The Making of Ethnic and Religious Conflicts in Southeast Asia: Cases and Resolutions

i The Making of Ethnic and Religious Conflicts in Southeast Asia: Cases and Resolutions e d i t o r s: Frans de Djal...

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i

The Making of Ethnic and Religious Conflicts in Southeast Asia: Cases and Resolutions

e d i t o r s:

Frans de Djalong Lambang Trijono

This ebook downl oaded from www.csps.ug m.ac.id

CSPS Books 2004

ii

This ebook downloaded from www.csps.ugm.ac.id The Making of Ethnic and Religious Conflicts in Southeast Asia: Cases and Resolutions

Copyright © 2004 by CSPS BOOKS. All rights reserved 12 12 Second Printing August, 2004 12 First Printing January, 2004 12 12 Editors: Frans de Djalong and Lambang Trijono 12 Assistant and Language Editor: Frans Vicki de Djalong 12 Managing Publication: M. Faried Cahyono 12 12 Layout and Cover Design: Syarafuddin 12 Arial (© 1990-92 Monotype), Century Gothic (© 1990-91 Monotype), Georgia 12 (© 1996 Microsoft), Impact (© 1991-96 Monotype), Wingdings (© 1990-1991 12 Type Solutions, © 1992-95 Microsoft) 12 original map in front-cover from Holland Horizon magazine 12 12 Volume 6 – Number 1 – 1994 (page 45) 12 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 12 text in back-cover by Frans Vicki de Djalong 12 12 12 Published jointly by 12 12 CSPS BOOKS 12 Center for Security and Peace Studies 12 Universitas Gadjah Mada 12 Sekip K-9 Yogyakarta 55281 12 12 I N D O N E S I A 12 Phone/Facs. (62-274) 520733 12 www.csps.ugm.ac.id 12 12 ISBN 979-98203-0-8 12 12 12 And the 12 12 Southeast Asian Conflict Studies Network (SEACSN) 12 Regional Office: 12 Research and Education for Peace Unit 12 12 School of Social Sciences 12 Universiti Sains Malaysia 12 11800 Penang, Malaysia 12 email: [email protected] 12 12 Phone (60-4) 6532123, (60-4) 6532658 12 12 In cooperation with the 12 12 Departement of Research Cooperation (SAREC) 12 Swedish International Development 12 12and Cooperation Agency (SIDA)

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The production of this book originally can be traced to the Regional Workshop on Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Southeast Asia, held by SEACSN (Southeast Asia Conflict Studies Networks) in cooperation with the Center for Security and Peace Studies (CSPS), Gadjah Mada University (GMU), in Yogyakarta, September 24-28, 2001. This book would not become a reality without the generous supports, contributions, and encouragements of many people from the beginning of the workshop until the publication of this book. My most special gratitude must go, first of all, to Dr. Kamarulzaman Askandar, the Regional Coordinator of SEACSN, for his endurance supports, not only financial supports but most importantly his professional generosity and intellectual guidance. I would like also to thank specially to Dr. Ramses Amer from SIDA for his generous supports and encouragement. In many occasion, especially during a coffee break in meetings or workshops, he always remind me about the importance of the publication of the book not only for the region but also for the global community. Special thank also must go to the nine contributors to this volume who made extraordinary efforts to focus on a common set of question and write the subject in a very short period of time. With their great efforts and patience, many thanks are also dedicated to our colleagues who involved in organizing the first regional workshop of SEACSN and contributing to the publication of this book. First, special thank to my colleague and also the Director of CSPS-UGM at the time, Rizal Panggabean, who genuinely supported and contributed to the creating of an “epistemic atmosphere” during the workshop. Many thanks are also dedicated to Arifah Rahmawati who organized the workshop with a successful result that made it possible to be published. Special thank also go to Diah Kusumaningrum, while she assisted to organize the workshop, with great efforts and patience she also sent paper for revision to all presenters and successfully collected the nine revised papers from presenters.

iv I would like also to express my debt of thank to all the staffs of SEACSN-Indonesia for their endurance supports in the publication processes. Many thanks to Ulyati Retnosari and Novri Susan who in the first hand outlining the papers and checking the language; M. Faried Cahyono, M. Najib Azca, Tri Susdinarjanti, and Syarafuddin who in the final stages assisting to have made this book ready for being published. And, last but not least, my special thank is also dedicated to Frans Vicki de Djalong for his generous and enthusiastic in editing and correcting the language, and assisting me to write the conclusion. Finally, I hope that this book will stimulate more critical debate, study and research on the issues and resolutions of ethnic and religious conflicts in Southeast Asia region.

Yogyakarta, December 2003 Lambang Trijono The Center for Security and Peace Studies Gadjah Mada University

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Ethnic And Religious Conflicts In Southeast Asia Welcoming Remarks Prof. Teuku Jacob Head of Board of Trustees The Center for Security and Peace Studies Gadjah Mada University

More than half of South East Asia comprises archipelagoes or islands, and the rest consists of a subcontinent and – peninsula. It is not surprising, therefore, that exchanges and interactions among populations in this region have been quite extensive and intensive, biologically as well as culturally. The region has served off and on as route of migrations, area of local evolution, and theatre of both peaceful and violent culture contacts throughout history. The ecological setting has been diverse due to its geographical location and changes, floral and faunal migrations, which causes varying modes of adaptation. Primary religions have been modified replaced by major world religions, and the language spoken belongs to the Malayo-Polynesian family which has the largest number of language, paroles and dialects, beside the Melanesian language family. Hence, there are many important factors of potential disagreements and conflicts which not infrequently emerge in this region. It is in fact remarkable that bloody or mutually destructive conflicts take place not as often as might be expected. The geographical area extending from Myanmar in the west to the east coast of Halmahera equals roughly the distance between Ireland and Afghanistan. Times of uneasiness, such as severe climatic change or natural disasters, or social upheaval may exacerbate minor conflicts. Sociopsychological stress may alter the existing tolerance of diversity, especially when it is provoked by external agents. Conflicts and violence that result may cause unprecedented brutality and suffering, particularly on the third uninvolved party. Coincidence of ethnic,

vi religious, political and economic boundaries in the population are sure to increase the intensity and complicity of conflicts. I think there are several principles that could be considered in any attempt of preventing and solving nascent conflicts before they erupt and spread out of bounds. Our world, in fact nature itself, is diverse and pluralist: variation is the cardinal theme of nature. People have to live with diversity. The recognition, and consequently, the toleration of differences have to be ingrained as early as possible in the education of succeeding generations. In case of manifested conflicts, the mediator has to understand as comprehensively as possible the nature and mechanism of that particular conflict, and construct a flexible plan of alleviation, secondary to the firm and prompt handling of suffering-generated violence. In closing, I hope that the deliberation in this Regional Workshop on Ethnic and Religious Conflict in South East Asia will be as fruitful as planned and that the results can be applied as a framework for solving potential conflicts in the near and not too distant future which, in my opinion, tend to increase in our beloved region. I welcome the participants to this workshop and I do sincerely hope that your short stay in this relatively peaceful city will be most enjoyable. Yogyakarta, September 25, 2001 Regional Workshop on Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Southeast Asia

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Workshop on Ethnic and Religious Conflict in South East Asia Welcoming Remarks Kamarulzaman Askandar Regional Coordinator of Southeast Asian Conflict Studies Network (SEACSN)

It is my pleasure to welcome all of you to this first Southeast Asian Conflict Studies Network (SEACSN) Regional Workshop on Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Southeast Asia. I would like to congratulate the Center for Security and Peace Studies, Gadjah Mada university for its ability to bring together specialists, both academicians and practitioners, from all over Southeast Asia and beyond to discuss an issue which is of continued importance to all of us living in this region. Conflict is something that all of us in this region, sadly enough, are very familiar with. All of us have faced destabilizing and destructive conflicts in our histories. Ethnic and religious conflicts are particularly important to us for a number of reasons. Firstly, many of our nations are divided along ethnic and religious lines. Indonesia, for example, has more than 200 ethnic groups living across more than 2000islands. In my home country Malaysia also, ethnicity and religious issues have always been issues that are deemed sensitive and have resulted in many tense situations and sometime violent conflicts in our history. The second reason why ethnic and religious issues are important is because of the nature of the conflicts themselves. As you all know, a conflict can be defined as a situation where two or more parties have incompatible positions, objectives, or interests and are trying to achieve these goals either by formal or informal means. All conflicts are difficult resolve. This is more so in the case of ethnic and religious conflicts because in a lot of cases the positions of the parties have hardened to such an extent that it makes compromising difficult. To many parties involved in these types of conflicts, the issues are nonnegotiable. Parties are sometime still willing to negotiate and

viii compromise over wealth, land, or other tangible interest, but not over issues of ethnicity or religion. They are willing to die for their causes and see their struggle as something which is not only important for their survival as a group, but also in many cases as a struggle which is sanctioned by God and one in which they will receive the rewards in the next life. This is why it is so difficult to resolve these types of conflicts. The member of the parties are also willing to resort to any types of activities including killing members of the opposing groups as well as themselves, as was evident whit the suicide bombings in many countries including the most recent one of the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York. In Southeast Asia, cases of ethnic and religious conflicts can also involve violence, as was evident in many of our countries. So, what do we do about these conflicts? It is not my intention here to answer this question in this welcoming session. Even if I try, I don’t think that I will be able to do justice to the issues. But I hope that the participants in this workshop can come up with some answers during these two and a half days that we are together. Among some of the question that I think need to be answered include the following: 1 . What are the critical issues underlying ethnic and religious conflicts in this region? 2. What have been the methods and approaches used to tackle these conflicts, and how successful have they been? 3. Do the experiences of one country in this region differ from another, and are there similarities in trends and patterns that we can draw from the various examples? 4. What can we learn from one another to make sure that existing and future conflicts are handled in a much more proactive and peaceful way? We hope that during these two and a half days that we are together, the participants which, have come from all over Southeast Asia and beyond, can not only try to answer the questions outlined but also use this opportunity to get closer together and learn from one another – the experiences that our friends in the other Southeast Asian countries have gone through; cases of successes or failures in resolving

ix conflicts situations; and other valuable lessons that can be learnt. The Southeast Asian Conflict Studies Network is very happy that we can be part of this process and hope that can contribute to more such activities. This inline with our objectives to: 1 . To promote cooperation and collaboration among researchers working in the area of peace and conflict research in Southeast Asia. 2. To promote research in peace and conflict resolution in Southeast Asia. 3. To produce a body of work on conflict analysis and conflict resolution/management. 4. To conduct a Southeast Asian conflict mapping exercise. We aim to achieve these objectives by organizing workshop, seminars and conferences at the national and regional level; by promoting exchanges of researchers between countries, by publishing research report, monographs and books on this subject matter; and also by compiling a directory of individuals and organizations involved in peace and conflict research and practice. At the moment we have affiliate members in all the Southeast Asia countries expect Myanmar and hope to expand our network in the future. We are also organizing workshop, seminars and training programs at the national level. I hope that you will take the time to find out about our activities and contribute to them. On a lighter note, I hope that the participant will also take the time out from our busy schedule during the workshop to visit and explore Yogyakarta. I, myself, have been here many times and am totally enchanted with what this wonderful town has to offer, in terms of arts, culture and not forgetting the bargains that you can find in the shops and markets of Yogyakarta. I hope that you will go out and spend your Indonesian Rupiah, your Singaporean and Bruneian Dollars, your Thai Baht, your Laotian Kip, your Cambodian Riel, and your Malaysian Ringgit. This will be our contribution to the Indonesian economy. Again, I would like to thank and congratulate the Center of Security and Peace Studies (CSPS), Gajah Mada university for hosting us and doing a wonderful job of organizing this event. I would also like

x to thank the Swedish International Development and Cooperation Agency (Sida) which has been generous in providing financial support to the Network’s activities through it’s research arm SAREC or the Department of Research Cooperation. I would like to acknowledge and welcome the representative of Sida to this workshop, Dr Ramses Amer, the Senior Research Advisor at Sida. Lastly, I would like to thank all of you for attending this workshop and hope you have a wonderful time here in Yogya. I also hope that when we leave Yogya on Friday, we would have gained not only the answers to some of the question posed as well as knowledge gathered during this workshop, but more importantly the friendship of one another. With that, thank you and have a wonderful and stimulating discussion. Yogyakarta, September 25, 2001

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CONTENTS Acknowledgements Preface I Teuku Jacob Preface II Kamarulzaman Askandar Introduction Lambang Trijono

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Structural-Cultural Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict: Toward a Better Understanding and Appropriate Solution In Managing Ethnic Conflict Lambang Trijono

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Approaches to Ethnic and Religious Conflict Resolution Samsu Rizal Panggabean

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Approaches to Ethnic and Religious Conflict Resolution: Managing, Resolving or Transforming Clem McCartney

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Ethnic and Religious Conflict in the Philippines: The Bangsamoro Experience Jamail A. Kamlian

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In Search of Commonalities between Muslim and Christian Filipinos: Political Values, Beliefs and Practices Soliman M. Santos

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Local Peace Alternatives to Ethnic Conflict in Mindanao: The Bual, Dinas and Maladeg Peace Zone Experiences Marilou F. Siton-Nanaman

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xii Ethno-Methodological Reflection on the Case of Acehnese Conflict Fuad Mardhatillah

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Religious Conflict in Maluku: In Search of Religious Community Peace Pieter Tanamal and Lambang Trijono

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Islamic Militancy in Malaysia Kamarulnizam Abdullah

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Conclusion Lambang Trijono

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Notes on Contributors

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Introduction

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Introduction Lambang Trijono

During the last decade, the Southeast Asian region has been indicated by the escalation of ethnic and religious conflicts. In Indonesia, for example, the violent ethno-religious conflicts have been occurring in Maluku, East and West Kalimantan, West Papua, and Aceh provinces with different degree and dynamic. In Malaysia, conflict between Malay and Indian ethnic groups also erupted again in the capital city of Kualalumpur, after they has been overcome for long time by government new economic policy. In Thailand, conflict between Phatani ethnic and Thailand government has been going on and still unresolved until now. Meanwhile, in Philippine we can find the conflict between the Manila government and the Bangsamoro people over the issues of self-determination. These ethno-religious conflicts could not be denied as a regional problem as the they do not only disturb the stability of a country, but also destabilize the conflict-laden region. Different from the previous ethnic and religious conflicts that generally perceived as domestic problems, the present ethnic and religious conflicts in the Southeast Asian region show us, more or less, as the problems beyond the countries. The contemporary ethnic and religious conflicts generally characterized by a blurred demarcation between its internal and external sources. There are multiple causal factors of the conflict, reflected in developing actors and issues of the conflict. Although the sources of the conflicts still lay predominantly within the country rather than outside the country, they are characterized by a specific nature that has regional and international linkages, economically and politically. The dynamic of Maluku conflict in Indonesia, for instance, in its sources and effects interlinked with external world. The illegal arms selling, direct financial support for the conflicting parties, and indirect support due to improper management of giving aid for the

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The Making of Ethnic & Religious Conflict in Southeast Asia

victims, may worsen the conflict situation rather than peace for the region. Viewed from its sources as well as its impacts, the Maluku conflict could be seen as regional issues that render us to address the conflict beyond domestic level, either at regional or international level 1 Unfortunately, the conflicts have not so far received a proper attention from the Southeast Asian public. During the last decade, the Southeast Asian countries were occupied themselves with many domestic problems, i.e. to deal with the economic crisis. This therefore makes the conflict difficult to get a proper handling from the domestic, regional and the international community. Many conflicts in the region have not been touched yet by sufficient interventions. Although there have been many forms of state and civil society interventions, they are still on the surface, and not sufficiently enough to overcome the existing conflicts. The ethnic and religious conflicts are proven to have been important to Southeast Asian countries for number of reasons. Firstly, many Southeast Asian countries divided into ethnic and religious lines. Indonesia, for example, has more than 200 ethnic and religious groups living across more than 300 islands. In Malaysia, ethnic and religious issues have always been the issues that deemed sensitive, resulted in many tense situations, and sometimes manifest to be violent conflicts. Secondly, the nature of the conflict shows us that it is very difficult to be resolved. Many issues, especially nonnegotiable issues, are involved in these types of conflicts. Thirdly, many cases of ethnic and religious conflicts in the Southeast Asian region manifest themselves to have been violent and destructive conflicts. This book presents papers of the regional workshop on Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Southeast Asia organized by SEACSN (Southeast Asia Conflict Studies Network) in collaboration with CSPS (the Center for Security and Peace Studies), Gadjah Mada University, in the end of 2001. The workshop attended by 42 participants of academicians and practitioners from nine (9) Southeast Asian countries. They came to participate and joint together in searching for the critical issues underlying the conflicts and finding best solution to manage the conflicts. The main purposes of the workshop are precisely

Introduction

3

to seek a better understanding of ethnic and religious issues in Southeast Asia region and explore some possible actions to manage, resolve, and transform them. During the workshop, there raises a common but also enforcing knowledge that the increasing number of ethnic and religious conflicts in the region do require a greater attention from the organic academicians and practitioners in the region to study and to address the conflict in democratic and peaceful ways.

Perspective on ethnic-religious conflict Ethnic and religious conflict is a complicated issue. Many researchers have developed theories, concepts, and definitions on this typical conflict to capture the complexity of the conflicts. However, though there have already been long debates amongst academia and practitioners to address the issues, the term ethnic and ethnic conflict themselves still have no such clearly defined meaning This hermeneutical problematic became significant concern during the workshop. Hence, any serious efforts to elaborate the conception and definition of the ethnic and religious conflict must be given space and priority. Many observers use the terms ethnic and ethnic conflict in various way. Different goals will have different meaning and definition about the subjects. In the narrow sense, people generally mean ethnic group as “racial” or “linguistic” group. For this sense, the term is widely used by common people in popular discourse. In addition, different context has different notion about ethnic groups. People in Indonesia, for example, usually use the term “Suku” to denote ethnic group. This term has a meaning close to what observers called “tribe” in academic discourse which conceptualized as a group of people who have a distinctive language and race. People in Malaysia use the term “Bangsa” or “Kaum” to denote ethnic groups which has a meaning associated with “race” and “community”. Thus, Malaysian usually says “Bangsa Melayu” or “Kaum Melayu” to refer to Malay people who have different “race” and “community” from “Kaum China” or “Kaum Indian”. The similar term is also used by Moro people when they call “Bangsamoro” to Moro ethnic group who struggles incessantly for

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being separately independent from the Philippine state. We can find this different usage in some articles in this book, especially which discuss the issues of ethnic and religious in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Philippine. Meanwhile, in a broader sense, people used the term “ethnic” and “ethnic conflict” based on ascribed group identities, such as race, language, religion, tribe, or caste. Horowitz’s notion about ethnic and ethnicity can be included here. According to him, all ethnic conflicts are based on the ascribed group identities such as race, language, religion, tribe, nationality, and caste2. In this usage, ethnic conflict has been confirmed by a number of evidences which, for examples, includes the Protestant-Catholic conflict in Northern Ireland, the Christian-Muslim conflict in Maluku, Black-White conflict in USA and South Africa, and the Dayak-Madura conflict in Kalimantan. Ethnic conflict in this term is then racial, religious, linguistic-cum-religious conflict. In this broader usage, we may distinguish between “ethnic” and “religious” categories, but the categorization does not per se make us capable of differentiating between those that are religious and ethnic. Compared to the narrow sense, this wider usage is increasingly becoming standard meaning amongst social scientists. Some writers in this book use the meaning in their presentation. Similar to Ashutosh Varsney’s notion, they connote the term ‘ethnicity” to a bundle of religion, race, language, and sect identities that belong to a group of people 3. The more comprehensive explanation shows that the terms of ethnic and ethnic conflict have a broader meaning; the terms not merely classified according to ethnic group category but also in accordance with cultural meaning or ethnic consciousness. Anthony D. Smith distinguishes ethnic categories and ethnic communities to differentiate ethnic group that solely attributed by outsiders from a group of ethnic and ethnic group who have self-awareness or a dim consciousness through which the members of the group do form a separate collectivity. The former are human population conceptualized by outsiders to differentiate other culture and historical grouping. Following this socially constructed meaning, a myth of common origins, shared historical memories, a sense of solidarity or

Introduction

5

an association with a designated homeland were largely absent. The latter are group of people who possess and shares ethnic attributes such as name-identity, myth of common ancestry, historical memories, language, specific homeland, a sense of solidarity, and unique cultural practices4. The latter conception broadly includes ethnic group in wider sense such as regional group, ethno-nation, and nation in general. This different basic conception consequently does circumscribe the conceptions of ethnic conflict in academic discourses. How does ethnic identity transform into identity conflict? When do ethnic identities give their forceful contribution to ethnic and religious conflicts and when they do not? These issues are still in debate amongst the social and political scientists. The problem here is whether the ethnic identity is something fixed or firmly attached to groups of people and unchangeable over time, or it is constructed and therefore it can change over time because of, for examples, economic developments, modernization, or any policies from governments. If we assume the first is the case then it means that ethnic conflict will always happen, whenever there are two or more different ethnic groups live side by side. On the other hand, if the second is the case then it bears a meaning that ethnic conflict occurs as long as there is an incompatibility between the two or more different constructing and constructed ethnic groups. If they do not perceive in such reactive way, the different identity amongst ethnic groups can not automatically be an impetus of conflict event. The first assumption popularly perceived by the primordialist proponent. They describe ethnic and religious conflicts in accordance with the basic assumption of the predominance of the different cultural traits, core value, and characters internal to each ethnic group. Meanwhile, the second notion is generally perceived by the proponent of constructivist in whom ethnic conflict is studied by focusing on the incompatible perceptions and constructions amongst ethnic groups. The facts that there are many cases in which two or more ethnic groups can peacefully live side by side without violent conflict is usually used by this proponent to support their arguments and refuse the primordialist views5.

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Another issue that also debated during the workshop is the issue of whether the formation of ethnic identity is something built-in within the ethnic group or it is formed as the result of the dynamic relationship between ethnic groups. There are two different views can be identified here in relation to this matter; the culturalist and structuralist approaches to ethnic conflicts6. The former argues that ethnic conflict, whether it is primordially attached or socially constructed, develops through the logic of internal dynamic within ethnic groups. On the contrary, the latter argues that it is difficult to understand ethnic conflict without looking at the relationship between ethnic groups and other ethnic group or with the wider social contexts. Different from the culturalist proponents who argue that ethnic identity is formed as the result of the internal dynamic within ethnic groups, the second proponents view that ethnic identity is formed by the dynamic of inter-relationship between ethnic groups and the larger structure, it can be bigger ethnic groups, state, or global structure. Consequently, the ethnic conflict can be comprehended only in relational contexts. On the other words, ethnic and religious consciousness is only realized as long as the groups perceive themselves as the part of the larger structures, either they feel threatened or get opportunities to gain their interests through the usage of purposiveinstrumental rationality in their everyday interaction with others.

Ethnic conflict handling mechanism It is uneasy to handle the ethnic and religious conflict because it associate primarily with multi-dimensional issues, not only interest based issues but also positional or identity based issues. Moreover, the ethnic conflicts are most manifested themselves into violent conflict and therefore, every act to handle it does not only need to address the original sources of the conflicts but also the dynamic impacts of the conflict that always become the new sources of the conflict. In other words, the circle of violence is often time accompanied by the ethnic and religious conflict. As for the other type of conflicts, there are several ways of handling the ethnic and religious conflict, especially those of

Introduction

7

preventing and avoiding the conflict not to be deadly or disastrous conflict. Among the famous ways there are three handling mechanism, namely conflict management, conflict resolution, and conflict transformation7. The first mechanism is to handle ethnic conflict by a very act of preventing it not to be escalated, being violent, or to reduce the level of ethnic violence. This mechanism usually relies on the use of force or power such as military force, law enforcement, economic sanction, and political and economic control. The second mechanism is to solve the ethnic conflict through problem solving approach or conflict resolution. The third mechanism is to transform the conflict through the policies of advocacy, reconciliation, and conflict transformation. The intervention of peacekeeping forces or military mobilization is in practice a hardest mechanism of conflict management or an arbitrarily ethnic conflict resolution. The idea behind this mechanism is that the ethnic conflict can only be prevented or reduced by separating the conflicting parties for not being in direct confrontations. Nevertheless, the question of how many forces or how many military personals should be deployed for a certain ethnic conflict is difficult to be given answer. Many cases have given us evidence that the intervention had been made sometime too much or if not so then, on the contrary, too little. In the case of UN peacekeeping forces in Rwanda, for instance, there were too much deployment and therefore the intervention in turn worsened the situation rather than reduced the conflict. On the contrary, the UN intervention in Yugoslavia had been too little and too late and therefore, the conflict did create much destruction and violence. Military can actually play various roles on ethnic conflict. The army may be an integrating institution, as sometimes has been claimed, though in a deeply divided society it is doubtful that any single institution can reverse the cumulative effects of all the others. Instead, bitter experiences in armed forces often seem to generate ethnic resentments8. The use of military force may be helpful in controlling ethnic rioting, but if the army favors one group or acts unjustly, its intervention may in turn exacerbate the violence. If there is a

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secessionist movement, an ethnically divided army may engender protracted warfare more possible. By the time a civil war starts, the divided army may have become two or more armies, as shown in the case of Burma, Nigeria, and Lebanon. However, depending on how they are structured, intra military ethnic divisions may also discourage attempts at secession. These possibilities illustrate the point that the military is quite often an active participant in ethnic conflict. Broadly, the action of the army can reverse or reinforce the ethnically measured outcomes of civilian politics. The military has a possible tendency to push excluded ethnic groups up to powerful position or prevent them from gaining power, and it is also capable of excluding power from groups that currently enjoy it9. The other way that practices a more soft management is conflict management through establishing democratic political institution. One famous but also practical method is what called “consociational democracy”. This is a political mechanism to manage conflict in plural society. Different from democratic system in general, consociational democracy is a typical democracy to accommodate so many different interests amongst ethnic groups within plural society. This type of democracy essentially contains at least four main elements: (1) grand coalition of all ethnic groups; (2) mutual veto in decision-making; (3) ethnic proportionality in the allocation of certain opportunities and offices; and (4) ethnic autonomy as often expressed in federalism10. Another way of ethnic conflict management is through what popularly called civic engagement promoting policy. In this notion, efforts to strengthen civic engagements can prevent ethnic conflict. In this respect, two kinds of civic engagements can be identified, namely, associational form and everyday form of civic engagements. The former is a formal or organized interethnic engagement such as business associations, professional organizations, reading clubs, film clubs, sport clubs, NGOs, trade unions, and cadre-based political parties. The latter consist of simple, routine, interaction of life, such as whether families from different communities visit each other, eat together regularly in social rituals, jointly participate in festivals, and allow their children to play together in the neighborhood. In case of Hindu-Muslim relation in India, Ashutosh Varshney found that both

Introduction

9

forms of engagement significantly promote ethnic peace. Contrariwise, their absence or lack opens up space for ethnic violence11. However, the capacity of the associational forms to withstand national-level exogenous shock-like partitions, civil wars, and desecration of holy places, is substantially higher than the latter. Organized civic networks, not only do a better job of withstanding the exogenous shocks, they also constrain local politicians in their strategic-instrumental behavior. Politicians who seek to polarize Hindu and Muslims for the sake of electoral advantage can tear at fabric of everyday engagement through the organized might of criminal gangs. John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, who categorize eight macromethods of ethnic conflict regulation, also suggest a general taxonomy of ethnic conflict management in term of managing the differences among ethnic groups12. According to him, there are many hard methods to eliminate differences among ethnic groups, namely: genocide, forced mass-population transfers, partition and/or secession (selfdetermination), and integration and/or assimilation. The other soft ways for managing differences are hegemonic control, arbitration (third-party intervention), cantonization and/or federalism, and consociationalism or power-sharing. The taxonomy is based precisely on the idea that there are two distinctive ways to deal with actual or potential ethnic conflicts; namely, structural and cultural methods for eliminating and managing differences. The taxonomy derives from an ontological assumption that at the center of ethnic conflicts there are issues related to differences. More precisely, according to him, the essence of the human condition is the existence of differences that should be regulated. On the other, hand problem-solving conflict management lies on the opposite assumption about human condition. It assumes that at the center of human existence there are similarities or universal features that shared by all people in all cultures, and therefore, these features must be captured in conflict resolution processes. The proponents of problem-solving conflict resolution set the discourse for this particular type of conflict management. For them, the similarities between human beings could be searched in the structure and processes of the social world within which people are socialized.

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Problem-solving conflict resolution is a form of conflict resolution that brings together the representatives of the conflicting nations or ethnic groups in active dialogue. The talks designed to contribute directly to the resolution of a conflict. Problem-solving conflict resolution takes place in problem-solving workshops that are relied on unofficial small group discussions. These workshops bring together representatives of parties in conflict for direct communication13. In this method, the role of third party differs from that of the traditional mediator. Unlike many mediators, facilitators do not propose or impose solutions. The function of the third party in the problemsolving workshop is to create an atmosphere where innovative solutions can emerge out of the interaction between the conflicting parties themselves. In short, the main objectives of the workshop are in last instance to create analytical communication and to generate inputs into political processes. Although problem-solving workshop is not supposed to be negotiations, it is often a complementary and parallel process to them.

Ethnic-religious conflict in Southeast Asia Ethnic and religious conflicts in Southeast Asia region have taken place in particular circumstances of state and civil society relation in the region that generally characterized by authoritarian states, on the one hand, and fragile civil society, on the other hand. To some extent, these typical circumstances create difficulties for the region to achieve long-standing peace and social harmony. In addition, globalization process into the region has also shaped state and civil society relations to be more prone to ethnic and religious conflict, as indicated by the emergence of religious fundamentalism in the region. Within this specific context of Southeast Asia region, we are well equipped with three main issues of ethnic and religious conflict in the region, namely, inter-ethnic and religious conflict or civil war, self-determination of ethno-nationalism movement, and religious fundamentalism conflict. The articles in this book present the three main issues of ethnic and religious conflict in this conflict-laden region. All articles discuss these issues, although with different approaches and emphasizes. The

Introduction

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first three articles present a general framework to understand the dimensions of ethnic and religious conflict in the region and general approaches to resolve the conflict. It then followed by series of articles which discuss the three main issues based on various case studies of the ethnic and religious conflict in the region. The brief description below will introduce to the general framework that might be used as hermeneutical and practical entry to understand the dimensions and approaches to resolve the conflict in the region and various case studies that show experiences of academia and practitioners on how to deal with the conflict.

Dimensions and approaches to resolve ethnicreligious conflict In his article Dimensions of Ethnic and Religious Conflict, Lambang Trijono elaborates the multi-dimensions of ethnic and religious conflict. For him, ethnic and religious conflicts will be more comprehensively understood by applying cultural and structural approaches dialectically, especially for explaining how cultural and structural dimensions create ethnic identity conflict. According to his dialectical way of thinking, both cultural and structural approaches have their own strengths and weaknesses in explaining ethnic and religious conflict. Cultural approach is superior for its exploration on how cultural bases of identity formation and enemy construction have always rendered prejudicing- stereotyping attitude against each other ethnic group more possible. However, it has their weaknesses on their neglect to explain how different ethnic groups compare, compete, and dominate one another in generating conflict. Structural approach, on the other hand, has its comprehensiveness to explain how the conflict amongst ethnic groups, between ethnic groups and the state, and between ethnic and religious groups and the forces of globalization, occurred. As an alternative to get better understanding and resolution for ethnic and religious conflict in the region, he then proposed what he called reflexive approach which focuses not merely on cultural dimension of ethno-religious conflict, but also dialectically on its structural dimensions. This approach does not only focus and

12


address the perception or cultural aspects of ethno-religious conflicts, but at the same time it also focuses and addresses the structural dimensions of the interrelation amongst ethnic groups, between ethnic groups and the state, and between ethnic groups and globalization forces or the relation of ethnic groups with the other bigger structure. Focusing more specifically on the issues of how we have to manage ethnic and religious conflict, Samsurizal Panggabean, in his paper Approaches to Ethnic and Religious Conflict Resolution, raises the issues related to conflict resolution approaches in handling ethnoreligious conflicts. According to him, the reason behind any effort to study about conflict is how to prevent, manage, resolve, and transform the conflicts. Preventing conflict from becoming violent and destructive conflict is more important, especially in the case of ethnoreligious conflict. Managing conflict is how to prevent the deadly conflict and human right abuse. In this respect, he points out two different approaches between light and deep prevention. The first is crisis management that aimed precisely at preventing situations with clear capacity for violence from degenerating into armed conflict. The second, in contrast, aims to address the roots of the conflict, including underlying conflict of interests and their mode of social-relationship. The primary focus of deep prevention is on good governance. This includes adequate political institutions and good governance, cohesive social structure, opportunities for groups to develop economically and culturally, and the presence of accepted legal or social norms capable of accommodating and peacefully transforming these formations. In addition, intermediate prevention has been introduced to indicate proximate policies that aim to reduce proneness to violence. Intermediate prevention includes a wide range of processes such as policies of pluralism, elite accommodation, autonomy, power sharing, moderation, and involvement in constitutional or at least nonviolent politics on the part of minorities, and supportive policies for minority. Both Consociationalism and federalism are also considered as intermediate prevention. Moreover, the deepest level of conflict reconciliation is conflict transformation. Conflict transformation is a fundamental and enduring change away from a protracted toward a constructive accommodation between them.

Introduction

13

Similarly, Clem McCartney in his paper Approaches to Ethnic and Religious Conflict Resolution: Managing, Resolving or Transforming, emphasizes on the importance of a better understanding of the qualities and elements of ethno-religious conflicts before we decide to choose any approach to resolve the conflicts. For him, there is no pure ethno-religious conflict, but it always associates with many issues such as poverty, inequalities, and disparity that influence the situation. But, none of us would deny that ethnic coloring does apply and that disparity does divide along the ethnic and religious lines, and that those different ethnicities and religions bring their behavior and attitudes to any given conflict situations. To deal with ethno-religious conflict, we have to think about such ethnicity and religion qualities and elements. Among important qualities, one is the meaning of ethnicity and religion themselves for people life. It should be recognized, however, that there are also transcendental elements of ethnic and religious identities that represent more than material things. When this process of constructing identity has not taken place yet, there is a sense of vulnerability that arises from our own uncertainty or external factors. In addition, he also argue that ethnicity and religion also have an emotional or non-rational component. The valuable thinks are transcendental and we could not apply our easygoing hermeneutical understanding to a conflict that may not be rational. It is the understanding of the nature of ethnicity and religion that will influence the nature of interventions. There are subtexts and values that have to be recognized in finding a resolution. In mapping conflict, we have to look more deeply into these kinds of issues to see the subtexts. Once we can recognize these issues, we can start transforming ethno-religious principles and beliefs.

Experiences dealing with the conflict in the region Experiences on how to deal with the ethnic and religious conflict in the region show us that the different type of conflict calls for different approaches to address the conflicts. Some academia and practitioners focus on top-level or formal negotiation approaches, some give their

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analytical stress on grass-root or community-based peace building approaches, whereas some others propose multi-track approaches of government and civil society interventions. The methods of how to deal with three types of ethnic and religious conflicts in the region, namely self-determination conflict, civil war or inter-ethnic and religious conflict, and religious fundamentalism conflict, are the central focuses presented here in this book. The brief lesson learned below illustrate how we have to deal with ethnic and religious conflicts in the region, especially in the case of the self-determination conflict in Mindanao and Aceh, the case of the civil war in Maluku (Indonesia), and in the case of the religious fundamentalism in Malaysia. In his paper Ethnic and Religious Conflict in the Philippines: the Bangsamoro Experience, Jamail A. Kamlian examines the effectiveness of the official or top-level negotiation between the Bangsamoro people and the Philippine government to address the issues of Mindanao conflict. According to him, the official and formal negotiation process between the Philippine government and the Bangsamoro people so far are still not adequate to address the main issues of Mindanao conflict, especially to answer the claim of Bangsamoro people for selfdetermination. The too much emphasizing on power based negotiation, the lack of participation of the Bangsamoro people in the negotiation process, and the unsuccessful implementation of the agreements that already achieved in the field, are the main causal factors of the failures of the existing negotiation. The problems are deeply embedded in the approach used by the Philippine government to address the Bangsamoro’s claim for self-determination. The Philippine government policies to address the problem of the Bangsamoro assertion for selfdetermination have been relied in fact on its general policy of national integration. The main objective of this totalitarian policy has been primarily to assimilate and integrate them into the mainstream of the Philippine political body. After more than two decades of its implementation, however, this policy failed to have brought about the meaningful integration of the Bangsamoro people into mainstream of the Philippine politics. The Philippine government, as the follow up of the signing of Tripoli Agreement on December 23, 1976, actually adopted the policy of

Introduction

15

granting political autonomy or self-government for the Bangsamoro people. Unfortunately, the Tripoli Agreement was not implemented properly. Instead, the Marcos government created its own version of autonomy in Southern Philippines. After the collapse of Marcos government, the Aquino government then pursued a new political solution to the Bangsamoro issues. Its initial step in the establishment of the regional autonomy in the Bangsamoro homeland was to negotiate with the Bangsamoro secessionist groups, especially MNLF. Unfortunately, after a series of peace negotiations, the Aquino government and the MNLF had no in common again to come up with a more acceptable agreement. Under the Fidel Ramos government, there had also been no substantial change to address the issues. The Ramos government and the MNLF signed the Final Peace Agreement in 1996 that puts into effect the provisions of the 1976 Tripoli Accord. The implementation of the Agreement was to come up in two phases. The first phase was to create a Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) in Southern Philippines and the establishment of Southern Philippine Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) and Consultative Assembly. This Final Peace Agreement also resulted into the election of Nur Misuari as governor of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindano (ARMM). In addition, substantial numbers of the MNLF Mujahedeen were integrated into the Armed Forced of the Philippine and the Philippine National Police. However, though the peace agreement has been put into practice, several fundamental issues will remain unsettled such as war reparations, economic redistribution, conflicting land claims and land reform, representation and rights of Lumad and Christians in a Bangsamoro-ruled autonomous region. The challenge to the various stakeholders of peace will continue to prevail despite of the so many efforts and initiatives poured in the Bangsamoro homeland until acceptable terms can be reached. To some extent, the main problem of this failure also conditioned by the lack of commonalities in the realm of politico-governmental structure and political-constitutional law that can be in fact a bridge for Muslim Mindanao and Christian Filipino to build peace. In his paper In Search of Commonalities between Muslim and Christian Filipinos: Political Values, Beliefs, and Practices, Soliman M. Santos

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argues that the road to peace in Mindanao involves at best the search for commonalities between Muslim and Christian Filipinos. These commonalities can help building bridges of understanding along that road. One area of life for this search is political life. But, the commonalities are in fact not so much in the realm of politicogovernmental structures, institution, and process, as they are in the realm of shared ideals, values, and principles. Although we can find there so many commonalities between Muslim and Christian Filipinos in term of political values, beliefs, and practices, they have not been embedded yet in the politico-governmental structure and constitutional law. This blocks any efforts to mediate and negotiate the conflict through formal politics and legal framework of the Philippine political body. On the contrary, experiences of civil society elements to prevent, resolve, and transform the conflict, have given significant contributions to build peace, especially at community level. In her paper Local Peace Alternatives to Ethnic Conflict in Mindanao: The Bual, Dinas, and Maladeg Peace Zone Experiences, Marilou F. SitonNanaman points out the significant role of civil society, especially the grass-roots and community-based organization in preventing and transforming the conflict between Muslim and Christian at community level through the establishment of peace zone. The disastrous impacts of the conflict on community life have inspired the people to declare zone of peace in their communities. The three success stories of Bual peace zone, Dinas peace zone, and Maladeg peace zone, are examples of how local people do response to conflict situation. Their primary response to conflict situation is the conduct of conflict prevention, conflict mediation and humanitarian intervention response. Most members of peace zones call it peace negotiation, although most often it has involved individuals acting as mediators between conflicting parties. The members have also decided to create a peace zone by signing of a covenant of peace and development, establishing the constitution of a council of elders. The peaceful methods employed in these cases are collective in nature and originated from within the communities. Peace interventions by civil society provide impetus for peace building and peace making at the community level.

Introduction

17

In different context, the failure of the official negotiation and the promising civil society participation to build peace also found in the case of Aceh’s self-determination movement in Indonesia. In his paper Ethnomethodological Reflection on the Case of Acehnese Conflict, Fuad Mardhatillah presents a good explanation on the Aceh conflict from ethno-methodological perspective. Similar to Soliman M Santos, the lack of politico-cultural commonalities within the body politics of Indonesian nation is one of the main causes of the Aceh conflict. According to him, the conflict in Aceh is a manifestation of the failure of the ideologically run state-policies to build a strong and cohesive nationalism. The ideological coercion and cultural unification imposed by the Indonesian state seem to have been a politics of marginalization against Acehnese culture. As a result, regardless of ethnic recognition, such coercive cultural unification does create spirit of resistance and rebellion among local ethnic groups. As shown in the failure of negotiation process recently mediated by HDC (Henry Dunant Center), the lack of space for cultural negotiation between central government and local people creates obstacle to promote peace talk and negotiation between conflicting parties, the central government and Acehnese. In addition, the long history of multidimensional repression of Indonesian state and state violence experienced by civil society tend to make the civil society easier to take violent actions in the logic trap of revenge toward Indonesian state. Nevertheless, similar to Marilo F. Sinton-Nanaman, Fuad Mardhatilah recognizes that in the middle of the repression and conflict violent, there are many initiatives from civil society components, especially at the grass root level, to build peace. Some important Acehnese civil society elements such as student activist, religious leaders of Ulama Dayah, women groups, NGOs, play their significant contributions to open space for dialogue, support the formal negotiation process, and look informally for democratic and peaceful solution, though looked holistically, their movements have not been as powerful as collective movement should have in practice of peaceful resolution. The role of civil society in promoting peace building, especially at grass-root and community level, can also be seen in the case of how

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people respond to civil war between Muslim and Christian in Maluku Islands. In spite of facing self-determination movement, Indonesian society has to deal also with this horizontal conflict. In their paper Religious Conflict in Maluku: In Search of Religious Community Peace, Pieter Tanamal and Lambang Trijono propose alternative solution to resolve the Maluku conflict based on the peace initiatives of Maluku civil society to prevent conflict, promote peace and build civic engagement. According to them, the religious conflict in Maluku Island was in its nature rooted in the state-promoted policies that tend to create wider social-economic gaps and segregation between Muslim and Christian communities in Maluku. The conflict did not manifest itself in the conflict between state and religious community, but it had taken a form of civil war or religious conflict between Muslim and Christian community. The failure and weaknesses of the Indonesian state to intervene the conflict has created a space for NGOs and civil society to take the place of formally run intervention the conflict and to initiate the very act of reconstructing this multi-cultural society by building peace, religious dialogue, and dialogic community. As shown in the case of Team 20 Wayame which composed of Muslim and Christian members, based on the principles of universal values such as trustworthy, openness, honesty, supportive, willing to work for the sake of humanity, and stick to the God deity, they instead successfully maintain solidarity in the midst of the conflict. Regardless the smallscale reconciliation potency, this could be regard as social capital and cultural resources for peace building in Maluku Islands. Focusing on recent dynamic context of the conflict in the region, another important issue is the issue of religious fundamentalism. This issue has been receiving much attention from the public especially after terrorist attacked on WTC, September 11, 2001, and in the region especially after Bali bombing case. This typical conflict recently arises in the context of the relation between religious groups, especially Islam, and globalization forces that massively influence the religious life in the region. In his paper Islamic Militancy in Malaysia, Kamarulnizam Abdullah examines the current trend of religious militancy in Malaysia and try to understand why Malaysia’s political Islam does enter a new stage of political identity. According to him,

Introduction

19

religious militancy in Malaysia, unlike in the early part of political Islamic movement, has contained international characters. The objectives were not only to change the government by force but also to change the character of international system. The United State of America and its allies viewed as the major-totalitarian system of value and practice that runs politics of blockage against Islamic utopia of political dominancy. Although Malaysia government managed to contain the spread and influence of Islamic militancy through methods of early crushing against these militant movements, one could not deny the possibility that beside all these measures Islamic militancy will always be a formidable challenge to government legitimacy.

Lesson learned from the workshop From the workshop there could be acquired a lesson learned that the underlying issues of the ethnic and religious conflict in the region can be searched in the structural and cultural dimensions of the Southeast Asia society. Moreover, many cases of experiences dealing with the conflict, whether practiced by state or civil society elements, show that efforts to recollect and reconstruct their conflict intervention practices are in a need to meet the best practice of managing, resolving and transforming the conflict. It should be marked that the ethnic and religious conflicts in the conflict-laden region have taken their place in a specific sociological and political context of Southeast Asia society. As has been believed by many observers, the Southeast Asia society is a fragile civil society characterized by multicultural and multiethnic society and a sharp cultural division and structurally social disjunction amongst its members. On the other hand, states in this geo-political region are in general post-colonial states with authoritarian characteristic. Many ethnic and religious issues are then the legacy of past colonialism problems that still embedded in post-colonial era. In the era of globalization today, the states become too dependent on the globalization forces, even many have in fact been instruments of international capitalism. The globalization saliently shapes the relationship between state and civil society in which the states in turn tend to dominates civil society in many sectors

20


of public life and cultural space. Taken place in and conditioned by such sociological and political context, the many ethnic and religious conflicts in the region manifest themselves into many forms of civil war, ethno-nationalism, and religious fundamentalism. The case of civil war can of course be confirmed by the cases like inter-ethnic conflict in Maluku, Kalimantan, and others. Ethno-nationalism issues manifest in the conflict over selfdetermination between local people and the state such as in Aceh, Papua, and Mindanao. The religious fundamentalism has been precisely in the case of Islamic militancy, especially in Malaysia, Indonesia, and Mindanao. These three type conflicts can be comprehended as the “hotpots” issues that powerful to give the ethnic and religious in the region a characteristic, even though they manifest themselves in different level and dynamic of conflict. It should be noted here that there have been differences between approaches in their priority to resolve those types of the conflict. From presented papers and discussion during the workshop, it can be proposed different types of interventions for different types of conflicts. Developing civic engagement, inter-sections, and community dialogue between ethnic and religious groups are the best strategies to resolve civil war or inter-ethnic conflict. These are alternative strategies to the failures of the coercion, separation, and exit strategies that have been thus far implemented by government. Another issue of conflict management that came up during the workshop is whether it used light or deep interventions of crisis management. Strategy to involve community and religious leaders in the making of conflict resolution is part of the light strategy, whereas the deep strategy applied for longterm conflict resolution such as promoting dialogue, democratic conflict resolution and good governance within a decision-making process. At cultural level, conflict resolution approaches have to be concentrated on developing any cultural consensus, cultural institution, and consensus-enacted norms that in practice acceptable to any ethnic and religious groups. These approaches should be led at best through peace education and developing democratic culture that in turn contribute to ethnic and religious peace.

Introduction

21

Another important approach is conflict transformation. This approach is in its nature and process a long-term conflict prevention and hence by the qualitative means it has, this transformation is capable of being alternative to short-term prevention. The conflict transformation could be actor or role transformation in the forms of personal or group transformation and issues transformation which consisting of structural or cultural transformation. These main forms of conflict transformation can be conducted by state, civil society components, or both state and civil society elements in multi-track conflict resolution approaches. Regarding the issues of religious fundamentalism, presenters and participants of the workshop agreed that solutions to the problematic of dealing with this issue are mainly in shoulders of international community. The role of state in this case is merely to prevent the conflict for not being escalated into violent conflict. In case of Islam militancy in Malaysia, for instance, too much state role and intervention proved to have not been sufficient in resolving the problem solely. For the causes of the arising of the religious fundamentalism lie precisely in the nature of globalization and in the praxis of international system, the solution must also emanate from actors, agencies, and institution beyond the state, whether at the regional or international level. To sum up, it can be said that the papers presented in this book clearly identify the common issues and agendas of action as valuable responses to the ethnic and religious conflict in the region. The main critical or the “hotspot” conflicts in this conflict-laden region are the issues of civil war or inter-ethnic conflict, self-determination conflict, and religious fundamentalism conflicts. These issues are prominent features of the ethnic and religious conflict. The papers also give remarkable contributions prior to some considerations of how we have to formulate approaches and methods to address the conflicts. There are three different approaches we can identify, namely conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and conflict transformation. These programs of conflict resolution, however, can be rendered more practical only through the active communication and participation of multi-tracks actors of state and civil society elements, whether at national, regional or global levels. Including in these efforts there

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must be multilateral intervention of national, regional and international third parties to intervene the ethnic and religious conflict.

End Notes Lambang Trijono, “International Action for Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Maluku”, paper presented in the conference on Mediating Human Right and Democracy; Indonesia, Australia, and the Netherland, held by Curtin University of Technology, Perth, Western Australia, 4-5 February 2002; 2 See Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Group in Confiict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 52-53. 3 See Ashutosh Varsney “Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society, India and Beyond”. World Politics, Vol. 53, No. 3 (April, 2001). 4 See Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (London: penguin Books, 1991), pp. 20-21. 5 See Michael E. Brown, “Causes and Implication of Ethnic Conflict”, in Michael E. Brown (eds), Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 3-26. 6 See Jan Nederveen Pieterse, “Varieties of Ethnic and Ethnicity Discourse”, in Edwin N. Wilmsen and Patrick McAllister (eds), The Politics of Differences, Ethnic Premises in a World of Power (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996), pp. 25-44; See also John L. Commoroff, “Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the Politics in an Age of Revolution”, in Edwin N. Wilmsen and Patrick McAllister (eds), Ibid., pp. 162-183. 7 See Hugh Miall, pp. 20-21. 8 See, Horowitz, 1985, pp. 443-444. 9 See, Horowitz, 1985, pp. 444 10 See, Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, A Comparative Exploration (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 25-44. 11 See, Ashutosh Varshney, Op. Cit. 12 See John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, (eds.), The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation (London : Routledge, 1993), P. 4. 13 See Christopher Mitchell and Michael Banks, Handbook of Conflict Resolution, the Analyticals Problem-Solving Approach (London: Pinter, 1996). 1

Structural-Cultural Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict

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Structural-Cultural Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict: Toward a Better Understanding and Appropriate Solution In Managing Ethnic Conflict§ Lambang Trijono A. Introduction On January 19, 1999, the peaceful everyday life of Ambonese was suddenly disrupted by violent ethnic-religious conflict. The trigger of the conflict seemed very simple; a young Muslim-Bugisnese from Batumerah village disputed with a young Christian-Ambonese from Mardika village. What they disputed was a trivial business, public minibus fare. However, its consequences were extraordinary. It was quickly degenerated into a mass clash between hundreds of the both young villagers who turned the dispute into a mass violent conflict between “red” (a symbol attributed to Christian) and “white” (a symbol attributed to Muslim) communities. It, then, spread into churches and mosques damaging in the neighbourhood, and eventually led into religious conflict for almost two years which claimed thousands of lives and torn Maluku community into pieces.1 The January 19, 1999 conflict was just one event of the episodes of the Ambon conflict that shows us how terrible the ethnic-religious conflict could be and a trivial dispute easily spread to be a communal conflict resulting in fatal damage of the Maluku community. The fights amongst urban youths for economic source as such were eventually common phenomena in most Indonesian cities since economic crisis started in 19972. But, unlike the disputes we found everywhere in Indonesian cities during the time, the January 19 dispute became very dangerous when it linked to inter-ethnic and inter-religious competition there. Ambon society is well known for its plurality, in terms of both ethnicity and religion. Economic crises and Indonesian government’s inability to overcome these problems have had a fatal consequence on

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ethnic and religious group relationship. When job opportunities in Ambon were distributed following ethnic and religious lines, political patronage became deeply rooted in local politics, economic crisis reigned, many youth found themselves unemployed, the “preman” (derived from “free man” that means hoodlums) were omnipresent, and conflict amongst political elites increasingly heated, it was not surprising then that inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflict became inevitable. Indonesia is not just one area where the problems haunt much. Such conflict was also happening in many places in the world. Many researchers noted that since the World War II was over, especially in post-cold war times, ethnic and religious conflicts within state, or internal conflict, have been common phenomena. Conflict between states or inter-state conflicts replaced by intra-state conflicts amongst ethnic groups and between ethnic-religious groups and the state. The statistical analysis of the issues shows that ethnic and religious conflicts have increased markedly since 1950s. Since 1950s, over one hundred minority groups have engaged in some forms of rebellion3. In the 1990s alone, for, example, ethnic groups had engaged in open warfare in Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Burma, Burundi, Georgia, Croatia, India, Liberia, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Zaire, etc. These ethnic wars produced high levels of death and destruction because they frequently involved direct, deliberate attacks on civilian populations. The number of people killed, wounded, or displaced in such conflicts are often counted in ten and hundreds of thousands, and in some cases in million4. Without an exception, the countries within the Southeast Asia region are also facing these conflicts. During the last decade, the region has been indicated by many ethnic and religious conflicts. They occur for example in Indonesia that confirmed by conflict cases in Ambon, Kalimantan, West Papua, and Aceh. In Malaysia, a conflict between Malay ethnic group and India ethnic group has recently come up again in the corner of Kuala Lumpur after this kind of conflict had been long overcame. In Thailand, a conflict between Pathani ethnic in the North Mountain and the Thailand government have been going on. Meanwhile, in Philippine we can find a conflict between the Moros and


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Manila government. Those conflicts have occurred ceaselessly for many years and they are still waiting for their solution until now. This paper enforces us to give more serious attention on the ethnic conflict. So many ethnic conflicts that occur recently push us to re-concentrate on this matter more seriously. This paper tries to examine the dimensions that have in fact of conflict situation become the sources of the ethnic conflicts. Responding to difference between the cultural and structural approaches in the study of ethnic conflicts in these days5, the paper is intended to pose reflexive approach as an alternative by examining both the cultural and structural dimensions in dialectical relations. As will be discussed in the latter part of this paper, ethnic conflicts can be reflexively understood as a result of structural and cultural factors which work simultaneously in affecting the conflicts, not only in the cultural dimension of people perception and attitudes, but also on the level of structural context which covers it. Given the fact that violent ethnic conflict marks many countries, this critical examination may have great practical implications for conflict resolution. It is expected that this rethinking will bring us to a better understanding of the sources of ethnic conflict and the appropriate solution to manage, resolve, and transform the conflict.

B. Conflict of Identity Facing ethnic-religious conflict, there are frequent questions: Why do these conflicts often happen by involving collectively almost the whole members of the community that they cause victims of violence and immense social destruction? Why are ethnic and religious conflicts often endless and why do they cause an immense destruction, to be long and destructive conflicts? Regarding these matter, I myself found a clear evidence of seeing the conflicts directly during my research. While conducting a study in Maluku on July 1999, the writer saw directly at that time how great the ethnic-religious conflict had been. All along the way in Ambon island, the writer saw the streets filled with folks of people who were ready to fight, carrying sharp-pointed arms. In alleys, all people; children, old and young men, men and women, got out of the house preparing to

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fight as soon as they heard guns explosion, rumours of fights between Moslems vs. Christians, and the noise of people preparing to fight on the streets. Such a situation has occurred for almost two years, causing many mass conflicts between the communities of Christian and Moslem in the whole Maluku islands. As the result, for more than two years, the conflict had taken victims of more than 4,000 people died and more than 450,000 people become refugees6. The answers given by the conflict study expertises are various. One of the famous explanations is the cultural view that sees the cause of this conflict on cultural characterisations i.e. the characters of ethnicity and religion that attach to the related ethnic and religious groups or communities. This point of view depicts the ethnic conflicts as conflicts based on cultural identity or so called conflict of identity. According to this view, the identity conflict occurs when cultural communities in a country or communities among countries could not share their identities together, or being contradicted and collided one another7. It can be an identity conflict between different ethnic groups of race, ethnic, language, religion8, or identity conflict based on, regionalism, ethno-nationalism or nationalism within wider range9. The cultural identity itself is very complicated identification. People have not only a single identity, but also multi-dimensions identities10. There are two kinds of identities belonging people can be identified: first, ascribed identity that attached and can not be refused by people and, second, achieved identity that is begotten because of choice or certain social action. The identities attached to race, region, language, ethnic, religion, are the example of the former. The identities belong to class or economic position, citizenship, professions, political position, social status, are the instance of the latter. Either ascribed or achieved, identity can change along with the time being and people lives. The former identity is surely hard to change compared to the latter. One is born as a certain tribe, for example, is difficult to change. But, as one day in long term, relatively he can change into another tribe’s member, for instance, when he moves from his residence or married to another tribe. However, for the achieved identity, it can change easily from time to time, for instance, due to political and economic development11.


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The importance of identity as the base of the ethnic conflict attracts expertises of conflict study to learn further on how the identity is formed, changed, or lost, so that it affects the dynamic of ethnic conflicts. In this respect, there are three different views can be identified12. First, primordialist view. This view sees the identity of ethnic cultural, religion, race, etc. is stable, fixed, ascribed, unchanged, and if it changes it only happens for a relatively long term. This is the essentialist view of ethnicity in which ethnic groups are taken as givens. According to this view, the identity of ethnic group is rooted to primordial sentiment, a cultural consciousness that internalized by members of community through the basic and primary institutions such as family, clan, belief groups, neighbourhood, locality etc. in which individuals are born and grew.13 The primordial sentiment as such is a core identity, basic identity, which exist prior to the other identities such as personal identity, class, political parties, citizen of a nation, etc. It attached to the consciousness of the member of communities that the primordial sentiments always influence people’s behaviour, the associational forms of communal membership, and its relation to the other community, including conflict relations. The ethnic conflict happens, according to this view, because of the difference of the tribal and religious characteristics. It is rooted in the prejudice, stereotype, and attitude of the member of the ethnic and religious community toward one another that pertainesd to cultural identity that are relatively permanent owned by a group14. Second, instrumentalist view. This view understands cultural identity as a product of manipulation and mobilization of certain political elites for their political purposes. As Paul Brass notes, “ethnic communities are created and transformed by particular elite in modernizing and in post-industrial societies undergoing dramatic change”15. From this point of view, the cultural forms, values, and practices of ethnic groups become political resources for elites to compete for political and economic power. This especially happens as politicians take the advantages of the significant number of ethnic group that can be mobilized for their benefits. Thus, according to this view, ethnic and religious conflicts occur as consequences of ethnic

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mobilization or the ethnically oriented domination in the politicaleconomic sphere by political elites for their interests. Third, perfecting the first and second views, the constructionist, or sometime called realist, emphasizes that community members and political elite work together in making ethnic conflicts. The awareness of myths, history, locality, tradition, and cultural symbolism among the member of ethnic and religious groups forms group identity that is then used by elite groups to create or reconstruct a new communal identity suitable with their imagination. According to this view, ethnic conflict is a dynamic social process of social construction of community as a whole, the community members and elite groups all together16. They all together produce conflict as objective reality, internalized by members of community, institutionalized through their practices and then become stock of knowledge for people to do with conflict. Of the three variants, the last view is the most popular one among conflict study expertise17. However, in the daily discourse of “common people”, the primordialist view is more believed. Listening carefully to the ethnic conflict or “religious war” in the field, what in common comes into people minds are bad characteristics of the conflicting ethnic groups. During ethnic and religious war, it is often come out words such as “arrogant tribe”, “stiff tribe”, “war-love tribe”, “terrorist religion”, “lost religion”, etc. Such a stigmatization, of course, can not be ignored. However strong our trust in constructionist view would be, we have to consider this fact since in reality of conflict the primordialist view often inspires members of community to involve in conflict. As noted by Robin Cohen, taking or defending the primordialist view is realistic choice and it is not wrong for us to take it into account, even though with the degree of modest defence18. This problem leads us into a hermeneutical difficulty that there is still a gap between the observer views and popular views. In practice, many people defend with all efforts of the primordialist view just because they are sympathized and too long in the subjective view and public discourse. On the contrary, many academicians unrealistically ignore this subjective view developed and practiced in the community even though it really motivates the conflict. Dealing


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with this problem, we have to find the modest method through which we run objective interpretation and formulate a more realistic conflict study approach.

C. Ethnic Conflict in Relational Context The cultural view has given a significant contribution in explaining how the cultural identity is formed and becomes the basic of an impetuous force in ethnic conflicts. However, the problem is: does a formation of identity likely tend to be conflicts? Or, on the contrary, can they be co-existence, to stand on their own without conflict with other, or even become the power of social cohesion? Can the formation of identity become something that stands alone or as an inseparable part of the constellation of inter-groups relation within communities? The cultural approach is still unsatisfying in explaining this problem. Many realities inform that the existence of different cultural identity in the society can coexist peacefully, even though conflict often happens among them. Moreover, the weaknesses of cultural approach is that it inclines to view ethnic identity formation as internal dynamic and treat cultural formation as a closed system. The structural approach gives alternative answers for this problem. According to this approach, ethnic conflict can only be understood in relational context of the dynamic relationship amongst ethnic and its relation to bigger structure such as state policy and globalization forces such as modernization and economic capitalism. This perspective views that ethnicity is not a thing for itself, but an immanent capacity in response to external forces. This claim is based on an assumption that ethnic consciousness only realizable when groups feel either threatened with loss of previously acquired privilege or conversely speculate that it is an opportune moment politically to overcome long-standing denial of privilege19. How ethnic identities are formed, according to this view, depends on their relations with the other ethnic or bigger structures20. In this respect, there are three sites of ethnic and religious conflicts can be identified: (1) ethnic conflict in the context of interrelation between ethnic groups; (2) ethnic conflicts in relation to the issues of the relation between ethnic groups and the

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state; and (3) ethnic conflict in relation to the issues of the relationship between ethnicity and globalization21.

C.1. Interethnic Conflict Comprehending the conflict dynamic among ethnic groups we need to understand how the constellation of the relation between ethnic groups conditions social cohesion or, in another hand, motivates conflict. The constellation of the relationship between the ethnic groups can take two types of relationship; symmetric and asymmetric relationship. The symmetric relationship can take form of co-existence, cooperation, equal exchange, interdependency, and competition, and conflict. The asymmetry relations usually take form of domination or super-ordination¾subordination relationship. In the latter case, usually the majority-strong force groups dominate the minorityweak force groups. But it can be overlapped, for example, the advanced minority, in terms of economic and education, dominates the underdeveloped-majority 22. In both symmetric and asymmetric relationships we never find a perfect social integration. Ethnic peace is more common in symmetric relations than in asymmetric relations. In the symmetric relations people often engage one another to form civic engagement, either in associational forms of engagement or everyday forms of engagement. The members of different ethnic are interlinked one another to share value and interests, to form solidarity, usually with a certain social control or political coordination23. However, the forming of civic engagement is difficult to take place permanently, especially in multiethnic society. In symmetric relation, the conflict often happens connecting with comparison, social jealousy, suspicion, imaginary construction, prejudice, stereotype, and competition between the groups that are motivated by the offensive and defensive tendencies as the result of an attack thread or annexation with one another. Meanwhile, in the asymmetric relation, integration happens through domination, repression, cooptation, and dependency. But, it contains of hidden conflict potency among sub-ordinate groups with super-ordinate groups to last power, status, and their privileges. In


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many cases, the sub-ordinate groups try to fight the domination that imposed by super-ordinate to maintain its power, status, economic monopoly. The conflict often comes up with the problems of distributions of scare resources such as economic and political resources, about whose interests dominate the scare and important political, economy, social-cultural resources in a certain territory. The power struggle among ethnic groups is unavoidable in accessing and dominating those resources. If there is no clear and fair distribution and allocation of the resource, the conflict is often unavoidable. Such a conflict usually terminates or ends when the conflict is incorporated into political institution that distributes and allocates resources fairly, or through assimilation, either because of incorporation or voluntarily in amalgamation process influenced or intervened by external forces. Incorporation happens when a group dissolves another group’s identity into their own identity. Amalgamation happens when two or more groups join to form a new and bigger group unit24. Nevertheless, whenever domination exists, potential conflict raises; the marginal and dominated ethnic groups which always try to fight another bigger ethnic group which dominates the political, economy, social-cultural resources. And so on, the conflict always happens when the fight over resources among ethnic groups occur within a certain territory unit, and it often becomes bigger conflict because of the influences of imbalance external forces, for instance state policy, which affects the relation constellation among those ethnic groups.

C.2. State and Ethnic Conflict The relation constellation between ethnic groups can change from time to time dynamically, and it creates social cohesion or, on the other hand, social conflict depends on the power of the outside influence. The influence of outside force of certain state policy, for example, can result in integration in which assimilation occurs, either in the forms of amalgamation or incorporation. On the contrary, the influence of change from outside can motivate conflict when there is differentiation, either in the form of division or proliferation. The

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division comes to the foreground of society when a civic community divided into two or more fragmented or smaller groups. Meanwhile, proliferation happens when a group or more divided into smaller groups which results in new small groups as the addition within it25. The influences of state policy on ethnic group relations are very complicated. It depends on how the policies, decisions, and actions of government are being made and the kind of the change that takes place in relation to ethnic group relationship. The government policies promoting peaceful inter-ethnic relations, security, and political, economical and social justice will succeed in integrating ethnics groups. State policies that fairly accessible by various ethnic and religious groups within civil society can compose, unite, interlink, and converge their differences26. Thailand’s state is an example of state that has succeeded in promoting peaceful interethnic relations. Charles Keyes explains that, for over one hundred years, Thailand’s government has pursued a policy of ethnic inclusiveness that enables the country to submerge ethnic differences and limit ethnic conflict. Since the late 1800s, successive governments in Thailand have successfully forged a national identity while avoiding intolerant and militant nationalism. The Thailand government can successfully strike a balance between the requirement to develop a national identity and the necessity to respect cultural difference. As a result, Thailand has experienced little sustained ethnic violence in recent decades27. Thailand’s experience is merely a special case. The challenge for many governments, however, consists of two difficult effort of promoting stability and justice at the same time. The government might be effective at maintaining stability, at least in the short term, but their methods often do not get good grades on the “justice” dimension. Indian government, for example, conveying with the challenges of extraordinary ethnic diversity within society has relied on three main instruments. First, a political order based on liberal constitutionalism and secularism. Second, power-sharing arrangements based on group rights and the devolution of authority to lower levels of government. Third, the use of force and coercion when the first and two instruments have failed28. Policies based on power sharing and devolution have proven to be the most successful


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in containing ethnic discord and violence. The use of force and coercion has some success in wearing down militant adversaries and bringing them to the bargaining table, particularly in Punjab and northeast. However, these strategies, along with the centralizing propensities of number of Indian governments, have also intensified ethnic alienation and conflict, for example, in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Moreover, the state policy can also trigger conflict between ethnic groups and state. In many countries, state is often used by certain ethnic dominant for his ends in the form of cultural despotism. In this case, the monoculture control of the state often leads to conflict between majority and minority ethnics. Some governments are obsessed with maintaining political unity and territorial integrity of their state, and they engage in vigorous efforts to create single national identity, suppress other ethnic identities, and squash ethnic movements. In this case, these governments have mono-cultural vision of their countries in which government run by one ethnic group who wants to stay in power, keeps other groups out of power, and absolutely corrupts democratic power to maintain the support of their ethnic constituents; and has no concern about or want to help other ethnic groups or minorities29. This making of ethnic state by a certain ethnic group has occurred in many countries, either by majority ethnic or minority ethnic, such as in Middle East in Syria (by Alawites) and Jordania (by Hashemite monarcy supported by Bedoins), in Turkey (Muslim Turkey over Kurdi ethnic and the other minorities), in Egypt (Muslim over Copts ethnic)30. In Southeast Asia, it can be found in Indonesia (Muslim Javanese over the other ethnics outside Java), in Malaysia (Malay over Chinese and Indian), in Singapore (Chinese over Malay and Indian), etc.31. The making of ethnic state by a certain ethnic group tends to create conflict between an ethnic group and state. In Pakistan, for example, a single ethnic community, the Punjabis, came to dominate the country’s civil-military bureaucracies and the new state failed viable representative institutions. Most peripheral ethnic communities therefore came to perceive the state as a partisan ethnic actor. Compounding these problems, the country’s leader neglected compelling ethnic problems and adopted strategies that transformed

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ethnic competition into violent conflict, such as the majority Bengali population of East Pakistan successfully seceded from Pakistan and created the new state of Bangladesh. The ruling elite in Islamabad has continued to ignore and mismanage many country’s ethnic problems, for instance, by denying regional autonomy to ethnic groups and pursuing cultural and educational policies that have excluded various ethnic minorities32. Sri Lanka is another example of the state’s failure to accommodate minority ethnic groups. According to Amita Shastri, the roots of ethnic violence in Sri Lanka can be traced directly to the central government’s failure to accommodate the legitimate demands of its Tamil minority. After independence, the country’s Sinhalese leaders adopted a centralized system of government that denied minorities regional autonomy. In addition, Sinhalese politicians, despite their commitment to a democratic state, increasingly came to conceive of democracy in majority terms. Tamil minority in particular, faced systematic political and economic discrimination, leading over half to leave for India33. Some secessionist movement in Indonesia and Philippine can also be seen as the consequences of the state’s failure to accommodate minorities groups. The self-determination and separation conflict of Aceh, Mindanao, West Papua, are typical cases of the conflicts. The conflicts in Aceh and West Papua occur because of the Muslim Javanese majority that controls Indonesian state do not accommodate the interests of local elites and people properly. On the contrary, the Soeharto’s new order regimes coerced and co-opted the local elites and exploited natural resources for their political interests since the local people opposed them with separation and selfdetermination movements34.

C.3. Globalisation and Ethnic Conflict Ethnic conflict also inevitably happens due to the influence of external force of globalisation. The issues of ethnic conflict in this area are more cultural and economic issues rather than political. Globalisation, either in the form of cultural imperialism or penetration of capitalism tends to create crisis of identities among ethnic communities. Moreover, the waves of modernization and capitalism


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that have been penetrating into state territory often result in socialeconomic gaps and inequalities among regions and ethnic groups. The reactions to this are various that can be seen in various social movements based on cultural, ethnic and religious identities35. The response of local ethnic communities to globalisation takes various forms of social movements. There are at least four forms of responses can be identified: (1) accommodation; (2) revitalization; (3) revivalization; (4) resistance. Accommodation occurs as long as local ethnic and religious communities accept the globalisation, enter or more extremely absorbed into global dynamic, and practice the cultural and economic system of capitalism in their daily life. Revitalization happens when local religious and ethnic communities use the elements of modernization and capitalism to reinforce and revitalize their culture and identities. Revivalization of certain ethnic and religious groups emerges as far as local religious and ethnic community oppose the globalisation by reinforcing their ethnic and religious traditions. Finally, resistance is a form of total refusal and opposition of local ethnic and religious communities to modernization and the penetration of capitalism mode of production.36 The recent emergence of ethnic and religious fundamentalism movements can be seen as the forms of revivalization to break with and oppose globalisation. Basically, fundamentalism has some characteristics: (1) holding belief and culture absolutely; (2) revitalizing tradition or opposing globalisation by using their tradition; (3) refusing globalisation by retreating the past, practicing the very old tradition by imposing it practically today in the middle of modern world37. Thus, the fundamentalism is very radical movement of antiglobalisation. This is a social movement that many modernist and liberalist are afraid of due to their difficulty to accommodate it by using modern and capitalism ways of life and system. Therefore, inevitable conflict between liberalist and fundamentalist becomes violent conflict. Other ethnic tensions dealing with globalisation is the problems of migrants, diaspora, refugees, in modern countries. Globalisation i.e. the development of global information and market expansion

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causes flexible and dynamic movements of people from one state to another. Globalisation i.e. economic growth of capitalism and industrialization also attracts many people to migrate to urban areas or big city. As a consequence, there are so many ethnic migrants and diasporas in many countries, especially in metropolitan cities. This often creates tension and conflict between the immigrant and the ethnic and religious communities within the host countries. The main problems dealing with the diaspora is that they often feel in crisis, disillusion, frustration, and displacement in the host community. These feelings tend to create ethnic and religious fundamentalism as they retreat and practice tradition and religion of their homeland in the middle of modern host countries. They are more fundamental than the people and community in their homeland. The growing of migrants and diaspora often creates negative responses followed by racism ideology from the ethnic and race majority of the host countries. The emerge of cultural fundamentalism of the migrant and diaspora, in one hand, and the growing of racism ideology within the host countries, on the other hand, can cause cultural tensions and ethnic and religious conflicts in modern countries.

D. Reflexive Approach From discussion above, we can see that both cultural and structural approaches have their own strengths and weaknesses. Cultural approach is superior for its exploration on how cultural bases of identity formation, enemy construction, prejudicing, stereotyping other ethnic groups drive the dynamic of ethnic conflicts. However, their weaknesses are on their neglect to explain how different ethnic groups compare, compete, and dominate one another in generating conflict and integration within community. Many facts which have shown how ethnic and religious conflicts can only emerge in a specific structural condition are not received much attentions in this approach. Instead of conflict, in many cases, ethnic and religious groups with different identities can coexist peacefully. Structural approach, on the other hand, has its comprehensiveness to explain how the conflict relations amongst


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ethnic groups, ethnic and religious groups and state and globalisation forces, arise. Influences of internal factors such as group affiliations and external factors such as the degree of state policy are taken into account in contributing to the degree of conflict and integration within community. However, this approach has its weakness that it is likely to ignore the internal dynamic of ethnic conflict. To understand ethnic and religious conflict comprehensively, therefore, it is important to take both structural and cultural dimensions, relational context and identity formations into our analysis. The problem is then how we can explain the dynamic interrelations of both structural and cultural dimensions that reinforce ethnic and religious conflict in dialectical ways. The reflexive approach of social sciences will help us to illuminate this problem. The reflexive approach is an approach to study social phenomena by examining the cultural and structural, social and individual, public knowledge and personal experience dialectically. It results in a discursive form of knowledge that reflects both structural and cultural facts, social and individual level, public knowledge and personal experiences38. Thinking on ethnic and religious conflicts reflexively means thinking critically on cultural motivation and structural context that generate the conflict and how they influence one another dialectically. The result will be a comprehensive knowledge of ethnic conflict that reflects cultural and structural realities behind the conflicts. Many cases inform us that both structural and cultural dimensions contribute simultaneously in reinforcing the escalation of the conflicts. The changes of structural context, such as the ethnic composition within society, the power relationship, the degree of domination and inequalities amongst ethnic groups can develop identity crises, cultivate group’s sentiments and cultural perception, that in return it will affects group competition and conflict behaviour. Those three factors of structural context, cultural perception, and groups behaviour, are mutually reinforced one another in the conflict dynamic39. In Ambon, for instance, structural changes promoted by the New Order government such as unequal social-economic

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development, central political domination, migration, shifting of ethnic composition, marginalization of minority, etc., cause “distrust feeling” and “perception crisis” among Christian minority over the dominant Muslim majority. Such feeling and perception in return generate competition and conflict over scare political and economic resources between the religious groups. As the conflict happened, it easily resulted in religious violence, social cleavages and segregation that become the sources of conflict in the coming circle of violent conflict 40. Reflexive approach is capable of enlightening the dialectic relationship between internal dynamic of the formation of ethnic groups, on the one hand, and ethnic group relations that produce social conflict and integration, on the other hand. In reality, conflict and integration are two forces that always pull one another, or differently stated they are two kernels of dialectical constituting of society. As a German realist-sociologist, Georg Simmel, mentioned a century ago, both conflict and integration are two inseparable course of social constitution.41 When a group is in conflict with another group, an internally social cohesion happens in each group. Since being involved in a conflict, each group needs solidarity and collective power to fight the enemy. Next, the internal social cohesion can cause frictions and social fragmentation. This condition happens because the inner social cohesion requires that the group has to be capable of self autonomy. But, since there is an impossibility for a group to live alone and that it can not stand on its own for the sake of sufficient resources, the latter forces them to build coalition or an ally with another group to form a bigger group. Thus, as mentioned by Lewis Coser, in whole process a conflict can functionally create social integration42. But, once a bigger group coalition formed, new friction and conflict occur within it, which are caused by vagueness of social, identity borders, and the emergence of dispute on how to distribute scare political, social-economic, and cultural resources. And so forth, the social conflict and social integration dynamic always happen in society. It is interesting then to see how the interlink between the conflict among ethnic groups and the internal cohesion within the ethnic


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group reinforces one another and how the conflict relations among ethnic group reinforce internal cohesion within the ethnic groups and the internal cohesion within ethnic group reinforces the conflict relations amongst the ethnic groups? Social cohesion within ethnic groups formed in various ways. It can be integrated based on genealogical bounds such as family, clan, tribe, race, or based on territorial bounds like neighbourhood, local community, region, nation-state, etc. Those social bounds can stand alone in autonomy way, but it can also joint with other social bonds, in intra-ethnic relations, to form an ethnic community. Social integration within the ethnic community happens when the member of those ethnic groups are engaged, bound, interlinked, intersected one another, in the forms of interethnic relation, to share value and interest and to form identity and solidarity. There are two kind of civic engagements that can be identified to preserve such interethnic integration, whether it constituted in organized or maintained in informal form. The distinction is based on whether civic interaction is formal or not. The former manifests in associational forms of engagement, the second manifests in everyday forms of engagement43. Political parties, business associations, professional organizations, sport clubs, NGOs, trade union, are examples of the formers. A simple, routine interaction of life, such as whether families from different communities visit each other, eat together regularly, jointly participate in festivals, and allow their children to play together in their neighbourhood, are the example of the latter. However, the social integration as such is difficult to take place, especially when the civic engagements of inter-ethnic relations are absent and intra-ethnic is more prevalent within society. In this situation, competition, frictions, and violent conflicts among ethnic groups are likely to occur44. The competition and struggle among ethnic groups over scare resources are very common. If there is no strong and powerful political institution to incorporate the conflict, and there is no clear division system of allocation and distribution of the resources, then the violent conflict among ethnic groups is certainly unavoidable.

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The conflict between religious groups also often happens because of these cases. The rivalry among religious group over scare resources is often triggered by structural changes that imposed by socialpolitical forces outside. This happens, for instance, between Hindu and Muslim in India by political parties, Palestine and Israel in Middle East by presence of US interest in the Middle East, Muslim and Christian in Ambon by the New Order coercion. The ethnic and religious conflicts often happens not only between ethnic and religious groups, but also between ethnic and religious groups and bigger social-political forces like state in the forms of secessionist or self-determination movement as what have been happening in Aceh, Mindanao, West Papua, etc. Indeed, the conflict among ethnic and religious groups and between ethnic and religious groups and the state are often overlapping. But, when the intra-ethnic relations is very strong, the borderline of the ethnic and religious differences are co-existence with other borderlines like political party, political association, social and economic class, occupation, and in short saying, the vague conflict often changes into open conflict.

E. Some Practical Implications As has been discussed earlier, this paper is aimed not just for academic purposes but also for practical reasons. By exploring the dimensions of the ethnic and religious conflicts, we find some key elements of the sources of the conflicts. By doing this, the paper then comes up with alternative for reflexive approach to examine critically the relationship between structural and cultural dimensions of the conflict. It is expected that by doing so, it will bring us to a better understanding and appropriate solution to manage, resolve, and transform the conflicts. As we use the approach, some practical implications on research and conflict management will follow. By using the approach, the way researchers conduct their researches on ethnic-religious conflicts will be very different compared to conventional one. Here researchers expected not only to observe the conflict from distance, as outsider, or take an external position to the observed conflict but, they should


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also conduct participatory research, entering into the situation of the conflict, directly experiencing a critical moment in the area of conflict, having close relationship with the conflicting parties in neutral ways, doing conflict resolution in the field, and reconstructing all of these experiences and findings to be a reflexive knowledge based on practical experiences. In this way, on the one hand, researchers practice conflict resolution based on their knowledge and inter-subjective faculty and on the other hand, they can reconstruct a new comprehensive theory based on their practical conflict resolution. Academician and practitioners who often conduct practical conflict resolution will not confront difficulties in doing such approach. Through their practical conflict resolution and efforts to promote peace building, they can make a reflection on the conflicts that have happened and build new theory based on their practical conflict resolution experiences. Taking into account the reflexive approach also implies a consequence on how to address the conflict. Although the sources of the conflict are structural, it is undeniable that the ethnic conflicts often manifest in clash of cultural identities. In this respect, the conflict resolution applied for the conflict should be pointed at two levels of facts; namely, structural and cultural dimensions. Based on this perspective, there are some options available here to resolve the conflicts: (1) Co-existence. One ethnic community lives separately and peacefully with the other ethnic community with non-intervention principles. This can create peaceful co-existence, even though it hides potential structural tensions because of its difficulty to maintain the autonomy of each ethnic community; (2) Exit, or avoidance. One ethnic community deliberately separates itself to avoid domination or hegemony of the other ethnic community and looking for its own autonomy, the secure and peaceful places that separated from the dominant ethnic; (3) Dialogue. These are cultural approaches to resolve conflict in which the conflicting ethnic groups open communication, respect the differences one another, and learn to see their compatibilities and commonalities. Through dialogue, mutual understanding can be built, enemy construction can be deconstructed, incompatibility can be reduced, and the conflict can be transformed

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toward cooperation and interdependency; (4) Strengthening interethnic relations. This is a structural approach to bridge and joint the different ethnic groups through civic engagements, either the associational forms or everyday forms of engagements. (5) Coercion, or violence. One ethnic community is being forced to follow of or to be subordinated by another ethnic community. In the context of globalisation today, the first and second option seemingly contain many constraints and limited opportunity for their realization. There is no such an ethnic community in our world today can coexist without its interlink with other ethnic communities. The globalisation process not only enters into every public sphere, but it also deeply enters in the subjective and personal experience of the community members. Therefore, it is very difficult for one community to deliberately separate from the other ethnic community. It is also very difficult for one ethnic community to exit, to avoid their contact, communication, and interaction with the other ethnic community because every community member easily moves, migrates, from one to another places due to globalisation45. Thus far, the remained options for us are: whether dialogue, civic engagement, or violence. Dialogue is surely the best option. Through dialogue, a peaceful resolution can be achieved. Even, through the primacy of dialogue the conflict can be transformed into cooperation. But, it is not easy to do with this dialogue and conflict transformation. The main problem is that the dialogue often practiced only by very limited people. Therefore, to achieve peace, ethnic dialogue should be supported by a very act of strengthening civic engagements. These two options should be developed in a simultaneous way to manage the conflict. If these are absent, then, domination, coercion, and violence will take place. And this is a common situation we confront in many multiethnic countries today. When dialogic praxis and discourse have not been practiced by communities members and civic engagements are absent, the ethnic tensions and actual conflict are likely unavoidable. Even on the contrary, any cases have confirmed us that the act of coercion and the use of violence strategies that have been popularised by many governments in multiethnic countries to create ethnic stability have indeed intensified ethnic conflicts. Increased


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reliance on violence and coercive strategies has contributed to spirals of ethnic violence within the multiethnic societies.

F. Conclusion The emergence of ethnic-religious conflict during the past few years is an important issue amongst researchers and practitioners of conflict studies. The ethnic-religious conflicts not merely happen in local and national scope and characters but, they also widely become a contemporary conflict with regional and global dimensions of their sources and effects. The violence and destruction they created has become a concern of people to seek the solution and management. However, the rise of awareness as such should be followed by an adequate capacity to manage, resolve and transform the conflicts. A better understanding about these conflicts will be very important to find out the ways to manage, resolve and transform the conflicts. Without better understanding it is impossible for us to promote an adequate intervention. Toward a better understanding on the conflict, the multi-dimensional sources of the conflicts should be examined carefully. There exist two important dimensions that should be taken into this programmatic account: cultural and structural dimensions. Cultural dimension of ethnic and religious conflict consists of an issue of how cultural identities formed and change under specific conflict situations. Meanwhile, the structural dimensions relate more to the issue of conflict relations amongst ethnic groups, between ethnic groups and state, and ethnic conflict in relation to globalisation. In fact, the two dimensions always interlink and reinforce one another in intensifying an ethnic conflict. The ethnic conflict happens as a result of the dialectical relation of the two dimensions that takes place simultaneously. Therefore, to understand conflict comprehensively, reflexive approach is very crucial. In this approach, researchers dialectically confront the realities of cultural identity formation i.e. subjective groups sentiment, belief system, attitude, perception, and the objective realities of structure that condition the conflict i.e. groups composition and interrelations, state and ethnic groups relations, ethnicity in relation to globalisation, to reproduce

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new knowledge based on the both realities. The reflexive knowledge as such is very crucial, not only relevant for our better understanding about the ethnic conflict but also for practical conflict resolution. The important implication of using this approach is that research activities and practical conflict resolution should be carried out simultaneously. Type of participatory research is very recommended for running ethnic conflict research. While doing practical conflict resolution, the researcher can catch the structural and cultural realities, the conflict situation, the behaviour, the perception of the conflicting parties. The other important implication is on practical conflict resolution. Taking into account structural and cultural sources of ethnic conflict, reflexive approach suggests us to address ethnic conflict by promoting dialogue and strengthening interethnic relations or civic engagements simultaneously. In this strategy, dialogue is the main strategy for conflict transformation, to transform intra-ethnic or internal ethnic cohesion that used to intensify ethnic conflict toward strong interethnic relations or civic engagements that contribute to ethnic peace.

End Notes Revised Paper presented in Workshop on Ethnic and Religious Conflicts in Southeast Asia, organized by the Conflict Studies Networks-Southeast Asia (CSN-SEA) in cooperation with the Center for Security and Peace Studies (CSPS), Gadjah Mada University, September 25 –28, 2001, Yogyakarta. 1 See Lambang Trijono, Keluar dari Kemelut Maluku, Refleksi Pengalaman Praktis Bekerja untuk Perdamaian Maluku (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2001). 2 Since economic crisis embraced Indonesia in the end of 1997, political tensions were mounting and various ethnic and religious riots erupted in many Indonesia cities such as Situbondo (East Java), Tasikmalaya (West Java), Rengasdengklok (West Java), Ketapang (Jakarta), Kupang (East Nusa Tenggara), Solo (Central Java), etc. Newspapers reported that most of the riots were triggered by dispute among political gangsters, organized hoodlums under politicians and military control, over scare economic and political resources. 3 See Ted R. Gurr, Minority at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflict (Washington D.C. US: Institute of Peace Press, 1993), pp. 98-100. 4 See Michael E. Brown, “Introduction”, in Brown ed., The International §


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Dimensions of Internal Conflict (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 4-7. 5 See Edward Mortimer and Robert Fine (eds.), People, Nation, and State, the Meaning of Ethnicity and Nationalism. (London: I.B. Tauris Publisher); Michael E. Brown, “Causes and Implications of Ethnic Conflict”. In Michael Brown (ed), Ethnic Conflict and International Security (New Jersey: Princeton University Press); for the critical review about the debate, see Jan Nedeveen Pieterse, “Varieties of Ethnic Politics and Ethnicity Discourse”. In Edwin N. Wilmsen and Patrick McAllister (eds.), The Politics of Difference, Ethnic Premise in a World of Power (London: the University of Chicago Press, 1996). 6 See Lambang Trijono, Op.Cit. 7 See Louis Kriesberg, “Preventing and Resolving Destructive Communal Conflict”, in David Carment & Patrict James (eds), Wars in the Midst of Peace, the International Politics of Ethnic Conflict (Pitsburgh: University of Pitsburgh Press, 1997). 8 See Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Group in Conflict (Berkeley: California: University of California Press, 1985). 9 See Anthony D. Smith, the Ethnic Origins of Nation (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986). 10 See Amin Maalouf, In Name of Identity, Violence and the Need to Belong (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2000). 11 See Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (London: Penguin Books, 1991). 12 See Michael E. Brown, “Causes and Implications of Ethnic Conflict”, in Michael E. Brown (eds), Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). 13 See Harold R. Isaacs, “Basic Group Identity: The Idols of The Tribe”. In Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moyniham (eds.), Ethnicity, Theory and Experience (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 29-52; Clifford Geertz, “The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiment and Civil Politics in the New State”. In Clifford Geertz (ed), Old Societies and New State (New York: the Free Press, 1963). 14 See Robin E. Cohen, “The Making of Ethnicity: A Modest Defense of Primordialism”. In Edward Mortimer and Robert Fine (eds.), Op.Cit., pp. 3-11. 15 See Paul R. Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism, Theory and Comparison (New Delhi: Sage Publication, 1991). 16 See Richard Ashley, “Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism, and War”. In James Der Derian and Michael Shapiro (eds.), International/ Intertextual Relations (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989), pp. 259-322; see also “Ethnic Communality and Conflict Resolution”. Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 33 (1) (London: Sage Publication, 1998), pp. 59-80. 17 See William A. Hazleton, “Ending Violent Ethnic Conflicts: Separation or Sharing as Options for Negotiation”, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol. 4, (Autumn, 1998). 18 See Robert Cohen, Loc. Cit.

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See Immanuel Wallerstein, The Capitalist World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). 20 See Jan Nedeveen Pieterse, “Varieties of Ethnic Politics and Ethnicity”. In Edwin N. Wilmsen and Patrick McAllister (ed) Op.Cit., pp. 25-44; John L. Comaroff, “Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the Politics of Difference in Age of Revolution. In Edwin N. Wilmsen and Patrick McAllister (ed), Op.Cit., pp. 162-183. 21 See Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Ibid.; Paul Brass, Op.Cit. 22 See Donald L. Horowitz, Op.cit. 23 See Ashutosh Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life, Hindus and Muslims in India (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002). 24 See Donald L. Horowitz, Loc.Cit. 25 See Horowitz, Op.Cit. 26 See Michael E. Brown and Sumit Ganguly, “Introduction”. In Michael E. Brown and Sumit Ganguly (ed), Government Policies and Ethnic Relations in Asia and the Pacific (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1977), pp. 1- 29. 27 See Charles F. Keyes, “Cultural Diversity and National Identity in Thailand”. Michael E. Brown and Sumit Ganguly (ed), Op.Cit., pp. 197231. 28 See Kanti Bajpai, “Diversity, Democracy, and Devolution in India”. In Michael E. Brown and Summit Ganguly (eds). Op.Cit., pp. 33-81. 29 See Michael E. Brown and Summit Ganguly, “Introduction”. In Michael E. Brown and Summit Ganguly, Op.Cit., pp. 16. 30 See jan Nederveen Pieterse, Op.Cit. 31 See Michael E. Brown and Summit Ganguly, Op.Cit. 32 See Samina Ahmed, “Centralization, Authoritarianism, and the Mismanagement of Ethnic Relations in Pakistan”. In Michael E. Brown and Sumit Ganguly (ed), Op. Cit., pp. 83-127. 33 See Amita Shastri, “Government Policy and the Ethnic Crisis in Sri Lanka”. Michael E. Brown and Summit Ganguly, Loc.Cit., pp. 129-163. 34 See R. William Liddle, “Coercion, Co-optation, and the Management of Ethnic Relations in Indonesia”. Michael R. Brown and Sumit Ganguly (ed), Loc.Cit., pp. 273-319. 35 See Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Op.Cit.; Anthony Gidden, Beyond Left and Right, the Future of Radical Politics (Cambridge: the Polity Press, 1994). 36 See Lambang Trijono, “Krisis Negara Bangsa, Tantangan Integrasi Nasional dalam Konteks Global”. ANALISIS, CSIS, No. 2, Maret-April, 1996. 37 See Anthony Gidden, Op. Cit. ; Thomas Meyer, “The Politics of Identity, The Challenge of Modern Fundamentalism”. Discussion paper on “Cultural Divergence and Democracy and Challenges, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Gadjah Mada University and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Yogyakarta, 2002. 38 See C. Wright Mill, Sociological Imagination (Midlesex: Penguin Books, 1959); Anthony Gidden, The Consequences of Modernity (London: Polity Press, 1997); Pierre Bourdieu, In Other Words, Essays Towards a Reflexive 19


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Sociology (London: Polity Press, 1990). See John Galtung, “Conflict as a Way of Life”, in Johan Galtung, Peace and Social Structure, Essays in Peace Research, Vol III, (Copenhagen: Christian Eljers, 1978). 40 See Lambang Trijono, “Religious Communal Conflict and Multi-Track Resolution: Lesson from Ambon, Indonesia”. Paper presented in Southeast Asia Conflict Studies Network Workshop, organized by Research and Education for Peace, Universiti Sains Malaysia (REP-USM) in cooperation with the Department for Research Cooperation (SAREC) and Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), Sweden. Penang, 3-5 May, 2001. 41 See Kurth H. Wolff, The Sociology of Georg Simmel (New York: The Free Press, 1950). 42 See Lewis Coser, The Function of Social Conflict (New York: The Free Press, 1959). 43 See Ashutos, Op.Cit. 44 See Ashutos, Loc.Cit. 45 See Anthony Gidden, Op.Cit. 39

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Approaches To Ethnic And Religious Conflict Resolution

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Approaches to Ethnic and Religious Conflict Resolution Samsu Rizal Panggabean Pluralism has been an historical and empirical fact of the societies in Southeast Asia. There is pluralism of social groups, organizations, and political parties that represent different and sometime incompatible interests. These interests may be related to environmental, human rights, economic, or political issues. There is also pluralism of culture. Indeed, the notion such as “Indonesian nation” is misleading if it is understood as a whole and monolithic culture. Religion and ethnicity play an important role in shaping and maintaining the culture, and religious and ethnic pluralism constitutes a significant part of the plurality of culture. Therefore, there is nothing mysterious, ancient, or modern about ethnic or religious heterogeneity in the region. Indeed, this situation applies to other regions of Asia and Africa. Cultural or civilizational pluralism marks these regions. Robert Hefner points out in this connection when he argues that old states in these regions, from Mughal India, the Ottoman Empire, West African Asante to Majapahit Java, consist of civilizations. all incorporated a diverse array of peoples and cultures, and were involved with a social and economic macrocosm extending far beyond their borders. Though often established through conquest and domination, most of these societies went on to develop more pacific arrangements to facilitate tolerable interaction among the varied groupings which comprised their whole. … Indeed, in matters of pluralism, premodern Western Europe – with its Christian church, Roman legal heritage, and politics of kingdom and manor — was considerably less pluralistic than many of its imperial counterparts in East Asia, West Africa, or Muslim Middle East. Moreover, Europe’s relative homogeneity was not merely the consequence of natural circumstances, but reflected a history of sometimes violent suppression of religious, ethnic, and cultural

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differences. With its antiheresy campaigns, mass killings of witches, and chronic inaccommodation of Muslims and Jews, premodern Europe can claim no special cultural genius in the problem of pluralism (Hefner, 1998: 8-9).

One way to appreciate the ways in which a member of society comes across pluralism of interest and culture is to look into her life experience in important realms of human interaction, namely social, economic, and political realms. She might be born into a family from a certain ethnic group, religious tradition, party affiliation, or occupation. Nevertheless, as she grows up, she will meet, talk to, or befriend people from different ethnic, religious, economic, or political backgrounds. The interaction takes place in her neighbourhood, in school, or during elections. She will also experience pluralism and heterogeneity in the marketplace, workplace, and in many other walks of life from her childhood to the day she died. Most of the time, she can adjust fairly easily into the pluralist environment, without serious cultural shock. Indeed, her experience with pluralism will probably enrich her life. As she moves from the social realms of production, consumption, and exchange, she will learn the capacity to accept the legitimacy of differences in identity and interest. She might not like people that are different from her in terms of religion, ethnicity, political affiliation, or occupation. Once in a while, especially in private, she might even ridicule them. Nonetheless, she can accept their existence without necessarily compromising her values, beliefs, or way of life. Moreover, her encounter with everyday forms of pluralism is part of a larger process in the society, where cooperation and coexistence are not only possible but also maintained throughout most of the history of the society where she lived. Ignorance and hatred do not necessarily and automatically emerged from the plurality of social backgrounds within a society. Indeed, social conflict can be a creative process in bringing about social change in society. However, peaceful and democratic conflict management sometime fails and violence does occur within her society. If she were a thirty-year-old Indonesian, she will have observed or perhaps even


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experienced directly and indirectly armed insurgencies in East Timor, Aceh, and, to a lesser extent, Papua/Irian Jaya. In addition to violence related to rebellion and separatism, she will have observed violence carried out by state’s apparatus against ordinary citizens such as workers or peasants. Other forms of violence she observed are fighting among high school students, villagers, and supporters of football teams. Violence related to elections and campaigns also takes place every five years. Of course, during the last four years, she will have observed the fierce riots before and during the fall of Soeharto in 1998 and civil violence in West Kalimantan, Moluccas, and Central Kalimantan. Ethnic and religious violence are part of the wider problem of violence within a society. Also called “cultural” or “communal” violence, ethnic and religious violence such as what took place in Indonesia, former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda are nasty and horrible. Partly due to this, ethnic and religious violence generate most attention and research during the last decade. The massive scholarly attention to religious and ethnic conflicts is also justified by the increasing numbers of conflict of these kinds after the end of the Cold War as compared to the period during the Cold War (Ellingsen, 2001: 8). However, James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin maintains that cases of actual communal violence are extremely rare compared to cases of potential ethnic violence, and peaceful and cooperative relations between ethnic groups are far more common (Fearon and Laitin, 1996: 716). Nevertheless, violence and armed conflict involving ethnic and religious groups need to be studied in itself and in order to understand why and how interethnic and interreligious peace occasionally broke down. These incidents of violence indicate several points for further consideration. First, why and how ethnicity and religion enter into conflict and violence, and how religious and ethnic appeals can be used to arouse for violent action. Second, how to manage, prevent, and transform ethnic conflict.

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Perspectives on Ethnoreligious Conflict There are several perspectives on how the “ethnic” and “religious” come into conflict dynamics, namely, primordialist perspective, instrumentalist perspective, and constructivist perspective. Primordialist perspective looks into religious and ethnic identities as fixed. According to Harold Isaacs, “Basic group identity consists of the ready-made set of endowments and identifications that every individual shares with others from the moment of birth by the chance of the family into which he is born” (Cited in Ellingson, 2001: 3). Here, ethnic and religious identities considered as fixed, natural, and inevitable facts. Furthermore, the unchanging nature of the characteristics between different ethnic and religious groups makes conflict inevitable. Accordingly, the impulse or drive to hate people from different ethnic or religious backgrounds is present inherently or naturally within an individual or a group of individuals, accumulated through a long history. These primordial affinities or sentiments are considered as deeply rooted attachments to historical ties or memories. (Isaacs, 1975: 35-36; Crawford, 1998: 16; Fearon & Laitin, 2000: 848-849; Cruz, 2000: 279). Primordial explanations are criticized in several respects. In the first place, they failed to account for variations in the level of conflict over time and place. According to Beverly Crawford, this perspective “can not account for situations in which ethnic groups coexist peacefully. They can not account for differences in the political expressions of cultural difference, i.e., separatist movements, efforts to control the state, or attempts at power sharing with other cultural groups. They are thus guilty of selection bias.”(Crawford, 1998: 11). In addition, primordial explanations “fail to make the distinction between cultural identity and politically relevant cultural identity.” They assume that cultural differences such as language, religion, cultural traditions, and ethnicity, automatically lead to conflict because they assume that culturally defined groups are by nature exclusionary and are dominated by parochial values that outweigh universalistic norms. According to primordial account, parochial norms attributed to cultural groups are believed to isolate them and lead to extremism. Extremism raises the odds of violence. (Crawford, 1998: 11).


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Finally, primordial explanations failed to take the role played by institutions, especially state institutions, “in easing, perpetuating, or triggering cultural conflict by structuring incentives in ways that either exacerbate or attenuate the political relevance of cultural identity” (Crawford 1998: 12). For Crawford, political institutions and especially the structure of state’s institutions should play a central role in explaining religious and ethnic conflicts. This criticism, however, did not apply for the primordialist approach. It is exactly the assumption of the innate tendency within primordialist perspective toward ethnic and religious conflicts that make political arrangements and control, such as through consociationalism that makes states’ structure important for primordialist approach. The second perspective on how ethnicity and religion comes into domain of conflict is the instrumentalist perspective. Here, individual or groups, in order to achieve their political or economic agenda use both ethnic and religious identity. Both religion and ethnicity serves as language for individuals and groups in achieving their agenda. In this regard, Consuelo Cruz asserts that ethnicity or religion do not cause conflict, or violence, but are used to mobilise support and to justify conflict or violence, while the causes for that conflict and violence originated somewhere else, such as from economic or political factors. Cruz maintains that this perspective “concentrates less on identity formation and more on the rational incentives that motivate political entrepreneurs to mobilize their ‘primordial’ constituencies” (Cruz, 2000: 275). The notion of political entrepreneurs occupies an important role in the instrumentalist perspective. A political entrepreneur is one who seizes and takes advantage of religious or ethnic identity in order to mobilize people to achieve political purpose, especially in transitional periods. According to Ronnie D. Lipschutz, a political entrepreneur is one who is able to articulate, in a coherent and plausible fashion, the structure of opportunities and constraints that face a specified group of people and in particular emphasize clearly the potential costs of not acting collectively. Such appeals have historically been especially persuasive in times of trouble, when societies are faced with high degrees of uncertainty

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and particular groups within societies see their economic and social prospects under challenge (Lipschutz, 1998: 70).

Timothy D. Sisk mentions only the primordialist and instrumentalist perspectives as schools of thought in explaining ethnic conflicts (Sisk, 1996: 12). Others, such as Consuelo Cruz and Tanja Ellingsen add another perspective, that is the constructivist perspective. According to Ellingsen, this perspective is an attempt to synthesize the primordialist and instrumentalist perspective (Ellingsen, 2001: 4). This perspective looks into religion and ethnicity, especially in conflict situation, as “constructed” identities, intentionally selected and emphasized from numerous kinds of social interaction. These identities are “contingent on choices that individuals make within shifting socio-political and historical environments, especially in response to the bids of entrepreneurs who trade in the business of identity politics.” (Cruz, 2000: 279). The present status of the studies on ethnic and religious conflicts indicates the increasing dominance of constructivist and instrumentalist approaches. Again and again, anti-primordialist arguments emerged in recent studies on ethnic and religious conflicts.1 In explaining “the banality” of ethnic war, Mueller considers ethnicity as “an ordering, organizational, sorting, or predictive device or principle, not as a crucial motivating force” (Mueller 2000: 25). Nevertheless, more studies are needed to really refuse the possibility of ethnicity or religion playing as an independent force in a society, not only as an excuse or epiphenomenon for political and economic interests and agenda. This is especially true of the possible role of religion as a turbulent force, not merely as a vehicle for the ambitious entrepreneur or a fig leaf for other aims as assumed by instrumentalist and constructivist approaches.

Conflict Analysis and Management The above perspectives matter not only for analysing religious and ethnic conflicts but for their prevention and management as well. First, for the purpose of analysis, one can approach religious and ethnic conflicts from the perspectives of primordialist,


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instrumentalist, or constructivist. The real issue is not whether an actual case of religious or ethnic conflict is primordial, instrumental, or constructed, but whether that specific case should be considered as basically primordial, instrumental, or constructed, depending on the judgment of a researcher about what perspective is the most appropriate to describe or explain a phenomenon or event of religious and ethnic conflict. In other words, the problems of primordialism, instrumentalism, and constructivism in ethnic and religious conflicts are problems of research strategy. The three perspectives are and should not be regarded as three irreconcilable schools of thoughts. Second, for the purpose of preventing, managing, or resolving religious and ethnic conflicts, the three approaches emphasize different ways and mechanisms in accordance with their respective assumptions. In the words of Sisk, “The extent to which analysts perceive ethnicity as immutable and innate versus socially constructed or manipulated by political leaders influences beliefs about the types of institutions and practices that can best ameliorate ethnic conflict.”2 A primordialist approach will emphasize the need to manage, control, and reduce the chance for ethnic and religious violence. Control and coercion are important in dealing with religious and ethnic violence and, accordingly, when control and coercion reduced in a society, for instance when state’s capacity in law enforcement and maintaining political order broke down, religious and ethnic conflicts and violence will increase. Violence, therefore, is understood as a failure of control and coercion. On the other hand, if the impulse to hate people from different ethnic or religious background are not inherent and natural and if primordial affinities are not deep-rooted as maintained by instrumentalist and constructivist perspectives, then a different set of approach to religious and ethnic conflicts and violence will come into view. The emphasis would be on social, political, and economic mechanisms that will enable people to pursue their interests and to fulfill their needs by using normal and peaceful means. Violence, ethnic, religious, or otherwise, is understood as failure or distortion in normal and working systems of good governance. Moreover,

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peaceful competition through democratic institutions will reduce the salience or intensity of religious and ethnic identities in the society, hereby decrease the opportunity for entrepreneurs and provocateurs to take advantage of the situation. Ethnic and religious conflicts are conflict, and managing ethnic and religious conflict is similar to managing components of conflict. A quick review of conflict definitions among researchers indicates that conflict has three components, namely conflict situation, conflict attitude, and conflict behaviour. Lewis Coser emphasizes conflict behaviour in his definition of conflict as “a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources in which the aim of the opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals” (Coser, 1956: 8). Kenneth Boulding emphasizes the situation of the conflict when he says that conflict is “a situation of competition in which the parties are aware of the incompatibility of potential future positions and in which each party wishes to occupy a position that is incompatible with the wishes of the other” (Boulding, 1962: 5). Louis Kriesberg, on the other hand, maintains that conflict is about belief. According to Kriesberg, “A social conflict exists when two or more parties believe they have incompatible objectives.” He also says, “social conflict refers to a situation in which parties believe that they have incompatible goals” (Kriesberg, 1982: 17-18). Finally, Jeffrey Rubin and Dean Pruitt say “conflict means perceived divergence of interest, or a belief that parties’ current aspirations cannot be achieved simultaneously” (Rubin and Pruitt, 1986: 4). In ethnic and religious conflicts, ethnicity and sreligion influence, permeate, or reinforce the three components before, during, and in the aftermath of conflict.

Preventing Ethnic and Religious Violence The term “conflict prevention” is misleading. What is needed is not to prevent conflict from taking place. Conflict may play a positive and constructive role in a society, for example to bring about social change by uncovering injustice, repression, or human right abuses. Therefore, “conflict prevention” means preventing violence and armed conflict from breaking out (Miall et. al., 1999: 96). Conflict prevention


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assumes that violence and armed conflict are not unavoidable; indeed, they can be prevented, provided certain measures and efforts are made. Recent studies on conflict prevention have elaborated the term to encompass several meanings (Lund, 1996; Leatherman et. al., 1999; Jentleson, 2000). One is the difference between light and deep prevention. Light prevention is basically crisis management. Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbhotam, and Tom Woodhouse argue that light prevention “aimed at preventing situations with a clear capacity for violence from degenerating into armed conflict.” (Miall et. al., 1999: 97). Examples of light prevention mechanisms by third party are intervention (diplomatic or military), intervention by NGOs, and mediation to avoid the outbreak or escalation of violence among conflicting groups. The creation of safe areas and the deployment of troops or police forces as a deterrent. A state involves in light prevention by fostering political accommodation through its programs and policies. Groups in society involves in light prevention by using moderation in pursuing their interests and in communicating with other groups in the society. Light prevention of religious violence may include several measures such as exposing or articulating human rights abuses. Muslim leaders in Indonesia played this role, for example, during the Soeharto era, by Bishop Belo in East Timor during Indonesia’s occupation, or by Aung San Suu Kyi in Myanmar. Religious leaders and organizations also play preventive role by convening community dialogue, problem-solving workshops, and training in conflict resolution skills. Of course, during violence, religious organizations can provide safe-havens for victims of violence, refugees and internally displaced people (Appleby, 2000: 216-219). Dialogue and training programs to combat ethnoreligious hatred also serve conflict prevention function, as well as more direct involvement in conflict situation such mediation and good offices. Religious leaders and organizations has been involved in these matters. (Appleby, 2000: 217-219). Deep prevention, in contrast, “aims to address the root causes,

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including underlying conflicts on interest and relationships” (Miall et. al., 1999: 97). The focus of deep prevention is on good governance. Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse illustrate some mechanisms of “deep preventors” to include “adequate political institutions and good governance, cohesive social structures, opportunities for groups to develop economically and culturally, and the presence of accepted legal or social norms capable of accommodating and peacefully transforming these formations” (Miall et. al., 1999: 97). At the national level, measures to strengthen governance include national conferences, constitutional commission, power-sharing arrangement, human rights monitoring, and strengthening judicial independence. At the society level, preventive measures include vibrant civil society and independent media. Earlier studies on ethnic and religious conflicts emphasize the deep prevention measures. For instance, Donald L. Horowitz, in his comparative study of ethnic conflict, identifies five mechanisms (Horowitz, 1985: 598): 1 . By diffusing ethnic conflict by proliferating points of power among institutions and territorial units. As stated by Horowitz, “ Conflict in one region is generally less dangerous than conflict that engages a whole country. A corollary is that interethnic conflict may be reduced by arrangements that effectively compartmentalize or quarantine it within sub-state units.” 2. By increasing the saliency of intra-ethnic conflict. “Intraethnic conflict is usually (though not always) less dangerous and violent than interethnic conflict. If intraethnic conflict becomes more salient, this may reduce the energy available for conflict with other groups.” 3. By creating policies that increase interethnic cooperation, for instance by using electoral system that encourage the emergence of coalition involving more than one ethnic group. 4. By encouraging alignments based on interests other than ethnicity, such as territory and social classes. 5 . By reducing disparities between ethnic groups so that dissatisfaction declines.


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In addition to light and deep prevention, “intermediate” prevention has been introduced to indicate “proximate policies” that aim to reduce proneness to violence. Intermediate prevention include a wide range of processes such as policies of pluralism, elite accommodation, autonomy, power-sharing, moderation and involvement in constitutional or at least nonviolent politics on the part of minorities, and supportive policies for minority. Consociationalism and federalism also considered as intermediate prevention.

Transforming Ethnic and Religious Conflict Conflict transformation is considered as a fundamental approach to conflict resolution. It deals with “the deepest level of change in the conflict resolution process” (Miall et.al., 1999: 21). Louis Kriesberg defines conflict transformation as “a fundamental and enduring change away from a protracted, destructive struggle between adversaries toward a constructive accommodation between them” (Kriesberg, 1999: 413). Students of conflict resolution now use the term conflict transformation to study protracted, deep-rooted, and recurring violence social conflicts. Some of these conflicts, such as conflict in South Africa, Israel-Palestine conflict, and conflict in Northern Ireland had undergone changes and transformation. The most important dimension of conflict transformation is how it happens and where does transformation take place in the conflict dynamics. Conflict transformation may happen in several ways (Väyrynen, 1991: 5; Miall et.al., 1999: 156-157; Kriesberg 1999). 1. Actor transformation. Changes, although partial and limited, may occur inside parties to the conflict – for example, the emergence of new leader, such as Mikhail Gorbachev or Nelson Mandela, may lead to changes in conflict policies. Old leader may learn and accordingly changes his or her policy, such as Yasser Arafat. Likewise, new actors may emerge during conflict – for example the recognition or legitimation of rebel group as party to the conflict. Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbhotam, and Tom

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Wood house spell out other possibility of actor transformation: Parties may have to redefine directions, abandon or modify cherished goals and adopt radically different perspectives. This may come about through a change of actor, a change of leadership, a change in the constituency of the leader or adoption of new goals, values or beliefs. It may involve intra-party conflicts, which is often crucial to the resolution of inter-party conflict. Changes of leadership are common as precipitators of change in protracted conflicts. Changes in the circumstances and interests of the constituency a party represents also transform conflicts, even if such changes in the constituency often take place gradually and out of view. Splitting of parties and integration of parties are important forms of change (Miall et. al., 1999: 157).

John Paul Lederach, in several of his writings, argues convincingly that actor transformation is necessary not only at the elite level. Transformation should also take place at the middle rank of leadership level as well as at the grass-root level. (Lederach 1997). 2. Issue transformation. This transformation takes place when, for instance, conflict between central and regional governments transformed from conflict over participation and distribution of wealth to that over identity (ethnic, religious, or regional). The saliency of participation and distribution as issues of contention decrease and identity emerge as a new issue. Conflict issues may be framed or reframed in a new way to make solution possible. 3. Rule transformation. This transformation occurs when the rule of the game altered and the norms which regulate the relations among the conflicting parties redefined. Changing the rules and norms, regulating the relationships between central government and its units, and changing the electoral laws to facilitate interethnic coalition, are examples of rule transformation. 4. Structural or context transformation. This transformation concerns with the overall structure of interparty relations. The end of the Cold War is an example of structural


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transformation for many international conflicts. Changes at the structural level may create profound effects for actors to a conflict as well as to the issues and rules of contention. For example, the emergence of strong international opinion supported by international regimes in human rights, environment, good governance, or limitation of small arms may influence or modify conflicts at the sub-national level. Humanitarian intervention, external sanctions, and arms sales limitations are transformation that took place at the context of conflicts that may facilitate the movement toward conflict resolution. In Miall, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse classification, structural transformation is called “context transformation.” They use structural transformation to refer to alterations in the power relationships among conflicting parties. As they put it, “The conflict structure is the set of actors, issues, and incompatible goals or relationships which constitutes the conflict. If the root cause of the conflict lie in the structure of relationships within which the parties operate, then a transformation of this structure is necessary to resolve the conflict.” (Miall, et.al., 1999: 156). One strategy to transform the relationships between unequal groups within a society is empowerment. 5. Personal and group transformation. This transformation takes place at the individual human level, and deal with spiritual and psychological reconciliation. New relationships among former belligerents or divided societies can be built if spiritual changes, from hate to forgiveness, from pain to healing, refusal to acknowledgement of the other, take place. Personal and group transformation also related to other psychological processes of transformation related to identity, trauma, grief, and self esteem. Religious and ethnic conflict transformation took place in any of the above ways or their combination. Efforts at conflict transformation may focus on one way, usually with the assumption that it will lead into changes in other levels or areas.

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Concluding Notes I have looked thus far at some questions related to ethnic and religious conflicts and approaches to prevent and transform them. Let us now consider the significance of the presentation for conflict and conflict resolution studies in Southeast Asia. Accordingly, the above presentation bring home the followings: 1 . The dearth of studies on conflict prevention, management, resolution, and transformation in Southeast Asia as compared to other regions, especially those in Africa. A fine example from Africa is several multi-annual and multivolume publications on conflict resolution, conflict management, and conflict resolution.2 It is true that Africa has been stereotyped as “the most warring region on the planet” and the appearance of these publications is a result of the attention paid to the high number of armed conflict in Africa. However, awareness of the significance of ethnic and religious heterogeneity within the countries of the Southeast Asia, and of the need to prevent the occurrence or recurrence of violent ethnic and religious conflicts has points up the need to gain sufficient knowledge of ethnic and religious conflicts and their resolution in the region. 2. The need to study religious and ethnic conflict resolution in Southeast Asia that take seriously the contemporary approaches from the scholarship of conflict resolution and peace studies. For political reasons, for example the need to maintain national unity and nation building, reliable information of ethnicity or religion might not be available in certain countries. Open discussion on SARA in Indonesia was discouraged for a long time. At the academic level, the tendency to favour certain approaches, for example studies on class or civil society in Southeast Asia, might ignore the role played by ethnic or religious identities. Researches on the role of religion in terms of modernism-traditionalism, the confrontation between religion and modern world, or fundamentalism did not facilitate discussion on the multiple roles of ethnicity and religion in violence and peacebuilding. On the other hand, rethinking the role of religion and ethnicity in Southeast Asia from the perspectives


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of contemporary conflict resolution studies might be attacked as another example of using “foreign” approaches. Nevertheless, and without being overwhelmed or alarmed by “non-Asian” or “western” scholarship on conflict resolution and peace studies, scholars of Southeast Asia can utilize new approaches from the growing body of peace and conflict resolution researches. 3. Finally, more attention should be given to the role of state and government in conflict management. Countries in Southeast Asia such as Indonesia usually look at itself as playing the conflict management role. In fact, however, the government is often involved in conflict as a party or actor to the conflict. It is therefore important to, first, look into what happened to the state, its policy, and its security apparatus, which is supposed to inhibit or regulate conflicts in society that open violence could be avoided or, if violence occurs, how government policies can stop it immediately in the hope that the violence would not continue; and second, how to encourage states in Southeast Asia in fostering its capacity to manage conflicts, including ethno-religious ones.

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End Notes See for example, Beverly Crawford and Ronnie D. Lipschutz (eds), The Myth of ‘Ethnic Conflict’: Politics, Economics, and ‘Cultural’ Violence (Berkeley: University of California Research Series No. 98, 1998); James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity,” International Organization Vol. 54 No. 4, 2000: 845-877; John Mueller, “The Banality of ‘Ethnic War’: Yugoslavia and Rwanda,” paper delivered at the 2000 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. 2 http://www.carnegie.org/deadly/sisk.html 3 See Francis M. Deng & I. William Zartman, eds., Conflict Resolution in Africa (Brookings, 1991); Thomas Ohlson & Stephen John Stedman with Robert Davies, The New is Not Yet Born. Conflict Resolution in Southern Africa (Brookings, 1994); I. William Zartman, ed., Governance as Conflict Management. Politics and Violence in West Africa (Brookings, 1997); and other publication from the Brookings Institution. Other important work on conflict resolution in Africa is I. William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution. Conflict and Intervention in Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985 and 1989). See also a recent volume from the European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation, Searching for Peace in Africa. An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Management Activities (Utrecht: European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation, 1999). 1

Bibliography Appleby, R. Scott, The Ambivalence of The Sacred (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000). Coser, Lewis, The Function of Social Conflicts (New York: Free Press, 1956). Crawford, Beverly, and Ronnie D. Lipschutz, eds., The Myth of “Ethnic Conflict”: Politics, Economics, and “Cultural” Violence (Berkeley: University of California, 1998). Cruz, Consuelo, “Identity and Persuasion. How Nations Remember Their Pasts and Make Their Futures” World Politics, Vol. 52 ( April, 2000). Deng, Francis M. & I. William Zartman, eds., Conflict Resolution in Africa (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1991). Ellingsen, Tanja, “Culture in Conflict: Old Stories or New Threats?” Paper delivered at Uppsala Conflict Data Project workshop, June 8-10, 2001. European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation, Searching for Peace in Africa. An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Management Activities (Utrecht: European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation, 1999). Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin, “Explaining Interethnic Cooperation,” APSR Vol. 90, No. 4 ( December, 1996).


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Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin, “Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity” in International Organization, Vol. 54, No. 4 (Autumn 2000). Gurr, Ted Robert, “Theories of Political Violence and Revolution in the Third World,” in Conflict Resolution in Africa, edited by F. M. Deng and I. W. Zartman, 153-189 (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1991). Gurr, Ted Robert, and Barbara Harff, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics (Oxford: Westview Press, Inc., 1994). Hefner, Robert W., “On the History and Cross-Cultral Possibility of a Democratic Ideal,” in Democratic Civility, edited by R.W. Hefner, 8-9 (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1998). Horowitz, Donald, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: UCLA, 1985). Isaacs, Harold R., Idols of the Tribe. Group Identity and Political Change (London: Harvard, 1975). Jeffrey Z. Rubin and Dean G. Pruitt, Social Conflict. Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1986). Kriesberg, Louis, Social Conflicts (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc.: 1982). Kriesberg, Louis, “Conflict Transformation,” Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, and Conflict, Vol. 1, (Academic Press, 1999). Leatherman, Janie, William DeMars, Patrick D. Gaffney, Raimo Väyrynen, Breaking Cycles of Violence. Conflict Prevention in Intrastate Crises (Connecticut: Kumarian Press, 1999). Miall, Hugh, Oliver Ramsbotham, and Tom Woodhouse, Contemporary Conflict Resolution (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999). Mueller, John, “The Banality of ‘Ethnic War’: Yugoslavia and Rwanda,” paper delivered at the 2000 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington D.C., August 31-September 3, 2000. Ohlson, Thomas & Stephen John Stedman with Robert Davies, The New is Not Yet Born. Conflict Resolution in Southern Africa (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994). Ohlson, Thomas, Stephen John Stedman, and Robert Davies, The New is Not Yet Born. Conflict Resolution in Southern Africa (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994). Sampson, Cynthia, “Religion and Peacebuilding,” in Peacemaking in International Conflict. Methods and Techniques, edited by I. William Zartman and J. Lewis Rasmussen (Washington, D.C.: USIP Press, 1997). Sisk, Thimothy D., Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflict (Washington, D.C.: USIP, 1996). Väyrynen, Raimo, “To Settle or to Transform? Perspective on the Resolution of National and International Conflicts”, in New Directions in Conflict Theory. Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation, edited by Raimo Väyrynen, 1-25 (London: Sage, 1991).

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Zartman, I. William, ed., Governance as Conflict Management. Politics and Violence in West Africa (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1997). Zartman, I. William, Ripe for Resolution. Conflict and Intervention in Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985 and 1989).

This ebook downloaded from www.csps.ugm.ac.id


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Approaches To Ethnic And Religious Conflict Resolution: Managing, Resolving Or Transforming Clem McCartney It is a common phenomenon where common people do perceive and experience ethnic and religious conflict events under physically or normatively based consideration in terms of which most conflict hermeneutics rely their basic assumptions. But the same problems have always been emanated from those uncritical conceptualizations as far as such theoreticians are faced with the question of whether ethnic and religious conflicts present special issues or whether ethnic and religious differences are just other ways of categorizing groups in conflict, no different from race and class. We must be clear what role religion is playing. Are we dealing with theological disputes about principles of faith and the meaning of faith? Or are we dealing with competition or rivalry between religious groups for the hearts and minds and souls of the people? Or is it a situation where religion is the marker or sign of membership of one group in contradiction to another group? In this case there is no interest in disputing points of faith or doctrine or winning souls but there is acute interest if the other religious group is gaining unfair privileges or material advantage. In this situation the dispute is about the very same issues as may arise between classes and other groups but the religious elements may still color the way the dispute develops. We will first look at some of the special issues associated with ethnic and religious conflicts, which have to be taken into account to deal with such conflicts. It has long been recognized that ethnicity and religion touch on very core aspects of our sense of ourselves - who we are, where we belong and what is valuable in that community which gives us a sense of our place in the world, our sense of self worth and belonging. When ethnicity and religion define the core of our identity

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in this way, they can stimulate much deeper commitments and intense passions than other systems to which we belong. This awareness has been reinforced by the attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001. I am sure that I was not the only one whose first thought was that the attacks were probably carried out by a religious group. They seemed to require a level of dedication and commitment, which we associate with religion and do not associate with groups such as the Columbian guerilla groups even though they have strong resentments towards the United States. Ethnic or religious identities are much less tangible than our skin color or gender. We can more easily take off our religious or ethnic identity, or it can be taken away from us if we are forbidden to worship in our own way, for example, and future generations are not taught the principles of our faith. Even more concrete elements such as language are open to change and decay. So we can feel that they help to create us but they are vulnerable. The vulnerability is greater because for many components of ethnic identity they can only exist, by definition, if they are practiced with other members of our ethnic group. I can talk to myself in my own language, but if no one else still speaks it then it has become to all intents and purposes a dead language and not a source of community for me. So whether they are primordial or constructed identities they are vulnerable to internal decay and outside pressures and the awareness of this vulnerability both creates conflict with other groups and makes it difficult to enter into dialogue with other groups. In relations with other groups we may have a fear of extinction either through assimilation, destruction or expulsion. In fact the threat of destruction or expulsion are in some ways less unsettling because the threat is apparent and the community can defend itself. Accommodation may be an insidious pathway to assimilation and gradual disappearance. This is why ethnic groups are often so distrustful of the language of peace. Another feature of ethnic identity is the way in which the emotional component is seldom open to material considerations. A good example of this is the identification with a particular piece of land. The land may have no material value and the individual members of the identity


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group may even want to move away to a more congenial environment. But it is difficult for the ethnicity to facilitate a change of ownership of the land, which might actual benefit them in the direction in which they want to go. Ethnic concerns are related not only to the present but also to the future of our group and the desire that it continues to exist after our own death. But religion can go even farther and deal not only with the future but also with the afterlife. If we believe that our religious beliefs are correct and our commitment to them will determine what happens to us after we die, then we want to pass them on to our descents and will worry that their faith may be diluted by what we believe to be blasphemy and wrong practices. In those circumstances we will take extreme measures to protect and maintain religious beliefs - even if we do not practice them ourselves. This explains why religion is a powerful motivator and stimulus. Further, Roger Williamson has said that we can get people to do the most horrible and savage acts if we can convince them that it is done in the name of religion. Our standards of what is acceptable in the present can be suspended and superseded if we feel that we are acting in relation to the afterlife. Given these powerful features of ethnic and religious groups and therefore of ethnic and religious conflicts how do we take account of them in trying to deal with conflicts? First we must consider what options exist for dealing with relations between ethnic or religious groups.

Options for Inter-Group Relations It is important to assess the possible aims of a process of conflict resolution and the promotion of good community relations. Different groups may have different and conflict visions of the future. They may aim for homogenization, separate development, co-existence or pluralism. These terms are often used loosely but nonetheless it is possible to identify four distinct orientations, which imply different approaches

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Homogenization aims to include the whole population in one common identity based around citizenship and assimilating minorities into the society. In such circumstances there will be little interest in recognizing different cultures and beliefs or at the most they are treated as private matters. Initiatives, if any, will be geared to creating a common sense of identity and are unlikely to promote awareness of different communities, their cultures and their concerns. The predominant orientation in Singapore might be characterized in this way. It creates and encourages opportunities for different racial groups to meet but the main focus is on social interaction without reference to racial differences and in this way a common Singaporean identity is encouraged. The ongoing debate about Special Assistance Plan (SAP) schools, which concentrate on teaching Chinese language and culture, is because they seem to go against the commitment to social cohesion and a common identity. In the case of Singapore this policy may be partly explained by the nature of the demographic balance in the state as the vast majority of the population are Chinese and the numbers of Malays, Indians and others are small. The government is also more motivated by concern about the low birthrate and the need to establish families rather than concerns about interethnic relations. A second goal might be separate development where the government promotes separation rather than contact or at the least is unconcerned if the different communities develop independently. This was the intention of the apartheid regime in South Africa though the development of the two communities was not equal and in any case the needs of the South African state were such that the different communities were dependent on each other and segregation could not be maintained. In some situations systems of devolution have been given to homogeneous territory and as a result the possibility of separate development could be realized. One such example is the Åland Islands, which have benefited from their special status within Finland, though it may leave resentment among other Swedish speakers in mainland Finland and among the Finish population. Co-existence seeks good relations between the different communities without reference to the issues and concerns that divide


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them. These concerns may be avoided deliberately if they are considered divisive and unhelpful to the development of good community relations. The term “co-existence” has been particularly used to describe the goal of many programs, which address intercommunity relations between Jews and Arabs in Israel and Palestine, though these programs are mainly sponsored by non-governmental bodies rather than government programs. In Lebanon most programs of interfaith dialogue between Christians and Muslims avoid the political issues as divisive and separate from the work of building understanding. However subordinate groups are often suspicious of co-existence as a goal because they believe participants are encouraged to value good relations between communities at the cost of leaving fundamental issues unresolved and there is a fear that the intention is co-option or assimilation of the minority. Finally the goal of the policy may be to create a pluralist society, encouraging a positive diversity or pluralism. What is required are opportunities for communication understanding and respect. There are many societies were different ethnic groups live in relative harmony but it is not easy to judge whether all the ethnic groups are equally valued and have “parity of esteem” and equal access to resources, influence and power. Some good examples have broken down into open conflict due to some new factors and pressures in the society. Fiji would be a case in point, which functioned relatively well to the point that an Indian could be considered Prime Minister. But that very development seemed to tip the balance for some native Fijians and since the coup of 1987 the country has faced constitutional uncertainty and the deterioration of ethnic relations. The choice of political structure, which will also influence the potential for inter-community understanding, follows from the preferred model for inter-community relations, Yash Ghai in a report for The Minority Rights Group on Participation, narrows the choices to two: consocialism and integration. Consocialism seeks to ensure that identity groups are the basis for representation, perhaps on the basis of separate electoral roles. Integration treats the whole population equally, but, in order to ensure that minorities are not disadvantaged, measures may be necessary to allow them to compete with the rest of

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the community on equal terms. The Minority Rights Group1 favors an integrationist approach as more conducive to long term inter-group harmony. It argues that identity continues to be significant within a consocial system and it follows that there is more likelihood that identity will continue to be a source of tension. On the other hand there can be a more unaffected and unconstrained expression of and sharing of cultural identity when it does not have political significance. The view of MRG may be rather sanguine and over-optimistic. While consocial arrangements does have the tendency to entrench identities societies such as Holland demonstrate that this is not always the case and attempts at integration can deny genuine minority grievances and even the existence of the minority. This is especially true when the state attempts to enforce integration as in the case of Turkey’s treatment of the Kurdish community.

Current Trends in Dealing With Inter-Community Relations The existence of injustice, inequality and denial of human rights raise the same concerns in situations of inter-ethnic conflict and in other types of conflict. There will be a need to work for fair treatment for disadvantaged groups of any kind. The inter-community hostility is an additional concern that needs to be addressed through, for example, contact programs to improve inter-community understanding, but they will be inadequate if problems of inequality, disadvantage and marginalization are not tackled. “Participation in public affairs by minorities is central to their sense of identity. It is crucial to their feeling a part of the state and the wider community. It is essential to the protection of their interests. It helps to inform decision-makers of the concerns of minorities and leads to better decision making and implementation.”2 Often groups that feel weak and in a subordinate position will resent programs to improve community relations because they seem to be intended to co-opt them into accepting the status quo. The existence of such programs can appear to make it more difficult to deal with political problems. It can also seem hypocritical to explore inter-


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community understanding if the actions that cause resentment and distrust are continuing. Israel is but one state where sections of each community have been hesitant to engage in co-existence programs in the absence of some progress on issues such as settlements, security and the status of the Palestinian Authority. Even in such cases the peculiar uncertainties that are associated with the sense of ethnic or religious identity come into play. When a weak religious or ethnic minority are supported by co-religionists or the same ethic group outside the state the majority community are likely to see such “interference” as an attempt to undermine the majority religion or ethnicity and perhaps as a way to pursue irredentist ambitions.

Exploring the meaning of identity If we recognize that underneath religious conflicts is a strong element of uncertainty about the maintenance of identity then we can see the need for sensitivity in the way we acknowledge those concerns. Clearly we have no right to challenge the basic beliefs of the individual and that community. And clearly it is not helpful to deny these concerns – it is easy to say that insecurities are not realistic when our own identity is not at risk. It is often the case that the most devout are not the most fanatical or that those who speak their language fluently are least concerned about its submersion in a dominant language. Those who are most passive in practicing their culture and religion are often the most hostile to other traditions. One explanation is that the passive adherents are least familiar with their culture or religion and the most uncertain about its maintenance, and they are confused and frustrated in the face of those who have a strong commitment to their faith and culture and yet are tolerant of other groups. This understanding points to some important element in dealing with ethnic and religious conflicts. Protagonists need to be able to consider the positions they have adopted and the actual and potential consequences, which may result. This can happen through an internal process of reflection within the community or it can be stimulated external pressure and the inadequacy of current positions to deal with

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these pressures. However communities are more likely to become more defensive in the face of external threats and may only reevaluate after a great deal of effort, and possibly lives have been expended to maintain existing positions. The process can also be stimulated by questions posed by sympathetic outsiders. It is possible to list some of the issues, which need to be addressed in this process: The protagonists want their concerns and worries recognized That does not mean that their outlook and attitudes have to be accepted if they lead to hurt and injustice to others They can be challenged on the way they pursue their concerns and the consistency of such behavior with their value system. Changes of orientation to other ethnic groups is a voluntary act which cannot be achieved by coercion but groups may be coerced to limit actions which harm other groups and in this way they may be faced with the consequences of their attitudes and the need to engage with and understand their opponents For some, particularly those with a fundamentalist orientation, an initial step may be to examinee the basic concepts of the nature of belief and the nature of truth, including the idea of relative truth. Such challenge and exploration comes best from within that same tradition. A process can be introduced into the community, which encourages reflection on the desired future by inviting people to envision their hopes for their society. In a project in the Indian state of Nagaland., the United Nations Educational, Social and Cultural Organization trained teachers and youth leaders to carry out the process through grass roots groups, churches, schools and similar groups. Since the foundation of the state, the Naga people have claimed that they were wrongfully incorporated into India and have pursued an independence struggle. In this context the public were invited to express their vision of the state in the future. Individuals could focus on any aspect of the future of the state that they wished but the process allowed the participants to express their views on future


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relations with India and the Indian people and in fact this was one of the main issues on which they focused.

Contact or Segregation? A change of orientation towards other ethnic groups, through the kind of reflection discussed in the last section, is less likely to happen if there is no contact between the communities. The necessity to deal with opponents, even at some minimal level, can create contact and the possibility for more equality in those relationships, which provides both the opportunity and stimulus for engagement and understanding and also emphasizes the necessity of such engagement. In contrast segregation is often seen as the safe way to manage inter-community conflict, but it normally harden the positions of each party. Physical proximity creates the possibility of tension and conflict and in these situation government will be under pressure to keep the different communities apart. In the Czech town of Ústí nad LabemNestemice tension between Czechs and Roma reached such a pitch by 1998 that the local authority proposed the building of a dividing wall somewhat along the lines of the Peace Walls in parts of Northern Ireland. The non-Roma population supported the move and it was in fact built, immediately pulled down by Roma residents and then rebuilt under the protection of the police. The national government and the Czech Commissioner for Human Rights wanted its removal as it damaged its liberal credentials and the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination also sought an explanation of the scheme. It is noteworthy that the eventual agreement, which was reached between the municipality and the national government meant that the wall would not be rebuilt but the government would provide finance to purchase the houses of non-Roma – in itself encouragement of a process of territorial segregation. Segregation in these circumstances is an understandable reaction and it may limit the level of violence but it does not contribute to a long- term lasting improvement in relationships and may in fact make good relationships less likely. An agreed process of neighborly cooperation needs more local involvement and takes more effort.

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In a divided society each racial or ethnic community develops its own world-view separately from the other sections of society. It attempts to explain how the nature of the society, how it works and why there is a conflict. Often that world-view is created in reaction to the other groups and justifies the actions of one’s own community as a reasonable response to the unreasonable behavior of the other. But there is no attempt to engage with the other groups in analyzing and modifying that perception in the light of the experience and understanding of the other group. If communities are separated geographically then it is more difficult for them to meet and have dialogue with each other and establish positive relationships. Identity groups often occupy discrete territories and the creation of mixed areas is not a feasible option. However in many other areas the communities are intermingled in a patchwork and the possibilities of further mixing is a possibility. Contact gives the opportunity and stimulus for engagement and understanding between different groups and also can change behaviors, which can eventually lead to a change of attitudes. The enforcement of racially mixed schooling in the United States may be a case in point. The government faced widespread opposition from sections of the white community, particularly focused on the system of bussing children out of their own area to ensure that the enrollment of all schools reflected the full range of social and racial groups. In time the policy became the accepted norm and the bussing program may have created the opportunity for the breakdown of prejudice and misunderstanding Singapore has been able to allocate public housing on the basis of racial mixing and the population has complied with minimal tension. As a result people are more aware of the habits and lifestyles of other racial groups and it has been argued by Ooi Giok Ling and others3 that the government’s ethnic integration policies and multiracial participation in grassroots organizations in public housing estates have contributed to the absence of ethnic tension and violence. This is an approach, which would be hard to replicate in other countries and even in neighboring Malaysia housing allocation operates on the basis of market forces and housing areas tend to be segregated.


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Dealing with the past The need to reconcile these perceptions is most evident in societies that have experienced overt conflict. Perceived wrongs suffered by one or more community in the past will continue to haunt the present. The South African lawyer and ANC activist, Albie Sachs, speaking of the situation in his own country said, “The essence is what has been buried from the past. When you have divided memories among the people, one community having experienced life in one way, the other community in a completely different way, you cannot come together in the future. If you grow up in a country with divided memories those divisions will articulate themselves and your future view of one another. The country cannot move forward.” While these contrasting perceptions can be dealt with between individuals and through small group discussion, academics can also work together to analyze the perspectives of each community and construct a shared memory of the past and vision of the future which can be offered to the society. For example historians can develop a new history curriculum for schools that is acceptable to all sections of the community. This process can be carried out at a national level and can influence the whole society. Symbolic gestures can be arranged. We are aware of the problems that can surround the removal of weapons after a conflict. In many situations weapons are disposed off away from the public gaze. However in some cases there has been a very public ceremony in which the weapons are handed over. This can be a demonstration of the surrender and humiliation of one side but it is sometimes an act of honor and respect in which the soldier formally presents his weapon in an agreed termination of the struggle. The establishment of a truth commission to try to search out the truth of what happened can also profoundly affect public attitudes especially if the hearing take place in public as was the case with the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The Chairperson Desmond Tutu has said that the function of the Commission was to promote reconciliation not to achieve it itself. But most cases have shown how such hearing and talking process failed from the beginning. Authorities have no serious intentions to deal with them because they

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are considered to have perpetrated illegal actions, but their community is seldom willing for others to represent them. Where secessionist groups have broken away the international community may refuse to recognize the new entity. At the present time Northern Cyprus and Abkhazia are two examples of de facto independent entities which are unrecognized by the international community. However in almost all ethnic conflicts the authorities has had to deal with the militant group. However it has usually taken a long process for the authorities to realize the inevitability of such a step and another long process of working out how to introduce such a change of policy when they have made a strong stand against negotiating with terrorists. This is one example of the danger of restricting one’s flexibility of action by dogmatic statements.

The contribution of Non-Governmental Organizations and Quasi-Governmental organizations Non-governmental organizations and self help groups have often played a pioneering role in the development of good practice in the field of inter-community relations. They have the freedom and flexibility and commitment that allow them to try out new programs often in difficult circumstances. There is limited governmental support for these efforts and they often have to rely on charitable trusts or inter-governmental organizations for support. More financial support from government would ensure that activities that it cannot carry out itself would be undertaken by voluntary effort. Community Relations Councils or Commissions are common initiatives which involve community organizations, including ethnic community groups, the business community and sometimes the local authority. They can provide an important role in linking with the community and taking responsibility for organizing, funding, encouraging and extending the types of community relation initiatives that the non-governmental sector is already familiar with. It can also act as a clearing house for the development of new ideas and approaches. Occasionally they are established by the government as in the case of the Community Relations Council in Northern Ireland and the Race Relations Commissions in the United Kingdom


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The primary motivation may be to provide opportunities for consultation but they are also situations where interaction and dialogue can take place, and this may have an impact on the wider society. If the leaders of a community are treated with respect and consulted then the rest of that community is less likely to feel alienated from the state and the wider community. A number of countries in Eastern Europe set up consultative bodies on minority issues in the post-Soviet area. They were prompted by the Council of Europe which was concerned about the status of minority populations and were willing to comply as they were seeking to become members of the Council. These bodies can have an influence on government policy and they may provide an opportunity for dialogue but the way these bodies are seen to function can also have an impact on attitudes within the wider community. They have had a mixed reception. For example Rumania established the Council of National Minorities as a consultative body in 1993. Within six months the representatives of the largest minority, the Hungarians, had withdrawn seeing it as a token body with no powers and controlled by the government. Shortly afterwards the Roma representatives also withdrew in protest at the Government’s failure to take action on attacks on Roma people. However it was reconstituted as the Council for National Minorities by the new government in 1996 and was given more independence, control over a budget and it had a direct channel for recommendations to the new government Department for the Protection of National Minorities. When representative bodies are manipulated or ignored by government, attitudes in the wider community will be affected. However it is not certain that positive inclusion of the elites will have an impact on the average minority citizen sense of inclusion and they may not even recognize that their community is being consulted. Action at this level can of course be combined with broader and more comprehensive programs, which may benefit from the existence of such consultative mechanisms. Many initiatives bring together people at the level of influence leaders and the elites but they do not increase the level of contact, communication and understanding at

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the level of the ordinary citizen. It becomes more difficult to influence attitudes and opinions the farther one hopes to penetrate into society, and therefore there is a tendency to work with influence leaders and elites and hope that through those contacts changing attitudes and greater inter-communal awareness will filter into the wider population.

The contribution of the media The media is an important tool for communicating with the wider society and influencing attitudes to community relations. We have already noted that attitudinal change and the development of a new perception of the other requires an individual experience. One of the most important ways to involve the individual in society is through the media. They can highlight many of the initiatives which have been mentioned in this report and involve the individual in those experiences. Much of the significance of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission resulted from the decision to broadcast its hearing so that millions of viewers could see and hear the testimony and the reactions of the listeners, who might be the perpetrators or the victims, and feel something of the emotions of all those involved. This experience has had a deep effect on many who will never read the reports of the Commission or even be aware of its findings. The media can also provide an insight into the cultures and values of other communities. It has been increasingly accepted, following the Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities, that the state has an obligation to ensure that the media caters for the needs of minorities. Television and radio programs which feature the culture, music and lifestyle of one group can also be enjoyed by people from other backgrounds though they may be less accessible if they are in a language which is not shared. At the same time they can help the outside group to acquire that language. Programming can also bring the different cultures together and demonstrate the possibilities of artists and performers enjoying and respecting each other’s traditions. In Plovdiv, Bulgaria, the public service television in co-operation with the local authority and NGOs produces a 20 minutes regional program, “Neighborhood”, which has been taken up by other cable television


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channels. Using a multi-ethnic production team the program presents the customs and traditions of the various ethnic communities, their problems and viewpoints and has provided an impetus for marginal groups to speak and show their way of life. An interesting use of the media is the production of soap operas which promote messages of peace and understanding. The model is the British radio serial, the Archers, which was devised to catch the attention of the farming community with “an everyday story of country folk” and then to use the drama format to communicate messages which highlighted good farming practice. Perhaps because the origin of the idea was in the United Kingdom, the UK Department for International Development has sponsored the production of drama series in conflict zones such as Afghanistan and Albania, though in the latter country the conflict is not inter-ethnic or inter-racial in nature.

The impact of infrastructure projects Joint work on infrastructure is very visible and benefits a wide cross-section of society and as such it is one area where specific action at one level can have an impact in the wider community. The infrastructure project may be the reconstruction of facilities damaged during fighting. Shared infrastructure projects are evidence of joint problem solving even though they may only directly involve a small section of the community. However the whole community can be aware of them as end users and also because of their high visibility. The UN in Cyprus encouraged the construction of a new sewage and water system in the divided city of Nicosia which required the co-operation of the separate Greek and Turkish municipal authorities on each side of the line of division. The project was necessary in itself but it also provided an opportunity for the engineers and planners to work together, though it is not clear whether the ordinary citizens of Nicosia were fully aware of these aspects of the project or viewed it as an example of the capacity of the communities to work together. In the Caucasus after Abkhazia broke away from Georgia they continued to share the Inguri hydroelectric scheme even though the two entities have reached no resolution of their conflict and Georgia does not

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recognise Abkhazia’s independence. Again it does not appear that the two populations view this co-operation as a sign of the potential for a long-term resolution of the conflict. Nevertheless the UK Department for International Development has taken such lessons and attempted to apply them to joint power supply in Bosnia Herzegovina. It is probably important that such projects are necessary in their own terms but it is also important to be alert to their potential to facilitate improvements in community relations.

Contribution Of Government And The Role Of Public Policy Governments seldom take initiatives themselves in relation to issues of inter-community tension, and in many situations the most positive response of government is a form of benign indifference to those who make efforts to ameliorate the conflict: they neither obstruct nor support activities to improve inter-community relations but allow them to continue even if they could stop them happening. For example the Israel government has tended to allow Jews and Arabs to meet and has allowed schools to be involved in inter-community contact schemes, even though society has become more polarized, not least as a result of government policy. With the recent escalation of violence contact is more difficult and many people are not willing to take the risk of crossing between the two communities. But even in this context there have been a number of highly public occasions when civil society groups have insisted on passing through military lines in order to meet each other. Nevertheless there are other conflicts where the government is sufficiently negative to interfere and stop activities happening. There have been numerous initiatives for people-to people contact between Indian and Pakistani civil society groups who have been hindered and obstructed by both governments. Until 1997 such meetings had to be secret and even though they have become more open, the governments still refuse visas for travel and only give approval at the last moment. Sometimes Governments may feel that supporting civil initiatives is dangerous and gives too much influence


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to civil society. Governments are also aware that inter-community conflict is not amenable to the normal forms of state intervention. States function better at a macro-level rather than dealing with micro-level personto-person interaction. Governments are much more happy to introduce programs with a tangible output where they can monitor and enforce implementation. They are much less comfortable with programs to foster attitudinal, change such as inter-community relations schemes, which appear more nebulous and where the outcome cannot be so easily controlled. There may also be a concern that programs directed at attitude change are open to the charge of manipulation. It is true that ideally attitude change is a voluntary process. People cannot be coerced into having respect and understanding for those to whom they have previously been hostile and there may be a backlash against attempts to do so. The normal response to a social problem is the delivery of services to those in need and the state may be more or less efficient in providing such services and more or less adequately resourced to ensure an adequate level of provision. But community conflict requires a different response which involves the active participation of the community and processes of interaction which deal with individual attitudes. It is very difficult for a state to contemplate what would be required to initiate and manage such a comprehensive program. By definition the states where inter-community conflict is most severe are the least ones capable of maintaining their authority and capacity to govern but established western states often have no more developed approaches to inter-community relations. Nonetheless governments have enforced programs which affect the individual’s behavior in order to bring them into more direct contact on an equal basis with people from different identity groups, for example at school or in the workplace. While governments may on occasion act to try to improve community relations, they may also on other occasions have different priorities which mean that they act in ways which may exacerbate inter-community tensions. For example the Baltic states were

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concerned about the promotion of the national languages in each case as part of the process of nation building, and therefore introduced language laws which disadvantaged Russian speakers and which were resented by sections of that community. In those circumstances civil society took the initiative to try to overcome problems in intercommunity relations. In situations of conflict there is often a desire to intensify difference and the government may share this feeling and take steps in that direction. Another example, which again relates to the question of language, is the promotion of a separate Croatian language after the independence of Croatia. The languages spoken in Yugoslavia were known as Serbo-Croat and the main difference in its form in Serbia and Croatia was the script. However the new Croatian government supported the identification of Croatian as a separate language with its distinct vocabulary. General development priorities may also affect the capacity to work on inter-community relations, and the priorities of donor agencies may create or exacerbate inter-community tensions. Donors often support cultivation projects which are then in conflict with traditional pastoral or shifting cultivation which were previously practiced in the area. The aid project may require private ownership of land where traditionally land was held in common. Often the traditional farmers are not interested in the new methods and settlers are brought in from other areas. All these changes are potential sources of conflict. Some sections of the community are better placed to take advantage of the changes and when ethnic groups are differentially affected by the changes then there will be a new source of inter-ethnic conflict. The Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangla Desh are but one example of these processes at work where the traditional communities have lost much of their land, on the one hand by the building of a dam to provide power for the plains people and on the other by the resettlement of plains people into the hill areas. The government has reached a settlement with the Hill Tracts people but little has been done to tackle the tension and resentment between the Hill Tribes and the Bangla settlers.


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Since the preferred approach of governments to any social policy issue is to create structures and mechanisms for managing the problem rather than dealing directly with inter-group relations, possible approaches to ethnic conflict include constitutional arrangements such as devolution, protection of the rights of minorities, provision of resources for cultural activities for each community and increased policing and security measures. Governments find it easier to ensure the implementation of such strategies compared to the difficulty of mobilizing people and working on attitudes and attitudinal change. Considerable attention has been given to identifying appropriate ways to protect the interests of minority groups resulted in documents such as the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention on National Minorities or the Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life sponsored by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. General Human Rights Charters also include provisions relevant to situations of community tension and inequality. There are a growing number of states which have introduced arrangements which apply these recommendations such as Rumania’s provision for Hungarian and other minorities, and Finland’s provisions for the Sami. Structural changes on their own may not be sufficient to ensure inter-community harmony and may in fact exacerbate community tensions. Mention has already been made to the multi-ethnic constitution of Fiji and other examples relate to positive discrimination policies. India for example has extensive systems of preferences and quotas for lower and backward castes and tribal peoples. However others not included in these preferences have resented these privileges and the anger has been evident in protests such as those followed the recommendations of the Mandall Commission to extent the system. While the main focus of positive discrimination in India relate to employment in the state sector there has also been continual intercommunal cast violence in rural areas most notably in Bihar and Tamil Nadu. The conflict in Sri Lanka was directly related to the government policies of positive discrimination such as preferential entry to university for Singhala students. The founders of the Tamil Tigers were

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young Tamils who were unable to gain admission to university because of the application of these policies. In Western Europe the dangers of positive discrimination have been recognized and policies of affirmative action are favored because they do not offer actual advantage through quotas but encourage and assist disadvantaged groups to compete with other groups. However, the operation of these policies, while helpful overall in redressing the balance have also caused resentment and dissatisfaction, in Northern Ireland for example. A sustainable settlement may provide cultural autonomy for cultural/religious groups. But provision for minority cultural and other rights may also have a negative impact on inter-community relations. The Framework Convention on National Minorities and other international documents encourage respect for and promotion of national identity through for example the provision of education in the mother tongue. However this may mean that there is less contact between children who may attend different schools and therefore it means less opportunities for mutual understanding to grow. Limited understanding of each other’s language is itself a barrier to communication, both for young people and adults. Reliance of media in one’s own language also limits the level of shared experience between the communities and yet it is right that minority groups should have access to the media and education in their own language and governments should take steps to ensure that such provision exists. When the state acts as an arbitrator between cultural and religious groups there is a danger that it will seem to become involved in promoting the interests of one or more of those groups and in what circumstances does the state’s identification with one or other group exacerbate the conflict? It may be necessary for each divided society to consider what areas of life are appropriate to the private and public spheres. Are the preservation of ethnic identity and religious belief matters for the state or for private action, perhaps supported by the state.


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It is important that thoughtful measures are put in place to ensure that extra barriers are not put in place to inter-community contact and understanding. For example when it was argued in Malaysia that there should be separate school provision, the government proposed that the schools should share a common campus with an overall principle in charge so that the children would continue to interact and meet in the playground and hopefully have an overarching identification with the whole campus and not just their own ethnically defined school. It is also important to ensure that the existence of separate education provision does not mean that disadvantaged children are not farther subtly disadvantaged. In contrast to separate arrangements for cultural expression, the authorities in Delhi, India have encouraged inter-community sharing during religious festivals such as Dussehra and Diwali. These reactions point to the importance of finding ways to deal directly with inter-communal relations and to increase understanding alongside measures to increase opportunity for disadvantaged sections of the community. Crawford Young says “accommodation does require the framework, which in turn needs affective attachments by citizens at large [i.e. engagement with attitudes and feelings]. Education is one area where the government is in a position to impact throughout the population. Governments have established systems for influencing the work of schools throughout their territory including the management structure, teacher training and control of the curriculum. The pupil population are fairly amenable to the authority of the education system though parents may oppose community relations programs if they appear to be a form of manipulation and acculturation. The education system can also promote separation and we have already noted the tensions between, on the one hand, the value of education in one’s own language and in one’s own cultural environment, and, on the other hand, the value of mixing with children from other ethnic and racial groups. In contrast, international bodies and national governments have seen the potential of the school for encouraging inter-community awareness and understanding and possibly enabling young people to

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meet those of different backgrounds. The United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization has taken a lead in this field in the last decade and developed an Integrated Framework of Action on Education for Peace, Human Rights and Democracy believing that these three components are the fundamental elements of a culture of peace. It produced a teacher/learning guide on Tolerance for the UN Year of Tolerance in 1995 and it has argued that these concepts are matters for the entire community and not just young people. Certainly work with school children often has an impact on their wider families.

Conclusion Ethnic and religious conflicts are many faceted and therefore their resolution requires many strategies and many initiatives working together. Ideally they need the involvement of many actors: governments, international agencies, the leaders of the ethnic communities, interested and supportive third parties and the community itself. If the commitment of all these interests can be mobilized and if they have a sense that a solution can be found then we should have the environment in which the strategies described in this paper can be pursued effectively.

End Notes 1

2 3

Yash Ghai, Public Participation and Minorities (London: Minority Rights Group, 2001). Yash Ghai, ibid. Ooi, Giok Ling, Siddique, Sharon and Soh, Kay Cheng, The Management of Ethnic Relations in Public Housing Estates (Singapore: Times Academic Press for IPS, 1993).

Ethnic And Religeous Conflict In The Philippines

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Ethnic And Religious Conflict In The Philippines: The Bangsamoro Experience Jamail A. Kamlian Introduction The Philippines, like many of the third world developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, is now seriously confronted with gigantic problems of national development and national unity after gaining political independence from her colonial masters. As a multiethnic and multi-religious state, one of her major problems is how to forge unity and cooperation among the various ethnic and religious groups within the archipelago. The Bangsamoro people, one of the said ethnic and religious minorities, have been struggling for their right to self-determination since the colonial period. This struggle has taken several forms ranging from parliamentary to armed resistance while the major demands vary from political autonomy to the establishment of a Bangsamoro independent state in southern Philippines. The Bangsamoro rebellion in Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan regions is a crucial problem of the Philippine government. It is threatening to tear the country apart. The cost of war was great despite the mellowing down, in recent months, of the military confrontation between the Bangsamoro revolutionary forces and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) resulting from the signing of the peace agreement between the MNLF and the Ramos Government in 1996 and the recent ceasefire agreement signed by the MILF and the Arroyo government in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. According to Congressman Eduardo Ermita, in his privilege speech in July 1996: “Available data from the Armed Forces of the Philippines indicate that over a period of 26 years since 1970, more than 100,000

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persons were killed in the conflict in southern Philippines. The government suffered about 20 percent of casualties; the rebels more than 50 percent; while civilians caught in the crossfire came to about 20 percent of total casualties. About 55,000 persons were wounded, not counting those from the rebel side. From 1970 to 1976 alone, an average of 18 people was slain everyday. All in all, the AFP has spent about 73 billion pesos in connection with the Mindanao conflict since 1970; or an average of 40 percent of its annual budget. If this figure could be multiplied by the inflation rate over the years, it is truly a gargantuan expense. Presently, about 30 percent of the budget of the Philippine Air Force is spent in Mindanao; so is 40 percent of our Naval budget and 60 percent of our Army budget.”

These figures exclude the number of displaced persons as well as the worth of the properties being destroyed as a result of the conflict. From 1946 to 1976, a period of almost three decades, the solutions taken by the Philippine government to the Bangsamoro assertion of their right to self determination were always based on its policy of national integration. The main concern of this policy was to assimilate and integrate the “ethnic or cultural minorities” into the mainstream of the Philippine body politics. Some Filipino political leaders believe that “educating”, “modernizing” and “civilizing” the Bangsamoro and the members of other ethnic and cultural minority groups in the country to the level of the Christian majority, can minimize, if not totally eradicate, the ethnic and religious problems in Mindanao and other parts of the country. Accordingly, the development of a strong and united Philippines would finally be realized. To institutionalize this policy, the Philippine Congress of 1957 enacted a law establishing the Commission on National Integration (CNI) to oversee the national integration programs of the state. Several other agencies were tasked to help CNI in the implementation of the national integration policies, like the Mindanao State University and the Mindanao Development Authority, to name a few. After almost 20 years of existence, the CNI and the other agencies failed miserably in their mandated efforts to bring about national unity and the happy integration of the Bangsamoro people into the Philippine body politics. Instead, the minority–majority relations in the country worsened and aggravated.


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In 1968 for instance, the Bangsamoro people under the banner of the Moro Naitonal Liberation Front (MNLF) and its Bangsa Moro Army (BMA) had threatened to secede from the Philippine Republic. The armed confrontation between the MNLF and the AFP, in the early 70s, has pressured the Philippine Government to change its approach to the ethnic conflict in the southern Philippines from one seeking religious and cultural integration to one that seeks for a political approach to the Bangsamoro struggle. Started during the Marcos regime, when the government agreed to grant political autonomy or self-government to the Bangsamoro people after the signing of Tripoli Agreement in 1976, this political initiative is continually being pursued also by post Marcos era administrations.

The Bangsamoro Homeland: Land and People Land Profile and Natural Resources Mindanao, Sulu, Basilan, Tawi-Tawi and Palawan comprise what is historically known as the “Bangsamoro homeland” that constitutes more than one third of the Philippine total land area of 30 million hectares. Bangsamoro homeland has an aggregate area of 10.2 million hectares or 102,000 square kilometers. The lands of the regions are classified according to general land use patterns as forest lands, agricultural cropland, pasture lands, marshes, swamps, fishponds, urban lands, and state reservations. A total of 48.6% of the land area of the Bangsamoro homeland is categorized as productive forests while 40% is classified as agricultural croplands. Agricultural crops are further classified as food crops, such as rice, corn, root crops, vegetables and fruits like non-export crops” which include coconut, sugar, rubber, pineapple, coffee, abaca, and export bananas.2 As in many parts of the Philippine archipelago, the pattern of Mindanao crops utilization is toward an increasing commercialization of agricultural products. From 1970 to 1978, the Marcos regime facilitated the dramatic increase of 64.1% in the land utilization by commercial crops throughout the country. On the other hand, only a meager 25% increase was realized in the utilization of lands for food

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and other basic needs of the people, in the same period. 3 The commercialization of the agricultural economy in the Bangsamoro homeland continued to be unhampered despite the on-going armed struggle waged by the Bangsamoro people against the Philippine government. The Bangsamoro homeland has huge amounts of mineral deposits which can provide the mining industry with lucrative ventures.4 Deposits of raw materials for the production of cement in the central Mindanao area are projected to last “for more than a thousand years”. The world’s largest nickel reserves are found in Nonoc island off the southeast coast of Surigao del Norte. Lump iron ore deposits are estimated at 11.6% of Mindanao’s reserves of this metal. Gold and silver are found mainly in the provinces of Surigao del Norte, Agusan del Norte, Davao del Norte and Agusan del Norte. Lead and zinc reserves are found mostly in Zamboanga del Sur, while Davao Oriental has 78% of Mindanao’s total chromite reserves of 383,000 metric tons. Marble deposits of 128 million metric tons are found in Davao del Norte. Other non-metallic minerals, which can be seen in Mindanao, are clay, sulphur, magnesite and phosphate rocks. More than half or 5.41 million hectares of the country’s 10.21 million hectares of forestland covered by timber are in Mindanao.5 As of December 1977, of the 376 timber licenses issued to logging companies, 188 are for Mindanao. The island’s log production constituted 72% of the total national output of the same year. Most of the Philippine’s business activities based on wood extraction and processing are concentrated in Mindanao. Almost all Philippines plywood is produced in plants based in the Bangsamoro homeland.6 Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan seas abound with fish. Almost 59% of the country’s fish catch comes from Mindanao waters. The Sulu Sea is the biggest producer with 34% of the total national production. Other major fishing areas are the Moro Gulf (between the provincial island of Basilan and the Zamboanga Peninsula) and Basilan Strait.7 However, the Bangsamoro fishermen remain poor and are increasingly marginalized.


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The Bangsamoro People and the Other Populations of the Bangsamoro Homeland Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan, until their incorporation into the Philippine republic and the subsequent arrival of the Filipino migrant settlers from Luzon and the Visayas in 1912 and thereafter, have always been the ancestral homelands of more than thirty (30) ethnolinguistic groups. Thirteen (13) of these indigenous groups are the composite of the Bangsamoro people. The others now popularly refer to themselves as the Lumad tribes of Mindanao. Today, the population of the Bangsamoro homeland can be divided into three (3) general categories, namely: the Bangsamoro people; the Lumad tribes of Mindanao; and the Filipino Christian migrant settlers. Historically, the Bangsamoro people is comprised of the thirteen (13) Islamized ethnolinguistic groups which include the following: Badjao Iranun (also known as Ilanun) Jama-mapun Kalagan Kalibugan Maguindanao Maranao

Molbog (or Melebugnon) Palawani Samal Sangil Tausug Yakan

The MNLF however says, in its official definition of Bangsamoro nationality, that it includes not only the thirteen (13) Islamized natives of Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan but also Lumad tribes and even Christian Filipinos who are sympathetic to their struggle for selfdetermination. Historically, the term Moro was the name initially given by the Spaniards to the inhabitants of Manila when they noticed that they professed the Islamic faith. Later, when they realized that there were other inhabitants who were not Muslims, they called these people Indios. Semantically however, Moro is the Spanish word for Moor, derived from the Latin Maurus, which refer to an inhabitant of the ancient Roman province of Mauritania in Northwestern Africa which

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today comprises the modern states of Algeria, Mauritania, and the Kingdom of Morocco. With the rise of Islam, Mauritania became a Muslim province under the Ummayad Caliphate thus, the name Moor. For the Spaniards, the term Moro did not necessarily have derogatory connotation. It was simply the Spanish name for anyone who was a Muslim.8 The ambition of the Spaniards to colonize and subjugate the Bangsamoro people by overruling their resistance and conquering them resulted into the 333 years of historic Spanish-Moro war beginning in 1565. The pejorative element in the name Moro like “pirates,” “traitors,” “juramentados,” and “slavers” were added in the course of the long war. More were added during the American colonial period. Until the 1960s, the Bangsamoro hated the name Moro because they preferred to be called “Muslim”. With the emergence of the MNLF however, the term Bangsamoro became a byword of ethnicity and identity in the Bangsamoro homeland. How did the MNLF define this new identity? The Bangsamoro became a universal identity of the people in Mindanao in southern Philippines as described in the maiden issue of the Mahardika, the MNLF official newsletter, to wit: “…from this very moment there shall be no stressing the fact that one is a Tausug, a Samal, a Yakan, a Subanon, a Kalagan, a Maguindanao, a Maranao, or a Badjao. He is a Moro. Indeed even those of other faiths who have long established residence in the Bangsamoro homeland and whose goodwill and sympathy are with the Bangsamoro revolution shall, for purposes of national identification, be considered Moros. In other words, the term Moro is a national concept that must be understood as all embracing for all the Bangsamoro people within the length and breadth of our national boundaries.”9

The MNLF declaration simply emphasizes the three theoretical components of the Bangsamoro nationality categorized as follows: a. The Bangsamoro Muslims (Islamized Moros) are those belonging to the 13 ethnolinguistic groups who profess the Islamic faith, b. The tribal Bangsamoro are the Lumad or the more than 20 nonMuslim and non-Christian ethno-linguistic groups in Mindanao,


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c . The Bangsamoro Christians are the Christian Filipino settlers who are sympathetic to the Bangsamoro revolution. The Bangsamoro people (Muslim) however, constitute about only 20% of the entire population of the Bangsamoro homeland.10 They are dominant only in the five provinces of Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, and also in some municipalities of Cotabato, Lanao del Norte, Zamboanga del Norte and Davao del Sur. There are high concentrations of them, too, in Sultan Kudarat, South Cotabato, Zamboanga del Sur and Palawan. The Lumad tribes are composed of the more than 20 ethnolinguistic groups, which include the following: Ata Bagobo Batak Bla-an Bukidnon Dibabawon Higaunon

Mamanwa Mandaya Mangguangan Manobo Mansaka Matigsalug Palawan

Subanen Tagakaolo Tagbanua Teduray T’boli Ubo

Other groups like the Tigwa, the Isamal, the Kamayo and Talaanding are generally regarded as sub-tribes. The Lumad groups constitute approximately 5% only of the entire population of the Bangsamoro homeland.11 The Filipino Christian migrant settlers mostly originated from Luzon and the Visayas. They came to the Bangsamoro homeland from the second decade of the 20th century through the encouragement of the American colonial government, and later, of the Philippine state. Most of them though came on their own. Except in the five provinces of the Bangsamoro homeland, the populations of Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan became dominated by the settlers. In fact, they constitute 75% of the total population of the region. For the purposes of this paper, the term Bangsamoro refers only to the 13 Islamized ethnic groups in the Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan regions.

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Bangsamoro Struggle for Self-Determination: Historical Overview It is necessary to step back into the past in order to find out why, in the first place, are the Bangsamoro people in southern Philippines engaged in armed struggle against the Philippine government. We may be able to properly understand the basic issues involved in the Bangsamoro rebellion by highlighting appropriate historical perspectives. Today, the Bangsamoro society is part of the Philippine state system that is based on western practices and system of governance. Reduced to being a minority group through the years, they are not happy and delighted with the state of affairs. They feel oppressed, exploited and being denied of their right to determine their own destiny. In their view, the only way to rectify this situation is to transform their ties with the Philippine government through the establishment of political autonomy or possibly, an independent Bangsamoro Republic.

The Bangsamoro Sultanates At the coming of the Spanish colonial aggressors, the Bangsamoro people through their sultanates (Sulu and Maguindanao) were the most dominant groups in the entire Philippine archipelago. The bases of this dominance, according to Rodil, are contained in the following statement: “… economically they had the virtual monopoly of trade with neighboring countries, specifically China as well as within the archipelago; politically, they were the only large groupings with centralized system of government, either the Sultanate as was the case of Sulu or principality as was the cases of Maguindanao and Buayan. In the second decade of the 16th century, Maguindanao and Buayan became united under the Maguindanao Sultanate (which also included parts of Lanao). 12

In contrast with the Bangsamoro Sultanates, communities located in the rest of the archipelago were either still under the communal system or the Barangay or has barely emerged from the latter.


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Religiously, the Bangsamoro people already had a monotheistic belief system in Islam, while the rest of the Philippine Islands still believed in diwatas in Visayas and Mindanao and anitos in Luzon.13 The Sulu Sultanate was formally established in 1450 A.D. At the peak of its power, its territory included the Sulu archipelago (covering the present provinces of Sulu and Tawi-Tawi), North Borneo or the present state of Sabah, Malaysia, Basilan, Palawan, Sambowangan (the present City of Zamboanga and parts of the provinces of Zamboanga del Sur and Norte). The capital of the Sulu Sultanate was in Sulu.14 The subjects of the Sulu Sultanate comprised vast groups of ethnic communities that lived on these islands. The aristocrats were all Tausug. Aside from the Tausug, the different ethnic groups within the territorial and political jurisdiction of the Sulu Sultanate were the Sama and Badjao in Tawi-Tawi, Jama Mapun in Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi and Southern Palawan, Molbog or Melebugnon and Palawani in Palawan, Yakan in Basilan, Kalibugan in Zamboanga peninsula and Sabahan of Sabah in Malaysia. In the political structure of the vast region of the archipelagic state of the Sulu Sultanate, the Tausug Sultan was recognized as the highest political authority. He was responsible for the appointment of a Panglima for each of the island. The Panglimas were responsible for the administration of their appointed territories. In each of these territories were local powerful families led by the Datu who enjoyed great prestige and authorities over his followers. The Datus were subordinates to the Panglima but they are more powerful because they could advise the Sultan by sitting in a council, the ruma bichara that based in the island of Jolo. Economically, the Sulu Sultanate controlled the entire marine based resources produced in the vast Sulu Sea and the forest resources from the jungles in the numerous islands surrounding its domain. The most significant of these islands were Borneo, especially its eastern coast, and the island of Mindanao. As noted by J. F. Warren: “…in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries there existed in the zone composing the Sulu Archipelago, the northeast coast of Borneo, the foreland of Southern Mindanao and the western coast

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of Celebes, a loosely integrated political system that embraced island and coastal populace, maritime, nomadic fishermen, slash and burn agriculturists on the coastal rim and interior foothills. The zone provided a socio-cultural context for inter-societal relations and commerce with the Tausug state and beyond.” 15

The economic base of the Sulu Sultanate in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was: “… predominantly the extraction of marine resources from the diverse marine ecology of the Sulu Sea. The surrounding islands and territories are the resource base for forest produce, agriculture and minerals which were collected, cultivated and extracted for market. There was also a distinct but small manufacturing base in the Sulu territories. The Tausug were the main traders of the Sulu Sultanate and trading was their main source of income and wealth… the largest market for the produce from the Sulu Sea was China.” 16

The above-mentioned characteristics of the Sulu Sultanate indicate that it was a de facto and a de jure nation state, no different from a monarchy, exercising sovereign jurisdiction over various people encompassed within its territory. The sovereignty and independence of the Sulu Sultanate as noted by Professor Abraham Sakili: “… was recognized by the Spanish crown as its chief colonial adversary, as well as by the British, the French, the Dutch and the American governments in most of their treaty relations with the Bangsamoro centered in Sulu.” 17

In particular, Sakili cited that the Sulu Sultanate had treaty relations with Spain in 1578, 1646, 1725, 1805, 1837, 1851 and 1878; with the British in 1761, 1764, 1769, 1849, and 1878; with the French in 1843 and 1845; and the Americans in 1842, 1899 and 1915.18 H. de la Costa, a Jesuit scholar, also made the following comment on the 1737 peace treaty between Spain and Sulu: “… it is important to note in view of later development that it was a treaty, strictly so-called, that is one between two sovereign and independent states, each recognized as such by the other.” 19

R. R. Pascual, former dean of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of the University of the Philippines, also affirmed the status


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of sovereignty of the Sulu Sultanate. He said that: “… many times did the Spanish Governor General conclude treaties with the Sultan of Sulu … It can be said that the Moros maintained their own sovereignty and independence while the greater portions of the Philippines were subjugated by the Spanish rulers.” 20

The Maguindanao Sultanate was established much later than the Sulu Sultanate around the second decade of the Seventeenth century. This Sultanate reached its peak of power during the reign of the popular Sultan Dipatuan Kudarat from 1619 to 1671, particularly during the last twenty years. Its territorial domain was authoritatively described by Majul in his book Muslims in the Philippines: “The coastal area from Zamboanga to the gulf of Davao was tributary to him. He was acknowledged as the paramount lord of the Pulangi. His sphere of influence extended to the Iranun and the Maranao territories and even as far as Bukidnon and Butuan in the north of Mindanao. His rule held sway over Sangil and Sarangani. Except in points like Butuan and Cagayan de Oro cities and in almost inaccessible part of the interior of the island, practically all of the inhabitants of the island of Mindanao has accepted him as suzerian. 21

The capital of the Maguindanao Sultanate was located in the present day province of Maguindanao. The Bangsamoro tribes that were under the territorial and political jurisdictions of the Maguindanao Sultanate included the Maguindanao, Maranao, Iranun, Sangil, and the Kalagan of the Davao provinces. The non-Bangsamoro tribes were the Subanen in Zamboanga, Teduray, Ubo, T’boli, and Bla-an in the Cotabato area (encompassing the present four provinces of North Cotabato, South Cotabato, Maguindanao, and Sultan Kudarat), Bagobo, Bla-an, Tagakaolo, Ata, Mandaya, Mansaka and Manobo in the Davao provinces, and the Bukidnon and Higaunon in Bukidnon, Agusan and Lanao Provinces.22 The aforementioned characteristics of the Sultanates of Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan show that before the coming of the colonizers into the archipelago two Bangsamoro “nation-states” already existed. The Sulu and the Maguindanao Sultanates had, by the time of the Spaniards’ arrival, already perfected the requisites of nationhood, namely,

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territory, people, government and sovereignty. However, the advanced development of the Bangsamoro people was radically changed with the untimely and unexpected twist of their history—the coming of the various colonizers in succession in an attempt to subjugate and colonize them.

The Bangsamoro Sultanates and the Spanish Colonial Aggressors The struggle of the Bangsamoro for freedom was not a simple revolt as what it was made to appear in some of the popular Philippine history books. In fact, it was a patriotic struggle for freedom and independence waged by the Bangsamoro sultanates to remain free and independent. The accounts of the Spanish-Moro War, 1565-1898 by C. A. Majul in his book Muslim in the Philippines, Rev. H. de la Costa in Jesuits in the Philippines, and Rev. Miguel Bernad in “Panguil Bay and Founding of Misamis”, and in pages 1-55 of Readings on the History of Northern Mindanao compiled by Renato Reyes, undoubtedly attest to the heroism and determination of the Bangsamoro and the sultanates to sustain their struggle against Spanish colonial aggression for more than three hundred years.23 The Spaniards, like most of the European colonizers, made use of the classical “divide and conquer” strategy. They consistently made good use of thousands of Christianized natives in their military expeditions against the Bangsamoro. In fact, Rad D. Silva has this to say about the basic motive and the strategies and tactics used by the Spanish colonial aggressors during the Spanish Moro War: “… the Spaniards came to these islands to extend their colonial empire, they came to conquer us, to subjugate us and to remain as masters of the archipelago. Thus if they had to Christianize the natives it was because such action was necessary to extend and consolidate their colonial holdings and render their rule more effective. If they had to coerce Christianized natives to fight the Moros, this was also an extension of their colonial ends…”24


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Not satisfied with coercing the Indios to constitute the colonial army, the Spaniards, through the courtesy of the Catholic church, also designed a propaganda tool in the form of folk theater. The popular moro-moro is an example of the utilization of popular theater in the Spanish black propaganda not only to show the negative characteristics of the Bangsamoro but also to criticize Islamic religion and its leaders. Given this context, one may understand the prevailing strong antiBangsamoro and chauvinistic attitude of the modern day Filipinos. T. S. J. George made the following vivid comments on the moro-moro theater as the most effective brainwashing device employed by the Spaniards: “… among the simple people of the islands, pasion plays were made sure to be popular. The Spaniards made them a way of life. The plays they introduced revolved around a single theme … Christian heroes tangling with Muslim villains in garish black and white. Nothing was too mean for the villains to try; there was no limit to the nobility of the heroes. Every play led to a shattering climax in which the baddies were crushed, along with their horrible faith while the Christian goodies emerged triumphant and clean. The plays became integral parts of all the folk and religious festivals. So profoundly did they govern the average Filipino’s mental picture of the Muslims right after World War II. It was the West’s most successful campaign for the hearts and minds in Asia.” 25

The Spanish colonial government believed that only a thorough Christianization of the Bangsamoro would make them totally subjugated and colonized. The Bangsamoro people, however, in the strength of their centralized sultanates and their Islamic tenets of progressive trades,26 fought the Spaniards defensively and offensively throughout the 333 years of their attempt to protect the Bangsamoro homeland from Spanish colonization. The Spanish-Moro War 27 considered by some historians as the longest anti-colonial war in the whole world which even surpassed the Northern Philippine Revolution in terms of duration, scale and magnitude,28 no doubt brought about resentment and ill-feeling between the Indios and the Bangsamoro people. The success of the Spanish colonization in the northern Philippines could

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even be gauged in the degree of estrangement and animosity that divided the Bangsamoro and the Filipino people. The overall result of the Bangsamoro struggle against the Spanish colonial aggressors was generally successful for at the end of the Spanish-Moro War in 1898 they emerged uncolonized. However, Rodil noted that: “… while they take pride in their feat, the price they have to pay was tremendous. There was political and economic decay in their homeland. They had also become impoverished. Gone were their former productive links with the rest of the Philippines and Asia. The Spaniards have taken over control of their former sources of economic wealth, especially trade with China; substantial portions of Mindanao where once the Moro people held sway were seized by the colonizers. Their productivity, too, suffered severely after being subjected to 333 years of continuous warfare, broken only by a brief lull from 1663 to 1717; the best of their manpower focused their attention to fighting off the enemy rather than to productive endeavors like agriculture and fishing; large-scale Spanish expedition not only limited their military effort to fighting, it included a large-scale destruction of plantations, boats and settlements.29

Rodil also noted that the problems of the Bangsamoro did not only come from the Spaniards. Based in the present Malaysia, the British imposed restrictions on the Moro trade from the 18th century. The Dutch too, acted similarly when they were in the now Indonesia beginning from the 17th century.30 With the establishment of Manila-based Spanish colonial government, Spanish authority was firmly established in Luzon (except in the Cordillera), in the Visayas and in northern and eastern Mindanao. The Filipino people must fight repeatedly to extricate themselves from this colonial stronghold and happily triumphed in the end with the declaration of independence on June 12, 1898, and the subsequent establishment of the Philippine republic. By 1898, the Bangsamoro saw the once powerful sultanates territories severely reduced. In particular, the Sulu Sultanate lost Palawan, Sambowangan (the present Zamboanga City, Dapitan City and some parts of Zamboanga del Sur and Zamboanga del Norte), and Sabah, North Borneo in Malaysia.31


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It is important to recall here the 1878 treaty between the Sultan of Sulu and the Spanish colonial government. The treaty was signed by Sultan Jamal-ul-Azam and the Spanish Governor of Jolo and ratified by the Manila Government on August 15 of the same year. It was also the last of the treaties entered into between the Spaniards and a Sulu Sultan. This document is very significant to the history of the development of the Sulu Sultanate because it somewhat reduced the sultanate into a protectorate of the Spanish colonial government immediately before the arrival of the American colonizers. Majul had this comment about the 1878 peace treaty: “… it made the Sulu Sultanate a sort of protectorate of Spain while retaining great deal of autonomy for Sulu both in matters of internal administration and commercial activities … the Islamic religion and customs of the Sulus were to be respected…” 32

Though it further weakened the Sulu Sultanate by diminishing its power and authority over its subjects and territories, and may have taken away its de jure status, it cannot be denied that in 1899, the Sulu Sultanate was still uncolonized and continued to retain at least its de facto status as a nation state. There was no direct colonial system of governance in operation in most parts of the ancestral territories of the Sulu Sultanate. It should be pointed out that General Emilio Aguinaldo’s message to Congress on January 1, 1899 contained a proposal for the republican government to be empowered to “negotiate with the Moros of Sulu and Mindanao for purposes of establishing solidarity upon the basis of a real federation with absolute respect for their beliefs and traditions,” implying rather clearly an affirmation of the statehood status of the sultanates. 33 The Bangsamoro people emerged victorious in the sense that they succeeded in preserving their freedom but they were severely battered. The final blow was to be delivered by the U.S. imperialists.

The Bangsamoro People and the U.S. Imperialists Unfortunately, while the Bangsamoro people were beginning to reconstruct their society and recover from the brutal and cruel war

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of Spanish aggression, the American imperialists came in 1898. Compared to their Spanish predecessors, the US imperialists were not only more determined but also more advanced – politically, technologically, economically and militarily. Before the display of superior might and fresh vitality, the weary, flagging and worn out resistance of the Bangsamoro gave way, but only after a decade of bloody fighting and heroic struggles.34 The basic motives of the Americans in coming to the Philippines are concretely revealed in the following statement made by U.S. Senator Albert Beveridge to a Boston audience. “We must obey our blood and occupy new markets and if necessary new lands. American factories are making more than the American people can use, American soil is producing more than they can consume.” 35

The U.S. interest in the Bangsamoro homeland must therefore be seen within the context of imperialistic interests of making the islands a source of raw materials, dumping grounds of surplus and unwanted finished products, and outlets of investments for their excess capitals.36 The U.S. capitalists also intended to use the islands as jump-off points for reaching Asia’s lucrative markets.37 The U.S. rule in the Bangsamoro homeland was both brutal and subtle. The brutal and effective military campaign was complemented with education programs and economic development schemes. The colonial administration was there to “systematize” the whole process of landownership, land registration, cadastral survey, homesteading, and agricultural investments.38 The effect of this “systematization” was devastating. Because of this, the resettlement programs of the U.S. imperialists began in 1912. The natives, both the Bangsamoro and the Lumad, lost their ancestral lands to the Filipino Christian settlers and large U.S. corporations.39 Asani in his speech entitled “Imperialist Conspiracy in the Bangsamoro Homeland” candidly described the extent of the U.S. imperialist aggression into the Bangsamoro society. He claims: “No people or nation has been victimized and suffered so much from the conspiracy of the imperialist forces as represented by


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those evils we call multinationals than in the Southern Philippines. 40

The resettlement programs in the Bangsamoro homeland were punctuated by the establishment of agricultural colonies or settlements in Cotabato, Lanao, Davao, Zamboanga and Agusan from as early as 1913. The one in Lanao was for the benefit of the American soldiers who were married to Filipinas and had no desire to go home to the U.S.41 All of these naturally displaced the Bangsamoro and the Lumad who were pushed out of their ancestral lands into the periphery where social, political or economic development was hardly possible. Worse, they were given the remaining unproductive lands to till. This signaled the beginning of their socio-economic marginalization. The Filipino Christian settlers who took over the ancestral lands of the Bangsamoro and the Lumad were actually victims of the agrarian unrest prevailing in northern Philippines during that period. This agrarian unrest was the direct result of the U.S. imperialists’ design to exploit and control the economic resources of the archipelago. For instance in 1939, in Cotabato’s Koronadal Valley alone, 97,000 hectares of lush grassland were given to these settlers.42 They were lured by the U.S. colonial government to go to Mindanao where they were given incentives and priorities in the granting of land ownership privileges as compensation for land losses in Luzon and the Visayas.43 Luzon and the Visayas at that time were beginning to feel the brunt of the control and monopolistic policies of the local elite and the U.S. capitalists. 44 The resettlement programs in the Bangsamoro homeland paved the way for the easy and massive entry of the Filipino big landlords and the U.S. capitalists, including the U.S. corporations, into the Bangsamoro economy. The Filipino Christian settlers who used to cultivate and own lands, later found that they had also lost their land holdings through bureaucratic maneuvers of the rich and powerful landlords, especially the U.S. corporations and private capitalists.45 These U.S. corporations included the BF Goodrich Company, which had rubber plantations in Basilan since 1902 and in Cotabato after the Second World War. Also among them was the Del Monte Company,

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which has lands in Bukidnon since 1926.46 Because of this, big chunks of the Filipino-Christian dominated resettlements went into the hands of a few local elite and foreign investors. These lands were soon planted to cash crops and other commercial products. Large-scale production of export crops such as copra, abaca, rubber, pineapple and sugar soon followed.47 Gradually the Filipino Christian settlers also suffered the same fate met by the Bangsamoro people and the Lumad. They were also dispossessed of their private lands. Their individual private lots soon became part of U.S. multinational corporations holdings.48 This landgrabbing problem brought serious social and political repercussions. In the political arena, the U.S. imperialists made sure that the traditional Bangsamoro and Filipino political leaders were amply trained and pampered to become their “sympathetic allies,” a euphemism for “collaborators”. In talking about a better way of training and pampering the Bangsamoro and Filipino leaders in order to subvert the people’s resistance, Silva said: “The pensionado program, the equivalent to today’s scholarship grants, had more lasting effects. Under this program sons and daughters of the Moro ruling elite, as also the case in the North, were sent for studies in the United States or Manila. Graduates came home with their stateside values, outlooks and beliefs. While the program constituted only a small portion of the public school system, it cannot be regarded lightly. For as was envisioned by the American colonizers, this was part and parcel of the grand design to develop American oriented leaders from among us under the guise of training us for self-government. With this program the colonizers in fact succeeded in softening our resistance to the American rule.”49

Gowing cites the following Bangsamoro political leaders as the direct beneficiaries and the products of the American educational policy: Hadji Butu and Hadji Gulamu Rasul of Sulu, Datu Facundu Mandi of Zamboanga and Alaoya Alonto of Lanao.50 Aside from “pampering” and “educating” the Bangsamoro political leaders, the U.S. imperialists also recruited the “sympathetic” Bangsamoro into the colonial army to fight their fellow Bangsamoro. For instance, in 1904, the Moro company of the Philippine


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Constabulary was formed not only to fight but also to provide scouting services and intelligence information to the U.S. colonial army.51 It is in this light that the weakening of the Bangsamoro resistance against the U.S. imperialist can be best understood. Confronted with military obedience and personal interests against resistance and death, the majority of the Bangsamoro political leaders chose the former. With their leaders either demoralized or turned U.S. allies, the Bangsamoro resistance, now under the leadership of the masses, lasted only for about a decade. As a result, they were defeated and colonized like the Filipino peoples of northern Philippines. The U.S. rule in the archipelago did not only perpetuate the Spanish legacy of mutual hatred and prejudices between the Filipinos and the Bangsamoro people but also added a new dimension to the conflict:, the monopoly and control by big landlords and the U.S. corporations of the Bangsamoro economy. The overall results of the U.S. imperialists’ aggression in the Bangsamoro homeland were the marginalization of the people and the denial of their right to self-determination. Its concrete manifestation is the loss of the Bangsamoro people of a wide area of their ancestral lands and economic resources. More importantly, they also were stripped of their right to govern themselves according to their own system because their territories were incorporated into the colonial government in the entire archipelago. Their once sovereign “states” in the form of the Sultanates were reduced into several provinces of the colonial government based in the northern Philippines and later incorporated into the emerging Philippine Republic.

How did the Bangsamoro Sultanates Become Part of the Present Republic of the Philippines? On July 4, 1946, the U.S. imperialists restored the “political independence” of the Filipino people, conveniently overlooking the statehood status of the Bangsamoro sultanates. The incorporation of the two Bangsamoro states into the Philippine Republic was done without the benefit of democratic consultation on whether or not the majority of the Bangsamoro people would want to join the new republic

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as individual citizens or as sultanates. This was arbitrarily imposed upon them despite the repeated calls of some Bangsamoro leaders to exclude the incorporation of their homeland into the Philippine territory and sovereignty. A case in point was that incident on March 18, 1935. One hundred twenty Bangsamoro datus of Lanao came up with the historical document popularly known as the “Dansalan Declaration”. This statement expressed to the U.S. colonial government their desire to be excluded from the proposed “independence” to be granted to the Filipinos in the north of the archipelago. This declaration is perhaps unmatched in its clarity: “… we do not want to be included in the Philippines for once an independent Philippines is launched, there will be trouble between us and the Filipinos because from time immemorial these two peoples have not lived harmoniously together. Our public land must not be given to people other than the Moros… “52

Furthermore, the declaration warned to wit: “We foresee what conditions we and our children will be in.” These conditions, it predicted, will be characterized by unrest, suffering and misery. Desperate, or may be for tactical reason, the Bangsamoro leaders expressed preference for continued U.S. colonial rule in the Bangsamoro homeland if they could not be granted their separate independence simultaneously. 53 One Bangsamoro datu said in a meeting here in Zamboanga that when it comes to union with the rest of Filipino people, although he is already old, he would still fight to oppose such a plan.54 All these protests were however, ignored by the U.S. colonial government. The U.S. colonial government was, in short, principally responsible for the Bangsamoro and the Bangsamoro sultanates’ inclusion in the present day Republic of the Philippines. The restoration of the Philippine “independence” did not improve the conditions of the Bangsamoro people, as expected. Rather, it even worsened their economic situation.55 The U.S. imperialists decided to relinquish their political rule over the Filipinos when they were already sure that the new Filipino leaders, both the Christian and the


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Bangsamoro alike, had become their loyal allies. This was done only when they were sure that they would remain the economic rulers of the land. Consequently, the Philippine government continued to protect and even strengthen the U.S. economic interests in the country in general, and in the Bangsamoro homeland, in particular. This situation continues unabated up to the present. One can mention, for instance, the multinational corporations’ extensive control and monopoly of the Bangsamoro economy, particularly in the export of pineapple, banana, rubber, sugar cane, etc.55 The banana industry in Mindanao alone covered 27,000 hectares of land wholly controlled by foreign U.S. multinationals engaged in agribusiness. As of 1975, 20,000 hectares were in the hands of three U.S. corporations. Dole had 9,000 hectares; Del Monte owned 6,588; and Tadeco had 4,500. At present, Del Monte owns the world’s biggest pineapple plantation with a total of 36,000 acres of land in the Bangsamoro homeland. 56 In addition to this, in the 1950’s and 1960’s, the Philippine government promoted migration to the Bangsamoro because of its fertile land and its tremendous abundance of other natural resources. This policy was encouraged in order to solve the agrarian problem in Luzon and the Visayan areas. Specifically under the famous Magsaysay administration, several resettlement programs like the National Authority for Reforestation and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA), Land Settlement and Development Corporation (LASEDECO), Economic Development Corporation (EDCOR) and others gave way to massive migration from the northern Philippines to the Bangsamoro homeland. As a result of the steady influx of the new migrant settlers, the Filipino Christian migrant settlers finally outnumbered the original Bangsamoro and the Lumad indigenous inhabitants of southern Philippines. In the succeeding years, other Christian migrant settlers followed in massive and uncontrolled migration until they dominated the socio-economic and political life in the Bangsamoro homeland.57 This resulted to the increasing marginalization and underdevelopment of the Bangsamoro masses.

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The Bangsamoro Secessionist Movement The Bangsamoro’s resentment over the loss of their political sovereignty, ancestral land and economic resources were expressed occasionally from 1914 to 1940 in minor incidents.58 In the 1960’s, these minor incidents were transformed into systematic opposition. Illustrating this is the introduction of a bill in 1961, by Congressman Ombra Amilbangsa of Sulu granting and recognizing the independence of the province of Sulu. In his explanatory note he mentioned, “This bill proposes the grant and recognize the independence of Sulu. By granting independence to the province of Sulu, the government of the Republic of the Philippines will withdraw and surrender all rights of possession, supervision, jurisdiction and control as well as sovereignty now existing and exercised by the Republic of the Philippines in and over the territory of the province of Sulu .”59

The Muslim Independence Movement The Muslim Independence Movement (MIM) was organized in 1968. It called for the outright secession of Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan regions from the Philippine government’s control. It also called for a Jihad (holy war) to defend the Bangsamoro homeland. The word “Muslim” was replaced with “Mindanao” in order to accommodate inhabitants in the Bangsamoro homeland who were non-Muslims .60 The following are the major reasons cited by the leadership of the MIM in agitating for secession: 1 . The establishment of the provincial and municipal governments undermined the status of the traditional leaders, dislocated the authority and communications set up, and negated the existing coalition formation patterns, so necessary in the cooperative and communal ventures that the Muslims were accustomed to. In operation, these governments were disruptive and not functional. 2. The imposition of a new legal system negated the judicial functions of the village elders. This caused a breakdown in social order and gave rise to a lot of social problems which exist up to this day;


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3. It was in the field of education where irreparable dislocations were created. The public school organization systematically alienated the school children. They were forced to learn new sets of values that put down the cultural milieu in which they grew; and 4. The transportation of settlers and land grabbers to Muslim provinces and the creation of agricultural colonies out of Muslim lands caused a lot of resentment in Muslim circles. In effect, this reduced the economic base of the Moroland.61 Datu Udtog Matalam, the founder of the MIM, has clearly defined his stand on justice in the Philippines as it affects the Muslims. “The Philippine government has utterly failed in the administration of justice in Muslim-land, that the present constitution of the Philippines has not provided for the observance of their personal laws based upon their shariah and Adat laws.”62 The Bangsamoro resentment over the loss of their right to selfdetermination became more intense with the exposé of the infamous Jabidah incident in 1968.63 The Jabidah massacre that involved the summary execution (killing) of the Bangsamoro trainees in Corregidor, Bataan by their Filipino Christian military superiors, reinforced the Bangsamoro belief that the Filipino government was out to “eliminate” them. From separate inquiries conducted by Congress and military authorities, besides the full media reportage, the Philippine government failed to unearth the real issue involved.64 To add insult to injury, the accused military officers were acquitted. The feeling of outrage became widespread among the Bangsamoro. Social and civic organizations like the Ansarul Islam and the Muslim Students Association of the Philippines, joined forces to militantly denounce the court martial’s verdict that whitewashed the incident. They described it as an “eloquent proof” of the criminal designs of the Philippine government against the Bangsamoro people and emphasized the necessity of the federalization of the country.65 The Jabidah incident was one of the dramatic incidents that precipitated a myriad of Bangsamoro movement towards a separate independent nation-state. Bangsamoro youth groups also emerged

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ventilating the plight and grievances of the Bangsamoro people. Later, some Bangsamoro youths underwent military training here and abroad to prepare for an armed struggle.66 This group has served as the core group in the Bangsamoro struggle for self-determination up to the present.

The Moro National Liberation Front In 1972, barely two months after the declaration of Martial Law in the Philippines, the Moro National Liberation Front – Bangsamoro Army (now Bangsamoro Armed Forces) hit the news when it first orchestrated well-coordinated attacks against several detachments of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in Sulu, Cotabato and the Lanao provinces. This was followed by a full-scale war in the Bangsamoro homeland. 67 The ultimate goals of the MNLF are the complete liberation of the Bangsamoro people and the independence of the Bangsamoro homeland. Its claim to a national homeland is primarily through armed struggle. It bannered the Bangsamoro national identity. What is desirable is the establishment of no less than a Bangsamoro Republic. The basis of this new phase of the Bangsamoro struggle is summarized in a two- paragraph manifesto dated April 28, 1974: We, the five million oppressed Bangsamoro people, wishing to free ourselves from the terror, oppression, and tyranny of Filipino colonialism, which has caused us untold sufferings and miseries by criminally usurping our land, by threatening Islam through wholesale desecration of its places of worship and its Holy Book, and murdering our innocent brothers, sisters and folks in genocidal campaign of terrifying magnitude… Aspiring to have the sole prerogative of defining and chartering our national destiny in accordance with our own free will in order to ensure our future and that of our children…68

Asani further clarified the MNLF struggle for self-determination in an article entitled “A Case for Self-Determination.” He stated the following as the reasons for the struggle: 1 . That the Philippine presence in the Bangsamoro Homeland of Mindanao, Sulu, Basilan and Palawan is colonial and that the Bangsamoro people are illegally deprived of their right to self-


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determination, freedom and independence; 2. That such colonial presence and domination bring about, and are the direct causes, of economic exploitation, repression and discrimination of the Bangsamoro people by the Philippine regime and its local and foreign collaborators; 3. That the Marcos regime in the Philippines is criminally engaged in a diabolical campaign of genocide against the Bangsamoro people; and 4. That U.S. imperialism, though its persistent support and assistance to the Philippine economy and military, is guilty of complicity with the Philippine regime in the commission of such crimes.69 Asani in another article “The Moro Problem in the South Philippines,” says that: “Colonialism is the root of the Moro problem in the South Philippines – a phenomenon that is not after all an exclusive preoccupation of Western nations. The present fighting in the area may be a fight against an established but repressive government. The issue therefore is essentially political in character. Hence it requires primarily a political solution; which calls for the thorough restructuring of the prevailing Filipino-Bangsamoro relations.”70

This restructuring means, according to the MNLF spokesman, the secession of the Bangsamoro people from the Philippine Republic. As they saw it, the only way to regain the full expression of their right to self-determination, freedom and independence is the establishment of a Bangsamoro Republic. Strategically, however, the MNLF has reduced its demand to a “genuine political autonomy” for the Bangsamoro homeland within the realm of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippine Republic. This can be gleaned from the Tripoli Agreement signed on December 23, 1976 by the Philippine government and the MNLF, under the auspices of the Organization of the Islamic Conference.

The Moro Islamic Liberation Front The signing of the Tripoli Agreement led to the fragmentation of the MNLF. A rival organization emerged in Mindanao, the Moro

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Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), organized by the former vicechairman of the MNLF Central Committee Hashim Salamat. The MILF started to influence and recruit MNLF members to their own ranks. In 1977, the MILF Leadership cited the following reasons for breaking up from the MNLF: 1 . The MNLF leadership was being manipulated away from the Islamic basis, methodologies and objectives and fast evolving towards Marxist – Maoist Orientations. 2. The Central Committee has evolved into mysterious, exclusive, secretive and monolithic body whose policies, plans and decisions – political, financial/or strategic, become and exclusive preserve of Chairman Nur Misuari. 3. The mysterious exclusive and arrogant nature of the MNLF leadership resulted in confusion, suspicion and disappointments among members.71 Initially, the MILF was calling for the establishment of a Bangsamoro Islamic State in Mindanao that in effect called for secession and also emphasized that “Islam be the ideology of the new front” and called for the Islamization of the Bangsamoro society. However in 1985, the MILF chairman, Hashim Salamat, advocated autonomy as their minimum objective. He wrote in the Bangsamoro Mujahid: “Our concept of self-determination is complete independence, or at least, a meaningful autonomous government embracing the traditional homeland of the Bangsamoro, namely, Mindanao, Palawan, Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi. 72

The Peace Process in the Southern Philippines and the Internationalization of the Conflict in Mindanao The Philippine government has always considered the Bangsamoro issues and concerns to be purely domestic problems. In the 1970s, however, the Bangsamoro traditional politicians and later the MNLF succeeded in bringing their grievances to the attention of an intergovernmental entity, the Organization of Islamic Conference


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(OIC). This resulted into the involvement of the international community as powerful players who are able to exert pressure to the belligerents on both sides of the Mindanao ethnic conflict. At first, the Philippine government applied strong military pressure, intimidation and terror tactics against the Bangsamoro revolutionary forces in order to neutralize their resistance. The Bangsamoro nationalists however, confronted the government forces with strong and organized armed resistance that resulted to a fullscale-war in the Bangsamoro homeland in 1972. On September 21, 1972, the Marcos government declared Martial Law in the Philippines citing the Bangsamoro secessionist movement as one of the major reasons for its imposition. From 1972 up to the present, the Bangsamoro struggle has been officially addressed to the organization of all the Islamic states from which the Bangsamoro revolutionary forces gained attention, sympathy and support. Eventually their movement captured international attention. In 1976, after having suffered serious setbacks caused by the Bangsamoro rebellion and experienced economic and diplomatic pressures exerted by the OIC, especially after Libya intervened and rallied behind the MNLF, the Philippine government finally decided to negotiate with the MNLF.73 This negotiation was conducted outside the country, an indication that the Philippine government was really pushed to the wall at that time. Finally, the Philippines was forced to sign the historic Tripoli Agreement in December 23, 1976. This agreement marked a quantum shift in the Philippine government policy on the Bangsamoro initiative, from non-political into political autonomy within the realm of national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippine state. The proposed areas of autonomy embraced the 13 provinces of Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga del Norte, South Cotabato, Davao del Sur, North Cotabato, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and Palawan and the cities and villages situated in the above-mentioned areas. Nevertheless, the Tripoli Agreement, which was supposedly the first major initiative taken by the Philippine government to effect the

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establishment of the self-government sought by the Bangsamoro people, was not fully implemented. The two sides failed to agree on the mechanics of its implementation. Instead, the Philippine government instituted its own version of autonomy by establishing two Autonomous Governments in Regions IX and XII. Region IX consisted of the provinces of Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga del Norte and the cities of Zamboanga, Dapitan and Dipolog. Region XII comprised of the provinces of Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Sultan Kudarat, North Cotabato, Maguindanao and the cities of Cotabato, Marawi and Iligan. It is significant to note that South Cotabato and Davao del Sur, where multi-national corporations in agribusiness are operating, and Palawan with its oil resources, were not included in the areas of autonomy. The MNLF has rejected the establishment of the two autonomous governments and demanded for the implementation of the Tripoli Agreement while continuing their armed struggle because they felt that the so-called autonomous governments were not really autonomous. Meanwhile, the OIC signaled its displeasure with the Philippine government by issuing a string of resolutions deploring the failure to implement the Tripoli Agreement and by giving the MNLF observer status in the organization in 1977.74 In 1981, the OIC affirmed its recognition of the MNLF as sole official representative of the Bangsamoro people and rejected all measures taken by the Philippine government to implement the Tripoli Agreement.75 Unfortunately, the Tripoli Agreement which initially had been hailed locally and internationally as the appropriate if not the effective solution to the Bangsamoro struggle, came to a sad ending for the Bangsamoro people. Consequently, the war in the Bangsamoro homeland continued to escalate and the MNLF returned to its original demand of political independence. Ten years later, in 1986, the hope for a peaceful political solution to the Mindanao conflict resurfaced anew with the restoration of democracy in the Philippines after the historic “EDSA people power” revolution which forced the authoritarian Marcos to leave the country.


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Immediately, after assuming the presidency, President Corazon Aquino sent her brother-in-law, now Congressman Agapito “Butch” Aquino to Jeddah in Saudi Arabia to invite Misuari to return to the country and discuss with the new government a peaceful solution to the Bangsamoro struggle. Thus, after some preliminary contacts between the two parties, President Aquino and Chairman Misuari met in Jolo, Sulu on September 5, 1986. As a result of that historic meeting, the Philippine government sent a three-member negotiating panel to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on January 3, 1987. The RP panel assured the MNLF panel that the government was willing and ready to “discuss anything under the sun except independence.” 76 Motivated may be by the assurance of the RP panel the MNLF, again, agreed to lower its original demand of political independence.77 The meeting of the two panels resulted in the signing of the Jeddah Accord of January 3, 1987 wherein the following joint statement was agreed on: “The panels agreed to continue discussion of the proposal for the grant of full autonomy to Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Palawan subject to democratic process.” 78

Pursuant to the Jeddah Accord of January 3, 1987, the MNLF panel presented 24 demands to the Philippine government. The following are among the most significant: 1 . The grant of full autonomy for the islands of Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Palawan; 2. Territory and its name – the area of full autonomy shall be known as the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region. The territory of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region shall comprise of the islands of Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Palawan and all other islands, islets and water embraced therein, the terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains, including the territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves and other submarine areas. The waters around, between and connecting the islands of the area of autonomy, irrespective of their breadth and dimension shall form part of its internal waters; 3. Regional Security Force shall be established in the area of autonomy for the maintenance of peace and order with the initial strength of

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60,000 at least 85% of which shall come from the Bangsamoro Armed Forces of the MNLF. The chief or highest Executive Official of the autonomous government shall be the Commander-in-Chief of the Regional Security Forces (RSF); 4. Powers of Taxation, Eminent Domain and Police Power – the Autonomous Government shall have the powers of taxation, eminent domain and police power. The Autonomous Government shall enjoy a share of 85% of national taxes accruing or deriving from properties, business transactions within the area of autonomy. 5 . Provisional Government – immediately after the signing of the agreement a provisional government shall be established to administer the area of autonomy. The provisional government shall continue to exercise powers until a government is formed by elected legislative assembly; 6. Proclamation by the President – immediately after the signing of the agreement between the MNLF and the government and before the first congress of the Philippines convenes in July 1987, the President of the Philippines shall issue a proclamation declaring full autonomy for Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Palawan pursuant to this Agreement; and 7 . Effectivity – the agreement shall come into full force and effect from the date of its signature. It shall be signed in Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in three original copies in Arabic, English and French all equal in legal power. The Philippine Government rejected the MNLF proposal and instead made a counter proposal with the following as the most important provisions: 1. On the territory of Autonomy. The will of the people in the affected areas shall be sought through a plebiscite. In particular, the creation of the Autonomous Region shall be in accordance with the provisions of Article X of the 1987 Constitution. 2. On the provisional government. It is unconstitutional for the President to exercise her legislative power under the transitory provisions to establish the provisional government.


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3. On the transfer of powers. The proposal of the MNLF on the transfer of power would be tantamount to secession. 4. On the Democratic Process. The democratic process with respect to the creation of the autonomous region is mandated in Article X of the 1987 constitution. 5. On the Mediation by the OIC . The peace talk with the MNLF is an internal or domestic affair subject to the constitution and sovereignty of the Philippines.79 After a series of meetings between the two panels from January 3, 1987 to May 1987, the negotiations finally collapsed. No substantial agreement had been reached. Again, the MNLF reverted back to its original demand of secession and threatened to wage a bloodier confrontation with the Aquino government. The MNLF cited two important reasons for the failure of peace talks with the Aquino government. First, they claimed that the Philippine Government was merely biding for time for the constitutional plebiscite and for the Congressional elections. Second, they claimed that when the Philippine delegations came to Jeddah to open the way for the negotiations, they promised the moon and the sun not out of sincerity but for the sake of political expediency. These were done because at that time, the Aquino government was threatened by various political groups aiming to destabilize her new established regime, citing for example, the various coup attempts by the rightist group among the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the nationalist struggle of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New Peoples Army (CPP-NPA).80 On the other hand, the RP panel blamed the MNLF for the failure of the peace talks because its demand would actually constitute the establishment of a fully independent nation.81 Meanwhile, a new constitution for the Republic was overwhelmingly ratified by the majority of the Filipino people, including the Bangsamoro people. One of the significant provisions is an article granting political autonomy to the Cordillera people and “Muslim Mindanao”. Pursuant to the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the Aquino

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government went ahead with the establishment of the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao and hailed this political action as the implementation of the Tripoli Agreement. It created the Regional Consultative Commission or RCC to draft an organic act that the Philippine congress would later adopt as Republic Act 6734. This law mandated the creation of the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) that was subjected to a plebiscite. It was a disappointment to the Bangsamoro people who had high hopes on the Aquino government to put in place a genuine autonomous government in their homeland. Of the thirteen provinces to be covered under the autonomy, only four voted for their inclusion in the ARMM. Misuari claimed that this result was due to the fact that a “large section of the Bangsamoro boycotted the referendum in accordance with the appeal made earlier by the Moro National Liberation Front.” 82 On the other hand, it should be noted that the majority of the non-Bangsamoro population apparently voted against the inclusion of their provinces and cities in the ARMM. This is not surprising because historical experiences of animosity, prejudice and hatred in living with the Bangsamoro had proven that they simply can not join any political exercise which would seem beneficial to the Bangsamoro. The MNLF, and the other Bangsamoro revolutionary forces expectedly also refused to take part in the implementation of the autonomous government as provided by the 1987 constitution. Instead, they asked the Aquino government to fully implement the Tripoli Agreement. Similarly, the OIC has rejected the ARMM and supported the MNLF by urging the Philippine government to implement the Tripoli Agreement .83

1996 Final Peace Agreement Between the MNLF and the Philippine Government After almost four years of peace negotiations, the Ramos administration and the MNLF signed a peace agreement at Malacanang Palace, Manila on September 6, 1996. This was proudly described, by both sides, as “the final agreement on the implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement” between the Government of the Republic of the


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Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front with the participation of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. The most salient points embodied in the agreement are as follows: 1 . The establishment of the Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD), the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) and the Consultative Assembly. 2. The expansion of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) 3. The joining in of the MNLF elements with the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippines National Police. 4. The establishment of the Special Regional Security Force for the autonomous region. 5 . The establishment of a Regional Legislative Assembly. 6. The Right of Representation and participation in the National Government and in all organs of the state of the citizens of the autonomous region. 7 . The establishment of a Regional Economic and Development Planning Board 8. The establishment of the Shariah Courts.84 The implementation of the agreement was to be carried out in two phases. Phase I shall cover a three-year period starting after the signing of the peace agreement and the issuance of Executive Order establishing the Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD), the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) and the Consultative Assembly. The President shall also issue the necessary instructions to initiate the integration process of MNLF elements with the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police.85 At Phase 2, the Philippine Congress shall initiate and complete the legislative process that will repeal and amend the Organic Act (RA 6734) of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The new law shall be submitted to the people of the concerned areas in a plebiscite to determine the establishment of a new autonomous government and its territory86

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The Status of the Implementation of the 1996 Peace Agreement Immediately after signing of the 1996 peace agreement, the Office of the President issued E.O. 371 proclaiming a Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) in the Philippines and creating the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) and Consultative Assembly (CA) in accordance with the provisions for Phase 1 implementation of the agreement. The performance of the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development and the Consultative Assembly has been full of controversy. The Philippine government claims that it has fulfilled its part to the letter. On the other hand, the MNLF counters that the government has never provided sufficient funds and guidelines to enable it to succeed.87 So far, the most successful implementation of the Peace Agreement is the integration of the 7,500 MNLF mujahideen into the AFP and the PNP. As of March 2000, this was 91% completed where a total of 5,250 former MNLF members have been integrated into the Armed Forces while 1,250 have been absorbed by the Philippine National Police.88 Just recently, on August 14, 2001, a referendum plebiscite was held in Mindanao to ratify Republic Act No. 9054 amending the Organic Act (RA 6734) of the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao. However, as of this writing, no official result has been declared by the Commission on Elections. Nevertheless, the initial and unofficial results of the Plebiscite in 13 provinces and cities in the proposed expanded area of Bangsamoro autonomy have confirmed all predictions and forecasts that the majority of the people in the proposed areas of autonomy will reject the new autonomy set-up. All but one province (Basilan) and one city (Marawi) resoundingly rejected to become part of an autonomous setup. 89 It is also interesting to note that the MNLF boycotted the plebiscite. In fact, Misuari had earlier petitioned the Supreme Court to issue a


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temporary restraining order to stop the Commission on Elections from conducting the exercise. He claims that it is a violation of the 1996 peace agreement between the government and the MNLF.90 The MILF, on the other hand, showed indifference to the said political exercise as they are still in the initial stages of their negotiations and peace talks with the Philippine government. The recent plebiscite on the expansion of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao had drawn different reactions and comments from the various sectors of Philippine society. Some of them are described in the subsequent paragraphs. No less than President of the Philippine Republic MacapagalArroyo concluded that the voting went along religious line. Her observation is more precise because in the Christian-dominated areas the turn out was reasonably good simply because the population wanted a strong rejection for the autonomy. Ever since the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, common among the non-Muslim population has been the sentiment that they would never accept being ruled by Muslims. Some among them even went to the extent of saying that the very name of the concept alone – the autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao was, to them, “terrifying” and even “repulsive.” 91 The feeling seems to be mutual among the Muslims. A high official of the present ARMM was overheard saying that: “Any government run by the Christian no matter how good, is bad for us.”92

These two opposing and contradicting views illustrate that the religious and ethnic differences in Mindanao are very real despite the peace efforts of various groups in the area. This situation indicates that in the Southern Philippines majority of the people is not yet ready to objectively play the game of numbers in deciding the government policy on ethnic and religious minorities as a basic requirement to a democratic political process. The people are more conscious of showing their religious and ethnic allegiance than they are with the issues and concerns that are good for their welfare. In other words, they are not yet ready to accept the political solution negotiated by

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the Philippine government and the MNLF to the Bangsamoro assertion of their right to self-determination. With the failure to expand the area of autonomy and the nonacceptance of the MNLF to the results of the plebiscite, the prospect of making Mindanao a home of peace, harmony and prosperity is still a great challenge to the various stakeholders of the peace process in southern Philippines.

The Initiatives of Civil Societies, Religious and Academic Institutions for the Promotion of Peace, Harmony and Prosperity in Southern Philippines Some civil societies and religious institutions have taken some initiatives in the promotion of peace and harmony in Mindanao. The impact of the raging war between the Moro National Liberation Front and the Philippine government has brought the realization that the search for peace in Mindanao is the task not only of the armed groups of the Bangsamoro and the Philippine government but should be the collaborative effort of the various civil societies, religious and academic institutions in the region. Hereunder are some of the programs and activities initiated by non-government organizations (NGOs), religious and academic institutions in the promotion of peace and harmony in the Bangsamoroland.

Inter-Religious Dialogue in Mindanao Hoping to soften the negative impact of the full-scale war between the Moro National Liberation Front and the Armed Forces of the Philippines on the relationship of Muslim and Christian populations in Mindanao, inter-religious dialogues in the area was initiated during the Martial Law days. This was undertaken in an effort to bridge the gap between the Muslims and Christians and bring them together. Initial efforts towards this end were undertaken by an NGO affiliated with the National Council of Churches in the Philippines based in Midsayap, Cotabato. The first project was the Duyog Ramadhan (Cebuano Bisaya for “Accompany Ramadhan”) program in 1977. The


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general objective of this program was to encourage a dialogue between the Muslims and the Christians. Later, it drew support from the Mindanao-Sulu Pastoral Council. By the 80’s, the Lumad population of Mindanao was included in the dialogue. Later, the Protestant Dansalan Research Center and the Catholic Church in Marawi City conducted their own version of Duyog Ramadhan.93 Eventually several multi-dimensional dialogues towards the promotion of peace in Mindanao were organized by different groups and organizations.

The Silsilah Dialogue Movement The Silsilah Dialogue Movement was founded in May 1984 in Zamboanga City. Silsilah means chain in Arabic. Its goal is to bring together Muslims and Christians to live together in harmony.The most significant activities of the Silsilah related to the promotion of peace and harmony among the Muslims and Christians in Mindanao are the Annual Summer Course on Muslim-Christian Dialogue and the quarterly Silsilah Islamic-Christian Bulletin. The five-week summer course presented a balanced presentation of the respective histories and theological systems of Christianity and Islam. On the other hand, the Silsilah Bulletin is a quarterly publication that is disseminated for free to interested parties in order to campaign for peace.

The Bishops Ulama Forum The Bishops Ulama Forum (BUF) was established on July 16, 1996. It is now the leading institution in inter-religious dialogues in Mindanao. It is presently composed of all the bishops from the catholic and protestant churches in Mindanao and the Ulamas from the Ulama League of the Philippines. Recently this forum is planning to include in its composition the religious leaders from the Lumad communities. The Bishops Ulama Forum was organized by the Mindanao Catholic bishops and the Ulama League of the Philippines in reaction to the emergence of the SPCPD. Both sides emphasized the importance of peace and development notwithstanding religious affiliation and called

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for dialogues among religious groups. The Office of the Secretariat of the Bishops Ulama Forum is located in Iligan City, Philippines. Among its major activities are the monthly regular meetings of the Bishops and Ulama and the conduct of a series of culture of peace seminars among educators, lay and religious workers, youth, administrators of schools and universities in Mindanao.

Peace Education in Notre Dame University and Other Institutions At present, the Notre Dame University in Cotabato City is the main center for peace and development studies in Mindanao. It grants degrees (MA, PhD, EdD) in peace and development. Its graduate program is now operating in consortium with Ateneo de Zamboanga in Zamboanga City, Ateneo de Davao in Davao City, Xavier University in Cagayan de Oro City and Mindanao State University in Marawi City. It also maintains a Peace Education Center that provides training on peace education for teachers and helps other educational institutions with curriculum development and peace related research. It also offers skills training in facilitation, dialogue, mediation and other nonviolent, pro-active and creative ways of resolving conflict and building peace.

Catholic Initiatives Peace advocates and peace organizations continue to emerge in the different regions of Mindanao. In Zamboanga City, PAZ or Peace Advocates Zamboanga was organized and its Muslim counterpart was the SALAM or Social Amelioration and Literacy Agenda for Muslim Foundation. In Marbel, South Cotabato, the Catholic Diocese of Marbel integrated peace education as a component in its Basic Ecclesiastical Community (BEC) while the archdiocese of Davao organized the Archdiocesan Center for Ecumenical and Inter-religious Dialogue (ACEID).


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The Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and the Mennonite Central Committee had established the Mindanao Peace Building Institute in Davao City. Among their objectives is to provide extensive in-depth training and education on various approaches, theories and practices in the field of conflict transformation and peace building. Its trainors and facilitators include professors coming from the famous summer Peace Building Institute of the Eastern Mennonite University and experts from Mindanao.

Kalinaw Mindanaw In July 1996, after a conference of peace advocates and educators at the South East Asia Rural Leadership Institute (SEARSOLIN), Xavier University, Cagayan de Oro City, jointly hosted by the Mindanao Support and Communication Center for Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (MINCARRD) and the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP), Kalinaw Mindanaw was established. It is a movement committed to the propagation of the culture of peace. Since then, Kalinaw Mindanaw has been in the forefront of peace advocacy and in the promotion of peace culture in Mindanao.

Some Concluding Remarks The paper shows that the on-going ethnic and religious conflict in Southern Philippines is basically a political conflict between the Bangsamoro people and the Philippine government. This conflict is not a contemporary development but is a part of the continuing struggle of the Bangsamoro people for self-determination. They had been in constant struggle against every attempt from outside forces (e.g. colonialism, imperialism and now the Philippine government) to destroy their way of life and to deny their freedom and independence. Historically, the Bangsamoro people has been the most progressive population of the Philippine archipelago before the coming of the colonizers. In fact, they were already organized into two autonomous states. This can be proven by the evidence of the organization of the Bangsamoro sultanates in Mindanao, Sulu and

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Palawan. The sultanates had already perfected the requisites of an organized nation state using even the modern requirements of a nation-state ¾ people, territory, government and sovereignty. At present, the Bangsamoro people claim that they are being denied their right to self-determination by the Philippine government. This had started way back in 1946 when they were arbitrarily incorporated into the Philippine Republic with its newly restored independence together with the other ethnic and religious minorities in the archipelago. As a result of this political arrangement, their once sovereign states were reduced into mere provinces of the Republic. This development signaled the intensification of their economic marginalization and political subordination. From 1946 to 1976, the Philippine government policy vis-à-vis the Bangsamoro assertion of their right to self-determination has been based on its general policy of national integration. The main objective of this policy was to assimilate and integrate them into the mainstream of the Philippine body politics. To make this policy operational, the Commission of National Integration, the Mindanao State University, the Mindanao Development Authority and other related agencies were established to oversee the overall national integration program of the government. After more than two decades of operation, these various agencies failed miserably in their tasks to bring about the meaningful integration of the Bangsamoro people into the mainstream of the Philippine society. In 1976, a remarkable shift in the Philippine government’s formula on the ethnic conflict in Mindanao started to take place. With the signing of the Tripoli Agreement on December 23, 1976, the Marcos government adopted the policy of granting political autonomy or selfgovernment in relation to the Bangsamoro people. There were two significant factors that contributed to the evolution of the Philippine policy on the Bangsamoro question from integration/assimilation to political autonomy. First, the political and economic pressures brought about the emergence of the Moro National Liberation Front. Second, the OIC or the Organization of Islamic Conference, an organization of all Islamic states in the world has been pressuring the Philippine


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government since 1972, to succumb to the demands of the Bangsamoro people. The OIC pressures take the form of economic and diplomatic offensive against the Philippine government. An example of the OIC economic pressure on the Philippine government happened during the world-wide oil crisis in the 1970’s. The Islamic Middle Eastern countries which were mostly OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) members, threatened an oil embargo if the Marcos government will not do something with the struggle of the Bangsamoro people. The Tripoli Agreement, which has promised meaningful political autonomy for the Bangsamoro, was unfortunately not implemented. Instead, the Marcos government created its own version of autonomy in Southern Philippines. This led to the establishment of two autonomous governments which also failed in bringing about the socio-economic upliftment of the Bangsamoro masses and in ensuring the right to self-determination of the people in Southern Philippines. The failure of the two autonomous governments can be attributed to two main factors, to wit: 1 . Its implementation was a unilateral act of the Philippine government without the important participation of the Bangsamoro Armed groups, especially the MNLF. Many sectors in the Philippine society acknowledge that any solution to the ethnic conflict in Mindanao without the participation of the Bangsamoro Armed revolutionary groups will be ineffective. 2. The two autonomous governments possessed no substantial economic and political functions and, in reality, will only serve as an extension of the Office of the President of the Republic of the Philippines. Some political observers claim that the powers vested in the autonomous government will not even allow the Bangsamoro people to exercise, at the minimum, their right to selfdetermination. For instance, it cannot even execute their own laws and resolutions for they have no police power. Their presence was not even felt among the majority of the Bangsamoro people. The Aquino government also ardently pursued a political solution to the Bangsamoro issues. Its initial step in the establishment of the

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regional autonomy in the Bangsamoro homeland was to negotiate with the Bangsamoro secessionist groups, especially the MNLF. Unfortunately, after a series of peace negotiations, here and abroad, the Aquino government and the MNLF failed to come up with a more acceptable agreement. Like the Marcos government, the Aquino administration also implemented its own version of political autonomy in the Bangsamoro homeland even without the participation of the MNLF and the other Bangsamoro secessionist groups. In fact, the Aquino government was responsible for the institutionalization of the establishment of the Regional Autonomous Government not only in the Bangsamoro homeland but also in the Cordillera region with the ratification of the 1987 constitution, sometimes known as the “Cory constitution”. After the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, a new congress was elected which enacted an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). It was subjected to a plebiscite on November 19, 1989. However, only four provinces – Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi voted for their inclusion in this new autonomy set-up. Proudly, the Aquino government declared this legislation as its main blueprint for peace in Mindanao. This political exercise was also considered as the government’s compliance with the spirit of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement. As expected, the MNLF vehemently rejected it since they had no part in the process of drawing up the autonomy law. They also believe that the autonomous region had very little real power and the plebiscite had reduced the autonomous region from thirteen (13) to only four (4) composite provinces. Moreover, these four provinces are among the poorest in the country. Compared with the previous government, these initiatives were improvements but they were inadequate responses to the conditions that cause the Bangsamoro to fight the government. The new autonomy Organic Act did not give the Bangsamoro people the opportunities to redress the suffering and insecurities arising from economic marginalization and political subordination. Therefore, similar to the Marcos inspired autonomous structures, the ARMM failed as a political response to the Bangsamoro struggle for self-determination.


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The Ramos government and the MNLF signed the Final Peace Agreement that puts into effect the provisions of the 1976 Tripoli Accord. The implementation of the Agreement was to come up in two phases. The first phase led to the creation of a Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) in southern Philippines and the establishment of Southern Philippine Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) and Consultative Assembly. This also resulted into the election of Nur Misuari as governor of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). In addition, substantial numbers of the MNLF mujahedeen were integrated into the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police. The second phase was the expansion of the present autonomous government (ARMM) after the plebiscite. However, the unofficial results of the August 14, 2001, plebiscite indicate that this part of the agreement is doomed to fail since only one province and one city voted for inclusion in the expanded ARMM. In fact, earlier the MNLF boycotted the said political exercise claiming this was a violation of the 1996 Peace Agreement. Nonetheless, by the signing of the 1996 Peace Accord, the MNLF agreed to end its revolutionary struggle and its leadership joined the mainstream of the Philippine political formula for Mindanao. Meanwhile, a common sentiment among the majority of the populations of Mindanao is that even if the final peace agreement will be fully implemented, several fundamental issues will remain unsettled: war reparations, economic redistribution, conflicting land claims and land reform, relations with national government and most of all, the representation and rights of Lumads and Christians in a Bangsamoro ruled autonomous region. The challenge to the various stakeholders of peace will continue to prevail despite of the so many efforts and initiatives poured in the Bangsamoro homeland until acceptable terms can be reached.

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End Notes Privilege Speech. “To Win the Peace, To Build the Nation” by Representative Eduardo R. Ermita (1st District, Batangas), House of Representatives, Republic of the Philippines, July 23, 1996. 2 Eduardo C. Tadem, Mindanao Report: Preliminary Study on the Economic Origin of Social Unrest (Davao City: AFRIM Resource Center, 1980), p. 3. 3 One of the commercial crops that flourished during this period was banana. Export banana plantations are occupying approximately 25,000 hectares of very fertile land of the Bangsamoro Homeland. 1978, banana ranked 9th in the year’s list of the top ten exports. However, the banana industry flourished under the aegis of foreign companies, most of which were affiliated with them. See Randolf David et al., “Transnational Corporations and the Philippine Banana Export Industry.” (Third World Studies Center: University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City) Commodity Series No. 2, 1981, pp. 44-11 (Mimeographed). 4 The May 1980 issue of the World Metal Statistics reports that the Philippines ranks as the World’s 9th and 16th largest producer of copper and gold respectively. Both gold and copper are first 2 biggest exported metals, followed by nickel, cobalt, chromite and silver, in that order. Japan, U.S., South Korea, Netherlands, and Taiwan are the largest importers of Philippine mineral commodities. See Balai Asian Journal, Vol. 2, No. 1, (March, 1981), p. 17. 5 As in the banana industry, foreign interests or capital is also present in the country’s wood industry. The presence of the U.S.-based transnational corporations engaged in wood processing and paper production is increasingly being felt in Southern Asia. Three of these TNCs have investments in the Philippine wood industry, while one is operating a logging firm in Mindanao. These U.S.-based companies are International paper corporations, Georgia Pacific Corporation, and Weyerheuser Company. See “TNCs in Forestry,” Balai Asian Journal, Vol. 2, No. 3 (September 1981), pp. 16-17. 6 Tadem, Mindanao Report, pp. 63-64. 7 Ibid., p. 93. 8 Jainal D. Rasul, The Philippine Muslim: Struggle for Identity (Manila: Nueva Era Press, 1970), p. 23. 9 Peter G. Gowing, Muslim Filipinos-Heritage and Horizon (Quezon City: Day Publishers, 1979), p. 14. 10 The 1981 Philippine Yearbook estimated that there were 4.5 million Bangsamoro. As for the Bangsamoro, the Moro Research Group cited 3 million, while the Institute of Islamic Studies at UP cited 5 million. Ibon Facts and Figures, No. 76 (October 15, 1981) reported 2,504,233. The MNLF in its latest survey (1988) cited 8 million Bangsamoro Muslim and 5 million Lumad inhabitants of the Bangsamoro Homeland. 11 The name “Lumad”, according to Rudy Rodil, grew out of the political 1


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awakening among the various Lumad tribes during the exploitative and repressive Martial Law regime in the archipelago. Earlier, outsiders labeled them with various names. The Spaniards call them “Paganos” or simply by their tribal identities. The Americans called them “wild tribes” or “cultural minorities” while others referred to them as “nitibo”, or “tagabundok”. The various social action agencies of the Catholic and Protestant churches call them “Tribal Filipinos”. Seemingly Rodil stresses, in their efforts to protect their basic interests they discovered greater commonality among themselves as generally deprived and marginalized with the need for a common identity that will serve as an ideological force. Thus, the name “Lumad” was adopted. 12 B.R. Rodil, The History of the Moro People and the Lumad Communities of Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan in Questions and Answers, MSU-IIT, Iligan City, 1988), pp. 6-7, Mimeographed edition, Rodil – 1988 hereafter. 13 B. R. Rodil, “Reflections on the Moro Right to Self-Determination,” Lecture delivered at the First Assembly of the Ranao Development Forum, Marawi City, May 18-19, 1985, p. 2. Also cited in Jamail A. Kamlian, “The MNLF and the Emergence of the Bangsamoro Identity Among the Muslim Minority in Southern Philippines: A Historical Perspective,” A Paper presented at the 16th Annual Conference of ASEASUK, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, April 24-26, 1996, p. 8. 14 Rodil – 1988, p. 5. 15 James F. Warren, The Sulu Zone 1968 – 1898: The Dynamics of External Trade, Slavery, and Ethnicity in the Transformation of a Southeast Asian Maritime State (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1985). 16 Ibid. 17 Abraham P. Sakili, “Towards Bridging the Gap and Crossing the Bridge in Muslim-Christian Relations in the Philippines, A paper prepared for the 18th National Conference on Local and National History, Jolo, Sulu, October 23-26, 1997, p. 22. 18 Ibid., p. 22. 19 Horacio de la Costa, S. J., “Muhammad Alimuddin I 1745-1773,” Philippine Historical Review, Vol. 1., No. 1, p. 97. Also cited in Sakili, 1997, p. 22. 20 Sakili, 1997, p. 20. 21 Cesar Adib Majul, Muslims in the Philippines (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1973), pp. 172-175. 22 Rodil, A Primer on the Moro History…, pp. 6-7. 23 Rodil – 1988, pp. 5-6. 24 Rad D. Silva, Two Hills of the Same Land: Truth Behind the Mindanao Problem (privately printed, 1978), p. 11. 25 T. S. J. George, Revolt in Mindanao: The Rise of Islam in the Philippine Politics (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 44-45. 26 Najeeb M. Saleeby, The History of Suly (Manila: Filipiniana Book Guild, Inc., 1963), p. 20.

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One may find the details of the Spanish-Moro War in any standard works on the Bangsamoro history. See for example Cesar A. Majul’s Muslims in the Philippines (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1973) and Gowing, 1979. 28 Sakili, 1997, p. 17. 29 Rodil, 1988, p. 7. 30 Ibid., p. 7. 31 Ibid. 32 Majul, 1973, pp. 119-123. 33 Majul, ibid., p. 315. 34 In spite of the military power of the U.S. imperialists, it was only after more than a decade of widespread resistance that they were able to subjugate the Bangsamoro people. See Gowing’s Mandate in Moroland: The American Government of Muslim Filipinos, 1899-1920 (Quezon City: PCAS University of the Philippines, 1977), pp. 77-105 for the details of the American-Moro War. 35 As quoted in George, 1980, p. 52. 36 Moro Research Group. ‘The Moro people’s struggle for national selfdetermination’, Unpublished monograph, no date, p. 8. 37 Ibid., p. 8. 38 Ibid., p. 9. 39 Aijas Ahmad, ‘Class and Colony in Mindanao: Political Economy of the National Question’, Unpublished Manuscript, May-June 1980, p. 17. 40 Abdurasad Asani, representative of the MNLF, his speech at the Oil Workers’ Anti-Monopolistic World Conference, Tripoli, Libya, 26-30 March 1986. The conference was sponsored by the General Trade Union of Petroleum, Petro Chemicals and Minerals of the Socialist Peoples’ Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. 41 Silva, pp. 35-40. 42 Ibid., p. 40. 43 George, ibid., p. 45. 44 Silva, ibid., p. 45. 45 Ibid., p. 78. 46 Ahmad, ibid., p. 17. 47 Ibid., p. 16. 48 Ibid. 49 Silva, ibid., p. 24. 50 Gowing, 1979, p. 172. 51 Silva, 1978, p. 18. 52 Philippine Muslim News (Manila), Vol. 2, No. 2, July 1968, pp. 7-12, also cited in Abdurasad Asani’s “The Bangsamoro People: A Nation in Travail”, Unpublished Monograph, no date, p. 11. 53 Ibid., p. 11. 54 Peter G. Gowing, Mandate in Moroland: The American Government of Muslim Filipinos, 1899-1920 (Quezon City: PCAS, University of the Philippines, 1977) pp. 151-152. 27


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An average income by region can be seen in the Philippine Yearbook, 1985 (Manila, NCSO), as quoted in Mindanao Focus, No. 10, August 1986, p. 8. See also George’s Mindanao Revolt…, pp. 224-225 for more details on the economic conditions of the Bangsamoro masses from 1972 to 1985. 55 For the details on the multinationals’ extensive control over the Bangsamoro economy, see Eduardo C. Tadem, Mindanao Report: A Preliminary Study on the Economic Origins of Social Unrest (Davao City: AFRIM Resource Center, 1980). 56 Ahmad, 1980, p. 21. 57 Jose A. Lomongo, ‘OIC Support to the MNLF: Its Effect on the Moro Problem in Southern Philippines’, Unpublished term paper, Asian Center, UP, Diliman, Quezon City (1988), pp. 10-11. See Lela G. Noble, “The Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines,” in The Southern Philippines Issue: Readings on the Mindanao Problems, Vol. 1 (Marawi City: Mindanao State University, November, 1979), pp. 101-102. 58 Gowing, 1979, pp. 164-198. 59 House Bill 5682, House of Representatives. 60 On May 1, 1968, the MIM manifesto was issued at Pagalungan, Cotabato. It called for the establishment of Islamic State out of the Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan regions. 61 Alunan C. Glang, Muslim: Secession or Integration? (Manila: Cardinal Book Store, 1971), pp. 91-92. 62 In the memorandum appended to the MIM Manifesto, quoted in Glang, Muslim: Secession or Integration?, p. 92. 63 The Jabidah affair was allegedly a secret military training of the Bangsamoro youth who will be sent to invade Sabah. This was also believed to be a secret operation of the Philippine Government against foreign infiltration in Mindanao. See George, Mindanao Revolt…, pp. 224225, and Glang, Muslim Secession or Integration? Pp. 94-104 for more details on the Jabidah massacre. 64 George, 1980, p. 123. 65 Ibid., p. 127. 66 MNLF Manifesto, April 28, 1974. 67 B. R. Rodil, ‘Autonomy for the Moro People: Its Implications on the Tribal Filipinos and the Christian Populations of Mindanao’. Paper delivered at the panel discussion series on the Moro People’s Right to Self-determination, Romulo Hall, Asian Center, UP, Diliman Quezon City, 19 August 1986, p. 2. 68 MNLF Manifesto, April 28, 1974. 69 In ‘Philippines: Repression and Resistance’, quoted in Rodil, “Reflections on the Moro…,” 1985, p. 4. 70 Abdurasad Asani, “The Moro Problem in South Philippines,” The Asean Review, August 1986. 71 Letter of Salamat Hashim (chairman of the MILF) to Dr. Ahmadre Karim Gaye, Secretary General of the OIC (Organization of Islamic Conference, December 24, 1977. 55

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Salamat Hashim, The Bangsamoro Mujahid: His Objectives and Responsibilities (Mindanao: Bangsamoro Publication, 1985). 73 Bernardo V. Lopez, “Filipino Muslim Autonomy and the Malaysian Factor”, Manila Standard, Vol. 11, No. 219, (September 15, 1988), p. 5. He claimed that President Marcos signed the Tripoli Agreement only to get Arab oil during the OIC crisis in the 70’s but never intended to implement it. 74 In 1977, the MNLF was granted “an observer status” by the Organization of Islamic Conference. Observers in the OIC are classified into three categories: States, Muslim Communities, and International or Regional Organization. The MNLF was classified as an observer in the category of Muslim Communities. 75 The official stands for the OIC on the question of the Muslims in the Southern Philippines is reflected in the resolution adopted by the conference during its 12th Islamic Conference held in Baghdad, Iraq, from March 21 to 25, 1981. 76 The MNLF. Peace Betrayed: MNLF-RP Negotiations January 1 to July 25, 1987, p. 1. 77 Ibid., p. 2. 78 Ibid., p. 28. 79 Philippine Government Panel. Aide Memoire on the Mindanao Peace Talks. (Manila, May 1987), pp. 49-70. 80 The MNLF, Peace Betrayed: MNLF-RP…, p. 18. 81 Statement of Ambassador Emmanuel Pelaez, the head of the RP panel after the collapsed of the negotiations with the MNLF. 82 Nur Misuari, “Address of Chairman Misuari of the Moro National Liberation Front before the Plenary Session of the 19th Islamic Conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs” Cairo, Egypt, 31 July – 5 August 1990. Also cited by Federico V. Magdalena “The Peace Process in Mindanao: Problems and Prospects, Southeast Asian Affairs 1997, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1997, p. 250. 83 The 17th Islamic Conference of the Foreign Ministers held in Amman Jordan from 21-25 March 1988, adapted resolution on the question of the Muslims in Southern Philippines, specifically rejected the formation of the RCC and strongly urged the Philippine government to implement the Tripoli Agreement. 84 1996 Final Peace Agreement 85 1996 Final Peace Agreement. 86 1996 Final Peace Agreement 87 B. R. Rodil, Kalinaw Mindanaw: The Story of the GRP-MNLF Peace Process, 1975-1996 (Davao City: AFRIM Resource Center, 2000). p. 82. 88 Status of Implementation of 1996 GRP-MNLF Agreement as of March 2000. Office of the President Adviser on the peace process. p. 1. 89 Naralyn Mustafa, “Autonomy doomed from the start”, Philippine Daily Inquirer (August 26, 2001) P. 13. 90 Ibid. 72

Ethnic And Religeous Conflict In The Philippines 91 92 93

Ibid. Ibid. Rodil, 2000, p. 96.

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Related Readings Ahmad, Aijas. “400 Year War – Moro Struggle in the Philippines”, Southeast Asia Chronicle, Issue No. 82 (February, 1982). _________. “Class and Colony in Mindanao: Political Economy of the National Question.” (New York: Unpublished Manuscript, May – June, 1980). Aquino, Benigno. “The Historical Background of the Bangsamoro Problem in the Southern Philippines”, Lecture delivered at the King Abdulaziz University, Science Auditiorium, Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, May 12, 1981. Asani, Abdurasad. “Imperialist Conspiracy in the Bangsamoro Homeland.’ Speech delivered at the Oil Workers Anti-Monopolists World Conference in Tripoli, Libya, March 26-30, 1980. _________. “The Bangsamoro People: A Nation in Travail,” Unpublished Monograph, no date. _________. “Moros-not Filipinos”, The Diliman Review, Quezon City, vol. 29, no. 2 (March-April 1981). _________. “The Moro Problem in South Philippines”, The Asean Review (August, 1986). Balacuit, Jimmy. “The Muslim Rebellion in the Southern Philippines”. Unpublished Seminar paper, Department of Sociology, U.P., Diliman, Quezon City (1987). Balai Asian Journal, Vol. 2, No. 1 (March 1981). Balai Asian Journal, Vol. 2, No. 3 (September 1981). Clavel, Leothiny S., They Are Also Filipinos: Ten Years with the Cultural Minorities (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1969). Costa, Horacio de la, S. J. “Muhammad Alimuddin I 1745-1773,” Philippine Historical Review, Vol. 1., No. 1. David, Randolf S. et al. “Transnational Corporations and the Philippines Banana Industry,” U.P., Diliman: Third World Studies Center, Commodity Series, No. 8, 1981, Mimeographed. Enloe, Cynthia H., Ethnic Conflict and Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973). Ermita, Eduardo R. “To Win the Peace, To Build the Nation” Privilege speech delivered by Representative Eduardo R. Ermita (1 st District Batangas), House of Representatives, Republic of the Philippines, July 23, 1996. Frank, Gunder Andre, Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1969). George, T.SJ., Revolt in Mindanao: The Rise of Islam in the Philippine Politics (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1980). Glang, Alunan C., Muslim: Secession or Integration? (Manila: Cardinal Book Store, 1971). Gowing, Peter G., Muslim Filipinos-Heritage and Horizon (Quezon City: Day Publishers, 1979).


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Hashim, Salamat, The Bangsamoro Mujahid: His Objectives and Responsibilities (Mindanao: Bangsamoro Publication, 1985). Kamlian, Jamail A. The MNLF and the Emergence of the Bangsamoro Identity Among the Muslim Minority in Southern Philippines: A Historical Perspective. A paper presented at the 16th Annual Conference of ASEASUK, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, April 24-26, 1996. Lomongo, Jose A. IOC Support to the MNLF: Its Effect on the Moro Problem in Southern Philippines. Unpublished term paper, Asian Center, UP, Diliman, Quezon City (1988). Lopez, Bernardo V. ‘Filipino Muslim Autonomy and the Malaysian Factor’, Manila Standard, Vol. 11, No. 219 (September 15, 1988). Majul, Cesar Adib., Muslims in the Philippines (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1973). Moro Research Group. The Moro People’s Struggle for National SelfDetermination. Unpublished monograph, no date. Mustafa, Naralyn. “Autonomy Doomed from the Start”, Philippine Daily Inquirer (August 26, 2001). Philippine Government Panel. Aide Memoire on the Mindanao Peace Talks (Manila, May 1987). Philippine Muslim News (Manila), Vol. 2, No. 2, July 1968. Rasul, Jainal D., The Philippine Muslim: Struggle for Identity (Manila: Nueva Era Press, 1970). Rodil, B.R. “Autonomy for the Bangsamoro People: Its Implication on the Tribal Filipinos and the Christian Populations in Mindanao.” (Paper delivered at the Panel Discussion Series on the Moro People’s Right to Self-Determination, Romulo Hall, Asian Center, U.P. Diliman: Quezon City, August 19, 1986). _________. “The Moro Struggle From a Global Perspective,” Sandugo, 1986 Issue. _________. “Reflection on the Moro Right to Self-Determinations, (Paper delivered at the First Assembly of Ranao Development Forum, Marawi City, May 18-19, 1985). _________. “A Primer on the History of the Moro People and Lumadnon of Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan,” MSU-IIT, Iligan City, March 1988. Mimeographed. _________. “The History of the Moro People and the Lumad Communities of Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan in Questions and Answers”. MSU-IIT, Iligan City, 1988, pp. 6-7, Mimeographed edition. _________ Kalinaw Mindanaw: The Story of the GRP-MNLF Peace Process, 1975-1996. (Davao City: AFRIM Resource Center, 2000). Saber, Mamitua. “The Majority – Minority Situation in the Philippines,” Solidarity, Vol. X., No. 6, (July – August, 1975). Sakili, Abraham P. “Towards Bridging the Gap and Crossing the Bridge in Muslim-Christian Relations in the Philippines. A Paper prepared for the 18th National Conference on Local and National History, Jolo Sulu, October 23, 16, 1997.

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Saleeby, Najeeb., The History of Sulu (Manila: Filipiniana Book Guild, Inc., 1963). Salgado, Geoffrey G. “Development Policies for Muslim Mindanao in the Pre-Martial Law Period (1955-1971): Historical Notes on their Origin and Implementation,” (A Paper read during the 7 th National Conference on Local and National History on November 29 – December 1, 1985, Surigao City). Shukri, Mohammad Aziz., The Concept of Self-Determination in the United Nations (Damascus, Syria: Al Jadidah Press, 1965). Silva, Rad D., Two Hills of the Same Land: Truth Behind the Mindanao Problem (Privately printed, 1978). Tadem, Eduardo C., Mindanao Report: A Preliminary Study of the Economic Origin of Social Unrest (Davao City: AFRIM Resource Center, 1980). Tan, Samuel K., The Filipino Muslim Armed Struggle 1900 – 1972 (Filipinas Foundaiton, Inc. 1977). __________. “Decolonization and Filipino Muslim Identity,” Philippine Social Science Review (January-December 1984). The 1991 Philippine Yearbook. Wallerstein, Immanuel, The Capitalist World – Economy (London: Cambridge University Press, 1979). Wali, Sali. “A Founding Member Speaks: Birth of the MNLF,” Zamboanga Journal, Vol. 1, No. 4 (July 17, 1980). Warren, James F. The Sulu Zone 1968 – 1998: The Dynamics of External Trade, Slavery, and Ethnicity in the Transformation of a Southeast Asian Maritime State ( Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1985).


In Search Of Commonalities Between Muslim & Christian Filipinos

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In Search Of Commonalities Between Muslim And Christian Filipinos: Political Values, Beliefs And Practices Soliman M. Santos, Jr. Introduction The road to peace in Mindanao involves the search for commonalities between Muslim and Christian Filipinos. These commonalities can help build bridges of understanding along that road. One area of life for this search is political life. As the discussion below will show, the commonalities are not so much in the realm of politico-governmental structures, institutions and processes as they are in the realm of shared ideals, values, and principles. The approach in seeking these commonalities is the comparative method as applied mainly in the discipline of political-constitutional law but not without references to both Holy Books of Muslims and Christians, especially the Qur’an. In the discussion below, the general pattern has been to present the Christian Filipino perspective first, followed by the Muslim Filipino perspective. This should not be seen as privileging the Christian Filipino side. Rather, this largely reflects the need to address the longstanding and documented pattern of more Christian Filipino intolerance towards Muslim Filipinos rather than the other way around. In other words, more peace education work has to be done with Christian Filipinos and, of course, starting with terms of reference familiar to them. When we speak of Christian Filipinos, we refer to mainstream Christian Filipino society, the dominant majority of the Filipino people. For them, political life is not framed by the Bible but by the Philippine Constitution. This has to be the main reference not only because it is the most authoritative embodiment of Filipino ideals and aspirations but also because it is always brought up by the Philippine government in the peace process with the various rebel

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groups. Aside from the Constitution, the discussion below makes use of other Filipino references, like notably the report of the National Unification Commission. This writer comes from a Christian Filipino background, who has studied as well as has had personal knowledge and familiarity with Philippine politics and governance. My knowledge and familiarity is much less when it comes to Muslim politics and governance, despite having done some study on this. But such study has made me familiar with the related literature, as I hope the end notes will show. In discussing the Muslim Filipino perspective, I have referred as much as possible to the writings of Muslim Filipino intellectuals and legal minds who, of course, usually cite the relevant Qur’anic verses. As term of reference for politics and governance, the Qur’an is to the Muslim Filipino as the Constitution is to the Christian Filipino. In addition to the writings of intellectuals, I have sought to understand and discuss the Muslim Filipino perspective from the cutting-edge prism of the two Moro liberation fronts and their leading ideologues. After all, the peace agreements (themselves embodying commonalities) and negotiations with them are very much part of the broader Mindanao peace process which also involves healing the cleavages between Muslim and Christian Filipinos. Only in the absence of Muslim Filipino writings on specific points have I resorted to related foreign literature on Islam and Islamic revivalism. Our discussion here emphasizes commonalities, but also acknowledges differences, between Muslim and Christian Filipinos in terms of political beliefs, concepts and practices. We considered only positive commonalities, not negatives ones, like patronage politics. It simply will not do to build bridges on faulty foundations. Each of the twenty or so commonalities we have found can be the subject of whole dissertations. We have tried to simplify and shorten the discussion in order to initially communicate the essential ideas which may then be pursued with further research or, if already deemed valid enough, developed into popular form.


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1. Pluralism and Tolerance Belief in a pluralistic Filipino society is one of the “values, principles and convictions which we all share.”1 After all, the Philippines has been described as “a singular and a plural place,”2 with as many as a hundred ethno-linguistic groups though eight major groups of Westernized Christian lowlanders are the dominant 86% majority of the population.3 Thus, it is no wonder that one of the three principles underlying the peace process as formulated by the National Unification Commission (NUC) in 1993 was this: “The peace process seeks to forge a new social compact for a just, equitable, humane and pluralistic society… It seeks to establish a genuinely pluralistic political society, where all individuals and groups are free to engage in peaceful competition for predominance of their political programs without fear, through the exercise of rights and liberties guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and where they may compete for political power through an electoral system that is free, fair and honest.”4 There is also an Islamic perspective on pluralism.5 The Islamic system itself evolved partly through democratic pluralism with its themes of tolerance, dissent and social justice. 6 Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Chairman Salamat Hashim accepts “pluralism within one Muslim political entity… Islam tolerates not only different Islamic groups but also other religions and ideologies. Christians, communists and pagans, etc. can live freely under an Islamic state.”7 Hashim himself cites the main Qur’anic verse basis for this: “O mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female and made you into nations and tribes that ye may know each other (not that ye may despise each other).” (Surah 49:13) The highlight of this is the Qur’anic phrase li-ta’arafu (know each other). Pluralism connotes tolerance for, if not understanding of, other political, cultural and religious persuasions, including “opinions that we loathe.”8 Toleration (tolerance), together with justice and nondiscrimination, are the particular principles on which Islamic civilization is founded, according to the Preamble of the Charter of the Islamic Conference,9 in which the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) has observer status. The General Framework of Agreement

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of Intent between the Philippine government and the MILF advocated “tolerance for the identity, culture, way of life and aspirations of all the peoples of Mindanao.”10 This is as good as it gets to the ideal of unity in diversity.

2. Religious Freedom Religious pluralism and tolerance have their firm legal or normative basis in freedom of religion. In Philippine constitutional law, “Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator.”11 The Bill of Rights of the 1987 Philippine Constitution guarantees that “The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed.” (Art. III, Sec. 5) Likewise, in the Qur’an, the famous injunction is “Let there be no compulsion in religion.” (Surah 11:256) Interestingly, the MILF has framed the Bangsamoro vision of an Islamic state as part of Muslim faith belief which “squarely falls within the ambit of the freedom of religion that is enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. The United Nations Charter also recognizes this pursuant to the right of the people especially the minorities to choose their religious, political, social, cultural way of life.”12 At this point, however, we must acknowledge the big difference between the Muslim and Christian Filipino paradigms on religious freedom and religion itself in relation to politics and governance. In Islam, there is integration of din wa dawla (religion and state), with the Islamic state ideal of having Islam as the state religion. In the Philippine constitutional system, there is the inviolable principle of separation of Church and State (Art. II, Sec. 6) and the non-passage of laws establishing a religion (Art. III, Sec. 5).

3. Democratic Consultation The essence of democracy is rule by the people or consent of the governed. Because the people are plural, pluralism is very much an


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aspect of democracy. Another major aspect is people’s participation or empowerment in governance. The most important provision in the 1987 Philippine Constitution is the declared principle that “Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.” (Art. II, Sec. 1) What is new in the 1987 Constitution is the recognition of and provisions for direct democracy like initiative and referendum to propose laws (Art. VI, Sec. 32) and constitutional amendments (Art. XVII, Sec. 32), participation of people and people’s organizations at all levels of social, political and economic decisionmaking (Art. XIII, Sec. 16), and adequate consultation mechanisms (Art. XIII, Sec. 16). In an Islamic political system, shura (consultation) is the main methodology or process prescribed by the Qur’an for the exercise of power, including subordinate legislation, in a state where there is mutual trust and togetherness among “those who conduct their affairs by mutual consultation” (Surah 42:38). It is obligatory for rulers, and participation therein is both a right and a duty of citizens, whose views “would appear to be binding.”13 The Islamic system also evolved through consensual democracy which was consultative in nature.14 For MILF Chair Hashim, shura is not only one of two foundations (the other being tawhid, or the absolute oneness of God) of the Islamic political system; it is also one of three principles (the others being justice and equality) of governance.15 Former UP Islamic Institute Dean, now election commissioner, Mehol K. Sadain highlights shura as a mechanism for the political empowerment of Muslims in the Philippines in the context of shari’ah (Islamic law) implementation as a solution to the Mindanao conflict,16 and as an important Islamic angle in alternative approaches toward structural change in Muslim Mindanao.17 Again, at this point, we must acknowledge the fundamentally different Muslim and Christian Filipino paradigms on sovereignty. For the latter, it is sovereignty of the people; for the former, it is sovereignty of Allah (hakimiyya) which is a ramification of the doctrine of tawhid, “the bedrock, essence and the key concept in Islam.”18 In contraposition to democracy, Islamists pose “nomocracy” or “theo-

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democracy.” The former is that which is governed by God’s law, a divine legal order,19 while the latter “rests upon the twin principles of the sovereignty of God and the caliphate of Man.”20 These are part of the continuing discourse of the compatibility or incompatibility of Islam and democracy, itself a contested concept.21 At the level of the grassroots Muslim Filipino community, the term itself “democracy” is “hardly understood… (but) concepts and practices of democracy and citizenship which conform with Islamic prescription and the needs of the concrete situation are bound to be accepted in the Muslim community.” 22

4. Republicanism and Vox Populi Under the 1987 Constitution, “The Philippines is a democratic and republican state.” (Art. II, Sec. 1) This means a state wherein government authority is exercised by representatives chosen by the people through periodic elections. It is in this aspect a representative democracy. According to a voice of resurgent Islam, “One can call an Islamic state a republic since the shari’ah rules out usurpation and [hereditary] succession as grounds of political legitimacy… In a large Islamic state, consultation would have to be indirect, undertaken by representatives of the people… So the ulama [the learned] posed as the representatives of the people and maintained that their consensus was a form of indirect representation… It follows that an Islamic order of government is essentially a form of representative democracy.”23 But while in the Philippine constitutional system the people are the ultimate principal, in the Islamic political system the people are themselves only the agent, representative or vicegerent of Allah as the ultimate principal, pursuant to the concept of khilafat (vicegerency of man). This vicegerency is bestowed by the Qur’an on the whole community of believers, and “this is the point where democracy begins in Islam… What distinguishes Islamic democracy from Western democracy, therefore, is that the latter is based on the concept of popular sovereignty, while the latter rests on the principle of popular (vicegerency).” 24


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Following the general law of agency, in so far as the agent is within its authority and can speak for and bind the principal, then the voice of the people is the voice of God: vox populi, vox dei. This is the closest reconciliation that can be made between the conflicting principles of sovereignty of the people and sovereignty of Allah. Incidentally, the said Latin maxim appears in the official seal of the Commission on Elections (notwithstanding the Church-State separation principle). Muslim Filipino lawyer-scholar Michael O. Mastura, while discussing the Islamic republic, notes that “Quite contrary to the Islamic Caliphs who were elected from a system of consensus, the Malay culture permitted a model of hereditary succession.”25 The latter would include the Moro traditional political institutions of sultanate and datuship, which represented nobility or royalty, itself another difference with Christian Filipinos. The 1987 Philippine Constitution prohibits laws granting a title of royalty or nobility (Art. VI, Sec. 31), a provision which was in no less than the Bill of Rights of both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, and described as “the cornerstone of. republican government.”26 It will be recalled that the seminal Manifesto of the MNLF was on the establishment of the “Bangsa Moro Republik.”27 And interestingly, Mastura describes the MILF as “an Islamic reformist movement (which) visualizes the people as a political force that in essence resembles a republican system.”28 At the same time, MILF Chair Hashim once clarified that “it is not, as some quarters mistakenly believe, an anti-Christian movement nor is it intended to upset the traditional sensibilities of ‘Datuism’.”29 How does one reconcile sultanate and datuship with republicanism? Mastura suggests that this might be restored by distinguishing the head of state from the head of government, such as along the lines of Malaysia’s constitutional monarchy.30 Datu Norodin Alonto Lucman, for one, proposes the restoration of the sultanates to “work as parallel institutions in partnership with the National Government. The Sultanates will focus on conflict resolution in addition to providing traditional remedies to socio-economic problems in the Muslim provinces. Sultanates provide for social and political cohesion in the Muslim communities.”31 In recent times,

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there have been Kadatuan conferences to explore the sociocultural potential of the datuship as part of the ancient cultural heritage basis of Filipino nationalism.32

5. Human Rights Human rights as a core value, like democracy, is well established in the 1987 Philippine Constitution, itself often referred to as a “human rights constitution,” which has a state policy that “The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.” (Art. II, Sec. 11) and provides for a Commission on Human Rights (Art. XIII, Secs. 17-19). Among these human rights are, of course, the fundamental freedoms which are given special constitutional status in the Bill of Rights (Art. III). “The Islamic tradition of rules limiting the power of the sovereign is much older than the concept of constitutional law in the secular West.”33 Christians can also trace a human rights tradition back to the Old Testament, deepened and strengthened by the teaching of Christ: “as summarized in the Sermon on the Mount, he shows us a way of life which is true to our human dignity, where human rights are protected and nurtured.”34 The Catholic human rights tradition is grounded in the dignity of the human person which is based on Imago Dei, being made in the image and likeness of God (Genesis 1:26-27).35 There has likewise been a discourse, abroad as well as increasingly in the Philippines led by Muslim Filipino intellectuals, on Islam and human rights, including on human rights in Islam.36 In addition to the Qur’an which contains general statements on the rights of human beings, there are now modern Islamic human rights instruments like the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights (1981)37 and the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (1990). 38 CHR Commissioner Nasser A. Marohomsalic says that the latter is generally in accord with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, with several exceptions. Citing authorities, he says “In Islam, human rights are granted and sanctioned by God and are an integral part of faith. They are binding divine commandments and their observance is an act of worship and their neglect or violation an abominable sin.”39 Former


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UP Islamic Institute Dean Wadja K. Esmula points out that the Islamic perspective on human rights is indeed “theocentric” while the Western perspective is “anthropocentic.”40 Another important difference in perspective or approach is noted by Sadain: “… the Qur’anic moral stress on the performance of duties instead of the demand for rights. Hence, many of the human rights injunctions in the Holy Qur’an are expressed in terms of one’s duties to fellow beings.”41 Notwithstanding these different perspectives on human rights between Muslim and Christian Filipinos, Mastura endorses a human rights-based approach to governance for peace and development in Mindanao.42 There are still more commonalities than differences in the matter of human rights. In fact, its being perhaps the most promising common ground is reflected in the General Framework of Agreement of Intent between the Philippine government and the MILF: “The Parties affirm their commitment to protect and respect human rights in accordance with the principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”43

6. Minority Rights Minority rights are part of the international human rights regime. At the same time, minority rights are the other side of majority rule which together constitute the democratic coin, as it were. This majority-minority dialectic is axiomatic as far as the democratic tradition is concerned, including in the Philippines. In fact, in democratic theory, the Bill of Rights is seen as the main anti-majoritarian safeguard for unpopular minorities. Respect for the minority and its rights has been further bolstered by further development around the general rule of international law that “In those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language.”44 Pope John Paul II once said that a nation is judged by the way it treats its ethnic minority. The Moros (Muslim Filipinos) are both an ethno-linguistic minority and a religious minority.

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In Islam, there is a tradition regarding the status of the dhimmis (protected non-Muslim minorities) which “went beyond mere tolerance to positive acceptance of others as a matter of religious devotion. The protection of non-Muslims and the guaranteeing of their various rights under the shari’ah was not only a matter of legal provisions or constitutional guarantees; it was an act of worship. Failing to uphold it was a sin as well as a crime punishable by law. Upholding it, on the other hand, was an act of piety and religious devotion through which Muslims, individually and collectively, hoped to merit divine approval and heavenly reward.”45 A non-Muslim has the same rights and privileges as Muslims in an Islamic system except holding the highest offices like head of state and chief of the army.46 MILF Chair Hashim justifies this by arguing that a non-Muslim cannot be expected to perform functions which call for the promotion, preservation and defense of Islam.47 In an Islamic polity though, the majority-minority pattern is not ideal because the ideal is ijma (consensus) achieved through shura. “That is not to say that decisions have to await a unanimous vote, because this could paralyze the government. But people can deliberate openly and argue and consult to ultimately reach a consensus and not simply assert or submit to a majority opinion.”48

7. International Law The foregoing discussion of human rights and minority rights already indicates a role for international law as a possible common ground, a sufficient core of agreement, or at least a legal lingua franca in the context of peace negotiations, particularly between the Philippine government and the MILF. Their General Framework of Agreement of Intent already mentions particular international legal instruments as terms of reference. Mastura, in his deep studies exploring constitutional structures for the Muslim community, concludes that “The context of the Philippine Constitution is a narrow framework in which to argue for self-determination and only an international frame of reference – one involving universal rights – can be the context for negotiated settlement of the Bangsamoro people problem.”49


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Yet, the 1987 Philippine Constitution recognizes the right to selfdetermination, albeit “in its relations with other states” (Art. II, Sec. 7), as well as “adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land” (Art. II, Sec. 2). Among these generally accepted principles are the right to self-determination of all peoples,50 human rights in the Universal Declaration, and pacta sunt servanda (treaties must be observed). Islamic law experts conclude that such principles are not contradictory with siyar (Islamic international law and relations) and that “acceptance of general principles of law by Islamic States does not provide any evidence of their Europeanization, Westernization or secularization as similar general principles of law are common to Islam and other legal systems, religions and philosophies.”51 The early Manifesto of the MNLF on the establishment of the Bangsa Moro Republik declared “That our people and Revolution recognize and adhere to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; and, in addition, they shall respect and adhere to all laws binding upon the nations of the world.”52

8. Rule of Law The rule of law is another axiom of democracy that has been adopted in the Philippines, as reflected in the Preamble of the 1987 Constitution. The concept is expressed in the familiar phrases that “ours is a government of laws and not of men” and that “no one is above the law.” The epitome of the rule of law here is the political doctrine of constitutionalism, the concept of a fundamental law, the constitution, superior to all other laws which must be consistent therewith or at least not violative thereof. The constitution is the supreme norm by which the validity of other laws and acts of government is measured. Constitutional supremacy derives from its direct promulgation by the sovereign people. The Philippines is thus among those characterized as a constitutional democracy. The rule of law is also “one of the main contentions of the Shari’ah.”53 In fact, “an Islamic scholar, Dr. Hamidullah has described the Charter of Medina [formulated by the Prophet Muhammad] as the

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first written Constitution in the history of humankind which established, in the real sense of the word, the modern concept of the rule of law. By which it is meant that the ruler and the ruled both had to submit themselves to law. Now, this very important principle – which I regard as one of the major contributions of Islam to civilization – the rule of law in its contemporary form, was manifested in the government of the early caliphs.”54 In Islamic systems, the fundamental law is the God-given Qur’an (the Holy Book of Islam), not the man-made or people-made Constitution. At another level, the contraposition of the Constitution and the Qur’an represents the contraposition of two very different legal traditions, Western and Eastern. In the case of the Moros, the shari’ah, belonging to a religious family of law, is suffused with their adat, their indigenous customary law, which is tied to their traditional political institutions. There is also a difference in the nature or status of legislation (considered the core of sovereignty) in the Philippine constitutional system and in an Islamic system. In the former, national laws are enacted by the sovereign Congress of the Philippines as the highest policy-making body of representative government under the Constitution, with the plenary power to repeal or alter existing laws (Art. VI). In the latter, the main body of law, shari’ah, is already given by the sovereign Allah as the supreme Law-Giver, whose law may not be repealed or altered by man. What remains to be legislated through the Majlis i-Shura (legislative or consultative council), therefore, is in the nature of subordinate legislation on matters not covered by nor contrary to shari’ah. In this sense, the legislature is not that important a branch of government in an Islamic system.55

9. Equality and Equal Protection Notwithstanding the contraposition of the Constitution and the Qur’an, they share certain common high ideals. Among these ideals, in the Preamble of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, are (in order of appearance) the aid of Almighty God, the common good, independence, democracy, the rule of law, truth, justice, freedom,


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love, equality and peace. Some of these deserve further discussion in the search for Muslim-Christian commonalities in the realm of political values, beliefs and concepts. Let us start with equality since this is closely related to the rule of law in the sense of equality before the law. The foremost Filipino human rights lawyer Jose W. Diokno once pointed out that the Constitution’s Bill of Rights clause on equal protection of the law (Art. III, Sec. 1) can be used “both negatively and positively, not merely to prevent discrimination but to promote equality.”56 Recent American and Canadian legal scholarship on North American Indian sovereignty and self-government has shed light on equality of peoples and not just individuals as a ramification of the equal protection clause.57 The principle of equality of peoples could constitute common ground between the Filipino people and the Bangsamoro people (Muslims of Southern Philippines). In the Islamic doctrine of equality, the latter is not subordinate to any condition because “men are born and created equal and become unequal by virtue of social and political, that is, man-made institutions.” The doctrine “negates all racial, ethnic and hereditary criteria of distinction among human beings because mankind is believed to form one community. The only valid distinction that would make an individual superior to others is fear of God, or piety (taqwa).58 Equality is very closely linked to justice, as shown by this Qur’anic verse: “O believers! faithfully apply the law as divinely ordained, even though it may go against yourselves, or your parents and relatives, to both the rich and the poor both of whom God maintains; do not be guided by personal considerations, so as to act against justice; if you distort or withhold equal justice, God knows well what you are doing.” (Surah 4:135) There is a spirit of egalitarianism in early Islam which later declined with the rise of hereditary power in some Arab societies.59 Mention was already made above about hereditary political succession in Malay culture, and nobility or royalty in Moro traditional society. Marohomsalic points out, however, that the structure of power of early Moro society was not a closed enclave of feudalism.60 Of course,

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political elitism, clans and dynasties (referred to even in the 1987 Philippine Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 26) are likewise part of the realpolitik of mainstream Christian Filipino society. Be that as it may, both Muslim and Christian Filipinos, however, share a common belief of equality in the sight of God.

10. Justice: Social and Political Justice exists in the Qur’an and the Sunnah (the way of the Prophet Muhammad) as an even more clearly defined concept than equality.61 “The Qur’an uses two terms for justice, ‘adl which means a just balance in human conduct between the two extremes of immoderate indulgence and callous neglect – and gist which means the just exercise of power.”62 Here are key Qur’anic verses: “O believers! stand out firmly for God as witnesses to fairness, let not other disinclination to you, make you swear to and depart from justice, be just – that is nearest to piety; and fear God, verily God knows all that you do.” (Surah 5:9) “When you judge, judge between them with equity, verily God loves those who act with equity.” (Surah 5:45) In the Bible, God is a “God of justice” (Isaiah 30:18). God loves (Isaiah 61:8; Psalms 37:28, 99:4) and does justice (Genesis 18:25; Deuteronomy 32:4; Jericho 9:24; Psalms 111: 7). Since injustice became part of the world’s experience, God works to reestablish justice or shalom (Deuteronomy 10:17-18) in the midst of history.63 Most relevant to social justice is what Marohomsalic refers to as the “ideological union of Muslim and Christian… In fact, there are basic and fundamental ideological social teachings shared by both Islam and Christianity, which can be the basis of lasting communitarian relations and political unity.”64 In particular, the social teachings of the Catholic Church, including on dialogue with the Muslim community, developed significantly with Vatican II and the subsequent papal encyclicals. 65 The 1987 Philippine Constitution speaks not only of “do justice to every man” in the oath of the President (Art. VII, Sec. 5) but also of a state policy to “promote social justice in all phases of national


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development” (Art. II, Sec. 10). This is buttressed by a whole Article XIII on Social Justice (and Human Rights). In the first paragraph of Sec. 1 thereof, there are mandates to “reduce social, economic and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.” According to Muslim Filipino academic, now ambassador, Sukarno D. Tanggol, social justice together with self-determination “constitute the core of the Moro grievance.” He explains that the principle of social justice calls for the correction of the neglect of and injustices against the Moro people in the past.66 At some point, the MNLF formulated the equivalent concept of Kaadilan (root word ‘Adl) as no less than its ideology: “This is an antithesis to all forms of human, social, political and other injustices that our people and humanity have been subjected to for so long. This term Kaadilan may sum up what we call our political, economic, social and cultural ideology.”67 Mastura also lists ‘Adl tempered with rahmah (mercy or compassion) as among the concepts around which a model of an Islamic constitution is built. As for the Philippine side, he calls for political justice of the constitution to correct the power structure which marginalizes the Bangsamoro people in terms of inadequacies in political representation and participation.68 It will be recalled that “the right of representation and participation in the Central Government and in all other organs of the state” are among the main planks of both the 1976 Tripoli Agreement (para. 7) and the 1996 Peace Agreement (paras. 63-72) between the Philippine government and the MNLF. On the relevant matter of the judicial branch of government which administers justice, the judiciary has a very important role, common to both the Philippine constitutional system and an Islamic system. In the former, as the familiar aphorism goes, “the constitution is what the judges say it is.”69 In the latter, “judges, as the guardians of shari’ah, adjudicate in all matters of law.”70 The judiciary may be said to assume an even more important role because of the less importance of the legislature in an Islamic system.

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11. General Welfare/Common Good/Public Interest The classic definition of social justice in Philippine jurisprudence includes the element of police power: “the promotion of the welfare of all the people… on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex [the welfare of the people is the supreme law].”71 The 1987 Philippine Constitution, in its Declaration of Principles, also mentions “the promotion of the general welfare” as among what “are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.” (Art. II, Sec. 5) Quite recently, the salus populi principle was invoked by no less than the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to justify his extraordinary initiative in administering the oath of office to President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in order to fill a dangerous vacuum in that office. Might it not be invoked for the peace process? Mention was already made above of “the common good” in the Preamble and in the Article on Social Justice. While “general welfare”and, for that matter, “national interest” (mentioned several times in the Constitution and described by some as “the state ideology”)72 can be majoritarian, “common good” can mean what is good in common to both majority and minority. In advocating a “commonwealth” paradigm for Mindanao, drawing from the historical experience of the 1935-1946 Philippine Commonwealth, then DAR Secretary Horacio R. Morales, Jr. said that the word “connotes the common good and the attainment of a common purpose. It also connotes mentoring and nurturing, a handholding governance capacity-building exercise that ends in self-rule and self-reliance.”73 But while the Philippine Commonwealth registered positively among the Filipino people aspiring for independence, the same registered negatively among the Moro people who did not want to be part of an independent Philippines dominated by Christian Filipinos. Relevant to general welfare and common good is the Islamic notion of maslahah (public interest). Senior Islamic scholar Mohamed Fathi Osman says that this notion is not specifically indicated in the divine sources of shari’ah but is subsumed in its general goals and principles. More importantly, it “provides important grounds for new


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laws that meet the ever-changing circumstances… since responding to new requirements that arise fulfills the justice and good-doing which are both commanded by God (Surah 16:90).”74 In contrast to the capitalist ethic of individualism at the expense of the community, a hallmark of Western culture and adopted in mainstream Christian Filipino society, Muslim culture subordinates the individual to the ummah (the community of believers), favoring communitarian or collective values over individualist ones. In this sense, “Muslims are socialists without being communists.”75

12. Doctrine of Necessity Philippine jurisprudence adopting American jurisprudence refers to the police power of the State as “a power co-extensive with selfprotection, and is not inaptly termed the ‘the law of overruling necessity.’”76 Might this, like the salus populi principle, not be invoked for the peace process? There is similarly a Darurah (Doctrine of Necessity) in shari’ah. A Qur’anic verse provides: “God intends every facility for you. He does not want to put you to difficulties.” (Surah 2:185) There is also a legal maxim that “hardship begets facility” in the Majallah (Ottoman Civil Code). These “justify setting aside some shari’ah judgments or values to achieve a greater and more urgent legitimate need or necessity… (it) justifies an act which would otherwise have dubious legal basis or no such basis at all in Islam.”77 It is darurah which often gives rise to ijtihad (creative reasoning effort) and qiyas (analogical reasoning and deduction) interpreting the primary soources of shari’ah to solve a novel problem. Mutual application by both sides of this doctrine of necessity common to them should result not only in finding more commonalities but also in achieving peace.

13. Peace “Islam means peace, whether as a way of life, an ideology, a code of law, a politico-economic system, or a moral and ethical value…

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Islam is derived from the Arabic root word Salama which connotes peace.”78 Pax Christi (the Peace of Christ) “is the peace of the new Covenant and new creation… salvation and reconciliation, healing of hostility and division.”79 The Bible enjoins Christians to “seek peace and pursue it” (Peter 3:11). Pope John Paul II has noted “the intrinsic link between an authentic religious attitude and the great good of peace.”80 This is certainly a commonality between Muslim and Christian Filipinos, besides being the common objective of the peace process. A policy of peace may even be made out from certain provisions in the 1987 Philippine Constitution: “a regime of… peace” (Preamble), “renounces war as an instrument of national policy… and adheres to the policy of peace” (Art. II, Sec. 2), and “maintenance of peace and order” (Art. II, Sec. 5). At the international level, the UN General Assembly in 1984 passed a Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace. UNESCO has been behind some international legal work on a draft Declaration on the Human Right to Peace.81 Then, at the Hague Appeal for Peace 1999 Conference, global civil society made the bold declaration that “peace is a human right.” The theme of “peace and development” used by President Ramos for the Mindanao Peace Process was eventually adopted by the MNLF after their 1996 Peace Agreement, as shown by the theme “Liberation through Peace and Development” during the Bangsamoro Freedom Day celebration on 18 March 1997.82 In fact, during that time, one of Misuari’s favorite Qur’anic quotations was “If the enemy inclines to peace, so you must also incline to peace” (Surah VIII: 63).83

14. Divine Providence Both Muslim and Christian Filipinos implore the aid of Divine Providence even in matters of politics and governance. For Muslims, this is but natural, considering the Islamic paradigms of the sovereignty of Allah and the integration of religion and politics. For Christian Filipinos, this seems less natural because of the inviolable principle of the separation of Church and State. Still, it happens, and this is


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reflected in no less than the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Its Preamble starts with “the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God.” This is similar to the basmala (Islamic invocation) “In the name of God, the Omnipotent (or Beneficent), the Merciful” starting each chapter of the Qur’an and all major agreements with the MNLF and the MILF. Another invocation of God is found at the end of the oath of the Philippine President: “…So help me God.” (Art. VII, Sec. 5) Sometime back, a leading authority on Philippine political law noted the legal recognition of Christianity, particularly the US maxim that “Christianity is part of the law of the land… as the religion of the great bulk of the people.”84 Though the Bible says “Render therefore to Caesar the things that are Ceasar’s and to God the things that are God’s” (Luke 20:25), it also says “Thy Kingdom come, Thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven” (Matthew 6:10) For some, religion has become “the missing dimension of statecraft.”85 Islamists view modern Western secularism as a root structural and conceptual cause for the lack of morality, ethics and spirituality in many Western and Westernoriented governments.

15. Morality in Government Morality in government is one common ideal of Muslim and Christian Filipinos, notwithstanding their different perspectives on the relationship of religion and politics. Of course, morality is not necessarily a matter of religion. The secular 1987 Philippine Constitution can, therefore, provide that “Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modesst lives.” (Art. XI, Sec. 1) Still, from time to time, government leaders have made various calls for moral recovery or renewal. The new President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in her inaugural address, stated the second of her four core beliefs as follows: “We must improve moral standards in government and society, in order to provide a strong foundation for good governance.”86

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A Muslim Filipino law dean once wrote, “The political concepts of Islam are anchored on the bedrock of a strong moral foundation. The infusion of strong religious moral responsibility into the conduct of government affairs is perhaps the solution to the problems of government today.”87 The Islamic perspective on public office is “to look upon duty as a sacred obligation and to fulfill it scrupulously; and to regard power as a trust from God to be used in the belief that one has to render an account of one’s actions to Him in the life Hereafter.”88

16. Leaders and Elections Muslim and Christian Filipinos share a common recognition of the importance of leadership, even to the point of leader-orientedness or leader-centeredness. Filipinos have become accustomed to a highly-centralized presidential form of government, of course with the classic features of separation of powers and a system of checks and balances. The Philippine President is both Head of State and Chief Executive in whom alone executive power is vested (1987 Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 1). Aside from extensive powers including as Commanderin-Chief of the armed forces, in initiating and approving legislation and the budget, and in the appointment of all judges, the President is also immune from suit during tenure. To be qualified as President, one must be a natural-born citizen, a registered voter, literate, at least 40 years of age, and a resident for at least 10 years immediately preceding the election. At her inaugural, President Arroyo stated her fourth core belief thus: “I believe in leadership by example. We should promote solid traits such as work ethic and a dignified lifestyle, matching action to rhetoric, performing rather than grandstanding.”89 In an Islamic system, the head of state, who is the religio-political leader, is called the imam or amir. “His is the major responsibility for the conduct of the state, and he is the real locus of power since he acts as the khalifah or representative of God on earth on the one hand and as representative of the Muslim people on the other.”90 “Whatever form the executive may take, a leader is always subject both to the shari’ah and to the ijma formulated under it. He enjoys no special immunities and can, therefore, be prosecuted or sued for anything he does in his private or public life. This is a fundamental principle of


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Islamic constitutional law, ensuing from the supremacy of the shari’ah. No rigid theory of separation of government functions can develop in a comprehensive, coherent system like the Islamic political order, except to provide some necessary checks and balances to safeguard liberty or justice.”91 Islam does not prescribe any particular form of government, “the Muslim community is free to determine any mode of constitutional structure which suits its requirements.”92 MILF Chair Hashim lists the qualifications of the imam as follows: a Muslim of legal age, just and fair, a credible witness under shari’ah, well-versed in shari’ah and Islam, morally pure, physically and mentally fit, and free from any cloud on his character. He believes the reins of leadership must be in the hands of the righteous and Godfearing. For him, the most important function of the leader is to provide a good example in matters of discipline, iman (faith), taqwa and ethics. But he is of the view that women cannot qualify as head of government, as their participation is limited by the demand of Islamic moral values and their family obligations.93 In the Philippines, the President, Vice-President, members of Congress, and certain local government officials are elected by direct vote of the people at regular intervals. Elections are the main mechanism for political legitimacy, and are themselves one of the pillars of Western democracy. But elections have also been the occasion for the worst kind of traditional politics. At every level, however, especially the local, there is no strict correlation between elected/ formal power and effective/traditional power. Traditional leaders are still very influential, more so in Moro society with its sultans and datus. MILF Chair Hashim is of the view that the imam should be elected but the manner of election depends on the level of political maturity of the people. If the people can freely choose the leader and can judge fairly who is the best, he is for direct election. If not, the election can be delegated to a council called ahl al-hal wa ‘al-aqd composed of the ulama, professionals, thinkers and sectoral leaders.94 There is a traditional notion that “Persons of greater knowledge should be given greater weight.”95

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17. Filipino Citizenship and Community Muslim and Christian Filipinos share a common Filipino citizenship, i.e. membership in a political community that is the Filipino nation-state called the Republic of the Philippines.96 But for many Muslim Filipinos, this is nominal or passport citizenship. A recent study of perceptions of citizenship in Muslim Mindanao indicated that: “Citizenship is an alien term among members of the Muslim grassroots community… they are Muslims with their respective ethnic groups and at the same time Moros before being Filipinos… Just as Moro is identical to Muslim, the term Filipino as well is often viewed by Muslims as synonymous to Christianity.”97 In the perception of the early MNLF (and the current MILF), they were/are Moros, not Filipinos. 98 Filipino citizenship will have to be rethought so that it becomes more meaningful for both Muslim and Christian Filipinos. Mastura proposes revisualizing the political community away from statist or nation-statist lines, i.e. the modern state as the umbrella framework for the diversity of politics.99 The rethinking also applies to the Muslim side, where there has been some debate on: Islamic state or Islamic community. “The Islamic state is not a nationalistic state because ultimate allegiance is owed to God and thereby to the community of all believers – the ummah.”100 The community approach is reflected in the first principle underlying the peace process, as formulated by the NUC: “A peace process should be community-based, reflecting the sentiments, values and principles important to all Filipinos. Thus, it shall be defined not by Government alone, nor by the different contending armed groups only, but by all Filipinos as one community.”101 “Community” may have a more inclusive and participative spirit than “state” and “nation.” “State” is the political and legal entity comprised of four essential elements: people (inhabitants), territory, government, and sovereignty. The last two elements include aspects of authority, coercion and obedience. “Nation” is an ethnic and cultural entity of people who share a distinctive culture, language, and historical consciousness, necessarily excluding other people who do not share


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these characteristics. “Community” connotes more voluntary interaction (communing) and sharing between or among different groups of people for the common good.

18. Nationalism Still, the nation is what often catches collective imagination. Muslim and Christian Filipinos share a common strong sense of nationalism, but for different nations: Filipino and Moro. The 1987 Philippine Constitution, not just once but several times, exorts “patriotism and nationalism” (Art. II, Secs. 13 & 17; Art. XI, Sec. 1; Art. XIV, Sec. 3(2)). As for the Muslim Filipinos, it was the imagination of the Bangsamoro (Moro nation), as a unifying identity for 13 disparate ethno-linguistic tribes, which has been the signal lasting contribution of the MNLF, particularly its Chair Nur Misuari. He once explained, “nationalism takes as much precedence as the inspired verses of the Holy Qur’an as ideological root of the Bangsa Moro people’s Revolution.”102 Moro nationhood in turn becomes the basis for claiming Moro statehood,103 separate from the Filipino nation-state. There is, therefore, a clash of nationalisms. The only unity in these opposites might be understanding the passion of nationalism, that the other side must feel as passionately about it as we do. This is perhaps best shown in the average Filipino citizen’s and soldier’s love for the Philippine flag as the foremost national symbol (1987 Philippine Constitution, Art. XVI, Sec. 1). But the average Moro “cannot identify with the symbolisms of the Filipino flag. Their struggle is not reflected in the Filipino flag.”104 More so when seen being waved by a conquering Filipino soldier atop a bombed-out mosque.

19. Freedom from Colonial Rule There is actually one other unity or commonality between Muslim and Christian Filipinos related to nationalism, and this is anti-colonial nationalism, developed by the historical fight for freedom from colonial rule, first against Spain and then against the US. Kalayaan (Freedom) was the name of the official publication of the Katipunan which led the

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Philippine revolution of 1896 against Spain. Maharlika (Freedom) and Maradika (Freedom) are the names of the official publications of the MNLF and MILF, respectively. The Filipino fight for freedom led to independence, first from Spain in 1898 and then from the US in 1946. Ironically, Philippine independence, particularly from the US, meant Bangsamoro bondage. Misuari and the MNLF called it Filipino colonialism,105 from which the Bangsamoro people still aspire for freedom and, more radically, independence. In fine, “independence” rings a different bell for Filipinos and Moros. Filipinos celebrate their independence but would deny the same thing to Moros. Moros aspire for independence because they do not enjoy “the blessings of independence” (1987 Philippine Constitution, Preamble) under the Republic of the Philippines.

20. Shared Territory of Mindanao As formulated by Misuari for the ideology of the early MNLF, “the Bangsa Moro people’s Revolution is primarily waged in defense of the Bangsa (nation), the homeland, and Islam.”106 And that Bangsamoro homeland in Mindanao is currently part of the national territory of the Philippines (1987 Philippine Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 1). To carve that homeland out from the national territory (in other words, to secede) would go against the “paramount consideration” of “territorial integrity” (Art. II, Sec. 7). A way out might be the notion of shared territory, akin to shared sovereignty. In particular, Mindanao is an island region which has to be shared by three main peoples there: the Christian Filipinos, the Moros, and the Lumads (indigenous highlander tribes). This geographic and demographic reality has become the basis of a tri-people approach which emphasizes not only the existence but also the desired equality and unity of these three peoples there.107 By their shared territory of Mindanao, this itself becomes the basis of a new or additional identity as Mindanaoan or Mindanawon.108 But this should not negate Moro and Lumad identities, which are still struggling for better recognition. After all, we seek not just harmony but harmony in diversity. From diversity to diversity, we have come full circle.


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Conclusion In conclusion, we should be glad to have found twenty or so commonalities between Muslim and Christian Filipinos in terms of political values, beliefs and practices. Among them, I consider the following as the ten most promising: 1 . Pluralism 2. Religious Feedom 3. Democratic Consultation/Shura 4. Vox Populi, Vox Dei 5 . Human Rights 6. International Law 7 . Social Justice 8. Doctrine of Necessity/Darurah 9. Peace 10. Shared Territory of Mindanao Every building block counts in the arduous task of peace-building. And because this is arduous, it may well be good to end for now with a caveat. This is not a numbers game of commonalities vs. differences. Quantitative commonalities may not be able to overcome qualitative differences. Thus, while our discussion has mainly emphasized commonalities, it has also acknowledged differences. Some of these differences are very significant, in fact, fundamental; so, let there be no illusions about this. In his reaction to this paper, Marohomsalic says “if we take a closer look at our whole social system, we will find some serious, if not insurmountable barriers standing in the path.”109 He cites as examples certain constitutional arrangements. In another study,110 I have problematized the opposing constitutional paradigms in the cutting edge GRP-MILF peace talks: 1 . Constitution vs. Qur’an 2. Sovereignty of the People vs. Sovereignty of Allah (hakimiyya) 3. Separation of Church and State vs. Integration of Religion and Politics/State (din wa dawla) 4. Autonomous Regions of a Unitary State vs. Independent Islamic State

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National Territory vs. Bangsamoro Homeland Philippine Flag vs. Moro Islamic Symbols

Perhaps, one key is to look at differences not as problems to be overcome but as essential to diversity, which we should cherish. By recognizing and accommodating diversity as high in our hierarchy of values, we should be able to eventually build the appropriate structures and superstructures, the roads and bridges, for peace in Mindanao. Kalinaw. Wassalam.

End Notes “Declaration of Unity” (26 December 1984) signed by the united opposition to the Marcos dictatorship before their agreement on the method of selecting the presidential and vice-presidential candidates of the opposition in the event of a special (snap) election. 2 David Joel Steinberg, The Philippines: A Singular and a Plural Place (3rd ed, 1990). 3 Jose W. Diokno, “The Filipino Is What He Chooses To Be” in Neelan Tiruchelvam and Radhika Coomaraswamy (eds.), The Role of the Judiciary in Plural Societies (1987) 61-2. 4 National Unification Commission Report to President Fidel V. Ramos on the Pursuit of a Comprehensive Peace Process (1 July 1993) 2. 5 See especially Mohamed Fathi Osman, ‘The Children of Adam: An Islamic Perspective on Pluralism’ (1996). This is an occasional paper published by the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding: History and International Affairs, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. 6 Datu Michael O. Mastura, “Democracy in Islam” (Discussion paper presented at the roundtable discussion with Muslim leaders on 22 August 2000, organized by the Asian Center for the Study of Democracy in cooperation with the Konrad Adenauer Foundation). 7 Interview (written answers) with Salamat Hashim, MILF Chairman (Melbourne-Maguindanao, 23 May 1999). 8 From the vigorous dissenting opinion of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. in the free speech case of Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616. Such American jurisprudence is very much incorporated into Philippine political law. 9 Charter of the Islamic Conference (1972), Preamble. 10 General Framework of Agreement of Intent between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) (27 August 1998), Article V. 11 Ebralinag v. The Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, 219 SCRA 256, 270 (1993). 1


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“Editorial: On Islamic State” (February 1999) XIX (2) Maradika 2. This is the official publication of the MILF Central Committee. 13 Khalid M. Ishaq, “People’s Authority, Representation and Election Under the Islamic Legal Theory: Some Observations” (1988) VIII (2) Islamic & Comparative Law Quarterly 85, 88-92. 14 Mastura, “Democracy in Islam.” 15 Abhoud Syed Mansur Lingga, The Political Thought of Salamat Hashim (MA Islamic Studies thesis, Institute of Islamic Studies, University of the Philippines, 1995) 32, 55. 16 Mehol K. Sadain, “Shariah Implementation as a Solution to the Mindanao Conflict.” 17 Mehol K. Sadain, “Alternative Approaches Toward the Structural Change in Muslim Mindanao: The Islamic Angle” (Paper delivered at the roundtable discussion on “Exploring Constitutional Structures for the Muslim Community” on 23 August 2000 at the UP Law Center, Diliman, Quezon City, sponsored by the Institute of International Legal Studies). 18 Lingga, The Political Thought of Salamat Hashim 32. 19 Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (1955), 14-18. 20 Charles J. Adams, “Mawdudi and the Islamic State” in John L. Esposito (ed.), Voices of Resurgent Islam (1983) 21 See, e.g., Carmen A. Abubakar, “Is Islam Compatible With Democracy?” (1996) 12 (1) Kasarinlan, 25-44. This is published by the Third World Studies Center, UP Diliman, Quezon City. 22 Wahab Ibrahim Guialal, “Perceptions of Democracy and Citizenship in Muslim Mindanao” in Maria Serena I. Diokno (ed.), Democracy & Citizenship in Filipino Political Culture (1997 ) 164, 172. This is Volume 1 of the three-volume Philippine Democracy Agenda published by the Third World Studies Center, UP Diliman, Quezon City. 23 Hassan al-Turabi, “The Islamic State” in Esposito, Voices of Resurgent Islam, 243-44. 24 Abul A’la Mawdudi, Human Rights in Islam (2nd ed., 1980) 10. 25 Atty. Michael O. Mastura, “Political Islam in the 21st Century Philippines: Can it Survive?” (Discussion paper presented to a policy workshop under the theme “Road to Peace and Reconciliation: Muslim Perspectives on the Mindanao Crisis” on 23 March 2001 in Makati City, sponsored by the Asian Institute of Management-W. Sycip Policy Center). 26 Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Philippine Constitution: A ReviewerPrimer (3rd ed., 1997) 266, citing The Federalist (No. 84). 27 Hajji Nur Misuari, “The Manifesto of the Moro National Liberation Front: Establishment of the Bangsa Moro Republik” (28 April 1974). 28 Michael O. Mastura, “The Struggle for Autonomy in Muslim Mindanao: A Human Rights Perspective” (Presented at the Forum on “A Human Rights Approach to Governance for Peace and Development” held on 26 June 2000 in Makati City, sponsored by the UNDP in cooperation with the Philippine Human Development Network and the Governance Forum). 12

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Salamat Hashim, The Bangsamoro Mujahid: His Objectives and Responsibilities (1985) 1. 30 Mastura, “Political Islam in the 21st Century Philippines.” 31 Datu Norodin Alonto Lucman, Moro Archives: A History of Armed Conflicts in Mindanao and East Asia (2000) 340. 32 University of the Philippines, Center for Integrative and Development Studies, Mindanao Studies Program, The Kadatuan I Conference Proceedings May 30-31, 1997. 33 al-Turabi, “The Islamic State,” 242. 34 “The Pax Christi International Declaration on Human Rights” in Born Free and Equal: Pax Christi and Human Rights (1990) 5, 6-7. 35 Sandie Cornish, The Catholic Human Rights Tradition and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (ACSJC Occasional Paper No. 21, 1994), 13. 36 Note, most recently, the Conference on Islam & Human Rights, held on 2 April 2001 at the Commission on Human Rights, sponsored by the latter, the Office of Muslim Affairs and the UP Institute of Islamic Studies. See also the work of a Catholic priest, Fr. L. P. Fitzgerald, O.P., The Justice God Wants: Islam and Human Rights (ACSJC Occasional Paper No. 18, 1993). 37 Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights, launched by the Islamic Council of Europe at the Paris headquarters of UNESCO on 19 September 1981. 38 Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, endorsed by the 19th Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of the Islamic Conference held in Cairo from 21 July to 4 August 1990. It was also submitted by the OIC to the UN for presentation at the 1993 Vienna Conference on Human Rights. 39 Nasser A. Marohomsalic, “Human Rights in Islam: A General Observation” (1995) I (2) The Human Rights Journal 1-9. This is published by the Commission on Human Rights. 40 Prof. Wadja K. Esmula, “The Islamic Concept of Human Rights” (March 2001). The theocentric-anthropocentric distinction is discussed in Riffat Hassan, “On Human Rights and the Qur’anic Perspective” in Arlene Swidler (ed.), Human Rights in the Religious Traditions (1982) 52. 41 Mehol K. Sadain, “The Concept of Human Rights in Islam and its Relevance to the Movement for Self-Determination by the Muslims in Southern Philippines” (1995) I(2) The Human Rights Journal 33-44. 42 Mastura, “The Struggle for Autonomy in Muslim Mindanao.” 43 General Framework of Agreement of Intent between the GRP and the MILF, Article II. 44 Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966). 45 Muddathir ‘Abd al-Rahim, Islam and Non-Muslim Minorities (1997) 6. This pamphlet is published by the Just World Trust (now International Movement for a Just World) in Malaysia. 46 Abubakar, “Is Islam Compatible With Democracy?,” 30-31. 29


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Lingga, The Political Thought of Salamat Hashim, 45. al-Turabi, “The Islamic State,” 244. 49 Prof. Michael O. Mastura, “Exploring Constitutional Structures for the Muslim Community: A Renascent Approach” (Paper delivered at the roundtable discussion on “Exploring Constitutional Structures for the Muslim Community” on 23 August 2000 at the UP Law Center, Diliman, Quezon City, sponsored by the Institute of International Legal Studies). 50 Common Art. 1(1) of the two International Covenants. 51 Hasan Moinuddin, The Charter of The Islamic Conference and Legal Framework of Co-operation among its Member States (1987), 66. 52 Misuari, “Manifesto of the MNLF,” para. 7. 53 Moinuddin, The Charter of the Islamic Conference, 11. 54 Dr. Chandra Muzaffar, “Islam: Obstacles to Equality” (March 2001) 1(3) Commentary 9. This is published by the International Movement for a Just World in Malaysia. 55 Javid Iqbal, “Democracy and the Modern Islamic State” in Esposito, Voices of Resurgent Islam 253, 259. 56 Diokno, “The Filipino Is What He Chooses To Be,” 76. 57 See, e.g., Patrick Macklem, “Distributing Sovereignty: Indian Nations and Equality of Peoples” (1993) 45 Stanford Law Review 1311. 58 Abubakar, “Is Islam Compatible With Democracy?,” 29, citing Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought (1982) 127-28. 59 Muzzafar, “Islam: Obstacles to Equality,” 9. 60 Nasser A. Marohomsalic, “Roadmap to the Bangsamoro Islamic State” (Discussion paper presented to a policy workshop under the theme “Road to Peace and Reconciliation: Muslim Perspectives on the Mindanao Crisis” on 23 March 2001 in Makati City, sponsored by the Asian Institute of Management-W. Sycip Policy Center). 61 Muzzafar, “Islam: Obstacles to Equality,” 11. 62 Ziauddin Sardar, “Some Thoughts on an Alternative to the Imperium of Human Rights” in Just World Trust (ed. & pub.) Human Wrongs: Reflections on Western Global Dominance and its Impact Upon Human Rights (1996) 257. 63 World Vision Australia, The Bible & Justice: A Study Guide (1996) 5-6. 64 Nasser A. Marohomsalic, Aristocrats of the Malay Race: A History of the Bangsa Moro in the Philippines (2001) 329-30. 65 See Pedro V. Salgado, Social Encyclicals: Commentary and Critique (1992), and William LaRousse, Walking Together Seeking Peace: The Local Church of Mindanao-Sulu Journeying in Dialogue with the Muslim Community (1965-2000) (2001). 66 Sukarno D. Tanggol, “Why the Moros Reject the Autonomy Law” (n.d.) 24 Mindanao Focus Journal 53, 54. This is published by the Alternate Forum for Research in Mindanao (AFRIM), Inc. in Davao City. 67 Prof. Nur Misuari, MNLF Guidelines: For Political Cadres and Military Commanders (1984) 9. This consists of extracts from policy speeches, interviews, and writings of Prof. Nur Misuari, Chairman, Central 47

48

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Committee, Moro National Liberation Front, compiled by Mohammad M. Abdulkarim, and published by the Bangsamoro Research Center. 68 Mastura, “Exploring Constitutional Structures for the Muslim Community.” 69 US Supreme Court Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes. 70 al-Turabi, “The Islamic State,” 249. 71 Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil. 726, 734-5 (1940). 72 Abdul Husyn M. Kazeem, “The Muslims in the Philippines: A Case of Conflict Ideology” (1989) 2(1) Mindanao Islamic Journal 117-32. 73 Horacio R. Morales, Jr., “Mindanao 2010: A Commonwealth Program for Peace and Development in Mindanao with the Republic of the Philippines” (n.d.). 74 Osman, The Children of Adam 17-18. 75 Mastura, “Political Islam in 21st Century Philippines” and ensuing open forum. 76 Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 708 (1919), citing Lake View v. Rose Hill Cemetery Co., 70 Ill. 191 (1873). 77 Mehol K. Sadain, “Islamic Perspective on Resolving the Mindanao Conflict” (Paper delivered at the roundtable discussion on “Human Rights and Development: The Quest for a Lasting Peace in Mindanao” on 5 June 2000 at the UP Law Center, sponsored by the Institute on Human Rights, Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute, and Mediators Network for Sustainable Peace). 78 Atty. Hamid Aminodin Barra, Ph.D., “Reflections on Peace: Why Islam is a Religion of Peace” <www.mindanao.com/kalinaw>, at the section on Bishops-Ulama Forum 79 Enda McDonagh, “Peace-Makers or Justice-Seekers” in Born Free and Equal 14. 80 “The Link Between Religion and Peace” <www.mindanao.com/kalinaw>, at the section on Bishops-Ulama Forum. This consists of Pope John Paul II’s remarks at the conclusion of the Day of Prayer for Peace, 27 October 1986 in Assisi. 81 “The Human Right to Peace,” UNESCOPRESSE No. 97-90, News Service of the UNESCO whose Director-General Federico Mayor reportedly initiated the said concept. 82 Souvenir Program of Bangsamoro Freedom Day Celebration, Jolo, Sulu, 18 March 1997. 83 See e.g. Prof. Nur Misuari, Statement of the MNLF Chairman, Signing of the GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement, Malacanang Palace, 2 September 1996, as Appendix K in Fidel V. Ramos, Break Not The Peace: The Story of the GRP-MNLF Peace Negotiations 1992-1996 (1996) 208-17. 84 Vicente G. Sinco, Philippine Political Law: Principles and Concepts (11th ed., 1962) 678. 85 Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson (eds.), Religion, The Missing Dimension of Statecraft (1994).


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President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, “A Time to Heal, A Time to Build” (Inauguration Speech, 20 January 2001 at the EDSA Shrine). 87 Atty. Oga Mangarun Mapupuno, “Islamic Political Concept of Sovereignty and Vicegerency” (1989) 3 (2) Mindanao Law Journal 56, 65. This is published by the Mindanao State University (MSU) College of Law. 88 Mawdudi, Human Rights in Islam, 11. 89 Arroyo, “A Time to Heal, A Time to Build.” 90 Adams, “Mawdudi and the Islamic State,” 123. 91 al-Turabi, “The Islamic State,” 248-49. 92 Iqbal, “Democracy and the Modern Islamic State,” 255. 93 Lingga, The Political Thought of Salamat Hashim, 45-46, 48, 51, 52. 94 Ibid., pp. 54-55. 95 Mastura, “Democracy in Islam.” 96 Jose V. Abueva, “Introduction: The Quest for the Filipino Nation-State” in Jose V. Abueva (ed.), The Making of the Filipino Nation and Republic: From Barangays, Tribes, Sultanates, and Colony (1998). This is designated as The Book on the Nation-State in PAMANA, the UP Anthology of Filipino Socio-Political Thought Since 1972. 97 Wahab Ibrahim Guialal, “Perceptions of Democracy and Citizenship in Muslim Mindanao,” 161, 164, 172. 98 Abdurasad Asani, Moros Not Filipinos (n.d.). 99 Mastura, “Political Islam in 21st Century Philippines.” 100 al-Turabi, “The Islamic State,” 242. 101 NUC Report to President Ramos on a Comprehensive Peace Process, 2. 102 Nur Misuari, “The Rise and Fall of Moro Statehood” in (1992) 6 (2) Philippine Development Forum, 38-9. This was published by the Development Studies Program, Department of Social Sciences, College of Arts & Sciences, UP Manila. The issue carried the theme The Bangsa Moro People’s Struggle for Self-Determination (Towards an Understanding of the Roots of the Moro People’s Struggle). 103 Ibid. at 1-41. 104 Rudy B. Rodil, “The Tri-People Relationship and the Peace Process in Mindanao” <www.mindanao.com/ kalinaw>. This is the website of Kalinaw Mindanaw. 105 See “The Moro People’s Struggle: Documents from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)” (1992) Philippine Development Forum, 43-59. 106 Misuari, “The Rise and Fall of Moro Statehood,” 39. 107 See Rodil, “The Tri-People Relationship and the Peace Process in Mindanao.” 108 Rey Magno Teves, “An Impasse-Breaker? An Islamic State Within a Federal Philippines” ( Davao City, 23 April 1999). 109 Nasser A. Marohomsalic, Reaction to the Paper of Atty. Soliman M. Santos, Jr., First Round Table Discussion “Bridges for Peace: Search for Commonalities Between Christian and Muslim Filipinos,” sponsored by the UNESCO National Commission of the Philippines and Asian Institute of Journalism and Communication, 14 September 2001, Philippine Social Science Center, Quezon City. 86

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Soliman M. Santos, Jr., The Moro Islamic Challenge: Constitutional Rethinking for the Mindanao Peace Process (2000).

Local Peace Alternatives to Ethnic Conflict in Mindanao

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Local Peace Alternatives to Ethnic Conflict in Mindanao: The Bual, Dinas and Maladeg Peace Zone Experiences Marilou F. Siton-Nanaman Introduction Conflict is never a static phenomenon. It is expressive, dynamic, and dialectical in nature. Born in the world of human meaning and perception, it is constantly changed by ongoing human interaction, and it continuously changes the very people who give it life and the social environment in which it was born, evolves, and perhaps ends. A grave problem that is shared by Southeast Asian countries in the twenty- first century is the persistence of intra-national ethnic conflict. This type of conflict is fought between groups that come from within the boundaries of a defined state. Intra-national conflict is more akin to communal and intra-communal conflict than to international or interstate conflict. As a concept, ethnic conflict may be defined as one in which “groups that defined themselves using ethnic criteria make claims on behalf of their collective interests against the state or against other political actors” (De Goor et al, ed.). The psychological perspective views ethnic conflict as a consequence of the individual’s attitudes, opinions, aspirations, and behavioral patterns (Balacuit, 1996:30). On the other hand, sociological perspective conceives ethnic conflict in the context of the components of social order that include the individual’s beliefs, goals, aspirations, and orientations; and the characteristics of the social structure such as groups and institutions and their interactions and culture, the patterned way of life (Balacuit, 1996:30). At the local level, the kinds of ethnic conflict are those of prejudice, hatred, hostility, stereotypes, scapegoat, aggression, fighting and violence.

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What is alarming in ethnic conflict is that it has become an integral part of most Asian societies including the Philippines. The pervasiveness of it and the lack of understanding and effective strategies to deal with ethnic conflict have brought greater concern among scholars and the various peoples in the region. Thus, it calls for a concerted effort is called for to solve this crucial problem. Focusing our attention on Mindanao, we need to acknowledge some basic realities or fundamental assumptions. Firstly, Mindanao, a product of historical forces, is now inhabited by a population that may be classified broadly into three distinct segments; the Lumads the Muslims and the Christians. The 1990 Philippine socio-demographic census discloses that the Lumads constitute approximately five percent of the total population, the Muslims around 18 percent, and the Christians make up the balance of about 75 percent (Rodil, 2000:134). Secondly, no longer can a single segment of the population claim Mindanao as theirs because it is already a shared territory. Thirdly, despite their differences, the three segments of the population are capable of rising above their inherited prejudices and working out a modus vivendi that can make Mindanao a home of peace and harmony (Rodil, 2000:135). This is the challenge that we must all face. The Mindanao experience may shed an understanding of the basis for unity. Notwithstanding the differing experiences with the past colonizers, unity and harmony can be realized through mutual acceptance of one another as distinct and diverse peoples of a nation. Unity in diversity is mutually beneficial and best for all ethnic groups. This is an important first step in the creation of a culture of peace. Ethnicity can be an instrument for sustaining a peace culture that, in turn, is a vital component for the of development. However, conflict is as indispensable for development studies as it is for peace studies. To develop is to create. The same is true of peace, but peace has its emphasis on violence-reduction. Conflict generates energy. The problem is how to channel that energy constructively that could also lead to constructive behaviors such as deep, meditative postures, also known as “inner dialogues,” or “outer dialogues” with others, about the problems (Galtung, 1996:71). At the community


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level, this may occur in the form of consultations, meetings, and public fora. While conflict is consuming more and more of the resources of the community, it is important to arrive at a solution that is reasonably acceptable and sustainable. There are two proposed areas of activity: peace-making and peace building (Galtung, 1996:103). Peacemaking is the transformation of attitudes and assumptions while peace building is overcoming of contradiction at the root of the conflict formation. In peacemaking, it is possible to resolve an incompatibility without resorting to violence. The initiative to make peace may either come from one of the contending groups or from a third party. In one instance, it may begin with the process of reconciliation coupled with other methods whose possible outcomes are pursued collaboratively by the parties concerned. Reconciliation, as a method of conflict resolution, provides a social space where diverse people come together. Moreover, peace building is more than post conflict reconstruction. It is a comprehensive concept that generates, encompasses, and sustains the full array of processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform conflict toward more sustainable and peaceful relationships (Lederach, 1997:19). The term thus involves a wide range of activities and functions that both precede and follow formal peace accords that set the parameters of a peace zone. In principle, anybody can enter into the communication process – by state, civil society, or by individuals with the actors in the conflict formation. At any time, the negative and positive purposes of conflict intervention can be served. During the settling of the conflict, it is not necessarily around a table and not necessarily with everybody together at the same time. According to Galtung (1996), conflict intervention as a means of communication is beneficial to the participants in a conflict formation as it will avoid further destruction by those who are directly affected by the conflict. The Constructionist view and the non-violent approach to ethnic conflict tackle it as a natural or a common experience present in all relationships and cultures. Ethnic conflict is further presented as a

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socially constructed cultural event. In this approach, people are deemed to be active participants in creating situations and interactions experienced as conflict (Lederach, 1996:9). The interactive process that people go through is accomplished through or rooted in their perceptions, interpretations, expressions and intentions. Each of these experiences grows from and cycles back to their common sense. Conflict and culture are not merely a question of sensitivity or of awareness of the people at the community level, but a far more profound adventure of discovering and digging in the archaeology of accumulated shared knowledge common to a set of people. The conflicts that devastate the different regions in Mindanao the Muslim-Christian war in 1970s, and the entry of the New People’s Army in the 1980s, continuous fighting, crime, killings, and property destructions - resulted in massive evacuation, so much misery, long sufferings and separation of families. This scenario inspired the people to declare a zone of peace in their respective communities. One of the peace zones in the Philippines is a local initiative conceived by ordinary people in the remote villages of Tulunan, Cotabato in 1990. Other areas in Mindanao have also declared a similar peace initiative in their respective municipalities. Peace zone, as deemed by people in conflict, is the best way to facilitate resolution of the conflict experienced by the people in the community. It simply provides that nobody is allowed to carry firearms within the zone, nor join the NPA or CAFGU and force anybody to fight or take sides with the combatants. The National Unification Council (NUC) and President Ramos supported the creation of peace zones and designated them as Special Development Areas with funding from the national government. Sagada, Mountain Province; Bangilo, Abra; Cantaman-log, Candoni, Negros Accidental, and Tulunan, were the said designated areas. A 20 million peso livelihood development fund for the four peace zones was provided by the president to assist the people of these areas recovering from their experiences (www.galingpook.org/93-94Ten.htm). In this connection, Brown (1996) states that the causes and consequences of internal conflict are not well understood. He further


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advances that detailed knowledge on the study of ethnic conflict and peace zones can be achieved through a careful study of selected cases. Corollary to this, this paper looks into the peaceful resolutions of ethnic conflicts at the community level particularly in Bual, Dinas and Maladeg. In particular, this paper seeks answers to the following questions:

What is the historical overview of the ethnic conflict? What are the causes of ethnic conflict? What are the ethnic groups involved in resolving ethnic conflict? What are the issues addressed in the peace zones? How are the issues resolved by the people in the peace zones?

The ensuing sections of this paper will consist of the theoretical and conceptual framework, the methodology and scope, the Bual, Dinas and Maladeg peace zones, a comparative analysis of the three cases and the conclusion.

Conceptual/Theoretical Framework This paper combines theories on conflict resolution of Lederach (1996) and Galtung (1996). Lederach’s constructionist view of conflict and Galtung’s non-violent conflict transformation theories revolve on culture and diversity and non-violent approaches to conflict. Utilizing these theories, this study primarily views ethnic conflicts from a historical perspective in order to have a background of the nature of ethnic conflict. It delves further into the causes of the conflict, the ethnic groups involved, the issues addressed and how these issues were tackled by the ethnic groups in the peace zones. The term ethnic groups refer to a social group distinguished by race, religion, or national origin. They are further characterized by cultural differences and by the distinctness of their physical features. The term ethnic group, as used in this study, refers to a group that is usually distinguished or set apart by others or by themselves, primarily on the basis of cultural or religious characteristics or religious beliefs Although the fields of conflict resolution and mediation have grown and expanded, and the interest in applications across cultural

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and in multicultural settings has heightened, little has been written on the function of these practices. Three largely implicit premises seem to dominate the mainstream dispute resolution view about culture. First, we appear to operate with the basic assumption that the model we use in one setting is sufficiently universal to use with “adjustments” and “sensitivity” in others (Folberg and Taylor 1984). That is, we take a high view of transferability of conflict resolution skills and processes. Second, we seem to assume that culture is an aspect of conflict resolution that can be reduced to technique, essentially through raising the level of sensitivity and skill of practitioners. Third, and a logical consequence of the technique orientation in terms of cultural training is aimed at empowering the professional and increasing the competence of the already trained. Thus, culture is most often included in advanced training (Duryea, 1992). On the other hand, a social constructionist views conflict as an idea that emerges and develops on the basis of the meaning and interpretation people involved attach to action and events. Social meaning is lodged in the accumulated knowledge, or what Schutz (1967) calls a person’s “bank of knowledge.” From this starting point, conflict is connected to meaning, meaning to knowledge, and knowledge is rooted in culture. According to Lederach, social conflict is a natural, common experience present in all relationships and cultures. Conflict is a socially constructed cultural event. It does not just happen to people who are active participants in creating situations and interactions they experience as conflict. This is the essential dialectic experienced in the construction of any social reality, as articulated by Schutz (1971) and Berger and Luckman (1967). Conflict emerges through an interactive process based on the search for and creation of shared meaning. The interactive process is accomplished through and rooted in people’s perceptions, interpretations, expressions, and intentions, each of which grows from and cycles back to their common sense knowledge. Meaning occurs as people locate such social things as situations, events, and actions in their accumulated knowledge. Meaning emerges by connecting one thing to another by an act of comparison (Schutz, 1971).


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Thus, an important working assumption from this perspective is the idea that a person’s common sense and accumulated experience and knowledge are the primary bases of how they create, understand, and respond to conflict. In the same way, culture is rooted in the shared knowledge and schemes created and used by a group of people for perceiving, interpreting, expressing, and responding to social realities around them. The connection between social conflict and culture is not merely a question of sensitivity or of awareness but a far more profound adventure of discovering and digging into the archaeology of accumulated shared knowledge common to a set of people (Lederach, 1996:10). To summarize, a constructionist view suggests that people act on the basis of the meaning things have for them. Meaning is created through shared and accumulated knowledge. People from different cultural settings have developed many ways of creating and expressing as well as interpreting and handling conflict. Understanding conflict and developing appropriate ways of handling it will necessarily be rooted in, and must respect and draw from the cultural knowledge of, a people. Likewise, Adam Curle in his book Making Peace (1971) suggests that the movement from unpeaceful to peaceful relationships can be charted in a matrix comparing levels of power with levels of awareness of conflicting interests and needs. At least three key peacemaking functions identified in this progression toward change are education, advocacy, and mediation. According to Curle, education or conscientization is needed when the conflict is hidden and people are unaware of imbalances and injustices. This role is aimed at erasing ignorance and raising awareness as to the nature of unequal relationships and the need for addressing and restoring equity, from the view of those experiencing the injustices. Increased awareness of issues, needs, and interests leads to demands for change of the situation. Such demands are rarely attained immediately and, more likely, are not even heard nor taken seriously by those benefiting from the situation, who prefer to keep things as they are. Hence, the entry of advocates, who work with and support

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those pursuing change. Their work pushes for a balancing of power through the recognition of mutual dependence, i.e., increasing the voice of the less powerful and legitimizing their concerns. This happens through some forms of confrontation involving choices between violent or nonviolent mechanisms or a combination of both (Lederach, 1996:13). If successful, the confrontation will increase the awareness of interdependence and balanced power. Negotiation now becomes possible, and the role of mediation emerges. In essence, negotiation means that the various people or groups involved recognize that they cannot simply impose their will or eliminate the other side, but rather they must work with each other to achieve their goals (Lederach, 1996:13). Successful negotiations and mediation lead to a restructuring of the relationship and deal with fundamental substantive and procedural concerns. This result is what Curle refers to as increased justice or more peaceful relations (Curle, 1971). At any point, the path of conflict can jump or even circulate among several of the quadrants for extensive periods of time. For example, negotiations do not always lead to restructured relationships. Confrontation does not automatically end in negotiation. There are several key ideas emerging from Curle’s approach. First, the framework suggests that education, advocacy, and mediation share the goal of change and restructuring unpeaceful relationships. They share the vision of justice, of substantive and procedural change. When justice ceases to be the goal, any particular role, activity, or strategy must be questioned. Any approach used as a play to co-opt or manipulate the less powerful and disadvantaged, it should not be pursued. It should be noted that Curle’s overall scheme assumes a value orientation in favor of the less powerful groups where a voice of peaceful relations and restructuring are the desired outcomes – an orientation which is the foundation for peacemaking endeavors (Curle, 1971). Second, these peacemaking activities overlap, complement, and more importantly, are mutually supportive and dependent. Negotiation becomes possible when the needs and interests of all


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those involved and affected by the conflict are legitimated and articulated. This process happens most often through confrontation and advocacy that emerge from an awareness of the basic needs and interests. On the other hand, restructuring the relationship toward increased equality and justice does not emanate automatically from confrontation, unless we assume the total elimination of the adversary. Mediation can and should facilitate the articulation of legitimate needs and interests of all concerned into fair, practical, and mutually acceptable solutions (Curle, 1971). It is worth noting where these roles differ. Advocacy, for example, chooses to stand by one side for justice’s sake. Mediation chooses to stand as connection to all sides for justice’s sake. Nonviolent advocacy pursues confrontation by moving to produce and increase the overt expression of conflict while seeking to reduce violence. Through conflict it seeks to move from silence and complacency to awareness and change. Mediation, building on the acute awareness of conflict, moves to produce and increase mutual understanding while reducing adversariness (Curle, 1971). What is interesting is that the former is experienced as increasing conflict and the latter as reducing conflict, creating the impression of incompatibility. This suggests that the longer-term progression of conflict toward increased justice and peaceful relations must integrate and view these activities as necessary and mutually interdependent in the pursuit of just change and peaceful transformation. On the other hand, conflict resolution indicates a need to understand how conflict evolves and ends. It encouraged the development of strategies and skills for dealing with the volatile and too often destructive outcomes of conflict. At times, however, resolution may conceptually promote the impression that conflict is undesirable and should be eliminated or at least reduced. Legitimate questions are raised about whether we really resolve a conflict or whether in many instances that is a desirable goal. Nader (1990 and 1993) has argued that conflict resolution seeks to stop the conflict and create harmony at the expense of justice (Nader, 1990 and 1993). It is certainly true that in any conflict progression specific decisions are made and expressions of conflict may end. But if there

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is an ongoing relationship, conflict remains. If in change increasing justice has not occurred because the root structural causes of conflict remained untouched, then reducing or eliminating the overt expression of the conflict may be an exercise of co-option. Thus, as a concept, resolution may not adequately describe the ongoing nature of conflict in the relational ebb and flow over time, or its usefulness in the construction of peace, and sometimes inappropriately pushes for the premature reduction of confrontation (Lederach, 1996:16). On one hand, management points toward the idea that conflict follows certain predictable patterns and dynamics that could be understood and regulated (Thomas, 1976 and Wehr, 1979). The evolving concept is an effort to take account of the nature and role of conflict in relationships; it is natural and should be managed. Management as a concept recognizes that conflict is not resolved in the sense of getting rid of it, but rather emphasis is placed on affecting the destructive consequences and components (Thomas 1976 and Wehr, 1979). Over the past years, the idea of conflict transformation has emerged in the search for an adequate language to describe the peacemaking venture (Curle 1991, Kriesberg 1989, Ruppesinghe 1994). Transformation provides a more holistic understanding, which can be fleshed out at several levels. Unlike resolution and management, the idea of transformation does not simply eliminate or control conflict, but rather points to its inherent dialectic nature. Social conflict is a phenomenon of human creation, lodged naturally in relationships (Lederach, 1996:17). It is a phenomenon that transforms events, the relationships in which conflict occurs and indeed its very creators. It is a necessary element in transformative human construction and reconstruction of social organization and realities. As such, transformation more closely acknowledges what social scientists have been suggesting for some time on the role and dynamics of social conflict: it moves through certain predictable phases, transforming relationships and social organization (Coleman 1956 and Boulding 1962). Conflict changes communication patterns, affecting relationships and social organization. Typically, at times of increased tension, there


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is less direct exchange between those experiencing the conflict and increased indirect communication by which others are brought in, changing the primary relationship and the broader social context in which conflict occurs. This was one of the earlier key findings by Coleman’s (1956) study of community conflict and lies at the heart of how family systems approaches describe the impact of conflict (Friedman, 1990). Conflict also transforms perceptions, and the issues in question, usually with the consequence of less accurate understanding of the other’s intention and decreased ability to clearly articulate one’s own intentions. This consequence relates to the psychological dimensions of conflict. On the one hand, a transformation is assumed in terms of the relationship, which shifts from mutually destructive, unstable, and harmful expressions to a mutually beneficial and cooperative basis. On the other hand, a transformation of the system and structure is assumed, in which the relationships are embedded and which can be changed by building on the energy and impact of conflict itself. In other words, conflict is seen as a transforming agent for systematic change (Lederach, 1996:18). In sum, transformation as a concept is both descriptive of the conflict dynamics and prescriptive of the overall purpose that building peace pursues, both in terms of changing destructive relationship patterns and in seeking systematic change. Transformation provides a language that more adequately approximates the nature of conflict and how it works and underscores the goals and purpose of the field. It encompasses a view that legitimizes conflict as an agent of change in relationships. It describes more accurately the impact of conflict on the patterns of communication, expression, and perception. Transformation suggests a dynamic understanding that conflict can move in destructive or constructive directions, but proposes an effort to maximize the achievement of constructive, mutually beneficial processes and outcomes (Lederach, 1996:19). Paulo Freire uses the individual and personal agenda as a tool for exploring and promoting social change. He refers to this as conscientization or, in context, awareness of self, a concept that simultaneously promotes personal and social transformation (Freire, 1970). Peacemaking embraces the challenge of personal

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transformation, of pursuing awareness, growth, and commitment to change at a personal level (Lederach, 1996:19). For this study, peacemaking covers the period from conflict to peace in selected peace zones of Mindanao. Figure 1. Analytical Framework

Methodology and Scope This paper explores peaceful resolution of ethnic conflicts through the establishment of a zone of peace at the community level by focusing on the Bual, Dinas and Maladeg peace zones in Mindanao. Data are derived from secondary sources both from published and unpublished works. Each case is described as briefly as possible using the historical approach. Then, each case is compared through the explanatory mode of analysis using the conceptual framework of this study. It is hoped that through this mode of analysis, the main objective of peaceful resolution of ethnic conflicts at the community level will be mapped out and clarified.


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Bual Peace Zone Barangay Bual is situated in the municipality of Isulan, Maguindanao Province inhabited by Muslims and Christians. The Muslims are of the Maguindanaon tribe while the Christians are mostly Ilongos and Ilocanos. Their principal means of livelihood is farming although some depend on vending. Despite the differences in their cultures and religious beliefs, the residents of Barangay Bual live in harmony. Both Muslims and Christians also freely practised their religions. In fact, mosques and chapels alike could be seen throughout the community. Barangay Bual was just like any other barangay in Mindanao where both Muslims and Christians live in mutual understanding. All these, however, changed in the early 70’s when feuds started to arise. The emerging discords among the residents worsened when the Christians, instigated by malevolent entities, organized among themselves an armed group, which came to be known as the Ilagas. Incidents of violence in the community increased as the Ilagas fought the Muslims who, by then, also affiliated themselves with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) which at the time was in the midst of waging a secessionist war and was engaged in a succession of armed encounters. As it turned out, Barangay Bual was never the same again. MuslimChristian animosity worsened and fighting among them became common. The situation deteriorated further when the Christians organized a religious cult known as the Tadtad, which literally means to “chop into little pieces.” This cult gained the reputation as being the major perpetrator of human rights violations particularly against the Muslims. For almost two decades, Bual came to be known as a war-torn barangay where Muslim-Christian conflict was at its worst. Violence reached its peak when, in December 14, 1996 after a succession of furtive attacks launched by unidentified armed men using high-powered weapons that included rifle-propelled grenades, a whole Muslim family was injured while one of the children was killed. On that same night, the house of the barangay chairperson was also

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burned. The assault on the Muslims continued until dawn of the next day forcing them to evacuate. By the time the attack subsided, almost all the houses of the Muslims had been razed to the ground including four of their mosques. The incident caught the attention of the municipal government and while investigations were going on, Barangay Bual was declared a calamity area. Shortly thereafter, non-government organizations (NGOs) and some government agencies provided relief assistance to the displaced families now residing in evacuation centers in nearby municipalities. Kadtuntaya Foundation, Inc., (KFI), in cooperation with Catholic Relief Services (CRS) was among those that first responded to the needs of the victims. Prompted by the initiatives of the NGOs and the local agencies, the National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC) released a calamity fund of 1.5 million pesos to be used in providing relief and in the reconstruction of public facilities and infrastructures damaged during the catastrophe. The NDCC also allocated an additional 2.5 million pesos for the building of temporary shelters and roads as well as for the construction of a reliable water system. Subsequently, the Bual Rehabilitation Task Force (BRTF) was formed and tasked to oversee the smooth implementation of the rehabilitation program. The task force was co-chaired by the Municipal Mayor of Isulan and the Barangay Captain of Bual. Its members comprised of representatives from the Sangguniang Bayan (Municipal Council), the different Local Government Line Agencies, the Barangay Kagawad (Barangay Councilors) and Kadtuntaya Foundation, Inc., from the NGO sector. In relation to this, a pulong-pulong or a consultation among the community members, both Muslims and Christians alike, was held. It was during this consultation that issues and concerns were discussed to resolve the conflict. Eventually, after the consultation and complemented with regular meetings of the BRTF with the community members, the evacuees were finally convinced to return to Barangay Bual on April 14, 1997 or four months after the Muslims’ return to the barangay. However, some of them who still feared that problems


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might erupt anew decided to migrate to other municipalities or provinces, instead. Recognizing the incident as an opportunity to strengthen the relationship and unity among the Muslims and the Christians, the KFI and CRS decided to embark on a peace-building program in Bual. So, KFI and CRS facilitated a Seminar-Workshop geared Towards Building a Culture of Peace and invited selected members of the community as well as those from adjacent barangays to participate. The seminar-workshop paved the way for the launching of the Bual Integrated Development and Peace Building Program which to date is continuously being implemented. Now on its second phase, the program has already successfully conducted various capabilitybuilding trainings as well as regular farmers’ classes that are designed to enhance their production capacity. The community members have also been organized and have in fact set up their own People’s Organization, the SAMAKANA or the Samahan ng mga Nagkakaisang Mamamayan ng Bual. To address the other concerns of the community, KFI is also currently implementing community social services programs that focus mainly on health and child care. So far, a health and day-care center has already been established and Mothers’ and Day-Care Classes for pre-school children are being held regularly. Educational activities that promote a culture of peace are likewise ongoing which, in effect, have encouraged the constituents of Bual to declare their barangay as a Zone of Peace on December 10, 1998. Moreover, the regular conduct of consultations among the different religious groups has also inspired the residents to agree on a formal Declaration of Cooperation to foster better personal as well as working relationships amongst them. Clearly enough, the Bual Integrated Development and Peace Building Program has achieved a major milestone in helping the barangay recover from what many perceived to be an irreconcilable situation. At present, the situation in Barangay Bual is practically the opposite of what it used to be three years ago.

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Dinas Peace Zone Dinas is one of the municipalities of Zamboanga del Sur. Together with five other neighboring towns, it forms part of the Baganian Peninsula, a cluster of coastal towns constituting one geographical division of the province. With a total land area of 16,237.63 hectares, Dinas is home to the Maguindanao Muslims, indigenous Subanen and Christian settlers who are locally known as Bisaya. At present, of the 28,364 people living in Dinas, 23.17 percent are Maguindanaon, 6.21 percent are Subanen and 68 percent are Bisaya. The Bisaya occupy the wide plains at the center of the municipality; the Maguindanaons inhabit the river banks; and the Subanen live in the mountainous parts. The period 1970-1972 was marked by violent encounters between “Muslim militia” groups, the Blackshirt of Cotabato and the Barracuda of Lanao, and the notorious “Christian” paramilitary and fanatical group, Ilaga. The physical chain of violent events started in Cotabato. Later, the conflict spread to almost all parts of Mindanao where there was a significant size of Muslim and Christian populations and where there was intense rivalry between Muslim and Christian politicians. The fighting found its way to Zamboanga del Sur in 1972. During this time, hundreds of evacuees from Lanao del Norte had sought refuge in some of the province’s towns, only to be pursued by the fighting there. For the Subanen who have always claimed to have shared common ancestry with the Moro people, the armed conflict in the 1970s further widened the wedge arising from their past subjugation by the Muslims. For the Christian settlers, it erected a barrier between them and the Muslims that has since been cemented by prejudices. While for the Moro people, the events in the 1970s validated their age-old perception against Christianized people, and marked the transformation of once tolerant attitude towards the latter into bitterest feeling of distrust and enmity. The Ilaga-Barracuda chapter was shortly followed by the protracted war between the revolutionary Moro National Liberation


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Front (MNLF) and the Armed Forces of the Philippines, fought with as much might and violence. This war of attrition further cemented the distrust that had beclouded Muslim-Christian relations in Dinas. It was a popular belief that Christian settlers worked as agents of the military while the MNLF enjoyed tremendous support from the Muslims. To many people in the Baganian Peninsula, this was another violence-laden episode of displacement of communities and loss of lives.

Peacemaking in Dinas: The Beginnings A small town like Dinas has proven that people need not rely on top-level negotiations and external interventions to work for peace. Actual experiences of violent conflicts and a collective will to act upon their own choices to transform conflicts into a situation of mutual understanding are the necessary ingredients of peacemaking. The organization of the Subanen, Moro and Bisaya (SUMBIS), otherwise known as Dinas Interfaith Movement, was pioneered in 1995 by three individuals; namely Bert Tilao, then a parish worker in Dinas and of mixed Cebuano and Subanen lineage; Jun Malanao, a Subanen; and Abdul Dadtum, a Maguindanao. The group was inspired by the bigger yet loose Interfaith Forum at the Pagadian Diocese. The forum is composed of different people’s and religious organizations collectively bearing the tri-people character. Under the leadership of Pagadian Bishop Zacharias Jimenez, among its constituents are members of the clergy, Muslim and Subanen leaders, government officials and employees, members of the local military and the police, and a few private organizations. With the major objective of having a regular forum that could be a venue for exchange and dialogue between and among the tri-people in the diocese, the Interfaith Forum has three major areas of concern; namely, interfaith solidarity, social issues and concerns, and fellowship. SUMBIS’ primary response to conflict situation is the conduct of conflict mediation. Most members of the interfaith organization call it peace negotiation, although most often it involves individuals acting as mediators between conflicting parties. A few others refer to it as peace dialogue.

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Because the organization is composed of the three peoples in the municipality; namely; the Maguindanaon, the Subanen and the Bisaya, sets of mediators or negotiators representing each ethnic group have been organized. Not all conflicts though are brought to the attention of SUMBIS. When the conflict involves camps of the same ethnicity, it is understood that the mediators or negotiators representing the group are responsible for resolving it. It is only when the conflict comes between distinct groups (Muslim vs. Bisaya; Muslim vs. Subanen) that a peace negotiation involving two groups of representative negotiators is held. There are instances though that both representative groups act as conflict mediators. Conflict mediation or peace negotiation is conducted at the very moment or stage that conflict arises. This is to prevent any eventuality that might worsen the situation. This approach provides opportunity for the community to get its act together in a situation of conflict without interference from outside. By outside interference, the interfaith members refer to that situation where official sanctions are sought. Apparently, the group seeks amicable settlement of conflicts. The idea here is that a conflict, whatever the cause may be, can be resolved if there is enough room for the conflicting parties to discuss and to talk about the problem in the spirit of dialogue. Conducted at the place where the conflict happens, actual conflict mediation or peace negotiation is often attended by the community. When conflicting groups or families reside in different barangays, either place can be the site of mediation. There have been a few cases when the conduct of mediation or negotiation comes late. This is when the conflict happens in a remote community and there is a delay in reporting the problem to the peace negotiators. Another reason involves the conflicting parties, wherein either one or both are not yet open to the idea of resolving the conflict, or not yet ready to make peace. The success of every mediation or negotiation effort of SUMBIS is manifested in the traditional handshake as a peace gesture between conflicting parties.


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Maladeg Peace Zone Homespun, designed by the very people themselves, the Maladeg Peace Zone is unique. It sprang forth in Maladeg, a coastal barangay of Sultan Gumander, Lanao del Sur, a province where more than 93 percent of its population is Maranao Muslim. Nearly 98 percent of its inhabitants are Maranao. But in Maladeg itself, the population is 90 percent Maranao and 10 percent Christian living in 876 houses. When the zone was started, there were slightly more than ten Christian houses; now there are more than a hundred. Many of the Maranaos do not come from Maladeg. A good number of them hail from the nearby towns of Nunungan, Calanugas, Malabang, Ganassi, Karomatan and Balabagan. They either came to Maladeg as evacuees during Martial Law days or simply sought shelter on because of unstable conditions in their places of origin. Muslim residents are clustered on the north side of the coast, the Christian on the south side; the leading families, the Antons stay in the middle. They used to be living mixed in the early days but because of differences in culture, like the sale and drinking of liquor and the raising of hogs among Christians, which are built-in irritants among the Muslims, they decided that it was best to have the Muslims on one end and the Christians on the other. (Islam prohibits the sale and drinking of liquor so Muslims are not allowed to buy or take liquor). There has been no trouble since then. The elected leader of the peace zone is 60-year old Manuel Anton — more popularly known as Bob, half Maranao, a Catholic Christian. Youngest in a brood of eight, his father was Miguel, half Spanish, onefourth Maranao, one-fourth Maguindanao, former Chief of Police and four-term mayor of Malabang, Lanao del Sur. His mother is Mareg Limano of the respected Ibrahim clan of Pualas, Lanao del Sur whose father was the former Sultan Dalumangkob of Pualas married to a Trinidad Carpio, a charming Zamboangueña Bob is endearingly referred to by the Maranao residents as the Ama-Ina (Father-Mother) of the zone. One reason he is called Ina-Ama, said Mauyag Ampuan,

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one of the original authors of the Peace Zone, is that “he protects his family, meaning not only his blood relatives but all the people who believe in him in the peace zone. When his family is in distress, he forgets himself and he will take maximum measure to save the lives of his family.” All the signatories of the Covenant of Peace and Development — the original of this document is in Maranao — used to be Bob’s mortal enemies, ridu-ai in Maranao, with whom his family was at war for more than two decades. They were sworn to eliminate his family from Maladeg but his family fought back to survive. In the process, he lost some members of his family. He himself is a veteran of countless armed encounters with them. Now, they are allies, sworn to protect each other in a peace zone. According to Sangcupan Kilab, one of the authors of the peace zone, when they arrived in Maladeg there were about ten houses there. They conferred with the Antons and decided to create a committee whose task was to fix all kinds of rido and to prevent the escalation of trouble, particularly inside the zone. There were so many rido all around them at the time. Now, the committee has more than 30 members and the houses have increased to more than 800. They also decided to create a Peace Zone which would be bounded by areas inside Turayas to the east, boundary of Liangan-Subuan to the west and then, going up to the north, Kalumpang or Kaludan and then going up to Mamaanan and back of Turayas. The area is about seven kilometers in width and about 15 kilometers in length. The members of the peace zone represent clans. They also have MNLF and MILF commanders among them, all sworn to uphold the eight rules of the zone. The Zone did not have a name in the beginning, just a Committee made up of 13 leaders, and the covenant was not written either (it was put on paper later). From the original 13 in 1978, the signatories of the Peace Zone covenant have now increased to 41. Four of the signatories are MNLF commanders, one a Chief Inspector of the PNP and another a Colonel of the Philippine Army. The incumbent mayor of Sultan Gumander is so pleased with the peace and order situation in Maladeg that he decided to relocate his office there.


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A Council of Elders sees to it that rules formulated are implemented. To ensure proper implementation, the rules are disseminated to all the families in the zone. Where a family or clan is unable to implement the rules, the signatories — datus and leaders — of the covenant will take over the implementation. They have a community jail for violators. The first tenant was the son of Bob himself for a minor infraction, proof that he (Bob) favored no one. The community respected him for that. Many others have been imprisoned there, including soldiers, CAFGUs. There were no exemptions as all the violators were apprehended. Armed conflict, gambling, the use of prohibited drugs, any form of criminality -in fact, anything considered bad - are prohibited inside the Zone of Peace. Good deeds, however, are encouraged. Outsiders who wish to reside inside the Zone are required to seek the permission of the Council of Elders and commit themselves to a strict compliance of the rules prior to approval. Any outsider of the Zone who has rido or family feuds but does not wish to be part of the rido can avail of sanctuary inside the Zone, provided he will promise to renounce violence and cut off his support for his relatives involved in the rido. This also means that he may not use the Zone as his base of operations to participate in rido. The Zone leaders, in turn, will provide him assistance and protection from any troublemaker. They also have a committee whose members are constantly alert for any outbreak of actual conflict or potential conflict. If they feel that a conflict is about to break out, they would immediately visit the involved parties and talk them out of it. Where armed conflict has already broken out, they will visit the contending parties and persuade them to a cease-fire. As soon as the parties agree, the next move is to get them to negotiate for a peaceful resolution. In cases of murder or attempted murder, Zone rules require that the weapon used in the crime must first be turned over to the Committee before resolution. The committee has not only confined its services to the people of Maladeg, it has also extended assistance to those in need in nearby areas of Maganding, Malabang, Nunungan, and Karomatan,

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Women violators, married or unmarried, may not be subjected to interrogation without the presence of male relatives of the first degree. The Committee’s success record at settling conflict has been spectacularly high. Also, contrary to the practice of mediation common among Maranaos of requiring a fee of 30% of the settlement sum, they as mediators do not charge a single centavo for their services. Neither are they compensated for their work. They have also built a reputation of fairness, regardless of social rank.

Feedback from the People Some feedback from the signatories reveal now successful the Peace Zone has been creating a new way of life in Lanao del Sur. In the interviews with the Maranao leaders, they were asked to respond especially to two questions, to wit: (a) How do you describe life with rido and life without rido? ; and (b) Why did you choose to live in Maladeg? . Originally from Nunungan, Mauyag “Mawi” Ampuan has lived 40 years in Maladeg. He is one of the authors of the Peace Zone and is also one of the signatories of the Covenant of Peace and Development. Asked about his opinion on life with or without rido, he said: “A person without rido can go anywhere. A person with rido is like a carabao tethered to a tree. He can only move around as far as the rope will allow.” To Ustadz Ampaso, originally from Uyaan, leader of more than 50 families from the same place and one of the original signatories of the covenant, life with rido is being a “prisoner inside your own household.” What attracted him to Maladeg was that the place is “peaceful and I decided to stay here because this is where I found peace of mind.” Kadi Abbas who hails from Nunungan heads more than 200 families. He has lived in Maladeg in the last 20 years. He commented: “When you have rido, you are never stable, you are like a prisoner. You cannot work, you cannot go out of your house, you cannot extend assistance to anybody because you are afraid to go out. Your enemy


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might be somewhere around and might take a chance on you. He can kill you.” He chose to stay in Maladeg “because of you and your brothers,” he told Bob Anton. “We have identified you as people who are concerned about helping other people especially when they are oppressed, when they are hard up. Your family is always there to extend assistance to these oppressed people, these people who are financially hard up. And most of all, your place is identified with peaceful coexistence among the inhabitants. We find this place very ideal for future plans. This is the place where we can rest with peace of mind. This is the place where we feel safe even if we have enemies. We believe you will not leave us unprotected.” To Datu Bra who has lived in Maladeg for 40 years, “The bad thing about rido is that our livelihood is really paralyzed. The advantage of having no rido is you are free to move wherever you like to go, no problem.” Why did he choose to stay in Maladeg? This is where he discovered that he can “make a living in peace.” Alim Abu Jabir, originally known as Khalid Rajah Muda Ali, is from Nunungan. He studied Arabic in Matampay, Marawi City and went to Kuwait University on a scholarship. He graduated in 1991. He came home when Iraq attacked Kuwait. As an Islamic teacher, he moves around a lot. Even if he does not concern himself with the rido of his clan, he still takes precautionary measures. He plans his movements. He is aware that rido is prohibited in Islam. One of the things he does in his travels is to tell people the efforts being done by the people of Maladeg. But how does one sustain the peace zone? Makaorao Sarif, Sultan sa Liangan and regular emissary during settlement processes, believes that to maintain the integrity of the peace zone, the datus must have one motive, which is to find peace for themselves and their followers. When the datus agree among themselves, it means that every leader must discipline his followers and his subjects. Leadership is very important. The leaders and datus’ participation in the settlement process is very important in achieving peace.

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Comparative Analysis of the Bual, Dinas, and Madaleg Peace Zones The various ethnic groups of Mindanao have a common history and territory. In Bual, the Maguindanaos, Ilongo and the Ilocano live in harmony and mutual respect. However, feuds among these ethnic groups started to arise in the early 70’s which led to the formation of armed militia groups such as the Ilaga and the MNLF. In Dinas, the Subanens, Maguindanaons and Bisaya share the same territory accordingly with designated domains for each ethnic group. The Subanens, who were the original settlers, moved to the mountainous areas when the Maguindanao and Bisayan settlers came to Dinas. Before the 1970’s, they lived in harmony and mutual respect. But like somewhere else in the country, there was a social commotion that consummated its inevitable collapse. In the 70s, the formation of militia groups such as the Blackshirt and the barracuda, among the Muslims; and the Ilaga and the Tadtad, among the Christians, caused the escalation of conflict from feuds to armed hostilities between militia groups. This situation was aggravated by the intense rivalry between Muslim and Christian politicians. On the other hand, the ethnic problem in Maladeg started with a two-decade family feud between prominent Christian and Muslim families that intensified into Christian and Muslim conflict in the community. The conflict grew to such an intense proportion due to lack of mutual understanding of their cultural practices that manifested in a rido between a Christian and a Muslim family. These data are presented in Table 1.


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Table 1. Types and Causes of Ethnic Conflict Peace Zone

Types and Causes of Ethnic Conflict

Bual

• Dispute between two families

(Isulan,

belonging to distinct ethnic groups

Sultan Kudarat) Dinas

• Formation of armed groups among

(Zamboanga del Sur)

ethnic communities • Power struggle between cultures

Maladeg

• Rido (Inter-ethnic Family Feud)

(Sultan Gumander,

• Cultural differences

Lanao del Sur)

Table 2 presents the ethnic groups involved in the ethnic conflict in the cited cases. The main political actors in the Bual case are the Maguindanao Muslims and the Ilongo and Ilocano Christians; while in Dinas, the actors are the Maguindanao Muslims, the Bisaya and the Subanen. Other subsidiary actors such as the militia groups are seen to have intensified the conflict in both areas. The case in Maladeg involves the Bisaya Christians and the Maranao Muslims. The ethnic conflict in Dinas reflects a tri-people struggle that is among the Lumad (Subanen), Moro (Maguindanao) and the Christian settlers (Bisaya). These cases manifest competing interests and the lack of mutual understanding of cultural practices among these communities. Table 2. Ethnic Group/s Involved in the Conflict Peace Zone

Ethnic Group(s) Involved

Bual

• Maguindanao Muslim • Ilonggos /Bisaya Christian

Dinas

• Maguindanao Muslim • Bisaya Christian • Subanen

Maladeg

• Bisaya Christians • Maranao Muslims

The conflict in Bual resulted in economic and social dislocation which traumatized hundreds of Maguindanao Muslims who sought

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refuge in the municipality of Isulan. These consequent problems caught the attention of NGOs, LGUs and the National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC) of the Philippine government. The Kadtuntaya Foundation Inc. and the Catholic Relief Services provided social services to these internal refugees. The NDCC provided PhP1.5M for relief and rehabilitation under the supervision of the Bual Rehabilitation Task Force (BRTF) of the municipality of Isulan. One of the interventions employed by the NGOs to minimize animosities in the area is the implementation of a peace-building program in Bual, one of which is a seminar-workshop geared towards building a culture of peace involving selected members of the community and its surrounding barangays. As a response to the prejudice and distrust among the tri-people in Dinas, a communitybased organization of the Subanen, Moro and Bisaya which is called SUMBIS was formed. It is also known as the Dinas Interfaith Movement. The warring families in Maladeg on the other hand, decided to begin their reconciliation process by signing the Covenant of Peace and Development to stop their ridu-ai. The said document provides for the establishment of a peace zone to present conflict, particularly rido, to take place within the parameters of the peace zone. The zone now has 800 households, representing the different clans, including MNLF and MILF commanders. Table 3. Issues Addressed in the Peace Zones Peace Zones

Issues Addressed

Bual

• Economic dislocation-hundreds of Maguindanaon evacuated to Isulan • Psychological Trauma

Dinas

• Prejudice and Distrust between Muslims, Christians and Subanens

Maladeg

• Prejudice and Distrust between Muslims and Christians: - fix all kinds of rido - prevent the escalation of trouble inside the zone


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The intervention of NGOs provided impetus for peace building efforts among the ethnic communities in Bual. Most crucial to the process are the seminar-workshop series on the culture of peace among the community members. These activities encouraged the people of Bual to declare the barangay as a Zone of Peace. The signing of a Declaration of Cooperation by the different ethnic groups led to the conduct of regular consultations among them. The community members have also been organized and have, in fact, set up their own People’s Organization, the SAMAKANA or the Samahan ng mga Nagkakaisang Mamamayan ng Bual. These constitute the Bual Integrated Development and Peace Building Program. In Dinas, the SUMBIS, comprised of peace negotiators and mediators from the different ethnic groups, conducts conflict prevention, mediation and negotiation within the community to avoid misunderstanding and settle conflicts amicably. A Zone of Peace was likewise declared here. In the case of Maladeg, the strategies were the signing of a covenant of peace and development, establishing a zone of peace and the constitution of a council of elders. Thus, the peaceful methods employed in these cases are collective in nature and originated from within the communities. Peace interventions by civil society provided impetus for peace building and peace making at the community level. Table 4. Peaceful Methods Used and Groups Involved in Resolving Conflict Peace Zone

Peaceful Methods/Groups

Bual

• Peace Advocacy (facilitated seminar-workshop geared towards a culture ofpeace) • Consultation of both the Muslims and Christians • Establishment of a Zone of Peace

Dinas

• Mediation/ NegotiationÏ • Establishment of a Zone of Peace

Maladeg

• Signing of a Covenant of Peace and Development • Establishment of a Zone of Peace

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The peaceful methods used in the resolution of ethnic conflict in Bual, Dinas and Maladeg support the theories of Lederach, Galtung and Curle. The ethnic communities begin with constructive behaviors such as dialogues, consultations and meetings. The purpose of which is to arrive at a solution that is deemed reasonable and acceptable and can be sustained by the political actors. While conflicts were processed at the community level, the positive interventions of other political actors, such as the civil society and the LGU, also incurred a significant dent on the direction of conflict - from violence to peace making and peace building.

Conclusion Ethnic conflict escalates because of groups’ quest for identity or group distinctiveness. The ethnic conflicts at the peace zones analyzed here suggest that conflict is likely to occur between ethnic groups when one of the groups pursue its interests without regard for the rights of the other groups. This is exacerbated by the armed groups operating in the area. Some of the conflicts in these communities can be attributed to the worsening political condition brought about by hostilities between the government troops and the militia groups in the 70s and recently, between the government troops and Muslim secessionist movements in Mindanao. The Mindanao experience shows that when confronted with conflicts, ethnic groups devise their own means of peacemaking to survive. The peaceful resolution or transformation of conflict which begins with the willingness by both sides to adopt peaceful rather than violent strategies to resolve disputes, will end conflict even without mediation. Among the modes employed are negotiation, mediation and reconciliation and the establishment of a zone of peace. While the establishment of peace zones is a new phenomenon in Mindanao, this peace alternative serves as a strong foundation of the process of peace building among ethnic communities in Bual, Dinas and Maladeg. The study supports the constructionist view of Lederach and the non-violent resolution of conflict of Galtung. Both political scientists


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say that conflicts can be resolved or transformed peacefully or constructively at the community level. Given the limited number of cases included in this study, there is a need for more systematic inquiries on the commonalities and differences and the root causes of conflict among ethnic groups in the Philippines and in the region. A long-term strategy on the development of concrete and sustainable peace building activities must be formulated by the academic community and the civil society with the participation of concerned ethnic communities for implementation at the local, national and regional levels.

Bibliography Arquiza, Mucha-Shim and M. Abdus Sabur, Interfaith Conference on the CULTURE OF PEACE: Celebrating A.M.A.N’s Ten Years of Relevance in International Solidarity, Networking and Peace-Work (Bangkok, Thailand: ASIAN MUSLIM ACTION NETWORK /A.M.A.N, 2001). Balacuit, Jimmy, Victor Isumonah and Kamala Liyanage, “Psychosocial Factors in Ethnic Conflict”, Mindanao Forum, Vol. XI, No. 1 (Iligan City: MSU-IIT, June, 1996). Berger, Peter and Thomas Luckman, The Social Construction of Reality (New York: Anchor Books, 1967). Boulding, Kenneth, Conflict and Defense (New York: Harper and Row, 1962). Brown, Michael E, The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict (London: The MIT Press, 1996). Coleman, James, Community Conflict (New York: Free Press, 1956). Curle, Adam, Making Peace (London: Tavistock Publications, 1971). __________ Tools for Transformation (London: Hawthorne Press, 1991). De Goor, Luc Van, Kumar Rupesinghe and Paul Sciarone, Between Development and Destruction (The Hague: The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1996). Doucet, Ian, (ed.), Conflict Transformation and Sustainable Peace (London: International Alert, 1996). Drew, Naomi, Learning the Skills of Peacemaking (California: Jaimar Press, 1987). Duryea, Michelle Lebaron, Conflict and Culture: A Literature Review and Bibliography (Vancouver: UVIC Institute of Dispute Resolution, 1992). Feagin, Joe R, Racial and Ethnic Relations (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1978).

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Findlay, Trevor, (ed.), “Challenges for the New Peacekeepers”, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Research Report, No. 12 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). Fisher, Roger and William Ury, Getting to YES: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In (New York: Penguin Books, 1981). Folberg, Jay and Alison Taylor, Mediation (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1984). Freire, Paulo, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (New York: Seabury Press, 1970). Galtung, Johan, Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace or Conflict, Development and Civilization (London: Sage Publications, 1996). Intuas, Abdullah M, “Indigenous Methodology of Conflict Resolution Among Maranao: A Theoretical Consideration”, The National Symposium on Peace and Development in Mindanao, Iligan City, MSU-IIT Iligan Institute of Technology (1996). Kriesberg, Louis, Terrell Northrup and Stuart Thorson, Intractable Conflicts and their Transformation (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1989). Lederach, John Paul, Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1995). _________________ Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1997). Lindgren, Goran, Kjell-Ake Nordquist and Peter Wallerstein, (eds.), Experiences from Conflict Resolution in Third World, Report from the 1992 Advanced International Programme CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Uppsala University, Sweden: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 1992). __________ (eds.), Issues in Third World Conflict Resolution, Report from the 1990 Advanced International Programme CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Uppsala University, Sweden: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 1990). (eds.), Peace Process in the Third World, Report from the 1991 Advanced International Programme CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Uppsala University, Sweden: Department of peace and Conflict Research, 1991). __________ (eds.), Experiences from Conflict Resolution in Third World, Report from the 1992 Advanced International Programme CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Uppsala University, Sweden: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 1992). __________ (eds.), Third World Dimensions in Conflict Resolution, Report from the 1992 Advanced International Programme CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Uppsala University, Sweden: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 1992). Mattews, Dylan, War Prevention Works: 50 Stories of People Resolving Conflict (Oxford: Oxford Research Group, 2001). Rodil, B. R., Kalinaw Mindanaw (Davao, Philippines: Alternate Forum for Research in Mindanao, Inc., 2000).


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__________ “It is time for Mutual Affirmative Action” (2001). Paper Delivered at the 25th Conference of the Pambansang Samahan as Sikolohiyang Pilipino, entitled Hamon sa Kapayapaan: Konteksto ng Mindanao, November 23 –25, 2000, Davao City. Ruppesinghe, Kumar, Protracted Conflict (London: McMillan, 1994). Thomas, Kenneth, “Conflict and Conflict Management”, In Handbook of Industrial and Organizaitonal Psychology (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1976). Wehr, Paul, Conflict Regulation (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979).

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Ethno-Methodological Reflection On The Case Of Acehnese Conflict

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Ethno-Methodological Reflection On The Case Of Acehnese Conflict Fuad Mardhatillah I. Introduction: The Formation of Indonesia and the Problem of Ethnicity Historically speaking, the notion of Indonesian nation-state was firstly established through a joint-agreement of multi-ethnic groups, which were suffering together from the similar physical and psychological humiliation of being colonized as experienced by all ethnic groups in the archipelago. Related to this reality, the event of Sumpah Pemuda (Youth Oath) pronounced by youth representatives from various ethnic groups in October 1928 was a historical proof showing the collective spirit in fighting together against the same enemy (the Dutch). Herewith, the Dutch colonialism became a common enemy for all ethnic groups in the archipelago at that time and then fabricated the same resistance spirit in struggling to achieve independence. And eventually, all ethnic groups succeeded to gain and declare their independence on August 17, 1945. That historical evidence, exhibiting such a psycho-politic reality on having the same common enemy, was certainly an unconscious reason d’etre underlying substantially in the existence of an Indonesian nation state today. It Means that within the same experiences all ethnic groups in the archipelago had created such a new sentiment of nationalism with which then became clearly united into one single state after they reached independence, under the banner of new state that then together agreed to name Indonesia. Furthermore, once the state of Indonesia was established, after the proclamation of its independence, without getting much trouble, all ethnic groups also agreed to accept Pancasila as their national ideology, within which Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (unity in diversity) was the national aphorism. Then Burung Garuda was a symbol for national unity and Red-White Color was also accepted as the national-flag.

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All those indications were very logical and historical to observe as essential factor toward the formation of national integration of Indonesia that constituted hundreds of ethnic groups altogether. And therefore, the founding fathers of Indonesian nation state assumed that they had succeeded to finalize the process of establishing a new nationalism inhabiting a very broad territory of Indonesian archipelago, from Sabang located in the northern tip of Sumatera island to Merauke located in the very eastern part of West Papua island. Bearing this in mind of the founding fathers, the state ran and ruled from one to other generations without any political and constitutional attention toward the paradigm of ethnicity and plurality, whereas Indonesia state consists of a multi-ethnic origin. Accordingly, we can then conclude that because of first the Youth Oath which accepted the single motherland, language and nation under the name of Indonesia, the second the acceptance of Pancasila (the Five Pilars) as the sole state ideology, consisting of the God Monotheism, the Humanity in Justice and Civilized, the Indonesian Unity, the People Soveriegnty under the Wisdom of People House Representative and the Social Justice for All Indoensian, and, the third, the acceptance of such a united slogan, symbol and flag, the founding fathers felt very satisfied in terms of being successful in establishing a new nationalism originating from multi-etnic groups called Indonesian nationalism. Such a political feeling of satisfaction is indeed merely a perception that clearly shows their being unlearned about the essence of ethnicity. Accordingly, Immanuel Kant said that perception without conception is blind and conception without knowledge is lame. It was, therefore, that the perception of being successful to finalize the nationalization process has never brought forth a thoughtful conception toward the problem of ethnicity together with their own uniqueness. Being disregarded of building a concept and elaborating knowledge about ethnicity, it has directed Indonesian-nation into the darkness of economical and socio-political life. As such, this was the resource of creating coercive centralized political patterns or system in encountering the problem of Indonesian multiethnic reality. From


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this political system and patronage, it was inevitable that the Indonesian government produced authoritarianism, ethnical majority hegemonic, and singularized all of the cultural plurality and people’s thinking creativity. Indonesian nationalist unquestionably believed that the national character building should be based on the perception of national uniformity rather than on appreciation and accommodation of the diversity and plurality of multiculturalism. As consequence, Indonesian citizens in majority from various ethnic groups have never better known and had never have an anthropological postulate that can create a mutual understanding and reciprocal belief and trustworthy amid Indonesian multiculturalism country. And now, they are all being entrapped into a multi-dimensional problems and crises, especially the problem of ethnical insurgency and the crises of humanity. Needless to say, that the cultivation of a nation-state nationalism based on perception that the problems of nationalism have already finished only through the ethnical agreements of accepting the sole national language, symbol, flag, slogan and ideology was the first error made by the Indonesian founding fathers, nationalists and political leaders, and occurred at the formation period of national character building of the Indonesian citizenship. Afterwards, they created massive perpetual errors in economical and socio-political management, justice, education and even religion in Indonesian multi-ethnic country. Frankly speaking, what had been achieved at the beginning of Indonesian nation-state formation period was only its first and initial stadium that surely contained the very important substances for further building of Indonesian nationalism processes. It is indeed that the Indonesian nationalism is only a pseudonationalism that is very imaginative, superficial and symbolic. It means that Indonesian nationalism still needs further deep and comprehensive understanding towards the concepts of similarities and differences of any ethnic that agrees to accept Indonesian as their own single country. We should carefully consider the uniqueness and peculiarities that the nation-state of Indonesia diverges essentially in

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their various world-view, patterns of thought, symbols, cultures, habits, religious affiliation and orientation and so forth that naturally exist and are traditionally inherited from one to other generation in any ethnic group. However, it was in fact that all these anthropological elements were violated in the long run by Indonesian political orientation and bureaucratic management history. It was true that there were no crucial problems emerged in terms of ethnicity at that time. It was because at first Indonesian independence period, most ethnic in the archipelago had not yet felt any problem towards their own identity. Their only concentration was focused on struggling for their own freedom from colonialism and most people of those ethnic groups did not have no their own state establishing orientation either. This was the historical reason why there was no political ethnicity coming up to the front of Indonesian national problem. The first ethnical problem emerged in 1950, when Indonesian central government liquidated the Aceh Province into North Sumatra Province and its political consequence of marginalizing the Acehnese history, religious and cultural specification.

II. Indonesian Ethnic Conflict Social scientists, on the one hand, often consider that cultural differences as a barely natural pretext resources to the existence of conflicts among people those from such multicultural societies. It is, therefore, the conflicts among various ethnic groups are a commonfamiliar thing and undeniable fact. But the question is that whether or not the conflicts are closely related to the context of ethnicity? Is conflict as such illegitimate? On the other hand, some educated-people may also argue that the unavoidable conflicts among societies are solely caused by the injustice, inhumanity or the atrocities, actions from one to other people, both individually and collectively. This opinion leads to disregard ethnicity as another conflicts source. But in fact, conflicts agitated among the societies were mostly caused by the humiliation of ethnicity sentiment and mostly related to its cultural values.


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From the perspective of some general theories of social cognition, collective behavior or civil violence has put the question surrounding the ethnic groups and their conflicts in a wider possible explanatory framework. Accordingly, social systems theory, frustrationaggression theory, or some general theories of cooperation and competition may be also useful to explain any pattern of social order and disorder in the society. But few social scientists are still trying to put the social ethnic conflicts in the light of psychoanalytic understanding by approaching it from the insight of emotions, sentiment and attitudes owned by any certain ethnic. Also, other few social scientists believe that the conflicts among ethnic groups or societies rationally emerge in terms of economical in born interest, homo economicus. To discern with, all those theories or approaches seem to draw attention away from the perspective of cultural differences in examining the ethnic conflict so far. It seems that the cultural differences are not well understood to the source of conflict, especially among the multiethnic societies like in Indonesia. In the Indonesian context, which kind of theory that may be equipped to analyze conflicts that are now existing among the Indonesian multicultural citizen? What are the core factors that may accurately be put as a major cause of Indonesian contemporary turmoil and chaotic situation among the citizen almost all over the Indonesian archipelago? To answer such questions, we should first draw attention backwards to socio-political reality implemented in Indonesia before the collapse of Soeharto’s New Order regime. Within this consideration, we can elaborate our understanding by starting from the regime systematic organization that is centrally well-regulated in every aspect of socio-political, economical, educational, religious, cultural life and so forth. From this point of view, we can look how all aspects of Indonesian multiethnic societal life were organized in a singular pattern that is then propagated under the term nationalism. In this nationalism sense, the cultural-plurality that naturally exists and is inherited in every ethnic group, the regime system came up to singularize all of differences and diversity under the control of onesingle hand of Soeharto.

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By so doing, it clearly shows us how the regime was politically against the natural-law in terms of multi-ethnic and cultural-pluralism realm, because the blue print of ethnic nature was created within the plurality as a quintessential factor in making life to be dynamic and progressive within its socially meaningful productivity. However, the New Order regime resistance against the quintessential factor of its multicultural citizenship can only be successful in a long period of time is by legitimizing the various coercive political forces and must be supported by a huge amount of money. Government holds such a coercive legitimate power and applies a militaristic security orientation approaches, having undeniably engendered and saturated with violence and brutality to their own citizens. Accordingly, economical crookedness, permitting corruptions and excessive exploitation of natural resources were the only way to maintain the loyalty of the civil bureaucrats and military officers support to Soeharto cold-blood and iron hand government. In the case of Acehnese, to subjugate the natural-differences in any aspect of life and to keep critical people silent, the New Order regime applied methodologically the militaristic conflict-management approach within various type of inhuman or amoral shock-therapy occurring during with the three decades of his government. As the result of such a coercive ruling methodology and regardless of ethnic recognition politic, the truly sense of national bound sincerity among various ethnic groups in Indonesian nationalism towards the country has never existed in the heart of Indonesian multiethnic citizens. Also, never among the variegated Indonesia ethnics have the mutual familiarity, solidarity and good cooperation grown. Sense of belonging towards the country and its productivity and public services responsibility is something alien to the people of Indonesia. Primordial prejudice, jealousy and untrustworthy were deep residing in the heart of Indonesian multi ethnic citizen, within a cumulative and exponential conflicts which will be some times ready to explode among the citizens of different and even similar ethic groups. In short, all conflicts that still reside in the heart of ethnic groups or that have been exploded were the only result of the extreme


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centralization system of people’s societal life. It therefore needs a very long time to recover, and above all, the situation never becomes better. Without a correct and immediate humanity political handling, the situation only becomes worse and worse. To conclude, there are so many other ethnic conflicts which are still in the waiting list of explosion, if there is no such a very substantial approach toward the cultural plurality. The outburst of conflicts and riots related to the cultural ethnicity in other regions of Indonesian archipelago, such as in Maluku (such as in Ambon), Sulawesi (such in Palu, Poso, Makassar); Kalimantan (in Pontianak, Banjarmasin), Irian (in Merauke, Atambua) Sumatera (Riau, Palembang) and even Java itself (in Banten, West Java) is all the ongoing natural process of ethnicity revivalism. There are so many conflict seeds breeding in Indonesia that will some times easily come up to the fore of Indonesian socio-political problems. Those all conflicts or riots to some extend exploded during last two years after the collapse of Soeharto regime. But insofar, there were no scientific research yet, in order to know exactly what the basic causes of those riots and conflicts are that took place during the two years. Even though most people tend to judge that the basic causes are the social injustice in which the gap between the rich and the poor is absolutely factual. However, some other observers also tend to believe that the riots, conflict and the chaotic situation in those regions were because those people in a multicultural do not have enough room to express their aspiration in terms of cultural and political context, after being long exploited by the uniformity pattern of New Order’s pseudonationalism. Through the government regulation issued in 1974 (UU. No.5 / 1974), all differences of ethnicity were stamped out radically by the single uniform and centralized pattern. By so doing, the regime argued that the national stability will be easy to maintain, and thereby the national development will also be secured. But in fact, what took place during the era of political centralization, such as a massive exploitation of natural and human resources in many regions was an undeniable reality. People within their own ethnicity in many regions

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have culturally, economically and politically no role at all in any aspects of state policy. In other words, people outside the central power have never participated in political decision-making which relates to various civic lives. The farther people from the central power (Jakarta) the weaker they are. So, for the long term of New Order government, the majority of Indonesian citizens, especially from the outsider of Java island, were absolutely weakened. People became only the object of Indonesian modern material and physical development, and thus people have no subjectivity role in any historical changing that every human being needs to participate directly. To conclude, that the multi-crises are happening in Indonesia now will become worse and worse, just because the citizen do not have enough capability to overcome it. This is surely the consequence of the centralized political pattern implemented by the New Order regime. The exponential error of the political system during the New Order is now becoming a boomerang to the new contemporary government.

III. The Case of Acehnese Conflict In general, the case of Aceh within its long vertical conflict with the central government of Indonesia is possibly also similar to the cases of other regions, in terms of cause and effect of uniformity and centralized political context applied by the New Order regime. Comparing to other ethnic groups in the archipelago, however, what made Acehnese different among others highly relates to resistence characteristic outpouring from the ethnicity, which is much more heroic, brave, militant and also absurd. These socio-ethnical characteristics actualize in facing, anticipating and encountering any violation, oppression and humiliation conducted by Jakarta. Related to this ethnic character, James Siegel has ever said that Acehnese society is an anti-theory society, meaning that there is no social theory that is compatible to equip, to analyze and to understand Acehnese precisely. Like my own phrase, I tend to name the Acehnese as an “Absurd Mysticism Society.” It means that if we examine the


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unconsciousness structure of Acehnese’s pattern of thought, there are so many militant, irrational or anomalous dispositions. And they also tend to choose an extreme or militant point of view in encountering any problem, and as if that there is a very limited moderate view. Furthermore, the Acehnese tend to apply a broad space for speculation in character by only giving up the output to the power of God, without passing through an accurate rational account, in their decision-making process. This way of thinking pattern much found in their traditional proverb or slogan. Nevertheless, at the same time, we can also find some other proverbs and attitude characteristic that seems very wise and philosophical. This characteristic model might have long and well stemmed and rooted in different genealogy and different historical experiences and background, if we compare it with to other ethnic groups in the archipelago. Genealogically, Acehnese might be classified as a meltingpot ethnic originated from various big races in the world such as Arabs, Chinese, Europeans, Indians, and Vietnamese. This genealogy can be still traced back in some Acehnese anthropological elements such as language: words, pronunciation and intonation; culture and customary; myth, physical and face profile, artifacts and some other historical manuscripts and inscription. I am very sure that this genealogical factor potentially brought some different manifestations and latent characteristics to the Acehnese. In relation to Papuanese in West Irian and East Timorese, they also have a different reaction toward the Indonesian political oppression. But it was only because of their different historical experienced and background in the course of integration process into Indonesia. And genealogically, they both Papuan and Timorese also have a different root of origin compared with other majority of Indonesian ethnics that clearly showed in their physical appearances( black skin, curly hair, and relatively tall skeleton) Other different reality compared to the Acehnese case was that there is no secessionist movement in other regions like what is happening in Aceh, even though the similar disasters have also been suffered from by all ethnic groups in Indonesia since this republic

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established. Also, if it was the secessionist movements in East Timor and Papua, but its root of causes and spirits was to some extent not completely similar. The Timorese and Papuanese have no state-sovereignty historical background in terms of state in the modern sense. While the Acehnese, they have a very proud historical feeling of their own past Islamic Kingdom known as the biggest one in Southeast Asia during the 17th century, especially under the rule of Sultan Iskandar Muda ((16071636). Under this greatest and most outstanding Acehnese rulers, there was much development in social, economic, political and religious spheres. And all of these historical data had been written down by many historians since centuries ago and Aceh was well known and recognized by so many countries at that time, both in the West and in the East. During that time, the city of Aceh even rivaled some cities in Europe in social and physical expansion and social institutions. (see, Barbara Leigh, “Design Motifs in Aceh: Indian and Islamic Influences,” in John Maxwell, ed., The Study of Politics in Southeast Asia, Australia: Monash University, 1982). Moreover, the process of Aceh’s integration into Indonesia was completely based on its own sincerity, even though Acehnese had an opportunity to build their own separate country in the first years when Indonesia proclaimed its independence from the Dutch. And even Aceh had also factually acted as the midwife to save birth of Indonesian baby state, through his financial (money and gold) and transportation (two air planes) support to the national movement in Java in order to maintain the independence of Indonesia and to set up networking with other countries. And Aceh had ever acted as the capital base of Indonesia for some days when other regions of Indonesia was again conquered by the Dutch. Nevertheless, after Indonesia was well established, Aceh was disappointed and treated as a step kid without receiving much appreciation to what Aceh had done and contributed. This was the first accident that deeply hurt the Acehnese’s pride whose history as a great kingdom state deep rooted in their historical memory. In the eyes of the majority of Acehnese today, after gross human rights


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violation continually took place, the central government with the connotation to Javanese ruler was presupposed as an ethnic that can never be trusted. This is one aspect of the Acehnese’s concrete differences compared to other ethnic groups in Indonesia that then shaped a different worldview, cultural values, social-characteristics and political consciousness in facing and reacting to the central government political game. Moreover, we can also trace the root of the Acehnese characteristic formation from their long violence and disaster along their historical experiences from about 125 years ago. Needless to say that Acehnese people have grown up in a long experience of warfare and suffered a long misery of violence from the foreigners, such as Portugees, British, Dutch (1873-1945), the internal warfare and conflict within themselves (Cumbok civil-warfare 19471949, DI/TII warfare 1953-1962, Communist Gestapo (1965-1967) and the latest is the violence committed by Indonesian New Order military regime (1976-1980) and in the case of making Aceh as a region where the special military operation was applied during 1988-up to now. As the aftermath, so many Acehnese were killed in the battle of warfare against foreign colonialisms and again so many Acehnese were also killed, tortured, raped, humiliated and disappeared during its integration into Indonesia, act of which was executed by their own government through the military hands, under the reason of encountering the Acehnese insurgency. Also a huge amount of their material assets were destroyed, stolen, robbed and burned. Along with those displeasing experiences, so many heroic stories arouse in the public sphere stimulating militant movement and bearing a revenge transmitted by Acehnese from generation to generation from hundreds of years ago up to the present days. It is common in traditional Aceh, that the parents often transmit their vengeance to their children to be retaliatory in the future. These all direct or indirect violence experiences have also psychologically stemmed such a trans-generational retaliatory tradition and formed a special characteristic of the Acehnese in their socio-political association and interaction within themselves and

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with the outsiders. As a consequence, for more than a hundred years, Acehnese do not have enough peaceful or tranquil time that is conducive to sit, reflect and think deeply, freely and seriously about their past, present and future, especially in the context of education. And therefore Acehnese have failed to bear a qualified human resources, who capable of translating and transmitting their historical “golden age” into a concrete social manifestation in terms of knowledge, legal, cultural and religious rational-piety development. And hopefully, from this translation movement Acehnese can then create an appropriate and correct way of self-esteem. Additionally, the standard of educational system implemented by Indonesian government, especially during Soeharto regime was also very low, centralized, monotonous and monologue. There is a clear expression to depict Acehnese character toward the failure of education system in Aceh: “Acehnese are brave to die but are not brave to think.” Eventually Acehnese were merely entrapped into such a historical romanticism, emotional apologetic appearance nuances, without knowing exactly what and why they should be proud of and how to inherit and apply it today and here in the real world. And consequently, Acehnese in majority remained under-developed and this still happens until the present days. All these realities were of course not conducive in developing the knowledge capacity and rational thinking and wisdom in case of getting rational means of creativity and productivity in their strategy of life. Being lack of such rational thinking, the vengeance, therefore, very much colored their struggling movements in encountering violence and humiliations. Any violence will go to endlessly if it is also faced by another violence. What, therefore, is going to happen is merely the reciprocal actions that perpetuate the violence. In the further reflection, it is important to ask what is the basic core reason that caused Acehnese militant reaction and then has always entrapped them into a perpetual violence and warfare. I can conclude that the reason behind the Acehnese resistance movement is surely to maintain and uphold dignity. The dignity scope here significantly relates to human dignity, cultural dignity and religious dignity.


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In other words, the reason behind the Acehnese struggle and rebellious movement is not mainly and substantially related to the injustice factor or economical, political and socio-cultural factors in the sense of material orientations. Shortly, we can say that the concept of “self-esteem” of ethnicity was the most important factor that thus makes Acehnese rebel or revolt towards any political attitude that humiliates them. Accordingly, Acehnese will never be uncompromising towards the central government if, for example, Acehnese are only killed by one bullet. But the Acehnese have been killed within the humiliation of their human, cultural and religious dignity which they feel as the source of dignity and self esteem. This dignity and self esteem problem will surely create an act of retaliation towards the persons or groups who do so. The case of how Snuock Hurgronye defeated Aceh was a good example for such a self esteem and dignity arguments. Here, Snouck had succeeded to suppress the Acehnese’s anger toward Dutch colonialism through such a cultural and religious approaches. Bearing this unique character in mind, one can exploit the Acehnese natural resources without any significant obstructions, if one never humiliates human dignity as well. The most important and essential point to actualize are sincerity, honesty and nobility in making friendship and cooperation. So in approaching the Acehnese, please do not touch their brains (asking them to operate rational thinking) but touch their hearts pleasantly through sincerity and honorable attitudes. By searching and tracing back the history of Acehnese heroic revolt carefully, we will find that the hidden essential factor in their resistance against the Dutch and the Indonesian Government merely related to the humiliation Acehnese human-dignity and their selfesteem. Other material factor, such as economical justice and natural resources exploitation will be a mere supportive factor for their revolt movement. Talking about the Acehnese’s self-esteem dimension, it closely relates to the discourse of ethnicity, such as uniqueness and peculiarities that anyone should take care of. There are two aspects of

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self-esteem that should be taken into account. First is the religious values that have grown up and deep-rooted historically that is then highly appreciated by the Acehnese, even though they themselves are not the pious muslim. Second is the humanity values that have been naturally and culturally constructed. In the context of Indonesian military political treatment, selfesteem humiliation is the core problem that hurt Acehnese very much through their massive and gross human rights humiliation. So if the Indonesian government still applies the military approach, the Acehnese will always remain against them until the last drop of blood and Acehnese will always keep and bear revenge in their minds, and will take action of reprisal towards the Indonesian government and military whenever and wherever they have chance to do so. In relation to this, Soeharto said in his biography book: “There a separatist seed in the mind of Acehnese that should be uprooted in order to safeguard the national integrity.” Being this in Soeharto’s mind, an uncivilized and brutal shock therapy and genocidal action became the only method to avoid disintegration. However, it is true that in the mind of Acehnese reside a rebellious spirit if their existence of dignity or their self-esteem can not be appreciated humanely. Above all, we now find that there is a psycho-historical problem in the Acehnese character building. Acehnese is an ethnic whose historical experiences were full with the cruelties of the others. From this point of view, one will know that the Acehnese are the people who give a high appreciation toward bravery, heroism and patriotism among the society. The coward can be then said as committed treason or betrayal to their homeland. According to this world-view, warfare is an essential part of their life, specially for those who are directly suffering from the humiliation and disgrace. To conclude, Indonesian government must keep in mind that do not provoke the humiliated Acehnese to trigger war, they will ready to do so. Acehnese will not really care about the power their possess. The most important thing for them is to take a revenge, even though they surely know that they will lost and defeated. For them, this more honorable rather than giving up to the tyrant.


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This orientation should be put in the correct understanding if the central government wants to keep Aceh remain integral to Indonesia, that has long performed a humiliation politic through various inhuman kind of shock therapy, since the first period of the Aceh integrated into Indonesian state. The sincere view, support and charity that had been given by the Acehnese during the formation period of Indoensian nation state is now completely changing, especially the militant faction. For them, political character of central government was completely distrustful, and to some extent they tend to accuse Javanese as acting ethnical hegemony toward the country’s overall assessment.

IV. Contemporary Aceh Conflicting Situation The Acehnese case seems to be a very complicated conflict. This complication is surely caused by the intertwined condition corresponding to both the national conflict level, in terms of elitenational conflict and the local level in terms of scattered societal horizontal conflict. This scattered society is also proved by no central figure obeyed and can lead in the fore-front of the Acehnese struggle movement. The reality of no central figure and obeyed leader was seemingly because of the success of New Order regime in diminishing the Acehnese leadership potential during his long run centralized government. As an effect, almost all over Indonesia, it is so difficult for us to find out a charismatic and trustworthy figure to be a powerful leader for our society, that in traditional society is highly dependent on their leader. This condition is also factual to the Indonesian contemporary national leadership. Since both levels are problematic, the Aceh contemporary upheaval situation is potentially becoming very wild, dangerous and turbulent. And to some extent, Aceh has been entrapped into the very blur political situation. Armed contact, kidnapping, forcedisappearing, poisoning cigarettes and meals, houses, schools, offices and shops burning and killings are still the every-day ongoing accidents. Unfortunately, those all accidents are still very difficult to give proof and conclude to have been done by a certain identified and responsible person.

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So common people consequently conclude that so many violation accidents were surely provoked and done by the state formal or informal organized terrorism. People also believe that the informal organized terrorism mostly refer to the grand scenario of the old regime, both military and civilian factions. However, the civilians have no power at all to give a material proof for their confident belief of the violence perpetrators. That is why thousands of acts of violence and criminals both in Aceh and in Indonesia have not been successful to be persecuted before the law. Law is completely impotent, specifically in Aceh now. Under this situation, the civilian Acehnese have completely no power and they are in the very weak position to end up the conflict, whereas they themselves often become the first and the most victims of the conflict. As such, this complicated situation is merely because the Acehnese have an a vengeance spirit within a separatist movement which have been well used by the third unknown interest person to provoke situation to become worse. At national level, this scenario is commonly believed to be an encountering method in avoiding the new reformation government of Gus Dur gaining success to safe the country that will directly threaten them before the law and marginalize them from the political arena. So it might be very clear that the Aceh conflict will never end up if the conflict at the national level also never ends. At the local level, if we examine carefully, we can find so many factions and collective groups of the civilian Acehnese that each of them has their own principle and standing. Moreover, we can also speculate that most of Acehnese will be the proponents of the freedom ideal. As a proof, it was a vast sympathy to the GAM exhibited by the Acehnese at the celebration of GAM anniversary day, Dec 4, 1999, and also a two million mass-gathering in the yard of a well known mosque, in Banda Aceh, on Nov. 8, 1999 as the pro-referendum rally, and the last was the 92% of Acehnese saying “yes” for freedom at the polling distributed by SIRA last November 2000. However, except GAM, we can classify the civilian Acehnese into at least eight functional groups, each of which simply shows a different


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point of views in uprising their voices to the solution of the Acehnese conflict, namely: 1. Youth and Student /Thaliban Group; 2. NGO Group; 3. Formal Ulama Faction; 4. Non-Formal Ulama Faction; 5. Public Servant Group; 6. Intellectuals Groups; 7. Formal Politician Group; 8. Woman Group. This fact is certainly showing up how all Acehnese have a very high consciousness and sensitivity to the sociopolitical life brought forth from their long historical misery they are suffering from. From all these groups, within the direct or indirect experiences of the violence, it is important to see what the main idea is behind each group that some times looks similar and /or completely different. This idea mapping can be very useful in showing how the Acehnese are viewed to some extent as a scattered society, and thus tend to make difficult in searching the common-commitment to resolve and to face common-enemy. Whereas such a common-commitment and a common-enemy would be a very important variable to enhance the Acehnese pressure to the central government. Let us now trace the explicate ideals that are publicly showed by those all groups. The first is the Youth, Student and Thaliban (boarding school students) group. To some extend they tend to be referendum fighters or proponents. They have succeeded to gain support from the common Acehnese and this has been proved in mobilizing grass-root and middle level Acehnese across the Aceh Province to attend their two big ceremonial events. The first was Sidang Umum Pejuang Referendum Rakyat Aceh (SU-MPRA or People Congress of Referendum Strugglers) on Nov. 8, 1999. In this event they gained success to make a two million mass-gathering in front of the grand mosque of Banda Aceh. They had also been successful in forcing Chair of Aceh House Representative and the Governor of Aceh to sign up the referendum petition that was then sent to Jakarta. It is important to note that there was no accident at all in this big gathering. The journalists from various countries, including the biggest News Enterprise CNN, AFP, NHK, and Reuter, were also the eye-witnesses and covered this event. The second was Sidang Rakyat Aceh untuk Kemanusiaan dan Kedamaian (SIRA-RAKAN or Aceh People Congress for Peace and

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Humanity), in Darussalam, Banda Aceh, on November 13-14, 2000. In this event, there were only five hundred thousand people who had chance to gather, because the police and army blocked all the roads leading to Banda Aceh. But some big waves of Acehnese from Pidie and North Aceh went by boat to Banda Aceh. Unfortunately, there were around 60 killed and other hundreds of people injured when the police were trying to blockade while firing the convoy on the way to Banda Aceh. It was very tragic and brutal accident showed by the Indonesian police and army. At the end of this ceremonial gathering, there were some resolutions read by the committee. The most three important ones were asking for the withdrawal of all military from Aceh and the withdrawal Dutch’s War Announcement to the sovereign kingdom of Aceh, 1826, and solve the Acehnese conflict through the civilized methods. It is sure that the Young and Student voices and movement have brought a significant pressure to the central government and attention from foreign countries. Next is the NGO groups. NGO voice and principle mostly tend to uphold and support the democratic methodologies to solving the Acehnese conflict. They are available to back up the civilian democratic movements. But they do not have a concrete choice for the future Aceh solution in terms of Autonomy, Independence or Federalism. Nevertheless, they tend to support referendum as a democratic way of getting solution for Aceh conflicting political situation. The existence of NGOs, by financial foreign support, has contributed a high significant role to widening public democratic and humanitarian horizon through their routine agenda, such as Propagating Human Rights and Democracy through Training, Workshop, Investigation of Human Rights Abuse, Information Dissemination, Fact Finding Action, Law Advocacy, Press Release, Socio-Political Seminar, Discussion in terms of looking for conflict resolutions. Needless to say that the existence of NGOs has also played an important role in penetrating the government stubborn authoritarianism and exclusivist as a watch-dog, breaking up ways for civil society democratic movement against the militaristic political hegemonic orientation. It is why, NGO activists are some


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times faced with a high risk in conducting their democratic and human rights programs. The third is the Formal Ulama Faction which involves in an organized formal ulama institution established and sponsored by the government. Therefore this ulama faction tends not to be closed to the grass root people. In the eyes of the Acehnese, this ulama faction had a very sinful historical background, since they used to be a Soeharto regime’s loudspeaker. Because of that, their voices are becoming only minor to the present Acehnese society environment, even though Acehnese are traditionally very loyal to their respectful Ulama. In the context of Acehnese conflict, this formal ulama faction tends to pursue a peaceful way, and they tend not to be vocal in criticizing government, tend to avoid a confrontative or fundamentalist point of view in dealing with government policy that is sometimes protested by people. For future Aceh, they tend to accept autonomy as the best solution for the province. The forth group is Non-Formal Ulama Faction. This ulama faction is originated from the owner or the teachers of the religious boarding school all over Aceh, and their organization called HUDA was recently established. In Soeharto era, this organization was never known. To some extend, they are very close to the grass root and tend to play a very significant role in backing up the youth and student civilian democratic movements. In their first, they were also concluded that referendum is the best way in searching for solution to the Acehnese conflict. At the beginning of 2000, they were trusted by the student and NGOs to lead a plan for making a big all Acehnese congress called Kongres Rakyat Aceh (KRA). But unfortunately, this congress plan failed to carry out because the GAM did not give approval to do so. This happened because GAM tended to see this congress will lead to the conclusion of accepting autonomy. This GAM’s conclusion was based on the reason that the Indonesian central government had highly supported this congress to take place and also gave some financial aids. Whereas this congress was intended to get a democratic voices of solution to the conflict where all Acehnese representatives were

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invited to attend, include GAM itself. Public Servant and bureaucrats Group is the fifth groups that has no potential role in Acehnese society at all. They tend to keep silent, but few of them have also affiliated with the NGOs in getting involved in a democratic and human rights problems. In term of political choice, they tend to be neutral or only follow whatever solution will be. The next sixth group is Intellectuals Groups. The intellectuals in Acehnese society tend to have somewhat significant role in decreasing the militancy of the student and the youth. They tend to choose the referendum as a democratic method in gaining what people want for their own future. They are also trying hard to avoid using armed power to free Aceh from Indonesia. But they also tend to look forward to the possibility of the federal system for solution, or at least, they also seem to accept the special constitution proposed by the Acehenese parliament called NAD that somehow looks almost similar to the federal system. Needless to say that intellectuals have very much involved in various discussions, seminars, trainings, workshops in preparing people in general to have a rational base in seeking solution that seems realistic. The seventh group is Formal Politician Group. This group origin comes from the member of Aceh Representative House. Their thinking pattern is highly parallel to a formal government framework sense. Their role in the societal conflict is very limited and tends to keep silent about human rights abuses. Their bargaining position is also very limited in front of the central government, though they tend to conclude that the very realistic solution to the future Aceh is autonomy in terms of the new constitution that they have been proposed, that is NAD. The last is Women Group. This women group consists of various women organizations where voice are is very minor. Overall, they tend to voice to stop any violence that is still going on until the present Acehnese conflict, as what is clearly exhibited in their first big congress. Based on those explanations, we tend to conclude that the various ideas have never been unified into one single claim towards what is


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actually the real need and political demand of all Acehnese that must be altogether strived for, which then can automatically effect its high bargaining position to the central government to consider. Being that as a reality, the central government has always said that Acehnese have never had a united voice to be consider by the central government and at the same time such a situation will lead to a horizontal conflict among the Acehnese themselves. What is, therefore, the basic reasoning toward why the Acehnese have never gotten a solid voice, on the one side, is that some Acehnese are still very afraid of being accused as a separatist that can let the government take a certain legal action for those who claim for freedom. But on the other side, they are also afraid of choosing autonomy just because GAM will be angry with them, and at the same time those who choose autonomy can also be accused by GAM as being committed the treachery. This is the dilemma that is now faced by the Acehnese who are continuously suffering from an avoidable disaster and the various violation of human rights. All this kinds of violation are presumably resulted from the claim of freedom that has never been tolerated by the Indonesian government. Beyond that dilemma, most Acehnese are socially needing very much for life security and safety condition, just law enforcement and assuring all their human, religious and cultural rights to be gained. It is of course a very vague future of Acehnese society which is still going on. They completely have no ability to create a single solid voice as all Acehnese wants whatver the consequence will be. Meanwhile, the various kinds of violence are also continuing to happen every day, without any one, including the central government, can stop them. Being that as the case, Acehnese now are highly looking support from the international world. But the international attention and pressure on the central government of Indonesia is still very limited, just because the international world is conventionally holding the principle that the Acehnese are as an internal Indonesian problem. Will this ethnic conflict and dilemma situation indicate toward the end of Acehnese history? Will Acehnese be able to revitalize their historical heroic movement in facing together the central government that

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seems to have never stopped the military operation in dealing the Acehnese rebellion? And how far will the international world be responsible for the human rights violation that are brutally taking place in Aceh a dozen years ago?

V. The Case of Joint Understanding on Humanitarian Pause Joint Understanding on Humanitarian Pause was the first international organization, i.e,. Henry Dunant Center, a US NGO, directly involved in the Acehnese conflict as a mediator and facilitator. This agreement took place and signed up on May 12, 2000, in Geneva, Switzerland, between GAM’s elite, DR. Zaini Abdullah, whose headquarter is in Stockholm, Sweden and Indonesian government representative acted by Indonesian ambassador to Switzerland, DR. Nur Hasan Wirayudha. Furthermore, from this joint understanding were two committees and one monitoring team born. The first committee was issued for assuring the humanitarian aid to the Acehnese that victimized during the conflict. The second committee is issued for assuring the cease fire. And the monitoring team was assigned to monitor the implementation of the committees tasks. All members of the three teams were from the trustee persons, within the same number, as the representative from the both sides. This jointunderstanding was prevailing for the first phase in only three months, but then it was lengthened to the second phase that was due on January 15, 2001. It was very historical, that a day before the signing of that joint understanding, most Acehnese became very enthusiastic to know such a join agreement would be signed up and thoughtfully that it will be the method for resolving conflict democratically and peacefully. As such, most Acehnese went to the mosque to pray God for the success of this joint agreement in creating solution to stop bloodshed. However, in the eyes of Indonesian elites, this joint-understanding has created a somehow controversial issue that tended to overview this as a blunder done by the President of Indonesia, Gus Dur. The


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reason behind this controversy was the involvement of International organization in Indonesian internal conflict and it was also to be the formal recognition of Indonesian government towards GAM that had never occurred before. Beyond that reality, we can presumably view that this joint understanding was a very surprising and paradigmatically showed a new radical political changes for both Indonesian and GAM, that have perpetually exhibited the reluctance of being able to seat together in the round table methodology. As such, this can be seen as a very wise and constructive humanitarian penetration in looking for solution in the era of reformation. In terms of humanitarian pause terminology usage, such an agreement seemed to have never happened in the history of political conflict resolution between one sovereign country and its internal insurgency movement. Even though, that is true that this joint-understanding has no certain substantial political solution in terms of the future of the Acehnese, but it can be the first step to go there. This humanitarian pause aimed at locking up the further armed contact between the both sides. Unfortunately, such a joint-understanding was only the agreement between top level of the both sides that has never been successful transferred to the lower in the field of conflict. Because in reality, this joint understanding was never well understood neither by GAM nor by Indonesian army and police. The armed contacts between the both sides are going to worsen. Also, civilian killing, kidnapping, arbitrary disappearance, buildings burning and bombing are still going on every day. The number of victims and material loss is also highly increasing either in the first or in the second phase of the humanitarian pause. And at present, all regions of Aceh province have become totally insecure. Internal displaced persons are also highly increasing in number. Needless to say, all what people hope at the first moment of the joint-understanding is now only becoming a nightmare and utopia. In conclusion, we can reflect that there is a wide gap in between the agreement in the top level and the reality at bottom level. It seems that such a political miscommunication or disagreement between the

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top and the lower indeed occurs. The question now is, why such a reality should happen? Did such a disagreement between the top and the lower really occur and why? Those all questions are still very difficult to answer, while the terms of the unknown civilian armed group or person or provocateur are still highly and intensively used by the Indonesian formal military and police at almost any accident took place. There were so many accidents without anyone claiming who responsible for. It means that Aceh has become a field for national former elite political bargaining. It is reasonable to predict that the long history of implementation of the military encounter insurgency strategy has now entrapped Indonesian into the humanitarian totally abuse, since the internal elite conflict, both civilians and military, in the reformation era is trying to marginalize and depoliticize the military and at the same time trying to persecute all elites in the former regime before the law. Being that the case, to conclude, it seems that Indonesian need such a national reconciliation within a certain concession to the former regime. And it also needs to establish such a truth commission in order to bridge and to record past fallacy to avoid in the future Indonesia.



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VI. Suggested Bibliograpy Amin, S.M., Sekitar Peristiwa Berdarah di Atjeh, (Jakarta: Soerongan, 1956). Bernard, H. Russel, Handbook of Methods in Cultural Anthropology, (California: Altamira Press, 1998). Carmejoole, P.J., Atjeh, Groningen, 1931 Coakley, John, The Territorial Management of Ethnic Conflict, (London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1993). Comaroff, Jean, Ethnography and the Historical Imagination, (Oxford, San Fransisco: Westview Press, 1992). Flynn, Pierce J., The Ethnomethodological Movement, Sociosemiotic Interpretations, (New York: Walter de Gruyter & Co, 1991). Forbes, H.D., Ethnic Conflict: Commerce, Culture, and the Contact Hypothesis, (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1997). Fukuyama, Francis, The End of History and the Last Man, (New York: the Free Press, 1992). Gellner, Ernest, Nations and Nationalism, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983). Ra’anan, Uri, et.al., (eds.), State and Nation in Multi-ethnic Societies, (New York: Manchester University Press, 1991). Reid, Anthony J.S., The Contest of North Sumatra, (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press). Said, Muhammad, Centuries Along with the Acehnese History, (Medan, 1961) Siddiqi, Mazheruddin, The Qur’anic Concept of History, (Karachi: Central Institute of Islamic Research, 1965). Stavenhagen, Rudolfo, Ethnic Question: Conflict, Development and Human Rights, (Tokyo: United Nation University Press, 1990). Tiskov, Valery A., et.al, (eds.), Ethnicity and the Power in the Contemporary World, (Tokyo: United Nation University Press, 1994). Weiner, Eugene, The Handbook of Interethnic Coexistence, (New York: Continuum Publishing Company, 1998). Wicker, Hans-Rudolf, Rethinking Nationalism and Ethnicity, the Struggle for Meaning and Order in Europe, (New York: Berg Publisher, 1997). Willet, Cynthia, Theorizing Multiculturalism: A Guide to the Current Debate, (Massachusets: Blackwell Publisher, 1998). Will, Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). Wuthnow, Robert, et.al., (eds.), Cultural Analysis, (London: Routledge, 1984). Yinger, J. Milton, Ethnicity: Source of Strength? Source of Conflict?, (New York: State University of New York Press, 1994).

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Religious Conflict in Maluku

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Religious Conflict in Maluku: In Search of Religious Community Peace Pieter Tanamal and Lambang Trijono 1. Introduction Recently, many ethnic and religious conflicts have erupted across Indonesian regions, which created serious instability for the country. The conflict between the Christian and Muslim communities in Maluku is the worst conflict among the other ethno-religious conflicts in Indonesia during the last five years1 Maluku is a province located in the eastern part of Indonesia. The Maluku society is popularly known as a plural society marked by ethnic and religious heterogeneity. The Maluku islands are not only inhabited by indigenous Maluku population, but also inhabited by the outer migrants of Butonese, Bugisnese, Makasarnese, Minahasanese, Javanese, and Chinese ethnic whose their number were drastically increased under the New Order due to the economic development. The increasing number of migrants has consequently changed population composition and their interrelation constellation in terms of ethnic and religion relationship because many outer migrants are devoted to Islam. Since 1971, the Muslim population in Maluku has steadily increased; meanwhile the proportion amount of Christian population has been decreased2. The religious conflict in Maluku has reached a level of destructive conflict. Comparing to the situation in the early of its emergence in 1999, the conflict has developed and became prolonged and protracted social conflict. The conflict did not only occur between Muslim migrant of Bugisnese and Christian indigenous of Maluku ethnics over the social-economic inequality issues, but also escalated to be between indigenous Muslim and Christian populations over the issues of religious identity. In addition, the conflict was not only located in

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Ambon city, but it had spread out across the community borders and reached almost the whole Maluku province, including the north Maluku Islands. Moreover, the conflict was not only resulted in direct violence such as people died, wounded, psychological terror, etc., but also resulted in structural violence such as social segregation, social displacement and refuges, public facilities destruction, etc. However, the Maluku conflict until now has not get a proper handling yet, either from the interventions of Indonesian government or from other third parties. Even though there were many interventions of Indonesian government, they were still many weaknesses. On the other side, there were also initiatives from civil society such as religious leaders, community leaders, and NGOs to promote peace. However, their efforts are still not effective enough to prevent and transform the conflict. Some of them even instigated the emergence of the new conflict. This paper attempts to map3 the religious conflict in Ambon and looks for peaceful alternative solutions. The focus will be on the conflict backgrounds, the sources of the conflict, the dynamic of the conflict and the intervention, the resolution, and the transformation that can be proposed based on these elements of conflict. This paper is based on the result of our research in Maluku since July 1999 until the end of 2000 complemented with the daily notes, observations, secondary data, and interviews which were collected during the research.

2. Background of the Conflict The conflict in Maluku was not a spontaneous event. In fact, the seeds of conflict were deeply embedded in the structural facts of the interrelations among ethnic and religious groups in the past and present. The interrelations have experienced shifting, changing, destructing, and eventually becoming open conflict as a result of the dynamic of political and social-economical changes at local and national levels. Maluku society is widely known for its plurality indicated by its ethnic and religion heterogeneity that lied upon genealogical relations


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in the particularly territorial unit. These ethnically and territorially based social entities overlapped one another. From genealogical side, in the past, the Maluku society was composed of, in the very basic, clan groups that were formed according to links of families that inhabited Rumahtau-Rumahtau. Those Rumahtau-Rumahtau formed a bigger social unit called Uku-Uku which then among them collectively formed Hena-Hena. Up to the Hena-Hena then there were bigger social units so called Uli-Uli. Meanwhile, from the territory and political point of view, Maluku society consisted of territory units that were formed from Soa-Soa units, which were chaired by head of clans called PatiPati, which at least they were united into Negeri-Negeri under the control of Raja-Raja. It was in the level of Negeri-Negeri that the very basic and the grass-root levels of autonomous political units were existing in Maluku. However, within the Negeri-Negeri the power relationship between Raja-Raja and Pati-Pati was unique. Raja-Raja did not have direct authority to control Pati-Pati because they had different social bases; the power of Raja-Raja were based on territorial and political units, meanwhile the power of Pati-Pati were based on genealogical and social-cultural units4. Moreover, the compositions of Negeri-Negeri themselves were various in Maluku. There were Soa-Soa territory units inhabited by a single clan and therefore genealogical and territorial ties were united. In this case, Pati was automatically as Raja, both the genealogical and political leader. But, there were also Soa-Soa inhabited by several clans and this had been the basic impetus for conflict between Pati-Pati to compete power to become Raja in the village territory. When the Dutch colonial occupied Maluku, the political status of Negeri-Negeri and the power of Raja-Raja became stronger. The Dutch colonial government invested its political influences through territorial-administrative entities by strengthening the position of Raja-Raja of the Soa-Soa. To some extend, the colonial policy had created ethnic conflict to struggle for power in Negeri-Negeri territory units, especially within the Negeri-Negeri which, consisted of many clans. Furthermore, along with the spread of Dutch influences, the new

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religion-based community came into existence in Maluku. Ever since, the Christian community grew in the midst of Muslim community that had inhabited Maluku before. The Dutch administrative policy not only strengthened clan-based or custom-based territory political entities, but also promoted the formation of the religious communitybased territorial entities5. Since those days, there were Soa-Soa and Negeri-Negeri that administratively based on religion, as shown in the terms of Negeri Salam (Muslim village) and Negeri Sarani (Christian village). The making of the social formation was often accompanied by high tension between Muslim and Christian communities in which the latter getting supports from the Dutch government. The resistance of Negeri Salam (Muslim Negeri) to Dutch colonial rule was famous for their intensity. It was particularly intensified by the social polarization of inter ethnic-religion groups tendency as a result of the Dutch administration policy. The people of Negeri Sarani inclined to work as Ambtenaar such as informal education, military institutions, and the other government sectors. While the people of Negeri Salam felt uneasy to cooperate with the Dutch because of ideological reason in which the people of Negeri Salam regarded the Dutch government as kafir (infidel). The people of Negeri Salam prefer to work in agricultural sector and trading along with migrants who came from Butonese and Bugisnese ethnics. The job opportunities distribution based on ethnicity and religion created tensions between Christian and Muslim communities. In facing the structural segregation as such, for a long time the Maluku society had confronted many barriers to develop social integration. Therefore, it is not surprising that in the post-colonial era, after the Maluku society released from the Dutch colonial occupation, it was easily fragmented. In 1950s, the early years of Indonesia’s independence, there was conflict between RMS (Republic of South Maluku) that wanted to be independent under the Dutch patronage and Maluku people supported by Indonesian government who wished to joint with the Indonesian state6. Since the civil war of 1950, the Maluku society enjoyed relatively calm situation. But, it was apparently on the surface. The domination


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and hegemony of the New Order regime had suppressed the potentials of conflict to remain submerged. Under the New Order Regime, then the massive social changes occurred. The ethnic and religion composition had changed significantly as a result of the political, economic, and social-cultural modernization implanted by the New Order regime since 1970s. One important change under the New Order era was the change of people composition based on ethnicity and religion that consequently changed the position and constellation of inter-groups relations among ethnic-religion groups in Maluku. For example, in the past ten years the habitants of Ambon-Lease Islands had rapidly changed as the result of incoming migrants. Now, beside the indigenous Ambon population, outer migrants such as Butonese, Bugisnese, Makasarnese, Minahasanese, Javanese, and Tionghoa ethnics inhabit Ambon-Lease Islands. According to 1971 Census and 1985 Supas, the non-indigenous inhabitants that were born outside Maluku had increased from 5,2% in 1971 to 14,1% in 1985. Consequently, the increasing number of migrants has changed the population composition from religion side. Comparing the 1971 population census and the 1985 Supas, it is indicated that Muslim population in Maluku had increased from 49,9% in 1971 to 54,8% in 1985. On the contrary, the proportion of Christian population decreased from 46,8% in 1971 to 44,1% in 19857. The other significant changes under the New Order also occurred in the social-economical and political realms. Since the New Order regime launched economic development, people employed in trading and service sectors increased in Ambon municipality. According to the 1990 data of BPS, around 28,08% non-agricultural occupation in Maluku was civil servant. It was relatively great proportion compared to other province in Indonesia. Since the colonial era, the service sector in Ambon generally occupied by the indigenous Ambonese from the Christian community because of their historical intimacy to the Dutch colonial rule. However, recently Muslim Ambonese and migrants began to climb social strata and removed the Christian position. Steadily they grew to be new social layer, which occupied trading and service sector. As an illustration, before January 1999

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conflict erupted the Butonese and Bugisnese migrants occupied lower and middle level of trading sector, while the upper level occupied by Arab and Tionghoa ethnics respectively. Moreover, the Muslim Ambonese and migrants were creeping the positions in political-bureaucracy sectors. Under the New Order, the opportunity for Muslim indigenous and migrants in politicalbureaucracy sectors were increasingly opened. For example, in 1999 about 74% of civil servants of the echelon I rank IV A to IV E in the provincial level were Muslims. In the echelon II, the majority was also Muslims, about 69%, either in the province or regency level. Meanwhile, in echelon III, there were about 53% Muslim civil servants8. Consequently, these changes caused high-tension competition among the ethnic and religious groups in Ambon-Lease Islands. Such a change has changed the constellation of inter ethnic-religion relations in Ambon-Lease Islands. The social-political mobilization and social grouping according to ethnicity and religion constitute a potential of conflict which every time may be convert into open conflict when there is no fair power sharing and economic distribution mechanism between the ethnic and religious groups. Actually, the Maluku society has its own social integration mechanism in the traditional system of Pela and Gandong, which can moderate the potentials of conflict. Pela is the relationship between ethnic and religious communities that bound one or more Negeri Salam and Negeri Sarani based on agreement a la social contract not to fight each other. Gandong is the social relations that bridge ethnic and religious groups based on genealogical ties9. Nevertheless, these Pela and Gandong institutions are applicable only among the Negeri in terms of custom relations. Beyond those interrelations between indigenous ethnics and migrants there is no binding force. Therefore, they sometimes cannot be effective to prevent the conflict. Moreover, the integrative force through acculturation slowly proceeds in Maluku. The New Order government did not have any systematic policy to build the integration force. Consequently, the acculturation process between the migrants, or popularly called by Ambonese as anak dagang, and the indigenous people, known as anak negeri, did not


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work perfectly. Even though the immigrants have lived in Maluku for centuries, they still treated as anak dagang living in the anak negeri homeland, therefore an uncertainty always haunts the migrants. Migrants would legitimately own local customary of property rights, e.g. land tenure, only after there were acceptances through custom process as anak negeri. The uncertain feeling as such often triggers open conflict between migrants and indigenous as a result of the weakness of the existing legal and political institutions under the New Order. Because of such facts of the inter-ethnic and religious relationship in Maluku, the ethnic and religious conflict in Maluku easily erupted. Prior to the ethnic and religious conflicts that ran-up in January 1999, there were growing conflicting issues that closely linked to ethnicity and religious issues. Among the Christian communities, for example, there were rumors circulating about migrants’ economic dominance, in particular those of Buton, Bugis, Makassar (BBM) ethnics accompanied by the issues of Islamization of Maluku bureaucracy. On the contrary, among Muslim community there were circulating issues on RMS separatism and Christianization of the Maluku population. These issues were growing as mushroom in rainy days and wildly turned into ethnic-religious conflict as the New Order state underwent crisis in the late 1990s. Under the New Order, the Maluku community heavily depended on Jakarta both economically and politically. The New Order central government so far served as political and economic patronage for elites in the Maluku society. From economic point of view, during the New Order era the economic of Maluku Islands heavily depended on the central government. In 1990, for example, 19,4% of local income averages relied on the central government development projects. Therefore, it is no wonder that when economic crisis encountered Indonesia since 1997, the city of Ambon was knocked down; youth unemployment severely increased, hoodlums emerged, social, security and public order were disturbed10. Moreover, in political affairs, the Maluku bureaucracy was also heavily dependent on the central government. The political crisis that entrapped Jakarta brought about particular uncertainty for local elites that relied on

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their position on political patronage to political elites in Jakarta. The central government had no power to cope with the conflict. The New Order regime found himself in the legitimacy crisis in the eyes of people in Maluku as a result of the bad effects of the centralization of government policies. In 1992, for example, local traditional leaders in Maluku had used a traditional land mapping movement, as a strategy for conflict11. Resistance as such was not something new under the New Order government. The fall of the New Order caused the Maluku elites lost their political-economic patronages. Consequently, the escalating issues of conflict could not be accommodated by local political mechanism and turned into open conflict as occurred in the last few years.

3. Current Dynamic of the Conflict The Maluku conflict was a protracted and prolonged violent conflict. It had occurred for more than two years and until now there is no single clue for its complete ending. The conflict had been broken out one after another and accompanied by horrible violence throughout the Maluku Islands. People in Maluku generally divided this conflict into three episodes, namely the first episode from January to April 1999, the second episode from July to December 1999, and the third episode from April 2000 up to now12. The first episode of conflict occurred from 19 January 1999 to the end of April 1999. The timing as such, in fact, is improperly enumerated, because before that time the conflict frequently erupted in Ambon. Prior to the end of 1998, for example, the conflict emerged in Wailette on 13 December 1998, in Air Bak on 27 December 1998, in Batu Gantung Waringin on 5 January 199913. However, people mostly, especially from Muslim side, refered to 19 January 1999 as the beginning of the conflict. It was because it coincided with Hari Raya Idul Fitri, the holy day for Muslims who are the majority population in Indonesia and it was the first greatest one that initiated the eruption of the conflicts. The 19 January conflict was sparked by a dispute between youth from Batumerah and Mardika villages. Until now, nobody knows why


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the conflict erupted. In fact, the conflict fatally damaged Ambon community. The conflict then escalated into the bigger conflict between Muslim and Christian communities because of the damage of mosques and churches. In this level, the conflict developed to become a religious identity conflict. The stories about the mosque and church that damaged spread out rapidly throughout the Negeri-Negeri of Muslim and Christian in Maluku. At the same day, the conflicts erupted in other places as the result of the effects of the Batumerah and Mardika conflicts such as in Dobo, Tanibar, Maluku Tenggara, Silale, Waihaong, Kudamati, Batu Gantung, etc. In the days after, the conflicts between Muslim and Christian communities were expanded. Villages inhabited by ethnic-religion mixture, for example in particular villages that inhabited by Buton, Bugis, Makasar (BBM) ethnics, market, shops, became the hot spots of conflict in Ambon. The Christians and Muslim and the indigenous people and migrants in those villages had been under great tensions. These conflicts had been continuing to flame up in Ambon in the following days. We cannot mention them here one after another for their extraordinary numbers. However, one thing is clear that these inter-community clashes had become inter-religious communal conflict. It was in such a way that the conflict widespread easily, not only in Ambon Islands but also reached other Islands. Outside Ambon Island, the conflict began to spread on February and continued until March 1999 such as in Seram, Lease, Saparua, Central Maluku, and South-East Maluku. The first episode of the conflicts decreased at the beginning of April 1999 when daily social-economic lives of Ambon had gradually recovered. After a two-month break, at the beginning of July 1999 the conflict erupted again in Ambon Island. It was a great-scale of conflict, which triggered the second episode conflict until December 1999. Initially, this conflict was instigated by the house burning in a middle class estate of Poka housings inhabited by multi ethnic-religious population. The Poka conflict had stimulated communities of Ambon villages to be back in war. It pushed the city of Ambon to be back into high tension. Daily social-economic activities of Ambon city was

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stopped up totally because of the burning of stores, shops, markets that especially took place in the border between Muslim and Christian communities of Ambon, known as “Gaza Strip” of Ambon. Following the pattern of first episode conflict, once a conflict broke out in Ambon, other surrounding villages would follow respectively. Subsequently, conflict spread extensively over the surroundings of Ambon Island. Since October 1999, conflict had not only taken place in South Maluku, but also reached North Maluku, such as Ternate, Tidore and Halmahera Islands. In the second episode, conflict had taken for long time, almost six months from July to 26 December 1999. The 26 December 1999 conflict might be called as a climax of the uninterrupted second episode of the conflict. The AnNur Mosque and Silo Church burning in “Gaza Strip” area of Ambon triggered this conflict. One reason for the conflict aggrandizing was the rising issues that there would be a massive conflict in Ambon that runup two religious holidays, i.e. Idul Fitri for Muslims and Christmas for Christian. For Ambonese, these two religious days reminiscent to the initiation of conflict two years ago that coincided Idul Fitri feast. Several issues circulated among Christian community that the Muslim would retaliate Christians. Furthermore, the conflict was also conditioned by previous sequence of conflicts in North Maluku, Seram, Buru, Haruku, and Saparua. In particular, the effect of the conflict was the refugees flow that rushed to Ambon and surrounding regions caused a tense situation in Ambon. However, after the 26 December 1999, the situation in Ambon had become gradually normal. In responses to the crisis, the central government had sent military reinforcements (Banmil) to reorder Ambon society in a huge number. However, this normal situation was merely “false secure” as a result of the mutual deterrence of Banmil policy, and not from better situation because of mutual trust and reconciliation. The third episode of the conflict has been happening from 26 April 2000 up to now. The 26 April 2000 conflict was triggered by dispute between Muslim and Christian youths in becak (tricycle) rally to celebrate “peace” feast when the rally passed Waihaong Muslim village. The dispute was triggered by two reasons: first, the rally


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brought about disturbance around the sunset prayer time for Muslim; second, becak was a sensitive case for Muslim community, for they thought that Christians had looted their becak in previous conflicts.14 The dispute claimed four Christian youth lives and tens of others were trapped in Muslim community. During that day, the relation between the two groups of Muslim and Christian was in heated tense again. The following day, that tension turned into massive clash between Christian and Muslim communities that claimed 13 Muslims lives. Since those days, again Ambon was entrapped in the frightening situation of conflict. However, by the time the dynamic of the conflict tended to move to different direction. The conflicts escalated beyond Ambon Island and instigated Laskar Jihad (holy war forces) came to Ambon to reinforce Ambonese Muslim forces. According to commander of Laskar Jihad Ahlussunah Waljama’ah, about 3.000 forces of the Laskar were dispatched to Ambon from Java.15 The present of laskar Jihad in Ambon intensified the tension of Ambon as if a gigantic battle would be set forth. Conflicts erupted everywhere throughout Ambon Island in a larger-scale than ever before. These conflicts no longer sporadic, they became a kind of “city war” or “city guerrilla” for heavy weapons, machine guns, bombs, pistols, were freely circulated in Ambon Island. Mutual attack between laskar Jihad of Muslim and “laskar Kristus” (Christ Troops) of Maluku occurred in Ambon. In this episode, Christian community was rather forced to retreat by Muslims that were reinforced by Laskar Jihad from Java. Many of Muslims’ houses that were abandoned during the initial unrest have now re-occupied by Muslim such as in areas of Tantui, Poka, Batugantung. Consequently, many Christians had to seek refuge in the surrounding mountains. Moreover, in the situation, the AmbonLease Islands endured severe crisis. It can be said that the dynamic is a culminating point of crisis after January 1999 eruption in Ambon. The reinforcement of Laskar Jihad backed by Indonesia military was the main cause of the crisis. Their presence had removed the position of conflicting parties. How severe the crisis was marked by the departure of all international agents and about 16 foreign staffers of MSF, ACF, MCI, and UNDP that fled from Ambon.

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Furthermore, because of the severe crisis they had to deal with, Christian Community leaders exerted all efforts to seek international concern to take part in Ambon conflict resolution. Maranatha Church Functionaries and Catholic Bishop of Amboina urged UN (United Nation) to intervene Ambon problems16. As a result of the UN and civil community that pushed Indonesian government to take actions immediately, the Gus Dur administration mobilised military and police forces to Ambon in order to halt the conflict. About ten battalions (about 6000 personals) of army and two battalions of Brimob (1200 personals), elite forces of national police, had been deployed to Maluku. In addition, the central government also imposed the civil emergency decree on 27 June 200017. This decision was enacted through Presidential Decree No. 88, 2000 and operated according to Law No. 23/Prp/ 1959. Ever since, conflict escalation gradually calmed down. But, whether it woulld bring escalation conflict down was still hard to predict. The conflict dynamic in Ambon was difficult to be predicted with no systemic efforts to overcome conflicts and to build the real peace.

4. Ethnic-Religious Conflict Many people consider Ambon conflict as religious conflict. Nevertheless, many others view that what had happened in Ambon was political conflict although they also recognize that religious factors played their parts there. Such kind of different perceptions not only developed in local community of Ambon, but also developed among political elites at national level. Responding to the Maluku conflict, political elites in Jakarta also hold different point of view on the matter concerned. Most political elites regard this conflict as the New Order political elites’ conspiracy that used religion as political vehicle to overthrow the new post-Soeharto government or to damage the fragile newly born democracy18. Regarding these different opinions, we need to examine carefully how religion and political factors contributing to the conflict in Maluku. The conflict in Ambon and Maluku generally perceived as the ethnic and religious conflict orchestrated by political elites. The


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political elites used the religious sentiments to mobilize people to get involved in the conflict. However, how they misused the religious sentiment for their objectives is difficult to be identified. From time to time, the main issues of the conflict changed dynamically. The political elites carefully manipulated the religious sentiments and other social-economic issues in the ways of which they were not openly known by the people and the mass. This opinion can be found in the perception and discourse among community leaders and people in Ambon in responding to the conflict. In respect of the first episode of conflict, generally they thought of religious issue not as crucial impetus as much as the second one. They saw the first episode of conflict mainly as an ethnic conflict that it was the conflict between the indigenous Ambonese and the migrants of Bugis, Butonese, and Makassar (BBM) ethnics. The social-economic disparities between them are the main issues. Nevertheless, the boundary between the ethnic and religious conflicts is indistinctive as the BBM ethnics mostly are Muslim and the majority of the indigenous Ambonese are Christians. As the Chairman of Maluku Christian Church Synod, Sammy Titaley, said: This is a tribal conflict and religious conflict at the same time. It is a religious war since it involved brothers from two religions; the Muslims and the Christians of Ambon. These two are indeed part of social bond so-called pela and gandong…..it is also can be called as a tribal war since two tribes were in this war namely the Ambonese against the migrants of Bugis, Buton and Makassar tribes 19.

Initially, the conflict related to the issue of social disparities between the Maluku indigenous and the migrants. Yet, this issue was then overlapped with the religious one as the migrants BBM are generally associated with Muslims and the Maluku indigenous are identified as Christian. As the conflicts erupted, these two issues were overlapped. It can be said then that in the first episode of conflict the seeds of religion conflicts emerged. In the second episode conflict, the religion issue emerged more saliently than in previous one. The general situation of the second

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episode of the conflict demonstrated clearly that the religious issues were part of the conflict. The people required supports indirectly from the religious leaders in the conflict. From their acts, the symbols they used, and the slogans they launched, it can be seen clearly that the religion motivated the conflict. There were also sensibilities that influenced by religious values, especially among the young generation, who asked religious leaders to pray for them, they came, met and consolidated their power in the religious houses, before they went to fight. Moreover, some political elites involved in the conflict, participated at the same time in the religious activities to get supports from the religious community. To some extend, it was very difficult for the religious leaders not to respond their demands. One Christian prominent figure in Ambon admitted this religious nuance in the conflict, even though he denied that religion was the roots of the problems; …Nowadays, the groups were attacking each other, while the religious figures became so powerless that they, indeed, has been prosecuted and threatened by their fellowmen. They demanded them to defend and protect their under-threat congregations…some religious leaders unable to prevent their fellowmen to fight against other religious groups….. Moreover, the religious leaders who have not supported what their fellowmen wanted will be identified as traitors 20.

Some prominent Muslim leaders also expressed the same opinion. In their view, religious issues emerged in the second episode of conflict because tribal issue was not a strategic one to mobilise people. They also said that certain politicians had abused religious issue for the sake of their own interests, and they had intentionally chosen religious issues because they were more sellable than tribal issues. As a leading Ambonese Muslim leader stated: “Initially the distinction between “red” (the Christians) and “white” (Muslim), was not significant. It was “indigenous” and “migrants” dichotomy that prevailed…perhaps for those involved in the conflict, “indigenous-migrants” identity was ineffective in the second conflict, so they used other issue, religion. Later on, it is the religion issue that has proved to be effective …the “indigenousmigrants” issue was just inter-media, in the very bottom of its lied


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religion politicking. It was obvious that since the first conflict eruption, the Muslim victimised not only the BBM people, but also the Muslim indigenous.21

This opinion shows us that the conflicts were not merely related to the issues of religious identity but also political conflict. As the second episode of conflict was over and the conflict was steadily deescalated, there were growing awareness among the masses and religious leaders that religion had been used by political elites to justify for their benefits. This perception expressed by the community leaders of Maluku from the Christian community side: The Maluku conflict not merely horizontal in character, based on religion issue, but also vertical and ideological in character, which manipulate religion symbol …these conflicts is also part of the political conspiracy involving various groups both in national level and local one namely the army forces, the fundamentalist group, national and local elites, to be included also the new order cronies, whose goal is for the political instability, for the sake of the political bargaining position and to illegitimate the current regime 22.

Although with different intonation, the Muslim community leaders also raised the same issues: Based on the whole chronological fact and all analysis on the conflicts which has endured for 20 months, we can conclude that there has been a religion politization to create horizontal conflicts as an effort to push the social change, hegemonic and economic struggle, and separation movement with violence as a main instrument 23.

By observing those views, both the community leaders from the Muslim and Christian community saw the conflicts as the product of the political elite conspiracy. In addition, we also found such a view among ordinary people of Ambon community, either from Muslim or Christian communities. In an interview with Ambonese people, a Christian gave a metaphor to the conflict as “Two elephants fight, and we, Ambonese, were the grass that is trampled into dead”24. The similar metaphor with different expression stated by the Muslim resident; “if you want to find the root of conflict, go to Jakarta, to the national level. As a case of fire, conflicts in Ambon is only the smog,

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the real fire is somewhere else, and it is in Jakarta.

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Those perceptions show us that the issues and dynamics of the conflict changed over time in each episode from the issue of ethnics to religion and political issues. It can be concluded that the conflict could be categorized as the politico ethno-religious conflict. Social mobilization that was carried out by the political elites, both at the local and the national level, had brought about the conflict. They manipulated the ethnic and religion symbols for their own sake. The perception among religious leaders in Maluku above could be seen as the rising critical awareness on the role of religion in the conflict. Many religious leaders realized that the religion was falsely interpreted and simulated by political elites. Religion has been manipulated as justification for seeking the politician own benefits. Moreover, the religious leaders were not only critical on the political interests behind the religious conflict, but also on the false theological interpretation among the religious leaders from both side. In this respect, religious leaders had irresponsibly measured religion and its properties for the sake of their own interests. This can be seen in many facts that religious leaders, directly or indirectly, involved in the conflict through participating and leading the religious rituals.

5. Toward Religious Community Peace If religion can inspire, motivate, and justify people to act violence and conflict, it is also possible that religion can motivate and inspire people to build peace. In this respect, religion has two faces in character; on one side, it can contribute to conflict and violence, and on the other side, it can be construed for peace. For the latter, the universal values within religion can be a medium or bridge for both the Christian and Muslim community to build a peaceful community in Ambon.

5.1. Building Religious Peace In the conflict situation like in Maluku, religious value had been seriously down graded. Conflicting parties, in order to justify their political interests, had abused religion. In this respect, religion became


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symbolic impetus for violence in character. However, as a social institution religion with its canonic texts, values, symbols, practices is an objective social fact with two faces; it can be means to render conflict, on the other side, it also can be a mean to promote peace. It depends on how people interpret the religion. As a sociological fact, we can see that it is not merely a sacred religion that automatically falls down from the sky to the earth but it is a social construction. People, in their own ways and depend on their life context, always interpret the sacred religion as a divinity fallen from above. Religion then can be both a conflicting institution and peaceful resolution. It can be interpreted, manipulated, and used to justify, make conflict and violence. But, on the other sides, it also can be interpreted and constructed to build peace. Religion can contribute to peace in many ways. In the individual level, religious values is normatively powerful to support personal transformation, change warring attitudes toward cooperation among religious members. The change of attitudes is very significant to initiate negotiation and dialogue amongst community members. Negotiation happens when the conflicting parties start to open communication, to break down the constructed enemy image from their side, for building reconciliation. In this respect, religious value and morality can motivate religious members to build open communication, dialogue, and common discourse to negotiate their conflicting issues. Moreover, the universal value of religion can help conflict transformation to happen through dialogue among religious communities. Inter-religious dialogue can deconstruct enemy perception toward other religion and facilitate inter-subjective communication among religious communities. By inter-subjective communication among religious community members, false perception and enemy image construction will be opened up and it will create opportunities to build a new peaceful inter-subjective relationship and new religious discourse. The dialogue among community members will break down the dominant discourse and religious narrative that have been used for energy of conflict. It also

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opens up for the rising of new non-religious discourse, or any noncontentious discourse based on common need, social welfare and socio-economic issues, therefore conflict can be transformed toward peaceful co-existence and cooperation among ethnic and religious communities. There have been plenty cases of how religion plays the role on promoting peace. In the midst of the conflicts many actors practiced many embryonic conflict resolution efforts based on religious values. One of the cases was what Tim 20 of Wayame had done in Maluku. This is a team established by religious leaders from Christian and Muslim in Wayame village to defend and protect their village. They successfully succeeded to maintain the solidarity in the midst of conflicts. One key that made them survived is their ability to keep the informal contacts and build agreement among themselves based on the universal religious principles. The principles they upheld are openness, honesty, supportive, willing to work for the sake of humanity, and stick to the God Deity26. Regardless the small-scale reconciliation potency, this could be regard as social capital on the peace effort in Ambon. The other example was what practiced by Gerakan Peduli Perempuan/GPP (women care movement). GPP is a women group whose members consist of women from Muslim and Christian communities, who concern on conflict, particularly women victims of violence. They launched many actions against violence to women and assisted women refugees who became the victims of Maluku conflict. In addition, among religious elites they created Pusat Rujuk Sosial/ PRS (a center for social reconciliation) whose members consisted of religious leaders from Muslim and Christian communities. They established PRS to be a center for both Muslim and Christian communities members to meet, discuss, and develop actions programs to prevent and promote reconciliation. The universal religious value became a basis for their actions. Instead of their particular interests, they put humanity first as the core value to address the conflict. This social movement significantly became an embryo of civic engagements through which people from different religion worked together toward peaceful religious community.


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5.2. Building Dialogic Community Religion and culture are deeply interlinked in Maluku society. Prior to the colonial period, the Maluku society was well known for its heterogeneity. The Maluku society composed of many ethnic and religion. Islam and Christianity have since long been brought into Maluku from Middle East and the West. People came with their culture, religion, and their other uniqueness. They met with the indigenous people who already had primitive religion that composed its institution, value, and culture. Then, it constituted a “multiple culture” of the Maluku society. The conflict in Maluku so far has destroyed structure and culture of Maluku society. In fact, the culture of Pela and Gandong, so far have unique meaning for the people in the region. This is a social-cultural mechanism to integrate people from different religious backgrounds to work together in dealing with social and economic life. Pela is a relational tie between two or more communities or between Muslim and Christian communities based on contractual agreement not to t conflict one another. Gandong, on the other side, is a social tie among communities and villages based on blood relationship or clan ancestry. For example, in Ambon there are some Muslim and Christian villages and communities that build social ties according to Gandong and Pela such as between Paso village (Christian village) and Batumerah village (Muslim village) based on Gandong ties, and between Galala village (Christian village) and Hitu village (Muslim village) based on Pela relationship. The structure and pattern of Pela and Gandong had drastically eroded during the conflict. The conflict has an impact on the delegitimation process of customary laws, local social institutions, and the community leaders in Maluku. Right now, many people in Maluku do not believe anymore in the customary ways to resolve conflict. They believe that Pela and Gandong are not effective anymore to be an integrative mechanism for the Maluku society because the Maluku community has segregated according to religion after the conflict. However, on the other side, because of the deep influences of Pela and Gandong on the way of life of people in Maluku, many

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people still believe that the cultural and social mechanism of Pela and Gandong can be a starting point to recover the Maluku post-conflict community. Many customary leaders believe that the customary institutions had been working during the conflict; therefore, it can be an entry point to prevent and promote peace building. Since the Ambon conflict is an ethnic-religious conflict, the effort to recover Pela and Gandong institutions through dialogic community is urgently needed. It is both a horizontal and vertical, involving not only among the people, but also between the community leaders and people. Formal way will not be appropriate to choose as a dialogue way, since too many groups involved in the conflicts, and problems would be hard then to be negotiated. The informal dialogue model will be a more suitable for Maluku case. By making use of this model, intensive dialogues will be carried out through active participation of the Maluku communities to melt the tense, and to erode distrust among community members. To establish the dialogic community, it is a need to facilitate the groups in every level in all Ambonese communities with different emphasize; the high level negotiation for the upper level, dialogues on problem solving conflict resolution for the middle level, and for the bottom one intra-subjective dialogue is the most appropriate way to erode the suspicious among them27. This strategy is also part of a problem-solving dialogue that is different from the conventional ways of conflict resolution. As the dialogue groups are formed, the next step is to conduct a conflict transformation toward the social-economic cooperation. For Ambon case where the social resources have disappeared because of the conflicts, the best method to be implemented is community development model. Social relationship and economic activities are main targets to be rebuilt based on the existing personal relationship. Economic activities are by no means portrayals as mediation as a daily needs are to be fulfilled and carried out by the people themselves.28 The people will not reject this kind of model since it is involved with non-contending issues. This model can transform the way of their thinking, and then it can be positive-sum-game resolution29. Multi-tracks conflict resolutions are required to implement this model. The Track one is government route and the second track is civil


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or daily social and economic activities. Each track has its own advantage and disadvantage. The advantage of the first model is that it has an abundant economic resource to be utilized; while the disadvantage is that it normally utilizes force and formal bureaucratic way. The second track involves civil society and its components; despite of creativity and authenticity, its obstacle is lack of economic resources unless supported by the donor institutions or international NGOs30. For all the possibilities of conflicts resolution mentioned above, the role of the third party should be multi-functions, not only as an external mediator (outsider) but also participates actively in the whole process. The third party can also play other important role such as the facilitator, initiator, consultant, and advocator that depend on the real situation31. As a facilitator, it is the third party responsibility to facilitate the dialogue in order to have a real output. As an initiator, the third party initiates actively the participant to avoid the deadlock. Those two roles are indeed a combinative act of political diplomats and social workers, which combines the conflicts resolution and community development. At the same time the third party motivates the creation of social-economic as mediation or a bridge for reconciliation.

6. Conclusion The ethno-religious conflict in Maluku had so far manifested itself to be prolonged and protracted social conflict. It had occurred ceaselessly for more than two years and resulted in fatal damage of the Maluku society. The conflict not only occurred between the indigenous Ambon ethnic and the Butonese, Bugisnese, and Makasarnese migrant ethnics over the issues of social-economic disparities as what happened initially in the beginning of the conflict, but also escalated to be conflict between Muslim and Christian communities over the issues of religious identity. At this level, the Maluku conflict had manifested to be protracted and destructed conflict. Basically, the Maluku conflict is a political ethno-religious conflict. This can be seen on the dynamic of the conflict. The conflict was initially associated with the issues of social-economic disparities

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between the Maluku indigenous and the Bugisnese, Butonese, and Makasarnese migrants that triggered by the dispute between Ambonese and Bugisnese youths over economic resources. Yet, the issue was then overlapped with ethnic and religious issues as the migrant BBM were generally associated with Muslim group and the indigenous Maluku people were identified as Christian group. As the result, the economic, ethnic and religious issues were overlapped one another during the conflict. At this stage, the religious conflict then emerged. The religious issues developed to become more silent issues. It could clearly be seen in the second episode of the conflict in which the religious identity issues became the dominant issues of the conflict. The people used religion to justify and legitimate the violent they had done. During the conflict, many interventions had been made by various third parties to prevent and resolve the conflict. The interventions were carried out either by the Indonesian government (track I) and the civil society components (track II) either at local, national or international levels. However, their efforts were not sufficient enough to prevent and contribute to sustainable peace for the Maluku society. The Indonesian government had done many efforts but they mainly used security and bureaucratic approaches. In other side, there also existed many initiatives from civil society components to prevent and reconcile the conflict such as religious leaders, community leaders, and NGOs, to promote peace. But, their efforts were not so powerful comparing to the big scale of the hazardous conflict. To resolve, transform, and build sustainable peace for the Maluku society, it requires a multi-track approaches. In these approaches, the potentials of local initiatives and peace building process can contribute to the official interventions and negotiation since the peace process becomes stronger. Since the Maluku conflict has in fact been political ethnic-religious conflict, religion can be reasonably used as an entry point for this. In this respect, religion can contribute to peace in various ways. First, at the individual level, religious values contribute to personal transformation that changes the warring attitudes toward cooperation among religious community members. This is very


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significant to initiate negotiation and dialogue among religious communities. Negotiation always happens when the conflicting parties are willing to open communication, to break down the constructed enemy image among the conflicting parties. Religious values also could motivate the religious members to involve in an active communication, to deconstruct the distorted image, and to negotiate their conflicting interests. Second, the universal religious values support the very process of conflict transformation through dialogue among religious communities. Only by putting the first prescription, the significance of universal religious values and principles in dialogue process is workable. Inter-religious dialogue can deconstruct enemy perception and facilitate inter-subjective communication among religious communities. Through inter-subjective communication, false perception and enemy image constructions can be opened up and will create opportunities to build a new peaceful inter-subjective relationship. The dialogue among community members will break down the dominant discourse and religious narrative that have been strongly used for energy of the conflict. It also opens up for the rising awareness on the non-religious discourse, or any non-contentious issues based on common need, social welfare, and socio-economic issues, therefore conflict can be transformed toward peaceful coexistence and cooperation among ethnic and religious communities. Instead of religion or theologically disputed discourse, another entry point is customary and indigenous approaches or sociologicalhistorical discourse for conflict resolution. The Maluku society has social-cultural mechanism so-called Pela and Gandong to unite people from different ethnic-religions. However, during the conflict, the structure, institution, and mechanism of Pela and Gandong had drastically eroded and broken down. But, on the other side, because of the deep influence of the Pela and Gandong on the Malukunese’s ways of life, many people still believe that the social-cultural mechanism can be revitalized to prevent and build peace in the Maluku society. To transform the conflict, the Pela and Gandong mechanism can be recovered and revitalized through dialogic community involving

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not only among communities members but also between community leaders and people at the grass-root level. Formal and official dialogues are often not appropriate in this respect because there are too many groups and issues involved in the identity conflict. The dialogic community is an informal and non-official way of conflict resolution. It will melt down the tension and erode the distrust among community members. In addition, it will also facilitate groups from any levels of the Maluku society with different approaches; the high level negotiation for the upper level, problem solving dialogues for the middle level, and inter-subjective dialogue for the lower and grass-root level. This strategy is an alternative problem-solving approach for creating sustainable peace in the Maluku society.

End Notes During the last five years, many ethnic and religious conflicts have erupted through out Indonesia country such as the Dayak-Madura ethnic conflict in Kalimantan, Muslim-Christian conflict in Poso, Central Sulawesi, and other ethnic and religious conflicts in many Indonesian cities before and during the crisis and political transition period in Indonesia. 2 See Lambang Trijono, Keluar dari Kemelut Maluku, Refleksi Pengalaman Praktis Bekerja untuk Perdamaian Maluku (Yokyakarta : Pustaka Pelajar, 2001), p. 15. 3 See Ziwar Effendi , Hukum Adat Ambon Lease (Jakarta : PT. Pradnya Paramita, 1987), p. 11. 4 Ziwar Effendi, Op. Cit., pp. 29-31. 5 Lambang Trijono, Op. Cit., p. 11. 6 Ibid., pp. 14-15. 7 Ibid., pp. 20-22. 8 Ziwar Effendi, Op. Cit.; Lambang Trijono, Op. Cit., p. 25. 9 Lambang Trijono, Op.Cit. ; see Collin Barlow and Johan Harjono (eds), Indonesia Assesment 1995 : Development in Eastern Indonesia (Canbera : RSPAS, ANU, 1996). 10 See Rom Topatimasang, “Pemetaan sebagai Alat Pengorganisasian Masyarakat : Sejarah dan Politik Sengketa Sumber Daya Alam dan HakHak Kawasan Masyarakat Adat Maluku”, in Tom Dietz, Pengakuan Hak atas Sumber Daya Alam (Yokyakarta : Pustaka Pelajar, 1998). 11 Lambang Trijono, Op.Cit. 12 See S. Sinansari Ecip, Menyulut Ambon, Kronologi Merambatnya Berbagai Kerusuhan Lintas Wilayah di Indonesia (Yokyakarta : Penerbit Mizan, 1999), pp. 50-51. 1


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Before the conflict broke out in Ambon, becak drivers were generally Muslims. Public call becak driver as Bang (derived from Abang) Becak. Bang or Abang is a call sign attributed to Muslim youth. It is different from Bu or Abu for Christian youth. On the contrary, after the conflict, following unrest many of Christian youths driving becak, there was Bu or Abu Becaks. Muslims regard those becak as loots when unrest occurred, regardless Christian youth denial for the latter have bought them, though in lowest price. 14 See interview in The Jakarta Post with Commander Laskar Jihad, Ja’far Umar Tholib, May 23, 2000. 15 See Kedaulatan Rakyat, 20 May, 2000 16 Lambang Trijono, Op.Cit., p. 64. 17 See Suara Pembaruan, Januari 24, 2000 ; Republika, Januari 17, 2000. 18 Sammy Titaley, in a letter to one relative lived in Holland that was sent to www.malra.org.hain 19 Interview with Rev John Ruhulesin, Ambon, August 1, 1999. 20 Interview with Lutfie Sanakhy, Ambon, August 2, 1999. 21 See the gist of though to calm down the tension in Maluku, deliverd by Maluku Christian leaders to President Gus Dur in Jakarta, 2 September 2000. 22 See the gist of though of Muslims delivered in Merdeka Palace to President Abdurrahman Wahid, September, 2, 2000. 23 Interview with the Christian Resident in Ambon, February, 4, 2000. 24 Interview with the Muslim Resident in Hitu Lama, February, 7, 2000. 25 Interview with the figures and members of Wayame Team, February, 216, 2000. 26 See, John Paul Lederach, “Just-Peace-The Challenge of the 21st Century”, in ECCP & IFOR, People Building Peace ( ECCP, 1999). 27 See Christopher R Mitchell, “Problem-Solving Exercise and Theories of Conflict Resolution”, in Dennin J.D Sondak, et all (eds), Conflicts Resolution, Theory and Practice, Integration and Application (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993). 28 See, Thulani Ndelu, “Conflict Management and Peace Building Through Community Development”, Community Development Journal, Vol. 33, No 2 (April 1998). 29 See, IFOR & ECCP, People Building Peace, 35 Inspiring Stories From Around The World (Amsterdam: European Centre For Conflict Prevention, 1999). 30 For the role of the third party, see RJ Fisher and L Keashly, “The Potential Complementary of Mediation and Consultation within the Contingency Model of Third Intervention”, Journal of Peace and Research, Vol. 28, No.1 (1991). 13

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Islamic Militancy in Malaysia

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Islamic Militancy in Malaysia1 Kamarulnizam Abdullah Prior to the kamikaze attacks of the New York World Trade Center, Medd and Goldstein (1997) commented on the vulnerability of United States’ airline industry to terrorist or militant attacks. They also predicted that future terrorist attacks would be on the American soil. Naturally, their critical evaluation proves to be right. The two authors also argue that at least three factors explain the evolution of religious militants over the past three decades (Meld and Goldstein, 1997: 282). Firstly, the threat is growing, secondly the threats appear to be more lethal and finally, religious militant is likely to continue for foreseeable future. Although the use of militant tactic was used as a tool for change by a variety of groups for variety of reasons, it was the rising number of militant attack for the sake of religion that alarmed political and security analysts. Religious militancy or terrorism is in fact a worrying development. The attack of American embassies in Africa in 1998; the abortion clinic bombings in Alabama and Georgia in 1997; the bombing of U.S military housing complex in Dhahran in 1996; the hijacking of Indian Airlines from Katmandu en route to Delhi in 1998; the nerve gas attack in the Tokyo subway in 1995 and; the explosions and destruction of the World Trade Center in New York city in September 2001 and most recently series of suicide bomb attack in the Israel’s occupied territories illustrate this gruesome phenomenon. The interesting part of these illustrations is that the so-called Islamic fundamentalist groups or militias are apparently actively involved. Furthermore, what is more interesting is that the American government and its citizen become the primary target. Malaysia encountered some terrorist and militant attacks in its soil such as the hijacking of American International Insurance Building

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by the Japanese Red Army in Kuala Lumpur in August 1975, the explosion of Air India office by Anand Marg group in Kuala Lumpur in November 1977 and, the hijacking and explosion of Malaysia Airlines aircraft by unknown terrorist in Johor Bahru in December 19772. These incidents, however, were carried out by outside terrorist groups. Religious factor was not part of the motives of these groups. The rise of the level of religious militants or extremism (or fanaticisms) within the society itself has raised concern. It has reached to a point; I would like to argue, where it would lead to the destabilization of the country’s political, economic and social systems. There were studies made to analyze how the excessive use of Islam has had detrimental effect on the societal cohesion (Abdullah, 1999:261282). Nonetheless, the studies mostly concentrate on major political actors and Islamic movements in Malaysia i.e. UMNO, Pas, Berjasa, AlArqam, and Abim. Yet a new breed of Islamic movements that is willing to use force and physical threat has emerged. Al-Ma’unah’s daring attempt in taking over briefly a military camp and attempts by a militant group called Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (Malaysian Mujahidin Group) or KMM to use terrorist tactics against the government led to a question; to what extent religious intolerance or religious-led violence has infiltrated into and affected the country? It also raised other interrelated points such as how the phenomenon is connected to party politics maneuverability among the political elites, political manageability and legitimacy of government, race relations, intraMalay conflict and others. Furthermore, the phenomenon also raises a question why violent religious assaults on public order are occurring now. Some analysts look at the answer in the context of political and social environment but “the frequency of religious violence and its appearance in diverse location around the world suggest that in some cases global factors might be involved as well” (Juregensmeyer,2001: xiii). Some Muslim people argue the existence of international political conspiracy and the new economic order imposed by major powers that pitted against Islam to some extent contributed to this phenomenon. This line of


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argument was consistently mentioned by Osama ben Laden, the late Ayatollah Khomeini, and Hamas leaders. Nonetheless, the above argument partly explains the growing tendency of some elements of Islamic movements in Malaysia that believe in the militant approach against the government’s authority. Islam is practiced by the majority Malays who known not only accommodative towards other religions or beliefs but also moderate in interpreting the religion. Islam in Malaysia has emerged as the dominant religion and become part of ethnic identification for the Malays since seventeenth century when non-Malays began to flock into Malay peninsular under British’s colonial policy of labor migration. Since then Islam has been the center of social and cultural activities of the Malays. By the turn of twentieth century, Islam became increasingly not only the symbol of Malay cultural dominance but also a powerful tool of Malay elites in Malay politics. Consequently, conflicting views exist over what role Islam should play in Malay politics. The Malays until today are divided through political line on this question. At one end there is a tendency to maintain the role of Islam to private matters, but at the other end, Islam has been promoted to encompass every aspect of human life. The purpose of this article is to analyze the current trend of religious militancy in Malaysia and to try to understand why Malaysia’s political Islam has entered a new stage whereby religious tolerance and accommodation are less appreciated and practiced. For the purpose of discussion, it is necessary first, to understand why militant Islam has set its foot in Malaysia’s political fabric. However, this attempt, to understand and to analyze the current trend of militant Islam in Malaysia is not an easy task since it is a complex phenomenon and would result in multi-faceted answers. Even the word militant is subject to further scrutiny since for some it may connote different meaning. It is, in fact, difficult if not impossible to define the word militant. How we differentiate Islamic extremist, terrorist, militant, or even fundamentalist? The leaders of Afghan Taleban or India’s Sikh separatist movement or left wings of Protestant group seldom use the above words but they do believe that they are

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fundamentalist wanting to go back to the basic teaching of the religion or the idealistic nature of society stipulated by their holy book. These groups opposed the word terrorist since the designation is a “subjective judgment about the legitimacy of certain violent acts as much as it is descriptive statement about them”(Juregensmeyer, 2001: 9). “One person’s militant is another person’s defender of god” may have some truth to it. These difficulties in defining the concept of terrorism also explain why recent Malaysian government initiative in hosting the OIC (Organization of Islamic Countries) conference on terrorism fall short of issuing an official stand of what terrorism really is. Nonetheless, for the lack of a better word, I will use the word militant to describe the use of unlawful force and violent acts to achieve one’s personal and political objectives. The acts would create either public fear or hatred against the other or would result in public disorder, which might have detrimental affects to the societal cohesion. Furthermore, I would like to argue in this article that to understand current phenomenon of religious militancy in Malaysia, one has to appreciate changes in Malay political culture and how globalization has added to influence these changes. What’s more, it is also useful to know the objectives of the actors involved and the questions of why these actors decided to resort to militant approach rather than to a more peaceful and normal political approaches.

Why religious aggression? A Theoretical Understanding Islam, as all ulama argue, is a religion of peace. The very name Islam, Juergensmeyer (Juregensmeyer, 2001: 79) comments, “is cognate to salam, the world of peace…it implies a vision of social harmony and spiritual repose”. Based on this reason, Muslim activist advocate a nonviolence approach before defending their use of force. Yet there are some Islamic tenets that condone the struggle out rightly and the use force especially against the unbelievers. Although the holy Quran prohibits killing, there are some exceptions and principles that


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allow it. The use of force are allowed for the purpose of punishment and in the context of current international relations the use of force is a means of cultural survival since some the world of unbelievers (Darulharb), Muslim activists believe, try to dominate and impose their cultural and belief3. Therefore, in such context maintaining the purity of Islam is a matter of jihad and literally translated as a “holy war”. This idea indeed is one of the cornerstones of belief among militant Islamic movements in Malaysia without realizing that even “Islamic law does not allow jihad to be used arbitrarily (Juregensmeyer, 2001: 79-80)”. A question then was raised whether Islam justifies aggression simply for political purposes. The question may sound simple yet complicated because the renewed role that Islam plays in various part of the world, as religious and political ideologies are intertwined. This intertwining may also differ from one society to another. Hence, Islam as a religion may not necessary lead to violence yet as a political force it may be used to justify one’s action. That happens only “with the coalescence of a peculiar set of circumstances – political, social, and ideological – when religion becomes fused with violent expression of social aspiration, personal pride and movements or political change” (Juregensmeyer, 2001: 10). Islamic sanctioning on force, furthermore, is not indiscriminate. In all over the world, the so-called Islamic militant group uses force for the purpose of defending the faith. The KMM group that will be discussed in details later in this article, for instance, decided to murder former state assembly of Lunas in Kedah, Joe Fernandez who was accused to be involved in the mass conversion of Malay-Muslim factory workers to Christianity. Fernandez was a symbol of enemies from without in which the movement has the godly obligation to perish him. KMM’c action could also be justified in the context of Islamic sanction for self-defense. The murder committed could be considered as a defense of religion’s dignity and pride. In addition, the approval of the use of force for the defense of Islam can be expanded to include struggles against political and social injustice. For the KMM, for instance, the government fails to implement a comprehensive political, social and economic systems based on

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syariah. The movement was impatient with the democratic process of political system believing that it would have detrimental effects to the attempts in implementing Islamic law in Malaysia. A use of force may also be committed if there is a perception that the community was being deprived or oppressed. Therefore, it is understandable why militancy has grown rapidly in the Palestinian Muslim society. Similarly it applies to the Sikh militant movements, Teleban, and Protestants and Catholics militants in Northern Ireland.

The Politics of Militant Islam: Case Studies There were some cases of religious aggression in Malaysia that deemed to be perceived as militant. Yet these cases could also be recorded as merely political clashes between followers of the ruling party- Umno (United Malay National Organization) and Pas (Parti Islam Se Malaysia). Most of the incidents were isolated cases and treated as insignificant since it was easily controlled by the authorities. Yet in some major cases, it has become a major concern not only for its sheer influence but also its implication to public perception on the legitimacy and the credibility of the government in handling the matter. The sensitivity of the issue may not only invite political backlash against the government but also put further strain on intraracial relations. The followings are three case studies on the issue of militant Islam in Malaysia.

Memali Incident The incident occurred when the Malaysian authorities decided to arrest Ibrahim Libya who was accused to ignite religious zealotry among people in Memali, a small village situated in the district of Baling, Kedah. Ibrahim Libya was an active member of Parti Islam Se Malaysia or Pas at the district and state levels. He held many important party posts such Pas Youth President, Baling; Pas committee member, Baling; and committee member of Pas Youth section, Kedah; and the Pas Information Committee, Baling. He bided for Kedah state constituencies twice in the 1978 and 1982 general elections but failed on both attempts.


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The authorities argued that Ibrahim Libya had incited religious passions and influenced his followers that whatever government action to keep peace and order would be regarded as oppression in line of their interpretation of the spirit of jihad and martyrdom. Ibrahim Libya and his followers were also accused of abusing and exploiting Islam for personal and political ends. He was blamed for condoning political violence in three aspects. First, he was accused for igniting and stirring up the kefir issue (infidel) and boycotting social activities in Memali4. Secondly, he was also blamed of inculcating extremist attitudes among Pas members and supporters in several neighboring states such as Penang and Perak. Finally, Ibrahim Libya has called Pas members to “rise and oppose the 2M (the then Mahathir-Musa) administration in every possible way, and if necessary, life and property must be sacrificed5. Ibrahim Libya and his followers believed that Malaysian political, economic and social systems had been corrupted by political elite who happened to be from Umno. Although most of them were Pas’ members, their approaches were different from that of Pas’. They believed that Pas took too many concessionary efforts in trying to make Malaysia an Islamic state. They did not share Pas’ political approach through normal democratic process hence they believed that the only way to correct the system was through radical changes. This then would involve jihad against the government that was seen to be failing in implementing syariah law. Therefore, in every ceramah (religious lecture) followers of this loosely organized movement were bombarded with concepts of jihad as part of fardhu kifayah (community obligation). Ibrahim Libya was wanted under the Malaysia’s draconian Internal Security Act (ISA). Nonetheless, the operation to arrest Ibrahim Libya received strong resistance from his followers. A group of women and children was used as a human shield to deter security force to enter Ibrahim Libya’s house compound. His followers also used shotguns, poisoned arrows and Molotov cocktails in confronting then security authorities. The White paper on Memali described a total of 576 police personnel took part in the operation, although only 228 approached

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Ibrahim Libya’s house. The manner, which the operation was conducted, received severe criticisms from the public and international community. They questioned the authorities’ justification in using several hundred police personnel only to capture thirty-two followers of Ibrahim Libya and the man himself. Pas quick to point out government’s over reacting to the issue and placed Ibrahim Libya and his followers who died in the incident as martyrs.

Al-Ma’unah Movement6 Al-Mau’nah movement was also a loosely organized group led by Mohd Amin bin Razali. He was known as distinguished guru of AlMa’unah by his followers. Ironically, Mohd Amin did not have any solid background of Islamic credentials and he even had failed to complete his religious study at Pondok Lanai - an independent madrasah type of school, in Baling Kedah. Yet he has charisma that may influence people to agree what he said or preached. He was exposed to Pas’ political activities and the story of Ibrahim Libya while he was studying at Pondok Lanai. Ibrahim Libya for him was the role model. Amin’s growing abhorrence with government started when he consistently attended Pas’ political ceramah (lecture), which praised Ibrahim Libya’s action. It then led him to set up AlMa’unah movement, which strives for the establishment of an Islamic state in Malaysia. Nonetheless, Al-Mau’nah was a one-man show movement since it was Mohd Amin who dominated the objectives of the movements and had the final says. In fact, Al-Mau’nah was a reflection of Mohd Amin’s political perception against the status quo. One of his followers confessed that Mohd Amin was so charismatic even when Mohd Amin directed him to prepare for a holy war against the government; he was tied-lips unable to argue anything7. This is not surprising since leadership plays an important role in any religious movements. The leader of the movement usually has charisma and charm that could attract ordinary people to join the movement. The movement would attract more members if the leader


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himself has, in the eyes of ordinary people, respected religious credentials. This kind of respect would usually lead to total and blind loyalty towards the leader. The implication is that such a leader seized the opportunity to achieve and attain his personal interest. Al-Mau’nah under Mohd Amin launched Jihad Fi-Sibilant to set up and Islamic state where a village called Sauk in the state of Perak would be the first territory to fully subscribe to the syariah law. Mohd Amin also defined jihad as Jihad Hujumy meaning that members of the movements were allowed to crush unbelievers in their efforts to set up Darul-Islam (Islamic state). Although Pas tended to distance itself from the movement, the authorities argued that one of the Pas branches in the city of Kuantan; Pahang provided the movement’s logistical support for a military training. In fact, the head of the branch had military training in Afghanistan years before. The movement decided to launch Jihad Fi sabiluna against the government in February 2001 when they were able to seize several hundred of ammunitions, M-16s, and rocket launcher from an army camp by using camouflaged army vehicles. The movement then split into two groups. The first group set up an army type of camp on the hill near Sauk and the second group launched sporadic attacks by using rocket launcher on Hindu temple in Batu Caves and Carlsberg factory near Shah Alam near Kuala Lumpur. Those two locations were seen as symbol of religious corruption or impurity in Malaysia. Lack of experience in manning the launcher, however, hampered their attempt to destroy the two places targeted. In a meantime, security enforcers, which consisted of police and army, launched a manhunt and were able to locate the first group at the hill. In the attempt, however, the group captured two army officers, one of which was a non-Muslim. They were physically tortured and one of them (the non-Muslim) was tortured to death. The episode ended when one of army generals managed to confront and persuade the group although Mohd Amin initially showed his resistance. At this moment, Mohd Amin together with six of his followers was on trial under the Malaysian criminal code, which carries mandatory death penalty.

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Kumpulan Mujahiddin Malaysia (Malaysian Mujahidin Group) or KMM Kumpulan Mujahiddin Malaysia or KMM8 was initially a loosely organized movement. The movement started in 1986 as clandestine movement under the name Halaqah Pakindo. Members of this movement were alumni of Persatuan Mahasiswa Pakistan, India and Indonesia (Student Association of Pakistan, India and Indonesia graduates) or Masapakindo. This student association was in fact under the aegis of Pas9. Halaqah Pakindon also tried to bring in Malaysian exAfghan fighters and those from Pas who were impatient with and demanded radical changes in Malaysian political system. The recruitment, like that of communist movement in Malaysia in the 40s and 50s, was done secretly. In 1995, leaders of Halaqah Pakindo decided to convene their first meeting. It was on that year KMM was born. Although at the early stage the government denied possible links between KMM and Osma ben Laden’s Al-Qeeda group, further investigation made by the authorities shows that KMM had indeed established relations with not only with the group but also with another regionally based militant Islamic movement known as Jemaah Islamiah (JI). At least fifteen members of JI in Singapore were arrested after the authorities in the republic discovered ploys to bomb MRT networks and to attack American military personnel stationed there. Elsewhere in the region, the Philippine government arrested a man connected to JI and in Indonesia, the Megawati administration, under international pressure, decided to re-open a case against Abu Bakar Bashir known to be the mastermind and the leader of JI10. The objectives of KMM were first, to seek religious purity among Malay-Muslims. In doing that, they tried to get, by invitation, the involvement of Masapakindo alumni and of Malaysian ex-Afghan fighters. During the Afghan war in the 80s, many Malay-Muslims went to the war-thorn zone to help and to protect what they believe fellow Muslim Afghans from being slaughtered by the Soviet armies. Some of


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these Malaysian were also students who were doing their studies in universities in Pakistan. It was not surprising then, Abdul Azab and Osama ben Laden were their respected figures. Another modus operandi in getting membership was through usrah (a small religious discussion group) among Pas members. Its second objective was to ensure Pas’ political struggle be maintained and encouraged. The leaders of the movement strived to protect Pas leader in case that the government attempted to arrest the leaders. Although this objective appeared to be pro-Pas, Pas leaders were in fact not aware of it. The movement initially believed that Pas could achieve it Islamic agenda through normal political process and the movement would become man behind the curtain to lend support. However, this affirmation was challenged by one of its braches, which will be discussed later. Finally, the movement’s long-term agenda was to implement syariah in Malaysia and subsequently an Islamic state. This movement also envisaged an Islamic state in the region, which would combine Indonesia, Malaysia, southern Philippines and southern Thailand known as Daulah Islam Nusantara. There was a meeting between KMM, Majlis Mujahiddin Indonesia, and unknown representatives from southern Thailand and Philippines to discuss the idea. The details, however, were not known. In 1997, the movement became more organized with a defined leadership structure especially when Nik Adli Nik Aziz took over leadership11. Subsequently, the movement appeared to be more militant in its approach. Leaders of the movement implanted a belief that Islam condones violence for the sake and purity of religion. Members were also allowed to use force against non-Muslims and were told to be prepared to launch a crusade against the government if time warranted. At the same time, they also bought weapons such as revolver, M16s, TNT explosive materials, hand-grenade, and man-made bombs from southern Thailand. In terms of organizational structure, an Amir led the movement at the national level. He was assisted by vice-Amir, a secretary, a treasury, and four committee members. The movement also set up a

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cell in the states of Perak, Kedah, Kelantan, Terengganu, Selangor and Johor. A leader without committee members headed each cell. Among the six cells, Selangor was the most active and militant. In April and May of 2001, members of the Selangor cell robbed Southern Bank and Hong Leong Bank in Petaling Jaya. The cell also sent two groups to Ambon. The first group consisted of 10 people while the second one consisted of six. Members of the Selangor cell were also found to be involved in the murder case of Lunas state Assemblyman, Dr Joe Fernandez. The cell also made an attempt to confiscate weapons by attacking a police station in Guar Chempedak. They were also planning to attack American marines in two places in Kuala Lumpur and to assassinate a newspaper columnist who was known to be anti-Pas. The activities of the movement were cleverly concealed not until the police found the link between the group and the robberies of the two banks. It was believed that the movement needed cash to buy more weapons. The authorities also believed that the movement was still in its early stage of formation. So far fifty-two members have been arrested under Malaysia’s draconian law of Internal Security Act (ISA) and at least one-hundred members believed to be on the run. In the latest police tough action against militancy, fourteen members of the movement including one woman were arrested. The police believed that the movement planned to sabotage the country’s premier port, Pelabuhan Klang12.

Islam in Malaysian context: Accommodating, Tolerating or Politicking? The heightened Islamic consciousness among Malay-Muslims is not new since it was in tandem with the revival of the religion worldwide. It was partly a reaction against modern Western values. At the same time it was also a reaction to rapid social and economic changes brought about by the New Economic Policy (NEP) aiming to restructure the society. Although NEP, to some extent, succeeded to uplift the social-economic ladder of Malay-Muslims, it failed to fill the vacuum between material and spiritual needs. Naturally, Malay-Muslims


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especially those benefited from the affirmative action turned to Islam begging for answers13. There was also ethnic dimension involved. The heightened feeling of Islam was in fact parallel with the idea of Malay reassertiveness and identity. As Mehmet (1990: 3) puts it, Malays, in residing n a multicultural country, needed “Islam as identity tag to differentiate themselves from the other races”. Questions however remain why some elements of Malay society believe in militant approach to achieve their godly objectives i.e. to purify Islam and subsequently to set up an Islamic state? In answering this question, I would like to borrow some of Nash’s arguments in explaining the trend of religious fundamentalism in Malaysia and Indonesia (Marty and Appleby, 1991:729-734). The rise of Islamic movements (also known as dakwah movements in the Malaysian context) and later its militant character could be explained in terms of firstly, problematic nature of Islamic orthodoxies in the face of diversity; secondly, the growing secular nature of the Malaysia state; and thirdly, the increasing social-economic stratification within the Malay community itself. Furthermore, I would like to add another two factors to this growing tendency towards militant act that the seriousness of intra-Malay political rivalry both between Umno and Pas, and within Umno itself; and the perceived global injustice towards Muslim people especially on Palestine and Afghanistan issues. Generally, Malay-Muslims subscribe to the Sunnah waljammah or the Sunni belief. Yet there is an attempt to circumscribe the intellectual and theological debate on Islam. What worse is that Islam and its tenets are “under pressure” whereby it was increasingly be put under narrowed and literal interpretation in the hands of certain ulama. This in fact is an irony to the “revive” of Islam in Malaysia itself whereby Islam, as it was argued by the Islamic movements, encompasses every aspect of human life, from personal etiquette to political management. In fact, Islamic practice in Malaysia has been portrayed as a dynamic religion compared to that of the Middle East and South Asia. Nonetheless it gradually is being marred by debates between independent and government ulama that claimed have the

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right to issue official stance on Islamic matters. The government and its ulama argue that independent ulama issued a fatwa at will in which would confuse the local public. Interestingly, some of these independent ulama are leaning towards the opposition hence confirm government’s accusation that some of them have political motivation. Hence, there was so much confusion among the general public as where the official Islam lies. The government through its ulama insisted that it has the rights on Islamic matters and barred others to issue different interpretation from that of the official one. As a result, the Quran, hadith and syariah are presented, “without much theological debate or subtly of interpretation, as the reliable and unwavering font of normative belief and behavior” (Marty and Appleby, 1991: 732). In short, there should not be any critical discourse on Islam for it would be considered as heresy and sin trying to questions the will of Allah. The Quran, therefore, should be understood as it is interpreted officially. The militant movements saw the development as an insult to the intellectual progress yet they themselves provided a distorted image of Islam. In their quest of Islamic idealism an idealized past, a golden age of purity, is reconstructed from literal reading of the Quran and Sunnah and presented as attainable in the future. It is presented without realizing the cultural and religious diversities that Malaysia has. Furthermore, the argument then was to turn back of time and to create an ideal society based on Islamic tenets in the context of contemporary society. What is interesting in this attempt is that, the movements actively opposed to modern West yet they are neither anti-technological nor anti-scientific. There is also a growing debate whether Malaysia is an Islamic or a secular state. Although the government claims otherwise, there is a prevalent agreement that Malaysia is a secular state. The state has increasingly being perceived moving towards secularism beside the fact the present government has introduced and implemented several Islamic based policies trying to win support from moderate and fundamentalist groups of Malay-Muslims. The Umno-led government even made a claim that it is an Islamic state and did not bother to meet


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the standard and criterion demanded by Pas. Yet the government is seen by some sectors of Malay-Muslims to contradict the Quranic mandate for a genuinely Islamic state. Some policies on youth and education, for instance, did not conform to the demand of Islamic activists. The tension between Islam and secular government in Malaysia, as Nash (1991) argued, is also exacerbated by the organization of religious life. There is religious minister at the federal level, at the same time, each Malay state under a sultan enjoys the rights to administer religious matters. These fracturing of religious matter seems intolerable to committed Muslims since some fatwa or religious decrees issue appeared to strengthen the legitimacy of regime in power. The third possible explanation to this growing trend of Islamic militancy is the increasing social-economic stratification within the Malay community itself. The oversimplify tripartite division of Malays into aristocrats, peasants and town civil servants has been complicated by the emergence of a commercial middle class, numerous professional, and an urban proletariat in the factories and assembly plants. It was reported that the income distribution especially in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis has widen especially within the Malay society. This widening gap of income distribution, more or less, has created tension in the community. NEP may prove to be successful in creating a bigger section of Malay middle-class, but it also fails to address why there is also bigger section of the lower income group. Another important factor is the frustration over the continuous political rivalry cum religious rightness with the Malay politics. The political rivalry between Umno and Pas is a known fact since independence. Pas envisages the notion of an Islamic state in Malaysia whereby Umno, looking at the multifaceted cultures of the society, argues the opposite. The political debate is just like a cycle. In some instances, Pas nearly convinced the Malays that they needed to have an ideal Islamic state especially when there was internal bickering within Umno. This has been shown when Pas was able to capture the state-seats of Kelantan and Terengganu in the 1960s and again since

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1990 in Kelantan and 1999 in Terengganu. Yet Pas was also marginalized by the Malay-Muslims especially in the 1981 and 1985 general elections. Internal problems within Pas cost the party dearly in the last two general elections. The seriousness of this Malay political rivalry culminated when Anwar, the then deputy prime minister, was sacked from the government and Umno. Although political sacking is common, the manner, which Anwar was sacked, could not be accepted by the Malays especially the younger generation that admire Anwar. Some political analysts argue the political culture of the Malays has changed. Malay politics used to practice the culture of closed political maneuvering in order to save face of individual leader. A Malay leader usually was asked to leave dignity. Any political clashes were not discussed openly as a way not to to expose one’s political indifference in order to avoid Malay disunity. Yet the Anwar broke all these rules and expose all the political intriguing of Malay politics that was an open secret before. What is more important is that to the militant movement, these entire factor especially the intra-Malay political rivalry is a vivid example of a failure of party politics to really subscribe and appreciate to true teachings of Islam. They even became enchanted and frustrated with current political rivalry for it won’t contribute to the betterment of the religion itself. They abhorred Umno’s indifference towards Islam and frustrated with Pas for its failure to really promote and implement syariah. Finally, there appears to be perceived global injustices against Muslim worldwide. In the context of globalize era and the post-Cold War period, the dominance of single power, namely the United States is seen to have the detrimental effect on Islam and its followers. America’s consistent support to Israel in the Middle East problems and Bush’s remark on the Axis of Evil against some Islamic countries tend to prove further Muslims’ conviction worldwide that the super power is indeed against Islam. In the September 11 incident, Islam and its followers have been closely associated with terrorism. In a small study, Malaysians were asked how they felt about the incident14.


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Although the majority of respondent abhor the terrorist act against innocent people yet surprisingly the respondents also argue that the incident was justifiable for the United States government. There is a lesson, according to one respondent, to be “learned”. It is not surprising that the militant religious movements in Malaysia tried to emulate the success of Islamic movements elsewhere that have successfully used force and militant approaches in their quest for a pristine Islamic society and state. The ability of the Taleban movement, for instance, proved that their goal could only be achieved through the use of militant approach. What’s happening around the region also aroused their religious consciousness since it shows that Islam has increasingly and systematically being discriminated.

Conclusion Whether the culture of militancy will prevail in Malaysia remains to be seen. Yet for sure, those in the power circle could not ignore the fact that the phenomenon is in the ascendancy because of their failure to fill some political, social and moral obligations to the society. Islam in Malaysia is an important factor not only as cultural identity but also as a political force that would charter the future of Malaysian polity. Furthermore, in the age of globalization, the society is fast learning from the others and able to share similar experience. Religious militancy in Malaysia, unlike in the early part of political Islamic movement, has interestingly had international characters. The objectives were not only to change the government by force but also to change, if possible the character of international system. For this part, the United States of America and its allies are viewed to be the major stumbling block towards Islamic utopia of political dominancy. What’s more is that militant act is seen by those radical elements as a viable option to achieve one’s religious and moral duties if the status quo remains unwilling to response towards changes. Although the Malaysia government managed to contain the spread and influence of Islamic militancy through methods of early crushing against these militant movements, one could not deny the possibility that beside all

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these measures Islamic militancy will always become a formidable challenge to government legitimacy.

End Notes 1

2

3

4

5

I would like to express my gratitude to my colleagues (especially in UKM) who offer some thoughts, arguments and new ideas on how to understand the current phenomenon of religious militancy locally and globally. My sincere thanks are also due to Swedish International Cooperation and Development Agent (SIDA), the Southeast Asia Conflict Studies Network in Penang, and those who made the first SEA-CSN Regional Workshop on Ethnic and Religious Conflict, in Yogjakarta possible. In addition, there were some other terrorist-related incidents such as the explosion of Saudi Arabian Airlines office in Kuala Lumpur in August 1988 and the hijacking of Singapore Airlines aircraft from Kuala Lumpur en route to Singapore in May 1991. There was attempt, furthermore, by one of the followers of Ramsi Ahmed Yuseff who was accused to be involved in the 1993 bombing of New York World Trade Center, to open a logistic and Far East activities center against American interest in the region and worldwide. The man, however, was handed over to FBI in December 1995 (reference anonymous police information). Moderate Muslim activists, however rejected the idea of dividing international relations between Darul -Islam (the World of Muslim) and Darul-Harb (the world of unbelievers/conflict) for the reason that Islam does not promote violence and the use of force. Force is only use for defensive purposes. The kefir issue was the major contention of political rivalry between Umno and Pas followers. It gained its momentum when Pas launched a crusade in mid-1980s by identifying itself as representing mustadhafin (the meek) as opposed to the mustakbriin (the arrogant); and fighting for the ‘adl (justice) against the zulm (the wicked). Pas leaders claimed to provide “legitimate” theological interpretation of contemporary relevance of Islam in Malay society (see Jomo Sundaram and Ahmeed Shabery, “Malaysia’s Islamic Movements”, in Fragmented Vision: Culture and Politics in Contemporary Malaysia, edited by Joel S. Kahn and Francis Lok Kok Wah, Sydney: Asian Studies Association in Association with Allen and Unwin, 1992). Pas also began a campaign against assabiyah (narrowed nationalism) and the major culmination of this campaign was a fatwa calling Umno members as infidel, which was based on socalled “Amanat Haji Hadi” (who is now the chief minister of Terengganu). Among other things the amanat preaches, “We do not have to change religion. We become kefir when we practice a chauvinistic and narrow political approach” (See Federal Government of Malaysia, White Paper on Threat to Muslim Unity and National Security (1984), p. 5). See Federal Government of Malaysia, White Paper on Memali Incident 21 (1986), pp. 6-7.


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The information of this movement was made possible by the anonymous police information. The author also relied on reporting in local newspapers. 7 Information based on police record and newspaper report. 8 The movement has been increasingly referred to as Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (Militant movement of Malaysia) 9 Pas sponsored several other Malaysian student associations overseas such as in the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom and Ireland. 10 Utusan Malaysia, April 19, 2002, p. 17. 11 Nik Adli Nik Abdul Aziz, is a son of chief minister of Pas-led government in Kelantan, Datuk Nik Aziz Nik Mat He was the leader of KMM at the national level. He was arrested under the Internal Security Act. His arrest, as expected, received condemnations especially from Pas leaders. 12 Utusan Malaysia, April 19, 2002, front page. 13 There were many articles and books written on this subject. Please refer to some of these books or articles such as Chandra Muzaffar, Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia (Fajar Bakti, 1986) and, Jomo Jwame Sundram & Ahmed Shabery Cheek, “The Politics of Malaysia’s Islamic Resurgence,” Third World Quarterly, 1988, 19(2), pp. 843-68 14 The study was made through a local magazine, which the author is one of the columnists. Readers were given two weeks to respond to a question about how they felt about the incident. Most of the respondents were university students. 6

References Chandra Muzaffar, Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia (Petaling Jaya: Fajar Bakti, 1987). Choueiri, Youssef M., Islamic Fundamentalism (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990). Federal Government of Malaysia, “White Paper on Memali Incident 21” , 1986. Federal Government of Malaysia, “White Paper on Threat to Muslim Unity and National Security”, 1984. Jomo Jwame Sundram & Ahmed Shabery Cheek, “The Politics of Malaysia’s Islamic Resurgence”, Third World Quarterly, 19 (2): 843-68 (1988). Juergensmeyer, Mark, Terror in the Mind: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001). Kamarulnizam Abdullah, “The Issues of Radical Religious Elements in Malaysia”, Contemporary Southeast Asian Studies, 21(2): 261-282 (1999). Marty, Martin E. and Appleby, R. Scott (eds.), Fundamentalism Observed (Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 1991). Medd, Roger and Goldstein Frank, “International Terrorism on the eve of

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a New Millennium”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 20: 281-316 (1997). Mehmet, Ozay, Islamic Identity and Development: Studies of the Islamic Periphery (London & New York: Routledge, 1990). Utusan Malaysia, April 19, 2002.

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Conclusion The wide-ranging issues emanated from SEA ethnic and religious conflicts serve to point out their contexts and dimensions of becoming. It is hardly surprising that both the contexts and dimensions have revealed the dynamic nature of the violent communal conflicts. Only through a deliberative but also reflexive inquiry into the reciprocal constituting of both contexts and dimensions, the current SEA ethnic and religious conflicts then can be understood comprehensively. Drawing carefully the issues from each paper, we are from the outset preoccupied with a sociological and political facts that the ethnic and religious conflict in the region do experience a relatively similar context consisted of three social, political, and cultural texts or inherent constituents. The term context gives priority to the three constituting aspects of SEA conflicts. It receives its meaningful relevance in two conditions. On the first hand, it consists of three constituents as factors, but on the other hand, it transcends these factors as actors in the field of SEA conflict. In other words, the term context we will explore contains both sources and proponents which in turn give birth to the SEA conflict dimensions. In what follows we will discuss each of these three social texts in such a collaborative way. The first text/fact which is contemporary in its emergence is globalization. As a social and economic supra nation-state power, it promotes the expansion of actor’s consciousness on the one hand and it creates the differentiation, extension, and interconnection of system and networks on the other hand. This global process undergoes the intensification of life-world resulting in reciprocity between local happenings and global events. Despite of the widely local reception, this new social process does not per se lead into expansion of an intersubjectively shared world and give birth for communicative civil society based on democratizing of multi-interests. Conversely, the unintended consequences of modernization have in fact stood in tension with the very efforts of local people to maintain their own tradition and heritage.

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Fundamentalism is the most apparent case of modern or global consequences that shows its incompatibility with the existing traditional and religious practices. The exclusive and inclusive effects resulting from the interconnection between globalization and fundamentalism have brought a fact that fundamentalism from its inception emerges from the vortex of social-economic modernization, and by that very fact, fundamentalism, whether it is religious or historical-political in nature, is itself a thoroughly modern movement of renewal and resistance. Moreover, politics of fundamentalism, as has been shown in Islamic militancy in Malaysia, refers more clearly to a practice of intolerance that raised from religious interpretation of the world claiming exclusiveness for a autonomous way of life. The second text/fact which has incessantly undergone the ongoing conflicts in these geopolitical societies is state. One clear characteristic of states in South East Asia is that they had been modern states laid down on political concept of nationality which since their declaration of independence has marked simultaneously both the end of colonialism and the birth of new political societies. What then becomes a politically oriented polemic bears predominantly on issue of hegemonic and paradoxical treatment of the authoritatively generated concept concerning genealogical constitution of nationstate. This is in fact confirmed by the state politics of homogenization or anti-political pluralism. The paradoxical political entity is inspired by a romantic idea of a common language and a historically shared practices. The very praxis and concept of a nation-state then become problematic for in social reality it comprised of differences of common languages and historical units which the state has rendered them to be only one political entity. The state policies aimed then at social and political integration of this multicultural society and at construction of a new type but loyal citizen through the use and abuse of legitimate means of domination and hegemony. The revelatory side of this politically authoritarian politics shows that it in turn conditions the emergence of a new but archaic political awareness in the forms of ethnic resistance. Mindanao case in Filipino and Aceh case in Indonesia have confirmed

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such a phenomenon. Both these specific cultural communities have already had their own political history within clearly distinguished communal territories. On the level of political discourse, these resistances or direct efforts to be independent indicate the crisis of post-colonial states. In addition to the problematic of the states, the collaboration between post-colonial states and capitalism has made widely societal modernization possible in all aspects of society. Economic exploitation of local natural resources ran by developmental-technocratic state in the end leads further into the development of underdevelopment of the periphery communities. And then this legal exploitation accords equal weight to the politics of local resistance based predominantly on ethnic commonalities. In short, the very efforts to be free have been an irony of the idea and praxis of an ontologically conceptualized nation-state. The third text/fact bearing similar significance with two other is SEA civil society. Sociologically viewed, SEA civil societies are multicultural which commonly composed of both religiously and ethnically distinguished social units. In contrast with a supposedly homogenous communality, each civil society does comprised of a culturally plural population. There is a diversity of cultural forms of life, ethnic groups, religions and worldviews. This diversity or multiculturalism of everyday form of life undeniably constitutes civic space as a field of individually and collectively social struggle over material resources and symbolic recognition. It will suffice to say that the functioning of this plural society depends largely on a presupposed communicative action among individuals and groups of individuals to reach a mutual understanding toward their respective culturally distinctive mode of experiencing collective meaning and of different mode of accessing structural means of production and reproduction. What meant here is that this functioning has a bearing on both issues of inter-subjectively based interaction and structurally differentiated social work. Without these two practical paradigms, social integration in the light of self-sustainable social system would be hard to exist.

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The most contagious fact of SEA civil society is its ethnic-religious determination, not as inclusive and transforming social power, but indeed in several conflict events it has behaved as two exclusive and competing cultural façades. This fact has been worsened by the increasing social differentiation/modernization which pushes ethnicreligious groups to survive or to experience their cultural practices in such a closed-rigid way. This ironic condition of modern SEA civil society shows how the modernization of public sphere which is not conducted by a set of civic norms for the very existence of a discursively generated civic polity seemingly fails to have circumscribed a civil society capable of self-transforming and self-regulating. Under this condition, a democratically generated consensus and peace would be impossible to reach. Of course, with the absence of consensus and peace, social conflicts tend to have been derivatives of the nonexistence of a communicatively institutionalized problem-solving from which they borrow their continuity and permanence. It should be remarked that the existing SEA social conflict is as modern in its genealogy as it is anti-modern procedural democracy in its mode of becoming. For instance, the ethnic-religious conflict that had brought about Ambon civil society into pieces is the best exemplary case upon which the paradigm of communicative-dialogic civil society immediately retains its importance and relevance. Nothing worse than this violent conflict as far as it comprehensively understood in term of the actual absence of the grounding norms of regulating and accommodating differences between two conflicting groups. The society had lost its integrative capacity which easily caused the dynamic of the early conflict to be extensive and explosive. The series of physically brutal confrontation had been its unavoidable phenomenon, and the respective symbolic but powerful social capital had been in a massive use that in turn run this society into a tragic collapse. In short, this conflict event however has marked an important but also similar trend in other SEA civil society. The previous discussion on the three contexts constituting the nature of SEA conflict society is to reveal the advantages and disadvantages that usually inhered in theoretical practices of three

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popularly used perspectives. In my paper (Dimension of Ethnic and Religious Conflict) and Samsul Rizal’s paper, these perspectives which emphasize primarily on human or anthropological factor have been explicitly criticized. The primordialist and instrumentalist perspectives give too much attention to the anthropological conflict of culturally individual and collective identities as prior to the former and concentrate only on the importance of local/national elite interests to the latter. Although constructivist perspective has introduced a collaborative analysis which simultaneously puts both actor and elite into consideration, it is still not capable of understanding structural factors which in fact give conflict event a social context of becoming and existence. Comparatively viewed, these three conflict perspectives have a crucial weakness in that they usually start their mode of analysis from one-sided epistemology of social conflict based on the ontological presupposition of human consciousness, will and interests. As I have pointed out in my paper, a reasonable suggestion to use reflexive approach is to comprehend the nature of conflict event not only based on the subjective performance of human actors but also supported by structural mode of analysis which in fact of social conflicts explains the objective context of multidimensional social conflict. By making use of this approach we are occupied with a more comprehensive interpretation of SEA social conflicts. Its advantage is that by dialectically putting cultural-agent and structural dimensions into a research process at once a clearer knowledge and conclusion will be captured. Shortly stated, reflexive approach highlights the dialectics of inter-subjectivity (actors) and inter-objectivity (structure) in the inter-relational contexts of both. In what follows, and through the reflexive understanding of the contexts of the conflict, we will reemphasize three dimension of ethnic and religious conflict in Southeast Asia.

Interethnic-religious conflict Interethnic-religious conflict commonly occurs in a specifically social interaction field. What we mean social space or social field

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conveys a physically interaction space, symbolic (ethnic-religious) interaction-competition, and political-economy struggle for social, economic, and political positions and roles. Before we generalize this field as civil society, it is better a consideration to use civil space as a proper terminology, a more realistic usage to figure out the struggle among ethnic-religious groups for social, economical, and political recognition. These contrasting groups empower or make use of cultural and social capital, including abusing religion for their own sake. Maluku conflict has been a representative case on how two conflicting parties had tried to occupy dominant positions and play important roles in their plural society. The economically growing Muslim community interacted vis a vis Christian community who felt threatened by the former influence. Despite its simple trigger, the ever bigger scale of subsequent events could not be avoided. This violent conflict that had spent for almost 4 years (1999-now) had in turn been a catharsis of conflicting conditions long embedded in the depth and surface of Ambonese society. It is certainly difficult to have ensured whether the conflict conditioned by the interest of local /national elites behind the bloody scene, but what has in fact been truthful is that there had been historical and sociological background, as I have pointed out in my paper and in my other paper resulted as a collaborative work with Tanamal. Interethnic-religious conflict contains group interests that are not accommodated or institutionalized in civil space. That is the reason we understand this complex society’s central problem as an impetus for being catharsis, that is, conflict as a social psychological outlet which, in Maluku case, had reached a point of no return. Since the society almost had no diversity-accommodating institutions, conflict, in its early and subsequent phases, engendered more feasible the salient process of inclusion of the community members and yet exclusion of others. Consonant with this condition, it was not difficulty for both to organize dispersed members of each community and to choose a leader or group of leaders in the battlefield of archaic symbols and barbarous sentiment. In short, between reinventing identity and reinventing communal power there has always been a phenomenology of violence, disastrous social conflict. The war of symbols and

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attributes, is, after all, the war of a long process of cultural embodiment, the unconscious war for the maximal sake of conscious reasons and interests.

Ethnic-state conflict Ethnic –state conflict is a current phenomenon in Indonesian and Filipino. Aceh & Mindanao cases have explicitly illustrated legitimation crisis of post-colonial states. Looking carefully at Jamail A Kamlian and Fuad Mardathilah’s reports on this typically modern conflict, it is clear that despite of political-economy issue, the current discourse on state’s political legitimacy plays in crucial role in determining the nature of ethnic-state conflict. Legal-political legitimacy exercised by Indonesian and Filipino state has increasingly become problematic considering the raising of cultural-historical awareness which gives Acehneses & Mindanao people powerful political agenda. These two enlightened movement can we define as cultural communities which are willingly to reconstruct state-oriented political paradigm of culture. The state’s antidemocratic paradigm has been critically anticipated and resistance or revolt had been their mode of constituting self-identity and of gaining regional-international recognition. Moreover, the failure of developmentalist state in redistributing technologically based resources gives their political resistance a set of sociological rationale. The state and its apparatus have a successful report on exploiting local resources, but has no serious effort to improve local political economy. Aceh and Mindanao cases have been examples of the raising awareness of colonized homeland and at the same time it serves to free her from new colonialist regime. The modern state’s failure to accommodate radical options and the usage of military approach to abolish them, seem to be more an extension of politics of an internally exclusion than of an internally inclusion. As has been indicated too by the two other connected writings, what both radical movements demand is no more than a greater responsibility to manage their own homeland affairs. Hence, ethnic-state conflict indicates not merely a political-economy

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autonomy of local people, but points toward independence, free from all state-determined political-economy constrains and free from totalitarian values enforced by state and its coercive apparatus.

Ethnicity-Globalization Conflict Ethnicity-globalization conflict is, however, a special case compared with the two other models above. As pointed by Kamarulizam Abdullah, anti-globalization movement “opposed to modern west yet they are neither anti-technological nor anti-scientific.” Fundamentalism, on the one side, tends to have conceptualized west as a diabolic entity, as an embodiment of evil values and practices, but, on the other side, this movement is presumed to be recognizable through the very help of technology of disseminating information. Despite of internal paradox this movement inheres, one clear characteristic we easily capture is the grounding of its action on purity of religion. Globalization is considered to have been uprooting the sacred tradition and distorting local values they adore most. Although it is not clear what global values they condemn, globalization they interpret as secularization of life world. What is interesting from fundamentalism case in Malaysia is that Malaysia government judged for not taking into the interest the Muslim people. Moreover, the government is seen as global instrument via practicing mode of capitalist production which in turn conditions the dissemination of mode of capitalist culture. It is not shocking anymore if the targets this movement has destroyed are representatives of global power or moderate political figures. Government, market, & liberal institution have been objects of their resistance. As we noted above, this movement contains in itself internal contradiction which in turn will shape trajectories of their long-term action. There has been too a problem of interpreting holy text in the context of modern world. This anti-globalization movement fills the scripturalist side that commonly obsessed with a religious-cultural society and state. But, there is another moderate and democratic point of view among the Malaysian Muslims who, based on their

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cosmopolitan way of life, interpret religious text in accordance with dynamic nature of space and time. These different interpretations in fact have become the internal hindrance of this anti global movement. As has been indicated by Kamarulnizam, although its movement is sporadic, the anti-globalization movement tends to survive for such a long time and has become formidable challenge to government legitimacy and authority. Following these three types of structural conflict, we can conclude that state or government has been playing a crucial role as a dominant macro-actor. Whatever forceful steps had been taken by the states in both cases proved to be no more a unilateral act of political integrating of these two separating movement into the existing political system than a democratic mechanism which does justice to the political demands of the separatist movement. Legitimation crises of these two post-colonial states, however, imply their internal lack of an institutionally political accommodation. Although, in Mindanao case, Filipino Government had incessantly tried to accommodate, Mindanao radical movement has been likely to fight for its homeland’s independence. Not different from the latter case, Aceh case demonstrates that the mutual benefits for both conflicting parties depend solely on the future of Indonesia government’s policy and persuasion.

Toward a Better Conflict Management SEA conflict analysis in turn confirms a need of reflexively based practical suggestion. The important contribution that can be directly taken from the reflexive elaboration of three conflict dimensions is that it conditions the possibility of appropriate conflict resolution. That is, the SEA conflicts has clearly revealed the actual existence of central problems in realm of cultural and structural interactions between the conflicting parties. What should be reminded here is that a participatory research contributes much in the process of creating practical solutions relevant to each conflict dimension. As I points out in my paper, the usage of reflexive-dialectical approach leads our attention to the efforts of conflict resolution.

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Compared to several options which possible to be brought into play, dialogue and civic engagement are two models of conflict resolution which properly applicable and more democratic in nature. Exit or avoidance is as impossible and anti-democratic as coercion or violence, since they basically turn their direction away from the very act of reaching mutual understanding/consensus and peaceful coexistence, indeed conversely they implicitly run further the project of abolishment and repression against a relatively weaker group. As far as dialogue put into action, then this practice has to be supported through the communicatively run actualization of civic engagement as a basic construction of a peaceful civil society. The case of peace zones in Mindanao, as has been presented by Marilou S. Siton-Nanaman, illustrates how the existence of dialogic community to bridge the gaps between Christian and Muslim communities through conducting regular meeting to deal with daily conflict issues is very effective to prevent violent and build peace at community level. As has been explained by S Rizal, preventing ethnic and religious violence necessitates both light and deep preventions. The former refers primarily to the crisis management in which leaders or representatives of each conflicting groups do conform a non exclusive but inclusive pact in the virtue of commonalities and democratically shared public interests. This type of conflict prevention aimed at avoiding an implicit social conflict from degenerating into armed conflict. On the other side, deep prevention puts its stress on structural aspects, especially the significance of good governance which gives direction to the crucial role of government and democratic-political institutions. Here, law enforcement and the everyday contribution of publicly controlled mass-media certainly play their important participation in the process of constituting a democratic civil society. Relevant with the way deep prevention suggests, good governance as one of the basic constituents for the very existence of justly and collectively accessed structural resources depends its successful trajectory on the quality of government officials and its publicly scrutinized policies. Here again, mass media and non-governmental organization do run their controlling function they inhere as

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representatives of social, cultural and religious groups. What then raises to the fore is a politics of differences that brings in itself a posteriori consciousness of politics of commonalities as has been worked out by Soliman Santos in his hermeneutical effort to search commonalities between Muslim and Christian Fillipinos. Hence, It implies a central role consistently played by educational institutions to create men of democracy and tolerance as Clem McCartney proposed in his paper. So far, there are conflict prevention, conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation. In order to rebuild such a conflict society the persistence of the long-term but deep transformation should be reinstated. Whereas the three others concentrate on the short-term issues of conflict mapping, conflict transformation entails a radical but also evolutionary change of aspects and actors of the conflict. It includes, as Samsurizal rephrases, actor transformation, issue transformation, rule transformation, structural transformation, and personal or group transformation. Prior to the SEA conflict dimensions, it brings state (government) and cultural-religious groups into the very act of transforming the existing social, political, cultural and economic structure and interaction to be more democratic and self-sustainable. However, the success of this normatively based projects borrows support from a well-established reflexive hermeneutics of conflict. Only through the working of this approach conflict resolution can be addressed at two already mentioned levels of fact, namely, cultural and structural dimensions. And a well-grounded praxis of conflict resolution further demands a serious collaborative attempt to reinvent a better civil society and state. Both components have to participate in a long term plan of conflict transformation conducted by comprehensive understanding of both contexts and dimensions of the existing SEA conflicts.

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Contributors

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Contributors Jamail A. Kamlian Office of the Vice Chancellor for Research and Extension MSU-Iligan Institute of Technology, Iligan City, Philippines.

Marilou F. Siton Nanaman Office of the Vice Chancellor for Research and Extension MSU-Iligan Institute of Technology, Iligan City, Philippines.

Soliman M. Santos, Jr Lawyer, peace advocate, legal scholar, Regional Director for Asia of Geneva Call, a research fellow of the Institute of International Legal Studies of the University of the Philippines Law Center, and a practicing human rights lawyer. Quezon City, Philippines.

Pieter Tanamal Lecturer, Protestant Church of Moluccas.

Lambang Trijono Head of The Center for Security and Peace Studies, Gadjah Mada University, and Lecturer at the Department of Sociology, the Faculty of Social and Political Science, Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta.

Kamarulzaman Askandar Research and Education for Peace, School of Social Sciences, Universiti Sains Malaysia. Regional Coordinator of SEACSN (Southeast Asian Conflict Studies Network)

Mohd. Kamarulnizam Abdullah Head of The Strategic and Security Studies Unit, Faculty of Social Sciences, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia.

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Fuad Mardhatillah Lecturer at State Institute for Islamic Studies, Banda Aceh, Indonesia.

Samsu Rizal Panggabean Researcher at The Center for Security and Peace Studies, Gadjah Mada University, and Lecturer at Department of International Relations Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta.

Clem McCartney A graduate of Queen’s University, Belfast, and also an independent research consultant on community and conflict issues.

About CSPS BOOKS CSPS BOOKS is non-profits publisher of Center for Security and Peace Studies (CSPS), Gadjah Mada University (UGM). CSPS BOOKS is designed to present the results of Center’s research, reviews, criticism and the proceedings of conferences and workshops and also many other publishing activities related primarily to the wide-ranging studies on security and peace as the main concern of CSPS.

Editorial Staff: Chief Editor

: Lambang Trijono, MA

Editorial Members

: Samsu Rizal Panggabean, MA M. Faried Cahyono Tri Susdinarjanti M. Najib Azca, MA


The Making of Ethnic and Religious Conflicts in Southeast Asia: Cases and Resolutions

Ethnic Conflicts in Southeast Asia

Identity and Ethnic Relations in Southeast Asia: Racializing Chineseness

Terrorism in Southeast Asia

Theatre in Southeast Asia

Encyclopedia of Modern Ethnic Conflicts

Southeast Asia

The Politics of Environment in Southeast Asia

World Conflicts: Asia and the Middle East

Tropical Wildlife of Indonesia and Southeast Asia

Revolution, Reform and Regionalism in Southeast Asia: Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam (Routledge Contemporary Southeast Asia Series)

Religious Outsiders and the Making of Americans

Colonial Armies in Southeast Asia

Special Forces in Southeast Asia

Malaria Research in Southeast Asia

Everyday Life in Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia in World History

Southeast Asia in world history

Heritage Tourism in Southeast Asia

Language and Identity: National, Ethnic, Religious

Social Dynamics in the Highlands of Southeast Asia (Handbook of Oriental Studies. Section 3 Southeast Asia)

Petroleum geology of Southeast Asia

Sultans, Shamans, and Saints: Islam and Muslims in Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia: Illusion and Reality in Politics and Economics

Tectonic evolution of southeast Asia

Britain, Southeast Asia and the Onset of the Pacific War

The Economies of Southeast Asia: Before and After the Crisis

The Political Economy of Educational Reforms and Capacity Development in Southeast Asia: Cases of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam

Southeast Asia: People, Land and Economy

Religious Diversity in Southeast Asia and the Pacific: National Case Studies

Frommer's Southeast Asia

The Making of Ethnic and Religious Conflicts in Southeast Asia: Cases and Resolutions

Ethnic Conflicts in Southeast Asia

Identity and Ethnic Relations in Southeast Asia: Racializing Chineseness

Terrorism in Southeast Asia

Theatre in Southeast Asia

Encyclopedia of Modern Ethnic Conflicts

Southeast Asia

The Politics of Environment in Southeast Asia

World Conflicts: Asia and the Middle East

Tropical Wildlife of Indonesia and Southeast Asia

Revolution, Reform and Regionalism in Southeast Asia: Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam (Routledge Contemporary Southeast Asia Series)

Religious Outsiders and the Making of Americans

Colonial Armies in Southeast Asia

Special Forces in Southeast Asia

Malaria Research in Southeast Asia

Everyday Life in Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia in World History

Southeast Asia in world history

Heritage Tourism in Southeast Asia

Language and Identity: National, Ethnic, Religious

Social Dynamics in the Highlands of Southeast Asia (Handbook of Oriental Studies. Section 3 Southeast Asia)

Petroleum geology of Southeast Asia

Sultans, Shamans, and Saints: Islam and Muslims in Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia: Illusion and Reality in Politics and Economics

Tectonic evolution of southeast Asia

Britain, Southeast Asia and the Onset of the Pacific War

The Economies of Southeast Asia: Before and After the Crisis

The Political Economy of Educational Reforms and Capacity Development in Southeast Asia: Cases of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam

Southeast Asia: People, Land and Economy

Religious Diversity in Southeast Asia and the Pacific: National Case Studies

Frommer's Southeast Asia

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