The Philosopher's Dictionary

ThePhilosopher's Dictionary

secondedition

RobertMartin

BroadviewPrrsc . 1994

01994bmrdviwprur Reprinted1994,l9%, 1997,l9gg All righs reserved.The uscof ury part ofthis publicrtion reproduced, tren$ritted in any form or by *y means,electronic,mecbanicd, photocopyi recording, or othcrwisc, or storedin e rcEievd systern,without prior written consent ofthe publisher -ss in thc cescof photocopytng,a liccncc from

cancopy (Csudian Copyright LicensingAgsncy) 5 A&laide StreetEast, Suite 900, Toronto, Ontario n5c rn6 -is an inGingementof thc copyright law. Cenedirn Crtaloguing in Publicrtion Detr Martin, Robert The philosopher'sdictionary, 2nd ed. r s B Nr - 5 5 I I I - o 4 4 - X 1. Philocophy-Dictionarics. I. Tide. B4r.M37 1994 to3 ca493o264-3 Broadview Press PostO6ce Box 1243, Peterborough,Ontario, CanadaK9J7H5 in thc Unitcd Statcsof Amedca: 3576 Catifomia Road, Orcherd Perk, Nv 14127 in the UnitedKingdom: B. R. A. D . Book Representation& Disaibution Ltd', 244A,London Road, Hedlcigh,Esex. ss72DE

Broadvicw Pressgratefirlly acknowlcdgesthc suPPortof the curada council, the Ontario Arts Council, and the Ministry of Carudian Hcritage. PRINTED IN CANADA

To Fran, who loves fivedollar words.

I love words but I don't like strange ones. you don't under_ stand them and they don't underrtand you. Will Rogas

feathen la: one of the light horny epidermal outgrowths that form the external covering of the body of birds and that consist.of a shaft bearing on each side a series of barbs which bear barbules which in rurn bear barbicels commonly ending in hooked hanruli and interlocking with the barbules of an adjacent barb to link the barbs into a continuous rrane. Websln's Satenth Nat Collegiatc Dictionary

Philosophy has its own rechnical vocabulary_ probably more than any other academic field-and philosophers often use ordinary words in special wap. yet dictionaries of philosophy have tended to concentrate on historical obscura, and to ignore many terms in wide conremponrry use. In vain will one look in most other philosophy dictionaries for such terms as ,rigid designator', .veii of ignorance','Godel's proof , or .prisoner's dilemma'. Moreover, other philosophy dictionaries tend toward long definitions that can too easily tempt the student into treating them as a substitute for actually reading philosophy. In this dictionary, Robert Martin works from very different premises. The central aim is to provide a comprehensive and uptdare guide to philosophicnl terms. Definitions are brief, clear and user-friendly. Notes on usage, spelling and pronunciation are included, and there are brief entries on hundreds of the best-known philosophers. Throughout, Martin writes in a style ar once informal and authoritative, enlightening and entertaining, making difficult conceprs intettigible withour distorting them. The Philosopher's Dictionary is an essential reference work for everyone who reads or writes philosophy. Practising philosophers will consult it ofren; students will rely on it for quick reference; anyone interested in philosophy will find ir as interesring ro browse through as it is invaluable for reference. Edtuated, at Columbia IJniucnity and tlu Uniaenity of Michigaa Robcrt Martin is o Professorin tlw Phihsophy Departnwrt at Dalhttrsic Uniursity. He is the author o/The Meaning of Language (MIT Pras, 1987),There Are Two Errors [n The The Title Of This Book, and. of many scholarb aflblzr.

About This Dictionary PnrlosopHERs H A v E T H E r R o w N t e c h n i c ar lp cabulary-perhaps mor€ of it than in any other academic field-and often use ordinary words in special ways. Thus this dictionary. I have tried to locate terrns in here where you'd likely look for them first, but there is a great deal of cross-reference,in case you look somewhere else. Alphabetization ignores spaces and punctuation. Phrases are defined in entries alphabetized according to the real order of the words: for example, there is an entry defining'general will'among the G's, cross-referencedunder'will, general' among the W's. Contrasting or very closely related terns are defined together: thus'analytic' and'synthetic' are both defined in the entry for 'analytic / synthetic', to which the entry for 'synthetic' will refer you. Slashes are used to separate such related terms. Before the modern era, people were formally referred to often by their lirst names. So, for example, the entry for 'Thomas Aquinas' is alphabetized under the T's (though cross-referenced under the A's). I have often grven philose phers' full names when they are commonly referred to only by a shorter narne. Parentheses tell you what to leave out when mentioning them. For example, J(ohn) L(angshaw) Austin is almost always called J. L. Austin, and we talk of Auguste Comte, not (Isidore) Auguste (Marie Frangois) Comte. Some definitions use words I define elsewhere; where it might be helpful for you to look up these words, they are in sMALL cAptTAIs. For brevity I ignore obvious grammatical variations (for example, 'coNsIsrEtIT' in one definition refers the reader to the entry under 'consistency'). When a term inside a definition is defined elsewhere, but not under its own heading, the entry in which it is defined is noted in

a'See ...'comment. I note related terms which it might be helpful for you to consult in a 'See also ...,comment. I have given spelling variations, warnings about common misspellings, usage directions, and pronunciations, where useful in square brackets.When it would be uncommon, or pretentious, or very diflicult for English speakersro use the original pronunciation of words or names that come from other languages,I have given the best acceptable English (mis)pronunciation. (I ignore the French 'r' and nasalized vowels, for example; but pronounce them if you can.) There is a Greek or l,atin name associatedwith almosr every philosophical concept talked about before 1600, and there is a non-English word for many concepts associated with non-English-speakingphilosophers. I have included non-English words when they are likely to be found unrranslated in English philosophical writing. The non-English terms are in italics,though most of them have been naturalized into working philosophical English and need nor be underlined or italicized in your writing. Some Greek and Latin words have a line over a vowel (example: 'agape');this mark is optional in English writing. To keep this book short enough to be handy, I have kept definitions brief and basic.There is much more to be said! A useful (but cumbersome) reference work, far longer and more detailed than this, is The Enqclopedia of Philosophy (New York: Macmillan, 1967). And, of course, there's no substitute for reading philosophical works themselves. I hope that you'll find this book friendly, informal, and helpful. My aim has been to give definitions that can be understood by people who don't already know what the defined term means. (Surprisingly, other philosophical dictionaries don't seem to have been written with this in mind!) I have tried to include all thc basicphilosophical words, and to be even-handed; but this book must reflect my own philosophical biases and training. If you find unhelpful definitions, or important words left out, or implicit philosophical bias, please write me at the Philosophy Department, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scoria, Canada B3H

I

3J5. Your suggestions will be gratefully acknowledged, and will be considered for future revised editions. I have several people to thank for their great help on the first edition of this Dictonary: the anonymous readers for Broadview Press, and (in alphabetical order) David Bray' brooke, Steven Burns, Doug Butler, Rich Campbell, Mary Macleod, Roland Puccetti, Tom Vinci, Sheldon Wein, and Anna Zaniewska. After the publication of the first edition, I received a large number of very helpful suggestions and corrections. For these, I express gratitude to: Sheldon Wein again (St. Mary's University); Terry Tomkow (Dalhousie University);Josefine Papst (Institut fi.ir Philosophie, Universiriit Graz); Robert Nadeau and G6rald l,afleur (Universit6 du Qu6bec ir Montr6al); Paul C. L. Tang (California State University, Long Beach); Robin Smith (Kansas State University), and Roderick T. Long (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill).

obdrclbn

obficfut

obductionThe processof inference to the best explanation. The term is associatedwith C. S. puncn. Ab6lord,Peter (or Fierre) (1079-l142)French philosopher with works mainly on THEor.ocy, Loclc, METApHysICs, and ethics. Noted for his position on uNlvERsnts: he argued that only INDIvIDUALs exist, and that general terms stand fior.+nstnec TroNSof the mind. obsolule'Absolute' as used in philosophy often means 'complete, perfect, independent, unchanging, not RELATIvE'. 'the Some philosophers think that something called abso lute' exists, basic to the EXrLANATIoNof other things; but perhaps this is only a RETFICATIoN. HEGELidentified the absolute spirit with God, and thought that it manifests itself in developmentsin the world (saeHrsroRrcAt-NTATERTAUSM/ mEeltst*,t).Other philosophers associatedwith this term are ScHELLING and gReoLgy.Sometimes capitalized: 'the Absolute';'Absolute Spirit'. obsolute spo(eondlime The view that space and time exist independently of the objects and eventsin them. This was Newton's view, rejected by Einstein, among others (SeescteN-

rrsrs). obsolulism, ethicol / cuhurolSeeRnL.,qrrvrsM / ABSoLUrrsM. obslroction An abstractionis a generalsort of thing,asopposed to a particular (SeeINDIVIDUALs)-forexample, greenness,as distinguished from any and all particular green things. It seems that abstractions aren't directly perceived; we can see

dqdty

oC/ogoot'mmhb

particular green thingr, and see that each is green, but we can't see greenness itself. perhaps greennesJ is known by the process of abstraction-i.e., as the result of thinking about green thingr-or perhaps (as rmro and others have argued) we must have independent prior knowledge of greenness in order to be able to classify the particulars (see pLAToNrcronus). The question whether abstract things exist is one way of putting the problem of urqrvnnsms. (seaalso coxcnpr). obsurdity l. Something clearly false or sElF.coNrReorctony. Deriving an absurdity in this sensefrom the denial of what is to be proved is what happens in a reductio ad absurdurn-an INDIp.tcTpRooF. 2. Something unreasonable, meaningless, inappropriate, without structure, incoherent, failing to make sense.ExIsTENTIAI-rsrs hold that reality, and our place in it, are absurd in this sense. AcodEmyThe Ahadlmia (Greek: "Academy") was the place in Athens where pLATotaught. Thus, the word came to refer to the disciples of Plato, the tLeroNISTs,and more generally (with a lower ft h e c o m r n u n i s t s t t i t e :

but also the author of rnorc abstract phikrsophir.:rl rvor-k, w h e r e h e a r g u e d a g a i n s t a n t i m e t a p h v s i c a l r , ( ) s t 'Itv t . s \ r . leonordo da Vinci Scz scrgrrrrlsls. L6vi-SlrousC s ,l a u d e ( b . 1 9 0 8 ) f i r e n c h s t ' R L : ( ] T r r R A l . r spr h i l r i s o pher, known for his application of structuralisnr to iurthr.opology, and for drawing philosophical conclusions fi-ornthis application. L e w i s ,C ( l a r e n c e ) I ( r v i n g ) ( l B B 3 - 1 9 6 . 1 A ) meric:rn phrlosophcr, b e s t - k n o w n f o r h i s r v o r k i n M O t ) A l .l o g i c a n d t , r , r s r f . \ . { ( ) r . ( ) ( ; \ ' . L e w i s ,D a v i d K ( e l l o g g ) ( b . 1 9 4 1 ) C o n t e m p o r a r y A m e r i c a n p h i l o s o p h e r k n o w n f b r h i s u ' o r k o n ( . o t r N r t . R r . A c t - L i . \ at .nsd t : r x , VENTIONS. liort porodoxConsider rhis senrence: I h e s e n t e n ci n e t h e b o xi s f o l s e Is it true? If it is, then what it says-that it's not true-is corrcct, so it's not true. But if it's not true, then it's true. It seemsthat i t c a n ' t b e e i t h e r t r u e o r f a l s e . T h i s p A R A D o xa r i s e s f r o m t h c SELF-REFERENcE of the statement. [,ogicians conside r-what tCUTIONARY/

PERLOCUTIONARY ACTl

INTENTTON). AUSTTN was

a pioneer in developingspeech-acr rheory. Spenceg Herbert (1820-1903)English philosopher who emphasizedrvolurloN as the unifying force behind all of nature, and as the principle of unification of all the sciences. Spinozo,Benedict (or Baruch) (1632-1677)Durch Jewish philosopher.He argued that nature is a unity, equivalentto a highly abstractand all-pervasiveGod, and that its facrs are necessary,and can be derived by a method of rigorous

220

spiril, obsohie

stoicisrn

"proof' (as in geometry). Spinoza,believing that humans were part of nature, was a thoroughgoing oerrnMINIST; given this, he concluded that emotions such as regret. and anger were mistaken.He argued that love of knowledge was the highest good. spiril,obsoluleSeeABSoLUTE. 5t. ... Seeunder name following. sfoge,lemporolSeeIorrulrv 3. sloleof nolure The historical state humans were in prior to governmental or conventional rules regulating conduct, or the state we would be in without them. HoBBESremarked that life in such a state would be "solitary, Poor, nasty, brutish, and short." Considerations of the relative advantagesof a state where there were moral and political restrictions have been thought to justify the existence of these restrictions (seesoctel coNTRAcr). bosicSeeBASIcsTATEMENTS. slolemenlt, lowlike Szet-RvlIrr sTATEMENTs. slolemenls, proto(olSaapRorocol sTATEMENTs. slolemenls, sfipulofive definitionSeennrnrrroN 5. 'having to do with pnonnBILITY'.A stochastic Means slochoslic (as opposed to onTnRMINISTIc) law predicts outcomes as only probable. ['stuh-K AS-tik'] sloicismThe views of the Stoics, an ancient Greek and Roman school. They held that vIRTUEis the highest good, and stressedcontrol of the passionsand indifference to pleasure 'stoic'). \irrbll-knownstoics and pain (thus the ordinary use of and ueRcus AURELIUS. are zENoof Citium, EpICTETUs,

221

$r(Iwmon

subsistent enfity

sfrowmon Straw man ar'gumentor reasoning (or setting up a straw man) is a bad form of reasoningin which one argues against some position by producing and nrrtrrNc a false and stupid version of that position: a "scarecrow"that can easily be knocked over. Slrcwson, P(erer) F(rederick) (b. lglg) English phitosopher, leading practitioner of eNeLyrrc pHrLosopHy,Lspeciailyin its onotun RyLANGUAGE version. slrkl implicotionSeacoNDrrroNAL. slruclurolism contemporary wide-ranging and controversial French philosophical school of thought. Its cenrral idea is that cultural phenomena should be understood as manifesting unchanging and universalabstractstructuresor ficrms; their meaning can be understoodonly when theseforms are revealed. slrudure,deep/ surfo(eSaenrrp,/ suREACE sTRUCTURE. probobility sublective SaepRosnsrLrry. subieclivism Any of a variety of views that claim rhar something is subjective-that is, a feature of our minds only, not of the external "objective"world. (The oppositeof 'objectivism'in one senseof that word.) Ethical subjectivism,ficr example, holds that our ethical 'Judgments" ref lect our own feelings only, not facts about externals. subselSeesnr. subsislenl onlity nnrNTANo agreed rhar some TNTENTToNATobjects don't exist, at least in the usual way; instead,he used the word 'sunsistence' to refer to their peculial mode of "existence."

222

subston(e

super8logotory

subslon(eAny basic, independently existing entity or subject; the stuff of which things are made. Thought sometimes to be unavailable to our senses,but conceptually necessaryas that which "underlies" or "supports" characteristicswe can and as that sense (seaqueltlY / AT'TRIBUTE / PRoPERTY), which is responsiblefor things existing through time despite changes in characteristics (seeYlttt- oF wAx ExAMPLE,in argued for the existence of substance). which DEScARTES believe that there are two substances:physical and DUALISTS 'corpomental. Physicalsubstanceis also called'material', 'extended' (searxreNstoN 3) substance. It's what real', or physical things are made of-that to which material qualities (size and shape, weight or mass, etc.) apply. Mental (or immaterial or incorporeal) substance is what mental or spiritual things are made of, and to which a different group of qualities apply: thinking of something, desiring something, feeling pain, etc. in the sensein which subslrolum Synomymouswith'suBSTANCE', this is supposed to be necessaryas what underlies properties. Also called'substrate'. suffidenlSeeuecnssRRy/ suFFrcrENT coNDITIoN. sufficienf couseA causal condition that is sufficient for its effect (saeNncEsseRy coNDIrtoN). Some causal condi/ sUFFIcIENT tions are not (by themselves)sufficient: striking a match is not a sufficient causeficr the match lighting: it also has to be dry, ficr instance. sufficienf reosonSrepRrNCrpLE oF suFFrcrENT REASoN. sunnun bonumLatin: "highest good.' The central principle of all that one should strive for. SUMOISEISSaaINTERsECTIoN / UNIoNoF SETS. sup0rer0goforlseeoBLrGArroN.

$,0emon

p0r000x surpffi&qutz

tup0rm0nNot Lois Lane's boyfriend, but, according to NIETZScHE, a person who representsthe highest type. This sort lives a self-disciplined,creative,and joyful life, mani fests the wrLL To powER, and deserves to rule over the "common herd." Ti'anslates Nietzsche'sGerman term, "i)ber. mensch,"more literally translated as "overman". Seeako SLAVE / MASTER MORALITY.

supernofur0lism, elhir0l se, ETHTCAL NATURALTSM / SUPERNATURAT-ISM.

sup0lvenign(e Things of kind A superveneon rhings of kincl B when the presenceor absenceof things of kind A is completely determined by the presenceor absenceof things of kind B; there can be no difference of sort A without a difference in sort B (though there may be differencesin B without differences in A). For example, it is sometimes thought that ethical properties superveneon physicalones; this meansthat there can be no ethical difference without a corresponding physicaldifferencein things, so the physical determines the ethical; but the same ethical property can be realized in a variety of physical ways.Supervenienceis distinguishedfrom reduction:when to be somethingof sort A actually is nothing but something of sort B (seenrouc TIoNISM).Important in philosophy of mind as well: it is sometimesargued that the mental superveneson the physical but that mental categoriesare not identical with or reducible to any physical categories.Thus, there is no mental difference without a physical difference, but mental categoriesare not equivalentto physicalones. surfo(ogr0mmor srRUCruRE. / sltucluts SeeDEEI7 suREAcE p0r0d0xSuppose your teacher announces that there sulpliso-quiz will be a surprise quiz (i.e., one whose date you can't predict-you'll know when it happens only at the moment it happens) on one of the next five meetingdays of the class. Now, lrou know it can't be day 5, becauseif it hasn't hap-

221

syllogbm pened by the end of day 4, you'd be able to predict then, in advance,that it will happen during day 5, so it wouldn't be a surprise. But it also can't be day 4, because if it hasn't happened by the end of day 3, you already know it won't happen on day 5, so you'd be able to predict it would happen on day 4, so it wouldn't be a surprise. Similarly, you can predict that it won't happen on day 3, or on day 2. So you can predict that it must happen during My l; but therefore it won't be a surprise! So the peneooxlcAl conclusion is that it's logically impossible that there be a surprise quiz' euINE and others have considered some complicated matters in MoDAL Loclc that lead to this paradox. Another version of this, known as the hangman's paradox or executioner's paradox, imagines that someone is sentenced to death, but told that the day on which this execution is to be carried out will be a surprise. syllogismA onnucrlvE cATEcoRIALARGUMENTthat has two For exTERM/PREMISE. premises (see ue;onTMIDDLE/MlNoR ample: No reptiles are sloppy animals; all pigs are sloppy animals; therefore no pigs are rePtiles. Categorizing and explaining valid and invalid syllogisms was a primary con'syllogisLocIC (also called DEDUCTIVE cern of TRADITIoNAL tic logic'). SeaHv porsErICAL sYLLocISM. hypotheticol syllogism, logic The main sort of toctc studied in the twentieth symboli( Loclc, and nruch more Powcentury, replacing TRADITIONAL erful and general than what it replaced. It usessymbols (see Loclc and sYMsoLsoF SEIITENTIAL syMBoLSoF qUANTIFIER Loclc) to representLocIcAL FoRM,and certain of its special areas are closely related to mathematics. symbolsPhilosophers often use symbols to abbreviate logical connections (seesvrrlnol.soF QUANIFIERLOGICand Svt'lnOLS LocIC), and letters to stand for terms or oF SENTENTIAL sentences.Using letters this way is useful when showing the

slmbob ofquontifrr fuic

symhb ofsententhl bgk

ficrm of a complicated argument, or as shorthand when you're going to use them several times, but avoid doing this otherwise. If you merely want to say that a man crossesa street,it will impress no one to say,i{, man M crossesa street

s."

symboh of quontifior logic Predicates (or predicare-lerters) srand for properties (seeeuAt-rry / ATTRTBUTE / pRopERTy):ficr example, suppose 'B' stands for the property of being bald. Constants stand for particular tNotvtouALS.If ,f' stands for Fred, 'Bf' stands for the sentence,'Fred is bald'. Variables stand for any individual thing. They are said to be ,bound' by quantifiers. The two quantifiers are rhe universal quantifier ('all') and the existentialquantifier ('some',i.e., 'at least one'), sometimes symbolizedby 'V' and 'l', respectively. Thus in '(fx)(Bx)', 'x' is a variable bound by the universal quantifieq and the sentencemeans 'Everything is bald'. '(3x)(Bx)' means 'Something is bald'. An alternativeway to symbolize that universal sentenceis '(x)(Bx)'. '(Bx)' all by itself is not a meaningful sentence-it's called an 'open' sentence, because it lacks a quantifier, so the variable is unbound (also called'free'). The equalssign (=) symbolizes identity: 'a = b' means'a is identical with b'. The iota-operator 'r' (sometimes upside-down) symbolizes the DEFINTTE DEscRJprroN, so '(tx)(Bx)= f' means'The one and only thirig thing that is bald is Fred'. '(y!x)' (sometimesread 'E shriek x') means 'There exists exactly one rhing'; so '(y!x)(Bx)' is the false statement that there exists exactly one bald thing. symbols of ssnfsntiol logit ttre symbols used to stand for logical TRLTTH ruNCTIONALconnections between sentencesin snNTENTIALLoclc. The sentencesthemselvesare usually abbreviated by capital letters.The connectivesare: The ampersand(&) and the dot (. ), both commonly used ro stand for'and'. 'P & Q'(alternatively,'P . Q ) is the coNJUNCrtoN of the two conjuncts P and Q, and means 'P and Q'.

225

symmehic / nonsymmeii( / osymmetic

symmetic I nonsymmetk / osymmelrk

The horseshoe(=) and the arrow (+), both commonly used 'P f for if...then'. Q' is a material coNotrtoNAI. rvhoseante'P' and consequentis 'Q; it means 'if P then cedentis Q'. 'P v The wedgeor vee (v) standsfor the inclusive'or'. Q'is or means'P whosedisjunctsare P and Q and a DIsJUNCTIoN

a,.

The tilde or curl (-) standsfor'not'or'is not the casethad' -P is a negation, and means'it is not the casethat P'. Other negation symbolsare'-' and'-r'. The triple-bar (= ) or the double-arrow (