The Life of Irony and the Ethics of Belief (S U N Y Series in Philosophy)

David Wisdo

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The Life of Jrony and the Ethics of Belief

SUNY Serie, in Philosophy George R. lucas, Jr., editor

The

Life of Irony and the

Ethics of Belief

David Wisdo

STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK PRESS

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Wiodo, Dovid. 1957_ 1M lile of irony and the ethica 01 belief I Dnid Wiodo. p. em. _(SUNYsm.. 1n ~y) Include. bihli.... phical re/e",ncCI and inS to ju.tify theu beliefs to othe,." but is ruher a matter of cuilivatin& what he calls the vinue of self-tru&! . The ideal of-Man"Th.inkin& ~ for inslance, which he anicuiuca in his wellknown address ~ The American Scholar, ~ provides US with a p.aradigm of the kind of pcn.on for whom inquiry is a malterof lubj.ectiv.: reOection, a IDalter of the hean . This does not mean, of course, that ""If-tru.u isan ideal 111.11 excludes any reference 10 intellectual accountability. On the conuary, Emerson's ideal of - Man Thinkin&wponrayed in nThe American Scholar" is akin to Friedrich Nieuscbe's " free spirits" whose vocation demands the almost impossible abililY to ~Jance self-trust with an austere suspicion of themsel""s and theu beliefs:

s.t./f-1hwllndtheEthicsoj!Wie! I 3 LanK he muS! Stammer in his Spttclli often forgo th~ livin,g for the d~ad_ Worse yet, he muSt aC«'Pt-how often! poverty and solitude_ fur the case and pleasure of treading the old road, acceptin,g the fUIDol15, the educltion, the reliKiOfl of society, he takes the c ross of making his own, and, of OOUI'Se, the selfaccusatioo, the f.int hean , the frcqueot uocertaimy and IllMof time which are the neltles and tanKlin,g vines in the way of the self-relying nd KIf..:lirected_ , . .3 Self·trust then does not ncccs.sarily e mail a blind dogmatism or a stubborn refus;alto usess critically onn way of life. Quite the OOIllTary, there is a sense in which th~ vinue of Klf-trust is baMd on an unoonditional desire for truthfulness and a willinp!ess to sacrifice security for, life of discovery. In shon, self-trust should OOt be confused with intellectual com placency. It is, rather, I demandin,g task pursued in solitude: Hin silence, in steadiness, in severe abstraction, 1~ 1 him hold by himself, add ob$erwtion ro obserwtion, patient of neKle1 that informs the work of Ludwig Wiltgenstein, who want. to rethink the ethics of belief in such I way as to • ..,id the problenn r:ai5ed by tr:adilionai formulations of the issue. Much, of roune, has been written about Wittgcnstein'J; views oa religion and it would be impossible to do justicc to aU of the controver· sial issues r:aised by his work.. My focul will be much more narrow and will inVl)I-..e the simple thesis that relipous beliefs should not be con· strued as i"-llued claims but r:ather as holistic interpretations about the meaning of life that enable us to make sense of our emotionl and desires as well as our utirudes about suffering and dellh. Although il might appear 10 make linle difference whether we view a peQOtl'J; n:ligious convict ions as in..,lving ccrtain judgments about the meanina: ofliu, there an: important consequences in construing re· ligious beliefs in this fashion. For eumple, it is impossible toassesl such life·views in any ilr:aightlorwatd way with respect 10 their Mplam truth~ because ow pr:actical deliber:ations about life's meaning are, as David Wigsins claims, #cognitiYely undenktennined. ~I Thi. n(>tion of Kcogni· ti-..e undetd~termin.ationP is important because it suggests that our views about the meanina: of life differ in at least one imponant ~spect from SCientific thCQrieo . In short, altho""" our judgment' about life'J; meanina: in..,l-..e an attempt to make sense of certain - existent ial data H such IS l~, suffering, and death, we do not expect our jucl&mcoll about the meanin3 of life w con-..efIC in the .... me wly that we expect OUr !!Cien· tifie theories to oonYerge. In other words, Wigginl's ICCQUnl 'uggests thlt it is l imply a mutake to suppose that there might be. 5ina:Je in· tCIpretation of life that is Mlrue" by virtue of the way the world i•. In the end then."..,o tho""" discussion abou l the question of the meaninl of life has become Wlwhionable in lIQrne philOSOphical and theolOSin " in On Emmon, cd. Edwin Cady and Loui s Budd (DurMm: Duke Uni¥l:'rsity Press, 1988), pp. 43-61. The best discussion of Emerson's pragmatism is Cornel West 's "The Eme rIOnian Prehistory of American Pragmat ism," in Tbe AmlltiClph W"ldo Emerson, p. 81. 7. For an excellent d iscussion 01 the im~t of Locke's epistemological pwia:t on the religious thou&iJt of his day, sec John W. Yoiton, loon l.cJckIl and thll Way of Ideas (Oxford: Oxford Uni~iry Press, 19$6).

8. See David Wiggins, "Truth, Invemionand the Mea.ningof Life, H in Nud&, ValullS. TI-uth (Oxford: Basil Blacltwell, 1987), pp . 87- 137. 9. Recently, h~t, IIOme philosoph.,.,. have expn:ssed. renewed interest in this topic. s.c." for example, Oswald tu.nfling. Tbll QU .... I for Mu minx 10rl0rd: Boil Blackwell, 1988)i John ~ke$, The EX(1min~d Lif~ (lewisburx: Buclmell University Press, 1988)i and Roben Noziclr., The Ex"milled Life: Philosophic.al Muii lf impartial CIlUn can be taken t() task lot g<JVImling !heir beliefs in an inesPQllsible fash ion_The problem is !hat CVl:n thoogh there are good reasons to grail! that there is an e!hies of belief, such traditionalutempu to anicubte this iuue as an epi!ltemological concern often fail to do justice 10 tbe question by QYCrl{)()king the utent to which the ethics of belief is priTrulriiy a question of personal knowledge . The lK:arch for a reliable and impartial way of adjudicating competing knowledge claim s begins wi!h the worries expressed by Rent Desc:artes in his semi-autobiogr:ophical treatise, V "$COO/Se on M~ thod r1637). In ffPart One of !he Visrou,u Oescart~ mn.., !he intere~tiI\& and importan t claim that reuon is a human catw:ity !hat all people share. Unlike some philosophcn who sometimu !!Cern to sug,gest that ru!IQn and intelligt!llce are the prized posscssions of a privileged few, Oescanea expresses confidence thn eY'CryoDe is ~apable of !hinking for themselVl:s. But if !his is true, wonders Descartes, why isit the caJetha! different people come to different conclusions about the same issues11n other words, once we accept an egalitarian view of reason, w.: mu~t first account for !he fact !hat people hold a wide v:arietyof opinions Concerning rcUpon, mo.-ality, md scicnce and !hen tf)' to adjudicate at1lOll3 the competing claims by fonnulating SOIDC way tOdi$C()Vl:f the truth of !he matter. Iu w.: read through the Visoo"""', it soon ~om"" clear that 0ce 10 thOle voiced by [kscartes in the DiS«!.me. Consi&r, iorill$tance, the followilll pau.age in which Locke e:lpTeSKS hi. frostration as he rN:all. one: particularew:ningof con~rsation with his friends: Were it lit to trouble thee with the History of this buy, I should leU thee thaI fi~ or six friends meeting al my Chamber, and discOUlSinI; on a Subject very remote from this, found them· ..,1 .... quickly al a stand, by the Difficulties thaI rose on every side. After we had, while puzzled our selves, withOUI CQming any nearer I Resolution 0/ those doubt s which ""rplned us, it came into myTboughu, that we took a wrong course, and that belore we sel ow selves upon Enquiries of thaI NuW'e , il wu necessary to examine ourQWn AbililiCll, a nd see, what Ob;ecu our Undcl$landilllS were, Or were nOI filled 10 dcal with.'11 AccordiT13 10 this p,ssa,e, Ihe type 0/ dilemma that motivates the entire project of the &wy Can be .""lled OUI in ICI1WI 0/ Ihe iroJullion we lui when the eXpectations thaI Iud us to enga~ in deb.lle and aJKU· menl fail 10 yield knowledge. In order 10 high1i&J>1 th" problem, we mi&J>t be&in by noting the ~lll5sumption that prople who enpge in inquiry and &~te do 110 because tht make the man: up. timislic and perhaps more problenutic assumption that knowledge is poMible and therefme I reuonablepl for human beinp 10 punue. BUI if we grant thelC IWO rather commonplace assumpliona, Ihen the IYJlC 0/ frustration that Locke ~ ... ue. in the opening pa&es 01 the &Jay presenlll u, with a senuine di lemmo. For if we assume that knowledge is possible, and that human beinp who eoga", in conversatioo and argomem do 110 in order 10 acquire such knowledge, then we need lOtne explanation thai migln accounl for our failures 10 ..,alize this ,oal. The hope, as l.Qcke sees iI, is thaI such an .rlempllO discovcrlhe ..,asons for our fallures 10 acqui.., knowledg" might abo help us to identify lOme method or philOllOJlhicai thwry tha. could sol'll! the problem and ensure the possihilityot acquiring knowledge. When we lurn to the &.ay 10 QaIIlin e how Locke himself deals with this problem, it l1OOO becomcs clear thaI he of/en twO 'll!rydiflerem ways 01 answering this qut'Slioolbat appear 10 be comp;lIible on the sW'fa« but that ma,k an underlyins lension running Ihrou&J>OUI hi. work..

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The ElhiC$ of Bclicf tJnd PCl'$()nill Knowlrogc J

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In his mo~ optimistic momenu, Locke seems to suggest that the best way to bciliute inquiry and to realize the pI of knowled&e i. to discover !IOmc kind 01 neutral and reliable method that might enable us to reach this gosl. According to this type of approach, people who sather in pXJd faith 10 pursue knowledge fail because they ha~ not undeluken the cueful and painstaking ..... lysis of knowlmge and hLlllU.n understanding that Locke himself offers throughout the Enay. At times Locke Ippean eoofident that if we can manage to giYe I tholougbgoingaccount 01 understandiJt& we can resl a$SurN that OUr inquiries will yield nOl blind opinion or prejudice, but true knowledge. Locke's projecl therefore il motivated both by his concern OYer what often appears to be the intractable natwe of moral and religious deb.1te and by the hope thltl neutral epistemological framework mighl ensun: the possibility for settling such disagreements . In recent )'I:atS, the sillnilicanc:c 01 this hnd of attempt to c~a te a framework for the arbitration of moral and religious disagreement !u.s been explored and criticiud by sew:rallbink era, moslnotably A1.5dair MaclnlyreandJeffrey Sl ou t_11 i.t illuminating to note, for eumple, the similarity between Locke .. approach to the ethic& 01 belief and thc account 01 righu criticized by Alasdlir Macintyre in his well-known study Alrer Virtue." According to Mlclntytt, the bisloryol moral thought since the Enlightenment can be cruracterized in tenns of the el"Ollion and fragmentation 01 our moral language and OUr increasing inability 10 settle mor-Ii questions. Although a deu.ilm discussion 01 Macintyre's subtle diagnosis 01 the present age is beyond the scope of this essay, il seems cle.r thai he sees the language of ri&hu and utility as ways of dealing with this prohlem. Macintyre suggestS that when the moral language of a tradition has deteriorated, the arbitration of conllictin,g moral claims will depend on our ability to di$COVO:r some way to weigh and eval uate them, a= if it in'o'OI"". the creation of w!u.t he would call a moral fiction. Aaording to Maclntytt, the appeal to the notions al "ri&hts" or ~u tilily, which emerges as a response to this kind of problem, i5 iust such an attem pt to diSCl1Ver • neutral epistemological framework for the arbitration of moral connict. Those bmiliar with Macintyre's work are weI! aware that he is rather pessimistic about these post-Enlightenmeot devdapments io moral thousht. As his ClItended critique 01 the work al lahn RawlsdemOIllItratCS, Macintyre himself has serious reservations concerning this ~solutionH to the problem 01 mow conflicI and suggCSts that )lOSt·EnIightenment moral theories are at best unsuccessful attemp ... 10 cope with a rather desperate predicament ." The point I wish to make, boweYeI, is that Macintyre's analysis 01 the motivations thai underli~ the appeal 10 such theories can help us better undentand the concerns ClIpressed by Locke in the Essay. More specifically. Locke's attempl to H

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The Efhic;s 0/ Belief 'II

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Ethit;J of Bfiief and Pmonal KnowlMgt I 27

terize thd . own ~n5O' of spiritual Wlun: in the~ terms, _ midtt begin by asking whether they n:llly understand the li811ificanoe of such Christian concepts as sin and &&Ivation. In the Nln troduetory Aphorisms u at the beginni", of the Aids 10 R4Iu'ion, Q.,leridge indicates Wt this is exactly the kind of concern that underlies his project. In the ""ry fint aphorism, he notu that Ihe pu.pose of this wo.k is 10 rescue truth from ne&iect by elueidnillJll and darifyillJll thO$e conccpts that many take ror granted: In philOSQphy equally as in pOetry, it i8 the highest and mO$t

u5O'ful prerogati"" of genius to produ ce the strongest impres· sions of novelry, while it n:scues admined tru ths from the ne· glect caused by the very circullUtance of thei r univusa.l admission. utremcs Ulttt. Truths, of all othen the mO$t awclul and interesting, arc 100 Men considen:d 00 true, Ihat Ihey lose: all power of truth, and lie bcd·ridden in Ihe dormiwry of th e soul, 5ide by side with the most despised and exploded errors. l1 Once apin il is difficuh to retiSl the lemptation of compUing Ihe con· cerns expn:ssed hen: by Coleridge with those voiced o""r and OYer again by hi. Danish contemporary Son:n Kierkcpard. As aln:ady mentioned, Coleridge sh...,. Kierkcgu nh belief thaI a person's religious convic· tions presuppo!lC' certain n:ligio,,, intuc,u and concerns, such as.n in· terest in an eternal happin ess, and that if one docs IXIt already ha"" thes.e inten:sts, it is not likely one will acquin: them as the ICliUII of argument OI dcmonsunion.. Thuc an: .imply no epistemologically neutra.! w nsid· el1ltions wt might bring a person 10 graD! Ihe imponance and signifi· cance of Christian concepts such as sin and n:demption. However. both Coleridge and Kierkc&nrcl acknowledge and endorse the imponance ri cleanns away the obstacles thaI might prevenl a person from wlutt Kierltcaaard would call the "suhireti"" appropriationff of these notions. In particular, both thinkers are esped ally concerned with the way Christian Cl)ncepuio5e then meaning and si811ificanee ror people when it is assumed that they an: universally aeoepted and taken ror gran ted . The taBk then iii not 10 develop a new type of Christian epi •• emology, bu. r.ther to explon: new ways of anicuiatil1l the dynami CJI of n:ligious undemanding; so as to faeili llle the appropriation of these tnUIloC, if we accept Coleridge's approach and "ant the importance thl! penonal considerations haw: io theac:tivityof giving~alK>lls, we should nOt be surprised whcn peofIle eilher do 001 understand each OIher o. fail to Icknowledge the relevaoce of each other's re.son •. In shan, there are limits tOalJUmenl, and there is no reason 10expeci thai Ihe ~uons I offer 10 defend my view. on ",ligion or moraHry will be ICceptable 10 everyone. Such an impossible idcal is based 011 the Lockean d",1Ol of an epistemological ulopi. in which our con""IKtion panneD h."" been "urged of aU Iheir panicul .. and subjecti"" inteTeSU. Locke's

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assumption is W t it is precisely luch particular and subjectiw: interests that make truth-seeJtins impossible. Hillu'picion is th.u once we granl the legitimacy of personal reuom, it bee sham Macintyre's suggestion that «Incepts sl.lch as Hri&hI5 and HUlility " an: merely conceptuaJ fictiona intended to milk the erosion of our monl language. An ahemative verdiCt on the dew:lopmenl and value of moral philosophy since the En!iJllterunent has been provided by jeffrey StOUt wboaJ&uea Ih,t the SttUlam.alion of public disc:ourse should be riewed a. a respooK to growin& lenaions amOD& C(>mpetin& reJ.isioul groups. AoJu and the T.actaUl$ in which he ill5iSts Wt religious belief is not a maner of fact. It is important co note, bowe~r, that he no 10nger $uPJX)ns this CQncention by appu.ling to the distinction between l.clI and value as he did in the earticlwu,k. Soe""n thoush Wingcn5lein Ilill Wants to insist that disa~ments about religion are not diJacr~menu aOOulthe facu, be does not b.asethil cl.aim OIl whu he later.dmitlto be mi.tilin view, conccrn.in,g the essence of Ianp.a&e. The point, rather, which is milk moreuplic.il in me PhilawphiCQ] Inv~tjgar;onJ, is thli if there are such disagrc:c:ments, it is nor bcishtforward propositions concerning what isoris not the case, rel;,ioU$ beliefs are an expression of what lam es calls a ceruin way of reading or imerprecin,g the lacu. in Ihe 1l-acralUs WingensceiD anempu to ex· pfC1.S this kind of imuit ion aboul reli~s belief wheD be speaks of whit it meaDS to view Ihe WOTld as a limited whole. And aIth"""'- he later abandons this way of speakin&. he makes a similar point when he draws the anal<JgY betWttn religious beliefs and "pictur-ea H chat enable I person 10 order experience in this way. E~n al late IS 1947 we find that Witlgcnsccin continues IQcharaclcriu religious belief in th~ terms: It strikes me that a religious belief oould only be something like a paQionate trnmitmcnt CQ a system of rekrence. Hence, al thoush it's bt:1i£/, it's really I way f living. 0. a way QI a55Cssin,g

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The Ethic.s of Iklief and the Mcanjn8 of Life I

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life. It's passiolU.tely seizing hold 01 this interpretation. In nruction in a ~ligious laith, th erdore, would have 10 take the form 01 a portrayal, a description of that system 01 ~ference, while at the same tilIle being an appeal to conscience.' ~

Wittgenstcin's appeal to a "system of reference" admillwly sounds a bit flat·footed when laken oUi of COntext . The point he wishes to make, however, is a subtle one and mns through all of his writings 00 the sub· ject. ~ry simply, Willgenst ein, like William Jamcs, wanlS to remind WI that when we ~fleet on ~ligious belief, we must be wary of trealing it as jusl another kind of knowledge claim that can be reduced toa set of prop' ositions about Hthe facts." And )'I:t, he would also reject hi s own earlier view that consigns religious beliefs to a completely separate realm of value. The qucstion is whether there is a third alternative Ihat enables us to account for the strang B.

David Wiggins on the Meaning of wfe

In order to appreciale the significance of Witlgenstein's pnsition On these mattenl would like to appeal to the work of David Wiggi ns, whose eS&aY "Truth,inVt:lltion, and the Meaning nf Life"" can be invoked to de· fend Wiltgen!tein'!! laler insights on the Dam", of ",ligious belief. AI first glance such a claim may sound strange, given the fact tlul thi s artide be· gins as a critique of naive noncognitivism and raises the question of whether considel1ltions of truth should figure into our rcfitttioni on life's meaning. By the end of the article, h~T, il be.::omes clur tlul Wiggins believcs Ihere is a grain of truth in noncognilivism - at leasl with respect t o OUT judgment s abouttbe meaning of life-and that an ap· pe.ol 10 what he calls the "doctrine of cognitive undenielerm.ination~ can perlups grant uS the insights of nonoognit ivism without the liabilities. We can, I believe, appeal to Wiggins's discussion of these is· sues to show th.u in a similar fashion Ihe", is an impottant grain nf truth 10 be lound in Wittgenstein'!! later views on religion.

The ElhiQ: of Brlief and the Meaning of Life I 47 A. the di5cussion unfolds, it beromes increasingly clear that Wiggins's primary t~tget& ~te writers such as )ean-P,ml $.:It"e, R. M. Hare, and Richard Taylor, all of whom p1"OpO$C an e>:treme and unacceptable form of noncognitivism by arguing that value and meaning in Uk are simply the creation of the human will. fullowing the lead of Alben Camus, for enmpk, Richard Taylor invokes the myth of Sisypbusas the cla"ie enmplc of OUt human·all·too-human .ttuggle to find meaning in life. He notes that any attempt to view out lives from a distance, "tbe view from nowhere, H to borrow a phrase from Thomas Nagel, seems to highlight the poirnlessness of many of our activities. On the face of it, suggests Taylor, it is difficult to imagine any inlrinsic value in life 10 vin· dicate our hope that it mighl be inherently meaningful. Like Schor ""obauer, clearly the !!(IIrn:e of his inspiration in these mailers, Taylor seems to think that the activities thai cnmprise a human life are, On their own terms, pointless and arbitrary. Given this bleak and r~ther pes" simislic picture, Taylor concludes that if our lives are meaningful, it i. only by virtue of fundamental choiCfJ to invest them with meaning. For even though the point of Uk "is simply 10 be livin,g." we must reo member, condudesTaylOt, that "Ihe meaningol likis lrom within us, it is DOt best~ from witbout. Hll Although Wiggins idenlifies JlCOJlle such as Taylor as h" primary largeu, il i. dear thai his crilique of naive noncognilivism would be equally appliCllblc 10 Witlgenstein's early views on ethics and religion, especially with respecllo the views proposed in Ihe Notebooks and the nat/OfllS. Like Taylor, whOM view seems 10 presuppose a radical distinction belw..cn laci and value, WiltgenSlein begins hisClI=r with the cbim tru.t religious valuec.annot be found in the world. Not suptisingiy then Wittgenstein's eady writing on ethics and religion also anticipate Taylor's "volitionalism" wheo, for example, he suggesls Ihat whn is required is some kind olleap of faith that might result in a radically differcot pers~tive 00 the world. For this reason, we should OOt be surprised thaI Wittgmstein encourages himself to Hlive ru.ppy," 13 a piece of existcntial advice he realrds in his Notebooks. Needless 10 SOIy, Wiggins would probably be suspicious of Wiltgenslein's early position, 10 the extCnt thai it tends 10 resem ble IheTaylor· Scbopenhauer aCGOUnt of whicb he ill so crilical. Aside from the fact that such an account is contrary 10 our pheoomenological ifltuilion namely, Ihat we cannol choose 10 make a meanlnglesslife meaningful by arbiuary fiat_ there are other prohlems. For example, there is something 10 be SOlid with res""ct 10 whether the meaningfulness of a life might deJ'C'nd on " how w..11 or badly ourstrivings are al'l to lum OUI.,,24 In addition, the nonoognitivist ClInnDt do justice to our sense that there mighl be relevant differences Ihal distinguish competing solulions 10

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of existence; ~hhough then: ~. nO! appear loa be a single and simple utr\lth oIlhe matter, il is possible 10 compue and aMeSS dif· ferin& ans_n 10 the question. Such considerations lead Wiggins 10 ask whtther Ihe nai"" noncognilivisl ~ves up 100 much and whether there is a better way of viewin8 the probl em. Al already mentioned, what mahs Wiggins's essay relevan l for OUI" present purposes is nIX only his dlarp critique of nai"" noncognitivism, but hi. suggestion that nOncognilivism might still include an imponam insighl . More specifically, Wisgins seems to dlue Wittgmsl ein's belief thaI ourjud&meotsabout the meaningollife fall shun 01 plain truth. Of panicuLu imponance in Ihis regard is Wiggins's nbservation that aJIhOU&l> WI: eKpecl ,Jl o ur t rue beliefs abou, the world to be re!: procCS$tS undulying it ha>!: been gr.adual, unconscious, and communal. Our formof Iife--()r Ihat in ou r form of life whi ch ~""I individual lives meaning- is nOI SQIDethillfl tha t men ha"" (""I las they are apt to uyl found Or disc:oYCred. II is not something that they u n

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Ethics of Bdie/ and the Meaning of Ule I 49

criticize Or regulate Or ~diust with an eye 10 what is true Or cOr"",,lor ,.,asonable. 17 AI this point 1 want IOStreS$ that although Wiggin s'scri liqueof nonClion, while rea ....... la~ behind, unable 10 keS(lphy- like work in archit ectun: in many 1U~cu-i s really more like workilli on oneself. On one's own imctpreu,rioo. On one's own wayof seeiDl things .... Nothing is so difficult as nOt deceivi"l oneself. wdwig Wirrgenstein'

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lthough the notioo of seU-deception provides an important criterion 1m the uses.ment 01 a pen
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empathy and allfonomy make if increasinsiy difficult to eu hiwfe and ,u,tain one's rc1igiOU$ belieb without succumbing to the temptation of seU-deucation. Early in the film, rorexample, _learn that the fisherman jooashas been plagued bydoubu and suicidal tendencies and has been encouraged by his wile Karin to seck spiritual C(Iunsel from TOrnaJl. Purina their conversation, ho_ver, it is Tomas who confesses his religious doubu to Jonas. Tomas undent.nds the buis of Jonas'll dCSP A

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88 I The Frllgililyof F;rilh traditionally devised subtle and complex strategia to enable them to ~""d~ tbis problem. Philosopbersof rel~on c. o learn an imponantl es· $On from Simone Wdl, who ri&htly observes that tbe life of faith is a1. ways a diffi cult thing, esped-ally when we attend to suth ineltap.oble problems as the possibility of sufkrilli and afflicti on. The paradox, of course, is that even though the problems of evil, sulfcrin&. and death pose: the kinds of questions fll! which religious faith might be an answer, they also present the kind of challenge that can sometimes lead to the erosion of f.i th. Unfortuna tely, however, there.re many philosophers of rel~on who labor under the illusion thilt it is possible (0 justify the Iii(: of faith with out takilli such difficulties into account. I SIJSpe. her religious beliefs. Plantioga. of coune. does not want ro deny that th e problem of evil is a potential de-featCT that the theist cannot simply ignore. Howe....,r. al· though he appears to take such potcotial defeaten seriously. the Free Will Oefenso: he offen as a response to the atheist's objec ti ons makes it difficuh IOSO:Chow a penon could lose faith and invoke th e existence of evil and suffering as a .c"son for this loss of faith. In The- N"It1,e of Neces· siry. a. well u in his less technical discussion. God. Freedom. and Evil.w Planting:> gi"'" a new twist to the Itadilional atlemptto show that the existence of an omniscient. omnipotent, and ben evolent Cod i. con. i.tent with th e existence of evil. According to Plantinga. the theist necd not attempt 10 formulate a [headic y that somehow expl ains Ihe uistence of evil. Such a strong deknse is neither desirabl e 001 requ ired. Hi s task is the more modest one of showing that C<x!'s cxi~tence. as lIaJi· tionaJly understood, is consistent with the existence of evil. Since my problems with P]antinga's solution to this issue ha"" little to do with the detail$ of his rather ingenious argument but more with ~neral worri es concerning the cogency of hi. approach. a brief sketch of his 5IIategy will have to suffice. Plantinga wants to admit tha t an appeal to the proper basicality of religious beliefs is perfect ly compatible with epistemit fallibilism. For this reason he takes seriously the poSsibilit y that the atheist's appeal to evil constitute. a prima facie defeatcr to theism. The solutiOn, hm.",,,,,dicies that appear 10 1101"" lhe problem by specious rationaliutions: HI UIKkrstandnothing." [van went on, as thou&h in delirium. " [ don't want to understand Uly~ now. J wanl 10 sticl< to the faCI. [ made up my mind long ago nOI to undersund. lf I try 10 und~ntand anything. I ,hall be fal$( to the fact and I ha"" determined 10 stiel< ttl the fact. ~!~ Ivan i, righltO be l uspiciousof reductiOnism with respecllofundomenlal religious issucs. FOI this rea$Oll he rejects any sort 01 speculati~

v

,

Th~

Fragili ty Q/ FtJilh I 97

theodicy that pn:SUlnt'S 10 justify or InlIke sense of senseless suiferin&. One W'Onders, however, whelher Ivan himself is guilly of his own subde forms of reducliotilim 1h.1t blinds him 10 other n:ligioul possibiliti9. Stewan Sutherland, /or uample, has SUgsesied that Ivan's dilemma is due 10 the fact that he d.elibentdy appeals to a false pictun: of God whicll may enable him to Jegirimare his religious n:bellion.:IG According to Sutherland, it is no m~ coincidence thai Ivan's diatribe against theism and his famous Grand inquisitor speech are delivered in the neighborhood pub. Sutherland's suggestion is thai Ivan !"educu Godtalk to tavern·talk and th~by succeeds in trivializins; the theist's daims. In this respect, Ivan's appIl)aci> 10 the problem is DO betler rruu. th.t of the theist who appeals 10 theodieies in onkr to HCUn: his faith in an iltegitimate faahloo. One might even say thai what IV3n offers Alyosha is an "antitheodiey" which is del igned 10 pIOteCI him against anyOne who mighl cbaUellF hU despair and n:bellion. In the end, Ivan's atheism is 5«UfI:d by the same kind of reductionism /or whicll he criticizes the theist who appeals to theodieies and other phi losophical utiomli1.ltiooslo amid any substantive chanco", 10 his n:ligious convictions.

c.

Simone Wei! alld the Virtue of Attention

Slrange as it seems Planting;! and Ivan Karamazov have e.acll in their own way devised subue and complex wlys to avoid those difficult ques· tions that mighl call their respecti.., vie~ inlO quCStion. Of course, this should Ci)me as noro-rprise, especially when we n:mindourselvesthat a penon's beliefs about God or the meaning of life an: tied to those sel/-in terpretations that an: constitutive of the self. To acknowledge the possi· bility thaI Ihese wic self·constitutive C()IIlmilmenl.ll can be vulneIllble is to aclmowled&e mon: serious possibilities 01 Ios.: l~ of self and low of ont''s W'Orld. for this reason, we an: ohm ternptro to n:fuse to acknow l· edge tht'se possibilities and appeal instead 10 various stIlltegies that could enable U3 to secure Ihex basic concerns and commitments from any thins; thaI mighl Ihreaten Iht'nt. To borrow a pbraso: from tht' philosopber Harry Frankfurt, we care for OUr carel." Ali we ha"" already seen, this kind of concern fot our caJ'C8 is unavoidable for the simple re.a1Oll that this characleristic 01. carins forono caru is pan of what il means to Ix a person.1bt' question, however, ;.. wht'tht'r tht'n: are limits to thHC: second-order e.ares and wht'lher we should be more circUmspecl with rupect to the stIlltegie. we UK to guatd and protect our basic con· cerna. For whil e commitment and loyallY 10 ourwicC&rH and COIIc.:m. are an essential part 01 our pcnOnhood, we cannot ignon: tht' contin&ent and unpredictable claims of reality whici> rni&hl call these basic cares

98

I

Th £ Fragility of FtJilh

imo queslion. !'lUI is it possible for a believer to care for his or her ~sic COIlviclions and loyalties Without appealing 10 siralegies thai WO\Ild ten· der them immune and invulnerable 10 those contingencies that call thc:m intoquutionl ln shon, is it possible 10 t... a Loyal t...lic""r while at the same time acknowledging the fragi.lity of fai th! Simone Wei! is one of the few religious Ihinkers who wanlS 10 call OUr allenrion 10 the mao)' wa),S a penon 's religious beliefs can be dUo!' lell8"d and pul at risk and who i. deeply concerned with how this possi· bility l'dates to the ethics of belief. Unlike those cont emporary thinkers who still con tinue 10 spell OUI the dynamics of failh by appealing to Ihe exislemialiJt notion nf commilment, Wei! expresses serious misgivinp aboul such VOliriOOllul language and argues inslead Ihat OUt ~sic be· li efs aDd concerw ought 10 conform 10 realil)' as il presems itself to us. Ibr this "'OI.IoOn, Weil e$ChcW$ the uadilional Kanlian approoch 10 knowlcdKe which emphasizctl the activity underlying all human understand· in& and emphasizes instead the p
2. This tum of phrase is intended II a reminder that this book is in keeping with the spiril of Manha Nwsbawn 's The Frlll/lity of Q>od. n us: lncl< and Elhi.,. in Gruk TI-agedy and Philo.&ophy (Cambridge: Cambridge Uniycrsity 1'=;1, 19861. 3. Alvin Plantinp, ~ ReI5Oll and Bclid in God, in fuith and Ra· Uonality: Reason and 1hJlef In God (Notre Dame: Uniycrsity of Notre Dame Press, 1983), pp. 16-93. N

4. fur a moredet.iled u u tmemof wbal CIDconscitutea "defeatcr" as well as • "defulCI of • defate," sec Richard fuley, The Epistem/c Tbwry of RIllianality (Cambrid,ge: Harvard UniYCnity Press, 1997), pp. 18H. The distinction belween polential.od genuine defeaters iSIKlted on pp. 42ft. 5. Friedrich NietzSche, The Gay ScJI!1lU, lrans. Walter Kaufmann lNew York: Viking Press, 1974), pp. 24s-46.

6. Charles Taylor, "Sclf-InlerprecingAuimals, N in Human Agency and Langu"ll:": Pmlooopmsition des.c~1 the dubious distinction of being labeled n:lativisf. Rl;,sponsc. to the views of people such as Phillip. and Winch aN: legion and any attempt to oonsider in detail the wide range of criticisms would take uS tOO far afield. Initial resp(>nses, duwn, for cx.ample, fmm critiCS such as Alasdair Madntyn:, rai$( worries about whether it is possible for the n:luivisl to account lor the p(>ssibility of undcnlanding.9 On the face of it, an account such as that offered by Winch, who denies that _ can evaluate by our standa rds the beliefs and practices of another cu lture, makes it difficult to sec how we can even begin the difficult task

,

Reductionism and tht Ethics of Belit! /

113

01 interpretation, Similar argumems against rdativism h.o.ve been of/e",d by ])Qnald Davidson whO$/: clueic article "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme" 10 presents a mo", sophisticated and nuanced treat ment of the kinds of concerns that motivate Macintyre's discussion. In light of such devastating criticisms one might .uspc:ct that there is little to recommend the views of someone such as Winch or Phillips. Although the StandMd criticisms of relativism are wt:JI founded, the", still might be a grain of truth that motivates the writings 01 Wittgensteinians such as Phillips and Winch. "The problem is that both Phillips and Winch voi"" legitimate coneems thu an: often overlooked because the dehate surrounding reductionism is, for the most p.art, misleadingly caSt in terms of such issues as rationality and relativism. When we reconsider the wmk of Wiltgen.tein himself, hOWl!ver, it will become dear Wt the most defensible and forceful obiections to reductionism are ethical ones, in the broad sense of that term. So even though there might be good Davidsonian grounds for rejectin,g the k.ind of relativism WI! hnd in the work of Phillips or Winch, then: still might be good ",aSOns to share their sU5picion of reductionism.

C. The Case for Explanatory Reduction Before we tum to consider this alternative way of articulating and defending these more plausible objtttions to reductionism, however, we need to consider the original and insightful defense of aplanatory reduction recently offered by Wayne Proudfoot in his study Religious Experience. ' ! Unlike many philosophers and social scientists who tend to conuntrate on the problem of reductionism in isolation from their positive views on the nature of religion, ProudfoO{ sitWltes hi. di5Cu,sion of reductionism in the COntext of more general questions about human aperienee and religious studies. In other words, Proudfoot's defen.., of reductionism is a necessary prolegomena 10 his more general claim that it is perfectly legitimate to explain n:ligious experien"" in naturalistic term s and thai cognitive psychology and attribution theory might provide important resources for thie kind of project. For the most p.art, Proudfoot's analysis turns on the suggestion that the deh.ate con""ming reductioni.m has traditionally been cast in misleading terms. On the one hand, Proudfoot grants that there is something to be said for those critics of ",ductiooism who rightly insist that the beliefs, actions, and experiences 01 a penon must be identified under descriptions intelligible to the person in question. Drawing. in p.art, upon the work of Elizabeth Anscombe and othen, Proudfoot agrees that there i. somethin,g wroog in the strategy of the descriptive ",ductionist who redescribes a person's experien"" io .ruch a way as to misch.aracteri~e

"

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114 I

Redl1cri()1li'm and

rh~

Emit:.! of Beli~f

il. II WQuld be ~ mist~ke, for example, tOSI1Ppose that Socrates was afraid thai the prople of Athens might perish in ~ nuclear war. The~ are many ways of characterizing the possible fears of an andent philosopher: plagues, droughts, and famines arc just a few of the more plausible candidales . It WQuld be a mislake, howev!:r, to appeal to the concept 01 nuclear war bec.ouse such a description of Socrates' experience would be bil· tandyanachronislic. Proudfoot, ho~r, is well aware that !he lask ofl,mdel"$tanding the beliefs, aClions, and experience! of olhers requires much m~ than the kind of gr~mmalical elucidation necessary for characterizing an exper· ience under the app«>priale description. Afl er ~ll, ona. Ihe socialllciemist has fixed the description of an experience or ~ practia. in the approprille terms, there is no reason why he or she should refraln propOSing ~ hypothesis Or theory 10 accoum lor the dala , Fot this reuon, Proudfool insists thll it is nOl only legitimate, but necessary, to draw a subtle distinction between what he calls descriptiVl: and explanatory reductionism. As ~lready mentioned, Proudfoot would agree thai descriptiw: reo ductionism is illicit sina. it distons the experience in question. Because the social scientist wants to explai n why an individual or community characteri:o:es their experience in the specific terlI1$ that they do, descrip· tive reductionism would be ruled out for the simple reason that it dis· tortS the evidence. However, once the expianandum has been fixed by engaging in wha! Clifford GeertZ has termed ~ thick description, H Proud· foot belie,,", that tbe scientist is flU to engage in explanatory reductionism and to offer an exp//lm:ms 01" hypothesis. And what is perhaPl' most important to remember about explanatory reductionism, says Proudfoot, is !hat once we hi"'! completed the descriptiVl: task, a scientiSI is perfectly fru to appeal to his or hcr own explaruotory categories. In other words, unlike description, where our interpretation is necessarily constrained by the conceptual repertOire ~cknowlcdged by th~ individwll or community in question, explanation nud not b£ rllStricud to Unn. /lcceptab/e 10 Ih£ person Or cU/lure W bring 10 our inves· tigation have nOI bttn shaped by the bias of our own particular cullure and training. In this respect, the various explorations of religion offl:red by Friedrich Nietz3kwYork: Macmillan Company, 19581, $«. 415. 25. David Huml!, An Inqoiry Concemillg rhf' Principlu 0/ Moral. Ilndiarupolis: fuckett Publishin& 19831, pp. 16--W. 26. Winch, "Undel\ltanding a Primitive Society, ~ p. 33. 27. l luve been mninded 01 the validity 0/ such concerns in numer· ous conVCfUtions with Kevin Trainor.

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8

Between Objectivity and Subjectivity: The Life of Irony

f th~ fundamental question of morality is "How should l liw]" then the basic question of the ethics of belief CC)"""'m$ analogous questions, nameiy, "How should I think!~ and "What should I believe]" As we have S«D, many thinkers from John Locke to Anthony Fkw haY!: ex· pres ... d a p.articular interest in how a person should govern his or her reo ligious beliefs and have proposed certain rules and principles to regulate these epistcmic activities, Locke, foreumple, tn)Ubled by the rdigjous cnthusiasu of his t ime, begins with the claim that a people are entitled to hold their beliefs only if they can be justified by an appeal to neutral epistemic criteria. Locke himself, of course, was a theist and not surprisingly expresses confidence that theism and Christianity are defens ible. It was 001 long though before other thinkeR, from Enlightenment figures sucb as David Humc 10 VicwrWl crit ies of religion l uch as W. K. diffonl and Leslie Stephen, among others, turned th ese usumptions against the theists in order to undermine their ..,ligious claim s. By the middle of the nineteenth century, critiques of rel igion became even mo.., polemical as the grut critic.tl of religion such as Karl Man, SiJ!:· mund Freud, AnhIlJ" Schopenhau«, and Friedrich Nietzsche, to name the mo.., well·known ones, look the ofiensive and sharpened their at· taclca against Christianity. The story ia, of course, a commonplace and has undoubt edly become JW1 of our cul tural legacy. The question, however. is whether theusumptiom underlying the traditional pictu.., of the ethic.tl of belief ean be defended and whether believen haV!: any other options. As we have seen, thinkers such as Samuel Coleridge and John Henry Newman, troubled by the implications of J«kean empiricism, ofu.r cODvinciI13 arguments in favor of what Michael Po!anyi calls ~ personal knowledge.N Convinced that there an no good reallOllS why personal considerations of piety sbould not inform

I

118 I

Betwun Obiectivity Qnd Subit ctivity: The Uft

at Irony

our n:f1«tions concerning Christian epistemology, Coleridge and Newman anume that the reasons a pel'$QJl actu.:ally offe", in defe~ of hi! Or her n:ligious conviction! an: "theory-laden, ff and will memOll' most likely involve appeals to religious consider.ations such as feelings of guilt 01sin-«lllsciousness, and a desin: for ulvation. Both argue, quite rightly in my view, that it is a mistake toupeet that people should defend meir beliefs by an appeal to neutral epistemic consider.a tiorul, especially when the .eal" reHOns thaI ground a per$Oll's n:ligious beliefs are n:ligious ones. The problem with this approach to the ethies of belief, h~r, i. that it does not address bow an individual's concerns about guilt or sin ~t be mOtinted. After all, IS both Coleridge and Newman admit, not everyone will be led tooonstrue and aS5CSS their Ii,," in thesc tenns. Such worries, as we have sccn,lead certain thinkers such as Son:n Kierkegaard and LudwigWittgenstein tosuggest that it is nOt enou&h toask whether a pel3On's religious belief, an: justified in !lOme minimal ",nSC. On the contrary, one must 61"$1 explon: the ways such belief. can be viewed 15 interpretations about the meaning of life. To say, ror eurnple, that lOme people a"css the shape of theirlivn with n:fen:nce lowncepts such as sin, juslification, and sanctification is to uy, with Wittgenstein, that Ihey have different pictun:s that elllble them 10 see their Ii""s as meanin&ful wholes . Socialized inlO different communities with differing Stories about the place and significance of human life in the cosmos, human bemp appeal to a wide range 01 rituals and symbols to answer the uhimate questions about the meaning of it all- the meaning of binh, love, s~rin& and death. We have seen, hOWmelimel n:quin: a willingness 10 wail on beliefs and concerns we may not share. Finally and most imporuntJy it will involve a willingness 10 PUt our own beliefs at risk. fur in the end, the ethics of belief is nothing more Ihan the etrucs of con"',"" linn and conversion_ N

Notes I. Max Deutscher, Subiecting and Objecting lLondon: Buil Blackwell, 19831, pp. 13-14.

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BetwulI Objectivity and Sub;ectivity: The Ufeof Irony I

139

2. Ibid., p. 17. 3. Ibid., p. 19. 4. See, fur example, Ronald de Sousa, The Rationality of Emotion ICambridge: MIT Press, 1987). Of panicular interesl is De Sousa's discus· sion 01 the Nlrame pmblem Nand bislugestion thaI wilhout emotions we would lack the kind 01 attention nec:essary for intellisent thought and behavior. 5. Deutscher, Snb;ecling and Obiectill8, p. 129.

6. R.o.lph Waldn Emersnn, The E$says of I«llph Walda £merson, intm. Alfred Kuio (Cambridge : Belknap Press, 19871, p. 179. 7. Ibid., p. IS4.

8. Ibid., p. 180.

9. Ibid., p.ISI.

10. Ibid., p. 245. II. Ibid., p. 189.

12. Ibid., p. 183. 13. 5«, for example, Dnid Van Leer's receot study, Emerson's Epis· temology ICambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19Sn which attempts 10 show that Emenoo's enigmltic prose hides sustained and oophisticated discussians 01 various epistemological issues. Unfununately, althoU&h Van Leer raises some important issues, his uposition tends to confuse rather than illuminate hi. provocati"'" thesis. 14. See Richard Rony, Philosophy Qnd the Minor of NalLlre IPrioce· tno: Princeton Uniftnity Pre", 19791, esp. pp. 3571f. 15. "intellect, N in The Essays of I«llpb Waldo £menon, p.lOO.

16. Ibid., p. 202.

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