The Logic of Hope: Extensions of Kant's View of Religion

Sidney Axinn

The

Logic of Hope: EXTBNSIONS OF KAHrS VlBW OF REUGlON

THE LOGIC OF HOPE: Extensions of Kant's View of Religion

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Samuel M. Nata1e

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THE LOGIC OF HOPE: Extensions of Kant's View of Religion

Sidney Axinn

Ammrdam - Atwu., GA 199W elly work against iI.- The ordinary human situation, lhen, is one in which the individual bolh docs and docs oot want 10 be selfL&h. Pul aoother way. the individual botb docs alld don oot wan! 10 be moral. l.ogical fSpcme kings is DOt 10 be upeaed. Nor is it to be wished. since I~ J'OfYrsiOtl of powtr iMvitubly /XIII'FUfJU the untrammeled judgments of reason.'" A remark that Lord Anon wu 10 repeal about one hundred years laler. Human nature, our R1fish .Dd yet ambivalent altitude 10000rd morality. IWgested the metaphor of C'OOked wood. "from such crooked wood as man is made of, no.hj". perfectly 5lraigbl can be buill" (23). 'The IOlutioo to the poJitieal probJem, the last problem thai humanity will solve, has three requirements.. Ooe, ' "correa

conception of. possible constitution"; two, "cat ~ricnce pined in many paths of life; .and three, "far beyond these... good will rudy 10 accept such • coll5lirution.· This Thesis cncb with lIle am:uneOI tbal the5e three Ibings arc bard 10 find. "and if lbcy arc ever 10 be found loaetber. il will be very Ille and after II'W!y vain allempu" (23). The ju5t Slale is an ideal that we may approach yet may DOl rcacb. This is an opeD question for hope. In a si&ni6cant footnole bcre, Kanl repclllS his Second 'J'beW, sayin,; that '"The role of man is very artificial." Perhaps on otbcr plancu.. "caeh individual can perfealy atlain his destiny in his own life. Amana II$, il is differeD!; 0tIJy the raa can hope /0 flIIain it" (my emphasis). Not juR lhe individual, bill the human lj)Ceies, now beeoma the moral actor. As """ lhaII see. the eonsequences of lhis point of view arc enormous..

KANT"S CONCEPTUAL TOOLS

SEVENTH rnESIS "The proh/t:m of atabIiJhina D paJeu rn'l(: wnsntwion u MpnuJmI upon 1M proh/ml of D ltlwfuJ mmwl rdation DIIflNI8 stales and CQllllDt ~ ~ wllhouJ a JOIWion of 1M Lmer pmbltm.·

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TIle mecbanism5 that drove individual people to restrict their own freedom in the prooea of CTellitillB a commonwealth are here applied to states themselves. Kant finds thai states have in their natures "the same unsociability" thai individuals have. TIlerefore, "each of them l1\li51 expect from another precisely the evil which opprlWed the individuals and forced them to ente r ioto a lawful cMe stale' (24). Earlier be had beld laloo individual could be trusled to treal otbers jllStly: here no Slate can be trusted with complete freedom. TIle IOlutinn is clear enoup 10 reason: r/un _ I be l1li w~ ·w"wr of NlIioIu: &11 reason does not determine the aetioos of states. Sornethin& else will. Nature uses "the friction among men, the inevitable an~ n.i.!;m," as the means of forcing stales to form an intemationailegIJ arrangemenl for 5eltlill8 disputes.. Earlier, lhe Fourth Thesis held that the individual', 5eIfJSltoc:ss, vanity, greed, and competitiveness were nature', means of establishing lawful lIl'TIlIgemenlS. Here Kan. bollb thai war ill the mechanism by which Nature can produce the desimlt resulL SIf'OII8 ernpbasls is liven the power of warfare to produce inlemational law: "., . throop the taDng and never-endill8 aa:umulation of armament, tbroup the want wbieh any state, even in pelcetime, mllSl !lUffer inlernally, Nature forces Ihem 10 make a. fust ilUldcquale and tentative auempts .. : (~), So far thi5 can sound smootb and manageable, oot Kant doesn't expect that il will be. Instead, it will take "devastations, revolutions, and even complete exhaustion,' before the greal stales arrive at the stage that reason could have preseoted to them "with far less s.ad experience.· At .h~ stage they ' step from the lawless condition of UYagQ; inlo • league of nations:

If war is the mechanism for this moral goa~ is war morally desirable? Kant's view is that individual acts of war are usually immoral. but looked al in the large, the condition after a war can wmetimes be more desirable, morally, than Ihe condition before iL II

J ust wha l is the moral advantqe of a leaJUe of nations? "even the Y!1aIIest nate (:OUld expect security and justice, not from its owo power and by irs own decrees, but only from this grealleague of nations . . . from a united power actina according 10 deci5ions reached under the laws or their uniled wilr (24). Several things are 10 be noted about this lut quolation. First, Slates are taken to he entities that have a will or intention, and second, Slaies are entities 10 whom juslice or injustice may be done. In lel1ll5 of t.he well-known nominalist·reallsl contrOVersy, is Kant a realisl aboul the c.islence of enlities like Slales? Heretofore, the only entities thai mighl be taken 10 have a "wilr and to be reeipienl$ of justine or injustice have been individuak An ab5tract enlity like a nation would seem a peculiar and unlikely cntity foc- such predkation. It appean unlikely 10 a nominalist, for whom abstract cntities arc mcrely names and do not uist as rcal cntities. A brief digression on this matter may be helpful. For an object 10 be known. it must be at least a pouib1e thought. A pouiblc object or thought. Kant divides possible objccu. inlo tbose that can be mcntioned consistcntly but oot constructed in thought, and those that can be so menlioned and alw CQII ~ lhoug/tl. In order 10 think an object, therc must be matcrial, "... since without malerial nothing whaUOCYcr can be thought" (A232/B284). The "malerial" must come from experiencc. A pouib1e object of though t must be made out of pam that are poi5iblc objecu. of expericnce. Howevcr, a possiblc objcct and an actual object are not identical. An actual objcct is cxpericnced; rather, it I'M be experienced. A possible object is oonstructcd in thc mind, but conslructed out of parts that are actually expericnced. To rcpeat this conclusion, a pouible object of thought is an arrangement constructed OUI of actually cEpcricnced pat1$.

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KANrS CONCEPllJAl TOOLS

From this pouu of view. OUT languaae iii welL-stocked with worth that can be mentioned consistently, but cannot be taken to be pos5ible objects of tboupl. Words thai Kanl dauifit'S as noumenal, "God," "Freedom," and "Immortality; arc aamples." For Kant'li comments on the relation between the possible and the actual. see the Finl Critique analysis. starting" A23O. How does this rauil about possible objects of thought affect Kant'li coll5idertltion or slales? 'The parts of. Slate are objects of pos51l1lc experience; therefore, the Slate is • proper objea of lhoop!. It can be both mentioned and used \0 refer 10 OUlllen of eJF:pericnce. We might define 11 StalC so thai it is mere ly an abstract c nlil)' thai does not refer to any experience. However. lherc is also • perfectly experimental way of defining a SlatC, and 50 Kant bas • legitimate phenomenal entity 10 analyze. (For example, the IOU-Ie can be taken 10 be the cnlil)' thai has as parts the kgislaturc, the stalC police. lbe couru. prisons. lU collector, highway department. board of heallb, etc.) Let us return 10 Kalll'l Slllcmcm aoo..n the position of lmall $la1C$ in a "great league of nations.' We found him holding Ihal staleS are entities that have will that they are moral acton and moral objects, and that they can live and receive justice 01' injustice. TIle romplt:re history of morality i$ the history of both individual and aroup morality. This distinetion between individual and collective morality pennil5 Kanl 10 make a lignilicant dicholomy. Individllals may llUlke DO ptllgreu in their own moialiry, bu.t their group. their SUte, may O!X!Isionally make real progreu in its morality. We shall f
The aradual transition 01 ecclesiastical fai th 10 the exclusive sovereignty of pure rcJigi0U5 failh is Ihe comin, of the Kingdom of God. When a churdl embraces the principle ofusin, its ecclesiastical faitb 115 a vehicle for continually approachina pure re ligious faill\, Kant holds that we can call this institution the true church, or the church militant. Why must ecclesiastical faith be abandoned? "Ecclesiastieal faith fancies il possible 10 become well plell5inllO God throu&h actlOI15 (01" wo~ip) which, thou&h irksome, yet r ' c" in themselves no moral worth and hence are ... merely IKIS which an evil man can also perform" (p. 106). A nIOra] God can bardly be impressed by an act wbich can be performed just as ~U by an evil person as by a good one. The COTlCepl of a llvins faith rums out to have two elements; finl, faith in an alOnemenl, reparation fOl" debt; second, faith that we can become we.U-pleasin. to God through a .ood course of life in !be furure. 1lIese IWO elemenes develop into what Kant calls a rellllfuble antinomy. Kant insuts that a reasonable person knows thai no "sis'a nce in the malICr of atonemenl is available from anyone else. lbat person knows thai fint his or her own way or life must be improved before there can be even the slig.htCSI hope of hipr moral pin. However, knowing that an individual is corrupt by IUltute, and knowing thai the individual knows this, how can we really expect such a person 10 IIIiIke himse.lf or berself into a new human being we ll-pleasill& to God? Apparently, "faith in a meril not his own .. • must precede every effort 10 good worb." H ere is !be antinomy: Do good works prect:de faith in divine alonement. or does faith in divine atonement precede good works? Kant holds that theoretically lhis antinomy cannot be rewlved. VII.

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But he transforms it into I practical pragmatic question mal can be resolved. "Where shall we lIart, i.e~ with a faith in what God has done on our behalt, or with what we are 10 do to become wonlty of God', asmtance (whatever this rtUIIy be)?" (p. lOS). Th is question can be answered: We must nan with wbat we 1ft to do 10 become worthy, and our source of elhics tdls us Ihis. Kant takes it that lIle history of religion shows thi$ conflict bet",.een two principles of faith to have existed througb lIle ages. The priesl$ on one side and the moralists on the other. Both sides hive offered CIpiations, and be adds that !be priem have l15UaJly complained more than the moralisu. Kant has given us a view in which "in the end religion wiD &radually be freed (rom .D empirical determining groonds and from allltalUteS which rest on history ..." (p. 112). Kant e1q)Ccts thai "lIle humiliating distinction between laity and clergy disappears, and equality arises from lI"IIe freedom .... (p. 112). This change from the visible to !be Invisihle church is supposed to be developed through ,",dually advancing reform. Revolu tioI1$ might hasten this progess, M agees. but "they rest in tM hands of providence and cannot be ushered in according to plan without damage to freedom" (p. Ill). Kant thinks thai an analogy 0CC\l1'$ between the history of political states and church history. Every single pol itical state strives to overcome every olber stale, but CIIentuaily il reacbe5 I certain size and breaks up of its own accord. In a simi lar way, individual churches pretend to become lIle church univeruJ. but iI$ 500n as lIlcy ~end themselves and Stan to rule. !.hey break up again into mall sccu. Kant IMn 5pCCUlates lIlal we might U5ume a design of providence 10 checlr. the ~ and morally harmful fusion of religioI1$. It would be harmful if it comes before human bein&:, have become morally improved. The two devices that Kant speculates may be operating here are the difference of tonguCi, and lite difference of religio11$. In bis own terms. this second difference should be called the difference of faiths.

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We DOW tum to what Kant calls the hi!torical aecount of the grlIdual e!iLlbli!hment of • sovereignty of the good principle on earth. What i! called the history of religion can be 5eelI as the constant conflict between the faith of divine worship and the moral faith of religion. Rather than. broad historical record of the different dogmas that hlive been developed, Kant propme5 to consider j\l$t that portion of church hislOf)' in which the clear be&inninas of the universal church may be foood.. He has already eqJlained that Chri5tianity has the s.eeds for the development of thi! universal faith. He m\l$t now commit himself to some relationship between the Jewish faith and Christianity. We are fIrst Jiven !.be hroad auertion that "the Jewish fai!.b stands in no essential connection Whatever. i.e~ in no unity of c:ooa:pts, with this ecclesiastical failh whose history we wish to consider .. ." (p. 116). Despite the faa that the Jewish faith immcdialely preceded the Chri5tiao church and provided the physical oocasioo for its e.slablishment, Kant fiDd$ no essential c:ooa:pt shared by both. He aTJIIe5 that J udaism is really not a rcliJion aI III, but . purely political il15urution. He offers three arguments in IlIppon of too char&e that J udaism is oot reliJious, deipite the "aristocracy of priests Of leaders, who hua!;t of instructiom imparted direetly by God." Hi! charges are these: Firs!, all of the commands "are of the kind which. political organi1lltion can insist upon and lay down as coercive laws, since: they relale merely to enema! aas." Kant does acrce that "the Ten Commandments are, to the eye of reason, valid as ethical commands. even had thCJ not been Jiven publicly . . ." (p. 116 ). His arpment here is thai the Ten Commandmcnb are directed to noq but OIlIer observance, and they make no requiremenu at all upoo the moral disposition. Second, Kant char&es thaI the rewards or punishments of (Oll(:Cm are limited to those "which can be allotted to all men in this world" (p. 111). He takes it that Judaism in iu pure form lack5 a belief in a future life and holds that lhis alone tak~ it 0111 of the category of religion since "no tel iaiOn ¢an be (Onccived of which

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involves 00 belief in a future life" (p, 117), Kant also adds that r.be rewards and p"oisbrnenU were DOl distributed ethically $inee tbey were 10 reach the posteril)' of the individual who 1001; pan in lbe deeds or mbdeeds. Kant's third point is based on the idea of a chosen people. A religion must include lIIe entile human race, and lIIe c:oncepl of a special people chosen exclusively by God is a IIOtion Ihal 'lhowed enmil)' roward all other peoples and which therefore C\IOked the enmil)' of alr (p. 117). Kant is careful 10 say lhal individual Jews may well frame $Orne sort of religious failh and combine it with Ibe legislation of Judaism. After tbese comments on !he status of J udaism. Kant tums 10 !he origin of Cbristianil)' as the beainnins of seneral church history. "Thus Cbrislianil)' IU'05C suddenly. though IIOt uppreplled f01', from Judaism' (p, 118). He traces the Oltistian narrative from Ibe poim at which the leacher of the goopel announced hilnKlf 10 be an am ...... 'OOr (rom heaven, throop the example of his own person of I genuinely good course of life, to his unmerited death. Olri.u's life is Ulken to be ' the archetype of a humanil)' alone pleasi", to God." He was able 10 say that "he ,"'QUId stilt be wilh his disciples cvcn 10 the end of the world' (Matthew XXVIII. 20) and by this Quist meant that the power of the memories of his teacIJin&. his eumple, and his real merit, would be with his disciples forcvcr. Kant sepatlte:s the Ouittlan narrative lnlo the public record of Olrisl', life, which ends with his death, and 'the more secret recon1s, added as a sequel, of his re5llrreetion and ascension, which took place before !he eyes only of his inlimales . . ," (p, 119). The fint, tbe publk record, can serve universally as an example of a worthy life, an enmple 10 be imitated Aboul the seael records of the resurrection, Kanl says thaI this "cannol be used in the interest of religion within the limiu of reason alone,' Kant holds lhal the only way 10 UIke these reamls 10 be of moral use is 10 do great violence to their historical value. This is

mentioned in passing. his more serious objectiOn is to what he

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caUs the concept of "the materialism of penonality" (p. 119). Kant lakes Ibis to be a concept that holds that a pcnonality ean exist only if it remaiN always in the same body. To this he opposes the hypllhesis of the spirituality of rational beings. the hypothesis that holds that the body ean remain de.d wlule the same penon continues 10 live. The conception of humanity a.s spiri t ~n1takes to be "more congenial to reason' for two rea5Ol15: (1) The impouihility of making comprehensible a matter which thinks, and (2) the material.ist requirement that • body be dragged along through elernity. Kant then turns to the requirement Ih.1 • hisloricaJ faith hll$ for a learned puhlie. Historical faith that ba$e$ i!$elf upon books needs for iU security. continuous tradition of scholanhip. He discusses the maner of the gap in scnotarship in the very first Christian ~neration. This question arises panicuiarly because Kant is COD5idering what effect !he teaching of Christianity had upon the morality of its .dherenu : the question of whether the very first believers were tbell15e]ves moral, 'or j~t people of • common run' (p. ]2 1). Kant makes the point that from the nap at whieb Ouistendom dcvelopc:d iu tradi tion of scho\ar$hip, we know 50Illething of tbe effed of the faitb on iu public. and he adds lIIat it "has served in 00 way tn recommend it on !he score of the magnifieelll dfed which ean jU$t1y be upeeted of. mom religion' (p. 121). Kant takes particular delight in remindina; us of the disunce from morality .t which believers have been found through the histOl)'. He notices tbat '&reat masses of people were rendered use ]eu to the world" by the a;lorification of tbe holiness of eehbacy, and tbe ueenes of Ill)'$tical fanaticism in the lives of henniu and monks. We are reminded that ' !he dreadful voiee of onbodoxy" appeared and divided the Christian world into embit· tered parties. Kant doesn't fail 10 note how ' the spiritual head ruled over and disciplined kings like children by means of a magic wand of his threatened excommunication' (p. 121), and how the: spiritual bead u ci ted tbe em""'" and other wars. He swns up these and other atrocities with the remark from Locrc:tius: "Such evil deeds could religion prompt!" He notes that none of these

Migion W"ulu"n rile Umiu of &a.sotI Alone

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faeu nor the truth of the remark of Lucretius obscures the fact thai the fint intention of Christianity was to introduce a pu.re religioU$ fai th, and this imention was diuupted and delayed by the evil propcnsitiC5 of hu man nalLITe. But the history in no way makes Kant lose his optimism about the Suoccss that Christianity is expected to have in foundina a universal world religion. Has the history of the church been a faU from a perfectly moral beginning. or a progress in il\CTCasing morality? For Kant the question is crucial, and his answer is dearly the second. He imists that the prescnt period is the best in "the enlire known history of the church" (p. 122). His optimism about the prescnt is based on the increasini deiTCC to which reason has freed itself from the weight of dogmatic faith. Kant takes it that reason is beginning to make clear the followilll tW'O principles.. Firtt, rile priJK:ipk of refJ.SOIIUbk modeJty in pronouncements abou t revelation. This means the ~ibility is recognized tl\.;lt a scriptLITe containing 50 much that is actually moral may be regarded as a genuinely divine rcvc:lllion. It is also taken to be possible, al least possihle, that a suocessful union of people into ODC true rel igion can only be brou&ht about wit h a holy book and a foundation of an ecclesiastical faith. "Hence, the most intelligent and reasonable thing to do is from now on to usc the book already at hand as the basis for ecclesiastical instruction and not lessen its value through use less or mischievous attach, yet meanwhile 001 forcin& belief in it as a requisile to y.lvation upon any man" (p. 123). 'The second principle is this: Sioce the ~(Jed narrative is used only for "the vivid presentation of in true object (virtue striving toward holiness)." Kant insists that this nt:lmIti'I>r mwt alway! M umgIu tmd ~ ill rhe im~ of morolily. It must be regularly ln$isted upon and repeated "that true religion is 10 consist not in the knowing or considering of whal God docs or has done for our salvation, bu t in what we must do 10 become worthy of il" (p. 123). Kant adds here, and whenever an nee"ion arises, that what we must do to become worthy an only be something that possesses in itself dear and absolute moral worth, and lherefore Ihis is WffiCthing aboo l whlch ",·e aD be

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certain "without any seripturai learning wruuever" (po 123). Kant insists that political rulers must neve r hi nder these two principles of reason from becoming pIlblic:. The principles are modeJ.ry and moraliry. A propell$iry !O sink !O a pusive belief is wpp5entiaUy wants 10 work upon himself or herself. In the iCCOod variety, "115 an addreM, he supposes this supreme being 10 be present in penon." Kaot adds, dryly, complete sincerity cannot be found in the latter, verbal, prayer. To illustrate the point about the !;incerity in vermu prayer, Kant challenges us to imagine a pious and well·meaning man. "Who someooe else takes unawares. I will not say in praying aloud, bul merely in behavior iodicative of prayer. Everyone will ... expect a man thus surprised to raU inlo confusion or embamwment 115 though in a situation whereof he should be ashamed" (p. 183). Why should web a penon be ashamed? Presumably became someone caUghl talking aloud to him is llIspeeted of a slight attack of madness., for behaving while alone in a way that we would ClIpec:t only if someone else were with Ihal person. Kanl insists that the tcacher of Ihe gospel has expresscd the spirit of prayer "mosl admirably in a formula whicb bas al once rendered dispensable not only all this bill also Ihe prayer itself as a verbal utterance" (p. 183). We must 00\ request something that God in divine wisdom might refuse us., but only a wish "10 become a man well pleasing to God." How abom the wish for the means of sustaininll. our existence-·for bread? The prayer for da ily bread is a prayer for an animal n.eed nllher than a distinc:tly human wish. Kant holds that the distinc:tly human wish would be for bread for anolher day. BUI his objection involves the Idea Ihal lhe petition for daily bread is addr~d 10 someone else. "It is funher not only a preposterOUS but also a presumptuOUS illusion to try to

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divine whether Ihrough the persistent importunity of one', requcsL God cannot be divened (to our present advantage) from the plan of his wisdom. Hence, we cannot hold that any prayer which is for a oon·moral object is lure to be heard .. : (p. 184). Kant generaJiz... that any prayer for III object that is possible only through supernatural influence, for something whose OC'aIrTence wouJd DOt trouble us to make our own efforts, is outside of the area in which we can pray. "I t follows that a gih of miracles ... taken literally, is not to be thought or (p. 184). What of the mere paMive contemplation of the profound wisdom of the divine creator? To this Kant responds that such contemplation would simply "U'lIIIIipon the mind into that thinking mood ealled adoration, annihilating men. as it were. in their own eyes" (p. 1&5). Kant does bold that set fonns of prayer fot children are of moral use. Children still stand in need of the leller. and 10 in their earliest yean they must be given the proper language In which to speak inwardly and make the allempt to allune the mind to the idea of God. But it muSI be made dear that the words being U&td are oot an aid to the imagination. The actual urvice of God "never consislll io mere feelings" (I'. 186). 1. Cbun:b-Goln" This is aUo presented [n Iwt) separale waY'. If formalitics are required thai might lead to idolatry. or "sensuous then the panem is contrary to the representations of command of rell5On. Here. interestingly enough. Kant takes a command of reason 10 be, Ibou $hal t 001 make unto thee any 4. graven illlll3e... : He makes the reference to Exodus without any comment ... all about the effect that this hu had on the ceremon.ial paltelll5 of Judaism. Kant's main point under Ihis heading is that church·going is a duty for the group. when it is thought of as a ceremonial public service of God. ' Public prayer is indeed no means of grace; yet it is • moral ceremony ... embracing aU the moral concerm of men" (p. 1&5). He COIltrasu puhlic prayers with privale prayen and finds that the mor:al benefit is found in the public pattern. The public ceremony repreltnting the ,HUOn of all people in a common desire for the Kingdom of

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God, "cannot be: accomplished more appropriately than by speaking to the head of the Kingdom just as thoop he were sped.ally present in tbat vel)' place" (p, 185), Public: prayer can "raise the feelings to the point or moral eultalion , , , and possess a more rational basis than does private prayer for clothi", the moral wish, ....hich constitutes the spirit of prayer, in a formal mode of address," Kant adds quickly tbat this is done ",of,IlOW piaurins Ihc Supreme Being as present, yel he bas also said in lbe remark just quoted above, lhal this may be done, "as lhoop he were present." 3. s.pU. ., "Ibis a ims at something holy (the development of a man inlo a cilizen in a divine state) but the Ict performed by othen is not in itself holy or productive of holiness." llIerefoce, Kanl takes an initiation ceremony 10 be highly significant for an individual .... ho "is in a pCIIition, hinuelf, to confess his faith,' or "upon the wimcw>e who pledge themselves 10 take care of his eduClilion," yet il is no means of grace by it5elf, The aSPJmption thai il can ....ash away si ns Kant calls "an allllOil more Ihan heathenish supentition" (p. 187), ... Co_aalo.. Here apin Kant holds that ....e have I significant ceremony, provided that we do nol assert "that God bas attached special f'V(ln to the celebration of this solemnity: '"IlIc formality of I common partaking of the same table. contains witbin itself something great, expanding the narrow, selfish. and unsociable cast of mind among men, "-'pecially in matten of religion, loward lhe idea of a cosmopolitan moral community. It is I good means of enlivening a community to tbe moral dispo$ition of brotherly love which it represents" (pp, 187-88). There could hardly be a wanner endonement, yet he WIIns thai to think of it as more than a mere churchly act .... ould be: "a religious illusion ....hicb can do cooght hut work counter to the spirit of religion," Kant concludes these comments aoo...t the so-eaJled means of grace \\l tb a dcfinitiOll of dericalism in general It is the dominion of the dergy over people's beans, by arrogating to themsclves tbe prestige Ittached to exclusive possession of means of grace

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(p. 188).

or the three divine moral altrib\lIes, Iloline5$, mercy. and

justice. "man habitually turns directly to the second in o rder tl'lus 10 avoid the forbiddilli condition of conforming to the require· menu. of the fil'$t" (p. 188). "Man busies himself with every conceivable formality designed to indicate l'Iow gready he resp«U the divine commands, in ordc r thai it may not be ne«ssary for him to obey thcm." Kant concludes with Matthew VII. 2 1, where the human heing crics "L)rd, Lord: 50 as noI to l'Iavc 10 "do the will of his H eavenly Father." The Christian concept of Ihe chosen.. those wllo "in Iheir own opinion are extrMlrdinarily favored: is a concepl that Kant treau. with contempt. If we can know people by their fruits, be con· cludes that thU$ far .... e do DOl see that the chosen ones surpass in the very leut "the naUJrally bol\C$l man who (In be relied upon in lIOCial intercourse, in busincu, or in trouble; on Ihe coniraJ)'. taken as • whole, Ihe chosen ones can s.carcely .bide comparison with him, which PTm'eS thai the righl COUT$C Is not 10 go from grace 10 vinue. but rather to progress from virtue 10 pardoning grace." No religiOU$ mystic sland$ above "men of native honesty who . .. take religion unto themselves not as a 5ubstitute for but as a funheran.ce of the vinuous d~tion. which $I\0I0.'$ itself through actiollli in a good COUT$C of life" (p. 189). 1be reader who has completed this comme ntary chapter and desires a brief in!erpretation Is advised to tum to Chaple r E1eveo of this book, "1'he R eligiOU$ Question."

Part II APPLICATIONS OF REASON

Four

AMBIVALENCE: THE NATURE OF THE INDIVIDUAL This chapter, true 10 its subject, tends 10 II"IOYe toward IWO pis. One is the effort 10 generaliu on Kant's notion of the subli me and make some features of WI into the euential pallem of human OlIIUTe. The other is the development of a formal model for dassilyiog twenty~igbt differeot types of ambivalence. The coonection between these IwO goals is lIle view WI serious attention to Kant's tbeory of human ambivalence requ ires a logically acceptable set of models for ambivalence. The formal or logical material on ambivalence is preceded by ~eraJ sections presenting Kant's views on human happiness, the idea of ambiVllknee, the n.ature of ranalicbm, and the monist and dualist traditions. The form.al material on ambivalence is followed by a section on the history of the relations between Kanl's and olber views of hwnan nature, and a 1ICCti0n on the sourcn and implications of Kant's dua.listie model Finally, comments are given 0 0 the connections between ambivalence and hoocsty. I, HapploeJil

We have already seen that Kant's dualism applie5 to individuals, and we have already considered his rejection of individual happiocu lIS a foundation (or morality. These IwO elements will continue to be basic lIS we orpnize his conception of individual human nature. Kant'. ethical theory aa~e several arguments for the rejection of happine5S as a basis for morality.' Morality apart, the very idea of bappine5S has a strange complication. 10 addition to the more famil iar points. Kant holds that "the concept of happiness is 50

1pcal

Opposition roT

2

I A always rcjecu B

s

~ion

A never rejecu B

COl'ITRARIES

s

U

U

B

B

A

T

A L T

R

• R

N

N

L

•

SUBCONTRARIES A iOmelimu rejectS B

A sometimes

does nol reject B

•

J

..9 At the top left point of the 'Quare is a ~ ~ statement, and a' the top ri&J!t comer a ~ "'V;~, with the umc subject and predicate. At the \ower left corner is • pa1ficuIor affUrruuive, and at the lower ri&hl romer a particuItlr nqatm, with the same subjects and predicates as !he twO 1.II1iverwi 5Ulements. It will then be dj~red that the two diagona.ls. lines 1·3, and 24. connect pairs of Slatcmeol$ that arc contradictory. The back face of the eube-comcn 5, 6, 7, and S-Offcn four positioos involvina the aca:plin& of B.

Diagram 2 Squre of Psycbolo&leaJ Oppolltion lOr Ac«pnace

,

, A

A always accepts B ...

n~r

accepts B

CONTI&lc.' ctauUkatiolt (I) hope fo r success oOf means (2) hope (Of d iscovery of mea ns (3) hope for communication of JOOI Semantic CI..,Ukatknl ( I ) Type L h~ to mmIion (dusify or analyze) (2) Type n. hope toO bsow tnI1h-~ (3) Type ill Iwpe to kIww",erMa

Colllpo8od Hopes

r.xpnimtiDJ (I) Dialectical hope: that there ~ a prqnuu ic synlhesis ~tweell opJIO$Itd po$itions that are po$5Jble experiences.

(2) Second-order hope: a hope concerning a hope.

tTruISCMderuaJ (3) Antinomie hope: tha t reason ean give decisive solu tioll5 10 the antinomies (conflicu ~~ell positions thaI are nol po5Slble experiences). (") Second-ord er hope: that il is possible that something nol u nderstandable is possible.

2. The Pmiopposlilo ll of lporllace. Couldt!red Pnamllllclllly Within a p ragmatic oOrientatioOlI, an individ ual may know the goal being soua,llt. oOr DUly know the best means by which to ~lIch it, or may have various combinations of knowledge and ignorance about means and end$. I flnl consider a preliminary introduction 10 lhe malter, and lhen replace it with II more salisfactory and detailed formulation. In Table 2. K u .... ds for knowledge and G for ignorance (the firsl consonant of these words). llIe lISSum!'" tioOn is that one doe$ noOt hope fo r something known toO oeeuT, or known to be irnpouiblc: ignorance, IlOllmowledge is presupposed

for hope.

nIE LOGIC OF HOPE

186

TABLE 2

,mol

K

1. 2.

K

3.

G

•.

G

K G K

o

(hope is WperllUOllS) (hope for efficieDt D\eaIll;) (hope for desirable goal)

(hope is oon-uislcllI)

Table 2 shows four possible combinations of knowledge and ignorance with respeo:t to means and goals. For hope 10 exist there must be a combination of knowledge and ignorance. The subject. Q, bas to know either the goal 01' the means. Coll5ider case I in Table 2. If one knows both means and goal perfectly, there if. no atea for hope. As in the eump\c of Spinoza's conception of God, if an individual bas perfect knowledge of everytbina. can predi~1 evcl)1hing with ceru.inty, there is no meaning 10 the notion of a hope. Spioou:s God is hopelcs.s.. However, if our subject docs n01 know thaI he or me wan ts a particular goal (perhaps because it miglll prevent reaching another goal that is cared about). then sud! an individual doc. nol have perfect knowledgt of the goal mal is sought. CT, if a penon is leD than e.r.>~ in leTlll$ of symbols, but the proof iJJdf cannot be observed. i5 undent.andable. However, it is undeT5li1ndable exactly ill one may unduslilnd any distinction between phenomena and noumena. All reference to t"t!aJily it~1f, apan (rom what is a possible experience. is reference to noumena. The hope to prove a mathematical theorem Is a hope to produce symbols that arc objects in the world of experience. The colleague who claims to have a proof but cannot exhibit it is either shy or sly. The point of this digression into the matter of mathematical entities and proofs is to present the notion that ')'mbots themselves are perf«tly common obje"IC ~ muon cannot know why, "'C will dusify tbi!. U Type 3 ignorance. 1)pe 4 IporaRce: &stntiaJ iJlnorance of consequences. Enmplcs are OlSel where we know why something is \0 occur, but 'lOt ..'hUJ exactly it will be. Many questions of eonscquences are matte rs of fact or law. and we mayor may not be able to avoid Type 1 or Type 2 ignorance abol.1I them. Wc reservt: this foorth

'" type (or the ease in which, for

$OnU!

OIJIIUptuaJ

nO credil for lhal morally desirable lilualion. The average life-span of !he random individual has increased in the lasl two O one of 1.15 deKrves moral credit for that desirable progress in human dilnity. (Otber things being equal, Ihe longer life is tbe more dignified.) I assume: that in a few yean tbe d ignity of old age will be: improved by • luaranteed annual income: this aJso will be: an improvement in the: morality of the community. but DOt in the morality of the common perKIn. From the: standpoint of individual morality. 5ciellCC may be lrivial. bul with resped to the: morality of the: community. the level of 5cience: is Ii significant presupposition. As the: range of whal we can do increases, the range of what we ought to do can aoo increase:. 4. CoaclllsloJiS

In view o f his position on the antinomy and answen 10 these nine queslioll!, where ~ Kant leave the: common person?

~

Moml Antinomy

273

Mon.lly, no one can be trusted more than the ordilllU)' individual. However, th is is weak p!'aisc. Kant is pessimi.ti~ about indi~idual moraliry, while he is optimistic about humanity's moral progre"Ind ividuah mUSI uy to be moral, they do ul'ldcntand what is at ;55ue, and they can hope to make it; bul, as II mailer of fact, they will probably not do 50. However, their contentment can come in part from their participation in humanity's progress toward a perfectly just legal system. Kant'S idea of radical evil in all people prevents him from bein, romantic about any primitive goodness in the ordinary individual or about any golden age of moraliry before civilization. 11Ie ordilllU)' penon makes .erious errors; as an uample Kant mentiOllS tbat the rommon perwn regards the ceremonies of religion as the wbole of it. Yel, there arc "men of native honesry: and 00 elite, 00 clerics., et~~ can "surpass in the very least lhe naturally bonest man, who can be relied upon in 5O(ial intercourse, io business, or in trouble; 00 the rontraJ)', taken u a whole, the chosen ooes can scarcely abide romparison with him ......... Howev~r. no 5uch "naturally bonest man" can be trusted with political power. Thue tvr no m«rIllwotS, but none are needed for moral progress IO'Nard the ethical commonwealth. 11'Iere are abo no ab$olute moral villains: the distinction between person and thing is always primary and must be respected, and anyone can hope 10 become a new person. morally. On moral malleB, U on everything el!IC, Kant is a dualist. lberefore, when moral ilSllcs arise, they are to be roI1$idered from tv..., di$tinct vicv.-points: the individual and humanity. What is desired by one is nol JIC' .... ssarily desired by tbe other. 1 have shown bow Kant handlcs this ",ithout rontradiction. While he doeso't state the moral aotinomy 11$ it is put in the fint KClion of this ~hapter, he provides all the materials. The moral judgment mUSI have I/~ form of the thesis. The judgment'S motive and machinery ha$ 10 lie rompletely within the individual. There is II ptnOflaJ dury 10 respect the idea of law, the categorical impcnllive. However, the effective ronlent or the moral judgment expresses the vieu.'POint or humanity. Kant 'S work on history, religion, and

274

11-IE MORAL ANTINOMY

law gives details of thaI ronteDt. TI!e IWO sid« of tbe antinomy may be taken as answers 10 different questions. TIle the5i5 is the response to. "What is the $OUrce of moral commandsr Tlie antithesis is Kant', :uuwer 10. "If we are 10 understand moral hislOry. wbat purpose must we iI$SIlmc?" Autonomy is nfccnry but 1'101 sufficient for morality. What are the religiOO5 ronsequences of the moral antinomy? TIle antioomy iuelf requires absolutely no re ligiow assumptioll5 because it is. moral problem and, therefore, prcsuppmcs o nly the properties of reason and of human nalllTe. H owever, we an raise the religious question, and raise ;1 in two vcl'$.iol1$. From the individual viewpoint the question is. What can I hope? From the rol lectivc viewpoint is the paralle~ What can humanity hope for? The problem of individual hope wu considered in Cbaplcr Eight aboYe, in Kant', 1101;00 of reasonable hope. O\Ir new question about colicC'livc hope 5CCms a grammatical error, a misuse of languasc, when we fint come upon il. AI any ralc, nol • Kantian

question. B UI, the argument of Ihis chapter should have penuadcd the ruder that moraJiI)' i5 both social and individual, for Kant. The antithesis in the moral antinomy is quite as Kantian as !he: theMs.

The q ue5110n of rea.son.able hope ari5el only for an entil)' that is morally worthy of ou.uide or additional (()Operation. TIlat que51ion i5 just as reasonahle or unreasonable with Te5pect 10 one entil)' as ano!he:r, if thaI entil)' can fulfill the requiremenu of the definitions of hope and wonhiDeY. Can humanil)'. rollective!y, 5alidy the5e requirements? Thili chapter dealt with humanity's moral ch.aracter, while the I'\e.1t ronsiden some of its hopes., those embedded in religion.

Eleven

THE RELIGIOUS QUESTION: THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION AS THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY Several distinctive ideas- are pre5ent in Kant's view of relipon: the e!hical eommol1\\-ealth, the nature of m)'$tery and i&noranc:e, the requirement of moral worthintss. and lhe limi15 of hope. The problem remains of combining the5e four, and connecting them with the eXlensions that have been dcvcloped in the iotl:ic of ambivalence, of ignorance, and of hope. This chapter will prnenl the view !hat Kant's philosophy of history is the framework. that COnntcts and rel.atC$ them. Some previous emp~ will have to be repeated Of wmmariud. I . The Ethical CommonWHllh

The history of humanity, collectively, may be taken as an effort to produce a perfectly ethical commoowealth. Where pre\~om writers concern themselves wilh the lalvation of individual~. we find Kant adding to this objective the additional goal of humanity's rationality. The connection between rat ionality and morality. beN.een reason and the kingdom of ends, has already been argued in Kant's ethical "'Ork.' To take this notion of an elhical common....ealth seriously "'e have to comlder the familiar and yet elusive notion of IwnUVIity. Does humanity have reality; is there such an entity? (Does humanity have a soul7 to put the iuue in the language of a distinguished tradition.) Is humanity a proper subject for value judgmen15 and ethical discriminations? Kant's altitude on the status of humanity may be found in many place$, perhaps TI1O!It dramatically in his Introduction. /o~. [n thaI work he added a fourth question to the famous three questions

TIm REUG IOUS QUESTION

276

this book opened. 'Those three "" crc said 10 cbaracleriu the subject of philosophy: What M'' ' llis/cry. Individuals ~nicipale in Ihis hi$tury, some time$ with and

Klmerime without enth\W:wrI or awarene:lS.. Hoy.ever, Kant's philosophy of hi$tOIy makes it essential to conside r separately the idea of the individual's behavior and the idea of humanity's status. Cbapter Ten has put the issue in Kant's _" teons: humanity is an Q))C rimental entity for him that has as mueh reality as a ny other object of experience. One observes (finds) it historically, over time, and OOlIStruCU the restlltant ronceplion, like Ilny othe r experimental concept. Humanity C',moot be observed in one ,lance, bul neither rould Nonh Ameria until quite recently. 11 canliOl be explained in terms of what human beings do at just one moment of time; nor can the slope of a curve be explained in terms of jtut one point on a graph. Humanity can be given it modest nominalistic definition: the entity that has as pans all human beinp; past. present. and future. 1lIe parts need not be present simultaneOUSly to define one entity: the lIO'Ies of a single piece of music are ordinarily spread fTVer rime. Suppose we grant

The Religious Religious Question Question The

277 277

that humanity humanity can can be be an an experimental experimental object; object; what what do do our our observaobservathat tions and and analysis analysis tell tell about about it? it? tions Kant reads reads the the history history of of civilization civilization as as aa pattern pattern in in which which Kant humanity gradually gradually becomes becomes more more rational. rational. To To be be rational rational is is to to humanity have the the same same set set of of consistent consistent laws laws govern govern the the entire entire universe universe of of have discourse. This This means means that that as as humanity humanity becomes becomes more more rutionul^ discourse. rational, more parts parts of of humanity humanity are are governed governed by by the the same same set set of of laws. laws. more When these these laws laws are are also also self-imposed, self-imposed, we we can can say say that that humanity humanity When becomes more more moral. moraL becomes From Kant's Kant's viewpoint, viewpoint, the the history history of of politics politics and and the the history history of of From reUgion are are converging. converging. They They converge converge on on one one special special area: area: the the religion problem of of peace. peace. They They are are never never to to be be identical identical as as long long as as one, one, problem politics, is is based based on on external external compulsion, compulsion, and and the the other, other, religion, religion, politics, internal compulsion. compulsion. F For the one, one, the the differences differences between between on internal on or the peoples are are emphasized; emphasized; for for the the other, other, the the essential essential moral moral peoples similarity between between them them is is stressed. stressed. For For some some purposes it is is most most purposes it similarity efficient to to consider consider the the differences, differences, for for some some others, others, the the similarisimilariefficient ties. Therefore, Therefore, politics pohtics and and religion religion have have separate separate scopes. scopes. But, But, ties. whatever our our political political circumstances, circumstances, no one of can avoid the no one of us us can avoid the whatever religious duty to work ethical commonwealth. commonwealth. religious duty to work for for an an ethical The duty duty to for an ethical commonwealth on The to work work for an ethical commonwealth is is unique unique on several collective several counts. counts. First, First, such such aa commonwealth commonwealth would would be be aa collective not status not aa distributive distributive achievement. achievement. It It gives gives rise rise to to the the strange strange status than of of aa collective collective duty. duty. Second, Second, it it is is aa matter matter of of hope hope rather rather than ordinary ordinary moral moral obligation obligation for for the the individual. individual. Each Each of of. these these is is worth Kant's are the the center center of of Kant's worth textual textual reference: reference: together together they they are position. position. We We may may find find the the first first property property in in Kant's Kant's view view that that with with the generis, the Ethical Ethical Commonwealth Commonwealth "we "we have have aa duty duty which which is is sui sui generis, not not of of men men toward toward men, men, but but of of the the human human race race toward toward itself." itself." Certainly one of philosophy. Certainly ·one of the the unique unique positions positions in in the the history history of of philosophy. He He turns turns to to the the second second property: property: For For the the species species of of rational rational beings beings is is objectively, objectively, in in the the idea idea of of reason, reason, destined destined for for aa social social goal, goal, namely, namely, the the promotion promotion of of the the highest highest as as aa social social good. good. But But because because the the highest highest moral moral good good cannot cannot he be achieved achieved merely merely by by the the .exertions exertions of of the the single single individual individual toward toward his his own own moral moralperfection, perfection, but but requires requires rather . . the rather aa union union of of such such individuals individuals into into aa whole whole toward toward the the same same goal goal .... the

278

ruE REUGIOUS QUESTION

idoa 01 IUd. ....... .. ;. .. idea

..,.,plelt11 disI"'*""d ,."'"

all 111"0'.01 II .... (wbido ......... wt..I_~ 10 lie ill ___ pootu); ~ it ~ --kiIIc 1-...1. wboIe nprdiat whldo _ do _ ~ 1>het1let. ulUdo, it 1ia. .. ow _ .,.. - . Hcals ' or ~ ..-ilk \lft/'C1c~li", pel'K'o'e'lIOU. Indeed, ........... dilly . do ....."" III>oricy, ..... IIoc f'l'e.do ~. /"",...1 c(dv HiIWy IlN 0.;,;.. '" MOIUd

297 S. D. hul SII)det, II""'" LafIc _ III AppIicMotu 1 _ , rn~ My CIlIph·;' 12. lINd. [4~

CNJ."".

~ ~1ittfitM 1t'ilJWo/lv

l..int/a a(~A_, 11..... n, >14. _

17. II>i4. P. LI. 1I>i4~ P.

P. 130. lJ(l.

m.

19. 1bId.

20. OiriqW '" 1\ .. ';';0>1 Rt.owIo . 1141).

21. 0iIi'f"I 0( " - _ . A... My o..,pboooio.. 2l. See . , "M. d.e ......ia .... &pcr._&! &ic_: I'IoilolDp I;' millie., ~l (1968):1-10.

M._

NOTES

300

I•

. "' -... .. A 11m,,'

lOud "• WiIliaaJ _ _ nOlo.') _. "'

...J~(N ,. 'r--v COO'

York: HtolI)' HoII, 18\10), Vol. 2,,. 5#1. 1. ' Idea far • UoMna! Hiuory &.. • rem I'cint of V ...; Kaal, OR Hiswty, cd.. LewioI W. IIeck (N.... York; Toe IIobbo·M.rrID 1963).

1""'"

eo..

d TIoeaio..

~,

}. lI>iJ., ~. IINI~

r.ru. ne.i&.

r.ru. '""'""' _

iu

Kaat, 1WitJoti4. P. 9l. II. Kaal, omq.., of tr ..... J. H. Bcraard (N." York: lIal..... Pub/i,hi.,. Co.. l'HI)' p. :lSl. 11. IINI. P. 282. U FOIl • differeAI -.I ..oK """,pie •• UlIdy 01 Ku!'I .;e.. 01 dutiello ( . •If, _ .... """t of JoIur, Atwell. _«"-I ....... bt4I ... ,.",,, -~\ - ." lot 1GoIlf~ At""" ~ (DoI. TIIaio.

,. "". 21.

1'U"'''2'~. [l69~

2:IL. 11Iid. [366].. 29. ibid. lO. ,.,..IkM~, [1631. ll. R~, P. \110.

301

I.

A_.

Iloe

-r

oipif_ oIOIdia

lID
i4. K4I!I. 0. HiJl<Jty, P. 59. A poIM

a..a..w;.,..

-.d1U~.

2S."ldeo !or. UIIi¥e..... H"""," P. U

Jr....,.,.

.e, dcYdoped ill SCm""" "",,,,,-

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Kut, ' ..... ........ ~o(l'IDc~, tr. Nand ... K. SIIlilh. New Yult: 51. Marti.'& Prao, 19211.

_ ,

~

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·1uI IUcat, If. Ln;s W. Beet.. New Vak: 1k Li>eraI

-. ow,... of'.........,. If. J. RIIenud. New York: fbfoer

l'ubh~in.

Co..

~,.

_, ~ MdWo "" UmiIJ of RuMJtt..u.:-, If. ""'" H. "...... New Y, If.........ud( Z ...... o.iqt ,

,..., u-:-.:... 01 Chi10./>: ' , , _

~

s.ne.

7

_ . 'No Old Queoliooo P oked .......·;.,

cd. l.eooio W. IIeIofiuI &1£& di, 15:1 (196'), pp. toS-lI6. _ _

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us". !,_. of 'Sd!i",., ',' ",'!.Moo_'

11-"....., Go '") • 1'-.rd I ",..,.,.

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D. J

"C

Re· .. 'cu·

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Bcd, J..eo,W. W. A C. ''''' " ... XMrl~ 0"7" "'I\*"'*'~. 0; i ' ol° ' an ........ 1960.

U~

w.

!In:oIdj.., K... E. Ccttf/IcI Mill DIoild'!r'i " s.......su.aadCa.l90C8. ,10)', ud

tcro.cr. It"' .. ."".,.".. 01 FaiIk' TM 0IrisMrI

Sr~.r

... . 7:1

aad ....

_

(Sprio&

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So" )

II,

~

Scl.fid

:

....