social order which offered a maximum of opportunities for al1 individuals alike. None the less it should be kept in mind 也atM在x Weber, unlike most of his contemporaries in Germany , also shared the essenti在1 elements of the western European intellectual tradition. It should be borne in mind that Weber had a lifelong admiration for the political culture of the Anglo-Saxon countries. He attributed the success of the liberal sysem in Great Britain and the United States in part to the influence of Puritanism, whereas , conversely, the authoritarian features of German politic在l culture could 玩 traced back largely to the intel1ectual and religious heritage of !-utheranism. In his view, it was not least for this reason tha艺 there had never 七een a 包enuine breakthrough ofli检ralism in Imperial Germany. In particular, the intellectual example ofJohn Stuart Mill certainly must be rated ve可 highly for Weber's intel1ectual development. 1t may be said that Max Weber's thought represented a genuine syn出iosis of the German 在nd the western intellectual traditions. In t主is respect he stood in stark contrast to the great m气jority of German intellectuals of his day, perhaps with the notable exception of 丑 rnst 币。eltsch， whose endeavours in the early 1920S to bridge the gap between 留 estern 在nd German intellectual culture, ho 旧 ow 附 恍 e 咣 v er几， proved singularly uns 怒阳附 su 旺 u1κ 汇 肌 c-田町-丽帽 帽

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It is this orientation ofWeber's sociological thou在ht which accounts for its limited success in Weimar Germany, despite the fact that 挝sw。这 was in the back of every初句's mind and continued to 汝 discωsed a great dea 1. His influence did not prove strong enough to lead German sociology out of the rut of a predominantly idealist, spiritual and often organi! holistic approach to the study of society and culture. Max Weber's theory of ration磊lization as the predominant feature of Western èultural development. in contrast to the development of the great cultures in the Middle and Far East, clearly spelled out the potential dangers for the liberal societies of the Western world in his own time. But he carefulIy a己stained 丘om condemning rationalization outright às a social force threaten鸣曲 individualist culture of the Wes t, as many of his fe l10w sociologists, includinghis own brother Al fred , were quick to do. In fact Max

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Neirher did he wish to get embroiled with 由e more common form of criti守le of moder也ry voiced by many of his colleagues from the vanr垂在e-point of an elitisr intellectual culture in which the great personaliry plays an outstanding role. It was f白hionable at the time to em阱asize the contrast between rhe irration在llife→p主ere of the personaliry and industrial sociery, in such a w主Y 主S to play into the hands of anti蛐moderni汉艺endencies. Weber's own position on this count was rather more circumspect than 齿。se of many of his co11eagues. He 。专jected to the cult of ‘ persona1iry' , s优nin radic在1 juxraposition to 泣如il泣a­ tion' , al出ough he w路 fullyaw在re of the secular d在ngers to man as an individual, as the only source ofcreative social action and imbued with a deep sense of personal responsibiliry. He refused to join in rhe f:在sruon of condemning 垃vilization' outright, and to indulge in a new intellectual romanticism. Instead 坠e considered bureaucratÎzation and formal rationalization as inevitable phenomena w且ich modern man had to endure, unless he wished to opt out of modern sociery altogether，明白 all the consequences this involved. Ra ther, man is called upon to m在ke 白e best of the situation in which he fìnds himselE While on one plane they put individual auronomy in jeopardy, on another .plane bureaucratÎzation and the rational techniques of the modern age provided new opportu出ties for creative (in other words , value-oriented) social action under the conditions of advanced industrial societies. 丁here was, in his view, no easy way out. It was not possible simply to opt for either modern, forma l1y rational culture or for the irrational cult of the personaliry and the cultivation of the individuallife四sphere， as preached at the time 峙， among others, notably Stefan George and his disciples. One had to put up with the fact 也就 modern life was dominated by the eternal struggle between conflicting value町principl时， and one had to solve these value-conflicts by an adequate personal 1ife-conduct rather than by looking for prophets or for 在 return to a traditional social order. Least of all did he favour convenient middle-of-the-road solutio黯.T头Ìs plea for rationa1iry and for accepting modern industrial culture and mass democracy separated Weber from the great r口气joriry of his 岳llow sociologists. For th巧 were all , or almos艺在11， influenced by the irrationalist tendencies of the currξnt intellectual climate which played with a

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implications. Neither Max 百出时's typology of different forms of social action nor his theo巧 of social groups would have anything in common with such an irrationalist conceptualization. 丁hough he was the last to consider irrational or even emotional forms of motivation of social action as somehow negligible (and indeed he had developed his interpretative sociology in order to provide the methodological tools for correc t1 y assessing non-rational forms of actÌon in a ratìonal mann吟， he refused to commend irrational types of social conduct. Neither did 且is methodological individualism allow social institutions to be interpreted in collectivistic terms , as, for instance, in Leopold von Wiese's work, 时， at the other end of the political spectrum，七y Ottmar Spann. In short , German systematic sociology in the 1920S 品llowed a pa出 of social analysis entirely different from that of Max Weber. It was influenced far more by tradi… tional ideal缸， neo-romanticist or organic-holistic views than Max Weber would have tolerated. An even stron在er contrast of t且is sort developed in sociology of culture, as represented in 设法 work of Franz Oppenheimer and Max Weber's brother Al丘ed. Both could not resist the temptation to present their sociological 飞news in the form of substantive theories of history sttongly critical of modern industrial civilization and mass culture. Oppenheimer ended up doing some抽 thing which Max Weber had always refused to do , namely outlining a teleological model of the historical process terminating in the utopian vision of 革丘恍 如cle巧r of the future in many ways reminiscent of early nineteenth-century liberal views; he envis主ged the eventual emergence of a new type of society of small proprietors within an economy devoid of big business; a decenttalized polìtical system would free all citizens from govemmental oppression and state interD挝ence in social affaÍrs. In Al fred Weber's sociology we 他serve an even sttonger fusion of liberal Vlews 叫出 an irrationalist notion of culture. His cultural sociology had a strong anti-modemist bias. Originally A1fred and Max Weber had 检en ve叮 close in their views; bo出 had been strong opponents of 七ureaucracy and authoritarian control in Wilhelmine Germa问. Bo社1 had fought hard ag在inst Schmoller's conservative views and their predominant influence within 由己 Verein 起r Sozialpolitik. Both had been associated with progressive liberal politics 革ndhad opposed extre

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and 'culture' as antinomies; wlùle civilization stood for the material sphere of human 在ctivity dominated by the powerful forces of technological change and material progress, culture stood for man's inner values, for the sphere of creative spontanei巧， dominated 均 irrational motives which Al fred Weber summed up in the notion Lebensgifühl (li岳 experience). Culture develops within sp机ific Geschichts剖irper (lùstorical entitie斗， that is to s在y particular socio-historical constellations which allow a certain degree of secluded dev e1 0pment of individual styl邸， emotions and fe e1ings wlùch then may 主nd expression in intellectual or aesthetic artefacts. Civilization, on the other hand, issu问jected to the iron laws of the market-place a时 ofma 汉艺仅 ter 盯na 必a过i 肘cess白 i让ties咄ere 芷衍 e 22 there is no room for 平 spon 时tan 挝 εe1艺句 y人y 户 Tlùs sort of conceptualization was in direct conflict with fundamental notions ofMax Weber's sociology. For the lattt: r h在d carefully avoíded opening up such a di飞ride between rationa1ity and the personal lifιsphere， betw时a civilization and culture, which, with lùndsight, appears to be very much part of a specific German heritage. In fact , a good deal of German sociological thought, in so far as it concerned itse1f with macro-sociological issues, dri在ed moreand more in tlùs d.irection,. na血盹C与 anω翩翩巾吁翩翩 f 陶.roI踹1拭riωi i妇 ndl山 1览st时 na 注1 sωOC1仕 et穹 Y wlùch originated in a cluster of motives pa衍r仅 圳t句 1与 yidea 过li加 s挝t， part1y neo-romanticist and part1y anti-capitalist. Tlùs is true also ofHans Freyer. Freyer seems to have grasped the gist of Max Weber's intellectual position more correc t1y than any oflùs colleagues. In lùs influential book Soziologie als Wirklichkeitswissenschafi pub1ished in 1930 Freyer exp 1icitly acknowledged as being correct what he called 'the fundamental tendency' ofWeb时's sociological system. Tlùs system, he argued, was ‘ the greatest and, a缸。吨 the modem academic [sociologic在11 sy阳I战 the on午 exa吨le of a sociology which aimed at system占uilding， but at the same rime at 在scertaining present-day reality, induding its lùstoric主1 premises and fùtu时-oriented tendencies: in 齿。rt， a concrete sociology.'23 But Hans Freyer chose to fo l1ow a diι ferent path wlùch deviated 丘om Max Weber's position, even though norninally lùs own sociological work was meant to implement the programme of sociology as a Wirklichkeitswisse附hafi (scie缸e of reali呐 in the 主叫ition of Webe

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would supplant class society and its constituent li快ral elements once and for al 1. A七out the ideological nature of such an undertaking he was 电uite unequivocal: 毛with such a thesis sociology establishes itself as a thoroughly antiliberal undertaking, as an intel1ectual position quite opposÌte to the ideology ofbourge01s SOCl叫了24 In this context Freyer addr岱sed hìmself direc t1 y to Max Web也 He pointed out that Max Weber had shared the same theme and approach 在S Marx, but instead of dr在wing the 0七vious conclusions about the future of the bourgeois order - namely that modern class society ought to be rejected and replaced with 注 new social order guaranteed by a strong state 呻 he had taken refuge in a formalistic casuistry. It is not difficult to see why Hans Freyer eventually became an adherent of National Socia1ism, even though he remained a radical conservative at heart. 25 Indeed, as has been shown 均 Jerry Z. Muller ìn a most interesting study,2Ó he soon found 且imself outflanked by f红 more radical tendencies. In 1934 Freyer had 七een elected Führer of the Deutsche Gesellschaft fùr Soziologie on the assumption that it might be possible for him to secure its survival with not too much sacrifice of scholarly standards. However, Freyer's relarionship with offìcial National Socialìst academic policies turned out to be rather coo1. He was not prepared to be instrumental in the implementarion of National Socialist principles in sociology. Eventually he ended up in a position of semiisolation. All the same, Freyer's intellectual development in these years provides a significant insight into the development of German social thought during the period ofNational Socialist rule. In the intel1ectual climate prevailing in the late 1920S and early 1930S Max Weber's ideas were considered nó longer satisfactory, precisely because they did not al10w compromises between scholarship and political be挂efs such as were considered imperative by Freyer and others. Besides, Freyer's qualification of Weber's sociology as typically 1iberal and bourgeois cor主esponded with views widely held in other quarters. In I932 ChristophS时ing published a doctoral thesis on Po /itiμndWi￥~senschaft bei Max Weber in which he launched a vitriolic attack 呻 upo 侃 n Webe 盯ra 剖S 白t 仨扯e last g主妃ea川E re 守 P陀 res 段阳附 臼盼 e n1

1iv 扣 vedi岱 t岱s优elf 扭 andwa蹈sab 如o】飞时 1汉t川tωob 怡er，肥e抖 pla征ced 七均 yar时 1拔ewsocla址lorde盯rwhi 让ich 挝1， though not

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Thε 反edisco何ryofMax

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years later pleaded for a National Soci在list hegemony over Europe as the first step tow在rds the creation of a new nationalist and organic European culture under Teutonic leadership which would conform to the principles of soci址 。rganization predominant in the Middle Ages, though now at an infinite1y higher leve1 of historical dev e1 opment. As 1 have shown e1sewhere, Weber's notion of charismatic domination and the radical formalization of parlia偏 mentary democracy in 且is political sociology had provided intellectual stepping四stones f吐出e emergence of non再democratic views among the German intelligentsia. But in substancεhe had nothing in common with irrational political creeds like Steding's. Hìs 1iberal convictions and hìs steadf主st adherence to the principle of rationali 咛 made his sociology unacceplable in the intellectual climate prevailing under National Socìalism. Contra巧r to a widely h e1d view, the National Socialist takeover did not lead to a sudden halt of socìological research. Given the fact that sociology had commonly been held to be closely associated to Marxist thought, its status as an ìndependent discipline appeared now to be threatened; however，问 redefining its su导机←matter in terms acceptable to the new regime and occasionally 切 taking shelter under the roof of other disciplines 呻 like， in Leipzig, universal history in the tradition of La mprecht - it managed to survive.28 As more recent re拢在rch has 也ow凡在s a schola向 discipline sociology actual与 thrived unde主 National Socialism as long as it conducted empirical 主esearch believed to be useful to the new regime. 29 In a w町， Freyer's programme for creating a ‘ German sociology' proved rather successful , though under somewhat different auspices than he would have liked to se巳 Under the umbrella of the new ‘Ge主man sociology' there gathered a considerable number of scholars from neighbouring disciplines like Volkskunde , ethnology, history, public law and political science conducting research on topics r出ted to Nation在1 Socia1ist ideology. 丁hey focused on Volkstum ('folkdom'), rather than 吨。n bourgeois society, something which came to be considered as a cypical shortcoming of socìology during the Weimar period. This h e1 ped to pull sociology close to the National Socialist camp and in some respects to make it a willing servant of the regime. 30 On the oth时 hand serious sociological research on fundamental issues was severe

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ship of the sort that Max Weber had ìnitiated did not find a place in the 丁hird Reich. Weber's liberal convictions and the steadfast adherence to the principle of rationaliry made his sociology unacceptable in 出e intellectual climate prevailing under 到ational Socialism. Therefore it will come as no surprise that during the period of National Socialism the intellectual heritage of Max Weber was largely abandoned; at best it survived in a 仕agmented and distorted form. A case in question was Al fred Müller-Armack's adaptation of M础 Weber's thesis on 'Protestantism and the origins of capitalism'. Müller-Ar mack reinterpreted Weber's argument in an altogether idealistic manner, in order to en1 ist it as support for h必 own theo町， according to which 念conomic history is determìned by a se弓uence of Wirtschaftsstile (‘economlc s叩les') which, in tum, are dependent upon secular changes in the prevaìling spirìtual dimate.τhus he concluded that the rise of capitalism was due to 'the intellectual revolution of the sixteenth centu巧， marked 均在 totally new relìgious attitude. 气lthough he presented his own findings throughour as being supported by the conclusions of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit 吃f Capitalism , he was careful to dissociate himself from Weber's economic liberalism, as this was not fa边ionable at the time; he argued. that 到ational Socialism had found the necessary means to restrain the destructive dynamics of capitalism.32 Indeed , National Socialism claimed that ìt had replaced bourgeoìs society and ìts class divisions once and for all. Seen in this petspective all tradìtional socìology which had focused upon bourgeois society was completely outdated. In 1935 Hans Freyer found it necessa可 to defend bourgeois sodology of 出e nineteenth and early twentieth centuries against wholesale condemnation, even though he shared the 飞riew that the National Socialist revolution had in principle superseded bourgeois sociery户 He pointed in particular to 也e continuing importance of the work of Ferdinand Tönnies, and likewise that of Max Weber.34 But this was oflitde avaìL German sociology came to be preoccupied with the themes of G盯man 市lkdom' and Gemeinschaft , while interest in Web旷s work almost disappeared. Instead Weber's sociological thought found a new home abroad , no的ly in the United States. Understandably, Raymond Aron's attempts to fam过lanze French scholarship with German social thought a

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capitalism was taken up everywhere, in Great Britain, in France,3S in Italy, in the United States and even in J在pan. On the whole, however, the. response was a mixed and qualified 01批R. H. T awney discussed at consider动le leng在 Weber's thesis that Puritanism had been one of the roots of modern capitalism, arn飞lmg 在t the rather 电ua1ified conc1 usion that there had been a 1ink between Puritanism and the rise of capita1ism but that it was not a causal 七ut rather a circumstantial 0挝，3