The Negotiated Reformation: Imperial Cities and the Politics of Urban Reform, 1525-1550

This page intentionally left blank The Negotiated Reformation Imperial Cities and the Politics of Urban Reform, 1525–...

Author: Christopher W. Close

43 downloads 1015 Views 2MB Size Report

This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form

DOWNLOAD PDF

This page intentionally left blank

The Negotiated Reformation Imperial Cities and the Politics of Urban Reform, 1525–1550

Utilizing evidence from numerous imperial cities, this book offers a new explanation for the spread and survival of urban reform during the sixteenth century. By analyzing the operation of regional political constellations, it reveals a common process of negotiation that shaped the Reformation in the Holy Roman Empire. It reevaluates traditional models of reform that leave unexplored the religious implications of flexible systems of communication and support among cities. Such networks influenced urban reform in fundamental ways, affecting how Protestant preachers moved from city to city, as well as what versions of the Reformation city councils introduced. This fusion of religion and politics meant that with local variations, negotiation within a regional framework sat at the heart of urban reform. The Negotiated Reformation therefore explains not only how the Reformation spread to almost every imperial city in southern Germany, but also how it survived imperial attempts to suppress religious reform. Christopher W. Close received his Ph.D. in history from the University of Pennsylvania and is currently teaching at Princeton University. He has held visiting professorships at several institutions including Kutztown University and the College of New Jersey. His articles have appeared in the Sixteenth Century Journal and Central European History.

The Negotiated Reformation Imperial Cities and the Politics of Urban Reform, 1525–1550

CHRISTOPHER W. CLOSE Princeton University

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo, Delhi, Dubai, Tokyo Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521760201 © Christopher W. Close 2009 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published in print format 2009 ISBN-13

978-0-511-64143-5

eBook (NetLibrary)

ISBN-13

978-0-521-76020-1

Hardback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of urls for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

Contents

List of Abbreviations Acknowledgments

page vii ix

Map One: South German Imperial Cities ca. 1525 Map Two: Imperial Cities in Upper and Eastern Swabia

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

xi xii

Introduction Consultation and the Urban Hierarchy Imperial Cities and Collective Politics Preachers, Consultation, and the Spread of Urban Reform in Southern Germany

1 20 57

The Urban Reformation in Donauworth ¨ The Urban Reformation in Kaufbeuren Negotiation and the Rural Reformation in Eastern Swabia Eastern Swabia and the Schmalkaldic War Conclusion

110 144 179 209 248

Bibliography Index

84

263 277

v

List of Abbreviations

ARG

¨ Reformationsgeschichte Archiv fur

BBK

¨ zur bayerischen Kirchengeschichte Beitrage

CEH

Central European History

CS

Corpus Schwenckfeldianorum

EKA KF

Evangelisches Kirchenarchiv Kaufbeuren

fl.

Gulden

PC

Politisches Correspondenz der Stadt Strassburg im Zeitalter der Reformation

SCJ

Sixteenth Century Journal

StA A

Staatsarchiv Augsburg

RNo, ¨ MuB ¨ StadtA A

Reichsstadt Nordlingen, Munchener Bestand ¨ ¨ Stadtarchiv Augsburg

LitS

Literaliensammlung

MB

Markgrafschaft Burgau

RA

Reichsstadt Akten

RefA

Reformationsakten

RP

Ratsprotokolle

StadtA MM

Stadtarchiv Memmingen

StadtA UL

Stadtarchiv Ulm

StN

Staatsarchiv Nurnberg ¨

ZBKG

Rst Nbg

Reichsstadt Nurnberg ¨ ¨ bayerische Kirchengeschichte Zeitschrift fur

ZHVS

¨ Schwaben Zeitschrift des Historischen Vereins fur

ZSRG, KA

¨ Rechtsgeschichte, Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung fur Kanonistische Abteilung vii

Acknowledgments

I owe a large debt of gratitude to many people, without whose help and inspiration I could not have completed this book. First and foremost, I wish to give special thanks to my Doktorvater, Thomas Max Safley. Over the last five years, he has read countless drafts of this monograph while offering invaluable advice. Nothing in this book would have been possible without his guidance, tutelage, and unwavering support for my research and career. Eric Crahan’s support at Cambridge University Press has played a crucial role in guiding this manuscript through its numerous stages of revision. He has been a patient and helpful editor whose enthusiasm for my project has made a tremendous difference in seeing it through to completion. I would also like to extend my deepest thanks to the three anonymous readers commissioned by Eric. Their influence appears throughout this monograph. The final product would have been impossible to complete without their insightful critiques. All errors and omissions remain solely my own. The support of the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) made possible a year of archival research in Germany, while a summer research grant from the Tuck Fund at Princeton University allowed me to return to southern Germany for an additional research stay. I owe a particular debt of gratitude to Professor Doktor Rolf Kiessling at Universitat ¨ Augsburg, who served as my mentor during my time in Augsburg and continues to offer advice and support for my research. His willingness to take me under his wing has improved me as an historian in ways I cannot even begin to describe. ix

x

Acknowledgments

I am deeply indebted to the staffs of the archives in which I worked. I would like to thank in particular Dr. Michael Kramer-Furstig, Dr. Georg ¨ Feurer, Simone Herde, and Michael Proll ¨ at the Stadtarchiv Augsburg; the staff at the Stadtarchiv Ulm; Dr. Christoph Engelhart at the Stadtarchiv Memmingen; the staff of the Bayerisches Staatsarchiv Augsburg and the Bayerisches Staatsarchiv Nurnberg; and Frau Katharina Pfunder at the ¨ Evangelisches Kirchenarchiv in Kaufbeuren. Dr. Stefan Dieter, Dr. Peer Friess, and Prof. Philip Kintner provided crucial guidance in my search for archival documents. James Thomas Ford, Darren Provost, and Joel van Amberg were kind enough to share their unpublished work with me, which has greatly improved the quality of this study. E. Ann Matter, Edward Peters, and Thomas Robisheaux read several early drafts of this monograph. Their advice played an instrumental role in the revision process, and I would not have been able to finish this manuscript without their help. The Reformation reading group at the University of Pennsylvania also offered insightful criticism and muchneeded encouragement during the early stages of composition. Particular thanks go to D’Maris Coffman, Emily Fisher Gray, James Melvin, Richard Ninness, and Alex Novikoff for helping me realize my vision for this book. More recently, my colleagues at Princeton University have been extremely gracious with their willingness to discuss my research, to give me feedback during various stages of revision, and to support my applications for research funding. Alan Allport, James Byrne, Steve Donatelli, Doug Goldstein, Benjamin Porter, Keith Shaw, and Kerry Walk have been especially helpful. This final product bears much of their influence, which has reshaped the way I conceptualize the writing of history. Finally, I would like to thank my family for their unwavering support. My relatives have always allowed me to pursue my own path, and this work is a result of that loving trust. My deepest thanks go to my wife, Elena, and my beautiful daughters, Eva and Emily. These three wonderful women have lived with sixteenth-century Swabia’s urban negotiations for several years. Without their faith in my abilities, I could not have written word one. To my parents, Wayne and Heidi, who have supported me in so many different ways over the past thirty-two years, I dedicate this work. May it in some small way begin to pay back all the love and guidance you have offered and all the sacrifices you have made.

ne

MEMBER OF SCHMALKALDIC LEAGUE

OTHER CITIES

Confederation

Swiss

Swabia

Bavaria

Franconia

map 1. Adapted from a map by Imus Graphics in Thomas A. Brady, Protestant Politics: Jacob Sturm (1489–1553) and the German Reformation (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1995), xviii.

Augsburg

IMPERIAL CITIES

SWABIA REGION

SOUTH GERMAN Imperial Cities ca. 1525

Alsace

/ Upp e r Rh i

CONSTANCE (1531) ce

tan

ons

Lak eC

(1531)

(1546)

UPPER

(1531)

(1531) Margravate of Burgau

(1531)

(1531)

SWABIA

(1536)

Boos

EASTERN SWABIA

GIENGEN

(1536)

map 2. Adapted from a map in Rolf Kiessling, “Strukturen sudwestdeutscher Stadtelandschaften ¨ ¨ ¨ zwischen Dominanz und Konkurrenz. Der Fall Oberschwaben,” in Stadtelandschaft – Réseau Urbain – ¨ ¨ ¨ Urban Network. Stadte im regionalen Kontext in Spatmittelalter und fruher Neuzeit, ed. Holger Gaf ¨ and Katrin Keller (Cologne: Bohlau, 2004), 72. ¨

Rh ine

ULM Imperial City (1531) Year of Entrance into the Schmalkaldic League.

Imperial Cities in Upper and Eastern Swabia

Rhine

Introduction

In early July 1546, war erupted in the Holy Roman Empire. On one side stood the Emperor Charles V, a supporter of the Catholic Church who sought to quell the religious dissension introduced into his realm by the Reformation. Opposing the emperor was an alliance of Protestant estates known as the Schmalkaldic League. Led by the prince-elector of Saxony and the landgrave of Hesse, two of the Empire’s most powerful noblemen, the Schmalkaldic League’s membership stretched across the geographic breadth of the Empire. Its financial base rested largely on mercantile wealth from its urban members in the south, self-governing republics called imperial cities. Autonomous city-states ruled by elected councils, imperial cities owed allegiance to no territorial lord but the emperor. During the 1520s and 1530s, many of these cities introduced evangelical1 religious reform within their walls. This severed their ties to the Catholic Church and placed a growing strain on their relationship with the emperor. Fearing imperial retribution for their religious deviance, many evangelical imperial cities joined the Schmalkaldic League, which promised military protection to its members. As armed conflict began in the summer of 1546, imperial cities across southern Germany mobilized their armies in defense of the Reformation. 1

Since advocates of reform commonly referred to themselves as “evangelical” (evangelisch), I have used this term to describe cities or individuals that broke with Rome and introduced some version of religious reform at odds with the traditional practices of the Catholic Church. The term Protestant, which came into being in 1529 to describe those estates that protested the antievangelical recess of the Imperial Diet of Speyer, I use sparingly where it helps the reader avoid confusion.

1

2

The Negotiated Reformation

Two exceptions to this mobilization were the Eastern Swabian imperial cities Donauworth and Kaufbeuren. Located just to the north and ¨ south of Augsburg, Swabia’s largest and in many ways most influential city, Donauworth and Kaufbeuren first adopted evangelical reform ¨ in 1545. The Reformation in these two cities proceeded under Augsburg’s guidance, but the onset of hostilities placed Donauworth and ¨ Kaufbeuren in precarious positions. Faced with a general war against the emperor, the councils in both cities declared their neutrality. This decision had profound repercussions for neighboring towns, especially Augsburg, which found its northern and southern approaches exposed to invasion. Donauworth’s neutrality was particularly galling since the ¨ city commanded a strategic crossing of the Danube River, one of the most important waterways in southern Germany. Control of this bridgehead meant control of the river, and Augsburg’s council moved swiftly to secure its outer defenses. On July 21, 1546, two squads of troops sent from Augsburg forcibly occupied Donauworth against the wishes ¨ of the local council. In response to its neighbor’s protests, Augsburg’s magistrates expressed remorse that “you have behaved so poorly toward us and other good friends, who want nothing more than to act fatherly toward you.”2 Augsburg’s occupation of a neighboring religious ally and closely related imperial city marked the collapse of a lengthy series of negotiations concerning Donauworth’s introduction of evangelical reform. These ¨ negotiations shaped the course of Donauworth’s reformation, but they ¨ failed to secure the city’s admission to the Schmalkaldic League. When diplomatic efforts bore no fruit, Augsburg’s council resorted to military coercion to ensure Donauworth’s participation in the war. While ¨ Augsburg did not use military force against Kaufbeuren, a similar set of negotiations between these cities helped determine the nature of Kaufbeuren’s reformation. The interactions between Augsburg and these two neighboring cities represented a wider level of intercity communication in matters of reform that has received only limited attention in past histories of the Reformation. In Donauworth, Kaufbeuren, and the other ¨ urban communes in Eastern Swabia, the introduction of religious reform depended on the support, guidance, and interference of other imperial cities. The Reformation in these cities did not result solely from dynamics within the local community but rather relied on regional political and 2

Stadtarchiv Augsburg (Hereafter StadtA A), Literaliensammlung (Hereafter LitS), 22 Juli 1546. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.

Introduction

3

power constellations. Urban reform in Eastern Swabia developed out of a complex process of intercity negotiation that allowed external agents to shape each city’s internal reformation. The course of reform in Donauworth and Kaufbeuren, as well as that ¨ of neighboring cities like Memmingen, Augsburg, and Ulm, highlights the need to reexamine the standard historical models used to describe the urban Reformation in southern Germany. Over the past several decades, historians have focused great attention on the social dynamics of religious reform in imperial cities.3 The Reformation is often seen as a quintessentially urban affair. In the oft-quoted words of A. G. Dickens, “the German Reformation was an urban event” whose success depended on the active support of burghers.4 Dickens’s formulation is misleading, as recent research has stressed the countryside’s importance as a source of enthusiasm for reform thought as well. The economic, social, and religious connections between town and country meant reform in the city was often closely linked to developments in nearby rural communities. Nevertheless, it remains true that urban populations comprised some of the earliest and most ardent advocates of the reform message. A reevaluation of the process by which urban reform occurred, therefore, modifies our sense of how and why the Reformation itself happened. The regional context of religious reform in Eastern Swabia’s imperial cities has much to tell about the south German urban Reformation as a whole. The process of reform in imperial cities has traditionally been viewed from four different perspectives. The first model, which emerged initially from the work of Bernd Moeller5 and Franz Lau,6 describes the urban Reformation as a process of “reform from below.” Focusing primarily on religious riots, acts of iconoclasm, and the popular appeal of the Reformation’s message of salvation, many scholars have portrayed the 3

4 5

6

For an overview of the historiography on the urban Reformation, see Kaspar von Greyerz, “Forschungsbericht: Stadt und Reformation. Stand und Aufgaben der Forschung,” ARG 76 (1985): 6–63; Hans-Christoph Rublack, “Forschungsbericht Stadt und Reformation,” in Stadt und Kirche im 16. Jahrhundert, ed. Bernd Moeller (Gutersloh: Mohn, 1978), ¨ 9–26; Bernhard Ruth, “Reformation und Konfessionsbildung im stadtischen Bereich. ¨ ¨ Perspektiven der Forschung,” ZSRG, KA 77 (1991): 197–282. A. G. Dickens, The German Nation and Martin Luther (New York: Harper, 1974), 182. Bernd Moeller, Reichsstadt und Reformation (Gutersloh: Gutersloher Verlagshaus, ¨ ¨ 1962). In English, Bernd Moeller, “Imperial Cities and the Reformation,” in Imperial Cities and the Reformation. Three Essays, trans. H. C. Erik Midelfort and Mark U. Edwards, Jr. (Durham: Labyrinth, 1982), 41–115. Citations refer to the English translation. Franz Lau, “Der Bauernkrieg und das angebliche Ende der lutherischen Reformation als spontaner Volksbewegung,” Luther-Jahrbuch 26 (1959): 109–34.

4


common folk as the driving force behind religious reform. In this view, the Reformation represented a grassroots movement that grew out of late medieval convictions about the communal nature of religious life. The reformers’ message of “faith alone” and “grace alone” spoke to the religious sensibilities of the common folk, who led the assault on the Catholic penitential system. This popular call for reform forced magistrates, often against their will, to alter the nature of urban religious practice. In the words of Moeller, “the Reformation was never the work of a town council” and “the magistrates were anything but the motive force behind the Reformation.”7 The “reformation from below” model remains highly influential, but its tendency to discount the motivating influence of urban magistrates has given rise to a competing school of thought that emphasizes the city council’s role in facilitating religious reform. Concentrating on the efforts of town councils to support or suppress the Reformation, several historians have portrayed urban reform as a process of “reform from above” guided by magistrates.8 According to this model, the urban Reformation could not succeed without an “institutional focal point.”9 While the initial pressure for reform may have come from below, the local council’s decision to take up this call and to direct its implementation represented the crucial moment of urban reform. For proponents of the “reform from above” paradigm, “the confessional decision and development of a city . . . corresponded directly with the attitude of the council vis-a-vis the ` Reformation.”10 In the past two decades, these opposing viewpoints have come under increasing criticism for their one-sided nature. Following the lead of Peter Blickle, some historians have replaced the dichotomy between top-down and bottom-up reform with a “communal Reformation.”11 According to this theory, the notion that the Reformation represented an urban 7 8

9 10 11

Moeller, “Imperial Cities,” 60–1. See Thomas A. Brady, Ruling Class, Regime, and Reformation at Strasbourg, 1520– 1555 (Leiden: Brill, 1978); Wilfried Enderle, Konfessionsbildung und Ratsregiment in ¨ der katholischen Reichsstadt Uberlingen (1500–1618) (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1990); Robert Scribner, “Civic Unity and the Reformation in Erfurt,” Past and Present 66 (1975): 29–60; Kaspar von Greyerz, The Late City Reformation in Germany. The Case ¨ of Colmar, 1522–1628 (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1980); Ulman Weiss, Die frommen Burger von Erfurt (Weimar: Bohlau, 1988). ¨ Robert Scribner, “Why Was There no Reformation in Cologne?” Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 59 (1976): 235. Enderle, Konfessionsbildung, 380. Peter Blickle, Gemeindereformation (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1985).

Introduction

5

event obscures important connections between city and countryside. In the years prior to the 1524–6 Peasants’ War, both peasants and burghers developed fundamentally the same understanding of evangelical reform. This shared sense of the Reformation’s meaning emphasized preaching the pure Gospel and the communalization of the local church by subjecting it to community oversight. In the process, the urban and rural laity sought to reorder society according to a new evangelical ethic rooted in the Bible. This initial popular enthusiasm for reform, however, ground to a halt after the bloodshed of the Peasants’ War. The failed rebellion marked a shift from communal reform toward a “Princes’ Reformation,” where reform was imposed on the general populace from above in service of ruling political authority. The communal Reformation model, therefore, combines aspects of “reform from below” with “reform from above” by placing them in discrete periods in order to explain the evolving nature of the sixteenth-century Reformation. These three views remain the predominant explanations for how the urban Reformation occurred, but they all run the risk of obscuring the complexity of daily life in imperial cities. While the initial impetus for religious reform in many communities may have come from the general populace, reform could not find an official expression until the city council took up that call and modified it. Magisterial and popular impulses for reform could exist side by side, a realization that has begun to reshape how scholars conceptualize the urban Reformation. It has led Berndt Hamm to conclude “a one-sided ‘from above’ did not correspond to the urban social structure with its interdependent relationships, which always . . . required a certain amount of cooperative consensus building.”12 Taking this line of thinking a step further, Olaf Morke has argued “reformation ‘from ¨ below’ and reformation ‘from above’ represent merely two sides of the same issue.”13 Top-down and bottom-up reform models, therefore, tend to simplify the multifaceted nature of urban reform. For Eastern Swabia’s imperial cities, such labels are entirely misleading. The Reformation in these cities represented neither a one-sided affair nor a communal Reformation. Instead, reform depended on the actions of outside agents that altered the direction of each city’s internal reformation. Our view of the south 12

13

Berndt Hamm, “Reformation ‘von unten’ und Reformation ‘von oben.’ Zur Problematik reformationshistorischer Klassifizierungen,” in Die Reformation in Deutschland und Europa: Interpretationen und Debatten, eds. Hans Guggisberg et al. (Gutersloh: ¨ Guterloher Verlagshaus, 1993), 281. ¨ ¨ Olaf Morke, Rat und Burger in der Reformation (Hildesheim: Lax, 1983), 9–10. ¨

6


German urban Reformation must incorporate multiple actors and contingencies into the process of reform, an approach advocated by scholars like Hamm, Morke, and Lorna Jane Abray. In her 1985 study of Strasbourg, ¨ for example, Abray shows that the common folk, Strasbourg’s council, and the city’s preachers all exerted unique influences on the city’s reform efforts. Reform emerged from a discourse between all segments of urban society. The Reformation and its attendant religious changes did not occur from above or from below, but rather “evolved through the interplay of magisterial, clerical, and popular designs for a Christian church.”14 We have four models of urban reform: “reform from below,” “reform from above,” communal reformation, and reform as a product of internal compromise between magistrates, clerics, and burghers. Each of these perspectives has contributed much to our understanding of the urban Reformation, but they all tend to view urban reform in isolation. While many scholars have pointed to the influence of larger political considerations on urban reform, most studies still focus on the Reformation’s development in one city while overlooking the importance of regional systems of support. Others take a comparative approach but continue to view reform as a matter decided solely by the local council and its burghers. By concentrating on one city, these case studies often treat the Reformation as an insular, internal event. They depict urban reform as the product of local circumstances largely divorced from the influence of external actors and neighboring imperial cities. This approach has proved useful in discerning the political, religious, and social dynamics within specific urban communities, but it does not account for the active interference of outside agents, including other imperial cities, in the process of reformation. It leaves unexplored the centrality of regional politics for the introduction, implementation, preservation, or suppression of religious reform. The importance of regional political constellations meant that in each geographic area, the process of urban reform looked slightly different. Large, catchall models cannot explain these divergences, and they obscure the significance of those similarities that did occur by presupposing a uniformity of process. It is therefore necessary to understand urban reform in a wider context, one that moves beyond individual city walls, and instead examines the Reformation’s place in a regional setting of political, social, and economic ties. By analyzing religious negotiation in an urban landscape such as Eastern Swabia, we can uncover how regional systems of communication shaped 14

Lorna Jane Abray, The People’s Reformation (Ithaca: Cornell, 1985), 224.

Introduction

7

the Reformation in different contexts. This means adopting a comparative framework that investigates the influence of patterns of consultation and regional spheres of influence on the course of religious reform. The urban Reformation in southern Germany cannot be simplified to a process of “reform from above” or “reform from below,” or limited to internal interaction between the council and its burghers. It often relied on a process of intercity negotiation that involved actors both native and foreign to reforming cities. These regional systems of negotiation provided the framework for the Reformation’s spread, evolution, and survival in many imperial cities. Scholarly attempts to analyze the relationship between urban reform and the collectivity of imperial cities – what I term the urban hierarchy15 – have focused on what Martin Brecht called the “collective politics of imperial cities.” These studies place the urban Reformation in the larger political constellation of the Holy Roman Empire, although they disagree about the ramifications of reform. For some scholars, urban attempts to pursue common religious policies suffered a major setback with the official outlawing of the Reformation at the 1529 Imperial Diet of Speyer and the 1530 Imperial Diet of Augsburg. This caused a “splintering apart of the cities” and an overall decline in the urban hierarchy’s cohesiveness.16 The appearance of evangelical reform movements in the 1520s undermined the internal estate solidarity of imperial cities, leading to “the fall of the urban front,” an event that “cut the cities adrift.”17 This view has been refined by Heinrich Schmidt, who “takes the cities’ external relationships as determinants for their religious policies.”18 While “the common man is the patron of the Reformation,”19 a chance for wider societal reform existed in the practice of urban collective

15

16 17 18 19

¨ I have chosen to refer to the collectivity of imperial cities – in German Stadtecorpus – as the urban hierarchy. This term portrays an environment where each town council participated in an intercity system of communication directed in part by the Empire’s largest cities. It speaks to the unequal level of power and influence exercised by urban communes while highlighting the important ties of influence that connected cities of all sizes. For an analogous use of this term to describe urban relations in late medieval Flanders, see Peter Stabel, Dwarfs Among Giants: The Flemish Urban Network in the Late Middle Ages (Leuven-Apeldoorn: Garant, 1997). Martin Brecht, “Die gemeinsame Politik der Reichsstadte und die Reformation,” ZSRG, ¨ KA 83 (1977): 180–263. Thomas A. Brady, Turning Swiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 194. ¨ Heinrich Richard Schmidt, Reichsstadte, Reich und Reformation. Korporative Religionspolitik 1521–1529/30 (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1986), 2. ¨ H. Schmidt, Reichsstadte, 332.

8


politics.20 Ultimately, however, the divide between “Lutheran quietism” and “Zwinglian-Upper German activism” prevented communes from forming a united front. Imperial cities became “victims of the Reformation,”21 which led in 1529–30 to a “collapse of corporate unity concerning the question of religion.” This resulted in “the cities emerging from the early Reformation divided and weakened as an estate.”22 This first school of thought argues that a rupture in urban cohesiveness during the 1520s prevented cities from pursuing common religious policies. This emphasis on discord among cities has given rise to a competing model that disputes the existence of a disastrous collapse “in the unity of imperial cities.” According to this view, the splintering of the urban hierarchy in matters of religion represented only a partial disruption of intercity cooperation. City councils continued to seek consensus with their counterparts in all areas besides religion, while evangelical imperial cities found new outlets for their collective politics in the Schmalkaldic League.23 Rather than shatter the estate solidarity of the cities, the Reformation encouraged many communes to pursue even broader common policies in order to consolidate and protect religious reform. Similar to competing theories of urban reform, these two opposing models often gloss over the details of daily negotiation between cities. When applied to Eastern Swabia, an emphasis on the collapse of urban unity in 1530 appears especially problematic. Throughout the 1530s and 1540s, southern Germany’s imperial cities continued to negotiate religious reform within their ranks. The spread of council-led reform throughout Upper and Lower Swabia after 1530 meant the exchange of reform ideas and policies between cities became even more central to the urban Reformation than before. This era represented a crucial transitional period between the official formation of confessional lines at the 1530 Diet of Augsburg and the forcible attempt of Charles V to roll back the Reformation at the 1547–8 Diet of Augsburg. It holds the key to understanding how only twenty-five years after declaring the Augsburg

20

21 22 23

The term collective politics refers to the pursuit of common religious, political, or economic policies by imperial cities, either through collaboration by a limited number of cities or within the framework of formal associations like the Urban Diet, the Swabian League, the Schmalkaldic League, and the Three Cities’ League. ¨ H. Schmidt, Reichsstadte, 334. Ibid., 316. Georg Schmidt, “Die Haltung des Stadtecorpus zur Reformation und die Nurnberger ¨ ¨ ¨ Bundnispolitik,” ARG 75 (1984): 194–233; Georg Schmidt, Der Stadtetag in der ¨ Reichsverfassung (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1984).

Introduction

9

Confession heretical, the Imperial Diet could legalize it as one of two permitted confessions within the Empire. From the perspective of urban collective politics, the 1530s and 1540s reveal how imperial cities navigated the shift from the tumult of the early Reformation to the onset of the confessional age. Grounded in a tradition of political consensus and collaboration, few south German magistrates abandoned attempts to form common religious policies with their counterparts in other cities. How can we reconcile these different viewpoints on urban reform and urban politics? More importantly, how can we come to a holistic understanding of the Reformation in southern Germany’s imperial cities that accounts for developments on the local level as well as the influence exerted by regional and imperial politics? The answer lies in reexamining the nature of urban reform through an analysis of intercity communication. In this study, the term communication encompasses both written and oral forms of information transmission between two or more parties. A series of social, political, economic, and religious interactions between parties often created communication networks, which allowed for the frequent and routinized exchange of knowledge.24 Such communication could occur through the exchange of letters or other types of written correspondence. It could also take the form of personal meetings or official diplomatic embassies. Regardless of their specific local manifestation, systems of communication shaped all aspects of political life in the early modern world. In the Dutch Republic, clientage networks provided government officials with timely political information that guided the formation of local policy.25 Diplomatic correspondence among Italian city-states played a similar role in defending urban independence against aggressive princes.26 For the Holy Roman Empire, recent research has highlighted the importance of communication patterns for facilitating 24

25

26

For an introduction to the study of early modern forms of communication, see among ¨ ¨ others Kommunikation und Alltag im Spatmittlelalter und Fruher Neuzeit (Vienna: Verlag der osterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1992); Kommunikation und ¨ Region, eds. Carl A. Hoffmann and Rolf Kiessling (Constance: UVK, 2001); Kommunikationspraxis und Korrespondenzwesen im Mittelalter und in der Renaissance, eds. Heinz-Dieter Heimann and Ivan Hlavaˇ 1998); Michael ´ cek (Paderborn: Schoningh, ¨ ¨ North, Kommunikation, Handel, Geld und Banken in der Fruhen Neuzeit (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2000). Geert H. Janssen, “Dutch Clientelism and News Networks in Public and Private Spheres. The Case of Stadholder William Frederick 1613–1664,” in News and Politics in Early Modern Europe (1500–1800), ed. Joop W. Koopmans (Leuven: Peeters, 2005), 151–66. ¨ Kaiser und Reich. Politische Kommunikation in der fruhen ¨ Anja Muesser, Fur Neuzeit: Johann Ulrich Zasius (1521–1570) als Rat und Gesandter der Kaiser Ferdinand I. und Maximilian II (Husum: Matthiesen, 2004), 210.

10


cooperation between Emperor Ferdinand and the imperial estates during the 1550s. Political communication proved indispensable to the Habsto argue that burg ability to govern,27 which has led Christine Pfluger ¨ Ferdinand’s cultivation of a broad communication network “contributed not only to the stabilization and deepening of his contacts to the imperial estates, but also to the extension of his authority and influence in the Empire.”28 Communication between imperial cities fulfilled similar functions. It could intensify urban relations through patterns of consultation that allowed certain cities to project their power and influence onto other urban communes. As in Italy, systems of communication helped cities defend their interests against the encroachment of other estates while encouraging the rapid movement of reform ideas within and across regions. Accordingly, as Peer Friess has observed, analysis of urban communication networks can shift how we study the Reformation “from a concentration on individual case studies toward the comparative research of urban landscapes.”29 During the sixteenth century, intercity communication influenced almost every aspect of civic governance. In the context of the Reformation, traditions of urban communication enabled south German magistrates to shape the introduction of religious reform in neighboring towns. The urban Reformation in southern Germany often occurred through a process of compromise and negotiation, not only within a city, but also between imperial cities. I call this new model the Negotiated Reformation. In this study, the terms negotiated and negotiation refer to the urban practice of exchanging advice, guidance, and information with fellow communes and the influence this communication exerted on urban reform. Negotiation between cities could occur with set goals in mind, such as the introduction of a specific religious confession or the transfer of a specific preacher. It might also represent a process of consultation intended to inform or legitimize magisterial policy. Negotiation, therefore, is a two-tiered idea that highlights how intercity communication shaped the reform policies of urban magistrates. Its success depended on a process of political communication in which each party, even those 27

28 29

¨ Kaiser und Reich; Christine Pfluger, Muesser, Fur Kommissare und Korrespondenzen. ¨ Politische Kommunikation im Alten Reich (1552–1558) (Cologne: Bohlau, 2005); ¨ Dietmar Schiersner, Politik, Konfession und Kommunikation (Berlin: Akademie, 2005). Pfluger, Kommissare und Korrespondenzen, 14. ¨ Peer Friess, “Reichsstadtische Diplomatie als Indikator fur ¨ ¨ die politische Struktur einer Region,” in Kommunikation und Region, 137.

Introduction

11

of unequal political power, possessed some form of leverage and a willingness to bargain. During the sixteenth century, city councils across southern Germany discussed nearly every aspect of religious reform with their urban counterparts. By allowing external councils to influence their reform initiatives, magistrates negotiated the nature of urban reform with other imperial cities. In Kaufbeuren and Donauworth, the final impetus toward official, ¨ council-led religious reform came from outside the city. This mirrored earlier developments in Eastern Swabia’s larger cities that shaped the Reformation’s course throughout the region. In Kaufbeuren, four neighboring communes compelled the council to adopt a religious confession at odds with the style of reform favored by large segments of the city’s population. Donauworth’s introduction of reform became possible through ¨ the activity of an Augsburg preacher. Ultimately, mounting pressure from Augsburg and other powers like the emperor forced Donauworth’s coun¨ cil to adjust the nature of its reformation and to rethink its political and religious allegiances. The Reformation in Kaufbeuren and Donauworth, ¨ as well as in Augsburg, Memmingen, and Ulm, had larger regional significance that attracted the support and interference of other imperial cities. The process of reform depended on a multitude of factors – some internal, some external – that had to be carefully negotiated between a city’s council, its burghers, its clergy, its neighboring cities, and larger political entities. The resulting negotiations determined the course, direction, and affiliation of religious change not just in Eastern Swabia, but throughout the south German urban hierarchy. Eastern Swabia as Regional Study Eastern Swabia offers a singular opportunity to analyze the relationship between urban communication, religious reform, and regional politics in southern Germany. Bounded by the Lech River in the east and the Iller River in the west, the Danube River to the north and the Allgau ¨ Alps to the south, Eastern Swabia formed an urban landscape30 with several important imperial cities: Augsburg, Donauworth, Kaufbeuren, Kempten, ¨ Memmingen, and Ulm. Social networks and patterns of consultation 30

¨ For an introduction to research on urban landscapes, see Stadtelandschaft – Réseau ¨ ¨ ¨ Urbain – Urban Network. Stadte im regionalen Kontext in Spatmittelalter und fruher ¨ Neuzeit, eds. Holger Graf 2004); Stadtelandschaft – ¨ and Katrin Keller (Cologne: Bohlau, ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ Stadtenetz – zentralortliches Gefuge, eds. Monika Escher et al. (Mainz: Von Zabern, 2000).

12


between cities were particularly strong in this region, and a long tradition of collaboration marked the daily political life of each town. These practices predisposed magistrates to participate in the internal affairs of their neighbors, both in quotidian concerns like the revision of guild ordinances and in religious matters like the abolition of the Latin Mass and the regulation of Christian morals. Similar patterns occurred across southern Germany, most notably in parts of Franconia and the Upper Rhine, but most regions possessed a mixture of reformed and Catholic cities. In Eastern Swabia, every imperial city adopted some version of evangelical reform during the first half of the sixteenth century, although they did so at different times. This meant the nature of urban reform in the region was subject to constant negotiation. An analysis of regional politics in Eastern Swabia is also useful in reevaluating models of urban reform because the region lacked a single dominant city. Unlike the Upper Rhine or Franconia, where no individual city could fully rival the authority of Strasbourg or Nuremberg, Eastern Swabia contained several cities vying for preeminence. Augsburg was the largest commune, but Ulm challenged Augsburg as a center of economic and political importance. Memmingen’s role as a significant source of consultation for cities in the Allgau, ¨ such as Kaufbeuren, further complicated this situation. The rivalry for predominance in the region meant smaller imperial cities like Donauworth and Kaufbeuren could use ¨ consultation with a variety of cities to assert their autonomy while still gaining support for the introduction of new religio-political initiatives. Magistrates in other parts of southern Germany employed similar strategies. The open competition for power and influence in Eastern Swabia therefore reveals the fault lines of regional politics that embedded the Reformation in numerous cities. The specific processes at work in this region mirrored wider developments that shaped religious reform in the southern part of the Empire. One additional factor that makes Eastern Swabia an important regional study stems from the territorial politics of the region’s largest city. Beginning in the late 1530s, Augsburg’s council undertook a conscious effort to expand its religio-political sphere of influence over neighboring cities and the surrounding countryside. The city’s magistrates sought to create a regional network of political and confessional alliances centered on Augsburg. These efforts relied on established traditions of intercity consultation, and one of the main tools Augsburg’s council used to achieve its goals was the spread of religious reform. For this reason, Augsburg sought to introduce the Reformation into nearby villages where

Introduction

13

it did not exercise territorial lordship. The council also used reform to draw Kaufbeuren and Donauworth into more dependent religio-political ¨ relationships. The city’s attempts to establish a sphere of hegemony in Eastern Swabia bring to light how neighboring cities and the urban hierarchy as a whole influenced the introduction of religious reform in both urban and rural contexts. This process was rarely simple. It did not occur solely from above or from below but from negotiation between multiple parties, each of which sought to promote its own prerogatives. Sources and Methodology Augsburg’s city council directed the city’s efforts to expand its religiopolitical sphere of influence. A group of elected magistrates who collectively formed the town council governed each imperial city. This study draws extensively from letters exchanged between different councils. Intercity correspondence reveals the reasons why city councils sought advice and guidance from their neighbors. It also shows the influence that consultation and the support or interference of other cities exerted on urban reform. Council minutes, official decrees, and civic statutes also play a central role, as do diplomatic instructions for urban delegates. These instructions presented urban ambassadors with plans for negotiation in face-to-face meetings. They provide especially useful information concerning the goals and negotiating strategies of councils at specific moments in time. Communication between urban magistrates and preachers offers another important source for this study, as does personal correspondence between officials of the same urban regime. Finally, theological tracts and sermons help illuminate the reform message preached from Eastern Swabia’s pulpits. These documents open a direct window onto the religious negotiations among Eastern Swabia’s imperial cities. At the same time, they tend to obscure personal religious convictions and differences of opinion within individual councils. In their external correspondence, city councils almost always presented a united front. The majority ruled in government decisions, and each council sought to project an image of unity to the outside world. In their letters, city councils emphasized their unanimity in a self-conscious way that masked internal divisions. Every effort has been made to tease out the religious sensibilities and disagreements of those involved in negotiations. In the minds of sixteenth-century Germans, political and religious motivations fused in a way that often made them one and the same. While correspondents may not have openly addressed

14


the spiritual dimensions of some initiatives, every act of reform occurred in a religious context that all involved parties would have implicitly understood. In many cases, the religious convictions of urban magistrates intertwined with political calculations to shape the Negotiated Reformation. The letters sent between urban councils reveal important tensions between two different strands of reform thought: Wittenberg theology and the broad movement historians have termed Upper German theology. Based on the writings of Martin Luther and his fellow theologians in Saxony, Wittenberg theology espoused a physical presence in the Eucharist and allowed most images to remain in its churches. At the same time, it rejected the Catholic Church’s theology of transubstantiation and called for the distribution of communion in both kinds. Pastors were encouraged to marry, the frequency of religious holidays curtailed, the Latin Mass eliminated, and the number of official sacraments reduced from seven to two. Upper German theology – named for its popularity and unique development in southern Germany’s evangelical imperial cities – shared several facets of these last four tenets with Wittenberg but differed in many other crucial respects.31 Most Upper German reformers advocated the removal of religious images from their churches, and they sought to reinterpret the sacraments of baptism and communion in a communal context. For this reason, Upper German preachers often used the same table to celebrate baptism and the Eucharist, both of which were supposed to occur only during Sunday church services that conformed neither to the Zwinglian nor to the Lutheran model.32 These Upper German services centered on preaching and contained little in the way of ceremony. In contrast to 31

32

This divergence marked the reform of religious holidays as well. While Wittenberginfluenced Nuremberg celebrated three Marian festivals (the Annunciation, Purification, and Visitation), Upper German Augsburg and Strasbourg observed only one: the Annunciation. Bridget Heal, The Cult of the Virgin Mary in Early Modern Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 85–6, 125–6. On Upper German theology in general, see among others James Thomas Ford, “Unter dem schein der concordien und confession: Wolfgang Musculus and the Confessional Identity of Augsburg, 1531–1548,” in Wolfgang Musculus und die oberdeutsche Reformation, eds. Rudolf Dellsperger et al. (Berlin: Akademie, 1997), 111–29; Peer Friess, “Der Einfluss des Zwinglianismus auf die Reformation der oberschwabischen Reichsstadte,” Zwingliana ¨ ¨ 34 (2007): 5–27; Rudolf Freundenberger, “Der oberdeutsche Weg der Reformation,” in ¨ “ . . . wider Laster und Sunde.” Ausburgs Weg in der Reformation, eds. Josef Kirmeier et al. (Cologne: DuMont, 1997), 44–61. In Augsburg, the formula of baptism varied based on which day the sacrament occurred with two different forms influenced by Zurich and Wittenberg theology respectively. Friess, “Einfluss des Zwinglianismus,” 11.

Introduction

15

the Wittenbergers, who denied the Mass’s sacrificial nature but retained much of its liturgy, the Upper Germans sought an entirely new form of worship distinct from Catholic practice that could make changes in theology visually accessible to the common folk.33 Most importantly, Upper German theologians privileged an understanding of the Eucharist closer to Martin Bucer’s notion of the “spiritual eating of Christ’s real body and blood” than to Luther’s idea of a physical presence.34 Disagreement concerning the Eucharist presented the major challenge to attempts at unifying the divergent evangelical camps. During the 1530s and 1540s, the majority of evangelical imperial cities in southern Germany adopted some version of Upper German reform. This does not mean they displayed total theological homogeneity. A wide variety of practices and theologies existed among Upper German cities, many of which observed the Eucharist and structured their local churches in slightly different ways. Accordingly, while Upper German reform can serve as a useful umbrella term, it is more precise to speak of individual urban reform styles, such as Augsburg-style reform, Strasbourg-style reform, or Basel-style reform. In the 1530s, these local churches began a process of reconciliation with Wittenberg that eventually led them to recognize the 1530 Augsburg Confession, the basic confessional statement of Wittenberg theology. For cities like Memmingen and Augsburg, the Confession served as a blanket statement of belief that united evangelical estates and facilitated their cooperation in the Schmalkaldic League.35 It did not exclude the persistence of urban “micro-Christendoms”36 in southern Germany, each of which sought to embody locally what it saw as the true Biblical form of Christian worship and looked to its neighbors for assistance in doing so. Acceptance of the Augsburg Confession by south German urban magistrates, therefore, represented an acknowledgement of similarities in teachings and a political need for conformity, not necessarily a desire to abandon local styles of reform in 33

34

35 36

On Augsburg’s reformed liturgy, see James Thomas Ford, “Wolfgang Musculus and the Struggle for Confessional Hegemony in Reformation Augsburg, 1531–1548” (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin- Madison, 2000), 178–98. On the influence of Bucer’s Eucharistic theology in south German cities, see Amy Nelson Burnett, “Basel and the Wittenberg Concord,” ARG 96 (2005): 33–56, quote at 53. For the history of the Eucharist in Augsburg’s reformation, see Lee Palmer Wandel, The Eucharist in the Reformation: Incarnation and Liturgy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 46–93. Peer Friess has recently made a similar point. See Friess, “Einfluss des Zwinglianismus.” On the concept of micro-Christendoms, see Peter Brown, The Rise of Western Christendom: Triumph and Diversity 200–1000 AD (Malden: Blackwell, 2003), esp. 355–79.

16


favor of a reformation dictated by Wittenberg.37 Officially recognizing the Augsburg Confession did not automatically remake the way town councils regulated reform within their jurisdictions. Indeed, the on-going tensions between differing styles of reform shaped the Reformation in Donauworth and Kaufbeuren, where Augsburg’s council and its preach¨ ers sought to prevent the spread of Wittenberg theology by introducing Augsburg-style reformations. Internal disagreements within the evangelical movement influenced both the process and the objectives of intercity negotiation in Eastern Swabia. Overview of Study Seven chapters form the body of this study. Chapter 1 examines the practice of intercity consultation that affected almost every aspect of urban political life in southern Germany. Communication between cities was a fundamental principle of urban government rooted in the late Middle Ages. Shaped by interlocking social networks and close economic ties, consultation between cities occurred within a regional framework that saw smaller cities seek guidance from larger, more influential communes. These larger cities corresponded across regional boundaries, creating a hierarchy of communication that influenced the formation of magisterial policy throughout the Empire’s southern reaches. Some of the ways in which this hierarchy influenced urban reform emerge from collective attempts to defend imperial cities against legal attacks on the Reformation’s legitimacy. Consultation molded how most south German councils approached both the introduction and the preservation of the urban Reformation. Chapter 2 focuses on the participation of south German imperial cities in two alliances: the regional Three Cities’ League and the supraregional Schmalkaldic League. These confederations sought to foster solidarity among cities through the formation of common external and religious policies. This became increasingly important for evangelical communes after the 1530 Diet of Augsburg, which threatened retribution against cities if they adopted religious reform. Membership in collective associations helped define the standing of individual cities within the Empire. It also provided protection in case a city came under attack for religious 37

See Gabriele Haug-Moritz’s parallel observations about the role of the Augsburg Confession within the Schmalkaldic League. Gabriele Haug-Moritz, Der Schmalkaldische Bund 1530–1541/42 (Leinfelden-Echterdingen: DRW, 2002), 98–111.

Introduction

17

reasons. Within these alliances, intercity negotiation proved crucial for the Reformation’s spread and survival, both in larger cities like Augsburg and in smaller neighboring cities. Urban collective politics played a particularly important role in Eastern Swabia, where the Reformation’s political viability relied on external support networks and pledges of military aid between imperial cities. Chapter 3 examines individual relationships among imperial cities. Intercity communication sat at the heart of religious negotiation in southern Germany. It proved especially influential in two areas: the transfer of preachers and the implementation of social and ecclesiastical reforms. This chapter analyzes these facets of reform with special attention to Augsburg and Ulm, Eastern Swabia’s largest cities. In their procurement of preachers, their promulgation of new marriage laws, and their efforts to reform their clerical pay scales, these two cities relied on guidance from other urban communes. This openness to outside advice allowed the collectivity of imperial cities to shape the religious policies of individual cities, fundamentally altering the direction of urban reform. The Negotiated Reformation described in this chapter foreshadows the events in Donauworth and Kaufbeuren, which occurred according to a similar ¨ process of consultation and negotiation. Chapters 4 and 5 focus on the 1545 introduction of the Reformation in Donauworth and Kaufbeuren. In Donauworth, a preacher from Augsburg ¨ ¨ named Wolfgang Musculus facilitated the adoption of evangelical reform. For both political and religious reasons, however, Donauworth’s council ¨ decided in March 1545 to accept reform modeled on Nuremberg, which oriented itself religiously toward Wittenberg. This act contradicted the wishes of Augsburg’s council, which urged its counterpart in Donauworth ¨ to follow a more austere reformation based on Augsburg’s model. Despite these confessional differences, Augsburg’s guidance remained crucial for Donauworth’s council, and the two cities continued to negotiate the ori¨ entation of Donauworth’s reformation. In August 1545, Donauworth ¨ ¨ even agreed provisionally to realign its reform endeavors in exchange for Augsburg’s formal military protection. In Kaufbeuren, four neighboring communes compelled the local council to accept the Augsburg Confession in August 1545. The city had long been a center of radical religious activity. Its growing association with the outlawed form of worship known as Anabaptism made Kaufbeuren’s religious orientation a liability for other evangelical communes. Augsburg, Kempten, Memmingen, and Ulm sought to move Kaufbeuren away from radical reform, but the city’s adoption of the Augsburg Confession

18


met with resistance, especially from Kaufbeuren’s spiritualist preacher, Mathias Espenmuller Under pressure from Augsburg and Memmingen, ¨ Kaufbeuren’s council agreed to remove Espenmuller in exchange for new ¨ preachers from its two neighbors. These pastors then began to alter the religious practice of the city’s population. As in Augsburg and Ulm, the official introduction of the Reformation in Donauworth and Kaufbeuren ¨ depended on the actions of neighboring imperial cities. Chapter 6 examines Augsburg’s attempts to spread the Reformation to surrounding rural communities, specifically the villages Haunstetten and Mindelaltheim. This program of rural evangelization formed part of the city’s wider efforts to expand its religio-political sphere of influence. In the case of Mindelaltheim, Augsburg decided in October 1544 to install an evangelical preacher in the village. It did so only after receiving Ulm’s assurances of solidarity. Almost immediately, the German King Ferdinand, a supporter of the Catholic Church who exercised territorial lordship over Mindelaltheim, demanded that Augsburg withdraw its preacher. Augsburg’s council appealed for aid to the Schmalkaldic League, which denied the city support because of Augsburg’s lack of high justice in the village. As a result, Augsburg had to abandon its attempts to reform Mindelaltheim. Like the urban Reformation, the rural Reformation in Eastern Swabia could be negotiated among a variety of agents. The inability of Augsburg to sustain reform in Mindelaltheim marked one of the first failures in the city’s policy of expansion. Negotiation was a powerful tool, but it often could extend only as far as the complex of legal rights controlled by a city. Chapter 7 returns to Donauworth and Kaufbeuren. It examines Augs¨ burg’s attempts to entrench religious reform under its guidance in its neighboring communes, as well as the tensions surrounding the start of the Schmalkaldic War. It does so primarily through an analysis of the negotiations over Donauworth and Kaufbeuren’s proposed admission to ¨ the Schmalkaldic League. Augsburg’s council represented both cities during this process, but it failed to persuade either city to join the alliance. The ultimate collapse of negotiations led Augsburg to employ military force in the hopes of salvaging its long-term goals in Eastern Swabia, but this act ensured that Augsburg’s council could not secure what it had long sought: the willing allegiance of its smaller neighbors. Chapter 7 therefore follows the story of religious reform in Donauworth and Kauf¨ beuren to the first months of warfare between the Schmalkaldic League and the Holy Roman Emperor. It highlights the centrality of regional politics to the survival of the south German Reformation while revealing

Introduction

19

the limitations of negotiation as a means of creating and maintaining new spheres of religio-political influence. The urban Reformation in southern Germany represented a religious, political, and social event that depended on multiple agents and contingencies. It did not correspond to a one-sided bottom-up or top-down model of reform, nor did it occur in isolation within the walls of a single city. It resulted in many cases from negotiation shaped by regional politics. Eastern Swabia’s imperial cities experienced negotiated reformations based on intercity patterns of communication and religio-political influence. This regional embeddedness provided strength and guidance to local reform movements, but it also led to conflict with supraregional entities that were beyond the control of urban councils. In the process, the Reformation initiated a growing tension within city walls between adherence to the evangelical faith, solidarity with one’s urban neighbors, and fealty to the Empire’s highest powers. Ultimately, on the eve of the Schmalkaldic War, Eastern Swabia’s imperial cities had to choose sides. They made their decisions within the regional framework of the south German urban hierarchy and its long-standing patterns of communication.

1 Consultation and the Urban Hierarchy

In mid-October 1531, an urgent letter arrived in the city council chamber of the imperial city Ulm. Penned by magistrates in Constance, an imperial city in southwestern Upper Swabia, the missive requested Ulm’s help in resolving a legal conflict between Constance’s council and several Dominican monks. The friars had left the city in protest after the council’s introduction of evangelical religious reform, whereupon Constance’s magistrates appropriated several vineyards owned by the monastery. The Dominicans now sought redress through legal action in imperial courts.1 As part of its defense strategy, Constance’s council forwarded Ulm a copy of its proposed reply to the friars. Since “this dispute affects and concerns not just us, but also you and all other members of the [Schmalkaldic League],” the council members wrote, “please offer your advice concerning what should be changed or eliminated from this response, or whether we should proceed in another way.”2 Constance’s magistrates asked for guidance “in the hopes that you and other cities might help us avoid a declaration of outlawry.”3 Ulm’s magistrates responded in two ways. The council commissioned its leading theologian, Martin Frecht, to compose a letter of advice for Constance.4 It forwarded this to Constance’s magistrates, who “altered the protestation concerning the preacher monks according to [Ulm’s] 1

2 3 4

¨ For more on Constance’s reformation suits, see Hermann Buck, Die Anfange der Konstanzer Reformationsprozesse (Tubingen: Osiandersche, 1964); Bernd Moeller, Johannes ¨ Zwick und die Reformation in Konstanz (Gutersloh: Mohn, 1961). ¨ Stadtarchiv Ulm (Hereafter StadtA UL), A [8997], Nr. 1. StadtA UL, A [8997], Nr. 10. StadtA UL, A [8997], Nr. 6–7.

20

Consultation and the Urban Hierarchy

21

recommendation.”5 At Constance’s request, Ulm also wrote two other evangelical imperial cities – Nuremberg and Strasbourg – asking for their aid in resolving the conflict. Ulm’s council emphasized that the legal proceedings against Constance threatened “all estates that adhere to the holy Gospel.” It entreated Nuremberg’s and Strasbourg’s magistrates to review the case and “to offer advice concerning this appeal.”6 Ulm specifically urged Strasbourg “to deliberate on the matter and to bring it to the attention of our lords the prince-elector of Saxony and Landgrave Philip of Hesse.” The councilors hoped thereby to ensure Constance’s “encountered difficulty will be halted and warded off.”7 For Ulm’s magistrates, the solution to Constance’s legal troubles lay in maintaining solidarity among imperial cities and procuring the support of leading evangelical estates. Strasbourg agreed. Since its council “was unaware of such a suit until receipt of your letter, we cannot offer any profound or fruitful advice. Nevertheless, we have hastily sent word of this affair to the landgrave and the prince-elector of Saxony.”8 With Ulm’s and Strasbourg’s assistance, Constance secured the Schmalkaldic League’s backing, which enabled the city to protect itself until the dispute’s resolution in 1538.9 Unwilling and perhaps unable to organize its defense alone, Constance’s council turned to other imperial cities to preserve urban reform. The defense of the Reformation in Constance depended on guidance and support procured through intercity consultation. The correspondence surrounding Constance’s feud with the exiled Dominicans reveals one of the central ways in which imperial cities negotiated religious reform. Faced with a legal challenge that threatened its new religious policies, Constance’s council turned to other cities for assistance. What began as a local dispute quickly involved urban magistrates across southern Germany. Such systems of communication and support between cities played crucial roles in urban policy making throughout the sixteenth century. They promoted urban solidarity through participation in collective alliances and allowed magistrates to gather external

5 6 7 8 9

StadtA UL, A [8997], Nr. 10. StadtA UL, A [8997], Nr. 12. StadtA UL, A [8997], Nr. 13. StadtA UL, A [8997], Nr. 14. Hans-Christoph Rublack, “Die Aussenpolitik der Reichsstadt Konstanz Wahrend der ¨ Reformationszeit,” in Der Konstanzer Reformator Ambrosius Blarer 1492–1564, ed. Bernd Moeller (Constance: Thorbecke, 1964), 70; Gabriele Schlutter-Schindler, Der ¨ Schmalkaldische Bund und das Problem der causa religionis (Frankfurt: Lang, 1986), 30, 46, 80.

22


examples to inform their internal policies. As Constance’s experience shows, consultation among cities also served as an important vehicle for the spread and defense of the Reformation. In all its manifestations, intercity consultation reflected the multivalent social, economic, and political ties that connected southern Germany’s imperial cities. Any analysis of the relationship between the urban Reformation and the politics of town councils must therefore begin with an examination of the place of consultation in civic governance. Imperial Cities and the Holy Roman Empire Few political entities have invited as many varying interpretations as the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation. A loose confederation of semiautonomous states, the Empire’s highest authority was the Holy Roman Emperor, who shared power with the Imperial Diet, the Empire’s central legislative body. The Imperial Diet served as the main forum for enacting legislation that was technically binding on all the Empire’s members, but the imperial estates maintained a large degree of autonomy in their local affairs. When the Diet’s pronouncements ran counter to the interests of individual estates, therefore, the assembly’s mandates could prove difficult to enforce. This was especially true in matters of religious reform. The Diet itself consisted of representatives from the Empire’s three political estates: the seven prince-electors who chose the emperor; the Empire’s other princes, nobles, and ecclesiastical lords, who controlled territories of varying size scattered throughout central Europe; and free, self-governing urban communes called imperial cities. When assembled, the Diet divided itself into the Princes’ Chamber, in which the first two estates sat, and the Cities’ Chamber, where the urban delegates gathered. Although the imperial cities occupied their own chamber, their position in the imperial constitution was perilous, since at the time of the Reformation the princes still sporadically contested the cities’ right to a full vote in the Imperial Diet. Some of the smallest polities in the Empire, imperial cities were also frequently the target of ambitious princes and noblemen who sought to expand their areas of jurisdiction at the expense of urban privileges. The existence of self-governing city-states resulted from the complexity of imperial law, which struck a balance between local autonomy and the central power of the emperor and Imperial Diet. Most imperial cities gained their independence from territorial lords during the Middle Ages by placing themselves directly under the emperor’s protection. In exchange for supporting the emperor’s dynastic ambitions, urban


23

communities received a charter of liberties that permitted townsmen to build city walls and to organize their own civic government. Recognition as an independent “city of the Empire” granted the local town council great independence to set its own domestic and external policies. The city leaders pledged loyalty to the emperor and paid imperial taxes but otherwise enjoyed substantial freedom to govern their city-states as they saw fit. The territorial politics of neighboring lords occasionally threatened this independence, a particularly acute problem in Eastern Swabia. Powerful noblemen like the duke of Bavaria and the bishop of Augsburg surrounded Donauworth, Kaufbeuren, and Augsburg, and they often ¨ advanced claims to jurisdiction over territory nominally subject to urban control. From 1458–62, the duke of Bavaria even occupied Donauworth ¨ in an attempt to deprive it of its imperial city status. Bavaria could not sustain its occupation, but over the next 150 years, the dukes constantly sought to incorporate Donauworth into their personal jurisdiction. The ¨ ongoing threat from Bavaria exerted a powerful influence on the religiopolitical policies of Donauworth’s council.10 The proximity of Eastern ¨ Swabia’s other imperial cities to powerful territorial states also shaped the manner in which these cities negotiated urban reform. The imperial tax list compiled at the 1521 Diet of Worms listed sixtynine imperial cities, the vast majority of which sat in the southern part of the Empire.11 These southern cities clustered in three regional groupings: along the Upper Rhine, in Franconia, and in Swabia. The size of imperial cities varied greatly. The largest and most influential cities in the south were Nuremberg, Strasbourg, Ulm, and Augsburg, while Cologne was the most populous of the northern imperial cities. These large cities were important economic and cultural hubs with populations approaching 40,000 in Nuremberg, 30,000 in Augsburg, and just over 17,000 in Ulm.12 Following the largest cities existed a broad level of middle-sized communes with populations ranging from 2,000–10,000. 10

11

12

Rolf Kiessling, “Wolfgang Musculus and die Reformation im schwabischen Einzugsge¨ biet der Stadt Augsburg,” in Wolfgang Musculus und die oberdeutsche Reformation, eds. Rudolf Dellsperger et al. (Berlin: Akademie, 1997), 137–8. The 1521 Imperial tax list categorized eighty-five cities as imperial cities, but only sixtynine remained subject solely to the emperor. Brady, Turning Swiss, 10 and G. Schmidt, ¨ Der Stadtetag, 36–75, which correct Bernd Moeller’s assessment of sixty-five cities in “Imperial Cities,” 41. Jason Coy, Strangers and Misfits: Banishment, Social Control, and Authority in Early Modern Germany (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 16; Stefan Dieter, Die Reichsstadt Kaufbeuren in ¨ der fruhen Neuzeit (Thalhofen: Bauer, 2000), 13–14; Heal, Cult of the Virgin Mary, 12– 14; Anton von Steichele and Alfred Schroder, Das Bisthum Augsburg, vol. 6 (Augsburg: ¨ Schmid’sche, 1896–1904), 325.

24


Most cities in Eastern Swabia fell into this category. After Augsburg and Ulm, Memmingen was the next-largest city, with approximately 5,000 inhabitants. Kaufbeuren and Kempten claimed about 3,000 inhabitants in the 1540s, while Donauworth had slightly more than 2,000 inhabitants.13 ¨ Below these middle-sized cities were the smallest communes, with populations of only a few hundred. These small communities often played important economic roles for their surrounding countryside but had little influence beyond their immediate locale. To govern their community’s affairs, the citizens of each town elected a city council, which in Eastern Swabia was usually chosen by a combination of guild members and patricians. In Augsburg, for example, the council operated under a guild constitution, whereby the city’s patricians and guilds shared power.14 Annual elections determined membership in Augsburg’s council, which included several different institutions. At the beginning of January, 233 members were elected to the Large Council, or Grosser Rat. It held power in financial matters like taxation and served as a forum to gauge popular attitudes toward controversial issues, such as the 1534 introduction of religious reform in churches under the council’s authority. More meaningful for the city’s external policy was the Small Council, or Kleiner Rat. The Small Council consisted of fortytwo members, thirty drawn from guild leaders and twelve representatives of the patriciate. It elected Augsburg’s public officers, the majority of whom belonged to the Small Council. The Small Council also provided the members of the inner Council of Thirteen, or Dreizehner, which held the true political power.15 This committee handled the day-to-day affairs of the city and decided which matters the Small Council should consider for a vote. The official political leaders were the two mayors – one from the guilds, one from the city’s patriciate – whom the Small Council elected. Their tenure lasted for one year, although it was common to be reelected mayor in alternating years until one’s death or retirement from city politics.16 13

14 15 16

Dieter, Reichsstadt Kaufbeuren, 13; Peer Friess, Die Aussenpolitik der Reichsstadt Memmingen in der Reformationszeit (1517–1555) (Memmingen: Memminger Zeitung, 1993), 20–1. This arrangement lasted until 1548, when Charles V reorganized the city’s government in favor of the urban patriciate. The Dreizehner included the city’s two mayors, three Baumeister, three Einnehmer, two Siegler, and three additional members of the Small Council. Katharina Sieh-Burens, “Die Augsburger Stadtverfassung um 1500,” ZHVS 77 (1983): 125–49; Katharina Sieh-Burens, Oligarchie, Konfession und Politik im 16. Jahrhundert (Munich: Vogel, 1986), 29–39. ¨


25

While the exact details of civic government varied from city to city, most south German imperial cities operated on a model similar to that of Augsburg.17 Commonalties of political organization, coupled with the need to defend their legal status against the encroachment of aristocratic states, encouraged urban communes to work together to promote their common interests. These efforts at collaboration began long before the advent of the sixteenth-century Reformation. In Swabia, which included the largest number of imperial cities, the desire to create urban alliances dated back to the fourteenth century. Eastern Swabia’s cities formed their first regional alliance as early as 1330,18 which was followed in the 1370s and 1380s by one of the first major attempts at creating a formal league among imperial cities in all parts of Swabia.19 In 1390, a larger alliance emerged that survived for more than sixty years. These urban leagues promised their members military support and provided a forum for collective policy making, both of which allowed otherwise small and isolated polities to negotiate policies beneficial to their estate as a whole. The advantageous nature of such alliances accounts for the growth and longevity of the 1390 league, which by the mid-fifteenth century had expanded to include most of the cities in Swabia, as well as the Franconian metropolis Nuremberg. When this league collapsed in 1451 as a result of warfare, its goal of fostering urban collaboration survived in numerous regional alliances formed during the 1450s, 1460s, and 1470s.20 17

18

19

20

Kaufbeuren and Memmingen had only one mayor, while the inner council in Ulm had five members rather than thirteen. Similar idiosyncrasies existed in all south German imperial cities. Nevertheless, each city in Eastern Swabia operated under a guild constitution whose civic institutions exercised comparable powers. For an overview of the similarities among these governments, see Rolf Kiessling, “Stadtischer Republikanismus. Regiments¨ formen des Burgertums in oberschwabischen Stadtstaaten im ausgehenden Mittelalter ¨ ¨ und in der beginnenden Fruhneuzeit,” in Politische Kultur in Oberschwaben, ed. Peter ¨ Blickle (Tubingen: Academica, 1993), 175–205. ¨ This alliance included all six imperial cities in Eastern Swabia, as well as Nordlingen, ¨ Biberach, and several nobles in Swabia and Bavaria. It formed under the leadership of Emperor Ludwig of Bavaria. Rolf Kiessling, “Stadteb unde und Stadtelandschaften im ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ oberdeutschen Raum. Ostschwaben und Altbayern im Vergleich,” in Stadtelandschaft – ¨ ¨ ¨ Stadtenetz – zentralortliches Gefuge, 79–83. See among others Heinz Angermeier, “Stadteb unde und Landfrieden im 14. Jahrhun¨ ¨ dert,” Historisches Jahrbuch 76 (1954): 34–46; Johannes Schildhauer, “Der schwabische ¨ Stadtebund – Ausdruck der Kraftentfaltung des deutschen Stadteb urgertums in der ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ Geschichte des Feudalismus 1 (1977): zweiten Halfte des 14. Jahrhunderts,” Jahrbuch fur ¨ 187–210; Karl Schnith, “Reichsgewalt – Schwabischer Stadtebund – Augsburg. Zur poli¨ ¨ tischen Konstellation im spaten 14. Jahrhundert,” ZHVS 74 (1980): 104–19. ¨ Two examples come from Memmingen: In 1453, the city formed a new alliance with Ravensburg, Wangen, Isny, Leutkirch, and Kaufbeuren. In 1460, Memmingen entered an

26


The support these urban alliances offered was particularly important for smaller cities like Donauworth, which after the 1458–62 Bavar¨ ian occupation sought from its urban neighbors protection against the duchy’s expansionist goals.21 Similar developments occurred along the Upper Rhine, where alliances between cities played a central role in the Burgundian Wars of the 1470s. Urban communication networks proved critical for the eventual defeat of Duke Charles the Bold. The successful collaboration of imperial cities like Basel and Strasbourg in prosecuting these wars strengthened ties between communes that remained important during the ensuing decades.22 They also helped solidify systems of regional politics that shaped the nature of urban relations throughout the early modern period. By the second half of the fifteenth century, the negotiation of collective urban policy had become an indispensable part of political life for the Empire’s southern imperial cities. Urban negotiations and collective action during the Reformation emerged from late medieval patterns that influenced how religious reform occurred. The Urban Diet Along with the urban leagues of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the 1471 creation of the Urban Diet codified attempts to promote intercity cooperation in the pre-Reformation era. A semiregular assembly of representatives from the Empire’s self-governing communes, the Urban Diet represented one of the main vehicles for urban collective politics. It functioned as an important forum for consensus building and policy formation, and as a linchpin in urban efforts to increase member estates’ influence at the imperial level. According to Georg Schmidt, imperial cities “attempted to realign themselves through the general Urban Diet and thereby to define their position as a political force within the Empire.”23

21

22

23

urban league that included Ulm, Kempten, Biberach, Gmund, Isny, Leutkirch, and Aalen. ¨ Friess, Aussenpolitik, 36; Rolf Kiessling, Die Stadt und ihr Land (Cologne: Bohlau, ¨ 1989), 347, 771. For more on fifteenth-century urban alliances, see Brigitte Berthold, ¨ “Uberregionale Stadtebundprojekte in der ersten Halfte des 15. Jahrhunderts,” Jahrbuch ¨ ¨ ¨ Geschichte des Feudalismus 3 (1979): 141–79. fur During the 1480s and 1490s, Donauworth also fostered a closer relationship with the ¨ emperor that helped prevent renewed Bavarian intervention in the city. Kiessling, “Musculus,” 138–9. ¨ Brady, Turning Swiss, 49–51; Claudius Sieber-Lehmann, Spatmittelalterlicher Nationalismus. Die Burgunderkriege am Oberrhein und in der Eidgenossenschaft (Gottingen: ¨ Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1995), esp. 356–62. ¨ G. Schmidt, Der Stadtetag, 146.


27

While the Urban Diet’s membership included all of the Empire’s imperial cities, it had a decidedly southern flavor. It met at the discretion of the largest and most influential imperial cities in southern Germany: Augsburg, Frankfurt, Nuremberg, Strasbourg, and Ulm. Four of these five communes served as corresponding cities for the Empire’s regions. They were responsible for maintaining official diet correspondence with towns in their geographic area, as well as inviting all other imperial cities to the diet’s meetings. The corresponding cities decided when and where assemblies would occur, which allowed them to set the diet’s agenda, since only those issues addressed in the letter of invitation could be incorporated into the official instructions for urban delegates. This meant corresponding cities exercised a good deal of control over the flow of information in their region. Accordingly, corresponding status allowed a city to exert influence over the political and economic policies of its immediate urban neighbors.24 It also made the largest communes in the south responsible for representing the interests of smaller cities. Constance’s reformation suit with the Dominicans points to the reciprocal nature of this arrangement. Constance’s council wrote its counterpart in Ulm for advice, but it also petitioned Ulm “as the corresponding city for this region to describe this matter to the other cities and estates. . . .”25 Constance’s magistrates not only sought Ulm’s consultation; they also entrusted Ulm, as Swabia’s corresponding city, with procuring wider support for their cause. Ulm obliged. Through the activity of corresponding cities, local concerns could become matters of interest for the urban hierarchy as a whole. The regional configuration of this system not only allowed for the rapid exchange of information but also provided smaller cities access to advocacy from larger cities that understood their specific regional political constellation. In this context, corresponding status reflected the preexisting regional importance of southern Germany’s richest and most politically active urban communes. By the 1520s, three of the four corresponding cities were firmly established. Strasbourg, Frankfurt, and Nuremberg held corresponding status for the cities of the Upper Rhine, central and northern Germany, and Franconia, respectively. Strasbourg and Nuremberg were the largest and most economically important cities in their regions, and there were no 24

25

¨ G. Schmidt, Der Stadtetag, 23. Similar dynamics characterized meetings of the Schmalkaldic League, where the short duration of diets made it difficult for urban delegates to negotiate matters not explicitly included in the letter of invitation. Haug-Moritz, Der Schmalkaldische Bund, 236–7. StadtA UL, A [8997], Nr. 1.

28


other local communes that could challenge their predominance. The same was true for Frankfurt in central Germany, but in the north, Cologne surpassed Frankfurt in both size and regional economic influence. Cologne’s exclusion from the ranks of corresponding cities highlights the southern nature of the Urban Diet’s leadership. While Cologne frequently participated at urban diets, it never possessed the same constitutional status as its southern brethren. The operation of the Urban Diet grew out of southern patterns of consultation and negotiation that evolved from earlier regional urban leagues. Many cities in the Empire’s north shared similar patterns, but different geographic and political concerns often prevented northern and southern magistrates from seeing eye to eye. In the context of the Reformation, this divergence appeared most dramatically in the decision of the five largest cities in the south to introduce evangelical reform while Cologne remained loyal to the Catholic Church. The Urban Diet’s southern emphasis meant Frankfurt, Nuremberg, and Strasbourg received corresponding status without much controversy. The matter was less clear in Swabia, where Augsburg and Ulm vied for supremacy. Both communes exercised comparable spheres of political and economic influence, and each advanced its own claim to corresponding status. The issue remained unresolved until 1523, when the region’s imperial cities named Ulm the sole corresponding city for Swabia based on the city’s central location and leadership role in earlier urban leagues. Augsburg’s council contested this decision to no avail.26 Conflict over corresponding status reemerged in the 1530s and 1540s, at the same time that Augsburg and Ulm quarreled over their roles in the Swabian Circle, a regional administrative unit that encompassed Swabia’s urban, princely, and ecclesiastical estates. In 1544, Augsburg challenged Ulm’s designation as the main assembly place for circle diets, as well as its corresponding status for the circle’s imperial cities. As with the Urban Diet, Augsburg’s efforts made few inroads,27 but both instances reveal an active rivalry between the two cities that derived from their direct competition for influence in Eastern Swabia. While they frequently worked together and were military allies throughout the sixteenth century, magistrates in Augsburg and Ulm often pursued their own individual interests to the 26 27

¨ G. Schmidt, Der Stadtetag, 18–20. The rivalry between the two cities within the Swabian Circle continued throughout the early modern period. Hans Eugen Specker, “Die Reichsstadt Ulm als Tagungsort des ¨ Schwabischen Reichskreises,” in Reichskreis und Territorium: Die Herrschaft uber der ¨ Herrschaft? ed. Wolfgang Wust ¨ (Stuttgart: Thorbecke, 2000), 179–96, esp. 194–6.


29

detriment of the other city. It is in this context of simultaneous cooperation and rivalry that their negotiations over reform in Donauworth, ¨ Kaufbeuren, and Mindelaltheim occurred. The Swabian League The first two decades of the Urban Diet’s existence coincided with numerous local protective alliances formed between individual cities and territorial lords that sought to ensure the safety of trade routes and to preserve urban independence. These arrangements provided the prehistory for a new collective association that emerged in the 1480s: the Swabian League.28 Founded under imperial auspices in January 1488, the Swabian League’s mission was to safeguard the public peace in the Empire’s southern regions. Its members included noble and ecclesiastical estates along with imperial cities, although urban mercantile wealth and the tradition of collective politics ensured the cities a prominent place in the League’s Central Council. According to the League’s initial 1488 constitution, the cities filled nine of the Council’s eighteen seats. This allowed imperial cities to influence the League’s agenda, but it also led to tensions between the alliance’s urban and noble estates.29 While some noblemen believed the cities received too many concessions within the League, town councils remained wary of attempts to encroach on urban jurisdictions. Some magistrates also chafed at the financial cost of supporting the League’s activity.30 When the League expanded its geographic boundaries to include polities outside Swabia in 1512 and again in 1522, for example, several cities in Upper Swabia contemplated leaving the alliance on the pretense that it had become too large and involved the cities in distant conflicts of little local benefit. Political pressure from the emperor suppressed these attempts at separation,31 but the divergence of interest within the alliance that spawned them increased with the advent of religious reform. In the early 1530s, discord between the alliance’s aristocratic territories and imperial cities helped lead to the dissolution of the Swabian League and the movement of many of its evangelical members into the new Schmalkaldic League.

28 29 30 31

¨ Horst Carl, Der Schwabische Bund 1488–1534 (Leinfelden-Echterdingen: DRW, 2000), 150–6. Brady, Turning Swiss, 53. ¨ Carl, Der Schwabische Bund, 353–64. Ibid., 160–2.

30


In Eastern Swabia, Kaufbeuren, Kempten, Memmingen, and Ulm joined the Swabian League at its inception, while Augsburg and Donauworth entered several months later on November 17 and Novem¨ ber 18, 1488 respectively.32 This delay stemmed from initial doubts about extending the alliance’s boundaries to the Lech River, as well as the cautious nature of Augsburg’s external policy in the late fifteenth century. Since the Swabian League sought to counter Bavaria’s attempts at expansion in Swabia, Augsburg’s council worried that joining the alliance could antagonize its territorial neighbor, with which the city had considered forming an alliance only two years earlier. Pressure from the League’s estates and the emperor overcame this concern, which Donauworth’s ¨ council shared. Its delay in entering the alliance rested also on fear of reprisal from Bavaria, an understandable anxiety given Bavaria’s earlier occupation of the city and the enactment of a protective arrangement between Donauworth and Lower Bavaria in 1481.33 The council’s ¨ decision to enter the Swabian League after its larger urban neighbor reflected its tendency to follow Augsburg’s lead in external matters. Like many imperial cities, Donauworth relied on neighboring communes and ¨ regional political constellations to guide its policies. This orientation toward Augsburg had its roots in strong economic, social, and political ties between the two cities that played central roles in Donauworth’s ¨ 1545 introduction of the Reformation. During the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, the Swabian League proved effective at enforcing the public peace and providing a forum for southern estates to coordinate common policies. By the 1520s, its membership had expanded to include most polities in southern Germany.34 A reworked constitution, in place since 1512, struck a balance between the alliance’s estates by awarding the princes, minor nobles, and cities each one chairman, seven council members, and one

32 33

34

¨ Ernst Bock, Der Schwabische Bund und seine Verfassung 1488–1534, 2nd ed. (Aalen: Scientia, 1968), 7. Donauworth enacted this alliance as a counterweight against Wittelsbach attempts to ¨ ¨ deprive the city of its independence. Carl, Der Schwabische Bund, 151, 156; Kiessling, “Musculus,” 138. ¨ Carl, Der Schwabische Bund, 61–71. For a complete list of the League’s membership at the time of the Peasants’ War, see Thomas F. Sea, “The Swabian League and Government in the Holy Roman Empire of the Early Sixteenth Century,” in Aspects of Late Medieval Government and Society, ed. J. G. Rowe (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), 268–71.


31

judge. Each representative served a one-year term, and the League designated Ulm as the standard assembly place for the Central Council.35 In order to coordinate policy within this enlarged alliance, its urban members created a separate Swabian League Urban Diet. This functioned as a subset of the regular Urban Diet, which it replaced from 1508–22 as the main forum for collective politics among the southern cities.36 Within this Swabian League Urban Diet, Nuremberg served as the main source of consultation for member cities in its region, but the League’s original nature as a Swabian alliance meant the most prominent cities were Augsburg and Ulm. Each controlled one seat in the Central Council, and the position of urban chairman – the head of the cities’ delegation in the Council – alternated regularly between these two cities. The rotation of this prominent office institutionalized further Augsburg’s and Ulm’s guiding role for Swabia’s other imperial cities while ensuring continuity in their leadership. It also created an additional area of rivalry for the two neighbors, which allowed middle-sized towns like Nordlingen, ¨ ¨ Uberlingen, and Memmingen to carve out their own consultative spheres by balancing the influence of the two larger cities.37 Despite the activity of the Swabian League Urban Diet, the alliance’s expansion and the political crisis caused by the Reformation led to a slow diminution of urban influence within the League. At the same time that evangelical communities began to emerge in many of the League’s cities, control of the princely and noble positions in the Central Council came increasingly into the hands of ecclesiastical lords, including the most powerful prince-bishops of southern Germany. This placed many cities at odds with the alliance’s other estates on issues of religion.38 Beginning in 1524, 35

36

37

38

¨ Bock, Der Schwabische Bund, 95–6; Heinrich Lutz, “Augsburg und seine politische ¨ Umwelt 1490–1555,” in Geschichte der Stadt Augsburg. 2000 Jahre von der Romerzeit bis zur Gegenwart, eds. Gunther Gottlieb et al, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart: Theiss, 1985), 415. ¨ Brady, Turning Swiss, 70; Carl, Der Schwabische Bund, 166–7, who ascribes the fourteen-year hiatus of the regular urban diet to a general “stagnation of the emperor’s imperial politics that manifested itself as a crisis of the Imperial Diet during the late phase of Maximilian’s reign.” ¨ ¨ Bock, Der Schwabische Bund, 58–9, 110–1; Carl, Der Schwabische Bund, 163–5, 292– 301; Heinrich Lutz, Conrad Peutinger (Augsburg: Die Brigg, 1958), 32. From 1488– 1499, Ulm’s Wilhelm Besserer was urban chairman. Augsburg’s mayor Hans Langenmantel, who remained chairman until his death in 1505, replaced Besserer. The position then went to Ulm’s mayor Matthaus ¨ Neithart, who held the post until 1513. When he died, the chairmanship returned to Augsburg and Ulrich Artzt. Upon Artzt’s death in 1527, Ulrich Neithart of Ulm became the final urban chairman. ¨ Carl, Der Schwabische Bund, 67.

32


several of the League’s episcopal members initiated a legal war against the urban Reformation by repeatedly petitioning the Central Council to declare acts of religious reform violations of the public peace.39 Many other princes openly blamed the cities for the spread of heretical ideas. These accusations reached their height after the 1524–6 Peasants’ War, which most princes in the alliance believed came “for the most part from the cities.”40 Indeed, growing tensions between the princely and urban estates brought on by the Reformation helped lead in 1522 to the revitalization of the regular Urban Diet. By 1533, dissension within the alliance had ripped the Swabian League apart. The urban Reformation in southern Germany, therefore, both relied on late medieval patterns of political communication and subtly altered the ways in which they operated. The Urban Diet and the Swabian League evolved out of fifteenth-century traditions of collective politics. They created part of the context for the Reformation’s spread by uniting disparate polities in ways that fostered communication and the exchange of ideas. At the same time that the Reformation traveled along regional communication networks within these associations, however, it placed stress on many of these relationships, especially those between evangelical and Catholic estates. Negotiating the difficulties presented by disparate forms of religious practice constituted one of the major challenges faced by urban magistrates during the sixteenth century. Social Networking and Consultation in Eastern Swabia The participation of imperial cities in collective associations like the Urban Diet and the Swabian League represented a wider level of urban collaboration during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries embodied in the practice of intercity consultation. Communication among urban governments was central to the daily administration of imperial cities, particularly in Eastern Swabia, where intercity consultation influenced all areas of governance. In 1537, for example, Memmingen’s council wrote Augsburg for help reforming its cloth-cutter’s ordinance.41 Five years later, Memmingen petitioned both Ulm and Augsburg to send a gunpowder specialist to help repair damage to the city’s powder supply.42 Such 39 40 41 42

Ibid., 169–70, 416–7. Thus spoke Bavaria’s representative Leonhard von Eck. Quoted in Carl, Der ¨ Schwabische Bund, 174. StadtA A, Reichsstadtakten (Hereafter RA) 550, 1537 Oktober 8. StadtA A, RA 550, 1542 September 29.


33

attempts to procure aid and advice from other cities were commonplace during the sixteenth century and often reciprocal. In January 1546, Augsburg asked Ulm to loan its water system expert, or Brunnenmeister, to improve the efficiency of Augsburg’s water supply system.43 At the same time, Ulm’s council sought Augsburg’s guidance in revising its tailor ordinance.44 Three months later, Ulm again wrote Augsburg, this time for advice concerning the creation of a new baking ordinance.45 These examples are a small sample of the consultative practices of Eastern Swabia’s imperial cities. They show how the guidance of other communes influenced everyday government initiatives, as well as the willingness of urban councils to allow counterparts in other cities to shape their policies. While these instances of consultation postdate the Reformation’s appearance in southern Germany, they evolved from the late medieval systems of communication evident in the Urban Diet and the Swabian League. During the 1530s and 1540s, many south German imperial cities used these regional patterns of consultation to negotiate the urban Reformation. Town councils approached the introduction and implementation of religious reform as they did other areas of urban governance: by enlisting the assistance of other cities. One factor that shaped the importance of intercity consultation for southern Germany’s imperial cities was the interlocking social networks that connected urban leadership circles. Like the Urban Diet, urban social networks often had their roots in the pre-Reformation era. Most of southern Germany’s prominent urban families had relatives in multiple cities.46 Important business arrangements connected different communes and their burghers, creating interlocking communication networks that spread political and religious news as well as economic information.47 43 44 45 46

47

StadtA A, RA 584, 1546 Januar 29, Januar 31, Februar 10. Augsburg sent Ulm a copy of its tailor ordinance with advice for its implementation. See StadtA A, RA 584, 1546 Februar 9. StadtA A, RA 584, 1546 Mai 25. Among others, the Ehinger, Hainzel, Herwart, Mair, Neithart, Rehlinger, Rem, and Welser families had members in several imperial cities, including Augsburg, Memmingen, and Ulm. Peter Steuer, Die Aussenverflechtung der Augsburger Oligarchie von 1500– 1620 (Augsburg: AV, 1988), 18–50. The Vohlin-Welser firm had two headquarters – one in Augsburg and one in Mem¨ mingen – as well as local factors in Kempten, Nuremberg, Ulm, and many other south German cities. Raimund Eirich, Memmingens Wirtschaft und Patriziat von 1347 bis 1551 (Weissenhorn: Konrad, 1971), 119–73; Mark Haberlein, “Handelsgesellschaften, ¨ Sozialbeziehungen und Kommunikationsnetze in Oberdeutschland zwischen dem ausgehenden 15. und der Mitte des 16. Jahrhunderts,” in Kommunikation und Region, 305–26; Steuer, Aussenverflechtung, 19. The Fuggers had close economic ties to families

34


In addition, ties of friendship between burghers opened lines of personal communication that could facilitate the movement of preachers and reform ideas.48 These social networks influenced the Reformation in individual cities like Augsburg as well as the spread of reform from one imperial city to another. While an internal will for reform was necessary for the Reformation’s introduction, multivalent social ties between communes could either promote or frustrate the process of reform in any given city. The manner in which social networking between Augsburg and other cities shaped urban policy emerges from the family histories of three of the city’s key Reformation-era political figures: Ulrich Rehlinger, Wolfgang Rehlinger, and Georg Herwart. The Rehlingers were one of the most prominent patrician families in Augsburg. The two cousins Ulrich and Wolfgang occupied the position of mayor regularly during the 1520s and 1530s.49 Control of this office allowed them to exert substantial influence on the direction of Augsburg’s evangelical reform movement.50 The course of Augsburg’s reformation during this period was closely linked to religious developments in Strasbourg, a city to which the Rehlingers had strong blood ties. Wolfgang’s mother hailed from Strasbourg, and both Ulrich and Wolfgang were related to the leading Strasbourg politician

48

49 50

in other cities as well, one example being the Prechters, a prominent Strasbourg merchant family who served as Fugger factors. Steuer, Aussenverflechtung, 49. Finally, Bernhard Besserer, one of Ulm’s leading politicians during the first half of the sixteenth century, invested heavily in the Augsburg Hochstetter firm. Steuer, Aussenverflechtung, 34. ¨ For Augsburg, the importance of friendship ties appears in the correspondence between Augsburg’s city physician, Gereon Sailer, and the Strasbourg reformer Martin Bucer. Marijn de Kroon, “Die Augsburger Reformation in der Korrespondenz des Strassburger Reformators Martin Bucer unter besonderer Berucksichtigung des Briefwechsels ¨ Gereon Sailers,” in Die Augsburger Kirchenordnung von 1537 und ihr Umfeld, ed. Reinhard Schwarz (Gutersloh: Mohn, 1988), 59–90. For Memmingen, Ambrosius ¨ Blarer’s friendship with Balthasar Funk and city secretary Georg Maurer seems to have been equally important. Peer Friess, “Die Zeit der Ratsreformation in Memmingen,” in Die Geschichte der Stadt Memmingen, ed. Joachim Jahn (Stuttgart: Theiss, 1997), 430. For more examples, see Steuer, Aussenverflechtung, 58–70. Ulrich Rehlinger was mayor in 1521, 1523, 1525, 1527, 1529, 1531, 1533, and 1535. Wolfgang was mayor in 1534, 1536, 1539, and 1541. Sieh-Burens, Oligarchie, 349. Ulrich played a key role in Augsburg’s procurement of new preachers after the 1530 Imperial Diet of Augsburg. His ties to Strasbourg may have helped facilitate the transfer of five preachers from the Rhenish city. Sieh-Burens, Oligarchie, 143–4. Wolfgang was instrumental in the initial step toward council-led reform in 1534, as well as the negotiations surrounding Augsburg’s admission to the Schmalkaldic League. From 1539– 43, he was the dominant political figure in the city. Sieh-Burens, Oligarchie, 157. See also Friedrich Roth, Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 2 (Munich: Ackermann, 1904).


35

Jakob Sturm. Peter Steuer has argued this relationship established “a high degree of trust” between the two sides that facilitated cooperation between their respective governments.51 Indeed, when Wolfgang withdrew from Augsburg’s political scene in 1543, he surrendered his Augsburg citizenship and moved to his mother’s hometown, where Sturm supported Rehlinger’s application for residency.52 In the 1530s and early 1540s, these social connections may have inclined Augsburg’s council to orient itself religiously toward Strasbourg.53 While the Rehlingers were in office, Augsburg’s magistrates turned frequently to Strasbourg for guidance in reform matters. The Swabian metropolis received numerous pastors from the Rhenish city, including the preacher Wolfgang Musculus. Augsburg’s council also relied on the Strasbourg reformer Martin Bucer to facilitate its introduction of the Reformation. Through their positions of power in Augsburg, the Rehlingers’ ties to Strasbourg linked the two communes in a way that affected both the process and orientation of urban reform. Wolfgang Rehlinger remained the leading politician in Augsburg from 1534–43, when he retired from public life in favor of a new leadership clique led by Jakob Herbrot. Once in power, this “Herbrot group,” as Katharina Sieh-Burens termed it, embarked on an ambitious program to expand the city’s religio-political sphere of influence through the spread of Augsburg-style reform. One of the most important figures in this ruling oligarchy was Georg Herwart, who served as patrician mayor in alternating years from 1538–46. Along with Herbrot, he constituted Augsburg’s main political leadership in the years prior to and during the Schmalkaldic War.54 Like the Rehlingers, Herwart had important familial ties to other imperial cities, especially Ulm and Memmingen. Georg Herwart was born in Ulm, and his father, Marx, sat on that city’s large and small councils. In 1513, Marx moved to Memmingen, where he subsequently served as a prominent magistrate.55 The family belonged to the patriciate in Augsburg and Ulm56 and was related through marriage 51 52 53

54 55

56

Steuer, Aussenverflechtung, 46. Brady, Ruling Class, 273; Sieh-Burens, Oligarchie, 157. Katharina Sieh-Burens, “Burgermeisteramt, soziale Verflechtung und Reformation in ¨ der freien Reichsstadt Augsburg 1518 bis 1539,” in Miscellanea Suevica Augustana, ed. Pankraz Fried (Sigmaringen: Thorbecke, 1985), 67. Sieh-Burens, Oligarchie, 156–69. Marx occupied the office of Einnehmer in Memmingen. He also ran a trading firm with his brother, Hans, who lived in Augsburg. Sieh-Burens, Oligarchie, 125–6; Steuer, Aussenverflechtung, 25. Steuer, Aussenverflechtung, 38.

36


to several of Memmingen’s most prominent families.57 In the context of the Reformation, these ties to Memmingen appear especially significant. They may help explain Augsburg’s tendency after 1538 to seek new preachers from its Allgau ¨ neighbor instead of Strasbourg.58 Indeed, after Wolfgang Rehlinger left office, Strasbourg declined in importance as a source of clergy for Augsburg’s council. During Herwart’s tenure, the city relied almost exclusively on Memmingen, smaller Swabian cities, and Swiss communes to provide new preachers for the city’s evangelical ministries. This suggests a connection between shifting political power, social networking, and the religious orientation of Augsburg’s magisterial reformation. The Herwart and Rehlinger families are two examples of social networking among southern Germany’s imperial cities. While correspondence between town councils rarely addressed these personal ties in explicit terms, social networks established part of the context for negotiation by linking the leadership groups of different cities. Such connections could promote or frustrate cooperation in matters of reform. The two-sided nature of these networks appears in the relationship between Donauworth, Kaufbeuren, and their larger urban neighbors in Eastern ¨ Swabia. Located approximately thirty-five kilometers north of Augsburg, Donauworth relied on its southern neighbor as its main source of con¨ sultation. This relationship reflected close socio-political ties between the two communes. Several prominent families had members living in both Donauworth and Augsburg, among them the Imhof, Lauginger, ¨ Hochstetter, and Schroter families. Georg Vetter, an early supporter of ¨ Luther and seven-time mayor of Augsburg from 1520–32, was born in Donauworth and belonged to the patriciate of both cities. The Regels, an ¨ important magisterial family in Donauworth, also enjoyed dual patrician ¨ status. In 1491, Georg Regel the Younger emigrated to Augsburg and married the Augsburger Barbara Lauginger. His father, Georg, served as a councilor in Donauworth, while Georg the Younger, one of the first ¨ Augsburg burghers to exchange letters with Ulrich Zwingli, agitated for reform in his adopted city.59 57 58

59

The Herwarts were related through marriage to the Funk, Studlin, Sattelin, Stebenhaber, ¨ ¨ and Hainzel families. Eirich, Memmingens Wirtschaft, 281. Between 1538–45, Augsburg received three preachers from Memmingen: Leonhard Flusslin, Johann Traber, and Ulrich Lederle. Roth, Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte, ¨ vol. 3, 539–46. ¨ Kiessling, “Musculus,” 136–7; Maria Zelzer, Geschichte der Stadt Donauworth von den ¨ Anfangen bis 1618 (Donauworth: Auer, 1959), 146–148. ¨


37

Similar to Augsburg’s networking with Strasbourg, Memmingen, and Ulm, these relationships established the framework for negotiation by creating personal connections between ruling elites in Augsburg and Donauworth. These links fostered close political ties between the two ¨ cities, which the less powerful Donauworth adeptly used to its advantage. ¨ Located at the confluence of the Wornitz and Danube rivers, Donauworth ¨ ¨ sat on one of southern Germany’s most prominent north-south trade routes connecting Nuremberg, Augsburg, and points beyond.60 Its position on a strategic bridgehead over the Danube made it important commercially and militarily, but it also made the city susceptible to encroachment from neighboring principalities. Situated between several states that favored Wittenberg theology – most notably Pfalz-Neuburg ¨ and Ottingen – and the Catholic territories of Bavaria and Burgau, Donauworth needed allies to safeguard its independent status against ¨ the intrusion of territorial neighbors. One of the ways its council sought to protect the city was developing a close dependence on Augsburg’s guidance in matters of external policy.61 Like magistrates in many other small and middle-sized cities, Donauworth’s council frequently allowed Augsburg to speak for its inter¨ ests at imperial and regional diets. Between 1495 and 1545, Donauworth ¨ participated in only six of thirty-three urban diets and five of twentyeight imperial diets. This amounted to 18 percent of the assemblies held during this fifty-year span. Conversely, the city allowed another polity to represent it on thirty-eight occasions, or at 62 percent of the diets held. The majority of the time, Donauworth’s council asked Augsburg to serve ¨ as its political representative.62 From 1536–46 alone, Augsburg represented Donauworth no fewer than six times at imperial diets and thirteen ¨ times at regional and urban diets.63 Attendance at diets carried great costs and required delegates to spend long amounts of time away from home in 60 61 62

63

Von Steichele and Schroder, Das Bisthum Augsburg, vol. 3, 691. ¨ Kiessling, “Musculus,” 137–9. ¨ G. Schmidt, Stadtetag, 36–38, 51. Donauworth offered a variety of reasons for its ¨ inability to attend diets, most of which referenced the city’s financial constraints. In November 1544, Donauworth’s council argued it could not attend an Urban Diet in ¨ Ulm “unser jarlichen Burgersteur und andern gemainer Statt ¨ ¨ obligen halben.” StadtA A, RA 571, 1544 November 15. The council used a similar rationale to explain its inability to attend the 1542 Imperial Diet of Speyer “gemainer stat obligen halben.” StadtA A, LitS, 1542 Januar 18. Examples include a 1538 Urban Diet in Ulm, a 1539 Urban Diet in Ulm, the 1542 Imperial Diet of Speyer, a 1544 Urban Diet in Ulm, and the 1545–6 Schmalkaldic Diet of Frankfurt. See StadtA A, LitS 1535–1546, as well as StadtA A, RA 571 and RA 572.

38


did not possess uncomfortable quarters.64 Smaller cities like Donauworth ¨ the means necessary to participate routinely in assemblies. They also could not muster the political clout of larger cities like Augsburg or Ulm. These attendance numbers reveal the constraints, both political and financial, under which Donauworth’s council operated. They reflect its willingness ¨ to rely on Augsburg’s leadership in matters of political importance, a readiness that derived in part from the cities’ social networks. On their own, however, social networks between Augsburg and Donauworth were not enough to encourage Donauworth’s magistrates to ¨ ¨ introduce Augsburg-style religious reform. Instead, Donauworth’s loca¨ tion amid several territorial states with differing confessional orientations led its council to take a cautious approach to the Reformation. During the 1520s and 1530s, the city remained an official supporter of the Catholic Church. Advocates for reform appeared in the city as early as 1525, but Donauworth’s evangelical community failed to grow into a substantial ¨ force for change. This resulted primarily from the actions of the city council, which suppressed the Reformation within its walls. In 1534, for example, it expelled a citizen for pro-Lutheran activities. Three years later, it dismissed the preacher Andreas Hoffmann for publicly espousing the “new teachings.”65 These antireform policies resulted in part from the religious preferences of Donauworth’s magistrates, many of whom ¨ continued to view Catholicism as the true form of Christianity. They also stemmed from fear of the political repercussions reform might have for the city’s relationship with neighboring territories. Starting in 1538 with an abortive attempt to dissolve the city’s Holy Cross monastery, however, Donauworth’s council began to ponder the ¨ 66 introduction of official religious reform. Its tendency to orient itself toward Augsburg played a crucial role in this attitude shift. The council’s initial contemplation of reform coincided with the Reformation’s establishment in several of Donauworth’s surrounding territories: Augsburg ¨ ¨ in 1537, Pfalz-Neuburg in 1538, and the Harburg section of Ottingen in

64

65

66

Erwein Eltz, “Die Reise zum Reichstag,” in Alltag im 16. Jahrhundert, eds. Alfred Kohler and Heinrich Lutz (Vienna: Verlag fur ¨ Geschichte und Politik, 1987), 195–221; Friess, Aussenpolitik, 234–5; Alfred Kohler, “Wohnen und Essen auf den Reichstagen des 16. Jahrhunderts,” in Alltag im 16. Jahrhundert, eds. Alfred Kohler and Heinrich Lutz (Vienna: Verlag fur ¨ Geschichte und Politik, 1987), 222–57. Kiessling, “Musculus,” 140–1; Friedrich Roth, “Beziehungen der Stadt Augsburg zur Reformation in Donauworth (1538–1546),” BBK 10 (1904): 150–1; Zelzer, Geschichte ¨ ¨ der Stadt Donauworth, 173–6. See Chapter 4.


39

1539. These direct neighbors of Donauworth adopted either an Upper ¨ German reformation (Augsburg) or Wittenberg-influenced reform (Pfalz¨ Neuburg, Ottingen) around the same time that Donauworth’s council ¨ considered action against Holy Cross. While it did not take the decisive step toward official reform until 1544–5, Donauworth’s flirtation ¨ with limited reform in 1538 may have resulted from the Reformation’s increased political viability in Eastern Swabia.67 Regional political considerations were central to Donauworth’s reformation, as was the use of ¨ neighboring polities as models of reform. When Donauworth’s council finally did express a desire to introduce ¨ the Reformation, it turned to Augsburg for assistance. Whenever a new social, legal, or religious issue arose in Donauworth, the council’s first ¨ action was often to consult Augsburg. At the same time, social connections between the cities complicated negotiations over the Reformation’s introduction in Donauworth, as well as the city’s proposed admission ¨ to the Schmalkaldic League.68 Despite Augsburg’s regional influence in Eastern Swabia, Donauworth remained an independent polity that sought ¨ to protect its autonomy against Augsburg’s expansion of power. The council in Donauworth needed Augsburg’s assistance, but it was wary of ¨ encroachment on its sovereignty from territorial states and other imperial cities alike. While their close relationship led Donauworth to seek Augs¨ burg’s aid, the council neither blindly followed Augsburg’s example nor failed to resist aspects of Augsburg-style reform its citizens found distasteful. Each ruling oligarchy knew the other one well, and Donauworth’s ¨ magistrates displayed an acute ability to manipulate ties between the cities to further their own religio-political goals, even against the interests of the more powerful Augsburg. A similarly complex relationship existed between Kaufbeuren and its larger neighbors Augsburg and Memmingen. Situated on the Wertach River about sixty kilometers south of Augsburg, Kaufbeuren sat at the crossroads of two major trade routes: one that stretched north-south connecting Augsburg to northern Italy and the mines of Tyrol, and one that stretched east-west between the Swiss cantons, Memmingen, and Bavaria.69 This location meant Kaufbeuren possessed strong economic ties to both neighboring cities, especially in the weaving industry.70 Not

67 68 69 70

Kiessling, “Musculus,” 141–2. See Chapters 4 and 7. Dieter, Reichsstadt Kaufbeuren, 60. See Kiessling, Die Stadt.

40


surprisingly, its council had a long tradition of orienting itself toward Augsburg and Memmingen. This tendency appeared as early as 1330, when Kaufbeuren adopted Memmingen’s system of law,71 while during the second half of the fifteenth century, only Ulm exchanged more correspondence with Augsburg’s council than Kaufbeuren did.72 The most prominent social connection between these cities existed through the family Hormann von und zu Gutenberg. The Hormanns were one of the most ¨ ¨ important merchant families in southern Germany. They were native to Kaufbeuren but operated business offices in Memmingen and Augsburg as well. In 1528, Georg Hormann, a factor for the Augsburg-based ¨ Fugger banking house, was elevated to the nobility by Emperor Charles V and established his primary residence in Augsburg. His son Ludwig lived in both Augsburg and Kaufbeuren. With his brother, Anton, Ludwig administered the family businesses, which included holdings in Augsburg and Kaufbeuren and territorial lordship of the village Gutenberg.73 The connections between the three cities facilitated by the Hormann family ¨ shaped the course of Kaufbeuren’s reformation. Their familial communication network offered an important source of information for members of Augsburg’s ruling elite concerning the religio-political situation in Kaufbeuren. The strong economic connections between the cities evident through the Hormanns may also have inclined Kaufbeuren’s council to ¨ model many of its magisterial policies on its two urban neighbors. Kaufbeuren’s consultation with Augsburg and Memmingen in matters of religious reform appeared first in late 1524. In the early 1520s, a theological divide emerged between Kaufbeuren’s two leading clerics: Georg Sigk and Jakob Lutzenberger. Sigk was a parish priest in St. Martin’s church and the Hospital Church who remained loyal to the Catholic Church; Lutzenberger was a chaplain at the Hospital Church who also held the privately endowed Honold preachership and embraced reform ideas. Each man railed against the other from the pulpit and condemned the “false heretical teachings” of his rival. As their conflict grew 71

72

73

Joachim Jahn, “Von der welfischen Marktsiedlung zur Reichsstadt. Memmingen im Mittelalter bis zur Mitte des 14. Jahrhunderts,” in Die Geschichte der Stadt Memmingen, ed. Joachim Jahn, vol. 1 (Stuttgart: Theiss, 1997), 138. Wolfgang Wust, “Reichsstadtische Kommunikation in Franken und Schwaben. ¨ ¨ ¨ Nachrichtennetze fur Rate Zeitschrift fur ¨ Burger, ¨ ¨ und Kaufleute im Spatmittelalter,” ¨ bayerische Landesgeschichte 62, 3 (1999): 685, 691. Thomas Max Safley, “Die Fuggerfaktoren Hormann von und zu Gutenberg. Werte und ¨ ¨ Normen einer kaufmannischen Familie im Ubergang zum Landadel,” in Augsburger ¨ ¨ Handelshauser im Wandel des historischen Urteils, ed. Johannes Burkhardt (Berlin: Akademie, 1996), 118–21.


41

more intense in the second half of 1524, Sigk appealed to the bishop of Augsburg for aid. In November, the bishop wrote Kaufbeuren’s council warning of the dangers Luther’s teachings presented and encouraging it to support Sigk against Lutzenberger. A month later, Kaufbeuren’s magistrates consulted with other cities about the matter at an urban diet in Ulm, but the council ultimately decided to remain neutral, openly favoring neither party while remaining divided behind closed doors.74 This policy could not succeed for long, however, since the conflict between Sigk and Lutzenberger personified a growing support for reform among Kaufbeuren’s citizenry. While the council deliberated on its options, several anticlerical outbursts occurred that heightened the sense of religious crisis within the community. On three separate occasions from July 1524-September 1524, the pewterer Ulrich Winkler created a disturbance during the Latin Mass, in one instance yelling at Sigk during his sermon, “Father, you are a liar!” In early January 1525, Winkler struck again, this time initiating a riot by physically assaulting a chaplain during one of Lutzenberger’s sermons in St. Martin’s.75 Similar to its reaction to the bishop’s letter, the city council responded to these disturbances by seeking guidance from other magistrates.76 On March 1, 1525, Kaufbeuren’s magistrates wrote Augsburg that “yesterday several of our burghers, according to the old usage, set up a banner in the middle of our church with Christ’s Passion painted on it. Today some people have removed that same banner.” The council feared this action might cause a “large disturbance.” Since it wished “to act in this matter the same as [Augsburg],” Kaufbeuren’s council requested “a written report concerning how you would deal with the aforementioned matter, and whether or not you would allow such a banner to be displayed.” Since “much discussion has arisen here concerning such things,” Kaufbeuren’s magistrates also wished to know “how you celebrate and read the Mass, and whether or not you allow painted images to remain in the churches.”77 74 75

76 77

Martin Weigel, “Der erste Reformationsversuch in der Reichsstadt Kaufbeuren und seine Niederwerfung,” BBK 21 (1915): 149–55. Karl Alt, Reformation und Gegenreformation in der freien Reichsstadt Kaufbeuren ¨ (Munich: Kaiser, 1932), 15–8; Thomas Fuchs, Konfession und Gesprach (Cologne: Bohlau, 1995), 278–81; Gudrun Litz, Die reformatorische Bilderfrage in den ¨ ¨ ¨ schwabischen Reichsstadten (Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 235; Weigel, “Refor¨ mationsversuch,” 150, 155–6. Kaufbeuren’s council also wrote Constance and Ulm in spring 1525 for advice concerning possible religious changes. Litz, Reformatorische Bilderfrage, 243–4. StadtA A, LitS, 1525 Marz ¨ 1.

42


Augsburg’s council replied “that such banners have been and still are displayed in our city. We are not at all opposed to them, nor do we prevent their exhibition. We continue to read and celebrate the Mass according to traditional custom and no one has removed the painted images from our churches.” It advised Kaufbeuren to follow its example and “to refrain from adopting such innovations” until a general council could convene to discuss the matter.78 This cautious advice is understandable, coming as it did in the midst of the Peasants’ War and a few months after religious riots erupted in Augsburg in August 1524.79 While Augsburg’s churches employed several evangelical preachers, by March 1525 the city had not introduced official religious reform, and many magistrates remained loyal to the Catholic Church. The council’s response to Kaufbeuren reflected this uncertain atmosphere, but it also established a pattern for later religious consultation between the two cities. When contemplating the introduction of religious change, Kaufbeuren wrote to Augsburg seeking guidance. Augsburg responded cautiously, encouraging its neighbor to eschew radical belief and to adhere as closely as possible to Augsburg’s church practices. This dynamic persisted throughout the ensuing decades. Kaufbeuren’s council also sought advice in religious matters from Memmingen. Under Lutzenberger’s leadership, Kaufbeuren’s evangelical movement had become popular enough by early 1525 that the council decided to hold a religious disputation from January 30-February 1.80 In preparation, Kaufbeuren turned to Augsburg, Kempten, and Memmingen for guidance. Memmingen’s council, which had organized a similar debate from January 2-6, offered the most important source of consultation. Kaufbeuren’s magistrates requested a transcript of Memmingen’s disputation, which had used the Zurich disputations of 1523 as a model. Kaufbeuren also asked for its neighbor’s cooperation in sending Memmingen’s preacher Christoph Schappeler to guide Kaufbeuren’s debate.81 Memmingen’s council agreed to both requests, although at the 78 79

80

81

Quoted in Litz, Reformatorische Bilderfrage, 244. See also Weigel, “Reformationsversuch,” 245. ¨ Philip Broadhead, “Popular Pressure for Reform in Augsburg, 1524–1534,” in Stadtburgertum und Adel in der Reformation, eds. Peter Alter et al. (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1979), 80–3. Lutzenbeger’s conflict with Sigk, along with the anticlerical outbursts of 1524–5, served as the immediate local impetus for Kaufbeuren’s religious disputation. Alt, Reformation ¨ und Gegenreformation, 15; Fuchs, Konfession und Gesprach, 279–82. Schappeler had been active in Memmingen since his 1513 installation as Vohlin preacher ¨ in Memmingen’s St. Martin’s church. He was an early proponent of religious reform


43

last minute Schappeler aborted his trip to Kaufbeuren.82 Nevertheless, Memmingen’s example provided the standard for Kaufbeuren’s disputation. This reliance on its western neighbor as a model of reform, as well as Memmingen’s role as a potential source of preachers, shaped relations between the cities during the 1530s and 1540s as well. Kaufbeuren’s council decided its disputation in favor of the evangelical party,83 but the Peasants’ War prevented the city from introducing official religious reform. Antirebel forces under the Swabian League’s command occupied the city for eight weeks in late spring 1525, an event that coincided with a shift of membership in the town council. As a result of annual May elections, a Catholic faction under the leadership of the new mayor, Mathias Klammer, gained the upper hand in Kaufbeuren’s government.84 Klammer and his allies expelled Lutzen berger along with other prominent supporters of the Reformation, which left the city’s evangelical community without its primary sources of institutional support.85 Shortly thereafter, Kaufbeuren’s council began actively to suppress religious reform within its walls and the surrounding

82

83

84 85

who during the early 1520s developed close ties to Zwingli and to Zurich’s reformation. He participated in the second Zurich disputation of 1523, and the bishop of Augsburg excommunicated him in February 1524. In early 1525, Schappeler drew on his experience in Zurich to compose seven theological articles that served as the basis for Memmingen’s religious disputation. He also coauthored the “Twelve Articles of the Swabian Peasants.” Because of his support for the rebels, Schappeler fled Memmingen in the summer of 1525 to avoid capture by the Swabian League. Friess, Aussenpolitik, ¨ 42–3, 72, 77; Fuchs, Konfession und Gesprach, 283; Litz, Reformatorische Bilderfrage, 134–6. Schappeler stayed in Memmingen when he received word that the bishop of Augsburg planned to arrest the preacher while he traveled to Kaufbeuren. The council also invited another preacher, Johannes Wanner of Constance, to attend Kaufbeuren’s disputation. Wanner, a native Kaufbeurer, was present for the debate. Alt, Reformation ¨ und Gegenreformation, 18–9; Fuchs, Konfession und Gesprach, 282–3; Litz, Reformatorische Bilderfrage, 239–40; Weigel, “Reformationsversuch,” 193–4. ¨ For the debate’s course, see Fuchs, Konfession und Gesprach, 284–92. A transcript of Kaufbeuren’s and Memmingen’s disputations appears in Thomas Pfundner, “Das Memminger und Kaufbeurer Religionsgesprach von 1525. Eine Quellen¨ ¨ ¨ veroffentlichung mit einem Uberblick,” Memminger Geschichtsblatter (1991/1992): 23– ¨ 65. This marked the eighth time Klammer was elected mayor. Weigel, “Reformationsversuch,” 245. Alt, Reformation und Gegenreformation, 40–1; Dieter, Reichsstadt Kaufbeuren, 61; von Steichele and Schroder, Das Bisthum Augsburg, vol. 6, 370–3. Most prominent among ¨ those expelled was Sebastian von Fuchssteiner, a former legal advisor to the council, who was exiled from Kaufbeuren in July 1525 on the pretext that he planned to initiate a riot during the city’s Corpus Christi procession.

44


countryside.86 Kaufbeuren even became a place of refuge for exiled Catholic clergy from neighboring cities, taking in several Franciscan nuns expelled from Memmingen in 1531.87 Despite the emerging religious differences between Kaufbeuren and its larger neighbors, Kaufbeuren’s council continued to consult with Memmingen and Augsburg. As did Donauworth, Kaufbeuren came increas¨ ingly to rely on advice from Augsburg. Social networks between the two cities played a role in Augsburg’s 1545–6 attempts to introduce religious reform under its guidance in Kaufbeuren. The preacher Augsburg sent to evangelize Kaufbeuren was Michael Keller, who had been a prominent supporter of Upper German theology in Augsburg since his 1524 installation in the city’s Franciscan church. His brother-in-law lived in Kaufbeuren, which gave the preacher a direct social connection to the city. Indeed, Keller’s brother-in-law appears to have kept the preacher well informed of religious developments in Kaufbeuren, especially concerning the activity of radical sects.88 This connection made Keller the natural choice to minister to Kaufbeuren’s community, allowing him to tailor his message to the specific challenges facing the Kaufbeurer. At the same time, the networks between Kaufbeuren and its two larger neighbors undermined Augsburg’s attempts to incorporate the city into an expanded sphere of influence. Kaufbeuren’s close ties to Memmingen allowed it to use Memmingen as a counterweight to Augsburg’s power. In so doing, Kaufbeuren’s magistrates sought to maintain their autonomy in religio-political affairs by playing the consultative authority of larger cities against each other. Social networking linked cities together, but the manner in which these networks influenced the Reformation depended on local circumstances and regional politics. The Urban Hierarchy in Southern Germany The dynamics of intercity communication in Eastern Swabia mirrored those of other regions in southern Germany that included multiple imperial cities. Consultation among southern cities occurred within a 86

87 88

In return for supporting the emperor, Kaufbeuren received numerous imperial privileges, including the right to coin money and an exemption from the jurisdiction of external courts. Dieter, Reichsstadt Kaufbeuren, 61. Alt, Reformation und Gegenreformation, 43–4; Friedrich Dobel, Memmingen im Reformationszeitalter, vol. 5 (Augsburg: Lampart, 1878), 38. Alt, Reformation und Gegenreformation, 66; Roth, Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 3, 254.


45

hierarchical, regionalized framework, at the top of which sat Augsburg and the four corresponding cities of the Urban Diet. These communes served as important orientation points for their respective regions. In Swabia, Augsburg and Ulm often functioned as advocates for less populous communes in external affairs while offering detailed guidance for the day-to-day operation of neighboring cities. Within the Swabian League, for example, cities in Upper Swabia such as Biberach, Leutkirch, and Isny tended to orient themselves toward Ulm, while Donauworth and Kauf¨ beuren frequently followed Augsburg’s lead.89 Similar to Donauworth, ¨ these cities regularly entrusted Augsburg, Ulm, or a regional subcenter like Memmingen with their representation at imperial or urban diets.90 Conversely, Augsburg and Ulm tended to consult with each other or with cities outside of Swabia that matched their size, wealth, and influence. Parallel dynamics shaped urban relations along the Upper Rhine and in Franconia as well. Similar to the situation in Swabia, the Upper Rhine featured two orientation points for urban communes: the corresponding city of Strasbourg and an alliance of ten Alsatian imperial cities known as the Decapolis. Founded in 1354, the Decapolis sought to protect its member cities’ liberties from encroachment by other estates. Its two largest cities, Hagenau and Colmar, served as representatives for their smaller allies at imperial and urban diets, an arrangement that paralleled representation patterns in other parts of the Empire and embodied the long history of urban collaboration in Alsace. Indeed, the Decapolis’s operation during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries provided a source of solidarity and consultation that allowed its members to avoid becoming overly reliant on Strasbourg’s leadership.91 89 90

91

¨ Carl, Der Schwabische Bund, 158–60. Biberach, for example, routinely asked Ulm to represent its interests at the Imperial Diet, while Memmingen often represented Leutkirch, Isny, and Kempten. In 1532, Kaufbeuren ¨ petitioned Uberlingen to represent it at the Imperial Diet of Regensburg. Kaufbeuren’s ¨ decision to entrust Uberlingen with its representation likely stemmed from the proCatholic politics of both councils at the time. More commonly, Augsburg, Memmingen, or occasionally Ulm represented Kaufbeuren’s interests. Friess, “Reichsstadtische Diplo¨ ¨ matie,” 120–2; G. Schmidt, Der Stadtetag, 51. For Biberach’s relationship to Ulm, see Litz, Reformatorische Bilderfrage, 160–78, and Bernhard Ruth, “Reformation in Biber¨ ach (1520–1555),” in Geschichte der Stadt Biberach, ed. Dieter Stievermann (Stuttgart: Theiss, 1991), 255–88. ¨ G. Schmidt, Der Stadtetag, 50; Lucien Sittler, “Der elsassiche Zehnstadtebund. Seine ¨ ¨ geschichtliche Eigenheit und seine Organisation,” Esslinger Studien 10 (1964): 59–77. At the time of the Reformation, the Decapolis’s member cities were Colmar, Hagenau, Kaysersberg, Landau, Munster, Oberehnheim, Rosheim, Schlettstadt, Turkheim, and ¨ ¨ Wissembourg.

46


Despite competition from the Decapolis, however, Strasbourg remained the largest and most powerful imperial city along the Upper Rhine. It was a major economic hub, functioning as the main center of export for local commodities like wine, wheat, and barley.92 Strasbourg’s importance as a distribution base for goods traveling along the Rhine complemented the city’s status as corresponding city for the region, although the activity of the Decapolis limited the frequency with which Strasbourg represented its smaller neighbors at local and imperial assemblies. Nevertheless, the city’s multivalent connections to Basel and the Swabian cities bolstered its political centrality for the Upper Rhine. Throughout the sixteenth century, Strasbourg functioned as the preeminent regional advocate for urban rights. This role became especially important in the 1530s and 1540s, when Strasbourg acted as one of the leading urban members of the Schmalkaldic League. Within this alliance, Strasbourg often served as a mediator between the League’s princes and the interests of its urban members.93 The manner in which Strasbourg advocated for nearby communes appears in its relationship to Metz, an imperial city located close to the French border. The two cities possessed long-standing political ties. In 1523, when Augsburg, Nuremberg, and Strasbourg organized an embassy to Emperor Charles V in Spain to complain about pending antimercantile legislation at the Imperial Diet, Strasbourg’s council persuaded Metz to assist. The city sent its own envoy and arranged for the embassy’s safe conduct through French territory.94 Metz’s proximity to France helped the 1523 urban embassy achieve its mission, but it also made the local council wary of imperial encroachment and the territorial designs of the French crown. The advent of religious conflict, coupled with frequent warfare between the Habsburg and Valois monarchs, accentuated these tensions. While the Reformation found an initial following in the city, Metz’s ruling patricians suppressed the movement after the Peasants’ War. Only in the early 1540s did a sizeable evangelical community reemerge in the city. Its adherents appear to have remained in the minority, although supporters of reform did manage to gain control of important political posts in the city’s government.95 92 93 94

95

Tom Scott, Regional Identity and Economic Change (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997), 82. See Thomas A. Brady, Protestant Politics (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities, 1995). Brady, Turning Swiss, 138. On the embassy itself, see Stefanie Hofmann, “Die Stadte ¨ zwischen Kaiser und Reich,” in Karl V. Politik und politisches System, ed. Horst Rabe (Constance: UVK, 1996), 163–90. Most notably, Gaspard de Heu, Metz’s mayor, supported evangelical reform. Brady, Protestant Politics, 175.


47

Despite the prominence of its advocates, however, the Reformation remained an outlawed movement in Metz. In 1542, fearful that renewed war with France might lead to the further suppression of reform preaching, the city’s evangelical community, led by the town’s mayor, decided to seek protection from the Schmalkaldic League. They turned first to Strasbourg, sending a delegation asking for their neighbor’s assistance in gaining the League’s recognition. In the ensuing negotiations, Strasbourg served as the main mediator between the Metz evangelicals and the Schmalkaldic League. Strasbourg’s council even organized its own embassy to Metz to negotiate the introduction of new religious policies with the city council. While this delegation failed and the League ultimately refused to admit Metz’s evangelicals,96 the community’s appeal to Strasbourg, along with Strasbourg’s role as an arbitrator between Metz’s burghers and the Schmalkaldic League, points to the religio-political centrality of Strasbourg for the southwestern part of the Empire. It sat at the focal point of regional economic and political networks that cemented its role as one of the main orientation points for surrounding urban communes. In Franconia, Nuremberg played a similar role for its neighboring imperial cities. While greater distances separated urban communes in Franconia than in Swabia or along the Upper Rhine, Nuremberg’s size and economic might allowed it to exercise a great deal of regional influence. The Franconian metropolis even succeeded at turning some communes into client or satellite cities whose economic, political, and religious policies depended largely on guidance from Nuremberg. Windsheim and Weissenburg, the two imperial cities closest to Nuremberg, relied exclusively on Nuremberg to represent them at imperial and urban diets when they were unable or unwilling to send their own delegates. Both cities also signed treaties with their larger neighbor that placed them under Nuremberg’s formal protection.97 In the case of Windsheim, an imperial city east of Nuremberg, the city was incorporated into the protective sphere of Nuremberg in 1536. The two councils enacted a treaty of alliance, which established the conditions of aid if one member came under attack. It stipulated that all meetings between officials from the cities take place in Nuremberg while promising Windsheim “loyal help and 96 97

For a detailed description of the Metz affair, see Brady, Protestant Politics, 174–81. ¨ G. Schmidt, Der Stadtetag, 52. On Weissenburg’s relationship to Nuremberg during the fifteenth century, see Ute Jager, “Weissenburg und seine Beziehungen zu den ¨ ¨ schwabisch-fr ankischen Reichsstadten im Spatmittelalter,” in Stadtelandschaften in Alt¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ bayern, Franken und Schwaben, ed. Helmut Flachenecker (Munich: Beck, 1999), 188– 220, esp. 215–20.

48


advice in case of future difficulties.”98 In return, Windsheim pledged loyalty to Nuremberg and recognized its dependence on its larger neighbor. By declaring Nuremberg the official political and military protector of Windsheim, the treaty institutionalized Nuremberg’s guiding role for its smaller counterpart. It formalized Windsheim’s status as a satellite city whose economic and political survival relied on Nuremberg’s protection. In the process, this agreement established an official framework for Nuremberg’s influence over the policies of a neighboring city, creating a direct sphere of influence larger than that of almost any other imperial city. Besides exercising direct influence in its satellite cities, Nuremberg served as the main source of consultation for other imperial cities in Franconia like Rothenburg ob der Tauber and Schweinfurt.99 Indeed, Nuremberg’s importance as an orientation point for smaller polities extended beyond the borders of Franconia to include cities in the far northeast of Swabia, such as Nordlingen. A medium-sized imperial city located ¨ on the linguistic border between Swabia and Franconia, Nordlingen ¨ acted as a source of consultation for smaller cities in its region, such council as Dinkelsbuhl. ¨ ¨ 100 When seeking guidance itself, Nordlingen’s turned most frequently to Nuremberg. The city procured preachers from Nuremberg and other surrounding cities, such as Schwabisch Hall, and ¨ it often followed Nuremberg’s example in religio-political affairs.101 At the 1541 Imperial Diet of Speyer, for instance, Nordlingen’s council ¨ ordered its delegates to orient themselves toward Nuremberg’s policies. 98 99

100

101

Treaty between Nuremberg and Windsheim, undated, filed under StadtA A, RA 572, 1545 November 18? On Nuremberg’s importance as a center for information distribution within the Empire as a whole, see Miloslav Pol´ıvka, “Nurnberg als Nachrichtenzentrum in der ersten ¨ Halfte des 15. Jahrhunderts,” in Kommunikationspraxis und Korrespondenzwesen, ¨ ¨ 165–78; Lore Sporhan-Krempel, Nurnberg als Nachrichtenzentrum zwischen 1400 und 1700 (Nuremberg: Verein fur 1968). ¨ Geschichte der Stadt Nurnberg, ¨ ¨ ¨ Hans-Christoph Rublack, Eine burgerliche Reformation: Nordlingen (Gutersloh: ¨ Mohn, 1982), 237. One example comes from November 1544, when Dinkelsbuhl’s ¨ council, after receiving two letters from the emperor asking the city to send representatives to meet with imperial commissars in Worms, wrote to Nordlingen to determine ¨ whether its council “ire gesanndten gen Wormbs vor den Comissarien zuerscheinen verordnet/ oder schon dahin geschikt haben/ oder nit/ auf das wir unns darnach auch wissen zuhalten.“ Staatsarchiv Augsburg (Hereafter StA A), Reichsstadt Nordlingen ¨ (Hereafter RNo), Bestand (Hereafter MuB) 56, Nr. 20. Another comes ¨ Munchener ¨ ¨ from January 20, 1548, when Dinkelsbuhl’s council wrote Nordlingen for advice con¨ ¨ cerning how it should respond to the emperor’s demand that the city pay war reparations totalling 800 fl. StA A, RNo, ¨ MuB ¨ 997, Nr. 129. ¨ Rublack, Burgerliche Reformation, 240.


49

When any issue related to religion arose at the assembly, the delegates were to consult with Nuremberg’s representatives before making any official pronouncement or even forwarding the matter to Nordlingen’s ¨ council for consideration.102 This policy continued at the ensuing Impemagistrates rial Diet of Regensburg.103 Two years later, Nordlingen’s ¨ asked Nuremberg to represent the city at an upcoming Schmalkaldic diet with the request “to negotiate on our behalf in matters touching directly on the kingdom of God’s word and the Christian religion in roughly the same way you intend to have matters handled or negotiated on your behalf.”104 Such orientation toward Nuremberg had its limits, as Nordlingen’s council instructed its delegates in late July 1541 that “if ¨ Nuremberg wishes to make common cause with the Protestants [i.e., the Schmalkaldic League], you should not align yourself with the Protestants in any way.” Nevertheless, it emphasized that the delegates “should fix your attention on Nuremberg’s actions. . . . If they offer their own individual protest against the diet recess, you should protest alongside Nuremberg.” In order to ensure “we do not provoke the emperor’s disfavor,”105 Nordlingen’s councilors relied on Nuremberg’s guidance in determining ¨ their religio-political options while trying to align their policies with their most influential neighboring commune. Nordlingen’s pattern of orientation toward Nuremberg continued into ¨ the late 1540s during the Augsburg Interim, an imperial reform program that ordered a reorganization of civic institutions in favor of the Catholic Church. Promulgated at the 1547-8 Imperial Diet of Augsburg, the Interim sought to restore Catholic religious practice in evangelical territories. As with much of the Imperial Diet’s legislation, the exact meaning 102 103

104

105

Ibid., 244–5. See the late July 1541 letter from Wolf Graf and Wolf Vogelman to Nordlingen’s ¨ council at StA A, RNo, ¨ MuB ¨ 49, Nr. 1: “nun seien wir aber daruff/ unnserm habenden bevelch nach/ zu den Nurembergischen gesanndten ganngen . . . also haben sy unns nach ettlichen hin unnd wider gepflegnen unnderreden/ unnder anndern ir gutbeduncken zuerkennen geben.” “inn dem/ so one mittel/ das gnadenreiche Gottes wort/ unnd christenliche religion belanngt/ vonn unnsernn wegenn hanndlenn zulassen/ innmassenn unngeverlich E F vonn irnn selbs wegen zethun/ oder zehandlenn zelassenn/ bedacht sein werdenn.” Nordlingen to Nuremberg, June 15, 1543. StA A, RNo, ¨ ¨ MuB ¨ 54, Nr. 3. Nuremberg’s council ultimately decided not to send a representative to the diet at Schmalkalden. “wo aber die von Nurmberg . . . sich zu den protestanten thon/ und mit inen einsezen wollten/ dess sollt ir euch . . . bey den Protestanten mit nichten einlasen”; “das ir uf Nurmberg euer achttung haben sollen . . . und die von Nuremberg allain . . . dawider protestirn wurden/ mogt ir neben inen auch mit protestirn”; “wir . . . bey kay mt nitt ungnad erwecken.” StA A, RNo, ¨ MuB ¨ 49, Nr. 21.

50


of the Interim’s stipulations remained a topic of heated debate after the diet recessed. This left many city governments unsure as to how they should observe the Interim. Nordlingen’s solution was to seek guidance ¨ from Nuremberg. Shortly after the Interim’s proclamation, Nordlingen’s ¨ council sent a delegation to its Franconian neighbor asking for advice regarding what it should allow its clerics to preach and how it should restructure the city’s sacramental practices. Nuremberg’s council replied with a detailed letter recommending the reestablishment of additional feast and fast days, as well as the introduction of private confession in the Nuremberg style. Nordlingen’s magistrates used this advice as ¨ the basis for their enforcement of the Interim.106 Throughout the 1530s and 1540s, Nordlingen’s council oriented itself politically and religiously ¨ toward Nuremberg, whose advice proved critical for many of its policies. According to Ronald Rittgers, “the Nordlingen city fathers looked to ¨ Nuremberg as their model for instituting the Reformation.”107 From this brief sketch, the central role of larger cities within their regions emerges. Strasbourg and Nuremberg both operated as the primary source of consultation for smaller cities in their geographic area. Given their status as corresponding cities, this prominence is not surprising. It reflects a regionalized hierarchy of consultation that shaped urban relations in southern Germany throughout the sixteenth century. Within this hierarchy, many middle-sized towns like Constance, Memmingen, and Nordlingen served as important regional centers of consultation.108 ¨ These middle-sized communes tended to offer guidance to smaller nearby cities, while they consulted with larger communes about their own affairs. Nordlingen’s role as a source of consultation for towns like Dinkelsbuhl, ¨ ¨ coupled with its simultaneous orientation toward Nuremberg’s example, reflects this dynamic. The same is true of Memmingen’s importance for Kaufbeuren and its tendency to consult with Ulm, Augsburg, and Constance. Regional politics and the long-term relationships they cultivated played a central role in establishing urban patterns of consultation. The place of middle-sized cities such as Memmingen and Nordlingen ¨ in this hierarchy emphasizes the local focus of intercity communication. 106

107 108

Ronald K. Rittgers, “Private Confession and the Lutheranization of Sixteenth-Century ¨ Nordlingen,” SCJ 36, 4 (2005): 1082 n. 120; Rublack, Burgerliche Reformation, 253 ¨ n. 40. Rittgers, “Private Confession,” 1082 n. 120. On this issue, especially Memmingen’s role as a subcenter of communication, see Friess, “Reichsstadtische Diplomatie.” ¨


51

Regional patterns of communication ensured that much consultation involved neighbors with close knowledge of each other’s interests. This allowed larger communes to carve out spheres of influence while providing less populous cities with essential political support. Both the center and the periphery benefitted from these regional patterns of influence. In Eastern Swabia, the rivalry between Augsburg and Ulm complicated this process. While Augsburg was more populous, Ulm’s status as Swabia’s corresponding city gave its council an institutional advantage over Augsburg. Both cities exercised important influences on neighboring communes, while Memmingen served as a source of consultation for cities in the eastern half of Upper Swabia. The fact that no city emerged as entirely dominant shaped local patterns of consultation by enabling smaller cities to play the interests of larger towns against each other. This gave communes like Donauworth and Kaufbeuren, which were unequal in power ¨ and influence compared to Augsburg, an important advantage in negotiations with their more powerful neighbors. While smaller cities consulted primarily with other communes in their region, larger cities like Augsburg and Ulm consulted most frequently with imperial cities of equal influence such as Strasbourg and Nuremberg.109 This meant they corresponded across regional boundaries with greater frequency than medium-sized and small cities. Like social networking and collective politics, this urban hierarchy of communication evolved from late medieval practices. Intercity systems of communication were particularly strong in Eastern Swabia, which may have made negotiations between cities in this region more intense, but comparable dynamics marked the Upper Rhine, Franconia, and the Swiss Confederation as well. The centrality of regional politics, therefore, ensured that while the outcome of each set of religious negotiations depended on the specific constellation of forces in its geographic region, the underlying processes remained similar. Intercity communication often enabled the Reformation to spread from region to region and from town to town within specific regions. The Reformation’s regional embeddedness was not just an Eastern Swabian phenomenon, but rather shaped reform throughout the entire south German urban hierarchy.

109

One exception was Augsburg’s tendency during the 1540s to seek new preachers from Memmingen. This reflected the theological similarities between the cities’ reformations, the specific regional political constellation in Eastern Swabia, and Augsburg’s increasing need for preachers to support its program of religio-political expansion.

52

The Negotiated Reformation Consultation in Defense of the Reformation

Social networking and intercity consultation created ties between cities that shaped magisterial policy in both secular and religious affairs. In the process, they provided the context for the ability of imperial cities to defend themselves against legal attacks on the Reformation’s legitimacy. In the 1520s and 1530s, monasteries, bishops, and other Catholic authorities initiated long-running reformation suits, or Reformationsprozesse, against some councils and their evangelical clergy. These lawsuits sought to reverse evangelical reform by restoring seized property to the Catholic Church. Throughout the 1530s, reformation suits exposed cities across the Empire to the potential loss of their independence in religio-political affairs.110 The imperial cities implicated in these proceedings responded in two main ways: They sought security in the Schmalkaldic League111 while employing intercity consultation to coordinate their legal defenses. Similar to other areas of urban governance, the strategies adopted by south German magistrates to protect the Reformation depended on other cities. The majority of reformation suits brought against imperial cities occurred in the Hofgericht in Rottweil or the Imperial Chamber court in Speyer. These two courts were primarily responsible for adjudicating civil lawsuits, and most reformation suits involved disputes over the appropriation of property or goods from the Catholic Church by an evangelical 110

111

While the 1532 Truce of Nuremberg promised to suspend all cases before the Hofgericht and Imperial Chamber court that “concerned the faith,” disagreement over the definition of this phrase meant the two courts continued to adjudicate reformation suits during the 1530s. Brady, Protestant Politics, 162–5; Gero Dolezalek, “Die juristische Argumentation der Assessoren am Reichskammergericht zu den Reformationsprozessen 1532–1538,” in Das Reichskammergericht in der Deutschen Geschichte, ed. Bernhard Diestelkamp (Cologne: Bohlau, 1990), 26–30; Schlutter-Schindler, Der Schmalkaldis¨ ¨ che Bund, 31–6. One of the Schmalkaldic League’s main goals was the disruption of reformation suits. The League had its own lawyers at the Chamber court, and starting in 1534, it disputed the basic authority of the two high courts to hear reformation suits without religious bias. Recognition of a League member’s reformation or legal conflicts as a causa religionis – a matter of religion – meant that the member enjoyed the full political, legal, and military backing of the alliance. The Schmalkaldic League’s agitation forced Charles V to suspend the operation of the Chamber court in 1543, although the emperor reinstated the court in 1548 as part of the Augsburg Interim. Brady, Protestant Politics, 164–9; Dolezalek, “Juristische Argumentation,“ 30–2; Haug-Moritz, Der Schmalkaldische Bund, 277–87. On the League’s lawyers, see Schlutter-Schindler, Der ¨ Schmalkaldische Bund, 65–73.


53

political authority.112 The ultimate punishment at the courts’ disposal was the imposition of outlawry (Acht), which placed the guilty party outside the protection of imperial law. In practical terms, a sentence of outlawry threatened a commune with forfeiture of its imperial city status. This left cities vulnerable to annexation by neighboring principalities.113 Urban magistrates sought protection against this eventuality through intercity consultation. This approach marked Constance’s 1531 response to the exiled Dominicans. In 1545, a similar strategy provided Donauworth ¨ and Kaufbeuren with defense against outside Catholic attacks on their reformations.114 An example of how intercity consultation shaped urban responses to reformation suits comes from Ulm’s city archive. In 1526, the bishop of Constance placed two of Ulm’s chaplains – Bartholomaus ¨ Strehler and Andreas Zierlin – under ban for their decisions to marry. Three years later, the bishop initiated a reformation suit against the two men before the Hofgericht.115 Ulm’s council, which held responsibility for the clerics’ defense, petitioned Nuremberg for guidance.116 Nuremberg’s council acknowledged the matter’s importance for “all estates that love the evangelical Christian truth.” Its magistrates “referred the abovementioned matter to our doctors, who have written down their thoughts and recommendations in a short statement, which we forward to you along with this letter. If you should require additional help or advice in this matter from us or our doctors, we are willing to offer such aid.”117

112

113

114 115 116 117

On the debate surrounding church property during the Reformation, see Christopher Ocker, Church Robbers and Reformers in Germany, 1525–1547 (Leiden: Brill, 2006). In August 1548, the ban of outlawry fell on Constance for its role in the Schmalkaldic War, which marked the culmination of a series of conflicts with Habsburg Austria. This sentence served as the legal justification for the Habsburg siege of the city and the eventual revocation of its imperial city status. Wolfgang Dobras, “Karl V., Ferdinand I. und die Reichsstadt Konstanz,” in Karl V. Politik und politisches System, ed. Horst Rabe (Constance: UVK, 1996), 215–21; Rublack, “Aussenpolitik der Reichsstadt Konstanz,” 76. A declaration of outlawry also led to Donauworth’s loss of imperial city status ¨ in 1607–9. C. Scott Dixon, “Urban Order and Religious Coexistence in the German Imperial City: Augsburg and Donauworth, 1548–1608,” CEH 40 (2007): 1–33; Zelzer, ¨ ¨ Geschichte der Stadt Donauworth, 234–50. See Chapter 7. Theodor Keim, Die Reformation der Reichsstadt Ulm (Stuttgart: Belser’schen, 1851), 113–4. StadtA UL, A [8996], fol. 9, 11–2. StadtA UL, A [8996], fol. 19.

54


Ulm’s council used Nuremberg’s letter and the recommendation of its jurists to draft an instruction for negotiations with the bishop of Constance.118 Before Ulm could send its delegation, however, the bishop suspended the case against Strehler and Zierlin. Shortly thereafter, Ulm received two additional letters from Biberach and Reutlingen. Rather than offer advice to Ulm, these cities sought guidance concerning their own legal troubles. Biberach’s council explained “the Hofgericht in Rottweil has placed one of our priests under ban with the intent of proclaiming a sentence of outlawry against him.” Since “you have encountered a similar case, we present our very friendly request that you inform us in writing at our cost how you have counteracted this situation. We also ask for your advice regarding how we should proceed and negotiate in our matter.”119 Reutlingen’s magistrates informed Ulm that their preacher Matthaus ¨ Alber had been ordered to appear before the Hofgericht because of his decision to marry.120 The council feared “since we are unfit to handle these negotiations with any skill, we and our city are at a great disadvantage. We have heard that two of your chaplains have also been cited . . . and are facing identical proceedings. We ask that you kindly take up our matter and offer us help and advice so we may be rid of this burden.”121 Ulm’s magistrates expressed sympathy for their neighbors’ predicaments and offered to send recommendations concerning their suits.122 Reutlingen’s council responded with “especial joy that you have brought the matter to a peaceful conclusion with the bishop of Constance and that the case has been suspended.” Since its case was still pending, the council asked Ulm as “our dear sirs and especially good neighbors and friends to send us in secret as soon as possible the means by which you achieved this suspension. As much as it is possible, we hope that through such means we will also be able to repeal the mandate.”123 118 119 120

121 122 123

StadtA UL, A [8996], fol. 34–5. StadtA UL, A [8996], fol. 75. The Hofgericht and the bishop of Constance’s court in Radolzell initially cited Alber in 1527–8. The bishop subsequently excommunicated him in 1529. Julius von Hartmann, ¨ Alber, der Reformator der Reichsstadt Reutlingen (Tubingen: Matthaus Osiander’schen, ¨ 1863), 81–91; Siegfried Hermle, “Matthaus ¨ Alber und die Reformation in Reutlingen,” ¨ ¨ ed. Siegfried Hermle (Holzgerlinin Reformationsgeschichte Wurttembergs in Portrats, gen: Hanssler, 1999), 13–48; Schlutter-Schindler, Der Schmalkaldische Bund, 28. ¨ ¨ StadtA UL, A [8996], fol. 76. StadtA UL, A [8996], fol. 77. StadtA, UL A [8996], fol. 79. The Hofgericht pronounced a sentence of outlawry against Alber on January 21, 1530. Reutlingen appealed the case to the Chamber court, which refused to accept it. Proceedings began again in Rottweil, and the suit dragged on until ¨ Alber, 87–91. its suspension in 1532. Von Hartmann, Matthaus


55

This exchange of letters with Ulm at its center reveals one way in which imperial cities employed intercity consultation to resist reformation suits. In order to coordinate its defense against the bishop, Ulm turned for assistance to its fellow corresponding city Nuremberg. Nuremberg’s letter of advice influenced the defense strategy of Ulm’s council, which subsequently became a source of guidance for smaller cities in Swabia burdened with similar legal troubles. These consultations illustrate how the hierarchy of communication among imperial cities could facilitate cooperation and imitation among urban councils. In the mid1540s, Donauworth and Kaufbeuren employed similar tactics, relying on ¨ the expertise of their neighbors to legitimize their own reform endeavors. Rather than proceed alone, imperial cities sought the backing of other communes to strengthen and clarify their individual negotiating strategies. This dynamic marked Constance’s dispute with the Dominican friars as well. On December 1, 1531, Constance’s council sent a letter to Strasbourg and Ulm describing a new development in the ongoing suit. The councilors had organized their legal defense “according to [Ulm’s] recommendation,” which advised Constance “to appeal the case to . . . the Imperial Chamber court, since you can achieve nothing with the Hofgericht.”124 Constance informed Strasbourg and Ulm that the Hofgericht had reached a verdict: “We have been placed under outlawry. As soon as this happened, we appealed sub forma juris to the Chamber court in Speyer. We obtained the court’s acceptance of our appeal, and it has asked the Hofgericht to stand still in these matters.”125 In responding to the Hofgericht, Constance’s council employed the exact strategy advocated by magistrates in Strasbourg and Ulm.126 Similar to Biberach, Reutlingen, and Ulm, Constance’s ability to defend itself did not stem solely from internal factors. It relied first and foremost on intercity consultation within a regionalized urban hierarchy. In southern Germany and particularly in Eastern Swabia, imperial cities often could not pursue religious reform without the help of other cities. Reform did not occur merely from above or from below. The spread, introduction, and defense of the urban Reformation throughout Swabia depended on regional systems of communication and patterns of influence that facilitated the movement of reform ideas from one polity 124 125 126

StadtA UL, A [8997], Nr. 11. StadtA UL, A [8997], Nr. 18. Moeller, Johannes Zwick, 146.

56


to another. Larger cities were especially important in this process of dissemination, but the political tenability of reform also relied on the ability of cities to cooperate in a collective fashion. For Constance’s council, the importance of such collaboration was clear: “If the protesting estates do not take common action in some way against [reformation suits], the instrument of outlawry will give the papists a considerable tool to conquer the protesting estates.”127 Constance’s warning offered a stark choice to south German evangelical cities and territorial states alike: unite or face defeat. The various attempts of evangelicals to close ranks in defense of religious reform held major ramifications for the urban Reformation in Eastern Swabia and throughout the Empire’s southern reaches. 127

“wo nit durch die protestierenden stend/ in ettwas weg werden solche gleichen sachen in gmain gehandelt/ so werde durch das mittle der aucht/ den papstlichen ain grosser weg ¨ gemacht/ all ir vorhaben (nach) gegen jegklichen protestierenden stenden zeerobern.” StadtA UL, A [8997], Nr. 18.

2 Imperial Cities and Collective Politics

One of the most iconic events of the early Reformation involved a series of peasant rebellions that spread across the Holy Roman Empire in the years 1524–6. Known collectively as the Peasants’ War, these uprisings combined traditional demands for economic reform with calls for reordering society according to the evangelical ethos of the New Testament. Many areas of southern Germany experienced intense outbursts of revolution, which in February 1525 caused the Swabian League to mobilize its members’ troops in defense of the common peace.1 While the alliance’s soldiers helped defeat the rebels, the Peasants’ War undermined the League’s cohesiveness. Many League members used the suppression campaign as an excuse to enrich their own territories, especially at the expense of ecclesiastical states that could not marshal military forces to protect themselves. This led to growing friction within the League’s ranks and dissatisfaction with some of its central policies. In the war’s aftermath, as many of the alliance’s princely estates came to view religious reform as a threat to public order, discord within the alliance placed growing pressure on the Central Council to root out the Reformation among its members. This strategy brought the Council into conflict with the alliance’s imperial cities, which many princes blamed for the war’s 1

For the Swabian League’s actions during the Peasants’ War, see Horst Carl, “Der Schwabische Bund,” in Der Bauernkrieg in Oberschwaben, ed. Elmar L. Kuhn (Tubingen: ¨ ¨ Bibliotheca Academica, 2000), 421–43; Christian Greiner, “Die Politik des Schwabischen ¨ Bundes wahrend des Bauernkrieges 1524/25 bis zum Vertrag von Weingarten,” ZHVS ¨ 68 (1974): 7–94. On the League’s role as a potential mediator during peasant uprisings, see Thomas F. Sea, “The Swabian League and Peasant Disobedience before the German Peasants’ War of 1525,” SCJ 30, 1 (Spring 1999): 89–111.

57

58


outbreak.2 Tensions came to the surface in 1527, when the Central Council ordered its member cities to expel evangelical preachers on the grounds that ringleaders of the Peasants’ War had taken refuge behind city walls. In protest, the League’s urban members united as a collective front, citing the 1526 Imperial Diet of Speyer’s decision that until the convening of a general religious council each estate should deal with matters of faith “in such a way as can be justified to God and the emperor.”3 Their solidarity made the Council’s mandate unenforceable.4 Controversy renewed in January 1529 when the Central Council expelled Memmingen’s urban representative, Hans Keller, as punishment for his city’s abolition of the Latin Mass. Keller in turn accused the League’s princes of arranging his dismissal in secret and imposing it on the cities against their will.5 Several of the League’s urban members rallied to Memmingen’s defense. Nuremberg’s council decried Keller’s expulsion as an attack on urban rights, since Keller was an elected representative of all the League’s cities.6 It filed a complaint denying the Swabian League any right to dismiss Keller on religious grounds, an argument that called into question the basic legitimacy of the alliance’s authority.7 At Memmingen’s request, Augsburg supplied the city with powder, cannon balls, and other defensive provisions. In Constance, the reformer Ambrosius Blarer wrote Memmingen’s council encouraging it to persevere in its religious undertaking and to seek assistance from the Central Council’s other urban representatives.8 The most forceful statement of solidarity came from Ulm. The city’s magistrates expressed “especially true and deep sympathy” for Memmingen’s predicament. They promised “through the chairman of the League’s cities to summon a general Urban Diet to meet in Ulm,”9 where they hoped to negotiate a collective policy among the 2 3 4 5 6 7

8

9

Thomas F. Sea, “Predatory Protectors? Conflict and Cooperation in the Suppression of the German Peasants’ Revolt of 1525,” SCJ 39, 1 (Spring 2008): 89–111. Quoted in Brady, Turning Swiss, 201. The translation is Brady’s. ¨ Carl, Der Schwabische Bund, 174–5. ¨ Bock, Der Schwabische Bund, 206; Dobel, Memmingen im Reformationszeitalter, vol. 2, 80–1. ¨ Carl, Der Schwabische Bund, 176–7. ¨ Adolf Laufs, Der Schwabische Kreis (Aalen: Scientia, 1971), 139. Nuremberg’s city sec¨ retary Lazarus Spengler first advanced this argument in late 1524. Carl, Der Schwabische Bund, 172. Dobel, Memmingen im Reformationszeitalter, vol. 2, 81; Friess, Aussenpolitik, 97. A list of the Council’s urban representatives during the Keller affair appears in Carl, Der ¨ Schwabische Bund, 517. Stadtarchiv Memmingen (Hereafter StadtA MM), Schublade 342 Nr. 4. Ulrich Neithart of Ulm was urban chairman at the time of Keller’s dismissal.

Imperial Cities and Collective Politics

59

League’s urban members to oppose the Central Council as a unified front. Ulm’s council stressed the importance of the Keller affair for all south German cities: “The League’s cities should take this to heart. If we do not firmly oppose this undertaking, there will be no other result than that the League’s cities, alongside all their onerous burdens, will be subjugated to the other estates and become their slaves and bondsmen.”10 The stakes could not have been higher for the Swabian League’s urban members. Since the upheaval of the Peasants’ War, the cities had managed to walk a fine line between maintaining a united front against the princes and preventing urban isolation from the other estates in the League’s Central Council. The controversy surrounding Keller put this strategy of solidarity and cooperation under intense pressure, especially since several members of the cities’ delegation in the Council remained Catholic.11 Under Ulm’s leadership, the League’s cities nevertheless managed to negotiate a collective statement of support for Memmingen sanctioned by both evangelical and Catholic cities. Their pronouncement denied the authority of the Swabian League to regulate religious affairs, and the remaining urban representatives in the Central Council threatened to withdraw from the alliance unless the Council reinstated Keller. This show of solidarity forced the other estates to compromise in order to avert the League’s collapse. While the Council continued to bar Keller, it allowed the urban chairman to exercise Keller’s vote until the cities elected a new representative.12 This restored the urban right to seven votes, which had shrunk to six after Keller’s expulsion. While their collective politics did not produce everything the cities desired, it allowed them to protect their general interests in a way that separate action could not.13 For southern Germany’s imperial cities, negotiating strength lay in numbers. Scholars have traditionally seen the late 1520s and early 1530s as a troubled era for urban relations. This period did indeed see a divergence ¨ in religious interests between cities like Uberlingen and Kaufbeuren that

10 11 12

13

Quoted in Dobel, Memmingen im Reformationszeitalter, vol. 2, 82. ¨ Carl, Der Schwabische Bund, 317–20. Both the threat to withdraw from the Central Council and the denial of the Swabian League’s authority in matters of religion were arguments advanced against the 1527 ¨ preacher mandate as well. Carl, Der Schwabische Bund, 174–7. Sigrun Haude has identified similar dynamics in urban resistance to princely demands that imperial cities provide funding for the 1534–5 siege of Anabaptist Munster. Sigrun ¨ ¨ Haude, In the Shadow of “Savage Wolves”: Anabaptist Munster and the German Reformation During the 1530s (Boston: Humanities, 2000), 123–33.

60


remained loyal to the Catholic Church and cities such as Nuremberg, Strasbourg, and Ulm that moved toward evangelical reform. The break became formal in 1529 when several imperial cities joined the protesting estates at the Imperial Diet of Speyer, but this divide did not end efforts at collective action among cities. The Urban Diet continued to provide a forum for imperial cities to negotiate policy on matters like taxation and imperial military support,14 while for the Empire’s growing number of evangelical imperial cities, the need for mutual support in religious affairs increased.15 The Keller affair and the defeat of the 1527 preacher mandate highlighted the ongoing centrality of intercity support systems to the ability of imperial cities to defend themselves against larger polities. They show how urban magistrates sought to preserve collaboration between cities, even as the Reformation introduced differing styles of worship within their walls. Rather than prevent evangelical communes from working together, the “splintering apart of the cities”16 encouraged urban councils to find new ways to provide for their collective protection and benefit. Central to these efforts was the participation of imperial cities in collective alliances. When the Reformation made membership in the Swabian League a liability, many of southern Germany’s evangelical imperial cities sought out other alliances that could preserve the gains of reform while promoting intercity cooperation. In Eastern Swabia, two associations of differing breadth and stature exerted particularly important influences on the Reformation’s course during the 1530s and 1540s: the Three Cities’ League and the Schmalkaldic League. These alliances – one regional, one spread over the entire Empire – helped establish the boundaries for urban reform, either by restricting the confessional options available to a council or by offering military, legal, and political support. They allowed imperial cities to pursue common policies, often within a regional framework, that influenced the spread and affiliation of reform throughout the southern 14 15

16

¨ G. Schmidt, Der Stadtetag, 478–517. Catholic imperial cities displayed less desire to form new alliances and to coordinate common religious policies than evangelical cities did. While the Nine Years’ League and the 1538 League of Nuremberg provided vehicles for Catholic collective politics, cities ¨ such as Rottweil and Uberlingen proved less than enthusiastic about shouldering the extra financial and political burdens of membership in alliances. According to Wilfried Enderle, their reluctance stemmed from the fact that “im Unterschied zu seinen protes¨ tantischen Nachbarn hatte es das katholische Uberlingen, das den Kaiser und das Haus ¨ Osterreich hinter sich wusste, auch uberhaupt nicht notig, eine aktive, konfessionell ¨ ¨ orientierte Bundnispolitik zu betreiben.” Enderle, Konfessionsbildung, 199. ¨ Brecht, “Gemeinsame Politik,” 180–263.


61

part of the Empire. The practice of urban collective politics ensured that negotiation acted as one of the Reformation’s guiding principles in Eastern Swabia’s imperial cities. The Three Cities’ League On February 3, 1534, the Swabian League ceased to exist. Its dissolution came at the end of a slow demise brought on by the League’s internal divisions, which caused many evangelical imperial cities to pursue their common and individual interests in a new series of alliances, both locally and at the imperial level. For the cities of Eastern Swabia, the most important new regional association formed in the Swabian League’s wake was the Three Cities’ League between Augsburg, Nuremberg, and Ulm. Founded in May 1533, this tripartite alliance sought to provide the three largest cities in southeastern Germany “at least a little backing that would not force us to sit all alone.”17 While doctrinal divisions often impinged on its effectiveness, the league’s creation reflected the importance of collective politics as a strategy for advancing specific magisterial agendas. Its operation reveals one way in which the larger south German cities sought to broaden regional patterns of consultation into formal alliances that could entrench localized spheres of influence. In this context, Augsburg’s membership in the Three Cities’ League established a crucial part of the framework both for its formal introduction of the Reformation and for its program of religio-political expansion in Eastern Swabia. Attempts to formalize the economic and political ties between Augsburg, Nuremberg, and Ulm began in the mid-1520s, although discussions initially made little headway. The main dissenter was Augsburg’s council, which demanded that any agreement exclude “the protection of Lutheran teachings” in order to minimize the chances of imperial retribution against the cities. Nuremberg, which by the mid-1520s had already adopted a reformation influenced by Wittenberg theology, could not agree to this stipulation, so no official alliance came into being. Disagreement over matters of faith, however, did not prevent the three cities from working together to achieve mutually beneficial goals. At a September 1525 Urban Diet in Speyer, for instance, the three cities defeated the enactment of a general urban military league that would have included almost all south German imperial cities. According to Augsburg’s council, the three cities’ 17

¨ Quoted in G. Schmidt, Der Stadtetag, 164. See also G. Schmidt, “Haltung des Stadtecorpus,” 215–6. The statement came from Nuremberg. ¨

62


opposed these plans because “such a league would certainly be disadvantageous and even intolerable to the three cities . . . for they would have to be perpetually ready to aid the other, smaller cities. But the latter would not come forth with the aid they owed the large cities.”18 Unwillingness to shoulder the defense of smaller cities was a dominant theme of the Three Cities’ League and presented the major roadblock to attempts to expand the alliance beyond its original membership. When Donauworth sought admission to the league in 1545, for example, ¨ Nuremberg rejected the application because of Donauworth’s inability to ¨ offer the larger cities any practical aid. This rationale may also explain the aversion Augsburg’s council felt toward paying the membership levy for smaller cities in the Schmalkaldic League.19 In 1525, Augsburg, Nuremberg, and Ulm’s successful collaboration at the Speyer Urban Diet reinvigorated their attempts to create a separate alliance, but the resulting negotiations failed to produce an agreement.20 The three cities suspended discussions until late July 1528, when Strasbourg’s council proposed the creation of a Four Cities’ League to block the antievangelical activity of the Swabian League.21 This alliance never materialized either, partly because Augsburg believed Strasbourg was located too far away to provide assistance on short notice to the other cities.22 This represented essentially the same argument its council advanced against the creation of a general urban league. It highlights the importance of the proposed alliance’s regional character to Augsburg’s magistrates. While Strasbourg and Augsburg possessed close social, political, and economic ties, the geographic distance between the cities meant Strasbourg’s inclusion in a regional urban league served little purpose for Augsburg. This emphasis on local networks of alliance and regional politics played a crucial role in later negotiations over the Reformation in Donauworth and Kaufbeuren. ¨ After the proclamation of the Augsburg Confession in 1530 and the onset of the Swabian League’s demise, Augsburg, Nuremberg, and Ulm resurrected the idea of a protective urban league. Unexpectedly, Augsburg

18 19 20 21 22

¨ Brady, Turning Swiss, 195–6, quote at 195; G. Schmidt, Der Stadtetag, 154–6. The translation is Brady’s. See Chapters 4 and 7. ¨ Andreas Gossner, Weltliche Kirchenhoheit und reichsstadtische Reformation (Berlin: ¨ Akademie, 1999), 53. Brady, Protestant Politics, 59. Brady, Turning Swiss, 196–9; Gossner, Weltliche Kirchenhoheit, 53; G. Schmidt, Der ¨ ¨ Stadtetag, 154. Augsburg advanced this argument against Strasbourg’s membership beginning in 1525.


63

was the driving force behind the alliance’s finalization. This change of course resulted in part from the Reformation’s growing popularity in the city,23 as well as the council’s desire for external backing in preparation for officially introducing reform. Like their counterparts in other cities, Augsburg’s magistrates sought ways to secure support from nearby communes to protect their city’s reformation. A formal alliance with their two largest urban neighbors, both of which had already introduced evangelical reform, presented just such an opportunity. On May 26, 1533, representatives from the three communes signed the Three Cities’ League into existence. Framed as a defensive political alliance, the league’s charter outlined the responsibilities of all three parties in case a member came under attack from outside forces. In an emergency, each city had to supply approximately 1,300 soldiers and 13,000 fl. in support of their fellow league members. The possibility existed that these numbers could increase as conditions warranted.24 In addition, the allies agreed to hold regular diets to discuss matters of mutual economic and political interest. These meetings occurred not only in member cities but also in neutral towns such as Donauworth, which sat at the geographic center of the ¨ new alliance. The league’s basic framework sought to create a powerful urban bloc by facilitating political, economic, and military cooperation among three of the Empire’s most influential imperial cities. Shortly after signing the treaty, however, the three cities began to squabble about the exact amount of aid and money they owed. They also haggled over the types of emergencies that required a response.25 Due to continued disagreement over the treaty’s basic tenets, mistrust of Nuremberg’s loyalties developed in Augsburg and Ulm.26 The Eastern Swabian cities, which favored versions of Upper German theology, doubted how Lutheran Nuremberg would react if Ulm or Augsburg came under attack. Nuremberg was equally suspicious of its allies. In fall 1533, Nuremberg’s council dismissed an Augsburg proposal to codify theological teaching among the three cities’ preachers. The Franconian magistrates found the

23 24

25 26

See Broadhead, “Popular Pressure for Reform in Augsburg.” In the original treaty, Augsburg was responsible for assembling 1,362 soldiers and 13,620 fl., Nuremberg 1,417 soldiers and 14,170 fl., and Ulm 1,221 soldiers and 12,210 fl., Roth, Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 2, 111–2. For the original charter, see StadtA A, LitS, 1533 Mai 26. Similar dynamics characterized the Swabian League during the 1520s. Sea, “Predatory Protectors?,” 90. See StadtA A, LitS, 1533 Dezember 1 for an example of haggling and backtracking. Also ¨ see G. Schmidt, Der Stadtetag, 164–6.

64


Upper German orientation of their Swabian counterparts distasteful both religiously and politically, a point epitomized for the Nuremberger by the frequent Eucharistic discord that plagued Augsburg. Nuremberg’s councilors certainly had no desire to introduce reform modeled on Augsburg or Ulm within their jurisdiction.27 This formed part of a larger Nuremberg program to oppose the spread of Zurich-influenced reform, which Nuremberg’s magistrates condemned as a “sacramentarian heresy” that led to social upheaval and revolution.28 After adopting its version of Wittenberg-influenced reform in 1525, Nuremberg’s council wrote a series of letters to Strasbourg that attempted to discredit the doctrines of Ulrich Zwingli and encouraged Strasbourg to follow Nuremberg’s confessional path.29 Seven years later in 1532–3, Nuremberg’s council wrote Kempten urging its magistrates to outlaw Zwinglian teachings, to expel Zwinglian preachers, and to adopt a reformation based on Nuremberg’s model.30 Neither effort proved successful. Nevertheless, these two incidents, both of which involved imperial cities far removed from Nuremberg’s immediate Franconian sphere of influence, reveal a desire within the city council to combat what it perceived as heretical religious practices in the urban hierarchy. They illustrate the centrality of doctrine as a unifying and potentially divisive element of urban reform, both within and between imperial cities. Nuremberg’s campaign against Zurich-influenced reform hardly represented the actions of a “quietist” city, as Heinrich Schmidt has characterized Nuremberg’s external policy.31 Like Augsburg and Ulm, Nuremberg sought to export its style of religious reform to other communities, urban and rural. It even attempted to do so across regional borders and outside of traditional communication networks. The doctrinal rivalry apparent in these efforts meant Nuremberg’s relationship with its Three Cities’ allies was one of simultaneous cooperation and conflict. All three 27 28

29 30

31

G. Schmidt, “Haltung des Stadtecorpus,” 217. ¨ Heinrich Richard Schmidt, “Die Haretisierung des Zwinglianismus im Reich seit 1525,” ¨ ¨ ¨ in Zugange zur bauerlichen Reformation, ed. Peter Blickle (Zurich: Chronos, 1987), 219–36. ¨ H. Schmidt, Reichsstadte, 178–80. G. Schmidt, “Haltung des Stadtecorpus,” 214–5. Nuremberg’s council wrote these let¨ ters in response to a query from Kempten’s council concerning how it should resolve a Eucharistic dispute between its preachers. Kempten also consulted Augsburg and Strasbourg on the matter. Herbert Immenkotter, “Kempten zwischen Wittenberg und Zurich. ¨ ¨ ¨ Luther oder Zwingli: die Reformation in der Reichsstadt,” Allgauer Geschichtsfreund (2000): 100–1. ¨ H. Schmidt, Reichsstadte, esp. 317–20.


65

worked together to further their mutual interests while at the same time pursuing the advancement of their local micro-Christendom. Partly for this reason, Augsburg’s council and its preachers feared the spread of Nuremberg-style reform into Eastern Swabia. Collaboration between the cities in religious matters could only go so far, and the confessional divide within the alliance created friction between the Eastern Swabian cities and Nuremberg. These tensions came to the fore in March 1534 when Augsburg initiated negotiations with its bishop concerning the introduction of uniform preaching in the city. The details of the discussions between Bishop Christoph von Stadion and Augsburg’s council have received detailed attention elsewhere.32 For this study, Augsburg’s attempts to secure support for its negotiations highlight the conflict of religious interest within the Three Cities’ League. On March 12, 1534, Augsburg sent both allied cities a copy of a letter it had written Bishop Christoph calling for a disputation to settle the city’s religious discord. Augsburg’s council asked Nuremberg and Ulm “as loyal league allies to offer us advice concerning this our most important affair, and in the case of an emergency to prove helpful and supportive.”33 Ulm pledged full support for its neighbor’s position, declaring that Augsburg had “begun the affair in the best way.” Ulm’s council was “sure through the coming disputation and God’s grace, reform will issue forth that is pleasing to God the Almighty and conducive and beneficial to our spiritual well-being.”34 Nuremberg’s council was more reserved. Its members expressed surprise at how “simplistically and childishly (gering und kindisch) the aforementioned matter is treated in your honor the council’s delivered correspondence.” Nuremberg’s magistrates agreed “as far as it is possible and can occur peacefully, it is a useful Christian work to establish unified preaching within one’s walls and commune.” However, they thought it doubtful “the cathedral chapter, which is not under the jurisdiction of the council in Augsburg, would accept preaching against its will that does not agree with its faith.” Nuremberg warned its neighbor “if your honor the council persists in this endeavor, it will be very complicated and place the affair in too much danger. This is especially true since you have not 32

33 34

See Philip Broadhead, “Internal politics and civic society in Augsburg during the era of the early reformation 1518–1537,” (Ph.D. diss., Canterbury/Kent, 1981), 336ff; Gossner, Weltliche Kirchenhoheit, 174–89; Roth, Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte, ¨ vol. 2, 155–64. StadtA A, LitS, 1534 Marz ¨ 12. StadtA A, LitS, 1534 Marz ¨ 16.

66


revealed to us what you plan to do if the cathedral chapter does not respond or fails to give its approval after slow deliberation.”35 Augsburg replied with a lengthy letter repudiating Nuremberg’s concerns and expressing disappointment at its ally’s contrarian stance.36 Augsburg’s council disapproved of “the harshness you have employed unnecessarily in your response to us.” Nuremberg’s letter upset Augsburg’s magistrates because “we revealed this matter to you solely out of loyal Christian remembrance, so [your] recommendation might lead to a strengthening of our position. That you then disavow us word for word and consider our deliberations and actions childish” was unacceptable. Augsburg hoped that, in the future, Nuremberg’s council would realize “that in your confidential writings, you should not be opposed to us, but rather seek solely to advance to the highest degree possible the honor, efficacy, and welfare of the city of Augsburg.”37 From the alliance’s inception, internal disagreements over religious doctrine hampered the Three Cities’ League. Despite their confessional differences, however, its members attempted to use the league to cultivate support for their individual religio-political endeavors. In this instance, Augsburg’s council does not appear to have desired constructive criticism from its two allies. Augsburg sought a collective expression of solidarity to strengthen and legitimize its negotiating position with the bishop. Its 35

36

37

“gering und kindisch auch angezaigt beschehen gesynnen in ewr fursichtigkait ubergeben schriften angezogen wirdet”; “nuzlich cristenlich werck ist/ in ainer rinckhmawr unnd ainem ainigen Comun/ soverr das fuglich unnd mit gutem friden beschehen mag/ ainhellige predig anzurichten”; “das Cappittel das ainem erbern rat zu Augspurg mit ainicher potmessigkait oder unnderthenigkait gar nit unndterworffen ist/ wider iren willen zu ainer anndern predig/ dann die irem glawben eenlich ist/ mog werden”; “das ¨ benottigt ¨ ewr weissheit in irem furnemen fort geen unnd furfaren solten/ das were . . . gannz weitlewffig unnd die sach zu vil in wagknuss gesezt/ zu dem das unns auch noch der zeit verporgen unnd von ewr weisshait auch nit angezaigt ist/ was ain erber rate zu Augspurg wo inen bey dem capittl aintweder gar kain anntwurtt/ oder dieselb gannz lanngksam unnd dannocht nit irs gefallenns gegeben werden sollt/ verrner zutun vorhaben” StadtA A, LitS, 1534 Marz ¨ 16. Gossner, Weltliche Kirchenhoheit, 175–7; Roth, Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte, ¨ vol. 2, 215. A concept of this letter can be found at StadtA A, LitS, 1534 Marz ¨ 22. All quotes come from this concept. “solher scherpfe/ als si sich in derselbigen irer antwurt/ gegen unns/ unnotturftiger weis geprauchen”; “solhs haben wir E F allain zu christenlichen gethrewen und schuldigen erinnerung/ auch unns selbs zu ainer sterckung/ uss dem egerurten getruckten ratschlag gezogenn/ unnd darumb hierinn von wort/ zu wort verleupt/ so unnser bedenncken und handlung bey E F also kindisch/ wie si schreiben/ geacht wurdt”; “das si solh ir verthrewlich schreiben unns gar nit zuwider/ sonnder allain der erbarn statt Augspurg Eer/ nuz/ unnd wolfart/ damit zum hochsten zu furdern/ thun.” StadtA A, LitS, 1534 ¨ Marz ¨ 22.


67

magistrates therefore took umbrage at Nuremberg’s disapproval, which they believed undermined the viability of their chosen course of action. Ultimately, Augsburg’s religious disputation never took place,38 and the council moved of its own accord in July 1534 to introduce partial religious reform. In so doing, Augsburg’s magistrates once again sought the support of their allies in the Three Cities’ League. While disagreements over reform undermined Augsburg’s attempts to secure Nuremberg’s assistance, the Franconian city’s orientation toward Wittenberg did not prevent Augsburg from allying with it. Confessional differences among cities could prevent cooperation on certain religious matters, but they did not necessarily stop cities from consulting or negotiating with each other. Nuremberg’s 1535 decision to join the Imperial Nine Years’ League further complicated relations within the Three Cities’ League. Composed primarily of Catholic princes from the Empire’s southern half, the Nine Years’ League formed under the aegis of Emperor Charles V and his brother, Ferdinand, as a replacement for the Swabian League. At its inception, the league offered membership to Augsburg, Nuremberg, and Ulm. The Eastern Swabian cites, both of which mistrusted the league’s Habsburg leadership, declined to enter the alliance. In order to curry favor with the Habsburgs, Nuremberg’s council accepted the emperor’s invitation.39 The city’s willingness to enter a largely Catholic alliance unnerved its Three Cities’ allies. In effect, Nuremberg’s admission to the Nine Years’ League, coupled with Augsburg’s entrance into the Schmalkaldic League a year later, formalized the religious rift within the urban alliance.40 By 1538, mistrust between the allies had become so pronounced that Augsburg and Ulm initiated secret discussions to form a contingency plan in case Nuremberg failed to provide the required military support during an emergency.41 These divisions meant the Three Cities’ League failed to offer significant military support to its members, but it nonetheless remained in effect until the start of the Schmalkaldic War in 1546. During the 1530s 38 39

40 41

The disputation never occurred because the emperor issued a mandate forbidding Augsburg and the bishop from holding the debate. StadtA A, LitS, 1534 Juli 4. Rudolf Endres, “Der Kayserliche neunjahrige Bund vom Jahr 1535 bis 1544,” in Bauer, ¨ Reich und Reformation, ed. Peter Blickle (Stuttgart: Ulmer, 1982), 87–92. On Nuremberg’s desire to achieve closer political relations to the Habsburgs, see G. Schmidt, “Haltung des Stadtecorpus,” 201–25. ¨ Roth, Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 2, 288. StadtA A, LitS, 1538 Oktober 22.

68


and 1540s, Augsburg, Nuremberg, and Ulm continued to hold Three Cities’ diets and negotiated to varying degrees of success common external and economic policies. In November 1534, for example, Augsburg’s council solicited guidance from its Three Cities’ allies regarding how it should legally defend its recent reforms. Both Nuremberg and Ulm responded with detailed letters of advice, which Augsburg’s magistrates used to modify their justification to the Habsburg emperor and king.42 The difference between this instance of cooperation and the antagonistic interaction of March 1534 lies in the fact that Augsburg’s council knew what course of action it wished to take concerning the bishop. Conversely, in late 1534, Augsburg’s magistrates appear to have been unsure how they should proceed with the emperor. They therefore sought advice from their allies and allowed them to guide the council’s actions. Both instances reveal the Three Cities’ League’s importance to Augsburg as a way to create collective policies based in regional power structures that furthered its individual religio-political goals. This observation helps explain why the Three Cities’ League survived so long, even as its members eschewed its initial purpose as a defensive alliance in favor of military protection in larger associations such as the Schmalkaldic and Nine Years’ leagues. For Augsburg’s council, the Three Cities’ League promoted cooperation with its two most important urban neighbors. This served not only to legitimize the introduction of official religious reform, but also as a way to protect the city’s economic, political, and regional interests. While its members continually debated and altered the league’s constitutional framework, the existence of a formal alliance created new areas of common interest that linked the cities closer together. This interdependence could strengthen the negotiating position of the league’s individual members. Indeed, Augsburg’s council sought to use the Three Cities’ League to facilitate the expansion of its religio-political sphere of influence. This policy especially influenced Augsburg’s negotiations with Donauworth, whose council sought inclu¨ sion in the Three Cities’ League. Augsburg’s council tried to use this desire for military protection to draw its neighbor into a more dependent religiopolitical relationship, and it attempted to mobilize Nuremberg and Ulm in support of this goal. The resulting negotiations within the Three Cities’ League helped determine the confessional orientation of Donauworth’s ¨ reformation. When reform in the city came under subsequent attack from the bishop of Augsburg, the three cities helped Donauworth defend its ¨ 42

Gossner, Weltliche Kirchenhoheit, 203–9. ¨


69

reform endeavors.43 The practice of collective politics within the Three Cities’ League was fundamental to the Reformation’s spread as well as its survival in Eastern Swabia’s cities. The Schmalkaldic League While the Three Cities’ League provided its members an important venue for negotiating common economic and external policies, it remained a regional alliance with limited military capabilities. Imperial cities could mobilize forces for short-term defense, and larger cities could amass enough artillery to defend their walls, but changes in military technology brought on by the growing prominence of gunpowder meant most cities, especially smaller ones, found it difficult to muster sufficient troops or supplies for extended warfare.44 This had become painfully clear during the Peasants’ War, when the military initiative within the Swabian League sat primarily with the princes,45 and both Memmingen and Kaufbeuren experienced occupation by allied troops. Densely populated urban centers dependent on trade and their surrounding countryside for food, imperial cities were also particularly vulnerable economically to the ravages of war, which disrupted mercantile traffic.46 At the same time, the rising cost of military readiness made urban wealth indispensable to the speedy marshalling of large, well-provisioned armies. Evangelical cities and princes needed each other, therefore, in order to offer credible military protection for the Reformation, a necessity that in 1531 led to the creation of the Schmalkaldic League. This supraregional alliance, which played a central role in imperial politics until its dissolution in 1547, sought to defend evangelical polities against legal and military attacks on the Reformation. In this capacity, the Schmalkaldic League exerted a significant influence on the course of reform in Eastern Swabia, especially in Augsburg. In July 1534, shortly after its failed attempt to engage Bishop Christoph in disputation, Augsburg’s council suspended the Latin Mass in all the city’s churches except eight that were subject directly to the bishop and cathedral chapter.47 This limited move toward reform meant Catholic and evangelical services coexisted openly in the city until 1537, 43 44 45 46 47

See Chapters 4 and 7. ¨ Haug-Moritz, Der Schmalkaldische Bund, 405; G. Schmidt, Der Stadtetag, 170. Sea, “Predatory Protectors?” ¨ Carl, Der Schwabische Bund, 150. These eight churches were Our Lady’s Cathedral, St. Georg, Holy Cross, St. Moritz, St. Peter, St. Stephan, St. Ulrich, and St. Ursula. Gossner, Weltliche Kirchenhoheit, 195. ¨

70


when the council outlawed the Latin Mass entirely. During this three-year period, Augsburg’s magistrates sought to strengthen their ongoing reform efforts in two major ways. The city council petitioned the services of the Strasbourg reformer Martin Bucer in preparation for the drafting of an official church ordinance. Concurrently, Augsburg sought political and military support for its actions through membership in the Schmalkaldic League. Of all the collective associations formed in the Empire during the first half of the sixteenth century, the Schmalkaldic League was the most innovative. It differed from other large alliances like the Swabian and Nine Years’ leagues in three major ways. First, the Schmalkaldic League was an alliance based on the protection of a religious confession,48 in this case “the pure teaching of our confession presented to the emperor and all the imperial estates in Augsburg.”49 The exact meaning of this phrase provoked debate within the League, since evangelicals had presented both the Wittenberg Augsburg Confession and the Upper German Tetrapolitana to the emperor at the 1530 Diet of Augsburg. The vagueness of this formulation in the League’s treaty resulted from the desire to present a unity of belief to the alliance’s opponents, even as a unity of practice proved unattainable.50 This in turn allowed the League to argue that all its members followed the Augsburg Confession while tacitly permitting local differences in religious praxis.51 It also meant any conflict between estates of differing confessions could fall under the League’s competency, which created an area of claimed jurisdiction more expansive than any other alliance.52 The Schmalkaldic League’s second major innovative feature was its geographic diversity. The League stretched from the Alps in the south to the shores of the Baltic Sea in the north, which set it apart from the 48

49 50 51

52

In this respect, the Schmalkaldic League also differed from the Catholic League of Nuremberg, which sought to preserve the religious status quo established by the 1532 Truce of Nuremberg and therefore did not explicitly exclude the inclusion of evangelical estates. Gabriele Haug-Moritz, “Zwischen Spatmittelalter und Reformation – Politischer ¨ Foderalismus im Reich der Reformationszeit,” in Politics and Reformations: Communi¨ ties, Polities, Nations, and Empires, eds. Christopher Ocker et al (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 524–5. Quoted in Haug-Moritz, Der Schmalkaldische Bund, 105. This formula comes from the December 1535 treaty of alliance. Haug-Moritz, Der Schmalkaldische Bund, 98–111. This held crucial importance for the political security of the League and its members, since treaties like the Truce of Nuremberg technically protected only those estates that professed the Augsburg Confession. Haug-Moritz, Der Schmalkaldische Bund, 115–21. Haug-Moritz, Der Schmalkaldische Bund, 91–2.


71

regional focus of exclusively southern alliances like the Swabian, Nine Years’, and Three Cities’ leagues.53 The vast distances it covered made the religious nature of the alliance even more important as a way to unite culturally and politically disparate estates, although ongoing tensions between Wittenberg and Upper German reform complicated the League’s dynamics. These tensions shaped the Schmalkaldic League’s third innovative feature: the League represented the first alliance to act as a military defensive pact against the emperor, albeit only in matters of faith as defined by the League’s members. All previous leagues had exempted the emperor as a possible opponent out of loyalty to the head of the Empire and fear of breaching imperial law. The unique nature of the League and its open-ended approach to what constituted a religious conflict eventually resulted in civil war within the Empire. In the 1530s, it made the Schmalkaldic League attractive to numerous estates that desired protection against imperial retribution for the introduction of evangelical reform.54 Several south German imperial cities – including Memmingen, Strasbourg, and Ulm – joined the Schmalkaldic League at its inception. Nuremberg refused to enter the alliance, arguing that the inclusion of the emperor as a possible enemy violated imperial law. At the time, Augsburg’s council also refrained from accepting membership, in part to maintain good relations with the Habsburgs.55 This tension between fidelity to the emperor and loyalty to the evangelical faith was never fully resolved during the Schmalkaldic League’s sixteen-year existence. It offered an impetus for imperial cities to consult with each other about how to justify reform to the Empire’s highest authority, an authority they ultimately could not control, while at the same time remaining true to what they believed to be the proper form of Christian religion. The strain the Reformation placed on relations with the emperor exerted an important influence on the 1546 negotiations concerning Donauworth’s and Kaufbeuren’s participation in ¨ 56 the Schmalkaldic War. It also eventually led to the League’s unravelling. Rather than group its members by estate, as the Swabian League had done, the Schmalkaldic League organized itself into a Saxon district under Prince-Elector John Frederick’s leadership and a Southern district under Landgrave Philip of Hesse. Nine votes were allocated for the League’s

53 54 55 56

Brady, Protestant Politics, 143; Endres, “Kayserliche neunjahrige Bund,” 91–3. ¨ ¨ G. Schmidt, Der Stadtetag, 515. Roth, Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 2, 3. See Chapter 7.

72


diets. Two each went to Saxony and Hesse, one to the north German princes, and two each to the southern imperial cities and their northern cousins. When the Schmalkaldic League incorporated a host of new members in 1536, it raised the total number of votes to thirteen with one extra vote going to the southern and northern cities alike. The cities therefore occupied an important place in the League’s constitution, even though the princes controlled a majority of votes. Since imperial cities paid slightly more than half the Schmalkaldic League’s entire levy, urban wealth was indispensable to the alliance’s operation. Although the northern cities possessed a regional system of consultation similar to that of southern Germany,57 divergent regional politics prevented the northern and southern cities from capitalizing on their potential strength within the League. The difference in regional interests that marked the two urban landscapes appears most strikingly in the northern cities’ increasing dependence on Saxony’s leadership and their geographic distance from the main centers of Habsburg power. This hindered the overall ability of cities to unite as an estate within the alliance, despite similarities in participation patterns at League diets among the largest Schmalkaldic cities in the north – Bremen, Hamburg, Braunschweig, and Magdeburg – and those in the south. While the southern cities displayed a good deal of solidarity, their northern counterparts often proved uninterested in closing ranks with the southerners, instead relying on John Frederick’s guidance in League affairs.58 The creation of separate Schmalkaldic League Urban Diets – one for the southern cities, one for those in the Saxon district – reflected this geographic divide, as well as the regional nature of political communication within the alliance. While the northern Urban Diet ceased to meet after 1538 and the Saxon district came increasingly under the control of the prince-elector,59 the southern Schmalkaldic Urban Diet functioned 57

58

59

See Volker Henn, “Innerhansische Kommunikations- und Raumstrukturen. Umrisse ¨ zur Sozial- und einer neuen Forschungsaufgabe?” in Der hansische Sonderweg? Beitrage Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Hanse, eds. Stuart Jenks and Michael North (Cologne: Bohlau, ¨ 1993), 255–68. From this perspective, regional politics played an equal if not greater role than “the absence of a common political culture” in inhibiting cooperation between the northern and southern cities. See Brady, Protestant Politics, 143–7, quote at 147; Haug-Moritz, Der Schmalkaldische Bund, 246–56. Haug-Moritz, Der Schmalkaldische Bund, 220, 232–3, 255–6. The southern diet was also more active than its northern counterpart. From 1530–42, it held twenty-four meetings compared to thirteen for the northern diet. Braunschweig and Magdeburg served as corresponding cities for the northern diet.


73

for its member cities as “the coordination point for all urban problems related to the evangelical religion.”60 It provided the southern cities a forum for coordinating policy in advance of a general Schmalkaldic Diet, as well as for discussing the implications of the recesses promulgated by the League’s meetings. Parallel to their importance in the general Urban Diet, the three largest Schmalkaldic cities in the south – Strasbourg, Ulm, and, after 1536, Augsburg – controlled the southern urban diet’s agenda and exercised the southern cities’ three votes in the general Schmalkaldic diet.61 It is worth pausing to analyze the process of Augsburg’s entrance into the Schmalkaldic League, since much of the council’s later external policy revolved around securing the inclusion of other imperial cities in this alliance. Augsburg’s road to Schmalkaldic membership also highlights internal tensions within the League that in the early 1540s erupted into open controversy, threatening the alliance’s very existence. Although Augsburg’s council turned down the Schmalkaldic League’s initial offer of admission in 1531, it began to reconsider joining the alliance shortly after the creation of the Three Cities’ League. This change in attitude stemmed from the city’s gradual move toward official religious reform and the attendant need to shield itself from the hostility of Catholic estates. It shows how the Three Cities’ League, while officially a protective alliance, proved more useful to Augsburg as a vehicle for advancing its regional political interests than as a way to provide military security. Accordingly, in July 1533, the city council asked Strasbourg and Ulm to gauge the Schmalkaldic League’s interest in admitting Augsburg. Ulm promised to secure its neighbor’s entrance, but the League’s other estates proved reticent. John Frederick was especially suspicious of Augsburg since the council had not formally adopted religious reform while its preachers and citizenry displayed what the princeelector termed “Zwinglian tendencies.” Consequently, Augsburg’s 1533 attempt to enter the Schmalkaldic League foundered on the confessional differences between its developing style of reform and the Wittenberg tenets of the Augsburg Confession, especially concerning the nature of the Eucharist.62

60

61 62

Georg Schmidt, “Die Freien und Reichsstadte im Schmalkaldischen Bund,” in Martin ¨ Luther. Probleme seiner Zeit, eds. Volker Press and Dieter Stievermann (Stuttgart: KlettCotta, 1986), 190. Haug-Moritz, Der Schmalkaldische Bund, 232–4. Gossner, Weltliche Kirchenhoheit, 168–9; Roth, Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte, ¨ vol. 2, 119–20.

74


In late summer 1534, Augsburg’s council made a renewed effort to enter the Schmalkaldic League. Similar to the previous year, negotiations occurred through Ulm, which within the League’s structure held responsibility for communication with Swabia’s imperial cities. In this respect, the Schmalkaldic League’s urban hierarchy paralleled that of the regular Urban Diet, but Ulm’s renewed efforts failed to produce Augsburg’s admission. Once again, the city’s theological divide with Wittenberg presented the major obstacle. John Frederick even declared that no further discussions regarding Augsburg’s admission would occur until the city accepted the Augsburg Confession.63 This refusal to consider Augsburg’s case provoked mistrust in Ulm concerning Saxony’s goals, a fear compounded by John Frederick’s attempts to curry favor with Ferdinand.64 In a letter to Philip of Hesse, Ulm’s leading politician Bernhard Besserer wondered “whether the prince-elector of Saxony has been moved by the German king to another disposition, which would produce great burdens for all believers and lovers of God’s word, serving more to defeat than promote the holy Gospel.”65 Ulm and Strasbourg even considered leaving the Schmalkaldic League to create a new southern evangelical alliance with 66 While these plans never came to fruition, Augsburg and Wurttemberg. ¨ Ulm did shore up Philip’s support for Augsburg,67 but the landgrave could not by himself overcome Saxony’s opposition.68 A major breakthrough occurred in July 1535 when Augsburg’s preachers negotiated a truce with Martin Luther.69 The Wittenberg Concord followed a year later, which established a uniform statement of belief on the Eucharist that nonetheless left room for differing interpretations and local variations in practice.70 With the major doctrinal roadblock to the 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70

Gossner, Weltliche Kirchenhoheit, 201; Roth, Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 2, ¨ 282–4. Haug-Moritz, Der Schmalkaldische Bund, 74–5. StadtA A, LitS, 1534 Oktober 13. Roth, Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 2, 284. StadtA A, LitS, 1534 September 7. For more examples, see Haug-Moritz, Der Schmalkaldische Bund, 159–60. See StadtA A, LitS, 1535 Januar 27. For the course of these discussions and the subsequent tensions among Augsburg’s preachers, see Roth, Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 2, 247–63. Especially influential for the south German cities was Martin Bucer’s interpretation of the Concord, which drew a distinction between the Eucharist’s heavenly and earthly elements. For Bucer, only the “believing soul” could truly receive “the heavenly element of the sacrament,” while those that “lacked faith, the impious could receive only the earthly elements of bread and wine but not the body and blood of Christ.” For a detailed analysis of how interpretations of the Concord varied and allowed for localized Eucharistic practices, see Burnett, “Basel and the Wittenberg Concord,” 33–56, quotes at 40.


75

city’s admission removed, Ulm and Strasbourg appealed to Saxony for Augsburg’s entrance into the Schmalkaldic League.71 Because of the city’s reconciliation with Luther and tacit assurances from Ferdinand that the League’s expansion would not violate the 1532 Truce of Nuremberg,72 Saxony no longer blocked Augsburg. The League approved its extension in December 1535, and Ulm and Memmingen were entrusted with negotiating Augsburg’s formal entrance. In January 1536, the two cities wrote their neighbor with the League’s offer.73 Augsburg’s newly elected mayors Mang Seitz and Wolfgang Rehlinger authorized the city’s membership, and in May, Augsburg officially joined the Schmalkaldic League.74 The negotiations surrounding Augsburg’s acceptance to the League reflect the importance of intercity systems of communication to the urban Reformation in southern Germany. During the entire process of admission, Ulm served as the chief negotiator between Augsburg and the League’s estates, a duty the city fulfilled for Frankfurt as well. The efforts of Strasbourg and Ulm, two cities with close ties to Augsburg, made it possible for Eastern Swabia’s largest city to join the Schmalkaldic League. Similar to Donauworth and Kaufbeuren, Augsburg gained external back¨ ing for its reformation through pledges of support from other imperial cities. This highlights the importance of regional communication structures to the League’s operation, as Gabriele Haug-Moritz has noted for the League’s northern estates,75 which made the orientation of Augsburg’s reformation a matter of interest for estates across the Empire. By forcing the city to recognize the Augsburg Confession, the League’s membership requirements reshaped the external affiliation of Augsburg’s reformation. 71

72

73 74 75

The two cities sent a combined delegation to the prince-elector composed of Ulm’s city secretary Sebastian Aitinger and Strasbourg’s city secretary Michael Han. Roth, Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 2, 284–5. Aitinger and Han also represented Frankfurt in negotiations with Saxony. Sigrid Jahns, Frankfurt, Reformation und Schmalkaldischer Bund (Frankfurt: Kramer, 1976), 325–31. The Truce of Nuremberg, which the emperor and the Schmalkaldic League concluded on July 23, 1532, suspended all legal disputes “in matters of faith” and stated that the current religious status quo should persist until the convening of a general religious council. Gero Dolezalek, “Die Assessoren des Reichskammergerichts und der Nurnberger Religionsfriede vom 23. Juli 1532,” in Recht, Gericht, Genossenschaft und ¨ Policey, eds. Gerhard Dilcher et al (Berlin: Schmidt, 1986), 84–96. Because the Truce declared the religious status quo should not change, John Frederick feared the expansion of the Schmalkaldic League beyond its 1532 membership might invalidate the Truce’s terms. StadtA A, LitS, 1536 Januar 21 and 1536 Januar 24. Augsburg’s council discussed both letters on January 25. Roth, Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 2, 285–8. Frankfurt entered the League at the same time. Jahns, Frankfurt, 384. Haug-Moritz, Der Schmalkaldische Bund, 94, 174–5.

76


In exchange, Augsburg’s council received the collective backing it needed to proceed with full-scale religious reform. Despite its recognition of the Augsburg Confession, however, Augsburg’s council continued to favor its own style of Upper German reform. Memmingen, Strasbourg, Ulm, and other cities in southern Germany followed similar policies. The League required its members to maintain an outward uniformity of belief based primarily on the Augsburg Confession. This was especially important after 1539, when the Truce of Frankfurt defined evangelical political authority as “those who adhere to the Augsburg Confession and the same religion.”76 The need to present this united front provided the political impetus behind the Wittenberg Concord, which created a bridge between the two confessions on the central theological issue: the Eucharist. As long as internal religious practice did not contradict this negotiated uniformity of belief, whose formulation was ambiguous enough to exclude only radicals and the majority of Swiss cities, town councils could continue to pursue their own local version of reform. In order to maintain this delicate balance, urban magistrates needed to coordinate reform with their counterparts in other cities. Such considerations shaped the entire course of Augsburg’s reformation. ¨ The Schmalkaldic League and Braunschweig-Wolfenbuttel The protracted negotiations over Augsburg joining the Schmalkaldic League revealed nascent tensions between the alliance’s princely estates and the south German cities. While the League proved able to subdue conflict between the estates during most of the 1530s, the divergent interests evident in the Augsburg negotiations foreshadowed the major controversy in the alliance before the 1546 Schmalkaldic War: Hesse and Saxony’s 1542 invasion of the north German duchy BraunschweigWolfenbuttel. The territory’s ruler, Duke Heinrich, was an active oppo¨ nent of the Schmalkaldic League who had long-running conflicts with the cities Goslar and Braunschweig. These feuds predated the Reformation, although both cities joined the League to gain protection against Heinrich.77 This coincided with an ongoing personal feud between the duke and the two Schmalkaldic chiefs. Together with Duke Moritz of Saxony, Philip and John Frederick cooperated in July 1541 to mobilize the Schmalkaldic League against Heinrich by persuading the alliance’s 76 77

Quoted in Ibid., 120. On Heinrich’s conflict with Goslar, see Gundmar Blume, Goslar und der Schmalkaldische Bund 1527/31–1547 (Goslar: Selbstverlag, 1969).


77

estates to recognize the duke’s struggles with Goslar as a religious matter. This made Goslar eligible for legal and military aid under the League’s constitution. A year later on July 13, 1542, Philip and John Frederick used this resolution to declare preemptive war on Heinrich. By midAugust, Hesse and Saxony had defeated the duke’s armies and conquered 78 Braunschweig-Wolfenbuttel. ¨ The invasion of Braunschweig-Wolfenbuttel marked an important shift ¨ in the Schmalkaldic League’s orientation, initiating what Thomas A. Brady has called the League’s “northern phase.”79 From the start of military action, the League’s urban members in the south complained about the financial burden the invasion placed on them. They also criticized the shaky legal rationale Hesse and Saxony advanced to justify the endeavor.80 Five days before the declaration of war, the southern Schmalkaldic Urban Diet proclaimed the princes’ actions unconstitutional, since John Fredrick and Philip had not sought advice from the League’s war council and possessed no obvious grounds for a defensive war. The cities could do little to block the invasion, as they controlled just three votes at the diet, but they agreed to pay only half the special war levy Philip requested. The two sides began almost immediately to haggle over the complicated financing of the duchy’s occupation, which Hesse and Saxony expected the southern cities to finance.81 On top of their rising fiscal burdens, southern magistrates expressed displeasure at the fact that Duke Heinrich found exile in Bavaria, where he pressured the ruling Wittelsbach family to help him regain his lands by force. Talk of Heinrich allying militarily with Bavaria worried officials in all southern Schmalkaldic cities, but especially in Augsburg, which bordered directly on Heinrich’s place of exile. Augsburg’s council feared it would be the first League member attacked if a general war broke out, which would have given the city little chance to defend itself. On top of this, Heinrich initiated a reformation suit against the League in the Imperial Chamber court, arguing that Hesse and Saxony had violated the imperial peace by invading his territory.82 As these costly legal proceedings dragged on, resentment toward the Schmalkaldic chiefs grew 78 79 80 81 82

Brady, Protestant Politics, 260–2; Roth, Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 3, 70. Thomas A. Brady, “Phases and Strategies of the Schmalkaldic League: A Perspective after 450 Years,” ARG 74 (1983): 171–3. Lutz, “Augsburg und seine politische Umwelt,” 426. Brady, Protestant Politics, 264–5; Roth, Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 3, 71–2. Roth, Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 3, 72–4.

78


among the southern cities. The princes’ plundering of the duchy complicated this situation further. Hesse and Saxony ordered the incorporation of the territory’s ecclesiastical wealth into their coffers while insisting the southern cities pay increasingly higher war levies to finance the occupation. Such actions characterized the princes’ attitudes toward the cities, which they sought to exploit financially in exchange for providing military protection. This naturally alienated many magistrates in the south, most of whom viewed the invasion as a drain on the League’s moral and economic capital. As early as September 1543, Augsburg, Strasbourg, and Ulm began to favor a plan that involved the emperor as mediator to resolve the feud.83 By 1544, urban magistrates in the south had come to believe the affair presented a danger to the League as a whole, thereby threatening the security of the Reformation throughout the Empire.84 In mid-1544, Augsburg and Ulm began coordinating a common policy among the League’s southern cities with the goal of securing the duchy’s sequestration in the emperor’s hands. On June 18, Ulm’s council sent a letter to all “Upper German evangelical cities” encouraging them to support sequestration. A special diet was scheduled to convene in July at Metz with the task of negotiating a settlement to the Braunschweig affair. If this conference did not resolve the matter, argued Ulm, “the alliance’s estates must face the fact that Duke Heinrich, according to his warlike ways, will undertake negotiations by force of arms. Above all else, this would force the cities in Upper Germany to endure daily more burdens, costs, and expenses.” The council feared “Saxony and Hesse will deny the emperor’s request and block the matter so they can keep the disputed territory in their hands, which serves their advantage but will be achieved through our costs and hardship.” Since “until now we have received no benefit from this territory, suffering instead damages and injuries, and since in the future we can expect no advantage to come to us,” Ulm proposed “writing the prince-elector and landgrave in the name of all southern cities and entreating them to trust the emperor in this matter.” Ulm asked its fellow cities “to reveal to us your disposition, namely if the proposed letter to the two chiefs Saxony and Hesse pleases you. We also wish to know whether you grant Strasbourg, Augsburg, and us the power and authority to compose such a letter in the name of all Upper German cities.”85 83 84 85

Ibid., 77. Brady, Protestant Politics, 269. StadtA A, LitS, 1544 Juni 18.


79

The next day, Ulm wrote Augsburg proposing a combined delegation to Metz alongside Strasbourg and Frankfurt. Ulm asked Augsburg’s council to appoint a delegate “who can speak both Latin and French, has knowledge of the Braunschweig affair, and is known and agreeable to the emperor’s counselors.”86 Since the success of the cities’ endeavor depended on face-to-face negotiations, these attributes would ensure the delegate enjoyed as many negotiating advantages as possible. Augsburg suggested its jurist Claudius Pius Peutinger, who had earlier served at the Chamber court.87 Meanwhile, other imperial cities in southern Germany expressed their overwhelming support for Ulm’s plans and authorized it, Augsburg, and Strasbourg to negotiate in their combined name.88 On June 23, Ulm sent Augsburg the draft of a letter it wished to present to Saxony and Hesse. It asked for Augsburg’s advice in improving the document, as well as a copy of Pius Peutinger’s instruction for the Metz negotiations.89 On June 25, Augsburg’s council formally appointed Pius Peutinger to the conference.90 Three days later, it forwarded Ulm a copy of his instruction. Pius Peutinger’s initial instruction reflected Ulm’s desire to pursue sequestration at all costs, but it was a product of Augsburg’s council, which sought to maintain good relations within the Schmalkaldic League. Augsburg’s magistrates believed the political freedom of their city depended on the protection of religious reform through solidarity in the alliance.91 Accordingly, they directed Pius Peutinger to negotiate in a manner that avoided alienating fellow evangelicals. His instruction stressed that if no consensus existed for Braunschweig’s sequestration,

86 87

88

89 90 91

StadtA A, LitS, 1544 Juni 19. StadtA A, LitS, 1544 Juni 20. The eldest son of the Augsburg humanist and city secretary, Konrad Peutinger, Claudius Pius Peutinger was educated in Basel, Orleans, Bourges, and Ferrara, where he received a jurisprudence degree in 1532. After working at the Imperial Chamber court, Pius Peutinger entered the service of his hometown in 1534. He supported the city’s reformation and became one of Augsburg’s most important diplomatic representatives. Friedrich Roth, “Zur Lebensgeschichte des Augsburger Stadtadvokaten Dr. Claudius Pius Peutinger (1509–1552),” ARG 25 (1928): 99–127, 161–255. Ulm received letters of support from Biberach, Kempten, Reutlingen, Heilbronn, Esslingen, and Memmingen on June 20, and from Lindau, Schwabisch Hall, and Isny on June ¨ 21. StadtA A, LitS, 1544 Juni 20 and 1544 Juni 21. The only city that disagreed with Ulm’s position was Constance, which stated that since the Braunschweig affair was a matter of faith, it wished “nitt nach menschliche vernunfft sonnder cristenlichen weise beratschlagen.” StadtA A, LitS, 1544 Juni 25. StadtA A, LitS, 1544 Juni 23. StadtA A, LitS, 1544 Juni 25. Lutz, “Augsburg und seine politische Umwelt,” 427.

80


Pius Peutinger “should not distance himself on behalf of the Upper German cities from the other delegates but rather negotiate with them in such a way that the matter will be delayed until a later date.”92 Augsburg’s cautiousness irritated Ulm’s magistrates. They rejected this stipulation in Pius Peutinger’s instruction, since above all else, the pressing need of our estate and especially our city requires that we approve of sequestration to the emperor as transparently, clearly, and openly as possible. It should be clear that we do not seek any further delay or deadlock in the matter. His Majesty should be able to perceive our disposition and rationale fully and completely, so there is no doubt about our stance and he does not suspect any fickleness on our part.93

For Ulm, the sequestration of Braunschweig-Wolfenbuttel presented ¨ an opportunity to free the southern communes from onerous financial burdens while placing the cities in the emperor’s good graces. Its council wished to pursue sequestration regardless of the effect on internal relations within the Schmalkaldic League. Behind this policy sat the conviction that the best chance to preserve urban reform lay in a collective expression of urban solidarity directed against the excesses of allied princely estates. Ulm’s council therefore requested that delegates from Augsbug and Ulm meet face-to-face to create “a respectable and orderly instruction.”94 Augsburg consented, and the ensuing discussions produced a compromise. Instead of seeking a delay, Augsburg’s council issued a new instruction that called for Augsburg and Ulm to consult their fellow imperial cities again before taking any further action if a consensus for sequestration did not exist in Metz.95 Ulm’s councilors remained troubled by “the proviso that, if the other estates do not approve the sequestration, the matter should be referred back to you and us.” Nevertheless, since “this course of action is more pleasing to you, it should not be allowed to undermine the intimate and friendly feelings between us.”96 Despite its acquiescence, Ulm remained suspicious of Augsburg’s caution. On July 11, its council wrote in secret to the Strasbourg diplomat Jakob Sturm. It informed him that Pius Peutinger had gone to Metz “with 92 93 94 95 96

StadtA A, LitS, 1544 Juni 28. StadtA A, LitS, 1544 Juni 29. StadtA UL, A 3530 K, Ratsprotokolle, 1 Juli 1544. StadtA A, LitS, 1544 Juli 7; StadtA UL, A 1219, fol. 403–5. StadtA A, LitS, 1544 Juli 11.


81

a very poor instruction” written primarily by Augsburg’s magistrates. While Ulm had agreed to the instruction “to preserve our friendship and neighborliness,” its council asked Sturm to order Strasbourg’s delegate in Metz to observe “whether or not Pius Peutinger stays true to his received orders and actually wishes to fulfill and obey them.”97 Sturm promised to discuss the matter with Pius Peutinger, but he informed Ulm that Strasbourg’s magistrates agreed with Augsburg that “it would be very difficult to decide whether to separate ourselves from the princes and to offer a separate petition to the emperor before we hear why the negotiations failed.” Indeed, “my lords are of a very similar mind to your instruction for Dr. Peutinger. . . . If the matter does not succeed, it will be necessary to hold a meeting of all Upper German cities to decide definitively how we wish to act in this matter toward the emperor and the allied estates.”98 Pius Peutinger arrived in Metz on July 19, 1544. While he found Hesse and Saxony prepared to discuss the matter, a lack of consensus concerning the exact terms of sequestration delayed the policy’s approval for another year until July 1545.99 Nevertheless, the negotiations surrounding Pius Peutinger’s embassy to Metz reveal the importance city councils attributed to urban collective politics. Both Augsburg and Ulm stressed the need to act in the name of all Upper German cities, since only through a strong expression of solidarity could the cities hope to carry the debate. In service of this goal, they used intercity communication to build consensus for sequestration. Smaller cities entrusted Augsburg and Ulm with their representation in Metz, which allowed the two larger cities to negotiate in the combined name of their compatriots. These dynamics demonstrate that, contrary to Gabriele Haug-Moritz’s conclusions, “the incorporation of the large communes in the decision making process of the League” did 97

98

99

StadtA UL, A 1219, fol. 420–3, quotes from fol. 422–3. A version of this letter appears in PC, ed. Otto Winckelmann (Strasbourg: Trubner, 1887), vol. 3, 525, Nr. 491. See ¨ also Roth, Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 3, 80. StadtA UL, A 1219, fol. 441–2. A version of this letter appears in PC, vol. 3, 525– 6, Nr. 492. The similarities between Strasbourg and Augsburg’s instructions appear in a letter from Marx Hagen, Strasbourg’s delegate in Metz. Hagen explained he and Peutinger had instructions that were “vast gleichformig” and that the two delegates ¨ intended to present a united front to the conference’s other representatives. PC, vol. 3, 527–8, Nr. 494. Braunschweig-Wolfenbuttel’s sequestration was approved in July 1545 on the condition ¨ that Heinrich not reenter the territory. Before the sequestration could go into effect, however, Heinrich invaded his former lands in September 1545. Schmalkaldic forces defeated him in battle on October 14, 1545. Brady, Protestant Politics, 270. For a description of the Metz negotiations, see Roth, “Claudius Pius Peutinger,” 234–41.

82


not “lessen their inclination to act as leaders of an estate group.”100 If the League’s actions threatened the interests of the urban hierarchy as a whole, magistrates in southern Germany’s largest cities proved more than willing to coordinate a united opposition. When push came to shove, almost all southern imperial cities – large and small – recognized the necessity of presenting a common front to strengthen and legitimize their negotiating position. In order to achieve this unity, Augsburg and Ulm, simultaneous rivals and allies, had to compromise, altering their original policies to facilitate cooperation. As late as 1544, evangelical imperial cities still sought to negotiate a common religious policy to protect urban reform. This did not ensure success in negotiations with other estates, but it allowed cities to express their mutual interests in a clear, forceful manner. Such clarity of position became especially pressing as the political climate in the Empire deteriorated toward open war. The Reformation in individual south German cities was negotiated among a number of agents on the regional and supraregional levels that helped determine the options available to evangelical councils. This occurred both in the first decade of the Reformation and during the 1530s and 1540s. Heinrich Schmidt’s contention that 1529-30 marked a “collapse of corporate unity concerning the question of religion”101 applies only in so far as it represented a break between the Empire’s evangelical and Catholic cities. Within the collectivity of evangelical imperial cities, urban magistrates continued attempts to coordinate religious policies, even among cities of differing evangelical orientations. The ongoing importance of urban solidarity in matters of religion marked the negotiations surrounding the proposed sequestration of BraunschweigWolfenbuttel. This represented one instance of a wider pattern of inter¨ city negotiation that shaped both the orientation and political viability of urban reform throughout southern Germany. At the same time, Schmidt’s conclusion that the cities “were weakened as an estate” after 1530 offers a possible explanation for their inability to secure the sequestration until July 1545.102 There were limits to the efficacy of urban collective politics, which the cities’ military dependence on the Schmalkaldic League’s princes compounded. In the years leading up to the Schmalkaldic War, southern Germany’s evangelical 100

101 102

Haug-Moritz, Der Schmalkaldische Bund, 271–2, quote at 272; see also 308, where Haug-Moritz asserts a “seit 1539 . . . stark nachlassende Neigung der Reichsstadte, als ¨ Gruppe zu agieren.” ¨ H. Schmidt, Reichsstadte, 316. Ibid., 316.


83

imperial cities found themselves in an increasingly difficult position. They remained financially important to the Schmalkaldic League’s leadership, but their powerlessness to prevent the invasion of BraunschweigWolfenbuttel exposed the weakness of the urban position within the ¨ alliance and the Empire as a whole. In this atmosphere, the split in the urban hierarchy that occurred at the imperial diets of 1529–30 did not signal the end of urban collective politics. Rather, it reinforced the desire of Eastern Swabia’s evangelical cities to work together in a collective fashion to defend their religio-political interests. During the 1530s and 1540s, collective politics and collaboration remained indispensable to urban reform, especially on the regional level. This was true not only within the framework of leagues and diets, but also of negotiations between individual town councils.

3 Preachers, Consultation, and the Spread of Urban Reform in Southern Germany

For many burghers in southern Germany, the earliest and most regular contact with reform ideas occurred through evangelical sermons. Preaching was an important if somewhat irregular aspect of fifteenth-century Christianity. The movement of itinerant preachers and the growth of endowed preacherships meant preaching before the Reformation often happened outside the structure of the Mass, which revolved around the miracle of transubstantiation. By contrast, the reformers’ rejection of the Mass’s sacrificial nature and their emphasis on the Word’s primacy elevated preaching to the centerpiece of the new evangelical church services. Through their ministries, preachers influenced the literate and illiterate alike, delivering daily sermons in simple, direct language or composing learned letters of advice for urban councils. They could use the pulpit to build popular support for magisterial reform policies, but their sermons could also challenge councilors to introduce controversial reform initiatives. All the major reformers – including Luther, Zwingli, and John Calvin – were accomplished preachers who recognized the crucial role preaching played in communicating their reform message.1 It was often through preachers that ideas expressed in theological tracts found initial entrance into the churches and council chambers of southern Germany. Eastern Swabia’s city councils recognized the importance of preachers for the introduction and maintenance of urban reform. During the 1530s and 1540s, magistrates across southern Germany recruited, transferred, 1

Andrew Pettegree, Reformation and the Culture of Persuasion (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 10–39. On the pre-Reformation Catholic Mass, see Wandel, The Eucharist, 14–45.

84

Preachers, Consultation, and the Spread of Urban Reform

85

and borrowed evangelical preachers in order to staff urban and rural parishes. One of the most active councils in this regard was Augsburg, which in the mid-1540s sent numerous preachers to minister to neighboring communities. In October 1544, the city council ordered Hans Hess to occupy the vacant country parish at Mindelaltheim. A year later, Augsburg sent Wolfgang Musculus and then Johann Freissleben to preach in Donauworth. Shortly thereafter, Augsburg’s magistrates lent ¨ the preacher Ulrich Lederle to Kaufbeuren and subsequently transferred him to a nearby rural parish. As a replacement for Lederle, Augsburg sent Kaufbeuren a new pastor named Thomas Naogeorgus, a well-known evangelical preacher and dramatist. The aggressive shipping of pastors to other polities marked an important aspect of Augsburg’s attempts to expand its religio-political sphere of influence. By using evangelical clergy to create new ties between communities, Augsburg operated as a reservoir of preachers for its surrounding region before and during the Schmalkaldic War. It is important to note that the majority of preachers active in Augsburg or shipped elsewhere by the council were not native to the city. Just as Augsburg supplied evangelical clergy to surrounding communities, its council drew on connections to other polities to satisfy its need for preachers. Hess came to Augsburg from the nearby town of Gundelfingen, whose council brought the preacher’s availability to Augsburg’s attention. Musculus ministered in Strasbourg before its council sent him to Augsburg in 1531, while Freissleben hailed from the Franconian town of Sulzbach. In response to a petition from Augsburg’s council, Memmingen lent Ulrich Lederle to Augsburg in 1544. Naogeorgus came to the city from Saxony through personal social connections with the Augsburg preacher Michael Keller, who hailed from Bavaria. At the height of its expansionist program, Augsburg even received six new preachers from the Swiss cities Zurich and Basel.2 Augsburg’s attempts to foster new religio-political ties with surrounding communities and to solidify its regional supremacy relied on systems of communication that facilitated the movement of evangelical clergy to and from the city. The transfer of preachers between communes represented a central aspect of the consultative practices of imperial cities during the Reformation. Intercity communication networks affected which preachers came 2

For more on Augsburg’s recruitment of Swiss preachers, see Christopher W. Close, “Zurich, Augsburg, and the Transfer of Preachers during the Schmalkaldic War,” CEH. Forthcoming.

86


to each city and from where they hailed. They also shaped how cities implemented social and ecclesiastical reforms necessitated by the Reformation. Clerical advice frequently influenced the formation of magisterial religious policy, as well as the guidance that urban councils offered their counterparts in other cities. The physical manifestation of the new faith, the preacher often sat at the heart of religious relations between imperial cities. When viewed through the lens of preacher transfers, the urban Reformation in southern Germany does not conform to a simplified process of “reform from above” dictated by one town council or “reform from below” driven solely by the actions of the common folk. For Eastern Swabia’s imperial cities, internal dynamics helped create a will for reform, but the urban Reformation could proceed only through support, guidance, and negotiation with agents from other cities. The Transfer of Preachers and Urban Reform The adequate staffing of pulpits represented an essential part of urban reform, which meant urban councils eagerly sought qualified preachers. Evangelical pastors were supposed to embody the ideal of the Christian man, serving as a model for the community through their words and actions.3 Besides delivering frequent sermons, preachers fulfilled catechetical duties, officiated at the reformed sacraments of baptism and communion, and occasionally carried out evangelizing missions to other communities. They also offered theological advice to town councils. Because of their centrality to the reform movement and the level of expertise needed to serve as a pastor, however, qualified preachers often proved difficult to find. Most city councils felt a pressing need to employ additional pastors, since an insufficient number of clerics could give rise to aberrant forms of religious practice. In 1538, Augsburg’s city secretary, Georg Frolich, ¨ gave voice to this danger. Referring to the empty preachership at the city’s urged the council to fill the opening as soon Franciscan church,4 Frolich ¨ as possible because “the parish folk do not desire to go to Our Lady or St. Moritz. For this reason, it has already happened that the common folk are meeting once again in private houses, reading and reciting to 3

4

Susan Karant-Nunn, “Preaching the Word in Early Modern Germany,” in Preachers and People in the Reformations and Early Modern Period, ed. Larissa Taylor (Boston: Brill, 2003), 205. The position was empty because the church’s regular preacher, Michael Keller, had recently experienced a debilitating illness and was physically unable to carry out his duties.


87

each other. Your honors can well understand how false belief, religious sects, and schism may result from this.”5 Peasants in the rural parish of Mindelaltheim expressed similar worries in 1544 concerning their vacant pastorate. The village’s lack of clerical leadership meant “not only are the imprudent youth left without any explanation of the articles of the holy Christian faith, but general morals and fear of God are also less nurtured.” The peasants needed a preacher soon, for “the longer we wait, the greater the peril and disadvantage to us becomes.”6 For many sixteenth-century Germans, a lack of qualified clerics in their community presented a danger to social order. Magistrates and common folk alike shared these concerns, lamenting the false belief that could arise from an extended vacancy in the pulpit. Both emphasized the importance of the preacher as a moral teacher, although they expressed this in different language based on their social rank. For the peasants in Mindelaltheim, the vacancy in their parish meant the loss of the village’s official moral compass. The absence of an institutional religious presence threatened the social fabric of the community, which required the appointment of “an instructor in holy teachings and the word of God.”7 Frolich and Augsburg’s magistrates stressed the subversive nature of false ¨ belief. The empty pulpit in the Franciscan church gave rise to schismatics, leading some of the common folk to “meet once again in private houses.” This choice of words is noteworthy, since the phrase, “inn di heuser geen,” had been used since the early 1520s to denote secret Sacramentarian groups that gathered in private residences. Augsburg’s civil authorities viewed these groups as sectarians intent on undermining the council’s rule. Around the time of the Peasants’ War, this problem had been particularly acute in the neighborhood surrounding the Franciscan church.8 Frolich’s ¨ letter therefore expressed fear that the absence of a pastor could encourage the rebirth of these clandestine groups among the common folk. This would have threatened the program of magisterial reform undertaken by 5

6

7 8

“dz pfarrvolkh/ gern zu unnser frauen oder Sant Morizen gienng kan es nit zukumen/ daruss ist uff dise stunde gefolgn das/ der gemain man widerzusamen inn di heuser geen/ ainander lesen unnd fursagen etc. ob nit unrat secten unnd spaltung doruss zubesorgen haben eur flt zuversteen.” StadtA A, LitS Personalselekt Cellarius, 1538 November 23. StadtA A, LitS Nachtrage ¨ 1545, undated. All the documents relating to Mindelaltheim in the StadtA A, LitS Nachtrage ¨ can found in the box titled “Nachtrag 1545” in a folder titled “Acta Mindelaltheim 1542–1545.” StadtA A, LitS Nachtrage ¨ 1545, Undated. Joel van Amberg, “A Real Presence: Religious and Social Dynamics of the Eucharistic Conflicts in Early Modern Augsburg 1520–1530” (Ph.D. diss., University of Arizona, 2004), esp. 136–40.

88


Augsburg’s council. According to Frolich, the council could avert this ¨ dire situation “through the appointment of a suitable preacher to the parish.”9 Whether for the preservation of Christian morals or the suppression of deviant belief, city councils had a vested interest in ensuring their pulpits were fully staffed. When confronted with open preacherships, imperial cities often sought new preachers from other urban communes. The recruitment of clergy occurred in several ways.10 Most commonly, one council petitioned its counterpart in another city for the services of a preacher.11 A council could also write directly to a specific pastor,12 or it might ask a preacher in another city to suggest suitable candidates for the position.13 In addition, urban magistrates could engage private citizens to intervene on the magistrate’s behalf.14 Finally, an individual preacher might present himself as a candidate for an open preachership.15 In each case, the preacher’s home council had to approve his departure before the cleric could begin service in a new city. All these procurement methods therefore depended in some way on the consent of individuals living in multiple imperial cities. The Reformation often moved from city to city on the backs of preachers, while those preachers traveled along communication networks within the urban hierarchy. During the 1530s and 1540s, southern Germany’s imperial cities exchanged three main types of preachers: long-term preachers, temporary preachers, and preachers who acted as short-term missionaries. These pastors differed in function and length of tenure. Long-term preachers were clergy sent from one city to another to occupy a permanent post. 9 10 11 12

13

14

15

StadtA A, LitS Personalselekt Cellarius, 1538 November 23. On the following recruitment methods, see Steuer, Aussenverflechtung, 55–6. An example of this is Augsburg’s November 1544 acquisition of Ulrich Lederle from Memmingen. In 1540, Augsburg’s council wrote directly to the preacher Ulrich Regius, then in Freiburg im Breisgau, in the hopes of bringing him to Augsburg. StadtA A, LitS, 1540 Januar 26. For additional examples, see Steuer, Aussenverflechtung, 56. In 1546, Kaufbeuren’s council wrote the Augsburg preacher Michael Keller for assistance locating a new preacher for the city. See Chapter 7. For additional examples, see Steuer, Aussenverflechtung, 56–7. Augsburg’s repeated requests to the Memmingen magistrate Hans Ehinger for help in procuring Ambrosius Blarer’s services offer one such example. Steuer, Aussenverflechtung, 56–70. This happened at least twice in Augsburg during the 1530s and 1540s: in 1538 with Leonhard Flusslin and in 1544 with Hans Hess from Gundelfingen. For Hess, see Chapter ¨ 6. For Flusslin, see StadtA A, LitS Personalselekt Cellarius, 1538 November 23, 27, and ¨ 28 and StadtA A, LitS, 1538 Dezember 2 and 7. Steuer fails to list this as a way city councils procured preachers.


89

In their role as the official leader of an evangelical church community, they represented the backbone of a city’s reformed clergy. It was their duty to preach regularly and to lead their local congregation. They became the official clerical voice of the new faith, which meant long-term preachers could use their office to build popular and magisterial support for the introduction of specific reforms. This allowed especially talented preachers to achieve lasting influence in their city. Long-term preachers could also create new ties between cities. The different councils involved often negotiated the preacher’s transfer, and long-term preachers frequently remained in contact with magistrates and pastors in their city of origin.16 This opened an additional avenue of communication that could promote the spread of specific reform ideas. In Augsburg, Wolfgang Musculus offers an example of the city’s longterm preachers. Musculus came to the city in 1531 from Strasbourg and remained in Augsburg until the 1548 introduction of the Interim. During his tenure, Musculus represented one of the city’s leading clerics. With the help of his Strasbourg colleague Martin Bucer, Musculus played an instrumental role in creating Augsburg’s 1537 church ordinance, reforming the city’s liturgy, and producing compromises among the city’s theologically diverse preachers. Musculus also served as a frequent diplomatic emissary for Augsburg’s council, representing the city at the Wittenberg Concord negotiations in 1536 and acting as a scribe for the council at the colloquy of Regensburg.17 His 1544–5 mission to evangelize Donauworth ¨ represented one of his most important endeavors in service of Augsburg’s magistrates and formed a crucial part of the council’s attempts to increase its religio-political sphere of influence. In the process, Augsburg sought to use regional patterns of consultation to spread specific types of reform, as well as to foster new alliances with neighboring communities, through the transfer of preachers. The two other types of preachers transferred between cities came from a council’s supply of long-term preachers. Temporary preachers were clergy lent from one city to another for a limited duration, during which time they served as a pastor in their new town. After the period of loan expired, a preacher’s home council extended the loan, recalled the preacher, or transferred him to another temporary post. Accordingly, 16

17

For Musculus’s ties to Bucer and others in Strasbourg, see Rudolf Dellsperger, “Bucer und Musculus,” in Martin Bucer and Sixteenth Century Europe, eds. Christian Krieger and Marc Lienhard, vol. 1 (New York: Brill, 1993), 419–28. For Musculus’s activity in Augsburg, see Ford, “Wolfgang Musculus and the Struggle for Confessional Hegemony.”


90

temporary preachers often represented an interim solution by allowing magistrates to staff an empty preachership while they searched for a longterm replacement. In Kaufbeuren, both Hans Schalhaimer and Ulrich Lederle served from December 1545-October 1546 and November 1546 respectively as temporary preachers. Their ministries helped stabilize the city’s reformation until Augsburg procured a new long-term preacher for the city.18 Closely related to but distinct from temporary preachers was a third group of preachers who acted as missionaries. These clerics traveled to other cities with the specific intent of fostering the introduction of evangelical reform. Missionaries operated in a new city for a short period ranging from a few weeks to several months, usually arriving shortly before or immediately after the local council’s decision to pursue official religious reform. Through their ministries, they sought to establish the basic institutional framework for the urban Reformation. Missionary preachers therefore often focused on convincing the local council to suspend the Latin Mass and to promulgate a new evangelical church ordinance. Their attempts to establish the Reformation could also cultivate lasting ties between the city and its visiting reformer. This was true in Donauworth and Kaufbeuren, where the Reformation’s introduction ¨ relied on the Augsburg preachers Musculus and Michael Keller. Similar dynamics marked the course of reform in Augsburg, Memmingen, and Ulm as well. During the 1530s and 1540s, missionary work facilitated new religio-political affiliations that shaped the course of urban reform throughout southern Germany. All three types of preachers played instrumental roles in the creation of Eastern Swabia’s reformed churches. Communication networks often facilitated the movement of these clerics. Close relationships between councils could be crucial for the procurement of long-term and temporary preachers, as in the case of Musculus and other preachers sent to Augsburg from Strasbourg. These networks were especially vital for the movement of missionaries. The primary missionary preacher to Augsburg, Martin Bucer, came from Strasbourg, a city with strong consultative ties to Augsburg. In both Donauworth and Kaufbeuren, missionaries hailed ¨ from cities that served as frequent orientation points for the smaller communes: Memmingen and Augsburg for Kaufbeuren, Augsburg for Donauworth. In this way, the pattern of missionary work often mirrored ¨ broader patterns of consultation among cities. The activity of missionaries 18

See Chapter 7.


91

represents one of the most powerful external influences exerted on the urban Reformation in Eastern Swabia. It brings into focus the importance of individual preachers for the success of reform, as well as the role south German magistrates played in guiding the Reformation in other cities. Martin Bucer’s Missions to Ulm and Augsburg Two of the most important missionaries for Eastern Swabia’s imperial cities were Martin Bucer of Strasbourg and Ambrosius Blarer of Constance. Both men enjoyed long careers in service of their home councils, but they ministered in many other locales as well, frequently traveling from city to city to spread their respective schools of reform. Their extensive activity made them key figures regionally and on the wider imperial scene. Historians have long noted Bucer’s importance as a voice for theological compromise.19 His efforts helped produce the Wittenberg Concord,20 and he participated in the religious colloquies of 1539–41.21 He was also instrumental in an abortive push for reform in Cologne during the early 1540s.22 Alongside these endeavors, Bucer ministered in numerous south German imperial cities, including Augsburg and Ulm. Magistrates in both cities relied heavily on Bucer’s consultation in religious matters, especially during the formative stages of their local reformations. While Bucer’s formal work in Ulm did not begin until May 1531, he had communicated with several individuals in the city since the mid1520s. Bucer possessed close personal ties to Ulm’s most important longterm preachers, Konrad Sam and Martin Frecht. For several years prior to his 1531 arrival, Bucer had also corresponded with Ulm’s council. 19

20 21

22

For an introduction to Bucer and citations to older literature, see Martin Bucer zwischen Luther und Zwingli, eds. Matthieu Arnold and Berndt Hamm (Tubingen: Mohr, 2003); ¨ Martin Greschat, Martin Bucer. A Reformer and his Times, trans. Stephen E. Buckwalter (Louisville: Knox, 2004); Nicholas Thompson, Eucharistic Sacrifice and Patristic Tradition in the Theology of Martin Bucer 1534–1546 (Leiden: Brill, 2005). See Greschat, Martin Bucer, 132–42. See Cornelis Augustijn, “Bucer und die Religionsgesprache von 1540/1,” in Martin Bucer ¨ and Sixteenth Century Europe, eds. Christian Krieger and Marc Lienhard, vol. 2 (New York: Brill, 1993), 671–80; Volkmar Ortmann, Reformation und Einheit der Kirche. ¨ ¨ Martin Bucers Einigungsbemuhungen bei den Religionsgesprachen in Leipzig, Worms und Regensburg 1539–41 (Mainz: von Zabern, 2001). See Marijn de Kroon, “Bucer und die Kolner Reformation,” in Martin Bucer and Six¨ teenth Century Europe, eds. Christian Krieger and Marc Lienhard, vol. 2 (New York: Brill, 1993), 493–506.

92


In September 1529, Ulm’s magistrates wrote Bucer and Strasbourg’s council for advice concerning the creation of a new evangelical school system. Bucer responded with a detailed letter of advice,23 but Ulm’s council hesitated to adopt official religious reform until after the city joined the Schmalkaldic League in early 1531. In April of that year, Ulm convened a special committee to oversee the Reformation’s introduction.24 One of the committee’s main goals was the creation of a new church ordinance, but its members acknowledged “regarding the composition of an ordinance we do not possess a sufficient number of learned men and fear that we will fail. We should therefore locate learned men who might help us.”25 The committee resolved to seek advice from several nearby cities concerning “[the formation of] a Christian ordinance and ceremonies, as well as the elimination of all things that are against God.”26 Ulm’s council also petitioned Strasbourg, Basel, and Constance “to lend us your preachers for a while in order to further our ongoing Christian undertaking.”27 Strasbourg’s council agreed “for the furtherance of God’s glory and his holy Word to lend Martin Bucer to you,” while Constance and Basel consented to send Blarer and Johann Oecolampadius.28 The three theologians arrived in Ulm on May 21 and immediately entered into negotiations with the city’s reform committee.29 Under Bucer’s leadership, the three reformers drafted an initial statement of belief containing eighteen articles of faith that served as the guidelines for Ulm’s magisterial reformation. Indeed, once Ulm’s council approved these articles, the three preachers began to implement religious reform in the city and its Territorium. The Latin Mass was abolished on June 16, and a month later Blarer led the first evangelical Eucharistic service in the city. The three preachers also encouraged the council to remove all religious images from its churches, a move the council 23 24

25 26 27 28 29

Darren Provost, “Martin Bucer and the Reformation of Marriage and Divorce in Early Sixteenth-Century Ulm” (PhD diss., Yale University, 2005), 90. Greschat, Martin Bucer, 107. Ulm’s reform committee consisted of four patricians, four guild masters, and the mayor Jorg ¨ Besserer, who acted as chairman. Hans Eugen ¨ Specker and Gebhard Weig, eds., Die Einfuhrung der Reformation in Ulm (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1981), 171. For the committee members’ names, see Litz, Reformatorische Bilderfrage, 108; Provost, “Martin Bucer,” 101. ¨ Quoted in Specker and Weig, eds., Einfuhrung, 171. Quoted in Litz, Reformatorische Bilderfrage, 109 n. 51. Ulm’s council sent requests for advice to Biberach, Constance, Isny, Lindau, Memmingen, and Reutlingen. ¨ Quoted in Specker and Weig, eds., Einfuhrung, 172. For the letter to Strasbourg, see PC, vol. 2, 37–8, Nr. 38. ¨ Quoted in Specker and Weig, eds., Einfuhrung, 172. See also PC, vol. 2, 38, Nr. 40. ¨ Specker and Weig, eds., Einfuhrung, 176.


93

approved on June 19.30 These measures met with some opposition from local Catholic clerics, and on June 27, Bucer took part in a public disputation against Georg Osswald, a priest from Ulm’s hinterland who had openly rejected the eighteen reform articles.31 Bucer departed Ulm at the end of the month, but once back in Strasbourg, the reformer composed a treatise defending Ulm’s reforms against potential outside attacks. In its formal reformation announcement of August 1, Ulm’s council included this defense as its theological justification for reform.32 Shortly thereafter, Bucer and his colleagues in Strasbourg, responding to a request from Ulm’s magistrates to remain “supportive, helpful, and ready with advice” in matters of faith, penned an additional defense for Ulm in case the city came under assault from Catholic estates at the upcoming Imperial Diet of Speyer.33 One of Bucer’s most influential activities in Ulm involved the creation of a new marriage court. The first civil marriage court of the Reformation era appeared in Zurich in 1525. Its operation led quickly to the introduction of similar institutions in neighboring Swiss cities like Basel and Bern, which modeled their new marriage statutes on Zurich.34 These courts severed the cities’ remaining ties to the local episcopal marriage court and established full magisterial control over marital disputes. As in other parts of the German-speaking lands, the imitation evident in the establishment of Reformation marriage courts reflected late medieval patterns of consultation in the Swiss Confederation.35 In southern Germany, where many cities possessed important ties to the Swiss, urban magistrates nonetheless remained wary in the late 1520s of creating separate marriage courts. The fear of imperial retribution and the Reformation’s unclear legal status during these years seem to have tempered the enthusiasm of many 30 31 32

33 34

35

Litz, Reformatorische Bilderfrage, 96, 114. Greschat, Martin Bucer, 107–9; Litz, Reformatorische Bilderfrage, 112; Specker and ¨ Weig, eds., Einfuhrung, 176–85. Ulm announced its reformation in an August 1, 1531, letter to the imperial estates. Greschat, Martin Bucer, 109; Provost, “Martin Bucer,” 237; Specker and Weig, eds., ¨ Einfuhrung, 192–3. PC, vol. 2, 58, Nr. 65; 60, Nr. 70. Quote at Nr. 65. Provost, “Martin Bucer,” 181–2. On Zurich’s marriage court, see Walter Kohler, ¨ ¨ Zurcher Ehegericht und Genfer Konsistorium, 2 vols. (Leipzig: Heinsius Nachfolger, 1932, 1942). Bern also solicited Zurich’s aid in reforming its school system. Beat Immenhauser, “’Hohe Schule’ oder Universitat? ¨ Zur Pfarrerausbildung in Bern im 16. Jahrhundert,” in Politics and Reformations: Communities, Polities, Nations, and Empires, eds. Christopher Ocker et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 152–9. See Michael Jucker, Gesandte, Schreiber, Akten. Politische Kommunikation auf eid¨ ¨ genossischen Tagsatzungen im Spatmittelalter (Zurich: Chronos, 2004).

94


councilors. In Strasbourg, for example, Bucer had tried unsuccessfully since 1524 to persuade the council to establish its own marriage court. After years of negotiation, the city’s magistrates declared they would not create such a court until they could observe its operation first hand elsewhere: “We will wait for the decision of Ulm’s city fathers in this matter before we move forward with the establishment of a marriage court in Strasbourg.”36 Bucer’s mission to Ulm therefore presented the reformer with an opportunity to reshape the religious practice of one community while simultaneously encouraging his home council to progress along its path of reform. This also reflected the desires of Oecolampadius and Blarer, who along with Bucer hoped Ulm could serve as a model “to encourage other Swabian cities.”37 In Ulm, Bucer found magistrates ready to enact his plans for an evangelical marriage court. Like the councils in many other imperial cities, Ulm’s council had sought to extend its jurisdiction over marriage since the fifteenth century. Some of the earliest reform legislation passed by the council dealt with the subject of marriage, but it stopped short of setting up a new marriage court. As in Strasbourg, Bucer encouraged Ulm’s magistrates to create such a court, penning two advisory letters on the matter for Ulm’s council in June 1531.38 Two months later, Ulm’s council wrote Bucer asking him to compose an official church ordinance for the city. The ordinance enacted on August 6 was almost identical to the proposals forwarded by Bucer. As part of the ordinance’s implementation, Ulm’s council created a separate marriage court, the first of its kind in Swabia. It did so according to Bucer’s guidelines.39 Bucer’s influence on Ulm’s marriage court did not stop at its creation. As the court began to hear cases and to rule on acceptable grounds for divorce or remarriage, it sent frequent requests to Bucer for guidance.40 It did not unquestionably follow Bucer’s suggestions, but the reformer’s opinion remained crucial for the court’s operation, especially in its initial 36 37

38 39 40

Provost, “Martin Bucer,” 204–5, quote at 205 n. 157. The translation is my own. On June 23, 1531, Blarer, Bucer, Oecolampadius, and Konrad Sam wrote to Joachim Vadian that “quo exemplo speramus etiam alias Suevicas civitates posse tandem ex[s]timulari, ut Christo gloriam suam, quam obscurant sophiste impii, asserant.” Quoted in Litz, Reformatorische Bilderfrage, 121 n. 107. Provost, “Martin Bucer,” 228–35. Ibid., 244–7. On January 26, 1532, for example, Bucer sent Ulm’s council a third advisory letter in response to queries about a case of divorce involving an adulterer and his mentally unstable wife. According to Provost, Ulm’s magistrates did not follow Bucer’s advice in this case. Provost, “Martin Bucer,” 255–7.


95

years of existence. In April 1534, for example, Ulm’s magistrates enacted an ordinance reorganizing the marriage court that derived almost entirely from a treatise Bucer wrote at the council’s request.41 His explanation of suitable grounds for divorce and allowable cases of remarriage created the theological parameters within which Ulm’s court adjudicated cases of marital strife. In the aftermath of his mission in the city, Bucer became the leading external theological figure for Ulm’s council and its clergy. His close relationship with Martin Frecht, Ulm’s leading preacher during the 1530s, encapsulates Bucer’s importance for the city. As Darren Provost has observed, Frecht “came to admire Bucer’s advice so much that at some points it seems he could hardly make a decision on anything without first consulting him.”42 The official introduction and theological defense of the Reformation in Ulm depended on the activity of preachers from other imperial cities. Bucer, Blarer, and Oecolampadius codified Ulm’s statement of evangelical belief while directing the initial stages of the city’s formal reformation. The importance of external advice appears particularly in the creation of Ulm’s marriage court, which drew continuously on the guidance of Martin Bucer. A similar reliance on foreign clerics characterized the Reformation in Eastern Swabia’s other imperial cities, especially in Donauworth and Kaufbeuren. Under the guidance of a preacher from ¨ Augsburg, the two councils suspended the Latin Mass and introduced evangelical religious services in their churches. Both cities also sought Augsburg’s help in justifying their reform endeavors to Catholic opponents. Reform in Donauworth and Kaufbeuren relied on a process of ¨ negotiation involving the local council, nearby cities, and foreign preachers that paralleled the experiences of Ulm and other neighboring communes. The negotiation of reform was not limited to small communes, but also shaped the reformations of larger imperial cities such as Ulm. The importance of negotiation for larger cities emerges from Bucer’s work in Augsburg as well, where the Strasbourg reformer exerted an important influence on the local reformation. While Augsburg possessed several notable preachers, much discord existed among its clergy during the 1520s and 1530s.43 This antagonism erupted in heated debates over the nature of the Eucharist and the role of images in worship. In order to overcome the theological differences among its preachers, Augsburg’s 41 42 43

Provost, “Martin Bucer,” 276. Ibid., 227–8. de Kroon, “Augsburger Reformation,” 66.

96


council sought external aid from Strasbourg. From 1534–7, Bucer visited the city four times at the request of Augsburg’s council.44 In the words of Friedrich Roth, Augsburg sought Bucer’s aid every time the council “stood before important decisions concerning its church’s existence.”45 Indeed, as Augsburg’s city physician, Gereon Sailer, observed, Bucer became the interim solution to Augsburg’s search for a pastor who “in an emergency could represent and answer for the city in matters of faith and whom the other preachers would have to view with respect.”46 Augsburg’s dependence on Bucer paralleled its reliance on Strasbourg as a source of preachers. In 1531–2, Strasbourg supplied Augsburg with five different preachers: Wolfgang Musculus, Bonifacius Wolfart, Sebastian Meyer, Theobald Schwarz, and Johann Held.47 Bucer’s support helped secure these men for Augsburg, while Strasbourg’s council approved and sanctioned their transfers. The same was true of Bucer’s missions. His first extended stay in Augsburg occurred from November 6-December 9, 1534, shortly after Augsburg’s July 1534 introduction of limited religious reform.48 During this time, Bucer produced an initial compromise among Augsburg’s preachers by persuading them to agree on ten articles of faith.49 When he departed in December, Augsburg’s council hoped “[Strasbourg] will kindly allow its citizen Martin Bucer to preach here for an additional half-year for our good and the good of the community, so from this initial godly work he can create a complete being (wesen).”50 With Strasbourg’s permission, Bucer returned to Augsburg in February 1535 and secured another temporary compromise among the city’s 44

45 46 47 48 49 50

Between 1534–7, Bucer ministerd in Augsburg on four separate occasions: November 6–December 9, 1534; February 26–April 22, 1535; April 6–April 27, 1536; and May 18–July 9, 1537. De Kroon, “Augsburger Reformation,” 59–60. Roth, Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 2, 19. Quoted in Ibid., 10. de Kroon, “Augsburger Reformation,” 67; Roth, Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 3, 539–50. de Kroon, “Augsburger Reformation,” 80. Roth, Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 2, 184–5. Rather than refer to “churches,” or kirchen, Augsburg’s magistrates asked that Bucer return to complete the creation of an evangelical “being,” or wesen. This implies a desire on the part of Augsburg’s council to go beyond an outward reform of its church practices to a deeper conversion of society to the evangelical word. By phrasing their request thusly, Augsburg’s magistrates may well have echoed Bucer’s notion of the fundamentally Christian nature of society. “das sy [Strasbourg] uns unnd unser gemaind zu guetem ine herrn burger [Bucer] . . . noch ein halb jar/ alhie zupredigen/ unnd allso das angefenngt Got gesellig werck unnd gepflanzte herzen vermittlt gotlichen gnaden in ein volkomen wesen zupringen/ gunstlich vergonnen/ zuegeben unnd bewilligen.” StadtA A, LitS, 1534 Dezember 14.


97

preachers. This new agreement laid the groundwork for Augsburg’s truce with Luther a few months later, which enabled the city to enter the Schmalkaldic League.51 Bucer’s assistance proved indispensable to Augsburg’s pursuit of its larger religio-political goals, which led the city’s magistrates to seek Bucer’s help again after fully outlawing the Latin Mass. In January 1537, Augsburg petitioned Strasbourg once more to return Bucer so he could “help complete the ongoing construction of our Christian church, for which he has laid no small cornerstone.”52 Once he arrived in Augsburg on May 18, Bucer set to work building renewed consensus among the city’s preachers, and his mediation facilitated the drafting of Augsburg’s new church ordinance. Similar to Ulm’s reliance on the Strasbourg reformer, Augsburg’s council also entrusted Bucer with writing the city’s catechism, which came into effect in November 1537.53 Bucer’s missions in Augsburg played a key role in guiding the city’s reform efforts. His assistance helped overcome internal divisions in Augsburg’s pastorate, and the city’s magistrates relied heavily on Bucer’s aid as a mediator and advisor. During the mid-1530s, when Augsburg faced an important crossroads in its move toward full religious reform, the council turned regularly to the Strasbourg reformer. In the process, the introduction of the Reformation in Augsburg evolved out of a complicated series of negotiations between the common folk, the city’s long-term preachers, Augsburg’s council, Martin Bucer, and other imperial cities. Impulses from above and from below influenced Augsburg’s reformation, therefore, but the course of reform in the city depended on external actors as well. As in Donauworth, Kaufbeuren, and Ulm, a preacher from ¨ another city sat at the heart of this negotiated process. Ambrosius Blarer: “Swabia’s Apostle” At the same time that Bucer ministered in Augsburg and Ulm, the Constance reformer Ambrosius Blarer traveled throughout Swabia preaching in Memmingen, Isny, Kempten, Lindau, Ulm, Esslingen, Wurttemberg, ¨ 51

52 53

de Kroon, “Augsburger Reformation,” 86; Greschat, Martin Bucer, 113; Gottfried Seebass, “Martin Bucer und die Reichsstadt Augsburg,” in Martin Bucer and Sixteenth Century Europe, eds. Christian Krieger and Marc Lienhard, vol. 2 (New York: Brill, 1993), 488. For the course of Augsburg’s negotiations with Luther, see Roth, Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 2, 241–75. For Augsburg’s admission to the Schmalkaldic League, see Chapter 2. StadtA A, LitS, 1537 April 17. Gottfried Seebass, “Die Augsburger Kirchenordnung von 1537 in ihrem historischen und theologischen Zusammenhang,” in Die Augsburger Kirchenordnung von 1537 und ihr Umfeld, ed. Reinhard Schwarz (Gutersloh: Mohn, 1988), 40–4. ¨

98


and Augsburg. This extensive activity led Bucer to dub Blarer “Swabia’s apostle.”54 His significance for the urban Reformation outside of Constance emerges foremost from his ministries to Memmingen and Esslingen.55 For Memmingen, Blarer’s importance as a theological advisor began as early as 1527. On November 27 in that year, Memmingen’s council informed the Constance preacher it wished “to subject all inhabitants of our city, both clerical and secular, to an ordinance and prohibition regarding their concubines and other forms of vexing fornication. Since we do not know how to undertake such a thing in the most skillful way possible, we ask you to present us your recommendation on the matter.”56 In addition, Memmingen petitioned Blarer’s “faithful advice” concerning how it “can bring the clergy, priests, and monks to pay taxes . . . tolls, and other duties for which our other citizens are responsible, just as numerous surrounding cities have done.”57 Blarer sent Memmingen detailed letters of advice, which the city’s magistrates used along with suggestions from other councils as the basis for new discipline and church ordinances.58 Over the next several years, the council continued to seek Blarer’s guidance on matters of religio-political importance. After Hans Keller’s 1529 expulsion from the Swabian League’s Central Council, Blarer acted as an advisor to the city in its refutation of the League’s demands. He then composed a tract defending Memmingen against the Ingolstadt theologian Johannes Eck, which the council subsequently employed as its main theological justification for enacting religious reform.59 Blarer also wrote the liturgy 54

55

56 57

58 59

¨ Traugott Schiess, ed., Briefwechsel der Bruder Ambrosius und Thomas Blarer 1509– 1548, vol. 1 (Freiburg: Fehsenfeld, 1908), 264, Nr. 210. For more on Blarer’s relationship with Bucer, see Ernst-Wilhelm Kohls, “Blarer und Bucer,” in Der Konstanzer Reformator Ambrosius Blarer 1492–1564, ed. Bernd Moeller (Constance: Thorbecke, 1964), 172– 92; Bernd Moeller, “Bucer und die Geschwister Blarer,” in Martin Bucer and Sixteenth Century Europe, eds. Christian Krieger and Marc Lienhard, vol. 1 (New York: Brill, 1993), 441–50. Since Blarer’s mission to Wurttemberg occurred in a territorial state and not an impe¨ rial city, it falls outside the purview of this study. For Blarer’s time in Wurttemberg, ¨ see Martin Brecht, “Ambrosius Blarers Wirksamkeit in Schwaben,” in Der Konstanzer Reformator Ambrosius Blarer 1492–1564, ed. Bernd Moeller (Constance: Thorbecke, 1964), 154–68. Schiess, ed., Briefwechsel, vol. 1, 143, Nr. 114. Memmingen also sought advice from Lindau. Dobel, Memmingen im Reformationszeitalter, vol. 2, 50. Schiess, ed., Briefwechsel, vol. 1, 143, Nr. 114. See also Friess, “Ratsreformation,” 421–2. Concerning the incorporation of Catholic clergy into the city’s tax structure, Memmingen’s council also wrote the councils in Constance, Nuremberg, and Ulm. Dobel, Memmingen im Reformationszeitalter, vol. 2, 51. Dobel, Memmingen im Reformationszeitalter, vol. 2, 51. Brecht, “Schwaben,” 143; Friess, “Ratsreformation,” 424.


99

for Memmingen’s first open celebration of an evangelical Eucharist on Easter Sunday 1529.60 During the early stages of Memmingen’s reformation, Blarer appears to have had the same importance for the council that Bucer held for Ulm and Augsburg. His work was so crucial to the city’s reformation that Bucer named him “father of this [Memmingen] church.”61 Blarer continued to play an important advisory role for Memmingen’s magistrates during the 1530s. His work to reform Ulm’s surrounding countryside in summer 1531 offered Memmingen an example that it could follow in its own Territorium. Indeed, similar to Strasbourg’s scrutiny of Ulm’s marriage court, Memmingen’s council resolved “to continue deliberating what we will do about the priests in the countryside until we hear news of Ulm’s undertaking.”62 When they did decide to initiate the reformation of the city’s countryside in August and September 1531, Memmingen’s magistrates specifically cited the eighteen Ulm articles composed by Bucer, Blarer, and Oecolampadius as the basis for eliminating the Mass in its subject communities.63 As its urban and rural reformation proceeded, Memmingen’s council also frequently sought Blarer’s direct guidance. On the advice of the reformer and his home council in Constance, Memmingen published a revised discipline ordinance in 1532 that drew heavily on Constance’s model.64 In the same year, Blarer visited Memmingen personally, where the council entrusted him with educating its rural preachers in the proper form of evangelical worship.65 Blarer also helped procure Gervasius Schuler66 as a new long-term preacher for 60

61 62 63 64

65 66

Friess, Aussenpolitik, 101. A copy of Blarer’s liturgy appears in Emil Sehling, Die evangelischen Kirchenordnungen des XVI. Jahrhunderts, vol. 12/2: Bayern/Schwaben (Tubingen: Mohr, 1963), 239–46 ¨ Quoted in Brecht, “Schwaben,” 144. Quoted in Litz, Reformatorische Bilderfrage, 97 n. 17. Ibid., 155. As early as May 1531, Memmingen’s council ordered Hans Keller to solicit information from Constance about its discipline ordinance. Memmingen’s magistrates subsequently used Constance’s ordinance as a model for their own March 1532 decree. Friess, Aussenpolitik, 121; Friess, “Ratsreformation,” 431. A copy of Memmingen’s 1532 Zuchtordnung appears in Sehling, Kirchenordnungen, vol. 12/2, 247–55. Litz, Reformatorische Bilderfrage, 156. Schuler hailed originally from Strasbourg and enjoyed a cordial relationship with the Zurich reformer Heinrich Bullinger. He served as a deacon in Basel before his transfer to Memmingen. He first came to Blarer’s attention in November 1531 on Bullinger’s recommendation. Several years later, Schuler represented Memmingen in the 1536 Wittenberg Concord negotiations. In the same year, Memmingen’s council named him superintendent of the city’s churches. He played a central role in the 1545–6 reformation of Kaufbeuren’s churches. Friess, Aussenpolitik, 122–3, 153; Schiess, ed., Briefwechsel, vol. 1, 293, Nr. 240.

100


Memmingen.67 Much like its neighboring cities’ relationship with Martin Bucer, when Memmingen required help in matters of reform, it turned to the Constance reformer for assistance. Memmingen’s reformation – like those in Augsburg, Ulm, Donauworth, and Kaufbeuren – developed ¨ through a process of internal and external negotiation with a preacher at its center. Blarer’s 1531–2 mission in Esslingen proceeded in a similar manner. From its opening stages, Esslingen’s reformation depended on external reform models. One of the council’s first official acts of reform, a preaching mandate issued in August 1531, derived from a 1523 decree promulgated in Strasbourg.68 Such reliance on reform initiatives from other cities continued after Blarer’s arrival in September. With Ulm as its model, Esslingen’s council called for a guild referendum to vote on the suspension of the Latin Mass.69 Blarer then organized a series of examinations for the city’s clergy based on the eighteen articles of faith from Ulm. These articles later became the theological basis for Esslingen’s abolition of the Catholic Mass and its introduction of reformed communion and baptismal rites.70 Finally, at the request of Esslingen’s council, Blarer put into effect “with small improvements” a modified version of Constance’s discipline ordinance that drew on statutes from Basel, Ulm, and Strasbourg.71 While internal calls for reform may have led Esslingen’s council to summon Blarer, the new reform policies enacted depended on his guidance and the cooptation of preexisting external models. In Blarer’s own words, “the Esslinger are entirely dependent on me and wish to do nothing in these matters without my help.”72 The Reformation in Augsburg, Esslingen, Memmingen, Ulm, and other urban communes in southern Germany was a complex affair that involved popular pressure for reform, the agitation of local preachers, the interests 67 68

69 70 71

72

Brecht, “Schwaben,” 144. Hans-Christoph Rublack, “Reformatorische Bewegung und stadtische Kirchenpolitik ¨ ¨ in Esslingen,” in Stadtische Gesellschaft und Reformation, ed. Ingrid Batori (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1980), 212. Litz, Reformatorische Bilderfrage, 182–3; Eberhard Naujoks, Obrigkeitsgedanke, Zunftverfassung und Reformation (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1958), 88. Theodor Pressel, Ambrosius Blaurer nach handschriftlichen und gleichzeitigen Quellen (Eberfeld: Friedrichs, 1861), 82. Schiess, ed., Briefwechsel, vol. 1, 294–5, Nr. 242; quote at vol. 1, 299, Nr. 246. On the relationship of Esslingen’s discipline ordinance to those of other cities, see Wolfgang Dobras, Ratsregiment, Sittenpolizei und Kirchenzucht in der Reichsstadt Konstanz 1531–1548 (Gutersloh: Mohn, 1993), 192. See also Brecht, “Schwaben,” 148; Naujoks, ¨ Obrigkeitsgedanke, 89; Pressel, Ambrosius Blaurer, 85. Schiess, ed., Briefwechsel, vol. 1, 292, Nr. 238.


101

of magistrates, and the influence of preachers lent by other councils. The many-sided nature of these negotiations, which relied on traditions of urban consensus building and interlocking networks between cities, reveals one reason city councils in Eastern Swabia frequently had difficulty cooperating with princely regimes in reform matters. The need for urban solidarity, as well as the magisterial desire to maintain social peace, meant in enacting reform, town councils had to integrate multiple competing viewpoints to address the specific dynamics present in their community and surrounding region. This approach often conflicted with notions of princely liberty, which emphasized the independence and prerogative of the individual territorial ruler against his subjects.73 For Eastern Swabia’s urban councils, by contrast, attentiveness to the wishes of their burghers as well as to the reform initiatives of other cities flowed naturally from the consultative practices of the urban hierarchy, which sought security through consensus. In southern Germany, the urban Reformation relied on patterns of intercity communication and regional politics that altered the religious fate of entire communities, large and small. The Negotiation of Social and Ecclesiastical Reforms The negotiated nature of the south German urban Reformation appears in other areas of civic reform besides the transfer of clerics. Preachers guided the religious policy of urban magistrates, but the final decision on what reforms to introduce usually rested with the council. Urban governments turned not only to preachers, therefore, but also to their counterparts in other cities for assistance enacting the Reformation. The role consultation between cities played in the introduction of specific reform initiatives appears at numerous points during the first decade of Augsburg’s reformation. In particular, the city council’s efforts to secure the Schmalkaldic League’s protection for its reformation, its attempts to create a new system of marriage law, and the reconstitution of its clerical pay scale reveal how intercity systems of support molded religious reform in the Eastern Swabian metropolis. As in Esslingen, Memmingen, and Ulm, external reform models exerted a major influence on Augsburg’s council. As justification for its complete abolition of the Latin Mass and the expulsion of the city’s remaining Catholic clergy on January 17, 1537, Augsburg cited

73

Brady, Protestant Politics, 147–8.

102


the honorable cities Nuremberg and Ulm, which years ago decided to allow no Catholic foundation (stiffung) to take root in their cities. For this reason, they above all others enjoy peace and tranquility. On the other hand, one can observe that, in all other honorable, free, and imperial cities where Catholic foundations have established themselves, either these cities fall into corruption by coming under the power of clerics, or these clerics are violent to them. It follows that the council must bring clerics under the authority of civil law or risk being robbed of honor, property, and above all else the word of God.74

For Augsburg’s council, its neighboring cities served both as examples of reform and as possible rationalizations for its own reform initiatives. This use of other cities as reform models represented an important aspect of Augsburg’s Reformation-era politics, including the city council’s attempts to secure the political backing of Nuremberg, Strasbourg, and Ulm for its introduction of religious reform. On January 21, 1537, Augsburg’s council sent Konrad Hel to Nuremberg and Ulm to explain Augsburg’s reform intentions in person.75 A few days later, Augsburg forwarded both cities a printed copy of its Reformation mandate. It asked its Three Cities’ allies “to examine the contents and for our sake to understand them just as they are written. If someone slanders us to you, you will not believe it, but rather stay true to us as we have gladly displayed our friendly will to you in comparable situations.”76 Augsburg’s magistrates expressed a similar sentiment in a January 25 letter to Strasbourg: “Should our common enemies call us out, defame, slander, accuse, or in any other way attack or burden us, you will not only defend us to others, but also not fail to offer us assistance, advice, support, and help.”77 Augsburg’s council asked Strasbourg “to write earnestly to your delegates at the current Diet of Schmalkalden and order them to present our affair to the general assembly as a matter of common interest for the estates. Should the affair come to a vote, you should order your delegates to cast their vote so our undertaking will be recognized and accepted as a general matter of religion.”78 74 75

76 77 78

StadtA A, LitS, 1537 Januar 17. StadtA A, LitS, 1537 Januar 21. Augsburg organized three other delegations: Lucas Ulstat, Georg Herwart, and Stephan Eiselin visited the Bavarian dukes; Ulrich Welser, Hans Zangmeister, and Claudius Pius Peutinger went to King Ferdinand; and Ludwig Spinner traveled to Spain to meet the emperor. Roth, Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 2, 372. StadtA A, LitS, 1537 Januar 27. StadtA A, LitS Reformationsakten (Hereafter RefA), 1537 Januar 25. StadtA A, LitS RefA, 1537 Januar 25.


103

One of Augsburg’s first actions after introducing full-scale religious reform was to secure the backing of the three largest and politically most influential evangelical imperial cities. Its efforts paid dividends with the Schmalkaldic League. With Strasbourg’s help, Augsburg persuaded the evangelical estates to acknowledge the city’s reformation as a causa religionis.79 This official recognition provided Augsburg with political, legal, and military support against outside attacks on its reformation.80 Eight years later, Augsburg acted as a similar buttress to Donauworth ¨ and Kaufbeuren when their reformations came under assault from exterand Kaufnal Catholic forces.81 The ability of Augsburg, Donauworth, ¨ beuren to maintain their reform endeavors depended not only on consensus within the city, but also on a sense of mutual support among cities and the evangelical estates as a whole. Augsburg’s reliance on external guidance continued after its official introduction of reform. By initiating a reformation of the city’s churches, the council claimed authority to regulate many matters that had largely been the purview of canon law and the local bishop, such as marriage and the payment of clerics.82 These represented expanded areas of responsibility for civil governments, and magistrates turned to intercity consultation to construct their new policies. Assistance from other cities might come through the work of a missionary, but it could also take the form of official letters of advice sent by other councils. Urban magistrates negotiated the substance of religious reform in much the same way they did the formation of guild ordinances and the renovation of water systems. The Reformation and its attendant social and ecclesiastical reforms became a part of everyday life for town councils, which employed the standard tools at their disposal to guide reform. Two examples drawn from the correspondence of Augsburg’s council illustrate how cities employed external consultation to shape internal religious reform. The first involves the regulation of marriage. As part of 79 80

81 82

For the course of these negotiations, see PC, vol. 2, 414–29, Nr. 439. Augsburg sought this support in the first half of 1537 because the council feared the Bavarian dukes, who had begun negotiations with Charles V and Ferdinand to form a new alliance, would attack the city on religious grounds. In order to prevent this, Augsburg hoped to secure the Schmalkaldic League’s official backing. Haug-Moritz, Der Schmalkaldische Bund, 205; Roth, Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 2, 383– 5; Schlutter-Schindler, Der Schmalkaldische Bund, 114–6. ¨ See Chapter 7. John Witte, Law and Protestantism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 179.

104


the city’s 1537 introduction of reform, Augsburg’s council created a separate civil marriage court. As in Ulm and other imperial cities, Augsburg’s marriage court represented one of the major administrative innovations of the city’s reformation. Lyndal Roper has argued that its establishment “signaled an important shift in political power within the city itself from guild to Council.”83 Accordingly, the marriage court and its activities were closely linked to Augsburg’s magistrates. Only the Small Council could hear appeals of the court’s decisions,84 which made marriage another area of oversight for Augsburg’s secular authorities. For this reason, argues Roper, “the city never permitted clerical representation on the Marriage Court . . . nor did it regularly solicit the clergy’s advice.”85 While Augsburg’s council may not have gathered advice from its clergy concerning the regulation of marriage, it did consult other imperial cities about their systems of marriage law.86 In November 1538, Augsburg drafted a letter to Strasbourg, Nuremberg, and Ulm that described a conflict over the ability of an innocent party to remarry after a divorce. Since we do not trust ourselves very much in such difficult matters and wish to handle the affair as securely as possible, we present our official and friendly request that you reveal to us in writing your highly learned advice and judgment concerning your course of action in similar instances. Namely, can or should the innocent party be allowed to remarry after a divorce where the guilty party is still alive?87 83 84 85 86

87

Lyndal Roper, The Holy Household (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989), 71. Ibid., 62–3. Ibid., 70. Augsburg was not the only city to do so. In 1528, Ulm received advice from Nuremberg about a case where a husband killed his wife and her lover in flagrante. Roper, Holy Household, 72. This case predated the establishment of Ulm’s marriage court, but it reveals the willingness of urban magistrates to employ consultation in order to negotiate tricky questions of legal practice. For Nuremberg’s letter of advice, see J. Baader, “Nurnbergisches Rechtsgutachten uber die Ermordung zweier Ehebrecher zu Ulm im ¨ ¨ ¨ Kunde der deutschen Vorzeit NF 11 (1864): 134–6. Jahre 1528,” Anzeiger fur “wir unns dann inn so wichtigen sachen selbs nit zuviel trawen/ unnd on verlezung/ weniglichs soviel moglich hierinn dest sicherer hanndlen mogen/ so ist an eur flt unnser diennstlich unnd fruntlich bitt/ die wollen unbeschweret sein unns irer unnd derselben hochgelerten rate unnd gutbedencken/ auch wie es eur flt im solchen fall halten/ namlich ob nach beschehner Eeschaidung dem unschuldigen/ bei leben des verprechenden widerumb zuheyraten gestatt werde oder werde moge etc./ inn schrifften zueroffnen“ StadtA A, RA 576, 1538 November 4. On the back of the concept appears the following: “An Strassburg des Eegrichts halb. Ist nit ussgangen.” It is uncertain if this letter was ever sent. Regardless, Augsburg’s decision to draft such a letter shows its readiness to solicit advice from other cities in such matters.


105

Six years later in September 1544, Augsburg’s magistrates again petitioned advice from Nuremberg, Strasbourg, and Ulm. The council explained, so many diverse cases concerning marriage are occurring here that we have cause to revise our current ordinance to be more just. We present our friendly request that you notify us in writing whether you have printed laws in use regarding the degree of relation to which a person is allowed to marry his own relatives. We especially wish to know if you have encountered any cases where a widower wished to marry his dead spouse’s niece.88

Over the next several months, each council replied to Augsburg’s inquiry. Nuremberg explained it did not have a formal statement of marriage law, for the city had “adopted a middle way in such marital matters. When problems have arisen, we have sent the cases to our city court. . . . At the moment, we cannot remember adjudicating a case where someone wished to marry their dead spouse’s niece.”89 On October 25, Augsburg wrote Strasbourg thanking it for “the delivered written report about a specific case of marriage. We request that should you promulgate additional marriage laws, you send us a copy of these statutes at our own cost.”90 Ulm’s council informed its Eastern Swabian counterpart that “in our printed Christian ordinance there is an article that relates to your matter, and we have sent a copy of this article along with this letter.”91 The statute in question listed the blood relatives to whom marriage was forbidden, which included the niece of a dead spouse. In return, Ulm asked Augsburg “to send us a copy of your new marriage ordinance once you have brought it into effect.”92 In late 1544, Augsburg issued a supplement to its marriage law that outlawed several types of consanguineous marriages, among them 88

89 90 91 92

“sich tragen so mancherley fall ¨ inn Eesachen allenthalb zu/ das wir geursacht werden/ wege zesuchen/ wie bestenndige ordnung furzenemen sein moge/ die billichait darum zehandlen . . . bitten hieruff freuntlichs fleiss eur flt wollen unns inn schrifften berichten/ ob sie ussgedruckte geseze unnd mass im prauch haben/ wie weitt oder nahend ain yede person der plutfreundschafft halb zuheyraten zugelassen werde . . . inn sonnderhait auch ob eur flt wa es bei ine zum fallen kame zuliessen/ das ainer seiner verstorben ¨ ¨ Eewittin . . . schwester dochter zur Ee nemen mocht.” StadtA A, LitS RefA, 1544 September 6. StadtA A, LitS RefA, 1544 September 11. StadtA A, RA 576, 1544 Oktober 25. StadtA A, RA 582, 1544 Dezember 13. This letter sits in the LitS RefA under 1545 Dezember 13, but it appears to have been misdated. Its content is identical to a similar letter filed in the RA 582 under 1544 Dezember 13. Given the context of Augsburg’s advice gathering, the December 13, 1544, date appears to be correct.

106


marriage to a dead spouse’s niece.93 It appears Augsburg’s magistrates waited until after they received the three letters of advice to make a final decision on the matter. A December 15, 1544, letter from Augsburg’s council to its jurists states that the council, which “has written to other places for advice and has received those recommendations,” now sought “[the doctor’s] highly learned advice and consideration whether the accompanying counsel should be followed.”94 Augsburg’s solicitation of advice from Nuremberg, Strasbourg, and Ulm therefore played a central role in the city’s reform of its marriage laws. Augsburg’s magistrates did not wish to act without first conferring with other cities. The council’s revision of marital law sought to improve the regulation of marriage within the city, but external communication with other evangelical communes fundamentally influenced its course of action. At the same time that Augsburg’s council solicited advice on marriage legislation, it also initiated a reformation of its pay scale for preachers. The financial status of Augsburg’s preachers appears to have been precarious for some time. In 1539, four of the city’s clergy95 wrote the council asking for an “increase of our salary so we may pay off our debts.” If a permanent raise was not possible, the four men requested the council “give each assistant a loan of 20 fl. in order to help us out of our current debts.” The council loaned the supplicants the requested 20 fl. each, but it did not undertake a general reform of the clergy’s pay scale.96 The situation appears to have worsened, however, and in 1543–4, two of the city’s most prominent preachers – Johann Ehinger, preacher at St. Stephan, and Michael Keller, preacher at St. Moritz – brought petitions about their poverty and indebtedness before the town’s magistrates. The council granted each preacher a special bonus,97 but after persistent complaints 93 94 95

96 97

The original 1537 ordinance outlawed this as well. Roth, Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 2, 357 and vol. 3, 181. StadtA A, LitS Nachtrage, 1544 Dezember 12. This piece of correspondence is filed ¨ under 12 Dezember, but it is dated 15 Dezember. Wolfgang Haug, Jakob Dachs, Caspar Huber, and Johann Mockhardt signed the docu¨ ment. At the time, Haug was the Verweser of Holy Cross, Dachs the Helfer at St. Ulrich, Huber the Helfer at the cathedral, and Mockhardt the Helfer at St. Moritz. Roth, Augs¨ burgs Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 3, 197, 537–44. Quoted in Roth, Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 3, 197. Ehinger received 150 fl. from the council in March 1543, and Keller received 100 fl. in April 1544. Neither of these bonuses appears to have offset the preachers’ financial difficulties for very long. StadtA A, Ratsprotokolle (Hereafter RP), 27 Marz ¨ 1543, 23 April 1544, and 14 August 1544. See also Roth, Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 3, 196–7.


107

from the two men, the magistrates decided to reorganize “what and how much each preacher should be paid in the future according to his status or number of children.”98 Immediately upon deciding to reform its payment of preachers, Augsburg wrote for advice to its Three Cities’ allies Nuremberg and Ulm. In an August 16, 1544, letter, Augsburg’s council informed its counterparts that “since these expensive times have not slackened, it is that much more difficult to maintain preachers and ministers. For this reason, we have decided to look for ways to support our church and school workers so in an emergency, such people are cared for and there is no damage done to the word of God, which they serve.” Augsburg asked its neighbors “to reveal to us roughly how much you pay your pastors, chaplains, or assistants so we can negotiate with our clergy and create a proper ordinance based on your practices.”99 Ulm and Nuremberg responded a few days later. Nuremberg explained “each chaplain is given 150 fl. per year and a suitable place to live. Concerning the preachers there is an amount of variety. Some receive 150, some between 200 and 300 fl. This results from the fact that we decided early on to grant a higher salary to those who display more ability than others.”100 Ulm informed Augsburg that “besides housing, the licentiate Martin Frecht receives 250 fl. per year; another preacher, who besides the Sunday sermon offers other important help, receives 200 fl. per year; the two men who give the weekday sermons receive 150 fl. and 140 fl.

98 99

100

StadtA A, RP, 16 August 1544. “es fugt sich das . . . die theure leuffd unnd zeitten nit nachlassen unnd dadurch die predicanten und kirchendiener clagbar unnd destschwerer zu underhalten werd derwegen wir geursacht uff mittl zugedencken wir bemelten kirchen und schuldiener/ dermassen zu underhalten damit solche personen zur notdorff fursehen werden unnd den wortt gottis darin sie dienen konn (kein) anstossen widerfere/ zu solchen dest fueglicher zekumen”; “uns in veiteren anzezaigen/ wie hoch sie ire pfarrer caplen oder helffer . . . ungeferlich besolden/ uns mit den unsern auch zuhandlen und gebirliche ordnung furzunemen haben dornach zerichten.” StadtA A, LitS RefA, 1544 August 16. “wurdet ainem yeden Caplan . . . jerlich annderhalb hundert guldin unnd ain zimlich herberg geraicht . . . Der predicanten halben ist es gleichwol ain underschid haben der etliche hie zu annderhalb hundert/ zu zweyhundert auch darob bis inn drey hundert guldin/ welches aber auch allerley ursachen im anfanng gehabt/ das wir inn hohere besoldungen ganngen bey denen auch mer dann andern geschicklicheit gefunden.” StadtA A, RA 558, 1544 August 23. A copy of this letter also appears at Staatsarchiv Nurnberg (Hereafter StN), Reichsstadt Nurnberg (Hereafter Rst Nbg), Briefbucher Nr. ¨ ¨ ¨ 131, f. 231, 23 August 1544.

108


per year each.”101 Based on this advice, Augsburg issued a reformed pay scale for its clergy in September 1544. The council declared Wolfgang Musculus and Master Michael Keller, in their role as presidenten, shall be given 250 fl. in coin per year. The pastors at St. Ulrich, Holy Cross, the Franciscan church, St. Stephan, St. Georg, and the Hospital Church shall be given 200 fl. in coin per year. The three assistants at Our Lady, St. Moritz, and St. Ulrich shall be given 150 fl. in coin per year.102

The gradations of pay introduced by Augsburg’s council reveal remarkable similarities to those described by Ulm and Nuremberg. As in Ulm, the most senior preachers – in Ulm Frecht, in Augsburg Musculus and Keller – were paid 250 fl. each. The rest of Augsburg’s preachers were paid 200 fl. each, while their assistants received 150 fl. These are almost the exact salaries described by Ulm’s council, and they correspond closely to Nuremberg’s advice as well. It appears Augsburg’s council coopted the clerical pay scales of its two neighboring cities and adapted them to its own specific circumstances. It did so based on information that Nuremberg and Ulm supplied directly to Augsburg’s magistrates. In the process, Augsburg’s revision of its payment of preachers, an initiative meant to offset the financial difficulties of the city’s clergy, depended on guidance and examples procured from other imperial cities. Similar to its regulation of marriage, Augsburg’s council used consultation with neighboring communes to “create a proper ordinance based on [other cities’] practices.” Intercity consultation played a central role in Augsburg’s reformation. As the council’s revision of its clerical pay scale and marriage legislation shows, the advice of other cities offered reform models that could 101

102

“erstlich dem Licennciaten Frechten 250 fl. Item ainem anndern predicanten/ der neben ime die sonntaglichen predigen furnemblich hilfft vonsehen/ (. Wiewol sie beed zu ¨ anndern kichenndiensten auch verbunden.) 200 fl. Item zwayen denenn das predigenn inn der wochenn geburt ¨ dem ainen 150 unnd dem anndern 140 fl . . . . fur ¨ besolldung neben dem das si auch all mit behausungen versehen/ jarlichs gegeben werden.” StadtA ¨ A, RA 582, 1544 August 22. “herrn Wolffganng Muesslin und herrn maister Michel Keller als presidenten ir yedem inn sonderhait zwayhundert und funfzig gulden reinisch in munz geben werdenn . . . Den pfarrern zu sand Ulrich, zum Creuz, zum Parfussern, zu sannd Steffan, zu sand Georgen und dem im Spitall soll yedem in sonderhait jerlich . . . bezalt werden 200 gulden reinisch in munz . . . Den dreien helfern zu unser Frauen, zu sand Maurizen und zu sannd Ulrich, soll jedem in sonderhait jerlich ainhundert funfzig guldin reinisch in munz ¨ geben werden.” StadtA A, RP, 23 September 1544. This represented an increase of at least 50 fl. per year across the board. Roth, Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 3, 160.


109

lead to almost direct imitation by their recipient. Consultation provided Augsburg’s council with a framework for its own reform legislation by presenting an array of options already in place in other cities. In new situations brought on by the Reformation, Augsburg’s magistrates made use of traditional political tools to design their reform policies. In so doing, the council allowed its counterparts in other communes to influence Augsburg’s reform initiatives. Along with the work of preachers such as Martin Bucer, intercity consultation represented a powerful way for city councils to shape the Reformation in other imperial cities. Reform in Augsburg was not an exclusively top-down or bottom-up process. It evolved from a Negotiated Reformation where internal calls for reform found their realization through external guidance from the urban hierarchy. The story of urban reform in Eastern Swabia is complex and multivalent. Participation in alliances like the Three Cities’ and Schmalkaldic leagues allowed imperial cities to negotiate collective policies to defend religious reform in the regional and imperial arenas. On the local level, intercity communication networks enabled town councils to procure advice and evangelical clergy from other imperial cities. This proved crucial for the urban Reformation’s spread in southern Germany. In every Eastern Swabian city, the formal introduction of urban reform resulted in large part from the activity of preachers borrowed from other town councils. Whether temporary, long-term, or missionary preachers, evangelical clerics spread specific visions of reform that often derived from the style of reformation present in their home cities. This meant that magistrates and preachers alike sought actively to export their own local version of the Reformation. All these influences converged during the 1540s to shape the introduction of religious reform in Donauworth and ¨ Kaufbeuren. To differing degrees, Augsburg served as a model of reform for the two smaller communes, both of which received numerous preachers from their larger neighbor. For its part, Augsburg’s council hoped to use the spread of religious reform to increase its religio-political sphere of influence through the formation of new religious alliances. The negotiated nature of Donauworth and Kaufbeuren’s reformations lies in their ¨ attempts to manipulate and at the same time escape from Augsburg’s program of expansion.

4 ¨ The Urban Reformation in Donauworth

On March 26, 1545, the city council in Donauworth sent a delegation to ¨ its southern neighbor Augsburg. Drawing on the traditionally close ties between the cities, Donauworth’s magistrates sought Augsburg’s pro¨ tection against the arrival of Spanish soldiers. The troops, who were under Habsburg command, had been ordered to the Turkish wars in Hungary by King Ferdinand. On their way, they were scheduled to stop at Donauworth to board ships supplied by the local council. Donauworth ¨ ¨ possessed neither the funds nor the ability to accommodate the soldiers, and the council feared “should [the Spaniards] . . . receive word . . . [we] have recently introduced religious change, they will be inclined toward dangerous action against [our] city.”1 Augsburg’s council agreed to send a detachment of troops to protect its neighbor, despite Donauworth’s ¨ decision three weeks earlier to adopt reform modeled on Nuremberg rather than Augsburg. This action had directly contradicted the wishes of Augsburg’s magistrates and temporarily soured relations between the cities. In its time of need, however, Donauworth’s council apologized to ¨ its neighbor that it “has not followed your example in all things, most notably in the acceptance of free Christian teaching and the Gospel, as well as the outward ceremonies of the Church.” It had acted out of “great cautiousness,” but Augsburg’s magistrates remained its “dear sirs and fathers.” The council hoped “with time God may grant a better opportunity to act with less fear.”2 1 2

StadtA A, LitS Nachtrage, 1545 Marz ¨ ¨ 28. StadtA A, LitS Nachtrage, 1545 April 4. ¨

110

¨ The Urban Reformation in Donauworth

111

The movement of Spanish troops into Eastern Swabia marked one important juncture in a series of negotiations between Augsburg and Donauworth concerning Donauworth’s introduction of evangelical re¨ ¨ form. Beginning in 1538, Augsburg’s council urged its neighbor to accept the Augsburg Confession in order to facilitate Donauworth’s entrance ¨ into the Schmalkaldic League. At the same time, Augsburg’s magistrates sought to foster a reformation within Donauworth’s walls that followed ¨ Augsburg’s theological example. From the perspective of Augsburg’s council, converting Donauworth to an Augsburg-style reformation would ¨ deliver an important victory for the true form of the Christian faith. It also had the potential to solidify Augsburg’s influence over Donauworth, ¨ a crucial goal of Augsburg’s external policy that stemmed from Donauworth’s location on the Danube bridgehead, a major commercial ¨ and military objective that guarded the northern approach to Augsburg. For its part, Donauworth’s council desired political and military backing ¨ from Augsburg in order to protect itself against external attacks on its sovereignty. This concern drove much of its anxiety about the Spaniards. Accordingly, Donauworth’s council made its acceptance of the Reforma¨ tion dependent on Augsburg’s ability to ensure outside support for the city in a time of crisis. Both councils used confessional affiliation as a negotiating tool to achieve long-held political and religious goals. During the 1540s, intercity negotiation shaped the entire course of Donauworth’s reformation. Much as Augsburg and Ulm relied on Martin ¨ Bucer, Donauworth’s council depended on Wolfgang Musculus to lay ¨ the foundation for the city’s new evangelical church structure. Because it feared retaliation from the emperor and nearby Catholic territories, Donauworth also sought admission to the Three Cities’ League. When ¨ these efforts failed, Donauworth’s magistrates used the city’s strategic ¨ location as leverage to procure guarantees of military protection from Augsburg. The council did not wish to adopt evangelical reform without the firm support of neighboring imperial cities. Ultimately, the assistance and guidance of other communes, and most especially Augsburg, made the city’s formal introduction of reform possible. Donauworth’s refor¨ mation constituted a Negotiated Reformation based on regional patterns of consultation and religio-political influence that characterized urban reform across sixteenth-century Eastern Swabia. ¨ Patterns of Consultation: Augsburg and Donauworth As discussed in Chapter 1, Donauworth had a long history of orient¨ ing its religio-political policies toward the example of Augsburg. During

112


the 1530s, Augsburg played a particularly important role as a proxy for Donauworth’s interests at regional and imperial diets.3 The exact nature ¨ of their relationship on the eve of Donauworth’s introduction of the ¨ Reformation emerges from two instances of intercity correspondence in 1537–8. In January 1537, shortly before Augsburg’s abolition of the Latin Mass, Donauworth’s council wrote its neighbor for guidance in initiat¨ ing a “reformation of our statutes, old customs, and traditions. . . . Since we and our forefathers have emulated the statutes and ordinances of the praiseworthy city Augsburg in such affairs,” Donauworth hoped ¨ Augsburg would send a copy of its statute books to assist the council.4 Augsburg’s magistrates agreed to help Donauworth, “which we wish to ¨ council, the logical first show good neighborliness.”5 For Donauworth’s ¨ step in reforming its statute books was to seek advice from its larger neighbor. It hoped to secure Augsburg’s support, in the process obtaining external models to guide and legitimize its own magisterial initiatives. Conversely, Augsburg’s council wished to display “good neighborliness” to Donauworth. This emphasis on neighborliness appears through¨ out sixteenth-century urban correspondence, underscoring the significance of regional relationships among imperial cities. Its prevalent use as a social norm has led several scholars to examine how neighborliness operated in different contexts. Rolf Kiessling has described the importance of the neighborhood for the interaction of imperial cities with surrounding polities,6 while Pascale Sutter has asserted that neighborhoods played a central role in regulating relations among burghers in the late medieval period.7 In the context of the urban Reformation, Emily Fisher Gray has argued that within individual communities, “good neighborliness” served “as a standard on which the two competing confessions could negotiate the practical challenges of physical proximity.”8 This could occur on the regional level as well, as the invocations of neighborliness in Augsburg’s correspondence with Bavaria and the bishop of Augsburg imply. Between imperial cities, however, good neighborliness was not limited to 3 4 5 6 7 8

See Chapter 1. StadtA A, RA 571, 1537 Januar 13. StadtA A, RA 571, 1537 Januar 18. Rolf Kiessling, “Die ‘Nachbarschaft’ und die ‘Regionalisierung’ der Politik,” in Europa 1500, eds. Winfried Eberhard and Ferdinand Seibt (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1986), 262–78. ¨ Pascale Sutter, Von Guten und Bosen Nachbarn. Nachbarschaft als Beziehungsform im ¨ ¨ spatmittelalterlichen Zurich (Zurich: Chronos, 2002). Emily Fisher Gray, “Good Neighbors: Architecture and Confession in Augsburg’s Lutheran Church of Holy Cross 1525–1661” (Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 2004), 13.


113

matters of religious reform or confessional conflict. Rather, it signified the importance of regional support networks to the introduction of any type of reform, religious or secular. On the intercity level, good neighborliness served less “as a principle of [confessional] coexistence”9 than as an acknowledgement of the interdependencies that linked cities together. For Augsburg’s council, good neighborliness meant it had a responsibility to aid Donauworth in its statute reform. Its willingness to do so ¨ reveals Augsburg’s desire to take an active role in the internal political circumstances of its smaller neighbor. In May 1538, Donauworth again sought guidance from Augsburg. In ¨ a letter from Donauworth’s Secret Council to its Augsburg counterpart,10 ¨ Donauworth explained that only the abbot and three priests remained in ¨ the city’s Holy Cross monastery. The monks could no longer “hold or complete the number of Masses commissioned from the cloister,” and the council hoped “the cloister’s income [could] revert to the common good and welfare of the city and be used for this purpose.” Donauworth’s ¨ magistrates, however, were unsure how to achieve this goal, since the abbey sat under the bishop of Augsburg’s protection. They therefore wrote Augsburg’s magistrates as those from whom we receive trustworthy counsel, help, and support, how and where these actions might be executed so this cloister’s goods, income, and rents shall be given to our poor hospital. We do this in order to further God’s honor, to eliminate the abuses that have arisen against His Godly word, and to support actions that redound to the benefit of our fellow Christians.

Donauworth sought such aid from Augsburg’s council “since our fore¨ fathers and we have now and always received true help and advice from you and your forefathers in matters concerning our city. We place greater trust in you than anyone else in the Empire. We have never found you to be anything but our especially dear sirs and fathers.”11 Augsburg’s council warned Donauworth that dissolving the monastery ¨ was a dangerous move that “could lead to difficulties with the princes and authorities in whose jurisdictions the monastery’s goods lie. The same danger and trouble exists that the emperor, the king, or their aides 9 10

11

Ibid., 39. In 1536–43, a Secret Council (Geheimer Rat) under the leadership of Wolfgang Rehlinger replaced the Council of Thirteen in Augsburg’s government. Roth, Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 2, 286–7, 302; Sieh-Burens, Oligarchie, 30. StadtA A, LitS, 1538 Mai 21

114


could get involved in this matter.” Without “the proper Christian preparation either through an inventory of goods or other method,” any hostile actions against the cloister could serve as an excuse for surrounding Catholic territories to threaten the city. Donauworth’s council should ¨ bide its time, applying pressure “so in the meanwhile, if the abbot decides that he wishes to leave his post in order to escape a disagreeable wind (widerwertigen windt), we believe you would be able to accomplish your goal in a legal, efficient manner.” In order to facilitate this change, Augsburg’s council voiced its readiness to send Donauworth an evangelical ¨ 12 preacher. Ultimately, Donauworth abandoned its plans to dissolve Holy Cross, ¨ in part out of fear of Habsburg retaliation. Shortly after consulting with Augsburg, Donauworth’s council received a letter from King Ferdinand ¨ that threatened political consequences for the city if it adopted the Reformation. The city’s magistrates responded by reaffirming their allegiance to the Catholic Church and promising to expel anyone who adhered to evan1538 correspondence with gelical beliefs.13 Nevertheless, Donauworth’s ¨ Augsburg established several leitmotifs that recurred throughout the later negotiations over Donauworth’s official introduction of religious reform. ¨ Both councils stressed Donauworth’s tenuous relationship with its territo¨ rial neighbors. The city’s desire to avoid a confrontation with the bishop of Augsburg or Ferdinand, along with Augsburg’s prescient concern over possible interference by the emperor or other Catholic powers, highlight the importance of external political considerations to Donauworth’s ¨ decision-making process. Donauworth’s location amid numerous territo¨ rial states threatened to separate it from other urban centers, a major concern of the local council since the 1458–62 Bavarian occupation. In the regional political context of Eastern Swabia, one of the few strategies available to the city was to seek Augsburg’s assistance and protection. Augsburg’s response to Donauworth offers the first indication that ¨ its council wished to use evangelical reform to draw Donauworth ¨ into a closer religio-political relationship. While the council warned Donauworth against dissolving the monastery, it did so because the city ¨ lacked the “proper Christian preparation.” An evangelical pastor from Augsburg could correct this situation, since the way to eliminate false

12 13

StadtA A, LitS, 1538 Juni 1. See also Roth, “Beziehungen,” 170–1. Konrad Hel composed Augsburg’s response. Roth, “Beziehungen,” 155; von Steichele and Schroder, Das Bisthum Augsburg, vol. 3, ¨ 723–4.


115

belief and clerical abuses was “through a Christian preacher who does not concern himself with his own desires or temporal affairs, but seeks only salvation and God’s honor.”14 Coming but a year after Augsburg’s adoption of full-scale religious reform, this offer to lend Donauworth ¨ a preacher points to the long-term goals magistrates in Augsburg held toward their smaller neighbor. As early as 1538, Augsburg’s council sought to promote religious reform in Donauworth under the guidance of ¨ one of its clerics. Its insistence that Donauworth adopt reform based on ¨ Augsburg’s model occupied a central place in their 1544–6 negotiations. Following the abortive attempt to dissolve Holy Cross, Donauworth’s ¨ council refrained from introducing official religious reform until late 1544. This delay resulted primarily from the cautious nature of the council, which remained under pressure from surrounding Catholic authorities to stay loyal to the Catholic Church. At the command of the bishop of Augsburg, the city even expelled several evangelical sympathizers in 1543.15 At the same time, Augsburg’s suggestion that Donauworth’s ¨ magistrates implement religious reform under the guidance of an Augsburg pastor crystallized into a formal plan to foster religious reform in Donauworth in preparation for the city’s inclusion in the Schmal¨ kaldic League. In a November 1543 letter to Philip of Hesse, Georg Frolich argued that if the Schmalkaldic chiefs “promised [Donauworth] ¨ ¨ acceptance into the Schmalkaldic League in such a way that the city would not be burdened by the endeavor . . . it would make the citizens take heart and encourage them to carry out God’s work.”16 In another letter to Philip, Frolich emphasized Donauworth’s importance to the ¨ ¨ League: “Donauworth is an imperial city . . . that lies six small miles from ¨ Augsburg and sits on a Danube bridgehead the likes of which the evangelicals do not possess. The city stands in good trust with Augsburg. . . . Your lordship can well imagine what a heroic deed it would be” if one could incorporate the city into the alliance.17 In these two letters, Frolich made a forceful argument for Donau¨ worth’s strategic importance. The city was especially significant for ¨ 14 15 16 17

Quoted in Roth, “Beziehungen,” 170. Ibid., 155–6. ¨ Quoted in Max Lenz, ed., Briefwechsel Landgraf Philipp’s des Grossmuthigen von Hessen mit Bucer, vol. 3 (Osnabruck: Zeller, 1965), 498. ¨ Quoted in Lenz, ed., Briefwechsel, vol. 3, 499–500. See also Kiessling, “Musculus,” 141. The “six small miles” are sixteenth-century miles, which were considerably longer than modern miles. Donauworth is located approximately thirty-five kilometers north ¨ of Augsburg.

116


Augsburg, which bordered on primarily Catholic territories controlled by Bavaria, the bishop of Augsburg, and King Ferdinand. Augsburg was isolated militarily from its Schmalkaldic allies, and much of the city’s north-south mercantile traffic flowed over the Danube bridgehead. Donauworth’s entrance into the League would have provided Augsburg ¨ with an important outpost to its immediate north that could protect its commercial and military interests. In pursuit of this goal, Augsburg’s council sought to use religious reform to expand its religio-political sphere of influence northwards to the Danube. Accordingly, Augsburg’s council continued to promote Donauworth’s interests at imperial and regional ¨ assemblies throughout the early 1540s. In 1543–4 alone, Augsburg represented Donauworth at three imperial diets and four regional diets.18 ¨ Its efforts proved effective. Under Frolich’s leadership, Augsburg’s coun¨ 19 In September cil negotiated a reduction of loan rates for Donauworth. ¨ 1544, it also helped Donauworth pay its war levy against the Turks.20 ¨ Donauworth’s magistrates accepted such favors willingly, and these mea¨ sures occurred in part at their request. A pattern of consultation between the two cities tied Donauworth’s external policies and its political welfare ¨ to the support of its southern neighbor. Donauworth needed Augsburg’s ¨ assistance, while Donauworth’s loyalty remained indispensable to Augs¨ burg’s long-term goals in Eastern Swabia. The Mission of Wolfgang Musculus The death of Donauworth’s Catholic preacher Matthaus ¨ ¨ Schmid offered the immediate impetus for the local council’s December 1544 decision to pursue religious reform. Other political and religious considerations almost certainly played a role as well. The city’s evangelical community had grown in size since 1538, and only the cloister church at Holy Cross continued to celebrate the Latin Mass.21 This placed pressure on Donauworth’s council to regulate the new religious practices present in ¨ the city. The recess of the 1544 Imperial Diet of Speyer, which extended the 1532 Truce of Nuremberg and stated “no estate should force another 18

19 20 21

See StadtA A, LitS 1543–4. The diets were the 1543 Imperial Diet at Nuremberg, the 1544 Imperial Diet at Speyer, the 1544–5 Imperial Diet at Worms, a 1543 Urban Diet in Frankfurt, a 1543 Kreistag in Reutlingen, a 1544 Kreistag in Ulm, and a 1544 Urban Diet in Speyer. StadtA A, RA 571, 1544 Januar 8. StadtA A, RA 571, 1544 September 3. Roth, “Beziehungen,” 155–8.


117

estate to its religion,”22 may have also affected the council’s openness to decision to pursue a formal reformation of its reform.23 Donauworth’s ¨ churches appears to have resulted both from internal support for evangelical ideas and external political developments that influenced the council’s readiness to act. The tension between these two considerations shaped the development of the city’s reformation throughout the ensuing years. Similar to its behavior in 1537–8, Donauworth solicited guidance from ¨ Augsburg immediately upon deciding to introduce a religious reformation. In a December 22, 1544, letter, Donauworth’s council explained it ¨ had until now refrained from accepting the Christian religion for two reasons. First, we accepted and sealed the recess of the Diet of Augsburg and hoped, in accordance with this and subsequent recesses, that a general church council would meet to heal the schism. Second, we feared that if we gave ourselves to God’s word, this action would bring us into disrepute with the emperor and king, especially since we have until now received no backing or support.24

It now appeared “the settlement in religious matters will continue to be delayed.25 Since our preacher died a few days ago,” Donauworth’s ¨ council petitioned Augsburg’s magistrates as its “especially dear sirs and fathers” to lend the city “an honorable, god-fearing, learned preacher.”26 Donauworth’s council also reminded its counterpart how it had “nego¨ tiated with you several years ago regarding whether we might be incorporated into an understanding or alliance with you and the two honorable cities Nuremberg and Ulm. At the time, this did not come to be,” but Donauworth’s magistrates still “wish to enter into a league ¨ or alliance with these three honorable cities.” Accordingly, Donauworth ¨ asked Augsburg’s council if it “believed it advisable to give your delegates 22 23 24

25 26

Bernd Christian Schneider, Ius Reformandi (Tubingen: Mohr, 2001), 118–20, quote at ¨ 119. Augsburg represented Donauworth in Speyer. In June 1544 it forwarded the diet’s recess ¨ to Donauworth. StadtA A, LitS, 1544 Juni 24. ¨ “wir uns mit annemung der Christenlichen Religion bisher enthalten haben/ aus zwaien ursachen. Erstlich das wir den Augspurgischen Reichsabschid angenomen und besigelt/ und guter hofnung gewest seien/ es solte laut und desselben und anderer seidher ergangen Reichsabschiden/ ain Cristenlich Concilium gehalten und die Zwispalt vergleichen worden sein. Zum andern/ wo wir uns zum Wort Gotes begeben/ uns mochte sollichs bey ¨ Kay. Und Kon. Mte. Zu ungnaden und nachthail gelangen/ in bedenckung/ das wir sonst bisher kainen Rucken oder trost gehabt haben.“ StadtA A, RA 571, 1544 Dezember 22. This statement likely refers to the 1544 Diet of Speyer’s decision to postpone discussion of a religious settlement until a future general council. StadtA A, RA 571, 1544 Dezember 22.

118


at the upcoming Urban Diet in Ulm the command to negotiate this issue with the delegates from Ulm and Nuremberg, or if the council preferred to write these councils directly about the matter.”27 If it received admission to this alliance, implied Donauworth’s council, it would finally have ¨ the “backing and support” it needed to proceed unhindered with reform. This December 22 letter lays out the official rationale for Donauworth’s decision to adopt the Reformation. It reflects the cautious nature ¨ of Donauworth’s council, as well as its desire to secure external sup¨ port from neighboring cities. Such backing was important for all south German imperial cities, especially for smaller communes like Donauworth ¨ that were vulnerable to encroachment from adjoining territorial states. To protect itself against this possibility, Donauworth hoped to use the intro¨ duction of religious reform to gain admission to the Three Cities’ League, which it had previously tried to join in the mid-1530s. This application had failed, most likely due to Nuremberg’s opposition to the league’s expansion.28 By using its acceptance of evangelical reform as leverage, Donauworth’s council tied its adoption of Augsburg-style reform and the ¨ Augsburg Confession to its neighbor’s ability to procure Donauworth’s ¨ entrance into the regional urban alliance. One notable aspect of Donauworth’s letter concerns its formula of ¨ address. During the first half of the sixteenth century, the formula of address in intercity correspondence usually followed a standard pattern: “our friendly willing service we present to you, our deliberate, prudent, and wise especially dear sirs und friends.”29 In its December 22 letter, however, Donauworth’s council addressed Augsburg three times not as ¨ “our dear sirs and friends,” but as “our dear sirs and fathers.” This phrase also appeared in the May 1538 letter from Donauworth to Augsburg.30 ¨ 27 28

29 30

StadtA A, RA 571, 1544 Dezember 22. At the start of 1534, the three cities discussed expanding the league. While Augsburg and Ulm argued for the inclusion of smaller imperial cities, Nuremberg refused. From Nuremberg’s perspective, the admission of smaller cities meant greater responsibilities with little hope of reciprocation. G. Schmidt, “Die Haltung des Stadtecorpus,” 218. ¨ This represented the same rationale Augsburg advanced against the creation of a general urban military league in 1525. “Unnser fruntlich willig dinst zuvoran/ fursichtig ersam und weis besonder lieb herren ¨ und frundt.” This specific formula comes from StadtA A, LitS, 1542 June 6. “unsern sondern lieben herren und vattern.” The phrase appears in two other letters ¨ Donauworth sent to Augsburg in 1544. In both instances, Donauworth’s council sought ¨ ¨ financial gain through Augsburg’s service as a negotiator. See StadtA A, LitS 1544 Januar 8, where Donauworth asked Augsburg to negotiate with the Palatinate concerning loans ¨ the city took out in the 1530s. Also see StadtA A, LitS, 1544 September 3, where Donauworth asked Augsburg to pay Donauworth’s share of the Turkish war levy. ¨ ¨


119

In a 1997 essay, Rolf Kiessling conjectured that the use of this different formula might have been intentional. By striking a more deferential tone, Donauworth’s council may have tried to curry favor with Augsburg by ¨ addressing it as a superior and expressing Donauworth’s dependence on ¨ it.31 In the correspondence preserved in the Augsburg city archive, this phrase appears in ten of ninety letters written by Donauworth to Augs¨ burg from 1535–50. In each instance, Donauworth’s council employed ¨ the deferential formula when asking its neighbor for important financial, religious, or military assistance. It never utilized this phrase when writing to other large cities such as Ulm or Nuremberg. From the context of the surviving correspondence, it appears Donauworth’s council ¨ manipulated the formula of address in several of its letters to Augsburg in order to play on its neighbor’s sense of paternalism and kinship. In so doing, Donauworth hoped to persuade Augsburg to intervene on the ¨ city’s behalf by acting as its protector. Donauworth’s request for a preacher from Augsburg corresponded ¨ with Augsburg’s own goal of fostering evangelical reform in neighboring cities. Augsburg’s magistrates expressed “heartfelt joy” at Donauworth’s ¨ decision to introduce the Reformation. They promised to send one of their most prominent preachers, Wolfgang Musculus, “to lay a foundation for this praiseworthy Christian undertaking.”32 Regarding Donauworth’s ¨ admission to the Three Cities’ League, however, Augsburg’s council was more circumspect. It suggested “[Donauworth’s council] should write ¨ Nuremberg and Ulm for their advice on the matter. You should inform the two councils of your movement toward the Christian religion and your desire to enter the league. You should then see what they say is the best course of action.”33 Musculus arrived in Donauworth on December 27. In his first meet¨ ing with the council, the preacher explained he wished “to preach everyday and three times on Sunday.” The council agreed, but after the meeting, Donauworth’s city secretary, Jorg ¨ ¨ Tettenrieder, informed Musculus “it would not be prudent to preach during Vespers on Sunday, for that is the time we sit together and drink wine.” This halfhearted approach to reform surprised Musculus, who urged the council “to examine, as much as is currently possible, the reform of baptism, marriage blessings, regulation of morals, schools, and other similar 31 32 33

Kiessling, “Musculus,” 135. StadtA A, RA 571, 1544 Dezember 26. StadtA A, RA 571, 1544 Dezember 24

120


issues.”34 The council’s reticence in this initial meeting marked the first of several instances of unexpected resistance Musculus encountered during his time in the city. Despite its petition to Augsburg, Donauworth’s coun¨ cil remained divided on the question of religious reform. The office of mayor, which in Donauworth was held by two officials, typified this dis¨ cord. While one mayor, Hans Bucher, displayed evangelical tendencies, the other mayor, Kaspar Manser, remained a supporter of the Catholic Church. The practical implications of this internal divide appeared from the moment Musculus arrived. Rather than receive an official welcome from Donauworth’s magistracy, which was standard practice for greet¨ ing dignitaries from another city, Musculus was met by Bucher alone. It was in this fractured and cautious context that Musculus sought to sway Donauworth’s citizenry to Augsburg’s reform model.35 ¨ Musculus recognized the thin margin of official support for reform in Donauworth. He sought to combat this hesitancy in several ways. He ¨ assured the city leaders that Augsburg’s council was “especially favorable toward and willing to help” in Donauworth’s reformation. He also began ¨ to preach the principles of Augsburg’s reform style, especially its views on baptism and marriage, to which “the common people have responded so enthusiastically that the council members are astounded.”36 Indeed, Musculus’s popularity with Donauworth’s burghers increased pressure on ¨ the magistrates to initiate official religious reform, but the divided nature of the council ensured this process proceeded slowly and cautiously. The council continued to tie full acceptance of the Reformation to the political support it would gain through admission to the Three Cities’ League. Musculus realized this, and he lobbied his home council to secure such protection for Donauworth. While the common folk ¨ are diligent and eager . . . it is clear to me that [Donauworth’s magistrates] seek ¨ support from the three cities. If they gained such backing, I believe they would devote themselves to godly matters. If they were to reach an agreement with the three cities, it would encourage them to decide what ceremonies they wish to introduce in their churches. This needs to happen before they eliminate the Papal church and begin to look for pastors, for if they decide to introduce Nuremberg’s ceremonies, there are not many who could serve them.37 34 35

36 37

Musculus to Georg Herwart, December 28, 1544. Quoted in Roth, “Beziehungen,” 174. Roth, “Beziehungen,” 172–88; Simon Xalter, “Wolfgang Musculus und die Reformation in Donauworth. Sein Wirken als Prediger vom Dezember 1544 bis Marz ¨ ¨ 1545,” Jahrbuch ¨ Augsburger Bistumsgeschichte e.V. 25 (2001): 67. des Vereins fur Musculus to Herwart, December 28, 1544. Quoted in Roth, “Beziehungen,” 174. See also Xalter, 68–9. Musculus to Herwart, January 16, 1545. Quoted in Roth, “Beziehungen,” 176.


121

Musculus’s apprehension that Donauworth might introduce a refor¨ mation modeled on Nuremberg highlights one of the main concerns he shared with his home council. Donauworth sat between areas influenced ¨ by Augsburg’s more austere variant of the Reformation and territories inclined toward Nuremberg, whose reformation had important connections to Wittenberg.38 These two reform styles practiced different church ceremonies, disagreed concerning the role of images in worship, and held divergent views on the sacraments.39 Most importantly, Augsburg’s reform differed from Nuremberg on the nature of the Eucharist, which led to considerable tension between Augsburg and Wittenberg in the early 1530s. The 1536 Wittenberg Concord had tentatively settled these issues, but Eucharistic practice in Augsburg continued to privilege a more symbolic reading of the Eucharist than practice in Nuremberg did. As a unit, Augsburg’s preachers emphasized the mystery of the sacrament. They recognized Christ’s true presence in the bread and wine, but they did not accept Luther’s formulation of a real presence “in, next to, or by the bread.” In Augsburg’s Eucharist, therefore, Christ’s body was not physically present, but neither was it merely a symbol of his covenant. According to the city’s clerics, their formulation was “neither Lutheran nor Zwinglian . . . but the simple teaching of our Lord, Jesus Christ.”40 It was this Eucharistic understanding, in line with certain interpretations of the Wittenberg Concord but modeled on Augsburg’s specific practices, that Musculus sought to introduce in Donauworth. Its ¨ exportation to surrounding communities represented a central pillar of Augsburg’s program of expansion. A decision by Donauworth to adopt ¨ Nuremberg-style reform rather than Augsburg-style reform would jeopardize Augsburg’s attempts to solidify its religio-political influence over the city. Since Nuremberg did not belong to the Schmalkaldic League, Donauworth’s orientation toward the Franconian city might also pre¨ vent Augsburg from incorporating Donauworth into the Schmalkaldic ¨ League. Accordingly, Musculus believed “my goal is to establish our church practices in such a way that [Donauworth] does not resort to ¨

38 39

40

On these connections, see Irmgard Hoss, “Melanchthon: Wittenberg und Nurnberg,” ¨ ¨ ZBKG 53 (1984): 19–32; Wandel, The Eucharist, 122–4. Ford, “Unter dem schein,” 123–6. For a comparision of the Reformation’s development in Augsburg and Nuremberg, see Heal, Cult of the Virgin Mary; Gottfried Seebass, “Augsburg und Nurnberg – ein reformationsgeschichtlicher Vergleich,” in Wolfgang ¨ Musculus und die oberdeutsche Reformation, eds. Rudolf Dellsperger et al. (Berlin: Akademie, 1997), 91–110. Wandel, The Eucharist, 46–93, quotes at 78 and 89. The quoted translations are Wandel’s.

122


the use of Nuremberg’s ceremonies.”41 In order to facilitate his mission, “[Augsburg] should encourage [Donauworth] not to introduce any half ¨ reforms, but instead to model its religious practices on those of Augsburg and Ulm, both of which belong to the Christian League. We will then be able to supply them with advice, pastors, and support.”42 These statements reveal the fused nature of Musculus’s political and religious motivations in Donauworth. His main aim was to establish ¨ Augsburg-style reform in the city in order to minister religiously to the souls of Donauworth’s burghers. At the same time, Musculus sought ¨ to draw Donauworth closer politically to Augsburg in preparation for ¨ inclusion in the Schmalkaldic League. These goals were inseparable for Musculus and his home council. Donauworth’s potential introduction of ¨ Nuremberg-style reform, which ran counter to both objectives, therefore threatened the entire purpose of Musculus’s mission. Accordingly, in late January 1545, Musculus intensified his pressure on Donauworth’s ¨ magistrates to introduce Augsburg reform. He warned Bucher, the city’s evangelical mayor, that any more delay in reforming “holy baptism, the Lord’s Supper, and the blessing of marriages” could force “the common folk, who through God’s grace have been overcome by a love for the truth, to return against their consciences to the priests.” At Musculus’s insistence, Donauworth’s council held a plenary session devoted to the ¨ question of religious reform on January 30.43 The next day, the council introduced some of the reforms Musculus had suggested, authorizing “baptism and the blessing of marriages in German . . . but regarding the Lord’s Supper [it] made no decision. The council also refused to order the schoolmaster to prevent his students from singing during the papal Mass.”44 These “half reforms” resulted from the cautious nature of Donauworth’s council, which by the end of January had yet to receive word ¨ concerning its application for admission to the Three Cities’ League. Without a promise of political and military alliance from its neighboring cities, Donauworth refused to move forward with full-scale reform. ¨ Continued divisions among the city’s magistrates exacerbated the situation, especially the council’s reluctance to eliminate the Latin Mass. On February 21, Musculus complained that “this past week I preached on

41 42 43 44

Musculus to Herwart, January 28, 1545. Quoted in Roth, “Beziehungen,” 177. Musculus to Herwart, January 16, 1545. Quoted in Roth, “Beziehungen,” 176. Musculus to Herwart, January 28, 1545. Quoted in Roth, “Beziehungen,” 177. Musculus to Herwart, January 31, 1545. Quoted in Roth, “Beziehungen,” 178.


123

the Lord’s Supper and against the papal Mass so . . . the Large Council would have cause to undertake some measures against them. Nevertheless, I fear the Small Council is too faint-hearted and will not act against the Mass at this time.”45 A day later Musculus reiterated his frustration at the council’s indecision: “Yesterday and the day before yesterday I was told the Seventy, called here the Large Council, are greatly aroused against priestly works (pffafenwerck). The Small Council however is not courageous, nor is it unified.”46 In order to overcome this divide, Musculus sought to stoke enthusiasm for Augsburg-style reform among Donauworth’s burghers. This approach ¨ remained consistent throughout his stay in the city. It underscores how preachers could employ popular enthusiasm for reform to encourage magistrates to pursue specific reform agendas, both in their home city and elsewhere. In response to the council’s reticence, Musculus began to baptize and bless marriages according to our church’s form and usage, both of which arouse great interest and support among the people . . . [The council] has promised me I will be allowed to do the same with the Lord’s Supper. For this reason, I have started to deliver sermons about the Lord’s Supper, so the congregation will hear the truth about this practice as well.47

As part of this program of evangelization, Musculus composed a catechism for Donauworth that sought to distance the city from the ¨ theological influence of Nuremberg, most notably by introducing a Bucerian interpretation of the Eucharist.48 Musculus emphasized the symbolic importance of the Lord’s Supper, referring to the wine as “the draught of our spirits.” He called the Eucharist the “heavenly meal,” a term borrowed from Bucer, and encouraged Donauworth’s burghers to ¨ understand communion as spiritual nourishment, not the physical body and blood of Christ.49 This interpretation differed greatly from Eucharistic practice in Nuremberg, which emphasized the physicality of Christ’s presence in the sacrament.50 Its central place in Musculus’s efforts to win 45 46 47 48

49 50

Musculus to Herwart, February 21, 1545. Quoted in Roth, “Beziehungen,” 180–1. Musculus to Herwart, February 22, 1545. Quoted in Roth, “Beziehungen,” 181–2. Musculus to Herwart, February 10, 1545. Quoted in Roth, “Beziehungen,” 179. Ford, “Unter dem schein,” 124–5; Xalter, “Wolfgang Musculus,” 77. The catechism is dated February 18, 1545. According to Ford, Musculus’s decision to place the Decalogue after the Apostles’ Creed was significant in “breaking up Luther’s sharp distinction between Law and Gospel and demonstrating the usefulness of the Law as a guide for Christian living.” Ford, “Wolfgang Musculus and the Struggle for Confessional Hegemony,” 274. On Eucharistic practice in Nuremberg, see Wandel, The Eucharist, 121–33.

124


over the Donauworther reflects the importance of Eucharistic practice as ¨ a line of demarcation between different versions of evangelical reform. After several weeks, Musculus’s ministries succeeded in persuading both the Small and Large councils to issue an evangelical church ordinance on February 25. While Donauworth’s church ordinance sanctioned baptism and mar¨ riage in the vernacular according to Musculus’s example, it failed to abolish the Latin Mass. Instead, it stipulated that “the preacher and his assistant should distribute communion in both forms to those who desire it at a special altar established for that purpose,”51 a provision that led Musculus to accuse the council of “tolerating popery alongside Christ’s Gospel.”52 Sections of the document displayed an open reliance on Musculus’s theology, but the ordinance also represented a conscious attempt by Donauworth’s council to avoid appropriation of Augsburg’s reform ¨ model. This attitude surfaced again in the council’s decision to allow religious images to remain in the churches despite Musculus’s demands that “the images (tafel) on the altar be removed.”53 These decisions frustrated Musculus, who claimed “the community is not very pleased that the Mass will continue here. . . . Nevertheless, since the council has now unanimously decided to devote itself to God’s word, we must send it a pious, learned, and faithful man who can carry out and complete the Lord’s work here. . . . Otherwise everything that has accomplished will be lost.” The city had entered the critical phase of its early reformation, and “this matter, namely what kind of preachers the Donauworther ¨ receive, holds the highest importance for this church.”54 Musculus therefore advised his home council to ask Memmingen to transfer its preacher Hans Schalhaimer to Donauworth, for “if they do not receive preachers ¨ from churches that are similar to ours, it will force the Donauworther ¨ to accept someone from Nuremberg or Pfalz-Neuburg. Such a person, however, would burden this church with Nuremberger or Palatinate ceremonies.”55 51 52 53 54

55

StadtA A, RA 572, 1545 Marz ¨ 18. See also Xalter, “Wolfgang Musculus,” 74–6. Musculus to Herwart, February 25, 1545. Quoted in Roth, “Beziehung,” 182. Quoted in Xalter, “Wolfgang Musculus,” 78. Musculus to Jakob Herbrot and Hans Welser, February 26, 1545. Quoted in Hans-Jorg ¨ Kunast, “‘Khann nit dencken, das die vonn Werd lang bey den pfeltzischen Ceremonien ¨ bleiben’ – Neue Briefe zum Aufenthalt von Wolfgang Musculus in Donauworth im ¨ ¨ Donauworth ¨ Jahr 1544/45,” Mitteilungen des Historischen Vereins fur und Umgebung (2001): 11. Musculus to Herbrot and Welser, February 26, 1545. Quoted in Kunast, “‘Khann nit ¨ dencken,’” 12.


125

Musculus’s fears came true two weeks later. On March 10, Jorg ¨ Tettenrieder informed the preacher “the Small and Large councils decided together they wish to organize their church according to the Nuremberg style, so they might be in agreement with their neighbors in this matter.”56 The councilors asked Musculus “not to leave this church until someone else comes, so [we] are not robbed of God’s word in the interim.” Musculus made a final attempt to sway the council, explaining “there are many impurities in such [Nuremberg] ceremonies”57 and asking for a new altar to administer the Lord’s Supper, “so I do not have to stand before the altar with the Lord’s bread and drink at my back. . . . It would be better to have the altar, sacrament, and the people in front of me.”58 Donauworth’s ¨ magistrates responded coolly that “the council has resolved to make no alterations to the altars at this time.”59 The decision made, Musculus could do little to change the council’s mind. Eleven days later, a new preacher arrived in the city from Pfalz-Neuburg. Donauworth’s mayors ¨ thanked Musculus “on behalf of the council for my labor and hard work and offered me a horse or wagon, whichever I desired, to help me get home.”60 Why did Donauworth spurn Musculus and Augsburg by adopting ¨ reform modeled on Nuremberg? One possible answer lies in the council’s ambivalence to Musculus’s reform initiatives. Many magistrates in Donauworth appear to have regarded Augsburg’s reform as too aus¨ tere, especially Musculus’s call for frequent preaching and the removal of images from the churches. While he claimed to have found a receptive audience among the general populace, there is no indication of widespread support for Musculus’s ideas in the Small Council, which continued to house proponents of the Catholic Church. Musculus’s demands for religious austerity and his appeal to the common folk could have also made some councilors wary of the potential social implications of Augsburgstyle reform. In this fractious atmosphere, the more moderate formulations of Nuremberg-style reform, which Donauworth’s neighboring ter¨ ritorial states had also adopted, proved more attractive politically and spiritually to the city’s magistrates. 56 57 58 59 60

Musculus to Herwart, March 10, 1545. Quoted in Roth, “Beziehungen,” 186. Musculus to Herbrot and Welser, March 10, 1545. Quoted in Kunast, “‘Khann nit ¨ dencken,’” 14. Ibid., 13. Ibid., 15. Musculus to Herbrot and Welser, March 22, 1545. Quoted in Kunast, “‘Khann nit ¨ dencken,’” 17.

126


Another explanation lies in the negotiations surrounding Donauworth’s proposed admission to the Three Cities’ League. These discus¨ sions ended in failure for Donauworth, which was denied inclusion in the ¨ urban alliance. For Donauworth’s council, its inability to gain member¨ ship in the league meant it had to seek protection in a church structure that “agrees . . . with our adjoining neighboring princes,” most notably 61 ¨ This issue came to the fore in TettenPfalz-Neuburg and Ottingen. rieder’s discussion with Musculus on March 10, when the frustrated preacher asked, “Why, if you knew that Donauworth’s council would ¨ adopt Nuremberg’s ceremonies, did you call me here from Augsburg? Why did you not request a preacher from the Nuremberger?”62 The city secretary replied that if Musculus “had been able to produce the support that Donauworth’s magistrates desired, they would have taken it ¨ into consideration when deciding this matter.”63 For his part, Musculus was distraught that Donauworth acted “without my knowledge or ¨ advice. The community is not pleased that the council has accepted PfalzNeuburg’s ceremonies. I cannot believe they will stay true to them for very long.”64 Augsburg’s magistrates were every bit as distressed as their preacher was. They expressed consternation that Donauworth, “which has ¨ addressed us multiple times as a friend, even as a father,” had decided to introduce “ceremonies other than those of our church.” The councilors voiced their bewilderment since “[Donauworth] asked us to lend one of ¨ our learned Christian preachers. Even though our churches are lacking in pastors at this time, we fulfilled your request in order to further the good of your populace and council.” Furthermore, “your honor the council has seen that the longer Herr Musculus preaches in your city, the greater is the support for Augsburg’s ceremonies among your population. It is upsetting and wrong for you to undertake such a contrary action in so assured Augsburg that “for rash and hurried a manner.”65 Donauworth ¨ 61 62 63 64 65

StadtA A, RA 572, 1545 Marz ¨ 18. Musculus to Herbrot and Welser, March 10, 1545. Quoted in Kunast, “‘Khann nit ¨ dencken,’” 13. Ibid., 14. Musculus to Herwart, March 18, 1545. Quoted in Roth, “Beziehungen,” 187. “die uns fur freund ja auch fur vatter vielfeltes angesprochen”; “doruff uns auch eur wlt umb ainen christlichen gelehrten predicanten ainlehens weiss freundtlich und bietlich geschrieben unnd wiewol unsere kirchen dieser zeit mit diesen nit allerding fursehen/ so haben wir danach eur wlt unnd derselben Burgerschafft zu guten desgleichen der ern gottis und seiner kirchen zu hailbaren furdrung nit lassen sollen noch komen”; “nach den eur wlt gut zutrachten haben ye lenger herr Meussli in eur wlt stat prediger/ ye mehr den


127

ages, we and our forefathers have placed our hope, solace, and highest trust in your honor the council.” It expressed gratitude for the loan of Musculus, whose “teaching by us has been so effective and borne such fruit that we have been able to eliminate papal abuses in our churches and to allow the Gospel to be preached loud and clear.”66 Concerning their choice for Nuremberg reform, we never presented the matter to you in such a way that you would oppose our decision, as a small city, to pursue a middle way in reforming our visible church practices. We sincerely hope from our actions you do not perceive any affront, defamation, or disdain, but rather receive praise from good-hearted people and your reward from God the Almighty.67

In the end, Donauworth’s council argued it had little choice, since “our ¨ attempt to gain that which would have provided us with the greatest security (i.e., inclusion in the Three Cities’ League) has been denied. Therefore, as this city’s caretakers, we have decided to adopt a church order that agrees not only with our adjoining neighboring princes and lords, but also with other prince-electors, princes, and imperial cities.”68 Both councils pursued differing objectives in the negotiations over the Reformation’s introduction in Donauworth. Augsburg’s primary goal ¨ was the adoption of religious reform under its guidance in Donauworth ¨ en route to its neighbor’s entrance into the Schmalkaldic League. For this reason, Augsburg’s council sent Musculus to Donauworth, and his ¨ letters display an awareness of the fused political and spiritual aspects of his mission. Conversely, Donauworth desired outside protection against ¨

66 67

68

volkh die augspurgischen ceremonien eingepildt werden/ und allso destbeschwerdlicher durch ainen anden uff ain anders von zebringen/ zu dem das es argerlich und irrig ist so jhelige und schnelle und ting widerumb zuthun/ darumb und dhweil uns on das mangl in unser kirchen an dienern des worts zusteen will/ so hetten wir ursach gedachten herr Meussli wider abzefordern.” StadtA A, RA 572, 1545 Marz ¨ 11. StadtA A, RA 572, 1545 Marz ¨ 18. “so haben wir doch bey e f w die sachen nie dahin vermorckt/ das e f w wurde missfellig ¨ noch zewider sein/ so wir nach gestalt und gelegenhait/ unsers clainen stettlins/ in eusserlichen kirchen gebreuchen/ im anfang den mitteln weg/ an die hand nemen/ verhoffen ¨ auch das auss sollichem unsern vorhaben e f w weder schimpf/ nachrede/ noch verachtung sonder bey den gutherzigen menschen/ ain lob/ und bey Gott dem almechtigen Gott/ die Belanung gewarten und haben werden.” StadtA A, RA 572, 1545 Marz ¨ 18. “so ist unser ansuche und das jehing so uns zum hochsten hette mogen trostlich sein/ ¨ ¨ gewaigert worden/ derhalben wir alls die sorgfeltigen/ auss disen und andern mer beweglichen ursachen/ den anfang der kirchen ordnung/ nit allein unsern anstossenden genachbarten fursten und herrn/ sonder auch anderer mer Churfursten/ fursten und ¨ ¨ ¨ reichstotten kirche ordnungen/ gemess furgenomem.” StadtA A, RA 572, 1545 Marz ¨ ¨ 18.

128


the intrusion of neighboring territorial states. When Augsburg’s council failed to produce the support Donauworth desired, it opted for a style of ¨ reform practiced by its territorial neighbors. The introduction of religious reform in Donauworth did not simply result from agitation within the city ¨ walls. A variety of actors internal and external to the city itself negotiated Donauworth’s reformation, and they all exerted their own influences on ¨ the direction of urban reform. Historians often view Musculus’s time in Donauworth as a personal ¨ council for Nuremberg-style failure.69 The decision of Donauworth’s ¨ rather than Augsburg-style reform, however, stemmed less from shortcomings in Musculus’s ministries than the conservatism of the city’s magistrates. The council’s cautiousness and its unfavorable regional political context presented major obstacles for Musculus. He could not overcome them without the help of Augsburg’s council. In the short term, Musculus’s mission did fail, since it did not lead to Donauworth’s accep¨ tance of Augsburg reform or to the city’s admission to the Schmalkaldic League. These were Musculus’s express goals. In pursuing them, he acted as a knowing and willing emissary of Augsburg’s magistrates. The council did not instrumentalize him to serve its larger political objectives, as Simon Xalter has argued.70 On the contrary, Musculus’s own goals complemented those of his home council, but his attempts to establish Augsburg-style reform in Donauworth foundered on the local council’s ¨ unsuccessful attempts to secure military backing from nearby cities. The initial failure of Musculus in Donauworth should not be ascribed to the ¨ preacher. Donauworth’s decision to adopt Nuremberg reform resulted ¨ in large part from the inability, and in some respects unwillingness, of Augsburg’s council to procure its neighbor’s admission to the Three Cities’ League. ¨ Donauworth and the Three Cities’ League The tale of Donauworth’s reformation has traditionally been told from ¨ the perspective of Augsburg and its preacher. This represents but part of the story. At the same time that Musculus attempted to transform 69

70

See Kiessling, “Musculus”; Xalter, “Wolfgang Musculus”: “so kommt man zu einer negativen Einschatzung der Einflussnahme Musculus’ auf die Geschehnisse in Donauworth,” ¨ ¨ 88. “Er wurde, wie viele andere Pradikanten, in den Mechanismen reichsstadtischer Politik ¨ ¨ vom Augsburger Rat fur Interessen instrumentalisiert.” Xalter, ¨ die bundnispolitischen ¨ “Wolfgang Musculus,” 88–9.


129

Donauworth’s religious life from within, a series of negotiations occurred ¨ among the councils in Donauworth, Augsburg, Nuremberg, and Ulm ¨ regarding the city’s proposed admission to the Three Cities’ League. While the literature on Donauworth’s reformation focuses extensively on ¨ Musculus, the correspondence between the four cities has received very little attention. There is almost no mention of the internal debate within the Three Cities’ League over Donauworth’s application. These intercity ¨ negotiations played a pivotal role in Donauworth’s March 1545 deci¨ sion for Nuremberg reform. In many respects, the Three Cities’ League’s refusal to admit Donauworth was more decisive for the immediate reli¨ gious direction of the city than was Musculus’s activity. As Musculus discovered, the confessional orientation of Donauworth’s reformation ¨ depended as much on negotiations with surrounding cities as it did on internal dynamics. On January 11, 1545, two weeks after Musculus arrived in the city, Donauworth’s council formally petitioned Augsburg, Nuremberg, and ¨ Ulm for admission to the Three Cities’ League. The city’s magistrates explained that despite past hesitation, they had recently received Musculus, who “has preached by us for fourteen days, which has greatly pleased our community and us.” Nevertheless, Donauworth’s council remained ¨ “somewhat cautious and fearful concerning the elimination of the Mass and other papal abuses, mainly because we are not currently the member of an alliance, meaning we have no sure backing or support.” The council reminded its neighbors of its failed attempt to “enter your special alliance” in the mid-1530s. Since “the times in this unfaithful world have grown more dangerous and troubling, we again advance a friendly and confidential request. We ask you to show us your intentions regarding how and in what way we may gain acceptance by you and the other two cities.”71 In its petition to the three cities, Donauworth’s council drew a clear ¨ connection between its cautious approach to reform and its lack of external political support. Only concrete assurances of solidarity from its larger

71

“noch etwas sorgkfeltig unnd forchtsam/ mit angreyffung unnd abstellung der Mess unnd anndern Babstischen misspreuchen/ in erwegung unnd bedennckung das wir diser ¨ zeit in kainer ainung eingeleibt/ unnd also kainen rugken oder gewisen trost haben”; “in ir sonnder ainigung mochten kumen.”; “dann die leuffdt in diser ungetrewen welt ¨ ye lennger ye geschwynder unnd sorgklich seyen wir abermals bedacht derhalben ain freuntlich unnd vertreulich ansuchen zuthun unnd ist hierauff unnser gannz fleyssig bit e f w wollen unns ir gemuet ¨ ¨ hierinn zuerkennen geben/ ob unnd mit was gestalt wir bey eur f w unnd den anndern zwayen erbern steten einkumen mochten.” StadtA A, RA 558, ¨ 1545 Januar 11.

130


neighbors could help the magistrates overcome their apprehension about reforming the nature of Christian worship in their city. This line of argumentation sought to persuade the most powerful and influential cities in southeastern Germany that the future of Donauworth’s reformation ¨ depended on membership in the Three Cities’ League. The three cities proved less than enthusiastic. Nuremberg’s council expressed satisfaction at Donauworth’s adoption of the “pure word of God.” Regarding admis¨ sion to the Three Cities’ League, however, the Franconian magistrates did not give a definite answer, instead promising to consider the matter and “thereafter send you a proper response.”72 Ulm’s reply was similarly circumspect. Its council informed Donauworth that “while you desire to ¨ enter our Three Cities’ League, it would not be proper for us to reach a conclusion on the matter without the foreknowledge of our alliance members. We believe negotiations with Augsburg and Nuremberg . . . will begin shortly.”73 Nuremberg’s and Ulm’s reluctance to endorse Donauworth’s appli¨ cation likely stemmed from the same reason they had decided against incorporating smaller members during the 1530s: the three larger cities would have to protect Donauworth, while it would be unable to offer ¨ military or financial aid to the other communes. Accordingly, in a council session held on January 17, Nuremberg’s magistrates “considered the matter urgently and decided it would be difficult and too complicated to accept this or any other city into the alliance at this time.”74 In a subsequent letter to Augsburg and Ulm explaining its decision, Nuremberg’s council expressed surprise that Donauworth had come to it and Ulm ¨ with its request for admission. The city fathers in Nuremberg thought it more logical “[Donauworth] would have gone first to Augsburg as the ¨ foremost city, and that the matter would subsequently come to us from Augsburg.”75 Nuremberg’s description of Augsburg as the “foremost city” for Donauworth represents an acknowledgement within the Three Cities’ ¨ League that Donauworth sat in Augsburg’s sphere of influence and ¨ protection. Nuremberg’s council found it unusual Donauworth would ¨ write to it about such a matter without first conferring with Augsburg, since the Eastern Swabian metropolis guided Donauworth’s policies in ¨ 72 73 74 75

StadtA A, RA 572, 1545 Januar 13. StadtA A, RA 572, 1545 Januar 14. StN, Rst. Nbg., Verl. D. Inneren Rates, Nr. 978 F. 32v, 1545 Januar 17. “sie solten sollichs zuvor an [Augsburg] als die vordersten stat/ gelanngt/ unnd uns das zukumen sein.” StadtA A, RA 558, 1545 Januar 17.


131

so many other undertakings. Unbeknownst to Nuremberg’s magistrates, Donauworth had consulted Augsburg. It wrote to Nuremberg and Ulm ¨ on the basis of Augsburg’s advice, but Augsburg had informed neither of its allies of this consultation.76 Nuremberg was therefore correct to point out that Augsburg had not forwarded Donauworth’s membership ¨ petition to the other two cities. Indeed, behind closed doors, Augsburg’s council expressed a lack of confidence in Donauworth’s prospects. In a ¨ passage deleted from a December 24, 1544, letter to Donauworth, Augs¨ burg ’s council wrote “such a plan on your part (i.e., inclusion in the Three Cities’ League) could be seen as not very sensible.”77 From the start of negotiations, Augsburg’s magistrates doubted the practicality of Donauworth’s request. They did not support their neighbor’s application ¨ but sought to conceal this fact from Donauworth until after Muscu¨ lus had established Augsburg-style reform in the city. Once Nuremberg rejected Donauworth’s application officially, however, Augsburg had to ¨ rationalize the league’s decision in order to protect Musculus’s mission. Accordingly, Augsburg’s magistrates informed Nuremberg “our belief is Donauworth is not in the position to take on the great costs and respon¨ sibilities of an alliance. We believe Donauworth should be written swiftly ¨ in all three cities’ names.”78 Why did Augsburg agree to deny Donauworth’s admission to the ¨ Three Cities’ League, especially when the council recognized the importance of external political support to Donauworth’s reformation and ¨ wished to incorporate its neighbor into another alliance, the Schmalkaldic League? As noted above, Augsburg’s council doubted the practicality of Donauworth’s application. Nuremberg had denied a similar request in ¨ the 1530s. As a collective unit, the three cities had no reason to admit a smaller member who could not shoulder the alliance’s financial and military burdens. Augsburg’s magistrates also appear to have viewed Donauworth’s proposed admission with a degree of aversion. The Three ¨ Cities’ League was an alliance of equals. Augsburg, Nuremberg, and Ulm all exercised a comparable amount of political and economic power within and outside of the urban alliance. Donauworth was a much smaller ¨ and less prominent city. Its inclusion in the Three Cities’ League would not have drawn it into a more dependent religio-political relationship

76 77 78

StadtA A, RA 572, 1544 Dezember 24. “solch eur elt vorhaben vielleicht nit so hoch furstendig angesehen werden mocht.” StadtA A, RA 572, 1544 Dezember 24. StadtA A, RA 558, 1545 Januar 27.

132


with Augsburg. On the contrary, Donauworth’s admission would have ¨ placed it on equal footing with its “especially dear sirs and fathers,” at least within the structure of the regional urban alliance. Donauworth’s potential admission to the Three Cities’ League gave ¨ Augsburg’s magistrates pause for another reason. Membership in the urban alliance would have removed Donauworth’s motivation for joining ¨ the Schmalkaldic League. Its council sought external political support for its reform endeavors, and it had long coveted membership in the Three Cities’ League. If Donauworth gained the backing it desired in ¨ this regional urban league, it would have had little reason to take on extra responsibilities by joining the supraregional evangelical alliance. Its inclusion in the Three Cities’ League would therefore have undermined Augsburg’s attempts to expand its religio-political sphere of influence over its neighbor, as well as its attempts to incorporate Donauworth into ¨ the Schmalkaldic League. Unless it wished to sacrifice two of its primary regional goals in Eastern Swabia, Augsburg’s council could not allow its neighbor to join the Three Cities’ League. The different natures of the two leagues were crucial for Augsburg. If Donauworth came under attack while a member of the Three Cities’ ¨ League, Augsburg, Nuremberg, and Ulm alone would bear responsibility for defending it with little hope of reciprocation. As a member of the Schmalkaldic League, however, the burden of protecting Donauworth ¨ would belong to the entire alliance. Donauworth’s inclusion in the ¨ Schmalkaldic League would provide Augsburg with an important outpost to its north safeguarded by the combined might of the Schmalkaldic League’s estates. By denying Donauworth admission to the Three Cities’ ¨ League, Augsburg’s council hoped to force its neighbor to seek political support through a more dependent relationship with Augsburg and its allies in the Schmalkaldic League. In order to maintain Donauworth’s confidence in Augsburg’s guidance, ¨ however, the council had to justify its neighbor’s inability to enter the Three Cities’ League. After receiving Nuremberg and Ulm’s approval of “the gentle yet unmistakable refusal composed in the name of the three in early cities,”79 Augsburg forwarded a rejection letter to Donauworth ¨ 80 February. The three cities recognized “because of the current state of

79 80

Nuremberg to Augsburg, StadtA A, RA 558, 1545 Februar 3. For Ulm’s letter of approval, see StadtA A, RA 583, 1545 February 4. The exact date Augsburg sent the letter to Donauworth is unclear. Two nearly identical ¨ copies exist. The one in StadtA A is undated, while the version in the StN is dated


133

worldly affairs, you had good reason for concern and possessed sensible grounds for your desire to gain entrance to our alliance.” Nevertheless, “your honor the council should know that said alliance, out of specific reasons of state, is so narrowly defined and limited to us three cities, that the inclusion of additional estates or cities would lead to an imbalance that we cannot afford at this time.”81 The three cities reassured Donauworth, ¨ in our opinion, there is no need for you to worry because of the Christian religion, or to take on the costs of entering an alliance, since the current imperial declaration, suspension, and diet recesses forbid forceful action on the basis of religion. Additionally, the Gospel continues to establish itself in so many estates and cities in the Empire, many of which are not in an alliance, that to deal with the matter by the sword would lead to an unbearably high amount of violence and the destruction of the German Nation. If forcible action were taken against one or more evangelical cities because of their religion, it is unlikely the enemy would start with a small city. Rather, for obvious reasons, they would attack the strongest and wealthiest cities first.82

This final passage reflects Augsburg’s pursuit of its own religio-political goals in negotiations with Donauworth. While Nuremberg took the lead ¨ in rejecting the city’s admission to the Three Cities’ League, Augsburg seized the initiative in explaining this exclusion. Its council sought to persuade Donauworth’s magistrates that membership in the urban alliance ¨ was unnecessary for their introduction of religious reform. Imperial proclamations and diet recesses like the 1544 Diet of Speyer protected the city, argued Augsburg, while the additional costs of entering the Three Cities’ League would create a needless financial burden for Donauworth. ¨

81 82

February 4, 1545. It is unlikely the letter was sent to Donauworth on that day, however, ¨ since it was only on February 4 that Ulm returned the draft to Augsburg. The latest the letter would have been sent is February 10. StadtA A, RA 583, 1545 Februar 4. “unnsers erachtens von wegen den christlichen religion nit von noten sich zubesorgen/ ¨ oder inn Bunndtnus unnd cossten zubegeben/ dann die kayserlich declaration suspension/ und Reichs Abschid/ welche Obgotwill widerumb wa nit mit besserer fursehung/ doch inn vorigen wirrckhung zuerlanngen sein sollten/ alle thatliche hannderung der Religion halb meniglich verpieten/ so hat sich dass Evangely/ Gott lobe/ unnter sovil Stennde unnd Stett/ dem vil inn kainer Bundtnus seyen/ im hailigen Reich/ innsonderhait rings umb eur w statt aussgebrait/ unnd nach teglich mehrung vor augen/ das nit wol mennstlich/ one gannze zerruttung Teutscher Nation ichzit mit dem schwert one uberschwernchschliche grossen gewalt dargegen zehanndlen/ unnd wa gleich/ das Got gnedigclichen verhutten wolle/ ichzit thetliche wider ain oder mehr Evangelische Stett von der Religion wegen wolt furgenumen worden/ ist doch wenig zuvermuten/ das der anfanng mit ainiger clainen statt gemacht wurde/ ains ursachen die leichtlich zuerwegen/ griffe man dann die starckhen vermoglichen stett an.” StadtA A, RA 583, 1545 ¨ Februar 4.

134


This rationale posed the danger of pushing Donauworth away from the ¨ Schmalkaldic League as well, but Augsburg promised its neighbor that “if some difficulty presented itself to a city on account of religion or any other grounds, the free and imperial cities would unite together in the most loyal fashion and make one city’s problem a common concern for council should not waver out of fear, but rather all.”83 Donauworth’s ¨ should proceed with the introduction of Augsburg-style reform under Musculus’s guidance. Augsburg’s efforts at reassurance did not succeed. In the context of its failed attempt to join the Three Cities’ League, Donauworth’s refusal ¨ of Augsburg’s church practices signified a reaction against its neighbor’s inability to admit the city to the urban alliance. For Donauworth’s coun¨ cil, Augsburg’s reluctance to secure the city’s admission represented a breech of Augsburg’s role as Donauworth’s political representative. Since ¨ “our attempt to gain that which would have provided us with the greatest security has been denied,” Donauworth turned away from Augsburg ¨ toward religious reform modeled on Nuremberg.84 Musculus stood little chance of persuading Donauworth’s magistrates to adopt Augsburg-style ¨ reform without the political and military assurances of membership in the Three Cities’ League. When this proved impossible, Donauworth’s ¨ council sought security in confessional solidarity with its surrounding territorial states. The Spanish Breakfast Donauworth’s March 1545 decision for Nuremberg reform did not ¨ mark the final stage in the city’s introduction of the Reformation. In the ensuing months, Augsburg and Donauworth continued to negoti¨ ate the city’s confessional affiliation. The initial impetus for these discussions came from the spring 1545 movement of Spanish troops outside Donauworth. On March 26, two days after Musculus returned ¨ to Augsburg, Donauworth’s council sent a delegation to its neighbor ¨ 83

84

“die erbarn gemeine frey unnd reichstett . . . ob sich ichts beschwerlichs/ wider ainige statt/ von der religion oder ander ursach wegen zutringen . . . sy wurden zum trewlichsten zusamn sezen/ unnd einer yeden besonndern statt ir aller gemeine sach sein lassen.” StN, Rst Nbg, Rep. 61a, Nr. 133, fol. 65v. In this respect, my findings concur with Ford’s conclusion that “Donauworth could not ¨ know which direction it would take until its exclusion from the Three Cities’ League was conclusive,” although Ford does not consider the later developments in Augsburg’s relationship with Donauworth. Ford, “Unter dem schein,” 127. ¨


135

announcing the impending arrival of Spanish soldiers in Eastern Swabia. The city’s failure to gain entrance to the Three Cities’ League left it exposed to hostile action from the Spaniards, whose maneuvers triggered anxiety in both Catholic and evangelical territories. According to Musculus, the news that “several thousand Spaniards are rumored to be coming here [to Donauworth] . . . has aroused palpable fear in many citizens. I ¨ worry it could cause some hindrance.”85 Wilhelm, the Catholic duke of Bavaria, echoed these sentiments when he wrote Augsburg in early March expressing concern over the poor reputation of the Spaniards.86 Augsburg’s council expressed its willingness to cooperate with Bavaria on the matter, and it received a delegation from the duke in the hopes of forming a common policy.87 As a deterrent against the troops, Wilhelm mobilized his army. In addition, he requested the bridges crossing the Lech River outside Augsburg be taken down out of “good and generous neighborliness.”88 Augsburg informed Wilhelm that the Spaniards were “not very strong in their own right, but their leaders have drafted numerous wanton persons. Their numbers have grown to around 4,000.” Nevertheless, the city council did not see the need to pull down the Lech bridges, since this would cause irreparable damage to the mercantile traffic that passed over the river.89 Conveniently for Bavaria, it also would have trapped the Spaniards on Augsburg’s side of the river. Wilhelm explained he wished to bring down the bridges solely to ensure “the Lech bridgehead is not free and open, forcing the Spaniards to take another way.” In respect of Augsburg’s protestations, he was “willing at this time to delay such action until a later occasion and necessity.”90 A few days later, Augsburg notified Wilhelm that King Ferdinand had written Donauworth and Ulm ¨ with orders “to prepare a fleet of ships and sailors, to be placed at the ready in Donauworth, for the use of numerous Spanish soldiers who are ¨ moving from Metz to Austria in defense against the Turks.” According to Augsburg’s reports, the troops were due to break camp at the end of March.91 85 86 87 88 89 90 91

Musculus to Herwart, February 21, 1545. Quoted in Roth, “Beziehungen,” 181. StadtA A, LitS, 1545 Marz ¨ 1. StadtA A, LitS, 1545 Marz ¨ 5. StadtA A, LitS, 1545 Marz ¨ 9. StadtA A, LitS, 1545 Marz ¨ 16. StadtA A, LitS, 1545 Marz ¨ 21. StadtA A, LitS, 1545 Marz appears at ¨ 28. A copy of Ferdinand’s letter to Donauworth ¨ StA A, RNo, ¨ MuB ¨ 996, Nr. 35.

136


It was in this context that Donauworth’s plea for assistance came to ¨ Augsburg’s council. Its magistrates possessed good information about the Spanish troops, and they had been working with Bavaria for four weeks to coordinate policy toward them.92 The initial negotiations with Donauworth therefore occurred swiftly. Upon receipt of Ferdinand’s ¨ letter demanding the city assemble a fleet, Donauworth sent Kaspar ¨ Manser – the city’s Catholic mayor – and Jorg ¨ Tettenrieder to Augsburg, where they “asked for help and advice concerning how they could best protect themselves against the alarming violence of the approaching Spaniards.” Augsburg’s council agreed to send Donauworth three hun¨ dred soldiers as protection. The two sides also decided it was “useful and necessary to provide information regarding the time of the Spaniards’ arrival, the manner in which they march, and whether Donauworth ¨ 93 is properly equipped with enough provisions and ships.” Augsburg’s council quickly put these assurances into written form. It recognized the danger the Spaniards presented to Donauworth, “for the wanton¨ ness and inequity of these people is widely known. Should they receive word from your enemies that you have introduced religious change, they will be inclined toward dangerous action against your city.” Augsburg urged Donauworth’s council to seek help from its neighbors in assem¨ bling a fleet “so the bloodthirsty mob does not lie around on land surrounding the city.” Furthermore, Augsburg’s magistrates expressed their “neighborly consideration” that “when the Spaniards are about three or four days journey from your city, it will be necessary to occupy your city with a detachment of suitable soldiers.”94 As a show of good faith, Augsburg’s council volunteered to supply the necessary manpower. Donauworth thanked Augsburg for its “loyal advice and fatherly dis¨ position and opinion.” The council set about putting Augsburg’s suggestions into action, asking its neighbor for “a captain . . . who could examine our wall and other poor defenses and give his advice on the matter.”95 92 93 94

95

Similar negotiations occurred in other regions of southern Germany as well. For Lower Swabia, see the correspondence in StA A, RNo, ¨ MuB ¨ 996. StadtA A, RP, 28 Marz ¨ 1545. StadtA A, LitS Nachtrage, 1545 Marz ¨ ¨ 28. All of the letters in the LitS Nachtrage ¨ pertaining to the Spanish troops are bound together in the 1542–1545 Nachtrag box under the following title: “Feb. 8-Mai 11: Donauworth wegen des Durchzuges spanischen ¨ Fussvolkes.” StadtA A, LitS Nachtrage, 1545 April 4. ¨


137

Donauworth’s magistrates expressed their gratitude to Augsburg, apolo¨ gizing even though at this time we have not followed your example in all things, most notably in the acceptance of free Christian teaching and the Gospel, as well as the outward ceremonies of the Church, you should not think poorly of us. . . . Our great cautiousness is to blame for these choices. It may be that with time God grants a better opportunity to act with less fear.96

Donauworth’s council recognized that the defense of the city and its ¨ reformation relied on the support of nearby cities. Tellingly, Donauworth ¨ did not petition Nuremberg or other surrounding states for aid, but rather turned to its Eastern Swabian neighbor.97 This continued political orientation toward Augsburg, despite the two cities’ recent disagreement over religious reform, highlights the depth of Donauworth’s reliance on Augs¨ burg’s leadership and guidance. In order to secure Augsburg’s support, Donauworth’s council even advanced the possibility of realigning its ref¨ ormation in exchange for sustained political backing. Augsburg’s council chastised Donauworth for its earlier actions, since “we wished for your ¨ part . . . to improve your churches, and in our opinion the situation has been helped very little.” Nevertheless, in order to show its “friendly and neighborly intentions,” Augsburg agreed “to send our dear captain Bernhard von Kalb, along with an expert in firearms and cannons (Buchssenmaister), to inspect and offer their best advice concerning your city’s fortifications and munitions.”98 Augsburg’s magistrates sought thereby to shore up their neighbor’s defenses while drawing the city back into Augsburg’s sphere of protection. On April 12, Donauworth’s council asked ¨ 96

97

98

“ob wir gleich E F W noch zur zeit nit aller ding/ wie in dem haubtstuck in annemung der christenlichen freien lere und dass Evangeliums/ also auch in eusserlichen kirchen ¨ Ceremonien nachgevolgt/ sollen doch E F W sollichs nit arger meinung uffnemen/ sonder die schuld unser grossen sorgveltigkait zuemessen/ mit der zeit gibt Gott der herr weitter gnad possere gelegenhait und minder forcht etc.” StadtA A, LitS Nachtrage, 1545 ¨ ¨ April 4. On April 1, Donauworth’s council wrote Nordlingen that “im fall/ da wir durch dise ¨ ¨ mutwillige kriegslewt solten in not und gefar komen/ und ains gedrungene noth verursacht wurden E W umb hilff rottung und beistand anzeschreien/ was wir uns zu E W getrosten mogen.” Donauworth also asked Nordlingen’s council to ensure the Spaniards ¨ ¨ had eaten plenty of food before arriving at the Danube “damit sy durch mangel und hunger nit zu gweltigem furnemen ursach suchen.” Coming shortly after Augsburg’s encouragement to seek additional help from neighboring polities, Donauworth’s council ¨ likely sent this letter because of Augsburg’s advice. StA A, RNo, ¨ MuB ¨ 996, Nr. 25. StadtA A, LitS Nachtrage, 1545 April 7. ¨

138


its neighbor “to proceed with the assemblage of troops along the lines you have recently spelled out.”99 After receiving word that the Spaniards would arrive at Donauworth on the first or second of May,100 the council ¨ again wrote Augsburg, pleading that “the ordered soldiers arrive here and take up their garrison next Wednesday before the arrival of the Spaniards.”101 Augsburg assured its neighbor that “the order has already been given to muster a detachment of soldiers at Purtembach on Monday. We plan to ready these troops . . . in such a way that they will arrive in your city this coming Wednesday. We hope they will work to your benefit and through them destruction and damage may be prevented.”102 Augsburg’s aid appears to have worked. The Spanish troops arrived in the region on May 2. According to Donauworth’s council, the soldiers ¨ “settled down next to the city on the right side of the Danube by the assembled fleet. . . . There . . . is a nice large place there where we have erected a kitchen and sent a good deal of provisions, so they will be provided breakfast. To this point, we have heard of no violence or damage caused by them. We hope it will remain peaceful.”103 Fully fed, the Spaniards departed on May 4. A few days later, Donauworth released its ¨ garrison to return to Augsburg. As a sign of gratitude, the council offered to compensate Augsburg for its expenses in mustering and equipping the troops,104 but Augsburg declined. Its magistrates had acted “as we believe a friend should behave toward another friend. We wish thereby to honor you and the city of Donauworth through our neighborly service ¨ and do not expect nor will accept a reimbursement of our costs. Rather, we wish to display a deep neighborly friendship to the council and city of 105 For its part, Donauworth’s council lauded the manner Donauworth.” ¨ ¨ in which Augsburg “behaves in all affairs toward us with special goodwill, love and friendship, much more than we as poor simple folk could

99 100 101 102 103 104 105

StadtA A, LitS Nachtrage, 1545 April 12. ¨ StadtA A, LitS Nachtrage, 1545 April 20; StA A, RNo, ¨ ¨ MuB ¨ 996, Nr. 10. StadtA A, LitS Nachtrage, 1545 April 22. ¨ StadtA A, LitS Nachtrage, 1545 April 24. ¨ StadtA A, LitS Nachtrage, 1545 Mai 4. ¨ Augsburg paid the soldiers’ wages while they garrisoned Donauworth. StadtA A, LitS ¨ Nachtrage, 1545 Mai 7. ¨ “wie wir achten dz freund sich gegen ainander halten solln/ seyen auch bedacht gewest/ wa es die notdorfft erfordert het ettwas bass darzesezen/ wollen mit sollichen unnsern nachbarlichen dienst eur wlt und gemaine stat Worde freundtlich vereert haben und ainige bezalung des cosstens nit gewarten noch ainnemen sonnder aus nachbarlichen guten freundtschafft bei eur wlt und gemain stat Worde versehen.” StadtA A, LitS Nachtrage, 1545 Mai 9. ¨


139

ever deserve. We wish to repay our dear sirs and fathers with especially deep and grateful thankfulness.”106 While Donauworth suffered no molestation from the Spanish troops, ¨ their approach aroused very real concern. The Spaniards’ appearance, occurring as it did immediately after Donauworth’s choice for ¨ Nuremberg-style reform, emphasized to the city’s magistrates their ongoing need for external political and military support. Despite its recent falling out with Augsburg, Donauworth’s council remained intent on ¨ securing its larger neighbor’s protection. In order to achieve this goal, the council offered Augsburg what it had failed to produce through Musculus’s mission: the potential realignment of Donauworth’s confes¨ sional affiliation. The city’s petition for assistance from Augsburg rather than its neighbors that practiced Nuremberg-style reform reveals that for Donauworth’s magistrates, the city’s security did not rely solely on ¨ espousing the same confession as nearby territorial states. Instead, the preservation of the city’s reformation depended on the support of their “dear sirs and fathers” in Augsburg. In this vein, the Spanish breakfast reinvigorated negotiations between the two cities concerning the exact orientation of Donauworth’s religious reform. ¨ “A Friendly Christian Union” After the Spaniards’ departure from Eastern Swabia, negotiations between Augsburg and Donauworth entered a new phase focused on ¨ the creation of an official military alliance. The nature of this agreement differed fundamentally from the Three Cities’ League. Instead of an alliance of equals, the military treaty between the two cities acknowledged Augsburg as the guiding force with the intent of formalizing its role as Donauworth’s political protector. These negotiations reached ¨ their climax in August 1545, at the same time that Augsburg sought to effect the introduction of religious reform in Kaufbeuren. Both endeavors served Augsburg’s larger program of expansion by attempting to create new regional networks of religious alliance. For this reason, on August 18, Augsburg’s council sent Jakob Herbrot and Matthaus ¨ Langenmantel to Donauworth to discuss the possibility of a military and political ¨ 106

“alle sachen gegen uns mit sunderer gunst liebe und freundtschafft mainen/ auch im werck erzaigen/ und vil mer dann wir als unvermogenlich einfaltig leut ¨ ¨ immer . . . khonnen verdienen. . . . Wir wollen auch sollichs . . . unsere lieb herrn und vatter mit sonderm fleis und pillcher danckbarkait zubeschulden und zuverdienen.” ¨ StadtA A, LitS Nachtrage, 1545 Mai 11. ¨

140


union with its neighbor. Nevertheless, Augsburg informed Donauworth’s ¨ council that, in order for such an alliance to occur, Donauworth had ¨ to agree “to accept the Augsburg Confession as the true Christian religion.”107 On August 21, Donauworth’s council responded that it ¨ remembered well the close and friendly relationship the two cities Augsburg and Donauworth have possessed for generations. We also remember how Augsburg ¨ has offered Donauworth loyalty, help, and support in its affairs and times of ¨ need. In these dangerous and unfaithful times, this council has decided it wishes to express its full gratitude to the city of Augsburg as its fathers and helpers in need.108

Donauworth hoped the two cities “could come together . . . and the Augs¨ burg council see in our deeds the great desire to further God’s honor, to establish and support His holy Word and Christian church, and in no way to diverge from Augsburg. Indeed, no less than our forefathers did, we wish to stand by you in love and pain as our trusted sirs and fathers.” The council’s reform choices “were in no way intended to belittle Augsburg. Rather, they are the simple result of people acting in a cautious manner without any political support. If we were to receive backing and inclusion in a suitable, useful alliance, we would ask almighty God to lead us to his godly Word and to the true apostolic church.”109 This August 21 letter marked a critical juncture in the relationship between the two cities. For Donauworth, its desire to secure “loyalty, ¨ 107 108

109

Letter from Augsburg to Donauworth to be read aloud by Georg Frolich. StadtA A, ¨ ¨ RA 572, 1545 August 24. “wol erinern in was hocher und freuntlicher verwantnuss beide Erbere statt/ ¨ ¨ ¨ Augspurg und Word von alter herkomen seien/ was auch die statt Augspurg/ der statt Word/ in ¨ irem anligen und notten fur getreue/ hilff/ Rat und beistandt bewisen hatt/ derhalben ¨ dann baide rathe nach dise stund und sunderlich in disen geverlichen/ ungetreuen zeitten ¨ und leuffen/ kains andern sins oder willens seien/ dann sich gegen ainem erbarn rath/ und gemeiner statt Augspurg alls iren Vattern und nothelffern danckbarlich und genaigt ¨ zuerzaigen und zuhaltten.” StadtA A, RA 572, 1545 August 21. “zusam komen . . . darab ain ersamer Rath der statt Augspurg im werck mogen erken¨ nen und spuren das baide rette zum hochsten begierlich seien/ die ere dess almechtigen ¨ ¨ Gottes zufurdern/ sein hailligen wort/ und christenliche kirchen ordnung anzerichten ¨ und furzenemen/ auch sich von der erbern statt Augspurg kains wegs zesundern/ sonder ¨ ¨ nit minder als ire oltern/ bei inen als iren vertrauten herren und vattern in lieb und ¨ ¨ laid zubleiben und zuverharren”; “sey kains wegs der erbarn statt Augspurg zu verclainerung/ sunder guter einfeltiger mainung/ als durch leut/ ¨ die kainen Rucken gehabt/ sorgfeltiger weiss bestehen. . . . doch die statt Word ¨ hinder ainen Rucken und ain gelegene nuzliche verstentnuss khonnen mochte/ so wollen baide Rathe den almechtigen ¨ ¨ ¨ Gott anrieffen/ das er sy zu seinem gottlichen Wort/ und zu der recht apostolischen ¨ kirchen laitte und weise.” StadtA A, RA 572, 1545 August 21.


141

help, and support in its affairs” served as an important motivating factor behind its acceptance of Nuremberg-style reform. After the appearance of the Spaniards, however, it became apparent to the city council that such support depended on close political ties to Augsburg. In order to strengthen these bonds, Donauworth’s council expressed a willingness to ¨ alter the nature of its reformation in exchange for a military alliance with its neighboring city. Augsburg’s council responded quickly, deciding on August 22 that “[Donauworth] should be taken into my lords’ protection, ¨ just as Windsheim and other cities have been taken into Nuremberg’s away protection.”110 At the same time that it sought to move Donauworth ¨ from Nuremberg theologically, Augsburg’s council looked to Nuremberg as a model to institutionalize its own regional sphere of hegemony. In their own words, Augsburg’s magistrates wished to make Donauworth ¨ a satellite city under the power and influence of its larger neighbor. Just as other cities offered models of religious reform to Augsburg’s council, they also presented examples of religio-political authority that the council could adapt to serve its program of expansion in Eastern Swabia. In late August 1545, Augsburg sent Georg Frolich to Donauworth to ¨ ¨ finalize an alliance. His instruction emphasized that if [Donauworth] desires inclusion in the [Schmalkaldic] League, the council mem¨ bers should be informed this cannot happen as quickly or as soon as they might wish. Nevertheless, we have no doubt that, with a little bit of time, their acceptance into the League shall easily occur. In order to ensure this waiting period does not lead to any uneasiness, the council in Augsburg is willing and inclined to form an agreement with Donauworth, just as Windsheim and Nuremberg have ¨ done.111

In order for this arrangement to work, “Donauworth must abolish the ¨ Mass in its city and replace it with a more modest form whose components our good city secretary shall explain.”112 110 111

112

StadtA A, RP, 22 August 1545. “Weren meine herrn woll genaigt/ sie inn die christlich verain zefurdern/ das khonne aber so jhehling unnd pald nit sein/ als es woll ir notturfft erfordert/ tragen aber khaien zweifel/ was es sie fur gut ansieht/ das sie mit der zeit darein leichtlich zebringen sein mogen. Damit aber der zeit unnd reuffd halb ine nit verkhurzung begegen/ seien meine ¨ herrn dess genaigt und urputtig/ sich mit ain erbern rat der statt Worde aines ver¨ stands zuvergleichen/ wie ungeverlich Nuremberg unnd Windsshaim etc. mit einannder verglichen seien.” StadtA A, RA 572, 1545 August 22. “die von Word ¨ die messen inn irer statt/ alle abschaffen/ durch ainen beschaidnen form wie ine statschreiber wirt wissen in die hennd zugeben.” StadtA A, RA 572, 1545 August 22.

142


For Augsburg’s council, the confessional affiliation of Donauworth ¨ was not “of secondary importance,” as Rolf Kiessling has theorized.113 It played a central role in negotiations between the two cities. Augsburg’s attempts to extend its religio-political sphere of influence over Donauworth, as well as its goal of incorporating the city into the Schmal¨ kaldic League, depended not only on Donauworth’s outward acceptance ¨ of the Augsburg Confession, but also on the reorientation of its reform efforts toward Augsburg’s specific reform model. Consequently, Augsburg’s magistrates made a change in their neighbor’s confessional affiliation a precondition for future assistance. Frolich discussed the matter ¨ with Donauworth’s council on August 24. The city secretary could think ¨ of no better way to ensure Augsburg’s ability to offer “timely solace and support” than “that we ally with you and the city of Donauworth, just as ¨ Nuremberg has allied with Windsheim.” Donauworth’s church ordinance ¨ could remain unchanged, primarily because Musculus had influenced several of its clauses. To avoid the “greatest danger,” however, Donauworth ¨ would be required to “recognize the Christian religion as godly and correct and introduce it in your city as promised.” In order to facilitate this move, Augsburg proposed “a friendly Christian union, so you will finally have support and be encouraged toward the true religion.”114 In the process, Augsburg sought to exchange political and military protection for greater control over the confessional affiliation of Donauworth’s ¨ reformation. Donauworth’s council took little time to consider the matter. On ¨ August 29, the two cities signed a formal treaty of alliance modeled agreed on Nuremberg’s arrangement with Windsheim.115 Donauworth ¨ to abolish the Mass within its jurisdiction and asked Augsburg to send it a “pious Christian preacher.” Most importantly, Donauworth promised ¨ “to preach and observe the Augsburg Confession – that is, the article of holy Christian faith as introduced in Saxony, Hesse, Wittenberg, and all 113 114

115

Kiessling, “Musculus,” 156: “Die ‘konfessionelle’ Orientierung erscheint demgegenuber ¨ eher als zweitrangig.” “das wir unns mit eur wlt und gemainer stat Worde verainigten wie ungeferlich Nurem¨ berg mit Windsshaim verainigt ist”; “erkenet ir die christlich religion fur gotlich unnd gerecht/ als ir bekennt und uns zugeschriben habt derselb anzenemen.”; “haben wir euch mit ainem christlichen freundtlichen ainigung/ wie in die notul gethan willferen wollen/ damit eur fur woll und strupt als hett ir kainen rucken ainmal hingemugen unnd euch zu waren religion geholffen wurde.” StadtA A, RA 572, 1545 August 24. The formal agreement between the cities does not bear a specific date. Based on the entries in the Augsburger RP, August 29 is the most likely day on which the city’s mayors signed the treaty.


143

the Upper German communes – in our city and churches without support for the Baptists, papists, or other sects.” In return, “the city of Augsburg 116 After wishes to enter into an alliance with the city of Donauworth.” ¨ a period of negotiation that lasted eight months, both sides had achieved their goals. Donauworth had secured external political and military sup¨ port through an alliance with its southern neighbor, while Augsburg had persuaded Donauworth to accept Augsburg-led reform and to acknowl¨ edge the Augsburg Confession. The course of the city’s reformation had taken several twists and turns, but intercity negotiation had finally produced a compromise that appeared acceptable to both sides. The way was now clear for Donauworth’s inclusion in the Schmalkaldic League, ¨ and Augsburg’s council could feel confident it had protected the Danube bridgehead and extended its sphere of influence through its “friendly Christian union.” This feeling lasted less than one year. 116

StadtA A, RA 572, 1545 August 27.

5 The Urban Reformation in Kaufbeuren

Roughly one month before Augsburg’s council enacted its military alliance with Donauworth, the city’s magistrates involved themselves ¨ in spreading Augsburg-style reform to another imperial city in Eastern Swabia. In late July 1545, Augsburg wrote Kempten, Memmingen, and Ulm detailing the lamentable state of affairs in Kaufbeuren. In the twenty years since its failed 1525 attempt to introduce religious reform, Kaufbeuren had become a haven for radical Anabaptist and spiritualist sects. These outlawed movements claimed adherents among the city’s common folk and magistrates alike, a realization that moved Augsburg’s council to action. In Augsburg’s opinion, Kaufbeuren had “fallen prey in matters of religion to poor judgment, false belief, and discord.” The city “stood in real danger of outside forces causing irreparable damage to its freedom, possessions, and goods.” To prevent this, Augsburg proposed a combined embassy to return Kaufbeuren “to the Christian religion as well as peace and unity.”1 The other cities concurred. Magistrates in Memmingen and Ulm pledged their support for a Four-Cities’ delegation to Kaufbeuren. Memmingen even volunteered to send pastors to convert the local population. Kempten was also sympathetic to Augsburg’s plan. Located closer to Kaufbeuren than any other city, Kempten’s magistrates felt “particular pain and sadness” at their neighbor’s decision to tolerate radical sects. Since the situation deteriorated daily, someone had to bring Kaufbeuren’s council to reason. Only the combined diplomatic efforts of the four cities could save the souls of “those heretics who have separated themselves from the proper established religion.”2 1 2

StadtA A, RA 583, 1545 Juli 21. StadtA A, RA 544, 1545 Juli 25.

144

The Urban Reformation in Kaufbeuren

145

The Four-Cities’ delegation sought to alter the direction of Kaufbeuren’s reformation in three ways. It hoped to persuade the local council to adopt the Augsburg Confession, to reorient the city’s religious practice toward the four cities’ Upper German model, and to eliminate support within the city for radical sects. As it had done during its negotiations with Donauworth, Augsburg’s council took the lead in coordinating this ¨ combined embassy. The council’s goals paralleled those it pursued in Donauworth: to minister to the souls of Kaufbeuren’s burghers while ¨ expanding Augsburg’s religio-political sphere of influence. It sought to achieve both through the introduction of Augsburg-style reform. For its part, Kaufbeuren’s council sought to maintain control of its internal reformation while also placating the demands of its larger, more powerful neighbors. These competing interests meant the orientation of Kaufbeuren’s reformation became a subject of negotiation among all magistrates in Eastern Swabia. On numerous levels, intercity communication played a central role in urban governance in sixteenth-century Eastern Swabia. In the context of the Reformation, correspondence between cities encouraged the spread of specific types of reform, but councils could also use patterns of communication to combat aberrant forms of belief. The ways in which magistrates mobilized regional systems of support to counteract radical religious practice emerges from the activity of the Four-Cities’ delegation. To facilitate the redirection of Kaufbeuren’s reformation, Augsburg’s council enlisted the support of the Schmalkaldic League as well as the active participation of three nearby imperial cities. Kaufbeuren possessed close ties to Augsburg but historically was not as dependent on its larger neighbor as Donauworth was. By mid-1545, Kaufbeuren’s tendencies toward ¨ radical reform had become too strong for Augsburg’s council alone to steer its neighbor away from heresy. Through their cooperation, the four cities hoped to spread one style of religious reform while suppressing another. Intercity negotiation could disseminate and defeat different versions of reform, sometimes in the same fell swoop. This goal sat at the heart of the Four-Cities’ delegation. When viewed through the lens of regional politics, Kaufbeuren’s August 1545 acceptance of the Augsburg Confession corresponds to a larger pattern of negotiation that marked the Reformation throughout Eastern Swabia. While support for different types of reform existed among Kaufbeuren’s common folk, the city’s external relationships with nearby cities provided the motive force behind the council’s decision to reorient its reformation toward the example of Augsburg and Memmingen. As in Donauworth, ¨

146


this choice involved internal dynamics, but it did not result from popular pressure or the individual prerogatives of the city council. Instead, Kaufbeuren’s magistrates negotiated it with its four urban neighbors, who used regional systems of communication to alter Kaufbeuren’s official confessional affiliation. Similar to Eastern Swabia’s other imperial cities, Kaufbeuren underwent a Negotiated Reformation whose participants and ramifications extended far beyond its own city walls. Kaufbeuren and the Anabaptists The popularity of radical reform among Kaufbeuren’s burghers provided the immediate motivation for the Four-Cities’ delegation. Two sects in particular drew suspicion from neighboring cities: the Anabaptists and a large cohort of spiritualists influenced by Kaspar Schwenckfeld. These movements developed during the late 1520s and 1530s, despite attempts by Kaufbeuren’s council to eliminate the institutional basis for reform in the city. The council’s opposition to the Reformation forced many adherents of reform into exile or underground, but it failed to assuage popular dissatisfaction with the Catholic Church. From 1519–35, Kaufbeuren’s council complained to the bishop of Augsburg eight times about the “unpriestly behavior” of its clergy.3 From September 1534-May 1535 alone, the bishop issued three separate mandates to Kaufbeuren’s priests ordering them “to fulfill their duties obediently and without negligence according to the conditions of their benefices.”4 Nevertheless, Catholic control of Kaufbeuren’s council meant that until the early 1540s, the city’s reform movement lacked an “institutional focal point.”5 No new leaders of Upper German- or Wittenberg-influenced reform emerged from within the community, while the council’s policies prohibited the evangelical clergy of neighboring towns from preaching in Kaufbeuren. This led some of Kaufbeuren’s reform-minded burghers to embrace Anabaptist and spiritualist beliefs, both of which de-emphasized institutional churches and were well suited to clandestine practice. In this respect, Kaufbeuren’s experience corresponds to Claus-Peter Clasen’s observation that “in territories where people were dissatisfied with Catholicism but did not have Protestant leaders to turn to, the Anabaptists sometimes

3 4 5

Dieter, Reichsstadt Kaufbeuren, 61. Stefan Dieter and Gunther Pietsch, eds., Die Urkunden der Stadt Kaufbeuren 1501–1551, ¨ vol. 2 (Thalhofen: Bauer, 1999), 1164, 1167, 1173. Quote at 1167. See Scribner, “Why Was There no Reformation in Cologne?” 217–41.


147

attracted a good part of the population.”6 The visibility of this “good part of the population” eventually impelled the four cities to intervene in Kaufbeuren’s reformation. The first recorded activity of Anabaptists in Kaufbeuren comes from 1528. In that year, Augustin Bader and Gall Vischer7 – two leaders of the persecuted Anabaptist community in Augsburg – came to Kaufbeuren at the request of a local Anabaptist named Mathias Maireck. Maireck had petitioned his brethren in Augsburg to send “brothers in faith” to minister to Kaufbeuren’s radical community. This request fit into a wider program of missionary activity by Augsburg’s Anabaptists that had its roots in an August 1527 missionary conference attended by Vischer.8 Bader and Vischer went as Anabaptist missionaries to Kaufbeuren, therefore, in much the same way that Martin Bucer went to Augsburg and Wolfgang Musculus to Donauworth. Each reformer’s mission began with the ¨ solicitation of their services by individuals in another city. With Bucer and Musculus, this took the form of an official magisterial request. With the Anabaptists, it involved a clandestine appeal for support from one underground community to another. The similarity in these procurement methods points to the existence of multiple levels of communication between imperial cities. The simultaneous operation of these networks ensured that intercity communication disseminated both licit and illicit types of reform. In Kaufbeuren, this meant the local Anabaptist movement displayed close links to Augsburg’s radicals. Anabaptist preachers from Augsburg ministered in the woods surrounding Kaufbeuren during the 1530s and 1540s, while several Anabaptists expelled from Kaufbeuren in 1545 sought solace among their Augsburg brethren.9 As with officially sanctioned religious reform, the radical Reformation traveled along networks of communication and influence between cities. 6 7

8 9

Claus-Peter Clasen, Anabaptism: A Social History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), 340; Dieter, Reichsstadt Kaufbeuren, 61. Bader and Vischer both belonged to Augsburg’s weaver’s guild. In 1527, they received rebaptism and became followers of Hans Hut. After their mission in Kaufbeuren, Bader developed an increasingly eschatological program based on visions and a conviction that he was the prophet sent to announce the coming of the end-time Messiah, who happened to be his son. Bader and Vischer were executed in Wurttemberg in 1530. Gustav Bossert, ¨ “Augustin Bader von Augsburg, der Prophet und Konig, und seine Genossen, nach dem ¨ Prozessakten von 1530,” ARG 10 (1913): 117–65, 209–41, 297–349; 11 (1914): 19– 64, 103–33, 176–99; Werner Packull, Mysticism and the Early South German-Austrian Anabaptist Movement (Scottsdale: Herald, 1977), 130–8. ¨ Hans Guderian, Die Taufer in Augsburg. Ihre Geschichte und ihr Erbe (Pfaffenhofen: Ludwig, 1984), 40–4. Dieter, Reichsstadt Kaufbeuren, 63–4.

148


Michele Zelinsky Hanson has demonstrated that Augsburg’s Anabaptist community encompassed a wide variety of beliefs and religious motivations.10 This was undoubtedly true in Kaufbeuren as well. Nevertheless, many Anabaptists in both cities appear to have shared several basic tenets of faith. Kaufbeuren’s Anabaptists practiced a form of Biblicism based on the New Testament that, according to their testimony in later trials, “attached no value to the sacrament of the altar, infant baptism, or the saints, all of which they say have been instituted by men rather than by God.”11 Drawing primarily on the Gospels of Matthew and Mark, the Anabaptists saw baptism as a visible sign of one’s previous spiritual conversion. Only adults could truly experience this Christian transformation, which entailed a lengthy period of spiritual reflection. This process of contemplation was so arduous that not every member of Kaufbeuren’s Anabaptist community merited rebaptism. When city officials tried eight Anabaptists for heresy in 1545, they discovered that only two claimed to have been physically rebaptized. The other six “are not yet ready for rebaptism, for they are still lacking much.”12 Alongside this emphasis on careful examination of one’s conscience, Kaufbeuren’s Anabaptist movement instituted a community of goods.13 According to Bader, the city’s Anabaptists “have decided to hold all of their goods in common. They would rather die than allow themselves to be forced away from this practice.” This sense of communalism also appeared in their commemoration of the Lord’s Supper, for which “they have but one loaf of bread, which they break together as a sign that all their hearts are one.”14 These beliefs ran counter to Catholic, Wittenberg, 10 11

12

13

14

Michele Zelinsky Hanson, Religious Identity in an Early Reformation Community: Augsburg, 1517 to 1555 (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 79–105. Quoted in Karl Alt, “Reichsstadt Kaufbeuren,” in Karl Schornbaum, ed., Quellen zur ¨ Geschichte der Taufer, vol. 5, part 2 (Gutersloh: Bertelmann, 1951), 142–54, quote at ¨ 142. Dieter, Reichsstadt Kaufbeuren, 66–8, quote at 68. Hanson has identified similar instances in Augsburg, arguing that a wide range of involvement in Anabaptism existed among the city’s inhabitants. She labels those who were not rebaptized yet supported the Anabaptists “sympathetic associates.” Hanson, Religious Identity, 87–90. In Kaufbeuren, the conviction of many who were not rebaptized appears to have gone beyond sympathy to active participation in group meetings. In this specific instance, the lack of rebaptism seems to have stemmed less from gradations of commitment than from a perceived inner spiritual unreadiness. On the wider history of the Anabaptist community of goods, see James M. Stayer, The German Peasants’ War and Anabaptist Community of Goods (Montreal: McGillQueen’s, 1991). Alt, “Reichsstadt Kaufbeuren,” 140; Dieter, Reichsstadt Kaufbeuren, 66–8, quote at 68. See also Bossert, “Augustin Bader,” 11:119–20.


149

and Upper German ideas concerning the proper order of Christian life. They reflect Hans Guderian’s observation that for Augsburg’s Anabaptist groups, “at the center theologically stood the individual person and his relationship to God.”15 This similarity is not surprising, given Bader and Vischer’s activity in Kaufbeuren. Avenues of communication between cities included official and unofficial channels that facilitated the dissemination of many different types of reform. From the perspective of Kaufbeuren’s council, unofficial channels of communication presented a danger to religious and social order. According to the city’s magistrates, Bader’s and Vischer’s ministries “spread much discord and misled many people.”16 The council therefore launched a series of persecutions to uproot the local Anabaptist community. After only eight days in the city, the two missionaries were forced to flee, while the authorities arrested over forty people for practicing Anabaptism. Faced with the need to prosecute these religious dissidents, Kaufbeuren’s council sent a delegation to Augsburg to gather advice concerning how it should handle the jailed radicals. These consultations led to the execution of five Anabaptists and numerous banishments from the city,17 but the council’s measures proved unsuccessful at eradicating Anabaptist belief. From 1528–45, popular support for Anabaptism appears even to have grown. At the time of Bader’s and Vischer’s arrival, the Anabaptist community in Kaufbeuren comprised between twenty to forty people. By the early 1540s, it had more than doubled in size to upwards of ninety members. This increase resulted in part from more lenient city council policies in the late 1530s, as well as the continued lack of an organized Wittenberg or Upper German reform movement in the city. The expansion of Kaufbeuren’s Anabaptist community meant, as Stefan Dieter has shown, that Kaufbeuren possessed proportionately the largest Anabaptist population of any Swabian imperial city, numbering somewhere between 1.5–3.8 percent of the total population.18

15 16 17

18

¨ Guderian, Die Taufer in Augsburg, 54. Bossert, “Augustin Bader,” 11:113. In May 1528, the council ordered the beheading of five leaders of Kaufbeuren’s Anabaptist community, as well as the branding of seven more individuals with a hot iron through the cheeks. The council also expelled thirty to forty men and women for practicing Anabaptism. Alt, Reformation und Gegenreformation, 48–52; Dieter, Reichsstadt Kaufbeuren, 60. While Augsburg’s Anabaptist population was numerically larger than Kaufbeuren’s, claiming between 300 to 600 members, Anabaptists accounted proportionately for less of the city’s total population, between .9–2 percent of the inhabitants. According to

150


The presence of this sizeable radical community gave Kaufbeuren a dangerous reputation in Eastern Swabia and the Holy Roman Empire as a whole. The Imperial Diet had outlawed Anabaptism in the late 1520s, and Kaufbeuren’s notoriety as a center of radical practice became especially 19 troublesome after the bloody 1535 Anabaptist uprising in Munster. ¨ By the mid-1540s, Kaufbeuren had become associated in the minds of many political authorities with subversive religious practice. Even after Kaufbeuren’s acceptance of the Augsburg Confession in August 1545, the emperor continued to accuse the city of “apostatizing to the condemned and forbidden Anabaptist sect.”20 As late as July 1546, its council felt compelled to assure Charles V it had “decreased, expelled, and punished with death the Anabaptists and other false sects that existed in our midst.”21 Ultimately, the size of the city’s Anabaptist community led both evangelicals and Catholics to view Kaufbeuren with suspicion. The possibility of outside Catholic intervention in the city on the grounds of combating Anabaptism provided one of the primary motives for the four cities’ attempt to reorient their neighbor’s reformation. It ensured that the nature of religious practice in Kaufbeuren intertwined with the larger religio-political interests of surrounding polities. Kaufbeuren and the Schwenckfelders The Anabaptists were not the only radical sect popular in Kaufbeuren. During the 1530s and 1540s, the city was home to a sizable community organized around the teachings of Kaspar Schwenckfeld. A Silesian nobleman, Schwenckfeld was an early supporter of Luther who in the mid-1520s began to espouse a theology based on rebirth through Christ and the Holy Spirit. His thought quickly diverged from the tenets of Wittenberg theology, especially over the nature of the Eucharist, which Schwenckfeld argued was effective only as far as it allowed the participant to commune spiritually with Christ. There was no real physical presence, as Luther maintained, although the sacrament did enable the

19 20 21

Dieter, the closest city proportionately to Kaufbeuren was Esslingen, where Anabaptists comprised 1.4–2.9 percent of the population. Dieter, Reichsstadt Kaufbeuren, 74–8. For an analysis of how the events at Munster shaped perceptions within the Empire of ¨ religious reform and Anabaptism in particular, see Haude, “Savage Wolves”. Quoted in Alt, Reformation und Gegenreformation, 71. Evangelisches Kirchenarchiv Kaufbeuren (Hereafter EKA KF), Anlage 59, fol. 180f.


151

faithful to experience a spiritual participation in the body and blood.22 This Eucharistic belief drew on Schwenckfeld’s central theological idea that the true Christian had to be reborn spiritually. This occurred through the attainment of “knowledge (Erkenntnis) of Christ,” a lengthy process that led the faithful to “a new identity through a fusion with Christ in the Holy Spirit.”23 Schwenckfeld’s theology fits into a broader category of radical thought known as spiritualism. His emphasis on individual spiritual rebirth outside an institutional church – ideas shared in part by some of Eastern Swabia’s Anabaptists – led many evangelicals and Catholics to view Schwenckfeld’s followers as heretics. His theology was particularly well known to urban magistrates in Eastern Swabia. Schwenckfeld traveled extensively throughout southern Germany. He resided for extended periods in Strasbourg, Augsburg, and Ulm, where he enjoyed the support of several members of the patriciate.24 Initially, Schwenckfeld’s opposition to Luther and the similarity of his Eucharistic beliefs to Zwingli facilitated his stay in these cities. As the Upper German and Wittenberg theological camps began to seek reconciliation, however, Schwenckfeld’s unorthodox spiritualism came under increasing attack from the region’s theologians. In 1539, a long-standing quarrel with Martin Frecht forced Schwenckfeld 25 ¨ to leave Ulm for exile in the neighboring territory Justingen-Opfingen. Undaunted, Schwenckfeld continued to travel throughout Eastern Swabia during the 1540s, taking advantage of an extensive personal communication network with contacts in almost every urban community. His activity won him followers in numerous imperial cities, including important underground congregations in Augsburg, Kempten, and Ulm.26 Much 22 23 24

25

26

For Schwenckfeld’s Eucharistic beliefs, see R. Emmet McLaughlin, “The Genesis of Schwenckfeld’s Eucharistic Doctrine,” ARG 74 (1983): 94–121. Paul Gerhard Eberlein, Ketzer oder Heiliger? (Metzingen: Franz, 1998), 165–72, quote at 168. Schwenckfeld stayed in Strasbourg from 1529–33. He then went to Augsburg, where he resided for one year before moving to Ulm. There he remained intermittently until 1539. Eberlein, Ketzer oder Heiliger?, 127–33; R. Emmet McLaughlin, Caspar Schwenckfeld, Reluctant Radical (New Haven: Yale, 1986), 160–225; Horst Weigelt, “Wolfgang Musculus und die radikale Reformation – die Auseinandersetzung zwischen Musculus und Kaspar Schwenckfeld,” in Wolfgang Musculus (1497–1563) und die oberdeutsche Reformation, eds. Rudolf Dellsperger et al (Berlin: Akademie, 1997), 159–66. McLaughlin, Reluctant Radical, 220–2. For Schwenckfeld’s activity in Justingen¨ ¨ Opfingen, see Franz Michael Weber, Kaspar Schwenckfeld und seine Anhanger in den ¨ freybergischen Herrschaften Justingen und Opfingen (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1962). Eberlein, Ketzer oder Heiliger?, 133, 142. Schwenckfeld’s early supporters in Augsburg included the mayor Ulrich Rehlinger: “Ceterum consul noster Rechlingerus

152


like Anabaptism, spiritualist ideas flowed between personal connecting points within the urban hierarchy. Schwenckfeld’s theology found a particularly receptive audience in Kaufbeuren. His stress on a noninstitutional church, which meant Schwenckfelder meetings almost always occurred in private houses, allowed the sect to survive the Catholic council’s persecutions.27 By the late 1530s, Kaufbeuren’s Schwenckfelder community had eclipsed its Anabaptist counterpart in size. It had even found entrance into the city council by claiming several patrician supporters. Most prominent among this group were Mathias Lauber, who occupied the position of mayor five times from 1536–45;28 Anton Honold, mayor in 1544 and 1546; and Matthaus ¨ Windisch, who replaced the Catholic Hans Ruf as city secretary in 1543.29 The city’s two main preachers during the mid-1540s – Burkhart Schilling and Mathias Espenmuller – were both adherents of ¨ Schwenckfeld. The Silesian reformer’s popularity in the city was so great, in fact, that the council’s 1544 decision to install Schilling in the Hospital Church as Kaufbeuren’s first official evangelical pastor occurred on the recommendation of Schwenckfeld himself.30 While none of Schilling or Espenmuller’s sermons survive, one can ¨ piece together the central tenets of Kaufbeuren’s Schwenckfelder movement from several different sources. Chief among these is a letter written by Schilling at the end of 1544 to followers in another city. For Schilling, a complete surrender of oneself to the example of Christ represented the key component of Christian practice. Jesus signified “the one true goal . . . the way, the truth, and the life [John 14:6]” that led to “the soul’s salvation.”31 Since “God does not give his glory to another . . . nor his honor to idols [Is. 42:8],” salvation could not be found in “silent and

27 28 29 30 31

Schwenkhfeldio multum est addictus; illo multum tenebatur.” Gereon Sailer to Martin Bucer, January 25, 1531, in Martin Bucer Briefwechsel, eds. Reinhold Friedrich et al., vol. 5 (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 227–33, here 231. For Schwenckfeld’s other associates in Augsburg, see R. Emmet McLaughlin, “Schwenckfeld and the Schwenckfelders of South Germany,” in The Freedom of Spirit, Social Privilege, and Religious Dissent (Baden-Baden: Koerner, 1996), 204–6 and Caroline Gritschke, ‘Via media’: Spiritualis¨ tische Lebenswelten und Konfessionalisierung. Das suddeutsche Schwenckfeldertum im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert (Berlin: Akademie, 2006), esp. 28–62 and 391–429. Dieter, Reichsstadt Kaufbeuren, 87. Lauber served as Kaufbeuren’s mayor in 1536, 1538, 1540, 1543, and 1545. Alt, Reformation und Gegenreformation, 44. Dieter, Reichsstadt Kaufbeuren, 96; Gritschke, ‘Via media’, 391. The council installed Schilling, a native of Baden who had studied at Heidelberg, on July 4, 1544. Dieter, Reichsstadt Kaufbeuren, 91–2; Gritschke, ‘Via media’, 391–2. CS, ed. Elmer Ellsworth Schultz Johnson, vol. 9 (Leipzig: Breitkopf, 1928), 234.


153

dead elements such as bread, wine, water, or anything else.” Instead, the path to grace lay in a “genuine knowledge and belief that the son is the one person, in unity with the Holy Spirit, who is a true god along with the Father. Through this faith in His name we have life.”32 Anyone who does not have this as their one goal . . . is a thief and murderer, as Christ Himself calls them [John 10:1] . . . They bring over themselves a swift damnation, which many other people follow. In this manner, they malign the way of the truth. Some among them practice their Mass and believe this is the correct goal. Others have their preaching, which they hold to be the saving word of God. Others their Lord’s Supper, their baptism, and their so-called keys that bind and release . . . . They are all false prophets and teachers who, like the ravenous wolves in sheep’s clothing of which Christ speaks [Mt. 7:15], hide and protect themselves with mere letters under the appearance of Holy Scripture and Christian belief.33

Schilling’s letter highlights several of the key ideas that motivated Kaufbeuren’s Schwenckfelder movement. Much like Schwenckfeld, Schilling stressed the need for a “genuine knowledge” of Christ. This could not occur through reliance on any outward ceremonies. Instead, the true Christian must follow “the way Christ Himself made . . . for the benefit and salvation of mankind. With His love, heartfelt patience, and humility, He established an example for all believers.” This conversion to the “way of truth” had to occur internally within one’s individual soul. Without proper faith in the imitatio Christi, Scripture represented “mere letters” that diverted the individual from the real purpose of Christian devotion. At the core of this argument sat a complete rejection of the sacramental church. No “silent or dead elements” could help humans compared to the “one true goal of Christ.” Those who relied on the Mass (Catholics), preaching the word (Upper Germans and Wittenbergers), or visible sacraments like baptism (Anabaptists) did not simply misunderstand God’s “voice from heaven.” They were “ravenous wolves” who “seduced poor, careless souls to their ruination.” According to Schilling, all those who placed their faith in ceremonies or preaching as a means of conversion “have left the true path, following instead the way of Balaam. That is, through avarice they seek their own honor and benefit.”34 Schilling’s letter represents a written form of communication intended to strengthen the faith of friends in another city, but the themes he and Mathias Espenmuller preached from the pulpit in Kaufbeuren would have ¨ 32 33 34

Ibid., 231. Ibid., 232. Ibid., 231–2.

154


been very similar to those in the letter. This message of strict adherence to the example of Christ would have been attractive for an urban population housing a significant number of Anabaptists. Schilling’s emphasis on the “one true way to God” offered the hope of salvation outside the structure of an institutional church. This message may have been particularly powerful in Kaufbeuren, where many burghers appear to have been dissatisfied with the Catholic Church but lacked any institutional alternative. Schilling’s polemical assault on other forms of Christian practice provides important evidence of the preacher’s rhetorical strategies in differentiating spiritualist belief in Kaufbeuren from the other varieties of reform present in southern Germany. It also reveals one of the major reasons why magistrates in neighboring cities came increasingly to view Kaufbeuren’s religious orientation as dangerous and heretical. While the survival of sources for Kaufbeuren does not allow for a statistical analysis of the Schwenckfelder community along the same lines as the Anabaptists, it appears that during the late 1530s and early 1540s, a good portion of the city’s population inclined toward spiritualism. As noted above, Schwenckfelder tendencies were especially prominent within the city’s leadership circles. Stefan Dieter has speculated that Schwenckfeld’s thought attracted urban magistrates because, “if they wished to avoid involvement in confessional conflicts without betraying their religious convictions, the strong emphasis of Schwenckfeld’s teachings on individualism and religious tolerance opened the possibility ‘to escape the insistent pressure of confessional church politics.’”35 This observation may certainly hold true for many of Kaufbeuren’s patricians. When applied to the entire citizenry, it seems insufficient to explain the popularity of spiritualist thought. Like Anabaptism, Schwenckfeld’s theology appears to have won supporters among both the elite and the common folk. Moreover, Kaufbeuren’s council did not avoid entanglement in church politics because of spiritualism. Its appointment of Burkhart Schilling involved the city directly in the debate over the proper form of Christian life. Spiritualism was in some respects politically useful for Kaufbeuren, as it allowed the council to refrain from declaring an official reformation while still permitting new religious practices, but it also carried many dangers. Coupled with the city’s Anabaptists, it made Kaufbeuren’s name synonymous throughout the Empire with seditious religious behavior. Political expediency alone, therefore, cannot explain the popularity of spiritualism in Kaufbeuren. Rather, the answer may lie in the individualistic nature 35

Dieter, Reichsstadt Kaufbeuren, 88.


155

of spiritualist piety. Considering the poor state of Kaufbeuren’s Catholic clergy and the prominence of Anabaptism in the city, Schwenckfeld’s and Schilling’s emphasis on each person’s individual need to follow Christ’s example without an official mediator like a priest or pastor might have attracted a wide segment of Kaufbeuren’s population. The directness of this message would have appealed to members of city hall as well as those in the town’s various workshops. The popularity of spiritualist thought among Kaufbeuren’s councilors and common folk appeared in the warm reception Schwenckfeld received when he visited Kaufbeuren in April 1545. Describing his stay in the city, Schwenckfeld wrote, the mayor Anton Honold invited me into his house in a friendly manner and encouraged me to hold services there on Sunday after the general sermon, an event that several members of the council and other good-hearted people attended. On Monday I was led into the house of mayor Lauber, where in the presence of many people – they have told me there were several hundred men and women there, including members of the council – we talked for almost the entire day about the ¨ of Christ, being born again, the Christian individual, the knowledge (erkantnus) church, and the sacraments of baptism and communion. We did the same in the morning and afternoon of the third day.36

According to Schwenckfeld’s account, the Kaufbeurer greeted his visit with great enthusiasm, and he found support among the city’s highest officials. His presence appears to have caused excitement in the general population as well. A private letter written on May 5, 1545, by Ludwig Hormann, a prominent member of Kaufbeuren’s patriciate,37 cor¨ roborates the popularity of Schwenckfelder theology on the eve of the Four-Cities’ delegation. In Hormann’s description of events, Schwenck¨ feld stayed in Kaufbeuren “for several days. He preached in the house of Anton Honold and also at Mathias Lauber’s residence.” Schwenckfeld was “a man . . . who does not put much stock in the sacraments and is more Baptist than evangelical.” Both of the city’s preachers sat under his influence, and “Herr Mathias [Espenmuller] has been rumored to preach ¨ directly from Schwenckfeld’s books.” As a result, “[the people] adhere strongly to Schwenckfelder beliefs, as do Honold, Lauber, his wife, and the city secretary.”38 36

37 38

CS, vol. 9, 303; Dieter, Reichsstadt Kaufbeuren, 92; Thomas Pfundner, “Geschichte der ¨ Reformation in der Reichsstadt Kaufbeuren,” Kaufbeurer Geschichtsblatter 9 (1981/83): 277. For more on Ludwig Hormann, see Chapter 1. ¨ EKA KF, Anlage 65, fol. 82.

156


Taken together, Schwenckfeld’s report and Hormann’s letter portray ¨ an urban elite that openly supported spiritualist practice in Kaufbeuren. This corresponds to a report from one of the city’s Catholic convents, which bemoaned the fact that “the new preacher Burkhart and the Schwenckfelder preacher [Espenmuller] have organized all church services ¨ 39 according to their heretical ways.” Schwenckfeld’s influence in the city, coupled with Kaufbeuren’s existing reputation as a center of Anabaptism, made its neighbors uneasy, especially Augsburg, whose preachers were vehement in their opposition to Schwenckfeld.40 Horst Weigelt has argued that Musculus saw the Silesian nobleman as “the prototype for heretics.” For Musculus, little difference existed between Anabaptism and “the Schwenckfeldian fanaticism and delusions.”41 This connection appears in Hormann’s description of Schwenckfeld as “more Baptist than ¨ evangelical,” as well as the nuns’ denunciation of the city’s preachers. By the time of the Four-Cities’ delegation in August 1545, Schwenckfeldianism and Anabaptism had become fused in the minds of many south German theologians and urban magistrates. This connection had major ramifications for the Reformation’s course in Kaufbeuren. The association of Schwenckfelder theology with Anabaptism presented Eastern Swabia’s imperial cities with a dilemma. According to the imperial edicts outlawing Anabaptism, the emperor or other polities could intervene against Kaufbeuren’s Schwenckfelders on the grounds that their beliefs violated imperial law.42 It was partly this fear of Catholic intervention that motivated first the Schmalkaldic League and then the Four-Cities’ delegation to negotiate with Kaufbeuren to prevent “outside forces causing irreparable damage to its freedom, possessions, and goods.”43 The combination of Kaufbeuren’s spiritualist orientation with 39 40 41 42

43

Helmut Lausser, ed., Die Quellen zur Geschichte der Schwestern im Maierhof bis zum Jahre 1550 (Thalhofen: Bauer, 2004), 436. Roth, Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 3, 245–6. Quoted in Weigelt, “Reformationsversuch,” 168–9. The first imperial decree against Anabaptism appeared in 1528. A year later, the Imperial Diet of Speyer unanimously approved the so-called Anabaptist Mandate, which prescribed death for anyone practicing or preaching rebaptism. It proved difficult to enforce. Observance of the decree varied widely depending on region, but the Anabaptist Mandate nevertheless formed the basis for the persecution of Anabaptism until the Peace of Augsburg. Failure to comply with the ordinance risked imposition of the imperial ban. The 1544 Diet of Speyer renewed the mandate, which provides a possible explanation for the timing of Augsburg’s attempts to direct Kaufbeuren away from radical practice. Hans-Jurgen Goertz, The Anabaptists, trans. Trevor Johnson (London: ¨ Routledge, 1996), 118–27. StadtA A, RA 583, 1545 Juli 21.


157

the size of its Anabaptist community put it inevitably at odds with its neighboring cities. Their attempts to coerce Kaufbeuren’s council into altering its confessional affiliation initially took shape under the authority of the Schmalkaldic League at the 1545 Imperial Diet of Worms. When this undertaking failed, the four cities acted on their own initiative to realign Kaufbeuren’s reformation. Patterns of Consultation: Kaufbeuren, Memmingen, and Augsburg As with many aspects of urban reform in southern Germany, the FourCities’ delegation depended on preexisting communication networks that facilitated cooperation among the councils involved. It also relied on traditional patterns of consultation between Kaufbeuren and its larger neighbors Augsburg and Memmingen. While the influence of Schwenckfeld’s thought meant Kaufbeuren’s religious orientation diverged from its neighbors, its council still sought Augsburg’s and Memmingen’s guidance in religious affairs on multiple occasions prior to the Four-Cities’ delegation. This conforms to the larger pattern of intercity consultation described in Chapter 1 and Chapter 3. In the case of Memmingen, the city’s importance as a religious orientation point for Kaufbeuren began with Kaufbeuren’s 1525 religious disputation. Kaufbeuren’s council sought Memmingen’s assistance in preparing for the debate, which occurred according to Memmingen’s example. Kaufbeuren’s request for a transcript of Memmingen’s disputation, as well as its petition that Christoph Schappeler participate in Kaufbeuren’s debate, reflected the city’s reliance on Memmingen as a model of reform. While Kaufbeuren’s disputation did not result in the enactment of official religious change, the two cities maintained close ties in the following years. Memmingen even represented Kaufbeuren occasionally at subsequent urban and imperial diets.44 As Donauworth’s council did, however, Kaufbeuren’s magistrates ¨ turned most frequently to Augsburg for advice in religious matters. This pattern continued after the Schmalkaldic War, a result of the regional embeddedness of the Reformation in Eastern Swabia that allowed urban reform to survive military defeat as well as the subsequent imposition of the Interim. On the eve of the Four-Cities’ delegation, religious

44

In 1527, for example, Memmingen had planned to represent Kempten, Isny, and Kaufbeuren at the cancelled Imperial Diet of Augsburg. Five years later, Memmingen represented Kaufbeuren at an Urban Diet convened at Kaufbeuren’s request to discuss worsted sales. Friess, Aussenpolitik, 95, 159.

158


correspondence between the two councils increased in intensity, a trend evident as early as 1543. Under the leadership of Mathias Lauber, Kaufbeuren’s council decided in that year to authorize the distribution of communion in both kinds, although it did not abolish the Latin Mass.45 In September, Kaufbeuren sent a delegation to Ulm and Augsburg informing its neighbors of this decision.46 The city’s embassy asked for counsel “concerning whether it should persist in distributing the sacrament in both kinds.” Augsburg’s magistrates replied, you should not be swayed because we administer and receive the Lord’s Supper in this way, namely sub utraque specie. Since Christ instituted it thusly, this council finds it correct and Christian. Whether you will be able to persist in this matter, however, you know your conditions better than anyone else. You should pray for God the Almighty’s grace and He will show you the correct path.47

Despite its less than enthusiastic support, Augsburg did encourage its neighbor to proceed as long as no misunderstanding existed concerning the true nature of the Eucharist.48 Augsburg’s statements, which Ulm appears to have supported, display suspicion concerning the religious motivations of Kaufbeuren’s council. Augsburg’s magistrates knew well the popularity of Schwenckfelder and Anabaptist thought in the city, and they remained wary of Kaufbeuren’s continued toleration of the Latin Mass. As a result, Augsburg encouraged its neighbor to proceed with the distribution of communion in both kinds but did not offer unconditional support. Its council cautioned against religious misunderstanding, and it appears to have doubted the sustainability of reform because of Kaufbeuren’s radical tendencies. Kaufbeuren’s distribution of communion in both kinds was worthwhile, therefore, but only if the council could realign the religious atmosphere in the city to reflect the “correct path,” namely the tenets of Augsburg’s reformation. 45 46

47

48

Alt, Reformation und Gegenreformation, 63; Dieter, Reichsstadt Kaufbeuren, 91. Roth, Augsburgs Reformatitonsgeschichte, vol. 3, 254; EKA KF Anlage 133, fol. 27. A year earlier, Ulm’s council had sent Kaufbeuren a copy of its 1531 church ordinance, which explains Kaufbeuren’s decision to send a delegation to Ulm as well. Litz, Reformatorische Bilderfrage, 245. “inen und iren erbern wer unverborgen das des herrn nachtmal alhie solcher gestalt geraicht (nemlich sub utraque specie) und empfangen wurde/ das hielt ain ersamer rat dieweil es von Christo also eingesezt were/ fur recht und christlich/ ob aber sie dasselb bei inen erhalten mochten das wissen sie irer gelegenhait nach am allerbassten/ sie solten Gott den almechtigen umb gnad anrufen/ der wurde sie den rechten weeg waisen.” StadtA A, RP, 6 September 1543. Alt, Reformation und Gegenreformation, 65.


159

A year later, Augsburg began a series of efforts to do just that: curtail radical thought in Kaufbeuren and reorient the city toward Augsburg. At the heart of these attempts stood the desire of Augsburg’s council to expand its religio-political sphere of influence in Eastern Swabia. Donauworth ¨ and Kaufbeuren formed two aspects of this policy, and Augsburg’s council pursued the enactment of religious reform under its guidance in both cities at exactly the same time. The first attempt by Augsburg’s magistrates to move Kaufbeuren away from Schwenckfelder thought toward Augsburg-style reform came in the summer of 1544. It took the form of a letter from the Augsburg preacher Michael Keller to Kaufbeuren’s new mayor, Anton Honold. Keller’s letter, which he appears to have written with the cooperation of Georg 49 encouraged Kaufbeuren’s leaders to abandon spiritualism in Frolich, ¨ favor of reform modeled on Augsburg and Memmingen. Keller stressed that Kaufbeuren’s council “must above all else establish uniform preaching in your city” based on a correct understanding of Scripture. The council should not operate under the conviction that “it can accomplish something fruitful with disagreeable preaching and teachings, which serve to hinder godly matters and to disturb and foment the community.” Instead, Kaufbeuren’s political authorities should “instruct your subjects in the godly Holy biblical scripture and support whatever agrees with the same writings.” Keller also advised Kaufbeuren’s magistrates to inform “the prince-elector of Saxony and the landgrave of Hesse that you wish fully and officially to join the [Schmalkaldic] alliance. In this way, you will receive a true and full backing . . . that will strengthen and encourage the faint-hearted in your midst.”50 Keller’s letter introduces the two main themes of the 1544–6 negotiations between Augsburg and Kaufbeuren: the need for Kaufbeuren to align itself religiously with its urban neighbors and Augsburg’s desire to incorporate Kaufbeuren into the Schmalkaldic League. The preacher’s entreaty that Kaufbeuren contact the Schmalkaldic chiefs offers the earliest written evidence of Augsburg’s long-term plans regarding its neighbor. Augsburg’s magistrates were well aware that Kaufbeuren’s admission to the League depended on the city’s abandonment of spiritualist theology and its introduction of a reformation in agreement with its regional neighbors. From its own experience in the 1530s, Augsburg’s council 49 50

Alt, Reformation und Gegenreformation, 66; Roth, Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 3, 254. StadtA A, LitS, Personalselekt Cellarius, 1544 Juli 21.

160


also realized the importance of persuading Kaufbeuren to accept the Augsburg Confession. Both Augsburg’s magistrates and Keller appear to have hoped that the preacher’s letter would move Kaufbeuren away from radical reform. When Kaufbeuren’s magistrates persisted in their spiritualist leanings, Augsburg’s council intervened directly in the city. It sought thereby to maintain regional order, to minister to the souls of Kaufbeuren’s burghers, and to achieve its larger religio-political goals in Eastern Swabia. As in Donauworth, patterns of influence between the ¨ two cities both promoted and inhibited the pursuit of these objectives. The April Delegation After Michael Keller’s July 1544 letter failed to produce the desired reorientation of Kaufbeuren’s reformation, Augsburg’s council enlisted the support of the Schmalkaldic League in a renewed effort to alter its neighbor’s confessional affiliation. The city’s magistrates hoped to leverage pressure from the alliance into greater influence over Kaufbeuren’s reform movement. This strategy remained a key component of Augsburg’s negotiations with Kaufbeuren through the end of the Schmalkaldic War. It affected all areas of Kaufbeuren’s reformation, beginning in March 1545 with the Schmalkaldic League’s decision to send a religious mandate to the city. Written at Augsburg’s request,51 the League’s letter encouraged Kaufbeuren’s council to remain faithful “to God’s word and the true Christian religion.” The League’s estates expressed two major concerns. The first involved the heretical behavior of Kaufbeuren’s preachers. The League was dismayed that the city “has a preacher who has introduced special opinions in your churches to the disadvantage and destruction of pure teaching. He has rejected the use of the holy sacraments as established by God’s Word and as performed in a true Christian fashion in our churches.”52 The preacher in question was Burkhart Schilling. Based on the content of his 1544 letter, the Schmalkaldic League’s accusations appear to have been true. Schilling’s private correspondence reveals a wholesale 51 52

Gritschke, ‘Via media’, 259–60; Roth, Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 3, 255. “das ir/ mit einem predicanten versehen sein/ welcher zu nachteil unnd abbruch der reinen leer/ in ewerer kirchen/ sonndere opinionen einfuren/ unnd den brauch/ der hailigen sacramenten/ wie der/ durch gottes wort eingesezt/ unnd in unnsern kirchen christelich gehalten wurdet/ verwerffen.” Two almost identical copies of this letter exist: One at StadtA A, LitS RefA, 1545 Marz ¨ 17, and one at EKA KF, Anlage 101, Nr. 4. The quotations are from the EKA KF copy.


161

rejection of the sacramental church. It was not the only place he voiced such opinions. Shortly after his arrival in Kaufbeuren, Schilling composed a tract entitled On the True and False Church. In this treatise, he repudiated Luther’s writings on the sacraments while drawing a clear division between those born again in the spirit and those tied to the practice of outward ceremonies.53 Concerning his ministry in Kaufbeuren, Schilling stated explicitly “he had not come to baptize or administer the sacrament.”54 Schwenckfeld referred to Schilling as “a fine man who has nothing to do with the sacraments, preaching only about the knowledge of Christ.” He even predicted that because of Schilling’s steadfastness in faith, “the great jealousy of the Lutherans will cause him misfortune.”55 Based on this evidence, it appears likely that Schilling’s theology found an open expression in Kaufbeuren’s churches. While the Latin Mass had not been abolished, spiritualist ideas were openly preached and practiced in the city. The Schmalkaldic League therefore had good reason to worry about Schilling’s activities. As one of the leaders of Kaufbeuren’s Schwenckfelder community, Schilling set the tone for the city’s reform movement. His removal was a prerequisite for any change in Kaufbeuren’s religious orientation. The League’s members also found it disturbing that “all kinds of opinions such as Anabaptism and other harmful sects have arisen and established themselves in your midst.” They reminded Kaufbeuren how “savage sects with the tolerance of authority created unspeakable horror and brought irrevocable devastation upon themselves a few years ago in Munster.” By invoking the 1535 Anabaptist uprising, the League offered ¨ a stark indictment of the council’s religious policies. It singled out for criticism those groups abetted by political authority, implying Kaufbeuren’s magistrates willingly tolerated dangerous radicals who might provoke a tragedy similar to Munster in Eastern Swabia. This admonition may have ¨ been especially pointed in the case of Kaufbeuren, since many Upper German theologians linked the chaos caused by the Munster Anabaptists ¨ to “the fruits of [Kaspar Schwenckfeld’s] spirit.”56 The Schmalkaldic League therefore issued Kaufbeuren a “Christian warning.” It demanded the city “remove said preacher, who teaches and preaches against a clear 53

54 55 56

The full title of Schilling’s treatise is Von der wahren und falschen Kirche, ihren beeden ¨ ¨ Hauptern, gliedern und furstehern. Alt, Reformation und Gegenreformation, 65; Dieter, Reichsstadt Kaufbeuren, 141; EKA KF, Anlage 133, fol. 32. EKA KF, Anlage 65, fol. 82. CS, vol. 9, 134. Quoted in Haude, “Savage Wolves”, 93. The quote comes from Martin Frecht of Ulm.

162


understanding of God’s Word and our Augsburg Confession. In his place, you should appoint other capable preachers to carry out the proper ministry of the church. You should accept our Confession and not tolerate or permit any teachings that might contradict it.”57 The Schmalkaldic League’s mandate sought to halt the growth of radical sects while encouraging Kaufbeuren to adopt the Augsburg Confession and seek admission to the evangelical alliance. These goals remained the main objectives of Augsburg and its neighboring cities throughout negotiations with Kaufbeuren. Not content with delivering its mandate by messenger, the League asked Augsburg to “send several envoys, as well as one of its preachers, to Kaufbeuren.” The embassy’s mission was “to force the city to remove its preacher and to abide by the true religion and Confession in accordance with the other estates.” This was necessary because “[Kaufbeuren] has a preacher who publicly proclaims the Schwenckfeldian heresy and other seductive opinions, such as the elimination of holy baptism.” Since “the mayor and many prominent members of Kaufbeuren’s council are in agreement with the preacher and are also responsible for this heresy,” a delegation had to negotiate with them in person. Otherwise, “they will not treat the matter seriously if all they receive is a simple letter.”58 The Schmalkaldic League’s decision to send an embassy to Kaufbeuren reveals much about the process of political communication in the sixteenth-century Empire. Written correspondence was fundamental to the spread of information and reform ideas. It constituted one of the basic tools of civic governance, informing all types of magisterial policies. 57

58

“allerlay opinionen/ als widerteuffer/ unnd andere dergleichen schedliche secten/ bey euch vornen zu einreissen/ und entstehn sollen”; “das zusehen der oberkait/ unnd die eingerissen secten/ vergangner Jar/ in der stat Munster/ fur erschrecklichen grewel unnd ¨ inen selbe/ unwiderbringlichen verderb/ verursacht hat”; “das ir solchen ewern predicanten/ da derselb dem reinen verstand/ gotlichs worts/ unnd unnserer zu Augsburg ubergeb¨ nen Confession/ zuwider lerete/ oder predigte/ abschaffen/ andere taugliche prediger zu versehung dess rechten Ministerii der kirchen/ uffstellen/ euch solcher Confession halten/ auch derselben entgegen/ andere leer/ nit einfuren lassen/ oder gestatten.” EKA KF, Anlage 101, Nr. 4. “samentlich etliche ire gesanndtten/ neben ainem irem predicanten zu der statt Kauffbeuren abfertigen”; “denselben predicantten von sich zuschaffen/ unnd bei wharer religion und Confession/ annderen stennden gemass ¨ zuverharren”; “sie ein predicanten hetten/ der das Swenckhfeldishen irrthumbs auch annderer verfuerischen opinionen/ und abstellung der hailigen tauff/ offentlich beruchtigt”; “der burgermaister und vil furnembsten des rhatts zu Kauffbeurn mit dem predicanten ainig und des irrsals auch tailhafft sein sollen/ das die nit etwa auff das plos schreiben die sach vertusteten oder doch nit ¨ notturfftiglich wie sich erbeurt in vervolg prachtten.” StadtA A, LitS Nachtrage, 1545 ¨ ¨ Marz ¨ 18.


163

At the same time, face-to-face negotiations remained one of the most effective ways for polities to exert political pressure on their neighbors. It also allowed delegates to witness first hand the religio-political conditions in other territories. Such face-to-face negotiations were especially important for imperial cities. Donauworth, for example, did not just write ¨ Augsburg for aid against the Spaniards. It sent an official delegation to its neighbor to emphasize the urgency of its request. Several months later, the military treaty between the cities resulted from personal negotiations between Frolich and Donauworth’s council. In Kaufbeuren, rather than ¨ ¨ send a “simple letter” that the local council could ignore, the evangelical estates entrusted Augsburg – a city that possessed strong consultative ties to Kaufbeuren – with explaining the League’s demands. Augsburg’s magistrates agreed “to send a delegation and to spare no effort to produce something fruitful in [Kaufbeuren],”59 but they expressed disquiet at “how little the council and community there strive for Christ’s Gospel, which is why the greater part of the population suffers such Anabaptist preaching.”60 Since “the Kaufbeurer still celebrate the Mass in their churches,” Augsburg’s council feared if it simply “encouraged them to remove this preacher, they may have cause to remain loyal to the papacy.” For this reason, Augsburg wished “to make the aforementioned preacher account for his beliefs to our preachers, who will be able to help us advise the good pious people there further.”61 Augsburg’s magistrates recognized the delicate nature of their mission in Kaufbeuren. From their perspective, Schilling’s removal was useful only if it led to greater control over the orientation of their neighbor’s reformation. Otherwise, it might cause Kaufbeuren to fall deeper into error. Accordingly, for its April delegation Augsburg chose two councilors – Joachim Langenmantel and Michael Sedelmaier – and the preacher Keller, who could offer a theological rebuttal to the spiritualist ideas of Kaufbeuren’s preachers.62 When the three men presented the League’s mandate to Kaufbeuren’s council on April 8, they discovered Schilling had died a month earlier.63 Augsburg’s council had heard rumors of 59 60

61 62 63

StadtA A, LitS, 1545 Marz ¨ 24. “wie gar wenig des Rats unnd gemaind daselbs nach dem Evangelio Christi ernstlich eifferen und darumb der merer tail leiden mochten das die predig/ gar wider dauffer were.” StadtA A, LitS, 1545 Marz ¨ 24. This passage is crossed out in Augsburg’s concept of the letter. StadtA A, LitS, 1545 Marz ¨ 24. Roth, Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 3, 256. Schilling died on March 11, 1545. Alt, Reformation und Gegenreformation, 68.

164


Schilling’s death before assembling its delegation, but had not relayed this information to the Schmalkaldic League. Instead, the council made a point of omitting a sentence that mentioned the preacher’s death from correspondence with its League delegates.64 It appears Augsburg wished to conceal Schilling’s death from its allies, possibly because the council feared the League might retract its mandate if its main target no longer lived. In the opinion of Augsburg’s council, Kaufbeuren still possessed a preacher in Mathias Espenmuller who “proclaims the Schwenckfeldian ¨ heresy.” He presented as much of a threat as Schilling had, and the council therefore entrusted Keller with countering Espenmuller’s influence. Once ¨ in Kaufbeuren, Keller “held a sermon in which he preached about the nature of the Sacrament. Many people attended this sermon. Several said he pleased them very well, while others stated Keller said he wished to preach more often in Kaufbeuren.”65 Keller preached only once while in Kaufbeuren as part of the April delegation. Especially noteworthy is the topic Keller selected: the nature of the Lord’s Supper. This choice complemented the delegation’s mission to reorient Kaufbeuren away from spiritualism toward the reform style of its neighboring cities. Keller knew that Kaufbeuren’s council had written Augsburg in 1543 for advice concerning distributing communion in both kinds. He was also familiar with Schilling’s forceful rejection of “silent and dead elements.” Keller’s sermon on the Eucharist represented a pastoral decision to lead Kaufbeuren’s laity away from false practice and errant belief by attacking what he viewed as one of the most egregious abuses in the city. Much as Musculus had done in Donauworth, ¨ Keller delivered a sermon that attempted to correct religious misunderstanding among Kaufbeuren’s leaders by cultivating popular support for specific aspects of Augsburg-style reform. Keller seems to have struck a chord among the general population, although it would be several months before he celebrated an Augsburg-style Eucharist in the city. In the short term, Keller’s sermon made the preacher known in Kaufbeuren, and the 64

65

In the concept of Augsburg’s March 24 letter to its delegates in Worms, the line “gleichwol wurdt uns angezaigt als sollt der angeregt schwenckfeldisch prediger mit todt abgangen sein” is crossed out. StadtA A, LitS, 1545 Marz ¨ 24. Coupled with the pattern of consultation between the cities and the skepticism of Augsburg’s council concerning the success of the April delegation, this action contradicts Caroline Gritschke’s claim that “man sich in Augsburg . . . uber die Verhaltnisse in Kaufbeuren und die Tatsache, ¨ ¨ dass die schwenckfeldische Obrigkeit Schilling ja bewusst berufen hatte, nicht im klaren war.” Gritschke, ‘Via media’, 260. On the contrary, Augsburg’s magistrates had detailed knowledge of the situation in Kaufbeuren and formed their policies accordingly. EKA KF, Anlage 65, fol. 82.


165

local burghers appear to have received him favorably. This served him well during his later mission in the city.66 Despite Keller’s best efforts, the April delegation failed to persuade Kaufbeuren to abandon Schwenckfelder thought or to accept the Augsburg Confession. In its official response to the Schmalkaldic League, Kaufbeuren’s council thanked the alliance for its warning, but “concerning the preacher you have been ill informed. He was a learned pious man who, according to our understanding, worked more to further a true knowledge (erkhanntnus) of God and our Lord Jesus Christ than to the disadvantage and destruction of the pure teaching of Christ’s Gospel.”67 Schilling had in no way rejected the Holy Sacrament. Rather, he noticed that elsewhere great misunderstanding had arisen concerning the Lord’s Supper. Accordingly, he sought to establish a good and steadfast basis in Christ according to Chapter 11 of Paul’s first letter to the Corinthians: remember the test, for they who belong at the Lord’s Supper are those Christians who are truly repentant and born again, not the unrepentant godless who cannot correctly recognize the host or the food.68

Kaufbeuren’s council claimed to “know nothing about the diverse opinions and harmful sects that [the League] has inexplicably mentioned. We seek and desire to become Christians who know our Lord Jesus Christ, and through his spirit, grace, and knowledge lead a new and pious Christian life.” Concerning the “uprising at Munster,” Kaufbeuren ¨ assured the alliance’s estates “we do not wish to see a similar uprising here, much less participate in one.” Rather, the people of Kaufbeuren 66

67

68

For Keller’s views on the Eucharist, which he saw as “a symbol and sign of God and Christ’s love” that should be celebrated in a communal setting, see van Amberg, “A Real Presence,” esp. 141–98; Roth, Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 1, 200–4. “sie seyen des predicanten halben ettwas zu milt bericht worden/ dan er ein geleerter gotseliger mann gewest/ der unsers verstands meer zu furderung der waren erkhanntnus gottes unnd unsers herren Jesum Christum . . . dann zu nachteil und abbruch der rainen leer des Evangeliums Christi.” EKA KF, Anlage 59, fol. 87. “die h. Sacrament kaines weges verworffen/ sonnder weil er vermerckt/ wie es anndersswo mit des herren Nachtmal widerumb inn mercklichen missbrauch wolle geratten . . . so hat er zuvor in Christo einen guten bstendign grund wollen legen unnd nach ¨ innhalt des eylfften capittols pauli 1 Corinth: uns der proba erinnern/ item wer auch die seint/ so zu des herren Christi Nachtmall wollen gehorn/ den waren Christe bussfertige ¨ ¨ und widergeborren mennsche/ nit unbussferttigen gottlosen noch solchen so weder den wird noch die speise oder auch sich selbst nocht kemen.“ StadtA A, LitS RefA, 1545 Marz ¨ 17.

166


sought only “the healthy pure teaching of the knowledge of Christ and His kingdom.”69 In its basic argumentation, Kaufbeuren’s letter to the Schmalkaldic League relied on the central tenets of Schwenckfelder theology. Echoing Schilling’s 1544 missive, Kaufbeuren’s magistrates emphasized they wished “only to come to know the one saving Christ and to follow His example.” The council also cited Paul’s first letter to the Corinthians when discussing the Lord’s Supper, a frequent leitmotiv of Schwenckfeld’s writings on the Eucharist. Scattered throughout were numerous references to “the knowledge of Christ” and spiritual rebirth, hallmarks of both Schwenckfeld’s and Schilling’s thought.70 Indeed, the April delegation and the formulation of Kaufbeuren’s reply coincided with Schwenckfeld’s 1545 visit to Kaufbeuren. This fact did not go unnoticed by Augsburg’s council, which speculated that “it is as if Kaspar Schwenckfeld himself has written their response.” Despite the Schmalkaldic League’s demands and Keller’s ministries, Kaufbeuren showed no interest in adopting the Augsburg Confession. Instead, the city “was inclined to a special religion. May God help them.”71 Kaufbeuren’s response did little to calm the fears of Augsburg or the other evangelical estates. It had quite the opposite effect, and the spiritualist nature of the council’s reply ensured outside intervention would be forthcoming. Accordingly, the April delegation marked a crucial turning point in Kaufbeuren’s reformation by confirming suspicions about the deep-seated and intransigent nature of radical theology in the city. Augsburg’s council even used “the embassy that we sent to [Kaufbeuren] at the request of the general Christian alliance” as a rationale for renewed involvement through the Four-Cities’ delegation.72 Despite its lack of immediate success, the April delegation hardened the resolve 69

70 71

72

“so wissen wir auch nichts von mancherley opinionen und schedlichen secten wie man uns bei E G und gunst unerfintliche weise angegeben wir suchen aber und begern Christen zu werden unnsern herren Jesum Christum nocht zu erkennen unnd durch seinen geist/ gnad und erkhannthnuss ein new christlich gottselig leben zufueren“; “den Monsterischen auffruren belangt.”; “nicht dafur ansehen . . . als ob wir dergleichen auffrueren wolten zu sehen/ vil minder uns derselbigen theilhafftig machen”; “die gesunde reine leer vonn dem Erkhannthnus Christy unnd seines Reichs.” StadtA A, LitS RefA, 1545 Marz ¨ 17. Dieter, Reichsstadt Kaufbeuren, 93. “habe herr Caspar Schwenckfeld/ diese antwurt getsellt und ist wol abzunemen seien sie zu ainer besonndern religion genaigt/ got wolle ime rat schaffen.” StadtA A, LitS, 1545 Mai 12. The line “habe herr Caspar Schwenckfeld/ diese antwurt gestellt” is crossed out in the concept. StadtA A, RA 583, 1545 Juli 21.


167

of Augsburg’s magistrates to alter the direction of Kaufbeuren’s reformation. Similar to its behavior toward Donauworth, Augsburg pursued this ¨ goal through the strategic application of religio-political pressure and the promise of future military assistance. The Four-Cities’ Delegation The Schmalkaldic League took no further action against Kaufbeuren after issuing its March 1545 mandate. Increasingly hampered by internal divisions over the occupation of Braunschweig-Wolfenbuttel, the League left ¨ Kaufbeuren to follow its own path of religious reform. Augsburg’s council had different ideas. After failing to induce a reorientation of Kaufbeuren’s reformation through the April delegation, Augsburg escalated its efforts to effect religious change in its neighboring city. This process culminated in late July 1545 when Augsburg’s council organized a new embassy to Kaufbeuren. It possessed the same goals as the April delegation with a key difference in its membership. Rather than act by itself, Augsburg’s council recruited the cooperation of its “dear and good friends and neighbors” Kempten, Memmingen, and Ulm. Together, the four cities sought to alter Kaufbeuren’s confessional affiliation through intercity negotiation. Similar to its role as the principal city in negotiations with Donauworth, Augsburg took the lead in planning the Four-Cities’ delegation. ¨ On July 21, 1545, its council informed Kempten, Memmingen, and Ulm that Kaufbeuren’s aberrant religious practices placed the city “at the current time in real danger, not only of internal disturbances, but also of outside forces causing irreparable damage to its freedom, possessions, and goods.” This threat came from powerful Catholic authorities like the emperor and the duke of Bavaria, who could use the rationale of combating Anabaptism to suppress reform in Kaufbeuren. Accordingly, “since the cities currently stand in a disadvantageous position vis-a-vis many ` other estates, it is in every way proper that cities and especially neighboring communes warn each other as much as possible against apostasy.” The four cities should send an embassy to Kaufbeuren to return the city “to the Christian religion, to encourage peace and unity, and to apply all diligence in transforming their discord to peace and tranquillity.”73

73

“inn was unrat missverstand und widerwillen ain erbere stat zu Kauffbeurn der Religion halb kumen”; “uff heutigen tag mit wercklicher gefahrlichait steen . . . dass ine nit allain ¨ under ainander selbs so under auch von usswendigen unwiderbringlicher nachtail an iren freihait leib und gut erfolgen mocht”; “dhweil dan/ die erb. stett on das nit in grossen

168


Augsburg’s proposal received a positive response from the other cities. Ulm expressed concern over the “antagonism and discord” in Kaufbeuren. Its council pledged full support in “relieving Kaufbeuren of this burden and ensuring that peace and Christian unanimity in religious and other affairs develop within its community.”74 Memmingen’s magistrates voiced their belief that “Kaufbeuren stands against God and the world.” The council agreed with Augsburg’s suggestion of a combined embassy, “despite the fact that your earlier delegation to [Kaufbeuren] was unable to achieve anything in this matter.” Memmingen promised to cooperate in order “to encourage and support everything that serves the true Christian religion, peace, and unity.”75 For Kempten’s magistrates, Kaufbeuren’s “unrelenting irregularity and discord in matters of faith and religious ceremonies have been clear to us on more than one occasion. As a neighbor, this has caused us particular pain and sadness.” Kempten’s council had considered sending its own delegation to Kaufbeuren “to display our faithful neighborly good will,” but because “we are practically the smallest of the Upper German evangelical cities,” it had trusted in God to correct the Kaufbeurer. However, “since these matters are not getting any better, but rather every day the amount of danger, false belief, and discord increases,” Kempten supported Augsburg’s decision to send a combined delegation. Only by applying direct pressure could Kaufbeuren’s neighbors “turn the city’s discord in the Christian religion to peace and unity.”76

74 75

76

freundlichen willen gegen vieln stend steen . . . so will sich im allweg gebueren/ das die erben stett und in sonderhait die genachbarten ainander vor abfall/ so viel moglich/ ¨ verwarn”; “zu christlichen religion auch fried und ainigkait zu ermanen und allen vleiss anzukeren ob sie ihres widerwillens . . . zu fried und ruhe gebracht werden mochten.” StadtA A, RA 583, 1545 Juli 21. StadtA A, RA 583, 1545 Juli 24. “ain erbere statt Kauffpeurenn/ gegen gott und der wellt steet”; “mit sondern freuden/ vasst gern gehort das dieselben/ ungeacht das ire zuvor bey inen derhalben gehapte Bottschafft/ nichts besonders ussrichten mogen”; “an allem dem/ so zu wharer cristennlicher religion/ frid und ainigkait/ dienstlich und furderlich sein mag/ zuermanen und verhelffenn.” StadtA A, RA 550, 1545 Juli 24. “eingedrungne ungleicheit unnd widerwartigkhait des glaubens unnd ceremonien halb hievor auch mer dann ain mal furkhumen/ darab wir warlich/ aus nachbaurschafft sonnder traurigkait/ unnd mit leiden empfanngen”; “unsern nachbewrlichen getrewen willen zuerzaigen”; “wir under den erbarn oberlendisch evangelischen stetten vasst die klainfuegist”; “dieweill sich aber/ die sachenn nit alain zu kainer besserung/ sonnder taglich zu mer geferlichait/ missverstands unnd widerwillens ziehen wolln”; “die von Kaufbewrn in christennlicher religion . . . irs widerwillens entschaiden zu rwe/ unnd ainigkait gebracht werden mochten.” StadtA A, RA 544, 1545 Juli 25.


169

As it had in negotiations with Donauworth, “neighborliness” played a ¨ central role in motivating the Four-Cities’ delegation. For the four cities, their geographic proximity to Kaufbeuren meant they had a responsibility to steer the city away from radical reform toward what they considered the true Christian religion. As evangelical political authorities, the councils had a duty to ensure their neighbors’ souls received appropriate spiritual care. Their actions reflected both political and religious concern for the well-being of Kaufbeuren’s citizenry. This fusion of spiritual and practical political considerations is especially evident in Augsburg’s and Kempten’s letters. In the context of the Four-Cities’ delegation, good neighborliness did not function as a means of confessional coexistence. It served the exact opposite purpose, providing a rationale for redirecting the orientation of a neighboring city’s reformation in order to provide its citizenry with proper religious ministry.77 Neighborliness operated as a complicated norm that could mean many things in different settings. At its core, it symbolized the tight bonds between Eastern Swabia’s imperial cities that made urban reform in one city dependent on the aid, guidance, and consensus of other communes in the region. Another significant phrase that appears throughout the four cities’ correspondence is “peace and unity,” which the cities emphasized they wanted to establish in Kaufbeuren. According to Peer Friess, this signified one of the main goals of urban external policy during the 1530s and 1540s.78 For the Four-Cities’ delegation, “peace and unity” meant not only the creation of religious unanimity in Kaufbeuren, but also between Kaufbeuren and its fellow evangelical cities. Radical reform in Kaufbeuren threatened to subvert the Reformation throughout Eastern Swabia. This “antagonism and discord” had to be defeated in a collective fashion in order for true Christianity to triumph. The maintenance of “peace and unity” possessed political aspects – the prevention of interference by outside forces – and a religious dimension – the desire to further Christian unanimity and worship. It is the conjunction of their desire for “Christian peace and unity” with the responsibility of “good neighborliness” that explains the four cities’ readiness to cooperate in combating Kaufbeuren’s spiritualism. Faith and politics were one and the same for Eastern Swabia’s magistrates as they dealt with radical reform in Kaufbeuren. 77 78

For another view of good neighborliness within an individual community, see Gray, “Good Neighbors.” See Friess, Aussenpolitik, 142ff.

170


After securing the participation of the other cities, Augsburg’s council composed a lengthy instruction detailing the goals of the Four-Cities’ delegation. The embassy’s members should encourage Kaufbeuren “to adhere and remain true to the pure, clear, and holy Gospel, as well as the pious teachings of the Augsburg Confession.” The delegates should pressure Kaufbeuren’s council “to institute preaching in agreement with the Augsburg Confession. The city should permit no other teachings, be they Anabaptist or otherwise, but rather work to eliminate such heresies.” This needed to happen “to maintain good Christian unity within the council, as well as between it and its fellow burghers and subjects.” The four cities promised that “if [Kaufbeuren] should adopt the holy Gospel and aforementioned Christian confession without allowing any teachings to survive in its city that contradict these two things, Kaufbeuren shall receive our faithful advice, help, and support as its dear friends and neighbors should it encounter any difficulties.”79 Parallel to Augsburg’s actions in Donauworth, the four cities sought to ¨ trade future military and political assistance for increased control over the direction of Kaufbeuren’s reformation. Just as “the most intelligent physician does not trust only himself with his own health, but rather collects the opinions of other learned and experienced physicians and then acts accordingly, so should the honorable council in Kaufbeuren consult and follow those who with good, right, and true friendship wish to preserve the city’s welfare and prevent its destruction.” This metaphor underscored the desire of Eastern Swabia’s other cities to remove spiritual illness from their neighbor’s community by encouraging Kaufbeuren to pattern its reformation on their example. In this context, intercity collaboration had the potential to heal Kaufbeuren’s burghers spiritually just as doctors cured each other physically. On the other hand, if Kaufbeuren continued “to tolerate Anabaptist or other heretical teachings that contradict the holy Gospel and the [Augsburg] Confession, the city should be reminded 79

“bei dem rainen lauthen hailigen ewangelio/ unnd desselbigen hailsame lere/ der Augspurgischen Confession gemess zupleiben unnd demselbigen anzuhangen”; “der Augspurgische Confession gemass . . . leren predigen hallten/ unnd hanndlen lassen das sy auch kain . . . anndere lere sy seie widertauferisch oder sonnst bey inen gestaten/ sonnder dagegen zu abstellung solher irrigen leren . . . handlen welle“; “ein E. Rath zwischen inen selbst auch iren mitburgeren unnd unnderthanen christenlichen gueter ainigkeit pleiben”; “wo inen das heilig Ewangelio unnd obgemelter christennlicher confession halben/ so sy bey derselbigen pleiben unnd darwider nit gestatten wurden solte was beschwerlichs begegnen das die E. Stet sy die von Kauffpeuren als ire liebe freundt/ unnd nachpauren mit getreuen Rhat hilff unnd beistanndt nit verlassen wurden.” StadtA A, RA 541, 1545 Juli 30.


171

of the irrevocable difficulties it will or perhaps already has encountered from the emperor, the king, and other neighboring princes.” The four cities therefore drew a clear contrast between the “faithful advice, help, and support” Kaufbeuren would receive after introducing the Augsburg Confession and the dangers it would confront if it continued to permit radical thought. The embassy’s instruction concluded by encouraging Kaufbeuren’s council to consider the matter “as fairly as a true issue of trust between cities and good neighbors should be.”80 Augsburg’s instruction for the Four-Cities’ delegation sought to reestablish “peace and unity” in Eastern Swabia through the creation of new religio-political relationships based on regional ties of neighborliness. Armed with these demands, the delegation arrived in Kaufbeuren on August 5, 1545. The next day, Kaufbeuren’s magistrates and the embassy’s members “discussed until ten o’clock how they should begin these things . . . namely the abolition of the Mass and the removal of images from the churches.”81 Their negotiations proved fruitful. In exchange for political and military support from the four cities, on August 5 Kaufbeuren’s council “approved the adoption of God’s Holy Word and the endorsement of preaching in accordance with the Augsburg Confession.”82 This decision, which Kaufbeuren’s magistrates had resisted as late as May 1545, came as an immediate result of the four cities’ intervention. While impulses toward radical reform existed both from above and from below in the city, Kaufbeuren’s adoption of the Augsburg Confession did not result from internal discourse between the council and its burghers. Rather, other cities compelled the council to acknowledge the Confession. By moving swiftly, Kaufbeuren’s magistrates appear to have hoped they could avoid political isolation while retaining some measure 80

81 82

“Wie auch die verstendigste Arzet/ an irem selbst anligen inen selbst nit vertraueten sonnder annderer gelerten erfarn Arzeten wolmainung auch ernemen unnd darnach hanndleten/ also solten auch sy die von Kauffpeuren . . . der erberen stet Rhat suechen und volgen/ welhe ir enthalben mit gueten rechten wharer freuntschafft . . . der hail und wolfart zuerhallten begirig auch derohalben unnd zu verheutung irres verderbens im werckh zum sorgfeltigisten gewest unnd noch weren.”; “widerthauferische oder annder irrige leren wesen unnd hallten/ wider das heilig Ewangelion unnd obegemelte confession zuentgegen gehayet gedultet oder gestatet erden solte/ so hetten sy sich selbst zuerinneren was inen fur widerspringliche beschwerden bey der Ro. Kay. unnd Ko. Mt. E. Unnseren allergnedigsten herrn iren genachpawren fursten herrn unnd state begegnen mecht unnd villeicht schon begegnet weren”; “wie billich zwischen den E Steten unnd gueten nachpauren ein rechts vertrauen sein solte.” StadtA A, RA 541, 1545 Juli 30. Lausser, ed., Quellen zur Geschichte der Schwestern, 430. StadtA A, RP, 11 August 1545. See also Alt, Reformation und Gegenreformation, 69; Dieter, Reichsstadt Kaufbeuren, 93–4.

172


of control over their religious affairs. This tension between external and internal control of reform remained a hallmark of negotiations between Kaufbeuren and Augsburg during the ensuing two years. Indeed, the council’s decision to accept the Augsburg Confession marked only the first stage of wrangling between Kaufbeuren and its neighboring cities over the exact nature of the city’s official reformation. “Ravening Wolves and Seducers” The official adoption of the Augsburg Confession on August 5, 1545, did not mean the end of Schwenckfelder thought in Kaufbeuren. Throughout the month of August, a tense series of negotiations occurred between the four cities and Kaufbeuren concerning the activity of the spiritualist preacher Mathias Espenmuller. Undaunted by the actions of his ¨ council, Espenmuller continued to preach in open violation of the four ¨ cities’ demand that Kaufbeuren “institute preaching in agreement with the Augsburg Confession.”83 The preacher appears to have remained popular among the laity, which meant Kaufbeuren’s council risked provoking religious riots if it removed him. Since Espenmuller held an endowed ¨ preachership controlled by a private family, Kaufbeuren’s magistrates also feared he could only be silenced with the consent of the endowment’s patron, Sebastian Honold. The Espenmuller affair quickly developed into ¨ a major controversy that endangered the gains of the Four-Cities’ delegation. It presented a direct threat to Augsburg’s attempts to establish control over the direction of its neighbor’s reformation. The Espenmuller affair began as a clash between the spiritualist ¨ preacher and Gervasius Schuler and Hans Schalhaimer,84 two preachers from Memmingen who participated in the Four-Cities’ delegation. In the days following August 5, Schuler and Schalhaimer guided the removal of images from Kaufbeuren’s churches, suppressed the city’s remaining Catholic clergy, and began to introduce worship modeled on practices in Augsburg and Memmingen.85 Their initial ministries appear to have been successful, but on August 12 the two men unexpectedly left Kaufbeuren.86 83 84

85

86

StadtA A, RA 541, 1545 Juli 30. Schalhaimer had served as Pfarrhelfer in Memmingen’s St. Martin’s church since 1538. Friess, Aussenpolitik, 181. In December 1545, he returned to Kaufbeuren and stayed in the city until October 1546, when Memmingen’s council transferred him to Fussen. See ¨ Chapter 7. Litz, Die reformatorische Bilderfrage, 246–7, who argues the council removed the images only from St. Martin; Roth, Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 3, 257–8; von Steichele and Schroder, Das Bisthum Augsburg, vol. 6, 378. ¨ StadtA MM, Ratsprotokolle 1542–1550, 12 August 1545.


173

The reason for their sudden departure was the public reappearance of Espenmuller. Since the arrival of the Four-Cities’ delegation, Espenmuller ¨ ¨ had “feigned an illness for some time” and not preached openly. A week after the council’s official adoption of the Augsburg Confession, however, Espenmuller returned to the pulpit and launched a blistering assault ¨ on Memmingen’s preachers. In his sermon, Espenmuller “disdained the ¨ Augsburg Confession and referred to the two preachers from Memmingen “did not stop there, but also attacked as ravening wolves.”87 Espenmuller ¨ our holy Christian religion by calling it a blind bride and portraying it to the people as a seduction.”88 These statements recall Burkhart Schilling’s earlier rejection of other reform styles, even repeating the same reference to Matthew 7:15. Kaufbeuren’s Schwenckfelder community retained an important proponent in Espenmuller, who refused to allow “raven¨ ing wolves” to seduce or devour his flock. When confronted by Schuler and Schalhaimer, Espenmuller remained defiant. The native Kaufbeurer ¨ “stated he has taken an oath to preach in this city and to care faithfully for its people. He will not step down.”89 The four cities expressed distress at Espenmuller’s actions and Kauf¨ beuren’s apparent decision “to tolerate in the churches false, unsustainable teaching alongside the true, pure, and unchanging Christian teaching of God.”90 Memmingen’s council wrote Kaufbeuren that Schuler and Schalhaimer “are neither wolves nor seducers. They are loyal servants of the Lord who have laid such groundwork for the adopted true Christian religion in your churches that neither Herr Mathias nor anyone else can claim they turned tail or do not know how to defend their teachings.”91 This statement highlights the immediate consequences of Schuler’s and Schalhaimer’s departure, namely that Espenmuller used it ¨ to question the Christian commitment of the Memmingen reformers and to mock their unwillingness to engage in debate. This strengthened the 87 88

89 90 91

“die Augspurgischen Confession veracht . . . desgleichen die zwen prediger von Memmingen . . . einreissend Wolff genennt.” StadtA A, RP, 13 August 1545. “auch hern Mathias es dabey nit gelassen/ sonder unser hailige cristenliche Religion/ als ain blinde brawt angetast/ und dz volckh darvor alss ainer verfurung zuverhieten ernant und gewarnt.” StadtA MM, Bd. A 62/1. Copies of this letter can also be found at EKA KF, Anlage 44, fol. 12 and StadtA A, RA 550, 1545 August 13. The line “und dz volckh darvor alss ainer verfurung zuverhieten ernant und gewarnt” appears in the concept in the StadtA MM but not the letter’s other versions. StadtA A, RP, 13 August 1545. StadtA MM, Bd. A 62/1. “das sy weder Wolff ¨ noch verfierer/ sonder getrewe diener des herrn . . . bey der angenomnen waren und Cristenlichen religion in ewer Cierchen ain sollicher grund geleget . . . damit dann auch weder hern Mathias noch jemandt andrerer sagen mogen/ sy weren geflochen/ oder wisten ir Leer nit zuverthedingen.” StadtA A, RA 550, 1545 August 13.

174


possibility that the ferocity of Espenmuller’s attack might discredit Upper ¨ German theology among the Kaufbeurer, causing the city to relapse into heresy. Ulm’s magistrates voiced this fear, expressing disappointment that “all kinds of divisions and discord have once again appeared under the guise of Schwenckfeldian and other more dangerous and damaging heresies.” According to the agreement reached with the Four-Cities’ delegation, Kaufbeuren’s council had a responsibility “to eliminate the aforementioned sects and heresies from your midst without delay. You should assiduously adhere to the true knowledge of God’s word and to the correct Christian understanding of the same by organizing your city’s churches according to the content of the Augsburg Confession and its Apology.”92 Kaufbeuren’s council responded to Espenmuller’s assault by sending ¨ a delegation to Augsburg and Memmingen for face-to-face negotiations. The preacher had caused such a row in the city “that the council has closed its churches until it can gather additional advice.”93 Memmingen’s magistrates encouraged Kaufbeuren to silence Espenmuller, explaining how ¨ “many years ago when we adopted the true Christian religion, there was a preacher here who held the endowed Vohlin preachership.94 He attacked ¨ our preachers and the Christian religion, but as the city’s authority, we gave him an ultimatum: prove his assertions with holy Godly scripture or be removed from his preachership.”95 Augsburg advised a similar course of action: “Because this Herr Mathias does not baptize or administer 92

93 94

95

“widermals allerlay spaltungen unnd zwitrechtigkait mit einweissung des Schwennckfeldischen unnd annderer mehr gefahrlicher unnd schodlicher irrthumben ereugt unnd ¨ zugetragen”; “die angezaigten secten unnd irrthumben/ bey ire on allen verzug sovil moglich abstollen/ sich daneben befleissen zu warer erkanntnus sollichs worts unnd ¨ recht christenlichem verstannd desselben zu komen/ und die haus haltung der kichen in irer statt nach innhalt der Augspurgischen Confession und Apologi . . . anzurichten.” EKA KF, Anlage 59, fol. 90. StadtA A, RA 583, Undated 1545; StadtA UL, A 1156, Undated. The Vohlin family of Memmingen endowed the Vohlin preachership in 1479. The inci¨ ¨ dent in question refers to the council’s November 1527 decision to remove Johannes Mack, the Vohlin preacher and a Catholic. Before dismissing Mack, Memmingen’s ¨ council collected letters of advice from the councils in Nuremberg and Constance, as well as from Nuremberg’s city secretary, Lazarus Spengler, who encouraged Memmingen “ine auss euer Statt zu schaffen oder zum wenigsten das predigampt solang niderzulegen bis er seine grunnd mit heiliger Biblischer ungefelschter schrift erhellt.” Dobel, Mem¨ mingen in Reformationszeitalter, vol. 2, 36–50, quote at 38; Friess, Aussenpolitik, 30, 81. For a detailed analysis of this conflict, see Benjamin Scheller, “’Damit dannocht etwas umb das gelt und des stifters willen beschech . . . ’ Der Streit um den Stiftungsvollzug der Vohlinschen Pradikatur bei St. Martin in Memmingen nach der Reformation ¨ ¨ (1526–1543),” in Stiftungen und Stiftungswirklichkeiten, ed. Michael Borgolte (Berlin: Akademie, 2000), 257–78. StadtA A, RA 550, 1545 August 13.


175

the Lord’s Supper, the council in Kaufbeuren, based on the power of its office, has a duty to remove said preacher as quickly as possible and to exile him from the city.” Since Sebastian Honold held the right of presentation for Espenmuller, the council should “negotiate with him in a ¨ friendly manner to approve [the preacher’s] removal. Whether Honold agrees to this or not, however, it will be necessary for the council to deal with [Espenmuller] as a fomenter. Since you currently do not have any ¨ other preachers, we would certainly lend you a preacher if you ask for one.”96 Both Augsburg and Memmingen counseled Kaufbeuren to remove Espenmuller, despite the fact that the council did not control the right ¨ of presentation for his preachership. Behind closed doors, Memmingen’s council expressed less confidence in this course of action. While “[Kaufbeuren] accepted the Augsburg Confession at [the four cities’] friendly Christian request,” Memmingen’s magistrates feared “if we immediately send one or more preachers of our true Christian religion to the city, it could lead to further complications and false belief. In the process, not only would the pure teaching of the holy Gospel be hindered, but the entire city might suffer discord and ruinous damage.”97 Augsburg’s magistrates responded that Kaufbeuren should declare Espenmuller ¨ in no uncertain terms a blasphemer of the Augsburg Confession and the true word of God. He should be removed from office and banished from the city. Consequently, we have ordered one of our dear preachers to go to Kaufbeuren at that city’s official request. We have pledged that should the city suffer distress or come under attack because of the true Christian religion, we will not abandon them.98

The discussions surrounding Espenmuller’s rabble-rousing involved ¨ the same emphasis on the norms of neighborliness and peace and unity as 96

97 98

“dann diser herr Mathiss weder tauffet/ noch des Herrn abentmal raichet/ so hat ain erber rat . . . zu Kauffbeurn . . . ja si seiens auch inn crafft irer oberkait schuldig/ gedachten prediger zum furderlichsten von dem predigambt ab unnd auss irer stat zuschaffen”; “mit ime frundlich handlen/ inn solche ab unnd ausschaffung zu willigen/ aber er thu das oder nit/ so wiertains erbern rats notdurfft ervordern . . . gegen ime als ainem auffrurer handlen . . . dieweil sie aber ditsmals kainen ubrigen prediger haben . . . wurdt inen onzweiffeln . . . ainen bestenndigen prediger auff fleissig nachfragen verleihen.” StadtA A, RP, 13 August 1545. StadtA A, RA 550, 1545 August 14. “namlich des gedachter Espenmuller als ain lasterrer der Augspurgischen Confession/ ¨ und allso des waren worts gottis inn allweg zubeurlauben und der statt zuverweisen sey . . . volgends haben wir ime ainen unnsern lieben diener im wort gottis uff ir statlich anhalten zugeordnet unnd uns erbotten . . . ob sie den waren christenlichen religion halb not oder anfechtung leiden sollten/ dz wir sie unsers ringen vermogens nit verlassen wollten.” StadtA A, RA 550, 1545 August 18.

176


the July 1545 Four-Cities’ correspondence. Augsburg’s desire to expand its religio-political sphere of influence also shaped both sets of negotiations. Augsburg’s council used the Espenmuller affair to increase its ¨ direct involvement in Kaufbeuren’s reformation by sending one of its own preachers to minister to the city. Not surprisingly, it chose Michael Keller. His transfer to Kaufbeuren did not mean Augsburg’s council opposed Schuler’s and Schalhaimer’s work. On the contrary, Wolfgang Musculus considered Memmingen part of “our churches.” He and Augsburg’s council had even tried to bring Schalhaimer to Donauworth as ¨ 99 a temporary preacher in February 1545. Memmingen and Augsburg shared many principles of evangelical reform, and Augsburg’s council initially allowed Memmingen’s preachers to evangelize the Kaufbeurer. Espenmuller’s reappearance, however, placed Augsburg’s attempts to ¨ redirect its neighbor’s reformation in grave danger. Keller’s loan to Kaufbeuren was therefore crucial, since it gave Augsburg greater influence over the details of reform in Kaufbeuren than it had previously enjoyed. Augsburg once again took the lead in dealing with Kaufbeuren, acting decisively to ensure its neighbor “will be cared for in a Christian manner.”100 Kaufbeuren used Augsburg’s and Memmingen’s advice as justification for dismissing Espenmuller from the Honold preachership. Its actions ¨ sought to appease all parties. In response to Augsburg’s statements, Kaufbeuren removed Espenmuller and accepted Keller as a temporary replace¨ ment. At the same time, several Schwenckfelders, including the mayor Mathias Lauber and the city secretary Matthaus Windisch, retained ¨ prominent positions in the city government. Kaufbeuren’s magistrates did not wish to become a satellite of Augsburg, and they were reluctant to punish or exile Espenmuller, a native son of the city, in the severe ¨ manner Augsburg demanded. After removing Espenmuller from office, ¨ therefore, the council allowed him to remain in Kaufbeuren until early 1546. It even contemplated permitting him to return to his former position. When renewed conflict with Schalhaimer, who returned to Kaufbeuren in December 1545, prevented Espenmuller from regaining his ¨ preachership, the council finally sent him away, but not in punishment or exile. Instead, it endowed him with a two-year stipend to study theology at the University of Basel.101

99 100 101

Roth, “Beziehungen,” 183. See also Ford, “Unter dem schein,” 125. StadtA A, RP, 13 August 1545. EKA KF, Anlage 133, fol. 39. See also Alt, Reformation und Gegenreformation, 70; Gritschke, ‘Via media’, 267.


177

The demands of external actors, as well as the council’s desire to maintain its autonomy and to care for its burghers, shaped Kaufbeuren’s actions toward Espenmuller. Balancing these concerns represented one ¨ of Kaufbeuren’s major challenges in negotiations with Eastern Swabia’s other cities. The council showed a willingness to acquiesce to some of Augsburg’s terms, but it remained protective of its independence. This desire to chart its own course separate from Augsburg’s influence became a central objective of Kaufbeuren’s religio-political policy in the years following its acceptance of the Augsburg Confession. Augsburg did not question Kaufbeuren’s council on its treatment of Espenmuller, primarily ¨ because it had procured what it desired: the loan of Keller to Kaufbeuren. In the process of negotiation, both sides reached a compromise that, while weighted in favor of the four cities, also made concessions to the specific conditions present in Kaufbeuren. As negotiations continued for the next two years, the scales slowly tilted the other way in favor of Kaufbeuren’s council. The course of reform in Kaufbeuren highlights the inadequacy of traditional top-down and bottom-up models for describing the urban Reformation in Eastern Swabia. Pressure from below did influence the council’s decision to organize a religious disputation in 1525, but Kaufbeuren’s magistrates also took an active role in the city’s early attempts at reform. Most importantly, outside influences were critical for the development of Kaufbeuren’s radical communities. The interplay between these various parties, as well as their intersection with the interests of Kaufbeuren’s preachers, came to the fore in the Espenmuller affair. Urban reform in ¨ Eastern Swabia relied on complex patterns of communication between cities that shaped the options available to Kaufbeuren’s magistrates. Similar to Donauworth, Kaufbeuren was not an island. The city council ¨ and many of the city’s burghers made their reform decisions within the framework of their regional urban hierarchy. In Kaufbeuren, the official introduction of religious reform resulted from the activity of not one but five city councils. In many ways, the magistrates and preachers in Kaufbeuren’s four neighboring communes acted as the motive force behind the city’s acceptance of Augsburg-style reform. As in Donauworth, this process involved negotiation between ¨ cities of unequal status. It was precisely for this reason that negotiation benefited both sides. It allowed smaller cities like Donauworth and Kauf¨ beuren to pursue their own goals while enabling Augsburg to influence and manipulate its neighbors but ultimately secure their willing cooperation. Negotiations could involve coercion, a tactic evident in the actions of

178


the Four-Cities’ delegation, but the application of direct diplomatic pressure could extend only as far as the limits of Augsburg’s influence. When it used coercion, Augsburg’s council still recognized that each smaller city retained something that Augsburg desired. In order to achieve its goals, the Swabian metropolis needed the willing allegiance of its neighbors. While the results might slant toward one side, compromise and negotiation were indispensable to Augsburg’s ability to extend its religio-political sphere of influence through the forging of new regional alliances. This policy proved successful in mid-1545. It became increasingly problematic as open warfare drew nearer.

6 Negotiation and the Rural Reformation in Eastern Swabia1

At the same time that Augsburg sought to guide the introduction of religious reform in Donauworth and Kaufbeuren, its council undertook ¨ a concerted effort to spread the Reformation to its surrounding countryside. These attempts at rural reform constituted another facet of the city’s program of religio-political expansion. Unlike its Three Cities’ allies Nuremberg and Ulm, Augsburg did not control an extensive hinterland. It exerted tremendous economic influence on nearby villages, but its jurisdiction outside the city walls was limited. During the 1530s and 1540s, Augsburg’s council employed religious reform as a means of establishing greater authority over neighboring rural communities. One of its most controversial undertakings centered on Mindelaltheim, a village in the Habsburg margravate of Burgau. After consulting with Ulm, in October 1544 Augsburg installed an evangelical preacher named Hans Hess in the village. It acted on authority of the parish’s right of presentation, which belonged to the city’s Dominican convent, St. Katharina. This act did not go unnoticed for long. King Ferdinand, who controlled high justice in Mindelaltheim, demanded Augsburg “remove the preacher . . . . If this does not occur, we will act against him ourselves under the authority granted us by our territorial lordship.”2 To counter Ferdinand, Augsburg sought aid from its Schmalkaldic allies. The League’s estates refused to support the city, stating they “could not defend Augsburg’s 1

2

Parts of this chapter appeared originally as “The Mindelaltheim Affair: High Justice, ius reformandi, and the Rural Reformation in Eastern Swabia,” SCJ 38, 2 (Summer 2007): 371–92. My deep thanks to the editorial staff at SCJ for allowing me to reprint this material. StadtA A, LitS Nachtrage, 1545 Mai 19. ¨

179

180


introduction of a preacher in Mindelaltheim, which is in direct violation of the king’s princely authority.”3 Reluctantly, Augsburg’s council removed Hess. Rather than serve as a great victory for the city and its version of Christianity, the events in Mindelaltheim became “a matter that could make us look foolish.”4 The Mindelaltheim affair highlights one of the major problems south German imperial cities confronted in their attempts to spread the Reformation beyond city walls. In order to establish religious reform in rural areas, imperial cities often needed both the right of high justice and the support of other evangelical polities. In Mindelaltheim, Augsburg’s installation of an evangelical preacher foundered on Ferdinand’s refusal to recognize the city’s ius reformandi – the right of reformation – in the village. The king based his opposition on the administration of high justice in Burgau, which he claimed gave him the right to enforce his territory’s religious exclusivity. The Schmalkaldic League employed similar reasoning, arguing Ferdinand could prevent Hess’s appointment because the king controlled high justice. By 1545, an interim arrangement of necessity had emerged between Catholic and evangelical leaders that tied the right to regulate religious practice to high justice and territorial lordship. Within this framework, the ability of south German imperial cities to effect rural reform often depended on the complex of legal rights a city controlled. Prior to the Peace of Augsburg, conflicts over the ius reformandi were often resolved by appealing to late medieval legal constructs. In the absence of clearly defined legal or theological formulas concerning which authorities could determine the religious practice of their subjects, traditional rights like high justice provided solutions to new controversies caused by the Reformation. This emphasis on tradition appears throughout the Mindelaltheim affair, as does the importance of urban communication networks to the dissemination of rural reform in southern Germany. Elite-peasant relationships played an important role in shaping rural reform, which often resulted from a process of discourse between the governing religio-political authority and the common folk.5 Like urban 3 4 5

StadtA A, LitS, 1545 Juni 1. StadtA A, LitS, 1545 Juli 21. Ulman Weiss, “Gemeinde und Kirche in der Erfurter ‘landschafft,’” in Landgemeinde und Kirche im Zeitalter der Konfessionen, ed. Beat Kumin (Zurich: Chronos, 2004), 61, 80. In ¨ his study of Brandenburg-Ansbach-Kulmbach, C. Scott Dixon characterizes the process of rural reform as “a dialogue . . . between the local officials and the emerging territorial church.” C. Scott Dixon, The Reformation and Rural Society (Cambridge: Cambridge

Negotiation and the Rural Reformation in Eastern Swabia

181

and radical reform, however, the rural Reformation also spread through patterns of influence that connected city and countryside. Multiple agents, including city councils and estates of opposing confessional affiliations, negotiated urban attempts to reform the Eastern Swabian countryside. Such negotiation, which paralleled the process of urban reform in the region, holds the key to understanding the course of events in Mindelaltheim, since Augsburg’s inability to maintain reform in the village did not stem from resistance among the common folk. Instead, it resulted from conflict with a neighboring territorial lord who held the legal high ground. Augsburg’s council sought to engage the king in negotiation in order to delay Hess’s removal and to rally support among its allies. However, while Augsburg had been in a favorable position during negotiations with Donauworth and Kaufbeuren, it possessed little negotiating leverage ¨ in Mindelaltheim. Lacking any substantial legal counterweight to Ferdinand’s claims, the council could not sustain its opposition without strong support from its confessional allies. When external systems of support faltered, so too did rural reform directed from behind city walls. The Margravate of Burgau: A territorium non clausum Located in the Habsburg margravate of Burgau, Mindelaltheim fell under the territorial authority of the German King Ferdinand. As margrave, Ferdinand’s political power rested on his administration of the forms of high justice known as the “four Malefiz.”6 Sixteenth-century legal theory equated high justice with the exercise of merum imperium, or the unquestioned power of territorial lordship.7 Merum imperium represented independent political and judicial authority derived from the right to try capital offenses.8 Since rights of low and high justice often

6

7

8

University Press, 1996), 205. David Warren Sabean makes a similar point in his seminal study, Power in the Blood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). The four Malefiz represented the four highest capital crimes: murder, arson, manslaughter, and robbery. The standard punishment for these crimes was the death penalty. Von Steichele and Schroder, Das Bisthum Augsburg, vol. 5, 44. ¨ This appears in the legal axiom: “merum imperium consistit in gladii potestate.” Dietmar Willoweit, Rechtsgrundlagen der Territorialgewalt (Cologne: Bohlau, 1975), 24–8, quote ¨ at 28. A second form of lordship existed called mixtum imperium, or mixed authority to rule. Mixtum imperium concerned judicial acts related to individual rights, such as the declaration of majority, but it fell short of the universal territorial authority that accompanied merum imperium and high justice. Willoweit, Rechtsgrundlagen, 18–21. During the Mindelaltheim affair, Augsburg sought to manipulate the legal situation in Burgau to imply that Ferdinand did not possess merum imperium, but rather mixtum imperium.

182


belonged to different parties in the Empire’s territories, the use of high justice as a standard for merum imperium allowed courts to determine who held authority in cases of disputed sovereignty.9 This tradition held particular importance for the Habsburg margrave, because the remaining legal rights in Burgau were a patchwork of hereditary privileges. The margravate, which occupied the region south of the Danube River between Augsburg and Ulm, was a so-called territorium non clausum. While the margrave acted as nominal head of the territory, actual political control was divided among numerous nobles, cities, and monastic institutions. Burgau represented in microcosm the Holy Roman Empire as a whole: a loose confederation of semiautonomous territories under the leadership of a Habsburg lord.10 Accordingly, the debate over Mindelaltheim involved questions of legal status that had implications for territorial and ecclesiastical jurisdiction throughout the Empire. Within Burgau’s complex legal framework, the margrave’s rights proved difficult to enforce. At the time of the Mindelaltheim affair, the bishop of Augsburg held the margavate on pledge. During the term of mortgage, which lasted until 1559, the bishop collected all taxes and feudal dues owed the territorial lord. The Habsburgs retained the title of margrave and continued to exercise the four Malefiz.11 In theory, the mortgage to the bishop detracted little from the margrave’s legal privileges, as he could still claim territorial lordship through high justice. In practice, the territory’s mortgaged status created an atmosphere in which the margrave’s exact rights were open for debate. The claim of Burgau’s individual landowners to exclusive political authority in their possessions complicated this situation. In exchange for the imposition of a special hearth tax in 1492, Emperor Maximilian I granted Burgau’s landowners formal control of all rights of justice except the four Malefiz. Almost immediately on confirmation of these privileges, Burgau’s landowners began to resist the margrave’s claims to universal jurisdiction, arguing 9 10

11

Willoweit, Rechtsgrundlagen, 34. Background information on the margravate of Burgau appears in Gerhard Nebinger, ¨ “Entstehung und Entwicklung der Markgrafschaft Burgau,” in Vorderosterreich. Eine geschichtliche Landeskunde, ed. Friedrich Metz, 2nd ed. (Freiburg: Rombach, 1959), 753–72; Schiersner, Politik, Konfession und Kommunikation; von Steichele and Schroder, Das Bisthum Augsburg, vol. 5, 12ff; Sabine Ullman, Nachbarschaft und ¨ ¨ Konkurrenz (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999); Wolfgang Wust, ¨ ¨ Gunzburg (Historischer Atlas von Bayern, Teil Schwaben, Heft 13) (Munich: Kommission fur ¨ bayerische Landesgeschichte, 1983), 29ff. Maximilian I mortgaged the territory to the bishop in 1498 for 22,000 fl. Wust, ¨ ¨ Gunzburg, 40–5.


183

they exercised territorial sovereignty in their own holdings. This line of thinking formed the basis for Augsburg’s assertion of its right to install an evangelical preacher in Mindelaltheim. The larger debate centered on an unresolved question: was the margravate a principality, in which the margrave exercised all rights of territorial lordship? Or was it a loose confederation of free imperial estates nominally headed by the margrave? The Habsburgs and Burgau’s landowners, including Augsburg and Ulm, clashed over this issue throughout the sixteenth century. The two sides did not reach a preliminary agreement until 1587.12 Augsburg’s reform efforts in Mindelaltheim occurred in the context of this long-running internal legal conflict. By installing Hess in Mindelaltheim, Augsburg hoped to strengthen its religio-political influence in the surrounding countryside by claiming the ius reformandi. Conversely, Ferdinand opposed Augsburg to preserve and reinforce his authority as margrave, which he believed was tied to the religious practice of his subjects. This view developed from the evolving constitutional relationship between the Church and secular authority during the late Middle Ages, especially the attempts of territorial lords and imperial cities to increase their jurisdiction over ecclesiastical institutions.13 The ability of secular authority to gain control of local church structures varied greatly across the Empire, but the amalgamation of rights of lordship with specific rights of religious regulation played a central role in the Mindelaltheim debate.14 At the heart of the matter sat the differing confessional orientations of the two sides. Both Augsburg’s council and Ferdinand wished to advance the 12

13

14

Von Steichele and Schroder, Das Bisthum Augsburg, vol. 5, 55–8. On the squabbling that ¨ ensued after the 1492 letter of privilege, see Christoph Bohm, Die Reichsstadt Augsburg ¨ und Kaiser Maximilian I. (Sigmaringen: Thorbecke, 1998), 35–46. For the course of the debate after 1587, see Wolfgang Wust, ¨ “’Ius Superioritatis Territorialis’: Prinzipien und Zielsetzungen im habsburgisch-insassischen Rechtsstreit um die Markgrafschaft ¨ ¨ ¨ Burgau,” in Vorderosterreich in der fruhen Neuzeit, eds. Hans Maier et al. (Sigmaringen: Thorbecke, 1989), 209–28. Schneider, Ius Reformandi, 11–49; E. E. Stengel, “Kirchenverfassung IV. Kirchenverfassung Westeuropas im Mittelalter,” in Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, ed. Kurt Galling, 3rd ed. (Tubingen: Mohr, 1959), 1561–2; Witte, Law and Protestantism, ¨ 177–82. According to Schneider, the rights gained by secular rulers during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries did not equal the right to regulate church doctrine or dogma. Rather, they pertained to “problems of discipline” within the Church. Schneider, Ius Reformandi, 47–9. The slow extension of secular authority over matters of church discipline created an environment in which magisterial claims to greater control of religious life could be made. Specifically, the emphasis on church discipline lent authority to the efforts of those administering high justice to regulate other aspects of religious practice as well.

184


cause of what they believed was the true faith. The policies they pursued were inseparable from their larger religious loyalties. In Mindelaltheim, the ius patronatus, parish income, and low justice belonged to St. Katharina, Augsburg’s Dominican convent.15 While Augsburg’s council did not control any direct legal rights in the village, it claimed jurisdiction through its custodianship of the cloister, for which it held the right of protection. As custodian of numerous monastic institutions, Augsburg’s council exercised authority in surrounding rural communities without controlling an immediate Territorium. According to Rolf Kiessling, such “indirect lordship” represented a hallmark of Augsburg’s territorial politics in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.16 These powers received a boost in 1537 when Augsburg’s magistrates placed St. Katharina under their formal control as part of the city’s reformation.17 In its new role as the convent’s administrator, Augsburg’s council sought to use the cloister’s right of presentation to appoint in the countryside clerics who preached Augsburg’s local style of evangelical Christianity. Alongside St. Katharina’s rights in Mindelaltheim, important economic connections tied Augsburg to rural communities in the margravate’s eastern half. Burgau housed countless small ecclesiastical and noble holdings that were important production sites for worsted. These territories, especially those east of the Mindel River, oriented themselves almost exclusively toward Augsburg as their primary market.18 The local markets of the margravate also acted as intermediate stations for the transportation of fustian from rural weavers to Augsburg.19 These connections made Augsburg’s magistrates intent on solidifying the city’s economic influence in Burgau. This desire appears in the council’s 1545–6 attempts to regulate the margravate’s production and sale of Wepfen, the prestrung warp-beams in a weaver’s loom.20 On February 24, 1545, Augsburg 15

16

17 18 19 20

St. Katharina purchased these rights in 1438. A bailiff installed from Augsburg exercised the convent’s authority in the community. Von Steichele and Schroder, Das Bisthum ¨ Augsburg, vol. 5, 702. In 1604, Mindelaltheim comprised three farms, twelve cottages ¨ (Solden), a smithy, and a tavern. It would have looked similar in the mid-sixteenth ¨ century. Wust, 189 ¨ Gunzburg, Rolf Kiessling, “Augsburg zwischen Mittelalter und Neuzeit,” in Geschichte der Stadt ¨ Augsburg. 2000 Jahre von der Romerzeit bis zur Gegenwart, eds. Gunther Gottlieb ¨ et al, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart: Theiss, 1985), 247; Rolf Kiessling, Burgerliche Gesellschaft ¨ und Kirche in Augsburg im Spatmittelalter (Augsburg: Muhlberger, 1971), 131–59; ¨ Kiessling, Die Stadt, 697–9. Roth, Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 3, 140. Kiessling, Die Stadt, 731. Ibid., 725. For a description of Wepfen and their importance to Augsburg’s weaving industry, see Claus-Peter Clasen, Die Augsburger Weber (Augsburg: Muhlberger, 1981), 181–210. ¨


185

issued a mandate forbidding the sale of imported Wepfen in the city and tightly restricting who could produce the material. The local lords of the margravate, whose territories benefited financially from the rural production of Wepfen, protested the decree, which Augsburg’s council nonetheless renewed in March 1546. Because the mandates proved difficult to enforce, the city eventually abandoned its attempts to outlaw the rural production of Wepfen in 1549. Nevertheless, its 1545–6 mandates reveal Augsburg’s intention to impose its economic and political will on neighboring territories in Burgau where it lacked direct legal jurisdiction.21 One of the main reasons Augsburg’s council sought to consolidate its influence in Burgau was economic competition with Ulm. The two cities controlled roughly equivalent economic spheres of influence in the margravate. While markets east of the Mindel River tended to orient their activity toward Augsburg, markets west of the Mindel did the same toward Ulm. In some places, the two cities vied for economic predominance. This direct competition was especially fierce in the market town of Weissenhorn, which in 1507 came under the control of Augsburg’s Fugger family. Located west of the Mindel, Weissenhorn sat in Ulm’s economic sphere of influence, which meant the dominance of Augsburg’s most important mercantile family led to tensions with Ulm’s merchants. Beginning in the 1530s, Ulm’s council launched a series of campaigns aimed at restricting Augsburg’s economic activity in Weissenhorn and reorienting the town’s textile production toward Ulm. This caused the two cities to clash openly over their economic power in the margravate.22 In this context, Ulm had little incentive to help Augsburg strengthen its influence in Burgau, but its solidarity remained vital for Augsburg’s attempts to reform Mindelaltheim. While Ulm’s magistrates espoused support for Augsburg’s reform actions in the village, their assurances never materialized into any practical assistance. Ulm pledged Augsburg its political backing as a good ally, but its individual interests in the region prevented it from fulfilling its promises. Augsburg’s actions in Mindelaltheim, which occurred at the same time as its 1545 Wepfen decree and its missions to Donauworth and Kauf¨ beuren, emerge as part of a larger program to increase the city’s political, economic, and religious influence. Lacking direct control of a sizable 21

22

Kiessling, Die Stadt, 729–30; Rolf Kiessling, “Stadt und Land im Textilgewerbe ¨ Ostschwabens vom 14. bis zur Mitte des 16. Jahrhunderts,” in Bevolkerung, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, eds. Neithard Bulst et al. (Trier: Auenthal, 1983), 124–6. Kiessling, Die Stadt, 740; Gotz Anton Fugger, vol. 2 (Tubingen: ¨ Freiherr von Polnitz, ¨ ¨ Mohr, 1963), 5ff.

186


hinterland, Augsburg’s council relied on indirect lordship and economic zones of control to extend its jurisdiction over surrounding communities in Eastern Swabia.23 Because of Burgau’s complex legal situation, Mindelaltheim presented the council with an opportunity to use its tools of rural authority to spread religious reform as well. As it had in Donauworth and ¨ Kaufbeuren, the Reformation in Mindelaltheim depended on a variety of agents, each of which pursued its own interests in Burgau. Augsburg’s council sought to use negotiation to create consensus for its position, but regional political constellations and the nature of its rights in the village prevented it from procuring the outside support necessary to oppose the king’s will. Rural Reform in Haunstetten The events in Mindelaltheim did not mark Augsburg’s first attempt to introduce the Reformation in a nearby village where it lacked high justice. It also was not the first time the city clashed with Ferdinand over rural reform. In 1539, Augsburg petitioned the Schmalkaldic League for aid in resolving a dispute with Abbot Simon Goll of St. Ulrich, a major imperial abbey in Augsburg. The conflict centered on tithes due the Benedictine monastery from the village of Haunstetten, a community just south of Augsburg in which St. Ulrich exercised all rights of low and high justice.24 After introducing religious reform in its urban churches in January 1537, Augsburg’s council encouraged the Haunstetter to pay their tithes to St. Ulrich’s monastic complex in Augsburg rather than to the monks themselves, who had gone into exile in Bavaria.25 The city also initiated evangelical church services in the village.26 Abbot Simon appealed to Ferdinand, who issued several mandates to the Haunstetter ordering the villagers to redirect their tithe payments to the exiled monks. 23

24

25 26

To spread religious reform, many imperial cities sought to use regional economic influence in conjunction with specific ecclesiastical rights acquired during the late Middle Ages. See Peter Blickle, “Zur Territorialpolitik der oberschwabischen Reichsstadte,” in ¨ ¨ Stadt und Umland, eds. Erich Maschke et al (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1974), 54–71; ¨ Eberhard Isenmann, Die deutsche Stadt im Spatmittelalter (Stuttgart: Ulmer, 1988), 231–44; Rolf Kiessling, “Reichsritterschaft und Reformation in Schwaben – Auf dem Weg zu einer evangelischen Diaspora,” in Staat und Verwaltung in Bayern, eds. Konrad Ackermann and Alois Schmid (Munich: Beck, 2003), 147–65. Wilhelm Liebhart, Die Reichsabtei Sankt Ulrich und Afra zu Augsburg (Historischer Atlas von Bayern, Teil Schwaben, Reihe II, Heft 2) (Munich: Kommission fur ¨ bayerische Landesgeschichte, 1982), 175. Ibid., 169–70. StA A, Kloster St. Ulrich Akten 208, fol. 14.


187

Threatened with increasingly severe punishments for their disobedience, the villagers buckled. In October 1539, they sent a delegation to Augsburg informing the council they could no longer pay tithes to the city. Augsburg’s council placed the delegates under temporary arrest. Angered by this open disregard for his commands, Ferdinand ordered thirty cavalry to occupy the village. The armed horsemen entered Haunstetten on November 23, reversed Augsburg’s religious reform, and returned the villagers’ loyalty to Abbot Simon.27 Ferdinand’s military action elicited protest from Augsburg’s council, but the Schmalkaldic League proved reluctant to involve itself in the affair. It advised Augsburg to negotiate with Abbot Simon and offer the monks reentrance to the city, provided they abandon “their unchristian ceremonies.” Otherwise, the League offered Augsburg no open support, and the council had little choice but to acquiesce to Ferdinand. The main reason for the League’s failure to endorse Augsburg’s supplication appears to have been the city’s lack of legal rights regarding St. Ulrich. Since the abbey was subject directly to the king, Augsburg had no authority over it.28 St. Ulrich also controlled all legal rights in Haunstetten, including high justice. The Schmalkaldic League did not wish to become embroiled in a controversy where Ferdinand controlled the legal high ground, a line of reasoning consistent with contemporary petitions to the Schmalkaldic League filed by other south German imperial cities. Appealing to the League for assistance in religious matters was common practice for urban communes. For the six-year period from 1536–42, the Schmalkaldic League received approximately one hundred forty supplications. Of these, at least sixty-five, or 46 percent, came from south German imperial cities. Another forty-two, or 30 percent, came from imperial cities in northern Germany.29 At the 1540 Diet of Schmalkalden – where Augsburg presented its complaint regarding Haunstetten – Memmingen, Strasbourg, Heilbronn, and Ulm also petitioned for support in matters of reform. In all four of these cases, the Schmalkaldic League supported its member cities based on the legitimacy of the cities’ legal claims, most notably their possession of high justice.30 Ulm’s supplication at the Diet of Schmalkalden is particularly noteworthy in its similarity to events in Haunstetten and Mindelaltheim. It 27 28 29 30

Liebhart, Die Reichsabtei Sankt Ulrich, 176–80; Roth, Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 3, 136–7; Schlutter-Schindler, Der Schmalkaldische Bund, 191. ¨ Schlutter-Schindler, Der Schmalkaldische Bund, 192. ¨ Haug-Moritz, Der Schmalkaldische Bund, 185–7. Schlutter-Schindler, Der Schmalkaldische Bund, 188–93. ¨

188


concerned the installation of an evangelical preacher in the parish of Offingen, which sat just to the northwest of Mindelaltheim. Ulm’s council controlled high justice in Offingen, while the ius patronatus belonged to Philip von Rechberg, the cathedral dean in Augsburg. Von Rechberg had filed a reformation suit against Ludwig von Freyburg, a citizen of Ulm, who had replaced the appointed Catholic priest in Offingen with an evangelical pastor. Von Rechberg claimed this action violated his right of presentation. Ulm’s council referred the matter to the Schmalkaldic League, which supported von Freyburg’s actions and promised Ulm “aid and advice in accordance with the alliance and its constitution.”31 Ulm’s control of high justice proved crucial to the League’s decision. While the city did not possess the ius patronatus for Offingen, its right of high justice gave it the authority to pursue reform in the village. Conversely, Augsburg’s lack of high justice in Haunstetten and Mindelaltheim hampered the city’s efforts to procure external backing for its cause while weakening the claims it advanced against Ferdinand. Because of the Schmalkaldic League’s reluctance to involve itself in the Haunstetten affair, Augsburg had to compromise with Abbot Simon.32 Religious reform in the village ended, and Haunstetten remained in St. Ulrich’s possession. The negotiations surrounding Augsburg’s actions in Haunstetten provide an interesting parallel to Mindelaltheim. As in 1545, the city’s attempt to expand its sphere of influence in the surrounding countryside brought it into conflict with Ferdinand. In both cases, Augsburg’s repeated petitions for the Schmalkaldic League’s support foundered on the city’s lack of high justice. The city council desired to use the Reformation to extend its religio-political authority, but without high justice, Augsburg’s council could not procure the backing it needed from its evangelical allies. Without this leverage, the city’s negotiations with Ferdinand stood little chance of success. Hans Hess’s Installation Augsburg’s first opportunity to install an evangelical preacher in Mindelaltheim came in April 1542 when the village’s Catholic priest died.33 31 32 33

Quoted in Ibid., 191. Liebhart, Die Reichsabtei Sankt Ulrich, 172. At about the same time, the priest in Altenbaindt, another village in St. Katharina’s jurisdiction, also died. Augsburg pursued a similar course of action in this village. Roth, Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 3, 140. Almost no record of the events in Altenbaindt survives. The existence of extensive documentation for Mindelaltheim


189

Augsburg’s council immediately wrote Ulm for guidance, explaining that it wished to replace the deceased priest since “the parish is currently not cared for by a Christian instructor and proclaimer of the clear truth.”34 However, the authority (oberkait) over [Mindelaltheim] does not belong to us, and we are unsure how we should proceed in the matter. Since we believe you and some of your citizens may possess goods and parish incomes in Burgau, we ask you to inform us how you and your citizens have dispensed of church services and the presentation of pastors in the margravate. We would also like to know if you have experienced the same difficulties that currently face us.35

Augsburg’s letter most likely referred to Ulm’s reform endeavors in Offingen. In its response to Augsburg, however, Ulm disavowed any knowledge of religious reform in the margravate. Its council claimed “neither we nor our citizens possess parish incomes or jura patronatus in the margravate. Accordingly, we are unable to advise you concerning any difficulties or opposition that we may have encountered.”36 Ulm’s unwillingness to offer counsel left Augsburg’s magistrates in doubt regarding their course of action. They asked three of their jurists – Claudius Pius Peutinger, Konrad Hel,37 and Lucas Ulstat38 – to compose a recommendation. The three doctors advised against introducing an evangelical pastor in Mindelaltheim because of the potential reaction from the king and the bishop of Augsburg, both of whom opposed the Reformation in their jurisdictions. The council decided “in accordance with this advice to call a halt to the presentation of a preacher. No one shall be installed in the parish at this time.”39

34 35 36 37

38

39

allows it to serve as a representative example of Augsburg’s attempts to expand its religio-political influence in the margravate through the spread of evangelical reform. StadtA A, RA 581, 1542 April 15. StadtA A, RA 581, 1542 April 15. StadtA A, RA 581, 1542 April 17. Hel entered Augsburg’s service in 1531 and remained one of the city’s most trusted diplomats until 1541, when he received a negative citation from the council for his activity as an imperial counsel. Thereafter Hel began to fall out of favor with the city’s leadership, and Pius Peutinger took on many of Hel’s former functions. Roth, “Claudius Pius Peutinger,” 119–22; Roth, Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 2, 6 and vol. 3, 46. Ulstat (1498–1558) entered the service of his hometown in 1535. Along with Pius Peutinger and Hel, he worked as one of the council’s chief legal advisors during the second half of the 1530s and the 1540s. He joined the city’s patriciate when its ranks expanded in 1538. Roth, Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 2, 198 and 213. StadtA A, LitS Nachtrage, 1542 April 27. ¨

190


The actions of Augsburg’s council in 1542 highlight the importance of consultation for its policy in Mindelaltheim. The city’s magistrates first solicited advice from an allied imperial city. When Ulm’s council offered no guidance, perhaps because economic competition meant Ulm did not wish Augsburg to expand its jurisdiction in Burgau, Augsburg’s council sought advice from its learned jurists. Based on their recommendation, the council refrained from acting. Consultation was crucial for the decision-making process of Augsburg’s magistrates, be it internally with their stable of jurists or externally with other imperial cities. Indeed, when Augsburg’s magistrates continued to contemplate placing a preacher in Mindelaltheim, the council turned its attention to securing the official support of the Schmalkaldic League. This proved difficult to achieve. After failed attempts in 1542–3 to get an answer from “the evangelical estates concerning how we should act regarding the parish of Mindelaltheim,”40 Augsburg tried again during the 1544 Imperial Diet of Speyer. In early May, Augsburg’s delegates at the conference “handed over [to Saxony and Hesse] the council’s written request in the Mindelaltheim matter. However, we find at this time that everyone is so busy with the Braunschweig affair that there is little time to discuss any other issue.”41 Augsburg’s petition eventually came before the assembled estates in early June, but as its delegates had suspected, the League postponed deliberation until a later date.42 It appears the Schmalkaldic League’s members saw little to no advantage in addressing the situation in Mindelaltheim. The years 1542–6 marked a tense period for the alliance, and matters relating to the ongoing dispute with Duke Heinrich of Braunschweig-Wolfenbuttel occupied ¨ much of the alliance’s deliberation time. Its leading members sought to preserve the League against internal dissension and external attacks on its legitimacy. The Mindelaltheim affair, although pressing in the eyes of Augsburg’s magistrates, centered on a small village in a Habsburg principality. Augsburg’s legal rationale for installing a preacher appeared tenuous, while support for the city would have further antagonized the emperor and the king. Accordingly, the matter held very little political interest for most members of the Schmalkaldic League. As in Haunstetten, Augsburg’s council found it difficult to justify the risk of supporting rural reform without the right of high justice. 40 41 42

StadtA A, LitS, 1543 Marz ¨ 3. StadtA A, LitS, 1544 Mai 7. StadtA A, LitS, 1544 Juni 8.


191

Nevertheless, Augsburg’s council remained intent on presenting an evangelical preacher in Mindelaltheim. Its policy toward the village entered a new phase after the 1543 political shift within the city, which transferred power to a new ruling clique led by Jakob Herbrot and Georg Herwart.43 This change in leadership exerted an important influence on Augsburg’s attitude toward urban reform in Donauworth and ¨ Kaufbeuren. It did the same concerning the council’s readiness to act in Mindelaltheim. While it had balked at installing a preacher in 1542, the council became more daring under Herbrot and Herwart. This change of course culminated in October 1544 with the installation of Hans Hess in Mindelaltheim. Two events in summer 1544 made viable Augsburg’s introduction of an evangelical pastor in the village. The first was the availability of a qualified preacher. On June 30, a letter arrived in Augsburg from the council of Gundelfingen, a territorial city located just north of the Danube, which had at its disposal a priest turned evangelical named Hans Hess. Hess had served well as a chaplain in Gundelfingen, but since “he can no longer support himself, his wife, and his many children with the income he receives as chaplain, he is seeking a better position. He has recently learned the parish of Mindelaltheim is vacant and has enlisted our aid in gaining this position.”44 A few days later, Augsburg received a petition from Hess himself. Echoing the statements of Gundelfingen’s council, Hess requested that “since the parish of Mindelaltheim . . . is open and I am the same religion as your honor the council, I humbly ask the council to bestow this position on me.” This offer intrigued Augsburg’s magistrates, who invited Hess to preach in Augsburg. They determined “Master Musculus should examine this supplicant. He and the other preachers should inform the council whether this man is fit for the position or not.”45 Hess presented himself to Musculus and his colleagues on September 15, 1544. After a thorough examination that lasted several days, Augsburg’s preachers recommended “Hans Hess of Gundelfingen

43

44 45

Sieh-Burens, Oligarchie, 157–69. During the Schmalkaldic War, Augsburg sought to reform several additional rural communities in the margravate’s eastern half. Its efforts in one such village, Lutzelburg, became a source of conflict between the city and the ¨ margrave into the first decade of the seventeenth century. See Dietmar Schiersner, “Die ¨ ¨ Suche der Schafe nach dem verlornen Hirten,” in Landliche Frommigkeit, eds. Norbert Haag et al. (Stuttgart: Thorbecke, 2002), 59–82. StadtA A, LitS Nachtrage, 1544 Juni 30. ¨ StadtA A, LitS Nachtrage, 1544 Undated. The note regarding Hess’s examination ¨ appears on the back of Hess’s letter to the council.

192


should be made the pastor in Mindelaltheim.” On October 9, Augsburg’s council followed this advice and installed Hess along with his wife and children in the village’s rectory.46 The second development that made this move possible was a letter of support from Ulm. After deciding to examine Hess, Augsburg’s council sent a delegation to Ulm to solicit its neighbor’s advice concerning the situation in Mindelaltheim.47 Ulm’s magistrates explained that “in our Territorium there is no village or territory that is not subject to us in all matters of high and low justice.”48 Nevertheless, approximately twelve or thirteen years ago, some of our citizens decided to eliminate papal ceremonies and abuses in territories where the king not only controlled the four Malefiz, but also all other forms of high jurisdiction and authority. These people removed all images from the churches, allowed the holy word of God to be preached, and permitted the celebration of the Christian Sacrament. These innovations persist to this very day.49

Ulm’s council felt confident enough in the experience of its citizens to assure Augsburg it could proceed in Mindelaltheim without great hindrance. If problems arose, Ulm’s magistrates promised “to support our especially dear and good friend, as a loyal neighbor and ally, in the proper manner as prescribed by the Christian alliance and our Three Cities’ League.”50 This letter of advice marked a change of course from Ulm’s 1542 statements. While the city council had earlier claimed no knowledge of situations similar to Mindelaltheim, it now offered detailed information about events from over a decade ago. Ulm’s decision to proffer advice in 1544 may have resulted in part from the transfer of power within 46 47

48 49

50

StadtA A, RP, 15 September 1544 and 25 September 1544. See also Roth, Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 3, 174. The delegation consisted of Hans Welser and Sebastian Seiz, both prominent magistrates and proponents of reform in Augsburg. StadtA UL, A 3530 K, Ratsprotokolle, 8 August 1544. StadtA A, LitS Nachtrage, 1544 August 15. ¨ “ettliche unnsere burger unnd mitrathsfreundt ongevarlich vor zwolff unnd drewzehenn ¨ jarn nit allain do der kon Mt die vier Malefiz sonnder auch ann orten/ do irer Mt alle hohe Jurisdictionn unnd oberkait zuaignet/ sich unnderfanngen haben/ inn irn flegken/ wolche auch zum thail/ inn anndere irer Mt kirchen so der allten religion/ pfarrig sein/ ¨ ¨ die bapstlichen ceremonien unnd missbreuch abzestollen/ die kirchen usszuraumenn/ ¨ ¨ unnd dagegenn das haillig wort gottes/ verkunden unnd die christennlichen sacramennt ¨ raichen zulassen/ wolchs sie auch vor lanngem unnd unnsern halb onnbefragt/ fur ¨ ¨ sich selber/ uss christennlichem eyfer furgenomen/ auch bissdoher/ gott lob/ darbey belibenn ¨ unnd verharrt sein.” StadtA A, LitS Nachtrage, 1544 August 15. ¨ StadtA A, LitS Nachtrage, 1544 August 15. ¨


193

Augsburg’s leadership circles. Of more immediate importance was Augsburg’s decision to send a diplomatic delegation rather than “a simple letter.” Augsburg’s council sent two of its members to Ulm, whose magistrates made special note of Augsburg’s “oral and written request for and Kaufbeuren, personal faceadvice.”51 As with events in Donauworth ¨ to-face negotiations were a powerful tool imperial cities could use to exert pressure on other communes. In this instance, they allowed Augsburg to procure support from Ulm’s councilors, even though those same magistrates had refused to offer advice only two years earlier. The success of political communication could depend on the ability of polities to manifest their influence in a direct physical way, but such a policy might only ensure cooperation in the short term. While Ulm pledged full support to Augsburg’s delegates when they were in the city, its council later proved less than willing to act on its promises. The importance of Ulm’s guidance for Augsburg’s subsequent course of action appears in an Augsburg city council entry from August 19, 1544: “The council has listened to Ulm’s letter regarding the parish of Mindelaltheim and has consequently decided to install a preacher there to proclaim the word of God.”52 Ulm’s support was vital to Augsburg’s decision-making process. Without the consent of its neighbor, Augsburg did not proceed with the installation of an evangelical preacher in 1542, while based on its neighbor’s advice it installed Hess in 1544. Augsburg’s actions in Mindelaltheim depended both on the council’s own eagerness to pursue reform and on external support for its endeavor. In this way, the placement of a preacher in a village like Mindelaltheim depended on intercity negotiation. The Schmalkaldic League and High Justice Contrary to Ulm’s assurances, Augsburg’s installation of an evangelical pastor in Mindelaltheim provoked a response from the Catholic forces that exercised lordship over the village. The bishop of Augsburg notified Ferdinand of Hess’s appointment, and the king reacted to what he perceived as an attack on his political and religious rights as margrave. On February 28, 1545, Ferdinand sent a lengthy mandate to Augsburg’s

51 52

StadtA A, LitS Nachtrage, 1544 August 15. ¨ “Der von Ulm schreiben die pfarr Mundlalthaim belangend hat ain ersamer rate angehort/ und sich darauff entschlossen/ ain predicanten zu verkundigung des wort Gottes daselbst hinzuverordnen.” StadtA A, RP, 19 August 1544.

194


council expressing concern that “the cloister St. Katharina in Augsburg, perhaps on its own or on your order, has introduced in a village within our margravate a preacher of your religion to teach and preach said religion. As the lord proprietor and margrave of Burgau, to whom all rights of high and territorial authority belong, this greatly displeases us.” The situation was unacceptable, since Ferdinand had “until now forbidden this new teaching from taking root among our subjects within the jurisdiction of our hereditary principalities.” The king ordered Augsburg “to remove the preacher without delay. You are not to assault or burden us or the administrators of Burgau . . . with religious innovations, which promulgated imperial edicts, mandates, and diet recesses clearly forbid.”53 In his initial mandate, Ferdinand opposed Hess’s installation on political and religious grounds. Essentially, the king argued that, since he held the right of high justice, he also had the authority to determine the religious affiliation of his principalities.54 This claim aroused concern in Augsburg. The council ordered its representatives at the Imperial Diet of Worms “to seek advice from the evangelical estates regarding the manner in which the council may best answer his majesty’s letter.”55 The city’s delegates promised to pursue the matter but feared it “will likely bear little fruit. Since the king holds the rights of high justice in Mindelaltheim, our presentation of a preacher there will be viewed as an attack on his authority. Other estates of the Christian religion will not support this, lest they set a precedent under which they may be attacked in the 53

54

55

“die kirchen pfleger sanndt Katherinen clossters zu Augspurg villeicht fur sich selbs oder aus ewrem bevelch in ain dorf weliches in unnserer marggrafschafft Burgaw . . . ainen predicannten ewrer religion anhengig verordennt alda solicher ewrer religion gemass zelernen/ unnd zupredigen/ weliches unns als aigenthumbsherren berurter marggrafschafft Burgaw unnd . . . als marggraven zu burgaw alle hohe unnd lanndtfurstliche oberigkait zuesteet/ nit unbillich zu misfallen raicht”; “das wir bissheere in unnsern erblichen furstenthumben oberigkaiten unnd gebieten an kainen ort gestattet noch zuegesehen haben/ solich newe leeren bey unnsern unnderthanen einwurzlen zelassen”; “den predicanten unverzogenlich/ widerumb abfordern/ unns unnd die innhaber bemelter unnser margrafschafft Burgaw in unnserer lanndtsfurstlichen oberigkait und hochait mit kainer newerung anfechten oder zubeschweren anmassen/ wie euch dann soliches in vermug angezaigter kayserlichen edict und mandaten/ auch gemachter reichs abschide kains wegs geburt.” StadtA A, LitS Nachtrage, 1545 Februar 28. ¨ Ferdinand’s opposition to Augsburg in Mindelaltheim paralleled the king’s actions in other principalities. In 1542, Ferdinand issued a mandate ordering every head of household in his territories to pray daily for the elimination of the new teachings. A year later, the king initiated a new round of visitations in his Austrian lands to root out aberrant religious practice. Ernst Laubach, Ferdinand I. als Kaiser (Munster: Aschendorff, 2001), ¨ 373–4. StadtA A, RP, 26 Marz ¨ 1545.


195

future.”56 Despite this advice, Augsburg’s council persisted. For its members, “it would be a great insult and humiliation if we have to remove our preacher and thereby rob the poor folk of the wisdom of the Word.” Augsburg’s magistrates remained hopeful the Schmalkaldic League would come to their aid, since “the alliance speaks often of religious matters where the evangelical estates should support each other.”57 In early May, Augsburg’s delegates expressed new optimism, since “Ulm and other cities have presented very similar supplications, and the committee has been ordered to deliberate on these matters.”58 Nevertheless, the Schmalkaldic League continued to delay action while Ferdinand grew impatient. On May 19, the king issued an ultimatum to Augsburg: “we request once again with all gravity that you obediently comply with our earlier letter and remove the aforementioned preacher within the next fourteen days. If this does not occur, we will act against him ourselves under the authority granted us by our territorial lordship.”59 This mandate elicited a quick response from Augsburg’s councilors. On May 26, the city wrote its ally Ulm. It reminded Ulm’s council how it had “promised us friendly support in this matter should we experience difficulties. You stated you would not abandon us in discussions with the Christian league. Accordingly, we installed a preacher in the village about nine months ago. We are now under great pressure from the king, as you will see in the attached communiqué.” Augsburg’s council emphasized Ulm’s 1544 pledge of support and called for its neighbor “to advance our cause with the Christian alliance so the League will grant us support. It will then write the king in the name of all evangelical estates requesting his toleration of our preacher.”60 Ulm’s council expressed sympathy for Augsburg. It explained, we have received a similar complaint from the king regarding a preacher we 61 We hold both high and low justice recently installed in our village of Gottingen. ¨ in the village, and the only right that does not belong to us is the ius patronatus for the parish, which the Prelate of Wiblingen holds. The king and the emperor have now written us three times demanding the preacher’s removal, but they have 56 57 58 59 60 61

StadtA A, LitS, 1545 April 8. StadtA A, LitS, 1545 April 14. StadtA A, LitS, 1545 Mai 6. StadtA A, LitS Nachtrage, 1545 Mai 19. ¨ StadtA A, LitS Nachtrage, 1545 Mai 26. ¨ Gottingen was a village in Ulm’s Territorium that sat just northeast of the city. Con¨ troversy over the council’s installation of a preacher there first erupted in June 1544. StadtA UL, A 3530 K, Ratsprotokolle, 13 Juni 1544.

196


not named a specific timeframe. We brought this matter to the attention of our fellow league members approximately two months ago, and we have now ordered our representatives to support your case as well.62

For both Augsburg and Ulm, intercity consultation was vital to the process of rural reform in urban jurisdictions. Without a strong show of solidarity from their allies, imperial cities in southern Germany often found it difficult to resist powerful Catholic opposition. Accordingly, Augsburg’s council introduced a preacher in Mindelaltheim only after Ulm promised to back Augsburg’s actions. For Ulm’s council, its earlier oath obliged it to continue professing support for its neighbor. This became even more significant because of the city’s own legal wrangling with Ferdinand. While Ulm’s pledge of support never materialized into any appreciable help, Ulm’s council was at least willing to put in a good word for its ally with the Schmalkaldic League. Similar to the Reformation within city walls, urban attempts to introduce religious reform in the Eastern Swabian countryside depended on agents beyond those in the local community. Alongside its correspondence with Ulm, Augsburg’s council urged its delegates at the imperial diet “to beseech the evangelical estates to petition the king so he may allow the pastor to remain in Mindelaltheim. They should do so on the grounds that [Hess] was sent not to blaspheme or anger, but at the urgent request of the poor people, who had been robbed of all care for their souls.” The delegates should portray “this as a matter of religion that belongs within the jurisdiction of the estates. The estates should recognize this and not fail to give us counsel.”63 Before the Schmalkaldic League would offer any help, however, Augsburg had to demonstrate that it was the proper religio-political authority in the village. The issue of territorial authority sat at the heart of evangelical rationales for the legitimacy of religious reform.64 Augsburg’s magistrates therefore emphasized that “the poor people there are related to us with all rights of authority except the highest four Malefiz.”65 In so doing, Augsburg’s council invoked the debate over lordship in Burgau by grounding its argument in the 1492 letter of privilege for the margravate’s landowners. Faced with the need to justify its actions in legal terms, the council 62 63 64 65

StadtA A, RA 583, 1545 Juni 5. Augsburg’s council to its delegates, StadtA A, LitS Nachtrage, 1545 Mai 26. ¨ Haug-Moritz, Der Schmalkaldische Bund, 505–29. “die armleut . . . unns mit aller oberkait on allain die hochsten vier malefiz sachen betreffende/ verwandt sind.” StadtA A, LitS Nachtrage, 1545 Mai 26. ¨


197

emphasized the rights it possessed through St. Katharina in the hope of offsetting Ferdinand’s control of high justice. The Mindelaltheim affair finally came before the evangelical estates in late May 1545. After a short period of deliberation, the League’s committee issued a decision on June 1: “Since the king exercises princely authority in the region and does not wish to tolerate our religion, [Augsburg] must respect his majesty’s rights, just as these princes use the same rights when they do not allow papal enclaves to exist within their principalities.”66 For the Schmalkaldic League, Augsburg’s lack of jurisdiction in Mindelaltheim meant the city had to obey Ferdinand. This decision tied the ius reformandi to control of territorial lordship and high justice. Without either of these, Augsburg’s council could not countermand Ferdinand’s orders, even if this meant the village remained subject to Rome. Since Augsburg did not install Hess until October 1544, support of Augsburg’s petition would also have violated the Diet of Speyer’s proclamation from earlier that year that “no estate should lead the subjects of another estate to a different practice.”67 The Schmalkaldic League could not approve Augsburg’s actions in Mindelaltheim without contradicting its own legal rationale for the right of reformation. A similar line of reasoning appears in two other supplications submitted at the same time as Mindelaltheim. The first involved Ulm’s actions in Gottingen. The League supported Ulm, arguing ¨ by virtue of the high and low authority and constituted office the council has in Gottingen, [Ulm] is responsible to furnish its subjects with Christian teaching and ¨ the word of God . . . . The council has appealed to the abbot of Wiblingen and requested he supply Gottingen with a Christian pastor. It hoped the abbot would ¨ respect its wishes and introduce a suitable man there. Since this has not happened, the council can act according to the above reasons, namely the authority and responsibility of its office, and install a Christian preacher who will furnish its subjects with God’s word and Christian instruction.68 66

67 68

“dhweil die kon Mt des orts die landsfurstliche oberkait habe/ und unnser Religion nit leiden wolle/ das man irer Mt solchs recht geben mussen/ wie dann dieser Religion Chur und furst inn iren landen auch gebrauchen/ in dem das sie nit gestatten/ da schon papistische flecken inn iren furstenthumbs ligen.” Augsburg’s delegates to Augsburg, StadtA A, LitS, 1545 Juni 3. Quoted in Schneider, Ius Reformandi, 119. “krafft irer hohen unnd nidern obergkait unnd bevolhenen Ambts/ die sie zu Gottingen haben schuldig weren/ ire unnderthanen zu Gottingen mit cristlicher lehre unnd dem gottlichen wortt zuversehen . . . Derhalben dann auch ain E rhat bei den Abbt zu Wyblingen angesucht/ die gmain daselbst zu Gottingen mit ainem cristennlichen pfarrher zufursehen/ unnd hette wol mogn leiden/ das der Abbt irem begeren nach ainen taugenlichen mann daselbst hin gegeben und verordent hette. Dhweil es aber . . . nit ervolgt/ so were der

198


The Schmalkaldic League also considered a supplication from Memmingen. One of the city’s citizens, Barbara Lieber, controlled the “low rights of justice” (nidern gerichtszwang) in the nearby village of Boos, while Memmingen’s council exercised “high authority. The church goods and the majority of the village pay feudal dues to the abbot and monastery in Kempten.” The council had decided “to abolish papal teaching and ceremonies [in Boos] and to establish teachings and ceremonies in agreement with the pure word of God.”69 The League ruled that since high authority belongs to Memmingen’s council, the power of this office allows it to abolish the ungodly ceremonies and institute a true Christian reformation. The council can do this even though the parish and sundry other goods belong to the abbot of Kempten as feudal dues. Consequently, the council and not Barbara Lieber should introduce these changes.70

The difference between these pronouncements and the Schmalkaldic League’s decision regarding Mindelaltheim is striking. In both Gottingen ¨ and Boos, the League stressed the “responsibility of office to furnish its subjects with the word of God and Christian teaching,”71 but this duty belonged solely to those who possessed territorial authority. For this reason, the estates urged Memmingen’s council and not Barbara Lieber to introduce the Reformation in Boos. When placed in the context of these two cases, the Schmalkaldic League’s rejection of Augsburg’s petition becomes part of a wider pattern of legal reasoning within the alliance. In denying Augsburg their support, the League’s estates argued that high justice trumped the ius patronatus in determining the religious orientation of a community. For the Schmalkaldic League, the ius reformandi derived from territorial lordship and its related legal rights.72

69 70

71 72

rhat auss vorgemellten ursachen/ der obergkait unnd seins schuldigen ambts halb bewegt worden/ ainen cristennlichen predicanten . . . zuverodenen welchen die unnderthanen mit Gotts wortt unnd cristennlichen lehre versehen.” StadtA A, LitS, 1545 August 7. StadtA A, LitS, 1545 August 7. “das die hohe oberkaindt ainem E rhat der statt Memmingen zustunde/ das inen alssdann ¨ crafft ires amptts geburen wolle die ungottlichen ceremonien abzuschaffenn/ und an statt derselben ware cristennliche Reformation anzurichten/ unangesehen das die pfarr unnd ettliche guetere vonn dem Abbt zu Kempten zu lehen giengen/ und das sich derhalben der rhat . . . und nit die Lieberin solche enderung unndersteen solle.” StadtA A, LitS, 1545 August 7. For similar statements in other cases, see Haug-Moritz, Der Schmalkaldische Bund, 526. Similar reasoning appears in some of the theological Gutachten evangelical reformers composed for urban councils. In 1545, for example, Martin Bucer advised Hamburg that since the city possessed “die hohe oberkeit unnd das obirist ius,” it could “per imperium” reform local Catholic foundations against the wishes of the cathedral chapter. Schneider, Ius Reformandi, 137.


199

Thomas A. Brady has stated, “So deep and bitter were the divisions between South and North, princes and cities, in the [Schmalkaldic] League, that it is by no means certain that the treaty would have been renewed, even had Charles not attacked the League in 1546.”73 This is undoubtedly true, as the contentious negotiations surrounding Braunschweig-Wolfenbuttel’s sequestration show. Nevertheless, despite ¨ its internal divisions, the Schmalkaldic League continued to supply its urban members with a source of external military and political support. The supplications submitted by Augsburg, Memmingen, and Ulm all display willingness on the part of southern imperial cities to rely on the League for the legitimization and protection of religious reform. These petitions appear to have been negotiated without overt bias. The League and its princely estates, the majority of which espoused reform based on Wittenberg theology, supported Memmingen’s actions in Boos despite the city’s reputation as a center of Upper German reform. The alliance’s committee officially backed Ulm’s endeavor, even though the city’s council was highly critical of the League’s princes and the most vocal supporter of Braunschweig-Wolfenbuttel’s sequestration. ¨ The Schmalkaldic League’s approval or rejection of urban supplications does not appear to have been greatly influenced by dissension over Braunschweig-Wolfenbuttel. As they had in 1540 during the controversy ¨ over Haunstetten, the League’s representatives reached their decisions based on the constellation of legal rights surrounding each conflict. While the internal dispute over Braunschweig-Wolfenbuttel strained relations ¨ within the alliance, it did not prevent southern Germany’s imperial cities from petitioning the League for assistance. The southern cities remained, in the words of Georg Schmidt, “much more dependent than the princes on the Schmalkaldic League for protection of the evangelical faith.”74 This was as true during the 1540s as it was during the 1530s. While some cities may have sought to distance themselves from the League’s governing mechanisms, therefore, the alliance continued to offer the best supraregional forum for protecting urban reform.75 On the eve of the Schmalkaldic War, the League’s support remained indispensable to the Reformation’s preservation in urban as well as rural settings. 73 74 75

Brady, “Phases and Strategies,” 172. G. Schmidt, “Die Freien und Reichsstadte im Schmalkaldischen Bund,” 205. ¨ Gabriele Haug-Moritz has reached a similar conclusion, although urban actions in the mid-1540s indicate that her emphasis on the south German cities’ desire to distance themselves from the alliance is overexaggerated. Haug-Moritz, Der Schmalkaldische Bund.

200

The Negotiated Reformation Ferdinand and the ius reformandi

The June 1 pronouncement of the Schmalkaldic League represented a major defeat for Augsburg. Without the alliance’s backing, Augsburg had no leverage against Ferdinand’s demands for Hess’s removal. Accordingly, the council continued to petition the League for aid while writing Ferdinand directly in an attempt to maintain its religious influence in Mindelaltheim. The city’s magistrates reassured the king they did not wish to undermine or usurp “your majesty’s rights of high authority in Mindelaltheim.” Rather, the village, the parish, the church goods, income and money, as well as all civil and low jurisdictions belong to our cloister St. Katharina. Since the last priest died three years ago and the parish desired another pastor, we decided to accommodate them. We did so not only to ensure the parish income and money would not be taken from them, but also out of concern for their salvation, as is the responsibility of every government toward its subjects.76

Augsburg did not act immediately in 1542 but waited to see “if Almighty God would help the poor people through a general or national settlement in the holy Christian religion.”77 Since this had not happened, Augsburg’s magistrates decided only nine months ago to send the poor people . . . a pious priest, who until now has preached the Gospel in a simple manner and performed other church duties. It never came into our thoughts that through these actions, we would be working against or undermining your majesty’s authority. We remain of the humble opinion that after reading our truthful report, the king will no longer think this is the case.78 76

77 78

“das dorff die pfarr unnd manschafft der kirchensaz rennt und guldt auch die burgerlich unnd alle nidere gerichtbarkait zu Mindlalthaim ist unnserm closter Sant Catherina in Augspurg on mittl zugehorig/ unnd wiewol der jungst pfarrer vor dreuen jarn mit todt verschieden/ unnd die arm pfarrgemain aines anndern seelsorgers emsiglichen begert/ wir auch wol genaigt gewesen/ sie zeitlich zufursehen/ damit nit allain rennt und guldt von ine genumen/ sonnder auch irer selikait unnd unnd wz ain yede oberkait iren underthanen zuthun schuldig war genumen wurde.” StadtA A, LitS Nachtrage, 1545 Mai 26. ¨ StadtA A, LitS Nachtrage, 1545 Mai 26. ¨ “so haben wir im namen gottis den armen leuther allererst bei 3 viertel jarn ainen frumen schlechten priester zugeordnet der ine das hailig evangelium bishere ainfeltiglichen gepredigt unnd anndere kirchen diennst gelaist hat/ ist unns nie inn unnsere gedancken kumen das eur K Mt dadurch zuwider oder zu abbrichen derselben oberkait solln gehanndelt sein/ seien auch den underthenigsten zuversicht eur kunig Mt werdens uff diesen unnsern warhafften bericht/ aller genedigst nit annders ermessen/ noch halten.” StadtA A, LitS Nachtrage, 1545 Mai 26. ¨


201

This letter provoked a stern reply from Ferdinand. The king acknowledged Mindelaltheim’s need for a Christian pastor. Indeed, “had you or the proprietors of St. Katharina staffed this parish with a qualified priest of our old traditional Christian religion,” Ferdinand would not have objected. But Augsburg’s council had installed “a priest in Mindelaltheim . . . who was never ordained a priest, is not a priest, has married a nun, thinks little of the old religion, and no longer administers the holy sacraments.” The king had no choice but to request Augsburg “not delay in any way in removing said preacher from Mindelaltheim.” If this did not occur, “we will feel compelled to remove the aforementioned preacher ourselves, just as we have prescribed and ordered.”79 As this exchange reveals, the conflict over Hess’s appointment revolved around competing ideas of true Christian practice. Augsburg’s magistrates introduced an evangelical preacher in Mindelaltheim not only to extend their city’s sphere of influence, but also to succour the religious needs of the local population. For his part, Ferdinand recognized Augsburg’s ius patronatus in the parish. It was the council’s decision to introduce “a priest . . . who thinks little of the old religion” that angered Ferdinand. Augsburg’s evangelical preacher threatened the margravate’s religious exclusivity, a prospect Ferdinand found objectionable both politically and religiously. In the context of the ongoing debate over jurisdiction in Burgau, Ferdinand could not allow Augsburg’s actions to go unchecked without undermining his claims to territorial sovereignty. He therefore acted to protect the traditional nature of religious practice in Burgau, defending what he believed to be the true faith while justifying his actions on the basis of high justice. In rejecting Hess’s installation, the king argued his authority to maintain Mindelaltheim’s loyalty to the Catholic Church superseded the individual privileges of clerical presentation. In its response to Ferdinand, Augsburg’s council denied it had transgressed by introducing an evangelical preacher, for “we practice no new 79

“hette den innhabern Sant Katrina closters zu Augspurg . . . oder euch . . . solche pfarr mit ainem teuglichen pfarerr/ unnser altten cristlichen hergebrachten religion verwonnt unnd anhenngig . . . zubesezen”; “ainen schlechten priester daselbsthin geen Mindlalthaim verordnet/ daenntgegen werden wir bericht/ das derselb ewer verodneten zu priester nie geweicht unnd kain priester sein auch ain closterfraw zu vermaintter ee genomen haben solle/ das auch derselb von der altten religion wenig halten/ noch die hayligen sacrament cristlicher ordnung nach administriere”; “dz ir angezaigtn predicanntn/ von stunden unnd on alless lenngers aufhalten von Mindelalthaim ob unnd dannen verschaffet unnd solches kains weegs waygeret”; “das wir auch verursacht wurden bemelten predicanntn selbst weg und dannen thuenn zelassen/ wie wir dann solches dermassen zubeschehen verordnet unnd bevolhen haben.” StadtA A, LitS Nachtrage, 1545 Juni 9. ¨

202


religion, but rather the ancient Christian religion as nurtured by Christ Himself and the holy apostles.” Concerning Hess, “your majesty has been wrongly informed that he has not been ordained according to the old order, and that he has married a nun.” Hess “is an old man who has been a priest for twenty years. He has not married a nun.” Accordingly, “we ask your majesty most humbly and respectfully to allow this priest to remain in the village until a solution has been found to the religious conflict.”80 Augsburg’s apparently duplicitous defense of Hess points to the contingent nature of religious reform during the 1530s and 1540s. The city waited for two years to act in Mindelaltheim, finally installing a preacher only after receiving support from Ulm. When faced with strong Catholic opposition, Augsburg’s magistrates searched for some type of legal justification that would allow their preacher to remain in the village. Their defense shifted from emphasizing their ius patronatus to appealing to the care of souls to highlighting the interim nature of Hess’s appointment until the final resolution of the religious schism. Augsburg’s council hoped these tactics would grant it time to secure the support of its allies, which would in turn supply the city with leverage against Ferdinand. Unfortunately for Augsburg, the nature of its rights in Mindelaltheim undercut the legitimacy of its endeavor. In response to renewed petitions for assistance, the Schmalkaldic League recommended that Augsburg “immediately and in the quickest way possible remove the preacher so the city does not receive an embarrassing amount of scorn and disdain.”81 Meanwhile, Augsburg’s delegates began tense negotiations with one of Ferdinand’s aides, Dr. Georg Gienger.82 These face-to-face talks proved less than successful. The delegates pressed Gienger to allow Hess and his family to 80

81 82

“gebrachen wir uns ye kainen newen/ sonnder der uralten christenlichen religion wie die von Christo selbs und den hailigen apposteln gepflanzt”; “darumb eur kunig Mt in den unnd sonderlich dz er nit nach alter ordnung geweicht/ das er jungst ain closterfrau zue ee haben sollt/ ettwz zumildt bericht ist”; “ain alter man und vor 20 Jarn priester gewest/ und kain closterfrau zu ee genumen hat”; “so langt an eur K Mt unnser underhtenigst gehorsam bitt und anrueffen/ die geruchen aller genedigst disen priester des orts lenger bis zu usstrag des spans in der religion pleiben zelassen.” StadtA A, LitS Nachtrage, ¨ 1545 Juni 20. StadtA A, LitS, 1545 Juni 24. Born in Ulm, Gienger (ca. 1496–1577) studied law in Vienna and was one of Ferdinand’s most trusted advisors. From 1538–44 he occupied the position of royal vice chancellor. He remained an important figure in Ferdinand’s court until Ferdinand’s death in 1564. Alfred Kohler, Ferdinand I. 1503–1564 (Munich: Beck, 2003), 145; Laubach, Ferdinand I. als Kaiser, 23. For a discussion of Ferdinand’s political advisors, see Helmut Goetz, “Die geheimen Ratgeber Ferdinands I. (1503–1564). Ihre Personlichkeit im Urteil der ¨


203

remain in Mindelaltheim. Gienger flatly denied this request: “Because of the current state of disagreement in the matter of religion, the king is greatly concerned with enforcing our religion in his princely territory in order to prevent other confessions from gaining an entranceway or encouragement.”83 Faced with Ferdinand’s intransigence, Augsburg’s delegates advised their home council “it would be best to drop the matter so we do not fan the fire that already burns there.”84 For Ferdinand and his aides, possession of high justice gave him the authority to enforce the exclusivity of the “old traditional Christian religion” in his principalities. This was especially important in a territory as politically diffuse as the margravate of Burgau, where the tangle of legal rights and the 1492 letter of privilege promoted local autonomy. The king moved forcefully against the Reformation in one of the margravate’s villages to prevent a precedent by which evangelical reform might enter other communities under Habsburg rule. He opposed Augsburg to protect the religious homogeneity of his principalities and to maintain the integrity of his lordship as margrave. In the process, the king and his confessional opponents in the Schmalkaldic League advanced essentially the same argument: Ferdinand’s ownership of high justice meant the ius reformandi in Mindelaltheim belonged to him alone. The Expulsion of Hess’s Family At the conclusion of their discussions with Gienger, Augsburg’s representatives informed their council “we could not tell from [Gienger’s] remarks whether the king plans to proceed in a harsh or mild manner.”85 It did not take long to find out. The failure of Augsburg’s policy in Mindelaltheim reached a nadir in late July-October 1545 with the forceful expulsion of Hess’s wife and children. Augsburg’s council removed Hess in late June, but in order to maintain a foothold in the parish, it decided “his wife shall remain in Mindelaltheim.”86 In mid-July, the city received word that “the

83

84 85 86

Nuntien und Gesandten,” Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken 42/43 (1963): 453–94. “dhweil der missverstandt der Religion izt also stennde/ das darumb ir kon Mt ain gross bedencken gehabt unnser religion in irer lanndtsfurstlichen obergkait zugestatten/ aus besorgung das es ein einganng machen/ und anndern auch ursach geben mochte.” StadtA A, LitS, 1545 Juli 1. “das vielleicht besser sein sollt umb dieselbig nit anzuhallten . . . damit wir nit das feur/ so an dies ort one das print/ derner auffplasen.” StadtA A, LitS, 1545 Juli 8. StadtA A, LitS, 1545 Juli 15. StadtA A, RP, 20 Juni 1545.

204


local bailiff (Amman) of Burgau has ordered the wife and children of the Mindelaltheim preacher to vacate the rectory within eight days.”87 The council wrote the local bailiff and his superior the high bailiff of Burgau in protest, threatening to “defend and protect its jurisdiction and legal possessions” as St. Katharina’s caretaker.88 It ordered the margravate’s administrators “to pursue no further this invalid and improper ban of yours.”89 High bailiff Friedrich von Grafeneck replied he acted “in this affair not on my authority as high bailiff of Burgau, but rather on the power of a royal command.” He had no choice but to carry out the king’s will.90 Augsburg’s council turned to its jurists to counter von Grafeneck. It chose Konrad Hel, Claudius Pius Peutinger, and Lucas Ulstat – the same three who penned the initial 1542 recommendation concerning Mindelaltheim – to formulate a response to the high bailiff. Their reply expressed incredulity that “his majesty the king would issue such an order, especially since he is aware of the privileges and freedoms that the landholders of Burgau hold. Namely, besides the four Malefiz, the margrave has no authority to govern or control the possessions, goods, or subjects of said landholders.” On this basis, the council ordered von Grafeneck “to refrain now and in the future from such violent disorder and molestation against us and our subjects.”91 For Augsburg’s magistrates, the 1492 letter of privilege provided the most convincing justification for their actions in Mindelaltheim. Their use of this letter, however, depended on the audience they addressed. The council’s shifting argumentation relied on the ability of its jurists to formulate legal rationales in response to specific conflicts. In this vein, the council sought to exploit the legal complexities of Burgau to justify its earlier decision to install a preacher within the margravate’s borders. Augsburg’s council also made a final effort to transfer Ulm’s pledges of support into a concrete advantage for the city. As it had done in August 1544, Augsburg sent an embassy to negotiate face-to-face with Ulm’s magistrates. On September 6, 1545, Pius Peutinger arrived in Ulm and pleaded his case before the city council. He “negotiated the matter in such a way that they would at least advise us how we should answer the king or 87 88 89 90 91

StadtA A, RP, 28 Juli 1545. StadtA A, Markgrafschaft Burgau (Hereafter MB), Nr. 9, 1545 Juli 29. StadtA A, MB, Nr. 9, 1545 August 1. StadtA A, MB, Nr. 9, 1545 August 4. StadtA A, MB, Nr. 9, 1545 August Undated.


205

his commissars.” While Ulm’s magistrates sympathized with Augsburg’s plight, they could offer no advice or political backing, “since the council does not possess any goods or lands in the margravate.” Pius Peutinger pursued the matter, stating, “To the best of my knowledge, my lords in Augsburg also do not possess any goods in the margravate, but rather act for the common good through their role as masters of the hospital, monasteries, and foundations. They wish to be advised concerning the related goods they administer.” Ulm’s council apologized but “without the mayor Georg Besserer they could negotiate nothing.”92 When push came to shove, Ulm’s council reverted to its 1542 position. This shift likely resulted from the course of Ulm’s own reform efforts in its surrounding countryside, which included not only Gottingen but also ¨ another nearby village named Gogglingen. As in Mindelaltheim, Ferdi¨ nand controlled high justice in Gogglingen, and Ulm’s council sought ¨ to reform the parish against his will. Predictably, while the Schmalkaldic League supported Ulm’s efforts in Gottingen, it denied the council’s ¨ request for aid in Gogglingen because of Ulm’s lack of high justice. On ¨ August 28, a little over one week before Pius Peutinger arrived for negotiations, Ulm’s council voted to maintain its appointment of a preacher in Gottingen. At the same time, however, it “decided on the basis of the ¨ League’s decision and advice . . . to put an end to [reform attempts] in 93 Involved in its own reform disputes with the Habsburgs Gogglingen.” ¨ and competing with Augsburg for economic predominance in Burgau, Ulm’s council saw little it could do to help its neighboring city, especially when Augsburg’s council insisted on maintaining a strategy Ulm had already abandoned. Ferdinand’s control of high justice meant even face-to-face negotiations could not salvage support for Augsburg’s policy among its closest allies. 92

93

“hab ich dan icht soviel gehandlet . . . was sie allenthalben in sehen bedenken sollen/ auch was und wie die Ko¨ Mt oder derselben comissarien/ zuanntworten sein werdt . . . demnach sie sich gegen mir endtschuldigen/ ain rhat fur ¨ sich selb/ kaine guet in der Marggrafschaft habe . . . darauff hab ich den funf angzaigt/ das meine ¨ gehaimen rhaten ¨ herrn meines wissen/ selber auch nit gueter in der Marggrafschaft hatten/ und diselbe ¨ Spital/ ordenshewser/ gestifter almuesen und pflegen d aber mein herren/ hatten als der ¨ magistrer das bdenck/ das ihnen gepurn ¨ wolt/ auff das gemain acht zurhaben . . . das sie von irer verwandten gueter wegen/ die ain rhat in verwaltend hat/ ¨ die sich erstmalen berathschlagen liess.“; “auff den herren ihren burgermaister Georg Bessrer/ one den man hierin nichts handlen verzuvahr.“ StadtA A, MB, Nr. 9, 1545 September 7. “darauff vernomen der Ainungsverwanten Stend/ entschaid unnd rathsam bedenncken/ ist meinen Gn hr Herrschaftpflegers abermals bevelch geben . . . mit Goggklingen soll in ruw gestanden werden.“ StadtA UL, A 3530 K, Ratsprotokolle, 28 August 1545.

206


The controversy surrounding Mindelaltheim continued until Ferdinand intervened personally in late October 1545. The king dismissed Augsburg’s claims, since neither you nor others of your religion have allowed places in your principalities and high jurisdictions that possess rights of low justice or church goods to determine their religion according to their own whims. Hence, we believe it proper and reasonable to allow no religious innovations to enter our high jurisdictions. We once again order you to remove the aforementioned preacher’s wife and her children from the rectory and to hinder us no longer in the exercise of our princely high justice.94

If this did not happen swiftly, “we have given the command to remove them from the rectory and our princely territory and to staff the parish in question with a qualified Christian pastor, whom the spiritual Ordinarius of the parish shall appoint.”95 This represented Ferdinand’s most forceful statement. He rejected outright Augsburg’s ius reformandi in Mindelaltheim, threatening to circumvent St. Katharina’s right of presentation by granting the appointment of the next pastor to the parish’s Ordinarius, the bishop of Augsburg. This ensured a Catholic priest would replace Hess. Since evangelicals did not “allow places that possess rights of low justice to determine their religion,” neither did Ferdinand. Without the support of its evangelical allies, Augsburg’s council could do little to resist. On November 7 it wrote Ferdinand one last time. The council apologized if its actions had offended the king. It hoped he would “allow us and those related to us in the margravate to retain our special freedoms.”96 Hess’s family left Mindelaltheim in the following weeks, and the rectory was prepared for the next priest.97 These steps settled the matter for Ferdinand. 94

95 96 97

“weder ir selbst noch die anderen ewer religion verwandtn stennd in irn furstenthumben unnd hoehn obrigkaiten dene so nidere obrigkaitn oder kirchensaz ¨ haben zuesehen oder gestatten ires gefallenss in der religion zu disponiern . . . gedenckhen wir der ennden unsere hohe obrigkait der gepur unnd billichait nach auch zehandthaben unnd zuverfechtn unnd hierinn kains wegs zugestatten unns mit ainicher newerung eingriff zethun zelassen/ unnd ist demnach nochmaln unnd zuubefluss unnser ernnstlichs begern unnd bevelch an euch/ das ir angeregts dess predicantn Magd sampt derselben kindern on alles verziehen auss dem pfarrhof zu Mindelalthaim abvorderet/ den pfarrhof raumen lasset/ und unns in unnser lanndsfurstlichen hohen obrigkait kain eintrag thuet.” StadtA A, LitS Nachtrage, 1545 Oktober 24. ¨ StadtA A, LitS Nachtrage, 1545 Oktober 24. ¨ StadtA A, LitS Nachtrage, 1545 November 7. ¨ Roth, Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 3, 142.


207

For Augsburg’s council, however, the matter was not yet closed. The city’s magistrates tried one last attempt at negotiation, taking their case to an unlikely source: Mindelaltheim’s Ordinarius, the bishop of Augsburg. While it had removed Hess from Mindelaltheim because of “increasing danger,” the council explained it had left behind “a woman to take care of the house until the parish could be otherwise staffed.” This woman von Grafeneck now sought to expel. Augsburg asked the bishop to display “good, peaceful neighborliness” and “ignore the aforementioned complaints and let the matter be decided by old custom.”98 Predictably, Augsburg’s request found little support. The bishop had “been a good Augsburger from his youth . . . and wishes to show Augsburg a benevolent, good, and neighborly will.” However, his hands were tied. First, “the supposed right the council possesses concerning the parish income is questionable.” Second, von Grafeneck had a royal command, and the bishop had no power to countermand the king. Indeed, the bishop could do nothing but suggest the council “write the king as well in your need.”99 Understandably, Augsburg’s magistrates did not follow his advice. Augsburg’s installation of a preacher in Mindelaltheim failed because the city did not possess the appropriate legal rights. The king’s invocation of his “high and territorial authority” and his objection to a preacher that strayed from his religion highlight the interconnected nature of the ius reformandi, high justice, and territorial lordship in the period before the Peace of Augsburg.100 The failure of reform in Mindelaltheim also points to a wider weakness in Augsburg’s strategy of negotiation. Negotiation could work as a tool to create expanded spheres of influence only if the parties involved controlled some form of leverage and were willing to bargain. In Donauworth and Kaufbeuren, both the local council and ¨ their neighboring cities possessed something the other side desired. In Mindelaltheim, however, Augsburg had nothing that Ferdinand needed. Its council controlled many legal rights, but not the most important one: high justice. When Ferdinand proved unwilling to compromise, the city’s attempts to negotiate with him and his aides inevitably foundered. 98 99 100

Beilage B, Gutachten for negotiations with the bishop, StadtA A, LitS Nachtrage, 1545 ¨ Undated. Bishop of Augsburg’s response, StadtA A, LitS Nachtrage, 1545 Undated. ¨ The ius reformandi’s relationship to high justice and rights of territorial lordship remained important after 1555 as well. See Kiessling, “Reichsritterschaft und Reformation,” 150–65; Schiersner, Politik, Konfession und Kommunikation.

208


A similar trend appears in Augsburg’s attempts to secure Ulm’s support. Ulm’s promises never resulted in any major help for Augsburg, and Ulm declined to advise its neighbor in the waning stages of the conflict. Not even Augsburg’s attempts at face-to-face negotiation could produce a beneficial result. This was true of the city’s direct negotiations with Gienger as well. Face-to-face negotiations offered a powerful means for exerting pressure on other polities, but they were not infallible. No matter which form it took, negotiation relied on leverage and a willingness to find common ground. Without either of these things, face-to-face discussions could bear as little fruit as “a simple letter.” This problem became especially pressing in the face of oncoming war.

7 Eastern Swabia and the Schmalkaldic War

On July 9, 1546, troops under the command of Augsburg’s military captain Sebastian Schertlin marched into the Allgau A ¨ city of Fussen. ¨ few days earlier, war had erupted between the Holy Roman Emperor and the Schmalkaldic League. Exposed to invasion from the south and the north, Augsburg sat in a precarious position. It was for protection against just such a crisis that the city’s magistrates had pursued their program of religio-political expansion. As the war began, therefore, the council encouraged Kaufbeuren to close ranks militarily with Augsburg, while it informed Donauworth it would “immediately send a detachment ¨ of troops . . . to protect the bridgehead and your city from the enemy.”1 As part of this strategy to secure the northern and southern passages to the city, Augsburg’s magistrates ordered Schertlin to occupy Fussen. A ¨ territorial city under the authority of the bishop of Augsburg, Fussen’s ¨ location at the foot of the Alps made it a crucial gateway to Habsburg Austria. It served as a frequent marshaling station for imperial armies, but on July 9, Schertlin entered the city unopposed. With him came evangelical reform. Augsburg’s council assigned one of its preachers, Holy Cross’s pastor Johann Flinner, to accompany Schertlin’s forces into the field. Once Schertlin had secured Fussen, Flinner “removed the idols from the ¨ churches” and began to preach the principles of Augsburg’s reformation. He started by explaining “from Mark that the Gospel does no one harm. I then expounded the end of the second chapter of the Acts of the Apostles. I talked for three days about the rise of the first Christian 1

StadtA A, LitS, 1546 Juli 9.

209

210


church and explained to the people that if they leave the papal church, they will not have left the old faith or the apostolic church.” A few days later, Flinner preached on “the Sunday Gospel from Luke 6, namely, how the Gospel does not forbid good works, but rather teaches whence good works come, what they are, and that no one can find salvation except through Christ.” The preacher performed “no ceremonies in the churches, even less than are held in the Augsburg Church,” but he did begin “to baptize, bless marriages, and perform other actions according to the content of Augsburg’s ordinances, which I have here with me. This has greatly pleased many of the people.” In the early stages of the Schmalkaldic War, Augsburg’s council and its preacher found new opportunities to extend the city’s sphere of influence by freeing Christian souls “from the devil’s bonds.”2 Flinner’s activity in Fussen opens a window onto the religious tactics ¨ utilized by Augsburg’s preachers in their attempts to evangelize nearby communities. His choice of biblical texts, as well as his removal of images from the churches, sought to instill a sense of confidence in the local population that they were following God’s will. By breaking with the Catholic Church, argued Flinner, Fussen’s burghers reunited themselves with the ¨ true apostolic church, a connection the preacher made explicit at multiple points in his sermons. Wolfgang Musculus and Michael Keller would have preached similar themes in Donauworth and Kaufbeuren, where ¨ the nature of religious reform remained a matter of negotiation at the start of the Schmalkaldic War. After securing the August 1545 adoption of the Augsburg Confession in its neighboring cities, Augsburg’s council attempted to strengthen its control over reform in both communes by lending them new evangelical preachers and by pushing for their inclusion in the Schmalkaldic League. In the process of negotiation, however, both neighboring councils sought to distance themselves from Augsburg’s influence. When hostilities began in July 1546, magistrates in Donauworth and Kaufbeuren announced they would “offer neither side ¨ Augsburg’s council employed help or resistance.”3 As it did in Fussen, ¨ military force as a last resort to protect its strategic interests. The September 1545-October 1546 negotiations concerning religious reform in Donauworth and Kaufbeuren revolved around three ¨ main issues: the defense of the Reformation from external attacks on 2 3

Roth, Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 3, 390; Friedrich Roth, “Zur Einfuhrung ¨ der Reformation in der Stadt Fussen,” BBK 9 (1903): 145–53, quotes at 145 and 150. ¨ EKA KF, Anlage 59, fol. 180f.

Eastern Swabia and the Schmalkaldic War

211

its legitimacy, the procurement of new preachers, and the two cities’ proposed admission to the Schmalkaldic League. Similar problems confronted almost every evangelical imperial city in southern Germany during the 1530s and 1540s. Reform in both cities continued to rely on external agents, and Donauworth and Kaufbeuren sought to use intercity ¨ communication to consolidate their reform efforts. However, the move toward war frayed Donauworth’s and Kaufbeuren’s relationships with ¨ neighboring cities, leading to the eventual collapse of negotiations with Augsburg. These cities’ decisions for neutrality, coupled with Augsburg’s forceful reaction, reveal the limitations of negotiation as a policy for creating spheres of influence as well as the challenges the Schmalkaldic War presented to the urban Reformation’s survival in Eastern Swabia. External Attacks on Reform Almost immediately after Donauworth and Kaufbeuren accepted the ¨ Augsburg Confession, the Reformation in these two cities came under assault from external Catholic forces. In response, both councils solicited aid from Augsburg. The initial attack on Donauworth’s reformation ¨ came from the bishop of Augsburg. On August 29, 1545, the same day Donauworth and Augsburg enacted their military alliance, Donauworth’s ¨ ¨ magistrates expressed concern to Georg Frolich regarding “what the ¨ Cardinal was going to allege against them in the coming days.” Frolich ¨ advised Donauworth to “write my sirs the council without delay.”4 A ¨ few days later on September 6, a delegation from the bishop arrived in Donauworth and submitted “on command of the emperor” a series ¨ of official complaints accusing the council “of introducing religious changes in its churches that violate promulgated imperial mandates magistrates followed Frolich’s advice and recesses.”5 Donauworth’s ¨ ¨ and turned to Augsburg for assistance. Augsburg’s council reassured its neighbor that “these things are not new or so constructed that there does not exist an answer that will please both the emperor and all Christians while serving God’s honor.” Augsburg offered Donauworth its support, ¨ but it wished first “to come to a consensus with Ulm and then send you our opinion.”6 If the bishop required an immediate reply, Donauworth’s ¨ 4 5 6

StadtA A, RP, 29 August 1545. StadtA A, RA 572, Undated. This document is filed under StadtA A, RA 572, 1545 September 10, but it was not sent until mid-October. StadtA A, RA 572, 1545 September 10.

212


council should “not enter into a wide-ranging disputation, but rather give a general answer. You are not alone in this praiseworthy Christian matter, but stand alongside numerous important and honorable estates of the Augsburg Confession.”7 Augsburg’s council handed the matter to Frolich and Nicholas Maier, ¨ 8 who composed a response to the bishop. It then forwarded this recommendation along with the original mandate to Nuremberg and Ulm. Augsburg’s magistrates asked their Three Cities’ allies “to examine the proposed response, to improve, shorten, or expand it, and then to return it to us along with your thoughts on the matter. We wish in this affair to come to an agreement with you.” This would ensure the reply “will be sent as a decree of the three cities, so the Cardinal will be answered by the Donauworther according to the promised support.”9 By secur¨ ing a collective expression of support from the Three Cities’ League, Augsburg’s council hoped to consolidate its new role as Donauworth’s ¨ official political protector. It sought to make good on its earlier assurances that Donauworth did not need to join the Three Cities’ League to ¨ receive aid or guidance from nearby cities. Nuremberg’s council found Augsburg’s response “very judicious and well thought through.”10 For its part, Ulm explained that, since “it was not clear the three cities desired to come to a consensus and produce a unanimous answer,” it had already written Donauworth with its own advice. It sent Augsburg a copy of its ¨ letter and promised “to let the matter rest at that.”11 Ulm’s letter of advice to Donauworth encouraged the city to persevere ¨ in its reform efforts, for “the true confessor of God’s Word is saddled with the cross from the very start.” It echoed Augsburg’s recommendation “to enter into a disputation with neither the emperor nor the bishop of Augsburg,” but it also encouraged Donauworth’s council to write the ¨ emperor directly to justify its reforms.12 Both Augsburg and Nuremberg found this course of action misguided, “since through your opposition 7 8 9

10 11 12

StadtA A, RA 572, 1545 September 15. StadtA A, RP, 10 September 1545. “eur w wolle denselben anhoren bessern/ mindern oder mehren/ unnd unns widerumb sambt irem bedennckhen ubersennden/ so wollen wor uns mit eur w unnd denen von Ulme hierinn vergleichen/ darnach solche anntwurt/ durch ain missive inn e. w. Gedachten von Ulm unnd unnsern namen, auch unnter unser dreyer stett decreten zusenden/ damit der Cardinal gethane vertrosten nach/ durch die von Worde beanntwurt werde” StadtA A, RA 558, 1545 September 12. StA N, Rchst Nbg, Rep. 61a, Nr. 134, fol. 195r–195v. StadtA A, RA 583, 1545 September 21. StadtA A, RA 583, 1545 September 17.


213

the emperor might be provoked to issue further mandates.”13 Augsburg’s magistrates also disliked that Ulm had written Donauworth without con¨ sulting them, since “we had hoped they would agree with Nuremberg and us on a unanimous opinion.”14 This annoyance turned to anger when Donauworth’s magistrates wrote Augsburg stating, “We have already ¨ received a recommendation from Ulm, which came to us five days ago. If possible, we ask that you and Nuremberg send us your advice as well with the messenger bearing this letter.”15 Augsburg’s magistrates fumed that “the Ulmer have gotten ahead of themselves in this matter.”16 Nuremberg’s council had to urge restraint on Augsburg, lest angry statements, “should they come into the hands of Ulm’s council, serve to stoke antagonism more than good friendship.”17 Augsburg’s magistrates saw reason in Nuremberg’s advice. Nevertheless, they remained disappointed that Ulm’s actions contradicted their hope that “the three cities Nuremberg, Ulm, and Augsburg would produce a unanimous advice and reply, not only to show Donauworth more steadfast support and solace, but ¨ also to foster an increased sense of friendship and cooperation between us.”18 The attitude of Augsburg’s council recalls the city’s March 1534 attempts to secure support for its own negotiations with the bishop. At that time, Augsburg’s magistrates objected to Nuremberg’s criticism of their “childish” actions.19 Eleven years later, Ulm’s decision to write Donauworth apart from the Three Cities’ League undermined Augsburg’s ¨ renewed attempt to coordinate a common policy toward the bishop. This especially irked Augsburg because of its recent treaty with Donauworth. ¨ As the “foremost city” for Donauworth, Augsburg’s council believed ¨ it possessed the prerogative to determine the nature of the advice its smaller neighbor received. From this perspective, Ulm’s letter threatened Augsburg’s recent religio-political gains in Donauworth by intruding ¨ on its sphere of influence. When Ulm’s cooperation proved impractical, therefore, Augsburg and Nuremberg “ordered our jurists and theologians 13 14 15 16 17 18

19

StadtA A, RA 572, 1545 Oktober 3. StadtA A, RA 572, 1545 September 26. StadtA A, RA 572, 1545 September 25. StadtA A, RA 572, 1545 September 26. StA N, Rchst Nbg, Rep 61a, Nr. 134, fol. 215v–216r. “die erbern drey stett Nurmberg Ulm und Augspurg . . . aines ainhelligen Ratschlags unnd anntwort verglichen das solchs nit allen denen von Worde zu merer bestenndigkait unnd trost gedihen/ sonnder auch zwischen unns merere freundschafft und zusammensetzens . . . verursacht hett.” StadtA A, LitS Nachtrage, 1545 September 26. ¨ See Chapter 2.

214


to produce the accompanying letter of advice” without Ulm “in order to display our goodwill and support.”20 Donauworth’s council assured Augsburg that it had “decided to pre¨ pare and send the response to the Cardinal as soon as possible in all ways exactly the same as you and Nuremberg have advised us.”21 This defense strategy, as well as Augsburg’s actions in this matter, point to the Three Cities’ League as a potential vehicle to strengthen regionalized spheres of influence. The bishop’s letter of complaint was the first danger that confronted Donauworth after the enactment of its alliance ¨ with Augsburg. This made the coordination of a collective statement of support within the Three Cities’ League vital for Augsburg’s magistrates, since this represented the first opportunity to display their effectiveness as Donauworth’s formal protectors. The council’s annoyance ¨ at Ulm highlights the importance it placed on maintaining its status as Donauworth’s leading source of consultation. In the end, Donauworth’s ¨ ¨ council patterned its official response almost word for word after Augsburg’s model. This successfully avoided interference from the bishop while preserving evangelical reform in the city under Augsburg’s influence. At the same time that Augsburg’s council coordinated Donauworth’s ¨ reply to the bishop, it also helped Kaufbeuren defend itself against an imperial decree accusing the council of “apostatizing to the condemned and forbidden Anabaptist sect.”22 Dated September 5, 1545, the emperor’s mandate denounced Kaufbeuren’s decision “to install new preachers who without any inhibitions have spread horrific teachings and sects. They have preached to the seduction of the common folk.”23 Faced with imperial demands “to return to the old true Christian faith,” Kaufbeuren sent a delegation to Augsburg for aid. Augsburg’s council asked its jurists to compose a response to the emperor, which Kaufbeuren the used as its formal reply to Charles V.24 Like reform in Donauworth, ¨ 20 21

22 23 24

StadtA A, RA 572, 1545 Oktober 3. “wir enschlossen seien/ die antwurt alss pald/ in aller massen und gestalt wie . . . durch E F W und die von Nurmberg beratschlagt/ und gestolt ¨ ¨ worden ist/ ungeendert zefertigen/ und dem Cardenal zueschicken.” StadtA A, RA 572, 1545 Oktober 10. Donauworth ¨ forwarded the response composed by Augsburg’s jurists to the bishop on October 15. Roth, Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 3, 264; Zelzer, Geschichte der Stadt ¨ Donauworth, 181. Alt, Reformation und Gegenreformation, 71. Quoted in Roth, Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 3, 259–60, 288. The emperor’s mandate targeted Burkhart Schilling and Mathias Espenmuller. ¨ Alt, Reformation und Gegenreformation, 71; Roth, Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 3, 288.


215

defense of Kaufbeuren’s reformation depended on Augsburg’s guidance, a connection Augsburg’s council made explicit. In its letter of recommendation, Augsburg encouraged Kaufbeuren’s magistrates “to continue as before in your blossoming Christian work and not allow yourselves to be frightened or discouraged from these practices by threats.” Other cities like Kaufbeuren had come under assault from Catholic forces as well. Indeed, Augsburg forwarded its neighbor a series of “letters between the Cardinal of Augsburg and our dear friends from Donauworth” who faced ¨ similar hardships. Augsburg’s council urged Kaufbeuren to stand fast like Donauworth and “to put all good trust in the members of the [Christian] ¨ alliance.”25 This letter marks the first time Augsburg’s council made a clear connection in writing between events in Kaufbeuren and Donauworth. In the ¨ process, Augsburg’s actions toward its neighboring cities emerge as two aspects of the same regional policy. In both cases, Augsburg wished to draw the smaller city into a more dependent religio-political relationship with the eventual goal of incorporating it into the Schmalkaldic League. The Eastern Swabian metropolis sought to create a regional network of evangelical alliances that could extend the influence of its reform style while safeguarding the city in case of war. In order to reassure Kaufbeuren, Augsburg’s council forwarded its counterpart the documents detailing Donauworth’s confrontation with the bishop and advanced ¨ Donauworth as an example for Kaufbeuren to follow. The negotiations ¨ surrounding the Reformation in their two neighboring cities were closely linked for Augsburg’s magistrates. Both communes represented key targets of the council’s attempts to expand its sphere of influence in Eastern Swabia. When faced with external attacks on their reformations, the councils in Donauworth and Kaufbeuren both turned to Augsburg, whose ¨ jurists composed written justifications for their neighbors’ reformations. Augsburg acted as a buttress to the smaller cities, providing legal expertise and enabling them to fend off attacks on their sovereignty. It made special sense for the councils in Donauworth and Kaufbeuren to solicit ¨ Augsburg’s assistance in defending reform, since Augsburg had recently played an instrumental role in guiding the Reformation’s introduction within their walls. These dynamics underscore the regional embeddedness of the Reformation in Eastern Swabia, where systems of solidarity and support between cities allowed religious reform to survive attempts to uproot it. Indeed, the defense of the Reformation in Donauworth ¨ 25

StadtA A, LitS RefA, 1545 Oktober 1.

216


and Kaufbeuren relied on the assistance of neighboring cities in a manner reminiscent of reformation suit proceedings during the 1530s.26 This similarity suggests that the influence of regional politics on the Reformation in Eastern Swabia paralleled developments in southern Germany’s other urban hierarchies. In Eastern Swabia and elsewhere, intercity patterns of consultation continued to shape religious reform long after imperial cities officially declared their support for the Reformation. The Procurement of New Preachers Shortly after facilitating the defense of reform in Donauworth and Kauf¨ beuren, Augsburg’s council sought to stabilize the Reformation in the two cities by sending them new evangelical preachers. This marked a continuation of Augsburg’s initial attempts to mold its neighbors’ confessional affiliation through the ministries of Wolfgang Musculus and Michael Keller. As argued in Chapter 4, the political and religious goals of Musculus’s mission to Donauworth were tightly fused. Keller’s mis¨ sion in Kaufbeuren had a similar dual purpose. As early as July 1544, Keller urged Kaufbeuren’s mayor Anton Honold to adopt Augsburg-style reform and to seek admission to the Schmalkaldic League.27 Once Kaufbeuren adopted the Augsburg Confession in August 1545, Keller took up residency in the city and began to reorient its religious practice toward Augsburg. Continuing the work of Memmingen’s preachers, Keller introduced an Augsburg-style Eucharist and preached against the spiritual danger of radical sects. Similar to Musculus’s actions in Donauworth, ¨ Keller also wrote a new church ordinance for Kaufbeuren based on Augsburg’s model. This established an official framework for Kaufbeuren’s new evangelical church structure.28 His efforts “freed [Kaufbeuren] from numerous false doctrines, discord, and dangers that existed not only in magisterial policy, but in the church as well.” To prevent a reversion to radical religious practice, a fear stoked by the continued presence of Mathias Espenmuller in the city, Keller and his home council made a ¨ special point of encouraging Kaufbeuren “to faithfully persist in your budding Christian work and not to look back into the past.”29 Through his mission, Keller hoped “we will soon have a fine, right¨ believing flank town (flugelstettlin) in Kaufbeuren that, God willing, will 26 27 28 29

See Chapter 1. See Chapter 5. Alt, Reformation und Gegenreformation, 71. “inn irer stat nunmehr viler irrigkait widerwillen unnd gefarde die sich ain Zeithere nit ¨ allain inn der burgerlichen pollicey sonnder auch inn der kirchen erhalten/ enntladen


217

not only stand beside the city of Augsburg in religious matters, but also in other Christian and neighborly affairs as well.”30 The same desire to spread Augsburg-style reform and to extend Augsburg’s sphere of influence motivated Musculus’s mission in Donauworth. Both preachers acted ¨ as willing emissaries of their home council who sought to strengthen the religio-political ties between Augsburg and its neighboring cities. Accordingly, Katharina Sieh-Burens’s contention that Musculus and Keller experienced a “marked loss of influence” after 1543 belies their continued significance to Augsburg’s council.31 While their role in the city’s internal politics may have decreased, both preachers became key agents of the council’s external policy. Their missions were fundamental to the success of Augsburg’s program of expansion, and their overall importance to the city’s leadership circles does not appear to have diminished. Rather, Keller, Musculus, and magistrates redirected their talents in service of the council’s larger religio-political objectives in Eastern Swabia. Keller remained in Kaufbeuren until mid-December 1545. His opinion quickly became formative for the local council in matters of reform, and he proved especially helpful in procuring new preachers for the city. Based on Keller’s advice, Kaufbeuren wrote Augsburg’s council on September 14, asking its neighbor to send a “learned, godly, Christian preacher and pastor.”32 Augsburg’s council expected such a petition. A few weeks earlier, it had asked Keller “to remind Kaufbeuren it would be to its advantage to look for a permanent pastor now. Also remind the city that, if it wished, we would be willing to give thought to the appropriate Christian man for its churches.”33 Keller assured his home council, “I will propose to the council in Kaufbeuren that it write to you my lords and ask for your help in finding a permanent pastor.”34 At Keller’s suggestion, Augsburg had selected Johann Freissleben, a preacher in the Franconian town of Sulzbach.35 Augsburg’s magistrates hoped “even though his speech and

30

31 32 33 34 35

unnd beruwigt seien”; “sie wollen inn dem angefanngnen christlichen werckh trostlich furfarn unnd nit wider hindersich sehen.” EKA KF, Anlage 101, Nr. 5. By referring to Kaufbeuren as a “flugelstettlin,” Keller emphasized Kaufbeuren’s impor¨ tance as a potential military outpost to Augsburg’s south. For this reason, I use the translation “flank town” rather than “satellite town,” although Keller’s statement also implies a deferential relationship between the two cities. “so wollen wir gar pald/ ein fein ¨ artig/ rechtglaubig/ flugelstettlin/ an Kauffbeuren haben/ das/ ob Got wil/ nicht allein der ¨ Religion halben/ sonder auch inn anderen christlichen und nachtparlichen sachen/ der stat Augspurg/ wol ansteen wirdet.” StadtA A, RA 541, 1545 August 27. Sieh-Burens, Oligarchie, 161. StadtA A, RA 541, 1545 September 14. StadtA A, RA 541, 1545 August 29. StadtA A, RA 541, 1545 September 3. StadtA A, RA 541, 1545 September 14.

218


pronunciation may seem somewhat foreign to you at first,” Kaufbeuren’s burghers would “listen to Herr Freissleben, test him, and thereafter grant him the pastorate so he, his wife, and children will have suitable accommodations and will be brought from Sulzbach at your own costs.”36 Kaufbeuren’s burghers apparently could not overcome Freissleben’s foreign speech and pronunciation. Two weeks after his arrival in the city, the council returned him to Augsburg as unsuitable for its churches. The exact reasons for Freissleben’s rejection are not recorded. However, in light of the council’s later haggling over the costs of membership in the Schmalkaldic League, Kaufbeuren’s lukewarm attitude toward the Sulzbach preacher may have stemmed from the expenses the city would have incurred in moving his family. A year later in October 1546, the council advanced a similar complaint concerning the prohibitive cost of relocating preachers.37 Theological considerations likely also played a role. In Sulzbach, Freissleben preached in support of Neuburg’s reformation, a style of reform closely linked to Nuremberg.38 That Keller would still recommend Freissleben implies that the Sulzbacher leaned toward Upper German theology, but his recent activity in service of Nurembergstyle reform may have worked against him in Kaufbeuren. His sermons may very well have been out of step with the religious atmosphere among Kaufbeuren’s burghers and council, which continued to house many individuals sympathetic to Schwenckfeld. A third possible reason for Freissleben’s rejection stemmed from Kaufbeuren’s desire to follow its own course of reform independent from Augsburg’s influence. This tendency appears in the city’s flirtation with Schwenckfelder thought and remained an important aspect of Kaufbeuren’s magisterial reformation. The local council sought Augsburg’s help in procuring a pastor, but it did not wish to let Augsburg dictate how it should staff its pulpits. Accordingly, Kaufbeuren sent its city secretary, Matthaus ¨ Windisch, to Augsburg to request a specific pastor: the preacher Ulrich Lederle. Augsburg’s council, which had acquired Lederle from Memmingen a year earlier,39 replied, “Since you were not pleased with the service of Herr Johann Freissleben, and your city secretary has asked us for Herr Ulrich Lederle, we hereby agree to send him to you.”40 Taking advantage of its close consultative ties to Augsburg, Kaufbeuren’s 36 37 38 39 40

StadtA A, RA 541, 1545 November 3. StadtA A, RA 541, 1546 Oktober 5. StadtA A, RA 572, 1545 November 18. See StadtA A, LitS RefA, 1544 Oktober 18, Oktober 29, and November 4. StadtA A, RA 541, 1545 November 20.


219

council used face-to-face negotiations to procure the exact preacher it desired. The city remained dependant on Augsburg’s assistance in matters of reform, but it sought to use the tools of political communication to maintain its religio-political autonomy. Lederle proved a better fit in Kaufbeuren than Freissleben, and he remained in the city for the better part of a year. For Kaufbeuren’s council, Lederle may have been an especially appealing candidate because of his earlier service in Memmingen.41 Kaufbeuren often relied on Memmingen’s religious example, both in the 1520s and after the Four-Cities’ delegation. While Augsburg rather than Memmingen transferred Lederle to Kaufbeuren, his acquisition enabled the council to install a preacher with connections to both of its larger neighbors. Lederle’s ties to Memmingen may have held particular importance for Kaufbeuren, because at the same time that the council petitioned Augsburg for Lederle’s services, it wrote Memmingen regarding “the pious and devout man Hans Schalhaimer.” Schalhaimer had accompanied the Four-Cities’ delegation, although he left Kaufbeuren after Mathias Espenmuller labeled him a “ravening ¨ wolf.” With Espenmuller removed from his preachership, Kaufbeuren’s ¨ council now requested Schalhaimer’s return to the city. Memmingen complied, lending Schalhaimer to Kaufbeuren at the start of December, shortly after Lederle’s arrival.42 When viewed in concert, the procurement of these two preachers appears to constitute a conscious effort on the part of Kaufbeuren’s council to use Memmingen as a counterweight to Augsburg’s attempts to establish religio-political influence over Kaufbeuren’s reformation. Lederle’s connections to both of Kaufbeuren’s neighbors mitigated the influence Augsburg’s council could exercise through him. Schalhaimer’s return to the city represented a crucial component of this formula, since Kaufbeuren could negotiate his transfer without any help from magistrates in Augsburg. In rejecting Freissleben and then petitioning the services of two Memmingen preachers, Kaufbeuren’s council ensured it did not depend entirely on Augsburg’s support to staff its pulpits. Despite Kaufbeuren’s reliance on Keller, its council used consultation and negotiation to balance Augsburg’s influence in the city. The negotiations surrounding the installation of a long-term preacher in Donauworth reveal a similar dynamic. Despite its agreement in August ¨ 1545 to introduce Augsburg-style reform within its walls, Donauworth’s ¨ council remained reluctant to surrender control of its reformation to a 41 42

Alt, Reformation und Gegenreformation, 74. EKA KF, Anlage 59, fol. 104f.

220


preacher from Augsburg. Indeed, the council and its burghers continued to favor the tenets of Nuremberg-style reform. Shortly after responding to the bishop’s mandate, for example, Donauworth wrote not to Augsburg ¨ but to Nuremberg requesting a new preacher. While Nuremberg’s council did not send Donauworth “a preacher who could accept a permanent ¨ appointment,” it stood ready to lend the city “Thomas Venatorius for two to three months.” Nuremberg also promised to petition Wittenberg for further aid.43 A few weeks later in November 1545, Donauworth ¨ received word from Augsburg that “we currently have a Herr Johann Freissleben at our disposal. Herr Freissleben recently preached for several years in Sulzbach according to the Neuburg church ordinance. In our opinion, he is willing to continue to tolerate such ceremonies. We believe you should receive and accept his services.”44 Despite Donauworth’s promises, Augsburg’s council realized its neigh¨ bor continued to privilege Nuremberg reform. Freissleben’s failure in Kaufbeuren meant the council had an unattached preacher at its disposal versed in this style of Christianity. It therefore decided the Sulzbacher 45 In the “should be honorably sent and presented to Donauworth.” ¨ process, Augsburg sought to maintain strong religio-political ties to its neighbor while remaining involved in the internal development of Donauworth’s reformation. Donauworth’s council in turn recognized the ¨ ¨ importance of Augsburg’s continued protection. While it “did not wish at this time to introduce the same ordinance in our churches as Augsburg,” it still desired “to enter into an alliance with no one more than the praiseworthy city of Augsburg, from whom our forefathers and we have found and received loyal help, advice, and support in our affairs and times of offered to meet Augsburg halfway: need.”46 Donauworth ¨ in as far as you wish to send us a preacher, we are willing to set up in our parish church, if he so wishes, a special altar without images for the Lord’s Supper. We will also decorate him with neither a surplice nor chasuble.47 In this way, we hope 43 44 45 46

47

StA N, RchSt Nbg, Rep. 61a, Nr. 135, fol. 4r–4v. StadtA A, RA 572, 1545 November 18. StadtA A, RP, 18 November 1545. “das wir in unser kirchen/ nit gleichformig ordnung/ mit der stat Augspurg/ noch derzeit ¨ anrichten wollen”; “wir mit niemand andern lieber wolten verstentnus machen oder uns ¨ in ainung zugeben/ dann zue der loblichen stat Augspurg/ dabei dann unsere vorfaren und wir/ in iren und unsern noten und anligen lange zeit here utfelig ansehenliche gutthaten/ ¨ getrew hilf rat und beistant gefunden und empfangen hetten.” StadtA A, RA 572, 1545 November 21. The willingness to allow the preacher to wear “neither a surplice nor chasuble” was significant, since these robes were permitted under Nuremberg’s church ordinance but forbidden in Augsburg’s church practice.


221

God will grant us grace that in time a uniform church ordinance will develop and be adopted among the general estates of the Christian religion.48

This proposal recalled the passage in Donauworth’s February 1545 ¨ church ordinance that called for the establishment of a separate altar for the distribution of communion in both kinds. In this instance, Donauworth’s council suggested establishing such an altar specifically ¨ to facilitate celebration of an Augsburg-style Eucharist. In the process, Donauworth’s magistrates sought to strike a middle way between fully ¨ accepting Augsburg’s church practices and outright rejecting the religious preferences of its larger neighbor, upon whose militay protection Donauworth relied. Similar to Musculus’s reaction to the church ordi¨ nance, however, Augsburg’s council was not satisfied with this “halfreform.” It issued the following response to Donauworth: “the alliance ¨ between [Augsburg] and Donauworth is delayed until after the diet in ¨ Frankfurt. [Donauworth] should persist in its religious undertaking. In ¨ the meantime, it should employ Johann Freissleben.”49 Ultimately, the formal military pact between Augsburg and Donauworth collapsed over the issue of religious practice. While Augsburg ¨ was willing to send its neighbor a preacher versed in Wittenberg theology, Donauworth’s continued confessional orientation toward Nurem¨ berg made the formalization of Augsburg’s protection through a military alliance unfeasible. Politically, Donauworth’s compromise failed to ¨ satisfy Augsburg’s council, which sought greater control over its neighbor’s confessional affiliation than Donauworth wished to concede. Reli¨ giously, Donauworth’s proposal to allow simultaneous celebration of ¨ different Eucharistic practices recalled Musculus’s accusation that the city “tolerated popery alongside Christ’s Gospel.”50 Despite the potential consequences, neither council desired to surrender the style of reform it believed was correct. As a result, negotiations surrounding the installation of new preachers in Donauworth and Kaufbeuren made tenser the ¨ 48

49

50

“seien wir erbutig/ soferr ir F W uns widerumb ainen predicanten verordnen wollen/ ¨ darumb wir dann ir F W hiemit bitten/ das wir in unser pfarkirchen/ nach seinem begern zu des herren nachtmal ainen sondern altar/ on tafl oder pilder verordnen/ auch ine weder mit Chorrock noch messgewant beladen wollen/ der hoffnung/ es sol Got der ¨ her genad geben/ das mit der zeit ain gleichformige kirchenordnung/ under gemainen stenden der cristlichen religion furgenomen und gehalten werde.” StadtA A, RA 572, 1545 November 21. “Die ainigung zwischen mein Herrn und Wordt ist angestellt bis nach dem tag zu Franckfurt/ sie solln auch mit der religion das furfaln als dann wurdt ine gute antwurt werden. Mitlerwail solln sie H Hans Friessleben versuchen und prauchen.” StadtA A, RA 572, 1545 November 21. Roth, “Beziehungen,” 182.

222


relationships between those cities and Augsburg. Both cities continued to rely on Augsburg’s guidance, but they also sought counterweights against their larger neighbor’s influence. Augsburg’s ultimate goal remained to foster a closer religio-political relationship between itself, Donauworth, ¨ and Kaufbeuren, but the creation of new spheres of influence depended on the specific orientation of religious reform in these cities. The Schmalkaldic Diet of Frankfurt (1545–6) While the procurement of new preachers for Kaufbeuren and Donauworth did not proceed exactly as Augsburg’s council had hoped, it ¨ nonetheless succeeded in sending both cities evangelical pastors. Augsburg’s magistrates granted concessions to the different religious contexts of their neighbors, but they remained intent on incorporating both cities into the Schmalkaldic League. This objective stood at the heart of the city’s program of negotiation at the 1545–6 Schmalkaldic Diet of Frankfurt, which opened on December 6. The Diet of Frankfurt came at a critical time for the Schmalkaldic League. The 1542 invasion of BraunschweigWolfenbuttel had opened a rift in the alliance that threatened its very ¨ existence. While the League still functioned as an important source of advice and support for urban communes, many southern imperial cities chafed at the high taxes imposed on them to fund the occupation of Braunschweig-Wolfenbuttel. Augsburg’s council even feared the confed¨ eration’s internal divisions could lead to the dissolution of the alliance itself.51 Ulm’s general dissatisfaction with the Schmalkaldic League compounded these worries. In November 1545, Ulm proposed to Augsburg a new system of alliance based on the creation of two separate evangelical leagues: one for southern Germany’s evangelicals and one for the north German estates. The two leagues would provide mutual military support if they came under attack for religious reasons but otherwise remain independent. Ulm’s plan troubled Augsburg’s council, which feared that splitting the Schmalkaldic League into two separate alliances would weaken the evangelical movement as a whole. In Eastern Swabia, Augsburg’s attempts to expand its sphere of influence relied on the League’s survival, 51

In a July 7, 1545 letter to Nicholas Maier, Augsburg’s mayors expressed concern that “it could easily happen that if the cities simply wait for the princes to open the question, the [League’s] treaty will elapse and the two groups will become estranged from one another.” Quoted in Brady, Protestant Politics, 272. The original letter is at StadtA A, LitS, 1545 Juli 7. The translation is Brady’s.


223

since the city had made its two neighbors’ admission to the alliance a key component of its external policy. For Augsburg, the solution to the League’s troubles lay in expanding the alliance to increase the flow of funds and to build as broad a front as possible against the Empire’s Catholic estates. Convening a few months after the acceptance of the Augsburg Confession in Donauworth and Kaufbeuren, the Diet of Frank¨ furt presented Augsburg an opportunity to strengthen the Schmalkaldic League through the incorporation of new imperial cities.52 Augsburg hoped Donauworth and Kaufbeuren would attend the diet ¨ in order to petition the League directly for membership. Their participation would help avoid “the suppression of the evangelical truth by force in the holy Empire of the German Nation. Such oppression cannot happen without the spilling of much blood and the greatest danger to the Fatherland, its freedoms, possessions, and goods.”53 Augsburg’s council therefore encouraged Kaufbeuren “to send a delegation or give someone the command to represent it [at Frankfurt]. The council should especially consider whether or not it intends to enter the Christian alliance.”54 Donauworth entrusted Augsburg with its representation, but its council ¨ expressed anxiety about the possible ramifications of joining the League. It reminded Augsburg, we are a poor commune, and our community chest has no reserve. If we had to pay high fees in this alliance, you can see yourself how burdensome it would be for this poor city. However, if you wished to offer advice and aid so we would pay only a specific sum that we could bear, we would very much like to enter the alliance.55

Donauworth’s magistrates tied their willingness to join the Schmalkaldic ¨ League to Augsburg’s ability to negotiate a reduced membership levy for the city. Concern over the financial burden of League membership represented a key issue for both Donauworth and Kaufbeuren. In the ¨ end, it provided the major obstacle to their admission to the alliance. 52 53 54 55

Brady, Protestant Politics, 272–4; Roth, Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 3, 326–9. EKA KF, Anlage 101, Nr. 6a. EKA KF, Anlage 101, Nr. 8. “Wir haben alhie ain arme Comun/ und seien in unser gemainen Camer mit kainem vorrat fursehen/ wo wir dann in berurter ainung hoch solten angelegn werden khonen ir F W selbs erwegen/ wie byschwerlich es diser armen stat fallen wurde/ so ferr aber ir F W mochten raten und helffen/ das wir mit ainer gewisen anzal/ die uns treglich were/ ¨ angenomen wurden/ wolten wir ganz gern darein khomen.” StadtA A, RA 572, 1545 November 21.

224


While Augsburg represented Donauworth in Frankfurt, Kaufbeuren’s ¨ delegates were not present when the diet opened on December 6. This absence frustrated Augsburg’s council, which complained to its neighbor on December 15 that “you have sent nobody to Frankfurt, nor have you given the command for someone else to represent you.” Augsburg’s magistrates had promised their allies Kaufbeuren would appear at the conference. They hoped the city “would prove our assurance correct so we are not disgraced.”56 In response to Augsburg’s letter, Kaufbeuren ordered Matthaus Windisch to Frankfurt, but he did not arrive until ¨ 57 December 29. This nearly one-month delay in attending the diet offers one of the first indications that Kaufbeuren’s council doubted the practicality of Schmalkaldic membership. While Kaufbeuren had stated its readiness “to follow the example of the Christian estates and the free and imperial cities,”58 its actions subverted Augsburg’s attempts to secure Kaufbeuren’s admission to the alliance. This is true of its delayed attendance in Frankfurt, as well as its later demands for a significant reduction of its proposed membership levy. Kaufbeuren’s magistrates were interested in joining the Schmalkaldic League only if their admission could safeguard the city against neighboring Catholic territories. Throughout the build-up to the Schmalkaldic War, the council remained skeptical that the League could guarantee such protection. Windisch stayed in Frankfurt for over two weeks. During this time, he presented a supplication to the League on behalf of his council. Rather than ask for Kaufbeuren’s admission to the Schmalkaldic League, however, the city’s petition inquired “whether Kaufbeuren should write once more to the emperor or king regarding its written answer [of October].” The council also wished to know “whether the city should write the bishop of Augsburg or the cathedral chapter regarding its pastorate.”59 The remainder of Kaufbeuren’s petition concerned “several villages in the countryside that belong to the city and [its] hospital.” The council especially desired advice about “a small village called Oberbeuren. All rights

56 57

58 59

EKA KF, Anlage 101, Nr. 11. EKA KF, Anlage 59, fol. 111. Karl Alt maintains Windisch never attended the Diet of Frankfurt, basing his conclusions on Augsburg’s letters from December 15, 1545, and March 12, 1546. Alt, Reformation und Gegenreformation, 76. Alt appears to have had no access to the correspondence Windisch sent from Frankfurt. The evidence in these letters points overwhelmingly to Windisch’s attendance at the diet. EKA KF, Anlage 101, Nr. 6b. EKA KF, Anlage 59, fol. 136. The letter is undated. From the context of the other surviving correspondence, it can be dated to January 5, 1546.


225

of justice in the village, including the right of presentation, belong to the city, but the Mass and all papal ceremonies are still celebrated there.”60 This was particularly troublesome because “our urban citizens who are still loyal to the papacy go out [to Oberbeuren] on a daily basis.”61 The council wished to expel the priest and all idolatrous practices there and to establish a pious, godly, honorable evangelical preacher. The council is worried and fears that as soon as it does this, other authorities – most notably the bishop of Augsburg, other prelates, and noblemen – will order their subjects to shun this parish, to refuse to pay their tithes and rents, and to disregard other rights of the pastorate.62

For many urban councils in southern Germany, the Reformation’s spread to the surrounding countryside was important not only to minister spiritually to rural inhabitants, but also to solidify reform in the city itself. The presence of a Catholic village immediately outside Kaufbeuren’s walls presented a religious and political liability to the city’s magistrates. It served as a vestige of the old religion that encouraged a segment of the population to act in open defiance of the council’s decrees.63 In order to consolidate urban reform, therefore, Kaufbeuren 60 61

62

63

EKA KF, Anlage 59, fol. 137f. EKA KF, Anlage 59, fol. 137v. Many villagers appear to have entered Kaufbeuren to attend evangelical services as well. During a 1549 visitation of Oberbeuren, the bishop of Augsburg’s representatives noted that “Multi sunt etiam subditorum, qui currunt ad praedictorum Lutheranorum in Kauffpeurenn. Nonnulli etiam (ibi) communicaverunt tempore pasce et ille non sunt (in) avorum sepultura sepeliendi.” Thomas Pfunder, “Die Beschwerde der Oberbeurer Bauern gegen ihren Pfarrer 1525,” ZBKG 68 (1999): 178– 183, here 180. “denselben pfarrer . . . sambt aller abgotterey abzustelln/ und einen frommen gotseligen eelichen evangelischen predicanten dahin zeordnen/ so tragen si doch sorg und furchtten ¨ gewislich zubeschehen/ sobald si solches thun/ so werden alsdan alle andere obrigkheiten/ der bischof von Augspurg/ prelaten und die vom Adl . . . denselben iren underthanen/ nit allein das si dise pfarr meiden und nit meer besuchen/ sonder auch weder ire zehennd/ zins/ reuth gullt ¨ noch andere pferrliche recht meer geben noch raichen sollen.” EKA KF, Anlage 59, fol. 137f. The proximity of communities with opposing confessional affiliations troubled authorities across the Empire. In Switzerland, rural parishioners near reformed Bern routinely visited neighboring Catholic villages to participate in traditional folk dances that the Reformation’s new moral order had outlawed. Walter Salmen, “Der ‘Bauerntanz’ im Urteil von Reformatoren und Reformierten,” in Landgemeinde und Kirche im Zeitalter der Konfessionen, ed. Beat Kumin (Zurich: Chronos, 2004), 105. In his study of Catholic ¨ Reform in the Bishopric of Speyer, Marc Forster shows the permeability of boundaries between communities of different confessions as well as the difficulties cathedral canons had restricting interactions between the Catholic laity and their evangelical neighbors. During the second half of the sixteenth century, the council in Weil der Stadt, a Catholic imperial city in the bishopric, even allowed evangelical citizens to attend church services

226


needed to introduce the Reformation in its surrounding suburban communities as well. The Schmalkaldic League agreed. It advised Kaufbeuren that no further communication with the emperor or bishop was necessary, since the council’s October letter had elicited no subsequent harassment. Concerning Oberbeuren, “since Kaufbeuren controls all authority including the church income in this village, this allows it in every way to pursue said village’s Christian advancement.” The League’s members urged Kaufbeuren’s magistrates to undertake similar action in “several other villages in which all authority belongs to you while another power controls the right of presentation.”64 Kaufbeuren’s supplication to the Schmalkaldic League represented an attempt by the city to pursue its own religio-political agenda independent of Augsburg’s influence and interference. For this reason, the council solicited advice on a matter it had already resolved with Augsburg’s assistance. It also asked for guidance regarding its rural parishes, a subject it had not discussed with its neighbor. Kaufbeuren’s magistrates sought to break away from sole dependence on Augsburg’s support while simultaneously legitimizing their actions through consultation with other evangelical estates. This reflected Kaufbeuren’s larger desire to escape from its neighbor’s expanding regional sphere of influence. Most telling of all, Kaufbeuren’s petition never expressed any open desire to join the Schmalkaldic League. The city took counsel with fellow evangelicals, but it avoided requesting a formal political or military alliance. This dynamic marked its relationship with Augsburg as well. Admission to the Schmalkaldic League Shortly after Windisch’s departure from Frankfurt, the Schmalkaldic League authorized Donauworth and Kaufbeuren’s admission to the ¨ alliance. It entrusted Augsburg with negotiating its neighbors’ formal acceptance, and on February 23, 1546, its council wrote both cities informing them the “recently held diet at Frankfurt has approved your

64

in Lutheran villages in Wurttemberg to avoid open confessional conflict. Marc Forster, ¨ The Counter-Reformation in the Villages (Ithaca: Cornell, 1992), 136–8. After abolishing the Latin Mass in 1537, Augsburg’s council forbade its citizens from leaving the city to participate in Catholic ceremonies, although many inhabitants continued to receive Catholic sacraments in neighboring villages. Hanson, Religious Identity, 109–24. EKA KF, Anlage 59, fol. 143f. The Schmalkaldic League’s response to Kaufbeuren, therefore, displayed the same rationale as its reaction to the Mindelaltheim affair and other urban supplications concerning rural reform. See Chapter 6.


227

admission to the Christian league.” While “your fee has been set at 400 fl. for the simple month,65 an amount that could prove burdensome, we hope to secure a good reduction and to bring the fee down to 200 or 300 fl.” Augsburg’s magistrates asked their counterparts “to consider and resolve replied immediately what you wish to do in this matter.”66 Donauworth ¨ on March 1 that “we remain as before willing to unite ourselves to the Christian alliance.” However, the city’s magistrates wished “to reveal our hearts to you as our fathers that we cannot afford a higher fee than 100 fl. for the simple month.” Donauworth hoped “the estates of the Christian ¨ alliance will take our limited means into consideration, as well as the fact that the small city of Donauworth is strategically located in relation to ¨ the bridgehead, and allow us to pay only 100 fl.”67 Donauworth’s March 1 letter introduces the dominant theme of nego¨ tiations between Augsburg and its two neighbors concerning membership in the Schmalkaldic League: the unwillingness of the smaller cities to pay levies greater than 100 fl. Both Donauworth and Kaufbeuren made their ¨ acceptance of the League’s offer dependent on a drastic reduction of their membership fees. While monetary constraints played an important role for both cities, Kaufbeuren’s earlier decision to avoid petitioning the League for membership suggests additional considerations within its council. Kaufbeuren’s magistrates doubted the practicality of admission to the alliance. This concern was compounded by what the council felt was an unfair financial burden. For its part, Donauworth’s council appears to ¨ 65

66

67

The League divided its levy into “months,” one of which equaled the financial equivalent of two thousand horsemen and ten thousand foot soldiers. The “double-month,” twice the amount of the month, was the basic unit used to calculate the alliance’s main levy, which it split among the alliance’s members nominally according to their ability to pay. Brady, Protestant Politics, 144. On the League’s finances in general, see Haug-Moritz, Der Schmalkaldische Bund, 389–503. Since the documents under examination here consistently refer to the “simple month” form of reckoning payment, I have used that calculation rather than the double-month. While Augsburg wrote Kaufbeuren and Donauworth separately, the two letters were ¨ identical. A draft of the letter appears at StadtA A, RA 572, 1546 Februar 23. The original sent to Kaufbeuren is located at EKA KF, Anlage 59, fol. 159, from which stem the quotes. “wir seien auch noch wievor des entlichen willens uns zu der cristlichen aynung zethun und zuverpinden”; “e f w . . . als unsern vattern unsere herzen vertreulich eroffnen . . . das ¨ ¨ uns nit moglich ist/ ainen hohern anschlag zuerschwingen/ dann uff ainen monat ain ¨ ¨ hundert gulden”; “die stende der cristlichen aynung werden sollich unser ring vermogen/ ¨ ¨ auch daneben bedencken/ das dannoch das stetlin Word/ pas und anderer sachen halben ¨ etwas gelegen ligt/ und uns also bey hundert gulden bleiben lassen.” StadtA A, RA 572, 1546 Marz ¨ 1.

228


have genuinely desired inclusion in the League but could not shoulder the attendant costs.68 Accordingly, it employed a negotiating tactic that highlighted its proximity to the Danube bridgehead. The council recognized its strategic importance to the League, and it sought to use its geographic location as negotiating leverage to secure the outside military protection it had long desired. Augsburg’s council was pleased to hear Donauworth’s magistrates “are ¨ still willing to enter the Christian alliance, but we have grave doubts the fee can be reduced to 100 fl.” Indeed, such a request could lead to “all sorts of suspicion that you are not serious about admission.”69 This statement struck a chord with Donauworth’s magistrates, who quickly “gave notice ¨ they are willing to enter the Christian alliance without delay.”70 They granted Augsburg’s delegates and representatives the special order and power to negotiate on our behalf with the honorable estates of the Christian league regarding the levy and other articles that will be submitted and decided upon. If necessary, we authorize them to take vows and oaths of obligation for us concerning the League.71

Negotiations with Kaufbeuren did not progress as smoothly. Unlike Donauworth, Kaufbeuren did not immediately respond to Augsburg’s ¨ February 23 letter. Similar to having delayed its attendance at the Diet of Frankfurt, the council remained mute concerning its proposed membership. When more than two weeks had passed without a reply, Augsburg’s council wrote Kaufbeuren once more on March 12. Since “we have until now received no answer from you, and the start of the Diet of Worms nears, we cordially request you reveal your disposition to us. Namely, we 68

69 70 71

Donauworth frequently employed the argument that it was a poor city, a claim with ¨ some basis in fact. In 1544, for example, Donauworth’s council asked Augsburg to ¨ intervene on its behalf to prevent an increase in its imperial taxation. The council argued it had no extra reserve of income, since “was dann gemainer stat cammer einnimpt an burger steur/ ungellt unnd zol/ dasselb stat jarlich widerumb auff zubezalunng des reichs ¨ steur ¨ unnd underhallttung der strassenn weg unnd steg/ auch beder wasser/ Thonaw unnd Werniz schlachtenn unnd pruckhenn.” StadtA A, LitS, 1544 August 27. “das allerlai verdacht doruff entstee mocht als were wenig ernst bei der sach.” StadtA A, RA 572, 1546 Marz ¨ 4. StadtA A, RP, 6 Marz ¨ 1546. “potschafften unnd gesanten/ sondern bevelh und gewalt/ bei denselben loblichen sten¨ den der cristlichen aynung/ unsernthalben widerumb zehandeln . . . in die anschleg und andere articul/ so alda furgenomen beschlossen und verabschidet werden/ zubewilligen/ auch soferr die notturfft erfordern wurde/ an unser stat/ uber die beschlossen und ¨ uffgerichten aynung/ gelubde oder aids pflicht zethun.” StadtA A, LitS, 1546 Marz ¨ 17.


229

wish to know whether or not you desire to stay true to us and the other estates by joining the League, which Donauworth has already pledged to ¨ do.”72 Augsburg’s magistrates again drew a direct connection between the reformations in their two neighboring cities. As with the defense of religious reform, Augsburg’s council hoped to use Donauworth’s example ¨ to persuade Kaufbeuren to follow Augsburg’s lead. Kaufbeuren’s magistrates responded on March 15. While they promised “to attend the coming Diet of Worms or be represented through another city’s delegates,” they made no pledge of membership in the Schmalkaldic League.73 Despite this noncommittal response, Augsburg resolved to petition the League to reduce both Donauworth and Kaufbeuren’s fees. The inclusion ¨ of both cities in the alliance was pivotal for the defense of the northern and southern passages to Augsburg. Its council realized the proposed levy of 400 fl. also presented a major roadblock to the realization of its larger religio-political goals. Accordingly, Augsburg instructed its delegates to emphasize “the impoverishment of small cities such as Kaufbeuren and Donauworth. They should not be burdened with fees higher than their ¨ ability to pay.”74 Meanwhile, Kaufbeuren’s council sought to procure a reduction through its own initiative. The city’s magistrates again circumvented Augsburg, this time by writing directly to the Schmalkaldic chiefs Saxony and Hesse. This letter marks one of the few instances where Kaufbeuren displayed an open willingness to join the League, but the council set specific conditions for its admission. It explained “our especially dear friends the mayors and council of Augsburg have informed us that for one month we would have to pay a set fee of 200 or 300 fl. Such payments are not within our ability or means to afford.” The council wished “in no way to separate [itself] from its fellow estates that adhere to the [Augsburg] Confession, evangelical religion, and the League,” especially since Kaufbeuren sat “in the middle of territories that are almost all enemies of the Confession and the evangelical religion.” If “our city were captured by the enemies, it would affect not only our city, but more importantly cities such as Kempten, Memmingen, Augsburg, and others, which could be attacked from our city and thereby suffer great damage.” Accordingly, Kaufbeuren’s council asked Saxony and Hesse “to accept us gracefully and benevolently as a small, weak, poor Christian member who 72 73 74

EKA KF, Anlage 101, Nr. 12. EKA KF, Anlage 59, fol. 174f. StadtA A, LitS, 1546 April 1.

230


can only pay according to our above thoughts concerning the common contribution.”75 This letter represented a calculated attempt to persuade the Schmalkaldic League’s leadership to reduce Kaufbeuren’s membership fees without Augsburg’s assistance. By highlighting its small and impoverished nature along with its strategic importance, Kaufbeuren employed the same argument that Donauworth did in its March 1 letter to Augsburg. The council ¨ even highlighted the potential dangers that could result from a refusal to lower the city’s levy: an invasion avenue would open up that threatened the security of all evangelical imperial cities in Eastern Swabia. Nevertheless, Saxony and Hesse denied Kaufbeuren’s request. In the ensuing months, the council became increasingly uninterested in joining the alliance. Its March 26 letter appears to have been Kaufbeuren’s final serious consideration of membership in the Schmalkaldic League. Only on the eve of open war did it again seek potential military aid from Augsburg and other evangelical estates, and then only as long as the council felt threatened by the emperor’s armies. Augsburg’s attempts to negotiate a reduction of fees for its neighboring cities met the same fate as Kaufbeuren’s appeal to Saxony and Hesse. Both petitions appear to have had little chance of success. By March 1546, the lowest levy paid by any member of the Schmalkaldic League was 400 fl. for the simple month. Imperial cities in similar circumstances to Donauworth and Kaufbeuren, such as Kempten and Isny, paid more ¨ than twice as much, while Augsburg, Ulm, and Strasbourg paid 5000 fl. each.76 At the same time that the two cities sought to reduce their proposed levies, the Schmalkaldic League contemplated raising the fees paid by its long-time urban members.77 The 400 fl. levies offered to 75

76 77

“wiir einen bestimbten anschlag/ wie uns dann unser besonder lieben herrn und freundt burgermaister und rathe der stat Augspurg . . . als auf einen ainfachen Monat/ zway oder dreyhundert gulden/ zugeschriben haben/ auf uns nehmen sollten/ wurde gar nit in unserm vermugen noch erschwinglich sein”; “uns kheins wegs von den Confessions ¨ und evangelischen religions noch ainungs verwanthen stennden zuschaiden”; “mitten in . . . herschafften/ welche vast all der Confession und evangelischer religion hessig”; “unser stat von den widerwerttigen erobert/ es nit allein umb uns . . . sonder vil meer umb die anderen/ als Kemptten/ Memmingen/ Augspurg und dergleichen (. welche alsdan aus unserer stat bekhriegt und nit kleiner schad zugefuegt mochte werden.)”; “uns als ein klein schwach und arm christenlich mitglid/ vermug ¨ obenangeregtten bedenckhens der gemainen contribution/ gnedig und gunstigklich aufzunehmen.” EKA KF, Anlage 101, ¨ Nr. 22. The two cities that paid 400 fl. were Tecklenburg and Ravensburg, the latter of which entered the alliance in April 1546. Brady, Protestant Politics, 145. StadtA A, LitS, 1546 April 21.


231

Donauworth and Kaufbeuren were already reduced in comparison to ¨ those of the League’s other estates. It was unlikely the alliance would approve an additional reduction of fees for two small imperial cities, no matter how strategically important they might be. While Augsburg negotiated for Donauworth and Kaufbeuren “with the intention that [the ¨ levy] should not prove burdensome to you,” the Schmalkaldic League decided “such fees cannot be reduced, especially in a time of emergency or war.”78 By the start of May 1546, Augsburg’s attempts to incorporate its two neighboring cities into the Schmalkaldic League had foundered on the expense of the proposed levy. Despite Augsburg’s failure to negotiate a diminution of its neighbor’s fees, its long-term goals in Eastern Swabia still hinged on the inclusion of both cities in the evangelical alliance. Accordingly, Augsburg’s council continued its attempts to procure the two cities’ formal entrance to the League. At the same time, both councils became increasingly reluctant to follow Augsburg’s leadership, especially as open war drew nearer. Augsburg’s inability to secure a reduction of its neighbors’ membership levies foreshadowed the final break down of negotiations among the three cities in the early weeks of the Schmalkaldic War. When armed conflict threatened “the evangelical truth in the holy Empire of the German Nation,” Augsburg’s council found it could only exert its will in Eastern Swabia through military force. Negotiating Neutrality: The Start of the Schmalkaldic War As the political situation in the Empire deteriorated in early summer 1546, Augsburg’s council remained intent on protecting its strategic interests in Donauworth and Kaufbeuren. While Donauworth guarded the Danube ¨ ¨ bridgehead, Kaufbeuren sat on an invasion route stretching northward from Fussen toward Augsburg. The two cities were critical to the defense ¨ of Augsburg’s flanks, and despite its inability to incorporate its neighbors into the Schmalkaldic League, Augsburg’s council hoped they both would support the alliance’s cause. The months leading up to the Schmalkaldic War represented a time of trepidation in many evangelical imperial cities, especially in smaller communes like Donauworth and Kaufbeuren that ¨ did not possess the military capability to defend themselves. Magistrates in both cities therefore sought ways to avoid involvement in the conflict while at the same time securing outside military support in case of attack. 78

StadtA A, LitS, 1546 Mai 6.

232


For this reason, Kaufbeuren’s council sent a delegation to Augsburg on June 17, contending that “in more than one place a war-cry has arisen, yet it is totally unclear against whom this furor will strike. We only know that you have much more information about this matter than we do.” Since Kaufbeuren “lies in the borderland, if this city – which despite its small nature still serves as a good forward city (vorstadt) for Augsburg and other communes – were overrun or conquered, it would affect not only Kaufbeuren, but all its neighboring cities.”79 If Kaufbeuren came under attack, it is not provisioned with money, cannons, powder, ammunition, shot, or soldiers. This poor little city has no way to defend itself. Hence we ask you most cordially and urgently to display your Christian goodwill and, in case of an emergency, to order a detachment of soldiers to Kaufbeuren to show support for us and to come to our rescue.80

Kaufbeuren’s June delegation reflected the city’s precarious situation in the weeks leading up to the Schmalkaldic War. The council’s delegates employed essentially the same argument as they had in the city’s March 26 letter to Saxony and Hesse. In this case, though, Kaufbeuren’s council appealed directly to Augsburg, requesting military aid similar to the assistance Donauworth had received a year earlier against the Spanish ¨ troops. Why did Kaufbeuren turn to its neighbor for military assistance when the council sought to resist Augsburg’s influence in so many other ways? The answer lies in Kaufbeuren’s uncertainty about the emperor’s intentions. Charles V had issued mobilization orders on June 10.81 The council’s anxiety that “it is unclear against whom this furor will strike” reflected a fear within the city that the emperor’s war campaign might be directed in part against Kaufbeuren. Given the emperor’s September 1545 mandate condemning Anabaptism in Kaufbeuren, such concern was 79

80

81

“meer dann an einem arth/ embarug und khriegs geschray erscheinen . . . und doch darneben genzlichen verborgen/ wohin oder wider wen wich solche lennden/ allein dasselbig ir E F E Wt vil meer grundlichs wissens dan die von Kauffbewrn vermuetlichs nachgedenkhens mochtten haben”; “an der grenzen gelegen . . . und furnehmlich wo solch stetlin (. wiewol es klein und rinschezig/ yedoch iro/ dero von Augspurg/ auch anndrer statt meer/ ein guete vorstat ist.) uberzogen und erorbert soltte werden/ das es nit allein umb sie/ die von Kauffbewrn/ sonder auch umb andre nahend gelegne statt . . . zethun wurde sein.” EKA KF, Anlage 101, Nr. 23. “si weder mit barschafft/ geschuz ¨ pulver/ khuglen/ pley och volckh gar nicht verfasst . . . und dieweyl yr das arm stetlin kheins wegs vermochtte sich selbs zubeschirmen . . . so were ir hochfleissigs freundlichs bitten/ sy wollten vorberurt ¨ ir christeliche vertrostung . . . zuherzen vassen/ gemainer stat hierin hilfflich retig und beystenndig sein/ im val der noth . . . ain fendlin Khnecht daheer ordnen.” EKA KF, Anlage 101, Nr. 23. Brady, Protestant Politics, 295.


233

understandable. Accordingly, the council sought to shore up its defenses in case of a general attack. The logical choice to guide this armament was Augsburg, which still sought to incorporate its neighbor into the Schmalkaldic League. As long as Kaufbeuren’s council remained unaware of the emperor’s designs, the city depended on Augsburg for political and military protection in the coming war. Shortly after its delegation left for Augsburg, however, Kaufbeuren’s council abandoned its plans to seek military aid from its neighbor. This swift change of course resulted from an imperial letter of assurance that arrived in the city on July 4. Writing directly to the council, the emperor explained that “several of our disobedient and disloyal vassals have decided, on their own self-willed and wanton presumption, to disrupt the peace and rule of law in the Holy Empire. They seek thereby the diminution and damage of our imperial reputation and sovereignty.” Charles did not intend that “these war preparations or any violent actions come against you or other obedient cities.” He meant solely to attack “those who have been disobedient to us.” In other words, Charles promised to direct his military campaign against members of the Schmalkaldic League, not against evangelical estates outside the alliance. The emperor therefore asked Kaufbeuren’s magistrates “not to believe anything our enemies tell you about our military intentions. Rather, you should behave as you have until now: stand firmly beside us and do not allow anything to sway you to the other side.”82 On July 12, Kaufbeuren’s magistrates responded to the emperor. They emphasized that Charles’s wish to cause no harm to “the obedient estates and cities, and that you count us among this number, has pleased us greatly.” Concerning the “disobedient vassals,” the city’s magistrates professed “although we have no idea of whom you speak, their deeds could bring irrevocable damage not only to the German lands, but all of Christendom. Their actions seem to benefit only the Turks, whose hands thirst for Christian blood.” In accordance with the emperor’s wishes, Kaufbeuren pledged it would “offer neither side help or resistance. We will neither equip ourselves with nor supply soldiers, cannons, powder, or other war munitions during these dangerous, anxious times.”83 82

83

EKA KF, Anlage 59, fol. 178f. A copy of this letter has been published in Thomas Pfunder, “Drei Kaiserbriefe Karls V. an die Reichsstadt Kaufbeuren,” ZBKG 63 (1994): 221–2. “der gehorsamen stennde und stott . . . und uns . . . in derselben zal bechriben/ haben wiir unns dessen . . . zum hochsten erfrewet”; “wiewol wiir/ wer oder welche diselben/ gar nit wissen . . . dieselben nit allein den teutschen lannden/ sonnder auch der ganzen christenheit zu unwiderbringlichen schaden/ verderbung und allein dem durstigen hand

234


Charles V’s letter to Kaufbeuren formed part of a larger attempt to separate southern Germany’s imperial cities from the rest of the evangelical estates in preparation for war against the Schmalkaldic League. The emperor sent similar letters to Augsburg, Memmingen, Nuremberg, Strasbourg, and Ulm, among others. While he failed to persuade any of these cities except Nuremberg to break ranks, the emperor’s assurances to Kaufbeuren produced the desired result.84 It provided Kaufbeuren’s magistrates with the justification they needed to legitimize the city’s neutrality in the coming war. Indeed, Charles’s promise to leave the city unscathed removed the single reason for Kaufbeuren’s potential cooperation with the Schmalkaldic League. Combined with the city’s pattern of resisting Augsburg’s influence, Charles’s letter ensured Kaufbeuren’s council would not ally with its fellow evangelicals. While the city’s churches continued to rely on preachers from Augsburg and Memmingen, the council now had a counterweight against the military designs of its neighbors. It used this leverage to maintain neutrality throughout the Schmalkaldic War. Donauworth’s council also opted for neutrality in early July 1546, ¨ but the city’s regional political context conspired against this decision. Its position on the Danube bridgehead, which was the key to moving troops along or across the river, made Donauworth indispensable to both ¨ sides in the war. The bridgehead also marked the northern gateway to Eastern Swabia, and Augsburg’s council could not let the river crossing slip away in the first month of armed conflict. As hostilities broke out in July 1546 along the Danube River valley, a tense series of negotiations ensued between Donauworth, Augsburg, and the Southern district war ¨ council of the Schmalkaldic League. On July 9, the same day that Schertlin marched into Fussen, Augsburg informed Donauworth, ¨ ¨ Margrave Albrecht of Brandenburg and others are on the march. Through their maneuvers, they may fall on your city and take possession of the bridgehead. We have therefore arranged for you to receive immediately a detachment of troops from Ulm or Weissenhorn. In this way, we hope with God’s aid to protect the bridgehead and your city from the enemy.85

84 85

des christlichen bluets/ dem Turckhen zu besigung und eroberung derselben raichen ¨ mochtte”; “niemands weder hilff nach widerstand thon mogen/ auch diser gefarlicher sorgklicher zeiten und emporungen weder mit khriegsleuten/ geschuz ¨ pulver noch annderer khriegs munition fursehen noch werden khunden.” EKA KF, Anlage 59, fol. ¨ 180f. Friess, Aussenpolitik, 196; G. Schmidt, “Die Freien und Reichsstadte im Schmalkaldis¨ chen Bund,” 207–10. “Marggraf Albrecht von Brandenburg unnd annder/ uff den painen sind . . . unnd allso im durch ziehen euch unnd eur statt uberfalln unnd den pass einnehmen mochten/ so


235

Augsburg’s council promised if Donauworth “held out and closed the ¨ bridgehead to our enemies, the League will not leave you in the lurch.”86 Augsburg’s magistrates had little reason to expect opposition from their counterparts in Donauworth. A year earlier, Donauworth had ¨ ¨ sought its neighbor’s military aid against the Spanish soldiers, allowing Augsburg to garrison troops in the city. Donauworth’s council had ¨ long desired its neighbor’s protection, and it had signed a preliminary military treaty with Augsburg in August 1545. While Augsburg later suspended this pact, its council could feel confident Donauworth would ¨ welcome the Schmalkaldic League’s soldiers. To the chagrin of Augsburg’s magistrates, however, Donauworth rejected its neighbor’s help. ¨ Instead, “in the current perilous war we intend to take no side and thereby observe neutrality.”87 As with Kaufbeuren, this decision stemmed from an imperial assurance of protection. The same day that Augsburg wrote Donauworth offering to garrison the city, Donauworth’s council received ¨ ¨ word from the emperor that his forces would not attack neutral estates.88 Accordingly, “if someone wishes to camp or use the water or roadways outside our city, we plan not to hinder them.” The councilors had “sworn an oath to the emperor. In addition, we are not members of the Christian alliance. Therefore we wish to behave impartially and ask you to put a halt to your deployment of troops.”89 Augsburg’s council had no desire to allow Donauworth to remain ¨ neutral. After encouraging the Donauworther “not to let your hands and ¨ feet sink beneath you, but to stand up tall like strong city folk,”90 it quickly referred the matter to the Schmalkaldic League’s Southern district war council assembled in Ulm. On July 14, the city explained to Johann von Heydeckh, the war council’s ranking member, that “since the Donauworther wish to stay neutral and serve both sides, we wonder ¨

86 87 88 89

90

haben wir dahin gefurdet das euch von Ulme oder von Weissenhorn auss . . . furderlich zur besazung ain fennden knecht zugeschickt unnd allso den pass mit gots hilff sampt eur statt vor dem feynnden erhalten mag werden.” StadtA A, LitS, 1546 Juli 9. StadtA A, LitS, 1546 Juli 9. “wir seien des willens/ uns in diser gegenwurtigen gefarlichen kriegs handlung/ kains tails anzenemen/ und also unpartheisch zuruem.” StadtA A, LitS, 1546 Juli 10. ¨ Zelzer, Geschichte der Stadt Donauworth, 182–3. “sich jemand des Bass halben ausserhalb unser stat neben dem wasser oder der landstrassen legen wolte/ daran wissen wir niemand zuverhindern”; “der kaiserlichen Mt . . . pflicht gethon und geschworn haben/ item so seien wir der alten christlichen verainigung nit eingeleibt oder verwannt/ derhalben wir uns hirinn unpartheisch halten wollen/ und darumb mogen E F W mit herschickung der knecht in ruestan.” StadtA A, ¨ ¨ LitS, 1546 Juli 10. “ir sollend dannoch nit gar hennd und fuess sincken lassen sonnder euch halten wie steiffen stett leuthen wol ansteht.” StadtA A, LitS, 1546 Juli 13.

236


if you think it prudent to send a strong squad of troops to enter the city to protect the bridgehead. We have no doubt they will allow the troops to enter if they are accompanied by a written request.”91 On the same day, Augsburg’s council wrote Joachim Langenmantel, one of its representatives in Ulm, commanding him “to discuss with the war council whether a detachment of troops could be sent immediately to protect the bridgehead. We believe the Donauworther will allow the troops to enter and ¨ thereafter behave differently in these matters.”92 The war council advised Augsburg “to send immediately one or two members of the city council with the necessary instruction to Donauworth. They should negotiate ¨ with the city in the friendliest way possible so it will keep the bridgehead open for the League and allow us to send one or two detachments of troops to occupy and protect the city.” If things went well, the war council recommended, Augsburg should garrison the city with troops under Schertlin’s command. If Donauworth’s magistrates remained obstinate, ¨ “you should discuss the matter further with Herr Schertlin and determine in what way one or two squads of troops can be brought to Donauworth ¨ under the appearance they are marching on Neuburg or somewhere else.”93 This decision frustrated Augsburg’s magistrates. The council had been negotiating the protection of the bridgehead with Donauworth for over ¨ a year. The policy of negotiation sat at the heart of the city’s program of religio-political expansion, but its discussions with Donauworth ¨ had broken down in the face of the current crisis. Without a sign that Donauworth’s council wished to bargain, negotiation could proceed no ¨ further. Accordingly, Augsburg’s magistrates informed the war council “how often and assiduously we have written [Donauworth] but always ¨ received a negative reply. We know of nothing relevant or substantial left to discuss with them.” In the current atmosphere, not even face-toface negotiations could swing Donauworth’s council to the Schmalkaldic ¨ League’s side. Instead, Augsburg’s magistrates argued “the only way and no other is to order one or two squads of troops into the Danube region 91

92

93

“dhweil sich Worde so neutral und zwyzech haldt geben wir . . . euch zu bedencken ob ime nit 1 starckh fendl knecht in die stat zelegen und den pass im zubehalten/ fursehung zuthun sein wolle tragen kainen zweiffel sie solln die knecht neben ainen schrifftlichen begern einlassen.” StadtA A, LitS, 1546 Juli 14. “den raten zuberatschlagen . . . obnit ain fenndl knecht/ zu erhaltung dess pass/ inn ir stat furderlich zelegen sein sollt/ des versehens sie wurdens einlassen unnd sich darnach annder in di sach schicken.” StadtA A, LitS, 1546 Juli 14. StadtA A, LitS, 1546 Juli 15.


237

around Donauworth. We believe they will welcome the soldiers, for their ¨ letter leads us to think they will not close the bridgehead to everyone, but rather allow the strongest to occupy it.”94 On July 18, Augsburg’s council wrote its representatives in Ulm, informing them that “today we sent two detachments of troops to Gersthofen, so in case an order comes from the war council in Ulm they can be sent to Donauworth. If no answer comes ¨ from Ulm tonight, we have decided to send the troops to Donauworth ¨ anyway. Time will tell whether or not the Donauworther open their gates ¨ to them.”95 Behind closed doors, Augsburg’s council expressed less confidence in Donauworth’s positive reception of the troops than it did in its statements ¨ to the Schmalkaldic League. Despite this uncertainty, the importance of protecting the bridgehead meant Augsburg’s magistrates had decided to act without the war council’s approval. Luckily for Augsburg, on July 19 the war council authorized the city “to proceed with the occupation of Donauworth by the two squads.”96 Augsburg wrote its neighbor immedi¨ ately, reminding Donauworth that “we have asked you several times cor¨ dially and fatherly to open the bridgehead to us.” The situation recalled last year when “a good number of Spaniards came toward Donauworth. ¨ Now there are several detachments of troops underway with the intention of taking the Danube bridgehead.” Augsburg’s council had “sent two squads of troops from the Christian League to your city to preserve the bridgehead for us and other estates of the Holy Empire, as well as to protect your city from downfall, damage, and destruction.” It hoped Donauworth’s council “would willingly and immediately allow these sol¨ diers to enter the city and not hinder them in any way before destructive foreign troops intervene. Should this not happen and you and your city 94

95

96

“wie hoch und hertt wir hievor in schrifften mehr als sunst bei inen angesucht aber allmal abschlegige antwurt empfangen derwegen wir nichts erheblichs noch furstendigs zehandlen wissen”; “den aing weg sein und kain annder . . . ain fendl knecht bis in 2 allso bald uff den andern land der Thonau gen Worde verordnet/ so achten wir . . . sie werden die knecht gern einlassen/ dann sie schreiben uns fasst uff die mainung das sie niemand den pass weren sonnder den sterkisstn allmal einlassen werden.” StadtA A, LitS, 1546 Juli 16. The letter is undated, but from its context it can be dated to either July 16 or July 17. In the StadtA A, LitS it is filed under July 16, 1546, so I have used that date here. “wir noch heut 2 fendl knecht gen Gersthof zelegen ob uns befelch von Ulme kume/ das dieselben mochtn gen Worde verordnen/ ob uns aber diesen abend kain beschaid zukumbt/ gedencken wir solliche 2 fendl knecht . . . gen Worde zuverordnen/ ob sie aber eingelassen werden oder nit/ wurdt die zeit zu erkennen geben.” StadtA A, LitS, 1546 Juli 18. StadtA A, LitS, 1546 Juli 19.

238


continue to display poor judgment, we have ordered our captains to notify us immediately.”97 Donauworth’s council replied a day later with a desperate attempt to ¨ prevent Augsburg’s interference. The city’s magistrates argued “little benefit can come to the praiseworthy League through our help or support, while it could cause us irreparable harm.” Donauworth implored Augs¨ burg to order its troops “to go somewhere else” and to respect “the causes of our neutrality.”98 Augsburg’s council responded on the same day. It assured its neighbor that if “this grave emergency did not stare you and the Christian imperial estates in the face, we would not have burdened you with this thing.” As it stood, Augsburg had no choice but to send its troops. It hoped Donauworth “would allow the aforementioned soldiers ¨ to enter without delay.”99 Augsburg’s troops arrived at Donauworth on July 20. According to ¨ Augsburg’s council, the soldier’s captains Christoph Kienberger and Hans Wick sent “a letter to Donauworth’s council asking for permission to ¨ enter the city. They did not receive a written reply, but instead a delegation composed of one mayor and other members of the council rode out to meet the captains.”100 The mayor spoke to the captains and pleaded with them not to proceed and to depart. The captains then asked how much longer they would have to wait. The mayor informed them he had no orders concerning the duration, and the Donauworther ¨ rode away. Both captains then marshaled their troops and marched quickly toward Donauworth with the intention of entering the city. As it stands, we believe ¨ it is necessary to send reinforcements as soon as possible, since the Donauworther ¨ have displayed bias and may give themselves to the enemy.101 97

98 99 100 101

“wir haben euch ettlich mal freuntlich unnd vatterlich . . . umb offnung des pass in eur stat unnsers tails [gebeten]”; “das ain gute anzal Spanier so uss dem Ungerland heruff kumen und verschynen jars fur Worde hierab zogen/ auch ettlich viel fenndl knect uff den painen seien sich umb die pass an der Thunaw anzenemen”; “zwei fenndl unser unnd gemainer christlichen ainigung knecht abgeferttigt inn eur stat zelegen/ unns unnd annder des hailigen reichs stennden solch pass uff zehalten/ auch euch und eur stat vor abfall schaden und zerstorung zuverhuetten”; “wollend dieselben knecht/ gutwillig und furderlich eh das frembd verterblich volkh darzwischen kome/ einlassen unnd sie an eur selbs wolfart zehandlen kains wegs verhindern/ sollt es aber nit geschehen und euch und gemainer stat unrat darab zusteen . . . begern des unsern hauptleuten . . . uns furderlichs eilends . . . antwurt zegeben.” StadtA A, LitS, 1546 Juli 18. StadtA A, LitS, 1546 Juli 19. StadtA A, LitS, 1546 Juli 19. StadtA A, LitS, 1546 Juli 20. “hat . . . die Hauptleut angesprochen und gebetten das sie nit furtfarn sonnder verziehen wollen/ doruff die hauptleut gefragt wie lanng sie wartten solln/ habe der burgermaister anzaigt/ er hab kain befelch von der zeit etc. unnd seien die von Worde verrieten/ so


239

Augsburg’s army made camp under the ramparts of Donauworth’s city ¨ walls. The next day, Kienberger and Wick marched before the city gates and presented a list of demands to Donauworth’s council. The captains ¨ promised “they would not disturb or burden the council and the general citizenry in any way, either bodily or monetarily, in the streets or in their houses.” Furthermore, the captains assured Donauworth’s burghers ¨ “they would introduce no new ordinances in the city, but rather allow the council to retain its authority, policies, and customs.” In exchange, the city should allow the troops to enter, since they desired nothing more than “to occupy the bridgehead on behalf of the common imperial estates, as well as to guard and protect the city and its citizenry against other hateful persons who may come after us.”102 Donauworth’s council refused the troops entrance. Kienberger and ¨ Wick recorded what happened next. The captains “once again held a discussion with Donauworth’s magistrates, but they demanded such ridicu¨ lous things and drew the matter out so much that we began to doubt their earnestness. Accordingly, we broke camp and took the city by force.”103 Their soldiers had the city under watch by night and day. Regarding the keys to the city gate, we do not have them yet in hand, but the council has issued an order and we should have possession of them shortly. While we were sitting in the council chambers today, unbeknownst to us our troops assaulted [Holy Cross] cloister and plundered it, destroying and taking with them a good deal of the cloister’s possessions.104

102

103

104

haben die bede hauptleut mit iren fenndlin den zug eilends uff Worde zu genumen und wollen understeen hienein zekumen/ wie es aber gerat/ steet bei unsern bott wurdt von noten sein/ das ine eilends eilends ain zusaz und sterckung geschehe dann/ uss diesen sach d von Worde parteilichait gespurt wurdt und zubesorgen ist/ da es ime moglich sie werden sich an den gegentail ergeben.” StadtA A, LitS, 1546 Juli 20. “sy ainen rat und gemaine burgerschafft . . . weder an iren leib noch gutern/ weder uff der gassen noch in den heusern nicht/ betrueben noch in ainig wege beschweren”; “sy in der stat kain newe ordnung wollen furnemen/ sonder ainen rat bei irer obrigkait pol¨ licei und irem herkhomen bleiben lassen wollen”; “von wegen gemainer reichs stende ¨ den bass einzenemen/ und die stat und gemain burgerschaft/ vor andern wider wertigen die hernach khomen mochten/ zeschuzen und zeschirmen.” StadtA A, LitS 1546 ¨ Juli 21. “nachmals mit den hern ein sprach gehalten/ haben aber sie so anzimliche verschreibung begert auch die sach so lang ufzogen/ das wir weittern onrath habenn miessen besorgen/ da seind wir abgestanden unnd die statt mit gwalt erobert.” StadtA A, LitS, 1546 Juli 21. “die statt thag und nacht nach notturfft untder wacht versehen . . . der thor schlissel betreffent haben wir bissher nit bei hand gehabt aber auff der hern befelch wellen wir die zu unsern handen nemen und biss auff weitern beschaid . . . alls wir heut auff dato bei den hern in rethen gesessen siend die knecht doch uns unwissend in das closter

240


Donauworth’s council wrote immediately to Augsburg demanding its ¨ counterpart “command its captains . . . and their troops to stay true to the agreed upon articles and behave modestly.” The overall tone of the city’s letter, however, was resigned. They had not denied the troops entrance out of antagonism, Donauworth’s magistrates explained. Rather, “we ¨ desired to remain neutral during this war since we learned the emperor would protect neutral estates from military action and the molestation of his troops.”105 For its part, Augsburg’s council expressed bitter disappointment in Donauworth’s behavior: ¨ we could not foresee that because of your neutrality, you would act against our repeated fatherly letters and warnings by obstructing and blocking the troops. We are sorry you have behaved so poorly toward us and other good friends, especially since we want nothing more than to act fatherly toward you. This matter does not have to burden you if from this point forward you display better fairness and friendship.106

The military occupation of Donauworth on July 21, 1546, marked the ¨ failure of negotiations between Augsburg and Donauworth. Its neigh¨ bor’s neutrality forced Augsburg’s council to recognize the limitations of its regional influence. The lengthy process of negotiation between the two cities shaped the affiliation, preservation, and implementation of religious reform in Donauworth. When warfare erupted in summer 1546, ¨ however, negotiation proved insufficient to maintain Augsburg’s influence over Donauworth’s reformation. When the local council refused to ¨ compromise, Augsburg could only secure the Danube bridgehead through force of arms. Donauworth’s council sought to use Augsburg as a source ¨ of military protection as long as it was convenient. Once the city no longer needed or desired Augsburg’s assistance, Donauworth attempted ¨

105

106

gefallen dasselb zu guter massen geblundert auch . . . was dem closter zugehert entwert und genomen.” StadtA A, LitS 1546 Juli 21. “den haubtleiten umb mer forcht und ansehens willen schreiben/ das sy sich und der gemain knecht beschaidenlich und den aufgenomen articulln gemess halten”; “wir in disen kriegs leuffen neutrale zesein gedencken/ und dann vernomen/ das kai Mt die neutral stende nit allain vor uberzug sonder vor seines kriegs volcks belestugung ver¨ sicher.” StadtA A, LitS, 1546 Juli 22. The letter is dated July 21, but it was not sent until July 22. “Eurs wagerns und sperens dergleichen . . . von wegen eur neutralitet widerumb uber unnser vielfeltig vatterlich/ schreiben und verwarnen hetten wir unns gar nit versehen und ist unns laid dz ir euch/ so groblich gegen unns unnder anndern guten freundten vergriffen/ aber wir wollen noch anderst nit dann vatterlich gegen euch handlen und sehen wie dise sach nit musten eur beschwerde/ abgee/ unnd gehandlt werde allain sehend/ dz ir euch hinfuran annder richtikait und frundschafft erzaiget.” StadtA A, LitS, 1546 Juli 22.


241

to escape from its neighbor’s influence. Unfortunately for Donauworth, ¨ Augsburg’s magistrates did not wish to abandon their interests in their neighboring city. When negotiations collapsed, Augsburg’s council chose the opposite solution. It used military supremacy to coerce another imperial city into a forced alliance. ¨ Donauworth, Kaufbeuren, and the Schmalkaldic War Augsburg’s occupation of Donauworth embroiled the city in the Schmal¨ kaldic War against its wishes. At the start of August 1546, the Schmalkaldic League’s Southern district war council relocated to the city. Shortly thereafter, Donauworth served as the main assembly point for a large ¨ army that moved northward to attack Ingolstadt. During this period, Donauworth relied on Augsburg for political and financial support,107 ¨ but the city quickly became a major objective for Charles V and his armies. On October 9, only two and a half months after Augsburg’s military action, Donauworth fell to the emperor’s troops. Its council swore ¨ renewed allegiance to Charles, offering him numerous gifts including a large live carp freshly caught from the Danube. The emperor forgave the city council, immediately returning the city keys to Donauworth’s mag¨ istrates, who had joined the war under duress. Charles even forgave the carp, which, as the emperor bent over to examine it, unleashed a powerful lash from its tail that knocked Charles flat on his backside. With a laugh, the emperor declared “so too will the ground be removed from beneath the Schmalkaldic League!”108 His words proved prophetic. By January 1547, the emperor had subdued his opponents in southern Germany’s imperial cities. A few months later, the Schmalkaldic League ceased to exist. Unlike Donauworth, Kaufbeuren maintained its neutrality through¨ out the Schmalkaldic War. Its council continued to pursue evangelical reform, however, and the city’s reformation still depended on the ministry

107

108

In late August 1546, for example, Donauworth asked Augsburg for help in provisioning ¨ eight detachments of Swiss troops lodged outside the city. StadtA A, LitS, 1546 August 24 and August 25. ¨ Zelzer, Geschichte der Stadt Donauworth, 184–8, quote at 185–6. Fish, along with wine and coins, were one of the most common gifts city councils presented to important dignitaries. In southern Germany, “an edible fish was a prestigious, rather expensive, and accordingly effective present.” Valentin Groebner, Liquid Assets, Dangerous Gifts: Presents and Politics at the End of the Middle Ages, trans. Pamela E. Selwyn (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), 27.

242


of preachers from Augsburg and Memmingen. Kaufbeuren’s failure to support the League had major ramifications for this arrangement. In response to Kaufbeuren’s refusal to close ranks militarily, both Augsburg and Memmingen withdrew their preachers to staff parishes more important to the war effort. In November 1546, Augsburg recalled Ulrich Lederle from Kaufbeuren,109 while in August Memmingen’s council denied Kaufbeuren’s request to extend Hans Schalhaimer’s loan. Instead, Memmingen wished to send Schalhaimer to Fussen. Since “Herr Schal¨ haimer preached earlier in that city, and the community found him very agreeable and pleasant, we wish to lend him to that city for a while in order to foster God’s honor in their midst.”110 To replace Schalhaimer, Kaufbeuren looked to Augsburg. Rather than contact Augsburg’s magistrates, however, Kaufbeuren’s council wrote privately to Michael Keller. This represented another attempt by Kaufbeuren to circumvent the influence of Augsburg’s council. Keller assured Kaufbeuren “I have applied for godly, Christian, well-learned men in more than one place, especially in the Swiss Confederation and Graubunden.” He asked the council to exercise “patience and perseverance” ¨ until a suitable preacher could be found. In the meantime, Keller informed Augsburg’s council of its neighbor’s need.111 Augsburg’s magistrates became involved in the procurement of a new preacher for Kaufbeuren not at the request of their fellow councilors, but through the actions of Keller. Until his death in 1548, Keller continued to act in concert with his home council in negotiations with Kaufbeuren. It took Keller a little over one month to find Kaufbeuren a suitable preacher. He finally settled on a pastor and playwright from Saxony named Thomas Naogeorgus, who had fallen out of favor with Wittenberg theologians because of his views on predestination and the sacraments.112 On October 1, Keller informed Kaufbeuren that Schalhaimer’s replacement would arrive shortly. He encouraged the council “to listen to him, to negotiate with him, and hopefully to accept him as a 109 110 111 112

EKA KF, Anlage 101, Nr. 20. EKA KF, Anlage 44, fol. 20. EKA KF, Anlage 59, fol. 208–9, quotes at 208. The reason for the delay was the council’s inability to bring Naogeorgus to Augsburg until the end of September. Roth, Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 3, 424. It appears Naogeorgus suggested himself to Keller as a good fit for Kaufbeuren, much as Hans Hess presented himself to Augsburg’s council for the Mindelaltheim pastorate. Leonhard Theobald, Das Leben und Wirken des Tendenzdramatikers der Reformationszeit Thomas Naogeorgus seit seiner Flucht aus Sachsen (Leipzig: Heinsius, 1908), 7.


243

pastor.”113 A day later, Augsburg’s council involved itself in the matter, informing its counterpart in Kaufbeuren that “we have a famous learned man here whom we cordially offer to lend you for a period of time.”114 This unsolicited interference by Augsburg’s magistrates made Kaufbeuren’s council reluctant to accept Naogeorgus. It thanked its neighbor for “your tireless efforts to foster God’s honor and the true knowledge of Christ (das war erkhantnus Christi) in our community.” However, “since Herr Schalhaimer’s time here is not yet up, and in the past we have incurred great costs from the back and forth movement of learned preachers, we do not wish to burden ourselves with any more preachers.”115 Kaufbeuren’s council hoped to enlist Keller’s aid in procuring a new preacher, but it did not wish to receive a pastor directly from Augsburg’s council. For this reason, it declined Augsburg’s offer to send Naogeorgus, even though it had petitioned Keller for just such a cleric. The council’s reference to “the true knowledge of Christ,” a typical Schwenckfelder formulation, complicated matters further. It must have had particular resonance in Augsburg’s council chamber, especially after the Espenmuller ¨ controversy a year earlier. Keller acted swiftly to diffuse the tensions. He dismissed Kaufbeuren’s concerns, informing the council he was sending “the pious, well-learned master Thomas Naogeorgus. You should listen to this man benevolently. You should test and consider his spirit and life with Christian judgment.” With Naogeorgus as pastor, Kaufbeuren “could continue to march forward in a knightly and Christian fashion with your Christian work begun through God’s redeeming Gospel.”116 Augsburg’s council followed with its own letter on October 20. It explained that Johann Flinner had to be recalled from Fussen because ¨ “his wife is deathly ill and also very pregnant.” Since Kaufbeuren’s council had “received a famous learned man named Thomas [Naogeorgus],” Augsburg’s magistrates hoped their counterparts would release Schalhaimer to take Flinner’s place. If this was not possible, then Augsburg asked Kaufbeuren “to send the aforementioned Thomas [Naogeorgus] to 117 Fussen.” ¨ 113 114 115 116 117

EKA KF, Anlage 59, fol. 210. StadtA A, RA 541, 1546 Oktober 2. StadtA A, RA 541, 1546 Oktober 5. EKA KF, Anlage 101, Nr. 27. EKA KF, Anlage 101, Nr. 19. A concept of this letter appears at StadtA A, LitS, 1546 Oktober 20, while a transcribed copy has been published in Roth, “Zur Einfuhrung ¨ der Reformation in Fussen,” 153. ¨

244


A day later, Kaufbeuren received a similar letter from Memmingen. Augsburg’s council had informed Memmingen of Flinner’s difficulties, and the city’s magistrates asked Kaufbeuren “to allow Hans Schalhaimer to come to Fussen as soon as possible.”118 On Memmingen’s formal ¨ request, Kaufbeuren finally released Schalhaimer and installed Naogeorgus in his stead on October 22.119 Coupled with Augsburg’s recall of Ulrich Lederle a few weeks later in November 1546, Schalhaimer’s replacement by Naogeorgus represented the simultaneous withdrawal of support and creation of new ties of influence between Kaufbeuren and its neighboring cities. Both Schalhaimer and Lederle relocated to territories controlled by the Schmalkaldic League. Schalhaimer went to a recently captured territorial city, while Augsburg installed Lederle in a rural parish named Grimoldsried with the intent of establishing an Augsburg-style reformation in the village. This marked one of several attempts Augsburg made to implement the Reformation in rural territories acquired during the war’s first few months.120 In order to pursue this program of rural evangelization, Augsburg and its allies required preachers. Once it became clear Kaufbeuren would not openly support the League’s cause, Augsburg and Memmingen were no longer willing to supply their neighbor with multiple preachers whose talents they needed elsewhere. At the same time, Augsburg managed to maintain ties to Kaufbeuren’s reformation by negotiating the installation of Naogeorgus as a new longterm preacher. In its search for Schalhaimer’s replacement, Kaufbeuren sought specifically to avoid the involvement of Augsburg’s magistrates. The city council’s desire to distance itself from Augsburg’s influence was so strong that it resisted Augsburg’s attempts to send the very preacher Keller recommended.121 Magistrates in the two cities sat at loggerheads, 118 119

120

121

EKA KF, Anlage 44, fol. 22. The council installed Naogeorgus as preacher for life, but he left Kaufbeuren in August 1548 during the introduction of the Interim. His replacement was Mathias Espenmuller, ¨ who in 1548 returned to Kaufbeuren from Basel. Alt, Reformation und Gegenreformation, 80–7; Theobald, Thomas Naogeorgus, 8–12. Alt, Reformation und Gegenreformation, 82; Close, “Zurich, Augsburg, and the Transfer of Preachers”; Friess, Aussenpolitik, 199–200; Roth, Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 3, 397–8. Part of the reason Keller recommended Naogeorgus was his friendship with the Saxon preacher. At the start of 1546, Naogeorgus preached in the Saxon town Kahla, but his teachings on predestination brought him into conflict with local authorities. He fled to Eastern Swabia in September 1546, although his troubles with Prince-Elector John Frederick forced Naogeorgus to remain in hiding at an undisclosed location near Augsburg. To avoid confrontation with Saxony, Keller’s and Naogeorgus’s other associates in the city, among them Georg Frolich, were anxious to install him in a ¨


245

and Keller’s insistence, not that of Augsburg’s magistrates, caused Kaufbeuren finally to accept its new pastor. Kaufbeuren’s council sought to emerge from under its neighbor’s sphere of influence, while Augsburg’s council endeavored to retain at least a limited role in Kaufbeuren’s reformation. Regional politics in Eastern Swabia ensured that both sides ultimately had to compromise. Similar dynamics appear in Kaufbeuren’s final refusal to ally with the Schmalkaldic League. On September 4, the council received a letter from Saxony and Hesse that described how the emperor has tried deceitfully to persuade all prince-electors, princes, and estates of the empire that he is not prosecuting a war based on religion. . . . He has done this purely to separate you and other evangelicals from us. When he has finished his wantonness with us, he will do the same to you at his leisure and once again establish obedience to the seat of Rome and the full sacrilege of the papacy.122

Saxony and Hesse advised Kaufbeuren to attend the upcoming Schmalkaldic Diet at Ulm “to take counsel and to unite together with the estates of the Augsburg Confession.” The council should “take to heart the current persecution of religion by the emperor and pope and not fail to offer us genuine help and support.”123 Kaufbeuren found itself in a difficult position. Closing ranks with the Schmalkaldic League would violate the terms of its neutrality with the emperor, while refusing to attend the diet might lead to the same fate as Donauworth: military occupation by Schmalkaldic troops. Accordingly, ¨ Kaufbeuren’s council decided to send a delegation to Ulm, but the council ordered its delegates “you should under no circumstances agree to something beyond our means, meaning at the most we would agree to pay 100 fl. for the simple month. If they do not grant this, but rather

122

123

preachership not subject to Augsburg’s council. Alt, Reformation und Gegenreformation, 79; Roth, Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte, vol. 3, 397; Theobald, Thomas Naogeorgus, 3–6. “wie betrieglich der khayser alle Churfursten fursten unnd stenndt des reichs zu per¨ suadiren . . . der religion halben keinen krieg furzunemen/ sonder etliche zeitlich unge¨ horsamen zustraffen/ allein aus diser ursach euch unnd andere religions verwanten vonn uns zu sondern/ unnd wan er seinen mutwillen mit uns aussgericht/ das er volgends sovill dester mher sein gelegenhait mit euch unnd andern auch schaffen/ und also zuletst den gehorsam des stuls zu Rhom und den ganzen grevel des Bapstthumbs wider ufrichten muge.” StadtA A, LitS, 1546 September 4. StadtA A, LitS, 1546 September 4.

246


require something else from us, you should not agree to it.”124 As late as September 1546, it appears Kaufbeuren’s council still considered joining the Schmalkaldic League, but its decision remained contingent on a substantial reduction of its membership levy. Kaufbeuren’s magistrates knew there was little chance the League would agree to this condition, especially since the estates had already rejected similar demands. The sincerity of Kaufbeuren’s commitment is therefore questionable. Indeed, shortly after its delegates arrived in Ulm, Kaufbeuren ordered them to return home. Its attendance at the diet did not represent a serious attempt to negotiate common policy with the League. It represented a show of faith to protect the city and “to preserve all of our current freedoms.”125 The final exchange of letters on the matter between Augsburg and Kaufbeuren supports this conclusion. Writing on October 3, Augsburg’s council informed its neighbor that “the League’s estates wish to know whether or not you desire to enter the alliance alongside the other estates and to shoulder the proper burden.” Augsburg’s delegates had assured the Schmalkaldic League Kaufbeuren was ready to join. Since “such important matters require every estate and city freely and openly to declare itself, we ask you cordially to inform us if you are finally ready to enter the Christian league. Also, you should tell us how much you think you should pay as a levy during a time of war.”126 On October 15, six days after imperial armies marched into Donauworth, Kaufbeuren gave its ¨ reply: Since our foremost wish has received only limited and minimal interest from the estates of the Christian alliance, and we have been asked to pay at least 200 fl. for the simple month – an amount that is neither bearable nor within our means – we find that membership would not only come too late for us, but also do us considerable harm and ruination. We unfortunately have nothing else to report.127 124

125 126

127

“doch sollen si sich kheins wegs uber unser vermugen . . . begeben noch einlassen/ sich ¨ auch nit meer erbieten/ dann auff einen ainfachen monat . . . zum hochstem hundert gulden bewilligen/ wo si aber ye darbey nit gelassen/ und inen was anders begegnen wurde/ sollen si es gar nit annehmen.” EKA KF, Anlage 59, fol. 217. EKA KF, Anlage 59, fol. 217. EKA KF, Anlage 59, fol. 223. A concept of this letter, which Augsburg also sent to Donauworth shortly before its occupation by the emperor, can be found at StadtA A, ¨ LitS, 1546 Oktober 3. “unser hochstes erbieten bey den stenden der christlichen verainigung ringschezigs und gar kleins ansehens seye/ sonder zum wenigsten einen ainfachen monat zwaihundert guldin begert werde/ welches ye . . . gar nit in unserm vermugen treglich noch ¨ erschwinglich ist . . . wurde uns dasselb nit allein zu spatt sonder zu sorgklichem verderblichen schaden raichen/ derhalben wiir im laider nit anderst thon khunden ¨ muessen.” EKA KF, Anlage 59, fol. 226. ¨


247

The negotiations that followed the official acceptance of the Augsburg Confession in Donauworth and Kaufbeuren reflect the importance of ¨ regional politics to the urban Reformation in Eastern Swabia. In both cities, the Reformation’s consolidation depended on the support and guidance of outside actors, most notably their mutual neighbor Augsburg. Until the start of the Schmalkaldic War, both councils relied heavily on Augsburg’s leadership in religio-political affairs, and the regional nature of their reformations allowed them to survive outside attacks on their legitimacy. The outbreak of hostilities placed these negotiated arrangements under intense pressure. The ultimate failure of negotiations between Augsburg and its two neighbors points to the limitations of intercity negotiation. Consultation, guidance, and interference from neighboring imperial cities shaped the Reformation in Donauworth and ¨ Kaufbeuren in fundamental ways, but the cities remained self-governing polities. Both councils set their own policies based on their religio-political self-interests, and Augsburg could never gain firm control over religious reform in either neighboring city. To secure its most pressing objectives, Augsburg ultimately resorted to military force, but this approach had little chance of long-term success. Intercity negotiation constituted a powerful tool that influenced the direction and confessional affiliation of the urban Reformation across Eastern Swabia. In the end, however, negotiation proved insufficient for Augsburg to dictate the course of religious reform in its neighboring cities. With Schertlin’s capture of Fussen, the Schmalkaldic War began with ¨ high hopes for Augsburg. Very quickly, the difficulty of negotiations with its neighbors tempered this optimism. Unequal in status to their powerful neighbor, Donauworth and Kaufbeuren needed negotiation to ¨ preserve their autonomy. Until the start of 1546, therefore, both cities were willing to bargain with their larger neighbor. When war came, they withdrew from negotiations to protect their own interests. Like the Reformation in Donauworth and Kaufbeuren, Augsburg’s attempts to ¨ expand its regional sphere of influence through negotiation relied on the acquiescence and cooperation of its neighboring cities. The war severely hampered Augsburg’s ability to establish such collaboration. When Augsburg’s troops marched into Donauworth, they succeeded in securing ¨ the Danube bridgehead, but at the cost of Donauworth’s willing alle¨ giance. Like the Schmalkaldic War, Augsburg’s attempts to establish “fine, right-believing flank towns” under its firm leadership ended in bitter defeat.

Conclusion

For a few months in the summer of 1546, it appeared the Schmalkaldic League might triumph over Charles V. As Schmalkaldic armies occupied Fussen, Donauworth, and the Eastern Swabian countryside, Augsburg ¨ ¨ and other evangelical imperial cities sent forth preachers to staff the newly captured parishes. The long awaited resolution of the religious question seemed at hand, and the region’s magistrates acted to prepare the way for the victory of evangelical reform. Their attitude appears in two letters sent to Kaufbeuren’s council a few months earlier in October 1545. In September of that year, Duke Heinrich of Braunschweig-Wolfenbuttel ¨ living up to the “warlike ways” attributed to him by Ulm’s council, invaded Braunschweig-Wolfenbuttel in an attempt to regain his lands by ¨ force. Within weeks, a Schmalkaldic force led by Philip of Hesse crushed the duke’s army.1 In announcing the Schmalkaldic League’s victory, Augsburg’s magistrates expressed their high hopes in God that, since the enemies’ captain has been defeated, they will now behave in a more modest fashion. It will serve us well to speak God’s praise, honor, and glory, as well as to call on His divine mercy, that we might recognize His opponents and place our dearest and best trust in Him. In this way, He will stand by us in all times.2

Memmingen’s council proclaimed “God the Lord seems to have given us this victory. We see how His divine majesty will long preserve His holy word by those faithful people who place their trust in Him.”3 1 2 3

Brady, Protestant Politics, 270. EKA KF, Anlage 101, Nr. 7. EKA KF, Anlage 44, fol. 16.

248

Conclusion

249

By the start of 1547, this cautious optimism had faded into the cold, hard reality of military defeat. After the surrender of Donauworth in ¨ October 1546, Eastern Swabia’s Schmalkaldic cities fell one by one to the emperor’s armies. Ulm surrendered to Charles V in December. Augsburg and Memmingen capitulated a month later.4 While Charles’s victory on the field of battle proved fleeting, it had lasting ramifications for these cities. Blamed by the emperor for the Reformation’s spread throughout the Empire, many of southern Germany’s imperial cities endured military occupation and the forcible reorganization of their councils. In the aftermath of the 1547–8 Imperial Diet of Augsburg and the promulgation of the Augsburg Interim, Charles imposed a new governmental structure on the cities that sought to punish them for their disobedience by recasting their councils in favor of the urban patriciate. As part of this imperial program of reform, the emperor ordered seized property returned to the Catholic Church, as well as the reinstitution of the Latin Mass in defeated territories. The emperor granted two concessions to his opponents: evangelicals could continue to receive communion in both kinds and their clergy could remain married. Nevertheless, scores of evangelical preachers, including Wolfgang Musculus, departed southern Germany’s imperial cities rather than subject themselves to the Interim’s restrictions. Even after the collapse of the Schmalkaldic League and the imposition of the Augsburg Interim, however, evangelical reform survived in Eastern Swabia. In the end, neither alliances with the Empire’s princes nor these princes’ engagement with the emperor ensured the continued existence of urban reform. Rather, the interconnectedness of cities, especially within regional urban hierarchies like in Eastern Swabia, provided the political framework for the urban Reformation’s survival in southern Germany. Just as it shaped how cities introduced and regulated reform, the Reformation’s regional embeddedness influenced how Eastern Swabia’s magistrates reacted to the Interim: they petitioned assistance, guidance, and support from other communes. In August 1548, Kempten’s magistrates asked their counterparts in Augsburg “what the emperor and his counselors have permitted your preachers to do and how you organize religious matters in your city. We do not doubt that whatever the emperor concedes to you, he will also benevolently allow to us and other cities.”5 Shortly

4 5

Friess, Aussenpolitik, 201; G. Schmidt, “Die Freien und Reichsstadte im Schmalkaldischen ¨ Bund,” 212–6. StadtA A, RA 544, 1548 August 17.

250


thereafter, magistrates in Augsburg and Ulm sent delegations to Nuremberg for advice concerning how they could best comply with the emperor’s orders to reorganize their governmental structures.6 A few months later, the councils in Ulm and Lindau solicited advice from Augsburg regarding the reconstitution of parish incomes and monastic property to the Catholic Church.7 Kempten wrote again to Augsburg in late December 1549, this time for counsel “concerning whether or not, according to the precepts of the Interim, a preacher who has divorced his wife can marry another woman.”8 Kaufbeuren petitioned Augsburg for guidance as well. Despite its neutrality in the Schmalkaldic War, the city did not escape the emperor’s wrath. In August 1548, Charles V ordered the Augsburg Interim implemented in Kaufbeuren. While the Interim forced most of the city’s evangelical clergy to leave, one pastor stayed behind. Mathias Espenmuller, ¨ the former spiritualist preacher who in 1548 returned from his paid exile in Basel, regained possession of the Honold preachership by permission of Kaufbeuren’s council. His activity did not elude the emperor. In October 1549, Charles V issued a mandate accusing Kaufbeuren’s magistrates of harboring dissident clerics intent on subverting the Interim.9 The city council reacted just as it had to the emperor’s September 1545 edict decrying the city’s toleration of Anabaptists: it turned to Augsburg for assistance. Augsburg’s council encouraged its neighbor “to remove [Espenmuller] from his preachership and to replace him with ¨ another pastor who will carry out the duties of his office according to the Interim.”10 Kaufbeuren followed Augsburg’s advice. After five years of controversy, its council officially removed Espenmuller from the Honold ¨ preachership in January 1550. At the same time, Kaufbeuren’s magistrates granted Espenmuller full use of the preachership’s income for the rest of ¨ Kaufbeuren’s his life.11 Similar to its 1545 treatment of Espenmuller, ¨ 6

7 8 9 10 11

Because of Nuremberg’s neutrality in the war and its loyalty to the emperor, Charles V ordered that southern Germany’s other imperial cities reorganize their civic governments according to Nuremberg’s model. For the delegations to Nuremberg, see the doc¨ uments in Eberhard Naujoks, ed., Kaiser Karl V. und die Zunftverfassung. Ausgewahlte ¨ ¨ ¨ Aktenstucke zu den Verfassungsanderungen in den oberdeutschen Reichsstadten (1547– 1556) (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1985), 47–96. See StadtA A, RA 585, 1549 Mai 23 for Ulm’s letter; StadtA A, RA 548, 1549 November 8 for Lindau’s letter. StadtA A, RA 544, 1549 Dezember 23. Alt, Reformation und Gegenreformation, 89–90. StadtA A, RA 541, 1550 Januar 16. Alt, Reformation und Gegenreformation, 90.

Conclusion

251

council acted on Augsburg’s advice, but it constructed its policy in a way that allowed it to maintain internal peace and to exercise control over its own religious circumstances. In the aftermath of the Schmalkaldic War, Kaufbeuren’s council continued to assert its autonomy from its larger neighbor. The Augsburg Interim and the subsequent reorganization of numerous urban councils did not stop imperial cities from negotiating religious reform. Intercity communication remained one of the standard tools that councils used to formulate their political, social, and religious initiatives. This was true not only in Eastern Swabia, but in Franconia and along the Upper Rhine as well. Nuremberg continued to operate as an important source of consultation for the councils in Augsburg and Ulm as well as for smaller communes in its region. As Ronald Rittgers has argued, these smaller cities, which included Nordlingen and the satellite city Wind¨ sheim, “looked to Nuremberg for guidance on how to cope with the Interim.”12 Strasbourg’s council sent numerous delegates to observe the implementation of the Interim in cities like Augsburg and Nuremberg in order to inform its own policy towards the new order.13 During this difficult period, the urban Reformation remained embedded in regional systems of support and influence that ensured its survival. The urban hierarchy continued to operate much as it had before the Schmalkaldic War, and networks of guidance and communication among cities enabled Eastern Swabia’s imperial cities to navigate a path between continuing allegiance to the evangelical faith and necessary obedience to the Augsburg Interim. Negotiation and the South German Urban Reformation This study reevaluates several traditional assumptions about the process of sixteenth-century urban reform. Historians like Bernd Moeller, Franz Lau, and Heinrich Schmidt have portrayed the urban Reformation as “reform from below,” arguing the Reformation owed its success to the agitation and agency of the common folk. These scholars downplay the importance of town councils for instigating reform, declaring “magistrates were anything but the motive force behind the Reformation.”14 Across Eastern Swabia, however, and most notably in Donauworth and ¨ 12 13 14

Ronald Rittgers, The Reformation of the Keys (Cambridge: Harvard, 2004), 184. PC, vol. 4, 992–1147. Moeller, “Imperial Cities,” 61.

252


Kaufbeuren, the local city council did act as the guiding internal force for religious reform. The council petitioned neighboring cities for new preachers. The cities’ magistrates sought external guidance in implementing and defending urban reform. Ultimately, in Donauworth, Kaufbeuren, ¨ Augsburg, and elsewhere, the choice between different confessional affiliations lay with the town council. Without the support of Eastern Swabia’s magistrates, no type of structured religious reform could have occurred in the region’s cities. At the same time, urban councils in Eastern Swabia balanced their reform endeavors with the interests of their burghers. While urban reform in this region did not represent a one-sided process of “reform from below,” it was also not an authoritative process of “reform from above.” Magistrates made their decisions based on how the inhabitants of their city and its neighboring territories would receive specific reforms. Both Donauworth’s privileging of Nuremberg-style reform over Augsburg¨ style reform and Kaufbeuren’s careful handling of the 1545 and 1550 controversies involving Mathias Espenmuller show a desire to maintain ¨ consensus within the cities. Town councils controlled the Reformation’s implementation, but as the actions of Wolfgang Musculus and Michael Keller show, preachers and the common folk influenced the introduction of specific types of reform as well. The urban Reformation in southern Germany cannot be reduced to an exclusively top-down or bottom-up process. Internally, it was often a product of compromise between the town council, its burghers, and its clerics. This does not give us the whole picture, however. Alongside the internal dialogue that occurred within many cities, negotiation between cities exerted a powerful influence on the south German urban Reformation. This was especially true in regions like Eastern Swabia that possessed long traditions of urban alliance and cooperation. In Donauworth, the ¨ Augsburg reformer Musculus facilitated the adoption of the Reformation. His mission reveals the challenges that often confronted preachers in their attempts to spread religious reform. The divided nature of Donauworth’s ¨ council, combined with its precarious geopolitical situation, meant the city’s magistrates introduced reform in a piecemeal fashion. The council sought thereby to maintain control over its reformation while also keeping its confessional options open pending admission to the Three Cities’ League. Musculus attempted to overcome this reluctance by using the common folk as a counterweight to the city council. The preacher took his message to the pulpit, sowing the seeds for Augsburg-style reform among the general populace. He then used their “love of the truth” as a prod

Conclusion

253

to encourage the introduction of council-led reform. In Donauworth, a ¨ borrowed preacher from another city mediated impulses from below and from above. Donauworth’s failure to gain admission to the Three Cities’ League ¨ meant Musculus’s mission could not sway the city into Augsburg’s confessional camp. Despite Donauworth’s choice of Nuremberg-style over ¨ Augsburg-style reform, Donauworth and Augsburg continued to nego¨ tiate the nature of the city’s reformation. The defense and survival of Donauworth’s reformation depended on regional political structures that ¨ tied the city to its larger neighbor. The guidance of a preacher from Augsburg enabled Donauworth to introduce religious reform; Augsburg’s ¨ assistance allowed the city to placate the dangerous Spaniards; and it was through Augsburg that Donauworth sought to protect itself against the ¨ bishop of Augsburg’s mandate. Donauworth needed Augsburg’s protec¨ tion just as much as Augsburg’s council desired to spread its version of reform and to secure the Danube bridgehead. Each city had something to gain from engaging the other party in negotiation. Most importantly, each side had something to offer as well. The councils in Augsburg and Donauworth pursued larger political and religious goals that alterna¨ tively conflicted and coincided with those of their neighbor. The resulting process of negotiation shaped the entire course of Donauworth’s early ¨ reformation. In Kaufbeuren, four neighboring imperial cities compelled the local council to accept the Augsburg Confession. Until August 1545, Kaufbeuren’s magistrates had taken limited steps toward reform, and the city housed sizeable Anabaptist and Schwenckfelder communities. Communication networks between cities helped foster the growth of these radical sects. Like its magisterial counterpart, radical reform could spread along intercity patterns of influence, but Kaufbeuren’s reputation as a haven for radicals ensured that its neighboring communes could not allow the city to remain on its unique reform path. The impetus for Kaufbeuren’s acceptance of the Augsburg Confession did not come from the council, its preachers, or its burghers. It resulted from the agitation of four nearby cities that used patterns of consultation and religio-political influence to alter the direction of Kaufbeuren’s reformation. By interfering in their neighbor’s internal religious development, Augsburg, Kempten, Memmingen, and Ulm realigned Kaufbeuren’s official confessional affiliation, although the exact nature of the city’s reformation remained a matter of negotiation. In the ensuing debate over Mathias Espenmuller, ¨ Kaufbeuren’s council sought to preserve its autonomy by constructing

254


policies acceptable both to its citizens and to its urban neighbors. The Reformation’s official introduction in the city resulted from the work not of one council but of five councils. The similarities between the Reformation’s course in Donauworth and ¨ Kaufbeuren are striking. Both cities accepted the Augsburg Confession in August 1545 at the request of neighboring imperial cities. One month later, the Reformation in both communes came under attack from outside Catholic forces. Magistrates in Donauworth and Kaufbeuren enlisted the ¨ aid of Augsburg, which guided their written justifications for reform and supplied the two cities with multiple preachers. In exchange, Augsburg sought to entrench its influence over religious reform in the two smaller cities. Regional politics, patterns of religio-political influence, and intercity negotiation proved decisive for the urban Reformation in Eastern Swabia. This region’s imperial cities experienced negotiated reformations shaped by their geopolitical context as well as their individual relationships with other cities. Similar dynamics marked many urban attempts to spread the Reformation to rural communities. In Haunstetten, Mindelaltheim, and elsewhere, the introduction of religious reform in the countryside often depended on the specific legal rights controlled by city councils. As with the Reformation in cities, urban attempts at rural reform rarely occurred without the city council consulting other polities. In the case of Mindelaltheim, Augsburg installed a preacher in the village only after it received Ulm’s pledge of support. During its negotiations with Ferdinand, Augsburg sought the assistance of the Schmalkaldic League to legitimize the city’s claim to the ius reformandi. Ultimately, Augsburg’s attempts to spread reform to Haunstetten and Mindelaltheim failed, primarily because the council did not possess the requisite legal rights and Ferdinand displayed no desire to compromise. Rebuked by the Schmalkaldic League and lacking any substantial leverage against the king’s demands, Augsburg’s council had to abandon reform in the two villages. Without the support of allies, town councils in Eastern Swabia were hard pressed to maintain the Reformation in either rural or urban settings. Augsburg’s council played a central role in reform endeavors in Donauworth, Kaufbeuren, and Mindelaltheim. Its involvement in the Reforma¨ tion’s simultaneous introduction in these three different settings resulted from an ambitious program of regional expansion. Augsburg’s council sought to establish an extended sphere of influence, an area of religiopolitical hegemony in Eastern Swabia similar to Nuremberg’s dominance in Franconia. In order to create this new order, however, Augsburg had

Conclusion

255

to negotiate the spread of religious reform with its two smaller urban neighbors. Although unequal to Augsburg in size, status, and political power, Donauworth and Kaufbeuren remained self-governing polities ¨ with liberties of their own. In the process of negotiation, Augsburg could employ coercion, a tactic its council used at several points, but its program of expansion ultimately sought to procure the willing cooperation of other cities. Both Donauworth and Kaufbeuren possessed something ¨ Augsburg’s council desired: allegiance in a deferential relationship that could establish Augsburg’s hegemony and, in a larger sense, lead to the victory of Augsburg’s version of evangelical reform. Fundamental to this program was Augsburg assuming the role of protector at the behest of other communes. Augsburg’s magistrates could force their neighbors to acquiesce, but as the occupation of Donauworth shows, this policy stood ¨ little chance of long-term success. In Kaufbeuren as well, Augsburg’s coercion through the Four-Cities’ delegation served in the end to push Kaufbeuren’s council away rather than draw it closer. Negotiation as a policy for creating expanded spheres of influence relied on the ability to exert leverage and a willingness to bargain. To varying degrees of success, however, the councils in Donauworth and Kaufbeuren strove to escape ¨ from Augsburg’s influence. When both neighboring cities proved unwilling to compromise or bargain, Augsburg’s council employed military force and hoped for the best. The course of religious negotiations among magistrates in Eastern Swabia highlights the importance of regional power structures in establishing the framework for negotiation. Both large and small imperial cities in southern Germany negotiated their reformations with other cities, although the dynamics of this process varied based on size and geographic location. Among the larger imperial cities, religious negotiation most commonly took the form of intercity consultation. This tendency marked the Reformation’s introduction in both Ulm and Augsburg, where consultation shaped the implementation of reform before, during, and after the Schmalkaldic War. Just as they did in smaller cities, larger cities used their influence to agitate for reform in other large cities. The case of Frankfurt is particularly instructive in this regard. Beginning in May 1529 with the introduction of a new moral code for the city’s clergy, Frankfurt’s magistrates came under growing pressure from Archbishop Albrecht of Mainz to reverse their reform course. Albrecht began reformation suit proceedings against the council, which responded by soliciting guidance from its fellow corresponding cities. Strasbourg, Nuremberg, and Ulm offered numerous letters of advice that encouraged Frankfurt not to compromise

256


its religious principles by giving in to the archbishop’s demands but instead to join the Schmalkaldic League. Frankfurt used this support to strengthen its negotiating position with Albrecht, but it also sought to distance itself from the League and the direct religio-political influence of the other cities. By the end of 1535, however, the deterioration of discussions with Albrecht, coupled with renewed entreaties from the corresponding cities, led the council to seek protection in the Schmalkaldic League.15 Left to its own devices, Frankfurt’s council might well have compromised with the archbishop and instituted a limited version of reformed worship similar to the agreement reached between Albrecht and the Thurigian city of Erfurt.16 Instead, the course of negotiations with the archbishop and the corresponding cities produced a situation where the council’s best option was to maintain full-scale reform by closing ranks with other evangelical imperial cities. Frankfurt’s experience during the first half of the 1530s parallels that of many other imperial cities in southern Germany. The course of religious negotiations in these southern cities points to a larger truth about urban relations during the sixteenth century. In her 1990 study of urban liberty in absolutist Spain, Helen Nader argues the Spanish monarchs created “an administrative structure that linked towns directly to the monarchy but not with each other.”17 Urban autonomy in early modern Castile depended on closer ties to the monarch that necessitated a rupture of ties to neighboring cities. In Eastern Swabia, the exact opposite was true. Drawing on a long tradition of consultation, southern Germany’s imperial cities relied on the assistance and guidance of other urban communes to implement and preserve reform, as well as to protect the common interests of their estate. Social, economic, and religious ties linked cities in countless ways. Their continued autonomy depended on a sense of mutual support within their ranks, a fact recognized by urban magistrates. As Ulm’s council argued in 1529, imperial cities had to unite if they wished to remain independent. Otherwise, “there will be no other result than that the cities, alongside all their onerous burdens, will be subjugated to the other estates and become their slaves and bondsmen.”18 These words applied equally well to the condition of imperial cities throughout the early modern period. 15 16 17 18

Jahns, Frankfurt. In 1530, Erfurt reached a compromise with Albrecht that allowed for the coexistence of Catholic and Lutheran services in the city. Scribner, “Civic Unity in Erfurt,” 48–50. Helen Nader, Liberty in Absolutist Spain (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1990), 4. Quoted in Dobel, Memmingen im Reformationszeitalter, vol. 2, 82.

Conclusion

257

Intercity communication provided urban magistrates with one of the most effective ways to negotiate consensus with other communes. In southern Germany, communication occurred in a regional framework that shaped the nature of religious negotiation. The most influential communes were Augsburg, Nuremberg, Strasbourg, and Ulm. These were the four leading cities of the Urban Diet. Along with Frankfurt, they represented the most economically and politically powerful urban centers in the southern part of the Empire. While these cities consulted within their ranks across regional boundaries, each served as one of the primary sources of guidance for neighboring communes in their respective regions. Smaller cities like Kaufbeuren rarely sought consultation from larger cities outside of Upper Swabia. Conversely, Augsburg and Ulm most frequently petitioned one of their fellow corresponding cities for advice, a tendency apparent in Augsburg’s reform of its clerical payscale and its marriage laws. Such patterns of consultation often mirrored traditions of representation at urban and imperial diets. It was natural for Kaufbeuren’s council to consult with Memmingen and Augsburg, since both were important nearby economic centers that often spoke for Kaufbeuren at assemblies. Intercity consultation among southern Germany’s imperial cities had a regional focus that influenced how political communication occurred. Social, economic, and political links between urban centers played a fundamental role in spreading the Reformation, both among city councils and among the common folk. Larger communes like Augsburg and Ulm served not only as regional economic hubs, but also as central places for the distribution of information. Magistrates in both cities tried to impose their will on surrounding communities through economic pressure, control of political communication, and the exportation of specific types of religious reform. In this respect, the urban hierarchy in Eastern Swabia reflects some of the tenets of central-place theory, which posits a hierarchy of cities connected through the centrality of different economic or transportation functions.19 In religio-political terms, this implies various centers of influence, participating in a ranked hierarchy, where each center provides an orientation point for smaller complementary communities surrounding it. In many ways, urban relationships in Eastern 19

See among others Walter Christaller, Central Places in Southern Germany, trans. Carlisle W. Baskin (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1966); Peter Clark and Paul Slack, English Towns in Transition 1500–1700 (London: Oxford, 1976); Paul L. Hohenburg and Lynn Hollen Lees, The Making of Urban Europe 1000–1994 (Cambridge: Harvard, 1995); Scott, Regional Identity, 73–9, 95–104.

258


Swabia exhibit this dynamic. In economic, political, and religious affairs, the region’s smaller towns oriented themselves toward their larger, more influential neighbors. This made perfect sense for smaller communes, since cities like Ulm and Augsburg had greater access to information as well as more sway at the supraregional level. By drawing on consultation with the region’s central urban places, cities like Donauworth and ¨ Kaufbeuren could legitimize their magisterial policies through reliance on their more powerful neighbors. The relationship between central places and their surrounding communities, however, was not one-sided. It operated as a reciprocal arrangement, as the negotiations over reform in Donauworth and Kaufbeuren ¨ demonstrate. Influences could come from smaller and larger cities, while less populous imperial cities could act as important central places for consultation within localized regions. This dynamic appears in Augsburg’s procurement of preachers from a smaller central place, Memmingen, as well as Kaufbeuren’s attempts to use the consultative authority of its neighboring cities against each other. The conflict between Augsburg and Ulm’s spheres of influence, which proved particularly important for Augsburg’s reform efforts in Mindelaltheim, further complicated the role of Eastern Swabia’s central places. The consultative practices of southern Germany’s imperial cities show that intercity communication was far from static. Most cities had one or two primary sources of consultation toward which they oriented their policies, but political communication could expand to include polities outside the local hierarchy. Donauworth’s consultation with Nuremberg reveals how this process ¨ could shape the urban Reformation. The urban hierarchy in Eastern Swabia, therefore, was not a closed system. Like the Reformation in individual towns, communication between the region’s imperial cities did not occur in isolation. Occasionally, other central places outside the local hierarchy tried to intervene in the region, such as Nuremberg’s attempts in the early 1530s to discourage Kempten from introducing Zwinglian reform. Influences from outside the urban hierarchy as a whole, especially those exerted by imperial agents or alliances like the Swabian or Schmalkaldic leagues, also shaped the orientation of negotiation along with regional information nodes. They provided alternate venues to the local central place for political communication. Kaufbeuren’s consultation with the Schmalkaldic League at the Schmalkaldic Diet of Frankfurt is a prime example of how councils could use appeals to other polities to circumvent the influence of their larger, central neighbors. The urban hierarchy in Eastern Swabia structured itself

Conclusion

259

around central places, but these central places had far from hegemonic control over their complementary regions. Within this communication system, Donauworth occupied a curious ¨ place. Linguistically and geographically Swabian, the city consulted both within its region and across the border into Franconia, seeking advice and preachers from Nuremberg in addition to its “foremost city,” Augsburg. Donauworth’s location at the boundary between Swabia and Franco¨ nia, as well as its position amid territorial states of differing confessional affiliations, encouraged the council to seek advice from a larger city that traditionally did not serve as its main source of consultation. The unusual nature of this situation was apparent to magistrates at the time. In their January 1545 letter to Augsburg, Nuremberg’s councilors marveled that Donauworth would come to them for advice rather than to Augsburg, ¨ since Augsburg’s council normally acted as the main orientation point for Donauworth. Similar to Kaufbeuren’s actions, Donauworth’s council ¨ ¨ used Nuremberg as a counterweight to Augsburg’s attempts to extend its religio-political sphere of influence. The councilors in Donauworth ¨ recognized that Nuremberg’s reformation corresponded well to their own vision for the city’s Christian church. Indeed, Nuremberg offered Donauworth’s council something Augsburg could not: a theological con¨ nection to Wittenberg as well as to many of the city’s territorial neighbors. Despite this, Donauworth’s deep ties to Augsburg meant it remained ¨ dependent on its southern neighbor as its main source of support. In the end, only imperial armies could alter this fact. The centrality of regional politics changes our understanding of how the urban Reformation in southern Germany occurred and why it survived military defeat. Reform in one imperial city cannot be divorced from the influences that external agents, especially neighboring cities, exerted daily upon it. Urban reform was sometimes a collaborative process, sometimes an antagonistic process, and sometimes a product of cooptation or compromise among cities. In many instances, the urban Reformation in southern Germany’s imperial cities resulted from negotiation, although this negotiation had its limits. As the collapse of negotiations between Augsburg, Donauworth, and Kaufbeuren demonstrates, the efforts of ¨ cities to guide the actions of their neighbors could only go so far. Throughout the 1540s, Augsburg’s council attempted to draw its two neighboring cities into a more dependent relationship in preparation for a general religious war. This program of regional expansion relied on a policy of negotiation between self-governing urban communes. When a mutual desire to find common ground evaporated, negotiations between the cities

260


broke down, and Augsburg resorted to the opposite strategy. In so doing, Augsburg’s council forfeited what it had sought most: the willing cooperation and allegiance of its neighboring cities. Despite the failure of negotiations in summer 1546, Eastern Swabia’s imperial cities continued to employ intercity communication as a way to legitimize magisterial initiatives and to build consensus in matters of religion. The idea of negotiation therefore leads to a clearer understanding of how city councils formulated policy and governed their burghers throughout the sixteenth century. The drafting of guild ordinances, the renovation of urban public works, the implementation of social and ecclesiastical reforms, the defense of religious reform, and the adoption of different religious confessions: town councils in southern Germany discussed and negotiated all of these things. Cities depended on each other for support just as neighbors within towns relied on each other for daily labor and food. This occurred across confessional lines. Augsburg and Ulm, both of which favored reform modeled on Upper German principles, consulted frequently with their Three Cities’ ally Nuremberg, a center of Wittenberg-influenced theology. While their relationship was often tempestuous, they found ways to cooperate. Despite their confessional differences, southern Germany’s evangelical imperial cities needed each other to make urban reform work. While negotiation had limitations, it played such a vital role in the everyday operation of imperial cities that after the disaster of the Schmalkaldic War, Eastern Swabia’s urban councils continued to employ it as a standard tool of governance. Kaufbeuren serves as a fitting example. After avoiding Augsburg’s 1545–6 attempts to incorporate the city into the Schmalkaldic League, Kaufbeuren’s council turned to its neighbor once again in 1549–50 for aid. As in 1545, negotiations between the two cities centered on the controversial preacher Mathias Espenmuller. ¨ Kaufbeuren’s magistrates may have wished to escape from Augsburg’s influence, but they could not turn their backs entirely on their larger neighbor. Augsburg’s support was too important and Kaufbeuren’s reliance on external consultation too great to allow for complete separation. Long after Michael Keller’s initial 1544 letter urging Kaufbeuren’s magistrates to accept the Augsburg Confession, the two councils continued to negotiate the direction of religious reform in Kaufbeuren. The regional configuration of the urban reform movement in Eastern Swabia ensured its survival after the Schmalkaldic War, while the strength and fluidity of urban communication networks in the southern part of the Empire resulted in the regionalization of the Reformation. This weakened

Conclusion

261

the movement politically at the imperial level, but on the regional level, it mobilized systems of support that allowed evangelical communities to survive external attacks on the Reformation. The negotiated model of reform that shaped the experience of cities in Eastern Swabia reveals how regional patterns of power and communication influenced the orientation, spread, and survival of reform in one urban hierarchy. The similarity of this process to dynamics in other regions, especially in Franconia and the Upper Rhine, suggests that with local variations, religious negotiation within a regional framework sat at the heart of the urban Reformation throughout southern Germany.

Bibliography

Archival Sources Evangelisches Kirchenarchiv Kaufbeuren Anlage 44, 59, 65, 101, 133 Staatsarchiv Augsburg Kloster St. Ulrich Akten 208 Reichsstadt Nordlingen, Munchener Bestand 49, 54, 56, 996, 997 ¨ ¨ Staatsarchiv Nurnberg ¨ Reichsstadt Nurnberg, Briefbucher Nr. 131 ¨ ¨ Reichsstadt Nurnberg, Rep. 61a ¨ Reichsstadt Nurnberg, Verl. D. Inneren Rates, Nr. 978 ¨ Stadtarchiv Augsburg Literaliensammlung 1525–1550 Literaliensammlung Nachtrage ¨ 1525–1550 Literaliensammlung Personalselekt Cellarius Literaliensammlung Reformationsakten Markgrafschaft Burgau Nr. 9 Ratsprotokolle 1525–1550 Reichsstadtakten 541, 544, 550, 558, 571, 572, 576, 581, 582, 583, 584 Stadtarchiv Memmingen Bd. A 62/1 Ratsprotokolle 1542–1550 Schublade 342 Stadtarchiv Ulm A 1156 A 1219 A 3530 K, Ratsprotokolle A [8996] A [8997] 263

264

Bibliography Printed Sources and Secondary Literature

Abray, Lorna Jane. The People’s Reformation. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985. Alt, Karl. Reformation und Gegenreformation in der freien Reichsstadt Kaufbeuren. Munich: Kaiser, 1932. ¨ . “Reichsstadt Kaufbeuren.” In Quellen zur Geschichte der Taufer. Edited by Karl Schornbaum. Vol. 5, part 2, 131–61. Gutersloh: Bertelmann, 1951. ¨ Angermeier, Heinz. “Stadteb unde und Landfrieden im 14. Jahrhundert.” His¨ ¨ torisches Jahrbuch 76 (1954):34–46. Arnold, Matthieu and Berndt Hamm, eds. Martin Bucer zwischen Luther und Zwingli. Tubingen: Mohr, 2003. ¨ Augustjin, Cornelis. “Bucer und die Religionsgesprache von 1540/1.” In Martin ¨ Bucer and Sixteenth Century Europe. Edited by Christian Krieger and Marc Lienhard. Vol. 2, 671–80. New York: Brill, 1993. Baader, J. “Nurnbergisches Rechtsgutachten uber die Ermordung zweier Ehe¨ ¨ ¨ Kunde der deutschen Vorzeit, NF brecher zu Ulm im Jahre 1528.” Anzeiger fur 11 (1864):134–6. ¨ Berthold, Brigitte. “Uberregionale Stadtebundprojekte in der ersten Halfte des ¨ ¨ ¨ Geschichte des Feudalismus 3 (1979):141–79. 15. Jahrhunderts.” Jahrbuch fur Blickle, Peter. Gemeindereformation. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1985. . “Zur Territorialpolitik der oberschwabischen Reichsstadte.” In Stadt ¨ ¨ und Umland. Edited by Erich Maschke and Jurgen Sydow, 54–71. Stuttgart: ¨ Kohlhammer, 1974. Blume, Gundmar. Goslar und der Schmalkaldische Bund 1527/31–1547. Goslar: Selbstverlag, 1969. ¨ Bock, Ernst. Der Schwabische Bund und seine Verfassung 1488–1534. 2nd ed. Aalen: Scientia, 1968. Bohm, Christoph. Die Reichsstadt Augsburg und Kaiser Maximilian I. Sigmarin¨ gen: Thorbecke, 1998. Bossert, Gustav. “Augustin Bader von Augsburg, der Prophet und Konig, und ¨ seine Genossen, nach dem Prozessakten von 1530.” ARG 10 (1913):117–65, 209–41, 297–349 and 11 (1914):19–64, 103–33, 176–99. Brady, Thomas A. “Phases and Strategies of the Schmalkaldic League: A Perspective after 450 Years.” ARG 74 (1983):162–81. . Protestant Politics. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities, 1995. . Ruling Class, Regime, and Reformation at Strasbourg, 1520–1555. Leiden: Brill, 1978. . Turning Swiss. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. Brecht, Martin. “Ambrosius Blarers Wirksamkeit in Schwaben.” In Der Konstanzer Reformator Ambrosius Blarer 1492–1564. Edited by Bernd Moeller, 140–71. Constance: Thorbecke. . “Die gemeinsame Politik der Reichsstadte und die Reformation.” ZSRG, ¨ KA 83 (1977):180–263. Broadhead, Philip, “Internal politics and civic society in Augsburg during the era of the early reformation 1518–1537.” PhD diss., University of Canterbury/ Kent, 1981.

Bibliography

265

. “Popular Pressure for Reform in Augsburg, 1524–1534.” In Stadt¨ burgertum und Adel in der Reformation. Edited by Peter Alter, Wolfgang Mommsen, and Robert Scribner, 80–7. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1979. Brown, Peter. The Rise of Western Christendom: Triumph and Diversity 200– 1000 AD. Malden: Blackwell, 2003. ¨ Buck, Hermann. Die Anfange der Konstanzer Reformationsprozesse. Tubingen: ¨ Osiandersche, 1964. Burnett, Amy Nelson. “Basel and the Wittenberg Concord.” ARG 96 (2005):33– 56. Carl, Horst. “Der Schwabische Bund.” In Der Bauernkrieg in Oberschwaben. ¨ Edited by Elmar L. Kuhn, 421–43. Tubingen: Bibliotheca Academica, ¨ 2000. ¨ . Der Schwabische Bund 1488–1534. Leinfelden-Echterdingen: DRW, 2000. Christaller, Walter. Central Places in Southern Germany. Translated by Carlisle W. Baskin. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1966. Clark, Peter and Paul Slack. English Towns in Transition 1500–1700. London: Oxford University Press, 1976. Clasen, Claus-Peter. Anabaptism: A Social History. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972. . Die Augsburger Weber. Augsburg: Muhlberger, 1981. ¨ Close, Christopher W. “The Mindelaltheim Affair: High Justice, ius reformandi, and the Rural Reformation in Eastern Swabia” SCJ 38, 2 (Summer 2007):371– 92. . “Zurich, Augsburg, and the Transfer of Preachers during the Schmalkaldic War.” CEH. Forthcoming. Corpus Schwenckfeldianorum. Edited by Elmer Ellsworth Schultz Johnson. Vol.9. Leipzig: Breitkopf, 1928. Coy, Jason. Strangers and Misfits: Banishment, Social Control, and Authority in Early Modern Germany. Leiden: Brill, 2008. De Kroon, Marijn. “Die Augsburger Reformation in der Korrespondenz des Strassburger Reformators Martin Bucer unter besonderer Berucksichtigung ¨ des Briefwechsels Gereon Sailers.” In Die Augsburger Kirchenordnung von 1537 und ihr Umfeld. Edited by Reinhard Schwarz, 59–90. Gutersloh: Mohn, ¨ 1988. . “Bucer und die Kolner Reformation.” In Martin Bucer and Sixteenth ¨ Century Europe. Edited by Christian Krieger and Marc Lienhard. Vol. 2, 493– 506. New York: Brill, 1993. Dellsperger, Rudolf. “Bucer und Musculus.” In Martin Bucer and Sixteenth Century Europe. Edited by Christian Krieger and Marc Lienhard. Vol. 1, 419–28. New York: Brill, 1993. Dickens, Arthur G. The German Nation and Martin Luther. New York: Harper, 1974. ¨ Dieter, Stefan. Die Reichsstadt Kaufbeuren in der fruhen Neuzeit. Thalhofen: Bauer, 2000. Dieter, Stefan and Gunther Pietsch, eds. Die Urkunden der Stadt Kaufbeuren ¨ 1501–1551. 2 vols. Thalhofen: Bauer, 1999.

266

Bibliography

Dixon, C. Scott. The Reformation and Rural Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. . “Urban Order and Religious Coexistence in the German Imperial City: Augsburg and Donauworth, 1548–1608.” CEH 40 (2007):1–33. ¨ Dobel, Friedrich. Memmingen im Reformationszeitalter. 5 vols. Augsburg: Lampart, 1877–8. Dobras, Wolfgang. “Karl V., Ferdinand I. und die Reichsstadt Konstanz.” In Karl V. Politik und politisches System. Edited by Horst Rabe, 191–221. Constance: UVK, 1996. . Ratsregiment, Sittenpolizei und Kirchenzucht in der Reichsstadt Konstanz 1531–1548. Gutersloh: Mohn, 1993. ¨ Dolezalek, Gero. “Die Assessoren des Reichskammergerichts und der Nurnberger ¨ Religionsfriede vom 23. Juli 1532.” In Recht, Gericht, Genossenschaft und Policey. Edited by Gerhard Dilcher and Bernhard Diestelkamp, 84–96. Berlin: Schmidt, 1986. . “Die juristische Argumentation der Assessoren am Reichskammergericht zu den Reformationsprozessen 1532–1538.” In Das Reichskammergericht in der Deutschen Geschichte. Edited by Bernhard Diestelkamp, 25–58. Cologne: Bohlau, 1990. ¨ Eberlein, Paul Gerhard. Ketzer oder Heiliger? Metzingen: Franz, 1998. Eirich, Raimund. Memmingens Wirtschaft und Patriziat von 1347 bis 1551. Weissenhorn: Konrad, 1971. Eltz, Erwein. “Die Reise zum Reichstag.” In Alltag im 16. Jahrhundert. Edited by Alfred Kohler and Heinrich Lutz, 195–221. Vienna: Verlag fur ¨ Geschichte und Politik, 1987. Enderle, Wilfried. Konfessionsbildung und Ratsregiment in der katholischen ¨ Reichsstadt Uberlingen (1500–1618). Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1990. Endres, Rudolf. “Der Kayserliche neunjahrige Bund vom Jahr 1535 bis 1544.” ¨ In Bauer, Reich und Reformation. Edited by Peter Blickle, 84–103. Stuttgart: Ulmer, 1982. ¨ Escher, Monika, Alfred Haverkamp and Frank G. Hirschmann, eds. Stadte¨ ¨ ¨ landschaft – Stadtenetz – zentralortliches Gefuge. Mainz: Von Zabern, 2000. Ford, James Thomas. “Unter dem schein der concordien und confession: Wolfgang Musculus and the Confessional Identity of Augsburg, 1531–1548.” In Wolfgang Musculus und die oberdeutsche Reformation. Edited by Rudolf Dellsperger, Rudolf Freundenberger, and Wolfgang Weber, 111–29. Berlin: Akademie, 1997. . “Wolfgang Musculus and the Struggle for Confessional Hegemony in Reformation Augsburg, 1531–1548.” PhD diss., University of WisconsinMadison, 2000. Forster, Marc. The Counter-Reformation in the Villages. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992. Freundenberger, Rudolf. “Der oberdeutsche Weg der Reformation.” In ¨ “ . . . wider Laster und Sunde.” Augsburgs Weg in der Reformation. Edited by Josef Kirmeier, Wolfgang Jahn, and Evamaria Brockhoff, 44–61. Cologne: DuMont, 1997.

Bibliography

267

Friedrich, Reinhold, Berndt Hamm, Roland Liebenburg, and Andreas Puchta, eds. Martin Bucer Briefwechsel. Vol. 5. Leiden: Brill, 2004. Friess, Peer. Die Aussenpolitik der Reichsstadt Memmingen in der Reformationszeit (1517–1555). Memmingen: Memminger Zeitung, 1993. . “Der Einfluss des Zwinglianismus auf die Reformation der oberschwabischen Reichsstadte.” Zwingliana 34 (2007):5–27. ¨ ¨ . “Reichsstadtische Diplomatie als Indikator fur ¨ ¨ die politische Struktur einer Region.” In Kommunikation und Region. Edited by Carl A. Hoffman and Rolf Kiessling, 113–38. Constance: UVK, 2001. . “Die Zeit der Ratsreformation in Memmingen.” In Die Geschichte der Stadt Memmingen. Edited by Joachim Jahn. Vol. 1, 419–56. Stuttgart: Theiss, 1997. ¨ Fuchs, Thomas. Konfession und Gesprach. Cologne: Bohlau, 1995. ¨ Goertz, Hans-Jurgen. The Anabaptists. Translated by Trevor Johnson. London: ¨ Routledge, 1996. Goetz, Helmut. “Die geheimen Ratgeber Ferdinands I. (1503–1564). Ihre Personlichkeit im Urteil der Nuntien und Gesandten.” Quellen und Forschun¨ gen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken 42/43 (1963):453–94. ¨ Gossner, Andreas. Weltliche Kirchenhoheit und reichsstadtische Reformation. ¨ Berlin: Akademie, 1999. ¨ Graf, – Réseau Urbain – Urban ¨ Holger and Katrin Keller, eds. Stadtelandschaft ¨ ¨ ¨ Network. Stadte im regionalen Kontext in Spatmittelalter und fruher Neuzeit. Cologne: Bohlau, 2004. ¨ Gray, Emily Fisher. “Good Neighbors: Architecture and Confession in Augsburg’s Lutheran Church of Holy Cross 1525–1661.” PhD diss., University of Pennsylvania, 2004. Greiner, Christian. “Die Politik des Schwabischen Bundes wahrend des Bauern¨ ¨ krieges 1524/25 bis zum Vertrag von Weingarten.” ZHVS 68 (1974):7–94. Greschat, Martin. Martin Bucer. A Reformer and His Times. Translated by Stephen E. Buckwalter. Louisville: Knox, 2004. Gritschke, Caroline. ‘Via media’: Spiritualistische Lebenswelten und Konfession¨ alisierung. Das suddeutsche Schwenckfeldertum im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert. Berlin: Akademie, 2006. Groebner, Valentin. Liquid Assets, Dangerous Gifts: Presents and Politics at the End of the Middle Ages. Translated by Pamela E. Selwyn. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002. ¨ Guderian, Hans. Die Taufer in Augsburg. Ihre Geschichte und ihr Erbe. Pfaffenhofen: Ludwig, 1984. Haberlein, Mark. “Handelsgesellschaften, Sozialbeziehungen und Kommunika¨ tionsnetze in Oberdeutschland zwischen dem ausgehenden 15. und der Mitte des 16. Jahrhunderts.” In Kommunikation und Region. Edited by Carl A. Hoffman and Rolf Kiessling, 305–26. Constance: UVK, 2001. Hamm, Berndt. “Reformation ‘von unten’ und Reformation ‘von oben.’ Zur Problematik reformationshistorischer Klassifizierungen.” In Die Reformation in Deutschland und Europa: Interpretationen und Debatten. Edited by Hans Guggisberg and Gottfried Krodel, 256–93. Gutersloh: Guterloher Verlagshaus, ¨ ¨ 1993.

268

Bibliography

Hanson, Michele Zelinsky. Religious Identity in an Early Reformation Community: Augsburg, 1517 to 1555. Leiden: Brill, 2009. ¨ Haude, Sigrun. In the Shadow of “Savage Wolves”: Anabaptist Munster and the German Reformation During the 1530s. Boston: Humanities, 2000. Haug-Moritz, Gabriele. Der Schmalkaldische Bund 1530–1541/42. LeinfeldenEchterdingen:DRW, 2002. . “Zwischen Spatmittelalter und Reformation – Politischer Foderalismus ¨ ¨ im Reich der Reformationszeit.” In Politics and Reformations: Communities, Polities, Nations, and Empires. Edited by Christopher Ocker, Michael Printy, Peter Starenko, and Peter Wallace, 513–37. Leiden: Brill, 2007. Heal, Bridget. The Cult of the Virgin Mary in Early Modern Germany: Protestant and Catholic Piety, 1500–1648. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Heiman, Heinz-Dieter and Ivan Hlavaˇ ´ cek, eds. Kommunikationspraxis und Korrespondenzwesen im Mittelalter und in der Renaissance. Paderborn: Schoningh, ¨ 1998. Henn, Volker. “Innerhansische Kommunikations- und Raumstrukturen. Umrisse ¨ zur einer neuen Forschungsaufgabe?” In Der hansische Sonderweg? Beitrage Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Hanse. Edited by Stuart Jenks and Michael North, 255–68. Cologne: Bohlau, 1993. ¨ Hermle, Siegfried. “Matthaus Alber und die Reformation in Reutlingen.” In ¨ ¨ ¨ Edited by Siegfried Hermle, Reformationsgeschichte Wurttembergs in Portrats. 13–48. Holzgerlingen: Hanssler, 1999. ¨ Hoffman, Carl A. and Rolf Kiessling, eds. Kommunikation und Region. Constance: UVK, 2001. Hofmann, Stefanie. “Die Stadte zwischen Kaiser und Reich.” In Karl V. Politik ¨ und politisches System. Edited by Horst Rabe, 163–90. Constance: UVK, 1996. Hohenburg, Paul L. and Lynn Hollen Lees. The Making of Urban Europe 1000– 1994. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995. Hoss, ZBKG 53 (1984):19– ¨ Irmgard. “Melanchthon: Wittenberg und Nurnberg.” ¨ 32. Immenhauser, Beat. “’Hohe Schule’ oder Universitat? ¨ Zur Pfarrerausbildung in Bern im 16. Jahrhundert.” In Politics and Reformations: Communities, Polities, Nations, and Empires. Edited by Christopher Ocker, Michael Printy, Peter Starenko, and Peter Wallace, 143–78. Leiden: Brill, 2007. Immenkotter, Herbert. “Kempten zwischen Wittenberg und Zurich. Luther oder ¨ ¨ ¨ Zwingli: die Reformation in der Reichsstadt.” Allgauer Geschichtsfreund (2000):97–102. ¨ Isenmann, Eberhard. Die deutsche Stadt im Spatmittelalter. Stuttgart: Ulmer, 1988. Jager, Ute. “Weissenburg und seine Beziehungen zu den schwabisch-fr ankischen ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ Reichsstadten im Spatmittelalter.” In Stadtelandschaften in Altbayern, Franken ¨ ¨ und Schwaben. Edited by Helmut Flachenecker, 188–220. Munich: Beck, 1999. Jahn, Joachim. “Von der welfischen Marktsiedlung zur Reichsstadt. Memmingen im Mittelalter bis zur Mitte des 14. Jahrhunderts.” In Die Geschichte der Stadt Memmingen. Edited by Joachim Jahn. Vol. 1, 75–161. Stuttgart: Theiss, 1997.

Bibliography

269

Jahns, Sigrid. Frankfurt, Reformation und Schmalkaldischer Bund. Frankfurt: Kramer, 1976. Janssen, Geert H. “Dutch Clientelism and News Networks in Public and Private Spheres. The Case of Stadholder William Frederick 1613–1664.” In News and Politics in Early Modern Europe (1500–1800). Edited by Joop W. Koopmans, 151–66. Leuven: Peeters, 2005. Jucker, Michael. Gesandte, Schreiber, Akten. Politische Kommunikation auf eid¨ ¨ genossischen Tagsatzungen im Spatmittelalter. Zurich: Chronos, 2004. Karant-Nunn, Susan. “Preaching the Word in Early Modern Germany.” In Preachers and People in the Reformations and Early Modern Period. Edited by Larissa Taylor, 193–219. Boston: Brill, 2003. Keim, Theodor. Die Reformation der Reichsstadt Ulm. Stuttgart: Belser’schen, 1851. Kiessling, Rolf. “Augsburg zwischen Mittelalter und Neuzeit.” In Geschichte der ¨ Stadt Augsburg. 2000 Jahre von der Romerzeit bis zur Gegenwart. Edited by Gunther Gottlieb, et al., 241–51. 2nd ed. Stuttgart: Theiss, 1985. ¨ ¨ . Burgerliche Gesellschaft und Kirche in Augsburg im Spatmittelalter. Augsburg: Muhlberger, 1971. ¨ . “Die ‘Nachbarschaft’ und die ‘Regionalisierung’ der Politik.” In Europa 1500. Edited by Winfried Eberhard and Ferdinand Seibt, 262–78. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1986. . “Reichsritterschaft und Reformation in Schwaben – Auf dem Weg zu einer evangelischen Diaspora.” In Staat und Verwaltung in Bayern. Edited by Konrad Ackermann and Alois Schmid, 147–65. Munich: Beck, 2003. . Die Stadt und ihr Land. Cologne: Bohlau, 1989. ¨ . “Stadt und Land im Textilgewerbe Ostschwabens vom 14. bis zur Mitte ¨ des 16. Jahrhunderts.” In Bevolkerung, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Edited by Neithard Bulst, Jochen Hoock, and Franz Irsigler, 115–37. Trier: Auenthal, 1983. . “Stadteb unde und Stadtelandschaften im oberdeutschen Raum. ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ Ostschwaben und Altbayern im Vergleich.” In Stadtelandschaft – Stadtenetz – ¨ ¨ zentralortliches Gefuge. Edited by Monika Escher, Alfred Haverkamp, and Frank G. Hirschmann, 79–116. Mainz: Von Zabern, 2000. . “Stadtischer Republikanismus. Regimentsformen des Burgertums in ober¨ ¨ schwabischen Stadtstaaten im ausgehenden Mittelalter und in der beginnenden ¨ Fruhneuzeit.” In Politische Kultur in Oberschwaben. Edited by Peter Blickle, ¨ 175–205. Tubingen: Academica, 1993. ¨ . “Wolfgang Musculus and die Reformation im schwabischen Einzugsge¨ biet der Stadt Augsburg.” In Wolfgang Musculus und die oberdeutsche Reformation. Edited by Rudolf Dellsperger, Rudolf Freundenberger, and Wolfgang Weber, 130–56. Berlin: Akademie, 1997. Kohler, Alfred. Ferdinand I. 1503–1564. Munich: Beck, 2003. . “Wohnen und Essen auf den Reichstagen des 16. Jahrhunderts.” In Alltag im 16. Jahrhundert. Edited by Alfred Kohler und Heinrich Lutz, 222–57. Vienna: Verlag fur ¨ Geschichte und Politik, 1987. ¨ Kohler, Walter. Zurcher Ehegericht und Genfer Konsistorium. 2 vols. Leipzig: ¨ Heinsius Nachfolger, 1932, 1942.

270

Bibliography

Kohls, Ernst-Wilhelm. “Blarer und Bucer.” In Der Konstanzer Reformator Ambrosius Blarer 1492–1564. Edited by Bernd Moeller, 172–92. Constance: Thorbecke, 1964. ¨ ¨ Kommunikation und Alltag im Spatmittelalter und Fruher Neuzeit. Vienna: Verlag der osterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1992. ¨ Kunast, Hans-Jorg. ¨ ¨ “‘Khann nit dencken, das die vonn Werd lang bey den pfeltzischen Ceremonien bleiben’ – Neue Briefe zum Aufenthalt von Wolfgang Musculus in Donauworth im Jahr 1544/45.” Mitteilungen des Historischen Vereins ¨ ¨ Donauworth ¨ fur und Umgebung (2001):4–23. Lau, Franz. “Der Bauernkrieg und das angebliche Ende der lutherischen Reformation als spontaner Volksbewegung.” Luther-Jahrbuch 26 (1959): 109–34. Laubach, Ernst. Ferdinand I. als Kaiser. Munster: Aschendorff, 2001. ¨ ¨ Laufs, Adolf. Der Schwabische Kreis. Aalen: Scientia, 1971. Lausser, Helmut, ed. Die Quellen zur Geschichte der Schwestern im Maierhof bis zum Jahre 1550. Thalhofen: Bauer, 2004. ¨ Lenz, Max, ed. Briefwechsel Landgraf Philipp’s des Grossmuthigen von Hessen mit Bucer. 3 vols. Stuttgart: S. Hirzel, 1880–91. Reprint, Osnabruck: Zeller, ¨ 1965. Liebhart, Wilhelm. Die Reichsabtei Sankt Ulrich und Afra zu Augsburg. Historischer Atlas von Bayern. Teil Schwaben, Reihe II, Heft 2. Munich: Kommission fur ¨ bayerische Landesgeschichte, 1982. ¨ Litz, Gudrun. Die reformatorische Bilderfrage in den schwabischen Reichss¨ tadten. Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007. ¨ Lutz, Heinrich. “Augsburg und seine politische Umwelt 1490–1555.” In Ges¨ chichte der Stadt Augsburg. 2000 Jahre von der Romerzeit bis zur Gegenwart. Edited by Gunther Gottlieb, et al., 413–33. 2nd ed. Stuttgart: Theiss, 1985. . Conrad Peutinger. Augsburg: Die Brigg, 1958. McLaughlin, R. Emmet. Caspar Schwenckfeld, Reluctant Radical. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986. . “The Genesis of Schwenckfeld’s Eucharistic Doctrine,” ARG 74 (1983):94–121. . “Schwenckfeld and the Schwenckfelders of South Germany.” In The Freedom of Spirit, Social Privilege, and Religious Dissent. 199–231. BadenBaden: Koerner, 1996. Moeller, Bernd. “Bucer und die Geschwister Blarer.” In Martin Bucer and Sixteenth Century Europe. Edited by Christian Krieger and Marc Lienhard. Vol. 1, 441–50. New York: Brill, 1993. . “Imperial Cities and the Reformation.” In Imperial Cities and the Reformation. Three Essays. Translated by H. C. Erik Midelfort and Mark U. Edwards, Jr., 41–115. Durham: Labyrinth, 1982. . Johannes Zwick und die Reformation in Konstanz. Gutersloh: Mohn, ¨ 1961. . Reichsstadt und Reformation. Gutersloh: Gutersloher Verlagshaus, 1962. ¨ ¨ ¨ Morke, Olaf. Rat und Burger in der Reformation. Hildesheim: Lax, 1983. ¨ ¨ Kaiser und Reich. Politische Kommunikation in der fruhen ¨ Muesser, Anja. Fur Neuzeit: Johann Ulrich Zasius (1521–1570) als Rat und Gesandter der Kaiser Ferdinand I. und Maximilian II. Husum: Matthiesen, 2004.

Bibliography

271

Nader, Helen. Liberty in Absolutist Spain. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990. Naujoks, Eberhard. Obrigkeitsgedanke, Zunftverfassung und Reformation. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1958. Naujoks, Eberhard, ed. Kaiser Karl V. und die Zunftverfassung. Ausgew¨ ¨ ¨ ahlte Aktenstucke zu den Verfassungsanderungen in den oberdeutschen ¨ Reichsstadten (1547–1556). Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1985. Nebinger, Gerhard. “Entstehung und Entwicklung der Markgrafschaft Burgau.” ¨ In Vorderosterreich. Eine geschichtliche Landeskunde. Edited by Friedrich Metz, 753–72. 2nd ed. Freiburg: Rombach, 1959. ¨ North, Michael. Kommunikation, Handel, Geld und Banken in der Fruhen Neuzeit. Munich: Oldenbourg, 2000. Ocker, Christopher. Church Robbers and Reformers in Germany, 1525–1547. Leiden: Brill, 2006. Ortmann, Volkmar. Reformation und Einheit der Kirche. Martin Bucers Eini¨ ¨ gungsbemuhungen bei den Religionsgesprachen in Leipzig, Worms und Regensburg 1539–41. Mainz: von Zabern, 2001. Packull, Werner. Mysticism and the Early South German-Austrian Anabaptist Movement. Scottsdale: Herald, 1977. Pettegree, Andrew. Reformation and the Culture of Persuasion. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. Pfluger, Christine. Kommissare und Korrespondenzen. Politische Kommunika¨ tion im Alten Reich (1552–1558). Cologne: Bohlau, 2005. ¨ Pfundner, Thomas. “Die Beschwerde der Oberbeurer Bauern gegen ihren Pfarrer 1525.” ZBKG 68 (1999):178–183. . “Drei Kaiserbriefe Karls V. an die Reichsstadt Kaufbeuren.” ZBKG 63 (1994):218–25. . “Geschichte der Reformation in der Reichsstadt Kaufbeuren.” Kauf¨ beurer Geschichtsblatter 9 (1981/83):270–9. . “Das Memminger und Kaufbeurer Religionsgesprach von 1525. Eine ¨ ¨ ¨ Quellenveroffentlichung mit einem Uberblick.” Memminger Geschichtsblatter ¨ (1991/1992):23–65. Politische Correspondenz der Stadt Strassburg im Zeitalter der Reformation. Edited by Hans Virck, Otto Winckelmann, Harry Gerber, and Walter Friedensburg. 5 vols. Strasbourg: Trubner, 1882–1898; Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1928– ¨ 33. Pol´ıvka, Miloslav. “Nurnberg als Nachrichtenzentrum in der ersten Halfte des ¨ ¨ 15. Jahrhunderts.” In Kommunikationspraxis und Korrespondenzwesen im Mittelalter und in der Renaissance. Edited by Heinz-Dieter Heimann and Ivan Hlavaˇ 1998. ´ cek, 165–78. Paderborn: Schoningh, ¨ Pressel, Theodor. Ambrosius Blaurer nach handschriftlichen und gleichzeitigen Quellen. Eberfeld: Friedrichs, 1861. Provost, Darren. “Martin Bucer and the Reformation of Marriage and Divorce in Early Sixteenth-Century Ulm.” PhD diss., Yale University, 2005. Rittgers, Ronald K. “Private Confession and the Lutheranization of SixteenthCentury Nordlingen.” SCJ 36, 4 (2005):1063–85. ¨ . The Reformation of the Keys. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004.

272

Bibliography

Roper, Lyndal. The Holy Household. Oxford: Clarendon, 1989. Roth, Friedrich. Augsburgs Reformationsgeschichte. 4 vols. Munich: Ackermann, 1901–10. . “Beziehungen der Stadt Augsburg zur Reformation in Donauworth ¨ (1538–1546).” BBK 10 (1904):149–88. . “Zur Einfuhrung der Reformation in der Stadt Fussen.” BBK 9 ¨ ¨ (1903):145–53. . “Zur Lebensgeschichte des Augsburger Stadtadvokaten Dr. Claudius Pius Peutinger (1509–1552).” ARG 25 (1928):99–127, 161–255. Rublack, Hans-Christoph. “Die Aussenpolitik der Reichsstadt Konstanz Wah¨ rend der Reformationszeit.” In Der Konstanzer Reformator Ambrosius Blarer 1492–1564. Edited by Bernd Moeller, 56–80. Constance: Thorbecke, 1964. ¨ ¨ . Eine burgerliche Reformation: Nordlingen. Gutersloh: Mohn, 1982. ¨ . “Forschungsbericht Stadt und Reformation.” In Stadt und Kirche im 16. Jahrhundert. Edited by Bernd Moeller, 9–26. Gutersloh: Mohn, 1978. ¨ . “Reformatorische Bewegung und stadtische Kirchenpolitik in Esslingen.” ¨ ¨ In Stadtische Gesellschaft und Reformation. Edited by Ingrid Batori, 191–220. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1980. Ruth, ¨ Bernhard. “Reformation in Biberach (1520–1555).” In Geschichte der Stadt Biberach. Edited by Dieter Stievermann, 255–88. Stuttgart: Theiss, 1991. . “Reformation und Konfessionsbildung im stadtischen Bereich. Perspek¨ tiven der Forschung.” ZSRG, KA 77 (1991):197–282. Sabean, David Warren. Power in the Blood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984. Safley, Thomas Max. “Die Fuggerfaktoren Hormann von und zu Gutenberg. ¨ ¨ Werte und Normen einer kaufmannischen Familie im Ubergang zum Lan¨ ¨ dadel.” In Augsburger Handelshauser im Wandel des historischen Urteils. Edited by Johannes Burkhardt, 118–29. Berlin: Akademie, 1996. Salmen, Walter. “Der ‘Bauerntanz’ im Urteil von Reformatoren und Reformierten.” In Landgemeinde und Kirche im Zeitalter der Konfessionen. Edited by Beat Kumin, 91–110. Zurich: Chronos, 2004. ¨ Scheller, Benjamin. “‘Damit dannocht etwas umb das gelt und des stifters willen beschech . . . ’ Der Streit um den Stiftungsvollzug der Vohlinschen Pradikatur ¨ ¨ bei St. Martin in Memmingen nach der Reformation (1526–1543).” In Stiftungen und Stiftungswirklichkeiten. Edited by Michael Borgolte, 257–78. Berlin: Akademie, 2000. Schiersner, Dietmar. Politik, Konfession und Kommunikation. Berlin: Akademie, 2005. ¨ . “Die Suche der Schafe nach dem verlornen Hirten.” In Landliche ¨ Frommigkeit. Edited by Norbert Haag, Sabine Holtz, Wolfgang Zimmerman, Dieter Bauer, and Hans-Christoph Rublack, 59–82. Stuttgart: Thorbecke, 2002. ¨ Schiess, Traugott, ed. Briefwechsel der Bruder Ambrosius und Thomas Blarer 1509–1548. Vol. 1. Freiburg: Fehsenfeld, 1908. Schildhauer, Johannes. “Der schwabische Stadtebund – Ausdruck der Kraftent¨ ¨ faltung des deutschen Stadteb urgertums in der zweiten Halfte des 14. Jahrhun¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ Geschichte des Feudalismus 1 (1977):187–210. derts.” Jahrbuch fur

Bibliography

273

Schlutter-Schindler, Gabriele. Der Schmalkaldische Bund und das Problem der ¨ causa religionis. Frankfurt: Lang, 1986. Schmidt, Georg. “Die Freien und Reichsstadte im Schmalkaldischen Bund.” In ¨ Martin Luther. Probleme seiner Zeit. Edited by Volker Press and Dieter Stievermann, 177–218. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1986. . “Die Haltung des Stadtecorpus zur Reformation und die Nurnberger ¨ ¨ Bundnispolitik.” ARG 75 (1984):194–233. ¨ ¨ . Der Stadtetag in der Reichsverfassung. Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1984. Schmidt, Heinrich Richard. “Die Haretisierung des Zwinglianismus im Reich ¨ ¨ ¨ seit 1525.” In Zugange zur bauerlichen Reformation. Edited by Peter Blickle, 219–36. Zurich: Chronos, 1987. ¨ . Reichsstadte, Reich und Reformation. Korporative Religionspolitik 1521–1529/30. Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1986. Schneider, Bernd Christian. Ius Reformandi. Tubingen: Mohr, 2001. ¨ Schnith, Karl. “Reichsgewalt – Schwabischer Stadtebund – Augsburg. Zur poli¨ ¨ tischen Konstellation im spaten 14. Jahrhundert.” ZHVS 74 (1980):104–19. ¨ Scott, Tom. Regional Identity and Economic Change. Oxford: Clarendon, 1997. Scribner, Robert. “Civic Unity and the Reformation in Erfurt.” Past and Present 66 (1975):29–60. . “Why was there no Reformation in Cologne?” Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 59 (1976):217–41. Sea, Thomas F. “Predatory Protectors? Conflict and Cooperation in the Suppression of the German Peasants’ Revolt of 1525.” SCJ 39, 1 (Spring 2008):89– 111. . “The Swabian League and Government in the Holy Roman Empire of the Early Sixteenth Century.” In Aspects of Late Medieval Government and Society. Edited by J. G. Rowe, 249–76. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986. . “The Swabian League and Peasant Disobedience before the German Peasants’ War of 1525.” SCJ 30, 1 (Spring 1999):89–111. Seebass, Gottfried. “Augsburg und Nurnberg – ein reformationsgeschichtlicher ¨ Vergleich.” In Wolfgang Musculus und die oberdeutsche Reformation. Edited by Rudolf Dellsperger, Rudolf Freundenberger, and Wolfgang Weber, 91–110. Berlin: Akademie, 1997. . “Die Augsburger Kirchenordnung von 1537 in ihrem historischen und theologischen Zusammenhang.” In Die Augsburger Kirchenordnung von 1537 und ihr Umfeld. Edited by Reinhard Schwarz, 33–58. Gutersloh: Mohn, 1988. ¨ . “Martin Bucer und die Reichsstadt Augsburg.” In Martin Bucer and Sixteenth Century Europe. Edited by Christian Krieger and Marc Lienhard. Vol. 2, 479–91. New York: Brill, 1993. Sehling, Emil. Die evangelischen Kirchenordnungen des XVI. Jahrhunderts. Vol. 12, part 2, Bayern/Schwaben. Tubingen: Mohr, 1963. ¨ ¨ Sieber-Lehmann, Claudius. Spatmittelalterlicher Nationalismus. Die Burgunderkriege am Oberrhein und in der Eidgenossenschaft. Gottingen: Vanden¨ hoeck & Ruprecht, 1995. Sieh-Burens, Katharina. “Die Augsburger Stadtverfassung um 1500.” ZHVS 77 (1983):125–49.

274

Bibliography

. “Burgermeisteramt, soziale Verflechtung und Reformation in der freien ¨ Reichsstadt Augsburg 1518 bis 1539.” In Miscellanea Suevica Augustana. Edited by Pankraz Fried, 61–88. Sigmaringen: Thorbecke, 1985. . Oligarchie, Konfession und Politik im 16. Jahrhundert. Munich: Vogel, ¨ 1986. Sittler, Lucien. “Der elsassiche Zehnstadtebund. Seine geschichtliche Eigenheit ¨ ¨ und seine Organisation.” Esslinger Studien 10 (1964):59–77. Specker, Hans Eugen. “Die Reichsstadt Ulm als Tagungsort des Schwabischen ¨ ¨ Reichskreises.” In Reichskreis und Territorium: Die Herrschaft uber der Herrschaft? Edited by Wolfgang Wust, 179–96. Stuttgart: Thorbecke, ¨ 2000. ¨ Specker, Hans Eugen and Gebhard Weig, eds. Die Einfuhrung der Reformation in Ulm. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1981. ¨ Sporhan-Krempel, Lore. Nurnberg als Nachrichtenzentrum zwischen 1400 und 1700. Nuremberg: Verein fur 1968. ¨ Geschichte der Stadt Nurnberg, ¨ Stabel, Peter. Dwarfs Among Giants: The Flemish Urban Network in the Late Middle Ages. (Leuven-Apeldoorn: Garant, 1997). Stayer, James M. The German Peasants’ War and Anabaptist Community of Goods. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s, 1991. Stengel, E. E. “Kirchenverfassung IV. Kirchenverfassung Westeuropas im Mittelalter.” In Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Edited by Kurt Galling, 1549–64. 3rd ed. Tubingen: Mohr, 1959. ¨ Steuer, Peter. Die Aussenverflechtung der Augsburger Oligarchie von 1500–1620. Augsburg: AV, 1988. ¨ Sutter, Pascale. Von Guten und Bosen Nachbarn. Nachbarschaft als Beziehungs¨ ¨ form im spatmittelalterlichen Zurich. Zurich: Chronos, 2002. Theobald, Leonhard. Das Leben und Wirken des Tendenzdramatikers der Reformationszeit Thomas Naogeorgus seit seiner Flucht aus Sachsen. Leipzig: Heinsius, 1908. Thompson, Nicholas. Eucharistic Sacrifice and Patristic Tradition in the Theology of Martin Bucer 1534–1546. Leiden: Brill, 2005. Ullman, Sabine. Nachbarschaft und Konkurrenz. Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & ¨ Ruprecht, 1999. van Amberg, Joel. “A Real Presence: Religious and Social Dynamics of the Eucharistic Conflicts in Early Modern Augsburg 1520–1530.” PhD diss., University of Arizona, 2004. von Greyerz, Kaspar. “Forschungsbericht: Stadt und Reformation. Stand und Aufgaben der Forschung.” ARG 76 (1985):6–63. . The Late City Reformation in Germany. The Case of Colmar, 1522– 1628. Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1980. ¨ Alber, der Reformator der Reichsstadt Reutlinvon Hartmann, Julius. Matthaus gen Tubingen: Osiander’schen, 1863. ¨ von Polnitz, Gotz Mohr, 1958–86. ¨ ¨ Freiherr. Anton Fugger. 3 vols. Tubingen: ¨ von Steichele, Anton and Alfred Schroder. Das Bisthum Augsburg. Vols. 3–6. ¨ Augsburg: Schmid’sche, 1869–1904. Wandel, Lee Palmer. The Eucharist in the Reformation: Incarnation and Liturgy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Bibliography

275

¨ Weber, Franz Michael. Kaspar Schwenckfeld und seine Anhanger in den freyber¨ gischen Herrschaften Justingen und Opfingen. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1962. Weigel, Martin. “Der erste Reformationsversuch in der Reichsstadt Kaufbeuren und seine Niederwerfung.” BBK 21 (1915):145–56, 193–202, 241–53. Weigelt, Horst. “Wolfgang Musculus und die radikale Reformation – die Auseinandersetzung zwischen Musculus und Kaspar Schwenckfeld.” In Wolfgang Musculus und die oberdeutsche Reformation. Edited by Rudolf Dellsperger, Rudolf Freundenberger, and Wolfgang Weber, 159–72. Berlin: Akademie, 1997. ¨ Weiss, Ulman. Die frommen Burger von Erfurt. Weimar: Bohlau, 1988. ¨ . “Gemeinde und Kirche in der Erfurter ‘landschafft.’” In Landgemeinde und Kirche im Zeitalter der Konfessionen. Edited by Beat Kumin, 59–90. ¨ Zurich: Chronos, 2004. Willoweit, Dietmar. Rechtsgrundlagen der Territorialgewalt. Cologne: Bohlau, ¨ 1975. Witte, John. Law and Protestantism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. ¨ Wust, Historischer Atlas von Bayern. Teil Schwaben, Heft ¨ Wolfgang. Gunzburg. 13. Munich: Kommission fur ¨ bayerische Landesgeschichte, 1983. . “‘Ius Superioritatis Territorialis’: Prinzipien und Zielsetzungen im habsburgisch-insassischen Rechtsstreit um die Markgrafschaft Burgau.” In ¨ ¨ ¨ Vorderosterreich in der fruhen Neuzeit. Edited by Hans Maier, Volker Press, and Dieter Stievermann, 209–28. Sigmaringen: Thorbecke, 1989. . “Reichsstadtische Kommunikation in Franken und Schwaben. Nachrich¨ ¨ tennetze fur Rate Zeitschrift fur ¨ Burger, ¨ ¨ und Kaufleute im Spatmittelalter.” ¨ bayerische Landesgeschichte 62, 3 (1999):681–707. Xalter, Simon. “Wolfgang Musculus und die Reformation in Donauworth. Sein ¨ Wirken als Prediger vom Dezember 1544 bis Marz ¨ 1545.” Jahrbuch des Vereins ¨ Augsburger Bistumsgeschichte e.V. 25 (2001):58–92. fur ¨ ¨ Zelzer, Maria. Geschichte der Stadt Donauworth von den Anfangen bis 1618. Donauworth: Auer, 1959. ¨

Index

Aalen, 26n20 Abray, Lorna Jane, 6 Aitinger, Sebastian, 75n71 Alber, Matthaus, 54, 54n120, 54n123 ¨ Albrecht, Archbishop of Mainz, 255 Altenbaindt, 188n33 Anabaptist Mandate, 156n42 Anabaptists, 143, 151, 153, 155 association with spiritualism, 156 in Augsburg, 147, 148n12, 149, 149n18 in Kaufbeuren, 17, 146–150, 148n13, 154, 158, 161, 163, 167, 170, 214, 232, 250, 253 in Munster, 150, 161 ¨ Augsburg, 2, 11–12, 17, 23, 27, 38, 42, 45–46, 90, 95, 98, 151, 257 abolition of the Mass, 69, 101, 226n63 admission to Schmalkaldic League, 71, 73–76 alliance with Donauworth, 139–143, ¨ 163, 213, 220 Anabaptist community, 147, 149 April 1545 delegation to Kaufbeuren, 160–167 attitude toward Augsburg Confession, 15, 75 Augsburg Interim, 249–250 collapse of negotiations with Donauworth, 240, 247 ¨ conflict with Ferdinand over Mindelaltheim, 193–195, 200–203, 205–206 consultation with Bavaria, 135

consultation with Donauworth, 37, ¨ 111–114, 116–119, 135–139, 211–214, 228, 254 consultation with Kaufbeuren, 41, 149, 157–159, 174–176, 214, 250, 254 consultation with Kempten, 167–168, 249 consultation with Memmingen, 32, 50, 51n109, 58, 167–168, 175 consultation with Nuremberg, 65, 68, 102, 104–108, 212–214, 250, 251 consultation with Strasbourg, 95, 102, 104–106, 251 consultation with Ulm, 33, 65, 68, 73–76, 102, 104–108, 167, 189, 192–193, 195–196, 204–205, 208, 211–214, 250, 254 controversy over Mathias Espenmuller, ¨ 174–177, 250 economic influence in Burgau, 184 end of reform in Mindelaltheim, 203–208 Eucharistic practice, 121 fear of invasion, 77, 103n80 Four Cities’ delegation, 144–146, 167–172, 253 goals at Diet of Frankfurt, 222–223 goals in Donauworth, 115, 121, 124, ¨ 127, 130–134, 137, 141–142, 177–178, 220–221, 231, 254–255 goals in Kaufbeuren, 144–146, 158–159, 162–163, 168–169, 175, 177–178, 216–217, 221, 231, 244, 254–255 in Schmalkaldic League, 73, 79, 190, 196, 198, 202, 222–223, 248

277

278

Index

Augsburg (cont.) in Swabian League, 30–31 installation of preacher in Mindelaltheim, 188–193 introduction of reform, 95–97, 100, 108, 252, 255 marriage regulation, 103–106, 257 member of Three Cities’ League, 61–69, 128–134, 260 movement of Spanish troops, 134–139 negotiations concerning BraunschweigWolfenbuttel, 78–82 ¨ negotiations concerning Donauworth’s ¨ and Kaufbeuren’s proposed admission to Schmalkaldic League, 226–231 occupation of Donauworth, 234–241 ¨ political organization, 24 preacher pay scale, 106–108, 257 program of expansion, 12, 18, 68, 85, 121, 139, 141, 158–159, 177, 185, 188, 191n43, 209–210, 214–215, 254, 259 relations with Donauworth, 39, ¨ 110–111, 126, 130–134, 138, 140–143, 235, 241, 247, 253, 259 relations with Kaufbeuren, 45n90, 90, 166, 223, 226, 232, 234, 242–246, 257, 260 religious similarities to Memmingen, 176, 258 rights in Burgau, 183–186, 196, 204 rivalry with Ulm, 28, 31, 51, 185, 212–213, 258 rural reform in Eastern Swabia, 179, 244, 248 rural reform in Haunstetten, 186–188, 254 Schmalkaldic League levy, 230 Schmalkaldic War, 1–2, 209, 234 social networking, 34–36, 40, 44 strategy of negotiation, 207, 236, 254, 259–260 surrender to Charles V, 249 transfer of preachers, 85, 89, 216–222, 242–245 underground sects, 86, 151 Augsburg Confession, 9, 15, 62, 70, 73, 74, 210, 212, 245, 247 in Augsburg, 75 in Donauworth, 111, 118, 140–142, ¨ 211 in Kaufbeuren, 17, 145, 150, 160–162, 165, 166, 169–172, 177, 211, 216, 229, 253, 260

Augsburg, bishop of, 23, 41, 112–116, 146, 182, 189, 193, 206, 209, 215, 224 opposition to Reformation in Donauworth, 211–214 ¨ Augsburg Interim, 49, 52n111, 89, 157, 249–251 Augsburg-style reform, 14n31, 14n32, 15, 111, 220n47 in Donauworth, 119–128, 134, ¨ 141–142, 219–222, 252–253 in Eastern Swabian countryside, 244 in Fussen, 209–210 ¨ in Kaufbeuren, 144–145, 158–160, 164, 172, 177, 216 Austria, 53n113, 135, 209 Bader, Augustin, 147–149, 147n7 Basel, 26, 46, 85, 92, 93, 100, 250 Basel, university of, 176 Bavaria, duchy of, 23, 30, 37, 77, 85, 103n80, 112, 116, 135, 167, 186 Bern, 93, 93n34, 225n63 Besserer, Bernhard, 74 Besserer, Georg, 205 Biberach, 25n18, 26n20, 45, 45n90, 54–55, 79n88, 92n26 Blarer, Ambrosius, 91, 97 religious mission to Esslingen, 100 religious mission to Memmingen, 58, 98–100 religious mission to Ulm, 92, 94, 95, 99 Blickle, Peter, 4 Boos, 198 Brady, Thomas A., 77, 199 Braunschweig, 72, 72n59, 76 Braunschweig-Wolfenbuttel, duchy of, ¨ 76–77, 199, 222, 248 sequestration, 78–83, 81n99, 199 Brecht, Martin, 7 Bremen, 72 Bucer, Martin, 34n48, 35, 98, 99, 198n72 religious mission to Augsburg, 70, 89, 90, 95–97, 109, 147 religious mission to Ulm, 91–95, 99 views on the Eucharist, 15, 74n70, 123 Bucher, Hans, 120, 122 Burgau, margravate of, 37, 179, 194, 203, 205 complex of legal rights, 181–184, 189–190, 196, 201, 204 Calvin, John, 84 Castile, 256

Index Cathedral of Our Lady, Augsburg, 86 central-place theory, 257–259 Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy, 26 Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor, 1, 8, 11, 29, 30, 40, 46, 52n111, 67–68, 78, 80, 103n80, 150, 199, 209, 248 mandates to Kaufbeuren, 214, 232–233, 250 mobilization orders for Schmalkaldic War, 232 surrender of Donauworth, 241 ¨ victory in Schmalkaldic War, 248–249, 250n6 war strategy, 233–234 Cities’ Chamber in Imperial Diet, 22 Clasen, Claus-Peter, 146 collective politics, 7–8, 81–83 Colmar, 45 Cologne, 23, 28, 91 Constance, 20–22, 27, 50, 53n113, 55, 58, 79n88, 92, 92n26, 98, 98n57, 99, 99n64, 100, 174n94 Constance, bishop of, 53–54 Dachs, Jakob, 106n95 Decapolis, 45 Dickens, A. G., 3 Dieter, Stefan, 149, 154 Dinkelsbuhl, 48, 48n100, 50 ¨ Donauworth, 3, 11, 16–17, 24, 29, 51, 55, ¨ 63, 75, 85, 95, 258 alliance with Augsburg, 139–143, 163, 213, 220 Bavarian occupation (1458–62), 23, 26, 114 consultation with Augsburg, 111–116, 135–139, 163, 211–214, 223, 228, 228n68, 254 consultation with Nuremberg, 219–220, 258 consultation with Ulm, 212 Diet of Frankfurt, 223 in Swabian League, 30 initial moves toward reform, 38, 113, 115–116 introduction of reform, 111, 119–128, 134, 251–254 loss of imperial city status (1607–9), 53n113 movement of Spanish troops, 110, 134–139, 237 Musculus’s religious mission, 89, 119–128, 176, 216, 252 negotiations with Three Cities’ League, 62, 68, 117, 128–134

279

occupation by Augsburg, 234–241, 248, 255 parallels to Kaufbeuren, 145, 157, 159, 164, 170, 177, 214, 216, 217, 229, 230, 232, 245, 254 potential admission to Schmalkaldic League, 223, 226–231 procurement of new preachers, 219 regional political context, 12, 114–115, 259 relations with Augsburg, 2, 13, 30, 36, 39, 90, 110, 118, 126, 134, 138, 140–143, 181, 185, 191, 207, 210, 214–215, 221, 235, 241, 247, 253–255, 259 relations with Nuremberg, 259 Schmalkaldic War, 1–2, 18, 71, 209, 211–215, 231, 234–241 surrender to Charles V, 241, 246, 249 Dutch Republic, 9 Eck, Johannes, 98 Ehinger, Johann, 106, 106n97 Eiselin, Stephan, 102n75 Erfurt, 256 Espenmuller, Mathias, 18, 152, 153, 155, ¨ 156, 164, 172–177, 216, 219, 243, 244n119, 250, 252, 253 Esslingen, 79n88, 100, 150n18 Ferdinand I, German King and Margrave of Burgau, 9–10, 18, 67, 74, 75, 102n75, 103n80, 110, 114, 116, 135 and ius reformandi, 203 opposition to reform in Haunstetten, 186, 254 opposition to reform in Mindelaltheim, 193–195, 200–203, 205–207, 254 opposition to rural reform, 179, 188, 195–196, 205 rights in Burgau, 181–184, 196–197, 201 Flinner, Johann, 209, 243 Four-Cities’ delegation to Kaufbeuren, 144–146, 157, 167–174, 178, 219, 255 Franciscan church, Augsburg, 86–87 Frankfurt, 27, 28, 75, 79, 255, 257 Frecht, Martin, 20, 91, 95, 107, 151 Freissleben, Johann, 85, 217–219, 220–221 Friess, Peer, 10, 169 Frolich, Georg, 86–88, 159, 163, 244n121 ¨ negotiations concerning Donauworth, ¨ 115, 141, 211 Fugger family, 185

280

Index

Fussen, 209–210, 231, 234, 242–244, 247, ¨ 248 Gersthofen, 237 Gienger, Georg, 202–203, 202n82, 208 Gmund, 26n20 ¨ Gogglingen, 205 ¨ Goll, Simon, Abbot of St. Ulrich imperial abbey, 186–188 good neighborliness, 112, 168–169 Goslar, 76 Gottingen, 195, 197, 205 ¨ Graubunden, 242 ¨ Gray, Emily Fisher, 112 Grimoldsried, 244 Guderian, Hans, 149 Gundelfingen, 85, 191 Gutenberg, 40 Hagen, Marx, 81n98 Hagenau, 45 Hamburg, 72, 198n72 Hamm, Berndt, 5 Han, Michael, 75n71 Hanson, Michele Zelinsky, 148 Haug, Wolfgang, 106n95 Haug-Moritz, Gabriele, 75, 81 Haunstetten, 18, 186–188, 199, 254 Heilbronn, 79n88, 187 Heinrich, Duke of BraunschweigWolfenbuttel, 76–78, 81n99, 190, 248 ¨ Hel, Konrad, 189, 189n37, 204 Held, Johann, 96 Herbrot, Jakob, 35, 139, 190–191 Herwart, Georg, 35, 102n75, 190–191 Herwart, Marx, 35 Hess, Hans, 85, 179, 183, 191, 193, 194, 196, 197, 200–203, 206, 207 Hesse, landgravate of, 142 Hoffmann, Andreas, 38 Hofgericht in Rottweil, 52–55 Holy Cross monastery, Donauworth, 38, ¨ 113, 116, 239 Honold preachership in Kaufbeuren, 40, 176, 250 Honold, Anton, 152, 155, 159, 216 Honold, Sebastian, 172, 175 Hormann, Anton, 40 ¨ Hormann, Georg, 40 ¨ Hormann, Ludwig, 40, 155 ¨ Hospital Church, Kaufbeuren, 40, 152 Huber, Caspar, 106n95 imitatio Christi, 153 Imperial Chamber court, 52–55, 77, 79

Imperial Diet, 9, 22, 37, 45n90, 46, 150 Augsburg (1530), 7, 8, 16, 70, 117 Augsburg (1547–8), 8, 49, 249 Regensburg (1541), 49 Speyer (1526), 58 Speyer (1529), 1n1, 7, 60, 156n42 Speyer (1541), 48 Speyer (1544), 116, 133, 156n42, 190, 197 Worms (1521), 23 Worms (1545), 157, 194 Ingolstadt, 241 Isny, 25n20, 45, 45n90, 79n88, 92n26, 97, 157n44, 230 ius reformandi, 180, 197, 198, 203, 206, 207, 254 John Frederick, Prince-Elector of Saxony, 1, 21, 71, 75n72, 159, 190, 229, 244n121, 245 attitude toward Augsburg, 73–75 attitude toward southern imperial cities, 78 occupation of BraunschweigWolfenbuttel, 76–81 ¨ ¨ Justingen-Opfingen, 151 Kaufbeuren, 3, 11, 16–17, 23, 24, 25n20, 29, 30, 45n90, 51, 55, 59, 69, 75, 85, 90, 95, 248, 258 Anabaptist community, 146–150 appeal to Saxony and Hesse, 229–230 Augsburg Interim, 250–251 consultation with Augsburg, 41, 149, 157–159, 174–176, 214–215, 232, 250, 254, 257 consultation with Memmingen, 42, 157, 174–176, 257 consultation with Ulm, 158 controversy over Mathias Espenmuller, ¨ 172–177, 250, 252, 253, 260 decision for neutrality in Schmalkaldic War, 231–234 Diet of Frankfurt, 223–226 Four Cities’ delegation, 144–146, 167–174 goals in negotiations with Augsburg, 145, 176, 218, 226, 244, 253 initial moves toward reform, 40–44, 157–158 introduction of reform, 139, 171–178, 251–253 Keller’s religious mission, 216–217 negotiations with Augsburg concerning new preachers, 217–219, 242–245

Index negotiations with Schmalkaldic League, 160–167 parallels to Donauworth, 177, 214–215, ¨ 229, 254, 259 refusal to join Schmalkaldic League, 245 relations with Augsburg, 2, 13, 44, 90, 145, 181, 185, 191, 207, 210, 214–215, 218, 221, 242–243, 254–255, 258–260 relations with Memmingen, 44, 90, 157n44, 219, 258 rural reform, 224–226 Schmalkaldic War, 1–2, 18, 71, 209, 211, 241–247 Schwenckfelder community, 150–157, 160–161, 165, 173, 218 skepticism concerning admission to Schmalkaldic League, 224, 226–227 supplication to Schmalkaldic League, 224–226, 258 Keller, Hans, 58–60, 99n64 Keller, Michael, 44, 85, 86n4, 90, 106, 106n97, 108, 252 procurement of Thomas Naogeorgus for Kaufbeuren, 242–245 religious mission to Kaufbeuren, 159, 163–165, 175–177, 210, 216–217, 260 significance in Augsburg, 216, 242 Kempten, 11, 17, 24, 26n20, 30, 42, 45n90, 64, 79n88, 97, 144, 151, 157n44, 167–174, 229, 230, 249, 253, 258 Kempten, prince-abbacy of, 198 Kienberger, Christoph, 238–239 Kiessling, Rolf, 112, 119, 142, 184 Klammer, Mathias, 43 Langenmantel, Joachim, 163, 236 Langenmantel, Matthaus, 139 ¨ Lau, Franz, 3, 251 Lauber, Mathias, 152, 155, 158, 176 League of Nuremberg, 60n15, 70n48 Lederle, Ulrich, 85, 90, 218–219, 242, 244 Leutkirch, 25n20, 45, 45n90 Lieber, Barbara, 198 Lindau, 79n88, 92n26, 97, 98n56, 250, 250n7 Luther, Martin, 3n4, 14, 15, 41, 73n60, 74, 84, 97, 121, 150, 151, 161 Lutzelburg, 191n43 ¨ Lutzenberger, Jakob, 40, 42 Mack, Johannes, 174n94 Magdeburg, 72, 72n59

281

Maier, Nicholas, 212 Maireck, Mathias, 147 Manser, Kaspar, 120, 136 Maximilian I, Holy Roman Emperor, 182 Memmingen, 3, 11, 12, 24, 30, 31, 35, 45, 45n90, 50, 51, 69, 85, 90, 124, 172, 218 attitude toward Augsburg Confession, 15, 76 consultation with Augsburg, 32, 167, 175 consultation with Constance, 98n57, 99, 99n64, 174n94 consultation with Kaufbeuren, 42, 90, 157, 174–176 consultation with Nuremberg, 174n94 consultation with Ulm, 32, 79n88, 92n26, 98n57 controversy over Mathias Espenmuller, ¨ 173–176 Four Cities’ delegation, 17, 144–146, 167–174, 253 Hans Keller’s expulsion from Swabian League, 58–60, 98 in Schmalkaldic League, 71, 75, 187, 198–199, 229, 248 introduction of reform, 98–100 relations with Kaufbeuren, 39, 45n90, 145, 157n44, 159, 219, 234, 242, 257 rural reform, 99, 198 Schmalkaldic War, 234 surrender to Charles V, 249 transfer of preachers, 51n109, 242–244, 258 merum imperium, 181, 181n8 Metz, 46, 78–80, 135 Meyer, Sebastian, 96 micro-Christendoms, 15, 65 Mindelaltheim, 18, 29, 85, 179, 185, 254, 258 complex of legal rights, 181, 183 conflict between Augsburg and Ferdinand, 200–207 demographics, 181n8 expulsion of Hess and family, 203–207 installation of evangelical preacher, 188–193 negotiations within Schmalkaldic League, 193–199 parallels to Haunstetten, 188 peasant religious views, 87 mixtum imperium, 181n8 Mockhardt, Johann, 106n95 ¨ Moeller, Bernd, 3, 251 Moritz, Duke of Saxony, 76

282

Index

Morke, Olaf, 5 ¨ Munster, 59n13, 150, 161, 165 ¨ Musculus, Wolfgang, 17, 35, 85, 89–90, 96, 108, 156, 191, 252 departure from Augsburg, 249 religious mission to Donauworth, 111, ¨ 119–128, 131, 134, 135, 139, 142, 147, 164, 176, 210, 216, 217, 221, 252 significance to Augsburg’s council, 216–217 views on the Eucharist, 123 Nader, Helen, 256 Naogeorgus, Thomas, 85, 242–245, 244n121 Negotiated Reformation, 10, 14, 17, 109, 111, 146, 254 Neuburg, 236 Nine Years’ League, 60n15, 67, 70, 71 Nordlingen, 25n18, 31, 48–50, 137n97, ¨ 251 Nuremberg, 21, 23, 25, 46, 50, 58, 60, 71, 174n94, 179, 257, 258 Augsburg Interim, 49–50, 250, 250n6, 251 consultation with Augsburg, 65–67, 102, 104–108, 212–214, 250, 251 consultation with Frankfurt, 255 consultation with Memmingen, 98n57 consultation with Strasbourg, 251 consultation with Ulm, 53, 55, 104n86, 250, 251 corresponding city for Franconia, 27 Eucharistic practice, 123 member of Three Cities’ League, 61–69, 117, 119, 129–133, 260 reform model for Donauworth, ¨ 120–121, 123–126, 219–220 relations with Donauworth, 119, 130, ¨ 137, 258–259 Schmalkaldic War, 234 sphere of influence in Franconia, 12, 31, 47–50, 141, 218, 254 Nuremberg-style reform, 14n31, 17, 50, 63–64, 218, 220n47 in Donauworth, 120–128, 134, 139, ¨ 140, 219–222, 252, 253, 259 Oberbeuren, 224, 225n61 Oecolampadius, Johann, 92, 94, 95, 99 Offingen, 187–189 On the True and False Church, 161 Osswald, Georg, 93 ¨ Ottingen, 37, 38, 126

Peace of Augsburg (1555), 156n42, 180, 207 Peasants’ War (1524–6), 5, 32, 42, 43, 57, 59, 69, 87 Peutinger, Claudius Pius, 79–81, 79n87, 102n75, 189, 204–205 Pfalz-Neuburg, 37, 38, 124–126, 218, 220 Philip, Landgrave of Hesse, 1, 21, 71, 74, 115, 159, 190, 229, 245 attitude toward southern imperial cities, 78 occupation of BraunschweigWolfenbuttel, 76–81, 248 ¨ preacher transfers, process of, 88–91, 147 Princes’ Chamber in Imperial Diet, 22 Provost, Darren, 95 Purtembach, 138 Ravensburg, 25n20, 230n76 reformation suits, 20, 27, 52–56, 77, 255 Regius, Ulrich, 88n12 Rehlinger, Ulrich, 34, 151n26 Rehlinger, Wolfgang, 34, 36, 75 Reutlingen, 54–55, 79n88, 92n26 Rittgers, Ronald, 50, 251 Roper, Lyndal, 104 Roth, Friedrich, 96 Rothenburg ob der Tauber, 48 Rottweil, 60n15 Ruf, Hans, 152 Sailer, Gereon, 34n48, 96 Sam, Konrad, 91 Saxony, electorate of, 14, 85, 142, 242 Schalhaimer, Hans, 90, 124, 172, 176, 219, 242–244 Schappeler, Christoph, 42, 42n81, 43n82, 157 Schertlin, Sebastian, 209, 234, 236, 247 Schilling, Burkhart, 152–155, 160, 163–165, 173 Schmalkaldic League, 8, 15–16, 18, 20, 46, 49, 52, 52n111, 62, 67, 92, 97, 103, 109, 258 admission of Frankfurt, 255–256 admission process, 73–76, 111 and ius reformandi, 187, 196–198, 203, 205 decision concerning reform in Mindelaltheim, 179, 190, 195–200, 202, 254 defeat by Charles V, 241, 249 defeat of Heinrich of BraunschweigWolfenbuttel (1545), 248 ¨

Index Diet of Frankfurt (1545–6), 222–226, 258 Diet of Schmalkalden (1537), 102 Diet of Schmalkalden (1540), 187 Diet of Ulm (1546), 245 internal tensions over BraunschweigWolfenbuttel, 76–82, 167, 190, ¨ 198–199, 222 levy structure, 227n65 mandate to Kaufbeuren, 145, 156, 160–167 occupation of Donauworth by ¨ Augsburg, 234–241 organization, 71–73 potential admission of Donauworth, 2, ¨ 121, 127, 132, 141, 210, 226–231 potential admission of Kaufbeuren, 159, 211–216, 218, 224, 226–231, 233, 234, 245–246, 260 Schmalkaldic War, 1, 209, 233–242, 244, 248 Southern district war council, 234–241 unique features, 69–73 urban supplications, 21, 46–47, 187, 195–199, 205, 224 Schmalkaldic League Urban Diet, 72, 77 Schmalkaldic War (1546–7), 1, 18–19, 53n113, 67, 71, 157, 199, 209–211, 241, 245–247, 250, 255, 260 build up to war, 231–234 occupation of Donauworth by ¨ Augsburg, 234–241 Schmid, Matthaus, 116 ¨ Schmidt, Georg, 26, 199 Schmidt, Heinrich, 7, 64, 82, 251 Schuler, Gervasius, 99, 99n66, 172, 176 Schwabisch Hall, 48, 79n88 ¨ Schwarz, Theobald, 96 Schweinfurt, 48 Schwenckfeld, Kaspar, 146, 150–152, 155–156, 161, 165–166, 218 Schwenckfelders, 150–157, 253 Sedelmaier, Michael, 163 Seitz, Mang, 75 Sieh-Burens, Katharina, 35, 217 Sigk, Georg, 40 Spinner, Ludwig, 102n75 spiritualism, 150–157, 159, 165–166 association with Anabaptism, 156, 161 St. Katharina convent, Augsburg, 179, 184, 194, 197, 200, 201, 204, 206 St. Moritz church, Augsburg, 86 St. Ulrich imperial abbey, Ausburg, 186 Steuer, Peter, 35

283

Strasbourg, 6, 12, 14n31, 23, 26, 34, 36, 45–46, 50, 55, 60, 62, 64, 76, 85, 89, 90, 100, 151, 257 Augsburg Interim, 251 consultation with Augsburg, 95–96, 102–106, 251 consultation with Frankfurt, 255 consultation with Nuremberg, 251 consultation with Ulm, 21, 92, 93 corresponding city for Upper Rhine, 27 in Schmalkaldic League, 71, 73–76, 187 marriage court, 94 negotiations concerning BraunschweigWolfenbuttel, 78, 80, 81n98 ¨ Schmalkaldic League levy, 230 Schmalkaldic War, 234 Strehler, Bartholomaus, 53 ¨ Sturm, Jakob, 35, 80 Sulzbach, 85, 217, 218, 220 Sutter, Pascale, 112 Swabian Circle, 28 Swabian League, 29–32, 43, 45, 57–61, 62, 67, 69–71, 258 Swiss Confederation, 93, 242 Tecklenburg, 230n76 Tetrapolitana, 70 Tettenrieder, Jorg, 119, 125, 126, 136 ¨ Three Cities’ League, 16, 71, 73, 109, 192 defense of the Reformation in Donauworth, 212–214 ¨ negotiations surrounding its creation, 61–63 negotiations with Donauworth, 111, ¨ 118–120, 122, 125–126, 128–134, 252 relations within alliance, 63–69, 212–213 Truce of Frankfurt (1539), 76 Truce of Nuremberg (1532), 52n110, 70n48, 70n51, 75, 75n72, 116 ¨ Uberlingen, 31, 45n90, 59, 60n15 Ulm, 3, 11, 12, 17, 23, 26n20, 27, 30, 35, 38, 45, 45n90, 60, 76, 90, 97, 135, 151, 179, 234, 235, 237, 255–258 consultation with Augsburg, 18, 33, 65, 73, 102, 104–108, 167, 179, 189, 192, 195, 204–205, 208, 211–214, 250, 254 consultation with Constance, 20, 27, 55 consultation with Donauworth, 212 ¨ consultation with Frankfurt, 255 consultation with Kaufbeuren, 158, 158n46

284

Index

Ulm (cont.) consultation with Memmingen, 32, 50, 58, 98n57 consultation with Nuremberg, 53, 104n86, 250, 251 consultation with Strasbourg, 21, 80 controversy over Mathias Espenmuller, ¨ 174 corresponding city for Swabia, 27–29, 51, 79n88 creation of marriage court, 93–95 Four Cities’ delegation, 17, 144, 167–174, 253 in Schmalkaldic League, 71, 73–82, 187, 195, 197, 199, 222, 248 in Swabian League, 31, 58–59 introduction of reform, 91–95, 100, 255 member of Three Cities’ League, 61–69, 117, 119, 129–134, 260 negotations concerning BraunschweigWolfenbuttel, 78–82 ¨ reform model for other cities, 94, 99–100, 102, 122 reformation suits, 20–21, 53–55 relations with Donauworth, 119 ¨ rights in Burgau, 183, 189, 205 rivalry with Augsburg, 185, 190, 205, 258 rural reform, 187, 192, 195, 197, 205 Schmalkaldic League levy, 230 Schmalkaldic War, 234 surrender to Charles V, 249 Ulstat, Lucas, 102n75, 189, 189n38, 204 Upper German theology, 14–16, 63, 149, 153, 174 Urban Diet, 26–29, 32, 37, 41, 58, 60, 61, 73, 74, 118, 257 urban hierarchy, 7n15 hierarchy of consultation, 50–51, 55, 257–259 in Eastern Swabia, 11–13, 45, 51, 177, 257–259 in Franconia, 12, 47–50 in Schmalkaldic League, 74, 81 in Upper Rhine, 12, 45–47

regional differences between south and north, 71–73 survival of reform, 249, 251 Venatorius, Thomas, 220 Vetter, Georg, 36 Vischer, Gall, 147, 147n7, 149 Vohlin preachership in Memmingen, 174 ¨ von Freyburg, Ludwig, 188 von Fuchssteiner, Sebastian, 43n85 von Grafeneck, Friedrich, 204, 207 von Heydeckh, Johann, 235 von Kalb, Bernhard, 137 von Rechberg, Philip, 188 von Stadion, Christoph, bishop of Augsburg, 65, 69 Wangen, 25n20 Wanner, Johannes, 43n82 Weigelt, Horst, 156 Weil der Stadt, 225n63 Weissenburg, 47 Weissenhorn, 185, 234 Welser, Ulrich, 102n75 Wiblingen, abbey of, 195, 197 Wick, Hans, 238–239 Wilhelm IV, duke of Bavaria, 135 Windisch, Matthaus, 152, 176, 218, 224 ¨ Windsheim, 47, 141–142, 251 Winkler, Ulrich, 41 Wittelsbach family, 77 Wittenberg, 15–17, 74, 121, 142, 220, 242, 259 Wittenberg Concord (1536), 74, 76, 89, 91, 99n66, 121 Wittenberg theology, 14–15, 148, 150, 153 Wolfart, Bonifacius, 96 Wurttemberg, duchy of, 74, 97, 147n7, ¨ 226n63 Xalter, Simon, 128 Zangmeister, Hans, 102n75 Zierlin, Andreas, 53 Zurich, 42, 85, 93 Zwingli, Ulrich, 36, 43n81, 64, 84, 151

The Negotiated Reformation: Imperial Cities and the Politics of Urban Reform, 1525-1550

In the Nature of Cities: Urban Political Ecology and the Politics of Urban Metabolism (Questioning Cities)

The Transformation of Cities: Urban Theory and Urban Life

Politics, Feminism and the Reformation of Gender

Green Cities: Urban Growth And the Environment

Race and the Politics of Welfare Reform

Imagined Cities: Urban Experience and the Language of the Novel

Cities and Sovereignty: Identity Politics in Urban Spaces

Urban Plots, Organizing Cities

Urban Meltdown: Cities, Climate Change and Politics-as-Usual

State of the World's Cities: Globalization and Urban Culture

Encyclopedia of Urban America: The Cities and Suburbs

Urban Crisis: Culture and the Sustainability of Cities

Imperial Israel and the Palestinians: The Politics of Expansion

Small Cities: Urban Experience Beyond the Metropolis

The politics of Canadian urban development

Remaking Planning: The Politics of Urban Change

Unsettling the City: Urban Land and the Politics of Property

The Scandinavian Reformation: From Evangelical Movement to Institutionalisation of Reform

The Age of the Reformation

The Politics of Electoral Reform: Changing the Rules of Democracy

Cities, Economic Competition and Urban Policy

Encyclopedia of the Renaissance and the Reformation

Urban Environment and Infrastructure: Toward Livable Cities

URBAN SPACE AND CITYSCAPES (Questioning Cities)

The Reformation

Eventful Cities: Cultural management and urban revitalisation

Healthy Cities and Urban Policy Research

The Negotiated Reformation: Imperial Cities and the Politics of Urban Reform, 1525-1550

In the Nature of Cities: Urban Political Ecology and the Politics of Urban Metabolism (Questioning Cities)

The Transformation of Cities: Urban Theory and Urban Life

Politics, Feminism and the Reformation of Gender

Green Cities: Urban Growth And the Environment

Race and the Politics of Welfare Reform

Imagined Cities: Urban Experience and the Language of the Novel

Cities and Sovereignty: Identity Politics in Urban Spaces

Urban Plots, Organizing Cities

Urban Meltdown: Cities, Climate Change and Politics-as-Usual

State of the World's Cities: Globalization and Urban Culture

Encyclopedia of Urban America: The Cities and Suburbs

Urban Crisis: Culture and the Sustainability of Cities

Imperial Israel and the Palestinians: The Politics of Expansion

Small Cities: Urban Experience Beyond the Metropolis

The politics of Canadian urban development

Remaking Planning: The Politics of Urban Change

Unsettling the City: Urban Land and the Politics of Property

The Scandinavian Reformation: From Evangelical Movement to Institutionalisation of Reform

The Age of the Reformation

The Politics of Electoral Reform: Changing the Rules of Democracy

Cities, Economic Competition and Urban Policy

Encyclopedia of the Renaissance and the Reformation

Urban Environment and Infrastructure: Toward Livable Cities

URBAN SPACE AND CITYSCAPES (Questioning Cities)

The Reformation

Eventful Cities: Cultural management and urban revitalisation

Healthy Cities and Urban Policy Research

Recommend Documents