The Peninsula and Seven Days: A Battlefield Guide (This Hallowed Ground: Guides to Civil Wa)

N4084.indb i 1/15/07 10:09:01 AM This Hallowed Ground: Guides to Civil War Battlefields SERIES EDITORS Brooks D. Sim...

Author: Brian K. Burton

32 downloads 425 Views 6MB Size Report

This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form

DOWNLOAD PDF

N4084.indb i

1/15/07 10:09:01 AM

This Hallowed Ground: Guides to Civil War Battlefields SERIES EDITORS Brooks D. Simpson Arizona State University Mark Grimsley The Ohio State University Steven E. Woodworth Texas Christian University

N4084.indb ii

1/15/07 10:09:02 AM

THE PENINSULA AND SEVEN DAYS A BATTLEFIELD GUIDE BRIAN K. BURTON

Cartography by Christopher L. Brest • University of Nebraska Press Lincoln and London

N4084.indb iii

1/15/07 10:09:02 AM

© 2007 by the Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska All rights reserved Manufactured in the United States of America

⬁ 䊊

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Burton, Brian K., 1959-The Peninsula and Seven Days : a battlefield guide / Brian K. Burton. p. cm. — (This hallowed ground) Includes bibliographical references. isbn-13: 978-0-8032-6246-1 (pbk. : alk. paper) isbn-10: 0-8032-6246-9 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Peninsular Campaign, 1862. 2. Seven Days’ Battles, Va., 1862. 3. Battlefields—Virginia—Guidebooks. 4. Historic sites—Virginia—Guidebooks. 5. Virginia—Tours. 6. Virgina—History, Local. I. Title. II. Series. e473.6.b87 2007 973.7⬘32— dc22 2006017252

N4084.indb iv

1/15/07 10:09:02 AM

Contents

Acknowledgments

vii

Introduction

ix

How to Use This Guide

xiii

The Road to the Peninsula

1

The Peninsula Campaign, April 4–May 15, 1862

4

introduction to the tour of the early peninsula campaign

7

stop 1

Johnston’s Headquarters

8

stop 2

Young’s Mill

11

stop 3

Lee’s Mill

14

stop 4

Skiffes Creek

17

stop 5

Dam No. 1

19

stop 6

The Lines at Yorktown

23

stop 7

Hancock’s Fight

26

stop 8

Fort Magruder

30

stop 9

Hooker’s Fight

33

optional excursion 1

Fort Monroe

38


Warwick Court House

41


Gloucester Point

44


Drewry’s Bluff

47

The Peninsula Campaign, May 15–June 24, 1862

51

Richmond National Battlefield Park Visitor Centers

55

overview of the first two days, june 25 and 26, 1862 56

N4084.indb v

stop 1

Lee’s Headquarters

58

stop 2

Lee’s Plans

62

stop 3

The Attack at Mechanicsville

65

overview of the third day, june 27, 1862

68

stop 4

Walnut Grove Church

70

stop 5

The Battle of Gaines’s Mill

73

5a

The Union Line

74

5b

The Breakthrough on the Union Left

75

1/15/07 10:09:02 AM

5c

Hood’s Breakthrough

77

5d

The Union Center

78

stop 6

Cold Harbor

81

stop 7

Grapevine Bridge

84

stop 8

McClellan’s Headquarters

87

overview of the fourth and fifth days, june 28 and 29, 1862

90

The Mess at Savage Station

92

overview of the sixth day, june 30, 1862

95

stop 10

The Fizzle at White Oak Swamp

97

stop 11

The Action on Long Bridge Road

101

stop 12

The Second Union Line at Glendale

104

overview of the seventh day, july 1, 1862

107

stop 13

Jackson at Malvern Hill

109

stop 14

Magruder at Malvern Hill

112

stop 15

The Union Line at Malvern Hill

114

15a

The Union Left

114

15b

The Union Center

116

15c

The Union Right

118

The Peninsula Campaign, July 2–August 26, 1862

121

Secondary Tour: Stonewall Jackson in the Seven Days

122


Polegreen Church

123


Confusion on the Farms

126


Malvern Cliff

129


Harrison’s Landing

131

appendix a

Early Peninsula Campaign Orders of Battle

135

appendix b

Seven Days Orders of Battle

141

appendix c

Organization, Weapons, and Tactics

151

Sources

163

For Further Reading

167

stop 9

N4084.indb vi

1/15/07 10:09:02 AM

Acknowledgments I have long thought of writing a guidebook to the Seven Days, having covered the ground several times and gone on tour with Ed Bearss and Will Greene once. My companion on most of those tours was my father, Joseph Burton, who is always the first reader of my work and whose companionship and comments have always been helpful and pleasant. My colleague at Western Washington University, Peter Haug, accompanied me on one trip; his interest in the Seven Days dates back at least as far as mine. One of the coeditors of this series, Steven Woodworth, was very encouraging when I first proposed this book and has helped at every step of the way, including reading the manuscript and making helpful suggestions. Robert E. L. Krick of Richmond National Battlefield Park, an accomplished historian and guide, went above and beyond the call in helping me, patiently answering e-mails and touring the fields with me as well as reviewing the Seven Days part of the manuscript. I hope his belief that this guide will help the park will be fulfilled. J. Michael Moore of Lee Hall in Newport News gave exceptional help in guiding me to interesting sites on the lower Peninsula and in reviewing that part of the manuscript. I found him through the assistance of another colleague at Western, Sandra Mottner, and her friend Fred Boelt. Tom McMahon, who is writing what promises to be the definitive history of the battle of Williamsburg, was very gracious in sharing his knowledge and reviewing the Williamsburg stops. His map of the redoubts near Williamsburg was most helpful as well. Richard Ray and his wife, Heather, graciously agreed to spend much precious free time driving these tours. I owe much to them, although perhaps some of my debt to Richard will be erased if Heather (who’d rather read fiction than history) agrees to take more battlefield tours. Finally, and most importantly, my wife, Lori, and sons, Andrew and Joshua, have put up with my sitting on the living room floor typing while they were doing other things, my occasional disappearances to print something out or look something up, and my less frequent trips to the east coast. Andrew accompanied me on my last trip to the Peninsula— which I hope will be the first of many battlefield excursions together. To all of them, my gratitude is undying. All illustrations reproduced in this book first appeared in the four volumes of Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, edited by Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence Clough Buel (New York: Century, 1887– 88). The volume and page number

N4084.indb vii

1/15/07 10:09:02 AM

viii Acknowledgments

from which each illustration was taken are indicated at the end of each caption. For my parents, who are always with me on battlefields and elsewhere.

Confederate sharp-shooter. blcw 2:202

N4084.indb viii

1/15/07 10:09:02 AM

Introduction The Seven Days Battles have been considered by British military historian J. F. C. Fuller to be one of the decisive battles in world history. They marked the end of the last chance for the Union to win the Civil War while Northern objectives were still modest—the restoration of the status quo ante. For that reason alone they are worth study. But the series of engagements in late June and early July 1862 also marked the first campaign in which Robert E. Lee led the Army of Northern Virginia, as well as the first campaign in which Lee and Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson worked together as part of that army. And they were the real battle test of George B. McClellan, the commander of the Army of the Potomac. The Seven Days were different from Chickamauga or Gettysburg, the first two battles covered by the guidebooks in the This Hallowed Ground series. Gettysburg began as a meeting engagement, and to a lesser extent the same is true for Chickamauga. Both developed into multi-day set-piece battles. In contrast, the Seven Days was a running series of engagements, as Lee tried to first flank McClellan out of his position and then destroy at least part of McClellan’s army on its move to the James River. No major battlefield saw action on more than one day, and in fact the fields typically were separated by a few miles. Major parts of both armies were on the march on each of the seven days. Thus, although the armies during the Seven Days were about as large as during the Gettysburg campaign, and larger than those at Chickamauga, the forces engaged on each day were substantially smaller. This difference has two effects on the visitor’s tour of the Seven Days sites as compared with Chickamauga or Gettysburg. First, the battlefields themselves are much smaller than either of the other two battles. Thus, they can be seen relatively quickly. Second, the distances between sites are longer, meaning there is more driving on the tour. These two effects mean it is possible to complete the tour in one day, but for those who have more time this book provides several optional excursions. Also, much of the driving is on the region’s historical road network, which to a large extent is little changed from Civil War times in this part of Virginia. This means that the tourist can better understand the armies’ movements by following the tour presented in this book. The Seven Days are different from Chickamauga or Gettysburg in another way. The latter two battlefields are largely, if not perfectly, preserved in the sense that the key areas of each are protected as National Park Service land, along

N4084.indb ix

1/15/07 10:09:03 AM

x Introduction

with most of the positions that each army held. The Seven Days, by contrast, show both the promise and the peril of battlefield preservation. The National Park Service does own key parts of three battlefields—Mechanicsville, Gaines’s Mill, and Malvern Hill. The last-named battlefield is substantially preserved in large part because of the work of the Association for Preservation of Civil War Sites and its successor organization, the Civil War Preservation Trust. Also, at Malvern Hill and Gaines’s Mill, substantial Park Service efforts have restored the ground as much as possible to its 1862 appearance. On the other hand, a substantial part of Gaines’s Mill and almost all of Glendale remain privately owned. Though much of the land is close to its condition in 1862, it is in danger of being lost as a battlefield site. Much of the Union position at Mechanicsville has been developed, for example. The entire battlefield at Savage Station has been lost to an interstate interchange, and the Oak Grove battlefield has been lost to Richmond International Airport. Further, although this guidebook includes a tour of sites that are connected with the Peninsula Campaign before the Seven Days, little mention is made of the battle of Seven Pines. That is because the entire field has been lost, except for a national cemetery. The tour of the early Peninsula Campaign is well worth the effort for those visiting the area. It includes some of the best-preserved Civil War earthworks extant. Fort Monroe and Drewry’s Bluff, though optional excursions because of their distance from the rest of the tour, are of great historical importance. Though the stone Fort Monroe is on an active army base as of this writing (the base is scheduled to be closed), it is quite accessible, and Drewry’s Bluff contains the extensive works of Fort Darling. Sites such as Lee’s Mill, Dam No. 1, and part of the Yorktown entrenchments are publicly accessible areas of a large, extant network of Union and Confederate earthworks from the siege of Yorktown, and they contain most of the important sites connected with that siege. However, the battlefield at Williamsburg either has disappeared or is in danger of doing so. The roads in this part of Virginia are not always well marked. For this reason, it is very important to pay attention to the approximate mileage figures in the Directions sections of the tour, particularly when you are on some of the lesswell-traveled parts of the tour. Be aware, of course, that the mileage figures down to the tenth may vary slightly in your experience.

N4084.indb x

1/15/07 10:09:03 AM

xi Introduction

It is hoped that this guide will not only afford readers the opportunity to study the Peninsula Campaign on the ground itself, but will also encourage efforts to preserve the remaining ground of the battles, one of the most important campaigns in American history.

Trooper of the Virginia cavalry, 1861. blcw 2:271

N4084.indb xi

1/15/07 10:09:03 AM

Confederate skirmish-line driven in by the Union advance. blcw 2:349

N4084.indb xii

1/15/07 10:09:03 AM

How to Use This Guide This book is divided into two main sections. The first is a guide to sites connected with the early Peninsula Campaign, the second to those connected with the Seven Days Battles. The Peninsula Campaign guide is divided into 9 main stops. These proceed from one part of the campaign to another in chronological order. That is, the tour follows the campaign as it progressed, from the Army of the Potomac’s arrival on the Peninsula through the battle of Williamsburg. The Seven Days guide is longer, with 15 main stops covering the action from June 26 to July 1, 1862. Each tour, including driving times, can be completed in about six hours. Most stops require about 10 to 15 minutes to complete. Only a few stops require you to walk more than 50 yards from your car. Two of the main stops in the Seven Days guide are divided into three or four substops. Substops are designed to develop the action at each point in a clear, organized fashion. In this guidebook, each substop has a section of text that is “married” to a map. This technique enables you to visualize the troop dispositions and movements at each stop without having to flip around the guide looking for maps. The stops and substops follow a standard format: Directions, Orientation, What Happened, Analysis, and/or Vignette. The Directions tell you how to get from one stop to the next (and sometimes from one substop to another). They not only give you driving instructions but also ask you, once you have reached a given stop, to walk to a precise spot on the battlefield. When driving, keep an eye on your odometer; many distances are given to the nearest tenth of a mile. Orientation. Once you’ve reached a stop, this section describes the terrain around you so you can quickly pick out the key terrain and get your bearings. What Happened. This is the heart of each stop. It explains the action succinctly without oversimplifying, and whenever possible it also explains how the terrain affected the fighting. Analysis. This section explains why a particular decision was made, why a given attack met with success or failure, and so on. The purpose is to give you additional insight into the battle. Some stops have a section called Vignette, whose purpose is to enhance your emotional understanding of the battle by offering a short eyewitness account or a particularly vivid anecdote. Although each basic tour can be completed in about six

N4084.indb xiii

1/15/07 10:09:03 AM

xiv How to Use This Guide

hours, you can also take Excursions to places of special interest. These sections use the same format as the basic stops. The sections for a few stops in this guide provide suggestions for further exploring the site of that specific stop. A few conventions are used in the guidebook to keep confusion to a minimum. We have tried not to burden the text with a proliferation of names and unit designations. They are used as sparingly as a solid understanding of the battle permits. Names of Confederate leaders are in italics. Union corps numbers are given in roman numerals. The full name and rank of each individual is usually given only the first time he is mentioned; the Order of Battle in the back of the book can remind you of commands when needed. Directions are particularly important in a guidebook, but we know that they can often be confusing. We have therefore tried to make them as foolproof as possible. At each stop you are asked to face a specific, easily identifiable landmark. From that point you may be asked to look to your left or right. To make this as precise as possible, we may sometimes ask you to look to your left front, left, left rear, or such, according to the system shown below: straight ahead left front right front left right left rear right rear behind/directly to the rear Often, after the relative directions (left, right, etc.), we add the compass directions (north, south, etc.) in parentheses. The maps can also help you get your bearings. Although this guidebook is intended primarily for use on the battlefield, it also contains information helpful for further study of the campaigns. The guide begins with a campaign introduction that describes the events leading to the initial confrontation on the Peninsula. The Peninsula guide has an overview outlining the main developments of the six weeks that began with the siege of Yorktown. Between the two guides is another overview of events from May 15 to the beginning of the Seven Days. The stops for each oneor two-day period are preceded by an overview of the main actions of the period. At the end of the Seven Days guide a section summarizes the remaining events of the Peninsula Campaign. This guide also includes appendices that give the orders of battle for both the Siege of Yorktown and the Seven Days, along with a third appendix that discusses organization, weapons, and tactics of Civil War armies. Suggestions for fur-

N4084.indb xiv

1/15/07 10:09:04 AM

xv How to Use This Guide

ther reading will help increase the reader’s understanding of the campaigns and personalities. We hope you enjoy your battlefield tours of the Peninsula and Seven Days campaigns. Mark Grimsley, Brooks D. Simpson, & Steven E. Woodworth series editors

On the skirmish line. blcw 3:31

N4084.indb xv

1/15/07 10:09:04 AM

A view of mainstreet, Yorktown, the Union troops marching in. From a sketch made May 4, 1862. blcw 2:173

N4084.indb xvi

1/15/07 10:09:04 AM

The Peninsula and Seven Days

N4084.indb xvii

1/15/07 10:09:05 AM

Skirmish at Lee’s Mill before Yorktown, April 16, 1862. From a sketch. blcw 2:193

N4084.indb xviii

1/15/07 10:09:05 AM

The Road to the Peninsula On July 22, 1861, Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan received orders to come to Washington and assume command of the Union army, which the day before had retreated in disorder from the first major battle of the Civil War. McClellan, who had campaigned successfully in western Virginia earlier in the month, was viewed as a savior by the North after the surprising and disappointing debacle at Bull Run. Naming his force the Army of the Potomac, the youthful West Point graduate immediately set to reorganizing and training his men, a process that would take some months. While discussions of blame and resolutions to avoid such misadventures again occupied people’s time in the North, in the South Gens. Joseph E. Johnston and P. G. T. Beauregard strengthened their army’s position near Bull Run and Manassas Junction. The new Confederate States of America had won its first important contest, and elation in the Confederacy was accompanied by some wonder that the army did not follow up its success by advancing on Washington. A strategy conference in the fall of 1861 confirmed the army’s basically defensive stance. However, friction over various seemingly minor incidents strained the relationships of Johnston, Beauregard, and Confederate president Jefferson Davis. In October, McClellan ordered a reconnaissance across the Potomac River upriver from Washington. That foray turned into the battle of Ball’s Bluff, a mismanaged affair that would have had few consequences if not for the death of Union colonel Edward Baker, a U.S. senator from Oregon and a friend of President Abraham Lincoln. Baker’s death led to investigations and fault-finding. McClellan escaped any blame for the incident, and in November became general-in-chief of the U.S. Army, replacing Mexican War hero Winfield Scott. He continued to train his troops and resist demands to begin active operations. In December he consulted with Lincoln about possible moves, but at the end of 1861 he fell ill and was incapacitated for more than a week. Once McClellan recovered, he had several meetings with Lincoln but refused to divulge his plan for offensive operations. While McClellan struggled with politicians, Jefferson Davis won a conflict with a general when he transferred Beauregard to the western theater of operations. That left Johnston in sole command of the Confederate army in Virginia. Johnston and Davis did not get along well either, however, and their relationship would deteriorate over time. In late January, just after Beauregard was sent packing, Lincoln attempted to send McClellan’s army packing to Virginia.

N4084.indb 1

1/15/07 10:09:05 AM

2


He issued the President’s General War Order No. 1, ordering all Union armies to advance on February 22—the 130th anniversary of the birth of George Washington, the first U.S. president and an icon to both sides, as well as the day of Jefferson Davis’s inauguration. Lincoln’s action was probably meant more rhetorically than literally, and was almost certainly a sign of his frustration with the inaction on all fronts. McClellan then presented his plan to move on Richmond by water, and Lincoln countered with his desire that the movement be overland to protect Washington. McClellan was getting ready to advance, however, at what seemed to many to be long last. The Confederates knew this. Johnston and Davis agreed that the Manassas position was vulnerable. Davis told Johnston to prepare for retreat, saving as much matériel as possible. Johnston waited until McClellan began his movement, overland toward Manassas, in early March, then left his lines and “Quaker guns”—logs painted and mounted to look like heavy artillery. The Confederates retired to Rappahannock Station west of Fredericksburg, and the Yankees occupied the Southern lines briefly before returning to their camps near Alexandria, Virginia, across the Potomac from Washington. McClellan claimed this move as a victory, but he suffered what his supporters considered a defeat shortly after, when Lincoln removed him as general-in-chief. Maj. Gen. Henry Halleck, under whose watch Brig. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant had captured the important points of Forts Henry and Donelson in Tennessee, gained overall command in the west, and Maj. Gen. John C. Fremont took command in western Virginia. McClellan then unveiled a new plan to transport his army to the Virginia Peninsula between the York and James rivers. The Peninsula led directly to Richmond, on the north bank of the James, and a quick movement would allow McClellan to steal a march on Johnston, who would have to march overland to meet the Army of the Potomac. This plan was made possible by the uss Monitor, a revolutionary ironclad warship. The Monitor was able to protect the Union transports and supply ships that McClellan needed against the css Virginia, its ironclad counterpart for the South. The two ships fought to an epic draw in early March, allowing Lincoln to approve McClellan’s plan. He did so with the proviso that enough troops stay in the Washington area to keep the capital secure. In the middle of March, McClellan began moving his men. At about the same time, Confederate major general Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson began to advance on Federals in the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia. His attack at Kernstown in late March showed

N4084.indb 2

1/15/07 10:09:05 AM

3


Lincoln the danger of keeping Washington uncovered, as he believed McClellan had, and the president held back one army corps (Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell’s I Corps) from the movement to the Peninsula. Johnston began his march to the Peninsula to reinforce Maj. Gen. John B. Magruder, who commanded no more than 15,000 men on the lower Peninsula. McClellan got there first and began to move toward Magruder, who had prepared several lines of defense across the Peninsula. The Southerner moved his men from an advanced line to his main line, anchored on the Revolutionary War fortifications near Yorktown. The stage was set for a climactic engagement, the second one in 81 years to be fought at Yorktown.

Major-General George B. McClellan. From a war-time photograph. blcw 1:92

N4084.indb 3

1/15/07 10:09:05 AM

The Peninsula Campaign, April 4–May 15, 1862 McClellan began his advance up the Peninsula on April 4 with two columns— each stronger than Magruder’s entire defensive force. One column left from Fort Monroe, heading directly toward Yorktown. The other left from Newport News on the road to Williamsburg. McClellan intended this column to flank the Rebel force at Yorktown, which he assumed would fall back to entrenchments to protect the town itself. He then would send his other mobile force, the I Corps, to take the Southern position at Gloucester Point across the York River from Yorktown, completing his encirclement of the latter city’s defenders. That accomplished, he would continue up the Peninsula until met by Joe Johnston’s main army nearer to Richmond. Although his use of the James River was stopped by the Virginia and shore batteries, his use of the York was protected by the Monitor and would be assured by the capture of Yorktown and Gloucester Point. The Yankees immediately ran into obstacles McClellan had not expected. The first was the roads, which turned almost impassable after rains. The second was the Confederates, who were in line across the Peninsula along the Warwick River and impeding further advance. The third was the holding back of the I Corps by Lincoln. The first two caused McClellan to entrench himself for a siege of Magruder’s line; the third caused him to believe he had no choice but to continue the siege. He reached this decision without observing all of the Rebel entrenchments and despite his advantage of nearly 70,000 men to fewer than 15,000. Johnston, meanwhile, headed from north of Richmond to the Peninsula with his army. After a look at Magruder’s lines, Johnston advocated a withdrawal from Yorktown, but Gen. Robert E. Lee, Davis’s newly named general-in-chief, argued that the army should hold as long as possible. Davis sided with Lee but told Johnston to withdraw when he could no longer hold the line. So the entire Army of Northern Virginia, totaling finally about 55,000 troops, moved into position, arriving in mid-April. McClellan also added troops, with his total eventually reaching 110,000. The two sides dug and skirmished as McClellan brought his siege guns into position. The largest skirmish took place on April 16 at Dam No. 1, one of three dams that Magruder had built on the Warwick River to flood avenues of approach. McClellan wanted to keep the Southerners from improving their works behind the river. Artillery and infantry from Brig. Gen. William Brooks’s Vermont brigade skirmished with men from Brig. Gen. Howell Cobb’s brigade. Then some of Brooks’s

N4084.indb 4

1/15/07 10:09:06 AM

5

The Peninsula Campaign

men crossed the river, held it for a bit, and then were forced back. McClellan had not wanted to start a general engagement, and he had his wish. By the end of April McClellan’s men had dug so well and so far that Johnston knew the game was up. He announced that he would need to withdraw soon, and he did so on the night of May 3– 4, just more than one day before McClellan’s planned artillery bombardment. Most of the Army of Northern Virginia headed up the Peninsula, but after Union cavalry caught up with the retreating Southerners at Williamsburg on May 4, Maj. Gen. James Longstreet’s division occupied Magruder’s entrenchments there to slow the Army of the Potomac’s pursuit. Brig. Gens. Joseph Hooker and William F. “Baldy” Smith advanced on May 5, and a struggle of several hours ensued, with Brig. Gen. Jubal A. Early’s brigade of Maj. Gen. Daniel Harvey Hill’s division reinforcing their fellow Confederates and Brig. Gen. Philip Kearny’s Union division reaching the field as well. Their movements yielded little result, however, except to allow the rest of Johnston’s army to continue its retreat. Two days later, in an attempt at a flanking movement, Brig. Gen. William Franklin’s division (which had been on transports, then unloaded, then loaded again onto the transports) landed at Eltham’s Landing on the south bank of the York River. However, Johnston’s army had retreated far enough that Franklin could not flank it, and Brig. Gen. John B. Hood’s brigade forced the Yankee forward units back to the main body. Two days later Southerners under Maj. Gen. Benjamin Huger abandoned Norfolk to the Federals, and two days after that the Rebels scuttled the Virginia, which had nowhere else to go. The James River was now open to Yankee ships. The Monitor, uss Galena (another ironclad), and other gunboats steamed up the river toward Richmond. On May 15 they encountered the Rebel defense at Drewry’s Bluff, on the south bank of the river seven miles south of Richmond. The Galena was seriously damaged, and the Monitor could not reach the Confederates on the high bluff. The attack was a complete failure; the James was closed to the Yankees at that point. On the same day, Johnston ordered his men to cross the Chickahominy River east of Richmond to set up his final defensive line, where he had wanted to fight in the first place. The stage was set for Seven Pines, Johnston’s wounding, Lee’s assumption of command, and the Seven Days.

N4084.indb 5

1/15/07 10:09:06 AM

N4084.indb 6

1/15/07 10:09:06 AM

7

Early Peninsula Campaign Tour

Introduction to the Tour of the Early Peninsula Campaign This tour takes you to some of the sites associated with McClellan’s siege of Yorktown and advance up the Peninsula in April and May 1862. Particularly in the area of the siege of Yorktown, the Civil War– era towns have since mushroomed into cities, and today the sites are disconnected. However, key areas where skirmishes and engagements occurred are at least partially preserved, the anchors of the Confederate defensive line at Yorktown are preserved (including sections of earthworks at Colonial National Historic Park’s Yorktown unit), and portions of the battlefield at Williamsburg can still be seen. Further up the James River and on its south side, the key site of Drewry’s Bluff is well preserved by the National Park Service as part of Richmond National Battlefield Park. The tour starts at Lee Hall, headquarters for John Magruder and Joseph Johnston during the siege of Yorktown. Lee Hall has been restored and, because of its exhibits on the Peninsula campaign, serves as a good visitor center for this tour. Check Lee Hall’s hours of operation as you plan your visit. From Richmond take Interstate 64 east to exit 247 (about 55 miles from the center of Richmond). From the off-ramp turn left at the stop sign onto Route 143. Proceed 1.2 miles on Route 143 to its intersection with Route 238, yorktown road. Turn right onto Route 238, and proceed 0.4 miles to Lee Hall on your right. Turn onto the entrance road, and park in the parking lot.

N4084.indb 7

1/15/07 10:09:06 AM

8

N4084.indb 8

Stop 1

STOP 1


Directions

Walk to the earthworks in front of the house, and face toward the house.

Orientation

You are standing at the headquarters of John Magruder and then Joseph Johnston during the siege of Yorktown. Lee Hall, the mansion in front of you, was built just before the Civil War. The main Confederate line stretched from your left front to your left rear, and the Union entrenchments paralleled them further to your left.

What Happened

From this mansion first John Magruder and then Joseph Johnston directed the Confederate forces opposing McClellan’s army during March and April 1862. Located just to the rear of Magruder’s main line of entrenchments, Lee Hall was owned by Richard Decauter Lee, who helped Magruder during the latter’s placement of the line of entrenchments and then evacuated the house with his family. Magruder conducted the defense of the main line until mid-April, when Johnston arrived

1/15/07 10:09:06 AM

9


with the rest of the Army of Northern Virginia. Magruder reluctantly handed over command of the assembled force to Johnston. Johnston was skeptical about the line’s usefulness against an assault, more skeptical than Magruder. Neither thought the line should be held at all hazards. At a conference with Jefferson Davis and Robert E. Lee, among others, Johnston argued for abandoning the position. Lee, however, argued in favor of contesting McClellan’s advance up the Peninsula, and Davis ordered Johnston to hold the line as long as practical. Johnston then commanded his army from this house. On April 17 a Confederate hot-air balloon lifted off from where you are standing to observe Federal activity. By late April it was obvious to Johnston that McClellan’s preparations for a grand assault were nearly complete, and he ordered a withdrawal from the lines. The Rebels withdrew on the night of May 3– 4. Analysis

N4084.indb 9

Magruder had begun forming this line in the fall of 1861, but he didn’t mean for it to be used for anything other than a hasty defense. In fact, he suggested to Johnston in March 1862 that it could be used as a base from which to launch an attack against the Yankees. However, when McClellan began to advance with his entire army from the area around Fort Monroe, Magruder abandoned the idea of an attack and worked to improve the line. It was useful as a way to delay McClellan long enough for the Confederates to decide how they should defend the Peninsula. The arguments on each side of that debate were good ones. Johnston, supported by Longstreet and Maj. Gen. Gustavus Smith, argued for a concentration of forces along the eastern seaboard so he could fight McClellan nearer to Richmond. As an alternative, he suggested that Magruder hold McClellan (who didn’t seem inclined to attack) at Yorktown while Johnston marched the rest of his army toward Washington, making McClellan come to its defense. Combined with Stonewall Jackson’s force, Johnston might have been able to accomplish this. Lee and Secretary of War George Randolph argued that giving up Yorktown would mean leaving the ironclad Virginia high and dry since its base at Norfolk would be lost, that the Confederacy needed time to reform and reinforce its army, and that stripping the rest of the seaboard of troops would mean the loss of cities such as Charleston and Savannah. These arguments also were cogent. Perhaps that is why the debate lasted for hours, into the night on April 14 –15.

1/15/07 10:09:07 AM

10

Stop 1

Further Reading

Newton, Joseph E. Johnston and the Defense of Richmond, 83, 88– 92, 94 –111, 130–35; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 24 –27, 46 – 48, 59 – 62.

Optional Excursion

If you have time, you may wish to visit Fort Monroe—still an active U.S. Army installation as of this writing. Because of that, if security levels are high enough the fort will be closed, so check first. If the base is open, the Casemate Museum in the Civil War– era fort will be open to the public; also, you can drive through the old fort. From Lee Hall, return to yorktown road and turn left. Proceed on yorktown road 0.2 miles to its junction with Interstate 64 East. Turn right onto the on-ramp, and proceed on Interstate 64 to Exit 268. From the off-ramp turn left onto mallory street. Proceed on mallory street 0.4 miles to its intersection with mellen street. Turn right on mellen street, and proceed across the bridge a total of 0.7 miles to a Y intersection. Bear right onto mcnair drive. Stop at the gate for a day pass. All adults will need a picture id to gain access to the base. Proceed 0.8 miles on mcnair drive to its intersection with ingalls road. Turn left and proceed on ingalls road 0.2 miles, then turn right to the main gate of the Civil War– era fort. After entering the fort, turn right and follow the signs to the Casemate Museum.

Major-General John B. Magruder, C.S.A. From a photograph. blcw 2:209

N4084.indb 10

1/15/07 10:09:07 AM

11

N4084.indb 11

Young’s Mill

STOP 2

Young’s Mill

Directions

Return to yorktown road. Turn right and proceed on yorktown road about 0.6 miles to its intersection with warwick boulevard (Route 60). Turn left onto Route 60 east, and proceed about 7.0 miles to old grist mill lane. Turn right and then immediately right into the parking area for Youngs Mill Historic Site. Cross old grist mill lane, and climb the hill to the earthworks. Face southeast so that warwick boulevard is on your left.

Orientation

You are facing toward Hampton Roads and the Union advance. The roads from the end of the Peninsula came from straight ahead. Other Confederate works were scattered throughout the lower Peninsula.

What Happened

Young’s Mill was the site of one of a series of works built by Magruder as a first defensive line to keep the Yankees at bay while he built his second, main line at Yorktown. Other areas fortified included Big Bethel, the site of the first battle on

1/15/07 10:09:07 AM

12

Stop 2

the Peninsula in June 1861. The Big Bethel site was meant to block the road from Fort Monroe to Yorktown. The Young’s Mill entrenchments blocked the road from Newport News, where the Federals had an encampment, to Williamsburg. The Southerners occupied this area through the winter, building winter quarters, and several skirmishes took place, but they abandoned the line on April 4 when McClellan’s army began its advance. The Yankees advanced in two columns. Two divisions under Brig. Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman in the right-hand column moved through Big Bethel directly toward Yorktown, and two divisions under Brig. Gen. Erasmus Keyes in the left-hand column moved through Young’s Mill to flank Yorktown itself. McClellan believed that only Yorktown itself was being held.

N4084.indb 12

Analysis

Magruder’s first line was meant to be a base for watching the Union forces and preventing scouts from moving up the Peninsula. As long as their opponents were not numerous, the Rebels in this area were relatively secure. Magruder then could work in peace on his more important defensive lines at Yorktown and Williamsburg. In fact, Magruder had a thought of attacking the isolated Newport News encampment but gave it up because it would be too easy for the Yankees at Fort Monroe, commanded by Maj. Gen. Benjamin Butler, to close on him from the rear. Union warships also helped deter a Confederate attack. Once McClellan started to move to the Peninsula in late March, it was obvious to all that the forward defenses were not to be held. They had served their purpose, however, for the Northerners were ignorant of the Yorktown defenses, an ignorance that showed itself in McClellan’s plan to flank them and that was exacerbated by poor Union maps. In fact, the Yorktown defenses could not be flanked by land. This miscalculation by McClellan would have important consequences.

Vignette

When Keyes’s column passed through Young’s Mill, Col. Phillipe Regis de Triobriand of the 55th New York remembered coming upon the Young plantation. Its owner was serving in the Confederate army. De Triobriand noted that the man “was a sort of lord in that part of the country. The house was his; the farm and mill were his; the fields and the forests were his; his were the cattle and the slaves. It seemed as though we could not get out of his domain.”

Further Reading

Newton, Joseph E. Johnston and the Defense of Richmond, 83; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 35 –36.

1/15/07 10:09:07 AM

13

Young’s Mill

Optional Excursion

N4084.indb 13

If you wish, you may stop to explore Erasmus Keyes’s headquarters during the siege of Yorktown and the site of some of Prof. Thaddeus Lowe’s balloon launches. To do so, return to warwick boulevard, turning right from old grist mill lane. Proceed 0.2 miles to its intersection with oyster point road (Route 171). Make a legal U-turn here, and proceed north on warwick boulevard (Route 60) 2.6 miles to its intersection with old courthouse road. Turn left and proceed 0.2 miles to grissom way. Turn right onto grissom way, then immediately left into the parking area. Turn in this guide to optional excursion 2, Warwick Court House.

1/15/07 10:09:07 AM

14

N4084.indb 14

Stop 3

STOP 3

Lee’s Mill

Directions

Return to warwick boulevard (Route 60), and turn right. Proceed on warwick boulevard for 0.2 mile to its intersection with oyster point road. Make a legal U-turn, and proceed approximately 5.4 miles on warwick boulevard to lee’s mill drive. As you drive on warwick boulevard you are following the route of Keyes’s soldiers. Turn left on Lee’s Mill Drive, and proceed 0.1 mile to river’s ridge circle. Turn left, proceed 0.3 mile, then turn left into Lee’s Mill Park. Get out of your car, walk along the trail (reading the signs) to the wooden deck over the earthworks, and face toward the Warwick River. After reading the stop, continue along the interesting and informative trail.

Orientation

You are in the position of Confederate soldiers viewing the Union advance on April 5. Route 60 basically follows the 1862 road through this area. The Confederate works extended to your right rear, as well as to your left.

1/15/07 10:09:08 AM

15

N4084.indb 15

Lee’s Mill

What Happened

Keyes’s column, on the road from Young’s Mill, continued its march on April 5 through the mud that passed for roads on the Peninsula. As the Yankees approached Lee’s Mill, they found an unexpected sight—Rebel earthworks manned by Southerners. The 7th Maine, deployed as skirmishers, stopped nearly 1,000 yards from these works, the rest of Brig. Gen. John Davidson’s brigade fell into line, and artillery was brought forward. A duel of batteries continued off and on for several hours while more of Keyes’s column fell into line and Keyes and others reconnoitered. They found strong works extending to the James River and a seemingly large number of Confederates manning those works. Keyes believed the works could not be carried by assault and informed McClellan. Those works were manned by Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws’s division, with the 10th Georgia as skirmishers. But Magruder, believing (correctly) that he was substantially outnumbered, moved troops around and called for sounds, such as the beating of drums, shouting of commands, and tramp of marching soldiers, to suggest the movements of large bodies of troops. This accounted for Keyes’s belief that he was facing a substantial number of Rebels. When McClellan heard of Keyes’s discovery and the resistance Heintzelman’s column had found near Yorktown, he examined the ground and deciding the works could not be carried he ordered his siege guns moved to the front. Then he heard from Washington that McDowell’s corps would be withheld from his army to keep the Union capital secure. He had intended to use McDowell’s force to clear the north side of the York River of Confederates. What McClellan had envisioned as a speedy flanking operation was now turning into something else. After reconnoitering the ground over the next two days, he began what was to be a monthlong siege.

Analysis

McClellan’s plan was to flank Magruder’s defenses at Yorktown, besiege Magruder there if the Confederate did not withdraw first, and use McDowell’s corps (the largest in the army at that time) as a massive mobile force to take batteries at Gloucester Point across the river from Yorktown. He would repeat the strategy at any point necessary until he reached Richmond. This plan hinged on two assumptions. First, McClellan needed good roads for fast movement. He knew the Confederates would bring Johnston’s army from north of Richmond to the Peninsula, and he wanted to advance as speedily up the Peninsula as he could to meet Johnston as near to Richmond as possible. He thought, based on reports, that he would have

1/15/07 10:09:08 AM

16

Stop 3

those roads. Second, he would need an opening in the Southern defenses to be able to flank Yorktown by land. Again based on reports he had received, he thought the road from Newport News past Young’s and Lee’s mills to Williamsburg would be open. Neither assumption held. The Peninsula roads almost universally turned into a mire after a heavy rain, which McClellan was plagued with on April 4 and 5. And Magruder’s line extended from the York to the James, covering the road past Lee’s Mill. Thrown off by these two discoveries, McClellan apparently decided he needed to commence full-scale siege operations after observing the ground, though not Magruder’s strength. He had good estimates of that strength (fewer than 15,000 men), and so believing he outnumbered the Rebels substantially (his force was nearly 70,000 men) he could have ordered an assault. Magruder believed that in such a case he would not be able to hold his lines. However, there is no evidence that McClellan considered the idea. Perhaps Magruder’s attempts at deception, as conveyed in Keyes’s report, banished any such thoughts from the beginning by encouraging McClellan to suspect his estimates of Confederate numbers. A third problem with the execution of McClellan’s plan was the lack of cooperation by Flag Officer Louis Goldsborough, who commanded the Union navy’s North Atlantic Blockading Squadron. McClellan expected Goldsborough to operate against Yorktown and Gloucester Point, but the navy did not do so. This lack of cooperation contrasted markedly with the cordial cooperation of Grant and Capt. Andrew Foote during the Fort Donelson campaign in Tennessee earlier that year. The final blow for McClellan on April 4 –5 was the withholding of McDowell’s corps. Without McDowell, McClellan did not believe he could spare a force substantial enough to accomplish McDowell’s task of taking Gloucester Point. It is true that a detachment from the army risked being caught between Magruder and Johnston’s army on its way north of Richmond. However, a quick turning movement probably could have been executed before Johnston reached the Peninsula, forcing Magruder out of his lines and enabling the army to be reunited. McClellan had plenty of men to hold his lines in front of Yorktown and conduct the turning movement. Again, however, there is no evidence that he considered the idea. Further Reading

N4084.indb 16

Newton, Joseph E. Johnston and the Defense of Richmond, 85; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 36 –39.

1/15/07 10:09:08 AM

17

N4084.indb 17

Skiffes Creek

STOP 4

Skiffes Creek

Directions

Return to river’s ridge circle. Turn right, proceed 0.3 mile, then turn right on lee’s mill drive. Proceed 0.1 mile to warwick boulevard (Route 60). Turn left on warwick boulevard, and proceed 1.0 mile to enterprise drive. Turn left, and proceed 0.4 mile on enterprise drive to the Skiffes Creek Redoubt Historical Park. Turn left into the parking area. Walk to the redoubt, and face into its interior.

Orientation

You are on the right of Magruder’s Yorktown line, on Mulberry Island, a spit of land bordered by the Warwick River to your left and Skiffes Creek to your right. Lee’s Mill is about one mile to your left, and more redoubts existed to your right in 1862.

What Happened

Magruder’s line was potentially strong against a frontal assault along the Warwick River, but it could be turned by water easily via either the James or York rivers. Gloucester Point on the York protected Magruder’s left, and the line at which

1/15/07 10:09:08 AM

18

Stop 4

you are standing protected his right. These entrenchments ran from about Lee’s Mill to near Skiffes Creek. This part of the Confederate defenses saw very little action during the siege.

N4084.indb 18

Analysis

What happened at Skiffes Creek is not as important as what did not happen. Magruder (and later Johnston) could do very little on land to stop a determined Union passage up the James River, which at this point is about two miles wide. For that they had to rely on the css Virginia. But a flanking movement could use Mulberry Island; since that point of land was west of the Warwick River, an advance up it would be into the Confederate rear, and troops could cross the Warwick out of range of the guns at Lee’s Mill. The work at which you stand was designed to contest such an advance. However, no effort was made, perhaps as a result of the report by Keyes after the skirmish at Lee’s Mill. Keyes had sent scouts and then troops along the Warwick and had received word of entrenchments along its course. These entrenchments may have been enough to keep McClellan from attempting a turning movement.

Further Reading

Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 26.

1/15/07 10:09:08 AM

19

N4084.indb 19

Dam No. 1

STOP 5

Dam No. 1

Directions

Return to enterprise drive. Turn right and proceed 0.4 mile to warwick boulevard (Route 60). Turn right onto warwick boulevard, and proceed 0.7 mile to the off-ramp for Route 105 East (fort eustis boulevard). Take the off-ramp, merge onto fort eustis boulevard and proceed 1.1 miles to jefferson avenue (Route 143). Turn left onto jefferson avenue, and proceed 0.2 mile to the entrance for Newport News Park on your right. Turn into the park, taking advantage of the facilities at the visitor center just inside the park boundary if you wish, and follow the signs for 1.0 mile to the Discovery Center. Park there and proceed to the end of the bridge over Dam No. 1. Face the water and the works beyond. If you wish, take the White Oak Trail from the parking lot to see Union earthworks built after the engagement.

Orientation

You are looking across the Warwick River, now Lee Hall Reservoir, at the Confederate defensive line from the point of the Union advanced position at the dam. The dam itself is just to your right, where both ends are visible. To your left the water

1/15/07 10:09:08 AM

20

Stop 5

would have been somewhat lower in 1862, although a dam existed at Lee’s Mill. What Happened

N4084.indb 20

On April 6, Brig. Gen. Winfield Hancock, commanding a brigade in Baldy Smith’s division, conducted a reconnaissance at this position, then held by the 14th Alabama. Hancock, with the 6th Maine and 5th Wisconsin, drove in the Rebel pickets and took some prisoners. He was ordered to stop, however, as McClellan did not want to initiate any action until he knew what he was up against. Both Hancock and Smith thought they could have taken the works at Dam No. 1 at that point, although Magruder soon reinforced the area. Magruder considered Dam No. 1 to be the weakest point in his line, and the Confederates worked to strengthen it. That bothered McClellan, as such strengthening might interfere with his efforts to construct siege works. McClellan decided the Confederate efforts should be stopped, and he ordered Smith to do so, adding that no general engagement should be brought on. Smith sent some artillery and Brooks’s Vermont brigade to do the job. The skirmishers from the 3rd and 4th Vermont and two guns silenced the Southerners (one gun and pickets from the 15th North Carolina). Once the fire stopped, Lt. E. M. Noyes of Brooks’s staff crossed the river below the dam, getting within 50 yards of the Confederate works without being discovered. When he reported the results of his scout, Smith asked McClellan (who was on the field) if he could move a force across the river. McClellan agreed, and Smith ordered part of the 3rd Vermont across the river to examine whether the works could be taken. Four companies crossed, gained the rifle pits on the other side, and forced the Tar Heels away from the forward works. Their ammunition got wet during the crossing, however. The soldier who was to wave a handkerchief (which would have triggered reinforcements) was mortally wounded crossing the river, and although others in the detachment did what they could, they failed to get anyone’s attention on the Union side of the river. The commander of the detachment then sent a courier, who failed to find any general. No reinforcements came. What did come was a Confederate counterattack. The 15th North Carolina, along with the 7th, 8th, and 16th Georgia and part of the 2nd Louisiana, advanced on the Vermonters. The Yankees withdrew back across the river. Later, three companies of the 4th Vermont and four companies of the 6th Vermont attempted to cross the river, the 4th at the dam and the 6th below it, but the newly arrived Rebels stopped both advances before they could cross the river. Smith’s men kept

1/15/07 10:09:09 AM

21

Dam No. 1

their positions near the dam, however, until the end of the siege.

N4084.indb 21

Analysis

Smith’s April 6 movement was fortunate and unfortunate. It was fortunate because it hit the point Magruder thought his weakest, and in fact Hancock found it so. The Yankees had the advantage of terrain, with the ground on the Union side commanding the ground on the Confederate side. Smith’s move was unfortunate because McClellan didn’t want any engagement, so the movement was stopped before it was fairly started, and that gave Magruder time to strengthen the area. Magruder used the 10 days well, and in fact brought the April 16 action on through his own activities. Still, McClellan did not want a general engagement, as he was intent on the siege. The result of this fact was a bungled operation on April 16. The first part, which was intended to force Confederates to cease work, went well. The second part, Noyes’s reconnaissance, went even better, as he seemed to find a true opportunity. Instead of taking immediate action on the chance that the opportunity indeed was genuine, however, the Yankees only put four companies across the river to reconnoiter. That gave the Southerners time to counterattack. Moreover, even if the four Vermont companies had had functional ammunition it is hard to see how they could have stayed on the Rebel side of the river. The ultimate blame for the 165 casualties suffered by Brooks’s men (including 83 in the 3rd Vermont) must go to McClellan, for allowing a reconnaissance that was doomed to failure. He thought the operation was a success, however, because he gained positions from which he could ensure that the Confederates would not cross their own dam to attack him. The Confederates lost about 75 men in the engagement.

Vignette

Smith was at Keyes’s headquarters on April 6, informing his corps commander that he had ordered Hancock forward, when the order from McClellan forbidding any engagement was received. “Very much chagrined,” Smith had to order Hancock back to camp. He later wrote that except for that order, “there would have been no siege of Yorktown in 1862.”

Further Reading

Newton, Joseph E. Johnston and the Defense of Richmond, 116 –18; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 42– 43, 55 –56.

Further Exploration

Newport News Park offers an extensive series of trails, many of which include Civil War earthworks. To cross to the Confederate side of the river, simply cross the bridge in front of you. The Twin Forts loop, reached by following the left fork af-

1/15/07 10:09:09 AM

22

Stop 5

ter you cross the bridge, is less than a mile in length. You can see more fortifications by taking the right fork at the bridge. Another trail, substantially longer, leads to the Wynn’s Mill loop. A trail map is available at the visitor center.

A tempting breastwork. blcw 2:196

N4084.indb 22

1/15/07 10:09:09 AM

23

N4084.indb 23


STOP 6


Directions

Return through the park to jefferson avenue (Route 143). Turn left and proceed 0.3 mile on jefferson avenue to fort eustis boulevard (Route 105). Turn left and proceed on fort eustis boulevard 3.6 miles to its intersection with george washington memorial highway (Route 17). Turn left on Route 17, and proceed 0.6 mile to cook road (Route 704). Turn right on cook road, and proceed 2.3 miles to ballard street. Turn left, then immediately right following the sign to the Yorktown Visitor Center. Park in the parking area, and walk to any of the earthworks that were on your right as you drove to the visitor center. Face south, away from the visitor center.

Orientation

You are in the works first built by Charles Lord Cornwallis in 1781 and reworked by John Magruder in 1861– 62. The Confederate works protecting Yorktown extended to your left, right, and right rear. The rest of the Rebel line ran farther to your right. The Union lines were straight ahead and to your right front, nearly one mile in front of you. Gloucester Point is across the York River to your left.

1/15/07 10:09:09 AM

24

N4084.indb 24

Stop 6

What Happened

When Magruder took command on the Peninsula in 1861 he began to fortify Yorktown, at which point the York River narrows to less than one mile in width. Using the remnants of the British fortifications from 1781, he built earthworks to protect Yorktown from land assault and water batteries to prevent Union vessels from moving up the York. At the same time, he had a water battery and earthworks built across the river at Gloucester Point. As 1861 passed into 1862, Magruder worked on a defensive line from Yorktown to the James River. By the time McClellan began his advance in April, the fortifications at Yorktown had become much stronger than they had been in 1781. The earthworks stretching to the west were in various states of repair. McClellan’s right-hand column approached these defenses by the road from Hampton to Yorktown on April 5. The advance, Brig. Gen. Fitz John Porter’s division, was stopped by fire from the fortifications and a series of earthworks to the west. McClellan that day ordered siege operations to begin, and the Federals built their own works and approaches, including batteries for siege guns. The Confederates readied themselves as best they could for the bombardment they knew would come. Joe Johnston, commanding those Confederates, knew the Union superiority in artillery would put Yorktown, Gloucester Point, and the entire defensive line in danger, so on the night of May 3– 4 —two days before McClellan planned to open fire with his siege guns—the Rebels abandoned their works and marched up the Peninsula.

Analysis

Magruder followed the general line of the British works, in many cases using their remnants, because he was protecting Yorktown from a land attack on the water batteries he set up to block the York River. Those lines were never designed to protect the Peninsula against a Yankee advance. That’s why most of the line at Yorktown proper was parallel to both the river and the Union line of advance. Magruder realized that such a position would not protect against a broad advance, and his construction of the Warwick River line, though haphazard, at least allowed for a defensible line. It probably would not have held against a determined Union assault in April, although the line of advance against Yorktown proper would have run into stiff opposition from the works here and to your right. McClellan’s decision to stop his advance and start siege operations stemmed not from the level of resistance but from the fact that his expectations were not fulfilled.

1/15/07 10:09:09 AM

25


All Confederates realized, however, that the Union advantage in ordnance would tell in a siege, particularly because the Union batteries were well placed and inaccessible to Southern sorties. Johnston never planned to try to defend the works; instead, he used whatever time McClellan would give him to strengthen his army. Once the Yankees guns were ready—signaled by the opening of Federal Battery No. 1 on April 30—Johnston knew the time to leave was nigh.

N4084.indb 25

Further Reading

Newton, Joseph E. Johnston and the Defense of Richmond, 88–91; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 59 – 62.

Further Exploration

The National Park Service has prepared a brochure describing the Civil War sites on its main (Revolutionary War) battlefield tour of Yorktown. If you have time, pick up the brochure at the Yorktown Visitor Center to see more of the siege area, as well as the site of the climactic engagement of the American Revolution. For further discussion of other Civil War sites in Yorktown, see Dr. Thomas Adrian Wheat, A Guide to Civil War Yorktown (Knoxville tn: Bohemian Brigade Bookshop and Publishers, 1997).

Optional Excursion

If you wish, you may see the site of the batteries at Gloucester Point across the York River. To do so, go straight onto the Colonial National Historical Parkway from the parking lot at the Yorktown Visitor Center. Proceed 0.6 mile on the parkway to the off-ramp for the george washington memorial highway (Route 17 North). At the end of the off-ramp turn left and proceed across the toll bridge 0.9 mile to lafayette heights drive, which is the first stoplight after the river. Turn left and proceed on lafayette heights drive about 0.2 mile to river view street. Turn left and then immediately left again onto battery drive, which bears right and becomes vernon street. Proceed about 0.3 mile to Tyndall’s Point Park on your right. Park, walk to the Civil War Trails marker facing the earthworks, and turn to optional excursion 3, Gloucester Point.

1/15/07 10:09:10 AM

26

N4084.indb 26

Stop 7

STOP 7

Hancock’s Fight

Directions

Return to your car. Leave the parking area, and proceed straight onto the colonial national historical parkway. Continue on the parkway 9.2 miles until you reach an overlook on your left, next to Jones Pond. Turn into the overlook. A sign there details how Lt. George Custer led Hancock’s first contingent of men across the dam here. Get out of your car, and face the pond.

Orientation

You are standing at the crossing point for Hancock’s men as they moved to flank the Confederate left at Williamsburg. The parkway crosses the pond on the historical dam. Just ahead of you on the hill across the pond is Redoubt 14, the left-most redoubt of Magruder’s Williamsburg line. About half a mile farther down the parkway is Redoubt 11, which occupied the crest of a hill overlooking Williamsburg and from which the Rebel line could be turned. These redoubts were part of the left flank of a line that stretched from Tutters Mill Pond near the James River to the mouth of Queens Creek to your right rear.

1/15/07 10:09:10 AM

27

Hancock’s Fight

What Happened

N4084.indb 27

While parts of the two armies clashed just east of Williamsburg, a local slave revealed to Union commanders that redoubts 11 and 14 were unoccupied. Baldy Smith recognized the potential for flanking the Rebels, and he talked Brig. Gen. Edwin Sumner, the II Corps commander and de facto Union commander at Williamsburg, into ordering several regiments to take Redoubt 14. Smith then selected Hancock to command the detachment, which consisted of the 6th and 7th Maine, 33rd New York, 49th Pennsylvania, and 5th Wisconsin, plus two batteries of artillery. Hancock marched across the dam next to the overlook, occupied Redoubt 14, then advanced to Redoubt 11, which overlooked the rest of the Confederate line. He placed artillery in advance of the redoubt, with half the 5th Wisconsin deployed as skirmishers and half supporting artillery. The 6th Maine and 49th Pennsylvania took positions to the redoubt’s left. The 7th Maine protected Hancock’s right flank. The portion of the 33rd New York not holding the redoubts acted as skirmishers in the woods on Hancock’s right front. Sumner, concerned about his left, ordered Hancock back about the same time that Hancock asked for reinforcements to secure his flanks. Hancock protested Sumner’s order, as did Smith, but Sumner was firm, and Hancock reluctantly made ready to retire. Meanwhile, his artillery had been bombarding the Confederate works. Longstreet had recalled D. H. Hill’s division, and Jubal Early, commanding one of Hill’s brigades, was resting on the campus of the College of William and Mary at the west edge of Williamsburg. Early marched his men to a field north of Fort Magruder. As he listened impatiently to the sound of Hancock’s guns, Early formed a plan to take what he thought was the unsupported Yankee artillery. He talked Hill into it, and Hill then got Longstreet and Johnston to approve it. Longstreet told Hill to proceed with caution, since no one knew exactly what forces accompanied the artillery. As Early’s brigade moved through the dense woods and underbrush below the guns’ position, the regiments became separated. When Early and his old regiment, the 24th Virginia, emerged from the woods, he saw he had miscalculated by bringing his men into line too far to his right. Wheeling the 24th Virginia into a wheat field, Early led its charge, but he was wounded almost instantly. The Virginians continued the attack and forced the Federals back to Redoubt 11. The 5th North Carolina, on the same maneuver, came out of the woods even farther from the Union line, and it too wheeled to the left to connect with the 24th Virginia. The 23rd North Carolina and 38th Virginia, Early’s other regiments, could not

1/15/07 10:09:10 AM

28

Stop 7

make it through the woods to provide support, and although the two charging regiments made it to a fence within 70 yards of the Yankees, they were decimated by Hancock’s superior numbers. Hill then withdrew Early’s men, and Hancock countercharged to clear the field of Confederates. Analysis

N4084.indb 28

Sumner, known in the army as a straight-ahead fighter, had no strategic vision—at least, not on this field. Smith and Hancock had that vision, and vigorous support from Sumner would have given Smith’s division a chance to roll up the Confederate line from north to south. This possibility was the result of Longstreet’s lack of knowledge of the extent of the earthworks Magruder had built as well as the mist and rain on May 5, which prevented Longstreet from seeing those works (including redoubts 11 and 14). Johnston had sent Magruder’s force off as the leading unit of his retreat, including McLaws’s men holding the redoubts. When McLaws left the redoubts around midnight, no one took his place. Apparently, no one thought to leave information with Longstreet or Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson, Longstreet’s designee as field commander, about the ground on which he was to position his force. Without that information Longstreet and Anderson left their left wide open. Hancock didn’t take better advantage of that fact because Sumner lacked the will to reinforce him. In fact, Hancock delayed obeying the order to retire by sending numerous staff officers to plead with Sumner to cancel the order and reinforce him. He knew one brigade might have been able to accomplish something, but it might also be cut up. One division, on the other hand, would stand a good chance of routing Longstreet. The Confederate failure to occupy these redoubts was exacerbated by the Rebel response to Hancock’s appearance. Early, perhaps spoiling to get into a fight, formed a plan with no knowledge of the true situation. His superiors acted in the same ignorance. Early then ignored Longstreet’s proviso to proceed with caution; instead he advanced without either a reconnaissance or regard for position and suffered heavy losses in two regiments as a result. Only a combination of circumstances kept Hancock from turning his countercharge into a full-fledged counterattack to finish what he had wanted to start. Early lost about 450 men out of 1,000 engaged in his ill-advised 20-minute charge (including 260 men of the 415 in the 5th North Carolina). Hancock’s casualties amounted to a mere 120.

1/15/07 10:09:10 AM

29

Hancock’s Fight

Further Reading

Newton, Joseph E. Johnston and the Defense of Richmond, 139 – 45; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 73–74, 78– 81.

Major-General Winfield S. Hancock. From a photograph. blcw 3:286

N4084.indb 29

1/15/07 10:09:10 AM

30

N4084.indb 30

Stop 8

STOP 8

Fort Magruder

Directions

Return to your car. Proceed west, toward Williamsburg. Proceed on the parkway 1.9 miles to the exit for Queens Lake. Turn right onto the off-ramp, then right on what becomes hubbard lane. Proceed 1.0 mile until hubbard lane intersects with penniman road. Turn left onto penniman road, and proceed 0.4 mile to its intersection with queens creek road. Pull into the grass parking area on the right at Fort Magruder across from the church. At the time this was written the remains of the fort are fenced off from public access, but plans are in place to restore the site and open it to the public. Face along penniman road in the same direction you were driving.

Orientation

You are next to what remains of Fort Magruder, the keystone of the Confederate line. Redoubts 3, 4, and 5 were to your right, and redoubts 7 through 14 were to your left rear. The 1862 intersection of the Yorktown and Hampton (or Great Warwick) roads, the intersection that made Fort Magruder important, lies just ahead of you. The old city of Williamsburg is to your right rear. The Federals approached the posi-

1/15/07 10:09:11 AM

31

Fort Magruder

tion on Hampton Road, which at this point follows Penniman Road. It is difficult to visualize the open fields and woods the combatants encountered around Fort Magruder given the encroachment of urban development from modern Williamsburg. Try to imagine the area in front of you cleared to create fields of fire for the cannon and muskets in this earthwork. It is also a bit difficult to envision Fort Magruder itself. Only the southern bastion remains—about one quarter of what was a very large earthen fort built around the intersection of Penniman Road (then Williamsburg Road) and Queens Creek Road.

N4084.indb 31

What Happened

Fort Magruder, constructed in the winter of 1861– 62, held the most important point of any in Magruder’s third and last line of defense on the lower Peninsula, the Williamsburg line. It commanded the intersection of the Yorktown and Hampton roads. On May 4 McLaws had occupied the fort in addition to the redoubts on either side after Brig. Gen. James Ewell Brown Stuart’s cavalry troopers were cut off by advancing Yankee cavalry. McLaws’s troops skirmished with that cavalry and held the line of earthworks. That night, McLaws pulled out, and Longstreet put two brigades, those of R. H. Anderson and Brig. Gen. Roger Pryor, into line, with his other brigades in reserve. Anderson, in overall command of the line, put his own brigade (eventually commanded by Col. Micah Jenkins) into the fort, redoubts 5 and 7, and intervening rifle pits. Pryor was spread out to Jenkins’s right in redoubts 1 through 4. Several pieces of artillery also were posted in the fort. Early the next morning, Joe Hooker approached this area with his division and pushed in the Confederate pickets. Artillery and infantry from the fort opened on his lead units. This fire continued all day with varying intensity. No Yankee assault seriously threatened the fort, leaving the Confederates to fire on those moving to the right. Later, when Hooker’s men had to retreat before a Confederate counterattack, Fort Magruder’s guns added their enfilading fire. Only nightfall stopped the fire from the fort.

Analysis

Magruder’s third line (the first was the Bethel–Young’s Mill series of positions, and the second was his main line on the Warwick River) was in a sense his strongest. It was the shortest, covering only about three miles due to its placement at the Peninsula’s narrowest point, and there were few good approaches. The two main roads, from Yorktown and Hampton via Lee’s Mill, converged before they reached Williamsburg, and only a few other roads (including the one along

1/15/07 10:09:11 AM

32

Stop 8

which redoubts 11 and 14 were built) led to Williamsburg. It is interesting to speculate on how long such a line, with water batteries covering the rivers, could have held if it had been defended by an entire army—say, the Army of Northern Virginia. However, the Confederates in fact almost lost this line to Union cavalry on May 4 because it was not garrisoned, and they had on May 5 a force large enough only to slow the Yankees without stopping them completely. Fort Magruder was still the key in this delaying action. Loss of control of the main road into Williamsburg could have led to a faster Union pursuit (and that pursuit already had been a bit faster than Johnston apparently expected), putting the main army in danger. The fort’s field of fire allowed it to support the other redoubts, and its obvious strength kept Federal advances (particularly by Brig. Gen. John Peck’s brigade) from progressing far. Jenkins, in charge of the fort’s defense, operated well in his supporting role. Further Reading

N4084.indb 32

Newton, Joseph E. Johnston and the Defense of Richmond, 138–39; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 70–72.

1/15/07 10:09:11 AM

33

N4084.indb 33

Hooker’s Fight

STOP 9

Hooker’s Fight

Directions

Return to your car and to penniman road. Turn left onto penniman road, and proceed 0.6 mile to its intersection with Route 143. Turn right on Route 143, which turns into 2nd street (Route 162). Proceed on 2nd street 1.1 miles to its intersection with page street (Route 60). Turn left, cross the railroad tracks, and in 0.2 mile bear left onto york street (Route 60). Follow Route 60 East (which becomes pocahontas trail) to the Fort Magruder Hotel and Conference Center. Turn right into the parking lot. Park and walk through the hotel to the courtyard in its rear. Enter the earthworks preserved there, and face the hotel.

Orientation

You are in what remains of Redoubt 3 of the Confederate line. Redoubts 1 and 2 are to your right, and the remains of Fort Magruder are out of sight to your left front. The old city of Williamsburg is to your left rear. Hooker approached on Hampton Road, which crossed modern Route 60 to your right front and continued on to become what is now Penniman Road. As at Fort Magruder, it takes some imagination

1/15/07 10:09:11 AM

34

Stop 9

to visualize the terrain at the time of the battle— open fields and woods along small streams. What Happened

N4084.indb 34

This redoubt, along with redoubts 1, 2, and 4, was held on the morning of May 5 by Pryor’s brigade. Hooker approached this area with his division early that morning. Reconnoitering the area, Hooker found the works, with nearly half a mile of cleared terrain in front of them. Losing no time, he ordered his lead brigade, commanded by Brig. Gen. Cuvier Grover, to advance, and he put first one, then another battery into action. Meanwhile, Hooker extended his line to the south with Brig. Gen. Francis Patterson’s New Jersey brigade. His men, however, stopped before assaulting Fort Magruder or the rest of the earthworks. Meanwhile, Anderson organized an attack of his own. Calling on Brig. Gen. Cadmus Wilcox’s brigade, Anderson directed it to his right. Wilcox’s 19th Mississippi advanced first, then the 9th and 10th Alabama fell into line on either flank. They engaged with Patterson’s men and the Excelsior Brigade’s New Yorkers, usually commanded by Brig. Gen. Daniel Sickles but at this fight led by Col. Nelson Taylor. Confederate reinforcements, including Brig. Gen. Ambrose P. Hill’s brigade, part of Pryor’s, and all of Brig. Gen. George Pickett’s, went into battle from the area around Redoubt 3. As Hooker realized his situation, he called for reinforcements to strengthen his left—which by then was an unequal contest, four Rebel brigades against his two. Sumner, however, refused any reinforcements from his area. Hooker would need to rely on Phil Kearny’s division, which was on Lee’s Mill Road several miles behind Hooker, to strengthen his left—if the Confederates let him. Eventually, the weight of numbers told, and the Southerners pushed Hooker’s men past Hampton Road and captured the artillery. More artillery on the road stopped the Rebels, while Heintzelman rallied the Federals by having regimental bands play, and Peck’s brigade of Brig. Gen. Darius Couch’s division reinforced Hooker’s right. Kearny arrived just in time after a hard march in the rain and counterattacked with his exhausted men. They pushed the Confederates, many of whom were low on ammunition, away from the road and the six Yankee guns still there (the Rebels had dragged off four others). The rainy day came to an end with the lines essentially where they had been at the start of the fighting, although firefights lasted into the evening. The Confederates withdrew from their lines and continued their retreat that night.

1/15/07 10:09:11 AM

35

N4084.indb 35

Hooker’s Fight

Analysis

Hooker seldom shied away from a fight, but he was careful in reconnoitering the ground first and did not launch a heavy attack. His men fought hard against superior numbers, particularly in the Confederate assault, but were giving way. Without timely arrivals by Peck and Kearny the Union line would have been in serious trouble. The Confederate command structure was a bit strange. Johnston was on the field but demurred to Longstreet, who in turn assigned responsibility for operations to Anderson. Wilcox, in command of the brigade first selected for the counterattack, asked for reinforcements, but other commanders waited for orders from Anderson or Longstreet before fully committing their men. However, the day’s truly strange behavior belonged to Sumner. In command of this part of the army, Sumner seemed paralyzed. He could think only of protecting his center—a reasonable thought if any threat had been made there. However, the threat was on his left (and opportunity lay on his right). He noted in his report that he did not have many troops until Peck’s men arrived, but he could have hurried them up the night before, or earlier on the 5th. Depending on estimates, between 25,000 and 40,000 Federals were within easy supporting distance of Hooker’s division that morning. Casualties in this part of the battle of Williamsburg were much more heavy for the Union than in Hancock’s area. Hooker, as might be expected, was particularly hard hit. Taylor’s brigade suffered 772 casualties, Patterson’s 527, and Grover’s 253. Kearny, in brief work, lost 417 men. Peck’s casualty total was 127. The Confederates lost more than 1,000 men in the area themselves, including more than 300 in A. P. Hill’s brigade and nearly 250 in Wilcox’s brigade.

Vignette

The first battery of Hooker’s division to go into action was Battery H, 1st U.S. Artillery. This battery had been at Fort Sumter, but Williamsburg was its first action in the field. Maj. Charles Wainwright, Hooker’s chief of artillery, watched as two officers and two men were shot while the battery positioned itself. Seeing this, many of the men ran from the guns as Wainwright and Capt. Charles Webber, the battery’s commander, tried without success to rally them. “Never in my life was I so mortified, never so excited, never so mad,” Wainwright wrote in his journal. Near him was Battery D, 1st New York Artillery, his old command. He appealed to the New Yorkers, and they responded by running to man four of the six guns. Webber turned some of his men around to work the other two, and the battery opened fire.

1/15/07 10:09:12 AM

36

N4084.indb 36

Stop 9

Further Reading

Newton, Joseph E. Johnston and the Defense of Richmond, 137– 40, 143; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 70–78.

Further Exploration

At the time this was written a park was being planned that will include redoubts 1 and 2 of the Confederate line. These redoubts had no part in the battle, but they are good examples of the earthworks built by Magruder. To view them turn left onto Route 60 from the Radisson Fort Magruder Hotel and Conference Center. Proceed to its intersection with quarterpath road (Route 637). Turn left and proceed on quarter-path road to the sign for the park, which at this writing is tentatively named Redoubt Park, on your right. Turn into the parking area, and follow the signs to the redoubts.

Optional Excursion

If you wish to see Drewry’s Bluff, the site from which Confederates denied the Union navy an easy route to Richmond and thus changed the nature of the campaign (and if you are headed back to Richmond it is well worth the small detour), you have several routes from which to choose. The most scenic is Route 5, which is called River Road closer to Richmond. To proceed via this route, return to your car and return to Route 60. Turn right and proceed 1.1 miles down Route 60 to its intersection with Route 199. Bear right on the off-ramp to Route 199 West, merge onto Route 199, and proceed 4.5 miles to its intersection with john tyler memorial highway (Route 5 West). Turn left onto Route 5, and proceed 45.1 miles to its junction with labernum avenue. Take the off-ramp that leads to Route 895, the pocahontas parkway (which is a toll road), and then in 0.5 mile take the on-ramp for Route 895 West. Proceed on Route 895 3.3 miles to its intersection with Route 1/301. Take the off-ramp for Route 1/301 south, and proceed on Route 1/301 2.5 miles to bellwood road (Route 656). Turn left onto bellwood road, and proceed 0.5 mile to fort darling road. Turn left onto fort darling road, proceed 0.4 mile to the Drewry’s Bluff unit of Richmond National Battlefield Park, park in the parking area, walk to a point among the earthworks from which you can see the river, and turn to Optional Excursion 5, Drewry’s Bluff, in this guide. The quickest route to Drewry’s Bluff is via Interstate 64. To proceed via this route, return to your car and to Route 60. Turn right on Route 60, and proceed about 1.0 mile to Route 199. Take the off-ramp for Route 199 East, and proceed on Route 199 about 1.0 mile to its junction with Interstate 64. Take the off-ramp for Interstate 64 West, and proceed on Interstate 64 to its junction with Interstate 295 (exit 200). Take the off-ramp for Interstate 295 South, and proceed to its junction

1/15/07 10:09:12 AM

37

Hooker’s Fight

with the pocahontas parkway (Route 895). Take the off-ramp for Route 895, and proceed west. You will reach Route 895’s junction with Route 5 in 4 miles. From there, follow the directions above to Drewry’s Bluff.

Uniform of non-commissioned officer of the 1st New York, Berry’s Brigade, Kearny’s Division, 3rd Corps. blcw 2:399

N4084.indb 37

1/15/07 10:09:12 AM

38

Optional Excursion 1

OPTIONAL EXCURSION 1—FORT MONROE

N4084.indb 38

Orientation

Face the Casemate Museum. You are looking at the Civil War– era fort and the heart of a still-active military installation. As the time this guide was written the fort was scheduled to be closed, but that may not occur for several years. In any case, it is quite likely that the Civil War– era fort will remain open to the public after the base’s closure.

What Happened

Construction of Fort Monroe, the largest fort in the United States during the Civil War, was begun in 1819 and finished in 1834. Several prominent soldiers were posted there in the antebellum years, including Joseph Johnston and Robert E. Lee. At the war’s beginning many coastal forts were seized by Southerners, but Fort Monroe’s strength prevented any attempt being made on it. That enabled the fort— commanding Hampton Roads, the entrance to Chesapeake Bay, and the mouths of the York and James rivers—to both shut those waterways to Confederate shipping and become a base of operations for Union forces coming to the Peninsula by water or land.

1/15/07 10:09:12 AM

39

Fort Monroe

McClellan used the fort as the primary disembarkation point for the Army of the Potomac in March 1862. Troops camped around the fort until all was ready for the move up the Peninsula. McClellan communicated through Fort Monroe to Washington throughout the campaign, and it was from Fort Monroe that the last of the army left the Peninsula in August after the campaign’s failure to take Richmond. It would be 1864 before a substantial army used Fort Monroe as a starting point for a campaign against the Confederate capital.

N4084.indb 39

Analysis

Fort Monroe’s great strength was necessary, as it commanded one of the most important areas of the antebellum U.S. coast. The Hampton Roads area is the gateway to Washington, Baltimore, and Annapolis, Maryland, as well as Richmond. After war started the area became even more important, as Chesapeake Bay offered many places for blockade runners to hide. But once the garrison at Fort Monroe was reinforced, it would have been suicidal to attack the fort, located as it was on a small neck of land called Old Point Comfort. McClellan considered the fort a possible base of operations but was concerned about the css Virginia’s ability to run rampant among the transports as they were unloading soldiers and supplies. Once assured of the Monitor’s ability to stop her adversary, and getting intelligence that the Virginia would be unlikely to try to pass the guns at Fort Monroe, McClellan could proceed with confidence to the Peninsula. The fort’s command of the mouths of the James and York rivers kept the Virginia based in Norfolk, where she had been constructed. Once Johnston retreated and Norfolk was given up, the ironclad had no place to go, for it could not chance running past the fort’s guns, and its deep draft kept it from retreating up the James River. The ship’s scuttling allowed McClellan to use the James as a supply line, although he did not take advantage of that opportunity until after the Seven Days. The fort served as a safety net for McClellan, secure in the knowledge that he could always retreat down the Peninsula to it in the event of disaster. It was not disaster but orders, however, sent by Halleck in the face of Lee’s move to confront Pope in northern Virginia after the Seven Days, that brought the Army of the Potomac back to Fort Monroe in August 1862. The wisdom of those orders is debatable, but the reality was the Peninsula Campaign was over. Fort Monroe thus was the beginning and ending point for the campaign.

Vignette

Virginia agricultural innovator and fire-breathing secessionist Edmund Ruffin, in Norfolk in March 1862, recorded in his

1/15/07 10:09:12 AM

40

Optional Excusion 1

diary his impressions of the Army of the Potomac’s landing at Fort Monroe: “It was impossible to count the vessels, though aided by a glass.” Further Reading

Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 18–20, 27–28.

Further Exploration

If you have time, be sure to tour the Casemate Museum, where Jefferson Davis was held after his capture in 1865, and see more of Fort Monroe by walking the grounds and driving around the inside of the fort.

To Return to

Return via the Civil War– era fort’s main gate to ingalls road. Turn left on ingalls road, then in 0.1 mile right on fenwick road. In 0.2 mile, turn right on mcnair drive. In 0.7 mile you will reach the modern main gate. Bear left, returning the way you came, onto mellen street. Proceed 0.7 mile on mellen street, then turn left onto mallory street. Proceed 0.3 mile to the on-ramp for Interstate 64 West. Turn right onto the onramp, merge onto Interstate 64, and proceed to exit 256. Take the off-ramp for Route 171 West. Once on Route 171 (oyster point road), proceed 2.1 miles to its intersection with warwick boulevard (Route 60). Turn right onto warwick boulevard, and proceed 0.4 mile until you can make a legal U-turn. Do so and proceed south on warwick boulevard 0.2 mile to old grist mill lane. Turn right, then turn into the parking area, and open to stop 2, Young’s Mill, in this guide.

the Main Tour

Sally-port, Fort Monroe. From a war-time photograph. blcw 2:145

N4084.indb 40

1/15/07 10:09:12 AM

41

Warwick Court House

OPTIONAL EXCURSION 2—WARWICK COURT HOUSE

N4084.indb 41

Orientation

From the parking area, the 1810 Warwick Court House is on your left. Facing the courthouse, you are also facing in the same direction as advancing Union soldiers on April 5. Lee’s Mill and the main Confederate defensive lines were straight ahead on Warwick Boulevard.

What Happened

Erasmus Keyes occupied this building on April 5 as his IV Corps advanced up the road from Young’s Mill. The courthouse was looted by the soldiers, and Keyes used it as his headquarters. On April 10, Prof. Thaddeus Lowe set up a camp for his men and the observation balloon Constitution, which made ascents from here during the rest of the siege.

Analysis

Because McClellan selected Fitz John Porter to run the siege, Keyes’s role was somewhat limited, although the major action of the siege, the fight at Dam No. 1, was initiated by his troops. The importance and interest of Warwick Court House lies more in its role as a staging area for Lowe’s Constitution,

1/15/07 10:09:13 AM

42


one of the first balloons used for observation during warfare by the United States. Balloons had been used during battle during the French Revolution, but not in the Western hemisphere. In early 1861, however, several men approached the War Department with plans for military use of balloons. After a protracted political struggle, Thaddeus Lowe, an experienced aeronaut with political and scientific connections (including with the young Smithsonian Institution), was given an official position with the army (first the Topographic Engineers, then with the Quartermaster Department). Lowe’s first efforts occurred near the Potomac in observation of Johnston’s works at Manassas. Lowe came to the Peninsula in March 1862. A large balloon, the Intrepid, was the first Lowe used (on April 5) and was based near Yorktown. Constitution, a smaller balloon, was brought by McClellan’s orders to Keyes’s headquarters five days later. Both balloons were used daily by Lowe, generals, and engineering officers to observe the Rebel earthworks, troop movements, and the ground itself for mapping purposes. Telegraphs often were used in the balloons in attempts to communicate information. Confederates tried to shoot down the balloons with artillery but never succeeded. They did, however, raise their own balloon from Lee Hall. In a strange coincidence, Fitz John Porter and the Confederate aeronaut, John Bryan, were each in their side’s balloon, alone, when their balloons broke loose from their single tether ropes, putting each man in danger of drifting into the enemy’s line. Neither did; Porter eventually got back into the saddle, so to speak, but Bryan never did. Lt. George A. Custer, on Baldy Smith’s staff, used Constitution to ascend over Warwick Court House. Lowe’s final ascent from Warwick Court House came on May 3. On the morning of May 4 he lifted off from his other base near Yorktown to confirm that the Confederates had evacuated their lines. Eventually, the balloons moved nearer to Richmond with the army and were used until the change of base to the James River during the Seven Days. Confederates used their balloon until July 4, when it was captured (Maj. E. P. Alexander, in the gondola that day, barely escaped the same fate). Lowe continued operating with the army until after the battle of Chancellorsville in May 1863. Balloons were less effective than you might think. The aeronauts sometimes found it difficult to see details of enemy positions through the trees, and they needed military knowledge to interpret what they did see. Communication was dif-

N4084.indb 42

1/15/07 10:09:13 AM

43

Warwick Court House

ficult, as telegraph lines frequently broke during ascents. However, commanders did gain some useful information. Vignette

McClellan was writing his wife when he heard of Porter’s adventure. He termed it “a terrible scare.” After hearing that Porter had been blown into Confederate lines, he saw Porter himself walk into his office “just as cool as usual. . . . You may rest assured of one thing: you won’t catch me in the confounded balloon, nor will I allow any other generals to go up in it.”

Further Reading

Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 41, 54 –55, 62, 125 –26, 196, 216, 255, 278, 289, 342.

To Return to

Return to grissom way, and turn right, and then immediately turn left onto old courthouse road. Proceed on old courthouse road 0.2 miles to its intersection with warwick boulevard (Route 60). Turn left onto warwick boulevard, and proceed 2.8 miles to lee’s mill drive. Turn left, proceed 0.1 miles to river’s ridge circle, and turn left. Proceed on river’s ridge circle 0.3 mile to Lee’s Mill Park. Turn left into the parking area, and turn to stop 3, Lee’s Mill, in this guide.

the Main Tour

Professor Lowe’s military balloon “Intrepid.” From a photograph. blcw 2:321

N4084.indb 43

1/15/07 10:09:13 AM

44


OPTIONAL EXCURSION 3—GLOUCESTER POINT

N4084.indb 44

Orientation

Straight ahead of you is the York River and Yorktown. Hampton Roads and Fort Monroe are to your left.

What Happened

Gloucester Point was the site of some of the first shots of the war in Virginia, when Confederate artillery outdueled a Union steamer, the uss Yankee, on May 9, 1861. Magruder built earthworks and a water battery at Gloucester Point to complement the batteries at Yorktown, across the York River. They were intended to stop any Yankee flanking moves up the river. For months the batteries accomplished that goal. When McClellan arrived on the Peninsula he planned to have the I Corps, the last to arrive, land on the north bank of the river and take the Gloucester Point defenses. However, after McClellan settled into a siege and the I Corps was withheld from him, the Gloucester Point defenses were safe until late April. Then, on April 30, the Federals opened from Battery No. 1, on the south bank of the river. It soon became obvious that the five 100-pound cannon and one 200-pounder could blast the Confederate batteries into nothing.

1/15/07 10:09:13 AM

45

Gloucester Point

When Joe Johnston evacuated Yorktown on the night of May 3– 4, he ordered the battery at Gloucester Point held for a few hours longer in hopes of stalling any Yankee flanking move up the York. The evacuation took place later that night, and the York was open to McClellan. Analysis

As with the earthworks at Skiffes Creek, what happened at Gloucester Point is less important than what did not. Gloucester Point was never attacked by land during the siege of Yorktown, at a time when McClellan had many thousands of men to do the job. Although the water battery was protected by the earthworks here, it would have been relatively easy for the Federals to capture. McClellan’s initial plan in fact called for the point’s capture, by the I Corps, as part of his overall strategy of flanking Confederate strong points. However, when Magruder’s defense was stronger than McClellan expected, the Union commander decided on a siege. Then, when Lincoln withheld the I Corps to protect Washington, apparently McClellan postponed using another force to take Gloucester Point until late in April, when William Franklin’s division of the I Corps arrived. That division was kept on board ships, ready to launch an amphibious assault on the point, until early May, when McClellan planned an assault on Magruder’s Peninsula line. That plan was never implemented because of the Confederate withdrawal. Johnston’s decision to withdraw was hastened by the opening of Battery No. 1 and the probability that its fellow batteries would open soon. He knew his army could not survive intact against such bombardment, so he got the army ready and moved as soon as he could. He was also worried (appropriately) about Yankee advances along both rivers. The Virginia could guard the James as long as the ironclad was afloat, although once Norfolk was taken (a certainty after Johnston withdrew) she would need to be destroyed. The Gloucester Point batteries could not hold the York as long as the Virginia could hold the James, but they might give Johnston enough time to meet any flanking force with at least part of his army.

Further Reading

Newton, Joseph E. Johnston and the Defense of Richmond, 83, 130– 33; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 26, 31, 61.

To Return to

Return to Vernon Street. Turn left and proceed to battery drive, then turn right onto river view street, and proceed 0.2 mile to lafayette heights drive. Turn right on lafayette heights drive, and proceed 0.3 mile to its intersection with the George

the Main Tour

N4084.indb 45

1/15/07 10:09:14 AM

46


Washington Memorial Highway (Route 17). Turn right onto Route 17, cross the river, and proceed a total of 1.9 miles on Route 17 to its intersection with the Colonial National Historical Parkway. Turn right onto the on-ramp for the parkway, and at the parkway turn right. Proceed 8.6 miles to the overlook by Jones Mill Pond on your left. Turn into the overlook, park, and turn to stop 7, Hancock’s Fight, in this guide.

Union mortar battery before Yorktown. From a photograph. blcw 2:194

N4084.indb 46

1/15/07 10:09:14 AM

47

Drewry’s Bluff

OPTIONAL EXCURSION 4—DREWRY’S BLUFF

N4084.indb 47

Orientation

You are standing in Fort Darling as it was expanded after 1862. The James River below you flows from your left. Richmond is to your left, about eight miles by river. The stretch of the James River straight ahead is just under a mile in length, after which the river twists and turns to your right front before emptying into Hampton Roads.

What Happened

Even before the css Virginia was scuttled, Commander John Rodgers and some of his ships, including the ironclad uss Galena (not on the Monitor’s design), had safely passed by the Confederate ship on their way up the James River. After the Virginia passed into history, the Monitor herself and another ironclad, the Naugatuck, joined the Galena and wooden gunboats Port Royal and Aroostook on their procession up the James. The gunboats bombarded shore batteries as they passed, and the Galena’s constant fire allowed the wooden boats to pass. Rodgers was looking to engage the Southerners’ James River gunboat squadron and then reach Richmond, perhaps even to force its surrender.

1/15/07 10:09:14 AM

48


Meanwhile, the Rebels were hastily improving the defenses at Drewry’s Bluff, the last likely place for a stand before Richmond. Drewry’s Bluff was named for the family of Augustus Drewry, who owned the land and also was captain of the Southside Heavy Artillery, which had been organized in January as part of the 2nd Virginia Artillery. In March, Drewry persuaded Robert E. Lee to build a battery (called Fort Darling) on the bluff, which towered over a narrow spot in the river, as another in a series of batteries along the James. Three guns were emplaced there, and work continued off and on until Johnston retreated from Yorktown, at which point the bluff assumed a greater importance and gained priority. Five more guns were taken from gunboats and mounted on the bluff, and other cannon were placed at Chaffin’s Bluff across the river and downstream from Drewry’s Bluff. Men from all over, including more gunners from the 2nd Virginia Artillery, two companies of Confederate marines, and men from the scuttled Virginia, came to the bluff. There was little cooperation among the commanders of these detachments, but still work continued. A gunboat was sunk in the channel, and other obstructions were placed in the river to close it to vessels of any substantial draft. Sharpshooters prepared to pick off any working parties. The Yankees would have to neutralize the artillery on the bluff so they could remove the obstructions before proceeding to Richmond. They began the attempt early on the morning of May 15. Rodgers steered the Galena to within 600 yards of the bluff and began firing at 7:45 a.m. The ironclad was already under fire when she stopped. The Monitor steamed to within 400 yards of the obstructions, but she could not send out parties to remove them because of the sharpshooters, and her guns could not elevate enough to reach Fort Darling. She then moved away from the obstructions and opened a deliberate fire. The Confederate guns caused as little damage to her in May as the Virginia had caused in March, hitting her only three times, but she was of little use to the Federals. The Naugatuck stayed at longer range and suffered only minor damage by her enemy, but her 100-pound rifled gun burst, putting her out of the fight. The two wooden gunboats stayed out of range and also contributed little. Because of these events, the battle came down to the Confederates against the Galena. It was an unequal contest. The ironclad’s fire killed seven and wounded eight. But the Rebels hit her 44 times, causing severe damage and briefly setting her on fire. Just after 11 a.m. Rodgers signaled a retreat. The Union navy’s attempt to seize Richmond had failed.

N4084.indb 48

1/15/07 10:09:14 AM

49

N4084.indb 49

Drewry’s Bluff

Analysis

The Confederates may have put too much stock in the Virginia’s ability to close the James River. As she moved relatively slowly, she had to rely on firepower to stop any Union ships, and another ironclad could draw her fire and then outrun her, also allowing wooden gunboats past her. The Confederates’ James River squadron, by this time stationed upriver, would provide the last waterborne defense against the Federals, and some land-based batteries were built. This seeming reliance on the Virginia, and disagreements between the Confederate army and navy, led to relative neglect of the position at Drewry’s Bluff, an almost-fatal defect. Without obstructions in the river the Union ships could have run the battery there. Without the battery they could have removed obstructions at their leisure. Yet neither the obstructions nor the guns were in place until after Norfolk was abandoned. After the engagement the Confederates ensured that Drewry’s Bluff would remain strong, but the effort would have been worth even more in April 1862. The strength of the Drewry’s Bluff position was revealed fully on May 15. The bluffs, reaching 100 feet or more above the river, were too high for some ships (like the Monitor) to reach with much effect. Yet any boat in the water was an easy shot for the gunners on the bluff, and only a well-built ironclad like the Monitor would withstand the blows. The Galena was not that well built. She was a wooden gunboat with iron bars and plates bolted to her sides, with boilerplate inside. She could not stand up to the pounding the Southerners gave her. Rodgers called off the engagement, and the naval officers eventually decided that Drewry’s Bluff could not be passed without the army’s assistance. That assistance was not forthcoming. Whether or not the gunboats could have forced Richmond’s surrender or just caused a nuisance, the garrison at Drewry’s Bluff had given the beleaguered Confederacy something to cheer about.

Vignette

As the Union vessels retreated, the Confederate guns fell silent. One, however, was cleaned, and William Clopton of the gun’s crew said to Lt. Dickerson Wilson, “Let us give them a parting salute.” Wilson agreed, and the gun was loaded and fired. The shot fell short but ricocheted into a gunboat thought to be the Naugatuck. As the men celebrated, Drewry said, “Don’t a man leave for the quarter, for I want you to fix up these parapets that have been knocked down, and those sandbags torn to pieces, must be replaced and get ready for them, for the boats will probably be back here again in

1/15/07 10:09:14 AM

50


two hours.” Drewry was wrong, however; the boats never returned. Further Reading

Newton, Joseph E. Johnston and the Defense of Richmond, 156 – 60; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 93–94.

Fort Darling, looking down the James. From a photograph. blcw 2:269

N4084.indb 50

1/15/07 10:09:15 AM

The Peninsula Campaign, May 15–June 24, 1862 George McClellan’s plans seemingly were working well in the middle of May 1862. Although the navy had not been able to force its way past Drewry’s Bluff to Richmond, McDowell’s I Corps had been reinforced and actually began its march from Fredericksburg to Richmond. Those plans changed as the result of Stonewall Jackson’s campaign in the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia. Jackson defeated Union forces and advanced as far as Harper’s Ferry on the Potomac. Lincoln, acting in effect as his own general-inchief, tried to capture Jackson’s force as it moved southward again, and one of his pieces was McDowell’s corps. McDowell, Fremont, and Brig. Gen. Nathaniel Banks failed to catch Jackson, and McDowell’s men were lost to McClellan. Nonetheless, McClellan was in position to besiege Richmond, although his army was split by the Chickahominy River northeast of the capital. Heavy rains in late May, making the Chickahominy difficult to cross, gave Johnston an opportunity. He determined to take advantage by attacking the two Union corps on the south bank of the river. But the Confederates did not coordinate their assaults well, and Edwin Sumner’s Yankees used rickety bridges to cross the river and aid their comrades. The Union line held, and late in the day Johnston was severely wounded. Although more fighting occurred the next day, nothing of consequence came of the battle except that Davis chose to replace the wounded Johnston as commander of the army with Robert E. Lee. By this time, McClellan was convinced that the Confederates outnumbered him substantially, although the reality was quite the reverse. Nonetheless, McClellan thought his siege guns would be the great equalizer and allow him to pound Richmond into submission. A more aggressive general than Johnston, Lee decided that the only way to prevent this from happening was to attack with his army. To help determine the best way to do that, Lee sent J. E. B. Stuart and most of his cavalry on a reconnaissance in force. Stuart, known as “Jeb”, and his men rode completely around the Army of the Potomac, giving Lee the information he needed and the South a reason to cheer. Lee decided to bring Stonewall Jackson’s men from the Valley to Richmond to join most of the Army of Northern Virginia in an assault on McClellan’s right flank on the north bank of the Chickahominy. That flank, only one corps strong after Seven Pines, was commanded by Fitz John Porter, who had a series of strong positions but no anchor for his right. Porter’s corps covered McClellan’s supply line from White House (owned by one of Lee’s sons) on the Pamunkey

N4084.indb 51

1/15/07 10:09:15 AM

52

The Peninsula Campaign

River to the main forward depot at Savage Station between the Chickahominy and Richmond. If Lee could accomplish his objective, McClellan would need to retreat from the gates of Richmond to maintain his supply line. As Jackson moved his men toward Richmond, Lee readied his men for the most crucial engagement yet in the Confederacy’s brief history.

Confederate retreat through Mechanicsville before the advance of McClellan’s artillery, May 24th. From a war-time sketch. blcw 2:322

N4084.indb 52

1/15/07 10:09:15 AM

N4084.indb 53

1/15/07 10:09:16 AM

N4084.indb 54

1/15/07 10:09:16 AM

55

Visitor Centers

Richmond National Battlefield Park Visitor Centers Richmond National Battlefield Park covers not merely the Seven Days Battles but also part of the 1864 contest between Grant and Lee, including the battle of Cold Harbor (fought over some of the same ground as the battle of Gaines’s Mill) as well as some important locations of the city of Richmond at war. Two sites in particular focus on Richmond’s roles as armer and healer of the Confederacy. The Civil War Visitor Center is located at 470 Tredegar Street, on the site of one of the Confederate military’s most important assets, the Tredegar Iron Works, which produced nearly 1,100 cannon for the South as well as armor plating for several Confederate ironclads, including the Virginia. The visitor center has three floors of exhibits focusing on Tredegar and the Richmond home front, women in the war, African Americans, and prisons; an audiovisual presentation concentrating on the battles around Richmond; a self-guided tour of the Tredegar site; and a bookstore. The other site, the Chimborazo Medical Museum, is the former park visitor center. It is located at 3215 E. Broad Street, on the former grounds of the Chimborazo Hospital, one of the largest military hospitals during the war, with a capacity of more than 3,000 patients. From its opening in October 1861 it treated more than 76,000 sick and wounded soldiers. The museum itself has exhibits and a film that describe hospital life at Chimborazo as well as another bookstore. A third visitor center is the Cold Harbor Battlefield Visitor Center, on Route 156 northeast of stop 5. Although, as the name indicates, the focus at this visitor center is the battle of Cold Harbor, the electronic battle map there also describes the battle of Gaines’s Mill (very helpful in understanding that battle), and still another bookstore is located there. Finally, the Glendale–Malvern Hill Visitor Center is located on Willis Church Road at stop 12. It is only open seasonally, but if it is open it is well worth a stop to see exhibits and an electronic battle map showing the action at Glendale and Malvern Hill.

N4084.indb 55

1/15/07 10:09:16 AM

56

Overview of the First Two Days

Overview of the First Two Days, June 25 and 26, 1862 Lee had planned to attack, but the first major engagement in more than three weeks was initiated on June 25 by McClellan. The Union commander planned to bring his siege guns into position just south of the Chickahominy River, near Old Tavern, an intersection at which the ruins of a tavern then existed. To do so he needed to take Old Tavern, but before accomplishing that he wanted the left flank of the assaulting troops to be secure. So he ordered an advance along the Williamsburg Road from the area around Seven Pines. Brigades from the divisions of Phil Kearny and Joe Hooker engaged Confederates from Benjamin Huger’s division. Charges and countercharges rolled across the area around King’s Schoolhouse, a grove of oak trees, and an orchard, all of which gave names to the engagement (most commonly called the battle of Oak Grove). At the end of the day, however, the lines were pretty much where they had been at its start. The day’s fighting initially worried Lee, but the Confederate commander dismissed McClellan’s attack and kept with his plan. Stonewall Jackson was behind schedule but still getting into position for the advance on the 26th, and at night A. P. Hill, D. H. Hill, and James Longstreet moved their men to positions near bridges across the Chickahominy. McClellan, hearing of Jackson’s proximity, ordered his army to stand on the defensive. As June 26 dawned, Jackson’s men were marching, but they were hours behind schedule. As the day passed, Lee waited— as did his army—for word of Jackson’s approach, but it never came. The Army of the Potomac was quiet as well. Finally, at 3 p.m., A. P. Hill moved his division across the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridges and swept down the north bank of the river to the settlement of Mechanicsville. This forced the Yankee pickets back and uncovered the Mechanicsville Turnpike bridge so D. H. Hill and Longstreet could use it to cross the river. Lee’s plan had been for Jackson’s approach to Fitz John Porter’s right flank to force Porter out of a prepared position so the two Hills and Longstreet would not have to launch a frontal assault. Jackson was not in position, however, so Porter stayed put, and attacks made on the Union lines behind Beaver Dam Creek had no real chance of success. Stonewall made it to Polegreen Church, his objective, late in the afternoon, and he camped within the sound of the guns at Beaver Dam Creek. The battle there was a decided repulse of Lee’s first attack as commander of the Army of Northern Virginia.

N4084.indb 56

1/15/07 10:09:16 AM

57

Overview of the First Two Days

That night, McClellan conferred with Porter, then ordered him back to another strong defensive position behind Boatswain’s Swamp, which he was to hold the next day. Boatswain’s Swamp was chosen not only for its strength but because the position protected the major bridges that Porter’s men would need to cross the Chickahominy. The rest of the army was to stay in place on the Chickahominy’s south side, while supplies were transferred to the James River. Lee’s pressure had accomplished one thing—the Army of the Potomac was going to abandon its base, retreat from Richmond, and head to the James. It would be Porter’s job to hold off the Confederate force on the north bank of the Chickahominy so McClellan could get started.

Major-General Fitz John Porter. From a photograph. blcw 2:333

N4084.indb 57

1/15/07 10:09:17 AM

58

N4084.indb 58

Stop 1

STOP 1


Directions

From the Civil War Visitor Center return to tredegar street and turn left. In 0.2 mile take the left-hand road out of the roundabout, which is 7th street. Proceed about 0.5 mile to broad street (Route 250, then Route 60). Turn right and continue on broad street 1.1 miles to 25th street, which becomes Route 33. Turn left and proceed 0.7 mile to where Route 33 bears to the right. Follow Route 33 (now nine mile road) 1.5 miles. Turn left at the County of Henrico sign, and park in a public space. Get out of your car, and walk to the markers in front of the three flags in front of the antebellum white house. From Chimborazo Medical Museum, turn left onto broad street, and proceed about 0.5 mile to 25th street. Turn right and proceed 0.5 mile to where Route 33 bears to the right. Follow Route 33 (now nine mile road) 1.5 miles. Turn left at the County of Henrico sign, and park in a public space. Get out of your car, and walk to the markers in front of the three flags in front of the antebellum white house.

1/15/07 10:09:17 AM

59

N4084.indb 59


Orientation

You are facing High Meadow, the house of the widow Dabbs. This was Lee’s headquarters before and after the Seven Days. It has been added to since the war, but the basic character of the main part of the building is still visible. The road behind you, Nine Mile Road, led in 1862 to Old Tavern to your right, through Fair Oaks Station to Seven Pines.

What Happened

Here Robert E. Lee first set up command of the Army of Northern Virginia. Here he formed the basic plan for the campaign that would become the Seven Days and also conceived the idea for the expedition that became Jeb Stuart’s first ride around the Army of the Potomac. Most importantly, High Meadow was the site of the June 23 conference at which final plans were made for the initial Confederate attacks of the campaign. Meeting with A. P. Hill, D. H. Hill, Jackson, and Longstreet, Lee outlined the basic plan in which Jackson ( joined eventually by Stuart and D. H. Hill) would sweep down from the northwest, flanking Fitz John Porter’s position, while A. P. Hill and Longstreet would hit Porter’s retreating men from the rear. Eventually, McClellan would be cut off from his supplies and subjected to a severe beating. Magruder and Huger, south of the Chickahominy River, would hold off the Yankees long enough for the Rebels on the north side to uncover New Bridge, northeast of where you are standing and behind Magruder’s line. Once Lee had outlined his plan, he left the details to his subordinates. Those details were not recorded at the time, but Jackson, Longstreet, and the two Hills eventually settled on June 26 as the day that Jackson would reach Porter’s flank. Lee moved his headquarters from the Dabbs house when the campaign began. After it ended, Lee returned to High Meadow to plan his next campaign, in which he would move his army north to confront Brig. Gen. John Pope and the Union Army of Virginia.

Analysis

Lee’s plan was sound but had flaws. For one, it depended on timing that could not be guaranteed. Jackson was moving several thousand men on uncertain roads to the vicinity of Richmond, and the time of his arrival was difficult to predict. In the event, the date was set one day too soon. The date wasn’t the only difficulty, however; the timing would depend on communication and coordination among men who had never directed large numbers of men together and who had few staff officers. Another flaw in the plan was that it depended on McClellan’s remaining passive with eight divisions south of the

1/15/07 10:09:17 AM

60

Stop 1

river while his three divisions north of the river and his supply line were threatened by a numerically superior force. The uncertainty of this element of Lee’s plan was demonstrated on June 25 at Oak Grove; a postponement to June 27 of Jackson’s arrival might have allowed McClellan to continue his plan to attack Old Tavern, throwing Lee’s plan into question. In particular it might have made New Bridge, the road that led to Old Tavern, useless to the Confederates from the north bank, possibly forcing them to retrace their steps and cross at Mechanicsville or Meadow Bridges. However, it is likely that Lee believed he had no alternative because he knew McClellan’s siege guns would blow his men out of any prepared positions. If he did nothing, he eventually would need to evacuate Richmond. He was risking little unless the disruption of his plans resulted in the capture of part of his army along with the capital. Lee probably thought that scenario was unlikely, however. And his reward for proper execution would be great—not only the breaking of the siege of Richmond but a major and possibly decisive victory. Vignette

Some 20 years after the battles D. H. Hill wrote about his summons to Lee’s headquarters at the Dabbs house (which he mistakenly put on the Mechanicsville Turnpike). “On approaching the house which the general occupied,” Hill remembered, “I saw an officer leaning over the yard—paling, dusty, travelworn, and apparently very tired.” As the officer straightened, Hill recognized with a start his brother-in-law Stonewall Jackson (they had married sisters), “who till that moment I had supposed was confronting Banks and Fremont far down the Valley of Virginia.” Jackson reported he had ridden 52 miles that day, starting at 1 a.m.

Further Reading

Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, 34 –39; Dowdey, The Seven Days, 148–59; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 175 –77.

To Proceed with

Return to nine mile road, and turn left. Proceed 0.8 mile to its intersection with laburnum avenue north, and turn left onto laburnum avenue, which becomes Route 197. Proceed about 6.0 miles to its intersection with brook road. Turn right and proceed on brook road (which becomes Route 1) 11.4 miles to the stoplight at ashcake road (Route 657). Turn right onto ashcake road, and proceed 4.1 miles to sliding hill road (Route 656). Turn right and proceed 1.1 miles to new ashcake road (Route 643). Turn left on new ashcake road, which turns into rural point road. As you drive you will be following Jackson’s march route on June 26 and passing over (at about

the Secondary Tour

N4084.indb 60

1/15/07 10:09:17 AM

61


7.0 miles) Totopotomoy Creek, where Jackson’s advance skirmished with Union cavalry. After a total of about 7.6 miles, turn left into the Polegreen Church site. Park at the Civil War Trails marker turnout, and turn to optional excursion 1, Polegreen Church.

General Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson. From a photograph. blcw 1:121

N4084.indb 61

1/15/07 10:09:18 AM

62

N4084.indb 62

Stop 2

STOP 2

Lee’s Plans

Directions

Return to nine mile road and turn left. Proceed 0.8 mile to its intersection with laburnum avenue north, and turn left onto laburnum avenue. Proceed 2.9 miles until laburnum avenue intersects with the mechanicsville turnpike (Route 360). Turn right and proceed 0.5 mile to the Chickahominy Bluffs unit of Richmond National Battlefield Park. Turn right (this turn is easy to miss, so be prepared), and proceed to the parking lot. Get out of your car, and walk to the observation platform. Face northeast, toward the Chickahominy River beyond the trees.

Orientation

You are standing in the general vicinity of Robert E. Lee’s headquarters on June 26. Lee waited here for his plans to develop. Straight ahead, across the river, are Mechanicsville and the Union position at Beaver Dam Creek. To your right front, Porter’s other units were in reserve. To your left and left rear waited Longstreet’s and D. H. Hill’s divisions, and far to your left, at Meadow Bridges, waited A. P. Hill’s division. Longstreet and D. H. Hill crossed the Chickahominy on the

1/15/07 10:09:18 AM

63

Lee’s Plans

Mechanicsville Turnpike, which follows its 1862 trace. In 1862 the area straight ahead was much more open, giving Lee a good view of his troops across the river.

N4084.indb 63

What Happened

Lee arrived here on the morning of June 26. Confederate president Jefferson Davis came soon after, and they, Longstreet, D. H. Hill, and their staffs waited through the morning and most of the afternoon for word of the arrival of Stonewall Jackson on Porter’s right flank and of the North Carolinians of Brig. Gen. Lawrence O’B. Branch nearer the river. As the day wore on, the assembled Confederates grew more and more concerned. Finally, sometime after 3 p.m., A. P. Hill’s division could be seen advancing down the opposite bank of the Chickahominy. Hill’s men quickly uncovered the Mechanicsville Turnpike bridge, and D. H. Hill’s division began crossing the river about 4 p.m. Artillery fire quickly began, and Lee himself crossed just after the artillery duel started. All the Confederates moved out by the end of the day, ready to do their part in Lee’s plan—which already had been thrown off by the events of the day.

Analysis

Lee’s plan was that Jackson’s arrival on Porter’s right flank early in the afternoon would force the Yankees out of their lines at Beaver Dam Creek. At the same time, Branch’s advance would uncover Meadow Bridges for the rest of A. P. Hill’s division, and Hill’s advance would then uncover the Mechanicsville Turnpike bridge for Longstreet and D. H. Hill. Longstreet and the Hills could then pursue the retreating Porter, while Jackson could continue to flank the Federals and possibly cut the Richmond and York River Railroad, McClellan’s supply line. Porter’s corps might be defeated or destroyed, and McClellan’s supplies almost certainly would be cut off. Unfortunately for Lee, his plan never had a chance to be implemented. Jackson’s march from the Shenandoah Valley to the vicinity of Richmond was delayed for many reasons. He was five miles short of where the plan called for him to be on the morning of June 26. Instead of arriving on Porter’s flank around noon, he didn’t achieve his objective of Hundley’s Corner until about 5 p.m., too late to turn the Northerners out of their lines. Jackson’s delay also meant that Branch, who was to march in concert with Stonewall, was late, so A. P. Hill was also late and in fact crossed at Meadow Bridges before Branch arrived. There is some question whether Lee had ordered Hill to cross despite Branch’s delay, but it seems certain that even if Lee had issued that order, Hill did not receive it but moved on his own. Even though Hill moved before Lee’s original plan stipulated, he was sufficiently late to prevent

1/15/07 10:09:18 AM

64

Stop 2

all of Longstreet’s men from crossing at Mechanicsville before dark. The prime result of this delay was that Porter was still in his lines at Beaver Dam Creek, and a combination of further mistakes led to a Confederate attack on Porter’s lines that Lee had tried hard to avoid. It would be the first of several Confederate mistakes that Southern soldiers would pay for in blood. Vignette

As Magruder expected to hear the sounds of battle and had not by 2 p.m., he sent Maj. Joseph Brent, Magruder’s chief of ordnance, to report to Lee and to see what was happening. Brent found Lee anxious: “His eyes were restless with the look of a man with fever,” Brent remembered in his memoirs. “His necktie or cravat had slipped around until the bow rested under his ear, and one leg of his trousers was notably displaced.” Brent also reported that he had “never in my life seen more gloomy faces” than the ones of President Davis and Secretary of War Randolph as they waited for the action to start.

Further Reading

Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, 36 –37, 59, 64 – 65; Dowdey, The Seven Days, 174 –75; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 194 –96, 200–201.

Lieutenant-General Ambrose P. Hill, C.S.A. From a photograph. blcw 2:626

N4084.indb 64

1/15/07 10:09:18 AM

65

N4084.indb 65


STOP 3


Directions

Return to the mechanicsville turnpike (Route 360, then Route 360 Bypass), and turn right. As you drive this route you will be following Longstreet and D. H. Hill’s route. Cross the Chickahominy River, and about 1.6 mile after leaving Chickahominy Bluff exit at cold harbor road (Route 156). Turn right at the end of the ramp, and proceed about 0.6 mile until you reach the Beaver Dam Creek unit of the Richmond National Battlefield Park. Turn right and proceed to the parking lot. Walk to the marker near the parking lot and face east, looking across the bridge.

Orientation

You are standing near the historical trace of the road from Mechanicsville to Ellerson’s mill. The road continued on to become Cold Harbor Road. The Confederate attackers mostly stopped behind you and to your left rear, although the 38th North Carolina and the 44th Georgia reached the creek just to the left of your present position. The supporting Rebel artillery was on the hills to your left rear. The Union positions were straight ahead and to your left front along the bluffs on

1/15/07 10:09:18 AM

66

Stop 3

the east side of Beaver Dam Creek and a little to your right front, with infantry near the swamp and artillery higher up on the bluffs. The current Route 156 crosses the creek to your left at about where the 3rd North Carolina and 48th Georgia made their attack. At the time of the battle the area on both sides of the creek was open farmland.

N4084.indb 66

What Happened

Once A. P. Hill’s division cleared the Mechanicsville crossing of the Chickahominy, the Confederates continued to advance toward the Union position behind Beaver Dam Creek, held by Brig. Gen. George McCall’s division of Pennsylvania Reserves. From Mechanicsville, the division fanned out from the Old Church road (the continuation of Route 360 northeast of Mechanicsville) south past Cold Harbor Road. Brig. Gen. Joseph R. Anderson’s brigade moved north of the Old Church road to attempt to flank the Union position. Some of his men charged the north end of the Yankee line and were pushed back across the creek. Just north of your position, the 38th North Carolina of Brig. Gen. William D. Pender’s brigade charged the Federal line at Ellerson’s mill and was beaten back 100 yards from the Union positions. Lee ordered Brig. Gen. Roswell Ripley’s brigade of D. H. Hill’s division to turn the Union left, but Ripley’s regiments were diverted by D. H. Hill to support a second frontal assault by Pender. The 3rd North Carolina and 48th Georgia attacked at a point near the current Route 156, while the 1st North Carolina and 44th Georgia attacked toward Ellerson’s mill. At both points, Ripley’s men ran into overwhelming infantry and artillery fire from the 7th, 8th, and 12th Pennsylvania Reserves. Some of the 44th Georgia reached Beaver Dam Creek just north of the bridge, but none crossed to the other side. The failure was complete, although firing continued until dark.

Analysis

A battle Lee did not want to fight, Mechanicsville was wholly mismanaged on the Confederate side. Southern commanders did not know the topography of an area fewer than 10 miles from their capital. Anderson’s brigade got into the wrong position as a result. Too many Rebels, including Lee, Davis, A. P. Hill, and D. H. Hill, were giving orders, which (as one would expect) sometimes contradicted each other. Pender gave D. H. Hill bad advice, and Ripley headed to the wrong area. The most important mismanagement, however, was the lack of communication between Lee and Stonewall Jackson. What Lee would have done if he had known Jackson’s position is open to question. It is certain, however, that he would have prevented a frontal assault at Mechanicsville that cost him 1,400

1/15/07 10:09:19 AM

67


casualties (335 from the 44th Georgia of Ripley’s brigade) and accomplished little. The Federals defending at Beaver Dam Creek had an excellent position, with a swampy watercourse fronting steep, high banks and open ground over which attackers would advance. They took advantage of the ground to construct a defense that would not be broken by any direct assault. To the south, the ground became flat but very swampy and difficult to traverse. The position would need to be flanked to the north, as it finally was by Jackson’s advance to Hundley’s Corner. As a result, Porter pulled his men from the lines that night, and they fell back to another position on steep banks behind a swamp to fight another day.

N4084.indb 67

Further Reading

Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, 66 –75; Dowdey, The Seven Days, 168–96; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 201–7.

Further Exploration

If you have time, you may wish to cross the bridge over Beaver Dam Creek to the vicinity of Ellerson’s mill. The Federals used the mill race as shelter for their first line of infantry. The National Park Service owns more land on the east side of the creek, but when this guide was written (2005) no access was possible. However, the Park Service has been working to provide visitor access to the remaining intact portion of the Union line, and by the time you read this that access may be possible. If so, follow the signs to more closely examine the strength of the Northern position.

Optional Excursion

If you have time, you may wish to visit the ending point of Stonewall Jackson’s march on June 26. To do so, return to cold harbor road (Route 156), and turn left. Cross Route 360, at which point the road changes to atlee road (Route 638). Proceed a total of about 2.4 miles to the intersection with meadowbridge road to your left and pole green road to your right (Route 627). Turn right. After about 0.8 mile you will pass Shady Grove Methodist Church, which marks the corner where Maj. Gen. Richard Ewell’s division of Jackson’s command turned toward Polegreen Church after marching from the north. Proceed a total of about 3.5 miles until you reach the intersection of pole green and rural point roads. Turn left, proceed 0.5 mile on rural point road, and pull into the turnout on the right for the Civil War Trails marker. Turn to optional excursion 1, Polegreen Church, in this guide.

1/15/07 10:09:19 AM

68

Overview of the Third Day

Overview of the Third Day, June 27, 1862 On the morning of June 27, the Confederates under A. P. Hill, D. H. Hill, and James Longstreet found just a token force opposing them near Beaver Dam Creek. They also found that Stonewall Jackson had arrived on their north flank. Lee was ready to carry out a revised version of his plan of the day before. Acting on an assumption that Fitz John Porter’s men were behind Powhite Creek, not the more distant Boatswain’s Swamp, Lee sent Jackson and D. H. Hill on a flanking march to the intersection of Old Cold Harbor, northeast of Porter’s supposed position. Once again, Lee figured that Jackson’s approach would force Porter out of his lines, and A. P. Hill and Longstreet could attack a retreating force outside entrenchments. But Porter was not where Lee thought he was, and Jackson’s march—held up by a wrong turn and obstacles in the road—met up with Union troops in position just beyond Old Cold Harbor. By that time, A. P. Hill’s division had charged the center of Porter’s line just south of New Cold Harbor along Boatswain’s Swamp and had been bloodily repulsed. As Jackson’s men approached the battlefield they formed a line to connect with and attack past A. P. Hill’s men, but those attacks also failed to move Porter’s line, now reinforced by Brig. Gen. Henry Slocum’s division. Longstreet, south of A. P. Hill on the right of the Confederate line, at first prepared a diversionary attack but then converted it into a full-scale assault. At that point, all the Confederates north of the Chickahominy were in line, and those who weren’t already exhausted from heavy fighting charged at about the same time. On the Confederate left, D. H. Hill forced back Brig. Gen. George Sykes’s division of mostly regular troops. On the Rebel right, Longstreet broke through part of Brig. Gen. George Morell’s line. Near the center of the line, John B. Hood, at the head of his old regiment, the 4th Texas, and part of the 18th Georgia, broke another part of Morell’s line. Union artillery tarried too long trying to hold the line, and many guns were captured. An ill-advised Yankee cavalry charge also failed to stop the Southerners. Only darkness, and perhaps two brigades from Brig. Gen. Israel Richardson’s division, saved Porter’s gallant men, who had withstood charges for more than five hours. The battle of Gaines’s Mill, as it has come to be known, was the second-largest battle of the war thus far (after Shiloh) and would be the largest battle of the Seven Days. While the fury of battle raged on the north bank of the Chickahominy, on the south bank quiet reigned for most of the day. McClellan had a substantial numerical advantage

N4084.indb 68

1/15/07 10:09:19 AM

69

Overview of the Third Day

over Huger and Magruder, but he could not bring himself to order an assault, especially when his corps commanders were reporting heavy Rebel troop movements. Close to sundown, some of Magruder’s Confederates charged entrenchments held by Baldy Smith’s division near Garnett’s Farm, with no tangible result. Once McClellan knew that Gaines’s Mill was lost, he ordered the Army of the Potomac to ready itself to move to the James River. All that could not be moved was to be destroyed, including the supplies at White House Landing and Savage Station. Elements of the army began moving that night. Just after midnight, McClellan wrote a telegram to Secretary of War Edwin Stanton that ended with the sentences, “If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or to any other persons in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army.” Those sentences were deleted before Stanton saw them, but they became fodder for more than a century of debate about the proper blame for the necessity of the Union retreat. Necessary or not, retreat was what the Union soldiers began to do.

Lieutenant-General Daniel H. Hill, C.S.A. From a photograph. blcw 2:214

N4084.indb 69

1/15/07 10:09:19 AM

70

N4084.indb 70

Stop 4

STOP 4

Walnut Grove Church

Directions

Return to cold harbor road (Route 156), and turn right. Proceed 1.4 mile until you reach Walnut Grove Baptist Church on your left. Turn into the parking lot, and walk to the stone marker. Face toward the intersection.

Orientation

You are standing in the general vicinity of the meeting of Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson on June 27. The road running from your left to the intersection straight ahead is the road on which Jackson’s men marched that morning. The road running straight ahead from the intersection is the road on which Jackson’s men marched toward Old Cold Harbor, their destination. The road coming from behind you is Cold Harbor Road, on which A. P. Hill arrived from Mechanicsville. The road from the intersection to your right front is the continuation of Cold Harbor Road, and it leads past Gaines’s mill and through New Cold Harbor to Old Cold Harbor. A. P. Hill marched his men down this road in pursuit of Porter’s corps as the latter retreated from Beaver Dam Creek. Longstreet used a road to your right, closer to the Chickahominy River. The

1/15/07 10:09:19 AM

71

Walnut Grove Church

older of the two church buildings here, on your immediate left, dates to before the Civil War.

N4084.indb 71

What Happened

This churchyard was the site of the first battlefield meeting of Lee and Jackson, who during the next 10 months would form a dynamic strategy team. The two generals met here after Jackson’s men had accidentally shelled A. P. Hill’s advance; Stonewall and Hill met here briefly before Hill continued with his men. Lee and Jackson, walking in the churchyard out of earshot of anyone else, discussed the plan for the day, which turned out to be a continuation of the general plan. Stonewall and D. H. Hill would move to the Old Cold Harbor intersection, from which Lee believed they would flank Porter’s position, again forcing Fitz John to retreat and giving A. P. Hill and Longstreet a chance to defeat him in the open. The two generals then parted, with Jackson leading his men on their flank march and Lee following A. P. Hill toward the Federals.

Analysis

Jackson would flank Porter at Old Cold Harbor on June 27 only if Porter had stopped behind Powhite Creek, a small watercourse west of New Cold Harbor. In fact, however, Porter had positioned his men behind Boatswain’s Swamp, another small watercourse apparently not on Lee’s map but east of Powhite Creek and tracing an arc, the top of which ran from west to east. Any Confederate force at Old Cold Harbor would thus not be flanking Porter’s real position. The bad Confederate maps, inexplicable given the area’s proximity to the Southern capital, again caused Lee a major problem. They also cost Jackson, as did his habitual reticence; a guide heard Stonewall’s instruction to head to Cold Harbor but did not know of the need to take a roundabout route, so he made a wrong turn that cost Jackson time. For a second day in a row, Lee’s troops would be in wrong positions and suffer from poor timing.

Vignette

Lee and Jackson kept out of earshot from their staffs, despite efforts by at least one staffer to listen in on the conversation. The two men presented a stark contrast. Lee was in full dress uniform, his handsome face and distinguished bearing impressing all who came into contact with him. Jackson was as dusty as one would expect after days on the road, his preferred cadet’s cap as dirty as any other part of his uniform. Even their horses were strikingly different—Lee’s grey Traveller appeared healthy and fit, while Jackson’s Little Sorrel looked as if it had suffered under its master’s two previous months of intense campaigning. As historian Stephen Sears

1/15/07 10:09:20 AM

72

Stop 4

has put it, “The Defender of Richmond and the Hero of the Valley, it was agreed, appeared as unalike as it was possible to be.” Further Reading

Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, 83– 84, 102; Dowdey, The Seven Days, 204 – 6, 211–13; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 217–19, 227–28.

To Proceed with the

From the intersection, proceed 2.0 miles northeast on walnut grove road, which begins as Route 636, then turns into Route 615. Turn right on colts neck road (Route 1507), and continue about 0.7 mile until that road reaches sandy valley road (Route 635). Turn left, proceed about 0.5 mile, then turn right onto beulah church road (Route 633). This follows the general route that Jackson took on his march. Continue on beulah church road 1.4 miles, passing Beulah Church itself at 0.6 mile, to the Cold Harbor intersection. Turn right on Route 156, and pull into the parking area for the old garage on your right. Turn to stop 6, Old Cold Harbor, in this guide.

Secondary Tour

N4084.indb 72

1/15/07 10:09:20 AM

73

N4084.indb 73


STOP 5


Directions

Return to cold harbor road, and turn left. Proceed 0.1 mile to the intersection of Routes 643 and 156. Turn right onto Route 156 (still cold harbor road, even though you must turn). As you drive you will be following A. P. Hill’s route to the battle of Gaines’s Mill. At about 1.4 miles, off the road to the right, is Selwyn, Lee’s headquarters during the battle. At 2.1 miles is Powhite Creek. Proceed a total of 2.9 miles to watt house road (Route 718), which is straight ahead of you as Route 156 turns to the left. At this point you are in the area called New Cold Harbor. Go straight on watt house road, and proceed to the parking lot. Walk down the historic trace marked by the fence to your left front up to the cannon. Face in the direction that the cannon are facing, toward Boatswain’s Swamp (which you crossed on the drive down Watt House Road).

1/15/07 10:09:20 AM

74

Stop 5

Stop 5a The Union Line

N4084.indb 74

Orientation

You are standing near the Union left during the battle of Gaines’s Mill. The Union line followed Boatswain’s Swamp from your left to your right, which was originally held by Morell’s division (later reinforced by parts of McCall’s and Slocum’s divisions). Sykes’s division (later reinforced by the rest of McCall’s and Slocum’s divisions) stretched to your right rear along a rise. Artillery was lined up near the Watt house and to the east of it to your immediate right rear. The ground was substantially as you see it, open fields with trees lining the swamp itself.

What Happened

During the battle Porter directed reinforcements to threatened points throughout his line. The artillery posted here mostly engaged the enemy at long range and supported infantry when the Confederates charged, firing over their comrades’ heads. Porter was busy. Attacks by A. P. Hill’s division to your right front and right, and by Ewell’s division to your right, were beaten back, but the effort cost Morell’s and Sykes’s men dearly.

1/15/07 10:09:20 AM

75


Once the Confederate breakthrough occurred, in the late afternoon, the Rebels came up the hill and charged the Yankee cannon. Brig. Gen. Philip St. George Cooke, commanding Union cavalry, ordered a charge to try to save the cannon, but it (the troopers coming from your rear) failed miserably. The gunners did what they could, but the Southerners captured 23 guns at Gaines’s Mill. Analysis

Porter’s work on the defensive at Gaines’s Mill was excellent. He had set up his line in a strong position, which will be better seen in the next stops, in a matter of hours. He also was able to get reinforcements to the most important spots at opportune times. If reinforced by more troops more promptly, he might have been able to prevent the final Confederate breakthroughs, which came (at least in the area near the Watt house) against units that had been in line all day and for which no relief could come. Those breakthroughs, and the resulting disruption of the Union infantry, left the artillery wide open for capture, and it was too late in the day for fresh Northern troops from Richardson’s division, sent at last by McClellan, to attempt to recapture the guns. The wisdom and effect of the cavalry charge were greatly debated after the war. Suffice it to say that it could have accomplished nothing, and that was its result.

Vignette

A French nobleman, the Prince de Joinville, served with his two nephews as a volunteer aide to McClellan. With Porter during the latter part of the battle, the prince described the scene around the Watt house after the breakthrough, where the Rebels on the plateau were “closing in upon the confused masses of the Federals. Such is the fury of the cannonade and the musketry fire that the cloud of dust struck up from the ground floats steadily over the battle.” He continued, “The artillery horses were killed, and I saw, with painful emotion, the men working with the courage of desperation at guns which could no longer be removed. They dropped one after another. Two alone were left at last, and they continued to load and fire almost at point-blank range.”

Further Reading

Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, 86 – 87, 108–9, 111–13, 132–34; Dowdey, The Seven Days, 224, 234 –35, 239 – 42; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 213–15, 226 –27, 232–34, 244 – 46. Stop 5b The Breakthrough on the Union Left

Directions

N4084.indb 75

Continue on the historic trace until another trail diverges to the right. If you wish, you may first follow the fenced road

1/15/07 10:09:20 AM

76

Stop 5

trace another 100 yards or so to the top of the hill, where there is an overlook to the Chickahominy River’s floodplain. If so, retrace your steps when you are finished at the overlook. Otherwise, turn right and proceed along the trail to the stone monument for Wilcox’s brigade. Face toward the swamp.

N4084.indb 76

Orientation

You are in the position of Brig. Gen. Daniel Butterfield’s brigade of Morell’s division, which held the left of Porter’s line during the battle. Across the swamp straight ahead of you, in the fields beyond, Longstreet’s division formed its lines of battle. This position is near the left of Butterfield’s line. Here, as elsewhere, the Northerners defended in three lines, from near the swamp to this position near the top of the hill, felling trees to form breastworks and digging rifle pits such as the one you passed along the trail.

What Happened

Butterfield saw little fighting during much of the day. Late in the afternoon, however, as part of the charges launched along the entire Confederate line, Longstreet’s division assaulted the Union left. The brigades of Cadmus Wilcox, Roger Pryor, and Brig. Gen. Winfield Featherston hit Butterfield’s men, and their combined weight forced the Yankees out of their lines. To your right, Brig. Gen. George Pickett’s brigade and part of R. H. Anderson’s brigade hit and broke elements of Butterfield’s brigade and that of Brig. Gen. John Martindale. The Union defenders in this part of the line streamed toward the Chickahominy River, giving the Confederates the ground.

Analysis

Longstreet, who was not involved in the earlier assaults to his left by A. P. Hill and Ewell, had his division well in hand. Despite the relative inaction of Butterfield’s men, the Confederates had a large numerical superiority—12 regiments (Wilcox, Pryor, and Featherston) to 3 (16th Michigan, 44th New York, and 83rd Pennsylvania), since Butterfield had sent one regiment to Martindale’s support earlier in the afternoon. Despite the strength of the Union position, evident from this vantage point, the power of the assault was too much to stop— especially when the smoke of battle obscured the Yankees’ view late in the day. To the right, Pickett’s brigade hit regiments that had been repulsing assaults since early in the battle and had received little relief. The numerical odds weren’t as great, but the Northerners were worn through after hours of fighting and could not withstand the final attack.

1/15/07 10:09:21 AM

77


Vignette

Lt. Robert Miller of the 14th Louisiana, in Pryor’s brigade, charged with his men. As he charged, a bullet passed through his scabbard and killed one of his soldiers. When he wrote his father of the attack, he said, “The bullets came so thick that I felt a desire to see how many I could catch with my open hand stretched out.” Miller survived the Seven Days but was killed at Second Manassas later that summer.

Further Reading

Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, 129 –32; Dowdey, The Seven Days, 235 –36; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 239 – 43. Stop 5c Hood’s Breakthrough

N4084.indb 77

Directions

From the Wilcox Brigade monument, follow the trail along Boatswain’s Swamp. Stop at the interpretive marker for Hood’s assault where the trail forks. Face up the hill, with the swamp behind you.

Orientation

You are standing at about the first line of the Union defense. The final Confederate attack came from directly behind you and broke through the defense in the area straight ahead. You can see that the slope in this area is not as steep as in the areas to your front left and front right. This terrain feature probably is partly what led Brig. Gen. John B. Hood to advance as he did with the 4th Texas and part of the 18th Georgia, as the relatively level ground would allow the attackers to keep more of their momentum as they moved up the slope.

What Happened

The first actions of the battle of Gaines’s Mill occurred to your left, across the road on which you entered the park, when A. P. Hill attacked the right of Morell’s line and Sykes’s left. Hill’s brigades, as they attacked, fell into line to their right. The area directly to your left saw several charges by the brigades of Brig. Gens. James Archer, Charles Field, and J. R. Anderson on Martindale’s center. All were repulsed, though one assault got within 50 feet of the Union lines. All of Hill’s charges saw basically the same result, although the first charges (to be detailed at stop 5d) gained more success initially. Later in the afternoon, Brig. Gen. William Whiting’s division arrived on the field from its march with Stonewall Jackson. Whiting, in deploying his men, had run into Lee, who directed him further to the Confederate right, into the area between A. P. Hill’s and Longstreet’s divisions. In the final charges, Whiting advanced on Pickett’s left. Hood, one of Whiting’s brigade commanders, originally was on the left of Whiting’s line, but he saw an opening to the right and moved his old regiment,

1/15/07 10:09:21 AM

78

Stop 5

the 4th Texas, along with part of the 18th Georgia into the space. Ordering that no one should stop to fire, Hood led the Southerners on the double-quick down the slope behind you, through the swamp, and through the New Yorkers and Michiganders holding this part of Morell’s line. Analysis

A. P. Hill’s assaults came against fresh Union infantry and artillery in a prepared (albeit hastily) position. They had little chance of success. What Hill’s men accomplished through their sacrifice, however—and they continued to fire at the Yankees after their charges were stopped—was to sap the defenders’ strength. Hill’s attacks in this area came early enough, and the firefights afterward were light enough, that few reinforcements came to the defenders. By the time Longstreet and Whiting launched their assaults, the men of Martindale’s brigade had been defending their position for several hours. Many were low on ammunition, and Civil War rifles were hard to work. The time was ripe for Confederate success, particularly as their fresh troops had (in Hood’s case) somewhat favorable terrain. It is hard to fault any Federal for the failure, after a long and difficult day, to hold his position in the face of the determination Hood’s men showed. The Confederates argued long after the war about who first broke the line at Gaines’s Mill. The best resolution of this dispute is that the breakthroughs likely came at about the same time, or near enough that no one can claim sole credit for the ultimate success that Lee’s army gained.

Vignette

During the 4th Texas’s charge, Val Giles of that regiment was severely wounded. Giles fell directly in front of a Union battery and, as the guns probably spat canister, was staring directly at death. Then a Southerner grabbed Giles by the collar and dragged him a few yards behind an apple tree. “He handled me without gloves and hurt me fearfully, and in return for that act of humanity I cursed him,” Giles remembered. “He made no reply, but hurried on.” In his memoirs Giles credited the unknown Rebel with saving his life.

Further Reading

Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, 97–99, 127–30; Dowdey, The Seven Days, 219 –28, 236 –39; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 226, 240– 42. Stop 5d The Union Center

Directions

N4084.indb 78

You have two options at this point. You may proceed up the hill, following Hood’s charge, or you may proceed on the trail

1/15/07 10:09:21 AM

79


along Boatswain’s Swamp. The second option gives you a good view of the strength of the Union defenses in the area attacked by some of A. P. Hill’s troops. In either case, once you emerge into the field at the top of the slope, proceed to the cannon on the east side, across the parking lot. Face the field straight ahead of you as you walk. If you wish, you may proceed further to the fence at the edge of the park property.

N4084.indb 79

Orientation

You are looking over the Adams field, as it was known at the time of the battle. This is private not park land, but it looks much as it did in 1862. The road from New Cold Harbor angled from your left rear to your left front about a quarter mile distant in the trees you see, then headed straight to the road from Old Cold Harbor to Grapevine Bridge. Most of Sykes’s division initially deployed parallel to this second section of the road though in front of it. Col. Gouverneur Warren’s brigade was in the trees on the other side of the first section of the road, and Brig. Gen. Charles Griffin’s brigade of Morell’s division was to your left and left rear on this side of the road. The area defended by Warren and Griffin looked substantially the same at the time of the battle as the park land does now: open fields with trees lining the swamp.

What Happened

Warren’s brigade took the first blow of the battle of Gaines’s Mill. Brig. Gen. Maxcy Gregg’s brigade of A. P. Hill’s division advanced against the 5th New York—the famous Duryee Zouaves—and the 10th New York. The 1st South Carolina Rifles of Gregg’s brigade lost 297 killed and wounded in the assault, but Gregg failed to break Warren’s line. A. P. Hill’s other brigades, led by Branch and Pender, also charged in the area to your left, hitting the 10th New York and Griffin’s brigade. After the Yankees repulsed these charges, they had little respite, as Ewell’s division attacked shortly afterward. These assaults hit some U.S. regular army troops from Sykes’s division who were relieving Warren as well as Griffin’s brigade. None of the Rebels, including the famous Louisiana Tigers just to the left of your position, could dent the Union line. As part of the final charges, elements of Ewell’s and Whiting’s divisions advanced in the same general area. They broke the Federal line (Brig. Gen. John Newton’s brigade and Brig. Gen. George Taylor’s brigade, both of Slocum’s division) and captured the 4th New Jersey and 11th Pennsylvania Reserves almost whole.

Analysis

Warren’s men fought hard in defense, and their combat with Gregg’s troops was one of the most savage of the war. Warren

1/15/07 10:09:21 AM

80

Stop 5

initiated one of the few Union counterattacks of the battle in pursuing Gregg’s men. Finally, Warren was relieved, but the supporting troops, mostly from McCall’s division, retreated because of pressure on both flanks. The pressure on the left side came after Slocum’s worn-out men were finally forced back from Boatswain’s Swamp. They had marched to the field and blunted Ewell’s initial assaults, but the final charge was too much. Much of the credit for the final Confederate success must go to A. P. Hill’s men. Their attacks in the area to your left and left rear, though unsuccessful, forced Porter to commit reserves early, setting the stage for the later victory. Further Reading

Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, 91–96, 104 –10, 117–27; Dowdey, The Seven Days, 221–23, 228–31, 239 – 40; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 223–25, 229 –30, 237–39, 246 – 47.

Uniform of the 83rd Pennsylvania of Butterfield’s Brigade, Morrell’s Division, 5th Corps. blcw 2:336

N4084.indb 80

1/15/07 10:09:21 AM

81

N4084.indb 81

Cold Harbor

STOP 6

Cold Harbor

Directions

Return to cold harbor road, and turn right. If you wish, you may stop at the Cold Harbor Visitor Center after about 0.2 mile. Proceed a total of about 1.2 miles to just before the intersection of Routes 156 and 633. Pull off at the old garage to your left. Face to the east along rockhill road.

Orientation

You are at the intersection of Old Cold Harbor, often just called Cold Harbor, named for a tavern located there. The road to your left runs by Beulah Presbyterian Church and was used by Stonewall Jackson to march to the battle of Gaines’s Mill. The road to your right leads to Grapevine Bridge. The road straight ahead could be taken to reach the sites of Tunstall’s Station, on the Richmond and York River Railroad, and eventually White House Landing, McClellan’s primary supply depot. The road network and terrain is basically the same as in 1862.

What Happened

This is the intersection toward which Lee directed Jackson on June 27. Jackson, joined by and eventually preceded by

1/15/07 10:09:22 AM

82

Stop 6

D. H. Hill, made his roundabout march to Old Cold Harbor, and Hill’s leading elements arrived early in the afternoon. Hill paused briefly here and then proceeded south on Cold Harbor Road, running into the right end of Sykes’s division less than a mile from the intersection. Most of Jackson’s men headed southwest from Beulah Presbyterian Church before they reached the intersection to form Stonewall’s line of battle. The center and right of Sykes’s division received its first blows from D. H. Hill’s men. The effects were minor, however, and Sykes was able to shift some regiments left to assist in the defense there for a couple of hours. Most of the action on this front occurred later, during the final charges, when most of Hill’s division plus elements of Stonewall Jackson’s division advanced on the Union line. An epic combat between the 20th North Carolina and 16th New York regiments over a battery took place during those last charges. The Rebels lost 272 killed and wounded, while the Yankees lost 194. The weight of Hill’s assault finally forced the New Yorkers back, along with the rest of Sykes’s division and Col. Joseph Bartlett’s brigade of Slocum’s division. Analysis

N4084.indb 82

Old Cold Harbor seemed to Lee to be the key intersection in this area of Virginia. If he controlled it, he thought he would be closer to McClellan’s supply line and depot than was Porter, forcing Porter to fall back and giving the Confederates a chance to attack a retreating enemy. This was the reason Lee had pinpointed the intersection as Jackson’s goal in his original plan for the campaign. The reality was different. McClellan was not planning to defend his supply line as Lee expected, and on June 27 Porter was further east than Lee supposed. For this reason, Old Cold Harbor did not become the important intersection in 1862 that it became 23 months later, when Grant and Lee ended their Overland Campaign on the same ground. Sykes’s men did not have ground as advantageous as Morell’s division, but they were not assaulted seriously until the final Confederate efforts. The regulars and Bartlett’s men were outnumbered but retreated slowly without being broken. The Southerners became jumbled in their assaults, but since they were all going forward the confusion didn’t matter. Gaines’s Mill cost the Confederates about 8,700 killed and wounded. About 4,000 Federals were killed and wounded, and another 2,800 were missing.

1/15/07 10:09:22 AM

83

N4084.indb 83

Cold Harbor

Vignette

The 16th New York went into battle at Gaines’s Mill wearing white straw hats, which Col. Joseph Howland’s wife had sent from Albany earlier in the month. The hats helped the men withstand the summer sun and gave them a distinctive appearance. Before the battle, the men enjoyed that; during the battle it made them a little too easily seen by Southerners with rifled muskets. By the time the battle was over, many of the hats were gone—some from being thrown away, but many because their owners were either killed or wounded.

Further Reading

Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, 102–3; Dowdey, The Seven Days, 213–16; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 227–28, 234.

1/15/07 10:09:22 AM

84

N4084.indb 84

Stop 7

STOP 7

Grapevine Bridge

Directions

Turn right at the intersection, and proceed south on cold harbor road (Route 156). As you drive this stretch of road, you will be following first D. H. Hill’s line of march at Gaines’s Mill, and then Jackson’s route after the battle. At about 0.7 mile there is a historical marker noting Sykes’s advanced line during the battle of Gaines’s Mill. A second historical marker at 0.9 mile and old quaker road (the remnant of the road from New Cold Harbor) at the 1.0 mile mark indicates the right end of Sykes’s main line. Proceed a total of about 3.4 miles until just after you cross the Chickahominy River, where a large parking area lies on your right. Pull into the parking area, and face the river. If you wish, walk to the bridge for a better view.

Orientation

You are a few hundred yards upstream of a historical ford of the Chickahominy River called Grapevine Ford because the river twists and turns so much in this area. A bridge erected across the Chickahominy in this area took the name Grapevine Bridge, though, as we will see, it no longer existed when

1/15/07 10:09:22 AM

85

Grapevine Bridge

the Army of the Potomac reached the area in the middle of May. At this point, where Route 156 crosses the river, stood Alexander’s Bridge, another important bridge during the Seven Days, if less well known than Grapevine Bridge. If you are here at low water, you’ll note that the Chickahominy presents few obstacles. If you are here at high water, you will see what the armies faced in the spring of 1862.

N4084.indb 85

What Happened

In late May 1862, men from Edwin Sumner’s corps built several bridges, including one officially known as Sumner’s Upper Bridge but usually referred to by soldiers as Grapevine Bridge for the old one that had occupied the spot. They then used Grapevine Bridge to cross a rain-swollen river during the battle of Seven Pines just before it was washed away. It was rebuilt in June, at the same time as Alexander’s Bridge was built. The two bridges became a focal point during two days in late June. On June 27, they were the points at which Porter’s corps would cross the Chickahominy after the battle of Gaines’s Mill. Porter arranged his line to cover them, and both were used by the weary Yankees on the night of June 27–28. The second day during which the bridges became important was June 29. Lee’s pursuit of the retreating McClellan was by then in full swing. Stonewall Jackson’s part was to cross at Grapevine Bridge, keep close to the Chickahominy, and attempt to turn the Federals’ eastern flank. To do any of that, Jackson had to use Grapevine and Alexander’s bridges, which the Northerners had destroyed after they had crossed. Jackson employed various bands of people to attempt the construction of both bridges, but it took most of the day to get Grapevine Bridge repaired and all day to get Alexander’s Bridge repaired. His men would not cross the Chickahominy until dawn on June 30.

Analysis

McClellan’s plan for Porter’s withdrawal meant Grapevine and Alexander’s bridges were vital to Porter’s safety. If a Confederate force could reach at least one, Porter would be in danger of being cut off from the rest of the Army of the Potomac. An early breakthrough would have accomplished that, but by the time the breakthrough did come it was too late, and the Rebels were too exhausted and disorganized to try to seize the bridges. The crossing took most of the night. Much has been written about Jackson’s delay at Grapevine Bridge (actually both Grapevine and Alexander’s bridges) on June 29. Most of the words have been critical of Stonewall. Also, much has been said about Jackson’s failure to support Magruder on June 29. Stonewall told Prince John that he had

1/15/07 10:09:22 AM

86

Stop 7

“other important duty.” That phrase, which has caused much comment, was the result of Jackson’s need to support Jeb Stuart’s cavalry in the unlikely event that McClellan tried to retreat down the Peninsula instead of to the James River. The simple truth has been obscured by this commentary. Jackson was attempting to rebuild two bridges, both of which had been damaged. Alexander’s Bridge had taken the Yankees five days to build, so getting it repaired in one day was an accomplishment, and Jackson needed both bridges for a swift crossing. Even Grapevine Bridge, not as sturdy a structure, would take several hours to repair. In reality, if Lee had wanted Jackson to cross the river on June 29, the bridges should have been repaired on June 28—but Yankees were in position south of the river to disrupt any bridge building on June 28. Further Reading

Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, 149 –50, 206 –11; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 252, 268– 69.

Optional Excursion

To view the north end of the Union line south of the Chickahominy, as well as the area of the actions at the Garnett and Gouldin farms, return to Route 156, which is now airport drive north. Turn right and proceed about 1.3 miles to north washington street. Turn right, and continue about 0.6 mile until where washington street makes a left turn. The road is wide here, but the land is private, so park in a convenient spot but stay on the side of the road as you get out. Turn to optional excursion 2, Confusion on the Farms.

To Proceed on the

Return to Route 156. Turn right and proceed 0.2 mile to old hanover road. Turn left and then in 0.1 mile turn left onto grapevine road. Proceed 1.3 miles to meadow road. Turn left and proceed on meadow road as it crosses under Interstate 64 and intersects with Route 60. Continue straight on meadow road, now Route 156, as it turns into elko road. As you pass portugee road on your right at about 5.8 miles you are passing the area in which Jackson’s artillery was located. After a total of about 6.3 miles turn into the pull-off on your right just before the bridge over White Oak Swamp. Get out of your car, and turn in this guide to stop 9, The Fizzle at White Oak Swamp.

Secondary Tour

N4084.indb 86

1/15/07 10:09:22 AM

87

N4084.indb 87


STOP 8


Directions

Return to Route 156. Turn right and proceed 0.2 mile to old hanover road. Turn left and then in 0.1 mile turn left onto grapevine road. Proceed about 0.3 miles until you see the Civil War Trails marker. Pull off at the marker to your right, get out of your car, and face toward the two-story house on the right of the road. The house and grounds are private property.

Orientation

You are facing the Trent house, McClellan’s headquarters from the middle of June until after the battle of Gaines’s Mill. Behind you and slightly to your left rear, about one mile distant, is Grapevine Bridge. The Gaines’s Mill battlefield is about two miles behind you and slightly to your right rear. The northern end of the Union line south of the river is about two miles to your right, and the Savage Station area is about one and a half miles straight ahead.

What Happened

McClellan moved his headquarters here from the north side of the Chickahominy when Franklin’s corps shifted to the south bank of the river. Before the Seven Days began, this

1/15/07 10:09:23 AM

88

Stop 8

area would have looked like a typical army headquarters, with couriers and generals coming and going, telegraph lines extending, and the hustle and bustle of running an army. On the night of June 26, after Mechanicsville, McClellan returned to the Trent house after meeting with Porter. It was then that he set in motion what he called the “change of base” but what would in reality be a retreat from the gates of Richmond. The next day McClellan heard reports from his commanders on the south side of the river of possible attacks— evidence of the success of the Rebel demonstrations. He did send Slocum’s division and two brigades of Richardson’s division to Porter, but he stopped Slocum before eventually ordering the move, and the other two brigades were too late to affect the outcome of Gaines’s Mill. In the evening of June 27, his camp already relocated from the Trent house, McClellan sat on a stump awaiting word of the outcome at Gaines’s Mill. After getting it from several sources, he then called his corps commanders together to tell them they would be heading to the James River. Keyes’s men would lead the way, followed by Porter and the Artillery Reserve. Sumner, Heintzelman, and Franklin would hold their positions on June 28, then begin their retreat. The meeting broke up, and McClellan left for Savage Station. The Trent house had not seen everything, however. Porter’s exhausted men crossed the Chickahominy during the night of June 27–28 and camped, if it could be called that, around the Trent house before leaving in the afternoon and evening of June 28. Analysis

N4084.indb 88

McClellan’s decision deserves consideration from two different points of view. The first is his. He thought Lee outnumbered him nearly two to one. Therefore, if Porter was substantially outnumbered on the north bank, he also was substantially outnumbered on the south bank. He could accomplish nothing by attacking toward Richmond and in fact risked annihilation if he did so, with the Rebel host north of the river ready to pounce on his rear. He couldn’t try to move everyone north of the river—there weren’t enough crossings, and nothing could be done against an enemy that had the roads to White House Landing covered. He had to move toward the James, and so he decided to move his base as far forward on the James as possible and race the Confederates there. He would have a head start, and perhaps he could beat the Southern hordes. The second perspective is that of reality. If Lee did outnumber McClellan, he did so by at most a few thousand men. Porter was outnumbered, but McClellan’s advantage on the

1/15/07 10:09:23 AM

89


south bank was about three to one. A movement toward Richmond would have forced Lee into a very tight spot and perhaps have led to the annihilation, not of the Army of the Potomac, but of the Army of Northern Virginia, if McClellan had been willing to live off the land and as many of his accumulated supplies as his men could carry for a few days. No simple explanation for McClellan’s belief concerning the relative strengths of the two armies is convincing. It is likely a combination of factors. Whatever its cause, that belief almost certainly prolonged the war and led to its metamorphosis from a conservative restore-the-Union objective to a more revolutionary abolish-slavery mission. Vignette

During the battle of Gaines’s Mill, parts of the south bank of the Chickahominy, including the Trent house area, were covered by an acoustic shadow (when the movement of sound waves is affected by vegetation, wind, or other atmospheric conditions). People only two miles from the battlefield at the Union headquarters heard no musketry throughout the day. They could see the artillery shells bursting, but they could hear little. This was not unusual along the Chickahominy, apparently; a similar phenomenon prevented Joe Johnston from hearing the sounds of the battle of Seven Pines. However, in Richmond the sounds of the battle were plain.

Further Reading

Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, 79 – 81, 88–91, 147–50; Dowdey, The Seven Days, 206 –10, 253–55; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 215 –17, 227, 233–34, 250.

Woodbury’s Bridge across the Chickahominy. From a war-time photograph. blcw 2:383

N4084.indb 89

1/15/07 10:09:23 AM

90

Overview of the Fourth and Fifth Days

Overview of the Fourth and Fifth Days, June 28 and 29, 1862 June 28 was to be a day of rest for most Confederates but a day of movement for many Federals, as McClellan’s army began its retreat and Lee waited to see which way his opponent was retreating. Signs of the retreat were obvious to the Confederate commander—including smoke from the various fires set by the Yankees—but he needed to be sure of the direction before he moved his force. Aside from some reconnaissances, including sending Richard Ewell’s division and Stuart’s cavalry to Dispatch Station on the railroad from White House Landing to Savage Station, he could do little but wait. Stuart continued along the railroad to the vicinity of White House, where he saw the flames from the burning house and supplies. Ewell moved to Bottom’s Bridge over the Chickahominy, where he was shelled by Union artillery. South of the Chickahominy, another confusion-wrapped Confederate attack occurred near Garnett’s and Gouldin’s farms, close to the site of the previous day’s attack. This was no more successful than the one of the night before. Otherwise, the day saw much of Erasmus Keyes’s corps crossing a small watercourse called White Oak Swamp so as to cover the Army of the Potomac’s trains. Porter’s men started toward the James River in the afternoon. The Artillery Reserve rolled out during the night, and the rest of the army moved back to a position covering Savage Station during the night of June 28 and the early morning of June 29. Lee had formed his plan for pursuit on the evening of June 28. Longstreet and A. P. Hill would march south and east to cut off the Yankees from the James River. Jackson and D. H. Hill would cross the Chickahominy and stay north and east of the Federals, herding them toward Longstreet and A. P. Hill and perhaps flanking them. Magruder and Huger would, on June 29, slow the Union retreat by fixing the Army of the Potomac’s rear guard as much as possible. As happened often during the Seven Days, Lee’s plans were imperfectly carried out. Through a mix-up in orders, Jackson perceived his duty to be to stay north of the Chickahominy so as to protect against a Union move straight east instead of southeast. Longstreet and A. P. Hill did their jobs, positioning their troops to cut the Union line of retreat by marching nearly 20 miles in the stifling heat. Huger spent much of the day marching back and forth between roads in response to various orders. Magruder was alternately too cautious and too aggressive. The aggression finally won out when he ordered an attack on the Federal position in front of Savage Station.

N4084.indb 90

1/15/07 10:09:23 AM

91

Overview of the Fourth and Fifth Days

McClellan had left both Sumner’s and Heintzelman’s corps and Baldy Smith’s division in place at Savage Station as the rear guard, so Magruder’s attack could have been a disaster for the Confederates. Fortunately for them, Heintzelman had decided there were plenty of Yankees at Savage Station, so he moved his men south of White Oak Swamp. When Magruder attacked, the result was a bloody draw. Meanwhile, the rest of the Army of the Potomac was moving toward the James River. Keyes’s men continued south past Malvern Hill, along with the trains. Porter’s corps reached the Glendale crossroads, joined in the area by Heintzelman’s corps and Slocum’s division. After Savage Station, the rest of the army pulled out and headed for White Oak Swamp, the last units crossing the swamp early in the morning of June 30.

Union field-hospital at Savage’s Station. From a photograph. blcw 2:387

N4084.indb 91

1/15/07 10:09:23 AM

92

N4084.indb 92

Stop 9

STOP 9


Directions

Continue on grapevine road about 1.0 mile until it runs into meadow road. Turn left, proceed 0.1 mile, and park at the historical markers on your right. Face southeast, over the fields bounded by Interstate 295, meadow road, and the railroad in the distance.

Orientation

You are facing Savage Station on the Richmond and York River Railroad. Savage Station, actually the Savage house, was located at the far corner of the field marked on your left front by a line of evergreens. The station was McClellan’s primary forward supply depot and the location of a large Union field hospital in the fields you can see before you. To your right front, on the south side of the railroad, was the location of the battle of Savage Station. The Federals retreated and the Confederates advanced from your right between the railroad and Williamsburg Road farther south. Unfortunately, the battlefield has been altered forever by the interchange of Interstates 295 and 64 to your right front, where the bridge is, and this is as good a view as there is. The construction led

1/15/07 10:09:24 AM

93


to the relocation from their original spots of many of the historical markers you see here, so they now provide inaccurate distances and directions. At the time this guide was written, for example, the Civil War Trails map places you in the wrong location—you are to the right of the 42nd New York’s position. What Happened

N4084.indb 93

During the night of June 28–29 the remaining Federals pulled back from their lines west of Seven Pines and retreated to the area around Savage Station. Their mission was to delay the Confederate pursuit. This would allow more time for the rest of the Army of the Potomac to march toward the James River and the supplies at the station to be destroyed before the complete evacuation. The Confederates moved forward slowly and with much confusion among the commanders. Huger was first ordered to pursue along Charles City Road, south of Williamsburg Road. Then he was ordered to assist Magruder’s advance along Williamsburg Road, if needed, but to return to Charles City Road if not. He finally moved down Charles City Road, but the confusion cost valuable time. Magruder also waited for Stonewall Jackson’s support, but it was not forthcoming, as Jackson was busy repairing bridges across the Chickahominy. Similar confusion marred the Union command. Heintzelman considered his command to be independent of Sumner’s orders, while Sumner considered himself the commander on the field, since McClellan was farther along with the retreating forces. Sumner ordered Heintzelman to cover Williamsburg Road, but Heintzelman decided there were too many troops in the Savage Station area and withdrew. When Magruder moved forward, his force—Brig. Gen. Joseph Kershaw’s brigade and the 1st Georgia Regulars—ran into a picket force composed of the 5th New Hampshire and 53rd and 71st Pennsylvania near Allen’s farm. Once that encounter was over, Magruder waited until late afternoon. Then, with Huger gone and Jackson’s bridge building continuing, Magruder launched an attack on the Yankees at Savage Station. North of Williamsburg Road, the 2nd, 3rd, and 7th South Carolina of Kershaw’s brigade initially made headway against the 72nd and 106th Pennsylvania, but the 5th New Hampshire, 15th Massachusetts, 1st Minnesota, 82nd and 88th New York, and 69th Pennsylvania helped drive the South Carolinians back. South of the road, the 10th Georgia, 5th Louisiana, and 32nd Virginia of Brig. Gen. Paul Semmes’s brigade slugged it out with the Vermonters of William Brooks’s brigade in a savage close-range musket fight. Finally, the Confederate attacks stopped, and during the night

1/15/07 10:09:24 AM

94

Stop 9

the Northerners continued their retreat, leaving thousands of wounded comrades to be captured by their enemy. The battle had produced nearly 1,400 casualties, about 450 Rebel and more than 900 Yankee.

N4084.indb 94

Analysis

The day of Savage Station showed the best side of few highlevel commanders on either side. However, particularly on the Rebel side it is hard to imagine that much more could have been done than was actually achieved, which was to pin the Yankees down as much as possible. Heintzelman’s initiative was all that prevented three Union corps from being held in the Savage Station area all day. On the other hand, his withdrawal eliminated the possibility of a counterattack and a severe handling of Magruder’s smaller force. Huger’s delay slowed the pursuit, which was an important part of Lee’s plan. And the engagement at Savage Station was a useless sacrifice of life.

Vignette

The Rev. J. J. Marks, a chaplain in Kearny’s division, was a prominent figure at the field hospital at Savage Station. Told of the retreat, he agonized over what to do, even consulting Samuel Heintzelman—who told Marks no orders kept the chaplain at the hospital. Even so, Marks decided to stay with the wounded but advised every man who could walk to leave before the Rebels captured the place. Leaving to get supplies, he saw a long line of wounded, some supporting each other, others carried by two men, some falling and struggling back to their feet. Later, when Heintzelman and his staff departed, all realized that the invalids were to be left. Fathers parted with sons, and friends with friends. The invalids cried out, and some struggled with renewed strength to escape certain capture. Marks later remembered, “Poor fellows! they thought this was the last drop in the cup of bitterness, but there were yet many to be added.”

Further Reading

Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, 151–52, 212–21; Dowdey, The Seven Days, 256 –57, 266 – 81; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 250–51, 266 –74.

1/15/07 10:09:24 AM

95

Overview of the Sixth Day

Overview of the Sixth Day, June 30, 1862 By mid-morning of June 30, all of McClellan’s men were south of White Oak Swamp, but they were stretched from just south of White Oak Swamp Bridge to Haxall’s Landing on the James River, a distance of more than five miles. Seven of the army’s 11 divisions and one brigade of another were posted around the Glendale crossroads. This position was critical to the Army of the Potomac because any troops north or northwest of the crossroads would need to march through it to reach the James River, and it was at least possible that capturing the crossroads would mean capturing part of the army’s trains. Lee recognized Glendale’s importance, and his plan for June 30 was an attempt to capture it and ruin half of McClellan’s army. Jackson and D. H. Hill, having crossed the Chickahominy early that morning, would march to White Oak Swamp Bridge to at least fix in place the Union force guarding it. Huger would march down Charles City Road toward Glendale and engage any force in his front. Longstreet and A. P. Hill, supported by Magruder if the latter’s men could reach the field in time, would drive for the crossroads in an attempt to cut the vital Willis Church Road that ran from Glendale southward to Malvern Hill. Maj. Gen. Theophilus Holmes, with troops from the Department of North Carolina, would advance down River Road to engage the Yankees on Malvern Hill. If all went as planned, Longstreet and A. P. Hill’s attack would cut off many of the Union divisions around Glendale. Unfortunately for Lee, very little went as he planned on perhaps the most crucial of the Seven Days. Jackson launched a surprise artillery barrage on men from Smith’s, Richardson’s, and John Peck’s divisions at White Oak Swamp Bridge. William Franklin, in charge at the bridge, at first thought a fullscale attack was coming, and he called for reinforcements from the Glendale area. In McClellan’s absence—the Union commander was on a gunboat on the James River examining possible campsites—Sumner and Heintzelman rushed troops to Franklin. But Jackson never attacked with infantry. Indeed, exhausted by his exertions the previous two weeks he fell asleep during the engagement. Huger encountered obstacles both human and nonhuman on Charles City Road. He made a half-hearted attack on Slocum’s division after spending much of the day cutting a new road through the forest because trees obstructed the main road. Holmes failed in a situation where failure was the only option—as he approached Malvern Hill the Federal artillery

N4084.indb 95

1/15/07 10:09:24 AM

96

Overview of the Sixth Day

on top of the hill broke and scattered his men. Magruder, caught in a web of countervailing orders, marched all over this section of the Peninsula but never got in position to help the Southern cause. As a result of these failures, the Yankees at Glendale did not need to send reinforcements to other threatened areas, and in fact were able to receive reinforcements. That became important when first Longstreet’s division and then A. P. Hill’s division attacked at Glendale. McCall’s division took the first blows, and (fought out after hard work at Beaver Dam Creek and Gaines’s Mill) was forced back, in some cases in disorder. At one point, Confederates approached the Willis Church road. But reinforcements from Franklin at White Oak Swamp Bridge and Slocum on Charles City Road arrived just in time to force the Rebels back. Lee had struck hard at Glendale and had almost succeeded without any other part of his plan working, but almost was not close enough. For the second night in a row and the third thus far in these series of battles, the Army of the Potomac withdrew from a field it had held during battle. Hooker’s division, the last to leave, vacated its position at daylight on July 1, marching toward Malvern Hill.

N4084.indb 96

1/15/07 10:09:25 AM

97

N4084.indb 97


STOP 10


Directions

Proceed on meadow road. The farm lane to your right at 0.1 mile is the historical road trace to Savage Station. Continue on Meadow Road as it crosses over Interstate 64 and intersects with Route 60. Continue straight on meadow road, now Route 156, as it turns into elko road. You are following Jackson’s route to White Oak Swamp. As you pass portugee road on your right at about 5.5 miles you are passing the area in which Jackson’s artillery was located. After traveling a total of about 6.0 miles, turn into the pull-off on your right just before the bridge over White Oak Swamp. Get out of your car, proceed to the markers, and face south toward White Oak Swamp.

Orientation

You are seeing what Stonewall Jackson and his men saw on June 30. They had marched down the road you followed on the route from Savage Station, as had many of their Yankee opponents. Those Yankees were straight ahead and to your right front on the hills south of White Oak Swamp. Aside

1/15/07 10:09:25 AM

98

Stop 10

from some modern houses, the area along and south of the swamp today looks much as it did in 1862. However, north of the swamp the ground was relatively open in 1862 compared with today.

N4084.indb 98

What Happened

Stonewall Jackson’s basic task on June 30 was the same as the day before: to follow Lee’s orders to keep the Federals from escaping to the east and, if possible, engage them. This day, however, he was able to cross the Chickahominy and move south and east. He found the Federal rearguard here. Setting up about 30 guns undetected by the weary Northerners (many of whom had marched all night), he opened fire in the early afternoon. After much confusion, the Yankees began to fire back, and a sometimes energetic, sometimes desultory artillery duel waged for the next several hours. Jackson tried to repair the bridge across the swamp, but his pioneers wouldn’t work under the artillery and infantry fire. Several fords were available, including one to the east, discovered by Brig. Gen. Wade Hampton, at which Jackson ordered a bridge built. However, no Southerners crossed the swamp permanently on June 30.

Analysis

Jackson’s performance, or lack thereof, at White Oak Swamp is the single most criticized event of his military career. Stonewall’s overall performance during the Seven Days came under intense scrutiny almost from the time of the battles, but most of these criticisms are easily countered. His inaction on June 30 is not. He did not press the issue at a time when pressure was necessary. He did not take advantage of the fords. He did not follow up the surprise he had gained. He did not reward his subordinates’ energy. In short, he failed utterly to accomplish anything. The result was that 10,000 Federals under Franklin’s command were able to move from the swamp area to reinforce their comrades at Glendale, possibly saving McClellan from a disastrous defeat.

Vignette

After Hampton had built a bridge at the ford he had found east of White Oak Swamp Bridge—a ford that apparently flanked the Federals south of White Oak Swamp—he returned to report to Jackson. The bridge was finished, Hampton said, and the Yankees were there waiting to be attacked. “He sat in silence for some time,” Hampton wrote later of Jackson, “then rose and walked off in silence.”

Further Reading

Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, 251– 63; Dowdey, The Seven Days, 308–15; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 285 – 89.

1/15/07 10:09:25 AM

99


To Proceed with the Secondary Tour

Proceed on elko road about 1.3 miles until you reach charles city road. Turn right (following Route 156), and proceed 1.2 miles to the intersection of charles city, darbytown, and willis church roads (the Glendale intersection). Turn left onto willis church road (Route 156), and proceed 2.2 miles to the parking lot for the Parsonage. Turn left into the parking lot, and then turn in this guide to stop 13, Jackson at Malvern Hill.

“Captured by Stonewall Jackson himself.” blcw 2:360

N4084.indb 99

1/15/07 10:09:25 AM

N4084.indb 100

1/15/07 10:09:25 AM

101


STOP 11


Directions

Proceed on elko road. At about 0.5 mile you will pass the Union position at White Oak Swamp. At 0.6 mile, turn left onto hines road. At 2.0 miles, hines road will intersect with charles city road. Turn right onto charles city road. As you are driving on charles city road you are in the rear of the Union position at Glendale. At 0.4 mile you will cross a stream, and in another 0.3 mile you will see a field on your right. In this field Slocum’s division was positioned on June 30. After turning onto charles city road, proceed about 1.9 miles and then turn left onto gill dale road. Proceed 1.7 miles until gill dale road intersects with darbytown road. Turn left and proceed 1.0 miles on darbytown road until its junction with carter’s mill road. Turn right onto carter’s mill road, and proceed 0.6 mile to a Y intersection at which carter’s mill road turns into long bridge road. Take long bridge road 0.1 mile to the Gravel Hill Recreation Center on your left. Turn into the recreation center, and face down long bridge road, now the right fork in the Y.

Orientation

You are on the line of advance of Longstreet’s and A. P. Hill’s divisions toward the battle of Glendale. They approached on Long Bridge Road from directly behind you. The Union line was straight ahead of you and to your right front about a half mile distant.

What Happened

Lee’s plan called for Confederate forces to concentrate around the Glendale crossroads, with Jackson approaching from the north, Huger from the northwest on Charles City Road, and Longstreet and A. P. Hill (after an all-day march on June 29) from the southwest up Long Bridge Road. Huger was delayed by several factors, including his own caution and Slocum’s division, which was posted on Charles City Road in the area you drove through on the way to this stop. When Longstreet attacked, he met McCall’s division on the front line. The first attacks came from Micah Jenkins, leading R. H. Anderson’s brigade. The South Carolinians hit the 1st and 9th Pennsylvania Reserves. A savage struggle ensued over a Union battery, which eventually was left standing and silent between the two exhausted armies. Brig. Gen. James Kemper’s Virginia brigade then attacked on Jenkins’s right, breaking the 12th Pennsylvania Reserves and capturing some guns. Countercharges from the 5th, 8th, and 10th Pennsylvania Reserves forced the Confederates back,

N4084.indb 101

1/15/07 10:09:26 AM

102

Stop 11

but Branch’s and Pickett’s men (Pickett’s brigade commanded by Col. John Strange) broke the Yankees again. Wilcox’s brigade advanced on Jenkins’s left. The 9th and 10th Alabama regiments supported Jenkins, while the 8th and 11th Alabama engaged the 4th, 7th, and 11th Pennsylvania Reserves in another hand-to-hand, back-and-forth struggle for another Federal battery. Again, the guns ultimately remained silent between the two spent lines. Further to the left, Pryor and Featherston advanced to engage elements of Kearny’s division. With Longstreet’s division committed, A. P. Hill’s men formed the next wave. Archer’s and Pender’s men charged over the ground fought over by the brigades of Kemper, Branch, and Pickett. J. R. Anderson’s men drove along Long Bridge Road, and Gregg’s and Field’s brigades advanced to the left of the road. Field’s Virginians retook the Union batteries, but all of these attacks were stalled by Union reinforcements and darkness. Analysis

Lee’s plan hinged on Jackson and Huger at least keeping the forces in front of them occupied while Longstreet and A. P. Hill drove toward Willis Church Road with a numerical advantage. Neither Jackson nor Huger did the job, however, and Longstreet and Hill wound up fighting at a numerical disadvantage. Fighting as hard as any soldiers in the war, their men succeeded in pushing back and at times breaking the Federal front line. They simply did not have the manpower to exploit their advantage. Confederate problems were almost equaled by the Yankee line of battle, which put McCall’s exhausted division in the front lines. McCall’s men had fought hard at both Mechanicsville and Gaines’s Mill, losing nearly 2,000 men in those battles, and they had marched as hard as anyone else in the army. They should have formed the reserve, not the advance post. They fought as long as one could reasonably expect, and in many cases they did not break completely. Nevertheless, fresh troops might have been able to hold out longer. This mistake almost cost the Yankees the battle.

Vignette

Near the end of the battle, McCall rounded up some men in an attempt to retake several Union guns. As they rode ahead on Long Bridge Road, they encountered some soldiers. “What command is this?” McCall asked. “General Field’s, sir,” came the reply. “General Field! I don’t know him,” McCall said. “Perhaps not, as you are evidently in the wrong place,” answered Lt. W. Roy Mason of Field’s staff, promptly taking McCall prisoner—the highest-ranking general on either side to be captured during the Seven Days.

N4084.indb 102

1/15/07 10:09:26 AM

103


Further Reading

Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, 266 – 67, 275 – 85, 288– 97; Dowdey, The Seven Days, 298–303; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 293–99, 302– 6.

Major-General Benjamin Huger, C.S.A. From a photograph. blcw 2:212

N4084.indb 103

1/15/07 10:09:26 AM

104

Stop 12

STOP 12


Directions

Return to long bridge road, turning right out of the recreation center and proceeding straight through the intersection with carter’s mill road. As you drive, you will be traveling through the Glendale battlefield. At about 0.6 mile, a stone marker on the right will mark the approximate area of the Union artillery discussed in stop 11. After a total of about 1.1 miles from the recreation center you will reach darbytown road. Turn right on that road, and proceed 0.4 miles to the intersection of the charles city, darbytown, and willis church roads. This is the Glendale intersection. Turn right onto willis church road (Route 156), and proceed about 0.7 mile. On your left will be the Glendale–Malvern Hill Visitor Center of the Richmond National Battlefield Park and Glendale National Cemetery. Park there, get out of your car, and walk to a convenient point where you can see both north and west. Face west, toward willis church road.

Orientation

You are looking across toward what became the second and main Union line at the battle of Glendale. In this area, Hooker’s division was positioned west and southwest of Willis Church, which is on your left front. Brig. Gen. John Sedgwick’s division and elements of Richardson’s division eventually formed on your right front. The ground in 1862 was a bit more open than it is today, although as one moved west through the battlefield straight ahead the trees became thicker, more as they are now. The ground is rolling, with small streams coursing through the low areas. Unfortunately, this orientation, along with the drive along Long Bridge Road from stop 11 to this position, is as much as you can easily see of the battlefield at Glendale. Few major Civil War battlefields are in the condition of Glendale. Though most of the battlefield largely resembles its appearance in 1862, much of it is in private hands and inaccessible. The National Park Service does own land on the southern part of the battlefield and hopes to open access to it. Check with the National Park Service at the beginning of your tour, and if access is possible by all means take advantage of the opportunity to see part of one of the most important battlefields in the Civil War.

What Happened

Hooker attacked Strange’s men in the flank and forced them back. Sedgwick’s division, which originally had been in reserve at Glendale but moved to reinforce Franklin at White Oak Swamp, moved back to Glendale at the double-quick

N4084.indb 104

1/15/07 10:09:26 AM

105


when fighting started there. Sedgwick’s men advanced across the fields to your right to stop Branch’s advance. The Confederate brigades had come close to taking Willis Church Road but could not sustain their positions against the counterattacks. During A. P. Hill’s assault, some of Hooker’s men, particularly the 1st Massachusetts and 26th Pennsylvania, along with the 15th Massachusetts, battled Archer’s brigade to a standstill across the road and past Willis Church to your left front. Pender’s attack to your right front was stopped by Sedgwick’s force, particularly the 1st Minnesota and 72nd Pennsylvania. Anderson’s advance most likely was stopped by George Taylor’s New Jersey troops, who moved from Slocum’s line on Charles City Road to help stop the Rebels at Glendale. At the end of the day, the Confederates held McCall’s old positions and some guns, but little else had changed. In particular, Willis Church Road—the vital Union line of retreat—remained in Federal hands. That night, the Yankees withdrew south to Malvern Hill. Analysis

N4084.indb 105

Cooperation among the Union corps commanders in the area helped keep Glendale from becoming a Union defeat. Again, McClellan was not in the important area. No one was in overall command, but Sumner, Heintzelman, and Franklin did not stand on ceremony and worked well together. In particular, Franklin (once Jackson’s artillery barrage proved to be relatively harmless) released four brigades to reinforce the force at Glendale—Sedgwick’s and Richardson’s men. These brigades kept the battle from being a Union disaster by arriving just in time to stop the most serious breakthrough of the day by Branch and Strange. The day had cost the Northerners about 2,800 killed and wounded and the Southerners about 3,500. The Federals lost 16 guns in the battle. The importance of Glendale lies in what it could have accomplished. If Lee could have taken a position across Willis Church Road and held it, he could have seriously hurt or even destroyed more than three full army corps. He had set the situation beforehand as well as he could. He was let down in part by his choice of where to position himself—he stayed with Longstreet and A. P. Hill, only moving south to Holmes’s sector along River Road. He easily could have traveled north and checked with Huger or Jackson. Mostly, however, he was let down by the failings of others—and at least partially by the valor of the Army of the Potomac. The Confederate artillerist E. P. Alexander later wrote of his belief that “no one day of the whole four years would seem to [Lee] more unfortunate than June 30, 1862.”

1/15/07 10:09:26 AM

106

Stop 12

Vignette

As the 15th Massachusetts moved from White Oak Swamp to help hold the line at Glendale, it passed Edwin Sumner, who was helping to direct units near Glendale. When he saw the Bay Staters, Sumner shouted, “Go in, boys, for the honor of old Massachusetts! I have been hit twice this afternoon, but it is nothing when you get used to it.”

Further Reading

Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, 285 –97; Dowdey, The Seven Days, 293–303; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 293–306.

An orderly at headquarters. blcw 2:406

N4084.indb 106

1/15/07 10:09:27 AM

107

Overview of the Seventh Day

Overview of the Seventh Day, July 1, 1862 As Lee moved his army south toward Malvern Hill on the morning of July 1, he was confronted with a united Army of the Potomac, artillery and infantry at the ready. Lee decided to investigate before he attacked. Malvern Hill was a low hill when viewed from the north, but it was steep on the east, west, and south, and the northern approach was through cleared fields, giving guns of all sorts clear lines of sight in almost any direction. It was the most formidable position that Lee’s men had faced during the Seven Days, and the commander wanted to be sure there was a vulnerable place in the Union line before he ordered an advance. There were very few such places. Artillery was spread throughout the line, spaced far enough apart that the pieces could be oriented in several different directions easily. Infantry rested behind the frontline artillery, with larger guns in the rear. Navy gunboats were ready to add their fire if needed. The Confederate reconnaissance, conducted by Lee and Longstreet as the Rebels continued to arrive, showed the Yankees’ strength. But it seemed possible, if enough Confederate guns could be gathered, to bring a converging fire onto the top of the hill and force the Federals off it. They could then be attacked by infantry. The Southerners tried to gather the guns, but the Union artillery prevented the needed concentration by quickly knocking the guns out of action. Lee had also ordered the Southern infantry to charge when they heard a cheer from a forward-placed unit. Through a combination of unfortunate circumstances, some of Magruder’s troops charged the line, an unplanned cheer was raised, and D. H. Hill, hearing the yells, ordered his division to the attack. The result was a slaughterhouse. Successive Confederate brigades attacked without coordination, and the Union defense, well handled by Porter and Darius Couch of the infantry and Col. Henry Hunt of the Artillery Reserve (McClellan again being absent from the field most of the day), broke every assault relatively easily. Union reinforcements were summoned and arrived at the right place at the right time in every area of fighting. Only once did the Rebels get to the Union line, and then just briefly before they were thrown back. The battle continued until after dark, and the result was one of the most complete defeats suffered by any army in the war. Porter and others wanted to use the victory as a basis for attacking Richmond. But McClellan, worried about supplies

N4084.indb 107

1/15/07 10:09:27 AM

108

Overview of the Seventh Day

and burdened with the illusion of great Confederate numbers, ordered the Army of the Potomac to continue its march to Harrison’s Landing on the James River. The fighting of the Seven Days was over.

Repulse of the Confederates on the slop of Crew’s Hill. blcw 2:417

N4084.indb 108

1/15/07 10:09:27 AM

109


STOP 13


Directions

Proceed on willis church road south about 1.5 miles until you see the sign for the parsonage. You are following the path of Jackson’s men to Malvern Hill. Turn left into the parking area. Cross the road to the marker near the ruins of the Willis Church parsonage. Face southwest toward Malvern Hill.

Orientation

You are standing near the right of Stonewall Jackson’s line during the battle of Malvern Hill. The line stretched out to your left through the Poindexter farm. The Confederate artillery deployed to your left in the same field. D. H. Hill’s division took its place straight ahead of you and to your left front, and Magruder’s force was to your right across Carter’s Mill Road. The Union line was on top of the hill to your left front and straight ahead. The area is much as it was at the time of the battle, wooded to the right of Willis Church road and open to the left of it.

What Happened

Lee’s plan for July 1 was to bring Jackson’s, Magruder’s, and Huger’s relatively fresh troops to the front lines, probe for

N4084.indb 109

1/15/07 10:09:27 AM

110

Stop 13

a weak spot, and capitalize on it if found. Jackson marched down Willis Church Road. When his lead unit, Whiting’s division, reached the parsonage it began receiving shells from the Yankee artillery. At that point, Jackson received an order from Lee to mass artillery on his front. This was part of an effort, devised by Longstreet and Lee, to bring more than 100 cannon together on Magruder’s and Jackson’s front so as to place the Yankees under a converging fire. Success would mean the Northerners would need to withdraw. Jackson tried to do his part, eventually running parts of six batteries into the Poindexter field. However, these 20 guns were ineffective against the Union artillery already in place on Malvern Hill. They all had been withdrawn by the end of the day. As part of his plan to take advantage of any opportunities, Lee had ordered his generals to advance their units if they heard a yell from Brig. Gen. Lewis Armistead’s brigade, well advanced on the right side of the line. D. H. Hill and his brigade commanders were in conference when a yell was heard. Hill launched attacks from this general area toward the Union line on the east side of Willis Church Road. Those attacks were uniformly decimated by the Yankees, and Hill lost more than 1,700 men. Hill called for reinforcements, and Jackson sent Ewell’s division and his own division, now commanded by Brig. Gen. Charles Winder. Ewell sent Jubal Early’s brigade to support Hill but ordered it not to charge. The 6th, 7th, and 8th Louisiana of the brigade commanded by Col. Leroy Stafford, along with part of the 13th Georgia of Brig. Gen. Alexander Lawton’s brigade of Jackson’s division, got to within 20 paces of the Union line on Malvern Hill before they were stopped. Brig. Gen. Isaac Trimble’s brigade reached the field late and did not advance on the Federals. Winder’s own brigade fragmented during the advance, as did Lawton’s. Few of these troops actually charged the Northern line. None of the rest of Jackson’s men did either, although some took position on Malvern Hill late in the day. Analysis

N4084.indb 110

Malvern Hill has sometimes been characterized as a battle brought on by Lee’s frustration over his failure the day before. It is better described as a tragedy of errors. Lee was cautious. He did not order a general assault on the obviously strong position before him. He put his freshest troops in the front line, the best decision regardless of what would happen during the day. He agreed with Longstreet’s suggestion to attempt to shell the Yankees out of their position because if it didn’t work little would be lost. The resulting effort to con-

1/15/07 10:09:27 AM

111


centrate guns was bound to fail, but it probably was worth the attempt. Lee’s order to advance was to be followed only if the artillery achieved success. Unfortunately, the order was terribly crafted, relying as it did on a yell from Armistead’s advanced force—which could come for any reason. The yell came from other Confederates attempting an advance, and it triggered D. H. Hill’s attack. The rest of Jackson’s moves in this area were a result of Hill’s repulse, as Stonewall attempted to reinforce Hill. Vignette

Late in the day, Trimble readied his brigade to charge the Yankee line. Jackson happened to come by and asked, “What are you going to do, General Trimble?” Trimble responded, “I am going to charge those batteries, sir.” Stonewall looked at Trimble and said, “I guess you better not try it. General Hill just tried it with his whole division and has been repelled. I guess you better not try it, sir.” Jackson rode away, and one soldier wrote, “We were more than delighted.”

Further Reading

Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, 316 –19, 337– 40, 347– 48, 354 –56; Dowdey, The Seven Days, 327–30, 341; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 316 –20, 333–34.

Further Exploration

If you wish, this stop is a good place to embark on a walking tour of the Malvern Hill battlefield. The tour takes about 45 minutes. You can follow the order of the rest of the stops in this tour by heading to your right, or west, along the National Park Service trail. You will come to the sites of stops 14, 15a, 15b, and 15c in order, then follow the trail back to the parsonage area. Many National Park Service markers along the route will give you more detail about the battle. It is possible that by the time you use this guide the Park Service will have more trails open. If you have time, they will be well worth exploring.

N4084.indb 111

1/15/07 10:09:28 AM

112

Stop 14

STOP 14


Directions

Return to willis church road, and turn right, the way you came. Proceed 2.2 miles to the Glendale intersection. Turn left onto darbytown road, and proceed 0.5 mile to its junction with long bridge road. Turn left onto long bridge road, and proceed 1.1 miles to where carter’s mill road comes in from the left. Turn left onto carter’s mill road, and proceed 1.1 miles to the turnout on the right. Pull off at the turnout, and face southeast toward Malvern Hill. At the time this was written the National Park Service planned to build a small parking lot here. If it has been built, park in the lot, and walk to the cannon in the field straight ahead.

Orientation

You are standing in the area of Magruder’s attempted concentration of artillery. Magruder’s infantry formed in the areas to your left and right as well as straight ahead after advancing down Carter’s Mill Road from behind you. The front of the Union line was straight ahead and to your right front. The ground here appears much as it did at the time of the battle, although the area to your right front was open in 1862.

What Happened

Magruder was ordered by Lee to march to Malvern Hill via the Quaker Road. Unfortunately, although Lee’s map showed Willis Church Road as the Quaker Road, Magruder’s local guides identified a different road as the Quaker Road. By the time Magruder, Longstreet, and Lee identified the correct road and Magruder headed down Carter’s Mill Road, Armistead’s brigade and Brig. Gen. Ambrose Wright’s brigade, both of Huger’s division, had filed into position along the same road. To help concentrate the Rebel artillery, Longstreet worked to assemble guns near this spot. Only parts of three Confederate batteries got into action at the beginning of the battle, and they were quickly silenced by the Northern artillery. Then Armistead advanced the 14th, 38th, and 53rd Virginia, and Wright followed with his brigade. Armistead got close enough to observe Union movements easily, which is why Lee selected him to give the signal if the artillery concentration worked. Not only did the artillery concentration fail, but some Yankee movements were misinterpreted as a retreat. As a result, Lee ordered Magruder to move forward with his whole line, including Huger’s division. The first charges were made by Armistead’s men on the Union left-center. Then the 3rd and 4th Georgia, part of the 22nd Georgia, together with the 1st Louisiana of Wright’s brigade, and followed by Brig. Gen. William Mahone’s brigade, aimed at the far left of the Union posi-

N4084.indb 112

1/15/07 10:09:28 AM

113


tion. Then came the 16th and 24th Georgia, 2nd Louisiana, and 15th North Carolina of Howell Cobb’s brigade and the 9th and 57th Virginia of Armistead’s brigade. These units were either charging or firing at Yankees throughout the day, but they achieved no lasting success. Following this attack, Brig. Gen. Robert Toombs, Col. G. T. Anderson, Col. William Barksdale, Brig. Gen. Robert Ransom, Semmes, and Kershaw (in roughly that order) led their brigades to the charge from this general area. None succeeded, although some from Semmes’s 10th Louisiana reached the Union line. Only Wright, Mahone, and Ransom aimed more or less at a relatively vulnerable point in the Union line, near the Crew house, and their power was not enough to put the line in danger. Analysis

Magruder’s part in the battle of Malvern Hill was a fiasco, but it was not all his fault. Lee’s bad maps cost the Confederates again by sending Magruder off on a wrong road. Huger pouted because his units were being taken from his command. Lee ordered Magruder to attack when he should never have given that order. However, Magruder himself was partially responsible for that order by informing Lee of a Union retreat that had not occurred. The attacks started as simultaneous but quickly became a series of uncoordinated assaults as Magruder fed brigades into the attacking column. It is hard to see how even coordinated attacks could have broken the Federal line. Uncoordinated attacks had no chance.

Vignette

As Magruder’s men waited that afternoon, Major Brent decided to investigate the battlefield. Riding on ahead, he came to a knoll on which a sentry post had been established. Brent climbed a tree at the knoll, from which he had a panoramic view of the field, including the entire Union line. Figuring he’d seen enough, Brent climbed back down. The sentry standing there said, “I was very anxious about you, as the enemy’s sharpshooters are in the bottom just below, and I was half expecting to see you tumble out of the tree.” Brent remembered, “I would have preferred his warning before I climbed, to his expression of surprise that I had escaped.”

Further Reading

Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, 319 –20, 324 –37, 341–53; Dowdey, The Seven Days, 331–34, 336 – 43; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 320–25, 331–34.

N4084.indb 113

1/15/07 10:09:28 AM

114

Stop 15

STOP 15


Directions

Turn right from the turnout onto carter’s mill road. Proceed on carter’s mill road 0.4 mile to its junction with willis church road. Bear right onto willis church road going south, and continue for about 0.4 mile. Turn right into the parking area at the National Park Service exhibit. Walk to the area near the house to your left on the west side of the road. Continue to the right of the house, and proceed to the stone marker. Face down the hillside. Stop 15a The Union Left

Orientation

N4084.indb 114

You are standing near the site of the Crew house, a landmark during the battle (the current structure was built after the war), as well as the site of the northwest corner of the Union line. Sykes’s division held the line to your left rear, and Griffin’s brigade formed the front line to your right, supported by Martindale’s and Butterfield’s brigades. The attacks of Wright and Mahone came up the hillside straight ahead. Ransom’s attack came from your left. The other Confederate attacks

1/15/07 10:09:28 AM

115


were directed to your right. The 12th and 14th U.S. were positioned to your left rear during the latter part of the battle. At the time of the battle the area was open fields. What Happened

The Union regiments in this area for most of the battle were the 13th and 14th New York. These regiments received Wright’s and Mahone’s attack and stopped it after a moment’s wavering. The Confederates stayed in position down the slope all day, engaged in a firefight with the Yankees. Later in the day, Ransom’s men charged this part of the line. The New Yorkers were still there, and they were supported by the 12th and 14th U.S. of Col. Robert Buchanan’s brigade. The Regulars hit Ransom’s men in the flank, and the New Yorkers fired in their front, stopping the Southerners. That ended the combat in this area.

Analysis

The New Yorkers were not numerous, but they had an excellent position from which to fight—at the top of a relatively steep slope with open fields of fire. Wright and Mahone had relatively small forces on the attack, and Ransom faced not only the New Yorkers but flanking fire from Union regulars. A larger force earlier in the battle might have been able to dent the Union line, but reinforcements from Sykes’s division were available, making any permanent breakthrough very difficult. As might be expected, casualties were lopsided. The Confederates lost about 1,200 men, including almost 500 from Ransom’s brigade. The 14th New York, the primary defenders, lost 121.

Vignette

John W. Lash had enlisted in 1861 in what became Company C of the 16th Virginia. That regiment charged the Union left along with others in Mahone’s brigade. During the charge, Lash was hit, but the ball passed through a picture of his infant son (born in June) and did not cause a serious wound. After the battle, Lash wrote home that the boy should be renamed Malvern Hill in honor of the event. Malvern Hill Lash became a successful owner of furniture stores in Hampton and Newport News.

Further Reading

Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, 334 –35, 345 – 46, 348–50; Dowdey, The Seven Days, 339 – 40, 343; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 325, 332.

Further Exploration

If you wish, you may continue along the crest of the hill to your left to a spot that overlooks the low ground to the west of Malvern Hill. From this spot you can see the general area

N4084.indb 115

1/15/07 10:09:28 AM

116

Stop 15

Holmes occupied on June 30, and get an understanding of why Holmes could not have been expected to accomplish anything either on June 30 or July 1. Warren’s brigade and a battery were posted to your left front in the low ground on July 1. Stop 15b The Union Center Directions

Turn around and walk back the way you came. Stop by the artillery on the same side of willis church road. Face down the gentle slope to the north.

Orientation

You are standing at the left-center of the Union front line. Artillery was posted up front, and the infantry supports were behind you. The Confederate assaults on this part of the line came from your left front and from straight ahead. The ground in this area looks now much as it did in 1862, although the trees to your left front were not there. This is an excellent place from which to view the effects of the terrain on the battle of Malvern Hill.

What Happened

Griffin’s brigade, the front infantry line of the Union defense, supported two batteries in this area at the beginning of the day. These batteries, set up with spacing to allow the guns to face in any direction, fired on and broke up Longstreet’s attempted artillery concentration. They then focused on the Southern infantry. Armistead and Cobb attacked first and were stopped by the 9th Massachusetts, 4th Michigan, and 62nd Pennsylvania. The Yankees then were supported or replaced by the 16th Michigan, 12th New York, and 83rd Pennsylvania. These forces stopped Barksdale’s charge, and they were reinforced by the 2nd Maine, 22nd Massachusetts, and 1st Michigan of Martindale’s brigade as well as additional artillery. Fitz John Porter, in overall command of the Northern front line, asked Sumner and Heintzelman for more men, and Brig. Gen. Thomas Meagher’s Irish Brigade came to this part of the line. They met Semmes’s assault, and in a battle of Yankee and Rebel Irish units the 69th and 88th New York bested the 10th Louisiana. With that outcome the battle in this part of the line ended.

Analysis

In this area Malvern Hill is gentle and unbroken, at least in comparison to the Beaver Dam Creek and Gaines Mill battlefields. However, it was a better defensive battlefield than either of those fields, and it’s easy to see why from this vantage point. The artillery on the front line had clear fields of

N4084.indb 116

1/15/07 10:09:29 AM

117


fire over open fields from an elevated position. And since the Union guns typically had longer range than Confederate guns, the Yankee artillery could dominate the battlefield. In fact, some Southern charges were broken up simply by artillery fire. The artillery’s success was helped by its formation and by the actions of the Union infantry. Instead of forming wheel to wheel to maximize the number of guns, the Northern guns were placed much as you see them, so each could shift its angle of fire without endangering gunners manning another piece. A maximum of 38 guns held the north side of the line from your left to your right. This wide spacing didn’t allow for any more guns, but it was more effective than would have been a greater number of guns crowded into the line. These 38 guns were supported by others to your left and right rear, including siege guns. The Yankee infantry, in contrast to the battle at Glendale, mostly maintained discipline, staying behind the guns until ordered to charge and then retreating quickly behind them to give the artillery clear shots at enemy infantry. Another factor in the Union’s success at Malvern Hill was its field command. Henry Hunt, unlike any Confederate commander, had direct command of most of the Union batteries and thus could move guns without going through chains of command. The field commanders cooperated well throughout the battle, moving troops to beleaguered areas and replacing fought-out units quickly and without hesitation. Thus, fresh units were always ready to confront the repeated Rebel attacks. It should be noted that Union gunboats fired from their positions on the James River to your rear during the battle, but their effect was more negligible than is often thought. Most of the damage done by heavy guns came from the Union siege train, also to your rear, which was dragged up the southern slope of Malvern Hill. Casualties in this area also were in favor of the Union, although less so than on other parts of the field. Armistead and Cobb lost 800 men total, while Griffin’s three regiments posted here lost fewer than 400. Butterfield, Martindale, and Meagher lost about 700 total, but Barksdale and Semmes lost more than 500 in much briefer work. Vignette

N4084.indb 117

One of the regiments in the last charge on the Yankee left at Malvern Hill was the 10th Louisiana, a largely Irish regiment. The 10th’s commander was Lt. Col. Eugene Waggaman, a devout Catholic who had made confession to the regimental priest the night of June 30. The 10th charged at the double-

1/15/07 10:09:29 AM

118

Stop 15

quick, Waggaman at its head, and reached the Union cannon, where it ran into the 69th New York of the Union Irish Brigade. As the sons of Eire fought hand to hand, Waggaman reached the second Union line, with cries of “Kill him” and “Bayonet him” all around. Waggaman survived the battle but was captured with several other Louisianans. He also survived the war, living until 1897. Further Reading

Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, 335 –36, 344 – 45, 350–52; Dowdey, The Seven Days, 337–39, 343; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 324 –25, 331–32, 334. Stop 15c The Union Right

Directions

Continue walking along the trail across willis church road to the artillery positioned on the east side. Face, as before, straight down the slope.

Orientation

You are standing at the point of the Union line commanded by Darius Couch. Here the infantry was in front of the artillery, stretching from straight ahead to your right front. The Confederate attacks in this area came from your left front and from straight ahead. The ground looks much as it did in 1862. The West house, to your rear, was a battlefield landmark (the current structure was built after the war). Here the slope is a bit steeper than it is at stop 15b, which probably accounts for the difference in the way the lines were configured.

What Happened

Couch’s initial front line consisted of the 10th Massachusetts, 36th and 55th New York, and 93rd and 98th Pennsylvania. Other elements of his division formed a second line. Five batteries were in position just behind the infantry. D. H. Hill’s division attacked this area. Ripley’s brigade charged on the Yankee right, but the 102nd Pennsylvania came from the second line to help force the Rebels back. The brigades of Cols. John Gordon and C. C. Tew charged the center of this line but were stopped and then pushed back by the 10th Massachusetts; 36th, 65th, and 67th New York; and 31st and 61st Pennsylvania. Hill’s other two brigades made even less progress. Couch’s line was reinforced by Brig. Gen. John Caldwell’s brigade and parts of Brig. Gen. John Robinson’s brigade. Artillery also came forward to replace batteries that had been in action all day. Toombs’s Rebels headed toward this reinforced line but made little headway. Kershaw’s men also moved forward but couldn’t launch an attack. Daniel Sickles’s brigade

N4084.indb 118

1/15/07 10:09:29 AM

119


formed the final reinforcements to Couch, and it helped stop Stafford’s assault, the last one on this part of the Federal line. Analysis

Couch’s work at Malvern Hill was excellent. He handled his own men effectively and used the reinforcements given him well. The Union infantry and artillery, as on the other side of Willis Church Road, had an excellent position and used it to its fullest extent. Hill’s men didn’t stand a chance, given that they were outnumbered by their foe. Because of the continuous reinforcement of Couch and the fragmented nature of the rest of the advances against Couch’s front, no other attacks stood a chance either. Confederates here suffered far more than did Yankees. D. H. Hill lost more than 1,700 men. In Couch’s division total casualties were about 600.

Vignette

The 5th New Hampshire of Caldwell’s brigade came to Couch’s support with the rest of the brigade. For awhile it waited near the West house. Just as the regiment received the order to support a battery (not a particularly plum mission, normally), Confederate guns found its position. Lt. Thomas Livermore yelled out to his commander, “Captain, we might just as well go across under the fire as to lie here, for we shall get killed here; so let us go!” The captain ordered an advance at the double-quick to get his men away from the fire. “Shells flew all around us, and the wonder was that more were not hurt,” Livermore wrote years later.

Further Reading

Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, 338– 42, 352–56; Dowdey, The Seven Days, 340– 41, 343; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 325 –29, 333–34.

Optional Excursion

Although this is the last stop on the tour, if you have time you may wish to continue on to two other sites of some importance to the campaign, Malvern Cliff and Harrison’s Landing. To proceed to Malvern Cliff, return to willis church road. Turn right and proceed about 1.1 miles to just before its junction with new market road (Route 5). Turn into the parking area to the left, and then turn in this guide to optional excursion 3, Malvern Cliff. Directions from that point to optional excursion 4, Harrison’s Landing, are provided at the end of that stop in this guide. To proceed directly to Harrison’s Landing, return to willis church road. Turn right and proceed about 0.2 mile to its junction with carter’s mill road (Route 606). Continue straight onto carter’s mill road, and proceed about 2.7 miles

N4084.indb 119

1/15/07 10:09:29 AM

120

Stop 15

until its junction with new market road (Route 5). As you drive on carter’s mill road you will pass the positions of the II and III Corps on July 1 in the fields to your left. Turn left and follow Route 5 about 6.3 miles to herring creek road (first Route 640, then Route 633). Turn right and follow the signs to Berkeley Plantation. Park and turn to optional excursion 4, Harrison’s Landing.

Berdan’s Sharp-shooters (of Morrell’s Division) skirmishing in the Meadow Wheatfield. blcw 2:413

N4084.indb 120

1/15/07 10:09:29 AM

The Peninsula Campaign, July 2–August 26, 1862 Throughout the night of July 1 and early morning of July 2 the Army of the Potomac left its positions on and around Malvern Hill, headed for Harrison’s Landing. On July 2, a hard rain made the march of eight miles or so a miserable experience for almost every Union soldier, but the army did eventually set up camp by the end of the day. Lee chose not to follow McClellan with his entire army on July 2, although Stuart’s cavalry harassed the Federals’ retreat and scouted the roads past Harrison’s Landing. They found the Yankees at Harrison’s Landing, and they found that Evelington Heights (named for the Evelynton plantation owned by fiery secessionist Edmund Ruffin) commanded the Northern camps. Lee, meanwhile, had started Jackson, Longstreet, and A. P. Hill in pursuit of McClellan early on July 3, and later that day he put them on the road to the heights to try to trap the Union army. But Stuart had fired with his artillery on the Yankee positions. Quickly realizing what a sizable force on the heights could do, McClellan sent infantry to run Stuart off and take possession of the heights. By the time Lee got there, on July 4, he could do McClellan no damage. In a few days he withdrew his infantry, and the Seven Days really did come to an end. The Army of the Potomac stayed at Harrison’s Landing for more than a month. In that time, very little happened except many Federals became sick in the Tidewater Virginia summer and occasionally a scout and skirmish occurred. In mid-July, Lee began to move his troops north to deal with the Army of Virginia, a Union force composed of veterans of the Shenandoah and new recruits commanded by John Pope. In late July, Halleck, appointed general-in-chief earlier in the month, ordered McClellan to evacuate his sick and wounded. McClellan wanted to cross the James River and move on Petersburg, an important rail junction south of Richmond, but Halleck ordered the Army of the Potomac to return to its namesake river to work with Pope’s army. In early August, the Confederates heard of this order, and Lee moved the rest of his army north before McClellan even started moving from Harrison’s Landing to Fort Monroe in mid-August. By August 26 every member of the Army of the Potomac had embarked from Fort Monroe, and the Peninsula Campaign came to an official end. McClellan had not succeeded in his aim of ending the war at a stroke. Instead, the conflict would increase in severity and consequences far beyond his desires or dreams, becoming instead, in Lincoln’s words, the “remorseless revolutionary struggle” of history.

N4084.indb 121

1/15/07 10:09:29 AM

122

Secondary Tour

Secondary Tour: Stonewall Jackson in the Seven Days If you have a special interest in Stonewall Jackson or if you have more than one day, you might wish to follow this tour route, which basically follows Jackson from the planning of the campaign through July 1 and Malvern Hill. It starts at stop 1, Lee’s Headquarters, and includes the following stops: —Optional excursion 1, Polegreen Church; —Stop 4, Walnut Grove Church; —Stop 6, Cold Harbor; —Stop 7, Grapevine Bridge; —Stop 10, The Fizzle at White Oak Swamp; —Stop 13, Jackson at Malvern Hill. Directions are provided where necessary in the narrative.

A straggler on the line of march. blcw 2:515

N4084.indb 122

1/15/07 10:09:30 AM

123

Polegreen Church

OPTIONAL EXCURSION 1—POLEGREEN CHURCH Directions

If you choose to get out of your car, walk to the marker and face southwest, to the right of the Rural Point Road.

Orientation

You are standing in the area where Jackson’s men camped the night of June 26. Mechanicsville and Beaver Dam Creek are straight ahead. Jackson arrived at this point from the road behind you. Richard Ewell’s division came here from the road to your right front, which is the extension of the road from Meadow Bridges that A. P. Hill used to cross the Chickahominy River.

What Happened

Jackson arrived at Hundley’s Corner in the late afternoon of June 26, after a march during which his men were harassed by Union cavalry almost constantly. He was soon joined by Ewell, who had marched down a road closer to the Chickahominy and had turned east at Shady Grove Church. Gunfire could be heard from Hundley’s Corner, and Jackson weighed his options—march to the sound of the guns or stay in this position, to which he had been ordered by Lee. Jackson decided

N4084.indb 123

1/15/07 10:09:30 AM

124


to stay in his position, and his men did not march until early on the morning of June 27. Analysis

Stonewall Jackson’s men became known for quickly covering a lot of ground during the Valley campaign. Much of their marching in that campaign, however, had been on good roads. Their march to Richmond was over relatively bad roads that turned to mud in rainy periods. Jackson was slowed by the need to bring his men together after they straggled over miles of Virginia countryside. Even so, the rate of march wasn’t bad, but it was wishful thinking to expect Jackson to reach Hundley’s Corner early on June 26. Once Jackson’s advance reached Polegreen Church and Hundley’s Corner, he had to decide whether to stop or keep marching. His orders were to head toward Polegreen Church, turning Porter’s flank, whereupon D. H. Hill would move to Stonewall’s support. Then, Jackson and Hill would head toward Cold Harbor. The sound of firing in Jackson’s front could have been interpreted in two ways—as an indication of battle, which Lee did not expect and did not mention in his orders, or an indication of an action to delay the Rebel crossing of the Chickahominy. If Jackson chose to proceed toward the gunfire, he would face a march of at least 90 minutes, getting his advance in position about 6:30 p.m. Visibility at that hour would still be good, but the rest of his troops would not be in position until much later, probably too late to do any real damage to Porter. Jackson had not heard of any change of plans from Lee, so Stonewall was operating under his original orders, which specifically tasked him to turn the Beaver Dam Creek line. He therefore took the prudent action of halting at Hundley’s Corner. The worst decision of the entire day of June 26 was the decision—made by both Lee and Jackson—to not communicate with the other. Communication would not have been impossible; Stuart’s cavalry had men who could have made the ride, as did Lee. With proper communication, the events of June 26 might have been very different.

Vignette

Col. Bradley Johnson of the 1st Maryland Infantry reported to Jackson and Ewell that a firefight was underway with Union skirmishers located in a thicket. When Stonewall asked, “Why don’t you stop them?”, Johnson replied, “Can’t do it, sir, without charging them, or shelling the place.” “Well, sir,” Jackson persisted, “you must stop that firing; make them keep quiet!” Johnson took two cannon and shelled the offending Federals out of their position.

N4084.indb 124

1/15/07 10:09:30 AM

125

Polegreen Church

Further Reading

Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, 59 – 62, 75 –77; Dowdey, The Seven Days, 193–202; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 197–200.

To Return to the Main Proceed on rural point road 0.4 mile to the intersection of Tour or Proceed with pole green road and rural point road. Turn right on pole the Secondary Tour

N4084.indb 125

green road (Route 627). Proceed 0.4 mile until its intersection with lee davis road (Route 643). Turn left and proceed on lee davis road about 2.7 miles to the intersection with cold harbor road (Route 156). Turn right at the intersection, and in 0.1 mile turn right again into the Walnut Grove Baptist Church parking lot. Park and turn in this guide to stop 4, Walnut Grove Church.

1/15/07 10:09:30 AM

126


OPTIONAL EXCURSION 2—CONFUSION ON THE FARMS Directions

Face the area beyond washington street that lay in front of you as you drove to this stop.

Orientation

You are on the right end of the Union line south of the Chickahominy River. To your left are the remains of Redoubt 6, the anchor of the Union right. The remainder of the Union’s prepared positions stretched out farther to your left. Straight ahead, across the ravines, was the Garnett field and, farther in that direction, the left of Magruder’s line. Out of sight to your right rear is the Gouldin (sometimes known as Golding) house, a landmark during the Seven Days. This is an area of ravines, some with creeks flowing at the bottom, and the Northern line took full advantage of this terrain. The ground in 1862 was more open than it is today. Much of it was farmed fields, although trees stood in the ravines near the creeks.

What Happened

Most of the activity south of the river on June 26 –27 consisted of Confederate demonstrations and Union worrying.

N4084.indb 126

1/15/07 10:09:30 AM

127

Confusion on the Farms

However, on the evening of June 27 a demonstration became something more. Magruder ordered Robert Toombs to get information concerning the Federal lines by advancing a regiment, the 2nd Georgia. The Georgians moved on Winfield Hancock’s men of Smith’s division, posted just east of the Garnett field. The rest of Toombs’s brigade as well as the 4th and 6th Vermont of William Brooks’s brigade joined the fight, which lasted until dark. This engagement was called the battle of Garnett’s Farm. That night, the Federals moved back near Redoubt 6, the anchor of their prepared lines. The next morning, the 28th, they continued to move, as Smith’s division prepared to act as the Army of the Potomac’s rear guard. Brig. Gen. David Jones interpreted the movements as a retreat and opened with artillery. He also ordered an attack by Toombs, supported by G. T. Anderson’s brigade. Toombs countervailed that, however, and Anderson became the attacker. His men, specifically the 7th and 8th Georgia, charged parts of the 33rd and 77th New York and 49th Pennsylvania just southwest of Redoubt 6. No support from Toombs was forthcoming, however, and Anderson received an order to withdraw his regiments, ending the battle of Garnett’s and Gouldin’s Farm. Analysis

On June 27, Magruder had accomplished his mission of holding McClellan’s attention without provoking an attack. He did not need to send Toombs’s men out early that evening in an information-gathering mission that would almost certainly lead to a fight since information could have been gathered by a scout after dark. On June 28, a series of snafus led to Anderson’s attack. Jones misinterpreted a Federal movement, Toombs changed an order, and Magruder had orders from Lee not to attack an occupied position. It was confirmation of those orders that caused Anderson’s withdrawal, after an advance that never should have occurred.

Vignette

Pickets of the 49th Pennsylvania were forced back by the Confederate advance. One of them, Joe Robbins, described by a fellow soldier as “rather an old man,” began to retreat when Rebels shouted for him to surrender. He answered, “Surrender hell!” They yelled back that if he didn’t surrender they’d shoot at him, and he replied, “Shoot and be damned.” They did, but they missed.

Further Reading

Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, 143– 46, 168–73; Dowdey, The Seven Days, 263– 66; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 247, 258–59.

N4084.indb 127

1/15/07 10:09:31 AM

128


To Return to the Main Tour

N4084.indb 128

Make the left turn, and follow north washington street for 0.6 mile until its intersection with east washington street. The Union line of prepared positions was on your left as you drive. Turn left on east washington street and then turn left again immediately onto airport drive. Proceed 2.0 miles to old hanover road, where you turn right. In 0.1 mile, turn left onto grapevine road. Proceed on grapevine road 0.3 miles to the turnout on the right. Turn in this guide to stop 8, McClellan’s Headquarters.

1/15/07 10:09:31 AM

129

Malvern Cliff

OPTIONAL EXCURSION 3—MALVERN CLIFF Directions

Get out of your car and face northeast, to the left of Route 156 and toward Malvern Hill.

Orientation

You are at about the farthest point of Holmes’s advance down what was then known as River Road. Holmes’s artillery probably was in a wood to your left. The Federal position was along the ridge line straight ahead. The ground in 1862 was much as you see it today, except that Malvern Hill was open ground.

What Happened

Holmes’s role in Lee’s plan for June 30 was to do anything he could to disrupt the Union retreat. His men, mostly from the Confederate Department of North Carolina, had crossed the James River from Drewry’s Bluff on June 29, and they marched down River Road on the morning of June 30. Holmes met Lee near this intersection. Lee told Holmes to go ahead with plans to set up six rifled guns to shell the Union position, as he had seen the Yankee supply trains rolling along

N4084.indb 129

1/15/07 10:09:31 AM

130


the top of Malvern Hill and probably thought Holmes might create a bit of havoc at little cost. Holmes in fact was able to get only five guns in position. When he opened fire, he did so on a Union line containing more than 40 guns set up by Fitz John Porter in an elevated position. Supplementing that was fire from two of the Union navy’s gunboats. The result was predictable, although the Confederates kept up the fire for about an hour. That night, Holmes withdrew his men a couple of miles up River Road. He would advance again on July 1 but accomplish nothing. Analysis

Any idea that Holmes could have contributed positively to the Confederate cause from his position is eliminated by a glance at this terrain and a review of the numbers. He had about 7,000 men. He was facing more than 20,000 Northerners with eight times the number of guns. More than that, he literally was looking up at his enemy. Malvern Hill slopes sharply in this area, in contrast to its north end, and any move Holmes might make would be seen immediately and countered.

Vignette

Holmes, who was hard of hearing, was in a house when the engagement began. His artillery commander had succeeded in reforming some men after their initial panic under the shelling and was getting ready to report when Holmes emerged from the house, put his hand to his ear, and said, “I thought I heard firing.”

Further Reading

Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, 267–71; Dowdey, The Seven Days, 304 – 6; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 290–92.

Optional Excursion

If you have time, you may wish to visit Harrison’s Landing, the Army of the Potomac’s headquarters after the Seven Days. To do so, head southeast on new market road (Route 5). Proceed 8.5 miles to herring creek road (first Route 640, then Route 633). Follow the signs to Berkeley Plantation. Park and in this guide turn to optional excursion 4, Harrison’s Landing.

N4084.indb 130

1/15/07 10:09:31 AM

131


OPTIONAL EXCURSION 4—HARRISON’S LANDING Directions

After getting out of your car, walk past the plantation house, and stop anywhere on the grounds of Berkeley Plantation near the James River. Face away from the river.

Orientation

You are standing in what, in July and August 1862, was the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac after the Seven Days. To the right, the James River flows to the Atlantic Ocean. To the left, upriver, lies Bermuda Hundred, Drewry’s Bluff, and eventually Richmond. The army was camped throughout this area.

What Happened

McClellan picked Harrison’s Landing, as the plantation landing was called after its original owners, as the army’s safe haven on June 30. The first units reached it early on July 2, and the rest of the army, except for a small rear guard, also arrived that day. They had marched from Malvern Hill in a driving rainstorm. Jeb Stuart soon showed McClellan his vulnerability by shelling the camp with a solitary cannon on July 3 from Eve-

N4084.indb 131

1/15/07 10:09:31 AM

132


lington Heights, the area northeast of Harrison’s Landing that contained the Evelynton plantation of Southern firebrand and agricultural reformer Edmund Ruffin. The heights dominated the Harrison’s Landing position, and Stuart’s cannon made clear that Lee’s presence there would mean great trouble for the Yankees. However, McClellan acted quickly, driving Stuart from the heights and fortifying them. As a result, when Lee arrived on July 4, after resting on July 2 and marching on July 3, he could find no weak point. The campaign was over. For the next six weeks, the Federals made Harrison’s Landing and the surrounding area home. The hot Virginia summer took its toll on the army, and much sickness was reported. Meanwhile, Lee moved his army north to deal with the new threat of John Pope’s Army of Virginia. By midAugust the Army of the Potomac was evacuating the Peninsula, and the last units left on August 26. The Peninsula would not see Union soldiers in force again for nearly two years. Analysis

Harrison’s Landing actually was McClellan’s second choice, after Haxall’s Landing nearer to Malvern Hill, but the navy could not guarantee safety at Haxall’s. Harrison’s Landing was a good position from a supply standpoint, and once Evelington Heights was occupied the Federals were secure. Jeb Stuart helped the Yankees by firing at them harmlessly with one gun, instead of staying quiet and reporting the position’s strategic potential to Lee. McClellan had planned to occupy the heights in any event, however, so it is possible that this “missed opportunity” was really no opportunity. The Harrison’s Landing site would allow McClellan to cross the James River and move on Petersburg, the important rail junction south of Richmond. That plan was rejected by Halleck, but it was substantially the same plan that Grant eventually followed in June of 1864. Whether McClellan could have carried it through as Grant did, or even better, is a forever-unanswerable question.

Vignette

Baldy Smith arrived at Harrison’s Landing early in the afternoon of July 2, in the middle of the rainstorm, and found the ground there under water. He tried to walk his horse down a slope, but he slipped at the start, let go of the bridle, and slid to the bottom. “On reaching the bottom I looked up and saw my dejected horse with head down and a picture of woe,” Smith later remembered. He had no chance of getting back up the slope, but fortunately a soldier happened along and brought the horse to him.

N4084.indb 132

1/15/07 10:09:32 AM

133


Further Reading

Burton, Extraordinary Circumstances, 368– 69, 378– 84; Dowdey, The Seven Days, 347– 48, 350–52; Sears, To the Gates of Richmond, 337– 41.

Dummies and Quaker guns left in the works at Harrison’s Landing on the evacuation by the Army of the Potomac. From a sketch. blcw 2:428

N4084.indb 133

1/15/07 10:09:32 AM

Map of the Battle of Malvern Hill. blcw 2:412

N4084.indb 134

1/15/07 10:09:32 AM

Appendix A: EARLY PENINSULA CAMPAIGN ORDERS OF BATTLE Union Forces

ARMY OF THE POTOMAC (McClellan) II ARMY CORPS (Sumner)

Abbreviations: art: artillery bde: brigade

Sedgwick’s Division

gorman’s bde

burns’s bde

dana’s bde

bn: battalion

15 ma

69 pa

19 ma

co: company

ma s.s. (1st co)

71 pa

20 ma

s.s.: sharpshooters

1 mn

72 pa

7 mi

34 ny

106 pa

42 ny

82 ny artillery: 1 ri Light, Battery A; 1 ri Light, Battery B; 1 ri Light, Battery G; 1 U.S., Battery I Richardson’s Division

howard’s bde

meagher’s bde

french’s bde

5 nh

63 ny

52 ny

61 ny

69 ny

57 ny

64 ny

88 ny

66 ny

81 pa

53 pa

artillery: 1 ny Light, Battery B; 1 ny Light, Battery G; 2 ny, Battery A; 4 U.S., Batteries A and C corps cavalry: 8 il III ARMY CORPS (Heintzelman) Porter’s Division

1st bde (Martindale) 2nd bde (Morell) 3rd bde (Butterfield) 2 me

9 ma

12 ny

18 ma

4 mi

17 ny

22 ma

14 ny

44 ny

13 ny

62 pa

25 ny

16 mi 83 pa

ma s.s. (2nd co) artillery: 3 ma (C); 5 ma (E); 1 ri, Battery C; 5 U.S., Battery D sharpshooters: 1 u.s. cavalry: 8 pa, co a Hooker’s Division

1st bde (Grover)

2nd BDE (Taylor)

3rd BDE (Starr)

1 ma

70 ny

5 nj

11 ma

71 ny

6 nj

2 nh

72 ny

7 nj

26 pa

73 ny

8 nj

74 ny artillery: 1 ny, Battery D; 4 ny; 6 ny; 1 U.S., Battery H

N4084.indb 135

1/15/07 10:09:32 AM

136

Appendix A Hamilton’s Division

1st bde ( Jameson)

2nd BDE (Birney)

3rd BDE (Berry)

87 ny

3 me

2 mi

57 pa

4 me

3 mi

63 pa

38 ny

5 mi

105 pa

40 ny

37 ny

artillery: 1 nj, Battery B; 1 ri, Battery E; 2 U.S., Battery G corps cavalry: 3 pa V ARMY CORPS (Keyes) 1st Division (Couch)

peck’s bde

graham’s bde

briggs’s bde

55 ny

65 ny

7 ma

62 ny

67 ny

10 ma

93 pa

23 pa

36 ny

98 pa

31 pa

2 ri

102 pa

61 pa

artillery: 1 pa, Battery C; 1 pa, Battery D; 1 pa, Battery E; 1 pa, Battery H Smith’s Division

1st bde (Hancock)

2nd bde (Brooks)

3rd BDE (Davidson)

6 me

2 vt

7 me

43 ny

3 vt

33 ny

49 pa

4 vt

49 ny

5 wi

5 vt

77 ny

6 vt artillery: 1 ny, Battery E; 1 ny; 3 ny; 5 U.S., Battery F Casey’s Division

1st bde (Naglee)

2nd BDE (Keim)

3rd BDE (Palmer)

11 me

96 ny

81 ny

56 ny

85 pa

85 ny

100 ny

101 pa

92 ny

52 pa

103 pa

93 ny

104 pa

98 ny

artillery: 1 ny, Battery A; 1 ny, Battery H; 7 ny; 8 ny sykes’s regular bde 2 U.S. 3 U.S. 4 U.S. 6 U.S. 10 U.S. 11 U.S. 12 U.S.

N4084.indb 136

1/15/07 10:09:32 AM

137

Early Peninsula Campaign Orders of Battle

14 U.S. 17 U.S. 5 ny ARMY CAVALRY RESERVE (Cooke)

emory’s bde

blake’s bde

5 U.S.

1 U.S.

6 U.S.

8 pa

6 pa mcclellan dragoons artillery reserve (Hunt) 1 U.S., Battery E 1 U.S., Battery G 1 U.S., Battery K 2 U.S., Battery A 2 U.S., Battery B 2 U.S., Battery E 2 U.S., Battery M 3 U.S., Battery C 3 U.S., Battery F 3 U.S., Battery G 3 U.S., Battery K 3 U.S., Battery L 3 U.S., Battery M 4 U.S., Battery G 4 U.S., Battery K 5 U.S., Battery A 5 U.S., Battery I 5 U.S., Battery K 1 bn ny, Battery A 1 bn ny, Battery B 1 bn ny, Battery C 1 bn ny, Battery D 5 ny cavalry 9 ny siege train 1 ct Heavy art volunteer engineer bde (Woodbury) 15 ny 50 ny bn u.s. engineers (Duane)

N4084.indb 137

1/15/07 10:09:33 AM

138

Appendix A CONFEDERATE FORCES ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA ( Johnston) Left Wing (D. H. Hill)

rodes’s bde

early’s bde

rains’s bde

5 al

5 nc

13 al

6 al

23 nc

26 al

12 al

24 va

6 ga

12 ms

38 va

23 ga

King William (va) art

Jeff Davis (al) art

ward’s command (attached) 2 fl 2 ms bn crump’s command (Gloucester Point) 46 va 9 va Militia 21 va Militia 61 va Militia Eastern Shore co 3 va Cavalry (1 co) Mathews Light Dragoons 4 bn va Heavy art Mathews (va) art CENTER (Longstreet)

1st bde (A. P. Hill)

2nd bde (R. H. Anderson)

3rd bde (Pickett) 8 va

7 va

St. Paul’s (la) Foot Rifles 4 sc bn

11 va

5 sc

19 va

17 va

6 sc

28 va

Loudoun (va) art

Palmetto s.s. (sc)

Lynchburg (va) art

1 va

Fauquier (va) art 4th bde (Wilcox)

pryor’s bde

9 al

3 va

8 al

10 al

13 nc

14 al

11 al

14 nc

14 la

19 ms

Donaldsonville (la) art

Richmond Fayette (va) art

Richmond (va) Howitzers, 3rd co

N4084.indb 138

colston’s bde

18 va

1/15/07 10:09:33 AM

139

Early Peninsula Campaign Orders of Battle RIGHT WING (Magruder)

McLaws’ Division

semmes’s bde

griffith’s bde

kershaw’s bde

cobb’s bde

10 ga

1 la Zouave bn

2 sc

16 ga

5 la

13 ms

3 sc

24 ga

10 la

18 ms

7 sc

Cobb’s Legion (ga)

15 va

21 ms

8 sc

2 la

Noland’s va bn

1st co

Gracie’s al bn

17 ms

1 la bn

Richmond (va) Howitzers

Alexandria (va) art

15 nc

Williamsburg (va) art

Morris Louisa (va) art

Halifax (va) art division artillery: Peninsula (va); Manly’s North Carolina Battery; Pulaski (ga); Henrico (va) D. R. Jones’s Division

toombs’s bde

g.t. anderson’s bde

1 ga Regulars

7 ga

2 ga

8 ga

15 ga

9 ga

17 ga

11 ga

20 ga

1 ky RESERVE (Smith)

hood’s bde

hampton’s bde

whiting’s bde

18 ga

14 ga

4 al

1 tx

19 ga

2 ms

4 tx

16 nc

11 ms

5 tx

Hampton sc Legion

6 nc

Madison (la) art

Staunton (va) art Rowan (nc) art

s.r. anderson’s bde (attached) 1 tn 7 tn 14 tn Fredericksburg (va) art pettigrew’s bde (attached) 2 ar bn 35 ga 22 nc 47 va 1 md art

N4084.indb 139

1/15/07 10:09:33 AM

140

Appendix A

ewell’s command 17 va (1 co) 32 va (1 co) 52 va Militia 68 va Militia 115 va Militia carter’s command 10 bn va Heavy art Rambaut’s va Heavy art Bedford (va) art cavalry bde (Stuart) 1 va 3 va 4 va Jeff Davis ms Legion Wise’s va Legion Stuart Horse art ARTILLERY RESERVE (Pendleton)

pendleton’s corps 2nd co Richmond (va) Howitzers Hanover (va) art Albemarle (va) art Troup (ga) art James City (va) art Hampton (va) art Magruder (va) art walton’s corps Washington (la) bn, 1st co Washington (la) bn, 2nd co Washington (la) bn, 3rd co Washington (la) bn, 4th co

N4084.indb 140

1/15/07 10:09:33 AM

Appendix B: SEVEN DAYS ORDERS OF BATTLE Union Forces

ARMY OF THE POTOMAC (McClellan) II ARMY CORPS (Sumner)

Abbreviations: bde: brigade

1st Division (Richardson)

bn: battalion

1st bde (Caldwell)

2nd bde (Meagher)

3rd bde (French)

s.s.: sharpshooters

5 nh

29 ma

52 ny

co: company

7 ny

63 ny

57 ny

61 ny

69 ny

64 ny

81 pa

88 ny

66 ny

art: artillery

53 pa 2 de artillery: 1 ny Light, Battery B; 4 U.S., Batteries A and C 2nd Division (Sedgwick)

1st bde (Sully)

2nd bde (Burns)

3rd bde (Dana)

15 ma

69 pa

19 ma

1 mn

71 pa

20 ma

ma s.s. (1st co)

72 pa

7 mi

34 ny

106 pa

42 ny

82 ny Russell’s s.s. artillery: 1 ri Light, Battery A; 1 U.S., Battery I corps artillery: 1 ny Light, Battery G; 1 ri Light, Battery B; 1 ri Light, Battery G corps cavalry: 6 ny, cos D, F, H, and K III ARMY CORPS (Heintzelman) 2nd Division (Hooker)

1st bde (Grover)

2nd bde (Sickles)

3rd bde (Carr)

1 ma

70 ny

5 nj

11 ma

71 ny

6 nj

16 ma

72 ny

7 nj

2 nh

73 ny

8 nj

26 pa

74 ny

2 ny

artillery: 1 ny, Battery D; 4 ny; 1 U.S., Battery H 3rd Division (Kearny)

1st bde (Robinson)

2nd bde (Birney)

3rd bde (Berry)

20 in

3 me

2 mi

87 ny

4 me

3 mi

57 pa

38 ny

5 mi

63 pa

40 ny

1 ny

105 pa

101 ny

37 ny

artillery: 1 ri, Battery E (Randolph); 2 U.S., Battery G (Thompson)

N4084.indb 141

1/15/07 10:09:33 AM

142

Appendix B

corps artillery: 6 ny; 2 nj; 4 U.S., Battery K corps cavalry: 3 pa IV ARMY CORPS (Keyes) 1st Division (Couch)

1st bde (Howe)

2nd bde (Abercrombie)

3rd bde (Palmer)

55 ny

65 ny

7 ma

62 ny

67 ny

10 ma

93 pa

23 pa

36 ny

98 pa

31 pa

2 ri

102 pa

61 pa

artillery: 1 pa, Battery C; 1 pa, Battery D 2nd Division (Peck)

1st bde (Naglee)

2nd bde (Wessells)

11 me

81 ny

56 ny

85 ny

100 ny

92 ny

52 pa

96 ny

104 pa

98 ny 85 pa 101 pa 103 pa

artillery: 1 ny, Battery H; 7 ny corps artillery: 8 ny; 1 pa, Battery E; 1 pa, Battery H; 5 U.S., Battery M corps cavalry: 8 pa V ARMY CORPS (Porter) 1st Division (Morell)

1st bde (Martindale) 2nd bde (Griffin)

3rd bde (Butterfield)

2 me

9 ma

12 ny

18 ma

4 mi

17 ny

22 ma

14 ny

44 ny

1 mi

62 pa

16 mi

13 ny

Brady’s co mi s.s.

25 ny

83 pa

ma s.s. (2nd co) artillery: 3 ma (C); 5 ma (E); 1 ri, Battery C; 5 U.S., Battery D sharpshooters: 1 U.S.

N4084.indb 142

1/15/07 10:09:34 AM

143

Seven Days Orders of Battle 2nd Division (Sykes)

1st bde (Buchanan) 2nd bde (Lovell)

3rd bde (Warren)

3 U.S.

2 U.S.

5 ny

4 U.S.

6 U.S.

10 ny

12 U.S.

10 U.S.

14 U.S.

11 U.S. 17 U.S.

artillery: 3 U.S., Batteries L and M; 5 U.S., Battery I 3rd Division (McCall)

1st bde (Reynolds)

2nd bde (Meade)

3rd bde (Seymour)

1 pa Reserves

3 pa Reserves

6 pa Reserves

2 pa Reserves

4 pa Reserves

9 pa Reserves

5 pa Reserves

7 pa Reserves

10 pa Reserves

8 pa Reserves

11 pa Reserves

12 pa Reserves

13 pa Reserves (1 Rifles), cos A, B, D, E, F, K artillery: 1 pa, Battery A; 1 pa, Battery B; 1 pa, Battery G; 5 U.S., Battery C cavalry: 4 pa corps cavalry: 8 il ARTILLERY RESERVE (Hunt)

1st bde (Hays)

2nd bde (Getty)

3rd bde (Arndt)

2 U.S., Battery A

1 U.S., Battery E

1 bn ny, Battery A

2 U.S., Batteries B & L

1 U.S., Battery G

1 bn ny, Battery B

2 U.S., Battery M

1 U.S., Battery K

1 bn ny, Battery C

4 U.S., Battery G

1 bn ny, Battery D

3 U.S., Batteries C & G

5 U.S., Battery A 5 U.S., Battery K 4th bde (Petherbridge)

5th bde (Carlisle)

md, Battery A

2 U.S., Battery E

md, Battery B

3 U.S., Batteries F and K

siege train: 1 ct heavy art VI ARMY CORPS (Franklin) 1st Division (Slocum)

1st bde (Taylor)

2nd bde (Bartlett)

3rd bde (Newton)

1 nj

5 me

18 ny

2 nj

16 ny

31 ny

3 nj

27 ny

32 ny

4 nj

96 pa

95 pa

artillery: 1 ma (A); 1 nj; 2 U.S., Battery D

N4084.indb 143

1/15/07 10:09:34 AM

144

Appendix B 2nd Division (Smith)

1st bde (Hancock)

2nd bde (Brooks)

3rd bde (Davidson)

6 me

2 vt

7 me

43 ny

3 vt

20 ny

49 pa

4 vt

33 ny

5 wi

5 vt

49 ny

6 vt

77 ny

artillery: 1 ny, Battery E; 1 ny; 3 ny; 5 U.S., Battery F cavalry: 5 pa, cos I and K unattached cavalry: 1 ny ARMY CAVALRY RESERVE (Cooke)

6 pa 1 U.S., cos A, C, F, H 5 U.S., cos A, D, F, H, I 6 U.S. volunteer engineer bde (Woodbury) 15 ny 50 ny bn u.s. engineers troops at white house, va (Casey) 11 pa Cavalry, cos B, D, F, I, K 1 ny Light art, Battery F 93 ny, cos B, C, D, E, G, I troops at general headquarters McClellan Dragoons Sturges’ Rifles Oneida NY Cavalry 93 ny, cos A, F, H, K 2 U.S. Cavalry 4 U.S. Cavalry, cos A and E 8 U.S., cos F and G

CONFEDERATE FORCES ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA (Lee) JACKSON’S CORPS Whiting’s Division

1st bde (Hood)

3rd bde (Law)

18 ga

4 al

1 tx

2 ms

4 tx

11 ms

5 tx

6 nc

Hampton (sc) Legion artillery: Staunton (va); Rowan (nc)

N4084.indb 144

1/15/07 10:09:34 AM

145


Jackson’s Division

1st bde (Winder) 2nd bde (Cunningham)

3rd bde (Fulkerson) 4th bde (Lawton)

2 va

21 va

10 va

13 ga

4 va

42 va

23 va

26 ga

5 va

48 va

37 va

31 ga

27 va

1 va bn (Irish)

38 ga

33 va

Hampden (va) art

artillery: Danville (va)

60 ga (4th bn)

Allegheny (va) art

61 ga

Rockbridge (va) art Ewell’s Division

4th bde (Elzey)

7th bde (Trimble) 8th bde (Taylor)

md Line ( Johnson)

12 g a

15 al

6 la

1 md

13 va

21 ga

7 la

Baltimore (md) art

25 va

16 ms

8 la

31 va

21 nc

9 la

44 va

1 nc bn

1 la Special bn

52 va

Henrico (va) art

Charlottesville (va) art

58 va (D. H.) Hill’s Division

1st bde (Rodes)

2nd bde (G. B. Anderson) 3rd bde (Garland)

3 al

2 nc

5 nc

5 al

4 nc

12 nc

6 al

14 nc

13 nc

12 al

30 nc

20 nc

26 al 4th bde (Colquitt)

23 nc 5th bde (Ripley)

13 al

44 ga

6 ga

48 ga

23 ga

1 nc

27 ga

3 nc

28 ga artillery: Jeff Davis (al) art; King William (va) art; Hardaway’s (al) Battery; Hanover (va) art MAGRUDER’S CORPS 1st Division ( Jones)

1st bde (Toombs)

3rd bde (G. T. Anderson)

2 ga

1 ga Regulars

15 ga

7 ga

17 ga

8 ga

20 ga

9 ga 11 ga

artillery: Wise (va); Washington (sc); Madison (la); Dabney’s (va) Battery

N4084.indb 145

1/15/07 10:09:34 AM

146

Appendix B McLaws’ Division

1st bde (Semmes)

4th bde (Kershaw)

10 ga

2 sc

53 ga

3 sc

5 la

7 sc

10 la

8 sc

15 va

Alexandria (va) art

32 va Manly’s (nc) Battery Magruder’s Division

2nd bde (Cobb)

3rd bde (Griffith)

16 ga

13 ms

24 ga

17 ms

Cobb’s Legion (ga)

18 ms

2 la

21 ms

15 nc

1st co Richmond (va) Howitzers

Troup (ga) art artillery: Magruder (va); Pulaski (ga); James City (va) Longstreet’s Division

1st bde (Kemper)

2nd bde (R. H. Anderson)

3rd bde (Pickett)

1 va

2 sc Rifles

8 va

7 va

4 sc

18 va

11 va

5 sc

19 va

17 va

6 sc

28 va

24 va

Palmetto s.s. (art)

56 va

Loudoun (va) art 4th bde (Wilcox)

5th bde (Pryor)

6th bde (Featherston)

8 al

14 al

12 ms

9 al

2 fl

19 ms

10 al

14 la

2 ms bn

11 al

1 la bn

3rd co Richmond (va) Howitzers

Thomas (va) art

3 va Donaldsonville (la) art

artillery: 1st co Washington (la); 2nd co Washington (la); 3rd co Washington (la); 4th co Washington (la); Lynchburg (va); Dixie (va)

N4084.indb 146

1/15/07 10:09:34 AM

147

Seven Days Orders of Battle Huger’s Division

2nd bde (Mahone)

3rd bde (Wright)

4th bde (Armistead)

6 va

44 al

9 va

12 va

3 ga

14 va

16 va

4 ga

38 va

41 va

22 ga

53 va

49 va

1 la

57 va

Portsmouth

co D, va Light art

5 va bn

(va) art

Fauquier (va) art

Lynchburg

Goochland (va) art

Beauregard (va) art A. P. Hill’s (Light) Division

1st bde (Field) Anderson)

2nd bde (Gregg)

3rd bde ( J. R.

40 va

1 sc

14 ga

47 va

1 sc Rifles

35 ga

55 va

12 sc

45 ga

60 va

13 sc

49 ga

14 sc

3 la bn

4th bde (Branch)

5th bde (Archer)

6th bde (Pender)

7 nc

5 al bn

2 ar bn

18 nc

19 ga

16 nc

28 nc

1 tn

22 nc

33 nc

7 tn

34 nc

37 nc

14 tn

38 nc 22 va bn

artillery: 1st md Battery; Charleston (art) German Battery; Fredericksburg (va); Crenshaw’s (va) Battery; Letcher (va); Johnson’s (va) Battery; Masters’ (va) Battery; Pee Dee (sc); Purcell (va)

DEPARTMENT OF NORTH CAROLINA (Holmes)

2nd bde (Ransom)

3rd bde (Daniel)

4th bde (Walker)

24 nc

43 nc

3 ar

25 nc

45 nc

2 ga bn

26 nc

50 nc

27 nc

35 nc

Burroughs’ Cavalry bn

30 va

48 nc 49 nc

46 nc Goodwyn (cavalry)

artillery: Branch’s (va) Battery; Brem’s (nc) Battery; French’s (va) Battery; Graham’s (va) Battery; Grandy’s (va) Battery; Lloyd’s (nc) Battery

N4084.indb 147

1/15/07 10:09:35 AM

148

Appendix B

wise’s command 26 va 46 va 4 va Heavy art Andrews’ (al) Battery Armistead’s (va) Battery French’s (va) Battery Nelson (va) art

RESERVE ARTILLERY (Pendleton)

1 va (Brown) Williamsburg (va) Richmond Fayette (va) 2nd co Richmond (va) Howitzers jones’ bn Long Island (va) Orange Richmond (va) Rhett’s (sc) Battery nelson’s bn Fluvanna (va) Amherst (va) Morris (va) richardson’s bn Fluvanna (va) Milledge’s (ga) Battery Ashland (va) sumter (ga) bn (Cutts) co D co E co B co A Hamilton’s Battery cavalry (Stuart) 1 nc 1 va 3 va 4 va 5 va 9 va 10 va Critcher’s bn (va)

N4084.indb 148

1/15/07 10:09:35 AM

149


Cobb’s Legion (ga) Hampton Legion (sc) Jeff Davis Legion Stuart Horse art Chew’s (va) Battery

N4084.indb 149

1/15/07 10:09:35 AM

N4084.indb 150

1/15/07 10:09:35 AM

Appendix C: ORGANIZATION, WEAPONS, AND TACTICS You will get much more from your battlefield tour if you take a few minutes to become familiar with the following information and then refer to it as necessary. The Organization of Civil War Armies Following is a diagram of the typical organization and range of strength of a Civil War army: army (40,000–120,000 men)

corps

corps

corps

(10,000–30,000 men)

(10,000–30,000 men)

(10,000–30,000 men)

division

division

division

(3,000–8,000 men)

(3,000–8,000 men)

(3,000–8,000 men)

brigade

brigade

brigade

(1,500–3,000 men)

(1,500–3,000 men)

(1,500–3,000 men)

regiment

regiment

regiment

regiment

regiment

(300–800 men)

(300–800 men)

(300–800 men)

(300–800 men)

(300–800 men)

The Basic Battlefield Functions of Civil War Leaders In combat environments the duties of Civil War leaders were divided into two main parts: decision making and moral suasion. Although the scope of the decisions varied according to rank and responsibilities, they generally dealt with the movement and deployment of troops, artillery, and logistical support (signal detachments, wagon trains, and so on). Most of the decisions were made by the leaders themselves. Their staffs helped with administrative paperwork but in combat functioned essentially as glorified clerks; they did almost no sifting of intelligence or planning of operations. Once made, the decisions were transmitted to subordinates either by direct exchange or by courier, with the courier either carrying a written order or conveying the order verbally. More rarely, signal flags were used to send instructions. Except in siege operations, when the battle lines were fairly static, the telegraph was almost never used in tactical situations. Moral suasion was the art of persuading troops to perform their duties and dissuading them from failing to perform them. Civil War commanders often accomplished this by personal example, and conspicuous bravery was a vital

N4084.indb 151

1/15/07 10:09:35 AM

152

Appendix C

attribute of any good leader. It is therefore not surprising that 8 percent of Union generals—and 18 percent of their Confederate counterparts—were killed or mortally wounded in action. (By contrast, only about 3 percent of Union enlisted men were killed or mortally wounded in action.) Although any commander might be called upon to intervene directly on the firing line, army, corps, and division commanders tended to lead from behind the battle line, and their duties were mainly supervisory. In all three cases their main ability to influence the fighting, once it was underway, was by the husbanding and judicious commitment of troops held in reserve. Army commanders principally decided the broad questions— whether to attack or defend, where the army’s main effort(s) would be made, and when to retreat (or pursue). They made most of their key choices before and after an engagement rather than during it. Once battle was actually joined, their ability to influence the outcome diminished considerably. They might choose to wait it out or they might choose, temporarily and informally, to exercise the function of a lesser leader. In the battles of the Civil War, army commanders conducted themselves in a variety of ways: as detached observers, “super” corps commanders, division commanders, and so on, all the way down to de facto colonels trying to lead through personal example. Corps commanders chiefly directed main attacks or supervised the defense of large, usually well-defined sectors. It was their function to carry out the broad (or occasionally quite specific) wishes of the army commander. They coordinated all the elements of their corps (typically infantry divisions and artillery battalions) in order to maximize its offensive or defensive strength. Once battle was actually joined, they influenced the outcome by “feeding” additional troops into the fight—sometimes by preserving a reserve force (usually a division) and committing it at the appropriate moment, sometimes by requesting additional support from adjacent corps or from the army commander. Division commanders essentially had the same functions as corps commanders, though on a smaller scale. When attacking, however, their emphasis was less on “feeding” a fight than on keeping the striking power of their divisions as compact as possible. The idea was to strike one hard blow rather than a series of weaker ones. The following commanders were expected to control the actual combat—to close with and destroy the enemy: Brigade commanders principally conducted the actual business of attacking or defending. They accompanied the attack-

N4084.indb 152

1/15/07 10:09:35 AM

153


ing force in person or stayed on the firing line with the defenders. Typically, they placed about three of their regiments abreast of one another, with about two in immediate support. Their job was basically to maximize the fighting power of their brigades by ensuring that these regiments had an unobstructed field of fire and did not overlap. During an attack it often became necessary to expand, contract, or otherwise modify the brigade frontage to adapt to the vagaries of terrain, the movements of adjacent friendly brigades, or the behavior of enemy forces. It was the brigade commander’s responsibility to shift his regiments as needed while preserving, if possible, the unified striking power of the brigade. Regiment commanders were chiefly responsible for making their men do as the brigade commanders wished, and their independent authority on the battlefield was limited. For example, if defending they might order a limited counterattack, but they usually could not order a retreat without approval from higher authority. Assisted by company commanders, they directly supervised the soldiers, giving specific, highly concrete commands: move this way or that, hold your ground, fire by volley, forward, and so on. Commanders at this level were expected to lead by personal example and to display as well as demand strict adherence to duty. Civil War Tactics Civil War armies basically had three kinds of combat troops: infantry, cavalry, and artillery. Infantrymen fought on foot, each with his own weapon. Cavalrymen were trained to fight on horseback or dismounted, also with their own individual weapons. Artillerymen fought with cannon.

infantry Infantry were by far the most numerous part of a Civil War army and were chiefly responsible for seizing and holding ground. The basic Civil War tactic was to put a lot of men next to one another in a line and have them move and shoot together. By present-day standards the notion of placing troops shoulder to shoulder seems insane, but it still made good sense in the mid-nineteenth century. There were two reasons for this: first, it allowed soldiers to concentrate the fire of their rather limited weapons; second, it was almost the only way to move troops effectively under fire. Most Civil War infantrymen used muzzle-loading muskets capable of being loaded and fired a maximum of about three times a minute. Individually, therefore, a soldier was nothing. He could affect the battlefield only by combining

N4084.indb 153

1/15/07 10:09:35 AM

154

Appendix C

his fire with that of other infantrymen. Although spreading out made them less vulnerable, infantrymen very quickly lost the ability to combine their fire effectively if they did so. Even more critically, their officers rapidly lost the ability to control them. For most purposes, the smallest tactical unit on a Civil War battlefield was the regiment. Theoretically composed of about 1,000 officers and men, in reality the average Civil War regiment went into battle with about 300 to 600 men. Whatever its size, however, all members of the regiment had to be able to understand and carry out the orders of their colonel and subordinate officers, who generally could communicate only through voice command. Since in the din and confusion of battle only a few soldiers could actually hear any given command, most got the message chiefly by conforming to the movements of the men immediately around them. Maintaining “touch of elbows”—the prescribed close interval—was indispensable for this crude but vital system to work. In addition, infantrymen were trained to “follow the flag”—the unit and national colors were always conspicuously placed in the front and center of each regiment. Thus, when in doubt as to what maneuver the regiment was trying to carry out, soldiers could look to see the direction in which the colors were moving. That is one major reason why the post of color-bearer was habitually given to the bravest men in the unit. It was not just an honor; it was insurance that the colors would always move in the direction desired by the colonel. En route to a battle area, regiments typically moved in a column formation, four men abreast. There was a simple maneuver whereby regiments could very rapidly change from column to line once in the battle area, that is, from a formation designed for ease of movement to one designed to maximize firepower. Regiments normally moved and fought in line of battle—a close-order formation actually composed of two lines, front and rear. Attacking units rarely “charged” in the sense of running full tilt toward the enemy; such a maneuver would promptly destroy the formation as faster men outstripped slower ones and everyone spread out. Instead, a regiment using orthodox tactics would typically step off on an attack moving at a “quick time” rate of 110 steps per minute (at which it would cover about 85 yards per minute). Once the force came under serious fire, the rate of advance might be increased to a so-called double-quick time of 165 steps per minute (about 150 yards per minute). Only when the regiment was within a few dozen yards of the defending line would the regiment be ordered to advance at a “run” (a

N4084.indb 154

1/15/07 10:09:35 AM

155


very rapid pace but still not a sprint). Thus, a regiment might easily take about ten minutes to “charge” 1,000 yards, even if it did not pause for realignment or execute any further maneuvers en route. In theory, an attacking unit would not stop until it reached the enemy line, if then. The idea was to force back the defenders through the size, momentum, and shock effect of the attacking column. (Fixed bayonets were considered indispensable for maximizing the desired shock effect.) In reality, however, the firepower of the defense eventually led most Civil War regiments to stop and return the fire— often at ranges of less than 100 yards. And very often the “charge” would turn into a stand-up firefight at murderously short range until one side or the other gave way. It is important to bear in mind that the preceding description represents a simplified idea of Civil War infantry combat. As you will see as you visit specific stops, the reality could vary significantly. artillery Second in importance to infantry on most Civil War battlefields was the artillery. Not yet the “killing arm” it would become during World War I, when 70 percent of all casualties would be inflicted by shellfire, artillery nevertheless played an important role, particularly on the defense. Cannon fire could break up an infantry attack or dissuade enemy infantry from attacking in the first place. Its mere presence could also reassure friendly infantry and so exert a moral effect that might be as important as its physical effect on the enemy. The basic artillery unit was the battery, a group of between four and six fieldpieces commanded by a captain. Early in the war, batteries tended to be attached to infantry brigades. But over time it was found that they worked best when massed together, and both the Union and Confederate armies quickly reorganized their artillery to facilitate this. Eventually, both sides maintained extensive concentrations of artillery at corps level or higher. Coordinating the fire of 20 or 30 guns on a single target was not unusual, and occasionally (as in the bombardment that preceded Pickett’s Charge at Gettysburg) concentrations of well over 100 guns might be achieved. Practically all Civil War fieldpieces were muzzle-loaded and superficially appeared little changed from their counterparts of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In fact, however, Civil War artillery was quite modern in two respects. First, advances in metallurgy had resulted in cannon barrels that were much lighter than their predecessors

N4084.indb 155

1/15/07 10:09:36 AM

156

Appendix C

but strong enough to contain more powerful charges. Thus, whereas the typical fieldpiece of the Napoleonic era fired a 6-pound round, the typical Civil War– era fieldpiece fired a round double that size, with no loss in ease of handling. Second, recent improvements had resulted in the development of practical rifled fieldpieces that had significantly greater range and accuracy than their smoothbore counterparts. Civil War fieldpieces could fire a variety of shell types, each with its own preferred usage. Solid shot was considered best for battering down structures and for use against massed troops (a single round could sometimes knock down several men like ten pins). Shell—hollow rounds that contained an explosive charge and burst into fragments when touched off by a time fuse—were used to set buildings afire or to attack troops behind earthworks or under cover. Spherical case was similar to shell except that each round contained musket balls (78 in a 12-pound shot, 38 in a 6-pound shot); it was used against bodies of troops moving in the open at ranges of from 500 to 1,500 yards. At ranges of below 500 yards, the round of choice was canister, essentially a metal can containing about 27 cast-iron balls, each 1.5 inches in diameter. As soon as a canister round was fired, the sides of the can would rip away and the cast-iron balls would fly directly into the attacking infantry or ricochet into them off the ground, making the cannon essentially a large-scale shotgun. In desperate situations, double and sometimes even triple charges of canister were used. As recently as the Mexican War, artillery had been used effectively on the offensive, with fieldpieces rolling forward to advanced positions from which they could blast a hole in the enemy line. The advent of the rifled musket, however, made this tactic dangerous— defending infantry could now pick off artillerists who dared to come so close—and so the artillery had to remain farther back. In theory, the greater range and accuracy of rifled cannon might have offset this a bit, but rifled cannon fired comparatively small shells of limited effectiveness against infantry at a distance. The preferred use of artillery on the offensive was therefore not against infantry but against other artillery—what was termed “counterbattery work.” The idea was to mass one’s own cannon against a few of the enemy’s cannon and systematically fire so as to kill the enemy’s artillerists and dismount his fieldpieces. cavalry “Whoever saw a dead cavalryman?” was a byword among Civil War soldiers, a pointed allusion to the fact that the battlefield role played by the mounted arm was often negligible.

N4084.indb 156

1/15/07 10:09:36 AM

157


For example, at the battle of Antietam—the single bloodiest day of the entire war—the Union cavalry suffered exactly 5 men killed and 23 wounded. This was in sharp contrast to the role played by horsemen during the Napoleonic era, when a well-timed cavalry charge could exploit an infantry breakthrough, overrun the enemy’s retreating foot soldiers, and convert a temporary advantage into a complete battlefield triumph. Why the failure to use cavalry to better tactical advantage? The best single explanation might be that for much of the war there was simply not enough of it to achieve significant results. Whereas cavalry had comprised 20 to 25 percent of Napoleonic armies, in Civil War armies it generally averaged 8 to 10 percent or less. The paucity of cavalry may be explained in turn by its much greater expense compared with infantry. A single horse might easily cost ten times the monthly pay of a Civil War private and necessitated the purchase of saddles, bridles, stirrups, and other gear as well as specialized clothing and equipment for the rider. Moreover, horses required about 26 pounds of feed and forage per day, many times the requirement of an infantryman. One might add to this the continual need for remounts to replace worn-out animals and that it took far more training to make an effective cavalryman than an effective infantryman. There was also the widespread belief that the heavily wooded terrain of North America would limit opportunities to use cavalry on the battlefield. All in all, it is perhaps no wonder that Civil War armies were late in creating really powerful mounted arms. Instead, cavalry tended to be used mainly for scouting and raiding, duties that took place away from the main battlefields. During major engagements their mission was principally to screen the flanks or to control the rear areas. By 1863, however, the North was beginning to create cavalry forces sufficiently numerous and well armed to play a significant role on the battlefield. At Gettysburg, for example, Union cavalrymen armed with rapid-fire, breech-loading carbines were able to hold a Confederate infantry division at bay for several hours. At Cedar Creek in 1864, a massed cavalry charge late in the day completed the ruin of the Confederate army, and during the Appomattox campaign in 1865, Federal cavalry played a decisive role in bringing Lee’s retreating army to bay and forcing its surrender. Appreciation of the Terrain The whole point of a battlefield tour is to see the ground over which men actually fought. Understanding the terrain is basic to understanding almost every aspect of a battle. Ter-

N4084.indb 157

1/15/07 10:09:36 AM

158

Appendix C

rain helps to explain why commanders deployed their troops where they did, why attacks occurred in certain areas and not in others, and why some attacks succeeded and others did not. When defending, Civil War leaders often looked for positions that had as many of the following characteristics as possible: First, it obviously had to be ground from which they could protect whatever it was they were ordered to defend. Second, it should be elevated enough so as to provide good observation and good fields of fire—they wanted to see as far as possible and sometimes (though not always) to shoot as far as possible. The highest ground was not necessarily the best, however, for it often afforded an attacker defilade—areas of lower ground that the defenders’ weapons could not reach. For that reason, leaders seldom placed their troops at the very top of a ridge or hill (the “geographical crest”). Instead, they placed them a bit forward of the geographical crest at a point from which they had the best field of fire (the “military crest”). Alternatively, they might choose to place their troops behind the crest so as to conceal their size and exact deployment from the enemy and gain protection from long-range fire. It also meant that an attacker, upon reaching the crest, would be silhouetted against the sky and susceptible to a sudden, potentially destructive fire at close range. Third, the ground adjacent to the chosen position should present a potential attacker with obstacles. Streams and ravines made good obstructions because they required an attacker to halt temporarily while trying to cross them. Fences and boulder fields could also slow an attacker. Dense woodlands could do the same but offered concealment for potential attackers and were therefore less desirable. In addition to its other virtues, elevated ground was also prized because attackers moving uphill had to exert themselves more and got tired faster. Obstacles were especially critical at the ends of a unit’s position—the flanks—if there were no other units beyond to protect it. That is why commanders “anchored” their flanks, whenever possible, on hills or the banks of large streams. Fourth, the terrain must offer ease of access for reinforcements to arrive and, if necessary, for the defenders to retreat. Fifth, a source of drinkable water—the more the better—should be immediately behind the position if possible. This was especially important for cavalry and artillery units, which had horses to think about as well as men. When attacking, Civil War commanders looked for different things: First, they looked for weaknesses in the enemy’s position, especially “unanchored” flanks. If there were no obvious weaknesses, they

N4084.indb 158

1/15/07 10:09:36 AM

159


looked for a key point in the enemy’s position— often a piece of elevated ground whose loss would undermine the rest of the enemy’s defensive line. Second, they searched for ways to get close to the enemy position without being observed. Using woodlands and ridge lines to screen their movements was a common tactic. Third, they looked for open, elevated ground on which they could deploy artillery to “soften up” the point to be attacked. Fourth, once the attack was underway they tried, when possible, to find areas of defilade in which their troops could gain relief from exposure to enemy fire. Obviously, it was almost never possible to find defilade that offered protection all the way to the enemy line, but leaders could often find some point en route where they could pause briefly to “dress” their lines. Making the best use of terrain was an art that almost always involved trade-offs among these various factors—and also required consideration of the number of troops available. Even a very strong position was vulnerable if there were not enough men to defend it. A common error among Civil War generals, for example, was to stretch their line too thin in order to hold an otherwise desirable piece of ground. Estimating Distance When touring Civil War battlefields, it is often helpful to have a general sense of distance. For example, estimating distance can help you estimate how long it took troops to get from point A to point B or to visualize the points at which they would have become vulnerable to different kinds of artillery fire. There are several easy tricks to bear in mind:

Use reference points for which the exact distance is known. Many battlefield stops give you the exact distance to one or more key points in the area. Locate such a reference point, and then try to divide the intervening terrain into equal parts. For instance, say the reference point is 800 yards away. The ground about halfway in between will be 400 yards; the ground halfway between yourself and the midway point will be 200 yards, and so on. Use the football field method. Visualize the length of a football field, which of course is about 100 yards. Then estimate the number of football fields you could put between yourself and the distant point of interest. Use cars, houses, and other common objects that tend to be roughly the same size. Most cars are about the same size, and so are many houses. Become familiar with how large or small such objects appear at various distances—300 yards, 1,000 yards, 2,000 yards, and such. This is a less accurate way of estimating distance, but it can be helpful if the lay of the land makes it otherwise hard to tell

N4084.indb 159

1/15/07 10:09:36 AM

160

Appendix C

whether a point is near or far. Look for such objects that seem a bit in front of the point of interest. Their relative size can provide a useful clue.

Maximum Effective Ranges of Common Civil War Weapons Rifled musket 400 yds. Smoothbore musket 150 yds. Breech-loading carbine 300 yds. Napoleon 12-pounder smoothbore cannon Solid shot 1,700 yds. Shell 1,300 yds. Spherical case 500–1,500 yds. Canister 400 yds. Parrott 10-pounder rifled cannon Solid shot 6,000 yds. 3-inch ordnance rifle (cannon) Solid shot 4,000 yds.

Further Reading Coggins, Jack. Arms and Equipment of the Civil War. 1962; reprint, Wilmington NC: Broadfoot, 1990. The best introduction to the subject: engagingly written, profusely illustrated, and packed with information. Griffith, Paddy. Battle Tactics of the Civil War. New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1989. Argues that in a tactical sense, the Civil War was more nearly the last great Napoleonic war than the first modern war. In Griffith’s view the influence of the rifled musket on Civil War battlefields has been exaggerated; the carnage and inconclusiveness of many Civil War battles owed less to the inadequacy of Napoleonic tactics than to a failure to properly understand and apply them. Jamieson, Perry D. Crossing the Deadly Ground: United States Army Tactics, 1865 –1899. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1994. The early chapters offer a good analysis of the tactical lessons learned by U.S. Army officers from their Civil War experiences. Linderman, Gerald F. Embattled Courage: The Experience of Combat in the American Civil War. New York: Free Press, 1987. This thoughtful, well-written study examines how Civil War soldiers understood and coped with the challenges of the battlefield. McWhiney, Grady, and Perry D. Jamieson. Attack and Die: Civil War Military Tactics and the Southern Heritage. Tuscaloosa:

N4084.indb 160

1/15/07 10:09:36 AM

161


University of Alabama Press, 1982. Although unconvincing in its assertion that their Celtic heritage led Southerners to take the offensive to an inordinate degree, this is an excellent tactical study that emphasizes the revolutionary effect of the rifled musket. Best read in combination with Griffith’s Battle Tactics.

Feeling the enemy. From a war-time sketch. blcw 3:224

N4084.indb 161

1/15/07 10:09:37 AM

Inspection. From a war-time sketch. blcw 2:153

N4084.indb 162

1/15/07 10:09:37 AM

Sources In general, the works cited in the “For Further Reading” sections of each stop provide information, interpretation, and insight. The citations of those works in that section should in every case be taken as an attribution of credit for the material presented there. The sources for specific items in each stop are provided in this appendix.

EARLY PENINSULA CAMPAIGN

Stop 2

The quotation in the vignette is from Richard Wheeler, Sword over Richmond: An Eyewitness History of McClellan’s Peninsula Campaign (New York: Fairfax Press, 1986), 118–19.

Stop 5

The quotations in the vignette are from William F. Smith, Autobiography of Major General William F. Smith 1861–1864, ed. Herbert M. Schiller (Dayton OH: Morningside, 1990), 34 –35.

Stop 9

The quotation in the vignette is from Charles S. Wainwright, A Diary of Battle: The Personal Journals of Colonel Charles S. Wainwright, 1861–1865, ed. Allan Nevins (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1962), 47–52.


The quotation in the vignette is from Edmund Ruffin, The Diary of Edmund Ruffin, Volume 2: The Years of Hope, April, 1861– June, 1863, ed. William K. Scarborough (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press), 269 –70.


The quotations in the vignette are from George B. McClellan, McClellan’s Own Story (New York: Charles L. Webster, 1887), 309 –10.


The quotation in the vignette is from William I. Clopton, “New Light on the Great Drewry’s Bluff Fight,” Southern Historical Society Papers 34 (1906): 94.

SEVEN DAYS

Stop 1

The quotation in the vignette is from Daniel H. Hill, “Lee’s Attacks North of the Chickahominy,” in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, 2:347.

Stop 2

The quotation in the vignette is from Joseph L. Brent, Memoirs of the War Between the States (N.p.: Privately printed, 1940), 160– 62.

N4084.indb 163

1/15/07 10:09:37 AM

164

Sources

Stop 4

The description and quotation in the vignette are from Stephen Sears, To the Gates of Richmond (New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1992), 218.

Stop 5a

The quotation in the vignette is from the Prince de Joinville, The Army of the Potomac: Its Organization, Its Commander, and Its Campaign (New York: Anson D. F. Randolph, 1862).

Stop 5b

The quotation in the vignette is from Robert H. Miller, “Letters of Lieutenant Robert H. Miller to His Family, 1861–1862” (ed. Forrest P. Connor), Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, January 1962, 88.

Stop 5c

The quotation in the vignette is from Val C. Giles, Rags and Hope: The Recollections of Val C. Giles, ed. Mary Laswell (New York: Coward-McCann, 1961), 111.

Stop 6

The story in the vignette is from Newton M. Curtis, From Bull Run to Chancellorsville (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1906), 120–26.

Stop 9

The quotation in the vignette is from Rev. J. J. Marks, D.D., The Peninsular Campaign in Virginia, or Incidents and Scenes on the Battle-fields and in Richmond (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1864), 248.

Stop 10

The quotation in the vignette is from Charles Marshall, An Aide-de-Camp of Lee, ed. Sir Frederick Maurice (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1927), 112.

Stop 11

The quotation in the vignette is from James Longstreet, “ ‘The Seven Days,’ Including Frayser’s Farm,” in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, 2:402n.

Stop 12

The quotation in the analysis is from E. P. Alexander, Military Memoirs of a Confederate (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1907), 155. The quotation in the vignette is from Andrew E. Ford, The Story of the Fifteenth Regiment Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry in the Civil War (Clinton MA: W. J. Coulter, 1898), 176.

Stop 13

The quotations in the vignette are from Austin C. Dobbins, Grandfather’s Journal (Dayton OH: Morningside, 1988), 89.

Stop 14

The quotations in the vignette are from Brent, Memoirs, p. 211.

N4084.indb 164

1/15/07 10:09:37 AM

165

Sources

Stop 15c

The quotations in the vignette are from Thomas L. Livermore, Days and Events, 1860 –1866 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1920), 96 –97.


The quotations in the vignette are from Bradley T. Johnson, “Memoir of the First Maryland Regiment, Paper No. 5,” Southern Historical Society Papers 10, no. 4 (April 1882): 150.


The quotations in the vignette are from Robert S. Westbrook, History of the 49th Pennsylvania Volunteers (Altoona PA: Altoona Times, 1898), 115.


The quotation in the vignette is from Daniel H. Hill, “McClellan’s Change of Base and Malvern Hill,” in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, 2:390.


The quotation in the vignette is from Smith, Autobiography, 48n.

N4084.indb 165

1/15/07 10:09:37 AM

N4084.indb 166

1/15/07 10:09:37 AM

Suggestions for Further Reading The Peninsula Campaign has been written about more in the past 15 years perhaps than in the previous 125. Stephen W. Sears’s To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign (New York: Ticknor & Field, 1992) was the first major study of the campaign as a whole since the 1800s. Many different aspects of the campaign are admirably covered in the three volumes edited by William J. Miller entitled The Peninsula Campaign of 1862: Yorktown to the Seven Days (Campbell CA: Savas Publishing, 1993, 1995, 1997), as well as the volume on the campaign in the Military Campaigns of the Civil War series edited by Gary W. Gallagher: The Richmond Campaign of 1862: The Peninsula & the Seven Days (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000). Steven H. Newton has written two volumes that help fill the niche of studies on the early Peninsula campaign. Joseph E. Johnston and the Defense of Richmond (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998) is an interesting and somewhat revisionist account of the Confederate side of the campaign through Seven Pines. That battle itself, not discussed in this guidebook because the battlefield itself does not exist, is the subject of Newton’s The Battle of Seven Pines: May 31–June 1, 1862 (Lynchburg VA: H. E. Howard, 1993). The battle of Williamsburg is also the subject of two books. A Pitiless Rain: The Battle of Williamsburg, 1862 (Shippensburg PA: White Mane, 1997), by Earl C. Hastings Jr. and David S. Hastings, focuses on the battle itself. Carol Kettenburg Dubbs’s Defend This Old Town: Williamsburg during the Civil War (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2002) devotes extensive coverage to the battle as part of a history of the colonial capital during the Civil War. The Seven Days battles were the major focus of Clifford Dowdey’s The Seven Days: The Emergence of Lee (Boston: Little Brown, 1964), although that book devoted much of its space to events leading up to Lee’s assumption of command of the Army of Northern Virginia. My own Extraordinary Circumstances: The Seven Days Battles (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001) is a detailed study of the battles. The leading generals on the Confederate side all have multiple biographies, and only one or two for each man will be listed here. For Robert E. Lee, the standard is Douglas Southall Freeman’s four-volume R. E. Lee (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1934), in which volume two contains coverage of the campaign. A more recent biography is Emory M. Thomas, Robert E. Lee: A Biography (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995). Craig Symonds has filled several gaps

N4084.indb 167

1/15/07 10:09:37 AM

168

Suggestions for Further Reading

in the Civil War literature with his works, one of which is Joseph E. Johnston: A Civil War Biography (New York: W. W. Norton, 1992). John Magruder, who played a crucial part throughout the Peninsula Campaign, is profiled in Paul D. Casdorph’s Prince John Magruder: His Life and Campaigns (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1996). Another Confederate with an important role through most of the campaign is James Longstreet. Jeffry D. Wert’s General James Longstreet: The Confederacy’s Most Controversial Soldier—A Biography (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993) is the most recent examination. Stonewall Jackson, whose role in the Seven Days began to be dissected as soon as the campaign ended, has many biographers. For years, the standard life was Lenoir Chambers’s two-volume Stonewall Jackson (New York: William Morrow, 1959), of which volume two includes coverage of the Seven Days. Stonewall Jackson: The Man, The Soldier, The Legend (New York: Macmillan, 1997), by James I. Robertson Jr., has set the new standard for Jackson biographies. With the exception of George McClellan, the important Union generals in the Peninsula Campaign have received less extensive treatment, but then McClellan should rightfully be the main focus on the Union side of the campaign. Of his numerous biographies, the two most recent and best are Stephen W. Sears, George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon (New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1988), and Ethan S. Rafuse, McClellan’s War: The Failure of Moderation in the Struggle for the Union (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005). Finally, studies of both armies are useful in examining the Peninsula Campaign. For the Army of Northern Virginia, Douglas Southall Freeman’s Lee’s Lieutenants: A Study in Command (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1942) is an exhaustive study; volume one covers this campaign. Davis & Lee at War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), by Steven E. Woodworth, focuses on the titular relationship. Kenneth P. Williams analyzes the Army of the Potomac’s command in Lincoln Finds a General: A Military Study of the Civil War (New York: Macmillan, 1949); again, volume one covers the campaign. Jeffry D. Wert’s The Sword of Lincoln: The Army of the Potomac (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005) is the most recent history.

N4084.indb 168

1/15/07 10:09:38 AM

In This Hallowed Ground: Guides to the Civil War Battlefields series Chickamauga: A Battlefield Guide with a Section on Chattanooga Steven E. Woodworth Gettysburg: A Battlefield Guide Mark Grimsley and Brooks D. Simpson The Peninsula and Seven Days: A Battlefield Guide Brian K. Burton Shiloh: A Battlefield Guide Mark Grimsley and Steven E. Woodworth Wilson’s Creek, Pea Ridge, and Prairie Grove: A Battlefield Guide, with a Section on Wire Road Earl J. Hess, Richard W. Hatcher III, William Garrett Piston, and William L. Shea

A disorganized private. From a photograph. blcw 2:556

N4084.indb 169

1/15/07 10:09:38 AM

university of nebraska press Also of Interest in the series: Shiloh A Battlefield Guide By Mark Grimsley and Steven E. Woodworth Designed to lead the reader on a one-day tour of one of the most important battlefields of the Civil War, this guide provides precise directions to all the key locations in a manner reflecting how the battle itself unfolded. isbn: 0-8032-7100-x; 978-0-8032-7100-5 (paper) Wilson’s Creek, Pea Ridge, and Prairie Grove A Battlefield Guide, with a Section on Wire Road By Earl J. Hess, Richard W. Hatcher III, William Garrett Piston, and William L. Shea Wilson’s Creek, Pea Ridge, and Prairie Grove were three of the most important battles fought west of the Mississippi River during the Civil War. This is the first book to provide a detailed guide to these battlefields and it takes the visitor step-by-step through the major sites of each engagement. isbn: 0-8032-7366-5; 978-0-8032-7366-5 (paper) Order online at www.nebraskapress.unl.edu or call 1-800-755-1105. Mention the code ”BOFOX” to receive a 20% discount.

N4084.indb 170

1/15/07 10:09:38 AM

The Peninsula and Seven Days: A Battlefield Guide (This Hallowed Ground: Guides to Civil Wa)

Shiloh: A Battlefield Guide (This Hallowed Ground: Guides to Civil Wa)

This Hallowed Ground: A History of the Civil War

Hallowed Ground

Hallowed Ground

Hallowed Ground

Hallowed Ground

Hallowed Ground

Hallowed Ground

Seven Days to Forever

Seven Days to Die

Seven Days to Die

This Hallowed Grnd

The Civil War Battlefield Guide, Second Edition

A Week of This: a Novel in Seven Days

Hallowed Ground- A Walk at Gettysburg

Hallowed Ground- A Walk at Gettysburg

Seven Days

Seven Days in Benevolence

Gettysburg Heroes: Perfect Soldiers, Hallowed Ground

Seven Days in May

Guerrillas In The Mist: A Battlefield Guide To Clandestine Warfare

Culloden, 1746: Battlefield Guide

An Archaeological Guide to Mexico's Yucatan Peninsula

Hallowed

Hallowed

Hallowed

Hallowed Ground: A Walk at Gettysburg (Crown Journeys)

The A to Z of the Civil War and Reconstruction (A to Z Guides (Scarecrow Press))

Battlefield

A Hallowed Warning

The Peninsula and Seven Days: A Battlefield Guide (This Hallowed Ground: Guides to Civil Wa)

Shiloh: A Battlefield Guide (This Hallowed Ground: Guides to Civil Wa)

This Hallowed Ground: A History of the Civil War

Hallowed Ground

Hallowed Ground

Hallowed Ground

Hallowed Ground

Hallowed Ground

Hallowed Ground

Seven Days to Forever

Seven Days to Die

Seven Days to Die

This Hallowed Grnd

The Civil War Battlefield Guide, Second Edition

A Week of This: a Novel in Seven Days

Hallowed Ground- A Walk at Gettysburg

Hallowed Ground- A Walk at Gettysburg

Seven Days

Seven Days in Benevolence

Gettysburg Heroes: Perfect Soldiers, Hallowed Ground

Seven Days in May

Guerrillas In The Mist: A Battlefield Guide To Clandestine Warfare

Culloden, 1746: Battlefield Guide

An Archaeological Guide to Mexico's Yucatan Peninsula

Hallowed

Hallowed

Hallowed

Hallowed Ground: A Walk at Gettysburg (Crown Journeys)

The A to Z of the Civil War and Reconstruction (A to Z Guides (Scarecrow Press))

Battlefield

A Hallowed Warning

Recommend Documents