The Making of Saudi Arabia, 1916-1936: From Chieftaincy to Monarchical State (Studies in Middle Eastern History)

The Making of Saudi Arabia, 1916-1936

STUDIES IN MIDDLE EASTERN HISTORY Bernard Lewis, Itamar Rabinovich, and Roger Savory General Editors THE TURBAN FOR THE CROWN The Islamic Revolution in Iran

Said Amir Arjomand LANGUAGE AND CHANGE IN THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST The Evolution of Modern Arabic Political Discourse

Ami Ayalon IRAN'S FIRST REVOLUTION: Shi'ism and the Constitutional Revolution of /905-1909

Mangol Bayat ISLAMIC REFORM Politics and Social Change in Late Ottoman Syria David Dean Commins

KING HUSSEIN AND THE CHALLENGE OF ARAB RADICALISM Jordan, 1955-1967 Uriel Dann

EGYPT, ISLAM, AND THE ARABS The Search for Egyptian Nationhood, 1900-1930

Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski EAST ENCOUNTERS WEST

France and the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth Century

Fatma Muge Gocek NASSER'S "BLESSED MOVEMENT" Egypt's Free Officers and the July Revolution

Joel Gordon THE FERTILE CRESCENT, 1800-1914 A Documentary Economic History

Edited by Charles Issawi THE MAKING OF SAUDI ARABIA, 1916-1936 From Chieftaincy to Monarchical Stale

Joseph Kostiner

ESTRANGED BEDFELLOWS Britain and France in the Middle East during the Second World War Avici Roshwald

The Making of Saudi Arabia 1916-1936 From Chieftaincy to Monarchical State

JOSEPH K O S T I N E R In cooperation with the Moshe Dayan Center and the Shiloah Institute for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University

New York Oxford O X F O R D U N I V E R S I T Y PRESS

1993

Oxford University Press Oxford New York Toronto Delhi Bombay Calcutta Madras Karachi Kuala Lumpur Singapore Hong Kong Tokyo Nairobi Dar es Salaam Cape Town Melbourne Auckland Madrid and associated companies in Berlin Ibadan

Copyright © 1993 by Oxford University Press, Inc. Published by Oxford University Press, Inc., 200 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016 Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Kostiner, Joseph. The making of Saudi Arabia, 1916-1936 : from chieftancy to monarchical state / Joseph Kostiner. p. cm. (Studies in Middle Eastern history) "In cooperation with the Moshc Dayan Center and the Shiloah Institute for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University." Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-19-507440-8 I. Saudi Arabia—History. I. Title. II. Series: Studies in Middle Eastern history (New York, N.Y.) DS244.K68 1993 953.8—dc20 92-17948

135798642 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper

To my parents, Hilda and Itamar Kostiner

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Acknowledgments

The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel-Aviv University, my home institute, strongly supported me in writing this book. I am most grateful to the center's previous and current directors, Itamar Rabinovich and Asher Susser, respectively, for their devotion, assistance, and good advice. Their help was essential in preparing this book. My colleagues and the administrative staff of the Dayan Center and the department of Middle Eastern and African history at Tel-Aviv University, notably the last three departmental chairmen, Mordechai Tamarkim, Michael Winter, and Aryeh Schmuelevitz, have been most helpful as well. The time I spent as a graduate student at the London School of Economics and Political Science at the University of London, as a visiting scholar at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Harvard University, the College of the Holy Cross, and George Mason University was most valuable in preparing this study. Fellowships from the University of Haifa, the British Council, and the Yad Avi HaYishuv Fund, and grants from the Federal Republic of Germany's Deutsches Akademisches Austausch Dienst (DAAD) and the Littauer Foundation facilitated the necessary research. I also am grateful for the assistance of the B'nai B'rith of London, the Anglo-Jewish Association, and the Zalman Aranne School of History at Tel-Aviv University. John Esposito of the College of the Holy Cross, Roy Mottahedeh and Nadav Safran of Harvard University, Melvin Friedlander of George Mason University, Werner Ende of the Albert Ludwig University at Freiburg, and Stefan Wild and Reinhard Schulze of the Friedrich Wilhelm University at Bonn all were very helpful in advancing my research. I consulted the archives of the British Public Record Office, the India Office Library and Records, the U.S. National Archives, and the Israel State Archives. I also reviewed private collections and the libraries of the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London; the Middle East Centre, St. Antony's College, at Oxford University; the School of Oriental Studies at Durham University; the British Library; the collections at the Firestone Library, Princeton University; the Orientalisches Seminar at

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

the Albert Ludwig University at Freiburg; and the Friedrich Wilhelm University of Bonn; the Widener Library at Harvard University; and the Library of Congress in Washington, DC. I thank the staff at these institutes for their service. My colleagues Daniel Silverfarb of Madison, Wisconsin; Joseph Nevo of the University of Haifa; James Piscatori of the National University of Wales; Marc Mancall of Stanford University; Mordechai Abir of the Hebrew University; Ernest Gellner of Cambridge University; and Jacob Goldberg and Emanuel Marx of Tel-Aviv University offered valuable comments on the study, which substantially helped improve its content. The assistance in this respect given by the late Uriel Dann of the Dayan Center at Tel-Aviv University was particularly useful. I also had the benefit and pleasure of Elie Kedourie's guidance through the complexities of historical scholarship. Kedourie's critical remarks, knowledge of the archives, and demands for thorough analysis and judgment of documents have been the torchlight of my work. His intellectual height and dedication constituted a continuous leaning post and stimulant. I deeply regret that both Elie Kedourie and Uriel Dann did not live to see the publication of this book. Helen Silman, Sharon Barnett, Abbie Ziffren, Noah Feldman, and Barbara Swirski, who read different versions of this study, helped me bring the text to its present form. Lidia Gareh, Yael Horner, and Gadi Meir typed the different versions of the manuscript. I also wish to thank Stacey International, Clio Press, and the Estate of Sir John Bagot Glubb, for allowing me to use in this book maps and figures published in their books. The completion of this work often required my family's efforts. My cousins Dr. M. Waechter and T. Auber and their families; my aunt Lidia Sand; and my wife Riki and our children, Na'ama, Uriya, and Nadav all were ready to help me and to shoulder the burdens of preparing this book. I dedicate this book to my parents, in token of my gratitude for the love and help that they have always given me.

Note on the Transliteration The transliteration system in this book is that used in the Dayan Center's annual Middle East Contemporary Survey. Thus ' is used for a hamza in the middle of a word; and ' is used for an ayin. The ta marbuta is not shown except in persons' names. The shadda is indicated by doubling the consonant containing it.

Contents

ABBREVIATIONS

Introduction

xi

3

1. War and Expansion, 1916-1925: Tribes, Rulers, and the British The Two Arenas of Conflict The Significance of Ha'il

13 18

On War and Proselytism: Some Further Remarks on Khurma, Turaba, and Ibn Sa'ud's Forces 35 Musical Chairs: Ibn Sa'ud and Rival Rulers The Subvention Policy 55 The "Crawling" Into the Hijaz

42

62

2. The Struggle Over Internal Consolidation, 1917-1930 Old and New Political Forces: The 'ulama', the umara', and the Ikhwan 72 At the Northeastern Frontier, 1921-1926 Najd and the Hijaz, 1925-1927

79

100

Challenge and Collision, 1927-1930

117

3. The Saudi State and Its Neighbors, 1930-1936 In the Lions' Den

141

The Fortunes of a Conspiracy

158

The Mode of Acquiescence 173

141

71

13

CONTENTS

x

Conclusion

185

APPENDIX A

The Main Tribes and Tribal Leaders Involved in the Events Covered in This Book 193 APPENDIX B The House of Sa'ud Until Ibn Sa'ud's Rule

197

APPENDIX c Rulers in Neighboring States During the Period Covered in This Book 199 APPENDIX D

Maps: Major Settlements, Principal Tribes, and Frontier Zones 201 NOTES

207

BIBLIOGRAPHY INDEX

257

241

Abbreviations

A.B. AIR 23 Al-Rashid's Documents

ARBUR B. Ag. Ji.

Arab Bulletin Air Ministry, Intelligence Ibrahim al-Radhid, Documents on the History of Sa\idi Arabia. First 3 vols. Salisbury: Documentary Publications, 1976 Arab Bureau (mainly in Cairo) British Agent at Jidda, Acting British Agent (Ac. B. Ag. Ji.), or His Majesty's Charge d'Affairs (Ch. d'Af.)

CAB 22

British Cabinet Files

CAB 24

British Cabinet Files

CCB

Civil Commissioner, Baghdad

CO 725 CO 773 & CO 727

Colonial Office, Aden Residency

CO 730 & CO 732 CO 788

Colonial Office, Iraq

Colonial Office, London, Arabia Colonial Office, London, Middle East Department

C.P.

Clayton Papers

D.P. 890 F.

Dickson Papers

FO882 FO 141 FO 905

U.S. Department of State, Arabia, Foreign Affairs Foreign Office, Arab Bureau Foreign Office, Cairo Consulate Foreign Office, Jidda Consulate

FO37I

Foreign Office, London

ABBREVIATIONS

xii

Foreign HC

L/P&S/io & L/P&S/I2

Foreign Department, the Government of India High Commissioner, for Iraq (HCI), TransJordan (HCIJ), or Egypt (HCE) Political and Secret Department, India Office

Pol.

Political Agent at Kuwayt (Pol. Ku.), Bahrayn (Pol. Bah.), Basra (Pol. Bas.). The high commissioner for Iraq or his deputy appeared often as Political Baghdad (Pol. Bag.)

P.P.

Philby Papers

R/15/1 . . . R/I5/2 . . .

India Office, Bushire Residency

R/I5/5 • • • Res. Bush.

India Office, Kuwayt Agency

R.P. 790 F. SOS

India Office, Bahrayn Agency British Resident at Bushire Ryan Papers U.S. Department of State, Arabia, Internal Affairs Secretary of State, for Foreign Affairs (SOSFO), India (SOSIO), or Colonies (SOSCO), and Under Secretary (USOS . . .) of these offices Umm al-Qura

U.Q. W.P.

Wilson Papers

Y.P.

Young Papers

The Making of Saudi Arabia, 1916-1936

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Introduction

The focus of this work is the transformation of Saudi Arabia from a tribal polity to an established monarchical state. This transition was prompted primarily by political and economic conditions that began to develop in the region during World War I and that were fully manifested after 1916. The social order that had prevailed in the Arabian Peninsula for centuries was based on the centrality of tribes in local life. In this book a tribe is taken to mean a political unit that was identified or appeared in historiographical accounts as such. It consisted of a group of people who shared a common territorial base, true or mythological kinship ties, and a corporate existence. The members' political allegiance was to the tribe, and in return they received physical and economic protection and social status. A tribe, however, was not a monolithic structure but was divided into subunits (families, clans, and larger factions). These were often bound together in one large political unit, dwelling in one grazing zone (dim) and appearing as a major "tribe" but sometimes segmented by kinship, geographical location, or interests.1 Group solidarity ('asabiyya) was revealed through military and economic cohesion and was most evident among nomadic tribal groups depending on pastoral economy and camel or horse breeding. Tribal identities were also evident in oasis and coastal-town ports, where the population maintained divisions corresponding to those prevailing among major nomadic tribes.2 Tribes, however, were not isolated political units but, rather, parts of chieftaincies, larger and stronger frameworks that provided their populations with security and political and economic needs. The chieftaincies consisted of loose tribal alliances based on power sharing, mutual responsibilities and duty-sharing relationships among nomadic tribal groups, sedentarized inhabitants centered in villages and towns, and a ruler who governed these alliances. The ruler was a member of a leading family of a major tribe who had both the authority and the obligation to maintain internal order in the chieftaincy, to protect his people (himaya), and to wage war against enemies. Sometimes he had religious authority as well. The nomads received the benefit of urban 3

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THE MAKING OF SAUDI ARABIA

facilities such as markets (musabala) and institutionalized religious rites. In return, they acknowledged the leader's authority, pledged their allegiance to him, defended the trade routes, and sometimes even paid tribute (or protection money, huwwa) to the ruler. The sedentarized population had to fight for the state, pay tribute to the ruler and sometimes to the regional nomadic tribe, and provide facilities for the nomads, in return for trade benefits and protection. The authority structures of a chieftaincy's various sectors were not controlled by the ruler but retained autonomy in the conduct of their internal affairs. 3 The chieftaincy differed from an organized state in several respects. It had no clear territorial definition and no clearly demarcated frontiers; its domains corresponded to the grazing zones of its member tribes at a given period. The chieftaincy had no elaborate administrative institutions; its political structure was loose and lacking in complexity. The integration of the different segments of the chieftaincy was based on a cooperative partnership among the existing tribal groups, rather than on either a nationalist or a broad, civic solidarity. The rules governing the chieftaincies, including the code of basic loyalty between a ruler and his tribes, depended on unstable personal and provisional commitments. Tribal groups habitually joined and left tribal chieftaincies according to their changing needs and interests. The durability of chieftaincies thus depended on the successful promotion of the interests of the various sectors and also on the rulers' ability to elicit tribal loyalty and to cement the chieftaincy with an ideological raison d'etre. The exercise and spread of Islam often provided this element, but they were no substitute for the social, economic, and political exigencies that motivated tribes to cooperate or go their separate ways. 4 With the exception of short periods when more organized states emerged in the region, the tribal chieftaincy, in its various forms, was the most common political organization in the Arabian Peninsula, from pre-Islamic times to the twentieth century. Kister's studies of Mecca and its surrounding tribes before Islam; Eickelman's study of Musaylima, "the false" prophet; and Donner's study of the early conquests of Islam all show that chieftaincies consisting of tribal groups aligned with a major town—often geared to trade—was the type of polity that preceded the emergence of the Islamic state. Serjeant shows that al-Madina, the hub of the early Islamic state, was a town-based tribal chieftaincy. Serjeant also traced the continuity of this type of polity by analyzing the nature of the tribal confederacies, which were centered in a sacred religious enclave (hawta) in Hadramawt, where bloodshed was forbidden and where religious, marketing, and other public activities were carried out, as in the early Islamic state. The Rashidi tribal state in the northern province of Jabal Shammar, which coalesced around commercial activities and military exploits, is another variation of the tribal chieftaincy extant in the Arabian Peninsula during the late nineteenth century.5 The first two Saudi states (1744-:818 and 1821-91), which coalesced around the doctrine of Wahhabism, did not deviate from the chieftaincy structure typical to the area. Ahmad Ibn Taymiyya (1268-1328), the scholar whose

INTRODUCTION

5

ideas formed the basis of Wahhabi doctrine, was concerned primarily with establishing a divine community (umma wasatan) and fulfilling the ideal of Islamic justice. He emphasized that the ruler (imam) should be obedient to the divine law (shari'a) and execute it justly. Ibn Taymiyya saw the 'ulama', the religious sages, as guardians and interpreters of the shari'a and, as such, as having autonomous authority. Although a network of lay rulers (umara'), led by a supreme ruler, were assigned responsibility for administering state affairs and foreign relations, whenever there was doubt or debate about "the will of God," the ruler was required to consult the 'ulama' and follow their ruling. The overriding interest of Wahhabism was in establishing an ideal society rather than in developing theories regarding the division of power. Thus the doctrine did not elaborate on the proper execution of political affairs. 6 Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab (1703-92), the founder of Wahhabism, did not consider the matter of the authority and power of the various tribal leaders in the Wahhabi state to be crucial. Indeed, A. S. 'Uthaymin, who wrote about Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's life and doctrines, noted that most of the references that al-Wahhab and his disciples made to this issue pertained to the appropriate qualities of an imam, the leader of the community, and that these generally emphasized that he was entitled to obedience.7 The concept of the state regime was thus determined by the common practices of the tribal chieftaincy. Under the banner of Wahhabi Islam, both the Saudi rulers of the first Saudi state and Faysal bin Turki of the second subordinated the tribes to their rule and secured their allegiance to an unprecedented degree. But even in the heyday of these states, no doctrine or practical initiative developed that was designed to alter the traditional role of tribal loyalties and structures and the position of tribes vis-a-vis the government. Hence, when the central authority in the Saudi state broke down during internal wars in the 1860s and 1870s, the contending factions quickly formed separate tribal confederacies. As Crawford showed in his study of the period, even the leading 'ulama'were unable to impose peace and reintroduce unity, a fact that revealed that the authority of religion was limited.8 In 1891 the Rashidi state conquered the Saudi realm. In my opinion, the early years of the third Saudi state, that is, the state that came into being following the occupation of Riyad by 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Saud (Ibn Sa'ud) in 1902, saw the reinstatement of what was also, essentially, a tribal chieftaincy. Although as Goldberg contends, Ibn Sa'ud arrived at a new understanding and conduct of foreign policy,9 no significant change occurred in the nature of the chieftaincy, and tribal allegiances remained unstable. The Mutayr tribe (whose grazing areas lay in the northeastern parts of Najd and in al-Ahsa') and the main towns of the al-Qasim area, Burayda and 'Unayza, often shifted their allegiances between the Saudi and Rashidi states. Schisms extended even into the royal family itself, for at one point the brothers of Ibn Sa'ud led a faction (the Ara'if) that set out to depose him. Ibn Sa'ud's conduct in these affairs was itself predicated on the traditional ideas of tribal allegiances and on the manipulation of tribal disputes.10

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THE MAKING OF SAUDI ARABIA

In contrast with some scholarly opinions, my contention is that the change that occurred during the period of Ibn Sa'ud cannot be attributed to the revival of Wahhabi Islam. Even at the peak of Wahhabi rule in the eighteenth century, religious feeling had not brought about a transformation of the political habits of the region. It would be incorrect, therefore, to ascribe the growth of the Saudi state solely to Ibn Sa'ud's commitment to Wahhabi tenets. Such an assumption does not account for the uneven development of the Saudi state and for Ibn Sa'ud's conduct of foreign affairs, notably his alliance with Great Britain, which ran counter to his ancestral legacy. Nor did the change stem merely from the influence of foreign—in particular British—ideas of a nation-state that infiltrated the region after World War I, for these influences began later and focused on the Gulf principalities rather than on the Saudi chieftaincy. Moreover, in 1917 the Peninsula's population was still primarily tribal, and it had no broad contacts with Western ideas. Another explanation, which attributes the change mostly to Ibn Sa'ud's genius and personal initiatives, also seems inadequate because it minimizes the role of important societal factors and exaggerates the importance of one individual, Ibn Sa'ud, in the historical process.11 A more cogent explanation of the transformation of the region would focus on the evolution of various components of the Saudi chieftaincy. The process began with changes in the strategic and economic conditions of the Arabian Peninsula, which shattered the rudiments of the Saudi chieftaincy, making way for the erection of a more statelike entity. Underlying this contention is the assumption that a state is a flexible organization capable of change; to use Ben-Dor's concept (drawing on J. P. Nettl), it may have varying degrees of "stateness."12 Although a chieftaincy has a low degree of stateness, it can develop attributes that exhibit a higher degree of stateness. Three such attributes are of particular significance here: a strong central government, stronger than any other party in the state; a basic social cohesion, marking the acceptance of all segments of the state to coexist and obey the incumbent government; and an acknowledged territoriality. The evolution of the Saudi chieftaincy into a more statelike entity was facilitated by major changes in its environment. These included the mobilization of local chieftaincies in response to diverse war efforts and economic developments in the region. The unprecedented involvement of the Great Powers, particularly Britain, in the area during World War I provided the background.13 The Great Powers introduced new strategic and economic realities into the Arabian Peninsula and encouraged rivalry among local rulers. These, in turn, led to changes in the structure and activities of local chieftaincies. By the late nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire's hold on the Peninsula had begun to weaken. Britain concentrated on reinforcing its strongholds by providing access to the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean, all vital links to India. To sustain this access, Britain constructed a network of relations with local rulers while at the same time carefully maintaining good relations with Istanbul. The indirect hegemony maintained by Britain in the

INTRODUCTION

7

area is evident in treaties such as that signed between Britain and the shaykh of Kuwayt in 1899, which gave Kuwayt protection in return for subordination.14 By 1913, Britain had considerably increased its influence in the Gulf area; in that same year, it concluded an agreement with the Ottoman Empire that confirmed its dominance.15 When it became clear that war with the Ottomans was imminent, Britain's involvement in the Peninsula became even more energetic. Two interrelated aspects of British policy were particularly important to generating change in the region. The first was the lack of coordination of British policymaking efforts; that is, policies were often formulated and executed by different authorities and so were often at odds. The second was the tactic of encouraging local rulers to fight the Ottomans and their allies, promising them independence to draw them to the British side. British policies were the result of practical necessities. Short-term solutions were needed to cope with the vicissitudes of war. Consequently, various departments and individuals in the British government formulated policies and implemented them in the peninsula, but little, if any, consensus was reached among British policymakers on the aims, means, and desired extent of British activity. Senior officials representing the major ministries dealing with local affairs, as well as lower-ranking officials who made contacts with local rulers, were involved in British policymaking. Coordination of the major regional offices was discussed in interdepartmental correspondence in November 1916, but no action was taken.16 Britain's major political undertaking, initiated by its intelligence officers in Cairo (the Arab Bureau) and supported by the Foreign and War offices in London, was the Arab Revolt, led by the Hashimite family of Mecca. Accordingly, the Sharif (i.e., the descendant of the Prophet Muhammad) Husayn, custodian of the holy places and the leader of the Hashimites, was installed as the head of the Revolt, which was intended not only to oppose the Ottomans militarily but also to culminate in the establishment of a British-protected Arab state, goals that received the blessings of Arab nationalists in Syria.17 British officials stationed along the eastern Arabian coast, from Mesopotamia through the Gulf states, served within the political jurisdiction of the British India Office in London and the government of India. Like the Arab Bureau, the India Office's interests were in the welfare of its own districts. H. St. John B. Philby, a British official in Mesopotamia, observed that Sir Percy Cox—the British resident in the Gulf region and later the civil commissioner in Mesopotamia, a major architect of British policy in eastern Arabia during the war—was anxious about the safety of Britain's proteges in the Gulf and was not interested in altering the territorial situation there. Cox, Philby noted, said "not a word . . . regarding obligations ... to the eastern frontiers of the Wahhabi domain."18 Moreover, although the Arab Bureau had the task of instigating a war and, thus, of radically changing the situation in the Arabian Peninsula, this was in opposition to both the India Office and the officials concerned with eastern Arabia. The latter were interested in maintaining the old order and suppressing any revolutionary ideas that might affect the stability of their

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THE MAKING OF SAUDI ARABIA

domains and of India itself. Hence, though Arab nationalism was championed by the Arab Bureau, it was not well regarded by the India Office staff, who feared that an Arab nationalist movement might infect India. Thus, they endorsed neither Husayn's promotion to leadership nor the logic of the Arab Revolt.19 Indeed, Sir Arthur Hirtzel of the India Office described the instigation of the revolt as "a piece of disingenuousness."20 Officials concerned with eastern Arabia also supported different local rulers. Thus, Captain William Shakespear, who established the first significant liaison with Ibn Sa'ud, recommended that Ibn Sa'ud "assist His Majesty's government and improve his own chances" while Husayn was to be left to "temporize with the Turks."21 Shakespear's death in early 1915 ended the attempt to promote Ibn Sa'ud's standing in the area. In 1916 and 1917, Cox planned to exploit the rifts within the Rashidi family, leaders of the proOttoman state of Jabal Shammar, by making contact with two contenders for power, Dari Ibn Tawwala and Faysal Ibn Fahd. Cox intended to create a coalition that included not only these figures but also Sa'ud Ibn Salih AlSubhan, a prominent Rashidi leader assigned to the court in Ha'il who had ties with several Shammar groups, and Nuri Shalan of the Ruwalla tribe, active in the Syrian desert. The contact with Sha'lan meant cutting through Ottoman lines and was to be followed by further "cuttings of communication between Iraq and Ha'il or Medina (dominated by the Ottomans)." Cox emphasized that the shaykh of Muhammara, as well as Ibn Sa'ud, basically sympathized with the plan.22 It should be stressed that although Cox did not single out Ibn Sa'ud as the main figure of his scheme, he certainly viewed him as a powerful element in it. Apparently Cox's concept of the tribal confederacy was totally different from the plans for an Arab-nationalist federation conceived by the Arab Bureau officials. Though not explicitly objecting to Husayn's leadership, Cox certainly did not accept it as extending over the whole of Arabia, nor did he regard Husayn as an important factor in an anti-Ottoman Arab movement. British officials in eastern Arabia thus acted as a counterweight to the Arab Bureau and the Foreign Office, often opposing their policies. The British officials in Aden, a British colony subordinated to the British government in India, were interested mainly in North Yemen and the principalities of South Yemen. They encouraged the ruler of 'Asir, Muhammad alIdrisi, to rebel against the pro-Ottoman leader of North Yemen, Imam Yahya.23 The Ottomans' allies included the Rashidi state of Jabal Shammar, a vital link to the Ottoman stronghold in al-Madina, which had not been captured by Husayn's forces. In 1915, Imam Yahya of North Yemen even assisted the Ottomans in attacking Aden.24 Just as the varying interests of British bureau staffs stimulated rivalry among Arab rulers, so too did the different tactics of the two major powers in the area: the Ottoman Empire and Britain. Each ruler was subject to the influence, encouragement, and economic subventions of these powers and had a role to play in their strategic designs. The treaty of April 30, 1915, between the ruler of 'Asir, Muhammad al-Idrisi, and the British authorities of

INTRODUCTION

9

Aden, promised al-Idrisi £2,000 per month and future independence in return for initiating a revolt against Imam Yahya.25 And on December 26, 1915, Ibn Sa'ud signed a treaty with Cox that promised him practical independence in return for a nonactive, pro-British attitude. However, the British compromised Saudi regional maneuverability by making Ibn Sa'ud guarantee that he would not encroach on the British-protected Gulf principalities.26 The British began providing financial aid to Ibn Sa'ud in late 1917. According to Ibn Rashid's account to the British in 1919, he himself also received the equivalent of £10,000 per annum from the Ottomans. The British gave farreaching but vague commitments to Sharif Husayn as well. Their promises to establish Arab independence over much of the Middle East, with Husayn as leader, as expressed in the second letter of the "Husayn-McMahon correspondence," were encouraging but ambiguous; they were not affirmed by treaty.27 In addition, such promises were practically contradicted by a reinterpretation by other British officials, which limited their scope, and by Britain's pledges to France and the Zionist movement, in the Sykes-Picot Agreement in 1916 and the Balfour Declaration in 1917. The British were careful not to commit themselves to Husayn's ambitions. They therefore rejected both the title he bestowed on himself in November 1916, "king of the Arab countries," (malik al-diyar al-'arabiyya), and his demand that other Arab rulers recognize him as their sovereign. Britain informed Husayn that it regarded him as king of the Hijaz only. Moreover, D. G. Hogarth, a leading official in the Arab Bureau, intimated to Husayn in December 1917 that he should not encroach on Ibn Sa'ud's territory because the latter had a treaty with Britain, which regarded him as an ally.28 Britain's most substantive encouragement to Husayn consisted of material assistance. Beginning in July 1916 and continuing for a period of nearly a year, Husayn received approximately £125,000 per month in gold to finance the Revolt, supplemented by considerable amounts at later dates. Husayn also received weapons from Britain and was assisted by military advisers dispatched from Cairo. The Revolt's success in defeating the Ottomans in most of the Hijaz, the penetration of the Hashimites into Syria after their occupation of 'Aqaba in July 1917, and the reinforcing and training of the Revolt's standing army after December 1916 all fueled Husayn's ambitions to be the "leader of the Arab cause" and to rule over the surrounding territories.29 This was the background of a series of bitter disputes that broke out in the region. The stakes were high, for rulers could win or lose the financial support of the interested powers, as well as the prospect of independence. This was an unprecedented situation, in that at one point or another most local rulers were able to advance their own interests at one another's expense. Husayn's promotion to a position of leadership was particularly alarming to his counterparts because of his ambitions. His activities and declarations shattered the balance of power among local rulers and threatened their positions, prompting Britain's high commissioner in Egypt, Sir Reginald Wingate, to comment in December 1917 that "aggrandizement of the Shereef and extension of his influ-

io

THE MAKING OF SAUDI ARABIA

ence . . . alarmed Bin Saud and other chiefs who . . . sought guarantees and material [aid] against him."30 The policies of the Great Powers during the war also led to economic developments in the region that altered tribal habits and loyalties. Traditional trade routes were either eliminated or lost importance. As the Arab Revolt spread, the British set up naval blockades in both Red Sea and Persian Gulf ports, particularly in the Hijaz and in Kuwayt, a move that affected both the nomadic and urban populations.31 Although the Red Sea blockade was eased as the Revolt progressed, the Gulf blockage, aimed mainly at damaging the supply lines of the Ottomans and the Rashidis in Mesopotamia, continued into 1918. Another change took place along the surface trade routes from Arabia to Iraq and Syria. Owing to the enmity between tribes supported by the British (i.e., those under the authority of Husayn and Ibn Sa'ud: the Mutayr, 'Utayba, Harb, and others) and the pro-Ottoman Shammar, all of them sustained heavy losses in their horse and camel trade. After the British occupied central Iraq in the spring of 1917, the Shammar were also barred from their usual marketplaces in central Iraq, and so their only remaining option was to smuggle goods to Kuwayt. 32 Alternative trade routes, markets, and financial sources therefore became increasingly important to Peninsula tribes and rulers. The use of British gold to recruit tribes increased the importance of economic incentives. Sir Mark Sykes, a supporter of the Arab Revolt, commented that "the success of [Britain's] policies in Arabia would depend rather on the expenditure of gold than on native initiative or enthusiasm."33 Tribes were also attracted by opportunities to acquire weapons or to join a series of successful raids, through which they could also acquire booty and a reputation for strength and daring. Their loyalties were therefore unreliable, as they shifted locations and political affiliation, wandering among the centers whose rulers could promise the most politically and economically attractive benefits. In addition, smuggling routes, such as the one that ran from Kuwayt to Ha'il and then to al-Madina, became a lifeline for adjacent tribes, which depended on, and fought over, the benefits provided by such routes.34 The need for a new, postwar order to decide control over these routes and centers, as well as the tribes shifting among them, further motivated rulers to strengthen their chieftaincies. Military and economic disputes became the most prevalent expression of the struggle for regional supremacy and control. Interruler rivalries and rulertribal disputes were waged over regional power and the new economic assets. To persevere under such circumstances, chieftaincies had to broaden their alliances and reach out to surrounding tribes. Thus, control of strategic locations, sources of income, and tribal groups became the focus of rivalries among chieftaincies in the peninsula. These rivalries motivated each ruler to develop the means for internal consolidation, waging war, and expansion. The pressures of war and the process of internal consolidation resulted in the strengthening of chieftaincies in the region, which, in turn, led to territorial expansion to the point that the territorial basis for a state was established.

INTRODUCTION

11

Expansion was often haphazard, depending on a successful series of raids, a compelling religious cause, the distribution of booty, and the projection of the image of a charismatic ruler. Sometimes the wars were premeditated and specifically aimed at territorial expansion. The latter were accompanied by the acquisition of populations, water and food resources, regional prestige, and the withholding of these from rivals. War and expansion and subsequent attempts to consolidate new territories, in turn, led both rulers and subjects to develop clearer notions of territorial control over a demarcated territory. They also contributed to social integration and encouraged the formation of a stronger government and institutionalized administration, the latter emerging from and replacing the provisional arrangements of the chieftaincy.35 The new circumstances created by the involvement of the Great Powers during the later stages of the war involved Ibn Sa'ud and the Saudi state in Najd in regional disputes over war and expansion. Three main factors determined the nature of these disputes. First was the rivalry with the Hashimites. Husayn's quest for power constituted a major problem for Ibn Sa'ud, because Husayn came from an old rival dynasty that vied for supremacy, territory, sources of income, and tribal allegiances. Second, whereas the 'Ujman and Shammar tribes, parts of the Harb, and the 'Utayba defied Ibn Sa'ud's authority, preferring that of the Kuwayti ruler, Ibn Rashid and Husayn; the Qahtan, Subay, and Mutayr tribes; and parts of the 'Anaza, Harb, and 'Utayba were willing to accept Saudi dominance. The third factor was the Saudi state's relations with the Great Powers. Ibn Sa'ud's cooperation with Britain had a twofold effect on the Najd state. The British were ready to grant the Saudis practical independence for no more than benevolent neutrality during the war. Ibn Sa'ud knew that the British were the strongest power in the region and that they already dominated the Persian Gulf, the most important area of influence for Najd, strategically as well as economically. As the Treaty of 1915 gave Najd valuable British protection against external aggression, Ibn Sa'ud reduced his contact with the Ottomans, with whom he had signed a treaty of cooperation in May 1914. Ibn Sa'ud may well have kept up his correspondence with the Ottomans in order to allay any suspicions they might have had about him. But his pro-British attitude became obvious in 1916-17.36. Ibn Sa'ud's friendship with Britain, which practically rendered Najd part of an anti-Ottoman framework, nonetheless contained a number of constraints. Ibn Sa'ud was not free to decide whom to fight or when and how to fight, nor was he able to oppose British policies that jeopardized the position of his Najdi state in the region. These were the conditions faced by the Saudi tribal chieftaincy when it became embroiled in conflicts in the central and northern parts of the Arabian Peninsula.

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CHAPTER 1

War and Expansion, 1916-1925: Tribes, Rulers, and the British

The Two Arenas of Conflict From 1916 to 1918, the Saudi chieftaincy of Najd was involved in conflicts in two main arenas, which consisted of tribal rivalries prompted by economic and strategic changes that took place during the Great War. The aim of this chapter is to trace the chieftaincy's involvement in these two areas from a passive strategy to an active one of war and expansion. From this process, the territorial basis of the modern Saudi state evolved. The first conflict spread along the northern and eastern areas of Najd: Its major protagonists were the Mutayr, on the one hand, and the Shammar and TJjman, on the other. The Mutayr, a bellicose tribe consisting of 1,500 tents, was under the authority of Ibn Sa'ud.1 The Shammar were known to be powerful but internally divided, and at the end of World War I they provided a maximum of 3,000 men for Sa'ud Ibn Rashid. 2 The 'Ujman claimed to have 10,000 fighters, but they were both internally divided and dispersed over a large area, extending along the Gulf to southern Iraq. 3 Ibn Sa'ud's clan had a problematic and bitter relationship with the 'Ujman, which dated as far back as the 1860s when the 'Ujman sided with an ousted Najdi ruler Sa'ud (to whom they were related on his mother's side) against the rule of Sa'ud's brother 'Abdullah, from whom Ibn Sa'ud was descended. The TJjman continued the dispute long after Sa'ud was killed while opposing his brother's right to rule. 4 In January 1915, at the battle of Jarab, the 'Ujman refused to assist Ibn Sa'ud against Ibn Rashid's forces, thereby ensuring Ibn Sa'ud's defeat. That same year, Ibn Sa'ud's brother Sa'd was killed in battle against the 'Ujman. Hostilities between the parties were further exacerbated when in 1916, as part of his campaign of consolidation, Ibn Sa'ud made re-

13

14

WAR AND EXPANSION

peated unsuccessful attempts to subjugate and tax the 'Ujman. 5 In order to defend themselves against Ibn Sa'ud, the 'Ujman formed an alliance with Ibn Rashid and sought British protection by taking refuge with the shaykh of Kuwayt. 6 In November 1916, Ibn Sa'ud visited Basra and Kuwayt, where he met the British resident in the Gulf, Sir Percy Cox, and complained about the 'Ujman's raids and Sharif Husayn's ambitions regarding Najd. Cox assured Ibn Sa'ud that Najd was safe from encroachment by Husayn's forces and facilitated an agreement among Ibn Sa'ud, the 'Ujman, and the shaykh of Kuwayt to refrain from "mutual molesting."7 Cox also initiated an agreement to involve Ibn Sa'ud in the anti-Ottoman campaign, through action against the Rashidi state: Ibn Sa'ud was to deploy 4,000 men to sever the smuggling routes between Kuwayt and Ha'il (a major source of Ibn Rashid's income), to harass Ibn Rashid's forces, and to keep them at bay. In return, Ibn Sa'ud was promised a monthly subsidy of £5,000 for 6 months beginning in January 1917, 3,000 rifles, and a bonus of £20,000.8 Thus, even though Ibn Sa'ud considered the 'Ujman treacherous and might otherwise have sought to avenge himself against them, his commitment to Cox and the benefits he stood to gain from the military role designated for him caused Ibn Sa'ud to desist from attacking the 'Ujman. The results of these meetings benefited Ibn Sa'ud not only by improving his material prospects but also by strengthening his position vis-a-vis Husayn through his membership with Cox in the pro-British camp. Ibn Sa'ud reciprocated by publicly lauding the British, the Arab Revolt, and Husayn. Other developments, however, were less felicitious for Ibn Sa'ud. Cox managed to move the 'Ujman to Zubayr in Iraq in order to separate them from Ibn Sa'ud. But the 'Ujman continued to raid Ibn Sa'ud's tribes and caravans, sometimes joining forces with Ibn Rashid and also taking an active part in smuggling operations on the routes that Ibn Sa'ud's son Turki was attempting to obstruct. Moreover, in May 1917 a new shaykh, Salim, ascended in Kuwayt and, in an attempt to limit Ibn Sa'ud's power, reactivated the smuggling route to Ha'il and, in October 1917, renewed the granting of asylum to the 'Ujman. 9 Bound by the agreement, Ibn Sa'ud was thereby forced to disregard the 'Ujman's provocations and concentrate instead on interrupting smuggling activities and raiding Ibn Rashid's chieftaincy. But these constraints prevented Ibn Sa'ud from halting the flow of goods from the Kuwayti harbor, and in September 1917, a report from Cairo noted that "he [Ibn Sa'ud] seems to have lost influence last year and to be almost powerless against the combined trading community of Kuwayt and Qasim and their smuggling activities.10 Ibn Sa'ud remained cautious and exercised restraint: He exerted pressure on Salim to surrender to him the leaders of the 'Ujman and also imposed a tax on one of Kuwayt's more vulnerable tribal groups, the 'Awazim.11 In November 1917, Ibn Sa'ud conveyed to R. Hamilton, the British political agent in Kuwayt, the following demands: to surrender the 'Ujman's leaders to him "and leave hostages for their future good behaviour" (a common practice in local tribal politics), and to evacuate them en masse to the territory of the northern 'Anaza in Iraq. 12 Ibn Sa'ud also conformed to the agreement signed on March 6, 1918,

THE TWO ARENAS OF CONFLICT

15

by Hamilton, Shaykh Salim, and Didan Ibn Hithlayn, the leader of the 'Uj man, which stated that the 'Ujman would move to Zubayr, returning to Kuwayt only for purposes of trade, which Ibn Sa'ud was to permit.13 Ibn Sa'ud exercised military restraint toward the Shammar as well. He explained to both Philby and Hamilton that the Shammar were still a formidable military power and that without British military aid and support and with the 'Ujman causing problems, he would not be able to launch a full attack on the Rashidis.14 Rather than initiating a military campaign, Ibn Sa'ud applied economic pressure on the Shammar. He deployed his son Turki with 4,000 men to obstruct the smugglers' route15 and made efforts to win over Shammar factions.16 He staged a propaganda campaign among the Shammar during 1917 and tried to lure away at least one major Shammar chieftain, Dari Ibn Tawalla of the Aslam section.17 Philby initiated these contacts, and Ibn Sa'ud met Dari in March 1918. Although Ibn Sa'ud considered the possibility of a military takeover of Ha'il, he did not devise any plan for such action at this stage. Ibn Sa'ud's abstention from fighting in the Kuwayt region did not serve as an example for all the tribes in the area. The Mutayr and the 'Ujman continued to raid each other. The conflict between the two tribes was rooted in traditional rivalries, exacerbated by Ibn Sa'ud's attempt to extend his authority over tribes in central Arabia. This attempt brought the Mutayr under full Saudi authority but antagonized the 'Ujman, who opposed Ibn Sa'ud's rule and taxation.18 It appears that the practice of continuous raiding was deeply entrenched between the two tribes and that it continued unabated until 1916. Article 7 of the agreement between Ibn Sa'ud and the Kuwayti ruler, signed on November 16, 1916, states: "The tribe of Umtair [Mutayr], both those who are located at their own camping places and those who go on raids from those places are not prohibited from raiding the Ajman ['Ujman] and vice versa."19 Such a statement in an agreement designed to put a stop to the 'Ujman raiding against Ibn Sa'ud's tribes could only mean that that the 'Ujman-Mutayr feud was independent of Ibn Sa'ud-'Ujman relations and that it was useless to attempt to curb it. The grazing area of the Mutayr constituted an important geopolitical terrain, extending as it did from Kuwayt to Hafar in Najd. The tribe itself was dispersed: One group lived on the Kuwayti border and was embroiled in local politics; the other resided in an area adjoining Jabal Shammar.20 The Mutayr were, therefore, able to intervene in the political affairs of Kuwayt and the 'Ujman, as well as in those of the Shammar and Ibn Rashid. Moreover, the Mutayr engaged in extensive looting along the smugglers' caravan route from Kuwayt to Ha'il, as during the war Ibn Rashid closed the routes to Syria to the Mutayr. This effectively cut off their horse trade with Syria, and the British blockade impeded their access to the markets of Kuwayt. For both the Shammar and the 'Ujman, however, the smugglers' caravan route was essential. As Ottoman allies, the Shammar were cut off from all British-dominated trade centers, and the 'Ujman had difficulty trading freely in Kuwayt and alQasim because of the British blockade and Saudi pressures.21 The two tribes

16

WAR AND EXPANSION

therefore collaborated in running the caravan route and in fighting off the Mutayr's sorties.22 Ibn Sa'ud's military restraint and political calculation were probably not imitated by the Mutayr, who were loyal to Ibn Sa'ud but had their own feud with the Shammar, aggravated by the killing by a Mutayri, in 1908, of the amir 'Abd al-'Aziz Ibn Rashid of Ha'il.23 In the summer of 1918, raiding between the two tribes reached a new peak. 24 The 1916-18 conflicts in the northeastern arena of Arabia enabled Ibn Sa'ud to achieve an important position in the pro-British camp in Arabia and thus to regain some of the prestige he had lost to Husayn, owing to the latter's leadership in the Arab Revolt. These conflicts, however, also entangled the Saudi leader in disputes that he could not control. Ibn Sa'ud did not always dominate the scene, nor did he display expansionist intentions in this arena. The second major conflict in Arabia in which the Najdi state was involved emanated from the protracted rivalry between the house of Sa'ud and the Hashimites. The dispute dated back to 1806, when the Wahhabis had invaded the Hijaz and captured Mecca for the first time. Numerous Hijazi attempts to seize control over Najdi (or partly Najdi) tribes and tribal raids by both parties intensified this conflict.25 It was further exacerbated by religious differences: The Hijaz constituted a center of traditional orthodox Islam, opposed to the revivalist Wahhabiyya of Najd. The Wahhabi creed, which stressed God's oneness (tawhid), forbade many of the religious practices in which the Hashimites engaged as custodians of the holy places but which Saudis regarded as the major sin of combining godly and human traits (shirk). This sin was manifested in prayer on saints' graves and in immoral behavior. Ibn Sa'ud viewed the Hijazi ashraf as infidels, and according to Egypt's high commissioner, Sir Reginald Wingate, Husayn was "genuinely anxious" about the violence and the expansionist tendencies of the Wahhabiyya. The emergence of Wahhabi revivalism, manifested by the Ikhwan of Najd, was a particular worry for him.26 The Ikhwan were Wahhabi zealots, fierce fighters who have generally been regarded as playing a major role in the later fighting in the Hijaz, a view that we shall examine later. An additional source of tension between the two rulers was their differing political stances. Wartime strategic and economic conditions forced Ibn Sa'ud to seek a limited objective: securing the position of his chieftaincy in central Arabia. On the other hand, as leader of the Arab Revolt, Husayn harbored ambitions that were much wider in scope: He aspired to become the preeminent figure in the Arab world. When, in the summer of 1916, Husayn demanded "assistance or alliance" from Ibn Sa'ud in the Arab Revolt, the latter replied that he would assist "to the best of his power" but demanded a solemn promise from Husayn to desist from interfering in Najdi affairs. Husayn replied that in making such a demand Ibn Sa'ud was probably "bereft of his mind—or intoxicated." Ibn Sa'ud forwarded Husayn's reply with a complaint to Cox, expressing his "fear ... of [Husayn's ambition to obtain] independent control over the Hijaz and the Arabs." Ibn Sa'ud pointed out the differences in the views of the various British authorities in the area, adding that

THE TWO ARENAS OF CONFLICT

17

though Cox appreciated his fears, "the representative of the British Government who is actually conducting negotiations with the Sharif" was not acquainted with the problem and should be informed.27 At their November 1916 meeting, Cox showed how unimpressed he was by Husayn's ambitions. He tried to allay Ibn Sa'ud's concerns about his domains and reiterated that Ibn Sa'ud position, as set by the 1915 agreement, would not be undermined. But Cox could not control the pro-Husayn tribal tide that Ibn Sa'ud feared. In the following months, reports indicated that Husayn was making payments in gold and imposing taxes on tribes under Ibn Sa'ud's rule in an attempt to bring them under his own domination. 'Abdullah (Husayn's son), who since 1915 had attempted to tax the 'Utayba and the Harb tribes as far as the south of al-Qasim, increased his efforts in 1916 and 19l7.28 In May 1917, delegates of the 'Anaza and parts of the Shammar proclaimed allegiance to Husayn.29 Hamilton noted that townsmen from Burayda, 'Unayza, Sharah, and Midhnib were bought over by the sharif, who paid a high price, and that 4,000 of "the best fighting stock" came from al-Qasim.30 In 1916 and until the summer of 1917, the tide of tribal affiliations turned against Ibn Sa'ud, who could not compete with Husayn's financial resources in the western arena. Ibn Sa'ud therefore had to resort to a policy of rapprochement with Husayn, the British-supported leader of the Arab Revolt, so as to improve his own position with the British. Several incidents manifest this attitude. During the summer of 1916, as part of his initial overtures to Husayn, Ibn Sa'ud asked Husayn for a loan of £6,000 "until we get rid of the prevailing crisis." Husayn responded, sending £2,000.31 Ibn Sa'ud further assured Husayn that he, Ibn Sa'ud, was "loyal and obedient"32 and expressed a similar view at a meeting in Kuwayt (which took place after Husayn's offensive letter reached al-Riyad) while simultaneously divulging his concern to Cox. The tide of tribal allegiances turned once again, however, this time against Husayn, who failed to establish lasting bonds among the tribes that had participated in the Arab Revolt. Husayn's main tool for gaining tribal support had been the distribution of gold and arms, which made his chieftaincy comparatively more attractive than others.33 But once the thrust of the Revolt moved to Trans-Jordan and the services of the Hijazi tribes were no longer needed, Husayn stopped subsidizing them and reimposed taxation.34 Consequently, dissent again became rife in the region, and in early 1918 various reports were received of desertions by Hijazi tribesmen from Husayn's army.35 Events in the town of Khurma, an important trade center on the routes from the Hijaz to Syria and Najd, further demonstrated Husayn's complex relations with the regional tribes. The local ruler of Khurma, Khalid Ibn Mansur Ibn Luway (himself a sharif), belonged to the Ruqa contingent (2,500 tents in 1920) of the 'Utayba tribe. This contingent dwelt mainly in the Hijaz, while another contingent, the Barqa (3,000 tents) lived mainly in Najd. The grazing lands of the 'Utayba thus spread from east of al-Qasim in Najd to central Hijaz. Husayn had made considerable efforts to involve the 'Utayba in his Arab Revolt, as well as to enlist the support of the Harb (5,000 tents, including all subtribes grazing throughout the Hijazi coastal areas and on the

18

WAR AND EXPANSION

Mecca-Burayda route) and other Hijazi tribes, like the Billi and the Juhayna. These tribes habitually dwelt in the Hijaz and Najd, and their allegiance had been the subject of persistent strife between these chieftaincies.36 Khurma was an area much coveted by both Husayn and Ibn Sa'ud. Evidence suggests that the inhabitants of Khurma had not paid taxes to any ruler for many years, nor were they under physical control. They cooperated with the Hashimites in the Arab Revolt but vehemently resisted Husayn's later attempts to subjugate them. Khalid's uprising must be seen against this background. It erupted when Khalid fell out with Husayn in the summer of 1917, following a quarrel with another shaykh during the Hashimites' siege of alMadina. Apparently, Khalid was not satisfied with the punishment that 'Abdullah, Husayn's son, had inflicted on his rival.37 The dispute escalated when Husayn appointed a religious judge, or qadi, for Khurma, a practice that had traditionally been the prerogative of the Hijazi rulers. Khalid dismissed the new qadi and refused Husayn's invitation to report to him at Mecca. In November 1917 a new amir for Khurma, appointed by Husayn, was rejected by the local population, and in the first months of 1918, Khalid refused to allow Husayn's tax collectors to operate in Khurma. 38 Consequently, in June 1918, Husayn dispatched a force under Sharif Hamud against Khalid. The people of Khurma managed to repel the attack, killing 28 fighters and capturing arms.39 Khalid, who had converted to Wahhabism in 1914, had already written to Ibn Sa'ud in November 1917, asking for assistance.40 As the town bordered on Najdi domains and many of its inhabitants had accepted Wahhabism, Ibn Sa'ud was, in effect, being approached to intervene in a major tribal dispute to which he was only indirectly a party. In May 1918, Ibn Sa'ud responded evasively to Khalid's plea for help, asking for patience and "exhorting caution." He even prevented a contingent from the Najdi town of al-Ghatghat from assisting Khalid.41 To sum up, it should be noted that tribal animosities, heightened by changing strategic and economic conditions, constituted the main factor underlying the events in each arena of conflict challenging the Saudi chieftaincy. It was these animosities that shaped the dynamics of conflict in both arenas. In each case, Ibn Sa'ud acted prudently and did not initiate any serious attempts to expand or escalate the conflict. Second, the fact that local politics were manipulated by British interests prolonged the intertribal and interruler problems and limited Ibn Sa'ud's ability to intervene and his opportunities for expansion and warfare.

The Significance of Ha'il A further analysis of the political activities in each arena will help elucidate the process by which Ibn Sa'ud embarked on more expansionist policies. The Shammar, who constituted Ibn Rashid's natural allies and operated the smugglers' caravan route, were harassed by Turki's forces, subjected to

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HA'IL

19

Mutayr raids, and found themselves on the losing side of the war. Their position was further complicated because they also were rivals of 'Ajaymi alSa'dun of the Muntafiq in southern Iraq, an ally of the Ottomans with whom Ibn Rashid, the Shammar leader, vied for favors. 'Ajaymi also befriended the Zayad tribe, traditional opponents of the Shammar. Because of these hardships, various Shammar chiefs and factions abandoned Ibn Rashid and turned to the British. During 1917, one of Ibn Rashid's chief advisers, his uncle Sa'ud Ibn Salih Al-Subhan of the important Aslam section (1,200 tents in 1920, headed by Dari Ibn Tawalla) and the Sinjara section (1,000 tents)42 reported to the British and developed contacts with Ibn Sa'ud. This fitted British plans. As previously mentioned, Cox wanted Ibn Subhan to assume leadership over a confederation of the Shammar, the Ruwalla, and the Dhafir. Shammar leader Sa'ud Ibn Rashid was also looking for opportunities to break his ties with the losing pro-Ottoman camp and to improve his relations with the British and pro-British Arab leaders in the Peninsula. Ibn Sa'ud took advantage of this situation, using diplomatic, religious, and economic means to manipulate and influence Rashidi politics. In May and November 1917, there were reports that Ibn Sa'ud was negotiating with Ibn Rashid. According to Hamilton, he might have reached "some sort of understanding" with Ibn Rashid.43 But Ibn Sa'ud was also employing different tactics. One was Turki's operations against Ibn Rashid, carried out between June and September 1917, which eventually compelled Ibn Rashid to retreat from Ha'il to a mountain fort. 44 Ibn Sa'ud also intended to interfere directly in Shammar politics by enticing tribes to join his camp and stalling for time while strengthening the Saudi military. He particularly sought to influence tribal factions, as well as chiefs and politicians in Ha'il.45 In December 1918, an emissary of Ibn Rashid, Muhammad Mughayribi al-Futayh, told C. E. Wilson, the British consul in Jidda, that Ibn Sa'ud's policy toward the Shammar was "to cultivate good relations and gradually be able to convert them to Wahhabism and thus win them over to his cause."46 This policy resulted in an increasing number of Shammar surrendering to him.47 Saudi policy gradually changed focus. Toward the end of 1917, the British sought to engage Ibn Sa'ud fully in the fighting against Ibn Rashid. As alMadina was still an Ottoman stronghold, the British deemed it urgent to prevent Ibn Rashid from assisting the Ottomans. Furthermore, the British hoped that Ibn Sa'ud's participation in the fighting would allay his suspicions about their support of Husayn, as well as confirm their trust in him. Consequently, in November 1917 Hamilton paid a visit to Ibn Sa'ud and subsequently recommended that he be supplied with artillery and authorized to occupy Ha'il.48 In the same month, a second mission, headed by Philby, who was then Cox's secretary in Baghdad, also arrived at al-Riyad.49 Two motives characterized Philby's mission throughout: the almost unanimous British decision to engage Ibn Sa'ud in fighting against Ibn Rashid, and his own personal ambitions. Philby's mission was both political and military: He was to explore the possibility of Ibn Sa'ud's active participation in the fight and to improve

20

WAR AND EXPANSION

relations among him, the British, and Husayn. 50 The plan was conceived simultaneously in Cairo and Baghdad and was in keeping with the guiding principle of each department. In Cairo, Wingate and Major Kinahan Cornwallis of the Arab Bureau stressed the military and political importance of Ibn Rashid's defeat at Ibn Sa'ud's hands. In Wingate's words, "a mission to Ibn Sa'ud should enhance the latter's prestige and reassure him of our confidence and determination to safeguard his proper interests. It should also serve as a useful object lesson to the Shereef [Husayn] in these respects."51 The Cairo officials also viewed Ibn Sa'ud's participation in the fight as the best way to bring about the cooperation and alliance they desired between Ibn Sa'ud and Husayn. In October 1917, before the mission left, Wingate wrote: "It is desirable to find a modus vivendi that will induce both Arab parties [Ibn Sa'ud and Husayn] to turn their whole energies against the Turks."52 In addition, Cox emphasized the importance of Ibn Sa'ud's campaign, referred to by Cox as a "military diversion," which was to harass the Rashidis and the main Ottoman force at al-Madina. He also favored encouraging Ibn Sa'ud and other "friendly chiefs" to act together in a local alliance.53 Philby was also pursuing his own ambitions. In a later account he explained that Cox had sent him because he (Cox) wanted "to give full reasonable protection to the interests of Ibn Sa'ud ... to whom he felt a sense of personal responsibility."54 To a large extent Philby attempted to model himself on Captain William Shakespear, whose explorations, principles, and death at the battle of Jarab at Ibn Sa'ud's side, together with the rapport he had developed with the Najdi ruler, were a source of inspiration to him.55 Philby appraised Shakespear in the following way: His name was remembered and held in high honor in Arabia by all with whom he came into contact and I have no doubt that had he lived, Ha'il would have fallen long since and Ibn Sa'ud, assisted by us on a more lavish scale than was in fashion during the early days of the war, would have taken a more prominent part in operations against the enemy.56

Philby and Lieutenant Colonel Cunliffe-Owen, who accompanied him as military expert, estimated that it would require six months to prepare Ibn Sa'ud's forces. Philby recommended that the Najdi ruler be provided with £50,000 per month for three months, a lump sum of £20,000, 10,000 new rifles, and heavy artillery. He proposed to equip an army of 10,000 men.57 In his opinion, "something big can be achieved" on the basis of the proposals made.58 Under Philby's guidance, Ibn Sa'ud abandoned his previous diplomatic, nonaggressive tactics and engaged in battle against his rivals. In December 1917, after meeting with Ibn Sa'ud and without having obtained prior permission from Cox, Philby traveled to Jidda and later to Cairo to persuade Husayn to support a Saudi onslaught on Ha'il. However, the attempt to involve both Ibn Sa'ud and Husayn militarily on similar terms aroused jealousy and bitterness in Husayn. He apparently feared two principal developments, first, that British support and arms would become available to Ibn Sa'ud, threatening both Husayn's leading position in the region and his

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HA'IL

21

preferential treatment when it came to British political support and arms; and second, that any strengthening of the Saudi forces would further augment Wahhabi encroachment into the Hijaz. The extent of the rivalry became apparent in Husayn's discussions with Philby and Hogarth (who had arrived from Cairo to join Philby in Jidda). 'Abdullah, Husayn's son, referred to Ibn Sa'ud as a "son of a dog" in letters. Husayn described the Najdi ruler as a treacherous double-dealer who was secretly cooperating with the Ottomans and as an expansionist who supported Khalid. As far as he was concerned, Ibn Sa'ud was an unwanted ally. Husayn further suggested that the only enemy Ibn Sa'ud should fight was 'Ajaymi al-Sa'dun, a pro-Ottoman tribal chief, in Iraq.59 After the meeting, Husayn forbade Philby to return to Najd through the mainland. After the Jidda meeting, Philby reported that Husayn not only opposed Ibn Sa'ud's occupation of Ha'il; he also was eager to remove the Najdi ruler from the theater altogether. Philby had come to view Husayn's personal enmity toward Ibn Sa'ud as irreconcilable. In his view, Husayn was interested in "a visible sign of Ibn Sa'ud's acceptance of his leadership or suzerainty rather than any independent action as our ally or his."60 Philby stressed that the Najdi ruler's submission to Husayn's suzerainty was out of the question. Husayn's response seemed outrageous to Philby, whose reaction can be understood only in light of his eagerness to achieve "something big," his determination to succeed, and his deep-rooted belief in Ibn Sa'ud. After the meeting in Jidda, Hogarth noted: He [Philby] is only thirty two . . . has not begun to look at things from any but an Indian and Mesopotamian standpoint. He takes a sharply personal view and thinks all men necessarily do likewise. For him Arabia is not part of larger questions and he is deeply imbued with the idea that Ibn Sa'ud as his man is to be championed against the "Cairo Champion." ... He had identified himself entirely with the first before the second became his personal enemy.61

As cooperation between the two rulers was unattainable, Philby devised another possible solution to the relations between them: License each ruler to establish his own dominance over a part of Arabia. In discussions held in Cairo after he had left Jidda, Philby stressed that Ibn Sa'ud was ready to acknowledge Husayn as king of the Hijaz and that he had no ambitions in this area. In return, Ibn Sa'ud should become king of Najd, including Ha'il.62 Philby elaborated verbally in Cairo and in letters to Cox: Not only was the occupation of Ha'il necessary for the British war effort, but it also was an essential outlet for Ibn Sa'ud's energies "after so much incitement."63 Philby stressed furthermore that only a scheme that would enable Husayn to occupy al-Madina could actually disengage the rulers and satisfy both. Philby's final argument was that his proposal was the only one that might prevent serious problems and save the British embarrassment in the future. 64 Philby's points were logical but based on speculation. Ibn Sa'ud was in fact neither eager nor ready to fight. In addition, although Philby's scheme grew out of what he had witnessed in Arabia, it is difficult to understand why he

22

WAR AND EXPANSION

believed that Husayn or even Arab Bureau officials would accept an independent Najdi kingdom ruled by Ibn Sa'ud. Indeed, Hogarth rejected several of Philby's points, and the Cairo-based officials were not completely convinced. Neither could Philby obtain Cox's permission from Cairo to carry out his scheme. The decision reached in Cairo was vague and equivocal: It was agreed that if Ibn Sa'ud can take Ha'il by a coup-de-main there would be no objection to his doing so. Cairo standpoint was that the importance of the capture of Ha'il had been lessened in the past few months and that although the elimination of this Turkish center was still very desirable we should not risk upsetting the present balance of power as between the Sherif and Ibn Sa'ud by largely increasing the fighting value of the latter's forces.65

From Philby's standpoint, no decisive objection had been raised against encouraging Ibn Sa'ud to capture Ha'il. Hence, on his return to Najd, Philby exerted further pressure on him to do so. But Ibn Sa'ud came close to attacking Ha'il only after Philby's intervention in another important sphere, that of tribal affairs. In October 1917, during a visit to Basra on his way to al-Riyad, Philby met Sa'ud Ibn Subhan and other tribal chieftains whom Cox regarded as pillars of a pro-British alliance. Philby decided against choosing Ibn Subhan as the main British ally among the Shammar, because the latter was on bad terms with the Mutayr. 66 Instead, he chose Dari Ibn Tawalla, leader of the Aslam Shammar, of whom he had formed "a high opinion," and explained that another local leader, Shaykh Ibrahim of Basra, supported his choice. Philby recommended that Dari be subsidized to the extent of 3,000 Saudi riyals per month and be placed under his (Philby's) authority.67 It is quite clear that this alignment was planned without consultation with Ibn Sa'ud; the Najdi ruler found out about, it from Philby in April 1918.68 But it suited Ibn Sa'ud's tactics to win over the Shammar, and as in any case he did not stand to lose anything by the agreement, Ibn Sa'ud did not obstruct Philby's actions. Despite the role Philby contemplated for Dari, he did not divulge to the latter that the purpose of the alliance was to attack Ibn Rashid. Later on, Philby set off for al-Riyad, Jidda, and Cairo. In his absence, payment and food for the Aslam, now under Philby's authority, were not sent at the agreedupon times, nor were strategic plans communicated to Dari. In March 1918, Dari bitterly complained to Kuwayt, from where Hamilton criticized Philby's neglect of Dari.69 Dari first heard about the plan to attack Ibn Rashid during a meeting with Philby and Ibn Sa'ud, in April 1918. Dari was expected to remain at Harar and to cut off a retreat by the enemy tribe, the Abda faction of the Shammar. It is hardly surprising that Dari did not carry out the assignment. Philby wrote on April 14, 1918, that Ibn Sa'ud had foreseen this development.70 The possibility of openly clashing with the rest of the Shammar and of toppling Ibn Rashid may have intimidated Dari. He eventually retreated to Safwan, began once more to cooperate with the smugglers' caravans, and denied any further assistance to Ibn Sa'ud. Turki, who resumed his attack on the Abda Shammar

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HA'IL

23

in June 1918, was unable to pursue his aim effectively and was forced to retreat to Burayda in al-Qasim.71 Philby's failure created a more volatile situation. The Shammar reunited and began to cooperate anew with the 'Ujman,72 strengthening Ibn Rashid's position. In July and August 1918, a new conflict broke out between these tribes and the Mutayr. Tribal politics thus made confrontation a more likely contingency for Ibn Sa'ud. There were other circumstances that influenced Ibn Sa'ud's decision to attack Ha'il as well. During the period following Philby's meeting with Husayn, British officials in Cairo withdrew their support from the scheme to launch a Saudi attack against Ha'il. To some extent, this decision was strategic. The capture of Palestine in December 1917 had made it evident that the British had vanquished the Ottomans. In January 1918, Wingate stated that the plan to engage Ibn Sa'ud in an anti-Rashidi campaign seemed to have become entirely superfluous. He argued that Ibn Rashid was not important in his own right and that the British and Hijazi operations would be sufficient to take Arabia from the Ottomans. (At that time, a quick victory of the Hashimites over al-Madina was still anticipated.) An additional reason for the change in British policy was Husayn's extreme resentment of any British support for Ibn Sa'ud, a fact revealed to the British officials in Egypt. It became apparent that not only was cooperation between the local rulers inconceivable but that it also might damage the entire proBritish strategy promoted by Cairo, the cornerstone of which was Husayn. Another factor was Wingate's fear of fanatic revivalist movements. Drawing on his experiences with the Mahdiyya in the Sudan, which he had encountered earlier in his career, Wingate considered the Wahhabi creed dangerous. Wingate and Arab Bureau officials therefore argued that Ibn Sa'ud should not be armed further. 73 They contended that strengthening Ibn Sa'ud would endanger the "peace of Arabia," for if Ibn Sa'ud's followers were armed, the fanatic Ikhwan would attack Husayn himself and jeopardize British interests by both damaging an ally and launching a war "near the holy cities." Viewing the possible Saudi occupation of Ha'il as an alarming addition to Ibn Sa'ud's strength, they found it essential to maintain the Rashidi state as a check on Ibn Sa'ud, to preserve the "balance of power."74 The implications of this position are striking. First, it meant that the Cairo officials were prepared to forgo their previous plans for the capture of Ha'il, as well as the overall British strategy of defeating Ottoman forces in the region. Second, they began to demand a wider "suzerain" title for Husayn, one that would consolidate his position and energize their own Arab Revolt scheme. They were ready to make this demand even though Husayn's position was already deteriorating. The Cairo officials even managed to prevail in London. In two meetings of the Middle East Committee of the War Cabinet, held on January 12 and 26, 1918, it was decided not to arm Ibn Sa'ud and not to assist him "in undertaking military operations on a grand scale."75 This decision was probably influenced by the War Office memo of January 21, which was decisively anti-Saudi and praised Husayn's role in the war. 76 More-

24

WAR AND EXPANSION

over, Wingate wrote from Cairo of the necessity to maintain the local balance of power, describing Husayn as its main pillar, "The King, official custodian of the sacred cities, Primus inter Pares."77 Cox, originally a mild supporter of the schemes against Ha'il, was at the time the only high-ranking British official who sided with Ibn Sa'ud. The second session of the committee was held only because of Cox's opposition to the resolution adopted by the first, although to no avail. Cox was obviously influenced by Philby's reports, which he probably interpreted in his own way. The exposure of the deep rift between Ibn Sa'ud and Husayn, as revealed at Philby's meeting with Husayn, the antagonism of Husayn and the Cairo officials toward Ibn Sa'ud, and his own attempt to elevate the Hijazi ruler's position had prompted Cox to state the following in December 1917: Any permanent understanding or peace between the two is out of the question . . . [hence] it seems to me that there will be great advantage in our having a potentate in Nejd who would form an adequate counter poise to the Sherif in the Hejaz. Such an arrangement will certainly tend greatly to simplify our work in Iraq and will automatically correct any inconvenient preeminence which our war policy obliged us to accord to the Sherif.78

Cox's interests concerning the Peninsula were entirely different from those of the Cairo-based officials. His focal point was the "simplified" work in eastern Arabia, which would be hampered by Husayn's dominance there. It seems that Cox was worried about two possible consequences of the new developments. First, if Husayn's rise to preeminence persisted and led to the cessation of aid to Ibn Sa'ud and his resulting inability to fight Ibn Rashid, Ibn Sa'ud would be likely to react violently, which might disrupt British collaboration with him and endanger British interests in the Gulf. Moreover, Cox probably viewed Husayn as an external influence, whose rise to preeminence in eastern Arabia could engender violence and local disarray. Cox's success in keeping eastern Arabia peaceful and under control depended on maintaining good relations with Ibn Sa'ud. Cox failed to change the viewpoint of the War Cabinet, but he evinced his support for Ibn Sa'ud on a number of occasions. In March 1918, he visited Egypt and made it clear that Ibn Sa'ud was jealous and suspicious of Husayn and that he would never accept a position of vassalage to the Hijazi ruler and acknowledge him as his temporal overlord. Cox made clear that Husayn's wish for overall recognition as a "king was absurd and should be abandoned." Cox also emphasized that Ibn Sa'ud "had always been most frank and straightforward in his dealings with us."79 By then, Cox presumably advocated Philby's scheme. Cox had to comply with the decision of the War Cabinet, however. In March 1918, he instructed Philby to inform Ibn Sa'ud that Britain would supply him with only 1,000 rifles (promised prior to the War Cabinet decision). Yet Cox did not tell Philby to stop Ibn Sa'ud from attacking Ibn Rashid; he simply wrote to Philby that "there is no pressing necessity to press him [Ibn Sa'ud] unduly" to embark on such an attack. 80 Cox probably thought that

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HA'IL

25

without artillery and sufficient rifles, Ibn Sa'ud would not attack; in any case, if it should become a fait accompli, he would not object. Cox stated that if Ha'il were actually to be captured by Ibn Sa'ud, Britain would grant the latter a substantial lump sum or probably double his subsidy. In making such a statement, Cox was probably relying on an initial decision by the Middle East Committee. During the committee's first session, Lord Curzon, the chair, stressed that it would be impolitic to inform Ibn Sa'ud about the decision to prevent him from attacking Ha'il. Despite the committee's objection to giving him substantial assistance, it was agreed "to keep Ibn Sa'ud in play by judicious doles of assistance."81 Cox was able to interpret those two points in a way that did not outrightly forbid Ibn Sa'ud to attack, and consequently, Cox's instructions did not deter Philby but, rather, encouraged him to persuade Ibn Sa'ud to attack Ha'il. Further developments in the Hijazi arena presented an additional incentive for Ibn Sa'ud to attack. During the first half of 1918, Ibn Sa'ud had steered a prudent course over the problem of Khurma. He refrained from giving Khalid any assistance. But events eventually forced him to change this policy. By the middle of the same year, both Husayn and Ibn Sa'ud had become entangled in a web of tribal politics. Husayn wrote to Ibn Sa'ud on May 7, 1918, that "Atebah ['Utayba] and others are under the protection of God and in my charge wherever they are and whatever they may be, Ikhwan [zealous Wahhabis] or subjects."82 Ibn Sa'ud, in his turn, mediated a dispute between two 'Utayba chieftains, thereby reinforcing his leadership over a tribe that dwelt along the Hijazi frontier. Husayn also wrote stirring letters to the population of al-Qasim to incite them against Ibn Sa'ud.83 The possibility of an open confrontation between Husayn and Ibn Sa'ud soon became real. In July 1918, the conflict further escalated when Khalid routed a military expedition sent by Husayn to capture Khurma. 84 By this time, Ibn Sa'ud was facing growing pressure to assist the inhabitants of Khurma—brothers of faith of the Najdis—against Hashimite attacks.85 Members of Ibn Sa'ud's forces, notably the zealous tribesmen known as Ikhwan, threatened to intervene unilaterally if Ibn Sa'ud refused. At the same time, in August 1918, Ibn Sa'ud commenced preparing for an assault on Ha'il. As he did not have the military capability to fight simultaneously in two arenas, nor were his troops interested in such a division of forces, he had to make a choice. It was a question of channeling the will to fight into the more promising sphere. Although the urge to fight in the Hijaz stemmed from the Saudi animosity to Husayn, augmented by internal pressures, the motivation for fighting at Ha'il had its origin in Philby's initiatives, in Ibn Sa'ud's desire to quell the Shammar, and in the prospect of expanding the Najdi state in central Arabia. Most accounts relate that Ibn Sa'ud managed to convince the Ikhwan and the 'ulama'ot al-Riyad of the necessity for attacking Ibn Rashid rather than Husayn. During late August and early September 1918, a conference was held at al-Shaqra, where the leaders of the Ikhwan—most notably Faysal Al-Dawish of the Mutayr—criticized the plan to attack Ibn Rashid. Ibn Sa'ud persuaded them,

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WAR AND EXPANSION

however, that the attack on Ha'il "is what necessity dictates." He offered them the following reasons, which reflected the new strategic and economic conditions in the region. It was incumbent upon him to satisfy the British, who preferred an attack on Ibn Rashid and opposed any offensive against Husayn. Also, the money and arms he received from the British were indispensable.86 But three facts must be added to the reasons offered at the conference, for they shed further light on the "necessity" binding Ibn Sa'ud. Frustrated by Khalid's continuing dominance in Khurma, C. E. Wilson, Clayton, and Wingate reiterated to London that the British clearly preferred Husayn's intervention in the Khurma crisis and recommended that he be authorized to recapture Khurma, while Ibn Sa'ud be instructed to desist from actions in the area.87 Their intent was to install Husayn as the leader of "a union of Arab independent states" (suggested by Clayton) and to reward him for his role in the war.88 Their policy was accepted by the British foreign secretary, Arthur James Balfour, and a letter was dispatched to both of the rulers in late July, informing them that Husayn would be authorized to attempt to occupy Khurma once again. Husayn was urged to send a conciliatory letter to Ibn Sa'ud, in order to assure the Najdi ruler that Husayn had no aspirations beyond Khurma.89 The achievement of Husayn's ambitions would have given him a major advantage over Ibn Sa'ud. According to Philby, Ibn Sa'ud felt that British policy had been made under Husayn's influence. He stated that he fully justified Khalid's uprising against Husayn and was of the opinion that Khurma should remain detached from Husayn's authority. Ibn Sa'ud stressed that if it did not, "I will not be responsible for anything that may happen."90 In a subsequent book, Philby noted Ibn Sa'ud's words: If your Government declines to modify its policy, I will show them what I can do, Wallah! It is the Sharif who is responsible for this blow at me—he has utterly deceived the rulers of Egypt and I will attack him if, to humour him, your Government persists in treating me so ill.91 It is reasonable to assume that Ibn Sa'ud made this threat; however, Philby was probably conveying his own impressions and convictions as well. Influenced by his proximity to Ibn Sa'ud, his admiration for and identification with the Najdi ruler, and his penchant for drama, Philby viewed the two rulers' commitment to Khurma as leading to a catastrophe, precipitated by the official British proHusayn policy.92 He repeatedly stressed to Cox that the British had to "prevent them [Ibn Sa'ud and Husayn] from getting at each other's throats." Furthermore, he thought that a collision between two British allies over Khurma, together with Ibn Sa'ud's frustration with the new British policy that ruled out his attacking Ha'il, would render Philby's mission a total failure.93 Philby saw a Saudi attack on Ha'il as the only means to distract Ibn Sa'ud from Husayn and to avoid war. In June 1918, on his own initiative and without prior authority (but probably encouraged by Cox's earlier-mentioned vague support), Philby promised Ibn Sa'ud financing to attack Ha'il. (He had £20,000 at his disposal at Kuwayt.) 94 As Silverfarb pointed out, the British had suffi-

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HA'IL

27

cient leverage over Ibn Sa'ud to prevent him from attacking both Husayn and Ha'il. They controlled his monthly subsidy and his imports through Kuwayt and Bahrayn and could have exploited the vulnerability of his coastal province of alAhsa', which could easily have been blockaded or seized outright.95 Because of his own views, however, Philby encouraged Ibn Sa'ud to attack the Rashidis. As Philby's proposal to finance the attack had been made in June and he had not reported any Saudi opposition to it, we can conclude that Ibn Sa'ud had probably made up his mind to attack Ha'il before the al-Shaqra conference. In addition to Philby's urging and promises of finance, Ibn Sa'ud's preference for attacking Ha'il rather than the Hijaz emanated from a conviction that military action was unnecessary on the Hijazi front, as a diplomatic course would create a situation that would be to his advantage. Hence in early August 1918, Ibn Sa'ud demanded several guarantees from the British government that indicated his preference for de-escalation of the tension over Khurma and in Kuwayt. He requested "absolute immunity of his territory" from Hashimite attacks on Khurma and the 'Utayba tribe. He also asked that the Shammar and 'Ujman—elements controlled by the British—be prevented from making incursions into his territories, that the shaykh of Kuwayt be required to limit smuggling, and that if he embarked on an attack on Ha'il, the British government would support him.96 If these demands had been met, Ibn Sa'ud would have been established as overlord in central and eastern Arabia in return for directing his forces against Ha'il rather than against the Hijaz. Philby's influence in formulating these demands was apparent: Ibn Sa'ud agreed to refrain from further battles in the Hijaz if he received guarantees that this quarter would pose no threat to him. The British reply arrived the same month. In return for Ibn Sa'ud's nonaggression against the Hijaz, it promised that Britain would "use every influence in our power to prevent encroachment upon Ibn Sa'ud's territories."97 Britain further promised to strengthen the blockade on smuggled goods leaving Kuwayt and to consider the possibility of a permanent boundary between Najd and the Hijaz after the war.98 Ibn Sa'ud understood that the British would keep a close watch on the Hijaz front. He reportedly told participants at the al-Shaqra conference that "as for Husayn, the English can stop him overreaching himself."99 Ibn Sa'ud thereafter limited his role to manipulations and threats. On August 15, 1918, Ibn Sa'ud wrote to Husayn, asking him to write a conciliatory letter to Khalid stating that "everyone should look to his religion without any interference."100 Two weeks later, he threatened Cox: "If any transgression from the Sherif will take place upon the people of Khurma. . . . Then I will not be responsible for anything that may happen."101 A diplomatic course of action was no longer possible on the Ha'il front. At least two writers pointed to one decisive factor that finally enabled Ibn Sa'ud to attack Ha'il:102 the interception of information to the effect that an antiSaudi liaison had been established between 'Abdullah and Ibn Rashid. By then, the Rashidi court at Ha'il was suffering from weaknesses typical of tribal states confronted by changing circumstances. As if to validate Ibn Khaldun's

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WAR AND EXPANSION

theories, the ruling family had become corrupt after several generations of city life and was reduced to Byzantine-style court politics. It was influenced by both the Harim and members of the ruling family and plagued by a series of murders and political upheavals. Moreover, the traditional tribal bonds did not suffice to maintain the state intact under the strategic and economic conditions created during the war. Witnessing the defeat of their Ottoman allies, the Shammar factions began breaking apart.103 Sa'ud Ibn Rashid, who was still a teenager in 1918, had held the title of regent since 1908. He had managed to navigate between malevolent contenders within his chieftaincy, by relying heavily on the Subhan faction; his uncle Sa'ud was his main adviser, and his grandmother Fatima was also an important influence on him. But her advice sometimes conflicted with that of his uncle. Whereas Fatima rejected rapprochement with Ibn Sa'ud, Sa'ud supported an alliance with Britain. The family conflict had an injurious effect on policy making, and in 1916 the ruler, Sa'ud Ibn Rashid, strove to improve the situation by appointing two members of the rival clan, the 'Ubayd, as ministers. Sa'ud Ibn Subhan found no supporters among the Shammar for his proposed course of action. His main opponent was a new court adviser, Rashid Bin Layla, who allied himself with the Ottomans. Early in 1917, Sa'ud Ibn Subhan left Ha'il and surrendered to the British. As stated earlier, a large section of the Shammar tribe, whose bonds with the ruler had become attenuated, followed suit.104 Rashidi dynastic problems spread among the Shammar factions, to the detriment of cohesion and military prowess.105 The chieftaincy encompassed the outlets of the caravan routes to Syria, Kuwayt, and the Hijaz. It bordered the territory of al-Jawf (to the northeast), which led into the Syrian desert and had also been under Ha'il control. As the Rashidi state weakened in the course of the war, these fell under the Ruwalla's power and presented a temptation to every expansionist chieftain.106 Among the considerations that encouraged Ibn Sa'ud to fight for Ha'il was the possibility of obtaining control over the whole of central Arabia. However, he knew that Ha'il politics offered the same opportunities to rival rulers.107 An alliance between Ibn Rashid and Husayn would therefore not only deny him his object but also allow Husayn to extend Hashimite influence into the Saudi backyard. It is also noteworthy that although Ibn Rashid suffered internal splits and sustained various military setbacks, he still commanded a relatively large and well-equipped force. It is difficult to estimate the strength of this force, as the British officials played it up or down according to their political inclinations. Whereas the pro-Hashimite T. E. Lawrence belittled Ibn Rashid's army, which he said numbered 300 fighters, Philby, who was trying to obtain maximum British support for Ibn Sa'ud, reported that Ibn Rashid had an army of 12,000 equipped with modern Ottoman weapons. Other sources confirm that Ibn Rashid launched several attacks on Tayma' in 1918 and that he had 9,000 fighters at his disposal.108 It is reasonable to assume that the prospect of Ibn Rashid's turning against Najd with Husayn's aid further strengthened Ibn Sa'ud's determination to attack Ha'il.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HA'IL

29

In September 1918 Ibn Sa'ud attacked Ibn Rashid at Ya'thab, in an attempt to break through toward Ha'il. With the help of the Mutayr, Ibn Sa'ud succeeded in seizing hundreds of animals, while Ibn Rashid fled from Ha'il to a distant fort to which Ibn Sa'ud did not follow him.109 Hardly a decisive victory for the Najdi ruler, the foray merely focused attention on Ibn Sa'ud's problems concerning Ha'il. Ha'il was, in fact, an arena for frequent political intrigues by both Husayn and Ibn Sa'ud. As stated earlier, Ibn Sa'ud seemed to have a certain "peaceful understanding" with Ibn Rashid, at least until early 1918. He also increased contact with Dari, and according to a British report of April 1917, a third of Ha'il's population supported Ibn Sa'ud.110 On the other hand, in 1915 and 1916, when Ibn Rashid fought Ibn Sa'ud, Husayn sent gifts to Ha'il and invited Ibn Rashid to cooperate with him against Ibn Sa'ud. But such cooperation developed only after the Rashids had become aware of the Ottoman defeat. Ibn Sa'ud's September 1918 attack brought him few real advantages in the arena, but it strongly inclined Ibn Rashid toward Husayn. In fact, near the summer of 1918, Sa'ud Ibn Rashid began negotiations regarding the future of his chieftaincy.111 He first tried the Ottoman option. From November and December 1917 onward, he and Ibn Layla solicited arms in both al-Madina and Istanbul. After the British had occupied Ma'an, east of 'Aqaba, the transfer of arms from the North through the Hijaz railway became impossible. The Ottoman commander of al-Madina, Fakhri, also refused Ibn Rashid's request to occupy Tayma' and regain control of the railway, which passed through the town. Even without Ottoman support in troops or weapons, Ibn Rashid still felt strong enough to attack. However, when he did, in April 1918, he was soundly defeated by a rival force of the 'Anaza.112 Disillusioned with the Ottomans and in great need of access to markets and supplies, Ibn Rashid was more ready than ever to enter into serious negotiations with his former enemies. The events that occurred between April 1918 and April 1920 enmeshed Ibn Sa'ud even deeper in Ha'il politics. In August 1918, 'Abdullah wrote to Ibn Rashid, asking him to align himself with the Hashimites; the latter replied that he would have to consider the matter.113 The following November and December, Ibn Rashid's envoy, Muhammad Mughayribi al-Futayh, stayed in Mecca and signed an agreement with Husayn. It is interesting to note that a document has been preserved entitled "Copy of an agreement between Ibn Rashid and the Sherif" dated July (4 Dhu al-Qa'da) 1918, on which only alFutayh's signature appears. It is possible that the document114 was only a draft, probably composed unilaterally by Ibn Rashid and sent with al-Futayh for Husayn's attention. The agreement was probably drafted in July, but Ibn Rashid did not dispatch al-Futayh until November. In all likelihood he was driven decisively toward Husayn after Ibn Sa'ud's attack on Ha'il in September; 'Abdullah had approached Ibn Rashid earlier, following the July incident at Khurma. This document included a reiteration of Ibn Rashid's retreat from the vicinity of Tayma' and Khaybar, territories claimed by Husayn. It asked for

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Husayn's pledge to help Ibn Rashid obtain supplies and access to markets, so as to enable him once again to become the chief supplier of all the Shammar tribes and to reestablish his control over them. The common interest of the two parties and the purpose of the agreement were stated in its opening paragraph: "Your [Husayn's] resistance to Ibn Sa'ud should be a permanent one and steps be taken to stop every material or moral help from reaching him, because he is known to be a traitor ... we therefore should join in rise [sic] each on his own tribes . . . against him."115 No actual agreement has been found, though there are various indications supporting the contention that such an agreement was signed. For one, in November 1918, Ibn Rashid acknowledged Husayn's sovereignty, and Husayn supplied him with arms, ammunition, and 12,000 sacks of rice; gave his people access to the Hajj; and advised him to purchase supplies from Iraq. If the supplies were unobtainable there, he was to buy them from Yanbu' in the Hijaz.116 The situation became further complicated when the British learned from Ibn Sa'ud in early November 1918 that Ibn Rashid was offering him friendly relations in return for lifting the blockade of Ha'il. Major Basset of the British consulate at Jidda tried to interpret Ibn Rashid's attempt "either to deceive the Sherifians while secretly plotting with Ibn Sa'ud against them, or ... he has [successfully] bluffed Ibn Sa'ud into believing he is at one with him and [thus] drawn the Akhwan army from his territory; of the two (b.) is in my opinion the more probable."117 From later reports, particularly a complaint filed by Ibn Rashid in September 1919, it appears that "Ibn Sa'ud sheltered hostile subjects and contravened the agreement." It seems, then, that toward the end of 1918 Ibn Rashid had indeed concluded an agreement with Ibn Sa'ud. The terms of the agreement did not take effect until the following year, but they reflect the situation prevailing at the end of 1918: Whereas Ibn Rashid was to be recognized as the "amir of Jabal Shammar," Ibn Sa'ud was the acknowledged master of a long list of tribes, including important ones like the 'Ujman, the 'Utayba, and the Harb, over which his authority was, to say the least, disputed. It was further agreed that loot taken by the tribal groups from one another should be returned either in kind or in money and that raiders and hostile subjects should be turned over rather than given refuge. Finally, it was agreed that tribal members who wished to undergo conversion to the Wahhabi denomination be permitted to do so.118 Although Ibn Rashid's final object was to undermine Ibn Sa'ud, the ruler of Ha'il had gained definite short-term advantages from his agreement with him: the return of loot, namely, goods seized from the smugglers' caravan route, and the surrender of raiders. On his part, Ibn Sa'ud gained further acknowledgment of his authority over subordinate tribes and the possibility of recruiting new Wahhabi adherents through the legitimization of conversion. Ibn Rashid's acknowledgment of Ibn Sa'ud's control over disputed tribes was a major step forward in Ibn Sa'ud's expansion. Moreover, it gave him control over tribes that Husayn claimed as his. Henceforce, the struggle between Ibn Sa'ud and Husayn was increasingly

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HA'IL

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carried out in the vicinity of Ha'il, a more promising and potentially fruitful arena for both rulers. This arena could determine not only who would be the future ruler in central Arabia but also which ruler would ultimately have the upper hand in the larger struggle for preeminence in the area. Herein lay the real intention behind Ibn Sa'ud's prerogatives regarding control of the tribes set down in the agreement with Ibn Rashid. The parallel agreement between Husayn and Ibn Rashid demonstrates that Husayn also wanted acknowledgment as the supreme ruler. Husayn thus sent limited numbers of men against Khurma (he was still occupied in fighting al-Madina) but contemplated making long-range plans in cooperation with Ibn Rashid, designed to give him eventual control of the area. Thus, Ha'il became the arena for both Ibn Sa'ud and Husayn in their drive for supremacy in Arabia. The importance of Ha'il can be demonstrated through an analysis of the situation along the Hijazi front. Although additional violent confrontations took place in the vicinity of Khurma, they were limited in scope and did not recur. In September, Husayn made another futile attempt to recapture Khurma. The British criticized Ibn Sa'ud for attacking Ha'il, causing him to cry out bitterly to Philby, "Who will trust you [British] after this?"119 For the first time, in November Ibn Sa'ud sent 450 of his men to the vicinity of Khurma,120 thereby reemphasizing his support for Khalid and increasing his involvement there, though not to any meaningful extent. Politics in the arena were still governed primarily by diplomacy, and British efforts were of major importance in this respect. Policymaking discussions took place in London, in interdepartmental conferences presided over by Lord Curzon. The sessions were dominated by pro- and anti-Saudi officials. In February 1919, Curzon formulated a decision that reconciled the divergent views of these British officials, mainly Philby, who had been called back to London in late 1918, and Wingate, who also attended the sessions. Curzon did not endorse Philby's recommendation to establish a boundary commission, nor did he compel Ibn Sa'ud to abandon Khurma. The British were to intervene only if the fighting were to reach the Hijaz proper. In March, Curzon came under growing pressure from the pro-Husayn group, led by A. T. Wilson, the new civil commissioner at Baghdad and hitherto a staunch supporter of Ibn Sa'ud. Curzon decided to partly endorse their recommendation and ordered Ibn Sa'ud's subsidy to be reduced by half.121 However, as we shall see, this decision had no effect. Rather, the salient feature of these interdepartmental sessions was the internal strife among the British officials, which temporarily stalemated any attempt to introduce changes into the area. Toward the end of May 1919, the tension along the Najd-Hijazi front escalated as Husayn dispatched 'Abdullah, who had just left the siege of alMadina after the Ottoman fort finally surrendered, with a force of 5,000 men to recapture Khurma. On May 25 and 26, Khalid defeated 'Abdullah's force in Turaba on the way to Khurma, slaughtering 1,350 warriors. Aware of 'Abdullah's advance, Ibn Sa'ud also sent a force of 1,500 men, who joined Khalid's forces after the Turaba battle. Thus Turaba led to an unprecedented collision course between the Najdi and Sharifi forces.

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This development triggered further British responses. On May 28, another interdepartmental conference took place in London, but despite strong pressure from Lord Allenby, the new high commissioner for Egypt, Curzon did not resort to any action beyond urging Ibn Sa'ud to withdraw his forces. However, in another session, on June 13, the pro-Husayn officials proposed a blockade against Ibn Sa'ud and reinforcement for Husayn in the form of a company of Indian troops. Six aeroplanes were sent to the Hijaz.122 At this stage, the India Office officials and A. T. Wilson (after a long period of indecision) decisively resisted the proposals of the pro-Husayn group and threw their support behind Ibn Sa'ud.123 There were several reasons for this move: Support for Husayn would have meant overt interference in the internal affairs of Arabia, a course the Gulf-based British officials consistently rejected. In addition, India Office officials feared that the dispatch of an Indian army force to fight in the vicinity of the holy places would stir up the rather pious Muslim population in India. In addition, Ibn Sa'ud's defeat would have resulted in a radical change in the regional balance of power, one that would have shattered the British position in both Mesopotamia and the Gulf. These officials did not seek to introduce a British military presence into Arabia. To prevent Ibn Sa'ud's advance beyond Khurma was one thing, but to collude in his defeat was quite another. The India Office therefore rejected the proposal to evict Ibn Sa'ud by force from Khurma and Turaba. Edwin Montagu, secretary of state for India, John Shuckburgh of the India Office staff, and Lord Chelmsford, the viceroy of India, expressed their disagreement with the idea that Indian Muslims be sent to fight Ibn Sa'ud over the holy cities. George Kidston of the Foreign Office noted that India Office officials cultivated "a stubborn dislike and distrust of Husayn and an equally stubborn championship of Ibn Sa'ud."124 At this point, A. T. Wilson's support for Ibn Sa'ud was crucial. As Cox's deputy and, later, his acting successor in Iraq, Wilson's position had been proSaudi until 1919. In May 1919, on a visit to Cairo, he apparently changed his views, adopting the line propagated in Cairo. He then urged that Ibn Sa'ud withdraw his forces from Khurma or face the withdrawal of his subsidy and forfeiture of the 1915 agreement.125 Wilson's motives are not clear; he may have changed his mind under the influence of the Arab Bureau. It is even possible that he may have been giving vent to a feeling of having been slighted by London's failure to consult him during earlier decisions.126 He was also quite unsympathetic to Philby; as early as October 1918, he had suggested his replacement in Najd by Captain G. E. Leachman (then a British political officer in Zubayr). He may well have fought against the policy because it was advocated by Philby. Wilson himself stressed that he was concerned about the wider problem of restiveness and aggression in the region, a problem that affected both Ibn Sa'ud and Husayn and that, in Wilson's view, had not been dealt with adequately in the existing agreements.127 By the summer of 1919, Wilson had already returned to Baghdad, and it appears that Husayn's attempt to capture Khurma, which resulted in the Turaba incident and in the recommendation that Ibn Sa'ud's forces be driven

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HA'IL

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back by Indian troops and the British air force, once more impelled him to support Ibn Sa'ud. The danger to eastern Arabia's stability was, in his view, too great to allow Husayn to have his way. Wilson then advocated Husayn's abdication, describing Husayn as "a puppet devoid of real influence." He also spoke of the "Arab Movement becoming more anti-British."128 N. Garland of the Arab Bureau noted that Wilson "appears to have reverted to the original doctrine of the Indian Government which may be expressed—there is no Emir but Ibn Sa'ud and Philby is his proxy."129 Although Wilson strongly advised Ibn Sa'ud to refrain from annexing Khurma and Turaba, he also assured him, on behalf of Britain, that "these places will remain empty,"130 thus ignoring Husayn's intent to reoccupy them. In London, the interdepartmental committee decided to send Philby to Ibn Sa'ud to persuade him to withdraw his forces into Najd and to allow Britain to arbitrate his dispute with Husayn. But Husayn did not permit Philby's passage through the Hijaz, and the latter could not reach Ibn Sa'ud.131 It seems that Ibn Sa'ud had, at that stage, accepted Philby's original plan to establish a buffer between the territories under his control and those under Husayn's. In the months following the Turaba incident, Ibn Sa'ud tried to convince the British that he contemplated no further expansion in that arena. In June, Ibn Sa'ud informed the British that he had pulled his forces back to Najd and demanded that Husayn refrain from making any further claims on Wahhabi centers.132 He further asked Britain to protect him from a Hijazi attack.133 This front then became relatively quiet. The fact that Ha'il was a substitute for the Hijaz arena was evident in another respect. After the Ottoman defeat, Ibn Rashid tried to align himself with the British through his contacts with Ibn Sa'ud and Husayn. We will describe the details of this venture only briefly, as they are marginal to this book, but its consequences are important. On January 22, 1919, Ibn Rashid wrote to Baghdad, and in April and May 1919, he resumed negotiations through his envoy to Basra. The following July and September, he wrote to Baghdad once again. In his first letter, he had claimed to have maintained "long and established relations" with Sharif Husayn and promised to "hold an even balance of power among the Emirs of Arabia." He asked for "friendly relations" and "for protection and aid" from Britain.134 In May, Ibn Rashid hinted at his price by indicating that the Ottomans had subsidized him to the extent of £10,000 per month, as well as providing him with food and 7,000 rifles. He proposed that the pilgrim routes that lay across his territories be reopened and that he receive a British liaison officer.135 At this stage, the Gulf-based British officials who dealt with Ibn Rashid still regarded him as a pro-Ottoman enemy and, unlike Ibn Sa'ud or Husayn, did not perceive him as a threat. Rather, they viewed Ibn Rashid with moderate indifference, which was in line with Cox's statement made at the end of 1917: "Our object is to eliminate Rashid either by winning him over or by crushing him."136 Although the original intention to crush Ibn Rashid (through Ibn Sa'ud) was officially abandoned, the British made no attempt to befriend him. Their attitude also reflected an interest in not alienating Ibn Sa'ud. And be-

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cause Montagu stated on February 2, 1919, "It is upon him [Ibn Rashid] to prove practically his goodwill,"137 the British gave no reply to Ibn Rashid. At the time of the Turaba affair, however, pro-Husayn officials began to reevaluate Ibn Rashid. On April 26, Clayton warned against alienating him.138 And on June 8, Allenby proposed contacting him immediately, noting his major asset: He was "a traditional enemy of Ibn Sa'ud and . . . probably hostile to and afraid of the Wahabite Movement."139 Even the estimation of the Baghdad and India offices seemed, ostensibly, to have changed. In the context of the Peace Conference in Paris, it was important for the British to prove that they could maintain a liaison with all the chieftains in the area. The British also wanted to reopen the pilgrim routes from Iraq that passed through Ibn Rashid's territory.140 In June, however, Shuckburgh reiterated the wellknown opinion that Britain "should not indulge in paying blackmail to chiefs by alarmist telephones from Cairo." The final British decision stressed that any rapprochement with Ibn Rashid should be in return for his refraining from attacking pro-British chieftains, including Ibn Sa'ud.141 As it turned out, no contact was established with Ibn Rashid. Husayn's defeat at Turaba probably pushed him closer to Ibn Rashid. In July 1919, Husayn referred to him as "my little son," asking him to state his wishes.142 There is another report that Ibn Sa'ud and Ibn Rashid met in early July 1919 on friendly terms near Burayda.143 If that was so (there is no additional evidence that such a meeting took place), it was of little significance. It would be reasonable to conclude therefore that Husayn's pressure and disillusionment with the British officials in Baghdad pushed Ibn Rashid toward Husayn. On July 27, 1919, Ibn Rashid wrote to Baghdad that "Ibn Sa'ud is an Arab whose status is below ours. Our respect therefore parts us from corresponding or writing to him."144 In a letter to 'Abdullah, Ibn Rashid also complained about Wahhabi raids and propaganda, referring to them as "this dangerous matter."145 Wahhabi activity could indeed have been a reason for Ibn Rashid's exasperation with Ibn Sa'ud, for (as earlier mentioned) he complained in September 1919 of Ibn Sa'ud's not surrendering "hostile persons." In turn, Ibn Sa'ud emphasized that those persons were Wahhabis and therefore legitimate converts.146 In October 1919, Ibn Rashid successfully reoccupied al-Jawf (northwest of Ha'il), removing it from the hands of Nuri Sha'lan, the supreme Ruwalla chief friendly to Ibn Sa'ud.147 Ibn Rashid also looted Najdi settlements at al-Qasim, paying tribute to Husayn with the booty.148 Hence, near the end of 1919, Ibn Rashid, probably in cooperation with Husayn, was reasserting his chieftaincy's position in Arabia, and Ibn Sa'ud appeared to be at a disadvantage with regard to Ha'il. In conclusion, until the first half of 1918, Ibn Sa'ud exercised a rather prudent and somewhat passive policy toward the tribal conflicts on his northeastern and western flanks. Near the middle of the year, however, events in both arenas surrounding Najd compelled him to embark on a more aggressive and expansionist policy. His dispute with Husayn developed concomitantly with his preparations for an attack on Ha'il during the summer of 1918. These

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developments forced Ibn Sa'ud to choose one of the two arenas as his main sphere of activity. He decided to attack Ha'il; the dynamics of Ibn Sa'ud dispute with Husayn, as well as the nature of politics in Ha'il, thus turned this arena into the main field for Saudi-Hashimite rivalry. Husayn and Ibn Sa'ud also sought Ibn Rashid's favors, each in order to bolster his own position against his rival. Toward the end of 1919, Husayn appeared to be the more succeessful.

On War and Proselytism: Some Further Remarks on Khurma, Turaba, and Ibn Sa'ud's Forces During these years of ongoing disputes among tribes and local rulers, the Najdi chieftaincy developed as a movement geared to growth and expansion. The main process of consolidation into a monarchical state was manifested in the 1920s and will be discussed in Chapter 2. The initial process, consolidation into a movement of conquest, should be underscored here. This process exemplifies attempts at consolidation typical of a chieftaincy, combined with a new wave of Wahhabi revivalism. The events in Khurma and Turaba demonstrate this process and shed new light on the ventures of the Ikhwan. Most of the literature on Saudi history singles out the events of Khurma and Turaba as a turning point constituting Ibn Sa'ud's first significant attempt at expansion. Those events are construed by many writers as a major example of the destructive tendencies of the Ikhwan, as well as of their military importance and expansionist intentions.149 A reexamination of those events raises several doubts, however, as to the validity of this contention. First, as pointed out earlier, the Khurma and Turaba events involved Ibn Sa'ud only indirectly and to a limited extent. Although the potential danger to the parties involved and to British interests was evident, the events are hardly proof of an intention by Ibn Sa'ud to wage an expansionist war. Second, in contrast with the common historiographic version, neither the people of Khurma nor those of Turaba can be defined as members of the Ikhwan. The most outstanding characteristic of the Ikhwan, as viewed by most writers, was their sedentarization in the hujar (singular: hijrd), namely, the sites in which Ibn Sa'ud had settled loyal adherents to Wahhabism from among the nomad tribes who actively readopted Wahhabi principles (after 1912). The settlers supposedly abandoned their traditional Bedouin life-style and their tribal loyalties, adapting to sedentarization, agriculture, and a strict puritan Wahhabi way of life. Raids were banned. The Ikhwan were expected to fight only as a unified front against the enemies of the state. The hujar were therefore garrison towns. Named after the Prophet Muhammad's historic voyage from Mecca to al-Madina in the year 622, the hujar also symbolized their inhabitants' full conversion, spiritually and physically, to true civilization, as manifested in Wahhabi Islam. Life in the hujar was described as a harmonious incorporation of agricultural work and studies, interrupted by occasional excursions to carry out military duties when called on by Ibn Sa'ud.150

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The town of Khurma, which fought Husayn, and the town of Turaba were not hujar. Although there is no doubt that Ibn Sa'ud established the first hijra in Najd, in 1912 (al-Artawiyya), these two towns were already in existence when the first Wahhabi state was formed in the eighteenth century, if not earlier.151 Furthermore, lists of hujar, drawn up by various writers and assembled by Habib, do not include Khurma and Turaba.152 Neither is there evidence that the people of these two towns abandoned their tribal structure and habits during the period under discussion. Ibn Sa'ud and Husayn, as well as their British supporters who debated the cases for the two rulers in their correspondence, always referred to the population of the towns in their tribal frameworks. The 'Utayba, Subay', and Buqum tribes, as well as some minor tribal adherents, seemed to have maintained their tribal values and structures.153 Khalid, as well as 'Abdullah, used to approach shaykhs of subtribes by their titles, acknowledging their freedom of political choice when attempting to win them over.154 Both during and after the war, the tribes of the area maintained their grazing lands despite their affiliation with the towns. A total changeover to an agricultural way of life had certainly not occurred.155 It would, therefore, be reasonable to conclude that the people of Khurma and Turaba were not part of the Ikhwan as they were defined by most writers. The events resulting in the rebellion of the towns of Khurma and Turaba against Husayn also were not related to any direct attempt by Ibn Sa'ud to capture the Hijaz.156 Their locations, too, deserve further analysis. Khurma was in the northeastern Hijaz, bordering on Najd. During the period in question it contained 3,000 inhabitants, most of whom were of the Subay' tribe, which was dispersed along the grazing area of the valleys of Ranniyya and Turaba. The population also included members of the two main groups of the 'Utayba, the Ruqa and Raqba, whose grazing areas extended to the north of the town. The Buqum tribe dwelt around Turaba and depended on the loot taken from caravans. The small Shalawa tribe was also dispersed throughout that area. Reports dealing with the region show that it was typically and traditionally Bedouin: Part of the population was town dwelling (Hadar) and ran the local trading center, and the larger part maintained its wandering habits (Badu), grazing and looting.157 Local political history demonstrates the same pattern. Reporting in September 1918, Captain Goldie, a local political officer, stated that three quarters of the Subay', as well as the Buqum and the Shalawa, were Wahhabis. The 'Utayba were a major tribe living in Najd and the Hijaz, whose leaders tended toward Wahhabism during the years preceding the events under discussion. Goldie also maintained that the tribes were known for their desire for independence and their abhorrence of any strict and lasting rule over them. They were attracted to Wahhabism because of the successes of Sa'ud the Great at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Later, their allegiance shifted to the Rashidis. Upon the decline of that dynasty, at the turn of the century, the Ottomans imposed the ashraf of Mecca over the area.158 The independence of these tribes was maintained during the war. When the protagonists debated about who owned Khurma, they discovered that for

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a prolonged period, the people of Khurma had not paid taxes to any ruler. Ibn Sa'ud claimed that their exemption was a Wahhabi practice introduced by Sa'ud the Great and maintained ever since. The Hashimites argued that Ibn Sa'ud had waived the right to tax Khurma only in 1910 and that he had further agreed that the 'Utayba, Buqum, and Subay' would be "free of taxation by either Ibn Sa'ud or Ibn Rashid."159 Husayn tried to prove that Ibn Sa'ud had thus conceded his sovereignty in the area, but he could not produce a copy of the agreement, a failure that supported the contention that the tribes had not been subjugated. The governor of Khurma was nominated by the sharif of Mecca (as Khalid and his predecessor Ghalib were) and was paid out of the Ottoman treasury. Philby maintained that Khalid also received a subsidy from Najd. From 1913 to 1916, Ibn Sa'ud and 'Abdullah attempted unsuccessfully to tax the tribes.160 Even in 1918, Goldie pointed out, the Subay', although Wahhabi, refused to pay taxes to Ibn Sa'ud.161 The tribes were not subordinate to Ibn Sa'ud, but neither did they belong to the Ikhwan. Their affiliation to Ibn Sa'ud must have had a different origin: Namely, they preferred Ibn Sa'ud's rule, which was less demanding and more remote, over Husayn's. Goldie noted that "possibly they [the tribes of Khurma] have been influenced by the Sa'ud dynasty being further away from them and thus less likely to meddle with them than the powers that be at Mecca which is only 100 miles distant."162 Goldie stressed that the rule of Mecca and that of the Ottomans had been nominal and that the local people wished to prevent any change that might involve their subjugation. The Wahhabi faith must have had some influence on their decision. There is no doubt that Ibn Sa'ud sent propagandists (mutawa'a) or missionaries to various Arabian tribes. As mentioned earlier, they converted many Shammar, and their impact was definitely felt in the Hijaz; in July 1919, 'Abdullah complained bitterly about that.163 Wahhabi revivalism was particularly successful among the 'Utayba, with Khalid and other leaders of this tribe becoming fanatical adherents. Lawrence discovered in July 1917 that a small group of revivalists was spreading Wahhabism among other tribes in Khurma. In one case, revivalist Subay' fought against other members of their own tribe and subdued them.164 This situation shows that a process of revivalism developed both among tribes that had been Wahhabis for centuries and among nonWahhabis, affecting Khurma and its surrounding tribes, whose members became enthusiastic believers committed to the active and expansionist form of Wahhabism. Ibn Sa'ud's reputation was much enhanced by this development, whereas Husayn was increasingly regarded as the "infidel" (kafir), a stigma commonly applied by Wahhabis to non-Wahhabi enemies. The fact that Husayn failed to conquer al-Madina until it surrendered in January 1919 made even the tribes of the Hijaz view him with contempt.165 Hence, a complicated relationship existed between the inhabitants of Khurma and the Najdi chieftaincy, based on Wahhabi bonds and mutual political interests, without administrative strings attached. An examination of the events of Khurma and Turaba reveals the shaping of the tribes' affiliation with Ibn Sa'ud. Khalid instigated a revolt against Husayn without Ibn Sa'ud's

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having been involved. Although Khalid wrote to Ibn Sa'ud for help and visited al-Riyad in November 1917, such assistance was not forthcoming. Apart from the letters that Ibn Sa'ud wrote to Husayn in June and in August 1918, the former extended no physical help to Khalid until October of the same year. The Ikhwan applied pressure on Ibn Sa'ud to assist Khalid, but Ibn Sa'ud diverted their attention to Ha'il. Until then, no real cooperation between Khurma and the Najdi Ikhwan had been established. The nearest hijra to Khurma was al-Ghatghat, about 25 miles northwest of al-Riyad. It was populated by 'Utayba tribesmen, under Sultan Ibn Humayd Ibn Bijad, and was a potential basis for an axis linking the Khurma and Najdi tribes. However, in the summer of 1917, Ibn Humayd of al-Ghatghat and the 'Utayba of Khurma became involved in a blood feud, which indicates that there was still division between the Ikhwan and the people of Khurma. 166 In July 1918, when Khalid received Ibn Sa'ud's evasive and discouraging answer to his plea, he embarked on an alliance with the Subay', on whom he imposed a zakat tax without Ibn Sa'ud's authority. At that stage Khalid acted as would an autonomous ruler of a small, quasi-independent chieftaincy.167 Eventually, Ibn Sa'ud arbitrated the blood feud in al-Riyad, and in early September four chieftains of the 'Utayba visited Ibn Sa'ud, offering him homage and paying zakat. 168 The 'Utayba were thus reunited under Ibn Sa'ud's auspices. Apparently, it was this act of traditional tribal mediation that encouraged Ibn Sa'ud to dispatch the 450 fighters to Khurma in November 1918. The events that followed were accompanied by no conspicuous or decisive involvement on the part of Ibn Sa'ud. Reports from late 1918 and the spring of 1919 indicate that Khalid had gained further support from the Dawasir tribe, as well as from the entire Ruqa section of the 'Utayba, including the elements in Najd under the leadership of Ibn Humayd and Ibn Ruba'yan. In March 1919, Ibn Sa'ud delivered arms and ammunition to Khalid.169 However, a report of November 1918 indicated that Khalid (and not Ibn Sa'ud) embarked on all those alliances, the nuclei of which were the Subay' and the Buqum.170 After the fall of al-Madina, when Husayn arranged a meeting of loyal supporters in 'Ushayra to fight Khalid and began to campaign for support among Hijazi ashrafand various tribes,171 Khalid strove to reinforce his chieftaincy. In December 1918 and January 1919, Shakir Ibn Zayd, Husayn's general, launched two small-scale attacks on Khurma, which were easily repulsed.172 Husayn's intention was to marshal tribal support and then to bring in 'Abdullah's army on its return from the surrender of al-Madina. On 'Abdullah's way to meet Husayn at 'Ushayra (the exact date is unknown), Ibn Sa'ud wrote to him, attempting to prevent a clash. 'Abdullah's initial reply was that there was no need to fight.173 Apparently, 'Abdullah tried to convince Husayn to refrain from any further conflict, but in vain. Husayn was determined, and 'Abdullah set out to attack. Ibn Sa'ud evidently learned about the situation from 'Abdullah himself, who wrote to him that he was on his way "to punish the rebels."174 On May 21, 1919, 'Abdullah conquered Turaba, 75 miles from Khurma, down into Wadi Subay'. Ibn Sa'ud then sent a force of 1,500 Ikhwan from alGhatghat and the Qahtan tribe, under Hamud Bin 'Umar. Khalid joined them

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with 4,000 men. Ibn Sa'ud stood by with a contingency force 80 miles from Khurma. It is not clear whether he was supposed to join the others and lead a counterattack, but the evidence shows that Khalid's attacking forces did not wait for Ibn Sa'ud. On the night of May 25-26, 1919, they launched a night assault and massacred 1,350 of "Abdullah's forces, inflicting a total defeat.175 Ibn Sa'ud thus became completely involved only when he learned that it was 'Abdullah, commanding the strongest forces of the Hijazi army, who was marching on Khurma. Having been informed about the meeting in 'Ushayra, Ibn Sa'ud knew that Husayn's ultimate intention was to "get Ibn Sa'ud's head." The Najdi ruler complained after the battle that this was the language Husayn employed in Turaba after 'Abdullah had entered the town.176 The combination of Wahhabi revivalism and the attraction Ibn Sa'ud's triumphs had for the surrounding tribes, as evident in the case of Khurma, should be examined also in the wider context of Najd affairs. It is necessary to recall once again what Hafiz Wahbah wrote about events of the year 1916: The year 1916 was one of the worst in the history of Najd. [In] that year something very near civil war broke out between [the] Ikhwan on the one hand and the town dwellers and the government on the other. Abdul Aziz dealt with it by [raising] an army of scholars well versed in religious debate to go [out to] the different hijras to repair the mischief wrought by [earlier] teachers. ... He was not able to eradicate fanaticism entirely [but] he met with considerable success.177 This statement reveals two facts. First, Ibn Sa'ud tried to generate a revivalist Wahhabi movement in central Arabia and its vicinity. Second, this was Ibn Sa'ud's main instrument for counteracting his neighbors' (notably Husayn's) power. In other words, although Wahhabi tenets had prevailed in the region, Ibn Sa'ud reorganized his movement in a revivalist fashion, as the center of attraction around which the Saudi chieftaincy could become a dominant force. This was a strategy of building a conquering force by enlisting tribal loyalty and counteracting Husayn's financial power and Ibn Rashid's trade advantages. It is also apparent that the process of revivalism developed its own dynamics and was beyond Ibn Sa'ud's control. Dickson reported that it was "a genuine religious revival—an attempt on the part of the masses of Central Arabia to improve themselves religiously and mentally."178 Wahbah's emphasis on the fanatic nature of revivalism, as manifested in the Ikhwan, contrasts with the works that depict the Ikhwan as sedentary, peaceful, and loyal revivalists. Wahbah's assessment is reinforced by indications demonstrating that the Ikhwan of the hujar did not constitute a separate group, sedentarized and completely loyal to Ibn Sa'ud, but that the process of revivalism was more complex. Proselytism was one campaign over which Ibn Sa'ud tried to preside personally. As Dickson explained, Ibn Sa'ud would inform a tribal leader of his being "ignorant" (jahil) of the ways of God. Mutawa'a would follow, accompanied by earlier converts who had become established Ikhwan. The members of the tribe were then forced to sell their cattle, camels, and so on and to submit to "civilization" in the hujar.179 That was the method. The

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process extended over a considerable period of time, making its appearance simultaneously in different places and in various forms, which Ibn Sa'ud could hardly control, as he himself admitted.180 Once the proselytism was under way, the process may have experienced setbacks or emerged in different degrees of revivalism. As the period in question was one of ongoing proselytism, it is improbable that the hujar were the sole and most conspicuous product of conversion. It is likely that various forms of conversion developed, not all institutionalized and sedentarized. Because the type of religion being spread was a popular one, it was easy to adapt: The common requirements of an akh were the wearing of a white turban, the denunciation of anthropomorphism (shirk), the prohibition of smoking and of prayers in front of saints' tombs, and the need to pray five times daily.181 Non-Wahhabi Bedouin had no difficulty accustoming themselves to these demands without fully understanding Wahhabi theology or resorting to ultimate sedentarization. Indeed, it was difficult to tell the difference between a fervent akh and a superficial badu believer. In April 1918, when Philby once again met Ibn Sa'ud, he understood both from him and Turki that there were various forms of believers: fully settled ones, who had become civilized—hadar (15,000, according to Philby), believers who remained "partly badu," and those who had not settled at all. The TJtayba, Harb, and Mutayr were partly hadar and partly badu, though all were believers. Philby reached the conclusion that "the common herd are partly Ikhwan and partly Badu."182 The Subay', for instance, had an Ikhwan settlement of 500 men at Dhabaj in Kharja, but most of the tribe lived in Khurma as Wahhabis.183 During the period under discussion, there was no exclusive body of believers living in hujar, the site of Ibn Sa'ud's loyal believers. There were, rather, Wahhabis at various levels of belief. These included the traditional Wahhabis, who had preserved their religion since the eighteenth century, as well as members of a revivalist movement that penetrated both their ranks and these of other Bedouin tribes, evident both in hujar or in various forms of badu life. In fact, proselytism spread into the Hijaz and later into Kuwayt and 'Asir, far from the original Najdi hujar and from Ibn Sa'ud's control and not necessarily bearing any resemblance to the original form. The primary means of consolidating the Saudi movement for conquest, then, was Wahhabi revivalism. It exemplified the integration of religious values with existing tribal ones: On the one hand, revivalism spread fast and brought over to the Saudi side many tribal groups from throughout the Peninsula that were infused with new religious fervor. The adaptation of new values did not cause changes in tribal habits and practices, which remained typical of chieftaincy political culture: Nomadic habits prevailed; raiding continued unabated; and obedience to Ibn Sa'ud's central authority was limited. Thus, the term Ikhwan cannot be applied solely to inhabitants of the hujar. This was a complex movement, and there was considerable confusion regarding its name. In Hijaz the revivalist movement was usually called Mutadayana184 (restoration of religion), but the British referred to it as "militant Wahhabism." In early 1919, Philby noted a more limited interpretation, focus-

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ing on the most fervent revivalist elements: "The word Ikhwan is used to denote Badawin who have entered the inner circle of Wahhabism; the rest are Hanbalis"185 (followers of the religious school of Ibn Hanbal, prevalent in Najd, from which Wahhabism emerged; Hanbalis included believers who did not adopt to the letter the new practices of the revivalist movement). Philby hinted that the inner circles of the movement were secret or at least exclusive, and Dickson made the same point explicitly.186 Relying on his sources, Habib stresses that there was nothing secret about the movement.187 It also seems that the events of the 1920s, particularly the 1929-30 revolt against Ibn Sa'ud, probably made the name Ikhwan synonymous with the whole of the revivalist movement and with Ibn Sa'ud's forces. However, the term Ikhwan used here applies only to tribal groups that perceived themselves as Ikhwan and constituted the core of the revivalist movement. The Ikhwan question was linked to another strategy employed in the establishment of a conquering force, that of taxation. At this stage Ibn Sa'ud imposed the traditional zakat and one-fifth (khums) of the booty.188 A symbol of bondage and subordination, proper taxation was essential to the fostering of a tribal alliance. It implied tribal recognition of a ruler through his right to impose a levy on the tribes' surpluses from trade and agriculture, or protection fees (khuwwa) on agriculturalists and traders, in return for defense (himayd). As a traditional bond of chieftaincies, the collection of zakat was employed sparingly and considerately by Ibn Sa'ud during the period under discussion. The sums that he imposed were small and never exceeded the allowance ordered by the Qur'an. He exempted certain tribes altogether; imposed it on others exclusively, notably on local, profitable economic enterprises; and made it payable sometimes in money and sometimes in kind. Furthermore, Ibn Sa'ud maintained the traditional obligation of rulers to their tribes and also afforded them protection. Dickson commented in February 1920 that Ibn Sa'ud's taxation policies involved "paternal affection and wisdom."189 The Subay' objected to Ibn Sa'ud's taxing them, but his approach was, nevertheless, much preferred to Husayn's high levies. Ibn Sa'ud's conduct toward tribes also served to strengthen the foundations of the conquest movement. In contrast with the contempt and fear the tribes felt for Husayn, Ibn Sa'ud was seen as a man who had "a commanding mien and impressed even the lawless Bedouin." In this respect, the Saudi marriage practices also were effective. Ibn Sa'ud, his brothers, and other members of the leading family took advantage of the Islamic practice of marriage to four wives and the relative ease of divorce. They intermarried with many of the leading nomadic and urban families, who were thereby tied to the Saudi state.190 The speed with which Ibn Sa'ud answered litigants and the opportunities he gave to tribes to participate in authorized raids were further reasons for supporting him. Ibn Sa'ud was also adamant about forbidding internal fighting among his tribes. 'Abdullah jealously noted this fact in an interview, admitting that such a strategy might bring about internal tranquillity in the Saudi state and direct the tribes' efforts to consolidate against outside targets.191

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In examining the actual formation of Ibn Sa'ud's army, it appears that the hujar population was definitely not the sole component. Al-Zirikli explained that each tribe fought according to its "nature" (bi-tabi'ihi). A formation of recruits was drawn from al-Riyad (al-'arid) and its environs, other towns (ahl hawadir al-mudun), the people of the hujar, and the Bedouin. During recruitment, various units (firqa, bayrak) were created, based on the original tribe or village.192 Habib quoted people who told him that "the Ikhwan were a loosely organized group of warriors . . . under the direction of their leaders."193 It seems that tribal traditions and structures were dominant; the hujar people did not change this but, rather, formed a part of this pattern. Ibn Sa'ud's forces were composed of large tribal formations based on tribal structure and descent rather than newly sedentarized elements. The tribes often engaged in fighting for local and tribal reasons (as the case of the Mutayr and the alliance of Khurma demonstrates), and Ibn Sa'ud began to interfere only at a later stage. Through a sensible policy of taxation, a rapidly spreading movement of Wahhabi revivalism, and a successful projection of his personal image, Ibn Sa'ud gained the loyalty and cooperation of the fighting tribes and became the real champion of each arena and battlefront in which he was engaged. Although these means of consolidation made the Saudi conquest movement more effective and attractive than other fighting bodies in the Arabian Peninsula, they did not alter the chieftaincy structure of the Saudi state and the tenuous nature of its internal bonds.

Musical Chairs: Ibn Sa'ud and Rival Rulers In analyzing the process of Saudi expansion, two phenomena should be pointed out: first, Ibn Sa'ud's interest in pursuing a diplomatic course in the Hijaz and, second, his rivalry with Husayn in other arenas. In 1919-20, the process of political change in Najd became linked with two other areas of conflict, namely, Kuwayt and 'Asir. Both had the ingredients of a local tribal dispute mixed with features typical of Saudi politics: shared interests with local tribes fostered by proselytism and expansion of the Wahhabi faith, and the growing Saudi military, economic, and political involvement. And because Kuwayt and 'Asir were geopolitical extensions of the Rashidi and Hijazi arenas, they constituted extensions of the Saudi-Hashimite rivalry. The confrontation between the Mutayr and the 'Ujman still continued at the border zone with Kuwayt. At this stage, however, it carried overtones of militant proselytism, including the Ikhwan's enthusiasm for martydom as a route to paradise. The struggle to assert the unitary nature of God against the sin of shirk194 took on renewed impetus, spurred on by successes. The followers of the new revivalist creed viewed themselves as the genuine missionaries of Islam who, like the Prophet Muhammad, had been sent to impose the true religion on erring people. The fact that these "peoples" were perceived as unlawful Muslims made the Ikhwan even more zealous.

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In November 1919, Faysal al-Dawish, the leader of the Mutayr who had become the leading spirit of revivalism and of the hujar Ikhwan in particular, killed 34 members of the 'Ujman who had earlier raided the Mutayr. The TJjman, the Aslam Shammar, and the Zafir (in the Muntafik region) became more fearful of and therefore more inclined toward revivalism, which was spreading rapidly in Kuwayt and Zubayr.195 The first half of 1920 witnessed a further spreading to Bahrayn and the Trucial Coast.196 In early May 1919, the British agent at Kuwayt reported that "recruitment for membership seems now to have passed the stage of mere conversion and 'frightfulness' appears to be the order of the day."197 A. T. Wilson wrote on November 7, 1919: "Hope of paradise—and the Brotherhood [Ikhwan] has no other cards in its hand— should induce the nomad tribes to abandon one ... of the pains [difficulties] in which they carry out their present existence."198 The combination of fear and the promise of heaven were effective for the 'Ujman. In November 1919, Ibn Sa'ud opened negotiations with them. He promised "full forgiveness" for their previous offenses against him and stipulated that they settle in Najd. Various leaders of the 'Ujman, including Didan Ibn Hithlayn, accepted the proposition, and in February 1920 Ibn Sa'ud reported that the 'Ujman had started building settlements in Najd. 199 Gertrude Bell noted that "Ibn Sa'ud has, therefore, cleared his path with the 'Ujman."200 The importance of this development lies in the neutralization of the tribe as an anti-Saudi factor and its embracing of the Wahhabi faith, which paved the way for complete Saudi domination near the Kuwayti border. To safeguard his domain against the spread of Wahhabi revivalism after the battle of Turaba, Salim of Kuwayt decided to erect a fortress at Dhubat Balbul, northwest of Jubayl.201 This led to a territorial dispute with Ibn Sa'ud, which precipitated a clash. In April 1920, Ibn Sa'ud ordered a local Mutayr chief, Ibn Shuqayr, to establish a hijra at Jarriyya al-'Ulya opposite Dhubat Balbul. In the middle of May, Salim deployed his commander, Da'ij Bin Sabah, with 400 men against the Mutayr. He harrassed, looted, and killed some Ikhwan of the Mutayr, as a result of which Ibn Shuqayr sent a plea for help to al-Dawish at al-Artawiyya. Al-Dawish responded immediately, completely routing Da'ij's force.202 These events exemplify a growing Saudi tendency to expand state interests by allying them with tribal practices as well as with the forces of proselytism. They also show Ibn Sa'ud's endeavor to improve the economy of the Saudi state. In order to minimize Saudi dependence on the port of Kuwayt, Ibn Sa'ud tried to develop a new trade route through the ports of Jubayl, Hufuf, and Qatif at al-Ahsa'. This he did by allowing the Mutayr to establish a hijra in a region leading to Jubayl Hufuf on the Gulf, particularly where the Dushan (members of the al-Dawish clan) used to dwell, an area that was also part of their dira. 203 But Salim had his own ambition to limit Ibn Sa'ud. He reacted by establishing a fortress and by harrassing the Ikhwan and cutting off supplies to Jarriyya, acts that precipitated the clash.204 At the same time, Ibn Sa'ud's attention also turned to a conflict in the area of northern 'Asir. In June 1915, Sayyid Muhammad al-Idrisi, based in the town of Sabya, revolted against the Ottomans after signing a treaty with the

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British in April of the same year. He managed to expel the Ottomans from most of 'Asir and, in so doing, to preserve the traditional semi-independent rule of the al-'A'id clan in the town of Abha. The town was an important center of convergent roads in 'Asir and contained a strong fortress.205 It is significant that the al-'A'id family had a tradition of political cooperation with Husayn; in 1910, Husayn had helped them repulse a campaign launched by alIdrisi against Abha in an attempt to capture it. Al-Idrisi's relationship with Husayn was one of hostility; the Hashimite leader viewed him as an inferior whose ancestors had come from North Africa. Husayn had even helped the Ottomans quell a revolt staged by al-Idrisi in 1911, a fact that led al-Idrisi to sustain doubts about the "Arab Revolt."206 The events that followed impelled al-Idrisi to distance himself from Husayn and to seek common cause with Ibn Sa'ud. In 1916, when al-Idrisi was about to conquer the important Red Sea port of al-Qunfida from the Ottomans after a long siege, Husayn deployed an army for the same purpose. Despite British attempts to discourage him, Husayn was determined to conquer al-Qunfida. Fearing a clash with the "Arab Revolt" forces, al-Idrisi allowed Husayn's forces to enter the town on August 23, 1916. On September 27 the Ottomans reoccupied the town. These events only strengthened alIdrisi's mistrust of Husayn.207 In 1919, al-Idrisi's problems with Husayn coincided with other conflicts between himself and minor tribal clans in the region. His local rivals cooperated with Husayn, and so eventually he turned to Ibn Sa'ud for assistance. In view of his dire financial situation, al-Idrisi attempted to exercise a more direct rule over Abha, and the local ruler, Hasan al-'A'id, sought to undermine him. Since 1910 Al-'A'id's cousin 'Abd al-Rahman had been notorious for his collaboration with Husayn. It is not clear what al-'A'id was up to, but in August 1919 al-Idrisi warned him to put an immediate stop "to the suspicious conduct and movement of his cousin." In response, 'Abd al-Rahman, encouraged by Husayn, visited Mecca. At the end of October, he returned with one of Husayn's envoys, 'Abdullah Bin Hamzah. A few days before they entered Abha, a bomb had destroyed the house of Sharif Hamud al-Hamzi, the agent of al-Idrisi at Abha, an act widely attributed to al-'A'id's treachery. Consequently, tribes from throughout the area gathered in Abha a few days later. A decisive majority of them were critical of al-'A'id's actions, and Husayn's envoy had to flee for his life.208 At the end of 1919, Captain Fazluddin, the British liaison officer with alIdrisi, stressed that al-'Aid's failure to resist al-Idrisi had restored the latter's authority over all 'Asir, a fact that Hasan al-'A'id acknowledged. Various tribes, including the important Ghamid and Zahran tribes,209 began seeking al-Idrisi's protection. But this discontent with al-Idrisi found other outlets for expression. Tribes like the Qahtan, the Ghamid, and the Zahran had, like the 'Utayba, been overrun by the Wahhabis in the eighteenth century. Though mainly adherents of the Shafi'i school of Islam, those tribes sent a delegation to Ibn Sa'ud asking for assistance. He responded by dispatching six leading mutawa'a, and a process of proselytism began in 'Asir. At the beginning of

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1920, Ibn Sa'ud also sent a warning letter to Hasan al-'A'id. Hasan replied that Ibn Sa'ud should stay out of 'Asir's internal affairs. This probably occurred before May 1920210 and led Ibn Sa'ud to retaliate by sending a force led by his relative Ibn Musa'id. Thus, tribal maneuvers and rivalry among local rulers, rather than premeditated expansion, locked Ibn Sa'ud into the local politics of 'Asir and Kuwayt, extensions of the main arenas of Ha'il and the Hijaz in which Ibn Sa'ud was involved. In order to establish the full importance of the Kuwayt and 'Asir events, it is necessary to examine further the developments in Ha'il. The instability of the Rashidi chieftaincy reached a new peak. At the end of 1919, the struggle to gain influence in Ha'il turned in Husayn's favor. On March 28, 1919, Sa'ud Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Rashid was murdered in Ha'il. The murderer, discovered and killed on the spot by a slave of the late ruler, was 'Abdullah Ibn Talal, of the ambitious al-'Ubayd clan that was contesting for power in Ha'il. Ibn Sa'ud apparently had no connection with the murderer.211 His supporters in Ha'il still consisted of various notables and 'ulama', who relied on Ibn Sa'ud to restore peace and open trade. They were also gradually converted to Wahhabism. In May 1920, Cox estimated that most of the Shammar tribe and two-thirds of the people of Ha'il were supporters of Ibn Sa'ud.212 The new ruler of Ha'il, 'Abdullah Ibn Mit'ib, a boy of 13, was in the hands of Rashidi notables in the capital. It is therefore not surprising that Ibn Sa'ud had his way. In April, the new ruler asked Ibn Sa'ud whether he would like to establish friendly relations with Ha'il. In order to exploit the situation to the fullest, Ibn Sa'ud replied that he would do so only with the consent of the "notables of Ha'il and the sheikhs of the Shammar."213 In late April, a deputation of Ha'il notables arrived at al-Riyad to draw up an agreement with Ibn Sa'ud. The text of the agreement, concluded in early May 1920, demonstrates Ibn Sa'ud's desire to dominate the Rashidi state. Two clauses established the continuity of Rashidi rule in Ha'il and complete local autonomy. Other clauses, however, stated that the Rashids would not be allowed to develop foreign contacts or conclude treaties, nor would they be responsible for the security of the Rashidi chieftaincy. Both matters were transferred to al-Riyad.214 Ibn Sa'ud apparently intended to put an end to Ha'il's instability by placing it under his protection,215 thereby gaining a decisive advantage over Husayn. It looked as if Ibn Sa'ud had succeeded in engineering a successful coup against the new ruler.216 When the deputation returned to Ha'il, however, a new opposition emerged. Its leader was 'Aqab Bin 'Ajil of the Abda section of the Shammar, which traditionally dwelt in Iraq and opposed Ibn Sa'ud's rule. 'Aqab had also been adviser to the murdered Ibn Rashid, in which capacity he had developed the afore-mentioned policy of diplomatic maneuvering between Husayn and Ibn Sa'ud. 'Aqab had devised that strategy as a lifeline for Ha'il and was mainly concerned with preventing Ibn Sa'ud from neutralizing it. 217 Dickson explained that 'Aqab supported 'Abdullah Ibn Mit'ib, the new ruler, to an extent unappreciated by Ibn Sa'ud. He also gained enough sup-

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port from Ha'il notables to enable him to abrogate the agreement concluded by the pro-Saudi group. Ibn Sa'ud sent a messenger to Burayda, backed by a force of 10,000. 'Aqab broke openly with Ibn Sa'ud, killing the Qadi and five notables who had made the agreement in al-Riyad in the presence of Ibn Sa'ud's messenger.218 This probably occurred in early May 1920. Ibn Sa'ud's strategy in all of northern Arabia seems to have been at a crossroads, and not only in regard to Ha'il. In May 1920, he deployed an army of 3,000, composed of the al-'Arid and of Qahtan Bedouin under 'Abd al'Aziz Bin Musa'id Bin Jlawi, against Abha. At the same time, the Mutayr clashed with Salim, the shaykh of Kuwayt, and were ultimately supported and encouraged by Ibn Sa'ud. Ibn Sa'ud also launched several new attacks on Ha'il. He himself did not make it clear why he was embarking on a comprehensive campaign, but there were several reasons for this change in Ibn Sa'ud's strategy. One was to gain advantages prior to a British-engineered settlement that both Cairo and London tried to effect in the region during 1919 and 1920. In light of the stalemate following the Turaba incident, the British believed that the cheapest and most effective way both to safeguard British interests and to satisfy friendly local rulers was to end the major local conflict in the area. Ibn Sa'ud was interested in obtaining Abha, for its strategic advantages: It would give him access to the port of al-Qunfida and the Red Sea trade, control over the town's trade center, and the opportunity to surround the Hijaz from the south. There is no evidence to suggest that at this stage Ibn Sa'ud had in mind a full reconciliation with Husayn. What is known is that he had several reasons for complying with the British request to enter into a settlement with Husayn. These were raised in November 1919, when a Najdi mission composed of Ibn Sa'ud's son Faysal and Ibn Sa'ud's chief adviser, Ahmad Ibn Thanayan, went to London to discuss the contemplated negotiations with Curzon. Ibn Sa'ud was particularly anxious to obtain official assurances for his independence, the free passage of Najdi pilgrims to the Hijaz, a larger guaranteed subsidy, and Philby's delegation as representative to his court.219 Ibn Sa'ud was drawn into fighting by local conflicts. In Kuwayt, even though al-Dawish acted against Salim's forces without his authority, he could not ignore the strategic importance of al-Jarriyya and his commitment to the Ikhwan. He therefore wrote to Kuwayt's shaykh, post facto, justifying alDawish's action and thereby assuming responsibility in the region.220 Ibn Sa'ud's involvement in Abha came about in a similar manner. Ibn Musa'id's campaign did not encounter serious resistance: He defeated an al'A'id family force near the village of Hijla and entered Abha in late May. Ibn Musa'id then launched a comprehensive campaign of proselytism. Hasan and 'Abd al-Rahman Ibn 'A'id were sent to al-Riyad and allowed to return after several months. 221 A new understanding between Muhammad al-Idrisi and the conquering Wahhabi leader was then established. Ibn Sa'ud was the one who directed Ibn Musa'id to extend his conquest southward, where they defeated 'Abdullah Ibn Zafar, a major chief of the Bani Shihr tribe. 222 Ibn Sa'ud also ordered the removal of decorations from tombs of saints, in accor-

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dance with Wahhabi tenets.223 By then, Ibn Sa'ud's rule had been established in Abha; Ibn Musa'id left, and a certain Fahd al-'Aqili was nominated as a local amir. Following the failure of his Ha'il coup, Ibn Sa'ud launched three more expeditions against the Rashidi state. Dickson is the only one who mentioned those ventures, without specifying dates; they probably occurred in the early summer of 1920 and before August 12, when Dickson wrote his report. The first expedition was led by Sa'ud, Ibn Sa'ud's son, near Baqa, 30 miles northeast of Ha'il; sheep and camels were taken in booty. The second attack, led by al-Dawish and Ibn Ruba'yan (of the 'Utayba), took place in the vicinity of Ha'il. Because of problems of logistics and the fear of being cut off, the force retreated, taking some booty with it. They were subsequently attacked by a large number of pro-Rashidi Shammar near Qusayba, where they sustained a decisive defeat, losing 500 men and all their booty.224 The basic structure of each conflict in which Ibn Sa'ud became involved consisted of a local dispute among tribal groups. This pattern ostensibly followed the earlier one, which had developed since 1917 throughout the Hijaz and Ha'il, but it was not really the same. Ibn Sa'ud had become more determined to expand. Unlike the earlier period, at this time he engaged simultaneously in three arenas of dispute. The first indication of a change in dynamics came during the summer of 1920. In August, Siddiq Hasan, Dickson's Indian assistant, reported that al-Riyad had received a confidential note from a Kuwayti 'alim. It informed the Najdi ruler that Salim had requested Ibn Rashid's help and that 'Aqab Bin 'Ajil had sent him a force. The letter also indicated that both Salim and Ibn Rashid had written letters to Husayn, via India, "asking for alliance and help."225 A few weeks later Ibn Sa'ud wrote to Dickson that Salim had tried to incite the Shammar and other tribes at alAhsa against Najd.226 Ibn Sa'ud thus intercepted a communication that appeared detrimental to himself. Judging by Dickson's and other reports, anti-Saudi cooperation was spreading. In March 1920, Husayn had written to Shaykh 'Isa, the ruler of Bahrayn, trying to construct an alliance against Ibn Sa'ud. Husayn intended to exploit the friction between Najd and Bahrayn over customs and protection of Najdi subjects in Bahrayn, but at that stage he did not obtain a favorable response.227 Later, however, Salim reciprocated Husayn's initiative. In July 1920, Salim wrote to Ha'il congratulating Ibn Rashid for the Shammar's success against the 'Utayba. Dickson noted that Salim had earlier communicated with Hamud Ibn Suwayt of the Dhafir, Shaykh Ibrahim of Zubayr, Sayyid Talib of Basra, and Khaza'il of Muhamara, thereby creating a tacit anti-Saudi alliance. The aforementioned communication to Ibn Rashid from Salim led the former to join the group. Dickson also stated that a "defensive and offensive agreement" had been concluded between Salim and 'Aqab. Subsequently, the 'Anaza group of Mada'in Salih joined as well. The most important venture embarked upon by Salim and Ibn Rashid were two pleas to Husayn to join and assist them. In Dickson's works, "the general intention [of the alliance was] to check Bin Sa'ud's increasing power,

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[and] the immediate object [was] to prevent him from going to Mecca."228 As we shall show, Husayn also communicated with al-Idrisi, Iman Yahya of Yemen, and members of the al-'A'id clan. The attempt to create an anti-Saudi alliance was Husayn's final bid for supremacy in Arabia, prompted by the fear of Ibn Sa'ud's military ventures and British pressure to negotiate with Ibn Sa'ud. The alliance should also be interpreted as an attempt by the various rulers to maintain their independence in the face of Ibn Sa'ud's growing power. The traditional instinctive resistance to any powerful hegemonic ruler was sufficient to unite other rulers Ibn Sa'ud. Dickson wrote: The general trend of Arabian news today, however, goes to show that two groups are gradually being formed: the northern group consisting of Harb, Hutaim, Madain Saleh, Shammar, Zhafir, Zubair and Koweit, centering round the standard of Bin Rashid, the old antagonist of the Bin Sa'uds; the southern group consisting of Nejd proper, including Hasan, the Idrisi and Trucial Oman. King Hussein, would, of course, support the northern group.229

The geographical divisions and the cohesion of each group, as Dickson indicated should surely not be overestimated. Nevertheless, the essence of his theory seems sound. By fighting simultaneously in various places, Ibn Sa'ud turned the whole of upper Arabia into a single theater in which no ruler was secure from Saudi forces and Ikhwan proselytism. In such circumstances, the position of Ha'il was crucial, for its political and strategic assets could cement an alliance. Thus, the geopolitical centrality of Ha'il and the anti-Saudi posture of its leaders made it possible for rulers from various parts of Arabia to align themselves against Ibn Sa'ud. Dickson stated that in August, Ibn Sa'ud intercepted Kuwayti correspondence with Husayn, and the entire scheme was exposed. Ibn Sa'ud became anxious about his position in Arabia: In the words of Dickson, "Bin Sa'ud is troubled about the present and the future, trusts no one around him."230 These were changing times in the Middle East. Ibn Sa'ud envisaged antiBritish forces emerging in Egypt and Hashimites gaining in Syria ("the northern landing stage of Nejd")231 and Iraq. The fact that during this period no British representative was sent to him and that the reduction of his subsidy was discussed irritated Ibn Sa'ud.232 He also expressed anxiety regarding the possibility that Cox, whom he considered his friend and champion and who had supported his position all along, would leave his office as high commissioner in Iraq.233 Elaboration on the subject of Saudi-Hashimite relations at this stage is essential. In September 1920, after numerous delays, a Najdi delegation that had come to Mecca to perform the Hajj met several times with Sharifi family members, including Husayn. In the light of Husayn's attempt to conspire against Ibn Sa'ud and given the latter's state of mind, it is not surprising that these meetings did not produce the kind of settlement that the British desired. On September 3, the two parties agreed to control movements across their boundaries, to prevent raids and encroachment from one territory on the

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other, and to maintain friendly relations. But the shortcomings of the agreement were apparent: All of Husayn's claims remained unchanged. He also argued that the cessation of hostilities was operative only until the Najd delegation returned to al-Riyad. On the other hand, 234 the agreement did not require Ibn Sa'ud to relinquish his hold on Khurma and Turaba; moreover, he did not ratify the agreement, despite his delegation's having been a party to it. Feeling insecure about his future position in Arabia and being particularly worried about Husayn's participation in the anti-Saudi alliance, Ibn Sa'ud was far from ready to engage in any fundamental settlement with Husayn. He was more interested in strengthening his own position through battle. The British initiative for a settlement was characterized by growing antiHusayn sentiments, which definitely worked in Ibn Sa'ud's favor. In the light of Husayn's military weakness, his repeated demands for British help, his continuing bids for dominance in the Middle East, and his reluctance to sign a postwar treaty with the British acknowledging British hegemony in Palestine and Iraq, Curzon described him as "a pampered and querulous nuisance" in July 1919.235 Other British officials began to take the same view.236 Among the innovations introduced by the British after the war was the abolition of the Arab Bureau in Cairo. Jidda was made to report directly to London, and it was officially underscored that "assistance hitherto given by the Arab Bureau to King Hussein . . . will cease."237 This decision was meant to eliminate redundant wartime arrangements and not necessarily to neglect Husayn, but, the British were definitely less committed to Husayn's ambitions than they had been in 1917-18. Consequently, Husayn lost his major supporting British institution and found himself on a level with Ibn Sa'ud. For the Najdi ruler, on the other hand, compliance with the British peace initiative was a means of improving relations with the British. Moreover, it gave Ibn Sa'ud an opportunity to exploit Husayn's decline and to establish, prior to any settlement, territorial limits to which the British, under the circumstances, would not object. Ibn Sa'ud's strategy proved successful insofar as in May 1920, Curzon noted that "Ibn Sa'ud had always agreed to this solution [a settlement between Najd and the Hijaz'] but King Hussein has objected."238 Securing Britain's neutrality or even tacit support for further fighting was, at this stage, one of Ibn Sa'ud's major goals. Ibn Sa'ud did not wish to spoil his relations with Britain by being overly critical; however, he did use mild criticism in order to increase his leverage on the British so that they would be more receptive to his needs. During the summer of 1920, he accused the British of preventing him from "securing the fruits of my victory"239 and denigrated Husayn, "the poor beggar, with no qualities of the head or heart . . . Miskin, faqir, darwesh," whom the British had elevated to "alMalik al-Malik." Ibn Sa'ud complained that the British failed to realize that if there was anyone fit to be called "king," it was Ibn Sa'ud himself.240 In September 1920, after several months of negotiations, Ibn Sa'ud and Salim agreed to refer their dispute over Jarriyya to British arbitration. But in early September, the continuing construction at Jarriyya, approved by Ibn Sa'ud, and possibly the encouragement Salim received from his partners in the

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alliance, impelled Salim to proceed to al-Jahra', 20 miles north of Kuwayt town, with a major contingent aided by Dari Ibn Tawalla and a Shammar force. Together they numbered 3,000. 241 Confronted with the first outcome of the alliance, Ibn Sa'ud deployed al-Dawish with an Ikhwan Mutayr force of 4,000. On September 9, al-Dawish reached Subayhiyya, south of al-Jahra'. Ibn Sa'ud announced a few days later, "I shall know how to punish him [Salim] that he may repent."242 Ibn Sa'ud, who was then meeting with Cox at 'Uqayr, informed the latter about the alliance against him. On his way back to Baghdad, Cox tried to persuade Salim to dissolve his military formation, but to no avail.243 On October 10, when Cox reached Baghdad, al-Dawish attacked. Militarily it was not an outstanding success. Al-Dawish destroyed Dari's flank and eventually conquered the village, but Salim managed to hold out successfully at the fort of al-Jahra'. The Mutayr sustained losses of 800, their opponents only 200.244 Al-Dawish demanded Kuwayt's religious purification, and Salim asked for British help. In the wake of British reconnaissance flights and threats to bomb the Ikhwan camp, al-Dawish had to disengage and retreat on October 11.245 Both strategically and politically, this was a victory for Ibn Sa'ud. He had defeated a joint military venture against him, frustrated the anti-Saudi alliance, weakened the pro-Rashidi Shammar, and above all, checkmated Salim's plans. After Salim's death in February 1921, the problem of Kuwayt was referred to arbitration. 246 Despite the hostile alliance confronting Ibn Sa'ud, he did not immediately launch further attacks against his enemies or make attempts at expansion. As Habib stated, "With the Kuwayt matter settled, Ibn Sa'ud led his armies against the Rashid capital of Ha'il."247 Rather, he preferred to wait, probably so that he could prepare a properly organized army. In November 1920, Ibn Sa'ud reported that 'Abdullah had violated the agreement between Najd and the Hijaz by assembling forces at al-Madina and Mada'in Salih and advancing to Ha'il.248 Although this movement did not result in immediate military action, it epitomized Hashimite treachery for the Saudis. In the Saudi view, the Hijazi-Rashidi cooperation also revealed a wider strategy of attempting to surround and weaken Najd. The installment of Husayn's sons, 'Abdullah and Faysal, as rulers of Trans-Jordan and Iraq, as decided by the British Middle East Conference in the spring of 1921, deeply worried Ibn Sa'ud, as he perceived the encirclement of his territories by Hashimite states as "a policy of engulfment" (siyasat al-tatwiq) against the Saudi state.249 Moreover, Ibn Sa'ud pointed to the fact that Faysal, who had been crowned in July 1921, was befriending the Shammar and had lured them into penetrating into Iraq. Ibn Sa'ud therefore feared that with Hashimite Iraq's aid, Ha'il might once again become a dangerous threat to Najd. 250 Husayn's anti-Saudi initiatives were also evident in Abha. Serious differences were reported between Ibn Sa'ud's representative and Hasan Ibn 'A'id. The former introduced tough administrative measures and imposed a zakat, an act that incensed the various tribes aligned with Hasan. 251 In an attempt to restore his own position, Hasan looked for an opportunity to plot against Ibn

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Sa'ud's representative, al-'Aqili. However, there was a wider background to Hasan's discontent, as the tribe most antagonistic to Saudi presence in Abha was the Bani Shihr, which acted on Husayn's instructions.252 Husayn indeed forwarded money and ammunition to the Bani Shihr, who joined Hasan in a revolt against al-'Aqili.253 On January 1921, they raided Wahhabi caravans and were defeated by al-'Aqili; their leaders were summoned to Abha.254 During the late spring and summer of 1921, Hasan organized a force 5,000 headed by members of the al-'A'id clan. He then swept through the Qahtan tribal groups that had been loyal to Ibn Sa'ud, levied a tax on them, and captured both their chiefs and al-'Aqili.255 The Hijazi ruler embarked on an even more far-reaching venture. Reports indicate that in May Husayn dispatched an envoy, Sayyid Muhhamad al'Attas, to Imam Yahya and al-Idrisi proposing friendship and cooperation. Although the imam was enthusiastic, al-Idrisi was evasive.256 In July 1921, another envoy of Husayn, Sayyid Muhammad 'Alawi al-Saqqaf, conducted negotiations with al-Idrisi and delivered six letters from Husayn to him.257 In September, Sayyid Ahmad al-Sanusi, a relative of the leading al-Idrisi clan from Libya, visited Mecca to sound out Husayn's intentions and to pass them on to al-Idrisi in 'Asir. At that time, the Hijazi ruler clearly indicated that he sought a triple alliance among Yahya, al-Idrisi, and himself. Husayn made his intentions clear regarding Ibn Sa'ud: "He is the common enemy of us all. . . . We can never be discharging the obligations of our religion if we do not make a combined effort to thwart his plans and wipe off this scourge of mankind."258 Even al-Idrisi seems to have shifted gradually toward Husayn. When Hasan revolted, he cleverly put himself under al-Idrisi's vassalage. At that stage, alIdrisi was explicitly pro-Saudi and declared his readiness to help al-'Aqili, but he was advised by Fazluddin to remain passive.259 In fact, both sides sought alIdrisi's help, a situation that presented him with new opportunities. In April 1921 and January 1922, al-Idrisi indicated that despite his collaboration with Ibn Sa'ud, he was concerned about the expanding Wahhabi influence in 'Asir and the internal divisions spreading since 1920 among the 'Asiri tribes. He also was continuing to have disputes with the imam and was beset with economic problems.260 The plan that Husayn shrewdly offered would have afforded al-Idrisi the possibility of reducing tribal strife, regaining at least nominal control over Abha, and allaying his dispute with Yahya.261 Thus, Husayn tried to implement a strategy of persuading all the regional rulers to form a comprehensive anti-Saudi formation. In the spring of 1921, Ibn Sa'ud faced a broad anti-Saudi alliance in the making. In April 1921, he deployed three forces against Ibn Rashid. While his brother Muhammad was sent toward Hall, his sons Sa'ud and Faysal (Ibn Sa'ud's oldest surviving sons were still teenagers. The actual leaders of these military columns were tribal chiefs, who acted under the nominal command of Ibn Sa'ud's sons) were sent against the Shammar tribe. Ibn Sa'ud thus successfully implemented a strategy to gain control of the center at Ha'il as well as of the surrounding Shammar groups. Muhammad defeated a major Rashidi force near Ha'il, and Faysal managed to defeat and then to obtain the support

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of all of Jabal Shammar. Ibn Rashid returned to Ha'il, and in August a force headed by 'Aqab attempted to retaliate at Burayda. Sa'ud's force defeated this column, eliminating 'Aqab Bin 'Ajil's power. Al-Dawish was also mobilized, and the Saudis gained clear access to the city.262 Given Hall's fortifications, it was obvious that Ibn Sa'ud would attempt a major siege to facilitate its capture. In June, 'Abdullah Ibn Rashid sent a delegation to Ibn Sa'ud, offering to accept Ibn Sa'ud's conditions for peace as set out in April 1920. Ibn Sa'ud refused, arguing that "the rule of slaves and women at Ha'il is unbearable." He demanded the submission of the Rashidi family, indicating his intention to impose direct rule over the chieftaincy. Ibn Sa'ud also threatened to march on Ha'il in three months' time if his demands were not met.263 This ultimatum was not taken seriously, however. In August 1921, Dari and a group of Shammar tried to attack Saudi forces near Ha'il and were defeated. The political carousel of Ha'il produced a new ruler, who posed new problems for Ibn Sa'ud: Mudammad Ibn Talal, the brother of 'Abdullah (who had assassinated Sa'ud Ibn Rashid in March 1920), had been detained for several months but was released in early summer 1921. He attempted to recover al-Jawf from Nuri Sha'lan (who had exploited Ha'il's weakness and gained control there) and became the new ruler in Ha'il. Ibn Talal acted swiftly. He deployed a large force at the villages of Jathamiyya and Siniyya near Ha'il. Al-Dawish moved against him but could not defeat him. On September 8, Ibn Talal launched a night raid on alDawish's camp.264 By that time, Ibn Sa'ud had arrived at the battlefront. He did not attack immediately but, rather, waited several days in order to bring together his whole army of 10,000 armed men. In the meantime, Ibn Talal retreated to Ha'il, where Ibn Sa'ud initiated a siege. On November 21, 1921, Ha'il surrendered to Ibn Sa'ud after 55 days of fighting under siege. Ibn Talal was taken prisoner,265 and Jabal Shammar fell into Saudi hands. The fall of Ha'il had major consequences. Not only had Ibn Sa'ud proved the fighting capacity of his forces, but in view of Ha'il's geopolitical location, he had gained strategic supremacy over the whole of central and northern Arabia. One area to which Ibn Sa'ud acquired immediate access was al-Jawf. It constituted a battleground for not only the Rashidis but also the Ruwalla, who dwelt in Trans-Jordan and Syria and were tempted to exploit the waning of Rashidi rule to seize al-Jawf, the source of their date supply. Until 1922, Ibn Sa'ud had not expressed any intention of capturing that area; rather, he became involved in al-Jawf politics through his dealings with Ha'il, by means of tribal entanglements that developed into strategic considerations. In late 1921, the area served as an important buffer zone for Ibn Sa'ud between his territory and Trans-Jordan; therefore, politics in al-Jawf were of crucial interest to him. The last years of Rashidi rule, marked by the growing weakness of the dynasty, created a power vacuum in al-Jawf. The Ruwalla, the main contenders for local power, had insufficient strength to contain the various surrounding forces and interests and had to yield to Rashidi power. After Muhammad Ibn Talal's short-lived success against the Ruwalla leader, Nuri Sha'lan, Ha'il fell, and Nuri Sha'lan managed to recapture the

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area. The strategic position of the Ruwalla, however, had for several years attracted the attention of French authorities in Syria and, after the establishment of the Trans-Jordan emirate in 1921, that of the British as well. Nuri, already old, went into partial retirement at Damascus, leaving the actual conduct of affairs to his grandson Sulton. Nevertheless, in August 1922, Nuri succumbed to British pressures and agreed to the region's annexation to the emirate of Trans-Jordan.266 The British consul in Damascus, C. F. Palmer, argued that Nuri was still unsure who would gain the upper hand in the area and hence oscillated between France and Britain. Palmer insisted that Ibn Sa'ud was also plotting in al-Jawf.267 During the summer of 1922, Wahhabi proselytism was widespread among the Ruwalla. In February 1922, Philby wrote that "everything looks like a big forward movement to Ibn Sa'ud." He indicated that a Wahhabi-inspired rebellion had occurred at al-Jawf's main village, al-Sakaka.268 In May 1922, Ibn Sa'ud concluded the treaty of Muhammara, which made some progress in settling Najd's frontier problems with Iraq. However, increasing attempts by British officials to tempt Sha'lan and annex al-Jawf to Trans-Jordan brought to the fore Ibn Sa'ud's deep-seated fears of a Hashimite encirclement. In July, various incidents took place that indicated a growing ambition by Ibn Sa'ud to seize al-Jawf. Palmer noted in a memo that Ibn Sa'ud had effected a liaison with the French authorities in Syria, who promised him financial assistance for a joint venture with Sha'lan to capture al-Jawf.269 But Ibn Sa'ud preferred to act through alliances with smaller, more loyal groups. In July 1922, a major Wahhabi column was sent to al-Jawf, in support of a rebel leader in the Ruwalla, Hammad Ibn Muwaythir. The column conquered Khaybar and Tayma' on its way and then, together with the rebels, defeated a major force of Sha'lan at Qaryat al-Milh.270 In September 1922, Ibn Sa'ud explained that as he was the successor of the Rashidi regime, al-Jawf was rightfully his, that Nuri Sha'lan had been governing the area under his commission, and that as Sha'lan had failed, al-Jawf had to be recaptured.271 In the weeks that followed, however, Ibn Sa'ud mended fences with Sha'lan, and alJawf remained under Saudi protection. In July 1922, Ibn Sa'ud also deployed a force of 4,000, mainly Ikhwan from the hujar and 'Arid tribesmen under his son Faysal, against Abha. On the way, this force conquered Bisha and took punitive action against members of the Ghamid and the Zahran, who had abandoned the Wahhabi cause. Although unauthorized by Ibn Sa'ud,272 these actions proved fruitful, as about 4,000 members of those tribes joined Faysal in his march on Abha. The defenders of the town, mainly Bani Shihr equipped by Husayn, sensed the weakness of their position and fled in all directions; Hasan Ibn 'A'id escaped to Harmala, a mountain fort two days' journey south of Abha. On October 21, 1922, Faysal entered Abha peacefully. After several days of negotiations (during which Hasan tried to plot against the Wahhabis), Harmala was captured. Hasan managed to escape.273 Husayn's attempted cooperation with alIdrisi and Imam Yahya apparently produced no tangible results: The Hashimite leader's aggrandizement had finally alienated his potential allies.274

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Consequently, there was no strategic grouping to contain Faysal's advance. Moreover, Husayn's direct intervention, manifested in the dispatch of 500 soldiers in support of a local shaykh who had rebelled against Faysal in northern 'Asir, proved ineffective, as this force was routed by the Saudis.275 From 1919 to 1923, Saudi forces managed to conquer the regions of Jabal Shammar, al-Jawf, and northern 'Asir and to weaken decisively the rulers of Kuwayt and the Hijaz. The manner in which Ibn Sa'ud decided on his conquests and his actual campaigns reveals that he had no master plan for a systematic conquest and expansion. He attacked various arenas where an existing tribal dispute between loyal tribal groups and hostile rulers became acute. Fie was driven to assume responsibility in battlefronts through proselytism and the protection given to a loyal tribe, after which strategic interests impelled him to take a more aggressive approach. It was not until the summer of 1921 that Ibn Sa'ud embarked on a full-scale policy of expansion aimed at defeating his rivals. Fear of Ibn Sa'ud united his adversaries, and consequently an alliance arose against him, fueled largely by Hashimite interests and initiative. That was the challenge giving Ibn Sa'ud the determination to destroy all of his rivals. One major factor contributing to the Saudi success was the fact that Ibn Sa'ud had managed to improve his relations with the British to the point that they did not oppose his conquests. This can be attributed partly to their diminishing evaluation of Husayn, a result of Husayn's obstinacy concerning the British mandate, his grave financial situation, his exaggerated demands for hegemony, and his initial rejection of any policy proposal offered by the British, including peace with Ibn Sa'ud. Ibn Sa'ud projected the image of a leader capable both of restraining his bellicose tribes to avoid harming British interests and of marshaling them to conquest when the opportunity arose.276 He also proved flexible enough to comply with British initiatives for local settlements and remain an ally despite British support of Husayn. He thus not only achieved a certain sympathy for his expansionist attempts but also managed to project the image of a thoughtful leader, one who was able to control his feelings and act pragmatically. In June 1922, Balfour stated: "Ibn Sa'ud has on the whole behaved very well and has shown loyalty to His Majesty's government. Moreover, of all the chieftains in Arabia, he alone has shown signs of statesmanship." 277 Ibn Sa'ud, his sons, and other commanders of his forces were well acquainted with tribal politics in each arena of battle. They took pains to recruit the tribes or, that failing, to defeat them, as happened in Kuwayt, Ha'il, alJawf, and Abha. The spread of Wahhabi revivalism, benevolent taxation, and a projection of Ibn Sa'ud's appealing and charismatic image sometimes succeeded in enlisting tribes to the expanding Saudi chieftaincy. When it came to fighting, the main attacking force was composed of one or more columns deployed from Najd. The Arab writer al-Madani stated that in 1921 Ibn Sa'ud grouped his forces in five main area headquarters: (i) a northeast force, led from Lina and Umm al-Radma by Ibn Jabril and Ibn Thanayan, covering the Iraqi frontier as well as the Shammar area; (2) a northwest force, led from al-

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Jubba by Ibn Daghmi and Ibn 'Uqayl, covering northern Hijaz and TransJordan; (3) a force based at Dakhna and Tayma' under Ibn Nahit, covering Mecca and al-Madina; (4) a force centered at Khurma, led by Khalid Ibn alLuwway, also arrayed against the Hijaz; and (5) al-Dawish's force based in alArtawiyya, which functioned as a reserve force.278 Even though Habib questioned the accuracy of al-Madani's description,279 al-Madani's outline of Saudi deployment was probably valid, at least during the period of active conquest. Fighting in a multiplicity of arenas, it is probable that Ibn Sa'ud established a highly organized force. The fact that in 1920 he could move the al-Ghatghat Ikhwan against Ibn Rashid, al-Dawish against Kuwayt and Ibn Rashid, and his son Faysal against Ibn Rashid and later against Abha proves that the nucleus of an institutionalized army had been established. Ibn Sa'ud's army included local tribes and possibly area headquarters and, at the same time, a highly mobile, strongly motivated, and durable force of the Ikhwan from the hujar and the 'Arid people.280 It was the participation of these elements in the different forces that constituted the real advantage of the Saudis over their opponents.

The Subvention Policy Subsidies paid in monthly installments of gold or cash were a major tool in implementing policies in Arabia. Not only were subsidies a legitimate and workable system for buying the loyalty of local chieftains for British interests; they also were an instrument in local politics. A local ruler could thus maintain a certain economic base for his chieftaincy, obtain the loyalty of tribes, and develop a fighting capacity. Sometimes accompanied by shipments of arms and ammunition, the subventions could symbolize and give actual substance to hierarchical arrangements between Britain and local rulers and among local rulers and tribes. Throughout the war, the British allocated subsidies to rulers like al~Idrisi, Fahd Beg of the 'Anaza, Husayn, and Ibn Sa'ud. Husayn's subvention was unequivocally the highest, far greater than all others: Throughout 1916-17, he received £125,000 per month, exclusive of military assistance. Ibn Sa'ud received a subsidy of £5,000 per month from January 1917, a situation clearly reflecting the priority assigned by the British to Husayn. Ibn Sa'ud's subsidy was nonetheless economically and politically significant. In 1919, when various British government departments checked their war expenditures, claiming refunds from one another, they discovered that the subsidy to Ibn Sa'ud, originally allocated for only six months, had been continued without interruption and was still being paid in 1919. It seems that the original allocation had been sent to India before its communication to the India Office and that it had not contained a clear time limitation. The financial secretary to the India Office then explained that the government of India "took this as an authority to continue payment." 281 Subsequently, the payments were overlooked. But because the secretary of state for India (Austen Chamberlain at the time when

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the payment was endorsed, who was then succeeded by Edwin Montagu), gave the authorization, in conjunction with other offices, it is almost inconceivable that such a mistake could have been perpetuated over such an extended period of time. As Shuckburgh explained: "The fact that the subsidy was being continued must have been well known to the departments concerned. It was clearly brought out and never challenged."282 The fact that it was not challenged arouses curiosity. The matter became further complicated during 1918, when additional sums were paid to Ibn Sa'ud. During the inquests of 1919, the War Office demanded a refund of £95,630, after a sum of £7,500 had already been returned to that office earlier (making the total amount of the refund £103,130), on account of allowances given to Ibn Sa'ud to March 1918.283 In the following months the Foreign Office claimed to have given Ibn Sa'ud £18,343, and the India Office, another £16,875 for special assignments during July and August 1918.284 Obviously those sums constituted an addition to the amount due to cover the unauthorized subsidies to Ibn Sa'ud. The Foreign Office officials thought that the additional sums related only to the "small doles" of money that the interdepartmental committee had authorized Cox to allocate to Ibn Sa'ud (on Cox's initiative) in order to keep Ibn Sa'ud in play after the decision not to launch an attack on Ha'il had been taken. The Treasury, accepting this explanation, noted that the Foreign Office was not aware that Ibn Sa'ud was also the recipient of a regular subsidy. The explanation of the Foreign Office officials stressed that "Simla [India] and Baghdad clearly regarded the doles as an addition to the subsidy."285 Hence, it appears that Wilson, Cox, and the government in India knew about both types of payment. It is thus reasonable to conclude that the former two were also aware that the subsidy had ceased to be authorized, yet they did not demand an inquiry. Wilson reported in November 1918 that Ibn Sa'ud was receiving a regular subsidy,286 revealing a discrepancy that should have drawn attention to the additional doles, but there was no follow-up. Moreover, as the subsidy to Ibn Sa'ud was paid by India—although from "imperial funds"287—it is not clear for what purpose the additional sums were allocated and to what extent their purposes overlapped. The problem was revealed in the various payments allocated through Philby's Najd mission. The India Office's claim for reimbursement related to that expenditure, and other similar claims, might have as well. It is apparent that a sum of £16,875 was allocated in July and August 1918 by the India Office for Ibn Sa'ud's operations against Ibn Rashid, but it seems that the actual sums expended were much higher. In his report of the Najd mission, Philby admitted that he had given Ibn Sa'ud the £20,000 for the assault on Ha'il in September, which Philby himself had instigated. (It is not certain whether this sum includes the figure that the India Office claimed to have spent.) But Cox had already asked in March 1918 that a two-month subsidy to Ibn Sa'ud be regarded as a special grant to support his ventures against Ibn Rashid. 288 Philby himself confirmed that an "enhanced subsidy" had been paid from April to December 1918.289

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The fact that larger sums of money were paid was investigated again in March 1920 by Shuckburgh. To his inquiry, Philby replied that an enhanced subsidy of £10,000 had been given to Najd "meant as regular subsidy for a new scheme but [that] only one such payment was made."290 This does not seem to have been the case; however. Shuckburgh stated in his report that £20,000 had been spent in this framework and that it was difficult to establish who had authorized the payment.291 In August 1918 Baghdad had again pushed for assistance to Ibn Sa'ud against Ibn Rashid, and the Foreign Office had agreed "to place liberal funds at Philby's disposal," actually to an unlimited extent.292 Indeed, Wilson wrote to Montagu in January 1920: "Kindly note that continuation of subsidy of £10,000 monthly till the end of the war was authorized in your telegram of the 28th October in reply to my telegram of 16th October."293 When responding to the request to cut Ibn Sa'ud's subsidy, Wilson commented, "Subsidy was to be continued at the rate of £5,000, i.e., half of the £10,000 he had been receiving till December 1918."294 Another fact should be emphasized: In addition to money, Ibn Sa'ud received from Philby (as part of the £42,500 Najd mission expenditure) 3,000 bags of rice, 200 bags of sugar, 5,300 rifles (from September 1915 to October 1918), and 700,000 rounds of ammunition. 295 The subvention policy adopted by the British toward Ibn Sa'ud was, thus, characterized by a certain amount of bureaucratic disarray, which resulted in uncoordinated expenditures by various offices lacking authoritative sanction. It is also clear that various British offices were not only liberal but also careless regarding the amounts expended. The relatively low figures invovled and the overwhelming pressures may in part account for the outlays. The Najdi ruler, of course, had to perform services to the British in return for these subsidies. But Ibn Sa'ud received far higher amounts than authorized: Not only did he receive a regular unsanctioned subsidy but also additional sums, mainly during 1918, in connection with Philby's initiatives. The expenditure of large sums on the initiative of Cox or Philby (in at least one case with Montagu's confirmation) might lead to the conclusion that the pro-Saudi British officials exploited the situation to their protege's advantage. The investigation of Ibn Sa'ud's subsidy exposed the tenuous basis on which it had been granted. The investigation also coincided with the interdepartmental committee meetings, which during the first half of 1919 were anti-Saudi in tone. In Cairo, during the period when Wilson's policy turned against Ibn Sa'ud, the pro-Husayn school had its way. A message initiated by Sir Milne Cheetham, then the acting high commissioner of Egypt, and approved in London, was sent to Baghdad: "Circumstances in which his subsidy was originally granted no longer exist. Termination of hostilities has entirely altered situation."296 The very low opinion of Ibn Sa'ud held by the proHusayn school was evident. The message ordered the halving of his subsidy and criticized Wahhabi rule in Khurma. 297 This message of March 12, 1919, was delivered to Bahrayn for execution on March 22.298. Officially, Wilson reported back only on December 12, after his return to Baghdad; he explained that the notification telegram "never reached Bahrayn

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with the result that payments have continued at full rates. . . . Ibn Sa'ud has not been informed of reduction . . . your telegram of March 12th reached Baghdad after my departure and was overlooked by me on my return in May."299 Wilson asserted that the order to cut Ibn Sa'ud's subsidy had not been carried out because of a communication failure. The money, therefore, was still being paid. It seems that no authority really questioned this explanation. Troeller proposed a different explanation: The March 22 telegram did reach Bahrayn, but because of a sympathetic communication from Ibn Sa'ud offering complete devotion to Britain, Allenby suggested that the message be delayed, pending its referral to Wilson. Wilson ultimately instructed Baghdad to carry out the order on April 11, 1919, and it was this letter that was lost, precipitating the error.300 Troeller based his assertion on valid evidence, but his conclusion is misleading, as the telegram in question—the original one— had indeed reached Bahrayn for execution, as Troeller himself admitted. It is necessary to examine what happened in Bahrayn itself. The British agent of the day, Captain Norman Bray, was in close liaison with Wilson's deputy in Baghdad, E. B. Howell. Siddiq Hasan reported to Wilson on December 9 (after an ailing Bray had left his position: This letter [of March 22] though prepared for Ibn Sa'ud was never sent in view of Bray's two telegrams . . . dated 26th March and . . . of 31st March and Howell's telegram . . . dated 1st April in which latter concurred with Bray's suggestion that letter be withheld. . . . My predecessor [Bray] states he fully understood reduction had not been finally ordered.301

The telegrams referred to, short and concise, contain Bray's query to Howell as to whether Howell concurred in withholding the execution of the order and Howell's reply: "I concur."302 Previous cooperation had obviously existed between Bray and Howell, culminating in this exchange. Their wish— especially Bray's—to maintain the flow of finances to Ibn Sa'ud is not explicit in this exchange but can be detected in various other communications. Undoubtedly one of Ibn Sa'ud's staunchest supporters, Bray, in his book, called the Najdi ruler the "National Champion of the Arab Peoples." In a note of July 1919, he stressed that Ibn Sa'ud personally obeyed Britain in all matters and was also vitally important to Britain's interests. In return, "it must be admitted that owing no doubt, to circumstances he has been treated in a way to make him doubt our good faith towards himself. ... If it came to a real war between King Hussein and Ibn Sa'ud, King Hussein would be driven from Mecca."303 One of the few officials who outlined a scheme for the future British retention of Arabia, Bray favored the establishment of an Arab federation in Arabia. He explicitly stated that pro-Husayn policies should not work to Ibn Sa'ud's detriment, as Ibn Sa'ud was actually the key person in the area, in a position to destroy Husayn and damage British interests.304 In this clear-cut, characteristically pro-Saudi formulation, Bray was expressing strong opposition to the dominant tendency of British policy in early 1919: He viewed full support to Husayn as a casus belli for Ibn Sa'ud, one that would trigger constant unrest and harm both Husayn and the British. Bray

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reiterated his stand at the beginning of March 1919,305 following an adamant February 27 letter from Curzon to Ibn Sa'ud that prohibited his advance "into what is unquestionable Hejaz territory." A further message to Ibn Sa'ud on March 8 threatened for the first time to cut off his subsidy.306 Howell complied with Bray's proposal to add a paragraph to the February 27 message, stating that Britain viewed Ibn Sa'ud as "the most enlightened leader in Arabia," who aimed "to increase . . . happiness and prosperity."307 In response to the March 8 message, Bray conveyed to Ibn Sa'ud a letter on March 9, obviously without approval from above, informing him that the March 8 message had been sent to him "in error" (arising from Wilson's earlier absence from Baghdad) and asking the Najdi ruler to disregard it. Simultaneously, he wrote to Baghdad suggesting that Husayn be urged "to cooperate with his powerful neighbor."308 Because opposition to Ibn Sa'ud was growing among British policymakers, who in early 1919 were engaged in a long series of meetings in London, Bray, assisted by Howell, tried to stem this tide by a number of moves. The result was the extension of Ibn Sa'ud's subsidy. Siddiq Hasan reported the extension to Wilson on December 9, 1919; the latter reported the version of the lost telegram and its subsequent neglect on December 12. Three days was usually sufficient time for a telegram to reach Baghdad from Bahrayn. Hence, one may conclude that Wilson had actually received the telegram and was covering up the true reasons for extending Ibn Sa'ud's subsidy. Back in Baghdad and having reembraced his old pro-Saudi views, Wilson collaborated in assisting the Najdi ruler. This assistance not only reflected the rivalry among the differing British camps (members of the pro-Saudi group were prepared to indulge in deceit in order to forestall the success of their rivals) but also resulted in financial benefit for Ibn Sa'ud. Wilson could have decided to cut Ibn Sa'ud's subsidy in December 1919, after the discovery of the "error." But he recommended deferring any change in the amount of the subsidy until April 1920.309 It is not surprising that the India Office also recommended extending Ibn Sa'ud's subsidy after that data at the rate of £5,000 per month "unless and until fresh circumstances such as the signing of the peace treaty would lead to the settlement of the controversy."310 What is more surprising is the fact that among the advocates for the extension of the subsidy were figures like Cornwallis and Allenby. Their various arguments seem to have had a common denominator: a design for future British influence in Arabia, facilitated by a major settlement. In designating the elements of the future settlement, British officials did not alter earlier British commitments based on prevailing perceptions, loyalties, and tactics. No changes in the status of or relationships among rulers were proposed, and even the afore-mentioned British-inspired conciliatory September 1920 meeting between Najdi and Hijazi delegates was irrelevant. The subvention policy continued to be crucial to maintaining British control. Not only was it a quicker and more efficient way of influencing rulers and a cheaper method of maintaining British interests than the deployment of troops, but it also was an effective means of satisfying local tribes and rulers, who had

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grown accustomed to subventions and financial doles. Austen Chamberlain (the chancellor of the exchequer) and Curzon, as well as Hirtzel of the India Office, reiterated this fact throughout 1920.311 The system satisfied the several British policymaking centers and tended to secure the positions of the various local rulers; consequently, there was no incentive to change it. When in an interdepartmental meeting in April 1920, Young of the Foreign Office and Garbett of the India Office raised "unconventional" ideas for subsidies, such as financing only one ruler or only the Hajj, their proposals were overruled.312 Marrs of the India Office summarized: "The chief considerations would be perhaps previous commitments on one hand and present value on the other. . . . Doing out [away] with subsidies, unless we are prepared to give every big chief a subsidy, upsets the natural equilibrium of Arabian politics."313 The neutralization of Ibn Sa'ud to prevent him from taking action that might jeopardize or upset the balance of power was perceived as crucial. As previously mentioned, one way to guarantee this was to involve the Najdi ruler in a future settlement; a further subsidy was also viewed as contributing to this end. Thus, British officials increasingly emphasized that future British interests were linked to the continuing payment of subsidies to Ibn Sa'ud. Philby, in London, was adamant that Ibn Sa'ud receive a quid pro quo. Otherwise, with no "gain hereby," Ibn Sa'ud would seize the Hijazi holy cities to compensate himself with pilgrimage and customs revenues.314 Cornwallis pointed out Ibn Sa'ud's ability to control his tribes.315 Allenby, who compared Britain's role in Arabia with the earlier Turkish one—thus manifesting the ambitious attitude of British officials toward Arabia—favored subsidizing all the local chiefs.316 Wilson stressed the danger of Ibn Sa'ud's joining the PanIslamic movement, and Shuckburgh underscored the possibility of the Najdi ruler's undermining a future settlement between Britain and Turkey by joining radical forces.317 Ibn Sa'ud himself pointed out that despite his obtaining only minimal financial help, he had served British interests. He brought as evidence his nonparticipation in anti-British intrigues, despite the incitement of his neighbors from Syria and Iraq,318 and the fact that he had not attempted to conquer the pro-British protectorates of Kuwayt, Bahrayn, Qatar, and Oman. In September 1920, he asked for an increase in his subsidy.319 The message was clear: Unless the subsidy—the most fluid and efficient tool of British policy—was extended, Ibn Sa'ud would be alienated and might act against British interests in Arabia. This was why Montagu questioned Wilson in October 1920 about the "precise directions in which you anticipate his [Ibn Sa'ud's] influence might be used for harm in case stoppage of subsidy proved sufficient to estrange him,"320 and Wilson offered the preceding answer. In an interdepartmental committee in December 1920, only the chancellor of the exchequer questioned the prolongation of Ibn Sa'ud's subsidy on purely financial grounds. It was then agreed that the annual sum for Arabian chiefs should not exceed £100,000, the cost of which would be shared equally by India and the imperial exchequer. Ibn Sa'ud's subsidy might have been reduced accordingly to £25,000 per annum, 321 but as these recommendations

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were to be enacted from 1921, they clashed with the preparations for the Cairo conference which was to lay down principles for future British policy. The secretary of state for the colonies, Winston Churchill, who presided over the meetings of the conference, was eventually influenced by the local experts. For Lawrence and Cornwallis, not to mention Cox, the extension of subventions to Ibn Sa'ud was indispensable. Indeed, even pro-Sharifi officials concurred, for the sake of maintaining the Hashimite regimes. Ibn Sa'ud's strategic and diplomatic assets remained intact: "His capacity to harm us" was the prevailing theme. Ibn Sa'ud's ability both to harness and check the "fanatic" Ikhwan, an effective military and raiding force, was attributed to his skill and leadership. Cox asserted that Ibn Sa'ud watched over the caravan routes well; even though Najdi tribes had raided Iraq and Trans-Jordan, Cox argued that if Ibn Sa'ud had not been in control, the raiding would have been worse.322 Even the British cabinet was impressed. Churchill argued that it was through subsidies that Britain checked what Arab chiefs did or, rather, "what they are not doing."323 He repeated the argument that a subsidy of Ibn Sa'ud should be given as a substitute for the dispatch of battalions to the area, which might be much more costly. The special subcommittee adopted Cox's proposal and argued for allocating to Ibn Sa'ud £100,000 per annum. Churchill stipulated the almost self-evident conditions: Ibn Sa'ud would refrain from attacking Kuwayt, Hijaz, and Iraq. In order to ensure this, Churchill suggested that payment to Ibn Sa'ud be made in arrears.324 In the end, influenced by Chamberlain's financial worries and by Curzon's objection to an extravagant increase in Ibn Sa'ud's subsidy, the authorities fixed the amount at £60,000 per annum, accompanied by one lump sum of £20,000.325 Financial difficulties subsequently overshadowed political considerations. The government of India was reluctant to pay its share of the subsidies, thus placing a heavier burden on the British exchequer. The staff of the newly established Middle East Department of the Colonial Office set itself the goal of reducing the total expenditure on subsidies from £33.5 million per annum to £4 million.326 In April 1923, it was decided to stop providing subsidies to Arabian chieftains by April 1924. Ibn Sa'ud and Husayn each were due to receive a final lump sum of £50,000.327 Despite their having no alternative policy, when confronted by an acute financial problem, the British decided to abolish the subvention system completely. In comparison with the subsidy allocated to Husayn (£125,000 per month till April 1917, then £100,000 till October 1919, £75,000 for only that month, and £25,000 per month till February 1920),328 Ibn Sa'ud received little more than token amounts. The subventions had not altered the basic economic situation in the Saudi chieftaincy. In fact, apart from a wish to establish a "state revenue" (divulged to Cox on October 1920),329 Ibn Sa'ud did not at this juncture contemplate any radical economic change. The money he received was employed for more traditional purposes. He complained that he had no means to pay his "great Bedouin tribes" who in the past had "terrorizefd] the countryside" but had

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been led to "abide the law"330 by his inducements. He complained of being unable to repay loans331 or to match Husayn's blandishments to his tribes.332 He also criticized the prohibitive rate of customs that Najdi merchants were forced to pay in the ports of Kuwayt and Bahrayn, 333 which since 1920 had resulted in an effective ban on Najdi subjects' trading with Kuwayt. These were standard political problems; in dealing with tribes, a chief had to buy their loyalty in order to secure caravan routes. Indeed, from Ibn Sa'ud's own references to his utilization of revenues, it is clear that he employed them for traditional chieftaincy arrangements and did not allocate them to other functions, such as increasing capital or investing in development.334 Philby noted that in 1914 Ibn Sa'ud could carry the state revenue "in the saddle bags of his camel";335 thus it is reasonable to conclude that relatively little had changed by the early 1920s. Ibn Sa'ud used the subventions as another "center of gravity" to help him secure tribal loyalties during expansion. Ibn Sa'ud also had to support a growing population in the hujar, a burden that had not existed in earlier years. Ibn Sa'ud also benefited from British financial policies toward Husayn, whose subsidy was completely cut off in February 1920. Its renewal was conditional on Husayn's fulfillment of demands such as a substantial improvement of the Hajj to satisfy the pilgrims and abstention from further antiFrench and Pan-Islamic agitation. 336 Husayn's subsidy was renewed only in September 1921 and maintained on a level similar to that of Ibn Sa'ud over the same period.337 It constituted a strikingly reduced amount for Husayn, to the benefit of Ibn Sa'ud. The dialectics of the British policy of subventions thus gave Ibn Sa'ud a major advantage over his rival in the crucial period of 192021, by cutting off the latter's subsidy over the larger part of that period. The terms on which Husayn's subsidy was later renewed were also very favorable to Ibn Sa'ud. It is noteworthy that British subventions were of greater use to Ibn Sa'ud when they were cut off. During the last years of their payment, the subventions undoubtedly took on the nature of ransom money paid to prevent Ibn Sa'ud from an onslaught on British-protected areas, mainly the Hijaz. As the "ransom" was ended as the result of a unilateral British step and not because of any dereliction on the part of the Najdi ruler, Ibn Sa'ud felt free to embark on his most cherished wish, capturing the Hijaz. In Philby's words, "Ibn Sa'ud, having no British subsidy to restrain him and no hope for a reasonable settlement to induce him to be patient, meant business."338

The "Crawling" Into the Hijaz Various Arab writers have described the Saudi occupation of the Hijaz by the term zahf, meaning an advance or a march on a target.339 Literally, the term means "crawling" or "creeping," and this sort of movement was characteristic of the Saudi advance. It is difficult to estimate when Ibn Sa'ud originally decided to occupy the Hijaz. Habib's observation that from the advent of his

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rise to power in Riyadh in 1901, Ibn Sa'ud intended to reclaim the Hijaz as his rightful inheritance, his ancestral birthright, cannot be doubted. Goldrup, on the other hand, believes that the incidents of Khurma and Turaba and the subsequent rivalries prompted the ensuing Hashimite-Saudi rivalry and lay behind the initiative to advance on the Hijaz.340 There is no real discrepancy between the two statements. Before the 1920s, Ibn Sa'ud might have had a general ambition to restore his ancestral empire and occupy the Hijaz. As late as the eve of the battle of Turaba, he had no practical strategy for attacking the Hijaz or occupying it. After the battle, however, the whole of the Hijaz was at Ibn Sa'ud's mercy, which made a major Saudi attack on the area a real possibility. Other considerations, however, still prevented Ibn Sa'ud from taking action. The British pressed for a settlement between the protagonists, and Ibn Sa'ud's dependence on the British subvention made it incumbent on him to try to conform to their wishes. Besides, his rivalry with Husayn was indirectly manifested in other arenas. The Hijaz itself did not constitute a full-scale combat arena until 1924. Before that time, Hijazi events involved mainly tribal conflicts, motivated by Wahhabi proselytism. The stage was set for Saudi expansion by proselytism and the projection of Ibn Sa'ud's victorious image, which spread in the Hijaz as a result of the battle of Turaba and the dispatching of mutawa'a to the area. In August 1919, Husayn discovered in Mecca a Wahhabi group supporting Ibn Sa'ud and connected with Khalid. The group included the chief qadi, the keeper of the holy shrine (al-ka'ba), several merchants and the Hijazi agent in Cairo, a notable named sharif Sharaf, and his Hijazi family. This group constituted the nucleus of a pro-Saudi constituency in the Hijaz, one that would grow steadily in the years to come. The 'Utayba and the Harb were major targets for proselytism. In July 1919, 'Ali (Husayn's son) was prompted to destroy the headquarters of the two tribes because of their Wahhabi sympathies. In November 1920, Farhan Beg (who participated in the Saudi-Hashimite discussions of September 1920) listed all the tribal chiefs who supported Wahhabism in Eastern Hijaz; only three 'Utayba shaykhs still supported Husayn, and they had no real followers.341 A report from January 1921 indicated that the 'Utayba's sympathy for Ibn Sa'ud "was common knowledge." A month earlier, one-third of the poor and one-half of the "better class" in Jidda were reported sympathetic to Wahhabism. In May 1922, "mudayanism" was reported to have heavily affected the population of al-Madina and Khaybar. Even the commander of the Khaybar fort was reported to be Wahhabi.342 In addition, Wahhabism was spread through raids launched by Khalid against settled areas, endangering travel routes among them. In July 1919, Khalid and the people of al-Ghatghat raided the villages of Sharma and Dafina, 65 miles north of 'Ushayra and 25 miles east of the Hajj route between Mecca and al-Madina. 343 In December 1920, Khalid raided Ta'if as well as Bisal and Mahani on the way to ai-Madina. A Hijazi column originating from Ta'if managed to repel the latter raid.344 It is important to note that

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according to British reports from Jidda, Ibn Sa'ud partially endorsed those raids, giving Khalid license to raid the countryside only. At that stage, Khalid probably exceeded Ibn Sa'ud's instructions.345 The Najdi ruler, in his turn, did not assist him beyond giving him ammunition. 346 However, from early 1922 Ibn Sa'ud tended to give his active endorsement to Khalid's operations, probably after the defeat of Ha'il and upon obtaining more evidence of Husayn's part in the anti-Saudi alliance. In February 1922, Dickson reported that Ibn Sa'ud had commissioned Ibn Humayd at al-Ghatghat to place himself at Khalid's service in fighting Husayn.347 Ibn Sa'ud might also have decided to enhance his support for Khalid in reprisal for an attack in the spring of 1922 by pro-Hashimite Bedouins of indeterminate tribal affiliation on a Wahhabi mosque at Turaba. In retaliation, Khalid conquered Ghamid in southeast Hijaz in March 1922.348 In July 1922, a column led by Khalid conquered Khaybar, removing a major obstacle in the route to al-Madina. The strategic benefit of such raids naturally encouraged Ibn Sa'ud to increase his support of Khalid. Combined with the potential benefits of adherence to Wahhabism, such as religious fervor, lower taxes, and participation in booty sharing, the fear aroused by the raids tended to bring Hijazi tribal groups over to the Saudi side. The pro-Wahhabi buildup and strategic advance in the Hijaz must also be evaluated in light of the shortcomings of Husayn's regime. As a result of the drastic reduction in British subsidies and the growing Wahhabi encroachments into the Hijaz, Husayn pursued increasingly harsh military and financial policies. Furthermore, as he was no longer able to pay tribes significant subventions, a major basis of his authority collapsed. He tried to replace it with forceful means and additional taxes, but these measures merely widened the gap between himself and his supposed subjects. The tribes resented Husayn's increasing attempts to tax them, as well as his efforts to mobilize them against Wahhabi forces. In October 1921, it was reported that about 800 men from Mecca had fled to Yemen and to the Sudan, in order to avoid conscription.349 Moreover, there are indications that Husayn's frustrations in military and financial matters and his worsening relations with the British caused him to become impatient and tyrannical toward his aides, the town dwellers, and the tribes.350 Consequently, the daily administration of the Hijaz began to deteriorate. Already in March and August 1920, robbery and bribery were reported to be "worse than under the Turks."351 In August 1921, Lawrence wrote that Hijaziorganized defense forces in each of the main cities did not exceed more than a few hundred men at the most. He noted that they were badly paid and that they constantly quarreled with the three hundred Syrian officers who commanded them. The Wahhabis could, Lawrence concluded, overrun the Hijaz with a thousand men.352 In November 1922, merchants at al-Madina revolted against the imposition of higher taxes, and both the mayor and the governor of the city resigned.353 Thus, the support of the local population for the Wahhabi forces emanated from a combination of proselytism, fear, and possible benefits to be got from

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the Saudi regime, as well as from antagonism toward the Hashimites. Batten noted: "The motive [to support the Wahhabis] appears to be largely due to fear and a desire to be on the safe side in the event of invasion. . . . But also genuine disgust with malpractices . . . and a reaction against the present state of affairs under King Hussein."354 This process gained momentum early in 1924. The British consul, Reader Bullard, explained the attenuating support for Husayn in these terms: "Why fight for a King we hate against a formidable enemy, when we may hope to conciliate [the] latter by calling ourselves Wahhabi and joining in the pillage or even by merely remaining neutral."355 The scenario of the Hijazi front thus involved tribal developments in which Ibn Sa'ud had a rather indirect role. His assistance to Khalid was at a low level, and it seems that his control over Khalid's forces was steadily growing but not yet total. According to Wahbah, during 1923 Ibn Sa'ud began to contemplate occupying the Hijaz.356 The cause for occupation, however, became evident only in 1924. The first was the failure of the Kuwayt conference to effect a regional frontier settlement. This fact, which became apparent in April-May 1924, meant the total breakdown of any attempted conciliation between Husayn and Ibn Sa'ud: A clash seemed inevitable. The deterioration can also be attributed to the Arabian anti-Saudi alliance and the erection of what Ibn Sa'ud envisioned as the "Hashimite tier" of states surrounding Najd. At the Kuwayt conference, some progress was made regarding the Najdi borders with Iraq and Trans-Jordan, but not with the Hijaz. Husayn did not send a Hijazi delegate to the conference and generally rejected what the Saudis perceived as "very moderate" Saudi proposals.357 In January 1924, after the first conference session, Husayn stated that there was no point in his holding any discussions with the Najdi ruler unless the latter first evacuated territories belonging to the Hijaz and Ibn Rashid, and compensated the offended tribes. He further complained bitterly to the British for not consulting with him before the conference: "Did that mean . . . that they wished no longer to consider him?"358 Ultimately, Husayn agreed to send his son Zayd to the conference, and the British put pressure on Ibn Sa'ud to follow suit.359 But the latter, not having been bound initially to comply with such a request, did not reciprocate.360 At this stage Ibn Sa'ud was convinced, in Wahbah's words, that it was time to "turn Hussein's many mistakes to the advantage of Nejd"361 and eliminate him. Before the conference was over in May, the presiding officer, Colonel S. G. Knox, wrote that Ibn Sa'ud was actually prepared to fight out his claims with Husayn.362 In a way, Husayn brought the problem on himself by failing to exploit the opportunity provided at the conference, but there is no doubt that at that stage Ibn Sa'ud himself was determined to embark on an attack. Another apparent reason for Ibn Sa'ud's determination was his relationship with the British. After the Kuwayt conference, the British finally decided to implement the decision to cut off subsidies to Arabian chiefs. With his aggressiveness toward Husayn already at a peak, Ibn Sa'ud found that a major constraint that had thus far subordinated him to the British had been elimi-

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nated, along with his obligation to refrain from attacking the Hijaz. The advantages of the Saudi occupation of the Hijaz, notably control over the holy places and access to the Red Sea trade, were actually considered by Ibn Sa'ud as factors that might in the future help him develop sound relations with the British.363 Hence, Ibn Sa'ud thought he had little to lose and possibly a lot to gain by occupying the Hijaz at that point. There were other developments in 1924 that favored occupation. By then, Husayn was on bad terms with both Egypt and India, because of his previous mistreatment of pilgrims from those countries. In addition, a serious problem had emerged regarding the Egyptian medical mission that escorted the annual Egyptian pilgrim caravan (mahmat). In March that year, Husayn declared himself khalifa, a declaration that naturally alarmed Ibn Sa'ud, as it signaled the renewal of his old rival's ambitions and a bid for supremacy. But Husayn received no support for his declaration from the Muslim world, whereas Ibn Sa'ud found support for his criticism of Husayn from Egypt and the khilafat movement in India.364 The religious and diplomatic support that Ibn Sa'ud had received were discussed on July 13 at a convention of Ikhwan and 'ulama'. Ibn Sa'ud then announced his decision to attack the Hijaz, a decision that met with general approval. The fact that Husayn had blocked the pilgrimage of Najdis angered every Wahhabi and was emphasized by all the speakers at the convention. Ultimately, it was decided to circulate "a Green Book" that would explain the Saudi decision to Muslim nations.365 Two considerations influencing that decision should be underscored. First, the prohibition of Najdis from performing the pilgrimage was not only a serious irritant to the Saudis but also an important pretext that could be used to legitimize Saudi action in the eyes of Muslim nations. In fact, cooperation with external Muslim forces was a new tactic that Ibn Sa'ud had begun to exploit. Ibn Sa'ud counted on Britain's not intervening. The appeal to Muslim nations indicates that preparations for the attack on the Hijaz included elements of planning and timing that had not characterized Ibn Sa'ud's previous military enterprises. Wahbah, who was an eyewitness to the events, explained that the timing of the attack (after the pilgrimage), the stages of occupation, and possible British reaction all were discussed beforehand. 366 The careful planning gave a new dimension to the occupation. Three diversionary forces were sent to Iraq and Trans-Jordan, and on September 5, a main force, composed of Ikhwan from al-Ghatghat, tribesmen of 'Utayba and Qahtan, and Khalid's men from Khurma occupied Ta'if.367 At this point, Ibn Sa'ud apparently gave no further operational orders, preferring to cease operations for the time being. The situation that then developed reflected the internal deterioration and collapse of the Hijazi regime, which was exploited by the Saudi forces. The occupation of Ta'if exposed the inadequacy of the Hashimite army and the mediocrity of its command. Ta'if fell easily after Sabri, the commander of the 500 Hijazi soldiers, made a futile strategic decision to abandon Ta'if's fortifications and face the Wahhabis at Wadi Muharram, outside the town. The Saudi forces defeated him easily and marched into the evacuated city. Husayn's son

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'All was to establish a second line of defense at Hada\ on the way to Mecca. But 'Ali fled to Mecca, where Husayn confronted him angrily and ordered him to return. 'Ali obeyed with 500 men. On September 26, the Wahhabi force gained an easy victory at Hada'. In early November, 'AH was left with only 50 men to defend the road to Mecca.368 The deteriorating state of the Hijazi forces had a devastating impact on the people of Mecca and Jidda. Evidence of Wahhabi massacres and looting in Ta'if, deliberately publicized by Husayn, added to their fear.369 As many as i ,500 of Mecca's merchants fled to Jidda. The administration of the city was reported paralyzed.370 A group of Mecca notables then organized and pressed Husayn to abdicate. The following facts shed some light on the nature of the group. These notables later established a "National Representative Council" (majlis niyabi watani), which led Goldrup to conclude that "the Hijaz became a constitutional monarchy."371 This assertion seems far-fetched, but it highlights the activities of a group of notables, calling themselves the Nationalist Hijazi party (al-hizh al-watani al-Hijazi), who dominated Mecca simply because nobody else did. They were definitely not eager to fall under a Wahhabi regime, and they tried to force Husayn to abdicate so as to placate Ibn Sa'ud in the hope that he would accept 'Ali's rule. Throughout September and early October, they corresponded with Ibn Sa'ud, presenting themselves as an "impartial body . . . only interested in the welfare and peace of the country."372 Their leader, Muhammad al-Tawil, was the director of customs at Mecca and a close aide of Husayn, but at this juncture, he used his position to force Husayn's abdication. On October 2, Husayn again announced his intention to "fight until the end," declaring 'Ali to be "his own" (flesh and blood) who would not take over.373 at this stage 'AH remained passive and did not visibly side with his father. On October 6, Husayn abdicated, acting under pressure from al-Tawil. On October n, al-Tawil wrote to Ibn Sa'ud, suing for peace and recognition of 'Ali as the new king.374 It would be reasonable to conclude that al-Tawi] and 'Ali cooperated, hoping to divert Ibn Sa'ud from Mecca. By 1924, the British understood that any attempt to save Husayn would be useless. On September 30, 1924, they informed Husayn of their decision in response to his request for British aid: "[The British do] ... not propose to be entangled in any struggle for possession of the holy places of Islam. . . . They [the British] intend to confine their efforts to an attempt to safeguard His Majesty's Government's Moslem subjects."375 The announcement indicated that Britain might agree to arbitrate if both sides requested it, something that would certainly not happen. British neutrality was, therefore, another factor precipitating the Hashimite downfall. Following al-Tawil's letter, the Wahhabis entered Mecca on October 18. On December 5, 1924, Ibn Sa'ud arrived at Mecca. Though it gained him prestige, the conquest of Mecca created new problems for the Najdi ruler. He considered completing the campaign by conquering Jidda but decided first to consider the interests of Britain and the other European and Muslim countries that were represented in the arena. The successful completion of the pilgrim-

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age and the safeguarding of the pilgrims were essential. Aware from the campaign's very beginning of its international implications, Ibn Sa'ud intended to achieve the support of foreign countries represented at Jidda through the cautious advance of his forces. At a conference held on January 1, 1925, Ibn Sa'ud agreed to avoid further harm to foreigners and Muslims, a policy demonstrated in subsequent Saudi activities. On January 5, a Wahhabi force did arrive at Jidda, not to launch an attack, but, rather, to lay siege. The records of the January 1 conference indicate that Khalid and Ibn Humayd as well as the old imam, Ibn Sa'ud's father 'Abd al-Rahman, pressed for a direct military attack but that the more prudent decision of a siege was Ibn Sa'ud's choice.376 He preferred this strategy, as foreign nationals were within range of Saudi guns.377 Clashes then ensued between the Wahhabis and 'Ali's forces. According to reports from Jidda, Saudi forces seemed rather disorganized, composed of various supplementary Hijazi tribes, not Najdis. Their attempts to shell Jidda did not bring about any decisive results. Ibn Sa'ud's attitude is demonstrated by the fact that he did not attempt to attack Jidda with his heavy guns, having left them at Mecca.378 Foreign contacts then became more intensive. In January, the Indianbased Khilafat party had sent a delegation to Ibn Sa'ud in order to reach a settlement, but without success. In April, the Soviet, Iranian, and Dutch consuls followed suit, with the same lack of effect.379 A friendly correspondence ensued between Ibn Sa'ud and King Fu'ad of Egypt, who offered to mediate in the dispute. In April, Ibn Sa'ud made it clear that he would not comply with any attempt to maintain the Hashimites on the throne, and Fu'ad's mediatory attempt culminated in an initiative to arrange a Muslim conference.380 Albeit unsuccessful, these attempts were another reason for and a manifestation of Ibn Sa'ud's reluctance to conquer Jidda in one military assault. It also seems that Ibn Sa'ud tried to use the siege in order to precipitate the collapse of'Ali's rule. In November 1924, he answered the Jidda branch of the hizb al-watani, the Nationalist party, regarding al-Tawil's earlier mentioned plea: "Neither King Hussein nor any of his sons can be allowed to exercise sovereignty over the Hejaz and anyone who keeps them so [does so] at his own risk."381 That statement expressed Ibn Sa'ud's determination regarding the Hashimites and also indicated his encouragement of Jidda notables to overthrow 'Ali. In February, Philby wrote that a "peace at any price" party had emerged in Jidda, which sought to bring about 'Ali's fall and kept in contact with Ibn Sa'ud. The activities of its members were obviously known to 'Ali, who had several of them arrested. 'Ali relied mainly on a small military cadre to combat this party.382 A crucial question arose over whether 'Ali could rely on his forces in the face of the siege. Of the regular Hijazi army, no more than a few hundred men were left, dispersed throughout Yanbu', Wajh, al-Madina, and Jidda. In addition, 'Ali had at his disposal a few hundred mercenaries, mainly from Palestine and Egypt. 383 The command was heavily jeopardized by the rivalry be-

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tween two of the mercenaries' commanders, and 'Ali, hesitant as usual, tried to mediate between them.384 In April 1925, the Palestinian soldiers mutinied, complaining of a two-month delay in payment, bad equipment, and the tyrannical attitude of their commanders.385 The siege made 'Ali dependent on external assistance. 'Abdullah deployed soldiers recruited in Trans-Jordan. From his exile in 'Aqaba, Husayn kept sending financial assistance to help 'Ali maintain his rule and quell the mutiny.386 In order to counteract this assistance, in April Ibn Sa'ud dispatched a force to march on 'Aqaba. This should be viewed in a wider context, that of Saudi claims on territories bordering Trans-Jordan. To the British, Ibn Sa'ud's initiative seemed dangerous enough to warrant their involvement. Although Husayn's presence in 'Aqaba was of no significance to them, preventing a war between Ibn Sa'ud and 'Abdullah was essential. The British therefore did not hesitate to announce to Husayn that his actions had precipitated the Wahhabi show of force. On May 27, Ibn Sa'ud was warned to desist from any attack on 'Aqaba, and on June 23 Husayn was expelled from the town and exiled to Cyprus. Consequently, after several skirmishes between the Saudis and 'Abdullah's forces near Ma'an, Ibn Sa'ud withdrew his forces to the Hijazi arena.387 It is important to note that though Ibn Sa'ud did not launch a massive attack directly on Jidda, he employed various siege tactics. He tried to cut the supply routes to Jidda and al-Madina. As early as January 1925, Saudi forces fought in Wajh and Yanbu', blocking the way between Jidda and other Hijazi ports.388 According to Reader Bullard, these actions, and particularly the lack of support from 'Aqaba, had a detrimental effect on 'Ali's forces in al-Madina and Jidda. 'Ali's financial position deteriorated drastically. In August 1925, he imposed heavy taxes on Jidda's merchants in order to establish a national bank and wrote to Husayn (in Cyprus) asking for £50,000. Neither project materialized. 'Ali's actions were meant to counter his forces' threat to stop fighting if payment was not made immediately. In August, 300 of Jidda's defenders demanded release from military service. The same month, the Harb tribe, part of which had supported 'Ali, went over to Ibn Sa'ud; subsequently, desertions became a regular occurrence.389 In November, an open revolt broke out; 'Ali promised payment, but it seems unlikely that he made it.390 On December 16, 'Ali asked Jordan, the British vice-consul, to inform Ibn Sa'ud that he would abdicate, and on December 26, as a result of British mediation, Ibn Sa'ud entered Jidda. On December 6, Ibn Sa'ud's son Muhammad entered al-Madina. Since November 1924, al-Dawish had maintained a siege on the city; in October 1925, negotiations started with the notables of al-Madina, culminating in its surrender.391 Thus, by employing the strategy of siege and controlled "crawling" into the Hijaz, Ibn Sa'ud precipitated the internal collapse of the Hashimite regime. On the one hand, this strategy prolonged the war and made it more complex; on the other hand, it avoided the recurrence of widespread bloodshed and massacre that had followed the fall of Ta'if. Furthermore, the rela-

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tively peaceful occupation and the internal disintegration of the Hashimite regime gained Ibn Sa'ud the sympathy of European and Muslim countries, which had by this time become totally disillusioned with the Hashimite regime. Finally, Ibn Sa'ud also managed to win over the majority of the Hijazi tribes and town dwellers, thus creating an initial basis of legitimacy for Wahhabi rule over the Hijaz. Examining Saudi expansion and warfare between 1917 and 1925, it seems that local tribal factors, motivated by political and economic ones, constituted the core of the conflict in each arena. From 1920, the venue of the SaudiHashimite conflict extended into local and tribal disputes, which directed the course of events throughout Arabia. Ibn Sa'ud's strategy was aimed at taking advantage of internal tribal affairs, by both forcibly opposing the tribes and winning them over to his side. He thus managed to erode the power of his rivals and to establish a power basis of his own in each arena. Wahhabi proselytism coinciding with tribal interests, the effectiveness of Ibn Sa'ud's leadership, and Ibn Sa'ud's military prowess combined to promote this process. Ibn Sa'ud's forces operated along parallel lines. They were based on a tribal-local structure, and local tribal help was a major asset to the Saudis in establishing themselves in each arena. In addition, during 1920-21, the central core of an institutionalized army emerged, based on the Ikhwan of the hujar and the townspeople of Najd, mainly of al-Riyad. This was the nucleus that led the forces, endowing them with a powerful spirit and producing a power to be reckoned with.

CHAPTER 2

The Struggle Over Internal Consolidation, 1917-1930

The factors that resulted in the forging of a Saudi conquest movement were not in themselves adequate to produce an enduring, organized state. The strategems that helped the state expand did not suffice for its consolidation. On the contrary, they constituted a hindrance to state building; expansionary tactics had to be abandoned, adapted, or transformed in order to construct institutions that would sustain a durable state. The aim of this chapter is to examine how state building evolved beyond the early stages of the expansionist period and how more effective mechanisms for a state were developed. The inherent conflict between the processes of conquest and internal consolidation was pointed out by Ibn Khaldun. He argued that the kin-based, power-oriented cohesion of tribes ('asabiyyd) leads them to victory over their rivals and to territorial expansion. After this occurs, the ruler attempts to establish a strong government to meet the challenges of the new realm by bypassing his former tribal comrades, who have become a burden to the new regime, and by establishing an organized, urban-based administration.1 Two factors account for this dialectical process. The first is the fact that a state's priorities change. During the conquest, a chieftaincy thrives on expansionist abilities and a fighting comraderie, which is more than adequately provided by the tribal structure. But the legacy of the conquest is one with which nomadic tribes are not equipped to deal: The realm became an extended one with varied populations that have to be integrated. The economy needs to be altered and internal calm has to be achieved so that the new, expanded realm can be consolidated. Second, guided by images projected by the Great Powers in the region, the ruler is tempted to model his postconquest government on new (often conquered) systems that are more sophisticated and advanced 71

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than the chieftaincy. All this leads him to adapt a form of government quite different from the earlier tribal confederacy. Ibn Khaldun argues that such a conflict inevitably leads to the collapse of the new regime. The change to a higher level of civilization causes decay in the ruler's ability and willingness to fight, and the tribal 'asabiyya becomes an unsurmountable foe of the regime, precipitating its downfall. To avoid such a fate, states that developed in tribal societies have used various means to overcome the conflict between the needs of conquest and those of internal consolidation. As Gibb demonstrated (by pointing to the achievements of the khalifa Hisham, 724-43), one of these methods is to rechannel expansionist energies into activities conducive to building stable and cohesive state institutions. 2 In the case of the Saudi state, both territorial expansion and the strategies used to facilitate this process posed major problems for a durable and lasting internal consolidation. The annexation of newly occupied territories into the Saudi realm brought with it the knotty challenge of absorbing their diverse populations and cultures. It meant coping with the economic and political problems of each new territory, as well as with old, displaced loyalties and redefined territorial claims resulting from the establishment of new borders. Expansion also implied a new relationship with the British. They held mandates for Iraq and Trans-Jordan and protectorates for the Gulf principalities with which the expanding Saudi state came into close contact, and they were determined to safequard the well-being of their proteges. Aside from these pressures, the creation of new state institutions and the rebuilding of a Saudi power structure became increasingly urgent challenges. The consolidation of the Saudi chieftaincy had hitherto been unplanned, based on provisional and partial measures aimed primarily at preventing certain tribes or territories from either falling into the hands of a rival or facilitating a specific Saudi conquest. However, when the Saudi chieftaincy reached the point described by Ibn Khaldun, at which creation of a centralized state becomes the primary goal, traditional means of consolidation such as marriage, allocation of subventions and booty, popularization of Ibn Sa'ud's image, and even the spread of Wahhabi revivalism became less useful and even counterproductive. In the process of Saudi state building, strategems initially utilized for expansion were either converted to or replaced by new and sometimes quite different institutions, more conducive to a durable state structure. We shall analyze this process in light of the repercussions of expansion and illustrate it through an analysis of (i) administrative and decision-making changes; (2) consolidation of frontiers; (3) societal and regional integration, with particular reference to the Hijaz; and (4) principles of foreign policy.

Old and New Political Forces: The 'ulama', the umara", and the Ikhwan The structure of the Saudi regime was based on a division of power formulated by one of the major intellectual inspirations of the Wahhabi movement,

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Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1322). He saw the umara' (singular: amir; temporal, lay rulers) and the 'ulama' (divines) as two governing pillars of the state. The umara' were in charge of maintaining security and internal order, and the 'ulama'were, responsible for teaching, upholding the values of Wahhabi morality, and interpreting the shari'a. This last function entitled them to advise the umara' on any relevant issue. The arrangement was intended to create an ideal, shari'a-boundt Wahhabi community. Saudi states invariably adhered to that structure, subject to established tribal norms. The umara' who served as governors of minor provincial towns were locally elected, whereas those of the major towns and of the provinces themselves were appointed by Ibn Sa'ud.3 Several accounts indicate that from 1917 to 1919, Ibn Sa'ud had already assumed control of a network of umara'spread throughout Najd. 4 He chose umara' from among his cousins and nephews, according to their abilities and personal loyalty to him. Thus 'Abdullah Ibn Jilawi governed al-Ahsa'; 'Abd al-'Aziz Ibn Musa'id ruled Burayda (until 1921, when Ha'il was occupied and Fahd ibn 'Abdullah Ibn Jilawi took over); and Sa'ud al-'Arfa governed al-Qasim.5 Dickson's July 1920 description of Ibn Jilawi illustrates the role of the amir: The Czar of Russia never possessed more unlimited power than Bin Jlouee does. . . . The Arabs believe in the one-man administration of government. Such a man is given a province with instructions to rule it. No written constitution embarrasses him and no council or parliament obstructs his freedom of action. If he succeeds, well and good, and if he fails, he is likely to taste without delay the experience of the next world.6 Ibn Jilawi's personal loyalty to Ibn Sa'ud meant that the Najdi ruler received credit for the exemplary conduct of Ibn Jilawi in that region. Another relative, Ahmad Ibn Thanayan, emerged in 1919 as Ibn Sa'ud's adviser, chief clerk, and foreign affairs executive. He accompanied Prince Faysal to Britain that year and headed the Najdi mission to the Hijaz in 1920. Dickson's assistant in Bahrayn, Siddiq Hasan, described Ibn Thanayan as "level-headed," well educated (in Istanbul), and most friendly to the British. He attributed Ibn Sa'ud's foreign policies to Ibn Thanayan's direction and emphasized the ruler's trust in him. 7 A contemporary biography of the Najdi 'ulama',8 as well as other sources, provide information on their various careers. Their early training involved moving among centers of learning where they studied ("qara' 'ala") under prominent 'ulama'; their main concern was advancing to the next stage. Once they were fit to officiate, it was Ibn Sa'ud himself who appointed them to their posts, and his wish prevailed in case of a dispute over an 'alim's future post. An 'alirn usually acted as a qadi (judge), a mufti (who rendered religious opinions), or a murshid (instructor) or khabir (expert). 'Ulama'were transferred from one category to another and from place to place as Ibn Sa'ud deemed suitable. 9 The most prestigious and rewarding posts were those in the cities, chiefly al-Riyad. Philby noted in 1918 that there were six prominent 'ulama' in al-Riyad, three in al-Qasim, three in al-Ahsa', and one in each of the other provinces, some twenty in all. 10 Al al-Shaykh indicates through the

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biographies that in cities like TJnayza and Burayda and in some villages, the 'ulama' were more active in public life than in other centers.11 The 'ulama' of al-Riyad possessed the most influence over Ibn Sa'ud because they often intermarried with his family and had achieved a high level of scholarship. Their political role, however, was minor. Living in the city's Dukhna Quarter, scholars like 'Abdullah and Muhammad bin 'Abd al-Latif, 'Abdullah bin Bulayhid, Sa'd bin Hamad bin 'Atiq, and Sulayman bin Sahman were held in high esteem. Others, like 'Abd al-Rahman bin Salim, 'Abdullah al-'Anqari, 'Umar bin Muhammad bin Salim, and Hasan bin Salim (who signed the crucial fatwa of 1919 concerning the Ikhwan) were also important figures.12 The most prominent were the 'Abd al-Latif brothers, descended from the founding family of Wahhabism, the "Al al-Shaykh," or the 'Abd alWahhab family. They adhered to the doctrine dissociating the 'ulama' from temporal matters. They were closely and personally associated with Ibn Sa'ud, accompanying him from his early rise, and in fact owed their prominence to his political success and friendly attitude. To advance their studies and careers, the 'ulama' depended on Ibn Sa'ud. Also, they were required to lead a strict Wahhabi life, characterized by egalitarianism and simplicity.13 Nurtured by personal and marital bonds to Ibn Sa'ud, the 'ulama' did not form a cohesive or autonomous political group; rather, each was related directly to Ibn Sa'ud and loyal to him. The group that emerged from the expansion process that did threaten the Saudi power structure was the Ikhwan. A discrepancy developed between their original position in the state and the actual, unofficial position they achieved during the expansion of the chieftaincy. The Ikhwan lacked a formal political role in the Saudi regime. This was consistent with traditional Saudi practice; tribal groups were expected to fight for the state, not to function in any leading political or administrative capacity. In the hujar system the Ikhwan were expected to be warriors, farmers, and students of religion; they were not to play a role in politics and decision making. However, in the period of change that we are considering the Ikhwan were able to advance causes of expansionism and assume unofficial leadership roles. They were pioneers in sedentarization, zealous advocates of revivalism, and agitators for expansion. Because of their link with such prestigious public goals, the Ikhwan played important roles in both expanding and consolidating functions, despite the looseness of their organization. Their military limitations notwithstanding, the Ikhwan also functioned as a major component of the Saudi forces and comprised the most zealous military units. In fact, their organizational looseness and lack of a formal position in the political structure actually worked in their favor, as they were unconstrained in political maneuvering by traditional limitations. The leaders of the main tribal groups actually emerged as a part of the elite in al-Riyad, and as they had never occupied such a position before, their entry into the elite was unconstricted by precedents of any kind. An American physician who visited al-Riyad in the summer of 1917, Dr. P. W. Harrison, reported that the capital was the Ikhwan's headquarters and that three hundred of them were gathered in special religious schools that trained

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instructors (mutawa'a; singular: mutatawwi') for the settlements or hujar.14 A British intelligence report from 1918 indicated that the Ikhwan directed the Wahhabi movement by deciding on methods of colonization, expansion, and proselytization.15 Philby reported in 1919 that they decided on wars and raids in special meetings with Ibn Sa'ud.16 Thus, a group of Ikhwan leaders appears to have used their prestige and military expertise both to implement proselytizing and military functions and to advise Ibn Sa'ud on paramount political matters of the day. Their propulsion into an influential position in the Saudi power structure did not render the Ikhwan merely an unbiased loyal elite. Elated by their own successes but unseasoned in the new configurations of regional politics, they acted as a partisan pressure group seeking to solidify the state in accordance with their own perceptions. These perceptions derived both from the new revivalist roles to which they had been officially assigned and from their tribal ways. Many of them failed to abandon tribalism during the revivalist period; indeed, their upbringing in closed groups in the hujar, in al-Riyad, or in nomadic tribes boosted their tribal identification. Thus, the blend of unmitigated tribal 'asabiyya and religious zeal led the Ikhwan to play a unique and complex role in state affairs. The conduct of the Ikhwan deviated from Ibn Sa'ud's chosen path of consolidation. Between 1916 and 1918, their activities led to turbulence and unrest rather than the stability he hoped to promote among his tribes. In 1916, when Ibn Sa'ud fought some of the less obedient tribal groups in central Arabia, he also replaced the Ikhwan's religious instructors.17 In 1918, probably as a means of consolidation against Husayn, Ibn Sa'ud embarked on another campaign to win over Shammar groups and what Dickson called "recalcitrant tribes."18 By then, Dickson reports, he had managed to assert his authority over all the Najd Bedouin, except the 'Ujman, who remained hostile. Ibn Sa'ud forced them to adopt "Ikhwanism" and had the 'ulama'issue a fatwa (a binding opinion on a religious matter) requiring tribes to settle in the hujar.19 However, being part of an uncontrolled revivalist movement, the Ikhwan embarked on a campaign of forcible proselytization in the following year, exceeding, if not altogether ignoring, Ibn Sa'ud's directives. They thus jeopardized the relations among various segments of the Saudi polity, the balance of which was essential to consolidation of the state. The Ikhwan's activities were associated with the ascent to power of the Mutayr leader Faysal al-Dawish. In view of his later notoriety as the leader of a revolt against Ibn Sa'ud, it is worth noting that his first major political appearance was at the al-Shaqra' conference of August 1918, at which he unsuccessfully pressed Ibn Sa'ud to fight the Hashimites. In early 1918, Lawrence mentioned al-Dawish and his clan as "recent converts" to the Ikhwan doctrine.20 In the rising tide of conversions, al-Dawish found a suitable climate in which to further his ambitions. Because there is hardly any evidence about his thinking or philosophy, it is difficult to determine whether he was a sincere akh or a successful opportunist. Whatever the case, al-Dawish proved to be a shrewd and ruthless tribal politician. 21 During Ibn Sa'ud's difficult days

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in the latter part of 1918 and 1919, al-Dawish exploited the geopolitical location of the Mutayr in a show of strength. During 1919, various complaints reached the British regarding Mutayr raids and forcible proselytizing among the Muntafiq groups in Mesopotamia, Kuwayt, and al-Ahsa'. These activities produced a strain on Saudi relations with both Shi'i and non-Ikhwan Sunni populations of the territories. In November 1919, urban people of al-Ahsa', notably from Qatif, complained to Ibn Sa'ud about "Ikhwan outrages in their territories," asking him to put an end to the "Ikhwan interference with their tribes."22 In fact, in early 1920, Dickson stated that Ibn Sa'ud had told him that "he never countenanced these acts at all from the first," but he was unable to stop them till the end of 1919.23 Ikhwan enthusiasm made adaptation to the Ikhwan doctrine—by nature a gradual process—instantaneous and irreversible. Tribesmen who failed to comply were killed or compelled to flee to Kuwayt. These actions not only earned al-Dawish the reputation of being a fanatic but also gained him supremacy over the llwa section of the Mutayr. For all practical purposes, al-Dawish became the leading chief of the whole tribe, 24 after which he proselytized/ threatened other tribes. The effort to force the tribesmen to settle in hujar was ordered with tremendous fervor: "You sell your camels, relinquish nomadic life, and take to cultivation"25 was the common command to nomads. In August 1919, the Ikhwan forwarded to Ibn Sa'ud their demands to accelerate and improve the sedentarization of the Bedouin. They demanded that the Bedouin be settled in stone houses and that new schools be built, the curricula of which would be determined by the Ikhwan. They also urged the abolition of coffee houses, because of the attendant gossip. Ibn Sa'ud was unwilling to consent.26 Indeed, in November 1919, al-Dawish criticized Ibn Sa'ud "for his lack of religious fervor and especially for [his] dealings with the British."27 Another leader, Khalid Ibn al-Luway, the amir of Khurma, who was preoccupied with a struggle against Husayn, also defied some of Ibn Sa'ud's instructions of the day. In letters to Ibn Sa'ud in late 1919, he warned that he would counterattack if Husayn should resume his onslaught on Khurma. His tone was threatening, indicating that Ibn Sa'ud had no choice but to comply.28 Earlier that year, an Arab Bureau report had emphasized Khalid Ibn alLuway's possible change of loyalty, suggesting that he was acting independently.29 But Khalid was not in league with al-Dawish, as Arab Bureau officials suspected; rather, as a revivalist tribal leader, he was simply displaying an increasing desire to gain more influence for the Ikhwan. Toward the end of 1919, various reports indicated that Ibn Sa'ud was on the brink of losing control over the Ikhwan. 30 At that point, their conduct brought them into confrontation with the Saudi power structure. Their harassment of Shi'i merchants embroiled them in disputes with Ibn Jilawi in alAhsa'. Ikhwan relations with the 'ulama'were also tense, despite their mutual interest in promoting Islamic revivalism. Biographies of the 'ulama' suggest that the great majority were born in towns and villages and were not of Bedouin descent. Unlike the Ikhwan, who were mainly nomadic in origin, the

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'ulama' spent most of their time in towns, either studying or executing the duties of office. Although some 'ulama' were appointed to accompany the Ikhwan and participate in raids conducted by them,31 a few, notably the shaykhs 'Umar Ibn Hasan Al-Shaykh and 'Abdullah al-'Anqari, were sent to officiate in hujar. They participated in a campaign called "the enjoining of the good and the forbidding of the hateful" (al-amr bi al-ma'rufwa al-nahi 'an al-munkar) ,32 or in various attempts to reeducate the Ikhwan; al-'Anqar'i was sent in 1919 to al-Artawiyya to "stop the [tribal] fanaticism (ta'asub) which is against religion (din)."33 Henceforth even those sent to the hujar were not regular mutawa'a but 'ulama' on special assignment on behalf of Ibn Sa'ud to ease the Ikhwan's bigotry. About ten other 'ulama' were also sent to hujar, but unlike the former, they were dispatched to officiate in formal posts, mainly as qudat. Best known among them was Umar bin Muhammad bin Salim, appointed to officiate in al-Artawiyya in1917?.34These men could not be regarded as either mutawa'a or Ikhwan. 'Abd al-Rahman Al-Shaykh was careful in his book not to call any of the 'ulama'he mentioned mutatawwi'. Mutawa'a were the pilot missionaries who first spread Wahhabi revivalism among the Bedouin. They were responsible for the Ikhwan's zeal and, possibly, their bid for power. Apparently tribal revivalists, they were trained in a city and then sent to the hujar to educate the Ikhwan and proselytize among the tribes.35 The mutawa'a, in fact, seem to have been the students of the 'ulama' and less knowledgeable than their masters. In contrast, the 'ulama'belonged to the religious establishment; they were loyal servants of Ibn Sa'ud whose task was to reduce the fanaticism encouraged by the mutawa'a and to restore Ibn Sa'ud's authority over the hujar. The 'ulama' had no dispute with the umara', who ruled the provinces and the central government and whose positions did not clash with their own authority. Whereas the 'ulama' served as advisers to umara', the Ikhwan were in competition with the 'ulama'over religious authority. Career patterns, family background, and allegiance thus divided the Ikhwan and the 'ulama'. In contrast with the ambitious and politically active Ikhwan, the 'ulama' were passive, unorganized, and governed by the constraints of the regime. The 'ulama' presumably feared the Ikhwan during this period and so supported Ibn Sa'ud's attempt to contain them. Apparently a showdown occurred in 1919 between Ibn Sa'ud and the Mutayr chief al-Dawish, the outcome of which was increased control over the Ikhwan. While Ibn Sa'ud was heading to Turaba, al-Dawish ordered the Bedouin of al-Ahsa' to obey his commands rather than those of Ibn Sa'ud. Upon his return, Ibn Sa'ud summoned al-Dawish to an open council and asked him by what right he had issued the orders: "Had you orders from me? What other orders do you reckon to obey?" Al-Dawish backed down at once, admitting his error.36 The incident in itself reflects the fine line separating the authority of the ruler from that of an important tribal chief. Ibn Sa'ud then proceeded to take full advantage of his victory over alDawish. He summoned a convention of 'ulama'and questioned them in order

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to ascertain who was acting in the true Wahhabi way, thereby putting into question the conduct of the Ikhwan. The 'ulama' of al-Riyad were cooperative, declaring in their fatwa that the non-mudayyan (i.e., not a revivalist)— or the one who wears an 'aqal (black strip worn to secure a head covering) instead of a turban, that is, one who is still an unsettled wanderer—is not inferior to a fully established akh. The fatwa reaffirmed Ibn Sa'ud's right to command and impose zakat and warned that those who acted contrary to the sunna and the shari'a would be publicly punished if they did not cease their wrong doing.37 Dickson noted that Ibn Sa'ud was compelled to execute several particularly rebellious Ikhwan and that he became increasingly cautious in the selection of mutawa'a, examining their loyalty to himself above all else.38 At the same time, sedentarization was intensified. Although this process strengthened the Ikhwan as a group, it also proved a means of increasing control over them.39 By early 1920, Ibn Sa'ud had successfully reestablished his position: The Ikhwan were reported to be tranquil and obedient, and the forcible proselytizing had stopped. Ibn Jilawi succeeded in stabilizing the situation in al-Ahsa', mainly by protecting the area from the Ikhwan's atrocities. In fact, he became the person associated with containing the Ikhwan, 40 thereby maintaining the authority of Ibn Sa'ud's family in crystallizing the Najdi chieftaincy. Ibn Sa'ud also appointed new umara', a measure that gave him stronger leverage in the provinces. The judicial system was reinforced, based on the appointment of qudat from the ranks of the 'ulama'. Ibn Sa'ud's own power was unharmed by this step, as in his capacity as ruler, he could overrule a qadi's decision (the ruler's word prevails, "amr al-sultan nafidh"). Furthermore, he personally collected the zakat from all the hujar every three months, thereby maintaining personal contact with the local leaders. He also embarked on a project to develop the harbors of Qatif and Jubayl, thereby turning al-Ahsa' into a richer prairie and an easier place to govern and weakening the dependence of the Mutayr and others on Kuwayt's harbor.41 Thus Ibn Sa'ud employed various means to contain the Ikhwan, and his efforts culminated in an embryonic administrative system that included a chain of loyal lieutenants, subordination to the authority of the 'ulama', and direct taxation. The 'ulama' further were incorporated in a civil judicial system under his direct control. These reforms signaled a new method of state building, based on centralization. They attested to the Najdi ruler's understanding that methods that seemed useful at the beginning of the war, such as the hujar system, had become a hindrance to internal consolidation. The Ikhwan had become a wild growth, with the hujar as their breeding ground, and so he had had to trim their branches occasionally to assert his superiority. He balanced these measures by weakening the Ikhwan's autonomy and instituting new practices, which served to increase the power of his government and improve its controlling apparatus. The Ikhwan were understandably concerned about this process. Led by alDawish, the Mutayri Ikhwan shifted their focus to the peripheral provinces.

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Denied any central position of power, al-Dawish and his men functioned as a mobile military force in the traditional grazing zones of the Mutayr, partly independent of Ibn Sa'ud's control. Their activities in these regions had important implications for the development of the Saudi state in the 1920s.

At the Northeastern Frontier, 1921-1926 During the years 1921 through 1926, the process of state building in Saudi Arabia was centered mainly on the northeastern frontier. This represented a shift: Previously, attention had been focused on the capital and the main cities. Once the Ikhwan's aspirations in al-Riyad were frustrated, however, their groups, notably the Mutayr, turned to the frontier, an area that presented a continuous temptation for various rulers and a free-mobility zone for the tribes. In the Ottoman period, when there were no state boundaries and no question of regional sovereignty or allegiance to any single authority, the tribes had shifted loyalties as circumstances warranted, without any problem of legitimacy arising from such reorientations. After the war, however, the newly created states tended to consolidate their authority and territorial jurisdiction under officially acknowledged rulers, and so tribes in Iraq, TransJordan, and, to a certain extent, the Gulf states, were required to declare allegiance to the respective authorities of these states. The setting of the frontiers and the various states' attempts to rally tribal allegiance generated a continuous struggle along the newly established frontier areas. In the early 1920s, several factors converged to precipitate conflicts at the eastern and northern frontier zones of Najd bordering on Kuwayt, Iraq, and Trans-Jordan. One was the rise to power of rulers hostile to Ibn Sa'ud. Encroachments by Salim of Kuwayt into territories that Ibn Sa'ud claimed as his own and the establishment of the Hashimite rulers Faysal and 'Abdullah over Iraq and Trans-Jordan were viewed by Ibn Sa'ud as a threat to his rule. The rivalry among rulers was fueled by tribal conflicts, as the border areas were also the sites of crossings and battlegrounds for various tribes. The Shammar had been infiltrating into Iraq for centuries, in search of new and more fertile grazing lands, most of them settling in the Jazira in the northern part of the country. The weakening of the Rashidi state and the final fall of Ha'il in November 1921 also precipitated a sharp increase in the number of Shammar tribesmen entering Iraq. Fearful of the Ikhwan and of Ibn Sa'ud's wrath, having lost their own state, and openly welcomed by Faysal and the Iraqi administration, the Shammar settled either in the Jazira or close to the Najdi domains, along the pastures of the 'Amarat section of the 'Anaza in eastern and southern Iraq ruled by Fahd Ibn Khaz'al.42 To assert his control, Faysal then taxed them as one of his own tribes. The Dhafir, who lived in the Muntafiq in southern Iraq and in certain parts of the 'Anaza, thereupon transferred their allegiance from Iraq to Ibn Sa'ud.43 In April and July 1921, Ibn Sa'ud accused Faysal of meddling in Najdi affairs. The Najdi ruler strongly asserted his own claim over the Shammar in

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Iraq and demanded their expulsion to Najd. In April 1921, he claimed authority over the entire 'Anaza (his own clan was a remote offshoot of that tribe located in southwest Iraq), and in October, just before Ha'il's capitulation, Ibn Sa'ud reiterated that claim.44 After the Rashidi state had been defeated, Fahd Ibn Khaz'al, the chief of the 'Amarat section of the 'Anaza, visited alRiyad and swore allegiance to Ibn Sa'ud.45 Other Shammar groups that remained in the Shamiyya desert near the Najdi border engaged in raiding activities into Najd. Searching desperately for a livelihood, they virtually obstructed the trade and the dim of the Mutayr. Although toward the end of 1921, Faysal issued orders prohibiting this action, the tribes continued their raiding, returning to Iraq for refuge after the raids. The Ikhwan responded with various clashes and counterraids. 46 There was another dispute over the large area occupied by the Muntafiq in southeastern Iraq. Traditionally, control had alternated between the Dhafir and the Sa'dun tribe. 'Ajaymi Ibn Sa'dun, who cooperated with the Ottomans, was forced to flee in 1917 after the British occupation, and Hamud Ibn Suwayt of the Dhafir seized control. He paid tribute to Ibn Sa'ud, received an Iraqi subsidy, and became embroiled in a dispute with the Mutayr. His position became precarious in late 1921 when Yusuf Beg, an offspring of Sa'dun, was appointed commander of an Iraqi Bedouin desert force after successfully wooing Faysal. The appointment was a blow to Hamud's prestige: Joining forces with Lizam Abu Dhara', a renegade Dhafiri tribal shaykh, Yusuf raided Hamud. Yusuf Beg also attempted to boost both his own power and Iraqi authority by marshaling the shepherds and the 'Anaza groups in the south against a possible Najdi offensive. The latter were also friendly to the raiding Shammar. In view of this hostile alignment against Najd, Ibn Sa'ud and Hamud made a pact. In January 1921, Hamud visited al-Riyad and was warmly received. He returned after several days with many gifts, accompanied by a Saudi wakil (representative), 'Abd al-Rahman Ibn Mu r ammar. The deployment of Ibn Mu'ammar demonstrated Ibn Sa'ud's effort to counteract the Iraqi claim and to strengthen his own grip over the disputed tribes. Hamud then confidently set about persuading tribes to acknowledge Ibn Sa'ud's authority and collected zakat on the latter's behalf. In view of the direct challenge that Hamud posed to Iraqi rule in the area, represented by Yusuf Beg, in January 1922 Beg was ordered by the Iraqi government to take up a military position at the Abu Ghar post, to neutralize Hamud's actions.47 On January 25, following negotiations over a possible meeting between Ibn Sa'ud and Faysal to de-escalate the tension, Cox informed the Najdi ruler that he endorsed the latter's proposal for preliminaries before finalizing such a meeting. At the same time, Cox informed Ibn Sa'ud of Iraq's stipulation that "the Muntafik, Dhafir and Anizeh tribes be accepted by the parties as appertaining to Iraq."48 Ibn Sa'ud was informed that Iraq had a good case for affiliation with these tribes and that his own claim to authority over them did not hold. A definite borderline was also discussed but not concluded; Ibn Sa'ud probably feared that Iraqi claims would prevail.

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This dispute coincided with a similar situation, involving Kuwayt. Ibn Sa'ud claimed the strategic height of Dhubat Balbul. Possession of it enabled him to control the routes used by the 'Awazim, TJjman, and Mutayr, a vital asset in establishing his authority in the region and counteracting the ambitions of Salim of Kuwayt. 49 Because the Kuwayti ruler had, on February 20, claimed the whole territory, including al-Jahra', Ibn Sa'ud's counterclaim was clearly meant to weaken Salim's hold over that area.50 In October 1920, after Cox met both Ibn Sa'ud and Salim, he reported that both rulers were willing to submit to arbitration.51 The al-Jahra' incident prevented the beginning of negotiations. In January 1921, Salim came to alRiyad to negotiate, but he died an untimely death several weeks later. Ibn Sa'ud continued to discuss the matter with Cox and Shaykh Ahmad, the new Kuwayti ruler, who was considered Ibn Sa'ud's friend. In June 1921, Ibn Sa'ud showed his goodwill toward the new Kuwayti ruler and announced that he was ready to waive his claim to the zone between al-Jahra' and Subahiyya.52 The frontier regions were significant in the context of internal state building. The administrative changes introduced by Ibn Sa'ud in 1920 and 1921 indicated a new determination by the Najdi ruler to establish the means to obtain a higher income to allow him more power vis-a-vis potential rivals and increase resources for further consolidation. In the early 1920s Ibn Sa'ud imposed a fixed, rather high tax on tribes and townsmen throughout his territories. It marked the change from Ibn Sa'ud's levying only zakat or hums (one-fifth of the booty), which were authorized by the shari'a, to his also imposing maks (taxes levied as a prerogative of the ruler, particularly on market transactions conducted by both nomads and townsmen and on certain agricultural products like tobacco). This new tax was often regarded as a heavy burden by both the Najd and al-Ahsa' populations. Another of Ibn Sa'ud's undertakings during this period was the development of ports in Jubayl and Qatif in al-Ahsa', which allowed him to wield more bureaucratic authority through the collection of customs levies from new trade routes. The new ports not only earned Ibn Sa'ud prestige in the region but also enabled him to avoid paying heavy customs duties to the Kuwayti ruler. Under Ibn Jilawi's authority, decrees were issued to direct all customs revenues to Ibn Sa'ud and to prohibit Najdi tribes from going to markets in Kuwayt. This initiative was a serious setback for Kuwayt, and customs revenues remained a matter of unresolved dispute between the two states during the period under review here.53 The growth of the al-Ahsa' ports also posed a problem for the Ikhwan, especially the Mutayr, who had previously thrived on Kuwayti trade. Ibn Jilawi saw to it that smuggling virtually ceased.54 It was in Ibn Sa'ud's interest to control imports into Najd and to deny the Mutayr free movement to markets, thereby increasing their dependence on him. They defied him and looked for new markets and grazing zones, their searches soon leading them to raid Iraq. 55 At the same time, Ibn Sa'ud also started to implement the shari'a in Najd and al-Ahsa' by assigning qadis to towns and insisting that umara' enforce the religious law. The Bedouin customary law ('ariba), which

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was inapplicable without a central state authority and which related to individuals rather than to the rights of the state, gradually gave way to the shari'a. Umara'like Ibn Jilawi were persistent in enforcing the shari'a, thereby further reducing tribal autonomy.56 Ibn Sa'ud sought to enhance tribal dependency on his rule by allocating subsidies to tribal leaders in a new mode—channeling the subsidies to the hujar. C. C. J. Barret, the British political agent at Bahrayn during the late 1920s, noted in regard to the Ikhwan that "for their livelihood they had to trust the generosity of Bin Sa'ud who hoped in this way to keep them wholly dependent on himself."57 Barret also pointed out that "certain tribal chiefs did not see the wisdom of beggaring themselves and thereby being forced to submit to the caprices of the ruler of Najd." 58 This was the background to Ibn Sa'ud's complex relations with Ikhwan groups. During this period, the Mutayr both advanced Ibn Sa'ud's interests in the frontier zones and constituted an irritant that he sought to contain. By utilizing the zeal of al-Dawish and his followers for raiding and proselytizing on behalf of Wahhabi principles, Ibn Sa'ud could successfully claim territories under his rivals' control and check tribal activities in both Iraq and Kuwayt. 59 But Mutayr actions threatened Ibn Sa'ud's interests in two respects: First, like their activities in al-Riyad before 1920, their raiding often exceeded Ibn Sa'ud's instructions and reduced his regional maneuverability, particularly when a compromise with local rulers or British interests was demanded. Second, al-Dawish's ambitions for power and unlimited raiding rights clashed with Ibn Sa'ud's plan for centralized government. The Ikhwan, for their part, could scarcely cope with the economic measures accompanying centralization. In Ibn Sa'ud's view, there was room for limited cooperation with the Mutayr. The Najdi ruler's goal was to establish a "tribal frontier" between Najd and its neighbors, what would amount to a nondemarcated, flexible border allowing the sphere of influence of the state to be determined by the movements and grazing zones of its tribes. In this sense, Ibn Sa'ud was adhering to the traditional model of the chieftaincy, following what a British official called the "law of the desert" rather than Western norms of territorial demarcation.60 This approach enabled him to continue cultivating the tribes as a mobile, expansionist instrument, using the Mutayr as a primary means to achieve these ends. Moreover, such an approach avoided the problems that a Western-style frontier would have generated by cutting through the grazing zones of tribes completely ignorant of its existence. The Mutayr, for their part, sought to cooperate with Ibn Sa'ud by raiding Iraqi territory, but alDawish held the view that cooperation with Ibn Sa'ud should be limited and should allow the Ikhwan a considerable measure of autonomy. Ibn Sa'ud's relations with the Mutayr were therefore ambivalent, even when he was escalating his involvement in a dispute. The case of the Jarriyya hijra is an example: Only retrospectively did Ibn Sa'ud endorse the Mutayr's attack on a Kuwayti force there in May 1920. On that occasion, his statement was, "I cannot blame him [al-Dawish]." 61 Ibn Sa'ud then deployed al-Dawish against Salim in October, in what became the skirmish of al-Jahra'. His initial

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consent to submit to arbitration (given to Cox in October 1920) was apparently due not only to British pressure but also to a fear that he might lose control over the al-Jahra' front. Al-Dawish's participation was, after all, an unpredictable factor. However, the Mutayr's raids on Shammar and Dhafir groups in January 1921 and al-Dawish's renewed intention to attack al-Jahra' at this time62 enabled Ibn Sa'ud to gain control over the limits of the Mutayri dim. This presumably coincided with the repeated Saudi demand that Salim cease his intrigues among Saudi tribes.63 Later Ibn Sa'ud came under growing pressure from Cox to agree to a fixed borderline. The fact that he had to focus his attention on the occupation of Ha'il also eased his demands on Salim. In June 1921, Ibn Sa'ud therefore announced that he was ready to waive his claim to the zone between al-Jahra' and Subahiyya. Another reason for this compromise was his diminishing fear of a regional entanglement, a fear that had been aroused by the Ikhwan. AlDawish had become increasingly detached from Kuwayt as a result of his involvement in the occupation of Ha'il, thereby freeing Ibn Sa'ud from the necessity of monitoring the Ikhwan's activities in the border area. A similar situation developed in southern Iraq. In early February 1922, it was reported that Ibn Sa'ud had deployed a force under al-Dawish at Hafar "for moral effect on Iraq desert tribes."64 When Yusuf Beg and Lizam Abu Dhara' attacked Hamud Ibn Suwayt in late February, Ibn Mu'ammar asked for al-Dawish's help, allowing the latter to raid the post of Abu Ghar in southern Iraq, on March 11.65 A report from Kuwayt dated March 13 confirmed that it was indeed Ibn Mu'ammar and Hamud Ibn Suwayt who had encouraged al-Dawish and that the latter had raided Abu Ghar without Ibn Sa'ud's permission.66 Consequently, Faysal urged Cox to exert his authority as representative of the British mandate to put an end to such raids and to guarantee Iraq's safety.67 The Mutayr's aggression led to a Royal Air Force attack on the raiders, and a wider dispute with the British seemed inevitable. Ibn Sa'ud had until then resisted Cox's proposals to waive his claim to the Dhafir and the 'Amarat, refusing to contemplate a frontier settlement on such a basis, but the new developments forced him to submit to Cox's renewed pressure. In the weeks that followed, Saudi internal politics converged once more with interstate conflicts. The negotiations commencing in May were crucial to the future of the disputes with Kuwayt and Iraq. On May 6 a treaty was signed by Najdi and Iraqi delegates in Muhammara. Ibn Sa'ud did not ratify the treaty, and a new conference was called in November 1922 at 'Uqayr, in Kuwayt. The events surrounding Ibn Sa'ud's refusal to ratify the Muhammara treaty are significant. The main issue discussed at both conferences was the demarcation of permanent boundaries between Najd and Kuwayt and between Najd and Iraq. In the postwar era, fixed borders seemed the cheapest and most efficient method for Britain to maintain stability in the area. Putting his confidence in such a boundary line, 68 Cox disputed Ibn Sa'ud's claim to control over tribes in southern Iraq69 and pressed for a conference to define their borders.

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Despite the gulf that separated the opinions of the parties before the meeting, they reached an agreement on May 6. It was decided that though the 'Amarat Muntafiq (led by the Sa'dun clan) and Dhafir belonged to Iraq, the Shammar, who had come from Jabal Shammar, belonged to Najd. The participants intended to fix the boundaries according to the "location of pastures and wells used by the above tribes." In the meantime, the Ikhwan were prohibited from attacking Iraqi tribes. Other articles of the agreement guaranteed the pilgrim route, freedom of commercial and tribal intercourse, and maintenance of previous customs duties. The agreement was made subject to ratification by Ibn Sa'ud and Faysal.70 Ibn Sa'ud later claimed that he refused to ratify the agreement because his representative, Ibn Thanayan, had gone beyond his instructions at the meeting. In June the British representative to the conference, Cox's secretary A. H. Bourdillon, expressed the opinion that Ibn Thanayan had in fact not contravened Ibn Sa'ud's instructions.71 In the light of Ibn Sa'ud's initial refusal to waive any rights over the tribes in question, however, it is reasonable to assume that he had not authorized Ibn Thanayan to accept the terms. The conference began on May 5, and the agreement was signed the next day. Ibn Thanayan thus could not have consulted Ibn Sa'ud in the interim. As the ruler's adviser on foreign policy, Ibn Thanayan knew that Ibn Sa'ud's main reason for participating in the conference was to satisfy the British desire for a specific boundary line. With that achieved and the actual location of the frontiers left unresolved, Ibn Thanayan might have thought the results he had negotiated were the best that Ibn Sa'ud could hope to achieve for the time being. Ibn Sa'ud was obliged to take part in British-led negotiations, but he refused to abide by an outcome he found unacceptable. From Ibn Sa'ud's perspective, Cox's very insistence on fixing a frontier and supporting Iraq's claims to the Dhafir and 'Amarat made it difficult to negotiate a settlement. Cox believed that as a trusted friend of the Saudi ruler, he would be able to reach a frontier settlement mainly by exerting more pressure on Ibn Sa'ud. In a subsequent account of the meeting, Cox reiterated his belief that "in my judgement there must be a recognized line of frontier between Nejd, and Katar, Koweit, Iraq and Transjordan alike within which the parties must be entitled to make their own provision for security. "72 By the end of 1922, Ibn Sa'ud was more ready to accept a frontier settlement than he had been in May, primarily because by that time he was anxious not to jeopardize his relations with Cox and thought it prudent to achieve all he could while Cox remained in office. He particularly needed Cox's support for a provision that Najdis be permitted to go on pilgrimage to Mecca in 1922 and for his demand for a halt to Iraqi-based Shammar raids into Najd. Ibn Sa'ud also wanted Cox's endorsement of Wahhabi encroachment on the alJawf area, the region bordering Trans-Jordon that had opened up for the Saudis following the fall of Ha'il. From this territory, in July 1922 Saudi forces had occupied areas as far northwest as Qaryat al-Milh, and in September Ibn Sa'ud made it clear that he viewed the area and the dominant Ruwalla tribe as

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part of his own domain.73 As the British authorities in Trans-Jordan opposed his claim to al-Jawf and the Ruwalla in favor of 'Abdullah's, Ibn Sa'ud feared that al-Jawf would develop into a controversial zone like southern Iraq, where further Ikhwan penetration would complicate the situation. He therefore sought to legitimize his control over the area.74 In early October 1922, Ibn Sa'ud renewed his request for a meeting with Cox. The meeting took place on November 19 at 'Uqayr. Ibn Sa'ud went in person, and so did Major J. S. More, the political agent in Kuwayt, together with Dickson. Sabih Bey, minister of communications and works in Iraq, came as Faysal's delegate. This conference proved a decisive victory for Cox's demand for a definite frontier line. Obviously it could only have been achieved through coercion. During the first sessions, Ibn Sa'ud reiterated his familiar claim to the 'Amarat, Dhafir, and the Shammar tribes, but Cox met him in private and, in Dickson's words, reprimanded him as though he were a "naughty schoolboy." He called Ibn Sa'ud's claim "ridiculous," and he himself drew a map from Kuwayt to Jabal Anaza, outlining a border. Ibn Sa'ud collapsed and dissolved into tears, declaring his loyalty to Cox. The Iraqi high commissioner intimated that he meant to compensate the Najdi ruler by allowing him two-thirds of Kuwayt's territory;75 thus Ibn Sa'ud was forced to give up his claims to the 'Amarat, Dhafir, and Muntafiq tribes. The adoption of a fixed frontier line had predictably grave results for the relationship between Ibn Sa'ud and the Mutayr. Ideologically, in the eyes of rabid Ikhwan, as the Mutayr were, Ibn Sa'ud had relinquished claims to tribes and territories that they considered Najdi. Practically, by complying with the concept of a fixed boundary, he had made it more difficult for them to graze or fight across the border in areas where they had dwelt for centuries. The relations between Ibn Sa'ud and the Mutayr were further complicated by issues omitted from the Muhamara discussions. Tribal affairs had been overshadowed by rulers' interests. In an effort to ameliorate the mistrust between Faysal and Ibn Sa'ud, the British attempted to satisfy both rulers' appetites for territories and strategic outposts. This had been an effective policy during the war, and Cox reverted to it once again. Faysal was given recognition of his hold over southern Iraq. In return, Ibn Sa'ud was allotted a large piece of Kuwayt and obtained Cox's support in his claim to al-Jawf and the land as far north as Wadi Sirhan. Ibn Sa'ud explained at the conference that he had to control the village of Qaryat al-Milh, for apart from his historical rights to the area the local salt mines were a source of livelihood for the whole of al-Jawf. Cox recommended a northern border that fell short of Ibn Sa'ud's claim, but he suggested that al-Kaf and Qaryat al-Milh remain under Najdi control.76 This decision was crucial to the relationship between Ibn Sa'ud and the Mutayr, because the compensation offered him could not conceal the failure of his original claims. The fact that strategic areas had become exchangeable among rulers encouraged the Najdi tribes to consider the new boundaries as only temporary and whetted their ambitions for raiding and autonomy.

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The Ikhwan's ventures were not discussed at these conferences. In fact, very little was done at 'Uqayr to resolve tribal problems. Cox ostensibly proposed, in Dickson's words, "a tribal boundary instead of an arbitrary line drawn on a map."77 Cox's boundaries included two neutral zones, one on the Najdi border with Kuwayt and the other on the border with Iraq, where the wells and grazing zones were at the service of several tribes. Reciprocal crossing for grazing was allowed, and the use of watering places and wells for military purposes was forbidden in the border vicinity. These clauses were included in a protocol duly signed on December 2, 1922, by Sabih and a new assistant (of Iraqi descent) to Ibn Sa'ud, 'Abdullah Damluji. A second protocol of the same date stipulated that a tribe would not be prevented from offering its allegiance to a state other than the one with which it had been previously affiliated. The weakening of chieftaincy practices was evidenced by the fact that the taking of khuwwa (a "protection" fee levied by strong tribes on weaker parties) was forbidden. 78 Despite these provisions, it is evident that the conference did not relate to intertribal rivalries or rivalries between rulers and tribes. There was no discussion of the reasons for such rivalries, nor was there any provision to conciliate rival tribes. This omission reflected British interests and tactics, but it also reflected in part Ibn Sa'ud's own reluctance to admit openly his difficulties with the Ikhwan; to do so would have discredited his position with Cox. The unresolved and unadjudicated tribal tensions thus remained a continuous irritant along the northern and northeastern frontiers of the Saudi state. To conclude, the British-inspired Muhammara and 'Uqayr conferences further exacerbated and Saudi-Mutayri dispute in the area and made the situation more volatile: first, by imposing frontier lines against the will of some of the local rulers and tribes; second, by failing to relate to, let alone resolve, intertribal and tribe-ruler relations; and third, by failing to satisfy Ibn Sa'ud's claims in southern Iraq yet allowing bargaining over strategic areas without regard to tribal conflicts. In this respect, the conferences of 1922 nurtured the ambitions of the rival leaders and encouraged their inclination to ignore or make light of the new boundaries. Thus, not only was the relationship between Ibn Sa'ud and the Mutayr affected, but tensions in the whole arena also were kept simmering. Dickson's comments on the 'Uqayr decision are telling: The arbitrary boundary of western type between Iraq and Najd was, in my opinion, a serious error. It resulted ultimately in Ibn Sa'ud, almost for the first time in history, restricting the annual natural movements of Najd tribes toward the north. . . . Had Ibn Sa'ud left well [enough] alone, it is not impossible that we should not have had the Ikhwan rebellion of 1929-30 or the friction between Iraq and Najd that preceded it. 79

As Ibn Sa'ud's rivals became more daring and bitter, his ability to retaliate across the border was increasingly hampered by British responses. The geographical expansion of the conflict created further problems for Ibn Sa'ud, as the disputes extended deep into Iraq as well as westward to al-Jawf.

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During this period, both of Ibn Sa'ud's tribal allies in southern Iraq became weaker. Following a deterioration in the relations between Yusuf Beg and the Iraqi government in May 1922,80 the former was not reinstalled by the Iraqi government to his earlier position in the region, and he mended fences with Ibn Sa'ud; Yusuf Beg even started collecting taxes on Ibn Sa'ud's behalf.81 But following a renewed attack by Yusuf on Hamud Ibn Suwayt's camp in August 1923, Ibn Sa'ud became exasperated with him. Presumably trying to exploit the situation, Faysal's administration refused asylum requests from both shaykhs, deposed them, and declared them outlaws.82 This left room for Lizam Abu Dhara', one of the chiefs in the Dhafir, to take control of the region. For the time being, he became Ibn Sa'ud's chief opponent there. Not surprisingly, this situation was exploited by the Shammar refugee tribes, which traditionally wandered northward toward the delta of the Euphrates and the Shamiyya desert. According to the 'Uqayr decision, they were to be deported to Najd. The Iraqi authorities, however, failed to implement that decision; two months of amnesty, declared by Ibn Sa'ud in the hope that they would return, were to no avail. Driven by both poverty and the desire for revenge against Ibn Sa'ud, they began raiding the relatively well off shepherd tribes in the area, extending their raids into Najd. In the spring and summer of 1923, Ibn Sa'ud sent various complaints to Faysal, demanding the extradition of the Shammar tribe. Faysal replied that he had tried to evict them but that he had no obligation to extradite them by force. In fact, it seems that Faysal did not mind sheltering a tribe that caused problems for Ibn Sa'ud. He further institutionalized the Shammar's position in the area by recruiting them into a new local Bedouin force, led by a minor Sa'dun chief named Thamir.83 The complications increased in the summer of 1923, when various Mutayri groups tried to escape Ibn Sa'ud's wrath by fleeing to Iraq, where they joined the raiders into Najd. All this compelled Ibn Sa'ud to pursue new initiatives. Meanwhile, the boundary problems escalated on all fronts. The debate regarding control over al-Jawf persisted, as did the Wahhabi infiltration. On June 19, 1923, a Wahhabi force attacked near al-Kaf, at the northern end of Wadi Sirhan, but was repulsed. Ibn Sa'ud denied any knowledge of the attack, and there is no conclusive evidence concerning the matter. At 'Abdullah's request, the British secretary of state for the colonies, the duke of Devonshire, discussed this issue with the pro-Saudi and pro-Hashimite officials and allowed the Jordanian ruler to reoccupy al-Kaf, but "on his own responsibility" without British assistance.84 Saudi encroachment on the Hijaz grew during late 1923. There were Wahhabi attacks in the vicinity of al-Madina; a major one occurred in November 1923, when al-Dawish led an onslaught on al-Ula.85 Because Iraq, Trans-Jordan, and the Hijaz all were engaged in frontier disputes with Najd and because these three countries all were Hashimite ruled, the British made efforts to reach a new and comprehensive HashimiteSaudi frontier settlement. They were eager to do so because both Hashimites and Saudis were allies and clients of Britain and also as a follow-up to the British tactics at the 'Uqayr conference, linking a settlement along one border

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to a settlement on another and using territories taken from one country to compensate another. In August 1923, returning from a visit to 'Abdullah in 'Amman, Faysal declared that he would not be able to remain passive in the face of a Najdi attack on Trans-Jordan or the Hijaz. He expressed anxiety about concentrations of Wahhabi forces near these countries and stated that he would like to represent his brother and father in a comprehensive settlement. He sought to meet Ibn Sa'ud in person for that purpose.86 The Foreign Office thought the suggestion impractical and doomed to failure.87 Although the British never endorsed Faysal's suggestion in its original form, their growing inclination to pursue a comprehensive settlement defining fixed borders between all the Hashimite states and Najd did eventuate in a conference involving delegates from all the countries concerned. The Kuwayt conference was convened in November 1923 and met intermittently until May 1924. From the Saudi viewpoint, although this conference presented opportunities to resolve regional tensions, it also posed major problems. One was the multiplicity of Hashimite demands, supported by delegates of all the Hashimite parties. This problem became evident even before the conference began. Husayn refused to send an emissary, stipulating that his delegate would participate only under conditions that he knew Ibn Sa'ud had previously refused to accept, namely, the Saudi evacuation of Abha, Ha'il, and the restoration of the al-'A'id and al-Rashid clans to their former capitals.88 Faysal reiterated these conditions: He wrote to Ibn Sa'ud just before the conference, demanding the retreat of Saudi forces from the frontiers surrounding Hashimite realms.89 In early November, Ibn Sa'ud tried to postpone the conference, writing that he needed "to examine and report on border lands,"90 but the British pressed for his participation. He did then appoint delegates to Kuwayt, headed by Sa'id Habal.91 During the conference the Hashimites tried to make further demands on the Saudi state, burdening Saudi relations with both the British and the Hashimite states. Husayn's initial reluctance to appoint an emissary and Ibn Sa'ud's refusal in the spring of 1924 to send his son, after Husayn had finally agreed to be represented by his own son Zayd eventually ended the conference.92 The Kuwayt conference also further aggravated Ibn Sa'ud's deteriorating relations with the Mutayr, by imposing new restrictions on their mobility.93 The deliberations of the conference illustrate Ibn Sa'ud's attempt to weaken the Ikhwan and his general approach to Saudi state building in the frontier region. The session commenced on November 13, 1923, with each delegation presenting several points for discussion, which in fact constituted their own demands. The difference between the Najdi and the Iraqi proposals was evident: Whereas the Iraqis wished to seal their border in order to prevent as far as possible any Najdi contact with Iraq, the Najdis sought, through a variety of means, greater leverage over the tribes dwelling in Iraq. The Iraqis demanded that Saudi communications to tribes in Iraq be made exclusively by the official Najdi representative in Baghdad, that pursuit of raiders be forbidden, and that no Saudi zakat collectors operate in Iraqi territory.94

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The Iraqis wished offenders to be expelled only as part of an extradition agreement and wanted tribes to be allowed to cross the frontiers only for grazing purposes and for them to obtain permits issued by special frontier inspectors.95 In contrast, the Najdi demands focused on the return of the Shammar and splinter groups from other tribes that had taken refuge in Iraq and were raiding Najd. The Saudis demanded the right to raise tribute from their tribes living in Iraq, the return of offenders and loot taken in raids after the 'Uqayr meeting, and the free movement of tribes across the frontier.96 Although the Najdi delegation did not resurrect the previous Saudi concept of mobile, "tribal" frontiers formed according to grazing zones, they tried to restore the status quo ante prevailing before the Muhamara treaty, which had partly been condoned at the 'Uqayr conference. They emphasized the "customs of the desert," according to "rights and lordship" that permitted the Saudis to collect zakat as well as to pursue offenders, loot, and fleeing criminal tribes. They also stated that the Iraqis had to comply with the general terms of friendship with the Najdi government, which the latter had keenly observed.97 Iraq's terms were based on the right of a state to delineate its borders, to exert its own authority over border areas, and to comply with extradition agreements. The Saudi counterclaims were anchored in both Bedouin customs and adherence to the accepted decisions of the 'Uqayr agrement.98 The Najdi delegation was ready, after only a few days of discussion, to consent to most of the Iraqi demands, including the appointment of a frontier officer and communication with tribes in Iraq only through an official representative. They were, however, adamant about Iraq's acceptance of Najdi rights with regard to the extradition of tribal groups and the restoration of loot taken by certain tribes. The chairman of the conference, Lieutenant Colonel S. G. Knox, the outgoing British resident in the Persian Gulf, supported the Najdi demands.99 The Iraqis were reluctant to agree to the expulsion of tribes, claiming that it contradicted international practice.100 They were probably afraid that the forcible expulsion of any tribe that preferred to remain in Iraqi territory would only be followed by the tribe's return to Iraq; such an outcome would precipitate an undesirable cycle of raids. For the same reason, they demanded that if a tribe from Iraq that was Najdi in origin were summoned for military service by Ibn Sa'ud, as was the custom, tribesmen should be accompanied by their women and children, thereby uprooting themselves from Iraq.101 When the Iraqi delegation raised the demand that a satisfactory agreement be reached between Najd and the Hijaz, based on the withdrawal of Wahhabi forces from Khurma and Turaba,102 the Najdi delegates objected, and Knox had to adjourn the conference. It was reconvened on January 10, 1924. The first sessions covered the points on which there was agreement as well as those in dispute. The demand concerning the Hijaz was not discussed any further in the framework of this conference; rather, the focus was on control over the disputed tribes. Although the Iraqis were willing to compensate for looting, they still refused to comply with the Najdis' demand to expel the tribes. On

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January 18, at the tenth session, the head of the Iraqi delegation, Sabih Bey, insisted that any question of mutinous tribesmen be discussed only as part of a comprehensive extradition treaty. Even the question of the Shammar was left open. In the case of the Dahamsha, another tribe over which Ibn Sa'ud claimed authority, the Iraqis consented to expulsion with no right to return.103 The British made various proposals in an attempt to bring the parties to an agreement. In a last-minute effort to save the conference, the duke of Devonshire suggested that the tribes whose extradition was demanded by Ibn Sa'ud give either cash or cattle as a guarantee against raiding. Knox added that the British government would then undertake to arbitrate future disputes that arose over raiding.104 These steps were aimed at persuading the parties to agree to a partial settlement on less contentious issues. These new proposals, however, necessitated further consultations between delegates and their leaders, particularly in the Saudi case. The restrictions on the Saudi delegates' freedom of negotiation became evident during the last days of January 1924, when under Ibn Sa'ud's orders, the Najdi delegation took a tougher line, seeking to defer discussion of all problems to a later date when a proposed tribal tribunal would meet.105 The conference was therefore adjourned once again. In early February 1924, Knox first proposed using economic sanctions as a means of pressuring Ibn Sa'ud. The suggestion was discussed in the Foreign Office, whose officials apparently feared a drastic weakening of Ibn Sa'ud's position, resulting in raids by tribal dissidents, and so the proposal was vetoed.106 In late February, Ibn Sa'ud himself eased the tension somewhat by writing to Knox that "King Faisal is too exalted to grant refuge to seditious persons,"107 as if he trusted Faysal's cooperation in matters of extradition. No further discussions on this matter were held between the parties at the conference. Both during the conference and in the "Green Book" that the Najdi government published afterward, the Saudis were careful to make clear that it was not the legitimacy of the Iraqi kingdom that they questioned or the recognition of Iraqi borders and tribes. They did not renew their claim to the Dhafir or the Muntafiq. During the conference, the Najdi position regarding outstanding issues with Iraq never challenged Faysal's legitimacy or the validity of the border as defined at Uqayr in 1922. They instead concentrated on specific problems such as looting and on tribes like the Shammar whose restoration had been accepted at 'Uqayr.108 The Najdi delegation was restrained and even conciliatory on a variety of issues. The logic and principles underlying that stance contrasted with the Najdi response to the Trans-Jordanian claims, which were presented on December 26, 1923. The Trans-Jordanian claims included one major territorial demand, namely, handing over al-Jawf (including the village of Sakaka) to Nuri Sha'lan, chief of the Ruwalla. Trans-Jordan made other minor demands, similar to Iraq's, including blood money to compensate for Najdi tribal raids, an agreement to prevent raiding, restrictions on border crossings, a Saudi promise to stop contacting tribes in Trans-Jordan, an exchange of official residents, and the right of refusing to surrender political refugees.

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The Najdi delegation's reaction was a flat refusal to acknowledge the limits of Trans-Jordanian territory as presented by the delegates. Moreover, they proposed their own borderline with Trans-Jordan, running along latitude 32 degrees, configured in such a way that they would keep Tayma' as far as Tabuk, and the whole of Wadi Sirhan, bordering on Jabal 'Anaza in Iraq.109 They strongly rejected Jordanian claims that it was the lawful successor of the Ottoman province of Syria in the area and therefore the master of the Ruwalla. The principal Najdi speaker during these sessions, Hafiz Wahbah, admitted that parts of certain tribes, such as the Bani Sakhr and the Huwaytat, were Trans-Jordanian but firmly upheld the contention that the Shararat, and especially the Ruwalla, had always been under Najdi control. He claimed that historically, al-Jawf had belonged to the Wahhabi domains, retaken from the Rashidis. He also stressed that Najd needed al-Jawf for economic reasons, as a basis for trade with Syria, and as a center for salt mining.110 In the Green Book published after the conference, the Najdis dealt with Trans-Jordan in a manner totally different from that shown to Iraq. They stated that because Trans-Jordan was a country that "has had no political existence until quite recently, it was not expected that this new state would look for many things before the establishment of its independence, or would be greedy or think of becoming great."111 Trans-Jordan was further accused of sending forces into al-Jawf to occupy Qaryat al-Milh, contradicting an understanding with Najd. As a result of the unresolved dispute over the al-Jawf territory, other points that could have been agreed on were not settled, and the first session ended in a deadlock.112 Knox then tried to coax Ibn Sa'ud into greater flexibility by offering a comprehensive deal with all Hashimite parties, including those of the Hijaz. The Hashimites themselves became more amenable to such a possibility. In January 1924, Husayn had offered to send his son Zayd as a delegate to the conference, and before adjourning the conference, the Iraqis proposed that Najd enter a settlement with the Hijaz. Knox sought to help facilitate this plan and introduced a British contingency plan: Wadi Sirhan would be annexed to Najd in return for which Ibn Sa'ud's forces would retreat from Khaybar, and Khurma and Turaba would be reincorporated into the Hijaz.113 This was intended as a new basis for a settlement with the Hashimites. The members of the Najdi delegation took it upon themselves to put the proposals to Ibn Sa'ud. Toward the end of January, Hafiz Wahbah presented Ibn Sa'ud's own principles for a settlement, which indicated that on the question of Trans-Jordan the Najdi remained intransigent. Ibn Sa'ud made it clear that he was opposed to the "confusion" of Hijazi affairs with those of TransJordan. But because he was in practical possession of the whole of Wadi Sirhan, he was willing to comply with such an agreement for a much higher price. Wahbah proposed that Khurma and Turaba become independent "buffer states" and that only Khaybar be returned to the Hijaz. He demanded in return that Husayn abandon Qunfida on the Yemeni coastline, refrain from further intervention in 'Asir, and acknowledge Najdi domains according to the Muhammara treaty.114

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Bearing in mind the deep enmity between Ibn Sa'ud and Husayn at the time and the attachment of Khurma and Turaba to Najd, it is reasonable to assume that Ibn Sa'ud's proposal was designed only to undermine the possibility of a further settlement. Ibn Sa'ud refused to send his son to the conference, as Husayn had proposed, and suggested dealing directly with Britain, as the mandatory power in Trans-Jordan. To avoid the total disintegration of the conference, J. H. Thomas, the new secretary for the colonies, suggested that if a comprehensive settlement were impossible, then at least an agreement to prevent raiding should be reached, even if Britain had to be Najd's negotiating partner.115 In late March, Knox tried to supplement Thomas's proposals by suggesting the establishment of a buffer state in al-Jawf under the Shavians, in return for Najdi concessions on the Najd-Hijaz frontier and the holding of a plebiscite in both regions. Both al-Kaf and Wadi Sirhan would be included in the al-Jawf state, which would be independent, demilitarized, and free from customs on goods in transit.116 Trans-Jordanian delegates withdrew for consultations with 'Abdullah, and no further deliberations were held on the matter. Although the talks with Iraq were no more successful than those with Trans-Jordan, the difference in the Najdi attitude toward the two states should be emphasized. The Saudis were aggressive and contemptuous toward TransJordan, and it was clear that they were intent on extending Najdi domains northward. In contrast, the Saudi attitude toward Iraq was businesslike and confined to specific issues. The reasons for these contrasting attitudes are worth noting: Ibn Sa'ud's strategy at the Kuwayt conference was designed to bolster Saudi authority in the disputed frontier zones by neutralizing the influence of the Hashimites and the power of the Ikhwan. As mentioned earlier, this strategy was anchored in attempts to centralize Saudi economic might, through higher taxation imposed on Saudi tribes and diversion of their trading routes and market centers to Jubayl and Qatif (rather than Kuwayt), where Ibn Sa'ud could levy high customs duties. The hitherto-autonomous tribes, notably the Mutayr, but also urban residents in al-Asha', strongly resented this policy. Reports dating from March and October 1923 reveal serious discontent among the tribes and townsmen of al-Ahsa', who complained of the "despotism" of Ibn Sa'ud.117 In December 1923, Ibn Sa'ud himself complained that Ikhwan splinter groups were active in Iraq, having fled there to avoid paying him taxes.118 Among the escaped Ikhwan leaders were 'Ali Abu Shuwayrabat and Shuryan Ibn Lami, leaders of minor Mutayri factions; Farhan al-Dhwaybi of the Harb; and Na'if Ibn Humayd of the 'Utayba.119 Certain Mutayr groups had, by then, joined the Shammar in Iraq in raiding Najd and Hamud Ibn Suwayt's pro-Saudi forces in southern Iraq. Faysal al-Dawish and Sultan Ibn Humayd, who remained loyal to the Saudi state, failed to prevent splinter groups from their tribes from trying to escape the economic difficulties in Najd by fleeing to Iraq, where they formed a group of "Ikhwan refugees." From June to September 1923, they raided Najd continually; in August, their raids coincided with the most serious raid of the Shammar into Najd, carried out by 'Aqab Ibn 'Ajil of the 'Abda section.120

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In September Ibn Sa'ud went into action. He needed to regain hegemony in southern Iraq, both to prevent the formation of an anti-Saudi base there and to regulate his relations with the Ikhwan. In addition to complaining to Sir Henry Dobbs, the new high commissioner in Iraq, Ibn Sa'ud exploited an old tribal enmity in Iraq between the 'Amarat and another section of the 'Anaza, the Dahamsha. Jaza' Ibn Mijlad, chief of the Dahamsha, was a rival of Fahd Ibn Khaz'al, leader of the 'Amarat and an important chieftain in Iraq. Because of his opposition to Fahd's leadership, he had been in Syrian territory since 1917; in 1923 he made contact with Ibn Sa'ud. In September he visited al-Riyad and returned laden with gifts and accompanied by a new Saudi wakil, Salih Ibn 'Adi, who began collecting zakat as soon as he arrived. However, he was later detained and brought to Baghdad by the Iraqi authorities. In the second week of September 1923, Ibn Sa'ud dispatched a force under Fahd Ibn Jilawi into Iraq to punish the Ikhwan. Most of them managed to escape to the north, later to resume their raiding.121 Once these attempts failed, Ibn Sa'ud was content to pursue his goals through negotiations at a conference. As for al-Dawish, he was busy marshaling his forces against both al-Jawf and the Hijaz; in November he attacked in the direction of al-Ula.122 Because Ibn Sa'ud had sound reasons for fighting the Hashimites in both al-Jawf and the Hijaz, it may be assumed that he deployed al-Dawish for these missions. Ibn Sa'ud had another motivation for sending al-Dawish to the Hijaz at this juncture: to allow him to participate in the Kuwayt discussions without the Mutayr's check and to gain concessions from Iraq that would facilitate control over the Ikhwan refugees, including the possible surrender of the Shammar. The result would have been the decisive reinforcement of Saudi government control over the Ikhwan. Ibn Sa'ud's designs regarding Trans-Jordan were quite different. Despite 'Abdullah's threats to reoccupy al-Jawf, Ibn Sa'ud's initial hold on the area was quite secure, supported as it was by the majority of the local population. It provided a springboard for attacks on Trans-Jordan, evident in a raid carried out by the Ikhwan in July (the sources do not specify exactly who executed it) and in the deployment of al-Dawish in September. This aggressive attitude was also manifested at the conference. Aside from the salt available in al-Jawf, the Najdi delegates based their claim on strategic considerations. Wahbah emphasized that Najd maintained its horse-trade route with Syria through al-Jawf, a trade that was a lifeline for the country. He pointed out the economic significance of the area, insisting that unimpeded passage toward Syria had to be available for Najdi caravans.123 Yet it would seem that the Najdi position reflected a broader and deeper concern. On January 16, 1924, Knox reported that "Trans-Jordania appears to regard it as vital that they should have through connection with Iraq, which Nejd is determined to deny to them."124 One day later, relying on different sources of information, Dobbs reported that "his [Ibn Sa'ud's] intention was to claim up to Syrian territory north of Jabal Anaiza. This would cut off Iraq

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from Palestine and complicate the question of [the contemplated] railway and pipeline."125 Both Knox and Dobbs suggested that Ibn Sa'ud's intention was to establish a connection with the French in Syria, an assumption that is not substantiated by any other evidence. It is highly likely, however, that the Najdi ruler intended to penetrate as deep as possible into Trans-Jordan in order to create a wedge between his Hashimite rivals, Iraq and Trans-Jordan. The Ruwalla was the most important tribe in this area. Oscillating between the surrounding forces, the Sha'lans seemed to be cooperating with 'Abdullah against Ibn Sa'ud. In early July, during a visit to 'Abdullah, Nuri Sha'lan showed such inclinations. This meeting led J. Murray of the Foreign Office to conclude that there was probably "some concert" between Nuri and 'Abdullah.126 In September 1923, the Ruwalla took another initiative that created problems for Najd. The British consul at Damascus, C. F. Palmer, reported: Sultan Ibn Nawaf [Nuri's grandson] tells me that efforts are still being made by the Roalla to unite all the Anaizeh—i.e., the Roalla, Amarat, Feddan—in a confederation to resist the advance of the Wahhabis. So far, he declares, this attempt at union has failed; but he has not abandoned hope completely, and pointed out that if success was eventually attained the Anaizeh would prove a serious obstacle even to the Wahhabis. He added that he was proceeding . . . to Kariet el-Milh, to be ready in case of further Wahhabi attacks. This is by direct request of the Emir Abdullah. At all events the Roalla chiefs now all seem to be on good terms with the Emir Abdullah, and Nouri was quite recently awarded a Hedjazian decoration.127

Ibn Sa'ud probably knew about these developments; he even complained to the Syrian government about Nuri's mischief.128 The persistent attempt to extend the Najdi border to latitude 32 degrees was intended to eliminate an initiative that might not only have helped 'Abdullah and the Hashimite cause as a whole but might also have increased and deepened hostilities toward Ibn Sa'ud among the Iraqi desert tribes. Those tribes, which Ibn Sa'ud hoped to sway toward Najd, might have then become part of an anti-Saudi tribal alliance, with the Ruwalla and the 'Amarat as its pillars. Ibn Sa'ud therefore tried to devise a broad strategy. He displayed a rather moderate and restrained attitude toward Iraq at the Kuwayt conference, insisting only on controlling tribes stationed there. This tactic was aimed at facilitating an alliance with a number of Iraqi tribes, which, in turn, would have given the Saudi government control over raiding factions and an advantage over the Ikhwan. At the same time, Ibn Sa'ud's approach toward Trans-Jordan was designed to turn alJawf and the Syrian desert into a Saudi domain. This would establish a wedge between tribes that might have been arrayed against him and, in wider terms, between Iraq and Trans-Jordan. Ibn Sa'ud would thereby outflank the Iraqi desert from the west, frustrate an anti-Saudi buildup, and reinforce his domination over tribes in Iraq. Finally, by deploying al-Dawish in the Hijaz, he would keep him from interfering with his attempt to gain supremacy in the region. The failure of the Kuwayt conference impeded Ibn Sa'ud's efforts to con-

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tain the Ikhwan through a buffer zone between Trans-Jordan and Iraq. Moreover, the Ikhwan themselves helped frustrate the plan. Early in 1924, it probably became clear to al-Dawish that Ibn Sa'ud was planning to contain the Ikhwan through maneuvers at the Kuwayt conference. While away fighting in the Hijaz, he expressed his anger over Ibn Sa'ud's attitude toward the Ikhwan and contemplated action to obstruct Saudi plans. He found an ally in Didan Ibn Hithlayn, leader of the 'Ujman, and both refused to report to Ibn Sa'ud when asked to do so.129 Apparently because of the reduction of the British subsidy and Ibn Sa'ud's eagerness to finance his early preparations against the Hijaz, he imposed a heavy economic burden on his populations and particularly on the relatively wealthy merchants of al-Ahsa', from whom he demanded quantities of coffee and sugar. The 'Ujman were outraged by the levy, which they could not escape, and encouraged by the rumor that Ibn Sa'ud was in trouble and that his position was weakening, they took action against him.130 Na'if Ibn Hithlayn, leader of the 'Ujman's Khudayr subsection, crossed the border and joined the other Ikhwan in Iraq.131 A series of raids and counterraids into Najd ensued, launched by groups of Ikhwan refugees and Saudi Ikhwan through a corridor wedged between Trans-Jordan and Iraq. Besides the necessity of reacting against the intrusion into Mutayri grazing zones, al-Dawish's prestige as supreme chief was at stake. On February 10, alDawish complained to Ibn Sa'ud about the situation. "You should take action in this matter," he wrote, making a veiled threat: "Nothing has prevented me from [raiding] except our obedience to God and to you."132 Ibn Sa'ud's ambivalent response was typical of his relationship with al-Dawish. There were reports in early March that Ibn Sa'ud had deployed al-Dawish with a fighting force between Iraq and Kuwayt.133 However, on March 14 when al-Dawish raided Iraq around Diwaniyya, slaughtering 146 people, Ibn Sa'ud argued that earlier raids into Najd had angered his tribes and that he was encountering difficulties in controlling them.134 Dobbs declared that Ibn Sa'ud must have endorsed the raid, but the resident at Bushire, A. P. Trevor, maintained that the Najdi ruler was on the verge of losing control over the Ikhwan and that he was probably aware of the raid but had been unable to prevent it.135 It remains unclear whether Ibn Sa'ud really endorsed the raid, feigning disapproval to the British, or whether he actually opposed it. This raid was a contributory cause to the dissolution of the Kuwayt conference and frustrated Ibn Sa'ud's designs for regional supremacy. The Mutayr raid encouraged other Ikhwan tribes to try their luck. In the middle of April, Didan struck again at Diwaniyya. Two minor Mutayri chieftains, Ibn Shuqayr and Ibn Mandil, attempted to raid the Dhafir but were repulsed.136 In June and July, both Ibn Sa'ud and Nuri Sha'lan reported that clashes had occurred between Najdi and Trans-Jordanian tribes, with raids carried out by both sides. In August, one of those raids was launched in the vicinity of 'Amman, the capital of Trans-Jordan, posing a renewed threat to 'Abdullah's rule.137 Frontier warfare, including residual intertribal fighting, interstate disputes, and Saudi-Ikhwan rivalries for regional supremacy, continued for the

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next few years. The outbreak of warfare was prompted by Iraq's renewed attempts to strengthen its grip over the frontier zone. The Iraqi government appealed to both Hamud Ibn Suwayt and Yusuf Beg and approached the Shammar, who had crossed into Iraq, to cooperate. The frontier post of Abu Ghar, guarding a tribal route from Najd into Iraq, was reinforced by a British officer in the service of the Iraqi government, J. B. Glubb, who was to play a major role in tribal affairs in the region.138 Ikhwan groups were quick to retaliate. On December 26, 1924, al-Dawish fell upon the Dhafir and local shepherd tribes in Diwaniyya and Umm Rahal and killed 46 people. The raiding party was dispersed only the next day by British aircraft bombers.139 Several days later, forces of the Harb and the Mutayr again raided southern Iraq.140 In early January, Didan Ibn Hithlayn also launched a raiding party in the direction of Iraq, which was apparently halted on receipt of information about the bombing of al-Dawish's party.141 In turn Ibn Sa'ud protested to Iraq about its "harboring criminals," tribal groups that had earlier raided Najd, 142 but at the same time he tried to avoid a wider clash with the British by prohibiting his tribes from launching further raids into Iraq. 143 Subsequently, Ibn Saud's lieutenants, Ibn Musa'id and Ibn Jilawi, pursued the raiders, and various raiding parties were held back.144 But the Najdi tribes had not been deterred. In January 1925, a raiding party led by the Briyya section of the Mutayr and accompanied by a faction of Ibn Busayyis of that tribe attacked a group of the 'Awazim in Kuwayt, killing their shaykh and sixteen other men and stealing 600 sheep. The 'Awazim were regarded by Ibn Sa'ud as one of his own taxpaying tribes.145 In late January, a second raid took place in what was a joint Ikhwan effort, led by 'Ubayd Ibn Humayd of the Utayba, Kharbush al-Dhuwaybi of the Harb, and 'Ali Ibn Shuwayrabat of the Mutayr.146 These ventures renewed the contest between Ibn Sa'ud and Ikhwan groups, as each tried to weaken the other through new alliances and outflanking maneuvers. The cessation of the British subsidy to Ibn Sa'ud (see Chapter i) increased the pressure on Ibn Sa'ud to develop his own economic resources. He raised the taxes imposed on the Ikhwan and reinforced the prohibition on trade with Kuwayt and Iraq.147 A successful execution of Ibn Sa'ud's policy could have weakened the Ikhwan; they also stood to lose their status relative to the Dahamsha, who, as they were being courted by Ibn Sa'ud, were exempt from these economic burdens. Hence, early in January 1925, al-Dawish raided and located Jaza' Ibn Mijlad of the Dahamsha, who had just purchased, with Ibn Sa'ud's permission, 500 sacks of rice from Ibn Musa'id in Ha'il, a benefit that Ibn Sa'ud had not bestowed on the Ikhwan. The latter's response was described as "running high against Jizza."148 Had Ibn Sa'ud succeeded in wooing the Dahamsha, he would have gained a decisive advantage at the frontier zone and deprived the Mutayr of vital food and supply routes. The 'Amarat 'Anaza were of critical importance; their location on the borders of the Ruwalla and the TransJordanian domains made them an object of interest to both Ibn Sa'ud and the Ikhwan. The former attempted to win them over to his side; the latter carried

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out retaliatory raids against them. While Ibn Sa'ud granted them immunity from Saudi-led raids, in early February, the Ikhwan prepared a raid against Fahd Ibn Khaz'al. Five major Ikhwan bayarik (columns)—three of the TJtayba and two of the Sinjara Shammar—cooperated in order to neutralize Saudi designs for supremacy in the attack of the 'Amarat 'Anaza. An understanding of the political situation in southern Iraq and TransJordan can provide insights into Ibn Sa'ud's reaction to this Ikhwan raid. As mentioned earlier, during the occupation of the Hijaz, Ibn Sa'ud had been placed in jeopardy by Trans-Jordan's assistance to the Hijazi army and government, notably that from 'Aqaba. Ultimately, the British put pressure on Trans-Jordan to desist and ordered Husayn to leave 'Aqaba. During the preceding months, however, Ibn Sa'ud had embarked on a number of initiatives. By October 1924, a message conveyed by the colonial secretary via the Persian Gulf resident made it clear to Ibn Sa'ud that Britain would not agree to any concession relating to 'Aqaba and Ma'an. Indeed, the colonial secretary explained that Britain would help Trans-Jordan defend that zone. The strategic importance of 'Aqaba, which commands the northern entrance to the Red Sea, made it indispensable to the British. The Colonial Office suggested that an arrangement be made with 'Ali in the Hijaz to include 'Aqaba in the boundaries of Trans-Jordan, thereby excluding it from Hijazi jurisdiction.149 In response to the Ikhwan's raid, Ibn Sa'ud concentrated his efforts on northern al-Jawf, particularly al-Kaf. The advantage of this strategy was not only that it applied pressure on 'Abdullah, discouraging him from giving aid to 'Ali, but also that it gave additional access to Iraq. Here Ibn Sa'ud sought new ways of influencing the tribes and of outflanking the Ikhwan by aligning these tribes against them. He was particularly interested in enhancing his power over the Najdi refugee tribes in Iraq. During February and April 1925, the Iraqi government attempted to reinforce its authority over tribal regions, mainly by removing refugee tribal groups to the north of the country, through the Shamiyya desert, and along the zone bordering Trans-Jordan.150 Ibn Sa'ud feared that his hold over tribes in Iraq might be weakened. To counteract the Iraqi moves, he reinforced his ties with the 'Amarat and the Dahamsha in Iraq and with al-Kaf in Trans-Jordan through both military and political actions. In late February 1925, Ibn Musa'id, in cooperation with Ibn Rimal of the loyal Shammar stationed in Najd, carried out a major raid, commanding over 6,000 men against the Bani Sakhr in Bir Ma'asr, Wadi Sirhan. The numbers involved, the quality of the leadership, and, indeed, the rumors that followed the clash indicated that Ibn Sa'ud was behind the raid. The fact that Ibn Daghmi of the Ruwalla, an allied chief, joined in the raid was further evidence that Ibn Sa'ud was on the offensive.151 The shifting loyalty of the Sha'lans between rival protagonists was a fact of life in the Middle East. Nevertheless, it was surprising when Nuri Sha'lan, who had tried to maintain freedom of action for the Ruwalla, allied himself with Ibn Sa'ud. The change was probably in response to Ibn Sa'ud's raiding parties and the emissaries sent to various Sha'lan centers and chieftains demanding their surrender. 152 While Fawwaz Sha'lan appeared to oppose Ibn

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Sa'ud's initiatives and complained about them to the British, Nuri entered into an agreement with Ibn Sa'ud, joined by another chieftain, Mujhim. They actually became Wahhabis and promoted the conversion of the Ruwalla, maintaining constant contact with Ibn Sa'ud's amir in Ha'il, Ibn Musa'id. Mujhim, Ibn Daghmi, and 'Awda Abu Tayy of the Huwaytat tribe also engaged in raids and collected zakat on Ibn Sa'ud's behalf.153 The Najdi ruler thus managed to create a new alliance along both the Iraqi and Jordanian frontier zones. Because Mujhim maintained good relations with Fahd, leader of the 'Amarat in Iraq, Fahd allowed him to purchase supplies there. He did not charge Mujhim the tax customarily payable and instead bestowed on him quantities of rice and dates.154 Ibn Sa'ud thus managed to exploit the link between the Ruwalla and the 'Amarat and establish an axis that gave him political leverage over 'Abdullah and some control over tribes in Iraq. In later March 1925, the Ikhwan retaliated in an attept to thwart Ibn Sa'ud's plan. Another Mutayri Ikhwan chieftain, al-Hamzi, raided a section of the 'Anaza, the Ghazalat, just west of Najaf in Iraq. In the absence of alDawish and Didan, who had left for the Hijaz, the Ikhwan tribes joined forces to retaliate against the Najdi ruler's initiatives. Ikhwan refugees heading north carried out repeated raids on the 'Amarat and into Najd; a group of them under Ibn Lami of the Mutayr turned eastward to Kuwayt and raided there as well.155 In June, 'Ali Ibn Ashwan of the Mutayr raided shepherd tribes in the Muntafiq and routed a force of the Dhafir. The importance of this campaign lies in the fact that the Ikhwan consequently began collecting taxes from the Iraqi tribes at the border, once more thwarting Saudi designs. In 1925, a struggle between Ibn Sa'ud and the Ikhwan over new territories and tribes was raging in various arenas, but without a decisive outcome. A new British initiative now affected the situation—a proposed new agreement with Ibn Sa'ud, which exhibited far more diplomatic skill than did previous British initiatives. As early as October 1924, a British emissary, Gilbert Clayton, was sent to Ibn Sa'ud, who by then had commenced his onslaught on the Hijaz and was in great need of British support. There were indications of a successful settlement: the direct and easy access to the ruler that Clayton enjoyed, the personal nature of discussions that took place between them, and the direct negotiations between Clayton's assistant, George Antonius, and Ibn Sa'ud's assistants, 'Abdullah Damluji and Hafiz Wahbah. Formal negotiations took place during October and early November 1925. The Trans-Jordanian and Iraqi boundary problems were discussed simultaneously: The Bahra agreement was signed with Iraq on November1, 1925, and the Hadda' agreement with Trans-Jordan the following day. During the first sessions Clayton raised one new issue: He suggested that Ibn Sa'ud had injured British interests through the actions of his tribes along the borders. Ibn Sa'ud seemed to be offended and affirmed his good intentions toward Britain. He could not at that point admit that he was locked in a multitribal dispute transversing official frontiers or that he was only one rival party to the dispute, rather than the recognized regional leader. He therefore resorted to

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traditional arguments, bargaining over strategic areas and technical border arrangements without which, he asserted, peace could not prevail on the frontiers. He maintained that the lack of such arrangements and the absence of his own control over strategic points were the real causes of border unrest. In the fifth through eighth sessions of the conference, Ibn Sa'ud laid down two basic demands: the return of "criminal" tribal elements from Iraq and the inclusion of al-Kaf in his domains. These demands indicated his intention to control Najdi dissident tribes in Iraq and to obtain a strategic corridor between Trans-Jordan and Iraq. Ibn Sa'ud further demanded that the frontier between Trans-Jordan and Najd run considerably northward from al-Kaf, as only such a boundary would give him the necessary link with the Ruwalla. From the British viewpoint, however, only al-Kaf was negotiable. Thomas had laid down this principle in October 1924. Clayton noted in his diary on October 13, 1925, that "Kaf is the crucial question and it is practically the only card that I have up my sleeve."156 In the eighth session, in order to achieve a breakthrough, Clayton agreed to allow Ibn Sa'ud to have al-Kaf but none of the other northern territories that he had demanded. In return, Clayton required that Ibn Sa'ud refrain in the future from raiding and from fortifying alKaf as a military stronghold. When in the eleventh session, Ibn Sa'ud pressed for more territories in Trans-Jordan, Clayton both refused and threatened to stop the negotiations. Souring relations with Britain at the crucial stages of the siege of al-Madina and Jidda may not have seemed worth the risk to Ibn Sa'ud, who then accepted the emissary's proposals. In both the Bahra and the Hadda' agreements, articles were inserted that included undertakings by the respective governments to refrain from raiding (though peaceful border crossing for grazing was allowed) and to establish border tribunals to deal with past raiding and the restoration of booty. In both cases it was stipulated that tribes be permitted to cross the border only after a specific request to do so. Although this provision might have given the respective governments some control over raiding, additional clauses were inserted to prevent any government from chasing raiding parties into another's territory and from expelling raiding tribes by force. In the case of Iraq, the Najdi refugee tribes were not returned. It was stipulated that if they should leave for Najd for military service, they would have to take their women and children with them, to prevent their returning. An extradition treaty was to be discussed only in the future.157 From the Saudi viewpoint, the acquisition of al-Kaf allowed Ibn Sa'ud a certain advantage in the control of Wadi Sirhan, which constituted the main regional passage into Trans-Jordan. However, this achievement fell considerably short of the corridor between Iraq and Trans-Jordan that Ibn Sa'ud had wanted; he remained unable to interfere with Hashimite territorial dominance to the north of al-Jawf, and he had difficulties controlling his own raiding tribes. The problems with the Ikhwan, kindled by inter-Hashimite and intertribal rivalries, continued to dominate the political environment. To conclude, although the fixing of the northern borders of the Saudi polity was an essential step in the creation of a modern state, the Arabian

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peninsula was so volatile at this time that the sudden imposition of official borders served to exacerbate intertribal, tribal-ruler, and interruler tensions. The process of frontier demarcation generated convoluted border disputes and imposed new challenges on Saudi consolidation efforts, demanding new tactics to deal with these challenges. Thus, prolonged insubordination characterized the Ikhwan in the frontier zones, a rebelliousness that threatened to spread and affect the consolidation of the Najdi heartland. This situation resulted in Saudi centralization in the new provinces, reflected in increased taxation, the creation of new trade routes, and maneuvering for political supremacy. Ibn Sa'ud tried outflanking and raiding and attempted to form wide-ranging alliances across the frontiers. Together these efforts were intended to achieve consolidation by overpowering external political rivals such as the Hashimites, as well as an internal rival, the Ikhwan. But given the complex relations between Ibn Sa'ud and the Ikhwan, in which interdependence and mutual interests often alternated with rivalry, the attempt to counterbalance the Ikhwan was carried out indirectly, at the expense of remote territories and distant tribes, and with unclear results.

Najd and the Hijaz, 1925-1927 After the Najdi expansion into the Hijaz, the focus of state building shifted to this province, where it was characterized by the development of bureaucratic institutions designed to bolster the state. The following analysis reflects the interplay between the development of such institutions and the use of traditional strategies of local politics in Ibn Sa'ud's efforts to incorporate the Hijaz into the Saudi realm. The occupation of the Hijaz in 1924-25 posed new problems for Saudi rule. One was the necessity of securing the pilgrimage route and maintaining good relations with Muslim states and their European rulers, a task calling for great diplomatic skill. The Ikhwan's determination to establish a Wahhabi regime in the Hijaz despite the opposition of local notables and Hijazi tribes was another problem. The integration of the Hijaz into the Saudi state inevitably required Ibn Sa'ud to compromise and, in so doing, to incur the wrath of various groups. On the other hand, Ibn Sa'ud's focus on centralization resulted in the weakening of his rivals, the strengthening of government institutions, and the promotion of economic growth. At this stage, the centralization efforts had two facets: New institutions, laws, and bureaucratic structures were established, paralleled by the appointment of members of the Saudi family, who were personally selected by Ibn Sa'ud, to run these institutions. The creation of new institutions was prompted by Ibn Sa'ud's interest in controlling his realm and also by the example of the Hashimite administration, which had preceded Saudi rule in the Hijaz. As happened in many other cases, the more elaborate administration of the ousted ruler provided a model for the victorious party. The assigning of members of the ruling family to key posts, on the other hand, derived from the tribal tradition, in which reliance

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on personal contacts for the control of political affairs was the norm. The process of regional integration and the adaptation of existing institutions was therefore accompanied by the reinforcement of personal rule in the state. The notables of the Hijaz posed a particular set of problems. Constituted as al-hizb al-watani, the Nationalist party, they facilitated the Saudi takeover of the main Hijazi cities. Ibn Sa'ud also relied on their assistance in the months following the occupation. Compared with their Najdi counterparts, the Hijazi businessmen were not only wealthier but also more accustomed to corporate political activity, having acquired experience during the earlier Hashimite regimes. Seeking to legitimize his rule in the Hijaz as quickly as possible, Ibn Sa'ud allowed the Hijazi notables to retain their positions as the local aristocracy and even institutionalized their leadership. A major strategem for consolidating the loyalty of the Hijazi nobility was the reintroduction of an advisory representative body. Thus a body of Hijazi notables (al-majlis al-ahli) was elected after the occupation of Mecca and reelected on August 1, 1925. The members of this majlis were elected by collectivities from various quarters of the town and from among merchants and 'ulama'.158 The convened body was thereafter known as the Advisory Council (majlis al-shura). In August 1926, however, as part of an overall administrative reform, the composition of the council was altered. A convention of seventy notables of Jidda and thirty of Mecca was called to decide on a "Basic Law" (al-qanun al-asasi). According to the Basic Law, a viceroy was to be appointed for the Hijaz (na'ib al-malik). This appointment went to Ibn Sa'ud's son Faysal who, together with his brother Sa'ud, began to take the place of Ibn Sa'ud's first son, Turki, who had died in 1919, and became the main representation of their father in the Hijaz and Najd, respectively. The Advisory Council, composed this time of thirteen appointed members, was formed at Faysal's discretion, with five members from Mecca, three from al-Madina, three from Jidda, and one each from Yanbu' and Ta'if. As representatives of public opinion, they advised the viceroy about legislative matters, the budget, concessions and licenses, and general communal interests. The Basic Law also provided for the establishment in each province of a provincial governor (qcfimaqam) and a District Council, composed of appointed officials and notables who advised the governor. The latter were to be responsible to the viceroy. Similar councils were also to be appointed in every village and tribe.159 This system resembled the old Islamic consultative bodies which functioned as political councils (majalis) of tribal confederacies, in which major policy considerations were debated. The Islamic principle of advice (shura) given to the ruler on policy issues by the notability had been adopted by Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab as a right pertaining to the 'ulama'. It was reinstated to support regional integration of the Saudi state. The idea was to attract local notables from different Hijazi regions and cities by giving them representation and, at the same time, placing them in hierarchical order under Saudi control. The Ikhwan presented Ibn Sa'ud with special problems. As a significant component of the Saudi military forces and the driving Wahhabi spirit of the

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day, they had played a major role in the Saudi takeover of the Hijaz. However, their ideological zeal and political ambitions threatened Saudi interests on a number of fronts. Friction between the Ikhwan and Ibn Sa'ud spread into the Hijaz both before and during the Saudi occupation of the area. Ibn Sa'ud instructed Ikhwan leaders to join him as military lieutenants. Accordingly, Ibn Humayd led a major force of the 'Utayba into the arena, and a second was headed by Khalid Ibn al-Luway. In late 1924, Al-Dawish had been ordered by Ibn Sa'ud to join the fighting. He did so in April 1925, besieging al-Madina. At the same time Didan Ibn Hithlayn of the 'Ujman joined the forces. This served the double purpose of removing them from Najd and facilitating Ibn Sa'ud's bid to obtain a "corridor" in the Syrian desert. The Ikhwan's objection to this strategy and their general resistance to Ibn Sa'ud's centralization policies, combined with the fact that they did not have an official role in the Saudi administration, fueled the conflict between them and the Najdi ruler. Hence, when Didan was first summoned to Ibn Sa'ud, he initially refused to report, consenting only several weeks later.160 Al-Dawish, too, registered his objections. On his way to the Hijaz, he visited al-Riyad. Finding Ibn Sa'ud absent, he met with his father, 'Abd al-Rahman, to whom he complained about the measures that the Najdi ruler had taken against the Ikhwan, particularly the prohibition on raiding.161 'Abd al~Rahman's response in this case is unknown, but he usually recommended Wahhabi, traditional values, to Ibn Sa'ud, and so he might have pressed him to accommodate alDawish's demands. A second manifestation of the tension between Ibn Sa'ud and the Ikhwan was the growing cooperation and increasing zeal among the various groups of Ikhwan. The raids carried out in late 1924 across the Iraqi border and against the 'Awazim were undertaken jointly by groups of the Mutayr, Harb, and 'Utayba. Furthermore, just before Didan was summoned to join Ibn Sa'ud in the Hijaz, he had conferred at Jibba, 12 miles north of Burayda, with Ibn Shuqayr and Na'if al-Fuqum of the Mutayr, and Muhsin al-Firm of the Harb, in order to plan a raid, presumably into Iraq. Ultimately, the raid did not take place, but the plan demonstrated the increasing cooperation among a variety of Ikhwan groups, even those of secondary importance. Like the Mutayr, the Ikhwan of al-Ghatghat, led by Ibn Humayd, displayed fierceness and cruelty in their occupation of Ta'if in September 1924. In early January 1925, after Ibn Sa'ud had entered Mecca, a conference of 'ulama', Ikhwan commanders, and Hijazi notables convened to discuss the ongoing occupation. Both Khalid and Ibn Humayd spoke, and both, especially Ibn Humayd, created an emotional impact by calling for the establishment of the word of God in the Hijaz. This zeal may have irritated Ibn Sa'ud, and during the convention he insisted on proceeding cautiously in order to avoid offending foreigners and fellow Muslims.162 In the following months, the cooperation among Ikhwan tribal leaders broadened. In late February, al-Dawish married Ibn Humayd's sister.163 In April 1925, after al-Dawish had arrived at Mecca, he visited Khalid and in the

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latter's presence declared, "Our sword and our lives are pledged to [fighting on behalf of God] not only in the case of the Shereef [Husayn] but in the case of all who follow in his footsteps and commit the misdeeds which he committed."164 During this period, three Ikhwan aspirations generated problems for Ibn Sa'ud. One was their wish to "purify" the Hijaz province, especially the holy shrines; it was in this connection that al-Dawish called for the execution of God's will. Their desire to carry out this aim intensified as they came into contact with the "misdeeds," that is, the shafi'i religious code of the Hashimites. If they had got their way, it could have precipitated a confrontation with the Hijazis, other Muslim states, and even their European protectors. The Ikhwan's second aspiration was to become part of the provincial administration, a desire inconsistent with Saudi political practices and Ibn Sa'ud's attempts to contain the Ikhwan. Their third aspiration was to introduce a regime that would satisfy their Najdi tribal values and prevail over the more urban, cosmopolitan, and trade-oriented practices of the Hijaz. In the face of the challenges posed by influential Ikhwan, Ibn Sa'ud chose to mobilize Najdi—and particularly Ikhwan—loyalty, by imposing the Wahhabi law and its religious principles on the Hijaz. This could at least satisfy their religious zeal as well as their Najdi regional pride, and it was accomplished in several ways. To begin with, the Ikhwan's attention was turned to the introduction of Wahhabi practices, first in Mecca and later in the entire Hijaz. Khalid Ibn al-Luway became the chief persecutor of tobacco smokers and traders in Mecca.165 In an attempt to stop the cult of shrines, which the Wahhabis regarded as idolatry (shirk), the shrines of Mawlid al-Nabi, Bayt Khadija, and Bayt Abu-Bakr (the Prophet's birthplace, his wife's house, and the khalifa Abu-Bakr's house, respectively) were destroyed in quick succession.166 In December 1924, the following practices were declared illegal: grave worship, the swearing of allegiance to any being other than Allah, and the functioning of any intermediary between God and man. But Ibn Sa'ud had to modify the drive for purification in the face of growing international Muslim pressure. In his declaration to the Muslim world on July 23, 1925, he announced that the holy law, the shari'a, would prevail in the Hijaz but that no damage would be done to holy shrines. Moreover, 'ulama' would be universally consulted in the governing of the holy cities.167 He also issued an order to permit the import of tobacco into the Hijaz, although smoking was still prohibited. In September 1925, he declared that carrying firearms would be illegal in Mecca, which offended the Ikhwan, who retaliated by molesting foreign pilgrims on several occasions. Their anger was quelled only toward the end of 1925, when they were sent to occupy Yanbu', Wajh, and other towns.168 The 'ulama' of the Hijaz were well incorporated into the judicial system and the administration of the awqaf (donations for public and private purposes, usually administered by 'ulama'), the mosques, and the educational system. 'Abd al-Rahman Al-Shaykh noted that many 'ulama'held administrative posts and also that there were several 'ulama', mainly of the al-Shaykh family, whom Ibn Sa'ud brought over from Najd after the occupation to become heads of the educational and judicial systems of cities like Jidda,

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Mecca, and al-Madina.169 From early 1925 onward, 'ulama' from al-Riyad were engaged in discussions with their counterparts in the Hijaz; that these discussions lasted well over a year proves that even the unification of the judicial system and the resolution of theological questions were difficult to achieve,170 although both were finally accomplished. These two means of integration—purification of the holy places and imposition of Wahhabi law in the Hijaz—were underscored by the reinforcement of Saudi rule. In order to maintain a proper balance among the different elements of the expanded realm and to satisfy the world outside, Ibn Sa'ud sought direct and augmented control over the process of state formation. One major move toward this goal was Ibn Sa'ud's assumption of a royal title. He became king of the Hijaz (malik al-Hijaz) on January 25, 1926, as a direct result of the vote of loyalty (bay 'a) that Hijazi notables gave him during this month, in acknowledgment of his rule. Ibn Sa'ud remained sultan of Najd for another year, until he proclaimed himself king of Najd on January 27, 1927. Although Islamic political theory had no provision for the title malik, it was nevertheless accepted by both the population of Najd and that of the Hijaz. The Hijazis viewed this title as representing the continuity and prestige of the tradition of local leadership, initiated by Husayn, who had become king of the Hijaz in 1916. For their part, the Najdis initially preferred Ibn Sa'ud to have a more familiar, traditional title, but after his becoming king of the Hijaz, they must have considered Ibn Sa'ud's assumption of the title malik Najd an answer to the Hijazi royal title. The assumption of royalty reflected Ibn Sa'ud's ability to convert the regional ambitions of both Hijazis and Najdis to a style of supreme leadership. As their monarch, he would be able to represent their interests in the realm. The assumption of the title malik therefore amounted to an institutionalization of Ibn Sa'ud's continuing efforts to balance the demands of varied groups. This is commonly found in other tribal societies in the Middle East, where the performance of political mediation ultimately leads its performer to take on the title of monarch.171 By assuming a royal title, Ibn Sa'ud confirmed his unprecedented supremacy in the realm, and the title also enabled him to present himself on equal terms with European heads of state, with whose governments he had increased dealings. Strengthening the central government's bureaucratic mechanisms was another crucial means of reinforcing the control of central government. During this period, the Najdi and Hijazi judicial systems were unified (tawhid alnizam al-gada'i) by a royal decree, in accordance with the Hanbali school that governed in Najd. Several shar'i codexes were designated as the authoritative judicial sources, and three levels of courts were introduced into the Hijaz, one for minor claims and crimes, another for major ones, and a court of appeal seated in Mecca (al-mahakim al-usta'jala, al-kubra, and hay'at al-murakabat al-qada 'iyya, respectively). This system was aimed at halting the arbitrary use of both tribal and shar'i law, preventing arbitrary verdicts of amputation and the death penalty, and strengthening the state's supremacy.172 To maintain peace within the state, a police authority (mudiriyyat al-shurta

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al-'amma) was established, first in Mecca in late 1925, after which branches were set up throughout the realm. These forces consisted of camel and horse riders responsible for keeping the peace and defending the regime. Telegraph, telephone, and radio networks were introduced in Mecca, al-Riyad, Burayda, and Jubayl, enabling the central government to control the periphery. In January 1926, a finance department was formed in Jidda (mudiriyya maliyya), which in 1927 became the General Financial Agency (wakalat al-maliyya al'amma). Though no Department of the Interior was instituted, offices dealing with public health, quarantine, and ports management were established in January 1926, each headed by a superintendent (mufattish) under the direct authority of Ibn Sa'ud's son Faysal.173 Ibn Sa'ud also had to institute new mechanisms to deal with foreign affairs. During the occupation of the Hijaz and the negotiations with foreign countries that ensued, a Foreign Office (mudiriyya kharijiyya) was officially established.174 A group of civilian officials rose to prominence around these new bodies. Among the more influential of these was 'Abdullah Damluji, a native of Mawsil and a former medical student at Constantinople. He had maintained a close relationship with Philby since 1922, gradually replacing Ibn Thanayan as Ibn Sa'ud's chief foreign affairs adviser. His influence spread to other areas as well. During the occupation period and throughout the negotiations leading to the Hadda' and Bahra agreements, other officials came to the fore. One of these was Hafiz Wahbah, of Egyptian origin, educated at al-Azhar. He was a teacher in Kuwayt before he followed Ibn Sa'ud to Mecca. After Khalid's departure, Wahbah became the governor of Mecca and an adviser on foreign affairs. His views were anti-British, but they appear to have been contained by Ibn Sa'ud, at least for a short time. Two other officials who rose to prominence were Fu'ad Hamzah and Yusuf Yasin, both Syrian in origin. The former had been educated by a missionary in Beirut and came to the Hijaz to work at the Department of Foreign Affairs, where he soon established himself as a talented and hardworking executive. Yusuf Yasin, a former disciple of Rashid Rida, the eminent modernist and editor of the periodical al-Manar, became editor of the official newspaper Umm al-Qura and an adviser on foreign affairs. As a rule, he advocated an uncompromising Wahhabi line. Another well-known official was Tawfiq Bey Sharif, a former captain of the Turkish army, who functioned as chancellor to Faysal and as a secret envoy of Ibn Sa'ud abroad.175 The group that was most content with these changes were the 'ulama', who appear to have maintained the position of importance they had attained in the postwar era. The 'ulama' occupied judicial positions as well as educational posts. They also constituted a major part of the Advisory Council, holding five seats.176 Figures like Abu Bakr Khuqayr, Majid Kurdi, 'Abd al-Rahman alZawawi, and 'Abd al-Aziz al-'Atiqi177 were prominent throughout this period. Although circumstances compelled Ibn Sa'ud to allow the continued influence of a local aristocracy in the Hijaz, through their representation on councils, and although he appointed 'ulama'to judicial and educational posts, he chose to extend his own power on the base provided by administrative offi-

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cials staffing the important foreign affairs, financial, and provincial government posts. Except for a few Hijazis, most of the senior officials in these bureaucracies were foreigners, particularly in foreign affairs. Through this strategem, Ibn Sa'ud attempted to avoid relying on the indigenous aristocracy, and thanks to his customary care in selecting aides, the foreign officials did not become a coherent political group. Operating through personal aides who posed no danger to his rule yet could skillfully execute both internal and foreign policies enabled Ibn Sa'ud to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of his ruling institutions. The application of the Wahhabi interpretation of the shari'a throughout the realm meant, in practice, that as its interpreters, the 'ulama'had a certain amount of moral and constitutional leverage. Yet they had neither the policymaking authority nor the organizational power to implement their rulings. Moreover, the fact that Wahhabi law was applied throughout the realm caused this creed to become a dominant norm exercised by established 'ulama' and associated with the supremacy of Ibn Sa'ud's administration. Thus Wahhabi denomination was reintroduced as the established state religion rather than as a popular and revivalist set of ideas propagated by the Ikhwan, as it had previously been. As a state religion, Wahhabi belief strengthened Ibn Sa'ud's rule, leaving little temporal authority that limited the will of the king by law.178 Ibn Sa'ud's move toward centralization and bureaucratization created a complicated situation for many of the groups concerned and for the prospects of Najd-Hijaz relations. It is noteworthy that the Ikhwan chieftains were alloted no administrative or governmental positions; this was true not only after the occupation of Mecca but throughout the reforms of 1926. Ibn Humayd waited in vain to become the amir of Ta'if. Khalid was sent back to govern Khurma. Al-Dawish anticipated being named amir of al-Madina and maintained the siege of the city even after its notables had submitted to Ibn Sa'ud's brother Muhammad. He returned disappointed to al-Artawiyya, only to find that the rebellion of the various Mutayri groups was at its peak and that he was losing control over his own people.179 The Ikhwan, particularly younger tribal members from al-Ghalghat,180 were dissatisfied with the way that Ibn Sa'ud had handled the religious campaign in the Hijaz and pressed him to impose more "purifications." In February 1926, under their influence, he decided to forbid the establishment of banks. Ikhwan clashed publicly with smokers and shrine worshipers.181 In March such "petty tyrannies" were also reported by Jordan, the acting British consul in Jidda.182 On April 6, the British official reported that "there are complaints on all sides of interference with religious matters and smoking and praying in isolation from thejama'a (congregation) were again prohibited and made liable to punishment."183 In May, a special fatwa was issued regarding the implementation of these prohibitions in al-Madina.184 The peak of the trend toward purification was reached in June, when the official Egyptian delegation to the Hajj, the mahmal, reached the zone of the Ka'ba while dancing and performing music. Ikhwan charged the Egyptians, and the Egyptian escort opened fire, killing twenty-five of the attackers.185

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Hijazi notables, town dwellers, and tribesmen also had grievances. Overwhelmed by financial difficulties inherited from the Hashimite period, the Hijaz had to bear the brunt of rising prices and taxes. Like their Najdi counterparts, Hijazi tribesmen were not allotted government posts. In common with the Hijazi urban population, they bitterly resisted the emerging influence of foreigners in government, Ibn Sa'ud's centralizing tendencies, and the measures taken in response to Ikhwan pressure. By January 1926, a movement was reported in Mecca and al-Madina calling for the exclusion of foreigners from administrative posts and their replacement by Hijazis.186 In February, Ibn Sa'ud responded by appointing a Turk, Sayyid Talib Hazazi, to the post of private chancellor (ra'is diwan al-sultan), at the same time appointing a local businessman, 'Abdullah al-Fadl, as chief purchaser for the government.187 In March, Damluji was removed from the foreign department and from the position of royal representative in the Hijaz, to return to Mecca to serve as adviser to the king.188 But there were other problems: A rebellion by a Hijazi tribe, the Bani Malik, broke out in May and continued for three months.189 In the same month, an anti-Saudi plot led by Sharif Muhsin al-Mansur and thirty-five other prominent Hijazis was discovered. Interestingly, al-Mansur had been a pro-Saudi conspirator during the last period of the Hashimite regime; his frustration with Saudi rule later caused him to shift his allegiance. Al-Mansur was regarded as influential with Hijazi tribal groups, and his arrest must have been a major factor in their revolt. Yet the most explicit challenge to Saudi domination occurred in July and August 1926, when the Bani Malik and Dukhana tribes began looting caravans and defeated a five-hundred-strong column sent against them by Ibn Sa'ud. The king shrewdly summoned the rebellious leaders to Mecca, where they explained that they were merely reacting to the molestation of Najdi caravans passing through their territory. The immediate grievance was resolved, but the Hizajis' basic complaints against the new regime remained.190 In response to pressure from Hijazi notables, in September an order was issued that holders of public office and employees of government departments had to be Saudi subjects. Foreign officials whose service was judged indispensable were allowed to be employed only on contract for a year at a time.191 This sequence shows that Ibn Sa'ud attempted to minimize the reaction of the local population to his attempts at consolidation by partially acceding to their demands and temporarily allaying their fears. Under intense pressure from all sides, he apparently defused each outburst and partially satisfied all parties concerned, without ever devising a significant, lasting solution to their differences. The only measure that he pursued consistently was governmental consolidation, carried out by tightening his control over the realm. In light of the growing Ikhwan pressure following the first international Muslim conference in Mecca in 1926, at which future rule in the Hijaz was discussed, Ibn Sa'ud decided to demonstrate that he was the real source of power in that province. Once his rule in the Hijaz was secure, he calculated, he could ignore the Hijazi notables who had helped him ascend to power.

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Hence, according to Consul Jordan's assessment in April 1926, the Saudi ruler decided to play a "lone hand" in the Hijaz,192 to avoid submitting to any further constitutional limitations on his powers. Accordingly, whereas the councils of 1924 and 1925 were elected, that of August 1926 was appointed. Under the Basic Law of August 1926, the appointed council was reduced to an advisory body at the disposal of Faysal, who was vested with the real powers. The council members retained only their right to ratify the budget and to represent public opinion. The civil administrators, placed under the direct control of the viceroy and appointed by the king, became, in fact, a long-standing and loyal executive arm of Ibn Sa'ud, with whom he could govern the province. The tenuousness of their position and the fact that the sphere of authority covered by each post was initially undefined made them dependent on the king's allocation of administrative apparatus. Philby commented in 1929: The extent of the authority depended entirely on each minister's [in 1926, director's] personality and his standing with the King. . . . There was still no system for the proper distribution of work, nor the allocation of responsibility. Questions were referred to the viceroy, who in his turn referred them to the King. Nor had the consultative body any special clear defined limits ... it is not easy to persuade eastern rulers, accustomed to rely on themselves and themselves alone in the conduct of everything, that there can be benefits from the delegation of work and responsibility.193

Wahbah described Ibn Sa'ud's central role in a more positive manner. He stated that the well-being of the government depended on the king's adherence to justice, his love for his people, and cooperation with the viceroy.194 These descriptions indicate that the power-sharing regime typical of the Saudi chieftaincy had become a patrimonial regime in which the central government stood preeminent over other groups in society. But the supreme executives of this regime were personally selected by the king from among his family, foreigners, and the business community, who were limited to the task that he had designed for them. To cement Saudi control, Ibn Sa'ud appointed his brother Muhammad as governor of Najd in September. Muhammad was valuable not only as a family representative but also as Humayd's son-in-law, a person friendly with the Ikhwan. Jordan reported that as governor of Najd, Muhammad was given "greater powers in his government at Riyad . . . where he will enjoy a large measure of independence." Muhammad's favorable relations with the Ikhwan ultimately became a liability to Ibn Sa'ud,195 but as of 1926 they represented a strengthening of his rule. At this time, Ibn Sa'ud also introduced a new military system that reinforced the government's power. Because it was located in the Hijaz and most of the recruits were Hijazis, the gap between the Hijaz and Najd widened. Jordan reported that 2,000 men had already been recruited as part of a force of five thousand local inhabitants that Ibn Sa'ud sought to enlist for the Hijaz. Despite the relatively low morale of these soldiers and their high cost as an organized standing army, in contrast with the Nadji army on

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which Ibn Sa'ud had previously relied, the king was determined to carry out his plan.196 Although the incorporation of the Hijaz into the Saudi realm reinforced the new central government, there was clearly no real integration between the populations of the two regions. Total unification was, in fact, impossible at this stage, given the great differences between the two provinces. Whereas the Najd population was mostly Bedouin or dispersed in villages, that of the Hijaz was more urbanized. Najd was a desert community characterized by an economy based on trading, looting, and some pastoralism; the Hijaz was a growing commercial community blessed with coastal cities of international importance that thrived on overseas trade and pilgrimage. For over two centuries, Najd had been governed intermittently by Wahhabis, whereas the Hijaz had known a succession of Hashimite, Ottoman, and, for a short while, even Egyptian governments (in the 1820s and 1830s), and the majority of its urban population was definitely unwilling to submit to Ikhwan values. The Hijazi administration was burdened by problems that originated in Najd, particularly the zeal of the Ikhwan. The differences in the political and religious aims and the cultures of Najd and the Hijaz could possibly have been eased, not by radical unification, but rather through a gradual and coordinated process. Instead, Ibn Sa'ud organized a separate administration for the Hijaz, living there for over a year (after the occupation) without once visiting Najd. Despite judicial and religious uniformity, the Najd-Hijaz administration in 1926 was marked by a separate, disproportionate, and discriminatory division of power between the two provinces. The Hijaz became a center of governmental rule, but Najd remained the religious base and, generally speaking, the state's ideological and spiritual center. The Najdis must have been disconcerted when Hijazis acquired high-ranking positions in the advisory councils and bureaucracy, and their own compatriots did not. Also, they were probably disappointed when the Hijaz did not turn into a staunch Wahhabi center; the gradual approach to religious change did not satisfy their desires. The Hijazis, in turn, were disappointed by the continuing economic crisis, the high taxes, the administrative centralization leading to the eclipse of the power of their own representatives, and what they probably considered arbitrary religious measures. Among the groups involved in shaping the future of the expanding realm, the Ikhwan were the best organized and most ambitious. Their dissatisfaction with Ibn Sa'ud stemmed from their basic identity as Najdis, as religious zealots, and as tribesmen. One of their major grievances was therefore the "foreign" life-style infiltrating from the Hijaz. The fact that Ibn Sa'ud had ceased to behave as "one of them" and was devoting most of his time and attention to the Hijaz was definitely a sore point, as was his tendency to hold more pragmatic cosmopolitan and secular perceptions. In March 1926, Jordan stressed that "Ibn Sa'ud himself is a man of wider outlook and more modern ideas than his fanatical followers."197 The Hijaz provided the major arena for Ibn Sa'ud to develop his contacts with foreign "infidel" countries. It was here that the Egyptian mahmal (pil-

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grim caravan) arrived and where his relations with Britain were stabilized. It also was in the Hijaz that he introduced telephone and telegraph systems, as well as cars and trucks. The telephone and telegraph were bitterly criticized by the Ikhwan as "infidel" inventions, and so the fact that Ibn Sa'ud introduced a radio and telegraph station in al-Riyad was another irritant to them. Indeed, throughout 1926, the Ikhwan sabotaged the telephone line that Ibn Sa'ud used in Mecca; the king refrained from public reaction.198 In November 1926, Jordan reported on the feeling of the Najdis, notably the Ikhwan, with regard to the new life-style typical of Ibn Sa'ud in the Hijaz: The King's Nejdian followers are said to be criticising what they consider to be Ibn Sa'ud's own fall from grace. They see motor cars and telephones in Mecca, and the King sitting down at Jeddah to meet with the infidel, and they ask, not very logically, what has become of the simple austerity of old times.199

A second major grievance of the Ikhwan focused on Ibn Sa'ud's increasingly intentional policy of centralization, which became evident in 1926. Bearing this point in mind, the rejection by the Ikhwan of the telephone and telegraph acquires an added dimension. The Ikhwan were interested in a strong and personal rule by Ibn Sa'ud in the Hijaz, to offset the influence of Hijazis in the government. By putting the government of the Hijaz on a more professional basis and giving it the instruments of modern technology, Ibn Sa'ud increased his ability to counter the power of the Ikhwan and to exert control over them. Through the telephone and telegraph, he could maintain such control from a distance. The ease of communication between Ibn Sa'ud and Ibn Jilawi in al-Ahsa', for instance, surely brought no joy to the Ikhwan. In short, the personal rule of Ibn Sa'ud, strengthened by modern technology, constituted a further threat to the Ikhwan's autonomy and their ability to raid and maintain their autonomous position. The technologies could well have been viewed as an extension of Ibn Sa'ud's attempts to tax the Ikhwan and control their economic bases in a new and more sophisticated way.200 The Ikhwan feared that Ibn Sa'ud might even attempt to increase his control over them through the use of religious bodies. In September, Ibn Sa'ud ordered the establishment of a Committee to Supervise Public Morals, based on the principles of "the enjoining of the good" (hay'at al-amr bi alma'ruf), which was attached to local police forces. Its duties were to control morality, encourage collective prayer, control the mu'azins and imams (who call to and lead prayer, respectively), and generally to draw attention to infractions of the shari'a. Under different circumstances, the Ikhwan would have approved of such a measure. However, the leader of the committee was to be not a Najdi but 'Abdullah al-Shaybi, a Hijazi 'dim, son of the keeper of the Ka'ba. Moreover, one of the purposes of the committee was to counter the excesses of the Ikhwan. 201 The Ikhwan must have felt the need to act at once in order to turn the tide that appeared to be going against them. In October, J. C. More, the British resident at the Gulf, reported "strained relations" between Ibn Sa'ud and the Ikhwan leaders, al-Dawish, Ibn Humayd, and Ibn Hithlayn. 202 Al-Dawish

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convened a conference at al-Artawiyya, attended by the other Ikhwan chiefs. Details of the meeting are not known, except that the chiefs formulated several demands to be put to Ibn Sa'ud.203 Ibn Sa'ud, obviously worried, rushed back to Najd, and a conference between him and the Ikhwan leaders was arranged in al-Riyad in January 1927. The deliberations lasted for several weeks. Before analyzing them, however, it is necessary to discuss two additional developments that occurred during this period and affected relations between the ruler and the Ikhwan. The first development relates to the treaty negotiations between the British and Ibn Sa'ud. In the 19208 the British were embarking on efforts to maintain their position in the Middle East through agreements with local governments.204 They had tried to reach an accord with the imam of Yemen, and now they turned to Ibn Sa'ud, whose occupation of the Hijaz increased his importance, expanded his territory, and enhanced his access to both European nations and Arab states. Under such circumstances, the treaty of 1915 seemed inadequate. Believing that Ibn Sa'ud "has not yet reached the limits of his ambition," the British wanted to reaffirm the Hadda' and Bahra agreements and secure their protectorates in South Arabia and the Gulf from any possible Saudi encroachment.205 They also wanted to prevent Ibn Sa'ud from gravitating toward other European countries, such as Italy or Soviet Russia, both of which had developed interests in Arabia during this period. The British feared that the image of the 1915 treaty portrayed them to the Muslim world in a bad light, as a superpower extending a protectorate over the Muslim holy places. They therefore wished to put their relations with the Saudis on a new footing.206 For his part, in negotiating with foreign states, Ibn Sa'ud wished to remove any remnants of the image of himself as a vassal that may have emerged from the 1915 treaty. After the occupation of the Hijaz, this became more crucial, as the treaty prevented him from having diplomatic relations and correspondence with any other nation except Britain.207 Moreover, as the new ruler of a vast and major territory, facing rapidly mounting frontier and internal problems, Ibn Sa'ud needed to secure friendly relations with and receive assistance from Britain. Hence, in December 1925, when Ibn Sa'ud first proposed to Clayton a revision of the 1915 treaty, he raised the question of importing arms into Najd, as they were "a necessity of life in the desert." He also asked about further financial aid with which to compensate the tribes after he had restrained their raiding.208 The British prepared a draft, which was negotiated by Jordan and Ibn Sa'ud in November 1926. After serious difficulties, the talks were adjourned in December, to be resumed only in May 1927, after a new draft had been formulated and Clayton had been delegated to negotiate. The Treaty of Jidda was signed on May 20 by Faysal and Clayton. The negotiations and the treaty have been discussed in detail elsewhere, and so only a brief summary is required here.209 Ibn Sa'ud apparently rejected most of the clauses contained in the first draft.210 Unwilling to formally concede 'Aqaba and Ma'an to Trans-Jordan or

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to submit to the British any of the tribes and territories that he had been claiming, Ibn Sa'ud ultimately refused to formally recognize the special position of Britain in Trans-Jordan, Palestine, and Iraq. He also refused to agree to clauses prohibiting him from any "interference" in the British-protected Gulf shaykhdoms or to those requiring him to recognize British-protected persons and to permit the British consul in Jidda to free slaves. He demanded the inclusion of clauses stating the absolute independence of his rule in Najd and in the Hijaz. Ibn Sa'ud also demanded permission to purchase arms and British assistance in obtaining the money of the waqf al-Haramayn (a special religious endowment for the maintenance of the holy shrines in Mecca and alMadina) from Egypt, Palestine, Iraq, and India.211 Ibn Sa'ud's goal during the negotiations was to secure the maximum degree of independence from the British without making any substantial concessions. The British attempted, as they had in previous dealings with him, to reach as comprehensive a settlement as possible. After negotiations broke down, British officials apparently changed their tactics. They realized that though Ibn Sa'ud did in fact recognize Britain's superior influence in the neighboring states as well as in his own domain, he would not be able to concede such recognition in an official treaty. Maintenance of the status quo, provided that Ibn Sa'ud would keep to it in the future, seemed the best they could do.212 Their new approach was emphasized by Austen Chamberlain, the foreign secretary, who asked Clayton to make it clear to Ibn Sa'ud that in the new draft, "His Majesty's Government have considered sympathetically and endeavoured to meet, so far as possible, the objections raised by him [Ibn Sa'ud] to the previous draft."213 In the new draft there was no further demand for Ibn Sa'ud to recognize British mandates over the surrounding states or the official inclusion of 'Aqaba and Ma'an in Trans-Jordan. In return, he was required to maintain the status quo and to refrain from disputing Trans-Jordanian authority over these places. Total independence was granted to the Saudi state, and British subjects were to be tried in local courts if involved in disputes with local inhabitants. In fact, the British relied on the ability of their envoy to secure the appropriate response from Ibn Sa'ud whenever a British interest was threatened. Although a clause was included recognizing the superiority of British status in the Najd compared with that of any other foreign state, it was agreed that the principles of international law would prevail among "independent governments," thereby formally alleviating Ibn Sa'ud's fear of foreign domination. Britain's India Office was anxious to sort out the problem of possible Najdi encroachment on British-protected territories along the Gulf. This was addressed in a clause that required "both parties" to prevent their territories from being used as bases for "unlawful activities" by one party against the other. Ibn Sa'ud was obliged to maintain "friendly and peaceful relations" with the Gulf principalities. Although arms sales were not mentioned in the treaty, Clayton removed Britain's objection to Ibn Sa'ud's purchasing arms, believing that he would probably buy them from British firms and that the

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British government would thus be able to exert some control over the deals. Clayton refused to commit Britain to help acquire the endowments for the holy cities (waqf al-haramayn); Britain could not impose this on India, and Ibn Sa'ud had to accept this fact. Once Ibn Sa'ud had written a letter promising to maintain the status quo in regard to Ma'an and 'Aqaba, all obstacles had been removed to concluding the treaty.214 In the context of Ibn Sa'ud's relations with the Ikhwan, the Treaty of Jidda had a twofold implication. On the one hand, Ibn Sa'ud sought and gained total independence, which might have been regarded favorably by the Ikhwan. However, several months before the treaty's conclusion, the negative side of the deliberations became apparent: The Ikhwan criticized Ibn Sa'ud's "negotiating with the infidel." They might have heard a rumor regarding British pressure to refrain from raiding or suspected the motive behind Ibn Sa'ud's attempt to lift the British ban on arms. Basically, they suspected and rejected Ibn Sa'ud's attempt to negotiate with Britain at a time when their own relations with him had worsened. To them it seemed that he had found an alternative to their support, and word spread among them that "Ibn Sa'ud had sold himself to the English" (qad ba'a nafsahu li al-inkliz).215 Relations between Ibn Sa'ud and the Yemeni imam Yahya, including the developments regarding the 'Asir province, are discussed in detail in the next chapter. What is relevant here is that whereas a pact had existed between Ibn Sa'ud and the imam since March 1925,,216 dividing 'Asir between them, tensions between the imam and 'Ali al-Idrisi, the ruler of 'Asir, rose during 1925 and 1926. In 1925, while Ibn Sa'ud focused on the occupation of the Hijaz, he needed to alleviate any possible friction with the imam. Several developments in 'Asir, however, concerned the Najdis. Since April 1925, it had been clear that the Italians were trying to strengthen the imam, and a treaty was actually negotiated between Rome and San'a.217 At the same time, the imam was increasing his pressure on al-Idrisi, in an attempt to subordinate him.218 In July 1925, Ibn Sa'ud responded to what appeared to be a request from al-Idrisi to capture the southern province of 'Asir and rid the area of the Yemeni threat. Ibn Sa'ud thus acted in accordance with his obligation to the local ruler and at the same time allayed his own anxieties about Yemeni encroachments into 'Asir.219 However, the tension between the imam and al-Idrisi grew steadily, developing into outright clashes in October-November 1926 between tribes controlled by each.220 During this period, Ibn Sa'ud expressed his willingness to take action if the imam should attempt to occupy the 'Asir towns of Sabya and Jizan.221 In a visit by Faysal to London in October 1926, the first question that the Saudi prince asked Chamberlain concerned the British response to the Italian-Yemeni collaboration. Chamberlain replied that he and the Italian ruler, Benito Mussolini, would "study the matter closely,"222 which could hardly have comforted Ibn Sa'ud. Negotiations between Ibn Sa'ud and the new ruler of 'Asir, Hasan al-Idrisi, were subsequently initiated, and on January 7, 1927, the Mecca agreement was made public. 'Asir was put under Saudi dominion. The conduct of internal matters was left to al-Idrisi, but foreign affairs, including

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commercial concessions, questions of war and peace, and the concession of part of 'Asir to foreign rulers were not permitted without Ibn Sa'ud's sanction. Ibn Sa'ud undertook to defend the territory.223 Details of the deliberations are not known, and so it remains unclear whether al-Idrisi applied pressure or whether Ibn Sa'ud exploited the 'Asiri ruler's predicament. In any event, Ibn Sa'ud installed an indirect administration in 'Asir, allowing the local amir to govern tribes and run the administration in his name, while taking over foreign affairs himself. The major Ikhwan leaders were not involved in these affairs, and this was exactly what must have disturbed them. Under the circumstances, Ibn Sa'ud, worried about the Ikhwan's opposition and about the Italian-Yemeni initiatives on his southern flank, may well have intended the 'Asir not only to bolster his administration and his maneuverability in foreign affairs but also as a means of strengthening his rule vis-a-vis the Ikhwan. The results could only have widened the gap between them. Thus, in addition to implementing advisory representation for Hijazis, insisting on Wahhabi uniformity, and, above all, strengthening the central administration, Ibn Sa'ud sought to augment his regime through improved relations with other states, notably Britain. All this was viewed with alarm by the Ikhwan, as were his renewed attempts to control tribes stationed in Iraq. The points the Ikhwan put to Ibn Sa'ud in January 1927 at the al-Riyad conference attest to their defiance of his efforts at consolidation. They opposed the dispatch of Sa'ud, Ibn Sa'ud's son, to Egypt following the mahmal incident, and of his other son, Faysal, to London in August 1926 as a goodwill emissary. They opposed the use of telegraphs, telephones, and motor cars and the tolerance of the Shi'i minority at al-Ahsa', and they demanded the conversion or death of the Shi'is. The Ikhwan made three demands regarding the northern and eastern borders: first, an end to grazing rights in Najd for Jordanian and Iraqi tribes; second, permission to trade with Kuwayt or, if the Kuwaytis did not prove to be true Muslims, to wage & jihad against them; and third, the lifting of custom duties "on the Muslims" in Najd. Interestingly, no definite decision was taken immediately on any of these points. Instead they were referred to the 'ulama'of al-Riyad. 224 The Ikhwan also presented a series of informal demands to Ibn Sa'ud and the 'ulama' concerning the Hijaz. They inquired why the Dome of the Prophet's tomb in al-Madina had not been destroyed, why Christians were still permitted in the Hijaz, and why the Egyptian mahmal was allowed to come to Mecca.225 They did not dispute the formation of new government positions in the Hijaz or the methods of government there, but they did reassert complaints about high taxation in Najd, the government's monopoly on trade, and the prohibition of tribal raids and incursions into other states. The last demand related to Ibn Sa'ud's prohibition of raiding across the Iraqi frontier, which he had reaffirmed following the Bahra conference and which was still in force. The demand to cease using the telephone and telegraph probably applied mostly to Najd, as this was where the Ikhwan were mainly concentrated. The Ikhwan were eager to prevent the centralizing influences

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and the innovations employed in the Hijaz from spreading to their own territories in Najd. The contrast between the Ikhwan's demands concerning Najd and those related to the Hijaz is further apparent in a report of February 1927, in which N. Mayers, the acting British consul at Jidda, suggested that the Ikhwan sought "the complete separation of the two realms." This was perhaps an exaggeration, but their intent to create a buffer between the two regions would explain why they had initial reservations about the idea of declaring Ibn Sa'ud king of Najd after he had already become king of the Hijaz. They also demanded the dissolution of the army that Ibn Sa'ud had begun mustering in the Hijaz.226 Mayers directly identified al-Dawish, Ibn Humayd, and Khalid as leaders of the opposition Ikhwan, and Ibn Sa'ud's brother Muhammad as their major supporter. Their goal, according to Mayers, was "their assuming . . . greater personal influence in Nejd."227 It later became apparent that Khalid was not one of the leaders—or even a member of the opposition. The Ikhwan's desire to keep the realms separate shows that Saudi state building had come to an impasse. Originally encouraged in their activities as a means of transforming the Saudi chieftaincy into an organized state, in 1926 the Ikhwan became the champion of the traditional Najdi chieftaincy, (in al-Dawish's words: al-nizam al-qadim)228 which they sought to preserve in the face of Ibn Sa'ud's and his aides' scheme for a centralized and peaceful state. Apparently aware that they would not be able to obtain political roles in the Hijaz, the Ikhwan limited their aspirations in this region to the religious sphere while concentrating their political ambitions on Najd. Hence, they criticized Ibn Sa'ud's religious laxity, demanding reinforcement of Wahhabi tenets in the Hijaz, especially the removal of holy tombs. At the same time, they sought, as a last resort, to block what they perceived as the impious and infidel influence of the Hijaz from affecting Najd and threatening their political status. They were most critical of those strategies that reduced their autonomy: increased taxation, restricted trading and access to markets, the creation of a new army, and the introduction of telegraph and radio systems. Their demands indicated the Ikhwan's anxiety over what seemed to be Ibn Sa'ud's increasing centralization of his own powers. From a distance, he maintained efficient control over their grazing areas, especially with the help of regional interlocutors like Ibn Jilawi and Ibn Musa'id. By aligning themselves with Ibn Sa'ud's brother Muhammad, Najd's official governor, the Ikhwan hoped to establish a political axis strong enough to reinstate the old regime in Najd. Finally, the Ikhwan criticized Ibn Sa'ud's conduct of foreign affairs. The dispatch of his sons to foreign countries (notably Britain) was perceived as a symbol of religious laxity, a lessening of Wahhabi puritanism, and they strongly condemned the measure. Moreover, they rejected Ibn Sa'ud's acceptance of borders, the consequent improvement in relations with neighboring states, the prohibition of raiding into neighboring territories, and the favorable market conditions that he had granted tribes from these states. For the Ikhwan, these were indicators of a new, unlawful conduct, epitomized in the

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relationship with infidel societies. It both contradicted traditional Wahhabi practices and further limited the Najdi tribes' raiding and grazing possibilities. The strategies of state formation that Ibn Sa'ud had begun to pursue along the new frontier zones and in the Hijaz included (1) strengthening the central government, including improving the taxation system and means of communication, transportation, and administration; (2) achieving international recognition; (3) adjusting frontier lines; (4) maintaining peaceful neighborly and foreign relations; and (5) integrating various societal segments by partial accommodation to their demands and by granting them limited autonomy in certain public spheres. This was as close as the Saudi regime came at this stage to becoming a modern, organized state rather than a traditional chieftaincy. During the second half of the 1920s, two concepts of state formation, one resembling the traditional chieftaincy and the other approximating the centralized, bureaucratic state, vied for dominance. Each was supported by different sectors of the population. The Ikhwan still regarded Ibn Sa'ud as the leader of the Wahhabi community; therefore they concentrated their demands on policy changes and did not to seek to depose him. However, their claims posed a strong political and religious challenge, thus inviting the 'ulama's' adjudication. The pressures placed on the leading 'ulama' by these conflicting conceptions may be discerned in two contrasting religious opinions handed down in this period. 'Abdullah Bin Bulayhid, a Najdi 'alim serving as the grand qadi of Mecca, discussed the issue with Ikhwan in Mecca. He maintained that the telephone and telegraph were as instrumental in contacts with the outside world as were foreign diplomats. He argued that the use of these technologies signified how important their ruler, Ibn Sa'ud, had become. He also explained that the destruction of tombs would precipitate vengeance from friends and well-wishers in other countries and therefore was inadvisable.229 The 'ulama' of al-Riyad, did, however, register an opinion that was less favorable to Ibn Sa'ud. On February 11, 1927, fifteen of them signed afatwa authorizing Ibn Sa'ud, as the leader (imam), to declare a jihad against infidels, (namely, to exercise his authority in foreign relations, in the Wahhabi way). They also called on him to destroy the mosque of Hamza in al-Madina; to forbid the entrance of the Egyptian pilgrim convoy {mahmal), whose participants behaved unlawfully by Wahhabi standards; to convert the Shi'i population of alAhsa'; and to prohibit Shi'is from entering Najd from Iraq. They declared Ibn Sa'ud's taxes illegal. They also asserted that they needed to study further the question of the telegraph and telephone before passing any judgment. 230 It appears that this fatwa of the 'ulama' of al-Riyad reflected the pressure applied on them by the ruler's brother Muhammad and by the Ikhwan while Ibn Sa'ud was away in the Hijaz. Moreover, unlike the situation in 1919, in 1927 the 'ulama'were dealing not with the impact of the extreme actions of a small group of Ikhwan but, rather, with a major political force advocating a legitimate alternative to the emerging state, an alternative that was well grounded in Najdi history. They were more critical of Ibn Sa'ud's position than they had been eight years earlier, though they refrained from issuing a general condemnation of his role as king. The situation also attests to the

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crisis of the established Wahhabi state religion. Under opposing pressures, the 'ulama' handed down conflicting opinions concerning the form that the Saudi state should take. It is therefore inaccurate to define the Ikhwan, as some writers have, as a group of religious renegades who escaped Ibn Sa'ud's control and came into conflict with him. Although they expressed their arguments in religious terms, insisting that religious law did not sanction a legislative prerogative for any individual or body in the society, whether the king or the 'ulama', the actual picture is more complex. Their quarrel with Ibn Sa'ud focused on the very nature of the Saudi state and its course of development,231 a fundamental dispute that came to the fore in 1926-27.

Challenge and Collision, 1927-1930 The evidence discussed so far shows that the Ikhwan did not dispute the legitimacy of Ibn Sa'ud's power. Rather, they opposed Ibn Sa'ud's direction of development for the state and competed with the government for the Najdis' allegiance. The friction shifted quickly from one province to another, affecting many facets of Saudi life and various social groups. The northern frontier region was a major arena of conflict, although after the signing of the Bahra agreement, relative tranquillity had been established along the Iraqi frontier. Ibn Sa'ud observed the Bahra agreement to the letter, and the Iraqi government found two relatively effective ways of preventing raiding into Najd: punishing raiders and refusing to pay subsidies to tribal chiefs.232 In February 1927, against the background of the al-Riyad conference, Ibn Sa'ud seemed once again determined to weaken the Ikhwan by building a power base among the tribes in Iraq. Local disputes paved the way. Lizam Abu Dhara' of the Dhafir went to al-Riyad, received gifts and honors, and remained there with his followers for several months.233 He did so in the light of an internal quarrel within the Dhafir tribe between himself and Hamud's successor, 'Ajaymi. It appears that Lizam went to Ibn Sa'ud because 'Ajaymi was being courted by Glubb and was favored by the Iraq government.234 Subsequently 'Ajaymi damaged his relations with the Iraqis and lost his subsidy from Iraq. In the summer of 1927, he, too, courted Ibn Sa'ud at al-Riyad and obtained similar favors from him.235 At the same time, Jaza' Ibn Mijlad of the Dahamsha also came to alRiyad, after a dispute with Fahd Ibn Khaz'al. Ibn Sa'ud, who had tried to maintain good relations with Fahd, instructed Ibn Musa'id, regional governor in al-Qasim, to return the loot that Ibn Mijlad had brought with him. However, when the Saudi convoy was on its way back, a group of Ikhwan under Ibn Rimal attacked it, taking the animals as booty. Ibn Sa'ud subsequently continued to foster his relationship with both Fahd and Jaza';236 at the same time, a Najdi tax collector was directed to resume his activities among Iraqi border tribes.237 In early April 1927, Ibn Sa'ud convened another conference at al-Riyad.

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In a show of anger and suspicion, neither al-Dawish nor Ibn Humayd attended, reducing the possibility of reconciliation. But Ibn Sa'ud was able to reconcile the three thousand Ikhwan who did attend. He rallied their support not only for his own authority but also against the two absent Ikhwan chieftains. During the conference, Ibn Sa'ud also tried to allay suspicions regarding his religious conduct and his contacts with foreign powers. He spent large quantities of money for gifts (the British acting consul in Jidda, J. Stonehewer Bird, mentioned a rumor of a sum of £80,000, indicating that it was probably exaggerated).238 Ibn Sa'ud marked for special favor minor Ikhwan leaders like Ibn Busayyis and Sultan Ibn Hithlayn. Some groups subsequently turned away from al-Dawish.239 The task of appeasing the Ikhwan was apparently quite difficult, and Ibn Sa'ud failed to reverse the 'ulama's' February fatwa,240 which declared his taxes illegal and expressed reservations about his policies. The conflict continued in the Hijaz, where Ibn Sa'ud was busy bolstering his administration. In January 1928, an office to supervise the pilgrimage (nizam idarat al-Hajj) and a public health and first aid office (nizam maslahat al-sihha al-'amma) were established. Regulations for an educational council (nizam majlis al-ma'arif) followed in July. An official authority for the shari'a courts (nizam tashkilat al-mahakim al-shar'iyya) and for other lesser offices was established in August.241 A fifteen-paragraph constitution was devised for the new majlis al-shura. Its membership was fixed at eight to ten, comprising four elected notables and four members nominated by the presiding viceroy. Even though half of its members were elected, the council's agenda was predetermined. Twice-weekly discussions dealt with the budget and other expenditures, prices, laws, rights for foreigners, employment of new officials, and contacts with business and companies. The members were allowed to draw the viceroy's attention to any contravention of the law and also to object twice to each government proposal. The final authority, however, rested with the king. He had the right to dissolve (haqq hall) the council and to nominate substitutes for any of its members.242 It was clear that Ibn Sa'ud had tried to reconstitute the Advisory Council on a more bureaucratic model, in which the members would be constrained by a technical routine. In July, there was a reported attempt to assassinate Ibn Sa'ud's son Sa'ud, with supporters of Ibn Sa'ud's brother Muhammad being involved.243 The attempt may have been connected with the Ikhwan, as they had maintained good relations with Muhammad, but, there is no substantive evidence to support this possibility, and Ibn Sa'ud did not change his strategy with regard to them. Ibn Sa'ud relied on the tactics of disarmament and appeasement when confronted with opposition by the Ikhwan. In early August, he arrested seven members of his administration; five were Hijazi notables who had held important posts under Husayn and whose views were somewhat anti-Wahhabi. The other two were staunch Wahhabis from Najd. One of them, 'Abd al-'Aziz al'Atiqi, was a leading 'alim and a former adviser to Faysal in Mecca. They were charged with incompetence and abuse of power. What is striking is that the arrest of these officials preceded a visit to the Hijaz by Ibn Humayd and al-

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Dawish. Stonehewer Bird suggested that Ibn Sa'ud had decided to remove the troublemakers before the arrival of the two Ikhwan leaders,244 in order to minimalize their influence. Stonehewer Bird also emphasized that the intention of al-Dawish and Ibn Humayd may have been that "of creating a disturbance" but that the aforementioned arrests "damped their ardour." In fact, Ibn Humayd arrived in the Hijaz accompanied by 600 warriors. Ibn Sa'ud tried to appease them further by dismantling the telephone and telegraph stations at al-Madina and Ta'if. He also made a large gift of money, horses, and camels to Ibn Humayd at alMadina. His appearance a fortnight later in Mecca was marked by the prohibiting of drinking and smoking in public. Stonehewer Bird commented: "It is distressing, if not alarming, that Ibn Sa'ud should be obliged to offer such sops to his Nejdi chiefs."245 In October 1927, additional Najdis were integrated into the Hijaz executive, notably as chiefs of police in Mecca and Jidda. The Public Morals Committee prohibited men from wearing silk and gold and from shaving their beards. A new Najdi qadi was sent to Rabigh in the Hijaz. Such attempts to appease the Najdis were definitely viewed with dismay in the Hijaz; the argument that Najd received too great a share of the state's finances was frequently raised, and the slogan "Hijaz for the Hijazis" became popular.246 New events that occurred in 1927 affected Ibn Sa'ud's relations with the Ikhwan leaders. By then al-Dawish was mainly involved in raiding, while Ibn Humayd kept his dispute with Ibn Sa'ud to himself and refrained from taking any overt action. Ibn Sa'ud was more attentive to Ibn Humayd and tried to win him to his side. Although the two leaders had had a certain degree of contact in the past, they did not appear to be cooperating. In November 1927, the frontier problems with Iraq became more pressing. Despite Ibn Sa'ud's protests, the Iraqi government proceeded to erect "watch posts" in the southern desert along the raiding routes between Najd and Iraq. On November 5, al-Dawish led a raiding party against the newly erected post of Busayya, killing 6 policemen, 12 workmen, an overseer, and a woman.247 This incident was followed by further raids into Iraq and Kuwayt, maneuvering Ibn Sa'ud into an open conflict with the Ikhwan and into a dispute with Iraq and the British. The Iraqis' original intentions in establishing the posts had been to gather intelligence, coordinate patrols, and inspect routes in an effort to prevent raids. They were chiefly concerned with raids launched into Najd, particularly by the Shammar.248 The principal beneficiaries of the posts might have been the Najdis. In February 1927, the Iraqi government continued erecting posts at Rutba, Sabiha, Salman, and Busayya. The posts were designed to cover a good part of the Najdi border and to be staffed by policemen. Glubb indicated that they were also intended to serve as part of a system for defending Iraqi tribes, modeled on the Abu Ghar fort. The Royal Air Force was also interested in these posts, as they constituted a ground-based defense, complementing air force reconnaisance and bombing activities by providing suitable bases for scouts and flight directors.

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Ibn Sa'ud's protests in February and again in October 1927 regarding the erection of the posts, particularly that at Busayya, indicate the reasons for his objections. Busayya was located in a well-known grazing area for various tribes, notably the Mutayr, and the post constituted an obstacle to the tribes' free movement. Glubb noted that for Ibn Sa'ud, a "police post" was in fact no different from a regular arrny fortification.249 Moreover, though the Iraqis called it a "watch post" (makhfar), Ibn Sa'ud and al-Dawish called it a "fort" (qal'a).250 The fact that a high wall surrounded the place served only to strengthen the Najdi argument. Furthermore, Busayya was built on the site of wells. As Article 3 of the 'Uqayr protocol of 1922 declared: "The two Governments [Iraq and Najd] mutually agree not to use the watering places and wells situated in the vicinity of the border for any military purposes, such as building forts on them, and not to concentrate troops in their vicinity."251 Busayya was located 80 miles from the border, but only about 55 miles from the neutral zone. The phrasing of the article was vague and did not define what "the vicinity of the border" meant. In the Arabic version, the term 'ala atraf al-hudud was equally unclear, meaning "on the sides of the borders" and possibly implying a wider area than that intended by the British.252 Cox left no minutes of the 'Uqayr conference, and the original intent of the document is difficult to ascertain. This article, however, gave Ibn Sa'ud sufficient grounds to oppose the Iraqi initiative. The designers of the post may be seen as failing in another respect, for they ignored the fact that raiding to and from Najd was rooted in intertribal relationships and in Ibn Sa'ud's relationship with the Ikhwan. Although the post could not end the raiding, which was intrinsic to this relationship, it could serve to complicate it. Al-Dawish was sensitive to the post at Busayya because it restricted the Mutayr's position. During his visit to the Hijaz in August 1927, al-Dawish was embarrassingly inquisitive on the subject of the establishment of military posts near the Iraqi frontier. Consequently, it was said that "Ibn Sa'ud is much worried."253 Annoyed by the attention that Ibn Sa'ud had been showing to Ibn Humayd, al-Dawish apparently raided the post at Busayya as a test case of his relations with Ibn Sa'ud and Ibn Humayd. The challenge posed to Ibn Sa'ud by this move was complex. Endorsement of the raid would have threatened his relations with the British. It also would have reversed Ibn Sa'ud's own scheme for regional stability, a scheme opposed by the Mutayri leader. Al-Dawish viewed the establishment of the Busayya post as an Iraqi attempt to prevent free movement for grazing and to exercise control over regional tribes, depriving the Mutayr of their power in the area. The posts, it was argued, would lead to the establishment of fortifications that would gravely interfere with tribal life. It was also contended, despite Dobbs's denials, that a railway would be built from Baghdad to Busayya and Ha'il to enhance Iraqi control over the area. Al-Dawish associated Ibn Sa'ud and the British with this "plot." After this open challenge, AlDawish expected the Najdi ruler to revert to traditional Najdi practices and attack the posts. Though Ibn Sa'ud could not have risked such a policy reversal, neither could he afford a revolt by the Ikhwan. He therefore opted to stall

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for time. To the king's satisfaction, Ibn Humayd did not respond to alDawish's call. Ibn Sa'ud instructed al-Dawish to stay put until he, Ibn Sa'ud, arrived at al-Artawiyya. 254 Both Ibn Sa'ud and Damluji had been protesting to the British about the erection of the post,255 but this certainly did not satisfy al-Dawish. The Mutayri chieftains viewed Ibn Sa'ud's failure to have the post removed as a further sign that he "has sold his country's rialth [rials] to the British." It was also clear that al-Dawish had deliberately moved to destroy the post against Ibn Sa'ud's wishes and interests.256 From al-Dawish's perspective, the raid was quite beneficial: Although it was directed against the Iraqis, it constituted a challenge to Ibn Sa'ud, who found himself in a confusing situation, torn between loyalty to his major tribe and a desire to honor the commitments he had made to the British and the Iraqis. The raid itself was a clean operation that enhanced the prestige of the Mutayr among the tribes in the area. The events following the raid suggest that al-Dawish had indeed not viewed it as an isolated event but, rather, as a means of establishing a new political situation in the area, which involved forcing Ibn Sa'ud to return to tribal modes and values. It was reported on December 20, 1927, that the king had dispatched two army columns to restore calm, one to Maragha, 165 miles south of Kuwayt, and the other to the neutral zone with Iraq.257 Yet at this stage, he was definitely not ready for a showdown with al-Dawish. The columns did not deter al-Dawish. On December 15, an Ikhwan conference had been held at al-Safah, at which further raids had been contemplated.258 On December 27, al-Dawish raided Jawkha in Iraq, heading toward Jaza' Ibn Mijlad's camp. At the same time, al-Dawish's son 'Abd al-'Aziz raided near Ghalidh and then into Diwaniyya. On December 4, Ibn Shuqayr raided north of al-Jahra' in Kuwayt, and on January 16 and 28, Ibn 'Ashwan raided Kuwayt. 259 The Mutayr clearly put Ibn Sa'ud in an awkward position. On the one hand, he was criticized by the British and the Iraqis for allowing the raids to take place. In early December, he even warned the Iraqi and Kuwayti governments of raids planned against their tribes.260 On the other hand, he was criticized in Najd, by both the Ikhwan and other tribes, because the Iraqis hurriedly rebuilt Busayya and other posts261 and retaliated with air attacks on the raiders, pursuing them into Najd. The most important element was the king's lack of control over events, as his stalling for time failed to bring him closer to influencing either the Mutayr or British reactions to the raids. Ibn Sa'ud embarked on a major diplomatic campaign with the British in early 1928. While still deferring action, he had positive goals. One was to rid himself of the image of instigator of the raids, by accusing the British in Iraq of the same. In late January, he filed a strong protest against the Iraqi government, accusing them of violating the 'Uqayr protocol by erecting the posts, adding that the posts were in fact useless against Shammar raids into Najd and that they had the negative effect of stirring up the Najdi tribes. He further accused the Iraqis of maintaining direct contact with tribes in Najd (forbidden by the Bahra agreement), challenging his sovereignty by sending aircraft and

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armored cars, pursuing raiders into Najd, ignoring his previous commitments to restore booty and prevent raids, and allowing the Iraqi press to denounce him.262 Ibn Sa'ud's accusation was also directed at Sir Henry Dobbs, whose attitude could be described as quite pro-Iraqi and anti-Saudi. Unlike his predecessor, Cox, Dobbs did not maintain an ongoing correspondence with Ibn Sa'ud, nor did he view the whole of the eastern Peninsula as being his responsibility. As the incursions from Najd grew more frequent, Dobbs suspected Ibn Sa'ud of complicity with the raiders. He also feared anti-British feeling in Iraq, as well as a possible attack on the contemplated oil pipeline and desert railway from Iraq to Haifa. All this hardened Dobbs in his opposition to Najdi raiding. Indeed, Ibn Sa'ud identified him with the Iraqi government. It was Dobbs who had previously rejected Ibn Sa'ud's protests over Busayya.263 Apparently glad to find an outlet for his frustration, the Saudi king blamed Dobbs and the Iraqis. In so doing, Ibn Sa'ud was attempting to remove suspicions regarding his own connection with the raiding from the minds of British officials in Iraq. Furthermore, by blaming Iraq for provoking the raids, he compelled the Iraqi government and Dobbs to prove their own innocence. Thus he gained time, not only to restore his relations with the British, but also to confer with the Ikhwan. Indeed, Dobbs answered Ibn Sa'ud's charges one by one.264 Because Ibn Sa'ud sought to restore his credibility as ruler vis-a-vis both the British and his own tribes, he opposed the Royal Air Force's action against the raiders. As has been mentioned, British aircraft bombed and kept surveillance on the raiders during the weeks following the Busayya incident. Unremitting as it was, the bombing could not prevent the raiding, but there were only a few fatalities. Nonetheless, it caused a setback to the raiders and led to disorder in their ranks.265 Ibn Sa'ud clearly meant to prevent British intervention. Complete elimination of the Mutayr raiders might have been beneficial for him. But caught in a web of conflicting aims, he preferred to reestablish his position by careful maneuvering. For him, the ideal would have been for the British to function merely as guarantors for Iraq, restraining the tribes in the frontier area from hostile actions. The British decided to carry out tactical bombing raids that would limit the incursions into Iraq and to refrain from decisive action that would undermine Ibn Sa'ud's rule entirely. Thus they unwittingly contributed to continued unrest in the area. When raids continued to be carried out every few days, the Foreign Office and the shaykh of Kuwayt reluctantly supported the policy to continue the tactical bombing.266 In early January 1928, Ibn Sa'ud dispatched Hafiz Wahbah to Kuwayt and Iraq for negotiations. He restated his case: A British onslaught on the Mutayr might indeed be effective, but it would cause immense harm to the king's image in Najd. Therefore, Ibn Sa'ud should be left alone to deal with the Ikhwan, a campaign that the king had already begun, Wahbah stressed. Wahbah again demanded the elimination of Busayya, as it was the main cause

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of the trouble. He added a new demand: a guarantee from Iraq not to offer refuge to al-Dawish when and if Ibn Sa'ud should pursue him.267 In late January, Ibn Sa'ud reiterated this demand as a condition for the Najdi leader's taking action against al-Dawish.268 Ibn Sa'ud complained again in early February that British aircraft were sabotaging his efforts, and he demanded a cessation of flights over Najd.269 Ibn Sa'ud thus cleverly diverted the attention of the British and the Iraqis by presenting the raids not as stemming from a problem between Ibn Sa'ud and the Mutayr but as a product of Iraq's incompetence, aggravated by the harsh responses of the British, which damaged the King's credibility in his own realm. Thus Ibn Sa'ud presented himself as an able ruler who knew how to handle al-Dawish but who was being undermined by the British and Iraqis. He tried to show that he was indispensable and that it was the British and Iraqis who should mend their ways. Consequently, on February 1, 1928, Iraq gave Ibn Sa'ud a guarantee that it would refuse refuge to al-Dawish.270 Leopold Amery, the secretary of state for the colonies, sent Ibn Sa'ud a note on February 25 describing the British government as having "no desire to take any action which would make it more difficult for you to punish the Mutair— It is naturally His Majesty's Government wish, however, that the necessary punishment should be inflicted by your Majesty yourself, rather than by aeroplanes of the British Government."271 Old differences of opinion had arisen among British officials, both before this decision and after it was made. India Office officials and the resident of the Gulf once again came out as Ibn Sa'ud's staunch supporters. In their estimation, there would be growing unrest in the Gulf area if Ibn Sa'ud's position were weakened. Such a development, they feared, might make a bad impression on India's Muslims, jeopardizing both air routes to India through the Gulf and the possibility of obtaining landing rights at al-Ahsa' for a newly planned route from Karachi to Cairo.272 The viceroy of India, Lord Irwin, and Sir A. Hirtzel of the India Office supported the position that the British ought to rely on Ibn Sa'ud to subjugate the raiders.273 Haworth, the Gulf resident, noted that the tribal problems and raiding were "a side issue" compared with Ibn Sa'ud's position in the region. He contended that Ibn Sa'ud's willingness to contain the Mutayr should satisfy the British as long as he did not prove either incompetent or deceitful.274 It appears from Haworth's arguments that he had completely overlooked the intertribal problem. Haworth was the main figure who stressed Ibn Sa'ud's vulnerability and the possibility that he would be the most likely casualty of a British offensive in Najd. Haworth viewed any attack on the tribes as an attempt to damage Ibn Sa'ud, advancing the theory that Ibn Sa'ud was in the throes of the dilemma of an enlightened Eastern ruler, obliged to allow fanaticism in order to maintain his rule but also set on introducing "civilization," an aim the British should support.275 His argument for maintaining good relations with Ibn Sa'ud convinced the Foreign Office that it should support the decision to refrain from bombing Najdi raiders. 276 In addition to establishing his own credibility, Ibn Sa'ud's goal in negotia-

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tions with the British in Iraq was dismantling the Busayya post in order to defuse the crisis with the Ikhwan. 277 In light of the breach between Ibn Sa'ud and al-Dawish from Busayya, Ibn Sa'ud accused the Iraqis in January and again in May 1928 of deliberately driving a wedge between him and his tribes. He further blamed the Iraqis for forcing him to choose between conflict with the British and conflict with his own people.278 These accusations came at a time when the British were in the midst of a debate over Iraq's defense, after they had given Ibn Sa'ud a free hand in containing the raiders. Foreign Office officials viewed Busayya more and more as "a great stumbling block," virtually the only threat to the region's stability. The Colonial Office officials, whose views reflected Dobbs's, agreed to clarify once and for all what the expression "in the vicinity of the border" meant, to determine whether or not erection of the posts was in order.279 At a cabinet meeting in March, it was decided that Clayton should be sent back to Ibn Sa'ud to discuss these questions.280 How Ibn Sa'ud managed to exploit the British threat to attack the Mutayr is worth examining. Al-Zirikli explained that Ibn Sa'ud did not embark on alDawish's destruction immediately after the Busayya raid because (1) he feared that such an initiative, which could develop into a full-scale war, would probably occur near or at the Iraqi border and thus involve the British and the Iraqis, and (2) al-Dawish did not turn against Ibn Sa'ud directly but, rather, acted for a legitimate cause as a "preacher for a jihad" (mutawi' lil-jihad),281 Moreover, it seems that Ibn Sa'ud was at the time in no position to overcome al-Dawish militarily. As Glubb noted, the Ikhwan had by then developed various advantages over other tribes and army units: an esprit de corps anchored in religious zeal; the advantage of surprise; a pattern of ruthless massacres of men, women, and children that demoralized their rivals; and relatively efficient organization, leadership, and logistics.282 Militarily, al-Dawish established his dominance over the tribes in the area and could have presented great difficulties to Ibn Sa'ud's force. Ibn Sa'ud's best course of action was therefore to exploit the involvement of the various parties to the dispute while bolstering his policy of centralization. He could outmaneuver the Ikhwan by obtaining the support of third parties, preventing cooperation among the main Ikhwan leaders, and weakening them through economic pressure. Military pressure was exerted only on the periphery of the Mutayr's grazing zone. During the first weeks of 1928, Ibn Sa'ud deployed two columns in the arena. In early January, Ibn Jilawi, who stood at the head of one of these columns, caused Ibn Shuqayr and Ibn Lami to flee from their headquarters at Jariyya and the former to beg for amnesty from Ibn Jilawi. At that stage, Ibn Sa'ud also purchased three thousand rifles from the British.283 He simultaneously fostered his links with the rich merchants of the al-Ahsa' area (particularly with the al-Qusaybi clan, one of whose members represented him in Bahrayn) by strengthening the prohibition on trade with Kuwayt. These measures made the Ikhwan more dependent on Ibn Sa'ud.284 On January 11, Ibn Sa'ud and senior 'ulama'left for Hafar al-Akh, where

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al-Dawish was supposed to meet them.285 There is evidence that the majority of the population, particularly that in the Hijaz, believed that al-Dawish had acted in direct opposition to Ibn Sa'ud.286 The king sought to encourage this belief by openly exposing and discrediting al-Dawish. Al-Dawish's fight against the supposedly infidel Iraqis constituted his strongest credentials, which was why Ibn Sa'ud attempted to involve the 'ulama' in the affair. Ibn Sa'ud took two additional steps in January to put pressure on al-Dawish: He dispatched a column against al-Artawiyya and sent gifts to Ibn Humayd and other Ikhwan leaders, in order to dissuade them from joining al-Dawish.287 Preventing Ibn Humayd from joining forces with al-Dawish was a high priority for Ibn Sa'ud. Ibn Humayd was apparently displeased with alDawish's ambitions and trigger happiness. Ibn Humayd's headquarters, located at al-Ghatghat, only 25 miles southwest of al-Riyad and on the route to Hijaz, was much more vulnerable to an attack by Ibn Sa'ud than was alArtawiyya, a fact that Ibn Humayd probably bore in mind.288 It seems that Ibn Humayd was not set on any direct action, whether it involved raiding or rebelling against Ibn Sa'ud's power. He bitterly resented the king's policies, but he did not intend to challenge his legitimacy. Rather, he preferred persuasion. In any event, Ibn Humayd was regarded as an important leader who headed the most powerful tribe of Arabia.289 The possibility of Ibn Humayd's joining with al-Dawish was a crucial issue for both Ibn Sa'ud and al-Dawish, and they competed for his loyalty. By late January, Ibn Sa'ud had succeeded in deterring Ibn Humayd from joining al-Dawish, possibly by his gifts, but also because of a row that developed between Ibn Humayd and Al-Dawish after the former vetoed a Mutayri plan to assassinate Ibn Jilawi.290 Consequently, Ibn Sa'ud felt confident enough to report to the British that he had "isolated" al-Dawish.291 Upon hearing that Ibn Sa'ud was marching to meet him and that a column had been dispatched against al-Artawiyya, al-Dawish did not try to avoid the confrontation. Rather, he sent for five standards (bayarik) of Ikhwan and he resumed cooperating with his son 'Abd al-'Aziz, and Ibn Lami and Ibn Shuqayr, other Mutayr chiefs.292 In so doing, al-Dawish hoped to thwart Ibn Sa'ud's attempt to subjugate him. At that point, Ibn Sa'ud was apparently not yet in a position to gain a decisive advantage over the Ikhwan. Despite the initial rift between Ibn Humayd and al-Dawish, the latter was still active militarily and had received Ibn Humayd's consent to conduct an organized jihad against Iraq.293 In early February 1928, Ibn Sa'ud met al-Dawish and other Ikhwan chiefs at al-Riyad. This conference, which has been overlooked by recent researchers of the period, is of considerable importance, for in the course of it, Ibn Sa'ud failed to delegitimize al-Dawish's role. On the contrary, he was compelled to agree to large-scale raiding by the Ikhwan. 294 Consequently, during the last days of February, sections of Iraqi and Kuwayti shepherd tribes were raided by one thousand Ikhwan near Jarishan in southern Iraq. Al-Dawish led the raid personally.295 Ibn Sa'ud's difficulties mounted as it became clear that other tribes, notably the 'Utayba, were joining al-Dawish. He kept Ibn

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Hithlayn in al-Riyad and forbade him to raid. Muhsin al-Firm, leader of the Harb, waited to see what would develop.296 Ibn Sa'ud's main efforts were directed toward Ibn Humayd, who had not participated in the last conference. Ibn Sa'ud continued to lavish on him gifts of money, dates, horses, and camels.297 Meanwhile, Ibn Humayd and alDawish planned a meeting to devise a large-scale incursion. Al-Dawish was under the impression that Ibn Sa'ud had given his clearance for such a raid; he further tried to persuade the king to join the raid himself and to send one of his sons to camp with the raiders. Ibn Humayd was definitely in favor of the venture.298 But he was obviously uneasy about Ibn Sa'ud's stance on the matter, and he asked the king's permission to join the raid.299 His answer is not known. In late February 1928, Ibn Humayd left al-Ghatghat and met alDawish at Awajiyya, northwest of al-Artawiyya. A massive raid was planned for March 7, with the participation of the Harb and Aslam Shammar, aimed at striking the area south of Basra.300 Opposition to Ibn Sa'ud was apparently crystallizing and spreading. Several days after Ibn Humayd set forth, Khalid Ibn al-Luway was sent by Ibn Sa'ud to dissuade Ibn Humayd from carrying out the raid. Despite his initial discontent, Khalid had not joined the group overtly opposing Ibn Sa'ud. As he was a veteran Wahhabi revivalist and a previous collaborator with Ibn Humayd in the Hijaz, the king sent him to stop Ibn Humayd. Khalid evidently succeeded in his mission, either by threat or by persuasion, and on March 5, Ibn Humayd returned to al-Ghatghat. Al-Dawish was reported to be back at al-Artawiyya.301 The alternation of Ikhwan offensives and tranquillity did not end there. The Mutayr themselves were weary of raiding and British bombing and frustrated by Ibn Humayd's withdrawal. 302 On March 17, Ibn Sa'ud again reported to the British that he had contained al-Dawish.303 But his contention was premature. Toward the end of March, Ibn Humayd left for al-Artawiyya with a force of 3,000 and married al-Dawish's daughter. This renewed cooperation was followed by immediate preparations for a raid. Ibn Humayd set forth on March 24. Two days later he was overtaken by Ibn Sa'ud's cousin Sa'ud al'Arfa and by the 'alim al-'Anqari, sent by Ibn Sa'ud to try to prevent the raiding. Adjudication of the jihad question was essential. In April, Ibn Sa'ud convened another conference at Burayda. About twelve thousand Ikhwan attended; al-Dawish and Ibn Humayd remained with huge forces at Jarab and did not enter the town. All parties used intermediaries.304 Ibn Sa'ud's measures of centralization were again the major issue of discussion. During the previous weeks, Ibn Sa'ud had made life more difficult for the Ikhwan by restricting their access to markets and by imposing higher taxes; as a result, Ikhwan members often sold their goods at lower-than-market prices.305 The conference became a forum for Ikhwan opposition to Ibn Sa'ud, expressed through a number of demands. They sought the abolition of taxes on sheep brought into towns for sale. They also demanded the dismantling of all telegraph stations in Najd. The right to visit Mecca, which Ibn Sa'ud had at-

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tempted to limit in order to avoid problems in the holy city, and the demolition of the Busayya post were also on their agenda. Initially, Ibn Sa'ud agreed to the first three demands. It seems that al-Dawish also wanted to see Ibn Sa'ud's May 20, 1927, treaty with the British before he would agree to a meeting. This was introduced indirectly but gave Ibn Sa'ud the opportunity to write a letter critical of al-Dawish, which was read aloud at the conference. For the first time in many months, Ibn Sa'ud obtained a favorable response. The Ikhwan reiterated Ibn Sa'ud's criticism against al-Dawish, who was losing support. Ibn Sa'ud consequently succeeded in obtaining an agreement with the Ikhwan on Busayya: They were to refrain from raiding for two months, during which he would try, through discussions with Clayton, to get the British to consent to its demolition. He agreed to embark on war if this tactic failed.306 Ibn Sa'ud's approach to the Ikhwan and the British at this stage thus proved partially successful, at least in delaying an acute crisis. His maneuvering among the British, the Iraqis, and the Ikhwan was well described by M. J. Clauson of the India Office: It certainly seems as if Ibn Sa'ud has been playing his cards well. He has put off meeting His Majesty's Government representative until he has a stronger case to stand upon. He has put off the necessity for dealing with Faisal al-Dawish himself by quibbling with the Iraq Government. . . . Meanwhile the task of bringing Faisal al-Dawish to heel has been undertaken by the Air Force, while Ibn Sa'ud had been able to make capital out of their incursions over his territory. ... By putting all the blame on Iraq he tries to avoid conflict with His Majesty's Government, and by remaining in comparatively inaccessible places and feigning illness he evades personal interview . . . until his position has become more favourable.307

The demolition of the Busayya post, the one aim that the Ikhwan had not achieved by this time, was Ibn Sa'ud's main rationale for discussion with Clayton. The British position could only have made it more difficult for Clayton to reach agreement with Ibn Sa'ud. He still avoided dealing with tribal politics, the result being that the British authorities had not become acquainted with Ibn Sa'ud's real problems. Their penchant for focusing on rulers as the only relevant variables prevented them from understanding the essence of the king's concerns. They felt that they had duly compensated him and had refrained from attacking his tribes and so decided to reject any territorial or strategic concessions regarding Busayya. This post was considered essential to both Iraq's defense and the maintenance of the frontier line, which they had initiated. Negotiations commenced on May 8, 1928, and broke off on May 20 with no result. Seeing a possibility of claiming strategic assets from the frontier settlements, Tbn Sa'ud was quick to raise his own demands with Clayton: First was the demolition of posts at Busayya, Salman, Sabiha, and Rutba, which, in his opinion, the Iraqis had erected in violation of Article 3 of the TJqayr protocol. He insisted that those posts were behind all the trouble and that

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unless they were demolished, peace could not prevail. Second, he demanded that all British and Iraqi incursions into his territories stop and that Iraq refrain from harboring criminal tribesmen. Clayton understood that even if Ibn Sa'ud himself agreed to the posts for the sake of peace, he could never win the approval of the Najdi population. Clayton's impression was also that Ibn Sa'ud's broad interpretation of the phrase "in the vicinity of the border" did not tally with the original intent of the article. Thus Clayton noted that Ibn Sa'ud "has amplified it [claims of demolishing the posts] in an endeavour to strengthen his case before His Majesty's Government and his position towards his own people."308 Clayton tried to argue that the posts would not bring about any military offensive against Najd and would not prevent the free movement of tribesmen. As Ibn Sa'ud remained unconvinced, Clayton proposed prohibiting the erection of posts within 25 miles of the border, specifically excluding posts near particular wells, and establishing a joint Najdi-Iraqi post on the border or in the neutral zone. But Ibn Sa'ud would not agree to any compromise.309 Clayton returned to Britain to report to the government and talk over future courses of action. In his report, he made it clear that only by demolishing the posts could he bring Ibn Sa'ud into line with British policy. He also stressed that Iraqi defense could be maintained by means other than scattered posts and that their demolition might promote tranquillity around the frontier, such as had prevailed until the Busayya raid.310 The discussion among British officials thus centered on whether to destroy or retain the posts. During cabinet and committee meetings, it was mainly the Air Ministry and Colonial Office officials who urged that the posts remain. The Air Ministry officials, militarily responsible for Iraq's defense, contended that the posts were indispensable. They stated that even if Ibn Sa'ud were to become more active against the raiders, the posts were important as intelligence bases for hot pursuit. The Royal Air Force would agree to six rather than the eight posts contemplated, but no fewer. Amery, the secretary for the colonies, added another dimension: distrust of Ibn Sa'ud. He referred to letters from Dobbs, Cornwallis, and particularly Glubb, underscoring the king's responsibility for the raids. As he was close to the arena, Glubb knew that Ibn Sa'ud had maneuvered among the tribes, encouraging raids in one case (in al-Riyad in 1928) and preventing them in another (the one from which Ibn Humayd had been dissuaded from participating). At this stage, however, Glubb was motivated by loyalty to his employers. Viewing Ibn Sa'ud's policies as tricks and intrigues, he pointed out that in the past Ibn Sa'ud always allowed raids and that they were the inevitable result of the difficult internal situation in Najd. Glubb's views influenced Amery's decision to maintain the posts intact.311 Ibn Sa'ud's inability to subjugate the raiders at this point apparently cost him support. The foreign secretary stated that although the posts indeed had to remain, means should be found to appease the king and maintain good relations with him. He therefore suggested informing Ibn Sa'ud that efforts would be made to negotiate an extradition treaty between the Saudi state and Iraq and that

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air raids would be carried out "only as an exceptional measure in a moment of active crisis."312 The British cabinet decided that Clayton's mission should resume on this basis. The renewed negotiations commenced on August 2, 1928, and lasted for one week. Ibn Sa'ud reiterated his strong commitment to demolishing the posts, a demand with which Clayton definitely could not comply. Clayton's explanations and promises of British arbitration were to no avail. Interpretation of Article 3 of the 'Uqayr protocol remained in dispute, and this led to the breakdown of the negotiations.313 Ibn Sa'ud's failure to have the Busayya post demolished through negotiations exacerbated the crisis. Although opposition to Ibn Sa'ud had not yet united all the Ikhwan groups, as some of the literature suggests,314 the movement was gathering momentum. Ibn Sa'ud's policies generated a considerable amount of criticism in Najd and the Hijaz during the summer and autumn of 1928. Ikhwan who had not joined the opposition were astonished at the ruler's indecisiveness over the Iraqi posts and criticized his persistence in acting against al-Dawish and Ibn Humayd. They maintained that his efforts to enlist support against them were disrupting the Wahhabi community. The critics wondered why he would not leave the two chieftains alone, for the sake of unity. Various Ikhwan groups, notably Muhsin al-Firm and the Harb, were uncertain about Ibn Sa'ud's intentions. In November, a minor chieftain of the Dhafir told Glubb that "Ibn Sa'ud is not the man he was ... he just wants to finish his days in peace." Furthermore, his failure to demolish the Iraqi posts made him an "infidel" to some Ikhwan groups.315 Unaware of the complexity of Ibn Sa'ud's position, the Ikhwan were reacting to the results of his apparent passivity. The case against Iraq and the challenge to march against the posts, openly voiced in the Umm al-Qura newspaper,316 produced a rift among Saudi experts on foreign affairs. 'Abdullah Damluji, originally from Mawsil, resigned in September and went to Iraq. Ibn Sa'ud's position was strongly condemned by the Syrian faction in the Hijazi Foreign Department, represented by Yusuf Yasin and Fu'ad Hamzah. Together with 'Abdullah Sulayman, a Najdi who functioned as the director general of the Financial Department, they became the real strongmen in the Hijaz. These changes, as well as the limiting of the powers of the Advisory Council (mostly by following the 1927 regulation),317 could have meant greater power for the executive elements of government, which might have pleased Ibn Sa'ud. Instead, it eroded Faysal's position as the viceroy in favor of the executive officials and led to a growing resentment among the Hijazis, chiefly against tax increases and the worsening economic situation caused by Ibn Sa'ud's array against the Ikhwan. In August, the Bani Malik started another rebellion, which the government crushed, this time with a force of 3,000.318 The northern tribal arena was the most active. In March, the entire Dhafir tribe, led by 'Ajaymi, wandered from Iraq to Najd. During the following weeks a Ruwalla chieftain, Farhan Ibn Mashur, took up Ikhwan tenets and initiated incursions into al-Jawf.319 The raids reached a peak when factions of

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the Huwaytat and the Shararat raided intensively into Najd.320 These groups obviously exploited the fact that Ibn Sa'ud's attention was distracted by the Ikhwan. It also seems that they were revolting against the leading chieftains, particularly 'Awda Abu Tayy of the Huwaytat, who had been on good terms with Ibn Sa'ud, and that they represented an anti-Saudi movement in TransJordan. Besides filing complaints and demanding blood money, matters that were referred to the tribunal established after the Hadda' accord, Ibn Sa'ud's men sought to subdue the raiders by increasing the collection of zakat in Trans-Jordan. They also brought over to their side more chieftains of the Huwaytat and successfully exploited an existing dispute between the Huwaytat and the Ruwalla concerning a tribal killing, to prevent them from creating a united anti-Saudi front. At the same time, Ibn Sa'ud resumed the collection of zakat among the Dahamsha and again demanded the eviction of the Shammar from Iraq.321 Even though al-Dawish and Ibn Humayd were quiet for a few months, in compliance with the agreement between them and Ibn Sa'ud reached at Burayda in April, there was discontent among their tribes. They were criticized for not raiding and for failing to achieve a reconciliation with Ibn Sa'ud. In October a raid on the 'Awazim of Kuwayt, proposed among the Mutayr, was vetoed by al-Dawish. 'Ali Ibn 'Ashwan of the Mutayr infuriated alDawish by crossing the border to Iraq against his orders. Ibn Humayd was facing growing opposition among his chiefs; it seems that his old rival, Ibn Ruba'yan, was his main adversary. In November, when Ibn Humayd refused to appear at the new al-Riyad conference, other 'Utayba chiefs proposed bringing him there by force.322 It was against this background, in which the conflict had begun to affect an increasing number of groups in society, that a new conference was held in al-Riyad. Ibn Sa'ud's advantage over al-Dawish and Ibn Humayd was partially achieved before the conference commenced. Despite Ibn Sa'ud's request, the two leaders once again decided not to attend. The matter was debated in a correspondence between al-Dawish and Ibn Sa'ud. The Mutayri chieftain reiterated the traditional Ikhwan demands to abolish the telegraph, cars, and taxes imposed on the tribes and to march against the Iraqi posts. Ibn Sa'ud insisted that the technologies were essential if the state were to strengthen itself in the face of the surrounding modern governments. He also explained that he could agree to abolish taxes, but then no payments would be allotted to tribal leaders. Finally, he pointed out that the British had been most helpful to the Muslims, that is, the Wahhabis. It was al-Dawish whose raids had upset the entire balance, the result of which had been the erection of the posts. Ibn Sa'ud felt that al-Dawish's persistence could cause further damage to the Saudi state. Ibn Sa'ud would certainly not precipitate a crisis by fighting the British, but if al-Dawish wanted to go ahead by himself, Ibn Sa'ud would "wish him joy." Ibn Sa'ud thus impressed on al-Dawish that the Mutayri activities caused critical damage, not to Ibn Sa'ud personally, but to the state that al-Dawish cherished and for the benefit of which he was working. A report by a minor

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Dhafiri chief stressed that "as the correspondence continued, Ibn Sa'ud became firmer and [forced] the Duwish [al-Dawish] to 'climb down.' Eventually, the latter sent his seal to Riyadh, telling Ibn Sa'ud . . . that he, Faisal, would obey all his orders, but that he could not come to Riyadh because he was afraid."323 Ibn Humayd also avoided the conference, although al-Dawish, for reasons that are unclear, advised the 'Utaybi chief to go to al-Riyad. Exasperated with alDawish "for submitting so far,"324 Didan Ibn Hithlayn also refused to go. Eight hundred delegates attended; 'Abd al-'Aziz came on behalf of his father, Fay sal al-Dawish. The discussions commenced on November 6. Ibn Sa'ud immediately achieved a strategic success by delivering a speech in which he offered to abdicate if the Ikhwan considered him unfaithful to the shari'a. He demanded their frank response, stressing that at the beginning of the conference they should raise no other demands but only choose "the one who will be in charge of ruling you other than myself." The tactic of separating this vote of confidence from other problems proved effective. It increased his prestige considerably, and he was called on by all sides to remain king. A speech by one of the 'ulama' followed, emphasizing that not only was Ibn Sa'ud suitable to rule—following the blessed commands of God, the Prophet, and the shari'a in general—but that "we are not entitled to disobey ... as in the same way the subjects are not allowed to disobey."325 The fear of anarchy and civil war must have had a decisive impact on the 'ulama'in Najd, who had usually adhered to law and order and supported an organized government, under which their profession thrived. They therefore opted for obedience and the maintenance of Ibn Sa'ud's power. Throughout this conference they apparently toed the line, offering no opposition. Ibn Sa'ud also learned a lesson. He responded immediately to charges against him, sitting alongside the 'ulama' and preventing them from delivering critical opinions, as they had done to his detriment in April 1927. This was a manifestation of Ibn Sa'ud's success in reestablishing the Wahhabi state religion on a sound footing, on his side. Among the leaders who then brought claims and raised problems were alFirm of the Harb, Ibn Ruba'yan of the 'Utayba, and other representatives of the Mutayr and Qahtan. They followed the strategy previously employed by al-Dawish: trying to persuade Ibn Sa'ud to change his policies to join them in a jihad. They stressed their past cooperation in the establishment of the hujar. In order to continue on the right path, they demanded the resumption of religious teachings for non-Wahhabis, the abolition of the telegraph, and the destruction of the posts. In fact, they challenged Ibn Sa'ud by demanding his guarantee to protect them from any negative effects of the posts. Indeed, they asked, why should he prevent the Ikhwan from embarking on a jihad to demolish them? The 'ulama' replied in Ibn Sa'ud's favor on the telegraph issue: As there was nothing against it in the Qur'an and the Sunna, it could not be considered unlawful. According to British reports, Ibn Sa'ud himself gave the Ikhwan a fairly sarcastic reply: Like the telegraph, their weapons were made by infidels. In return for demolishing the telegraph, would they give up their rifles? The

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answer could only have left the telegraph intact.326 Ibn Sa'ud also pointed out that religious teaching still prevailed among the Bani Malik tribe, whom the Ikhwan suspected of laxity. It seems that this was the only purely religious query that the Ikhwan had raised in years, and it attracted no further comment. Politics, however, did. Attacking al-Dawish openly for the first time, Ibn Sa'ud explained that only Mutayri raids with which he had not associated had led to the building of the posts. The Ikhwan were apparently ready to dissociate themselves from al-Dawish and even "attack and punish him." They stipulated, however, that he be allowed to destroy the posts and prevent the British from interfering in their punitive actions in Iraq, directed mainly against their old enemy, Yusuf Sa'dun. The 'ulama'also asked Ibn Sa'ud to try to remove— but not necessarily attack—the posts, as they were a danger to Najd. 327 Although the question of the posts had become a symbol of the tribes' position in the Saudi polity, the 'ulama's' request was more in line with Ibn Sa'ud's policies. He had consistently demanded that the British abolish the posts and had renewed his pressure on them to do so. He attempted to refer the matter to arbitration between himself and the Iraqis, probably with a Briton serving as arbitrator. Therefore he presumably welcomed the support of the 'ulama'. It was the demand for jihad that he had to neutralize. According to Umm al-Qura, he privately explained that Najd's future depended on peaceful relations with its neighbors and Britain. But according to various British accounts, he asked only for a two-month period to negotiate the matter with the British, assuring them that if he failed, he would go to war.328 Ibn Sa'ud did not seek the approval of the al-Riyad conference for his policy of allowing the posts to remain intact. His goal was to attack alDawish's position, and in this he succeeded. He announced that 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Dawish would replace Faysal al-Dawish as chief of the Mutayr and that Ibn Ruba'yan would replace Ibn Humayd as ruler of the 'Utayba.329 He also bestowed gifts on many chiefs, particularly 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Dawish and Na'if Ibn Hithlayn. This seems to have deeply upset Didan Ibn Hithlayn, who rushed to visit Ibn Sa'ud after the conference.330 The Ikhwan's response to Ibn Sa'ud's demand to extend the ceasefire for two more months is unclear. The fact that during the conference they expressed willingness to abandon al-Dawish if Ibn Sa'ud embarked on a jihad suggests that they were not satisfied with this demand. Furthermore, alDawish and Ibn Humayd still had to be reckoned with. They both were dissatisfied with the delays and humiliated by Ibn Sa'ud's attempt to oust them and deprive them of political leadership.331 Ibn Sa'ud seems to have overestimated the problems that restrained the two and their hesitation to oppose him; he overreached himself. First, according to the code still upheld by Najdi tribes, deposing tribal chiefs was not a prerogative of the ruler but of the tribal leaders and elders. Their fear that Ibn Sa'ud would strive to assume absolute powers and to dictate tribal life thus resurfaced. Second, in practice, Ibn Sa'ud could do little to enforce a deposition. It is unclear whether there were any real attempts to oust al-Dawish and al-Humayd, but it is obvious that at this stage, the king had not yet arrayed a

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military force that was strong enough, numerically or otherwise, to force the Mutayr and 'Utayba chiefs to abdicate.332 Third, the declaration of their deposition and the attempt to reach an agreement after drawing the tribes away from them must have been seen by al-Dawish and Ibn Humayd as a direct challenge. Although the two had been acting against Ibn Sa'ud's policies for some time, he had hitherto been able to manipulate each of them into obeying his orders. It seems that more by carelessness than anything else, Ibn Sa'ud lost considerable room to maneuver in his dealings with al-Dawish and Ibn Humayd, as well as with Didan Ibn Hithlayn. After the conference, they no longer had anything to lose and so could freely undertake militant actions, which increasingly appeared as a revolt against Ibn Sa'ud. With the passage of time it became clear that each party had an interest in confrontation. There were several milestones on this collision course. In November 1928, Ibn Lami left the conference and crossed into Iraq. During the next three months, Ibn Ashwan and Ibn Shuqayr were reported to be raiding in Iraq.333 Toward the end of February 1929, it became clear that the Mutayri groups' raiding was no longer sporadic or uncoordinated. Reports indicate that an 'Ujman raiding group of 1 ,000, together with the Mutayri forces of Ibn Lami Ibn Shuqayr and Ibn Fuqum, had set out to attack northern Kuwayt. AlDawish went to raid 'Abtiyya in southern Iraq, adjacent to the neutral zone, and Ibn Humayd prepared twelve hundred men to launch incursions toward the west in the Huzul area of Iraq. Other raiding parties of 'Utayba were already in action. Ibn Humayd's activities were particularly crucial at this stage. Pious and sincere, he was frustrated by Ibn Sa'ud's actions and desired revenge. A meeting planned between Ibn Humayd and Ibn Sa'ud at Shawqi334 never took place. Further tension developed between himself and Ibn Ruba'yan, Ibn Sa'ud's choice for the 'Utayba leadership. Information reached Ibn Humayd that with Glubb's help, the Iraqi tribes that feared 'Utayba raids were preparing for a confrontation with him. In view of this, he turned against indigenous and loyal tribes, raiding the Sinjara Shammar, who were themselves Ikhwan, the Dahamsha, and the Ruwalla. He also attacked caravans of Saudi townsmen, mainly from Burayda and al-Qasim.335 Ibn Sa'ud found himself in unprecedented difficulties when pressured to defend his townspeople and punish the offenders. Glubb commented: "Whether or not Ibn Sa'ud would in any case have taken action against Ibn Humaid, the massacre of the Agail merchants created such an outcry amongst townspeople of Najd, as almost to compel him to take action."336 Ibn Sa'ud commenced mobilizing and fortifying the main towns in the arena. He particularly sought to prevent cooperation between Ibn Humayd and al-Dawish, which could lead to immediate internal war. Al-Dawish set out on a major invasion in the middle of February and was halted by Ibn Sa'ud's envoys. They persuaded him to delay the raid until after the next fast of Ramadan, so as to allow Ibn Sa'ud to complete the negotiations he was conducting with the British. Al-Dawish agreed337 but simultaneously continued his preparations for a wide anti-Saudi front. His greatest achievement in this context appears to be a reconciliation he managed to effect between Ibn Humayd and Ibn Ruba'yan. 338 Another

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achievement was the attempt to bring over Ibn Hithlayn. It is difficult to determine whether it was his fear of Ibn Sa'ud or the temptation of raiding and looting that made Ibn Hithlayn join al-Dawish. His help was short-lived, as in late March he succumbed to pressures from Ibn Sa'ud and his neighbors, the Awazim, and ceased cooperating with al-Dawish.339 While it lasted, Ibn Hithlayn's cooperation was of major importance, as it brought to a peak the pressure on shaykh Ahmad of Kuwayt. Ahmad feared and personally respected Ibn Sa'ud but was helpless against the renegade Ikhwan's pressures. In late 1928 and early 1929, al-Dawish managed to establish a tacit alliance with Ahmad, guaranteeing the latter protection from raids. The Mutayr acquired full musabala in Kuwayt, but there still were raids in the vicinity of Kuwayt. Ibn Hithlayn raided a Bani Malik group at Kuwayt in late January 1929, and a month later Ibn Shuqayr raided Iraqi shepherds living there. As Glubb indicated, the Ikhwan sought to rely on Kuwayt as an economic base and also viewed it as a raiding target.340 By March 1929, the Ikhwan opposition front had become a formidable challenge for Ibn Sa'ud. They cooperated successfully to form an autonomous economic hinterland, which could only outrage Ibn Sa'ud, as it had been an old policy of his to avoid trading with Kuwayt. They also intensified their brutal raiding campaigns. According to Glubb, Al-Dawish, Ibn Humayd and Ibn Hithlayn had decided to overthrow Ibn Sa'ud and establish themselves as rulers of Najd, the Hijaz, and al-Ahsa', respectively.341 Judging by the Ikhwan leaders' earlier demands and their attitude toward Ibn Sa'ud, Glubb's contention does not seem a likely one at this stage. But Ibn Sa'ud had enough cause to worry about the Ikhwan's activities. Ibn Sa'ud was impelled into action by another factor as well—renewed British retaliation against the raiders. A British proposal of November 1928 to refer the outstanding problems between Iraq and Najd to arbitration was still intact in March 1929, though it had not yet been acted upon. Ibn Sa'ud consented to the proposal in December 1928 but had demanded that Iraq and Najd have an equal number of arbitrators to adjudicate the problems and that the British not participate. He also insisted, as expected, on a reexamination of Article 3 of the 'Uqayr agreement concerning the location of the posts. Moreover, he demanded that Article 1 of the protocol, dealing with demarcation of the borderline, be reexamined, as he considered it the source of the problem.342 This demand in itself shows that the very principle of borderlines was untenable in the region, at least for one of the parties. The British, however, could not have complied with the demand. With the increase in raiding, the British again used armored cars and aeroplanes to rebuff the raiders. Ibn Sa'ud protested against incursions into his territories, and both India Office and Foreign Office officials supported him.343 It was clear, however, that the British actions were essential to curb the raiders, who otherwise would have inflicted grave damage on Iraq and possibly on Kuwayt as well. The intensification of both British and Ikhwan military activities put increasing pressure on Ibn Sa'ud to take some direct action to improve his position.

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He fortified Jubayl and Qatif in February, and a large mobilization was initiated under Ibn Jilawi's supervision. Ibn Sa'ud recruited from the Qahtan, the Harb, loyal 'Utayba, and Shammar and from among the townspeople. Ibn Ruba'yan of the 'Utayba (whose reconciliation with Ibn Humayd was shortlived) and al-Firm of the Harb, both of whom led significant tribal groups, were on his side. Umm al-Qura proudly reported Ibn Sa'ud's inspection of the forces.344 Deprived of major portions of the Ikhwan in his army and, in fact, turning against them, Ibn Sa'ud may well have paused to wonder about the most suitable way to utilize the army. It was a matter of the right method, time, and place for his forces to strike. Al-Dawish's inaction lasted only a few days. Given the new cooperation among himself, Ibn Humayd, and Ibn Hithlayn, each was compelled to act. On February 28, al-Dawish attacked Lizam Abu Dhara' of the Dhafir, who had reestablished friendly relations with Ibn Sa'ud. In early March, a vicious attack was carried out by Ibn Shuqayr against Kuwayt; simultaneously, Ibn Humayd raided Ibn Rimal of the Shammar 'Abda, Ikhwan loyal to Ibn Sa'ud.345 In early March, Ibn Sa'ud left al-Riyad and moved to Burayda. Two forces, one under Fahd Ibn Jilawi and the other under Ibn Sa'ud's son Sa'ud, followed.346 Ibn Sa'ud's original idea may have been to install his forces as a buffer between Ibn Humayd, who acted in western Najd, and al-Dawish in the east. But on hearing of Ibn Sa'ud's movements, Ibn Humayd rushed to join forces with al-Dawish at Sabila, between Ajibba and al-Artawiyya, 20 miles north of Zifli.347 Ibn Sa'ud followed, and small-scale raiding and skirmishes ensued between the camps. The parties still did not rule out negotiations. In the last days of March, Ibn Sa'ud sent two 'ulama'—'Umar al-'Anqari, who had been on previous missions for him, and 'Ali Ibn Salim—to Ibn Humayd. They offered to refer to arbitration the matters outstanding between them, in accordance with the shari'a. Despite his mistrust of Ibn Sa'ud, Ibn Humayd was amenable to this proposal, and there are reports dating from the last days of March indicating that both sides had agreed to arbitration.348 In addition, Ibn Humayd delegated one of his lieutenants, Ibn Kathila, to Ibn Sa'ud. It remains unclear whether it was the ongoing enmity between the parties or the fact that Ibn Kathila did not reciprocate Ibn Sa'ud's salams—a manifestation of his failure to regard the king as an akh and a true believer—that angered Ibn Sa'ud. Whatever the case, he informed Ibn Humayd that he could either surrender and be tried by the shari'a or meet him on the battlefield.349 At this point, al-Dawish intervened. According to one report, his son and other leaders tried to persuade al-Dawish not to go to battle with Ibn Sa'ud, because unlike the situation in 1928, Ibn Humayd was now the king's specific target.350 Al-Dawish in fact went so far as to go to Ibn Sa'ud's camp. Quoting Wahbah, Habib and Goldrup state that al-Dawish then promised to surrender but changed his mind after he had returned to his camp, saying that Ibn Sa'ud's army was composed of "soft men and cooks" who had no chance of victory against the Ikhwan. 351 As Goldrup pointed out, even though he had

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lived in a town (al-Artawiyya) for over ten years, al-Dawish had not acquired the outlook of a sedentary townsman but, rather, maintained that of a Badu who despised the peaceful conduct of sedentarized people.352 The battle took place the next day, March 30, and Ibn Sa'ud emerged victorious. Habib rejects Glubb's version, according to which al-Dawish spent a night in Ibn Sa'ud's camp.353 Habib states that the Mutayri chief went into battle the next morning and therefore could not have remained in Ibn Sa'ud's camp overnight. The question would not have arisen had there not been a report that al-Dawish had returned to his own camp to try to persuade Ibn Humayd to surrender. According to this report, al-Dawish had definitely reached a reconciliation with Ibn Sa'ud on the night of March 28; Ibn Sa'ud promised large gifts to Ibn Humayd if the latter surrendered. Al-Dawish returned to his camp but failed to persuade Ibn Humayd. On March 29, al-Dawish sent a messenger to Ibn Sa'ud. In order to convince Ibn Humayd, he demanded Ibn Sa'ud's promises in writing. While they were awaiting the reply, Ibn Sa'ud attacked.354 It could be that this was the point at which al-Dawish rejoined Ibn Humayd in fighting against Ibn Sa'ud. If this version is true, Ibn Sa'ud actually attacked al-Dawish when the latter was unprepared and under the impression that negotiations were still in progress. The foregoing report is based on evidence from Kuwayt that relies on informants who witnessed the battle. Even though they might have been biased, the version was accepted as truth in the realm. In early June, H. G. Jakins, the British consul at Jidda, reported that "feeling is running very high over the 'treacherous' manner in which Faisal-Ed-Doweish . . . and Ibn Bujad [Ibn Humayd] were attacked."355 Dickson even wrote that al-Dawish was attacked even though he had received guarantees for his safety as a gobetween for Ibn Humayd and Ibn Sa'ud.356 Ikhwan from the Harb and the Hutaym loyal to Ibn Sa'ud were the ones who fought the Mutayr, and they had no great trouble defeating them, particularly after al-Dawish was shot in the stomach. Najdi townsmen engaged the 'Utayba under Ibn Humayd and had a much more difficult time. They were repulsed twice before overcoming their adversaries, with the help of Ibn Ruba'yan and Ibn Busayyis of the Mutayr, who had remained loyal to Ibn Sa'ud.357 The activities following the battle had important implications. As Goldrup stated, once Ibn Sa'ud was "satisfied that Faysal [al-Dawish]'s career as a challenger to his authority was at an end," he was ready to offer an amnesty to the Mutayr. On the other hand, he pursued Ibn Humayd, who had fled to al-Ghatghat. The latter and his followers were arrested, and the hijra was completely destroyed.358 The day after the battle of Sabila, Ibn Sa'ud convened the fighters and the 'ulama' there, to emphasize to them the necessity of stabilizing public life. He told the assembly: So far as religion was concerned they must rely on the rulings of the Ulema and not on their individual judgement; that they should give him their complete allegiance; that they should hold no meetings or assemblies without his permis-

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sion; and finally, that they should respect their fellow Moslems and their property. The Ulema approved of these proposals.359 Ibn Sa'ud thereby sought to address two problems: He wanted to minimize the current schism in Saudi society by using his victory as a vehicle to introduce new cohesion and stability. Ibn Sa'ud also had to settle the problem of the future development of the Saudi state: Saudi society would have to accept Ibn Sa'ud's rule of a pacified and centralized state. It would be run by Ibn Sa'ud and legitimized by the 'ulama', who thus became guardians and controllers of the state religion. Partisan religious interpretations were forbidden. This instruction was particularly urgent, as various segments were still heavily influenced by the Ikhwan and identified with their values. On June 30, 1929, Dickson interviewed Faysal al-Shiblayn, a lieutenant of al-Dawish, in Kuwayt. Al-Shiblayn clearly stated that the Ikhwan "were against Bin Sa'ud because he was trying to restrict the Bedouins' freedom to an unheard of extent."360 Ibn Shiblayn pointed out that the main assets that the Ihkwan had preserved were their autonomy and their traditional tribal life-style. At issue was the subjugation of the geopolitical and economic infrastructure of their existence and its replacement by an organized polity. During April 1930, it became clear that peace would not prevail. Despite their pact with the Mutayr and the 'Utayba, the 'Ujman remained in al-Ahsa' and did not participate in the Sabila battle. It is not clear whether this represented an attempt to safeguard the Ikhwan flank at al-Ahsa' and Kuwayt or whether it meant that they no longer opposed the king. Whatever the case, Ibn Sa'ud was ready to effect an amnesty, and Ibn Jilawi ordered his son Fahd to carry out the mission. Fahd managed to bring Didan Ibn Hithlayn to his camp on April 11, but after an initial display of hospitality, he ordered Didan placed in chains. Several of Didan's entourage escaped and returned with a large 'Ujman force, headed by Na'if Ibn Hithlayn. During the ensuing battle, Didan was put to death, Fahd was killed, and Ibn Jilawi's forces sustained heavy losses.361 This event inflicted critical damage on Ibn Sa'ud's reputation and precipitated a revolt by the Ikhwan against his rule. In the following weeks, the 'Ujman started moving toward Warfa in the Kuwayt neutral zone. They were joined there by Farhan Ibn Mashur of the Ruwalla, who had penetrated from Trans-Jordan several weeks earlier and had been evicted from Kuwayt. After Didan's killing, Ibn Sa'ud offered Ibn Mashur safe conduct if the latter would surrender; Ibn Sa'ud also asked the British to prevent any smuggling of supplies to the rebels from Kuwayt and not to give them any shelter there. Ibn Mashur nevertheless joined the 'Ujman. On June 19, Faysal al-Dawish reentered the arena after recovering from his injuries, by arriving at Jarriyya al'Ulya. Initially, he asked only for grazing and watering facilities. But by August, it became evident that malcontents of the 'Utayba had joined him and that the 'Ujman were also willing to ally with him.362 According to reports from Kuwayt, following the Ikhwan's defeat and his personal injury and military loss, al-Dawish was trying to restore his preemi-

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nence over the whole area of northeastern Najd and al-Ahsa', particularly the region near Kuwayt. The Mutayri leader adopted a new tactic: He claimed that his quarrel was only with Ibn Sa'ud and promised to avoid raiding Iraq and Kuwayt and to stop quarreling with the "Hukuma" (the British government).363 His intention was to establish support for his fight against Ibn Sa'ud. During the summer of 1929, he regained control over part of the 'Awazim and established a supply line from al-Artawiyya. Militarily, al-Dawish was in no position to meet a full-scale Saudi force. He rightly assumed, however, that Ibn Sa'ud's support was concentrated in the cities and that he had no ready forces in the field,364 a situation that could help al-Dawish gain a clear advantage in the area. Under a new rebel leader named al-Dahayna, the 'Utayba also blocked roads and raided in the area of al-Qasim, as well as in the area between Najd and the Hijaz. The raiders maintained close contacts with alDawish and acquired supplies from the 'Anaza of Iraq.365 The rebellious Ikhwan strengthened their front, denied the Saudi party safe passage through their territories, and regained some of the support they had previously lost. Ibn Sa'ud himself declared that "most people of Najd became refractory and would not obey my orders."366 In June, July, and August, Ibn Sa'ud tried to gain the upper hand once more by bringing tribesmen from the Mutayr and the Shammar to al-Riyad for gifts and compliments. On July 9, he confronted the 'Utayba, who themselves were on the brink of a revolt, and urged them to back him against the rebellious 'Ujman. Ibn Sa'ud did not seem fully confident about approaching these tribesmen; he solicited their aid but at the same time threatened to annihilate "with his sword" any opposition among them. He referred to their possible abstention from a jihad against the rebels as a criminal offense,367 but there is no indication that he succeeded in garnering any support from the 'Utayba. Another problem faced by Ibn Sa'ud was the considerable increase in raids on loyal tribes and on towns. On July 26, al-Dawish successfully raided the Subay' and Sahul camp at Qaya, near al-Artawiyya.368 Several days later, a caravan led by one of Ibn Sa'ud's sons was attacked in al-Ahsa', and a large number of his followers were killed. The amir of Burayda, Mish'ari, was said to have been assassinated by a supporter of al-Dawish in his household. The 'Utayba followed suit in raiding.369 It was therefore urgent for Ibn Sa'ud to move against the rebels. And according to reports from Shaykh Ahmad of Kuwayt and other sources, King Faysal of Iraq was trying to incite the Shammar against Ibn Sa'ud by encouraging them to restore their rule in Ha'il. When they indicated that they were afraid of al-Dawish, Faysal replied, "Do not fear, al-Dawish is with me" (al-Dawish 'indi). It was then decided that the Shammar would wait a while before acting. Other Kuwayti reports, however, indicated that a regional anti-Saudi alliance had been forged. The Shammar shaykhs were moved to the border, and in addition, the Ruwalla shaykhs, aided by 'Abdullah, were in touch with al-Dawish. Al-Dahayna's activities in al-Qasim were part of this scheme.370 Ibn Sa'ud reported these developments, clearly indicating the danger caused by al-Dawish's axis with the sharifs.371

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The following remark by Shaykh Ahmad seems an accurate assessment of the nature of the plot and of al-Dawish's intentions in general: Al-Duwish is a great politician . . . there is no question of Din [religion] behind this rebellion; what Duwish is playing for is the downfall of the house of Sa'ud and the rise of himself, al-Duwish, in Bin Saud's place. With success his horizon has become widened and now he hopes to become master of Nejd, and in the process does not care if the Hijaz returns to the Shereefian family or Hail to Bin Rashid.372

The Ikhwan opposition to Ibn Sa'ud thus reached the extent of collaboration with the Hashimites, enemies of the Saudi state, whom they had earlier regarded as infidels. The danger of an alliance with the Hashimites was probably another factor that forced Ibn Sa'ud to send his forces against the rebels. In early September, Ibn Sa'ud called for another conference of Ikhwan, 'ulama', and townsmen in al-Shara, a town on the road between Mecca and alRiyad. Unlike the long and weighty conferences of previous years, the discussions this time were relatively short and conclusive. Ibn Sa'ud was seeking legitimacy for the punitive actions his forces were about to launch, and that is what he obtained. In fact, the decision taken at this conference is what finally determined the supremacy of the central Saudi government over tribal formations. A seven-paragraph resolution was adopted, its main line being that whoever participated in the rebellion (naming the 'Utayba and sections of the Mutayr) had to be punished according to the shari'a. Anyone giving them aid would be deprived of his household. To implement this, Ibn Sa'ud was entrusted with the right to dispatch his umara' and army to each "corrupt" (mufsida) hijra.373 Ibn Sa'ud sent various forces: (1) Near Kuwayt, an 'Awazim force, assisted by contingents of Bani Khalid, Qahtan, Sahul and others, were sent with a small detachment of regulars, a total of 2,500 men; (2) at Ajibba, Ibn Musa'id was deployed with Shammar and Harb forces, also about 2,500 hundred strong, placed there especially to sever contacts with Iraq and Trans-Jordan; and (3) Khalid Ibn al-Luway and Sa'ud were leading columns from Khurma, Turaba, and loyal 'Utayba.374 These troops represented a significant change in the Saudi forces' structure, for some were regular columns of paid, full-time soldiers who were not fighting within the traditional tribal framework. Others were government-controlled tribal groups that fought against tribal separatist groups. The way was thus paved for the exclusion of the Ikhwan from the army. In the early clashes, neither side achieved victory. Khalid tangled with alDahayna's forces and had to retreat to Khurma. At Umm al-Rudhuman, Ibn Musa'id routed a party of 500, led by 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Dawish, who died shortly afterward.375 Faysal al-Dawish scored an important victory on October 5, against the Saudi contingency force near Kuwayt; he then triumphed over the 'Awazim, who had in the early stages defeated the 'Ujman. 376 Khalid did better with the 'Utayba, who were caught between Ibn Ruba'yan and Khalid, and sustained heavy losses; the remnants of the rebel force were subsequently compelled to move northward. 377

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Despite their resilience, the rebels' retreat was fatal, for two reasons. One was their lack of proper strategic deployment. Ibn Sa'ud's forces were arrayed in different arenas, under different commanders, and they also controlled the supply lines from central Najd. Thus the destruction of one Saudi force left others still intact. In contrast, the rebels fought in areas in which they had been living and did not deploy their forces into territories not under their control. Once defeated, they had no contingency plans on which to draw or regions to which they could retreat. Besides, their concentration made them an easy target for attack. Thus the 'Utayba were defeated by a pincer movement led by Khalid and Ibn Ruba'yan. Although al-Dawish was victorious against the 'Awazim, he then had to face the entire Saudi army alone, an impossible feat. The second reason for the rebels' final defeat had to do with British actions. After Sabila, Ikhwan raids into neighboring countries no longer posed a problem, and so the British therefore ceased pursuing the Ikhwan with aeroplanes into Najd, thereby releasing Ibn Sa'ud from this burden. Moreover, they were ready to sell ammunition and three thousand rifles to Ibn Sa'ud. Most important, they responded positively to his requests to prevent Iraq and Kuwayt from harboring rebellious Ikhwan. The Mutayri chieftain asked for asylum in August and again in early November 1929, when he realized the difficulty of his position. Despite the overtures he made to Kuwayt and despite his sending his women to plead for refuge, the British refused him asylum. Another way in which the British played a helpful role was in putting pressure on the Hashimite rulers 'Abdullah and Faysal to refrain from aiding the rebels. In December 1929, Faysal established contacts with al-Dawish, encouraging him to fight and possibly supplying him with money and horses. As soon as the British became aware of this, they ended the collaboration.378 Al-Dawish attempted to solicit a pardon from Ibn Sa'ud in November 1929. The king refused to grant it, though he promised to spare al-Dawish's life. After it became clear that the rebellious Ikhwan would not be able to obtain refuge in any neighboring country, al-Dawish, Ibn Lami, and Ibn Hithlayn surrendered to the British on January 10, 1930, and on January 28, the rebellious Ikhwan were brought to Ibn Sa'ud.379 The aggressiveness of the tribes was irreversibly curbed. Ibn Sa'ud's strategy of state building had achieved a decisive victory, and the Saudi state was undergoing a process of change.

CHAPTER 3

The Saudi State

and Its Neighbors, 1930-1936

In the Lions' Den The new Saudi polity that crystallized after the defeat of the Ikhwan is perhaps best described as "encapsulation." The Saudi state had developed a superior structure capable of subordinating the tribes but unable to institutionalize its rule and cement it by means of a new ethos that would replace tribal practices and values. The government coopted the military prowess and political structures of tribes, which were more tangible and therefore easier to subordinate. However, tribal values and practices are an intrinsic part of the patterns of behavior and the weltanschaung of a society and thus far less amenable to change. Accordingly, a new duality evolved in the Saudi state in the early 1930s; a victorious new regime, politically centralized, reliant on Hijazi, urban centered, and oriented toward economic development, alongside a defeated tribal entity, Najdi based, pious, and supportive of the chieftaincy system. In the years that followed, this duality presented several problems for state building. First, the new elite was lacking in experience. Business entrepreneurs and administrators, many of whom were either based in Hijazi or foreigners, had to cope for the first time with the unfamiliar responsibilities of ruling a rapidly expanding state. Furthermore, they had no internal cohesion or the modes of cooperation necessary for their new role. The more common, parochial, tribal values therefore often governed the behavior of these groups, functioning as a substitute for modern political practices. The formation of a cohesive elite, capable of establishing an effective administration and rational policymaking procedures was in itself a painful challenge in the early 1930s. The process of social and regional integration

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was also slowed by the self-imposed isolation of a number of tribal groups that were left demoralized and alienated after the Ikhwan's defeat. In addition, there was the problem of establishing cooperation between the Najdi and Hijazi populations. Although the new leaders were interested in integration, they viewed the Najdi tribes as marginal groups that had to be weakened and subdued. This was the background against which the state continued to evolve in the 1930s. During this period the Saudi state faced several crises generated primarily by economic problems. Economic affairs do not necessarily have the power to change the ideologies, beliefs, or structural bases of a regime; however, they do constitute a decisive influence on the daily conduct of a government and its relations with its subjects. As Ibn Khaldun asserted, performance determines a government's wealth, its level of corruption, and the nature of the demands it makes on its subjects. 1 According to Karl Wittfogel's thesis, economic conditions lead to a political leadership that can rule in accordance with these conditions.2 Although the Saudi state was a far cry from Wittfogel's model of hydraulic, oriental despotism, his thesis can be applied to it: An economic crisis affected the entire Saudi state, demanding a centralized, comprehensive response, in a manner resembling the situation that Wittfogel described. Attempts to find a solution for economic problems resulted in the development of a distinctive pattern of political activity. These "politics of economic remedy" are the focus of the following discussion. The worldwide financial crisis of the 1930s had a great impact on the Saudi economy, evident mainly in the declining number of pilgrims who arrived in the Hijaz each year. In the late 1920s, an average of almost 100,000 people made the pilgrimage annually. This constituted the main source of the state's income. Their numbers dropped to 85,000 in 1930 and to just over 39,000 in 1931.3 The government also was heavily in debt to various bodies that had lent assistance in the past. Among the creditors were the government of India, which had helped Najd with financial subsidies before 1923 and with arms for its struggles against the Ikhwan; Hijazi and Najdi subjects, who had financed the government for the same purpose; two British firms (the Eastern Telegraph Company and Gellatly Hankey); and Holmes and Company, which had erected the telegraph and radio systems for the Saudi government. Some £30,000 was owed to India, about £90,000 to Hijazi and Najdi merchants, and £10,000 to the foreign companies. Thus, in early 1931, the Saudi debt exceeded £130,000. In March 1931, after intense British pressure, the government paid off the entire sum owed to the Eastern Telegraph Company and two-thirds of the debt to India, further burdening the local economy.4 In February and March 1931, in order to increase currency reserves and save gold, 'Abdullah Sulayman, the director of finance, changed the basis of the local riyal from gold to nickel.5 This step was counterproductive, however, as the demand for gold only increased and it became the most popular trading commodity. Consequently, gold was both exported and hoarded in enormous quantities. More nickel, therefore, had to be brought into the market to replace the gold, and by May 1931, the local riyal had depreciated (although

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the change was not officially recognized) from 10 to 20 riyals to the pound sterling.6 The implementation of economic reforms was retarded by the residual features of the tribal state. There was no separation between state finances and Ibn Sa'ud's private treasury. It was neither controlled through a public budget nor subject to an established, long-term plan. Despite the relatively high level of income the Saudi state enjoyed during the late 19205, no amount had been set aside, in Philby's words, "for rainy days."7 Thus in 1930-31 the government ran up a deficit. In 1930, for example, imports exceeded $13 million while income was no more than $7.223 million. Imported goods included essential food items as well as many luxuries intended for the royal household. The Saudi state had no substantial products for export; leather and pearls were the main commodities, but they did not yield more than $200,000. The other sources of income were customs revenues (about $3 million of the total income), taxes, and duties paid by pilgrims.8 As the crisis affected both the central government and the provinces, it is necessary to discuss some of the attempts at economic relief and some of the political reverberations. In March 1932, an agreement was made with a Dutch company, the Netherlands Trading Society, by which the company was commissioned to trade Saudi gold abroad and to control market activity in the Hijaz, in return for a commission of 0.5 percent. However, six weeks later it was discovered that the Saudi government had reserved no more than £10,000 in gold for that purpose and so could not pay the Dutch company its commission, and the arrangement was canceled. The government then poured more nickel into the market, which only increased the rate of inflation. A compulsory loan was then imposed on the Hijazi merchants, calculated to yield £24,000.9 Another attempted solution was to seek assistance from foreign sources previously unavailable to the Saudi state. In the summer of 1931, Ibn Sa'ud looked for a body to control and regulate the finances of the local market. For this purpose, he sought the services of a British bank. In July and August, a special Saudi envoy, through the mediation of the British Department of Overseas Trade, met with representatives of several British banks. Wahbah, then officiating as Ibn Sa'ud's representative in Britain, sought to sway Arthur Henderson, the foreign secretary, by explaining that without the British government's help, Ibn Sa'ud might turn to Soviet Russia for assistance. However, Henderson made it clear that the British government would not depart from its "long established practice of non-intervention in transactions between foreign governments and British banks."10 It seems that Henderson did not envisage a real shift in Saudi foreign policy toward the Soviet Union. What he feared were two possible consequences of engaging a British bank as a Saudi state bank: (i) Knowing the situation of the Saudi economy, he was probably apprehensive of the British bank's incurring heavy losses; and (2) he probably feared that if it became deeply involved, the British government might ultimately have to make good any losses resulting from such a venture. Because Britain was still trying to persuade the Saudis to repay their debts,

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Henderson was reluctant to encourage any British bank to get involved. In the end, Ibn Sa'ud's envoy failed both in London and the Netherlands. In July, an Egyptian-based Syrian, Habib Lutfallah, made a third proposal to Ibn Sa'ud, but his financial scheme was rejected.11 Another project undertaken was the exploitation of minerals and natural resources. In the summer of 1931 and during 1932, K. S. Twitchell, an American geologist, made a survey of potential Saudi resources and wrote four reports. He emphasized that water could be found close to the surface in several sites between Wajh and Jidda and that it could facilitate the growing of cotton, corn, and dates. Twitchell also found traces of aluminum, quartz, and gold and indicated that silver, iron, lead, and petroleum might also be found in places like Yanbu', Wajh, and Dhaba. But he emphasized that both the specimens and the potential fields had to be reexamined.12 In addition to Twitchell, Luftallah, and the earlier-mentioned Dutch group, other American, British, and Egyptian entrepreneurs became involved. Philby, who strove to become Lutfallah's agent in the Hijaz13 and established contacts with other companies, was the most prominent member of this group of foreign entrepreneurs. They had no direct access to the Saudi market and entered it only after contacts with the government. As such, the foreign entrepreneurs could at best stimulate the development of an improved and centralized government that might eventually preside over a planned and carefully budgeted economy. But their foreign status and specialized activity precluded them from directly influencing the government and the vicissitudes of the Saudi economy. Under such circumstances and in the absence of a state bank, the effects of the foreign enterprises were felt only in the long term; they did not help remedy the immediate economic crisis. Twitchell's ideas had a similar lack of effect. In late 1931 and early 1932, he reiterated the need to reexamine the specimens and mineral fields he had discovered, to develop water supply facilities for Jidda and for agricultural enterprises, to open a port at Ras Tanura on the Persian Gulf, and to construct roads and mines. Conveying his ideas in an advisory manner, it seems that Twitchell increasingly emphasized infrastructural projects that would be utilized only in the distant future. But Twitchell's plans could not produce any immediately effective improvements in the Saudi economy. Ibn Sa'ud eventually became annoyed with his recommendations, asserting that he was engaged "to write technical reports and not to advise him as to how they should be acted upon."14 Local merchants and administrators had a more forceful and direct impact on the Saudi politics and economy. They exemplified the duality of the day: They contributed to the new efforts to improve the economy and the administration but also used tribal descent and personal ties with Ibn Sa'ud to cultivate their own positions. Thriving on both the patrimonial system and the priority that Ibn Sa'ud gave to administrative development, this group had been advancing its interests since the early 19205. Merchants and administrators had stood firmly by the government during the difficulties at the end of the decade, and they included the king's chief advisers on centralization and

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economic development. Hijazi and Najdi merchants also became the primary financiers of the government, a role that grew during the economic crisis. The al-Qusaybi family, for instance, consisted of important merchants in al-Ahsa and represented Ibn Sa'ud in Bahrayn. Their activities demonstrate the path that such groups had trodden. In January 1931, H. Biscoe, the British resident at Bushire, commented: They [the al-Qusaybis] are of humble origin and entirely self-made men. . . . They got in touch with merchants on the Hasa coast, Hoffuf etc., and gradually [made] a considerable fortune by lucky deals in pearls and other means and ultimately started financing Ibn Saud. For some years they farmed the Hasa customs and then prevailed on Ibn Sa'ud to divert trade with Nejd from Kuwait to Bahrain Ujair and Hoffuf supported in this by the influence of the Hasa merchants. They are said to receive a salary of R 5,000 a month from Ibn Sa'ud and to make enormous profits on goods ordered by him from India. It is currently reported that they are owed seven to eight lakhs [about £80,000] by Ibn Saud . . . and I think there is no doubt that they wield much influence with the King.15

There were several families who were in a position to obtain economic assets, perform administrative roles, and enjoy personal and marital ties with Ibn Sa'ud. They included the al-Qusaybis in the Gulf area; Ibn Sa'ud's envoy to discussions on the state bank project in Europe was a member of this family. Furthermore, the Saudi ruler owed them a great deal of money, which gave them considerable influence over him. Biscoe stressed that although one-quarter of the state's revenues from al-Ahsa' went to the al-Qusaybis, another quarter went to the Ibn Jilawi family.16 Another Najdi family, the alSudayris, were also connected to Ibn Sa'ud by marriage, through his mother and two of his wives; three members of the family were governors during the 1930s.17 The most prominent member of this group of merchants and administrators was Ibn Sa'ud's director of finance, 'Abdullah Sulayman. From a position as minor clerk in Ibn Sa'ud's court, Sulayman developed business interests in Bombay, Bahrayn, and Najd, attracting Ibn Sa'ud's attention to his talents.18 He served not only in an official position but also, following Philby's description, as a "provider" for Ibn Sa'ud's family, managing their personal businesses.19 All members of the group were interested in a close but unfettered relationship with the government, one that would allow them to advance their own private enterprises and gain control over the market; they were less concerned with a planned and properly budgeted economy than were the foreigners. Hijazi merchants were also involved in the state economy. In December 1931, the British minister at Jidda, Andrew Ryan, stated that Hijazi merchants had become the main financiers of the government.20 Accustomed to a long tradition of trading and to a more organized and elaborate government, the Hijazi merchants advocated a budgeted economy. They opposed the somewhat clandestine ties between Ibn Sa'ud and the Najdi merchants, which, in their view, encouraged a volatile and uncertain economy. In December 1930,

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the Hijazi majlis al-tujjar (Trade Council) renewed its activity, which had been suspended since the occupation. It functioned both as a chamber of commerce and as a special tribunal for commercial affairs, and it boosted the Hijazi merchants' pride. At the same time, a Hijazi commission headed by Muhammad al-Tawil of Jidda was sent to al-Ahsa' to reorganize its customs and economy, resulting in a mild erosion of the al-Qusaybis' position there.21 The various elite groups clashed with one another over the most desirable method of economic reform. These clashes were articulated in different spheres of state building. The highest level of decision makers—which included members of the royal family, top government officials, and the leading business entrepreneurs—constituted the center of activity. As Philby explained, an informal body consisting of such exalted elements began to operate in the early 1930s. Philby compared this body with a "privy council" and stated that although it was informal, the topics its members discussed were of the highest concern.22 The acute financial crisis demanded a firm attitude by Ibn Sa'ud. Although firmness had been typical of his past behavior, it seems that the "privy council" witnessed a weakening of Ibn Sa'ud's personal quality of leadership. It is difficult to assess whether the previous troubles with the Ikhwan had exhausted Ibn Sa'ud mentally or whether purely physical problems, stemming from severe eye and stomach conditions, were taking their toll. It is also difficult to determine to what extent Ibn Sa'ud consciously retreated from power or whether he was considering abdication. Retrospectively, it seems that Ibn Sa'ud never really lost complete touch with the major—that is, economic—problems of the day. However, as early as August 1930, Ryan reported Ibn Sa'ud's tendency to distance himself from current political affairs, "to reign rather than to rule."23 In 1931 and 1932, the tendency to leave more and more to his senior officials and to Faysal was further reported by Wahbah in London, by the shaykh of Kuwayt, and by Biscoe. Their reports also alluded to Ibn Saud's health problems.24 Moreover, the fact that in July 1931, the peak of the economic crisis, he left the Hijaz for al-Riyad, indicates that he was passing through a difficult period.25 Ryan later commented that the king "was disheartened in spirit, disillusioned in mind and approaching impotence in body."26 Ibn Sa'ud's difficulties probably had an adverse effect on other members of the royal family. Faysal, the viceroy in the Hizaz, was described by G. Hope Gill, the British charge d'affaires who was echoing local public opinion, as a "bum" and a "nonentity."27 Sa'ud, Ibn Sa'ud's first son, then governed in al-Riyad and had hitherto been unable to establish for himself a position of influence on high-level decision making. It was also reported that Ibn Sa'ud hated his brother Muhammad for the latter's continuing ambitions and tried to exclude him from power.28 The royal family thus offered little leadership and resolution amidst the economic crisis. The princes affected the crisis in yet another way: It appears that the hundreds of royal family members had become relentless consumers of the exiguous Saudi finances. In August 1932, the American vice-consul in Aden

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commented: "The personal patrimony of the King has increased greatly during the last two years: He possesses vast lands and important commercial enterprises, administered by numerous of agents ... for his own and his family's use. He has 93 automobiles of which two are elegant Rolls-Royces." This writer also stressed that Ibn Sa'ud "provided generously" for the 184 wives he had by then married and for his 130 children.29 Biscoe also noted the large sums spent on maintenance and gasoline for the cars.30 One result of the growing worldwide economic crisis and the weakening of the royal family's leadership was the widening divisions within the "privy council" and the elite along parochial lines. The Saudi state was then conducting negotiations with both the British government and private firms. As foreign experts, Hamzah and Yasin were important members of the council. Although their influence was evident only in foreign affairs, other officials and Hijazi notables resented them as "Syrian foreigners" and tried to limit their power. The restructuring of the Saudi Foreign Office produced other problems. In July 1930, it was reported that Ibn Sa'ud had a row with Hamzah.31 Valuable as he was to the king, Hamzah continued to maintain close relations with the British delegation as well as with other Europeans and so probably seemed to Ibn Sa'ud too "Europeanized." Ibn Sa'ud preferred Yasin, who was a more pious Muslim. In July 1930, Yasin was appointed head of the political department in Ibn Sa'ud's diwan, a new position that Ryan construed as an attempt by Ibn Sa'ud to establish a new authority for foreign affairs and to weaken Hamzah in this sphere.32 In December 1930, the directorate for foreign affairs became a ministry, and although Faysal was hardly interested in such matters, it was he who became minister, and Hamzah received the position of under secretary.33 Hamzah became ill in January 1931 and did not return to work until April.34 As a result, he exerted little influence during the most serious stage of the economic crisis. Yasin replaced Hamzah during the latter's absence but did not wield any more influence than Hamzah had.35 Philby was also a member of the "privy council," but his interest lay with the foreigners who were not active in current affairs. Thus the arena was vacant for 'Abdullah Sulayman. His power derived not only from his official position, which in itself made him the chief executor in economic affairs, but also from the personal service he rendered to the royal family. Demonstrating indecisive leadership and at the same time a growing appetite for luxury, the family needed Sulayman to serve both as the main executive in internal policies—thus relieving the royal members of that duty—and as the guardian of their economic welfare. With his help, the princes could maintain their standard of living and disengage themselves from politics. In return, with their support, Sulayman became the strongest figure in the "privy council," indeed, in the whole country. Sulayman's policy focused on satisfying the king and other members of the royal house. In Philby's words, he ran the state like an "immense family business concern."36 Ryan explained further the object of Sulayman's labor: "All of [what Sulayman did] goes to show where the money goes and where it

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does not, how the finance minister is the King's man . . . but also he will avoid bad blood and oblige the Viceroy, if it can be done without tapping the tank." 37 His loyalty to the royal family impelled Sulayman to tap any available financial asset for their sake, regardless of other interests and groups involved. The nature of Sulayman's activities excluded any possibility of introducing a rationalized, budgeted economy. On the contrary, Sulayman tried to increase reserves by pouring nickel into the market. This attempt failed, and in July 1931 Ryan stated that "any gold reserve which the Director-General of Finance may have had up his sleeve has been practically exhausted."38 In May, Sulayman imposed the afore-mentioned £24,000 loan on the Hijazi merchants. Sulayman's rationale was probably that because the Hijazis were relatively rich, at least richer than most of the Najdis, they should be the ones to fill the coffers, and because they were not very popular with the king, he would probably welcome such an action. Other measures deeply offended the Hijazis. In June 1931, for example, the Public Morals Committee declared liable for punishment any person who failed to attend prayer, sold tobacco publicly, used gramophones, or committed other offenses of this kind. 39 Hijazis also suffered from the decline of commerce. During the Hijri year of 1349 (ending in May 1931), the income from trade dropped to £880,320 from £998,263 during the previous year.40 The Hijazis' complaints against Sulayman demonstrated the shortcomings of the dual system that prevailed during the early 1930s: They demanded a planned and rational economy that would limit Sulayman's arbitrary conduct. Indeed, between June 2 and 11, Hijazi merchants and notables convened a conference to discuss the situation. Ibn Sa'ud did not oppose this initiative, but he firmly rejected the conference's resolutions. Ryan described the main items on the agenda and Ibn Saud's reaction as follows: [First,] the Hijaz is the victim of a double drain on its meagre resources owing to the amount of money expended abroad on extravagant requirements, of which motor cars are the favourite example, and the amount which is devoted to expenditure proper to Nejd, notably subsidies to the tribes there. [Second,] the country has no budget in any true sense, and almost unlimited power in the financial domain is exerted by the director general . . . whose unpopularity increases by leaps and bounds, but whose position with the King seem to be unimpaired, certain members of the conference had the courage to criticize Abdulla Sulaiman and to proclaim the necessity for a budget. The King's reply is said to have been in effect "le budget c'est moi."41

An additional attempt was made to turn the conference into a consultative body that would hold annual meetings. The members were to be elected representatives from various Hijazi towns (22 from Mecca, 11 from Jidda, 9 from al-Madina, and 3 from Taif).42 A president and three committees, one for Islamic morals, another for economic affairs, and the third for judicial affairs were established. 43 Ibn Sa'ud probably was aware of the discontent and believed that he could allow some of it to be vented; the conference might

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channel Hijazi energies in the regime's favor. But he was reluctant to endorse any decline in Sulayman's status. Thus, Ryan asserted, the conference "did more to make discontent articulate than to solve problems."44 Eventually, the discontent felt by the elite groups spread to others. In the late summer of 1931, when Ibn Sa'ud was away at al-Riyad, Sulayman deferred for several months paying the salaries of government employees,45 thereby fueling the anger of governors, soldiers, and Hijazi officials. In early September, gasoline ran out completely. Sulayman ordered 20 million gallons from the Soviet Union, which did not arrive until October 20. The shortage was in evidence everywhere, and Sulayman could not wait any longer. On September 9, unidentified men, presumably acting on Sulayman's initiative, raided the yards of the Dutch Trading Company and the Eastern Telegraph Company, emptying their gasoline tanks. The Dutch lost about £12,000 and the Eastern Telegram, represented by Philby, about £4,000. The theft was most embarrassing, as everyone knew whose fleet of cars needed gasoline.46 The theft also for the first time directly involved foreign entrepreneurs in the economic crisis. Already in July, Philby had fiercely criticized Sulayman's monetary policy and Ibn Sa'ud's "floundering ignorance" in economic matters.47 After the theft, Philby wrote to Sulayman indicating that the retribution for theft according to the shari'a law was the loss of a hand. According to Ryan, Philby added that Sulayman "deserved to be chopped into little pieces." He also sent Ibn Sa'ud a detailed denunciation of Sulayman. He tried to ally with other "privy council" members and top Hijazi officials, no easy task, as many feared Sulayman and the support given him by Ibn Sa'ud. But after considerable pressure, Hamzah, whose salary had not been paid for eight months, and Faysal, whose office had to be moved to Ta'if because of diminishing funds, were ready to ally themselves with Philby. He also managed to win the support of two important Hijazi notables in the Legislative Council, the al-Fadl brothers. As Hope Gill stated, "they were all victims of his [Sulayman's] power in that they were not only completely overshadowed by ... but were also starved by his lack of funds."48 Philby made them sign an ultimatum directed to Ibn Sa'ud at al-Riyad, threatening to resign if Sulayman were not dismissed. A letter was included elaborating on the details of mismanagement. They asked Sulayman to sign the letter; his anticipated refusal made evident his guilt. On October 23, the letter was sent to al-Riyad.49 On November 13, Ibn Sa'ud responded. He managed to mask his own responsibility for the crisis and removed Sulayman, at least temporarily. Ibn Sa'ud instead blamed the world crisis for the economic difficulties; stated that the information brought to him from the Hijazi had, in fact, been conveyed on his orders; and added that it was his duty to act to reorganize "income and expenditure." Sulayman was kept at al-Riyad "to conduct an inspection in Najd."50 Hence, in late 1931, against the background of economic crisis, those groups advocating a budgeted economy and an effective administration seemed to have gained the upper hand in their struggle against Sulayman. Ibn Sa'ud announced two reforms that strengthened central governmental institutions but at the same time preserved a strong vestige of tribal practices.

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In the autumn of 1931, a budget was announced. Expenditures were to be planned and rationalized: Fully 35 percent of the budget would cover official salaries, 25 percent would cover all debts, 15 percent would be left in reserve, and the remaining 25 percent would be used for extraordinary expenses, for example, guaranteeing the welfare of pilgrims and resource development.51 In January 1932, the establishment of a Council of Ministers (majlis alwukala') was announced, composed of the head of the new internal ministry, the director of finance, the under secretary for foreign affairs, and the deputy leader of the Legislative Council. Each minister was responsible for policy in his own field, but to prevent the recurrence of the arbitrary practices that characterized Sulayman's administration, they were, for the first time, made jointly responsible to the king. The viceroy was to be the leader of the council and to act as the liaison with the king. He was given the right to decide any unresolved disputes in the council. Members were allowed to argue and question one another's policy. It was also decided that the council would control the larger part of the newly established regular army.52 These new institutions allowed the top administrative level considerable executive authority but reaffirmed their subordination to the Saudi royal family. An authoritative estimate of the income needed to support the planned expenditures was never presented; furthermore, the budget of the royal household, traditionally a large consumer of the country's income, was initially not set.53 As a result, the sources of income remained obscure and uncontrollable, and the total sum of the budget remained unclear. The amounts allocated to various fields were not incorporated into one general account, and their proportionate share of the total remained unknown. Only certain parts of the actual expenditure were later made public. In late April 1932, it was announced that the new minister of finance would use £410,000, described as one-half of the income of the Hijaz, to cover the expenses of the royal family and the army. He was to receive an additional £100,000 for communications and transport. The share that the king actually received also remained unclear, and salaries continued to be paid several months after their due.54 Hope Gill commented that there was hardly any connection between the actual allocation of money and the original budget.55 Examining the list of participants in the various new institutions, it appears that an attempt was initially made to satisfy Hamzah and Yasin and the notables of the Hijaz. In November 1931 they became responsible for implementing the new budget; Hamzah later became a member of the Council of Ministers. Also, in November a "reorganization committee" for government departments was established, consisting of Hijazi notables. Ibrahim al-Fadl became treasurer in a new Department of Finance.56 Parallel to the establishment of the Council of Ministers, Hammad Sulayman ('Abdullah's brother) was appointed director of finance. The circle was completed in August 1932, when 'Abdullah Sulayman was reappointed to his old post, carrying the title wazir, one that until then only Faysal had held. AlFadl's department survived, in Hope Gill's terms, only as "an eye wash." 57 The power structure in the new institutions entailed a mixture of new

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bureaucratic and traditional, chieftaincylike practices. It was a balancing act of leading Saudi political groups that manifested the supremacy of the Saudi royal leaders. The promotion of both the "Syrians" and the Hijazis and their involvement in the reforms reactivated the rivalry between them, a rivalry that for a short while, during the time that both sides were united against Sulayman, had been less salient. Hope Gill believes that Ibn Sa'ud had in fact carefully planned this development.58 It not only allowed the king to bring the Sulaymans back into the system, but it also gave vast authority to Faysal, who presided over the council in the fourfold role of viceroy, leader of the majlis al-shura, foreign minister, and internal affairs minister. As a newly appointed minister of internal affairs, Faysal was responsible for health, education, execution of the shari'a, the police, the quarantine for pilgrims, and the control of the telegraph system. A great deal of power was once again concentrated in the hands of royal family members and their aides. The power was invested in Faysal and in the Sulaymans, but one cannot fail to observe that Ibn Sa'ud was slowly reemerging as the prime mover. A hierarchy was established in which the administrative and political bodies operated under the authority of monarchical institutions. Parochial loyalties and practices dominated the behavior of the elite. The new bodies were attached to the old institutions in an "ameboid" form, as Hope Gill put it.59' Separation of the elite groups prevailed, and arbitrary allocation of funds continued; of the £110,000 that the government received for the first quarter of 1932, about £80,000 was sent to al-Riyad, where Ibn Sa'ud presided.60 Thus, the Saudi monarchical institutions increased in strength and became the most powerful in the realm. Their power was based on a combination of bureaucratic and tribal elements, each of which contained components of the other. In 1931-32, this anomaly of the Saudi regime had a negative effect on the remote provinces of the state and on their characteristic frontier problems, an effect deriving from two tendencies of the new polity: the tendency to increase centralization, which focused on the main cities of the Hijaz, and the tendency to promote any interest that might lead to economic profit, to the detriment and neglect of others. The Saudi attitude toward its frontier problems with Iraq and Kuwayt is indicative of these tendencies. Until 1930, Iraq was perceived as an archenemy, and the Najdi-Iraqi frontier problems seemed insoluble. Then in early January 1930, Ibn Sa'ud agreed to an Iraqi proposal for a settlement. The Iraqi government's proposal involved not only the future of the frontier posts and the return of loot and rebel refugees and other "traditional" problems, but also a "good neighbor" treaty and mutual recognition. Faysal proposed to meet Ibn Sa'ud personally to conclude the settlement.61 The move took the British by surprise, as they were at the time fully engaged in matters concerning the extradition of the Ikhwan leaders.62 Once alerted, they were, of course, in favor of a settlement, but they insisted that a clear working schedule precede the meeting.63 On February 22 and 23, 1930, Ibn Sa'ud met King Faysal on board HMS

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Lupin in the Persian Gulf. The two kings criticized each other privately and could not reach full agreement on all the issues under dispute. But what had seemed most improbable in 1929, a good neighbor treaty, was concluded.64 In addition, the kings agreed to reach a settlement within six months' time over the desert posts, to discuss extradition problems, and to negotiate the return of loot according to the proceedings of the Bahra tribunal. 65 The shift in Ibn Sa'ud's position was evident not only in his basic inclination toward a settlement but also in his attitude toward his chronic frontier problems. During the meeting Ibn Sa'ud privately admitted to Sir Francis Humphrys, the high commissioner in Iraq, that the Iraqi frontier posts that had caused most of the earlier troubles "were quite harmless to Nejd" and that he insisted on their removal only because he had promised his people that he would do so. He did agree to refer the matter to arbitration. While complying with the tribunal's intervention, he clearly expressed a lack of confidence in its ability to conclude a settlement. Indeed, by the middle of March 1930, no list of claims or procedures for the Bahra tribunal had been prepared. Ibn Sa'ud made clear his conciliatory attitude, telling Humphrys that "it was not his wish that the friendliness of the meeting should be marred by the intrusion of controversial discussion."66 Simultaneously, he was ready "to take effective steps to prevent raids into Koweit or Iraq in the future." 67 After the subjugation of the Ikhwan, only the extradition of most of their leaders would, in his view, achieve this end. All these activities and expressions show that Ibn Sa'ud's real aim at that stage was to formally resolve the dispute along the Iraqi frontier zone. Yesterday's intractable problems had lost most of their significance in his eyes. Conclusion of an agreement was, however, to take more time. In March 1930, Wahbah and Hamzah visited Baghdad. In May 1930, following Iraq's refusal to agree to the Saudi plan for extradition, Ibn Sa'ud threatened to break off negotiations. He was not ready to forgo the basic Najdi demand that any tribesman regarded by Ibn Sa'ud as an offender should be extradited.68 Only in August 1930 did negotiations commence. In April 1931 Nuri al-Sa'id, the Iraqi prime minister, visited Jidda and a treaty of friendship and good neighborliness was signed. On May 10, 1931, the treaty was ratified. It declared that "inviolable permanent peace and friendship, based on diplomatic relations would prevail." In an attempt to prevent future problems, the articles of the treaty focused mainly on tribal relationships along the frontier: to prevent tribal aggression, to establish a permanent frontier commission, and not to obstruct musabala. Arbitration and extradition protocols were also signed. Although the treaty excluded extradition on political grounds, Nuri alSa'id gave an assurance that Bedouin tribesmen fell within the category of "extraditable offenders," as the Saudis wanted.69 Ibn Sa'ud had thus achieved his major aim. The Saudi policy toward Kuwayt was quite different from its policy toward Iraq. Both the Saudi and Kuwayti rulers were prepared to give their tribal and territorial problems a low priority. Ibn Sa'ud emphasized economic concerns. As early as late 1929, when he stated his demands to C. C. J. Barrett, the

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Persian Gulf resident, he had stressed his desire to obtain revenues from Kuwayt customs, demanded the reduction of Bahrayn's transit dues on commodities entering the Saudi state, and requested official representation there.70 The British were not interested in having any representatives of foreign countries in Bahrayn and could not ask the shaykh of Bahrayn to lower further the already low rate of 2 percent transit dues; hence they dismissed these demands.71 But they did feel a special obligation to ensure Kuwayt's independence and as early as 1929 had promised Shaykh Ahmad to arbitrate his troubles with Ibn Sa'ud.72 Ibn Sa'ud's demands should be examined against the background of Saudi-Kuwayti relations. Since the early 1920s, Ibn Sa'ud had objected to the insufficient share he obtained from Kuwayt's profits on the massive Najdi trade passing through Kuwayt and the customs dues imposed there. He also objected to the fact that the tribes he sought to subjugate, like the Mutayr, were living on trade and that they had the right of musabala at Kuwayt. In a situation of economic adversity, Ibn Sa'ud insisted that he had the right "to milk his own people." He therefore established a trade blockade on Kuwayt, prohibited his subjects from trading with the town, and prevented merchandise bound for Najd from passing through there. As mentioned earlier, he even commenced building ports at Jubayl and Qatif in order to divert the trade routes in his favor. In early 1930, during negotiations with Shaykh Ahmad, Ibn Sa'ud indicated his readiness to lift the blockade in return for a large share of the latter's revenues. As Kuwayt had lost 75 percent of its potential income owing to the blockade, Ahmad was ready to give Ibn Sa'ud a share. This, he suggested, would be done by setting up four checkpoints outside Kuwayt where dues would be collected. But Ibn Sa'ud was not ready to settle for less than a major station within Kuwayt, as in his view, this was the only effective way to avoid smuggling into Najd. Alternatively, he wished to obtain a substantial annual sum from the shaykh.73 Ibn Sa'ud's policy toward Kuwayt was thus intended both to establish an economic monopoly over al-Ahsa' and the Gulf and to exploit Kuwayt's revenues as part of this scheme. The policy was further connected with the new development ethos of the Saudi elite. The al-Qusaybis, for instance, undoubtedly had a vested interest in the blockade, as they had persuaded Ibn Sa'ud to divert trade routes to Hufuf, 'Uqayr, and Bahrayn, where they had considerable economic influence.74 During most of 1930 and 1931, the British tried by various means to induce Ibn Sa'ud to reach a settlement on this issue. In August 1931, in an interdepartmental British government meeting, it was decided to separate the discussion on Kuwayt from other questions concerning Ibn Sa'ud's policy in the Gulf. Biscoe was authorized to meet Ibn Sa'ud and discuss the matter.75 In January 1932, the meeting took place, with Yasin participating on Ibn Sa'ud's side, but apparently no progress was made. The Saudis dismissed any idea of establishing Najdi customs posts as inefficient in preventing smuggling. Biscoe, who represented Kuwayti interests, could not accept Ibn Sa'ud's demand for an annual sum representing the Saudi share in Kuwayt's customs, as

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this would put the principality in a position of vassalage to Ibn Sa'ud.76 The matter was then referred to arbitration between representatives of both parties. In April 1932, Shaykh Ahmad visited al-Riyad, but the subject was not formally raised.77 Hence, in early 1932, attempts made by Najdi tribes to trade in Kuwayt were blocked, and their merchandise was confiscated.78 Developments in the Saudi-Jordanian frontier zone and the area of the northern Hijaz are also indicative of the Saudi regime's tendency to increase centralization and tighten control over outlying areas. Between September and November 1930, the tribunal based on the Hadda' treaty was in session, chaired by a special British envoy, M. S. MacDonnell. The tribunal encountered the same difficulties that had caused its failure in the past. Both parties raised hundreds of demands for return of loot and compensation for previous raids. Bogged down by technical details concerning these raids, the tribunal was unable to establish undisputed cases and therefore had to dissolve.79 Following Ryan's suggestions, the British convinced both parties to agree to the sensible tactic of relinquishing all previous claims.80 In March 1931, a new forum of negotiations, corresponding to Article 3 of the Hadda' treaty, was established. Glubb, who was the newly appointed Trans-Jordanian inspector of Bedouins, and Ibn Sa'ud's envoy 'Abd al-'Aziz Ibn Zayd were the representatives of the parties, and they were commissioned to examine only those raids carried out after MacDonnelPs tribunal had commenced work.81 The new forum was similar to its predecessors and did not promise much success. The problems inherent in the Saudi-Trans-Jordanian frontier were particularly difficult to resolve. The Trans-Jordanian problems related, first, to tribes whose basic loyalty and state affiliation were not clear. Ibn Sa'ud was adamant in contending that the Bani 'Atiyya tribe was Hijazi, and as most of its members dwelt in Trans-Jordan, he demanded their exclusion prior to any settlement.82 Complicating the situation were the cases of the Shararat, Huwaytat, and Billi, who dwelt on both sides of the frontier but were now subjected to new categories of nationality, forcible eviction, or denial of entry. A second problem was that small raids were carried out by the Shararat, Billi, and part of the Bani 'Atiyya from the Najdi side of the border and resisted by other Bani 'Atiyya, Huwaytat, and the Bani Sakhr from the TransJordanian side.83 Unlike the 1927-30 Saudi-Iraqi frontier disputes, which had focused on the rivalry between Ibn Sa'ud and the Ikhwan, these disputes were more diffuse and therefore more difficult to control or limit. They did not arise only from local issues but also derived from Ibn Sa'ud's influence and policy in the area. There were a number of indications that the Najdi ruler sought to impose centralized rule, exploit this area economically, and cultivate a new basis of support from which a strong residual Wahhabi nucleus was lacking. In February 1931, there even were indications that tribes in the northern Hijaz were subsequently suffering from hunger and opposed Ibn Sa'ud.84 Hence, in October 1931, Glubb reported that Ibn Sa'ud tried to increase his strength and popularity with the Shammar, that he gave presents to the Shararat, and that he cooperated in Bani 'Atiyya's raids. Simultaneously, he fortified towns at the frontier and increased his forces there sub-

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stantially, to six times the size of the Trans-Jordanian desert patrol.85 In February 1931, Ibn Sa'ud also dismissed Ibrahim al-Nashmi, his governor at al-Kaf, after the latter collaborated with raiders into Trans-Jordan.86 Saudi efforts at appeasement proved futile, and the measures introduced turned out to be counterproductive. The tribes on the Hijaz periphery were forced to stop their trade with Trans-Jordanian centers and to direct it only to the main Hijazi cities. They also had to pay higher taxes. The fortifications, the additional forces, and the new governors decreased their power. In addition, these tribes received no economic aid. Despite their being part of the Hijaz, they had no share in the central political and economic enterprises based in the main cities and ports of the Hijaz; rather, the lion's share of their revenues was directed to al-Riyad. The northern rural region of the Hijaz became a neglected and deprived area. Periods of drought added to the problems of the local tribes, which became embittered toward Ibn Sa'ud. Glubb commented: "Little or no grazing and famine, mal-government, financial stringency and a general revulsion of feeling against Ibn Sa'ud have produced widespread discontent amongst Billi, Anaizah and Harb, the tribes adjacent to Bani Atiya on the south."87 Glubb's own activities constituted an additional cause of discontent for the local tribes. Whereas on the Saudi side of the border they were overwhelmed by increasing troubles, they watched with jealousy the improved administration and relative prosperity of tribes on the Jordanian side, accomplished by Glubb's efforts. This situation provided a constant temptation for the tribes in the northern Hijaz either to raid or seek refuge in Trans-Jordan. Their resentment of Ibn Sa'ud thereby became more substantial; understandably, Ibn Sa'ud was highly critical of Glubb's activities.88 Ibn Sa'ud's agreement in March 1931 to conduct negotiations between Ibn Zayd and Glubb should therefore not be viewed as a sudden desire on Ibn Sa'ud's part to agree to a final settlement but, rather, as an attempt to pacify the frontier temporarily. Such an accomplishment would enable him to foster Saudi authority in the area immediately after al-Nashmi's dismissal. Ibn Sa'ud's policy of restricting Ibn Zayd's freedom during the discussions and of limiting his authority to discussion of technical issues only (i.e., the return of the loot) point in this direction. Ryan called Ibn Sa'ud's tactic "a game of evasion."89 In May 1931, it became clear that (as in MacDonnell's tribunal) liability for raiding would be difficult to prove and that summoning tribal shaykhs to testify on these issues was impossible.90 In June, Ibn Zayd and Glubb met. Although they reached an agreement to prevent future raids, Ibn Zayd obviously lacked the authority to come to a more comprehensive settlement. He could not even guarantee that Saudi tax collectors would cease operating among tribes in Trans-Jordan.91 In August 1931, following a shortlived British scheme to break the deadlock by forcing 'Abdullah to recognize Ibn Sa'ud, a step that the Jordanian amir fiercely resisted, it was decided in a British interdepartmental committee to refrain from any new moves and carry on with the Glubb-Ibn Zayd meetings.92 In the same month, another meeting of the two produced only an agreement on compensation for several raids

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carried out before August 1930.93 In January 1932, a further meeting took place in which Ibn Zayd refused to allow the return of camels taken from Trans-Jordan during a raid in September 1930, claiming that they had originally been looted from the Hijaz. 94 The situation on the northern Saudi frontier worsened during the period between November 1931 and spring 1932, as the area experienced a difficult drought. In al-Jawf, northern Hijaz, and southern Trans-Jordan, grazing zones and wells dried up and came under constant locust attacks; tribes moved from one place to another, restless and hungry.95 The Billi, Shararat, Bani 'Atiyya, and Huwaytat had to cope with both conflict and starvation.96 Glubb later commented: "This further bad year is said to have reduced both Nejd and the Northern Hejaz to a truly deplorable condition as far as bedouin tribes are concerned. Deaths from starvation are said to be frequent and likely to increase."97 Amidst an economic crisis, the government demanded full political loyalty but displayed indifference to the tribes' economic problems. In December 1931, a Saudi envoy was reported trying to bring tribes over to Saudi territories,98 and in February some supplies were sent to the north, but only to the Saudi forces stationed there.99 The tribes were definitely in an anti-Saudi frame of mind. In December 1931, Glubb further commented: When it is recollected that 5 years ago wandering bedouins of Najd were afraid even to pick up a stray sheep or camel found in the desert, for fear of being accused of theft, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Ibn Saud's power has passed its apex and is rapidly on the wane.100

The tribes' discontent with Ibn Sa'ud should be viewed in the context of his worsening relations with 'Abdullah of Trans-Jordan. The shelter and the assistance available to tribes in Trans-Jordan could have been detrimental to Ibn Sa'ud if combined with planned Hashimite anti-Saudi action. In May 1931, with remarkable foresight, Ryan wrote about a possible pro-Hashimite wave spreading from the north into the main Hijazi cities.101 In April 1932, talking to Biscoe, Ibn Sa'ud praised King Faysal but described 'Abdullah as a "poisonous intriguer" who would not rest until he raised a rebellion against Ibn Sa'ud.102 The problems of the northern Hijaz had thus become a threat to Ibn Sa'ud's rule. The area of 'Asir bordering with Yemen was the center of another conflict between the new Saudi regime and peripheral tribes. It was vulnerable to Yemeni penetration because of the mountainous terrain and undemarcated frontier. During the 19205, the Saudis extended their authority over most of 'Asir. And in a further agreement between Ibn Sa'ud and Hasan al-Idrisi, concluded in November 1930, the Saudis took over the entire territory of 'Asir and came into direct contact with Imam Yahya's domains. Various frontier problems then emerged. One was the frontier on the coastal area of 'Asir, or the Tihamat 'Asir. Although this area was undoubtedly under Saudi (and previous Idrisi) protection, it was not clear whether the important coastal town of Midi was under Saudi protection, as the Saudis claimed, or in Yemeni

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domains, as the Imam claimed.103 A more difficult question emerged regarding the southern frontier in the eastern part of 'Asir, known as Najran, which had never been absolutely under al-Idrisi's protection. In fact, the Bani Yam tribe dwelling in that area was not aligned with either party, although the Imam claimed protection over this tribe and all of Najran. A further difficulty developed because whoever dominated Najran would also dominate the area lying between the Tihama and Najran, (namely, the hilly zone known as Surat 'Asir) and gain strategic supremacy in the whole area.104 In September 1931, the situation was exacerbated when Yahya sent his son Ahmad with an army to Jabal 'Arw, opposite Surat 'Asir, heading for the Tihama. The imam claimed that he had come to help a local tribe that had been offended by the Saudis in what he claimed was his territory. As they were in the throes of an economic crisis, the Saudis were not eager to fight. Ibn Sa'ud also probably feared the possibility of Italian intervention on the imam's side.105 The British, who unofficially favored Ibn Sa'ud's seizure of 'Asir and were even ready to give it de facto recognition, were not ready to endorse a takeover and risk a dispute with the Italians.106 Thus Ibn Sa'ud did not feel secure enough to embark on war, and his envoys entered negotiations with a messenger of the imam. On December 15, 1931, an agreement was concluded in which the Saudis waived their claim to Jabal 'Arw, which then reverted to Yemen.107 Ibn Sa'ud seemed to have been overoptimistic about the agreement. Later, in May 1934, he disclosed to Ryan that he had viewed the December 1931 agreement as a final treaty of friendship with the imam and that he had not realized that the latter would seek opportunities to violate it. This demonstrates Ibn Sa'ud's lack of astuteness during that period. This crisis had deeper underpinnings, related to the incumbent Saudi regime. In the November 1930 agreement between Ibn Sa'ud and the local ruler Hasan al-Idrisi, the latter was accorded the right to "head the local government" under Saudi protection. This indirect rule typified the Saudi policy toward 'Asir. A legislative council composed of local notables continued to operate, serving in an advisory capacity to the amir. In addition, Ibn Sa'ud appointed a governor, Hammad al-Shuwwayr. His authority was not defined, but he was Ibn Sa'ud's personal representative in the area. To secure Saudi control, a special director of finance was appointed by Ibn Sa'ud to impose taxes and organize the finances of the area.108 The Saudis were mainly interested in controlling the government and the economic assets of 'Asir. According to Saudi documents, al-Idrisi agreed "to entrust administration and finance of our country to your majesty."109 The temptation to conquer and develop the Jizan port in the Tihama may also have been a major motivation of the Saudi takeover.110 Conceived by the new Saudi polity and under direct Saudi rule, the government established in 'Asir deprived al-Idrisi and the local notables of most of their roles and sought to obtain the highest possible income from the area. These measures were counterproductive. The rural population were, in the words of an informant, "dragged ... to the last verge of ruin" by high taxation, particularly a new "jihad toll" imposed by the government.111 The

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governor, Ibn Shuwwayr, prohibited Hasan al-Idrisi from meeting his own notables, humiliated him publicly, and imposed a high tax on the Jizan port.112 The imam was worried about the competition that the development of the Jizan port would mean to his ports of Luhiyya and Hudayda and, generally, about the centralizing Saudi administration on his northern frontier.113 This was a key factor in his decision to deploy soldiers at 'Arw to quell the rebellion there. Tribal discontent directed against the Saudi government grew in the peripheral areas of 'Asir and northern Hijaz from 1930 to the winter of 1932. In certain areas there was an even greater danger to Ibn Sa'ud: The stage was set for foreign intervention to support a local rebellion. This danger was well known to Ibn Sa'ud, as well as to the British. In September 1930, a top-secret report, prepared by the Royal Air Force, entitled "Ibn Sa'ud versus Transjordan or the Yemen?" underlined these possibilities.114 In May 1932, problems on these two fronts became acute.

The Fortunes of a Conspiracy On May 20, 1932, 150 Bedouins crossed the Trans-Jordanian-Saudi frontier near 'Aqaba into the Hijaz. They were headed by Hamid Ibn Rifada, a chief of the Billi tribe, and their mission was to instigate a rebellion against Ibn Sa'ud. Apparently Ibn Rifada recruited the core of his men in Egypt, from malcontents of Hijazi tribes who had taken refuge there during the Najdi occupation of the Hijaz in 1925.115 In April 1932, Ibn Rifada and his men had crossed the Sinai Peninsula and lingered for a while near 'Aqaba, where they were given rifles, food, and supplies by a certain TJbayd, a merchant from Suez, and by Hamid Kabriti, the mayor of 'Aqaba. They may also have met there with a representative of the amir 'Abdullah.116 They then crossed into the Hijaz and camped at Shari'a, 7 miles into the Hijaz. There, tribesmen of the Billi, Huwaytat, Juhayna, Bani 'Atiyya, and others joined them. In early June, the force numbered over 1,500 men.117 Both Saudi and British authorities then realized that there was danger of a clash between Trans-Jordan and Saudi forces. Najd warned against giving any aid to the rebels, but 'Abdullah denied any connection with them.118 At the end of July, Ibn Sa'ud sent a force which met Ibn Rifada's group near Jabal Shar'. The latter force was defeated, and Ibn Rifada was killed along with 370 of his men.119 Four months later, in November 1932, an anti-Saudi revolt broke out in 'Asir. It was led by Hasan al-Idrisi and aided by two sons of the late Muhammad al-Idrisi. The rebels conquered Sabiyya, Abu 'Arish, and Jizan and destroyed the Saudi garrisons there.120 It was apparent that the rebels were assisted both by the imam and by a group of Hijazi notables in exile, particularly members of the al-Dabbagh family.121 From November 1932 to January 1933, two Saudi forces, headed by Khalid Ibn al-Luway and 'Abd al-'Aziz Ibn Musa'id, managed to weaken the rebels and reconquer these towns,122 but they did not wipe out the rebellion altogether.

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It is necessary to examine whether these two attempts at rebellion were orchestrated and whether they were anchored in the anti-Saudi sentiments prevalent in the northern Hijaz and in 'Asir. Investigations by British authorities revealed a number of interesting facts. An organization known as hizb altahrir (or al-ahrar) al-hijazi, the Hijazi Liberation party, was the active force behind the rebellions. Its leaders were Hijazi exiles who believed that the Hijaz had suffered humiliation and deprivation under Saudi rule and therefore called for its "liberation." The main figure was Husayn Tahir alDabbagh, head of a Hijazi house of business, who in 1927 established in Mecca an organization named 'anjumani hizb al-ahrar. He was exiled in 1928 but continued to agitate against Saudi policy in al-Mukalla (Hadramawt) and India. The hizb was not necessarily opposed to the centralizing policies of the new Saudi government but, rather, was anti-Saudi in principle. During the mid-igios, al-Dabbagh and his followers opposed the rule of any monarchy in the Hijaz, be it Saudi or Hashimite. In late 1928, a brother of Husayn al-Dabbagh, and the former Hashimite finance minister in the Hijaz, Muhammad al-Dabbagh, established a connection in Alexandria with 'Abd al-Hamid al-Khatib, who had been Sharif Husayn's envoy in Egypt. The group was then registered as a social club, although its members wrote antiSaudi articles in the newspaper al-Umma. Their ideas gradually acquired a pro-Hashimite character.123 One of their members who had resided in Egypt, a Hijazi journalist named 'Abd al-Ra'uf al-Sabban, moved to Trans-Jordan and became the manager of 'Abdullah's estates there.124 The group thus established two branches early in 1932, one in Egypt and one in Trans-Jordan, and probably had a small clandestine branch in Mecca. The hizb served as a haven for rich Hijazi businessmen in exile, most of whom were connected with the previous Hashimite regime in the Hijaz, and some of whom were acquainted with 'Abdullah. Each of the branches was financed with several thousand pounds sterling. Large amounts of money were contributed by rich supporters, and the income from 'Abdullah's estates in the Egyptian delta was also exploited for this purpose.125 Some measure of cooperation existed between the al-Dabbaghs and the Hashimites, the conspirators behind the two rebellions, as was evident in both operational and financial endeavors. As Ryan discovered, Husayn al-Dabbagh visited 'Amman in December 1931 to collaborate with the Hashimites. On February 28, 1932, he wrote to Sharif Shakir Ibn Zayd, a close friend of 'Abdullah, urging him to "operate the movement in the north." It is also known that al-Sabban transferred money to Husayn al-Dabbagh at least twice in the following months.126 In December 1931, Husayn al-Dabbagh, who had until then worked as a schoolmaster in Aden, met 'Abd al-Hamid al-Khatib from Egypt and decided to establish a "Hijazi Defense League" (jami'at aldifa' lil-hijaz). But he was unable to activate the Ibn Rifada conspiracy until June 1932, when his brother Muhammad came from Singapore to Aden and, together with other Hijazi exiles, established a local branch of the Hizb, using its full name. In December 1932, members of the al-Dabbagh family again met Shakir in Jerusalem.

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The original idea was to launch a coordinated action on both fronts,127 but the rebellion in 'Asir did not break out until November 1932, whereas Ibn Rifada's revolt had begun the previous May. The 'Asir rebellion was mainly organized by al-Dabbaghs. They established links with al-Idrisi through a certain Ahmad al-Shanqiti of the 'Asiri legislative council, who began passing them sums of money. They also gave leaflets to the local population, calling on them to revolt against the "Wahhabi infidels."128 There was no Hashimite involvement in the preparations for the revolt in 'Asir, whereas Ibn Rifada first trained his people at 'Abdullah's estates in Egypt, recruiting Hijazi tribal malcontents.129 He then enjoyed the hospitality of the Hashimite mayor of 'Aqaba, and he and other Billi shaykhs met Shakir, and according to reports by C. H. F. Cox, the British resident in Trans-Jordan, they met 'Abdullah on May 11, 1932. On June 25 and 26, al-Sabban sent money to Ibn Rifada,130 who was already in the Hijaz, but there is no further indication that the hizb was directly connected with Ibn Rifada's revolt. A certain amount of loose cooperation surely existed between the al-Dabbaghs and the Hashimites over Ibn Rifada's revolt; however, the Hashimite initiative was the main force behind Ibn Rifada's activation and organization. The looseness of this coordination helps explain the fact that the rebellions did not break out simultaneously. The literature issued by the Hizb and the al-Dabbaghs reflects the fact that they wished to obscure their ultimate goals. The few leaflets of the hizb still available call for complete liberation of the Hijaz and resistance to any foreign intervention. The hizb demanded a National Assembly (majlis watani) to establish a representative government that would be supported by Arab and Islamic conferences.131 Leaflets supporting the revolt in 'Asir ignored the larger issue of the complete liberation of the Hijaz. The al-Dabbaghs declared al-Idrisi the lawful ruler of 'Asir, while avoiding the question of whether 'Asir would belong to a liberated Hijaz ruled by a new government. Yet despite the hizb's calls for a nationalist, representative government and resistance to foreign intervention, the al-Dabbaghs quietly approached King Fu'ad of Egypt and offered him their support if he could assume the role of a modern Muhammad 'Ali, defeat the Wahhabis, and establish his rule over the Hijaz.132 The Hashimites' initiatives went somewhat further. Fu'ad's account, based on other sources, indicated that in late May 1931, ex-King 'Ali met the Egyptian consul in Baghdad and offered support for Fu'ad as khalifa (an important aspiration of his), settlement of outstanding issues in Egypt's favor, and a guarantee to support Egypt's interests in the Hijaz. In return, Fu'ad was supposed to assist the Hashimites in overthrowing Ibn Sa'ud, mainly by donating a few tens of thousands of pounds sterling.133 It seems, however, that the Hashimites did not fully trust Fu'ad, as at the same time they were also dealing with his rival in Egypt, the ex-khedive, 'Abbas Hilmi. The latter apparently developed a variety of schemes to realize his ambitions in the Hijaz. According to al-Mukhtar, Hilmi had made Ibn Sa'ud an offer to establish a state bank, on the assumption that the Hijaz was rich in natural resources that he wanted to control. According to British

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sources, Hilmi assisted Ibn Rifada's revolt with £25,000.134 A British secret report elaborated: The Hashimites, who have been looking forward to trouble in the Hejaz, secured money from the ex-Khedive and a benevolent attitude on the part of King Fu'ad; the Amir Abdullah is in touch with Ibn Rifada and the Hejazi malcontents whose preparations on Egyptian territory are connived at by King Fu'ad and supported by Abdullah with money received from the ex-Khedive.135

Fearing either Hilmi's competition or the risk of a possible clash with the British, Fu'ad divulged 'Ali's proposal to the British.136 These plots hardly tallied with the Hizb's platform to prevent any foreign concession in the Hijaz. Apparently, the Hashimites did not consult, let alone include, the alDabbaghs in their discussions with Egyptian representatives. Thus, no viable and broadly based alternative was established to Ibn Sa'ud's rule in the Hijaz. The conspiracy constituted an umbrella framework that loosely incorporated various interest groups seeking the collapse of the Saudi rule, but it failed to establish more than a loose cooperation among its main actors or a consensus over an alternative rule for the Hijaz. The al-Dabbaghs, al-Khatibs, and other Hijazis in exile represented wealthy Hijaz families who felt they had been offended and weakened by the Saudi exploitation of the Hijazi economy and hoped to reverse the tide. The leading Hashimite and Egyptian figures were political actors who aspired to strengthen their position in the competition for leadership in the Arab world. They found in the Hijaz fertile ground for their ambitions. The improved means of communication allowed the conspirators to extend their intricate web from Iraq to India via Egypt, giving them a regional framework for complex, large-scale activity. Given their limitations, what could the conspirators have hoped for? It seems that they wanted the internal collapse of the Saudi regime as a result of the crisis in which it was embroiled. They particularly hoped to capitalize on the problems of tribes in the frontier areas. In July 1932, 'Abdullah himself indicated to Sir A. Wauchope, the high commissioner for Palestine and TransJordan, that Ibn Sa'ud's regime was in decline and that he, 'Abdullah, anticipated its immediate collapse.137 Ibn Rifada was a Billi chieftain who had looted Saudi caravans in the 1920s and was forced into exile in 1928. His own rebellion and that of his tribesmen, in which members of the Huwaytat, Billi, and Juhayna took part, constituted a reaction to the misery that had overwhelmed them.138 Cox believed that Ibn Rifada and his men were expecting a large-scale uprising of Bedouins in the Hijaz and at the Yemeni frontier.139 After analyzing the rebels' motives, Glubb concluded that they could have expected even more support. He stressed that even the educated and relatively worldly people of Mecca and al-Madina "have resented with some bitterness the narrow bigotry and cruelty of the Wahhabi regime . . . perhaps exacerbated by their financial traits."140 As we shall soon see, the people of 'Asir also had serious complaints about Saudi conduct in their country. Even though condi-

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tions were ripe for revolt, the conspirators did not embark on a detailed and well-coordinated operation; rather, they limited their role to acting as a catalyst in what they regarded as an inevitable anti-Saudi uprising. In their view, an armed rebellion and a series of inter-Arab intrigues would be sufficient to precipitate such an uprising. The failure of the rebellion was due to several factors. Its organization was so inefficient that mistakes were made even in the preparatory stages. It is difficult to keep secrets in the desert, and the conspirators did not succeed in concealing their activities. As a result, both the British authorities in TransJordan and the Saudi government were aware of the plans before they went into effect. In early May 1932, Hamzah warned Ibn Rifada not to rebel. In late May and early June, he demanded that the British forbid contacts between 'Abdullah and the rebels in order to neutralize the rebels immediately.141 Cox responded by insisting that 'Abdullah remove "the suspicious characters" from the frontier. 142 In June, tribal groups, notably the Bani 'Atiyya, who had been encouraged to join the rebels (possibly by 'Abdullah himself),143 were caught and detained by Glubb near the border.144 Sir John Simon, the foreign secretary, also wrote to the Colonial Office, pressing for a sharp warning to 'Abdullah. He sought an inquiry into the latter's contacts with the rebels and requested that the Trans-Jordanian government prevent any future incursions into the Saudi state.145 The fierce reaction of the British authorities is another factor that the conspirators had underestimated. It is unknown what kind of response they had envisaged, but their inability to thwart or at least to circumvent the British reaction suggests that they had not anticipated it. The British government reexamined its policy toward Iraq, Trans-Jordan, and the Saudi state in 1932 and decided to continue supporting Ibn Sa'ud, as his rule was regarded as a "more or less ordered government" over most of the Peninsula. It provided security for the pilgrims, refrained from attacking Kuwayt, and prevented Soviet expansion in the Peninsula, all of which were viewed as assets. At the same time, the British appreciated the old friendship and friendly disposition of the Hashimites. The British authorities therefore decided to support both the Hashimites and the Saudis. They also decided to avoid a situation in which London would be compelled to choose between the parties; in a crisis, the policy would be to make the parties cooperate. Thus, even before Ibn Rifada's crossing of the border, the British considered their interests best ensured by the status quo, which included Ibn Sa'ud's regime. This policy was duly conveyed to Wauchope.146 As a result, Ibn Rifada's group found itself poorly equipped and supplied in Shar', as they awaited in vain the tens of thousands who were to join them. Not only was the Trans-Jordanian frontier sealed, but British authorities in Egypt and Aden also began to pursue the conspirators. 'Abdullah and Fu'ad, who could not risk a clash with the British, denied any involvement in the affair and withheld aid from the rebels. This withholding of supplies and particularly of soldiers meant that the rebellion was doomed to failure. Wauchope commented on the matter: "When the leaders [of tribes] learnt

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that the British troops were placed all along the frontier, they realised that no rebellion had any chance of success."147 Fear of Saudi reprisals and the conspirators' failure to formulate a clear strategy for an uprising presumably kept the Hijazis from joining Ibn Rifada's rebellion. The arrest in late June of six notables from Mecca, ten from Jidda, and others from Ta'if, for "spreading propaganda" against the regime, sufficed to deter the local population from instigating serious disturbances there.148 Other Saudi populations were beyond the rebels' reach. That the government had initial difficulty in recruiting a force to tackle the invaders attests to the alienation of some of the Najdi tribes from the new Saudi regime. Ryan wrote that "the news of Ibn Rifada's adventure fell on a soil of public opinion prepared for every kind of untoward eventuality."149 Dickson then reported from Kuwayt that the Mutayr and TJjman in Najd were "secretly jubilant" at the revolt and "had no stomach" to fight the incipient rebellion at Najran. 150 The locally enforced blockade on Kuwayt also angered some tribal leaders.151 It was further reported that the Ruwalla, who roamed freely over the Syrian desert, sympathized with the rebels.152 It appears that many a group in and around the Saudi state had ample reason to applaud the uprising and to hope for the introduction of a new regime. But none was prepared to take part in it. While resenting the new Saudi rule, the Najdis could hardly sympathize with a pro-Hashimite uprising. Ibn Sa'ud met the Ikhwan leaders and persuaded them to come to his assistance. A Najdi force led by 'Abdullah Ibn 'Aqil was then mobilized. Two forces of the regular army were d .ployed from the Hijas itself. Together, they defeated Ibn Rifada's rebels.153 In August 1932, the government was still fragmented because of new divisions between Faysal and Hamzah.154 In September, however, it made a new effort to overcome the difficulties, focusing on measures that would enhance integration among the alienated territories. Hence, government statements stressed that the Ibn Rifada affair had "liberated energies and strengthened hearts" and that there was great need for internal unity.155 This was to be achieved by strengthening monarchical institutions and hastening the integration of dissatisfied regions. The establishment of a unified monarchical state served both to impress Saudi rivals outside the kingdom and to convince local tribes of Ibn Sa'ud's prowess. Moreover, the example of the 19205 had taught the Saudi leaders that the establishment of monarchical institutions was favored by both Najdis and Hijazi elements, who viewed them as a means of furthering their own interests in the realm. To foster feelings of regional loyalty to the government, Saudi leaders introduced the new institutions in accordance with common tribal practices. On September 16, 1932, after Hamzah and fifteen other notables had written to various personalities and to the king himself, agitating for the unification of the realm, full unity was declared between Najd and the Hijaz, under the newly named al-Mamlaka al'Arabiyya al-Sa'udiyya, or the Saudi Arabian Kingdom. 156 Hope Gill believed that Hamzah's initiative had been instigated by Ibn Sa'ud himself. 157 The same month, Ibn Sa'ud, overcoming his brother Muhammad's opposi-

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tion, succeeded in obtaining his family's support for designating his eldest son Sa'ud, who had already served as military commander and governor of Najd, as heir apparent. There was no clear ruling in the Sunni doctrine, nor indeed in the Wahhabi one, regarding political succession, but the founding of a dynasty was perceived as a legitimate form of leadership in tribal society and had been endorsed by the earlier Wahhabi chieftaincies. The agreement to promote Sa'ud, the king's oldest son, to this position (to be announced officially only in August I933)158 was therefore a considerable achievement for Ibn Sa'ud: It amounted to the establishment of the monarchical principle of a dynasty of kings in the unified realm. In Hope Gill's view, the unification of the kingdom meant that the policy of centralization would be extended to 'Asir as well. 'Asir had been ruled as a Saudi province since 1930 and its inhabitants complained of high taxation and humiliation by the Saudis. Presumably sharing this perception, Hasan al-Idrisi refused to add his signature to Hamzah's initiative,159 whereupon Ibn Sa'ud sent a mission of inquiry to 'Asir in early November 1932. Al-Idrisi ignored the envoys, however, and the rebellion commenced.160 It seems that at that stage, the influence of the hizb was already apparent to Hasan al-Idrisi, Muhammad al-Idrisi's sons, and others such as Muhammad Yahya Bashihi, a member of Hasan's entourage. The imam gave the rebels additional encouragement.161 Quelling the 'Asir rebellion was difficult, mainly because of the region's topography and its remoteness from the center of the kingdom. But the matter was urgent, as the rebels were challenging the entire system of Saudi government. The Najdis, traditional warriors for the government, were reluctant to undertake the mission. The situation in the Hijaz and Najd was still reported as "gloomy." Tribes were suffering from starvation, and townsmen were bitter.162 The large Najdi tribes, some of them Ikhwan, were reluctant to fight because of the topography and weather in 'Asir, as well as the lack of prospects for booty.163 The reasons that the Najdi tribes ultimately took action against the 'Asir revolt reflect the twofold nature of the Saudi state at that time. Although the tribes opposed Ibn Sa'ud's centralizing regime, they were also attracted by subventions and the prestige deriving from the alliance and personal contacts with Ibn Sa'ud. Furthermore, they were drawn by the Saudi success against Ibn Rifada, the creation of the kingdom, and Ibn Sa'ud's renewed involvement in politics. In early November 1932, Ibn Sa'ud met the leaders of the 'Ujman and the Mutayr in al-Riyad and presented them with generous bounties.164 Relations then improved, and the Najdi tribes sent thousands of tribesmen to fight. Khalid Ibn al-Luway commanded a column on the coast; Khalid Ibn Muhammad headed another on the mountains in the direction of Najran; and Ibn Musa'id led a third in the rear. Ibn al-Luway, who was a devoted commander, fell sick and died after Sabbiyya had been occupied. Despite this setback, the Saudis proved stronger in open battles, and their deployments were more effective than those of their enemies.165 With the 'Asir rebellion contained and the immediate danger to the Saudi regime removed, Ibn Sa'ud set out to reassert the power of central institutions

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over the peripheral provinces. He appointed Ibn Musa'id governor of Abha and named members of the Sudayri branch of the royal family to govern Tabuk and al-Jawf in June 1933. Thus, a tighter and more experienced government was imposed on the sensitive areas bordering on Trans-Jordan and Yemen.166 One key element in the integration of the frontier areas concerned Saudi relations with the surrounding states. Immediately after quelling Ibn Rifada's revolt, a dispute arose over 'Abdullah's involvement in the abortive action. Attempting to act as honest brokers and satisfy both the Jordanian and Saudi rulers, the British set about investigating 'Abdullah's conduct. Unable to prove a connection between 'Abdullah and the rebels, Wauchope refrained from denouncing the Jordanian ruler and was supported by the Colonial Office. Ibn Sa'ud, on the other hand, tried to use this crisis to rid himself of a major Hashimite rival. He depicted 'Abdullah as the main instigator of Ibn Rifada's revolt and as an archenemy of the Saudis. He even demanded 'Abdullah's dismissal or a British guarantee to prevent him from any further interference in Saudi Arabia. Ryan and the Foreign Office did not support Ibn Sa'ud's demands, but they insisted that the Colonial Office instruct Wauchope to be firm with 'Abdullah and inquire into his relations with the rebels.167 It took a combined effort by all the parties to mend fences. The British decided to reactivate an idea that had first been introduced in September 1932. In an interdepartmental meeting, British officials concluded that the only expedient way to overcome the crisis and circumvent Ibn Sa'ud's demands for 'Abdullah's dismissal was to ignore the current dispute and attempt to bring the two parties to mutual recognition. The "rationale" of these officials was to force the two parties together in the face of what seemed an interminable hostility. They therefore proposed that the protagonists sign a treaty of friendship similar to the one the Saudis had signed with the Iraqis.168 Wauchope reported an immediately positive response by 'Abdullah.169 Facing rebellious tribes in two arenas, Ibn Sa'ud had to swallow his bitterness toward 'Abdullah and accept the diplomatic course offered by the British. To improve their bargaining position, the Saudis simultaneously worked to strengthen their standing with tribes along the frontier. In January Ibn Sa'ud courted the Bani 'Atiyya, bestowing bounties on their leaders. "The Arab enjoys the mild thrill which he gets from the intrigue," explained Glubb, who had expelled the Bani 'Atiyya into Saudi Arabia for their conspiring. There, they were not allowed to trade with Trans-Jordan but were free to raid it, a privilege for which they were grateful to Ibn Sa'ud. In addition, Fawwaz Sha'lan, one of the Ruwalla leaders, paid homage to Ibn Sa'ud by visiting the Saudi amir at al-Kaf. The latter also strengthened the Saudi hold over the Sirhan tribe living along Wadi Sirhan, deployed tax collectors among them, and made them accept Saudi suzerainty.170 Hamzah informed Ryan in early January 1933 that Saudi Arabia would be ready to come to "an arrangement" with Trans-Jordan if Britain were to be involved. Faysal reiterated this statement later.171 British and Trans-Jordanian consent to negotiate contradicted Glubb's

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belief that only a preliminary agreement on the allegiance of tribes like the Bani 'Atiyya and Sirhan and the Saudis' right to extradite "political criminals" from Trans-Jordan would pave the way for a viable peace treaty. Glubb was of the opinion that as he and Ibn Zayd had been unable to reach such a preliminary agreement, no progress was possible.172 In February, after another meeting between Glubb and Ibn Zayd failed, Ryan visited 'Amman and met Wauchope, Cox, and Glubb. They then decided, over Glubb's protestations, that under the present circumstances, it would be preferable to reach a general agreement first and to deal with the technical frontier problems later.173 The decade-old British policy, which had burdened every attempt at a settlement since 1925, was thereby changed. In April, negotiations between the parties commenced in Jidda. It was decided that the existing frontier line would prevail and that border commissions of both parties would maintain continuous contact in order to prevent raids. No provisions for extradition were made, though disputes concerning the return of loot would be referred to special tribunals, and raiders would be expelled. Unsolved problems would be referred to arbitration, and the arbitrators would be British officials who were also commissioned to guarantee the Trans-Jordanian commitments in the process. On July 27, a "good neighbor" treaty and a protocol of arbitration were signed by Hamzah and Tawfiq Abu al-Huda, the Trans-Jordanian prime minister.174 This treaty did not, however, reflect a definite solution for the frontier problems; in fact, the difficult questions of tribal nationality, loot, and the expulsion of those whom the Saudis perceived as political criminals from Trans-Jordan were not resolved. Ibn Sa'ud and 'Abdullah did not indicate that the agreement lessened the personal enmity between them, and they did not meet. However, the decisions to establish better communications on the frontier, an arbitration committee, and British guarantees supporting the treaty constituted a substantial improvement in the frontier situation and served to decrease tension in the northern Hijaz area. Containment of the rebellion in 'Asir worsened Saudi relations with the imam. A clash developed during 1933. In January of that year, immediately after the Saudis had reestablished their hold over 'Asir, several problems arose between Saudi Arabia and Yemen, though none of them indicated that a war might be at hand. One problem was the escape of Hasan al-Idrisi and other members of his family to Yemen, where the imam granted them asylum.175 Another was the rebelliousness of the tribes that roamed along the unmarked frontier between the states. The Masariha of the Tihama revolted against the Saudis, and the Bani Yam in Najran revolted against the imam.176 Relying on the 1927 treaty between the two states, the Saudis demanded the extradition of al-Idrisi, but in February 1933, in correspondence between the rulers, Ibn Sa'ud expressed a willingness to compromise on the removal of alIdrisi and his men from the frontier area, provided that they were confined to the interior of Yemen. 177 At that stage, although each side accused the other of inciting rebellious frontier tribes,178 the correspondence between the rulers continued uninterrupted. From October 1932 on, a Saudi proposal of ncgotia-

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tions between the states was discussed. 179 In May 1933, Ibn Sa'ud sent a delegation headed by Hammad Sulayman, 'Abdullah's brother. It was, therefore, most surprising for the Saudis and the British that at this time, Yahya commenced preparations for war. The 'Asir problems should be examined in a wider context, taking into account the strategic interests of each of the parties. Rebellious tribes and quarrelsome leaders like al-Idrisi, who were involved in local frontier disputes, acted as catalysts who brought into prominence the larger concerns of the states. Thus, the real problem that the imam feared was Saudi expansion throughout 'Asir. The defeat of al-Idrisi's rebellion resulted in the establishment of a centralized Saudi government and the deployment of Saudi forces at the Yemeni frontier. The threat to Yemen was particularly evident when in October 1932, Ibn Sa'ud first proposed an agreement on a precise and clear delimitation of boundaries.180 Yahya agreed to negotiate; however, after the Saudi victory over the rebels, such negotiations would have implied surrender to Saudi threats near the Yemeni frontier. From Yahya's vantage point, Ibn Musa'id's advance to Midi might precipitate an invasion into Yemen. The rebellion of the Bani Yam could also have serious repercussions for Yemen. This tribe was of the Isma'ili denomination and had not fully accepted Yahya's temporal and religious authority. The tribe was large, and it was spread over most of Najran and into Yemen. In January 1930, its leaders had initiated contact with the Saudis and, with the latter's blessings, had begun an anti-Yemeni campaign.181 In Yahya's view, this could only mean a Saudi attempt to establish control over Najran, which would threaten his domain. Thus the Yemenis viewed the dispatch of the Saudi delegation to San'a as an attempt to negotiate an agreement under conditions unfavorable to them. They feared the establishment of Saudi presence along the entire Yemeni frontier. But Yahya did not want to formally withdraw from the negotiations and give Ibn Sa'ud an excuse to invade Yemen. He therefore resolved to surprise the Saudis, and he apparently believed that he would be able to put hundreds of thousands of tribesmen onto the battlefield.182 Ibn Sa'ud was not aware of Yahya's plans. Ryan, who at the time maintained close contacts with Ibn Sa'ud and Hamzah, asserted that Ibn Sa'ud genuinely believed in the Saudi-Yemeni agreements of 1927 and 1931, which granted all of 'Asir to Saudi Arabia. He therefore thought that the deployment of Saudi forces to all 'Asiri regions would be acceptable to the imam.183 Ryan also contended that although Ibn Sa'ud might have had a case regarding the Tihama, the imam had claims to territories in Najran.184 Because the clarity of agreements between Arabian chieftains left much to be desired and various interpretations of their major clauses could have been justified, Ibn Sa'ud believed that he could establish Saudi authority over Najran and still avoid a clash with the imam. Occupied by negotiations with the TransJordanians, he was probably not interested in a war on the Yemeni frontier. During the next several months, the two parties gradually altered their positions, a direct result of the dispatch of Yemeni forces to Najran. In July 1933, negotiations were carried out between the Saudi and Yemeni delega-

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tions, but according to the Saudi account (the only one available), the Yemeni position was quite intransigent. Although the imam's granting of asylum to the al-Idrisis was presented as a humanitarian rather than as an anti-Saudi gesture, the Saudi claim to 'Asir—the assertion that 'Asir had never been part of Yemen and that the 1931 agreement had established Saudi authority over this area—was regarded by the Yemenis as "causing amazement." The Yemenis stressed their "hereditary" right to rule over 'Asir and the Bani Yam. They described the 1931 agreement as a "provisional agreement based upon conditions of fact which ceased with the Saudi elimination of the Idrissite dynasty" and insisted that Yemen was therefore "free to observe or deny the treaty" and "will not make a new treaty until they are satisfied concerning the Tihama and the northern frontiers [Najran]."185 On August i, after accusing the imam of mistreatment, the Saudi delegation left for the Hijaz.186 The parties became increasingly entrenched, each insisting on its right to control 'Asir. Other factors, however, still prevented war. The first was the role of the Great Powers. In late June and during July, Wahbah inquired in London whether Britain would support Saudi Arabia in a war, in return for Saudi protection of British interests in Yemen if the Saudis should triumph.187 Although the British recognized the de facto Saudi hold over 'Asir, they were unwilling to support a Saudi invasion of Yemen, as they did not wish to provoke the Italians into giving the imam full support. In addition, because a British delegation from Aden (led by Colonel B. Reilly) was due to negotiate with the imam over the Yemeni boundary with the British-controlled protectorates in South Arabia, the British were unwilling to provoke Yahya unduly. In parallel negotiations with the Italians, the British also refused to press Ibn Sa'ud to avoid open hostilities, as in Ryan's opinion, they were unwilling to admit that Yahya had any right to 'Asir. But on July 31, Sir John Simon, the secretary for foreign affairs, declared that Britain would not be able to accede to the Saudi request.188 Hence, though the British would not object to a firm Saudi hold over 'Asir, they were not interested in encouraging a war in Yemen at that time.189 The British position temporarily cooled the Saudi aggression. The Italians, too, did their best to prevent the imam from embarking on a hasty military campaign. Although they supported his claim to 'Asir, they hoped to prevent the Saudis from controlling the area, through cooperation with the British.190 The Italians tried to avoid both a clash with the British and a complete break with Saudi Arabia. With an interest in safeguarding their naval routes in the Red Sea, the Italians were not willing to risk a rift with Ibn Sa'ud. In November 1933, Hamzah met an Italian emissary at Jidda, who told him that Italy intended "to preserve good relations with both Ibn Sa'ud and the imam."191 Another factor that prevented the parties from engaging in war immediately was their lack of military strength. The imam's forces, led by Yahya's son Ahmad, fought against the Bani Yam with only mediocre results. Ahmad did not have many men at his disposal and their equipment was inadequate, and the tribes in the occupied areas were hostile and uncooperative. 192 Ibn Sa'ud,

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in his turn, still had difficulty raising a large army. The quelling of the revolt in 'Asir could not hide the fact that he had no more than a few thousand Hijazi regulars and that the major Najdi tribes were still critical of his conduct of domestic affairs and not predisposed to fight in Yemen, especially as the venture promised no substantial booty.193 The only option that Ibn Sa'ud had was to embark on a slow process of recruitment among his major tribes. Although in the summer of 1933 both parties were still unprepared to wage war, the conflict escalated, and by March 1934, armed conflict appeared imminent. The changes that had occurred in the interim related to the parties' involvement with local tribes and to sudden shifts in tribal loyalties that aroused mutual suspicions. The Saudis seemed to have gained the upper hand. Ibn Sa'ud's forces had a more effective control of the area, and Yahya felt obliged to recap his losses. Lacking substantial support from either Italy or the tribes, Yahya focused his operations on quelling the Bani Yam. In September, his forces managed to occupy Badr, the main city of Najran, 70 to 80 miles north of the supposed frontier line between Yemen and 'Asir. Saudi contingents were sent to support the Bani Yam. In November, members of the Qahtan and TJjman, in cooperation with the Bani Yam, managed to repulse the Yemeni forces and defeat them in several battles.194 The Yemeni advance to Badr had enabled Ibn Sa'ud to deploy his main forces in 'Asir. Ibn Sa'ud's nephew Faysal Ibn Sa'ud went as far as Jizan in the Tihama, and his brother Muhammad reached Abha. Faysal, Ibn Sa'ud's son, was in charge of the operation.195 After several weeks of activity, Ibn Sa'ud found himself in an advantageous position. On November 15, he sent Yahya a list of desiderata for a settlement, which Hammad Sulayman carried to San'a. The Saudis demanded Yemen's acknowledgment of the existing borders between 'Asir and Yemen and of Saudi control over 'Asir, the removal of al-Idrisi, an end to Yahya's meddling with 'Asiri tribes, the immediate evacuation of Najran, and the acceptance of the 1927 Saudi-Idrisi treaty as a basis for friendship in the future.196 Ibn Sa'ud planned not only to remove the Yemeni forces from Najran but also to ensure himself against future problems. Yahya accepted most of the terms, and on December 29, a preliminary agreement seemed to have been reached. The Saudis agreed that Najran would remain neutral, its status to be determined by negotiations, and Yahya agreed to Saudi lordship over the rest of 'Asir. He also agreed to cease his intrigue with the tribes, to send al-Idrisi to Zabid (in Yemen), and to accept the delimitation of the frontiers as part of a twenty-year treaty of friendship.197 The ensuing events raise questions about the imam's motivations. On the one hand, the parties agreed to convene a peace conference in February 1934 in Abha. On the other hand, Yahya initiated fighting along the frontier. Still suffering from inferior strategic and military status, Yahya's reasons for escalating the conflict are hard to determine. He may have been making a bid to improve the Yemeni position at the Abha conference. He may also have thought that a sudden military move, concomitant with negotiations, would surprise the Saudis and afford him a substantial advantage. Finally, there may

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have been direct provocation, for in January 1934, Faysal Ibn Sa'ud carried out an unauthorized attack on Yahya's forces, killing 700 men; Ibn Sa'ud apologized and explained that the action had been taken in error. However, this incident exacerbated the situation, and Yahya launched an attack.198 Throughout January, Yemeni forces invaded Jabal Fayfa and Jabal Bani Malik in the south of Najran, and they began levying taxes and taking hostages from the tribes in the area. Saudi representatives were expelled, and Yahya sent 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Idrisi (Muhammad al-Idrisi's son) to enlist the tribes.199 The imam's forces focused mainly on Najran. When asked by Ibn Sa'ud for an explanation, Yahya dismissed the events as "unimportant," a response that may be taken as confirming that the imam's intention was to strengthen his position at the coming conference rather than to start an all-out attack. In February the conference convened, with Fu'ad Hamzah representing Saudi Arabia. Yemen tried to impose conditions. Not only were the participants unwilling to agree on a frontier line, but they also refused to evacuate their forces from Najran and demanded the release of Yemeni prisoners previously taken at Jizan. In March the conference broke off without result.200 By then Saudi forces had already been mobilized and were approaching the area. In addition to Najdi tribal forces, contingents were brought from Turaba and Bisha in the Hijaz, and they remained under the command (previously led by Khalid Ibn Luway) at Jizan. Another force of 'Utayba and Qahtan members was deployed at Abha under Ibn Musa'id.201 In March, the number of Saudi forces in the area reached 30,000 (8,000 regulars), against the 37,000 Yemenis (12,000 regulars) that Yahya had managed to recruit.202 In Ryan's opinion, Ibn Sa'ud was ready to fight and waited for the failure of the Abha conference only "to make the breakdown of a conference rather than any particular dispute the justification for hostilities."203 Immediately after the conference's collapse, Ibn Sa'ud issued an ultimatum to Yahya to evacuate Najran and hand over the Idrisis. A showdown then seemed imminent. Examining the strategies of both sides, it appears that Yahya was indeed in an inferior position, despite his somewhat larger force. Yahya attacked in June 1933 and in January 1934, with the campaigns concentrating mainly on Najran, in an attempt to secure that area, a no-man's-land not under Saudi control. In so doing, Yahya forced Ibn Sa'ud to dispatch major Saudi contingents not only to Najran but also to the sensitive and important Yemeni coastal cities. The Saudi deployment proved more effective than the Yemeni concentration in one arena; moreover, the Saudis had several other advantages, including several trucks to transport soldiers and a number of portable wireless sets. They also had four Wapita bombers, although these were not used during the fighting.204 On April 3, a column led by Hammad al-Shuwwayr moved along the coast, and on April 7, it captured Harad. Operating in the east of 'Asir and at Najran, Ibn Sa'ud's son Faysal captured Yabad and Baqum and reached the Bani Malik area. In the center, Khalid Ibn Muhammad captured Wadi alNishur, and Sa'ud, Ibn Sa'ud's other son, who then assumed command over

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Ibn al-Luway's force, conquered Sa'da and defeated the Sahar tribes there. Faysal's and Sa'ud's forces blocked the retreat of the Yemeni forces from Najran, most of which fell into their hands by April 21. Faysal then went to Ibn Shuwwayr's assistance on the coast. On April 25, Midi surrendered after a siege, and on April 28, the Saudi forces entered Hudayda. Breaking through the main routes and mountain passes, the Saudi forces next turned to destroy Yemeni pockets of resistance and fortresses that hitherto had been beyond the reach of the attacking columns.205 The coastal Yemeni tribes, notably the Zaraniq, who were Sunni-Shafi'is (and opposed the ruling Shi'i-Zaydis), were happy to join the Saudis and turn against the imam; Hudayda surrendered without a battle, thanks mainly to their help.206 Faced by pressures and the advantage that would result from their joining the winning Saudi side, the tribal inhabitants of Yahya's periphery proved no more loyal to him than the 'Asiris had been to Ibn Sa'ud. The Saudi victory was made possible by the British policy, which prevented possible Italian intervention. In early April 1934, the Italians proposed a meeting with British officials to discuss the problem of sovereignty over 'Asir. Foreign Secretary Sir John Simon then clarified the British position: In International Law the sovereignty over the territory ruled by the Idrisi has undoubtedly passed to King Ibn Saud . . . (and that it therefore cannot be considered an open question. ... It may be well to add that His Majesty's Government will naturally continue . . . not only to refrain from intervention in the present conflict . . . but also to avoid all appearance of taking the part of either of the disputants.207 Britain sent a warship, H M S Penzance, to Hudayda, and in early May, the Italians, who had also sent a ship to the harbor, informed Hamzah that they, too, would maintain strict neutrality in the conflict. London feared provoking Italian intervention, and though British policy was sufficient to deter such an eventuality, it was surely not meant to support a Saudi occupation of parts of Yemen. Ryan made it clear to Hamzah at the end of March that Saudi penetration into Yemen "would mean war," by which Ryan meant the danger of an Italian response.208 His words were followed by a strong reiteration of the Italian demand, voiced after the occupation of Hudayda, that the British stop Ibn Sa'ud. The Italians were again informed that their intervention would not be tolerated. Immediately afterward, Ryan recommended that the Saudis withdraw, in order to eliminate the possibility of a clash with Italy.209 When Ibn Sa'ud sent 'Abdullah Sulayman to Hudayda to find the most efficient way to exploit the port revenues, Britain began to suspect that Saudi forces planned to remain in Hudayda.210 This suspicion increased when Ibn Sa'ud asked the British to protect his occupation of Hudayda against the Italians, as well as against Fu'ad of Egypt, who was attempting to mediate between him and Yahya. In return, the Saudis offered to the British special rights in Hudayda. 211 British officials were afraid that London would become the protector of a continuing Saudi expansion and would find itself en-

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trenched in frontier and political problems that were totally irrelevant to its interests in the area at the time. Ibn Sa'ud was made to understand that if he kept Hudayda, he would risk conflicts with both local and European powers, and the British would not support him.212 Indeed, Saudi sources expressed concern over the presence of British and Italian ships in the Hudayda harbor and the possibility of Italian intervention.213 The outcome was that Ibn Sa'ud returned to the imam Hudayda as well as the other occupied Yemeni areas and concluded a peace treaty. There were additional reasons for Ibn Sa'ud's retreat. After the initial jubilation, the maintenance of long supply lines from the Hijaz to Hudayda became increasingly difficult. Scattered Yemeni forces still attacked Saudi troops, and Sa'ud, the heir apparent, was injured in one of these attacks.214 Philby explained (as it was rumored in various Saudi circles) that Ibn Sa'ud maintained good relations with both the ShafTi tribes along the coast and with Yahya's chief delegate to the meeting of Saudi and Yemeni officials (scheduled for April 1934 at Ta'if), 'Abdullah al-Wazir, the imam's future governor of the Tihama.215 By utilizing such tribal and personal contacts in the region, Ibn Sa'ud calculated that he would be able to maintain a certain amount of leverage over the imam, even after the return of the occupied areas, and to limit Yahya's activities against him. In a peace treaty for 20 years, signed at the end of May 1934 at Ta'if, the Saudis achieved most of the aims for which they had gone to battle. In the initial armistice that preceded the peace treaty, the Yemenis promised to evacuate Najran completely, return the hostages they had taken, and surrender the Idrisis. By the end of May, these conditions had been met.216 The peace treaty that followed determined that disputes would in the future be resolved only through negotiations or arbitration. The designated frontier line was that which previously had separated 'Asir from Yemen, leaving 'Asir in Saudi hands.217 To conclude, the inconsistencies within the centralizing Saudi government deriving from tribal practices were particularly evident in the frontier regions of northern Hijaz and 'Asir. In time of recession, these areas were adversely affected by both the urban orientation of the Saudi regime and its taxation policies. The local tribal populations reacted by revolting against Saudi rule. The proximity of these regions to Trans-Jordan and Yemen made it possible for the latter to participate in anti-Saudi conspiracies. However, once foreign powers entered the arena and neighboring countries became involved, the Saudi regime proved more effective than either Trans-Jordan or Yemen. The Saudis' diplomatic maneuvering, military deployment, and strategic planning were superior to those of their neighbors. In addition, Britian was ready to assist the Saudi regime in its defense of Saudi territory against foreign intervention. As a result, the Saudis were able to demonstrate flexibility in their foreign relations and to conclude agreements with Trans-Jordan and Yemen after checking their aggressive intentions against Saudi Arabia. This state of affairs enabled the Saudi regime to overcome the crisis that arose in the

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summer of 1934, by eliminating the immediate danger confronting it. Yet the government did little to improve the conditions of the people in the northern Hijaz, 'Asir, and other poor and disadvantaged regions.

The Mode of Acquiescence

The Saudi success in overcoming the crises of 1932-34 had a sweeping effect on state building. It proved to the population that the Saudi state was durable and required their acquiescence. It also encouraged the government to demonstrate greater concern for the population. By 1934, the immediate and acute

dangers to the Saudi regime had been eliminated, but this had been accompanied by only minor improvements in the structure, orientation, and performance of the polity. The duality resulting from the policy of "encapsulation" did not disappear, but all the parties began to play their roles more willingly. Ibn Sa'ud's resumption of leadership positions had improved the decisionmaking process. In June 1934, Glubb commented, "Now that he had emerged victorious, all will hasten to ride to Mecca to congratulate him on his glorious victories."218 Although Ibn Sa'ud had become more arbitrary in his conduct toward the tribes and more interested in his share of the booty,219 Ryan reported in the summer of 1934 that Ibn Sa'ud was also more interested in internal affairs than he had been in 1932, that his health seemed to be good, and that a son he had recently fathered eliminated any suspicions of weakness due to impotence.220 There was an initial improvement in regional integration, due to the realization by both tribals and townsmen that they had to comply with the mandates of the regime, and a reciprocal awareness by the government that its policy should take into consideration the interests of peripheral and frontier regions, even if its major aims were centralization and economic exploitation. The various populations did not assimilate, but neither did they fully cooperate. Nonetheless, they were more willing to coexist, through minimal cooperation, with the government. The government's ability to rise to the challenges of the early 1930s and the improvement in its rule resulted in growing societal compliance. It was a restrained coexistence, not an enthusiastic one, which rested on a broadly based awareness by all Saudi sectors that they needed to coexist in the framework of the new polity. It necessitated a give-and-take between the government and the different populations. During the wars, Najdi tribes had constituted a reservoir of fighting power, recruited through personal contacts between Najdi tribal leaders and Ibn Sa'ud. Nevertheless, Najdi leaders continued to be excluded from highranking political positions and from access to decision-making power. Any problem that emerged concerning tribal members in Najd and al-Ahsa', particularly concerning those caught running the blockade from Kuwayt, was dealt with harshly. "Ibn Jilawi is allowed to execute on the slightest pretext," Dickson reported in an intelligence report from Kuwayt. Ryan indicated that unlike the situation in 1920s, in 1934 Ibn Sa'ud was not under the influence of

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extreme Wahhabis and that even the impact of the Najdi 'ulama had declined. Several 'ulama'' criticized the religious laxity of the ruler and his sons, but most of them were content to carry out their traditional duties as instructors and interpreters of the shari'a. As teachers and prayer leaders, they enjoyed a considerable moral position. They remained aloof from political activity and wielded little influence.221 The regime made a number of efforts to cultivate the Najdi tribes. In November 1934, Ibn Sa'ud hosted a feast in al-Riyad for Najdi chieftains.222 In fact, he spent a fortune on such entertainments. In addition, Faysal and Ibn Sa'ud often paid visits to tribes during their excursions in Najd. In addition, Ibn Sa'ud allotted 300 riyals monthly to Bandar, Faysal al-Dawish's son, and treated his family with respect.223 In 'Asir, the problems had not been solved, but the tension eased. Tribes continued to complain about starvation and the conduct of Sulayman's officials, particularly the tax collectors. In January 1935, for the first time, Ibn Sa'ud sent supplies to the tribes in the cAsir area and expressed readiness to waive part of their taxes. He did so on the recommendation of a committee commissioned by him personally "to organize the newly occupied territory of al-Idrisi on the lines of [the] administration prevailing in the Hijaz and Nejd,"224 that is, to try to integrate the area more effectively. A similar situation prevailed in the northern Hijaz. On the one hand, there were indications of continuing discontent with the regime. For a short while, Nawwaf Sha'lan of the Ruwalla, 'Awda Abu Tayy of the Huwaytat, and other tribal leaders contemplated organizing against the government. Nonetheless, with the exception of small-scale raids that the government could not prevent, relative quiet was maintained in the area by means of several new military posts and additional soldiers.225 The central, urban part of the Hijaz was still the nerve center of the government, and the rulers tried to govern it with relative benevolence. Hence, no new obligatory loans were imposed on the local merchants. Ryan reported that "the [local] administration did not become worse but perhaps somewhat improved," and no strict Wahhabi regulations were reintroduced. But the payment of salaries was still irregular, and purchases made by the government were not always immediately covered. The fact that the local riyal depreciated to 25 to the pound sterling made life still harder.226 Improvement was made in the relations among top decision makers and in administrative conduct. Sulayman was still a paramount figure, but he seemed more concerned now with economics than politics. During the war with Yemen, Sulayman was appointed deputy defense minister and was fully occupied with both the reorganization of the army and the financial management of the port of Hudayda. 227 According to Ryan, Sulayman had learned how to get along with the Hijazis: "While old debts may be put on the long finger, current liabilities must be met if credit is to be maintained."228 The activities of Yasin and Hamzah in foreign affairs helped them both to strengthen contacts with foreign businessmen and to establish orderly procedures for dealing with other states. A decision was made in June 1934 to

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improve the administration by transferring the authority and functions of the Ministry of Interior to the Council of Ministers. Because Faysal headed both these bodies, Ryan asserted that greater efficiency would be achieved.229 Faysal also enjoyed the support of the Hijazis, both because of his "easygoing and pleasure loving nature"230 and because of his demonstrable diplomatic talent, which started earning him a reputation as a skillful mediator and sensible statesman. On the other hand, decision making was burdened by the division between Najd and the Hijaz, reflected in the relations among members of the royal family. The introduction of the role in heir apparent was not accompanied by the institutionalization of a hierarchy among family members. Consequently, relations among the princes remained subject to parochial conflicts. In late 1934 and early 1935, Sa'ud was reported to be opposing Faysal. Although Faysal's position had been enhanced by his activities in the Hijaz, Sa'ud, the heir apparent, had been left in al-Riyad to govern the capital of Najd in relative obscurity. Unlike Faysal, he had the reputation of being a puritanical, somber man and was not very popular with either Hijazi or Gulf-based notables. Moreover, his attitude toward Faysal reflected a wider feeling of frustration prevalent among Najdis in general and Najdi-based princes in particular. In December 1934, Ibn Sa'ud's brothers, notably Muhammad, were said to have protested to Ibn Sa'ud for his not granting them a province to run or a governmental post. Muhammad, who was Ibn Humayd's son-in-law and a supporter of the Ikhwan, resisted Ibn Sa'ud both for subjugating the Ikhwan and for not treating the orthodox, Najdi-based factions of the royal family as cordially as he treated his sons. Muhammad and other brothers threatened to remain loyal and obedient only to Ibn Sa'ud himself, but not to his successor. "Let the best man win after your death, Oh brother" is what Muhammad was reported to have said,231 attesting to the presence of conflict but also to the inclination to defer the outcome and to comply with the existing power structure. Economic conditions also encouraged acquiescence to Saudi rule. The cost of quelling the Ibn Rifada rebellion had been £4o,ooo,232 and in Philby's estimate, the war with Yemen had cost £150,ooo.233 In late 1932, government debts exceeded £200,000 (mainly to the Dutch Trading Society—£115,000— but also the al-Qusaybis, the Shell and Marconi companies, and others).234 In 1933, only 20,000 pilgrims arrived, and in 1934, there were about 25,ooo.235 In December 1934, Philby estimated that the "grants of gratitude" to tribes and chieftains totaled £100,000 in gold, and Calvert of the British legation in Jidda added that this sum could have been paid only by making "serious inroads upon the royal treasury, a reservoir of unknown dimensions."236 The sums flowing in and out of the royal treasury did not seem to have the same negative political impact that they had had in 1931, for the royal family's practices were no longer deemed provocative to nonroyalists, as they had been in 1932. Nonetheless, the basic economic difficulties had to be eased. Various attempts were made in 1933 and 1934 to encourage foreign entrepreneurs to invest in Saudi Arabia. On May 29, 1933, after long negotiations, the American Standard Oil

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Company of California signed a contract with the Saudi government to search for oil in al-Ahsa'. The politics behind the American initiative, the intention of which was to compete with British companies, have already been analyzed in detail elsewhere and are beyond the scope of this book. Looking for the best economic deal, Ibn Sa'ud tended to prefer the American proposal. The British were uncertain regarding the potential of Saudi oil and its value to British interests, and they were ready to advance only £10,000 in cash, which Ibn Sa'ud rejected. The oil deal's economic effect on Saudi Arabia is important. The American company acquired the concession for 60 years; it would pay the Saudi government a "dead rent" of £5,000 per annum, that is, a fee paid before finding oil. Another £100,000 would be advanced after the discovery of the same. In addition, the company also agreed to grant the government occasional loans. Only after oil was found would a regular royalty be paid. The company would not pay any charges or taxes; it would be run by Americans but employ as many Saudis as possible.237 In August 1933, £25,000 arrived from Standard Oil, and in July 1934, another £20,000.238 The deal could hardly have provided much immediate relief for the Saudis, but it held promises for the future. From the summer of 1932, two additional foreign companies negotiated various projects with the Saudi government. Two British citizens of Syrian origin, 'Abd al-Ghani Idlibi and Husayn 'Awni, offered both to establish a state bank and to search for oil in the Hijaz. In October 1932, the British government refused to guarantee or even to recommend deals with the Saudis.239 In March 1933, Idlibi was further deterred by Sulayman's demands for high royalties, and he retreated from the negotiations.240 Although in March 1934, he raised the idea once again, he did not make any progress.241 In February 1933, a contract was signed with 'Abd al-Hamid Shadid, the representative of the ex-khedive of Egypt, 'Abbas Hilmi. The contract included the establishment of a state bank and a concession for the development of the port in Jidda and various railway lines. Hilmi was supposed to supply all the initial capital (covering the Saudi government's share as well) and to pay the Saudis a royalty of £200,000.242 Ryan, who suspected the deal from the very beginning, particularly Philby's part in it,243 was therefore not surprised in January 1934 to find that Shadid had not paid his share, that he had failed to communicate with Hilmi, and that the whole project was hopeless.244 During the mid-1930s, the process of encapsulation continued, but relations among the centralizing government, the provinces, and the tribes grew more cooperative, despite residual animosities. The process was facilitated by the government's improved conduct: It continued to develop bureaucratic institutions and to focus on economic growth, while maintaining patrimonial, personal contacts with remote tribes and cultivating them through more effective economic means. Ibn Sa'ud was aware of the internal situation in Saudi Arabia. Though the dissension was not acute, wide gaps existed between the various groups in the kingdom, between different provinces, and between members of the royal family. In Ryan's opinion, the nomination of Sa'ud as heir apparent, the

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appeasement of tribal leaders, and the allowance that Ibn Sa'ud had given to various former enemies of the regime (including members of hizb al-tahrir alhijazi) in exchange for their return to Saudi Arabia demonstrated Ibn Sa'ud's anxiety in this respect and his wish to disarm his enemies. For both external and internal reasons, Ryan asserted, Ibn Sa'ud was eager to reinforce tendencies in the direction of compromise and acquiescence and to aim "for settlements calculated to ensure the future of his regime."245 In late 1934, Ibn Sa'ud embarked on a new nation-building strategy: He sought to improve the financial situation and to bolster security in regional peninsular politics, the lack of which had proved dangerous to the kingdom in the past. The key to Ibn Sa'ud's new approach was improving relations with Britain, the dominant power in the Persian Gulf area. There was the prospect of money that would flow in from Kuwayt if a settlement could be reached on the Kuwayti blockade question, and the even more promising prospect of finding oil in Saudi territories near Kuwayt and the Trucial Coast. For their part, the British feared Saudi expansion into their protected Gulf Principalities, and they were interested in preventing the expansion of the American company (Standard Oil), which had gone into partnership with the Saudis. Thus, Ibn Sa'ud suggested a settlement concerning the demarcation of frontiers.246 But he had another reason for approaching Britain for a settlement: Apparently he was interested in securing Saudi Arabia's future against any unwanted developments in the region. To this end, he was willing to forgo expansion in favor of regional accommodation with his neighbors.247 As Ryan indicated, such inclinations were evidenced by Ibn Sa'ud "periodically" whenever new political trends emerged in the area. On the one hand, Ibn Sa'ud felt more secure with the Hashimite states after the conclusion of the agreements with Trans-Jordan and Iraq and after the death of King Faysal in 1933. On the other hand, he had just come close to clashing with Italy, and he also feared intercession by Turkey and Iran, two states248 undergoing reform and concomitant increases in power. To realize his desire for regional accommodation, Ibn Sa'ud sought a military alliance with Iraq, assisted by the British, who would guarantee cooperation between the two dominant regional powers against outside interference and regional upheaval.249 Britain played the key role in this scheme. It could both pave the way for local settlements in the Arabian Peninsula and confirm the friendship with Saudi Arabia through a bilateral alliance. Ibn Sa'ud hoped ultimately to increase British commitments to Saudi Arabia, in a departure from what he conceived of as the reserved and rather ambiguous support Britain had lent the kingdom during the war with Yemen.250 British officials were prepared to respond favorably to Ibn Sa'ud's initiative. In July 1934, Ryan recommended that London not treat Ibn Sa'ud in a laissez-faire manner but be "constructive" and negotiate a comprehensive settlement with him regarding all outstanding issues. In Ryan's opinion, given Ibn Sa'ud's current state of mind, it was worth Britain's while to settle the existing problems once and for all, to satisfy Ibn Sa'ud and make him acknowledge the vital British interests that had been threatened by his actions.251

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In September 1934 and January 1935, respectively, Hamzah met G. W. Rendel, head of the Foreign Office's Eastern Department, and other British officials, and Ryan discussed the same issues with Hamzah and Yasin in Jidda. In January 1935, Rendel was ready to negotiate a settlement between the two states. As Ibn Sa'ud had a number of demands for Arabia, Ryan deemed it possible to extract several concessions from him that would serve British interests, while at the same time allowing him to satisfy some of his other interests. At that time British officials seemed to appreciate fully Ibn Sa'ud's position as the paramount ruler in Arabia, and they acknowledged that his interests might extend beyond Saudi territories. For example, the Saudis were adamantly opposed to British tolerance of Jewish rights in Palestine, and Rendel warned that ignoring Ibn Sa'ud's request would cause British interests "to be seriously injured." 252 Furthermore, British officials felt that the time was right: Ibn Sa'ud had proved his strength by emerging victorious from challenges to his rule. In early 1935 it became clear to both parties that it would be impossible to incorporate all the outstanding issues into one comprehensive settlement; the complexity of the issues varied, and finding solutions would take different amounts of time. Also, linking one issue to another would be counterproductive, as the difficulties inherent in one could prevent progress in others. In February, both Ibn Sa'ud and the British expressed anxiety that the current negotiations for an overall settlement might collapse. It was then decided to continue the negotiations, but to seek a separate settlement on each issue.253 It also became clear that Britain would not enter a military alliance with Ibn Sa'ud, as such an act might clash with commitments that Britain had given other states in the region. In April 1935, negotiations resumed, concentrating only on a revision of the May 1927 Jidda treaty between the two parties.254 What were the prospects in 1936 for the various issues discussed? One major topic was the final demarcation of the Saudi-Trans-Jordanian frontier. There was a de facto frontier, but the official treaty of Hadda' covered only on 'Aqaba and on Wadi Sirhan. The de facto frontier line was rarely disputed, except for occasional Saudi complaints about Trans-Jordanian border patrols encroaching on the Hijaz. Thus, this issue necessitated no immediate settlement. Under the "comprehensive" policy, however, the matter of the SaudiTrans-Jordanian frontier was incorporated into the discussions, and it raised problems that, indeed, made a comprehensive settlement impossible. In January 1935, the British discovered that the maps used in 1918 and for the Hadda' agreement of 1925 were highly inaccurate, particularly where 'Aqaba and Ma'an were concerned. New surveys were necessary.255 The British moreover suspected that encroachments of the Trans-Jordanian frontier patrols into Saudi Arabian territory occurred at two spots (the well of Hazim at the north of Wadi Sirhan and Thaniyya Tara'if in the southwestern part of the frontier, near Tabuk) which, according to the corrected maps, belonged to the Saudi kingdom. 256 As these spots were vital to Trans-Jordan, a debate ensued between Ryan and Wauchope as to whether the whole matter should or should not be divulged to the Saudis.257

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The issue was raised with Hamzah in London in July 1935. He insisted on including the two spots in Saudi Arabia, which meant slightly revising the Hadda' treaty. He scolded the British for relying "on the 1918 map when it suited them and [discarding it] when it did not." Rendel then warned that if Hamzah insisted on these changes, the whole question of the frontier would be opened up.258 In May 1936, Yasin reported that the Saudi government would agree to participate in a committee that would locate the disputed areas on the ground and decide their proprietorship. The map would then be adjusted accordingly.259 Although the Saudi government did not achieve a final frontier settlement with Trans-Jordan at this time, the frontier situation had become relatively stable, and the governors in the area controlled the tribes under their rule.260 There were, however, other issues that encouraged an accord between Britain and Saudi Arabia. After extensive negotiations, a treaty of alliance between Iraq and Saudi Arabia was signed in Baghdad on April 2, 1936. A previous Saudi proposal for a military pact between the states had been rejected by the British as superfluous and had not even been presented to Iraq.261 In an attempt to improve Saudi Arabia's relations with all of its neighbors, the Saudis raised the issue of a treaty of alliance once more, and this time it was negotiated. Its main articles reiterated the 1931 treaty, emphasizing the friendship between the states, nonaggression in case of a dispute between them, and their intention to cooperate over mutual passport arrangements, economic affairs, and means of communication. Despite disagreements over wells and the extradition of tribal groups and individuals, there was no further demarcation of frontiers. Most of these problems were centered on the neutral zone. Although the solution of dividing it between the two countries was considered, no conclusive result was achieved.262 The treaty also reflected broader, inter-Arab issues. The growing interests of both Iraq and Saudi Arabia in aiding the Palestinian Arabs in their struggle against the Jews (which would in later years become a cause for SaudiHashimite rivalry over regional influence) and the emerging tendencies of inter-Arab cooperation and solidarity, reinforced following Italy's invasion of Ethiopia in 1935, were probably additional factors that brought al-Riyad and Baghdad together. The alliance reflected the Saudis' interest in regional security and Iraq's compliance. Hence, they decided to avoid entering understandings with third parties that could compromise the interests of either of the two, to embark on mutual cooperation against a third party through military coordination, and to engage in political consultation in case one of the parties came under attack. The treaty also included general commitments to Arab unity and an indication that other Arab parties could join by cosigning the document. The British had reservations about the alliance, as they feared being indirectly involved in unwanted military action arising from their earlier commitment to Iraq. In the light of this, the parties did not include clauses that would obligate Britain to any military activity. The treaty was then signed, to Ibn Sa'ud's apparent relief. 263 Saudi-Kuwayti relations also constituted a difficult issue for these two

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parties, as well as for Britain. Until the summer of 1934, the parties were still concerned with the blockade that Ibn Sa'ud maintained on Kuwayt. He refused to accept any suggestion of a Saudi customs post outside Kuwayt or to ease the blockade in any way.264 Dickson asserted in September 1933 that Ibn Sa'ud's intention was actually to "swallow" the shaykhdom, and in July 1934, Philby stressed that the king's intentions were "to starve Kuwayt into submission."265 In the Summer of 1934, however, a new Saudi approach was evident: In the opinion of Standard Oil of California experts, there were good prospects for the discovery of oil in the vicinity of Kuwayt, particularly in the neutral zone between Najd and Kuwayt. According to their contract, the Saudi government was obliged to give the concession for any such prospecting to Standard Oil. But because Idlibi's British-supported group was also interested in this concession and because Kuwayt was under British protection, Hamzah applied for British assistance. In July 1934, he proposed that Britain help merge Standard Oil and Idlibi's group for this purpose, make Shaykh Ahmad agree to explorations in Kuwayt, or, alternatively, divide the neutral zone.266 The British were apprehensive about the Saudi initiative. As early as July 1933) Ryan had tried to discourage any British interest in the Saudi search for oil, viewing it only as an attempt "to get what cash they can at [the] outset for uncertain prospects."267 British officials feared that Standard Oil might jeopardize any possibility of a fair prospect for Idlibi's group and for Britain and might expose Kuwayt to Ibn Sa'ud's mercies.268 The possibility of Ibn Sa'ud's compromising over the blockade in return for a settlement on the neutral zone encouraged these officials to negotiate the issue with him. In fact, as long as a comprehensive settlement was on the agenda, the blockade issue seemed to have top priority for British officials. In the summer of 1935, the blockade problem was referred for direct negotiations between Saudi and Kuwayti delegates. It was then made clear that the Saudis demanded not only the lion's share of the Kuwayti customs (acquired through a customs post in Najd) but also full guarantees that not a single smuggler would penetrate from Kuwayt. In the words of the Saudi delegate, al-Walid, the Saudis insisted that in return for open trade and the erection of customs posts, "not even a single hair must get through."269 The Saudis were not ready to accept anything less than full guarantees, not even Shaykh Ahmad's "good will and honest best to try to comply with the Sa'udi demand."270 It was then that British officials decided to intervene by exerting pressure on Ibn Sa'ud. The Saudi demands seemed exaggerated to both India Office and Foreign Office officials. The bilateral and various other issues Britain was then negotiating with Saudi Arabia enabled the British to press the Saudis on the subject. Sir Samuel Hoare, the foreign secretary, instructed Ryan to inform Hamzah that Britain would see to it that no smuggling occurred but that the Saudi demand for watertight guarantees was impossible. Ryan was also instructed to suggest that a reduction in Saudi Arabia's customs rate imposed on imports arriving at the kingdom's own ports in the Gulf would discourage Saudi subjects from using Kuwayt ports and thereby decrease smuggling, and

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that the Saudis were not consistent in their demonstration of friendship to Britain. In December 1935, Ryan addressed Hamzah about the matter; in his words, Hamzah "then came into the open, having evidently got the King's consent to a partial surrender."271 Consequently, in April 1936, a draft agreement was prepared concerning the operation of the future trade route between Kuwayt and Saudi Arabia and the prevention of smuggling.272 A final agreement on the issue was not reached until 1943, but the 1936 agreement eased tension in Kuwayti-Saudi relations and paved the way for future cooperation. Another difficult issue was the demarcation of the Saudi frontier at its southern and southeastern provinces, bordering on Qatar and the emirates of the Trucial Coast, TJman and Hadramawt. These issues were first raised in 1934 when Standard Oil inquired as to whether it could obtain a concession for oil exploration in the area bordering Qatar.273 As Standard Oil had priority in Saudi territory, the question arose as to where exactly the limits of that territory were. Both India Office and Foreign Office officials were opposed to further Saudi encroachment into the Gulf area. They relied on the "Blue Line" agreement Britain had signed with the Ottomans in 1913, according to which the Ottomans had been practically excluded from the coastal areas on the Gulf, including 'Uman, conceding these regions to British influence.274 They claimed that as the inheritor of the Ottoman territories, Ibn Sa'ud had to abide by these terms. During the discussions between Hamzah and British officials in 1934 and in further correspondence in 1935, the Saudis stressed that the tribes in these areas (mainly the Al-Murrah) were under Saudi control and paid zakat to Ibn Sa'ud (there were also two hujar in the vicinity of Qatar), that Saudi Arabia was not the successor to the Ottomans—and therefore it was not bound by the Blue Line agreement—and that the respective areas had been claimed by Ibn Sa'ud since the 1922 'Uqayr agreement. In April 1935, Hamzah presented a suggestion for a border line (the "Red Line") that extended into the territories of Qatar and the Trucial Principalities of 'Uman and Hadramawt. Rendel and other officials opposed the Saudi claims, which were based on tribal grazing zones.275 Ryan, however, argued that if the main British objective were to prevent Ibn Sa'ud from encroaching on the Gulf and Hadramawt, then the 1913 agreement would be pointless, as it would allow Saudi Arabia (like the Ottoman Empire before it) to expand almost to Qatar. The territory under dispute would then constitute only a small strip of land separating Saudi Arabia from Qatar and the Trucial Coast. Ryan therefore proposed including a good part of the respective areas in Saudi territory. On Ryan's initiative, British officials carried out a further study of the tribal situation in southeastern Arabia. They came up with a new proposal for a frontier line (the "Green Line") in the same month and another in November of the same year (the "Riadh line") which went beyond the original British "Blue Line" and gave the Saudis most of the territory they claimed in the Qatar and Trucial Coast vicinities. The Saudis still demanded the zones of Jabal Nakhsh and Khawr al-'ubayd and did not accept this proposal. But the basic concept of the location of a frontier area was set.276

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Most of the territory that Ibn Sa'ud claimed was in the empty Rub" alKhali desert, which Britain would not have been able to control effectively and which held no economic prospects. The British desire to obtain Saudi goodwill and cooperation in other areas, moreover, made his claims even more acceptable in their eyes. Rendel commented on these negotiations: To fight a stubborn rearguard action knowing in advance the limits to which we are really quite ready to retreat would . . . give Ibn Sa'ud grounds for claiming that each step of our retreat had been forced upon us against our will, and our ultimate concessions to him will be much more of a victory for him than if he had given them rather more lightly. His claim to have defeated us might be untrue but it would be made to appear very plausible and very damaging to our prestige in the Gulf.277

Ironically, Rendel himself was the main initiator of concessions to Ibn Sa'ud. In October 1934, he proposed defining the Rub' al-Khali and its surroundings as a "special desert zone," in which Ibn Sa'ud would be given practical control over local tribes. Questions of sovereignty, administration, and future concessions in the area would be decided in a special settlement.278 During the ensuing negotiations, it became evident that Ibn Sa'ud was not willing to settle for the Rub' al-Khali alone and would try to obtain further territories in the Gulf. The British subcommittee dealing with Saudi Arabia's frontiers therefore decided in November 1935 to allow Ibn Sa'ud full sovereignty in the Rub' alKhali if he insisted on it, while preventing any further concession in the Gulf. Except for a small alteration in Saudi Arabia's favor in the area bordering Qatar, Britain insisted on territorial continuity among the various southern Gulf principalities and rejected Saudi demands for territories under the control of Abu-Dhabi. The frontier line in the southeast that Ibn Sa'ud was offered ran approximately along meridian 52. This frontier line was not fully determined either and remained undemarcated for decades to come. But the basic territorial principles in the region, notably the inclusion of the majority of the Rub' alKhali within the Saudi state, were set in 1936. Saudi demands for tribes in the region, notably the al-Murrah and the Manasir, were accepted.279 In November 1936, it was reported that Philby, accompanied by 300 Saudi soldiers, intimidated Hadrami tribes in an attempt to bring them over to Saudi Arabia. This was clearly an attempt to foster Saudi interests in the region and facilitate possible Saudi advancement to southern Arabia. The imam, the British resident in Aden, and Sir Reader Bullard, the new British minister at Jidda, all complained to Ibn Sa'ud about the matter.280 No similar attempts were made. Easing the various outstanding frontier issues between Saudi Arabia and Britain paved the way for an extension of the 1927 Treaty of Jidda. Although the most difficult problems were bilateral, regarding the freeing of slaves and the supply of arms (issues beyond the scope of this work), British officials decided not to regard the frontier issues as an obstacle to extending the treaty. They did insist, however, that the articles preventing Saudi encroachment into

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British-protected territories were to remain intact. Hamzah did not dispute the matter.281 The results of the various issues discussed by Britain and Saudi Arabia between 1934 and 1936 were at least partly beneficial to the Saudi state. Its relations with its neighbors improved, and a 1936 treaty of friendship with Egypt helped improve the kingdom's regional standing. Saudi Arabia was accepted by the surrounding Arab states as possessing the prerequisites of a viable state: expanded territories and frontiers, a centralized government, religious authority, and the legitimacy to conclude interstate agreements. The prospects of harm to Saudi Arabia from the outside were undoubtedly reduced. Relations with Britain were also better. Ibn Sa'ud's fears for the future of his state were partly allayed. No real economic advantages for Saudi Arabia emerged from the discussions, however. Britain was unwilling to offer a loan, and despite the vast territories annexed to Saudi Arabia, no visible or immediate economic benefit stemmed from the contemplated settlement with Kuwayt or any of the other Gulf states. The improved foreign relations did have a salutory effect on the local economy. In 1935, the number of pilgrims increased to 34,000, which meant a slightly higher income from the Hajj. Income rose to £600,000 including a somewhat higher profit from customs and from oil, discovered for the first time in al-Habar at al-Ahsa', initially amounting to 115 barrels per day. Private business increased, to the delight of foreign and Hijazi businessmen. There was also some appreciation of the riyal, which was now worth twelve to the pound. As most of the debts had been paid, the British consul observed "some improvement tendency" that was "encouraging," although the crisis was far from over.282 Except for one incident, no serious political upheaval occurred. On March 1 5, 1935, two Yemenis tried to assassinate Ibn Sa'ud and his son Sa'ud during the performance of the Hajj. The attackers used knives, slightly injuring Sa'ud before they were overpowered and killed by the guards. The would-be assassins were Yemeni nationalists, but no wider conspiracy was detected, and the incident passed with no further repercussions.283 That this was an isolated event demonstrates the tenor of Saudi society during the period: There was opposition to Ibn Sa'ud and to the existing polity, but only rarely did this opposition flare up into violence. The improved economy and growing contacts with foreign countries helped stabilize the situation. Some discontent was reported in al-Ahsa'. In December 1935, in the process of preparing the area for a future settlement with Kuwayt and for oil production, land was requisitioned, a regular court system was introduced, and a local police force of 150 men was formed.284 A high tax was imposed on the local population.285 'Abdullah Ibn Jilawi, the undisputed amir of al-Ahsa', died in 1935. His son, Sa'ud, took over, but in order to prevent any disruption in the sensitive local economy, Muhammad al-Tawil, the former customs director at Jidda, was dispatched to al-Ahsa' to occupy a similar post as the local "director of finances."286 The consequent raising of taxes and the supervision by the new amir and financial director created more, but limited, local discontent.

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In the Hijaz, too, the improved economic situation, growing trade, and increasing contacts with foreign countries made the local population, which still resented the Saudis, more cooperative with the government administration. In September 1936, Ihsanullah, the Indian informant at the British legation in Jidda, reported mild discontent. Apparently, various sectors of the population in Mecca were opposed to Ibn Sa'ud: Westernized middleaged merchants and high-level officials viewed the government as "a set of old fools" whose backwardness was the main reason for the crisis in the Hijaz. Older and more conservative merchants and 'ulama' secretly hoped that Egypt, with British aid, would take over the Hijaz. Ihsanullah also mentioned a group of young officials, young businessmen, army officers, and pilots in the small Saudi air force who thought that the government was inefficient, slow, and overgenerous to Najd. These young men, who were well educated and had foreign contacts, were influenced by the deeds of Ataturk and Mussolini, and they hoped for a similar type of a modernizing, determined rule in the Hijaz. In Ihsanullah's words: "The general idea amongst all these three classes of people and amongst the illiterate folk in Mecca . . . is to see the end of the Saudi regime, for which they earnestly pray."287 It is important to note that most of these groups did not do much other than pray. Although a basic resentment toward the Saudi regime was prevalent in the Hijaz in 1936, the population did not actually embark on any antiSaudi activities. The resentment stemmed from old pro-Hashimite feelings, from the deficiencies of the regime, and from a wish to be governed by a fashionable foreign or nationalistic, efficient regime. But there was no real call for secession or the dismantling of the state. The relative improvement in the economy and the ill-fated results of other anti-Saudi activities provided a lesson to the Hijazi population. The fact that ex-hizb al-tahrir activists like alSabban and Muhammad Tahir al-Dabbagh, who had been allowed to return, were associated with the younger group, only added to the caution of that group. Ihsanullah explained that they were "reaping the full advantage of the experience they gained out of the Hejaz." He further commented: "They [the opposition] have been able to organise a strong party of their own in the 'Majlis Ash Shura' and with [the] little power they possess in this capacity they are directing it in constitutional ways towards the best interests of the Hejaz."288 In the years to come, this opposition became the focal point of a group of educated Hijazis who felt antagonism and contempt for the Saudi regime. They did not, however, crystallize into an effective, let alone violent, opposition but preferred to coexist with the government. In 1936, Ibn Sa'ud and the Saudi government prevailed over the opposition, not because its enemies had been beaten into submission, but because the latter had chosen a course of nonresistance and acquiescence. The opposition operated within institutionalized frameworks. The regime had developed an acceptable religious creed and a system that worked and was able to withstand criticism, and the various sectors of Saudi society had accepted the kingdom and its new regime.

Conclusion

In 1937, the Saudi Arabian kingdom was still evolving. But the fundamentals of the Saudi state, which ensured continuity and a high degree of stability for the kingdom, had already been established. The demarcations of Saudi territory, the formation of a viable administrative structure, and the broad integration of the different Saudi societal groups had been achieved. These processes signified the evolution of the Saudi chieftaincy into a monarchical state. The Saudi chieftaincy established in 1902 was typical of the political entities that had coalesced and dissolved in the Arabian Peninsula for centuries. It was a loose alliance of nomads and townsmen, with a minimal, noninstitutionalized governmental structure and an undefined territory that changed in accordance with the shifts in tribal loyalty from one chieftaincy to another. Changes brought about by the Great War destroyed this pattern. British and Ottoman intervention affected the regional political and economic balances of power, and local rulers realized that in order to deal with their immediate hardships and to cope with future developments in a British-dominated Peninsula, they would have to alter this loose structure and strengthen the economic and political foundations of their chieftaincies. Thus the rivalries among chieftaincies, manifested in wars and attempts to consolidate state structures, form the backdrop for the rise of the Najdi state in 1915-20. The Saudi competition with the Hashimite chieftaincy exemplifies this change. Interchieftaincy competition, combined with a drive for internal reinforcement in the face of major strategic and economic challenges, inspired the Saudis to expand and consolidate. At first, the changes followed the traditional practices of the chieftaincy. Najd embarked on a course of war and territorial expansion, in an effort to carry on the traditional means for obtaining economic and political assets as well as to affirm the old raison d'etre of Saudi-Wahhabi chieftaincies. The Saudi chieftaincy found itself involved in tribal conflicts centered in two arenas in the northeastern and northwestern frontiers of Najd, locations that constituted the focus of Saudi activities after World War I. There was no Saudi master strategy of expansion, and even if Ibn Sa'ud did have expansionist 185

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ambitions, they did not find expression in an overall plan. The process of expansion evolved through the opportunities presented by the conflicts in each arena. The turning point came only in 1920, when after discovering a regional alliance of tribes and rulers against his chieftaincy, Ibn Sa'ud resorted to organized military campaigns that ultimately brought Jabal Shammar, the Hijaz, and 'Asir under Saudi control. Several other processes marked the passage from tribal conflict to a statesponsored strategy of expansion. One was an attempt to spread Saudi authority through the imposition of taxation; another was intermarriage with a variety of groups. The attempts to facilitate expansion through religious proselytizing, mainly by the Ikhwan, served as a major means of expansion and consolidation; religious zeal brought many groups under Saudi rule during the crucial stage of competition with other tribal chieftaincies. In the 1920s, additional factors helped legitimize Saudi expansion: claims concerning the rights of Saudis to perform the Hajj (then administered by the Hashimites), the projection of Ibn Sa'ud's charismatic leadership among the tribes, and the image of his thoughtfulness, restraint, and power that spread among British officials ("signs of statesmanship," in Balfour's words). These developments were paralleled by yet another: British involvement in regional affairs. Since 1902, Ibn Sa'ud had developed an awareness of Great Power strategies and the necessity of exploiting foreign intervention. As the British presence in the region grew more complex, Saudi interaction with British authorities acquired new nuances. Seeking a stable alliance with Britain, which Ibn Sa'ud rightly perceived as the future dominant power in the area, the Najdi ruler proved adept at using British involvement to secure his own independence and territorial expansion. The former was virtually achieved in the treaty of December 1915. In the aftermath of the treaty, Britain perceived Ibn Sa'ud as a friend, and he proved adroit at turning to his own advantage the divisions and misunderstandings among British policymakers. The group of British officials in the Persian Gulf, headed by Cox and Philby and separate from the Cairobased officials, was instrumental in allowing Ibn Sa'ud to resist Husayn's hegemony and to enjoy, after the Turaba incident of May 1919, a decisive advantage over Husayn. The loyalty of some of these officials to Ibn Sa'ud, and the financial disarray prevailing during the war, which made it possible for Ibn Sa'ud to obtain a substantially higher subsidy than was due to him, further enhanced his power. In the early 1920s, the British were primarily concerned with negotiating peace settlements in the area, and Ibn Sa'ud became a key factor in their scheme. The Najdi ruler then succeeded in projecting the image of a strong, cautious, victorious, and pro-British leader. In the eyes of officials like Cox, as well as those of less experienced newcomers to the area like Dobbs and Clayton, Ibn Sa'ud was the only restraining influence on the turbulent Najdi tribes, and he was given tremendous credit on this account. The sharp decline in Husayn's standing with the British, due to his failure to maintain an effective and economically stable rule in the Hijaz, further aided Ibn Sa'ud, mainly by neutralizing any pro-Hashimitc support during the Saudi occupation of the

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Hijaz. When Ibn Sa'ud finally embarked on military campaigns, he arrayed his forces in organized formations and managed to obtain local tribal assistance in every battle, accompanying the occupation of the Hijaz with a propaganda campaign that legitimized the venture. The vicissitudes of territorial expansion left their mark on the formation of state institutions and social bonds. Expansion turned the Saudi chieftaincy into a "conquest movement," that is, a loose coalition of tribesmen and townsmen, based on a commitment to expansion. Marriage ties, obedience to Ibn Sa'ud's personal authority typical of a chieftaincy, and revivalist-Islamic zeal constituted the main bases of authority and social cohesion during this period. On the one hand, Ibn Sa'ud and his aides continually tried to establish a new political order and to create power structures appropriate to a durable state that could persevere into the postwar era. On the other hand, for the sake of immediate and effective war and expansion, the Saudi leaders had to rely on the existing social order. Hence, from 1916 onward, the process of internal development became increasingly complex: new institutions, notably sedentarization, accompanied a social infrastructure resembling that of the traditional chieftaincy. The Ikhwan revivalist movement aimed at sedentarizing nomads and reestablishing a broad religious identity that would counter tribal ones. But the Ikhwans' practices failed to supersede the habits of chieftaincy; the Ikhwan were integrated into the tribal system, and their goals served as another incentive for expansion rather than as a basis for a solidified state. When the Ikhwan leaders failed to establish themselves as a new elite, they began to encourage their followers to engage in tribal warfare. Their failure to promote cohesion demonstrated that the superstructure they represented was unsuitable for state building. Alongside traditional practices, Ibn Sa'ud began in 1921 to construct a centralized, bureaucratic regime that would provide the superstructure for an organized state. This was manifested in the creation of initial communication, transportation, and trade networks and, notably, in taxation and reinforcement of the central administration. In contrast with the European experience, Saudi Arabian centralization did not emerge from a new middle-class drive for improved trade conditions, spurred by capitalist demands. As Lisa Anderson noted with respect to Libya and Tunisia,1 such conditions were absent in Arabia during this period. Another contention put forward by scholars—that colonialist policies were responsible for centralization—also appears inapplicable in this case. There is no evidence that British officials encouraged Ibn Sa'ud to embark on centralizing policies, although the overwhelming challenge they presented and their influence over the Kuwayti and Bahrayni governments did presumably influence the Najdi ruler. The defeated but more developed Hashimite institutions in the Hijaz also inspired the creation of the new Saudi government. Ibn Sa'ud was prompted by two other motives as well. First was the need for a method to integrate and administer an expanding state, one that included annexed populations and new territories. These conditions, in turn,

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made it imperative for the Saudi ruler to resolve new diplomatic questions and a tangle of frontier problems. Second was the need to reharness what Gibb, in his discussion of early Islamic government, called the expansionist energy,2 that is, to balance and institutionalize the forces that had been assembled to promote a conquest movement and that subsequently had to be transformed into a durable basis for a lasting state. Through the process of administrative and economic centralization, a new superstructure gradually developed that engulfed the traditional tribal society. Following the occupation of the Hijaz, the challenges of territorial integration and diplomacy—combined with the legacy of earlier centralized Hijazi governments—prompted further attempts at state building through government centralization. It then became evident, however, that the centralizing version of state building was not the only tendency in the area: Adherents of the traditional decentralized chieftaincy crystallized into a camp of their own, led by the Ikhwan and garnering wide support in Najd. A rivalry ensued between the two competing groups, with both parties basing their claims on Islamic practices sanctioned by the Wahhabi tradition. This in itself attests to Islam's versatility as a moral code that could support both tribal and organized state formation—and not only the latter, as many Western and Muslim scholars have maintained. But Wahhabi Islam did not provide a basis on which to choose between the two versions of state formation. Just as in the Saudi civil war of the 1870s, the 'ulama'v/ho served between 1927 and 1929 were not able to reach a clear decision concerning the Saudi state's proper course of development. This rivalry eventually turned into a military confrontation in which Ibn Sa'ud's centralizing version finally gained the upper hand in 1929-30. Ibn Sa'ud's victory enabled him to establish a centralized monarchical structure throughout the realm. Any tribal power that might have functioned as an alternative to Ibn Sa'ud's government was eliminated, but tribal practices and values still guided the behavior and attitudes of most societal groups. This resulted in a new form of duality, the "encapsulation" of tribal practices by the new state institutions. As a consequence, those who assumed positions in the new administrative-entrepreneurial elite were inexperienced and did not constitute a coherent group. Frontiers remained undefined; interregional and social integration was deferred; and peripheral regions such as 'Asir and northern Hijaz were neglected. Exacerbated by the severe worldwide economic crisis of the 1930S, these problems precipitated several revolts and interelite disputes. The revolt in 'Asir developed into a full-fledged war with Yemen in 1934. The Saudi government's victory over its rivals during this period resulted in a growing acquiescence by various societal sectors to the existence of the state, and a growing willingness by the government to improve its administration and the treatment of its subjects. The Saudi state evolved gradually, slowly taking on the attributes of a centralized polity. Both Ibn Sa'ud and the Saudi tribes had difficulty adapting to the principle of permanent, defined borders, for these would clash with free tribal movement and Saudi control. In the early 19205, under the pressure of

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British authorities who were seeking to demarcate the borders of local states, the Saudi perception of boundaries began to change, and fixed boundaries became a common means of marking the limits of states in the area. Saudi acquiescence to the principle of fixed boundaries underscored a more substantial change in the perception of Saudi Arabia's role vis-a-vis other states in the region. Since the Saudi occupation of the Hijaz, Ibn Sa'ud had realized that the neighboring states were not merely objects for Wahhabi conquest and targets for "purification" but also a source of pilgrims and trade, factors that contributed to the Saudi economy. Influenced by his non-Saudi advisers, Ibn Sa'ud developed a preference for British-sponsored regional tranquillity, evident in good-neighbor agreements between Saudi Arabia and adjacent states. In the wake of aggressive incursions into Saudi territory from Trans-Jordan and Yemen in the early 19305, Ibn Sa'ud sought full recognition from all the neighboring states as a means of securing Saudi Arabia's territorial integrity, and he attempted to cement this recognition by means of demarcation of boundaries, frontier settlements, and even a military pact with Iraq. In the mid-1930s, Saudi territorial perceptions focused on regionally recognized, permanent, and demarcated boundary lines and active cooperation with neighbors. Although the Saudis did not develop a judicial concept of sovereignty, they grew to favor this type of territoriality as the one that best served their interests and security. The Saudi ruling institution gradually constructed stronger state attributes. In 1915-20, "Saudi government" was still a metaphor for Ibn Sa'ud's own rule. Ibn Sa'ud presented himself as possessing the traditional, charismatic attributes of a chieftaincy ruler, and with his expertise in foreign relations as the sole factor that could "deliver" British policies in Najd's favor. He also introduced sedentarization as a means of controlling nomadic tribes and frontier areas. Beginning in the early 1920s, in the wake of Saudi expansion and the unsuccessful attempts to control the Ikhwan tribes, Ibn Sa'ud gradually adopted a policy of centralization, for the first time defining the position of the government as stronger than that of any particular group in the realm. He did so by reinforcing the provincial administration establishing a central government and by reappointing trusted umara'in the main cities. He started using the new trading facilities (notably Persian Gulf ports) and imposed higher taxation, in a further effort to subdue the Ikhwan. Ibn Sa'ud also introduced technological innovations to improve transportation and communications under the auspices of new government offices. Efforts at centralization were evident in the creation of several additional institutions. One was a consultatory body of Hijazi notables, the majlis alshura. This body did not evolve into a parliamentary institution and in fact weakened during the 1930s. The second was the institution of Ibn Sa'ud's role as king and his sons as heir apparent, viceroy, and umara'. The monarchy rested on a variety of tribal, Hashimite, and new administrative bases: on Ibn Sa'ud's role as a super intermediary among the different segments of the realm, on the Hashimite practice of designating the local ruler as king, and on the hierarchical structure of the new administration, presided over by the

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Saud family. The monarchy did not become an elaborate, ramified institution; rather, it evolved as an institution representing the old and the new practices of state authority, the populations of both Najd and the Hijaz, and the unity between them in one embracing Saudi institution. Another institution that represented the authority of the emerging Saudi government was the Wahhabi religion. Ibn Sa'ud sought to make it the state ideology and the basis of law and the state judiciary. But he failed to enlist it to support his new regime. During the period that the Ikhwan opposed Ibn Sa'ud, the ulama' did not really represent the Saudi state, and they did not resolve to support fully the government against the Ikhwan, or its version of state formation against the tribal one. The triumph of Ibn Sa'ud over the Ikhwan, through military force rather than the 'ulama's' support, resulted in Islam's becoming the focus of the ideology and law of the realm, but not of its politics and power structure. Ibn Sa'ud used religion to gain legitimacy, introduce religious services, and institute educational and judicial systems, but he did not depend on it for decisions in political affairs. Relying on the legitimacy it received from the institutions of consultation, monarchy, and religion, the power of the emerging Saudi government was based primarily on centralized administration and the supremacy of the government over any alternative, decentralizing tribal power. The government established its power through both force and administrative means and, in the 1930s, through "encapsulation," which, by the middle of the decade, was effective enough to ensure its continuation. The new polity did not conform with Max Weber's concept of "routinization of charisma"; that is, it did not constitute a fully institutionalized and bureaucratic-rational administration. Rather, it resembled a patrimonial regime based on a highly personalized system of administration and informal, traditional practices woven into the new institutions. Societal integration in the Saudi state also began to approximate that of a centralized state. The pattern of integration prevalent in the Saudi chieftaincy had focused on coalitions among tribes. Ibn Sa'ud and other members of the Saudi family fostered this principle by means of intermarriage with leading urban and nomad families throughout the realm. Moreover, the failure of the Ikhwan to eliminate tribal loyalties prolonged the role of tribes as a viable social unit. Ibn Sa'ud's efforts at centralization therefore drew on the resilience of existing social units and encapsulated them in a new administration. During the period covered in this book, there were no major demographic changes that could destroy the ecological balance and effect tribal disintegration. Consequently, Saudi society did not assimilate into cross-tribal units and did not break ascriptive loyalties. The Saudi government succeeded in bonding most segments of society to its own structures and functions. The administration, and particularly the royal leaders, became providers of subsidies, defense, and administrative rank. The government functioned as the central institution linking different parts of Saudi society. It is quite obvious that Saudi state formation did not produce a "nation" of

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Saudis during the period under review here. In many cases of post-World War I nationalism, feelings of a mythical volksgeist were based on common ethnic descent, molded through a struggle with a Western imperial power. In Saudi Arabia (and in many other Third World states), however, regional-tribal descent—rather than a concept of "nation"—determined group identity. A society that focused on tribal identities and religious values coalesced and integrated in a dialectical interaction of centripetal and centrifugal forces, rather than in the course of a struggle for independence from a European power. It was cemented by a monarchical regime and Islam rather than by secularist republican principles. The cohesion of coalitions, their ability to integrate and accept a monarchy, and a ruling version of Islam all were keys to a stable sociopolitical entity in Saudi Arabia. The regime that developed in the mid-1930s confirmed these principles. It maintained equilibrium among different tribal descent groups, which retained their particularist nature while agreeing to coexist within the framework of a state. The Saudi state demonstrated the characteristics of an "Ibn Khaldunian" type of chieftaincy, together with more Weberian, centralist, and institutionalized traits. Tribal loyalties and practices mingled with the development of a central government and administrative institutions. The royal figures themselves combined these functions, acting as top administrators and intertribal mediators and chieftains. Other state and societal institutions were molded in the same form. During the reign of King Sa'ud (1953-64), the foundations of the equilibrium that Ibn Sa'ud had established were shaken. The influence of tribal practices on decision making regarding foreign affairs, regional integration, and financial conduct could not be maintained in the face of the effects of the cold war, radical Arab nationalism, and initial oil revenues. The reforms of King Faysal (1964-75) succeeded in changing the institutions of the kingdom and transforming it into a more institutionalized state. But the fundamental principles of the original Saudi state, based on the coexistence of a wide range of parochial groups, the house of Sa'ud, and Wahhabi Islam, continued to function and to affect the future of Saudi Arabia.

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APPENDIX A

The Main Tribes and Tribal Leaders

Involved in the Events Covered in This Book

Tribes in East Arabia (and penetrating into Iraq) 1. The Mutayr were a big Wahhabi tribe that dwelt in eastern Najd, al-Ahsa', Kuwayt, and northern Najd to the Muntafiq in Iraq. They occasionally fought Ibn Sa'ud till 1915 and then became the most important Ikhwan tribe. Fay sal al-Dawish was the chief of the 'Ilwa section and recognized as the supreme leader of the tribe. Ibn Shuqayr was al-Dawish's lieutenant and belonged to the same section. He commanded the Hijra of al-Jarriyya. The other section of the Mutayr, the Briyya, was divided into several subsections, headed by 'AH Ibn Shuwayrabat, Shuryan, andJasirlbnLami; Salman Ibn Busayyis; and Na'if Ibn Fuqum. After 1923 they became the "Ikhwan refugees" in Iraq. The Mutayr participated in the Ikhwan revolt and lost political power after the Ikhwan's subjugation in 1929-30. 2. The 'Awazim originated from the Hutaym tribe and included a collection of different tribal malcontents who had had Kuwayti protection since 1918. They lived in al-Ahsa' and Kuwayt. They also displayed loyalty to Ibn Sa'ud but had no significant leader among them. 3. The 'Ujman, another Wahhabit tribe, also dwelt in al-Ahsa', Kuwayt, and up to the Muntafik in Iraq. They were in opposition to Ibn Sa'ud's clan from the nineteenth century and until 1919. Parts of the 'Ujman were evacuated to Zubayr under British control in 1917-18. Most of the tribe became Ikhwan in the early 1920s. Their leader Didan Ibn Hithlayn. After his assassination in 1929, he was succeeded by Na'if Ibn Hithlayn, who had previously headed the Khudayr section. The c Ujman participated in the Ikhwan's revolt and lost political power after the Ikhwan's subjugation in 1929-30. 193

194

THE MAKING OF SAUDI ARABIA

Tribes Dwelling Mainly in Iraq 4. The Shammar, notably the Abda section, lived in the Jazira in northern Iraq and in the Shamiyya desert in the south. They were headed by 'Aqab Ibn 'Ajil, who often raided Najd in the 1920s. They wandered to Iraq mainly after the fall of Ha'il, in November 1921. Until then they inhabited the Rashidi state in Jabal Shammar and were usually loyal to the Rashidi dynasty (with the exception of some groups who became pro-Saudi), though they were divided regarding the contenders to the Rashidi throne, Sa'ud Ibn Subhan, Faysal Ibn Fahd, and others. The following tribes were mainly involved in the Saudi-Iraqi frontier problems in the 1920s: 5. The 'Amarat section of the 'Anaza lived in the Jazira and in the Syrian desert. They were headed by Fahd Ibn Khaz'al, who maintained a continuing contact with Ibn Sa'ud, who claimed control over the tribe. But the 'Amarat remained under Iraq's protection. 6. The Dahamsha lived in the Shamiyya desert in Iraq and were headed by Jaza' Ibn Mijlad. Ibn Sa'ud claimed control over them and maintained contact with their leader. But from the mid-1920s onward the Dahamsha became an Iraqi tribe. 7. The Dhafir dwelt in the Muntafiq, led by Hamud Ibn Suwayt and, after his death, by 'Ajaymi Ibn Suwayt. A rival chief, Lizam Abu Dhara', tried to achieve supremacy by beating the Suwayts. Ibn Sa'ud claimed control over the tribe and maintained contact with both factions. 8. The Muntafiq tribe was led by Yusuf Beg of the Sa'dun clan. They were traditional rivals of the Dhafir and of Ibn Sa'ud, although Yusuf sometimes cooperated with the Najdi ruler. The Dhafir and the Muntafiq tribes remained Iraqi tribes. Tribes Stationed Mainly in the Northern Hijaz and Trans-Jordan 9. The Ruwalla also originated in the 'Anaza. They were powerful and quasi-independent, living in the Syrian desert and in al-Jawf. They collaborated with the Hashimites during the Arab Revolt and then maintained good relations with all the surrounding rulers who had interests in the area: Ibn Sa'ud, 'Abdullah in Trans-Jordan, and the French in Syria. Nuri Sha'lan was their leader, although in the 1920s various factions differed over whom the tribe should align itself among the surrounding rulers. Members of the Sha'lan family, like Fawwaz, Nawwaf, Mujhim, and others led those sections. 10. The Huwaytat dwelt in southern Trans-Jordan, headed by 'Awda Abu Tayy. They assisted the Hashimites during the Arab Revolt but then cooperated with Ibn Sa'ud and became Ikhwan. 11. Along the Hijaz-Trans-Jordan frontier lived other tribes, often crossing from one state into the other. The Shararat often raided into Trans-Jordan

APPENDIX: TRIBES AND TRIBAL LEADERS

195

in the late 1920s. The Billi followed suit, finding refuge in Trans-Jordan during the famine in the Hijaz in 1932. A section of this tribe, led by 'Abd al-Hamid Ibn Rifada, was the pivotal force in the anti-Saudi plot, launched in May 1932. The Bani 'Atiyya resided in the northern Hijaz, but sections of them dwelt in Karak, deep in Trans-Jordan. They often changed sides between Ibn Sa'ud and 'Abdullah and were a constant problem for both sides along Wadi Sirhan, on the northeastern side of the Saudi-Trans-Jordan border. Tribes Stationed in Western Najd and the Hijaz 12. The 'Utayba lived in central Arabia, from Ta'if in the Hijaz to the center of Najd. They shifted between Saudi and Hashimite protection until 1915-16, when they became an Ikhwan tribe. Sultan Ibn Humayd led the Rutba section and was their most important leader. During the 1920s there were factions led by Na'if Ibn Humayd and 'Ubayd Ibn Humayd. 'Abd al-Rahman Ibn Ruba'yan led the Ruqba section. Khalid Ibn alLuway came from the 'Utayba, although he functioned as the amir of Khurma and led his townspeople. The 'Utayba participated in all the Saudi expansionist campaigns, notably those into the Hijaz. They participated in the Ikhwan revolt in 1929-30 and lost some power after the Ikhwan's subjugation. 13. The Harb lived in the central part of Najd and the Hijaz. They had been partly Wahhabi and became Ikhwan between 1915 and 1918. They participated in several Saudi wars. Their leader was Muhsin al-Firm. 14. The Bani Malik dwelt in the central area of the Hijaz, under Sharif Muhsin al-Mansur. 15. In and about the town of Khurma lived the Subay' tribe, who were Wahhabis, and the Buqum tribe, who also inhabited Turaba. As mentioned, Khurma was also inhabited by groups of the 'Utayba. Tribes Dwelling in Southern Najd and 'Asir 16. The Qahtan were a big Wahhabi tribe in the central parts of southern Najd. They had been loyal to Ibn Sa'ud since 1903, became Ikhwan, and participated in most of the Saudi military expeditions. In southeast Najd lived the Al-Murra, who revolted against Ibn Sa'ud in 1915 but after that had remained loyal to him. In the 1930s their grazing areas were a major criterion in defining the Saudi frontier line in this area. 17. The Bani Yam lived in southeast 'Asir and stood out as an Isma'ili-Shfi tribe. They maintained contact with both Ibn Sa'ud and Imam Yahya of Yemen, but in 1933-34, they fought against Yahya on the Saudi side.

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APPENDIX B

The House of Sa'ud Until Ibn Saud's Rule

197

r SA'UD IBN" MUHAMMAD

• 'ABD AL- 'AZIZ 2nd Amir •SA'UD 3rd Amir

L 'ABDULLAH L-M!SH"ARI L- KHALID 4th Amir

1 s- 'ABDULLAH 11th Amir & restored as 13th Amir

-SA'UD 12th Amir (d. 1874)

•'ABDULLAH

-THUNAYYAN

-TURK! 6th Amir

• 'ABDULLAH 9th Amir

• FAYSAL 7th Amir & restored as 10th Amir (d. 1865)

•JILAWi

-IBRAHIM

•SA'D •MUHAMMAD

- 'ABD AL- 'AZIZ "ibn Saud" 1st King of Saudi Arabia (d. 1953)

LSA'UD

-KHALID

-FAHD

-FAHD "-TURKI "- KHALID "-MUHAMMAD LfAHD -KHALID

L

L-

ABD

AL-MUHSIN

Ami of Ha' ii until 1973

-SA'D KABDULLAH [-AHMAD

-MUHAMMAD -'ABDULLAH

L'ABDULLAH

-'ABDULLAH "-MUSA'ID L FAHD

(d. 1928)

•'ABD AL-'AZIZ •FAYSAL •FAHD

-THUNAYYAN

•'ABD AL-RAHMAN

• 'ABD AL- 'AZIZ -FAYSAL

8th Amir

L MUHAMMAD

"-MUHAMM/AD"- 'ABDULLAH -'ABD AL-'AZiZ - FAYSAL

5th Amir

-MUHAMMAD 1st Amir of Najd (d. 1765)

L L

j-MUSA'ID

LBANDAR L-'ASD AL- "-FAYSAL RAHMAN

BANDAR

L

-SA'D

-BANDAR

TURKI L SA'UD L FAYSAL LMUHAMMAD L- KHALID L FAHD (d. 1919) 2nd King 3rd King 4th King 5th King (d. 1969) (d. 1975) (d. 1982)

The house of Salid until Ibn Saud's rule (including only his elder sons). Based on D. Schofield, and R. Kemp, eds., The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (London: Stacey International, 1990). Courtesy of Stacey International.

APPENDIX C

Rulers in Neighboring States During the Period Covered in This Book

Idrisi rulers of 'Asir Muhammad Ibn 'Ali Ibn Muhammad al-Idrisi 'Ali Ibn Muhammad al-Idrisi Hasan Ibn 'Ali Ibn Muhammad al-Idrisi

1904-23 1923-26 1926-33

Rulers of Kuwayt Mubarak Ibn Sabah Jabir Ibn Mubarak Salim Ibn Mubarak Ahmad al-Jabir 'Abdullah ai-Salim

1896-1915 1915-17 1917-21 1921-50 1950-65

Rashidi Rulers of Ha 'il and Jabal Shammar Muhammad Ibn 'Abdullah 'Abd al-'Aziz Ibn Mifib Mifib Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz Sultan Ibn Hamud Sa'ud Ibn Hamud Faysal Ibn Hamud Sa'ud Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz 'Abdullah Ibn Mit'ib Muhammad Ibn Tallal

1870-97 1897-1905 1905-6 1906-8 1908-1908 1908-1908 1908-20 1920 1920-21

199

200

THE MAKING OF SAUDI ARABIA

Hashimite Rulers of the Hijaz (of the 'Awn clan) 'Awn al-Rafiq Ibn Muhammad 1882-1905 'All Ibn 'Abdullah 1905-8 Husayn Ibn 'Ali 1908-24 'All Ibn Husayn 1924-25 Faysal Ibn Husayn was king of Syria (1918-20) and of Iraq (1921-33). 'Abdullah Ibn Husayn was the ruler (amir) of Trans-Jordan from 1921 to 1946 and the king there until 1951.

APPENDIX D

Maps: Major Settlements, Principal Tribes, and Frontier Zones

201

Map I. Major towns and other important settlements in Saudi Arabia. Source: F. Clements, Saudi Arabia, World Bibliographical Series (Oxford: Clio Press, 1979; reprinted 1988). Courtesy of Clio Press.

202

Map 2. Principal tribes of Arabia. Source: D. Schofield and R. Kemp, The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (London: Stacey International, 1990). Courtesy of Stacey International.

203

Map 3. The Sa'udi-Iraqi frontier zone, including the controversial Iraqi frontier posts. Source: J. B. Glubb, War in the Desert (London: Hodder and Stoughoton, 1960), p. 195. Courtesy of the Estate of Sir John Bagot Glubb.

Map 4. The Saudi-Yemeni frontier zone: 'Asir. 205

Map 5. The Saudi-Trans-Jordanian frontier zone.

206

N es

Introduction 1. See the discussion on tribes in D. F. Eickelman, The Middle East: An Anthropological Approach, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1988), pp. 73-150; F. M. Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), pp. 11-36; C. M. Helms, The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia: Evolution of Political Identity (London: Croom Helm, 1981), pp. 29-75. 2. See Helms, The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia; J. G. Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, 'Oman and Central Arabia (Calcutta: Government Printing House, 1908-15). 3. This type of society is discussed by E. Gellner, Muslim Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 1-99; H. R. P. Dickson, The Arab of the Desert (London: Allen & Unwin, 1956); W. Shack and P. S. Cohen, eds., Politics in Leadership (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 3-10. Compare these with M. Fortes and E. E. Evans Pritchard, African Political Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 1-23. 4. The analysis mainly follows Ronald Cohen's thesis as outlined in his introduction to R. Cohen and E. R. Service, eds., Origins of the State (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1978), pp. 1-17; also see I. Schapera, Government and Politics in Tribal Societies (London: C. A. Watts, 1963); J. Middleton and D. Tail, eds., Tribes Without Rulers (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958), pp. 1-31; the introduction by A. S. Ahmed and D. M. Hart, eds., Islam in Tribal Societies (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), pp. 1-20; and Ibn Khaldun, An Introduction to History: The Muqaddimah, trans. F. Rosenthal (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967), vol. 2; Gellner, Muslim Society; and J. Kostiner, "The Hashimite 'Tribal Confederacy' of the Arab Revolt, 1916-1917," in E. Ingram, ed., National and International Politics in the Middle East, Essays in Honour of Elie Kedourie (London: Cass, 1986), pp. 126-143; see also P. S. Khoury and J. Kostiner, "Introduction: Tribes and the Complexities of State Formation in the Middle East," in Khoury and Kostiner, eds., Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East (Berkeley arid Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 1-24; I. M. Lapidus, "Tribes and State Formation in Islamic History," in Khoury and Kostiner, eds., Tribes and State Formation, pp. 2547; E. Gellner, "Tribalism and the State in the Middle East," in Khoury and Kostiner,

207

208

NOTES

eds., Tribes and State Formation, pp. 109-26; Eickelman, The Middle East, pp. 73-94, 126-50. 5. See M. J. Kister, "Mecca and Tamim," in M.J. Kister, Studies in Jahiliyya and Early Islam (London: Various, 1980), pp. 113-63; D. F. Eickelman, "Musaylima," Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 10 (1967): 17-53; R- B. Serjeant, "Haram and Hawta," in A. R. Badawi, ed., Melanges Taha Husain (Cairo: Dar al-Ma'aref, 1962), pp. 41-58; H. Rosenfeld, "The Social Composition of the Military in the Process of State Formation in the Arabian Desert," Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 95 (1965): 75-86; Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests. 6. Helms, The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia, pp. 102-16; A. S. al-Uthaymin, "Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab: The Man and His Work" (Ph.D. diss., University of Edinburgh, 1972), p. 275; E. Rosenthal, Political Thought in Medieval Islam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), pp. 51-61. 7. Rosenthal, Political Thought; Uthaymin, "Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab," pp. 275-76; L. P. Goldrup, "Saudi Arabia 1902-1932: The Development of a Wahhabi Society" (Ph.D. diss., University of California at Los Angeles, 1971), pp. 203-5. 8. M. J. Crawford, "Civil War, Foreign Intervention and the Question of Political Legitimacy: A Nineteenth Century Saudi Qadi's Dilemma," International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 14 (1982): 227-48. 9. Goldberg's thesis is brought out in his book The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia and the Formative Years, 1902-1918 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986). 10. D. Holden and R. Johns, The House of Sa'ud (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1981), pp. 1-51; Goldberg, The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia; Goldrup, "Saudi Arabia," pp. 24-150. 11. These views emerge from reading Goldrup's and Helms's works, as well as from personal accounts such as H. St. John B. Philby's Arabian Jubilee (London: Hole, 1952); or K. Williams's Ibn Saud: The Puritan King of Arabia (London: Cape, 1933); or by Arab writers such as Ahmad Abd al-Ghafur 'Attar, Saqr al-Jazira (Beirut: Matba'at al-Hurriyya, 1973). 12. See the thesis presented by G. Ben-Dor, State and Conflict in the Middle East: Emergence of the Post-Colonial State in the Middle East (New York: Praeger, 1983). 13. Cohen, "Introduction," relates to new conditions, revealing the seeds of a new state formation process. These conditions include drastic economic changes and a fundamental shift in the balance of power in a region. Such changes, in their turn, alter old loyalties and traditional political structures. New disputes and new alliances emerge accompanied by a new, compelling motivation among parts of the local population to establish new facets of state in order to thrive under the new conditions. In his introduction, Cohen focuses mostly on two processes that form and reform states: One is war, leading to state formation by conquest, annexation, and subjugation of territories and populations, and the other is internal consolidation, stemming from a necessity to overcome an anarchy of establishing a binding order. The combination of both processes forms cases of state building. 14. Philby, Arabian Jubilee, p. 33; G. Troeller, The Birth of Saudi Arabia, Britain and the Rise of the House of Saud (London: Cass, 1976), pp. 7-12. 15. B. C. Busch, Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1894-1914 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 304-47. 16. D. Silverfarb, "The British Government and the Khurma Dispute 1918-1919," Arabian Studies 5 (1979): 37-52; L/P&S/10/586, P5263, Arab Revolt: Sir M. Sykes's report, December 13, 1916.

CHAPTER 1

209

17. E. Kedourie, In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth: The Husayn McMahon Correspondence and Its Interpreters 1914-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976); Kostiner, "The Hashemite 'Tribal Confederacy'." 18. Philby, Arabian Jubilee, p. 43. 19. N. N. E. Bray, A Paladin of Arabia (London: Heritage, 1936). This tendency is sensed throughout the book; see in particular Leachman's meeting with Lawrence, pp. 297-98; See also B. C. Busch, Britian, India and the Arabs 1914-1921 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 165, 179-80; 'Umar Abu alNasr, Sirat al-Jazira al-Arabiyya Li-Ibn Sa'ud (Beirut: al-Maktaba al-Ahliyya, 1935), p. 104. 20. L/P&S/IO/586, p. 705, Note by Sir A. Hirtzel, December 23, 1916. 21. A.B., no. 19, Note to ARBUR, July 17, 1916; enclosed are Ibn Sa'ud's letters to Cox, June and August 15 1916. 22. FO 371/3046/10971, Pol. Bas. to Foreign, January 12,1917; FO 371/3046/13924, Cox to Foreign, January 15, 1917. 23. Busch, Britain, India and the Arabs, pp. 215-30. 24. Ibid., pp. 223-24. 25. Goldberg, The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia, pp. 112-35. 26. Kedourie, In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth. 27. FO 371/3383/2557, Hogarth to HCE, report on mission to Jidda, January 15, 1918. 28. FO 882/3, AP/18/1, Memo by Cox re meeting at the residency, Cairo, June 14, 1917. 29. FO 371/19117/3056, Wingate to SOSFO, December 23, 1917. 30. A.B., no. 41, February 6, 1917; R. L. Coleman, "Revolt in Arabia, 1916-1917: Conflict and Coalition in a Tribal System" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1976), pp. 208-10. 31. H. St. John B. Philby, Arabia of the Wahhabis (London: Constable, 1928), pp. 216-18; A. J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1925), p. 330. 32. FO 882/3, minutes of a meeting at the residency, Cairo, May 12, 1912. 33. FO 686/14, ARBUR to Wilson, September 21, 1917. 34. A.B., no. 92, June 11, 1918. 35. Cohen, "Introduction," pp. 1-17. 36. Goldberg, The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia, pp. 167, 112-35; R/15/5/104, Diary by R. Hamilton on a visit to Najd, December 19-28, 1917.

CHAPTER 1

1. Admiralty, Geographical Handbook for Arabia (London: Naval Intelligence Division, 1920); pp. 83-84 (hereafter cited as Handbook). 2. FO 371/5o61/E378, note by G. Bell, February 23, 1920; A.B., note by Lieutenant R. Marrs, A.P.O. Zubeir, no. 43, February 28, 1917 (hereafter cited as Marrs, note). 3. Marrs' note; Handbook, p. 77. 4. FO371/4144/4370, Philby to Wilson, report on the operation of the Najd mission, November 2, 1918 (hereafter cited as Philby, report); FO 371/3044/3539, A. T. Wilson to ARBUR, Cairo, relations with Ibn Saud, September 17, 1917 (hereafter cited as Wilson, relations).

210

NOTES

5. Wilson, relations; P.P., Inward Correspondence, vol. 1; G. Bell, The Ajman Question, September 5, 1918 (hereafter cited as The Ajman Question). 6. Philby, report. 7. Wilson, relations; FO 371/306Q/101317, Cox to Foreign, September 28, 1917, including a report of an American missionary, Dr. Harrison: The Ajman Question. 8. Philby, report. 9. Wilson, relations. 10. FO 686/14, ARBUR, Cairo to C. E. Wilson, September 21, 1917. 11. The Ajman Question. 12. CO 727/3/10767, note by Colonel Hamilton, political agent, Kuweit, based on conversation at Riyadh in November 1917 (hereafter cited as Hamilton, note). 13. The Ajman Question. 14. Philby, report; Hamilton, note. 15. P.P., Diary of Political Mission to Central Arabia, 1917-1918, vol. 2, Cairo to Riyad, April 13 (hereafter cited Philby, Diary). 16. Hamilton, note. 17. Philby, Diary, April 13, 1918; Amin al-Rihani, Ta'rikh Najd wa-Mulhaqatihi (Beirut: Dar al-Rihani, 1928), p. 267 (hereafter cited as al-Rihani, Najd)', Sallah al-Din al-Mukhtar, Ta'rikh al-Mamlaka al-'Arabiyya al-sa'udiyya (Beirut: Dar Maktabat alHayat, 1957), pp. 221-22 (hereafter cited as al-Mukhtar). 18. Marrs, note; FO 882/21, IS 19/25, H. Dickson, notes on the "Akhwan" movement (hereafter cited as Dickson, Akhwan). 19. Wilson, relations; and enclosures in P.P. Box xv/12, translation of a set of instructions to be communicated to and imposed upon the Zafir, Shammar, Aslam, and Ajman, with the consent and approval of Ibn Saud and Shaykh of Kuwait, November 1916; see also Handbook. 20. Handbook, pp. 83-84; FO 371/5o61/E378, note by G. Bell, February 23, 1920; H. R. P. Dickson, The Arab of the Desert (London: Allen & Unwin, 1949), p. 47. Dickson noted that the dira of the Mutayr was 120 miles wide and 180 miles long; L. P. Goldrup, "Saudi Arabia, 1902-1932: The Development of a Wahhabi Society" (Ph.D. diss., University of California at Los Angeles, 1971), pp. 74-83. 21. P.P., Inward Correspondence, vol. 1, Pol. Bas. to Pol. Ku., August 18, 1918; Pol. Ku. to Philby, August 23, 1918. Didan said that he would not be able to stop the TJjman's raids as long as the Mutayr would raid his tribe. See Pol. Bas. to Pol. Ku., December 6, 1918. 22. Ibid. 23. Handbook, 1920, pp. 77, 83. 24. P.P., Inward Correspondence, vol. 1, Pol. Bas. to Pol. Ku., August 18, 1918; Pol. Ku. to Philby, August 23, 1918. 25. FO 882/8, IS/16/14, Ibn Saud to Cox, October 20, 1916; FO 371/3390/152559, Wingate to SOSFO, September 4, 1918. 26. FO 371/3062/216547, Lawrence to Wingate, July 29, 1917; FO 371/3390/19117, Wingate to SOSFO, December 23, 1917. 27. FO 882/8,IS/16/4, Ibn Saud to Cox, July 20, 1916; Arbur Basra to Arbur Cairo, September 8, 1916. 28. Wilson, relations. 29. FO 686/14, ARBUR (Cairo) to C. E. Wilson, May 23, 1917. 30. FO 686/14, H. Ruhi to C. E. Wilson, May 24, 1917; CO 727/3/10767, notes by Colonel Hamilton, Pol. Ku., based on a conversation at Riyadh in November 1917. 31. A.B., no. 29, November 8, 1917.

CHAPTER 1

211

32. Diary by R. Hamilton on a visit to Najd, December 19-28, 1917 (hereafter cited as Hamilton, Diary). 33. R. L. Colman, "Revolt in Arabia, 1916-1919: Conflict and Coalition in a Tribal Political System" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1976), pp. 63-68, 289-90. 34. J. Kostiner, "The Hashimite Tribal Confederacy of the Arab Revolt, 19161917," in E. Ingram, ed., National and International Politics in the Middle East: Essays in Honour of Elie Kedourie (London: Cass, 1986), pp. 29-49. 35. FO 686/10, report by Capt. Goldie, n.d. (probably written in early 1918 (hereafter cited as Goldie, report). 36. Handbook, pp. 63-68; FO 686/15, H. Goldie to Basset, September 7, 1918; S. Iqbal, The Emergence of Saudi Arabia (Singar: Saudiyah Publishers, 1977) p. 36. 37. Goldrup, "Saudi Arabia," pp. 309-10; Amin Sa'icl, Ta'rikh al-Dawla alSa'udiyya, (Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-'Arabi, 1964) pp. 81-82 (hereafter cited as Sa'id). 38. FO 371/4146/91521, N. Garland, note on the Khurma dispute, June 21, 1919 (hereafter cited as Garland, note). 39. Goldrup, "Saudi Arabia," p. 309; H. St. John B. Philby, Arabia of the Wahhabis (London: Constable, 1928), pp. 20-21. 40. FO 371/3390/191477, CCB to Foreign, July 9, 1918; Goldrup, "Saudi Arabia," P- 30941. FO 371/3390/191477, CCB to Foreign, July 9, 1918; Philby, Arabia of the Wahhabis, p. 19. 42. Handbook, pp. 79-80; Marrs's note. 43. FO 686/23, ARBUR, Cairo, to C. E. Wilson, June 6, 1917 (referring to a letter of Ibn Sa'ud to Cox, May 12, 1917); Hamilton, Diary. 44. FO 371/3057/186688, Cox to Cairo, September 21, 1917. 45. FO 371/3057/217020, Cox to Foreign, January 21, 1917. 46. L/P&S/IO/765, P7I34, C. E. Wilson to ARBUR, Cairo, interview with Muhammad Mughayribi al-Futayh, December 19, 1918 (hereafter cited as Al-Futayh, interview). 47. FO 371/3057/203556, Cox to SOSIO, October 22, 1917. 48. Hamilton, Diary. 49. G. Troeller, The Birth of Saudi Arabia: Britain and the Rise of the House of Saud (London: Cass, 1976), p. 108; D. Silverfarb, "The Philby Mission to Ibn Sa'ud 1917-1918," Journal of Contemporary History 14 (1979): 269-86. 50. Philby, report. 51. FO 371/19117/3056, Wingate to SOSFO, October 23, 1917; FO 882/8,IS/17/17, Cornwallis to C. S. Symes, October 3, 1917. 52. FO 371/3601/192213. Wingate to SOSFO, October 5, 1917. 53. FO 371/3061/243246, Cox to Foreign, July 28,1917; R/15/2/38, Pol. Bah. to Pol. Bag, December 7, 1917, December 9, 1917. 54. H. St. John B. Philby, Arabian Jubilee (New York: Day, 1953), p. 53. 55. Philby, report. 56. Ibid. 57. R/15/2/38, Philby to Pol. Bag., January 9, 1918; FO 882/9, Hogarth to ARBUR, Cairo, January 10, 1918. 58. Quoted by Troeller, The Birth of Saudi Arabia, pp. 112, 139. 59. FO 686/14, Philby to Pol. Ku., January 9, 1918; FO 686/14, Philby to Pol. Ku. n.d., probably January 8, 1918; FO 882/8, IS/17/25, Cornwallis to Clayton, December 5, 1917; J. Goldberg, The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia: The Formative Years, 1902igi8 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), p. 159; al-Mukhtar, p. 194.

212

NOTES

60. FO 686/14, Philby to Pol. Ku., January 9, 1918. 61. FO 882/9, IS/i8/ii, private note of a meeting held at the residency, Cairo, January 21, 1918 (hereafter cited as note on the Cairo meeting); P.P., Box XV/5, Hogarth to Wingate, January 10, 1918. 62. P.P. Box XV/5, Hogarth to Wingate, January 10, 1918. 63. Hamilton, Diary; FO 686/14, Philby to Pol. Ku., January 9, 1918. 64. FO 371/3383/26262, Pol. Bag. to Foreign, November 14, 1918. 65. Note on the Cairo meeting. 66. Philby, report. 67. Philby, Diary, April 13, 1918; Philby, report. 68. Philby, Diary, April 13, 1918. 69. FO 371/3390/191477, Pol. Ku to Pol. Bag., July 7, 1919; P. P., Inward Correspondence, vol. 1, Pol. Ku. to CCB, July 8, 1919. 70. Philby, report. 71. Philby, Diary, April 13, 1918. 72. Philby, report; R/15/2/38, Philby to Pol. Bag., July 13, 1918. 73. FO 371/3383/7730, Wingate to SOSFO, January 12, 1918; Silverfarb, "The Philby Mission." 74. FO 882/8, IS/17/34, Hogarth to Wingate, December 31, 1917; FO 882/8, IS/17/ 32, Wingate to SOSFO, December 23, 1917; Silverfarb, "The Philby Mission"; FO 371/19117/1390, Wingate to SOSFO, December 25, 1917; FO 371/3383/6696, Wingate to SOSFO, January 10, 1918. 75. FO 371/1917/1390, Wingate to SOSFO, December 23, 1917. 76. Quoted by Silverfarb, "The Philby Mission." 77. Ibid. 78. Quoted by B. C. Busch, Britain, India and the Arabs, 1914-1921 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971), p. 255. 79. FO/37I/34O7/7O822, account of a meeting at the residency, March 23, 1918; FO 371/3061/245024, Cox to Foreign, December 23, 1917. 80. R/15/5/101, Cox to Foreign, March 9, 1918; Silverfarb, "The Philby Mission." 81. Ibid.; P.P., Najd Mission, vol. 1, Cox to Philby, March 9, 1918; R/15/5/101, Cox to Foreign, March 9, 1918. 82. FO 686/39, Husayn to Ibn Saud, May 7, 1918. 83. FO 371/3389/11716, Wingate to Balfour, June 7, 1918 (Husayn's letter to Ibn Saud, undated, is enclosed); FO 686/39, Hussein to Nil, June 29, 1918; C. E. Wilson, interview with Hussein, July 20, 1918. 84. Goldrup, "Saudi Arabia," p. 310. 85. See. for example, Philby, Arabian Jubilee, pp. 59-61. 86. Philby, Arabia of the Wahhabis, pp. 46-47; Binua Mishan (Mechin), 'Abd al'Aziz Sirat Ball wa-Mulid Mamlaka (Beirut: Dar al-Katib al-'Arabi, 1965), pp. 44-46. 87. For example: FO 882/9, 18/18/46, note by Clayton, August 15, 1918; D. Silverfarb, "The British Government and the Khurma Dispute, 1918-1919," Arabian Studies 5 (1979): 37-52 • 88. FO 371/3383/172134, secret note by Clayton, September 9, 1918. 89. FO 371/3390/130592, SOSFO to HCE, July 29, 1918; FO 371/3390/133928, viceroy to SOSFO, July 30, 1918. 90. FO 882/9, IS/18/62, Ibn Sa'ud to Philby, July 25, 1918; CAB 2723, Cornwallis to Ormsby Gore, December 14, 1917; FO 882/9, IS/18/62, Ibn Sa'ud to Philby, July 25, 1918; FO 882/1, IS/18/94, Ibn Sa'ud to Philby, August 30, 1918. 91. Philby, Arabia of the Wahhabis, pp. 332-33.

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213

92. FO 371/3390/4793 ARBUR Baghdad to Foreign, July 9, 1918 (from Philby, June 6, 1918). 93. FO 686/16, Pol. Bag. to HCE, October 16,1918 (from Philby, October 15); R/ 15/5/101, Philby to Cox, June 6, 1918. 94. Philby to Cox, June 6, 1918. 95. Silverfarb, "The Philby Mission." 96. FO 371/3390/7213, Pol. Bag. to Foreign, August 8, 1918. 97. R/I5/5/IO3, Pol. Bag. to Foreign, August 7, 1918. 98. FO 686/18, N. Garland, note on Wilson and the Khurma crisis, August 2,1918. 99. 'Umar Abu al-Nasr, Sirat al-Jazira al-'Arabiyya li-Ibn Sa'ud (Beirut: alMaktaba al-Ahliyya, 1935), p. 118 (hereafter cited as Abu al-Nasr). 100. P.P., Box XV/5, Ibn Sa'ud to Hussein, August 15, 1918. 101. P.P., Box XV/V, Ibn Sa'ud to Cox, August 30, 1918. 102. Abu al-Nasr, p. 122. 103. Gertrude Bell's letter of March 7, 1917, in Lady G. Bell, ed., The Letters of Gertrude Bell (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1939), vol. 2, pp. 335-40; A.B., no. 57, July 29, 1917. 104. P.P., Box XV/II, enclosure to serial no. 3, June 1917 (The author of this report is unknown). 105. A. Musil, Northern Nejd (New York: American Geographical Society, 1928), p. 250. 106. H. Rosenfeld, "The Social Composition of the Military in the Process of State Formation in the Arabian Desert," Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 95 (1965): 75-86. 107. Iqbal, The Emergence of Saudi Arabia, pp. 107-8. 108. FO 882/8, IR/18/1, ARBUR Cairo (Philby) to Pol. Bas., February 4,1918; IR/ 18/5, note on Philby's draft telegram to Cox (February 7, 1918) by Cornwallis, August 8, 1918. 109. 'Abd al-'AzizRifa'i and 'Abd al-Rahman Yunis, Bina'al-Dawla al-'Arabiyya alsa'udiyya bi al-'Asr al-Hadith wa-al-Mu'asir (Cairo: Al-maktaba al-'Alamiyya, 1978), pt. 1, p. 45no. A.B., no. 91, June 4, 1918; FO 686/23, 'Abdullah to Hussein, September 5,

1917; FO 686/24, L. L. Bright to D.C.P.O. Damascus, 111. A.B., no. 57, July 24, 1917.

112. A.B., no. 91, June 4, 1918. 113. A.B., no. 99, August 6, 1918. 114. FO 882/8, IR/18/10, copy of an agreement between Ibn Rashid and the Sherif, dated 4 Dul'Qada 1336 (July 1918). 115. Ibid.; see also FO 686/23, C. E. Wilson to ARBUR, Cairo, November 17,1918. 116. FO 686/23, Garland (Yanbo) to Jedda, November 18, 1918; Yanbo to Bassett, September 15, 1918; L/P&S/10/769, p. 4929, Wingate to SOSFO, November 4, 1918; FO 371/9390/18591 Wingate to SOSFO, November 12, 1918. 117. FO 882/9, IS/18/106, Basset to C. E. Wilson, December 9, 1918; FO 37I/339O/ 188149, Pol- Bag. to Cairo, November 9, 1918. 118. R/15/2/34, Siddiq Hassan to Res. Bush., September 15, 1919; FO 686/24, L. L. Bright to D.C.P.O. Damascus, November 18, 1919. 119. FO 686/16, Pol. Bag. to HCE, October 16, 1918. 120. FO 371/3390/206397, SOSIO to CCB, December 13, 1918. 121. R/15/2/34, Allenby to Pol. Bag., May 27, 1919; R/15/2/34, note by N. Garland, dispute between King Husayn and Ibn Sa'ud, n.d.

214

NOTES

122. Silverfarb, "The British Government and the Khurma Dispute." 123. FO 371/3390/176864, SOSIO to viceroy, November 17, 1918; FO 37I/3390/ 206397, SOSIO to CCI, December 13, 1918. 124. Quoted by Silverfarb, "The British Government and the Khurma Dispute." 125. Philby, report; FO 882/9, IS/18/61, Pol. Bag to SOSIO, September 9, 1918; FO 882/9, IS/18/99, Pol. Bas. SOSIO, December 28, 1918. 126. Silverfarb, "The British Government and the Khurma Dispute." 127. W. P., 52455, A. T. Wilson to Cox, August 14, 1919; FO 882/21, 18/19/5, meeting in the residency, Cairo, March 2, 1919; FO 371/3370/140184, Wingate to SOSFO, August 8, 1918. 128. Silverfarb, "The British Government and the Khurma Dispute." 129. FO 686/18, Garland, note on Wilson and the Khurma crisis, August 2, 1918. 130. R/15/2/34, Indian assistant (Siddiq Hasan) at Bahrain Agency to Ibn Saud, July 19, 1919. 131. Silverfarb, "The British Government and the Khurma Dispute." 132. Ibid.; and L/P&S/IO/37O, p. 3566, Allenby to SOSFO, June 23, 1919. 133. W. P., 52455, A. T. Wilson to Cox, August 14, 1919. 134. L/P&S/IO/765, Pi944, Shuckburgh to USOSFO, April 15, 1919. 135. L/P&S/IO/3045, P 3045, CCB to SOIO, June 8, 1919. 136. Cox, aide memoire. 137. L/P&S/IO/765, P 467, Shuckburgh to SOSFO, February 10, 1919. 138. L/P&S/IO/765, P 2221, USOSFO to USOSIO, April 26, 1919. 139. L/P&S/IO/765, P 3161, Allenby to SOSFO, June 8, 1919. 140. L/P&S/IO/765, P 3451, Pol. Bag. to SOSFO, June 23, 1919. 141. L/P&S/IO/765, P 6207, USOSFO to USOSIO, September 29, 1919. 142. FO/371/4146/117489, Hussein to Ibn Rashid, July 11, 1919. 143. FO 686/18, L. L. Bright to D.C.P.O. Damascus, July 17, 1919. 144. FO 371/4147/150018, Bin Rashid to CCB, July 27, 1919. 145. FO 686/18, Abdullah to B. Ag. Ji., July 20, 1919. 146. R/15/2/34, Siddiq Hassan to Res. Bush., September 15, 1919. 147. Al-Mukhtar, pp. 221-22. 148. R/i5/2/34, Ibn Sa'ud to Siddiq Hassan, October i, 1919. 149. This theory was put forward in the various works by Philby, Troeller, Habib, Goldrup, and others; see also J. Kostiner, "On Instruments and Their Designers: The Ikhwan of Najd and the Emergence of the Saudi State," Middle Eastern Studies 21 (1985): 298-323. 150. On the hujar, see J. S. Habib, Ibn Sa'ud's Warriors of Islam: The Ikhwan of Najd and Their Role in the Creation of the Sa'udi Kingdom, 1910-1930 (Leiden: Brill, 1978), p. 47-62; C. M. Helms, The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia: Evolution of Political Identity (London: Croom Helm, 1981), pp. 127-50. 151. Philby, report; Garland, note. 152. Habib, Ibn Sa'ud's Warriors, pp. 164-79. The Subay' had a separate small village called Dhabaj in the vicinity of Kharja, populated by five hundred people. This was probably a hijra, see A.B. no. 102, September 3, 1918; FO 371/3390/191477, CCB to Foreign, July 9, 1918. 153. Garland, note; Philby, Diary, April 16, 1918; FO 686/38 Hussein to alHawazim and al-Ahmadah, Harb, February 17, 1918. 154. FO 686/17, Abdullah to Hussein, March 29, 1919; FO 686/16, a local agent to C. E. Wilson, November 4, 1918; D.P., Box, 2A/IV, Report of Sheikh Farhan Beg alRahman of the Muntafiq, November 18, 1920.

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215

155. Garland, note; A.B. no. 75, January 3, 1918; FO 882/9, Bin Saud's claim over Khurma, extract from memorandum by Philby, August 13, 1918 (hereafter cited as Philby, Saudi claim). 156. See Kostiner, "On Instruments and Their Designers." 157. Goldie, report; al-Rihani, Najd, pp. 250-51. 158. Goldie, report. 159. Philby, report, p. 32; A.B., no. 41, February 6, 1917; A.B., no 75, January 3, 1918. 160. A.B., no. 41, February 6, 1917 (Faysal's words); A.B. no. 57, July 7, 1917 (Lawrence's words); FO 882/9, note on a conversation between Miralai Abdul Mejid and Lieut. Guillaume, September 24, 1918 (hereafter cited as Abdul Mejid, conversation). 161. Goldie, report. 162. Ibid. 163. FO 686/18, C. W. Wilson, conversation with Abdullah, July 7-8, 1919; FO 686/15, Basset to ARBUR, May i, 1918. 164. A.B., no. 57, July 7, 1917; Further on the Mutawa'a, see Ameen Rihani, Ibn Saoud of Arabia: His People and His Land (London: Constable, 1928), pp. 207-9 (hereafter cited as al-Rihani, Ibn Sa'ud). 165. Abdul Mejid, conversation. 166. P. P., Inward Correspondence, vol. I, note by ARBUR, Cairo, June 6, 1917. 167. FO 686/16, a local agent to C. E. Wilson, November 4, 1918; FO/686/I7, Abdullah to Hussein, March 29, 1919. 168. Ibid.; 11/15/2/34, note by ARBUR, Baghdad, January 16, 1919. 169. Sa'id, p. 83. 170. Goldrup, "Saudi Arabia," p. 311. 171. Al-Mukhtar, p. 200. 172. Sa'id, pp. 86-89; al-Rihani, Najd, pp. 237-39. 173. Sa'id, p. 83; Goldrup, "Saudi Arabia," p. 312. 174. R/15/2/34, Ibn Sa'ud to Yousif Bin Ahmad Kanoo, Bahrein, May 31, 1919. 175. On the battle, see Goldrup, "Saudi Arabia," pp., 311-18; Khayr al-Din alZirikli, Shibh al-Jazira fi 'Ahd al-Malik 'Abd al-'Aziz (Beirut: Matabi' Dar al-Qalam, 1970), vol. i, pp. 320-24 (hereafter cited as al-Zirikli); al-Rihani, Najd, pp. 253-54; Al-Mukhtar, pp. 213-23; Garland, note; Ibrahim Al-Khamsin, Usul Al-Sa'ud (Beirut: Dar al-Najah, 1972), pp. 147-51 (hereafter cited as Al-Khamsin). 176. R/15/2/34, Ibn Sa'ud to Yousif Bin Ahmad Kanno, Bahrein, May 31, 1919. 177. Hafiz Wahbah, Arabian Days (London: Barker, 1964), p. 127. 178. Ibid.; also Dickson, Akhwan. 179. Dickson, Akhwan; FO 686/18, L. L. Bright to B.L.O. Deraa, n.d., received on August 12, 1919. 180. Wahbah, Arabian Days, pp. 128-29. 181. H. R. P. Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours (London: Allen & Unwin, 1949), pp. 153-57182. Philby, Diary, April 13-14, 1918. 183. FO 371/3390/191477, CCB to Foreign, July 7, 1918. 184. See, for example, L/P&S/IO/926, p2667, Major Marshall to Balfour, (Jidda report, May 11-31, 1922) May 31, 1922. 185. A.B., no. 108, January n, 1919. 186. Dickson, Akhwan. 187. Habib, Ibn Sa'ud's Warriors, pp. 25-27. 188. Helms, The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia, pp. 151-80.

216

NOTES

189. D.P., Box 2A/V, Diary of Pol. Bah. on his journey to Hasa and back, January 29 to February 20, 1920 (hereafter cited as Dickson, Diary); Philby, Diary, April 13, 1918; on a more general discussion about taxation, see W. Sharara, al-Ahl wa-alGhanima: Muqawwimat al-Siyasa fi al-Mamlaka al-'Arabiyya al-Sa'udiyya (Beirut: Dar al-Tali'a, 1981). 190. FO 371/3389/4067, Wingate to SOSFO, January 7, 1918. 191. FO 371/3390/191477, CCB to Foreign, July 9, 1918. 192. Al-Zirikli, vol. i, pp. 177-81. 193. Habib, Ibn Sa'ud's Warriors, p. 73. 194. Helms, The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia, pp. 127-50; Habib, Ibn Sa'ud's Warriors, pp. 63-78; Sulayman Bin Sahman al-Najdi, ed., Kitab-al Hadiya al-Sunniyya wal-Tuhfa al-Wahhabiyya al-Najdiyya (Cairo: al-Nahar, 1925-26), pp. 26, 30 (hereafter cited as Bin Sahman). 195. FO/37I/4I47/I7I942, Colonel I. A. for CCB to USOSIO, November 3, 1919; FO 371/4147/94340, note on the Ikhwan by political officer, Basra, n.d. 196. FO 882/21, IS/20/1, Dickson, Diary, February 20, 1920; FO 686/18, Pol. Bah. to Pol. Bag., April 26, 1920. 197. FO 686/17., Pol- Ku., memo no. 429, May 3, 1919 (extract from Diary no. 8 for the fortnight ending April 20, 1919). 198. FO 371/4147/17942/ CCB to USOSOIO, November 7, 1919. 199. FO 882/21, IS/20/1, Diary of Pol. Bah., February 20, 1920. 200. FO 371/5o61/E3798, Note by Bell, 23 February 23, 1920. 201. Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours, pp. 250-51. 202. D.P., Box 2A/IV, Pol. Bah. diary and intelligence report for April and May 1920; R/is/s/ig, Pol. Bah to Res. Bush., May 24, 1920. 203. FO 371/5o63/E7216, Abd al-Aziz al-Qusaybi (Ibn Sa'ud's agent at Bahrayn), to Dickson, June 3, 1920 (hereafter cited as al-Qusaybi, note). 204. FO 371/4147/171942, Colonel I. A. for CCB to USOSIO, November 3, 1919; Al-Qusaybi, note; FO 371/5o65/EL3066, Pol. Bah. to Res. Bush, July 10, 1920. 205. Handbook, pp. 141-43. 206. Colman, "Revolt in Arabia," pp. 387-94. 207. Ibid. pp. 392-99; A.B., no. 30, November 15, 1916. 208. CO 725/1/39717, Diary of Captain M. Fazluddin, liaison medical officer with the Idrisi, December 28, 1919. 209. Ibid. 210. Al-Rihani, Najd, pp. 297-303; Goldrup, "Saudi Arabia," pp. 368-69. 211. Goldrup, "Saudi Arabia," pp. 341-42; L/P&S/IO/765, p. 3082, CCB to SOSIO, April 19, 1920. 212. L/P&S/IO/765, P43I3, CCB to SOSIO, May 16, 1920; L/P&S/I2/2O82, Captain G. S. De-Gaury to Res. Bush., events prior to the end of the Ibn Rashid rule at Hail 1921, n.d. 213. FO 371/5o61/E4430, CCB to SOSIO, May 3, 1920 (enclosed is Ibn Sa'ud's letter to Cox). 214. D.P., Box 2A/IV, Pol. Bah. intelligence report for April and May 1920; FO 371/5o62/E76o6, Ibn Sa'ud to Pol. Bah., April 25, 1920; al-Mukhtar, pp. 223-24; Iqbal, The Emergence of Saudi Arabia, pp. 109-12. 215. FO 37i/5o62/E76o6, Ibn Sa'ud to Pol. Bah., April 25, 1920. 216. L/P&S/IO/765, P369O, minutes by Calvert, May 19, and Pervet, June 4, 1920. 217. Dari Ibn Fuhayd, al-Rashid, Nubdha Ta'rikhiyya 'an Najd (al-Riyad: Dar alYamama, 1966), pp. 159-68 (hereafter cited as Ibn Fuhayd); Fu'ad Hamzah, Qalb

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217

Jazirat al-'Amb (Mecca: al-Matba'a al-Salihiyya, 1933), pp. 347-49 (hereafter cited as Hamzah, Jazira).

218. FO 37I/5O65/EL2852, memorandum on the political situation in Nejd, by H.

R. P. Dickson, August 12, 1920 (hereafter cited as Dickson, political situation). 219. FO 371/4147/156079, note on the conversation between the SOSFO and the Arab Mission representing Emir Ibn Sa'ud, November 26, 1919. 220. Al-Rihani, Najd, p. 72. 221. Al-Rihani, Najd, pp. 300-1; Goldrup, "Saudi Arabia," pp. 369-70; L/P&S/ 10/1089, P76i8, extract from Fazluddin's diary, September 7, 1920. 222. R/I5/2/37, Siddiq Hassan to Pol. Bah., August 6, 1920. 223. CO 721/1/31739, Scott to SOSCO, eighth Aden Newsletter, June 10, 1921. 224. Dickson, political situation. 225. R/15/2/37, Siddiq Hassan to Pol. Bah., August I, 1920. 226. L/P&S/IO/936, P82i6, Ibn Sa'ud to Pol. Bah., August 18, 1920. 227. FO 371/5o61/E54461, CCB to SOSIO, April 15, 1920. 228. R/I5/5/99, Dickson to CCB, July 28, 1920; Dickson, political situation. 229. Dickson, political situation. 230. D.P., Box 2A/IV, diary of Major H. R. P. Dickson on deputation to Hassa for week ending on October 9, 1922. 231. L/P&S/IO/365, P7439, Shuckburgh to USOSFO, April 29, 1920. 232. L/P&S/IO/983, Pi2O, Cox to Devonshire, December 18, 1922; R/I5/2/36, H. Dickson to CCB, February 20, 1920; Ibn Sa'ud to Dickson, April 2, 1920. 233. D.P., Box 2A/V, diary of Major H. R. P. Dickson on deputation to Hassa for week ending on October 9, 1922. 234. L/P&S/IO/936, P7439, agreement made between Najd deputation and King Hussein's committee, September 3, 1920; FO37i/5o64/E 11854, Batten to ARBUR Cairo, September 5, 1920, R/15/2/37; Indian assistant to Dickson, August 1, 1920. 235. Quoted by Busch, Britain, India and the Arabs, p. 333. 236. L/P&S/IO/390, P3827, Note by Shuckburgh, July 8, 1919; T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1978), p. 332. 237. FO 141/738/3818, SOSFO to HCE, September 2, 1920. 238. FO 371/5o61/E3916, by the secretary to interdepartmental committee, relations between King Hussein and Ibn Saud, n.d.; FO 371/5061/E3798 USOSFO to USOSIO,May I, 1920. 239. FO 371/5061/E37998, Dickson to CCB, February 10, 1920. 240. R/I5/2/I37, Indian assistant to Dickson, August I, 1920. 241. R/15/5/79, Pol. Bah to CCB, July 28, 1920; R/15/2/37, Nayif Bin Shoqair of Qarriyya to Bin Saud, September 8, 1920. 242. R/I5/5/I04, Ibn Saud to Pol. Bah., September 13, 1920; Badr al-Din alKhususi, Ma'rakat al-Jahra' (Kuwayt: Manshurat Dhat al-Salasil, 1987), pp. 81-82,

believes the numbers of warriors were grossly overstated (hereafter cited as al-Khususi).

243. L/P&S/IO/937, P7769, HCI to Pol. Ku., October 21, 1920. 244. R/15/5/34, Pol. Ku. to Res. Bush., October 17, 1920; Pol. Ku. to Res. Bush., October 18, 1920; Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours, pp. 253-54; al-Khususi, pp. 83-110, discusses at length the various versions of the battle and the parties' policies. 245. FO/37I/5065/EI2940, HCI to SOSIO, October 21, 1920. 246. Al-Rihani, Najd, p. 276. 247. Habib, Ibn Sa'ud's Warriors, p. 10. 248. R/I5/2/37, Pol. Bah. to HCI, November 29, 1920 (Ibn Sa'ud's letter from November 19, 1920).

218

NOTES

249. Hamzah, Jazira, p. 384. 250. L/P&S/I2/SO82, Captain G. S. De-Gaury to Res. Bush., events prior to the end of Ibn Rashid rule at Hail, 1921, n.d. 251. CO 725/1/38946, Scott, tenth Aden Newsletter, June 30, 1921. 252. Al-Rihani, Najd, pp. 301-2; Handbook, pp. 132-34. 253. Al-Rihani, Najd, pp. 301-2. 254. Goldrup, "Saudi Arabia," p. 370. 255. FO 37I/625I/E4556, Batten to Curzon, March 31, 1921. 256. Al-Rihani, Najd, p. 302. 257. FO 371/7716/E14118, Fazluddin to first assistant to the resident, Aden, November 12, 1922; CO 725/1/47678, Scott, eleventh Aden Newsletter, July 28, 1921. 258. Al-Rashid documents, American consul, Aden, to SOS, February 17, 1922; CO 725/1/29392, report on visit to the Idrisi at Jizan, on April 3, 1921, by Fazluddin. This report was written just before al-Idrisi invited Husayn's envoys. 259. CO 725/1/50336, Scott, twelfth Aden Newsletter, September 8, 1921. 260. FO 371/5148/E13795, Scott to Curzon, October 21, 1920. 261. CO 725/1/50336, Scott, twelfth Aden Newsletter, September 8, 1921; and CO 725/3/6972, Scott, first Aden Newsletter, January 31, 1922. 262. R/I5/2/76, Pol. Ku. to Pol. Bah., April 25, 1921 (covering Ibn Sa'ud's letter to Salim, April 10 and 16); al-Mukhtar, pp. 232-33; al-Rihani, Najd, pp. 272-74. 263. Al-Rihani, Najd, pp. 234-35. 264. At this stage, Ibn Talal reported to Husayn to have won a victory (the English version, though, was circulated later); L/P&S/IO/936, P5356, Fuad al-Khatib to A. W. Marshall, Decembers, 1921. 265. Al-Mukhtar, pp. 234-37; al-Rihani, Najd, pp. 274-84; al-Khamsin, pp. 27484; for an analysis of the Rashidi state's collapse, see M. al-Rasheed, Politics in an Arabian Oasis: the Rashidi Tribal Dynasty (London: Tauris, 1991), pp. 223-43. 266. Philby, then in the service of Trans-Jordan government, signed the agreement with Sha'lan, FO 371/7714/E7650, minutes by G. E. Carnegie, August 3, 1922; H. St. John B. Philby, Arabia (London: Benn, 1930), pp. 287-88. 267. FO 371/7714/E8186, Palmer (British consul, Damascus), to SOSFO, July 26, 1922. 268. D.P., Box XV/1, Philby to G. Bell, February 17, 1922. 269. FO 371/7716/E7630, Palmer to SOSFO, July 18, 1922; FO 371/7716/E7632, Palmer to SOSFO, July 19, 1922. 270. Hamzah, Jazira, pp. 385-86; Philby, Arabia, pp. 288-90. 271. R/I5/2/28, Pol. Ku. to HCI, September 26, 1922; FO 371/7175/E10857, Palmer to SOSFO, September 15, 1922. 272. FO 37I/7720/E8520, Major C. C. Barett (Aden) to SOSCO, August 3, 1922. 273. FO 371/7716/E14118, Fazluddin to first assistant to the resident, Aden, November 12, 1922. 274. Al-Rashid documents, American consulate, Beirut, report by Amin Rihani, December 3, 1922. 275. FO 371/7716/E14118, Fazluddin to first assistant to the resident, Aden, November 12, 1922. 276. FO 371/6251/E4493, Note by R. B. Howorth (assistant secretary to the cabinet), April 14, 1921. 277. FO 37I/77I3/E6O73, Balfour to Marshall, June 22, 1922. 278. Muhammad, Mughayribi, al-Madani, Firqat al-Ikhwan al-Islamiyya bi-Najd (Cairo: No publisher, 1923-24), pp. 43-45 (hereafter cited as al-Madani).

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219

279. Habib, Ibn Sa'ud's Warriors, pp. 139-40; See also Helms's criticism in The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia, p. 145. 280. Helms, The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia, pp. 142-46. 281. L/P&S/IO/635, P14132, report of financial secretary, November 25, 1919. 282. FO 37I/5I92/E2935, Shuckburgh to USOSFO, April 8, 1920. 283. FO 371/4234/139687, minutes by Hawthorn Hall, October 16, 1919. 284. FO 371/4234/158108, financial secretary, India Office, to USOSFO, December 3, 1919; FO 371/4234/171501, minutes by H. W. Minshull, January 20, 1920. 285. L/P&S/IO/635, P4I32, report by financial secretary, November 25, 1919. 286. L/P&S/IO/635, P9854, Pol. Bag. to SOSIO, November 15, 1918. 287. L/P&S/IO/635, P43I7, Chamberlain to USOSFO, January 10, 1917. 288. L/P&S/IO/635, Pi4i32, report of financial secretary, November 25, 1919. 289. L/P&S/IO/635, P493, SOSIO to CCB, February 25, 1920. 290. L/P&S/IO/635, Philby to Shuckburgh, March 28, 1920. 291. L/P&S/IO/635, Shuckburgh to USOSFO, April 8, 1920. 292. L/P&S/IO/635, Pi4i32, report of financial secretary, November 25, 1919. 293. R/I5/2/36, CCB to SOSIO, January 11, 1920. The related telegrams cannot be traced. 294. R/is/2/34, CCB to SOSIO, December 12, 1919. 295. Philby, report (supplement). 296. L/P&S/IO/635, P1314, SOSIO to CCB, March 12, 1919. 297. Ibid. 298. R/is/2/34, Pol. Bag. to Pol. Bah., March 23, 1919. 299. Ibid. 300. L/P&S/IO/390, P1763, Allenby to SOSFO, March 31,1919; Troeller, The Birth of Saudi Arabia, pp. 163-64. 301. R/I5/2/34, Pol. Ban. to Pol. Bag., December 9, 1919. 302. R/I5/2/34, Pol. Bah. to Pol. Bag., March 31, 1919; Pol. Bag. to Pol. Bah., April 1, 1919; Bray's telegram of March 26. 303. FO 371/4147/129678, note on the Arabian question by N. N. E. Bray, July 28, 1919. 304. R/I5/2/34, Pol. Bah. to Pol. Bas., March 9, 1919. 305. R/I5/2/34, Pol. Bag. to Pol. Bah., February 27, 1919. 306. 11/15/2/34, Wilson to Pol. Bah., March 8, 1919. 307. R/I5/2/34, Pol. Bag. to Pol. Bah., March 12, 1919. 308. R/15/2/34 Pol. Bah. to Pol. Bag., March 9, 1919. 309. R/15/2/34, CCB to SOSIO, December 12, 1919. 310. FO 37I/5I93/E3984, Shuckburgh to USOSFO, April 29, 1920. 311. FO 371/5o67/E15615, minutes by an interdepartmental committee, December 7, 1920; L/P&S/IO/635, P5433, note by Hirtzel, June 5, 1920. 312. FO 371/5065/E1334, minutes of a meeting held at the Foreign Office, April 17, 1920. 313. FO 37I/5O65/E 15334, R- Marrs, Question of future policy subsidies to chiefs, October 19, 1920. 314. FO 371/5o61/E2156, note by Philby, March 23, 1920. 315. FO 371/5233/E15722, memo by Cornwallis, March 16, 1920. 316. FO 371/5233/E618o, Allenby to Curzon, May 28, 1920. 317. L/P&S/IO/936, p. 8376, CCB to SOSIO, November 21, 1920; L/P&S/10/635, P3I22, Shuckburgh to USOSFO, April 29, 1920. 318. D.P., Box 2A/IV, memo by Siddiq Hasan, no. 9, July 29, 1920.

220

NOTES

319. FO 371/5182/E1 1049, CCB to SOSIO, September 5, 1920. 320. FO 371/5182/E13399, SOSIO to CCB, October 26, 1920. 321. FO 371/5233/E16o38, SOSIO to HCI, December 16, 1920; FO 371/5067; £15615, minutes of the interdepartmental committee, December 7, 1920. 322. FO 37I/624O/E6589, fifth and sixth meetings of the subcommittee, March 16 and 18, 1921; P. Graves, The Life of Sir Percy Cox (London: Hutchinson, 1941), pp. 284-85. 323. Al-Rashid documents, vol. 1, American consul in London to SOS, March 4, 1922. 324. FO 37I/624O/E6589, fifth and sixth meetings of the subcommittee, March 16 and 18, 1921. 325. R/15/2/74, File 1/2, GCI to Ibn Saud, May 4, 1921; Cox was allowed a counterargument, but to no effect. 326. Troeller, The Birth of Saudi Arabia, p. 166. 327. FO 37I/8937/E2693, memo by Middle East Department, March 8, 1923; IV P&S/10/881, P1355A, SOSCO to HCI, April 7, 1923. 328. FO 37I/772I/E2358, minute by E. G. T. Adams (following a parliamentary question by Lord Raglan), n.d. 329. L/P&S/IO/937, P7446, Cox to SOSIO, October 5, 1920. 330. L/P&S/IO/936, P7495, Cox to SOSIO, October 10, 1920. 331. D.P., Box 2A/IV, memo by Siddiq Hasan, no. 9, July 29, 1920. 332. FO 37I/7U/E2566, Ibn Saud to HCI, June 21, 1921. 333. L/P&S/IO/937, P 7446, Cox to SOSIO, October 5, 1920. 334. FO 371/7711/E2566, Ibn Saud to HCI, June 21, 1921. 335. Philby, Arabian Jubilee, p. 49. 336. FO 37I/6251/E4493, Churchill to prime minister, received on March 21, 1920. 337. L/P&S/10/881/ P2522, Middle East Committee, minutes of a meeting held on May 20, 1921; FO 371/5064/11854, SOSFO to Scott, September 28, 1920. 338. H. St. John B. Philby, "The Triumph of the Wahhabis," Journal of the Central Asian Society 13 (1926): p. 309. 339. This term appears, for example, in al-Rihani, Najd; al-Mukhtar; Sa'id; and others. 340. Habib, Ibn Sa'ud's Warriors, p. n. 341. FO 686/iS/, L. L. Bright (Dera) to D.C.P.O. Damascus, July 20, 1919; D.P, Box 2A/IV, report of Shaikh Farhan Beg of the Muntafiq to Dickson, November 18, 1920. 342. L/P&S/IO/926, P 2319, Batten to Curzon, January 21, 1921 (Jidda report for January 11-20); FO 37I/6254/E455, Ac. B. Ag. Ji. to Curzon, December 21, 1920 (Jidda report for December 11-20); L/P&S/IO/926, P 2677, Marshall to Curzon, May 31, 1922 (Jidda report for May 11-31). 343. FO 686/18, C. E. Wilson to ARBUR, Cairo, July 14, 1919. 344. FO 371/ 6254/E6255, Ac. B. Ag. Ji. to Curzon, February 21, 1921. 345. L/P&S/IO/926, P 4986, Marshall to Curzon, October 21, 1921 (Jidda report, October 11-20). 346. FO 37I/6254/E6255, Ac. B. Ag. Ji. to Curzon, February 21, 1921 (Jidda report, February 1-20). 347. R/15/5/28, Pol. Bah. to HCI, February 23, 1922. 348. L/P&S/IO/936,Pr337, Graffety Smith to SOSFO, March 27, 1922; L/P&S/io/ 936 P2200, Graffety Smith to SOSFO, May 18, 1922.

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349. L/P&S/IO/926, P 5186, Graffety Smith to Curzon, October 31, 1921 (Jidda report for October 11-30). 350. FO 37I/6255/E.5364, Batten to Curzon, summary for March 1-31, 1921. 351. L/P&S/IO/926/P3867, Vickery, intelligence report up to March 2, 1920; L/ P&S/IO/926, P 6910, extract from Batten's report, August i-io, 1920. Among others, Husayn hardly compensated pilgrims who had been attacked by robbers. 352. L/P&S/10/881, P 3742, Lawrence to SOSFO, August 2, 1921. 353. L/P&S/IO/986, P 4907, Marshall to Curzon, October 31, 1922 (Jidda report for October 1-31); L/P&S/IO/I986, P 188, Marshall to Curzon, December, 1, 1922 (Jidda report for November 1-30). 354. L/P&S/IO/926, P 2319, Batten to SOSFO, January 21, 1921 (Jidda report for January 11-20). 355. FO 371/10014/E8o46, Bullard to SOSFO, September 17, 1924. 356. Wahbah, Arabian Days, p. 146. 357. Ibid., p. 148. 358. FO 371/9O97/E1622, interview with King Hussein at Amman, January 21, 1924. 359. L/P&S/IO/I034, P 2103, SOSCO to Res. Bush., March 8, 1924; FO 371/9996; £46, SOSCO to HCI, December 30, 1923; G. O. Linabury, "British-Saudi Arabian Relations, 1902-1927: A Revisionist Interpretation" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1970), p. 237. 360. R/i5/5/70, Knox to SOSCO, March 7, 1924. 361. Wahbah, Arabian Days, pp. 146-47. 362. FO 37I/IOOI7/E6403, Pol. Bah. to Res. Bush., May 24, 1924. 363. Iqbal, The Emerjence of Saudi Arabia, pp. 131-32. 364. Goldrup, "Saudi Arabia," p. 375. The khilafat were an Indian nationalist movement that propounded allegiance to the Ottoman caliphate (khilafa). Its members viewed Husayn as a rebel against the Ottomans, and when he assumed the title of khalifa, they looked to Ibn Sa'ud as a countercandidate. See Troeller, The Birth of Saudi Arabia, p. 217. 365. Wahbah, Arabian Days; Sa'id, pp. 146-47; al-Mukhtar, pp. 289-291; Muhammad 'Abdullah Madi, Al-Nahdat al-Hadithafi Jazirat al-'Arab (Cairo: 'Isa al-Babi alHalabi, 1952), pp. 148-59. 366. Wahbah, Arabian Days, p. 148. 367. L/P&S/IO/II24, P 4003, Bullard to SOSFO, September 4, 1924; L/P&S/io/ 1124, P 3665, Bullard to SOSFO, September 7, 1924; al-Rihani, Najd, pp. 331-34. 368. Sa'id, pp. 152, 155-56; al-Mukhtar, pp. 196-298; L/P&S/IO/H24, P40O3, Bullard to SOSFO, October 2, 1924, 369. L/P&S/10/1124,P3793, Bullard to SOSFO, September 12, 1924; L/P&S/io/ 1124, P3776, Bullard to SOSFO, September 15, 1924. 370. L/P&S/10/1124, P3759, Bullard to SOSFO, September 27, 1924; L/P&S/10/ 1124, P4003, Bullard to SOSFO, October 2, 1924. 371. Goldrup, "Saudi Arabia," p. 379. 372. L/P&S/IO/II24, P4059, Bullard to SOSFO, October 4, 1924; FO 371/10015! £9341, Bullard to SOSFO, October n, 1924, Sa'id, pp. 158-60. 373. L/P&S/io/1124, P4003, Bullard to SOSFO, October 2, 1924. 374. FO 37i/iooi5/E934i, Bullard to SOSFO, October n, 1924. 375. L/P&S/IO/U24, P 3979, SOSCO to HCI, September 30, 1924. 376. Ibid., p. 383; U.Q., January 10, 1925.

222

NOTES

377. L/P&S/IO/II25, ?46o, HCP to SOSCO, February 20, 1925. 378. FO 371/10807/1397, Bullard to Chamberlain, February 10, 1925 (Jidda Report, January 2O-February 9); al-Zirikli, vol. i, p. 30 (description of Saudi forces). 379. Hafiz Wahbah, Khamsun 'Amman fi Jazirat al-'Arab (Cairo: Matba'at Mustafa al-Babi al-Halabi, 1960), p. 275. 380. Wahbah, Arabian Days, pp. 151-57. 381. FO 371/10015, £9634, Bullard to SOSFO, November 5, 1924. 382. Daily Telegraph, February 14, 1925 (Philby's article). 383. Al-Zirikli, vol. i, p. 330. 384. FO 371/10807/E2105, Bullard to Chamberlain, March 19, 1925 (Jidda report for March 2-19). 385. L/P&S/IO/U25, Pi465, Bullard to SOSFO, April 18, 1925. 386. L/P&S/IO/JI26, P402, Bullard to SOSFO, March 6, 1925. 387. FO 37i/io8o8/E299o, SOSFO to HMS Cornflour, May 27, 1925; L/P&S/io/ 1126 P2IO9, Bullard to SOSFO, June 23, 1925; U.Q., June 20, 1925. 388. L/P&S/10/1126, Pi88, Bullard to SOSFO, January 17, 1925. 389. FO 371/108o9/E4126, Bullard to Chamberlain, June 30, 1925 (Jidda report for May 30-June 30); L/P&S/IO/H25, P 3397, Jordan to Chamberlain, August 29, 1925. 390. FO 371/10810/E7167, Jordan to SOSFO, November 20, 1925; L/P&S/IO/H27, P 4299, Jordan to SOSFO, December 5, 1925. 391. Goldrup, "Saudi Arabia," pp. 385-87; U.Q., November 13 and December 2, I925-

Chapter 2 1. Ibn Khaldun, An Introduction to History: The Muqaddimah, trans. F. Rosenthai (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967), vol. 2. 2. H. A. R. Gibb, "The Evolution of Government in Early Islam" in H. A. R. Gibb, ed., Studies on the Civilization of Islam (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 34-46. 3. FO 882/21, IS 19/25, H. Dickson, notes on the "Akhwan" movement (hereafter cited as Dickson, Akhwan). 4. H. St. John B. Philby, Arabia of the Wahhabis (London: Constable, 1928), pp. 41, 61, 162, 188 (the various umara' Philby encountered); see also Hafiz Wahbah, Arabian Days (London: Barber, 1964), pp. 65, 77. 5. FO 686/20, Pol. Bah. to SOSIO, copy of report regarding the present situation in Najd, March 20, 1920. 6. D.P., Box 2A/5, note on the political situation in Nejd at the end of July 1920, n.d. 7. R/I5/I/37, Siddiq Hasan to HCI, February 7, 1921. 8. 'Abd al-Rahman ibn 'Abd al-Latif ibn 'Abdullah Al al-Shaykh, Mashahir 'ulama' Najd wa-Ghayrihim (al-Riyad: Dar al-Yamama li-al-Bahth wa al-tarjama wa al-Nashr, 1974) (hereafter cited as Al al-Shaykh). 9. Ibid., p. 152, for example, a case of an 'alim, 'Abdullah bin Husayn Al alShaykh, who had been appointed by Ibn Sa'ud to officiate at al-Artawiyya. The local inhabitants wanted him to remain there, but Ibn Sa'ud later assigned him elsewhere, against his will and theirs. 10. H. St. John B. Philby, The Heart of Arabia: A Record of Travel (New York: Putnam, 1923), vol. i, p. 297.

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223

11. This assumption emerges from the biographies in Al al-Shaykh's book. 12. L. P. Goldrup, "Saudi Arabia, 1902-1932: The Development of a Wahhabi Society" (Ph.D. diss., University of California at Los Angeles, 1971), pp. 215-16; H. Wahbah, Jaziratal-'Arabfial-Qarnal-Ishrin(al-Q&}\ira: Maktabt al-Nahda al-Misriyya, 1961), pp. 282,330 (hereafter cited as Wahbah, Jaziro); FO 371/5o61/E3798, note by G. Bell, August 23, 1920. 13. Sulayman Bin Sahman al-Najdi, ed., Kitab-al Hadiya al-Sunniyya wa al-Tuhfa al-Wahhabiyya al-Najdiyya (Cairo: al-Nahar, 1925-26), pp. 36-37 (hereafter cited as Bin Sahman) (taken from Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's second and third rasa'il); I. M. al~ Awaji, "Bureaucracy and Society in Saudi Arabia" (Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 1971), pp. 62-66. The 'ulama's' opposition to the sharifs was also motivated by resentment to the latter's claim for superiority as the Prophet's descendants. 14. FO 371/3062/230596, Dr. R. W. Harrison (American missionary in Bahrayn) on a visit to Riyadh, August 1917 (no exact date is given). See also diary by R. Hamilton on a visit to Najd, December 19-28, 1917 (hereafter cited as Hamilton, Diary). 15. FO 882/9,18/18/85, Notes on a conversation between Miralai Abdul Mejid Bey and Lieutenant Guillaime, September 24, 1918. 16. Report by Philby, A.B., no. 108, January n, 1919. 17. Wahbah, Arabian Days, p. 127. 18. Hamilton, Diary. 19. Dickson, Akhwan. 20. A Report by Lawrence, A.B., no. 77, January 27, 1918. 21. Dickson highlights al-Dawish's personality in different parts in H. R. P. Dickson, The Arab of the Desert (London: Allen & Unwin, 1949). 22. FO 371/4147/171941, CCB to USOSIO, November 3, 1919. 23. Dickson, Akhwan. 24. FO 371/4147/171942, CCB to USOSIO, November 3, 1919. 25. Ibid. 26. FO 686/18, L. L. Bright for B.L.O. Dera to Jidda, received on August 12, 1919. 27. FO 371/4147/171942, CCB to USOSIO, November 3, 1919. 28. R/I4/2/34, Pol. Bag. to Pol. Bah., December 24, 1919. 29. R/I5/I/34, note by Arab Bureau, Baghdad, January 17, 1919. 30. FO 371/4147/129678, Capt. N.N.E Bray, note on the Arabian question, July 28, 1919. 31. Al al-Shaykh, pp. 384-87; the cases of Sa'ud bin Rashid and 'Abdullah bin Zahim. 32. Ibid., p. 17; for instance, 'Umar bin Hasan Al al-Shaykh. 33. Ibid., pp. 381-82. 34. Ibid., p. 357. 35. Dickson, Akhwan; Harrison's report corroborates this. 36. FO 37i/so6i/E3798, note by G. Bell, August 23, 1920. 37. Ibid.; See also Amin al-Rihani, Ta'rikh Najd wa-Mulhaqatihi (Beirut: Dar alRihani, 1928), p. 202 (hereafter cited as al-Rihani, Najd) Also mentioned by J. S. Habib, Ibn Sa'ud's Warriors of Islam: The Ikhwan of Najd and Their Role in the Creation of the Saudi Kingdom, 19/0-1930 (Leiden: Brill, 1978), pp. 81-83. Helms referred to that fatwa as if it had been proclaimed in 1914. Judging by these sources, the event probably took place in 1919. See C. M. Helms, The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia: Evolution of Political Identity (London: Croom Helm, 1981), pp. 132-33. 38. Dickson, Akhwan.

224

NOTES

39. Diary of Major H. R. P. Dickson on deputation to Hassa for week ending on October 9, 1922 (hereafter cited as Dickson, Diary). 40. Wahbah, Arabian Days, pp. 132-33; Dickson, Akhwan. 41. Dickson, Akhwan. 42. Sadiq Hasan al-Sudani, al-'Ilaqat al-'Iraqiyya al-Sa'udiyya igzo-ig^i: Dirasafi al-'ilaqat al-Siyasiyya (Baghdad: Dar al-Jahiz, 1975), pp. 64-66 (hereafter cited as alSudani, 'Ilakat); R/i5/5/28, HCI to Pol. Ku., September 16, 1921. 43. FO 37I/I2993/E23I6, HCI to SOSCO, history of Iraq-Najd relations from about the time of the fall of Hail to Ibn Saud's protest against the establishment of the Iraq police post at Bsaiyah, April 24, 1928 (hereafter cited as Dobbs, 'Iraq-Najd relations); al-Sudani, 'Ilaqat, pp. 55-56; FO 371/7711/E2566, Ibn Saud to HCI, July 14, 1921. 44. Dobbs, Iraq-Najd relations; R/15/5/28, Pol. Ku. to HCI, October 16, 1921. 45. R/15/5/99, Pol. Bah. to Res. Persian Gulf, May 24, 1920. 46. Ibid., pp. 70-76; al-Rihani, Najd, pp. 305-7; J. B. Glubb, War in the Desert (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1960), pp. 72-73. 47. L/P&S/IO/937, p 1373, HCI to Pol. Bah., January 25, 1922. 48. Cox elaborated on the subsidies that these tribes received from the Iraqi government, L/P&S/IO/937, p. 1683, HCI to Pol. Bah., February 24, 1922. 49. R/15/5/99, Pol. Ku. to CCB, February 20, 1920. 50. Al-Sudani, 'Ilaqat, pp. 66-68. 51. FO 371/5065/E12779, Cox to SOSIO, October 18, 1920. 52. FO 371/7711/52566, Ibn Sa'ud to HCI, June 21, 1921. 53. CO 727/8/40377, Pol. Ku. to Res. Bush, July 7, 1931; Helms, The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia, pp. 151-80. 54. R/15/5/90, C. C. Barrett (Pol. Bah.), note on Bin Sa'ud and his doings, March 3, 1928 (hereafter cited as Barrett, report). 55. L/P&S/10/1034, P- 1210, HCI to SOSCO, March 9, 1923; FO 31/8948/5/0403, Res. to SOSCO, October 19, 1923; FO 37I/895O/E2O27, minutes by Mallet, December 22, 1923. 56. Goldrup, "Saudi Arabia," pp. 274-78; Fahd al-Marik, Lamahat 'an al-Tatawwur al-Fikri fi Jazirat al-'Arab fi al-Qarn al-'Ishrin (Damascus: Matba'at Ibn Zaydun, 1926), p. 28 (hereafter cited as al-Marik). 57. Barrett, report. 58. Ibid. 59. Al-Sudani, 'Ilaqat, pp. 76-78. 60. R/15/5/103. Pol. Ku to CCB, June 13, 1920. 61. R/15/5/79, Pol. Ku. to HCI, July 5, 1920. 62. R/15/5/105, Ibn Sa'ud to Siddiq Hasan, November 12, 1920, Pol. Ku. to HCI, January 24, 1921. 63. R/15/5/105, Pol. Ku. to HCI, November 14, 1920. 64. L/P&S/IO/937, p. 1683, Res. Bush, to Foreign, February 27, 1922. 65. Al-Sudani, 'Ilaqat, pp.-74-75. 66. FO 371/7711/E2897I HCI to SOSCO, March 13, 1922. 67. R/i5/5/105, Pol. Ku. to HCI, March 23, 1922. 68. R/i5/2/37, CCB to Pol. Bah., January 25, 1922. 69. FO 39i/i03i8/E3792, Cox to Shuckburgh, July 25, 1928. 70. R/15/2/28, HCI to SOSCO, May 7, 1922; L/P&S/IO/937, P68i, Extract from the proceedings of the council, May 9, 1922. 71. L/P&S/IO/937, P248o, HCI to SOSCO, June 12, 1922.

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72. FO 37i/i03i8/E3792, Cox to Shuckburgh, July 25, 1928. 73. R/I5/5/28, Pol. Ku. to HCI, September 26, 1922. 74. M. Iqbal, The Emergence of Saudi Arabia (Sinjar: Saudiyah Publishers, 1977), pp. 118-19. 75. H. R. P. Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours (London: Allen & Unwin, 1956), pp. 270-72; al-Rihani, Najd, pp. 307-15. 76. FO 371/13018/E3792, HCI to SOSCO, December 6, 1922; Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours, pp. 276-77. 77. Ai-Sudani, 'llaqat, pp. 103-4; Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours, pp. 270-72. 78. L/P&S/IO/937, P68i, Extract from the proceedings of the council meeting, December 27, 1928. 79. Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours, pp. 276-77. 80. Glubb, War in the Desert, p. 73; Air 23/332, report on Akhwan defense, by SSO Nasiriyya, March 8, 1925. 81. Dobbs, Iraq-Najd relations; Glubb, War in the Desert, p. 74. 82. Glubb, War in the Desert, pp. 75-78; AIR 23/332, report dated April 15, 1925. 83. Al-Sudani, 'llaqat, pp. 135-46. 84. FO 371/8939/E6997, SOSCO to Res. Bush., July 4, 1923. 85. FO 371/8949/E11056, HCI to SOSCO, November 14, 1923; FO 37I/8949/ £11077, HCI to SOSCO, November 15, 1923. 86. FO 37I/8948/E8653, Ac. HCI to SOSCO, August 25, 1923; FO 37I/8948/ £8731, Ac. HCI to SOSCO, August 28, 1923. 87. FO 37I/8948/E8772, minutes by L. Oliphant, August 31, 1923. 88. FO 37i/8949/Euo98, Naji Assil to USOSFO, November 16, 1923; FO 37i/ 895o/Eii363, Aviation Baghdad to War Office, November 27, 1923. 89. Al-Sudani, 'llaqat, pp. 150-54. 90. FO 37i/8949/Eio896, Res. Bush to SOSCO, November 8, 1923. 91. CO 727/7/61655, Knox to SOSCO, December 19, 1923. 92. R/I5/5/70, Knox to SOSCO, March 7, 1924. 93. CO 727/7/62577, Knox to SOSCO, December 22, 1923. 94. Waddah Sharara's explanation of tribal mobility and political relations regulated by taxation provides relevant background material. See his al-Ahl wa alGhanima: Muqawwimat al-Siyasa fi-al-Mamlaka al-'Arabiyya al-Sa'udiyya (Beirut: Dar al-Talira, 1981). 95. CO 727/7/62577, Knox to SOSCO, December 22, 1923. 96. Ibid. 97. R/I5/5/69, Najd delegation commenting on the Iraqi delegation's reply at the fifth session (of the Kuwayt conference), no date (hereafter cited as Najd comments); R/I5/5/69, Knox to SOSCO, December 18, 1923; R/15/5/69, Knox to SOSCO, December 21, 1923. 98. FO 371/9996/E1535, HCI to SOSCO, January 9, 1924; G. Troeller, The Birth of Saudi Arabia: Britain and the Rise of the House of Saud (London: Cass, 1976), pp. 203-4. 99. CO 727/7/62371, Knox to SOSCO, December 21, 1923. 100. Najd comments. 101. CO 727/7/62371, Knox to SOSCO, December 21, 1923; FO 371/895O/E11415, HCI to SOSCO, November 27, 1923. 102. R/I5/5/70, Knox to SOSCO, January 10, 1924; R/I5/5/7O, Colonel Knox's impressions of the tenth and eleventh conferences, January 18 and 19, 1924.

226

NOTES

103. L/P&S/IO/I034, PSOO, SOSCO to HCI, January 14, 1924; L/P&S/10/1034, P4I9, Knox to SOSCO, January 21, 1924. 104. L/P&S/IO/IO34, P156, Knox to SOSCO, January 25, 1924. 105. FO 37I/9997/EI257, Knox to SOSCO, February 15, 1924. 106. FO 371/997/E1257, minutes by Oliphant, February 11, 1924. 107. CO 727/7/4898, Knox to Ibn Saud, January 28, 1924; FO 371/9997/E1257, Knox to SOSCO, February 15, 1924. 108. FO 371/9997/E1257, Knox to SOSCO, February 15, 1924. 109. R/I5/5/69, Knox to SOSCO, December 27, 1923. no. FO 37I/996/E47, Knox to SOSCO, December 29, 1923; R/I5/5/7O, Knox to Devonshire, January 16, 1924; Green Book, p. 7; R/15/5/70, Knox to SOSCO, December 26, 1923, ninth session of the conference. in. Green Book, p. 7. 112. R/I5/5/7O, Knox to SOSCO, December 26, 1923 (ninth session). r i 3 . FO 37I/996/E47, Knox to SOSCO, December 29, 1923. 114. L/P&S/IO/I034, P547, Knox to SOSCO, January 28, 1924; L/P&S/IO/IO34, Pi 12, Knox to SOSCO, February 29, 1924; Badr al-Din al-Khususi, Ma'rakat alJahra' (Kuwayt: Manshurat Dhat al-Salasil, 1987), pp. 136-41 (hereafter cited as al-Khususi). 115. L/P&S/IO/IO34, P1379, Thomas to Knox, March 24, 1924. 116. L/P&S/10/1034, Pisoi, Knox to SOSFO, March 26, 1924; FO 371/998/E2932, Knox to SOSCO, March 30, 1924. 117. L/P&S/IO/I034, Pi2io, HCI to SOSCO, March 9, 1923; FO 37i/8948/Eio4O3, Res. Bush to SOSCO, October 19, 1923. 118. FO 37I/895O/EI2O27, minutes by Mallet, December 22, 1923. 119. Dobbs, Iraq-Najd relations; Glubb, War in the Desert, p. 107. 120. Glubb, War in the Desert, p. 107. 121. FO 37I/8948/E953I, aviation officer, Baghdad to Air Ministry, September 21, 1923; FO 37J/8948/E9538, HCI to SOSCO, September 22, 1923; al-Sudani, 'Jlaqat, pp. 130-31122. R/i5/5/28, Pol. Ku. to Res. Bush., September 3, 1923; FO 371/8948/510401, general officer commanding in Palestine to secretary, Air Ministry, October 4, 1923. 123. FO 371/9996/547, Knox to SOSCO, December 28, 1923; 14/15/5/70, Knox to SOSCO, January 16, 1924. 124. CO 727/9/6875, Knox to SOSCO, January 14, 1924. 125. L/P&S/IO/I034, P326, HCI to SOSCO, January 17, 1924. 126. FO 371/8939/5669, HCP to SOSCO, July 4, 1923; FO 371/8939/57018, minutes by J. Murray, July 16, 1923. 127. FO 371/8949/E9629, Palmer to Curzon, September 12, 1923. 128. Ibid., enclosed in Palmer's letter, Ibn Saud to Fazan El Sabig, August 9, 1923. 129. R/15/5/70, Knox to SOSCO, January 16, 1924. 130. R/I5/5/28, Pol. Basra, to Pol. Ku., April 29, 1924; L/P&S/i0/1034, P3O73, Pol. Bah. to Res. Bush, May 24, 1924. 131. R/J5/5/28, Pol. Ku. to Res. Bush., February 10, 1924 (enclosed with Trevor's report, February 23, 1924). 133. L/P&S/IO/I034, Pi 143, Res. to SOSCO, March 5, 1924. 134. L/P&S/IO/I034, PT383, HCI to SOSCO, March 19, 1924; al-Sudani, 'Ilaqat, pp. 183-85. 135. L/P&S/IO/I034, PI732, Res. Bush, to SOSCO, April 10, 1924; FO 37I/9997/ £2640, HCI to SOSCO, March 20, 1924.

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227

136. Dobbs, Iraq-Najd relations; al-Sudani, 'Ilaqat, pp. 201-2, 204. 137. FO 37I/IOOI2/E8489, F. G. Peake (officer commanding the Arab Legion), to HCTJ, August 26, 1924. 138. AIR 23/332, Report by SSO Nasiriyya, April 15, 1925; Glubb, War in the Desert, pp. 114, 123. 139. R/is/5/38, HCI to Pol.Ku., January I, 1925; FO 371/1o816/E111, HCI to SOSCO, January 19, 1925; R 15/5/106, Res. Bush, to Ibn Saud, January 6, 1925. 140. FO 37i/io8i6/Ei63, HCI to SOSCO, January 8, 1925; AIR 23/79, report on defensive measures against the Akhwan, winter 1925-26, April 16, 1925. 141. AIR 23/332, SSO Nasiriyya, report on Akhwan defense, February 9, 1925. 142. FO 37i/io8io/Ei63, HCI to SOSCO, January 19, 1925. 143. Glubb, War in the Desert, p. 143. 144. AIR 23/332,880 Nasiriyya, report on Akhwan defense, March 8, 1925; AIR 23/79, Report of the offensive operations against the Akhwan, winter 1925-26, June 12, 1926. 145. AIR 23/331, SSO Nasiriyya, report on Akhwan defense, January 25, 1925. 146. AIR 23/4, SSO Baghdad to Air Staff Intelligence, January 24, 1925. 147. CO 727/11/26603, Committee of Imperial Air Defence, report by Subcommittee, Arabia: situation in Akaba, June 4, 1925. 148. AIR 23/3, SSO Ramadi to Air Staff Intelligence, January 9, 1925. 149. FO 37J/IOOI3/E90I9, SOSCO to HCP, October 15, 1924; 00/727/11/26603, Committee of Imperial Defense, Report by Subcommittee, Arabia: situation in Akaba, June 4, 1925. 150. AIR 23/9, SSO Basra to Air Staff Intelligence, April 15, 1925; AIR 23/10, SSO Basra to Air Staff Intelligence, April 29, 1925. 151. AIR 23/71, SSO Ramadi, extract from weekly report, February 25, 1925. 152. L/P&S/IO/II25, P470, HCP to SOSCO, February 13, 1925. 153. FO 37i/io8i6/Ei76t, Smart to Chamberlain, February 26, 1925; AIR 23/4, confidential memo from the Mutassarif, Dulaim Liwa, to the Ministry of Interior, December 30, 1924; AIR 23/73, extract from report by British liaison officer, Beyrouth, February 25, 1925. 154. AIR 23/4, confidential memo from the Mutassarif, Dulaim Liwa, to the Ministry of Interior, December 30, 1924. 155. AIR 23/332, Akhwan defense, March 8, 1925; AIR 23/10, SSO Basra to Air Staff Intelligence, April 30 and May 17, 1925. 156. R. O. Collins, ed., Sir Gilbert Clayton, An Arabian Diary, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), p. 102. 157. L/P&S/io/ii6s, ?747, report by Sir G. Clayton on his mission to negotiate certain agreements with the sultan of Nejd . . . , Colonial Office, February 1926. 158. U.Q., August i, 1925. 159. U.Q., September 13, 1926; Salah al-Din al-Mukhtar, Ta'rikh al-Mamlaka al'Arabiyya al-Sa'udiyyafi Madiha wa-Hadiriha (Beirut: Dar al-Hayat, 1958), vol. 2, pp. 385-87, 390-91 (hereafter cited as al-Mukhtar); al-Riharii, Najd, pp. 373-76; Khayr alDin al-Zirikli, Shibh al-Jazira fi 'Ahd al-Malik 'Abd al-'Aziz (Beirut: Matabi' Dar alQalam, 1970), vol. 2, pp. 569-73 (hereafter cited as al-Zirikli); Fu'ad Hamzah, al-Bilad al-'Arabiyya al-Sa'udiyya, 2nd ed. (al-Riyad: Maktabat al-Nasir al Haditha, 1961), pp. 98-102 (hereafter cited as Hamzah, al-Sa'udiyya); See also Ghazi Shanneik, "Die Modernisierung des Traditionellen Politischen System," in T. Koszinowski, ed., Saudi Arabien: Oelmacht und Entwicklungsland (Hamburg: Stiftung Deutsches Uebersee Institut, 1983), pp. 155-63.

228

NOTES

160. AIR 23/6, SSO Nasiriyya, report on Akhwan defense, February 9, 1925; AIR 23/71, SSO Basra to Air Staff Intelligence, April 10, 1925. 161. FO 37I/9997/E2O26, Knox to SOSCO, February 29, 1924. By February 1924, the two chieftains have met and maintained contact. 162. AIR 23/10, extract from report from SSO Nasiriyya, June i, 1925; AIR 23/10, extract from report from SSO Nasiriyya, June 6, 1925; U.Q., January 10, 1925. 163. AIR 23/7, SSO Basra to Air Staff Intelligence, May 21, 1925. 164. Wahbah, Arabian Days, p. 133. 165. Al-Zirikli, pp. 95-96. 166. Wahbah, Jazira, p. 22. 167. U.Q., December 12, 1924, July 23 and November 6, 1925. 168. Wahbah, Jazira, pp. 309-13; Goldrup, "Saudi Arabia," pp. 399-400. 169. Al al-Shaykh. 170. U. Q., January 12, 1925, September 25, 1925; Goldrup, "Saudi Arabia," p. 397. 171. Hamzah, al-Sa'udiyya, pp. 196-97; A. Bligh, From Prince to King: Royal Succession in the House of Saud in the Twentieth Century (New York: New York University Press, 1984), pp. 23-24. 172. U. Q., August 19, 1927; Hamzah, Sa'udiyyah, p. 189; Goldrup, "Saudi Arabia," pp. 279-84. 173. Al-Zirikli, vol. 2, pp. 454-55; TJmar Abu al-Nasr, Sirat al-Jazira al-'Arabiyya li-Ibn Sa'ud (Beirut: al-Maktaba al-Ahliyya, 1935), pp. 125-47 (hereafter cited as Abu Nasr); L/P&S/io/i 15, ?937, Jordan to Chamberlain, February 4, 1926 (Jidda report for January); Hamzah, al-Sa'udiyya, pp. 87-88, 114-16, 158-59, 180-81. 174. Hamzah, al-Sa'udiyya, pp. 115-17. 175. L/P&S/I2/2I07, P2507, AC. British consul to SOSFO, April 20, 1928. 176. Hamzah, al-Sa'udiyya, p. 102. 177. Ibid.; also Al al-Shaykh. 178. P. P. Box 16/5 note [by Philby] on Saudi Arabia to Dr. Hugh Scott, August 29, 1944. 179. Al-Zirikli, vol. 2, pp. 465-67. 180. FO 371/11447^3790, Jordan to Chamberlain, June i, 1926 (Jidda report for May); U.Q., April 15, 1926. 181. FO 371/11447/EI9I9, Jordan to Chamberlain, March i, 1926 (Jidda report for February). 182. FO 371/1147^2627, Jordan to Chamberlain, March 31, 1926 (Jidda report for March). 183. FO 371/11447/E2287, Ac. British consul, Jidda to SOSFO, April 6, 1926. 184. FO 371/11447/E3I98, Jordan to Chamberlain, May i, 1926 (Jidda report for April); U.Q., April 15, 1926. 185. Goldrup, "Saudi Arabia," pp. 400-1. 186. FO 371/11447/EI399, Jordan to Chamberlain, February 4, 1926 (Jidda report for January). 187. FO 371/11447/EI9I9, Jordan to Chamberlain, March i, 1926 (Jidda report for February). 188. FO 37I/II447/E2627, Jordan to Chamberlain, March 31, 1926 (Jidda report for March). 189. FO 371/11449^3790, Jordan to Chamberlain, June i, 1926 (Jidda report for May). 190. FO 37I/II447/E5409, Jordan to Chamberlain, September 3, 1926 (Jidda report for August).

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229

191. FO 371/11447^4376, Jordan to Chamberlain, October i, 1926 (Jidda report for September). 192. FO 371/11447/E3I98, Jordan to Chamberlain, May i, 1926 (Jidda report for April). 193. P.P. Box 15/8, a survey (by Philby) of Wahhabi Arabia, 1929. 194. Wahbah, Arabian Days, p. 74. 195. FO 371/11447/E4376, Jordan to Chamberlain, October i, 1936 (Jidda report for September); Bligh, From Prince to King, pp. 18-31. 196. P.P., Box XLII, Philby, Hejaz News, September 27, 1926; FO 371/114477 £4376, Jordan to Chamberlain, October i, 1926 (Jidda report for September). 197. FO37I/H447/E2627, Jordan to Chamberlain, March 31, 1926 (Jidda report for March). 198. Abu Nasr, pp. 143, 145-47; Wahbah, Arabian Days, p. 192. 199. FO37I/H47/E7O77, Jordan to Chamberlain, December 5, 1926 (Jidda report for November). 200. FO 371/12236^ 1123, Mayers to HCE, February 18, 1927. 201. Goldrup, "Saudi Arabia," p. 402. 202. FO 371/11434/E6298, Res. Bush, to SOSCO, October 23, 1926. 203. Goldrup, "Saudi Arabia," pp. 417-18. 204. D. Silverfarb, "The Treaty of Jidda of May 1927," Middle Eastern Studies 18 (1982): pp. 276-85. 205. CAB 24/182/415, memo on British interests in Arabia, December 8, 1926; Silverfarb, "The Treaty of Jidda." 206. Silverfarb, "The Treaty of Jidda"; FO 371/1 i437/Ei8o, viceroy, India to SOSIO, January 5, 1926; /P&S/io/iiss, P2723, interdepartmental conference, January 19, 1927. 207. Silverfarb, "The Treaty of Jidda." 208. FO 371/11437/E322, Clayton to SOSFO, December 16, 1926. 209. Silverfarb, "The Treaty of Jidda." The treaty includes paragraphs concerning the manumission of slaves and future channels of communication between Britain and Ibn Sa'ud that have no direct relevance to our discussion. 210. L/P&S/io/ii65, P3637, minutes of a conference at the Colonial Office, October 6, 1926; FO 371/1 i438/E59i8, memo by V. Mallet, October 13, 1926; note by V. Mallet, October 22, 1926. 211. Silverfarb, "The Treaty of Jidda." 212. L/P&S/10/1166, P83i, draft minutes of an interdepartmental conference held at the Colonial Office on February 4 and 7, 1927, to discuss objections raised by Ibn Saud to the draft treaty; see also L/P&S/io/ii66, Pi4i2, SOSFO to Consul Mayers (Jidda), March 14, 1927. 213. FO 37i/i2245/Ei744, Chamberlain to Clayton, April 14, 1927. 214. The analysis in Silverfarb, "The Treaty of Jidda"; FO 37i/i224O/Eio93, Oliphant to Stonehewer Bird (Jidda), May 12, 1927; FO 371/122 45^2583, Clayton to Chamberlain, June 6, 1927; L/P&S/IO/I966, P3269, Clayton to Chamberlain, June 6, 1927; see also C. Leatherdale, Britain and Saudi Arabia 1925-1937: The Imperial Oasis (London: Cass, 1983), pp. 64-71. 215. Al-Rihani, Najd, p. 439. 216. CO 725/7/10709, Res. Aden, to SOSCO, March 6, 1925. 217. FO 141/665/7996, record of a conversation set at the residency, April 26, 1925. 218. CO 725/7/32050, Res. Aden to SOSCO, July i, 1925. 219. L/P&S/IO/792, P2794, Bullard (Jidda) to Chamberlain, July 8, 1925.

230

NOTES

220. FO 371/1 i445/E6oi5/, Jordan to Res. Aden, October 2, 1926; €0725/9/22301, Ac. Res. Aden to SOSCO, November 30, 1926. 221. FO 371/11432/E5796, SOSFO to Ac. British Consul Mayers, October 10, 1926. 222. FO 371/11447/E6655, Mayers to Chamberlain, November 3, 1926 (Jidda report for October). 223. U.Q., January 7, 1927; CO 725/12/48021, Mayers to Chamberlain, January 8, 1927. 224. U.Q., April 8, 1927, May 10, 1927; Wahbah, Arabian Days, pp. 134-36. 225. FO 37i/i225o/Eioi2, Mayers to Chamberlain, February 5, 1927 (Jidda report for January). 226. FO 371/12236/Ei 123, Mayers to HCE, February 18, 1927. 227. Ibid. 228. Al-Mukhtar, p. 443. 229. Al al-Shaykh. 230. Goldrup, "Saudi Arabia," pp. 419-20; Wahbah, Arabian Days, pp. 134-36. 231. See, for example, D. C. Edens, "The Anatomy of the Saudi Revolution, International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 8 (1974): 50-64; J. Kostiner, "On Instruments and Their Designers: The Ikhwan of Najd and the Formation of the Saudi State," Middle Eastern Studies 21 (1985): 298-323. Bin Sahman, pp. 36-47; Iqbal, The Emergence of Saudi Arabia, pp. 166-68. 232. FO 371/1224o/E1217, HCI to SOSCO, February 16, 1927; al-Sudani, 'Jlaqat, pp. 250-53. These sources particularly refer to a Shammar raid into Najd in November 1926, which led to the punishment of their leader, 'Ajil Ibn Yawr, by the Iraqis. 233. Al-Sudani, 'Ilaqat, pp. 256-58. 234. FO 371/11434/E2038, HCE to SOSFO, March 28, 1926; Glubb, War in the Desert, pp. 157-83. 235. Al-Sudani, 'Ilaqat, pp. 256-58; Glubb, War in the Desert; FO 371/13714/E88o, a note on policy of the Najd frontier; FO 37I/I2993/E2877, administrative inspector, Muntafiq (C. H. Gowan) to adviser, Ministry of Interior, March 18, 1928 (hereafter cited as Gowan, report). 236. Gowan, report; al-Sudani, 'Ilaqat, pp. 259-62. 237. Al-Sudani, 'Ilaqat, pp. 255-56; Gowan, report.

238. FO 37I/I225O/E2849, Stonehewer Bird to Chamberlain, June i, 1927, (Jidda

report for April and May); FO 371/12250^3204, Stonehewer Bird to Chamberlain, July i, 1927 (Jidda report for June); R/15/5/38, Pol. Ku. to Res. Bush., January 3, 1927. 239. Goldrup, "Saudi Arabia," pp. 420-21. 240. FO 37I/I225O/E32O4, Stonehewer Bird to Chamberlain, July i, 1927 (Jidda report for June). 241. Al-Zirikili, vol. 2, p. 442. 242. Hamzah, al-Sa'udiyya, pp. 102-5. 243. FO 37I/I225I/E3520, Res. Bush, to Foreign, August 8, 1927. 244. FO 37I/I2250/E4U5, Stonehewer Bird to Chamberlain, September i, 1927 (Jidda report for August); FO 371/12251^3714, Stonehewer Bird to SOSFO, August ir, 1927. 245. FO 371/12251/E,3714, Stonehewer Bird to SOSFO, August 11, 1927. 246. FO 37i/!225O/E438g, Stonehewer Bird to Chamberlain, September 27, 1927; L/P&S/IO/III5, P5732, Jakins (Jidda) to Chamberlain, November 6, 1927. 247. R/15/2/89, HCI to Res. Bush, November 7, 1927.

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248. FO 37I/I2240/EI2I7, HCI to SOSCO, February 16, 1927; L/P&S/IO/I235, P 1204, extract from the annual report of the administrative inspector, Muntafiq Liwa for 1927 (no date given). 249. Glubb, War in the Desert, pp. 193-94. 250. Al-Sudani, 'Ilaqat, pp. 265-66.

251. L/P&S/IO/I236, P328o, comment by G. Antonious, June 22, 1928; Silverfarb,

"The Treaty of Jidda." 252. Silverfarb, "The Treaty of Jidda." 253. FO 37i/i225o/E438o, Stonehewer Bird to Chamberlain, September 27, 1927 (Jidda report for September). 254. Silverfarb, "The Treaty of Jidda." 255. FO 37I/I244O/E5O82, Damluji to the British consul, Jidda, October 29, 1927; FO 37i/i2249/Es36o, Res. Bush, to SOSCO, December 12,1927; FO 371/12988/15:686, note on conversation between HCI and Hafidh Wahbah, January 7, 1928. 256. R/I5/2/89, Pol. Ku. to Res. Bush., January 10, 1927. 257. R/is/5/38, Pol. Ku. to Bush., December 19, 1927; 11/15/5/38, Pol. Ku. to Res. Bush., December 20, 1927. 258. L/P&S/IO/235, Pi2O4, extract from the annual report of the administrative inspector, Muntafiq Liwa for 1927 (no date given). 259. R/15/2/89, Pol. Ku. to Res. Bush., December 20, 1927; L/P&S/IO/I235, Pg88, HCI to SOSCO, January 19, 1928. 260. FO 37I/I224I/E5326, Ac. HCI to SOSCO, December 12, 1927. 261. Al-Sudani, 'Ilaqat, pp. 177, 270-71, 273, 177. 262. L/P&S/IO/I235, P989, HCI to SOSCO, January 28, 1928. 263. FO 37I/I2988/E256, memo by D. G. Osborne, January 2, 1928; R/i5/2/89, Res. Bush, to SOSCO, January 2, 1928; D. Silverfarb, "Great Britain, Iraq and Saudi Arabia: The Revolt of the Ikhwan 1927-30," International History Review 4 (1981): 222-48. 264. FO 371/12993/62047, H. Dobbs, replies to additional arguments used by Ibn Saud in his letter (dated February 7, 1928), March 30, 1928. 265. FO 37i/i299i/Ei499, HCI to SOSCO, March 19, 1928; R/i5/2/90, Pol. Ku. to Res. Bush., March 4, 1928. 266. FO 37i/i224i/Es6, Oliphant to USOSCO, December 13, 1927; L/P&S/io/ 1238, P737, Res. Bush to SOSCO, February 13, 1928; FO 37i/i224i/Es6i5, minutes by D. G. Osborne, December 31, 1927. 267. FO 37I/I2988/E686, note on the conversation between counsellor (to HCI) and Wahbah, January 6, 1928. 268. R/I5/2/89, Pol. Bah. to Res. Bush., January 26, 1928. 269. L/P&S/IO/I239, P644, B. Con. Ji. to SOSFO, February 7, 1928; R/i5/2/89, Pol. Bah. to Res. Bush., February 10, 1928. 270. R/i5/2/89, HCI to SOSCO, February i, 1928. 271. L/P&S/IO/I235, Pi493, Res. Bush to Pol. Bah., February 25, 1928; L/P&S/io/ 1234, P890, SOSCO to HCI and Res. Bush., February 24, 1928. 272. Silverfarb, "Great Britain, Iraq and Saudi Arabia." 273. L/P&S/IO/I234, P839, SOSCO to HCI and Res. Bush., February 22, 1928. 274. L/P&S/io/1234, P844, Res. Bush, to SOSCO, February 18, 1928. 275. L/P&S/TO/T235, Pi359, Res. Bush to SOSCO, March 15, 1928. 276. Silverfarb, "Great Britain, Iraq and Saudi Arabia"; CAB 2/5, Chamberlain's comment at meeting of CID, May 22, 1928; FO 371/2989^995, Stonehewer Bird to Chamberlain, February 10, 1928.

232

NOTES

277. Glubb, War in the Desert. 278. L/P&S/IO/I235, P1028, Ibn Sa'ud to the B. Con. Ji., January 25, 1928; FO 371; I2I88/HCI to SOSCO, January 27, 1928; L/P&S/IO/I236, PSOS, B. Con. Ji. to SOSFO, February 15, 1928. 279. FO 37i/i2992/Ei82o, minutes by Osborne, April 7, 1928. 280. CAB 23/57, cabinet, discussing Clayton's mission, March 28 and May 23, 1928. 281. Al-Ziriqli, vol. 2, pp. 377-78. 282. FO 37I/I2995/E85O, Glubb to adviser to Ministry of Interior, September 6, 1928. 283. R/i5/2/89, Pol. Ku. to air officer commanding Baghdad, January 7, 1923; L/ P&S/io/iiis, Pi66, Stonehewer Bird to Chamberlain, February i, 1928 (Jidda report for January). 284. Barret, report. 285. R/i5/5/89, Pol. Ku. to Res. Bush., January 13, 1928. 286. R/i5/5/89, Pol. Ku. to Res. Bush., January 7, 1928; L/P&S/io/ns, Pi66, Stonehewer Bird to Chamberlain, February i, 1928 (Jidda report for January). 287. R/I5/5/39, SOS Basra to Aviation Headquarters, Baghdad, January 16, 1928. 288. L/P&S/IO/I236, P2I74, Glubb to adviser, Ministry of Interior, on the situation in Najd, March 27, 1928; FO 37I/I2988/E686, note on conversation between HCI and Hafidh Wahba, January 7, 1928. 289. R/I5/5/4O, Pol. Ku. to Res. Bush., Intelligence, note on the 'Utayba (no date given). 290. R/15/5/39, SOS Kuwait to Air Staff Intelligence, Baghdad, March 4, 1928. 291. FO 371/12988/E78o, Res. Bush, to SOSCO, February n, 1928. 292. R/I5/5/39, SOS Basra to Aviation Headquarters, Baghdad, January 16, 1928; R/15/5/39, Pol. Ku. to Res. Bush., March 3, 1928. 293. L/P&S/IO/I234, P447, HCI to SOSCO, January 26, 1928. 294. R/15/5/90, Pol. Ku. to Res Bush., February 27, 1928. 295. L/P&S/IO/I234, P890, HCI to SOSCO, February 23, 1928. 296. R/i5/2/90, Res. Bah. to SOSCO, February 23, 1928. 297. R/i5/2/90, Pol. Ku. to Res. Bush, February 27, 1928; R/i5/2/40, SOS Kuwayt to Air Staff Intelligence, March 9, 1928. 298. R/i5/2/90, Pol. Ku. to Res. Bush, March 7, 1928; R/I5/5/39, Pol. Ku. to Res. Bush., March 3, 1928; R/i5/5/39, Pol. Ku. to Res. Bush., March 7, 1928. 299. L/P&S/IO/I235, Pi255, Res. Bush, to SOSCO, March 10, 1928. 300. R/i5/2/90, Pol. Ku. to Res. Bush, March 14, 1928. 301. FO 37i/i299i/Ei42i, Pol. Ku to SOSCO, March 15, 1928. 302. R/I5/5/39, SSO Nasiriya to officer commanding air force, UR, March 17, 1928; R/I5/5/39, Pol. Ku. to SOSCO, March 27, 1928. 303. FO 371/12991IE 1479, Res. Bush, to SOSCO, March 17, 1928. 304. R/i5/5/40, Pol. Ku to Aviation, Baghdad, received April 6, 1928. 305. L/P&S/IO/I235, Res. Bush, to SOSCO, April 11, 1928; R/i5/2/91, Pol. Ku. to SOSCO, April 21, 1928. 306. R/I5/2/9I, Pol. Bah. to Res. Bush., May 6, 1928; R/15/2/gi, Pol. Bah. to Res. Bush, (no date given, but probably May 6 or 7); R/15/2/91, Pol. Bah. to Res. Bush., May 13, 1928; FO 37I/I2994/E3475, note by Glubb on the meeting at Buraidah, June 9, 1928. 307. L/P&S/IO/I234, P644, minutes by M. J. Clauson, February 10, 1928. 308. L/P&S/IO/I237, report by Sir Gilbert Clayton on his mission to the king of the

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Hejaz and of Najd and its dependencies for the purpose of negotiating a settlement of outstanding questions (April-June 1928), June 18, 1928 (hereafter cited as Clayton, report of 1928). 309. Ibid.; also Silverfarb, "Great Britain, Iraq and Saudi Arabia." 310. Clayton, report of 1928. 311. CAB 24/193, joint memo by SOSCO and SOS for Air, March 1928; CAB 24! 196, memo by SOSCO, Akhwan situation, June 15, 1928. 312. CAB 24/196, report by Prime Minister Baldwin on the subcommittee's meeting, June 26, 1928 (including minutes). 313. Clayton, report of 1928 (second mission, July-August 1928). 314. See Habib, Ibn Sa'ud's Warriors; Helms, The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia. 315. L/P&S/i0/1240, Pi86, Glubb to adviser, Ministry of Interior, Intelligence from Najd, November 17, 1928; L/P&S/IO/I238, P4992, Pol. Ku. to Res. Bush., July 30, 1928. 316. U.Q., September 7, 1928. 317. U.Q., July 13, 1928. 318. FO 37I/I30IO/E477O, Stonehewer Bird to Cushendown, August 31, 1928 (Jidda report for August); FO 371/13010/E4956, Stonehewer Bird to Cushendown, September 30, 1928 (Jidda report for September); L/P&S/IO/I235, P4798, officer administering the government for Palestine to SOSCO, August 30, 1928. 319. L/P&S/IO/I235, Pi436, Res. Bush, to SOSCO, March 13, 1928. 320. L/P&S/IO/I235, P2955, B. Con. Ji., to SOSFO, March 13, 1928. 321. FO 37i/i3oi6/E445, Stonehewer Bird to Hijazi acting minister for foreign affairs, September 4, 1928; FO 37I/I3724/E2I4, minutes by Rendel, April 30, 1929; FO 37I/I2995/E 483, extract from Glubb's report, September 14, 1928. 322. R/15/2/91, Pol. Ku. to Res. Bush., October 31, 1928; L/P&S/10/1240, Pi86, Glubb to adviser, Ministry of Interior, Intelligence from Najd, November 17, 1928, R/ 15/5/40 Pol. Ku. to Res. Bush, November 9, 1928. 323. L/P&S/10/1240, Pi86, Glubb to adviser, Ministry of Interior, Intelligence from Najd, November 17, 1928. 324. Ibid. 325. L/P&S/10/1240, P4I9, Jakins to SOSFO, December 20, 1928. 326. R/is/5/40, Pol. Ku. to Res. Bush., February 12, 1928. 327. U.Q., December 13, 1927; FO 371/13713^387, statements of the men in the (al-Riyad) conference, Jakins to Chamberlain, December 31, 1928; L/P&S/IO/I24O, Pi092, extract from summary of the news from Arab states for the month of december 1928; U.Q., October 12 and December 18, 1928; FO 37I/I3728/E489, Jakins to Chamberlain, September i, 1929 (Jidda report for December). 328. U.Q., October 12 and December 18, 1928; Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours, pp. 296-97; FO 37i/i37i3/E5ii, Res. Bush, to SOSCO, January 20, 1929. 329. L/P&S/10/115, P2497, Jakins to Chamberlain; January i, 1929; R/I5/2/9I, Pol. Ku. to Res. Bush., October 31, 1928. 330. FO 37I/I37I3/E387, statements of the men in the conference, Jakins to Chamberlain, December 31, 1928. 331. FO 37I/I3728/E2I74, Jakins to Chamberlain, April i, 1929. 332. Glubb, War in the Desert, p. 232. 333. FO 371/13714/E88o, Glubb, monthly administrative report for December 1928, January 14, 1929; FO 37I/I37I4/E995, Ac. HCI to SOSCO, February 21, 1929. 334. Habib, Ibn Sa'ud's Warriors, p. 137; L/P&S/10/1240, Pi722, Pol. Ku. to Res. Bush., January 16, 1929.

234

NOTES

335. L/P&S/IO/I24O, P3572, extract from report of the southern desert, for the month of march 1929 (Enclosure in Ac. HCI to SOSCO, April 23, 1929) (hereafter cited as Extract from March report). 336. Ibid. 337. R/15/2/91. Pol. Ku. to Res. Bush., February 20, 1929. 338. R/15/2/91, Pol. Ku. to Res. Bush., February 8, 1929. 339. R/15/5/42, Glubb to Aviation, March 28, 1929. 340. L/P&S/IO/I238, P285I, Glubb to adviser, Ministry of Interior, March 12, 1929; L/P&S/IO/I238, P285I, Glubb to adviser, Ministry of Interior, Relations with Kuwayt, March 15, 1929; L/P&S/IO/I243, PsSoy, Pol. Ku. to Res. Bush., March 29, 1929. 341. Glubb, War in the Desert, p. 232. 342. FO 37i/i37i3/Ei4O, Jakins to Chamberlain, December 20, 1928; L/P&S/io/ 1240, P2778, questions of submission to arbitration of points in dispute between Ibn Sa'ud and Iraq, minutes by G. Laithwaite, April 12, 1929. 343. L/P&S/10/1240, P46s, Jakins to SOSFO, January 8, 1929; L/P&S/IO/I24O, P462, minutes by G. Laithwaite and J. C. Watt, January 22, 1929; L/P&S/IO/I240, P692, USOSFO to USOSCO, January 23, 1929; L/P&S/IO/I24O, P6i2, USOSFO to USOSCO, January 23, 1929. 344. R/i5/5/49, SSO Kuwayt to Air Staff Intelligence, March 9, 1929; U.Q., February 12, 1929. 345. R/i5/2/91, Pol. Ku. to Res. Bush., March 5, 1929; L/P&S/IO/I238, P2O3, HCI to SOSCO, March 3, 1929. 346. L/P&S/IO/I238, Ac. HCI to SOSCO, March 23, 1929; R/15/2/91, Pol. Ku. to Res. Bush., March 20, 1929. 347. R/i5/5/42, SSO Kuwait to Aviation, Baghdad, March 16, 1929. 348. R/i5/5/41, SSO Kuwait to Aviation, April 3, 1929. 349. Goldrup, "Saudi Arabia," p. 429; Habib, Ibn Sa'ud's Warriors, pp. 138-39. 350. R/i5/5/42, SSO Kuwait to Aviation, March 31, 1929. 351. Wahbah, Jazira, pp. 302-4. 352. Goldrup, "Saudi Arabia," p. 429. 353. Habib, Ibn Sa'ud's Warriors, p. 139; Glubb, War in the Desert, p. 286. 354. R/i5/5/4.1, SSO Kuwait to Aviation, April 3, 1929; 0/15/5/41, Glubb to Aviation, April 5, 1929; R/i5/5/41, SSO Kuwait to Aviation, April 5, 1929. 355. FO 37I/I3728/E3449, Jakins to Chamberlain, June 7, 1929 (Jidda report for May). 356. Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours, pp. 303-4. 357. Glubb, War in the Desert, pp. 287-88. 358. Goldrup, "Saudi Arabia," p. 431. 359. L/P&S/IO/I240, P39O8, Jakins to Chamberlain, May 25, 1929; U.Q., April 12, 1929. 360. FO 37I/I3737/E433O, Pol. Ku. to Res. Bush., July i, 1929. 361. R/i5/5/41, Pol. Ku. to Res. Bush., May 7, 1929; Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbours, pp. 304-5; Habib, Ibn Sa'ud's Warriors, pp. 142-43. 362. L/P&S/10/1243, Ps696, Pol. Ku. to Res. Bush., August 22, 1929; L/P&S/io/ 1243, P3403, Ac. HCI to SOSCO, May 9, 1929; L/P&S/IO/I243, P4O35, Pol. Ku. to Res. Bush., May 4, 1929; L/P&S/IO/I243, PsiSo, Br. Con. Ji to SOSFO, June 7, 1929. 363. L/P&S/10/1243, P5508, Res. to SOSCO, August 22, 1929; L/P&S/10/1243, P6i6i, Pol. Ku. to Res. Bush., August 20, 1929. 364. FO 37I/I3737/E433O, Pol. Ku. to Res. Bush., July i, 1929. 365. L/P&S/10/1243, P6690, Pol. Ku. to Res. Bush., September 24, 1929.

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366. Ibid.; also FO 371/13728/133449, Jakins to Chamberlain, June 7, 1929 (Jidda report for May). 367. L/P&S/IO/H5, P9386, Bond (Jidda) to Chamberlain, September 22, 1929; R/ 15/5/92, Bin Saud to Shaykh Hammad, September 19, 1929. 368. L/P&S/10/1243, P56i4, Bond to SOSFO, July 30, 1929; U.Q., July 31, 1929. 369. L/P&S/10/1243, P6436, Pol. Ku. to Res. Bush., September 2, 1929. 370. L/P&S/io/i 115, P8i35, Bond to Henderson, September 24, 1929 (Jidda report for August); R/15/5/92, extract from Ibn Saud's letter to Shaikh Hamad, supplement, September 19, 1929. 371. L/P&S/10/1243, P6793, Pol. Ku. to Res. Bush., September 18, 24, and 26, 1929, Intelligence, situation in Hassa and Nejd. 372. R/I5/2/92, Br. Con. Ji. to Pol. Ku., September n, 1929. 373. Al-Zirikli, vol. 2, pp. 496-97; Habib, Ibn Sa'ud's Warriors, p. 146, counted eight points. 374. R/I5/2/92, Br. Con. Ji. to Pol. Ku., September 11, 1929; L/P&S/10/1247, ?3167, a report on operations on the Iraq-Nejd frontier, December i, 1927, to September 21, 1930. 375. L/P&S/10/1243, P8i42, Br. Con. Ji., to SOSFO, September 21, 1929; L/P&S/ 10/115, P82I3, Bond to Henderson, September 24,1929 (Jidda report for September). 376. R/15/2/92, Pol. Ku. to Res. Bush., October 9, 1929; R/15/2/92, Pol. Ku. to Res. Bush., October 14, 1929. 377. L/P&S/io/iis, P733, Bond to SOSFO, November 8, 1929. 378. Silverfarb, "Great Britain, Iraq and Saudi Arabia"; L/P&S/IO/I244, P830, Res. Bush, to SOSCO, December 24, 1929. 379. Habib discusses those events in the last chapter of his book Ibn Saud's Warriors; see also L/P&S/10/1246, P8399, statement made to Bin Sa'ud by Sultan Ibn Muhalib (a Mutayr chieftain) who was sent by al-Duwish, n.d., enclosed in HCI to SOSCO, December 30, 1929.

Chapter 3 1. Ibn Khaldun's theory in this regard is well summarized by Muhsin Mahdi, Ibn Khaldun's Philosophy of History, new ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), chap. 4. 2. K. A. Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power, new ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1981), chap. 2. 3. P.P., Box XXXII/I4, Philby, economics in Arabia, September 8, 1933 (hereafter cited as Philby, economic report); L/P&S/12/2073, PZ 449, Ryan to Henderson, March 4, 1931 (Jidda report for January and February 1931). 4. L/P&S/I2/2O73, PZ55O2, Ryan to Henderson, May 29, 1931 (Jidda report for March and April). 5. L/P&S/i2/2074, PZ 2932, Ryan to Henderson, March 23, 1931; U.Q., March 6, I93I6. Philby, economic report; FO 371/15299/63024, Ryan to Henderson, May 15, I93I7. Philby, economic report. 8. Al-Rashid's documents, vol. 3, memo of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, economic situation in the Hijaz Nejd and its dependencies, January 27, 1931. 9. FO 37I/I5299/E3024, Ryan to Henderson, May 15, 1931; U.Q., May 3, 1931.

236

NOTES

10. FO 37i/i5299/53931, Henderson to Hope Gill (Jidda), August 7, 1931. 11. L/P&S/12/2073, PZ 2969, Ryan to Henderson, July 19, 1931 (Jidda report for May and June); L/P&S/i2/2073, PZ 7248, Hope Gill to Reading, October 9, 1931 (Jidda report for July and August); P.P., Box XXXII/5, Philby to Fuad Hamza, July 22, 1931. 12. L/P&S/I2/2077, PZ6547, Hope Gill to SOSFO, September 2, 1931; U.Q., July 31, August 28, and September 21, 1931. 13. P.P., Box XXXII/5, Philby to Fuad Hamza, July 22, 1931. 14. L/P&S/12/2077, PZ 6547, Hope Gill to SOSFO, September 12, 1931; L/P&S/ 12/2077, PZ 2552, Hope Gill to SOSFO, March 31, 1932. 15. L/P&S/12/2066, PZ 1234, Res. Bush, to SOSCO, January 31, 1931; also FO 37I/I6878/E3745, Ryan to SOSFO, June 19, 1933. 16. L/P&S/12/2066, PZ 1388, Res. Bush, to SOSCO, February 5, 1932. 17. FO 37i/i6878/E3745, Ryan to Simon, June 19, 1933, personalities in Saudi Arabia (hereafter cited as Ryan, personalities). 18. M. Almana, Arabia Unified: a Portrait of Ibn Sa'ud (London: Hutchinson Benham, 1980), pp. 292-95. 19. H. St. John B. Philby, Arabian Jubilee (New York: Day, 1953), p. 81. 20. FO 37i/i6oi8/Ei65, Ryan to Simon, December 28, 1931. 21. FO 37i/i53oi/E342i, Ryan to SOSFO, December 22, 1930. 22. P.P., Box XVI/s, H. St. John B. Philby, notes on Saudi Arabia for Dr. Hugh Scott, August 29, 1944. 23. FO 37I/I4483/E4657, Ryan to Henderson, August 11, 1930. 24. L/P&S/i 2/2066, PZ 5773, record of a meeting (with Wahbah) held at the Foreign Office on August 12, 1931; FO 371/6012/52469, Res. Bush, to SOSCO, April 22, 1932; L/P&S/I2/2066, PZ 1388, Res. Bush, to SOSCO, February 5, 1932. 25. L/P&S/i2/2073, PZ 27248, Hope Gill to Reading, October 9, 1931 (Jidda report for July and August). 26. L/P&S/i2/2073, PZ 579, quoted by Hope Gill to Simon, December I, 1931. 27. L/P&S/12/2073, PZ 7248, Hope Gill to Reading, October 9, 1931 (Jidda report for July and August). 28. FO 37I/I53OI/E342I, Ryan to SOSFO, December 22, 1930; See also A. Bligh, From Prince to King: Royal Succession in the House of Sand in the Twentieth Century (New York: New York University Press, 1984), pp. 26-29. 29. Al-Rashid's documents, vol. 3, W. W. Walnsley, Jr. (American vice-consul in Aden) to SOS, August 15, 1932. 30. L/P&S/12/2066, PZ 1338, Res. Bush, to SOSCO, February 5, 1932. 31. L/P&S/i2/2087, PZ 5250, Ryan to SOSFO, July i, 1930, L/P&S/I2/2IO7, PZ 5178, Ryan to SOSFO, July 15, 1930. 32. FO 371/14483/54657, Ryan to Henderson, August 11, 1930; U.Q., July 18, 1930. 33- U.Q., December 19, 1930. 34. FO 371/15292/52484, Ryan to Henderson, April 17, 1931. 35. FO 371/15292/52484, Ryan to Henderson, April 17, 1931 (Jidda report for January and February); L/P&S/I2/2O73, PZ4I49, Ryan to Henderson, April i, 1931 (Jidda report for January and February); L/P&S/I2/2O73, PZ5502, Ryan to Henderson, May 25, 1931 (Jidda report for March and April). 36. Philby, Arabian Jubilee, p. 81. 37. L/P&S/12/2073, PZ289, Hope Gill to Simon, November 7, 1932 (Jidda report for September and October).

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38. FO 37I/I5279/E3889, Ryan to Henderson, July i, 1931. 39. FO 371/15298/124167, Ryan to Henderson, July 12, 1931; U.Q., June 12, i93i40. FO 371/15299/64677, Hope Gill to Reading, August 29, 1931. 41. FO 371/15299^ 3889, Ryan to Henderson, July i, 1931. 42. L/P&S/12/2074, PZ 5109, Ryan to Henderson, June 9, 1931; U.Q., May 29, i93i43. U.Q., June 5, 12, and 19, 1931. 44. FO 37i/i5298/E4i66, Ryan to Henderson, July 12, 1931. 45. L/P&S/12/2074, PZ 7400, Ryan to Simon, November 2, 1931; L/P&S/I2/2073, PZ 579, Hope Gill to Simon, December i, 1931 (Jidda report for October and November). 46. L/P&S/I2/2064, PZ 5895, H.M. Ch. D'Af. to SOSFO, September 14, 1931; L/ P&S/I2/2074, PZ 6710, Hope Gill to Reading, September 30, 1931; L/P&S/I2/2O73 PZ 2579, Hope Gill to Simon, December i, 1931 (Jidda report for October and November). 47. L/P&S/i2/2074, PZ 5876, Hope Gill to Henderson, July 30, 1931. 48. FO 37I/I6878/E745, Ryan to SOSFO, June 19, 1933; FO 371/15299^5799, Hope Gill to Reading, November 2, 1931. 49. FO 37I/I5299/E5799, Hope Gill to Reading, November 2, 1931. 50. FO 37i/i5299/E6o67, Hope Gill to Simon, November 17, 1931. 51. Ibid.; U.Q., November 13 and 17, 1931. 52. U.Q., January 15, 1932; FO 37i/i6o25/Ei484, Hope Gill to SOSFO, March 5, 1932. 53. FO 37i/i5299/E6oo7, Hope Gill to Simon, November 17, 1931. In Hope Gill's opinion, a possible moratorium of debts was to be expected. 54. L/P&S/I2/2O73, PZ 4403, Hope Gill to Simon, April 27, 1932 (Jidda report for February and March). 55. L/P&S/I2/2074, PZ 2132, Hope Gill to SOSFO, May 5, 1932. 56. U.Q., November 20, 1931; L/P&S/12/2073, PZ 2792, Hope Gill to Simon, February 16, 1932 (Jidda report for November and December 1931). 57. L/P&S/12/2074, PZ 2132, Hope Gill to SOSFO, July 25, 1932; U.Q., March 11, 1932; FO 37i/i6o25/E482o, Ryan to SOSFO, August 27, 1932. 58. L/P&S/I2/2073, PZ 4403, Hope Gill to Simon, April 27, 1932 (Jidda report for February and March). 59. FO 37i/i6o25/Ei484, Hope Gill to SOSFO, March 5, 1932. 60. L/P&S/i2/2074, PZ 2650, Hope Gill to Simon, March 20, 1932. 61. FO 37I/I5299/E3642, Ryan to Henderson, June 20, 1931. 62. L/P&S/IO/I246, Pi27, HCI to SOSFO, January 7, 1930. 63. L/P&S/io/i246, Pi 155, SOSCO to HCI, January 7, 1930; L/P&S/I2/I246, P627, SOSCO to Res. Ku., January 23, 1930. 64. L/P&S/IO/I247, Pi2i7, SOSCO to HCI, February n, 1930. 65. L/P&S/10/1247, Pi452, Res. Bush, to SOSCO, February 24, 1930; L/P&S/io/ H5> P3798, Bond (Jidda) to Henderson, March 23, 1930. 66. FO 37I/I4463/E2I7I, Humphrys to Passfield, March 15, 1930; L/P&S/IO/I247, P2&99, suggestions by T. C. Fowle (Res. Bush.), regarding procedure of the Iraq-Nejd special (Bahra) tribunal, March 12, 1930. 67. L/P&S/IO/I246 P754, Res. Bush, to SOSCO, January 28, 1930. 68. L/P&S/10/1247, P4i86, Ryan to SOSFO, May 29, 1930. 69. L/P&S/10/I247, P5363, Ryan to SOSFO, August 14, 1930.

238

NOTES

70. FO 37I/I3740/E527, C. C. J. Barret to SOSCO, August 8, 1929. 71. L/P&S/12/2066, P4353, enclosure in Foreign Office covering letter dated July 8, 1930, prepared by Ryan, July 3, 1930. 72. FO 37i/i4462/E68i8, memo by R. Warner, December 18, 1930. 73. L/P&S/IO/I245, P3352, Res. Bush, to SOSCO, April 30, 1930; L/P&S/io/ 1245, P6357, memo by G. Grudle, October 4, 1930; L/P&S/10/101245, P42OO, precis of recent correspondence regarding questions of outstanding nature between Ibn Saud and sheikh of Koweit, minutes by G. Laithwaite, July i, 1930; FO 37i/i6oi9/Eii45, Biscoe to SOSCO, February 5, 1932. 74. FO 37I/I5292/E4499, record of a meeting held at the Foreign Office on August 12, 1931, to consider certain questions connected with Kuwait. 75. Ibid.; FO 371/16019/61417, minutes by Warner, April 2, 1932. 76. FO 371/16019/61145, Biscoe to SOSCO, Februarys, !93277. FO 37i/i6oi2/E2469, Res. Bush, to SOSCO, April 22, 1932. 78. L/P&S/12/2066, PZ6i, Ryan to Faysal, January n, 1932; L/P&S/12/2066, PZ2538, Pol. Ku. to Res. Bush., March 26, 1932. 79. FO 371/14467/65591, MacDonnell to Passfield, October 15, 1930; FO 3717 !5286/E48i6, Ch. D/Af. Ji. to SOSFO, September 15, 1931. 80. FO 37i/i6286/E2225, minutes by Rendel, May 15, 1931. 81. L/P&S/12/2067, PZi6o8, Ryan to SOSFO, March n, 1931. 82. FO 37I/I5286/E43, Ryan to SOSFO, January 2, 1931; L/P&S/I2/2IO3I, PZ 937, Glubb to HCP, February 4, 1932. 83. FO 371/15289/52152, Glubb to HCP, February 24, 1931; L/P&S/io/i3io, Pi983, HCI to SOSCO, March 31, 1931. 84. FO 37i/i5293/E6i5, SOSFO to Ryan, February 6, 1931. 85. FO 371/16013/5703, Glubb, a monthly report on events in the Trans-Jordan desert for October 1931 (hereafter cited as Glubb's report for . . .). 86. FO 37I/I5289/E2I52, Glubb, raids by Nejd Shararat, February 24, 1931. 87. FO 87I/I5295/E5I43, Glubb's report for July 1931. 88. L/P&S/i2/2067, PZ 3212, Glubb to HCP, March 7, 1931. 89. L/P&S/I2/I2067, PZ 1954, Ryan to SOSFO, March 31, 1931. 90. L/P&S/i2/2067, PZ 3444, SOSFO to Ryan, May 29, 1931; L/P&S/i2/2067, PZ 3444, Ryan to SOSFO, May 28, 1931. 91. FO 37I/I5295/E34I4, HCTJ to Passfield, June 10, 1931. 92. FO 371/15295/54221, SOSCO to Ac. HCTJ, August 8, 1931; FO 37I/I5295/ 55234, Reading to Hope Gill, October 22, 1931. 93. FO 371/15296/55804, Hope Gill to SOSFO, November 7, 1931. 94. FO 371/16013/51767, Glubb's report for January 1932. 95. FO 37i/i6oi3/E7O3, Glubb's report for November 1931; FO 37i/i6oi3/E2327, Glubb's report for February 1932. 96. FO 371/16013/51120, Glubb's report for December 1931. 97. FO 37i/i6oi3/ 62327, Glubb's report for February 1932. 98. FO 371/15290/66441, extract from letter by Air Commander Freeman, Army Headquarters Jerusalem, to Air Vice-Marshal Burnett, December 7, 1931. 99. FO 37i/i6oi3/E2327, Glubb's report for February 1932. 100. FO 371/16013/61120, Glubb's report for December 1931. 101. FO 371/15298/63267, Ryan to Henderson, May 18, 1931. 102. FO 371/16012/62469, Res. Bush, to SOSCO, April 22, 1932. 103. FO 371/16874/67186, Ryan, memorandum on Saudi-Yemeni situation, November 21, 1933.

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239

104. L/P&S/I2/2I45, PZ6623, Ryan to SOSFO, March i, 1932; L/P&S/12/2065, PZ 1973, Ryan to Simon, note respecting the Saudi-Yemeni situation, January 24, 1934. 105. Wizarat al-Kharijiyya, Bay an 'an 'al-'Ilaqat bayna al-Mamlaka al-'Arabiyya alSa'udiyya wa al-Imam Yahya, 2nd ed. (Mecca, 1934), document n (hereafter cited as Saudi Green Book); FO 37I/I5296/E457I, minutes by Rendel, September 4, 1931. 106. L/P&S/I2/2064, P4888, SOSFO to Hope Gill, July 22, 1931. 107. Saudi Green Book, documents 14, 16; L/P&S/I2/2O64, PZ2895, Ryan to Simon, February 19, 1932; U.Q., October 9, 1931, and February 26, 1932. 108. L/P&S/12/2064, P89I, Hope Gill to Henderson, December 10, 1930; U.Q., November 13, 1930. 109. L/P&S/12/2064, P8242, Hope Gil! to Henderson, December 10, 1930; U.Q., November 13, 1930. no. L/P&S/i2/2064, P6o4, Ac. Res. Bush, to SOSCO, September 17, 1931. in. FO 905/21, Ihsanullah to Calvert (Jidda), January 21, 1935; al-Rashid Documents, vol. 3, A. K. Sloan (American consul, Jidda), to SOS, further information concerning the revolt in Asyr, December 7, 1932. 112. L/P&S/12/2064, Hope Gill to Simon, November 17, 1932; FO 37i/i68s6/E79, Hope Gill to Simon, December 17, 1932; Muhammad Bin Ahmad Tsa al-'Aqili, Min Ta'rikh al-Mukhallaf al-Sulaymani aw al-Junub al-'Arabifi al-Ta'rikh (Cairo: Publisher unknown, 1960), vol. 2, pp. 131-51, 292-93, 302-29 (hereafter cited as 'Aqili). 113. L/P&S/I2/2064, P604, Ac. Bes. Bush, to SOSCO, September 17, 1931. 114. L/P&S/IO/I249, P3I42,1. S. Erskine Lindop, Air Staff Headquarters, R.A.F. Palestine and Transjordan, Ibn Saud versus Transjordan, or Yemen? A review of the situation, September 10, 1930. 115. FO 37i/i6oi6/E3835, note on information given orally to Major Jarvis, July 28, 1932. 116. L/P&S/I2/21O2, P26o7, memo of the possible connexion of the Amir Abdullah and/or on his entourage with recent attempts to undermine Ibn Saud, n.d.; FO 37i/ i6oi4/E3i46, H.Q. R.A.F. Trans-Jordan and Palestine to H.Q. Mid. East, June 23, 1932; L/P&S/I2/2096, PZ23i8o, C. H. F. Cox (Trans-Jordan) to HCTJ, May 27, 1932; 79oF.90115/2, J. R. Walmsley to SOS, June 28, 1932; U.Q., June 10, 17, 1932. 117. L/P&S/12/2096, PZ2876, Cox to HCTJ, June 4, 1932. 118. L/P&S/I2/2096, PZ 3180, Cox to HCTJ, May 27, 1932. 119. L/P&S/12/2102, Pi6is, Ryan to SOSFO, July 31, 1932; L/P&S/I2/2O73, PZ 112, Hope Gill to Simon, September 8, 1932 (Jidda report for July and August). 120. L/P&S/I2/2O73, PZ 2269, Ryan to Simon, January 31, 1933 (Jidda report for November and December 1932); L/P&S/12/2064, PZ768i, extract from Aden political intelligence summary for the week ending December 6, 1932. 121. FO 37i/i68s6/E766, Ryan to SOSFO, January 17, 1933; U.Q., January 13, 1933122. L/P&S/12/2064, PZ 67874, Ryan to SOSFO, December 28, 1932; FO 371/ i68s6/Ei493, Ryan to Simon, March 3, 1933; U.Q., February 4, 1933; 'Aqili, pp. 330-43123. L/P&S/12/2096, PZ 3636, P. Lorrain (Cairo) to SOSFO, June 17, 1932; FO 37i/i6oi6/E4i88, minutes by Rendel, August 17, 1932. 124. FO 37i/i6oi6/E4i88, minutes by Rendel, August 17, 1932. 125. Ibid.; L/P&S/12/2096, PZ 7213, Cox to HCIJ, June 2, 1932; FO 141/764, C. Penny, controller, Public Security Intelligence, Alexandria, to Sudan agent, Cairo, January 12, 1933. 126. FO 37i/i6859/Ei74i, Ryan to Hamzah, March 19, 1933 (hereafter cited as

240

NOTES

Ryan, report); L/P'&S/12/2103, PZ655, C. H. F. Cox, report on the political situation in the month of December 1932. 127. Ibid.; FO 371/16016^3772, Res. Aden to SOSCO, July 25, 1932; L/P&S/I2/ 2102, PZ4837, Ryan to SOSFO, August 8, 1932; U.Q., August 5, 1932, FO 371/168597 Ei8i8, Muhammad Husain (of the Hizb), an appeal by Ha'iat ul-Shoorat i Idreesia wa Shoorat i Idressia ul-Hijazia, n.d.; U.Q., December 2, 1932. 128. L/P&S/I2/2I02, PZ4837, Ryan to SOSFO, August 8, 1932. 129. L/P&S/12/2096, PZ72I3, Cox to HCTJ, June 2, 1932; FO 37i/i6oi6/E4i88, minutes by Rendel, August 17, 1933. 130. FO 37i/i6oi4/E287i, P.O. Memorandum, secret reports regarding Hashimite intrigue against Ibn Saud, n.d.; L/P&S/I2/2IO2, PZ5723, C. H. F. Cox to HCTJ, July 27, 1932. 131. FO 141/764, The charter (Mithaq) of the Hizb al-Tahrir al-Hijazi, sealed on 12 Rabi' al-Awwal 1346 (1931). 132. FO 37i/i6859/Ei898, an appeal issued by Hizbul Ahrar on 20/21 Rajab 1351; FO 37i/i6859/Ei898, an appeal to Fu'ad by M. Tahir al-Dabbagh, November 15, 1932. 133. FO 37i/i6oi4/E2986, P. Lorraine to SOSFO, June 15, 1932; M. Kramer, "Shaykh Maraghi's Mission to the Hijaz, 1925," Asian and African Studies 16 (1982): 121-36. 134. Salah al-Din al-Mukhtar, Ta'rikh al-Mamlaka al-'Arabiyya al-Sa'udiyya fi Madiha wa-Hadiriha (Beirut: Dar al-Hayat, 1958), vol. 2, pp. 455-56 (hereafter cited as al-Mukhtar). FO 37i/i6oi4/E287i, F.O. memorandum on secret reports regarding Hashimite intrigue against Ibn Saud, n.d. 135. FO 37i/i6oi4/E287i, F.O. memorandum on secret reports regarding Hashimite intrigue against Ibn Saud, n.d. 136. FO 37i/i6oi4/E2986, P. Lorraine to SOSFO, June 15, 1932. 137. L/P&S/I2/2096, PZ4127, HCTJ to SOSCO, July 9, 1932. 138. L/P&S/I2/2096, PZ3I42, C. H. F. Cox to HCTJ, May 27, 1932; U.Q., August 26, 1932 (the testimony of a captive rebel). 139. F. W. 890 B. 00/122, P. Knabenshue (American consul, Jerusalem) to SOS, July 9, 1932. 140. FO 37i/i6o27/E4io5, Glubb's report for June 1932. 141. FO 37i/i6oi3/E26i9, Hamzah to Hope Gill, May 30, 1932; FO 37i/i6oi3/ £2690, interview with minister of the Hejaz and Nejd, June i, 1932. 142. L/P&S/i2/2096, PZ 3142, C. F. H. Cox to HCTJ, May 27, 1932. 143. FO 37i/i6oi5/E3579, HCTJ to SOSCO, July 9, 1932; Wauchope had no incriminating proof of "Abdullah's involvement. 144. FO 37i/i6o27/E4iO5, Glubb's report for June 1932; L/P&S/i2/2096, PZ29i8, HCTJ to SOSCO, July i, 1932. 145. L/P&S/12/2096, PZ 3285, USOSFO to USOSCO, June 3, 1932. 146. L/P&S/I2/2I03, PZ 674, Cunliff Lister to Wauchope, February i, 1932. 147. FO 37i/i6o24/E4703, HCTJ to SOSCO, September 3, 1932. 148. U.Q., July i, 1932; Ryan, report. 149. L/P&S/I2/2O7I, PZ5O36, Ryan to Simon, June 21, 1932. 150. L/P&S/12/2066, PZ2734, Pol. Ku. to Res. Bush., July 7, 1932. 151. Ibid.; L/P&S/I2/2O66, PZ2845, Dickson to Res. Bush., August 13, 1932. 152. FO 37i/i6oi6/E3920, E. C. Hole to British liaison officer, Beirut, July 13, 1932. 153. U.Q., August 5 and 26, 1932; L/P&S/12/2102, PZ4968, Ryan to SOSFO, August 12, 1932.

CHAPTER 3

241

154. L/P&S/i2/2074, PZ5036, Ryan to Simon, June 21, 1932; L/P&S/i2/2073, PZ 112, Hope Gill to Simon, September 8, 1932 (Jidda report for July and August). 155- U.Q., September 16, 1932. 156. U.Q., September 16 and 23, 1932. 157. L/P&S/i2/2099, PZ 5734, H. M. Ch. D'Af. to SOSFO, September 22,1932; 17 P&S/I2/2099, PZ63I4, H.M. Ch. D'Af. to SOSFO, September 25, 1932. 158. L/P&S/I2/2073, PZ 289, Hope Gill to Simon, November 7, 1932; L/P&S/I2/ 2082, PZ 6585, Res. Bush, to Foreign, September 30, 1931; see also Bligh, From Prince to King, pp. 26-28. 159. FO 37i/i6856/E79, Hope Gill to Simon, December 17, 1932. 160. U.Q., December 2, 1932. 161. 'Aqili, pp. 296-98; M. A. al-Shahari, Al-Matami''al-Tawassu'iyya al-Sa'udiyya fil-Yaman (Beirut: Dar Ibn Khaldun, 1979), pp. 169-94 (hereafter cited as al-Shahari); See also Johannes Reissner, "Die Idrisien in 'Asir: Ein historischer Ueberblick," Die Welt des Mams 21 (1981): 164-92. 162. FO 37i/i6oi2/E62, Ryan to Rendel, December n, 1932. 163. L/P&S/I2/2O64, PZ 880, Dickson, Kuwait intelligence summary for the fortnight ending December 15, 1932. 164. L/P&S/I2/2O73, PZ 2269, Ryan to Simon, January 31, 1933 (Jidda report for November and December 1932). 165. L/P&S/I2/2064, PZ 7874, Ryan to SOSFO, December 28, 1932. 166. FO 37i/i686o/E3962, Ryan to SOSFO, July i, 1933. 167. L/P&S/i2/2102, PZ 4841, Ryan to SOSFO, August 8, 1932; FO 37i/i66i7/ £6495, crisis in relations between Trans Jordan and Saudi Arabia, by G. W. Rendel, December i, 1932. 168. L/P&S/i2/2102, PZ 6013, SOSCO to HCTJ, September 30, 1932. 169. FO 37i/i6o24/E4703, HCTJ to SOSCO, September 3, 1932. 170. FO 371/16860/1459, Glubb's report for January 1933; FO 37i/i686o/E45i4, Glubb's report for May 1933. 171. L/P&S/i2/2103, PZ 230, Ryan to SOSFO, January 9, 1933; L/P&S/I2/2I03, PZi476, Faysal to Ryan, January 22, 1933. 172. FO 37I/I6859/E2030, Cox to HCTJ, May 18, 1933. 173. FO 37I/I6859/E2030, Cox to HCTJ, March 2, 1933; L/P&S/12/2103, PZ 937, memorandum by Ryan on discussions with Colonel Cox, Mr. Kirkbride, and Captain Glubb at Amman, February 16-17, r 933174. L/P&S/12/2112, PZ4562, Ryan to Simon, May 8, 1933; FO 37I/I7937/E3824, Treaty of Friendship and Bon Voisinage between Trans-Jordan and Saudi Arabia, signed at Jerusalem, July 27, 1933, together with Protocol on Arbitration and Schedule appended to treaty; L/P&S/I2/2H2, PZ5O29, Ryan to SOSFO, August 10, 1933. 175. Saudi Green Book, document 23. 176. FO 37i/i6838/Eioo7 Aden political intelligence report, January 13, 1933; FO 37i/i6838/E836, Aden political intelligence report, January 18, 1933; FO 37i/i6838/ Eii45, Aden political intelligence report, February 8, 1933. 177. L/P&S/i2/2065, PZ72O, Calvert to Simon, February 12, 1933. 178. Saudi Green Book, document 23. 179. Ibid. 180. Ibid. 181. L/P&S/i2/2064, PZ 4828, Aden political intelligence report, n.d.; L/P&S/iz/ 2064, PZ49I6, Mohammad Zada, (Royal Legation of Saudi Arabia, London) to Rendel, July 28, 1933.

242

NOTES

182. 79oF, goJ/io, R. Fox (American consul, Aden) to SOS, July 8, 1933; R.P., Box VI/7, Ryan tentative outline of the historical background of the war between Ibn Sa'ud and the imam Yahya, 1933-34. 183. L/P&S/I2/2O65, PZ 6718, Ryan, memorandum respecting Saudi-Yemeni relations, September 30, 1933. 184. FO 37i/i6874/E7i86, Ryan, memorandum on Saudi-Yemeni situation, November 21, 1933. 185. Saudi Green Book, document 33; 790 F. 901/48, L. J. Callaman (American consul, Aden) to SOS, August 14, 1934. 186. L/P&S/i2/2064, PZ4725, Calvert to SOSFO, August i, 1933. 187. L/P&S/i2/2064, PZ 4773, Simon to Calvert, July 27, 1933. 188. FO 371/16870^1072, Simon to Wahbah, July 31, 1933; FO 37i/i6874/E7i86, Ryan, memorandum on Saudi-Yemeni situation, November 21, 1933. 189. L/P&S/i2/2064, PZ679O, minutes by Morley, September 29, 1933. 190. L/P&S/i2/2065, PZ 6652, minutes by Rendel, October 5, 1933. 191. FO 37i/i6874/E7i69, Calvert to SOSFO, November 22, 1933. 192. FO 37i/i6873/E677?., Calvert to Simon, October 24, 1933. 193. FO 905/1, Ihsanullah to Calvert, January 13, 1934. 194. L/P&S/i2/2065, PZ8oi4, Calvert to SOSFO, December 11, 1933; FO 371; I7922/E79, Calvert to SOSFO, December 12, 1933. 195. FO 37i/i6874/E7i69, Calvert to SOSFO, November 22, 1933; al-Shahari, pp. 195-220. 196. Saudi Green Book, documents 35, 36; FO 37i/i6873/E67i5, memorandum by' the Eastern Department on the Saudi-Yemeni crisis, November 6, 1933. 197. L/P&S/i2/2065, PZ 8370, Ryan to SOSFO, December 29, 1933; L/P&S/I2/ 2073, PZI245, Ryan to Simon, January 7, 1934 (Jidda report for December). 198. L/P&S/i 2/2125, PZ2389, extract from Kuwait intelligence summary for February 1934; R/is/2/328, Pol. Ku. to Res. Bush., January 27, 1934. 199. 790 F. 9OJ/48, L. J. Callaman to SOS, August 14, 1934; FO 37I/I7923/E988, Ryan to Simon, January 30, 1934; U.Q., January 26, 1954. 200. FO 37I/I7924/E2354, Ryan to Simon, March 25, 1934; U.Q., February 16 and March 24 and 30, 1934. 201. U.Q., January 16, 1934. 202. FO 37I/I7928/E4IO3, Captain of HMS Penzance to SOSFO, March 30, 1934. 203. FO 37I/I7924/E2854, Ryan to Simon, March 25, 1934. 204. FO 371/17928/4103, Captain of HMS Penzance to SOSFO, March 30, 1934. 205. FO 905/26, Ryan to Simon, April 19, 1934; L/P&S/I2/2I25 PZ3243, extract from Aden political intelligence summary, for the week ending April 24, 1931; U. O., April 13, 1931; Sawtal-Hijaz, April 16, 1931; al-Shahari, pp. 221-78. 206. L/P&S/I2/2I25, PZ 3243, extract from Aden political intelligence summary for the week ending April 24, 1931. 207. L/P&S/i2/2155, PZ 2831, Simon to E. Drummond (Italy), April 5, 1934. 208. L/P&S/I2/2I25, PZ 3245, Ryan to SOSFO, May 13, 1934. 209. L/P&S/I2/3U5, PZ 3073, SOSFO to Drummond, May 6, 1931. 210. FO 905/1, Ihsanullah to Furlonge (Jidda), July 11, 1934. 211. L/P&S/I2/2II5, PZ 2961, Ryan to SOSFO, May i, 1934; L/P&S/I2/2I25, PZ 3093, Ryan to SOSFO, May 5, 1931. 212. FO 37I/I7928/E3999, Ryan to SOSFO, May 29, 1934. 213. FO 905/1, Ihsanullah to Furlonge, May 17, 1934; L/P&S/12/2082, PZ 3564, extract from Kuwait intelligence summary for the period of October i to 31, 1934.

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243

214. FO 37I/I7927/E3429, HMS Penzance to Admiralty, 28 May 1934; L/P&S/I2/ 2082, PZ3564, extract from Kuwait intelligence summary for the period of October i 1031, 1934. 215. FO 905/7, Ihsanullah to Furlonge, July 12, 1931; FO 37I/I794O/E5O63, record of conversation during Sir A. Ryan's visit to Taif, July 12-14, 1934- In the 19405 the alWazir family were important contenders to the Yemeni throne. 216. FO 905/5, Ryan to SOSFO, May 27, 1934; The Times, May 16, 1934. 217. FO 37I/I7928/E3999, record of conversation between Ryan and Yasin, May 25, 1934; FO 905/5, Ryan to SOSFO, May 28, 1934; U.Q., May 25, June 22 and 29, 1934218. FO 37I/I7934/E5272, Glubb's report for June 1934. 219. L/P&S/12/2082, PZ 3564, extract from Kuwait intelligence summary for the period October i to 31, 1934. 220. FO 37I/I7940/E5O64, Ryan, memorandum respecting Anglo-Saudi relations, July 1934 (hereafter cited as Ryan, Anglo-Saudi relations). 221. Ibid.; Kuwait's intelligence report; A. Bligh, "The Saudi Religious Elite (ulama) as Participants in the Political System of the Kingdom," International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 17 (1985): 37-50; A. Layish, '"Ulama and Politics in Saudi Arabia," in M. Hepper and R. Israeli, eds., Islam and Politics in the Modern Middle East (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984); M. Abir, Saudi Arabia in the Oil Era (Boulder, Westview, 1987), pp. 20-22. 222. L/P&S/i2/2073, PZ404, Calvert to Simon, December 3, 1934 (Jidda report for November). 223. L/P&S/i 2/2082, PZ 927, extract from Kuwait intelligence summary, for the period January i to 15, 1935. 224. FO 905/21, Ihsanullah to Calvert, January 26, 1935; FO 905/2, Sawt al-Hijaz, April 30, 1935. 225. FO 37i/i8999/E634O, Calvert to Simon, September 25, 1934. 226. Ryan, Anglo-Saudi relations; L/P&S/i2/2074, PZ 424, Calvert to Simon, December 5, 1933; FO 905/5, Ihsanullah to Furlonge, May 30, 1934. 227. FO 905/2, Ihsanullah to Ryan, February 19, 1934. 228. Ryan, Anglo-Saudi relations. 229. FO 37I/I794I/E4883, Ryan to SOSFO, July 9, 1934. 230. L/P&S/12/2082, PZ 7198, Calvert to Rendel, November 6, 1934. 231. FO 905/21, Ihsanullah to Calvert, January 2, 1935; L/P&S/i2/2082, PZg-jj, extract from Kuwait intelligence summary, no. i, for January 1935, January 25, 1935. 232. L/P&S/12/2074, PZ 7391, Hope Gill to Simon, October 19, 1932. 233. L/P&S/12/2074, PZ 6694, Ryan to SOSFO, October 4, 1933. 234. L/P&S/12/2074, PZ 7391, Hope Gill to Simon, October 19, 1932. 235. L/P&S/12/2074, PZ 424, Calvert to Simon, December 5,1933; L/P&S/12/2074, PZ 554, Calvert to Simon, December u, 1934. 236. L/P&S/12/2074, PZ 554, Calvert to Simon, December n, 1934. 237. FO 37i/i687i/E7646, grant of a concession for exploiting oil, December 12, 1933; FO 37i/37i/i687i/E4699, enclosure with note on Hasa oil concession, September 20, 1933. 238. L/P&S/12/2074, PZ6694, Ryan to SOSFO, October 4, 1933; L/P&S/12/2074, PZ554, Calvert to Simon, December n, 1934; C. Leatherdale, Britain and Saudi Arabia, ig2$-ig3j: The Imperial Oasis (London: Cass, 1983), pp. 198-208; I. H. Anderson, Aramco, The United States and Saudi Arabia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), pp. 24-26.

244

NOTES

239. FO 37i/i6o2i/E5i68, Rendel, Ydlibi and Company's desire to develop certain concessions in the Hejaz, October 7, 1932. 240. FO 37i/i6870/Ei792, Ryan to SOSFO, March 22, 1933. 241. FO 37I/I793I/E23OI, memorandum by Ryan, March 19, 1934. 242. FO 37i/i6867/Ei49i, Ryan to Simon, February 28, 1933; U.Q., March 17, 1933; L/P&S/12/2074, PZ7394, Ryan to SOSFO, January 23, 1934. 243. FO 37i/i6867/Ei49i, Ryan to Simon, February 28, 1933; L/P&S/i2/2074, PZ6578, Ryan to SOSFO, October 4, 1933. 244. L/P&S/i2/2074, PZ 7394, Ryan to SOSFO, January 23, 1934. 245. Ryan, Anglo-Saudi relations. 246. FO 37i/i794O/E3i82, Rendel proposed a new comprehensive Anglo-Saudi settlement for the question of the southeastern frontier of Saudi Arabia, November 15, 1934. 247. Ryan, Anglo-Saudi relations. 248. Ibid. 249. L/P&S/12/2087, PZ4756, Ryan to SOSFO, July 15, 1934. 250. Ibid. 251. Ryan, Anglo-Saudi relations. 252. FO 371/12007/6921, minutes by Rendel, January 24, 1935. See also G. Rendel, The Sword and the Olive (London: Murray, 1957), pp. 82-83. 253. FO 371/12007/6933, Ryan to Simon, January 22, 1935; FO 37i/i9Oo8/Ei637, Ryan to SOSFO, February 22, 1935. 254. FO 371/19008/62246, Ryan to SOSFO, April 5, 1935. 255. FO 37I/I90IO/E593, minutes by O. G. R. Williams (Colonial Office), January 8, 1935; L/P&S/12/1233, PZ 593, Williams to USOSFO, January 26, 1935. 256. FO 37I/37I/I9OIO/E2437, memoranum by Malcolm, the Saudi-TransJordanian frontier, April 24, 1935. 257. FO 37i/i9Oio/Ei5i3, minutes by Rendel, March 5, 1935. 258. L/P&S/I2/I233, PZ 5043, record of part of the fifth meeting with Fuad Bey Hamza at the Foreign Office, July 15, 1935. 259. FO 371/20060/63194, Ryan to SOSFO, May 10, 1936. 260. FO 371/20054/62691, Glubb's report for March 1936. 261. L/P&S/I2/2087, PZ4756, Ryan to SOSFO, July 15, 1936. 262. FO 371/20056/61974, Clark Kerr to Eden, April 8, 1936. 263. FO 371/20056/652, Ryan to SOSFO, January 3, 1936; See Y. Porat's discussion in his In Search of Arab Unity 1930-7945 (London: Cass, 1986), pp. 180-83. 264. FO 371/17940/65063, record of conversation during Sir A. Ryan's visit to Ta'if, July 12-14, '934265. Ibid.; R/15/4/no, Pol. Ku. to SOSCO, November 27, 1933. 266. FO 37i/i79i9/E6oi8, sixth and seventh meetings with Fuad Bey Hamza, September 25, 1934. 267. L/P&S/I2/2I27, PZ4I5I, Ryan to SOSFO, July 12, 1933. 268. FO 37i/i79i9/E6oi8, sixth and seventh meeting with Fuad Bey Hamza, September 25, 1934; FO 371/17919/63058, minutes by K. R. Johnstone, May 7, 1934. 269. R/15/5/iii, Pol. Ku. to British Consul Bushyre, exchange of correspondence, June 17-25, 1935. 270. FO 371/19006/63950, Res. Bush, to SOSCO, June 22, 1935; FO 37i/igoo6/ £3998, Res. Bush, to SOSIO, June 26, 1935. 271. FO 905/31, Ryan to Hoare, December 10, 1935. 272. R/i5/5/112, Res. Bush, to Her Majesty's minister, Jidda, April 4, 1936.

CONCLUSION

245

273. FO 37I/I7940/E 3182, Rendel proposed a new comprehensive Anglo-Saudi settlement for the question of the southeastern frontier of Saudi Arabia, November 15, 1934 (hereafter cited as Rendel, proposals); 7906. goF 15/12, P. Knabenshue to W. Murray (Baghdad), December 12, 1934. 274. Rendel, proposals; M. Morsy Abdullah, The United Arab Emirates: A Modern History (London: Croom Helm, 1978), pp. 180-83. A comprehensive discussion was forwarded by R. Said Zahlan; see her "King Abd al-Aziz's Changing Relationship with the Gulf States During the 19308," in T. Niblock, ed., State, Society and Economy in Saudi Arabia (London: Croom Helm, 1982), pp. 58-74. 275. FO 37I/I794O/E59O8, record of the second meeting with Fuad Bey Hamza held at the Foreign Office on September 20, 1931; J. B. Kelly, Eastern Arabian Frontiers (London: Faber & Faber, 1964), pp. 123-28. 276. Morsy Abdullah, The United Arab Emirates, pp. 183-84; J. B. Kelly, Eastern Arabian Frontiers (London: Faber & Faber, 1964). 277. FO 905/31, Rendel to J. G. Laithwaite, April 8, 1935; see also Rendel, The Sword and the Olive, pp. 82-83. 278. Rendel, proposals. 279. Morsy Abdullah, The United Arab Emirates, pp. 188-95; FO 905/31, Hoare to Ryan, October 23, 1935. 280. R.P. Box VI/5, Bullard to Ryan, December 9, 1936; L/P&S/I2/2I53, PZ 8795, H. C. Cowell (Colonial Office) to USOSFO, November 19, 1936. 281. FO 905/45, Ryan, memorandum on the question of the future of the Treaty of Jidda, July i, 1935; FO 37i/Ei9oo8/E42i8, record of the fourth meeting with Fuad Bey Hamza in the Foreign Office on July 5, 1935; L/P&S/2O88, PZ 6379, Ryan to Simon, April 11, 1935. 282. FO 37I/I90I5/E4820, Calvert to SOSFO, August 9, 1935; L/P&S/12/2074, PZ 560, Calvert to Hoare, November 30, 1935. 283. L/P&S/12/2082, PZ 3564, Ryan to Simon, March 22, 1935. 284. R/I5/2/312, Bahrayn political intelligence report for the period December i to 15, 1935285. FO 905/42, Res. Bush, to SOSIO, April 16, 1936. 286. FO 905/42, Ihsanullah to Calvert, January 8, 1936; FO 905/42, extract from Bahrayn political intelligence summary of January 26, 1936; FO 905/42, Ihsanullah to Basil Judd (Jidda), January 8, 1936; G. De Gaury, Arabia Phoenix (London: Harrap, 1946), pp. 42-43. 287. FO 905/42, Ihsanullah to Eyres (Jidda), September 13, 1936. 288. Ibid.

Conclusion 1. L. Anderson, The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya 1830ig8o (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), see esp. the concluding chapter. 2. H. A. R. Gibb, "The Evolution of Government in Early Islam," in H. A. R. Gibb, ed., Studies on the Civilization of Islam (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 34-46.

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Archival and Documentary Collections British Museum, London: A. Wilson's Papers. Firestone Library, Princeton, NJ: K. Twitchell's Papers. India Office Library and Records, London: India Office Files, Series L/P&S/io, L/P&S/I2, R/IS/I, R/I5/2, R/IS/S. Israel State Archive, Jerusalem: Section 65. Lorimer, J. G. Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia. Calcutta: Superintendent Government Printing, 1915. Middle East Centre, St. Antony's College, Oxford: Arab Bulletin (Arab Bureau) Series. H. R. P. Dickson's Papers. A. Ryan's Reports. H. St. John B. Philby's Papers. H. Young's Papers. Public Records Office, London: Air Ministry Files, Series 23. Cabinet Files, Series 22, 24. Colonial Office Files, Series 725, 727, 730, 732, 773, 775, 788. Foreign Office Files, Series 141, 371, 882, 886, 905. Al-Rashid, Ibrahim. Documents on the History of Sa'udi Arabia. First 3 vols. Salisbury: Documentary Publications, 1976. School of Oriental Studies, University of Durham: G. Clayton's Papers. R. Wingate's Papers. U.S. National Archives, Washington, DC: State Department Files, Series 79oF, SgoF.

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'Abd al-Jabbar, 'Abdullah. al-Tayarat al-Adabiyya al-Haditha fi Qalb al-Jazira al'Arabiyya. Damascus: Ma'had al-Dirasat al-'Arabiyya al-'Ulya, 1959. Al 'Abd al-Qadir, Muhammad Ibn 'Abdullah. Ta'rikh al-Ahsa'. al-Riyad: Matabi' alRiyad, 1960. Abu 'Aliyya, 'Abd al-Fattah. "Watha'iq 'an Ta'rikh al-Dawla al-Sa'udiyya fi 'Ahd alMalik 'Abd al-'Aziz 1902-1953." al-Dara 1 (1978): 144-73. Abu al-Nasr, 'Umar. Sirat al-Jazira al-'Arabiyya li-Ibn Sa'ud. Beirut: al-Maktaba alAhliyya, 1935. Al al-Shaykh, 'Abd al-Rahman Ibn 'Abd al-Latif. Mashahir 'Ulama' Najd waGhayrihlm. al-Riyad: Dar al-Yamama lil-Bahth wa-al-Tarjama wa-al-Nashr, 1969. Al-'Aqili, Muhammad Bin Ahmad 'Isa. Min Ta'rikh al-Mukhalaf al-Sulaymani aw alJunub al-'Arabifi al-Tar'rikh, 2nd vol. Cairo: Publisher unknown, 1960. 'Attar, 'Abd al-Ghafur. Sagr al-Jazira. Beirut: Matba'at al-Hurriya, 1972. Bin Sahman, Sulayman al-Najdi. Kitab al-Hadiya al-Sunniyya wa al-Tuhfa alWahhabiyya al-Najdiyya. Cairo: al-Manar, 1925-26. Binua Mishan (Benoit Mechin), 'Abd al-'Aziz Al Sa'ud. Sirat Batal wa-Mulid Mamlaka. Translated into Arabic by 'Abd al-Fattah Yasin. Beirut: Dar al-Katib al-'Arabi, 1965. Al-Dakhil, Sulayman Bin Sabah. al-Qawl al-Sa'udi fi Akhbari Imarat al-Rashid. alRiyad: No publisher, 1966. Al-Dubayb, Ahmad Muhammad. "Ihya' al-Turath Ba'da Tawhid al-Jazira." al-Dara 3 and 4 (January 1978), pts. A and B. Hamzah, Fu'ad. Qalb Jazirat al-'Arab. Cairo: Matba'at al-Salafiyya, 1933. Al-Haqil, Hammad Ibrahim. 'Abd al-'Aziz fi al-Ta'rikh. Beirut: Mu'assasat al-Ma'arif, 1969. Ibn 'Isa, Ibrahim Bin Salih. Ta'rikh Ba'd al-Hawadith al-Waqi'afi Najd. al-Riyad: Dar al-Yamama, 1966. Al-Jasir, Muhammad. Madinat al-Riyad 'Abra Atwar al-Ta'rikh. al-Riyad: Dar alYamama, 1966. Al Khamsin, Ibrahim 'Abd al-Rahman. Usul Al Sa'ud wa-Tajribati Fi al-Haya. Beirut: Dar al-Najjah, 1972. Al-Khususi, Badr al-Din. Ma'rakat al-Jahra'. Kuwayt: Manshurat Dhat al-Salasil, 1987. Al-Madani, Muhammad Mughayribi. Fiqrat al-Ikhwan al-Islamiyya bi al-Najd. Cairo: No publisher, 1923-24. Madi, Muhammad, 'Abdullah. al-Nahdat al-Haditha fi Jazirat al- 'Arab. Cairo: 'Isa alBabi al-Halabi, 1952. Al-Marik, Fahd. Lamahat 'an al-Tatawwur al-Fikri fi Jazirat al-Arab fi al-Qarn alIshrin. Damascus: Matba'at Ibn Zaydun, 1926. Al-Mukhtar, Salah al-Din. Ta'rikh al-Mamlaka al-'Arabiyya al-Sa'udiyya fi Madiha wa-Hadiriha, 2 vols. Beirut: Dar al-Hayat, 1958. Al-Mumayyiz, Amin. Al-Mamlaka al-'Arabiyya al-Sa'udiyya. Beirut: Dar al-Qulub, 1963. Qasim, Jamal, Zakariyya. "Baritanya wa al-Khalij al-'Arabi fi al-Harb al-'Alamiyya alUla." Dirasat al-Khalij wa-al-Jazira al-'Arabiyya \ (1975): 87-111. . "Mawqif al-Kuwayt min al-Tawassu' al-Sa'udi fi Najd wa-Sawahil al-Ahsa'." al-Majalla al-Ta'rikhiyya al-Misriyya 17 (1970): 112-27.

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Al-Rashid, Dari Ibn Fuhayd. Nubdha Ta'rikhiyya 'an Najd Ma'a Muqtatafat min alQawl al-Sadid fi Akhbar Imarat Al Rashid. al-Riyad: Dar al-Yamama, 1966. Rida, Rashid, Muhammad. al-Wahhabiyyun wa-al-Hijaz. Cairo: al-Manar, 1925-26. Rifa'i, 'Abd al-'Aziz, and 'Abd al-Rahman Yunnis. Bina' al-Dawla al-'Arabiyya alSa'udiyya hi al-'Asr al-Hadith wa-al-Mu'asir, Pt. i. Cairo: Al-Maktaba al'Alamiyya, 1978. Al-Rihani, Amin. Ta'rikh Najd wa-Mulhaqatihi. Beirut: Dar al-Rihani, 1928. Sadiq, Muhammad, Tawfiq. Tatawwur Nizam al-Hukm wa-al-Idarafi al-Mamlaka al'Arabiyya al-Sa'udiyya. al-Riyad: Ma'had al-Idara al-'Amma, 1965. Sa'id, Amin. Ta'rikh al-Dawla al-Sa'udiyya. Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-'Arabi, 1964. Al-Shahari, Muhammad. Al-Matami'al-Tawassu'iyya al-Sa'udiyya fi al-Yaman. Beirut: Dar Ibn Khaldun, 1979. Sharara, Waddah. Al-Ahl wa-al-Ghanima: Muqawimat al-Siyasa fi-al-Mamlaka al'Arabiyya al-Sa'udiyya. Beirut: Dar al-Tali'a, 1981. Al-Sudani, Sadiq, Hasan. Al-'Ilaqat al-'Iraqiyya al-Sa'udiyya 1920-1931, Dirasafi al'Ilaqat al-Siyasiyya. Baghdad: Dar al-Jahiz, 1975. . "Jama'at al-Ikhwan Jaysh Ibn Sa'ud Shibh al-Nizami." al-Khalij al-'Arabi. no. 10 (1978): 99-109. Al-Tarbayn, Ahmad. " 'Abd al-'Aziz Al Sa'ud wa-Mansha' Dawlatihi wa-Ba'ith Nahdatihi." Dirasat al-Khalij wa al-Jazira al-'Arabiyya 2 (1976): 37-70. Wahbah, Hafiz. Jazirat al-'Arab fi al-Qarn al-Ishrin. Cairo: Matba'at al-Nahda alMisriyya, 1961. . Khamsun 'Amman fi Jazirat al-'Arab. Cairo: Matba'at Mustafa al-Babi alHalabi, 1960. Wizarat al-Kharijiyya. Bay an 'an al-'Ilaqat Bayna al-Mamlaka al-'Arabiyya al-Sa'udiyya wa al Imam Yahya. 2nd ed. Mecca: No publisher, 1934. Al-Zirikli, Khayr al-Din. Shibh al-Jazira fi 'Ahd al-Malik 'Abd al-'Aziz. 3 vols. Beirut: Matabi' Dar al-Qalam, 1970.

Books and Articles in European Languages 'Abdullah, M. Morsy. The United Arab Emirates: A Modern History. London: Croom Helm, 1978. Abir, M. Saudi Arabia in the Oil Era. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1987. Admirality, Geographical Handbook for Arabia. London: Naval Intelligence Division, 1920. Ahmed, A. S., and D. M. Hart, eds. Islam in Tribal Societies. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984. Almana, M. Arabia Unified: A Portrait of Ibn Saud. London: Hutchinson Benham, 1980. Anderson, H. Aramco, the United States and Saudi Arabia. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981. Anderson, L. The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830-1980. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987. Armstrong, H. C. Lord of Arabia: Ibn Saud, an Intimate Study of a King. Beirut: Khayats, 1946. Ashkenazi, T. "The Anazah Tribes." Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 4 (1948): 222-36.

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Al-Awaji, I. M. "Bureaucracy and Society in Saudi Arabia." Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 1971. Baker, R. King Husain and the Kingdom of the Hijaz. London: Oleander Press, 1979. Balandier, G. Political Anthropology. Trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1970. Baldry, J. "Anglo-Italian Rivalry in Yemen and 'Asir, 1900-1934." Die Welt des Islams 17 (1977): 155-93. "The Struggle for the Red Sea: Mussolini's Policy in Yaman, 1934-1943." Asian and African Studies (Prague) 16 (1980): 53-89. Bell, Lady G. ed. The Letters of Gertrude Bell. 2 vols. London: Benn, 1927. Ben-Dor, G. State and Conflict in the Middle East: Emergence of the Post-Colonial State in the Middle East. New York: Praeger, 1983. Bindagji, H. H. Atlas of Saudi Arabia. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978. Bligh, A. From Prince to King: Royal Succession in the House of Saud in the Twentieth Century. New York: New York University Press, 1984. . "The Saudi Religious Elite (ulama) as Participant in the Political System of the Kingdom." International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 17 (1985): 37-50. Bray, N. N. E. A Paladin of Arabia. London: Unicorn Press, 1936. Bullard, Sir R. The Camels Must Go: An Autobiography. London: Faber & Faber, i95iBusch, B. C. Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1894-1914. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967. . Britain, India and the Arabs, 1914-1921. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971. Clayton, Sir G. "Arabia and the Arabs." International Affairs 8 (1929): 8-20. Clements, F. Saudi Arabia. Oxford: Clio Press, 1979. Cohen, R., and E. R. Service, eds. Origin of the State: The Anthropology of Political Evolution. Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1978. Colman, R. L. "Revolt in Arabia 1916-1919: Conflict and Coalition in a Tribal Political System." Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1976. Collins, R. O., ed. Sir Gilbert Clayton: An Arabian Diary. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969. Dawn, C. E. From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins of Arab Nationalism. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973. De Gaury, G. Arabia Phoenix. London: Harrap, 1946. Dickson, H. R. P. The Arab of the Desert. London: Allen & Unwin, 1949. . Kuwait and Her Neighbours. London: Allen & Unwin, 1956. Donner, F. M. The Early Islamic Conquests. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981. Doughty, C. M. Travels in Arabia Deserta. 3rd ed. London: Cape Medici Society, 1921. Edens, D. C. "The Anatomy of the Sa'udi Revolution." International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 5 (1974): 50-64. Eickelman, D. F. The Middle East: An Anthropological Approach. 2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1989. . "Musaylima." Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 10 (1967): 17-53. Eilts, H. F. "Ameen Rihani and the Hijaz-Najd Conflict: An Abortive Peace Mission." In J. P. Piscatori and G. S. Harris, eds., Law, Personalities and Politics of

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Fisher, S. N. "Civil Strife in the Ottoman Empire, 1481-1503." Journal of Modern History 13 (1941): 448-66. Fortes, M., and E. E. Evans Pritchard African Political Systems. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963. Gavin, R. J. Aden Under British Rule, 1839-1967. London: Hurst, 1975. Gellner, E. Muslim Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. . "Tribalism and the State in the Middle East." In P. S. Khoury and J. Kostiner, eds., Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East, pp. 109-126. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990. Gibb, H. A. R. "The Evolution of Government in Early Islam." In H. A. R. Gibb, ed., Studies on the Civilization of Islam, pp. 34-46. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962. Giubb, J. B. "The Bedouins of Northern Iraq." Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society 22 (1935): 13-31. . War in the Desert. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1960. Goldberg, J. "Captain Shakespear and Ibn Sa'ud: A Balanced Reappraisal." Middle Eastern Studies 22 (1980): 74-88. . The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia: The Formative Years, 1902-1918, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986. . "The 1914 Saudi-Ottoman Treaty—Myth or Reality?" Journal of Contemporary History 19 (1984): 289-314. . "The 1913 Saudi Occupation of Hasa Reconsidered." Middle Eastern Studies 18 (1982): 21-29. . "The Origins of British-Saudi Relations: The 1915 Anglo-Saudi Treaty Revisited." Historical Journal 28 (1985): 693-703. Goldrup, L. P. "Saudi Arabia, 1902-1932: The Development of a Wahhabi Society." Ph.D. diss., University of California at Los Angeles, 1971. Graves, P. The Life of Sir Percy Cox. London: Hutchinson, 1941. Habib, J. S. Ibn Sa'ud's Warriors of Islam: The Ikhwan of Najd and Their Role in the Creation of the Sa'udi Kingdom, 1910-1930. Leiden: Brill, 1978. Helms, C. M. The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia: Evolution of Political Identity. London: Croom Helm, 1981. Hogarth, D. G. Arabia. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1922. . "Wahabism and British Interests." Journal of the British Institute of International Affairs 3 (1925): 70-81. Holden, D., and R. Johns. The House of Saud. London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1981. Howarth, D. The Desert King: A Life of Ibn Saud. London: Collins, 1964. Ibn Khaldun. An Introduction to History: The Muqaddimah. Trans. F. Rosenthal. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967. Iqbal, M. The Emergence of Saudi Arabia. Singar: Saudiyah Publishers, 1977. Al-Jazairi, M. Z. "Saudi Arabia: A Diplomatic History, 1924-1964." Ph.D. diss., University of Utah, 1971. Kedourie, E. In the Anglo Arab Labyrinth: The McMahon-Husayn Correspondence and Its Interpretations, 1914-1939. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

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