The Missile Defense Systems of George W. Bush: A Critical Assessment (Praeger Security International)

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The Missile Defense Systems of George W. Bush

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The Missile Defense Systems of George W. Bush A Critical Assessment RICHARD DEAN BURNS

PRAEGER SECURITY INTERNATIONAL

Copyright 2010 by Richard Dean Burns All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Burns, Richard Dean. The missile defense systems of George W. Bush : a critical assessment / Richard Dean Burns. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-313-38466-0 (hard copy : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-313-38467-7 (ebook) 1. Ballistic missile defenses—United States. 2. Ballistic missile defenses—United States—History. 3. Bush, George W. (George Walker), 1946– 4. United States—Politics and government—2001–2009. 5. United States—Military policy. 6. World politics—1989– I. Title. UG743.B86 2010 358.1'740973090511—dc22 2010021795 ISBN: 978-0-313-38466-0 EISBN: 978-0-313-38467-7 14

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This book is also available on the World Wide Web as an eBook. Visit www.abc-clio.com for details. Praeger An Imprint of ABC-CLIO, LLC ABC-CLIO, LLC 130 Cremona Drive, P.O. Box 1911 Santa Barbara, California 93116-1911 This book is printed on acid-free paper Manufactured in the United States of America

Contents

Preface

vii

Abbreviations

ix

Introduction

1

1

Missile Defense to ABM Diplomacy: From Eisenhower to Nixon

10

The Strategic Defense Initiative: From Reagan to G.H.W. Bush

32

Politics of Missile Defense Deployment: From William Clinton to George W. Bush

55

4

Missile Defense in Europe: Bush to Obama

79

5

North Korean and Iranian Missile Programs: Their Regional Impact

95

2 3

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The Status of Missile Defense Systems

112

7

The Obama Administration and Missile Defense

133

Reflections

154

Notes

159

Selected References

177

Index

189


Preface

President George W. Bush’s controversial order to deploy a land-based ballistic missile defense in 2002, following the unilateral abrogation of the 1972 Antiballistic Missile [ABM] Treaty, did not end five decades of debate. Indeed, not only were old issues revisited but new ones arose, especially given the Bush administration’s efforts to extend America’s ballistic missile defense (BMD) network to Central and Eastern Europe. Nor did the Bush administration’s efforts to use the new BMD system as a deterrent succeed in persuading the so-called rogue states of North Korea and Iran to halt their development of missiles or nuclear activities. This account, then, reviews the Bush BMD deployment after its first eight years and introduces the manner in which his successor, President Barak Obama, has sought to deal with the continuing issues. If this account’s objectives are met, readers should have sufficient data to judge whether these issues have been adequately assessed by American leaders and, with the deployment of a missile defense system, whether the American public will actually be protected by the system. For the preparation of the introductory chapters, I have revisited an earlier work, The Quest for Missile Defense, 1944–2003 (2004), written in collaboration with Professor Lester H. Brune. The first three chapters provide a brief background regarding the research and development of various ballistic missile defense components as well as the pros and cons regarding the issue of actual deployment. A glossary is provided for easy reference to the acronyms used. A select bibliography is provided for those who wish to delve further into the issues. For those individuals uninitiated in the basic workings of ballistic missile and antiballistic missile systems, the chart following the Introduction may prove helpful.

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Preface

Along the way, I have accumulated several debts. My wife, Glenda, encouraged me to stay with the challenge of preparing this study. My earlier coauthor, Lester H. Brune, provided a great deal of material for the initial study, some of which has found its way into this account. I especially wish to acknowledge the efforts of senior editor Steve Catalano at ABC-CLIO Praeger in steering this study through to completion. Finally, I must acknowledge the vital assistance I have received from Philip Coyle; indeed, without his considerable efforts and material contributions it is unlikely that this book would have been completed. His reading of the manuscript and his willingness to share his extensive knowledge of the subject have helped me capture the technical features of the missile defense components. I owe Philip much for his encouragement, his kindness, and his perseverance. Even so, I accept full responsibility for any errors that remain and all unattributed opinions offered in the text. Richard Dean Burns Claremont, California

Abbreviations

ABL ABM ACDA AEC ALI ALTB ARPA ATBM BMD BMDO BMDS BP CFE CIA DAB DIA DSB EKV ERIS FAR FOAB GAO GAPA GMD

Airborne Laser Antiballistic Missile Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission Aegis Lightweight Exoatmospheric Projectile Intercept Airborne Laser Testbed Advanced Research Projects Agency Antitactical Ballistic Missile Ballistic Missile Defense Ballistic Missile Defense Organization Ballistic Missile Defense System Brilliant Pebbles Conventional Forces in Europe Central Intelligence Agency Defense Acquisition Board Defense Intelligence Agency Defense Science Board Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (exoatmospheric = outside the atmosphere; endoatmospheric = inside the atmosphere) Exoatmospheric Reentry Interceptor Subsystem Forward Acquisition Radar Father of All Bombs General Accounting Office, U.S. Ground-to-Air Pilotless Aircraft Ground-based Midcourse Defense (G. W. Bush)

x

GPALS GPS H-bomb HEDI HOE ICBM INF IRBM JIAMDI JLENS

Abbreviations

Global Protection Against Limited Strikes Global Protection System Hydrogen bomb High Endoatmospheric Defense Interceptors Homing Overlay Experiment Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netter Sensor LAR Local Acquisition Radar LPAR Large Phased-Array Radar MAD Mutual Assured Destruction MDA Missile Defense Agency MEADS Medium Extended Air Defense System MIRV Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicle MOAB Mother of All Bombs; also Massive Ordnance Air Burst NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NMD National Missile Defense (ground-based-Clinton) PAC-3 Patriot Advanced Capability-3 PATRIOT Phased Array Tracking Intercept of Target SAC Strategic Air Command SALT I (1st) Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (Talks) SALT II (2nd) Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (Talks) SAM Surface-to-Air Missile (Soviet) SBIRS-High Space-Based Infrared System SCC Standing Consultative Commission SDIO Strategic Defense Initiative Organization SLBM Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile SM Standard Missile START Strategic Arms Reductions Talks START I (1st) Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty START II (2nd) Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty THAAD Theater High-Altitude Area Defense TMD Theater Missile Defense UHF Ultra High Frequency ZAR Zeus Acquisition Radar

Introduction

The development of ballistic missiles by Nazi Germany launched the United States on a quest for the means to defeat this new weaponry. America’s first Secretary of Defense James Forrestal supported this effort, because he believed that history has shown “that all new weapons always developed a countermeasure, beginning with what the Romans developed to counteract Hannibal’s use of elephants.” He did recognize, however, that technology could not always ensure success. Yet technical and operational capabilities of various ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems quickly garnered considerable attention from government officials, military officers, the scientific community, and a segment of the public. Gradually this attention spread to the broad political and strategic aspects of the BMD quest, along with the financial costs of its many projects.1 Those individuals subsequently advocating the deployment of BMD systems have based their demands on “threats” that changed frequently. During the Cold War, it was the threat of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and an occasional concern with mainland China’s missiles. The BMDs were vital, according to these advocates, either to enhance and preserve the deterrence system, to serve as “bargaining chips” in negotiations, or to fend off accidental or unintended launches. In subsequent years, their attention focused on the so-called rogue nations, such as North Korea and Iran, who were thought to be developing nuclear weapons that could be attached to their missiles. Fear of these real and alleged activities persuaded neighboring countries such as Japan, South

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Korea, India, and Israel to deploy various types of BMD systems. After the 9/11 attacks, Washington justified the use of BMDs as protection from terrorists. President George W. Bush’s decision to proceed with the deployment of an ABM defensive system in 2002 was the culmination of a series of increasingly partisan political controversies that reached back to the 1950s. During this half-century, three contentious debates witnessed increasingly insistent demands, which were equally aggressively criticized, to deploy the existing components. The first debates that spanned the presidencies of Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon arose in response to the army’s deployment request in 1955 and to the Johnson-Nixon decisions to construct a rudimentary BMD system in the late 1960s. The controversy temporarily abated with the bilateral ABM Treaty of 1972. This initial debate was waged largely between the White House, the Pentagon, and Congress; only occasionally did it extend into the public arena. The second controversy, this time quite public, stemmed from President Ronald Reagan’s startling request, in a speech on March 23, 1983, for the scientific community—that had created the nuclear-tipped ICBMs—to develop the means of shielding the American public from the consequences of their possible use. The Reagan administration’s eagerness to develop and deploy a BMD system encountered several political and technical obstacles that eventually diminished enthusiasm for immediate deployment. His successor, President George H. W. Bush, reacted to the lack of technical progress by postponing deployment while the administration concentrated on the essential research and development needed to improve the various ABM components. Reagan and his supporters’ much publicized efforts, however, succeeded in making BMD deployment a partisan political issue. Indeed, they stitched it onto the ideological fabric of the Republican Party. The final contentious debate, stimulated by partisan politics and the July 1998 Rumsfeld Commission Report, found a Republican Congress demanding that the Clinton administration immediately deploy the existing ABM components. If President William Clinton ultimately rebuffed these partisan efforts, his successor George W. Bush moved with alacrity to abrogate the 1972 ABM Treaty and, subsequently, to order deployment of a controversial land-based BMD network in Alaska and California. The American electorate has had considerable difficulty following the various arguments related to BMD systems. Pollsters discovered that the heated political exchanges over the deployment issue apparently served largely to confuse the electorate. A public opinion survey taken in late July 1998, for example, indicated that two-thirds of all Americans erroneously believed that a missile defense system already existed to protect them from a nuclear attack!2 The public’s confusion over the status of missile defenses was undoubtedly due to a variety of reasons. Among the more obvious of these has been an overconfidence in America’s technological

Introduction

3

abilities, the public relations strategies of missile defense proponents and contractors, and the partisan political approach to the issue. * * * The contentious debates frequently centered on three basic issues: the financial expense, operational reliability, and impact on international strategic stability of ballistic missile defense systems. The fiscal cost of BMD efforts from 1945 to 2002 was substantial. Since the end of World War II, thousands of scientists and technologists had spent hundreds of thousands of hours seeking to develop effective antimissile components including specialized computers and their software, radar units, and interceptor missiles. Beyond extensive basic research, these specialists had developed experimental components and conducted tests of various ABM systems for more than 50 years at the cost of well over $120 billion. From 2002 to 2008, President George W. Bush’s Missile Defense Agency (MDA) spent an additional $57 billion on development, deployment, and procurement of its antimissile systems. However, as Richard F. Kaufman and others pointed out in their concise study, The Full Costs of Ballistic Missile Defense: When a program requires many years of development, production, installation, and operation, the costs incurred at the beginning will be misleadingly low as to the ultimate cost of the system. As weapons systems have become more sophisticated and more complicated, this disparity between ultimate and immediate costs has grown. But few, if any, military or other systems match the long-run nature of the commitments involved in ballistic missile defense.

After thorough examination of the factors involved, these analysts concluded the long-run costs “could mount to the neighborhood of one trillion dollars.” In a somewhat similar vein, the General Accounting Office (GAO) has pointed out “the cost to operate and support a weapon system traditionally accounts for over 70 percent of the total cost over the system’s lifetime.” Consequently, “the resources needed to operate and support BMDS could be significant over time.” The GAO also noted in a March 2009 report that various MDA’s ballistic missile defense systems have experienced cost overruns and vague accounting procedures. During the last few years, members of Congress, not surprisingly, have gradually began to ask more questions regarding the budgeting for the MDA’s antimissile systems.3 Critics have persistently questioned the operational reliability of various ABM components and, especially, proposals for the deployment of these units as BMD systems. One measure of an antimissile’s performance was its authorized tests, but confusion often surrounded the assessment of the test results. This skepticism stemmed from the Pentagon’s early antimissile tests claims, which initially were widely touted

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as successful but later found to be largely bogus. Media coverage of an antimissile test initially echoed the Pentagon’s claims, but rarely clarified the specific nature of the actual test. Even an accurate, widely heralded “successful” test does not necessarily indicate that an antimissile system is operationally effective, because most of these tests have been heavily scripted. That is, the early tests were conducted with the target trajectory known in advance and at a lower altitude and slower speed than a hostile intercept would undoubtedly require, and some early test targets carried a transponder whose data were used to direct the interceptors toward the target area. Data defining the mock warhead were usually fed into the “kill” vehicles before their attempted intercept in order for them to locate the mock warhead among other objects, including decoys, in the area. When challenged, the Pentagon has readily admitted that its antimissile tests were scripted, but it defends these practices as necessary because of range limitations, safety considerations, and a lack of radar coverage across the entire test area. Also, missile defense officials point out that the first test for a new aircraft is to see if it will taxi properly; thus they insist scripted tests allow for the step-by-step determination of which individual pieces of equipment function properly and which require modification. Critics have continually challenged the Pentagon’s evaluation of flight test results by pointing out that these activities, even if they accomplished their objectives, did not take place in a “real-world environment.”4 Consequently, skeptics pointed out that the Bush administration undertook to deploy a system that the Pentagon could not certify as an operationally reliable BMD system capable of protecting the continental United States from an attack by a barrage of enemy intercontinental ballistic missiles or, perhaps, even a single missile. Indeed, it is difficult to assess the status of the U.S. missile defense systems, as a former assistant secretary of defense and director of weapon testing at the Pentagon, Philip Coyle, has emphasized, because “the current programs have no operational criteria for success.” Consequently, he pointed out to the House Subcommittee on Strategic Forces in 2009, that it is very difficult to evaluate the system until one knows: “How good is the system supposed to be? Is 10% effectiveness good enough? What about 1%? Can the system handle realistic threats as documented in Intelligence Community threat assessments? How many interceptors should be required to defeat one target?”5 Then, too, there are serious considerations regarding actual “realistic operational conditions” that are rarely mentioned. Any adversary’s use of several ICBMs to challenge America’s ballistic missile defenses would involve nuclear warheads; the BMDs are not designed to intercept scores of bomblets loaded with biological weapons. In the case of such an ICBM attack, some enemy warheads could breach U.S. defense and reach their target, some enemy missiles may be equipped with warhead fuses that trigger the warhead just before defensive interceptors arrive, and some enemy warheads may explode when hit by an interceptor. Any nuclear

Introduction

5

weapons that were triggered would produce mushroom clouds, blast, neutrons, x-rays, and fire storms, creating a disruptive nuclear environment. Such an environment could affect missile defense interceptors, satellites, and command and control installations, especially radars. Apart from the potentially chaotic nuclear environment, realistic operational conditions include the other dizzying aspects of warfighting and the fog of war that include such events as bad weather or the angle of the sun relative to infrared sensors. Although U.S. officials have frequently made exaggerated claims about the reliability and dependability of the nation’s antimissile systems, they seldom consider the very real difficulties of trying to maintain BMD systems during a nuclear assault. As the director of Operational Test and Evaluation described it in the Survivability section of his January 2009 report to Congress, “Specific assets are unhardened to nuclear, biological, or chemical attack.”6 * * * The impact of BMD systems on the international strategic environment has often been a stated concern. As nuclear arsenals expanded in the 1960s, and the concept of deterrence grew, strategic theorists gradually linked the new idea with such descriptive words as “creditable,” “effective,” and “stable.” These theorists also speculated about various ways in which the expanding nuclear arsenals might be employed. A “first strike” might occur when one nation thought it could unleash sufficient nuclear forces to overwhelm its foe and achieve a decisive victory. A closely related scenario, a “preemptive strike,” called for launching a nuclear strike when a state anticipated its enemy was preparing to launch a first strike. A “retaliatory strike” or “second strike” would occur after a nation had absorbed a nuclear first strike and launched a retaliatory strike sufficient to ensure the destruction of the attacker. When each adversary possessed sufficient nuclear weaponry to conduct a second strike, theorists held, de facto deterrence became a reality. As Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara clarified this situation, “assured destruction” was less a particular policy or doctrine than it was a strategic reality. Many individuals pointed out that the U.S.’s vast nuclear arsenal and global delivery capabilities were more than adequate to deter a ballistic missile attack from any nuclear-armed state. Advocates of BMD deployment have argued that terrorist groups were likely to seek missiles for use against American targets, but no nation was likely to allow terrorists to launch a ballistic missile from its territory because the host nation would risk instant retaliation and annihilation. Should foreign terrorists, according to several analysts, choose to use weapons of mass destruction, they would likely employ a ship or truck to carry them to their targets. After all, long-range ballistic missiles, which are complicated to load, aim, and launch, would likely be beyond the ability of covert terrorists. In this context, America’s greatest threat, in one commentator’s words, is not from rogue states, but from stateless rogues.

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Those individuals who believed the mutual deterrence syndrome to be immoral hoped they could escape from it by building a missile defense system. According to James M. Lindsay and Michael E. O’Hanlon, “a national security policy that deliberately leaves the American people vulnerable to attack when technology makes it possible to protect them is immoral and unacceptable. Not only does it fly in the face of common sense to leave the nation undefended, but it could hamstring America’s role in the world.” Other proponents of establishing BMD systems argued that governments hostile to the United States possessing ballistic missiles might believe they could challenge America’s worldwide interests and deter Washington, without a missile defense, from resisting the threat. Then, too, without an adequate missile defense, U.S. allies might question Washington’s willingness to honor its security pledges and thus lessen U.S. global influence. Additional questions have arisen regarding the possible destabilizing effect of ABM systems on the strategic environment. The Bush administration undertook to expand its BMD network into Central and Eastern Europe, ostensibly to detect and destroy any Iranian missiles aimed at European countries or the United States. This projection of American influence and power aroused the ire of the Russians and led to mounting tensions. Moscow viewed Washington’s efforts to develop BMD sites in Poland and the Czech Republic as an infringement on its sphere of interest. Although the administration sought to ease tensions by insisting these new BMD sites did not threaten Russia’s ICBMs or its security, this rationale was found unacceptable in Moscow. The White House sought to launch the construction of the European extension of its BMD system before the Bush administration ended despite the destabilizing effect such action might have on the relations between the two countries. “Such an approach,” the Arms Control Association’s executive director, Daryl G. Kimball, wrote, “is mistaken and reckless.”7 The Obama administration inherited this ongoing dispute and the search to find a solution. In a speech on November 10, 2009, General Kevin Chilton, head of the U.S Strategic Command, pointed to the risks involved in creating an elaborate BMD program. As reported by Reuters and other news outlets, he explained that a U.S. missile defense system that is too robust could actually backfire and become destabilizing, prompting countries like China to expand their nuclear arsenal. Chilton explained, ”We have to be cautious with missile defense. Missile defense can be destabilizing depending on how you array it.” Certainly a BMD deployment might have a destabilizing impact on its relations with allies and adversaries. Would rival nations fear that the United States—believing it to be impervious to retaliation—might begin pressing them to conform to Washington’s wishes or face serious consequences? Would missile defenses thus create a potential “first strike” situation? Would such activity impede strategic arms limitation efforts and launch a new strategic arms race? Is the next step to place weapons in space? Would U.S. missile

Introduction

7

defenses renew the strategic nuclear arms race? Thus, BMD critics have contended that a nationwide missile defense could result in an adversary considering several options: launching a first strike, engaging in an arms race in outer space, or expanding their fleet of ballistic missiles and arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. In any of these, as well as other detrimental circumstances, Americans might find themselves with less, rather than more, security.8 * * * The United States has not been alone in the pursuit of a missile defense system. The Soviet Union and, later, Russia have shown an interest in pursuing antimissile systems during the past five decades. “Soviet and Russian defence policy decisions,” British analyst Jennifer Mathers has noted, “were shaped by a combination of domestic and international factors and by the agendas and priorities of individual political and military leaders as well as the constraints and opportunities of the environments in which they operated.”9 All in all, Moscow’s decisions throughout were driven by fears and special interests, such as their powerful military industrial complex. The Soviet Union expended considerable scientific talent, technological effort, and rubles, largely unsuccessfully, to develop an antimissile system for the protection of its major cities from ballistic missiles. During the Cold War, U.S. intelligence agencies attempting to follow these activities, often erroneously credited the Soviets with undeserved successes. American Cold War hawks then frequently used these claims to press various administrations to deploy one or another of the nation’s fledgling missile defense systems. The recognized inadequacies of their early deployments around Leningrad and Moscow in the 1960s led Soviet leaders to join President Nixon in the bilateral 1972 ABM Treaty to limit the development and deployment of missile defense systems. President George W. Bush’s unilateral abrogation of the ABM Treaty in 2002, to pave the way for deployment of a nationwide missile defense system, forced Russian leaders to discuss reviving their pursuit of antimissile development. Moscow’s limited resources, however, greatly hindered a serious BMD undertaking. Instead, the Russians opted to equip their existing ICBMs with various sophisticated decoy devices and to build more and more accurate ICBMs designed to overwhelm any American BMD system. Beijing officials revealed concern and irritation that their ICBMs might be the real reason for Washington’s BMD deployment and began reassessing their missile arsenal. The Bush administration, however, insisted that the termination of the ABM Treaty and deployment of a land- and sea-based antimissile network were designed to counter any ICBMs from the so-called rogue nations—Iran and North Korea. Although there has been an increase in the number of ballistic missiles around the world, there are legitimate questions as to whether national BMD systems are the only way to deal with the problem. Even if most

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of the world’s missiles are in the hands of governments that generally have friendly relations with the United States, perhaps more emphasis on controlling the proliferation of ballistic missiles might supplement BMD efforts. While missile nonproliferation and missile defense are directed against the same threats, according to former member of the U.S. Arms Control Agency Richard Speier, “in practice there are gaps and potential conflicts between nonproliferation and defense strategies.” But, according to Speier, it should not be a situation of missile controls versus missile defenses. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) focuses on controlling, often restricting, transfer of ballistic missiles and, as such, has established a set of stringent rules governing their export. U.S. export of antimissile interceptors that approach and/or exceed the MTCR’s 500 kilogram/300 kilometer line—such as the SM-3, the ground-based missile system (GBM), Israel’s Arrow—invites the weakening of controls. If the MTCR’s principle of restraint were damaged, and a large numbers of transfers were made, there is the danger that the basic rocket systems of these large interceptors might be used as the basis for offensive missiles. One solution that makes military and nonproliferation sense would be to have centralized control of these interceptors, especially among allies, rather than transferring ownership. “The key for missile defense policymakers,” according to Speier, “is to avoid demonizing the MTCR and to look more broadly at export vulnerabilities and operational realities.”10 * * * The chapters that follow review the pros and cons raised by Americans regarding a decision to deploy an antimissile system. These chapters provide information regarding such a decision and address a wide range of considerations, not exclusive to the following: 1. Is the missile threat believable? 2. Is BMD the most effective way to deal with a potential foe? 3. Can raid attacks and countermeasures limit the effectiveness of a BMD system? 4. Are the benefits of a BMD worth the cost? 5. How reliable are the BMD systems? 6. Has their reliability been subjected to operational testing? 7. Can a BMD destabilize international strategic security?

If this account’s objectives are met, readers should have sufficient data to judge whether these considerations have been adequately assessed by American leaders and, with the deployment of a missile defense system, whether the American public will actually be protected. Certain themes, ideas, and data are central to grappling with this topic. Consequently, the reader may find some of these reiterated in the text because the author believes these concepts or data warrant repeating.

Introduction

9

BALLISTIC MISSILE BASICS* Ballistic missiles are classified by their maximum range, which is a function of the missile’s engines (rockets) and the weight of the missile’s warhead. To add more distance to a missile’s range, rockets are stacked on top of each other in a configuration referred to as staging. There are four general classifications of ballistic missiles: • Short-range ballistic missiles, traveling less than 1,000 kilometers (approximately 620 miles) • Medium-range ballistic missiles, traveling between 1,000–3,000 kilometers (approximately 620–1860 miles) • Intermediate-range ballistic missiles, traveling between 3,000–5,500 kilometers (approximately 1,860–3,410 miles) • Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), traveling more than 5,500 kilometers

Short- and medium-range ballistic missiles are referred to as theater ballistic missiles, whereas ICBMs or long-range ballistic missiles are described as strategic ballistic missiles. The ABM Treaty prohibited the development of nationwide strategic defenses, but permitted development of theater missile defenses. All Ballistic Missiles Have Three Stages of Flight:** • The boost phase begins at launch and lasts until the rocket engines stop firing and pushing the missile away from Earth. Depending on the missile, this stage lasts between three and five minutes. During much of this time, the missile is traveling relatively slowly, although toward the end of this stage an ICBM can reach speeds of more than 24,000 kilometers per hour. The missile stays in one piece during this stage. • The midcourse phase begins after the rockets finish firing and the missile is on a ballistic course toward its target. This is the longest stage of a missile’s flight, lasting up to 20 minutes for ICBMs. During the early part of the midcourse stage, the missile is still ascending toward its apogee, while during the latter part it is descending toward Earth. It is during this stage that the missile’s warhead(s), as well as any decoys, separate from the delivery vehicle. • The terminal phase begins when the missile’s warhead re-enters the Earth’s atmosphere, and it continues until impact or detonation. This stage takes less than a minute for a strategic warhead, which can be traveling at speeds greater than 3,200 kilometers per hour.

*Reproduced with permission from Arms Control Today ( July/August 2002): 31–34. **Short- and medium-range ballistic missiles may not exit the atmosphere or have a warhead that separates from its booster.

CHAPTER 1

Missile Defense to ABM Diplomacy: From Eisenhower to Nixon

A new aerial threat arose late in World War II when, in September 1944, Germany launched V-1 and V-2 missiles at England and Allied forces in France. The V-1 was an unmanned, jet-propelled cruise missile, virtually a flying bomb; the V-2 was a liquid-fueled ballistic missile that propelled itself during the launch stage and then fell freely in its descent toward its target. Each German missile carried about one ton of high explosives, but since they could not be aimed with any precision, they were essentially weapons of terror. Beginning on September 8, 1944, for example, the first of 500 German V-2 missiles hit London resulting in, by the time strikes ended on March 27, 1945, more than 2,500 deaths. Meanwhile, the Germans had launched literally hundreds of these primitive missiles against France, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, and advancing Allied forces. Fortunately, the war ended before the Germans could deploy a planned two-stage ballistic missile that apparently was intended to target New York City. Although the Allies bombed the launch sites, when they could be located, there was no defense against V-2s once they were in flight. Had the “V” weapons been available earlier, according to General Dwight Eisenhower, the Allies’ June 1944 Normandy invasion might have been impossible without an antimissile defensive system.1 Since it is an axiom of warfare that once a new weapon appears there is a rush to develop defensive countermeasures, it is not surprising that the Truman administration immediately initiated ballistic missile defense (BMD) research. Both the U.S. Army and its Air Corps promptly initiated separate programs aimed at developing antimissile systems to counter the threat of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. The

Missile Defense to ABM Diplomacy

11

army established its original, evolving Nike program in February 1945, and a month later the Army Air Corps created Project Wizard. The War Department’s Equipment Board, headed by General Joseph W. Stilwell, issued a report in May 1946 that foresaw much of the future technological challenges: Guided missiles, winged or non-winged, traveling at extreme altitudes and at velocities in excess of supersonic speed, are inevitable. Intercontinental ranges of over 3,000 miles and pay load [sic] sufficient to carry atomic explosive [sic] are to be expected. Remotely controlled, and equipped with homing devices designed to be attracted to sound, metal, or heat, such missiles would be incapable of interception with any existing equipment such as fighter aircraft and antiaircraft fire. Guided interceptor missiles, dispatched in accordance with electronically computed data obtained from radar detection stations, will be required.

The report recommended, consequently, “the development of defensive measures against atomic weapons be accorded priority over all other National Defense projects.”2 Subsequently, presidents from Dwight D. Eisenhower to William Clinton undertook, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, the research and testing technology initially to counter enemy bombers and then long-range missiles. The problems encountered in meeting the threat of missiles would prove much greater than that of bombers because missiles reach their targets much more quickly and because a single nuclear-tipped missile reaching an urban area could cause massive devastation. Among the major technological challenges in creating a reliable antimissile system was that of detecting enemy missiles soon enough to launch and direct interceptors to destroy them, or that of identifying a detached incoming warhead among its countermeasures, penetration aids, or several decoys. Then, too, political-strategic questions arose regarding the potential detrimental impact of antiballistic missiles (ABMs) on the prevailing concept of deterrence. Would missile defenses only prompt a new type of arms race, with each side trying to build more and more offenses to overwhelm those defenses, while also building up more missile defenses? Would a deployed ABM system, if effective, provide a nation’s leaders the opportunity of launching a first strike with little concern of retaliation? Despite difficulties in resolving technical challenges and strategic considerations, American presidents often found themselves under pressure from a variety of contractors, military officers, political officials and scientists to deploy the antimissile systems currently under development. * * * With the onset of the Cold War, and after the Soviet Union developed atomic weapons and aircraft capable of delivering them over the North Pole during the 1950s, the United States focused its efforts on obtaining

12


missiles capable of shooting down enemy bombers. Drawing on previous research and development efforts, the Eisenhower administration in 1953 supervised the Army’s deployment of its evolving Nike surface-to-air system around U.S. cities and airfields to provide protection from Soviet bombers. By 1958, some 200 sites hosted the short-range, liquid-fueled Nike-Ajax system; however, that same year the army began upgrading the batteries with the solid-fueled and nuclear-tipped Nike-Hercules that had a range of 75 miles. A key component of the new Nike program was the radar-driven early warning system that began with 7 sites in 1949 and ultimately numbered 74 stations by 1952. Later, with the completion of the Distant Early Warning (DEW) line in the far northern Arctic regions in 1960, the early warning system provided coverage, initially targeting enemy bombers, from northern Canada to the Mexican border. With the shifting of emphasis from a defense against enemy bombers to that of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in the 1960s, the value of the Nike-Hercules batteries rapidly diminished until they began to be deactivated in November 1968. On November 3, 1973, the army was directed to shut down all remaining sites. Meanwhile, the Eisenhower administration had been searching for a defense against the deadly nuclear-tipped ICBM missiles. Before the end of the decade, the army had created the NikeZeus antiballistic missile system that it argued could cope with Soviet ICBMs. This system included a three-stage, solid-propellant interceptor missile tipped with a 400-pound nuclear warhead, an advanced radar, and

Nike-Hercules Air Defense Missile. (Courtesy: Department of Defense)


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communication links.3 Attention then focused on the possible deployment of the Nike-Zeus system. Initial debates regarding an ABM deployment during the last years of the Eisenhower administration soon erupted into a hotly contested dispute between the army and the newly independent Air Force. Between 1956 and 1958, the U.S. Army and the Air Force disagreed over an antimissile defense system’s ability to protect the Air Force’s airfields that housed the U.S. main deterrent force, its nuclear equipped bomber fleet. In the opening round of the interservice debates, Army General Maxwell Taylor on October 28, 1957 insisted: “We can see no reason why the country cannot have an antimissile defense for a price that is within reach.” Because its Nike-Zeus program was two years ahead of the Air Force’s inherited Wizard project, the army argued that its system should be put into production and deployed to protect the airfields. Seeking funds for additional ICBMs, air force officials urged the Joint Chiefs of Staff not to press for deployment of Nike-Zeus because the system could be easily deceived by decoys, would be too expensive, and could create an unrealistic sense of security. Not adverse to joining the interservice rivalry, the navy in 1959 suggested that its Talos missile could be employed in an ABM system. After analysis of army and air force ABM systems in 1959, Richard E. Horner, the Air Force’s assistant secretary of defense for research and development, reported that the air force’s ABM system would cost more than it was worth. He believed, moreover, that both air force’s system and the army’s Nike-Zeus could be readily overwhelmed by the Soviet Union’s ICBM reentry vehicles carrying nuclear warheads and a variety of decoys. Thus, Horner urged canceling all ABM programs and spending the money on production of more ICBMs.4 His advice was ignored. These vigorous debates among the armed services was indicative of how vitally concerned they were about their assigned roles and missions in the newly emerging strategic environment. Upon gaining its independence, the air force with its bombers and ICBMs claimed a broad strategic role, while the army hoped to retrieve its former power, prestige, and funding with short-range missiles and by gaining control of the ballistic missile defense program. As the army was gradually assigned primary responsibility for the ABM systems and the navy added submarines designed to launch Polaris missiles in 1961, the missions of the armed service were clarified and the rivalry declined. By the mid-1960s, a unified Joint Chiefs of Staff began pressing for deployment of a ballistic missile defense system. The army sought funding for the production of the Zeus system in the fiscal year 1959 budget, hoping to gain approval of a 1962 operational deployment of an antimissile system. The secret November 1957 Gaither Commission Report added to the arguments for an ABM deployment when it claimed the Soviets were far ahead of the United States in the development and deployment of strategic nuclear forces. To protect the American public, the report argued, it was

14


of the utmost importance to construct a nationwide program of fallout shelters and to provide “an active defense of cities and other critical areas [which] demands the development and installation of the basic elements of a [missile defense] system at an early date. Such a system initially may have only a relatively low-altitude intercept capability, but would provide the framework on which to add improvements brought forth by the research and test programs.”5 This approach of “build and test, improve and test” until an adequate system was established lay at the heart of most rationales for deployment including much later that of George W. Bush. A series of studies conducted during 1958 and 1959 within the Defense Department, however, found that the introduction of ICBMs had vastly complicated development of defensive measures. The Pentagon’s Reentry Body Identification Group’s spring 1958 report had, according to missile defense historian Donald Baucom, “detailed several weaknesses in the Zeus system, including vulnerability of its radar, the inability of NikeZeus to deal with decoys, and the fact that nuclear explosions at high altitudes would blind the Zeus radar. (Even if the Soviets did not detonate a warhead, the explosion of the nuclear warhead of a Zeus missile would blind its own radar.)” The president’s Scientific Advisory Board’s January 1959 report concluded that antimissile technology was not “sufficiently advanced to enable anyone to conceive reliable systems for intercepting and destroying missiles.” In spite of the Soviet’s August 1957 test of a long-range ballistic missile and its October launch of Sputnik, Eisenhower declared, “We are well ahead of the Soviets in the nuclear field both in quantity and in quality. We intend to stay ahead.” He followed the advice of his scientific advisers and vetoed deployment of the Nike-Zeus system because it was still considered unreliable. Outspoken in defense of the administration’s rejection of the shelter program, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles believed the American people would be hard pressed “to sustain simultaneously an offensive and defensive mood.” Moreover, he argued, “For our security we have been relying above all on our capacity for retaliation.”6 The Gaither Report argued that the Soviet Union would likely have a dozen ICBMs operational within a year, while it would take the United States two or three years to catch up, thereby creating what the media labeled a “missile gap.” The notion of missile gap was further encouraged by subsequent intelligence estimates, later shown to be inflated, and by the U.S. Air Force’s prediction that the Soviets would have up to 500 operational ICBMs by 1961. “Once again,” according to journalist Strobe Talbott, “[the] constant underlying American analysis of the Soviet’s quantifiable capacity was an assumption of their malevolent intent.”7 In the language of the Gaither Report, “Khrushchev’s Semyorka [new ICBM] was an instrument for a ‘disarming counterforce attack,’ while America’s Atlas and Titan ICBMs, as well as its Thor and Jupiter intermediate-range land-based missiles were ‘our deterrent power.’ ” President Eisenhower,


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meanwhile, had top-secret U-2 reconnaissance aircraft’s photographs of Soviet missile operations that revealed the quality and variety of Soviet weapons under development and being tested were vastly inferior to those being developed and deployed by the United States. It was later acknowledged that the Gaither Report’s assessment and the “official” air force estimates, especially the latter, were grossly inaccurate, for by 1960 the Soviets actually had only four operational ICBMs.8 Meanwhile, segments of the secret report had been leaked to the press, and several politicians, both Democrats and Republicans, criticized Eisenhower for allowing a situation that endangered the deterrence system and provided Moscow with a strategic advantage. However, classified data that would have refuted these assertions, such as from the U-2 flights, were not yet in the public domain. Thus, presidential candidate John F. Kennedy, in an August 14, 1958 speech, claimed 1960–1964 would be “the most critical years of the gap,” while the Democratic Party platform denounced the Republicans for the “missile gap, space gap, limited war gap.”9 Political repercussions that stemmed from the “missile gap” episode would influence later antimissile defense debates, because no future candidate wanted to be blamed for an “ABM gap.” Early in 1961, President Kennedy was urged to deploy the army’s Nike-Zeus system despite its serious technical weaknesses and strategic concerns. His science advisor, Jerome Weisner, and other scientists, such as the Defense Department’s Dr. Jack P. Ruina, reiterated the previous administration’s negative findings and worried that an American ABM system would only stimulate an arms race, as the Soviet Union would feel compelled to develop more advanced offensive nuclear arms and the United States would reciprocate. Since both nations understood that missile defenses could be overwhelmed with a massive attack, the more missile defenses, the greater the number of offensive weapons that each side would believe it needed. Mutual ABM systems, moreover, challenged the basic principle of nuclear deterrence—that of mutual vulnerability. Only if both nuclear powers were unquestionably vulnerable to a retaliatory nuclear attack would mutual deterrence rest on a solid foundation. Harold Brown, director of Defense Research and Engineering, and Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara’s chief weapons advisor, expanded on this position in an April 1961 report. He concluded that the prospect of an effective missile defense remained “bleak,” due to an enemy’s expected use of decoy aids that would ensure the penetration of many nuclear warheads. Any technical effort to counter these penetration aids would add substantially to the cost of a successful ABM system. With the same funds, more enhanced, less costly offensive systems such as ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, could be deployed. McNamara applied the same analysis to the Nike-Zeus system, as he questioned its technical feasibility, vulnerability to sophisticated ICBMs screened by multiple decoys, and cost compared to offensive missiles. He told the

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President John F. Kennedy and Premier Nikita Khrushchev at Vienna Conference, June 3, 1961. (Courtesy: John F. Kennedy Library)

Senate Armed Forces Committee on April 4 that “as ICBMs become easier and cheaper to produce in coming years,” any missile defense would become an “expensive system in relation to the degree of protection that it can furnish.” He also argued that deploying a system that destroyed ICBMs after they reentered the atmosphere, as the Nike-Zeus did, would require civil defense shelters to protect the population from the radiation fallout released by both the enemy’s ICBM and the Nike interceptor’s nuclear warheads. The Senate Armed Forces Committee disagreed with McNamara’s evaluation of Nike-Zeus and persuaded the Senate to establish the Shifter Commission to examine Zeus’s current capabilities. The commission recommended that $137 million be allocated to Nike-Zeus until scheduled rocket tests were completed in 1962. In a 1962 test, a Zeus launched from the Kwajalein atoll in the South Pacific was deemed successful because it came within 2 kilometers of an Atlas missile fired from Vandenberg Air Forces Base in California. At that proximity, the Zeus’s nuclear warhead would have effectively destroyed it. After the Zeus rocket intercepted two more Atlas missiles before the end of 1962, McNamara decided to integrate Zeus with other essential configurations. Beginning in January 1963, Nike became known as Nike-X,


17

which incorporated a multiple-array radar system designed to search large areas of space to detect ICBMs and discriminate between decoys and ICBM warheads. In addition, Zeus (now Spartan) was integrated with the fast acceleration Sprint missile. Sprint was first tested at the White Sands Missile Range in November 1965. By that date, however, McNamara had postponed production of the Zeus system because the speed, number, and nuclear payload of American and Soviet missiles had increased since 1962. The Defense Department endorsed the decision.10 Both the Sprint and Spartan missiles carried thermonuclear warheads. The Spartan warhead had a yield of about five megatons. Spartan was designed to target ICBMs at a distance of 75 to 100 miles above the earth. Any missiles that Spartan missed were to be shot down by Sprint missiles that could reach up to about 20 miles. Sprint and Spartan missiles were tested frequently from 1965 to 1973. Domestic politics and the desire to stabilize the nuclear environment resulted in pressure on President Lyndon B. Johnson to consider deploying an ABM system. Increasingly, members of Congress, alarmed at U.S. vulnerability during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and fearing the Soviet’s estimated 470 solid-fuel ICBMs, sought to put in place an antimissile system to deflect any Soviet nuclear attack. Even though the United States possessed 1,146 ICBMS—suggesting both super powers possessed more than enough missiles to effectively deter each other from their use— congressional leaders and military chiefs continued lobbying for an ABM system.11 Raising doubts about the prospects of an ABM system, Herbert York and Jerome Wiesner echoed earlier reports in their seminal October 1964 article in Scientific American. Basically, they argued that in their “considered professional judgment” the problems of developing an effective missile defence had “no technical solution.” More significantly, however, they concluded that the deployment of ABM systems could threaten the nuclear balance and its deterrent effect. Setting aside the earlier concerns of Kennedy’s science advisors, this was, historian Donald R. Baucom argues, the “first serious presentation” of the critical relationship between the budding ABM programs and deterrence.12 In any event, it fixed the attention of Defense Secretary Robert McNamara. * * * Not long afterward, McNamara became a proponent of limiting or banning missile defense programs, even as he and the president were under heavy pressure from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and several members of Congress to deploy existing ABM technology. On December 6, 1966, McNamara reached a compromise with General Earle G. Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and with Johnson. The administration should immediately deploy a light or thin missile defense, Wheeler argued, although the Joint Chiefs preferred a heavy city antimissile system “for

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the highest density populated areas.” He based his recommendations on two factors: First, we have watched “the growing Soviet ability to destroy our population and our industry,” and second, the research and development of the upgraded Nike system (now Nike-X) has reached a point where the military believes it was “ready for deployment.” A host of other prominent Americans also urged that a broad-based U.S. ABM system was required to meet the challenge to deterrence posed by Galosh, the Soviet ABM system. The Committee for a Prudent Defense Policy asked for public and congressional support to put in place an antimissile system. Similarly, the powerful chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Richard B. Russell of Georgia, and other prominent individuals including former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, mathematician Donald Brennan, Pentagon consultant Herman Kahn, physicist Edward Teller, and Professor Albert Wohlstetter urged President Johnson to deploy an ABM system.13 In the spring of 1966, the Senate Armed Services Committee, led by Russell, persuaded Congress to authorize $168 million for procuring components of the Nike-X system, although it was not in McNamara’s proposed Pentagon budget. Moscow’s deployment of its ABM system and China’s testing of its first thermonuclear device on May 6 prompted the House Armed Services Committee to endorse its Senate counterpart’s call for an ABM deployment. The issue took on a partisan political hue when, in the spring of 1967, the Republican National Committee issued a lengthy red, white, and blue pamphlet titled Is LBJ Right? The Republicans demanded to know why the president had failed to order the deployment of the Nike-X. Bowing to the building pressure, the president accepted McNamara’s proposed compromise that would satisfy the secretary’s concern about costs and effectiveness and Johnson’s instinct of the political necessity for a positive stance on the ABM issue. On September 7, McNamara announced the restoration of funds that he had previously withheld for deploying a “thin-line” ABM system, subsequently named Sentinel. It was designed, he insisted, to defend against China’s less threatening nuclear missile batteries, as it could not deflect a Soviet ICBM attack. He hoped by stressing Beijing’s nascent ICBM program that Moscow would not see a need in Washington’s ABM deployment to escalate the strategic arms race. At the same time, Johnson declared that the restored funds would not be used to deploy the Sentinel system until it was determined whether Moscow was willing to discuss limitation of strategic weaponry, including ABMs.14 To bolster his case against a nationwide deployment and to sustain the president’s desire for only a limited Sentinel system, McNamara arranged a 1967 White House meeting with Johnson and the past and current White House science advisors and Defense Department directors of research. The distinguished group of scientists included Donald Hornig, John Foster, Harold Brown, Jerome Weisner, James Killian, George Kistiakowsky, and Herbert York. During the meeting, the scientists unanimously opposed


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deploying existing ABM components because the existing technology simply could not defeat a major ICBM attack. In an attempt to head off a decision on deployment, Johnson and McNamara met with Soviet leader Aleksei Kosygin at a brief, hastily arranged Soviet-American summit from June 23 to June 25, 1967 at Glassboro, New Jersey. They found Kosygin opposed to negotiations linking offensive and defensive strategic arms, claiming that defensive missiles “don’t kill people. They protect them.” Secretary of Defense McNamara responded that the Soviet deployment of a missile defense system would “lead to the escalation of an arms race. That’s not good for either one of us.” At this point Kosygin became agitated; he pounded the table and shouted, “Defense is moral; offense is immoral.”15 Although Soviet leadership had yet to agree on a position regarding negotiation of strategic weapons generally or ABM systems in particular, as early as 1965 Soviet critics of their own antiballistic missile efforts began to emerge. Some Russian scientists had become convinced that “an effective ABM system was technically infeasible given the existing technologies.” Civilian analyst Gennadi Gerasimov was one of the Soviets to acknowledge serious problems in developing an adequate ABM program. Reflecting the views expressed by physicists Herbert York and Jerome Wiesner in Scientific American, he accepted the pair’s claim that a technical solution to the ABM problem was not currently possible, and that it was “time to move beyond the arms race” to disarmament. Gerasimov’s comments were doubly significant in that they revealed that the Russians were observing the discourse among the American nuclear scientists and that their anti-ABM position had begun to penetrate Soviet thinking. Later in 1968, dissident Soviet physicist Andrei Sakharov released his searching samizdat memorandum, “Reflections on Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom,” which also called for limiting ABM systems as part of broader plea for “sweeping domestic reforms and international cooperation.”16 Although Soviet leadership continued to resist limiting missile defenses, its weapons research and production specialists realized the significance of America’s development of long-range missiles capable of carrying multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs). These scientists were certain that the MIRVs would enter the U.S. inventory in a few years and that they would easily saturate any ABM missile system, rendering it useless. Soviet strategists, however, initially failed to recognize the extent to which MIRVs would enhance the U.S. ICBMs, increase their counterforce potential, and render their adversary’s ABM systems impotent. Meanwhile, Russian critics of missile defenses lamented that “their doubts went unheeded by the country’s politico-military leadership, who remained convinced that no problem was beyond solution and no technical difficulty was insurmountable, provided there was enough investment and perseverance.”17 The memory of the heavy losses suffered

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during World War II continued to dominated Soviet strategic thought and led policymakers to emphasize defensive measures. The initial U.S. motivation for developing MIRVed ICBMs was, as Soviet scientists surmised, to overwhelm any Soviet missile defense system. During July 1968, the United States began testing MIRVs, which would increase the payload of Minuteman III ICBMs by three or more warheads, with each warhead aimed at independent targets. Ironically, by the time the MIRVs became available, the Defense Department reported that the construction of Moscow’s Galosh and Leningrad’s Tallinn antimissile systems was slowing down. In January 1968, McNamara informed Congress about the Soviet ABMs, emphasizing three points. First, Moscow’s construction of the Galosh system was “proceeding at a moderate pace” and the Soviets had not expanded it to other cities. (The U.S. intelligence report on Galosh was only partly accurate, as earlier in 1967 the Soviets had canceled Moscow’s A-35 ABM system because of questions regarding its reliability. The Soviets were currently depending on the Aldan combat antiaircraft system to protect Moscow.) Second, U.S. intelligence reports indicated the Tallinn system had no “significant ABM capability,” a finding repeated by Secretary of the Air Force Harold Brown before a congressional committee in the spring of 1968. Third, intelligence officials believed China had not tested an expected long-range ballistic missile during 1967. (Indeed, three years later China’s ICBM program continued to fall behind schedule.) The Pentagon’s desire for the new MIRV technology, however, was undeterred, for it would provide the United States a temporary edge, but the military chiefs had yet to acknowledge that it would also greatly escalate the strategic arms race.18 Assessments of the Johnson administration’s proposed Sentinel ABM system in 1968 remained largely negative. The Federation of American Scientists denounced it as economically irresponsible and militarily futile. “At first,” the noted physicist Hans Bethe wrote in 1968, “I supported ABM and worked on it for several years. In the course of my work, however, I became convinced of the effectiveness of countermeasures—and penetration aids especially. I concluded that ABM is likely to lead to an increase of offensive weapons by both sides . . . thus, the country with the ABM [system] is less secure than before.” A month later, in March 1968, Bethe and Richard Garwin published an article in Scientific American that drew together the science community’s objection to the ABM. They reiterated the technical, economic, and strategic arguments against the ABM, pointing out the ease with which penetration aids could defeat the costly, ineffective system. Their conclusion was “that the system could be easily overwhelmed, so as to render it practically useless.”19 Nonetheless, the Johnson administration was confronted by increasing pressure from Congress, due in part to its contractors’ lobbying to deploy the Army’s Nike ABM system. When McNamara initially postponed the


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production and deployment of Nike-Zeus, for example, Army Magazine for February 1961 published a two-page advertisement displaying a map that showed the location of Zeus contractors in 37 states, where an anticipated expenditure of $410 million would bring jobs and prosperity. The magazine’s advertisement reached all congressional representatives and senators in those 37 states and most of them, in turn, supported budget allocations for the Defense Department to fund missile defense research and development programs. On September 23, 1967, Business Week reported that Western Electric had spread out design and development work on missile defense projects among “close to 3,000 different companies.”20 These lobbying efforts were greatly aided by persisting public fears that had arisen during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and by demands that the administration match the feeble Moscow and Leningrad ABM systems. Thus, in brief, the Johnson administration decided to undertake the Sentinel program because of three factors: various groups and prominent individuals who pressed the administration to counter the Soviet ABM system, the congressional figures who wanted keep or expand the jobs provided by missile defense contractors in their districts, and Johnson’s fear that Republican leadership would charge him with creating a “missile defense gap.” The prospect of partisan charges led a well-known newspaper columnist to suggest that the Democrats were deploying the Nike-X “to defend against Republican-launched missiles.”21 * * * The newly elected Republican president, Richard Nixon, would deploy an antimissile system, while at the same time negotiating with Moscow to limit ABM programs. During his January 20, 1969 inauguration address, Nixon called for an “era of negotiations” with Moscow. The same day, the Soviet Foreign Affairs Ministry responded that it was willing to explore issues regarding strategic weapons, including ABMs. While Nixon stalled opening negotiations (they actually began in November), he reviewed the Johnson administration’s thin-line Sentinel ABM system. On March 14, 1969, Nixon told a White House press conference that: “After a long study of all of the options available, I have concluded that the Sentinel program previously adopted should be substantially modified.” He said the proposed ABM system could not defend “our cities”; therefore, he argued Sentinel should be replaced with the Safeguard system, which would protect up to 12 Minuteman III ICBM sites to preserve a credible deterrent. Initially, Safeguard systems would be deployed at Malstrom AFB, Montana, and at Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota. Safeguard would also protect the United States against any Chinese Communist threat that might arise in the next 10 years as well as “against any irrational or accidental attack that might occur of less than massive magnitude” from the Soviet Union. The president emphasized: “Moving to a massive city defense

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Short-lived Safeguard BMD site at Grand Forks, North Dakota: large radar built some distance from Sprint and Spartan interceptors. (Courtesy: Ballistic Missile Defense Organization)

system, even starting with a thin system and then going to a heavy system, tends to be more provocative in terms of making a first-strike capability against the Soviet Union. I want no provocation that might deter arms [limitation] talks.”22 If Nixon concluded the United States only required a “sufficient” number of ICBMs to survive a first strike and still be able to retaliate in kind, he believed the Galosh system around Moscow was part of a Soviet firststrike strategy because it defended the USSR’s capital city and would partially shield their citizens from a U.S. retaliatory strike. In reality, of course, Nixon’s rhetoric about first- and second-strike tactics obscured the fact, as McNamara indicated in 1967, that each side already had sufficient missiles and warheads to destroy much of the world regardless of who launched missiles first or who deployed largely ineffective ABM systems. Nixon chose initially not to announce important decisions made to enhance the Safeguard system. First, Safeguard increased the number of ABM interceptors to protect Minuteman III ICBM sites, and second, Safeguard altered Sentinel’s radar range to cover the continental United States. The president’s National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger noted in his memoirs that the extended radar coverage would create “a better base for rapid expansion” of ICBMs site defenses if needed in the future.


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Although Nixon omitted data about radar coverage, Soviet scientists correctly anticipated that this was part of his Safeguard plan.23 Nixon’s change of the name and mission of the Sentinel system intensified debate in Congress when he sought increased funding for Safeguard, as well as for the completion of testing and deploying MIRVed Minuteman III missiles. The Nixon administration faced the same criticism that Johnson and McNamara experienced in 1967 and 1968. The challenge to deploying the Safeguard ABM system came from prominent scientists and liberal congressmen such as Democratic Senators Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts and Albert Gore of Tennessee. Reporter Strobe Talbott called opponents of the antimissile program a “Who’s Who of liberal defense intelligentsia.” These included President Kennedy’s former science advisor Jerome Weisner and Nobel Prize-winning physicist Hans Bethe. These arms control proponents, inside and outside of Washington, D.C., argued that maintaining a strategic balance through negotiated limits was more likely to lead to long-term security than an unlimited race, with both sides seeking to gain temporary edge with the MIRVs. The ABM systems, they insisted, challenged the basic principles of nuclear deterrence and could stimulate a new arms race. Echoing the earlier criticisms of Bethe and Garwin, a March 1969 memo to Kissinger from a staff member of the National Security Council concluded that the Safeguard system’s technical problems were “so serious that we will not . . . [be able to] rely on the system to do what we say we want it for.” The considerable vulnerability system’s radars to attack and easy overloading of its computers were major concerns, Lawrence E. Lynn wrote. Moreover, “the computer programs, data processors and radars have never worked together, and we don’t know if they can.” Even so, pointing to the heart of the matter, he noted that Moscow and Beijing might “take the system seriously even if it doesn’t work.” Consequently, the deployment of Safeguard might provide a “bargaining chip” in future negotiations.24 Supporters of the Safeguard system included Paul Nitze, author of harshly anti-Soviet NSC-68 and a frequent government insider specializing in military issues who disliked physicists like Bethe and Weisner because they meddled in politics, and the hawkish Committee for a Prudent Defense Policy. Among the committee’s most outspoken proponents of an ABM system were Senators Richard Russell, a recent convert, and Strom Thurmond; former Secretary of State Dean Acheson; strategic analyst and economist Edward Luttwack; Rand Corporation’s military analyst Albert Wohlstetter; and Wohlstetter’s protégé Paul Wolfowitz. Except for individuals whose jobs depended on antimissile research and development, the committee had no prominent scientists supporting Safeguard.25 Congressional debate on the ABM issue temporarily subsided with a Senate vote on August 6, 1969. On an amendment to prohibit spending for Safeguard, the final vote was deadlocked, 50 to 50, requiring Vice President Spiro Agnew’s vote, which defeated the amendment and preserved Safeguard funding. The close vote persuaded Nixon that Safeguard’s best

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President Richard Nixon talking with National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger. (Courtesy: National Archives)

use would be as a bargaining chip during the upcoming negotiations with the Soviet Union. Nixon and Kissinger entered into negotiations with Moscow ignoring the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, who argued throughout 1969 that nuclear deterrence based on assured destruction was better than vaguely verified arms control agreements. The president and his national security adviser adopted what they termed “realistic balance of power concepts” that focused on international stability. They envisioned strategic arms negotiations, along with other programs such as economic incentives, as the way to promote cooperation, perhaps a détente, with the Soviet Union and People’s Republic of China. Meanwhile, Soviet military and foreign policy leaders also debated policies based on détente and strategic arms control. In 1968, when Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko announced that Moscow would discuss strategic arms limitations with the Americans, he criticized unnamed “theoreticians” who believed arms control arrangements and a détente with capitalist nations were an “illusion.”26 * * * American-Soviet negotiations for the ABM Treaty and Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) I pact began on November 17, 1969 and lasted until May 1972, alternating between Helsinki and Vienna, with Gerard C. Smith, director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, heading the


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American delegation, and Vladimir Semonov leading the Soviet team. After the initial round of talks at Helsinki, the Soviet commission supervising the strategic arms talks reviewed the American position on missile defense systems. They concluded, “the U.S. position strongly supported Soviet opponents of ABM systems, who were few in number and weak at the time.” The commission, nevertheless, was impressed with “American arguments on the destabilizing nature of ABMs—in terms of strategic stability—and the dangers inherent in a territorial ABM system deployment.” It was not American arguments, however, that prompted a policy change. Soviet leaders who had been enthusiastic about the A-35 Moscow and Tallinn ABM systems before 1967 had become discouraged “with the existing level of ABM technology” in the Soviet Union. Thus, when the commission finally met with Soviet designers working on ABMs, virtually every one of the scientists “expressed serious doubts about the possibility of creating an effective ABM system in the near term.” Consequently, the Soviet delegation “offered to discuss three possible options” with the Americans to resolve the ABM problem. The first option allowed both parties to deploy “a comprehensive and dense” defense system; the second option permitted each party to deploy one or two ABM systems; the third option called for a total ban on the deployment of ABMs.27 Subsequent American offers regarding ABMs alternately puzzled and confounded their Soviet counterparts. In April 1970, the United States offered an unusual proposal, endorsed by Kissinger, that would limit ABMs to the defense of the National Command Authorities (NCA), that is, Washington and Moscow. The new offer was surprising—Kissinger later labeled the proposal “a first class blunder”—because it varied greatly from the U.S. deployment program “both in concept and in terms of congressional authorization and actual construction” that focused on defending ICBMs sites. A week later, the Soviets accepted the NCA concept and offered to work out the technical details. Apparently Kissinger—and perhaps Nixon, who according to Kissinger “displayed a remarkable indifference” to technical issues—had expected the Soviets to counter, asking for additional ABM sites, which the administration could use against congressional foes of Safeguard. On August 4, the Americans again surprised the Soviets by advancing a new ABM proposal calling for either an NCA deployment as earlier proposed or a total ban. Moscow promptly restated its desire for the NCA limitation.28 ABM discussions lagged until early in 1971 when Kissinger’s suggestions, through Dobrynin, prompted Soviet delegates to propose a separate ABM treaty, leaving strategic offensive force decisions for subsequent negotiations. The White House, however, continued to insist on dual offensive-defensive agreements because they hoped to use Safeguard’s deployment as a bargaining chip to gain Soviet concessions on offensive nuclear systems. Nixon instructed the American delegates, on March 26, 1971, to propose a “third alternative” that called for four U.S. ABM sites

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with 386 interceptor launchers to defend its ICBMs silos and one Soviet ABM site with 100 interceptor launchers to protect Moscow. The proposal astonished the Soviet’s chief delegate Semonov who immediately rejected it.29 Consequently, on May 20, 1971, Kissinger and Dobrynin dropped all previous proposals and agreed to accept a separate ABM accord to be accompanied by an interim agreement, SALT I pact, that would “freeze” offensive ICBM launchers at their current numbers. In spite of Kissinger’s understanding with Dobrynin, the American delegates received orders from Nixon not to deviate from the previous, clearly unacceptable, hybrid NCA offer. Nevertheless, on July 13, Smith privately asked Semenov if Moscow might consider banning all ABMs, even though Nixon and Kissinger were convinced the Soviets would never relinquish Moscow’s ABM system. With Moscow’s approval, Semenov suggested that discussions begin on an ABM ban, but Nixon and Kissinger—mindful of the Pentagon’s strenuous advocacy of Safeguard—declined. Although Semenov indicated possible acceptance of a ban, Kissinger instructed Smith to drop the idea while Nixon asked Smith to inform the Soviets that, during the SALT II discussions, the United States would seek to ban all ABMs. Neither Nixon, however, nor later presidents seriously considered a total ABM ban. Moscow must have become even more puzzled by Washington’s subsequent proposal. After May 20, talks shifted back to a separate ABM accord with Washington still seeking an advantage in ABM sites. In August 1971, the U.S. delegates asked for two American ABM sites, while limiting the Soviet to one. The Soviet Union’s chief negotiator Semonov flatly rejected giving the United States a two-to-one advantage in ABM sites.30 There was serious concern, meanwhile, regarding the characteristics of future ABM systems and what restrictions should be placed on these new technologies. In 1971, ABM systems were largely composed of groundbased missile interceptors designed to carry nuclear warheads into space where they were to explode near incoming enemy warheads and destroy them. Speculation abounded on both sides about various future systems, known as “exotics,” that might involve lasers, charged-particle beams, or other, as yet undreamed of, devices that might be launched from space-based stations. If exotics were to be controlled, simply prohibiting deployment was insufficient because research laboratories could develop and test such systems, which if successful might provide a technological “breakout”—a missile defense network that could be rapidly deployed in violation of the ABM Treaty and shatter the strategic balance. Washington’s fear of a Soviet breakout and the desire to exempt secret U.S. groundbased laser experiments from the proposed treaty created a conundrum for American policymakers. Finally, in August 1971, Nixon instructed U.S. delegates to seek provisions that prohibited both parties from developing, producing, testing, or


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deploying “sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based ABM launchers, ABM missiles, or ABM radars.” Neatly exempted were the Joint Chiefs’ experimental fixed-site ABM lasers. The presidential directive also instructed the delegates not to be too precise in defining various technologies. “In presenting this position,” it stated, “the delegation should not invite a detailed negotiation or discussion of future ABM systems. Our objective is to reach agreement on the broad principle that the agreement should not be interpreted in such a way that either side could circumvent its provisions through future ABM systems or components.”31 In late August, Alexander Shchukin, the Soviet delegate who was a specialist in radio-wave theory, asked American delegate Harold Brown to clarify the U.S. “understanding of the notion of ‘development’ and of practical application of limitations at this stage.” After checking with his superiors, Brown carefully responded: By “development” we have in mind that stage in the evolution of a weapon system which follows research (in research we include the activities of conceptual design and laboratory testing) and which precedes full-scale testing. The development stage, though often overlapping with research, is usually associated with the construction and testing of one or more prototypes of the weapon system or its major components. In our view, it is entirely logical and practical to prohibit the development—in this sense—of those systems whose testing and deployment are prohibited.32

By the fall of 1971, the delegates at Geneva agreed on the basic elements of Article V of the ABM Treaty that read: “Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.” Provisions for fixed landbased systems required additional discussions before being defined in Article II as “a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of” ABM interceptors, launchers, and radars. The phrase “currently consisting of” was added at the suggestion of Raymond Garthoff, the executive secretary to the U.S. team, in order to indicate that the treaty was to cover all systems—current and future. The Soviets exercised a persistent inquisitiveness regarding “exotic” systems, especially the American laser program, and, in fact, they hoped to employ their own large experimental antimissile lasers currently at a Central Asia fixed-site testing station. Eventually Soviet probing resulted in an agreement to ban the deployment of fixed-base exotic ABMs. In the Agreed Statement D of the ABM Treaty, a footnote stated that “the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their components would be subject to discussion . . . and agreement.”

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Paul Nitze, the Defense Department’s representative on the American delegation, suggested the phrase “systems based on other physical principles” that would prohibit future systems not available or even thought of in 1971. After he convinced American and Soviet delegates of the crucial role of ABM radars, Nitze adopted a complicated formula for an index of radar’s power-aperture product—the power of the radar and its area, a standard way of measuring radar capacity—that permitted agreement on limits for the size of radars. Without these limits, both sides could define future agreements on radars in a way that best suited new technologies.33 These radar and other exotic provisions in the ABM Treaty later became the basis for a nasty political battle between Reagan’s White House and Congress during the 1980s. The final negotiations found American officials still seeking an advantage in ABM sites. From August 1971 until April 1972, the U.S. delegation continued to pitch a request for two American sites to a single Soviet site. During the discussions in April and May 1972, however, it was agreed that each side would be entitled to equal deployments. In the end, Smith, Semenov, Kissinger, and Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev finally agreed that each side would be entitled to two ABM sites. Nixon visited Brezhnev at Moscow on May 22, 1972, where they finalized and signed the terms of the ABM Treaty and SALT I agreement. The ABM Treaty limited each side to one ABM site constructed around each nation’s capital and another unstipulated site, each to be separated by no less than 1,300 kilometers (800 miles) to keep them from overlapping each other. Consequently, each of the two permitted sites was limited to 100 ABM launchers and 100 ABM interceptor missiles and was restricted to specific areas that could provide only limited coverage. The treaty clearly prohibited the establishment of a nationwide ballistic missile defense system.34 In Washington, Senate ratification did not come easily. Some opponents claimed that SALT I failed to adequately limit Soviet ICBMs, whereas the ABM treaty limited U.S. antimissile programs too severely. Others were concerned that the ABM treaty provisions on exotic weapons prohibited efforts to develop airborne laser systems that might someday be able to protect the American people. Despite this opposition, the ABM Treaty was ratified by the Senate (88 to 2) and became Public Law 92–448 on November 15, 1972.35 Even senators who questioned the ABM Treaty’s limitations knew that the Congress had no intention of providing the funds required to sustain the Safeguard system and, thus, recognized the desirability of restricting Soviet ABM efforts. At the same time, the advent of satellite reconnaissance increased the American military and political establishment’s confidence that adequate verification of Soviet ABM activities was taking place. The ABM treaty of 1972 was the first pact in which each party pledged to “not interfere with the national technical means of verification” of the other. Nevertheless, wrangling over strategic limitations and the specifics of the


29

ABM agreement continued into the SALT II negotiations. On July 3, 1974, when Nixon visited Moscow to discuss SALT II with Brezhnev—but was unable to achieve limits on MIRV warheads—the two leaders did agree to amend the 1972 ABM Treaty. This change limited each nation to one ABM site in place of the two sites in the initial treaty.36 During preliminary discussions to establish the ABM and SALT negotiating process, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed that verification of the treaty provisions would be carried out by “national technical means,” that is, by each nation independently employing electronic surveillance, satellite reconnaissance, and other forms of intelligence gathering. But how should the inevitable questions regarding compliance with arms control agreements be dealt with? This issue was addressed early in the negotiations when delegates devised the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) to serve as a mechanism for resolving questions regarding implementation of the SALT I and ABM agreements or alleged violations. Article XIII of the ABM Treaty created the SCC and defined its wideranging verification duties. The commission was to “consider questions concerning compliance” that might be “considered ambiguous.” This involved voluntarily providing information “necessary to assure confidence” and to resolve issues “involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification.” And, as pertained to ABM sites, the commission was to “agree upon procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or their components” as provided for by the treaty. The SCC organization included a commissioner and deputy commissioner from each side to the SCC agreement and a staff adequate to carry out assignments of the commission. The Soviets insisted that commission discussions and findings remain confidential; only items agreed to by both sides could be made public. Although the SCC was often used effectively, its emphasis on secrecy made it difficult to evaluate the commission’s value. In practice, however, both the United States and the Soviet Union avoided using the SCC’s broader mandates for verification and tended to limit their discussions to issues of technical questions, especially regarding compliance with the ABM Treaty.37 * * * Throughout the bilateral ABM negotiations, Safeguard soldiered on, although as a gradually diminished program. In 1969, construction for missile defense facilities had begun at 2, instead of the planned 12, Minuteman ICBM sites: Malmstrom Air Force Base (AFB), Montana and Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota. With additional funding in 1970, construction began at Whiteman AFB, Missouri and Francis E. Warren AFB, Wyoming. With the signing of the ABM Treaty in 1972, which restricted each country to one antimissile site for the protection of ICBMs, Washington

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decided to retain the nearly finished Grand Forks site. Work was halted at Malmstrom, which was only 10 percent complete because of construction difficulties, and at Whiteman and Warren. Two years later, Congress canceled much of the remaining Safeguard program but allowed work to continue at Grand Forks. Safeguard’s basic design called for the actual ABM and radar sites to be deployed several miles from their respective ICBM bases. On 400 acres near Nekoma, ND, were “the missile site control building—the largest structure on the site, which housed the radar and the computer elements of the site and served as the command and control center; an underground power plant adjacent to the missile site control building; a missile launch field containing both Spartan and Sprint missiles; a missile handling building; and a warhead handling building.” Most of the missile control building was “underground, with only the radar faces and necessary electronic equipment above ground, resulting in an exposed concrete pyramid” reaching the height of 77 feet. The four remote Spartan/Sprint missile sites, each containing 12–16 missiles, were located in underground cells from which they would be launched. Some distance away from the basic missile site radar, a Perimeter Acquisition Radar (PAR) was constructed on 250 acres. The PAR building “housed the radar, data processing, command, and control elements.” The radar itself was contained in a 10-story concrete reinforced structure 130 feet high and 200 feet wide. The advantage of this huge radar—linked to the basic missile site radar—was that it “aided in “simultaneous tracking of multiple objects. In addition to locating and tracking incoming objects, it could predict the point of impact through its data processor.” With construction completed on various buildings in 1972 and 1973, the entire facility was handed over to the U.S. Army Safeguard Command on September 3, 1974, and the following spring when the Spartan and Sprint interceptor missiles were installed, the complex was declared “fully operational” on October 1, 1975.38 Because of Safeguard’s technical limitations, however, the House of Representatives, on October 2, 1975, voted to deactivate the ABM base at Grand Forks, North Dakota. In 1976, after spending $6 billion, Congress cut off funds for maintenance of Safeguard’s ABM system. This action followed realization that Safeguard’s large phased array radars provided easy targets for Soviet missiles and also that when nuclear warheads on the Spartan and Sprint missiles detonated, their explosions blinded the U.S. radar system. Although much of the site was mothballed and the interceptor warheads removed, operation of the PAR unit was handed over to the air force in October 1977 to provide additional missile early warnings and was the only major facility of Safeguard to remain in operation.39 * * * Ballistic missile defense programs underwent several phases during their first three turbulent decades. There were several efforts by congressional


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and military officials to persuade succeeding presidents to deploy the current technology even though it was largely untested, or, if tested, often found wanting. Although critics constantly pointed to the ineffectiveness of the current devices, advocates of deployment argued that testing would result in a constant upgrading of the deployed systems as research and development corrected previous malfunctioning components. President Johnson and Nixon succumbed to the political demands for deployment of BMD systems only to have the critics’ assessments verified by the decision to scrap the Safeguard system before its network was completed. Although the Soviets were willing to discuss a total ban of BMD systems, American officials were not. Thus the resulting 1972 ABM Treaty represented a compromise aimed at protecting the deterrence system. Although Nixon and Kissinger ultimately decided that the value of the Safeguard program was probably a bargaining chip for a reduction of Soviet ICBMs, this did not happen. The SALT I agreement failed to result in any reduction of either country’s ballistic missile arsenal. If the BMD issue appeared to be decided by the ABM Treaty, this was not to be the case. Like the phoenix, it would rise again.

CHAPTER 2

The Strategic Defense Initiative: From Reagan to G.H.W. Bush

Ronald Reagan came to the presidency in January 1981 convinced that the United States was seriously endangered by the Soviet Union’s rapidly expanding strategic forces and its widespread interventionist activities. His public condemnation of the “evil empire,” endorsement of an expanded U.S. military buildup, and a subsequent challenge to the 1972 antiballistic missile (ABM) Treaty heightened tensions greatly between the superpowers. The Reagan administration was dominated by hardliners who opposed the idea of détente and believed that arms control agreements had given the Soviet Union undue advantages. Richard Pearle, later an assistant secretary in the defense department, was one of the more colorful individuals who had little use for arms control and who made it clear that he hoped to derail the ABM Treaty.1 In this regard, Reagan had never supported any arms control treaty—at least until he met the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. By then, however, he had launched an ABM program that would ultimately undermine the ABM treaty. After closing down Nixon’s Safeguard system, Congress continued to appropriate nearly $1 billion per year for research on various segments of the ABM program, including technologies using computer software and satellite surveillance systems. The army stressed research for nuclear and nonnuclear missile defense systems designed to protect infantry from short-range, low-altitude missiles or aircraft. These programs included the Patriot system, an antiaircraft project that was eventually modified into a theater missile defense system, which was initially pressed into action during the first Gulf War. Since the ABM Treaty permitted laboratory research, rather exotic concepts could be explored. For example,

The Strategic Defense Initiative

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the air force contracted for an experimental unmanned plane equipped with solar power to carry kinetic-kill vehicles that would intercept and destroy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) by colliding with them. In theory, the unmanned plane would destroy ICBMs in their boost or mid-course trajectory after they were launched from the Soviet Union. The air force also experimented with space-based lasers, particle beams, and other exotic methods for space-based missile defenses.2 Although President Nixon had suggested that future negotiations might alter the 1972 ABM agreement, neither President Jimmy Carter nor Soviet Premier Brezhnev considered any changes between 1977 and 1980. In 1981, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger was briefed on ABM experiments conducted during the Carter administration. Afterwards the Pentagon’s Defense Science Board was charged with reviewing all existing U.S. defensive systems from fallout shelters to various technologies on directed energy. In its report, the board concluded that current spacebased defenses were not technologically capable of providing a satisfactory missile defense system. The report did recommend, however, an increase in Pentagon funds for civil defenses and low-altitude interceptors such as the Patriot. In October 1981, the White House concluded that its “ballistic missile technology [was] not at the stage” where it can provide “defenses against Soviet missiles.” This finding, according to biographer Lou Cannon, did not lessen Reagan’s “vision of nuclear apocalypse and his deeply rooted conviction that the weapons that could cause this hell on earth should be abolished.” Moreover, the president was morally opposed to the U.S. 20-year-old deterrence doctrine, assured destruction, which his administration had inherited.3 In early 1983, while being challenged by a grass-roots nuclear freeze movement, Reagan prepared a speech in support of another increase in the Defense Department’s budget for fiscal year 1984. For more than a year Americans and Europeans, including the American Council of Catholic Bishops, had advocated a freeze on nuclear weapons production as a first step to eliminate all nuclear warheads. Also, a congressional debate on the nuclear freeze, which threatened the president’s requests for increases in military expenditures, was scheduled for late March 1983. A public opinion poll indicated in December 1982 that Reagan’s favorable rating was only 41 percent, the lowest percentage for any president after two years in office since 1945. Other polls in 1982 and January 1983 revealed that 66 percent of Americans believed he had failed to promote arms control activities and, consequently, 70 percent supported the nuclear freeze movement.4 Meanwhile from 1979 to 1982, Republican Senator Malcolm Wallop from Wyoming; Lt. General Daniel O. Graham (retired); Angelo Codevilla, a staff assistant to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence; and Edward Teller, of the University of California Lawrence Livermore Laboratories, had been lobbying the Pentagon and Congress to fund various missile

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defense projects. They vigorously urged approval of such concepts as nuclear- and chemically based lasers, orbiting space-based battle stations using lasers, and an improved air force space-aircraft. In February 1981, Defense Secretary Weinberger had told the Senate Committee on Armed Forces that the United States might be able to “deploy MX [missiles] in fixed silos protected by ABMs.” Although advocates of antimissile systems had prompted congressional and Pentagon discussion about various missile defense systems, apparently none of their ideas were directly related to Reagan’s famous proposal in his March 1983 speech.5 Indeed, there are several different versions of who and what influenced the speech. On February 11, 1983, Reagan and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) met to discuss the Pentagon’s list of five options to deal with the current strategic arms situation. One option was the missile defense system proposed by Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral James Watkins. He argued that a forward strategic ballistic missile defense would “move battles from our shores and skies.” Such battles would be “moral” and palatable to the American people because a missile defense system would protect Americans “not just avenge them” after a Soviet attack. Finally, Watkins said it seemed realistic to have a long-range program to “develop systems that would defeat a missile attack.” Despite Weinberger’s opposition, Reagan immediately gravitated to Watkins’s concept of a missile defense, as it could alleviate the need for nuclear deterrence.6 The basic text of Reagan’s March 23 speech, urging Congress to increase defense funding, was prepared by McFarlane, other members of his National Security Council staff, and Admiral Watkins. McFarlane was concerned that Reagan’s congressional coalition that had supported his earlier requests for increased military spending was crumbling. Consequently, he thought the Pentagon’s investment in futuristic antimissile technology was appropriate. Watkins suggested an advanced directed energy source, plus high-speed computers, might produce an experimental missile defense system that could be used as a bargaining chip to persuade Moscow to accept significant strategic arms reductions. When the president’s science advisor George Keyworth II learned of the inclusion of a missile defense plan, he opposed it because the White House Council on Science’s panel of experts recently reported there was little possibility in the foreseeable future for a successful missile defense based on directed energy or other emerging technologies. Keyworth reluctantly withdrew his objections after McFarlane informed him that the decision to propose a missile defense system was a political, not a scientific, decision.7 According to Reagan’s autobiography, the president received a final draft of the speech on March 22, and that night “did a lot of rewriting. Much of it was to change bureaucratese [sic] into people talk.” In its finished form, his speech began with a lengthy section designed to persuade Congress to approve a significant increase in funds for fiscal 1984 to continue the U.S. military buildup. As his speech drew to a close, Reagan told


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his audience about his recent discussions on missile defense. Then, after noting the nation’s national security had previously depended on nuclear deterrence and the threat of retaliation, Reagan continued: Let me share with you a vision of the future which offers hope. It is that we embark on a program to counter the awesome Soviet military threat with measures that are defensive. . . . What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest on the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies?

The president acknowledged this was a formidable task, but suggested that current technology made it reasonable to begin the effort while pursuing reductions in nuclear arms. Reagan recognized that pairing a defensive system with our offensive missile systems could be viewed as an aggressive policy, and no one wants that. But with those considerations firmly in mind, I call upon the scientific community in this country, who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their great talents to the cause of mankind and world peace, to give us the means of rendering these weapons impotent and obsolete. Tonight, consistent with our obligations of the ABM treaty and recognizing our need for closer consultation with our allies, I’m taking an important first step. I am directing a comprehensive and intensive effort to define a long-term research and development program to begin to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles.8

Reagan’s belief that nuclear weapons could be made obsolete was good news to most Americans. Yet the scientific community was baffled about how to develop an ABM system that would find, track, intercept, and destroy a multitude of incoming Soviet ICBMs and their warheads. Less than a decade earlier, Congress had shut down the briefly deployed Safeguard ABM system with its nuclear-armed interceptors because it could not deal with the Soviet threat. During the intervening years, moreover, applicable science and technology had not changed significantly. If the administration eventually labeled Reagan’s proposal the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in January 1984, critics who believed the president had misled his listeners dubbed his idea “Star Wars” (after the then popular science fiction movie). Reagan, they claimed, had failed to apprise the American people of the daunting technological realities confronting such a project. * * * The informed response to Reagan’s proposal was, at best, mixed as individuals in and out of his administration registered their opinions. Undersecretary of Defense Richard Delauer, who endorsed funding for ABM research, objected to nuclear policy being subjected to such a “half-baked

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political travesty.” A commission headed by insider Brent Scowcroft— a retired general—issued a report on April 6, stating “applications of current technology offer no real promise of being able to defend the United States against massive nuclear attacks in this century.” Similarly, the day before Reagan’s speech, Major General Donald L. Lamberson, head of the Pentagon’s directed-energy research told a Senate Armed Forces subcommittee that space-based weapons were not sufficiently promising to warrant additional research funds. Because they were uncertain how to respond to the proposed defense initiative, most congressional Republicans remained silent. When cornered by a reporter, Minority Whip Robert Michel of Illinois said the speech may have been “a bit of overkill,” and worried that Americans might get an image of Republicans as “being rather macho on the defense budget.” Democratic Congressman Tom Downey of New York said the only thing Reagan did not tell us was “that the evil empire was about to launch a Death Star against the United States.” Time magazine’s lead story for April 4 perhaps best summed up early skeptical reactions to the speech when it claimed Reagan’s proposal was representative of a “video-game vision.” Time’s cover placed Reagan’s picture against a background of space weapons resembling those from a Buck Rogers comic strip about the 25th century.9 The Soviets were understandably upset by Reagan’s speech because it called into question the status of the 1972 ABM Treaty. Attempting to minimize its significance, Michael Deaver, deputy chief of staff at the White House, told Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin that the president’s call for a missile defense program was simply a campaign effort to neutralize the complaints of Democrats who had attacked “Reagan as a warmonger.” Secretary of State George Shultz had met with Dobrynin shortly before Reagan’s speech and gave the ambassador a copy of the text. Shultz told Dobrynin that Reagan only wanted to promote research and development of missile defense program and it would be in compliance with the 1972 ABM Treaty. But the text disturbed Dobrynin who told Shultz: “You will be opening a new phase in the arms race.” Although Shultz had not participated in preparation of the speech, he thought Reagan should have emphasized research and development for a missile defense system and not suggested the United States was on the verge of a technological breakthrough, which it clearly was not.10 The SDI speech, however, did help blunt the challenge posed by the nuclear freeze movement even though Reagan did not mention missile defense during the 1984 election campaign. His opponent, Democratic candidate Walter Mondale, denounced the Star Wars concept as a dangerous hoax costing American taxpayers billions of dollars, speeding up the arms race, and providing no real protection for the American people.11 In the spring of 1983, the Pentagon called on two groups of experts—the Fletcher and Hoffman panels—to examine possible missile defense systems. James C. Fletcher, former director of the National Aeronautics and


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Space Agency, became chairman of a 65-member panel, 53 of whom had direct financial interests in SDI research. He asked its members to plan a missile defense capable of eliminating the threat of Soviet ICBMs. In early 1984, the panel proposed a multilayered system. The first layer, consisting of space-based interceptors, would find and intercept ICBMs when they were being launched, that is, during the initial boost phase. The second layer, also space-based, would find, attack, and destroy the ICBMs during their mid-course trajectory before they reentered the atmosphere above American territory. Finally, a third and fourth layer of ground-based antimissiles would use nuclear warheads to destroy any reentry vehicles (warheads) that had escaped earlier interception. In addition, the panel proposed a network of space-based radars, plus sensors, that could discriminate between decoys and warheads, and track the latter. To develop this technology, the Department of Defense budget should include $1.78 billion for SDI research during the fiscal year 1985 in order to reach a decision on deploying a missile defense system in the early 1990s.12 The new head of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO), General James A. Abrahamson, declared that the Fletcher Report’s antiballistic missile system would be 99.9 percent effective. Given the Soviet Union’s ability to attack the United States with some 10,000 warheads, even this exceptionally optimistic percentage would still permit 100 warheads to hit 100 American cities or ICBM silos. When former President Nixon heard these numbers, he replied: “With 10,000 of those things [nuclear warheads] there is no defense.” Former Defense Secretary Harold Brown insisted that anything less than a perfect missile defense would only allow the United States to protect a strategic retaliatory force; therefore, security still rested on the deterrent scenarios of the 1970s.13 When Defense Department officials testified before the Senate Armed Forces Committee, its chairman, Democratic Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, asked them whether the SDI program was intended to be a population defense or simply “adding a defensive system arms race to our present, substantially costly strategic offensive modernization program?” Nunn asked the Pentagon officials to clarify SDI’s actual goal because some of its technical experts had conceded that the “objective of highly reliable population defense is unattainable.” Nunn’s question was never directly answered during the committee hearings, although the Pentagon’s ambiguous statements indicated the program’s goal failed to include the population defense that Reagan declared was its basic purpose. Yet other administration officials continued to support Reagan’s view that SDI’s goal was to “render obsolete the balance of terror—or Mutual Assured Destruction”—and it should “never to be misconstrued as just another attempt at protecting silos.” In that vein, Weinberger stated on NBC’s televised “Meet the Press” that: “The defensive systems the president is talking about are not designed to be partial” but should be “reliable and total” missile defenses. George Keyworth explained to aerospace contractors

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that only “protecting weapons represents no change in recent [deterrence] policy.” “Protecting people,” Keyworth emphasized, “holds out the promise of dramatic changes.” Then, too, arose the perennial erroneous assertion—this time put forward by Under Secretary of Defense Richard DeLauer even though he could not validate his claim—that the Soviet Union was far ahead in defensive missile technologies.14 At the same time in 1983 that the Fletcher panel was created, the Pentagon appointed a Future Security Strategy Study team, chaired by Fred S. Hoffman, president of a defense consulting firm, to assess the role of the nation’s strategic defenses. The Hoffman Commission also drew a majority from future SDI contractors—17 of its 24 members. In early 1984, the Hoffman Commission offered a more realistic appraisal of the SDI program. Rather than assume that a decision to deploy a missile defense system should be made in the early 1990s, Hoffman’s report concluded that a perfect defense against enemy missiles might “take a long time and may prove to be unattainable in a practical sense against a Soviet effort to counter the defense.” The report said the president’s goal of defending the nation’s population from ICBMs with nuclear warheads raised questions about the Defense Department’s readiness to defend against other threats, notably an air attack by Soviet bombers and cruise missiles. In addition, the report pointed out that the nuclear threat was not simply airborne, because nuclear devices could be smuggled into the United States in suitcases carried by individuals arriving in the United States by airplanes, passenger ships, or in automobiles driven across the Mexican or Canadian borders. Consequently, the panel recommended a “comprehensive review of air defense technologies, leading to the development of useful systems concepts.” Because the Hoffman report failed to support the Defense Department’s desire to deploy an antiballistic missile system by 1990, both Weinberger and Keyworth chose to ignore it. They used the Fletcher report to substantiate their contention that Reagan’s SDI was a realistic goal.15 In yet another assessment, Senate legislative analysts Douglas C. Waller, James T. Bruce, and Douglas Cook reported that the head of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO), Lt. General James Abrahamson, and other SDIO officials avoided the subject of an impenetrable shield to protect all Americans in their briefings. Rather, they claimed the layered SDI systems under consideration were effective enough in protecting cities to deter the Soviets from attacking in the first place. Reagan, meanwhile, wavered between asking for total umbrella defense and a partial one. In a 1985 interview, the president claimed he never asked for a 100 percent accurate defense system, adding: “If SDI is, say, 80 percent effective, then it will make any Soviet attack folly. Even partial success in SDI would strengthen deterrence and keep the peace.” This meant, of course, that mutual assured destruction still dominated American and Soviet strategic policies.16


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Reagan’s vision of a missile defense system was essentially inspired by personal preferences and domestic politics, not by a scientific or technological breakthrough, and sustained by pressure exerted by military chiefs, congressional advocates, and the program’s contractors. The SDI program appeared to offer hope to Americans who, during the early 1980s, had become alarmed about the dangers of a nuclear holocaust through the nuclear freeze movement and television programs such as “Nuclear Winter,” “The Day After,” and “Facing up to the Bomb.” These shows depicted the cruel consequences of a nuclear war that would result in the death of untold millions of people and virtual destruction of Western civilization. Some television and news magazines sought to allay fears of a nuclear catastrophe by using animated explanations of SDI’s proposed goals that showed lifelike images of SDI lasers that always zapped incoming Soviet missiles. These images reinforced the public’s belief that Yankee ingenuity would quickly find the technology to abolish all threats of Moscow’s nuclear warheads.17 * * * In pursuit of Reagan’s vision and the objectives of the Fletcher panel, SDI planners set about devising a series of layered defenses aimed at thinning out the incoming offensive ballistic missiles and nuclear-armed warheads. The first layer involved SDI sensors detecting ICBMs leaving their silos and the immediate launching of missile interceptors to attack the enemy missiles in their boost phase. The second layer of U.S. interceptors would seek to destroy enemy warheads in the postboost, or bus deployment,

Table 2.1 Foreign Contractors for SDI by 1991 Country Israel United Kingdom West Germany Netherlands Italy France Canada Japan Belgium Denmark Total a

Value ($m.) 218.73a 92.06 74.55 22.24b 14.83 13.00 7.43 3.83 0.30 0.03 447.01

Includes $47.1 million contribution by Israel. Includes $7.0 million contribution by the Netherlands. Source: “Status of Allied Contracts,” SDIO viewgraph (Mar. 1991).

b

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This diagram illustrates boost, midcourse, and terminal phases. (Courtesy: Department of Defense)

phase. The third layer of interceptors would look for any deployed enemy warheads during a mid-course phase before they entered the atmosphere. Finally, a fourth layer of interceptors would sort out surviving warheads from the decoys and debris during the terminal phase and destroy them. Assuming it could be done, destroying enemy ICBMs in the brief initial boost phase would provide the best opportunity for reducing the number of incoming nuclear warheads. Once the boost phase passed, the postboost phase missiles (or “buses”) would continue to carry their warheads and decoys until they reach their apogee 750 miles above the earth during which time a second U.S. layer of interceptors would try to find and destroy the buses. The postboost period is the next best time to intercept the nuclear warheads, because at its apogee the buses would adjust their trajectory, and each could release up to 10 nuclear warheads, plus numerous decoys, all of which would begin descending toward selected targets on earth. The third layer of missile defense comes into play during the midcourse phase after the buses release their warheads and decoys, but before these objects reenter the earth’s atmosphere. This layer provides the antimissile system its greatest amount of time, perhaps up to 20 minutes, to locate and destroy the incoming warheads as they race through space at speeds of


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roughly 15,000 mph toward their targets. The interceptors, however, also have to contend with decoys and space debris that could be mistaken for enemy warheads. The final missile defense phase begins when warheads and decoys reenter the atmosphere about 60 miles above the earth. During this phase, interceptors have only tens of seconds to find and hit the warheads before they reach their targets. The one advantage for defensive missiles at this stage is that the warheads’ skin is heated by friction while decoys, presumably of lighter-weight, would slow down after they separate from the warhead. It has been argued that for a BMD system to qualify for deployment, it should effectively fulfill three tasks. First, the system should be able to detect and identify enemy targets, that is, distinguish among ICBM booster rockets, warheads, decoys, and debris. Second, the system’s tracking devices should be able to locate and plot the trajectory of a target in order to guide an interceptor missile to its target. Finally, a defense system should be able to assess the damage caused by the defensive weapon to ensure the destruction of the booster rocket, bus, or warhead. This is necessary so that defenders can determine whether they must launch additional interceptors. Obviously such complex demands pose daunting challenges to the scientists and technicians undertaking to develop and test its components. It also requires substantial funding, much larger than the estimates initially offered by the Reagan administration.18 Paul Nitze had presented a three-part formula that any SDI system should also meet before it could be considered for deployment. The “Nitze criteria,” as it was known, stated that the antimissile system should (1) be effective, (2) be able to survive against a direct attack, and (3) be cost effective at the margin—that is, cost less to increase one’s defense than its opponent’s costs to increase their offense against it. Nitze’s formula was adopted as National Security Directive No. 172 on May 30, 1985, prompting James Schlesinger to fear that stressing cost effectiveness would essentially kill the program.19 * * * Reagan remained steadfastly committed to SDI, if inconsistent about its objective, in spite of diplomatic, political, and technical challenges. As time went on, the president described his program as though he already was certain it was being accomplished. In 1987, he stated without qualification that American scientists could “design and build a strategic defense.” Indeed, he declared: “All humanity can begin to look forward to a new era of security when the burden of nuclear terror is lifted from its shoulders.” Defense Secretary Weinberger echoed this enthusiasm and continued to issue optimistic statements about progress being made in missile defense research. But these claims were unfounded.20 Some of this enthusiasm undoubtedly stemmed from reports of the SDIO’s June 1984 test of the Homing Overlay Experiment (HOE). Using

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the Army’s Titan rocket to fire a non-nuclear homing device from Kwajalein atoll in the Pacific Ocean, the HOE allegedly hit and destroyed a dummy reentry vehicle on an Atlas rocket launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. The HOE was a crude prototype of an exoatmospheric reentry interceptor subsystem (ERIS) designed to hit warheads outside the atmosphere in the mid-course phase of their flight. After the June test, the SDIO boasted that the HOE had demonstrated that “a bullet hit a bullet in space,” thereby ensuring that a strategic missile defense would work. Claims of HOE’s successes were excessive. Not only had the test followed three failed attempts, but 10 years later even HOE’s modest success was qualified. In August 1993, a New York Times article reported that former Reagan administration officials had acknowledged the 1984 HOE test was rigged to make the interceptor appear to have found and destroyed the dummy warhead. For the test, officials heated the target and turned it on its side to make it more visible to heat-seeking sensors. These alterations made it easy for the interceptor to come close enough to the target so that it appeared to have made a direct hit.21 Meanwhile, the Senate Defense Appropriations subcommittee ordered a study of Pentagon officials’ assertions that “incredible” progress was being made in SDI research. The subcommittee’s 1986 report and an updated report issued in March 1987—both prepared by senatorial staff members Douglas C. Waller, James T. Bruce III, and Douglas M. Cook—could find no significant technical breakthroughs. Both reports concluded that most SDI scientists scoffed at the exaggerated claims about SDI progress made by Weinberger and SDIO Director Lt. General James Abrahamson. The scientists thought the hype about their program destroyed its scientific credibility and created a backlash against their projects. Although some progress had been made, many projects had proven ineffective including Malcolm Wallop’s concept of chemical lasers and Edward Teller’s nuclear-tipped or nuclear bomb pumped X-ray lasers and particle beams. The exotic nuclear X-ray and bomb-pumped particle beam research had failed to demonstrate any value and remained a dubious concept for the foreseeable future. The value of space-based interceptors also appeared questionable when scientists calculated that thousands of orbiting space stations housing interceptors would be needed, as well as scores of other space satellites for surveillance and tracking of enemy warheads. Waller and his colleagues found that scientists had become increasingly aware of the daunting problems involved in building an effective strategic missile defense system.22 Despite these obstacles, Edward Teller, Eugene Rostow, and other SDI proponents urged an early deployment of some segment of the SDI system. On January 22, 1987, Weinberger told a Colorado Springs audience: “Today we may be nearing the day when decisions about the deployment of the first phase of strategic defenses can be made. We are now seeing [more] opportunities for an early deployment of the first phase of strategic


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defenses than we previously thought.”23 He concluded by assuring his audience that the first phase was designed to be “one piece of an entire system that provides a thoroughly reliable defense for the free world.” Ignoring the skeptical Senate committee reports of 1986 and 1987, which drew almost no media attention in the United States, many missile defense enthusiasts pushed to speed up the deployment of a missile defense system so that some portion would be in place before Reagan left office. In December 1986 and during 1987, the SDIO had redirected its technologies and research funds in the hope of being able to deploy an SDI system by 1988. Abrahamson also diverted secret “black” funds, first allocated for a mid-1990s SDI space-based system, to finance an ERIS type of ground-based interceptor system. Senator Sam Nunn and other members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, as well as JCS Chairman Admiral William Crowe, became alarmed by the push to deploy a “Phase One” SDI system of questionable reliability. Crowe took steps to prevent any deployment unless the antimissile system obtained approval from the Defense Acquisition Board and the Defense Science Board. Initially, the Acquisitions Board set a minimum of 30 percent effective ratio for the number of enemy missiles to be “killed” before it recommended deployment of any antiballistic missile system. Abrahamson testified that SDI’s “Phase One” system could meet the 30 percent criteria and be deployed by 1994, but he also admitted the system could protect only a few military installations, not population centers. Phase One cleared the Acquisitions Board, but after members of the Science Board examined the system, they recommended withholding approval of Phase One until the SDIO filled the “gaps in the system design and technology”—a recommendation that the Acquisitions Board accepted and subsequently withdrew its approval for deploying Phase One.24 In the political arena, meanwhile, Weinberger and other White House hardliners—who wished to scrap the 1972 ABM Treaty that they saw as prohibiting the development and testing of a space-based defense system—undertook to reinterpret the treaty. On October 6, 1985, National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane told NBC’s “Meet the Press” that the ABM Treaty allowed development and research of a missile defense system that involved “new physical concepts.” He also argued that the treaty permitted the testing of exotic systems and technologies, presumably lasers and particle beams. McFarlane’s statement promptly drew extensive protests from congressional supporters of the ABM Treaty and America’s European allies. West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher wrote personal letters to Reagan criticizing his acceptance of McFarlane’s interpretation of the ABM Treaty. After endorsing McFarlane’s broad interpretation, Secretary of State Shultz sought to allay the mounting criticism by adding that the United States would limit SDI development and testing in accordance with the traditional interpretation.25

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The State Department’s legal advisor, Abraham D. Sofaer, argued that the classified ABM treaty negotiation record and treaty provisions showed its language to be ambiguous and that the record of Senate ratification supported the broader view. He also claimed, without providing any substantiation, that the Soviet Union never accepted a ban on mobile ABM systems or on exotic technologies and that Soviet ABM research was similar to SDI projects. Later when challenged about key omissions and misrepresented statements from the unclassified ratification records, Sofaer was forced to acknowledge that the ratification records did not support the broad interpretation and blamed the errors on “young lawyers” on his staff. The highly respected chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Sam Nunn, labeled Sofaer’s argument as “sadly indicative of the kinds of half-truths, misrepresentations, and unsubstantiated assertions that have emanated from the Office of Legal Advisor since the beginning of the controversy.” In rebuttal, Sofaer insisted the president had wide latitude to disregard many of the explanations provided to the Senate during the ratification proceedings. This claim directly challenged the Senate’s role in the treaty-making process. Thus when leaks to the media in early 1987 suggested that the administration might be contemplating expanded SDI tests and a partial SDI deployment in violation of the traditional interpretation of the ABM Treaty, Nunn warned the president that any such undertakings would cause “a constitutional confrontation of profound dimensions.” After a series of studies concluded Sofaer’s legal reasoning was in “serious error,” Nunn—joined by Senator Carl Levin of Michigan—sponsored an amendment to a defense authorization bill prohibiting any SDI testing that challenged the traditional interpretation of the ABM Treaty prohibitions. After a sharp partisan debate and an extended Republican filibuster, a modified version of the Nunn-Levin wording was approved in late 1987.26 The broad interpretation was never formally revoked by the White House, however, until the Clinton administration rejected it in July 1993. After Reagan’s reelection in November 1984, many top administration officials, while supportive of the SDI program, realized that a reliable system was some years away. Consequently, several of the president’s more moderate advisors, such as Robert McFarlane and Secretary Shultz, hoped that delaying any deployment might be used as a bargaining chip to gain a reduction of Soviet strategic weapons. In this vein, Shultz told Reagan that such a concession “would be like giving them the sleeves off our vest.”27 The president’s refusal to accept any compromise regarding his SDI program, however, would conflict with his belated diplomatic efforts to achieve a reduction in nuclear weaponry. Indeed, Reagan along with many of his key aides had little regard for the post-World War II arms control accords. In his first term, the president initially stressed expanding U.S. military strength because he believed the Soviets could not keep pace. Then, Reagan insisted, they will “have to weigh, do they want to meet us realistically on a program of disarmament or do they want to face a legitimate arms race.”


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President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev discussed arms reductions at Geneva in November 1985 and at Reykjavik, Iceland in October 1986. At the final scheduled session in Reykjavik, Reagan offered “sweeping” U.S. proposals to eliminate all nuclear warheads by 2000. The president’s advisors, confident the Soviet leader would reject them, had devised these proposals. Surprising everyone, Gorbachev responded “yes.” He would accept Reagan’s proposal provided the president agreed to limit SDI research to “laboratories” for at least five years. Reagan rejected Gorbachev’s offer, saying he would never surrender development of his antimissile program. At 6:30 P.M., Reagan closed his briefing book and said “Let’s go George [Shultz], we’re leaving.” As they walked out of the conference room Gorbachev asked, “Can’t we do something about this?” Reagan replied, “It’s too late.” On returning home from Iceland, Reagan’s aides undertook a propaganda blitz to emphasize that the Soviet’s concern about SDI proved it was essential. But when the final summit records were disclosed in the 1990s, it was clear that Reagan walked away from an opportunity to reach agreements reducing or eliminating intermediate- and long-range ballistic missiles.28 History will not easily decide who made the worse blunder, Reagan for rejecting Gorbachev’s counter offer, or Gorbachev for not accepting Reagan’s initial offer outright. Had the two leaders agreed—and gained the support of their respective defense officials, both civilian and military—nuclear weapons could have been substantially reduced by 2000.

Soviet Chairman Mikhail Gorbachev (right) and President Reagan (left). (Courtesy: Ronald Reagan Library)

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When the two leaders met again at Washington, DC, the SDI program no longer blocked an agreement eliminating intermediate-range missiles— the INF [Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces] Treaty. The December 1987 summit succeeded largely because Andrei Sakharov had persuaded Gorbachev that U.S. defenses could never stop a full-scale attack by ICBMs carrying multiple warheads. Sakharov argued that SDI should not be linked to progress in efforts to limit nuclear weapons, because it was a kind of “Maginot line in space,” a line that could not stop ICBM attacks anymore than the French Maginot line stopped the Germans blitzkrieg in 1940. While Reagan’s apostles have claimed that Gorbachev’s lack of military funds had ended the Soviet link between missile reductions and SDI, it is more likely that Sakharov’s February 1987 criticism, in tandem with other Soviet scientists, lifted the veil on SDI that was “hidden in plain sight.” Several Soviet scientists had long realized SDI was a “fuss about nothing.” As Roald Z. Sagdeyev, the head of the Soviet Institute for Space Research told Strobe Talbott, “We came to realize that we had not helped ourselves by screaming so much about SDI. We had encouraged some Americans to think that anything the Russians hate can’t be all bad. And we had overestimated how much damage SDI could do to strategic stability in the short run and even in the medium term.”29 * * * To allay NATO’s concerns about the U.S. ballistic missile defense activities, Secretary of Defense Weinberger solicited SDI contracts with America’s allies. It was hoped that this process would be a means of gaining technical knowledge that might not only assist the SDI program, but also advance NATO’s defense preparations. During the mid-1980s, NATO sought to improve the defense of Western Europe against Soviet combat aircraft, bombers, and intermediate- and short-range missiles. In addition, the U.S. Army was spending $9.3 billion to deploy a Forward Air Defense system in Europe and modernize its North American early warning system. During 1984, West German Defense Minister Worner proposed research for a European Defense Initiative to include antitactical ballistic missiles (ATBM). The goal was to provide Europe with a ballistic missile defense system similar to America’s SDI, but the proposed initiative never reached beyond the level of discussions and debates among European defense ministers. Because of a lack of interest and financial support, the initiative was dropped in favor of concentrating on the ATBM system that eventually obtained funds for research and development from America’s SDI program. In March 1985, Defense Secretary Weinberger invited 18 allied nations to compete for SDI contracts with U.S. companies and research institutes. Following the invitation, he and his staff negotiated a Memorandum of Understanding with interested nations. Weinberger and British Minister of Defense Michael Heseltine signed the first such agreement on December 8,


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1985 and, in the next two years, Weinberger signed agreements with Israel, West Germany, Italy, Canada, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Japan, and France. Among the 10 countries signing SDI agreements, Israel, Britain, and West Germany received the most money from SDIO between 1985 and 1990. Israel’s funds were primarily used for flight tests and production of the Arrow as an ATBM system to defend against Scud missiles and other types of intermediate- and short-range missiles. Both Britain and West Germany used SDI funds to develop ATBMs that had non-nuclear warheads intended to destroy Soviet short- and intermediate-range missiles or cruise missiles launched by Soviet bombers. In Britain, 12 of its 14 SDIO contracts were to study allied architecture for ATBMs. The other two contracts were for NATO’s Extended Air Defense System. It should be noted that Europeans were not awarded contracts for research that the SDIO classified as “sensitive.” Initially, France rejected contracts for SDI research because it had designed a system called Eureka as an ATBM system and looked to other European nations for funds to continue their research. In 1988, after failing to get financial assistance from other European states, France accepted $13 million of SDI funds for research to assist its ATBM system. Other NATO members and Japan used SDI money for their own ATBM system research. The SDI funds were not evenly distributed. Israel’s Arrow program received more than any other nation including twice as much as the total received by Britain and West Germany.30 The U.S. initial efforts to interest other NATO members in its SDI programs was relatively short lived. It has been suggested, since allied technology could contribute little to the America’s SDI program, the main purpose of the endeavor was “alliance management.” Accordingly, Washington’s principal motivation was to create the illusion of a partnership that would lessen European concerns about America’s development of an antimissile shield. Also, there was fear in several NATO capitals that should the SDI program prove successful it might antagonize the Soviets, make achievement of new arms control accords more difficult and find the Americans less interested in the fate of NATO. Allied political endorsements for Washington’s antimissile programs were lukewarm at best and, perhaps as a result, the promise of substantial funding that allied businesses sought never materialized. In any event, by the early 1990s the U.S.’s European allies showed less interest in antitactical missiles because of the INF pact and the Conventional Forces in Europe negotiations that yielded a treaty between members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.31 * * * Many professional Cold War hawks, blinded by their ideological bent, refused to admit that the arms control and détente policies of Reagan, Bush, and Gorbachev were responsible for the end of the Cold War. After 1991, Gates and Weinberger, as well as such pundits as George Will and

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Irving Kristol, argued that the Reagan administration’s military build-up and SDI program had played the dominate role in the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although this notion received extensive publicity during the 1990s, respected scholars investigating U.S.-Soviet relations have since dismissed such claims as much oversimplified.32 Closer to reality was President George H.W. Bush’s recollection of his 1990 trip to Eastern Europe where he saw “the many uplifted bright faces” in Warsaw, Gdansk, Prague, and Budapest where communist power was ended in 1989 with the support of Gorbachev. “This was their victory. We all were winners, East and West.” Bush believed his relations with Gorbachev smoothed developments at a critical time. These changes were “the culmination of many years of efforts by many people, both in the United States and elsewhere. . . . From those who served in our military to those who . . . implemented policy across succeeding administrations, all had a hand in bringing the Cold War to a peaceful conclusion.”33 The transition in 1988 and 1989 from Reagan to Bush was not as smooth as might have been expected. Bush immediately put in place a new national security and foreign policy team consisting of James A. Baker III as secretary of state, Brent Scowcroft as his national security advisor, and Richard Cheney as secretary of defense.34 The Soviet Union’s demise, culminating in December 1991, coupled with the Reagan administration’s failed effort to deploy a missile defense program, allowed Bush to modify SDI’s design. Instead of seeking an umbrella, they shifted research activities to a new program, Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (or GPALS), designed to defend the country from a possible missile attack by a “rogue” nation or an “accidental” Russian or Chinese missile launch. The BMD program’s survival was due more to skilled lobbying and continued Pentagon subsidies to companies holding contracts for research and development of exotic technology than to successful antimissile tests or a fearful American public. Since the 1960s, Pentagon contracts had branched out from major contractors such as Boeing, Lockheed-Martin, TRW, and Hughes Aircraft to include subcontractors scattered widely in a number of states whose congressional representatives could be counted on to keep missile defense contracts renewed and profitable.35 Within one month of Bush’s inauguration on January 20, 1989, SDIO chief, General Abrahamson, retired, but his final report urged a new method for creating space-based defenses against Soviet ICBMs. Known as Brilliant Pebbles (BP), Abrahamson calculated it would be less costly and more successful in destroying ICBMs in their initial boost phase or mid-course phase of flight. The BP system, devised by Edward Teller and his protégé, Lowell Wood, consisted of several thousand small interceptor sensors deployed in space orbits above the earth. Each “pebble” would contain computerized data so that after a pebble detected an ICBM, its sensors would locate the target and send a vehicle to destroy the ICBM by ramming it at high speed. Abrahamson calculated the BP system would


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cost $25 billion, be proved viable in two years, and be ready to deploy in three more years, that is, by 1994. Meanwhile, the JCS sought to drop the Reagan administration’s plans for an early deployment of Phase One in 1993 because the ERIS system had failed to show it could intercept missiles in space. During the spring of 1989, the JCS recommended cuts in SDI expenditures and suggested that Bush return to the traditional interpretation of the ABM Treaty. The JCS also wanted to end Reagan’s linkage of Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) with the SDI program in the continuing Geneva negotiations. Bush rejected the Joint Chief’s call for SDI reductions, initially vowing to retain Reagan’s broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty and allocating $33 billion for SDI over the next five years. He would, however, later sign a START I treaty, without restrictions on the SDI program. To accelerate BP research and development, SDIO shifted funds from Phase One research to the BP program. These funds would help the SDIO determine BP’s ability to intercept ICBMs in their boost or mid-course phase before a missile’s nuclear warheads reentered the atmosphere. Lt. General George L. Monahan, now head of SDIO, decided to concentrate on BP as the Phase Two system, with the goal of being deployed by 1994. Unfortunately, BP research proved not only to be more costly than estimated, but less likely to function as envisioned. Each BP was initially conceived as weighing about five pounds, but by the end of 1990 each pebble weighed 100 pounds and was three feet long. The revised cost estimate increased from $100,000 to $1.5 million for each pebble, and its architecture required about 2,000 ground-based interceptors to back up to the space-based BP system. In addition to the Pebbles’ problems, the ERIS interceptor system remained unreliable. ERIS had passed one test by hitting a mock warhead, but two months later it failed a similar test.36 In his January 1991 State of the Union speech, Bush finally proposed a smaller nationwide defense system designed to protect the United States from an accidental Soviet launching of up to 200 nuclear warheads or an attack by a so-called rogue nation such as Iraq, Iran, or North Korea. This smaller system, GPALS, would combine 1,000 BPs with 500 or more ground- and sea-based missile interceptors carrying non-nuclear warheads with hit-to-kill technology. GPALS was a scaled down version of Reagan’s SDI program and, unlike Reagan’s early SDI program, was intended to use non-nuclear interceptors. Bush’s new program, however, required an array of untested parts. To promote the president’s plan, Republican Senators William Cohen of Maine and John Warner of Virginia, joined by Democrat Sam Nunn, obtained a bipartisan consensus to fund a missile defense system of 700 to 1,200 ground-based interceptors at five to seven sites that would provide “at least some protection against incoming missiles.” In early January 1991, Congress approved the compromise proposal.37 The linkage of the SDI’s ballistic missile defense program to the army’s Patriot missile defense system during the first Gulf War was more the

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result of enthusiasm than knowledge of the two programs. The Patriot was initially planned as a mobile tactical antiaircraft defense to protect battlefield forces. Its tests in 1983 and 1984 uncovered faulty connections and electronic modules. After these problems were resolved, Patriot’s software was upgraded sufficiently for a successful PAC-1 test. After 15 additional tests, the Defense Department approved the upgraded PAC-2 for production by the Raytheon Company late in 1988. After Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, Raytheon speeded up delivery of Patriots to defend military bases as well as urban areas.38 During the brief war, Iraq launched upgraded, short-range Scud missiles with conventional warheads at Saudi Arabia and Israel where they challenged deployed Patriot missiles. The president and others subsequently exaggerated the Patriot’s success. On a February 15 tour of Raytheon, Bush praised the Patriot for its “high-tech wizardry.” He claimed that when the first Scud was launched at Saudi Arabia, the Patriot “struck it down” and “with the arrival of Patriot ballistic missiles in Israel, all told, Patriot is 41 for 42; 42 Scuds engaged, 41 intercepted.” This was “proof positive that missile defense works,” according to the president. SDI supporters hailed the Patriot as demonstrating the validity of Reagan’s vision. Columnist Patrick Buchanan wrote: “Using SDI technology, the United States has shown it can attack and kill ballistic missiles.” Statements by Bush, Buchanan, and other SDI proponents persuaded many in Congress to renew their support for a BMD system.39 Theodore Postol, a missile expert at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, studied videos of Patriot-Scud engagements in Israel and Saudi Arabia. Supplemented by reports from Israel’s newspaper Ma’ariv, whose information on Scuds was confirmed by Reuven Pedatzur, a missile expert at Tel Aviv University, Postol provided details about Scud and Patriot collateral damage resulting when Scuds, and Patriot missiles that missed Scuds, exploded over Israeli or Saudi territory. Of 40 Scuds targeted for Israel, 24 were aimed at Tel Aviv. Before the Patriots arrived in Israel, 13 Scud attacks killed no one, wounded 115 people, and damaged 2,698 apartments. After Patriot’s arrived, 16 Scuds detonated near and in Tel Aviv, killing one person, wounding 168 people, and damaging 7,778 apartments, thus doubling Israeli injuries and tripling apartment damage. If the Patriot “miracle” had involved the use of nuclear warheads, the consequences would have been catastrophic. Postol surprised members of the House Armed Services Committee on April 16, 1991 by suggesting that the Patriots may have done more harm than good. Despite the Patriot’s salutary political effect in keeping Israel from retaliating, he argued the military results showed they had proved to be an ineffective defense system. He also refuted wartime reports suggesting that the Patriot would be a successful SDI system capable of protecting the nation against strategic ballistic missiles. Postol’s findings were challenged. Robert Stein of Raytheon claimed the Patriot was 80 percent accurate in Saudi Arabia and 50 percent accurate in


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Israel. He argued Israeli apartment damages were “slight” and the Scud was a difficult target to hit. Using data from Israel’s Ministry of Health, Stein claimed the apartment damage would have been greater if Scuds had detonated on the ground. He insisted Raytheon could improve the Patriot to produce a long-range antimissile defense system for the army. In April 1992, Army Brigadier General Robert Drolet told the House committee that Bush was correct in stating on February 15, 1991 that the Patriots “intercepted” 41 of 42 Scuds fired by that date. Drolet said “intercepted” meant that “a Patriot and a Scud passed in the sky.” As members of the House Government Operations subcommittee noted, Drolet’s definition of “intercepted” was unique if he meant that “having passed in the sky” was equal to successfully destroying a Scud.40 Despite mounting evidence questioning claims of the Patriot’s success, Raytheon’s Washington lobbying law firm accused Postol and others of being captives of anti-SDI missile groups such as San Francisco’s Ploughshare Fund. These lobbyists depicted Postol’s analysis as “snake oil” and “sloppy as s—,” even though Princeton University physicist Frank von Hippel described Postol as “one of the strongest analysts in this game, and he’s right on this one.” For two years after the April 1992 hearings, the Patriot’s status continued to be debated. The Israeli Air Force investigated the Patriot’s war record and concluded that “there is no clear evidence of even a single successful intercept” of an Iraqi Scud by the Patriot missiles. There was, however, “circumstantial evidence” of one possible intercept. The report indicated that 8 of the 56 Patriot missiles launched in Israel malfunctioned and crashed to the ground, and 11 missiles were fired at targets that did not exist. In its summation, the Israeli report listed three reasons for the Patriot’s failure. First, it had been developed as an antiaircraft system; second, the Scuds traveled much faster than any aircraft, and they often tumbled or disintegrated when they entered Israeli air space; and third, the Patriot’s fuse and warhead system could not cope with the Scud’s high speeds. A 1992 U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO) report found that at best “nine percent of the Patriot-Scud engagements had strong evidence that there was a warhead kill,” which meant that no more than four Patriots hit their target. In brief, the wartime claims of the Patriot’s success were erroneous and raised questions about the veracity of initial official claims. On the 10th anniversary of the Patriot’s combat debut in the Gulf War, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen echoed the criticisms of the missile’s performance. Although advocating increased funding for missile defense research, Cohen told reporters that in January 1991 “the Patriot didn’t work.”41 * * * Before the postwar disclosures about Patriot’s military ineffectiveness, Congress had approved the Missile Defense Act of 1991 to increase SDI funding for fiscal 1992 and to provide for additional Patriot research and development. The act also called for deploying 100 ground-based ballistic

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missile interceptors at a single site within five years. One site would not violate the 1972 ABM Treaty, but would be the first step toward multiple missile defense sites that would require U.S. negotiations with the Soviet Union to obtain permission for any additional ground-based sites.42 Yet while the Missile Defense Act was being considered, the House Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security conducted hearings regarding the effectiveness of the SDI program. Congressman John Conyers Jr. of Michigan, chairman of the subcommittee, opened the hearings declaring that “over the past eight years, the administration had been successful in convincing Congress to give it billions of dollars for Star Wars, but the program proved remarkably unsuccessful in producing much of anything with the funds.” It was, he said, the subcommittee’s purpose to find out what had been done with the $24 billion Congress authorized for SDI during the last eight years. “Today,” Conyers said, “we are beginning our investigation into where all the money went.” What is known “is that scattered around the country are dozens of test facilities, half-completed projects, hundreds of reports, and the swollen bank accounts of a handful of contractors and dozens of consulting firms that now specialize in getting contracts for the SDI program. We also know that we are no closer to making nuclear weapons . . .‘obsolete’ than we were 8 years ago when President Reagan launched this wild goose chase.” In response, the Republican’s senior subcommittee member Congressman Frank J. Horton of New York acknowledged, “we are at a crucial crossroads with the President’s Strategic Defense Initiative.” But Horton sought to reestablish SDI’s value, explaining that what existed was “the classic glass half empty and half full problem.” He cited SDI program’s 1987 change to the Phase I project concentrating on the deterrent effect of SDI rather than a nationwide defense against ICBMs and President Bush’s change to the Brilliant Pebbles and Global Protection Against Limited Strikes program. Rather than a glass half-empty, Horton saw “a normal progression of a substantial research and development program as a glass half full.” When Conyers’s subcommittee reconvened in October 1991, it heard testimony and received reports from supporters and critics of SDI and its later incarnation as GPALS. Among the opponents of the existing antimissile program were Bruce Blair of The Brookings Institution and John Pike of the Federation of American Scientists. Pike dismissed as unwarranted the fear of an accidental or unintended launching of long-range missiles from Soviet ICBMs or Soviet submarines. He also offered detailed reasons why Third World nations such as Iraq were not genuine threats to the United States. Pike agreed that the United States should continue missile defense research to “explore the potential contribution of these technologies to our national security.” But, he continued, “the prospects that an antimissile shield might be needed in this century are so remote that there is no reason, other than political expediency, for proceeding now with


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deployment of such a system.” Pike concluded that none of the threats advanced justified “spending billions of dollars and tearing up the ABM treaty.” In contrast, Keith Payne, a consultant at the White House on science and technology for the Reagan and Bush administrations, argued that many Third World countries could ultimately construct long-range ICBMs capable of carrying nuclear warheads. He specifically pointed to Scud missiles whose range Iraq had extended and could further extend in the future. Payne also mentioned China’s CSS-4 missile that had a range of 8,000 miles. Among other Third World parties who dislike America, he cited Pakistan, Iran, and Libya as nations who might obtain long-range missiles during the 1990s. Payne concluded that when threats of the “late 1990s and early 21st century are considered, initiating deployment of GPALS is not only reasonable, but essential for future U.S., Allied and Soviet security. No alternative to missile defense, alone or in combination, will constitute a reliable response to emerging missile threats.”43 The GAO, however, reported in March 1992 that GPALS had failed to develop a stable architecture and the BP system faced “tremendous challenges” before it could become a viable space defense system. A short time later, the Senate Armed Forces Committee learned that the experimental ERIS interceptors built by Lockheed-Martin had experienced serious problems. After January 1991, ERIS had reduced the weight of the original ERIS package from 544 to 73 pounds, prompting Pentagon officials to tell the Senate Committee that 100 ERIS interceptor missiles could be deployed by 1996. Two months later, one ERIS missile test hit a mock warhead but in subsequent tests it failed to hit other targets because of “technical errors.”44 In September 1992, the GAO released a review of seven tests by the interceptors between January 1990 and March 1992. The success of four of the tests, it declared, were exaggerated and three other tests were either failures or only partly successful. No BP test had succeeded despite official claims of achieving their main objective. Even in the alleged success of the January 1991 test, ERIS failed to discriminate between a warhead and the decoys as the SDIO claimed.45 Combined with the exaggerated claims about the Patriot missile, the GAO’s report demonstrated that despite eight years of research and testing, the antimissile programs had achieved few positive results. Meanwhile, Russian President Boris Yeltsin had proposed to the United Nations Security Council in January 1992 the deployment of a “global system of protection” that would be based on a revised SDI system and advanced technologies developed by Russia’s military-industrial complex. With these ideas in mind, Yeltsin attended a summit with Bush on June 17 in Washington DC during which they issued a statement that committed them to cooperate in developing a Global Protection System (GPS)— that Yeltsin referred to as a Global Defense System—and to coordinate the defense system with other interested nations. Both leaders believed the

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GPS could be achieved outside of, but consistent with, the ABM Treaty. During the summit, Bush and Yeltsin also agreed to cooperate in ballistic missile technology to explore the possibility of sharing data on a BMD early warning system and to develop a legal basis for implementing a GPS. Although the Bush-Yeltsin agreement on GPS resulted in meetings between U.S. Special Envoy Dennis Ross and Russian diplomat Georgi Mamedov, President Clinton ended the Ross-Mamedov talks in favor of negotiations to clarify interpretations of the 1972 ABM Treaty.46 * * * Even though Reagan’s SDI did not result in the immediate deployment of a ballistic missile defense system, it did generate renewed interest in antimissile programs. More than that, Reagan’s SDI proposal left a legacy that found roots deep in the Republican Party’s political ideology. This legacy would play a major role in future attempts to terminate the ABM Treaty and to deploy a nationwide antimissile system.

CHAPTER 3

Politics of Missile Defense Deployment: From William Clinton to George W. Bush

President William (Bill) Clinton confronted a series of issues related to U.S. missile defense priorities, but he succeeded initially in limiting their costs and scope. After Clinton’s election in 1992, the administration sought to defuse the threat of recalcitrant states, to persuade the reluctant Russians to amend the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) treaty in order to allow expanded U.S. antimissile testing, and to decide whether any missile defense systems were ready for deployment. Clinton appointed former Congressman Les Aspin as secretary of defense, and a former aide to President Carter, Warren Christopher, as secretary of state. Having previously chaired the House Armed Services Committee, Aspin had decided views on missile defense that led him to often criticize the Reagan and G.H.W. Bush programs as fiscally extravagant. After a review of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization’s (SDIO) programs, the SDIO was restructured as the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) on May 13, 1993 and charged with centralizing management of all missile defense projects. Announcing the newly named agency, Aspin declared the “end of the Star Wars era” and stated that America’s missile defense research and development would no longer focus on “space-based weapons.” The new BMDO shifted funds to research and development of theater missile defenses (TMDs) to protect army, navy, and air force forces and bases in battlefield areas, for a land-based national missile defense (NMD) system designed to protect against accidental or unauthorized intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launches or attacks from Russia or China, and for continued research on advanced technology for future TMD or NMD

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systems. From 1993 through 1995, Congress authorized about $9.2 billion for these projects. In the 1994 mid-term elections, meanwhile, the Republicans gained control of Congress and focused attention on missile defense. They believed this would provide their candidates in the 1996 elections with a strong, possibly deciding, issue if they could demonstrate that the Democrats were soft on defense. Consequently, it soon became evident that the Missile Defense Act of 1991, part of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal years 1992–1993 and signed into law by President George H. W. Bush, had been merely a truce between contending parties. The act called for deployment at “the earliest date allowed by the availability of appropriate technology or by fiscal year 1996 a cost-effective, operationally effective, and ABM Treaty-complaint antiballistic missile system at a single site as the initial step toward deployment.”1 * * * In control of both the House and Senate for the first time since 1954, the Republicans attributed their success to campaign pledges contained in their 1994 “Contract with America” that among other issues reflected a deep commitment to a nationwide missile defense system. The contract called for deploying a “cost effective, operational antiballistic missile defense system” as early as possible to protect the United States “against ballistic missile threats (for example, accidental or unauthorized launches or Third World attacks).” While their goals were the same as Clinton’s, the Republicans demanded the imminent deployment of existing antimissile systems. Consequently, the contract insisted that the 1972 ABM Treaty was “a Cold War relic that does not meet the future defense needs of the United States. . . . It is a moral imperative that U.S. strategic defenses be expanded and that the Clinton administration not yield to Russian demands that Americans remain defenseless in the face of potential nuclear aggression.” That the new speaker of the House, Newt Gingrich of Georgia, stressed a “renewed commitment to a National Missile Defense” revealed how enmeshed in the Republican Party’s political pantheon the issue had become.2 Imbued with an exaggerated illusion that technology could create a new defensive shield to provide the protection that historically had been provided by two oceans, the Republican congressional majority presented the administration with a series of partisan challenges from 1995 to 2000 over missile defense issues. For example, in 1995, the Republicans passed the Defend America Act mandating deployment of a national missile defense system by 2003 while research would continue on more sophisticated technology to provide improved missile defense coverage. This action occurred despite a National Intelligence Estimate of November 1995 that stated no Third World country currently had missiles capable of hitting the United States and would not possess them in less than 15 years. Clinton

Politics of Missile Defense Deployment

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vetoed the bill, however, and the Republicans lacked the necessary votes to override it. The president did accept Republican legislation, however, that authorized $745 million for missile defense programs, doubling the $371 million the Pentagon requested for fiscal 1996.3 To counter these partisan pressures, the administration sponsored a “three-plus-three plan” for deploying a missile defense system (discussed later). The plan would devote three years to research and testing and, if the tests were satisfactory, a missile defense system would be produced and deployed in another three years if it complied with the ABM Treaty. The proposed system would consist of 20 ground-based interceptors capable of destroying a few ICBMs launched either accidentally or by the so-called rogue states—Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. During the 1996 presidential election campaign, Republican candidate Senator Robert Dole of Kansas continued to challenge the administration by embracing the Defend America Act in the hope of attracting security-conscious voters. But the Defend

Illustration of Clinton’s National Missile Defense concept. (Courtesy: Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers)

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America Act failed to generate much enthusiasm among voters and Clinton simply ignored Dole’s insistence on the need for a national missile defense. Public opinion polls indicated that most Americans, apparently confused about its capabilities, thought the 1991 Patriot missile system provided an adequate defense. In brief, Clinton won the 1996 election on domestic issues and was able to postpone a decision on deploying an antimissile system.4 Congressional efforts to gain deployment of antimissile systems had the active support of those industries involved in the research and development of these programs. In addition to parceling out subcontracts to companies in as many congressional districts as possible, these industries also used fear tactics to gain grassroots support for their “products.” One such activity was an “educational film” entitled “America at Risk,” produced by the Space and Missile Defense Working Group, a division of the National Defense Industrial Association, and made available to key state officials and school administrators in all 50 states. The following is a transcript from the film. MARKETING THE MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM 5 Scene 1 [Low, sweeping aerial views of strip malls and highways, fading into scenes of suburban streets—children getting out of school, riding bikes, playing soccer] Scene 2 [Bill, his wife, and their daughter, Rachel, eating dinner] Rachel: Mommy, this boy in my class, he spilled red paint all over his pants. Wife: Red paint? Rachel: Uh-huh. Mommy, can I please be excused? Wife: I guess so. [Rachel goes to play in the den] Bill: Have you seen all of the news about some of the Third World countries? What are they called, “rogue nations” or something? [Close-up of newspaper headline: “Missile Threat Still Real, Expert Says”] There must be half a dozen countries all threatening to fire missiles at us, to keep us out of their business. You know, just like North Korea the other night, when we wanted to keep them from moving on South Korea. And just the other day China made that speech about us interfering in their new desire to take back Taiwan. Wife: Oh, honey, all that’s just talk. You know, we hear it all the time. Bill: Maybe so, but we’ve really gotten mixed up more and more in situations where countries threatened us with their ballistic missiles.


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Wife: Sweetheart, if they did fire something at us, we could handle it. We’d just shoot them down. They really can’t get to us with those things, you know. Bill: Yeah, but I’ve still got a bad feeling about all this talk of missiles being fired at us. There’s been so much happening just in the past week. Tensions have gotten really high, and all that diplomatic stuff sure hasn’t worked. Wife: Don’t worry. There’s been plenty of time and more than enough people to have already taken care of these things. Look, Bill, no one’s going to do anything to us. We’re the United States of America, for goodness sake! With all that money our country spends on defense, we’ve got it covered. Now come on, give me a hand? [Wife walks to sink] Scene 3 [Daughter stands in front of television holding a remote control. A news program ends, and orange triangle appears behind the words “Stand By”.] TV: This is not a test. Rachel: Mommy? TV: Repeat. This is not a test. [Bomb sirens sound] Bill: Wife: Bill: Wife:

I don’t believe it. This is it. It’s all over. Bill, where are we supposed to go? There is nowhere to go! Then what do we do? Rachel, come here, baby! Now! Bill! What do we do? Please tell me! Bill! Rachel: Daddy? [Fade to white] Scene 4 [Montage of images with voice-over] Announcer: It didn’t have to be like this. [Footage of protestors] It could have been different. [Rachel’s face in front of television, distraught parents, a Chinese rocket launching] How often do any of us remember that the threat is real? But the technology to defend ourselves does exist. [Military Base, soldiers at computers] And the capability for a working missile defense has been demonstrated.

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[Computer image of missile shot from North Dakota intercepting a missile shot from the east Atlantic] In fact, our government has proven that it can be done. [Footage of a missile striking something and exploding] Now it’s time to begin defending our nation from this threat. [Rockets launching] Don’t let this opportunity slip through our fingers again. [Fade to black]

Even more important in the selling of antimissile programs was the danger from missile attack claimed by the Rumsfeld Commission. Republicans were appalled and unconvinced by the 1995 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that held no new nation would possess threatening long-range missiles in less than 15 years. They challenged its major points, accusing Clinton officials of applying political pressure to gain conclusions that supported the administration’s contentions. Even though a subsequent review by former CIA director Robert Gates endorsed the 1995 NIE, the Republican congressional majority in November 1996 created an independent commission to “Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat.” When the commission finally convened in January 1998, the Democrats appointed three members and Republicans chose the other six members. The Democrats appointed physicist Richard Garwin; founder of the Henry Stimson Center, Barry Bleckman; and retired commander of the U.S. Strategic Forces, General Lee Butler. The Republicans selected President Ford’s former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who became the commission’s chairman; Paul Wolfowitz, who served in the Pentagon under President G.W.H. Bush; William Schneider Jr., an undersecretary of state in the Reagan administration; William Graham, a science advisor to President Reagan; R. James Woolsey, CIA director before resigning in 1994; and retired Air Force chief of staff, General Larry Welch. During the first month of its hearings, some Rumsfeld Commission members complained that briefings by intelligence officials were superficial. One member told CIA Director George Tenant that: “There is more information in Time magazine” than in the briefings they had received. Later, Tenant gave the commission access to secret intelligence reports. Like the earlier “Team B’s” gross overstatement of the Soviet threat in 1976, the Rumsfeld commission’s report in July 1998 reflected a similar overblown assessment of the so-called rogue states’ abilities to secretly develop and field long-range ballistic missiles with Russian and Chinese assistance. The unclassified summary declared that North Korea, Iran, and


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Iraq could, within five years (10 years for Iraq), possess missiles capable of inflicting severe destruction on an unsuspecting United States. Should they decide to do so, these nations and others possessing a “Scud-based ballistic missile infrastructure” could produce an intercontinental ballistic missile. The United States, warned the commission, could find itself seriously threatened by the rogue states, as these countries were currently engaged in just such activities. The solution to this threat was a nationwide antimissile system.6 Yet five years after the appearance of the report “none of the emerging missile states have flight-tested a missile with even half the range of an ICBM,” according to a former member of State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Greg Thielmann. One of the more dubious of the Rumsfeld Commission’s projections, Thielmann pointed out, was the notion a single-stage, short-range ballistic missile could be rapidly reconfigured into a multiple-stage ICBM. Such an assumption of a straight-line, predictable progress was not based on any previous experience and was quite unrealistic, he argued. Rumsfeld’s assumptions about ballistic missile technology and operational necessities, concluded Thielmann’s critical 2003 assessment, disregarded the considered findings of specialists to emphasize highly unlikely worst-case scenarios demanding military responses.7 Arriving at much the same conclusions as had other defense experts, James M. Lindsay and Michael E. O’Hanlon of The Brookings Institution believed that eventually 38 nations might come to have ballistic missiles, but none would possess ones with sufficient range to endanger the United States before 2010. No nation that fielded long-range missiles, they contended, had any desire to attack the United States and the possibility of an accident or unintended missile launch by Russia or China was virtually nil.8 The Rumsfeld report, however, gained unusually wide attention because of North Korea’s failed attempt in August 1998 to place a satellite in orbit. This coincidence was most unfortunate, Thielmann notes, because it further stimulated “a political tidal wave that ultimately engulfed one of the most successful arms control treaties in history, the . . . ABM Treaty. The report also led to massive increases in spending on defenses against ICBMs rather than . . . more urgent defenses against short- and medium-range missiles.” * * * During the Clinton administration, the most likely threats to justify a U.S. national missile defense system were from Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. Among these latter three nations, North Korea had the most advanced missiles and nuclear weapons programs. Throughout the 1990s, Pyongyang produced and exported ballistic missiles based on a prototype of the Soviet Union’s 300-mile-range Scud missiles that could reach South Korea, Japan, or other nearby U.S. allies. After 1992, North

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Korea began developing single-stage and later multistage missiles called the No Dong. Pyongyang’s test flight of a long-range multistage missile Taepo Dong-1 (TD-1) in August 1998 achieved a range of 1,240 miles. The 1995 Intelligence report may have underestimated North Korea’s abilities; yet, the TD-1’s third-stage booster failed to launch its space satellite. The 1998 test surprised Americans and their Asian allies, but there was no evidence Pyongyang had mastered the technology required for a reliable missile guidance system or developed accurate reentry vehicles able to carry nuclear warheads.9 North Korea’s 1998 test and the subsequent National Missile Defense Act of 1999 nonetheless put a great deal of pressure on the Clinton administration to move more rapidly toward the possible deployment of an antimissile system and to persuade Pyongyang to halt its missile test flights. Negotiations during September 1999 resulted in North Korea announcing it would stop its missile tests “while talks were underway” with the United States. In exchange, Washington announced that it would lift the economic sanctions levied on Pyongyang in 1953. North Korea’s halting of the missile tests, however, was not a moratorium on North Korea’s missile research and development.10 Russia and China already possessed ICBMs and nuclear warheads, but they were concerned about political maneuvers in the United States regarding the 1972 ABM Treaty. The Clinton administration hoped to negotiate amendments to the ABM Treaty with Moscow so that a theater missile defense (TMD) system could be tested and deployed without violating the pact. Protracted negotiations for amendments began in 1993 during a Standing Consultative Commission meeting in Geneva—the body that monitored ABM compliance—with the Americans seeking to clarify the treaty’s Article VI(a), which did not indicate the precise speed of an interceptor for it to be considered ABM-capable. Washington wanted an agreement that would legally allow interceptors to be tested against targets traveling up to 5 kilometers per second—a speed that would not allow a missile to intercept an ICBM—to be compatible with the 1972 ABM Treaty. After much discussion, Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed new protocols modifying the ABM Treaty—appearing in the form of “Agreed Statements” emanating from the Standing Consultative Committee—on September 9, 1997, which added a specified class of nonstrategic defense missiles that no longer would be limited by the ABM Treaty. The specific demarcation line permitted a theater defense missile to have a velocity of five kilometers per second as long as the system was not tested against targets traveling faster than five kilometers per second.11 The Russian parliament eventually ratified Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II and the 1997 ABM agreements on April 14, 2000. Russia’s newly elected president, Vladimir Putin, endorsed the ratification May 4, 2000, on the condition the United States ratify the 1997 ABM protocols. Republicans senators led by North Carolina’s Jesse Helms, chairman of the Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee, opposed any limits on


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U.S. missile defense systems. Consequently, Clinton never submitted the ABM protocols to Congress for fear Helms would keep them in committee or orchestrate their defeat on the Senate floor. Helms claimed the 1997 agreements would not permit the United States to deploy any upper-tier interceptor system. Nevertheless, the Clinton administration continued working on TMDs, assuming they could be deployed when and if they became a viable system.12 America’s NATO allies opposed U.S. plans for any missile defense program that would violate the ABM Treaty. When a high-ranking State Department official, Strobe Talbott, visited Brussels to discuss the U.S. missile defense programs with NATO officials, he quickly discovered just how suspicious and upset the Europeans were about American motives. The French delegate, Ambassador Philippe Guelluy, complained they were not consulted, but instead were faced with unilateral decisions. He feared any national antimissile system would upset the deterrence system, prompting the Russians, Chinese, and other nations to counter with more sophisticated missiles. Was the United States seeking to defend itself from missile attacks, leaving NATO members to fend for themselves in a crisis? Washington’s belief that “rogue” nations would defy traditional deterrence was highly questionable, he asserted; moreover, it was risky to assume nothing could be accomplished by negotiation and engagement. In November 1999, Russia sponsored a UN General Assembly resolution opposing any missile defense system violating the 1972 ABM Treaty that passed a committee vote, 54 to 7, with all members from the European Union either voting with Russia or abstaining.13 On January 19, 2000, John Holum, senior adviser for the State Department’s Arms Control and International Security Affairs Bureau, and Yuri Kapralov, head of the Russian Ministry’s Arms Control Department, met in Geneva to discuss a new U.S. proposal. Washington desired to shift the permitted location for placement of its nominal “100” ground-based ABM interceptors—permitted under the ABM Treaty—from North Dakota to Alaska. Moscow found this suggestion unacceptable and, on July 5, 2000, Putin and Chinese President Jiang Zemin declared that the ABM treaty must not be altered. In addition, Putin told a press conference that if the United States moved ahead with its antimissile programs and violated the 1972 Treaty, the United States would undermine the “world balance” of nuclear weapons.14 * * * The Clinton administration, moved in large part by political pressures, had announced a three-stage national missile defense (NMD) system in 1996 that was quite different from President Reagan’s space-based concept for nationwide protection against ballistic missiles. The administration’s initial NMD plan, which remained intact until 1999, consisted of a staggered scheduled deployment whose basic elements were:

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Capability-1 (C-1): 20 Alaska-based interceptors; upgrading five existing radars in Alaska, Greenland, Great Britain, and on the U.S. West Coast; a new “X-band” radar at the western tip of the Aleutian Islands; a battle management system; and communications relays for guidance information of interceptors in-flight. The system was to begin operating in late 2005. Capability-2 (C-2): 100 Alaska-based interceptors; additional X-band radars in Alaska, Great Britain, and Greenland. The interceptors could be operational by 2007. Capability-3 (C-3): Up to 250 interceptors based in Alaska and in North Dakota; with additional X-band radars on both U.S. coasts and possibly in South Korea. This system could be deployed by 2010 or 2011.

The Pentagon claimed C-1 would be able to defeat a “few warheads” that only employed “simple penetration aids” or countermeasures; C-2 could defeat a “few tens” of warheads with more sophisticated countermeasures; and C-3 would defeat a “few tens” of warheads that included advanced countermeasures. In late 1999, the Clinton administration chose to modify its first stage with what it termed an “expanded C-1 architecture.” Instead of initially deploying 20 interceptors, the new plan called for installing 100 interceptors, probably in Alaska, and upgrading the five existing radars in Alaska, Greenland, Great Britain, and on the U.S. West Coast. Although some of the 100 interceptors would not be ready for deployment by 2005, it was hoped the full complement would be available by 2007. As additional support for the modified C-1 architecture, Washington hoped to add a six-satellite system—the Space-Based Infrared System-High (SBIRSHigh)—as an upgraded replacement for the early warning satellites of the existing Defense Support Program. The SBIRS-High would circle the earth to detect any missile launch by detecting exhaust plumes from ignited boosters. It was projected that the new system would be available in time to enhance the initial NMD deployment in 2005. Also on the drawing board was the 24-satellite Space-Based Infrared System-Low (SBIRSLow) program that employed two types of infrared sensors designed to track missiles in flight and direct interceptors to incoming warheads. With a projected deployment date of 2006–2007, the SBIRS-Low, if successful, would significantly enhance the role satellites played in missile defense; however, technical issues suggested that it might be delayed. Although the SBIRS-High satellites did not clash with the terms of the 1972 ABM Treaty, deployment of the SBIRS-Low system would violate the treaty’s prohibitions against space-based sensors that could pass targeting directions to interceptors.15 Demands for deployment of SBIRS-Low were prompted by the passage of the 1999 National Missile Defense Act, sponsored by the Republicans but joined by many Democrats. The significance of the Rumsfeld Commission’s grossly inflated estimates and North Korea’s August 1998 launch of a three-stage Taepo Dong-1 rocket had increased the pressure


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on the administration to immediately install a national antimissile system. Despite his insistence that no decision on deployment had been made, the president understood that Congress would only accept technological obstacles as justification for delay. Yet the necessity for a delay in deployment should have been evident to everyone, for, in January 1998, the Pentagon received a shockingly critical review of the NMD program ordered the previous year. Former Air Force Chief of Staff General Larry Welch directed the 16-member panel of civilian and military officers, all of whom had been involved in developing missile, aeronautical, and naval projects. Although skeptical of the NMD, Welch had a reputation for unbiased, to-the-point evaluations of defense department projects. The panel’s 76-page report savaged the Pentagon’s entire missile defense program, as Bradley Graham noted in his book Hit to Kill, for its “poor planning, insufficient testing, and political pressure” to speed up deployment. The report went on to declare that “decisions by officials to accept abbreviated timetables and minimal numbers of flight test had raised the risk of flops, delays and cost overruns.” All of this, Welch concluded, could result in a “rush to failure.”16 Technical problems surfaced in the critical exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV), a significant part of a national missile defense program, which should find and destroy the incoming nuclear warheads. Raytheon’s initial test of the EKV in January 1999 was a fly-by, but an intercept attempt took place in October. An unarmed Minuteman missile was launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, and the interceptor, comprised of an EKV and boosters, lifted off from Kwajalein atoll in the western Pacific Ocean. The interceptor scored a direct hit on the Minuteman about 140 miles above Kwajalein. Although Raytheon celebrated the EKV’s success, controversy arose because a Mylar decoy balloon allegedly helped the interceptor find the Minuteman. The Pentagon and Raytheon insisted that the balloon provided little aid to the EKV, but in January 2000, the New York Times reported the EKV had drifted off course until it was guided to the target by the Mylar balloon. The next tests of the NMD system were conducted in January and July 2000, but on both occasions the interceptor failed to hit the target. The National Security Council examined the results of all three tests according to criteria established by the White House. The four factors to aid Clinton in reaching a decision regarding deployment were: “(1) whether the threat is materializing; (2) the status of the technology based on an initial series of rigorous flight tests, and the proposed system’s operational effectiveness; (3) whether the system is affordable; and (4) the implications that going forward with NMD deployment would hold for the overall strategic environment and our arms control objectives.”17 Since two of the three tests conducted up to that point were outright failures, and the results of the first of those tests were mixed, clearly the system had not demonstrated operational effectiveness.

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U.S. efforts in 2000 to modify the ABM treaty had been based on the assumption that sooner or later some part of the overall antimissile system might run afoul of the ABM Treaty, but all of the tests to this point had been conducted within its framework and there was no immediate need to modify the treaty. The NMD system, however, was twice unable to meet the second criterion of effectiveness in rigorous flight tests: the January 18 test failed because the cryogenic system failed to properly cool the infrared sensors on the kill vehicle; and the kill vehicle failed to separate from the interceptor missile during the July 8 test.18 On September 1, Clinton announced that he was postponing a decision on constructing the NMD defense system so that whoever was elected president in November would have the final decision on any future deployment. Meanwhile, tests of theater antimissile systems provided mixed results. The theater high-altitude area defense (THAAD) system failed six intercept tests between December 1995 and March 1999 for a variety of reasons. On June 10 and August 2, 1999, THAAD completed two successful intercepts; nonetheless, in November a Defense Department panel of experts recommended that THAAD be redesigned with subsequent flight and intercept tests delayed until 2004 or 2005.19 By the end of 2000, the Army’s short-range Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) defense system had been significantly improved by providing a radar with greater range and, at the same time, the ability to track more incoming missiles. In developmental tests, PAC-3’s hit-to-kill interceptors had been tested successfully several times. Also at the end of 2000, the navy’s Aegis-class ships had modified its standard antiaircraft missiles for low-altitude theater missile defense. As the Aegis covered a larger operational zone than PAC-3, the Navy sought approval for converting Aegisequipped cruisers and destroyers to mount Navy Theater Wide (NTW) ship-launched antimissile interceptors. Some proponents even pressed to have it become part of the national missile defense system, with the Pentagon suggesting that a strategic version of the NTW system might be complementary to the ground-based NMD system, especially in protecting harbors and other costal areas. The navy had been attempting to develop another program, Navy Area Wide, in addition to NTW, but uncertainty existed about whether to proceed with one or both. At the end of the Clinton administration, the navy’s missile defense role, other than protecting its own combat ships, had not been fully defined.20 * * * Even though a missile defense system would not have intercepted the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on New York City’s World Trade Center and Washington D.C.’s Pentagon building, the newly installed president, George W. Bush, insisted that a missile defense system was essential to American security. A few months after his inauguration, President Bush informed his audience at the National Defense University that he


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intended to deploy a missile defense system. “We need a new framework that allows us to build missile defenses to counter the different threats of today’s world,” he said on May 1, 2001. “To do so, we must move beyond the constraints of the 30-year-old ABM Treaty.” Continuing, he declared: Several months ago, I asked Secretary of Defense [Donald] Rumsfeld to examine all available technologies and basing modes for effective missile defenses that could protect the United States, our deployed forces, our friends, and our allies. . . . The Secretary has identified near-term options that could allow us to deploy an initial capability against limited threats. In some cases, we can draw on already established technologies that might involve land-based and sea-based capabilities to intercept missiles in midcourse or after they reenter the atmosphere. We also recognize the substantial advantages of intercepting missiles early in their flight, especially in the boost phase.

Bush also indicated that he was going to “reach out to other interested states,” including allies, China and Russia, “to develop a new foundation for world peace and security in the 21st century.” All of this, he believed, would create a new political environment that would “encourage still further cuts in nuclear weapons.”21 Shortly before Bush met with Russian President Vladimir Putin on June 16, 2001, Rumsfeld provided the media with a glimpse of the administration’s plans for a more “robust” missile defense program involving ground-based, sea-based, air-based, and space-based systems. According to Rumsfeld, the Defense Department had compiled a list of 12 different projects that would be scrutinized, developed, and tested. Those projects that showed promise would be selected for accelerated research and testing; the programs that did not live up to expectations might be canceled.22 What emerged as the so-called new missile defense program was largely the recasting of the Clinton administration’s various antimissile projects, with the integration of these programs into a multilayered system. The Bush administration hoped to develop a layered system capable of downing enemy missiles—short-, medium-, and long-range—in all phases of flight—boost, midcourse, and terminal—and do this from land, sea, and space. Although nearly all of the elements of the plan had existed under Clinton, after eight years a space-based missile defense was again under consideration. In addition to renaming the National Missile Defense program as the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) project, the Bush administration anticipated adding a few new interceptors and a sea-based X-band radar to be based in the Pacific, along with an upgraded, land-based radar on Shemya, a small island southwest of Alaska. The missions of some theater systems could be expanded and integrated, not only to defend against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, but also to counter long-range ones as well. The Navy Theater Wide (now Aegis sea-based), THAAD, and Patriot systems, however, had yet to prove themselves

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President George W. Bush and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Photo by Staff Sgt. D. Myles Cullen. (Courtesy: Department of Defense)

capable of accomplishing their original, more limited missions under realistic scenarios. The 1972 ABM Treaty long had been the nemesis of most missile defense proponents. Senior officials in the Pentagon and State Department frequently disagreed as to what testing was permissible under the treaty, with some in the Pentagon and the missile defense organization complaining their activities were being restricted. On July 11, 2001, the administration announced a testing program that might soon violate the ABM Treaty. Included in the announcements were plans to begin clearing trees for what it called a test bed facility at Fort Greely about 100 miles southeast of Fairbanks, Alaska, plans for 17 new missile tests during the next 14 months, and up to 30 additional tests by 2006. Also, the environmental documents indicated that 40 interceptors would be allowed at Fort Greely. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul D. Wolfowitz informed the Senate Armed Services Committee on July 13 that the Pentagon had scheduled 10 flight tests of ground-based interceptors and seven tests of the navy’s theater-wide program. During the next year, the test bed would be built in Alaska, including a command center and five missile silos at Fort Greely, near Fairbanks, plus one or two silos from which to launch target missiles on Kodiak Island. The Pentagon also planned to upgrade the Shemya radar at the end of the Aleutian chain and improve the navy’s Aegis computer system so it could track long-range missiles.23


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Wolfowitz declined to be specific about whether the missile tests might violate the ABM Treaty, but he indicated that the Bush administration would withdraw from the ABM Treaty if Russia did not agree to permit the tests. He acknowledged that disagreement over the treaty put the United States and Russia “on a collision course . . . we have either to withdraw from [the ABM Treaty] or replace it.” Defense Secretary Rumsfeld acknowledged that the Pentagon budget for fiscal year 2002 would include specific requests for its missile defense systems. The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO)—shortly to be renamed the Missile Defense Agency (MDA)—had requested $3.9 billion for the GMD interceptor’s program; $968 million for terminal interceptor programs such as THAAD and the Patriot PAC-3; $787 million for the research and development of methods to detect decoys and for tests; $495 million to develop sensors for the navy’s Aegis, the X-Band radar, and space-based infrared systems; and $685 to develop boost-phase interceptors—Brilliant Pebbles and space-based laser programs. The total BMDO budget would be $8.5 billion, representing a 56 percent increase over the Clinton administration’s budget for 2001.24 On July 14, 2001, the Pentagon conducted a “scripted” test of the Clinton administration’s NMD, now the Bush administration’s GMD program. Shortly after a mock enemy target was launched—a Minuteman ICBM from Vandenberg Air Force Base—a prototype interceptor from Kwajalein carrying an EKV hit and destroyed its target 140 miles above the earth. The Defense Department promptly reported that a “bullet hit a bullet in space;” but, as with the 1984 SDI Homing Overlay test (noted in chapter 2), reporters later learned the July test was only partially successful. During the test the interceptor knew the target’s “speed, altitude, path, precise capabilities,” and “the target was fitted with a transponder, which allowed radar operators positioned in line with the arc of the test to mark the target’s progress through most of its flight.” On August 9, 2001, Major General Willie Nance, who headed the GMD, acknowledged that the X-Band radar tracking the ICBM warhead failed to verify that the target was hit. Boeing’s test chief at Kwajalein was more blunt: “Look, we’re not hiding anything. Somehow people got the idea that we’re doing operational tests; we’re not. These are developmental tests. We’re in very early stages.”25 Critics continued to question the technical reliability of the BMD programs. They pointed out that the tests had been scripted, with the interceptor missiles providing information in advance that would never be available during hostilities. Skeptics also pointed to various types of countermeasures that adversaries could use and, in April 2000, the Union of Concerned Scientists described three such devices. These countermeasures could include submunitions with biological or chemical weapons carried in hundreds of small warheads to be released soon after the ballistic missile’s boost phase ended, thus overwhelming a missile defense.

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A warhead could be disguised with antisimulation balloon decoys where a nuclear device would be placed in one light-weight balloon and released with several similar but empty balloons. The inability of sensors to distinguish one balloon from another would necessitate shooting down all of the balloons. Finally, nuclear warheads could be covered by shrouds cooled by liquid nitrogen, reducing the infrared radiation and making it difficult for the kill vehicle’s sensors to intercept them.26 The director of BMDO under Clinton and MDA under George W. Bush, Lt. General Ronald Kadish, responded to critics of missile defense tests. In the first of several rebuttals on June 5, 2000, Kadish stressed: Some suggest that we are not testing the NMD system against realistic targets. But they ignore our . . . practice of testing other complex systems, such as new aircraft. The first test planned for each aircraft had always been a high-speed taxi test. After all, there is an understandable interest in making sure the basic mechanics, avionics, and computers work as they should before taking the far more risky step of lifting off the ground. This is the evolutionary nature of the testing approach we must use when we develop highly complex machines—we don’t test to the maximum every component of the system the first few times. Two central technological problems confront us. The first is the discrimination problem, or, can we find a warhead? The second is the so-called ‘hit-a-bulletwith-a bullet’ problem, or, once we find a warhead can we hit it? [S]olutions to both these problems have eluded us, especially against a massive raid involving hundreds of incoming warheads . . . decoys, radar chaff, and debris. Up to now, the technological immaturity of our sensors did not allow us to discriminate, or pick out, the countermeasures within a target cluster.

Kadish thought critics tended to magnify “the capabilities of states like North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. But just because states can build missiles doesn’t mean they can or will develop countermeasures. And, even if they demonstrate a capability to build them, it is not automatically true that they can use them effectively . . . I would argue that they can’t.”27 Few critics were satisfied with his response. * * * The Bush administration soon found Japan, China, South Korea, and America’s European allies were concerned that their BMD program threatened the strategic stability created by previous arms control agreements. In the spring of 2001, Russian President Putin apparently sought to counter Bush’s missile defense plans by seeking closer relations with Western Europeans, China’s President Jiang Zemin and North Korea’s Kim Jong Il. Putin and Zemin feared Bush’s plans for a national missile defense system would destabilize the world’s strategic arms relationships. America’s European allies also feared that the deployment of a missile defense system could undermine nuclear arms control agreements and seriously damage relations with Russia. In February 2001,


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Secretary of State Colin Powell met with Russia’s Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov in Cairo, Egypt, to discuss possible changes in the ABM Treaty only to learn that Moscow refused to accept any of the administration’s suggested compromises.28 Although Bush’s advisors had only disdain for Clinton’s reliance on a personal friendship with Russia’s President Yeltsin during the 1990s, Bush appeared to have quickly developed a similar relationship with Putin. When the two presidents met briefly for the first time in Ljubljana, Slovenia on June 16, 2001, Bush told a press conference that he found Putin to be “very straightforward and trustworthy. . . . I was able to get a sense of his soul. He’s a man deeply committed to his country.” Putin responded that “we found a basis to start building on our cooperation” with the United States. Two other Bush-Putin meetings during 2001 established the groundwork for early cooperation. After the tragic assaults of September 11, Putin was the first foreign leader to call Bush and offer support in fighting terrorists.29 On October 3, Putin visited Brussels to talk with NATO’s Secretary General Robertson and other NATO members about a closer partnership between Russia and NATO. British Prime Minister Tony Blair suggested Russia should become a partner on an equal basis with other NATO members. Although not granting Putin’s wish for equality, NATO members did agree on May 28, 2002, to upgrade the NATO-Russia Permanent JointCouncil that had been established in 1997.30 Americans and Russians met frequently to discuss possible changes in the ABM Treaty. On October 22, after Bush and Putin held an informal meeting in Shanghai, China, Putin told reporters that he and Bush might be able to work out some changes in the ABM Treaty when they met at Crawford, Texas, on November 14. During the Crawford summit from November 14 to 16, the two leaders agreed that the United States and Russia would begin negotiations to reduce their arsenal of offensive nuclear warheads. But Bush refused to continue compliance with the ABM Treaty unless Putin accepted major changes. As in a previous meeting with Clinton in 2000, Putin warned Bush that ending the ABM Treaty could force Russia to abrogate all previous arms control treaties that had maintained strategic stability for nearly 30 years.31 Nonetheless, Bush announced on December 13, 2001, that Washington had given Moscow the required six months notice of its intention to withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty. Indicating he was willing to sign a formal treaty with Russia to reduce offensive weapons, Bush insisted that the end of the ABM Treaty does not “undermine our new relationship or Russian security.” Putin responded that he considered Bush’s decision to be a mistake, but stressed that his nation had an offensive system capable of overcoming any antimissile defenses. “For this reason,” Putin concluded, “I can state with complete confidence” that Bush’s decision “presents no threat to the national security of the Russian Federation.”32

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Meanwhile between December 2001 and May 2002, Secretary of State Colin Powell and Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov negotiated a new arms limitations pact designed to reduce offensive nuclear warheads. Bush flew to Moscow where the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), better known as the Moscow Treaty, was signed on May 26, 2002. At the final ceremonial signing, Bush declared the Moscow Treaty finally ended the legacy of the Cold War, a bit of hyperbole because the Cold War had actually ended 10 years earlier. American critics of SORT pointed out that the agreement was retrogressive, as it did not require a single offensive nuclear weapon or delivery system to be destroyed. On the contrary, it permitted both nations to abandon the limitations of previous U.S.-Soviet or U.S.-Russian arms control agreements, especially START II—which had never entered into force—that banned multiple warheads on ICBMs.33 On June 13, 2002, with no ceremony or protest to mark the U.S.’s official termination of the ABM Treaty, only a presidential statement was handed out to the media. Despite the critical remarks of some Russian legislators, officials in Moscow appeared resigned to the treaty’s demise and believed that it would be some time before the United States was able to deploy an effective national missile defense system. Still confronting daunting domestic problems, President Putin chose not to jeopardize his generally warm relations with the Bush administration. Even few negative public comments were heard from NATO allies who had feared abrogation would cause an unraveling of the basic arms control structure crafted during the Cold War. Somewhat surprisingly, there was little celebrating by Republicans who had for several years demanded the termination of the ABM Treaty. Senator Jon Kyl of Arizona was enthusiastic because, he said, the United States “is no longer handcuffed to a policy that intentionally leaves its own people defenseless to missile attack.”34 The next day in the Wall Street Journal, Paul Wolfowitz expressed enthusiasm at the possibilities now available to the BMD program. “We can now move forward,” he declared, “with the robust development and testing program that the Department of Defense has designed to take advantage of new technologies and basing modes.” Canadian leaders, however, were upset with Bush’s unilateral abrogation of the ABM Treaty because it presented the Ottawa government with a difficult decision regarding its role in the North American Air Defense (NORAD) command. Should the Canadians not join the missile defense system, American officials threatened to place the operation under Washington’s sole control. In May 2003, the Canadian government began wrestling with whether to participate in the U.S. missile defense program. Art Eggleton, the former defense minister, pointed out: “If decisions are going to be made about these missiles being used in a defensive fashion over Canadian territory, I don’t think we should be outside the door. I think we should be inside at the table.” Other members of parliament voiced reservations about U.S. intentions in deploying antimissile weapons in


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space, fearing that it would lead to a new arms race in space weapons. After considerable debate the government, while declaring its continuing commitment to NORAD, postponed a final decision declaring: “Canada shares U.S. concerns about the proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction but also continues to have questions about the missile defence’s potential impact on arms control and global stability.”35 * * * Even before Bush announced his intention to abrogate the ABM Treaty on December 13, 2001, the Pentagon had planned a new series of carefully scripted missile defense tests in which all intercepts employed a surrogate, slower two-stage booster until a new more powerful three-stage booster had been proven. The MDA hailed its December 3, 2001 test as successful since a prototype GMD interceptor avoided the Mylar balloon serving as a decoy and demolished a mock warhead 140 miles above the earth. Questioning the test’s operational realism, critics pointed out that the interceptor had been fed a substantial amount of targeting information before launch.36 Ten days later, Boeing’s new three-stage booster rocket for the GMD interceptor failed when the rocket, developed to carry kill vehicles that would track and destroy long-range missiles above the earth’s atmosphere, veered off course seconds after being fired from Vandenberg Air Force Base. Although successfully tested in August 2001, it had been plagued with persistent problems and delays. Soon after this failure another company, Orbital Sciences, was asked to build a booster model and Lockheed Martin took over the Boeing model. A GMD interceptor test, similar to the December 3, 2001 test, took place on March 15, 2002. Just as in December and July 2001, the ground-based missile from Kwajalein atoll in the Pacific Ocean hit a mock warhead carried to the area by a modified Minuteman II missile from Vandenberg Air Force Base. The main difference with prior tests was that this time three (not one) balloon decoys accompanied the target.37 The navy’s missile defense plans experienced trouble in 2001. On December 14, the Pentagon announced that plans for the Navy Area Wide Missile Defense consisting of a short-range antimissile system had been canceled. The ship-based system was to defend vessels, naval ports, and amphibious operations, but it was more than 50 percent over budget and more than two years behind schedule. The program’s allocated funds were shifted to navy ships capable of carrying both short- and longrange missile defenses—Navy Theater Wide (later Aegis) system.38 The navy’s first test of a ship-based interceptor designed to counter short- and medium-range ballistic missiles took place on January 25, 2002. Described by the Pentagon as a “controlled developmental test and not operationally representative,” an interceptor missile fired from a navy Aegis class cruiser successfully collided in outer space with a mock warhead carried by an Aries missile launched from Kauai, Hawaii. The test’s primary

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mission was to evaluate the guidance system and Raytheon’s Standard Missile-3 (SM-3). On June 13 and November 21, 2002, the MDA held the second and third tests of a sea-based defense missile at the Pacific Missile Range Facility at Kauai, Hawaii. Both times a developmental SM-3 fired from the Aegis-class cruiser USS Lake Erie successfully intercepted an Aries ballistic missile launched from Kauai. The Aegis Lightweight Exoatmospheric Projectile Intercept (ALI) had launched an SM-3 whose kinetic warhead tracked and hit its target, demonstrating that the SM-3 ALI system could hit the ballistic missile outside the atmosphere. In his February 2003 report to Congress, Thomas Christie, director of the Pentagon’s Operational Test and Evaluation office, noted while the MDA’s 2002 sea-based intercept tests had been successful, the “flight test engagement geometries, scenarios, and timelines were non-stressing.” Future tests, he argued, required a target with a warhead that separated from its booster rather than a target that stayed together making it much easier to track.39 After three successful intercepts, the Aegis system encountered its first failure on June 18, 2003, when an SM-3 launched by the USS Lake Erie missed an Aries target. The Aegis system could prove to be useful for theater defense, but it still was too slow by half to target ICBMs.40 Although missing only one of ten targets in its developmental tests, the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) system responded dismally to operational tests during the first half of 2002. The PAC-3 ground-based tactical missile defense system was designed to intercept short- and mediumrange ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and aircraft. Conducted by soldiers under more realistic battlefield conditions, in three of the four operational tests, PAC-3 and older model PAC-2 interceptors were simultaneously launched at multiple targets. The last test anticipated that two PAC-3 missiles would be launched automatically in rapid sequence at a single target. In the first test, a PAC-3 interceptor failed to hit its target, and in each of the next three tests, a PAC-3 missile refused to launch as programmed. Consequently the tests resulted in PAC-3 missiles destroying two of five assigned targets, and one missile struck its target but failed to destroy it. Nevertheless, production and deployment of the PAC-3 continued. According to General Kadish: “The decision on Patriot is to work out the difficulties we found and improve the system over time and build as much as we can afford in the process.”41 As the Pentagon planned for the invasion of Iraq, General Kadish, despite test glitches, remained convinced that the PAC-3s did not suffer from any significant design weaknesses. Philip E. Coyle, III, who headed the Pentagon’s weapons testing from 1994–2001, was considerably less encouraging. He thought that the army “won’t be able to rely on them,” because failures in the operational tests indicated that the PAC-3 would likely be less than 50 percent successful against Scud missiles. After the U.S. March 2003 invasion of Iraq, reports regarding the effectiveness of the


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Patriot missile defense systems were mixed. According to the U.S. Army, the Patriot batteries destroyed all the Iraqi missiles (9 for 9) they fired at, but they also shot down two friendly aircraft and locked on to a third. Most of the intercepts were accomplished by the older model, PAC-2, as the newer PAC-3 accounted for only two of the nine Iraqi missiles. Although he acknowledged the Patriots mistakenly targeted friendly aircraft, General Kadish claimed the Patriot’s record still was “very, very good.” Yet Iraq reportedly launched at least 23 ballistic and cruise missiles. Wade Boese, director of research for the Arms Control Association, noted “of the 14 Iraqi missiles not engaged by Patriots, four were reported as outside the range of any Patriot system and one exploded shortly after launch. No official explanation [has been] given for why the other nine Iraqi missiles were not fired upon” although at least three may have been “judged to be non-threatening.” Iraq fired no Scud missiles this time, missiles that had been a problem in the 1991 war, so Patriot remained unproven against Scuds in battle. Instead Iraq launched a number of cruise missiles, but no cruise missiles were intercepted, a situation that could cause future problems. Skeptics emphasized the lack of realistic testing as one of the problems. “The PAC-3 missile has been retrofitted into a system that is basically ’70s technology,” claimed Joseph Cirincione of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Since earlier Patriot tests employed a drone aircraft, the slowest, most vulnerable target, he suggested: “We may need a brand-new system. But we’ll never know that until you realistically test the Patriot.”42 Israel responded to the Iraqi invasion by testing an anti-Scud missile shield of its own—the Arrow BMD system funded in part by the United States. A 23-foot-long thin missile, the Arrow was designed to search out and hit enemy missiles at an altitude of more than 30 miles in less than three minutes. In a rapid test firing of four interceptors on January 6, 2003, the Arrow’s radar located all four simulated targets and directed the interceptors to their targets; however, the test did not include actual target intercepts.43 The Iraqis, however, never launched a Scud toward Israel during the brief military activity, so a realistic test was missed. On August 26, 2004, Israel and the United States carried out a joint test off the California coast under test conditions that would be prohibited for safety reasons in Israel. An Arrow missile launched from San Nicholas Island missed a separating ballistic missile target, and testing was suspended until late 2005. On July 18, 2002, the Airborne Laser (ABL) aircraft made its first significant flight over western Kansas. Although this Boeing project began in November 1996 with an appropriation of $1.1 billion, the Boeing 747 aircraft was not adapted for the ABL program or delivered to the U.S. Air Force’s McConnell Air Force Base until January 2002. In Kansas, a technical team from Boeing, TRW, and Lockheed Martin installed some essential components of the BMD system. TRW was scheduled to supply

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the megawatt-class lasers for the kill mechanism, and Lockheed was to provide the complex maze of mirrors and lenses to guide the laser to the target. The July 18 flight, without the laser, was the first for the reconfigured 747 that now had a rotating turret to house the ABL’s five-foot telescope and the lens through which the lasers would be fired. Thus the reconfigured Boeing plane was a hybrid aircraft with a distinctive nose and a teardrop-shaped pod atop the aircraft. Air Force plans called for the final development and testing of the ABL to be completed by the end of 2004, and possibly be ready for use between 2006 and 2008. If successfully tested, the ABL could theoretically provide the missile defense system with the ability to shoot down any hostile ballistic missile during the boost phase immediately after its being launched.44 The General Accounting Office (GAO) was less than enthusiastic about the ABL program. It charged that the air force underestimated the technical difficulties of the program, its management process, and its costs. The cost up to the initial test was $1.7 billion on a project that the air force budgeted at $2.5 billion, but in 2001 was raised to $3.7 billion—a figure the GAO believed was still unrealistic because the basic ABL technologies had yet to be tested. Although some progress had been made, the GAO pointed out that the devices needed to stabilize the laser, as well as the mirrors to focus and guide the laser beam, had yet to demonstrate they could work together. Although development of target-tracking hardware, safety systems, and devices required to adjust for air turbulence were further along, they were not ready to be integrated into the final system.45 Concern about collateral damage existed not only with the ABL but with all boost-phase weapons. Although rarely mentioned in media handouts, the various antimissile interceptors could, in hitting and destroying an enemy missile over-head, deposit the fallout from that missile’s warhead on the people below. Consequently, boost phase systems designed to destroy enemy missiles early in their flight could result in the death of many innocent people. If an enemy ICBM were launched from the Middle East, for example, the destruction of the missile could cause its nuclear warhead to fall short of the United States and possibly land in Turkey or southeastern Europe, causing numerous casualties. Also, nuclear missiles launched from North Korea could be destroyed, and the warhead might land in relatively isolated parts of the Pacific Ocean or in Japan or South Korea. Should the nuclear warhead land on, or explode over, the Japanese islands, the deaths could be worse than the 1945 atomic bombs.46 * * * On December 17, 2002, President Bush issued a statement announcing a National Missile Defense Initiative. “I have directed the Secretary of Defense,” he said, to deploy the initial elements of a strategic missile defense system by September 30, 2004. “The new strategic challenges of the 21st century require us to think differently, but they also require us


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to act.” “The deployment of missile defenses is an essential element of our broader efforts to transform our defense and deterrence policies and capabilities to meet the new threats we face.” The deployment scheduled to take place in 2004 and 2005 included 20 GMD interceptors and 20 seabased interceptors positioned on three vessels. An unspecified number of Patriot PAC-3s and the sea-based interceptors, along with upgraded radar systems to help locate potential targets, would be deployed to protect against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. The 20 GMD interceptors—16 to be placed in Alaska, where work had begun on six missile silos on June 15, 2002, and four located at Vandenberg Air Force Base (AFB)—were designed as a shield against long-range ballistic missiles. Vandenberg AFB in south-central California was chosen because it was already a missile base and a test facility. Thus, a Pentagon official stated, “there is already infrastructure there, so it is a logical place to put them [interceptor missiles] in the continental United States.” Theoretically, Rumsfeld stated, all 50 states would be protected by this rudimentary system, but the limited size and uncertain effectiveness indicated that the initial project could, in his words, offer only a “modest” defense. Even so, he argued, the system would be better than none at all. The White House defended its decision for deployment in a May 20, 2003 statement arguing that the initial deployment was only a “starting point” and that the system would be upgraded as technology improved and added onto as new systems became available. Consequently, the administration believed that there would be no “final, fixed missile defense architecture.”47 Not everyone agreed with the rushed deployment schedule, especially since it was acknowledged that only five of the eight ground-based midcourse scripted tests had been successful. Moreover, results from tests of the sea-based system and the PAC-3 had been less than satisfactory. “Neither the interceptor nor the radar to be used with the new national missile defense system have ever been tested against any ballistic missile target,” according to Democratic Senator Carl Levin of Michigan, a senior member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. To deploy systems before they are tested in a realistic environment, he concluded, “violates common sense.” The administration, Democratic Senator Jack Reed of Rhode Island complained, “does not know if the system works, yet there is a rush to deploy it.” Even some of the missile defense supporters were concerned about the decision to reduce the developmental testing, skipping operational testing where components are integrated and tried out in a real world environment, and moving directly to deployment. The deployment of a flawed primitive system not only might have heavy additional costs, but might very well delay the development of a more effective system. The basic reason the administration was acting now, according to James Lindsay of The Brookings Institution, was because “once you deploy a system you’ve really stuck a stake in the ground and makes it very hard for a new administration to undo it. This is irreversible.”48 It

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may be recalled, however, that in 1976 Congress shut down the completed Safeguard system because of questions regarding its reliability and maintenance costs. The deployment issue flared anew when it was discovered that buried in President Bush’s 2004 budget proposal was a request to exempt the missile defense program from the law that prevents starting fullscale production of weapons that have not been operationally tested. Should the exemption be granted, it would be the first time that a major weapons program had avoided the testing requirements. Many analysts opposed granting the exemption. “Without these tests,” Philip Coyle pointed out, “we may never know whether this system works or not, and if they are done after the system is deployed, we won’t know until we’ve spent $70 billion on a ground-based missile defense system.” Senate Democrats, among them Dianne Feinstein (CA), Carl Levin (MI), and Jack Reed (RI), were properly concerned about the proposed waiver. In a letter to Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, Feinstein wrote: “I believe that any deployed missile defense system must meet the same requirements and standards that we set for all other fully operational weapons systems. Indeed, given the potential cost of a failure of missile defense, I believe that, if anything, it should be required to meet more stringent test standards than normally required.”49 The Bush administration’s obsession with secrecy posed a threat to the long-term development of a reliable system. In June 2002, the Pentagon announced it would henceforth keep key information secret about its missile defense program, especially data concerning flight tests. The administration justified its action on the grounds that it was necessary to keep information out of the hands of U.S. adversaries, but several legislators feared that it was to avoid congressional oversight. The administration’s strategy could be counterproductive if suspicion arose in Congress that an ineffective system was being built or that money was being wasted, because support for the project would surely wane.50

CHAPTER 4

Missile Defense in Europe: Bush to Obama

When President George W. Bush announced his decision to deploy missile defense units in Alaska and California on December 16, 2002, few people realized that the administration had already begun quiet, “unofficial” talks with Poland and the Czech Republic about basing missile defenses in Europe.1 In the summer and fall of 2002, the Bush administration approached Poland and the Czech Republic regarding the possibility of locating U.S. missile defense units on their territory. Existing military installations in several countries had been previously examined to determine whether suitable locations and support facilities existed, and in 2003 the Pentagon’s Missile Defense Agency (MDA) briefed the president about the potential options.2 The 2002 National Security Presidential Directive 23, National Policy on Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), called for missile defenses to protect the United States, its deployed forces, and its allies. President Bush’s policy announcement stated the deployments would include “ground-based interceptors, sea-based interceptors, additional Patriot (PAC-3) units, and sensors based on land, at sea, and in space,” but beyond a reference to America’s allies, made no mention of specific deployments in Europe.3 In general, European nations had opposed U.S. withdrawal from the 1972 Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and were critical of Bush’s initial plans for a missile defense system. Some of America’s European allies saw those plans as potentially destabilizing, given Russia’s longstanding opposition to U.S. deployment of a national BMD system, potentially leading to a new arms race and undercutting international efforts to prevent missile proliferation. During Bush’s June 2001 visit to Europe, he was

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told as much by several European heads of state. In July 2001, Prime Minister Tony Blair presented Bush with a report signed by approximately 250 members of the House of Commons that also was critical of American BMD plans.4 Ignoring this display of resistance, the Bush administration chose to forge ahead with expanding its antimissile system to Europe. By initiating talks with Poland and the Czech Republic, Washington also ignored a commitment it had made to Moscow in conjunction with the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty—also known as the Moscow Treaty. That Joint Declaration, signed by Presidents Bush and Putin on May 24, 2002, called for joint research and development on missile defense technologies, and American/Russian cooperation on missile defense for Europe. Washington’s proposal to establish U.S. missile defenses in Europe was neither joint nor cooperative and was undertaken unilaterally almost before the ink had dried on the Joint Declaration.5 But the Bush administration also faced a logical inconsistency in its approach to Iran. Although naming Iran part of the “axis of evil,” and calling for regime changes in Tehran as well as Pyongyang, the administration had done very little to address the ballistic missile threat it claimed Iran posed. The ground-based missile defense (GMD) system in Alaska and California was aimed at North Korea, and the huge sea-based X-band radar was to be based in the Pacific Ocean. No strategic-level U.S. missile defenses had been establish in Europe or elsewhere to defend against Iranian missiles. While MDA studies had indicated that it was theoretically possible to intercept a missile launched from Iran toward the eastern United States using interceptors based at Fort Greely in Alaska, the engagement timelines for such an intercept posed serious problems and, consequently, the eastern parts of the United States remained vulnerable. Moreover, there was no existing radar system located in Europe that could locate and target offensive missiles launched by Iran. The large early-warning radar at Fylingdales in England could become part of such a system of radars, but first built in 1962 as part of the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System and significantly revamped 30 years later, it still would need to be upgraded to modern standards. Even so, it could not alone find missiles launched from Iran early enough in their flight to provide adequate warning and tracking. Also, the radar at Fylingdales itself could become a target during hostilities for presumed attack of multiple Iranian missiles. The concept of some sort of a missile defense system for Europe, however, was not new. Discussions for joint theater missile defense exercises between NATO and Russia were initiated in September 1994 by Presidents William Clinton and Boris Yeltsin. Since 1996, the two nations had undertaken several such joint activities employing computer simulations and focusing on communication systems. In March 2004, they held their initial exercise aimed at testing procedures, jointly developed, to defend their forces from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles.

Missile Defense in Europe

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Meanwhile, a partnership between the United States, Germany, and Italy under NATO was launched in 1996 to develop the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS). France had originally been a partner but dropped out before the Memorandum of Understanding was signed in May. MEADS itself came from an earlier air defense concept called Corps SAM (corps surface-to-air missile), which had been born, canceled, and then reborn on several occasions during the previous decade.6 In July 1996, NATO established a MEADS Management Agency to oversee the program. Originally a U.S. Army program, MEADS was envisioned to become a highly mobile system replacing the Hawk and Patriot air defense components, and protecting ground units against tactical ballistic missiles, aircraft, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles. Estimated then at a total program cost of $3.6 billion, full production was scheduled for fiscal year (FY)-2007.7 Protecting such a wide variety of targets was recognized as a technological challenge from the outset. Moreover, the complexities of managing a multinational missile defense program quickly led to delays. As the cost of MEADS was a concern, almost from the outset the United States began evaluating options for reducing the cost, including making greater use of a newer Patriot system—PAC-3. Consequently, today MEADS continues based on the PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement version of Patriot, a longer-range type of PAC-3. Flight testing of this new version has been scheduled to begin in 2012. * * * Since MEADS was never designed to handle long-range ballistic missiles, the Bush administration envisioned a more capable antimissile defense located at a “Third Site,” that is, interceptor and radar sites in Europe. The European locations were frequently referred to as the “Third Site,” following the first two major U.S. missile defense installations at Fort Greely in Alaska and at Vandenberg AFB, in California. Later the Third Site would come to be identified by various other labels such as the European Interceptor Site, European Midcourse Radar, or simply the “European Capability.” The first formal request by the Bush administration for appropriations to pay for “long-lead activity for ground-based interceptors at a potential third site” came in early 2004 as part of its FY-2005 budget request. In particular, the FY-2005 budget request explicitly called for “acquisition of up to ten (10) [exoatmospheric kill vehicles] EKVs and boosters for a third site.” However, beyond noting that the administration was “examining the possibility of placing some BMDs assets overseas, to enhance the protection of the U.S. homeland as well as for our allies and friends,” the budget request did not indicate where the “Third Site” would be located. When questioned about the “Third Site” in a March 11, 2004 hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, the head of the Missile Defense

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Agency, Lt. General Ronald Kadish, seemed confused about whether or not money had been requested for a third site, even after Senator Carl Levin read the president’s budget request to him, word for word. When Levin persisted in seeking the location of the third site, General Kadish responded: “That’s the reason why it’s not postulated fully in ’05, we still have to determine where that third site is going to be.”8 The Third Site plan was based on the prototype of the GMD system being deployed in Alaska and California. The interceptors, however, would be new two-stage versions of the three-stage interceptors in the GMD system. The X-band radar would be a similar to the ground-based radar (GBR-P) located at Kwajalein atoll in the Pacific Ocean that had been previously used in flight intercept tests. At that point, in early 2004, the MDA had conducted only eight flight intercept tests of the basic GMD system, and although five of those had been successful, the program had not had a successful flight intercept test since October 2002, and would not have another successful flight intercept test until September 2006. The rationale for seeking a third site interceptor location, promptly surmised to be in Europe by Washington insiders, was that those sites currently under construction could not readily defend the U.S. East Coast from Middle Eastern ballistic missiles.9 Even so, many members of Congress questioned the plans to expand U.S. missile defenses to Europe. Since the proposed missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic did not cover all of Europe, questions arose in Congress as to why the Pentagon would choose to “defend” some European countries and not others. Recognizing congressional resistance to the Third Site proposal, the Bush administration did not request significant funding for the next two years. Work continued at the MDA on the proposed missile defenses in Europe, and the Pentagon narrowed its site options. By the end of 2005, there was little doubt that the MDA had settled on Poland and the Czech Republic, with whom informal discussions had been ongoing for more than three years. In May 2006, the Czech government formally requested that the United States consider placing missile defenses in the Czech Republic.10 During the summer of 2006, the MDA conducted formal studies of sites in Poland and the Czech Republic and, on November 30, 2006, announced it had issued a noncompetitive contract to the Boeing Company “to support locating, designing, and establish a Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) missile complex in Europe.”11 Even though formal negotiations with Poland and the Czech Republic had not technically begun, the U.S. Army was designated the lead service in October 2006 for the proposed interceptor site in Poland. On December 27, 2006, just days after President Bush had replaced Donald Rumsfeld as secretary of defense, the new secretary, Robert Gates, recommended to President Bush that the United States place 10 ground-based interceptors in Poland and an advanced radar in the Czech Republic.12


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Meanwhile, tensions between Moscow and Washington had been mounting. On December 13, 2006, shortly before Gates gave his endorsement to President Bush, Yuri Baluyevsky, the head of the Russian general staff, publicly challenged U.S. plans. Speaking at a gathering of foreign military attachés in Moscow, Baluyevsky declared: “The creation of a U.S. anti-missile base cannot be viewed otherwise than as a major reconfiguration of the American military presence. Vanguard groupings of the U.S. armed forces in Europe have until now had no strategic components. This raises the question as to who U.S. antimissile plans are really targeted against, and what kind of implications they may have for Russia and Europe at large.” He also “expressed concern over the potential damage that may be caused to Russia’s environment by the nuclear warheads of missiles shot down over Russian soil.” Finally, Baluyevsky suggested that Russia might chose to withdraw from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty banning U.S. and Russian ground-launched cruise and ballistic missiles with ranges of 500 to 5,500 kilometers.13 In early 2007, the Bush administration requested that formal negotiations begin with both Poland and the Czech Republic, and discussions began in May. At this point the cooperative nature of proposed agreements were described in general terms, including that the Untied States and Poland (and the United States and the Czech Republic) would become strategic partners, that cooperation in missile defense was of mutual interest, that some forum such as a strategic cooperation consultative group would serve as a mechanism for discussing particulars, that there would be information sharing, and that there would be a sharing of workload by the host country. To kick off the negotiations, Secretary Robert Gates traveled to Warsaw to meet with Polish President Lech Kaczynski on April 24, 2007. For several reasons, not all European leaders were pleased with the Bush administration’s decision to undertake formal discussions with Poland and the Czech Republic. For example, there were southeastern European countries, such as Bulgaria, Greece, Romania and Turkey, that would not benefit from the proposed American antimissile system even though they were located closer to Iran. Lt. General Henry Obering, the new director of the MDA, acknowledged that interceptors based in Poland would not be able to protect southeastern Europe, but he suggested that separate systems might provide the necessary protection. Then, too, there was the fear that the Bush administration was ignoring NATO and the European Union. This concern was forcibly addressed by German Chancellor Angela Merkel in a March 13, 2007 interview. “Germany prefers a solution within NATO,” she declared, “and an open dialogue with Russia” regarding the proposed U.S. antimissile program. It was the chancellor’s opinion that European missile defense was a project “for the alliance collectively.” Washington officials indicated their willingness to inform its allies and Russia on its plans, but refused to provide NATO a voice in its antimissile program for Europe. French President Jacques Chirac argued that “we

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must be very careful, as regards this project, not to encourage the creation of new dividing lines in Europe or the return to an obsolete order.”14 Ignoring these concerns, the MDA requested $310.4 million in February 2007 for FY-2008 to begin site preparation and construction of the missile defense sites in Eastern Europe. Deployment of the Third Site systems was scheduled to begin in 2011 and to be completed by 2013 at a total cost of $4.04 billion. Observers concerned about U.S. defense spending may not have regarded this as a significant sum, but for the MDA it represented a major commitment to the European deployment. That this commitment was a high priority for the Bush administration was evidenced by an unusual letter sent to Vice President Richard Cheney, but addressed to him in his role as president of the U.S. Senate, and to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi. Dated May 21, 2007, the letter signed by Secretary of Defense Gates and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice urged the Congress “to fully fund the President’s FY-2008 request of $310 million to field missile defense capabilities in Europe.” Stating that “Some Iranian missiles can already reach parts of Europe,” the letter warned that a reduction in funding would delay, if not terminate, the fielding of missile defense assets in Europe, reducing U.S. security and that of our European allies.”15 Here was yet another example of the administration’s proclivity toward unilateral action. * * * At the G-8 Summit in early June 2007, the difficulties and complexities of proposed U.S. missile defenses in Europe were on full display. In the weeks preceding the G-8 Summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin had set the Bush administration—and the world—back on its heels with talk of Russian missiles aimed at Europe in retaliation for proposed U.S. missile defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic. Thus, the Bush administration thought there might be a G-8 confrontation over its proposed missile defense system. Then on June 7, Putin proposed a technical and policy solution that the Pentagon should have thought of first: establishing a missile defense radar site at the existing Qabala early warning radar station in Azerbaijan. Immediately following Putin’s surprise proposal, the question was how would the administration react? President George W. Bush said the proposal was an “interesting suggestion” and seemed to welcome a policy shift, but others in the administration appeared to immediately reject the offer. “One does not choose sites for missile defense out of the blue,” snapped Secretary of State Rice in an interview with the Associated Press. “It’s geometry and geography as to how you intercept a missile.”16 But in that short undiplomatic comment, Rice appeared not to appreciate either the geometrical or the geographical logic in Putin’s proposal. Russia had done its homework and proposed a site that was better for a missile defense from both American and Russian technical and policy


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points of view. Because of its location farther south, relative to the original sites Washington proposed in Poland and the Czech Republic, the Azerbaijan option had several advantages. At that location, missile defenses could cover all of Europe, including southeastern Europe, under the umbrella of the proposed U.S. ground-based system. Also, in an actual missile versus missile battle, the Azerbaijan site would minimize that problem of nuclear debris falling on Russia if U.S. missile defense interceptors sent Iranian missiles careening off course. However, a radar at Azerbaijan would not be able to “see” Russian missile launches going over the pole toward America, which meant that it could not be used to defend America from Russia. Within a week, Defense Secretary Gates quashed Putin’s idea, declaring that the Azerbaijan radar site could complement, but not replace, the proposed site in the Czech Republic. He did, however, commit to work with Russia on optimizing the coverage of Europe from short-range missiles, although the arrangements for meetings of U.S. and Russian experts to further explore U.S.-Russian missile defense cooperation could take months. Moscow apparently felt this cold shoulder toward its suggestions validated its concerns about U.S. intentions. Gates reported on June 15 that in his meeting with Russian Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov, the subject did not even come up. At the G-8 Summit, Putin also proposed locating the U.S. missile defense systems in Turkey, Iraq, or even on sea-based platforms. The Iraqi officials’ initial reaction focused on the fear that a U.S. missile defense site in Iraq could provide a new target, and new motivations, for insurgents. Two weeks later, during his visit with President Bush at Kennebunkport, Putin proposed locating a radar in southern Russia near Armavir, about 450 miles north of the Iranian border. Putin also proposed involving other countries through the NATO-Russia council, established in 2002, thereby eliminating the need for facilities in Poland or the Czech Republic. Again, Bush seemed to respond open mindedly, but still insisted the sites in Poland and the Czech Republic were required.17 In putting forward his proposals to locate U.S. missile defenses in Azerbaijan or in southern Russia, Putin questioned the efficacy of the proposed sites in Poland and the Czech Republic. Repeatedly the U.S. Congress had withheld funding for construction at these sites. If Congress had become increasingly skeptical, Putin’s proposals suggested that they had reason to be. Perhaps the two sites were not optimum. Also, under the agreements the administration sought with Poland and the Czech Republic, the proposed missile defense sites would essentially become sovereign U.S. territory, similar to an embassy. It remained to be seen whether Poland or the Czech Republic would agree to this arrangement, and perhaps neither Russia nor Azerbaijan would agree to it either. To complicate the issue further, on June 17, 2007, Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Mohammad Ali Hosseini said that Russian officials had indicated to Tehran that Putin

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did not intend for his Azerbaijan proposal to provoke Iran. “It seems Russia does not plan to make decisions that may cause instability and insecurity in the region, where it [Russia] is located,” Hosseini said, reminding all concerned that Azerbaijan shares borders with both Russia to the north and Iran to the south. Putin understood that Washington was in no rush to deploy U.S. missile defenses in Eastern Europe to defend against an Iranian threat. Even if it were, the American systems that could be deployed in the near term would not be effective under realistic operational conditions. The MDA had indicated that, at best, they could currently handle only what they called “an unsophisticated threat,” that is, just one or two missiles from Iran, with no decoys or countermeasures. The MDA definition of the supposed threat raised a significant question: Would Iran be so suicidal as to attack Europe or the United States with only one or two missiles and then sit back and wait for the consequences? From the outset, the Poland/Czech Republic arrangements raised a serious question about what state the antimissiles were defending against? Was it really to defend against Iran, as advertised, or was it an attempt by the Pentagon to locate new military forces close to Russia and/or to defend the United States from a Russian missile attack? Also, by establishing new U.S. military forces in Poland and the Czech Republic, the arrangement provided comfort to some Polish and Czech officials who saw it as a renewed American commitment to the defense and security of their countries vis-à-vis Russia. In both countries, however, the overall public reaction was quite the opposite. Opinion polls showed that 60 to 70 percent of the general populations in these countries opposed the creation of U.S. antimissile sites on their territory. In October 2007, at a news conference following the Russia-European Union summit in Portugal, President Putin drew the analogy with the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 when the Soviet Union based missiles in Cuba that could easily reach the Untied States. “The situation is quite similar technologically for us,” Putin said. “We have withdrawn the remains of bases from Vietnam and Cuba, but such threats are being created near our borders.”18 Just as 46 years ago America saw Russian missiles in Cuba as an alarming threat, Russia clearly felt that the proposed U.S. missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic were too close to its territory. Of course, the Soviet missiles in Cuba were offensive, whereas the proposed U.S. interceptors in Poland were to be defensive. Nevertheless, because the U.S. proposal flew in the face of the Joint Declaration issued in conjunction with the Moscow Treaty, signed by Presidents Bush and Putin, it was understandable that the Russian president was annoyed. Putin also noted that the U.S. decision to deploy missile defenses close to Russia was presaged by the unilateral withdrawal in 2002 of the United States from the 1972 ABM Treaty, which President Nixon and Soviet Communist Party Secretary Leonid Brezhnev signed in Moscow.


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Given Washington’s unilateral handling of the aforementioned accords, it is not surprising that Russia regarded the proposed U.S. interceptors as potentially offensive. These U.S. interceptor missiles were to be two-stage variants of the proven Pegasus missiles, which have enough payload and thrust to carry satellites into low-earth orbit. Accordingly, these missiles could easily carry nuclear warheads aimed at targets in Russia. Moscow was unwilling to take the Pentagon’s word that these missiles were only for defense and would not carry a lethal offensive payload. Russia’s suggested verification and inspection provisions to accompany the deployment of U.S. missile defenses in Europe could take years of negotiations to reach an agreement. The Bush officials, however, were determined to get cement poured in Europe, literally at the proposed missile defense sites, and figuratively in terms of concrete agreements with Poland and the Czech Republic. This view was obviously based on the premise that, once such action was taken, it would be difficult for a new administration to halt the program. Another stake in the ground, critics complained. The Pentagon would accept nothing that might derail the deployment of U.S. missile defenses in Eastern Europe beyond the time remaining for the Bush administration. Yet, the MDA had spent five years in discussions with Poland and the Czech Republic, and the desired agreements were still not in hand. Even if the first agreements were signed in 2008, serious issues would remain to be resolved in the last few months left in the Bush administration. Accepting the Putin proposal would have left it up to the next American president to decide whether to establish U.S. missile defenses in Europe, but the Bush administration wanted the matter settled before its term was up. In addition, the Pentagon felt that Azerbaijan is too close to Russia from a military standpoint for its comfort—too much “under the thumb” of Russia. Putin’s references to the existing Azerbaijan radar site may have meant that he intended for it to be a Russian-managed or -controlled site, a situation that the Pentagon was not likely to accept. The existing Russian arrangement with the Qabala radar station in Azerbaijan was a 10-year lease that would expire in 2012, but had an option for renewal. Putin’s proposal, however, opened up new options for U.S. cooperation that America needed, and that would carry over to the Obama administration. For example, a second site was needed for a powerful, transportable forward-based radar whose location had yet to be determined but was intended to be closer to Iran than the site in the Czech Republic. Negotiations over this second radar site could bring additional Russian objections. As for the 10 new interceptors the administration proposed to base in Poland, they were not yet developed or tested and, at the time, were not scheduled to be tested until 2010.19 During a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing with on April 11, 2007, the director of the Missile Defense Agency Lt. General Obering explained that the agency was requesting money for 10 interceptors for

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Europe or, if not in Europe, for U.S. locations. He said that if agreement on the European sites took too long to wrap up, then the agency wanted to buy 10 interceptors for the American sites instead. “Why?” asked Senator Bill Nelson from Florida. “We don’t want to lose the money,” responded Obering.20 * * * If Poland and the Czech Republic each had their own reasons for agreeing to America’s basing requests, they also shared some doubts. Neither country faced a threat from Iran, but by hosting U.S. missile defenses in their territory, they could motivate new animosity in Iran and among Muslim populations toward Poland and the Czech Republic. In an actual ballistic missile attack, Poland and the Czech Republic would become, as simply a matter of ordinary military tactics, the first targets that an enemy would attack. By attacking the X-band radar, an enemy could blind the system so that it could not see attacking missiles, and by attacking the interceptors in their silos, an enemy could disable the interceptors themselves. This meant that beyond the threat that other European countries might face, Poland and the Czech Republic could require special missile or other effective defenses designed just to protect those two sites.

Director of Missile Defense Agency Lt. General Henry A. Obering (left), and Polish President Lech Kaczynski. Photo by Airman 1st Class Keyonna Fennell. (Courtesy: Department of Defense)


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Poland and the Czech Republic might also request other security guarantees for taking on the new risk of becoming targets. Obering had told the press in January 2007, however, that MDA had no plans to put Patriot or Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems at the proposed European sites. Not that Patriot or THAAD could necessarily be depended on, but the MDA did not plan to deploy Patriot or THAAD at the European sites “for deterrence,” as it had in Japan. If either Poland or the Czech Republic wanted to buy missile defense systems such as Patriot or THAAD, however, that would be a different situation. Also, to the extent that Russia saw the proposed U.S. missile defenses as a threat, Russia could readily retaliate in serious ways toward Poland or the Czech Republic, especially if U.S.-Russian relations turned hostile. For example, President Putin had threatened that Russia might target Poland and the Czech Republic with the deployment of medium-range Iskander offensive missiles in the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad on the Polish border.21 Taken more broadly, Europe as a whole also did not face a threat from Iran, but by cooperating with the United States, Poland and the Czech Republic might become a more frequent target of terrorists or even cause Europe to be viewed less favorably by Iran. In turn, the potential impact of the U.S. plans for missile defenses in Europe also raised concerns in NATO. The bilateral agreements being sought with Poland and the Czech Republic were outside of NATO and detrimental to the spirit of NATO. The Bush plan threatened to divide Europe and raised questions about the effectiveness of Article 5 of the NATO charter. Article 5 held, in a general sense, that an attack on any one member of NATO was to be considered an attack on all members. Many policymakers in the United States and Europe argued that the establishment of any missile defense system in Europe should proceed solely under NATO auspices, rather than on a bilateral basis with just three NATO partners—the U.S., Poland, and the Czech Republic. At the same time, there were many other difficult items on the NATO agenda, not the least of which were the U.S. call for increased NATO support in Afghanistan and the expansion of NATO to include Croatia and Albania, and perhaps eventually Georgia and Ukraine. Russia strongly opposed enlargement of NATO in general, and NATO expansion to include countries of the former Soviet Union in particular. The NATO Summit in Bucharest Romania in early April 2008 discussed all these contentious issues. As for the proposed antimissile shield, the Bucharest Summit did not confront the issue of its integration with NATO and, instead, issued a diplomatically supportive endorsement of the Bush plan.22 Thus the Polish and Czech people, as well as NATO, found themselves in the middle of an international struggle over missile defenses in Europe. This struggle had already pitted Russia and the United States against each

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other in stressful ways not seen since the end of the Cold War and raised questions about the cohesiveness of NATO. * * * Under the Bush administration, the Department of Defense spent about $10 billion per year on missile defense, a large enough sum to attract the attention of Congress year after year. At the April 11, 2007, Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, referred to previously, Brian Green, deputy assistant secretary of defense for Strategic Capabilities, OSD [Office of Secretary of Defense] Policy, stated that the Third Site arrangements would be executive agreements and, therefore, would not require congressional approval. Congress apparently did not agree. In acting on the FY-2008 budget, the House of Representatives cut out all funds, about $85 million, for preparation and construction of the European sites. The House, however, did authorize $42.7 million for the development of the new twostage interceptors needed for the site in Poland. The Senate concurred, cutting all funds for site preparation and construction. Green also said that although the administration would consult with NATO, the agreement on the interceptors and radar would be bilateral agreements and would require U.S. ownership. Senator Nelson asked him what would happen if either European nation decided not to go forward. Green had no answer. Many in Congress understood that a considerable number of Czech and Polish citizens opposed the proposal because they feared that the U.S. plan would not lead to enhanced security, but rather would create new dangers and insecurities. Thus the participants of the International Conference against the Militarization of Europe, which took place in Prague on May 5, 2007, issued the Prague Declaration, rejecting the proposed U.S. missile defense system in Europe. There were also members of Congress who harbored doubts about the effectiveness of the proposed system—would it really work? On the occasion of the July 2007 visit of Polish President Lech Kaczynski to Washington D.C. and Vandenberg AFB, then Senator and presidential candidate Barack Obama expressed this concern diplomatically: “If we can responsibly deploy missile defenses that would protect us and our allies we should—but only when the system works. We need to make sure any missile defense system would be effective before deployment.”23 In its actions on the FY-2008 budget, Congress repeatedly expressed its concerns. The House Armed Services Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee, or both, stated that the proposed deployment was premature, questioned the adequacy of the proposed testing plan, called for formal studies of alternatives to the Bush administration’s proposed system, limited funding until bilateral agreements with Poland and the Czech Republic have been negotiated and ratified, required a joint Department of Defense/Department of States study of how the proposed system would be integrated into NATO, and required a joint Defense and


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State report on the role that shorter range missile defense systems such as Aegis and THAAD might play in the proposed system. In addition, Congress required that before site preparation and construction could begin, a study must be completed by an independent federally funded research and development center of options for the missile defense of Europe. Before funds would be authorized to buy and deploy interceptors in Poland, Congress also required the secretary of defense to certify that the proposed two-stage interceptor “has demonstrated, through successful, operationally realistic flight testing, a high probability of working in an operationally effective manner.”24 The old adage, “the president proposes, the Congress disposes,” was at work, and Congress was telling the president in no uncertain terms that it controlled the purse strings. Russia’s hostile reaction to the proposed U.S. missile defense sites relatively close to its borders also troubled members of Congress. In response to the proposed U.S. military sites, Russia had announced the successful development of new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), warned that its nuclear weapons might have to be aimed at Europe, put its strategic bombers back in the air on training flights, and threatened to pull out of the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty. On December 12, 2007, President Putin also announced that Russia had suspended its participation in the treaty restricting deployments of Conventional Forces in Europe, potentially bringing back the Cold War. By cutting funds for site construction in Europe, Congress sent a message to President Bush that it did not want a new Cold War with Russia and that the issues in Poland and the Czech Republic were with their independent-minded citizens, not with their governments that supported Bush. Congress was emphatic about the emerging situation, especially with not starting a new Cold War with Russia. In early March 2008, President Bush tried to smooth relations with Russia by writing Putin that they should recognize “the legacy that both presidents are leaving behind”—an obvious reference to the Russian and American elections taking place in 2008. President Putin, subsequently acknowledged the existence of the letter and stated, “It’s a serious document and we analyzed it carefully.” Reportedly the letter addressed several items that had been contentious between Russia and the United States including missile defense in Europe; the Treaty of Conventional Forces in Europe, which Russia had suspended a year earlier in part in protest of U.S. missile defense plans; and the Strategic Arms Reduction treaty, which was due to expire in December 2009.25 Gates and Rice traveled to Moscow on March 17, 2008, for two-plus-two talks with their counterparts, Defense Minister Anatoliy Eduardovich Serdyukov and Foreign Affairs Minister Sergey Lavrov. They also met with President-Elect Dimitri Medvedev. Gates, who had fallen on the ice outside his home and broken his arm on February 12, joked that with his arm in a sling he would not be “nearly as difficult a negotiator.” “We’ll see,” Medvedev rejoined.26

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Gates told Moscow that to calm their concerns over the proposed missile defense system, the United States would promise not to turn it on until Iran had demonstrated that it had a missile capable of reaching Europe. Despite this offer, an unusually warm welcome by Putin, and the diplomatic effort by Gates and Rice to reach out to Moscow by traveling “out of the usual rotation” (the next such meeting was to have been in Washington, D.C.), Russia’s fundamental objections to the proposed antimissile system were not alleviated.27 * * * To accomplish its program, the Bush administration needed to negotiate two different agreements with Poland and the Czech Republic. First, general BMD agreements were required to create the basis for cooperation with the United States and establish the understandings between the parties as to their respective roles. Second, supplementary status of forces agreements (SOFA) were needed with both Poland and the Czech Republic to define such matters as the legal status of U.S. military and civilian personnel working at the proposed sites, civil and criminal jurisdictions, property liabilities, and employment for host-country nationals. On March 3, 2008, the Bush administration concluded negotiations with the Czech Republic establishing a bilateral ballistic missile defense cooperation pact that was formally announced a month later. Secretary of State Rice signed the agreement with Czech Foreign Minister Schwarzenberg in Prague on July 8. In its bilateral negotiations with Washington, Poland had lagged behind the Czech Republic, due in part to internal politics. The elections in October 2007 changed the Polish government and the next month the new government was formed with Donald Tusk as the new prime minister. Tusk was committed to working within a NATO framework, while also expressing Poland’s interest in its own security before that of the United States. Even so, the Polish government on August 14, 2008 concluded negotiations for ballistic missile defense cooperation. Secretary Rice signed the BMD agreement with Polish Foreign minister Sikorski in Warsaw on August 20. Twenty-four hours later Russia’s Deputy Chief of Staff General Anatoly Nogovitsyn warned Poland that it was “exposing itself to a strike-100 per cent.” He told the Russian Interfax news agency: “By hosting these, Poland is making itself a target. This is 100 per cent certain. It becomes a target for attack. Such targets are destroyed as a first priority.”28 The Polish government had indicated earlier that it was not fear of Iranian missiles that prompted their decision to join the U.S. missile defense program. When Sikorski visited Washington in January, he made it clear that his government “does not feel directly threatened by Iran.” Rather, he noted, by having the United States locate a base in Poland, this “will make [our] security mutually dependent for decades.” The Polish prime minister added that with U.S. antimissiles would also come American-supported modernization of Polish military forces—it would be “one package.”29


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In the face of Russia’s threatening posture, the recently concluded agreements with Poland and the Czech Republic would have to be ratified by their respective parliaments. The prospects were poor for that happening before President Bush’s second term ended. Washington completed the SOFA with the Czech Republic as Secretary Gates signed the agreement with Czech Defense Minister Vlasta Parkanova at London on September 19, 2008. The SOFA for Poland, however, was still unresolved. Complicating the process was the fact the ratification of the BMD agreements and the SOFA became intertwined. Since Washington had not completed its negotiations with Warsaw over a SOFA and, since both agreements required ratification by their respective parliaments, delays compounded. The Czech Republic decided that construction could begin on the radar site once both of its agreements with the United States were ratified, but Poland decided that construction could not begin at the missile interceptor site until all agreements had been ratified in both parliaments. By September 2008, elections were looming in the United States and progress was halted on Bush’s proposal for missile defenses in Europe. On October 29, 2008, the Czech Republic announced that it would place further efforts toward ratification on hold until after the inauguration of the next American president. “We want a delay,” explained Czech Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek, “to make sure about the attitude of the new American administration.”30 In November, immediately after the U.S. presidential elections, Poland placed its ratification process on hold recognizing that until the new Obama administration had completed its Ballistic Missile Defense Review and determined its policy toward missile defenses in Europe, little progress could be achieved.31 * * * During 2007 and 2008, the U.S. Congress began calling for a new approach to missile defense in Europe. In the House of Representatives, Democratic Congresswoman Ellen Tauscher, chair of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Services, focused attention on the need to defend against the existing threat from Iran’s short and medium range missiles that had already been flight-tested. She and others in Congress also called for defending U.S. troops overseas from shortrange missile attack, including U.S. troops stationed in Europe. Tauscher pointed out the capabilities of the mobile, shorter-range U.S. missile defense systems, such as the Navy’s Aegis BMD system, and the Army’s THAAD and Patriot systems, and worked to shift funding to such systems and away from the fixed ground-based missile system designed to defeat ICBMs. Significantly, Tauscher also declared that missile defenses in Europe should not be bilateral arrangements, but should be under the umbrella of NATO, and be “NATO-ized.” Some Republican members of Congress also supported these suggestions and favored using the Navy’s Aegis BMD system that had been successfully flight-tested.

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For FY-2009, the Bush administration requested $712 million for missile defense in Europe. Once again Congress expressed its concerns that were incorporated into a Continuing Resolution signed into law by President Bush on September 30, 2008. Congress had approved $467 million for the European sites and for development and testing of the two-stage interceptor. Funding for the radar site, however, was withheld until the Czech Republic ratified its basing agreement with the United States and the SOFA. Similarly, funds were withheld for the Polish interceptor site until after both the Polish and Czech governments ratified their basing agreements and after Poland ratified its SOFA with the United States. Also, Congress required that the secretary of defense certify that the proposed two-stage interceptor “has demonstrated through successful, operationally realistic flight testing, a high probability of working in an operationally effective manner and the ability to accomplish the mission.”32 But at this point, no further progress was made regarding the bilateral agreements with Poland and the Czech Republic; thus, for the remainder of the Bush administration, most of the funds that Congress had authorized were frozen. Going into the November 2008 elections, the question was would the next president continue the Bush program? Senator McCain had indicated strongly that he would, but Senators Clinton and Obama had been more circumspect. After Barack Obama’s election as president, his transition team posted its policy statement about national missile defense: “The Obama-Biden Administration will support missile defense, but ensure that it is developed in a way that is pragmatic and cost-effective; and, most importantly, does not divert resources from other national security priorities until we are positive the technology will protect the American public.”33 What this policy would mean in practice, once the Obama administration began to govern, kept defense contractors and think tanks wondering for nearly a year, given that the Obama administration had many new priorities. The new administration quickly showed itself to be pragmatic, but considering that the Bush administration had been spending more than $10 billion per year on missile defense, how would the Obama administration interpret “cost-effective?” Also, how could the Obama administration be “positive” that missile defense technology would protect the American public, let alone our allies in Europe? More fundamental, perhaps, was the question, Would the next U.S. president see the threat in the same terms as had President Bush? From its first days in office, the Bush administration had been emphasizing the threat from attacks with ICBMs from North Korea or Iran. How would the Obama administration view the missile threat, and what systems would it select to deal with that threat?

CHAPTER 5

North Korean and Iranian Missile Programs: Their Regional Impact

The Bush administration’s decision to deploy a ballistic missile defense system, according to Washington officials, was designed only to destroy missiles launched at the United States or its allies by the remaining members of the “axis of evil.” If administration officials hoped that this demonstration of American technology would cause Pyongyang and Tehran to halt their efforts to build ballistic missiles, they were disappointed. Yet while Washington emphasized its determination to erect a defense against North Korean and Iranian long-range missiles, it was not their ballistic missiles that were the major concern; rather, it was the cargo the missiles might be carrying. Consequently, the Bush administration also sought to prevent these two countries from developing weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear warheads. Although the efforts of America and other nations failed to prevent North Korea’s joining the nuclear club, discussions continued to secure restrictions on Pyongyang’s missiles and to persuade the North Koreans to restrict their nuclear activities. In the Middle East, multilateral negotiations have persisted in seeking to limit Iran’s nuclear programs to civilian uses while drawing Eastern European countries into a possible defense network against Tehran’s missiles. Moreover, the U.S. announced deployment of a missile defense system, which epitomized the heady unilateralism that dominated George W. Bush’s first term, had a ripple effect. It raised security questions that impacted nations in different regions of the world. Since the administration initially ruled out direct diplomatic contacts with the designated rogue states, officials in Pyongyang and Tehran could only wonder whether utterances by various neoconservatives suggesting the need for “regime

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changes” was driving U.S. policies. When North Korea responded aggressively with missile and nuclear tests, these actions persuaded concerned Japanese officials to expand their missile defense activities and raised fears in some quarters that Japan might “go nuclear.” With the Bush administration’s initial Pacific focus, Beijing immediately became suspicious that these defensive systems were aimed at diminishing the deterrent effect of its ballistic missiles. Soon Washington found itself concerned about a modestly growing Chinese missile arsenal, including antimissile systems. As a result of China and Pakistan’s missile activity, India—who had earlier rejected the idea of missile defense—began to reconsider its decision. Finally, the possibility of a hostile Iran equipped with ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads, which Washington claimed required antimissile sites in Eastern Europe, also found Israel focusing considerably more attention on its own fledgling antimissile system. * * * America’s concern with North Korea’s ambitious program for developing ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons predated the arrival of George W. Bush’s administration. The recurring crises that have defined negotiations with North Korea began in the mid-1980s and stemmed from many factors, including Pyongyang’s errors in judgment, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) missteps, and Washington’s poorly managed policies. After North Korea joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in late 1985, the initial crisis arose when the IAEA sent the wrong supplemental safeguards document, which Pyongyang refused to sign. The Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula of December 1992 temporarily resolved the crisis only for it to flare up again in March 1993 when North Korea withdrew from the NPT. The Clinton administration’s diplomatic efforts temporarily persuaded North Korea to halt developing nuclear weapons, exporting short-range missiles, and experimenting with longer range ballistic missiles. In the October 1994 Agreed Framework, Pyongyang agreed to freeze and eventually dismantle its nuclear arms project in exchange for Washington’s assistance in constructing two new more proliferation-resistant, small nuclear reactors; providing an interim supply of heavy-fuel oil; easing some trade restrictions; and gradually improving the relations between the two countries. In particular, Washington was to stop threatening North Korea. U.S. diplomats believed they got what they wanted in halting North Korea’s processing of plutonium, but assistance in constructing the two small reactors was delayed. Since congressional Republicans denounced the deal as appeasement, the Clinton administration did not insist on funds to construct the new reactors. Consequently, the first replacement reactor, which was to be completed in 2003, fell three years behind schedule. Moreover, the agreed upon fuel oil was not always delivered on time and a presidential visit by President Clinton to Pyongyang failed to materialize.1

North Korean and Iranian Missile Programs

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Meanwhile, North Korean technicians had been pressing ahead with their development of ballistic missiles. After obtaining a Soviet-made Scud-B missile from Egypt, by 1984 they had employed reverse engineering to create the Hwasong-5, and in June 1990 successfully tested an upgraded version, the Hwasong-6, which was believed to have a range of 500–600 kilometers. In the late 1980s, North Korea developed an extended version of the Scud, the No Dong (ND)-1, designed to have a range of 1,000 to 1,300 kilometers. Pyongyang launched four test missiles in May 1993, but one apparently was a ND-1 that traveled 500 kilometers. Their target was believed to be a buoy in the direction of Japan, an act that Tokyo authorities regarded as threatening their security. The test also caught the attention of officials in Washington.2 Initially American officials, concerned with Pyongyang’s export of missiles, imposed economic sanctions in March 1992 against specific North Korea companies for their traffic in missile components. After the 1994 Agreed Framework, the first of a series of bilateral missile discussions took place in April 1996, with Washington officials urging Pyongyang to join the voluntary international Missile Technology Control Regime to regulate sales of ballistic missiles, components, and technology. The North Koreans emphasized that these transactions provided a significant amount of revenue and insisted, unsuccessfully, on compensation for any financial losses resulting from halting such sales. In a June meeting the next year, after the United States failed to stop the North Korean deployment of its No Dong missile or its trade in Scud missiles, Washington began imposing additional economic sanctions on Pyongyang. The United Nations and other countries also applied economic penalties. The so-called Rumsfeld Commission’s report in July 1998 claimed that North Korea and Iran had the capability to produce operational long-range ballistic missiles “with little or no warning” from U.S. intelligence agencies. The Commission’s unclassified executive summary emphasized that: “The newer ballistic missile-equipped nations [North Korea, Iran, and Iraq] . . .would be able to inflict major destruction on the U.S. within about five years of a decision to acquire such a capability. . . . During several of those years, the U.S. might not be aware that such a decision had been made.” The summary also insisted that any nation that possessed “a welldeveloped, Scud-based ballistic missile infrastructure” could, within five years of making the decision, be ready to test an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). North Korea and Iran, who the commission claimed to be developing nuclear weapons, have put “a high priority on threatening U.S. territory, and each is even now pursuing advanced ballistic missile capabilities to pose a direct threat to U.S. territory.”3 In his 2003 critique, Greg Thielmann, formerly of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, questioned the Rumsfeld Commission’s assumption that a single-stage, short-range ballistic missile could be enhanced into a multiple-stage ICBM. This notion of a feasible “straight-line, relatively

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rapid, and predictable progression” was, he argued, “both ahistorical and unrealistic.”4 On August 31, 1998, North Korea launched a three-stage Taepo Dong (TD)-1 missile, with a range of 1,500 to 2,000 kilometers in an unsuccessful attempt to place a satellite in orbit. Satellite photos revealed that the initial stage was a ND-1 and the second a Hwasong-6. Western analysts, observing that after launch the first and second stage separated at 300 and 1,380 kilometers, respectively, were surprised at North Korea’s ability to design and manufacture multiple-stage missiles. Analysts were even more surprised that there was a third stage, although it failed just before reaching orbit. In this tense environment, the administration held an additional round of bilateral missiles talks with Pyongyang. The October 1, 1998 meeting resulted in little progress as the North Koreans rejected the U.S. request that it end its missile programs in exchange for the lifting of economic sanctions. The talks in March 1999 resulted only in Washington describing them as “serious and intensive”; however, in September, Pyongyang agreed to a moratorium on its testing of long-range missiles as long as the negotiations continued. The agreement, negotiated by Defense Secretary William Perry, held for several years. In return Washington would lift some of its economic sanctions. At the same time, a U.S. National Intelligence Estimate concluded that, by 2015, North Korea would “most likely” possess an ICBM able to carry a 200-kilogram warhead to targets on the American mainland. The continuing talks, in July 2000, found Pyongyang demanding $1 billion a year compensation in return for ceasing its missile sales, a proposal Washington immediately rejected. In subsequent meetings with various groups, North Korean leader Kim Jong II suggested he might halt “developing rockets when the United States” or other interested parties stepped “forward and launches our satellites.” While the State Department claimed to be seriously considering this offer, nothing positive resulted.5 North Korean officials had hoped that the Clinton era negotiations would continue with President Bush’s administration. In March 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell told the press that the new administration planned “to engage with North Korea to pick up where President Clinton left off. Some promising elements were left on the table and we will be examining those elements.” Indicating that negotiations were not imminent, Bush informed the media on March 7 that he looked “forward to, at some point in the future, having a dialogue with the North Koreans, but that any negotiations would require complete verification of the terms of a potential agreement.” Bush went on to question whether the North Koreans were “keeping all terms of all agreements.” Not surprisingly, the Korean Central News Agency responded by calling the U.S. new attitude “hostile” and noted that the Pyongyang government remained “fully prepared for both dialogue and war.” Yet at a Moscow meeting on August 4, Kim Jong II reiterated his promise to hold off any ballistic missile flight-


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tests until 2003, a pledge that Pyongyang modified in mid-September 2002 to an indefinite period as part of an agreement with Tokyo. The Bush administration showed little interest in meeting with Pyongyang for nearly two years until after the Japanese opened discussions with North Korea. The president had publicly repudiated South Korea’s efforts to foster friendly relations between the North and South. He discouraged South Korea from providing the North with electricity, spoke disparagingly of Kim Jong Il and, finally, in his January 2002 State of the Union address labeled North Korea a member of an “axis of evil.” Bush also refused to reaffirm the previous administration’s October 12, 2000 pledge to North Korea of “no hostile intent” and adopted a unilateral position. Interpreting this American position as threatening, North Korea retreated to its pre-1994 demands. During Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly’s visit to Pyongyang on October 3, 2002, Washington charged that North Korean officials acknowledge the existence of a covert nuclear program in violation of the Agreed Framework—a charge the North Koreans repeatedly denied. The 1994 Agreed Framework restricted North Korea’s efforts to obtain plutonium. This alleged new violation over its uranium program was not covered by the Agreed Framework, but was considered by Washington officials as a violation “in spirit.” Consequently, heavyfuel oil shipments to North Korea were suspended in November. Pyongyang repeatedly called for a nonaggression pact in return for which they intimated they would terminate their nuclear projects. Not receiving any encouragement from Washington, North Korea pulled out of the Nonproliferation Treaty in January 2003, having earlier sent IAEA inspectors home. On June 9 they formally declared they were pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. Meanwhile in January, North Korea’s ambassador to China indicated that his government no longer felt it could “go along with the self-imposed missile moratorium any longer.”6 Policymakers in the Bush administration appeared unable to agree on policy options, especially one that would allow the search for a diplomatic solution. Those who argued North Korea could be persuaded to abandon its nuclear program in exchange for economic aid and other incentives, including a guarantee of security, pushed the diplomatic option. Their more influential opponents, however, profoundly disliked the Pyongyang government and lobbied for severe economic and political pressure to bring about its capitulation or collapse. In 2003, one of the most outspoken hardliners, Vice President Dick Cheney, bluntly stated their position: “We don’t negotiate with evil; we defeat it.” A U.S. military response was not likely since it would require dealing with 1 million North Korean soldiers and their artillery and missiles that could easily destroy Seoul—a prospect that South Korea would not relish—and put at risk the 30,000 American troops stationed nearby. Nevertheless, the ideologically driven members of the Bush administration initially found arms control measures distasteful and paid little attention to negotiations to expand nuclear nonproliferation.

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They chose instead, Peter Scoblic pointed out, to “denounce the nuclear ambitions of ‘evil’ countries while tolerating, occasionally facilitating, the spread of nuclear weapons to nations that passed Washington’s current political litmus tests.” This scorning of the 1968 NPT, Scoblic has written, was one of the administration’s “more bizarre and foolish stands.”7 The administration continued to indicate that it wanted a peaceful solution, but it would not deal directly with the North Koreans. The search for a political solution shifted to multilateral talks with Pyongyang. Throughout 2003, however, the Bush administration was unable to offer much constructive assistance to the Chinese—who had emerged at the center of the negotiations—in order to elicit concessions from the North Koreans. Chinese Vice Minister Wang Yi told reporters “the main problem we are facing” was not the North Koreans, but the lack of a helpful American policy. The multilateral talks continued, with the United States taking on a more positive role after President Bush’s reelection. During discussions in June 2004, Washington presented its first detailed proposal, which failed to achieve results. The six-party talks, involving North and South Korea, the United States, Russia, China, and Japan, continued throughout 2004 and 2005 with general recognition of a desire for a “verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” The inability to reach an agreement centered, in large part, on Pyongyang’s insistence on a peaceful nuclear energy program and Washington’s refusal to endorse North Korea’s possession of light-water reactors.8 At the center of the problem was North Korea’s desire for face-to-face discussions with the United States and the Bush administration’s reluctance to do so. In 2006, Pyongyang defied its negotiating partners with new missile flight tests and its first nuclear test. On July 4–5, North Korea launched several short- and medium-range missiles, and a long-range Taepo Dong (TD)-2 ballistic missile that could travel 3,600–4,300 kilometers. Although the TD-2 failed within a minute after launch, it prompted North Korea’s neighbors and the United States to condemn the tests and Japan to initiate an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council to review possible sanctions. Pyongyang ignored international protests on the grounds that launching a missile was “an issue that is entirely within our sovereignty. No one has the right to dispute it.” Three months later, on October 9, North Korea conducted its first underground nuclear test that again led to international protests. The UN Security Council’s Resolution 1718 imposed additional sanctions and demanded that Pyongyang cease “further nuclear tests or launch ballistic missiles.” Although some officials in Washington worried about what they saw as the new North Korean threat, Admiral William J. Fallon, USN, downplayed the latest North Korean effort to testfire a long-range ballistic missile. He insisted that their missiles were not capable of reaching long distances and were not likely to achieve this feat “for a while.” Moreover, Fallon declared, “The fact that it [the TD-2] failed, and the fact that apparently the last time they did this, which was eight


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years ago, it was also a failure, indicates some problem.” He argued that: “Before we could credibly give them a capability, or assign a capability, they’d have to demonstrate an ability to actually get a missile off the pad and have it fly at long range.”9 In a continuing show of defiance, the North Koreans continued to testfire a number of short-range missiles during 2007 and 2008. Then on April 5, 2009, they launched a TD-2, three-stage ballistic missile, the first stage of which fell into the Sea of Japan, while the other stages along with its cargo fell into the Pacific Ocean. Although Pyongyang claimed the TD-2 placed a satellite in orbit, the U.S. Northern Command reported “no object entered into orbit.” Nevertheless, American intelligence and military experts were concerned about North Korea’s progress in its missile technology. Following a UN Security Council’s condemnation of its latest missile launch, North Korea withdrew from the six-party talks, set off a second underground nuclear test on May 25, and launched another series of short-range missiles. In a series of test firings, North Korea launched a total of 11 missiles on July 2 and 4, 2009. Several of these were short-range KN-01 missiles with a 60-mile range, together with four Scuds and three medium range No Dong missiles that traveled 240 to 310 miles before landing in the Sea of Japan. The Obama administration condemned these latest launches, but it was the Japanese government who labeled them a “serious act of provocation against the security of neighboring countries.”10 * * * Not surprisingly, officials in Tokyo and Seoul had become more and more interested in establishing missile defenses as North Korea continued building and testing its missiles. All of Japan and South Korea was within reach Pyongyang’s arsenal of more than 1,000 missiles. Tokyo’s initial, but cautious, steps in developing an antimissile program began with a modest grant by the Reagan administration in the late 1980s. When North Korea’s surprise ballistic missile test in August 1998 flew over Japanese territory, it stimulated renewed interest in ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems. Consequently, the U.S.-Japanese cooperation that increased in 1999 focused on basic research on components for ship-based missile interceptors. The Japanese government decided in December 2003 to expand its missile defense capabilities, but, in part because of Japanese constitutional restrictions, Tokyo indicated it would not tie itself to America’s global BMD system. Government officials declared that its defense system “aims at defending Japan, will be operated based on Japan’s independent judgment, and will not be used for the purpose of defending third countries.”11 Subsequently, in May 2004, Japan approached the Unites States to purchase nine ship-based missiles, the Standard Missile-3, which Tokyo intended to deploy by 2007 as part of its basic antimissile system. These interceptor missiles were to be assigned to one of Japan’s four Aegis-type

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destroyers to provide protection from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. Tokyo also prepared to upgrade its land-based antimissile systems by replacing its six U.S. Patriot (PAC-2) missile batteries with the newer Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) systems. At the end of March 2008, the Japanese completed installation of the fourth PAC-3 battery intended to defend Tokyo. Later, in September, Japanese Air Self Defense personnel participated in a successful test of the PAC-3 system at the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico. By using a pair of PAC-3 interceptors, the Japanese battery destroyed a ballistic missile target 120 kilometers away. It was hoped that the test might reveal what kind of debris pattern might be expected from a successful intercept, especially over populated areas. This episode not only established Tokyo as Washington’s first international partner to successfully use a PAC-3 to intercept a target, it also aroused some controversy in Japan. It sparked concern whether the nation’s missile defense program might have offensive capabilities and, if so, whether it might antagonize neighboring countries.12 Japan’s growing role in missile defense activities, led by Tokyo’s expenditure of $1 billion a year, prompted Peter Flory, a U.S. assistant secretary of defense, in 2006 to classify Japan as “our largest international partner.” On March 8, U.S.-Japanese collaborative efforts resulted in a successful experiment involving one of the four components of the original 1999 arrangement. As research director for Arms Control Today, Wade Boese, explained, “a U.S. Standard Missile-3 interceptor 88 kilometers above the Pacific Ocean employed for the first time a Japanese-designed ‘clamshell’ nosecone. In an actual missile intercept attempt or test involving a mock warhead, the nosecone would release a kill vehicle to collide with a target hurtling through the atmosphere.” In this test, however, only a telemetry device was ejected. U.S. nosecones required maneuvering to release a kill vehicle, but the Japanese model avoided the necessity of such actions. Subsequent joint cooperation resulted in Japan conducting its initial intercept of a ballistic missile target on December 17, 2008, employing the U.S.-developed Aegis ballistic missile defense system. This system, which is designed to destroy ballistic missiles with less than a 5,500-kilometer range, uses a ship-fired interceptor that ejects a kill vehicle designed to find and hit a designated target. On December 17, a target missile was launched from Hawaii. The JS Kongo, a Japanese destroyer, located and tracked the target for three minutes before firing a Standard Missile-3 interceptor, and in another three minutes the interceptor’s kill vehicle collided with the target 160 kilometers above the Pacific Ocean.13 North Korea’s nuclear test in October 2006 raised speculation in foreign quarters that Japan might decide to create its own nuclear arsenal. While there was heightened concern in Japan, and considerable public discussion about the consequences of North Korean nuclear activities, the general reaction was relatively restrained. The nuclear test, however, did weaken a persistent public taboo regarding discussion of the possibility of


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a Japanese nuclear weapons program. If some Japanese nationalists flirted with the idea of developing their own nuclear weapons, nothing came of it. “The Japanese public in general did not demonstrate active interest in taking any specific measures, such as establishing underground shelters,” Hajime Izumi and Katsuhisa Furukawa have noted. “Rather the Japanese media focused primarily on the radioactive contamination risks the [North Korean] test might pose to Japan.” When the public realized such a risk did not exist, they lost interest in the issue. In Tokyo, officials were more interested in shoring up global nonproliferation and in remaining under “the U.S. nuclear umbrella.”14 If Seoul authorities began to consider deploying antimissile systems in response to North Korea’s activities, it was only after they had long sought to develop an offensive ballistic missile arsenal. In the 1970s, South Korea had hoped to build up its offensive missile force but found it difficult because it lacked the industrial and technological base. Moreover, Washington resisted providing the needed technical assistance out of fear that such action would stimulate an arms race with the North and, indeed, the entire East Asia region. In a 1979 agreement with the United States, South Korea was restricted to developing ballistic missiles limited to ranges of 112 miles (180 kilometers) and carrying a 500-kilogram payload. Following North Korea’s expanded missile activities, Washington and Seoul revised the original agreement in January 2001 to permit South Korea to join the Missile Technology Control Regime and allowed it to expand its missiles’ range to 186 miles (300 kilometers) with a 500 kilogram payload. Given its new capabilities, the South rejected participation in an American theater missile defense program in favor of deterring the North with the increased range of its offensive missiles. Even though Pyongyang continually enlarged its offensive missile forces for several years, officials in Seoul were reluctant to participate in an antimissile program because it might undermine its “sunshine policy” designed to increase North-South contacts. In January 2008, South Korea’s defense minister, Kim Jang-Soo, indicated that while his government would consider obtaining and deploying short-range missile defenses, there were no plans to link them to U.S. antimissile systems. Instead, Seoul deployed the Patriot Advanced Capability-2 (PAC-2) missile defense batteries, which relied on blast-fragmentation warheads. Initially, the South Korean government had hoped to purchase PAC-3s from the United States, which used the warhead’s kinetic energy to eliminate the target, as the foundation of its theater missile defense system. This plan failed when South Korean officials were confronted by domestic anti-American protests and budget shortfalls. Seoul desired to continue relying on its offensive missiles to deter North Korea’s missile arsenal. Increasingly tense relations prompted by Pyongyang’s subsequent missile testing, however, persuaded South Korea in February 2009 to acknowledge the need to develop and deploy “an

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independent lower-tier missile defense system” in four years. This program involved U.S. Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missile interceptors, a missile command-and-control center to detect and track missiles up to a distance of 1,000 kilometers, and Standard Missiles to be placed on three Aegis destroyers. Seoul’s newly found interest in antimissile programs did not eliminate the risk of destabilizing the region or initiating an arms race. Nor was it likely that South Korea’s security would be greatly enhanced with these missile systems because of the preponderance of the North’s missile arsenal. Without belittling Seoul’s efforts to employ missile defenses to enhance its security, it should be noted, as defense researcher Jenny Shin points out, Pyongyang missile arsenal could readily overwhelm “South Korea’s limited defenses, making Seoul’s defense completely obsolete. Deploying missile defenses certainly has risks.”15 * * * China rejected the Bush administration’s argument that it needed to base a missile defense system in Alaska because of North Korean missile activities. Indeed, Beijing officials, as early as the Clinton presidency, had evidenced concern about an American BMD system, combined with its ICBMs, being employed to threaten mainland China if disagreements arose over the status of Taiwan. On a visit to Beijing, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen indicated that Chinese officials opposed a U.S. antimissile defense system because they believed it would destabilize the strategic balance. After trying to convince them that the National Missile Defense (NMD) under consideration was not directed at China, he correctly concluded, “that they will continue to be opposed to NMD.” The Bush administration’s deployment of an antimissile system apparently prompted Beijing’s subsequent decision to modernize and expand its missile arsenal. This activity, in turn, aroused concerns, not only in Taiwan and the United States but also in South Asia. India became concerned about the increasing number of Chinese and Pakistani missiles. Beijing’s fears were further aroused when unclassified information from the Bush administration’s initial Nuclear Posture Review appeared in the press. The review argued that the United States should be ready to employ nuclear weapons against China because of “the combination of China’s developing strategic objectives and its ongoing modernization of its nuclear and non-nuclear forces.” Although estimates floated around during 2003–2004 that China’s nuclear arsenal consisted of up to 400 nuclear warheads, it was much more likely that the figure was closer to 100. Earlier intelligence estimates usually exaggerated the size of Chinese nuclear weapons deployments.16 Washington’s new policies and actions, Joanne Tompkins wrote in 2003, found China’s foreign policy elite divided into three schools of thought. The first, comprising a small group of scholars and a few military officers, believed that China should ignore the U.S. missile defense deployment because it was a ploy to engage China


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in an arms race that would gravely weaken its growing economy. Moreover, they did not believe the U.S. antimissile system would work and thought that the next president would cancel it. A second small coterie of Shanghai academics took the opposite approach and urged a large missile buildup—perhaps as many as 1,000 ICBMs—that could saturate any missile defense. They insisted China’s economy could readily accommodate such a construction program. They also argued that China should abandon its “no-first-use” policy, because it only emphasized the weakness of China’s nuclear forces. The centrist position, the third school, was occupied by a majority of China’s professionals, academics, political leaders, and military officers who believed that Bush’s pursuit of a missile defense required a measured response to maintain a credible, if minimal, deterrent should a crisis emerge regarding Taiwan. The moderates urged a three-prong approach. China should increase the credibility of its nuclear deterrent by building an additional 100 or 200 ballistic missiles; it should develop and deploy multiple independently targeted reentry warheads that could increase the probability of penetrating any U.S. defensive shield; and, finally, more attention should be given to devising countermeasures that could disrupt missile defenses. China already had decided to modernize and augment its missile arsenal to counteract the U.S. missile defense system and had begun deploying large numbers of short-range missiles along the coastline facing Taiwan. Unlike Russia, China did not possess several hundred ICBMs, which enabled President Putin to shrug off Bush’s national missile defense effort as irrelevant.17 In its 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Defense Department concluded that China “has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military advantages.” This estimate also presaged China’s antisatellite test, which destroyed one of its aging weather satellites in January 2007, when it referred to its space and counter-space capabilities. Although proud of its successful antisatellite test, officials in Beijing vigorously objected to the idea that their military modernization program was other than “moderate and reasonable.” A representative of the foreign ministry sharply criticized Pentagon-inflated claims before Congress as spreading a “myth of the China threat by exaggerating China’s military strength and expenses out of ulterior motives.” The issue of Taiwan also added to the increased Chinese-American tensions. The Taiwanese legislature approved upgrading its current antimissile system, the PAC-2, but refused to buy the newer PAC-3 option.18 If Beijing was concerned about U.S. missile defense deployments, Washington was uncertain about China’s nuclear and strategic intentions. As Professor Christopher Twomey at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California has noted, “the development of [U.S.-Chinese] strategic forces has increasingly assumed an interlocked form. The U.S.

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revolution in precision-guided munitions was followed by an emphasis on mobility in the Chinese missile forces. U.S. missile defense systems have clearly spurred an emphasis on countermeasures in China’s ICBM force and quantitative buildups in it regional missile arsenal.” Subsequently, information emerged that China was developing its own BMD system when Reuters news service reported on January 12, 2010, that China had successfully conducted a “ground-based mid-course missile interception.” Although few details were provided, the Chinese Foreign Ministry was quoted as saying “the test is defensive in nature and is not targeted at any country.” Yet it was obvious that Beijing was displeased with Washington’s recent sale of the Patriot (PAC-3) to Taiwan and chose to emphasize its own technical abilities in weapons development. Not surprising, each nation’s military views the other as a potential adversary and develops plans and force structures with that in mind. In the Defense Department’s March 2008 “Military Power of China” summary, the Americans complained that the “lack of transparency in China’s military and security affairs poses risks to stability by increasing the potential for misunderstanding and miscalculation.” The report states that China’s modernization of its nuclear and missile arsenal has allowed for the deployment of solid-fueled and liquid-fueled missiles of varying ranges and with “different types of warheads.” Although the Pentagon declared in 2008, “China has the most active ballistic missile program in the world,” Beijing’s actual strategic arsenal consisted largely of some 20 DF-5A liquid-fueled missiles deployed since 1981 with a 13,000kilometer range. The DF-5s, however, are being replaced by two new mobile solid-fueled ICBMs, the DF-31, with a 7,000-kilometer range, and the DF-31A, with a range of 11,000 kilometers. A 2009 Pentagon estimate suggested six launchers of each model currently existed. While the modernization program is underway, Chinese officials have extended public and private assurances that the nation’s nuclear “no-first-use” policy was unaffected.19 At the same time, however, Beijing had deployed hundreds of missiles armed with both conventional and possibly nuclear warheads aimed across the Taiwan Straits. These activities led officials in Taipei and Washington, who had been considering missile defenses for the island since the Reagan administration, to again seriously examine these possibilities. As tensions between the United States and China heated up in 2006 over the status of Taiwan, an article by William Arkin appeared on the Washington Post Web site in May claiming that the Pentagon’s war plans, Oplan 5077, included sending missile defense forces to aid Taipei in protecting the island. In the event of a confrontation, he noted, the Bush administration had put a greater emphasis on missile defense, particularly employing the much improved U.S. Aegis cruisers and destroyers carrying Standard Missile-3s. Although some Taiwanese officials contemplated a theater missile defense system, others questioned whether it would be sufficiently


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effective to prevent a substantial penetration by Chinese missiles, especially medium-range ones. Then, too, there was the cost of purchasing U.S. systems that could stress the Taiwanese defense budget, which had been declining in the 1990s.20 By 2008, Washington had approved the sale of 330 PAC-3 missiles to Taiwan, but it was suggested that more than 1,000 were needed. Also a PAVE PAWS phased array radar was currently under construction that could “see” some 3,000 kilometers into China and provide six-minute warning of a ballistic missile attack. The next year a major contract was awarded to Raytheon for the “refurbishing” of Taiwan’s Patriot system and train operators to prepare for any attack. It was expected that the upgraded Patriot would be able to shoot down tactical ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and aircraft. Even so, a former Republican congressional staff member, William Hawkins, commented that there were not nearly a sufficient number of Patriot systems on Taiwan “to blunt the barrage of short range ballistic missiles China has aimed at the island.” His solution was to permit Taiwan to purchase the U.S. Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to augment the Patriots.21 Meanwhile, by 2006, officials in New Delhi had begun to rethink their long-held opposition to missile defenses. Among the several factors that prompted this reconsideration was proximity of potentially hostile neighbors, especially China and Pakistan, who possessed the ability to target nuclear-armed India with weapons of mass destruction. In December 2007, India’s Defense Research and Development Organization reported that it had recently conducted a successful second missile defense test, using a single-stage Advanced Air Defence (AAD) antimissile to intercept a ballistic missile target. An Israeli missile authority Uzi Rubin confirmed that a video of the test revealed a “flyby intercept, not a kill intercept.” He pointed out that such tests were common and could generate data for continued improvement of the system “regardless of the nonkill of the target.” Head of India’s antimissile program V. K. Saraswat was reported as claiming that an operational system would be deployed within four years and would provide protection against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles attacks from either China or Pakistan. Unfortunately for his plans, the Associated Press reported on March 15, 2010 that an Indian interceptor missile failed to launch against a medium-range and nuclear capable Prithvi II surface-to-surface missile in routine test. As early as 2003, however, Pakistani officials had warned India that its obtaining missiles defense capabilities could upset the regional military balance.22 As relations with the Bush administration improved, India and the United States began discussing the possibility of bilateral cooperation on antimissile programs. In February 2008, Reuters reported that Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated, “We’re just beginning to talk about perhaps conducting a joint analysis about what India’s needs would be in the realm of missile defense and where cooperation between us might help

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advance that.” Washington’s interest in a cooperative venture was motivated by at least two major considerations. India’s indigenous antimissile program closed a potential market for American weapons industry, but a cooperative venture could offer the United States and Israel a potentially large competitive market. Then, too, this cooperation might be tied to U.S. efforts to widen its global BMD network.23 * * * During the past several years Iran has been seen as posing the twin threat of an ambitious missile program and the construction of enhanced nuclear enrichment facilities that could be a first step in obtaining nuclear warheads. The United States and the European states have taken the lead in seeking to persuade Iran not to join the nuclear weapons club. Among neighboring countries most interested in obtaining antimissile defenses for protection from Iranian missiles have been Israel, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. The Bush administration also focused on creating a network of antimissile facilities, with emphasis on European bases, to provide a defense against any possible Iranian missile attack (see chapter 4). Most media attention has been focused on Iran’s nuclear activities and the efforts to persuade the Iranian’s to keep to the announced purpose of creating civilian nuclear energy and not to develop nuclear weapons. After the initial European-led negotiations failed to accomplish their goals, eventually the United States and Russia sought to provide more attractive packages. The Bush administration at first tried to distance itself from Iran and depended on the European diplomats to conduct the actual discussions. Although there was talk of preemptive military strikes to neutralize Iranian nuclear facilities, Western diplomats turned to the UN Security Council for economic sanctions resulting in Resolutions 1803 (2006) and 1747 (2007), which were supplemented by Resolution 1696 (2006). Essentially, these resolutions intended that Iran halt its nuclear enrichment programs and allow its facilities to be inspected by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Since Security Council actions failed to accomplish these objectives, the Bush administration was stymied. By 2004, Iran had made considerable progress in achieving self-sufficiency in mediumrange ballistic missile production and in heightening Washington efforts to strengthen its antimissile defenses. The Iranians had drawn their missile technology from Chinese samples that led to the surface-to-surface Mushak series, the Soviet-designed Scud-B that provided the core for the Shahab-1, and the North Korean Scud-C and No Dong-1 that provided the basis for the follow-on Shahabs-2 to 5 ballistic missiles. Subsequent Iranian missile activities indicated to Western observers that North Korea had become its major source of technical assistance. In September 2006, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Robert Joseph stated, “North Korea has been . . . the principal supplier to Iran


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of ballistic missile technologies.” A month later, Tehran announced that it had tested a Shahab-3, with a range of 2,000 kilometers, whose technology was based on North Korea’s No Dong-1 missile. In August 2008, Iran tested a space launch missile involving a two-stage rocket, named Safir, that was believed to employ a Shahab-3 for the initial stage and an indigenously designed and developed propulsion system for the second stage. Geoffrey Forden emphasized that the “home-grown” Safir system indicated a growing innovation perhaps overshadowing foreign assistance. The former UN weapons inspector went on to point out, “the important thing is that Iran, not North Korea, not Iraq, is the first country to break out of the Scud type of missile mold.” Although the indigenous second stage had difficulty with its steering mechanism, it appeared that Iran was seeking to increase the range of its missile arsenal. Iranian officials said, “no” they were trying to develop rockets to launch satellites into space. Although the UN Security Council adopted three resolutions that placed sanctions against Iranian agencies involved in missile programs and aimed at preventing the transfer of additional missile technology, it did not demand that Iran halt its missile program. Iran continued its missile development programs and, in April 2010 paraded its arsenal through the streets of Tehran. As it awaited delivery of sophisticated BMD from Russia, Iran unveiled what it claimed was a new air defense system designed to protect against missiles and high-altitude aircraft. The consequence of this new Iranian military development may have further limited Western options to respond to Tehran’s apparent military buildup. If American officials have emphasized Iran’s efforts to develop longrange ballistic missiles in their argument for a European BMD system, the Israelis showed more concern for Iran’s existing shorter-range missiles. After all, as Yitzhak Ben Israel, chairman of Israel’s Space Agency, noted, Israeli territory already was within range of Iran’s Shahab-3 missiles, “the threat posed by Iran comes from its nuclear program and not from its satellites or ballistic missiles.”24 Israeli officials had long been concerned with developing an antimissile system. They had eagerly accepted Washington’s assistance (see chapter 3); indeed, its Arrow program received more U.S. funds between 1985 and 1990 than any other nation jointly involved in antimissile development. Israel used the funds primarily for flight tests and production of the Arrow I as an antitactical ballistic missile (ATBM) system to defend against Scud missiles and other types of intermediate- and short-range missiles. During the first Gulf War, Iraq targeted Israel with 40 Scud ballistic missiles, of which 24 were aimed at Tel Aviv. To keep Israel neutral during the conflict to avoid confrontation with its Arab allies, Washington sent Patriot (PAC-2) batteries to Israel in an effort to intercept the Scuds. Unfortunately, according to data analyzed after the conflict, the Patriots that were fired at the incoming Scuds frequently missed and exploded over Israeli or Saudi territory and caused substantial collateral damage.

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The PAC-2 had fared poorly in its initial battlefield test during the first Gulf War as a 1992 Government Accounting Office report claimed that 158 Patriot missiles were launched at 47 Scuds with no more than four possible hits.25 As the prospects of a second war with Iraq approached, Israel responded with its own anti-Scud missile shield, the Arrow or “Hetz” system. The $2.4 billion project, over half of which had been funded by the United States, is designed to find and destroy, in less than three minutes, an enemy missile flying at an altitude of more than 30 miles. In addition, the Israeli also possessed operational PAC-2 systems.26 During preparations for the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Pentagon transferred PAC-3 batteries to 27 Middle East locations in Israel, Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. The new PAC-3 batteries were to protect U.S. and British aircraft from Iraqi missiles. Yet, no Scud missiles were launched. Iraq did reportedly fire some surface-to-surface missiles and at least 23 ballistic and cruise missiles at U.S. forces and installations. The results of attempted intercepts of Iraqi missiles by the U.S. Army’s Patriot PAC-2 and PAC-3 batteries were mixed at best. Iraq fired two Ababil-100s surface-to-surface missiles that reportedly American Patriot interceptors engaged and destroyed before they could reach their targets. The army reported that the batteries had destroyed the nine Iraqi missiles they targeted; however, they also shot down two friendly aircraft and locked on a third. According to an unofficial report, however, “of the 14 Iraqi missiles not engaged by Patriots, four were reported as outside the range of any Patriot system and one exploded shortly after launch. No official explanation [has been] given for why the other nine Iraqi missiles were not fired upon.” None of the cruise missiles were intercepted, which could pose problems for the Patriot system in the future.27 Since no Iraqi Scuds were fired at Israel during the U.S. 2003 invasion, no Israeli Arrow or Patriot missiles were launched in response. In 2006, however, Israel did come under rocket attacks during its offensive against Hezbollah militants in southern Lebanon. Nearly 4,000 rockets and missiles, most allegedly supplied by Iran, hit inside Israel, causing the deaths of 43 civilians and forcing many thousands of others to frequently take shelter. Neither the Arrow nor Patriot systems could intercept the 122-millimeter Katyusha rockets because they had only a one- or twominute flight time. The Israelis subsequently have worked on a system called the Iron Dome, designed to counter short- and medium-range rockets employed by Palestinian and Lebanese militants. It is planned to be available for deployment in 2010. Meanwhile, Israeli leaders chose to focus on Iran’s role in the episode and to concentrate their resources on developing and deploying a ballistic missile defense to counter Tehran’s growing arsenal of offensive missiles and possible nuclear weapons. “I think the Iranian threat is now also clearer,” Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni told a media gathering


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in Washington. Mindful of its failure to deal with Scud missiles during first Gulf War, Israel successfully conducted the 17th test of the Arrow system—a U.S.-Israeli joint venture—in March 2009. The upgraded Arrow II interceptor succeeded in locating and hitting the target in a test designed to provide protection from an Iranian Shahab ballistic missile. “While we are for peace,” Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared as he applauded his Defense Ministry, “we will know how to defend ourselves.” An ATBM battery consists of “four or eight launch trailers, each with six launch tubes and ready-to-fire missiles, a truck mounted Hazelnut Tree launch control centre, a truck mounted communications centre, a trailer mounted Citron Tree fire control centre and the units of a mobile Green Pine radar system.” The first such battery developed to intercept short- and medium-range ballistic missiles became operational in 2000 and several others have since been deployed.28 The Bush administration also sounded an alarm at the development of Iran’s missile arsenal. Quite early on, as explained in the previous chapter, it sought to expand America’s newly deployed antimissile system to the former Warsaw Pact countries of Eastern Europe.

CHAPTER 6


A comprehensive assessment of the reliability of major antimissile programs at the end of the Bush administration has been made difficult, as a former director of weapon testing at the Pentagon, Philip Coyle, has emphasized, because “the current programs have no operational criteria for success.” When President Bush ordered the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) to deploy the ground-based missile defense (GMD) system at Fort Greely in Alaska and at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California by the end of 2004, the White House and Pentagon emphasized the rapid deployment of hardware pursuing what was known as “spiral development” or “capability-based acquisition.” Taken to an extreme, this approach, Coyle has argued, is “like building a house while the floor plan is constantly changing. It makes for a very expensive house, and if your family ever gets to move in, they [may] find they don’t like how their topsy-turvy house turned out.” In missile defense, he explained, “the problems with dynamic acquisition stem from a lack of definite requirements.”1 In 2003, the General Accounting Office (GAO) similarly warned that “fielding a missile defense capability by 2004 places MDA in danger of getting off track early and impairing the effort over the long term. This danger is highlighted by MDA’s decision not to follow some of its knowledge-based practices. . . . For example, MDA is beginning system integration . . . with immature technology and limited testing. While doing so may help MDA meet the President’s deadline, it also increases the potential that some elements may not work as intended.” According to the GAO, the MDA has confirmed: “There are currently no final or fixed architectures and no set of operational requirements for the proposed


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[ballistic missile defense system] BMDs.” Moreover, the MDA was unclear about how the entire antimissile program would be supported or “who would provide or fund them.”2 Thus the question of long-term costs also needed to be considered. Since President Bush’s objective in deploying missile defenses was to protect against an attack by a so-called rogue state—Iran or North Korea— the accomplishments of the technical and operational features of these programs necessarily are the focal point of any meaningful assessment. Despite his criticism of the Clinton administration’s antimissile projects and deployment plan, Bush’s initial versions offered little different except for a third layer defense. Clinton focused on targeting long-range missiles with two defensive layers: a midcourse-phase employing a groundbased midcourse defense (GMD) system, then called “National Missile Defense,” and on a terminal-phase using mobile Patriot interceptors, and possibly sea-based Aegis’s Standard Missile-3 interceptors, to destroy descending warheads near the end or leaving the mid-course phase. An additional system—the theater high altitude area defense (THAAD)—was designed to intercept short- and medium-range ballistic missiles at the end of their mid-course stage and in the terminal phase. The Bush administration sought to emphasize an additional third defensive layer known as the “Boost-phase” designed to fire interceptors at enemy ballistic missiles just after launch. Arriving at an objective, accurate assessment of these systems, however, was made more difficult by the Bush administration’s decision in late December 2005 to halt future announcements of antimissile deployments “in the interest of operational security.” Moreover, this step followed a series of efforts by the administration to limit the public’s information regarding the development of America’s ballistic missile defenses—a reluctance to provide “precise testing schedules, certain test details, and press briefings before and after tests.” Arms Control Today’s analyst Wade Boese reported in early 2006, “Technical program standards also were shelved in the name of spiral development” along with “the processes of fielding a system under development and the evolving it.” The administration’s policies restricting public announcements, MDA spokesperson Rick Lehner confirmed, also extended to the ship-based Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system.3 * * * “Is the fledgling ground-based missile defense [GMD] system deployed [in Alaska and California] 18 months ago,” Boese wondered in April 2006, “capable of destroying an incoming long-range ballistic missiles?” The answers he found depended on the responding advocate or critic, individual or agency, as the GMD deployment had become a focal point for most discussions dealing with antimissile programs. Examples of administration enthusiasm flourished. Missile Defense Agency chief Lt. General

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A Patriot missile battery being operated by the 801st Squadron, GGW de Peel, Netherlands. Photo by Sgt. Mike Doncell. (Courtesy: Department of Defense)

Henry Obering told the House Armed Services Subcommittee on March 9, 2006 that the deployment of the ground-based midcourse defense system in 2004 had made “history by establishing a limited defensive capability . . . against a possible long-range ballistic missile attack.” He informed reporters on March 20 that site- and flight-testing assured him that the GMD could “shoot down an incoming missile” and that testing so far had failed to indicate any problems that might be called “showstoppers.” Echoing this view before the House Subcommittee, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Peter Flory stated that “today, the United States has all of the pieces in place that are needed to intercept an incoming long-range ballistic missile.” Similarly, acting director of the Pentagon’s Office of Operational Test and Evaluation David Duma endorsed the notion that “we have all of the pieces in place” to attempt an intercept of an incoming missile; but, he also hedged—“the testing to date has not confirmed that you could count on that.”4 Skeptics who bothered to examine the data found the administration’s rhetoric failed to be supported facts, a situation that would prevail through the Bush years. Duma’s predecessor, Thomas Christie, told congressional authorities in January, that he had questions about the GMD’s readiness. “Due to immature [missile defense] elements,” he stated, “very little system level testing was performed” by the end of 2003. Actually, the MDA had not flight-tested the GMD’s ability to intercept a target since a December 11, 2002 failure that reduced the GMD’s record to five hits and


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three misses. Even the five hits were downgraded in a GAO report for Congress. In April 2005, the GAO characterized those tests as “developmental in nature, and, accordingly, engagement conditions were repetitive and scripted,” and urged more realistic and challenging trials.5 Two subsequent tests of the GMD interceptors, one at the end of 2004 and the other in early 2005, failed because the interceptors did not leave their silos, tending to confirm some of the critical assessments and casting a shadow on the Pentagon’s claims. Yet Defense Department spokespersons retained their enthusiasm. The December 15, 2004 test, according to MDA’s Richard Lehner, had not failed because it simply was not completed. “We weren’t able to complete the test that we had planned,” he stated. “I definitely wouldn’t categorize it as a setback of any kind. . . . We will isolate the anomaly and fix it.” On February 24, 2005, however, a second test launch failed when there was a problem with the retracting arms that held the interceptor in its silo to prevent it from tipping over in case of an earthquake. This episode prompted Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard B. Myers to tell members of Congress: “They [MDA] don’t think that’s a systemic issue, but it’s one they are going to have to deal with, nevertheless.”6 In prepared remarks of March 15, 2005 to the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, MDA Director Obering took a surprisingly more positive approach. “For the first time in its history,” he stated, “the United States today has a limited capacity to defend our people against long-range ballistic missile attack.” At the same time, Duma offered a less sanguine evaluation of the GMD system. With a nod to the obvious, the Pentagon’s chief weapons tester said, “I don’t think that you can say the system is operationally ready today . . . We don’t have a demonstrated capability from detection through negating the incoming threat.” Meanwhile, he lauded the MDA director for his “prudent” method of developing the various antimissile systems. “I applaud his commitment to a ‘test-fix-test’ philosophy,” Duma said, “that results in an event-driven test program.” In a report issued the same month, the GAO warned that there was a downside to deploying elements without their being fully tested. If the elements do not work as projected and require replacement or repair, the process can become costly.7 Critics continued to be dismayed at the Pentagon’s consistent rationalizations. For example, at a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton (D-NY) challenged Myers and Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld regarding the decision to establish antimissile bases without more successful tests. “It strikes me as a little odd,” she noted, “that we would deploy a system that hasn’t succeeded and expect that to serve a deterrent value.” Rumsfeld agreed that “there’s no deterrent if something is known to not work.” The defense secretary showed a much different attitude here compared with his endorsement in 2002 of President Bush’s decision to deploy the GMD. At that time he

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acknowledged that additional research would be required to perfect the system, but insisted criticism of the technology was a “red herring.” On CBS’s “Face the Nation” he declared: “We have no intention of deploying something that doesn’t work, but what the definition of ‘work’ is, is terribly important.”8 After the last two test failures, the MDA commissioned an “Independent Review Team” comprising a trio of experts—former NASA administrator William Graham; Maj. General Bill Nance, a former program manager of the GMD system; and William Ballhaus, president and chief executive officer of The Aerospace Corporation—to examine the entire testing process. Their report, turned over to Obering on March 31, 2005, concluded that the development of the GMD system was driven by a White House schedule instead of performance benchmarks. The administration defended its actions stating that the schedule was based on what it perceived to be a mounting missile threat to the United States. Although the MDA “met the challenge” of the president’s charge to begin deploying the GMD by 2004, the three experts emphasized that the “next challenge is to verify the system’s operational performance and reliability.” Testifying before congressional committees, Obering continued to assert his confidence that the system would work based on the MDA’s experiences with simplified tests and broad-ranging simulations and experimental modeling. Unimpressed, the experts argued that to make sure that hardware and software performed as predicted, “there is a need to validate the design and reliability of the system as currently deployed . . . [M]odels and simulations have not yet been sufficiently validated and require additional flight data to improve confidence.” This would involve undertaking tests requiring more rigorous, realistic trials.9 Another GAO report to Congress in March 2006 sought to evaluate all of the MDA’s missile defense systems. Although it acknowledged that some progress had been made, the report criticized the agency for hastily deploying various systems “at the expense of cost, quantity, and performance goals.” In particular, the GAO implied that Bush’s decision to deploy the GMD system in Alaska and California by 2004 appeared to have led to quick fixes and poor quality of work as the MDA shifted from focusing on experimental elements for testing to fielding operational units. “Time pressures,” according to the report, “caused the MDA to stray from a knowledge-based acquisition strategy.” This, the GAO continued, was especially evident with the GMD system, as “the performance of the emplaced GMD interceptors is uncertain because inadequate mission assurance/quality control procedures may have allowed less reliable or inappropriate parts to be incorporated into the manufacturing process.” Another factor complicating assessment of the GMD system, the GAO pointed out, was the inability to conduct an “end-to-end flight test . . . using production-representative components” since the five successful intercept tests, the last occurring in October 2002, “used surrogate


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and prototype components.” Not surprisingly, General Obering found the GAO’s report lacking its “best work” as he emphasized that the rationale for the 2002 deployment was to quickly achieve a minimum antimissile capability with the expectation of improving it as deficiencies were discovered.10 On September 1, 2006, the Pentagon and MDA celebrated a success as an interceptor launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California collided with a target missile fired from Kodiak Island in Alaska. The GMD interceptor left the ground seven minutes after the target was launched and flew at 17,000 miles per hour to meet its objective where it released its “kill vehicle.” The exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV) detached from its boosters and, using onboard sensors to locate the target, scored a hit on the target warhead over the Pacific Ocean. Originally, the purpose of this test was advertised as an attempt to collect data on the phenomenology of an intercept, and so the test was designated as a radar certification test, not as a flight intercept test. Nevertheless, an intercept was achieved, breaking a string of flight intercept test failures that had begun in late 2002. There were a number of firsts for this test. In addition to the first launch of the same interceptor as the 11 then deployed in Alaska and 2 in California, this was the first time both the test interceptor and target were launched from new locations and the GMD’s fire control center was staffed by an actual crew from the 100th Missile Defense Brigade rather than by private contractors. Finally, an upgraded radar based at Beale AFB 300 miles north of Vandenberg collected data in the test. “What we saw today,” Obering told reporters, “was a very realistic trajectory for the threat . . . and a very realistic trajectory, a very realistic intercept altitude, and intercept speeds for the . . . interceptor against the target.” Yet critics cautioned that the target missile did not employ any countermeasures such as decoys or multiple warheads that could confuse the kill vehicle. “This is the best thing they have done to date,” a senior analyst at the Union of Concerned Scientists, Stephen Young, acknowledged. “But it is still far below the standard of a real-world test.” To the former director of the Defense Department’s weapons testing, Philip Coyle, the latest effort was “the simplest flight intercept test ever” because of the failure to include decoys. On a somewhat more optimistic note, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld suggested, “While today’s test was a success, the test program is by no means complete. Tests will continue, some of which will be successful and some will not. This was a challenging test, and the tests will become even more challenging in the period ahead.”11 * * * In January 2007, however, the Bush administration began to openly acknowledge the vulnerabilities that its fixed GMD systems in Alaska and

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California confronted. For example, “raid attacks”—that is, an attack by many missiles not just one or two—could overwhelm missile defenses, and decoys and countermeasures could become the Achilles heel of these missile defenses. Initially, not wanting to admit to any such vulnerability, the Bush Pentagon had “dumbed down” the supposed threat from Iran (and North Korea) by defining it to be just one or two missiles with no decoys or countermeasures. In this fashion, the administration did its best to deflect the comments of skeptics who pointed out that these systems could be vulnerable to both raid attacks and to decoys and countermeasures. As late as April 2007, General Obering defended the MDA’s test programs before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces. “We think that there are many situations where we will not be faced with complex countermeasures.” Again at an April Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee hearing, Obering argued that “Just because you do not have countermeasures does not mean that [trials are] not realistic.”12 A task force of the Defense Science Board—an advisory group to the secretary of defense—challenged Obering and the MDA for ignoring the problem of countermeasures. In its December 2006 report, the task force warned that “fielding the current systems in larger numbers will not lead to a robust [defense].” Rebutting the task force’s finding, MDA spokesperson Rick Lehner argued that the agency was currently developing multiple kill vehicles that could be placed on a single interceptor. These miniaturized kill vehicles, planned to be about the size of a loaf of bread, would resolve the problem by singling out warheads in a target cluster and destroying all objects in the cluster. MDA planned to have these new vehicles ready for testing in 2012.13 Meanwhile, many critics pointed out the artificiality of this view. To use a popular golf analogy, hitting an enemy missile out in space going 17,000 mph is like trying to hit a hole-in-one when the hole is going 17,000 mph. And if an enemy uses decoys and countermeasures, missile defense is like trying to shoot a hole-in-one in golf when the hole is going 17,000 mph and the green is covered with several black circles the same size as the hole. The defender doesn’t know which target to aim for. Of course, in an all-out strike, missile defense radars and interceptor sites would be prime targets for an enemy from the outset. Towards the end of Bush’s second term, the MDA began to reflect more openly on these issues. For example, the limitations of the planned missile defense capability were revealed by an unusually candid admission in the MDA FY-2008 budget request: “This initial capability is not sufficient to protect the United States from the extant and anticipated rogue nation threat.” This remarkable statement and the others that followed in this section of the president’s budget were among the few times that the White House would acknowledge weakness in its GMD program. Consequently, the Bush administration declared:


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We therefore must close the gaps in the system and improve its [GMD’s] capability to keep pace. Three key elements of this effort are additional Aegis BMD sea-based interceptors, the introduction of four transportable Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) fire units consisting of radars and interceptors, and the introduction of a land- and sea-based volume kill capability (Multiple Kill Vehicle program) to address potential countermeasures. Additionally, to ensure full coverage of the United States against threats from the Middle East, we will upgrade an Early Warning Radar in Thule, Greenland. This radar, in conjunction with the radar at Fylingdales, UK provides the ability to track threats to the U.S. and Europe from the Middle East. Because we must protect these radars or risk losing the “eyes” of our system, we are planning to field ground-based interceptors and an associated ground-based midcourse radar site in Europe. This achieves four goals: protecting the foreign-based radars, improving protection of the United States by providing additional and earlier intercept opportunities; extending this protection to our allies and friends; and demonstrating international support of ballistic missile defense.14

This statement also called attention to the capabilities of the Navy Aegis and army THAAD systems. At the same time, it revealed that the MDA saw the proposed missile defenses in Europe as vital to protect existing radar sites in Greenland and the United Kingdom necessary to defend the United States, not first and foremost to defend Europe. After a May 25, 2007 test was scrubbed because the target missile veered off-course, the Pentagon on September 28 successfully repeated the flight test of a year earlier by destroying a target high above the Pacific Ocean. If this accomplishment raised GMD’s record to 7 hits out of 13 attempts, it also was just the second successful intercept by the system since President Bush ordered its deployment. Both the interceptor and the target missile flew the same trajectories as previously, with the almost 60-kilogram EKV—employing similar onboard sensors—hitting and shattering the mock warhead. Again there were no countermeasures included in the target package, such as balloon decoys used in the tests between 1999 and 2002. According to Rick Lehner, this was because the X-band radar located in the Marshall Islands and used in the earlier trials was not positioned to track targets launched from Alaska. He said that the introduction of a sea-based X-band radar (SBX) mounted on a mobile, ocean-going oil rig platform would provide the necessary discrimination for the next test, perhaps in February 2008. Unfortunately, the scheduled February date slipped to mid-May at which time the planned test was canceled because of a faulty telemetry unit on the test interceptor’s EKV that was to relay data back for evaluation. It was anticipated that another test would be rescheduled for 2009, but it slipped into 2010. There were a few positive aspects to the September 2007 test. These included the use of Aegis radars to track the target missile in a so-called shadow mode for the first time since such targets were launched from Kodiak, Alaska. Also, MDA officials were heartened by the fact that the test

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interceptor used on September 28 had been installed in its underground launch silo since the aborted May 25 test when the target went awry. Interceptors normally were put in place only a month before a scheduled test; that this interceptor had been in its silo for more than three months before launch prompted Lehner to declared that the longer wait displayed “operational realism.”15 Responding to critics who questioned the worth of the deployed antimissiles, some administration officials pointed to what they saw as the successful outcome of a crisis posed by North Korea’s missile launches in 2006. Pyongyang in June had placed its newest ballistic missile the Taepo Dong-2, on a launch pad; some observers estimated that this missile could reach the United States. The United States let it be known that it had ordered its nine GMDs stationed in Alaska to shift from a test mode to an operational status, as crews at Fort Greely readied the interceptors for possible launch. Some members of the administration believed that possessing the GMD system and placing the interceptors on alert freed President Bush from having to decide whether to order a preemptive strike on North Korean missiles, thereby escalating the already tense situation. John Rood, the acting undersecretary of state for arms control and international security affairs, struck this note when he returned to the episode for members of the media in a March 11, 2008 briefing. Because of the deployed antimissile system, he declared, “we didn’t have to seriously consider options like pre-emption or overwhelming retaliation. We had a defense, and we were content to use that defense, and it was a way of not contributing to the crisis being larger.” When testifying a month later, General Obering revisited the same event on April 30 before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. The existing GMD antimissile system, he stated, “was good enough that when the North Koreans stacked their Taepo Dong-2 in the summer of 2006, the president was relying on [it] as opposed to taking the advice of some . . . former senior officials to preemptively strike the site.”16 Yet just how reliable was the antimissile system that the president was supposedly depending on to guarantee U.S. security? At the time of the 2006 North Korean missile test, during which the Taepo Dong-2 failed seconds after launch, the GMD deployed in Alaska had not been successfully tested; indeed, in eight trials dating back to 1999, the system had achieved only five intercepts. Congressman John Tierney (D-MA), who chaired the subcommittee MDA director Obering addressed on April 30, later reflected less confidence than had the MDA director and administration officials in the deployed antimissiles units. The “components of the [GMD] system have yet to undergo successful realistic and operational testing,” Tierney stated in a delayed formal statement issued on June 11, “such as would warrant full confidence against real-life threats should they be developed anytime soon.”


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The GAO also lacked confidence in the system. Reviewing the two GMD tests since the summer of 2006 where interceptors hit their targets and a third canceled test, it reported in March 2008 that “the tests done to date have been developmental in nature, and do not provide sufficient realism for [the Pentagon’s] test and evaluation director to fully determine whether the BMDS [Ballistic Missile Defense System] is suitable and effective for battle.” The long-range element of the entire antimissile project was the GMD system.17 In the latter half of 2008, this report from the GAO and a critical report from the private Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) appeared that evaluated various aspects of President Bush’s directive to swiftly deploy missile defenses. The IDA’s 20-member panel noted that while the MDA’s efforts to meet the president’s order resulted in the placing of two dozen ground-based long-range interceptors in Alaska and California, this was accomplished with the “limited goal of an initial capability without specific performance requirement.” The deployment of the antimissile systems, however, “has been less successful in fostering the planning and preparation needed to adequately address future operations of deployed systems and follow-on procurement and sustainment.” The August report, directed by Congress as part of its fiscal year 2008 defense authorization, also found that the military units designated to ultimately operate the systems “have not been heavily involved” in those activities necessary to assume that responsibility. The IDA panel felt the MDA needed to involve the military services more in establishing performance standards and testing goals. Indeed, the panel argued that the MDA has had “too little interaction” with other elements within the Pentagon and stated that the agency’s efforts to develop these capabilities “needs to involve the ultimate user throughout” so that the systems are “militarily useful.” The September findings of the GAO, which regularly conducted such assessments for Congress, paralleled much of the earlier IDA evaluation of America’s missile defense projects. The GAO also found that MDA and the military forces “have not routinely worked together on support planning” and that the agency failed to develop future support plans for many of the antimissile projects. Moreover, the GAO cautioned “the difficulties in transitioning responsibilities from the MDA to the services have complicated long-term planning.” Except for the navy’s Aegis system, the MDA was currently overseeing or participating in operating some deployed antimissile systems and had yet to make the final arrangements for turning over to the military services the responsibility for running and paying for some of the units. Finally, the IDA panel argued that the MDA should return to its primary role focusing on research and development, which included placing a “renewed emphasis on science and technology, and to turn the responsibility for procurement and operation over to the military services.” Pointing to the midcourse interceptor systems, which included the GMD

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and the ship-based Aegis systems, the panel contended that “the balance between qualitative improvements and deploying more of existing capabilities should be strongly in favor of qualitative improvements. Without such a focus, the current system capabilities will become obsolete.” Consequently, a “trend toward more deployments of current capabilities would seriously degrade the ability to increase the future capability” of all the ballistic missile defense systems. The MDA was quick to defend its actions. Its spokesperson Rick Lehner stated that the agency is “engaging with all the military services to improve operations and sustainment activities and funding.” Moreover, he contended, the agency has “a lot of responsibilities based upon the sheer number of programs and technologies we manage, and we do a great job.” Reminding the critics that the MDA emphasized a “spiral development acquisition approach,” Lehner went on to state: “We have always planned on qualitative improvements to both the land-based and sea-based midcourse defenses.” An example of this, he said, was the agency’s decision to pursue smaller kill vehicles so that a single interceptor could challenge more than one target. While insisting they were already moving in the directions urged by the IDA panel and the GAO, the Pentagon and MDA believed that because of the urgency of the perceived threat and military needs, it could be “unwise to slow or delay fielding of BMDS [Ballistic Missile Defense System] capabilities until every step is taken to complete operation and support planning.”18 After North Korea’s nuclear test and planned missile trials, Defense Secretary Robert Gates inspected the GMD complex in Alaska in June 2009 for the Obama administration. He declared: “If there were a launch from a rogue state such as North Korea, I have good confidence that we would be able to deal with it.” Gates repeated his view, earlier provided to the Senate’s Armed Services Committee, that North Korean missiles did not pose an imminent threat to America “given the pace at which [that country] is developing its program.”19 Gates may well be correct, but there is little verifiable evidence that the GMD system is truly reliable. * * * Although the ground-based midcourse defense system—designed to combat ballistic missiles with ranges greater than 5,500 kilometers— tended to be the center of attention during the Bush years, the MDA has been involved in several other antimissile programs. Two of the more prominent of these programs have been the sea-based Aegis and the THAAD projects that focus on destroying short, medium, and intermediate ballistic missiles with ranges of less than 5,500 kilometers. The “Kill” Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) project was conceived to destroy ballistic missiles—medium, intermediate, and intercontinental—with ranges of more than 1,000 kilometers, and the technologically complicated Airborne Laser program has been focused on defeating all ranges of ballistic


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Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates talks to Col. Bond of the U.S. Army, at a ground-based interceptor missile silo at Fort Greely, Alaska, on June 1, 2009. Photo by Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison, U.S. Air Force. (Courtesy: Department of Defense)

missiles. The Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) system, developed to deal with short- and medium-range missiles in their terminal phase, was transferred to the army for deployment. The sea-based Aegis system, initially deployed in 1983 to defend ships from aircraft, antiship cruise missiles, surface, and subsurface threats, was frequently upgraded. The basic elements of the Aegis system includes: “the SPY-1 radar [is] a phased-array, multifunction radar that is designed to detect and track multiple targets in flight, and to provide midcourse guidance to interceptor missiles; a suite of computers running the Aegis fire control and battle-management computer program; and the Standard Missile (SM),” so-called because it replaced a variety of older navy surface-to-air missiles. In 2002, the Aegis program became part of the overall antiballistic missile defense program. In its new configuration, the Aegis BMD system is designed to “detect and track ballistic missiles of any range, including ICBMs, and intercept short- and medium-range ballistic missiles . . . above the atmosphere . . . during their midcourse [sic] phase of flight.” When tracking intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), Aegis ships could perform as sensor platforms providing fire-control quality tracking data to the overall U.S. ballistic missile defenses. Whereas the GMD

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ground-based midcourse antimissiles based in Alaska and California are intended to intercept ICBMs, the Aegis system as of 2008 will not “intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles . . . or intercept ballistic missiles inside the atmosphere, during either their initial boost phase of flight or their final (terminal) phase of flight.” Not all of the comparisons of the Aegis and GMD systems have noted the basic difference in intercept objectives.20 Although frequently called a “midcourse” system, the Aegis’s interceptors were too slow to accomplish a long-range midcourse intercept. As of early 2009, three U.S. Navy Ticonderoga class cruisers and 15 Arleigh Burke class destroyers had Aegis antiballistic missile capabilities, and plans called for modifying the remaining Ticonderoga class cruisers and six additional destroyers. The program projects having 21 ships upgraded by December 2010, 24 in 20012, and 27 in about 2013. Two major alterations were necessary to modify a ship for Aegis antiballistic missile operations: “changing the Aegis computer program to permit the SPY-1 radar to detect and track high-flying ballistic missiles; and arming the ship with a BMD version of the Standard Missile called the SM-3 Block 1A.” A ship with the first modification is referred to as having a long-range search and track capability. A ship with both modifications is referred to as an “engage-capable ship.” Employing a “hit-to-kill” warhead, the SM-3 Block IA “is designed to destroy a ballistic missile’s warhead by colliding with it outside the atmosphere, during the enemy missile’s midcourse phase of flight.” The schedule called for the deployment of 133 SM-3 Block 1A and IB interceptors to Aegis ships, 34 by the end of calendar 2008, and all 133 by 2013. Since the SM-3 Block IA and IB interceptors do not fly sufficiently fast to challenge long-range missiles, a faster version, the Block IIA, was being developed in cooperation with Japan to improve the prospect of defeating intermediate-range ballistic missiles and “some capability for intercepting ICBMs.”21 Testing of the Aegis antimissile system has been the most extensive and successful of any of the MDA’s systems. Philip Coyle, former head of the Defense Department’s testing agency, credited the navy for its “discipline and successes,” even when its ninth trial failed. “The U.S. Navy has an enviable track record of successful flight intercept tests,” he told Inside the Navy on December 7, 2007, “and is making the most of its current, limited Aegis missile defense capabilities in these tests.” The navy’s record for tests of the Aegis system from January 2002 through November 2008 was “15 successful exo-atmospheric intercepts in 19 attempts. This total includes one successful intercept and one unsuccessful intercept by Japanese Aegis ships in two Japanese test flights. The Aegis BMD system has also achieved 3 successful [SM-2] endo-atmospheric intercepts in 3 attempts, for a combined total of 18 successful exo- and [SM-3] endoatmospheric intercepts in 22 attempts.” The Aegis SM-2, which defends against missiles inside the atmosphere during their final descent, uses a blast-fragmentation warhead that explodes near its target to destroy the


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Guided missile destroyer USS Hopper, equipped with the Aegis integrated weapons system, launches a Standard Missile (SM) 3 while under way in the Pacific Ocean, July 30, 2009. U.S. Navy Photo. (Courtesy: Department of Defense)

incoming warhead. It differs from the SM-3 interceptor, which launches a kill vehicle that locates and collides with its target outside the atmosphere. Also, an Aegis antiballistic missile system was temporarily altered and employed on February 20, 2008 to successfully destroy a defective U.S. surveillance satellite.22 It should not be surprising, given these successes, that not only Japan, but Australia, Norway, South Korea, and Spain have added Aegis-equipped ships to their naval forces. The Theater (after 2004, Terminal) High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system is designed to provide ground-based protection for troops, critical facilities and population centers from short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. Each THAAD battery consists of nine truck-mounted launchers each carrying 10 missile-launch containers, interceptor missiles, an air transportable X band radar with a range up to 1,000 kilometers, and a battle management, communications and intelligence system. The interceptors have an estimated range of 200 kilometers and may reach an altitude of 150 kilometers. Originally a U.S. Army project, with Lockheed Martin selected as its prime contractor 1992, the THAAD system had a difficult beginning, with six attempted intercepts from December 1995 to March 1999 failing to hit their targets. It was recognized that the system confronted significant engineering challenges; however, studies performed by the Pentagon and independent sources pointed to three basic underlying problems: the tight flight-test schedule did not provide for adequate

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ground testing; seeking to quickly deploy an early prototype system failed to provide the time necessary for the normal interceptor development process; and insufficient emphasis on quality assurance during component production resulted in unreliable components. The failed tests, caused by manufacturing defects, hindered the army from showing that the “hit-tokill” technology critical to THAAD’s effectiveness was reliable.23 Although THAAD had two successful tests late in 1999, the program was transferred to the MDA in late 2001 and underwent a substantial restructuring to stretch out its flight-test schedule and ensure reliability of the system’s interceptors. Switching from White Sands to the Pacific Missile Range, THAAD returned to flight-testing in November 2005, with satisfactory results. Its first successful interception of a live target missile in July 2006 was followed by three tests in 2007. Two of these tests intercepted “Scud”-type targets at different levels in the atmosphere; the third successful test demonstrated the THAAD’s interceptor ability to detect, track, and intercept an incoming target above the earth’s atmosphere. One test employed communications with the Aegis system as well as its link with the Command, Control, Battle Management and Communications system. The next year, a THAAD test succeeded in intercepting a

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) unit. Photo by MDA. (Courtesy: Department of Defense)


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separating target inside the Earth’s atmosphere, demonstrating the system’s ability to operate in both the endoatmosphere and exoatmosphere. On May 28, 2008, the U.S. Army activated its first THAAD battery at Fort Bliss, Texas. The battery consisted of 24 interceptors, 3 launchers, fire control and radar in this initial fielding. Between 2005 and 2009, according to the prime contractor, Lockheed Martin, THAAD completed 11 successful test flights, including “6 for 6 successful intercepts of both unitary and separating targets.” In its annual report, the GAO in March 2009 declared: “THAAD’s technologies are mature and its design appears stable.” Testing of the system has continued to check on quality of production components to ensure the reliability of the system.24 Some congressional Democrats in 2008 criticized the MDA for spending too much on what they called “less mature systems” and subsequently urged that those systems that showed greater promise should receive more attention. In particular, they believed that a shifting of funds to the other systems, such as the Aegis and the mobile land-based THAAD, as both of these systems had recorded more successful tests. Also, these critics pointed to the immediate need to protect U.S. troops from short- and intermediate-range missiles, rather than a questionable current danger from long-range missiles.25 With this sort of attention being directed to these systems, it was not surprising that the Obama administration would find a larger role for the Aegis and THAAD in its antiballistic missile defense strategy. MDA’s Airborne Laser (ABL) program has not fared as well. Designed to destroy enemy missiles during the boost phase of flight, the ABL is carried aloft in a considerably altered Boeing 747. Using a high-energy chemical laser, the ABL would direct a beam at the enemy missile’s fuel tanks, hoping to rupture them. The 747 aircraft would carry a beam control/fire control subsystem to focus the laser and battle management subsystem to plan and carryout engagements. The air force created the ABL project in 1996 and, according to a GAO report in 2002, established cost and schedule goals before “officials had the knowledge to make realistic projections.” At the project’s launch, not enough was known about the challenging technological issues and, consequently, the Air Force “underestimated the complexity of the engineering task at hand and misjudged the amount of time and money that the program would need. Some critical technologies that the system’s design depends upon remain immature, making it very difficult, even today [2002], for analysts to establish realistic cost and schedule goals.”26 Even with certain developmental progress, the ABL project encountered technological difficulties that challenged the program’s costs and schedules. According to the Defense Department, these occurred “because the program and its contractors underestimated the complexity of (1) designing laser components, (2) the system’s engineering analysis and design effort, and (3) engineering the system to fit on board the

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aircraft.” It was found that “the system would need a beam control/fire control assembly that could (1) safely move the laser beam through the aircraft, (2) shape the beam so that it would not be scattered or weakened by the atmosphere, and (3) hold the beam on target despite the movement of the aircraft.” In addition, engineers determined that the system would need a battle management and control system capable of planning and executing an engagement. In August 2001, the original Air Force estimate of developmental cost at $2.5 billion and the fielding projection of 2006 had to be extended to $3.7 billion and deployment pushed out to 2010. Meanwhile, in October 2001, the Pentagon transferred the project to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, subsequently known as the MDA.27 The ABL program was restructured in February 2004 “to focus on nearterm milestones and to provide a more realistic budget and schedule” for completing its development. A GAO briefing of the Senate’s Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, on March 4, 2004, reiterated the many shortcomings of the ABL’s past performances. Also, Robert E. Levin’s May 17 letter, entitled Uncertainties Remain Concerning the Airborne Laser’s Cost and Military Utility, which forwarded the GAO briefing documents, pointed out: Predictions of the military utility of the initial ABL aircraft are still highly uncertain because these forecasts are not based on any demonstrated capability of the system, but rather on modeling, simulations, and analysis. These assessment tools predict that the initial Airborne Laser will be militarily useful against most theater and intercontinental ballistic missiles; but flight-test data are not yet available to anchor these tools. . . . When it is fielded, ABL is expected to require unique support for its laser and beam control and fire control components in addition to the support burdens attached to all high-value air assets.28

The next year, its work plan was further refined, but “technical problems associated with the program’s beam control/fire control ground test series” added additional costs and prompted a schedule revision. During 2006, many laser subcomponents “failed or were found to be deficient” and were blamed on inadequate quality control that reduced the laser’s power to 83 percent of the original goal. In March 2007, the GAO found that the MDA faced serious challenges, as some of the ABL technologies “have to improve between 60 percent and 80 percent.”29 Consequently, the program encountered additional slippage, as a full-scale test to demonstrate the system’s ability to shoot down a short-range missile was pushed back to fiscal year 2009, and later delayed further to fiscal year 2010. Pentagon officials had planned to use a prototype to test-flight the ABL critical technologies in late 2008 but realized that its basic elements were not ready. Program officials did express confidence that it would have the “jitter” effect—a vibration phenomenon related to the stability of the laser beam—under control to carry out the 2009 flight test.


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Congress was becoming increasingly concerned about the “affordability” of the ABL system. Should the planned 2009 flight test, scheduled for the fiscal year’s fourth quarter, accomplish all that its managers hoped for, according to the GAO, they still had to “make the business case that the system is affordable and operationally feasible—a task that has not yet been accomplished.” Given that the program had incurred mounting unbudgeted costs and encountered technical issues that require additional time to rectify, the March 2009 GAO report concluded: “MDA will need to determine whether an operationally effective and suitable ABL system can be developed with available technologies, funding, time and management capacity. For example, the ABL will require unique support in addition to the standard support required for the aircraft. To remain deployed for extended periods of time, ABL will need a facility in the theater of operations that can store and mix chemicals for the high-energy laser. . . . These [and other] support requirements and the cost associated with them have yet to fully determined by MDA.”30 The KEI program also has encountered technical difficulties. These interceptors were designed to become part of the missile defense system by destroying medium, intermediate, and ICBMs during the boost and midcourse phases of their flight. The KEI’s significant elements include hit-to-kill interceptors, mobile launchers, and fire control and communications units. As a result of component integration and hardware manufacturing issues, funding was reduced during fiscal years 2004 to 2006. After revisions in April 2007, the program limited its efforts to four aspects of the interceptor’s booster with expectation of a booster flight test in fiscal year 2009. The operational design was planned to be finalized in 2011 when several elements will have been flight and ground tested. In justifying its KEI budget, the program presented the Senate Appropriations Committee with its three prime objectives: “(1) to develop a midcourse interceptor capable of replacing the current fixed Ground-based interceptor (GBI) when the deployed GBIs become obsolete; (2) to develop this interceptor so that it could be strategically deployed . . .; and (3) to assume the boost- and ascent-phase intercept mission within the Ballistic Missile Defense System if the ABL fails to meet its performance objectives.” The committee questioned the KEI’s stated objectives because “existing systems can achieve the same goals, and that the missile is not suitable for Navy platforms.” Developing the KEI to replace the GBI, the committee argued, was premature, as the GBI was currently undergoing “continuous upgrades and retrofits,” and still required significant testing. If new midcourse interceptors were needed, it would be appropriate to consider upgrading the THAAD system. Finally, the 40-inch diameter KEI is much longer, nearly 39 feet, than the 21-inch diameter, 21 feet long, SM-3 Standard missile, and both missiles use a kinetic energy warhead designed to ram an enemy missile. Apparently a KEI missile launch tube would be so large it would replace six SM-3 launch tubes. “That’s a poor exchange

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ratio,” according to one naval analyst. Consequently, the Appropriations Committee recommended a reduction in the KEI’s budget.31 * * * At the end of George W. Bush’s presidency, there appeared to be little public discussion about the operational reliability of the various BMD projects or the costs involved in their research and deployment. Despite optimistic and often exaggerated official claims to the contrary, there was considerable room for skepticism about the reliability of the administration’s missile defense system. Indeed, few BMD projects could claim to have been tested in a realistic setting, that is, tested in a real-world environment, without scripted tests, fending off realistic countermeasures, and manned by regular military units rather than civilian specialists. The GMD system, with two dozen units deployed at Fort Greeley, Alaska, and Vandenberg AFB, California, was the centerpiece of the administration’s program. As of the end of 2008, the system had managed only 8 “hits” in 14 intercept tests that unfortunately did not capture the fog of war. Only two fully successful tests had been conducted since the GMD project was deployed. Admittedly, counting test successes and failures is something even the experts do not agree on. For example, does one score the FTG-05 test on December 5, 2008 a success? The interceptor hit its target, but the decoys failed to deploy; thus, the primary purpose of the test was not achieved. Yet, because they hit the target, MDA counted this test as a success. Although there is room for disagreement, this summary also counts FTG-05 as a “hit.” Eight or so of the earliest tests all included countermeasures, but those countermeasures did not closely resemble the target. Consequently, skeptics have questioned whether they were realistic and challenging. Meanwhile, another test scheduled for 2008 was canceled, but this slippage was to be corrected with a new test anticipated in 2009. The test was again postponed until early 2010. Problems also arose with the GMD’s EKV that Bradley Graham described as a “120-pound package of sensors, computers, and thrusters intended to home in on the enemy warhead and pulverize it with the sheer forces of a high-speed collision.” Pentagon officials called its first flight intercept test in 1999 a major success. A later reevaluation by skeptics, however, suggested that the EKV apparently drifted off course and was finally aided in locating its Minuteman target by a much larger, bright-colored Mylar decoy balloon. A bitter conflict between Boeing and Raytheon corporations added to its fundamental technical difficulties and by 2008 had caused considerable schedule slippage and cost overruns.32 The Aegis and THAAD projects designed to counter short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles were more successful. The Aegis system, originally developed to defend naval ships from enemy aircraft, was added to the MDA’s antimissile program by the Bush administration. Some public accounts labeled the Aegis as a “mid-course”


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system; however, in 2008, its SM3 interceptor was too slow to successfully engage incoming ICBMs, although a faster model was under development. Meanwhile, the Aegis ships could serve as sensor platforms that would allow them to engage in fire control tracking for other antimissile units. During its flight testing, the Aegis system achieved a solid record, to reiterate, of “15 successful exo-atmospheric intercepts in 19 attempts,” plus its successful 3 endoatmospheric intercepts, thus accomplishing 18 successful intercepts in 22 tests. The THAAD system was initially developed to protect troops and fixed locations from shortand intermediate-range ballistic missiles. After THAAD was transferred to the MDA in late 2001, it was subjected to various modifications and to a longer flight-testing schedule to determine the reliability of its interceptors. Following endoatmospheric and exoatmospheric intercepts, in 2008 the army organized its first THAAD battery consisting of 24 interceptors and 3 launchers. All in all, the THAAD system had successfully conducted 11 flight tests between 2005 and 2009, including 6 for 6 successful intercepts. The Patriot (PAC-2 and PAC-3) missile program, originally designed by the army as an antiaircraft system, has been, and is, highly touted by the Pentagon and Raytheon Corporation as a viable defender against shortand medium-range missiles. Indeed, as noted in an earlier chapter, it has been widely marketed to America’s allies and friends. Yet in spite of all the praise, the Patriot’S performance in two Gulf wars has been less than dazzling. During the 1991 conflict, the White House and Defense Department’s enthusiastic claims—that the PAC-2’s interception rate of Scud missiles was 41 of 42—were subsequently vastly downgraded. Indeed, an Israeli Air Force investigation found that “there is no clear evidence of even a single successful intercept.” The Patriot’s record during the 2003 conflict, according to the U.S. Army, was nine for nine (they also shot down 2 friendly aircraft), although no Scuds were involved. Why nine other Iraqi missiles were not engaged is not clear. Thus, even with combat experience, Patriot units staffed by army personnel still have much to prove regarding their effectiveness. Perhaps an even more serious consideration is that no Iraqi cruise missiles were intercepted, which could well pose a serious problem for the future. Other MDA programs have fared poorly. The ABL program, designed to destroy enemy missiles during the boost phase of flight, encountered serious technological problems and, thus, was unable to meet its schedules. MDA had hoped to flight-test a prototype in late 2008, but significant deficiencies remained in the ABL’s basic units. With schedule slippage and mounting costs, questions were raised as to the ABL’s affordability. Meanwhile, the KEI program also had encountered technical difficulties, involving integration of its basic components and hardware production. After design and production modifications, the KEI was expected to conduct a booster flight test during 2009.

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If most attention has been focused on the technical and operational capabilities of the deployed systems, the broad political aspects of this action and the financial costs of the various projects also have been matters of serious concern. From 2002 to 2008, the MDA spent $57 billion on development and procurement of the initial units of its antimissile systems, a sum that may be added to approximately $120 billion expended since 1945 in the same quest. As Richard F. Kaufman and others pointed out, however, in their concise study, The Full Costs of Ballistic Missile Defense: “When a program requires many years of development, production, installation, and operation, the costs incurred at the beginning will be misleadingly low as to the ultimate cost of the system. As weapons systems have become more sophisticated and more complicated, this disparity between ultimate and immediate costs has grown. But few, if any, military or other systems match the long-run nature of the commitments involved in ballistic missile defense.” After thorough examination of the factors involved, these analysts concluded the long-run costs “could mount to the neighborhood of one trillion dollars.” In a somewhat similar vein, the GAO has pointed out “the cost to operate and support a weapon system traditionally accounts for over 70 percent of the total cost over the system’s lifetime,” consequently, “the resources needed to operate and support BMDS could be significant over time.” The GAO also noted in a March 2009 report that various MDA’s ballistic missile defense systems have experienced cost overruns and vague accounting procedures. During the last few years, members of Congress, not surprisingly, gradually began to ask more questions regarding the budgeting for the MDA’s antimissile systems.33 The questions many observers were still asking at the end of the Bush administration were which units in the missile defense program are actually reliable and are they, in the immediate years and the long-run, really affordable? And how would the new president address these concerns?

CHAPTER 7


In the spring and summer of 2008, anticipating the fall elections, supporters of missile defense in Congress were concerned about what the policies of the next administration might be toward missile defense. As part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Congress called for the next administration to conduct a full review of U.S. missile defense policy and strategy.1 For all practical purposes the Ballistic Missile Defense Review began with the transition team immediately after the election, but it began officially in March not long after the inauguration. The first indication of direction that the Obama administration might take with missile defense seemed to justify those congressional concerns. In early February 2009, the Office of Management and Budget proposed cutting the Pentagon’s missile defense budget by $1.9 billion. As it turned out, however, in April 2009, when the FY-2010 defense budget request was released, the cut was about half that. The administration ended up proposing a $7.8 billion budget for the Missile Defense Agency for FY-2010.2 Thus the first Obama Missile Defense Agency (MDA) budget ($7.8 billion) was the same as that requested by President George W. Bush in 2006, a bit larger than what Bush requested in 2004 ($7.7 billion), and significantly larger than the Bush request in 2003 ($6.7 billion). And the first Obama MDA budget was equal to, or a few hundred million more, than funding appropriated by Congress in four of the Bush years, including two years, FY-2004 and FY-2006, when Republicans controlled both the Congress and the White House. Republicans in Congress had not complained about too little money for missile defense in those years, and so their complaints when the Obama administration budget request was released seemed

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more partisan than substantive. As one Republican staff member told the journal CQ, “In the long term, everybody is right. We Republicans have to appreciate, too, that despite the rhetoric from the Obama campaign, they only cut $1.2 billion from missile defense compared with what was appropriated in fiscal 2009.”3 Moreover, many critics of Obama’s budget request did not note that much missile defense spending, roughly $3 billion, was not counted in the MDA budget. These additional funds would be spent by the military departments for programs such as Patriot, Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netter Sensor ( JLENS), Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization ( JIAMDO), Space-Based Infrared System-High (SBIRS-High), or for other missile defense projects that are outside the MDA budget. Patriot, MEADS, and SBIRS-High are described in the previous chapter, JLENS is basically an elevated radar to look over the horizon carried on a large Aerostat balloon tethered to a ground station. JIAMDO is part of the staff servicing the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and designated to plan, coordinate, and oversee joint air and missile defense requirements. Nor did the skeptics always note that the administration added roughly $1 billion to its missile defense budget, including $700 million for more Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptors and $200 million to convert six more Aegis ships for ballistic missile defense (BMD), that offset cuts in other areas. Perhaps more stunning than the absolute size of the Department of Defense missile defense budget were the actions and comments made by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in announcing the president’s budget request. Since Gates had been a long-time supporter of missile defense, defense budget analysts had not expected his actions to cut or terminate missile defense programs; however, he proposed to cut the ground-based missile defense (GMD) system in Alaska by $524 million and the Airborne Laser (ABL) program by $214 million, and to terminate the Multiple Kill Vehicle (MKV) program, saving $283 million. Secretary Gates also terminated the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) program, and requested no new money for missile defense in Europe, as the Defense Department had substantial unobligated funds left over from prior years during which missile defense in Europe had been delayed.4 * * * In public testimony Gates used critical language not heard before from a secretary of defense when addressing missile defense. For example, during a House Armed Services Committee hearing on May 13, 2009, in response to complaints from Republican Congressman Trent Franks of Arizona, about the programs Gates had canceled, the secretary was blunt: “I would say that the security of the American people and the efficacy of missile defense are not enhanced by continuing to put money into programs that


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in terms of their operational concept are fatally flawed, or research programs that are essentially sinkholes for taxpayer dollars.”5 At another House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee hearing a week later, Gates responded rather sharply to Kansas Republican Congressman Todd Tiahrt’s concern regarding the administration’s failure to support the ABL: “I don’t know anybody at the Department of Defense, Mr. Tiahrt, who thinks that this program [airborne laser] should, or would, ever be operationally deployed. The reality is that you would need a laser something like 20 to 30 times more powerful than the chemical laser in the plane right now to be able to get any distance from the launch site to fire. . . . So, right now the ABL would have to orbit inside the borders of Iran in order to be able to try and use its laser to shoot down that missile in the boost phase.” Before the ABL would be close enough to its target, Gates emphasized, the aircraft carrying the laser would have to invade Iranian territory first. “And if you were to operationalize this you would be looking at 10 to 20 747s, at a billion and a half dollars apiece, and $100 million a year to operate. And there’s nobody in uniform that I know who believes that this is a workable concept,” he added. “I have kept the first [aircraft]—the prototype,” Gates continued, “because we do need to continue the research on directed energy and on lasers, and that will be robustly funded because we do need to continue developing a boost-phase capability. But, operationally, this first test, for example, is going to be from a range of 85 miles.”6 At the same House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee hearing, with respect to the KEI program, which Gates had also canceled, he said: “The missile’s 38 or 39-feet long. It weighs 12 tons. There’s no extant ship we can put it on. We would have to design a new ship to put it on. And as I say, it would have to operate in close proximity to the territorial waters of these countries. . . . So for all these reasons, the decision has been made that this is not a productive way to look at the booster problem.” He also pointed out that the decision to cancel the KEI had been made earlier by the Bush administration: “Actually, this is one decision that I can’t take credit for. The Missile Agency itself last fall, during the Bush administration, essentially eliminated the kinetic energy interceptor from its FY ’10 POM [Program Objective Memorandum]. And the reasons for that are as follows: First of all, this was to have been a five-year development program and it now looks like it’s about a 16-year development program.” More to the point, he explained: “a big part of the problem with this program is that it needs to be close to the launch site to be able to be effective—the only potential country where it could have a role with some confidence would be North Korea. It has poor capability against Iran and virtually no capability against either Russia or Chinese launch facilities.”7 Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Gates explained why the MKV program was neither affordable nor appropriate to today’s threats. “On the Multiple Kill Vehicle, the policy of the Bush administration and the policy of this administration has been to develop a missile defense

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against rogue nations, not against China and Russia,” Gates said. “And the Multiple Kill Vehicle, in addition to schedule and cost and technology issues . . . was designed against a far more capable enemy than either North Korea or Iran are going to be . . . for the next 10 to 15 years.”8 In his several trips to Capitol Hill to explain the president’s budget request, Gates not only showed that he knew his facts, but revealed weaknesses in some missile defense systems that were so fundamental that even if the next development tests might go well, these programs still had no viable operational future. * * * In addition to shifting priorities on individual missile defense projects, the Obama administration was also examining new concepts for the defense of Europe from a potential Iranian ballistic missile attack. In a study released in February 2009, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) had recommended four options for U.S. missile defense systems in Europe. All four options involved the establishment of a “Forward-Based” X-band Radar located in Gabala, Azerbaijan, or alternatively in Armavir in the Krasnodar region of Russia between the Black and Caspian Seas. Thus all four CBO options would require cooperation with, and participation by, Russia on the establishment of a new radar site in or near Russian territory. Since Russian President Putin had proposed something quite similar to President Bush in June 2007, the new administration presumed Russia might still be amenable to such ideas. The new administration saw several possibilities in such an approach. Engaging Russia directly in U.S. missile defense plans for Europe would help to establish American sincerity in wanting to reestablish relations with Russia and further reduce the tensions between the United States and Russia over proposed U.S. missile defenses in Europe. It could facilitate Russia and the United States coming to a new agreement on lower levels of nuclear weapons beyond the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT). Working with Russia also could increase the deterrence pressure on Iran. If Iran were so reckless as to attack Europe, ordinary military tactics would require that Iran’s first step would be to attack the forward-based radar inside or near Russia to blind the “eyes” of the system. This would place Iran in the position of having to attack both Russia and Europe at the same time. This approach would, in addition, send a signal to NATO, Poland, and the Czech Republic that the Obama administration was taking a fresh look at missile defense in Europe and reviewing its most effective options. In fact, the MDA had already been involved in BMD discussions with Russia, and the United States had proposed a set of “transparency measures,” including “joint monitoring of potential threats, joint situational awareness, cooperative regional missile defense architectures, and delay fully operationalizing European sites until Iran demonstrates long-range


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missile capability.” The United States and Russia had also discussed “sharing of U.S. and Russian surveillance data.”9 In February 2009, shortly after the inauguration, President Obama wrote Russian President Medvedev offering to reconsider U.S. plans for missile defense installations in Poland and the Czech Republic in return for Russia withholding its assistance to Iran’s long-range missile program. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs William J. Burns delivered the letter during a visit to Moscow.10 President Obama had emphasized that proposed U.S. missile defenses in Europe were not aimed at Russia, but rather at Iran, and that he desired Russia’s support in dealing with the Iranians. * * * Public opinion in Poland and the Czech Republic was still largely unfavorable toward the original Bush proposal. On March 17, 2009, the Czech government removed from Parliamentary consideration the proposed treaties on the installation of a missile defense radar in the Czech Republic rather than see them voted down. The center-right Czech government had been supporting the radar, but the proposal had been unpopular with Czech citizens and in the Czech Parliament.11 Then, on March 24 2009, the Czech government collapsed after a no-confidence vote in Parliament. Analysts varied in their assessment of the role that the controversial missile defense radar played in the government’s loss. It was embarrassing, however, for Czech President Vaclav Havel, a strong proponent for the Bush system, who was midway through his term as president of the European Union. On April 5, President Obama gave his famous speech in Prague stating “America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” In a strong endorsement of the arms control process, he also pledged to negotiate “a new Strategic Arms Reduction treaty with the Russians this year” and to “aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.” The Prague speech with the pledge to shift America’s nuclear arms policies probably supported Obama’s Nobel Peace prize more than any other action. Missile defense issues also figured in his speech. Citing the continuing missile threat from Iran and North Korea, and praising the courage of Poland and the Czech Republic in agreeing to host missile defense elements, Obama promised, “As long as the threat from Iran persists, we will go forward with a missile defense system that is cost effective and proven.” Less often cited was the very next sentence in the president’s Prague speech: “If the Iranian threat is eliminated, we will have a stronger basis for security, and the driving force for missile defense construction in Europe will be removed.” In two sentences was the core of the new administration’s policy: a pledge to proceed with missile defenses in Europe as long as Iranian missiles remained a threat, and the need to work with Russia and other countries

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to eliminate that threat. However, the Obama administration was also narrowing its definition of the threat. Under President Bush, the Pentagon had exaggerated the ballistic missile threat to justify a world-wide layered missile defense system, with interceptors launched from land, sea, aircraft (the ABL), and perhaps eventually from space, capable of shooting down enemy missiles of all types: short range, medium range, long range, and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Furthermore, the Defense Department wanted the system to be capable of shooting down enemy missiles in all phases of flight—in the ascending boost-phase, in the mid-course of flight, and in the terminal phase descending toward targets. The idea behind the layered defense was that if one layer missed, perhaps the next layer would not. Pentagon briefings pictured giant glass domes covering the United States, and Americans were meant to imagine that enemy missiles would bounce off these glass domes like hail off a windshield. The missile defense system proposed by President Bush for Europe was an extension of that plan. Reinforcing the justification for U.S. missile defenses in Europe, Iran periodically conducted sword-rattling missile tests and announced progress in its drive to enrich uranium. Iran always asserted that its nuclear program was for peaceful purposes, to produce electric power, and not for nuclear weapons, but its behavior on the international stage often had

The Airborne Laser (ABL) is a boost-phase missile defense system that is designed to use directed energy to destroy a ballistic missile in the “boost” phase of flight. Photo by MDA. (Courtesy: Department of Defense)


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been reckless. In particular, Iran would not cooperate consistently with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Iranian leaders frequently engaged in wild denunciations and threats. Ironically, the missile defense systems being proposed for Europe depended for their justification on Iran behaving badly from time to time. If through creative diplomacy, undoubtedly with help from other nations, Iran and the United States could settle their differences, there would be no justification for missile defenses in Europe. This point had been established two years earlier on January 25, 2007, when MDA Director Lt. General Obering held a reporters’ roundtable where members of the media could ask him questions via conference call. One reporter asked the director what would be the point of the European site if the so-called Iranian threat went away, and Obering could not come up with an answer. Where missile defense spending for Europe is concerned, the Pentagon—ever mindful of Russia’s ICBMs—has been dependent on the idea that Iran is, or would soon become, a threat. * * * Beyond the proposed U.S. missile defense sites in Europe, the Bush administration had urged a substantial buildup of missile defenses around the world. During the Bush years, the Pentagon and the White House had emphasized the worldwide threat from the proliferation of ballistic missiles to justify its own missile defense systems. For example, in October 2007, the White House announced, “America faces a growing ballistic missile threat. In 1972, just nine countries had ballistic missiles. Today, that number has grown to 27 and it includes hostile regimes with ties to terrorists.” Similarly MDA’s Obering spoke of the growing threat from enemy missiles by emphasizing that 20 countries possessed missiles. Yet, all but two of those 20 countries, Iran and North Korea, are either friends, allies, or countries from which the United States faced no missile threat, such as Israel, India, Pakistan, Vietnam, South Korea, Moldova, Ukraine, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Moldova, and later Venezuela was added to the MDA’s list. With the exception of Russia and China, moreover, none of those 20 countries, including Iran and North Korea, had proven missiles that could reach the United States. By contrast, the Obama administration chose to focus its missile defense plans on the existing missiles possessed by North Korea and Iran, not on all the other countries that possessed ballistic missiles. If the administration was concerned with missile proliferation, it also recognized that America’s friends and allies held most of those missiles. The threat from Iran, the Obama administration acknowledged, was urgent and real— albeit limited—and that meant dealing with today’s threat with existing missile defense systems. Iran already possessed short- and medium-range missiles that could reach its neighbors in the Middle East and in southeastern Europe. Similarly North Korea already had missiles that could reach South Korea and Japan.

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This shift in emphasis, to deal with today’s threats first, led to what the Obama administration would call a “Phased-Adaptive Approach” for a missile defense in Europe. On September 17, 2009, the administration announced its new plan for Europe.12 This approach would rely on deploying “proven capabilities and technologies to meet current threats,” in particular existing navy Aegis ships with SM-3 interceptors, and landbased army THAAD and Patriot batteries. Arranged in four phases, the plan would add longer range and faster interceptors later, especially landbased versions of the SM-3. Ironically, a provision added to the FY-2010 Defense Authorization Bill by congressional Republicans had helped pave the way for Obama’s Phased-Adaptive Approach. Language in both the House and Senate Defense Authorization bills permitted the administration to take FY-2009 funds originally intended for the Bush plan of ground-based interceptors (GBIs) in Poland and an X-Band radar in the Czech Republic, and reallocate those funds to a phased approach with less costly Aegis SM-3 interceptors and a different arrangement of radars. The language required the phased system to be “at least as cost-effective, technically reliable, and operationally available in protecting Europe and the United States from long-range missile threats as the ground-based midcourse defense system.”13 The Obama administration moved quickly to deploy missile defenses near Iran, and on January 22, 2010, speaking at the Institute for the Study of War, General David Petraeus, head of U.S. Central Command, announced that two Aegis cruisers with SM-3 interceptors “are in the Gulf at all times now.” Petraeus also said the eight Patriot missile batteries were deployed in the region, two in each of four countries flanking Iran.14 While the original Bush administration plan focused on ICBMs, which Iran did not have, his successor’s plan focused on what Iran actually possesses. These are short- and medium-range missiles that can reach southern Europe. Then too, the original Bush administration plan did not cover all of Europe, prompting some members of Congress to ask why the United States would defend some parts of Europe but not others. The Obama plan does not initially cover all of Europe either, but it does provide more immediate coverage from existing Iranian missiles. As Defense Secretary Gates put it in his press conference on September 17, 2009, the Obama administration’s program would produce coverage for Europe six to seven years earlier than would the Bush plan. At the rate the Bush plan had been proceeding, President Obama could serve two terms and never see GBI interceptor coverage from Poland if he had stayed with the Bush plan. Whereas the Bush bilateral approach had caused difficulties for NATO, the Obama administration plan would distribute defenses under NATO, in step-by-step phases covering all of Europe, since NATO is designed for all nations to work together for their common defense, not one or two in bilateral arrangements. Thus while Bush’s plan was bilateral, U.S./Poland and U.S./Czech, the Obama plan provides full cooperation


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with NATO. Both Poland and the Czech Republic would still be involved, but under the wider, more distributed plan. At first, the Obama plan called for deploying missiles defenses to the south closest to the threat, perhaps in Turkey. In December 2009, however, Turkey objected to U.S. missiles defenses deployed on its soil because it could harm Turkey’s relations with Russia and Iran.15 This reaction from Turkey added new complications to the administration’s Phased-Adaptive Approach plan. Under that plan missile defenses would be added, in subsequent years, farther north to distribute missile defense forces in the event Iran should develop longer range missiles that could target all of Europe. Overall, the Obama plan was pragmatic and provided more coverage sooner than the Bush plan would have, but it faced many of the same obstacles. For example, most citizens in the Czech Republic still opposed the establishment of a new X-band radar near Prague and welcomed the cancellation of the original Bush proposal. In December 2009, a Czech polling organization, the Center for Public Opinion Research, reported that a survey of Czech citizens revealed that 80 percent of the country’s residents were pleased that the Czech Republic would not be hosting a U.S. radar base; only 12 percent were disappointed.16 * * * Countless news organizations initially reported that the Bush plan was canceled. With few exceptions, the American press was so focused on the notion that President Obama had charted a new course that it missed almost entirely the fact that Obama’s Phased Adaptive Approach had not abandoned the Bush plan.17 Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General James Cartwright reinforced the continuing commitment to the originally proposed Bush system in a September 17, 2009 press conference. “So at the same time, we’re continuing the effort that we have ongoing today on the ground-based interceptor, which is to build a two-stage capability. Those tests . . . are funded, and will continue. So we’ll have two ways to address this threat,” he declared. “[w]e are not abandoning the work that we are doing with the ground-based interceptor.” At the same press briefing, Defense Secretary Gates also hedged to keep his options open relative to the future involvement of Poland and the Czech Republic. His comments in this press conference were quite open to future involvement by both countries. At one point, Secretary Gates acknowledged: “the Russians are probably not going to be pleased that we are continuing with missile defense efforts in Europe.” Subsequently, he added: We are very interested in . . . in continuing to work with the Czech Republic, in terms of a piece of this architecture. And we are eager to go forward with the framework agreement with the Czechs . . . that would allow that. Clearly, what

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this represents is, if the Poles are interested in going forward, it meets their concerns about having this capability in Poland. And so I think that this is actually an enhanced opportunity for . . . particularly the Polish government, but it also offers opportunities for the Czech Republic as well.18

Nevertheless, the Obama plan was intended to make the “resetting” of relations with Russia more likely. The importance of this goal to the administration was demonstrated in early March 2009, when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton presented her counterpart Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov with a symbolic red button marked “reset” in English, but with “peregruzka” in Russian, which means “overload” or “overcharged.” Fortunately for the administration, the Russians responded to the incident in good humor, and a new path in American-Russian relations was begun. For both technical and strategic policy reasons, officials in Moscow had been complaining about U.S. missile defense plans in Europe for years. They saw those plans as encroaching on their traditional strategic sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, as possibly being aimed at containing Russia’s ICBMs, and the BMDs as having offensive potential. Russian officials sometimes contradicted themselves by noting that because of the large number of Russian ICBMs, many that used decoys and countermeasures—the Achilles heel of missile defense—even futuristic missile defenses would not be dependable against Russian ICBMs. The Russian military and scientific establishment also recognized this fact, as they had also tried to develop missile defenses and knew the difficulties involved. In any case, Russia has so many ICBMs it must realize that it can easily overwhelm U.S. missile defenses. That is, after all, why the U.S. Congress shut down the Safeguard ABM system in the 1970s, just one day after it was declared operational. Given the context of the current administration’s missile defense plans for Europe, however, the promise of new and improved relations with Russia was not without complications. Cooperation from Russia in dealing with Iran could be very helpful, and for technical reasons locating a missile defense radar on or near Russian soil offered definite advantages. President Putin’s June 2007 proposal to Bush had suggested new avenues for American-Russian cooperation, and the Obama administration desired to explore such proposals. Yet such cooperation could become a partisan issue. If the Obama administration appeared to be conceding any part of the defense of America to Russia, then Congress and American voters could view the Obama administration as “soft on defense” or even foolhardy. Confronted with these two sets of realities, the Obama PhasedAdaptive Approach for missile defenses in Europe included no specific features that would involve Russian participation. Instead, the White House said only, “We also welcome Russian cooperation to bring its missile defense capabilities into a broader defense of our common strategic


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interests. We have repeatedly made clear to Russia that missile defense in Europe poses no threat to its strategic deterrent.” The reaction from Moscow to the Obama plan was generally positive. “First of all, it is a victory for common sense,” said Mikhail Margelov, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the upper house of Parliament, “We perceive this as another positive signal suggesting that in the current administration in Washington, pragmatism prevails over an ideological approach to foreign policy.” However, Maj. General Vladimir Dvorkin, former chief of Russian military’s main research institute for nuclear strategy, warned: “Everything depends on the scale of such a system. If it comprises a multitude of facilities, including a space echelon, it may threaten the Russian potential of nuclear deterrence.” Moscow understood that the Phased-Adaptive Approach contemplated much more powerful interceptors and radars in the later years and, depending on where those interceptors and associated radars might be located, that the Obama plan might be no better from Russia’s point of view than the original Bush plan.19 Another dimension, rarely discussed, was the impact of America’s continued missile defense activities on China. In contrast to Russia’s hundreds of ICBMs, China currently has about 20 missiles that could reach U.S. targets. Some of those missiles also have countermeasures that could confound American missile defense systems. If China should decide to build up its stockpile of ICBMs in response to U.S. missile defense efforts, it could probably overwhelm U.S. missile defenses. Moreover, if China does that, U.S. missile defense programs will have destabilized an important segment of the international strategic environment. * * * U.S. missile defense plans for Europe posed a particular dilemma for the Obama administration as it sought to negotiate a replacement for the important Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I signed by the United States and the Soviet Union on July 31, 1991, and ratified by the U.S. Senate on October 1, 1992. An essential element of START I, which expired on December 5, 2009, 15 years after it had entered into force, was that both parties had used its verification system to monitor SORT. The Obama administration expended considerable effort to negotiate a successor treaty before START I expired, but with less than a year in office, the deadline passed. Knowing how long treaty negotiations can take, the Bush administration could have made this a priority while it was still in office, but it did not. Now the Obama administration was faced with the daunting challenge of negotiating a new treaty that could win the votes of 67 senators, while also dealing with Russian objections over U.S. missile defenses in Europe that had not been a consideration when START I was first discussed. The Obama administration was well aware of Russia’s concerns—repeated again and again during the Bush years by President

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Putin and by Russian defense ministers and generals. But in 2009 and 2010, the stakes were higher. Bush had only needed Russian acquiescence to his plan to deploy U.S. missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic; Obama needed that too, but his administration also needed Russian cooperation on a new START pact. Missile defense also had been an issue with START II signed by the United States and Russia on January 3, 1993, which banned the use of multiple, independently targeted reentry vehicles. But it never entered into force largely because Russian ratification was delayed in the Duma for more than seven years, primarily resulting from Russian objections to the U.S-led expansion of NATO. When the Duma finally did ratify START II on April 14, 2000, it was with the condition that the ABM Treaty remain in force; however, by then there were strong pressures in the U.S. Congress to pull out of the ABM Treaty. When on June 13, 2002, the U.S. withdrew from the ABM Treaty, Russia announced the next day that it would no longer consider itself bound by START II. This history was reflected anew in the negotiations for a replacement to START I. On December 29, 2009, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin declared on television that Russia needed more detailed information about U.S. missile defenses. Concerned that missile defense would give the United States an advantage, Putin complained, “The problem is that our American partners are developing missile defenses, and we are not.” He went on to explain that “the issues of missile defense and offensive weapons are closely interconnected. . . . There could be a danger that having created an umbrella against offensive strike systems, our partners may come to feel completely safe. After the balance is broken, they will do whatever they want and grow more aggressive.” Under the new START negotiations, the United States was demanding unencrypted telemetry data from both U.S. and Russian offensive missile tests to be shared, as was required under the original 1991 START I agreement. Russia, in turn, was now coupling this to more data about U.S. missile defenses.20 Ever since President Reagan’s famous “Star Wars” speech in 1983, various Washington officials claimed they wanted to cooperate with Russia on missile defense, but through six administrations from Reagan to George W. Bush, real cooperation failed to materialize. In both the United States and Russia, missile defense skeptics questioned whether missile defense could be effective. If both countries acknowledged that missile defenses might never be effective under realistic operational conditions, then the real benefit would be to show that Russia and the United States could cooperate closely on a difficult matter. Conversely, if the Pentagon would not acknowledge that missile defenses might not be effective under realistic operational conditions—asserting that U.S. missile defenses actually might work in an all-out nuclear war—it would be suggesting that those U.S. missile defenses might work against Russian missiles. If those defenses were located where they might be effective against Russia, this


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would be something that Russia could not accept. During the Bush years, Russian officials had strongly indicated that they would not accept U.S. missile defenses being deployed in Eastern Europe. They have reacted to Washington’s indifference by threatening to pull out of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty and by threatening to aim offensive missiles at Europe, thus potentially restarting the Cold War. Moscow, moreover, ordered the resumption of strategic bomber training flights and claimed to have successfully developed new offensive ICBMs with maneuvering reentry vehicles to defeat U.S. missile defenses. The Russians also stated that they wanted the United States to halt consideration of the deployment of attack weapons in space, which they found threatening to their security. The Russian test on September 17, 2007, of the “Father of All Bombs,” (FOAB) claimed to be four times more powerful than the conventional U.S. 20,000 pound Massive Ordnance Air Burst bomb, also called the “Mother of All Bombs”(MOAB), was interpreted by many as yet another message to the United States that the proposed missile defenses were unacceptable. If, as Russia claimed, the FOAB was more powerful than the MOAB, then it was indeed a new technological accomplishment, with the explosive force of a small nuclear weapon. Russia seemed to be going through a new, heady sense of nationalism employing military accomplishments as the vehicle for its expression. Some observers suggested that this new focus was to impress Russian voters more than to impress America and to secure President Putin’s future if he should decide to run for president again, which is possible under Russian law after sitting out for a term. Undoubtedly, Putin did not mind if he impressed Russian voters and secured his future, but it appeared to many analysts that these developments were aimed more at the United States than at Russian voters. The Obama administration’s persistent efforts eventually were rewarded with the New SALT treaty signed on April 9, 2010, but the missile defense issues were not resolved (see “Reflections”). * * * On December 11, 2009, Poland and the United States signed a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) defining the legal status of 100 U.S. soldiers to be stationed on Polish soil. These forces would operate Patriot and SM-3 missiles as part of the Phased-Adaptive Approach to missile defense in Europe. This agreement completed the process begun in August 20, 2008 by President Bush when the United States and Poland signed the Declaration on Strategic Cooperation. Under this pact, 10 GBI missiles were to be deployed at a planned U.S. Air Force base in northern Poland. The revised SOFA, however, described the deployment of a set of Patriot and SM-3 interceptors with more modest technical capabilities than the GBIs. It was the capabilities of those GBIs, of course, that Russian officials had objected to all along, and the Phased-Adaptive Approach sought to reduce their concerns.21

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On January 2010, the Polish government announced that it would station in northern Poland the Patriot missiles scheduled for delivery in April. Those missiles were originally to have been deployed near Warsaw, but the Polish government decided to move them to Morag closer to the border with the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad. Polish officials said the decision was operational, not strategic, and that no affront to Russia was intended. Nonetheless, National Security Adviser James Jones and Joint Chiefs Chairman Admiral Mike Mullen immediately left Washington for Moscow to reassure Russia and to try to prevent the Polish action from unsettling negotiations on a replacement for START I.22 In July 2007, Russia had threatened to deploy nuclear-tipped offensive Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad in retaliation for the Bush plan to station missile defense interceptors in Poland. Then on November 5, 2008, Russian President Medvedev had warned that not only would those Iskander missiles be deployed, but that they would be aimed at U.S. missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic. On January 28, 2009, however, after President Obama announced that his administration was reconsidering the Bush plan for Europe, Russia’s plans for Kaliningrad were suspended. Now, just one year later with the proposed deployment of U.S. Patriot missiles so close to the Russian border, Russia’s hackles were up again and the resetting of relations was in trouble.23 Some of the sharpest criticism of Poland’s new proposed basing of Patriot missile defenses near the border of a Russian province came from unexpected new quarters. For example, the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance (MDAA), a promissile defense industry lobbying organization, called the plan “provocative to Russia, as the U.S. Patriot Air Defense Units to be deployed can only defend a very small area that will be composed of Polish military forces that directly oppose Russian military forces across the border in Kaliningrad.” Aimed as they would be at Russia and not Iran, the MDAA complained, “this decision is directly providing Poland a capability with deployed U.S. troops to defend Polish military against Russia with no intention of the future threat from Iran to Europe. . . . It would seem logical that those valuable and limited U.S. Missile Defense assets, such as the Patriot, be deployed in a more useful position then [sic] defending Poland against Russia.” Pointing to the obvious, the MDAA asked: “How would our government, our military, our nation and our public react to having Russian Army Soldiers with Russian S-300s Air and Missile Defense units along our nation’s borders?” Uncharacteristically the MDAA was reflecting Russia’s point of view about all of the proposed U.S. missile defense systems in Europe, not just the short-range Patriots. In early March 2010, Poland signed a new version of the agreement that it had concluded with the Bush administration on August 20, 2008. The Polish government stated that this new protocol would replace the GMDtype interceptors with land-based versions of the Standard Missile-3 interceptors, silos for which would not be constructed before 2018. Washington


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indicated that it was not interested in placing long-range missile silos near the Polish-Kaliningrad border. Also, Warsaw acknowledged that the system was being developed with the primary mission of guarding against short- and medium-range Iranian missiles.24 On February 4, 2010, Romania announced that it had accepted an Obama administration plan for basing U.S. missile defense interceptors.25 These interceptors would be the more capable, SM-3 Block IB versions of the Aegis SM-3. The plan envisioned deploying these interceptors in Romania by 2015 in Phase Two of the Phased-Adaptive Approach. Even more capable SM-3 Block IIA interceptors would deployed in Poland in Phase Three of the plan targeted for 2018.26 U.S. Ambassador to Bulgaria James Warlick announced on February 12 that the United States had begun informal talks with Bulgaria on hosting U.S. missile defense elements, and that Bulgaria as well “has a place in the US missile defense shield.” Bulgarian officials indicated their openness to host missile interceptors to “show solidarity” as a member of NATO. Romania and Bulgaria are closer to Iran than Poland, and now Russia faced plans for U.S. interceptors in three countries near its border. Under the Bush plan, these interceptors were to be in Poland only. Also Romania and Bulgaria border the Black Sea, which is regulated by the 1936 Montreux Convention that restricts combatant vessels. To complicate matters further, a week later Prague announced that it was in strategic talks with the Obama government on a plan to host a command and control center for the Phased-Adaptive Approach.27 With U.S. missile defense facilities now likely to be based in Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and the Czech Republic, to Russia the Obama Phased-Adaptive Approach was beginning to look more threatening than the original Bush plan for Europe. Russia understandably expressed concern about exactly what direction the Obama plan was taking. On February 6, a spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry told reporters, “We still have serious questions regarding the true purpose of the US missile system.” “Therefore,” Andrei Nesterenko explained, “we will continue to consistently oppose any dubious unilateral actions in relation to the missile defense that can negatively affect international security.” In Moscow’s strongest statement of objection since it had learned of the U.S. missile defense plans for Romania from media reports rather than directly from Washington or Bucharest, Nesterenko said, “We are again becoming witnesses to a hasty anti-missile arrangement for Europe when the fragile architecture of European security essentially becomes hostage to imaginary missile threats that are defined unilaterally.” To Russia these unexpected developments—the “Romanian surprise,” followed by the “Bulgarian surprise”—raised questions regarding Washington’s sincerity in wanting “an equal partnership.”28 In nearby Moldova, the breakaway territory of Transdniestria announced its willingness to field Russian Iskander tactical missiles in retaliation for the expanding U.S. missile defense strategy. This was eerily reminiscent

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of the earlier Russian threat to place Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad in retaliation for the U.S. GBIs President Bush had proposed in Poland. Now with Transdniestria making a similar type of threat, the Obama administration faced a situation with Russia in Transdniestria similar to what the Bush administration faced with Russia in Kaliningrad.29 * * * Just when the Obama administration had its hands full with Russia, China conducted a surprise missile defense test of its own. On January 11, 2010, days after the Pentagon approved the export of new U.S. missile defenses to Taiwan, China conducted a reportedly successful mediumto long-range missile defense test, making China only the second nation to have successfully shot down a missile outside the atmosphere.30 The test demonstrated a new Chinese defense capability and added another dimension to the issue between China and the United States over Taiwan. Most observers seemed to agree that China had conducted this test mostly to express its anger with the United States for approving new arms sales to Taiwan, including U.S. Patriot missiles. China had issued a half-dozen warnings of impending grave consequences should the sales be approved; consequently, the approval of the arms sales—coming so soon after Obama’s November 2009 visit to Beijing—must have appeared to Chinese officials as a lack of respect.31 Thus the Chinese government’s announcement, in mid-January 2010, that it had successfully tested a ground-based mid-course missile interceptor capable of destroying missiles in mid-flight emphasized China’s emerging antimissile technology. While it did not elaborate on whether any missile or object had actually been destroyed, Reuters on January 12, quoted the Chinese Foreign Ministry as saying, “The test has achieved the expected objective. . . . The test is defensive in nature and is not targeted at any country.” Longer term, China’s new missile defense system could lead to furthering the arms race, with China, Russia, and the United States, not to mention India, Pakistan, and other countries. India wasted no time, announcing on February 11, 2010, that within the month it too would conduct an exoatmospheric missile defense test, and bragged that its missile defense system was superior to China’s. “This is one area where we are senior to China,” said V. K. Saraswat, the director of India’s Defense Research and Development Organization, referring to Indian software algorithms, a key portion of any missile defense system.32 Unfortunately for Indian officials, the Associated Press reported on March 15, 2010 that their latest antimissile test failed when the interceptor refused to take off due to a technical failure. With a burgeoning new arms race in missile defense and with U.S. budget deficits at record levels, pressure for more defense spending was hardly what the Obama administration needed. The situation was compounded, however, when Iran announced, on February 3, 2010, that it had launched a satellite into space, the third


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such test in recent years. This time the rocket sent a capsule into orbit containing a rat, two turtles, and some worms. Although Iran said its satellite test was for peaceful purposes, the launch showed that Iran possessed much of the technology needed for an intercontinental-range offensive missile. The premise behind the Phased-Adaptive Approach was that the U.S. intelligence community “now assesses that the threat from Iran’s short- and medium-range ballistic missiles is developing more rapidly than previously projected, while the threat of potential Iranian intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities has been slower to develop than previously estimated.”33 Iran’s testing of spacelaunch vehicles capable of traveling long distances was a challenge to the Phased-Adaptive Approach. Then five days later Iran announced that it would soon deploy a missile defense system of its own, produced domestically and more capable than the Russian S-300 system that Iran had ordered in 2007, a system that had never been delivered. Adding to the mixed messages from Iran, on February 8, 2010, Iran formally notified the IAEA of its intent to enrich uranium to higher levels, 20 percent, for Tehran’s research reactor, but a step that could bring it closer to having enough uranium for a nuclear weapon.34 Meanwhile the Obama administration had its first experience with the unpredictability of missile defense tests. On January 31, 2010, the MDA attempted another GMD flight intercept test. The target and the interceptor both launched properly, but the interceptor missed. Going back over a decade, the MDA had only had eight GMD flight intercept hits in 15 tries. Since late 2002, when President George W. Bush made his decision to begin deploying the GMD system, there had only been three hits in eight tries, and during the most recent five years only two hits out of six tries. More often than not something had gone wrong, sometimes with the target if not with the interceptor. The timing of this failure was awkward, coming as it did the day before the administration released its FY-2011 budget requests, including a boost in funding for missile defense. A few days later in tests off the California coast, the ABL, now being called the Airborne Laser Testbed (ALTB), following Secretary Gate’s decision to send the program back to the research phase, successfully shot down a solid-fueled Black Brant sounding rocket. Then on February 11, the ALTB also shot down a short-range liquid-fueled ballistic missile. An hour later, however, in a second attempt to shoot down another Black Brant sounding rocket, the ALTB failed, reportedly because of a beam misalignment problem. Success in two of the three laser tests, tests that had first been scheduled for 2002 but repeatedly delayed, prompted ABL advocates in Congress to immediately call for Secretary Gates to reverse his decision to curtail the program. The Pentagon quickly responded, however, that Gates’s fundamental issues of cost, too little range and power, and an unworkable concept of operations had not been addressed. “We still very much want to pursue development of this promising technology,” a Pentagon spokesman said, “and we’ll figure out down the road what

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the appropriate and cost-effective platform is.” To punctuate Gates’s decision, at a February 23, 2010, House Armed Services Committee hearing, Air Force Chief of Staff Norton Schwartz stated flatly, “the reality is that this does not reflect something that is operationally viable.”35 * * * In early February 2010, the Obama administration also completed the BMD Review required by Congress. The same week the administration also released to Congress its annual National Security Strategy document—the Quadrennial Defense Review—and submitted the annual federal budget for FY-2011. Together all these documents portrayed an administration with surprisingly little policy differences from the Bush administration that had preceded it. The administration’s BMD Review issued strong warnings about the threat. In his cover letter Defense Secretary Gates warned that the threat from ballistic missile attack to our deployed military forces and to our allies and partners is growing rapidly. The report echoed this view and reported that the ballistic missile threat is increasing both quantitatively and qualitatively. The BMD Review also claimed that the United States is currently protected against limited enemy ICBM attacks, an assertion called into question by the GMD test failure the day before. The Obama administration canceled a few military acquisition programs, but the overall direction for defense spending was about the same, and missile defense in particular was well funded. For Fiscal Year 2011, the Obama administration requested $8.4 billion for the MDA, an increase from its FY-2010 request of about $600 million. This increase brought the Obama budget request for FY-2011 to a level exactly equal to the average budget request for the MDA during the eight-year tenure of the Bush administrations. The latest Obama request included $281 million for a new program element “Land-based SM-3,” also called “Aegis Ashore,” to develop new faster and more powerful land-based Aegis interceptors for the missile defense of Europe. Over the five fiscal years of the budget request, the Obama administration requested $1.047 billion for this new program. Along with $1.467 billion for BMD Aegis ($5.602 billion over the FYDP), and $319 million for Aegis SM-3 Block IIA interceptor development in cooperation with Japan ($1.705 billion over the FYDP), it was clear that the Obama administration was placing high priority on Aegis systems going forward. Similarly, for the THAAD system, also part of the Phased-Adaptive Approach for the missile defense of Europe, the administration requested $859 million in FY-2011 procurement funds to buy 67 more interceptors and two additional THAAD batteries, more than doubling the FY-2010 THAAD procurement budget request.36 These sums did not count about $3 billion in other missile defense spending requested for the Military Department and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).


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For example, funding for Patriot (PAC-3) in the budget of the U.S. Army was requested at about $0.5 billion, for MEADS about $0.5 billion, and funding for SBIRS-High in the Air Force budget at about $1.5 billion. Thus an outside observer viewing the defense budgets of the Bush administration, and also its missile defense budgets, and comparing them with the second defense budget of the Obama administration, might not be able to determine which budget had been submitted by which president. To be sure, the Obama administration had made a mark on missile defense policy by adopting its Phased-Adaptive Approach in Europe, and by canceling or cutting several missile defense projects such as the MKV and the ABL. Defense Secretary Gates had been especially forceful about those decisions. But in its second year, the Obama administration had also added several new missile defense projects, notably the new Land-Based SM-3 interceptors, and “Airborne Infrared,” a new $112 million program to track ballistic missiles with sensors on unmanned aerial drones. The net result produced a missile defense budget request that stood eye-to-eye with the earlier Bush administration requests. When President Obama asked Gates to stay on as secretary of defense that decision foretold an overall direction that would continue America’s major commitment to missile defense. As Gates wrote in the New York Times shortly after the Phased-Adaptive Approach was announced, “I have been a strong supporter of missile defense ever since President Ronald Reagan first proposed it in 1983.”37 Although the news media regularly reported that the Obama administration was “scaling back Reagan’s vision” or “scrapping” the Bush plan for Europe, such reporting missed the point that the Obama administration was fully committed to the missile defense concept.38 * * * Early in its tenure the Obama-Biden administration had declared that it would “support missile defense, but ensure that it is developed in a way that is pragmatic and cost-effective; and, most importantly, does not divert resources from other national security priorities until we are positive the technology will protect the American public.”39 Despite its undoubtedly sincere attempt to make a fresh start on missile defense policy, and especially proposed missile defenses in Europe, by the end of its first year in office, the Obama administration found itself no better off than the Bush administration. In some respects, it was worse off. Russia continued to express objections to U.S. missile defense plans in Europe, but possessed greater diplomatic leverage because of the START I renegotiations. China had emerged as a new and stronger player in missile defense with its January 2010 exoatmospheric flight intercept test. Poland was causing new problems with Russia over deployment of Patriot missiles near Russia’s Kaliningrad province, and the citizens of the Czech Republic largely still opposed placing U.S. missile defense hardware on Czech soil. Moreover,

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the Obama administration had committed itself to continuing work on the GBIs originally proposed by President Bush to be deployed in Poland. The plan to also base interceptors in Romania and possibly Bulgaria added to Russia’s concerns. As the Obama administration entered its second budget year with its FY-2011 budget request, it was spending as much money on missile defense as had the Bush administration and had done little new testing to show that the technology was cost effective and would protect the American public. The original Bush proposal to establish missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic had alienated Russia to a degree not seen since the height of the Cold War and for no good purpose. The proposed missile defense system in Europe had not demonstrated capability to defend the United States, let alone Europe, under realistic operational conditions. Although the Obama administration had recommitted to working with Poland and the Czech Republic under the Phased-Adaptive Approach, it received little credit within those countries. Those citizens in Poland and the Czech Republic who had opposed the whole concept from the outset believed that while the Phased-Adaptive Approach would bring different missile defense systems, they would remain possible targets of Iran, of terrorist actions, and perhaps also of Russia. At home, the administration found itself being criticized by missile defense advocates for not staying the course with the original Bush plan, for not being sympathetic to the needs of Poland and the Czech Republic, for placing less importance on relations with Eastern Europe than on relations with Russia, and for portraying America as an undependable ally. It is a truism that Americans and the U.S. military have a tendency to count on technological breakthroughs to solve thorny national security problems. Many Europeans also had accepted the concept that American technology could be relied on to solve international conflicts. Technology has produced some amazing advances, such as personal computers and the Internet, that have changed our lives at home and at work. But too often America relies on technology as the first, best hope to save us from our problems. This is apparent in fields as diverse as defense, medicine, and the environment. By appealing to a single-point technological fix, we hope we can avoid dealing with the long-term problem. In national security, as in other fields, we have used our hope for technological relief as an excuse to avoid accommodating or dealing with our adversaries— sometimes at a very high cost in political and economic terms, sometimes in dangerous self-delusion about our own military capabilities in the global environment in which we all exist. The Bush administration pursued the promise of missile defense technology for eight years, and now it appears that with somewhat different technology, the Obama administration is going down the same path. After decades of research and development, it still remains to be seen if this technology could be relied on in battle. On March 1, 2010, the Gov-


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ernment Accounting Office (GAO) released a new report that summed up the many changes that had been made in the overall BMDs in 2009, in its various elements, and in the management of those elements. The GAO stated that it could not say how dependable the overall system would be in battle, and that “overall BMDS performance cannot be assessed because MDA models are not sufficiently mature.” The report also noted that the BMDs Operational Test Agency could not project which models and simulations could be accredited or when, and that the models required to project overall system performance may not be adequate until 2016, five years later than the GAO projected a year earlier in 2009.40 Nonetheless, in 2010 the concept of possessing a missile defense system has become deeply ingrained in the Pentagon and is championed by the Democratic congress and the White House. “I would never have thought between last year and now that we’d be sitting here with a program that has broad global support, broad national support, bipartisan support on the Hill,” General James Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff declared. At a conference of missile defense contractors in late March, Cartwright noted that few critics challenged the notion of whether the United States should press ahead with missile defenses. “Now,” he said, “we’re really in a mode that’s ‘How fast can you produce?’.”41 Ironic as it seems, it may be that the first year of the Obama administration did more to make missile defense politically acceptable than eight years of efforts by the Bush administration.

Reflections

Although framed in the rhetoric of “defending America,” George W. Bush’s decision to deploy America’s ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) program in Alaska and California was a politically driven act designed to fulfill a portion of the Republican Party’s mantra. Testimony to the decision’s political nature was the fact that just a few days earlier, on December 11, 2002, an important GMD flight intercept test failed. Moreover, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) would not attempt a similar test for two more years and would not conduct another successful GMD flight interceptor test for four years. Obviously, the operational readiness of the system was not so much a consideration in the deployment decision as the desire to put silos in the ground and components in place so that the program could not be easily reversed. In this regard, the Bush administration was successful. President Obama has continued supporting the GMD, as well as other components of the antimissile program and, unfortunately, has suffered a fate similar to Bush. At the end of the Obama administration’s first year, shortly before it released a supportive budget in early February, a major flight test of the GMD system on January 31, 2010 also failed. Given the reluctance of many in Congress to seriously question reliability issues, cost overruns, or test failures, the missile defense program has become a permanent, flourishing part of America’s military industrial establishment. The Bush administration’s strident efforts to establish U.S. missile defenses in Eastern Europe has been modified by Obama’s national security team, but the overall effort including the signing of a New START treaty has not soothed the Russians. This has resulted in a curious series of

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rationalizations. Washington has tried to convince Moscow that America’s missile defenses will not work against Russian missiles; rather, they will work only against Iranian missiles. And Washington has said to Tehran, in so many words, since we can shoot down your missiles you are wasting time and resources building them. The Russians have not accepted this fiction, recognizing that if the U.S. missile defenses can shoot down longrange Iranian missiles, they could also be used against Russian missiles. Since Moscow was aware that the U.S. missile defenses face many technical obstacles and were not likely to protect Europe in an all-out nuclear war with Iran, the basic issue was one of treading on Russia’s sphere of interest. The argument that a terrorist group may launch a single nuclear-armed missile at the United States or Europe is highly unlikely given the complex nature of construction, deployment, and launch with accuracy. It is even more unlikely that any sovereign state would allow a launch from its territory knowing the terrible retaliatory consequences of such an act. As has been pointed out time and again, it is far more likely that a terrorist attack with a weapon of mass destruction would employ a ship, truck, or commercial aircraft to reach its target. In reviewing the Pentagon’s enthusiastic reports of any successful achievement in the U.S. GMD program to defeat intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), a skeptic detects the fervor similar to that which must have driven the architects of China’s Great Wall and France’s Maginot Line. After the expenditure of billions of dollars and the expectation of spending many more, the technological “fix” to the GMD sought by the Bush administration to provide Reagan’s “glass dome” to shield the nation from long-range missile attack is still far in the future, if attainable at all. It is, nevertheless, worrisome that the Pentagon seems to be engaging in a dangerous self-delusion about its own antimissile capabilities. Only the most diehard supporters of a nationwide missile defense system are seemingly able to avoid looking at its several evident limitations. First of all, BMD systems designed to destroy long-range missiles can be countered by building a large arsenal of faster, more maneuverable ICBMs. It is less costly, as former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara pointed out in the 1960s, to build offensive missiles than defenses to counter them. Second, decoys and countermeasures introduced in the missiles and warheads pose a major threat to GMD systems. The deployed antimissiles in Alaska and California have yet to demonstrate an ability to overcome them. Third, the Bush administration belatedly recognized that an ICBM assault is most likely to be a “raid attack” involving the launching of several missiles loaded with countermeasures and, most likely, multiple warheads. In such a barrage, some warheads will penetrate existing antimissile defenses. Fourth, any “leakage” in the missile defense will result in substantial destruction, for these missiles and warheads will be carrying nuclear devices for the U.S. antimissile system is not designed to deal

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with many small containers carrying biological weapons. Any resultant nuclear explosions, whether caused by missiles exploding before or on contact, or warheads hitting their targets, would disrupt command and control systems, as well as satellite and computer detection systems. This nuclear environment could disable the BMD system in addition to causing extensive other damage. America’s missile defense program has witnessed some promising successes during the past decade, along with many setbacks.1 Tests of the Aegis, THAAD, and Patriot systems have shown promise in countering short- and/or medium-range ballistic missiles. There are obvious advantages to improving these units to provide battlefield protection from shortrange missiles. Officials of the MDA, however, have shown little concern with the recent dramatic proliferation of cruise missiles. During the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, while Patriot units successfully engaged nine shortrange ballistic missiles, they failed to intercept any of the primitive Iraqi cruise missiles. Consequently, the improvement of American defense against shortand medium-range ballistic missiles, Dennis M. Gormley has written, has made land-based “cruise missiles much more attractive to the countries’ adversaries because U.S. cruise missile defenses remain weak and poorly managed.” Upgraded fighter aircraft may possess a modest capability to detect and track a few incoming cruise missiles. “If the cruise missile threat grows uncontrollably,” as Gormley, author of Missile Contagion: Cruise Missile Proliferation and the Threat to International Security (2008) continued, “the comparative high cost of missile defense interceptors could make such defenses increasingly unaffordable and ultimately ineffective in coping with combined ballistic and cruise missile attacks.” He charges: “Existing U.S. cruise missile defense programs are underfunded, while doctrinal, organizational, and interoperability issues continue to discourage military services from producing truly joint solutions for defending U.S. forces and allies.” Moreover, Gormley argues “cruise missile defenses for safely projecting force overseas should take priority over the more improbable threat of a terrorist group launching a cruise missile from a freighter.”2 A partial solution to slowing the proliferation of cruise missiles would be to repair the Missile Technology Control Regime to halt the flow of foreign skills and technology. The Obama administration did succeed in concluding a series of intense negotiations with the Russians in late March 2010 for a new treaty to replace START I—the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) signed on April 8 at Prague. Because relations between Washington and Moscow had so soured under the Bush administration, reaching an all-time low during the post-Cold War era, negotiations had proceeded slowly in order to overcome the Russians’ distrust of America’s antimissile plans. Not surprisingly, when Romania announced in February that it would host one of the proposed U.S. missile interceptor sites, Moscow again became wary

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of Washington’s antimissile program. In a telephone conversation with Obama, Russian president Medvedev asked that the two nations issue a joint statement aimed at limiting the U.S.’s missile defense program, but the American president refused. Obama did, however, suggest each nation issue a nonbinding unilateral statement spelling out its position. Russia did issue a unilateral statement on April 7, 2010, stating that it could withdraw from the treaty if U.S. missile defenses “give rise to a threat to the strategic nuclear force potential of the Russian Federation.” With or without this statement, of course, Russia would have the right to unilaterally withdraw from the treaty at any time just as the Bush administration did from the ABM Treaty. The United States issued its own unilateral statement the same day, declaring that its missile defenses “are not intended to affect the strategic balance with Russia.” This statement, however, did little to allay Moscow’s concerns even though the treaty did recognize the existence of the interrelationship between “strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms, that this interrelationship will become more important as strategic nuclear arms are reduced, and that current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the Parties.” Republican opposition to any restraints on the U.S.’s antimissile program was revealed in a March 15 letter sent to the president by Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell of Kentucky and Minority Whip Jon Kyl of Arizona. It was highly unlikely, they wrote, that the Senate would ratify the New START treaty should it contain a “linkage of offensive weapons and missile defense” or be accompanied by “unilateral declarations that the Russian Federation could use as leverage against you or your successors when U.S. missile defense decisions are made.” In briefing the media in late March, Secretary of Defense Gates insisted that U.S. “missile defense is not constrained by this treaty.” Regardless, the ratification process will undoubtedly be contentious in both Washington and Moscow. At the Prague signing, President Medvedev summarized Moscow’s continuing concern with the U.S.’s missile defense program: “I am convinced that all that has been done so far is just the beginning of a long way, long way ahead. I wouldn’t like to see the Russian Federation and the United States be narrowed down to just limiting strategic offensive weapons.” Nevertheless, he cautioned, “It matters to us what will happen to missile defense. It is related to the configuration of our potential and our capabilities, and we will watch how these processes develop.”3 Given Russian and various other nations’ responses, the U.S.’s missile defense saga appears likely to continue for some time.


Notes

INTRODUCTION 1. [Forrestal] Diary entry, 7 Sept. 1945, Walter Millis, The Forrestal Diaries (New York: Viking, 1951), 93; see also Richard Dean Burns and Lester H. Brune, The Quest for Missile Defenses, 1944–2003 (Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 2003) for early BMD developments. 2. Bradley Graham, Hit to Kill: The New Battle Over Shielding America From Missile Attack (New York: Public Affairs, 2002): xxvi, 390. 3. Richard F. Kaufman, ed. The Full Costs of Ballistic Missile Defense (Washington, DC: Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation and Economists Allied for Arms Reduction, Jan. 2003) see at www.ecaar.org; Burns and Brune, The Quest for Missile Defenses, 221–224; U.S. Government Accountability Office, Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and Cost Estimates for Long-Term Support of Ballistic Missile Defense, GAO-08-1068 (Washington, DC: Sept. 2008); GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO-09-326SP (Washington, DC: Mar. 2009). 4. James M. Lindsay and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Defending America: The Case for Limited National Missile Defense (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 1–2; see also Craig Eisendrath, Melvin A. Goodman, and Gerald E. Marsh, The Phantom Defense: America’s Pursuit of the Star Wars Illusion (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001). 5. Philip Coyle, prepared remarks before the House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Strategic Force, “The Future of Missile Defense Testing,” Washington, DC: Feb. 25, 2009, p. 8. 6. Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, FY-2009 Annual Report (Washington DC: The Pentagon, Dec. 2009).

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Notes

7. Lindsay and O’Hanlon, Defending America, 2; Daryl G. Kimball, “Missile Defense Collision Course,” Arms Control Today ( July/Aug. 2007): 3. 8. Lindsay and O’Hanlon, Defending America, 1–2. 9. Jennifer G. Mathers, The Russian Nuclear Shield From Stalin to Yeltsin: The Cold War and Beyond (New York: St. Martin’s, 2000), 1. 10. Richard Speier, “Missile Nonproliferation and Missile Defense: Fitting Them Together,” Arms Control Today (Nov. 2007): 15–20.

CHAPTER 1 1. Donald R. Baucom, The Origins of SDI, 1944–1983 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992), 3. 2. Ibid., 3–6. 3. Ralph E. Lapp, Arms Beyond Doubt: The Tyranny of Weapons Technology (New York: Cowles, 1970), 37–38; Mark A. Berhow, US Strategic and Defensive Missile Systems, 1950–2004 (New York: Osprey, 2005), 9–11, 24. 4. Baucom, Origins of SDI, 11–14; Ernest J. Yanarella, Technology in Search of a Mission, rev. & updated (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2002), 35, 81–86. 5. Lapp, Arms Beyond Doubt, 38–39; Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), 312–314, 561–563. 6. Baucom, Origins of SDI, 14, 20–21; Dwight D. Eisenhower Waging Peace: The White House Years, 1956–1961 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965), 220–224; Gregg Herken, Counsels of War (New York: Knopf, 1985), 187. 7. Strobe Talbott, The Master of the Game: Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace (New York: Knopf, 1988), 68–70. 8. Herken, Counsels of War, 140. 9. Richard Aliano, American Defense Policy From Eisenhower to Kennedy, 1957– 1961 (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1975), passim for politics of missile gap myth. 10. Yanarella, The Missile Defense Controversy, 88; Richard Dean Burns and Lester H. Brune, The Quest for Missile Defenses, 1944–2003 (Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 2004), 23; Baucom, Origins of SDI, 20. 11. Benson D. Adams, Ballistic Missile Defense (New York: American Elsevir, 1971), 39–49; Yanarella, The Missile Defense Controversy, 81–86; J. I. Coffey, “The Antiballistic Missile Debate,” Foreign Affairs (April 1967): 403–413; John Prados, The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis & Russian Military Strength (New York: Dial Press, 1982), 151–171. 12. Baucom, Origins of SDI, 22. 13. Yanarella, The Missile Defense Controversy, 123–124; Adams, Ballistic Missile Defense, 39–49. 14. Lapp, Arms Beyond Doubt, 48–49; Bird, Scientists in Conflict, 186–187; Herken, Counsels of War, 195–197. 15. Gerald C. Smith, Disarming Diplomats: The Memoirs of Gerald C. Smith, Arms Control Negotiator (Lanham, MD: Madison Books, 1996), 170; John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1973), 87–89, 100. 16. Aleksandr’ G. Savel’yev and Nikolay N. Detinov, The Big Five: Arms Control Decision-Making in the Soviet Union (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995), 4–5;

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G. Gerasimov, “The First Strike Theory,” International Affairs 3 (Mar. 1965): 42–45; also see N. Talenskii, “Antimissile Systems and Disarmament,” International Affairs 10 (Oct. 1964): 15–19 (reprinted in the BAS, Feb. 1965); Robert D. English, Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals & the End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 107. 17. Savel’yev and Detinov, The Big Five, 4–5; Raymond Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994), 153; Talbott, Master of the Game, 104–105. 18. Newhouse, Cold Dawn, 100; on the Soviet S-35 ABM system and Aldan, see Pavel Podvig, ed. Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2001, 414–415. 19. Jacqueline M. Bird, Scientists in Conflict: Hans Bethe, Edward Teller and the Shaping of United States Nuclear Weapons Policy, 1945–1972 (Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 2009), Bethe quoted 144, 173; Hans Bethe and Richard L. Garwin, “AntiBallistic Missile Systems,” Scientific America 218:3 (Mar. 1968): 21–31. 20. Edward Reiss, The Strategic Defense Initiative (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 7–36. 21. Lapp, Arms Beyond Doubt, 48. 22. Public Papers of the Presidents, Richard M. Nixon for 1969: News Conference of March 14, 1969 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971): 208–209; Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 209–210; Gerald C. Smith, Disarming Diplomat: The Memoirs of Gerald C. Smith, Arms Control Negotiator (Lantham, MD: Madison Books, 1996), 159. 23. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 151, fn. 8., 153; Kissinger, White House Years, 209. 24. Talbott, Master of the Game, 111–114 and fn 4, 398; Memo, Lawrence E. Lynn (NSC) to Henry Kissinger, Mar. 10, 1969, quoted in Bird, Scientists in Conflict, 214. 25. Kissinger, White House Years, 209; Ambrose, Nixon, 288–290; Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 146–149, including 149, fn. 5. 26. Newhouse, Cold Dawn, 166–167; Kissinger, White House Years, 822; Savel’yev and Detinov, The Big Five, 21–22. 27. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 162, 165; Dobrynin, In Confidence, 213–214; Kissinger, White House Years, 542. 28. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 166–167. 29. Ibid., 166–175; on proposals to ban all ABMs, see p. 174, fn. 69; Dobrynin, In Confidence, 214–216. 30. Talbott, Master of the Game, 126–127. 31. Ibid., 127. 32. Ibid., 128–129, 130–134. 33. Ibid., 132–134; Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 183–194; Ambrose, Nixon, 525–551; Kissinger, White House Years, 810–823, 1216–1246; Dobrynin, In Confidence, 216–222, 250–257. 34. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 217–219; Talbott, Master of the Game, 134–136; Senate Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements (Washington, GPO: 1972). 35. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 214–215. 36. Ibid., 474–480. 37. See Ch. 8 in Gloria Duffy’s Compliance and the Future of Arms Control (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1988), 163–184, for a discussion of the SCC.

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38. Berhow, US Strategic and Defensive Missile Systems, 33–36. 39. Ibid., 36; see also Craig Eisendrath, Melvin A. Goodman, and Gerald E. Marsh, The Phantom Defense: America’s Pursuit of the Star Wars Illusion (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001): 7–8; Missile Defense Agency MDAlink, Missile Defense Milestones, 1944–2000, at www.acq.osd.mil.bmdo.bmdolink/html/history.

CHAPTER 2 1. Raymond L. Garthoff, The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1994), 139–142; Ronald Brownstein and Nina Easton, Reagan’s Ruling Class (Washington: Presidential Accountability Group, 1982), 524–536, includes the list of CPD members in Reagan’s administration as of 1982. 2. Frances Fitzgerald, Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the End of the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), 116–117. 3. Ibid., 119–120; Lou Cannon, President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime (New York: Public Affairs, paperback ed., 2000): 250–254, passim. 4. Robert McFarlane, Special Trust (New York: Cadwell and Davies, 1994): 226–227; Fitzgerald, Out in the Blue, 190–191; Strobe Talbott, The Master of the Game: Paul Nitze and the Nuclear Peace (New York: Knopf, 1988), 195–196. 5. Donald R. Baucom, The Origins of SDI: 1944–1983 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992), 181–192 has quote by Weinberger; Gregg Herken, Cardinal Choices: Presidential Science Advisors from the Atom Bomb to SDI (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 207–212; Fitzgerald, Out in the Blue, 196–207; George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Scribners, 1993), 245–256. Also see, William Broad, Teller’s War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992), 123–126; Daniel O. Graham, High Frontier: A New National Strategy (Washington DC, High Frontier, 1982); Edward Reiss, The Strategic Defense Initiative (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 46–47. 6. Cannon, President Reagan, 279–288; Fitzgerald, Out in the Blue, 194–197. 7. Fitzgerald, Out in the Blue, 204–206; Shultz, Turmoil, 256. 8. Ronald Reagan, An American Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 571–572; Public Papers of the Presidents, Ronald Reagan, Part 1 for March 23, 1983, 437–439; Walter Isaacson, “Reagan for Defense,” Time (April 4, 1983): 8–19. 9. Fitzgerald, Out in the Blue, 210–212, 261; Shultz, Turmoil, 258–261; Michael A. Learner and William Cook, “Star Wars: Will Space be the Next Battleground,” Newsweek (April 4, 1983): 16–22; Isaacson, “Reagan for Defense,” 8–19. 10. Shultz, Turmoil, 249–256; Dobrynin, In Confidence, 528–530; also see, Peter J. Westwick, “ ‘Space-Strike Weapons’ and the Soviet Response to SDI,” Diplomatic History 32:5 (2008): 955–979 for another view. 11. Strobe Talbott, Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administrations and the Stalemate in Arms Control (New York: Knopf, 1984): 305–313; Fitzgerald, Out in the Blue, 241–242. 12. Fitzgerald, Out in the Blue, 243–245; Edward Reiss, The Strategic Defense Initiative (Cambridge, G.B.: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 73–76, 198. 13. Fitzgerald, Out in the Blue, 250–251. 14. Ibid., 251–252, 243 for Weinberger quote; Reiss, Strategic Defense, 53–54 for Keyworth quote.

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15. Fitzgerald, Out in the Blue, 252–255; Reiss, Strategic Defense, 76–78, 198 for Hoffman panel members. 16. Douglas C. Waller, James T. Bruce III, and Douglas M. Cook, The Strategic Defense Initiative: Progress and Challenge (Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 1987), 7–17, 91–93. 17. Walter Isaacson, “Reagan for Defense,” Time (Apr. 4, 1983): 8–19; Fitzgerald, Out in the Blue, 210–212. 18. Waller, et al., Defense Initiative, 19–23. 19. Paul H. Nitze, with Ann M. Smith and Steven L. Rearden, From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989), 406–408. 20. Reagan, Presidential Documents, Mar. 30, 1987, p. 290; Caspar Weinberger, “Why Offense Needs Defense,” Foreign Policy (Fall 1987): 17. 21. Fitzgerald, Out in the Blue, 244–245; 489; Tim Weiner, “Lies and Rigged ‘Star Wars’ Test Fooled the Kremlin and Congress,” New York Times (Aug. 18, 1993): A-1, 15; Weiner, “ ‘Star Wars’ Tried Plan to Exaggerate Test Results,” New York Times ( July 23, 1994): A-1, 26. 22. Waller, et al., Defense Initiative, 7–17, 40–41, 49–51, 51–64. 23. Fitzgerald, Out in the Blue, 388 for Weinberger quote. 24. Ibid., 377–380, 402–407; Waller, et al., Defense Initiative, 100–104; William J. Crowe, The Line of Fire From Washington to the Gulf the Politics and Battles of the New Military (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1993), 301–309. 25. Fitzgerald, Out in the Blue, 290–291, 296–299; Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 580–582; also see Raymond Garthoff, Policy versus the Law: The Reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1987). 26. Matthew Bunn, Foundation for the Future: The ABM Treaty and National Security (Washington, DC: The Arms Control Association, 1990), 60; Garthoff, Transition, 239–248; Fitzgerald, Out in the Blue, 294–298. 27. Fitzgerald, “ The Poseurs of Missile Defense.” New York Times, June 4, 2000, Sec. 4, p. 19. 28. Garthoff, The Great Transition, 252–267, 285–289; Fitzgerald, Out in the Blue, 332–340, 347–329; Shultz, Turmoil, 751–753; see also Mikhail Gorbachev, Reykjavik: Results and Lessons (Madison, CT: Sphinx Press, 1987). 29. Andrei Sakarov, Moscow and Beyond (New York: Knopf, 1991): 21–42; Talbott, Master of the Game, 306. 30. Reiss, Strategic Defense, 126–136. 31. Ibid., 134–135. 32. Fitzgerald, Out in the Blue, 466–478. Examples of books that created a dubious “legend” about Reagan achieving more to end the cold war than either Gorbachev or Bush include Don Oberdorfer, The Turn: From the Cold War to a New Era (New York: Poseidon Press, 1991), 327; Dusko Doder and Louise Branscom, Gorbachev (New York: Viking Press, 1990), 371–372; and Robert Hutchins, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1997), 327; Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). 33. George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Alfred Knopf: 1998), 564–565. 34. Garthoff, The Great Transition, 380–388; Shultz, Turmoil, 1137; James A. Baker, III, The Politics of Politics of Diplomacy (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1995): 17–18.

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35. Michael Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War (Boston: Little, Brown: 1993), 47–48; for SDI contractors see Reiss, The Strategic Defense Initiative, 97. 36. Fitzgerald, Out in the Blue, 480–484; William J. Broad, Teller’s War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 251–255. 37. Bradley Graham, Hit to Kill: The New Battle Over Shielding America from Missile Attack (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 18–23. 38. Donald R. Baucom, “The Case of Patriot’s Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile Capability,” Air Power History (Spring 1992): 3–12; Robert M. Stein, “Patriot ATBM Experience in the Gulf War,” International Security 17 (Summer 1992): 199–240; Wayne Biddle, “The Untold Story of the Patriot,” Discover 12 ( June 1991): 71–79. 39. Lester H. Brune, The United States and the Iraqi Crisis, 1990–1992 (Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 1993): 174–175; Fitzgerald, Out in the Blue, 485–488. 40. Brune, Iraqi Crisis, 175–177; Theodore Postol, “Lessons from the Gulf War’s Experience with the Patriot,” International Security 16 (Winter 1991–1992): 119–171; Postol and Robert M. Stein, ibid. 17 (Summer 1992): 199–240. A 1992 GAO report claimed that 158 Patriots were fired at 47 Scuds with no more than 4 possible hits. 41. John Conyers, Jr., “The Patriot Myth: Caveat Emptor,” Arms Control Today (Nov. 1992): 3–10; and Conyers and Frank Horton, “The Patriot Debate: Part 2,” Arms Control Today ( Jan./Feb. 1993): 26–29. Also see, Seymour Hersh, “Missile Wars,” New Yorker (Sept. 1994): 86–99; John A. Farrell, “The Patriot Gulf Missile ‘Didn’t Work’ Defense Secretary Cohen Speaks Out,” The Boston Globe ( Jan. 13, 2001): A1. 42. Fitzgerald, Out in the Blue, 484–487. 43. Conyers committee data is in House Committee on Government Legislation and National Security, May 16 and October 1, 1991, Strategic Defense Initiative: What Are the Costs? What Are the Threats? (Washington, DC: GPO, 1992), includes statement of John Pike, “Chicken Little and Darth Vardar: Is the Sky Falling?”; John Wilson Lewis and Hau Ai, “China’s Ballistic Missile Programs: Technology, Strategies, Goals,” International Security (Fall 1992): 5–40, includes table that lists all of China’s ballistic missiles by designation, range, payload, and technical descriptions. 44. Fitzgerald, Out in the Blue, 374–389; 485–488. 45. Ibid., 488–490. 46. Graham, Hit to Kill, 21–22; Bush and Scowcroft, World Transformed, 545–566.

CHAPTER 3 1. Frances Fitzgerald, Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the End of the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), 490–492; Bradley Graham’s, Hit to Kill: The New Battle Over Shielding America from Nuclear Attack (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 21–25; Graham provides a comprehensive account of the Clinton years. 2. Contract with America: The Bold Plan by Rep. Newt Gingrich, Rep. Dick Armey and the House Republicans to Change the Nation, edited by Ed Gillespie and Bob Schellhas (New York: Times Books, 1994), 93, 107, 112. 3. Fitzgerald, Out in the Blue, 492–493; Graham, Hit to Kill, 24–27.

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4. William J. Hyland, Clinton’s World: Remaking American Foreign Policy (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 145–151; Fitzgerald, Out in the Blue, 493–494; Graham, Hit to Kill, 26–28. 5. Reprinted from Harper’s Magazine (Sept. 2001): 25–26. 6. Graham, Hit to Kill, 30–51. 7. Greg Thielmann, “Rumsfeld Reprise? The Missile Report That Foretold the Iraq Intelligence Controversy,” Arms Control Today ( July/Aug. 2003): 3. 8. James M. Lindsay and Michael E, O’Hanlon, Defending America: The Case for a Limited National Missile Defense (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 62–67 and excerpts from the Rumsfeld report on 197–217; Thielmann, “Rumsfeld Reprise?” 3. 9. Fitzgerald, Out in the Blue, 455, 497–499; Graham, Hit to Kill, 51–69. 10. Graham, Hit to Kill, 337–339; Lindsay and O’Hanlon, Defending America, 59–65. 11. Sidney N. Graybeal and Patricia A. McFate, “Strategic Defense Arms Control,” in Larsen and Rattray, Arms Control, 131–136; 28; Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand (New York: Random House, 2002), 377–383; Fitzgerald, Out in the Blue, 494; Sokov, Russian Strategic Modernization, 174–175; Lizbeth Grolund, “ABM: Just Kicking the Can,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists ( Jan.–Feb. 1998): 15–16. 12. Graham, Hit to Kill, 111–121; Talbott, Russia Hand, 383–385. 13. Graham, Hit to Kill, 154–155, see chapter 8; Elizabeth Becker, “U.S. Seeks Missile System Despite Treaty Risk,” New York Times (Nov. 6, 2000): A-8; Alexander Altounian, “Why Russia Fears a Missile Defense,” WPNW (Aug. 20, 2001): 27; Talbott, Russia Hand, 383–397 describes unsuccessful talks in 1999 with Mamedov. 14. Anthony H. Cordesman, Strategic Threats and National Missile Defense: Defending the American Homeland (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 62–116; Graham, Hit to Kill, 279–283. 15. Stephen W. Young, Pushing the Limits: The Decision on National Missile Defense (Washington, DC: Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers and Council for a Livable World Education Fund, 2002): 4–5; for more details see Victoria Samson, American Missile Defense (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010), 160–184. 16. Graham, Hit to Kill, 181–185; James Glanz, “Antimissile Test Viewed as Flawed by Opponents,” New York Times ( Jan. 14, 2000): A-1, A-6. 17. Young, Pushing the Limits, 48. 18. Graham, Hit to Kill, 287–307; Lindsay and O’Hanlon, Defending America, 84–90; Cordesman, Strategic Threats, 240–271; 327–329; Philip E. Coyle, Assistant Secretary of Defense and Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, “Operational Test and Evaluation Report in Support of the National Missile Defense Deployment Readiness Review,” Aug. 10, 2000. Know as the “Coyle Report” and available on the web. 19. Wade Boese, “Missile Defense Post-ABM Treaty: No System, No Arms Race,” Arms Control Today ( June 2003): 22. 20. Cordesman, Strategic Threats, 206–209; Graham, Hit to Kill, 188–189 and 214–217; Lindsay and O’Hanlon, Defending America, 42, 184–85, 101–103. 21. George W. Bush, “Remarks at the National Defense University, May 1, 2001,” in John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency Project [online] at Santa Barbara, CA http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=45568; Cordesman, Strategic Threats, 176–179; Graham, Hit to Kill, 350–352; Roger Cohen, “Europe’s Shifting Role Poses Challenge to U.S.” New York Times (Feb. 11, 2001):

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A-1, A-5; Wade Boese, “U.S., Russia Still Seeking Common Ground on Missile Defense,” Arms Control Today (Nov. 2001): 19, 22. 22. On Rumsfeld, see Graham, Hit to Kill, 351. 23. Cordesman, Strategic Threats, 275–289; Department of Defense. Record of Decision to Establish a Ground-Based Midcourse Defense Initial Defensive Operations Capability at Fort Greely, Alaska, Apr. 18, 2003. 24. Ibid., 179–181, 211–212; Judith Miller, “Bush to Request a Major Increase in Bio-terrorism,” New York Times (Feb. 4, 2002): A-1, 11; John Isaccs, “Pebbles and All,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (Sept.–Oct. 2001): 22–23. 25. Vernon Loeb, “Interceptor Makes a Direct Hit,” Washington Post ( July 15, 2001): A-1, A-7; Cordesman, Strategic Threats, 275–289; James Dao, “Amid Applause, Caution Urged on Missile Defense,” New York Times ( July 16, 2001): A-6; Esther Schrader, “Tougher Test Delayed For Missile Test,” Los Angeles Times (Aug. 16, 2001): A-3. For an assessment of the July 14 test see report of Union of Concerned Scientists on internet at www.ucsusa.org. 26. Union of Concerned Scientists, “Countermeasures,” July 2000, at www.uc susa.org; Cordesman, Strategic Threats, 303–306, 312; Graham, Hit to Kill, 366–367. 27. Cordesman, Strategic Threats, 307–308; Wade Boese, “Comment,” Arms Control Today (Sept. 2002): 17. 28. Cordesman, Strategic Threats, 89–94; James Risen, “CIA Chief Sees Russia as Trying to Revive Its Challenge to U.S.” New York Times (Feb. 8, 2001): A-11; Johanna McGeary, “A Salesman on the Road [Putin],” Time ( July 30, 2001): 18–19; Michael Wines, “North Korea, with Putin, Vows to Curb Missile Program,” New York Times (Aug. 5, 2001): A-6; John Newhouse, “The Missile Defense Debate, Foreign Affairs ( July–Aug., 2001): 97–110; Graham, Hit to Kill, 355–356. 29. Ibid., 368–370; Talbott, The Russia Hand, 405–406, 413–414. 30. Talbott, Russia Hand, 416–427. 31. Wade Boese, “Pentagon Puts off Missile Defense Testing, Citing ABM Treaty,” Arms Control Today (Nov. 2001): 18, 21; Talbott, Russia Hand, 417–418; David E. Sanger, “Bush and Putin Agree to Reduce Stockpile of Nuclear Warheads, Difference Remains on Missile Defense,” New York Times (Nov. 14, 2001): A-1, 10; Elaine Sciolino, “New Allies: One Trusts, the Other’s Not So Sure,” New York Times (Nov. 14, 2001): A-14. 32. Talbott, Russia Hand, 418–420; David E. Sanger and Elizabeth Bumiller, “U.S. To Pull Out of ABM Treaty,” New York Times (Dec. 12, 2001): A-1, 14; Sanger, “Bush Offers Arms Talks to China as U.S. Pulls Out of ABM Treaty,” New York Times (Dec. 14, 2001): A-1, 12; Steven Mufson and Sharon LaFraniere, “A Farewell to Arms Control,” WPNW (Dec. 17, 2001): 15; Michael Wines, “Moscow Miffed Over Missile Shield but Others Merely Shrug,” New York Times (Dec. 19, 2002): A-15; Katrina Vander Heuvel and Stephen F. Cohen, “Endangering US Security (Russian Policy Is),” The Nation (Apr. 15, 2002): 5–6. 33. Todd S. Purdum, “Powell Says U.S. Plans to Work Out Binding Arms Pact: Meets Russian Demand,” New York Times (Feb. 6, 2002): A-1, 8; “Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty: Analysis, Commentary, Text, Factfile,” Arms Control Today ( June 2002): 3–23; James Carney, “Our New Best Friend [Putin]?” Time (May 27, 2002): 42–45; Jonathan Schell, “The Growing Nuclear Peril,” The Nation ( June 24, 2002): 11–18. 34. Wade Boese, “U.S. Withdraws from ABM Treaty; Global Response Muted,” Arms Control Today ( July/Aug. 2002): 14–15; Arms Control Today (Mar. 2003): 36;

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35. Sheldon Alberts, “Liberal Rift Delays Entry to Arms Plan,” National Post (Canada) (May 8, 2002), A1, 9. 36. BMDO link, “Missile Defense Test Successful,” Dec. 4, 2001, at www.bmdo. bmdolink; Center for Defense Information, “Flight Tests For Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) System,” Updated Dec. 22, 2008 by Victoria Samson, www. cdi.org. 37. James Dao, “A Setback for Missile Shield as Booster Rocket Fails Test,” New York Times (Dec. 14, 2001): A-6; William J. Broad, “U.S. Ignores Failure Data at Outset of Flights,” New York Times (Dec. 18. 2002): A-16; Missile Defense Agency, “Missile Defense Test Conducted,” Dec. 11, 2002, at www.acci.osd.mil/bmdolink; Christopher Marquis, “Rocket Intercepts Missile in Test,” New York Times (Mar. 16, 2002): A-6. 38. Dao, “Navy Missile Defense Plan Cancelled by the Pentagon,” New York Times (Dec. 16, 2001): A-6. 39. Wade Boese, “Navy Theater Missile Defense Test Successful,” Arms Control Today (Mar. 2002): 29; Boese, “Sea-Based Missile Defense Scores Second Straight Hit,” Arms Control Today ( July–Aug. 2002): 19; Union of Concerned Scientists, “An Analysis of the 25 January Test of the Aegis-LEAP Intercept for the Navy Theater Wide,” www.uscusa.org. 40. BMDO, “Sea-Based Midcourse Flight Test Successful,” June 13, 2002, at www.bmdo.bmdolink; “Third Sea-Based Missile Intercept Succeeds,” Arms Control Today (Dec. 2002): 27; Wade Boese, “Missile Defense Systems Not Ready for Action, Pentagon Says,” Arms Control Today (Mar. 2003): 25; Boese, “SeaBased Missile Defense System Misses Target,” Arms Control Today ( July/Aug. 2003): 25. 41. Wade Boese, “PAC-3 Production to Continue Despite Program Shortcomings,” Arms Control Today ( July–Aug. 2002): 18. 42. Paul Richter, “In Event of War, Patriots Won’t Be on Front Line,” Los Angeles Times (Nov. 2, 2002): A-5; Wade Boese, “Patriot Scorecard Mixed; PAC-3 Use Limited,” Arms Control Today (May 2003): 33; Charles Piller, “Vaunted Patriot Missile Has a ‘Friendly Fire’ failing,” Los Angeles Times (April 21, 2003): A1, 11; Wade Boese, “Army Report Details Patriot Record in Iraq War,” Arms Control Today (Nov. 2003): 30–31; also see, Samson, American Missile Defense, 98–110. 43. Michael A. Gordon, “U.S. Sends 600 Troops and Antimissile System to Defend Israel if Iraq Attacks, New York Times ( Jan. 16, 2003): A-10; “Israel Tests an Anti-Scud Missile System,” Los Angeles Times ( Jan. 6, 2003): A-9. 44. U.S. Air Force News Release, “Airborne Laser Completes First Flight,” ( July 18, 2002) at www.acqosd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/html/. 45. Wade Boese, “ABL Flies, but Government Agency Warns Sky Is Not Clear,” Arms Control Today (Sept. 2002): 17. 46. Geoffrey Forden, “Laser Defense: What if They Work?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Sept./Oct. 2002): 49–53. 47. “Statement Announcing a National Missile Defense Initiative,” Dec. 17, 2002, in John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency Project [online] at Santa Barbara, CA http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid; Maura Reynolds, “Bush: Missile Defense by 2004,” Los Angeles Times (Dec. 18, 2002): A-1, A-36-37; Wade Boese, “Bush to Deploy ‘Modest’ Missile Defense in 2004,” Arms Control Today ( Jan.–Feb. 2003): 18, 29; Boese, “Missile Defense Post-ABM Treaty: No System, Nor Arms Race,” Arms Control Today ( June 2003): 21.

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48. Maura Reynolds, “Missile Plan Faces Obstacles,” Los Angeles Times (Dec. 24, 2002): A-1ff; Eric Schmitt, “Bush Ordering Limited Missile Shield,” New York Times (Dec 18, 2002): A-1, A-16. 49. Esther Schrader, “Missile Defense Waiver Sought,” Los Angeles Times (Feb. 24, 2003): A-1, 13. 50. Paul Richter, “Missile Data to Be Kept Secret,” Los Angeles Times ( June 9, 2002): A-1ff.

CHAPTER 4 1. Embassy of the United States, Prague, Czech Republic, Frequently Asked Questions on Missile Defense: Q: “Haven’t negotiations been taking place for years? A: The U.S. has been exploring options for a missile defense system in Europe since 2002.” http://prague.usembassy.gov/md_faq.2html, updated Feb. 11, 2008. 2. GAO-09-771, “Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and Information on Construction and Support Costs for Proposed European Sites,” Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, Aug. 2009, 3. National Security Presidential Directive 23, National Policy on Ballistic Missile Defense, Washington, DC, Dec. 16, 2002. 4. CRS Report for Congress, RL31111, “Missile Defense the Current Debate,” Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Updated Mar. 23, 2005. 5. Joint Declaration, May 24, 2002. See ACQWeb, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Treaty Compliance, Moscow Treaty, www.dod.mil/acq/acic/treaties/sort/sort_jd.htm last retrieved online on October 14, 2009. 6. Wade Boese, “NATO, Russia Hold Joint Missile Defense Exercise,” Arms Control Today (Apr. 2004): 36; Thomas R. Marino Jr., “CORPS SAM: Down Selection to One Contractor VS. Competition,” Thesis, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, Dec. 1995; for more details about MEADS, see Victoria Samson, American Missile Defense (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010), 110–117. 7. DOT&E FY-98 Annual Report, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, Feb. 1999. 8. Federal News Service Transcript, Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Missile Defense and the Fy2005 DOD Budget, Washington, DC: GPO, Mar. 11, 2004. 9. Wade Boese, “U.S. Eyes Missile Defense Site in Europe,” Arms Control Today ( Jul.–Aug. 2004): 39. 10. Hearing, Missile Defense and the Fy2005 DOD Budget; GA0-09-771. 11. “MDA Plans to Tap Boeing for European GBI Work,” Defense Daily, Dec. 5, 2006. 12. Robert M. Gates, “A Better Missile Defense for a Safer Europe,” New York Times, Sept. 19, 2009. 13. The Russian Information Agency, RIA Novosti, December 14, 2006; Wade Boese, “U.S. Europe Anti-Missile Plans Upset Russia,” Arms Control Today (Mar. 2007): 47–48. 14. Oliver Meier, “Europeans Split Over U.S. Missile Defense Plans,” Arms Control Today (Apr. 2007): 36–38.

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15. Identical letters from Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, and Secretary Condoleezza Rice, to the Honorable Richard B. Cheney, President of the Senate, and the Honorable Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the House of Representatives, May 21, 2007. 16. Matthew Lee, “Rice: Russia’s Softening on Missile Defense Won’t Alter US Plans,” USA Today, June 8, 2007. 17. “Putin Expands on his Missile Defense Plan,” New York Times, July 3, 2007; “Putin Proposes Broader Cooperation on Missile Defense,” Washington Post, July 3, 2007; “Russian Experts to Visit Missile Defense Base in Alaska,” RIA Novosti, Aug. 1, 2007. 18. RIA Novosti, Oct. 26, 2007. 19. “Long Range Ballistic Missile Defenses in Europe,” RL-34051, Congressional Research Service, updated July 15, 2007. 20. Ibid. 21. Ibid. 22. “Bucharest Summit: US Missile Defense Bases Continue to Divide NATO,” Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No. 87, Spring 2008. 23. Press release: Lech Kaczynski, Obama Statement on Visit of Polish President, July 16, 2007. See: http://obama.senate.gov/press/070716-obama_ statement_73/. 24. Conference Report, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008; HR 3222; Public Law 110–116. 25. Anna Smolchenko and Nikolaus von Twickel, “Bush’s Letter Puts Putin in a Good Mood,” Moscow Times, Mar. 18, 2008, see Johnson’s Russia List #9-2008-58. 26. Fred W. Baker, III, “Putin Hints at Progress in Talks with Rice, Gates,” American Forces Press Services, Moscow, Mar. 17, 2008. 27. Thom Shanker, “To Placate Moscow, U.S. Would Keep Missile-Defense System Off for Now,” New York Times, Mar. 17, 2008. 28. Harry de Quetteville and Andrew Pierce, “Russia Threatens Nuclear Attack On Poland Over US Missile Shield Deal,” London Daily Telegraph, Aug. 16, 2008. 29. Wade Boese, “U.S. Edges Closer to Europe Anti-Missile Deals,” Arms Control Today (Apr. 2008): 31. 30. “U.S. Missile Chief Concerned by Delays to Polish Base Accord,” Armed Forces Press, Oct. 30, 2008. 31. “Czech Gov’t Wants Vote on Missile Shield after US Election,” Armed Forces Press, Oct. 29, 2008; U.S. Missile Defense Agency, FY-2008 Budget Estimates, Overview, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, Jan. 31, 2007, p. 5. 32. Public Law 110–329. H.R. 2638, Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009. 33. See Obama Transition Team Web site: “www.change.gov”.

CHAPTER 5 1. Bong-Geun Jun, “Recurring North Korean Nuclear Crises,” Arms Control Today ( Jan./Feb. 2006): 8; see also Marion Creekmore, Jr., A Moment of Crisis: Jimmy Carter, the Power of a Peacemaker, and North Korea’s Nuclear Ambitions (New York: Public Affairs, 2006) for insight in the negotiations with North Korea.

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2. See Jenny Shin, “Chronology of North Korea’s Missile Flight Tests,” Center for Defense Information, July 13,2009, www.cdi.org/pdfs/NKmissiletimeline5.26.09. 3. Ibid.; Bradley Graham, Hit to Kill: The New Battle Over Shielding America from Nuclear Attack (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 30–51; James M. Lindsay and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Defending America: The Case for a Limited National Missile Defense (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 197–217. 4. Greg Thielmann, “Rumsfeld Reprise? The Missile Report That Foretold the Iraq Intelligence Controversy,” Arms Control Today ( July/Aug. 3002): 3; Lindsay and O’Hanlon, Defending America, 62–67 with excerpts from the Rumsfeld report on 197–217. 5. Shin, “Chronology of North Korea’s Missile Flight Tests.” 6. Ibid.; Anthony H. Cordesman, Strategic Threats and National Missile Defense: Defending the American Homeland (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 122–144; Leon V. Sigal, “North Korea is No Iraq,” Arms Control Today (Dec. 2002): 8–12; Victor D. Cha, “Korea’s Place in the Axis,” Foreign Affairs (May–June 2002): 79–92; Los Angeles Times, Jan. 12, 2003. 7. See review of J. Peter Scoblic’s U.S. vs. Them: How a Half Century of Conservatism Has Undermined American Security (Viking, 2008) in Arms Control Today ( June 2008): 43–45. 8. James T. Laney and Jason T. Shalen, “How to Deal with North Korea,” Foreign Affairs (Mar./Apr. 2003): 16–30; Paul Kerr, “U.S. Courts Allies to Contain North Korea, Talks Lag,” Arms Control Today ( July/Aug. 2003); 23–24; Glenn Kessler, “A Shifting Script: The Bush Administration Is Split as New Talks Near on North Korea,” Washington Post National Weekly (Dec. 15–21, 2003): 17–18; “Chronology: The North Korean Nuclear Crisis, 2002–2006,” Arms Control Today (Nov. 2006): 27–29 9. “Chronology: The North Korean Nuclear Crisis, 2002–2006”; see also Shin, “Chronology of North Korea’s Missile Flight Tests”; U.N. Resolution in Arms Control Today (Nov. 2006): 30; on the North Korean nuclear test, see articles in USA Today, Oct. 10, 2006, 5A, 8A Peter Spiegel, “North Korea’s Strike Range Cast in Doubt,” Los Angeles Times, Sept. 23, 2006, A-4. 10. “Chronology: The North Korean Nuclear Crisis, 2002–2006”; see also Shin, “Chronology of North Korea’s Missile Flight Tests”; John M. Glionna, “North Korea Launches Rocket,” Los Angeles Times, Apr. 5, 2009, A-1, A-24; Julian E. Barnes and Greg Miller, “North Shows Progress in Its Missile Technology,” Los Angeles Times, Apr. 6, 2009, A-5; on second nuclear test, see Daryl G. Kimball, “Testing the World’s Patience,” Arms Control Today ( June 2009): 3. 11. Jenny Shin, “The Concern with South Korea’s Missile Defense System,” Center for Defense Information (Aug. 25, 2009): 2; Wade Boese, “Japan Seeks Missile Defense Interceptors,” Arms Control Today ( June 2004): 35; for the 1998 North Korean missile test, see Arms Control Today (Aug./Sept. 1998). 12. “Missile Defense Protection for Tokyo Reaches Completion,” New York Times, March 29, 2008; “Japan Performs Successful Missile Defense Intercept at White Sands Missile Range,” Las Cruces Sun-News, Sept. 28, 2008; Science Letter, Sept. 30, 2008; The Japan Times, Sept. 19, 2008. 13. Wade Boese, “Japan Embracing Missile Defense,” Arms Control Today (Apr. 2006): 36; Boese, “More States Step Up Anti-Missile Work,” Arms Control Today ( Jan./Feb. 2008): 51; see also Michael D. Swaine, et al. Japan and Missile Defense (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001) and Patrick M. O’Donogue, “Theater Missile

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Defense in Japan. . . .” U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Sept. 2000. 14. Hajime Izumi and Katsuhisa Furukawa, “Not Going Nuclear: Japan’s Response to North Korea’s Nuclear Test,” Arms Control Today ( June 2007): 6–11; also see Llewelyn Hughes, “Why Japan Will Not Go Nuclear (Yet): International and Domestic Constraints on the Nuclearization of Japan,” International Security 31:4 (Spring 2007), 67–96. 15. Shin, “The Concern with South Korea’s Missile Defense System,” 3–4; The Korea Times, Sept. 16, 2008. 16. Linda D. Kozaryn, “Taiwan, Missile Defense Top Cohen’s China Talks,” American Forces Press Service, July 12, 2000, www.defenselink.mil/news/news article.aspx?id=45327; “China Concerned by Missile Defense Plan,” New York Times (Dec. 19, 2002): A-15; Jeffrey Lewis, “Nuclear Numerology Chinese Style,” Arms Control Today (March 2005): 48. 17. Joanne Tompkins, “How U.S. Strategic Policy Is Changing China’s Nuclear Plans,” Arms Control Today ( Jan.–Feb. 2003): 11–15; Cordesman, Strategic Threats, 94–112; see also Hans M. Kistensen, et al. “Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning,” Washington, DC: Federation of American Scientists/Natural Resources Defense Council, Nov. 2006. 18. Wade Boese, “Taiwan Buys U.S. Arms; U.S. Eyes China,” Arms Control Today ( July–Aug. 2007): 43–44; Scarlet Kim, “Chinese Proud, Defensive About ASAT Test,” Arms Control Today (Mar. 2007): 29; Peter Crail, “Chinese Report Discusses Nuclear Planning,” Arms Control Today (Mar. 2009): 50 19. Brian Ellison, “Chinese Nuclear Arsenal,” Center for Defense Information, Jan. 21, 2009, see www.cdi.org; Christopher P. Twomey. “Chinese-U.S. Strategic Affairs: Dangerous Dynamism,” Arms Control Today ( Jan./Feb. 2009): 17–19; “China Unveils Anti-Missile Test After Taiwan Sale,” Reuters, Jan. 12, 2010. 20. “Ballistic Missile Defense Key to Defending Taiwan,” United Press International, June 12, 2006, www.spacewar.com; also see Wei-Chin Lee, “Thunder in the Air: Taiwan and Theater Missile Defense,” Nonproliferation Review (Fall 2001); David Isenberg, “China: The Case for Missile Defense,” Asia Times, July 24, 2003 on line at www.atimes.com/atimes/China/EGe4Ad02. 21. John Tkacik, “On Taiwan: Pricing Taiwan’s Missile Defense,” Taipei Times, Dec. 6, 2008, www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2008/12/06/2003 430467; William Lowther, “Taiwan’s Missile Defense Set for Upgrade,” Taipei Times, Sept. 3, 2009, ibid /2003452657. 22. Ashley J. Tellis, “The Evolution of U.S.-Indian Ties: Missile Defense in an Emerging Strategic Relationship,” International Security 30:4 (Spring 2006): 113– 151; Martin Sieff, A Giant Leap Forward For Indian Missile Defense,” www.space war.com/reports/A_Giant_Leap_Forward_For_Indian_Missile_Defense_999; Wade Boese, “More States Step Up Anti-Missile Work,” Arms Control Today ( Jan./ Feb. 2008): 51–52; Todd Fine, “Missile Defense: A Wrong Turn for U.S.-India Cooperation?” Center for Defense Information, March 5, 2008. 23. See Bharath Bopalaswamy, “Missile Defense in India,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Feb. 27, 2009. 24. Ali Chaudhry, “Iran’s Ambitious Missile Programs,” and “Iran’s Missile Flight Tests,” Center for Defense Information, July 1, 2004 on line at ww.cdi.org; Paul Kerr, “Iran, North Korea Deepen Missile Cooperation,” Arms Control Today ( Jan./ Feb. 2007): 38–39; Peter Crail, “Iran Space Launch Raises Missile Concerns,” Arms

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Control Today (Sept. 2008): 41–42. For an up-to-date assessment of Iran’s missile program, see Steven A. Hildreth, “Iran’s Ballistic Missile Defense Program: An Overview,” Congressional Research Service RS22758 (Feb.4, 2009); see also Anthony H. Cordesman and Adam C. Seitz, Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Birth of a Regional Nuclear Arms Race? (New York: Praeger, 2009); Julian E. Barnes and Borzou Daragahi, “Iran Touts Arms as U.S. Defends Policy,” Los Angeles Times, April 19, 2010, A-6. 25. Edward Reiss, The Strategic Defense Initiative (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 126–136; Theodore Postol, “Lessons from the Gulf War’s Experience with the Patriot,” International Security 16 (Winter 1992): 192–240; John Conyers, Jr., “The Patriot Myth: Caveat Emptor,” Arms Control Today (Nov. 1992): 3–10; see also Richard Dean Burns and Lester H. Brune, The Quest for Missile Defenses, 1944–2003 (Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 2004), 140–143 and Samson, American Missile Defense, 98–110. 26. “Israel Tests an Anti-Scud Missile System,” Los Angeles Times ( Jan. 6, 2003): A-9. 27. Michael A. Gordon, “U.S. Sends 600 Troops and Antimissile System to Defend Israel if Iraq Attacks, New York Times, Jan. 16, 2003, A-10; Paul Adams, “Shock and Awe: An Inevitable Victory,” in Sara Beck and Malcom Downer, eds. Battle for Iraq: BBC News Correspondents on the War Against Saddam (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 105–107; Paul Richter, “In Event of War, Patriots Won’t Be on Front Line,” Los Angeles Times, Nov. 2, 2002, A-5; Charles Piller, “Vaunted Patriot Missile Has a ‘Friendly Fire’ failing,” Los Angeles Times, Apr. 21, 2003, A1, A11; Williamson Murray and Robert H. Scales, Jr., Iraq War: A Military History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 154–156; Wade Boese, “Patriot Scorecard Mixed; PAC-3 Use Limited,” Arms Control Today (May 2003): 33; Wade Boese, “Army Report Details Patriot Record in Iraq War,” Arms Control Today (Nov. 2003): 30–31; also see Burns and Brune, The Quest for Missile Defenses, 204–205. 28. Wade Boese, “Israel Looks to Bolster Arms Capabilities,” Arms Control Today (Oct. 2006): 28–29; see “Arrow 2 Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence System, Israel,” at www.army-technology.com/projects/arrow2/; Matti Friedman, “Israel Tests System to Shoot Down Iranian Missiles,” The Associated Press, Mar. 7, 2009 on Yahoo! News.

CHAPTER 6 1. Philip Coyle, prepared remarks before the House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Strategic Force, “The Future of Missile Defense Testing,” Washington, DC: Feb. 25, 2009, pp. 8, 10; Also see Victoria Samson, American Missile Defense: A Guide to Issues (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010) for a valuable extension of this chapter as Ms. Samson provides much more detail regarding the various antimissile systems. 2. U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Missile Defense: KnowledgeBased Practices Are Being Adopted, but Risks Remain, GAO-03-441 (Washington, DC: Apr. 2003), 1. 3. Wade Boese, “Missile Defense Goes Stealth,” Arms Control Today ( Jan./Feb. 2006): 33; also see GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs (Washington, DC: GAO-09-326SP, Mar. 2009).

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4. Wade Boese, “U.S. Missile Defense Capability a Mystery,” Arms Control Today (Apr. 2006): 37. 5. Wade Boese, “Top Pentagon Official Says Missile Defense Performance Questionable Without More Test,” Arms Control Today (Mar. 2004): 40; Wade Boese, “Pentagon Split on Missile Defense,” Arms Control Today (Apr. 2005): 30. 6. John Hendren, “Missile Defense System Fails Test,” Los Angeles Times, Dec. 16, 2004, A1, A24; “Arms, Not the Missile, Faulted,” Los Angeles Times, Feb. 18, 2005, A5. 7. Boese, “Pentagon Split on Missile Defense,” 30; Wade Boese, “Missile Defense Performance Top Concern,” Arms Control Today (May 2005): 31. 8. Wade Boese, “Ground-Based Interceptor Fails Again,” Arms Control Today (Mar. 2005): 29. 9. Wade Boese, “More Testing Urged for Missile Defense,” Arms Control Today ( July/Aug. 2005): 28. 10. Boese, “U.S. Missile Defense Capability a Mystery,” 37. 11. Julian E. Barnes, “U.S. Test Missile Hits Mock Target,” Los Angeles Times, Sept. 2, 2006, A1, A25; Wade Boese, “Anti-Missile System Scores Test Hit,” Arms Control Today (Oct. 2006): 31. 12. Wade Boese, “Missile Defense Five Years After the ABM Treaty,” Arms Control Today ( June 2007): 31. 13. Wade Boese, “Missile Defense Under Scrutiny,” Arms Control Today ( Jan./ Feb. 2007): 35. 14. U.S. Missile Defense Agency, FY-2008 Budget Estimates, Overview, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, Jan. 31, 2007): 5. 15. Wade Boese, “Pentagon Repeats Missile Defense Test Success,” Arms Control Today (Nov. 2007): 34–35. 16. Wade Boese, “Missile Defense Role Questioned,” Arms Control Today ( July/ Aug. 2008): 43–44. 17. Ibid. 18. Wade Boese, “Reports Fault U.S. Anti-Missile Approach,” Arms Control Today (Nov. 2008): 44–45. 19. Viola Gienger, “Gates Says U.S. Could Repel North Korean Missile,” Bloomberg, June 1, 2009; U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Hearing to Receive Testimony in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2010 and the Future Years Defense Program, Washington, DC: GPO, May 14, 2009. 20. Ronald O’Rourke, Sea-Based Ballistic Missile Defense—Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Oct. 22, 2009), 2–5, 22. 21. Ibid. 22. Ibid., 1, 61–62. 23. GAO, Missile Defense: THAAD Restructure Addresses Problems But Limits Early Capability (Washington, DC: GAO/NSIAD-99-142, June 1999), 1–3. 24. GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs (Washington, DC: GAO-08-467SP, Mar. 2008), 163–164; GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs (Washington, DC: GAO-09-326SP, Mar. 2009), 55–56; see www.army-technology.com/projects/thaad/ and www.lockheedmar tin.com for additional information. 25. Wade Boese, “Anti-Missile Test Shelved by Technical Glitch,” Arms Control Today ( June 2008): 41.

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26. GAO, Missile Defense: Knowledge-Based Decision Making Needed To Reduce Risks in Developing Airborne Laser, GAO-02-631 (Washington, DC: July 12, 2002), 2–5. 27. Ibid., 4, 6. 28. See GAO, Airborne Laser Costs and Military Utility, GAO-04-643R (Washington, DC: rev. May 3, 2004). 29. GAO, Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Information for Supporting Future Key Decisions for Boost and Ascent Phase Elements, GAO-07-430 (Washington, DC: Apr. 2007), 13. 30. GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessment of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO07-406SP, GAO-08-467SP, GAO-09-326SP (Washington, DC: Mar. 2007, 2008, 2009), 22–23, 36, 43–44. 31. Senate Appropriations Committee’s Report, S. Rept. 110–155, Sept. 14, 2007 on the FY2008 defense appropriations bill (H.R. 3222), 268. 32. Bradley Graham, Hit to Kill: The New Battle Over Shielding America from Missile Attack (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), 181–185; James Glanz, “Antimissile Test Viewed as Flawed by Opponents,” New York Times, Jan. 14, 2000, A-1ff. 33. Richard F. Kaufman, ed. The Full Costs of Ballistic Missile Defense (Washington, DC: Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation and Economists Allied for Arms Reduction, Jan. 2003) see at www.ecaar.org; Richard Dean Burns and Lester H. Brune, The Quest for Missile Defenses, 1944–2003 (Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 2004), 221–224; GAO, Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and Cost Estimates for Long-Term Support of Ballistic Missile Defense, GAO-08-1068 (Washington, DC: Sept. 2008); GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO-09-326SP (Washington, DC: Mar. 2009).

CHAPTER 7 1. See Public law 110–47, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 2009, Section 234. 2. Jim Wolf, “U.S. missile defense said to face near $2 billion cut,” Reuters, Feb. 13, 2009; Office of Management and Budget, “Terminations, Reductions, and Savings,” Budget of the U.S. Government Fiscal Year 2010, Washington DC. 3. Frank Oliveri, “GOP Provision Aided Obama Missile Plan,” CQ Today Print Edition, Oct. 2, 2009. 4. Fiscal Year 2010 Department of Defense Budget Overview for the Missile Defense Agency, May 7, 2009. 5. U.S. Congress, Hearing, House Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC, May 13, 2009. 6. U.S. Congress, Hearing, House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, Washington, DC, May 20, 2009. 7. Ibid. 8. U.S. Congress, Hearing, Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC, May 14, 2009. 9. Missile Defense Agency, Briefing, Jan. 28, 2009, Approved for Public Release 09-MDA-4234 ( Jan. 23, 2009). 10. See Laura Rosen, “U.S. missile-defense policy under review,” Foreign Policy, “The Cable,” Mar. 3, 2009.

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11. See Reuters, Mar. 17, 2009. 12. The White House, “Fact Sheet on U.S. Missile Defense Policy—A ‘Phased, Adaptive Approach’ for Missile Defense in Europe,” Sept. 17, 2009. 13. Frank Oliveri, “GOP Provision Aided Obama Missile Plan,” CQ Today Print Edition, Oct. 2, 2009. 14. Julian E. Barnes, “Defenses Go Up Outside Iran,” Los Angeles Times, Jan. 31, 2010, A1ff; also see Nathan Hodge, “Petraeus: Missile-Shooting Ships on Station in the Gulf,” www.wired.com, January 22, 2010. For transcript see Institute for the Study of War website: http://www.understandingwar.org/press-media/ webcast/centcom-2010-views-general-david-h-petraeus-video. 15. “Turkey Opposed to U.S. Missile Defense Deployment,” RIA Novosti, Dec. 16, 2009. 16. “Poll Says 80% of Czechs Hail Cancellation of U.S. Radar Plans,” RIA Novosti, Dec. 1, 2009. 17. See for example, David Jackson and Ken Dilanian, “Obama Scraps Bush Missile-Defense Plan,” USA Today, Sept., 17, 2009. 18. The Pentagon, Transcript, DOD News Briefing with Secretary Gates and Vice Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. James Cartright, Sept. 17, 2009. http:// www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4479. 19. Philip Pan, “A Cautious Russia Praises Decision,” Washington Post, Sept. 18, 2009, 7ff. 20. Vladimir Isachenkov, “Putin Urges US to Share Missile Defense Data,” Associated Press, Dec. 29, 2009. 21. U.S. State Department Web site, Dec. 11, 2009, http://www.state.gov/r/ pa/prs/ps/2009/dec/133470.htm; “US, Poland sign deal on stationing US Troops, Associated Press, Worldstream, Dec. 11, 2009; John Vandiver, “US Forces to Train Poles on Air Defense,” Stars and Stripes, European edition, Dec. 21, 2009. 22. “Poland Says Basing Patriot Missiles Nearer Russia Not Political,” RIA Novosti, Jan. 21, 2010; “Missiles Threaten Nuclear Pact, Patriots Will Be Deployed Near Russia,” Washington Times, Jan. 21, 2010; “US To Deploy Defensive Missiles on Russia’s Doorstep,” Agence France Presse, Jan. 20, 2010. 23. Luke Harding, “Russia Scraps Plan to Deploy Nuclear-capable Missiles in Kaliningrad,” World News, The Guardian, Jan. 28, 2009. 24. See Riki Ellison, “Friend or Foe,” www.missiledefenseadvocacy.org, Jan. 22, 2010; “Poland Approves Revised US Missile Shield Agreement,” Agence France Presse, Mar. 2, 2010; “Poland Agrees to Host U.S. Anti-Missile Interceptors, Global Insight, Mar. 4, 2010. 25. “Romania to Host US Missile Interceptors,” Washington Post, Feb. 4, 2010; Tom Z. Collina, “U.S. Taps Romania for Missile Defense,” Arms Control Today (March 2010): 44–46. 26. Valentina Pop, “Russia in Stand-by Mode over US Missiles Plans in Romania,” EUobserver.com, Feb. 8, 2010. 27. “Czechs in Talks to Host Missile Command Center,” The Prague Post, Feb. 11, 2010. 28. “Russia Worried by US Missile Defense Plan,” Agence France Presse, Feb. 26, 2010. 29. “Bulgaria to Talk with U.S. about Missile Defense,” Global Security Newswire, Feb. 16, 2010.

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30. “China Said to Close Gap with U.S. Missile Defense in Monday Test,” Global Security Newswire, Jan. 10, 2010; “Pentagon Received No Warning of Chinese Missile Defense Test,” Global Security Newswire, Jan. 12, 2010. 31. Andrew Jacobs and Jonathan Ansfield, “China’s Missile Test Is Said to Signal Displeasure with U.S.,” New York Times, Jan. 13, 2010. 32. “India’s Anti-Ballistic Missile Defence Programme Is Ahead of China,” indiadaily.com, Feb. 11, 2010; “We Are Ahead of Chinese in Missile Programme,” The Hindu, Feb. 11, 2009. 33. The White House, “Fact Sheet—U.S. Missile Defense Policy ‘A Phased, Adaptive Approach’ for Missile Defense in Europe,” Washington, DC, Sept. 17, 2009. 34. George Jahn, “Iran Moves Closer to Nuke Warhead Capability,” Associated Press, Feb. 8, 2010; Borzou Daragahi and Julian E. Barnes, “Iran Plans 10 Nuclear Facilities,” Los Angeles Times, Feb. 9, 2010, A-1ff 35. Amy Butler, “MDA Analyzing Test Beam Misalignment,” Aviation Week, Feb. 22, 2010; “Feds not Interested in Boeing’s Airborne Laser,” www.dailyherald. com, Feb. 18, 2010; “Air Force Chief of Staff: Airborne Laser not “Operationally Viable,” Inside Missile Defense, Feb. 24, 2010. 36. Todd Harrison, “Few Surprises in the 2011 Defense Budget Request,” The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, CSBA Update, Feb. 1, 2010. 37. Robert M. Gates, “A Better Missile Defense for a Safer Europe,” The New York Times, Op Ed, Sept. 19, 2009. 38. David Sanger and Willian Broad, “New Missile Shield Strategy Scales Back Reagan’s Vision, The New York Times, Sept. 17, 2009. 39. See White House Web site, www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/ statements-and-releases. 40. GAO, “Missile Defense Transition Provides Opportunity to Strengthen Acquisition Approach,” Washington, DC: GAO-10-311, Feb. 2010. 41. Kevin Baron, “Once-Divisive U.S. Missile Defense System Now Widely Accepted,” Stars and Stripes, Mar. 25, 2010.

REFLECTIONS 1. A challenge to the effectiveness of the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) was reported by the New York Times, May 17, 2010, which drew on an article appearing in the May issue of Arms Control Today. The Missile Defense Agency promptly, and with considerable success, rebutted the New York Times report. See MDA press release, “Missile Defense Agency Responds to New York Times Article,” May 18, 2010. 2. Dennis M. Gormley, “Winning on Ballistic Missiles but Losing on Cruise: The Missile Proliferation Battle,” Arms Control Today (Dec. 2008): 27–28. 3. Paul Richter, “U.S. and Russia to Cut Nuclear Arsenals,” Los Angeles Times, Mar. 25, 2010, A-1ff; Paul Richter and Christi Parsons, “U.S. Russia Sign Pact to Cut Arsenals,” Los Angeles Times, Apr. 9, 2010, A-1ff; Tom Z. Collina, “New START to Be Signed April 8,” Arms Control Today (April 2010), 29; see also “Senate Foreign Relations Committee Request for Information,” at http://lugar.senate.gov/ issues/start/pdf/SFRCrequest.pdf.

Selected References

Note on Sources: For valuable sources dealing with the period since 2002, check the Notes chapter, especially for government documents that are too numerous to be cited individually here. These include such sources as the very useful Government Accounting Office reports, Congressional Research Reports, and congressional hearings, most of which may be found on line. There are Several other Web sites, such as the Union of Concerned Scientists at www.ucsusa.org., provide useful information. Useful monthly updates may be found in Arms Control Today, which also has an online service. MISSILE DEFENSE: GENERAL The Aspen Study Group. Key Issues in American Security: Anti-Satellite Weapons and U.S. Military Space Policy. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1985. Baucom, Donald R. The Origins of SDI, 1944–1983. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992. Broad, William J. Star Warriors: A Penetrating Look into the Lives of the Young Scientists Behind Our Space Age Weaponry. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985. Bundy, McGeorge. Danger and Survival. New York: Random House, 1988. Burns, Richard Dean, and Lester H. Brune. The Quest for Missile Defenses, 1944– 2003. Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 2003. Carter, Ashton B., and David N. Schwartz, eds. Ballistic Missile Defense. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1984. Cimbala, Stephen J. “Deterrence and Friction: Implications for Missile Defense.” Defense & Security Analysis 18:3 (Sept. 2002): 201–220.

178

Selected References

Denoon, David B. H. Ballistic Missile Defense in the Post-Cold War Era. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995. Flax, Alexander. “Ballistic Missile Defense: Concepts and History.” Daedalus 114 (Spring 1985): 33–52. Franck, Raymond E. Jr., and Francois Melese. “The Access Deterrence Scenario: A New Approach to Assessing National Missile Defenses.” Defense & Security Analysis 18:3 (Sept. 2002): 227–238. Kaufman, Richard F., ed. The Full Costs of Ballistic Missile Defense. Washington, DC: Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation and Economists Allied for Arms Control, 2003. Lebovic, James H. “The Law of Small Numbers: Deterrence and National Missile Defense.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 46:4 (Aug. 2002): 455–483. Mathers, Jennifer G. The Russian Nuclear Shield From Stalin to Yeltsin. New York: St. Martin’s, 2000. (useful bibliography) Podvig, Pavel, ed. Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001. Pratt, Erik K. Selling Strategic Defense: Interests, Ideologies, and the Arms Race. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1990. (good on groups pressing for ballistic missile defense) Samson, Victoria. American Missile Defense : A Guide to the Issues. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010. Stares, Paul B. Space and National Security. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1987. Wirtz, James J., and Jeffrey A. Larsen, eds. Rocket’s Red Glare: Missile Defenses and World Politics. Boulder, CO: Westview, 2002. (favorable arguments for a NMD system; a useful primer) Young, Stephen W. Pushing the Limits: The Decision on National Missile Defense. Washington, DC: Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers and Council for a Livable World Education Fund, 2000. Zaloga, Steven J. The Kremlin’s Nuclear Sword: The Rise and Fall of Russia’s Strategic Nuclear Forces, 1945–2000. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2002.

MISSILE DEFENSE CONTROVERSIES, 1960 S –1970 S Adams, Benson D. Ballistic Missile Defense. New York: American Elsevier, 1971. Chayes, Abram, and Jerome B. Wiesner, eds. ABM: An Evaluation of the Decision to Deploy an Antiballistic Missile System. New York: Harper & Row, 1969. (the first Ballistic Missile Defense controversy) Halperin, Morton H. “The Decision to Deploy the ABM: Bureaucratic and Domestic Politics in the Johnson Administration.” World Politics 25:1 (1972): 62–95. Jayne, Edward R. The ABM Debate: Strategic Defense and National Security. Cambridge: MIT, Center for Strategic Studies, 1969. Rabinowitch, Eugene, and Ruth Adams, eds. Debate: The Antiballistic Missile. Chicago, IL: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 1967. Schneider, William Jr., et al. The Strategic Nuclear Policy and Ballistic Missile Defense: The 1980s and Beyond. Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1980.

Selected References

179

Schwartz, David N. “Past and Present: The Historical Legacy.” In Ballistic Missile Defense. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1984. Slater, Jerome. “Re-examining the ABM Moratorium: Population Defense Reconsidered: Is the ABM Really Inconsistent with Stability?” Policy Studies Journal 8:1 (1979): 53–59. Yanarella, Ernest J. The Missile Defense Controversy: Strategy, Technology, and Politics, 1955–1972. rev. & expanded. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2002. (debates over ballistic missile defense system)

THE ABM TREATY, 1972 Bunn, Matthew. Foundation for the Future: The ABM Treaty and National Security. Washington, DC: Arms Control Association, 1990. Drell, Sidney; Philip J. Farley, and David Holloway. “Preserving the ABM Treaty: A Critique of the Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative.” International Security 9 (Fall 1984): 51–91. Durch, William J. Jr. The ABM Treaty and Western Security. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1988. Garthoff, Raymond L. Policy versus the Law: The Reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1987. Graham, Thomas Jr. “Law, Politics, and the ABM Treaty.” Comparative Strategy 20:2 (Apr.–June 2001): 197–201. Kennedy, Kevin C. “Treaty Interpretation by the Executive Branch: The ABM Treaty and ‘Star Wars’ Testing and Development.” American Journal of International Law 80 (Oct. 1986): 854–877. Longstreth, Thomas K., and John E. Pike. “U.S., Soviet Programs Threaten ABM Treaty.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 41 (Apr. 1985): 11–15. Mullerson, Rein. “The ABM Treaty: Changed Circumstances, Extraordinary Events, Supreme Interests and International Law.” International & Comparative Law Quarterly 50:3 (July 2001): 509–539. Paine, Christopher. “The ABM Treaty: Looking for Loopholes.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 39 (Aug./Sept. 1983): 13–17. Payne, Keith B., and Rebecca V. Strode. “Space-Based Laser BMD: Strategic Policy and the ABM Treaty.” International Security Review 7 (Fall 1982): 269–288. Rhinelander, John B. “U.S. and Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense Programs: Implications for the 1972 ABM Treaty.” Space Policy 2 (May 1986): 138–152. Sherr, Alan B. “Sound Legal Reasoning or Policy Expedient? The ‘New Interpretation’ of the ABM Treaty.” International Security 11 (Winter 1986–1987): 71–93. Sofaer, Abraham D. “The ABM Treaty and the Strategic Defense Initiative.” Harvard Law Review 99 (May 1986): 1972–1985. U.S. Department of State. The ABM Treaty and the SDI Program. Current Policy Paper no. 755. Washington, DC: Bureau of Public Affairs, Oct. 1985. (Nitze & Sofaer defend administration) U.S. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. International Security and Science Subcommittee. Hearings; ABM Treaty Interpretation Dispute. Washington, DC: GPO, Oct. 22, 1985.

180

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TERMINATING THE ABM TREATY “Arms Agreements Are Invalid if US Abandons ABM Treaty.” New Perspectives Quarterly 18:4 (Fall 2001): 79–81. Boniface, Pascal. “The Specter of Unilateralism.” Washington Quarterly 24:3 (Summer 2001): 155–162. Clemens, Walter C. Jr. “Who Terminates a Treaty?” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 57:6 (Nov./Dec. 2001): 38–39, 42–43. Lindsay, James M., and Michael E. O’Hanlon. “Missile Defense after the ABM Treaty.” Washington Quarterly 25:3 (Summer 2002): 163–176.

REAGAN AND THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE, 1983–1989 Boffey, Philip M. et al. Claiming the Heavens: The New York Times Complete Guide to the Star Wars Debate. New York, 1988. Broad, William J. Teller’s War: The Top Secret Story behind the Star Wars Deception. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992. Carter, Ashton B., and David N. Schwartz, eds. Ballistic Missile Defense. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1984. DiMaggio, Cosmo, and Davey Michael. The Strategic Defense Initiative Institute: An Assessment of DoD’s Current Proposal. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Aug. 1986. DiMaggio, Cosmo, Arthur F. Manfredi, and Steven A. Hildreth. The Strategic Defense Initiative, Program Description and Major Issues. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Jan. 7, 1986. Drell, Sidney D., Philip J. Farley, and David Holloway. The Reagan Strategic Defence Initiative: A Technical, Political and Arms Control Assessment. Cambridge, MA, 1985. Fitzgerald, Frances. Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the End of the Cold War. New York: Simon & Shuster, 2000. Graham, Lt. Gen. Daniel O. We Must Defend America—And Put an End to MADness. Chicago: Regnery Gateway, 1983. Haley, P. Edward, and Jack Merritt, eds. Strategic Defense: Folly or Future? Boulder, CO: Westview, 1986. “President Ronald Reagan’s Address to the Nation, March 23, 1983: ‘Peace and National Security’.” Daedalus 114 (Summer 1985), Appendix B: Relevant Documents, pp. 369–372. Reiss, Edward. The Strategic Defense Initiative. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Waller, Douglas C. et al. The Strategic Defense Initiative: Progress and Challenge. A Guide to Issues and References. Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 1987. (an extended bibliography to 1988) Yost, David S. Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense and the Western Alliance. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988.

THE BUSH-CLINTON PROGRAMS, 1989–2001 Cirincione, Joseph. “Assessing the Assessment: The 1999 National Intelligence Estimate of the Ballistic Missile Threat.” Nonproliferation Review 7 (Spring 2000): 125–137.

Selected References

181

Cirincione, Joseph. “Why the Right Lost the Missile Defense Debate.” Foreign Policy No. 106 (Spring 1997): 38–55. Cooper, Henry F., Robert C. Richardson, and John Hutt Cunningham. “The Rising Threat of Missile Proliferation.” The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies 21 (Winter 1996): 371–382. Cordesman, Anthony H. Strategic Threats and National Missile Defense: Defending the U.S. Homeland. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002. Fox, Eugene, and Stanley Orman. “The Limitations in American Capabilities for Missile Defense.” The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies 22 (Fall 1997): 259–265. Garwin, Richard L. “A Defense That Will Not Defend.” Washington Quarterly 23:3 (Summer 2000): 109–123. Graham, Bradley. Hit to Kill: The New Battle Over Shielding America from Missile Attack. New York: Public Affairs, 2001. Hadley, Stephen J. “A Call to Deploy.” Washington Quarterly 23:3 (Summer 2000): 95–108. Hartung, William D. “Reagan Redux: The Enduring Myth of Star Wars.” World Policy Journal 15:3 (Fall 1998): 17–24. Infosino, Charles J. A Technical History of Ballistic Missile Defense from 1984–1994. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, September 1995. Jones, Rodney W. Taking National Missile Defense to Sea: A Critique of Sea-Based and Boost-Phase Proposals. Washington, DC: Council for a Livable World, 2000. Larson, Jeffrey A., and Gregory Rattray, eds. Arms Control Toward the 21st Century. Boulder, CO: Lynn Reinner Publishers, 1996. Lewis, George, Lisbeth Gronlund, and David Wright. “National Missile Defense: An Indefensible System.” Foreign Policy No. 117 (Winter 1999/2000): 120–131. McMahan, K. Scott. “Unconventional Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons Delivery Methods: Whither the ‘Smuggled Bomb’.” Comparative Strategy 15 (Apr. 1996): 123–134. Powaski, Ronald E. Return to Armageddon: The United States and the Nuclear Arms Race, 1981–1999. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States: Executive Summary. Pursuant to Public Law 201. 104th Cong. Washington, DC: GPO, July, 15, 1998. Talbott, Strobe. The Russian Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy. New York: Random House, 2002. U.S. General Accounting Office. Ballistic Missile Defense: Evolution and Current Issues. Report to the Chairman, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate. Washington, DC: 1993. Young, Stephen. Pushing the Limits: The Decision on National Missile Defense. Washington, DC: Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Danger, April 2000.

THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE Bloomberg, Howard. “The Theater Missile Threat and Allied Defense.” The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies 20 (Spring 1995): 3–19.

182

Selected References

Christensen, Thomas J. “Theater Missile Defense and Taiwan’s Security.” Orbis 44:1 (Winter 2000): 79–90. Fox, Eugene, and Stanley Orman. “The Relevance of Naval Theater Missile Defense.” The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies 23:1 (Spring 1998): 3–15. Fox, Eugene, and Stanley Orman. “Why International Theater Missile Defense Is Still a Challenge Rather Than a Reality.” The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies 23:2 (Summer 1998): 107–120. Frankel, S. “Defeating Theater Missile Defense Radars with Active Decoys.” Science and Global Security 6:3 (1997): 333–355. Hildreth, Steven A., and Jason D. Ellis. “Allied Support for Theater Missile Defense.” Orbis 40 (Winter 1996): 101–121. Lee, Wei-chin. “Thunder in the Air: Taiwan and Theater Missile Defense.” Nonproliferation Review 83 (2001): 107–122. O’Donogue, Patrick M. Theater Missile Defense in Japan: Implications for the U.S.China-Japan Strategic Relationship. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2000. Swaine, Michael D., Rachel M. Swanger, and Takashi Kawakami. Japan and Ballistic Missile Defense. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001. Wang, T. Y. “Taiwan and Theater Missile Defense.” The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies 25:3 (Fall 2000): 259–283.

THE PATRIOT MISSILE CONTROVERSY Boese, Wade. “Army Report Details Patriot Record in Iraq War.” Arms Control Today (Nov. 2003): 30–31. Conyers, John Jr. “The Patriot Myth.” Arms Control Today 32 (Nov. 1992): 3–10. Conyers, John Jr., and New York Congressman Frank Horton “[on the Patriot Missile].” Arms Control Today 33 (Jan. 1993): 26–29. Hersh, Seymour. “Missile Wars.” New Yorker (Sept. 1994): 86–99. Postol, Theodore. “Lessons from the Gulf War’s Experience with the Patriot.” International Security 16 (Winter 1991–1992): 119–171. Postol, Theodore, and Robert M. Stein. “[Patriot Missile].” International Security 17 (Summer 1992): 199–240.

GEORGE W. BUSH’S ACCELERATED PROGRAM, 2001– Boese, Wade. “Bush Team Reaffirms Missile Defense Plans; Dems Leery.” Arms Control Today 31 (July/Aug. 2001): 18–19. Boese, Wade. “Missile Defense Post-ABM Treaty: No System, No Arms Race.” Arms Control Today 33 (June 2003): 20–24. Bormann, Natalie. National Missile Defense and the Politics of US Identity: A Postcultural Critique. New York: Manchester University Press, 2008. Butler, Jeffrey T. The Influence of Politics, Technology, and Asia on the Future of US Missile Defense. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2007. Eisendrath, Craig, Gerald E. Marsh, and Melvin A. Goodman. The Phantom Defense: America’s Pursuit of the Star Wars Illusion. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001.

Selected References

183

Garrett, Major. The Enduring Revolution: How the Contract with America Continues to Shape the Nation. New York: Crown Forum, 2005. Gizewski, Peter. “The International Politics of Missile Defence.” International Journal 56:3 (Summer 2001): 527–532. Gormley, Dennis M. “Enriching Expectations: 11 September’s Lessons for Missile Defence.” Survival 44:2 (Summer 2002): 19–35. Hey, Nigel. The Star Wars Enigma: Behind the Scenes of the Cold War Race for Missile Defense. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2006. Hildreth, Steven A., ed. Missile Defense: The Current Debate. New York: Novinka Books, 2004. Lindsay, James M., and Michael E. O’Hanlon. Defending America: The Case for Limited National Missile Defense. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001. Lodal, Jan. The Price of Dominance: The New Weapons of Mass Destruction and Their Challenge to American Leadership. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2001. U.S. Government Accountability Office. Defense Management: Actions Needed to Improve Operational Planning and Visibility of Costs for Ballistic Missile Defense. Report to the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives. Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2006. U.S. Government Accountability Office. Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Information for Supporting Future Key Decisions for Boost and Ascent Phase Elements. Report to Congressional committees. Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2007. (examples of useful GAO reports) U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs. What Are the Prospects? What Are the Costs? Oversight of Missile Defense (part 2). 110th Congress, 2d sess., Apr. 16, 2008. Washington, DC: GPO, 2009. U.S. House of Representatives. Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs. Hearings; Oversight of Missile Defense (part 3): Questions for the Missile Defense Agency. 110th Cong., 2d. sess., Apr. 30, 2008. Washington, DC: GPO, 2009. (examples of useful congressional hearings) Wirbel, Loring. Star Wars: US Tools of Space Supremacy. London: Pluto Press, 2003.

EUROPE AND MISSILE DEFENSE Ball, Charles. “The Allies [and NMD].” In James J. Wirtz and Jeffrey A. Larsen, eds. Rockets’ Red Glare: Missile Defense and the Future of World Politics. Boulder, CO: Westview, 2001. Blinken, Antony J. “The False Crisis Over the Atlantic.” Foreign Affairs 80:3 (May/ June 2001): 35–48. Bowen, Wyn Q. “Missile Defense and the Transatlantic Security Relationship.” International Affairs 77 (July 2001): 485–508. Brauch, Hans G. From “Star Wars” to Strategic Defense Initiative: European Perceptions and Assessments. New York: St. Martin’s, 1986. Cohen, Nick. “Star Wars in Their Eyes.” New Statesman 130 (Jan. 8, 2001): 9–12.

184

Selected References

Daalder, Ivo H. The SDI Challenge to Europe. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1987. Daalder, Ivo H., and Christopher Makins. “Towards a Transatlantic Consensus on Missile Defence.” Survival 43:3 (Autumn 2001): 61–66. Dinerman, Taylor. “France and the Idea of Strategic Defense: Technology, Politics and Doctrine.” The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies 25:3 (Fall 2000): 285–302. Ennals, Richard. Star Wars: A Question of Initiative. New York: Wiley, 1987. (British view; anti-SDI) Fenske, John. “France and the Strategic Defense Initiative: Speeding Up or Putting on the Brakes?” International Affairs [Great Britain] 62 (Spring 1986): 231–246. Fox, Eugene, and Stanley Orman. “The Divergence of Long-standing Allies.” The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies 24:2 (Summer 1999): 131–140. Fox, Eugene, and Stanley Orman. “Will Europe Invest in Missile Defense?” The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies 24:1 (Spring 1999): 3–16. Gordon, Philip H. “Bush, Missile Defence and the Atlantic Alliance.” Survival 43:1 (Spring 2001): 17–36. Gray, Colin S. “European Perspectives on U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense.” Comparative Strategy 21:4 (Oct.–Dec. 2002): 279–310. Hamm, Manfred R., and W. Bruce Weinrod. “The Transatlantic Politics of Strategic Defense.” Orbis 29 (Winter 1986): 709–734. (pro-SDI) Hoadley, Stephen. “Europe’s America Problem.” New Zealand International Review 27:5 (Sept.–Oct. 2002): 14–16. Holm, Hans-Henrik. “SDI and European Security: Does Dependence Assume Security?” Alternatives: A Journal of World Policy 10:4 (1985): 517–532. Johnson, Rebecca. “Downing Street Says Yes; Britons, No.” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 57:6 (Nov./Dec. 2001): 28–30. Kanter, Arnold. “Thinking about the Strategic Defense Initiative: An Alliance Perspective.” International Affairs [Great Britain] 61 (Summer 1985): 449–464. Koehl, Stuart. “The Strategic Defense Initiative and Its Potential for European Industry.” Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies 10 (Winter 1985): 387–406. Lellouche, Pierre. “SDI and the Atlantic Alliance.” SAIS Review 5 (Summer–Fall 1985): 67–80. (critical of SDI) Lodgaard, Sverre. “European Views of the US NMD Programme.” Pugwash Occasional Papers 2:2 (March 2001): 52–63. Mueller, Harald. “Germany Hopes It Will Go Away.” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 57:6 (Nov./Dec. 2001): 31–3. Neuneck, Götz. “Missile Defense, Germany and Europe.” Pugwash Occasional Papers 2:2 (March 2001): 85–96. Pearce, Sarah. “UK Views on National Missile Defence.” Pugwash Occasional Papers 2:2 (March 2001): 64–75 Segell, Glen. “Britain, the United States and Missile Defense.” Review of International Affairs 1:4 (Summer 2002): 91–104. Stocker, Jeremy. Britain’s Role in U.S. Missile Defense. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2004. Taylor, Trevor. “Britain’s Response to the Strategic Defense Initiative.” International Affairs [Great Britain] 62 (Spring 1986): 217–230.

Selected References

185

SOVIET/RUSSIAN BMD POSITIONS Adragna, Steven P. On Guard for Victory: Military Doctrine and Ballistic Missile Defense in the USSR. Cambridge: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1987. Daalder, Ivo H., and James M. Goldgeier. “Russia [and NMD].” In James J. Wirtz and Jeffrey A. Larsen, eds. Rockets’ Red Glare: Missile Defense and the Future of World Politics. Boulder, CO: Westview, 2001. Gobarev, Victor. “The Early Development of Russia’s Ballistic Missile Defense System.” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 14:2 (June 2001): 29–48. Postol, Theodore A. “The Target Is Russia.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 56:2 (Mar./Apr. 2000): 30–35. Shoumikhin, Andrei, ed. “Evolving Russian Perspectives on Missile Defense: The Emerging Accommodation.” Comparative Strategy 21:4 (Oct–Dec, 2002): 311–336. Sokov, Nikola. Russian Strategic Modernization. Lanham, MD: Rowan & Littlefield, 2000. Stevens, Sayre. “The Soviet BMD Program.” In Ashton B. Carter and David N. Schwartz, eds. Ballistic Missile Defense. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1994. Voas, Jeanette. “Soviet Attitudes towards Ballistic Missile Defence and the ABM Treaty.” Adelphi Papers #255. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990. Yost, David S. “Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense and NATO.” Orbis 29 (Summer 1985): 281–292.

CHINA AND MISSILES [See also, Theater Missile Defenses] Bi, Jianxiang. “Uncertain Courses: Theater Missile Defense and Cross-Strait Competition,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 25:3 (Sept. 2002): 109–160. “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2000.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 56 (May–June 2000): 78–79. Ferguson, Charles. “Sparking a Buildup: U.S. Missile Defense and China’s Nuclear Arsenal.” Arms Control Today 30 (Mar. 2000): 13–18. Glaser, Bonnie S., and Banning N. Garrett. “Chinese Perspectives on the Strategic Defense Initiative.” Problems of Communism 35 (Mar./Apr. 1986): 28–44. Huntley, Wade L. “Missile Defense: More May Be Better—for China.” Nonproliferation Review 9:2 (Summer 2002): 68–81. Lampton, David. Same Bed, Different Dreams: U.S.-Chinese Relations, 1989–2000. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001. Lewis, John Wilson, and Xue Litai. China Builds the Bomb. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988. McDevitt, Michael. “Beijing’s Bind.” Washington Quarterly 23:3 (2000): 177–186. O’Hanlon, Michael. “Why China Can’t Conquer Taiwan.” International Security 25 (Fall 2000): 51–86. Roberts, Bradley. “China [Response to NMD].” In James J. Wirtz and Jeffrey A. Larsen, eds. Rockets’ Red Glare: Missile Defense & the Future of World Politics. Boulder, CO: Westview, 2001.

186

Selected References

Roberts, Bradley, Robert A. Manning, and Ronald N. Montaperto. “China: The Forgotten Nuclear Power.” Foreign Affairs 79 (Jul–Aug 2000): 53–63. Shambaugh, David. “Facing Reality in China Policy.” Foreign Affairs 80:1 (Jan./ Feb. 2001): 50–64. Swaine, Michael D. Taiwan’s National Security, Defense Policy, and Weapons Procurement Processes. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp., 1999. U.S. House. Report of the United States House of Representatives Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China. H. Rpt. 59. 106 Cong. 1st Sess. G.P.O., 1999. The “Cox Report.” See Jonathan Pollack, “The Cox Report’s Dirty Little Secret,” Arms Control Today 29 (Apr.–May 1999): 26–27; John M. Spratt, Jr. “Keep the Facts of the Cox Report in Perspective.” Ibid, 24–25. Zang, Ming. “What Threat?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 55 (Sept.–Oct. 1999): 52–57.

OTHER NATIONS AND MISSILE DEFENSE Arkin, William. “Nuclear Junkies: Those Lovable Little Bombs.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 49 (July 1993): 25. Cirincione, Joseph. “The Asian Nuclear Reaction Chain.” Foreign Policy 118 (Spring 2000): 120–136. Clugston, M. “A Polite ‘No’ to Star Wars.” MacLeans 98 (Sept. 16, 1985): 10–11. (Canadian Government) Fergusson, James. “Not Home Alone: Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence.” International Journal 56:4 (Autumn 2001): 678–685. Haglund, David G. “Yesterday’s Issue? National Missile Defence, Canada, and the Allies.” International Journal 56:4 (Autumn 2001): 686–698. Holmes, Kim R. “U.S.-Soviet-China Relations and Strategic Defense.” Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 1986. Hoyt, Timothy D. “South Asia [and NMD].” In James J. Wirtz and Jeffrey A. Larsen, eds. Rockets’ Red Glare: Missile Defense and the Future of World Politics. Boulder, CO: Westview, 2001. Jimbo, Ken. “A Japanese Perspective on Missile Defense and Strategic Coordination.” Nonproliferation Review 9:2 (Summer 2002): 56–62. Lyon, Rod, and David Dellit. “Ballistic Missile Defence: An Australian Perspective.” Australian Journal of International Affairs 55:3 (Nov. 2001): 445–451. Mueller, David. “Inescapable SDI.” International Perspectives [Canada] (Sept./Oct. 1986): 14–16. Perkovich, George. India’s Nuclear Bomb. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. Rohrlich, Paul E. “Canada and Star Wars.” International Perspectives (May/June 1985): 17–20. Ross, Douglas A. Coping with “Star Wars”: Issues for Canada and the Alliance. Aurora Papers #2. Ottawa: Canadian Center for Arms Control and Disarmament, 1985. Russell, Richard L. “Swords and Shields: Ballistic Missiles and Defenses in the Middle East and South Asia.” Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs 46:3 (Summer 2002): 483–498.

Selected References

187

Shelton, Garth. “Military Technology, Missile Defence, New Global Threats and South Africa.” South African Journal of International Affairs 9:2 (Winter 2002): 129–145. Sheppard, Ben. “South Asia Nears Nuclear Boiling Point.” Jane’s Intelligence Review 11 (Apr. 1999): 33–35. Stav, Arieh, ed. The Threat of Ballistic Missiles in the Middle East: Active Defense and Counter-measures. Portland, OR: Sussex Academic Press, 2004. Takase, Shojio. “What Star Wars Means to Japan.” Japan Quarterly 32 (July/Sept. 1985): 240–247. Thornton, Thomas Perry. “Pakistan: Fifty Years of Insecurity.” In Selig Harrison, Paul Kreisberg, and Dennis Kux, eds. India and Pakistan: The First Fifty Years. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center and Cambridge University Press, 1999. Tow, William T., and William Choong. “Asian Perceptions of BMD: Defence or Disequilibrium?” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 23:3 (Dec. 2001): 379–400. Urayama, Kori. “Japan’s Wait-And-See Approach.” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 57:6 (Nov./Dec. 2001): 33–35. Wirick, Gregory. Canadian Responses to the Strategic Defense Initiative. Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace & Security, 1985.

THE “ROGUE” STATES Ehteshami, Anoushiravan. “Teheran’s Tocsin.” Washington Quarterly 23 (Summer 2000): 171–176. (discusses its missile policies) Lake, Anthony. “Confronting Backlash States.” Foreign Affairs 74 (March/April 1994): 45–55. (first official use of the term rogue states) Lavoy, Peter, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds. Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000. Litwak, Robert S. Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Containment after the Cold War. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 2000. McMahon, K. Scott. “Unconventional Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons Delivery Methods: Whither the ‘Smuggled Bomb’.” Comparative Strategy 15 (Apr. 1996): 123–134. Nolan, Janne. Trappings of Power: Ballistic Missiles in the Third World. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1991. Simon, Michael W. “Rogue State Response to BMD: The Regional Context.” Defense & Security Analysis 18:3 (Sept. 2002): 271–292.

NORTH KOREA Bermudez, Joseph S. Jr. “A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK [North Korea].” Occasional Paper 2. Monterey, CA: Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Nov. 1999. Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, Executive Summary of Report to Congress. Washington, DC: GPO, July 15, 1998.

188

Selected References

Harrison, Selig S. “The Missiles of North Korea: How Real a Threat?” World Policy Journal 17 (Fall 2000): 13–24. Oh, Kongdan and Ralph C. Hassig. North Korea through the Looking Glass. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000. Sigal, Leon D. Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998. (Includes the “Agreed Framework” for persuading North Korea to halt missile development) Snyder, Scott. “Pyongyang’s Pressure.” Washington Quarterly 23 (Summer 2000): 163–170.

Index

AAD (Advanced Air Defence), 107 ABL (Airborne Laser aircraft), 75–76, 122–23, 127–29, 131, 134, 135, 138, 149 ABM. See Antiballistic missile ABM Treaty (1972): Agreed Statement D of, 27; Article II of, 27; Article VI(a) of, 62; Article V of, 27; Article XIII of, 29; Bush, G.W., and, 2, 7, 9, 23–27, 71, 157; Clinton, W.J., and, 54; compliance with, 28, 29, 52, 56–57, 62, 69; modification of, 29, 44, 62, 66, 71; NATO and, 63; 1997 protocols for, 62; Nixon and, 86; Nunn-Levin amendment and, 44; Pentagon and, 68; politics and, 43, 61, 62; as Public Law 92–448, 28; ratification of, 28, 44; Reagan and, 32, 36; research/ development under, 32–33, 36; SALT I/II under, 24–26, 28–29, 31; SCC for, 29; between Soviet Union/U.S., 2, 7, 9, 23–28, 35; Standing Consultative Commission for, 62; termination of, 72, 79, 86; testing under, 68 ABM Treaty and Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), 24 – 26, 28 – 29, 31

Abrahamson, James A., 37, 38, 42, 43, 48 – 49 ACDA (Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, U.S.), 24 – 25 Advanced Air Defence (AAD), 107 Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system, 66, 67 – 69, 91, 93, 113, 119, 121 – 25, 127, 130 – 31, 134, 140, 147, 156 Aegis Lightweight Exoatmospheric Projectile Intercept (ALI), 74 Agreed Framework (1994), 96, 97, 99. See also North Korea Airborne Laser aircraft (ABL), 75 – 76, 122 – 23, 127 – 29, 131, 134, 135, 138, 149. See also Airborne Laser Testbed Airborne Laser Testbed (ALTB), 149 Alaska/California, BMD in, 2, 63 – 64, 67, 68, 77, 79 – 82, 104, 112, 113, 116 – 24, 130, 134, 154, 155 ALI (Aegis Lightweight Exoatmospheric Projectile Intercept), 74 ALTB (Airborne Laser Testbed), 149 America at Risk (film), 58 – 60 American Council of Catholic Bishops, 33

190 American Scientists, Federation of. See Federation of American Scientists Antiballistic missile (ABM): approach to, 14, 17, 20; ban on, 26; decoys and, 15; as destabilizing, 6, 17, 25, 70, 79; as deterrent, 11; Eisenhower and, 2, 11; exotics for, 26, 27, 42, 48; funding for, 32, 34 – 36, 49 – 51, 57, 61, 81, 84 – 88, 90, 94, 132; Galosh as, 18, 20, 21, 22; interceptor for, 4 – 5, 8, 11, 69; lasers for, 27, 69; limiting of, 19; North Korean ABM as, 101, 122; partisanship for, 2 – 3, 21, 56 – 57; PATRIOT system as, 32 – 33, 49 – 51, 58, 66 – 69, 74 – 75, 77, 79, 81, 89, 93, 102 – 4, 105 – 7, 109 – 10, 113 – 14, 123, 131, 134, 140, 145 – 46, 151, 156; political pressure for, 11, 17 – 18, 20 – 21, 34, 60; radars for, 28, 30, 64, 67, 69, 82, 88, 107, 119, 123, 136; reliability of, 3, 112; restrictions on, 26; in Romania, 147; Sentinel as, 18, 20, 21, 23; Talos missile for, 13; technology for, 3 – 4, 27, 56. See also Brilliant Pebbles Antiballistic Missile treaty, 55 Antitactical ballistic missiles (ATBM), 46 – 47 Armed Forces Committee, House/ Senate, 16, 18, 34, 37, 44, 50, 53, 55, 68, 81 – 82, 87 – 90, 122, 135 Arms Control Agency, U.S., 8, 75 Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, U.S. (ACDA), 24 – 25 Arms Control and International Security Affairs Bureau, U.S. State Department, 63 Arms Control Association, 6 Arms Control Today, 102, 113 Arms race: as deterrent, 1, 5 – 7, 11, 15, 19 – 20, 36, 73, 79, 104 – 5; disarmament v., 19, 24 – 25; in space, 6 – 7, 73; between U.S./China, 104 – 5; between U.S./Soviet Union, 6 – 7, 11, 15, 19 – 20, 36, 79. See also ABM Treaty Army Magazine, 21 Army Safeguard Command, U.S., 30 Arrow, by Israel, 8, 47, 75, 109 – 11

Index Assured destruction, doctrine of, 5, 24, 33, 37, 38 ATBM (antitactical ballistic missiles), 46 – 47 Azerbaijan, 85, 87 Ballistic missile defense (BMD): in Alaska/California, 2, 63 – 64, 67, 68, 77, 79 – 82, 104, 112, 113, 116 – 24, 130, 134, 154, 155; Bush, G.W. and, 2; Clinton, W.J., and, 2, 11, 56 – 57; computers for, 34; costs of, 1, 3; Cuban missile crisis and, 17, 21, 86; in Czech Republic, 6, 79 – 80, 82 – 90, 92 – 94, 136, 137, 140 – 41, 151; debates over, 2 – 3, 30 – 31, 50, 130; decoys and, 15; as deterrent, 1; flight stages of, 9; GAO cost estimates for, 3, 51, 53, 76, 112 – 13, 115 – 17, 121, 127, 128, 132, 152 – 53; for India, 1 – 2, 107 – 8, 148; for Japan, 1 – 2, 101 – 2; by Johnson-Nixon, 2; Joint Chiefs of Staff and, 13; limitations of, 4, 9, 130; National Security Presidential Directive 23 for, 79; for North Korea, 97; Obama and, 6, 87, 90, 94, 140; Operational Test and Evaluation for, 5; for Pakistan, 107; as partisan issue, 1, 2 – 3, 21, 56 – 57; for Poland, 6, 79 – 80, 82 – 90, 92 – 94, 136, 137, 140, 145 – 47, 151; public opinion about, 2 – 3; Rumsfeld Commission Report and, 2, 60 – 61, 64, 97; for South Korea, 1 – 2, 103; technology for, 69, 94, 130, 153; as theater ballistic missiles, 9; Truman and, 10; U.S. public and, 2 – 3; U.S./Soviet Union negotiations over, 1, 6, 31, 34, 142. See Ballistic missile defense Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), 55, 69. See also Missile Defense Agency Ballistic Missile Defense Review, 133, 150 Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS), 122 Ballistic Missile Early Warning System, 80 Blair, Tony, 71, 80

Index BMD. See Ballistic missile defense BMDO (Ballistic Missile Defense Organization), 55, 69. See also Ballistic missile defense; Missile Defense Agency BMDS (Ballistic Missile Defense System), 122 Boeing corporation, 48, 73, 75, 82, 130 Boese, Wade, 75, 102, 113 – 14 BP (Brilliant Pebbles), 48 – 49, 52, 69 Brezhnev, Leonid, 28, 29, 33, 86 Brilliant Pebbles (BP), 48 – 49, 52, 69 Brown, Harold, 15, 18 – 19, 20, 27, 37 Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 61, 97 Bush, George H.W., 2, 47 – 49, 53 – 54, 56 Bush, George W.: ABM Treaty and, 2, 7, 9, 23 – 27, 71, 157; BMD and, 2; MDA under, 3, 69, 73, 74, 79, 80, 82, 86 – 89, 112 – 18, 120 – 22, 126, 128, 131, 133, 150; missile defense program under, 2, 67, 113, 155 – 56; National Missile Defense Initiative by, 76 – 78; NATO and, 83, 89 – 90, 140; 9/11 attack and, 2, 66, 71; rogue nations and, 1, 7, 49, 57, 80, 95, 99, 113, 135 – 36; Rumsfeld and, 2, 60 – 61, 64, 67, 68, 69, 77, 82, 97, 115 – 16; secrecy and, 78, 113; unilateralism of, 7, 63, 72, 80, 84, 86, 87, 95, 99 California/Alaska, BMD in, 2, 63 – 64, 67, 68, 77, 79 – 82, 104, 112, 113, 116 – 24, 130, 134, 154, 155 Carter, Jimmy, 33, 55 CBO (Congressional Budget Office), 136 Central Command, U.S., 140 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 60 CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe), 47, 145 China, 1, 6, 20, 21, 53, 61 – 62, 96, 104 – 7, 143, 148, 151 CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), 60 Clinton, Hillary R., 94, 115 Clinton, William J., “Bill”: ABM Treaty and, 54; BMD and, 2, 11, 56 – 57; NATO/Russia exercises and, 80;

191 NMD by, 55 – 56, 63 – 65, 69, 104; North Korean negotiations by, 96 – 100 Cold War, 1, 7, 11 – 12, 47 – 48, 56, 72, 90, 91, 145 Committee for a Prudent Defense Policy, 18, 23 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 137 Concerned Scientists, Union of, 69 – 70, 117 Congressional Budget Office (CBO), 136 Contractors, defense, 21, 37 – 39, 46 – 48, 58 “Contract with America” (Republican Party), 56 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), 47, 145 Cook, Douglas M., 38, 42 Corps SAM. See Medium Extended Air Defense System Coyle, Philip E., III, 4, 74, 78, 112, 124 Cuban missile crisis, 17, 21, 86 Czech Republic, BMD sites in, 6, 79 – 80, 82 – 90, 92 – 94, 136, 137, 140 – 41, 151 DAB (Defense Acquisition Board), 43 DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency), 150 – 51 The Day After (television), 39 Decoys, detection of, 7, 15, 69 Defend America Act, 56, 57 – 58 Defense, U.S. Department of, 1, 4, 14, 90 Defense Acquisition Board (DAB), 43 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), 150 – 51 Defense Authorization Bill, 140 Defense Science Board (DSB), 33, 43 Defense Support Program, 64 Delauer, Richard, 35 – 36, 38 Democratic Party, 15, 21, 23, 36, 37, 49, 56, 60, 64, 77, 78, 93, 127, 153 Deterrent: ABM as, 11; arms race as, 1, 5 – 7, 11, 15, 19 – 20, 36, 73, 79, 104 – 5; BMD as, 1; Minuteman III as, 20, 21, 22; mutual vulnerability under, 15, 37, 38; negotiation v., 23, 34; provocation v., 21

192 DEW (Distant Early Warning), 12 Distant Early Warning (DEW), 12 Dobrynin, Anatoly, 25 – 26, 36 DSB (Defense Science Board), 33, 43 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 2, 10 – 17 EKV (exoatmospheric kill vehicle), 65 – 66, 69, 81, 119, 130 Energy, as directed, 34, 36, 135, 138 ERIS (exoatmospheric reentry interceptor subsystem), 42, 43, 49, 53 Eureka, as ATBM system, 47 European Defense Initiative, 46 European Union, 63, 83, 86, 137 Exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV), 65 – 66, 69, 81, 119, 130 Exoatmospheric reentry interceptor subsystem (ERIS), 42, 43, 49, 53 Extended Air Defense System, by NATO, 47 Face the Nation (television), 116 Facing up to the Bomb (television), 39 Father of All Bombs (FOAB), 145 Federation of American Scientists, 20, 52 Fletcher panel, 36 – 38 Flory, Peter, 102, 114 FOAB (Father of All Bombs), 145 Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Senate, 62 – 63 Forward Air Defense system, 46 Francis E. Warren Air Force Base, 29 – 30 The Full Costs of Ballistic Missile Defense (Kaufman), 3, 132 Funding: for ABM, 32, 34 – 36, 49 – 51, 57, 61, 81, 84 – 88, 90, 94, 132; for North Korean reactors, 96; for Pentagon, 13, 34, 69, 133; Reagan’s request for, 34 – 35; for Safeguard system, 23 – 24, 28 – 30; for SDI, 37, 42, 43, 46 – 47, 49, 52, 69 Future Security Strategy Study team, 36 – 38 Gaither Commission Report, 13 – 15 Galosh, as Soviet ABM system, 18, 20, 21, 22

Index GAO (General Accounting Office), 3, 51, 53, 76, 112 – 13, 115 – 17, 121, 127, 128, 132, 152 – 53 Gates, Robert, 47 – 48, 60, 82, 84 – 85, 91 – 92, 107 – 8, 122, 123, 134 – 35, 140 – 42, 149 – 51, 157 GBI (ground-based interceptor), 140, 145, 152 GBM (ground-based missile system), 8, 47, 134, 140, 145 GBMD system, 130 General Accounting Office (GAO), 3, 51, 53, 76, 112 – 13, 115 – 17, 121, 127, 128, 132, 152 – 53 Global Defense System, 53 – 54 Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS), 48, 49, 52 Global Protection System (GPS), 53 – 54 GMD (Mid-course Ground-based Midcourse Defense project), 67, 69, 77, 82, 113 – 18, 121 – 22, 134, 149, 154, 155 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 32, 45, 46, 47 – 48 Gormley, Dennis M., 156 GPALS (Global Protection Against Limited Strikes), 48, 49, 52 GPS (Global Protection System), 53 – 54 Graham, Bradley, 65, 130 Graham, William, 60, 116 Ground-based interceptor (GBI), 140, 145, 152 Ground-based missile system (GBM), 8, 47, 134, 140, 145 Gulf Wars, 32 – 33, 49 – 51, 58, 110, 131 Havel, Vaclav, 137 Hit to Kill (Graham, B.), 65, 130 HOE (Homing Overlay Experiment), 41 – 42, 69 Hoffman Commission. See Future Security Strategy Study team Homing Overlay Experiment (HOE), 41 – 42, 69 IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), 96, 108, 139 ICBM. See Intercontinental ballistic missile

Index IDA (Institute for Defense Analyses), 121 – 22 India, BMD for, 1 – 2, 107 – 8, 148 INF Treaty, 46, 47 Inside the Navy, 124 Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), 121 – 22 Institute for the Study of War, 140 Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM): Atlas as, 14; from China, 1; decoys on, 7, 15, 69; defense against, 12, 123 – 24; flight stages for, 9; Jupiter as, 14; kinetic-kill vehicles for, 33; as long-range, 9; Minuteman III as, 20, 21, 22; MIRV enhancement of, 19 – 20; nuclear warhead on, 4; SALT II pact for, 26; Salt I pact for, 24 – 26, 28 – 29, 31; from Soviet Russia/Russia, 1, 37, 91, 142; START II for, 62, 72, 144; Thor as, 14; Titan as, 14 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (1987), 83, 91 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 96, 108, 139 Iran: missile program by, 6, 7, 49, 53, 57, 60 – 61, 70, 83, 84, 85 – 89, 92 – 97, 108 – 11, 118, 138 – 40, 148 – 49; nuclear enrichment facilities by, 108; as rogue state, 1, 49, 57, 80, 113, 135 – 36 Iraq, 49, 52, 57, 60 – 61, 70, 74, 110 Iron Dome, 110 Is LBJ Right? (Republican National Committee), 18 Israel, 1 – 2, 8, 47, 75, 109 – 11 Ivanov, Igor, 71, 72 Japan, BMD for, 1 – 2, 101 – 2 JCS ( Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S.), 13, 17 – 18, 23, 24, 49 JIAMDO ( Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization), 134 Jiang Zemin, 63, 70 JLENS ( Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netter Sensor), 134 Johnson, Lyndon B., 2, 17 – 18, 20, 21, 31 Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. ( JCS), 13, 17 – 18, 23, 24, 49

193 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, 96 Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization ( JIAMDO), 134 Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netter Sensor ( JLENS), 134 Kaczynski, Lech, 88, 90 Kadish, Ronald, 70, 74, 82 Kaufman, Richard F., 3, 132 KEI (Kinetic Energy Interceptor), 122, 129 – 30, 131, 134, 135 Kennedy, John F., 2, 16, 17, 21 Keyworth, George, II, 34, 37 – 38 Khrushchev, Nikita, 14, 16 Kim Jong Il, 70, 98 – 99 Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI), 122, 129 – 30, 131, 134, 135 Kissinger, Henry, 22 – 26, 28, 31 Laser, use of, 27, 69, 75 – 76, 122 – 23, 127 – 29, 131, 134, 135, 138, 149 Lavrov, Sergey, 91, 142 Lawrence Livermore Laboratories, 33 Lehner, Rick, 113, 115, 119, 122 Levin, Carl, 44, 77, 82 Levin, Robert E., 128 Lindsay, James M., 6, 61, 77 Lockheed-Martin, 48, 53, 73, 75 – 76 MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction), 15, 37, 38 Massive Ordnance Air Burst bomb (MOAB), 145 McFarlane, Robert, 34, 43, 44 McNamara, Robert S., 5, 15 – 18, 155 MDA (Missile Defense Agency), 3, 69, 73, 74, 79, 80, 82, 86 – 89, 112 – 18, 120 – 22, 126, 128, 131, 133 – 34, 136 – 37, 149, 150, 153 MDAA (Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance), 146 MEADS (Medium Extended Air Defense System), 81, 134, 151 Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), 81, 134, 151 Medvedev, Dimitri, 91, 137, 146, 157

194 Meet the Press (television), 37, 43 Merkel, Angela, 83 Mid-course Ground-based Midcourse Defense project (GMD), 67, 69, 77, 82, 113 – 18, 121 – 22, 134, 149, 154, 155 “Military Power of China” (U.S. Department of Defense), 106 Minuteman missile, 20, 21, 22, 73, 130 MIRV multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs), 19, 23 Missile Contagion: Cruise Missile Proliferation and the Threat to International Security (Gormley), 156 Missile Defense Act (1991), 51 – 52, 56 Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance (MDAA), 146 Missile Defense Agency (MDA), 3, 69, 73, 74, 79, 80, 82, 86 – 89, 112 – 18, 120 – 22, 126, 128, 131, 133 – 34, 136 – 37, 149, 150, 153 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), 8, 97 MKV (Multiple Kill Vehicle program), 134, 135 – 36 MOAB (Massive Ordnance Air Burst bomb; Mother of All Bombs), 145 Moscow Treaty. See Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime), 8, 97 Multiple Kill Vehicle program (MKV), 134, 135 – 36 Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), 15, 37, 38 Nance, Willie, 69, 116 National Aeronautics and Space Agency, 36 – 37 National Command Authorities (NCA), 25 National Defense Authorization Act (1992 – 1993), 56 National Defense Authorization Act (2009), 133 National Defense Industrial Association, 58

Index National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), 56, 60 National missile defense (NMD), 55 – 56, 63 – 65, 69, 104. See also Midcourse Ground-based Midcourse Defense project National Missile Defense Act (1999), 62, 64, 67. See also Mid-course Ground-based Midcourse Defense project National Missile Defense Initiative, 76 – 78, 113 National Security Council, U.S., 23, 34, 65 National Security Directive No. 172, 41 National Security Presidential Directive 23, 79 National Security Strategy document, 150 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), 46, 47, 63, 71, 72, 80, 83, 89 – 92, 136, 140 – 41, 147 NATO-Russia Permanent JointCouncil, 71 Navy Area Wide Missile Defense, 73 Navy Theater Wide (NTW), 66, 67 – 68, 73. See also Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system NCA (National Command Authorities), 25 Nelson, Bill, 88, 90 New SALT treaty, 145 New START treaty, 154 – 55, 156, 157 NIE (National Intelligence Estimate), 56, 60 Nike missile systems: Nike-Ajax as, 10 – 12; Nike-Hercules as, 12; Nike-X as, 16 – 18; Nike-Zeus as, 12 – 17, 20 – 21, 22, 30 9/11, attacks of. See September 11, 2001; Terrorism, war on Nitze, Paul, 23, 28, 41 Nixon, Richard M., 2, 21 – 32, 37, 78, 86, 142 NMD (national missile defense), 55 – 56, 63 – 65, 69, 104 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 96, 99 NORAD (North American Air Defense command), 72

Index North American Air Defense command (NORAD), 72 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 46, 47, 63, 71, 72, 80, 83, 89 – 92, 136, 140 – 41, 147 North Korea: Agreed Framework by, 96, 97, 99; BMD for, 97; Clinton, W.J., negotiations with, 96 – 100; Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula by, 96; missile program by, 97 – 102, 113, 118, 120, 122, 139; negotiations with, 96 – 100; NPT for, 96; Obama and, 101, 122; reactor funding for, 96; threat by, 1, 7, 49, 57, 60 – 62, 64 – 65, 70, 76, 80, 94, 95 – 96; U.S. sanctions against, 97, 98 NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty), 96, 99 NTW (Navy Theater Wide), 66, 67 – 68, 73 Nuclear freeze, movement for, 36, 38 Nuclear Posture Review, 104 Nuclear Winter (television), 39 Nunn, Sam, 37, 43, 44, 49 Obama, Barack H.: Aegis/THAAD and, 127, 134, 147, 150, 156; Ballistic Missile Defense Review by, 93; defense budget by, 133 – 34, 150 – 52; Europe BMD and, 6, 87, 90, 94, 140; MDA under, 133 – 34, 136 – 37, 149, 150, 153; Nobel Peace prize for, 137; North Korean ABM and, 101, 122; Phased-Adaptive Approach plan by, 140 – 41, 142, 145, 147, 149 – 50, 152; Russia’s relations with, 142 – 45, 151, 154 – 57 Obering, Henry, 83, 87 – 89, 113 – 17, 120, 139 O’Hanlon, Michael E., 6, 61 Operational Test and Evaluation, Pentagon Office of, 74, 114 Oplan 5077, 106 Orbital Sciences, 73 PAC-2 (Patriot Advanced Capability-2), 103, 105, 109 – 10, 131 PAC-3 (Patriot Advanced Capability-3), 66, 69, 74 – 75, 77, 79,

195 81, 89, 102, 104, 106, 107, 110, 123, 131, 151 Pacific Missile Range Facility, 74 Pakistan, BMD and, 107 PAR (Perimeter Acquisition Radar), 30 Patriot Advanced Capability-2 (PAC-2), 103, 105, 109 – 10, 131 Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3), 66, 69, 74 – 75, 77, 79, 81, 89, 102, 104, 106, 107, 110, 123, 131, 151 PATRIOT systems, 32 – 33, 49 – 51, 58, 66 – 69, 74 – 75, 77, 79, 81, 89, 93, 102 – 4, 105 – 7, 109 – 10, 113 – 14, 123, 131, 134, 140, 145 – 46, 151, 156 PAVE PAWS, 107. See also Radar Pentagon: ABM tests by, 3 – 4; ABM Treaty and, 68; defense contracts from, 48; Defense Science Board for, 33; directed-energy research by, 34, 36, 135; funding for, 13, 34, 69, 133; Future Security Strategy Study team by, 38; MDA under, 3, 69, 73, 74, 79, 80, 82, 86 – 89, 112 – 18, 120 – 22, 126, 128, 131, 133 – 34, 136 – 37, 149, 150, 153; NMD program by, 55 – 56, 63 – 65, 69, 104; Operational Test and Evaluation office under, 74, 114; Oplan 5077 by, 106; Reentry Body Identification Group report for, 14; SDI and, 37, 39, 40, 42, 43, 46 – 47, 49, 52, 69. See also Defense, U.S. Department of Perimeter Acquisition Radar (PAR), 30 Personnel, U.S. military/civilian, SOFA for, 92, 94, 145 Petraeus, David, 140 Phased-Adaptive Approach plan. See Obama, Barack H. Phased Array Tracking Intercept of Target (PATRIOT). See PATRIOT systems Ploughshare Fund, 51 Poland, BMD sites in, 6, 79 – 80, 82 – 90, 92 – 94, 136, 137, 140, 145 – 47, 151 Polaris missiles, 13 Politics, for missile defense: ABM Treaty and, 43, 61, 62; Democratic Party and, 15, 21, 23, 36, 37, 49, 56, 60, 64, 77, 78, 93, 127, 153; missile/

196 space/limited war gap and, 15, 21; Nike-Zeus system and, 20 – 21; pressure through, for ABM, 11, 17 – 18, 20 – 21, 34, 60; Republican Party and, 2, 15, 18, 21, 33, 36, 44, 49, 52, 54, 56 – 57, 60, 62 – 64, 72, 93, 96, 107, 133 – 35, 140, 154, 157; SDI and, 37, 42, 43, 46 – 47, 49, 52, 69 Polling, about BMD systems, 2 – 3 POM (Program Objective Memorandum), 135 Powell, Colin, 71, 72, 98 Prague Declaration, 90 Program Objective Memorandum (POM), 135 Project Wizard, 10 – 11, 13 Public Law 92 – 448. See ABM Treaty Putin, Vladimir, 62, 67, 70, 72, 80, 84 – 87, 89, 91, 136, 142 Quadrennial Defense Review, 105 Radar: for ABM, 28, 64, 67, 69, 82, 88, 107, 119, 123, 136; PAR as, 30; PAVE PAWS as, 107; SPY-1 as, 107, 123; X-band as, 64, 67, 69, 82, 88, 119, 136 Rand Corporation, 23 Raytheon corporation, 50 – 51, 65, 74, 107, 130 Reagan, Ronald, 2, 28, 32, 34 – 35, 45 – 48, 63, 151 Reconnaissance, satellite, 28 Reed, Jack, 77, 78 Reentry Body Identification Group, 14 “Reflections on Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom” (Sakharov), 19 Republican Party, 2, 15, 18, 21, 33, 36, 44, 49, 52, 54, 56 – 57, 60, 62 – 64, 72, 93, 96, 107, 133 – 35, 140, 154, 157 Rice, Condoleezza, 84, 91 – 92 Romania, ABM in, 147 Rumsfeld, Donald, 2, 60 – 61, 64, 67, 68, 69, 77, 82, 97, 115 – 16 Rumsfeld Commission Report, 2, 60 – 61, 64, 97 Russell, Richard B., 18, 23 Russia: BMD sites near, 6, 142; defense policies of, 7; ICBMs by, 1, 37, 91, 142; missile threat from, 61 – 62;

Index nationalism in, 145; NATO exercises with, 80; NATO-Russia Permanent Joint-Council and, 71; Obama relations with, 142 – 45, 151, 154 – 57; tension between U.S. and, 83, 86 – 87, 89 – 91, 151, 156 – 57. See also ABM Treaty Safeguard system, 21 – 30, 78, 142 Sakharov, Andrei, 19, 46 SALT I/II, 24 – 26, 28 – 29, 31. See also ABM Treaty and Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Saraswat, V.K., 107, 148 SBIRS-High (Space-Based Infrared System-High), 64, 69, 134, 151 SBIRS-Low (Space-Based Infrared System-Low), 64, 69 SBX. See X-band, as radar SCC (Standing Consultative Commission), 29 Scientific Advisory Board, 14 Scientific American ( journal), 17, 19, 20 Scowcroft, Brent, 36, 48 Scud missile, 47, 50, 53, 61, 75, 97, 109 – 11 SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative), 35 – 49, 52, 69 SDIO (Strategic Defense Initiative Organization), 37, 38, 41 – 43, 47, 48, 49, 52, 55 Semonov, Vladimir, 24 – 25, 26, 28 Sensor, infrared, 5, 64, 69 – 70 Sentinel, ABM, 18, 20, 21, 23. See also Safeguard system September 11, 2001, 2, 66, 71 Serdyukov, Anatoliy Eduardovich, 91 Shelters, civil defense, 14, 16 Shifter Commission, 16 Shultz, George, 36, 43, 44, 45 SM (Standard Missile), 8, 123, 125, 134, 140, 145 Smith, Gerard C., 24 – 26, 28 SOFA (supplementary status of forces agreements), 92, 94, 145 SORT (Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty), 72, 80, 86, 136, 143 South Korea, BMD for, 1 – 2, 103 Soviet Institute for Space Research, 46

Index Soviet Union: ABM development and, 19 – 20; ABM Treaty with, 2, 7, 9, 23 – 28, 35; arms race for, 6 – 7, 11, 15, 19 – 20, 36, 79; Cold War for, 1, 7, 11 – 12, 47 – 48, 56, 72, 90, 91, 145; defense policies of, 1, 7; demise of, 48; Galosh ABM system for, 18, 20, 21, 22; Sputnik by, 14; Tallinn ABM system by, 20, 21; technology in, 25. See also Russia Space and Missile Defense Working Group, 58 Space-Based Infrared System-High (SBIRS-High), 64, 69, 134, 151 Space-Based Infrared System-Low (SBIRS-Low), 64, 69 Spartan warhead, 17, 22, 30 Sprint missile, 17, 22, 30 Sputnik, 14 SPY-1, as radar, 107, 123. See also Radar Standard Missile (SM), 8, 123, 125, 134, 140, 145 Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), 29 START (Strategic Arms Reductions Talks), 49 START I (1st Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty), 49, 143 – 44, 146, 151, 156 START II (2nd Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty), 62, 72, 144 Star Wars. See Strategic Defense Initiative Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START), 49 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II), 62, 72, 144 Strategic Command, U.S., 6 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 35 – 49, 52, 69 Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO), 37, 38, 41 – 43, 47, 48, 49, 52, 55. See also Ballistic Missile Defense Organization Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), 72, 80, 86, 136, 143 Strike, as first/preemptive/retaliatory, 5, 7, 11, 22 Supplementary status of forces agreements (SOFA), 92, 94, 145

197 Taiwan, China v. U.S. over, 104 – 7, 148 Talbott, Strobe, 14, 23, 46, 63 Tallinn antimissile system, 20, 21 Talos missile, 13 Technology, U.S., 2 – 3, 8, 27, 35, 37, 39, 42 – 47, 56, 69, 94, 97, 113, 130, 152, 153 Teller, Edward, 18, 33 – 34, 42, 48 Terrorism, war on, 2, 66, 71, 155 Theater high-altitude area defense system (THAAD), 66, 67 – 68, 69, 89, 91, 93, 107, 113, 119, 122, 125 – 27, 129, 130 – 31, 134, 147, 150, 156 Theater missile defense (TMD), 55 – 56, 62 Thielmann, Greg, 61, 97 Third Site systems, 81 – 82, 84 – 85, 90. See also Czech Republic, BMD sites in; Poland, BMD sites in; Romania, ABM in TMD (theater missile defense), 55 – 56, 62 TRW, 48, 75 – 76 U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, 15 “Uncertainties Remain Concerning the Airborne Laser’s Cost and Military Utility” (Levin, R.E.), 128 Union of Concerned Scientists. See Concerned Scientists, Union of United Nations, Security Council of, 53 – 54, 100, 108 – 9 United States (U.S.): ABM Treaty by, 2, 7, 9, 23 – 29, 31 – 32, 35 – 36, 43 – 44, 52, 54, 56, 57, 61 – 63, 66, 68 – 69, 71 – 72, 79, 86, 157; advancement in technology by, 2 – 3, 35, 152; allies of, 6; armed services of, 1, 4, 10 – 17, 20 – 21, 30, 46, 66, 90, 92, 94, 140, 145; arms race for, 6 – 7, 11, 15, 19 – 20, 36, 79, 104 – 5; BMD and public in, 2 – 3; Cold War for, 1, 7, 11 – 12, 47 – 48, 56, 72, 90, 91, 145; Congress of, 62 – 63; defense of, 35; global influence of, 6; JCS for, 13, 17 – 18, 23, 24, 49; 9/11 attack on, 2, 66, 71; North Korean sanctions and, 97, 98; State Department of, 68; Strategic Command of, 6; Taiwan and, 104 – 7, 148; technology for, 2 – 3, 8, 27, 35,

198 37, 39, 42 – 47, 56, 69, 94, 97, 113, 130, 152, 153; tensions between Russia and, 83, 86 – 87, 89 – 91, 151, 156 – 57; terrorist threat to, 2, 5; War Department under, 11 Vienna Conference, 16 Vulnerability, as mutual. See Mutual Assured Destruction Waller, Douglas C., 38, 42 Wallop, Malcolm, 33 – 34, 42 War Department, U.S., Equipment Board under, 11 Warsaw Pact, 47 Weapons: countermeasure for, 1, 10; of mass destruction, 5, 95; as nuclear, 1, 5, 6, 13, 17, 25, 33, 70, 96; in space, 6 – 7, 73

Index Weinberger, Caspar, 33, 34, 37, 38, 41, 42 – 43, 46, 47 – 48 Weisner, Jerome, 15, 17, 18 – 19, 23 Welch, Larry, 60, 65 Wheeler, Earle G., 17 – 18 White House Council on Science, 34 Whiteman Air Force Base, 29 – 30 WMD (weapons of mass destruction), 5, 95 Wohlstetter, Albert, 18, 23 Wolfowitz, Paul, 23, 60, 68, 69, 72 World War II, V-1/V-2 missiles during, 10 X-band, as radar, 64, 67, 69, 82, 88, 119, 136. See also Radar Yeltsin, Boris, 53, 62, 70, 80 York, Herbert, 17, 18 – 19

About the Author RICHARD DEAN BURNS is professor emeritus and former chair of the Department of History at California State University, Los Angeles. He has authored and edited more than a dozen books and two dozen in-depth articles covering arms control, diplomatic history, international law, and American foreign policy. He most recently authored The Evolution of Arms Control (2009). A bibliographer, essayist, and editor, Burns has long been involved in preparing reference books such as the internationally recognized A Guide to American Foreign Relations Since 1770 (1983) and the critically acclaimed 20th century presidential bibliography series. Dr. Burns designed and edited a three-volume Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament (1993) that also received two national awards, coedited the three-volume Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy, second edition (2002), and edited a three-volume Chronological History of United States Foreign Relations (2002) and a Cold War Chronology, 1917–1992 (2005).

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