The New Central Asia: The Regional Impact of International Actors

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THE NEW

CENTRAL

ASIA

The Regional Impact of International Actors

Forthcoming title in The Making of Economics, 4th Edition By E Ray Canterbery

Volume III: The Radical Assault

Published title: Volume I: The Foundation

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THE NEW

CENTRAL

ASIA

The Regional Impact of International Actors

Edited by

Emilian Kavalski

University of Western Sydney, Australia

World Scientific NEW JERSEY

•

LONDON

•

SINGAPORE

•

BEIJING

•

SHANGHAI

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HONG KONG

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TA I P E I

•

CHENNAI

Published by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. 5 Toh Tuck Link, Singapore 596224 USA office: 27 Warren Street, Suite 401-402, Hackensack, NJ 07601 UK office: 57 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London WC2H 9HE

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

THE NEW CENTRAL ASIA The Regional Impact of International Actors Copyright © 2010 by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. All rights reserved. This book, or parts thereof, may not be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage and retrieval system now known or to be invented, without written permission from the Publisher.

For photocopying of material in this volume, please pay a copying fee through the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. In this case permission to photocopy is not required from the publisher.

ISBN-13 978-981-4287-56-2 ISBN-10 981-4287-56-3

Typeset by Stallion Press Email: [email protected]

Printed in Singapore.

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For lust of knowing what should not be known We take the Golden Road to Samarkand James Elroy Flecker (1922)

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Contents

List of Abbreviations

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List of Contributors

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Map of Central Asia

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Chapter 1

Uncovering the “New” Central Asia: The Dynamics of External Agency in a Turbulent Region Emilian Kavalski

Part One

THE CENTRAL ASIAN AGENCY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

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Chapter 2

NATO’s Partnership with Central Asia: Cooperation à la carte Simon J. Smith and Emilian Kavalski

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Chapter 3

The OSCE in the New Central Asia Maria Raquel Freire

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Chapter 4

The European Union’s New Central Asian Strategy Ertan Efegil

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Contents

Chapter 5

The United Nations and Central Asia W. Andy Knight and Vandana Bhatia

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Part Two

THE CENTRAL ASIAN AGENCY OF STATES

115

Chapter 6

China and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: The Dynamics of “New Regionalism”, “Vassalization”, and Geopolitics in Central Asia Michael Clarke

117

Chapter 7

Russia and Central Asia Marlène Laruelle

149

Chapter 8

The United States and Central Asia Matteo Fumagalli

177

Chapter 9

Turkey in Central Asia: Turkish Identity as Enabler or Impediment Brent E. Sasley

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Chapter 10

Iran and Central Asia: The Smart Politics of Prudent Pragmatism Pierre Pahlavi and Afshin Hojati

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Chapter 11

India and Central Asia: The No Influence of the “Look North” Policy Emilian Kavalski

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Chapter 12

Japan and Central Asia David Walton

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Contents

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Part Three

PROSPECTS AND TRAJECTORIES FOR THE AGENCY OF INTERNATIONAL ACTORS IN CENTRAL ASIA

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Chapter 13

The Influence of External Actors in Central Asia Stephen Blank

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Bibliography

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Index

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ABM ADB ATC BGS BOMCA BTC CACO CADAP CAIP CALO CANWFZ CAO CAREC CARICC

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Asian Development Bank Anti-Terrorist Center Border Guards Service Border Management Program for Central Asia Baku-Tbilisi-Çeyhan Pipeline Central Asian Cooperation Organization Drug Action Program in Central Asia Central Asia Indicative Program Central Asian Liason Office Central Asian Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zone Central Asian Organization Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre CAU Central Asian Union CCP Chinese Communist Party CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy CICA Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia CIS Commonwealth of Independent States CNPC China National Petroleum Corporation C(N)TBT Comprehensive (Nuclear) Test Ban Treaty C(N)TBTO Comprehensive (Nuclear) Test Ban Treaty Organization xi

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CPC CRDF CSCE CSTO CTC DCECI DFAIT EAEC EAPC EC ECO ECOSOC ECOTA ENP ESDP EU FAO FCO FSB GATT GDI GEM GUAM

HCNM HDI HDR HPI IAEA IBRD

Caspian Pipeline Consortium Collective Rapid Deployment Force Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe Collective Security Treaty Organization Counter-Terrorism Committee Development Cooperation and Economic Cooperation Instrument Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Canada) Eurasian Economic Community Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council European Commission Economic Cooperation Organization The Economic and Social Council The Economic Cooperation Organization’s Trade Agreement European Neighborhood Policy European Security and Defence Policy European Union Food and Agriculture Organization Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK) Federal Security Service (Russia) General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs Gender-Related Development Index Gender Empowerment Measure Organization for Democracy and Economic Development of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova High Commissioner on National Minorities Human Development Index Human Development Report Human Poverty Index International Atomic Energy Agency International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

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ICC ICG ICMEC ICJ IFI ILSA IMF IMU INOGATE IOM IPAP IPI ISAF JTCAFA MDG NACC NADIN NATO NGO NMD NPT NWFZ OCEEA ODA ODIHR OECD OEF OHCHR OPEC OSCE

xiii

International Criminal Court International Crisis Group Intergovernmental Committee for Military and Economic Cooperation International Court of Justice International Financial Institutions The US’ Iran–Libya Sanctions Act International Monetary Fund Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe International Organization of Migration Individual Partnership Action Plan Iran–Pakistan–India Pipeline International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan Japan, Turkey, and Central Asia Friendship Association Millennium Development Goals North Atlantic Cooperation Council National Drugs Information Network North Atlantic Treaty Organization Non-Governmental Organization National Missile Defense Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zone Office of the OSCE Coordinator on Environmental and Economic Activities Official Development Assistance Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Operation Enduring Freedom Office of the Human Rights High Commissioner of Human Rights Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

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PAP-DIB PAP-T PARP PCA PCC PfP PRC PSO R2P RSP RSFSR S-5 SCO SES TACIS TRACECA UK UN UNDP UNECE UNEP UNICEF UNIFEM UNMOT UNODC UNTOP USA USAID USSR UTO WHO WTO XUAR

Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism Planning and Review Process Partnership and Cooperation Agreement Partnership Coordination Cell Partnership for Peace People’s Republic of China Peace Support Operations “Responsibility to Protect” Regional Strategy Paper Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic Shanghai Five Shanghai Cooperation Organization Single Economic Space Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States Transport Corridor Europe–Caucasus–Asia United Kingdom United Nations United Nations Development Program United Nations Economic Commission for Europe United Nations Environmental Program United Nations Children’s Fund United Nations Development Fund for Women United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime United Nations Tajikistan Office of Peace-Building United States of America United States Agency for International Development Union of Soviet Socialist Republics United Tajik Opposition World Health Organization World Trade Organization Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

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Vandana Bhatia is Doctoral Candidate at the University of Alberta (Canada). Stephen Blank is Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute of the United States Army War College (USA). Michael Clarke is Post-Doctoral Research Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute (Australia). Ertan Efegil is Associate Professor at the Department of International Relations, Sakarya University (Turkey). Maria Raquel Freire is Professor of International Relations at the School of Economics, University of Coimbra (Portugal). Matteo Fumagalli is Assistant Professor of International Relations at the Central European University (Hungary). Afshin Hojati is Doctoral Candidate at the Département de Science Politique of the Université de Montréal (Canada).

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Marlène Laruelle is Senior Research Fellow with the Central AsiaCaucasus Institute and the Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center, SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC (USA). Emilian Kavalski is Lecturer of Politics and International Relations at the University of Western Sydney (Australia). W. Andy Knight is Professor of Political Science at the University of Alberta (Canada) and Governor of the International Development Research Center. Pierre Pahlavi is Assistant Professor in the Department of Defence Studies and Chair of the Department of Security and International Affairs at the Canadian Forces College, Toronto (Canada). Brent E. Sasley is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Texas at Arlington (USA). Simon J. Smith is Doctoral Candidate at Loughborough University (UK). David Walton is Senior Lecturer in Asian and International Studies at the University of Western Sydney (Australia) and a Member of the National Executive of the Japanese Studies Association of Australia (JSAA).

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Map of Central Asia

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Uncovering the “New” Central Asia: The Dynamics of External Agency in a Turbulent Region Emilian Kavalski

In Central Asia the position of affairs changes not every hour, but every minute. Therefore, I say, Vigilance, vigilance, vigilance… It [Central Asia] is the blank leaf between the pages of an old and a new dispensation; the brief interval separating a compact and immemorial tradition from the rude shock and unfeeling Philistinism of nineteenth-century civilization. The era of the Thousand and One Nights, with its strange mixture of savagery and splendor, of coma and excitement, is fast fading away, and will soon have yielded up all its secrets to science. Here in the cities of Alp Arslan, and Timur, and Abdullah Khan, may be seen the sole remaining stage upon which is yet being enacted that expiring drama of realistic romance. Lord Curzon (1889: x–xii)

Introduction As the epigraph above suggests, at least since Lord Curzon’s time, thinking about Central Asia (encompassing the countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) easily borders on the realm of fantasy and hyperbole. That being so, an ungainly but important task is to distinguish between the phantoms and substance in the external involvement in Central Asia. This 1

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seems to be particularly the case when grappling with the nascent regional agency of a multiple set of diverse (and often contending) international actors — both international organizations and states. The presumed raison d’etre of their interactions seems to have rekindled stereotypes of a “new great game” in Central Asia. Even when one seeks to debunk the clichéd imagery of the “land of discord”, “pulpit of the world”, “geographical pivot of history”, “global chessboard”, etc., it is still legitimate to study historical and institutional legacies, cross-regional patterns, and lasting socio-economic structures that shaped political phenomena across Central Asia. An important task, therefore, is to separate the phantoms from the substance in the reflections on the Central Asian experience(s) during the over two decades following the annus mirabilis of 1991 — marking the dissolution of the Soviet Union. During the 1990s, the region became an idiom symbolizing the uncertainty of the post-Cold War climate of global life. Still, the statebuilding and democratization paradigms have highlighted issues of borders, minorities, and violent conflicts. Thus, rather than a transitory stage, the resilient and pervasive randomness of Central Asian trends has challenged the dominant frameworks for the study of both global and regional patterns. Such a claim necessitates the qualification that the analysis of the regional agency of external actors points to one of the central problems of International Relations theory — its engagement with difference. As Inayatullah and Blaney (2004, p. 123) demonstrate “difference is almost pre-consciously treated as simultaneous with disorder, fear, suspicion, and condescension”. Thus, the contemporary positioning of Central Asia in the analysis of world politics confirms the observation that there is still “no non-Western International Relations theory” (Acharya and Buzan, 2007). This has led the study of world politics to present “crude and caricatured understanding of […] the varying forms of life of ‘non-Western’ peoples” (Inayatullah and Blaney, 2004, p. 2). Having an awareness of this shortcoming within the epistemological, ontological, and methodological purview of the discipline of International Relations, this volume’s focus on the international involvement in Central Asia helps develop nuanced contexts for the

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“more flexible, more dynamic, and more evolutionary” understanding of “a new world” marked by “ambiguities, ambivalence, and uncertainty” as well as simultaneous “transformations at the local, national, regional, international, and global levels” (Chen, 1998, p. xiv). In this respect, the dynamic changes in Central Asia associated with the end of communism, the “revival” of ethno-political, religious, and clan mobilization, and the gradual involvement of various international actors have inspired extensive scholarly and policy engagement with the region. However, while many of the debates on the political developments in the area have been primarily conducted at the level of empirical consideration, the contributors to this volume make a critical reflection on their observations, findings, and research experience by relating their particular cases to broader themes in their fields of study. The following chapters included in this collection are underpinned by the uncovery of the international agency in the “new” Central Asia — i.e., the investigations included in this volume not only discover previously untouched perspectives on the complexity of regional affairs, but they also excavate insights from underneath layers of ossified or never-problematized knowledge (Bially-Mattern, 2005, p. 5). The contention is that observers of world affairs “need to be cognizant of the powerful cultural forces” shaping the agency of international actors without “reify[ing] these forces,” because “cultures — even ‘security cultures’ — are ambiguous, complex, and dynamic, and they can and do change over time” (Latham, 1998, pp. 133–134). The uncovery of the international agency of different international actors in Central Asia traces the trajectories and logics of such changes and adaptations in making their foreign policy. The investigations included in this volume problematize prevailing notions of the external agency of the dominant international actors engaged in Central Asia. In this respect, the following chapters are about the intertwining of Central Asia with world politics and the way international affairs affect Central Asia. At the same time, it is also about the place of Central Asia — both actual and appropriate — in the study and practice of world politics. Therefore, the contributors to this volume

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have simultaneously generalized and contextualized the “Central Asian experience” (as well as have reconsidered and reevaluated its comparative relevance). The claim is that such an approach is relevant to understanding the context in which Central Asian issues have reflected and affected the patterns and theories of international affairs. In addition, the volume investigates the construction and individualization of Central Asian affairs as a distinct field of observation in the wake of the Cold War. Before moving to the substantive chapters included in this volume, the introductory chapter proceeds by framing the scope, connotations, and frameworks of the Central Asian label. The following section, in particular, expounds upon the notion of the “new Central Asia”, whose content has been substantially redefined after the region’s rediscovery in 2001 (Lewis, 2008, p. 1). Such a study provides a background for the engagement with the Central Asian agency of international actors. This assessment details the perception of a regional power vacuum and the emergence of awkward statehood as key contributing factors to the construction of Central Asia as a permissive environment for external agency. Consequently, the confrontation with the proliferation of “actorness” in Central Asia accounts for the dynamics of the “new great game” and the patterns of “hegemonic fragmegration” in the region. The chapter concludes with an outline of the analytical framework for the contributions to this volume.

Framing the New Central Asia As suggested, the region of Central Asia has become one of the emblematic features of the post-Cold War geography of international relations. The region’s appellation is one of those labels whose ramifications are open to contestation. In this respect, thinking about Central Asia (i.e., defining and mapping its designations) has never been an easy enterprise. The outline of its symbolic geography exposes the particular strategic connotations that the region has acquired. The reference to the “new Central Asia” therefore becomes shorthand for the complex challenges confronting the making of

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foreign policy in the globalized context of world politics. The tension between perception and substance during the 1990s resulted in further definitional complications which reflect the fuzziness of the functional and analytical approaches to regional patterns. The region has been defined either by its common — usually backward, violent, and fatalistic — culture or the legacy of imperial rule. This tortuous legacy appears embedded in the very fabric of the newly independent states that emerged in the wake of Soviet dissolution. The claim here is that the analytical fickleness of the notion of Central Asia reflects the “fragmentedness” of designations — that is, such notions neither command what is spoken through them, nor can they simply be commanded. Instead: they slip and slide, evade our grasp and convey both more and less than we intended. They do this both because they have a history and because when we use them we set them off again on their historical way, in the unpredictable ways in which anything which lives in the way that it is received through time remains intractable to the designs that might be made upon it. Despite the art of the spin-doctor, then, you can never determine the outcome of that reception… To take a word, then, is to hold a fragment of life and its mystery in your hand. (Dillon, 1996, pp. 114–115)

The point of departure in understanding the malleability of the Central Asian label is Neumann’s assertion that “regions are spoken into existence” (Neumann, 2001, p. 60), which indicates that the immediate issues for exploration are (i) who does the articulation, and (ii) how does it matter (i.e., create outcomes). Thus, it is still a daunting task to define Central Asia by looking solely at the discourses and mental mappings of regional complexity, without intricating them with the external agency of various international actors. The claim of this volume is that it is external agency that speaks the Central Asian region into existence — to the extent that it is international actors that are involved in articulating the boundaries of the region and positioning Central Asian countries into a category of states that share

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similar characteristics (Kassimeris, 2009, p. 93). In this setting, the suggestion is that a multiplicity of international actors has been involved in packaging and repackaging the geographical and geopolitical ramifications of Central Asia. The concern underpinning such endeavors seem to reflect the experience that no major empire of the 20th century has dissolved without its successor states undergoing protracted and bloody civil wars (Banuazizi and Weiner, 1994). At the same time, the desire of (some) international actors to influence the direction of Central Asian affairs is not necessarily matched by a willingness to take positions of leadership in the region. The pervasive simultaneity of these twin dynamics constructs a confusing picture which not only underwrites the terminological and analytical vagueness of regional patterns, but also suggests that the label of Central Asia, per se, has become a notion of little explanatory value. In this respect, the notion of a “new Central Asia” has been propagated as a fresh analytical platform for engaging with regional patterns. The newness of the region was initially associated primarily with the novelty of independent national statehood. The emergence of the sovereign post-Soviet “stans” was a development which — unlike the experience of other post-communist countries — did not spell a return to or a revival of earlier forms and symbols of independent statehood (Anderson, 1997; Ferdinand, 1994; Garnett et al., 2000; Roy, 2000). It has been argued that Central Asians — both publics and state-elites — had less of a say in their independence than they had in their absorption into the realm of the Russian empire during the 19th century. The region thereby “owed its new separateness to the dissolution of a metropolitan power, the USSR: a process over which Central Asian leaders had little control and to which they contributed little” (Allison, 2004, p. 463). As a result, independence appeared to be thrust upon the hesitant regional states with little warning. The tenuous experience as Soviet republics did not seem to offer the Central Asian countries the required “political, economic, and psychological” preparedness for independent participation in and interactions with the global society of states (Lloyd, 1997, p. 97). As one commentator put it, “the Central Asian republics were nonplussed;” they did not know “whether to celebrate their liberation

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from the century-old Russian yoke or to grieve the passing away of their protector and benefactor” (Shams-ud-Din, 1997, p. 329). Very quickly, however, the notion of the “new Central Asia” was promulgated as an indication of the fluidity of regional politics, which has demanded more comprehensive conceptualizations of their dynamic patterns. To start with, the Central Asian states seemed bent on “reestablishing pre-Soviet trade and transport routes” (Lloyd, 1997, p. 99). Rather than isolated in their landlocked location, the Central Asian “stans” have gradually become entangled in interactions stretching from Mongolia and China’s Xinjiang autonomous region, through Kashmir, Pakistan’s Northwestern Frontier Province, and Afghanistan, to Iran, Turkey, and the states of the Caucasus. Thus, although the regional character of these communications more often than not is evidenced by different forms of criminal and illegal transnational networks (Bohr, 2004, p. 500), it has nevertheless shifted international perceptions of the region toward broader conceptualizations. The notion of a new Central Asia appears to indicate the enhanced awareness of international actors that regional issues require a broader analytical and policy framework within which they can be addressed. In other words, the regionness of the new Central Asia derives from the shared socio-economic, political, and environmental vulnerabilities whose interaction drives (if not plagues) the workings of regional polities. This proposition should not, however, be understood as a suggestion that Central Asian populations do not constitute imagined communities, even if “the development of a pan-Central Asian regional identity will remain a chimera” (Bohr, 2004, p. 502). On the contrary, they do, but not necessarily ones that fit neatly the conventional Westphalian schemata of “nation states”. Consequently, the established modes for analytical and policy adaptation aimed at grasping and addressing changing realities become obsolete and new ones are required (Kavalski, 2007a). This is probably one of the most important qualitative alterations of our perceptions demanded by the dynamics framed within the label of a “new Central Asia”. The contention is that external involvement — especially, external involvement intent on the introduction of a framework of

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appropriateness — shapes the social space and developmental possibilities for the awkward states of the region (Hall, 2006, p. 102). Thus, to facilitate the uncovery of the new Central Asian experience — past, present, and prospective — this volume advances a novel contextualization of regional patterns by looking at two relationally interconnected processes: (i) the role of international organizations — inclusive of the EU, NATO, the OSCE, and the UN; and (ii) the agency of individual states — Russia, the United States, China, India, Iran, Japan, and Turkey. The new Central Asia, therefore, is treated here as a prism for teasing out the regional agency of these actors as well as the strategies through which they are articulated. It provides a crucial context for engaging with the agency underpinning international efforts. The volume contends that the region is not merely a geographic location on the map of world politics, but an embodiment of ongoing dilemmas of international relations. In other words, the new Central Asia becomes an idiom, an intervening variable, and a context (i.e., an enabling environment) for the confrontation, on the one hand, with the modalities and the emergent complexity of global life, and, on the other hand, the patterns of external agency in the region.

Engaging International Agency This volume surveys Central Asian dynamics against the backdrop of a wide and variegated international involvement in regional trends. The evaluation of such a proliferation of agency has taken into account the patterns, contexts, and analytical frameworks informing the formulations of the strategy of international actors toward Central Asia. In this respect, the contributors to this volume engage in a parallel comparative assessment of the dominant international actors engaged in Central Asia. The interlocutors of such a conversation reflect on the dynamics, logics, and policies underpinning this international involvement. It would appear that the dominant theme underpinning the agency of international actors in the region is the goal of introducing a framework of predictability that would allow them to make feasible calculations about future intentions.

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Although concurrent, such externally promoted frameworks of order are not necessarily internally compatible — a dynamic captured by the label of the “new great game”. In other words, Central Asia has become a “zone of intense, complex interaction between local conditions and the larger world system” (Hall, 2006, p. 104). Therefore, the uncovery of the agency of international organizations and actors in Central Asia does not impute, nor endow with coherence the story it tells. Instead, its account facilitates an encounter with the nuances and complexity characterizing seemingly straightforward propositions. To facilitate the engagement with the international involvement in Central Asia, the following sections detail the conditions that have permitted the proliferation of agency in the region as well as the main features of the interactions between international actors.

Central Asia as a permissive environment for international actors The recent rash of attention to the proliferation of agency in international life is underpinned by the recognition that the end of Cold War bipolarity has allowed a number of actors to extend their international roles and outreach. In Central Asia, the propagation of such multiplicity of distinct attitudes and attempts at framing regional patterns has been made possible by two interrelated processes: (i) the perception of a power vacuum in the region after the dissolution of the Soviet Union; and (ii) the awkwardness of Central Asian statehood. Analytically, these dynamics implicate the conditions of an “immature anarchy” in the region, which — in contrast to the “mature anarchy” setting — identify competitive and fragmented patterns of relations, which do not appear to be constrained by the normative framework of international affairs (Buzan, 1991, p. 175). At the same time, it is the interplay between both of these dynamics that have made the region permeable (and permeated) by external agency.

Power vacuum in Central Asia The perception of a power vacuum in Central Asia derives from (i) the relative inability of Russia — the traditional “big brother” of the

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region — to assert its centrality in the region during the 1990s; and (ii) the failure of Central Asian regionalization. For the purposes of brevity (as this issue is addressed at length in Chapter Seven), it has to be acknowledged that Moscow’s engagement in Central Asia reflects not only the thorny history of its interactions with the region, but also the complexity of Russia’s geography and demography — that is, while “eighty-five percent of the Russian Federation can be said to live in the East, eighty-five percent of its population lives in the West” (Black, 2004, p. 275). On the one hand, the weakening of the Kremlin’s position in Central Asia reflects the broader pattern of Moscow’s foreign policy inconsistencies during the tenure of President Boris Yeltsin. Thus, Russia’s preoccupation with the Caucasus (mainly the conflict in Chechnya) has led to the attenuation of its position in Central Asia. On the other hand, Moscow’s foreign policy attention toward integration with the West and away from the former Soviet republics in the early 1990s, made its Central Asian policy “uncertain, with different agencies and institutions holding conflicting points of view with regard to local issues” (Mullojanov, 2008, pp. 121–128). At the same time, these twin dynamics have evinced Russia’s status as a “declining hegemon” in Central Asia — i.e., it was “dominant in the region but only because of a variable combination of acceptance and even greater weakness on the part of most of the other states [which] meant that its government was powerless to prevent the incursion into what it perceived as its sphere of influence” (Deyermond, 2009, p. 160; Jonson, 2001, pp. 95–126). The declining hegemony of Russia has been underpinned by the resource-extraction nature of Soviet rule in Central Asia. During Soviet times, Moscow found itself perpetuating the Tsarist economic policy, which — in the words of Lenin — treated the region as a mere “cotton appendix of Russia” (cited in Rywkin, 1963, p. 65). Thus, a number of commentators have labeled the Central Asian republics “colonies of the Soviet Union”, whose economies were deliberately structured to keep them as “primarily agricultural, produced raw materials (e.g., cotton and wheat) to be processed elsewhere, and exhausted their nonrenewable resources (e.g., oil, gas, and minerals), and thus were wholly dependent on other Soviet republics” (Luong, 2004, p. 8).

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Furthermore, this experience of dependency coupled with the withdrawal of Moscow’s attention from the region appeared to encourage the newly independent states of Central Asia to engage more proactively in diversifying their strategic partnerships. Their geopolitical location, historical relations with a number of neighboring countries, and access to hydro-carbon (and other mineral) resources assisted the compilation of long lists of international suitors. Such patterns, however, did not seem to assist the appearance of a Central Asian integrative process. Instead, tensions and divisions between regional states — especially, between their leaders — appear to have turned this option into a chimera. It was early in their experience of independence, despite expectations to the contrary, when it became conspicuous that Central Asian states are growing increasingly “hesitant and inconsistent in formulating regional agendas or structures for security cooperation” (Allison, 2004, p. 463). Some trace the origins of this trend in their shared Soviet experience, when the Central Asian republics were “parts of a centralized administration that often deliberately strove to keep them from being able to play complementary roles for each other” (Blank, 2004b, p. 139). Commentators have even ascertained that the deep divisions characterizing intra-regional relations are “effectively laying to rest for the foreseeable future prospects for the development of an inclusive Central Asian regional identity” (Bohr, 2004, p. 492). But then the question arises: How can the mushrooming of various regional organizations bringing together different Central Asian countries be explained? According to Allison (2008), such frameworks for institutional relations in the region are instances of the “bandwagoning” of Central Asian leaders with external actors to weather different (perceived and real) pressures and challenges. This contextualization explains regional organizations such as the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), etc. as alliances of convenience or, what Allison calls, forms of “virtual regionalism”. The contention is that these organizations do not strengthen Central Asian regionalization, not merely because of “the

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absence of any deeper regionalist impulse behind them”, but because of their specific political function — the “reinforcement of regime security and legitimacy and it has priority over other security, economic, or trade goals”. Allison argues that what emerges from these virtual regionalisms of convenience is a process of “protective integration” — in other words, such institutional cooperation between regional states and some international actors offers protection against the perceived interventionist strategies of other actors (Allison, 2008, pp. 185–202). The growing need to buttress their stability has urged Central Asian leaders into a growing number of (simultaneous) collaborative arrangements with diverse sets of external actors. This development indicates an interesting twist on the conventional “patron-client” relationship between external (hegemonically minded) actors and Central Asian states — namely, international “patrons” do offer their Central Asian “clients” assurances about the maintenance and protection of their sovereignty and territorial integrity; yet, external actors do not seem to enjoy more bargaining power (see Kassimeris, 2009, p. 94). Such a pattern, therefore, befuddles the prospects and processes of regionalization in Central Asia which further strengthens the perception of a regional power vacuum. Yet, apart from the observation of a power vacuum in the region — because of Russia’s perceived withdrawal from the region and the failure of Central Asian region-building — external agency has also greatly been abetted by the awkwardness of Central Asian statehood.

Awkward statehood in Central Asia The notion of “awkward states” (Field, 2001; Kavalski, 2006) is used as a designation of the condition of international existence of Central Asian polities. It reflects the assertion that the countries of the region were “hardly prepared for an unexpected adventure in state building” (Lewis, 2008, p. 123). Thus, although the post-Soviet transition has marked a sharp (if uncertain) break with the past, the subsequent trajectories of Central Asian states exhibit “puzzling” ongoing dynamics “between the formal and the informal elements of politics,

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and a surprising re-emergence of informal organizations embedded in both the Soviet and the pre-Soviet political order of this region” (Collins, 2006, p. 5). Unlike its treatment as another synonym for “weak”, “failed”, or “quasi” states, the use of the term “awkward states” here expands its meaning beyond a mere indication of the Weberian dysfunctionality of Central Asian statehood. The notion of “awkwardness” problematizes simultaneously the concepts, images, and process of domestic rule and international behavior. On the one hand, awkward states are characterized not only by their volatility, but by a mode of government whose methods and practices contradict accepted norms and rules (Nincic, 2005, p. 13; Kavalski, 2008a, p. 74). The process of state-building, in this context implies a process of establishing authority over a given territory — i.e., “state-building in the literal sense of the word” (Grzymala-Busse and Luong, 2002, p. 2; Krastev, 2003, p. 1). On the other hand, awkward states engage in occasionally erratic and often unpredictable international behavior (to the extent that they are willing to interact with the outside world at all, as the case of Turkmenistan illustrates). Thus, the awkwardness of Central Asian statehood becomes an idiom for the topsyturvydom of the post-Cold War climate of world politics where more often than not inter-state relations are characterized by a modicum of order, while intra-state affairs elicit patterns of anarchy. As Blank has suggested, the Central Asian states exhibit the exigencies faced by decision making without the sufficient means and resources for meaningful action. In this respect, “their primary concern is internal security […] Consequently, foreign policy’s purpose is to protect the internal regime from domestic anarchy that lies inside of it and that can be stimulated by the pressures of the outside world” (Blank, 2004b, pp. 139–140). Such prioritization of the value of domestic stability by Central Asian regimes is a function of the “privatization of decision-making” (Krastev, 2003, p. 8) by regional rulers. The awkwardness of Central Asian statehood reflects the emergence of practices, which are “designed to ensure that the leader remains untainted by the failure of the state to deliver on its promises” (Lewis, 2008, p. 163). The contention is that unlike

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integrated states (which tend to be characterized by deliberative peace within and between societies), awkward states belie a spectrum of enmity and insecurity (Kavalski, 2008a, p. 76). Thus, the international involvement in awkward states demonstrates their treatment by external actors as far as possible as states, while guarding against the undesirable effects of their awkwardness (Navari, 2003, p. 106). In this respect, rather than a transitory stage, the resilient and pervasive uncertainty of Central Asian trends attests to the entrenchment of the region’s awkwardness in global life. Consequently, this situation presents international actors with the demands of “ ‘complex socialization’ in a complex situation” (Flockhart, 2005, p. 62). The dynamism of complexity in Central Asia instances regional awkward states with relatively vast endowments but low institutional capacities, challenged by “strongly networked and semi-modern societies” (Collins, 2006, p. 48). The lack of “effective” and “neutral” state institutions has urged Central Asian populations to withdraw in “an essentially private world, revolving around family, friends, and work, with as little engagement as possible with the repressive state” (Lewis, 2008, p. 47). Awkward states, thereby, have the tendency to make their citizens “demobilized and disunited” as well as “quite cynical” about the political process (Bunce and Wolchik, 2009, p. 72). In this context, international agency is often coopted by Central Asian rulers to bolster the appearance of legitimacy — both domestically and internationally — for their authoritarian regimes (Lewis, 2008). In other words, the demand for recognition underpins the willingness of the awkward states of the region to engage with a wide range of international actors.

Confronting the proliferation of actorness in Central Asia The confrontation with the proliferation of external agency in Central Asia requires an understanding of the “actorness” of the international organizations and states active in the region. Actorness defines the capacity of an international actor, to speak, influence, and act cohesively in different international environments. In other words, it encompasses an actor’s ability both to achieve its goals and to transmit

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institutions, practices, and norms that would construct an environment congruent with and conducive to its agency. A central feature of actorness is cohesion since without it an agent merely has a presence but no capacity to act (Allen and Smith, 1990). Actorness, thereby, identifies an “ability to behave in ways that have consequences in international politics” (Hopkins and Mansbach, 1973, pp. 36–37). Actorness, however, is not a static condition. An actor can display “varying degrees of ‘actorhood’ across issues and time” (Caporaso and Jupille, 1998, p. 244). In other words, the assessment of the Central Asian agency of the actors included in this volume offers insights only into their regional policies and not their foreign policy strategies, per se. Although the two are related, the (particular) Central Asian and the (general) international relations of external actors reflect distinct conceptualizations of identity, interests, utility, and effort that are contingent both on contextual and ideational interpretations. For instance, the Central Asian agency of the international actors included in this volume suggests the modes in which each of them conceives their agency in the region, not in global life (although the two aspects influence and impact on one another). Actorness, thereby is “conditioned by circumstances as well as by formal grants of authority” (Laffan et al., 1999, p. 169). Furthermore, it is framed by the ability of external actors to adjust to the dynamic processes at work both within regional states and between the state and society (Kavalski, 2007b, p. 851). The increase in the international involvement in the region is characterized by the twin-dynamics of the “new great game” and “hegemonic fragmegration”, which are detailed in the following sections.

“New great game” in Central Asia The origins of the notion and practices of the “new great game” in Central Asia are traditionally traced to the permissive environment — especially, the perception of a power vacuum in the region — that emerged in the wake of Soviet dissolution (Ahrari and Beal, 1996; Ehteshami, 1995; Kleveman, 2003; Menon, 2003). In other words, the break-up of the Soviet Union did not alter the geographic location

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of the region, but its meaning (Bhattacharjea, 2008, p. 11). Thus, the growing use of the notion of a “new great game” seems to simultaneously coincide with and be caused by the revival of interest in geopolitics as a viable framework for describing, explaining, and understanding the international affairs of Central Asia (Edwards, 2003, p. 83). In this respect, what appears to be “new” about this “great game” (in comparison with its 19th century variant) is the simultaneous proliferation of external (i.e., from outside the region) and internal (i.e., regional) agency. Likewise, one commentator has ascertained that “this new ‘great game’ in the heart of Asia is unfolding not so much among the old colonial powers as among their former minions, many of whom are themselves just emerging from colonial domination and seeking to define their roles in their regions and the world” (Rumer, 1993, p. 89). Such an understanding has provoked the drafting of extensive lists of actors with vested interests in Central Asian resources. Usually, such lists include (but are not limited to) China, the European Union, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United States, etc. The chapters included in this volume detail the Central Asian agency of the most prominent among those actors. It has to be acknowledged that what distinguishes such involvement of international actors in regional affairs is that they do not appear to be interested in imperial expansion for the control of territory, but in gaining access to the strategic resources of Central Asia (Muni, 2003, pp. 97–98). In other words, the “new great game” is about the creation of “niches of influence” (Shams-ud-Din, 1997, p. 340). Such an influence does not rely on or derive from the territorial effects of external actors (as conventional geopolitics would suggest), but on their distinct regimes of governance (Goetze and Guzina, 2008, p. 334). Central Asia, thereby, emerges as the contested site of competing “nodes of governance” — externally promoted strategies aimed at the transmission of rules, produced elsewhere (Bliesemann de Guevara, 2008, p. 348; Kavalski, 2007c). Consequently, the notion of the new great game comes to characterize the dynamics of processing, selection, and internalization of some rules and not others.

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At the same time, and more significantly, the Central Asian states do not appear to be the “pawns of great powers” any longer — i.e., the proliferation of external agency has intensified the contest between international actors vying for the attention of regional countries. This context has provided a facilitating environment for “pick-and-choose” strategies and bandwagoning for profit policies (Kavalski, 2007b, p. 856). In fact, all five of the Central Asian states have indicated their propensity and panache for this kind of engagement with international actors. The space for such independent agency by Central Asian states reveals the qualitative distinction of the new great game from its 19th century version. In other words, regional states might be compelled to indicate their preferred model of external agency, but they are not constrained to comply with its injunctions for long and often swing their preferences to another external pole of attraction. As a result, the assertions of political solidarity with different international actors do not diminish the competitive nature of Central Asian affairs, not only because such closeness of relations is temporary, but also because they are in no way intended to diminish the regional divisions between different actors (Allison, 2008, p. 186). In this respect, the proclamations of a new great game appear to demonstrate the transformation of the pattern of Central Asian affairs into one which is dominated by a complex network of overlapping interregional relations (Katzenstein, 2005; Lake and Morgan, 1998; Solingen, 1998). The various international actors engaged in Central Asia are also promoting their own and distinct regionalizing strategies. The discourses of the new great game, thereby, acknowledge the extant potent symbolic resources that simultaneously reflect and create social processes through which meanings are exchanged (Kinnvall, 2006). This inference confirms that the foreign policy of Central Asian states is unlikely to be formed independently of their external environment because of expectations that their relations are “to be of a certain context” and “owing to restraints such as [their] economic, political, military, and cultural ties with other states” (Kassimeris, 2009, p. 94). In this respect, the foreign policy engagement of various international actors in Central Asia indicates the

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particular political, socio-economic, and (geo) historical conditions within which their agency is framed.

Hegemonic fragmegration in Central Asia The discourses of the new great game in Central Asia have provoked a concerted effort at the positioning of regional patterns within the frameworks for understanding and explanation available to the study of international relations. Such interest reveals that even if local (and localized), Central Asian affairs are nevertheless enmeshed in global networks of relations. In other words, “‘things’ do occur locally but not necessarily solely as a result of local influences. Similarly, local changes can alter the nature of wider networks” (Gills and Thompson, 2006, p. 2). International agency, thereby, has a significant impact on the pattern, flow, and character of regional interactions. In the instance of Central Asia, it reveals the (uneasy) merger of the region into the currents of world politics. The incorporation of Central Asia confirms the historical observation that the effects of even very mild forms of incorporation into the global system of international relations can be quite dramatic (Hall, 2006, p. 99) — especially, in awkward states. The pattern of relations in Central Asia, thus, points to the pervasive “fragmegration” of global life — the simultaneity between fragmenting and integrating processes in international affairs, which “serves as a constant reminder that the world has moved beyond the condition of being ‘post’ its predecessor to an era in which the foundations of daily life have settled into new and unique rhythms of their own” (Rosenau, 2003, p. 11). In this setting, the ensuing increased awareness of vulnerability to distant causes conveys a sense of chaotic uncertainty prompted by the catalytic effects of small events, whose consequences are felt later, elsewhere, and by others (Kavalski, 2008b, p. 426). This awareness has provoked nuanced engagement with the Central Asian agency of international actors. Deyermond (2009) has provided one of the most erudite accounts of the “multilevelled hegemonic encounter” between different international actors in the

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region. Her analysis acknowledges that external actors bent on influencing Central Asian patterns can simultaneously coexist, cooperate, and compete at the different levels of their interactions in the region. Deyermond captures this condition through her “matrioshka model of hegemony” — that is, “in the same way that Russian matrioshka dolls, identical in appearance and function but varying in size, can be accommodated within one another, so hegemons — functionally similar but operating at global regional, and sub-regional levels — appear to coexist”. While accounting for the concurrence of competition and cooperation on the same issues, between the same set of actors, at the same time, and in the same region, Deyermond’s suggestion of multilevelled hegemony also indicates that “the global hegemon is not necessarily the hegemon in any given region” (Deyermond, 2009, pp. 151–173). In this respect, the claim here is that the complexity of Central Asian interactions among various international actors reveals a pattern of hegemonic fragmegration — the simultaneous attempt by external actors to influence Central Asian patterns, which pushes them to continuously align and re-align themselves with various other actors to advance their own goals and thwart the advances of others — an objective, which also produces some paradoxical alliances between them. This dynamic of hegemonic fragmegration prevents the emergence of a single leading power dominating Central Asian affairs, but it also seems to make unlikely the outbreak of violent confrontation between them in the region.

Roadmap for the Volume This section makes a brief tour of the volume by (i) outlining its analytical structure; and (ii) sketching the proposition of the individual chapters. It needs to be made clear from the outset that this volume does not intend a closure of the field by providing the final word on the international involvement in Central Asia. Instead, it attempts to offer suggestions for deepening and broadening the conversation on the effects of external agency in regional affairs.

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Analytical framework To ensure the coherence of the volume, the following chapters incorporate responses to the following research questions: 1.

2. 3.

4.

5.

What is the nature of the international actor under discussion? Why it became involved in Central Asia? What is its scope? Whom does it affect? What is the understanding of state-building and democratization that this international actor represents? What theoretical and methodological approaches have been employed in understanding and explaining the state-building and democratization dynamics of this international actor? What does the explanation and understanding of this international actor’s agency tell us about the nature and concerns of contemporary Central Asian politics? What critical perspectives, revisions, and developments does it suggest in regard to the theories it has been informed by?

The analytical setting provided by these queries assists with the construction of the comparable between the distinct contexts of the different international actors involved in Central Asia (Kavalski and Zolkos, 2008, p. 8). At the same time, the parallel assessment of the contributions framed through these research questions permits the use of a spectrum of approaches across the following chapters, which do not demand the recourse to a single epistemology or methodology in explaining the phenomenon and instances of external agency in Central Asia.

Outline of contributions No volume, not even one as encompassing as this one, can be completely comprehensive in its coverage of the external actors involved in Central Asia. In fact, the provision of an exhaustive inventory of the international agency in the region — even if it was possible — is not the objective of this collection. Instead the intention is to provide a set of cases, perspectives, challenges, and priorities that offer

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relevant approaches to the study of moving targets in a changing environment. The volume is divided into three parts. The first one details the agency of several international organizations in Central Asia. The section outlines the roles and agency of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union and the United Nations. Such overview assists a comparative assessment of the actorness of these international bodies. The second part of the volume examines the Central Asian involvement of several states. Included in this section are China, Russia, the United States, Turkey, Iran, India, and Japan. Again the study of the Central Asian policies of these states assists the parallel assessment of the distinct international identities that they project in the region. It has to be acknowledged that the division between the agency of states and international organizations is somewhat artificial. For instance, the discussion of the Central Asian agency of NATO is closely intertwined with the regional involvement of the United States, which is discussed in the second part of the volume. At the same time, the discussion of the Central Asian agency of China can have equally be included in the first part of the volume as Beijing’s regional engagement is largely framed by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Finally, the third part of the volume discusses the possible trajectories for external agency in Central Asia and the dynamics that are likely to affect the prospective patterns of international involvement.

Conclusion The phenomenon of the proliferation of international agency in Central Asia is part of the ongoing collapse of different geopolitical areas into a single globalized network of inter-regional interactions. Paradoxically, it was the establishment of the ancient Silk Road that set this process in motion, by bringing into contact — and eventually merging — the regional frameworks of Europe, Africa, West Asia with the one of East Asia via the Central Asian region (Cioffi-Revilla, 2006, p. 89). In this respect, the significance of Central Asia is likely

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to increase in the context of broadening and deepening the dynamics of globalization. In this respect, commentators have pointed out that the post-Cold War rediscovery of Central Asia by the world “was always going to be a traumatic and dangerous process” (Lewis, 2008, p. 3). Without negating, nor accepting the validity of the claim, this volume undertakes an investigation of the involvement of external actors in the region. Thus, “what seems at first glance as an artificial patchwork” of contingent post-Soviet states both gains facticity through the patterns of international relations and “makes new sense by adapting to the evolutive geostrategy of an area in the making” (Roy, 2000, p. 200). The sense of trauma and danger arises from the failure to provide the overwhelming majority of the Central Asian populations with the opportunity for independent lives. This condition contrast the experience of the states in which those populations live in and whose independence from the Soviet Union appears to have been translated into a structural capacity for international promiscuity — the ability to engage with a range of external actors to ensure the survival of Central Asian regimes. The impact of international actors on Central Asian societies is deliberately skimmed over. The reason is that external efforts are targeted exclusively at state-elites and building statelevel institutional arrangements (Kavalski, 2008a). The choice for leaving this lacuna open intends to draw attention to this disturbing feature of international agency. It is not least because of international disentanglement from social concerns that there is a growing detachment of regional populations from the states they inhabit. In other words, international actors furnish the capacities of authoritarian and repressive regimes, whose appeal among local populations is tied to external assistance. Thus, there emerges a marked distinction between state and society (or informal social networks) in the region, which did not seem to exist at the time of the dissolution of the USSR. As commentators have asserted the “boundary between the state and society [in Central Asia] was purposefully blurred” by the Soviet system “in accordance with the vision of creating a heroic-Leninist state” and in an attempt to prevent the development of independent societal organizations that could

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become alternative hubs of power and resistance (Luong, 2004, p. 24). Consequently, the withdrawal into the informal system of clan networking and structures of patronage provides alternative mechanisms for political mobilization (Collins, 2006, p. 11). Bearing this in mind, Pickering (2007) has argued that international actors interested in the stability of Eurasia need to desist the temptations to dismiss such societal networks as “backward”. Instead, the existence of these informal structures reflects “a practical approach [for survival] that is born out of necessity and tied to experience”. The authoritarian framework of awkward statehood in Central Asia has compelled regional populations to develop indigenous structures for adaptation. Thus, the formal state structures — maintained and buttressed by international agency — fail to resonate with the citizens of Central Asian states “fomenting disillusionment and encouraging reliance on the informal ties that, as with prior generations, helped ordinary people cope with the political institutions that do not appear to offer them a better life” (Pickering, 2007, pp. 165–188). International actors in this regard bolster the hold on power of regional state-elites. The understanding provided by this volume inscribes itself within the project of “lifting people as individuals and groups out of structural and contingent oppression” (Booth, 2007, p. 110). Such an endeavor entails not only holding regional leaders to account, but also the agency of external actors. It is hoped that this volume will contribute to this critical conversation. Returning to Lord Curzon’s words in the epigraph to this chapter, the dynamics of international agency in Central Asia seem to suggest that the “expiring drama of realistic romance” is still being enacted in the region and the stakes for all involved are as high as the principles to which they are held accountable.

Related Websites On the region Cambridge Central Asia Forum: http://www.cambridge-centralasia.org. Central Asian Gateway: http://www.cagateway.org.

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Central Asian page of Global Voices: http://globalvoicesonline.org/-/world/ central-asia-caucasus/. Central Asian Voices: http://www.centralasianvoices.org/. Eurasia Heritage Foundation, Analytical Resources: http://www.eurasian home.org. Eurasia Research Center: http://eurasia-research.com/erc/homepage.htm. News Central Asia: http://www.newscentralasia.net/. Reporting Central Asia: http://www.iwpr.net/?p=rca&s=p&o=-&apc_state= henh. Resources on Central Asia at http://www.cc.utah.edu/~jwr9311/MENA/ National/Cenasia.html. Russian and Eurasian Security Network: http://www.res.ethz.ch/.

By country Kazakhstan Government of Kazakhstan: http://www.government.kz/. Assessment Risk Group: http://www.risk.kz. International Institute for Modern Politics: http://www.iimp.kz. Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies: http://www.kisi.kz.

Kyrgyzstan Government of Kyrgyzstan: http://www.gov.kg/. Center for Social and Economic Research: http://netkey.bishkek.su/case/. Institute for Public Policy: http://www.ipp.kg. International Republican Institute: http://www.iri.kg/. Social Research Center: http://www.src.auca.kg/index.php.

Tajikistan Association for the Development of Science and Education: http://www. education.tajnet.com/. Tajikistan Development Gateway: http://www.tajik-gateway.org. Tajikistan Information Portal: http://tajikistan.tajnet.com/.

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Turkmenistan Government of Turkmenistan: http://www.turkmenistan.gov.tm/. Turkmenistan Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights: http://www. tmhelsinki.org. Turkmenistan Chronicle: http://www.chrono-tm.org/. Turkmenistan News: http://turkmenistannews.net/.

Uzbekistan Government of Uzbekistan: http://www.gov.uz/. Center for Economic Research: http://www.cer.uz. Institute for Strategic and Interregional Research: http://www.uzstrateg.info. Uzbekistan News: http://www.uzland.uz/.

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Part One

THE CENTRAL ASIAN AGENCY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

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NATO’s Partnership with Central Asia: Cooperation à la carte Simon J. Smith and Emilian Kavalski

Introduction Owing to the Cold War context of its emergence, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has mainly be seen as a military defence alliance aimed at the protection of Western Europe from a Soviet invasion. In connection with that aim, NATO (and the United States in particular) had a vested interest in preventing any one power from dominating Europe. With regard to Central Asia, it is assumed here that the aim of the Alliance is similar — preventing any one power from dominating the region. Such understanding reflects NATO’s transformation during the 1990s which indicated that the Alliance did perceive itself not only as a mechanism of collective defence, but also as an organization indispensable to the projection and maintenance of international order (Webber, 2002). In this respect, NATO’s relationship with Central Asia evolves along two interrelated levels. Firstly, NATO has an obvious involvement in the region as a result of its ongoing mission in Afghanistan. Secondly, NATO is encouraging the Central Asian states to make the difficult transition from authoritarian regimes to systems of governance that are more transparent, open, and equitable. This aim is assisted through the various programs for defence and security sector reform developed by the Alliance. Both these levels indicate distinct instruments for international socialization through NATO programs, which are characterized by explicit conditionality of compliance (i.e., inclusion) and punishment 29

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(i.e., exclusion) which reiterate its underlying objective of introducing a pattern of peaceful state behavior (Kavalski, 2008a, p. 155). The claim here is that NATO’s agency is becoming increasingly marginalized in the dynamics of the “new great game”. The required qualification relates to the difficulty of evaluating the Alliance’s roles in Central Asia independent of the agency of its key member state — the United States. Commentators have therefore insisted that “only the United States and NATO can create an effective system of security and support stability in this region” (Rumer, 2005, p. 63). It would therefore seem that (as indicated in Chap. Eight) NATO’s trajectories in Central Asia follow the destiny of Washington’s agency. The assessment of this chapter proceeds by briefly outlining the trajectories of NATO’s evolution (especially, in the post-Cold War period). It then details the various instruments employed by the Alliance in its engagement of Central Asia. Such an analysis assists in teasing out NATO’s strategies and tactics for dealing with the complexity of the region. In this respect, the chapter evaluates the statebuilding and regionalization effects of NATO in Central Asia.

NATO Today In the early 1960s, Stanley Hoffman (1963, p. 547) queried whether “the Atlantic subsystem [would] remain an essential component, even if the Soviet Union should give up all hopes of world expansion, even if the communist camp should split into two rival groups, i.e., even if the Cold War should stop being the relationship of major tension”? Although Hoffman’s expectation of a “friendly separation” between the American and European pillars of NATO seems to be coming true, the continuing persistence of the Alliance as an international actor is in itself evidence of the resilience of its security community nature (Deutsch et al., 1957). NATO’s original role was the protection of Western Europe from a perceived imminent attack by the Soviet Union and its allies from the Warsaw Pact. Thus, the creation of the Alliance was driven by the need to minimize the cost of defence through a collective security mechanism. In the hackneyed expression of NATO’s first Secretary-General Lord Ismay, its purpose was “to keep

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the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down” (cited in Kavalski, 2008a, p. 157). However, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, NATO’s raison d’être and the continued need of its security umbrella were called into question. Many a commentator have suggested that the Alliance is bound to disappear in the absence of its “founding” enemy and questioned the logic behind the adoption of a “flexible” (if not diluting) institutional adaptations. Without wishing to adjudicate on the validity of those claims, the assumption is that instead of disappearing, the complex transformation initiated by NATO in response to the challenges of “the new world order” (Bush, 1991) ensured its viability as international (security) actor. Most notably these alterations were in the areas of enlargement, the shift to “out-of-area” — that is, “out-of-Europe” (Kavalski, 2008a, p. 86) — operations, and the development of new capabilities to address current challenges. These institutional adaptations have asserted initially the Alliance’s centrality as a European and then as a global security actor. Consequently, NATO has sought to develop partnerships with states that are (to varying degrees) interested to benefit from its outreach programs. These transformations have permitted the Alliance to pursue its order-promoting goals by differentiating between “new, soon-to-be, would-be, and not-to-be members” (Krahman, 2003, p. 4). These strategic adaptations implicate the “deeper structure of values” that maintains the legitimacy of the Alliance (Webber, 2002, p. 44). In this context, NATO’s engagement in Central Asia confirms that the Alliance’s “entire agenda is pivoting from an inward focus on Europe to an outward focus” (Burns, 2005). Thus, it is the stabilization of Afghanistan that holds the key to NATO’s surge in the Central Asia theater with over 56,000 troops contributing to the ISAF mission. Prior to assessing the various instruments of the NATO–Central Asia relations, it is appropriate to take a brief look at the analytical contexts within which they are positioned. As already hinted, realist approaches were skeptical about NATO’s continued longevity. Kenneth Waltz, in particular, famously asserted that although NATO’s days are not numbered, “its years are” (Waltz, 1993, p. 76). It would appear, however, that as a result of its expansion and transformation, the

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Alliance is here to stay. In other words, the end of the Cold War challenged but did not remove NATO’s shared politico-military culture and its institutionalized provision of collective security (Kavalski, 2008a, p. 160). Therefore, the claim is that closer relations with the Alliance — “regardless of whether it is debased or not” — is likely to “provide Eurasian states with a reassuring security guarantee” (Sperling, 2003, p. 17). Thus, NATO’s persistence projects “a view grounded on the assumption that NATO’s integrity and purpose have never depended solely on the existence of an external threat” (Moore, 2008). This approach assumes that NATO has always been more than just a defensive Alliance and that, in fact, since its formation it has been grounded on a secondary function as well — that of a political community. For instance, Manfred Wörner (1990), the then NATO Secretary-General suggested that (procedurally) NATO is a paragon of western standards: “NATO is not simply an alliance of threat or intimidation. It is a model of partnership, success and a vision of a Europe of peace and freedom”. Building on its experience of providing a secure space for the nurture and practice of liberal democratic values, the Alliance’s post-Cold War agenda gradually developed and asserted a more explicitly normative language about its purpose and practices (Kavalski, 2008a, p. 160). Thus, institutional arguments, such as Rob de Wijk’s (1998), propose that during the Cold War years, “NATO transformed from a traditional military alliance for collective defence into a political-military organization for security cooperation with an extensive bureaucracy and complex decision-making process”. While the political function of the Alliance never developed to the same extent as its military one, the opportunity which joint consultations offered “for airing grievances, compromise and consensus-building played a key role in the development of the institutional form of a mutual defence pact” (Kay, 1998, p. 24). In other words, this political-military mixture not only helped to defend Europe from the Soviet threat, but it also helped to reduce historical tensions and suspicions between the member states. This process of normative alignment was the result of intense elite socialization which initiated a “NATO Spirit” (Kavalski, 2008a, p. 157).

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It is therefore, the institutional arrangements of the Alliance that provided a “the skeletal framework, which held the western security community together, but the various webs which linked the community together often rose above a tangible inter-institutional dimension, to the sphere of cultural and social norms” (Aybet, 2000, p. 1). In this respect, social constructivist approaches argue that the glue holding NATO together has always been more than just a common enemy. Instead, a sense of shared goals and values has also contributed to the formation and persistence of NATO’s strategic culture. Thus, the multilateralism on which the Alliance was forged developed its own socializing environment among the members and facilitated the development of a practice of trust. The institutional interaction of NATO made it possible to affect the preferences of participating elites by acquainting them with the “preferences or beliefs, or environmental constraints” of the others (Wallander et al., 1999, p. 12). Thus, “realist and neoliberal scholars largely ignore NATO’s vital role in shaping state preferences in ways that have served to promote both military cooperation and the growth of liberal democratic institutions and practices well beyond the borders of NATO” (Moore, 2008). It is this ability of the Alliance to impact the interactions among its members on both societal and decision-making levels that Bradley Klein (1990, p. 319) calls “the genius of NATO”: By effectively wedding itself to the defense of distinctly modern, Western, Atlantico-centric cultural project, strategic discourse deflected criticism of the Alliance’s otherwise obvious contradictions… NATO’s strategy was thus the only feasible means of securing that precarious historical construct called “the Western way of life”.

Bearing these perspectives in mind, the contention here is that the engagement with NATO’s Central Asian agency can benefit from an eclectic theoretical view. Such an eclectic approach is informed by (i) the understanding that the disciplinary paradigms of international relations are commensurate and can be mediated; and (ii) the suggestion that, on the one hand, rationalist theories are more compelling when they are combined with ideational insights into effects

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of norms and identities, while, on the other hand, the explanatory value of constructivist propositions is expanded by a focus on power (Kavalski, 2008a, p. 5). Thus, NATO’s involvement in Central Asia can be explained through its willingness to defend the normative underpinnings of the Euro-Atlantic space from the strategic threats emanating from the region. The Alliance therefore finds itself balances between the provision of hard security and the promotion of liberal democratic norms. At the same time, such balancing act is complicated by NATO’s intergovernmental character. Thus, NATO’s agency in Central Asia is often hampered not only by the idiosyncrasies of working in a volatile environment, but also by the difficulties of reaching an agreement between the allies.

NATO’s Instruments of Engagement Recognizing the need to upgrade its relations with non-member, at its Brussels Summit in January 1994, the Alliance launched the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, which still provides the core framework for NATO’s relations with Central Asia. The PfP is more often not discussed in the context of NATO’s subsequent decision to enlarge (as it initially was preoccupied with the post-communist transitions of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe); thereby, it is traditionally described as a halfway house to membership. Such tendency, however, overlooks its broader framework of relations. Thus, although enlargement was presupposed by the PfP, its rationale was (and still is) serving purposes larger than enlargement (Kavalski, 2008a, p. 162). In other words, its development was a clear indication that NATO realized its initial handicap to engage the countries of the former Soviet Bloc “since the ‘politics of exclusion’ was its raison d’étre. [Thus], we have the paradoxical outcome that it is NATO the has practiced most effectively the ‘politics of inclusion’ with the institutional innovations of the NACC, EAPC, and the PfP” (Sperling, 2003, p. 15). The PfP offers participation in “political and military bodies at NATO Headquarters with respect to partnership activities”. The rationale behind the initiative is to “increase stability, diminish threats

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to peace, and build strengthened relationships by promoting the spirit of practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles”. Furthermore, the initiative entails “field exercises”, “joint military activities”, and the capacity for “liaison officers” to participate in the Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC) located at NATO’s headquarters in Mons, Belgium (NATO, 1994). The NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer maintains that the PfP “will ensure that the unique strategic value of [the Alliance] remains high. Today’s global challenges require global answers. PfP [is] an important part of the response” (RFE/RL Newsline, 5 November 2004). The rationale for the partners depends on their relations with the Alliance. For NATO membership-aspirants, it is the prospect of accession; for the rest, it is either an interest in the promotion of stability deriving from their compatibility/concurrence with NATO security interests as defined in the 1991 and 1999 Strategic Concepts; or an instrumental benefit from the import of know-how and expertise from NATO; or the value-added of legitimacy from inclusion (Kavalski, 2008a, p. 163). In this respect, PfP not only helps to institutionalize partnership into a “permanent fixture” of “associated membership” (Ulrich, 1999, p. 3), but also offers strategic incentives for a state’s alignment with NATO by lowering the cost of security cooperation. As Joshua Spero (2003, p. 170) explains, PfP can therefore be perceived as an association of “non-predatory bandwagoning states” — i.e., states which: try to attain gains not through aggression, but from extending the bandwagoning state’s value system. Encouraged by NATO, PfP states have sought to institutionalize the values of cooperative security even if they do not actually seek formal NATO membership… [The] objective of bandwagoning centers on the opportunity for a state to gain by joining the security system it values, the state determines that its costs to achieve security defensively might be lower than to defend the existing order, which may be more unfavorable. The security system comprises a stronger state or a coalition of stronger states and the bandwagoning state attempts to align, usually during a time of geopolitical change, and not in a

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manner threatening to other states — especially those states outside security institutions.

Such bandwagoning interactions are structured by a “Partnership Framework Document”, which sets out the normative framework of relations by reaffirming the participant’s commitments to the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Helsinki Final Act. Contained within such a comprehensive agenda are a series of compartmentalized initiatives that seek to address the more specific areas in which NATO has unique expertise and experience. The PfP is thereby construed as a multilateral framework for participating countries to implement tailor-made policies. The program provides partners with an extensive menu from which they can choose those specific options that best suit their individual needs. From the point of view of the Alliance, the PfP’s strategic role of order-promotion is thus an effect of its policy of “inclusion” of partners. Participation (or inclusion) advances a perception of a common purpose among the partners, which tends to facilitate their cooperation both with NATO and among themselves. In contrast, exclusion (non-participation in the PfP and other partnership initiatives) hinders the socialization of non-partners and instead subjects them to the possibility of a coercive disciplining (Kavalski, 2008a, p. 162). All five of the Central Asian countries are members of the PfP with Tajikistan joining only in 2002, while the rest have been involved almost from the beginning of the program in 1994. Yet, it has to be acknowledged that “it is primarily since the launching of the Allied operations in Afghanistan that NATO has become aware of the essential role that the states of Central Asia can play with regard to the stability of the region” (NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2008). Confirming this trend are the current discussions to position Central Asia within a “26+5+1” forum (i.e., NATO member states plus the Central Asian republics plus Afghanistan). NATO proclaims that cooperation with Central Asia manifests itself in five “key areas”: security cooperation, defence and security sector reform, disaster preparedness and response, science and environmental cooperation, and addressing issues of public awareness (NATO Backgrounder, 2007).

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The initiative contained within the first two areas — security cooperation and defence and security sector reform — impact most dramatically on NATO’s state-building and regionalization strategy in Central Asia. With the start of the war in Afghanistan, these issue areas have been the main concern for all players involved the “new great game” and have, in many ways, become fundamentally juxtaposed to one another. In other words, addressing NATO’s strategic interests in Central Asia has often conflicted with the objectives of democracy promotion. It is important to highlight this juxtaposition as its dilemmas undermine the Alliance’s leverage in the region. The broader pattern of relations between NATO and the Central Asian states indicates that regional actors tend to be swayed into cooperation only if they stand to gain in terms of military training and resources (which are often used to strengthen the hold on power of regional regimes). Although some states has embraced PfP more than others, it is fair to conclude that none of the five Central Asian states has come close to the levels of reform enacted by even the laggards among the Central and East European countries. Consequently, the nature of PfP cooperation reflects the extent to which local regimes are willing to concede some practices in order to gain access to NATO’s expertise in military affairs. What has made this situation even more challenging for NATO is the proliferation of external agency in the region which puts it in a position to contend for the attention of Central Asian states. At the same time, the need to maintain the viability of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan has diminished the Alliance’s insistence on its normative agenda due to the need to safeguard critical security interests. In this respect, NATO has worked with Central Asian governments on developing mutual understanding through the Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T). The Alliance proposes that PAP-T “facilitates greater intelligence sharing and cooperation in areas such as border security, terrorism-related training and exercises, the development of capabilities for defense against terrorist attack and for managing the consequences of such an attack” (NATO, 2008a). In terms of state-building and regionalization in Central Asia, it is NATO’s focus on defence and security sector reform that are

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especially relevant. NATO’s key instrument in this regard is the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP). PARP is a wide-ranging initiative that aims to tackle issues ranging from interoperability between local military forces and NATO forces to reforms that encourage democratic control over military and defense institutions. PARP is negotiated individually with each partner country and it aims to develop “a planning and review process, designed to provide a basis for identifying and evaluating forces and capabilities which might be made available for multinational training, exercises and operations in conjunction with Alliance forces” (NATO Handbook, 2002). The Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB) is NATO’s leading initiative with regard to helping other states democratically reform their defense and security institutions. The underlying assumption of the Alliance is that regional stability will only be achieved when defense and security structures are put under transparent civilian control (NATO, 2007). Finally, the PfP Trust Funds have been put in place in order to help the Central Asian states tackle issues concerning the demilitarization of weapon stockpiles as well as removing dangerous ordinances such as anti-personnel landmines. According to NATO, between 2000 and 2008, over 40 million Euros have gone towards Trust Fund projects. Ideally, NATO would like to see all Central Asian republics to sign Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAPs). These two-year plans, launched at NATO’s 2002 Prague Summit, have been developed in order “to bring together all the various cooperation mechanisms through which a Partner country interacts with the Alliance” (NATO, 2008c). Although, none of these states has the intention of joining the Alliance, IPAPs are seen as a more determined commitment on behalf of the partner country to undertake the prescribed reform process. However, to date only Kazakhstan has signed an IPAP with NATO (2006). Thus, the key words in understanding the PfP socialization dynamic are interoperability and self-differentiation. The interoperability concept advances not only the required defense adaptations of the partners, but also harmonization of their operational and political planning. Self-differentiation, on the other hand, allows the

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partners to define their own place in the program — aspirants and non-aspirants — as well as the intensity of their partnership with the Alliance (Kavalski, 2008a, p. 164). However, as the case of Central Asia indicates the instrumental export of know-how and the ideational export of values, which frame NATO’s partnership activities in the region, are not necessarily assured to promote socialization into (let alone, internalization of) the promoted patterns of behavior in an environment where the Alliance is vying for the attention of regional states. Attesting to the dynamics of a “new great game” in Central Asia, Kazakhstan’s ambassador has revealed that his country “does not discriminate, whether it is north or south or east or west [that provides the assistance]… if it serves our needs we are happy” (Idrissov, 2008). Central Asia therefore provides a qualitatively new context for NATO’s post-Cold War agency.

The Effectiveness of NATO as an Enabler of Reform NATO’s main contribution to state-building is its experience in civil–military relations. The reality of the “new great game”, however, has ushered a situation in which the Central Asian states can choose à la carte from NATO’s menu of options as they see fit. Consequently, the Alliance’s partnerships in the region have been termed “not very meaningful in practical terms” (NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2008). Such a conclusion raises the question “whether NATO itself can adequately adapted to the dramatically changed 21st-century environment by going sufficiently beyond its core Atlantic orientation” (Spero, 2003, p. 180). NATO has engaged Central Asia with a flexible attitude (and with a somewhat optimistic hope) that such a dialog can initiate a genuine reform process. Although there are certain multilateral dimensions to NATO’s engagement with the region, the reality is that all the relationships the Alliance has built with the Central Asian states are primarily focused on the individual needs of the respective countries. When it comes to leverage, the only tool that NATO really has is the threat of disengagement. So far this has not occurred and with the persisting insecurity of Afghanistan, it seems unlikely to happen in the

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near future. Instead, more often the case is that individual Central Asian states have opted to reduce the depth of their relations with NATO more than the other way round. It is perhaps best to consider NATO’s involvement and approach to Central Asia in terms of three distinct periods. The first period runs from the fall of the Soviet Union up until 11 September 2001 (9/11). Although NATO was active in the region through its PfP program from the early 1990s, Central Asia was marginal to its agenda of securing the peaceful transition of the Central and East European states into Western security structures. Moreover, the Alliance appeared “disappointed by the lack of progress and perspective” (Roy, 2000, p. ix). Thus, it was as a result of the “war on terror” and the invasion of Afghanistan that Central Asia moved to the center of NATO’s strategic attention. This interest not only stemmed from the need to secure supply roots for the ISAF mission, but also targeted the proliferation of terrorism and Islamic extremism in the region. Therefore, this second period — lasting from 9/11 until the USled invasion of Iraq in 2003 — was a time of relative cooperation, not only between NATO and the individual Central Asian states, but more broadly between the West (broadly defined) and Russia and China. It is the experience of “non-predatory bandwagoning” that convinced some commentators to insist that the “original strategic rationale for the PfP, enhancing stability among, and practical cooperation with the countries along NATO’s periphery, has become even more compelling in the context of NATO’s further enlargement, the war on terrorism, growing Western interest in Southwest and Central Asia, and the rise of authoritarian and neoimperialist sentiments in Russia” (Simon, 2004). This provided a facilitating environment for NATO to establish its presence in the region. However, the fact that this cooperation was taking place in the context of both a “war on terror” and a war in Afghanistan indicates that attention was concentrated more on securing local support for military operations such as PAP-T and PARP and less on reform initiatives such as PAP-DIB. The third period — beginning from 2003 onwards — witnessed a dramatic decrease in NATO’s influence in state-building and

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regionalization in Central Asia. The strategic shift of attention to the occupation of Iraq, the “color revolutions” in Georgia and the Ukraine, but most notably the 2005 Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan were perceived, sent a direct message to the other Central Asian rulers as threatening the survival of their regimes (Rumer, 2006, p. 149). In this context, while NATO still requires support for its mission in Afghanistan, regional regimes are much less inclined to accept externally set conditions on their support (Tynan, 2009). Consequently, NATO member states will have to continue to “temper their criticism of democratic shortcomings in order to safeguard strategically important fixed assets” (Cooley, 2008c, p. 1174).

NATO’s Approach to Regionalization As stated, there has been a push to link NATO’s partnerships in Central Asia to Afghanistan under the “26+5+1” framework. The Alliance identifies this as opening up an alternative relationship for the Central Asian republics with South Asia. Thus, in the area of regionalization, NATO’s central aim seems to be convincing regional states that they have other options aside from Russia and China. Where NATO has had more success with regionalization programs has been in the area of disaster response, scientific and environmental projects, and information sharing. An instance of this trend is the “Virtual Silk Highway” project — which has extended internet access to research facilities in the region. However, NATO alone is not a driving force behind Central Asian regionalization. NATO sees itself as one aspect of the West’s much broader multidimensional policy which includes a security aspect and it also encompasses economic, social, and governance aspects. In this respect, owing to the bilateral nature of the PfP process, the following sections offer sketches of NATO’s relations with the individual Central Asian states.

Kazakhstan In a commentary, Roger McDermott has suggested that “the relationship between Kazakhstan and NATO has deepened considerably

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as a result of 9/11, Kazakhstan’s role in Peace Support Operations (PSO) in Iraq and Nazarbayev’s capitalization on the rupture in NATO’s relations with neighboring Uzbekistan” (McDermott, 2007b, p. 17). Maybe more to the point is that Kazakhstan has been very adept at extracting exactly what it wants from all the major actors (Russia, China, and the United States) in the region, while at the same time not upsetting any one of them in a way that would risk ongoing relations. While Kazakhstan may be NATO’s “anchor in Central Asia”, it would be over presumptuous to assume that the cooperation achieved to date is anything more than one based on the self-serving nature described above (McDermott, 2007b, p. 16). Kazakhstan, unlike any other states in the region, does participate in the “full spectrum” of PfP programs (NATO Backgrounder, 2007). The most important of which is the IPAP it signed in 2006. Some NATO representatives have called it “the best IPAP among the Alliance Partner countries” (McDermott, 2007b, p. 14). Kazakhstan has a representation at PCC. According to NATO documentation, Kazakhstan has attempted to pass on the experience it has gained through cooperation through the PARP to other states in the region. There is no reason to believe that the nature of the NATO– Kazakhstan relationship will alter drastically in the future. NATO is all too aware of the country’s proximity to Russia and the relationship the two former Soviet actors retain.

Uzbekistan Uzbekistan is a prime example of NATO’s difficulties in Central Asia. A recent report described the Alliance’s relationship in the country as “virtually non-existent or at least on standby” (NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2008, p. 76). This has been the case ever since 2005 the brutal suppression of the Andijan uprising in 2005. This event has clearly indicated NATO’s quandary of training local armed forces, which are then used against regional populations. The sense of “guilty by association” has been exacerbated by the demands of fighting a “global war on terror”.

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Once again, the lack of any real leverage over Uzbekistan has meant that the only way NATO can encourage reforms is through negative incentives. In the case of Uzbekistan, this has meant “strict minimum co-operation with the most reprehensible regimes” (NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 2008, p. 78). Uzbekistan’s cooperation before the Andijan crisis was improving. It had agreed to a PARP, which lasted from 2002 until 2005. It even had been developing an IPAP with NATO. Uzbekistan, however, still maintains representation at the PCC.

Tajikistan Being the weakest state in Central Asia, Tajikistan is adversely conducive to spillover from Afghanistan with regard to security and issues such as illegal trade and drug-trafficking. It has set aside an “infantry platoon to support PfP activities within Tajikistan” (NATO, 2009a). Border security is of primary concern to Tajikistan. This is especially the case with its 1,200-km long border with Afghanistan. Therefore much of Tajikistan’s cooperation with NATO focuses on border security. Tajikistan was the last Central Asian state to join the PfP in 2002. In 2004, Tajikistan signed a transit agreement with NATO and Dushanbe airport has played host to French military aircraft. Tajikistan has also had a small role to play in the building of infrastructure within Afghanistan and helped to secure passage across the Panj River. Through the NATO Trust Funds scheme, it has also contributed to destroying 1,200 anti-personnel landmines. However, Tajikistan is yet to agree a PARP with NATO and it currently has no representation at SHAPE. However, there are current signs that this relationship may be slowly developing. On 11 February 2009, the Tajik President visited NATO headquarters. Discussions centered on border security issues but interest has been tangible in the desire to develop deeper cooperation, possibly even an IPAP. The NATO spokesman James Appathurai commented that discussions related to “a range of areas of cooperation based on the Individual Action Partnership Plan where NATO might provide further assistance to Tajikistan”

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(Appathurai, 2009). Recently, Tajikistan has also agreed to allow “the transit of non-military cargo to Afghanistan by land” (Kozhevnikov, 2009). Yet, NATO has remained wary of the uncertainty and multivector nature of foreign policy in Central Asia.

Kyrgyzstan Kyrgyzstan’s cooperation with NATO has been somewhat mixed. On the one hand, it is the only country, along with Kazakhstan, to have agreed a PARP with the Alliance (2007). Until 2009, the country hosted a US airbase used in operations in Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan has also set aside units for PfP operations, which have been especially active in counter terrorism through the PAP-T. Bishkek has also been involved in crisis management and civil emergency planning operations. But despite this active cooperation, Kyrgyzstan’s motives have been acutely driven by financial incentives — both before and after the 2005 Tulip Revolution. The Tulip Revolution makes Kyrgyzstan a unique case in Central Asia. Although this revolution has been “disappointing” in terms of liberal democratic reforms, it instances Western willingness “to sacrifice stability for the sake of democracy” (Rumer, 2006, p. 148). There is an argument that Western support for this revolution has caused other regimes in the region to shrink away from any cooperation with NATO because of the interference perceived in the demands for robust liberal democratic reforms. This dynamic indicates the Alliance’s difficult balancing act — trying to walk the tightrope of pushing concrete reforms while seeking security cooperation in return.

Turkmenistan Turkmenistan’s commitment to neutrality in the region has meant that it rejects involvement with security alliances and international organizations. In this respect, until the death of President Supramurat Niyazov, Turkmenistan’s cooperation with NATO through the PfP was only rhetorical. It has engaged in almost no cooperation through

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the PfP programs concerning interoperability and security sector reform. However, its long border with Afghanistan has given Turkmenistan an incentive to work with the Alliance on border security issues in the post-9/11 period. Somewhat paradoxically, Turkmenistan does have representation at the PCC. Furthermore, there has been some cooperation in the fields of civil emergency planning, scientific, and environmental affairs. Also, Turkmenistan has recently participated in a NATO-Russia Council “pilot project” on counter-narcotics aimed at Afghan and Central Asian personnel (NATO, 2009b). Desisting from closer cooperation with Turkmenistan has been NATO’s primary leverage approach to the country. Turkmenistan’s human rights record is widely regarded to be the worst from any of the countries in the region. Thus, with minimal influence, NATO has not been able to contribute to the reduction of autocratic policies and human rights abuses. There are some signs that President Berdymukhammedov wants to develop closer ties with NATO. For the moment, however, Turkmenistan insists on maintaining its formal neutrality, which prevents NATO’s involvement in its security sector reform.

Conclusion The chapter has outlined NATO’s difficult relations with Central Asia. In summary, it has been an ambiguous order-promoting actor in the region. As a security organization, NATO has the builtin difficulty of trying to persuade autocratic regimes to loosen their grip on power, while at the same time insisting on their cooperation in order to access bases, transit routes, and over-flight rights for its operation in Afghanistan. Added to this dilemma, NATO also has to be mindful that in training the security forces of these regimes, it does not open itself to accusation of inadvertently contributing to human rights violations. With the West’s perception of the greater Central Asian region skewed by the lenses of the “need to succeed” in Afghanistan, local regimes find themselves able to leverage external demands for democratic reform against the ongoing need for transport

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corridors. This situation appears to serve Central Asian leaders well in their consolidation of power, but it does detract from NATO’s longterm interests. On the one hand, engaging autocratic regimes by training their armed forces has put the Alliance in the precarious position of inadvertently contributing to human rights violations. On the other hand, the demands of the “war on terror” and the need to provide supply routes for its ISAF mission demands that NATO stays actively involved in the region. At the same time, a constraining factor for NATO’s agency has been the realization that its involvement in the region is not assisted by the “carrot” of membership — neither as an offer, nor as a regional desire. Such environment has forced upon the Alliance a flexible cooperation à la carte, which does not lead to the type of reforms that NATO expects. Some have insisted therefore if the underlying logic of the PfP’s “prospect of ‘joining the West’ is to be an effective engine for conduct in accordance with 21st-century standards, it needs to be drained not of its democratization element, but of grounds for suspicion that its true intent is subversive” (Simons, 2008, p. 140). Finally, NATO’s ability to impact Central Asian dynamics has been affected by the involvement of other actors in the region. In particular, Russia and China have proven to offer viable alternatives. In this respect, it seems that the fundamental question for NATO is how does it protect its short-term needs and interests while pursuing its long-term objective of promoting fundamental political reform. This seems to be the leading policy conundrum that NATO needs to address — one on which NATO’s agency in Central Asia depends.

Related Websites Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council: http://www.nato.int/issues/eapc/index. html. International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan): http://www.nato.int/ isaf/index.html.

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NATO website: http://www.nato.int/home.htm. NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program: http://www.nato.int/issues/pfp/ index.html. NATO Parliamentary Assembly: http://www.nato-pa.int/. NATO Review: http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue3/english/ analysis2.html. PfP Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes: http://consortium.pims.org.

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3

The OSCE in the New Central Asia Maria Raquel Freire

Introduction Established during the Cold War as a framework for dialog and cooperation, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) had to reformulate its aims and procedures after dissolution of the Soviet Union. Its constitutive purpose of bridging the divisions between East and West disappeared, and with it its very raison d’être. The post-Cold War decade brought with it profound changes in the international system as well as new challenges requiring nuanced approaches and innovative responses. The CSCE adjusted to the new international setting by redefining its goals and procedures, and establishing new instruments. As a part of this process, in January 1995, it transformed itself into the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). As an organization for peace and cooperation, the OSCE pursues a comprehensive, indivisible, and cooperative approach to security. Inaugurated with the signing of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, this understanding of security was further reinforced after the end of bipolarity as an acknowledgment of the underlying insufficiency of military approaches to respond to the most pressing challenges in the international arena. This process of institutional maturity appeared to demonstrate the organization’s flexibility and adaptation to rapidly changing circumstances. At the same time, and despite the many difficulties and changing circumstances, the OSCE has been able to maintain the viability of its founding principles. In fact, these remain 49

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Maria Raquel Freire

embedded in both its documents and its work: (i) political–military issues; (ii) economic, scientific, and environmental matters; and (iii) human aspects, which constitute the core area of OSCE action. It has to be reminded that the security complex within which the Central Asian countries (mis)alignments take place provides a difficult environment for the exercise of any external agency. Thus, in a broad strategic sense, the context provided by the Central Asian countries presents “a volatile security environment, caused by weak civic and state institutions in the individual states of the region; socioeconomic crises; and ethnic, religious, and political tensions” (Perovic, 2005, p. 62). At the same time, Central Asian states demonstrate differentiated understandings about the definition and necessity of cooperative efforts to address shared problems. Drawing on this broad context, this chapter assesses the OSCE’s involvement in Central Asia. It queries whether the new (post-Cold War) OSCE offers an adequate institutional framework to address regional challenges. The chapter starts by analyzing the OSCE as a normative actor and evaluates its relevance as a security promoter, contributing to the establishment of a Central Asian security community. Such an investigation analyzes how the normatively grounded principles of the organization have been employed in Central Asia and for highlighting the centrality of regional cooperation. Consequently, the chapter assesses the activities and limitations of the OSCE in Central Asia looking at the logic of its involvement, the organization’s commitments and activities, and local perceptions about its role. Despite the organization’s potential, the chapter argues that the OSCE has been unable to define and empower an efficient regional strategy. It concludes by looking at the projected trajectories for the OSCE involvement in Central Asia. In this respect, the investigation makes several critical suggestions for improving its effectiveness in the region.

The OSCE in Central Asia: A Normative Actor with a Comprehensive Security Agenda Since the establishment of the CSCE in 1975, the notion of security within the institutional, policy, and discursive framework of the

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OSCE has been defined in broad terms, concerning not only military aspects — the traditional realist-centered understanding that prevailed throughout the Cold War — but also political, economic, environmental, and social aspects. This broader understanding of security, which has been advanced through the “Europeanization” of postCold War Europe, demonstrates the OSCE’s innovative approach already at the time of the Helsinki consultations (Buzan et al., 1998). Aiming at an inclusive approach to security, the OSCE has linked the collective and the individual levels of security through the commitments and principles enshrined in its different areas of activity. As a result, the OSCE’s comprehensive approach to security “relates the maintenance of peace to the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It links economic and environmental solidarity and cooperation with peaceful interstate relations” (Freire, 2003, p. 10). Such conceptualization also reflects the complex context where relations take place, at the bilateral or multilateral levels, and responding to a multiplicity of challenges, by pressuring, facilitating, directing, or at least, conditioning change. Security in the OSCE area reflects shared notions about democratization and stability-building through the initiation of cooperation as a first step toward the establishment of a security community. At the same time, the issue of security is perceived as transformative not only regarding specific issue-areas but also regarding different decision-making actors and involving (inter) national governmental and non-governmental agents. The OSCE model follows a set of norms and values that underpin the promotion of security within the OSCE-space by (i) championing the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedom; (ii) instigating confidence-building measures and transparency in civil–military relations; and (iii) initiating sustainable economic development and environmental protection. These principles apply equally to all members and define the OSCE’s comprehensive, indivisible, and cooperative understanding of security. In other words, it is: ‘comprehensive’ (it links classic security elements to economic, environmental, cultural, and human rights factors), ‘indivisible’ (one state’s security is inseparable from that of other states), and ‘cooperative’

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(security is based on confidence and cooperation, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and the work of mutually reinforcing multilateral institutions). (Adler, 1998, pp. 119–120).

Building on the now hackneyed definition of security community as “a group [that] has become integrated, where integration is defined as the attainment of a sense of community, accompanied by formal or informal institutions or practices, sufficiently strong and widespread to assure peaceful change among members of a group with ‘reasonable certainty’ over a ‘long’ period of time” (Deutsch et al., 1957, p. 5), Adler and Barnett (1998, p. 30) have advanced its understanding by defining a security community as “a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change”. Achieving even low levels of intra regional cooperation in Central Asia is not an easy task. The OSCE approach toward the region has tended to reflect the (West European) liberal democratic model — i.e., the OSCE’s understanding of security is informed by the promotion of rules and norms (Warkotsch, 2007, p. 491), which seek to “lay the foundation for a liberal transnational collective understanding in the area from Vancouver to Vladivostok” (Adler, 1998, p. 121). This normative approach has underpinned the OSCE’s work since its inception — as is evidenced by its efforts at creating a sense of community, fostering dialog between East and West during the Cold War and generating support for nascent civil societies (Adler, 1998, p. 121). Nevertheless, despite the fact that the OSCE member states are politically committed to the organization’s principles, this does not mean that members uphold these norms equally and universally. With regard to Central Asia, the countries of the region form a heterogeneous set of actors, with distinct political cultures, different levels of social and economic development, and differentiated foreign policy goals. Simultaneously, and as a parallel to existing differences, the countries in the area share concerns about the growing threats from Islamic terrorism, illegal trafficking, transnational organized crime,

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and other illicit activities which contribute to insecurity in the region. In addition, to quote Warkotsch (2007): The social fabric of Central Asian societies is made up from an intermixture of traditional institutions like family, kinship and clan affiliations and loyalties. The underlying culture of these networks is not democratic, but authoritarian, patrimonial, and personal — none of them compatible with Western governance norms. (Warkotsch, 2007, p. 499).

The issue is that contrary to what could be expected, the main opponents to democratization are in many instances not faith-based groups, but secular authoritarian regimes (Roy, 2005, p. 1002). Central Asia is an intracontinental corridor exposed to different influences which impact on its development policies, security-building options, and strategic alignments. Moreover, Soviet modes of rule are still very much present in Central Asian states. At the same time, the current period of “imitative democracy” is a part and parcel of a complex borrowing mechanism that attempts to come to terms with the status and experiences of independence. This seems to have allowed an excessive personalization of decision making — i.e., the development of personality cults — which shifts on a spectrum between outright despotism and soft authoritarianism. In practice, the triad between individual-society-state does not exist in a number of Central Asian states and civil society appears to be absent. There also seems to be additional difficulties in introducing new governing practices in the region as a result of the availability of (clashing) models of development, in particular the ones peddled by Russia and China, as well as diverse political, religious, and clan affiliations and their impact on state-elites (Imanaliev, 2008). These dynamics provide the context for the OSCE’s involvement in Central Asia.

The OSCE in Central Asia: Involvement and Purpose Stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostock, with a membership of 56 states and a constrained access to resources, the OSCE’s main

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zones of operation have been in the countries of former Yugoslavia and the states that emerged from the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The OSCE’s expanded agenda — linking the organization’s three dimensions (politico-military, economic and environmental, and human) in a combined approach — is present at the decision-making level, in the activities of its main institutions, such as the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, and the Office of the OSCE Coordinator on Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA), as well as in the mandates of its field offices. These have, in fact, become the fundamental vehicles for the implementation of OSCE commitments, through increased contacts between the different OSCE Missions, which enhances the level of sharing of good practices and facilitates the development of alternative approaches to common problems (Freire, 2005, pp. 193–194). This type of regional networking for the promotion of the organization’s guiding principles has proven problematic in Central Asia. The five Central Asian republics became CSCE member states in 1992, shortly after their independence. Thus, “with the exception of Tajikistan [due to the outbreak of civil war in May 1992], the countries of Central Asia have all in all peacefully gone through the collapse of the Soviet Union and their separation from each other” (Salber, 2001, p. 276). In this respect, from the point of view of the OSCE, the overall situation in the region indicates that — despite local specificities and the particular case of Tajikistan — most of the problems are shared, and demand the enactment of a regional approach. This is an aspect often highlighted in the organization’s documents, but as it will be explained, it does not mean that the OSCE has a clear strategic approach to Central Asia. The OSCE’s involvement in Central Asia dates back to the mid1990s, when it set up the OSCE Mission to Tajikistan (in February 1994) in support of political reconciliation, democracy-building, and respect for human rights. In 1995, it opened the Central Asian Liaison Office (CALO) with headquarters in Tashkent (Uzbekistan), whose goal was to bring the Central Asian states closer to the organization.

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The CALO’s tasks involved the promotion of contacts and exchange of information as well as the implementation of human development projects in collaboration with the ODIHR, particularly on gender issues, migration, and election assistance. In December 2000, CALO was renamed as the OSCE Center — a change, which had to indicate the enhanced presence of the OSCE in Central Asia. By that time, the organization had already opened field offices in January 1999 in Ashgabad (Turkmenistan), Astana (Kazakhstan), and Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan). These developments were reinforced by the decision to establish OSCE Offices also in Osh, Kyrgyzstan (from April 2000); to rename the Center in Almaty as OSCE Center in Astana, from June 2007 (the OSCE keeps nevertheless a small presence in Almaty); and to rename the OSCE Mission to Tajikistan as the OSCE Center in Dushanbe (in October 2002) and more recently as the OSCE Office in Tajikistan (June 2008) with five field delegations mandated to follow the regional political and security situation, in Guam, Khujand, Kulyab, Kungan-Teppa, and Shartuz. Such transformations, as has been evidenced by the experience of the OSCE mission to Tajikistan, underline the “substantial changes in the socio-political and socio-economic life” of the region as well as the willingness of Central Asian states “to further strengthen co-operation with the OSCE” (PC Decision 852, June 2008). These changes are also indicative of a different kind of OSCE involvement as a result of the improved situation in Central Asia — i.e., its perceived relative stability in comparison to the early 1990s. At the same time, such an enhanced and individualized presence has arguably strengthened the OSCE’s role in the region. Such increase in the visibility of the OSCE had to indicate that it no longer regards the region as merely a part “of the larger reconfiguration of a postcommunist ‘security space’” (Allison, 2004, p. 466). Usually the references to Central Asia in the organization’s main documents have tended to be broadly formulated — though always emphasizing the OSCE’s normative character — appealing to the promotion of the OSCE’s commitments and principles in the area, with a clear focus on enhancing the dynamics of regional integration. OSCE’s principles cut across the three main dimensions of its activity, including

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the politico-military dimension with counter-terrorism activities, concerted actions to combat violent extremism, organized crime, drug and arms trafficking; in the human dimension, the monitoring of electoral processes, along with democracy promotion, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; and increased cooperation in economic and environmental issues, with particular focus on water resources and energy assets. This concern with a more diversified and even-handed approach to economic, environmental and security issues has been taken into account by the organization, but without neglecting its focus on the human dimension of its initiatives. As the OSCE has proclaimed: “While maintaining the attention paid to the human dimension, we will strive to achieve a better balance among the three dimensions of the OSCE’s approach to security, both at policy and project levels”, but “making clear to the Central Asian countries that this would not be achieved at the cost of their commitments within the human dimension” (Porto Ministerial Council, 2002, pp. 23, 70; see also Bucharest Ministerial Council, 2001, p. 49; Sofia Ministerial Council, 2004, p. 97). However, in 2006 such commitments provoked a wave of criticism by four of the Central Asian states — namely, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan — which demanded that the OSCE pay more attention to economic issues, especially to the expansion of existing transport infrastructure that would increase the connectedness of the landlocked economies of the region (see Report to the Ministerial Council on OSCE Migration Activities, 2006). In the face of such expectations, it seems obvious that the OSCE has to make an explicit and coordinated effort to indicate that it is not a financial institution, per se. Such clarification can assist in striking a more realistic balance between the organization’s capabilities and Central Asian expectations. In 1993, shortly after the Central Asian republics became members of the CSCE, a section of the Rome Council document was dedicated to the integration of new members, focusing primarily on the establishment of institutional links between the organization and these governments. Surprisingly, the documents from the Budapest Summit in 1994 and the Budapest Ministerial Council in 1995 do not make

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any reference to Central Asia, apart from a brief reference to Tajikistan (where a mission has been in place since 1994). The Lisbon Summit Declaration in 1996 does not go much further, making just a short reference to Central Asia broadly formulated in terms of promoting OSCE principles in the area, with no further development regarding concrete means or capacities. From 1997 the wording of documents has become more precise, with the establishment of CALO clearly intended to enhance the visibility of Central Asia in the OSCE agenda. This has coincided with the growing international recognition of the complex game of geopolitics in the region. In this respect, the increased attention of the OSCE to Central Asia was clearly noticeable in its subsequent policy documents. Furthermore, visits from OSCE high level officials to the area have intensified, demonstrating a new level of engagement. This enhanced attention to and significance of the region to the OSCE was further strengthened by the appointment of Personal Representatives to Central Asia of the OSCE’s Chairman-in-Office (a position, which has been occupied by personalities such as Ján Kubiš, Wilhelm Höynck, Jan Troejborg, Martti Ahtisaari, and Alojz Peterle). At the same time, however, the vague wording — characterizing the main OSCE documents — is also a feature of its field mandates. Usually encompassing and open-ended, they underline the enhancement of the OSCE principles, by proffering the internalization of its normative character, along with efforts for regional cooperation (to a lesser extent regarding Uzbekistan). Emphasis has been placed on state-building (involving all three dimensions of OSCE activity) and on the promotion of platforms for Central Asian interaction. It has also been recurrently underlined that Afghanistan is a key state for stability in the region. The OSCE’s Centers, Office, and Project Coordinator are all interacting simultaneously with the government, parliament and specialized agencies, as well as with non-governmental organizations and other civil society institutions. On the one hand, the broad scope of this engagement allows flexibility of action, leaving room for creativity in the definition of programs of action. On the other hand, however, it reveals the organization’s lack of coherence and well-defined strategy toward Central Asia.

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In this complex setting, the following section investigates the centrality of regional cooperation to the OSCE agenda, looking at the Central Asian differentiated readings of the concept of “region” and how these affect (and have affected) the OSCE’s normative and operational approach. In this way, the section provides a background for analyzing whether the OSCE constitutes an adequate institutional framework for addressing the regional challenges of a heterogeneous Central Asia, particularly in the face of a multiplication of (if not, overlap between) different international fora in the region.

The “Regionness” of Central Asia? Commentators usually point out that “Eurasian integration, initially advocated by Kazakhstan’s President Nazarbayev and subsequently endorsed by Russia’s President Putin, is a concept on paper only” (Rywkin, 2006, p. 196). According to Muratbek Imanaliev, Central Asia is a place of complex nationalisms, with different systems of governance, distinct self-perceptions and decision-making behavior both in domestic and international affairs. For example, Turkmenistan sees itself as a Caspian state and prioritizes its relations with Iran and Azerbaijan, while Tajikistan directs its attention to South Asia (see Chap. Eleven), whereas Kazakhstan perceives itself as a Eurasian country, and the only true bridge between Central Asia and the West (Imanaliev, 2008). In this respect, the perception of Central Asia as a homogeneous region is often bitterly contested. More recently, moves by Kazakhstan to revive the idea of Central Asia’s “regionness” have once again been confronted, this time by Uzbekistan’s reticence. As Uzbekistan’s President Islam Karimov observed, “concerning the four-sided, or even five-sided consortium, we still are determined [to create it], but for now this will not happen because again we have different opinions” (cited in Pannier, 2008a). In this regard, Central Asia is often seen as a graveyard for regional cooperation initiatives. Thus, “[t]he list of failed cooperation attempts [in the region] speaks volumes” (Gleason, 2006, p. 53). This process appeared to be set in motion with the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) which was expected

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to play an aggregating role after the fall of the Soviet Union. Consequently, following the ups-and-downs of intra-regional dynamics, the establishment of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) — bringing together Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Russia — has been promoted by Moscow as an alternative to the nearly defunct CIS as a reassertion of Russia’s centrality in Central Asia (Allison, 2004, p. 469). At the time of the Madrid Ministerial (November 2007), Russia had even indicated an interest in promoting a form of civil-military cooperation under the aegis of the OSCE, by requesting the inclusion of a statement in the final document acknowledging the existing collaboration between the OSCE and CSTO. Russia pursues in this way the role of a “security manager” for Central Asia, intent on consolidating its “hegemonic position” in the region (Blank, 2008a, p. 79). To some extent, CSTO has been functioning as a counter-balance to the involvement of the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In addition, Russia is promoting the legal grounds for “permanently stationing Russian forces and bases in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and possibly Uzbekistan; ostensibly to defend these regimes against terrorism” (Blank, 2008a, p. 79). However, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are not members of CSTO which, given Uzbekistan’s military clout in the region, is a significant shortcoming for the Kremlin. Thus, it would seem “unlikely that cooperation under the CSTO will do much to foster a regional security identity or to address the most pressing challenges for regional security management” (Allison, 2004, p. 473). Other Russian initiatives in the region involve (i) the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO) — founded in 1994 — including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan; and (ii) the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC) — set up in 2001 and bringing Russia and Belarus together with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. In 2005, EAEC and CACO were merged. Furthermore, in 2003 with a clearer economic outlook, the Single Economic Space (SES) was established including Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine.

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Such a proliferation of membership in different regional institutional arrangements has tended to make their cooperation initiatives devoid of substance. On the one hand, the multilevel participation of states in these different institutional arrangements embeds them in a complex policy management, while on the other hand it prevents these organizations from becoming effective forums for Central Asian cooperation. In a nutshell, such a multiplicity of interactions and interests together with competing security demands, have rendered regional integration a difficult process. In addition, the personalized authoritarian style of governance in Central Asia further impairs the promotion of regional cooperation. As some commentators have pointed out, regional “presidents, who are unwilling to share domestic political power with other actors through a more pluralist system, or even subject themselves to parliamentary scrutiny, seem no more ready to share power internationally with regional organizations though pooling some elements of their jealously guarded state sovereignty” (Allison, 2008, p. 186). These dynamics underpin the instability that appears to define Central Asian affairs. Regional states are “characterized by large-scale economic inequalities and widespread poverty that may contribute to destabilization pressures in the region” (Linotte, 2002, p. 176). Thus, despite assertions that regional integration “would encourage geopolitical maturation and [provide] a platform designed to promote the mutual national interests of the states in the region” (Shaikhutdinov, 2007, p. 57), the different contexts of Central Asian statehood undermine attempts at initiating patterns of relations premised on the basis of shared concerns. It is on this complex background that the OSCE activities in Central Asia have been developed and have to be assessed. Thus, after contextualizing the myriad of institutions operating in the region, it is fundamental to analyze the particularities of the OSCE, including its potential and contributions. Building on the organization’s normative underpinnings, political commitments and operational capabilities, the next section addresses the dual exercise of combining the national and regional dimensions in a unified strategy, paving the way for an assessment of the OSCE involvement in Central Asia.

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The OSCE’s Regional Approach: Balancing In-Country Activities with Broader Cooperation Formats — Working Toward a Central Asian Security Community? The heterogeneous character of Central Asia demands from the OSCE a careful negotiation of regional idiosyncrasies so that it can be able create the facilitating conditions that might prompt the emergence of a regional cooperative environment. In this respect, the OSCE seeks to promote a balanced approach to Central Asia which would not provoke an escalation in intra-regional tensions, nor would strain the relations of Central Asian states with external actors. Thus, as a result of its unique constitutive nature, the politically binding character of its decisions, and its reliance on soft power, the OSCE is simultaneously a strong and weak organization in Central Asia. From 2000 onwards, the references to an OSCE “strategy” for Central Asia has identified an “action-oriented role for the OSCE in the region […] starting from a comprehensive security policy approach which also addresses socio-economic and environmental related risks to security and stability” (OSCE Vienna, 2000, p. 34). This vague formulation has been narrowed down to specific areas of intervention, including policing, border security, anti-trafficking and countering both the financing of and terrorism-related activities, small arms and light weapons; water management, labor migration; democracy building, civil society, legislative reform, freedom of the media, election monitoring, and education programs. However, concrete guidelines for empowerment have remained too broad, making the assessment of OSCE effectiveness subject to contested debates. With regard to democratization, for example, the OSCE defines Central Asia as a region undergoing “political and economic transition” (OSCE Porto, 2002, p. 71). However, there has been a growing recognition of difficulties in initiating compliance with OSCE standards as a result of regional challenges to the meaning, purpose, and objectives (if not the very necessity) of democratization. Consequently, despite the identification of broad issue-areas for OSCE involvement, its regional strategy remains unclear.

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For the OSCE and many of its Participating States the notion of a regional approach is attractive — and for good reasons. The concept sounds fascinating, not to say magical. It sounds like the key to a solution to a complex task, it sounds like synergy, like combined efforts […] Countries which are the object and “beneficiaries” of such an approach might look at things in a different way. They might perceive it as the reflection of the incapacity to understand their individual needs and ambitions, or worse: an unwillingness to do so. (Salber, 2001, p. 273).

In effect, despite the commitments made, the OSCE’s regional approach to Central Asia has not seemed efficient in terms of creating cooperative synergies. A regional diplomat has explained this situation as an “abject failure” for the organization (cited in The Economist, 2003). Thus, although the OSCE has ascertained the significance of its regional approach, it appears that the combination between a lack of coherence and the absence of incentives that would convince Central Asian states to enmesh in regional cooperation activities still undermines its agency (Freire, 2005, p. 199). It seems that the premium which Central Asian leaders put on regime security takes precedence over “western-inspired processes of regional security cooperation or even to the security aspect of some new regional initiatives of their own” (Allison, 2004, p. 483). Hence, to pursue its ambitious goal of security community promotion, the OSCE needs to develop an innovative and comprehensive approach, building on bilateral agreements and fostering an understanding of the regionwide nature of Central Asian challenges. The promotion of good governance, with a focus on issuer relating to the human dimension of its initiatives — particularly democratization, the rule of law and human rights — has been a key area for OSCE intervention, through its involvement in the reformation of the judiciary, including penal reform, prison regimes, and law enforcement agencies; the adaptation of national legislation to international standards, addressing issues such as the fight against corruption and violation of fundamental freedoms and human rights, and the creation

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of legal precepts to address legislative gaps. Many projects, which have been initiated by the OSCE alone or in collaboration with other international organizations, have had mixed results. For example, the European Commission and the ODIHR have signed an agreement on a joint program for advancing human rights and democratization in Central Asia (Freire, 2005, p. 200). Environmental issues have been on the OSCE’s agenda, given the particular relevance of radioactive waste management, natural disaster preparedness, water conflict prevention, access to environmental information, land degradation and erosion, and support to municipal communal services. Following the organization’s integrated logic, the OSCE’s field presence seeks to address the various dimensions of activity in an interrelated manner, combining efforts regarding legislative adaptation, raising awareness toward environmental problems, focusing on the work of NGOs and media development, and promoting cross-border youth initiatives as concrete examples of the interconnection between the building of security, democratization, and economic development (Pannier, 2008b). However, these initiatives have been accompanied by many difficulties. As some have noted: The context is very different from Cold War times, and there is now a great deal of pragmatism, which in differentiated and asymmetrical dealings might render cooperation possible or turn relations even more complicated. As a fragmented area there has been difficulty in gathering Central Asian countries around pressing issues and external players might reinforce this by supporting country specific projects, though with ambivalent results. The problems with the sharing of water and fossil energetic resources are a good example. (Interview, 2008f ).

For instance, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have recurrent tensions as a result of resource problems — namely water and gas. Both countries compete for “the limited amount of water from the Syr-Daria [river]” (Sharipzhan, 2008). Such issues are acknowledged by regional actors as a greater source of conflict than ethnicity or religion and therefore

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they require additional attention by the OSCE (Interview, 2008a–e). At the same time, the deep socio-economic and cultural differences among the Central Asian states along with their political unwillingness to cooperate (Herzig and Melvin, 2003, p. 182) have further undermined the operational effectiveness of the OSCE. Apart from the challenging contexts provided by the Central Asian countries, the OSCE has also been suffering from its own limitations. As is often pointed out, its power of persuasion has no enforcement capacities and meager financial means (further compounded by the non-legally binding nature of its decisions). As a result, the OSCE’s “capacities are limited, making its actions very disperse and without substantive impact. In the eyes of Central Asian countries the issue of democratization is an instrument of pressure and interference in internal affairs” (Interview, 2008f ). This depreciation has been evident both with regard to decisions taken at the level of field operations and headquarters as well as with regard to the stance within and toward the organization taken by member states. For instance, this perception of the organization’s inability to deliver on its objectives has been exemplified by the low key representation that some countries (in particular European countries and the United States) send to the OSCE’s most important meetings — such as the annual Ministerial Council — which signals the reduced importance which some member states attach to the organization. Furthermore, the requirement for decision making by consensus together with the politically binding nature of the commitments endorsed by all participating members underscores the tendency toward vagueness and political unwillingness, which hinders the implementation of the organization’s objectives (Freire, 2005). In this respect, conflicting perceptions about the OSCE among regional publics and state-elites ushers in an evaluation of its activities based not on its mandate, but on what it is understood that the OSCE should be doing.

Is There an OSCE Strategy Toward Central Asia? The analysis made so far has indicated the underpinning values shared by the different OSCE’s field presence in Central Asia.

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However, these should be understood neither as an indication of an OSCE strategy toward Central Asia, nor as a suggestion of the OSCE’s irrelevance in the region. As its representatives believe, the “OSCE has made a difference in Central Asia, in the South Caucasus and in the Western Balkans. No one can question the OSCE’s role in promoting co-operative security and the common values of human rights, democracy and the rule of law in its area” (Stubb, 2008). These statements notwithstanding, the OSCE has not been able to introduce the facilitating conditions for security community building in Central Asia. As already explained, this shortcoming reflects both intra-organizational constraints to the OSCE’s activities (such as insufficient funds, limited personnel, etc.) and external factors related to the political will of the Central Asian states (i.e., their state-elites). Thus, the OSCE, which should be the instrument of choice for dealing with problems related to democratization, is under-utilized and has been relegated to the margins of Central Asian politics (Robert, 2002, p. 6). In this context, the urgency of building an independent strategy toward Central Asia involves several interrelated steps: •

•

First, the OSCE needs to improve the exchanges between its field presence and the host governments. Gaining the confidence of the Central Asian states is crucial to the OSCE’s effectiveness in the region and would also facilitate its influence over formulation and adaptation of legislation, democracy promotion, and building respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Second, the definition of the OSCE activities should be tailored to answer specific needs of the population, to gain a reinforced status among civil society, essential for an effective implementation of mandates. Thus, a balanced approach addressing urgent needs, while socializing state-practices offers a more viable approach for the OSCE in Central Asia (Costa, 2004, p. 16). In addition, in the words of a local expert, the OSCE activities should reflect a change from “the current approach of ‘stability through democratization’ to one of ‘democracy through stabilization’” (Bogatyrev, 2003, p. 286). Thus, by taking into account the region’s specificities and each country’s expectations and

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•

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willingness to comply with promoted norms can the OSCE achieve confidence and legitimacy for its actions (Freire, 2005, p. 205). Third, the OSCE should work for a better representation of Central Asian civil society groups in their dealings with regional governments. In this regard, considering possible ways of rewarding compliance provides incentives for compliance with OSCE norms. Conversely, “criticism and monitoring of events have their uses, but they are no substitute for assistance to participating states in those fields where it is requested, and in strict and full compliance with the Mission’s mandate” (OSCE Magazine, 2004, p. 25). Thus, there is joint ownership of responsibilities on the part of the host government, but also of the OSCE. Fourth, the reinforcement of bilateral ties between the OSCE and Central Asian states can contribute to the development of a more objective regional policy by the organization. This might also assist in overcoming the many obstacles still present in multilateral contacts — such as the translation of final resolutions agreed at regional forums into the different Central Asian languages, but with different content. The OSCE needs to avoid misinterpretations emanating in this way if it were to advance a regional strategy, built on common understandings. Finally, rather than unveiling grand projects, the OSCE should concentrate efforts on smaller-scale initiatives which tend to have a more comprehensive impact. For example, cross-border projects have been used as a mechanism to promote confidence between populations in border areas, and thus, foster community-building. Thus, targeted action should be the motto. It is already apparent that “[w]here regional projects offer practical, identifiable security benefits […] they can attract the interest of Central Asian leaders. But otherwise local leaders have given priority in their security and defense policies to building bridges bilaterally with strong states: Russia, the United States, Turkey and China” (Allison, 2004, p. 482). The OSCE’s regional strategy should, therefore, be developed as a multilevel approach, based on variable geometry, with the goal of fostering cooperation on issues of common concern at the bilateral or trilateral level. In the long run, if these initiatives

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gradually become building blocks for more comprehensive forms of cooperation then the OSCE might be able to set forth a regional strategy toward Central Asia. Thus, by “helping to devise, diffuse, and institutionalize the concept of comprehensive, indivisible, and cooperative security, the OSCE has set in motion a learning process that is inducing governments and military establishments to replace deterrence, let alone the use of military power, with reassurance and trust building measures, as means of achieving security objectives. This redefinition of security has been necessary for the development of mutual trust and a growing sense of mutual identification in the OSCE region” (Adler, 1998, p. 148). In addition, owing to the limited (human and material) resources of the OSCE regarding economic and environmental aspects, the organization should seek the cooperation of specialized partners. This might be pursued in a complementary logic, where the OSCE might certainly be able to play key roles both as a facilitator and a political platform for discussion, formulation and implementation of local projects, given its field knowledge. Currently, the multitude of regional institutional arrangements in Central Asia seem to balance and contain each other. At the same time, they have also clearly assumed the role of containing external players. In this context, the role of the OSCE as a security-promoter might be much valued and become a fundamental catalyst in the building of the necessary ties for the reinforcement of the regional strategy, underlined by the security community goal.

Conclusion: Looking into the Future of the OSCE in Central Asia This chapter has focused on the OSCE activities in Central Asia and has detailed the significance of regional cooperation to the organization’s agenda. It has argued that whereas the OSCE offers a combination of normative, political, and operational capabilities that could serve well this goal, the fact is that the organization has been unable to draw a working approach to address regional challenges.

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In other words, its contribution has been severely limited by its inability to agree on and implement a solid strategic approach toward Central Asia. This suggestion has been illustrated through an analytical process-tracing of the logic of the OSCE’s involvement, the reach of its commitments and local perceptions about its role. Such a consideration confirms the assumption that the “causal relation between international institutions and security communities rests on agency, that is, the catalytic function of institutions to promote, induce, and socially construct community by means of community-building practices” (Adler, 1998, p. 120). In this respect, the OSCE has a mixed record in Central Asia. Its agency seems to rest on the application of constitutive and normative principles, exemplified through lasting missions, presences, and representations in the region. Therefore, despite its weaknesses, the institutional memory from these initiatives should allow the OSCE to leverage its comparative advantage (especially in terms of local knowledge) in Central Asia. Thus, it is “the connected nature of these dimensions [politico-military, economic and environmental, and human] rather than the dimensions on their own which constitutes the major competitive strength of the OSCE and that needs to be reflected in [its] activities” (Huber, 2003, p. 130). In the face of concrete difficulties in a heterogeneous area such as Central Asia, the OSCE’s regional approach can have effect only if it is framed in targeted action. Thus, through the promotion of its founding principles, the OSCE has slowly but gradually been fostering the instrumental internalization of its procedures in the region. At the same time — through its practices — it is providing a concrete example to Central Asian states for a range of appropriate ways of engaging in decision making. In the face of increasing competition in the region, these might provide the tools needed for the affirmation of its distinctive international identity. It would seem that in order to continue to “play a useful role” (Menon and Spruyt, 1999, p. 104) in Central Asia, the OSCE has to reassert the viability of its main strength as a normative actor, the promotion of regional cooperation and the aim of initiating a security community in Central Asia.

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Related Websites Centre for OSCE Research: http://www.core-hamburg.de/. International Crisis Group: http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm. International Relations and Security Network: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn. Model OSCE: http://www.modelosce.org/. OSCE — Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe: http:// www.osce.org/. OSCE Academy: http://www.osce-academy.net/en/. OSCE Networking: http://www.osce.ethz.ch/.

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4

The European Union’s New Central Asian Strategy Ertan Efegil

Introduction Following the dissolution of the former Soviet Union in 1991, the condition and complexities of independence prompted Central Asian states consolidate their sovereignty and political independence. This urged them to prioritize integration into the global economy and the promotion of foreign direct investment (FDI). In this respect they looked toward various Western actors — including the European Union — to realize their intentions. Despite such regional expectations, the European Union preferred to develop slowly its policies in Central Asia. Owing to concerns with the stabilization of its immediate post-communist neighborhood — the Central and East European states — and the integrity and coherence of its own governance structures in the wake of the Maastricht Treaty, the European Union appeared reticent to engage Central Asian states. Apart from the bigger member states (such as the United Kingdom, France, and Germany), the other EUROPEAN UNION member did not open diplomatic representations in the region. Instead they chose to have diplomatic contacts with the region either via Moscow or Ankara (Melvin, 2008). Thus, some commentators have pointed out that while the “potential reunification of Europe was viewed as the consequence of the retreat of Soviet power, the fact that an enormous territory in Central Asia, twice the size of Western Europe, had also

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been liberated from Soviet rule remained relatively unnoticed” (Dannreuther, 1994, p. 3). In 1994, an European Union delegation was opened in Kazakhstan. The delegation has also additional responsibility for Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and two suboffices in Bishkek and Dushanbe. Consequently, the European Union initiated bilateral and multilateral relations with the Central Asian states — mainly within the framework of the TACIS (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States) program (Matveeva, 2006). Brussels has also begun the signing of Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) with the individual Central Asian countries. Although, the PCAs lacked a clear sense of priorities they appeared to offer a more pertinent basis for the political, commercial, economic, social, and scientific cooperation between the European Union and the region by encouraging concrete steps for democratic and economic reforms (Efegil, 2007). Thus, in the period between 1996 and 2001, the PCA remained the central instrument for the European Union support to Central Asia, by offering assistance primarily for economic and commercial reforms, state-building. This ad hoc approach to the region changed radically after the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 (9/11). This shift in both perception and policy was reflected in the appointment of a Special Representative for the Central Asia. On the one hand, this move was undertaken as an indication of the increased significance of the region to Brussels. On the other hand, it had to boost the European Union’s visibility in Central Asia and enhance its relations with regional states. In 2006, the European Union also adopted a new regional strategy, which emphasizes the significance of human rights, democratization, good governance, and the eradication of poverty as the central concepts in its relations with Central Asia. Thus, the European Union’s policy has evolved from a project-based approach to a new strategic partnership. This chapter examines these developments. It looks at the trajectories of the European Union’s engagement in the region. The European Union has generally been construed as a counterpoise to the influence of other international actors in the region, in particularly

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the United States. In this setting, the investigation teases out the alterations in the perceptions and approaches of Brussels toward Central Asia and vice versa. The focus here is on the European Union’s new partnership strategy. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the implementation of and implications from such a policy shift. However, before undertaking this investigation it is necessary to provide a brief outline of the external agency of Brussels.

The External Affairs of the European Union The development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) alongside the appointment of its first High Representative and the consequent launch of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) demonstrates the trend toward an enhanced “Brusselsization” of the international relations of the European Union — a process, which not only reflects the substantial shift of foreign policy making from the capitals of the member states to Brussels, but also confirms that the European Union is edging incrementally toward a fully working set of foreign and security policy (Dover, 2007, pp. 248–249). At the same time, however, the discussion of European Union’s external affairs often tend to overlook that “since the Union itself is a complex actor, dependent on the memberstates for its security-political capacity to act and with instruments subject to different institutional procedures and decision-making processes, the creation of a coherent security governance structure for effective crisis management is an ongoing challenge” (Ehrhart, 2006, p. 435). Such complexity often befuddles even the most astute commentators. This suggestion beckons two mandatory caveats. The first one is that European Union’s international identity is implicated by its norms, rules, and practices outlining a pattern of peaceful inter- and intranational behavior. Therefore, it is a purposive condition guided by dominant values and is consciously crafted by international actors. As such, it relates to the concept of order and involves an idea of a desired end-state, but also relates to the actual condition of international life (Kavalski, 2008a, p. 63). Consequently, the

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European Union’s identity of peace signals the notion of normative outreach through the extension of its framework of appropriateness. It indicates, the European Union’s power of attraction to export (and, if required, coerce) its pattern of relations. Therefore, Moravcsik (2004, p. 191) has remarked that “European Union accession is the single most powerful policy instrument for peace and security in the world”. The second caveat relates to the significance of 1999 as a watershed in post-Cold War relations in Europe (Kavalski, 2008a, p. 8). It would be historical to suggest that a framework of normative appropriateness emerged in a given time. However, perceptions of order (and, hence, the interpretations of identity, which they articulate) are often led by an emphasis on these individual years, which see the accumulation of significant events. This study, thereby, corroborates the claim that international identities are performed and maintained in particular contexts (Monroe et al., 2000). In this respect, the events in Kosovo during 1999 provided the context in which, to preserve its salience (i.e., the credibility of its order), the European Union had to reiterate (and, thus, reinforce) the orderpromoting capabilities of its security identity. This pattern is central to understanding the delay in European Union’s involvement in Central Asia. In his reflections on the post-1989 continental “disorder”, Duke (1994, p. 4) suggests that “the unctuous ‘stability’” that marked the Cold War years “has been swapped for one that is every bit as unstable”. The most oft-quoted reasons for the European Union’s policy confusion in the early 1990s have been: (i) the institutional restructuring of the European Union; (ii) the focus on German re-unification; (iii) the attention given to the still extant Soviet Union (and, then the Russian Federation); and (iv) the related attempt to lock the continent in a “new security architecture” provided by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (Kavalski, 2008a, p. 123). Thereby, as a result of its initial unassertiveness, the European Union seemed content of having a security identity for itself without actually being a fully fledged European identity. This unwillingness to extend the West European “community method” is also suggestive of

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an uncertainty about the post-Cold War character of its identity. This was made blatantly apparent in the context of the Balkan crises of the 1990s. The confusion caused by controversies about objectives, purposes, and expectations evinced the seeming “lack of any clear European security identity” on behalf of the European Union (Duke, 1994, p. 93). Instead, its policy responses remained essentially a method of intergovernmental coordination “reliant on words”, rather than on the deployment of even the softest common instruments (Smith, 2003, p. 561). Thus, as already indicated, it was the Kosovo crisis that provided the European Union with the context to overcome the fear of “itself” and become provider of order in Europe (Drakulic´, 2000, p. 9). A statement by the then External Relations Commissioner, Hans van der Broek (1999) confirms this claim: Over the last ten years, the Union has gone through many changes and is reaching the third phase in its geopolitical re-definition. The first stage was the 1989 fall of the Berlin wall, which led to German re-unification and the start of the enlargement process to the east. The second phase came in 1992 with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, thereby fundamentally changing the dynamics within the European continent. We are now entering the third phase, which is the stabilization of the Balkans and their integration into the process of European Union-enlargement.

The inkling is that it is the explicit conditions, practices, and conjectures of enlargement — i.e., its ideational and material matrix — that sanction the European Union’s power of attraction (Kavalski, 2008a, p. 125). In this respect, the European Union is not merely a unique global actor whose international identity swings on the spectrum between a superstate and an international organization, but is “a living, complex, and contradictory actor… whose preference for norms is seen as a guarantee of its good faith and disinterestedness” (Laïdi, 2008, p. 18). It is this context that provides the framework for engaging with the agency of Brussels in Central Asia. Deprived of the lure of prospective membership, the European Union’s power of attraction

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appears stunned. Not only is the European Union not a magnet for the Central Asian states, it finds itself confronted with the necessity to vie for the attention of regional countries distracted by the choice of suitor. Used to socializing post-communist countries willing to comply with its demands, Brussels appears confused and uncertain. The following sections outline the European Union’s attempts to come to terms with the complexity of Central Asian affairs.

Priorities and Objectives of TACIS Program: 1996–2000 As indicated in Chap. One, for the Central Asian states, the collapse of former Soviet Union meant deterioration of their economic conditions and living standards. This weakening of state institutions was accompanied by the emergence of political and ethnic tensions, territorial clashes, and boundary conflicts. The Central Asian republics were unprepared for independence — they lacked effective state institutions, industrial infrastructure, armed forces, and even coherent national identities. To complicate matters even further, their economies were interconnected to the economies of the other former Soviet republics with Russia as the hub of such exchanges (Fumagalli, 2007). In this setting, the international relations of the Central Asian countries were predicated on the need to consolidate their statehood and foster conditions for economic and social development (Kuru, 2002). It appeared in the early 1990s that regional countries are willing to follow foreign policies, which were based on active, balanced, and pragmatic and constructive dialog with external actors (Bohr, 2004). Thus, in their fledgling international relations, the Central Asian republics prioritizes the assertion of their sovereignty, assuring their political stability, facilitating their economic developments by exporting oil resources to the world market, and decreasing their dependency on Russia (Bobokulov, 2006). The European Union’s engagement in the region has been contextualized within such demands for ensuring the viability of Central Asian independence. Since 1991, the PCAs have provided the legal basis of bilateral relations between the European Union and the Central Asian states. At the same time, the TACIS program — which

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includes all post-Soviet countries — has formed an administrative framework for the European Union’s technical assistance to the region. The main objective of the TACIS program in the 1996–2000 period was the provision of assistance for the transition of participating countries to (i) a free market economy and (ii) a democratic polity. This agenda framed the European Union’s promotion of political and economic stability in Central Asia. The TACIS initiatives focused on five main areas: training, energy, transportation, industrial and commercial enterprises, and food production (ICG, 2006, p. 19). The EU assistance was allocated to the improvement of small- and medium-sized companies, banking training, reorganization of private companies, new legal regulations, agriculture, environment, transportation, energy, and telecommunication (Efegil, 2007, p. 116). The following section offers information on the TACIS projects in individual Central Asian countries. •

•

• •

•

Kazakhstan: Macroeconomic and sectoral policies, the development of production, sustainable middle-term development, protection of social groups, the reorganization of banking system, customs management, environmental issues, reform in the higher education, the reorganization of national oil company, and membership to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Kyrgyzstan: The development of private sector, the strengthening of the transportation and infrastructure, postal services, the development of national airline company and agricultural industry, and reforms in the higher education. Tajikistan: Humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation projects in the wake of the civil war in the country. Turkmenistan: Improvement of the conditions of peasants, tax reform, reforms in higher education, privatization, the reorganization of banking system, the development of oil and natural gas sectors, the improvement of small- and medium-sized companies, the development of cotton sector, the customs management, and the agriculture. Uzbekistan: Restructuring the Ministry of Education, regional projects (TRACECA, INOGATE), to make the state institutions more efficient, health reform and membership of the WTO.

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During this period, the Central Asian countries themselves indicated a preference for assistance in the areas of strengthening their administrative institutions and capacities, the encouragement of foreign investment, the improvement of education systems, the development of the agricultural sectors, and making progress in the codification of their legal regulations. It has to be acknowledged that the consolidation of regional statehood in this period was a significant impediment to the Central Asian engagement with the European Union. Yet, despite the enhanced involvement of both China and Russia in the region by the end of the 1990s, the Central Asian states have never eliminated the Western vector of their external relations. For them, the West offers the promise of economic and commercial relations, financial support, FDI, and military assistance. The European Union’s agency in the region during this period has been viewed primarily from this point of view — Central Asian states have been interested to obtain credits for improving their industrial, technological, and transport infrastructure. the social projects; integrate their economies with the world economy; to develop their national industrial infrastructure; to improve technological infrastructure of oil and natural gas sectors; to form their national armies; and to balance the Russia’s power in the region (Bohr, 2004).

New European Union Approaches to Central Asia after 2001 9/11 became the cornerstone for the European Union’s policy trajectories in Central Asia. In the wake of the terrorist attacks in the United States, Brussels changed radically its regional strategy. As indicated in the European Union Security Strategy the issues of terrorism, the distribution of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failed states, bad governance, corruption, the abuse of power, the existence of weak state institutions, and the activities of transnational organized crime networks provided the outlines for the map of new security threats (Kimmage, 2007). Apart from the global security concerns animating the “war on terror”, the

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European Union’s shift in perceptions was, on the one hand, driven by the simultaneous need to secure and diversify its energy sources (Andersen, 2000). In this respect, Brussels has unfurled the so-called “Baku Initiative” and the establishment of a European Union Energy Transport Corridor. On the other hand, as a result of its “Big Bang” — East European — enlargement, Central Asia became a much more proximate neighbor for the European Union. The focus of the post-2001 approach has been the development of democratic institutions, respect for human rights, good governance, and eradication of poverty. In 2002, the European Union advanced the rudiments of a specific policy tailored to the five Central Asian states by issuing a separate Regional Strategy Paper (RSP) administered by the TACIS programming (EC, 2002). Furthermore, in 2004, the European Union established a regular regional political dialog mechanism with the Central Asian states. The objectives of this dialog are: (a) to assist the regional countries to negotiate the issues of shared concern; (b) to give positive answer to the Central Asian states’ demands of having close relations with the Union; and (c) to support the European Union Commission’s Central Asia regional strategy (Efegil, 2007, p. 129). As Kavalski has noted, on the positive side, these developments indicate that the European Union has finally recognized the particularity of the five Central Asian states as well as the need to project distinct policies in the region. At the same time, the pervasive tension underwriting the RSP — whether to develop a regional approach to Central Asia or to engage the five states of the region individually through bilateral contractual relations — has further exacerbated the European Union’s taciturn engagement in Central Asia (Kavalski, 2007c, p. 47). For instance, while the European Union imposed sanctions on Uzbekistan after the Andijan events, Germany adopted a softer line to retain its military base in Termez (Youngs, 2008). It was also in this period that the European Union began to reconceptualize the meaning of the extent of its foreign-policy outreach gradually extending the notion of “near abroad” from the Central and East European states to the Balkans (Kavalski, 2007c, p. 46). At the same time, Brussels began speaking about “wider Europe”

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(EC, 2003), thus indicating its intentions for proactive engagement in regions that are not included in the accession process. These intentions were institutionalized through the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) (EC, 2004; Warkotsch, 2008). The underlying objective of this approach is fostering a “good neighborhood” by promoting the core values of the Brussels-based bloc and insisting that states that have the relations with the European Union need to respect democracy and the rule of law, and practice good governance (Efegil, 2007, p. 119). In this respect, while the establishment of a Development Cooperation and Economic Cooperation Instrument (DCECI) assures a more flexible European Union-policy approach to Central Asia, DCECI mostly seems to signal the Brussels’ perception of Central Asia: it is not a neighborhood of the European Union (Kavalski, 2007c, p. 47).

The European Union’s New Central Asian Strategy Acknowledging the transformations in global politics and the idiosyncrasies of the Central Asian context, the European Union unveiled a new Central Asia Strategy in 2006. This strategy indicates the development of a new mentality in Brussels through strengthening its regional dialog. The Central Asian Strategy reiterates the European Union’s continuing support for human rights, the establishment of independent judiciary and the promotion of legal reforms. At the same time, the European Union recommits to contribute to the regional programs of the WTO, as well as furtherance of the Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe (INOGATE) and the Transport Corridor Europe–Caucasus–Asia (TRACECA). The development of such a strategic partnership by Brussels infers the simultaneous exercise of “hard power” and “soft power” in Central Asia. According to the Central Asian Strategy, the European Union intends to facilitate the establishment of a peaceful, democratic, and economically prosperous Central Asia that would ensure the stability and prosperity in the region, including attention to common security challenges. In this respect, Brussels has pledged its continued

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assistance with combating drug trafficking, organized crime, international terrorism, and poor governance, lack of rule of law, poverty, and the violation of human rights. In the energy field, the European Union has expressed its intention to construct oil and natural gas pipelines that bypass Russia (Melvin and Boonstra, 2008). In this respect, the perception of the European Union’s “hard power” insertion in the security and democratization frameworks of Central Asian states has provoked disagreement between Brussels and regional capitals. On the one hand, in the security field there is a pronounced cooperation in the fields of border management, counternarcotics, and transnational organized crime. On the other hand, the European Union and Central Asian states have conflicting understandings of the notion and practices of security, which is a constant source of disagreement in the identification of security threats. For instance, Central Asian states have prioritized the survival of their regimes as the main security concern. That is why political pluralism is often construed by Central Asian state-elites as a security challenge. For Brussels, however, the (at best) “decorative democracy” mode of governance in the region is one of the main sources of insecurity. In this respect, democratization has become the sticking point in the European Union’s relations with Central Asia. Regional leaders have ensconced their power in political fiefdoms through the provision of privileges to their clan networks (Collins, 2006; Dave 2007). By using the revenues of their countries to bolster their own positions of power, Central Asian leaders have resisted any radical change to their rule and challenges to their regimes. As indicated in Chap. One, the centrality of such networks of support — regardless of whether they are based on kinship, clan, tribal, or other forms of regional affiliation — underpins the current awkwardness of Central Asian statehood. It is the privileged position that these networks of political support have vis-à-vis state institution that undermines the viability of state structures in the region (Ceccarelli, 2007). Thus, as a result of the pre-occupation with the preservation and protection of elite power, corruption and authoritarian modes of governance have become commonplace in Central Asia (Zhoutis, 2007). Consequently, regime security has become tantamount to the pursuit

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of national sovereignty — which is currently understood as recognition of a state’s independence (meaning the independence of the ruling regime as it please). The interaction and contractual relationships with various international actors has therefore become “an important source of legitimacy for failing regimes” (Lewis, 2008, p. 59). Such international recognition of their rule is an important source of symbolic power for Central Asian leaders (Ceccarelli, 2007). In this setting, regional leaders have viewed any call for political reforms as a direct challenge to their position of authority. Therefore, they have taken serious steps to hinder any European Union project that demands the promotion of more political participation and encourages the establishment of civil society organizations (Hall, 2007). Thus, as a result of Western criticism of their authoritarian practices, Central Asian leaders have indicated a growing proclivity to balance their interactions with the European Union, the United States, and NATO with ever closer relations with the Russian-based Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Chineseinspired Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) (Allison, 2008). Much less controversial has been the exercise of “soft power” by Brussels. At the same time, the European Union’s Central Asian Strategy offers support for the education of young people and the promotion of economic development, trade, and investment. It is these “soft power” initiatives — such as the “Investing in the Future” program — that demonstrates the European Union’s willingness to export its norms and values to the region. Thus, the strategic partnership, which Brussels has unveiled for the region illustrates the European Union’s strategies for international socialization (Kassenova, 2008a; Melvin, 2007). In this setting, the European Union has unveiled concrete policy initiatives that have to confirm its commitment to the region. The Central Asia Indicative Program (CAIP) — which covers the period between 2007 and 2010 — gives priority to the development of regional cooperation and good neighborly relations, the eradication of poverty and the improvement of living standards, the establishment of good governance, and the initiation of economic reforms. The CAIP is to offer assistance to education, energy, transportation,

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environment, and border security, the development of civil society, social dialog, democratic reforms, and legal reforms. Under the label of “Democratic Development and Good Governance”, the European Union intends: (1) to develop respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; (2) to establish national human rights institutions; (3) to provide participation of the public into the decision-making processes; (4) to promote cooperation between governmental and non-governmental organization; (5) to improve structures of democratic institutions; and (6) to develop social dialog among private, public, and civil society organizations (EC, 2006, pp. 21–23). At the same time, the new RSP (2007 and 2013) — now administered by DCECI and no longer by the defunct TACIS — reiterates the commitments made under CAIP. The RSP proposes further assistance for the political and economic transition of Central Asia, strengthening the rule of law, democracy, good governance, and reinforcing the respect for human rights (EC, 2007). The stated objectives once again are: (i) assuring the stability and security of the Central Asian region; (ii) improving living conditions; and (iii) developing regional cooperation for tackling the issues of energy, transport, higher education, and environmental degradation. Despite discrepancies in the area of security concerns, in 2008 the European Union signed bilateral Priority Papers that have detailed the range of projects to be conducted within the framework of the Central Asian Strategy. In the meantime, the high-level political contacts have been intensified. There were a series of meetings between the European Union Troika and the Central Asian countries. In the context of the regional energy dialog, the European Union and Turkmenistan signed a Memorandum of Understanding on energy. It has to be noted that all these initiatives have been underpinned by a softening of the European Union’s condemnation of Central Asian authoritarianism. Some commentators contend that Brussels has largely abandoned its criticism of human rights violations in the region so that it can procure access to the energy supplies of Central Asia. Although regional states have not meaningfully engaged in the European Union-promoted economic, judicial, and political reforms,

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some Central Asian republics have expressed interest in increasing the efficiency of their governance mechanisms. For example, during its 2008 dialog with the European Union, Kazakhstan proclaimed that it intends to harmonize its foreign policy with the principles embedded in the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Thus, although the European Union does not have the same “Europeanization” effects in Central Asia as it did in Central and Eastern Europe, Brussels anticipates that its Central Asian strategy will provide sufficient leverage to push democratic reforms that would result in political pluralism and social modernization.

In Lieu of a Conclusion Since 1991, the Central Asian states have attempted to reintegrate themselves into the system of global politics. In this respect, the complexities of the post-Cold War period have seemingly reignited a “new great game” in the region. The European Union did not appear interested in jumping into the fray and enmeshing itself the competitive dynamics of Central Asia. Instead, Brussels appeared content to observe from the sidelines and offer token support through various technical assistance programs. It was only the 9/11 that jolted the European Union out of its passivity and prompted a more intense reconsideration of Brussels involvement in the region. Many commentators have asserted that such policy behavior is indicative of the involvement of international actors in Central Asia — i.e., they have consistently “ignored the systemic reality” of the region and “never seemed to have [had] the kind of instinctive understanding of its political system” (Lewis, 2008, pp. 25–26). In this respect, the European Union’s talk of normatively-underpinned foreign policy approach is presented as a mere distraction from the confrontation with “the reality of Europe’s provincialization in world politics” and the recognition that “it constitutes a bordered international site” (Postel-Vinay, 2008, p. 47). Yet, the normative and policy clash between Central Asian authoritarianisms and the European Union’s democratic governance still continue to challenge the establishment of closer relations. Thus,

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regime stability remains the determining factor in the foreign policies of the Central Asian states rather than the geostrategic competition among different external actors. Regime survival therefore has grown in paramountcy in Central Asia and is currently equated with the core national interests, national security, and political independence of regional states. The reality of these strategic attitudes needs to be taken into account when evaluating the Central Asian agency of the European Union. In this respect, it appears too early to assess the Central Asian Strategy of Brussels. So far, the European Union has provided different types of “know-how” assistance to regional states. Yet, this is unlikely to enhance its stance in Central Asia. The European Union needs to enhance its visibility by opening offices throughout Central Asia. Furthermore, following Kelly McMann’s suggestion that it is “economic autonomy that allows people to engage in the political activities that are essential to the operation of democratic institutions”, the European Union would need to enhance its assistance for the economic development of regional societies. In other words: the calculation of whether one’s economic autonomy is sufficient to protect one from government harassment comes before consideration of interests, resources and organizational capacity — the focus of other studies that examine the impact of capitalism on democracy. Democratic interests and resources are not sufficient for political activism. The ability to make a living independent of the state is crucial to the practice of democracy; otherwise, citizens will avoid activism for fear of economic reprisals by the government. (McMann, 2006, p. 4).

According to some, Central Asia is already the key instance of the latter. Thus, the nepotistic violence practiced by regional regimes has not only “accentuated the weakness of the state” in Central Asia, but has also urged the majority of Central Asian populations to withdraw in “an essentially private world, revolving around family, friends and

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work, with as little engagement as possible with the repressive state” (Lewis, 2008, pp. 47, 163). Both acknowledging this reality and engaging Central Asia from this premise still appears to elude the European Union. At the same time, the European Union would also have to recognize the necessity of cooperating with Russia and China to implement the regional projects collectively — such as TRACECA, INOGATE (Melvin, 2008). Equally significantly, the European Union also needs to renew its efforts to cooperate with other like-minded (as well as its “traditional”) partners — the United States, NATO, and OSCE. Reflecting on the urgency of such renewed cooperation between the European Union and the OSCE in Central Asia, one commentator has presciently outlined the benefits from such closer partnerships: Firstly, European Union support for the OSCE as an actor in European security could be crucial for the organization’s continued relevance and even its continued existence. European Union solidarity could bridge the gap between US and Russian divisions, and counter the increasingly antagonistic and militaristic tone propounded by both these states. Secondly, the European Union needs to draw on the OSCE’s experience in its pursuit of its ENP and Central Asia Strategy objectives. The frozen conflicts in Moldova, Georgia, and Nagorno Karabakh are not a priority for UN action, and therefore require better coordination of objectives and activities between the OSCE and the European Union. The Central Asian states are far behind the rest of Europe in terms of democratic practices and human-rights protection, and require concerted international action to promote reform. In short, the OSCE’s political crisis should not jeopardize the European Union’s commitment to work with, and improve, the organization, which, with its inclusive membership and consensus-based approach, remains a relevant and essential actor in pan-European security. Finally, if the European Union is to succeed in securing the future of the OSCE, European Union member states have to address their difficult relationship with the Russian Federation and prioritize the forging of a common and

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constructive European Union–Russia policy. This final task, to use Solana’s rhetoric, is not an option, it is an imperative. (Stewart, 2008, pp. 280–281).

In this respect, the launch of the Central Asian Strategy seems to conjecture that the institutional patterns underwriting the practices of the European Union’s agency in the region would have to reaffirm their habits of peace if Brussels is to remain a relevant actor in global life (Kavalski, 2008a, p. 45). One of the main advantages of the European Union, thereby, not least because of its reticence to get involved more proactively in Central Asia during the 1990s, is that it is not perceived as a threat by either external or regional actors. This low threat-perception might provide the leverage that Brussels needs to assert its agency in the contested environment of the region. In this respect, the European Union should maintain its involvement in Central Asian not as a strategic competitor of different external actors but a strategic partner to regional states.

Relevant Websites The official website of the EU: http://europa.eu/. ARENA, Center for European Studies: http://www.arena.uio.no/. Center for European Policy Studies: http://www.ceps.be. Center for European Reform: http://www.cer.org.uk. EU Institute for Security Studies: http://www.iss.europa.eu/. European Council on Foreign Relations: http://www.ecfr.eu/. European Society for Central Asian Studies: http://www.escas.pz.nl/. FORNET, a network of research on European Foreign Policy: http:// www.fornet.info/.

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5

The United Nations and Central Asia W. Andy Knight and Vandana Bhatia

Introduction This chapter examines the United Nations and its impact on the states in the region of Central Asia. Its analyzes the geopolitical and geostrategic importance of the Central Asian region particularly since the end of the Cold War, and the place of the five Central Asian republics in world affairs since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Clearly, these states have faced enormous challenges since declaring independence. As new UN member states in the early 1990s they brought a unique combination of problems on to the world body’s agenda that are characteristic of awkward states. The analysis below is an attempt to understand how the various UN agencies have been used to confront some of the challenges and problems faced by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan as they attempt to build state capacity and to cohere as a region. Given the challenges faced in Central Asia, it is not surprising that several external actors have demonstrated an interest in this pivotal region. The UN is no exception. Since the early 1990s, UN agencies have tried to assist the states in Central Asia to deal with a myriad of issues, including the processes of state-building and regionalization. Some commentators have noted that the state-building process in Central Asian states has been “influenced as much from without” (Jones Luong, 2004, pp. 1–4). The UN’s approach to state building has been to encourage democratization, human rights protection, human security, human development, and good governance 89

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(Knight, 2007; 2008). It is an approach rooted in the constitutional principles and norms which undergird the organization. First, we begin with a brief historical background of the UN, to provide a sense of the nature and character of this international actor and its agencies — particularly those that are relevant to the Central Asian region, as well as the theoretical approaches employed to understand and explain the international outreach of this actor. This is followed by an examination of the UN’s expanding mandate in response to changes in the international system since the end of the Cold War; because it provides a sense of the organization’s embrace of human security and human development norms deemed important in any discussion of its interests and role in Central Asia. Next, the chapter explores some of the policies, approaches, and unique tools used by the UN to assist the Central Asian states in building state capacity and regionalization. The UN as an external actor is well placed to assist these Central Asian states in the process of state-building, but it has to be careful that in its zest to advance human security and human development it does not impose a set of values that are alien to the region. The final section is in lieu of a conclusion. It suggests that regionalization, constructed on the principles of subsidiarity, might be a useful approach to capacity building among the five Central Asian states. Such an approach might shore up the individual weaknesses of these states by pooling their sovereignty and it could act as a buffer to the onslaught of negative globalization pressures.

The United Nations and Its Agencies In 2010, the UN will celebrate its 65th birthday. Since its founding in 1945, this universal international organization has attempted to maintain international peace and security — its primary mandate — despite the many challenges it has faced in various regional “hot spots”. It is important to bear in mind that the UN is not a world government but a trans-governmental body created by sovereign states and operating within conditions of systemic anarchy. The UN did not emerge out of a vacuum. It is actually a by-product of a long

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history of idealist attempts at institutionalizing norms and mechanisms of collaboration and cooperation designed to govern the behavior of states and their societies. Immanuel Kant had already conceptualized in 1795 the outlines of such “cosmopolitan” organizations whose objective would be to facilitate the construction of a peaceful community of nations. The UN system simply represents the most recent, and most universal, of these attempts.

Historical background Previous experimentations with international governance bodies include: the Concert of Europe, a balance of power mechanism that tried to keep the peace between the great powers on the European continent; a number of intergovernmental conferences and congresses — e.g., the Congress of Vienna (1815–1822), the Hague Peace conferences (1899 and 1907). The 19th century saw a proliferation of regional and international governance institutions in the form of public international unions, international offices, regional commissions, and tribunals whose purpose it was to encourage the peaceful coexistence of states. Instances of such international organizations are the International Telecommunication Union (founded in 1865) and the International Telegraph Union and the Universal Postal Union (both established in 1874; today all three are specialized agencies of the UN system). The UN’s most immediate predecessor, however, was the League of Nations. Founded in 1919, through the Treaty of Versailles, the League emerged out of the ashes of World War I to become the first 20th century, multipurpose, intergovernmental organization. Its mandate as well as its membership expanded beyond those of previous international organizations. One can consider the League of Nations as the first attempt at universalizing the governance of the inter-state system. The second, and much more successful, attempt thus far has been the UN. When the League of Nations proved unable to arrest the events that led to World War II, it was clear that a new effort is required to prevent the scourge of war while, at the same time, building on the

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League’s experience. In this respect, the UN inherited the norms of “collective security” and peaceful settlement of disputes as well as the mandate to foster international cooperation in economic and social relations. Recognizing the possible threats from awkward states, the UN Charter made provisions for the world body to address their deviance by utilizing coercive measures. Chapter VII of the UN Charter notes that when peaceful measures are exhausted, the UN can call on its members to use such coercive means as “complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations”. Should such measures prove inadequate for restoring the peace, the Security Council can authorize the use of military force to bring awkward states back in line with the wishes of the international community. At its founding in 1945, the 50 member UN system was set up as a complex super-bureaucracy with six principal organs: the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Secretariat, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the Trusteeship Council, and the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Under these main organs are suborgans — main and sessional committees, standing committees, advisory bodies, special offices, subsidiary organs, specialized/functional agencies, regional commission, peacekeeping, peace-building, and other peace support operations, and autonomous but related organizations. Collectively, these decision making and administrative bodies utilize the principle of functionalism to carry out the organization’s Charter mandates and to achieve the wishes of the “international community”.

Peace/security and socio-economic mandates When issues are raised in the Security Council regarding threats to international peace and security, the Council’s first reaction is to recommend that conflicting parties try to resolve their conflicts peacefully. In some cases, the Council will undertake its own investigation of the matter or offer mediation services to the parties involved. In other cases, it may appoint special representatives, or ask

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that the secretary-general use his/her good offices, to resolve the conflict. In all cases, the Council will suggest principles for peaceful settlement of disputes to dissipate a potential threat to international peace and security. In cases where disputes cannot be resolved peacefully and conflicts turn violent, the Council’s first concern is to end the violence as quickly as possible. This may mean issuing cease-fire directives, which can prevent widening the hostilities, or establishing a UN peacekeeping force to help reduce tensions in troubled areas, to keep opposing forces apart and to create conditions of temporary calm so that disputants can be brought to the bargaining table. There are certain instances in which the Council has no choice but to authorize enforcement measures — for example, economic sanctions (such as trade embargoes), arms embargoes, or collective military action. The United Nations’ role in the area of commercial and financial regulation became part of the operations of broader international machinery that included the Bretton Woods institutions — the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), or the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) (Markwell, 2006). This development indicates the United Nations’ recognition of the link between peace and human development. At the same time the creation of an ECOSOC has played only a marginal role in shaping global economic and social policy. However, it oversees a large number of autonomous specialized agencies and subsidiary bodies that work under the United Nations’ umbrella and which are relevant to the dynamics of state-building and regionalization in Central Asia — e.g., the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the World Health Organization (WHO), the UN Development Program (UNDP), the UN Environmental Program (UNEP), the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), the Office of the Human Rights High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (Knight, 2009).

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Expanding Its Mandate: The United Nations, Human Security, and Human Development Apart from its peace and security and economic and social mandates, the United Nations through its Charter aims to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as the progressive development of self-governance and self-determinism for subjugated peoples. The UN system was expected from its inception to harmonize the actions of all nations and regions to attain the above ends. Collectively, its principal organs, along with its specialized agencies, programs, funds, commissions, offices, committees, and peacekeeping and other peace operations all combine to address almost every conceivable transnational, regional, or global issue, and demonstrate the dual task of the world body: to maintain international peace and security while ensuring social and economic development (Knight, 2000). But, particularly since the end of the Cold War, the United Nations’ Charter goals have been extended to include advancing human security and human development. Traditionally, the United Nations has been a very state-centered organization. After all, it was created by states to carry out the wishes of states. But the preamble to the UN Charter begins with “We the People” and continues with a reaffirmation of “faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women” as well as with the goal of promoting “social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom”. One is therefore struck by the extent to which human security and human development goals were already implied in the constitutional document that brought the United Nations into being. Other goals of the organization were added later, such as protecting the global commons and encouraging democratization and good governance across the globe. One can add to these the recent objective of countering terrorism that is reflected in the UN Security Council’s resolution 1373, passed on 28 September 2001 in response to the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States. That resolution 1373 also established a counter-terrorism committee (the CTC) made up of all 15 members of the UN Security Council.

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The United Nations and human security While the idea of human security is implied in the UN Charter, it was not until the end of the Cold War that it began to be perceived as a desirable international norm. In particular, the phenomenon of awkward states meant a rise in the number of civil conflicts that placed large numbers of human beings at risk. With the state’s monopoly over the means of violence lost, in several instances, rebel groups and irregular forces took advantage of the situation to create conditions of human insecurity. Unlike traditional conflicts in which soldiers on opposing sides battled for supremacy and in which civilians sometimes got caught in the crossfire, in post-Cold War intra-state conflicts innocent civilians generally became deliberate targets. Children were recruited as soldiers or as members of rebel militia. In some cases, intra-state conflicts led to genocide, massacres, ethnic cleansing, and other egregious forms of human rights abuse, the temporary or permanent displacement of large numbers of people, the systematic rape of women, and complex humanitarian crises. The international community, represented in the United Nations, could not stand idly by and allow this situation to continue. In the early 1990s, this concern led to calls for humanitarian intervention to protect civilians living within war-affected countries, and to put a halt to the “spill-over” of such conflicts: In an interdependent world, in which security depends on a framework of stable sovereign entities, the existence of fragile states, failing states, states who through weakness or ill-will harbor those dangerous to others, or states that can only maintain internal order by means of gross human rights violations, can constitute a risk to people everywhere. (ICISS, 2001, p. 5)

Underpinning those calls for intervention was a “new” norm in international relations — “the responsibility to protect” (R2P), which lent credence to the embryonic norm of “human security”. The concept of human security was proposed and popularized in the first half of the 1990s, at a time when there was much optimism

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about the establishment of a post-Cold War “new world order”. There was also much talk, at that time, of a “peace dividend” in which security, defined as both “freedom from want” as well as “freedom from fear”, would be enhanced (MacLean et al., 2006). This peoplecentered concept, human security, was pushed vigorously onto the international stage in the early 1990s by the UNDP and by the then Canadian Foreign Minister, Lloyd Axworthy. It was generally framed as an alternative to the Westphalian norm of state security, although it is possibly better to see it as a supplement to state security norm. The embrace of the human security norm rested, in large part on the realization that some states were either unable or unwilling to protect their citizens from harm. Furthermore, in many of the intra-state conflicts, “the antagonists were frequently gangs and/or private militias rather than standing national armies” (MacLean et al., 2006, p. 4; Smillie and Minear, 2004). The solution to this problem was to “put people first” in matters of security — i.e., moving the security referent away from the state to the individual (Axworthy, 2001, pp. 19–23). It also meant using traditional and non-traditional tools and strategies to address this problem. While the term “human security” may be of relatively recent origin, the ideas that underpin it are far from new. For more than a century — at least since the founding of the International Committee of the Red Cross in the 1860s — a doctrine based on the security of people has been gathering momentum. Core elements of this doctrine were formalized in the 1940s with the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the four Geneva Conventions and the two additional Protocols on international humanitarian law in armed conflict, and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; in the 1960s with the twin Covenants on civil, political and social rights and economic and cultural rights; and in the late 1990s with the adoption of the Rome Statute that established the International Criminal Court (ICC). In 1993, a UNDP report listed the “new concepts of human security” as one of five pillars of “a people-centered world order” which “must stress the security of people, not only of nations”. According to that report, “The concept of security must change from

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an exclusive stress on national security to a much greater stress on people’s security, from security through armaments to security through human development, from territorial security to food, employment and environmental security” (UNDP, 1993, p. 2). However, the term “human security” is most commonly associated with the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report, which had as one of its explicit goals the attempt to capture the post-Cold War “peace dividend” and redirect those resources toward the development agenda. The human security definition advanced in that report was extremely ambitious. Human security was defined as the summation of seven distinct dimensions of security: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political (UNDP, 1994). By focusing on people and highlighting non-traditional threats, the UNDP report made an important contribution in expanding post-Cold War thinking about security. The very breadth of the UNDP approach to human security (i.e., freedom from fear and freedom from want), however, made it unwieldy as a policy instrument (Paris, 2001, pp. 87–102; Khong, 2001, pp. 231–236). With such a large laundry list of threats, policy makers would have to devise multiple, diverse and, at times, incompatible sets of policy solutions to resolve them (Owens and Arneil, 1999, p. 2). There was also a criticism that the 1994 UNDP report, in emphasizing the threats associated with underdevelopment, largely ignored the continuing human insecurity resulting from violent conflict. However, with the outbreak of clan violence in Somalia (1992–1993), internecine slaughter in Bosnia (1992–1995), genocide in Rwanda (1994), and attempts at ethnic cleansing in Kosovo (1997–1999), preoccupation with human security re-emerged. This time, practice led theory. In the case of Somalia it was clear that brute force was not going to bring an end to the violent clashes between armed clans. By 1995, the United Nations had withdrawn its peacekeepers from Somalia, raising grave concerns about human insecurity in that country (Knight and Gebremariam, 2001, pp. 77–94). The failure of the international community, as represented by the United Nations, to prevent the massacre of thousands of civilians in Srebrenica again indicated the need for operational human security concept.

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But it was the genocide in Rwanda and the resultant humanitarian catastrophe (with over 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutus dead) that brought human security from the back burner to the front of the United Nations’ agenda. The United Nations’ inaction was heavily criticized and many countries pledged that something like this should never again happen. Axworthy (2003, p. 162) recalls that what happened in Rwanda “led me inexorably to my decision to support military intervention in Kosovo… to stop what had become a massive case of ethnic cleansing of the majority of the Muslim population”. In fact, it was the Canadian government, with Lloyd Axworthy’s leadership as foreign minister that led the way in making the human security norm operational (Hampson et al., 2001). Human security, therefore, identifies the protection of people from both violent and non-violent threats. Rather than focusing exclusively on the security of territorial states, human security represents a paradigm shift that entails taking practical measures to reduce human vulnerability and to take “remedial action when prevention fails” (DFAIT, 2006).

Human development and the millennium development goals (MDGs) As with the human security concept, human development was also implied in the UN Charter. Richard Jolly (2004, p. 635) notes that a “focus on people” was at the center of the United Nations’ economic and social development strategies from the very beginning. However, it was not until 1990 that the United Nations’ focus on human development was given conceptual depth and wide application with the creation of the UNDP’s Human Development Report (HDR). In essence, human development is about expanding people’s choices, to allow them to lead long and healthy lives, “to be educated and enjoy a decent standard of living”. The key measure of human development is the Human Development Index (HDI). It measures the average length of life of a population, its accumulation of knowledge, and its access to a range of choices that allows for a decent standard of living. Other measures of human development include: the Gender-related

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Development Index (GDI), the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM), and the Human Poverty Index (HPI). Furthermore, in 2000 a General Assembly meeting of the Heads of Governments of the member states of the United Nations passed unanimously a declaration to “spare no effort to free our fellow men, women, and children from the abject and dehumanizing conditions of extreme poverty”. Known as Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), these objectives encompass poverty reduction, freedom from hunger, right to basic education and health, gender equality, the reduction of child mortality, maternal health, combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other communicable diseases, ensuring environmental sustainability, and developing a global partnership for development (United Nations, 2008). In 2005, the United Nations prepared a report on Regional Cooperation for Human Development and Human Security in Central Asia. It was the first time that the United Nations had ever put together in one report the many interconnected challenges that face the Central Asian states. These included poverty, poor governance, corruption, human insecurity, trade difficulties, drug trafficking, human trafficking, environmental degradation, and conflicts. While this report brings together many diverse strands of analysis, its main message is that greater regional cooperation would significantly improve lives in the Central Asian region where nearly half of the people live in poverty (UNDP, 2006).

The UN’s Strategy in Central Asia Since the End of the Cold War During the Cold War period, ideological tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union were played out in the UN Security Council. In fact, the Council’s effectiveness in dealing with threats to international peace and security was stymied by the superpowers’ disagreements — usually reflected in the excessive utilization of the veto by both the United States and the Soviet Union. With the end of the Cold War, the situation in the Security Council improved somewhat, primarily because the ideological tensions abated as the

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Soviet Union disintegrated and the United States became the sole remaining global superpower. At the same time, new conflicts emerged that dramatically increased the workload of the Council. There has been little scholarly analysis on the United Nations role in Central Asia. However, based on a number of primary documents from UN agencies as well as documents from the five Central Asian countries, it is possible to piece together the United Nations’ activities in this region. It is clear that, as an external actor, the United Nations is preferred by most of the leadership in Central Asia over other external actors. This is because the United Nations is viewed, largely, as a neutral actor that can assist in stabilizing the region and in facilitating the process of state-building. In addition, Chapter VIII of the UN Charter demonstrates that the world body is not averse to collaborating with regional agencies and institution to carry out its human security and human development functions in specific geographical areas, as we shall show later.

Nuclear non-proliferation issues One of the major issues addressed by the Security Council in the wake of Soviet dissolution was the location and control of Soviet nuclear weapons. A decision was made that by the end of 1991 the strategic and tactical nuclear weapons located in non-Russian territory would either be handed over to Russia or destroyed. By May 1992, all Soviet tactical nuclear weapons located on the territory of the Central Asian republics were moved to Russia. The strategic nuclear weapons located in Kazakhstan were eliminated by 1996 (Woolf, 1996). These moves, while not directed by the UN Security Council, were facilitated by the norms of the UN disarmament provisions as well as by the terms of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which states such as Kazakhstan signed onto in 1993 (United Nations, 2006a). The former UN Under-Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs, Jayantha Dhanapala, had worked incessantly on creating a Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zone (NWFZ) in Central Asia (Dhanapala, 2003). On 11 December 2008, the countries of Central Asia completed the ratification of the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone

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(CANWFZ) Treaty. The CANWFZ joins three other active NWFZs that cover Southeast Asia, the South Pacific, and Latin America and the Caribbean (CNS, 2008). The establishment of the CANWFZ came at a time when the entire NPT was under severe strain (United Nations, 2006b). What the CANWFZ showcases is the extent of the commitment of the Central Asian region not only to nuclear non-proliferation but also to the nuclear disarmament norms propagated by the United Nations — especially, bearing in mind that the region previously had nuclear weapons on its territory and continues to be surrounded by nucleararmed states (Russia, China, Pakistan, and India). Under the terms of the CANWFZ treaty, the Central Asian states became the first countries to be legally bound by the Additional Protocol of the United Nations’ IAEA safeguards on any of their civilian nuclear energy assets. This treaty requires the Central Asian states to meet international standards for the physical protection of nuclear materials, particularly in light of the fact that Central Asia could become a source, or transit corridor, for terrorist smuggling of nuclear materials. Furthermore, the CANWFZ treaty acknowledges the environmental damage which Central Asian states sustained due to the Soviet nuclear weapons program (e.g., in Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan alone there were about 456 Soviet open air nuclear tests), and it contains provisions for the environmental clean-up, which could be overseen by UNEP (CNS, 2009). It should be noted here that while Russia and China supported a resolution of the First Committee of the UN General Assembly that endorsed the CANWFZ, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France have been critical (Parrish and Potter, 2006).

UN peacekeeping and peace-building in Tajikistan After the Soviet Union’s dissolution, there was much concern that the Central Asian states might succumb to inter-ethnic or intra-state conflict. Not all the states in the region met that fate. But, within a year of independence, a major civil conflict broke out in Tajikistan. The United Tajik Opposition (UTO), which comprised of liberal and Islamic groups, took power briefly in mid-1992. Emomali Sharipani

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Ramona’s government forces were able to regain control militarily, but the clash between the opposition and the government turned into a full blown civil war. By mid-1993, about 50,000 of the 6 million people in Tajikistan had been killed, most of them civilians. Approximately 600,000 were displaced internally, and an additional 60,000 became refugees in northern Afghanistan. Although much of the fighting stopped by the end of 1993, there were occasional skirmishes between UTO-insurgents and Tajik government forces along the Tajik–Afghan border. A number of regional attempts to broker a peace failed. So, in an attempt to stabilize the situation in Tajikistan, the Governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan held a meeting in Moscow on 24 September 1993 and established the Commonwealth of Independent States’ Collective Peacekeeping Forces in Tajikistan. When peace did not result from this effort, the president of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov made a direct appeal to the UNSG, Boutros BoutrosGhali to intervene. The UNSG did so by first appointing a Special Envoy for Tajikistan, on 26 April 1994, and providing that envoy with the mandate “to obtain agreement on a ceasefire and make recommendations on appropriate international monitoring mechanisms; to ascertain the positions of all the concerned parties and make good offices available to assist in the establishment of a process of negotiations for a political solution; and to enlist the help of neighboring countries and others concerned in achieving those objectives” (United Nations, 2000). The second move by the UNSG was to send a fact-finding mission into the country to observe the humanitarian situation. The third move was to ask the UN Security Council to consider the deployment of a peacekeeping mission to the conflict area to investigate and report on any ceasefire violations. The UNSC Resolution 968 of 16 December 1994 formally established the UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) with an initial strength of 55 peacekeepers, including 22 military personnel (United Nations, 2000). After three years of UN-mediated negotiations, the Tajikistan peace accords were signed between the two warring parties. The mandate of UNMOT expired in 2000 and the UN peacekeeping force was replaced by the

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UN Tajikistan Office of Peace-Building (UNTOP) on 1 June 2000 (FCO, 2008a). Kofi Annan, the then UNSG, appointed Ambassador Ivo Petrov of Bulgaria to serve as the Head of UNTOP. The UNTOP’s mandate was to focus on: consolidating peace in Tajikistan; providing political support for efforts to mobilize international resources and assistance for national recovery and reconstruction; promoting the rule of law; strengthening democratic institutions; supporting local human rights initiatives; and, promoting a coordinated and focused effort by the UN system in the country with respect to matters related to peace-building (ReliefWeb, 2001).

UN efforts to tackle drug and arms trafficking in Central Asia The Central Asian region has served as a significant route for the opium trade and for the heroin produced in Afghanistan. Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, there has been an exponential expansion of drug trafficking from Afghanistan through Central Asia. Much of these drugs find their way into Russia and Europe, and sometimes into the North American markets. While Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have emerged as the “frontline states” for this “deadly cargo” trade, due in large part to their extensive border (more than 1,500 km) and an inhospitable terrain, drugs are also trafficked through Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan (Hidalgo, 1999). An estimated 80 percent of the heroin seized in Europe, and 95 percent in Great Britain, originates from poppies in Afghanistan, most of which is trafficked through Central Asia. Cultivation and trafficking has become a way of life, and sometimes a matter of survival, for many people in the region. In Central Asia, increasing numbers of impoverished people are willing to risk the harsh legal penalties of drug trafficking because they see opium as their only ticket to survival. Since 2000, women throughout Central Asia have been taking part in drug trafficking at an alarming rate, primarily because they are less likely to come under suspicion at border crossing than men. Various estimates indicate that 30 percent of drug traffickers are women, mostly from rural areas.

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Young adults between the ages of 14 and 35 now constitute the majority of drug addicts in Central Asia. This is a particular problem for Kazakhstan, where drug addiction has a high occurrence among high-school students from middle- and high-income families. Experts are concerned that the region, besides being a transit zone for Afghan drugs, is now becoming a major consumer (Osmonaliev, 2005). There is also evidence of a causal link between the drug economy and the armed mobilization of non-state actors that challenge state forces by instigating armed clashes and terrorist attacks against security forces or state structures in Central Asia (Baran et al., 2006; Cornell, 2006, pp. 37–67). Though the Central Asian states recognize the drug threat they appear incapable of tackling the problem. Part of the reason is the lack of effective management of their highly permeable borders. This is why the UNDP has begun to collaborate with the European Union in establishing the Border Management Program for Central Asia and the Drug Action Program in Central Asia (BOMCA/CADAP). Funding for these programs is provided by the European Union, while the UNDP has been given the task of implementing them. The main aim of the BOMCA is to incorporate modern border management techniques for “enhanced border security and facilitation of legal trade and transit” (Central Asian Gateway, 2006). The CADAP was officially launched in 2003 and is currently in its fourth phase. The primary objective of CADAP is “to foster a development-oriented drug control strategy in Central Asia that ensures a sustained reduction of drug consumption and trafficking in line with EU Commission drug strategies” (EU CADAP, 2008). The long-term objectives of BOMCA/CADAP are three-fold: (1) to provide policy advice and assist with legal and institutional reform; (2) to build national capacity; and (3) to develop pilot projects at borders of the five countries that can be replicated by the respective governments with financial support from donors. Of particular interest here are the national capacity building and regionalization activities. They include: constructing and renovating training facilities for Border Guards Service (BGS) officers in all five Central

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Asian republics; developing new BGS training curricula for integrated border management across the region; providing common software and training in intelligence analysis for law enforcement bodies and linking those agencies to Europol and Interpol; and providing equipment and training to be used in forensic labs to improve drug route intelligence, toxicological post-mortem examination, and criminal conviction rates (Central Asian Gateway, 2006). In November 2008, at a three-day regional seminar for drugprofiling units in the capital of Turkmenistan, Inita Paulovica (a United Nations official) reiterated the need for the introduction of advanced techniques to combat all types of illegal cross-border trade — drugs, arms or even human trafficking (UNDP, 2008). Following that, the European Union and the UNDP, in a significant effort, established a National Drug Information Network (NADIN) for Central Asia. The objectives of NADIN include: compiling reliable and comparable data that covers all aspects of the drug trade; encouraging greater cooperation at national and regional levels for countering drug trafficking; curbing the use of illicit drugs and precursor trafficking; and combating increasing drug use within the Central Asian region (UNDP, 2009c). Illicit drug trafficking is not just a problem for individual states in Central Asia but for the entire region, with implication for the globe. It requires, therefore, a coordinated multilevel governance effort that involves local, national, regional, and global actors. To that effect, the UNODC’s Central Asian Regional Information and Coordination Centre (CARICC) was established as a pivotal regional communication centre for analysis and exchange of information on transnational crime in real time as well as a centre for the organization and coordination of joint operations (UNODC, 2008). Finally, the UNODC, the primary sponsor of counter-narcotics initiatives throughout the region, has worked for over a decade now on programs ranging from “mapping illicit crop cultivation in Afghanistan and Central Asia, to supporting research at Uzbekistan’s Institute of Genetics on the development of a fungus capable of destroying the opium crop at its root”. In the Central Asian states, the main focus of the UNODC is to help each country develop a

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“centralized counter-narcotics infrastructure” — i.e., to assist them in creating indigenous counter-narcotics and drug control agencies and administrations, in drafting legislation, in providing training and equipment to border guards, customs officials, and others working on counter-narcotics initiatives; and, to help establish separate courts to prosecute narcotics consumption and trafficking crimes. The UNODC supports regional collaboration in all of the above areas through an agreement, signed in 2000 by all the states in Central Asia, on fighting transnational crime (Lubin, 2001).

United Nations’ role in combating crime and corruption in Central Asia Transnational organization crime is generally rife in awkward states. In such states organized crime tends to infiltrate the government and further weaken its capacity to address this serious issue. Observers have noted that in some cases there has been a merger of state structures with organized crime (Marat, 2006). The absence of strong political and institutional structures capable of cracking down on organized crime groups in the states of this region ensures that crimes such as drug trafficking and the trafficking of humans continue to flourish. In turn, organized crimes are often linked to corruption at many levels within awkward states. The claim is that “the weakness of the Central Asian states created a permissive environment for the formation of organized crime groups in the 1990s” (Marat, 2006, p. 65). But the criminal activity and accompanying cases of corruption are facilitated by a combination of: chaotic privatization; the large volume of foreign currencies entering the countries as a result of the investment in oil and gas resources in the region; the paltry pay that most civil servants are given; and the inadequate norms, laws, and institutions that are supposed to be in place to combat this problem. The sizeable oil and gas revenues in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan are clearly responsible for the rise in state corruption in both countries. In Turkmenistan, for instance, the President controls a fund that is made up of 50 percent

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of the gas revenues of that country. The money is supposed to be used for economic development. However, budgetary transparency and accountability is more or less lacking and there have been a number of allegations regarding kickbacks by US energy companies to government officials (Financial Times, 2004, p. 27). In fact, politicians throughout the region are known to use criminal gangs to harass, intimidate or eliminate their political opponents. These activities further facilitate the criminalization of the state. The United Nations addresses this problem in Central Asia through the UNODC. Its agenda in the region is “to strengthen national and international inter-agency cooperation, improve data collection and analysis, and enhance relevant expertise within the law enforcement and prosecution through training” (UNDOC, 2008, p. 5). Human trafficking is another pressing problem involving organized crime in Central Asia. Women, children, and labor migrants are common victims of trafficking. Indeed, trafficking in human beings is closely connected with trafficking in drugs and corruption. Many of these unfortunate individuals end up in Middle Eastern countries, or in Europe or Russia. For instance, in May 2008, the UNODC joined forces with the OSCE to run a workshop in Tashkent on law enforcement and judicial cooperation in Central Asia aimed at assisting them to investigate effectively transnational offences on human trafficking and the illegal smuggling of migrants (UNODC, 2008). The United Nations’ International Organization for Migration (IOM) has also been trying to assist the Central Asian states in addressing the problem of human trafficking. The IOM has assisted Central Asian governments through rapid humanitarian responses to sudden migration flows, post-emergency return and reintegration programs, assistance to migrants on their way to new homes, and lives, facilitation of labor migration, assisted voluntary return for irregular migrants, aid to migrants in distress, training and capacity building for officials, measures to counter trafficking in persons, migration medical and public health programs, mass information and education in migration, research related to migration management, and other services for migrants (IOM, 2008a).

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The UN, the social sector, and gender mainstreaming The issue of human trafficking in Central Asia has also highlighted the position of and the vulnerabilities faced by women, in the region. The dissolution of the Soviet Union led to an unraveling of the gains that Central Asian women had made while under Soviet rule. Part of the reason for this was that the authoritarian leaders in Central Asian states selectively resorted to certain traditional Islamic practices and used those traditions as a means of controlling women. The Central Asian HDR notes that the taking of statistics that are disaggregated by gender are extremely limited in the region (UNDP, 2005, p. 11). Thus, for over a decade, gender equality has been an essential component of the United Nations’ strategy for achieving equitable and sustainable human development in Central Asia (UNDP/RBEC, 2007, p. 13). In this context, “gender mainstreaming” refers to “the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programs, in all areas and at all levels”. It is a strategy aimed at making the concerns and experiences of both women and men “an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programs in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated”. To this end, the United Nations has organized several workshops dealing with “gender sensitization of the UN agencies and other gender focal points in the Central Asian countries” (UNDP, 2009a). Despite the fact that some of the Central Asian states have signed conventions such as the United Nations’ Conventions on Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women and the National Plan of Realization of Platform of Actions of the IV World Conference of Women, there are still major gaps in their implementation. This is an area in which the United Nations has not been very successful in changing the attitudes, let alone the practices of Central Asian regimes.

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United Nations and human rights The difficulty in bringing about gender equality is in some ways linked to the deplorable human rights situation in the Central Asian states. Some of the more blatant human rights violations that have been recorded in the media include: enforced disappearances, arbitrary arrests, clamping down on dissent, unfair trials, internal exile, torture or other ill-treatment, political assassinations, and restrictions on freedoms of expression, association and religion. According to Amnesty International’s Nicola Duckworth, “journalists, civil society activists and religious believers are… subject to harassment and intimidation” by regional governments. In Turkmenistan, government authorities “launched a new wave of repression in April 2008, as part of their policy to silence civil society activists and deny freedom of the media” (Amnesty International, 2009). In many of the Central Asian states, opposition parties are either banned or allowed limited freedom of expression. For instance, in Uzbekistan, political parties deemed to be supporting Islamic extremism are generally repressed (FCO, 2007). Similarly, in Kazakhstan, too, opposition activists have been subjected to torture (FCO, 2008b). Likewise, while in Turkmenistan the constitution guarantees a wide range of human rights, arbitrary state-sponsored repression remains a reality (FCO, 2008c). In this respect, the United Nations’ OHCHR has begun to raise awareness in the region, which has led to the establishment of a Regional Human Rights Office for Central Asia (United Nations, 2009). This office is expected to assist the OHCHR in curbing impunity with respect to torture, violence against women, and infringements on the rights of vulnerable groups. The Regional Office will also have a complaint mechanism. It will play a key role in assisting UN Country teams, as well as other international and national agencies, to incorporate human rights-based approaches in their areas of work in the region (United Nations, 2009). In this context, it is significant that Kazakhstan has now signed on to the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture — becoming the first Central Asian state to do so (United Nations, 2009).

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Thus, the United Nations has at least been able to utilize its agency to spotlight some of the human rights violations in the region.

In Lieu of a Conclusion States in the Central Asian region are landlocked entities whose security, trade, economic growth, and political stability are dependent on their relationship with adjacent regions. In fact, one of the states, Uzbekistan is one of only two “double landlocked” countries in the world (Bobukolov, 2006, p. 76). Given the awkwardness of Central Asian states, some have argued that external actors need to assist in the process of state-building: The region’s disintegration and polarization is likely to be long term. While strengthening their independence and sovereignty, the Central Asian states will likely falter in attempts at cooperative integration without Western assistance. The West should promote steps towards regional cooperation, preventing attempts by Russia or other external players to establish political and economic hegemony in Central Asia. There is hope that a new kind of regional cooperation and partnership will develop as an alternative to the old-Soviet style mechanisms of integration in Central Asia. (Tabyshalieva, 1999, p. vii)

Yet, leaders in Central Asia are quite wary of the motives of external actors and equally apprehensive about the possibility of dominance by one or more of the five states within the region (Swanstrom, 2004, p. 51). It is for those reasons that the United Nations — as a “neutral” external actor — may be acceptable to these states. The world body provides a forum within which all five Central Asian states can solicit advice and assistance regarding the myriad of problems which they face. As noted above, the UN system is a multipurpose multilateral organization and within it, or affiliated to it, are specialized agencies and functional bodies charged with the mandate to deal with threats to human security and human development.

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From the above analysis, it is clear that the United Nations’ impact and influence in Central Asia has grown since the end of the Cold War. It has been instrumental in ensuring the control of nuclear weapons and materials in the five states. Its nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament norm seems to have had a major influence on the Central Asian states. These states have committed themselves to abiding by the Additional Protocol of the IAEA safeguards on future civilian nuclear energy assets. The UNEP is also working with these states in cleaning up nuclear waste left over from the days of the Soviet Union. With respect to conflict resolution, the United Nations has been quite active in Central Asia. When Tajikistan seemed about to implode, the United Nations sent in special envoys and utilized the UNSG’s good office to mediate the conflict. It also established a peacekeeping force to monitor a ceasefire and carry out fact-finding missions. Further, the United Nations developed a peace-building operation that helped to consolidate peace in Tajikistan. That operation mobilized international resources for the national recovery and reconstruction process. It promoted the rule of law and helped to strengthen the democratic and human rights institutions in that country. These human security initiatives by the United Nations in Central Asia were coupled by human development outreach. The United Nations has been trying to assist the five countries in the region to counter drug, arms, and human trafficking as well as crime and corruption. It has done so by combining the efforts of its own agencies, such as the UNDP and the UNODC with that of regional organizations such as the European Union and the OSCE. Most of these efforts involved working with the states in Central Asia to strengthen their border management and their drug action programs. In some cases, the United Nations has provided policy advice to these states and assisted them with legal and institutional reforms. The whole idea behind this strategy is to help build national capacity so that the five countries, and the entire region, can address those problems that weaken the states and their civil societies as well as threaten their fledgling democracies and economies. The United Nations recognizes that some problems are best resolved in certain parts of the globe by using regional agencies and institutions (as noted in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter). It supports the idea of

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greater regional cooperation as one solution to resolving some of the intricate and interrelated problems that all five states in Central Asia face. Particularly, in the current climate of global financial instability and food and energy insecurity, the need for greater cooperation between Central Asia and the rest of Asia, for example, is stronger than ever. Regional cooperation, and possible integration, can provide the necessary platform for initiating and sustaining mutual understanding and dialog among the Central Asian states and in the process create a win-win situation for all the parties involved (Bobokulov, 2006, p. 88). Due to the geographic interdependence of the Central Asian region, states in this area need to cooperate in order to resolve water and land disputes; migration issues; gender inequality; problems of drug, guns and human trafficking; and, the spread of religious extremism and terrorism (Tabyshalieva, 1999, p. 32). As the Central Asian HDR concludes: Much remains to be done, however, to reduce cross-border barriers, to facilitate the best use of regional resources and to ensure that the people of Central Asia benefit from improved links among their countries, with their neighbours and with the rest of the world. (UNDP, 2005, p. 3)

It is useful to note here the UNDP’s philosophy with respect to capacity development. The UNDP basically supports national partners “to assess their own capacities, to develop and implement responses that build on existing capacities, and to evaluate changes over time…. Above all, capacity development is about transformations — in people, organizations and societies — that lead to sustainable human development” (UNDP, 2009b). Thus, in the end, leaders in the five states of this Central Asian region must be held accountable for creating a permissive climate that undermines human security and human development. The poor state of human security in Central Asia is blamed, for example, on the failure of some of the governments in this region to adhere to principles of democracy, respect for human rights, the rule

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of law, environmental protection, and good governance. It should be clear from the analysis above that the UN system has, particularly since the end of the Cold War, begun to pay attention to the problems being faced by the countries in Central Asia. It has not always been successful in addressing these problems, but it has made an attempt, through its various agencies, to use the norms of human security and human development as a theoretical and practical guide in its efforts to assist the Central Asian states build capacity both within the respective states as well as within this region. However, the United Nations has to be careful not to be perceived as imposing a set of “Western” values on these largely Islamic states. It might be useful for the states of Central Asia to embrace the norms of human security and human development in their quest to build more robust state institutions. They should also consider developing watchdog institutions at the regional level, with the United Nations’ help, to make these norms operational. Pooling of sovereignty through regionalization and subsidiarity could help these states establish a “buffer” against unwanted intrusions from outside, while at the same time provide them with the resources needed to strengthen their individual state/society complexes.

Related Websites International Development Research Center: http://www.idrc.ca. International League for Human Rights — Central Asia: http:// www.ilhr.org/ilhr/regional/centasia/index.html. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Central Asia Regional Office: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/EnacaREgion/Pages/ CentralAsiaSummary.aspx. Official Website locator for the United Nations System: http:// www.unsystem.org/. UN Special Program for the Economies of Central Asia: http:// www.unece.org/speca/. UNDP — Central Asia: http://europeandcis.undp.org/environment/ centralasia. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime: http://www.unodc.org/.

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Part Two

THE CENTRAL ASIAN AGENCY OF STATES

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6

China and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: The Dynamics of “New Regionalism”, “Vassalization”, and Geopolitics in Central Asia Michael Clarke

Introduction The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is a multilateral group comprised of six member states — China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan — and four observer states — Mongolia, Iran, India, and Pakistan. This organization has been variously described as “the world’s least known and least analyzed” multilateral group, an “OPEC with [nuclear] bombs”, and a prospective anti-American “Asian NATO” (Bailes et al., 2007; Brummer, 2007, p. 185; Weitz, 2006, p. 42). Yet, these somewhat alarmist characterizations stand in stark contrast to the treatment of the organization immediately after the events of 11 September 2001, whereby it was dismissed as either an ineffectual and shallow regional “talk-fest” or a transparent cloak for the maintenance and expansion of malignant Russian and Chinese influence in Central Asia (Blank 2002; Tisdall, 2006). These perceptions, however, fail to understand both the roots and evolution of SCO and, perhaps more importantly, the core imperatives of its principle driver, the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Indeed, China’s foreign policy in Central Asia has been variously characterized as constituting a “new regionalism”, establishing 117

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vassal relations between China and Central Asia or as geopolitical maneuvering (Chung, 2004, pp. 989–1009; Lanteigne, 2006/07, pp. 605–622; Swanstrom, 2005, pp. 569–584). I will briefly address what each of these conceptualizations of China’s foreign policy means and then relate these models to the record of Chinese foreign policy in the region since 1991. What will emerge from this discussion is that all three conceptualizations can be seen as constituting accurate pictures of China’s multilateral (new regionalism) and bilateral (vassalization) diplomacy/relations in Central Asia and its over-arching strategic concerns/imperatives in the region (geopolitics). Moreover, it will also be suggested that the development of these three levels within China’s approach to the region has been a significant expression of China’s grand strategy of “peaceful rise”. This chapter argues that while SCO might resemble other multilateral organization, its origins and the interests of China have shaped it in a particular and unique fashion. Indeed, SCO’s norms, declared policies, and rhetoric bear the imprint of China’s evolving foreign policy thinking since the early 1990s, particularly Beijing’s formulation of “new regionalism” and “new security concept” to promote China’s “peaceful rise” in international affairs. For Beijing, the organization is an example of “new regionalism” in that it is defined by “open, functional, interest-based cooperation among contiguous states” that is underpinned by a mutual respect for the member states’ sovereignty (Chung, 2004). This imperative of privileging state sovereignty within a multilateral context is driven by China’s twin concerns with its own sovereignty and control of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and its desire to develop multiple regional and global relationships in order to counter US primacy in the international system. Therefore, Chinese policy in Central Asia is the product of the interaction of its domestic security and development concerns in Xinjiang, its region-specific interests in Central Asia (such as border security and counter terrorism) and its global foreign policy strategy of hedging against potential US containment. The analysis concludes that China has been relatively successful in embedding these three imperatives within the operation of SCO, although the potential remains for specific issues, such as those

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surrounding competition for access and/or control of Central Asian energy resources, to upset the equilibrium established between China and Russia within the organization since the late 1990s. The chapter will begin, however, with a brief discussion of the evolution of China’s grand strategy of “peaceful rise,” as this “big picture” perspective provides an excellent vantage point from which to assess the development of China’s diplomacy and foreign policy in the discrete Central Asian context. What will emerge is that each of the strands of Chinese policy toward the region have been shaped by fundamentally strategic decisions about China’s internal development (specifically in Xinjiang) and the opportunities for geopolitical gains in post-Soviet Eurasia. As such Chinese policy toward Central Asia significantly contributes to the achievement of its “peaceful rise” in international affairs.

China’s Grand Strategy of “Peaceful Rise” and the Role of Central Asia A major question that has confronted observers of China’s diplomacy in Central Asia since the end of the Cold War has been how best to conceptualize and explain the bases of Beijing’s approach to the region. The response of scholars has been varied. Some simply suggest that Beijing opportunistically took advantage of the relative retreat of Russian power after 1991 to expand its influence in the region (Kerr and Swinton, 2008). Others suggest that the drivers of Chinese interest in Central Asia have had purely domestic origins ranging from concern for the security and development of the restive province of Xinjiang to China’s burgeoning need for further sources of oil and natural gas to fuel its growing economy (Chang, 1997). Another recent theme has been to perceive the relations between China and Central Asian as increasingly defined by a dynamic of economic and political dependency that resembles imperial China’s “vassal” relationships with neighboring states (Swanstrom, 2005; Goldstein, 2005). None of these conceptions provides a coherent picture of Beijing’s encompassing interests or of the full weight of its long-term significance for the region and the world. Attempting to explain China’s approach to Central Asia in isolation from a consideration

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of the evolution and driving themes of Beijing’s post-1991 foreign policy risks occluding the intimate and dynamic connections between the internal, regional, and global visions of this rising power. The end of the Cold War and the strategic certainties of that era resulted in the development of three guiding themes for China’s post-Cold War foreign policy — “preservation, prosperity, and power” (Wang, 2005). Key to securing this trilogy of national goals has been the development of a foreign policy “line” of “peaceful rise (heping jueqi)” (Yongnian, 1999, pp. 114–116). These pre-eminent concerns have meant that from 1991 onward China has generally attempted to safely enter and engage with the existing international order in order to reap the benefits of the contemporary international political and economic system. Thus, China developed a preference for “cooperation”, “multilateralism”, “integration”, and “regionalism” in its diplomatic endeavors, especially with respect to relations with immediate neighbors — a dynamic particularly prevalent in Beijing’s relations with Central Asia (Hsiung, 1995; Chung, 2004). This dynamic illustrates a central facet of China’s strategic and foreign policy since 1991 — the development of multiple regional and global relationships in order to balance against the perceived threat of US predominance (Hsiung, 1995; Foot, 2005). China’s grand strategy of “peaceful rise”, as officially stated has reflected these themes of establishing good relations with neighbors, integration in the international economy, and avoidance of conflict with the United States. For Zheng Bijian, the former vice-president of the Central Party School in Beijing and originator of the term, the essence of China’s strategic path of “peaceful rise” consists of “independently building socialism with Chinese characteristics, while participating in rather than detaching from economic globalization” (Zheng, 2003). Chinese President Hu Jintao has also stressed that “the very purpose of China’s foreign policy is to maintain world peace and promote common development” through forging “good neighborly relationships” while practicing “a policy of bringing harmony, security, and prosperity”. Such an approach, according to Hu, would ultimately lead to the “strengthening of mutual trust and cooperation

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between Asian countries” (Hu, 2004). Thus, the Chinese “are not seeking to become a big military power contending for hegemony around the world, but a big market, a major civilization, and a responsible big power playing a constructive role in the international community” (Zheng, 2005). Where does Central Asia fit in this grand strategy? Central Asia’s importance in China’s grand strategy is enhanced due to the fact that “Beijing is not seeking a place in the sun, but rather a protected place in the shade” (Xiang, 2004, p. 109). In essence, this view, in conjunction with the statements of Zheng Bijian noted above, suggests that China is seeking to orient its strategy of “peaceful rise” toward regions where there are less obstacles for the expansion of China’s political, economic, strategic, and military influence. In this regard, an over-arching theme of “engaging the periphery” in China’s post-1991 foreign policy, whereby China has sought to construct conducive relations with its immediate neighbors on the basis of shared economic and security concerns/interests, has been observed and commented upon in some detail (Shambaugh, 2004/05; Kang, 2003). In this context, Central Asia has arguably emerged since 1991 to be a path of least resistance as it offered China a strategically “safe” axis for the expansion of its power, as the newly independent Central Asian states sought to diversify their foreign relations in the wake of the Soviet collapse and the absence of a significant US presence (Xiang, 2004, p. 109). There is also a complementarity between what might be termed China’s Xinjiang, Central Asian and grand-strategy derived interests here. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, China has attempted to utilize Xinjiang’s geopolitical position in order to simultaneously achieve the security and integration of Xinjiang and, as this project has progressed, China’s rise as Central Asian power. The integration of Xinjiang grants China significant security, economic, and strategic benefits that serve two purposes — the consolidation of China’s control of Xinjiang and the expansion of Chinese power in Central Asia — which contribute to Beijing’s quest for a “peaceful rise” to great power status (Clarke, 2008).

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China and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Toward a “New Regionalism”? The SCO, formed in June 2001, is of major importance not only for understanding China’s approach to Central Asia but also to the development of its wider foreign policy grand strategy. Indeed, the SCO is the only multilateral grouping in which China is involved that has from the first been driven by Beijing. This is all the more noteworthy as the SCO’s agenda was initially focused on military and security issues, areas which Beijing had traditionally been loath to engage with on a multilateral basis. Importantly, the SCO, both through its declarations and practical measures, has developed a normative agenda, although one that is at odds with the normative agendas of other multilateral actors in Central Asia such as the European Union not to mention the “democracy promotion” agenda of the administration of President George W. Bush. China’s pre-eminent role in the SCO has been demonstrated through the framing of the organization’s agenda by the principles of China’s “New Security Concept”, which stresses such things as non-interference in the internal affairs of member states and sovereign equality. While this could be portrayed as rhetorical window-dressing on the part of Beijing, it nonetheless reflects China’s decision to engage Central Asia on the basis of shared interests in order to achieve its own strategic interests while preventing overt opposition from the region. For Beijing, the SCO is an example of “new regionalism” in that it is defined by “open, functional, interest-based cooperation among contiguous states” that is underpinned by a mutual respect for the member states’ sovereignty (Chung, 2004). However, what is actually “new” about the “new regionalism”? For Fawcett, regionalism simply “implies a policy whereby states and non-state actors cooperate and coordinate strategy within a given region” in order to “pursue and promote common goals in one or more issue areas” (Fawcett, 2004, p. 433). Thus, regionalism is conceived of as a policy and a process (Schulz et al., 2001, p. 5). However, regionalism can be divided into two types — “soft” and “hard”, where the former is defined by a

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process of promoting a sense of regional awareness/community and the latter by the consolidation of regional groups/networks or sub-regional groups, “formalized by interstate arrangements and organizations” (Fawcett, 2004, p. 433). According to some commentators, however, the “new regionalism” is also “extroverted” reflecting the greater interdependence of the contemporary global political economy and it is an “instrument to supplement, enhance, or protect the role of the state and the power of the government in an interdependent world” (Schulz et al., 2001, p. 4). Therefore, the “new regionalism” is conceived of as operating not against the prevailing systemic structure but as means by which states can mediate or negotiate the challenges posed by the numerous transnational processes identified under the rubric of “globalization”. The development and operation of the SCO correlate well to these parameters in that it exhibits both “soft” (promoting a sense of regional awareness/community) and “hard” (regionalism formalized by interstate arrangements) elements of regionalism.

From the “Shanghai Five” to the Shanghai cooperation organization China’s preeminent interest in Central Asia after 1991 concerned ensuring the security of Xinjiang. Indeed, the recent history of Xinjiang has made Beijing vigilant against the potential infiltration of radical Islamism and Turkic nationalism into the predominantly Turkic-Muslim populated region (Millward, 2004). This has resulted in an enduring Chinese concern with both external threats (from neighboring states or groups) and internal threats (from ethnic separatism) to Xinjiang. This has played a central role in generating China’s interests in Central Asia and in the development of the SCO. Arguably a circular logic lies behind China’s approach to Xinjiang and Central Asia with security within Xinjiang perceived by Beijing to be predicated on delivering economic growth, while economic growth is assured by the reinforcement of the state’s instruments of political and social control, which in turn is to be achieved by opening the region to Central Asia (Becquelin, 2004). For Beijing, the evolution

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of the Shanghai Five (S-5) and the SCO has been particularly important in ensuring that this essential opening to Central Asia would not backfire on China. In this respect, the core issues for the emerging multilateralism of the S-5 and SCO have often been a barometer of Chinese concerns in the region. The SCO developed out of the so-called “Shanghai Five” (S-5) group of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Significantly, this grew out of China’s bilateral discussions with each of these states soon after the Soviet collapse regarding issues of border demarcation, troop reductions, and confidence-building measures (Dillon, 1997, p. 136). These discussions led to the signing of the five-nation “Agreement on Confidence Building in the Military Sphere in the Border Areas” at a heads-of-state summit in Shanghai on 26 April 1996. This agreement was wide reaching, encompassing a package of fourteen agreements on border issues and military confidence-building measures, and emphasized the need to maintain the multilateral nature of security dialogs in the region, demonstrating China’s desire to resolve its long-standing fear of vulnerability along its western frontier (Beijing Xinhua, 1996a; Lanteigne, 2006/07, p. 608). Even at this early stage, it was clear that the grouping was perceived by China as an important means through which not only to secure its western frontier but also to further its wider strategic interests. Indeed, a joint Sino-Russian statement regarding the establishment of a Beijing–Moscow “strategic partnership” issued after Presidents Jiang Zemin and Boris Yeltsin met on the sidelines of the summit emphasized the need-to-counter “hegemonism” (i.e., US primacy) and the importance of achieving “regional and global stability, development, and prosperity” on the basis of “the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each others internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence” (Beijing Xinhua, 1996b). While this statement and that of the 1996 S-5 summit carried the caveat of not being “directed at any third country”, they were clearly congruent with Beijing’s goal of developing multiple regional and global relationships to counter what it perceived to be

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the negative aspects of US primacy in international affairs. On the issue of China’s specific interest in the security of Xinjiang, the S-5 summit of 1996 was also used to pressure the leaders of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan to declare that they were “opposed to any form of splittist activities” — code for cooperating with Beijing to control the activities of pro-independence Uyghur émigré organizations within these Central Asian states (Beijing Xinhua, 1996b). The S-5 experienced significant development over the subsequent four years due to China’s perception of a confluence of external and internal threats to its interests in Central Asia and its governance of Xinjiang. Externally, Central Asia over the 1996 to 2000 period was characterized by the rise of Islamic radicalism in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan and the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, while the region was also bedeviled by weapons and drug trafficking. In particular, China and Russia viewed with alarm the rise of the Taliban and its influence in the wider Central Asian region through the development of linkages between it and Central Asian Islamist groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT), which aimed to topple the authoritarian but secular regime of Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan (Rashid, 2002, pp. 137–156). Internally, China’s rule of Xinjiang was rocked by a wave of ethnic minority unrest and anti-government violence over the same period with a vice-chairman of the XUAR admitting in May 1998 that the region had been plagued by violence and that the “separatists” were using weapons “smuggled from abroad” (O’Neil, 1998). Despite this Chinese implication that such violence was externally generated, it was clear that government policy also played a key role in generating unrest (Millward, 2004, pp. 14–19). Major elements of Chinese policy, such as increased migration of Han Chinese into Xinjiang and increased state control/management of ethnic minority religious and cultural expression, were widely recognized as sources of Uyghur grievance against the state. The state’s response to this has consisted of alternating periods of repression, with the authorities instituting regular “Strike Hard” campaigns against “splittists” and “separatists” in the region. These campaigns focused on increasing arrests, accelerating trials, and sentencing of

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“national separatists”, which have led to widespread human rights violations (Vicziany, 2003). These influences combined to encourage Beijing to expand the issues addressed by the S-5 process. Thus, while the second summit of heads-of-state of the S-5 in Moscow on 24 April 1997 produced a further agreement on troop reductions in border areas, the third leaders summit on 3 July 1998 in Almaty, Kazakhstan witnessed a shift in the S-5’s emphasis toward issues relating to “extremism”, “separatism”, and non-traditional security threats. The 1998 joint statement also declared that the member states would not “allow their territories to be used for the activities undermining the national sovereignty, security, and social order of any of the five countries”. This document also contained further development of the guiding principles of the organization with the statement declaring that the S-5 was a “concrete manifestation of the new-type security concept”, which significantly had become a dominant trope of China’s foreign policy discourse. The “new security concept” stressed the pursuit of common interests, peaceful dialog, common security for all regional actors, and the discouragement of formal, hierarchical alliances (Lantiegne, 2005, p. 19). Its insertion into the declaratory output of the S-5 was significant, as it not only demonstrated China’s desire to use the forum to further its specific interests in the region but also to gain the rhetorical support of its partners for its attempt to construct alternative structures to the US-led “world order” (Lanteigne, 2005, p. 140). Despite the 1998 declaration that the S-5 would fight against “international terrorism” and other “transnational criminal activities”, the subsequent year in Central Asia was in many respects defined by the continuation of these dynamics. China’s motivation for greater regional action on the issue of transnational Islamic movements was both obvious and pressing with ongoing incidents of ethnic minority opposition to Chinese rule in Xinjiang. Further concerns for China during this period were reports that the IMU was actively recruiting amongst all ethnic groups in Central Asia including Uyghurs (Rashid, 1999). Russia, although, alarmed by reports of connections between the IMU, secessionist Chechnya, and the Taliban also saw the specter

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of “Islamic fundamentalism” as an opportunity to draw the Central Asian governments back into its orbit. Thus, the agenda of the 24 August 1999 meeting of the S-5 in the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek continued to shift the focus toward establishing a regional response to the interconnected issues of transnational Islamic movements, drug and weapon trafficking, and border security. The need for a common regional response to these issues was undoubtedly further impressed upon the meeting’s attendees by the simultaneous incursion of 1000 IMU fighters into the Batken region of Kyrgyzstan (Davis, 1999). In the wake of the “Batken Incident”, both China and Russia stepped up their diplomatic activities to persuade the Central Asian states of the need for a common regional response to what were perceived to be shared security concerns. As such Russia played a major role in convincing Uzbek President Islam Karimov to attend the S-5 meeting, in the Tajik capital Dushanbe between 4 and 5 July 2000. At the meeting, the members signed a joint declaration condemning the Taliban for supporting terrorism, agreed to the establishment of an anti-terrorist security center in the Kyrgyz capital, Bishkek, and declared a commitment to increase collective efforts to counter what the group now termed the “three evils” of “separatism, terrorism, and extremism” (Cummings, 2001, p. 147). This declaration was also significant as it demonstrated the convergence of Chinese and Russian foreign policy and strategic interests beyond the specific Central Asian context. As such the declaration endorsed China and Russia’s call for the development of a “multipolar” world order, stressed the need to respect national sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs of other states, affirmed the AntiBallistic Missile Treaty (ABM), and endorsed China and Russia’s opposition to national missile defense (NMD) systems. Internal considerations were nonetheless also to the fore with the statement’s section dealing with respect for national sovereignty explicitly referring to the S-5’s support for Russian policy in Chechnya and China’s stance on Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet (People’s Daily, 2000). The meeting of the S-5 in Shanghai on 14 June 2001 transformed the organization into a fully fledged international institution — now

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dubbed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) — complete with secretariat and inter-ministerial committees, and a new member with the formal ascension of Uzbekistan to the organization (Eurasianet, 2001; Cutler, 2004). Two major documents were adopted at the meeting, the “Declaration of the Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization” and the “Shanghai Covenant on the Suppression of Terrorism, Separatism and Religious Extremism” (SCO Secretariat, 2001; Aris, 2001). The latter document clearly demonstrated that establishing a regional response to the perceived threat of radical Islam to member states was a central concern of the new organization (Eurasianet, 2001). The former document, however, was also significant, as it explicitly outlined the principles of the SCO and demonstrated the influence of Chinese interests. Thus, the document asserted that the principles of the group, or the “Shanghai spirit” as Chinese commentary referred to it, comprised of “mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for multi-civilizations, and common development” (SCO Secretariat, 2001). Therefore, while the SCO’s agenda was the result of a gradual convergence in the interests of Russia, China, and the Central Asian states, the guiding principles of the group also strongly reflected China’s wider foreign policy interests: These principles ostensibly establish a set of regional norms which move beyond power differentials amongst the organization’s members and toward a consensus-based approach to resolve regional problems. It is also important to note that this “spirit” is not seen as solely a set of regional norms, but is openly promoted as universally applicable and as a basis for global politics. (Ambrosio, 2008, p. 1327)

9/11 and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization The terrorist attack on 11 September 2001, however, intervened to place the development of the SCO process in some doubt. 9/11 and the subsequent US-led invasion of Afghanistan resulted in a Central

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Asian tilt toward the USA to the detriment of China and Russia, and SCO. For example, in 2001 and 2002 all of the Central Asian states except Turkmenistan signed military cooperation and base access agreements with the United States, as well as receiving significant economic aid packages. Uzbekistan especially benefited from increased US interest in the region, receiving not only an initial aid package worth US$150 million but also the conclusion of an US–Uzbek “Strategic Partnership” in March 2002 (Rumer, 2002, pp. 59–60). The security and economic benefits of the sudden US engagement with the region were seen as a windfall for the Central Asian states, with Kyrgyz Prime Minister Kurmanbek Bakiev reportedly suggesting that the basing of thousands of US military personnel at Kyrgyzstan’s Manas airbase was a potential “gold mine” (Peuch, 2002). Despite this, both China and Russia attempted to reinvigorate the SCO process. At the SCO foreign ministers’ meeting in Beijing on 7 January 2002, the Russian and Chinese foreign ministers put forward proposals to improve the SCO’s anti-terrorism and security capabilities. Moreover, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov maintained that SCO should assume responsibility for regional security, suggesting that China and Russia were already wary of the direction of the involvement of the United States in the region. These efforts made limited headway in 2002 due to the wide array of US agreements and cooperation with the Central Asian states noted above. Indeed, the lack of concrete practical action to make good on SCO rhetoric regarding regional military and security cooperation in 2002 led some observers to consider it a “stillborn” organization made irrelevant by the penetration of US power into Central Asia (Blank, 2002). Nonetheless the SCO did make some progress in establishing the organization’s operational framework. These included initial law enforcement agency meetings in Almaty, Kazakhstan, to coordinate responses to border security issues, illegal migration, and drug trafficking and the official adoption of the SCO charter, establishment of the SCO secretariat in Beijing, and the conclusion of agreement to open the “Regional Anti-Terrorism” center in Bishkek (Blagov, 2002).

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Between 6 and 11 August 2003, all of the SCO states except Uzbekistan also conducted “Cooperation–2003” joint military exercises on Kazakh and Chinese soil, which was the first joint military exercises China had ever taken part in (Carlson 2003). Yet, the absence of Uzbekistan illustrated Tashkent’s half-hearted commitment to the SCO and strengthened Russian and Chinese perceptions that Karimov’s government was yet to be convinced of the benefits that SCO could contribute to Uzbek security. Therefore, the 8 September 2003 SCO meeting in Tashkent assumed great importance for the strategic imperatives of China and Russia in the region. At this summit, it was announced that the SCO secretariat would begin its functions on 1 January 2004 in Beijing and the executive committee of the RAT center would open on 1 November 2003 in Tashkent and not in Bishkek as previously announced. The transfer of the RAT to Uzbekistan from Kyrgyzstan was symptomatic of Russia and China’s desire to see Uzbekistan drawn away from the US orbit (RFE/RL, 2003). Therefore, by 2004, SCO had achieved a measure of success in reestablishing its pre-September 11 positions in the region. However, the major events that would enhance SCO’s attractiveness to the Central Asian states were internal in origin. In March 2005, Kyrgyzstan experienced the Tulip Revolution that toppled long-standing President Askar Akayev, while in May, Uzbekistan also experienced a wave of violent unrest in Andijan in which approximately 4000 people rioted and they were violently suppressed by the Uzbek military. The significance of these events stemmed from their role in souring Central Asian perceptions of the US role in the region, with Central Asian leaders criticizing the US government’s promotion of democracy and human rights as opposed to “stability”. The aftermath of these events demonstrated that China’s previous investment in “community building” in the region through the guiding principles of the S-5 and SCO had not been in vain. Thus, China’s emphasis on common interests in economic development, security, stability, and “anti-terrorism” through the SCO combined with China’s wider emphasis on “non-interference” in the internal affairs of other states to make China appear as reliable partner from

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the perspective of the region’s remaining authoritarian leaders (Rumer, 2005). The subsequent July 2005 SCO summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, furthered the tilt of the Central Asian states away from the United States and it was arguably a triumph for Chinese strategic interests in Central Asia as it demonstrated the Central Asian states’ disillusion with the agenda of Bush administration in the region. Thus, the heads-of-state declaration released after the conclusion of the summit requested that “the members of states of the SCO consider it necessary that the respective members of the antiterrorist coalition set a final timeline for their temporary use of objects of infrastructure and stay of their military contingents on the territories of the SCO member states” — a thinly veiled message to Washington that the immediate post-9/11 glow in its relations with Central Asia had faded (SCO Secretariat, 2006). The sentiment expressed by the SCO was underlined when Uzbekistan subsequently canceled its agreement with the United States regarding the US military’s use of the Karshi-Khanabad air base, with the last US Air Force plane flying out on 21 November 2005 (Rumer, 2005, p. 141). These two trends of further progress in the SCO’s security cooperation and anti-US rhetoric remained predominant over the next few years. Indeed, the SCO’s June 2006 summit in Shanghai resulted in the conclusion of agreements concerning further joint SCO antiterrorism exercises and the establishment of a US$900 million credit fund, supplied by China, to establish a SCO Business Council and SCO Inter-Bank Association. This meeting also saw the attendance of representatives of four observer states — Iran, India, Pakistan, and Mongolia. Meanwhile, the heads-of-state declaration restated the SCO’s commitment to combating the “three evils” while celebrating the organization’s promotion of a “new security architecture” that “discards ‘double standards’ and seeks to settle disputes through negotiation on the basis of mutual understanding” and it respects the right of all countries “to pursue particular models of development and formulate domestic and foreign policies independently and participate in international affairs on an equal basis” (SCO Secretariat, 2006).

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The August 2007 summit of SCO leaders in Bishkek not only further underlined these trends but also highlighted some emergent problems. While the summit captured headlines for the anti-US rhetoric of Iranian President Ahmedinejad, it was more significant for the reemergence of Russia as an equal driver with China of the organization’s agenda (Eurasianet, 2007). Indeed, President Putin was publicly enthusiastic about the SCO “Peace Mission 2007” joint military exercises held between 9 and 17 August at Chelyabinsk arguing, “The idea of holding such regular exercises on the territory of various SCO member countries deserves consideration” as this would “bolster the SCO’s potential in security matters” (Interfax, 2007). While the summit produced the current customary declarations of “good neighborliness, friendship, and cooperation”, perhaps the most significant factors were the explicit Russian and Iranian anti-US rhetoric and Sino-Russian hesitancy to admit new members to the organization (Marat and Murzakulova, 2007). In the latter respect, both China and Russia’s position on SCO’s expansion was running counter to that of the Central Asian members with Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev asserting confidently prior to the summit that expansion was simply “a matter of time” (ITAR-TASS, 2007). Such Chinese and Russian reticence was unsurprising given that expansion of the SCO to include any of the current observers would introduce extra-regional powers while diluting Sino-Russian dominance over the organization. China’s endeavors toward building a shared sense of regional interests among the states of Central Asia through SCO, which had had some success since 2001, were subsequently threatened by Russia’s intervention in Georgia in August 2008. Indeed, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev attempted, but ultimately failed, to get the SCO’s unconditional support for its incursion into Georgia at the 28 August 2008 summit meeting in Dushanbe, Tajikistan (Farizova, 2008). The summit’s declaration noted the members’ “deep concern” over the Ossetia–Georgia issue and called for all parties to resolve the issue through diplomacy. Moreover, the declaration reasserted SCO’s proclaimed commitment to the territorial integrity of states, good neighborly relations, and common development

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(SCO Secretariat, 2008). For Beijing, the Ossetia–Georgia issue was unwelcome on a number of counts. First, China could not recognize Russia’s intervention in Georgia as to do so would risk setting a precedent that could potentially be used against it in the future regarding Xinjiang, Tibet, or Taiwan. Second, as Stephen Blank correctly noted, “separatism” is one of the “three evils” along with extremism and terrorism that form a core issue for SCO, and thus Russia’s actions arguably undermined this pillar of the grouping (Blank, 2008a). In terms of the power dynamics within SCO, Russia’s precipitous action in Georgia has arguably strengthened China’s position as Beijing has to the present stood by the stated principles of the organization (Swanstrom, 2008). In summary, the development of the S-5 and SCO reflects China’s endeavor to establish multiple regional and global relationships in order to counter US primacy in the international system — a goal achieved to an extent in 2005 and 2006, with the tilt of the Central Asian states back toward the SCO and China. Moreover, as the statements from the 2005, 2006, and 2007 SCO summits demonstrate, China increasingly views SCO as a forum in which to present its foreign policy as a distinct alternative to that of other (especially, Western) actors. Of central importance here has been China’s commitment to embed within the SCO a normative framework — focused on maintaining “stability” and guided by concepts of noninterference in “internal affairs” — that supports the political status quo in Central Asia. This is important not only for China’s specific interests in Central Asia, such as ensuring the security of Xinjiang and a stable immediate regional environment, but also for its strategy of “peaceful rise” that places a premium on the maintenance international security and “stability”.

China’s Bilateral Relations with Central Asia: Toward “Vassalization”? A number of observers have suggested that Sino-Central Asian relations are increasingly defined by a dynamic of economic and political dependency resembling imperial China’s “vassal” relationships with

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neighboring states (Swanstrom, 2005; Goldstein, 2005). For such observers, China’s dominance can be seen through its bilateral trade relationships with individual Central Asian states and its major investment in acquiring Central Asian oil and gas. Indeed, Goldstein noted that “dramatic energy investments were the clearest sign during the 1990s that Central Asia figured prominently in China’s overall development strategy” (Golstein, 2005, p. 18). However, China’s interests in its bilateral relationships go beyond this, albeit crucial, desire for energy security to encompass wider political, economic, and strategic interests. As will be demonstrated below, China’s interests within its bilateral relations with Central Asia are intimately connected to its strategy toward Xinjiang. Before moving the discussion to focus on this however it is necessary to briefly clarify the concept of vassalization. In John K. Fairbank’s classical exposition, imperial China’s foreign relations were framed through a complex of practices that he referred to collectively as the “tribute system”. According to this model, imperial China structured its foreign relations with non-Chinese through a hierarchical ordering of culturally superior to inferior, focused on a Sinic cultural and geographic center (Fairbank, 1968, pp. 1–17). Yet, there is an important aspect, particularly, in the actual practice of this vision of world order that has been overlooked and it is important to note in the context of China’s relations with Central Asia. Through analysis of the practice of relations between the Qing empire and various non-Chinese peoples of Central Asia during the 17th and 18th century, for example, scholars such as Joseph Fletcher and James Millward have demonstrated that the Fairbank model of a hierarchical relationship between the imperial center — personified in the “Son of Heaven” — and the “tributary” state was more often fiction rather than fact (Fletcher, 1968; Millward, 1998). As they have suggested, the Fairbank model was often modified to serve practical material interests in imperial China’s foreign relations. Thus, while the ideal vision of the Chinese world order was hierarchical, in practice the conceit of Chinese civilizational superiority, and the Confucian emphasis on moral example, which lay at its core permitted the toleration of difference and plurality in the realm of

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“international relations”. Indeed, the Chinese did not attempt to make the conceit of hierarchical relationships embodied in the theory or ideal state of the tribute system fact through the conversion of the barbarian to Chinese ways. What lay at the core of the Chinese world order, was that datong — i.e., “great harmony” or “universal commonwealth” that theoretically all emperors sought to facilitate — would be achieved by the cultural attraction and example of the Sinic center. This has a resonance with contemporary Chinese foreign policy in Central Asia — whereby it has made a great virtue in recent times, particularly through the SCO, of emphasizing common interests and reserving differences as a distinct counterpoint to the neoliberal agenda of the West. It should also be noted that the hierarchical “tribute system” often cost imperial China considerably more than it gained in economic terms, as for the hierarchical model elucidated by Fairbank was primarily an internally focused political construct (Fairbank, 1968). As such Fairbank noted that in imperial China’s foreign relations, “the rulers of China usually declared themselves ready to sacrifice economic substance in order to preserve political form” (Fairbank, 1968, p. 12). Thus, traditional “vassal” relations often did not necessarily conform to the conventional picture of a dominant China and weak Central Asia but of a more fluid and pragmatic set of relations. During the Qing period (1644–1911), for example, economic or trade advantage was given to Central Asian khanates in return for security guarantees for China’s position in Xinjiang (Fletcher, 1968; Millward, 1998). Indeed, the Chinese term fan usually translated as “vassal” has the meaning of “a hedge, a boundary; to screen, to protect”, which is suggestive of the role of Central Asia can play, in Beijing’s perception, regarding Xinjiang (Fairbank, 1968, p. 9). As we shall see below, this more nuanced view of the “vassalization” of Central Asia, whereby China provides Central Asia with certain economic or political/security goods, for example through SCO, in return for guarantees regarding the issue of Uyghur “separatism” in Xinjiang, is one that is more accurate than the one that is initially invoked by the “vassal” label.

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Security, development and energy — the bases of Sino-Central Asian relations China’s relations with individual states of Central Asia have been shaped and defined by two factors — the collapse of the Soviet Union and Beijing’s goal of integrating Xinjiang into the People’s Republic. Integration here is understood in its two predominant senses: (a) to the relationship between the majority and minority populations of a given state and to “the patterns by which the different parts of a nation-state cohere”; and (b) “the manner and degree to which parts of a social system (its individuals, groups, and organs) interact and complement each other” (Mackerras, 1994, p. 7; Seymour, 1976, p. 6). The first understanding of integration can be seen as a means by which a large, multiethnic state can ensure and maintain sovereignty over its territory, while the second concerns the operation of society once the territorial integrity of the state has been ensured. In Xinjiang, the goal of integration encompasses both senses — the mechanisms by which the state has attempted to incorporate the territory of the region and the deeper endeavor to incorporate the non-Han peoples of the region into the “unitary, multiethnic” Chinese state. This goal of Chinese policy in Xinjiang not only serves core internal functions but it has also served as a key driver of China’s bilateral relations with Central Asia. In particular, it has been the way in which integration has been conceived of as both a goal and a series of policies in Beijing since 1991 that has generated this dynamic. The key here is that during the Maoist era and into the early 1980s, Beijing perceived Xinjiang’s geopolitical position as a liability and obstacle to its goal of integration due not only to the vast geographical distance between the region and the Chinese heartland but also to the obvious historical, ethnic, and linguistic affinities that linked the Turkic-Muslim peoples of a Central Asia then divided between Soviet and Chinese spheres. With the Soviet collapse, however, came something of an epiphany for Beijing. With the Soviet menace to its Western frontiers gone it would no longer view Xinjiang’s geopolitical position as an obstacle to be overcome in search of integration but rather as an important asset to achieve it.

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Thus, a dominant goal of Chinese policy from this point onward would be to make Xinjiang a “Eurasian Continental Bridge” connecting the region’s economy with that of Central Asia through the development of direct trade relations with neighboring Central Asian states, increasing state investment in infrastructure projects, and fully developing and exploiting Xinjiang’s oil and gas resources. However, this was to be achieved by a contradictory internal logic. In order to solve the separatist issue, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had to deliver economic development through the entrenchment Deng Xiaoping’s economic strategy of “reform and opening”, while simultaneously maintaining “stability and unity” in Xinjiang through the strengthening of the CCP’s hold on power (Urumqi Xinjiang Ribao, 1991). Therefore, the security of the region was to be achieved by delivering economic growth, while economic growth was to be assured by the reinforcement of the state’s instruments of political and social control, which in turn was to be achieved by opening the region to Central Asia. Importantly, the economic opening to Central Asia would come to offer Beijing a significant element of leverage to induce the Central Asian states to aid it in its quest to secure Xinjiang against “separatist” elements. This logic has continued to inform China’s approach into the 21st century, although it is now framed under the banner of the domestic Great Western Development campaign. While this campaign is a nation-wide one, its operation in Xinjiang reflects the intensification of Beijing’s long-standing statebuilding policies in the region (Becquelin, 2004). The strategy in the 1990s was characterized as one of the “doubleopenings”, which is an attempt to simultaneously integrate Xinjiang with Central Asia and China proper in economic terms, while establishing security and cooperation with China’s Central Asian neighbors (Christofferson, 1993). The key elements of this strategy throughout the 1990s demonstrated its purpose to serve the “internal” goal of tying the province closer to China and the “external” goal of utilizing the region’s position to accelerate economic relations with Central Asia. These included the recentralization of economic decision making to increase the region’s dependency on Beijing; the expansion of Han colonization of the region; increased investment for

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the exploitation of Xinjiang’s potential energy resources; the opening of border trading “ports” with Central Asia; and significant investment in transport links with Central Asia (Becquelin, 2000, pp. 71–74; Pannell and Ma, 1997, pp. 218–226). The external manifestation of this approach was a concerted endeavor to develop greater economic and trade relations with the newly independent Central Asian states, particularly Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, through the extension incentives for border trade and improvement of infrastructural links (Pannell and Ma, 1997, p. 223). Significantly, a major theme of Chinese overtures to the Central Asian states was Xinjiang’s potential role in linking the economies of China and Central Asia to become the hub of a “New Silk Road” (Martin, 1994, pp. 30–32; Peng, 1994, p. 18). One of the major commodities that would traverse this road, however, was to be oil/natural gas rather than the silk of times past. Indeed, Xinjiang’s petrochemical industry was to become a “pillar” industry within the government’s “double-opening” strategy for Xinjiang with the primary goal of establishing the region into a transit route and refinery zone for Central Asian oil and gas. Such an approach ultimately enmeshed China into the wider geopolitical competition not only for accessing Central Asia’s oil and gas but also for greater political and economic influence in the region. Indeed, Beijing’s reorientation of its energy strategy toward Russia and Central Asia in the early 1990s was very much a strategic maneuver rather than a “market” approach to energy security induced by the realization of the strategic weakness of China’s growing dependency on Middle East sources of oil and gas (Andrews-Speed et al., 2002, pp. 42–43). In relation to China’s foreign policy, the development of this strategy proved to be a further spur in generating China’s greater engagement with the states of Central Asia (Martin, 1994). In many respects China’s economic and security concerns regarding its frontiers with the new states of Central Asia were complementary. The development of bilateral relations, spurred on by the development of economic linkages noted above, was further strengthened by the identification of common interests in the security sphere. Significantly, as we have already noted, China used its emerging bilateral relations

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and the nascent multilateral forum of the S-5 to pressure the Central Asian states to control and suppress the activities of “splittist” elements within the significant Uyghur diaspora population in the region — a theme that has continued to define China’s participation in the S-5 and subsequent SCO process. Indeed, since 2001, China by virtue of bilateral security agreements with key Central Asian states and police/security cooperation through SCO has successfully extradited a significant number of alleged Uyghur “separatists and terrorists” from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, and Nepal (Mukhamedov, 2004). Domestically, the question of Xinjiang’s economic development has assumed national importance over the last decade with the central government’s launching of the “Great Western Development Plan” in 2000, which envisages the creation of Xinjiang as an industrial and agricultural base and a trade and energy corridor for the national economy (Becquelin, 2004). This goal can only be achieved with the development of greater interaction and cooperation between China and the Central Asian states — a point underlined by Chinese rhetoric and policy since 2001 with ongoing references to the mutual benefits of developing a “Continental Eurasian land-bridge” that will link the major economies of Europe, East Asia, and South Asia (Xinhua, 2005; Garver, 2006; Raballand and Andresy, 2007, p. 248). Importantly, Sino-Central Asian trade and economic relations since 2001 have experienced a “boom” with trade flows more than tripling from US$1.5 billion in 2001 to US$5.8 billion in 2005 (Raballand and Andresy, 2007, p. 250; Peyrouse, 2007, p. 16). A closer examination of the structure and nature of this trade reveals that not only Sino-Central Asian trade relations are increasingly unequal but a relationship of economic dependency is developing that China will undoubtedly seek to leverage in order to negate “separatist” tendencies that it sees as the major threat to its position in Xinjiang. Although the increase in trade flows noted above is significant, Central Asia now accounts for merely 0.6 percent of China’s overall foreign trade (Peyrouse, 2007, p. 18). China, however, accounts for 12 percent of Central Asia foreign trade. China’s dominance in the realm of Sino-Central Asian trade relations is further underlined if we

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breakdown this trade data on a state-by-state basis. In particular, it becomes clear that China’s influence is predominant in the Central Asian states with which it shares borders with China accounting for 34 percent of Kyrgyzstan’s foreign trade, 15 percent of Kazakhstan’s, and 10 percent of Tajikistan’s. Of Chinese exports to Central Asia, 85 percent consist of low-priced manufactured goods, while over 85 percent of Central Asian exports to China consist of raw materials, petroleum, and ferrous and non-ferrous metals (Peyrouse, 2007, p. 18). Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, with whom China shares the most significant economic relations, reflect this point most clearly. Some 86 percent of Kazakh and 78 percent of Kyrgyz exports to China, for example, are comprised of petroleum, non-ferrous metals, and iron and steel (Wu and Chen, 2004, p. 1067). China’s growing economic weight in the region is also reflected in the number of Chinese companies operating throughout Central Asia with, for example, 744 Chinese enterprises (including 40 large companies) established in Kazakhstan, 100 in Uzbekistan, and 12 in Kyrgyzstan by 2005 (Peyrouse, 2007, p. 18). The lack of diversification in Central Asian exports to China has also resulted in growing regional concerns that China’s economic interests are simply based upon a need to extract natural and mineral resources necessary to fuel its resource-hungry economy. The flooding of Central Asian markets with cheap Chinese-manufactured consumer goods, combined with the increasing activities of Chinese companies and enterprises has also reinforced societal concern that Russian dominance will simply be replaced by that of China (Wilson, 2007, pp. 42–45). Yet there remain major impediments to the development of stronger Sino-Central Asian trade. The most important concerns are the lack of adequate infrastructure linking the region to China and ongoing trade barriers such as tariffs and visa restrictions (Xinhua, 2007; Raballand and Andresy, 2007, pp. 242–243). The latter issues have been important in driving Chinese support for the efforts of the Central Asian states for membership in the WTO, which currently is limited to that of Kyrgyzstan (Peyrouse, 2007, p. 17; Norling and Swanstrom, 2007b, pp. 360–361).

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For China, in particular, investment in developing modern infrastructural links (e.g., roads, railways, and telecommunications) between Xinjiang and Central Asia and the lowering of trade barriers are equally strategic, as they are purely economic considerations (Garver, 2006, p. 1). This imperative has been clear in Chinese policy since the collapse of the Soviet Union, with Chinese investment in infrastructure both within Xinjiang itself and between the province and the neighboring Central Asian states a major element of Chinese policy. Some significant developments in this sphere since 2001 have included: • • • • • •

•

Opening of international bus routes between Osh (Kyrgyzstan) and Kashgar (Xinjiang) in May 2002. Chinese pledge of US$15 million for the construction of a highway linking Xinjiang and Lake Issyk-Kul in Kyrgyzstan in May 2003. September 2003 agreement to establish a highway links between Xinjiang and Tajikistan. December 2003 announcement of Kyrgyz a deal to sell hydroelectric power to Xinjiang. Announcement of Chinese government-funded US$2.5 million feasibility study to construct a Kyrgyz–Xinjiang rail link. May 2004 Chinese extension of US$900 million of credit to the five Central Asian states to finance infrastructure projects involving Chinese companies. Trilateral Uzbek-Kyrgyz-China project to link Andijan (Uzbekistan), Osh (Kyrgyzstan), and Kashgar (Xinjiang) by a 1,000-km rail and highway connection (Peyrouse, 2007, p. 30; Dillon, 2003; Moore, 2008).

China’s energy security strategy of diversification and increased investment and exploration of its state oil corporations has also continued since 2001. Major developments and activities in this sphere have included: •

The conclusion of a Sino-Kazakh agreement in May 2004 for joint exploration and development of oil and gas resources in the Caspian Sea.

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•

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The acquisition of PetroKazakhstan by CNPC in 2005 for US$4.2 billion. The completion of the 988-km Kazakh–China oil pipeline linking Atasu in western Kazakhstan and Alashankou in Xinjiang in December 2005. China’s state-owned International Trust and Investment Corporation purchase, for US$1.9 billion, of a stake in oilfields in western Kazakhstan. July 2006 US$600 million loan to Uzbekistan for the joint exploration of energy deposits in Uzbekistan (Blua, 2004; Blank, 2006a; Wilson, 2007, pp. 42–45).

More recently in April 2008, a joint venture between Uzbekneftegaz and CNPC to build and operate the 530-km section of the 1,830-km Turkmenistan–China natural gas pipeline was reportedly concluded. While in May 2008, it was reported that CNPC had unveiled a plan for a new Kazakhstan–China natural gas pipeline to carry 40 billion cubic meters of gas per year, 30 billion of which would flow to China, from the Darhan block on the Caspian Sea (Energy Business Review, 2008). Thus, China’s relations with Central Asia have reflected the preeminence of the goal of integration for Xinjiang, with an emphasis placed on the establishment of political, economic, and infrastructural links with the Central Asian states, particularly Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Moreover, it also reflected China’s concern for the “safe” expansion of its political, economic, and strategic power. In this respect, the developments in the sphere of Sino-Central Asian trade relations, Chinese investment and acquisition of Central Asian oil, and investment in infrastructure projects demonstrate Beijing’s growing “gravitational pull” for the region. As noted previously, this has resulted not only in Central Asian acquiescence to China’s dominant role in SCO but also in Central Asian assurances and cooperation with Beijing on the issue of Uyghur “separatism” in Xinjiang. While China’s strategic and economic weight ultimately plays a great role in determining that the Central Asian states will “toe the line” on such core security interests for Beijing as the issue of separatism, China’s “soft power” in the region has also been significant and it highlights

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the connection between Beijing’s Central Asian foreign policy and its global approach. In this regard, it has been noted that China has undertaken a “charm offensive” in order to mitigate anxieties about the implications of a “rising China” (Kurlantzick, 2007). In the Central Asian context, this has consisted of coupling its growing dominance of Sino-Central Asian trade and political influence with, for instance, practical expressions of its rhetorical commitment to “common prosperity” through the provision of low-interest loans for local development projects (Trilling, 2007). In combination with its multilateral efforts through SCO, these developments ultimately highlight that Beijing’s approach to Central Asia is fundamentally strategic in nature and informed by an acute understanding of the region’s geopolitical importance.

Keeping the Wolf from the Door: The Geopolitics of China’s Strategy in Central Asia China’s strategy in Xinjiang and Central Asia has been defined by the endeavor to achieve a “double integration” of Xinjiang with China and Central Asia. Beijing has sought to achieve this through the extension of modern infrastructure throughout Xinjiang and the connection of these to neighbouring Central Asian states. This strategy has been significantly affected by the implications of the events 9/11 and the subsequent projection of US military and political influence into Central Asia. The impact of this was contradictory for China’s position as the projection of US political and military influence into the region was perceived to be a negative consequence of the “war on terror” as it not only undermined Beijing’s bilateral relations with the region but also SCO. Significantly, these developments exacerbated perceptions in Beijing that Washington was bent on the strategic “encirclement” of China, a development that Beijing’s post-Cold War foreign policy sought to avoid. Indeed, US strategy in Central Asia was perceived in geopolitical terms with Washington’s core goals identified as the containment of Russia, the “encirclement” of Iran and Iraq, the expansion of US influence in South Asia, and the “containment” of China’s rise (Gao, 2002). Thus, Washington’s aim,

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according to this view, was not only to weaken China’s position in Central Asia, and therefore jeopardize the integration of Xinjiang, but also China’s wider foreign policy strategy: Central Asia is China’s great rear of extreme importance. The penetration of the United States into Central Asia not only prevents China from expanding its influence, but also sandwiches China from East to West, thus “effectively containing a rising China”. (Gao, 2002.)

Such perceptions reflect the interlinked nature of China’s interests in Xinjiang and Central Asia, and their connection to and role in Beijing’s grand strategy of “peaceful rise”. Thus, as we have seen, China’s foreign policy in Central Asia has reflected the pre-eminence of the goal of integration for Xinjiang, with an emphasis placed on the establishment of political, economic, and infrastructural links with the Central Asian states. Indeed, for one Chinese scholar writing in 2001, China’s strategy in Xinjiang was intimately linked to the achievement of its wider strategic goal of countering US dominance through establishing a foothold in Central Asia: The core of the Go-West strategy consists of driving straight at Central Asia. Central Asia is the second Middle East, not only in terms of resources but also in terms of the strategic situation. Central Asia is of an extremely great geopolitical strategic value. One may well say that of the countries at both ends of the Euro-Asia land bridge, those that control Central Asia will be able to control the future of countries at the other end of the bridge. (Li, 2007, pp. 26–27.)

In addition, the author suggests, as do many western observers, that China’s “westward advance” into Central Asia is also determined by its growing need for energy resources (Li, 2007, p. 28; Goldstein, 2005; Swantsrom, 2005, pp. 577–578).

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More recent Chinese commentary further highlights these themes. An article prior to the 2007 SCO summit in Kyrgyzstan, for example, provided an analysis that further illustrated the strategic importance Beijing attaches to Xinjiang and Central Asia. The article, “SCO Reshaping International Strategic Structure”, asserted that: (1) the region was characterized by an emerging balance between China and Russia; (2) as US strategic pressure on Russia mounts, SCO’s importance to Russia has risen making Moscow “even more dependent on help from SCO” to combat the US challenges to its traditional preeminence in the region; and (3) securing China’s western frontier will play a key role in China’s overall foreign policy (Li, 2007). The logic subsequently propounded to illustrate the latter point explicitly identifies the interlinkages that Beijing perceives between the security and development of Xinjiang, its position in Central Asia and its grand strategy: Even more importantly, as China embarks on the great enterprise of national resurgence, the biggest threats to its national security continue to be attempts to damage China’s territorial integrity and interference of outside forces in its unification process. In this sense, China’s strategic focus will remain in the southeast in the foreseeable future, with western China continuing to be the “rear” in China’s master strategy for many years to come. Nevertheless, only if the rear is secured will the strategic frontline be free from worry… As the squeeze on China’s strategic space intensifies, a stable western region takes on additional importance as a strategic support for the country. The strategic significance of western China is self-evident. (Li, 2007; emphasis added.)

Conclusion This chapter has argued that from Beijing’s point of view, China’s position in Central Asia and Xinjiang is clearly linked to its ability to

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successfully pursue a strategy of “peaceful rise”. As the preceding overview of China’s strategy in Xinjiang and Central Asia suggests that Beijing is arguably in a stronger position in the region than at any time in the history of China-based state’s attempts to control Xinjiang. It has consolidated and extended its mechanisms of political, economic, and social control within Xinjiang through such instruments as Han colonization, increased state investment in the petrochemicals industry and modern infrastructure developments. Externally, Beijing has succeeded in leveraging its developing political and economic clout in Central Asia to enlist these states, both in a bilateral and multilateral sense, to resolve long-standing border disputes, develop security and military cooperation, and undermine and control pro-separatist movements or organizations amongst the Uyghur diaspora in the region. China has also been successful in absorbing and then countering the effects of the injection of major US influence into the region post-9/11 through the intensification of the major elements of its strategy toward Central Asia. Thus, Beijing played a major role in the reinvigoration of SCO, assiduously worked toward the revitalization of its bilateral political, economic, and military relations with key Central Asian states, and continued its quest to diversify its access to the region’s oil and gas resources. As we have seen, an important element of China’s success in the SCO process has been the promotion of a normative agenda — under the label of “new regionalism” — that seeks to protect the regional status quo, promote economic development, and combat the perceived common threat of the “three evils” of “extremism, terrorism, and separatism”. Taken as a whole, China’s strategy presents a complex web of interlinkages between its imperatives of integration and control within Xinjiang, its drive for security and influence in Central Asia and its over-arching quest for achieving a “peaceful rise” to great power status.

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Related Websites SCO Secretariat Website: http://www.sectsco.org. Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst: http://www.cacianalyst.org. Eurasianet: http://www.eurasianet.org. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Silk Road Studies Program: http://www. silkroadstudies.org/new/index.htm. The Times of Central Asia: http://www.times.kg.

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7

Russia and Central Asia Marlène Laruelle

Contemporary Central Asia cannot be understood without an examination of Russia’s place in it. In fact, Moscow continues to play a part on all levels: as the former colonizer of the region, its culture and language are still widely practiced; it is held up as a possible political model for the ruling Central Asian elites; it plays a leading role in their economies, in particular in the energy domain; and it is an essential strategic and military partner. Through its multiform presence and its global influence, Russia plays a key role in the dynamics of state-building and regionalization in Central Asia. This chapter assesses the existing cultural, political, and economic patterns of Russia’s Central Asian agenda and it scrutinizes Moscow’s evolving influence in the region as well as the challenges that Russian thinking on Central Asia is likely to face in the coming years.

Is Russia a “Classic” Power in Central Asia? Russia is not a power like the others in Central Asia, as it is former colonizer of the region, a role which began in the nineteenth century (and even in the eighteenth for some of Kazakhstan’s northern regions). This legacy has its positive and negative aspects: positive ones insofar as it has involved a long period of Russo-Central Asian cohabitation that has given rise to a common feeling of belonging to the same “civilization”; negative ones insofar as it had accrued all the political resentment and cultural misinterpretations of the colonizercolonized relationship. After the implosion of the Soviet Union, 149

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Russia’s standing as former colonial center presented it with many difficulties: in Central Asia, holding Moscow at bay was a top priority. Resounding critiques rang out about “Russian colonialism”, but they lasted only for a brief period. Since the mid-1990s, the newly formed independent states attenuated their criticisms of Moscow, as they were encountering social difficulties, a time when nostalgia for the Brezhnev years also became an increasingly popular leitmotiv, and Russians could no longer be blamed for all the evils of the Central Asian transition. Less than two decades has therefore sufficed for this common legacy to have been more positively reshaped, that is, for Moscow to succeed in inverting the Soviet past and turning it into an asset of shared proximity. Since 2000, Russia has once again become a respected power in Central Asia, where it is admired for its economic and geopolitical revival. As a result of these post-Soviet continuities, Russia has the upper hand over the other great powers rivaling for influence in Central Asia. Many factors point in its favor: the Central Asian political and intellectual elite generally received its education in Moscow or Leningrad; the Russian and Central Asian military circles and secret services all belonged to the same administrative entity prior to 1991; the economic milieu’s corporatist strategies were all formed in the same Soviet mould; and the Central Asian leaders and their personnel networks have a lot of experience working with their Russian colleagues. On the cultural level, Russia also has a marked advantage. Russian remains the most spoken international language in the region, and in three states it has an official status — namely Kyrgyzstan, which is officially bilingual, and in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, where it is the language of interethnic communication. As yet, English has not managed to unseat the predominance of Russian, even less Turkish or Chinese. Russian culture remains very present not only because of the television and cable channels accessible in Central Asia broadcast from Moscow but also due to its variety music and the many imported Russian books. As a whole, the Central Asian populations continue to look at the world through the Russian prism, which is much more familiar to them than any other.

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In this sense, Russia’s relations with Central Asia are based partly on a complex former metropole/periphery relationship and on logics of decolonization. It is therefore fruitful to compare contemporary relations between Russia and Central Asia to those, for example, between France and Algeria, or between Great Britain and its former Indian colonies. Nevertheless, whereas the shared cultural elements between Central Asia and Russia are likely to be decisive for the evolution of their relations, the majority of western research dealing with this question focuses upon ideological readings of the situation. Indeed, the western view of Russia’s presence in Central Asia is often highly politicized and marked by memories of the Cold War. Many scholars have taken the 1990s, a time when Russia was economically weak, politically divided, and did not express any opinions on international matters that conflicted with the United States, as the norm of the new post-Soviet situation. As a result, Russia’s national revival in the international arena in the 2000s has widely been interpreted as a “deviation” from the established norm and a return to the “old demons” of the Russian empire. This interpretation must be turned upside down: the 1990s were the exceptional years, whereas the 2000s have seen the reemergence of Russia that is again able to pursue its own foreign policy objectives (Tsygankov, 2006b). This reversed perspective seems far more relevant for interpreting what is actually at stake in today’s Russia and in its relations with neighboring countries. Studying the current situation from this standpoint opens up several interpretative axes of Russian foreign policy. First, just as the regime’s political evolution is not to be interpreted as a “return to the USSR”, Russia’s retreats and advances in the post-Soviet space, and more particularly in Central Asia are not to be analyzed solely from the angle of “Russian imperialism” or that of a “return to the Cold War”. The reason is, first, that the past never returns and, second, that the Russian case reveals a type of westernization and modernization that, paradoxically, is presently being pursued through authoritarianism and nationalism (Laruelle, 2009). A more detailed analysis shows that Russian foreign policy toward Central Asia is developing in pragmatism,

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flexibility, and games of influence. Such an analysis relativizes the notion that present-day Russia marks a supposed return to an historical continuity of long-standing strategies that would provide the relevant background for understanding present events. Second, Moscow has never thought of post-Soviet space as uniform and this is even less the case today: though Russia might use force in the stalemated conflicts, such as that with Georgia, or deploy logics of energy blackmail against strategic countries, such as Ukraine, when it feels its interests are threatened, this approach cannot be generalized to the whole area. Indeed Moscow’s approach in Central Asia is unambiguous that of soft power (Tsygankov, 2006a). Third, works devoted to Russian foreign policy often tend to classify opinion artificially in a western binary schema — with prowesterners/democrats on one side and imperialists/nationalists on the other — and use it to interpret in the same framework foreign policy decisions and regime’s economic and political evolution. However, the ideological reality turns out to be a lot more complex: there is no Russian politician today that endorses a pro-western stance, if by that is meant a refusal to take Russia’s national interests into account. Andrei Tsygankov defines four main schools of foreign policy thinking: on the one hand, the integrationists emphasize Russia’s similarity with the West, while the nationalist hardliners define Russia in opposition to the West, as an “anti-West”. Both these groups comprise small minorities and they are generally excluded from decision-making processes. On the other hand, the ruling elites are either balancers (i.e., endorse the view that Russia should be a geopolitically and culturally distinct entity with a mission to stabilize relations between the East and the West) or great-power normalizers. Today, the latter are in the dominant position and they insist that Moscow’s foreign policy must remain essentially non-confrontational: for them, to be a great power does not necessarily mean being antiwestern (Tsygankov, 2005). Evaluating Russian foreign policy turns out to be an even more complex matter insofar as it has shifted many times over the last two decades (Lo, 2002; Donaldson, 1998). The ideological revolutions that have taken place since Mikhail Gorbachev’s push for perestroika

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in 1985 were a major destabilizing force on Russia’s external relations, causing shockwaves that still affect the formulation of its long-term objectives. The relevant foreign policy documents — for instance the “Foreign Policy Concept” — are difficult to interpret. Thus, while it still contains multiple criticisms of NATO and repeatedly denounces American unilateralism, the concept adopted in July 2008 still appeals to a Euro–Atlantic partnership and it speaks about establishing security from Vancouver to Vladivostok (Foreign Policy Concept, 2008). Its remarks on post-Soviet space are littered with references to a community with a Eurasian destiny in which Russia would be a driving, but not oppressive, force. A similar thing can be said of Russian military doctrines, which have been rather vague about how to define the enemy, oscillating between the West in general and NATO in particular, on the one hand, and separatist movements and international terrorism, on the other. This is not a minor issue, since the definition of the enemy entails fundamental military decisions, particularly in relation to changing to a professional, smaller but well-trained and better equipped, army (Barany, 2007). In the case of Central Asia, Russian foreign policy is particularly vague, all the more as the alliance between Moscow and the Central Asian regimes is in part negatively founded. Since the Central Asian states generally have much less room for maneuver than Ukraine and the South Caucasus, they turn out to be favorable, albeit somewhat reluctantly on occasion, to Russia’s renewed regional leadership (Jonson, 2004). At the same time, however, Central Asia is essentially a second-order issue on the Kremlin’s list of strategic priorities, for several reasons. First of all, because Russia’s relationship to Central Asia historically has always been somewhat paradoxical. Since tsarist times, the influential currents of Russian foreign policy have been significantly more focused on the western fringes of the empire (Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic States, and the Caucasus) than on its eastern fringes. In the Russian imperialist theories of the nineteenth century, Central Asia was considered economically and culturally backward, no more than a burden that Russia had accepted to shoulder, and certainly the region was not deemed the proprietor of any great culture. And yet, Russia’s imperial legitimacy was directly grounded

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in its ruling over Central Asia: the exalting of its vastness, of its expansion into Asia, of the “great game” with western powers, of the idea of being the meeting point of the Christian and Muslim worlds — all these notions were made possible by the colonization of the Steppes and of Turkistan (Laruelle, 2008). The asymmetry in this relationship is indicative of way in which Central Asia has essentially functioned as an instrument for Russia to assert the greatness of its power.

A Very Evolutionary Policy: The Ebb and Flow of Russia’s Agency in Central Asia Russian interests in Central Asia have significantly altered since the end of the Cold War. The past two decades can be divided into three phases. These are discussed in the following sections.

Phase one In the first, which stretches from the fall of the Soviet Union to the mid-1990s, the Kremlin had neither a clear Central Asia policy nor even one addressing coherently the rest of former Soviet space. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was construed as a mechanism to procure a “civilized divorce”, not as a means to maintain Russian leadership over the rest of the former empire. The reasons for Russia’s sudden disinterest in Central Asia were multiple, and of a nature that was at once ideological, political, and economic. Ideologically, the governments of Egor Gaidar (1992–1993) and Viktor Chernomyrdin (1994–1996) were inspired by American-style liberalism and considered that Russia’s strategic interests were the same as the West’s. Still harboring the Gorbachevian idea of the “European common house”, many of the ruling elites expected a rapid integration into European space, a relatively unproblematic transition to a market economy, and the establishing of western democratic norms. They decried what they saw as Russia’s centurieslong “diversion” from the European path by the imperial legacy and the Soviet experience.

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In this way, Boris Yeltsin built his political legitimacy around the delegitimization of Mikhail Gorbachev: in the wake of his election in 1990, the first Russian president played heavily on anti-Soviet sentiment. He criticized the weight of the southern republics, deemed economically “backward” and politically conservative, for having halted Russia’s modernization, urged the republics to seize “maximum sovereignty”, and put forward the idea that the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (RSFSR) ought to be the first to quit the Soviet Union. Russian interventionism also suffered a major setback: after the traumatic failure of the Afghanistan invasion the dominant slogan was simply “never again” (Trenin, 2003). These convictions thus stood in complete contradiction to any desire Moscow might have had to maintain control over Central Asia. It no longer sought to develop the human and cultural potential that the Soviet regime had created in the region. Lastly, Russia’s shock therapy also affected it economically, since the rapidly privatized, large Russian companies no longer played any major or structural role in foreign policy. The brutal collapse of living standards for the vast majority of the Russian population also prevented Moscow from influencing the evolution of the other republics with its subsidies. In its relations with Central Asia, Russia ceased to think of itself as the motor of integration and in 1993, abruptly expelled the republics from the ruble zone. In terms of regional alliances, Russia dismissed the proposition, put forward by the Kazakhstani President Nursultan Nazarbaev in 1994, of creating a Eurasian Union in order to conserve a high degree of economic integration without the ideological references to communism, and to aid the region’s countries in their transition to a market economy. Moreover, Russia barely reacted to NATO’s Partnership for Peace, which integrated the former Soviet Republics, and remained content with its observer status in the Central Asian Union (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan). Bilateral trade with Central Asia literally went into freefall: in 1993, it was only a tenth of its 1991 levels (around 6 billion down from 60 billion two years earlier) and it remained stagnant until 1995. Moscow retained only a partial interest in Central Asia in the strategic domain, which involved renting the site of the Baikonur

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Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan, putting political pressure on the new states to ensure compliance to the CIS’s Collective Security Treaty; maintaining Russian troops in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan along the international borders with China, Afghanistan, and Iran; and deploying the Russian 201st Motor Rifle Division in Tajikistan during its civil war (1992–1997). Only in 14 September 1995 did Russia finally decree that the CIS was “a space of vital interest”, meaning that Moscow wanted to reserve a right of inspection over the external borders of the former Soviet Union. Lastly, on the cultural level, Moscow was also rather absent, choosing not to defend the sizeable Russian minority in Central Asia, amounting to nearly 10 million people in 1989. Neither did it invest much in the Russophone structures (schools, universities, the media, etc.) so crucial to preserving cultural influence (Laruelle, 2006). Moscow’s chaotic and contradictory foreign policy appeared destined to “lose hold” of Central Asia and this was the case despite the fact that the local governments interpreted Russian foreign policy as betrayal and abandonment. Around 1994–1995, the shock of economic collapse, fears that there would be a repeat of the Tajik scenario throughout the rest of the region, and the deterioration of the situation in Afghanistan worked to halt the Central Asian states’ anti-Russian rhetoric (Syroezhkin, 2002). However, Moscow’s disinterest in former Soviet space, which was total in Central Asia, did vary according to the region: albeit to little effect, Russian foreign policy was more offensive in conflict regions such as Latvia, Estonia, the Crimea, Transnistria, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia, where Moscow implemented far more elaborate mechanisms of influence.

Phase two In the second half of the 1990s, rapid changes in Russia’s domestic situation led to the birth of a second phase of Russian foreign policy. Only a few years after the USSR’s collapse, the report on Russia’s global state could only be disastrous, even from a liberal viewpoint: the state was weak, without resources, unable to finance an army,

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exerted a reduced influence on the international scene, without clearly defined geopolitical objectives, and, domestically, central power was in constant retreat vis-à-vis the concessions demanded and obtained by the national republics. Even before his second mandate in 1996, Boris Yeltsin therefore set about getting the country back on its feet. One of the major signs of the Kremlin’s political reversal was the replacing of the Foreign Affairs Minister Andrei Kozyrev by Yevgeny Primakov, a Soviet-era diplomat who later became prime minister (1998–1999). The political authorities went looking for more conservative figures which would be capable of reducing the gap that separated the liberal government from a society that was increasingly skeptical about the pace and content of changes. Once in office, Primakov adopted a realistic stance and began endorsing multilateralism: he promoted a balanced policy in relations with the West, which he thought should continue to develop in a friendly fashion, in particular with the European Union, and prioritized cooperation with Asian countries, above all with China and India. In his first speeches, Primakov affirmed what the majority of the political elites dared not proclaim publicly: to be acknowledged as a great power, Russia must adopt a multivectorial policy strategy. It must therefore criticize the unipolarity of the contemporary world, but without seeking to confront the United States, and contribute to developing alternative geopolitical alliances in Asia and the Middle-East. According to the “Primakov doctrine”, part of Russia’s attempt to regain its international status involved recovering its role as a center of influence over the post-Soviet space. The formulation of this strategy, however, remained ambiguous, since official discourse continued to appeal for the creation of a Euro-Atlantic alliance that included Russia. In addition, the means for Moscow’s return were lacking: first, due to the fact that most large companies had been privatized the Russian state had no finances; second, it was having problems pulling itself out of the economic crisis, exacerbated by the crash in the summer 1998; third, it seemed unable to resolve the domestic issues linked to the war in Chechnya; and, last, it was being undermined by the ongoing oligarchic clan warfare being waged around the ageing and already ailing President Yeltsin, which provoked a

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quick succession of prime ministers (five between 1996 and 1999). Finally, the Russian elites were divided over the end goals of this new foreign policy: although everyone seemed to agree about the necessity to reassert the country’s great power status, many thought that Moscow could do so without having to reinvest in the postSoviet space, in particular in Central Asia. Nevertheless, the Kremlin was beginning to display greater concern about the degenerating situation on its southern borders (Kortunov, 1998). Despite the 1997 peace agreements to end the civil war in Tajikistan, the stability of Central Asia appeared increasingly fickle. Kabul fell under Taliban’s control with the defeat of the Northern Alliance in 1996, drug-trafficking was rife throughout the region, and in 1999–2000 Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan came under direct challenge from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Despite these developments, Russia decided to abandon its patrolling of the former external border of the Soviet Union: in 1999, the Russian army was withdrawn from Kyrgyz and Turkmen borders with China, Iran, and Afghanistan, and stayed only in Tajikistan. Economic relations between Moscow and the Central Asian states were at an extreme low collapsing in 1999 to an official total of less than 4 billion dollars. The real figures for Russian-Central Asian trade were no doubt higher, but the lack of liquidities had forced both sides to use a barter-trade system, which is not reflected in official statistics (Paramonov and Strokov, 2008a, p. 8). Moscow then staged its comeback, basing it on its performance in the Central Asian oil and gas industries: with Kazakhstan it negotiated the export of oil to the west, and with Turkmenistan the export of gas. And Moscow did not hesitate to employ the transport of energy as a tool for shaping the policies of regional states. However, this urged the Central Asian states to develop strategies for bypassing Russia, with Astana deciding to go via China, and Ashgabat via Iran. Even if more pressing discourses on Russia’s “natural” role in post-Soviet space were emerging, Moscow continued to lack the means to implement any such policies. At the institutional level, Russia could function on a bilateral level, thanks to its friendship and cooperation treaties with the Central Asian states, but it had no efficient

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multilateral policies at its disposal (Buszynski, 2005). There was no any collective political will on the strategic level, a fact confirmed by the insufficient amounts of funding that CIS member countries allocated to the organization’s structures. The Kremlin’s room for maneuver on its former territory was also drastically reduced: NATO was particularly active in the region, the United States were advancing their pawns by helping to set up an anti-Russian axis, namely Georgia-Ukraine-Azerbaijan-Moldavia (GUAM) and by financing the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, Ukraine and Georgia became the bridgehead of western influence in its face-off with Russia. The European Union also took up its eastward calling by accepting to integrate the Baltic states. Last, during this time many new economic actors also became firmly established in Central Asia, including not only the United States and the European Union, but also China, Turkey, Iran, and Japan, thereby disallowing Russian companies from gaining a firm foothold in the (regional) market, with the sole exception being in the hydrocarbon sector.

Phase three The third phase of Russian foreign policy is linked to Vladimir Putin’s rise to power in Moscow, first as Prime Minister (September 1999) and then as President (March 2000). As soon as he took office, Russia’s new strongman went to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, followed in May 2000 by another visit to Uzbekistan and then to Turkmenistan. On 28 June 2000, Putin unveiled a new foreign policy for the Russian Federation, which recognized its limited capacities and the need to make a certain amount of geopolitical concessions. It gave priority to Russian investments in the CIS states (Crane et al., 2005) and to developing active diplomatic relations with strategic partners such as India, Iran, and China. Putin’s Russia called for the CIS Collective Security Treaty to be strengthened in order to deal with Islamist threats in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and it declared its desire to regain control of the region’s energy resources, particularly those in the Caspian Sea (Baev, 2004). Relations with the two Central Asian states most resistant to Russian influence, Turkmenistan

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and Uzbekistan, slowly improved, and Putin’s visit to the capitals of both countries in 2000 was hailed as a diplomatic success. The polices of the other three states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan), more balanced between the West and Russia; thus, they also positively welcomed the signs of revival emanating from the Kremlin (Cummings, 2001). The events of 11 September 2001 then had the effect of sharply reinforcing Moscow’s desire to step up its involvement in Central Asia. During Vladimir Putin’s two mandates as president (2000–2008), Russia has succeeded in returning to its status as the most important partner of the Central Asian states. On the multilateral level, the two Moscow-initiated organizations, the Eurasian Economy Community, created in 2000 on a Kazakhstani proposition, and the Collective Security Treaty, founded in 2002, function as the major institutional frameworks of Russo-Central Asian cooperation. On the bilateral level, Moscow is again a first-order strategic and military ally (Allison, 2004). The Kremlin has made a show of its abiding political support for the Central Asian regime, a rapprochement facilitated by the common struggle against the so-called Islamist threat. In exchange for the Kremlin’s backing of their fight against the IMU (Naumkin, 2005; Crane et al., 2006), and political opposition more generally, the states of Central Asia have agreed to support Russia in its war in Chechnya. The “color revolutions” in Georgia in 2003, in Ukraine in 2004, and in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 further strengthened this political rapprochement, which was compelling all the Central Asian presidents to toe Putin’s line; all of them reiterated his accusations of unacceptable western interference, defended the necessity of strong central governing authorities in order to avoid destabilization by Islamists, and adopted stricter legislation concerning NGOs and “civil society” groups. This alliance reached its apogee during the Andijan insurrection on May 13, 2005, which was brutally suppressed by the Uzbek authorities. Whereas western countries condemned Islam Karimov’s regime for its immoderate use of force, for the massacring of civilians, and rejected Tashkent’s official explanation concerning an attempted Islamist coup d’état, the Kremlin, together with Beijing, came to the assistance of the Uzbek regime (Peyrouse, 2007).

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In the economic domain, Russia has also regained a dominant position (Perovic, 2005). Russian-Central Asian trade bounced back at the start of the 2000s and tripled between 2003 and 2007, shooting from 7 to 21 billion dollars, a third of which is in the hydrocarbon sector (Paramonov and Stropolski, 2007). In 2006, Russia again became Kazakhstan’s main import partner (trade figures rose to over US$10 billion) and its third largest export partner after the European Union and China. It is now once again Uzbekistan’s premier commercial partner, accounting for more than a quarter of its total foreign exchange (more than US$3 billion in 2007). In addition, Moscow has become Kyrgyzstan’s second largest trade partner after China but remains Tajikistan’s largest partner with China second. In Turkmenistan, Russia to date has trailed behind Ukraine, Iran, and some European countries; however, Gazprom’s growing role is likely to change this in 2009. In the trade sector in Central Asia, Russia will in all likelihood be overtaken by China, if such is not already the case in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (Peyrouse, 2007). Over the last two decades, then, there have been many ebbs and flows in Russia’s presence in Central Asia, which have been the result of the impact of global developments on Moscow’s foreign policy, as well as of the effects of domestic political re-organizations.

Russia’s “Central Asian Card”: Control Over Hydrocarbons and Regional Security Russia has two main goals in Central Asia: to control energy resources and to maintain regional security. Moscow’s economic interests intertwine with its security objectives and they are largely focused on the region’s oil and gas reserves, although Russia is also interested on other resources (such as electricity, uranium, gold, and precious metals). The following sections outline the Kremlin’s pursuance of its energy and security interests in Central Asia.

Accessing Central Asian energy resources Russia’s presence in the Central Asian energy sector has steadily grown since the 1990s. Its activities were initially limited to

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Kazakhstan, but in around 2000 Russia also began to make significant inroads in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, and, since 2005, in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as well. Reflecting Russia’s energy interests, there has been an increase in the relative proportion of gas and oil exchanges in Russo-Central Asian trade, which went from 23 percent of total trade in 2003 to 36 percent in 2006, or from 2 to 4.6 billion dollars (Paramonov and Stropolski, 2008c, p. 2). Despite this rapid increase, the trade in hydrocarbon sector is still below its Soviet-era levels: Central Asian imports of Russian oil and intra-Central Asian trade remain largely inferior to 1990 levels; only in the area of Central Asian gas exports to Russia do trade figures look likely to exceed Soviet levels until 2010. These energy flows are on the whole unidirectional, going from Central Asia to Russia. Russia itself only consumes a small quantity of Central Asian hydrocarbons and then re-exports them to Ukraine and Western Europe. In comparison to other international actors, Moscow’s 2006 investment in the hydrocarbon sector in Central Asia was a modest 4–5 billion dollars, 80 percent of which was invested in Kazakhstan and 10 percent in Uzbekistan. However, Russian companies are now looking to augment their financial involvement in the region and they are planning to invest about 15 billion dollars until 2012, principally in developing infrastructure for transport and deposits. Moscow’s aim in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is to gain a firm hold over the sale of highly profitable oil products, while Gazprom is undertaking the exploration of Tajik gas deposits in Sargazon (Khatlon region) and in Rengan (close to Dushanbe), as well as of Kyrgyz gas deposits in the country’s south, and is hoping to acquire a share of the state-run companies Kyrgyzgaz and Kyrgyzneftegaz as they enter the privatization phase. Russia is involved in numerous energy projects in Kazakhstan. It is undertaking the geological study and development of gas deposits in Karachaganak (western Kazakhstan) and Imashevskoe (Atyrau region), oil deposits in North Buzachi and in Karakuduk (Mangystau region), both gas and oil deposits in North Kumkol (Kzyl-Orda region), Alibekmola, and Kozhasay (Aktobe region), and lastly, undertaking the geological study and development of offshore

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sites situated in the Kazakh part of the Caspian Sea, namely TyubKaragan, Atashskaya, Kurmangazy, Zhambay, Khvalinskoe, and Tsentralnoe. Russian companies are also involved in the construction of a gas refinery in Orenburg and in that of a gas chemical complex close to Khvalinskoe. Furthermore, Rosneft is part of a project to augment the Atyrau-Samara pipeline’s capacity, which is set to increase from 15 to 25 million tons annually. At the same time, the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), 24 percent of which is controlled by the Russian state and 20 percent by Russian companies, is planning to increase capacity of the Tengiz-Novorossiisk site from 32 to 67 million tons annually. Other collaborative projects on Center-Central Asian gas pipelines (SATs) and the Bukhara-Ural are also underway to develop the capacity to transport Uzbek and Turkmen gas (Paramonov and Strokov, 2008). In Turkmenistan, Russian interests are focused on the gas sector. ITERA is the only Russian company directly involved in the exploitation of hydrocarbons, although Lukoil and a TNK–BP joint-venture are presently trying to enter the Turkmen market. Russia’s presence remains rather limited as Ashgabat only permits foreign companies to invest in offshore deposits, which are the most costly and technologically challenging. Because the status of the Caspian Sea remains unresolved, such deposits are also the most complex geopolitically since they are often close to the Iranian border. Russo-Turkmen cooperation is therefore limited in the main to exporting Turkmen gas to Russia via the Center-Central Asia gas pipeline. In Uzbekistan, Russian companies are involved in developing gas deposits in Shakhpakhty and Kungrad (Karakalpakstan), petrol deposits in Kandym, Khauzak, and Shady (the Bukhara region), gas and petrol deposits in Zhambay (in the Uzbek part of the Aral Sea), the Gissar region (near Karshi), Urga, Kuanysh, and Akhchalak (on the Ustyurt plateau). Moscow has also invested in transit infrastructure such as the Center-Central Asia and Bukhara-Ural gas pipelines; Uztransgaz and Gazprom are planning to modernize and develop the gas pipelines. More so than other international actors, Moscow plays a structuring role in the development of the Central Asian hydrocarbon market. Always on the lookout for possibilities to export resources and collect

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transit rights, Russia is contributing to the increases in export levels of Central Asian resources out of the region (85 percent of Kazakh oil products are exported out of the CIS, while the figure for Turkmenistan is 78 percent) and to reducing internal trade between the five states. Uzbekistan exports five times less gas to Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan than it did in 1990 and it imports very small quantities of oil from Kazakhstan, while Turkmenistan no longer plays any part in the regional energy game at all (Paramonov and Stropolski, 2008b, p. 7). With domestic consumption rising, however, the increasing emphasis on exporting energy is aggravating the recurrent energy crises in the two weakest states, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, while South Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also experience regular but less severe energy shortfalls. Russia is reinforcing Central Asia in its role as an exporter of primary resources by neglecting to develop its hydrocarbon refining capacity, especially the manufacture of products with high added value. This is ultimately an inefficient, and even dangerous, trade pattern from the viewpoint of Central Asia’s long-term economic interests. However, it seems likely that Moscow will lose its control over this regional market. Not only have new actors emerged, especially China, but the development of shipping in the Caspian Sea and rail transport had reduced the importance of land pipelines. Moreover, the fact that Russo-Central Asian energy exchanges are mainly run by state companies involved in government-directed activities entails a political will for cooperation that sometimes runs counter to the commercial interests of each state.

Maintaining regional security The second key domain of Russian presence in Central Asia is that of regional security. Arguably, this concern has been the primary driving force behind Moscow’s historical presence in the region; however, since 2000, the mechanisms of this collaboration have been profoundly transformed. Of the CIS institutions, only the Anti-Terrorist Center (ATC) seems to be functioning properly inasmuch as it provides training and regular joint exercises (called “South Anti-Terror”, administered by

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the Russian FSB) to Central Asian states. Russo-Central Asian multilateral collaborations are in fact geared toward the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which includes Russia, the Central Asian states (with the exception of Turkmenistan), Belarus, and Armenia. The CSTO seems to be the only regional institution with a genuine military dimension (Paramonov and Stopolski, 2008a). The Collective Rapid Deployment Force (CRDF) for Central Asia, comprised by Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Russian, and Tajik units, totalling around 4,000 persons, is the only one with trained armed forces capable of prompt response to regional insecurity. Since 2005, the CSTO has also revived cooperation between the Russian and Central Asian military industrial complexes. The Intergovernmental Committee for Military and Economic Cooperation (ICMEC) allows for the preferential sale of Russian military material to Central Asian states at domestic Russian market prices and for the closer integration of national military industries. However, bilateralism dominates the security domain. From the early 1990s, Russia has held joint military exercises with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, in particular at Ashuluk in the Astrakhan region; although, exercises with Uzbekistan only began in 2005 and none have yet been organized with the Turkmen army. From the outset, Russia was explicit about what it saw as the main concern for bilateral cooperation: the protection of the international borders of the former USSR. Although Russian troops today are no longer in Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, or Tajikistan, they still conduct bilateral consultations on the securitization of borders and organize operations focused on drug-trafficking and illegal migrations. The FSB border service plays an advisory role and it provides technical assistance in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Russian military personnel continue to train the air forces of both countries. In fact, the Soviet legacy as well as Russian dynamism in this sector have enabled Moscow to train a majority of the Central Asian military personnel, including more than 2,500 from Kazakhstan, more than 800 from Kyrgyzstan, more than 500 from Tajikistan, and more than 250 from Uzbekistan. Several hundred high-level Central Asians have done their diplomas at Russian military academies, which also serve as models for the

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Central Asian military schools, and the two Russian military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan also offer specialized on-site training. The Russian authorities have succeeded in keeping (or have regained access to) a number of military and research facilities in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Of those facilities, the ones based in Kazakhstan have been central to the Russian defense system. Since the 1990s, Astana has given Russia the use of several firing ranges in exchange for military equipment, specialized maintenance, and officer training. Moscow, for instance, rents not only the famous Baikonur spatial complex from Astana (70 percent of Russian rockets are launched there) but also weapons and missile launch centers in the regions of Atyrau and western Kazakhstan, ballistic missile test firing ranges in the regions of Karaganda, Zhambul, Aktobe, and KzylOrda, and the Gulchad site, close to Priozersk, in the region of Lake Balkhash, which monitors ballistic missiles and spatial objects circulating above Asia as far as 3,000 km away. In Kyrgyzstan, Russia has the Kant base at its disposal, which opened in 2003 and it is able to accommodate close to 800 men. It controls several sites such as the seismic control station of the Russian Defense Ministry in the Tian Shan mountain range, the Kara-Balta station at Chaldovar in the Chui region, which depends on the Russian military fleet, and the anti-submarine weapons test zone of the Russian army in Karakol on the shores of Lake Issyk Kul. Since the signing of a 2004 treaty with Tajikistan, Moscow has opened a military base, which is the largest outside the Russian Federation’s borders. Russia has been allowed to deploy other troop units at Kurgan-Tiube and Kuliab, to occupy the Aini air base close to Dushanbe which stations Russian helicopter squadrons and the “Okno” space surveillance and monitoring center (Paramonov and Stopolski, 2008c). The two other major sectors of Russo-Central Asian military collaboration are, first, the provision of military equipment and, second, cooperation between military-industrial complexes. Since the start of the 2000s, Russia has supplied the Central Asian states with large quantities of military equipment, either by selling it at preferential prices, notably to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (the only two states in

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the region able to finance their armies), or by supplying the material in return for the rental of sites (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan). Russia therefore equips the Central Asian armies with weapons, munitions, night-vision equipment, as well as planes, helicopters, anti-missile defense systems, and tanks (as well as ships for the Kazakhstani Caspian Sea Fleet), and it also provides after-sales service and repairs. Since 2005, Moscow’s influence, bolstered by the importance of its Soviet legacy, has further been enhanced by the re-launching of the Central Asia military industrial complex.

Russian Approaches to State- and Region-Building in Central Asia Any account of Russia’s influence in Central Asia proves complex. Indeed, despite its return in the 2000s, Moscow has well and truly lost its stranglehold over the region. But yet, the Kremlin itself seems never to have envisaged returning to a Soviet-style situation nor has it tried to reintegrate the Central Asian states politically by including them in the Russian Federation. It seems, therefore, that the Kremlin has learned (although still somewhat reluctantly) to compromise with other international actors. Although Moscow still spurns the external involvement in the region, it nonetheless accommodates the presence of other international actors in Central Asia and it does not seem to punish regional states for the lack of exclusivity in their hospitality. The Russian elites are in fact quite pragmatic: they understand that the Central Asian states are prepared to exploit the international competition factor in their own national interests and that the latter will not give them any preferential policies on grounds of sympathy alone. The conclusion therefore seems to be that Russia’s return has been a partial success insofar as it has again become an important partner and a legitimate ally in a no longer monopolistic Central Asian market. In the energy domain, Moscow realizes that it can no longer control Central Asian gas and oil prices, which are in the process of rising to the world prices thanks to the energy needs of Iran, the West, and above all China — all of whom are ready (and able) to pay high

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prices to strip Gazprom, Lukoil, and Rosneft of their quasi-monopoly in the region. The export routes are now no longer exclusively in Russia’s hands either: Turkmen gas is already exported directly to Iran and it will soon also be to China; Kazakh oil is exported to China and the west via the BTC. Russia is also soon going to be outweighed by China in trade terms, first in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and then in the other states of the region. Trying to capture markets, large Russian companies have implemented aggressive trade strategies, which become purveyors of state-policy. Although in the 1990s the major Russian companies pursued their own policies, often in contradiction with those of the Kremlin, under Putin state interests and those of the major companies have come together again. This seems to have provided Russia with a single solution for its multiple objectives: first, to maintain political influence over the Central Asian regimes through the control of resources; second, to continue to collect considerable transit revenues from these landlocked countries; third, to slow down — but not to stop — the emergence of competing export routes to China, Iran, and Turkey; and finally, to meet growing European energy demands. However, while Russia has been overwhelmed in the economic field to such an extent that it seems unlikely to recover its primacy in regional markets; this does not seem to be the case on the political and geopolitical level. Although Russia was criticized by Tashkent for barely reacting to the incursions of IMU into Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in the summer of 1999, Moscow’s awareness of the Islamist danger in the region has enabled it to find a common language with the Central Asian states. Moscow has also deftly taken advantage of the deteriorating relations between Central Asia and Washington and it has put in place strategies for the “containment” of western influence in the region. Indeed, what distinguishes Russia from western countries is that it does not link its assistance to political conditions, and the Central Asian regimes, which have become more and more authoritarian, have been particularly appreciative of this. Russia has thus played a crucial role in Central Asian state-building by promoting a post-Soviet mode of governance that could be defined as authoritarian.

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With the beginning of the 2000s, the Kremlin’s influence on Central Asian policymaking has become more direct, notably after its statement that it considered the western model of parliamentary democracy inapplicable in the region. This political rapprochement has had a significant political impact on Central Asian societies: political reforms for democratization have been impeded; the activities of NGO’s and civil society are increasingly curtailed; and getting access to new technologies and to media like the Internet has become more difficult. Even Kyrgyzstan, generally considered the most advanced democracy in Central Asia, has begun to unfurl a “vertical power” structure in an attempt to introduce stability to the country. Furthermore, the seeming transfer of power in the Kremlin from Vladimir Putin to Dmitri Medvedev has been closely followed in the region. It appears that Russia has once again offered a political model for Central Asian regimes, which are attracted neither to Western pluralist systems nor to the Chinese single-party rule. More than any other international actor, Russia plays a major (albeit contradictory) role in the regionalization dynamics of Central Asia. In particular, the institutionalization of the CSTO and the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC) has assisted the growing prominence of the Kremlin in the region. Within the space of a few years, EAEC has become the principal institutional framework for economic cooperation in Central Asia. It was hoped that EAEC would be strengthened by Uzbekistan’s accession; however, Tashkent suspended its participation in October 2008. Similar to strategic relations, economic relations remain principally bilateral. Moscow seems aware that the Central Asian regimes do not enter into collaborations on the basis of goodwill: the Russian elites have a good memory of the conflicts internal to the republics in Soviet times and they did not naively dream, like western countries in the 1990s, of some form of Central Asian union. The processes of integration being implemented in Central Asia are effectively being driven by Russia (and more recently by China): the Central Asian states are participating in these processes not so much to strengthen regional integration, but to shore up integration with the promoting international actor (i.e., with Russia). Nevertheless, Moscow appears

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to be contributing (even if indirectly) to increasing the interactions among the Central Asian states through initiatives such as joint military exercises; integrating trade flows by reducing customs duties and constructing transnational transport infrastructure; facilitating cooperation on sensitive inter-state questions such as water management; and simplifying procedures for migration etc. If the Central Asian states are ever to see themselves as a regional entity, this would chiefly be through the agency of a third party — essentially Russia (and, also, quite likely China). Nevertheless, the reality of trade relations and funds allocation dictates that Russo-Central Asian relations remain principally bilateral not multilateral: on the economic level, each of the Central Asian states prefers to reinforce direct ties to Moscow rather than to its neighbors, and, on the military level, bilateralism gives both sides more room to protect their national interests. In view of the distinct development of trajectories of Central Asian countries and the policies pursued by their regimes, the Kremlin has been compelled to conceive of its relations with each state on its own specific terms. Thus, Russia has engaged in a more differentiated Central Asian policy. For instance, from this point of view, Kazakhstan is perceived by Moscow as an essential economic and political partner in the postSoviet space — therefore, the Kremlin has no other choice but to accept Astana’s decision-making autonomy. For their part, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are perceived as beneficiaries of Russian aid; they are seen more as burdens to carry and as destabilizing factors to be controlled, than as equal partners. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, on the other hand, are viewed as countries difficult to control: Russia seeks to make the most of their recent geopolitical reorientation, and is quite aware that their current more or less pro-Russian policies are by no means assured in the long term — should the chance arise, some anti-Russian policy will be swiftly implemented. This view of the region thus partially intersects with Soviet-era division between Middle Asia (Sredniaia Aziia) and Central Asia (Tsentra’lnaia Aziia) — where Kazakhstan is included in the former category and excluded in the latter. Kazakhstan has in fact always enjoyed a specific status in Russia’s perception of the region.

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Schematically speaking, it can be argued that the real advances in economic and military cooperation are occurring in bilateral relation. If Moscow fosters multilateralism, it is generally as a means by which to showcase close regional inter-state relations to the rest of the world. Each of the multilateral institutions functions to achieve a specific goal: the SCO is a way for Moscow to administer its growing competition with China; the CSTO a way for it to contain western influence and make it into the indispensable intermediary for military relations between NATO and the Central Asian regimes (Nikitin, 2007); and the EAEC a way to show reluctant post-Soviet states such as Ukraine and Georgia that they can only lose by not returning to Russia’s economic fold. Moscow thus sees multilateral cooperation as an effective way to increase its bilateral geopolitical and economic influence in the region.

The Well-Known International and the Less-Known Domestic Challenges to Russia’s Presence in Central Asia Although Russia has succeeded to recover most of its positions in Central Asia, it is also an actor “like the other” international actors vying for influence in the region: Moscow’s standing is by no means guaranteed and it remains subject to the complexity of global international scene. It is true that neighboring regional powers, such as India, Iran, and Turkey, do not have the means to dethrone Russian supremacy; however, this is not the case with China, which is going to prove problematic for Moscow in the long term (Laruelle and Peyrouse, 2009). Though for the time being both actors have managed to pursue their objectives without major confrontations, this situation will, in all likelihood, change rather quickly, especially since the competition for control over Central Asia’s oil resources is likely to become more acute. Thus far, the Russo-Chinese alliance in Central Asia has been possible because Beijing has an interest in keeping Central Asia under Russia’s political and security shelter. But if the Chinese authorities were to consider, for whatever reason, that they ought to modify their activities in Central Asia, and enhance their involvement in political, military, and cultural issues, and not only in

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economic ones, then Beijing’s interests are likely come into conflict with Moscow’s. The relations between Central Asia and Russia are also affected by the global power struggle between Moscow and Washington. The reorientation of American foreign policy after 11 September 2001 and the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan (as well as the more-than-uncertain future of Pakistan) have prompted a degree of cooperation between the Kremlin and the White House in Central Asia. At the same time, Moscow’s influence in Central Asia has been propped up by the financial windfall from the high price of hydrocarbon resources sold by or transiting through Russia. Thus, in the context of the current global financial crisis when the price of oil and gas has plummeted the Kremlin’s continued ability to use its economic profits to shape the patterns of relations in Central Asia might be undermined, which would impact negatively the political influence of Moscow’s regional agency. Russia’s weight in Central Asia does not depend solely upon global geopolitical and financial redistributions, but also on domestic factors. To analyze the long-term trajectory of the Russia–Central Asia relationship, it is thus necessary to focus on cultural issues, whose impact is too often neglected by commentators. As part of a broader historical movement, the current demographic crisis, the depopulation of Siberia, and the general “re-centering” of Russia to the European regions of the country signal a historic retreat for Moscow that will inevitably affect its presence in Central Asia. The Russian state has also difficulties in conceiving of what impact a massive intake of Central Asian workers would have on Russia, and, moreover, of how the rise of xenophobia and Islamophobia in Russian society might change its relationship to Central Asia. From the Kremlin’s standpoint, the region has only three choices: remain in Russia’s fold, sink into a state of chronic instability (whether due to Islamic fundamentalism or the criminalization of the state by mafia networks), or fall under Chinese domination. Policy debates on Moscow’s use of soft power in Central Asia confirm that the five states are construed as an intrinsic part of the Russian sphere of influence: political submission and economic

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control are desired, but not cultural proximity, since this is a source of anxiety for the articulations of Russia’s international identity. In fact, Russian public opinion tends to associate Central Asia with the specters of Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism, and criminality, while positive references are extremely rare. This generalized disdain for Central Asia provides the negative context in which the intellectual and political elites conceive the economic, geopolitical, but also social utility of the region. Moscow, for instance, no longer produces any real expert knowledge about this region. Despite its old Orientalist traditions, knowledge on Central Asia is drying up and reflection on the future of Central Asia in Russian think tanks is minimal. This situation can partly be explained by Moscow’s general view of Central Asia as part of its de jure sphere of influence in Eurasia. As a result, it tends to focus attention on the Western and the Caucasian fringes of the former empire. Central Asia enjoys less attention since Russia’s influence over it is considered self-evident. For the moment, therefore, Russia has almost neither long-term vision of the relations it would like to entertain with its “South” nor any strategy that would offer Central Asia any status other than that of being Moscow’s geographical and political appendix. Aware of this lack of constructive engagement with the region, the Central Asian governments have on more than one occasion been resentful and have denounced Moscow for merely surfing on the petering momentum of its historical legacy. Moscow does not seem to have considered seriously the proliferation of such attitudes as a series of related questions loom over its relations with the region: What interaction will the Central Asian states have with Russia, once the Soviet generations have disappeared? Is the Kremlin sufficiently prepared for the upcoming generational transfer of power, in particular in states like Uzbekistan? What role will China come to have as a political, economic, and cultural magnet for Central Asia? Indeed, to date, the Kremlin has not engaged in any meaningful debate on those issues. In this respect, Russia could maintain its key role in Central Asian affairs were it to give itself the means to do so (Laruelle, 2007).

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Conclusion This chapter has explored Russia’s relations with Central Asia and their impact on the dynamics of state-building and regionalization. The lack of cooperation between Central Asian states seems conspicuous. They tend to form cooperative relations when prompted by an external actor — more often than not, Russia. Thus, Moscow plays a role in the regionalization of Central Asia, despite its preference for bilateralism. At the same time, the Kremlin tends to prop up the authoritarian practices of Central Asian states and maintains their economies in resource-extraction dependency — a development pattern that seems to enhance the volatility of regional statehood. Furthermore, in the wake of the 2008 Russo-Georgian war over South Ossetia, the question of soft power has assumed a central place in Russian foreign policy analysis. This has necessitated making a clear distinction between zones, where Moscow’s influence is open to contestation and those in which it arrogates itself the right of control. In Central Asia, Moscow has so far desisted from issuing military threats and applying direct pressure of the kind it did in Georgia. Instead, the current patterns of strategic cooperation seem to be complemented by the dynamism of economic relations. In this respect, even though Russia’s foreign policy discourses are often marked by references to its imperial legacy, in practice Moscow’s agency in Central Asia tends to be based on pragmatism. Its ability to co-opt rather than coerce elites, its political legitimacy, and its cultural values are crucial aspect of Russia’s involvement in Central Asia. Thus, despite its economic and military preponderance in the region, Russia does not seem to have a viable solution for the multiple Central Asian posers. Nevertheless, even if the future of Russia’s presence in Central Asia remains uncertain, for the present, the Kremlin appears content to frame its agency in the region on the credentials of its Soviet legacy. As a result, even if Russia manages to exercise its influence on the political, economic, cultural, and social levels, Moscow’s actorness in Central Asia remains seemingly unaware of the need to renew its strategies in order to ensure its place as the region’s premier partner.

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Related Websites Foundation for the Strategic Research on Central Asia: http://www. asiastrategy.ru. Institute for the Diaspora and the Integration, Moscow: http:// www.materik.ru. Institute for World Economics and International Relations: http:// www.imemo.ru. Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies: http://www.kisi.kz. Moscow State Institute for International Relations: http://portal.mgimo.ru/. Russian Institute for Strategic Studies: http://www.riss.ru.

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The United States and Central Asia Matteo Fumagalli

Introduction The presence and influence of the United States in Central Asia are at a historical low. Notified at the beginning of 2009 of its eviction from the Manas airbase in Kyrgyzstan, Washington has seen its presence in the region shrink dramatically. Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (9/11), the regional states seemed all too keen either to welcome direct American presence or indicate willingness to participate in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Since then the international context has changed significantly and US agency in Central Asia is severely constrained. In this respect, Washington’s involvement in the region distinguishes three distinct periods. Firstly, the 1990s — marked by an overall neglect, apart from the initiative to convince Kazakhstan to relinquishing its portion of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. Toward the later part of the decade attention gradually shifted toward gaining access to energy resources. Secondly, in the beginning of the 2000s, Washington’s involvement in Central Asia was defined by the security concerns underpinning the “global war on terror”. Finally, since 2005, US influence has been on a steady decline (ever since its evicted from Uzbekistan’s Qarshi-Khanabad (K2) airbase) seemingly stuck between giving priority to political and economic reforms and maintaining a security-dominated approach. Overall, the impact of US policy on Central Asian state-building has been peripheral. Instead, Washington remains focused on ensuring 177

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that the Central Asian region would not descend into chaos and export instability (Abdullaev and Barnes, 2001). Aid, economic, and military assistance have not been wanting, but underspecified priorities and a lack of a diversified approach to the region, coupled with a lack of understanding of the local context have contributed to make the United States a less-than-desirable partner for the Central Asian states. Thus, from being a “friend in need” (in the post-9/11 period), Washington has become a “threat” to the Central Asian regimes. The claim here is that while the reluctance to adopt a regional approach may not be a negative thing in itself (the region is extremely diverse and it may require ad hoc intervention in some areas), the United States has become hostage of an ambiguous “Uzbekistan first” approach, which has tied it to a strategic partnership with an actor unwilling to undertake democratic reforms. The failure to develop a coherent strategy that identifies priorities and to diversify engagement in the region has translated into a propensity to opt for short-term gains. The chapter proceeds by examining the current state of affairs in the relations between the United States and the five Central Asian states, paying special attention to how US policy in the region has been conceptualized. Next, the contribution examines the nature of US interests in Central Asia, as well as their evolution over time. It then turns to the analysis of the policies and approaches adopted, with special regard to the issues of state-building and regionalization. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the prospects of US–Central Asian relations.

The Global Hegemon and the Periphery: Understanding US–Central Asian Relations after the Cold War The United States entered the 1990s as the world’s remaining superpower. In fact, Russia’s descent into economic collapse and political uncertainty (accompanied by unresolved dynamics of fragmentation in the North Caucasus) led many to believe that a “unipolar moment” had arrived (Krauthammer, 1991). This, paradoxically, seemed to

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characterize the way in which Washington engaged with the Central Asian republics. During the Cold War, the framing of the Soviet Union as an existential threat “captured” the US foreign policy attention. The dissolution of the Soviet Union removed such threat perceptions. As a result, attention to Central Asia declined substantially. Moreover, during the 1990s, Washington prioritized relations with Russia. Central Asia was thereby relegated to the periphery of strategic thinking and treated as “a collection of forgettable ‘stans’” (Legvold, 2003, p. 1). It is now a truism to acknowledge that “9/11” constituted a watershed in US–Central Asian relations. The region was suddenly catapulted to centre-stage. Central Asia mattered both because of its geopolitical location at Afghanistan’s border (Giragosian, 2006) and because of the potential security threats emanating from regional awkward states and non-state radical organizations. It has to be acknowledged, however, that despite this popular and policy attention, US–Central Asian relations have remained to a large degree under-theorized. The theoretical literature exploring the US role in Central Asia is scarce. Most of the work has been traditionally policy oriented, seeking to identify key strategic priorities and interests in the region and inform policymaking through an assessment of US policy. However, this should by no means be read as a negative assessment of the quality of the more policy-oriented work on US–Central Asian relations, often extremely insightful (Starr et al., 2001; Oliker and Shlapak, 2005; Brill Olcott, 2009). While part of this literature sheds light on the evolving impact of the United States on the Central Asian republics, we know remarkably little about how the United States actually impacted on statebuilding and regionalization. A focus on great power competition (and its impact on US interest in the region), often informed by geopolitical thinking has been the minimum common denominator of most of the work conducted on the role of Central Asian in world politics and on how external powers (typically Russia, China, and the United States) have shaped (or not) regional order (Brzezinski, 1997; Blank, 2001; Giragosian, 2006). In fact, little time has been spent to listen to Central Asian perspectives, as if the Central Asian states were endowed with no autonomous political agency (Starr, 2008, p. 345).

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The literature on regionalism and US–Central Asia relations seems to be predominantly informed by neo-realist approaches (Allison and Jonson, 2001; Allison 2008; Blank, 2007b; Daly et al., 2006). Geopolitical analysis and great power competition have been a particularly popular prism through which to look at the region, although the insights of approaches focused on great power competition, control of the Eurasian heartland, are of limited help when seeking to account for US role in supporting/hindering state-building and regionalization. Perspectives informed by critical security studies have contributed not only to show how concepts taken for granted by neorealist analyses are in fact very much contested, but also to show how the discursive competition over who actually is a regional power or an external one may be leading to the emergence of a sense of a “new imagined security community” (Heathershaw, 2007, p. 124). More recently, attention has also been posed to the apparent dilemma between the promotion of values and the pursuit of more material (security and energy) interests. In this regard, Cooley’s work on “base politics” well captures the US dilemma (Cooley, 2008a–c). Although certainly catchy at a rhetorical level, the expression “values versus interests” does not fully capture the difficulty that external powers have to conceptualize and deal with the diversity of the region in terms of their attitude toward rule of law and political reform, natural resource endowment, and even type of challenges faced. Energy considerations certainly Western drive policy toward Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, whereas security has come to dominate US ties with Uzbekistan. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan deserve separate mention, since state weakness is much more apparent there, and the different — and often more pressing — nature of human security concerns should be taken into account when formulating a strategy towards the region. What is beyond doubt is that the US difficulty to develop and implement policies reflected its variety of interests in the region, which resulted in the failure to fine-tune the former to the latter. Promoting stable and independent statehood and democratic values has been the belief shaping US policy toward Central Asia, as emphasized in the Silk Road Strategy Acts of 1999 and 2006,

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outlining the vision for US engagement in Central Asia and the South Caucasus (Silk Road Strategy Act, 1999; 2006). The first document lists, among other things, “the promotion and strengthening of independence, sovereignty, democratic government, and respect for human rights; the promotion of tolerance, pluralism, and understanding and counter racism and anti-Semitism; the assistance in the resolution of regional conflicts and to facilitate the removal of impediments to cross-border commerce” as some of the key principles driving US policy in Central Asia (Silk Road Strategy Act, 1999). The second document, reflecting the changes that have occurred as a result of the 9/11 attacks, states that the main interests in the region include security, economic development, energy, and human rights, but it also highlights the “need for mutually beneficial security cooperation” between the United States and the countries in the region. Referring to the “colored revolutions” in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan occurred in previous years, the document argues that such events “demonstrate the essentialness of steady progress toward democracy and the rule of law. While these revolutions resulted in the ouster of corrupt and ineffective regimes by largely peaceful protest movements, the long-term interests of security, stability, good governance, and economic growth are better served by evolutionary democratization” (Silk Road Strategy Act, 2006). Given the lingering threat emanating from Afghanistan before and after 9/11, the consolidation of secular governments also emerged as a pressing concern for the United States. As Starr notes this should have been expected. The United States was among the first actors to recognize the independence of the Central Asian states and open diplomatic relations and representations in the region. More broadly, alongside support for market economy and international security, concern for human rights and democratic institutions have been the main pillars driving US foreign policy since the signing of the Helsinki Agreement in 1975 (Starr, 2008, p. 345). Under the presidency of George W. Bush (2000–2008) emphasis on the normative dimension of US foreign policy has become a compelling driver of US action abroad. “Democracy promotion” figured prominently in the administration’s official discourse. At the same time, “regime change” has

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been restricted to very isolated cases — namely the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. For the first part of the current decade emphasis on democracy promotion and the war on terror went hand in hand, on the assumption that failed (and authoritarian) states provided fertile ground for terrorist organizations. Promoting stable and democratic governance was seen as an important asset in countering terrorism and/or tackling the conditions that may lead to its “appeal”. As time progressed, however, emphasis on democracy (and on exerting pressure on authoritarian allies) was overshadowed by short-term gains and interests, as Western courting of Uzbekistan over the past few years shows. While the United States heralded the “colored revolutions” in Central Asia as instances of a democratic breakthrough, “regime change” never guided Washington’s agency in the region. Thus, while democracy promotion was certainly a norm informing US foreign policy and action in other parts of the world, the norm co-existed (oftentimes uneasily) with the preponderance of other interests (e.g., security), which tended to take precedence. In this setting, it is claimed that “American policy toward regionalism in Central Asia is the product of contradictory impulses” (MacFarlane, 2004, p. 448). As a result, while some actions have sought to follow up US perceptions of its international role, overall the results have been disappointing, trumped by other concerns. Like other international actors, the United States has encountered serious problems in translating its belief in the value of democracy into policy, as well as in accommodating it with other — often more pressing — interests. The mismatch was not so apparent in the 1990s, mostly as a result of the fact that the region was peripheral to the strategic interests of the United States. The gulf between the normative dimension of US foreign policy and the more pressing (short-term) goals widened dramatically in the post-9/11 era. It should not be forgotten that the beginning appeared to be promising. Despite its global hegemony, Washington sought Moscow’s consent on the use of the Central Asian republics as launching pads for the invasion of Afghanistan. Emphasis was equally put on the strategic importance of the region as well as the necessity

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to push for greater political and economic reform. As indicated in the document that lay the basis for US–Uzbekistani cooperation: Recognizing the importance of competent implementation of democratic and market reforms in Uzbekistan as a necessary condition for ensuring political, social, and economic stability, sustainable development, prosperity, and national security; […] The Uzbek side reaffirms its commitment and intention to further intensify the democratic transformation of society in the political, economic and spiritual areas, taking into account the obligations deriving from international treaties and the requirements of national legislation. (United States–Uzbekistan Declaration on the Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Framework, 2002)

Actual behavior, however, soon began to differ from both norms and policies, as security concerns started to cast a shadow over other interests and goals. Reports pointing to the violations of human rights and the repression of opposition and independent organizations were not just authored by human rights organizations. The “Country Report” issued by the US Department of State singled Uzbekistan out as a particularly serious offender (US Department of State, 2005). However, high officials in the Bush administration were seen in Tashkent praising President Karimov for the country’s contribution to the war on terror (Islamov, 2004). Such behavior was not exclusive to the case of Uzbekistan, but applied to Washington’s engagement in regional states. Apart from undercutting democratization and reform in Central Asia, gaining access to the military bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan also came at a high financial cost — reportedly, US$40–60 million a year in the case of the Manas base in Kyrgyzstan (Cooley, 2008c, p. 1177). Thus, the increasing fragility of awkward statehood in Pakistan and growing disagreement with Iran, left the United States with few options, but openly to support Central Asian rulers. As a result, “the West’s credibility as an agent of political reform has been undercut by a series of missteps and concessions

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made to Central Asia’s authoritarian regimes” (Cooley, 2008c, p. 1174; Fumagalli, 2007).

In Search of a Strategy The nature of Washington’s engagement in Central Asia has been termed a “policy in search of a rationale” (Rumer, 2007, p. 28). In fact, one could even push the argument further and suggest that not only was a comprehensive regional strategy not formulated, but the lack of clearly defined interests assisted implementation of contrasting policies. This setting makes it “difficult to pin down American interests in Central Asia and their policy implications” (MacFarlene, 2004, p. 449). Policymaking tilted toward the promotion of security interests and it was designed around the (prioritized) US–Uzbek partnership, with the other republics left at the margins. As already indicated, securing Central Asian statehood was a central concern for Washington. Also, ensuring the safe disposal of the nuclear arsenal and weapons of mass destruction components located in different parts of the former Soviet Union was paramount to US interests in the 1990s. At the same time, Washington’s involvement in the region was driven by the aim of securing access to the large untapped energy reserves in the region. Thus, reducing Russia’s monopoly over resources and pipelines and the diversification of the export markets remained high on the US policy agenda. However, owing to Moscow’s obstruction, the lack of diplomatic relations with Iran, growing Chinese assertiveness, and local idiosyncrasies hindered progress on this issue. Toward the end of the 1990s, a sense of disillusionment underscored Washington’s involvement in Central Asia (Rumer, 2007, p. 36). The 9/11 attacks brought a qualitative alteration of the US foreign policy context and they forced security considerations on the driving seat of US–Central Asian relations. In other words, security appeared to trump all other interests in the region (e.g., political and economic reform). The United States focused on the regional activities of militant Islamic factions (ICG, 2001). Reduction of conflict potential (at intra- and inter-state level) also emerged as a key

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priority, in a region where the reality of weak statehood often hid behind rhetoric and a semblance of strong state (regime) control. Also, the United States was concerned not only about a potential spillover of Afghan instability into Central Asia, but also about the regional ramifications of Central Asian conflicts (e.g., as a result of the disputes over water control and management, border demarcations). Thus, 9/11 and the Afghan war led to a sizeable increase in US assistance to the region. Such assistance (see below) was skewed, though. It was greatly tilted toward the security realm, but it also had a heavily bilateral focus, with Uzbekistan taking the lion’s share of US financial support. If security cooperation was greatly enhanced, what remained unchanged from previous years was the emphasis on energy resources — not because the US depended on them, but in order to reduce Russian hold on them. It turned out however that a greater focus on Central Asia did not actually translate in comprehensive efforts to understand the local priorities and demands, and did not even lead to the formulation of a clear and coherent strategy for advancing US interests in the region. Instead, Washington persisted with sending conflicting messages to Central Asian capitals, which ultimately undermined its regional influence.

US Policy and Approaches In pursuit of its conflicting objectives — diversifying energy export routes; securing access to the region in the war on terror; providing assistance; and contributing to reform — the United States combined a rhetoric of regionalization with an enhanced bilateral approach. The latter, in particular, attests to the different weight that the United States ascribed to relations with the Central Asian republics. In this respect, the interactions with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan were of entirely different quality in comparison with Washington’s relations with the other states of the region. Close political and military ties with Tashkent and Bishkek ensured continued access to the military bases in those republics. However, a policy of selective bilateral ties reflected negatively on the dynamics of regionalization, which was

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severely hampered both by the power asymmetry between the United States and the regional states and by the preferential status given to Uzbekistan, reluctant to any cooperative initiative in the region. As a result of its strong bilateral approach, Washington has become increasingly engulfed in the conundrum affecting cooperative and competitive dynamics at the regional level as a result of its efforts to prevent the collapse of regional awkward states. In this context, the argument is that “where the focus is on the development of bilateral relations and on the pursuit of concrete interests (such as strategic or economic access) at the expense of the effort to establish durable cooperative structures and norms at the regional level, external agency may militate against cooperation” retains all its validity today (MacFarlane, 2004, p. 457). Apart from the indirect involvement through NATO (examined in Chap. Two) and regional initiatives — such as the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC), launched in 1997 and aimed at reducing poverty and improving living standards through more effective regional cooperation — the US involvement in the region employed different forms of assistance. Non-military assistance took place within the framework of the US Agency for International Development (USAID). It has been present in Central Asia since 1992, where it operates through bilateral agreements with the respective governments. Over the years, USAID has provided about US$1.5 billion in programs assisting the development of the economic sector, education and healthcare systems, and democratic institutions in Central Asian assistance has been distributed as follows: US$500 million in the case of Kazakhstan; US$400 million for Kyrgyzstan; US$300 million to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, respectively; and US$80 million to Turkmenistan. It has to be noted, however, that over time, aid has declined. Aid provided to all the post-Soviet countries has shrunk from US$452 million in the financial year 2007 (for aid to be provided in 2008) to US$396 million in 2008 and an expected US$346 million in 2009 (Kucera, 2008). By contrast military aid has somewhat increased, from US$17.5 million to US$20.7 million since 2006 (Kucera, 2008).

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The most problematic issue with such assistance is the lack of suitable and effective mix of “sticks and carrots” to ensure not only accountability, but more generally that Washington’s approach is effective and it infuses a sense of accountability — i.e., that progress is rewarded, while lack of reforms is possibly sanctioned. In this respect, the United States does not possess the appropriate mechanisms for encouraging institutional change and democratic reforms (Cooley, 2008c, p. 1174). Thus, in the current policy climate in the region, sanctions do not seem to be working (as indicated by the sanction applied to Uzbekistan after the Andijan) and Washington does not seem capable of offering any attractive incentives either.

Evaluating US Policy in Central Asia Washington’s record in the region is mixed. Despite an overall sense of mutual neglect, the 1990s were marked by moderate success. On the one hand, negotiations convinced Kazakhstan to relinquish its stockpiles of Soviet nuclear weapons and none of the Central Asian states has yet collapsed. Washington has also assisted with diversifying the export of Central Asian energy resources — as evidenced by the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline. On the other hand, however, the Central Asian states have yet to establish viable democratic polities — if anything the local regimes consolidated their own forms of authoritarianism (Cummings, 2002; Collins, 2006). Liberalization and reform were not helped by the post-9/11 shift of attention towards the prioritization of security. Instead, the strategic importance of Central Asia in the global war on terror enhanced the leverage of regional regimes in their dealings with external actors. The international alignments of Central Asian states reflected domestic concerns with regime survival. Washington’s own security concerns contributed to the dynamics of de-democratization in the name of preventing the “Afghanization” of Central Asia. Such a narrow strategic focus did little to strengthen the institution of Central Asian statehood, empower regional society, and enhance cooperation.

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Consequently, the assessment that “a stable regional environment [in Central Eurasia] has yet to emerge” (Fairbanks et al., 2001) remains valid today. In this respect, Washington’s impact on regionalization has been negative. A number of factors have contributed to this outcome. Firstly, the keenest sponsor of deeper Central Asian regionalization — Kazakhstan — has remained sidelined by the US strategy for the region. Secondly, Washington’s heavily bilateral approach played against greater regional cooperation. Thirdly, the dynamics of the “new great game” allowed Central Asian elites to play external actors against each other. External competitive policies have backfired against the United States. The local actors have turned to closer ties with Washington when needed and they have moved away toward Moscow or Beijing when their threat perceptions changed. Perhaps, ironically, it was only after the regional elites started to perceive US presence as politically threatening in 2004–2005 that they began to cooperate with each other as well as with Russia and China in order to reduce the possibility of another Kyrgyzstan-style “colored revolution”. Fourthly, the United States has not coordinated well with its allies in the region. Though often informed by similar interests and seeking to achieve analogous goals, policies of the United States and the European Union often do not seem to be in unison. For instance, Washington contributes to the CAREC initiative (to which the European Union is not fully committed), while Brussels is involved in the BOMCA/CADAP program (where the role of the United States is marginal). Such disparity evidences Washington’s failure to coordinate its policy with relevant partners (Huskey, 2008). Overall, the impression is that few, if any lessons have been drawn from the US failure to engage Central Asia effectively. This also raises the question of what importance the region actually occupies in US policymaking and strategic priorities, apart from its proximity to Afghanistan. Perhaps the main hindrance to US influence in the region is its insistence on engaging the Central Asian states bilaterally rather than multilaterally. At the same time, due to their association with Washington, other extra-regional institutional actors — such as the WTO, NATO — have also started to be sidelined by the countries of the region.

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Prospects for US Policy in Central Asia It seems that presently the prospects for greater and more effective US engagement in the region are bleak. This makes it difficult to envisage a radical change in US–Central Asian relations in the short term. Incremental change may be possible should Russian aid pledges to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan fail to materialize, and these countries continue to look abroad for support of their collapsing economies. As noted above, Uzbekistan’s relations with the United States, after a “great chill” which followed the Andijan events in May 2005 and protracted until 2008, have gone through some improvement. This, nevertheless, has not led to a reorientation of Uzbek foreign policy nor to curbing the pressure on the opposition and civil society groups. So, at present, only high level official relations have slightly improved. Also, the improvement of ties with Tashkent has been marked by a severe worsening in the US relationship with Kyrgyzstan. While the newly elected Obama administration has once again made Afghanistan a foreign policy priority for the United States, it is still unclear how the Central Asian republics may fit into this scenario. Unwilling to align themselves too closely to anyone, and especially to Washington, the Central Asian republics may choose a strategy of “wait and see”. The claim here is that despite the seriousness and urgency of the problems emanating from Afghanistan, it is the impact of the global financial crisis on Russia and from there on Central Asia (with hundreds of thousands of migrant workers returning to the region where they do not have any job prospects). The deteriorating economic situation in the region is therefore key to the stability of Central Asia. Its effects coupled with a weakening state capacity across the region do not bode well for Central Asian security.

Related Websites Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Russia, and Eurasia Program: http://www.carnegieendowment.org/programs/russia/. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Russia and Eurasia Program: http://www.csis.org/researchfocus/RussiaEurasia/.

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Patrick Frost’s blog analyzing American Foreign Policy in Central Asia: http://centralasia.foreignpolicyblogs.com/. RAND Corporation, Center for Russia and Eurasia: http://www.rand.org/ international_programs/cre/. USAID Central Asia: http://centralasia.usaid.gov/.

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Turkey in Central Asia: Turkish Identity as Enabler or Impediment Brent E. Sasley

Introduction The study of Turkish foreign policy is woefully under theorized, with a tendency toward the descriptive. Several studies at the end of the 1990s and into the 2000s have attempted to address this gap, but their tendency was to highlight a number of relevant variables (domestic and international) without incorporating them into a general theoretical framework that can be applied to other countries as well. Both of these trends have underlined the existing perception that Turkey is too unique for comparative analysis and general theory construction in International Relations (IR). Pushed and pulled between East and West, it is considered geographically, culturally, and politically idiosyncratic. But this should not be so. Turkey can be studied in a comparative framework by using existing theories of IR. The advent of Constructivist approaches to state behavior during the 1990s drew attention to the importance of national identity as a major determinant of a country’s foreign policy, and such an approach can easily be applied to Turkey as well. Ankara’s policy toward Central Asia is an ideal case study toward this end. This chapter argues that Turkish foreign policy is best explained by reference to its identity, which has conditioned its foreign policy preferences. A Western-oriented identity lasted from the creation of

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the modern republic in 1923 until the end of the Cold War. After 1991, disorientation set in. Turks began to question whether their Western-oriented identity was still valid, which led to questions about its foreign policy priorities. It was during this period of disorientation that Turkey first constructed its policy toward the region. As a Western orientation seemed less plausible and desirable, Ankara turned toward Central Asia as a new foreign policy pole. In this context, it sought to create a process of state-building and regionalization centered on itself. That is, Turkey promoted itself both as an example of appropriate development for the states of the region and as a leader, or at least a first-among-equals, in a new bloc of states tied together by a common identity — Turkic (a shared culture and language) and Muslim (a shared religion). Since no other country outside the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) could claim both of these elements of Central Asian identity, Turkey considered itself to be the natural model for the states of the region. But as events unfolded that undermined Turkey’s ability to act as a model for Central Asia, Turkey’s Western orientation was reemphasized and this reduced the role it could plausibly play in the region. A few clarifications are in order here: •

•

First, the reference to Central Asia here indicates the “Turkic” states of the region — Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan. These four republics are considered Turkic, as they are ethnically and linguistically related to the Turks in Turkey. Tajikistan — the fifth Central Asian state — is ethnically and linguistically Iranian and although it was always invited to participate in various Turkic activities, it has often remained apart. In this context, it has to be mentioned that Azerbaijan is also deemed Turkic, but as it is part of the Caucasus, Turkey has a different relationship with it, which is not part of this discussion. Second, the focus here is on Ankara’s official policy toward Central Asia. Other groups in Turkey have been engaged in their own efforts at cultivating ties with the region — such as Islamists and ultra-nationalists (see Landau, 1995) — but their efforts,

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while noteworthy, are small compared to official foreign policy and cannot determine the course of interstate relationships. Third, it is recognized that one cannot assume the Central Asian states are alike in almost any context apart from the Soviet experience, and Turkey’s policy toward them reflects this variation. For example, Kazakhstan’s possession of hydrocarbon reserves has made it a higher priority for Turkey than Kyrgyzstan. Still, Turkish foreign policies toward the individual states share enough similarities that we may make general theoretical and analytical observations. The chapter proceeds under this assumption.

The chapter begins by outlining the theoretical framework of this investigation. The first section, thereby, draws on Constructivist IR approaches in order to draw attention to identity as a determinant of foreign policy formulation. The second part examines the “disorientation” in Turkey’s international identity in the wake of the end of the Cold War. The argument is that the uncertainty of Turkey’s foreign policy orientation during this period opened up Ankara’s international agenda so that Central Asia could become a higher priority. The third segment focuses on the specific policies that Ankara extended toward the region. The fourth section forms the crux of the argument—namely, that identity did not offer a strong-enough foundation for Turkey’s Central Asian policy due to the weakness of the presumed ties. Consequently, this realization allowed a number of other foreign policy problems and issues to eclipse Central Asia on Ankara’s foreign policy agenda. The conclusion notes that although Turkey remains involved in the region, it is only one of many international actors — the implication being that Turkey is less important, especially in the 2000s, for the development of Central Asia.

Explaining Turkish Foreign Policy All states are similar in that they share some minimal common objectives, such as ensuring their survival as political/territorial units and enhancing their prosperity. Beyond this, similar states act differently under the same circumstances. Despite their shared history

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and co-membership in the small club of the most industrialized liberal democracies, Britain and Canada reacted very differently to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003: Britain became a staunch advocate of US policy while Canada offered at best lukewarm support, but certainly not endorsement. How can we explain different reactions to the same set of conditions? Constructivist answers to this question have highlighted the importance of non-material variables — such as the ideas, norms, values, and cultures of national communities — in determining state behavior. In other words, understanding national identity helps us understand why states choose one foreign policy over another. Identity is relevant in two ways: One, individual state identity will motivate states to adopt specific foreign policies (see Telhami, and Barnett, 2002; Katzenstein, 1996; Berger, 1998). Two, states that share similar identities will engage in similar foreign policies (see Barnett, 1998). Both facets are useful for explaining Turkish policy toward Central Asia. Like any other state, national identity in Turkey prescribes parameters within which domestic and foreign policy is made. It is difficult for decision makers to craft policies outside of these boundaries; in addition to sharing general national proclivities, policymakers are aware, even in non-democratic states, of the high costs that come with ignoring popular ideas and expectations (Siverson, 1998). Of course a national community is composed of several different sub-groups, each with their own set of cultural traits. But we can identify some general ideas that stem from a widely accepted (if not completely accepted) understanding of a population’s conception of itself and the role its country should play in world politics. In the context of its foreign policy, there are three main competing identities in Turkey, each of which recommends a different foreign policy orientation: Islamism, Turkism (or pan-Turkism), and Kemalism. Of these, Turkism never obtained the same level of support or viability as the other two, while Kemalism has been the dominant paradigm since 1923. (Islamism has increasingly challenged Kemalism since the 1990s, but the effects have been felt more on domestic issues than in foreign affairs.) Understanding the nature of

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these two identities and their foreign policy preferences will help us understand the evolution of Turkey’s policy toward Central Asia. Pan-Turkism came out of the twilight era of the Ottoman Empire, in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Ottoman intellectuals, trying to find ways to staunch the Empire’s decline, put it forward as an alternative to existing identities within the Empire in order to strengthen its Turkish core (Landau, 1974, p. 193; Poulton, 1997). Much of it was constructed by Tatar émigrés who sought refuge in Turkey from the Russian empire. Their influence helped direct pan-Turkist energies against Russia, as the state that had conquered and suppressed the Turkic peoples who lived beyond Turkey’s own borders, thus preventing them from achieving their natural unification with Turkey. Enver Pasha, by 1914 one of the leaders of the Young Turk government, trekked to Central Asia to participate in the Basmachi Revolt against the Soviet Union in the early 1920s. He took control of much of the rebellion’s military activity, giving it a clear pan-Turkist meaning. After the establishment of modern Turkey in 1923, pan-Turkism competed with Kemalism to be the ideology of the new state. Rightist elements, particularly the radical right (later referred to as ultranationalists), adopted it (Poulton, 1997, pp. 130–134), drawing for their inspiration from emerging European fascism (see Landau, 1974, pp. 193–204). Though it is somewhat difficult to discern the historical origins of the Turkic peoples (see Dewdney, 1993; Roux, 1993), the assumption is that they originated in Siberia but spread out from Mongolia into Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and Europe (Roux, 1993). Pan-Turkists after 1923 tended to focus on Central Asia as the ancient historical homeland of the Turks. They adopted the symbol of the Grey Wolf (Bozkurt), a mythical creature that played a role in nurturing the Turkic peoples, similar to the role played by a wolf in the legend of Romulus and Remus. All Turkic peoples, according to pan-Turkists, thus shared a common heritage. This underlined a common identity — that the Turkic peoples compose a single nation — that should be reflected in a political union of the Turkic peoples. There follows a clear set of foreign policy objectives: a union of some kind between the Turkic states. In reality, the nature of these objectives have been subject to debate — some

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pan-Turkists have focused on something like a cultural configuration while others have advocated for a political merger. But in either case, pan-Turkism would orient Turkish foreign policy toward the Turkic states, which are concentrated in Central Asia. These heady ideas were believed even by outside observers: Even in 1957, Charles Hostler wrote that “[t]he Turkish regions of the Soviet Russian Empire, historically and culturally, gravitate towards the Middle and Near East […] The Turkish Republic, by its mere existence, affects the political and cultural life of the Turkish provinces of Soviet Russia” (Hostler, 1957, p. 2). As a foreign policy, pan-Turkism never became a viable paradigm. Kemalism, entrenched among the major foreign policymaking elites, remained the prevailing policy framework. The closest pan-Turkism came to becoming official government policy was after the 1960 military coup. The young, middle-ranking officers who led the overthrow of the civilian government tended to hold radical preferences, including pan-Turkist inclinations (Poulton, 1997, pp. 136–138). But their goals were too extremist, and the senior offices of the National Unity Committee — the military group set up to run the government after the coup — expelled all of them from the country. But their ideas remained in play in Turkish politics, and Turkish leaders were well aware of them by the time Central Asia emerged from Soviet control after 1991. As such, Turkism provided a ready-made alternative to the Western orientation of Kemalism, as Kemalist foreign policy principles were called into question in the 1990s. When Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the modern republic, took control of the nationalist resistance against the Allies after World War I, he imposed his policy preferences on the resistance and then on the politics of the new state. Atatürk believed that Turkism, the notion that there was a viable worldwide ethnic-linguistic community, was a chimerical distraction: “I am [not] a believer […] in a league of the Turkish peoples […] Away with dreams and shadows!” (cited in Poulton, 1997, p. 93). Instead, he constructed the ideology of Kemalism, a belief and policy system that he imposed on the new Turkish state and its society through a series of political reforms and social engineering in the 1920s and 1930s. To Atatürk, a pan-Turkist policy was simply inappropriate to achieve modern development. Already in 1921, he asserted that

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“[n]either Islamic union nor Turanism [pan-Turkism] may constitute a doctrine or logical policy for us. Henceforth the government policy of the new Turkey is to consist of living independently, relying on Turkey’s own sovereignty within its national frontiers” (which he had set himself) (cited in A g aog ullari, 1987, pp. 184–185). These national boundaries were laid out in the National Pact, a document adopted by the nationalist resistance in 1919 that limited Turkey’s territorial claims primarily to Anatolia, and excluded any territory in the Caucasus or Central Asia (see Poulton, 1997, pp. 92–101). Atatürk thereby undercut the central claim of pan-Turkism: that the existence of Turkic peoples beyond Turkey necessitated some form of union or connection. An integral part of Kemalism was the belief that Turkey should be a modern and civilized state. Atatürk defined modern as Western, as a state that adopted Western ideas and political, social, and cultural norms and institutions; and he defined civilized as European (see Kinross, 1964). In addition to being necessary for development, Atatürk often stressed that Westernization was pursued because it was the right thing to do if one wanted to join the community of civilized states (see Berkes, 1964, pp. 463–464). Kemalism also provided a set of foreign policy priorities, all of them underlined by this basic Western orientation shared by the key foreign policymaking elites (see Robins, 2003, pp. 68–79). In the beginning years of the republic, its two main leaders, Atatürk and Ismet Inönü, were careful to keep Turkey as neutral as possible in international affairs, even during World War II. But after the War, Soviet demands on Turkish territory in the east and for a greater role in the Turkish Straits revived fears of Russian enmity, and prompted Ankara to accept the need for close allies. This dovetailed with the Kemalists’ preference for the West, and thus Turkey was drawn into the American-led camp during the Cold War. Then, once the European Economic Community was established during the 1950s, it became Turkey’s objective to join what it considered the institutional expression of Western-European civilization. As Önis (2003, p. 17) put it, “eventual membership in the [EU] has been interpreted as a necessary counterpart of the westernization and modernization

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drive”. A pro-Western foreign policy was easily reconciled with the overall preferences of the Kemalists. But Turkey’s Turkic identity remained deeply rooted even in the Kemalist worldview. This was done purposely by Atatürk, with consequences for Turkish foreign policy after 1991. Atatürk was more concerned with preventing Islam from becoming the framework of Turkish politics than Turkism (see Kinross, 1964). In order to avoid connotations of and connections with the Ottoman Empire, which the Kemalists saw as too Islamic and thus too backward, Atatürk and the group of “historians” he commissioned emphasized not only that the Turks were the heirs of a great pre-Islamic Turkic civilization and culture in Anatolia (the Hittites), but also one that stretched eastward as well: Central Asia was identified as the “fatherland” of the Turks (Poulton, 1997, pp. 105, 287). So although he disparaged pan-Turkist policy, Atatürk nonetheless stressed the Turkic heritage of the Turks, and this embedded the connection between Turkey and the Turkic republics of Central Asia, even if subconsciously. The dissolution of the Soviet Union exposed these previously hidden currents, and highlighted the shared identity that the Kemalists had perpetuated without tying foreign policy to them, but which now became important foreign policy priorities. In addition to its own national identity, understanding a potential transnational identity to which Turkey might belong is also important for understanding variation in Turkish foreign policy after 1991. Many states belong to a specific grouping, usually defined by its regional borders (e.g., the Arab world) and/or political and cultural affiliations (e.g., Western liberal democracies). But the presumed uniqueness of Turkey (a Muslim state with a constitutionally mandated secular order, divided between Europe and the Middle East) has meant that Ankara has often felt isolated and alone in pursuing its foreign policy goals. Philip Robins (1991, p. 16) accurately noted long ago that “Turkey is left without a natural community of states of which it can feel properly a part”. This can help us understand Turkish foreign policy during the Cold War to some extent (for example, why Turkey tried courting the Arab states after the United States failed to support Turkey’s Cyprus

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policy in the 1970s [see Mango, 1975]), but more importantly for our purposes here it helps us understand the “euphoric” reaction (Winrow, 2000, p. 117) Turkey had to the emergence of Central Asia and Azerbaijan after the breakup of the USSR. Turkish policymakers believed they had finally found a group of states with which they shared an identity, and that could be used to construct a shared set of foreign policy guidelines. Because of this, they were willing to break with their traditional foreign policy and adopt a more assertive policy focused on Central Asia. If Kemalism has been the primary framework for Turkish foreign policy until the end of the Cold War, then practitioners and analysts could be forgiven for assuming that Turkism would become the model for foreign policy after the Cold War. After 1991, the series of global and regional developments that stemmed from the shift from bipolarity to unipolarity raised a number of questions about what had until then been key assumptions about Turkish foreign policy. The emergence of Central Asia from Moscow’s control coincided with these changes, exposing the ethnic, linguistic, and religious similarities between the region and Turkey and prompting new options for policymakers. We turn now to the development of these options.

Disorientation in Turkey’s Foreign Policy Orientation Turkey’s Western orientation conditioned its foreign policy from 1923 to 1991, pushing it closer to the West in two key arenas: security and economics. Turkey became a key member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952, and for the rest of the Cold War was anchored in the American-led Western security architecture, pitting it against the Warsaw Pact. In this context, Turkey was the only member of NATO to border the USSR, highlighting its clear strategic importance in the bipolar struggle. In economic terms, Europe became Turkey’s main trading partner. Driven by a new export-oriented trade strategy, the European Union by 1990 accounted for 56.5 percent of Turkish exports and 45.8 percent of Turkish imports (Undersecretariat, 2006). Individual EU countries

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(especially Germany, Britain, France, and Italy) similarly occupied the top positions in trade. Although tensions and disagreements did mar the Turkish–Western relationship (Delvoie, 2005; Eren, 1977), Turkey persisted in its Western orientation. Efforts to complement or balance this orientation with renewed attention to the Middle East in the 1970s were only experiments; they did not constitute a full-fledged shift in foreign policy, and when they produced no real benefits from Ankara’s point of view, emphasis swung back to the West. But the end of the Cold War produced disorientation in Turkey’s foreign policy, as it did for most countries. As a result, the West was no longer the point of reference for Turkish foreign policy it once was, raising the possibility that other regions might replace it as Ankara’s international pole. This disorientation produced three trends in the study of Turkish foreign policy in the 1990s, and in all of them Central Asia figured, if not prominently then certainly as an important variable. •

First, particularly in the early 1990s, questions were raised about the continuing importance of Turkey to the West. Although this had some effect on the Turkish–American relationship (Congress became hesitant about approving arms sales to Turkey), mostly it impacted on Turkey’s relations with the European Union. Some European states (Norway, Germany, and Belgium) also questioned or cancelled the sale of offensive weapons to Turkey, but more importantly Turkey’s premier foreign policy objective, membership in the European Union — ongoing since 1963 — was now viewed by Europe as at best questionable, at worst a waste of time. The removal of the Soviet threat combined with a renewed emphasis on deeper integration all but removed the security justification for a common European identity and shifted the foundations of its identity to political and cultural factors. This made Turkey’s differences stand out (Larrabee, 1998) and accentuated Turkey’s poor human rights record and the weaker conditions of its democracy (see Müftüler-Bac, 1997; Hale, 2003). In light of these changes, the independence of

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Central Asia gave Turkey a potentially new regional direction, as well a new bloc of states to which Turkey could aspire to be part of. Second, some analysts argued that the end of the Cold War actually increased Turkey’s strategic value, particularly for the United States. It was argued to be one of the “pivotal states” in the developing world that Washington should center its global post-Cold War strategy around (Chase et al., 1999). In the words of one observer: In the new security environment, Turkey’s geographical position and its military strength now made it a European, Balkan, Middle Eastern, Near Eastern, Caucasian, Mediterranean, Aegean, and Black Sea power. Sharing borders with Greece, Bulgaria, Georgia, Armenia, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, Turkey’s control of the Bosphorus Straits and the Dardenelles also made it a Black Sea neighbor of Russia, the Ukraine, Romania, and Moldova. Turkey’s ethnic roots lay in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Balkans, influencing its interests, concerns, and sympathies. Its Muslim identity demanded a community of interest in the Middle East, through Pakistan, and across to South East Asia. None of the immediate and demanding post-Cold War issues of Bosnia, the Middle East Peace Process, Iraqi sanctions, Operation Provide Comfort, Trans-Caucasus separatism, Russian activities in the “Near Abroad”, CFE flank issues, NATO enlargement, Cyprus, Central Asia, and energy pipelines could be discussed without reference to Turkey. (Mayall, 1997, pp. 1–2)

Books appeared with titles such as Turkey’s New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China (Fuller and Lesser, 1993) and Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power (Rubin and Kiris çi 2001), all of them emphasizing Turkey’s location at the center of a circle of strategically important regions (including Central Asia), often with the corollary that Turkey was a critical vehicle for the promotion of Western interests. In this respect,

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both the United States and even the European Union began to promote Turkey as a model for the Central Asian states. Third, the end of the Cold War produced a series of new threats and opportunities for Turkey (Sezer, 1996) that converged to prompt a new activism in its foreign policy (Kirisci, 1995) that differed from the “caution” that characterized its international agenda during the Cold War (Mufti, 1998). The end of the Cold War loosened the constraints set in place by the bipolar structure of the international system. States were no longer urged to remain in their respective camps, led either by Washington or Moscow, but instead had more choice in their foreign policy (Fuller, 1993). As one military officer put, “as the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union dissolved, Turks discovered that Turkey looked bigger from outside than it did to them from inside. Freed from the constraints of the Cold War era, Turkey seemed to have a better chance of playing bigger and different roles” (Ergüvenç, 1998). Turkey could, in this context, pursue relations with CA for its own benefit; the presumed existence of a shared identity dovetailed with this new foreign policy freedom (Kramer, 1996).

These trends beg the question whether, in light of the ease with which its foreign policy was called into question, Turkish identity really was Western, or whether it was as deeply rooted as was widely assumed. There is no a priori reason why a country cannot experience a shift in its national identity, which can then cause a change in its foreign policy. Culture itself is not static; however, slowly, it can adapt to new ideas and developments. Israel is often cited as an example of how changes in national society can lead to changes in foreign policy (in this case toward a willing to compromise on land concession to the Palestinians). However, as discussed below, in the case of Turkey and the West, these changes were illusory: while Turkey’s identity seemed to be a vehicle for the expansion of its activities in Central Asia, and thus to shape the region’s development, its identity remained locked firmly toward the West. Before this reality was exposed, the “opening up” of Central Asia to Turkey created a mirage of expectations. While the USSR existed,

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Moscow was intent on preventing the rise of either ethnic (Turkic) or religious (Muslim) identities that might challenge central Communist control. Turkey was — like every other country — shut out of Central Asia. But out of the wreckage of the USSR, the Central Asian states emerged at the same time that Turkish identity and foreign policy were casting about for a new focus. Being truly new states (Roy, 2000), the countries of Central Asia offered other actors the opportunity to establish their interests and influence among them. With the presumed shared identity between them, Turkey believed it had an opportunity to construct new foreign policy architecture not only for itself but also for the newly independent Turkic republics of the region as well. The next section describes this initial effort by Turkey.

Turkish Policy Toward Central Asia Even before the 1990s, Turks in Turkey often referred to the peoples of Central Asia as “the Outer Turks” (Dıs Türkler). But there had been no direct ties between Turkey and the region while the USSR existed. The sudden appearance of the new Turkic states generated intense excitement among Turkish and Western policymakers and analysts. The natural evolution in CA of a national consciousness was stunted by the Russian and then the Soviet conquest; consequently, the sudden disappearance of the USSR left these states without any kind of national identity on which to anchor themselves (Winrow, 1992, p. 103). This, observers concluded, made them open and amenable to the Turkish model, and it was widely assumed that, given their need for help in developing their economies, political systems, and even their national identities, Turkey would play a key role in these efforts. In so doing, it would create a process of regionalization in Central Asia — tying the Central Asian states both together and to Turkey in a structure based on a common identity and common societal and political structures. In other words, Ankara was expected to guide the regional state-building processes. In light of the disorientation in its international agenda discussed above, Turkey was eager to argue that its shared identity with Central

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Asia constituted a critical axis on which to build a strong relationship. Indeed, though always careful not to be seen promoting a pan-Turkist political union, Turkish policymakers (especially in the early 1990s) reacted with grandiose, sweeping statements about the future of Turkish–Central Asian relations. Süleyman Demirel, the then prime minister, often referred to the existence of a large “Turkic world” stretching from the Adriatic Sea to China (BBC, 1992a, 1993), which constituted a critical bloc of culture and civilization in the world (BBC, 1992f) based on an exclusive bond that tied this world together (Robins, 1998, p. 133). Even more excitedly, President Turgut Özal at the opening of a summit of Turkic leaders in October 1992 proclaimed the 21st century would be “the century of the Turks” (BBC, 1992c). At the same summit, Demirel noted that identity was a powerful bond between the Turkish-Turkic states, and that relations between them should be commensurate at “a level worthy of the kinship among our peoples” (BBC, 1992a). More specifically, Turkish policymakers were eager to note that Turkey could serve as a model of development for Central Asia: as a secular Muslim democracy with an open market economy. Both Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin and Prime Minister Demirel promoted this idea when they toured the region in 1992 (Robins, 1993, p. 600; 1998). Even into the late 1990s, some Turkish leaders made similar assertions. For instance, in 1997 Demirel, the then president, wrote that “Muslim Turkey has shown that [democratization] can be achieved without disturbing social order and compromising its stability. There is a lot to be learned from the Turkish experience; a democratic and secular Turkey has a potential to contribute to the attempts toward integration with the world by the newly independent states in the Caucasus and Central Asia” (Demirel, 1997). In this context, Turkey was promoted as a “bridge”, in the words of Prime Minister Tansu Çiller, between the region and the West (BBC, 1995). Turkish leaders could be forgiven for assuming the central role that Turkey would play in Central Asia, because the Turkic republics themselves seemed to advocate this same position — again based on their shared identity. At the opening of Kazakhstan embassy in Turkey in 1992, Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev declared that the

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establishment of official relations between the two countries satisfied “the longing which the Turkish and Kazakh peoples had been feeling for each other for years” (BBC, 1992b). Turkmen President Saparmurad Niyazov, at the opening of the Turkmen embassy later that same day, referred to the historical ties between Turkey and Turkmenistan, and noted that “[o]ur peoples, who were separated artificially in the past, are now coming together again” (BBC, 1992b). Some Central Asian leaders were more explicit: when Demirel visited Uzbekistan as part of his 1992 tour of the region, Uzbek President Islam Karimov asserted that Turkey was “the most suitable country and the one closest to us in terms of both geography and the policy it is conducting” (BBC, 1992e). Finally, Western governments promoted Turkey as an example for Central Asia’s transition (see Bal, 2000; Robins, 1998, pp. 135–136). Western claims about Turkey’s significance for the region were often hyperbolic and melodramatic (see Bal, 2000, pp. 108–109). Although there were concerns that the Central Asian states develop into healthy democracies and open markets, for the United States especially, there was also a fear that the region was open to Iranian penetration and its brand of fundamentalist Islam (see Macfarlane, 2004, p. 453; Walker, 1992). Even Israel, at the beginning of an increasingly close strategic and security relationship with Turkey, believed that Turkey was an important conduit for the advancement of Israeli interests in Central Asia (Bengio, 2004, p. 96). Given all this rhetoric, what was Turkey’s actual policy in the region? In reality, the concrete manifestations of these assumptions and predictions were quite limited. Turkey engaged in a number of initiatives that certainly surpassed what many other countries were doing — particularly from 1992 to 1994/1995 — but in the end they did not effectively herald a new beginning for Central Asia. Turkey’s involvement began before the dissolution of the USSR — it became the first country to formally recognize the independence of the Central Asian states on 16 December 1991. That same month the presidents of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan visited Turkey (the Kazakh president had already come in September.) A flurry of agreements were negotiated and signed; according to one

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estimate, there were soon about 140 bilateral treaties between Turkey and the Turkic republics of Central Asia (Robins, 2003, p. 279; Landau, 1995, pp. 215–220). In the economic arena, Turkey moved quickly to establish close business links with the region. The Turkish-Uzbek Business Council was set up already in November 1991. In February 1992, Turkey’s Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin visited all five Central Asian states, with a 140-member delegation, including business leaders (Robins, 1998, p. 132). When President Demirel toured the region in April–May 1992, he took 144 members in his delegation (Robins, 1993, p. 603) and promised hundreds of millions of dollars in aid (Sezer, 1996, p. 85). Apart from business representatives, Demirel also took Alparslan Turkes, the leader of the main ultra-nationalist party. Because of his pan-Turkist leanings, the inclusion of Turkes was considered by many to be an indication of the importance Turkey was placing on a shared identity. Already by September 1993, Turkey’s Eximbank had allotted about $665 million in credits for Central Asia (Winrow, 1995b, p. 288) and by 1996, this figure was over $1 billion (Winrow, 1996, p. 135). Turkish firms were immediately involved in a number of construction projects, sometimes working with companies from third countries, in hotels, airports, textile and leather factories, glass-manufacturing plants, and others (Hale, 2000, p. 294; Winrow, 1995b, p. 291), with estimates of total investment running more than $6 billion. At the same time, private Turkish banks founded branches throughout the region (Robins, 1993, p. 609). Other links were also quickly established: Turkey’s GeneralDirectorate of Post, Telegraph, and Telephone set up land lines and satellite access to all the Central Asian republics (Robins, 1993, p. 606). Avrasia channel, a new television station setup to operate among the states of the region, began beaming programming in May 1992, with Turkish subtitles (Robins, 1993, p. 607). Turkish Airlines arranged for direct flights to several points in the region and in March 1992, discussions began on constructing a rail link through Azerbaijan and then by ferry across the Caspian Sea to Central Asia (Robins, 1993, p. 604). Finally, in security terms, a number of bilateral military training agreements were signed (Winrow, 1995b, p. 292).

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In the context of a “blank”, impressionable Central Asia, the sense of competition also motivated other policies. While Saudi Arabia and Iran were encouraging the shift from the Cyrillic alphabet to the Arabic, Turkey pushed for adoption of the Latin alphabet, which the Turkic republics did beginning in March 1993. The Education Ministry began to establish schools in the national languages, Turkish, and English across the region (Hale, 2000, p. 293) while facilitating the attendance of thousands of Central Asian high school and university students at schools in Turkey. And in foreign affairs, Turkey campaigned to have regional states admitted into the United Nations, the European Security and Cooperation Conference, the Economic Cooperation Organization, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Region, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and NATO — achieving success in all but the last (Landau, 1995, p. 204). Finally, Turkey’s foreign ministry was reorganized to better facilitate policy toward Central Asia. In 1992, a new directorate dealing with the Commonwealth of Independent States was created, and then divided into a department on the Turkic republics and one on the Slavic regions. This was followed the same year by the establishment of the Turkish International Cooperation Agency, an organization designed to specifically enhance relations with Central Asia by providing technical support and training (Robins, 2003, p. 279). The highlight of Turkish policy in Central Asia was the Turkic summit on 30–31 October 1992. It was attended by Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan (Tajikistan, though not Turkic, was also invited but could not attend as the country was already engulfed in civil war). It was at this meeting that Özal put forward an ambitious and wide-ranging agenda of cooperation, including the establishment of a Turkic Common Market and a Turkic Bank. The 1992 summit was followed by a second summit in October 1994, and a third in August 1995. All three discussed the construction of close cooperation in education, cultural development, and foreign affairs. Although as discussed below the first summit marked the beginning of the “failure” of Turkish policy in Central Asia, the second and third summits were much more positive in all these areas. This was particularly so in international policy, when the

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summit began to take an official, common policy of support for Azerbaijan in its conflict with Armenia. From the above list, it appears that Turkey was engaged in a process of establishing close links with Central Asia, providing much-needed aid. In all of these areas, Turkish policy drew the states of the region closer to Western-style norms and institutions. However a closer examination of Turkey’s Central Asia policy reveals a number of problems and disincentives that worked to undermine the relationship and diminish its closeness. The following section elaborates on these issues.

Success or Failure in Central Asia? Turkish Identity as Foreign Policy It would be too strong a characterization to say that Turkish foreign policy toward Central Asia after the Cold War failed. More appropriately, it is Turkey’s Central Asia policy as a function of identity that did fail, because Turkey’s Central Asian policy could not be sustained by reference to any shared identity. There were factors and developments beyond Turkey’s control that worked to inhibit and even undermine close links. As a theoretical approach, then, an identity-based explanation helps us understand this “failure” by highlighting the weakness of the presumed bonds of identity. Non-identity factors — more tangible material disincentives — disrupted these efforts. It was in fact the Turkic summit in October 1992 that highlighted the problems in the relationship, although the presumption of a shared identity continued to animate Turkey’s rhetoric and policy for a number of years following. The summit was the “moment of disillusionment” for Turkey (Robins, 1998; cf. Sezer, 1996). A number of these disincentives soon became predominant, and if the 1992 summit is to be a metaphor for Turkish-Turkic relations more generally, then the outcome of the meeting is symbolic. As noted above, the Turks had hoped to establish a number of important institutions that would bring the Central Asians and the Turks closer together. But the end of the summit resulted not in the announcement of a number of dramatically new cooperative efforts, but a single communiqué (the

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Ankara Declaration) that referenced no specifics and commented only in a general way on the value of continuing cooperation. Underlying the importance of material factors was, in Patricia Carley’s (1995, p. 70) words, “complete ignorance … about Central Asia, its relations with Turkey, and, most certainly, about panTurkism”. Although generally considered Turkic, there was almost nothing similar between societies in Turkey and in Central Asia. Neither of two most widely assumed similarities — language and ethnicity — constituted a strong enough base to point out a shared identity. Although all Turkic languages belong in the same Altaic language group, there are distinct differences among all of the Turkic languages (Dewdney, 1993). An Uzbek speaker cannot automatically understand Turkish. As well, the ethnic connections between Turks and Central Asians was also minimal: the Turkic peoples in the two regions diverged considerably over the centuries as each grouping absorbed the ethnic characteristics of the peoples with whom they intermarried — among Turks the Bulgarians, Greeks, Serbs, and others, and among Turkic peoples Mongol and Chinese tribes (Carley, 1995, p. 174). Soviet efforts to reengineer identities in Central Asia in the 20th century, in order to weaken the potential for national, ethnic, or religious groups to challenge central Communist control, speeded this process along (Winrow, 1992). And their sudden sovereignty made the Central Asian states prefer to build their own national identity, rather than continue to rely on an identity given to them by someone else (Malashenko, 1998, pp. 163, 165–167). The lack of real similarities made it easier for a host of material factors to take on greater significance. First, the presumption of a shared identity led to a presumption of shared policy preferences, when in fact a number of disagreements over key domestic and foreign policy issues quickly arose. This was evident as early as the 1992 summit, when inter-Turkic disputes erupted, particularly over fears of antagonizing Russia. At the meeting Kazakhstan led the opposition to the formation of any organization based on ethnic or religious criteria or that might distract from relations with the Commonwealth of Independent States (Robins, 1998, p. 137). This position “poured cold water” on the broad set of

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ideas that President Özal had outlined at the beginning of the summit (Hale, 2000, p. 291). In part this was due to the existence of millions of ethnic Russians living in Central Asia — in the mid-1990s, about 38 percent of Kazakhstan’s population was ethnic Russian (compared to 40 percent Kazakh), while Kyrgyzstan’s population was about 22 percent Russian (Landau, 1995, pp. 197, 198). And in part it was due to the emerging consensus among Russian policymakers that the “near abroad” (Central Asia and the Caucasus) belonged under Russian influence (Tsypkin, 1995). Russia’s violent efforts to reinstate its control over Chechnya in the 1990s are, some have argued, evidence of this attitude (Tanrısever, 2004, p. 138). In this respect, Russia’s military operations in Georgia in August 2008 might be added as a more recent instance of this trend. At the same time, inter-Turkic tensions also came to the fore, wiping away the veneer of Turkic solidarity, and they began to pursue individual rather than coordinated foreign policies (see Hunter, 1996a). Some of the Central Asian states feared that Uzbekistan harbored ambitions for regional domination (Dawisha and Parrott, 1994, pp. 85–86; Winrow, 1995b, p. 292). As regional regimes grew increasingly authoritarian, they also became less interested in adopting the liberal democracy that Turkey promoted, and instead modeled themselves on some of history’s most intrusive dictators — the most extreme case here being the late president of Turkmenistan Niyazov. In this respect, Central Asian leaders became more sensitive to domestic dissidents and any support they were perceived to have from other states, even Turkic ones (Winrow, 2000, p. 118). For its part, Ankara was surprised by the refusal of the Central Asian republics to publicly support Turkey on a number of issues central to Ankara’s foreign policy during the 1990s — such as the recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Moreover, there was simply too much difference between the economic and political conditions in Central Asia and Turkey. Having only just emerged from decades of Soviet rule, Central Asian states were economically underdeveloped and politically unstable (Hunter, 1996a). These challenges were quite different from the ones faced by Turkey (Brown, 1995), which complicated the task of finding common policy priorities.

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Third, despite their rhetoric to the contrary, the Central Asian leaders were uncomfortable with the assumption that a shared Turkic identity automatically translated into a preference for closer ties with Turkey at the expense of other states (Brill Olcott et al., 1999). Having finally been freed from the straightjacket of Russian control, the states of the region wanted to establish their individual sovereignty. The Central Asian states not only believed that they could attract investment and aid from multiple states (Saudi Arabia, Iran, China, and India had all expressed interest in expanding ties with the region), but they also were busy consolidating their own national identities, and feared that any close union with Turkey would simply swap a Communist identity for a Turkish one (Dawisha and Parrott, 1994, p. 218). Nazarbayev made this clear as early as March 1992, when he insisted that despite their commonalities, “[t]his does not mean we will give precedence to Turkey, we are open to all countries” (BBC, 1992d). Moreover, many Central Asian leaders were becoming irked by Turkey’s presumptions that it should guide and direct their development; in some areas, such as literacy rates and education in science, Central Asia was doing far better than Turkey (Robins, 1998, p. 134; 2003, pp. 282–283). Fourth, regional leaders quickly realized — if they had not already suspected it before — that relations with Russia across a range of policy areas was more relevant for their security and development than a relationship with Turkey could be. In security terms, the civil war that erupted in Tajikistan in May 1992 played a major role in the desire to reaffirm close military relations with Russia. Karimov, in particular, was alarmed that the fighting would spill over the border into Uzbekistan (Robins, 1998, p. 137). Russia military involvement in Tajikistan, at the urging of the Central Asian states, did help contain the violence. It was understood that Turkey simply did not have the proximity or means to become militarily involved in the region (nor is it clear the Turkish public or the armed forces would support such activity). In addition, the Central Asian militaries had inherited Soviet ideas and equipment, and had to continue to rely on Russia for the maintenance and improvement of their armaments (Brown, 1995). Turkey simply lacked the resources and technical

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expertise needed for the stabilization and development of the Turkic republics, even though it was considered one of the most important emerging economies in the 1990s (Nation, 1996, pp. 104–106). Moreover, its lines of communication to the region are long and blocked by natural barriers and other states. Finally, strategic issues in other regions — such as the Caucasus, the Middle East, the Balkans, and Eastern Europe — became more important to Turkey itself, eclipsing the relevance of Central Asia to Turkey’s international agenda (e.g., Çarkoglu and Rubin, 2003; Hale, 2000, p. 295; Mufti, 2002; Sasley, 2001). Compared to these other areas and concerns, as one observer put it, “[i]n no instance may Turkey’s interests in [Central Asia] be described as truly vital” (Nation, 1996, p. 98). Perhaps most representative of Central Asia’s low ranking on the Turkish international agenda is the foreign policy undertaken by the county’s first Islamist prime minister, Necmettin Erbakan, who came to power in June 1996. Committed to an “Islamist” foreign policy, he undertook a number of initiatives designed to enhance ties with other Muslim countries, including creating Islamic international organizations such as the D-8 (an economic grouping of Islamic countries) and an Islamic NATO. But Erbakan paid little attention to Central Asia, despite the fact that these are Muslim states. He focused instead on countries such as Iran and Libya. When touring Asia, he disregarded the region and instead visited Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan (Robins, 1997). None of this is to suggest that Turkey ignores Central Asian affairs. But an array of other foreign policy challenges (e.g., Kirisci, 2006) means a dilution of attention and resources to Central Asia. In this context, Central Asia becomes only one of several competing priorities.

The Future of Turkey’s Relations with Central Asia Commentators have noted the “heavy dose of sentimentality” characterizing Turkey’s initial post-Cold War interactions with Central Asia (Sezer, 1996, p. 86). As suggested, this foreign policy attitude reflected the assumption of a shared identity between Turkey and the

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region. This presumption was enough to drive public rhetoric and expectations and it was also enough to motivate a range of immediate policies toward the region. But it was not enough to sustain a continuing high level of commitment on the part of Turkey, or a high level of demand on the part of the Central Asian states. In addition, Turkey never had the region all to itself, and the renewed interest in regional hydrocarbons guaranteed intense interest by other international actors (Roy, 2000; Rubinstein and Smolansky, 1995). In such a crowded field, Turkey was constrained from asserting its own priorities. This has become more obvious in the 2000s, as both the United States and Russia have become more involved in the region. The catalyst for Washington was 11 September 2001 (Macfarlane, 2004). Before that, US interests in the area were primarily economic (Sasley, 2001, p. 228). Access to energy resources remains pivotal, but the “war on terror” prompted Washington to enter into a number of new security arrangements with Central Asian states. In Russia, the presidency of Vladimir Putin has consolidated a process of renewal of Russian nationalism and aggressive assertion of its right to protect its influence in the near abroad against any perceived encroachments (Tuncer, 2000). Moreover, as Russian–American rivalry has increased over the course of the 2000s, the Central Asian states themselves have been divided over whether they support either party; indeed, some observers argue that they have begun playing the two off against each other in furtherance of their own interests (Bohr, 2004). The future of Central Asia will therefore depend not on Turkey, but on a combination of regional and extra-regional actors. Certainly Turkey continues to be involved in Central Asia. The Ministries of Education and of Culture, in particular, remain active in institutionalizing ties between Turkey and the Turkic republics. Turkish business interests continue to expand in the area. But all of these activities are small and they are not matched by any initiatives in the strategic affairs of the region — which are considered by Central Asian leaders as one of the most important policy areas. For a brief moment in the early 1990s, Central Asia shone as a beacon for a new direction in Turkish foreign policy. In that period it appeared that Turkey might, on a foundation of shared identity, lead

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a process of state-building and regionalization in Central Asia. But as a foreign policy pole, Central Asia has receded from the top priority that it once held, overshadowed by Russian protectionism, Central Asian reluctance, Turkish lack of resources, and the growing importance of other regions to Ankara’s international agency. Thus, Turkey’s role in Central Asia is limited, and there is no reason to expect it would expand in any significant way in the near future.

Related Websites Eurasianet: http://www.eurasianet.org. Foundation for Middle Eastern, Central Asian, and Balkan Studies (OBIV): http://www.obiv.org.tr. International Strategic Research Organization: http://www.usak.org.tr/EN/. Perceptions — a journal of Turkish foreign policy: http://www.sam.gov.tr/ perceptions.php. The Turkey Analyst: http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/ articles/index.shtml. Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation: http://www.tesev.org.tr. Turkish Center for International Relations and Strategic Analysis: http:// www.turksam.org/en/. Umut Foundation: http://www.umut.org.tr/en/home.aspx.

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10

Iran and Central Asia: The Smart Politics of Prudent Pragmatism Pierre Pahlavi and Afshin Hojati

Introduction In the immediate aftermath of the 1979 revolution, Iran remerged as a radical, independent, Islamic, and non-aligned actor on the regional and international scenes. Yet, it was recognizable to most that by the end of the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988), Iran’s foreign policy outlook was undergoing a distinctly pragmatist transformation. Although the pace of change in the country’s domestic politics can be characterized as somewhat slower, after the war, changes in its foreign policy have been indeed substantial (Milani, 2005, pp. 30–36; Hunter, 2003, pp. 133–139; Hunter, 1990; Maleki, 1989). Iran’s increasing pragmatism coincided with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the establishment of the newly independent states of Central Asia. This proved significant and fortunate for Teheran, in so far as its relations with the countries of Central Asia did not experience the Islamic regime’s decade-long revolutionary foreign policy. As this chapter will demonstrate, Iran has been following a rather discrete and pragmatic policy toward Central Asia for the past two decades, including attempts at both bilateral and region-wide initiatives. Although such policies have not established Iran as a hegemonic power in the region, they have nonetheless allowed it to be recognized as a solid economic partner and a credible political interlocutor in the process of regional integration. In the early 1990s, contrary to expectations, Iran had neither the material capability nor the interest 215

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to impose its hegemony on the region through the practice of power politics. Conscious of its disadvantages and fearing further diplomatic isolation, Iran instead has chosen to develop regional ties through the pragmatic exploitation of its geographic, cultural, and economic assets in order to score relatively limited, yet tangible, gains. Even if this policy seems to have produced relatively modest results at first glance, it has nonetheless achieved important objectives. It has assisted Teheran in consolidating its position across the Middle Eastern and Asian theaters and asserting its international presence. As with other major aspects of Iranian foreign policy, Teheran’s Central Asian policy is an integral aspect of the country’s overall strategy. It aims to ensure Iran’s survival, to limit Western interference in its immediate neighborhood, and to make Teheran a trusted partner, on equal footing with other regional and international actors. In illuminating this pattern of “smart politics”, this chapter, first, details the analytical perspectives that permit a constructive engagement with Teheran’s foreign policy (Nye, 2007). Then the investigation examines the evolution of Iran’s Central Asian strategy. This context provides a background for assessing Iran’s impact on the dynamics of statebuilding and regionalization in Central Asia. Finally, the chapter concludes with an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the Iranian approach to the region and charts its possible future trajectories.

The Nature of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Comparative Historical Perspective One of the most important characteristics of Iran’s post-revolutionary foreign policy can be identified as its strong adherence to nonalignment, moving from a close alliance with the West to a staunchly revisionist and anti-American (and to a lesser extent, anti-Soviet) stance. Teheran’s version of non-alignment, “neither East nor West, but Islamic Republic”, was to be understood as the universalization of a republic based on Islamic, and more particularly, Shi’a values and principles. This was indeed a revolutionary outlook because of the ideological threat it posed to the existing regional and world orders (Sadri, 1999, pp. 29–46).

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There is little doubt that Teheran’s immediate post-1979 foreign policy had caused a massive problem in terms of the country’s international relations, reinforcing Iran’s image within the international community as a rogue or pariah state. The experience of the revolution’s first decade taught Iran an important lesson however, one that informs Iranian foreign policy to this day: never again allow yourself to become so internationally isolated and strategically vulnerable (Hilterman, 2005, pp. 151–166). From this lesson arose the need for a prudent and pragmatic foreign policy with a definite emphasis on regional matters. Although Iran tried, as early as 1985, to diversify its trade partners as well as its sources of technology in order to avoid over-dependence on any one foreign power, it was the Rafsanjani presidency (which began in 1989) that officially inaugurated the consolidation of the pragmatist trend, and the gradual “de-Arabization” of Iranian foreign policy (Maleki, 1989, p. 348; Rakel, 2007). The growing interest in regionalism and multilateralism, including Teheran–Moscow and Teheran–Beijing commercial and military relations, thus acquired particular significance (Maleki, 2007). In other words, Iran has tried to counterbalance some of its weaknesses due to the absence of relations with the United States by developing close ties with other major and emerging powers. Thus, the former rigidity of Iran’s global outlook imposed by its non-alignment philosophy gave way to a much more “realist” policy characterized as “both North and South” (Ramazani, 1992, pp. 393–412). In fact, Iran’s gravitation toward pragmatism traces its origins in Khomeini’s major fatwa (a religious edict) issued shortly before his death in 1989. Having witnessed the disastrous effects of overtly idealistic and ideologically driven domestic and foreign policies during the 1980s — many of which of his own making — in 1988 Khomeini tipped the balance in favor of state and national security at the expense of ideology. He issued a fatwa upholding that “the state, which has the full delegated authority of the Prophet takes precedence over other Islamic regulations, even prayer and pilgrimage”, and can even abrogate one of the five pillars of Islam if it is deemed necessary to safeguard Iran (Akhavi, 1992, p. 524). The shift in foreign policy became clearer when Teheran stood on the

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sidelines during the Persian Gulf War of 1991. Furthermore, “Iran maintained its neutrality even during the mini-civil war that erupted in Iraq after its expulsion from Kuwait. While the Iraqi army slaughtered defiant Shiites, Iran, like the US-led coalition, remained silent. That silence was the symbolic burial of the revolutionary phase of Iranian foreign policy” (Milani, 2005, pp. 30–36). Had the Thermidor put an end to the revolutionary decade? Despite the overall shift in Teheran’s global outlook in favor of pragmatism, Iranian foreign policy has remained difficult to discern clearly, and the fundamentals of its strategy do not readily conform to any of the conventional theoretical frameworks (Dizboni, 2008). On the one hand, the Iranian Constitution sets the stage for a confrontational policy vis-à-vis the United States and Israel, and the ties developed within the past 30 years with revisionist countries around the globe provide further evidence for the identification of Teheran as an international pariah. On the other hand, there is little doubt that Iranian foreign policy, at least as of 1989, has indeed followed a prudent and pragmatic path (Pahlavi, 2008a). Is it thus not more appropriate to characterize the ideological and pragmatic elements of Iran’s foreign policy as constituting two sides of the same coin? After all, Iran may not be so different from other states that have the relative potential and capability to reach outside their frontiers. Iran, therefore — like the United States, Russia, France, Britain, China, and others — is compelled to realistically balance its material interests with its ideational and ideological values. In this regard, Iran is hardly an exception. Interestingly enough, some theoretical models, informed by the realist tradition, allow for the explanation of the seemingly “contradictory” elements of the Iranian foreign policy that tend to oscillate between ideological and pragmatic logics. One such model has been put forth by Stephen Walt, according to which the Iranian Revolution, like the French and the Russian Revolutions, pursued a revolutionary and anti-status quo foreign policy for a number of years. Despite the intensity of the disruptions that they cause, and the changes that they bring in the regional and sometimes international balance of power, revolutionary regimes are gradually “re-socialized”

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into the international system and tend to return to their more “traditional” concerns of territorial integrity, regional influence, and the preservation of status quo (Walt, 1996, p. 43). This tendency has also been identified as a revolutionary regime’s Thermidor characterizing the return to some sort of “business as usual” (Brinton, 1963, pp. 205–235). Yet, in his ground-breaking work on the anatomy of revolutions, Brinton had referred to Russia as a case demonstrating aspects of a “permanent revolution” where, in contrast to the American and French Revolutions, the nature of the Thermidor was open to question and debate (Brinton, 1963, pp. 225–235). Here again parallels may be drawn with the case of Iran, which, because of the sheer complexity of the regime in power, its ideological underpinnings, the regions of which it is a part, and its relations with the world’s only remaining superpower, does not readily lend itself to quick generalizations. The logic of Iran’s foreign policy can also be approached through the analytical model of Goldgeier and McFaul (2001, pp. 1–26), which considers the international system as being composed of two co-existing worlds: the liberal core and the realist periphery. Although the two worlds are not disconnected from one another, and may in some cases (as in Europe for instance) engage in a dynamic interaction, in the Middle East and Central Asia a more comprehensive variant of realism may prove to be the most useful paradigm for understanding foreign policy dynamics. Located in a Hobbesian world of the “realist periphery” where Russia, China, and Pakistan interact far away from the postmodern considerations of the “liberal core” of Western powers, Iran mainly follows the dictates of realism — whereby religion and ideology (or soft politics) are employed as yet another tool in the overall project of maximizing national interests through the establishment of a zone of influence in the Middle East and Central Asia. Thus, Iranian foreign policy should be understood first and foremost as a pragmatic and realist enterprise, coupled with a set of ideological motivations and underpinnings that, when combined, give way to the Iranian model of “smart power”, or the “ability to combine hard and soft power into a successful strategy” (Nye, 2007).

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Iran’s prudent pragmatism results from its unique geo-strategic location, a factor that also explains the priority given to the development of its regional relations (Maleki, 2007). Of course, Teheran’s relations with the countries of the region cannot solely be understood in terms of geopolitics. The linkage politics is of importance here because Iran’s quest for greater interdependence in the economic domain is not only limited to its aspiration, in the medium and long term, that with interdependence comes eventually peace. Iran’s internal dynamics, realities, and needs, on the one hand, and its tense relations with the West, on the other hand, compel it to look elsewhere for economic cooperation, trade, and investment. The economic incentives for regionalization have been, from the very beginning of the Central Asian countries’ independence, a high priority for Iranian leaders and policymakers (Ramazani, 1992, pp. 393–411).

Does Iran Walk the Walk? The regional policies pursued by the Iranian regime in the past 30 years seem to confirm the validity of these theoretical approaches. Ever since the Islamic Revolution, Teheran’s regime has demonstrated a decision-making behavior characteristic of entrapment, intensely motivated by the logic of survival. In this respect, the issue of Iran’s agency in its immediate neighborhood goes to the heart of the articulation of its national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Aware of its relative weakness in relation to other international actors, Iran’s overall posture toward its external environment has demanded a strategy of balancing. Whereas during the 1980s, Teheran had chosen the strategy of domestic balancing — that is, the consolidation of the state apparatus and mobilization of resources to defend the country from external aggression — during the 1990s it made a conscious move at international balancing (Walt, 2005, p. 120). This shift has, however, met a set of complications due to the fact that no other country in the region shares Iran’s particular vulnerabilities, especially vis-à-vis Washington. Thus, Teheran’s attempts at balancing have increasingly become centered on the need to expand cooperation with other major powers as well as the countries in the region

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(Herzig, 2004, pp. 503–517). Thereafter, regional and international organizations began to establish themselves as a major preoccupation of Iranian leaders and policymakers. The emergence of the post-Cold War world order acted as a catalyst, accelerating the policy of détente that had been envisaged and pursued by the Rafsanjani administration soon after he took office in 1989. Realpolitik has thus continued to shape Iranian foreign policy in the 1990s as reflected by Teheran’s attempts to drive a “grand bargain” (modeled on the Yalta agreement between Churchill and Stalin) aiming to establish Iran as a legitimate “regional power”. By the beginning of Khatami’s presidency, in 1997, the shift in the fundamentals of the regime’s global outlook had become evident to most. Khatami’s conception of the international system was very different from Khomeini’s, representing a significant change from the first revolutionary decade. For Khomeini, the Islamic Umma (community of believers) constituted the political community and the basic unit, and as such, the international system, along with its rules and norms, could legitimately be rejected, even destroyed. For Khatami, on the other hand, the Umma was more of a cultural community, while the nation-state was the most relevant unit. Consequently, the system in place lends itself to criticism, but the fundamentals of the international system are not rejected. This is important for the evolution of Iran’s foreign relations because whereas Khomeini’s conception of international politics led Iran to a head-on collision with the international community, Khatami’s political philosophy was geared toward further détente and conciliation (Mozaffari, 1999, pp. 9–28). Fully aware of the notion that Iran could not engage the United States on purely geostrategic and “materialist” grounds, Khatami nevertheless managed to reinforce the realist turn of Iranian foreign policy through the twin themes of “tension reduction” (Tashanojzedai) and a “dialog of civilizations”. On the one hand, he knew that the key to Iran’s re-integration into the international community lay in Iran’s ability to portray itself as a constructive and responsible actor, while engaging the West by appealing to the postmaterial values that it cherishes (Ansari, 2006, pp. 155–170). On the other hand, he left no doubt about his will to reduce Western influence

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in Iran’s region — declaring, for instance, during a tour in Central Asia that “our nations have the right to resolve their problems on their own and decide for themselves what is good or bad for them” (Recknagel, 2002). Like his predecessor, President Khatami combined this realist approach with a strong emphasis on the regional character of Iranian foreign policy. Khatami’s minister of foreign affairs stated, in his first address to the UN General Assembly in 1997, that “[our] highest foreign policy priority… is to strengthen trust and confidence and peace in our immediate neighbourhood” (Maleki, 2007). President Ahmadinejad and his minister of foreign affairs, Manucher Mottaki, have continued to follow this direction in foreign policy. During a recent visit to Kaboul, Iranian Vice-President Ali Saeedlou reaffirmed that the promotion of security and cooperation with regional states was a priority of Iran’s foreign policy (Tehran Times, 2008a). The realist variant outlined above is indeed very appropriate for understanding Iran’s motivations toward Central Asia. With the exception of a very short period in the early 1990s, immediately after the disintegration of the Soviet Union — when most experts expected a political vacuum as a result of the Russian decline — Iran’s overall approach with regards to Central Asian states (CAS) has been discrete, prudent, very pragmatic, and “remarkably free of ideological influence” (Maleki, 2007). It did not take long before Iran realized that it did not possess the resources required to assert itself as the dominant player in Central Asia (Hunter, 2003, pp. 133–134). Given the limited capabilities of the Iranian regime, it tried to make the most of its economic and cultural assets in order to serve its interests and extend its regional influence, especially in the face of an adverse regional context that exposed Iran to both important opportunities and dangerous vulnerabilities. The highest priority of Iran vis-à-vis the region has been to safeguard its security and promote its economic interests (Atal, 2003). The need for stability and predictability in its immediate neighborhood explains why Iran’s Central Asian policy is largely driven by the desire to accommodate Russia (Fairbanks et al., 2001, pp. 73–77), an approach that may have been

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costly in the short term but allowed Iran to secure strategic benefits in the longer run (Hunter, 2003, pp. 141–142). In many respects, the cautious Iranian strategy with regards to Central Asia conforms to the “prudential-realist model”, which is quite effective in describing the political and security dynamics characteristic of Central Asian affairs (Paul, 2000, pp. 14–34). This prudential realism is exemplified by Iran’s refusal to provide military assistance to Islamist forces during the civil war in Tajikistan (1992–1997) or by its decision to maintain friendly relations with Tashkent despite Uzbekistan’s discriminatory policy vis-à-vis its Persian-speaking minority, including the banning of Tajik language schools in 2001. Iran’s strategy vis-à-vis Central Asia truly reveals the secondary role of ideological considerations. Naturally, one must proceed with caution in order to avoid overgeneralizations and the tendency to overstretch “mainstream” theories to fit the cases under study. For example, an adequate understanding of the political dynamics of the Middle East and Central Asia is rendered more cumbersome due to the constant interaction of the national, international, and transnational factors such as cross-cutting ethno-cultural solidarities and religious cleavages (Dizboni and Pahlavi, 2007). Yet the region as a whole does not constitute an exception, and mainstream theories, as we shall see, do contribute to a better understanding of Iran’s role in Central Asia.

The Evolution of Iran’s Interests and Objectives in Central Asia Relations between Iran and the newly independent states of Central Asia developed swiftly after the collapse of the Soviet Union. These relations reflected common interests, ethno-cultural affinities, and the geostrategic particularities of the region. For the newly independent states of Central Asia, Iran represented an important partner in their attempts at integration in the world economy (Dannreuther, 2003, pp. 39–43). Iran, for its part, needed to develop relations with its new neighbors in order to ensure its security, political, and economic

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interests. Iran therefore developed a markedly pragmatic regional policy — a far cry from the supposedly ideologically driven behavior often ascribed to it. At the core of Iran’s interests in the various processes of regionalization, or its bilateral and multilateral relations with the countries in the greater region, was the strong belief in the region’s self-reliance, and thus, in the exclusion of extra-regional powers (Herzig, 2004, pp. 503–517). Wishing to take advantage of its historical connection to the region and the vacuum caused by the Soviet collapse, Iran initially aimed at establishing a region-wide Islamic coalition of states that could act as a strategic shield, safeguarding Iran from foreign (especially American) encroachment or encirclement. Yet Iran soon realized that this strategy of exporting its radical Shi’a model proved ineffective in Central Asia, which is largely composed of Turkic-speaking Sunni Muslims. Iran quickly found that it did not have the material capabilities to assert and project itself as the dominant actor within the region. Hemmed in by the Persian Gulf, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, Teheran found itself in a precarious geopolitical position during the 1990s — a position which constrained it to adopting a realist and circumspect foreign policy putting primary emphasis on Iran’s survival, rather than in the export of its religion-based model of governance. Besides the growing regional activity of rivals such as Turkey (Pahlavi, 2004), Iran faced growing pressure from the United States, which, from the beginning of the 1990s, set out to counter Teheran’s regional outreach — notably in Afghanistan, where the growth of the Taliban movement may have even been encouraged as a means of countering Iranian influence in Central Asia (Mackenzie, 1993, pp. 90–103). In this uncomfortable context, Iranian leaders chose to develop a more prudent Central Asian policy, symbolized by the notion of “siasat-e dast-e gol”, or the policy of “a handful of flowers” (Halliday, 1995, p. 222). Iran’s decision to promote its historic and cultural links, rather than Islam alone, at the center of its relations with Central Asian states was among the symptoms of this shift toward prudence. Since this period, “Iranian conceptions of regionalism generally attach importance to culture both as a defining feature and

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as a basis for cooperation” (Herzig, 2004, pp. 503–517). The events of 11 September 2001, and the subsequent American and NATO incursions in Afghanistan and Central Asia — initiating what may be called Central Asia’s “strategic revolution” — brought about an additional deterioration of Iran’s security environment (Blank, 2003, pp. 51–76, 269–277). The new environment confirmed in the minds of Iranian leaders the wisdom in pursuing a prudent and pragmatic regional strategy. Over the course of the last three decades, the formulation of Teheran’s Central Asian policy has thus largely been driven by a security situation which, while evolving, has remained consistently inhospitable. In this context, Iranian policy toward Central Asia has been articulated around several key objectives: •

•

•

First, Iran’s Central Asian policy is geared toward the “decontainment” of the country: to counterbalancing the geopolitical pressure exerted on it, and to increasing, be it discretely, its regional influence, while securing for itself a number of concrete gains. The latter include the development of fruitful political and economic relations with the states of the region, especially in the domain of energy. Second, Teheran’s gains in the Central Asia are likely affect the broader Eurasian and Middle Eastern scenes — in particularly, allowing it to curtail Western interference in Iran’s neighborhood (eventually providing it with a cordon sanitaire, or a strategic shield). Third, one of the most constant and enduring themes in Iran’s foreign policy outlook has been the assertion of its “rightful” place in various regional arrangements in its neighborhood, which in turn allows Teheran to demand limits on foreign influence within them (Kupchan, 2005, pp. 106–110). In other words, Iran’s Central Asian policy is not an end in itself, but is rather one facet of a broader approach to external affairs, which assists the “grand strategy” of Iranian power (Pahlavi, 2008a, b). Yet despite its ambitions, Iran’s strategy remains discrete, underpinned by the logic of prudent pragmatism.

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Conscious of its limited relative capabilities and the steady opposition from Western powers, Iran is not keen on imposing itself as a classical hegemonic power in the region. Without necessarily compromising its regional ambitions, the Islamic regime has nonetheless accepted to moderate and at times to reformulate these ambitions into a more pragmatic and cautious framework in order to be identified as a more important economic and cultural partner. So far the imperative of prudent pragmatism has led Iran to operate within the Russian shadow, taking care not to cross Russian sensibilities. Iran also actively uses its principal assets — ethno-cultural kinship with the region, geostrategic positioning, and vast natural resources — in order to achieve its foreign policy objectives. This is why Iran’s Central Asian policy is more geared toward development and trade, rather than political or military domination.

Iranian Strategy in Central Asia Iran’s pragmatic approach toward Central Asia rests on a multifaceted strategy. As such, an adequate understanding of Teheran’s role in the region warrants the examination of three critical domains of its foreign policy activity: (1) a strategy based on the development of bilateral economic and political relations with various Central Asian capitals; (2) a strategy toward the development of regional infrastructure capacities of which “pipeline politics” is an essential part; and (3) a strategy of regional integration pursued through the establishment of multilateral organizations such as the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The following sections discuss those in turn.

Bilateral relations Iran’s attempts to exert influence beyond its northern flanks — given its perceived status by many international actors in the 1980s and early 1990s as a pariah state — have constituted one of the most important aspects of its overall Central Asian policy. Realizing the enormity of the challenges, the country faced in terms of its dire

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economic situation and severe diplomatic isolation, and as a result of continued American hostility, Iran’s attempts at reintegration into the international community were to be spearheaded by important breakthroughs in its bilateral relations with neighboring countries, serving both its short-term interests through the stimulation of trade as well as its medium- and long-term interests as confidence-building measures to further improve Iran’s political and security imperatives in the region. As such, Teheran has actively sought to develop closer ties with Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, through a series of ad-hoc initiatives.

Turkmenistan Iran’s relations with Turkmenistan have been particularly fruitful with the two countries pursuing policies of accommodation and security neutrality (Herzig, 2001, p. 187). President Khatami’s first state visit was to Turkmenistan, underscoring its significance Iran. The two countries have had extensive cooperation in the energy sector as well as strategic transportation links and pipelines; they have signed 10 bilateral documents, including 57 interstate agreements (Fars News Agency, 2008). The trade turnover between them amounted to more than $1.3 billion in 2006, $1.9 billion in 2007, and nearly $2.5 billion for the first 10 months of 2008 — making Iran, Turkmenistan’s second-largest trading partner (IRNA, 2008a).

Tajikistan With Tajikistan, too, relations have improved in recent years, as the two states share a common cultural and linguistic background. By October 2008, bilateral trade between Iran and Tajikistan had increased 350 percent from its 2007 figures (Tehran Times, 2008b). During the 2008 visit of the president of Tajikistan to Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad renewed Iran’s commitment to building a new hydroelectric station, while work already undertaken on the Sangtuda-2 Station, due for completion in 2009, was set to further accelerate (McDermott, 2008). During the same visit both leaders

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also spoke about extending their bilateral relations to the defence and security domains, with Tajikistan supporting Iran’s accession to the SCO (China News, 2008; IRNA, 2008b).

Uzbekistan Iran has also tried to improve relations with Uzbekistan, Central Asia’s most populous country, given that relations have not always been smooth between the two countries. Uzbekistan’s endorsement of American initiatives at containing Iran, its overt willingness to cooperate with the United States in security matters, and its meddling in the affairs of Tajikistan (which Teheran has characterized as “imperialist”) had all contributed to a problematic relationship between the two countries (Mesbahi, 2004, pp. 109–139). But the Uzbek–American “partnership” has lost much of its substance — especially after 2005, when the Uzbek government asked Washington to withdraw its troops from the country. Since then, the relations between Uzbekistan and Iran have been improving gradually. The trade volume between the two countries stood at $650 million in 2008 and it might reach $1 billion by the beginning of the next decade. Iran constitutes Uzbekistan’s sixth largest economic partner and Uzbekistan is viewed by Iranian officials as constituting a great potential market for Iranian goods, given its large population (27 million) and its common cultural heritage with Iran (Tehran Times, 2008a).

Kyrgyzstan Overall, Iran’s perceived constructive role in opposing the Taliban in Afghanistan and its contribution to ending the civil war in Tajikistan have won Iran recognition in Central Asia. One such government is that of Kyrgyzstan, whose deteriorating relations with Washington have coincided with Bishkek’s intensification of its relations with Teheran. Kyrgyzstan has demonstrated a growing interest in further improving relations with Iran by establishing bilateral relations (McDermott, 2007a).

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Kazakhstan Iran’s relations with Kazakhstan have also improved significantly in recent years. Astana has indicated willingness to engage in oil swaps with Teheran — as a way of circumventing Iran’s exclusion from energy transit routes. This is a mutually beneficial arrangement that, although limited in quantity, may contribute to the promotion of further economic cooperation (Mesbahi, 2004, pp. 109–139). For instance the trade volume between Iran and Kazakhstan in 2005 amounted to a mere $700 million, which grew to $2.1 billion in 2006, and nearly $3 billion in 2007. Yerik Utembayev, the Kazakh ambassador to Teheran, has suggested that achieving a trade volume of $10 billion is not that far in the future (IRNA, 2008c). In this respect, Iran’s engagement of Central Asian states through bilateral arrangements has been met with a modicum of success (Hunter, 2003). On the one hand, further economic cooperation has been hampered by structural problems within the Iranian economy — its over dependence on oil and gas. On the other hand, some of these problems derive from the idiosyncrasies of the Central Asian region, which hamper the establishment of a free trade area or the pursuit of tariff reduction measures (Pomfret, 1997, pp. 657–668). Yet despite many challenges, and in the face of stiff competition from Russia, Turkey, China, and Western countries, Iran remains an important trading partner for Central Asian countries.

Infrastructure, pipeline politics, roads, and railway networks The second overall aspect of Iran’s strategy in the region is the development of large-scale infrastructure projects — mainly pipelines, roads, and railway systems. Teheran expects that such infrastructure projects would not only connect Central Asia to the rest of the world through Iran, but that they would also transform Iran into the unavoidable hub for the exploitation and the transport of energy (thus, eschewing American efforts for its isolation).

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In this respect, Iran has heavily invested in its railroad network in an attempt to establish itself as an economically viable route for Russian, Central Asian, and Chinese goods destined for international markets via the Persian Gulf. In 2004, for example, it completed the 1,000-km Baqf–Mashhad railroad, which reduced the rail journey from Central Asia to the Persian Gulf by two days (Kucera, 2006). Such projects have also been extended to Turkmenistan, the only Central Asian state sharing a land border with Iran. Iran and Uzbekistan have also concluded an agreement signed by the national railway companies of both countries in 2008, aiming at the promotion of container transit in Central Asia (Press TV, 2008). Iran’s engagement in “pipeline politics” complements its efforts at promoting socio-economic prosperity and political stability in Central Asia. It is through the establishment of a region-wide pipeline system that Iran could mostly benefit from its unique geostrategic location bridging Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, and the Persian Gulf. This geopolitical zone has been referred to as “Pipelineistan” due to the extensive network of natural gas and oil pipelines that have been established across the region (Blanche, 2008, pp. 22–25). Iran possesses nearly 16 percent of the world’s natural gas reserves — second only to Russia — and yet its share of the world gas market is negligible as a result of the 1996 American Iran–Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), which had driven away the much-needed foreign investment in the outdated (and mostly undeveloped) Iranian gas fields. In order to achieve its objectives, Iran is engaged in the construction of a number of projects. The Korpeje–Kurtkui, Central Asia’s only gas pipeline not running through Russian territory, exports Turkmen natural gas to Iran, while the Balkanabat–Aliabad grid exports Turkmen electricity to Turkey via Iran. Other plans include the Iran–Pakistan–India pipeline (IPI), a very ambitious ($7.5 billion) program sponsored by Teheran that would connect Iran to India via Pakistan through a 2,600-km gas pipeline. If the IPI project were to be realized, Iran would join the greatest players in the international energy market, a position that has so far been out of its reach (Djalili and Kellner, 2006, pp. 73–103). Demonstrating Iran’s impatience for the realization of the project, Teheran has already

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completed its stretch of the 48-inch diameter pipeline (Blanche, 2008, pp. 22–25). Faced with India’s hesitance on the construction of the pipeline, Iran and Pakistan chose to proceed with construction on a bilateral basis, while Iran’s oil minister called on India to be more active in the project (Middle East Times, 2008). China, meanwhile, is willing to take India’s place if New Delhi backs down from its commitments. Some have argued that an Iran–Pakistan–China pipeline is more likely to be established than the IPI project (Stratfor, 2008). At the same time, the prospects of Iran tapping into its own huge gas reserves may only be a matter of time. With continued problems affecting the delivery of Russian natural gas and oil to European countries, Iran may be well considered as an alternative pipeline route. Thus, given Iran’s exceptional geographical location and geostrategic importance for world energy, an integral aspect of Teheran’s Central Asian policy has focused on pipeline politics, more specifically on the promotion and construction of a vast pipeline network for oil and gas to link the landlocked nations of Central Asia to international markets. However, Iran’s success or failure in this valuable sector, at least to an important extent, is based on factors beyond its immediate control. As commentators have pointed out, “new competing national interests have produced tensions over fuel prices, transit fees and more generally over the vast energy resources and transmission corridors of the former Soviet Union, with economically detrimental and often irrational consequences” (Kandiyoti, 2008, pp. 75–93).

Regional integration As already suggested, regional integration and multilateralism have been constituent ingredients of Iran’s foreign policy as indicated by Teheran’s involvement in various regional and international organizations. Iran’s interest in promoting regional cooperation in Central Asia “raises the political profile of Iran in the region, displaying a side of Teheran not often reported in the West; namely, as a country interested in active cooperation within international organizations”

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(McDermott, 2008). If Iran is acknowledged as a constructive, legitimate, and responsible actor across the region, it would be much more difficult for the United States to continue with its containment policies against Teheran. The following sections detail Iran’s attempts to enmesh Central Asia through the regional framework provided by the ECO and the SCO.

Economic Cooperation Organization The ECO was created in 1985 by Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey as an intergovernmental organization aiming to advance and promote economic, technical, and cultural cooperation among the member states. In 1992, with the emergence on the international scene of the newly independent countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus, the Muslim republics solicited Iran’s help and support for their membership in an expanded ECO. Iran pursued with enthusiasm the accession of all Central Asian states into ECO. The main goals of the organization include the enhancement of trade within the region, the removal of impediments and problems in transit trade, the further integration of the Central Asian states to the global economy, and increasing cooperation in the exploitation of natural resources and energy (Herzig, 2004, pp. 503–517). The Economic Cooperation Organization’s Trade Agreement (ECOTA), signed on 17 July 2003 in Islamabad, was a step toward removing the barriers that have historically impeded further economic cooperation and trade between members. The extension of ECO membership to the former Soviet republics of Central Asia and the opportunity provided by the Caucasus to these countries to diversify their trading partners, to reduce their historical economic dependency on Russia, and to connect with markets to the West and South such as Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. For Iran, the benefits of an expanded and strong ECO included reduction of its isolation within the region, a step forward in its attempts to break free from American containment, and integration of Iran into the world economy. Not only is regional integration important because of its mediumand long-term stabilizing force within the region as a whole, but

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more specifically, it would help consolidate Iran’s position as an efficient and viable energy transit route from the landlocked countries of Central Asia. In 2000, the member states of ECO demonstrated their interest for further cooperation in the energy sector by establishing alternative pipelines. This was welcomed by Teheran since it hoped that ECO would provide the legal framework through which American companies could bypass ILSA limitations and invest in Iran’s energy sector (Afrasiabi, 2000). However, despite the enormous potential in the region for economic cooperation, ECO has not lived up to expectations. Shortcomings have been caused by the lack of appropriate transit infrastructure, limited financial resources, the sheer number of cross-cutting regional groupings (CIS, GUAM, SCO, etc.), and, of course, the rivalry between Iran and Turkey within the ECO, itself (Afrasiabi and PourJalili, 2001, pp. 62–79). Although ECO has not gotten the scholarly attention that it deserves, it does hold a great potential for the future of economic and security relations in Central Asia. If ECO has not been a definite success story so far, it has certainly not been a failure. Indeed, one could argue that none of the regional organizations and institutions that have been set up in the aftermath of the Soviet disintegration can be characterized as undeniable success stories. The region as a whole faces many challenges intimately tied to the emergence of the nascent, and thus vulnerable, states in Central Asia. Viewed in this context, Iran’s attempts at forging greater regional cooperation through ECO have contributed to the establishment of a regional organization that holds much potential for the future, and has, at the very least, created a medium through which disagreements among members can be limited to the negotiating table (Herzig, 2004, pp. 503–517). ECO has allowed Iran to remain engaged in Central Asia by providing Teheran with the opportunity to have a say, in tandem with the other member states of ECO, in shaping the future of the region.

Shanghai Cooperation Organization The development and implications of SCO for Central Asia are discussed at length in Chap. Six. Iran’s interest in the organization derives from

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the geostrategic advantages that its membership can offer Teheran. Alongside India, Pakistan, and Mongolia, Iran has an observer status in SCO. During the 2006 summit, for example, $2 billion in contracts were signed between both member and observer states, with bilateral trade receiving more attention and substance than region-wide, multilateral initiatives. Experts note that bilateral talks between Teheran, Beijing, and New Dehli have been dominated by issues such as the development of the Yadavarn oil field in Iran or Iranian supply of liquefied gas to China and India (Norling and Swanström, 2007a, pp. 429–444; de Haas, 2007, pp. 246–259). Yet despite the huge potential in the further development of SCO and a move from merely bilateral to multilateral economic cooperation, so far SCO’s successes are modest. According to Alexander Lukin, “one must admit that not a single project has reached the stage of implementation yet. All reports by ministers in charge of economic cooperation only enlist bilateral or (much less often) multilateral projects, which in fact are related to SCO only because its members participate in them” (Lukin, 2007, pp. 1–12). Teheran submitted an official application for membership in April 2007 and reapplied for full membership on 24 March 2008. This determination demonstrates the urgency of Iran’s desire to join an institutionalized alliance. Whatever Iran’s other economic, political, and security benefits, becoming a full SCO member would assist its attempts at decontainment and its quest for regional influence (Pahlavi, 2008a). Full Iranian membership in SCO would further improve its attempts at staying relevant in Eurasian matters, would reduce American efforts at its containment and marginalization, and would increase its influence in the promotion and development of multilateralism within the wider region.

Iranian Strategy: Success or Failure? It is difficult to give a clear-cut appraisal of Teheran’s agency in Central Asia. On the one hand, it can be argued that Iran’s approach to the region has been a failure, because Teheran has not been able

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to assert itself as the dominant Central Asian actor. Yet, to base our criteria of success or failure on Iran’s not having achieved preponderance in the region is to ascribe to Iran ambitions that it never really entertained. Conscious of its strengths and vulnerabilities, Teheran deliberately chose to implement a strategy of prudent pragmatism that would increase the credibility of its actorness in Central Asia. In this respect, the appraisal of Iran’s agency in the region focuses on two aspects: (1) Teheran’s contribution to the dynamics of statebuilding in Central Asia; and (2) Iran’s impact on the processes of regionalization.

Iran’s impact on state-building Within the perceived rivalry between Iran and Turkey, the Turkish model seems to have been more desirable to the ex-Soviet republics than the Iranian one. During the immediate post-independence period, Iran perceived itself as the rightful model for the political transition of the Central Asian states. Aware of Teheran’s ambitions, both Washington and European capitals promoted Ankara’s secular governance as a version of the Western model that might be applicable to the Central Asian context (Ahrari and Beal, 1996, pp. 62–66). Influenced by decades of Soviet rule and centuries of authoritarian rule, the new leaders of the Central Asian states identified more closely with the secular, centralized, and top-down Kemalist model than they did with Iran’s (Lipovsky, 1996, pp. 211–223). In Kazakhstan, for example, despite Moscow’s influence, Turkey has maintained a healthy relationship through its cultural ties — an indication that Astana prefers to engage more closely with a secular state, on the basis of linguistic solidarity, rather than a Persian-speaking Islamic entity such as Iran (Hunter, 1996b, pp. 313–316). The relative failure of Iran in exporting its social model can partly be explained by its reticence to engage in an ideologically driven foreign policy specially if this means relying on the pre-Islamic heritage of the Central Asian region (Hunter, 2003, p. 145). However, one should not underestimate the discrete initiatives that

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Iran has recently unveiled as part of its cultural policy toward Central Asia. The best example of this is the newly created regional grouping of Persian-speaking states, which comprises Iran, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan. Started as a purely cultural project, this grouping is progressively expanding to cover socio-economic development, regional security issues (notably anti-drug and counter-terrorism efforts), as well as cooperation in technical and military domains (Pahlavi, 2008a). In the future, Iran may also use such a political grouping as an opportunity to strengthen its regional position by, inter alia, membership of SCO.

Iran’s impact on regionalization A major impediment for regionalism in Central Asia is the economic factor. The countries’ economies are not complementary to the point that would allow for a functional division of labor to take place based on the notion of comparative advantage. The planning of a region-wide division of labor is fraught with difficulties as states fear losing more than they can gain, a condition that has so far hindered ECO’s efforts at increasing economic cooperation. On the regional scale, if the pursuit of bilateral agreements tends to be more advantageous to the stronger party, institutionalized multilateralism favors the weaker side. Iran’s interests are best served in region-wide initiatives and agreements. The best indication of this trend can be seen in Iran’s difficulties over the legal regime of the Caspian Sea. Whereas Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and, to a lesser extent, Turkmenistan stood to gain more by proceeding in bilateral negotiations with one another, Iran’s share of the Caspian has been reduced to a mere 12 or 13 percent. As noted earlier, because no other country in the region shares Iran’s particular security concerns, Teheran has been forced to emphasize its economic, political, and cultural ties with the countries of the region (Herzig, 2004, p. 189), promoting regional cooperation and various processes of regionalization as guarantors of its influence in a safer and more stable region.

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Conclusion This chapter has argued that for the foreseeable future, Teheran will likely maintain its multifaceted approach to Central Asia through smart politics — a combination of hard and soft foreign policy instruments. The region is an area in which Iran will continue to invest in order to gain economic, political, and security advantages. Iran’s international relations with other regions reveal that it is a very patient player. It would seem that Teheran has learned — perhaps the hard way — that it stands to gain most by staying the course rather than engaging in erratic policymaking. Thus, unlike those who claim that Iran has lost the game for the dominance of Central Asia, this chapter has demonstrated that such a conclusion has no relevance if Iran’s performance is to be judged according to its proclaimed policy choices and its actions. Of course, Iran is far from occupying the dominant position within the region. But no country has yet come out as the dominant force — a prospect that seems increasingly unlikely given the number of international actors who are engaged in the so-called “great game”. A number of factors have convinced Iranian leaders to reduce their expectations and move closer to a position of prudent pragmatism. That is why Iran’s Central Asian policy is geared, first and foremost, toward the promotion and establishment of bilateral trade, infrastructure development, and, last but not least, the process of regionalization. It is in this light that Iran’s ambitions toward Central Asia should be understood. This is how Teheran envisages integrating itself to the Central Asian economic systems and the global markets. According to some observers, “the most critical aspect of Iranian relations with the Central Asian republics, in the immediate future, will remain Iran’s persistent efforts to increase regional integration and control of energy resources, through the establishment of pipeline networks traversing Iranian territories” (Khan, 2004, pp. 45–56). In this new world, Iran may rightly be considered as the “center of the universe”, as it will no doubt continue on its path toward greater creation of wealth, infrastructural development, and the promotion of cooperation and multilateralism. In contrast, it stands to gain nothing by

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engaging in plans for the political and military domination of the region, which will by all means meet a strong opposition from all the other players involved. On the political front, Iran is certainly not the politically dominant country of the region, but it has indeed proven itself as an unavoidable and credible interlocutor. In line with its historical place in Central Asia, Iran will continue to play an important and decisive role toward the political stability of the region as a whole, something in which it has a vital stake. Iran is already an important actor on the Middle Eastern scene and Afghanistan, with its power and influence growing in a number of countries; there should be no reason why Iran would not be able to occupy the same position in Central Asia (Pahlavi, 2008b). One of Teheran’s advantages is its cordial relationship with Russia and, to a lesser extent, China. The Russia–China–Iran axis may grow in significance in the near future. In this respect, Iran has “contributed to the regional stability” of Central Asia, “and it will continue to do so” (Milani, 2006) — just as it has done for the past century.

Related Websites Central Asian Institute: https://www.ikat.org/. Institute for Political and International Studies (Iran): http://www.ipis.ir/ English/index.htm. International Institute for Caspian Studies (Iran): http://www.caspian studies.com/. Iranian Journal of International Affairs: http://www.theiranianjournalofinternationalaffairs.org/. Iranian News, Information, and Research Center: http://www.iras.ir/English/. Institute for War and Peace Reporting: http://www.iwpr.net/?apc_ state=henprca. Jamestown Foundation: http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/.

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11

India and Central Asia: The No Influence of the “Look North” Policy Emilian Kavalski

Introduction During a visit to Turkmenistan in September 1995, the then Prime Minister PV Narasimha Rao made it clear that “for India”, Central Asia is an area “of high priority, where we aim to stay engaged far into the future. We are an independent partner with no selfish motives. We only desire honest and open friendship and to promote stability and cooperation without causing harm to any third country” (cited in Muni, 2003, p. 110). Rao’s proclamation offers a glimpse at the discursive genesis of the “Look North” policy — the discursive framework of India’s relations with Central Asia. As its appellation suggests, the “Look North” policy strives to emulate the logic and achievements of India’s “Look East” approach to Southeast Asia (Devare, 2006, p. 28). The evaluation of New Delhi’s agency in Central Asia attests to the regionalization of India’s foreign policy — i.e., the development of distinct external policies toward different global regions. In this respect, the discourses of India’s external relations offer insights into the country’s international identity. For instance, the propositions of the “Look North” policy point to “secularism”, “democracy”, and “literacy” as “national strengths” that India and Central Asia share (Sinha, 2004, p. 6). Such a framing is then taken as an indication that India has a “strategic will” (Bal, 2004, p. 35).

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The chapter reveals that for the better part of the 1990s, India’s foreign policy formulation has remained in the grips of conceptual tensions, strategic uncertainty, and geopolitical constraints. These diplomatic predicaments reflect New Delhi’s difficulties with adjusting to the patterns of the post-bipolar world order. It will be explained shortly that this perception seems to have changed as a result of the May 1998 nuclear tests. Their detonations appear to reveal a discursive overhaul of India’s international relations premised on a much more assertive (if not aggressive) foreign policy stance. These detonations were linked directly to New Delhi’s international strategy. In other words, they were constructed as part of India’s new foreign policy toolkit. At the same time, the nuclear tests also (i) ended the policy ambiguity about the relationship between nuclear weapons and international relations; and (ii) asserted that nuclear weapons (just like any other military assets) are among the foreign policy instruments at India’s disposal, which it would not hesitate to deploy if New Delhi deems it necessary (Kapur, 2006, p. 180). It is necessary to qualify here that the interpretative account of this chapter is framed by the analytical frameworks of narrative imbrication. As the term suggests, narrative imbrication is an approach that brings together the articulations of analysts and commentators on a specific issue. The result is a narrative produced by collating relevant statements that reveal the external stance of a state by tapping into the discourses of its domestic legitimation. Thus, narrative imbrication engages in a textual process tracing which both uncovers “the narratives within narratives” context of external relations and exposes that what distinguishes the explanation of international phenomena are “the ingredients used in the narrative accounts” (Suganami, 2008, pp. 347–355). Thus, narrative imbrication offers an opportunity of simultaneously experiencing and deducing the ingredients of Indian discursive formulations regarding the country’s international agency and its experience in Central Asia. In this respect, Steven A. Hoffmann’s provocative caveat is pertinent to the analyses of India’s foreign policy formulations presented in this chapter: should be considered those of Indian analysts, officials, and leaders, and not those of this writer. This is so even though in this type of essay the

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words generally must be those of the author and even though the Indian views are described in broad or general terms that pull together a number of specific thoughts that may come from more than one person. Expressions of the author’s own opinions will be rare and will be made quite explicit. (Hoffmann, 2004, p. 36; emphasis added)

The claim here is that narrative imbrication extends the following trumps to the study of a country’s international interactions. Firstly, it allows the introduction to the discursive ingredients that go into the broth of foreign policy making without interfering in the actual voice of these articulations. Although structured by the one collating such utterances, the ability to retain the authenticity of domestic articulations allows for a large amount of noise to seep through. Secondly, narrative imbrication neither impute nor endow coherence on the story it tells. Instead, it facilitates a confrontation with the complexity underpinning seemingly akin propositions. Thirdly, such an approach makes it explicit that the creator of the narrative imbrication is or has consciously decided to take the position of an external observer. This acknowledgment is especially pertinent to the study of India, where the role of an external/Western observer has been inherently problematic. Thus, while not doing away with the controversies associated with “the eye of the Western beholder”, the self-acknowledged subjective splicing of the narrative imbrication approach intimates that it neither attempts objectivity nor intends the promotion of grand narratives. Instead, by presenting the cacophony of domestic articulation of foreign policy making, its collation illustrates the complex diversity encountered by the one conducting the narrative imbrication. Such an approach, thereby, derives its logic, content, and coherence from the warren of pronouncements populating the terrain of a country’s international affairs. The chapter proceeds with outlining the post-Cold War trajectories of India’s foreign policy making. This sketch provides the background for contextualizing the narrative assessment of the “Look North” policy. The examination identifies the implications emanating from

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the narrative juncture provided by the 1998 nuclear tests on the formulation of the “Look North” policy. In this setting, the chapter details the idiosyncrasies of India’s bilateral relations with Tajikistan. This context becomes a point of departure for an analysis of the lack of influence in New Delhi’s interactions with Central Asia. The chapter concludes with an assertion that India’s international interactions in Central Asia evince that its international agency still has no influence in global affairs.

Dominant Patterns in India’s Post-Cold War Foreign Policy The trajectories of India’s post-Cold War foreign policy reflect the pervasive complexity of globalizing interactions. Some have claimed that the “seesawing foreign policies” (Chaulia, 2002, p. 220) witnessed in this period attest to the “infinitely malleability” of India’s international identity owing to the constant modification, manipulation, and adaptation of its “national security culture” (Latham, 1998, pp. 134–154). Others have interpreted the perceived affliction with “a general ambience of indiscipline and lack of national purpose” as an indication that in its international relations India acts “like a lady who has powerful suitors but is determined not to marry [any of them], because it is not in her interest to do so. A lady in this position has to play the game with considerable skill because every suitor is likely to feel that she is too inclined to the other party” (Basu, 2007, pp. 1, 213). Such statements offer a smattering of the cacophony involved in interpreting India’s diplomatic formulations. For the purposes of clarity, the following sections identify the main themes animating their narratives.

Post-Cold War blues The conceptualization and practice of India’s external relations reflect the contingencies of its geopolitical climate. Unlike other international actors, however, India seemed not only unprepared for the changes triggered by the end of Cold War bipolarity, but it also

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perceived them as an unwelcome turn of events. In a nutshell, for India the crumbling of the Berlin Wall represented “the loss of an entire world” (Menon and Nigam, 2007, p. 166), because of “the disappearance of the familiar contours of the postwar world” (Chiriyankandath, 2004, p. 202). Thus, while it lasted, the “Cold War [had] provided an ideally stable environment: it allowed India to play an exaggerated role on the international stage for many years, where it could moralize about the inequalities of bipolarity and the ‘Cold War mentality’ while still benefiting materially and politically from its ties to both the Soviet Union and the USA” (Singh, 2006, p. 52). Such attitudes underpin the “incoherence and indistinctiveness of India’s foreign policy due to the absence of a well-defined and wellarticulated policy framework” (Jain, 2008, p. 42). The tensions and ambiguities that came to define this period indicate both a lamentation for the passing of comfortable certainties and the (unwilling) recognition of the necessity to abandon well-entrenched practices and patterns of behavior. The turbulence of this policy ambivalence “plunged India into a morass of political instability and uncertainty” (Chaulia, 2002, p. 220). The former Indian ambassador to the United States, Abid Husain (1993) has offered one of the most revealing metaphors for India’s foreign policy anxiety: “One economist described India as a tiger in a cage. When the cage is open, the tiger would show its real strength. The cage is now open but the tiger refuses to come out of the cage”. The reference to a “post-Cold War Blues”, in India’s foreign policy making indicates New Delhi’s reluctance to venture out of the cage of Cold War politics. At the same time, it also suggests the central dilemmas facing the repositioning of India’s foreign policy: (i) the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and (ii) the need to acknowledge the failure of non-alignment. These two mutually reinforcing dynamics evinced the third underlying predicament — (iii) the increasing tension between “militarism” (i.e., coercive international stance) and “moralism” (i.e., cooperative international stance) during the reevaluation of India’s external relations. Thus, in the final analysis, it was the attempt to pursue a “business-as-usual” (Jha, 1997, p. 76) pattern of behavior (with as little alteration from accepted practices as

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possible, while sidelining the ambiguities, contradictions, and inconsistencies of New Delhi’s international agenda) that underpins the lack of focus and vision in India’s external relations in the immediate post-Cold War period.

1998 and after: nuclear assertiveness The testing of nuclear weapons is never a small affair. However, the actual event tends to grow in magnitude when the state undertaking the test has refused to formally accede to the nuclear non-proliferation regime and is in a nearly permanent state of attrition with one of its (equally armed) neighbors. The five nuclear devices detonated by India during 11–13 May 1998 at the Pokhran range confirmed this point. The tests set off an international controversy and widespread criticism and, at the same time, prompted concerns about a nuclear arms race in South Asia. The latter’s fears seemed confirmed by Pakistan’s nuclear tests during 28–30 May 1998 at its sites in the Koh Kambaran mountain and in the Khoran desert. More significantly, however, the geopolitical discourse of India’s nuclear tests indicated a marked departure from its previously largely conciliatory and non-committal attitude. In a nutshell, they were aimed to provoke. Said otherwise, by flaunting its ability for “pre-emptive response”, New Delhi publicized the alteration in foreign policy making that had to ensure India’s “survival” in an anarchic world (Basu, 2007, pp. 207–222). The 1998 nuclear tests have become an important cut-off point in India’s post-Cold War development. They reveal its progress toward “a more focused sense of itself in the world” that formed the backbone of “a more aggressive and self-confident foreign and security policy” (Lak, 2008, p. 245). At the time, the Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh (1999, p. 44) proclaimed that “nuclear weapons remain a key indicator of state power. Since this currency is operational in large part of the globe, India was left with no choice but to update and validate the capacity that had been demonstrated 24 years ago in the nuclear test of 1974.” This assertiveness seems to have been borne out of a long-standing frustration with New Delhi’s marginalization in the international system.

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1998, thereby, becomes a cornerstone for the identification of the central features of India’s new international identity. In other words, it was “India’s perception about itself” that “impacted on its foreign policy making” (Basu, 2007, p. 159). It needs to be reminded that the emergence of such a stance was not decoupled from historical patterns. In fact, the symbolism of 1998 has been discursively embedded in the context of India’s strategic perceptions. As the then Prime Minister Vajpayee proclaimed, the nuclear tests responded to “a regional and global reality that has evolved over the past fifty years. […] We live in a world where India is surrounded by nuclear weaponry. No responsible government can formulate a security policy for the country on abstract principles, disregarding ground realities. Nor can policy be based on anything but the supreme consideration of national interests” (cited in The Statesman, 15 May 1998). In this respect, the claim here is that India’s post-1998 foreign policy indicates not a mere pragmatic operationalization of “improved tactics” (Narlikar, 2006, p. 74), but a qualitatively different interpretation both of the country’s role in international life and the character of the international system. A critical aspect of the message sent by the 1998 nuclear tests is that “Indians are finally emerging from the mindset of dominated people, staking a claim to their rightful place in the modern global village” (Rai and Simon, 2007, p. 242). The discourse on and the desire for foreign policy independence have long been part and parcel of New Delhi’s international relations. Yet, Indian policy makers have seemed reticent to engage in a behavior that might be (mis) interpreted as the escalation of tensions in already conflictual relations. Moreover, the Cold War provided an additional layer of structural constraints that limited India’s room for independent foreign policy maneuver. The nuclear tests (at least discursively) appear to have lifted the perception of such constraints and they have revealed India’s willingness to insert its national interest on the global agenda (regardless of the opinions and expectations of other international actors). It is in this respect that the 1998 nuclear tests have become a symbol for the tectonic shift in the post-Cold War foreign policy of India.

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The Narrative Outlines of the “Look North” Policy Most commentators maintain that India’s engagement with Central Asia is a function of the country’s historical interactions with the region. Thus, the “long-standing historical ties encompassing the political, cultural, economic, and religious dimensions” constitute the basis for the international relations between New Delhi and the individual Central Asian states (Bal, 2004, p. 4). Yet, alongside these proclamations of extensive historical associations, observers also acknowledge that while “Central Asia is closer to New Delhi then Chennai or Bangkok, Tashkent, and Almaty ring a distant bell when the names pop up in casual conversations” (Bhattacharyya, 2004). Such attitudes indicate that it was only after the break-up of the Soviet Union that New Delhi gradually began to recognize that Central Asia is a distinct region in India’s immediate vicinity and whose patterns of interaction impact on and are impacted by developments in South Asia. This realization seems to have been one of the underlying features in the transformation of India’s post-Cold War foreign policy. In this context, a number of Indian analysts have proposed the articulation of a “Look North” policy. Such discursive engagements with the roles played by India in Central Asia emphasize the need for the development of a “proactive and meaningful policy that accords top priority to the region” (Joshi, 2007b, p. 445). Thus, the narrative exploitation of the legacies of the past by Indian foreign policy elites discloses a strategy that aims “to remind the new generation in Central Asia that India is not new to them but rather a very old friend if seen in the historical perspective. This creates a ‘love at first sight’ situation exhorting these past civilizational entities to recognize each other” (Jain, 2008, p. 210). This conviction underpins the strategic rationale of New Delhi’s relations with Central Asia. In particular a distinct “Look North” policy would enable India “to formulate proactive strategies, to minimize potential threats, exploit opportunities and influence the final outcome of the transition” (Bal, 2004, pp. 141–279). It therefore becomes an expression of India’s desire “to promote a secular, multiethnic order in the region” (Dietl, 1997, p. 142). Consequently, India is presented as a model for Central Asian

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states. It is claimed that in their search for “support and constructive cooperation”, India stood as an attractive direction to relate to. India was not only a multiethnic, multi-cultural, [and] resilient society with vast experience of managing delicate intra-ethnic relations, but also a secular and democratic polity. [At the same time], India was geographically distant, but culturally and historically close, without any record of an intrusive or aggressive behavior towards the newly emerged Central Asian republics. (Muni, 2003, p. 106)

These statements do not intend to deny the diversity, multiplicity, and idiosyncrasies of Central Asia. Instead, they promote the understanding that from the perspective of Central Asian states, the “large and nearby India does not breathe down anyone’s neck in [the region]. No Central Asian country has a dispute with, or apprehension from, India” (Gandhi, 1996). Thus, from “an Indian perspective”, the region has several defining features: (i) the rise of religious extremism in the post-Soviet period; (ii) the increasing levels of trafficking in goods and people; (iii) the incomplete, erratic, and uneven process of political and economic reform; and (iv) the turbulent geopolitical location of Central Asian states (abetted by their natural resources) that makes them subject to the interests of a number of extra-regional third parties (Joshi, 2007b, pp. 441–442). Such characterizations indicate the “Look North” policy did not emerge in a vacuum, but were profoundly implicated by the post-Cold War trajectories of India’s foreign policy making. The following sections sketch out these dynamics.

India’s engagement in Central Asia before 1998 The “post-Cold War Blues”, which infected India’s international affairs during the 1990s made India’s relations with Central Asia one of the most conspicuous aspects of its foreign policy ambiguity during

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this period. The uncertainty that has dominated this period had “two important implications”: One was that there emerged a new Central Asia, independent and sovereign, freed from the control of the former Soviet Union, and looking forward to a greater and dynamic engagement with the rest of the world, particularly Asia. The second was a sort of crisis of confidence in India’s foreign policy perspective resulting from the collapse of the Cold War framework of global politics and the consequent erosion of the former Soviet Union as a source of foreign policy support. (Muni, 2003, p. 102)

However, India’s failure to engage Central Asia more convincingly is an outcome not only of the “post-Cold War Blues”, but also of the formulation of New Delhi’s external relations in reaction to Pakistan’s foreign policy strategies. The memory and the construction of a historical narrative of independent Indian statehood have been profoundly scarred by the communal divisions that flared during the partition of British India (Butalia, 2000). Such discursive experiences underpin the foreign policy belief that neither geography nor economic interests maintain the state boundaries between India and Pakistan, but the “enmity between Hindus and Muslims” (Hagerty and Hagerty, 2005, p. 17). In “Indian perceptions”, therefore, Pakistan has “vested interests” in pursuing a “quest for strategic depth vis-à-vis India in Central Asia” (Joshi, 2007a, p. 150). The assertion is that the “philosophy [of Pakistan’s interactions with the region] appears to have always focused on a prescriptive approach as to what should happen in or to the Central Asian state within the overall backdrop of deep antagonism against India” (Bal, 2004, pp. 332–333). The “Look North” has therefore been construed as a “non-Pakistani alternative” for Central Asia (Hindustan Times, 13 July 2008). Indian commentators, however, have point out that it is “foolish to talk of Islamic revivalism in Central Asia” and structure India’s engagement with the region from

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such an assumption (Dietl, 1997, p. 138). Nevertheless, the persistent preoccupation with Islamabad’s policies in Central Asia has framed the “belated, slow, and half-hearted stand” taken by India during this period (Asopa, 2007, pp. 172–173). Thus, the “ill-conceived [and] ill-executed treatment [of the region] as a counterpoise between India and Pakistan” (Singh, 1999, p. 111) has tended to befuddle New Delhi’s foreign policy making. In this setting, the framework of India’s “Look North” policy appears unable to obviate both the legacy of mistrust between India and Pakistan as well as the very real barrier posed by the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). The experience of India’s engagement with Central Asia during the pre-1998 period illustrates that Pakistan “remains an important obstacle to a more productive cooperation with the region” (Muni and Mohan, 2005, p. 66). At the same time, however, Indian commentators have noted that since “neither India nor Pakistan is an immediate neighbor of Central Asia”, the wrangling between New Delhi and Islamabad for Central Asia can be described as an “avoidable small game” (Dietl, 1997, p. 134). Such statements reveal the narrative oscillation underscoring India’s interactions with Central Asia for much of the first post-Cold War decade.

India’s engagement in Central Asia after 1998 The post-1998 foreign policy perception of Central Asia seems to be informed by the realization that despite the proclamations of the region’s “historical belonging” to India’s “strategic neighborhood”, New Delhi is “not giving sufficient attention to Central Asia”; consequently, “good intentions have not been converted into substantive relations” (Dixit, 2004, pp. 18–19). India has therefore been relegated to “a mere spectator” of regional politics (Mahalingam, 2004, p. 133) owing to the lack of a “well spelled out policy towards Central Asia” (Asopa, 2007, p. 181) revealing “wait-and-watch” approach of “benign neglect”, which conjectures “to react to events as they occur and to hope for the best” (Bal, 2004, p. 35). As a result, India has become “somewhat marginal” to the international relations of Central Asia (Dutt, 2000, p. 106).

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In this setting, “India’s ‘forward’ Central Asian policy” in the post-1998 period is seen “as an integral component of its growing military, nuclear, and economic power” (Jain, 2008, p. 210). The perception is that New Delhi’s relations with the Central Asian states reveal “the operation of a virtuous circle, with economic gains propelling an associated political push from India [which] produces both an improved country image and country’s standing in regional and multilateral I” (Rana, 2007, pp. 62–63). Such a discursive shift animating New Delhi’s post-1998 external relations provides a “conceptual ‘model’, ‘window’, ‘lens’, and ‘frame of reference’ through which Central Asia must be viewed” (Bal, 2004, pp. 354–355). In this setting, the stated overarching objective of India’s “Look North” policy is the promotion of “peace and mutual prosperity” (Sinha, 2004, p. 9). This intent, however, has been buttressed by the twin-ambition of: (i) maintaining “the democratic and secular ethos” of the region, because it “binds India and Central Asia together” (Joshi, 2004, p. 210); and (ii) evolving “measures that would safeguard the stability and integrity of Central Asian republics and save them from getting divided and opposing one another” (Asopa, 2007, p. 188). The narrative construction of this twin-ambition is detailed in turn in the following sections.

Experience of managing diversity within a secular and democratic polity Indian commentators have noted that the (violence accompanying the) dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has “eroded the legitimacy of multiethnic, multi-lingual, and multi-religious states” (Dixit, 2004, p. 24). This observation informs the (tacit) conviction that India is one of the few (if not the only) remaining countries that shares the characteristic features of the now defunct socialist federal arrangements (Kavalski and Zolkos, 2008). Consequently, such a realization underpins the responsibility of its foreign policy making to assert the viability of India’s statebuilding project by demonstrating the relevance and experience in successfully managing its internal diversity through the institutional

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arrangements of a secular and democratic polity. In other words, India is not “multicultural by accident”, but “multicultural by design” (Manohoran, 2003, p. 330). Consequently, India’s strategic objective in the region is to “work for the rise and consolidation of democratic and secular polities in Central Asia, because the spill-over of the rise of religious extremism may threaten India’s own internal stability and security” (Muni, 2003, pp. 98–99). Indian efforts and expectations however have been frustrated by the realization that the Central Asian states “were ill-prepared for independence” (Joshi, 2003, p. 69). Although “conversant in the art of governance” (Asopa, 2007, p. 173), all countries in the region are believed to suffer from a pronounced democratic deficit that hinders the establishment of “long-term political and strategic vision” for their development (Sharma, 2007, p. 125). In this setting, “state failure remains a concern in New Delhi” (Gupta, 2008, p. 115). Indian commentators list multiple (and, oftentimes, contradictory) rationalities in their explanation of the weakness of democratic practices in the region: •

•

Firstly, there is a near-universal agreement that independence “was thrust upon [the Central Asian states] in 1991” with little warning and preparation (Joshi, 2004, p. 204). Thus, “the newly emerged Central Asian states were internally and externally insecure” owing to their “porous, unnatural borders and fragile security structures” (Muni, 2003, p. 103). According to these assessments, the independence of Central Asian states was an outcome of “the exclusively subjective ambitions of a group of political leaders and their scramble for political power” (Bal, 2004, pp. 301–302). Secondly, despite their independence from the Soviet Union, the governance of Central Asian states is still “dominated by the former communist party ruling elites who had adopted democratic pretensions” (Muni, 2003, p. 103). This makes it “difficult for [regional leaders] to appreciate something that their cognitive process had never experienced” (Dash, 2007, p. 190). The proposition is that it is “the ruling elites [that] are not

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ready for democracy” rather than the populations of the region (Sharma, 2007, p. 127). Thirdly, the nascent forms of authoritarianism in Central Asia have been contextualized within long-standing indigenous forms, institutions, and processes of power relations. Consequently, the legacy of hierarchical modes of governance has facilitated the “over-concentration of [state] power in the hands of political elites”, which, in turn, has precipitated “the collapse of democracy” in the region (Sharma, 2004a, p. 264). In particular, the reference to the clan-mentality of Central Asian politics points to the quandaries of a political process in which the dynamics of “regional and tribal affiliations” trump the legitimacy of “political vision and program” (Sharma, 2004b, p. 429). Lastly, the post-Soviet transition of the Central Asian states has been profoundly disrupted by “drug trafficking and organized crime” (Dwivedi, 2007, p. 240). Indian commentators ascertain that “Central Asia is the hardest hit [global region] by the explosion of Afghan heroin” (Roy, 2001, p. 2278). Consequently, the claim is that the Central Asian states have not been “capable of meeting these challenges on their own due to the lack of prior experience in managing such problems, paucity of funds, ill-equipped security services, and the failure to arrive at a common strategy” (Mahapatra, 2005, pp. 168–169).

The multiplicity of these dynamics and the accidental nature of their interactions in Central Asian politics infer “little prospects for a radical departure from the present scenario” (Dash, 2007, p. 204). This understanding is deeply engrained in the narratives of the “Look North” policy. At the same time, despite the underlying assertiveness, its discourses are not completely divorced from the conceptual and policy inconsistency that marked India’s pre-1998 engagement in the region.

Encouraging regional cooperation in Central Asia Intertwined with the narrative modalities of secularism and democracy, the “Look North” policy also stresses the significance of regional

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cooperation to the stability and prosperity of Central Asia. The proposition of Indian commentators is that “India should try [to] forge a collective security arrangement and a collective project for the development of all the countries of the region regardless of their policy slants in favor of this or that great power” (Asopa, 2007, pp. 173–188). New Delhi’s call for “greater political cooperation among the Central Asian states” rests on the perception of a “host of common specificities” shared among them (Gidadhubli, 2007, p. 171; Sharma, 2007, p. 123). This insistence on maintaining the unity of Central Asian states reflects Indian perceptions of the pragmatic benefits from (even a rudimentary form of functional) cooperation that “transforms conventional aspirations into more open, dynamic, and wider practices of peaceful coexistence, collective responsibility, and development” (Lama, 2005, pp. 134–135). The regional character of “these flows” facilitates the “forging [of] linkages and bonds of solidarity” among the participating states (Pant, 2005, p. 181). The fear is that without regional integration, history might be repeated and Central Asia may lose “its creative capacity [just like it did] during the sixteenth century, owing to its internecine warfare, internal instability, and external aggressive policy” (Haidar, 2003, p. 260). In this respect, there seems to be a significant level of disappointment among Indian commentators that “the political leadership of these countries has been unable to evolve a mind-set that could be truly characterized as [Central Asian]” (Behera, 2003, p. 210). This failure tends to be explained through the pursuit of narrow personal gains by nepotistic state-elites, which (more often than not) are disguised under the narrative cloak of (ethno-) national interests. Thus, commentators have noted that the failure of Central Asian states to establish a robust framework for regional cooperation illustrates their “poor governance” (Pillai, 2003, p. 249). The regionalization implicit in the discourses of the “Look North” policy exposes a conviction that “it is our [i.e., India’s] purpose to engage more vigorously with an independent Central Asia through cultural structures” (Palat, 1999). Such contextualization indicates New Delhi’s resentment of the regionalizing strategies of other

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international actors (especially, China and the United States). In this respect, some Indian commentators have proponed that the alleged “homogeneity [of the region] is quite deceptive” and hinders the comprehension of the “diversity, which is articulated in many different ways” in the convoluted dynamics of Central Asian politics (Sharma, 2007, p. 123). Thus, the suggestion is that India needs to accompany its regional with “country-specific” strategies targeting the individual Central Asian states (Dash, 2007, p. 205). This understanding informs the discussion of India’s bilateralism in the region in the following section.

New Delhi’s Bilateralism in Central Asia: India’s Relations with Tajikistan This chapter has already demonstrated that the narratives of the “Look North” policy are underpinned by a desire to encourage a framework for the regional cooperation of the Central Asian states. Such proclamations notwithstanding, India’s engagement in the region has been paralleled by a significant level of bilateral relations between New Delhi and Central Asian capitals. In particular, Astana and Tashkent have been the subjects of India’s courtship. India’s relations with both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are not only “a matter of historical continuity” (Mann, 2001, p. 2048) but also reflect a perception that either of them is “well poised to emerge as a ‘core’ country and assume the leadership of Central Asia” (Asopa, 2003, p. 174; Stobdan, 2009, p. 3). Analytically, the bilateral approach rests on the assertion that (at least initially) “the desired stability of Central Asia” will depend not on regional cooperation, but above all, on the success of individual Central Asia states. […] The ability of each Central Asian state to evolve a political system which incorporates political pluralism and includes power-sharing arrangements for their multiethnic populations will, in particular, curb existing ethnic tensions and prevent confrontation along inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic lines. (Sharma 2003, p. 97)

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Pragmatically speaking, the development of strong bilateral relations with some countries in the region reveals New Delhi’s attempts to overcome the constraints imposed by its latecomer status in Central Asian affairs, which has further compounded the effects from the lack of a direct physical access to the region (Kavalski, 2007b, p. 854). Thus, India has adopted an approach aimed at making up for lost time with respect to the Central Asian agency of other international actors. In this respect, it is Tajikistan that — to all intents and purposes — has become the posterchild of New Delhi’s bilateralism in Central Asia. The construction of Tajikistan as India’s “gateway to Central Asia” (Asopa, 2003, p. 153) is of complex provenance in the narratives of the “Look North” policy. The hackneyed point of departure seems to be the observation of “millennia-old”, “civilizational relationship between Tajikistan and the Indian subcontinent” (Kaushik, 2003b, pp. 30–37). At the same time, the closeness between New Delhi and Moscow during the Cold War has allegedly given India a particular “edge” in Tajikistan both as a result of “a large number of [Indian] technical cadres trained in the Central Asian republics during the Soviet period” and the concomitant “immense popularity of Indian literature, music, and dance, and the high esteem India [is] held by the Tajik and the Central Asian people” (Singh, 2003, p. 198). Furthermore, many commentators assert that Tajikistan is “the first Central Asian republic [to] realize the importance of building a broader national identity based on institutions” and not on an exclusive ethnicity — a state-building strategy akin to that of India (Sharma, 2003, p. 73). Strategically speaking, however, it is the shared perception of external threats that appears to motivate India’s bilateral relations with Tajikistan. Indian commentators explain that the civil war which ravaged the country during the 1990s has been “caused by a skillful exploitation of the inter-regional/inter-clan rivalries by forces of Islamic fundamentalism supported by the Pakistan-backed Mujahideen in Afghanistan” — i.e., it was “a spill-over of the victory of the Mujahideen armed groups in Afghanistan. The jobless Afghan jehadis found employment both in Tajikistan and in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir” (Kaushik, 2003b, pp. 39–40). In this respect, from the

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viewpoint of New Delhi, India and Tajikistan having “suffered a lot on account of onslaughts of the dark forces of religious extremism active in Afghanistan must work together” (Warikoo, 2003, p. 151). Thus, while demonstrating the balance-of-power attitude informing India’s policy toward Central Asia, commentators tend to establish a link between New Delhi’s logistic and military support for the antiTaliban Northern Alliance through Tajikistan. Such an assistance was articulated as a strategy for “strengthening Tajikistan’s secular forces in their war against Islamic fundamentalism” (Asopa, 2007, p. 173). For instance, there have been allegations that India’s military outposts in the country have been set up as early as the mid-1990s (Bedi, 2002, p. 17). Framed as an offer of “humanitarian assistance”, in 2000 India has formally acknowledged the establishment of a military hospital on the Tajik–Afghan border at Farkhor and the widening of a military airstrip near Dushanbe for transport aircraft (Singh, 2003, pp. 201–202). More recently, India — still “quietly, very quietly” — has deployed at least one helicopter squadron at its “Ayuni” air-base in Tajikistan to bolster its already existing rapid response capabilities (Pandit, 2007). The discourses of the “Look North” policy legitimize this military outreach by maintaining that “the nation’s strategic interests lie far beyond [its] borders” — a realization, which is “compelling New Delhi to consider the possibility of sending troops abroad outside of the UN framework” (Mohan, 2007, p. 395). The discursive accounts of these developments seem to indicate that the rise of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan has jolted New Delhi out of its post-Cold War stupor vis-à-vis its relations with Central Asia. In this respect, the transformations of Central Asian affairs in the post-“ 9/11” period confirm (at least to Indian commentators) the “timeliness” and “prescience” of the Indo–Tajik support for the Northern Alliance (Singh, 2003, p. 202). In fact, some have suggested the emergence of a strategic triangle between India, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan (Kaushik, 2003b, p. 45). Others have indicated New Delhi’s centrality to the emergence of an international coalition ensuring the security of Tajikistan (Asopa, 2003, p. 192). Thus, the fostering of strong bilateral ties with Tajikistan reveals India’s attempt to carve out a space for its stakes in Central Asia. This

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development suggests that India’s post-1998 foreign policy stance can be termed “revisionist” to the extent that New Delhi aims to revise the existing patterns in its international environment in order to facilitate the exercise of its own agency (Mohan, 2004, p. 80). This understanding informs the engagement with the analytical and decision-making implication of the “Look North” policy.

In Lieu of a Conclusion: The No Influence of the “Look North” The preceding discussion has engaged the narrative modalities of the “Look North” policy. Its articulations reveal a proclivity toward a narrative projection of India as a blueprint for Central Asian development. The claim here is that the region is construed as the testing ground for the grappling international agency of actors vying for global outreach. The narratives of the “Look North” policy have been simultaneously (i) driven by the realization that “it is the oil of Central Asia that [has] made India active in the politics of the region” (Asopa, 2003, pp. 185–186) and (ii) plagued by the understanding that India “cannot make massive investments because of its financial constraints” (Asopa, 2007, p. 184). The contention of this analysis is that the discursive proclamations of India’s external agency in Central Asia have not been matched by comparable transformations in the ideational and institutional makeup of New Delhi’s foreign policy formulation. Thus, despite the proliferation of discourses on India’s rise to global prominence, the absence of a readily available Indian vision of global politics — a Pax Indica, if you will — prevents New Delhi from living up to the expectations generated by such narratives.

Influence: understanding the power of attraction Despite the narrative construction of the post-1998 foreign policy, the possession of nuclear weapons and the concomitant assertive foreign policy posturing have not been able to enhance India’s influence. The notion of influence reflects the power of attraction of

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an international actor. For instance, actor A has a power of attraction over actor B, because actor B wants to follow the example of, emulate, and, thereby, be socialized by actor A. This is done not by force, but by attraction — actor B likes actor A’s behavior, norms, and values as expressed both on the international and the domestic stage and wants to be associated with it. The hackneyed example is the European Union, whose power of attraction became a magnet for East European states after 1989. The notion of influence, thereby, redefines power as “socializing power” — “the power of shaping the habits and attitudes of the individuals and small groups of which any society is composed, and upon whose habits and attitudes its governing power depends” (Carroll, 1972, pp. 588–611). Thence, power as ability indicates the socializing power of external actors (such as India) to shape the policy preferences of the state-elites of target countries (such as the Central Asian states). This understanding of influence is informed by the growing skepticism about the definition of power solely in terms of its intended effects. The issue of influence suggests an actor’s ability to establish itself as a model in global politics. This ability derives not from military power, but from the power of attraction — the perception of an actor as a model engenders a desire in others to become like it by adopting the most important elements of its international identity.

Not a model: the lack of vision in the “Look North” policy The discussion of the narratives of the “Look North” policy underpins a desire that India becomes “a kind of a model for other countries” (Dutt, 2006, p. 205). At the same time, the confrontation with the reality of Central Asian politics and the involvement of other international actors have made Indian commentators aware that New Delhi has little (if any) influence in the region. More conspicuously, the absence of power of attraction (and so far, at least, the seeming lack of willingness to develop one) has plagued India’s international engagement not only with Central Asia, but also other global regions. As indicated, New Delhi’s “policy towards its immediate and extended neighborhood is indistinct and incoherent” (Jain, 2008, p. 228)

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because of its underlying “lack of vision” (Alexander, 2004, p. 357). New Delhi’s failure both to articulate and to project a coherent strategy for its involvement in Central Asia underpins the inability to “intertwine India’s geopolitical interests with the interest of [regional] countries” as well as “India’s noticeable absence” from regional politics (Bhadrakumar, 2008). In other words, the claim here is that India has a number of influential individuals and businesses, but it, itself — as an international actor — does not have an influential foreign policy strategy that could establish it as an alternative to existing ones. Such an assertion should not be misinterpreted as an allegation that India does not have a respected and significant historical and cultural heritage. However, the international recognition of this legacy (just like the recognition of its nuclear capabilities) does not amount to influence, which would be able to arouse a desire for emulation among other actors. The discussion of Central Asia has demonstrated that the narrative construction of India’s current external affairs does not project a specific (if any) vision of world order that would distinguish if from the other participants in the “new great game”. Consequently, the international identity of New Delhi has no distinct attributes that regional actors might be tempted to emulate. Thus, the question emerging from the discussion of New Delhi’s agency in Central Asia is whether India can “offer an alternative vision of a new world order” (Bhattacharjea, 2008, p. 10), just like the United States, the European Union, and China have done. In other words, the analysis of India’s external affairs still does not seem to offer a convincing response to the query whether India “can change enough” to become a pole of attraction in an international environment marked by “extreme turbulence” (Kachru, 2007, p. 14). The current setting seems to suggest that India would retain its relative position of no influence for some time to come.

Related Websites Asian Development Research Institute: http://www.adri-india.org. Center for Policy Research: http://www.cprindia.org.

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Delhi Policy Group: http://www.delhipolicygroup.org. Institute of Defense Studies and Analyses: http://www.idsa.in/index.htm. Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies: http://www.ipcs.org/. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies: http://www.makaias. gov.in/about.html. SAPRA India Foundation: http://www.subcontinent.com/sapra/. Strategic Foresight Group: http://www.strategicforesight.com. The Energy and Resource Institute: http://www.teriin.org.

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12

Japan and Central Asia David Walton

Introduction Until the end of the Cold War and breakup of the Soviet Union, there was minimal interest among Japanese officials about the countries of Central Asia. In many respects, the “stans” were perceived to be distant, backward parts of the Soviet Union and of limited strategic value. Within mainstream public awareness it is unlikely that much general knowledge or indeed interest about the region existed. Given the high level of insularity in Japan at that time, this is not surprising. What is remarkable is the upsurge of interest in the region at the governmental level in the post-Cold War period. The last five years, in particular, represent an increase in Japanese engagement at both the bilateral and multilateral level. This chapter considers factors behind these developments and ponders why Japan has played such an active role in the region. It is argued that Japan’s position has been influenced by multiple factors — resources diplomacy, geo-strategic importance of Central Asia, Japan’s global and regional leadership aspirations, and rivalry with China — but that policy has been driven by a neo-liberalist agenda. Given the complexities in Japan’s post-war history and constraints placed on foreign and defense policies, it is necessary to offer an overview of debates on post-war Japanese foreign policy, before examining the relationship with the five Central Asian states.

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An Overview of Japanese Post-War Foreign Policy At the conclusion of World War II, Japan found itself not only devastated economically and militarily, but also as a linchpin in the American Cold War strategy to contain the Soviet Union and communist China. One could argue that as a vanquished nation, Japan had little say in this turn of events, as American policymakers began to factor in the important islands of Okinawa and Japan’s strategically advantageous position adjacent to mainland China, North Korea, and the Russian Far East into their Cold War calculations (Welfield, 1988). For a nation with its industrial infrastructure in tatters and surrounded by unfriendly nations from the opposite ideological camp, American military protection allowed Japan to focus on rebuilding itself economically and effectively defer security considerations to the United States, thus forming the essence of the “Yoshida Doctrine”. The occupation of Japan, which lasted from August 1945 to September 1952, profoundly shaped Japanese foreign policy and the post-war bilateral relationship with the United States. Although technically it was an allied occupation of Japan, in reality it was very much an American occupation, since Washington provided the bulk of manpower, capital, and the occupying force. The end of the war in the Pacific theater and the occupation of Japan by Allied Forces in August 1945 was part of the United States process of establishing a new world order in the post-war period. The United States, in relative terms unscathed and indeed empowered by the war, had established itself as the pre-eminent hegemon. Within Washington’s grand design for a new world order, the United States provided substantial support toward assisting the economic reconstruction of war-torn Europe and non-communist Asia. As part of this policy, US officials were the principal (although by no means the only) architects of the United Nations, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) — all international institutions that Japan felt a pressing need to join in order to regain its place in international society. The historical circumstances outlined above have led to two major schools of thought on Japanese foreign policy behavior during the

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Cold War: Japan as a “strategic state” and Japan as a “reactive state”. In the post-Cold War era, a new model has emerged, Japan as an “adaptive state”. These dynamics are addressed in the following sections.

Strategic state model The “strategic state” model argues that domestic and foreign policies have been driven actively by an elite conservative agreement as to what is in the national interest. Although there is discord among scholars within the strategic state camp between a Japan Inc. critique (mercantile realism or comprehensive security model) and defensive realism as an explanation for Japanese behavior. The broad consensus is that Japan has attempted to maximize its strategic goals at minimal cost (Berger, 2007, p. 265). From this perspective, Japan responded to the constraints placed on the nation’s options in the aftermath of the Pacific War. In particular, the constitutional limitations, chiefly in the form of Article 9 and the unambiguous language of the constitution’s “no war” clause, made it impossible for Japan to make a military contribution to any regional conflict throughout the Cold War. Article 9 of the post-war Japanese Constitution, according to the strategic state model, has permitted Japan narrowly to pursue its national focus on economic reconstruction since World War II (Chapman et al., 1982). As a result, a clear priority was placed on export-driven economic growth policies and “low posture” diplomacy undertaken in response to international crises. In addition to this unequivocal constitutional constraint on external relations, the deep seated norm of antimilitarism found in Japanese society was another factor that policymakers carefully considered when planning responses to structural changes and how Japan could best respond to regional conflict. This turn of events, some intended by Japan and others determined by Cold War structural developments, and indeed Japan’s historical past, led to Japan enthusiastically embarking upon an explicit policy of “economic diplomacy” and distinctly separating economics from politics (seikei bunri) in its national policymaking. In light of the constitutional and normative constraints that Japan

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possesses, policymakers have understandably been much more comfortable framing responses to regional problems in terms of (low-risk) economic solutions rather than (high-risk) political ones (Green, 2003, pp. 14–16). This trend reflects the saliency of Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru’s early intentions of placing economic reconstruction as Japan’s chief national priority and entrusting traditional security to the United States (Pyle, 1993, pp. 21–41).

Reactive state model By the 1980s, the extreme predatory nature of the Japanese economy was waning and more attention was paid to Japan’s tendency toward minimalist, passive, and risk aversion diplomacy. Kent Calder was the first scholar to use the “reactive stat” label describing Japan’s opaque decision-making process as “reactive policymaking” and a direct result of the “fragmented character of state authority”, which effectively “discourages pro-active foreign policy behavior”. As Calder explicitly noted, in a “reactive state” such as Japan, “the impetus to policy change is typically supplied by outside pressure” (Calder, 1988, p. 528). Developing this theme, Takashi Inoguchi and Purnendra Jain have used the metaphor of Karaoke (empty orchestra) to explain post-war Japanese foreign policy. In essence, Japan pursues policy from a set menu of choices offered by the United States — i.e., Japan’s autonomy is prescribed by Washington (Inoguchi and Jain, 2000, pp. 11–21). Commentators, however, argue that Japan, although still operating within the reactive state framework, has demonstrated evidence of proactive policy in certain areas. For instance, Keiko Hirata (2001) puts forward the framework that both reactive and proactive elements are evident in Japanese foreign policy in Southeast Asia. Others demonstrate that Japan has played a leadership role in the regional architecture such as ASEAN and it has been proactive in policy formulation at the bilateral and multilateral level (Llewelyn et al., 2009). Mike Mochizuki concurs, suggesting that examples of Japanese efforts at proactive policy can also be found in geographical and issue pockets — places where the United States does not pay much attention or is not that involved — to pursue

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autonomous diplomatic missions. He argues that Tokyo’s efforts to act as a loyal ally allow Japan to expand areas of Washington’s tolerance in pursuing policies that might contradict United States policies (Mochizuki, 2007, p. 12).

Adaptive state model Both the “reactive state” and the “strategic state” arguments have their roots in the Cold War system, which limited Japan’s international role. Since the first Gulf War (1990), however, Japan has evolved from a nation whose foreign policy had been in non-critical lockstep with its chief security provider and who was only willing to pursue foreign policy as defined in economic terms, to a nation that had substantially more assertiveness and confidence in its own leadership capabilities. A critical factor was criticism of Japan’s “Check Book” diplomacy during the first Gulf War. Despite massive financial support (US$13 billion) Japan was heavily criticized by the international community for its perceived inaction (Shinoda, 2007, p. 5). Accordingly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) began to more actively undertake foreign policy initiatives that had both explicit economic and political aims as well as changing legislation to allow a contribution of Self Defense Forces in the United Nations sanctioned peacekeeping operations (Pyle, 2006). The end of the Cold War offered immense opportunities for Japan to play a more proactive role in regional and global affairs. In general, the Japanese approach is to maintain strong ties with Washington, but to develop new multilateral relations with Europe and East Asia and to play a leading role in global institutions. Takashi Inoguchi argues that Japan is currently seeking a more assertive role on the international stage while remaining within the US-led hegemonic system. He has characterized the period since 2005 as Japan’s efforts at being a “global ordinary power”. In this context, “ordinary” means being more comfortable with the use of force within the alliance with the United States, the auspices of UN-sanctioned peacekeeping operations and the East Asian region (Inoguchi, 2008, pp. 3–13).

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Thomas Berger has posited the emergence of the liberal “adaptive state” model to describe contemporary Japanese policy initiatives. Although there has been more acceptance of the use of force than in the past, Berger argues that Japan has also become more cosmopolitan and it has made a serious effort to contribute to the international system, motivated by the liberal philosophy of international relations: building international institutions and deepening economic and social ties between nations to create a more cooperative and peaceful international system (Berger, 2007, p. 260). From this perspective, Japan’s polices have taken it from “one of the world’s savage economic predators to a normal law abiding member of the international economic community” (Berger, 2007, p. 284).

Japanese Strategy in Central Asia: Testing the Adaptive State Model The evolution of Japanese foreign policy has important implications for the understanding of Tokyo’s perceptions of Central Asia. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union signaled the beginning of initiatives in Tokyo to play a role in the region. In the first phase between 1991 and 1996, a core focus was to assist the five newly independent states while also offering aid and support to a faltering Russian economy. One senior minister was quoted as saying, “Of course, providing assistance to Russia is a top priority. But as an Asian nation, we would like to lend greater support to the former Soviet states in the Asian region” (Japan Times, 20 October, 1992). An emerging theme in MOFA was to combine bilateral relations with a multilateral approach while also extending a sense of “Asian identity”. The multilevel approach continues to be a hallmark of Japanese diplomacy to the region. Asian identity, while difficult to define, represents the desire in Japan to expand the idea of identity beyond an East Asia framework. An example of the multilateral approach was Japanese insistence that the five Central Asian states be placed on the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee list of developing economies, allowing Japan to register aid to the region as official development aid (Len, 2005, p. 133). Another initiative was to use its leadership role

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to ensure that Central Asian countries were admitted into the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to enable the countries to draw credits from the bank. Nonetheless, Japan’s early diplomatic initiatives in Central Asia were slow. It was only in January 1993 that its opened embassies in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. According to Akio Kawato (former ambassador to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan), the slow pace reflected Japan’s lack of interest in Central Asia that to some extent was due to the regular rotation of MOFA officials. Many of the new officials did not have the same level of commitment or interest as their predecessors (Kawato, 2007, p. 16). During this first wave, diplomatic relations were established and Japan began operating as a major donor of Official Development Assistance (ODA). The first Japanese ministerial delegation was led by Foreign Minister Michio Watanabe in May 1992 to Kazakhstan. Understandably, there was a lack of symmetry in visits. No prime ministerial visits from Japan took place during this period, for example, and only a few Japanese delegations were sent. Conversely, a number of high-powered Central Asian delegations made the trip to Tokyo. Although accessing the natural resources of the region stirred considerable interest within the Japanese private sector, there was minimal economic activity at the bilateral and multilateral level. A feasibility study for a gas pipeline between Central Asia and Western China was announced as early as 1992 by Mitsubishi Corporation (cited in Len, 2005, p. 133). Nonetheless, projects have been hampered by over-regulated bureaucracy, the lack of infrastructure, instability, and the vast distances involved. To date this pipeline project looks like a pipedream, as it is still at the planning stage and may take decades before it is in operation. The key emphasis in Japan during this period was not commercial. Early policy, which was driven by a few key policymakers sympathetic toward countries in Central Asia (specifically Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan), was to establish a close rapport with elite policymakers. There was no serious attempt at short-term acquisition of resources which was, in any event, an unrealistic option. Instead the focus was on constructing networks with Central Asian elites through dialog, human exchange, humanitarian assistance, and ODA as part of Japanese soft diplomacy strategy.

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It was not until 1997 that Japanese policy in the region was clearly defined. By this time, there was an appreciation of the geopolitical value of Central Asia vis-à-vis the Caucasus, Russia, China, and the Middle East as well a heightened awareness of the abundance of natural resources available for exploration and joint initiatives. In late June, the then Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi (next in line as prime minister) led a large (60-person) delegation to the region. The following month Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto gave his “Silk Road Diplomacy” speech to the Japan Association of Corporate Executives. The speech on 24 July 1997 was the beginning of a longterm coherent strategy and thereby signaled that the key ministries (the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, the Ministry of Finance, as well as MOFA) were supportive. There were three main components to the speech: to enhance trust and understanding through official channels; to foster prosperity through economic cooperation as well as cooperation for natural resource development; and to build peace through nuclear non-proliferation, democratization and the fostering of stability. Notably, Hashimoto emphasized the need to create a transport, telecommunications, and energy supply system in Central Asia (Hashimoto, 1997). His speech explicitly focused on regionalism as well as bilateral relations and it was designed to encourage the private sector in Japan to inject capital into the region and to advance the country’s national interest. The new policy was a clear departure from the earlier, rather ad hoc style and highlighted a new direction. As noted by Christopher Len (2005, p. 198), this was a clear long-term vision to assist Central Asia attain closer integration and regional stability. Thus, the policy demonstrated a commitment to the Central Asian region. The events of “9/11” and its aftermath further highlighted the strategic importance of Central Asia. Importantly also, from a Japanese perspective, the stability of Central Asia was (and remains) closely tied to Afghanistan. To this end, Japan engineered Afghanistan’s entry into the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) initiative — a grouping organized by the Japan-led ADB in 2005 (Ferguson, 2009). In 2002, Prime Minister Koizumi, who had reaffirmed the position of Central Asian integration and economic cooperation, sent his

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MOFA Senior Vice Minister Seiken Sugiura along with a delegation of ten business and academic experts to Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan on a mission for energy resources. The delegation was followed by a steady flow of senior Japanese officials over the next two years, including former Prime Ministers Yoshio Mori (2003) and Hashimoto (2004). These visits indicated a change in Tokyo’s regional engagement. Koizumi and subsequent prime ministers have viewed Central Asia as an alternative energy supplier to the Middle East. A pressing concern was how to enmesh Japan in the already dense framework of regional institutional arrangements. During 2002 and 2003, discussions took place within MOFA and networking was utilized to informally sound out Central Asian leaders. Former Ambassador Akio Kawato noted that by 2003, there was strong support for a Central Asia plus Japan forum to strengthen regionalism and multilateralism. At the first Central Asian ambassadorial meeting held in the Uzbek capital Tashkent in September that year, delegates warmly endorsed the proposal (Kawato, 2007). Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi then proceeded to discuss this proposal with regional leaders, before the official announcement was made in Tashkent on 28 August 2004. The construction of the Central Asia plus Japan Dialogue in 2004 marked a new phase in Japan’s relationship with the “stans”. Based on the “ASEAN Plus Three” model, the forum elevated Japan’s position to that of a formal dialog partner on intraregional cooperation in Central Asia. At the inaugural meeting, a substantial range of regional issues were discussed and the following objectives were agreed: • •

• •

the strengthening of peace, stability, and democracy in the Central Asian region; the strengthening of the region’s economic foundations, the promotion of reform, and social development of the region, including the correction of intraregional disparities; the strengthening of intraregional cooperation in Central Asia; the maintenance and development of good relations between Central Asia and neighboring regions as well as with the international community; and

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cooperation between Japan and Central Asia with respect to both regional issues and issues having international dimensions (MOFA, 2004).

Each of the above objectives offered substantial scope for further Japanese involvement. The strengthening of peace, for example, involved discussion and active participation on counterterrorism measures, Afghanistan (as a major impact on stability in the region), small arms and light weapons, anti-personnel mines and denuclearization (MOFA, 2004). As a consequence, Tokyo has made a major commitment to the region and it has provided considerable capital in personnel and resources. A second layer of dialog (track two diplomacy) known as the “Central Asia Plus Japan: Tokyo Intellectual Dialogue” was inaugurated in 2006. The forum offers the opportunity for discussion in Tokyo for experts from Central Asia and Japan on key topics. The second track meetings also provide insight into Japanese efforts at networking and agenda setting. At the first track-two meeting, in June 2006, the focus was on energy-related issues (MOFA, 2007). Notably Japan’s focus had by this stage changed to a stronger emphasis on energy security. Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to the region, which was the first by a standing Japanese prime minister, in August 2006, was widely perceived as an attempt to secure Japan’s access to Central Asian energy resources. So far this has involved scoping and confidence building measures. Japan remains dependent on the Middle East for oil and trade with the region remains at a low level, though a burgeoning bilateral trade is emerging with Kazakhstan. However, as noted by Michael Green, the post-1997 “Silk Road diplomacy”, “might not provide much energy to Japan, but it does empower Tokyo to explore a larger diplomatic role in an area of crucial strategic significance to its powerful neighbors on the Eurasian landmass” (Green, 2003, p. 163).

Bilateral Relations Japan has sought engagement at both the bilateral and multilateral level in Central Asia. A central focus has been to consolidate and

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enhance human connections through a shared sense of “Asian identity”. At the bilateral level such efforts have come through regular meetings and confidence building measures, which have then filtered through to multilateral forums. A case in point was the nemawashi (literally, “wrapping around the roots” or preparing the groundwork) by Japanese diplomats on the Central Asia plus Japan dialog framework. Regular meetings with regional leaders offered sufficient support for the concept to be proposed at a meeting held in Tashkent in 2004. The following sections outline Tokyo’s bilateral relations with the countries of Central Asia.

Kazakhstan Kazakhstan is the largest of the Central Asian countries and the only country to share a border with all countries in the region. Rich in natural resources, particularly oil, natural gas, coal, and gold, the country has a burgeoning economy growing at over 9 percent per annum over the past six years. The Japanese Embassy was established on 26 January 1992 and the Kazakhstan Embassy opened in Tokyo on 22 February 1996 (MOFA, 2009a). Owing to energy security issues, commercial interest, geo-strategic location, and official visits, Kazakhstan is the most important partner for Japan in the region. As an example, Kazakhstan that has substantial oil and pig iron reserves also has 20 percent of the world’s supply of uranium and aspires to become the largest producer (surpassing current leaders Australia and Canada) by 2010 (Kassenova, 2008b). Though not stated officially, it is clear that Tokyo perceives the country to be of immense strategic importance. Apart from substantial ODA, Japan has invested close to US$2 billion in commercial ventures (MOFA, 2009a).

Kyrgyzstan A small nation-state with few resources apart from one gold mine (Lewis, 2008, p. 123), Kyrgyzstan has a weak economy. Japan opened its embassy in Bishkek in 2003 and it has been a major donor through the World Bank and the ADB. The Kyrgyz Embassy in Tokyo was

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opened in 2004 (MOFA, 2009b). The main areas of Japanese assistance include: the enhancement of transport infrastructure, agricultural development, social development, and the promotion of human security (Marat, 2007). The government of Kyrgyzstan has, since 2005, become increasingly authoritarian in nature. Japan’s response has been to focus on economic and cultural ties and to refrain from comment on domestic politics. A flourishing Japan Center has been established as part of soft power diplomacy to develop and cultivate personal ties and to deepen bilateral relations. The center also acts as an information center offering language training, an international satellite news services, and a well-stocked library with material in Japanese, English, and Russian (Marat, 2008).

Uzbekistan Diplomatic relations were recognized quickly after the breakdown of the Soviet Union. Embassies were established in Tashkent in January 1993 and in Tokyo in February 1996. Uzbekistan is the recipient of substantial Japanese ODA through loans and grants in excess of US$10 billion (MOFA, 2009c). Of particular interest has been Japan’s approach to the Uzbek regime after 2005. In July of that year, the brutal suppression of protesters in Andijan led to international condemnation of the government. However, there has been limited public criticism of the Andijan incident by Tokyo, which has emphasized respect for each other’s diversity and history. Thus, Japan has kept its focus on economic and cultural issues and developing personal relations through soft diplomacy and networking. By not condemning human rights abuses in the country, the Japanese Government, despite the close ties with the United Staes, has been able to retain its high profile in Uzbekistan.

Tajikistan Tajikistan is a poor country, bordering on China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, which was ravaged by a protracted civil war during the 1990s. Tajikistan is of geo-strategic significance and central to

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regional stability. The Japan opened its embassy in Dushanbe in January 2002. There have been regular visits to Tokyo by leading Tajik officials, including three visits by President Rahmonov since 2001 (MOFA, 2009d). Much of the Japanese aid has been in the form of emergency assistance for refugees from Afghanistan, internally afflicted persons, and natural disaster relief (MOFA, 2009d).

Turkmenistan Although rich in gas deposits, Turkmenistan is one of the poorest countries in the region and it is probably the most repressive of the awkward states in the region. Japan has maintained diplomatic ties since 1992 and opened its embassy in January 2005. Compared to the other countries in Central Asia, there has been limited exchange of visits and a lower amount of ODA. Notably, Turkmenistan is the only regional state with no direct investment from Japan (MOFA, 2009e).

Regional Integration: The Adaptive State Model in Action Unlike Russia and China, who through geography and history remain central to events in the region, Japan is not a Central Asian neighbor. Nonetheless, Japan has become a “player” in the regional “new great game” by adopting a multifaceted approach to regional issues. Officials in Tokyo have used a wide range of political and economic resources, diplomatic initiatives, and networking to gain trust and respect. A core theme in Japanese initiatives since 1997 has been to assist in establishing a loose regional organization. In this capacity, Japanese officials have been actively searching for ways to initiate a regional framework that will allow for greater levels of transparency, economic growth, and prosperity. The “Central Asia plus Japan Dialogue” is the premier example of Japan’s regional integration efforts at the multilateral level. So far three forums have been held (accompanied by the track-two “Intellectual Dialogue”). Key issues addressed have included energy security, terrorism, and narcotic trafficking. In this context, Japan’s

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role has been important and credible. A vital ingredient in the success of the forums has been Japan’s relative low-key posture and willingness to act as a facilitator. In a similar way, Japan has been active in establishing ODA and other forms of financial and capital assistance through multilateral agencies such as the World Bank, the IMF, and the ADB. The use of Yen loans, moreover, has allowed Japan to build considerable infrastructure in Central Asia: roads, upgraded airports, railways, bridges, power plants, and vocational schools. Indeed Japan was able to initiate, in an unprecedented move, that the Central Asian republics be beneficiaries of both the ADB and the OECD Developmental Assistance Committee list of developing countries (Len, 2005). There has also been a considerable effort made through soft diplomacy at the regional level. To this end, the Japan Foundation has been actively promoting a range of grants and exchange programs designed to financially assist students from the region to study in Japan. As well the Nippon Foundation, a private foundation, has provided funding for the Japan, Turkey, and Central Asia Friendship Association (JTCAFA). Successful applicants from Central Asia are sent to study in Ankara, Turkey for 12 months with optional Japanese language training and trips to Japan including visits to major cultural sites and meeting with relevant officials and parliamentarians. Designed to inculcate a sense of regional identity, the grant also fosters and supports student links between the Central Asian countries and Turkey (JTCAFA, 2009). Japan’s Central Asian agency, however, is confronted by two difficulties: dealing with SCO and the United States/NATO pressure on Japan to do more in Afghanistan. Tokyo’s relationship with SCO (see Chap. Six) has been problematic. Leadership rivalry between Japan and China in East Asia and Washington’s perception of SCO as an anti-US bloc have led to shared concerns about the organization in both Washington and Tokyo. For Japan, the main concern has been the potential for SCO to turn into an energy club monopolizing the region’s energy resources (Hirose, 2007). Nonetheless, Japan has engaged with SCO and this reflects its objective of ensuring that the region retains its autonomy and therefore it does not become dominated by China. Tokyo has indicated its preference for a broad framework bringing

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together the Central Asian states and the dominant external actors. There have been informal discussions about a “SCO plus Three (European Union, Japan, and United States)” as a way of ensuring that open regionalism is maintained in Central Asia (Kassenova, 2008b). The stabilization of Afghanistan has been a priority area for Japanese policymakers. The conundrum has been to balance the role in Afghanistan with sensitivities about the involvement of the United States and NATO in Central Asia. So far, Japan has managed to effectively support Euro-Atlantic initiatives in the region without endangering its bilateral relations in Central Asia. Key factors are Japan’s low posture on military issues and focus on economic reconstruction efforts. In 2002, Tokyo hosted an international conference on reconstruction and assistance for Afghanistan and it has been active in offering support through multilateral institutions as well as financial assistance through the ADB. Moreover, the Japanese government has announced that it will pay the salaries of 8000 members of Afghanistan’s police force for six months until presidential elections in August 2009, through the UNDP special fund (Japan Times, 8 March 2009). Central Asia, in this context, is viewed in Tokyo as being pivotal to stabilization of Afghanistan. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan supported by NATO and the US Central Command could also be a beneficiary of Japanese efforts toward Central Asian regionalism. Given the deterioration of relations between Washington and the Central Asian countries after the 2005 uprising in Andijan, Japan would be taking a considerable risk in pursuing this venture. Although the supplies are non-military (food, fuel, and building material) and therefore not violating Japan’s constitutional constraints, such actions could potentially erode Japan’s position as a neutral player in Central Asian politics. Pressure on Japan by the Obama Administration to play a greater role in Afghanistan will test Japanese diplomatic abilities.

An Assessment of Japanese Strategy in Central Asia This chapter has argued that Japan has played a substantial role in Central Asia since 1997 and it will continue to do so for the foreseeable

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future. Analytically, this regional agency suggests that the “adaptive state” model offers a more effective explanation of Japan’s external relations. A key feature of Tokyo’s policy has been a long-term commitment to stabilizing the region and encouraging open regionalism to promote stability and prosperity without an overt political agenda. In terms of state building, Japan has focused on assistance in building essential infrastructure (roads, train lines, bridges, schools, and hospitals) and it has been the leading ODA donor. There has also been an effort to maximize the impact of soft diplomacy through cultural exchanges, the establishment of Japanese Studies Centers and friendship societies. Noticeably, there has been minimal attention (apart from lip service to a few principles raised in broad policy statements) paid to domestic political issues. As a result and despite Tokyo’s close connections with Washington, Japan has been well received in the region as a partner and it has strong bilateral relations with all five states. The impact on regionalization is more difficult to gauge. On the one hand, Japan has been successful as demonstrated by the “Central Asia plus Japan Dialogue” and the raft of Japan-sponsored multilateral activities on terrorism, transportation of narcotics, and denuclearization. On the other hand, Japan appears to be utilizing massive resources without direct benefit. The adaptive neo-liberalist state model provides insightful understanding of Japan’s motives. Clearly, Tokyo has gone beyond straightforward realist driven goals such as competition with China more generally (and, especially, the Beijing-inspired rival multilateral organization — the SCO) and the desire to secure energy resources at all costs. This seems to indicate that Japanese officials are aware of the need to operate within a framework promoting open regionalism. This approach works within Japanese strengths, particularly given the constitutional constraints placed by Article 9 of the Japanese constitution. As a supporter of multilateralism and a leading contributor to a range of international organizations including the World Bank and the IMF, Tokyo has used its role in Central Asia as a springboard to the broader Eurasian region. Japan therefore considers initiatives in Central Asia as part of a larger strategy to stabilize political and

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economic norms in the region and to showcase Japanese leadership at the global level with a view to a permanent seat at the UN Security Council.

Related Websites Shigetsu Electronic Journal of Japanese–Islamic Relations: http:// www.shingetsuinstitute.com/publications2.htm. Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University: http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/ index-e.html. Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs: http://www.mofa.go.jp/. Japanese Ministry of Defense: http://www.mod.go.jp/e/index.html. Japan, Turkey, and Central Asia Friendship Association: http://www.jatcafa. org/scholarship.asp. Japanese Institute of International Affairs: http://www2.jiia.or.jp/en/ aboutus/index.php.

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Part Three

PROSPECTS AND TRAJECTORIES FOR THE AGENCY OF INTERNATIONAL ACTORS IN CENTRAL ASIA

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The Influence of External Actors in Central Asia Stephen Blank

Introduction Prior to the collapse of the USSR in 1991, Central Asian peoples had no tradition of independent statehood. Since becoming independent, the five former Central Asian republics of the Soviet Union have withstood serious internal and external challenges while their territories have become steadily more important for world politics. Their rising geopolitical importance stems from their proximity to major world powers, e.g., Russia, China, India, Iran, and cultural ties to Turkey, the international threat of Islamic terrorism emanating now from Afghanistan and Pakistan, and their possession of significant energy and raw material deposits. Not coincidentally these are among the main reasons for the great powers’ strategic interest in them (see Sestanovich, 1998; Talbott, 1997). This mounting rivalry among the great powers is another factor in this area’s rising geopolitical importance. Ever more actors are involving themselves here in politics, economics, and defense. This is not just a point that should be addressed to Russia, China, America, and the European Union. India, Pakistan, East Asian states, and Iran, even Turkey, are expanding their ties with the Central Asian states. As we shall see, these interventions are inherently problematical in character and diverse in their implications. For instance, Russia has already long since announced that it has the right to intervene to defend Soviet era pipelines and its access to economically vital regions. Presently and 281

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parallel to this declaration, the European Union is discussing a security pact to protect oil and gas infrastructure with Central Asian governments. Yet at the same time, and due to its war with Georgia, Russia is proclaiming not only that it has the right to defend Russians everywhere, but that it also has a sphere of influence throughout the former Soviet Union and beyond (Medvedev, 2008). Furthermore, even as these international rivalries intensify, virtually every analyst of the region has insisted or at least emphasized the fact that Central Aisan states’ internal security structures are intrinsically precarious. All of the region’s states suffer from authoritarian misrule that is ultimately bound to lead to a heightened risk situation. This risk environment could then quite easily explode during a major challenge to the system, e.g., a succession struggle, into a full-blown crisis that could even lead to insurgencies and terrorism (Matveeva, 2006, pp. 7–33; Blank, 2005; Brill Olcott, 2005). In other words, an interactive dynamic exists between the presumed inherent precariousness of the domestic structures of Central Asian states and the forces driving foreign governments and institutions into an ever-deeper involvement with Central Asia. Hence, the influence of all the great powers, multilateral security organizations, and international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank, IMF, and Asian Development Bank center on helping these states to overcome the very visible signs of economic and political underdevelopment or misrule and bad governance. But this external involvement takes myriad forms. Whereas America and Europe sponsor both governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to help provide the basis for greater liberalization and democratization, Russia and China intervene through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and through other wide-ranging means to provide support for the undemocratic status quo (Ambrosio, 2008). These other means underscore the intensity of the struggle that links domestic politics and foreign involvement in Central Asia. The Kremlin under Putin has established its own network of political consultants and election monitors, parallel to Western organizations, which Russia deploys in neighboring countries to help anti-democratic

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leaders keep their grip on power. The Kremlin also has allegedly helped the Tajikistan regime arrest a key opposition leader, tried to block European election monitors, launched an outpost of the pseudo-fascist group “Nashi” in Uzbekistan — and most prominently invaded Georgia. At the United Nations and other global bodies, Russia consistently opposes plans to sanction dictatorships […] As part of its broader anti-democratic initiative China now offers training programs for judges, police, and other law enforcement officials from Central Asia; in China, they can learn how to use the legal system to subtly prevent opposition in their home countries. (Kurlantzik, 2008, p. 31)

Although these various external forms of influence vary, they all share this point in common, the desire to help stabilizes the region against the threat of internal upheaval and externally abetted terrorism and fundamentalism. Therefore, beyond advancing their interests, the leaders of these governments and international institutions all act according to their lights to forestall the very real possibility of an explosion that endangers their interests in Central Asia. But obviously such stabilization operations, as well as other forms of involvement in Central Asia, aim to increase each organization’s particular influence and leverage upon the region and individual governments. Moreover, Central Asian regimes themselves, to the extent that they are involved in their neighbors’ business, do so for the same reason. Kazakhstan’s growing investments in Kyrgyzstan and overall economic involvement there are not purely altruistic acts or a search for productive investments, rather they represent an effort to invest in stabilizing a particularly precarious state whose stability Astana deems to be crucial to its interests. For the same reason, Kazakhstan founded the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), namely to secure its great standing in Asia and to provide a forum through which Kazakhstan could help provide security and participate with others in doing so in Asia (Khamzayeva, 2008). Thus, in today’s iteration of the new great game, two important differences distinguish it from the old version. First, there are

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many more and new actors involved in Central Asia, not all of whom are states, e.g., the European Union as an integral actor, and international financial institutions. These actors also include the regional states themselves who are now as much subjects of international relations as they are objects of other actors’ attention. Thus, they too can act to influence their neighbors’ development.

The Absence of Regional Cooperation as a Source of External Involvement The lack of sufficient regional cooperation has facilitated this external involvement in Central Asia. In the past, Central Asian states have more often than not sought to insulate themselves against the consequences of their neighbors’ misrule thereby inhibiting the growth of regional cooperation. Central Asian governments feared that misrule or instability in any one state could then be exported to them. For instance, in 2004, Vladimir Bozhko, first deputy director of Kazakhstan’s National Security Committee, publicly warned that as long as Uzbekistan and Afghanistan’s populations remain economically depressed and the local situation in those countries remains politically volatile, Kazakhstan will be at risk from terrorist attacks (Yermukanov, 2004). As signs of continuing repression and misrule in Uzbekistan, and of instability and misrule in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan multiply, the anxiety expressed by Bozhko continues to pervade regional governments. Such anxiety should trigger international concern for: The closing down of Uzbekistan is more than a threat to the country’s own population. It also represents a growing danger to all Central Asian nations. The arbitrary behavior of Karimov’s administration is increasingly seen as a destabilizing factor for the entire region. (Rashid, 2004; emphasis added)

Thus, Uzbekistan was then and may yet become an exporter rather than an importer of Islamic extremism throughout Central Asia,

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including Afghanistan, particularly when the inevitable succesison to President Islam Karimov occurs (Rashid, 2008). If this trend toward mounting unrest under a façade of strong repression continues, the destabilization of Uzbekistan could, as Farkhod Tolipov (2004) warned, become a catalyst for the spread of similar trends and it forces to other Central Asian countries and then back to Afghanistan again, thus undermining, if not undoing, what has been accomplished since 2001 there. The same holds true for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and it is this general anxiety about Central Asian futures that also drives external efforts either to reform it or to entrench the status quo. For example, when President Sapirmurad Niyazov of Turkmenistan died suddenly in December 2006, clearly his successors were quite alarmed about the possibility of an internal uprising and many foreign observers feared that an uprising might break out there and quickly spread to neighboring states (Blank, 2007a). Similarly Russia is quite concerned about the possibility of Islamic fundamentalist and terrorist takeovers in Central Asia and, it among other potential ways of influencing the situation, it is contemplating the introduction of military forces to preempt or block such outcomes. As a result of the Russo–Uzbek agreement of 2006, Russia will be able to gain access to the Navoi air base in Uzbekistan in case of emergencies or what some reports called “force majeure” contingencies. In return, Russia will provide Uzbekistan with modern navigation systems and air defense weapons. Since Afghan-based terrorists lack the capability to launch air strikes in Central Asia and neither Moscow nor Tashkent is rushing to send forces to Afghanistan to fight the Taliban, this provision suggests that both sides had other contingencies in mind. Access to an air base in Navoi adds to Russia’s capability to project air and air defense assets in and to Central Asia against a possible domestic insurgency, e.g., another Andizhan uprising, or one resembling it, or an uprising triggered by a succession crisis, or a foreign military operation (which seems very unlikely). Since both Moscow and Beijing showed considerable anxiety over their inability to intervene in Kyrgyzstan in 2005’s Tulip Revolution and have subsequently both made conscious efforts to achieve the necessary power projection capability, this base is part of Russia’s

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larger efforts to encompass all of Central Asia in a single defense organization whose aims are frankly counter-revolutionary or antidemocratic. Russia has already supported turning the SCO into a miliary organization that could intervene for such purposes in Central Asia. Thus, Ilyas Sarsembaev notes that: Some Russian military analysts consider that if Kyrgyzstan was overtaken by a complete political collapse, Russia and Kazakhstan could impose some kind of protectorate until stability could be reestablished and new elections held. In this scenario, the United States would allow Moscow to take action in Kyrgyzstan, because most of its own resources would already be mobilized in Iraq and Afghanistan — and probably in Iran and Syria. Russian help would then be welcomed and much preferred to that of China. Indeed, if Russia did not dare to put itself forward as a stabilizng force, China might use Uyghur separatism. (Sarsembaev, 2006, p. 33)

Russia has also occasionally sought allies to help it in this quest to keep a friendly government in power. At times it has eagerly sought to bring India into a partnership with it to enforce security there, soliciting New Delhi’s participation in its military alliance for Central Asia the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Russian and Indian diplomats thus began discussions in February 2006 on the possibility of enlarging the CSTO and on whether India might participate in its forums. Specifically, two reasons for this initiative have been cited. Firstly, because of the unstable situation created by the possibility of a military crisis over Iran, India is forced into seeking to secure, as quickly as possible, access to energy sources in post-Soviet Central Asia, sources whose availability would be guaranteed by some political and military mechanism; in an emergency, the CSTO institutions could be mobilized to ensure the security of gas and oil production in the region. Second, a war against Iran could destabilize India’s

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neighbor Pakistan where radical Islamists are influential; this could amount to a serious threat to the whole region. (Sarsembaev, 2006, p. 30)

Domestic Security as a Driver of External Intervention At the same time for the major actors adjoining Central Asia — India, Pakistan, Russia, and China — their involvement appears to be driven not just by traditional geopolitics but also by a belief that their own domestic security requires such action. Thus Pakistan views this ongoing contest for influence in Afghanistan as an essential issue in its national security. According to diplomats, it also views U.S. forces in Afghanistan as providing security for Pakistan in its strategic depth, which role cannot be minimized. Pakistan also considers that India, Iran, China, and Russia will not consider it in their own interests for Pakistan to have a final, completely safe border with Afghanistan. This Pakistani view, whether correct or not, is the perception by which Islamabad views its national security interests in Central Asia. (Meppen, 2006, p. 27)

That has been and continues to be the rationale behind Pakistan’s decades-long efforts to mastermind a pro-Pakistan regime in Afghanistan and its continuing support for the Taliban (Rashid, 2008). For its part both India and China also approach Central Asia as an outgrowth of their domestic security concerns. India’s primary instinct, to put it another way, is self-preservation […] India wants to see the Central Asian Republics (CARs) evolve into progressive, secular democracies, neutral in disposition and independent in fact […] the inherent weakness of some of the CARs makes them extremely vulnerable to hostile forces and destabilization. To prevent this India needs to be proactive on various fronts. Russia’s influence in the region is receding at a remarkable pace and the

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resultant space is being filled by various conflicting forces. If there is any consensus by the major powers on Central Asia, it is on the need to check the inroads by militant Islamic forces. But state and non-state forces from Pakistan, the Middle East, and some other countries are continuing to erode the region’s secular character. Economic and military competition, if not outright rivalry among the big powers, is also, inadvertently in some cases, adding to regional contradictions. Within the republics, a volatile mix of ethnic and religious groups is pulling in different directions. The democratic urge is battling autocratic tradition. Abruptly dispossessed economic classes are railing against the affluent. In short, Central Asia is caught in an age of turbulence. (Banerjee, 2004, p. xii)

Undoubtedly not the least of its motives for assisting forces trying to destabilize Afghanistan is Islamabad’s fear about rising Indian influence there and in Central Asia. India’s endeavors are hardly altruistic but reflect enduring geopolitical interests (Weinbaum, 2006, p. 16). Therefore, it is hardly surprising that former US intelligence analyst Michael Scheuer observed that: India, having invested $750 million, has deployed what appears to be half of its diplomatic corps and moved in commandos to protect its nationals. India clearly envisions an Afghanistan that is pro New Delhi, is perceived by Islamabad as an Indian vassal, and provides a platform for Indian intelligence operations into Pakistan. (Scheuer, 2006, p. 116)

Neither is India uniquely cynical in this regard given the extent of continuing Pakistani support for the Taliban and the large-scale intervention by all of Afghanistan’s neighbors in its affairs. Nevertheless it is inescapably the case that whenever India and Afghanistan grow friendly, Pakistan grows anxious and one reason for close Indo-Afghani relations is precisely Pakistan’s continuing toleration of terrorist and Islamist elements within its own country (Tarzi, 2006).

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India’s interests in Afghanistan comprise both security and access to energy either through Turkmenistan and Afghanistan or through Iran and Afghanistan. They also comprise checking Pakistan’s ability to gain the dominant influence there. And those Indian interests are recognized abroad as London has apparently asked it to contribute troops to Afghanistan. A recent study by the US Institute of Peace illustrates the scope of Indian efforts in Afghanistan and the linkages between energy and security. India has worked hard to win the confidence of the Post-Taliban government in Kabul. New Delhi has contributed $565 million toward Afghan reconstruction — the sixth largest contributor divided among infrastructure repair, humanitarian assistance, and institutional and human resource development. A wide spectrum of programs includes highway repair, communications, energy, health care, and capacity building in contributors to secondary education and the training of diplomats and bureaucrats. India will finance the construction of a new parliament building at a cost of $50 million. Indian-donated Tata buses are a key part of Kabul’s public transportation. Assistance to Afghanistan’s reconstruction advertises India’s claims to be a regional economic power, ready to assume regional responsibilities. Indian activities in Afghanistan regularly draw complaints from Pakistan. Few actions rankled the Pakistanis more than the opening of Indian consulates in several Afghan cities, where they seem designed mostly as listening posts to monitor Pakistani influences and activities. But Pakistan sees more sinister motives than simple intelligence gathering, accusing the Indians through its consulates in Kandahar and Jalalabad of fostering an insurgency inside Pakistan’s Balochistan. Pakistan takes this especially seriously because the Chinese built port at Gwadar stands at the southern boundary of the province. The port is central to Pakistan’s plans to create a new international route for sea traffic that could serve China, but also Afghanistan and Central Asia. Meanwhile India is building an $80 million road linking Afghanistan’s Kandahar province with the Iranian port at Chahbahar and providing a 300 man paramilitary force to ensure the security of Indian workers. (Weinbaum, 2006, p. 16; emphasis added)

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China’s case is in many respects quite similar in its motives. Its newly announced special development plan for China’s minorities, announced for the first time separately from its overall Five Year Plan, not only allocates large sums to investment in minority regions, it also will create a specific control system for minorities to “avoid separatist activities and maintain national stability” (Asianews, 2007). But in order to ensure Xinjiang’s economic growth, China must encourage it to trade with Central Asia, especially as Xinjiang is becoming China’s largest energy-producing province and the site of its nuclear test center at Lop Nor. For a long time, it has remained a truism for Chinese analysts of Central Asia that the economic growth of Xinjiang, China, and Central Asia are inextricably tied together. Thus, in 1998, Guancheng Xing wrote: For China, a Central Asia which is capable of overcoming its economic difficulties and getting out of its economic crises has a better chance of achieving economic prosperity and political stability. China can benefit greatly from its stable and prosperous neighboring states. Only when Central Asian states are politically stable and economically prosperous can Sino-Central Asian economic cooperation be conducted effectively and smoothly. Such economic cooperation can and will speed up economic development in the Northwest of China. It can therefore be argued that to a large extent the stability and prosperity of Northwest China is closely bound up with the stability and prosperity of Central Asia. It is, rightly, because of this consideration that China advocates and promotes active trade and economic cooperation between China and Central Asian states for common economic prosperity. (Xing, 1998, p. 35; emphasis original)

Since then this consensus has held among analysts and policymakers alike (Hawkins and Lowe, 2006). Xinjiang’s importance has grown as Central Asia’s security has become more important to world politics and as China has become a major energy importer. Consequently, the same logic of economic improvement and trade as mitigating factors

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of instability in Xinjiang also applies to Chinese foreign policy insofar as the economic component of its ties to Central Asia are concerned. Therefore, an important but under-appreciated element of China’s policies in Central Asia has been its substantial asistance to local governments to build major rail, transportation, telecommunications, and other forms of infrastructure throughout Central Asia and tie them to Chinese terminals. The same holds true for major ports in the Indian Ocean such as Gwadar in Pakistan that can then link up with these land based systems through equivalent investments in and by Pakistan (Garver, 2005, pp. 206–209). China’s economic policies in Central Asia foster bilateral and multilateral ties in trade, energy, and beyond, not only for the inherent benefits that such trade and investment provide but also to gain leverage upon weaker Central Asian governments so that they will comply with China’s demands for curtailing support to Muslim and Uighur movements in Xinjiang lest they incur Beijing’s visible displeasure. China’s motives and tactics are well understood and often resented in Central Asia (Akimbekov, 2002; Burnashev, 2002; Syroezhkin, 2002). For example, China holds Central Asian businessmen in China as “collateral” — i.e., hostages for their governments’ good behavior on issues pertaining to Xinjiang (Najibullah, 2004). Indeed, China’s growing presence in Kazakhstan’s energy sector — and Kazakhstan is China’s most crucial partner in Central Asia because of its energy — is clearly generating charges and counter-charges concerning the extent of China’s influence and the potential threat posed by its economic power. For this reason there is evidence of Kazakh moves to restrict Chinese influence and presence in that sector. And for the same reason, the European Union has also expressed concern about Chinese energy moves in Central Asia. Nevertheless Chinese analysts continue to believe that only with Chinese help can Central Asia overcome impediments to economic development. According to the Chinese scholar S. Zhaungzhi, “SCO members share a common border. It is unimaginable for Central Asian countries to develop their economies and to maintain domestic stability without support from their neighbors” (cited in Dwivedi, 2006, p. 155). It need not be added that this is a

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traditionally neo-colonialist view of so-called backward states and their relationship to the metropole. Finally, close examination of Russia’s energy economy shows that Russia must monopolize Central Asian energy flows in order to continue its political economy and the current ruling system based on cheap domestic energy at home (or cheaper energy at home) and sales at market price abroad. Much of Russia’s neo-imperial designs in Central Asia are connected with the fact that the Kremlin’s global economic strategy is dependent on Moscow’s continued access to cheap Central Asian energy. Central Asian energy is far cheaper to extract than Russia’s, thus the Kremlin uses it for Russian domestic consumption, which is heavily subsidized, while shipping Siberian production abroad. The ensuing price manipulation is the source of enormous revenues that helps sustain the government and overall Russian economy. It is easy to see how the loss of control over Central Asian energy exports and production would severely damage Russia’s political and economic interests. If Central Asian states start pumping oil to China and Azerbaijan, Russia would likely have to use its own production to meet domestic needs. This, in turn, would dash Moscow’s export plans for Europe and Asia. At the very least, the availability of other export options would force Moscow to pay considerably higher prices for Central Asian oil and gas — a development that could have ruinous consequences for the Russian economy. (Blank, 2006a)

While Russia is clearly the most successful power in regard to achieving its energy aims in Central Asia, given the centrality of energy questions in today’s world, on a day-to-day basis the great powers’ main efforts go into influencing Central Asian energy policy particularly with respect to pipelines (Nygren, 2007; 2008). These are only a few of the multiple ways in which foreign governments and international institutions seek to affect trends in Central Asia. But what this analysis shows is that Central Asian internal and external security is becoming

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increasingly intertwined with the security agendas at home and abroad of powerful Asian states and regional rivalries in South Asia as well as rivalries between America and Russia, America and China, Russia and China, and finally Indo-Chinese relations. Since “power projection activities are an input into the world order”, Russian, European, Chinese, and American force deployments into the Transcaspian and economic-political actions to gain access, influence and power in the region represent potentially competitive and profound, attempts at effecting a long-term restructuring of the regional strategic order (Houweling and Amineh, 2004, p. 15). And in many cases — most notably Russian, Chinese, and Pakistani intervention — the clear preference of those external states is for a resulting situation in which the real sovereignty and freedom of maneuver of the target states, be it Afghanistan or a former Soviet republic, is diminished. Thus, Central Asian governments must also balance the outcomes of this intervention which in many cases is vitally needed, e.g., external assistance, security provision, or access to pipelines, with the effort to prevent incursions into their real sovereignty and/or domestic upheavals. Indeed, such diminution of sovereignty could contribute to their becoming failed states as dependency inevitably hobbles efforts to build viable states that have vibrant links to society and genuine legitimacy. So far they have been successful. Despite seventeen years of increasing rivalry among international institutions and states, and the entrenched misrule regularly underlined by scholars, there is no sign of any such upheavals happening anytime soon. Even in the two successions that have occurred, the so-called “Tulip revolution” of 2005 in Kyrgyzstan and the succession in Turkmenistan after Niyazov died in late 2006, no upheaval has occurred although Kyrgyzstan seems to be perpetually on the edge of one. Obviously, the facts seem to have played a trick on the paradigm makers. How is it then, that despite these twin phenomena of internal misrule and mounting and ever more pervasive foreign influences, and the ubiquitous presumption of formidable internal security threats and deficits that the Central Asian states seem to be stable (see Tabyshalieva, 2006)?

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Internal Weakness and External Intervention It has been suggested that one must look at the interplay between the Central Asian states’ simultaneous need (typical of Third World states) to build both internal and external security in environments where the very concept of a state is contested, if not altogether questionable (Blank, 2008c, pp. 23–39). These countries simultaneously face the exigencies of both state-building, i.e., assuring internal security, and defense against external threats without sufficient means or time or resources to compete successfully with other more established states. Not surprisingly their primary concern becomes internal security and their continuation in power; hence, the proliferation of multiple military forces, intelligence, and police forces in these countries, often enjoying more resources than do their regular armies, and their governments’ recourse to rent-seeking, authoritarian, and clientilistic policies (Ayoob, 1999; 2002). These facts possess significant relevance for any discussion of security, particularly in the Third World, including Central Asia, where the security environment is one of “reversed anarchy”: While in modernity the inside of a state was supposed to be orderly, thanks to the workings of the state as a Hobbesian “Leviathan”, the outside remained anarchic. For many states in the Third World, the opposite seems closer to reality — with fairly orderly relations to the outside in the form of diplomatic representations, but total anarchy within. (Alekseev, 2003, p. 12)

Similarly, Amitav Acharya observes that: Unlike in the West, national security concepts in Asia are strongly influenced by concerns for regime survival. Hence, security policies in Asia are not so much about protection against external military threats, but against internal challenges. Moreover, the overwhelming proportion of conflicts in Asia fall into the intra-state category, meaning they reflect the structural weaknesses of the state, including

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a fundamental disjunction between its territorial and ethnic boundaries. Many of these conflicts have been shown to have a spillover potential; hence the question of outside interference is an everpresent factor behind their escalation and containment. Against this backdrop, the principle of non-interference becomes vital to the security predicament of states. And a concept of security that challenges the unquestioned primacy of the state and its right to remain free from any form of external interference arouses suspicion and controversy. (Acharya, 2007, p. 241)

Indeed, for these states, and arguably even for transitional states such as Russia, internal police forces enjoy greater state resources than do the regular armies, this being a key indicator of the primacy of internal security as a factor in defining the term national security (Cooper, 2007). Nevertheless, at the end of the day, it also still remains true that if they cannot defend themselves militarily against these threats that have arisen due to a previous failure to provide security, they go under as classical thinking about hard security would predict. This is also the case in Central Asia where the central issue is ensuring the continuation in power of the ruling regime and of the president’s power (Matveeva, 2005, pp. 133–153; 2006, pp. 7–33). Even though these states acknowledge themselves to face external threats of terrorism and narcotic trafficking from Afghanistan which then corrupts and corrodes the socio-political fabric in their countries, those threats are second to the preservation of the status quo. Indeed, to a certain extent, governments outsource part or most of the responsibility for dealing with those issues to other states and major power. They have also shown considerable willingness to associate themselves with Russia and China in regard to issues such as external calls for liberalization and democracy. Thus until now, states such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have pursued multivector diplomacy aiming to make themselves agreeable to all their neighbors and all the great powers so as to avoid having to choose among them. Likewise,

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they play up their weakness as something that cannot be allowed to go further in order to extract aid and assistance from these powers and they exploit the almost compulsive efforts of the great powers to enlist them for their side against the other rivals in order to gain more autonomy (Gaddis, 2005, pp. 119–155). In this respect, they are clearly emulating what Third World states often sought to do during the Cold War, often with great success. Through this “multivector” diplomacy, local governments have hitherto been able to mitigate their potential external security dilemmas by exploiting great and major power rivalries to secure tangible security assistance that they could not otherwise produce on their own. They thereby prevent or have sought to prevent any of those external powers from dominating the regional security agenda if not the region. This external assistance is becoming ever more costly as the cost of energy and Central Asia’s ability to export it to diverse markets rises and as the region’s strategic importance grows making investment in it ever more necessary for those powers who have interests or wish to see themselves as great international actors. The security and material assistance they provide allowed Central Asian regimes to worry less about external threats, and even to forego genuine regional integration while they can concentrate on exploiting those rivalries and the circumstances that grow out of them such as energy rivalry to increase their domestic security, and leverage enough resources such as energy rents with which to keep domestic challenges at bay. Thus, the new great game has materially assisted domestic security in Central Asia and not only by foreclosing possibilities for any one power to dominate it. One way such rivalry contributes to regional security is through direct material assistance — e.g., China’s $900 million loan to local governments after the SCO summit in 2005, NATO’s help through the Partnership for Peace, in building up Kazakhstan’s armed forces, US presence in Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan, Russia’s military presence in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and more recently Uzbekistan, and the growing scope of the exercises of SCO member forces against terrorism, separatism, and extremism, as displayed at the 2007 exercises. The SCO also functions in this way on behalf of regional governments.

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Such assistance not only brings rewards in itself, but it also stimulates anxieties about one or another power winning forcing the other state to make greater investments in Central Asia in order to retrieve their influence. Thus, Chinese investments in pipelines from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have not only led Moscow to invest in building their own new ones from these countries to Russia, the Kremlin has also agreed to pay Ashgabat $130/tcm of gas, a 30-percent increase. In turn that led Ashgabat to hold out with China for a price of $195/tcm, a price that became its benchmark for all future sales abroad. Likewise, Uzbekistan was able to secure that price of $130/tcm from Gazprom, which is 30 percent higher than the previous price it paid and then it along with other producers were able to force Russia to agree to a price of $300/tcm in 2008 before the ensuing financial crash of that year. Similarly, the rivalry with the European Union and America for influence over the direction of gas pipelines has also led Russia to discuss new energy deals with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan which both those states eagerly want and which gives them more resources to meet pressing internal challenges even if Russia raises its profile in their countries (Marat, 2008). Indeed Moscow’s elite appears to view any gain by China or America in Central Asia with unceasing paranoia. Thus, its media repeatedly speculates about China’s economic “conquest” of Central Asia and regards the handover of two obsolete Huey helicopters by Washington to Astana as the beginning of the end of Russian influence there (Panfilova, 2007). Alternatively, the benefits the Central Asian governments gain from such multi-vector diplomacy where other actors are allowed in to provide security against domestic threats may be purely political as in the case of the SCO’s political dimension. For Moscow and Beijing, a key purpose of the SCO is to organize and articulate regional support for the ouster of American bases from Central Asia and to prevent the formation of any kind of American-led security organization there. At the same time, a second clear purpose of the SCO is to provide a forum for its members’ virtually unanimous opinion that Washington should not interfere in their domestic arrangements. In other words, it functions, inter alia, as an organization of mutual

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protection and for the granting of the international legitimacy, its members so desperately lack and crave. All the members support the continuation of the status quo and have united to reject calls for externally interested parties such as Washington on behalf of democratic norms. Thus, Russia and China provide both security and ideological cover for local regimes, allowing them to continue on their preset course with some sense that key players will back them up (Ambrosio, 2008).

Threats from External Intervention On the other hand, current regional trends suggest that the scope for Central Asian regimes to play this game may be narrowing. At present, it appears quite conclusively that Russia has won or it will win in the contest with the West for control of Central Asian pipelines, leaving Central Asian energy producers with only China as an alternative pipeline route and thus confirming their relative, even neocolonial, dependence upon Russia (Kandiyotti, 2008). And since Russia has now openly and formally proclaimed that Central Asia, along with the rest of the CIS, is part of its sphere of influence, these states’ continuing propensity to rely upon Russia or to yield to Russian pressure could soon lead to intensified Russian efforts to reduce their real freedom of maneuver in world politics (Medvedev, 2008). Then, these states and their governing elites would fall victims to a process of integration not in the world but in a Russiandominated bloc, what could be called “transimperialism”. Transimperialism is the extension of Russian patrimonial authoritarianism into a globalized world. Russia can trade and invest without being open and permeable by selectively integrating transnational elite networks in the globalized international economic system and replicating the patron–client relations of power, dependency, and rent seeking and distribution at the transnational level. Russian foreign policy is increasingly founded on creating transnational elite networks for access to rent-creating opportunities in the globalized international economy Moscow functions as the arbiter and control point for Russia’s interaction with the outside economy to ensure that Russia

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is not exposed to the liberalizing effects of marketization, competition, and diversification of interests and local power. If that were to happen, the political system that keeps the present leadership in power would be at risk of failing. In this sense, globalization is a threat not to Russian national interests but to the interests of Russia’s political leadership. (Wallander, 2007, pp. 117–118)

To the extent that this becomes the case the freedom of action currently enjoyed by such masters of “multivector” diplomacy such as Karimov and Nazarbayev will be considerably restricted, especially if their successors do not enjoy their authority. If we are right about succession cases, they may actually lead, at last for a time, to an effective diminution of these states’ de facto capacity for independent action in world politics. Certainly, if their success in exporting their energy assets remains tied to Russia, they will be kept in a permanent state of neocolonial dependency upon Moscow for the successful export of their cash crop and they will be unable to set market prices for those exports, thus being locked into an inherently sub-optimal status as a petro-state with all the political and economic deformations attached to that status. Another very real danger is that Pakistan’s intervention in Afghanistan, i.e., the provision of support and safe haven for Taliban and associated militants might succeed thereby opening up the entire region to the possibility of further terrorist and subversive movements. However, the bigger danger is Russian neo-imperial efforts to enclose Central Asia in its sphere of influence. This is not just a question of military intervention or political action to ensure the continuation of the status quo. While Russia sees itself as the gendarme of Central Asia (just as it was the Gendarme of Europe under Nicholas I), it also demands control over the region’s vital economic resources. Andrei Grozin, head of the department on Central Asia and Kazakhstan at Russia’s Institute for CIS countries, has frankly outlined Russia’s approach to energy issues with Central Asian states: Proper defense services do not come cheap. Russia’s effective policy should be placed on the firm basis of a wide economic presence and

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large-scale and mutually economic projects. Genuine alliance relations require an economic basis — Moscow should take part in mining, it should have a share in the region’s railways and highways, power lines, generating facilities and pipelines. (Grozin, 2007, p. 56)

Grozin’s idea of mutually advantageous economic projects may be seen in his remarks that: For successful economic cooperation with Russia “in the nearest future Uzbekistan will need to give up the system of state capitalism, in particular, by “shaking” servicing of expensive ore mining and energy industries off state shoulders.” [Grozin] believes that if Gazprom obtains control over Uzbekistan’s gas transporting system, Lukoil is granted free access to exploration and extraction of oil and Russia’s expansion into the nutrition and light industry sectors of the Uzbek market takes place, then one can say that the Russian state has received what it expected from the [Russo-Uzbek treaty of November 2005] alliance treaty. (Grozin, 2007, p. 56)

Elsewhere Grozin admits that Russia’s neo-imperial policies are in many respects against economic logic although they make excellent geopolitical sense from an imperial perspective. Thus, he writes: The changes on the world market might force the Russian Federation to start importing uranium instead of exporting it. This may happen in the relatively near future. For this reason, the uranium of Kazakhstan and its products are of special interest for Russia, while bilateral cooperation in the atomic, space research, and other high tech applied spheres might pull all the other branches along with them. Russia does not profit financially from its relations with Kazakhstan, which have nothing to do with altruism: financial input is accepted as payment for Russia’s geopolitical interests and national security. This is a long-term strategy that allows the Republic of Kazakhstan to adjust its nearly entire scientific and

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technical potential to Russia: Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are two key Central Asian states. This strategy also applies to the military-technical sphere — Moscow sells its resources for “allied” prices not only to strengthen military and foreign policy contacts with Kazakhstan, but also tie it, for many years to come, to Russia’s military-industrial complex and standards. (Grozin, 2006, p. 45)

Grozin’s recommendations and the closely corresponding Russian policy should not be seen as classical or traditional imperialism. Current conditions prevent that from happening, but Moscow’s policies would clearly diminish the sovereignty of Central Asian states and their opportunities for economic progress, showing those policies to be truly neo-colonialist. The character of such policies may be described as follows. On their face, the distinctions between the heartland, the rimland, and the World Island have become analytically inaccurate. The empirical manifestations of this inaccuracy are manifold: globalization, intercontinental ballistic missiles, weapons of mass destruction, globally operating terrorist networks, Islamic fundamentalism, and transnational organized crime. These phenomena render any notion of territorial control functionally meaningless, regardless of military power. A more apt description of recent developments in the rimland and the heartland would outline preventive and repressive crisis management for regional stabilization and influence or a “muddling through” (Hess, 2004, p. 96). Thus, it seems unlikely that Moscow or Beijing would be interested in the territorial control of these states, but it is likely that they will (as Moscow has already indicated) aim to enfold them in a more or less exclusive sphere of influence where they will either individually or bilaterally exercise this “preventive and repressive crisis management for regional stabilization and influence”. The problem with this approach is that “hegemonic ambitions come at the cost of regional local development and ignore the need for effective preventive measures against asymmetric threats” (Hess, 2004, p. 105). This policy

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would privilege the needs of external interveners or one of them over those of domestic development and thus create a relationship of dependency that inherently diminishes the capacity of the dependent state to provide effective or legitimate governance to its peoples. It creates a permanently weak state that is not only in danger of failing, but because of its weakness is a catalyst for festering international rivalries that often lead to larger wars. In this respect, the current trends in external intervention in Central Asia betray an inherently problematic character. The need for this intervention is all too visible yet its costs are ultimately very high and even dangerous for those who welcome it. As Central Asia will remain for some time to come in the center of world attention due to the war in Afghanistan and the global energy crisis, intervention to rescue beleaguered states or to exploit their weaknesses on behalf of the intervener will be inevitable. The task for both sides is to remember that the deeper the intervention, the more inextricable it becomes with good money going after bad. If intervention is uncontrolled, it no longer becomes part of a search for stability or to balance among the various competitors for influence or access there. Instead, the target country then becomes one of the wrecks of empire where future political leaders in both the intervening country and the target state can say with Shelley’s Ozymandias, “look on my works ye mortals and despair”.

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accession 35, 74, 80, 169, 228, 232 actorness 4, 14, 15, 21, 174, 235 adaptation 3, 7, 23, 31, 38, 49, 62, 63, 65, 242 Afghanistan 7, 29, 31, 36, 37, 39–41, 43–46, 57, 102, 103, 105, 125, 128, 155, 156, 158, 172, 179, 181, 182, 188, 189, 224, 225, 228, 236, 238, 255, 256, 268, 270, 272–275, 281, 284–289, 293, 295, 296, 299, 302 agency 2–5, 8, 9, 12, 14–23, 27, 30, 33, 34, 37, 39, 46, 50, 62, 68, 73, 75, 78, 85, 87, 93, 107, 110, 115, 129, 154, 170, 172, 174, 177, 179, 182, 186, 207, 214, 220, 227, 234, 235, 239, 240, 242, 255, 257, 259, 274, 276, 279 Armenia 59, 165, 201, 208 ASEAN 264, 269 authoritarianism 53, 83, 84, 151, 187, 252, 298

awkward state 4, 8, 12, 13, 14, 18, 23, 89, 92, 95, 106, 179, 183, 186, 273 Azerbaijan 58, 159, 192, 199, 206, 207, 208, 236, 292 Balkans 65, 75, 79, 201, 212 Belgium 35, 200 Black Sea 201, 207 Bulgaria 103, 201, 209 Canada 194, 271 Caucasus 7, 10, 65, 80, 153, 159, 178, 181, 192, 195, 197, 201, 204, 210, 212, 224, 232, 268 Central Asia 1, 29, 49, 71, 89, 117, 149, 177, 191, 215, 239, 261, 279 identity 7, 11, 15, 59, 68, 73–75, 173, 191–195, 198–204, 206, 208, 209, 211–213, 239, 242, 245, 255, 258, 259, 266, 271, 274 population 7, 10, 14, 22, 23, 42, 65, 66, 85, 98,

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136, 139, 150, 155, 172, 194, 210, 228, 252, 254, 284 region 1, 29, 50, 71, 89, 118, 149, 177, 192, 215, 246, 261, 282 states 2, 29, 50, 71, 89, 117, 150, 177, 192, 215, 246, 266, 282 CFSP 73 “charm offensive” 143 Chechnya 10, 126, 127, 157, 160, 210 CIS 58, 59, 154, 156, 159, 164, 233, 298, 299 clans 97 Cold War 4, 9, 29, 30, 32, 49, 51, 52, 63, 74, 89, 90, 94, 95, 99, 111, 113, 119, 120, 151, 154, 178, 179, 192, 193, 197–202, 208, 242–245, 248, 249, 255, 261–263, 265, 266, 296 constructivism 33, 194 corruption 62, 78, 81, 99,107, 111 CSTO 11, 59, 82, 165, 169, 171, 286 democracy 37, 44, 53, 54, 56, 61, 65, 80, 81, 83, 85, 112, 122, 130, 169, 181, 182, 200, 204, 210, 239, 252, 269, 295 diplomacy 118, 119, 132, 261, 263–268, 270, 272, 274, 276, 295–297, 299

enlargement 31, 34, 40, 75, 79, 201 EU 8, 77, 87, 104, 197, 199 Eurasia 11, 23, 32, 58, 59, 119, 128, 132, 137, 139, 153, 155, 160, 169, 173, 180, 188, 225, 234, 270, 276 Europeanization 51, 84 fragmegration 4, 15, 18, 19 France 71, 101, 151, 200, 218 Georgia 41, 86, 132, 133, 152, 159, 160, 171, 174, 181, 201, 210, 282, 283 geopolitics 16, 57, 117, 117, 143, 201, 220, 287 Germany 71, 79, 200 great game 16, 37, 154, 237 Greece 201 hegemony 10, 19, 110, 121, 182, 216 IMF 93, 262, 274, 276, 282 imperialism 151, 298, 301 India 8, 21, 101, 117, 131, 157, 159, 171, 211, 230, 231, 234, 239, 241–259, 281, 286–289 integration 10, 12, 52, 55, 56, 58, 60, 71, 75, 110, 112, 120, 121, 136, 142, 143, 144, 146, 154, 155, 165, 169, 200, 204, 215, 221, 223, 226, 231, 232, 237, 253, 268, 273, 296, 298

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international relations 2, 4, 8, 15, 18, 22, 33, 73, 76, 95, 135, 191, 217, 237, 240, 242, 245, 246, 249, 266, 284 intervention 61, 62, 95, 98, 132, 133, 178, 287, 288, 293, 294, 298, 299, 302 Iran 7, 8, 16, 21, 58, 117, 131, 143, 156, 158, 159, 161, 167, 168, 171, 183, 184, 201, 207, 211, 212, 215–224, 226–238, 281, 286, 287, 289 Iraq 40–42, 143, 182, 194, 201, 215, 218, 286 ISAF 31, 37, 40, 46, 275 Italy 200 Japan

8, 21, 159, 261–276

Kazakhstan 1, 38, 41, 42, 44, 55, 56, 58, 59, 72, 77, 84, 89, 100–104, 106, 109, 117, 124, 125, 126, 129, 131, 138–140, 142, 150, 155, 156, 158, 160–162, 164–166, 168, 170, 177, 180, 186, 187, 188, 192, 204, 207, 209, 227, 229, 235, 236, 254, 267, 269–271, 283, 284, 286, 291, 295, 297, 299–301 Kemalism 194–197, 199 Kosovo 74, 75, 97, 98 Kuwait 218 Kyrgyzstan 1, 41, 44, 55, 56, 59, 63, 72, 77, 89, 102, 103, 117, 124, 125, 127, 130, 138–142, 145, 150, 155, 156, 158,

343

160–162, 164–170, 177, 180, 181, 183, 185, 186, 188, 189, 192, 193, 205, 207, 227, 228, 269, 271, 272, 283–286, 293, 296, 297 “Look North” policy 239, 241, 242, 246, 247, 249, 250, 252–258 membership 34, 35, 46, 53, 60, 75, 77, 86, 91, 140, 194, 197, 200, 232, 234, 236 Middle East 138, 144, 157, 195, 198, 200, 201, 212, 219, 223, 231, 268, 269, 270, 288 Moldova 86, 201 Mongolia 7, 117, 131, 195, 234 multilateralism 33, 120, 124, 157, 171, 217, 231, 234, 236, 237, 269, 276 NATO 8, 21, 29–46, 59, 82, 86, 117, 153, 159, 171, 186, 188, 199, 201, 207, 212, 225, 274, 275 Nepal 139 neutrality 44, 45, 218, 227 “new” Central Asia 1, 3 new great game 2, 4, 9, 15–18, 30, 37, 39, 84, 188, 259, 273, 283, 296 new regionalism 117, 118, 122, 123, 146 norms 13, 15, 33, 34, 51, 52, 53, 66, 73, 75, 82, 90–92, 100, 101, 106, 113, 118, 128, 154,

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183, 186, 194, 197, 208, 221, 258, 277, 298 Norway 200 order 9, 13, 29, 31, 35–38, 41, 45, 68, 73–75, 95, 96, 112, 118, 120–122, 126, 127, 133–135, 137, 139, 143, 153, 155, 159, 160, 174, 179, 185, 188, 192, 193, 195, 198, 204, 209, 216, 217, 221–223, 226, 230, 237, 240, 246, 257, 259, 262, 290, 292, 293, 296, 297 OSCE 8, 21, 49–68, 74, 86, 107, 111 Pakistan 16, 101, 117, 131, 139, 172, 183, 201, 212, 219, 230–232, 234, 248, 249, 255, 272, 281, 287–289, 291 partnership 29, 32, 34–39, 43, 72, 73, 80, 82, 99, 110, 124, 129, 153, 155, 178, 183, 184, 228, 286, 296 PfP 34–38, 40–45 power 4, 6, 9, 12, 15, 19, 23, 29, 34, 37, 45, 46, 60, 61, 64, 67, 71, 74, 75, 78, 80–82, 91, 101, 119–121, 123, 128, 129, 133, 137, 141, 142, 146, 149, 150, 152, 154, 157–159, 169, 172–174, 179, 180, 186, 201, 212, 215–219, 221, 225, 226, 238, 244, 250–254, 256–258, 265, 272, 274, 283, 285, 286, 289, 291–301 Putin, Vladimir 58, 159, 160, 169, 213, 284

reform 29, 36–40, 45, 46, 61, 62, 77, 86, 104, 137, 180, 183–185, 187, 247, 269, 285 regime change 181, 182 regionalism 11, 117, 118, 120, 122, 123, 146, 180, 182, 217, 224, 236, 268, 269, 275, 276 revolution 41, 44, 130, 188, 215, 218–220, 225, 285, 293 Romania 201 rules 13, 16, 52, 73, 221 Russia 8–10, 16, 21, 40–42, 45, 46, 53, 59, 66, 76, 78, 81, 86, 87, 100, 101, 103, 107, 110, 117, 119, 124–130, 132, 138, 143, 145, 149–174, 179, 188, 189, 195, 196, 201, 209, 211, 213, 218, 219, 222, 229, 230, 232, 236, 238, 266, 268, 273, 281, 282, 283, 285–287, 292, 293, 295, 297–301 Saudi Arabia 16, 207, 211 SCO 11, 21, 82, 117, 118, 122–124, 128–133, 135, 139, 142, 143–146, 171, 226, 228, 232–234, 236, 274–276, 286, 291, 296, 297 security 3, 29, 49, 73, 89, 118, 153, 177, 199, 222, 242, 262, 282 separatism 123, 126–128, 133, 135, 142, 146, 201, 286, 296 sovereignty 12, 60, 71, 76, 82, 90, 110, 113, 118, 122, 124, 126, 127, 136, 155, 181, 197, 209, 211, 220, 293, 301

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Soviet Union 2, 9, 10, 15, 22, 30, 31, 40, 49, 54, 59, 71, 74–76, 89, 99, 100, 103, 108, 111, 121, 136, 141, 149, 154–156, 158, 179, 184, 195, 198, 202, 215, 222, 223, 231, 243, 246, 248, 250, 251, 261, 262, 266, 272, 281, 282 state-building 13, 20, 37, 39, 40, 57, 72, 89, 90, 93, 100, 110, 149, 168, 174, 178, 179, 180, 192, 203, 214, 235, 255, 294 strategy 8, 33, 37, 50, 57, 60, 61, 64–67, 71–73, 75, 78–81, 83–87, 99, 104, 108, 111, 118–122, 133, 134, 137, 138, 141, 143–146, 157, 173, 178, 180, 181, 184, 185, 188, 189, 199, 201, 216, 218–220, 223–226, 229, 234, 235, 240, 246, 252, 255, 256, 259, 262, 266–268, 275, 276, 292, 300, 301 Syria 201, 286 TACIS 72, 76, 77, 79, 83 Taiwan 127, 133 Tajikistan 36, 43, 44, 54, 55–59, 72, 77, 89, 101–103, 111, 117, 124, 125, 132, 141, 150, 156, 158–160, 162, 164–168, 170, 180, 186, 189, 192, 207, 211, 223, 227, 228, 236, 242, 254–256, 267, 272, 283–285, 296, 297 Taliban 125–127, 182, 224, 228, 256, 285, 287–289, 299

345

territorial integrity 12, 124, 132, 136, 145, 219, 220 terrorism 37, 40, 44, 52, 56, 59, 61, 78, 81, 94, 112, 118, 126–130, 133, 146, 153, 173, 182, 236, 273, 276, 281–283, 295, 296 Tibet 127, 133 tribute system 134, 135 Turkmenistan 1, 13, 44, 45, 55, 58, 59, 77, 83, 89, 103, 105, 106, 109, 129, 142, 156, 158, 159, 161–165, 170, 180, 186, 192, 205, 207, 210, 227, 230, 236, 239, 269, 273, 285, 289, 293, 297 Turkey 7, 8, 16, 21, 66, 159, 168, 171, 191–195, 197, 198–213, 224, 229, 230, 232, 233, 235, 274, 281 UK 71, 101 Ukraine 41, 59, 152, 153, 159–162, 171, 181, 201 UN 8, 86, 89–96, 98–103, 108–111, 113, 222, 256, 265, 277 uncovery 3, 8, 9 UNDP 93, 96, 97, 99, 104, 105, 108, 111, 112, 275 USA 129, 243 Uyghur 118, 125, 135, 139, 142, 146, 286 Uzbekistan 1, 42, 43, 54, 56, 57, 59, 63, 77, 79, 89, 102, 103, 109, 110, 117, 125, 128, 129, 130, 131, 140–142, 155, 158–160, 162–166, 170, 173,

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178, 180, 182, 183, 185, 186, 187, 192, 205, 207, 210, 211, 227, 228, 230, 254, 267, 269, 272, 283, 284, 285, 295–297, 300, 301 values 31–33, 35, 39, 51, 64, 65, 73, 80, 90, 113, 174, 180, 194, 216, 281, 221, 258 “vassalization” 117, 118, 133–135

World Bank 93, 271, 274, 276, 282 WTO 77, 80, 140, 188 Xinjiang 7, 118, 119, 121, 123, 125–127, 133–139, 141–146, 290, 291 Yeltsin, Boris

10, 124, 155, 157

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