The Moral Theory of Poststructuralism

"This is an extremely worthwhile book-a real bridgebuilder-executed by one of the few philosophers in the world able to speak eloquently in the language of Anglo-American and Continental philosophy." -Owen Flanagan, Duke University Both Anglo-American and Continental thinkers have long denied that there

can

be a coherent moral defense of the poststructuralist politics of Michel

Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, and Jean-Fran9)is Lyotard. For many Anglo­

American thinkers, as well as for Critical Theorists such as Habermas, poststructuralism is not coherent enough to defend morally. Alternatively, for Foucault, Deleuze, Lyotard, and their followers, the practice of moral theorizing is passe at best and more likely is insidious. Todd May argues both that a moral defense of poststructuralism is necessary and that it is possible. First, he develops a metaethical view of moral theoriz­

ing that treats it as a social practice rather than a transcendentally derived

guarantee for right action. He then articulates and defends antirepresen­

tationalism, a principle central to poststructuralism. Finally, May offers a version of consequentialism that is consonant both with the principle of antirepresentationalism and with other poststructuralist commitments. In conclusion, he distinguishes morality from an aesthetics of living and shows the role the latter plays for those who embrace antirepresentationalism. Todd May is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Clemson University. He is

the author of two previous books published by Penn State Press, The Political Philosophy of Poststructuralist Anarchism (1994) and Between Genealogy and Epistemology: Psychology, Politics, and Knowledge in the Thought ofMichel Foucault

(1993).

The Pennsylvania State University Press University Park, Pennsylvania

Todd May

The Moral Theory of Poststructuralism

The Pennsylvania State University Press University Park, Permsylvania

Contents Preface Introduction Moral Discourse 2 Moral Antirepresentationalism

3

A Multivalue Consequentialism

4 Consequentialism and Supererogation

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Public�lion Data May, Todd, 1955The moral theory of poststructuralism / by Todd May. cm. p. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-271-01468-7 (cloth) ISBN 0-271-01469-5 (paper) 1. Ethics, French.

2. Ethics, Modern-20th century.

4. Foucault, Michel-Ethics. Jean Fram;ois-Ethics.

3. Deconstruction.

5. Deleuze, Gilles-Ethics. 6. Lyotard,

I. Title.

BJ703.D44M38 1995 170'.944-dc20

94-45435 CtP

Copyright -val �e �on�eq �entialist mig�t try to fudge matters here and say tha t the smgle value � s , X dlstnbuted accord109 to pattern Y of just distribution." . ASld� from . the q�eshon whether this is any longer a single-value consequential­ 'sm, ,t still runs mto the problem that issues of distributive justice usually con­ cern m ?rc than one value to be distributed (unless, of course, one defines the vatuI' . to b� ?,stflbuted so abstractly that one gains a formal solution to the problem by . sacnf.clng any interesting mora! content).

ning in so many directions, it may fairly be asked, What unifies these the moral theory? There are two answers here, the first easier and less surprising than the second. The first is that if alt three are right, then we have in hand a fairly good overview of the moral realm. Given the argument above for the independence of metaethics and moral theory, one would expect their relationship to be one of consistency rather than seamlessness. However, with both together, the moral realm is delineated much more sharply than with merely one. The principle of antirepresentationalism further directs moral reflection by offering a strong, ceteris paribus, constraint on moral deliberation and action. Taken together, then, the three draw the battle lines for moral delib­ eration, not as a unified front for attacking moral questions, but as several well-coordinated fronts that should, in the end, prove as pow­ erful as any single well-fortified front (if the martial metaphors will be forgiven in a book on morality). The second answer to the question of what unifies these different theoretical strands is not as straightforward. Although it will not be manifestly apparent in much of the book, I am trying to provide a moral defense of many of the political writings of contemporary French 2. It is not, of course, the role of a moral th'.'Qry simpty to COdify Our moral intuitions. Nor must it be committed to preserving all of them. However, when it rejects a morat intuition of ours, it must do so for reasons, and those reasons presumably-at least in part-rest on other, more deeply held moral intuitions. This sccms to me an implication of Rawls's concept of reflective equilibrium . 1 discuss this issue more in Chapter 3.

Introdu ction

6

thinker,s, especially those of Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, and Jean­ Fran�Ois Lyotard, thinkers I will group under the rubric "poststruc­ tUfalist." This task involves taking their common and deepest corn­ , enls and showing how Ihey are morally both compelling and mlt � conSistent. It is a project that, although outlined in Ihc last chapler of my last book/ is not undertaken without some hesitation. The pri­ mary Source of that hesitation is the attitudes of these thinkers them­ selves toward moral reflection, as attitudes that ranged from reticence (Fou �a ult and Lyotard) to outright disdain (Deleuze). . of the poststructuralist approach to political philosophy, es­ C::rlhCS pecially those associated with the Critical Theorists (who have focused primarily on �ouca �lt), have seen the lack of a moral grounding for poststructurahst claIms to be one of the most problematic areas of its thought, The (broadly) critical theoretical argument against this as­ pect of poststructuralism begins with the recognition that, for poststructuralism, power is both creative and pervasive, Power is cre­ ative in that it not only represses pregiven objects but also creates its � bjects: f�r inst��ce, psychological practice creates certain personal­ Ity types In addlhon to marginalizing others (which it also may help , pervasive in that power lies not only in the state or in to cre �te), It I� orgamzed reSistance to the state but at all levels of interpersonal (and, , psychological practice creates its objects, intrapersonal) interac­ smce tion. "For Foucault," writes Michael Walzer, "there is no focal point, but rather an endless network of power relations.'" And Peter Dews: " IDluring the 1?70's Foucault's inclination is to play down the repres­ . sive and negahve aspects of power and to present the operation of power as primarily positive and productive."5 J� order to grasp this dual point, which is the starting place for the . theoretical critique, it would perhaps not be a bad idea to offer Critical an example. In Discipline alld PIli/ish, Foucault offers a history of the . prison, an � es �ecially the French prison, that tries to undermine any . progressIvist history that would portray prisons as gradually reform­ mg themselves from a state of barbarity to their current state of semibarbarity. �roj ects such as the shilting of emphasis from punish­ . , ment to rehablhtatlon have had the effect not so much of introducing �uma �e t�eatment of prisoners as of turning them from doers of wrong 1010 crlmmal personalities, "Behind the offender, to whom the inves-

�

3 , T t P01i1ic1l1 Philosophy ofPostSlwcll/rlllist AIJarchism

(University Park: Penn­

sylvanlll Stale University Press, 1994), chap, 6. 4 .."The Politics of Michel Foucault," in FflUCIlUII: A CritiCll1 Reillier, ed. David COUSinS Hoy (Oxford: Basi! Blackwell, 1986),55. 5. Logic, of Disi"Ugralio'l: Post-Structuroli'l Though! /Iud /I,t Claims of Cr;tiCllt TlI(cry (London: Verso, 1987), 161-62.

Introduction

7

tigation of the facts may attribute responsibility for an offense, stands the delinquent whose slow formation is shown in a biographical in­ vestigation, The introduction of the 'biographical' is important in the history of penality. Because it establishes the 'criminal' as existing be­ fore the crime and even outside il."6 Modern penology, along with the allied "sciences" of psychology, criminology, and sociology, creates objects like delinquency, abnormal­ ity, and at-risk personalities, which in turn it feels called upon to cure, quarantine, or oversee. This creation is not merely an ideological ob­ fuscation; it does not cover up some truth about who the objects of penal intervention really are. Instead, by subjecting them to its proce­ dures, penology and its allied practices actually produce their objects in the specificity of their characteristics. This productive aspect of power is not restricted to the state, but occurs by means of a convergence of several practices that not only emerge from nonstate sources but also do not directly answer to the state. The relation, for instance, between psychotherapeutic practice and the state is a complex one; it would be an inadequate character+ izalion of this relation's political effects to say that they work to sup­ port state power. For the poststructuralists, not only psychology and penology but many practices create their political effects this way. The convergence of social practices often creates political effects that are not correctly seen as either emanating from or in support of a single institution (state or otherwise) or a single class. Rather, the social field is a field of political effects, effects of power, that both constrain and constitute many of the ways in which people act and think of them­ selves. In short, for poststructuralism the social field is a network of intersecting practices, each generating (by itself and in resonance with others) effects of power, power effects that are both productive and pervasive.1 But if power is productive and pervasive, then one must wonder­ for two related (but not always clearly distinguished) reasons-what jus­ tification there would be for resisting it. First, if the moral principles that are invoked to justify the resistance are themselves social creations, what justificatory force can they possess? Since what are being criticized are social practices, and since the ground of criticism is also a social prac­ tice (the social practice of moral discourse), and since all social prac6, Disripliut aud Punish 119751. trans, Alan Sheridan (New York: Random House, 1977),252. 7. One might be tempted to ask here what power is. For the postslructuralists, ;t is the efk>