The ISA Handbook in Contemporary Sociology (SAGE Studies in International Sociology)

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Author: Ann B. Denis | Professor Devorah Kalekin-Fishman

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The ISA Handbook in

Contemporary Sociology

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The ISA Handbook in

Contemporary Sociology

Conflict, Competition, Cooperation

Edited by

Ann Denis and Devorah Kalekin-Fishman

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Editorial arrangement © Ann Denis and Devorah Kalekin-Fishman 2009 Chapter 1 © Ann Denis and Devorah Kalekin-Fishman 2009 Chapter 2 © Lauren Langman and Devorah KalekinFishman 2009 Chapter 3 © Nira Yuval-Davis 2009 Chapter 4 © Kjeld Hogsbro, Hans Pruijt, Nikita Pokrovsky and George Tsobanoglou 2009 Chapter 5 © Reza Banakar 2009 Chapter 6 © Elisa P. Reis 2009 Chapter 7 © Jaime Jiménez 2009 Chapter 8 © Ulrike Schuerkens 2009 Chapter 9 © Elianne Riska, Ellen Annandale and Robert Dingwall 2009 Chapter 10 © Julia Evetts, Charles Gadea, Mariano Sánchez and Juan Sáez 2009 Chapter 11 © Fabien Ohl 2009 Chapter 12 © Jan Marontate 2009 Chapter 13 © Robert van Krieken and Doris BühlerNiederberger 2009 Chapter 14 © Stéphane Moulin and Paul Bernard 2009 Chapter 15 © Bali Ram and Shefali S. Ram 2009

Chapter 16 © David R. Segal, Christopher Dandeker, and Yuko K. Whitestone 2009 Chapter 17 © Paul Leduc Browne 2009 Chapter 18 © Edward Webster and Robert Lambert 2009 Chapter 19 © Marco Silvestro 2009 Chapter 20 © Markus S. Schulz 2009 Chapter 21 © Joseph F. Donnermeyer, Pat Jobes, and Elaine Barclay 2009 Chapter 22 © Mustafa Koc 2009 Chapter 23 © Maria da Glória Gohn 2009 Chapter 24 © Victor Armony 2009 Chapter 25 © Ari Sitas 2009 Chapter 26 © Alexius A. Pereira 2009 Chapter 27 © Henry Teune 2009 Chapter 28 © Sandi Michele de Oliveira 2009 Chapter 29 © Philippe Couton, Ann Denis, Leslie Laczko, Linda Pietrantonio, and Joseph-Yvon Thériault 2009 Chapter 30 © Ann Denis and Devorah KalekinFishman 2009

First published 2009 Apart from any fair dealing for the purposes of research or private study, or criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, this publication may be reproduced, stored or transmitted in any form, or by any means, only with the prior permission in writing of the publishers, or in the case of reprographic reproduction, in accordance with the terms of licences issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside those terms should be sent to the publishers. SAGE Publications Ltd 1 Oliver’s Yard 55 City Road London EC1Y 1SP SAGE Publications Inc. 2455 Teller Road Thousand Oaks, California 91320 SAGE Publications India Pvt Ltd B 1/I 1 Mohan Cooperative Industrial Area Mathura Road New Delhi 110 044 SAGE Publications Asia-Pacific Pte Ltd 33 Pekin Street #02-01 Far East Square Singapore 048763 Library of Congress Control Number: 2008932231 British Library Cataloguing in Publication data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978-1-4129-3463-3 Typeset by CEPHA Imaging Pvt. Ltd., Bangalore, India Printed in India at Replika Press Pvt Ltd Printed on paper from sustainable resources

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Contents

Diagrams, Figures, and Tables Preface

viii xi

Acknowledgments

xiv

Reviewers

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About the Contributors

xix

INTRODUCTION

1

1

3

Introduction Ann Denis and Devorah Kalekin-Fishman

PART ONE: ANALYSES OF APPROACHES TO RESEARCH 2

Alienation: Critique and Alternative Futures Lauren Langman and Devorah Kalekin-Fishman

3

Identity, Citizenship and Contemporary, Secure, Gendered Politics of Belonging Nira Yuval-Davis

7 9

29

4

Sociological Practice and the Sociotechnics of Governance Kjeld Hogsbro, Hans Pruijt, Nikita Pokrovsky, and George Tsobanoglou

5

Law Through Sociology’s Looking Glass: Conflict, and Competition in Sociological Studies of Law Reza Banakar

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New Ways of Relating Authority and Solidarity: Theoretical and Empirical Explorations Elisa P. Reis

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6

7

New Collaborative Forms of Doing Research Jaime Jiménez

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CONTENTS

PART TWO: TRENDS IN CONCEPTUALIZING CONFLICT, COMPETITION, AND COOPERATION IN SUBFIELDS OF SOCIOLOGY 107 8

9

10

11

12

13

14

Conflict, Competition, and Cooperation in the Sociology of Development and Social Transformations Ulrike Schuerkens Health Sociology: Conflict, Competition, Cooperation Elianne Riska, Ellen Annandale and Robert Dingwall

16

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Sociological Theories of Professions: Conflict, Competition and Cooperation Julia Evetts, Charles Gadea, Mariano Sánchez and Juan Sáez

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Competition, Conflict and Cooperation, and the Naturalization of Social Difference in Sport Fabien Ohl

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Controversies as Sites of Conflict and Collaboration: Insights from the Sociology of the Arts Jan Marontate

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Rethinking the Sociology of Childhood: Conflict, Competition and Cooperation in Children’s Lives Robert van Krieken and Doris Bühler-Niederberger

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The Lifecourse of the Social Mobility Paradigm Stéphane Moulin and Paul Bernard

PART THREE: RESEARCH ON SOCIAL ISSUES – INTERWEAVING PROCESSES 15

109

201

221

Health, Illness, and Mortality in Less Developed Countries: Convergence, Divergence, and Stagnation Bali Ram and Shefali S. Ram

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Conflict, Competition, and Cooperation in Twenty-First Century Military Peacekeeping Operations David R. Segal, Christopher Dandeker, and Yuko K. Whitestone

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17

Conflict, Competition, and Cooperation in the Social Division of Health Care Paul Leduc Browne

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Markets Against Society: Labour’s Predicament in the Second Great Transformation Edward Webster and Robert Lambert

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Political Consumerism: An Extension of Social Conflict or a Renewed Form of Economic Collaboration? Marco Silvestro

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19

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Modes of Structured Interplay in the Modeling of Digital Futures Markus S. Schulz

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Sociological Theory, Social Change, and Crime in Rural Communities Joseph F. Donnermeyer, Pat Jobes, and Elaine Barclay

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PART FOUR: ILLUSTRATIVE CASE STUDIES

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Hunger and Plenty: Fragmented Integration in the Global Food System Mustafa Koc

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Social Movements in Brazil: Characteristics and Research Maria da Glória Gohn

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Making Sense of Social Justice and Social Mobilization in Latin America: A Discourse Analysis Victor Armony

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Industrial and Labour Studies, Socio-Economic Transformation, Conflict, and Cooperation in KwaZulu Natal Ari Sitas

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Economic Globalization and Singapore’s Development Policies: Competition, Cooperation, and Conflict Alexius A. Pereira

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25

26

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The Dynamics of Local-Global Relations: Conflict and Development Henry Teune

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Negotiating Identity, Conflict, and Cooperation within a Strategic Model of Address Sandi Michele de Oliveira

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Conflict and (Ethno-Linguistic) Diversity: Canada/Québec Philippe Couton, Ann Denis, Leslie Laczko, Linda Pietrantonio, and Joseph-Yvon Thériault

PART FIVE: CONCLUSION 30

Index

Conflict, Competition, and Cooperation: Means and Stratagems for Shaping Social Reality in the Twenty-First Century Ann Denis and Devorah Kalekin-Fishman

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Diagrams, Figures, and Tables

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Law through Sociology’s Looking Glass. Conflict, and Competition in Sociological Studies of Law Reza Banakar Diagram 5.1 Relationship between Socio-Legal Approaches New Ways of Relating Authority and Solidarity: Theoretical and Empirical Explorations Elisa P. Reis Figure 6.1 Distribution of NGOs According to Year of Establishment Table 6.1 Changes in Objectives and/or Publics of NGOs According to Date Established Table 6.2 Changes in Objectives and/or Publics According to Main Area of Activity Table 6.3 Major Source of Support of NGOs According to Date Established Table 6.4 Major Sources of Financial Support of NGOs Ten Years Ago Table 6.5 Number of Paid Workers of the NGOs According to Year of Establishment Table 6.6 Leaders Consult Their Constituencies? Table 6.7 How Often Is the Webpage Updated Table 6.8 Major Purpose of the Webpage Table 6.9 Partnership with the Federal Government According to Characteristics of the NGO Table 6.10 Partnership with Local Government According to Characteristics of the NGO Table 6.11 Partnership with the Regional Government According to Characteristics of the NGO New Collaborative Forms of Doing Research Jaime Jiménez Table 7.1 Comparison of the Characteristics of Mode 1 and Mode 2 of Knowledge Production Competition, Conflict and Cooperation, and the Naturalization of Social Difference in Sport Fabien Ohl

58 65

74 82 83 83 84 84 85 85 86 86 87 87 88 91

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DIAGRAMS, FIGURES, AND TABLES

Figure 11.1 Distribution of Articles Concerning Conflict, Cooperation, and Competition 18

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24

25

26

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Markets Against Society: Labour’s Predicament in the Second Great Transformation Edward Webster and Robert Lambert Diagram 18.1 The Northern Compromise Diagram 18.2 The Global South: The Case of South Africa Diagram 18.3 The Critical Strategic Choice for Trade Unionism Hunger and Plenty: Fragmented Integration in the Global Food System Mustafa Koc Table 22.1 Level of Concentration in the US Food Processing Sectors (2005 figures) Graph 22.1 Market Net Income in Farming in Canada, 1926–2005 Making Sense of Social Justice and Social Mobilization in Latin America: A Discourse Analysis Victor Armony Table 24.1 ‘What Are the Main Injustices in this Country?’ Table 24.2 ‘Who Benefits from this Situation?’ Table 24.3 ‘What Should be Done in Order to Put the Country on the Right Track?’ Table 24.4 ‘Who Speaks on Behalf of the People?’ Table 24.5 ‘What Is Your Role in the Movement?’ Table 24.6 Activists’ Distinctive Vocabulary by Gender (El Salvador and Honduras) Industrial and Labour Studies, Socio-Economic Transformation, Conflict and Cooperation in KwaZulu Natal Ari Sitas Table 25.1 Culture Activists in Natal’s Trade Unions: Index of Hardships, 1986–92 (N = 120) Economic Globalization and Singapore’s Development Policies: Competition, Cooperation and Conflict Alexius A. Pereira Table 26.1 Cases of Biotechnology Foreign Direct Investment in Singapore (selected) The Dynamics of Local Global Relations: Conflict and Development Henry Teune Table 27.1 Demscore (Mean Score) Table 27.2 Trust in People: Percentage Yes Table 27.3 Groups Not Wanted as Neighbors: Percentages Table 27.4 Having Local Autonomy: Mean Table 27.5 Influence across Policy Areas: 14 areas Table 27.6 Local Priorities vs. National Priorities – Mean Score Table 27.7 Conflicts Interfere with Public Action – Mean Table 27.8 Number of Support Groups Sought Across 16 Groups – Mean

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267 268 269 271 323

327 328

351 357 359 360 361 363 364

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394 400 410 411 411 412 412 412 412 413

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DIAGRAMS, FIGURES, AND TABLES

Negotiating Identity, Conflict, and Cooperation within a Strategic Model of Address Sandi Michele de Oliveira Table 28.1 Simplified Schema of the Address Form System in Portugal Diagram 28.1 Stages of Address Form Relationships Diagram 28.2 Strategic Level of the Conventionalized Plane Diagram 28.3 Strategic Level of the Negotiated Plane Table 28.2 Applicability of Hierarchy to Other Languages Conflict and (Ethno-Linguistic) Diversity: Canada/Québec Philippe Couton, Ann Denis, Leslie Laczko, Linda Pietrantonio, and Joseph Yvon Thériault Table 29.1 Top 10 Source Countries, Montréal, Toronto, Vancouver, 2002 Figure 29.1 Québec’s Proportion of Canada’s Immigrants and of Canada’s Population, 1970–2000 Figure 29.2 Proportion of Foreign-born, Top 10 Countries and Québec, 2000

416 420 422 424 425 428 433

442 443 443

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Preface Michel Wieviorka, President, International Sociological Association

In our era, which is apparently dominated on the one hand, by violence, communally based divisions of all kinds, and war, and, on the other, by phenomena of exclusion and social vulnerability, and the intensification of individualism connected with economic globalization; how refreshing it is to encounter discussions of competition, or at least of conflict – that is, of conflictual relations and not of impasses – and of cooperation! In the period from the end of World War II to the mid-1970s, there were two great conflicts which constituted a double principle structuring the world, at least for a number of societies, especially in the West. The Cold War, in which the threat of nuclear attack played a major role as a deterrent, regulated the opposition between two blocs, except for an exceptional moment of crisis which was quickly resolved (the affair of the Cuban missiles). This made it possible for the planet to avoid violence between the two superpowers. Ultimately, they never made war directly and never went too far locally, because a local war always carried the risk of expanding into a confrontation at the summit, which neither the West nor the East wanted. And in the industrialized countries, at any rate in the West, social relations took the form of a central oppositional conflict, in the factory and in the workshop, between the workers’

movement and the masters of their work (the employers). This conflict structured collective life well beyond the places where it was initiated. Politics, notably the left/right cleavage, was informed by this, as were many other social or cultural movements, including those of students, grass roots associations, peasants, consumers, families, movements for children’s education, and so on. But we are no longer concerned with those conflicts. The Cold War is behind us, and by and large, the workers’ struggles have lost their centrality, their ability to make the proletariat the main actor in collective life, the one who is called upon to lead. The post-War years were also those of decolonization, and today we often have the feeling of living in societies where the debates and the problems owe a good deal to the impact of the end of the colonial era. This is true both in the formerly colonized as well as in the formerly colonizing societies which, in fact, now often receive fairly large-scale migrations from their former colonies. In some ways, we may say that we are orphans of two great conflicts which were the Cold War and the struggles of the workers’ movements. Moreover, from the logic of the shattering of colonialism, we see the growth of new highly charged conflicts based on cultural and historical factors as well as on collective memories. These conflicts are sometimes described as ‘post-colonial’.

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These new conflicts are certainly not the only ones, and they do not preclude diverse forms of cooperation. In my view, they are the opposite of a crisis, and are best thought of as opposed to, rather than as complementary to the idea of violence. To my mind, there is conflict when actors oppose one another for control of the same stakes, when they acknowledge that they are in a relationship, that they are adversaries; at the same time this does not entail their being transformed into enemies who make war against each other, and, in extreme cases, destroy one another. Conflict is a relation, while crisis is a breakdown or a dysfunction of a system of action. Violence is the indicator of an extreme crisis – complete disintegration, the absence of any relation. The book edited by Ann Denis and Devorah Kalekin-Fishman invites us therefore to give the attention they deserve to the concepts of conflict, cooperation, and competition. Even if most of the authors do not take the same approach as I do to these questions, examining them is, in my opinion, decisive: it is important, in effect, to give voice to those who are studying the world as it is, without reducing it to worst dramas of violence, mass crime, fundamentalisms of all sorts, nor to the effects of globalization alone. In conflict, cooperation, and competition, there are actors, social relations, and intercultural relations, all at various levels, and not only victims, criminals, armies, remote economic forces, or communities which have withdrawn into themselves. By examining the available paradigms and approaches, by reflecting on the possible articulations of these concepts, in attempting to apply them in diverse fields of social science, including in the framework of monographs dedicated to case studies, the authors recruited by Ann Denis and Devorah Kalekin-Fishman perform the service of returning a set of concepts, approaches, or paradigms to their legitimate place. Furthermore, they provide us as well with an original instrument, a Handbook, which is all the more useful because it was conceived and

carried out from a comparative (or transversal) perspective. I would also like to add a more institutional statement to this preface. This Handbook is the first published by the ISA in this millennium, and it is clear that this publication will be followed by further editorial initiatives. There are certainly a number of edited works in sociology which deal with major themes in the discipline. Their quality depends, in large part, on their contributors, but also on the way in which the authors were solicited, on the preparatory work by the editors, on the guidelines given to the authors, and on all the work invested in editing the contributions. Here, the volume was preceded by an important conference, which attests to the vitality of the Research Committees (RCs) of the International Association of Sociology (ISA). The ISA has more than 50 of them, not to mention the Thematic Groups and the Working Groups which pave the way for tomorrow’s Research Committees. Each RC has its own intellectual life, its agenda, its own, often highly impressive, dynamism. For instance, I am writing these lines after having participated in a conference of RC 04, ‘Sociology of Education’, which took place in Brazil (Joao Pessoa, February 19–22, 2008) with almost 1500 participants who came from all over the world. The RCs are a resource of the ISA, perhaps even its principal resource; they make our association a unique locus of intellectual life, and not merely an incorporated organization. The ISA not only encourages its RCs to be as active as possible, to be open to researchers from every part of the globe, to function in the three official languages, to give opportunities for presentations by ‘junior sociologists’ alongside those of recognized researchers; it also creates the conditions which allow for their meetings and for discovering their complementarity. This Handbook is the fruit of in-depth dynamics, and the conference which preceded it was only one event, certainly a particularly intense one, among others. Additional ISA resources are found in the quality and substance of its

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publications, both its books and journals. This publication capacity is another of the assets of the ISA, from which this work, which is published within a reasonable interval and with all the care required, benefits. It is obviously not by chance that the two editors of the book, in addition to their competence as sociologists,

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are important personalities in our association, one having been Vice-President for research while the other is currently VicePresident for publications. I thank them warmly for offering us this fine volume, which, clearly, will be a milestone.

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Acknowledgments

Having an academic conference in conjunction with the mandated mid-term meeting of the Research Council (the Council of Research Committees) had already become an International Sociological Association tradition that Ann was eager to continue after her election as Vice-President for Research of ISA in 2002, and a publication was a ‘natural’ outcome of such a conference. That the publication would be a Handbook was a result of the enthusiasm with which conference participants embraced the theme of the conference, the quality of the revised papers that were submitted after the conference, the high standards of the reviewers who commented on these papers, and the quality of the authors’ final revisions. Acknowledgments therefore begin with those involved in the ISA Research Council conference held at the University of Ottawa in 2004. The scientific committee for the conference included representatives of the two national scholarly associations which cosponsored the event, members of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Ottawa, of Carleton University, and of the International Sociological Association. The committee members were: Victor Armony (Université du Québec à Montréal, for l’Association Canadienne de Sociologues et Anthropologues de Langue Française), Ann Denis (University of Ottawa, Vice-President Research, ISA), Myriam Denov (University of Ottawa), Katherine Kelly (Carleton University), Karen March (Carleton University, for Canadian Sociology and Anthropology Association), Ari Sitas (KwaZulu Natal

University, Durban, South Africa, VicePresident Program, ISA), Piotr Sztompka (Jagiellonian University, Cracow, Poland, President, ISA), J. Yvon Thériault (Université d’Ottawa), and Kathryn Trevenen (University of Ottawa). We thank Professor Leslie Laczko, Chair of the Department of Sociology, for hosting the conference. Pierre Doucette, our student assistant, provided invaluable administrative assistance before, during, and after the conference. We are grateful for the administrative support we have received from the University of Ottawa, particularly from Anick Mineault (Sociology) and Ginette Rozon (Faculty of Social Science). We also want to express our thanks for the financial support for the conference (and the preparation of this publication) which we received from: the International Sociology Association; Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada; International Development Research Centre; the Department of Sociology and Anthropology of Carleton University; and at the University of Ottawa – the Rector – Professor Gilles Patry, the Faculty of Social Sciences, the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, the Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences – Professor Caroline Andrew, and the Department of Sociology. First the conference itself, and then the publication, would have been impossible without the collaboration of the authors. We greatly appreciate the contributors’ cooperation throughout this long and sometimes arduous process. On receipt of the revised papers after the conference, after our

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

initial reading of each text (and in some cases requiring initial revisions), we invited up to three experts in the field to provide double blind anonymous peer review of each one. Based on their comments we invited the authors to carry out further revisions to their draft chapters. Some chapters were rejected at this stage because the authors did not have the time or the inclination to make the modifications that would result in a fit between their paper and the objectives of the publication. We are immensely grateful to those who provided the reviews. Critical assessments by the reviewers enabled authors to strengthen their initially interesting contributions by calling attention to how analyses could be made more focussed and more comprehensive. In recognition of their effort, and as a gesture of our gratitude, we have included the reviewers’ names in this volume. Insofar as the preparation of the Handbook itself is concerned, we are grateful for the efficient help of our student assistants – Pierre Doucette, Diana Reis, and Sylvie Giraud. Madeleine Potvin of the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ottawa, has provided

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an invaluable service in reconciling the formats, particularly of the references, of all the articles. Throughout the publication process we have appreciated the support of the Executive Secretary of the ISA, Izabela Barlinska, and of Julia Evetts, Editor of the SAGE Studies in International Sociology Series, as well as that of SAGE Publications in London, in particular Chris Rojek (Senior Editor for Sociology) and Mila Steele and Jai Seaman (Assistant Editors). We also wish to thank Michel Wieviorka, President of the ISA, who kindly wrote the preface for the collection. Work on this Handbook has brought us the rewards of learning about developments and challenges in the diverse (and cross-cutting) fields within our discipline. It has also given us the opportunity – and pleasure – of working together on this project, and of enjoying the stimulation of working with a very distinguished group of sociologists. Ann Denis and Devorah Kalekin-Fishman Editors February 2008

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Reviewers

Jon Anson, Professor, Department of Social Work, Ben Gurion University – Negev, Israel. Farshad Araghi, Professor, Department of Sociology, Florida Atlantic University, Boca Raton, United States. Pat Armstrong, Professor, Department of Sociology, York University, Downsview, Canada. Zabeer Baber, Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Toronto, Mississauga, Canada. Bernadette Bawin-Legros, Professor, Nandrin, Belgium. Eliezer Ben-Rafael, Professor, Department of Sociology, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel. Tova Benski, PhD, Department of Behavioural Sciences, College of Management Studies, Rishon-Leziyon, Israel. L. M. Beukema, Professor, Department of General Studies, Utrecht University, Utrecht, Netherlands. Dan Cook, Professor, Department of Childhood Studies, Rutgers University-Camden, Camden, United States. Denise Ferreira da Silva, Professor, Department of Ethnic Studies, University of California, San Diego, United States. Vincenzo Ferrari, Professor, Instituto di Filosofia e Sociologia del Diritto, Facolta di Giurisprudenza, Universita degli Studi di Milano, Milan, Italy. Eliot Freidson, Professor, University of California, San Francisco, United States. Lawrence Friedman, Professor, Stanford University, Stanford, United States. Jan Marie Fritz, Professor, School of Planning, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, United States. Stefan Gandler, PhD, Facultad de Ciencias Politicas y Sociales, Universidad Autonoma Querétaro, Querétaro, Mexico. Madeleine Gauthier, PhD, INRS Urbanisation, Culture et Société, Québec, Canada. Deborah Golden, PhD, Faculty of Education, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel. Helga Hallgrimsdottir, Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Victoria, Victoria, Canada.

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REVIEWERS

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Maureen Harrington, PhD, Dept. of Tourism, Leisure, Hotel and Sports Management, Griffith University, Mount Gravatt, Australia. Juergen Hartmann, Professor, European Tourism Management, Dalarna University, Borlaenge, Sweden. Paul Higate, PhD, School for Policy Studies, University of Bristol, Bristol, United Kingdom. Heather Hofmeister, Professor, Institut für Soziologie, RWTH-Aachen University, Aachen, Germany. Marjan Hocevar, PhD, Faculty of Social Sciences, Centre for Spatial Sociology, University of Ljubljana, Ljubljana, Slovenia. Alexandra Hofmanner, PhD, Research Officer, University of Cape Town, Rondebosch, South Africa. Danielle Juteau, Professeure, Département de sociologie, Université de Montréal, Montréal, Canada. Kalpana Kannabiran, PhD, Asmita Resource Centre for Women, Secunderabad, India. Douglas Kellner, Professor, Graduate School of Education and Information Studies, University of California at Los Angeles, United States. Bert Klandermans, Professor, Department of Social Sciences, Free University, Amsterdam, Netherlands. Robert Lambert, Professor, Organisational and Labour Studies, University of Western Australia, Perth, Australia. Paul Lamy, Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Canada. Lt. Col. David Last, Registrar’s Office, Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, Canada. Maurice Lévesque, Professeur, Département de Sociologie, Université d’Ottawa, Ottawa, Canada. Loet Leydesdorff, PhD, Amsterdam School of Communications Research, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands. Judith Lorber, Professor, New York, United States. Deirdre Meintel, Professeure, Département d’Anthropologie, Université de Montréal, Montréal, Canada. Nancy Midol, PhD, Université de Nice, Nice, France. S.M. Miller, Professor, Commonwealth Institute, Cambridge, United States. Melinda Mills, Professor, Faculty of Behavioural and Social Sciences, University of Groningen, Groningen, Netherlands. Barbara Misztal, Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Leicester, Leicester, United Kingdom. Marc Molgat, Professeur, École de service social, Université d’Ottawa, Ottawa, Canada. Arturo Rodriguez Morato, Professor, Department of Sociology, Universidad de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain.

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REVIEWERS

Manuel B. Moreira, Professor, Technical University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal. Ronaldo Munck, Professor, Theme Leader: Internationalisation, Interculturalism & Social Development, Dublin City University, Dublin, Ireland. Claus Offe, Professor, Institute of Social Sciences, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany. Michèle Ollivier, Professeure, Département de Sociologie, Université d’Ottawa, Ottawa, Canada. Eric Ouellet, PhD, Director of Academics/Directeur des études académiques, Canadian Forces College/Collège des Forces canadiennes, Toronto, Canada. Frank Pinch, PhD, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Gloucester, Ontario, Canada. Gilles Pronovost, Professeur, Département des Sciences de Loisirs, Université du Québec à Trois Rivières, Trois Rivières, Canada. P. Radhakrishnan, Professor, Madras Institute of Development Studies, Chennai, India. Karlheinz Schneider, Professor, University of Heidelberg, Heidelberg, Germany. Scott Simon, Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Canada. Thomas S. Smith, Professor, University of Rochester, Rochester, United States. Raquel Sosa Elizaga, Professor, Centro de Estudios Latinoamericanos, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Mexico. Willfried Spohn, Professor, Free University of Berlin, Berlin, Germany. Devanayaka Sundaram, Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Madras, Chennai, India. Heinz Sünker, Professor, Center for International Studies in Social Policy and Social Services, Universität Wuppertal, Wuppertal, Germany. Marek Szczepanski, Professor, Head, Institute of Sociology, Silesian University, Poland. Rachel Tomer, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Haifa, Mount Carmel, Israel. Bryan Turner, Professor, Department of Sociology, National University of Singapore, Singapore. Mariya Tysiachnuk, Professor, Centre for Independent Research, St. Petersburg, Russia. Vivienne Wee, Professor, Department of Applied Social Studies, Chinese University, Hong Kong, China. Alex Ziegert, Professor, Sydney Law School, University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia. Dieter Zinnbauer, London School of Economics, London, England.

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About the Contributors

Ellen Annandale is Senior Lecturer in Sociology at University of Leicester, UK. She is Vice-President of the Research Committee on Sociology of Health (RC 15) of ISA. Her main interests are in gender and health, and medical work and practice. She is the author of The Sociology of Health and Medicine (Polity Press, 1998) which is currently being prepared in a 2nd edition, and Women’s Health and Social Change (Routledge, 2008). She is currently Editor-in-Chief of the journal Social Science & Medicine. Victor Armony is an FQRSC Professor in the Department of Sociology at the Université du Québec à Montréal and an Adjunct Professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of Ottawa, both in Canada. He is a past President of the Association canadienne des sociologues et des anthropologues de langue française (ACSALF) and the current Editor of the Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies. Reza Banakar is Professor of Socio-Legal Studies at the University of Westminster in London, UK. He was previously Senior Research Fellow in Law at Harris Manchester College and Paul Dodyk Research Fellow at the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies at the University of Oxford. Among his publications are: Theory and Method in Socio-Legal Research, co-edited with M. Travers (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005), Merging Law and Sociology: Beyond the Dichotomies in Socio-Legal Research (Berlin/Wisconsin: Galda + Wilch Verlag, 2003), and Introduction to Law and Social Theory, also co-edited with M. Travers (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002). Elaine Barclay is the Director of the Centre for Rural Crime which is incorporated within the Institute for Rural Futures, a research centre at the University of New England, Armidale, Australia. The research program of the Centre for Rural Crime includes studies of crime in rural communities, crime and crime prevention on farms, biosecurity on farms, and environmental crime. She has authored/co-authored several journal articles and book chapters and is co-editor of Crime in Rural Australia published by Federation Press in 2007. Paul Bernard, PhD in Sociology, Harvard, 1974, is a Professor at the Université de Montréal, in Canada. Research on job quality, social cohesion, social capital, welfare and gender regimes, social inequalities of health, indicators of social development, lifecourse and social investment, flexicurity, and poverty among single-parent families. Member of the National Statistics Council, of the Steering Committee of the Canadian Household Panel Survey, of the Board of Governors of the Council of the Canadian Academies, of the Board of the Social Research and Demonstration Corporation, and of the Board of Québec’s Centre d’études sur la pauvreté et l’exclusion sociale.

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ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

Paul Leduc Browne has been the Professor of Political Science at the Université du Québec en Outaouais in Gatineau, Québec, Canada, since 2002. Before that he was a Senior Research Fellow at the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives in Ottawa for eight years. He has also taught at the Universities of Sussex, Ottawa, and Regina. He is the author and editor of several books and other publications, including Unsafe Practices: Restructuring and Privatization in Ontario Health Care; The Commodity of Care: Home Care Reform in Ontario; Love in a Cold World: The Voluntary Sector in an Age of Cuts; and (with Douglas Moggach) The Social Question and the Democratic Revolution. Doris Bühler-Niederberger, Professor for Sociology at the University of Wuppertal, Germany, is currently the President of ISA RC 53, Sociology of Childhood, and coordinates the section ‘Sociology of Childhood’ in the German Sociological Association. Main research activities concern political programs and debates about children, expert interventions into children’s lives and families, scientific images of children, and socialization of self. Philippe Couton is an Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of Ottawa in Canada. His areas of interest include immigration, immigrant social and political engagement, political sociology, and labour relations. Christopher Dandeker is the Professor of Military Sociology in the Department of War Studies in the School of Social Science and Public Policy (where he served as Head of School from 2005 to 2008) at King’s College, London, UK. He is a co-Director of the King’s Centre for Military Health Research as well as a member of the executive committee of RC 01. Recent publications include, ‘Surveillance and Military Transformation: Organizational Trends in TwentyFirst Century Armed Services’ in K Haggerty and R V Ericson (eds.), The New Politics of Surveillance and Visibility, University of Toronto Press, 2006, 225–249. Ann Denis is the Professor of Sociology in the Département de sociologie et anthropologie, Université d’Ottawa, in Ottawa, Canada. Presently a member of the Executive Committee of ISA (2006–2010), she was its Vice-President for Research (2002–2006), and is an active member of Research Committees 5 and 32. Current and recent research interests include the effect of state policies on women (and their work) in the Commonwealth Caribbean and among immigrants in Canada, the use of the Internet by minority young people in Barbados and francophone Ontario, and the effects of society-centered educational practices on women in engineering. Robert Dingwall is Professor and Director at the Institute for Science and Society, University of Nottingham, UK. He is Secretary of the Research Committee on Sociology of Health (RC 15), ISA. His most recent book (with Elizabeth Murphy) is Qualitative Methods and Health Policy Research (Aldine Transaction 2003) and he has recently edited a four-volume collection of classic works, Qualitative Health Research, published by Sage in 2008. He is currently co-editing (with Ivy Bourgeault and Raymond De Vries) a Handbook of Qualitative Health Research, due for publication by Sage in 2009. Joseph F. Donnermeyer is a Professor in the Rural Sociology program at The Ohio State University, USA, with a specialty in the study of rural crime, and the International Research Coordinator for the Rural Crime Centre, University of New England, New South Wales, Australia. Dr. Donnermeyer is the author/co-author of numerous journal articles, book chapters and books on rural crime, co-editor of a recently published book on Crime in Rural Australia

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(Federation Press), and co-author of a policy brief on methamphetamine’s impact in rural America for the Rural Sociological Society. Julia Evetts is an Emeritus Professor of Sociology in the School of Sociology and Social Policy at the University of Nottingham, UK. For a number of years she has been researching and writing about professions and occupations including women’s and men’s careers in teaching, banking, science, and engineering in industrial organizations. Currently she is working on projects to do with professionalism in the armed forces and journalism; the increased use of the concept of professionalism as a mechanism of occupational change and social control in work organizations; and the role of the scientific and engineering institutes in the UK. Charles Gadea is the Professor of Sociology at the University of Versailles, France. He is the President of ISA RC52 ‘Sociology of Professional Groups’, President of the Association des Sociologues Enseignants du Supérieur (ASES), and Director of the journal Knowledge, Work & Society. He is also in charge of the thematic net ‘Knowledge, Work and Professions’ in the Association Française de Sociologie (AFS) and the working group ‘Savoirs, metiers, identité professionnelle’ in the Association Internationale des Sociologues de Langue Française (AISLF). His main research themes are currently the death of the professions, medical professions, managers, and gender. Maria da Glória Gohn, sociologist, PhD in Political Science, University of Saˇ o Paulo/Brazil (1983); Pos/PhD in the New School of University, New York (1996/97). Professor at the University of Campinas (UNICAMP) and at the University of 9 July, S. Paulo (UNINOVE). Researcher I of the CNPQ–National Council of Research. Secretary of the RC 47 of the International Sociological Association since 2002. Some of her published books on social movements: Movimentos Sociais no Inicio do Século XXI, (Vozes, 2007, 3a ed); O Protagonismo da Sociedade Civil (Cortez, 2008, 2a ed). She had published a new book this year, titled Novas Teorias ods Movimentos Sociais (Loyola, 2008). Kjeld Hogsbro, Professor of Social Work, Department of Sociology, Social Work and Organisation, Aalborg University, Denmark. PhD (1991) with a dissertation on social problems and self-help organizations in Denmark, he has published books on disabilities, mental illness, social work, and community development in Denmark, As senior research fellow at The Danish Institute of Governmental Research he conducted several evaluations of programs for people with mental illness, substance abuse, homelessness, brain injury, and pervasive developmental disorders. He has been Secretary of ISA Research Committee on Sociotechnics and Sociological Practice since 2002 and Vice-President since 2006. Jaime Jiménez has a doctoral degree in Social Systems Sciences from the University of Pennsylvania, USA. He is a full-time researcher for the Institute of Applied Mathematics and Systems (IIMAS), Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM). Currently, he is involved in research in the science and technology, education, and health systems. He is specialized in development processes, participative strategic planning, quality of working life, total quality, and group dynamics associated to organizational change. He has conducted research projects for UNESCO, OIT, and Mexican public and private agencies. He has published several books and research papers in specialized journals. Pat Jobes received his PhD in sociology at the University of Washington, USA. He has held academic positions in the United States, Romania, Pakistan, and Australia. Most of his research

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has analyzed social problems, deviance, and crime in rural communities by drawing upon cross-theoretical interpretations. His most recent research has analyzed crime and law enforcement in Australia. He is a past President of RC29 of the International Sociological Association. Devorah Kalekin-Fishman, senior researcher in the Faculty of Education at the University of Haifa, Israel, holds a doctorate from the University of Konstanz in Germany (adviser, Thomas Luckmann). Her work centers on critical studies of alienation, everyday life, multiculturalism, sociological perspectives on the senses, and biography in sociology. She is currently VicePresident for Publications of the ISA, past President of ISA RC 36 (Alienation), and founding editor of International Sociology Review of Books. Recent publications include a book on education in Israel, one on ultra-orthodox women (with Karlheinz Schneider), and three edited volumes on multiple citizenships in Europe (with Pirkko Pitkanen). Mustafa Koc teaches as an Associate Professor at the Department of Sociology and the Immigration and Settlement Studies Program at Ryerson University, Canada. He served as the director of the Centre for Studies in Food Security (1995-2005) at Ryerson and the founding president of the Canadian Association for Food Studies (2005-2008). His teaching and research interests include sociology of agriculture and food, social impacts of globalization and restructuring, and population movements. His publications include For Hunger-proof Cities, Working Together, and Interdisciplinary Perspectives in Food Studies. Leslie Laczko is Professor and Chair in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at the University of Ottawa, Canada. He holds degrees from the University of California, Berkeley and McGill University, and is the author of Pluralism and Inequality in Quebec, as well as a number of articles on language conflict, ethnic diversity, nationalism, the welfare state, and religious change. Robert Lambert is an Associate Professor at the University of Western Australia, where he is Director of the Australian Global Studies Centre. He is currently the President of the International Sociological Association’s Labour Movements Research Committee. His books include State and Labour in New Order Indonesia (University of Western Australia Press, 1997); Work Choices: The New Industrial Relations Agenda, with Julian Teicher and Anne O’Rourke (Prentice Hall, 2006), and Grounding Globalization: Labour in the Age of Insecurity, with Edward Webster and Andries Bezuidenhout (Blackwell, March 2008). He is the founder and coordinator of SIGTUR, a southern movement of democratic trade unions. Lauren Langman is a Professor of Sociology at Loyola University of Chicago. He received his PhD from the University of Chicago with further training at the Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis. He works in the tradition of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory, especially relationships between culture, alienation, politics/political movements, nations, and national character. He is currently President of Research Committee 36 (Alienation) of ISA. He served on the editorial boards of Sociological Theory, Current Perspectives in Social Theory, and Critical Sociology. Recent publications have looked at alienation, social movements, Islamic fundamentalism, the body, nationalism, and national character. Jan Marontate, Hon. BA (York U.), MSc and PhD (U. Montréal) taught sociology and held a Canada Research Chair in Technology and Culture at Acadia University in Nova Scotia before joining the School of Communication at Simon Fraser University in 2006. Her current research

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projects focus on arts networks, cultural heritage institutions, collective memory, changing forms of creative work, technological innovation, and trans-disciplinary collaboration. She is on the board of arts research groups in the Association internationale de sociologues de langue française (GR18) and the International Sociological Association (RC37) and a member of the International Advisory Board of Cultural Sociology. Stéphane Moulin is currently an Assistant Professor in social statistics in the Department of Sociology at the University of Montréal, Canada. He was an alumnus of the ENS LettresSciences Humaines (Lyon, France), holds a Phd in economics (Aix-Marseille II, France), and was a postdoctoral fellow in the Centre Maurice Halbwachs (Paris, France). His research interests cover the transitions between education and work in France and Canada, the empirical measure of gender discrimination, and the sociology of social statistics. Fabien Ohl is the Professor at the University of Lausanne (Switzerland) since 2006. Before that he was the Professor at Marc Bloch University of Strasbourg (France). His main research topics are on sport consumption and mediasport. He recently developed research on drugs and doping in sport. Fabien Ohl has published books and papers on sociology of sport; he edited Sociologie du sport: Perspectives internationales et mondialisation in 2006 (Presses Universitaires de France). He is also a Vice-President of ISSA (International Sociology of Sport Association) and ‘Associate Editor’ of the International Review for the Sociology of Sport, a review published by ISSA and Sage. Sandi Michele de Oliveira is an Associate Professor of Portuguese linguistics in the Department of Romance Studies at the University of Copenhagen and current Co-President of the Research Committee on Language and Society (RC 25 of the International Sociological Association). Research areas include the linguistic construction and negotiation of identity within the Portuguese-speaking world, with ongoing projects on address, cross-cultural comparisons of politeness, and linguistic acts of identity. Under preparation is a manuscript presenting address and identity in their kaleidoscopic complexity, as well as an integrated model to aid in their analysis. Alexius A. Pereira is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Sociology, National University of Singapore. He received his PhD (sociology) from the London School of Economics and Political Science. He is the author of State Collaboration and Development Strategies in China (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003). He is currently researching the social impact of foreign direct investments and transnational corporations in Asia. Between 2006 and 2010, he is serving as the Vice-President of the International Sociological Association’s Research Committee 02 (Economy and Society). Linda Pietrantonio is an Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Ottawa, Canada. Her main areas of expertise are the sociology of ethnic, race, and gender relations, in which she concentrates on the examination of the discursive aspect of majority/minority social relations. Her research and publications focus on popular and scientific uses of notions of equality, diversity, and difference. She is currently developing a meta-analysis of the notion of ‘majority’ and conducting comparative research (France–Canada) documenting the central role(s) of HIV/AIDS community associations in the collective appraisal of discrimination for various population groups. Nikita Pokrovsky is the Head of the Department of General Sociology at the State UniversityHigher School of Economics in Moscow and a full Professor of sociology at Moscow

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State University. He is the President of the Society of Professional Sociologists (Russia). Dr. Pokrovsky served as a member of the Program Committee of ISA (1998–2002) and the ISA Executive Committee (2006–2010). Currently, he is conducting a longitudinal interdisciplinary research on ‘Cellular Globalization and Focal Economy of Rural Communities in the North of Russia’ (2003–). Among his other scholarly interests are history of sociology, theory of globalization, sociology of consumption and tourism, visual sociology, and virtual reality. Hans Pruijt’s teaching and research focus on information technology, the organization of work, and social movements. Key publications are Job Design and Technology, Taylorism vs. antiTaylorism (London, 1997, Routledge), and ‘Is the institutionalization of urban movements inevitable? A comparison of the opportunities for sustained squatting in New York City and Amsterdam’ (in International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 2003, Vol. 27, 1). He obtained a MSc in Sociology from the University of Amsterdam and a PhD from Erasmus University of Rotterdam. Before working in academia, he was employed by the Royal Dutch Academy of Sciences as a scientific programmer. Bali Ram is a Senior Research Advisor, Demography Division, Statistics Canada and Adjunct Research Professor, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada. He obtained his MA in Sociology from the University of Western Ontario in 1971 and PhD in Sociology from the Ohio State University in 1975. He is current President of ISA Research Committee on Sociology of Population (RC41). He was President of the Federation of Canadian Demographers during 1999–2002. Most of his research has been in the various sub-fields of demography. His publications include a monograph, New Trends in the Family published by Statistics Canada, Ottawa (1990). Shefali S. Ram is a Research Associate (Epidemiology), Canadian Blood Services, Ottawa, Canada. Formerly, she was a Research Associate with the Cancer Research Institute, Queen’s University, Kingston, Canada. She obtained her MSc in Community Health and Epidemiology from Queen’s University in 2005. She has published articles primarily in the area of transfusion medicine. Elisa P. Reis is the Professor of Sociology at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and Chair of the Research Network for the Study of Inequality (NIED). She is also a fellow of the Brazilian Academy of Sciences and of the Academy of Sciences for the Developing World (TWAS). Her work concentrates mostly on sociological theory and on political sociology. She is currently doing research on the changing patterns of interaction between state, market, and civil society. Her recent publications also focus on elite perceptions of poverty and inequality. Elianne Riska is the Professor of Sociology at the Swedish School of Social Science, University of Helsinki, Finland. She was Chair of the Research Committee on Sociology of Health (RC 15), ISA, during 2002–2006. She has written on women physicians and gender and health. Her most recent book is Masculinity and Men’s Health: Coronary Heart Disease in Medical and Public Discourse (Rowman & Littlefield, 2004). Juan Sáez is a full Professor of Social Education at the University of Murcia, Spain. One of the leaders in the process of shaping social education as an independent academic and professional field in Spain, his research and publications cover a wide range of topics including health education, adult education, older adult education, and theory of professions. During the last couple of decades he has concentrated on much of his efforts in revisiting theories of professions and

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professionalization within social sciences in order to set a theoretical and practical framework to support Spanish social educators in their process of professionalization. Mariano Sánchez is the Professor of Sociology in the Department of Sociology at the University of Granada, Spain. As one of the scholars responsible for the development of Gerontagogy, i.e., older adult education, in Spain, he is interested in researching and writing about professional developments in this field. This interest took him, with his colleagues J. Sáez and L. Svensson, to co-edit recently the book Sociología de las profesiones. Pasado, presente y futuro, which includes a critical assessment and an updated state-of-the-art of Sociology of Professions in Spain. He has published articles on the professionalization of social professsions, specifically social education. Ulrike Schuerkens has doctorates in sociology, social anthropology, and ethnology, from the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales in Paris, and the diploma ‘Habilitation à diriger des recherches’ from the University Paris V – René Descartes. She is a Senior Lecturer at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris, France. She has published extensively on development, social change, migration, multiculturalism, and colonialism. Her latest monographs are Globalization and Transformations of Local Socio-economic Practices (ed., Routledge, 2008); Transnational Migrations and Social Transformations (ed., Current Sociology, 53, 4, 2005); Global Forces and Local Life-Worlds: Social Transformations (ed., Sage, 2004). Markus S. Schulz serves as the President of the ISA Research Committee on Futures Research (ISA-RC07). He is a Professor with the University of Illinois and researcher at New York University. He earned his PhD from the New School for Social Research. He co-authored a book series of six volumes on Internet and Politics in Latin America (Vervuert, Germany). Among his published articles is ‘Collective Action across Borders’ (Sociological Perspective). He has won national and international awards for his research, including ISA’s Prize for the Internationalization of Sociology. His current work focuses on new media, social movements, and global futures. David R. Segal received his PhD from the University of Chicago and spent the first nine years of his career at the University of Michigan. He is currently a distinguished Scholar-Teacher, Professor of Sociology, and Director of the Center for Research on Military Organization at the University of Maryland, and is a member of the executive committee and past President of Research Committee 01, Armed Forces & Society, of the International Sociological Association. His research focuses on military organization and personnel issues, and unconventional military operations. Marco Silvestro has a Master’s in sociology from the Université de Montréal, Canada. His thesis examined the institutionalization of the community movement for economic development in Montréal. His subsequent research has dealt with links between community and trade union movements in Québec, with self-management and ethical consumption. His doctorate deals with protests about the agro-food system in Québec by a farmer’s organization. He recently co-edited La consommation responsable. Entre bonne conscience individuelle et transformations collectives (Éditions Écosociété, 2007). He teaches courses on anarchist thought and on the sociology of social movements at the Université du Québec à Montréal.

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Ari Sitas is a writer and a sociologist. He is a past President of the South African Sociological Association and on the executive of the African Sociological Association. He is based in Durban at the University of KwaZulu Natal where he holds the Chair of Industrial, Organizational, and Labour Studies. Henry Teune is the Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, USA. He is a principal investigator of two on-going research programs, Universities as Sites of Citizenship, and Democracy and Local Governance. The latter has conducted surveys on democratic values and practices of thousands of local political leaders in 30 countries, in many of them for two and more points in time. He was President of the International Studies Association and has been active in both the International Political Science and Sociological Associations since the 1970s. His theoretical interests and writings continue to address relationships among development, democracy, and globalization. Joseph-Yvon Thériault is the Professor in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at the Université d’Ottawa, Canada where he holds the Research Chair on ‘Identité et Francophone’. A political sociologist, his work has focussed on relations between collective identity and democracy (citizenship) within the perspectives of the history of ideas and the comparative analysis of small societies. His work on Canadian society has concentrated on Québec, Acadia, and minority francophones in Canada. He was elected to the Academy of Social Sciences of the Royal Society of Canada in 2004 and holds the Trudeau Foundation Prize (2007–2010). Georgios Odysseus Tsobanoglou is the President of ISA-RC26, and Professor of Sociology of Work, Sociology Department, Aegean University, Greece. He obtained his PhD from Carleton’s Sociology Department. Member of CIRIEC, Liege, LEED, OECD, and IIAS, Brussels, Belgium, his publications include ‘The Ombudsman System in Greece’ in R. Gregory and P. Giddings (eds.) Righting Wrongs, ‘Aspects of the Public Justice System in Greece’, in M. Fabri and P. M. Langbroek (eds.) Changing Positions of Courts in Society, The Challenge of Change for Judicial Systems, ‘The Struggle for Integration in the Greek Juridical System’ in M. Fabri and F. Contini (eds.) Justice and Technology in Europe. Robert van Krieken is an Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Sydney, Australia. Author of Children and the State (1992), Norbert Elias (1998), lead author of the Australian sociology textbook, Sociology: Themes and Perspectives (2004) and numerous journal articles on the history and sociology of Australian childhoods. He is currently working on a book titled Civilizing Divorce, which develops a sociological account of the changes to the legal regulation of parent–child relations after separation and divorce. He is also past President of RC53, Sociology of Childhood, Vice-President of RC17, Sociology of Organizations, and a member of the ISA Executive. Edward Webster is Emeritus Professor and a former director of the Sociology of Work Unit at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa. He was a senior Fulbright Scholar at the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 1995. He is past President of the Research Committee on Labour Movements for the International Sociological Association. He is co-editor, with Glenn Adler, of Trade Unions and Democratisation in South Africa, 1985–1997 (NY: St Martin’s Press, 2000) and, with Karl von Holdt, of Beyond the

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Apartheid Workplace: Studies in Transition (University of KwaZulu Natal Press: Pietermaritzburg). He is author, with Rob Lambert and Andries Bezuidenhout, of Grounding Globalisation: Labour in the Age of Insecurity (Blackwell, 2008). Yuko K. Whitestone is a Research Associate at the Center for Research on Military Organization at the University of Maryland, USA. Her dissertation was on the impact of peacekeeping participation on professional identity of Japanese service members. Nira Yuval-Davis BA, etc. is a past President of the International Sociological Association Research Committee on Nationalism, Racism, and Ethnic Relations and appointment member of the UK 2008 RAE Sociology panel. She has written extensively on issues of racism, nationalism, multiculturalism, fundamentalisms, citizenship, identity, and gender relations in Britain, Europe, Israel, and other settler societies. Among her books are: Racialized Boundaries (Routledge, 1992); Unsettling Settler Societies (Sage, 1995); Gender and Nation (Sage 1997 [translated into seven languages]); Women, Citizenship and Difference (Zed Books, 1999); Warning Signs of Fundamentalisms (WLUML, 2004); and The Situated Politics of Belonging (Sage, 2006).

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Introduction

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1 Introduction Ann Denis and Devorah Kalekin-Fishman 1

This book is an outcome of the mid-term Research Council Conference of the International Sociological Association (ISA), which Ann Denis, as Vice-President for Research of the ISA (2002–2006) organized at the University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Canada in May 2004. Some of the local members of the Scientific (Program) Committee (Ann Denis, Victor Armony, Karen March, Joseph-Yvon Thériault) developed the conference theme, in consultation with its international members (Ari Sitas, ISA Vice-President for Program, 2002–2006 and Piotr Sztompka, ISA President, 2002–2006). Our challenge was to provide an opportunity for representatives of the Research Committees, Working Groups, and Thematic Groups of the ISA (who collectively make up its Research Council), to discuss contributions/approaches of their respective specialized branches of sociology in a collective reflection around a common theme. Our chosen theme was Conflict, Competition, Cooperation: Contemporary Sociological Theory and Research in the XXIst Century. In our call for papers, addressed both to representatives from the ISA Research Council (as well as the ISA Officers and members of the ISA Executive Committee’s Research Coordinating (sub)-Committee) and to members of the Canadian Sociology and

Anthropology Association and l’ Association canadienne de sociologues et anthropologues de langue française, the national associations which were co-sponsoring the conference, we invited participants to discuss how specialized fields of sociology contribute to the description, interpretation and explanation of conflict, competition and cooperation as contemporary processes of social and societal relations. The conference and this Handbook provide an unparalleled opportunity to share, identify commonalities among, and establish links between different fields of research. At the same time it has allowed us to document and extend our analyses – both theoretical and empirical – of these social processes in societies throughout the world. In our elaboration on the theme, both in the call for conference papers and in the subsequent invitation to submit revised papers for publication, we provided the following guidelines to participants. Conflict, competition, cooperation: these classical notions within sociology remain very pertinent for the analysis of the aspirations and realities within and among contemporary societies in our globalizing world. Equally, these are notions which can have distinctive meanings, depending on the field of sociology, the theoretical approach, and/or the cultural context, both within and across societies.

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We went on to point out that theoretically these notions may be conceived of as being on a continuum, as being unconnected, mutually exclusive poles of social relations, or as being intertwined (and perhaps complementary). From some theoretical perspectives, we noted, only one – conflict, for instance – is considered key to the analysis of social (and societal) relations; from others, two – competition and cooperation, for instance – are concurrently important. We suggested that the importance and the meaning of these concepts can also vary within a particular field of sociology due to diverse theoretical, methodological, and epistemological perspectives. These variations may be – but are not necessarily – related to the specifics of national sociologies, to addressing international comparisons, or to questions of particular salience within a given socio-historical context. In addressing conflict/competition/cooperation, one may also ask: from whose perspective and at what level of analysis? Analysis may be from the perspective of, for example, the majority, one or more minorities, and/or (relative) equals. It may be at the macro, the meso or the micro level – about societies, states, nations, or groups (local, national or transnational), which are based on such criteria as ethnicity, gender, social class, occupation, kinship etc. The possible impact of individuals’ multiple (and potentially conflicting) social locations and identities may be a preoccupation. How and to what extent can actors choose or are they constrained to participate in social relations characterized by cooperation, competition, conflict? Again this question can be addressed at one or more of the micro, meso, or macro levels. In brief, in their papers participants were invited to present a synthesis of how and to what extent the themes of conflict, competition, and cooperation are examined within contemporary analyses in the field of specialization of the Research Committee, Working Group or Thematic Group they represented.2 In relation to one or more of the

main topics of analysis in this field of specialization, and bearing in mind the questions suggested above, they were invited to consider what types of questions are addressed, what types of explanations are proposed, and, perhaps, what some of the main empirical findings are. Where social policy (national or international) is of relevance, the authors were encouraged to consider its implicit theoretical agenda, and the constraints that it imposes on the options of conflict, competition, cooperation in social and societal relations, and/or the constraints which other socio-political factors impose on it. Authors were encouraged to highlight alternative approaches, tensions, and contradictions within the field, drawing on material from several societies, and, ideally, from more than one region of the world. In short, within the analytical framework of the classical notions of conflict, competition, and cooperation, an invitation was launched which aimed to be very inclusive, providing ‘space’ for contributions from the wide range of specialities and approaches represented within the International Sociological Association. Ann Denis and Devorah Kalekin-Fishman, then a member of the Research Coordinating Committee (2002–2006) and now VicePresident for Publications (2006–2010), have worked together on this Handbook. Authors of each of the 52 presentations at the conference were invited to revise and submit their papers for consideration for publication. While some had already committed their paper to another publication outlet, and for others the time-lines or the focus of the book were not appropriate, a total of 28 chapters have been accepted, double the number initially anticipated for publication. Given the rich selection available, the publication, originally to have been a special journal issue and/or a regular length monograph volume, was transformed, at Sage’s recommendation, into a Handbook. Using the prisms of conflict, competition, and cooperation for focusing on what it means to be doing sociology, researchers

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INTRODUCTION

from the global South as well as from the global North were able to provide integrative descriptions of theoretical orientations, salient subfields of sociology, and sociological interpretations of general and specific social problems. Thus the collection introduces readers to ways in which the focal concepts are used in diverse fields of sociology and how they are applied to research by scholars from different national traditions working within the same discipline. The material covered is of interest to researchers and practitioners in anthropology, psychology, economics, political science as well as in sociology. Both experts in the subfields and those with a more general interest in them will find the chapters informative and engaging. Because the chapters all deal with issues that are relevant to contemporary reality, the Handbook is appropriate for university use, especially for graduate seminar courses but also for advanced undergraduate courses that focus on research, analysis, and application. Following this Introduction, the chapters have been divided into four main sections: (1) ‘Analyses of Approaches to Research’; (2) ‘Trends in Conceptualizing Conflict, Competition, and Cooperation in Subfields of Sociology’; (3) ‘Research on Social Issues – Interweaving Processes’; (4) ‘Illustrative Case Studies’. The concluding chapter highlights the commonalities, divergences, insights, and challenges which have been presented. The six papers in Part 1 (‘Analyses of Approaches to Research’) provide a disciplinary overview of how conflict, competition, and cooperation figure in broad orientations to sociology. Their dialectical inter-relationship is evident on the macro, meso, and micro levels when examined through the lens of theories of alienation (Langman and Kalekin-Fishman, ‘Alienation: Critique and Alternative Futures’), and when considering the concept of belonging (Yuval-Davis, ‘Identity, Citizenship and Contemporary, Secure, Gendered Politics of Belonging’). They show that the processes can be traced in research that focuses on the level of wideranging governmental practices (Hogsbro,

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Pruijt, Pokrovsky, and Tsobanoglou, ‘Sociological Practice and the SocioTechnics of Governance’), and in the development of appropriate methodologies in a specific field (Banakar, ‘Law through Sociology’s Looking Glass’). Further permutations of the three processes can be seen to characterize developments in the analysis of community organizations (Reis, ‘New Ways of Relating Authority and Solidarity’) as well as in ‘New Collaborative Forms of Doing Research’ (Jimenez). With the complexification of the social world, sociology has responded by making room for subfields each of which focuses on a different domain. Thus, in Part 2 of the Handbook (‘Trends in Conceptualizing Conflict, Competition, and Cooperation in Subfields of Sociology’), the seven chapters sketch how conflict, competition, and cooperation are theorized and underlie research in the sociology of development and social transformations (Schuerkens), health sociology (Riska, Annandale, and Dingwall), sociology of the professions (Evetts, Gadea, Sanchez, and Saez), sociology of sport (Ohl), sociology of the arts (Marontate), sociology of childhood (Van Krieken and BühlerNiederberger) and the study of social mobility (Moulin and Bernard). Although the articles make no pretense to being exhaustive, the subfields described in this section provide insights into the range of interests that sociologists deal with as well as into the diverse ways in which an orientation to processes can be adapted to different aspects of social life. Part 3 of the Handbook (‘Research on Social Issues – Interweaving Processes’) is devoted to discussions of some of the problems – and betimes to the types of solutions – that can be better understood with the help of theories of conflict and/or competition and/or cooperation. In the seven articles, researchers present sociological approaches to problems that arise in health, illness and mortality in Less Developed Countries (Ram and Ram) and in Military Peacekeeping Operations (Segal, Dandeker, and Whitestone). They also look at how reductions of social

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benefits are raising new problems worldwide, among them, Health Care (Browne). Additional problems are pin-pointed in the domain of economic life: Markets and Labour (Webster and Lambert) and Political Consumerism (Silvestro). The two remaining chapters relate to the problems that computer development has created – Digital Futures (Schulz), and to the prevalence of Crime in Rural Communities (Donnermeyer, Jobes, and Barclay). This last article constitutes a reminder that crime is not exclusively a function of modern urbanism. By contrast with the first three sections which provide wide-ranging views of orientations, subfields, and problems, the eight chapters of Part 4 present ‘Illustrative Case Studies’ which exemplify the workings of conflict, competition, and cooperation in particular contexts. Koc brings findings from research on the distribution of food throughout the world. Gohn describes how different theoretical orientations interpret social movements in Brazil as moved by conflict or by competition or by cooperation. Armony analyzes the meanings of social justice and social mobilization in El Salvador and in Honduras by examining the discourse of activists in responses to open questions. Sitas looks at industrial relations in South Africa, while Pereira explains how Singapore’s continuously evolving investment strategy

illustrates the impact of choices by the State on national economic outcomes. Teune looks at attitudes toward democracy among heads of local councils in Sweden, Russia, and Poland, and presents insights into how the local may be aligned with global institutions to reduce conflicts. De Oliveira discusses how modes of address reflect and guide the tangling and untangling of negotiation. Finally, five researchers, Couton, Denis, Laczko, Pietrantonio, and Theriault, examine different aspects of ethno-linguistic diversity in Canada and more specifically in Québec, with a special emphasis on how the issues are often dealt with in contradictory ways between the two jurisdictional levels. In the final chapter of the Handbook, we sum up implications for the development of sociology in the twenty-first century of the various meanings of conflict, competition, and cooperation that are elaborated in the kaleidoscope of approaches presented here.

NOTES 1 Authors’ names are listed alphabetically, since both contributed equally. 2 In the case of those not representing a Research Committee, Working Group or Thematic Group, participants were asked to examine the issues in the field of research in which they had an interest.

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PART ONE

Analyses of Approaches to Research

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2 Alienation: Critique and Alternative Futures Lauren Langman and Devorah Kalekin-Fishman

The burden of this chapter is to show how, despite a multiplicity of interpretations and a great number of conceptual critiques, alienation theory remains a valuable analytical tool in the social sciences. By looking at social reality in the twenty-first century with the theoretical apparatus derived from analyses of alienation, we commit ourselves at the outset to grasping the world as a site of conflict, oppression, and exploitation which contextualizes social life and is likely to foster alienation. More recently, however, many researchers are concluding that a dialectical analysis of social processes and social structures reveals that alienation can also give rise to moments of competition and even of cooperation. Alienation has been, is and will remain a central concept for sociologists insofar as it reveals how life within the fragmented communities of meaning of modern, technologically advanced, hierarchical societies inform the nature of deviant and criminal behavior, community, and personal life. Alienation can be seen as a way the social thwarts the freedom and fulfillment of the personal. In this chapter we discuss how insight into the diverse workings of alienation

shows its enduring value for sociological inquiry.

INTRODUCTION Derived from the Latin word for ‘other,’ the concept of alienation has been applied to various domains of living in order to describe different types of conditions and situations. In Roman law the concept has been deployed to refer to the transfer of property and giving up all claims upon sale. In the Middle Ages, it was used by the early psychiatrists, the alienists, to mean the loss of normal mental competence. More recent meanings have included the surrender of personal privilege for the good of the collective, or the Hegelian notion of estrangement of the world from transcendental spirit (cf. Israel, 1971; Meszaròs, 1970; Smith, 2005). In the nineteenth century the term alienation was adapted to explaining the unsettling structural dysfunctions that were making radical changes in the world people knew. Social theorists were confronted with the upheavals

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of social life that followed upon the development of capitalism. The on-going concentration of industry, the fragmentation of the labor process, and attendant intensive urbanization that atomized social relationships required new tools for investigating society. In attempting to explain the adversities of a rapidly expanding modernity, the fathers of sociology pinpointed different foci as the dynamic mechanisms of change. Emphasizing the centrality of rationality, the primary value of modernity, Weber (1958/1946) saw that Enlightenment based rationality of capitalism had expanded to almost every realm of social and personal life. Capitalism, as a rationally organized economic system, depended on a rationalized administrative apparatus that entrapped people into ‘iron cages.’ The bureaucratic implementations of rules and regulations which were efficient in the workplace were debilitating in social life, and caused an imprisonment of the body and the mind. Following upon the positivist legacy of Comte, Durkheim (1951/1897) attempted to understand the shifting normative sands of modernity as driven by a disruption of standards for behavior. As traditional precepts waned, new rules emerged that were not however widely shared in a society with an advanced division of labor. In the varied experiences of daily life, people were faced with ‘anomie,’ uncertainty about what norms were applicable to novel situations, and about how norms were to govern action. In contrast with the attempts to situate the effects of capitalism as limitations on action or on thinking about rules, Marx (1978/1844) argued that alienation was an inherent consequence of a capitalist society in which one class owned private property and another class, the workers, sold their labor power as a commodity. Capitalism, as the latest expression of an economic system based on classes with competing interests, most clearly revealed how the wealth of the ruling class, the bourgeoisie, was based on the exploitation of the workers, the proletariat. But wage labor, necessarily fostered alienation that

thwarted workers’ humanity in every domain of their existence. In his analysis, alienation followed the estrangement of the worker from his/her tools on the one hand, and from the products of his/her labor, on the other. The capitalist mode of production resold the labor the worker expended in the production of commodities, but that ‘surplus value’ went to the owners of capital, not the workers who produced it. The sale of labor as a commodity that produced commodities, created a system that stood outside the worker and refluxed back upon her. Workers were rendered powerless, their communities lost coherence, and their selfhood was truncated. Work no longer provided workers with sources of meaning and/or self expression. Moreover, people who had to earn their livelihood according to arrangements imposed by the capitalist system could not escape its pervasive effects. Notwithstanding the radical transformations of the current world by a globalized capitalist political economy, the Marxist critique remains a viable framework for revealing the nature of late capitalism and unpacking its manifold consequences. Current theorization of alienation builds upon the shift in Marxian theory that recaptured the concerns with culture that began with the neo-Marxian analyses of Korsch (1923), Lukacs (1971/1920), and the Frankfurt School (see Jay, 1996; Kellner, 1989) in the first half of the twentieth century. Against the economistic reductionism of the Second International, these theorists defended the role of culture and subjectivity first articulated by Marx in his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (1978/1844), The German Ideology (1978/1846), and The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon (1978/1852). In the twentieth century, the concept of alienation was central to the Frankfurt School’s understanding of the rise of fascism, and somewhat later, to their analyses of the nature of consumerism. They synthesized Weber’s discussions of Protestantism and rationality with Freud’s notions of individual character and his understandings of group

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ALIENATION: CRITIQUE AND ALTERNATIVE FUTURES

psychology when they noted how alienation prompted ‘an escape from freedom’ especially among ‘authoritarian character types’ with attenuated social ties and difficulties in fathoming the deeper significance of their actions (Adorno et al., 1950; Fromm, 1965). Following World War II, they explored insights into the effects of the ‘culture industries,’ the frameworks in which both high and popular art were, to their minds, mass produced for the sake of both profits and ideologies of deception that sustained ‘one dimensional’ consumer society. While concerns with alienation were rooted in the nature of wage labor in a class society, in more recent conceptualizations, thinking about alienation led to a migration of its locus from production to the nature of modern consumption and contemporary forms of self-expression. For example, Adorno (2000) explored the pervasiveness of alienation in the arts and in personality, and concluded that the alienation that was growing out of conflict was an indicator of the inevitable deterioration of humanity. Ironically, Gramsci (1991), who spent ten years in fascist prisons until his death in 1937 at the age of 46, found ways to describe the dialectical possibility of overcoming alienation. In his view, capitalism was deeply entrenched in the twentieth century not only because the historic bloc (ruling classes) controlled the institutions of force and violence, i.e., the police, the courts, and the army, but also because it ruled indirectly by means of a hegemonic ideology that engineered ‘willing consent.’ By hegemony, Gramsci meant that: the entire system of values, attitudes, beliefs, and morality which permeated society had the effect of supporting the status quo in power relations. … To the extent that this prevailing consciousness is internalized by the population, it becomes part of what is generally called ‘common sense’ so that the philosophy, culture, and morality of the ruling elite comes to appear as the natural order of things (Boggs, 1976: 39).

Nevertheless, Gramsci did not believe that the hegemonic culture imposed by the traditional intellectuals allied to the historic bloc – the coalition of economic, political, and

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cultural elites – was all powerful. Hegemony was an on-going process located within a larger social reality ever subject to change, and therefore the nature of hegemony constantly needed to be revised. His analysis revealed that openings for contestation and challenge were especially likely at moments of crisis. While one such opening was seen in attempts to organize and unite the Southern Italian peasants and Northern workers, the Church subverted these efforts by demonizing communists and warning that those who joined unions would perish in hell. Moreover, as the appeal of religion waned, consumerism emerged as the dominant hegemonic justification. Nevertheless, Gramsci remained convinced that workers would be able to escape the impasse of alienation. As he put it, society at best sustains only a few ‘formal’ intellectuals, but the fact is that all people are intellectuals. Dialectically, he could show that the ‘organic intellectuals’ among workers would eventually be able to forge counter-hegemonic understandings and articulate a culture that would both reflect their true position and be able to envision alternatives. In sum, successive re-conceptualizations of alienation have provided seminal perspectives on the failure to realize the emancipatory promise of the Enlightenment. As we will show, however, in the spirit of Gramsci, alienation has become a tool of analysis that offers not only a political critique but also images of alternative futures that could envision the overcoming of alienation. Thus while alienation was first theorized in terms of powerlessness, social fragmentation, and the warping of selfhood in industry. Marx would later extend his analysis to the political alienation of the French peasants. Further, his analysis of Hegel and the German ideology as alienated consciousness moved the analysis to the cultural/ideological levels. Finally, his notion of commodity fetishism, as a reification, when a class relationship appeared as a thing, completed the move of alienation to the cultural realms – though it would need to await Lukacs for a comprehensive analysis of

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the reification of consciousness. We would note that not only has alienation expanded from the factory floor to culture, but so too do we now look at alienation more dialectically. Today we also look at how even within contexts that might be considered alienating, there are ways people attempt to find agency, community, and forms of subjectivity that overcome their alienation. Thus the very existence of wage labor presupposes its negation, creative labor, political alienation presupposes freedom and democracy, and cultural alienation promises transcendence and freedom, what Hegel claimed the ‘joyous’ consciousness. Finally, we would note that the concept of alienation has important implications for many other basic sociological concepts such as social conflict, criminal, and deviant behavior, and even religious behavior, such as the various ways many people turn to fundamentalism as a way to overcome alienation qua powerlessness, meaninglessness and/or social fragmentation. In the community of sociologistresearchers, interest in the concept of alienation has flourished, waned, and flourished again. There was widespread interest in alienation in the 1950s and 1960s, with studies focusing on the workplace and its impact on selected aspects of social life. At that time, researchers operationalized alienation as a delimited quantitative index of attitudes (see Ludz, 1973; Seeman, 1991). Concerns with alienation declined as political activism among minorities, women, and anti-war crusaders in the late 1960s overcame alienation and fostered progressive political changes in the Americas and in Europe. Meanwhile, inspired by semiotics and critiques of language and signification, post-modern and post-structural critiques of de-centered selfhood, and the implosion of institutional boundaries signaled a shift from actually existing conditions to texts, representations, and simulations. Thus, many scholars embraced perspectives in which alienation was regarded as an essentialist concept located in now outmoded grand narratives.

Social critique centered on the anxious interests of consumer society. Post-modern and post-structural theories, concerned with representation and meanings decoupled from the political economy, viewed selfhood as a disconnected series of self presentations, while social life and interaction were described as little more than a pastiche of free-floating signifiers (Gergen, 1991; Ritzer, 1997; Rosenau, 1992; Turner, 1990). This vision of social relations as random and fragmented left no room for conceiving of alienation.

ALIENATION IN SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH In the dominant sociological literature of the twenty-first century, however, alienation, interpreted as estrangement, dehumanization, stunting of relationships, and the hegemonic domination of consciousness, remains salient. The globalized production of McJobs (Ritzer, 2004) and the ever more relentless colonization of selfhood and desire (Hochschild, 1986) underscore the insight that alienation in the classical Marxist sense has not disappeared. The soaring accumulation of wealth by trans-national capitalist elites, whose intellectuals celebrate neoliberalism, has been accompanied by the expansion of labor saving technologies of production as well as outsourcing work to developing countries, and has had adverse consequences for millions of people. Increasingly workers have to contend with the erosion of job security, the contraction of entitlement programs, and growing instability in the quality of life as standards of living decline. Some of the responses to the adverse, destabilizing, and alienating effects of globalization range from fundamentalism and reactionary politics on the one hand, to extravagant machinations in popular culture. Exemplars of these contemporary forms of alienation can be found among racist, antiSemitic, and homophobic clusters of groups

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and individuals (see Berlet and Lyons, 2000).1 In popular culture, we note the rise of MTV, Music Television, a channel devoted to the youth market consisting primarily of music videos, songs with a variety of visuals from street scenes to dancers, and there may well be a chorus dancing in the streets. The basic content of MTV consists of unending spectacles of song, dance, and consumerism in which an artificial reality, or ‘hyper-reality’ is idealized. The bodies of the singers and dancers represent an intersection of individual genetics and extensive training such that very few viewers will ever sing, dance or look like the performers, yet the viewers, especially young women, will be encouraged to spend vast sums of money on clothes, adornments, cosmetics, and medications in illusory quests to achieve the looks, lifestyles, and perhaps the unbridled eroticism of their favorite idols. Spectacles of ever-gyrating bodies, qua commodified representations, are perpetually celebrating hedonistic sexuality, appearance, and the happiness supposedly attainable by all. The collage of the songs, dances, and celebrity images re-inscribe and valorize essentialist notions of gender which, as role models of ‘ideal’ masculinity and femininity, are both alienating and dysfunctional in the current world. Yet these images have multiple uses; they sell clothes, cars, jewelry, foods, medications, and beverages. The music evokes emotions of power and desires to live in an ideal, if imaginary world, where the good life is promised to all, but which, as is soon evident to youth who join the labor force, very few can attain. Other realms of popular culture, such as Goth, punk, heavy metal, or ‘ghetto rap’ which critique the conformity and one-dimensional nature of an alienated and alienating society, create spaces for alternative, counter-cultural life styles. Their articulation of alienation and anger, however, as commodities produced by the culture industries, ultimately neutralizes the promise of political impact (see below). In sum, we suggest three moments of contemporary capitalism that show why alienation

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remains a significant aspect of late modern social life. 1 Wages for labor in routinized services include payment for demonstrations of emotion: While manufacturing has declined in the developed world, jobs today are often automated, computerized, deskilled, and routinized. In interpersonal services, workers are exploited in new ways; they are required to do ‘emotion work,’ commodifying their feelings to ensure corporate profits (Hochschild, 1986). People employed in these types of jobs have to balance their admitted submission and their being palpably ‘other’ than the front demanded of them (Braverman, 1998; Goffman, 1958; Leidner, 1993; Ritzer, 2004). 2 Changes in technology: Advanced technologies of information and production have enabled global capital to produce a vast array of goods from cell phones to pharmaceuticals to highly sophisticated means of destruction. At the same time, technologies of surveillance and control foster new modes of domination, dehumanization, and, indeed, of alienation (Foucault, 1995; Gergen, 1991). In doctoral research on the functions of Internet purchasing and inventory control, Zalewsky and Rezba (2000), found that not only was on-line ordering and computer-tracked inventory control devoid of human contact and brutalizing, but the electronic Panopticon enabled greater surveillance and control by management. It is important to remember, however, that technologies can also enable new kinds of freedom and fulfillment. 3 Culture and identity: While Mead (1934) saw the self as an outcome of negotiation that begins in early childhood, Erikson’s (1950) elaboration of Freudian theory which pinpointed the crystallization of one’s identity as a developmental achievement of the late teens, was already outdated in his lifetime, something he appreciated. Instead of finding themselves capable of defining talents, obligations, aspirations, many young people were seen to take out a ‘moratorium,’ so to speak, putting off the definition of self until the beginning of their fourth decade (Erikson, 1980; Keniston, 1965). Half a century later, the very image of an integrated Eriksonian selfhood is unsustainable, just as the Meadian image of ‘I’s and ‘me’s calmly acting in tandem and interacting with role partners has given way to a vision of interaction as a hectic battleground where highly calculated self presentations

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compete with each other. Prodded by a kaleidoscope of possibilities, on the one hand, and stifled by instant commodified representations, on the other, the individual’s search for selfhood is likely to come up against an unruly collection of fragments that cannot, in essence, be configured into a coherent, stable respectable self. Deliberate escapes from the confusion lead many of the alienated to take refuge in collective certainties such as religious fundamentalisms and extreme nationalisms. These ideologies foster rigid identities as adaptations to the rapidly changing world of today. Yet such fundamentally alienated identities (racist and xenophobic with patriarchal and/or homophobic attitudes and mobilizations) are ill-equipped to deal with late modernity (Berlet and Lyons, 2000). On the other hand, various youth cultures formulate pastiches of identity that are marketed as ‘cool’ (Rushkoff, 2001), or shape subcultures that create a carnivalesque identity as bricolage (Langman, 2000, 2005a). Such subcultures may grant encapsulated realms for alternative identities, meanings, and communities, by enabling ‘escape’ from the social and withdrawal from the political. But in the end the presumed alternatives serve to reproduce the alienating conditions that fostered them.

Given the dilemmas evident in contemporary life, it is understandable why there is renewed interest in Marx’s dialectical approach, including its dialectical methodology for uncovering how capitalism fosters malaise and discontent and also plants the seeds of its own demise.

MARXIAN DIALECTICS AND ALIENATION One of the fundamental differences between Marx and other theorists of modernity was his adaptation of the dialectical approach pioneered by Hegel. While Hegel’s analysis was ideal and abstract, however, Marx insisted that dialectical analysis must consider first and foremost the actual corporeal human subject that is a constituent component of material reality. Marx appropriated

Hegel’s dialectical method and grounded it in material conditions, the actual lives of living people. As Marx (1978/1844: 72) put it (emphasis in the original): The whole history of the alienation process and the whole process of the retraction of alienation is therefore nothing but the history of the production of abstract (i.e., absolute) thought – of logical, speculative thought. The estrangement, which therefore forms the real interest of the transcendence of this alienation, is the opposition of in itself and for itself, of consciousness and selfconsciousness, of object and subject – that is to say, it is the opposition between abstract thinking and sensuous reality or real sensuousness within thought itself.

Insofar as thought was the subject in Hegel’s presentation of objectivity as the externalization of the idea, thinking objectifies and alienates itself (Entäusserung), and objectifies the self into an object. But consciousness, as externalized, doubles back on itself, and transcends itself. Imminent in thought is the potential of the idea to negate itself, that is, to negate the negations.2 Marx’s critique of Hegel was based on the separation of consciousness from the actual human subject that is immanent within material conditions. Overlooking material reality, Hegel presented the subject of the dialectic as disembodied self-consciousness, with the result that even when Hegel did deal with material conditions (civil society, the state, ethical life, etc.), he reproduced the very dualism that he had earlier critiqued in Kant. Having concluded that the idealistic aspect of the Hegelian dialectic was itself an expression of alienated consciousness, Marx established his own point of departure. In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven. That is to say ... [w]e set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this lifeprocess. The phantoms formed in the human brain are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material life-process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to material premises. Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of independence. They have

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no history, no development; but men, developing their material production and their material intercourse, alter, along with this their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking. Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life (Marx and Engels, 1978/1846: 154–5).

More specifically, as noted, under conditions of wage labor, where labor power is sold as a commodity, the product of that labor was a commodity that was owned by the capitalist while the whole of commodity production now stood outside the worker. His/her labor created that ‘externalized system that now refluxed back upon him/her as an alien force, as an outside power’ (Marx, 1978/1844: 72). Yet Hegel valorized Reason, for he contended that if and when people understood the nature of domination as a historical moment, they could transcend it. Thus within the context of alienated labor, there was a possibility of transcendence which would enable the attainment of de-alienated labor. Dunayevskaya (1965: 51) put it very clearly: It is here – in the second stage of Marx’s relation to the Hegelian dialectic – that Marx fully transcended Hegel. The split in the philosophic category of the Absolute into two, like the split of the economic category of labor into labor as activity and laborpower as commodity, forged new weapons of comprehension. It enabled Marx to make a leap in thought to correspond to the new, the creative activity of the workers in establishing a society on totally new foundations which would, once and for all, abolish the division between mental and manual labor and unfold the full potentialities of man – a truly new human dimension.

Thus the fundamental difference between Marx’s notion of alienation from either rationalization and entrapment as for Weber, or anomie for Durkheim, was that for Marx, social life had a material foundation and alienation, as a cultural moment, was rooted in wage labor, and therefore rested on contradictions of class interest. For Marx, the domination of private property, inherent in capitalism, held within itself the possibility of overcoming its unique and tragic dysfunction, alienation. His dialectical approach made it possible to establish a society where all could find the full realization of their creative

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possibilities within a meaningful and supportive community. This required the negation of negation and the subsequent move from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom. But further, for Marx, the material and cultural (ideological) were not separate realms, as bourgeois thought would make it seem (see Lukacs, 1971/1920). Bourgeois thought, much like the fetish of commodities, was reified and its ideologies were imbued with contradictions revealed by critique, the Ideologiekritik of the Frankfurt School. Their critical analyses of the prevailing concepts of ‘common sense’ demonstrated that the ideological conceptualization of ‘freedom’ sustained the freedom of the market at the expense of alienated individuals, while the valorization of ‘equality’ masked the inequality of a class society. Yet the freedom and equality promised by capital, thwarted by the alienation it generated yet immanent within its ideology, would follow the overcoming of alienation. This insight, examining the migration of alienation from the specifics of labor power commodified to diverse dimensions of the cultural realm has been one of the major developments in alienation research. Indeed, on the one hand, studies show how alienation can be discerned in unexpected domains, such as science, culture, leisure, and the realm of what we think of as private life. On the other hand, researchers are uncovering the implied dialectic to show how the very pervasiveness of alienation provides opportunities for evading or even overcoming it.3

ALIENATION AS THE INEVITABLE HEGEMONIC DOMINATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS? There is still room for clarifying Lukacs’ question of how consciousness was dominated by the reified categories of bourgeois thinking that served capitalist interests. Among current studies of alienation, some researchers who present theorizations of various social

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domains voice hope for change but cannot clearly confirm that change is possible. They show that domination is integrated into the modes of operation of political, economic, social, and cultural apparatuses – including the sciences and the realm of high, as well as mass culture. One major consequence of various institutional arrangements is the mystification of the way they impact consciousness, especially of language, perception, and understanding to mystify their operations and foster ‘willing assent’ to structures and processes that foster alienation. Harry Dahms (2002), for example, argues that contemporary theorists tend to ignore Marx’s insight into the totality of alienation’s influence. Thus, they are likely to disregard the fact that the very tools they employ in studying how alienation characterizes modern society may be determined by the alienation they are supposed to illuminate. Calling for an invigorated, interdisciplinary, critical theory of society, Dahms explains that in his view, it is highly likely that what is defined as the work of social scientists imposes at once both alienation and an illusion that the pitfalls of alienation can be evaded. Striving to uncover the inner meanings of social phenomena, sociologists themselves, in his view, embracing empiricism, as the logic of ‘rationality,’ often become victims of an illusion of objectivity; indeed reification based on the choices of such methods is almost inevitable under the conditions of late modernity. Much as Lukacs showed how using the very categories of bourgeois thought thwarted the proletariat from seeing their own ‘standpoint,’ the embrace of various ‘rationalist’ empirical research strategies to study alienation fosters the very alienation that would be studied. Such research, by ‘disavowing’ a normative stance, cannot inform the transcendence of alienation. Similar concerns underlie Matthew David’s (2005) discussion of how contemporary scientific projects contribute to alienation. Reviewing recent developments in technologies of cloning, genetics, and computing,

David concludes that these fields serve to valorize essentialist understandings of humans as machines, albeit complex, multifunctional machines. Based on an implicit determinism, they lead to reductionist scientific conceptions that normalize alienation in mechanistic and fragmented accounts of humanity. Contemporary theoretical approaches to these developments at the frontiers of natural science actually contribute to the spread of alienation, the locus of which is the colonization of the life-world. The body is subjected to systematically repressive aspects of rationality, and instrumental reason is implemented to distort distinctively human communicative interaction. People are conceived of as disembodied, insensitive to free and open communication, and impervious to either personal or social creativity. Building on the neo-Marxian Ideologiekritik of the Frankfurt School with its reliance on Freudian theory, David N. Smith (1996) explains the compulsivity of the ‘authoritarian character’ that disposed the German working class to support Hitler rather than socialist or communist parties. From their studies of authority within the family, the psyche, the political economy, and the interiorization of ideologies that shape how people think, Horkheimer and Adorno (1976), Adorno et al. (1950), and Fromm (1965) concluded that certain kinds of character structures, alienated from either power or communities, were likely to gravitate to conservative, if not reactionary, political parties when faced with social crises. Extending their theorization, Smith finds that the constructs of projection, aggression, and the personalization of abstract social forces explain the world of alienated labor, as well as how and why the alienated classes, when made fearful or anxious by larger social crises and contradictions, become enthralled with the appeals of charismatic leaders. Elaborating on what he calls ‘authority fetishism,’ Smith claims that deference to a person in authority does not stem, as is usually supposed, from an admiration of his/her

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personal qualities. Rather, adulation of the authority figure surfaces because he/she is a personification, a representation of larger economic forces. Further, deference to different variants of authority is facilitated by the tendency of individuals to idealize and submit to those above them in order to gain their love and powerful protection. The masochism is ‘balanced’ by their denigration of, sadism toward, and demands for disproportionate obedience from those below them in status. Tending to displace aggression, projecting it onto ‘enemies,’ such people embrace a Manichaean outlook on the world, seeing it as consisting of good friends, ‘people like us,’ and vile enemies, ‘those that are different.’ These understandings are not merely implicit. Right-wing movements among populations that have been alienated by neoliberal globalization often develop similar conspiracy theories that become part of a reactionary ideology (Berlet, 2005). Berlet describes a range of perspectives (moderate, reactionary, radical, and extreme right) that accord with variations in group memberships, tactics, and agendas. Embedded narratives describing conspiracies and openly embracing scapegoating and demonization are designed to show the alienated how history has led to the oppression that members of such groups are currently experiencing. Elements of this kind are evident in some fundamentalist versions of Islam that have developed in the last two decades – especially those that might be considered forms of clerical fascism in which only the restoration of the caliphate, and traditional theologies, can purge Islamic societies of the evil influences of the Western world. Facing economic stagnation, repressive governments, cultural assaults, and powerlessness in face of the Israeli military, the strategies and appeals of such Islamisms are based on conspiracy narratives. The tragedy, of course, is that they have brought hardship, misery, and poverty to Muslims who accept their interpretation. Berlet warns that the plight of the alienated, the marginalized, and the downtrodden must

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be taken into consideration just as efforts are made to understand the rhetoric by means of which masses are recruited by the political right. Further, the nature of alienation today can be seen in various conspiracy theories of the left as well: consider the many ‘explanations’ of 9/11 as the work of Mossad or the CIA. Similarly, the operations of global capital are often explained by some leftists as based on conspiracies of elites such as the Bilderberg, an elite, but somewhat secretive group that ‘controls’ global capitalism. (The paranoid right considers Bilderberg a Zionist cabal.) Political rhetoric is not the only tool for expressing alienation and furthering it. Alienation feeds into and is fostered by various forms of popular and popularized culture. Consider for example the varied expression of transgression evident in popular culture and the uses of human suffering on television. Weinstein (2000), looking at the tradition of ‘heavy metal,’ has argued that its seemingly ‘antiestablishment’ head-banging culture which celebrates masculinity is indeed a response to the political-economic alienation of globalization; many men feel that they are powerless and that their lives are meaningless in the face of these larger forces. The concerts and music provide transgressive erotic and/or aggressive action, expressions of rage and anger at the submerged political economic arrangements, structural constraints, and rationalized culture, but that anger is located within the concert where it is contained and controlled – and neutralized. Another means for turning alienation into profit is the ‘trash-talking’ genre of television shows, with their claim to bestowing distinctiveness on participants. Focusing on humiliating and degrading telecasts where ‘freaks speak out’ (Gamson, 1998), Prosono (2005) shows that contemporary capitalism has the capacity to turn the suffering of human beings into wares for entertainment. For Grindstaff (2002), the goal of the program is to capture the moment of intense emotion, typically the anger, shame, or humiliation that constitutes the ‘money shot,’ a term originally used in

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the production of porn in which the ‘action’ which most people want to see is most blatantly evident. While such programs seemingly provide people with opportunities to be media stars, if only temporarily, the ‘guests’ can only achieve ‘stardom’ by publicly disclosing their private lives, their foibles, failures, transgressions, and/or weaknesses, by spelling out their tribulations to a two-headed voyeuristic audience. The audience inside the studio is eager to perform well by applauding, booing at, shouting, and deriding the guest ‘performers;’ while the home viewers are busily gaping. However unfortunate the life conditions of the studio audience and/or the viewers, their lives are fine when compared to those of the ‘stars’ on the shows. They are mothers angry at hooker/stripper daughters, wives angry at husbands’ infidelities with mothers-in-law, or people who have sexual relations with animals. The resentments that might be expected to weaken or destroy the ruling hegemony are commodified: displayed as ‘freaks,’ and sold as goods to the very human beings who suffer most from the contradictions of capitalism. According to Prosono (2005), in junk TV, alienation suffers the final indignity of becoming the raw material of new commodities for exchange or for entertainment. As the Frankfurt School argued, and as Prosono demonstrates, popular culture is a commodity produced by the ‘culture industries’ for the market and in the process, produces vast profits. In the final analysis, popular culture is a moment of hegemony that sustains global capital.4 Many of these specific forms of alienation speak to a larger issue, the extent to which capitalist modernity is itself fundamentally alienated. There is no better place to follow up this possibility than in the ambiguities of community living. It is generally agreed that community is a form of life to be desired, but increasingly, it has been feared that communities can subvert freedom, independence, and even civil rights. The dialectic between the community as rigidly controlled, stifling, and alienated, typically by Calvinist Churches, and the frontier where anything was permitted

reflects a long standing dialectic in American society in which the alienation of communities takes different forms in particular historical moments. (See below) In American sociology, a number of recent critiques demonstrate that the glorification of individualism has resulted in the fragmentation of the social and the demise of various kinds of group life. Bellah et al. (1985) lament the demise of genuine communities and the retreat to ‘life style enclaves,’ gated communities divorced from larger realities. Putnam (2000) has made a similar argument on the basis of evidence that various community groups from Shriners to bowling leagues are shrinking in size. But the antidote to individualism suggested by people like Bellah is often a communitarianism that suppresses the individual and denies certain minorities certain rights. For example, certain communities might not grant recognition or rights to cohabitation or to gay marriage. One possible result of this self-enclosure can be seen in the work of Smith-Lovin (1988), whose analysis of survey data shows that, compared to 20 years earlier, people have fewer confidantes. But Wellman et al. (2004) have suggested that this may account for the fact that today many people maintain relationships, often quite intimate relationships, through the Internet. While the term ‘community’ is often used to betoken cooperation as human salvation (Etzioni, 1993; Toennies, 1957/1887), in practice there has been longstanding ambivalence about community in the United States which was born of – and in turn created – the subtle interplay of presumed cooperation, obvious conflict, and the relentless implementation of competition. The uncertainty of social life and an enigmatic social structure have characterized American communities since Puritan times. While the structure of many contemporary communities confirms the attenuation of social bonds under capitalism as both Marx and Durkheim maintained, the supposition of unchallenged communal social bonds in pre-capitalist eras, as idealized by Toennies, does not hold up under a detailed historical examination.

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According to Salerno (2005; see also Sennett, 1994, 1998), alienation is a core problem of American communities, with roots going back to colonial times. He shows that American communities have been characterized by different permutations of alienation at different stages of their history. The Puritan ‘cities on the hill’ were notable emblems of cooperation because they were ruled by strict church authorities. Their word was law; their iron hand was feared, and they imposed cooperation on their alienated flocks pitilessly. Communities that sprouted in the West during the nineteenth century were from the first riddled with structural conflict. Devoutly religious people, living side by side with people whose only law was the rule of the gun, created communities that were chaotic – the milieu of competition often driven to the point of small-scale warfare. By a curious turn of the wheel, the ‘gated communities’ of the twentieth and the twenty-first centuries proclaim alienation from the surrounding threat of invasion by ‘everybody.’ At the same time, they provide an environment in which pseudo-identities can be staged and restaged in different ways – an environment where people’s alienated selves can pretend to find authenticity. Community, then, can be recognized as an attempt to find a compromise between the inherent psychological need for connectedness and solidarity, and the fear of losing one’s individual identity. The solution of geographical proximity does no more than underline the inevitability of alienation – among the sub-groups that make up the community, between the community and the environment, as well as within the conflicting orientations to which individuals are prone. Scheff (2006) has pointed out that it is impossible to grasp the nature of social relationships by thinking in terms of an alienationsolidarity polarity; he insists that in theorizing and researching alienation, we need to consider both ‘inner and outer aspects of solidarity and alienation.’ It is possible to be engulfed within one set of relationships and, because of that, isolated without, as in sects,

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cults, and academic schools of thought. Looking at the social interactions that constitute solidarity as Buberian I-thou rather than I-it relationships, he shows that Elias (1987) comes closest to theoretically integrating macro and micro levels of isolation, solidarity, and engulfment. More specifically, following Goffman, he suggests that the interactional level of alienation comprises ‘mutual awareness’ as well as emotions, especially pride and shame. Scheff’s analysis supplements and expands the Marxian notion of alienation and community and has quite provocative implications. Allied to Hegel’s description of the struggle between bondsman and lord, and following Goffman, Scheff’s (2006) analysis shows that inegalitarian relationships preclude genuine recognition. Where there are blatant inequalities, mutual recognition of the humanity of the Other is not possible, and people are denied recognition of their own humanity.5 We would suggest that under conditions of capitalism, most people are shamed and humiliated when personal status is regarded as an indication of merit and ability (see Sennett and Cobb, 1972). We have already seen how humiliation has been turned into a commodity. But further, as Sennett (2003) has noted, even those who achieve a modicum of ‘success’ within the system are alienated both from larger communities and from the kinds of ideals of self they might prefer to the ‘corroded’ notions of character they experience. Given the concern with the micro-social and interpersonal aspects of alienation, Kalekin-Fishman (2000, 2005) also notes that the pervasiveness of alienation is underlined by its migration into what would normally be thought of as the stronghold of authentic intimacy, the face-to-face encounter. Here, too, it can be shown that the alienation produced in macro-structures is reproduced in the microsocial realm of consciousness and in the practices of daily life. Because it facilitates reason without having to rely on individuals’ ability to think rationally about how to begin to solve a multiplicity of problems (Habermas, 1998), communicative action has been held to further

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the potential for reason embedded in different types of everyday interactions. Unconstrained by economic and political imperatives, talk, qua undistorted communication, should disclose how reason is exercised quasiintuitively by the individual subject. Logic, like common sense, would seem to dictate that when people consciously cheat, con, or minimally misinform their fellows, they are contributing to the perpetuation of alienation while when they act in good faith, alienation is weakened. According to Kalekin-Fishman, however, this is not substantiated by close analysis. The achievement of intimacy is moderated by the relatively unconscious implementation of communication techniques that are alienated and alienating. The authority of face-to-face exchanges (whether perfunctory greetings, monitoring, giving orders, and even consultations) stems from the communicants’ acceptance of the convention that talk is spontaneous and heartfelt. But even the talk that is interpreted subjectively by the participants as expressions of interest, concern, and care frames relationships so that principles of control and conformity, power and social exclusion preserve institutionalized alienation. Burrowing in taken-for-granted modes of behavior and even in the emotional tones of attempts to maintain intimate relationships, varied patterns of alienation intervene almost inexorably to undermine the achievement of authenticity.

SEEDS OF RESISTANCE – OVERCOMING ALIENATION IN ALTERNATIVE FUTURES? In stark contrast to the consistently bleak presence of alienated and dominated consciousness implicated in the work cited above, some researchers find evidence of processes that undermine the effects of alienation. Dialectical analyses of technology, household work, education, and different aspects of identity lead to conclusions that

seem to promise at least partial release from alienation. Following Marx’s acknowledgment that beyond the capacity to subjugate people to capital, technology also has the potential to set them free, Douglas Kellner (1989, 1995, 2005) examines rationality in general and technology in particular in a dialectical critique of domination, dehumanization, and alienation. Although technology cannot be separated from the main trends of the society in which it is used, Best and Kellner present persuasive evidence that technology holds promise of de-alienation. They look forward to a critical theory of technology that will celebrate the potential of the computer. Such a society contextualizes technology within a social, political, and economic framework, and … assesses both the positive and negative implications of new technologies in terms of their potential to enhance or restrict freedom and democracy, to promote or undermine environmental sustainability, and to create or block the creation of a more humane and just society (Best and Kellner, 1991: 18–19).

Such a society would provide space for the free self-development that overcomes alienation. Kellner (1995) theorizes that overcoming alienation will enable new kinds of cultural experiences which serve as the context for the steadily changing nature of human identity and of social relations. In his view, moreover, theories have to be tailored to analyses of far-reaching changes and thus should be able to propose a responsive politics. We might further note that the Internet, while providing the means for the control, command, and co-ordination of global capital, has also enabled the growth of progressive mobilizations. Thus, for example, with a variety of alternative news sites that act as ‘virtual public spheres,’ and the explosion of blogging, many people have access to counter-hegemonic information and discourses. This has had far-reaching consequences for emancipatory activity, from empowering women in the Middle East (Moghadam, 2005) to the World Social Forum (Langman, 2005b).

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In a similar vein, we might note the recent explosion of the high tech video games, especially the violent shooter games that now might even include sexuality such as Grand Theft Auto. The moralistic critique would condemn the games as sinful, inciting violence, wanton sexuality, and/or violent sexuality. Notwithstanding the explosion in the popularity of such games, violent crime among young men has plummeted, and most youth crimes are for drug use or sale. The classical critique might say that these games foster alienation by rendering players powerless in face of an outside force they themselves produced, and/or by fostering a withdrawal from the social and indifference to the community. But closer examination shows that despite all the imagined sins, horrors, and imputed alienation fostered by such games, in practice, they are most typically played in groups in which the players demonstrate and experience a great deal of agency – while playing together in cohesive groups. Finally, it has been shown that an unintended consequence of playing video games has been greater skill in geometry and greater hand – eye coordination, skills quite important for jobs like piloting airplanes. Alternative futures may also be discovered in the mundane context of maintaining households. Considering the household as the proverbially alienating site, some feminist researchers who have built on (a phallocentric) Marxism have seen the household as exclusively the ‘domestic mode of production,’ the sphere of patriarchal subjugation, sexual exploitation of women, and alienating domestic labor. Touted as a ‘private sphere,’ households are described as being designed to provide the illusion of a realm of love, warmth, intimacy, and authenticity cut off from the domains of public institutions. It is often emphasized that they are in fact characterized by dehumanizing indifference to others and the calculating attitude of urban life, all of which serve the ends of capitalism. Households are frequently documented as a social location in advanced capitalism where women work under alienating, exploitative

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conditions (among others, see Coontz, 1997; Hochschild, 1986; Rubin, 1994). In a recent article, ‘Loving Alienation: the Contradictions of Domestic Work,’ Martha Gimenez (2005), long one of the strongest voices for a Marxist, materialist feminism, shows, however, that if alienation is understood dialectically, experiences quite antithetical to the way capitalism typically operates can also be found in the realm of work in the home. Gimenez contends that neither the radical Marxist views of oppression, nor the bourgeois illusions of ultimate fulfillment, capture the class-based variations and the dialectical nature of domestic labor. Upon close examination, domestic work can be seen as a set of socially necessary, contradictory activities. Some are unpleasant, but some are constructive with the potential to fuel the emergence of a critical consciousness, antithetical to the alienated world of capitalist economic and social relations. Gimenez points out two central factors that affect the impact of household experiences: varying conditions and opportunities for empowerment. For one thing, the marital or couple status, age, school/work conditions and/or location of the household unit in the class system affect how alienating or gratifying household tasks may be. For another, the domestic mode of production also offers realms of creativity, recognition, and empowerment, allowing for experiences of agency, self-realization, caring, reciprocity, and cooperation. These material bases are likely to spur the emergence of needs and values that counter the selfish, competitive, and dehumanizing world of capitalist work and social relations. The complex dialectic of alienation and de-alienation that is played out in domestic arrangements can also be observed in schools. Gibson (2005) examines the intricacies of relations in communities in and near San Diego where there have been several incidents of high school shootings. In a richly detailed analysis, Gibson shows that alienated actions stem from attempts by schools to quantify learning so as to find reassurance of

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progress in numerical measures. Converting knowledge into a commodity, schools commodify their students in turn. Well-known Skinnerian techniques of learning objectify students through testing and ranking, and reinforce their alienation by making it impossible for them to evade the realization that they are found wanting. Such alienation leads many adolescents to withdrawal and perhaps to an alcohol- or drug-based flight from reality. Some students, more alienated than others, more isolated than others, and angrier, find in violence the only way they can express agency. Ironically, it is only when the dehumanized take human lives that they gain recognition. Locating these seemingly isolated acts in the larger context of capitalism, Gibson shows how the school system exploits the marginalization of many youths whose academic and social statuses are closely intertwined. By contrast, moreover, with the frequently expressed conclusion that exploitation and marginalization may be effected despite the efforts of egalitarian schooling, Gibson points out that where quantification takes over and test scores become the be all and end all, the efforts are minimal. In an area of California where well-to-do neighborhoods and impoverished neighborhoods send children to the same schools, it is relatively easy to show that the schools serve particular interests. The agenda of preserving distances between social classes is disguised as maintaining standards of achievement and as education for values. Alienation is insinuated into the subtle procedural messages that convince the under-classes that they deserve to be marginalized. Through the inner conviction that their isolation from the benefits of a good education is justified, they submit to an alienation that is cruel and unrelenting in damning them to a kind of slavery – failure in studies and rejection by the peers-who-count. As Heidegger (1967) intimated, however, eventually Slaves, with their fragmented, ignorant, and weak selves, are likely to come to understand the situation and refuse to

accept their subordination. Illustrating this insight, Gibson describes how excessive pressures led parents at one school to succeed in mobilizing protest against mechanical teaching and performance testing; determined teachers have also found ways of counteracting and evading detrimental regulations. This concerted ‘revolt’ is a fact, but also an analogue of the diverse ways available for escaping the shackles of alienation by achieving a viable identity through insight and action. In modern societies, with a wide range of options for identities, viable identities are created, negotiated, and articulated in different ways. Looking at the wide range of meanings and usages that identity has assumed in academic discourses, Langman (2000, 2005a) defines identity as a narrative based on group membership that becomes part of individual selfhood, a self referential template where memory meets the future as people present themselves and plan agendas. Following Castells’ (1996) analysis of network society, he differentiates (1) conformist identities that legitimate the status quo, (2) resistance identities (oppositions to various forms of domination), (3) project identities that articulate new forms of subjectivities. But further, (4) Langman (2000) suggests that Castells did not consider the ludic identities fostered by consumerism and popular culture. Langman notes that each kind of identity is disposed to different forms of alienation. He argues that identities may be alienated in different ways, but points out, too, that they may also exercise agency through choices that are likely to allow escape from alienation. Beginning by legitimating the very conditions that victimize, they may develop the ability to resist them, or find ways to take part in the ‘fun and games’ that the capitalist system provides as entertainment. But there is still the possibility that in developing the resistance, underlings will become capable of articulating progressive identity projects. It is only this type of

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negotiation that will enable people to learn to valorize a self-identity that is freed of the bonds of consumption and is truly emancipatory. This possibility is especially significant in the capitalist-generated culture of consumption. Ultimately, the pursuit of commodities, produced by the alienated labor of remote Others, generates alienated forms of selfhood that compulsively pursue privatized hedonism through the accumulation of goods or cultural experiences. But consumer-based selfhood cannot provide individuals with meaningful intimate ties, nor give them a sense of control or a meaningful existence. These consumer-based identities and lifestyles have become an essential moment of ideological hegemony. Nowadays, however, rampant consumerism is not available for all; instead, people opt for more modest expressions of the culture industry, from escapist films to television programs that are an indication of alienation and at once a critique of society and illusory palliatives. For other people, the alienation that stems from rapid socio-economic change, assaults on traditional values, and the emptiness of consumerism are assuaged by shared resistance to modernity, such as the embrace of fundamentalist religions that provide stable identities, redemption through spiritual renewal and an imaginary return to an earlier, golden age that never was. The diverse guises of fundamentalism may well provide compensatory gratifications within their communities, but then prompt further conflicts, quarrels, and often bitter animosities in the larger society. However, these very conflicts between absolutist and authoritarian values and the nature of modern life spur vast numbers of people throughout the world to forge ‘project’ identities from feminism to ecology that overcome alienation by taking up globally based causes of social justice. The dialectical promise of de-alienation is also evident in some of the banal incidents of everyday life. While, as seen above, KalekinFishman demonstrates how principles of alienation that are unavoidable in the macro-system

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are likely to rule relationships in the micro, Ahponen (2005) finds that everyday life can offer moments of emancipation. In her account of the media as a launch pad for insights into the self, into family life as a field of struggle and achievement, and into liberation through appreciation of the Other, she touches on themes explored in the work of Gibson and of Gimenez. As she shows, everyday life is strewn with demands for performing alienating routines, but it is also a site of action where one can find opportunities for experiencing the excitement and exhilaration of heroism. Ahponen (2005) does not ignore the fact that the content of everyday life is saturated with thankless tasks that are ineluctably imposed by the conditions of an alienating environment and entail deprivation consequent on disorientation at the macro. From her data, however, she finds that the very same alienating environmental conditions are likely to evoke agency and creativity. Ironically, moreover, when these events attract the attention of the media, their subjective value is enhanced. The very media that have developed modes of exploitation for purposes of capitalist profit can also effect turning points in people’s lives. For everyday heroes, media attention has created moments of emancipation from the patterns of alienation that seem to be inevitably embedded in the routines of everyday life. In a similar way Porpora (2005) evokes spirituality as a means of transcendence and a way of overcoming alienation. He points out that the trap of alienation that attends theorizing can be evaded (see discussions of Dahms and David earlier in this chapter). What is lacking in the efficient and productive, but at the same time shallow, instrumental rationality that characterizes modernity is morality – both of action and of being. Arguing that the spiritual alienation of our age, an era devoid of ultimate concerns, is at the same time alienation from one’s true self, one’s own potential, as well as alienation from others, Porpora (2005: 244) points

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out that religion was an essential part of hegemony long before capitalism emerged. Despite the fact that sociology is reluctant to deal with spiritual alienation, Porpora (2005: 246), much like Fromm (1965), maintains that human beings need rootedness, and a frame of reference and devotion, for the moral aspect of selfhood which is emotional and not a matter of rational calculation. Clearly, neither the fundamentalisms that negate all achievements of modernity nor the mass consumerism in which the accumulation of goods becomes one’s primary aim in life and the basis of one’s identity, fulfills human needs. Today, it is possible, however, to see the reinstatement of religion in different types of configurations that do indeed foster seeds of de-alienation. In his view, there are such seeds in the traditions of all religions. Among them are the group procedures for learning the Holy Books of Judaism (Heilman, 1984), the mystical experiences of the Sufi in Islam. And he agrees that there need be no contradictions between Christianity and socialism, even in its most radical form (Zizˇek, 2000). Denying that blind fundamentalisms that deepen alienation are the only channel for religious expression, Porpora (2005: 247) sees the various forms of alliances with a higher spirit as fertile ground for de-alienation.

CONCLUDING REMARKS During the first half of the twentieth century, Lukacs (1971/1920) argued that commodity fetishism was no longer limited to objects produced for their exchange value on the market. Reification, embedded within the very categories of bourgeois thought, had come to colonize the totality of consciousness – and by implication, subjectivity as well. Thus proletariat understandings of self and society were framed within the alienated bourgeois discourses that sustain domination. In short, the key to understanding capitalist society writ large was ascribed to alienation.

That is why, as Lukacs asserted, explorations of alienation have indeed moved beyond the factory to culture, community, politics, and the structure of the self. As an organizing orientation, alienation enables self-criticism as well as critique. With the pointed instruments of alienation theory, researchers can uncover the malevolent core of exuberance (Prosono, 2005) and the unwitting invasion of macro-structures into intimacies (KalekinFishman, 2005). Beyond these, thinking of alienation in dialectical terms, however, enables sociologists to show both how, through the insidious colonization of consciousness, people are incited to violence, and how this violence impels them to active resistance (Gibson, 2005). Yet again, a dialectical understanding of alienation makes it possible to discover how oppression can be transformed into creativity (Ahponen, 2005; Langman, 2005a), how desperation and hope are intertwined, and how the unending richness of human experience is a constant challenge to discern opportunities as well as hazards (Kellner, 2005). Marx saw alienation as a concept rooted in contradiction, as the core of conflictual structure and the heart of conflicted consciousness. At the same time he realized its dialectical potential: out of the tormented consciousness in a community fragmented by conflict, people are capable of discerning the emergent potential for agency, and the means to re-humanization. In a word, as conflicts ripen, it becomes possible to discover how to reconfigure cooperation. The dialectical conceptualization and methodology of alienation that are demonstrated in recent writings provide ingress into the dynamic tangle that reflects this vision of social reality. While sociology, like so many other disciplines, has its fashions and changing interests, some basic concepts of the discipline, among them certainly the concept of alienation, endure and have as much, if not more, explanatory power today than in the past. In a globalizing age of mass consumption, with unprecedented kinds of advanced technologies of production and communication, the concept

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of alienation and its theorization shed light on hitherto unexplored subtleties in social and personal life.

NOTES 1 We acknowledge that terrorism has multiple roots, but here we wish to underscore how alienation can be recruited through popular culture. 2 Because Hegel’s Absolutes emerged out of the French Revolution which put an end to serfdom, Hegel’s Absolutes breathed the air, the earthly air of freedom. Even when one reads Absolute Mind as God, one cannot escape the earthly quality of the unity of theory and practice, and grasp the Absolute Reality as man’s attainment of total freedom, inner and outer and temporal. The bondsman, having gained through his labor, as Hegel put it, ‘a mind of his own,’ becomes part of the struggle between ‘consciousnessin-itself’ and ‘consciousness-for-itself.’ Or, more popularly stated, the struggle against alienation becomes the attainment of freedom (see Korsch, 1923). 3 Members of the International Sociological Association’s Research Committee for the Study of Alienation Theory and Research are among those whose work is at the cutting edge of new approaches to alienation research. They have elaborated on the contemporary relevance of alienation for theoretical critiques, descriptions of concrete political developments that embody authoritarian responses to alienation, as well as cultural expressions of ambiguities in forms of everyday life under late capitalism. For a wider view, see Langman and Kalekin-Fishman (2005). 4 Sklair (2002) has argued that consumerism serves as the ideological glue that sustains transnational capitalism. 5 See, for example Fraser and Honneth (2003), or Taylor (1994).

REFERENCES Adorno, Theodore, Frenkel-Brunswik, Else, Levinson, Daniel and Sanford, Nevitt (1950) The Authoritarian Personality: Studies in Prejudice. NY: W. W. Norton. Adorno, Theodore (2000) The Adorno Reader, Brian O’Connor (ed.) Oxford: Blackwell. Ahponen, Pirkkoliisa (2005) ‘The Precariousness of Everyday Heroism,’ Qualitative Sociology Review, 1(2): 22–42.

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Bellah, Robert, Madsen, Richard, Sullivan, William M. and Swidler, Ann (1985) Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life. Berkeley: University of California Press. Berlet, Chip (2005) ‘When Alienation Turns Right: Populist Conspiracism, the Apocalyptic Style, and Neofascist Movements,’ in Lauren Langman and Devorah Kalekin-Fishman (eds.) The Evolution of Alienation: Trauma, Promise and the Millennium. Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 115–44. Berlet, Chip and Lyons, M. N. (2000) RightWing Populism in America: Too Close for Comfort. NY: Guilford. Best, Stephen and Kellner, Douglas (1991) ‘Kevin Kelly’s Complexity Theory: The Politics and Ideology of Self-Organizing Systems,’ Illuminations. http://www.uta.edu/huma/ illuminations/best7.htm Boggs, Carl (1976) Gramsci’s Marxism. London: Pluto Press. Braverman, Harvey (1998) Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century. NY: Monthly Review Press. Castells, Manuel (1996) The Power of Identity. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell. Coontz, Stephanie (1997) The Way We Really Are: Coming to Terms with America’s Changing Families. NY: Basic Books. Dahms, Harry (2002) ‘Sociology in the Age of Globalization: Toward a Dynamic Sociological Theory,’ in Jennifer Lehmann (ed.) Current Perspectives in Social Theory. Greenwich, CN: JAI Press, 21: 287–320. David, Matthew (2005) ‘Embodiment and Communication: Alienation, Genetics and Computing. What Does it Mean to be Human?,’ in Lauren Langman and Devorah Kalekin-Fishman (eds.) The Evolution of Alienation: Trauma, Promise and the Millennium. Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 69–88. Dunayevskaya, Raya (1965) ‘The Theory of Alienation: Marx’s Debt to Hegel,’ in Mario Savio, Eugene Walker and Raya Dunayevskaya (eds.) The Free Speech Movement and the Negro Revolution. Detroit: News and Letters. pp. 49–52. Durkheim, Emile (1951/1897) Suicide (translated by J. A. Spaulding and G. Simpson), NY: The Free Press.

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Elias, Norbert (1987) Involvement and Detachment. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. Erikson, Erik (1950) Childhood and Society. NY: W. W. Norton and Co. Erikson, Erik (1980) Identity and the Life Cycle. NY: W. W. Norton and Co. Etzioni, Amitai (1993) The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities, and the Communitarian Agenda. NY: Crown Publishers. Foucault, Michel (1995) Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. NY: Vintage Books. Fraser, Nancy and Honneth, Alex (2003) Redistribution or Recognition?: A PoliticalPhilosophical Exchange. NY: Verso. Fromm, Erich (1965) Escape from Freedom. NY: Avon Books. Gamson, William (1998) Freaks Talk Back. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Gergen, Kenneth (1991) The Saturated Self. NY: Basic Books. Gibson, Rick (2005) ‘Lonely Privilege in Despair: Aiming for Unfeigned Hope,’ in Lauren Langman and Devorah Kalekin-Fishman (eds.) The Evolution of Alienation: Trauma, Promise and the Millennium. Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 145–76. Gimenez, Martha (2005) ‘Loving Alienation: The Contradictions of Domestic Work,’ in Lauren Langman and Devorah KalekinFishman (eds.) The Evolution of Alienation: Trauma, Promise and the Millennium. Boulder CO: Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 269–82. Goffman, Erving (1958) The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. NY: Anchor Books. Gramsci, Antonio (1991) The Prison Notebooks, 1. NY: Columbia University Press. Grindstaff, Linda (2002) The Money Shot: Trash, Class, and the Making of TV Talk Shows. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Habermas, Jürgen (1998) On the Pragmatics of Communication, Maeve Cooke (ed.) Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Heidegger, Martin (1967) Being and Time. Oxford: Blackwell. Heilman, Samuel (1984) The Gate Behind the Wall: A Pilgrimage to Jerusalem. NY: Summit Books. Hochschild, Arlie (1986) The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling. Los Angeles: University of California Press. Horkheimer, Max and Adorno, Theodor (1976) The Dialectic of Enlightenment. (trans., J. Cumming) NY: Continuum Publishing Co.

Israel, Joachim (1971) Alienation from Marx to Modern Sociology: A Macro-Sociological Analysis. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. Jay, Martin (1996) The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923–1950. Los Angeles: University of California Press. Kalekin-Fishman, Devorah (2000) ‘Constructing Mundane Culture: "Plain talk",’ Journal of Mundane Behavior, 1(1). Refereed journal on the internet: www.mundanebehavior.org Kalekin-Fishman, Devorah (2005) ‘Plain Talk: Producing and Reproducing Alienation,’ in Lauren Langman and Devorah KalekinFishman (eds.) The Evolution of Alienation: Trauma, Promise and the Millennium. Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 283–307. Kellner, Douglas (1989) Critical Theory, Marxism, and Modernity. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins. Kellner, Douglas (1995) Media Culture. Cultural Studies, Identity and Politics between the Modern and the Postmodern. London and NY: Routledge. Kellner, Douglas (2005) ‘New Technologies and Alienation: Some Critical Reflections,’ in Lauren Langman and Devorah KalekinFishman (eds.) The Evolution of Alienation: Trauma, Promise and the Millennium. Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 47–67. Keniston, Kenneth (1965) The Uncommitted: Alienated Youth in American Society. San Diego: Harcourt. Korsch, Karl (1923) ‘Marxism and Philosophy,’ www.marxists.org/archive/korsch/1923 retrieved 13 September, 2006. Langman, Lauren (2000) ‘The Carnival Character of the Present Age,’ paper presented at the Socialist Scholars Conference, NY, March 15. Online at: http://www.angelfire.com/ or/sociologyshop/langfr1.html Langman, Lauren (2005a) ‘Globalization, Alienation and Identity: A Critical Approach,’ in Lauren Langman and Devorah KalekinFishman (eds.) The Evolution of Alienation: Trauma, Promise and the Millennium. Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 179–200. Langman, Lauren (2005b) ‘From Virtual Public Spheres to Global Justice: A Critical Theory of International Social Movements,’ Sociological Theory, 23(1): 42–73, March.

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Leidner, Robin (1993) Fast Food, Fast Talk: Service Work and the Routinization of Everyday Life. Berkeley: University of California Press. Lukacs, Georg (1971/1920) History and Class Consciousness. Cambridge: MIT Press. Ludz, Peter C. (1973) ‘Alienation as a Concept in the Social Sciences,’ Current Sociology, 21(1): 1–103. Marx, Karl (1978/1844) Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 and the Communist Manifesto, in Robert Tucker (ed.) The Marx Reader. NY: Norton and Company. pp. 66–126. Marx, Karl (1978/1852) The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon, in Robert Tucker (ed.) The Marx Reader. NY: Norton and Company. pp. 594–617. Marx, Karl and Engels Friedrich (1978/1846) ‘The German Ideology,’ in Robert Tucker (ed.) The Marx Reader. NY: Norton and Company. pp. 146–200. Mead, George Herbert (1934) Mind, Self and Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Meszaròs, Ivan (1970) Marx’s Theory of Alienation. London: P. Merlin. Moghadam, Valentine (2005) Globalizing Women: Transnational Feminist Networks. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Porpora, Douglas (2005) ‘Alienation and the Cosmos,’ in Lauren Langman and Devorah Kalekin-Fishman (eds.) The Evolution of Alienation: Trauma, Promise and the Millennium. Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 243–50. Prosono, Martin (2005) ‘The Final Indignity: The Commodification of Alienation,’ in Lauren Langman and Devorah KalekinFishman (eds.) The Evolution of Alienation: Trauma, Promise and the Millennium. Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 227–42. Putnam, Robert D. (2000) Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. NY: Simon and Schuster. Ritzer, George (1997) Postmodern Social Theory. NY: McGraw-Hill. Ritzer, George (2004) The Globalization of Nothing. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press. Rosenau, Pauline (1992) Post-Modernism and the Social Sciences: Insights, Inroads and Intrusions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Rubin, Lillian B. (1994) Families on the Fault Line. NY: Harper Collins.

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Rushkoff, Douglas (2001) Merchants of Cool. Boston: WBGH Educational Foundation. Salerno, Roger (2005) ‘Alienated Communities: Between Aloneness and Connectedness,’ in Lauren Langman and Devorah KalekinFishman (eds.) The Evolution of Alienation: Trauma, Promise and the Millennium. Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 253–68. Scheff, Thomas (2006) ‘Defining Alienation and Solidarity as Concepts,’ paper presented at the Congress of the International Sociological Association, Durban, South Africa, July. Seeman, Martin (1991) ‘Alienation and Anomie,’ in J. P. Robinson, P. R. Shaver and L. S. Wrightsman (eds.) Measures of Personality and Social Psychological Attitudes: Measures of Social Psychological Attitudes, I: 291–371. Sennett, Richard (1994) Flesh and Stone: The Body and the City in Western Civilization. NY: W. W. Norton. Sennett, Richard (1998) The Corrosion of Character: The Transformation of Work in Modern Capitalism. NY: W. W. Norton. Sennett, Richard (2003) Respect: The Formation of Character in an Age of Inequality. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Sennett, Richard and Cobb, Jonathan (1972) The Hidden Injuries of Class. NY: Vintage Books. Sklair, Leslie (2002) The Transnational Capitalist Class. Oxford: Blackwell. Smith, David Norman (1996) ‘The Social Construction of Enemies: Jews and the Representation of Evil,’ Sociological Theory, 14(3), November: 203–40. Smith, David Norman (2005) ‘Authority Fetishism and the Manichaean Vision,’ in Lauren Langman and Devorah KalekinFishman (eds.) The Evolution of Alienation: Trauma, Promise and the Millennium. Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 91–114. Smith-Lovin, Lynn (1988) Analyzing Social Interaction: Advances in Affect Control Theory. London and NY: Routledge. Taylor, Charles (1994) Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Toennies, Ferninand (1957/1887) Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft. Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press. Turner, Bryan (ed.) (1990) Theories of Modernity and Postmodernity. London: Sage.

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Tracy L. M. and Tan, Phuoc (2004) Connected Lives: The Project. Berlin: Springer. Zalewsky, Jackie and Rezba, A. (2000) ‘Where the Links Were Broken: Mandating Efficiency through an Electronics Supply Chain,’ unpublished manuscript. pp. 1–13. Zizˇek, Slavoj (2000) The Zizˇek Reade, Elizabeth Wright and Edmond Wright (eds.) Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell.

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3 Identity, Citizenship and Contemporary, Secure, Gendered Politics of Belonging Nira Yuval-Davis

INTRODUCTION Nationalist ideologies and practices have sought to appropriate and to reconstruct notions of belonging. Various historians and theoreticians of nationalism have shown how nationalist discourses have come to replace other forms of belonging, whether local, religious, or associated with explicit lines of loyalties to specific political hierarchies. Under hegemonic discourses of nationalist politics of belonging the ‘nation-state’ has come to be the Andersonian (1991 [1983]) ‘imagined community’ in which people, territories, and states are constructed as immutably connected and the nation is a ‘natural’ extension of one’s family to which one should be prepared, if necessary, to sacrifice oneself. Or is it? Recently, under the onslaught of globalization, very different constructions of belonging are gaining momentum and various state agencies are investing a lot of resources in an

attempt to reconstruct what they often call ‘social cohesion’, in which such naturalized belongings can prosper. At the same time, human rights activists are trying, with somewhat contradictory results, to nurture a sense of global human belonging. The chapter aims to deconstruct some contemporary notions of belonging as they relate to ethnic and national processes. Its main focus will be the contrasting multi-layered and paradoxical narratives of the ‘authentic indigenes’, on the one hand, who, with their multi-faceted social, political, and spatial dimensions, consider themselves to be the rightful ‘owners’ of their nations; and, on the other, those of the ‘diasporic strangers’. The claims of the latter for such ownership might be challenged by the indigenes in the territories in which both live together, while the claims of the diasporic strangers to national ownership might relate to far away, imagined homelands. The chapter will also examine

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how these paradoxical narratives relate to discourses on human and state security. Finally, it will highlight some of the gendered dimensions of that discourse. Belonging is a deep emotional need. Countless psychological, and even more, psychoanalytical, works have been dedicated to writings about the fears of separation of babies from the womb, from the mother, from the familiar (for the most elaborate accounts of this, see, for example, Bowlby, 1969, 1973; Rank (1973 [1929]). It is important to emphasize that the need to belong and the fear of separation exist even in cases of sexual and other abuse in the family, and even when the environment of the womb itself proves to be far from the perfect haven in which all the needs of the baby are being satisfied (Fodor, 1949; Lake, 1966; Mott, 19481). Belonging and the yearning to belong, however, have not only been central in psychological discourse. To some extent, one could claim that one of the prime concerns of sociological theory since its establishment has been the different ways in which people belong to collectivities and states – as well as the social, economic, and political effects of instances of the displacement of such belongings as a result of industrialization and/or migration. Some classical examples are Tönnies’ distinction between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft as the two major ways in which people belong to communities and collectivities (1940 [1935]), Durkheim’s distinction between mechanical and organic solidarity which, again, examines ‘pre-’ and ‘modern’ ways of belonging (1933 [1893]), or Marx’s notion of alienation (1975 [1844]) which examines the effects of displacement and human commodification. Anthony Giddens (1991) has argued that during modernity, people’s sense of belonging becomes reflexive, while Manuel Castells (1997) claims that contemporary society has become a ‘network society’ in which effective belonging has moved from the civil societies of nations and states to reconstructed defensive identity communities.

As will be explained later in the chapter, neither citizenship nor identity can encapsulate the notion of belonging which encompasses them, but also includes the emotional dimension of attachment. Like other hegemonic constructions, belonging tends to become ‘naturalized’ and thus invisible in hegemonic formations. It is only when one’s safe and stable connection to the collectivity, the homeland, the state is threatened that belonging becomes articulated and reflexive. It is then that individual, collective, and institutional narratives of belonging become politicized and give rise to various social and political movements which promote specific constructions of belonging as their projects. This politicization tends to focus on the ‘“dirty work” of boundary maintenance’ (Crowley, 1999: 30). Indeed, as Adrian Favell argues (1999: 211), the ‘boundary problem’ is archetypal to the politics of belonging. Constructing borders and boundaries that differentiate between those who belong and those who do not determines and colors the meaning of the particular belonging. All too often people talk about otherness on the one hand, and crossing borders on the other hand, without paying attention to how these borders and boundaries are actually imagined by people who are positioned towards them in different ways. At the same time, many recent theories of identity emphasize – and often celebrate – the ever changing, fluctuating, and contested nature of identities. Such theoretical articulations can sometimes disguise ways in which the exercise of power may fixate subjugated identities and create what Amrita Chhachhi (1991) calls ‘forced identities’, and impose what Kubena Mercer (1990), under somewhat different conditions, calls ‘the burden of representation’. However, it is important to relate the notion of belonging to the differential positionings from which belongings are imagined and narrated, in terms of gender, class, race and ethnicity, sexuality, stage in the life cycle, etc., even in relation to the same community and in relation to the same boundaries and borders (Yuval-Davis, 2006a, b).

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SECURE, GENDERED POLITICS OF BELONGING

These boundaries and borders can be contested not only between those who are internal or external to them, but also between people who see themselves, and are seen, as belonging to the same collectivity, or even by the same people at different times and in different situations because of their different social locations and different social values. The contested and shifting nature of these boundaries and borders may reflect not only dynamic power relations between individuals, collectivities, and institutions but also subjective and situational processes. One of the crucial intervening factors in these dynamics is the fact that people tend to belong – in different ways and with different intensities – to more than one collectivity and polity. Local, ethnic, national, inter- and supra-national political communities are just some of the ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson, 1991 [1983]) with which people may identify, in which they are active, at least to a certain degree, and to which they may feel a certain sense of attachment. One level of exploration, following Anne-Marie Fortier (2000), is that of the ways in which common histories, experiences, and places are created, imagined, and sustained in what Vikki Bell (1999) calls ‘the performativity of belonging’. Another level, however (although interwoven with the first), is the examination of the hierarchy and dynamics of power that are exercised between these collectivities and the degree of cooperation or conflict between them. In other words, the relationship between the society and the polity is crucial to the understanding of the multi-layered and multiplex constructions of belongings of both individuals and groupings. Following a terminology first used by Michael Walzer (1997), Crowley argues (1999: 22) that the idea of ‘belonging’ is an attempt to give a ‘thicker’ account of the political and social dynamics of integration in relation to the concept of citizenship, which he defines as formal membership in a nation-state. In my own work on citizenship (1994, 1997a, 1999; Yuval-Davis and Werbner,

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1999) I have followed a wider definition of the concept. Using T. H. Marshall’s definition of citizenship (1950, 1975) as ‘full membership of the community with rights and responsibilities’, I have argued that the concept can also be used in relation to other polities than the ‘nation-state’, to the extent that membership in other collectivities endows citizens with rights and obligations in a similar manner. Historically, citizenship emerged as active participation in political communities that evolved in cities (the Greek polis) and then developed as a legal status in empires (such as the Roman Empire). Jean Cohen (1999) argues that in the nation-state these two elements of citizenship have come together. However, as Yasemin Soysal (1994), David Held (1995), and others have argued, new trans-national and supra-national forms of citizenship are developing, forms that Bryan Turner has called (1998) post-Fordist citizenship. As I have argued elsewhere (1999), international legislation on human rights can be seen, from such a perspective, as just another layer of citizenship. At the same time, I have also pointed out that in terms of affecting personal lives and constructing rights and obligations, sub-national and cross-national communities can also become bearers of significant citizenships, in specific local, religious, and ethnic contexts. As mentioned above, however, the notion of citizenship needs to be differentiated from that of belonging, which encompasses not only the participatory dimension of citizenship but also the cognitive and emotional dimensions of identification and attachment (Yuval-Davis, 2006a). Identities are the individual and collective narratives people tell themselves and others about who they are and who they are not. However, belonging is not only about cognitions and perceptions. Feeling that one is (or is not) part of a collectivity, a community, a social category, or yearning to be so, is central to a sense of belonging, and is not the same as actually taking part (or not) in a political community with all the rights and responsibilities involved.

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This is a differentiation that identity politics has not been inclined to make, tending, as a result, to neglect the complex and contested relationship between individuals, groupings, and collectivities. Since individuals and collectivities are interchangeable emotionally in identity politics, questions of representation, accountability, and governability have tended to be ignored (Bourne, 1987; Cain and Yuval-Davis, 1990; Yuval-Davis, 1994, 2006c). The politics of belonging is where the sociology of emotions and the sociology of power intersect. To illustrate the different ways identities, citizenships, and belonging(s) interrelate in different modes of the politics of belonging, I shall now turn briefly to exploring narratives of belonging of both indigenousness and diasporism.

DISCOURSES OF INDIGENOUSNESS To be an indigene means to ‘really’ belong to a place, and to have the most ‘authentic’ claim for rights over it. The discourse of ‘indigenousness’ has been used by hegemonic majorities as an exclusionary means to limit immigration, withhold citizenship rights, call for repatriation, and in its most extreme forms, for ‘ethnic cleansing’. In such a discourse, the immutable link of people, state, and territory is formulated in its most racialized mode. However, the discourse of ‘indigenousness’ has also played a central role in the politics of inclusion and recognition, of claiming rights. It is used by movements of the largely excluded, dispossessed, and marginalized remnants of societies that existed before or on the margins of settler and other nation-states (Feldman, 2001; Stasiulis and Yuval-Davis, 1995). These remnants are frequently seen, by themselves and by others, as an ‘organic’ part of the land and the landscape, and all other inhabitants are seen as part of the ‘imposing society’ (to use an Australian Aboriginal expression) who

dispossessed them. A major focus in their struggles is the call for recognition of their ‘land rights’ and claims of ownership of the lands where they used to reside before the European invasion. As they had often been stateless nomadic populations, they had no official land titles registered in their name, as would be the case under a bureaucratic state apparatus. As the lands they claim are often now either privately or state owned, their claims have frequently been faced with fierce resistance by settler societies and states, at the same time as they are endorsed by human rights discourse. One of the questions that arise in the attempts to define who the indigenous inhabitants of a particular territory are concerns the temporal dimension. Although in the narratives of indigenous people’s movements ‘they have occupied a specific territory from time immemorial’ (Abu-Saad and Champagne, 2001: 158), usually the crucial date of authenticity is fixed as that of occupation at the time of European colonization. This can prove to be Eurocentric. It constructs the past as if history started when contact with the Europeans was established, and covers up previous population movements and colonizations (as happened in Algeria, for instance, with the Arab settlement, and, in the case of Amerindians, with empires such as those of the Aztecs and the Mayas). Another question, however, even more central to our discussion here, concerns the form of ownership to be claimed by those ‘land rights’ movements. Should land be given to individual members of the ‘first nation’, in a way that would not limit their freedom to sell it? Or should it be transferred collectively, to families/households, or to ‘the community’ as a whole in the form of a Trust? Who should then have the decisionmaking power in these Trusts? And who should be included in these ‘communities’ or collectivities? Very often there are bitter conflicts between certain kinship groups of aboriginal people who each claim that only they are the rightful inheritors of a specific territory and that other Aborigines, who are

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descendants of groups that were expelled from their own lands and displaced to those territories, are not entitled to a share in the Trust. DNA tests are even used to prove these exclusive essentialist belongings. The most important question – in relation to other Aborigines but also in relation to other members of the settler society – is whether land rights should be exclusive, or whether other members of the society (as well as the state itself) could continue to have rights to the land as well. What are the political, let alone the economic, consequences of indigenous land claims? Indigenous people often claim a spiritual unity with the land: We are the land. More than remembered, the Earth is the mind of the people as we are the mind of the earth. … It is not a means of survival. … It is rather part of our being, dynamic, significant, real (a Laguna author, quoted in Tsosie, 2001: 184).

Feldman (2001) argues that such claims are part of critical transformative pedagogy, a ‘strategic essentialism’, to use a well-known expression of Gayatri Spivak (1993), which can prepare the ground for an exclusive claim to the land, once enough political power is accumulated for self government as an enclave within the nation-state, unless there is enough power to claim a full ‘take-over’ of the state (as happened in Algeria, Zimbabwe, and in a somewhat different manner, in South Africa). However, there are also arguments (e.g., Reynolds, 1996) that the aboriginal perception, for instance, that ‘they belong to the land’, rather than that the land belongs to them, paves the way for an alternative, non-exclusive, mode of ownership and sovereignty. Such a claim, for an alternative inclusive nationalist discourse, has also been argued by Gilroy (1993, 1997) and others (e.g., Boyarin, 1994; Raz-Krakotzkin, 1994), as applying to diasporic discourses.

DIASPORISM AS AN ALTERNATIVE DISCOURSE OF BELONGING Gilroy (1997: 328) attempted to contrast nationalist sentiments based on ‘notions of

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soil, landscape, and rootedness’ with the idea of diaspora as ‘a more refined and more worldly sense of culture’. Avtar Brah (1996) incorporated into her normative notion of ‘diaspora space’ not just racialized diasporic minorities but also the hegemonic majority in a decentred and non-privileged positioning. Post-modernist discourses on ‘travelling cultures’ (Clifford, 1992), ‘nomadism’ (Braidotti, 1991), ‘hybridity’ (Bhabha, 1994), and ‘living at the border zones’ (Anzaldua, 1987) have both inspired and echoed these constructions of diasporism. Unfortunately, as some of the critiques of such literature (e.g., Anthias, 1998; Helmreich, 1992; Ifekwunigwe, 1999; Yuval-Davis, 1997a, b) have pointed out the binary, naturalized, and essentialist ideas about kinship, nature, and territory, so characteristic of more traditional nationalist rhetoric, often creep in ‘through the back door’ in these theorizations. Moreover, diasporic politics often tends to have very different sets of values and political dynamics. Unlike the Simmelian (1950) and Schutzian (1976) constructions of ‘the stranger’ members of diasporic communities often engage in narratives of belonging, or of yearning to belong, not only in relation to the country/society where they live, or even a ‘cosmopolitan’ boundary-less humanity, but also in relation to their country, nation, and/or state of origin. As Sara Ahmed (2000) has pointed out, the construction of ‘the stranger’ is a form of fetishism that is produced in the naming, and is devoid of any real human characteristics. It is just a reflection of the gaze of the one who has named her/him as such. As Robin Cohen (1997) has shown, diasporas are much more heterogeneous than the above theories would allow us to believe. Moreover, as the NGO document of the 2001 World Conference Against Racism in Durban pointed out, Western people who are living in the Third World are often described as ‘ex-patriates’ while Third World people living in the West are described as migrants or immigrants. In this sense diasporism is a racialized concept. The hegemonic Western gaze prevails in this, as in so many other instances.

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Furthermore, Gilroy and some others do not take into account the effects that ‘diaspora yearning and ambivalence’ can have on ‘the homeland’. Mechanisms of identity regulation, which have the symbolic meaning of boundary reproduction for the members of the diasporic communities in the countries where they live, can have serious effects on the continuation of national and ethnic conflicts in ‘the homeland’ (Anthias, 1998; Yuval-Davis, 1997a). Contributing funds to various ‘causes’ and struggles in the homeland can often be the easiest and least threatening way for members of the diaspora to express their membership in and loyalty to the collectivity. Such acts of symbolic identification, which are part of contemporary identity politics (Safran, 1999; see also Yuval-Davis, 1997b), can, however, have very radical political and other effects in the ‘homeland’, a fact that might often be only of marginal interest to the people of the diaspora. As Benedict Anderson (1995) has pointed out, diasporic politics is often reckless politics, without accountability and without due democratic process. At the same time, as more and more ethnocracies develop, in Central and Eastern Europe as well as in the Third World, laws parallel to the Israeli and German ‘laws of return’ are being developed, and states are constructed that see as their body of citizens all the members of their hegemonic ethnic collectivity all over the world, rather than all those, of whatever ethnic origin, who are living in their territory. In states such as Lithuania – but also Ireland – the presidents of the state have spent all or most of their lives outside the borders of the state until being called to fill the post. Diasporic communities can have very important roles as political lobbies of superpower governments (for instance in the case of the Israeli lobby in the USA), as well as constituting primary resources for the homeland economy via the remittances that are sent to the families that stay behind (as, for example, is the case in the Philippines). The development of transport and communication technologies in the second half of

the twentieth century has produced new possibilities for maintaining contact between diasporas and homelands. The spatial/temporal shortcuts in communication between diasporas and homelands have intensified the level of information, as well as the level of interaction, between the two. Maybe even more importantly, they have offered people in the diaspora, who were previously isolated from each other, new possibilities for getting together, and for changed discourses of belonging. These can be described as transnational (Basch et al., 1994; Cohen and Vertovec, 1999; Grewal, 1999) rather than diasporic. The nomadic way of life in which people move back and forth between their country of origin and their diasporic location cannot be described, on a factual level, let alone in terms of the politics of belonging, as taking place in one country or the other, nor can these people’s lives. At the same time we should not forget that, running counter to the technical ease of communication, there is a growing strategy of fortification of borders and securitization of migration. More and more obstacles are piled up, and more and more rights are removed from those who travel from country to country, in an attempt to escape the devastating effects, economic as well as political, that ethnic and civil strife, as well as neoliberal economic restructuring, have had on their lives. Paradoxically, refugees and asylum seekers, who have been recognized by international laws as having a right to escape danger and persecution from their homelands, are now constructed as major sources of threat to people in the countries where they seek refuge – as criminals and terrorists. Moreover, with the ‘global war on terrorism’, any resistance to any regime is easily constructed as terrorist activity, so the whole raison d’être of giving refuge to resisters, as happened during the Cold War, has been undermined. And yet, as the report of the Commission on Human Security has commented (see also Yuval-Davis, 2005), refugees and asylum seekers are still the only minority among the

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many millions of ‘people on the move’ globally – documented and especially undocumented migrants as well as internally displaced people – who have any formal legal rights at all. The others become what Giorgio Agamben (1997) has called, following Hanna Arendt (1943), ‘bare lives’, easy prey to extreme forms of exploitation and abuse. Furthermore, more and more states are now engaged in constructing ‘extra-terrestrial spaces’,2 such as Guantanamo Bay and off-shore detention camps for asylum seekers, in which the states attempt to construct spaces where neither national nor international laws apply.

‘SECURITY’, ‘HUMAN SECURITY’, AND THE POLITICS OF BELONGING Terrorists or Al-Quaida people, on the one hand, and asylum seekers from poor Southern countries, on the other hand, are perceived, then, as major threats to Western states. The latter are seeking, in a variety of ways to contain them and keep them outside their national borders, so as to keep their own citizens ‘secure’. As I mentioned at the beginning of the article, ‘security’ and belonging are perceived to be closely related: Michael Ignatief, while Head of the Centre for Human Rights at Harvard University, argued that belonging is about ‘feeling safe’ (2001). The development of international human rights discourse and legislation since the end of World War II can be interpreted as one way of ensuring that people will have the right to feel secure, with their basic rights respected wherever they are in the world. The Nazi experience made it evident that national governments cannot be given a monopoly of guardianship of the rights of the people, whether citizens or non-citizens, living under their rule. The UN Human Rights declaration aimed to create an end to ‘bare life’ situations as a basic mission of the UN, international relations and law.

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The original design of the UN members who passed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 was to consolidate the rights listed in the declaration in a single treaty encompassing civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights. USA lobbying resulted in the division of the covenant into two: an International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and one on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (16 December 1966). From that time onwards, the official USA position has been to relegate the latter rights to a lower status and view them as something to be ‘achieved progressively’ rather than implemented immediately’. (Herman, 2002: xiii)

Therefore, during the Cold War, democracy and human rights became the banner, in different ways, of both sides of the conflict. The West placed more emphasis on the liberal civil and political rights, while the Soviet bloc presented itself as the friend of the developing world, with industrialization and economic development as their priorities. The development of international aid can be seen as one historical manifestation of the competition between the two blocs in the Third World and the open door to refugees in Western countries (who were then seen mainly as escaping from communist regimes) has also been a direct effect of this. Since the end of the Cold War, which has been accompanied by the exacerbation of local ethnic and national conflicts, there has been a massive increase of human rights discourse and legislation – partly as a replacement for socialist discourse which had been delegitimized. Another contributing factor was the vision which, for a few years, offered the illusion that the world was progressing towards a unified global democracy. This vision was aided by a series of UN conferences with growing NGO participation, starting with the 1994 conference in Vienna on human rights. At this time cosmopolitan discourse became more dominant again (e.g. Held, 1995; Kaldor, 2003; Pollock et al., 2002) and the discourse on ‘human security’ became a complementary (and for some a substitute) discourse to that of ‘human rights’. I have no space here to summarize in detail the debates about human security (see, for

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example, Alkire, 2002; Basch et al., 1994; Yuval-Davis, 2005). For many in NGOs and development organizations, human security discourse served as an attempt to overcome some of the perceived shortcomings of human rights discourse, especially its liberal version, which excluded economic and social rights. It was closely linked to Amartya Sen’s (1992, 2000) ‘capabilities approach’ to development. This approach rejects the discourse of rights and entitlements as well as of general measures of opulence, such as GNP per capita, and instead focuses on how people positioned in all groups in society are capable of achieving quality of life in terms of achievement and freedom. It argues that resources have no value in themselves apart from their role in promoting human functioning. This interpretation of human security was the dominant one in the Human Security Commission, which acted as a consultative body to UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. This was how human security came to be incorporated into his Millennium Report. The Report of the Human Security Commission, when it finally came out in 2003, argued in its introduction that: Human security complements state security, furthers human development, and enhances human rights. It complements state security by being people-centered and addressing insecurities that have not been considered as state security threats. By looking at ‘downside risks’, it broadens the human development focus beyond ‘growth with equity’. Respecting human rights is at the core of protecting human security (UN Human Security Commission, 2003: 3).

However, as Basch and Timothy argue in their articles in the special issue of Peace Review on human security they edited in 2004, by the time the Report came out, the subversive use of the notion of ‘security’ which had made it so popular among human rights and peace activists, had lost much of its flavour, as a result of the shift in discourse on security after 9/11. In the context of the ‘global war on terror’, the changing patterns of warfare, and the growing securitization of borders and boundaries, the notion of human security reflects the growing individuation of

military operations. Generally in the post Cold War period there has been a growing move in security concerns from inter-state to intra-state ones, and from national territories to ethnicized and racialized communities, local and trans-national. Moreover, the growing use of long-distance guided missiles which are targeted at specific people, and the global hunting of particular terrorists, has greatly exacerbated this tendency. It is in this way that ‘human security’ has been transformed from a cosmopolitan discourse of inclusion into a global discourse of exclusion and fear, from a complement of human rights to its antithesis. This can be illustrated in the various ways ministers in Tony Blair’s Labour government in the UK, including the Prime Minister himself, have publicly regretted the incorporation of the Human Rights Act into British legislation as blocking an efficient treatment of people who are perceived to be security threats. Ironically, its passage had been one of that government’s first acts when it originally came to power in 1997.

THE GENDERED PARADOXES OF SECURE BELONGINGS The security discourse is closely related to nationalist politics of belonging. As Anderson (1991 [1983]; see also Kitching, 1985) pointed out, there are very few causes for which people – traditionally men – are ready to sacrifice their lives as well as to kill, one being the cause of their imagined communities of belonging. Paradoxically, in the name of communal security, real and/or imagined, they are prepared to sacrifice their personal security; for the ‘right of self-determination’, they are prepared to sacrifice their right to live; and for the sake of ‘peace’, they go to war. With the shift from national drafts to professional militaries, however, men – and more and more women – are prepared to do all this for the security of professional military careers and – as the American and

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British soldiers explained in Iraq – ‘they were only doing their jobs’. (This is, of course, why the growing reliance in the American army on reservists, who are dependent on the military for extra income but not their main jobs, is an inherent weakness in American military strategy). The inherent paradox in women’s politics of belonging is often somewhat different, and relates to the different relationships that women usually occupy in ethnic and national collectivities. On the one hand, women belong to and are identified as members of the collectivity in the same way as men are. Nevertheless, there are always rules and regulations – not to mention perceptions and attitudes – specific to women. Such constructions involve a paradoxical positioning of women as both symbols and ‘others’ of the collectivity. On the one hand, women are seen as signifiers of the collectivity’s honour (Yuval-Davis, 1997a, b; Yuval-Davis and Anthias, 1989), in defence of which nations go to war (‘for the sake of womenandchildren’ to use Cynthia Enloe’s (1990) expression). On the other hand, they are a non-identical element within the collectivity and subject to various forms of control in the name of ‘culture and tradition’. However, such a formulation reifies the notions of ‘culture and tradition’ and homogenizes them, often under hegemonic formulations. Cultures and traditions are always contested as well as constantly shifting and changing. One of the major debates in the arena of ‘human rights’ (which, in the 1994 UN human rights conference in Vienna, was termed the debate on ‘Asian values’, see Herman, 2002; Ignatief, 2001) has been to what extent communities have the right to keep their collective cultural traditions, even if the latter are in conflict with accepted rights of individual men and women in those communities. Often the debate is formulated in such reified terms that any recognition of women’s rights is equated, by those who support collective cultural rights, with (undesirable) Westernization and secularization. However, as feminists from all over the world have pointed out, the

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real debate is often about the right of a particular patriarchal leadership to keep its power to define the collective political project. The acquisition of women’s rights often means more changes in the communal power relations than anything else. In fact, the freezing of cultures in a highly selective manner, which is beneficial to them, is often one of the major tactics of fundamentalist leaderships. Another paradox which concerns the relationship between belonging and security for women is the fact that often the highest danger to women’s security lies where their bonds of belonging lie as well. Feminists have always been preoccupied with ‘the enemy within’. They have pointed out that it is often the woman’s nearest and dearest who are the most violent towards her. Long before the days of the ‘global war on terrorism’, feminist activists had looked for ways to make women feel secure wherever they were, whether at home or outside at work, to reclaim the street as a safe space, as well as all other private and public spaces (e.g., Bunch, 1997; Lees, 1997). However, while this preoccupation with women’s safety and security has constituted a major part of feminist politics, it has also always been only part of it. Feminist politics also called for a thorough transformation of the relations of gender and sexuality within the family and within society as a whole. To borrow from the differentiation made by ‘Aunt Lydia’ in Margaret’s Atwood’s book The Handmaid’s Tale (1985; see also the introduction to Sahgal and Yuval-Davis, 1992 [2002]), feminist politics has always included both the notion of ‘freedom of’ as well as that of ‘freedom from’. It is much easier for people to perceive and sympathize with the idea of negative freedom, however, than with that of a positive one. Often demands for women’s safety get a more sympathetic ear than those which call for the radical transformation of social relations that is necessary for safety to be realized. Moreover, as Charlotte Bunch (2002) has commented, even within such constructions of negative freedom and

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‘human security’, the physical security risks for women from violent men of whatever nationality, race, and religion have been marginalized, if not completely ignored, within the overall global concern with security. Except, I would add, when the call to protect and/or liberate women was useful as a rallying cry for war – as, for example, happened in the case of the war in Afghanistan and to a lesser extent, on Iraq during the first decade of this century.

CONCLUDING REMARKS Today – and probably always – belonging is multiplex and multi-layered, continuous and shifting, dynamic and attached. This is true both in terms of the subjective and in terms of the political. The notion of belonging should be examined not as an abstract notion but as one that is embedded in specific discourses of power, in which gender, class, sexual and racialized social and political divisions, local and global, are intermeshed. It incorporates discourses of participation, of identification, and of emotional attachments. The task is to explore the extent to which it is possible to develop a politics of belonging in which differentiated social positionings, identifications, and political values are acknowledged in a non-exclusionary way and in which individual and collective emotional security would not feel threatened by permeable borders and boundaries. Constructions of nationhood have been changing since the late twentieth century. Territories continue to carry crucial symbolic and emotional meaning for nationalist discourses, but in a world in which technologies of transport and communication as well as free market ideologies rule, and more and more branches of the state are being privatized – including large sections of the military – ethnic boundaries and loyalties play an increasingly central role in nationalist ideologies. The liberating principle of ‘selfdetermination’ can become a launching pad

for regressive defensive identities leading to spatial as well as social segregation rather than the democratic principle of pluralist societies. These regressive, defensive identities can take the forms of racist, extreme Right movements on the one hand, and fundamentalist religious movements, which have appeared in all major religions during the last twenty years, on the other hand. Yet, we should not ignore the complex emotions of impotence, fear, and yearning to belong that drive the contemporary politics of belonging. They are not pre-modern relics of the past – they have been playing major constitutive roles in local and global politics. The Right has always understood and used them. It is time the rest of us do as well – but differently.

NOTES 1 Thanks to Richard Mowbray who drew my attention to this literature. 2 Use of this expression stresses the attempt – even though it was ultimately unsuccessful – to find spaces where international law would not apply.

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Feminism and Human Rights Regimes in Transnationality’, Citizenship Studies, 3(3): 337–54. Held, David (1995) Democracy and the Global Order. Cambridge: Polity Press. Helmreich, Stefan (1992) ‘Kinship, Nation and Paul Gilroy’s Concept of Diaspora’, Diaspora, 2(2): 243–50. Herman, Edward (2002) ‘Introduction’, in David Chandler (ed.) From Kosovo to Kabul: Human Rights and International Intervention. London: Pluto Press. Ifekwunigwe, Jayne O. (1999) Scattered Belongings. London: Routledge. Ignatief, Michael (2001) Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Kaldor, Mary (2003) Global Civil Society: An Answer to War. Cambridge: Polity Press. Kitching, Gavin (1985) ‘Nationalism: The Instrumental Passion’, Capital and Class, 25: 98–116. Lake, Frank (1986 [1966]) Clinical Theology. London: Darton, Longman & Todd. Lees, Sue (1997) Ruling Passions: Sexual Violence and the Law. Buckinghamshire: Open University Press. Marshall, T. H. (1950) Citizenship and Social Class. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Marshall, T. H. (1975) Social Policy in the Twentieth Century. London: Hutchinson. Marx, Karl (1975[1844]) Early Writings. Hammondsworth: Penguin Books. Mercer, Kubena (1990) ‘Welcome to the Jungle: Identity and Diversion in Postmodern Politics’, in J. Rutherford (ed.) Identity, Community, Culture, Difference. London: Lawrence and Wishart. Mott, F. J. (1948) The Universal Design of Birth. Philadephia: David McKay. Pollock, Sheldon, Bhabha, Homi K., Breckenridge, Carol A. and Chakrabarty, Dipesh (2002) ‘Cosmopolitanisms’, in C.A. Breckenridge, S. Pollock, H. K.Bahbha and D. Cahkrabarty (eds.) Cosmopolitanism. Durham: Duke University Press. Rank, Otto (1973[1929]) The Trauma of Birth. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Raz-Krakotzkin, Amnon (1994) ‘Diaspora within Sovereignty: A Critique of the Negation of Diasporism in the Israeli Culture’, parts I and

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Globalization’, a paper presented at a Departmental Seminar. London: University of Greenwich, November. UN Commission on Human Security (2003) Human Security Now. NY: United Nations. Walzer, Michael (1997) On Toleration. New Haven, Yale University Press. Yuval-Davis, Nira (1994) ‘Women, Ethnicity and Empowerment’, Feminism and Psychology, special issue Shifting Identities Shifting Racisms, 4(1): 179–98. Yuval-Davis, Nira (1997a) Gender and Nation. London: Sage. Yuval-Davis, Nira (1997b) National Spaces and Collective Identities: Borders, Boundaries, Citizenship and Gender Relations, Inaugural Lecture. London: University of Greenwich, May. Yuval-Davis, Nira (1999) ‘The Multi-Layered Citizen at the Age of Globalization’, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 1(1): 119–37.

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Yuval-Davis, Nira (2005) ‘Asylum & Human Security’, Mediactive, 4: 38–55. Yuval-Davis, Nira (2006a) ‘Belonging and the Politics of Belonging’, Patterns of Prejudice, 40(3): 196–213. Yuval-Davis, Nira (2006b) ‘Intersectionality and Feminist Politics’, European Journal of Women’s Studies, 13(3): 193–209. Yuval-Davis, Nira (2006c) ‘Human/Women’s Rights and Feminist Transversal Politics’, in Myra Marx Ferree and Aili Mari Tripp (eds.) Global Feminisms: Women’s Transnational Activism, Organization and Human Rights. NY: New York University Press. Yuval-Davis, Nira (forthcoming) Nationalism and Belonging. London: Sage. Yuval-Davis, Nira and Anthias, Floya (eds.) (1989) Woman – Nation – State. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Yuval-Davis, Nira and Werbner, Pnina (eds.) (1999) Women, Citizenship and Difference. London: Zed Books.

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4 Sociological Practice and the Sociotechnics of Governance Kjeld Hogsbro, Hans Pruijt, Nikita Pokrovsky, and George Tsobanoglou 1

INTRODUCTION In many fields of practice (such as the organization of work, industrial relations, economic development, housing, social services, public administration, public safety, conflict resolution, anti-poverty policy, health care) the emphasis on top-down control for a long time repressed interaction-centered paradigms. But in the last twenty years a greater emphasis has been put on bottom-up programs, users’ participation and developmental programs mobilizing actors in civil society. Driving forces behind this swing are varied and include: demands for autonomy, disillusionment with inefficient centralized bureaucracy, and the neo-liberal agenda of curtailing the redistributive functions of the state. As a result, many professionals have become – in their own ways – experts in stimulating, structuring and managing interaction. Intellectual entrepreneurs such as

management gurus and political ideologues offer concepts, models and advice. The goal of this chapter is to examine the possible role for sociology, as policy and practice, in this field of intervention. The point of departure is the debate on ‘sociotechnics’, which was once driven by the bold proposition of a unique, universal, systematic, scientific method for intervention based on citizendriven humanistic values. We will trace how and why this vision tended to give way to pragmatic, contextually dependent approaches. Next, we will introduce a perspective which puts sociological theory and practice into an ‘intertextual relation’ with discourses of governance as they appear on the global scene and, by doing this, look at sociology as integrated in the development of modern society. Finally, we will draw some conclusions from this history with respect to the request for a practical sociology in a globalized world.

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SOCIOLOGICAL PRACTICE

FROM SOCIOTECHNICS TO SOCIOLOGICAL PRACTICE In 1966, the Polish sociologist Adam Podgórecki set out to develop sociotechnics as an applied social science that was non-ideological, but would have the capability of unmasking the Communist regime’s social engineering stratagems (Alexander and Schmidt, 1996). In the 1970s he went on by developing the ISA Research Committee 26 on Sociotechnics. Within the newsletter of this research committee from 1978 to 1990, discussion aimed at developing and promoting a paradigm for sociotechnics which could serve as an alternative to top-down social engineering traditions. Sociotechnics, as a key concept, was then sometimes used to label concrete forms of social intervention (mostly in a political context) and sometimes to label an academic discipline studying different forms of social practice and governmental strategies (Alexander and Schmidt, 1996). The point seems to be that it is both: thus, it is an analytic discipline producing results in the form of recommendations. Sociotechnics was distinguished from earlier traditions of social engineering, though it still referred to the same idea of supporting rational choice in political processes and social practice (Podgórecki and Schmidt, 1977a, pp: 4–13; 1977b, pp: 13–28). One may understand ‘sociotechnics’ as an applied social science that may be defined as the set of methods of engineering social action. It provides intended social aims and goals with elaborations of frames of references as well as effective ways and means for their realization, relying in its operation solely on verified or verifiable propositions that describe and explain relevant social behaviour (Podgórecki and Schmidt, 1977a: 8).

In its ambition to be both a critical discipline analyzing contemporary social policy, legislation, mass media, management, etc. and, at the same time, a practical one producing concepts and guidelines for social practice, action and development, sociotechnics was supposed to tap many different sources of sociological theory. In their book,

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Multidimensional Sociology, Podgórecki and Los (1979) profiled a sociology that combined various theoretical perspectives and levels of analysis referring to systems theory, functionalism, structuralism, historical materialism, critical sociology, hermeneutic sociology, phenomenology, ethnomethodology, and symbolic interactionism. The scientific interest that legitimized this rather eclectic approach was the pragmatic aim of developing a useful tradition of applied sociology which combined different contributions to the sociological understanding of social realities with an instrument for recommendations, interventions and active involvement. This multidimensional sociology represented a multileveled methodological and conceptual framework designed to help researchers ‘to grasp more comprehensively the variety of faces of social reality’ (Podgórecki and Los, 1979: 332). The authors emphasized the importance of scrutinizing ideological dimensions of various contemporary sociological traditions by studying the social conditions surrounding their development, success and failure in particular socio-political contexts. They believed that through this awareness and reflexive multidimensionality, their proposed approach would resist “ideological appropriation by one group or one type of political system. It would actually pose problems for any group looking for one-sided yet ‘convincing’ ideas in order to elevate their political programmes to [the] status of ‘science’” (Los, 1979: 136). Later contributions to the overall paradigm of sociological practice have had the same quest for a multidimensional approach (Fritz, 1991; Turner, 2001). Podgórecki’s concept of sociotechnics built on Popper’s (1957) distinction between, on the one hand, utopian social engineering that was driven by an elusive vision of the ideal society and was bound to have disastrous consequences, and, on the other hand, piecemeal social engineering, which proceeded by identifying social evils and responding to these by cautious, reversible reform. It took the form of an elaborate framework of consecutive steps,

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expressed in keywords (Podgórecki, 1996), which were later developed further in Podgórecki and Shields (1989: 15–31): ● ●

●

●

● ●

●

problem recognition, problem identification (clarification and ranking of values and goals), global evaluation (initial diagnosis of cause, prognosis, teleological decision), activation of the theory base (strategy, accessible options), design, action (experiments, implementation of final plan) and evaluation.

An innovation with respect to an earlier framework formulated by Zetterberg (1962) was the choice to include investigation of the ‘relationship between the values of a client, a sponsor, an expert and the public in general’ (Podgórecki, 1983: 35). Underlying the paradigm of sociotechnics was a belief in modern policy as based on well-defined values and the possibility of reaching a scientifically based consensus about the consequences of different strategies, as Weber believed (1922), and in rational decision-making, as outlined by Lindblom (1968). The assumption of rational decision-making was a problematic aspect, however. Maria Los pointed out that both diagnostics and the range of possibilities for action were inseparably linked to politics (Los, 1978: 18–25), and David Mills suggested that the significance of the manner in which actors defined problems was being overlooked in the contributions by Zetterberg (1962), Lazersfeld and Reitz (1975), and Podgórecki (1975) (Mills, 1981). Podgórecki was strongly influenced by the experiences of Poland before, during and after the breakdown of the communist regime. This transformation of the political system represented a dual development, whereby a top-down social engineering tradition was confronted with a bottom-up approach and, eventually, the emergence of Solidarnosc as a competing political actor. Different actors used the accumulated

sociotechnical knowledge while competing sociotechnical experts were put to the test by new socio-political dynamics. Influential social actors endorsed some experts; others were promoted by their own scientific community (Podgórecki, 1996). These developments reinforced Podgórecki’s belief in a sociotechnical tradition that aimed at equipping common people with steering capabilities to advance social projects on the basis of scientifically backed means. Yet, they also contributed to an appreciation of the complexities surrounding interventions in a field of actors, who have diverse understandings of the problems they address. This was made especially clear by the post-communist realities, whereby the long suppressed ideological and other conflicts emerged with unexpected and sometimes destructive vigour. It is necessary to remember Podgórecki’s warnings about utopian sociotechnics. They were rooted in the totalitarian experience of twentieth century Europe. As history has shown, the dangers of utopian designs aiming at transforming social structures to fit a ‘scientific’ blueprint are immense. Even when the goals seem progressive and legitimate, an imposed utopia represents a threat to the vital interests and integrity of local society. To exemplify this, Podgórecki referred to a study conducted by Massell (1974), which concerned the revolutionary strategy to emancipate women in the Muslim communities of the Soviet Central Asia in 1919–1929. The hidden goal was to penetrate tightly-knit Muslim society and undermine it from within. This intervention resulted in a worsening situation for the local women. The lessons derived from the totalitarian past have to be kept in mind as a reminder of a negative potential of grand designs and the need for a realistic sociological understanding of the context in which the intervention is taking place. The newsletter discussions in the first decade of RC26 mirror a growing concern about the dilemma faced by sociological experts when confronted with conflicting

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values and social interests. Conflicts like these might deter experts from participating in public debates and lead them to suppress critical comments on dominant values. The dilemma demands strong academic institutions and networks to counterbalance these forms of repression (Benveniste, 1983). At the end of the 1980s, we can see the contours of the following conclusions about the possibilities and obligations for sociologists working in the field of political recommendations and social practice: 1 Definitions of problems and accessible strategic solutions are defined by the societal context. 2 Sociological practitioners are obliged to address certain ethical questions concerning the values of accessible strategies before making recommendations and interventions. 3 Guidelines for sociological interventions are multidimensional, and the theoretical approach must be open to using different sociological theories to shed light on different aspects of social realities. 4 It is an important task for a sociological practice to address the issue of conflicts between different definitions of the problems and their connection to different public epistemologies and social interests.

SOCIOLOGICAL PRACTICE In 1987, ISA approved the addition of the term Sociological Practice to the name of Research Committee RC26 at the RC’s request. The change was seen as ‘a response to the considerably increased number of scholars and practitioners engaged in various countries in developing and applying theories and methods of social policy research and utilization’ (Schmidt, 1987: 5). At the same time, the board of the Research Committee established cooperation with the three American organizations addressing the utilization of social science, namely the Sociological Practice Section of the American Sociological Association, the Society for Applied Sociology and the Clinical Sociology

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Association.2 The merging process of these different initiatives was not limited to a broadened access to and interchanges among members of these organizations. From an epistemological perspective, the paradigm of sociotechnics moved away from an aspiration to establish a unique model for studying social practice and to make recommendations for socially sustainable solutions for questions of influence, social problems, democracy and management, to a more pragmatic position where problems and possible solutions were regarded as closely linked to the context in which they were situated. This gave a new impetus to a long-recognized need for bringing into discussion the wide range of experiences from the whole spectrum of sociological intervention. This need was recognized by Adam Podgórecki as a vital aspect of Sociotechnics, as documented first in a series of volumes edited by him in Poland and later in his publications in English, including the 1996 volume edited by him with Jon Alexander and Rob Shields. It might be interventions in family patterns as well as political programmes. It might be the application of macro-sociological theory as well as microsociological theory. Not only was the need of a multidimensional sociology now introduced as a basic approach to understanding sociotechnics, but a multidimensional practice was institutionalized as the empirical point of departure. The ambition to have one outstanding matrix for analysis and recommendation had receded into the background, and the conviction linked to early modernism, namely that it was possible to define rational solutions to problems defined with consensus, had evaporated. As Adam Podgórecki defines the problem in 1978, the ‘unexploited potentialities’ of sociology compared to disciplines such as economics, legal sciences, demography and psychology stem from four major characteristics: 1 Sociology is not associated with a practical nonacademic profession. 2 Sociology is much younger as an academic discipline.

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3 Sociology has no institutionalized tradition for offering advice and consultancy. 4 Sociological associations have no tradition of generating diagnostics and guidelines for social intervention.

A paradox of sociology is that, on the one hand, most students have little ambition to pursue careers in scientific research, while, on the other hand, the applied branches of the discipline were never firmly established. Psychology, for example, did much better in this respect. Two explanations have been advanced (Jacobs, 2004). One explanation is that the association of the label ‘sociology’ with left wing politics may have hindered the acceptance of the field of ‘applied sociology’. The reality is, however, that concepts and methods that originate in sociology did see a wide application. One example is the use of focus groups in market research. The second explanation is that members of academic sociology departments were, for a long time, preoccupied with establishing the scientific respectability of their discipline, and were not very interested in applying sociological insights to, for example, business or administrative problems. Instead, this tended to become the province of applied disciplines such as business studies and public administration. Nevertheless, sociological practitioners have a lot to offer. They bring a strong sensitivity to social context. They are versed in both quantitative and qualitative methods and can use a variety of theoretical frameworks to approach practical problems from different angles. And, when drawing on the ethnographic tradition, they have access to subtle, often taken-for-granted, micro-processes that are frequently overlooked but can have macro-consequences (Jacobs, 2004). By establishing a link between sociotechnics, clinical sociology and sociological practice, the Research Committee became the host of intensive discussions linking practical sociological interventions at micro, meso and macro levels to the continued development of sociological concepts and theories.

In 1991, Jan M. Fritz defined ‘clinical sociology’ as: the creation of new systems as well as the intervention in existing systems for purposes of assessment and/or change. Clinical sociologists are humanistic scientists who are multidisciplinary in approach. They engage in planned social change efforts by focusing on one system level (e.g., interpersonal, community, international) but integrate levels of focus in their work and do so from a sociological frame of reference (Fritz, 1991: 18).

The distinction between clinical sociology and sociological practice was not that clear. The term clinical sociology was first used in the 1920s to label a kind of practical medical sociology (Fritz, 1991: 18) and though the concept was soon used outside the medical domain, it still bears connotations linked to the concept of social pathology. It is currently used as a label for sociological intervention in social problems, conflicts and interaction on a personal level. Examples of such interventions are work with delinquent youths (Bility, 1999), victims of sexual abuse (Disch, 2001), self-help groups (Williams, 2000), as well as work related to family interaction and conflict mediation on an individual and even on a national level (Fritz, 2002). The broader term ‘Sociological Practice’ is used for sociological support to social development at an organizational, local and national level.

GOVERNMENTALITY OF SOCIOTECHNICS Sociotechnics can be seen as part of a wider conceptual field of social intervention. This field can be captured by the term ‘governmentality’. Foucault (1978) coined this term to denote a new form of government, the origin of which he dated in the eighteenth century. This new form of government involves ‘the continual definition and redefinition of what is within the competence of the state and what is not’ (Foucault, 1978: 103). In other words, governmentality means

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how people are governed, agree to be governed and govern themselves (Tsobanoglou, 1993). Authors such as Mitchel Dean distinguish different modes of governmentality, and suggest that in a given era a certain mode of governmentality may be broadly dominant. A mode of governmentality consists of a set of specific answers to the questions ‘what is it to govern’, ‘what are we going to govern’, ‘how are we going to (be) govern(ed)’ and ‘why are we going to (be) govern(ed)’ (Dean, 1999). Thus, governmentality includes answers to epistemological, technical and ethical questions. These answers are cultural products that are largely taken for granted by members of society (Dean, 1999: 16). When reasoning from the viewpoint of governmentality theory, the increased emphasis apparent in all kinds of policy towards interaction among subjects should be seen as a switchover to a different mode of governmentality. Governmentality theorists have suggested that the current mode of governmentality is characterized by an emphasis on ‘responsible and disciplined autonomy’ (Dean, 1999: 153), a ‘will to empower’ and a focus on interaction among subjects (Cruikshank, 1999). A case that seems to demonstrate such transformations in the modes of governmentality is welfare policy. In 1980, the then Minister of Social Affairs in Denmark announced at the OECD assembly that the time had come to reduce professional dominance in the whole field of social services and to try to mobilize social networks of disabled individuals (Bjerregaard, 1980). Though she belonged to the Social Democratic Party, Ritt Bjerregaard thus became one of the first politicians who challenged the social engineering project that had dominated the Nordic model of ‘welfare governmentality’ since 1960. In 1982 the neo-Conservative/neo-Liberal parties won the Danish election and replaced the Social Democratic government. During the following years the government focused on: ● ●

decentralization of influence and decision-making, a rehabilitation of voluntary social work and

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social networks and community as explanatory factors for understanding social problems.

In the USA the situation was very similar, when the Reagan administration took over and introduced a right-wing, voluntarist agenda into the concept of the welfare system, challenging the hegemony of the ‘Great Society Programme’ of the 1960s. Though the former Danish Social Democratic Minister of Social Affairs, Ritt Bjerregaard, would never identify herself with right-wing American policy, her attack on the professionals of the social system was linked to the same discourse. Looking at the ‘the governmentality of the welfare state’ discourses, we can follow a transformation of the social engineering discourse from focusing solely on structural reasons for poverty to focusing on the responsibility of the individual. Given that this transformation was effected by political parties that occupied opposite positions in the political arena, it represented a deeper change in the governmentality, or welfare discourse, of the western welfare states. In the process, the ‘post-Reagan’ USA gained a leading global role in formulating the agenda of the welfare system – clearly, a role that it had never had before (Prince, 2001). Already in the 1960s, neo-conservatives in the USA combined economic liberalism with an emphasis on morality, ethics and community values (Gibson, 1997). Charles Murray thought that the welfare system was actively contributing to the creation of a permanent underclass dependent on welfare benefits. This ‘underclass’ was defined by its culture and its self-destructive behaviour (Murray, 1994). In a more sophisticated way other conservatives, such as Marvin Olasky, argued that it was necessary to distinguish between ‘those who need a hand’ and ‘those who need a push’ (Olasky, 1992). This led to the instrumentality of a ‘welfare to workfare’ policy introduced by President Clinton in 1996 in the USA (Tsobanoglou, 2002, 2004, 2006). Such policy spread to Europe as the only possible way for the Social Democrats

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to regain the lost political leadership. Thus the neo-conservative emphasis on personal responsibility, morality, family values, communities and national values has dominated the welfare discourse unchallenged since the beginning of the 1980s (Gibson, 1997). The concept that a sector of the population is defined by a kind of cultural inability to cope with the challenges of modern society is widely accepted today, not least among professional helpers (Gibson, 1997: 175). The liberal Democratic discourse in the USA (like the Social Democratic discourse in Denmark) had been caught by a paradigm that understood ‘antisocial acts as simply the result of structural factors’ (Gibson, 1997: 191). This made them incapable of relating to issues of morally unacceptable behaviour. They did not have an answer to the conservative focus on individual responsibility, safe communities and a shared work ethic (Gibson, 1997: 191). Furthermore, the Liberal charity was running directly into a critique of being chauvinistic when it reduced poor people to helpless victims who had to be saved by liberal experts (Gibson, 1997: 191). The dominant policy discourse jumped from one-sidedly blaming everything on structure to one-sidedly holding the individual accountable for all problems. This shows how political discourses can change the specific definition of the problem and the limits of accessible strategies, thus redefining what can be perceived as rational solutions. Vivian Schmidt (2002) argues, in a comparative study of welfare systems in Britain, New Zealand, Germany and France that it is a mistake to think that political innovations that are up against strong group interests are doomed to suffer defeat. The study shows that it is possible to succeed by changing fundamental discourses about social problems and political obligations. In these instances, sociologists have to be able to explain how these changes in public discourses take place (Schmidt, 2002). It must be admitted that efforts to analyze these changes are rather difficult because of the different levels of

social processes that have to be taken into consideration (Hastings, 1998). The specific constellation of values, issues and governmentality in local settings widens the variety of existing welfare models in the world. Welfare systems are often understood from an ethnocentric European point of view as limited to a mixture of three or four European models (Abrahamson, 1999; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Titmus, 1974). In a global sociological discourse these limited possibilities seem to be contradicted by a variety of East Asian models with different characteristics (Abrahamson, 1999; Clammer, 1997; Hong, 2000) Specific studies in this field, such as Clammer’s study of Singapore (1997) and Joseph Tharamangalam’s study of the Kerala Province in India (1998), are examples of case studies that focus on the genesis of a certain governmentality and a specific welfare system linked to it. The question now is whether trends in governance are so pervasive that they permeate sociology as well. In the 1980s, theoretical sociology seemed to move away from a focus on structural determination, which had been dominant in the 1970s, towards a stronger focus on the individual subject acting in a field of possibilities. Bourdieu (1980), Habermas (1981) as well as Luhmann (1984) produced works that exemplify this. All three approaches share the same theoretical interest in overcoming the gap between macrolevel sociological theory and micro-level social psychology, and in re-installing the individual as a responsible actor, not totally dependent on the structure, but confronted with the structure. The structure is not seen as a determining structure in these approaches, but more as a social field, as defined by Sartre in his Critique de la Raison Dialectique (1960/1982: 479–504, 549) and elaborated by Bourdieu (1980). Understood as a social field, the structure permits the social agent certain possibilities for changing his or her position in the field, and as an effect of numerous individual movements, the field in itself changes and opens up new possibilities for other agents.

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This development in sociological theory took place in the same period when liberals in the USA and social democrats in Europe were losing their grip on the dominant political discourse. This new emphasis in sociological theory corresponds to the increasing role of the acting subject that Dean (1999) and Cruikshank (1999) saw as the hallmark of the current mode of governmentality. McLain (2002: 268) suggested a two-way relationship between sociological theory and the wider society: ‘From a reflexive perspective, applying sociology is a redundancy: sociological knowledge is always applied in ways that have transformative consequences for both sociology and society’. Sociological thinking may have an impact through the education of social workers or the general public debate, and the public debate might influence the content of new sociological theory when academic sociologists try to produce socially relevant and applicable theories, or try to answer questions posed by local authorities or the public debate. The perspective of pervasive trends in governance can help us understand the obstacles that any attempt at establishing a contextindependent applied form of sociology will face. Interventions that unleash the unique qualities of sociology require insight into the dominant discourse on governance. One has to be able to decide whether to confront and expose it, or simply adapt to it. This aspect of the conditions for sociotechnics was not acknowledged by Podgórecki and others in the early discussions on sociotechnics. It leaves sociological practice in a more profound dilemma of, on the one hand, adapting to a form of governance and, on the other hand, maintaining a critical distance from its goals, premises and epistemological framework. Historical experience shows that sociology tends to be perceived as a threat by totalitarian or authoritarian regimes. Sociology in China was banned between 1950 and 1979. Though the sociological tradition in China before 1950 aimed at practical innovations, the Communist Party did not want any competing discourse of

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society (Li, 1999). When liberal economic activities were encouraged at the end of the 1970s, departments of sociology were reestablished as an answer to social problems following the rapidly emerging social changes (Li, 1999). Still, the government ‘discourages free discourse about political ideas’ so mainstream Chinese sociology has limited its attention to ‘social problems that confronted economic development and social stability, such as population growth, urban poverty, unemployment and crime’ (Li, 1999: 275). This development is in many ways comparable to the situation in the Soviet Union (Nikitin, 2001) and several other communist states, where sociology was also suspended for considerable periods of time. Similarly, parallels can be drawn with the European South when dictatorial regimes in Greece, Spain and Portugal were in control of the political process. The Madrid ISA Congress, in 1990 signalled the renaissance in social studies in Iberia, but not in Greece where to this day law, theology, philosophy, architecture and journalism appear to play the role of substitute social sciences (Tsobanoglou, 2000).

SOCIOLOGICAL INTERVENTION AT THE MESO-LEVEL In articles from the 1980s, James March liberated himself from the ‘myth of rationality’ in social science when addressing issues of organizations. He claimed that much of the organizational reality might better be seen as products of ongoing performance and institutionalized ways of tackling problems and pretending to be in charge (March, 1984; 1988). Engaging in intervention, for example by providing training to managers, involves entering into a discursive field that tends to be populated by concepts that have been successfully promoted by members of what has been called the ‘guru industry’ rather than having proved to be effective rational solutions to well-defined problems (Collins, 2000).

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Standard procedure in the guru industry is: identify some problem, formulate a model solution, find some empirical material that to some extent supports the model, find a catchy label, and promote the model globally as the way forward. The message is: Smart players are starting to adopt the model; do as I advise you to do and rich rewards will be yours; ignore this message and you will find yourself stranded. Let us consider an example from the field of the organization of work. A straightforward way to apply sociological knowledge would be to offer training sessions on the contrast between scientific management and sociotechnical systems design. A problem, however, is that many managers will not find this interesting. In contrast, managers often are much more attracted by the concept of team work. Part of its popularity stems from a global bestseller on the organization of production (Womack et al., 1990) that took the Toyota production model – relabelling it as ‘lean production’ – and tried to make it socially acceptable by adding (unsubstantiated) claims about dynamic teams in which workers learn and creatively apply professional skills. The authors presented it as a model that every company must implement. A possible course of action for a practical sociologist is to hop on the bandwagon of team work, but then to open up the discourse by presenting various dimensions of team work and their complex ramifications for the mode of supervision, decision-making, power relations and the logistical and disciplinary context of work processes (Pruijt, 2003). Thus, the occurrence of a pervasive trend in governance does not imply that the sociologist has to choose between either joining the fashionable rhetoric-reproducing flock or retreating into post-modern theorizing. Within concepts that conform to the dominant trend in governance, there is space for widely divergent opinions and practices. This is exemplified by the concept of team work. While neatly encapsulating all the characteristics of the current mode of governmentality (responsible and disciplined autonomy, empowerment and interaction among subjects), it can be

used to promote various models of organization and management, ranging from a modernized version of Taylorism, to a polar opposite of Taylorism inspired by sociotechnical systems design theory. It seems to be a general characteristic of popular guru concepts that they are open to diverse interpretations, are flexible, and rife with internal contradictions (Pruijt, 1998). The seeming convergence at the macro-level, which governmentality theory suggests, does not imply determinism at the meso-level.

GLOBALIZATION, GOVERNANCE AND UTOPIA In the early discussion on sociotechnics we meet references to Mannheim (1936), and though the concept of utopia is not explicitly addressed and elaborated as is done in the works of Gramsci (1971) and Bloch (1965) and later on by Etzioni (2004), the existence of utopian visions of more democratic organizational forms is vivid in the considerations addressing questions of sociotechnics that contribute to the mobilization of civil society and support the influence of the common citizen. As such, the discussions about sociotechnics have not only addressed the day-to-day questions of conflicts in families, organizations and social policy but also raised the question of utopian ideals and grappled with the quest for feasible forms of social practices informed by these ideals. Today these discussions are inevitably linked to questions surrounding recent trends in the globalization processes. Globalization is one of the most frequently used terms in modern scholarly and everyday language. It has long joined the ranks of such terms as ‘history’, ‘civilization’, ‘era’, ‘progress’, ‘modernity’, ‘post-modernity’, and other conceptual terms that express the style and character of the public mood and consciousness of our times. The appearance and proliferation of sentiments and movements opposed to globalization, not just in the West but in Russia and developing

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countries as well, have contributed to the dramatization of the mass media’s coverage of globalization, influencing concerns of the general public. Commonly accepted models of globalization are based on ideas about a united and integrated world civilization which encompasses the entire earth and near-earth space and sweeps away all kinds of borders, be they between cultures or states, in the domain of social inequality, or between time-zones and geographical regions. The world is portrayed as becoming compact, accessible, transparent and visible, with its parts linked by interdependency. This concerns economics, technology, politics, the environment, moral values, and all the other areas of interest to contemporary humankind, including such negative phenomena as organized crime, the narcotics business, terrorism and other destructive forms of activity. The statement ‘the world is so small’ is the epitome of this mindset. The world really is becoming small, in both the best and the most threatening sense of the word. It is becoming pervaded by anomie, which makes governance very difficult and expands the scope of risk as an unavoidable element in the everyday life of concerned citizens (Beck, 1986). The perception of risk factors is further differentiated by the particular context in which different agents operate (Benveniste, 1983): ●

●

●

To the expert, the risk might be that people do not understand the consequences of CO2 before it is too late. To the politicians, the risk might be to lose the support of the citizens. To different groups of citizens, the risk might be that experts and politicians might be wrong.

Globalization processes are not evolving arbitrarily or at the whim of impersonal forces, but, to a large extent, through rational human efforts. These processes permeate all social groups and institutions, transforming them both from within and from without. NGOs as the important caretakers of civil concerns turn into INGOs (International Non-Governmental Organizations) and these INGOs strive to put on the agenda the issue

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of how to distribute scarce resources fairly at a global level. Globalization is also having a direct impact on the primary ‘cells’ of human societies, small social groups of people possessing closely related values, similar social experience, and corresponding perceptions of the world. With their inner beings shaped by the same historical events, members of each group have experienced these events in approximately the same fashion. In the most general terms, it can be said that the social and biological stages of an individual’s development are superimposed on a series of historical events and this results in the unique social characteristics of the ‘cells’. Therefore, as expressed in Pokrovsky’s concept of ‘cellular globalization’ (Pokrovsky, 2001), the ultimate meaning of globalization goes beyond processes of integration of those parts of the world community that used to be isolated and alienated from each other. According to this conceptualization, globalization permeates every cell, every small community, at times radically changing the nature of basic relations between people and organizations and creating new sets of values and reference points in our everyday lives. In other words, globalization not only implies ‘a small world’, but also a world which is essentially new in all of its modalities. And this pervasive change is often resisted as unacceptable, and sometimes gives rise to direct protest by those who are not ready to embrace the birth of a new system with all its unpredictable and unstudied characteristics. This is the way it has always been in the past whenever a civilization crossed a threshold in its development, passing from one moment of history to another. The concept of cellular globalization helps to grasp a number of important developments, such as: ● ● ●

●

a tendency towards material consumerism, a constant narrowing of social interest, the requirements of flexibility, expressed in the ability to adapt to unpredictable social changes, a tendency towards virtualization, understood as often unconscious entry into the world of ‘simulacres’ (artificial mythological structures) that do not have any direct bearing on the objective reality,

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the dislocation of moral issues, compartmentalization of traditional functions of moral consciousness, and the spread of anomie, understood as the disintegration of basic values, and increased vagueness with respect to what is considered right and wrong and the prevalence of superficiality, the disappearance of cultural demands, the departure from the classical cultural heritage and national traditions, as well as the willingness to make use of and disseminate cultural ersatz.

The world system is moving towards a situation often described as ‘glocalization’. Both individuals and local communities are influenced by international discourses and they are active in the implementation of these discourses in local cultural contexts. With the help of negotiation, global governance acts in an organizational field of local actors. At its most effective, it acts through reflexive, responsive processes, forming an institutional milieu of relative consensus and collaboration on the basis of local values (OECD, 2001). This can be done with respect to international contracts and projects. In this situation, governance often aims at increasing the competitiveness of the given region in the international arena. An unusual symbiosis between global and traditional trends at a cellular level is occurring in many countries, which gives every national situation its own special flavour and meaning. Some crisis-stricken societies, such as Russia, actually find a relative stabilization through integration into world processes. In this sense, societies of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) are influenced by these trends to a greater extent than the relatively stable western societies, and are acting as a kind of proving ground for trends that will fully manifest themselves globally only in the future. While globalization opens new opportunities, it also generates new threats. It has resulted in an anomic world, making governance very difficult. This situation calls for new forms of sociotechnics. There are some instances of brand new procedures geared towards civil involvement at a global level.

One of these new approaches is ‘Die Plannungzelle’ (in English ‘The Planning Cell’), after Peter Dienel who initiated this reform movement in 1997. It is also known, worldwide, as ‘Citizens’ Juries’ after the American participatory democracy institution that was initiated at the same time in the USA (1972) and influenced by ideas of Thomas Jefferson. The ‘Planning Cell’ is a group of randomly selected citizens released (with remuneration) from their daily duties for a limited period in order to work out solutions to problems. Process moderators assist them. In this method, the citizens act as lay assessors or lay planners. In order to avoid all forms of selective distortion, a systematic random procedure of selection from a clearly demarcated basic population is necessary. In this way a microcosm of society is formed, in which all social strata and age groups and both sexes have the chance of being represented. It is possible to include as many social values as possible in the decision-making process. As well as possessing ‘common sense’ and everyday experience, participants are provided with the necessary factual information. The input of this information takes place mainly in the form of pre-prepared informative material, hearings with affected interest groups, interviews with experts, on-the-spot visits, etc. (Dienel 1997; Steward et al., 1994). The Planning Cell illustrates a type of ‘pragmatic utopian construction’ set up to address the conflicts and problems of modern globalization. The influence of these constructions is not linked to institutional control over nation-states, but to a ‘moral authority’ of their ordinary members and recommendations worked out by them. Rather than focusing on legal balances between powerful actors on the international political scene, this scheme offers a possibility for an alternative choice in the formation of global discourses. Furthermore, this approach represents an example of sociotechnics with a slightly utopian bent. While it builds on the early aspirations to activate civil society, it does not, however, link them to the trust in a consensus

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based on rational choice, but to a possibility of facilitating a novel political discourse to widen the field of participatory strategies. The Planning Cell is but one example of the global tendency to focus on citizens’ rights and participation. The Blair government introduced ‘Citizens’ Juries’ into the exercise of local social policy in order to advance inclusion policies (Steward et al., 1994). There are numerous forms of social action and social development programs all over the world undertaken as social experiments in the hope of finding ways of involving common citizens in the search for solutions to local problems. The political aim of such initiatives is to trigger a process in which local volunteer resources are mobilized and the relation between public institutions and citizens is brought into debate (Capece and Schanz, 2000; Chappell and Lanza-Kaduce, 2004; Hegland, 1994; Hogsbro et al., 1991; Rusmore, 1999; Stoecker, 1999; Williams, 2000). They involve a multiplicity of evaluation designs from summative to formative evaluation, empowerment evaluation, participant evaluation and ‘responsive constructivist’ evaluations (Fettermann et al., 1996; Guba and Lincoln, 1989; Patton, 1997). The reports following from these different kinds of evaluations have a triple aim: ●

●

●

For the politicians, the function of the reports is to identify the profound elements in the legislation needed to push the societal development in the preferred direction. For the professional practitioners and grass-roots activists, the function of the reports is to identify barriers and possibilities for future practice in local projects. For the sociologists involved, the reports contribute to the theoretical understanding of community relations and processes.

The legislation that might follow these new types of developmental programme is supposed to encourage and support further developments in the field, where local mobilization has already engendered a local practice ready to benefit from the new legislation.

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These developmental programmes represent an innovative political form of mediating between top-down and bottom-up governance. At the same time, they constitute an almost utopian form of new reflexive governance, a sociotechnics of a decentralized welfare state. The method aims at mobilizing local people (civil society) around selfdefined issues and goals, and, as such, it remains sensitive to local context and local differences throughout the world (Bility, 1999). There is nothing fixed about such approaches to sociotechnics. They might be transient. They are not inseparably linked to a certain level of governmental development. But they are part of a valuable practice that needs to be both documented for future recognition and added to the accumulated cultural capital enlarging the field of optional strategic choices. Clifford Geertz used the concept ‘the universe of human discourses’ to underscore the point that we are dealing with multiple possibilities of ways people can organize themselves in meaningful societal relations (Geertz, 1973: 14). The limits of these possibilities we will never be able to anticipate. Geertz makes a statement that is relevant to the discussion on sociotechnics when he concludes: ‘The essential vocation of interpretive anthropology is not to answer our deepest questions, but to make available to us answers that others, guarding other sheep in other valleys, have given, and thus to include them in the consultable record of what man has said’ (Geertz, 1973: 30). Sociological practice must realize that by contributing to the disclosure of the ‘universe of human discourses’ and reporting about sociotechnics practiced in different places and different times, we contribute to human development.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ROLE OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY From the recent and past discussions about sociotechnics, its methodology, goals and

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interdependency with governmentality, we can outline the following conclusions related to the current processes of globalization and the prospects for sociology to make a difference in the field of international discourses: 1 In a glocalized world, the primary function of sociology may involve expansion of the discursive field of governmentality by offering opportunities for people to develop or access different discourses, thereby enhancing their ability to engage with the processes of globalization and concomitant transformations of organizations, local communities and everyday life. 2 Sociological practice presupposes a sociological theory that is not exclusively oriented towards either macro – or micro – level phenomena. Sociological theory has to mediate between these two levels, as even the smallest social unit will be an actor on a global scene. 3 Under glocalization, local actors are increasingly liberated from national bonds and become more open to international networks and discourses. Relations between organizations are subject to continuous construction and reconstruction. Theories of discursive fields and inter-organizational networks become of vital importance. 4 The nature of current trends of globalization both requires and introduces profound transformations of social relations. Both at micro- and macro- level, in theory and practice, we need to address issues of innovation, social security and social integrity. 5 Sociology must combine the empirical study of social phenomena, and the critical analysis of social forms and processes with the production of policy guidelines directed to both governments and social movements. These guidelines should aim at guarding fundamental civil rights, while facilitating negotiated change and the accommodation of aspirations of diverse communities and groups. 6 Sociotechnics has to encompass different levels of (global) society respecting their specific cultural/institutional characteristics. Thus the practical sociologist must master a multiplicity of sociological approaches to gain a more realistic understanding of the complexity of the changing social world.

During its conferences the Research Committee on Sociotechnics/Sociological Practice has emphasized the different aspects

of modern sociology and presented innovative ways by which sociological interventions can enhance local democratic participation in various parts of the globe. Given the absence of structures and institutions capable of guaranteeing that the basic human problems and issues of the global society are addressed through democratic political processes, sociologists should play a role in making administrative processes more transparent and opening up channels for citizen participation spanning all levels of global society. Both governance and social movements are under the influence of global discourses that must be critically examined for their arguments, their social function and their consequences with respect to the distribution of influence and resources.

NOTES 1 We would like to thank Prof. M. Los, University of Ottawa, for her invaluable help in the preparation of this chapter. 2 John Glass and Jan-Marie Fritz were among the co-founders of the Clinical Sociological Association in 1978. In 1986 its name was changed to The Sociological Practice Association (Fritz, 1991).

REFERENCES Abrahamson, Peter (1999) ‘The Welfare Modelling Business’, Social Policy and Administration, 33(4): 394–415. Alexander, Jon and Schmidt, Joachim K. H. W. (1996) ‘Social Engineering: Genealogy of a Concept’, in Adam Podgórecki, Jon Alexander and Rob Shields (eds.) Social Engineering. Ottawa: Carleton University Press. Beck, Ulrich (1986) Risikogesellschaft. Suhrkamp Verlag. Eng.: Risk Society. Sage 1992. Benveniste, Guy (1983) ‘Professionalization of Political Experts’, RC26 Newsletter, No. 8: 18–33. Bility, Khalipha M. (1999) ‘School Violence and Adolescent Mental Health in South Africa: Implications for School Health Programs’, Sociological Practice, 1(4): 285–303.

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Bjerregaard, Ritt (1980) ‘Fra Stabsarbejde Til Græsrodsplan’ (‘From Staff to Grass-roots Level’). OECD speech 1980. Dagbladet Information, 13(11). Copenhagen. Bloch, Ernst (1965) ‘Antizipierte Realität – Wie Geschieht und was Leistet Utopisches Denken?’, Wissenschaft und Plannung, Universitätstage. Gruyter Verlag, Berlin. Bourdieu, Pierre (1980) Le Sens Pratique. Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit. Capece, Michael and Schantz, David (2000) ‘An Approach to Community Facilitation Using Mediation Techniques: Skills for the Sociological Practitioner’, Sociological Practice, 2(1). Chappell, Allison T. and Lonn Lanza-Kaduce (2004) ‘Integrating Sociological Research and Theory with Community-oriented Policing: Bridging the Gap between Academics and Practice’, Journal of Applied Sociology/Sociological Practice, 21(2): 80–98. Clammer, John (1997) ‘Framing the Other: Criminality, Social Exclusion and Social Engineering in Developing Singapore’, Social Policy and Administration, 31(5): 136–53. Collins, David (2000) Management Fads and Buzzwords. Critical-Practical Perspectives. London: Routledge. Cruikshank, Barbara (1999) The Will to Empower. Democratic Citizens and Other Subjects. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Dean, Mitchell (1999) Governmentality. Sage. Dienel, Peter C. (1997) Die Plannungzelle, Eine Alternative zur Establishment-Democratie, 4 Auflage, Westdeutscher Verlag GmbH, Opladen. Disch, Estelle (2001) ‘Research as Clinical Practice: Creating a Positive Research Experience for Survivors of Sexual Abuse by Professionals’, Sociological Practice, 3(3). Esping-Andersen, Gøsta (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge: Policy Press. Etzioni, Amitai (2004) From Empire to Community. NY: Palgrave, Macmillan. Fetterman, David M., Kaftarian, Shakeh J. and Wandersman, Abraham (1996) Empowerment Evaluation. Thousand Oaks: Sage. Foucault, Michel (1978) ‘Governmentality’, in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (eds.) (1991) The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality. Harvester. Fritz, Jan Marie (1991) ‘The Emergence of American Clinical Sociology’, in Howard M. Rebach and John G. Bruhn (eds.) Handbook of Clinical Sociology. NY: Plenum Press.

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Fritz, Jan Marie (2002) ‘Teaching Sociological Practice: Starting with Something Special’, Sociological Practice, 4(2). Geertz, Clifford (1973) The Interpretation of Cultures. NY: Basic Books. Gibson, Cynthia (1997) ‘Facing Off on Social Policy: Can the Right and Left Find Middle Ground?’, Social Service Review, University of Chicago. Gramsci, Antonio (1971) Selections from Prison Notebooks. London: Lawrence and Wishart. Guba, Egon and Lincoln, Yvonne (1989) Fourth Generation Evaluation. Newbury Park: Sage. Habermas, Jürgen (1981) Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. Suhrkamp Verlag. Hastings, Annette (1998) ‘Connecting Linguistic Structures and Social Practices: A Discoursive Approach to Social Policy Analysis’, Journal of Social Policy, 27(2): 191–211. Hegland, Tore Jacob (1994) Fra de tusind blomster. Aalborg: Forlaget Alfuff. Hogsbro, Kjeld, Henrik Jochumsen og Birte Ravn (1991) Beyond Limits – Development of the School as a Cultural Centre in Denmark. Copenhagen: Udviklingscenteret. Hong, Zhou (2000) ‘Decomposing Welfare – A Methodological Discourse on Welfare States with Lessons from China’, IDS Bulletin, 31(4): 42–9. Jacobs, An (2004) ‘Sociological Practitioners Contributing to New Product Development: Mapping the Challenges’, Sociological Research Online, 9(4). http://www.socresonline.org.uk/9/4/jacobs.html Lazarsfeld, Paul F. and Reitz, Jeffrey G. (1975) An Introduction to Applied Sociology. NY: Elsevier. Li, De (1999) ‘Reconstructing Chinese Sociology: A Quest for an Applied Science’, Sociological Practice, 1(4). Lindblom, Charles (1968) The Policy Making Process. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall. Los, Maria (1978) ‘Comments of the Rapporteur’, RC26 Newsletter, No. 3: 18–25. Los, Maria (1979) ‘Multi-dimensional Sociology’, in Adam Podgórecki and Maria Los, (eds.) The Multi-dimentional Sociology. London. Routledge & Kegan Paul. Luhmann, Niklas (1984) Soziale Systeme. Frankfurta.M: Suhrkamp Verlag. Mannheim, Karl (1936) Ideology and Utopia. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

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March, J. G. (1984) ‘How We Talk and How We Act – Administrative Theory and Administrative Life’, Leadership and Organizational Cultures. Chicago: University of Illinois Press. March, J. G. (1988) Decisions and Organizations. London: Blackwell. Massell, G. J. (1974) The Surrogate Proletariat. Moslem Women and Revolutionary Strategies in Soviet Central Asia: 1919–1929, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. McLain, Raymond (2002) ‘Reflexivity and the Sociology of Practice’, Sociological Practice – Journal of Clinical and Applied Sociology, 4(4): 249–77. Mills, David (1981) ‘Sociotechnics – A Methodological Analysis’, RC26 Newsletter, No. 6: 38–73. Murray, Charles (1994) Losing Ground. NY: Basic Books. Nikitin, Denis (2001) ‘Russian Social Science in Transition: Applied Political Research and Social Criticism’, Sociological Practice, 3(2): 157–173. OECD, (2001) Local Partnerships for Better Governance. Paris. Olasky, Marvin (1992) The Tragedy of American Compassion. Washington DC: Requiry. Patton, Michael Quinn (1997) Utilizationfocused Evaluation. Thousand Oaks: Sage. Podgórecki, Adam (1975) Practical Social Sciences. London: Routledge. Podgórecki, Adam (1978) ‘Revised Memorandum on the Potentialities of the International Sociological Association to Provide Social Expertise’, RC26 Newsletter, No. 3: 8–12. Podgórecki, Adam (1983) ‘Social Impact Assessment versus Sociotechnics’, RC26 Newsletter, No. 8. Podgórecki, Adam (1996) ‘Sociotechnics: Basic Concepts and Issues’, in Adam Podgórecki, Jon Alexander and Rob Shields (eds.) Social Engineering. Ottawa: Carleton University Press. Podgórecki, Adam and Los, Maria (1979) Multidimensional Sociology. London: Routledge. Podgórecki, Adam and Schmidt, Joachim K. H. W. (1977a) ‘Sociotechnics – The New Paradigm of Social Sciences’, RC26 Newsletter, No. 1: 4–13. Podgórecki, Adam and Schmidt, Joachim K. H. W. (1977b) ‘Proposal to Establish an International

Research Institute for Sociotechnics’, RC26 Newsletter, No. 1: 13–28. Pokrovsky, Nikita (2001) Human Development Report. Russian Federation, Moscow. The United Nations Commission. Popper, Karl R. (1957) The Poverty of Historicism. London: Routledge (1991). Prince, Michael (2001) ‘How Social is Social Policy? Fiscal and Market Discourses in North American Welfare States’, Social Policy and Administration, 35(1). Pruijt, Hans (1998) ‘Multiple Personalities: The Case of Business Process Reengineering’, Journal of Organizational Change Management, 11(3): 260–68. Pruijt, Hans (2003) ‘Teams between NeoTaylorism and Anti-Taylorism’, Economic and Industrial Democracy, 24(1): 77–101. Rusmore, Barbara (1999) ‘Arts Education for Human and Community Development: The Contribution of Participatory Evaluation’, Sociological Practice, 1(2). Sartre, Jean Paul (1960) Critique de la Raison Dialectique. Paris: Edition Galimard, References to the English Edition Critique of Dialectical Reason, Verso Paperback, London 1982. Schmidt, Joachim (1987) ‘Introduction’, Newsletter of RC26, No. 10. Schmidt, Vivian (2002) ‘Does Discourse Matter in the Politics of Welfare State Adjustment?’, Comparative Political Studies, 35(2): 168–93. Steward, John, Kendall, Elizabeth and Coote, Anna (1994) Citizens’ Juries. London: Institute for Policy Research. Stoecker, Randi (1999) ‘Making Connection: Community Organizing, Empowerment Planning and Participatory Research in Participatory Evaluation’, Sociological Practice, 1(3). Tharamangalam, Joseph (1998) ‘The Perils of Social Development without Economic Growth: The Development of Kerala, India’, Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 30(1): 23–34. Titmus, Richard (1974) Social Policy. London: Allen and Unwin. Tsobanoglou, George (1993) ‘Considerations on Modern Absolutist Politics in the Periphery: Their Historical Linkages via an Analysis of Legal Modes of Codification: The Case of Post-War Greece’, in Vincenzo Ferrari and Carla Faralli (eds.) Laws and Rights Milano: Dott, A. Giuffre Editore. pp. 483–521.

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Tsobanoglou, George (2000) ‘The Ombudsman Institution in Greece’, in Philip Giddings and Roy Gregory (eds.) Righting Wrongs: The Ombudsman System Across the World. Amsterdam, Tokyo: IOS Press & Ohmsha. Tsobanoglou, George (2002) ‘Responses to Globalization: Building Collective and Individual Capital Accounts. Social Enterprises in Europe and IDAs’ in America’, XV World Congress of Sociology, International Sociological Association, Research Committee 26, Session 5, Socio-cultural Structures in an Era of Globalization: Implications for Sociotechnics, Brisbane: Australia, 7–13 July. Tsobanoglou, George (2004) State, Civil Society and Ergaxia. Approaches to the Concept of Governmentality. Athens: Gutenberg. Tsobanoglou, George (2004) ‘Building Social Capital and Local Communities Under Globalisation’, Proceedings of the XVIII Conference of ISA RC26, Molyvos, Lesvos, Greece.

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Tsobanoglou, G. (2006) ‘Aspects of Regional Social Governance. Welfare Reform in the US: Implications for a Global Policy Against Exclusion’, in G. Korres, (ed.) Regionalization, Growth and Economic Integration. Berlin: Springer Verlag. Turner, Jonathan H. (2001) ‘Social Engineering: Is this Really as Bad as it Sounds?’, Sociological Practice, 3(2): 99–120. Weber, Max (1922) Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Tübingen. Williams, Patricia (2000) ‘Community Development’s Role in Cardiovascular Disease Prevention Projects for African Americans’, Sociological Practice, 2(3): 205–19. Womack, James P., Roos, Daniel, and Jones, Daniel T. (1990) The Machine that Changed the World: Based on the Massachusetts Institute of Technology $5 million 5-Year Study on the Future of the Automobile. NY: Rawson. Zetterberg, Hans. (1962) Social Theory and Social Practice. NY: The Bedminster Press.

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5 Law Through Sociology’s Looking Glass: Conflict and Competition in Sociological Studies of Law Reza Banakar

Law and its countless legal, academic, professional and institutional manifestations, all being intrinsically social, fall within the scope of sociological inquiry. It is, therefore, not surprising if some sociologists and jurists have tried to bring the benefits of sociological ideas to legal thought and practice. Introducing sociological insights into law, a feasible and useful project in theory, has however been only marginally accomplished in practice. Despite the social make-up of law and the kinship between legal theory and social theory, the former being a branch of the latter, and despite the efforts of sociolegal scholars over the past hundred years to integrate legal and sociological ideas, law and sociology remain apart. This chapter explores the roots of this separation by describing some of the conflicts and competitions which arise out of, and impede, attempts to integrate legal and sociological understandings of law. It starts

by juxtaposing sociological and legal epistemes, i.e., by comparing the collections of beliefs, concerns and assumptions which are used to organize worldviews and practices of lawyers and legal scholars, on the one hand, and those of sociologists, on the other.1 It then moves on to present the various research approaches, such as Law and Society and Socio-Legal Studies, which make use of social scientific methods and concepts to study law. Although it is often impossible to distinguish between certain branches of socio-legal research, I shall nonetheless discuss similarities and commonalities between various approaches to the study of law, focusing specifically on the (inter)disciplinary conflicts and competitions between them, as a method for highlighting the discourses which constitute the sociological studies of law. The chapter concludes by reflecting on the potential of law and sociology to learn from one another.

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LAW THROUGH SOCIOLOGY’S LOOKING GLASS

Although the study of law played a significant role in the formation of classical sociology, law has become conspicuous only by its absence from recent mainstream sociological research and teaching. Beyond its immediate concern, this chapter hopes to draw attention to law’s normative role in guiding action and shaping relationships, a role which increases in sociological significance as societies become ethno-culturally more diverse and socio-politically more complex. This chapter may also be read as an attempt to show that mainstream sociology has more to learn from studying law in contemporary society, than when Durkheim famously described law as the ‘visible symbol’ of social solidarity (Durkheim, 1984: 24). The discussions which will follow are limited in a number of ways. Their sources are restricted to social scientific and legal production in English and its institutional references and observations reflect above all the general academic conditions in Britain.

PART ONE: LAW AND SOCIOLOGY

Jurisprudence, legal studies and legal practice Law manifests itself in different forms and at different levels of social reality simultaneously. It is a formal instrument of regulation (i.e., a tool in the hands of policy-makers), a body of rules, doctrines and decisions (i.e., a normative system with a distinctive social form and identity), a field constituted by the actions of lawyers, the judiciary and other practitioners of law (i.e., an institutionalized form of practice), an occupational setting (i.e., a profession with a well-established identity and interest), an academic discipline (i.e., scientia iuris, legal studies and jurisprudence), and a form of learning, teaching and training (i.e., legal education) at the same time. Focusing on any aspect of law, we discover further layers of meaning and diversity of legal forms. For example, looking at law as a

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system of rules we find that some rules are substantive while others are procedural, some regulate private transactions while others confer powers or impose duties, and so on (Galligan, 2006: 6). A similar diversity can be found in respect to the legal profession, which consists of many groups and individuals with different working conditions, tasks and aims. The working conditions and daily tasks of lawyers who work at large international law firms are, for example, a world apart from those of the sole-practitioners who provide legal services for local communities (Cotterrell, 1992: 184 –7). In addition, law is often seen and experienced differently by different groups in society. Some see it as a source of justice, while others experience it as a form of oppression. Some regard it as an arena where marginalized groups can struggle for their rights (Banakar, 2004), while others perceive it as an ideology implicated in perpetuating racial, gender and class violence (Tuitt, 2005). Still another group sees the law as an expression and a form of social organization aimed at facilitating interpersonal and inter-institutional interactions and exchanges (Stjernquist, 2001). The list of the ways law is seen, depicted and/or experienced by various people can be made much longer. None of these images of law are entirely untrue, but none of them by itself captures the totality of law. Fragmented as the reality of law might be, it still presents itself as a unified corpus capable of interacting with other normative orders, such as custom and morality, without apparently compromising its distinctive normative force or identity. The problems associated with the multifaceted character of law that makes it sociologically impossible to generalize about its nature is hardly alien to jurisprudence (I use the term to refer to both legal theory and legal philosophy). Jurisprudence is concerned with clarifying the general framework of legal ideas and formulating general and abstract descriptions of legal systems (for a discussion see Galligan, 2006: 7–12). Within jurisprudence we find many orientations and

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schools of thought that implicitly or explicitly recognize the social and institutional character of law (Raz, 1979: 41). Yet, the image of law as a highly rationalized rulebased activity, i.e., as a system of rules, norms, decisions, doctrines and principles designed to direct action, guide legal analysis and justify decisions in an ‘objective’ manner, pervades juristic discourses and creates the cornerstone of legal education. Rule-based thinking can be regarded as part of the method through which law distinguishes the legal from extra-legal events, at the same time as it appears to be deciding cases on an all-or-nothing basis, which in principle leaves little or no space for general moral or sociological considerations (Luhmann, 1985). Rule-based thinking might appear to be a mechanical method of decision-making, but in practice it is an open-ended and reflective process of interpretation, where the same rule can be interpreted by different lawyers in different ways, reflecting their specific legal standpoint, interest and the social context in which they find themselves. Rules are thus standards for action, or one among many resources used to negotiate the boundaries of law. The interpretive and contextual nature of legal rules indicates that law does not consist of rules alone, but also of communicative processes through which the interpretation and application of rules are realised in various social contexts. Sociologically, these communicative processes, rather than legal rules, are the units of analysis. Also, from a sociological point of view, the rule-based approach reflects law’s attempt to rationalize and confine complex social processes to the conceptual boundaries of legal rules and standards. The significance of the rule-based understanding of law can be observed in theories which subscribe to ‘legal positivism’ and see law as consisting in rules (Hart, 1998; Kelsen, 2001; Raz, 1979). The tradition of ‘legal positivism’, which continues to provide the most influential modern account of law, has its roots in the Enlightenment and

emerged, in part, as a reaction to natural law theories, which sought a permanent and universally valid basis for law in nature and/or divine reason.2 Various schools of legal positivism share three fundamental assumptions: firstly, law is a system of rules, norms or principles; secondly, law is a matter of ‘social fact’ and its sources of authority and validity are empirically verifiable; and, thirdly, there is no necessary link between law and morality. This means that the validity of a legal rule is not derived from its content but from its source, which is in turn conceptualized in terms of a social agency or institution such as the ‘sovereign’. Despite recognizing the social nature of the sources of law, legal positivism pays little, if any, attention to the social constitution of this agency. As a result, we find H. L. A. Hart (1907–92), who is one of the influential legal philosophers of the twentieth century, recognizing the importance of ‘officials’ of law, but neglecting to consider how the social constitution of these ‘officials’ can influence the way law is formulated, promulgated, interpreted and enforced (Cotterrell, 2003: 210–11). Hart also argues that law consists in various rules which are essentially social, but again stops short of analyzing whom law speaks for and ‘whose voices and expressions are excluded from legal expressions’ (Cotterrell, 2003: 210–11). Legal positivism’s unwillingness to discuss the constitution of the ‘social’ is a reflection of what much of jurisprudence – obvious exceptions being legal realism, critical legal studies and schools of legal feminism – has set out to achieve. Legal positivism tries to provide an adequate account of law as it is in contrast to how law ought to be, but it wishes to achieve this analytically and at the level of general theory, i.e., by clarifying the basic concepts and frameworks through which we observe, describe and understand law rather than through empirical investigation of the mundane practices and experiences of men and women who produce and reproduce the law and its institutions.

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If we describe jurisprudence as the theoretical wing of law, then doctrinal studies of law, or ‘black letter scholarship’, becomes its pragmatic academic wing. The ‘conventional legal approach to the law is all about doctrine’ which represents the standards or principles which ‘can generate outcomes in conventional disputes independent of the political or economic ideology of judges’ (Tiller and Cross, 2006: 518).3 A basis for a doctrine is laid when a court outlines a specific framework, set of rules, procedures and other legal techniques to decide a case. The doctrine becomes established once other courts follow the same procedure and form of reasoning to decide similar cases. This type of reasoning requires an understanding of substantive rules, their origins (legal sources), how they have developed over time, their scope and underlying policy. It can also require an analysis of the relationship between the rules within the same substantive category of law and how these overlap with other legal categories. The role of the doctrinal researcher is to examine ‘the content of legal opinion to evaluate whether it was effectively reasoned or to explore its implications for future cases’ (Tiller and Cross, 2006: 518). In contrast to their counterparts in other disciplines such as sociology, doctrinal scholars ‘do not usually “produce” new knowledge’ and what they produce is often parasitical upon the work which has already been done by others (Vick, 2004: 177). Doctrinal studies use jurisprudence, legal history and comparative law as auxiliary sources of knowledge or tools of analysis. Although a large part of such studies remain descriptive, black letter lawyers can, and do, engage in prescriptive work which aims to influence the developmental direction of the law. Yet, they often shy away from social theorizing or addressing the broader societal issues which arise out of legal practice, legal doctrine or legal developments. This is in part because they treat the law ‘as a sealed system which can be studied through

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methods which are unique to the “science of law”’, and believe that ‘legal developments can be interpreted, critiqued, and validated by reference to the internal logic of this sealed system’ (Vick, 2004: 178–9). In short, doctrinal studies use their own method of reasoning and analysis to collect the specific rules and decisions of the existing legal system, reduce them to their essential statements of rules and exceptions, systematize them and, at times might even evaluate them. Sources from which they collect their raw material are limited to ‘a finite and relatively fixed universe of authoritative texts’ such as statutes, legal opinions and legal cases (Vick, 2004: 178). Legal knowledge produced through the exegesis of legal texts is, admittedly, of a special kind, but its esoteric character should not conceal its social nature. Forms of knowledge and ‘truth’ that law produces are dependent on communicative processes which are inherently social and fall within the scope of social theory. As pointed out by Cotterrell, law has no ‘truth’ of its own and sociology is in principle capable of grasping the essence of legal doctrine and providing it with a form of insight which is ‘not only useful but necessary for legal studies’ (Cotterrell, 2006: 45). Why sociological ideas are not adopted to enrich doctrinal analysis is another matter which will be addressed in Part Three. Legal doctrine sets the normative context in which lawyers acquire their ‘juridical gaze’, i.e., it sets the backdrop against which they learn to identify relevant questions and to read and criticize legal texts by paying close attention to textual contexts, while avoiding the broader social and political contexts of legal arguments.4 ‘A question which cannot be legitimately answered by reference to a statute or judgment lies outside the doctrinal gaze’ (Bradney, 1998:76). However, knowledge of legal rules and doctrine does not by itself provide a sufficient basis for legal practice. Much of lawyers’ day-to-day work concerns dealing with

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clients, interviewing witnesses or drafting documents which require the use of nonlegal knowledge and social skills. Also, practicing lawyers have a pragmatic understanding of law, which is aimed at settling cases to their advantage. Legal rules and doctrine are only two among a number of devices (or ‘resources’) that the practicing lawyer employs if, and in so far as, they serve to negotiate the boundaries of the law in his or her favour. Legal doctrine is abandoned in favour of other measures (for example delay tactics) when it no longer serves to bring about the desired end (Banakar and Travers, 2005: 9). Most scholars agree that doctrinal studies are of the law, i.e., they are born out of the practical needs of the law and serve certain normative needs of legal practice. However, we find little agreement on how jurisprudence, which appears to be about the law, is related to legal practice. Some theorists see much of jurisprudence as ‘theory-talk’ which at best conveys a better understanding of the context in which law is practised without helping to shape those practices (cf. Haplin, 2001: 12). Others see jurisprudence as a practical inquiry, which is interpretive, normative and ultimately actionguiding (Coyle and Pavlakos, 2005: 6). In this latter sense, there is a dialectical relationship between theory and practice which brings together conceptual, normative and empirical descriptions and understandings of law. However, there is little doubt that jurisprudence observes and learns from legal practice while influencing it indirectly. In that sense, the boundary between ‘what is of the law’ and ‘what is about the law’ becomes blurred. Various assumptions about the nature of law which are elaborated by jurisprudence can, for example, exert a normative force over legal education and doctrinal studies. Also, legal philosophical discussions can engage more directly with legal issues by clarifying certain legal concepts, ideas or relationships – for an example see Hoefeld’s typology of rights (Hoefeld, 1923).

Mainstream sociology and law Sociology does not consist of rules if by a ‘rule’ we mean a binary method of making decisions or a set of standards for guiding action. Instead, it consists of assumptions, concepts, ideas and methods, none of which is treated in a formalistic manner or as an element of a normatively sealed system. Sociology’s constitutive concepts and methods are understood and applied reflexively and in accordance with the general criteria of social scientific enquiry. That is also why, in contrast to doctrinal studies, sociology allows many competing sets of theoretical and methodological approaches. Sociology is ultimately driven by sociologists’ curiosity about social life as reflected in their attempts to explain and understand social reality. The most valuable asset of a sociologist is, to use Erving Goffman’s words, ‘the bent to sustain in regard to all elements of social life a spirit of unfettered, unsponsored inquiry and the wisdom not to look elsewhere but to ourselves and our discipline for this mandate’ (Goffman, 1983: 5). It does not mean that sociologists do not have civic commitments or that sociology is free from all forms of pragmatism and instrumentalism. Neither is it implied that all sociological studies are driven by the desire to enlighten. Sociology has become increasingly pragmatic in recent years and a growing number of sociologists tend to see their role as providers of scientific knowledge to the decision-makers (Halliday and Janowitz, 1992). Still what bestows on sociology a unique understanding of social phenomena and transforms it into ‘a form of life’ will remain the curiosity about social life and the urge to reveal the hidden social structures. This means that a sociologist is often not satisfied with the self-descriptions of law, behind which he or she searches for layers of meaning, social functions and power structures. In contrast to the lawyer, who thinks pragmatically – sees law as an instrument to do things with – and tends to reason in terms of

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individual or exceptional cases, the sociologist is often interested in the general characteristics of social phenomena and looks for repeated patterns of social behaviour. This is in turn directed towards producing a general knowledge of society, i.e., social theories. Individual cases in themselves and for themselves are often of little value to the sociologist. It means that when sociologists and other social scientists conduct case studies, they try to go beyond the specific properties of that particular case by connecting it to some broader social concern. Thus, sociology and law are founded on two different approaches or epistemes. This can also be said about the relationship between sociology and medicine. Yet, there is less tension between the sociology of medicine and the medical profession than there is between law and sociology. Sociologists of medicine have much to say about the social roots of health and illness, but they do not suggest that medical doctors use sociological theories and concepts in their diagnosis and treatment of physical disorders and disease. In contrast, the sociology of law can appear to be claiming that it understands law better than law understands itself and to be telling lawyers how they should understand, conceptualize, apply and practice law (Banakar, 2000; Nelken, 1998). The sociology of law is thus a meeting place for two different standpoints on the role of law in society. These two standpoints can be described at the level of social action by focusing on how an ideal typical lawyer and sociologist would perceive the relationship between law and society. At this level the question becomes if, and how, a legal image derived through processing individual cases and shaped by a pragmatically oriented practice of law can be integrated with a sociological image aspiring towards generalizable knowledge of society and formed through social scientific curiosity. Alternatively, we can compare the two standpoints at an institutional level by exploring the discourses of law and sociology. In its extreme form, the legal standpoint regards the State as the

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primary source of law, and the law as a sealed system consisting in successive layers of rationally interconnected rules, decisions and principles, which can and should be studied in reference to law’s internal logic (Kelsen, 2001). In contrast, the sociological standpoint views legal rules as a sub-category of social norms and the legal system as a set of socially constructed institutional practices, which, like knowledge, permeates all walks of social life and, directly or indirectly, forms all collective social action. In its radical form, the sociological standpoint rejects the primacy of the State as a source of law and argues that the centre of gravity of law has always been in social relations and processes (Ehrlich, 1936; Griffiths, 1986; Gurvitch, 1947). Irrespective of how we compare the epistemes of law and sociology, the socio-legal field appears as being constituted by tension between a legal and a sociological image of society. The epistemic tension causes disputes between sociology, legal studies and jurisprudence on how to view and study law, but also forms the debates within the socio-legal field on, for example, how to understand, conceptualize and study law sociologically. As we shall see in Part Two, some sociological studies adopt a ‘legal centralist’ view and conceptualize law in terms of positive or State law, other research approaches adopt a broader perspective, or a legal pluralist view, by treating law as a special form of social organization. The recognition of the diversity of forms of law has always been the cornerstone of the sociology of law and marks the place where it diverges from, and challenges, traditional legal scholarship and much of jurisprudence. However, even those socio-legal schools which adopt a pluralistic concept of law continue to interact with, and be influenced by, positive (official) law through their rejection of the State as the main source of law (Griffiths, 1986). This concern with official forms of law, admittedly, links the sociology of law with jurisprudence and legal studies, on the one hand, and with legal practice, on the other, but it does not bring them together.

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This is in part because socio-legal approaches, jurisprudence and legal studies articulate their concerns differently. What is captured by these different understandings of law is the tension between a ‘juridical gaze’, which is gained through legal training devoted to reading of cases, law reports and searching for, interpreting and applying legal rules, and an inquiring approach which uses sociology’s looking glass to see beyond the selfdescriptions of law and the legal profession. How this tension has been utilized and to what extent these two images are brought together is discussed in the next section where various orientations within the sociological studies of law are discussed.

PART TWO: SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES OF LAW The sociological study of law is similar to the sociologies of medicine and religion in one respect: it accommodates two ideal typical approaches to its subject matter, one which is informed in the first place by the theoretical concerns and objectives of mainstream sociology and one which reflects the concerns of its subject matter, which consists of forms of law and legal behaviour (Banakar, 2000). For lack of better names, we call the former ‘pure’ and the latter ‘applied’ socio-legal research. Each of the ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ approaches can in turn be divided into different orientations depending on the extent to which they are influenced by the concerns of sociology, other social sciences, law or policy. Figure. 5.1 helps to visualize the relationship between these socio-legal orientations. This diagram is, admittedly, misleading in a number of ways. For example, it fails to capture the overlap between the four major research orientations named above and suggests that it is possible to distinguish between the interests of various socio-legal researchers with roots in different disciplines. In reality, it is often impossible to find distinctions between the concerns of some

legal historians, political scientists, legal sociologists and social anthropologists who study legal issues empirically. These sociolegal scholars ‘form a clear and cohesive interdisciplinary community’ (Sutton, 2001: 21) called the Law and Society Association in the United States and the Socio-Legal Studies Association in the UK. This diagram is also misleading in that it fails to demonstrate the impact of policy oriented research, which is more easily funded by government agencies than pure research, on the field (Sarat and Silbey, 1988). In addition, it does not do justice to the important role played by legal anthropology and political science in the development of the field as a whole. Finally, it is based on a British view of the sociology of law in the sense that it sharply distinguishes between Socio-Legal Studies and the sociology of law (Banakar and Travers, 2005; Campbell and Wiles, 1976).5 Such a division would not apply, for example, to the Scandinavian situation where there has not been a socio-legal movement within the law schools. The diagram shows whether an orientation is influenced by various social sciences, but fails to demonstrate that the concerns of sociology, law and policy influence all these orientations, albeit in different ways and to different degrees. While the Sociology of Law and Sociological Jurisprudence are primarily influenced by mainstream sociology, Law and Society Studies and Socio-Legal Studies are influenced by both sociology and other social science disciplines. In the remaining part of this section I shall briefly describe these research orientations against the backdrop of various debates on law and socio-legal research.

The sociology of law The sociology of law distinguishes itself from, for example, philosophy of law or legal history, by fulfilling three interrelated and broadly defined criteria. Firstly, it borrows its concepts and theoretical frameworks from

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Sociology

“Pure” Socio-Legal Research (Reflecting the Concerns of Sociology)

The Sociology of Law

“Applied” Socio-Legal Research (Reflecting the Concerns of Law and Policy-makers)

Law and Sociological Society Studies Jurisprudence

Socio-Legal Studies (Law in Context and Policy Research)

Other Social Sciences (Social Anthropology, Political Science, Psychology and Economics)

Figure 5.1

Relationship between socio-legal approaches.

sociology; secondly, it treats law either as a socially dependent or independent ‘variable’; and, finally, it adopts an empirical approach to collecting the data it needs in order to conduct its analysis (Ferrari, 1989: 9). The notion of ‘empirical’, as it is used here, should be understood broadly. Some research orientations adopt a strict positivistic interpretation of what empirical data means, i.e., they understand it in terms of data collected systematically through surveys, interviews, etc., while other orientations use more interpretive methods, such as discourse analysis of legal texts. John Sutton, for example, describes law as ‘a group activity’ and the sociology of law as the study of ‘the legal behavior of human groups’ (Sutton, 2001: 8). On the other hand, M. P. Baumgartner, who is influenced by Donald Black’s positivistic approach (Black, 1976), defines the sociology of law as ‘the scientific study of legal behaviour’, a study which deals only with what is ‘observable and measurable’ while aiming to ‘predict and explain legal variations of every kind’ (Baumgartner, 2000: 406). Sutton’s definition appears to be the

broadest in terms of the theoretical and methodological constraints that it subscribes to. Not only does Sutton avoid specifying how sociological studies of law should proceed methodologically, he also avoids subscribing to any concept of law. At least in principle, Sutton allows the possibility of a form of ‘legal behaviour’ which exists independently of positive law and thus, of the State. Baumgartner, on the other hand, adopts a strictly positivistic approach to the study of law. His approach is positivistic in the methodological sense of recognizing only what is ‘observable and measurable’ as its proper subject matter, and it is positivistic in a legal philosophical sense of equating law with positive law. These two definitions show that the sociologists of law can, and often do, differ on how law is to be conceptualized and studied. These disagreements should be viewed against the background of the multifaceted nature of the law and the epistemic tension we discussed in the previous section. The sociology of law studies legal behaviour, institutions and systems in the tradition

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of Durkheim and Weber, who used the study of law as a means to investigate the underlying social mechanisms of modernity. Law provides the sociologists with a standpoint from which they may view and study a range of theoretical and substantive issues such as social differentiation, social integration, forms of authority, the role of rationality or the process of inclusion, exclusion and criminalization of groups, equality of wealth and resources, or the significance of gender or race in social organization. As Roger Cotterrell explains, Durkheim seemed ‘to approach legal materials mainly for their capacity to provide, in the documentary form of ancient and modern codes, “visible symbols” of social solidarity, an “index” or measure of this elusive phenomenon’ (Cotterrell, 2005: 504). Durkheim’s analysis of law is, thus, ‘a methodological device for examining something that is, apparently, of greater sociological significance than law itself’ (Cotterrell, 2005: 504). To give a concrete example, if a sociologist of law decides to study unlawful gender or ethnic discrimination, it is most probably not because he or she wishes to explore how courts use doctrine in the process of legal reasoning to decide discrimination cases. It is, instead, more likely that he or she seeks to understand how the interpretation and application of anti-discrimination laws help to constitute race and gender-related social inequalities in society (Banakar, 2004). Expressed differently, how law views and treats unlawful discrimination provides the sociologist with a vantage point from which to study how social inequalities in society are constructed and how society copes with conflicts of values, interests and worldviews using formal methods of dispute resolution. Most sociological studies of law focus on the external manifestations of law. They focus, for example, on the rate of litigation in a specific jurisdiction, asking why one group is more likely to litigate than another; or examine the attitude of ordinary citizens to new legislation, asking how the introduction of a new law has influenced behaviour.

Such studies ignore concepts and ideas which are internal to law and legal reasoning and through which law constructs its images of society and impacts on social relations. Looking at the sociologist’s neglect of legal ideas in a positive light, we could argue that it frees him or her from the internal culture of the legal system and assumptions about the sources of law and the nature of legal reasoning. It enables the sociologists to identify the sources of law in social formations and associations which have come about and exist independently of the State. It also makes it possible to ask questions which fall outside the paradigm of legal studies regarding, for example, the objectivity of legal reasoning. That is partly why many sociologists and social anthropologists adopt a bottom-up perspective on law, regarding social interactions and relations as the primary focus of their study while treating the law as a ‘residual category’ (Sarat, 2000: 195). This can lead them to emphasize the interests and experiences of ordinary men and women in general, and marginalized groups, in particular. Jurisprudence, legal studies and policy research, on the other hand, adopt a topdown view of the law, viewing the law from above, treating the State as the source of law and addressing the concerns of policymakers. As a result, much of socio-legal research appears to foster a ‘critical’, rather than ‘neutral’, understanding of the ideology of law, highlighting issues related to social justice, ‘marginalized groups, peripheral institutions, deviant behavior’ (Abel, 1987: 827) and generally depicting law in a negative light. However, freedom from the constraints of law’s internal culture can mislead the sociologist into assuming that the legal system’s modus operandi is of no importance to the studies conducted from a vantage point external to the legal system. As a result, the sociologist can be misled into treating one manifestation of the legal system, such as the rate of litigation in one jurisdiction or the attitude of certain groups to a particular law, as representing the totality of law in action.

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A more complete picture of the relationship between law and society emerges once the sociologist recognizes that law’s internal operations and processes are in constant interaction with, and inseparable from, the extra-legal factors which constitute its social environment.

Law and Society studies Law and Society, as I am using the term here, is primarily an American movement, which was established after the Second World War through the initiative mainly of sociologists who had a vested interest in the study of law (Friedman, 1986). The only difference between the sociology of law and Law and Society is that the latter does not limit itself theoretically or methodologically to sociology and tries instead to accommodate insights from all social science disciplines. Not only does it provide a home for sociologists and social anthropologists and political scientists with an interest in law, but it also tries to incorporate psychologists and economists who study law. Although Law and Society has in principle relied on and used all social sciences, it has nonetheless received more input from mainstream sociology, social anthropology and political science than from other social science disciplines. Psychology or economics, in particular, have had only a marginal impact on the development of the movement, partly due to the fact that they early on formed their own Law and Psychology and Law and Economics associations and journals. An excellent example of research in the Law and Society tradition is to be found in Order Without Law, where Robert C. Ellickson (1991) uses different social scientific ideas, including economic theories, to study how residents of Shasta County, a rural area in California, resolve a variety of disputes that arise from trespassing by cattle and fence-tending. Law and Society has, according to Jonathan Simon, brought about ‘change in

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legal education, judicial administration, and political discussion of law. It helped complete the realist shift of law school textbooks from cases to material and notes. It achieved recognition in the law through the creation of the significant social science functions within the court system’ (Simon, 1999: 144). Having said that, Simon admits that the Law and Society project still ‘finds itself not only incomplete but also increasingly uncertain about its identity or future’ (Simon, 1999: 144).

Sociological jurisprudence Sociological jurisprudence is also closely linked with the sociology of law and Law and Society studies. It is, however, of much earlier date than the Law and Society movement and more interested in legal theory and legal education (see Ehrlich, 1936; Gurvitch, 1947; Petrazycki 1955; Pound, 1943). It is often associated with Roscoe Pound (1870–1964), who is also known as a prominent philosopher of law, and through him with the American legal realist movement. However, there are historical and theoretical reasons for including a number of European scholars such as the Polish-Russian jurist Leon Petrazycki (1867–1931) and the Austrian jurist Eugen Ehrlich (1862–1922) under this rubric. These scholars were critical of analytical jurisprudence for its conceptual formalism and neglect of empirical facts such as the role of social forces in creating the legal order and shaping legal behaviour. They also argued that legal research, legal education and judicial decision-making should adopt the methods and insights of social sciences in order to counterbalance this shortcoming. The founders of sociological jurisprudence distinguished themselves from mainstream sociologists, such as Emile Durkheim and Max Weber, in one important way. While mainstream sociologists have used law to study social developments and issues arising out of the rise of modernity, Petrazycki,

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Ehrlich and Pound (and a generation later Georges Gurvitch) employed social sciences to transform legal education and practice and to devise a scientific concept of law. At the centre of this transformative legal project, we find theories and concepts of law which are empirically tuned and broader in scope than what most jurists recognize as the law proper. Pound criticized and challenged the legal formalism (which used strict conceptual logic) that dominated the American legal thought of his day for being mechanical, artificial and out of touch with the needs of society. He argued instead for a jurisprudence which placed the human factor and condition, rather than logic, at the heart of its analysis. He borrowed insights from the philosophy of pragmatism and the new discipline of sociology to develop a new approach to law, legal research and legal education. This led Pound to argue that it was ‘law in action’ and not ‘law in the books’ which constituted the basis of law and legal institutions. He criticized the individualist theories and standards of ‘legal justice’ to which lawyers adhered, and instead urged both legal scholars and practitioners to work towards a concept of ‘social justice’ which was informed by the standards of sociologists. The European scholars went further than Pound by directly challenging the underlying ideology of legal positivism. They urged jurists to recognize the vital role played by the informal and unofficial mechanisms of social control in creating legal institutions and moulding legal behaviour. In this way they confronted the jurisprudence of their time by presenting the social forms of law, rather than the rules posited by the State, as the basis of legal order. For them the State could not be the primary source of law for the simple reason that its existence presupposed a form of law. Petrazycki and Ehrlich argued, each in his own way, for an empirically based concept of law which was broader than the State law and existed independently of any outside authority. Using our example of unlawful discrimination, a sociologist working within this tradition

would begin his or her study by anlyzing the anti-discrimination laws. He or she would recognize and take into consideration the internal point of view of lawyers by studying legal cases and court decisions to settle disputes which are based on gender or ethnic discrimination. However, he or she would not limit the sphere of inquiry to positive law and its application by the courts but would also pay attention to how these disputes are settled by extra-legal means, sometimes outside the courts and in the shadow of law. If the sociology of law tends to view law from the outside by emphasizing how it interacts with other social factors and institutions, sociological jurisprudence tries to view how the law is seen from both inside, i.e., how it is experienced by legal practitioners and others who participate in law’s processes and from the outside. The dialectical interaction between the internally and externally produced concepts, ideas and images of law lies at the heart of many studies which fall within this tradition (Banakar, 2003).6 To sum up, the sociology of law, Law and Society and sociological jurisprudence began somewhat differently, in different times and places and with different aims in mind. Yet, there is more which unites than separates them. As a result, many of the individual studies couched within these three orientations are hardly distinguishable from each other. These three orientations demonstrate the diversity of aims, theory and methods within the sociologically inspired studies of law.

Socio-Legal Studies and legal policy research ‘Socio-Legal Studies’ in the UK has grown mainly out of the interest of law schools in promoting interdisciplinary studies of law. Whether regarded as an emerging discipline, sub-discipline or a methodological approach, it is often viewed in light of its relationship to, and oppositional role within, law (Thomas, 1997: 3). It should not, therefore, be confused with the legal sociology of many

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West European countries or the Law and Society scholarship in the US, which foster much stronger disciplinary ties with the social sciences. In the past, it has been presented as the applied branch of the sociology of law and criticized for being empiricist and atheoretical (Campbell and Wiles, 1976; Travers, 2001). Max Travers, for example, regards Socio-Legal Studies as a subfield of social policy, ‘mainly concerned with influencing or serving government policy in the provision of legal services’ (Travers, 2001: 27) and adds that it ‘has given up any aspirations it once had to develop general theories about the policy process’ (Travers, 2001: 26). Looking more closely at the work which has been produced by the socio-legal community in more recent years,7 we detect two (again ideal typical) general approaches. The first approach, which I call the studies of Law in Context, uses social theory and a broadly conceived notion of what empirical research amounts to in order to study issues which are internal to the processes and operations of law.8 Studies of Law in Context are neither empiricist nor sociological, yet are conducted against the backdrop of social theory. According to this approach, the ‘socio’ in Socio-Legal Studies does not refer to sociological theory or to an empirical understanding of the broader context of social development, but represents ‘an interface with a context within which law exists’ (Wheeler and Thomas, 2002: 271). The second approach is what Travers calls Policy Research, and is concerned with social policy, regulation, enforcement and implementation issues, i.e., how law affects social behaviour or social conditions. These studies often draw attention to the gap between the intentions of legislatures and the reality of law once it is interpreted and enforced by officials. Policy Research is not committed to theory development either, but is more empirically oriented than the studies of Law in Context. Again, using gender or ethnic discrimination as an example, a study of Law in Context

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could focus on the discrepancy between antidiscrimination legislation and the empirically verifiable reality of unlawful discrimination through a closer scrutiny of the legal instruments themselves, asking questions concerning the goals and intentions of the legislation, the substantive provisions constituting that legislation, or its remedial structures (Fredman, 2002: 1–2). According to this standpoint, whenever a law fails to bring about the intended effects, one should start re-evaluating its goals, substantive provisions and remedial structures. In other words, if a law is ineffective and does not deliver the policy goods, it must be technically flawed. Thus, a closer examination of, for example, who bears, or should bear, the burden of proof in discrimination cases or how the law distinguishes between direct and indirect discrimination, becomes of paramount importance. From the sociologist’s point of view, the difference between studies of Law in Context and mainstream legal studies is insignificant, for they seek no generalizable knowledge about social conditions or relations underpinning discrimination or about how law sees and relates to racial violence or gender discrimination. We find, however, a significant difference between Law in Context and the approach adopted by black letter scholars who focus on legal doctrine, in that the former does not treat the law as a sealed system of rules and doctrines to be studied on its own terms alone. Unlike doctrinal studies, Law in Context recognizes the important role played by, and can seek causal analysis of, extra-legal factors and relations. More importantly, the studies of Law in Context seek and produce new knowledge of law, its limits and potentials. Policy Research can share many of the assumptions held by the sociologist about law and still take a more pragmatic view of the impact of law on social conditions without engaging with the broader social theoretical issues surrounding such impact. Furthermore, it sees law more in terms of legislation, i.e., as a measure aimed at realizing policy objectives, than as technical or

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doctrinal legal issues which might preoccupy some lawyers. Policy researchers will be more interested in asking questions about the efficacy of the enforcement of anti-discrimination provisions. The enforcement here is not necessarily defined in terms of how the law is interpreted by the courts, but how legal institutions facilitate, or alternatively discourage, the examination of race or gender related discrimination. Policy researchers would, for example, use surveys to assess the knowledge of a piece of anti-discrimination legislation among employers and employees, and to form an idea about the attitude of employers to the law and to what extent various groups experience that they are the victims of unlawful discrimination. Policy researchers could also try to establish what sort of legal aid is available to those who seek compensation for unlawful discrimination (for references to various studies see Banakar and Travers, 2005). The two applied socio-legal approaches discussed here treat the social sciences largely as a tool for gathering empirical data on the role of law in society. Admittedly, regarding social sciences as an auxiliary method for collecting legal data makes them somewhat acceptable to some academic lawyers, but it also impairs their reflexive properties which enable researchers to identify and explore the taken-for-granted social and cultural values of the law. Why sociolegal research stops short of adopting reflexive approaches of the social sciences, in general, and of sociology in particular, is a question which takes us back to the epistemic conflicts and institutional competitions that define the relationship between legal practice, jurisprudence and sociology.

PART THREE: CAN LAW AND SOCIOLOGY LEARN FROM EACH OTHER? As we argued earlier, legal practice is dependent not only on knowledge of legal rules and doctrine, but also on tacit know-how

about the social relationships and processes which produce and reproduce legal institutions. Jurisprudence is, admittedly, not interested in the day-to-day mundane practices of lawyers and officials, and instead seeks to elucidate the general characteristics of legal thought, clarify legal concepts and produce general descriptions of legal systems. But it still requires data on how law operates and interacts with its social environment to produce such general descriptions. It also needs methods for verifying the empirical validity of these general descriptions. Therefore, both legal practice and jurisprudence should in principle be open to the types of insight that sociology and other social sciences can provide. Sociological accounts of how law works as an institution can provide legal practice with insight into law’s social processes, while methods of the social sciences can help jurisprudence to examine if its concepts and frameworks are grounded in the reality of law or need to be modified or disregarded (Galligan, 2006: 18). Sociology can, in return, gain from the study of how sets of formal norms, principles and ideas are dialectically linked to patterns of institutional practices, which in turn reproduce the normative backbone of modern society. Sociology can also learn from jurisprudence about the internal mechanisms of the law, about how those who participate in legal processes understand and define their participation, and about the ‘softer’ interpretive expressions of law, which are found in legal doctrine and legal reasoning, and which are not readily available to those who view the law from the outside. In short, sociology is equipped and strategically placed to observe and analyze law’s interaction with its social environment, whereas jurisprudence is best equipped to explore its internal operation and realities. This can also mean that neither jurisprudence nor sociology is sufficiently equipped to provide an adequate description and analysis of the role of law in society. As pointed out by Gurvitch (1947: 241), the sociology of law and philosophy of law, without mutual contact, are doomed to ‘sterility, dogmatism, and impotence’

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(Gurvitch, 1947: 241; for a similar conclusion see Habermas, 1996: 66). If sociology and jurisprudence can complement each other, why do they not join forces to establish the science of law? Possible answers to this question can be found by examining, as we did in Part One, sociological and legal epistemes and demonstrating that law and sociology make sense of, and orient themselves towards, the social world using different sets of concepts and ideas. Irreconcilable as these sociological and legal ideas might appear on the surface, they all represent forms of knowledge acquired by observing and examining the social (rather than physical or supernatural) conditions. Why is it then that the epistemic tensions nonetheless appear to pose insurmountable obstacles to bringing law and sociology together? To answer this question, we need to consider the politics of academia in addition to the epistemic differences. For example, why could H. L. A. Hart not admit that he had read Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society and was indebted to Weber for his internal account of legal rules (Lacey, 2004)? Also, why do some prominent philosophers of law, such as Dworkin, regard sociological and historical studies of law which view the law from without as ‘perverse’, while failing to recognize that internal studies of the law which ignore questions about the social properties of the law and the external manifestations of the law are also ‘impoverished and defective’ (Dworkin, 1986: 14)? I suggest here that the answers to these questions reveal as much about the construction and distribution of ‘scientific stakes’ in academia (Bourdieu, 1975) as about the theoretical make-up of sociology, legal studies and jurisprudence. The tension between law and sociology is, thus, as much about academic competition between disciplines and fields of research as about epistemic conflicts. Academic competition should be viewed in the context of power relations in academia and as a means of obtaining or maintaining access to financial resources, such as funding, grants, posts, contracts, etc. This type of

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professional interest is a powerful incentive for individual researchers in academic fields such as law and sociology, but leads to disciplinary isolation once each discipline has developed its own ‘stakes’ and internal ‘structure of the distribution of the specific capital’ (Bourdieu, 2004: 59). Law and sociology have long established their own academic forms of capital that exist independently of the ‘stakes’ in other fields of research, and this relieves them of the need to compete with each other. The preoccupation of academic lawyers and mainstream sociologists with their own ‘scientific stakes’ has been at the expense of paying sufficient attention to epistemological debates and exchanges, which form the interdisciplinary lifeline of socio-legal research. Socio-legal research appears to have no alternative but to create and establish its own forms of capital, which will potentially transform it into a discrete discipline independent of law and sociology. However, the most valuable asset of socio-legal research lies in its ability to offer an added value to both law and sociology by highlighting issues that neither law nor sociology can articulate or study alone. Also, it can provide this added value as long as it remains an interdisciplinary space which offers relief from the methodological constraints of other disciplines (Banakar and Travers, 2005). Thus, socio-legal research finds itself in a paradoxical situation. It needs to create its own ‘scientific stakes’ in order to become independent of both law and sociology, which are no longer interested in epistemological confrontations. At the same time, it needs to safeguard its interdisciplinary character in order to continue the epistemological debates which law and sociology no longer pursue. This paradoxical situation brings uncertainty to socio-legal research, discouraging those who seek the academic security and identity of established disciplines, but posing an exciting challenge to those who wish to explore the socio-legal issues which lie beyond the disciplinary boundaries of law and sociology. Socio-legal research is still in the initial stages of its development. The realization of this paradox

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signals its move to a new stage when the socio-legal field has to reconsider its relationship with both law and sociology.

NOTES 1 In the following pages, I shall distinguish between ‘socio-legal research’ and ‘Socio-Legal Studies’. The former refers to all social scientific studies of law, while the latter refers to the Socio-Legal Studies movement in UK. 2 For lack of space I limit my discussion of jurisprudence and legal positivism to the English analytical tradition of Austin and Hart. 3 This understanding of law is questioned by critical legal scholars and various schools of feminism as a smoke screen for concealing the class, racialized and gendered nature of the law and legal reasoning. Even assuming that the judge can and does apply the law objectively, he or she applies a law which is tilted in favour of a specific group’s interests and values. 4 The notion of ‘gaze’ is borrowed from Foucault (1997) and refers to an impersonal way of observing which does not belong to any individual person, and can operate as a general principle of surveillance (even monitoring one’s own activities), while unifying diverse practices. 5 Let me reiterate that I distinguish between ‘Socio-Legal’, which refers to the British movement within law schools which is influenced by social theory and ‘socio-legal’ which refers to all social scientific studies of law including sociology of law. 6 Distinguishing between the legal system’s internal and external points of view, or ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of law, is problematic and misleading. For a discussion see Banakar (2003). 7 Papers published in such journals as Journal of Law and Society, Modern Law Review and Social & Legal Studies provide fairly reliable indicators of the type of work produced by the socio-legal community in Britain. 8 This can also mean that the rise of legal feminist scholarship and postmodern legal research has brought Socio-Legal Studies (SLS) closer to Critical Legal Studies (CLS). While the SLS has gone from strength to strength, the CLS has somewhat shrunk in size and lost its ideological momentum.

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Ellickson, R. C. (1991) Order Without Law. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press. Ferrari, V. (1989) ‘Sociology of Law: A Theoretical Introduction’, in V. Ferrari and P. Uusitalo, Two Lectures on the Sociology of Law. Helsinki: University of Helsinki, Sociology of Law Series, 6(101): 7–31. Foucault, M. (1997) The Birth of the Clinic. London: Routledge. Originally publ. in 1963. Fredman, S. (2002) Discrimination and Human Rights: The Case of Racism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Friedman, L. M. (1986) ‘The Law and Society Movement’, Stanford Law Review, 38: 763–80. Galligan, D. J. (2006) Law in Modern Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Goffman, E. (1983) ‘The Interaction Order’, American Sociological Review, 48: 1–17. Griffiths, J. (1986) ‘What is Legal Pluralism’, Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 24: 1–55. Gurvitch, G. (1947) Sociology of Law. London: Routledge & Kegan. Habermas, J. (1996) Between Facts and Norms. Cambridge: Polity Press. Halliday, T. C. and Janowitz. M. (1992) Sociology and its Public: The Forms and Fates of Disciplinary Organization. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Haplin, A. (2001) Reasoning With Law. Oxford: Hart Publishing. Hart, H. L. A. (1998) The Concept of Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, reprint. Hoefeld, W. (1923) Fundamental Legal Conceptions. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. Kelsen, H. (2001) Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press, reprint. Originally publ. in 1934. Lacey, N. (2004) A Life of H. L. A. Hart: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Luhmann, N. (1985) A Sociological Theory of Law. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

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Macaulay, S. (1963) ‘Non-Contractual Relations in Business’, American Sociological Review, 28: 55–67. Nelken, David (1998) ‘Blinding Insights? The Limits of a Reflexive Sociology of Law’, Journal of Law and Society, 25: 407–26. Petrazycki, L. (1955) Law and Morality. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Pound, R. (1943) ‘Sociology of Law and Sociological Jurisprudence’, University of Toronto Law Journal, 5(1): 1–20. Raz, J. (1979) The Authority of Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Sarat, A. (2000) ‘Pain, Powerlessness, and the Promises of Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship’, Windsor Year Book of Access to Justice. pp. 187–212. Sarat, A. and Silbey, S. (1988) ‘The Pull of the Policy Audience’, Law and Policy, 10: 98–166. Simon, J. (1999) ‘Law after Society’, Law and Social Inquiry, 24: 143–94. Stjernquist, P. (2001) Organised Cooperation Facing Law: An Anthropological Study. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell. Sutton, J. (2001) Law/Society: Origins, Interaction, and Change. London: Pine Forge Press. Tamanaha, B. (1997) Realistic Socio-Legal Theory: Pragmatic and Social Theory of Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Thomas, P. (1997) ‘Socio-Legal Studies: The Case of Disappearing Fleas and Bustards’, in Phil Thomas (ed.) Socio-Legal Studies. Aldershot: Dartmouth. pp. 1–22. Tiller, E. H. and Cross, F. B. (2006) ‘What is Legal Doctrine’, Northwestern University Law Review, 100: 517–33. Travers, M. (2001) ‘Sociology of Law in Britain’, American Sociologist, 32: 26–40. Tuitt, P. (2005) Race, Law, Resistance. London: GlasHouse Press. Vick, D. W. (2004) ‘Interdisciplinarity and the Discipline of Law’, Journal of Law and Society, 31: 163–93. Wheeler, S. and Thomas, P. (2002) ‘Socio-Legal Studies’, in David J. Hayton (ed.) Law’s Future(s). Oxford: Hart Publishing. pp. 267–80.

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6 New Ways of Relating Authority and Solidarity: Theoretical and Empirical Explorations1 Elisa P. Reis

INTRODUCTION The profound changes the world has experienced in the last three or four decades pose great intellectual and political challenges to us sociologists. No doubt, the world has always faced crises and undergone changes. Of course, social sciences usually view such events as challenges. However, it is also true that, at some particular moments, society experiences turning points, ones at which conventional frameworks of understanding seem inadequate, and they make room for feelings of rupture or discontinuity. To conceive of the economy as a distinctive dimension of life, for example, is something that took place only after there emerged a notion that the public and private spheres of social life were not the same. In a sense, the very process of fragmentation of the social

sciences into specialized disciplines can be connected to historical-cultural challenges that made the old theoretical concepts sound wrong or too limited (Elias, 1984). In the present context, I will focus on a specific contemporary challenge, one that concerns many of us trained in the old tradition of historical sociology with regard to the standard ways of looking at society and at its basic forms of organization. As I see it, there are recent conceptual changes in sociology that respond to actual transformations in both objective and subjective social processes. At the same time, I agree with Sommers and Gibson (1994: 45) when they observe, ‘Social theory is as much history and narrative as it is metatheory. In its very construction, all theory presumes a prior question the theory is designed to answer – hence the theory itself is already an intervening

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RELATING AUTHORITY AND SOLIDARITY

moment in a narrative process of knowledge construction’. In the following, I proceed first to a theoretical discussion, and then to a brief empirical analysis in an attempt to deal with ongoing changes in contemporary theory and practice. Taking ideas and actions as interwoven components of social processes, I discuss a broad intellectual change and an empirical institutional innovation as phenomena that mirror each other. At the theoretical level, I look at the tendency to approach society in ways that differ from old established canons. I contend that the resurgence of civil society in the public discourse, the rise of new social movements, the emergence of cosmopolitan ideals are some of the indications of transformations that have demanded new theoretical lenses for social scientists. At the same time, I do not ignore the fact that, while responding to social change, sociologists also contribute to shaping a new understanding of social life. At the empirical level, I focus on the world of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) as a phenomenon that somehow illustrates the new image of society. I suggest that the elevation of such organizations to the condition of either partners or alternatives to authority mechanisms points to a new way of framing the relationships between state and society. While voluntary organizations, philanthropic initiatives, and other solidarity movements are no novelty, there is something new when social organizations are perceived as societal manifestations vis-à-vis the state and/or the market. It is not my purpose to prove that NGOs, or other civil society entities, are expanding the amount of social solidarity one finds in society. My objective while combining theoretical reflections and empirical investigation in the following text is not to test hypotheses. Rather, I want to study NGOs because from the perspective of a sociology of knowledge, I take it for granted that societal solidarity has become a proper focus of analysis, in the same sense that state authority and market interests have long been legitimate analytical perspectives.

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Using information from an empirical research project in Brazil, I look at some basic characteristics of a sample of NGOs in order to suggest research questions that I believe could help map out the new terms of interaction between state, market, and society. The newly emerging image of the social world constitutes a significant cultural transformation. It has an impact on the constitution of new social actors, and, at the same time, the latter affect the way society is portrayed. It is not my purpose to suggest that one or the other influence takes precedence. On the contrary, I want to stress the mutual impact at play between these two dimensions of analysis. I also want to draw attention to the fact that concepts are cultural products, and, therefore, contextual factors deeply affect them. This means that the constant human attempts at redefining concepts express our historicity: while accounting for the changes that society experiences, we are at the same time shaping the future, or acting upon the reconstruction of society. In this sense, sociological theory responds to cognitive as well as to moral concerns.

THE CHANGED SOCIETAL MIRROR The noticeable acceleration of global processes and the stunning revival of liberalism have had among their multiple consequences a deconstructing impact on the ways we used to conceive of society; they therefore pose new challenges to the social sciences. Under the general label of globalization, the world is experiencing economic, political, social, and cultural transformations so rapid and encompassing that we still lack clear concepts and definitions of what is taking place. Caught in the midst of such empirical and intellectual changes, we social scientists experience at times an almost anomic situation, given that our basic tools or concepts for organizing ideas, formulating hypotheses, and elaborating theoretical propositions appear to be inadequate.

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The discomfort is common to sociologists from the global North and the global South, in both wealthy and poor countries. The general terms of the new sociological puzzles are the same everywhere. Yet, there are also obvious differences among them, pointing to the conclusion that no matter how global the world is, nor how fluid modernity is, nationstates still matter, still confer meaning to the way problems and their solutions are conceived in both hemispheres (Axtmann, 2004; Reis, 2004). In other words, the way people perceive the changes in course are deeply influenced by their historical experiences, by what they once trusted to be their society and its prospects. Yet, to the extent that we all have to take into account our respective contexts, this condition makes us fellow cosmopolitan explorers, observers bound to one another, and perhaps comparativists. The conceptual change I want to address is certainly not directly relevant to some branches of sociology. Yet, it is general enough to affect several subfields of the discipline. I want to call attention to the changed theoretical status of social solidarity that implicitly or explicitly has taken place in both lay and sociological discourses. Until recently, we used to think of authority and interest mechanisms as ways of organizing society and ensuring solidarity. In recent times though, solidarity or society itself is increasingly taken as one more instance, another logical dimension, and an analytical component equivalent to state authority and market interests. Whose Keeper?, the suggestive title of the book by Wolfe (1989) summarized well the growing feeling that authority and market interests are not sufficient resources to solve problems of societal organization. With the classics of historical sociology, we had learned that contemporary society relied mainly on two basic instruments to organize itself: authority resources and interest-based exchange mechanisms. In other words, we became used to thinking of society as organized into structures of authority, chief among them the state, and structures of

exchange, the market being the most obvious one in modern society. Along the same lines, we became used to thinking of structures of solidarity as derived from common interests, be these material or ideal ones. In this tradition of sociological analysis, we learned to think of society as clusters of material and ideal interests that count on authority and market mechanisms to organize themselves and to attain distinctive goals (Bendix, 1964). As Weber (1978, II: 927) put it, a market situation is not a community, but it is a possible basis for community action. Even taking into account structural antagonisms, solidarity can emerge to the extent that labor and capital, buyers and sellers, producers and consumers share a common interest in the smooth operation of exchange. Interests not only generate competition, but also interdependence. In the same sense, legitimate authority binds together the ruler and the ruled, lords and peasants, government and citizens. In short, as outlined above, state and market resources were thought to constitute the basic instruments that contemporary society counts on to organize itself. They were thought of as the instruments that provide social order, albeit an order that entails oppression and exploitation, as strongly stressed in the Marxist tradition. Taking society as a substantive ground, this perspective views the repertoire of means available to governments, on the one hand, and firms on the other, as instrumental mechanisms to be used to organize solidarity, to enforce order, and to advance interests. In this perspective, the national state appears as a successful historical amalgamation of authority and solidarity. Thanks to a cultural process that led to a sort of naturalization of the nationstate, society became equivalent to nation, and nation the source of state legitimacy (Reis, 1998a). In other words, the formation and consolidation of the nation-state entailed a peculiar fusion: obedience to the state authority on the one hand, and spontaneous compliance with it on the other, the latter derived from the

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feeling of belonging that nationhood conferred upon individuals. In this politicalcultural framework, the national state came to be perceived not only as the European historical path, but also as the natural development of modern society. People got used to thinking of societies and nations as equivalents, and of both as circumscribed by the territory of nation-states. In that context, national citizenship became the ideal type of modern collective identity. The successful nationstate should be able to convert citizenship into the prime identifier of a collectivity or a ‘society’ as nations became synonymous with societies. The impact of the nation-state as an ideology was overwhelming in the Developing World. To begin with, the idea of a basic right to self-determination that inspired decolonization did not refer to communities of any other nature, but to people as members of nation-states. Other clusters of solidarity were underestimated, if not openly equated with obstacles to progress. The hopes for economic growth, development and modernization were interlaced with ideas that mixed in variable combinations of authority and market resources. In the perspective of political activists, reforms and revolutions constituted means to make possible efficient use of market and/or authority. Among scholars and policy makers, we observe a similar outlook. Looking at the classic development literature of the 1950s and 1960s, a clear pattern emerges: prescriptions for growth were essentially plans for the efficient use of market and/or authority initiatives. Solidarity did not constitute an instrumental resource in those plans, but rather the ‘natural’ stuff sociability is made of. The specialized literature did recognize that solidarity feelings might even be restrictive, pulling apart tribes, clans, ethnic or religious groups. Yet, in the authors’ accounts, such feelings were always there, as a sort of residual ground binding people together while often preventing them from taking rationally planned decisions. It was only in recent decades that images of social life and

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plans to affect it replaced the conventional model with a new one that includes community and solidarity as elements amenable to rationalizing initiatives, whether one calls them social capital, trust, associativeness, or other related notions. The idea that, like authority and market mechanisms, societal resources can be rationally planned to attain goals, finds a parallel in the revival of civil society in public discourse. Rescued from the past, after a long period of oblivion, if not open deprecation (Alexander, 1998; Cohen and Arato, 1992; Keane, 1988a; b; Pérez-Diáz, 1993), nowadays civil society has come to stand for the bright side of the world, one of the virtuous components of collective life. The return of ‘civil society’ to daily discourse reveals an interesting fact. While the expression assumed quite distinct overtones, depending on the context, everywhere it conveys the idea of healthy social forces to curb excesses of either authority or market influences (Van Rooy, 1998). As Hall (1995: 2) observed, civil society became ‘at one and the same time a social value and a set of social institutions’. That it was meant to convey the notion of a reaction to political and/or economic malaise in very different contexts is quite clear, if we observe that civil society became an epitome of democracy in former communist countries as well as in former state-led capitalist dictatorships in Latin America. In both contexts, together with the concept of citizenship, civil society replaced old slogans in the democratic discourse. While previously, even in some academic circles, the notion of citizenship was considered a ‘bourgeois mystification’, in the post bi-polar era, it has become a redeeming idea, a cherished value. One could say that now any positive image of social life stresses the role of active citizens to revitalize civil society so as to compensate for the shortcomings of both state and market. At the same time that the call for an active society becomes increasingly strong, one also observes clear signs that the image and role of both market and state actors experience

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significant changes. The idea of corporate social responsibility, which has become so important within the entrepreneurial world, is a good indication that a new moral code is gaining currency (Carroll, 1999; Garriga and Melé, 2004; Hemingway and Maclagan, 2004; Zadek, 2004). The new market morality has been interpreted in various ways. For some, it is mainly a marketing strategy, that is, it creates a false solidarity between the suppliers and the consumer market, manipulated by the former. For others, the new managerial welfare is a sort of natural return to voluntary action given the state’s retreat from welfare initiatives under the pressure of neoliberal forces. For my purposes here, it is not relevant to test if these or other hypotheses for the rise of corporate social responsibility prove true. I want simply to draw attention to the fact that the conventional solutions that modern society had reached for providing social goods have been brought into question. In my view, the fact that the state shares welfare provision with other models that ensure solidarity has not received the attention it deserves among sociologists. At the same time that corporate social responsibility gains salience, the adoption of market principles within structures of authority, the vivid claims for new government management we hear in different corners of the world, suggest that elements typical of the market have permeated the state. That government should behave like lean firms and that firms should fulfill welfare functions have become as much current values as the idea that civil society has to compensate for the deficiencies of both state and market resources. To decipher the deep meaning of this sort of cultural revolution that puts into question the conventional meanings of authority, market, and solidarity, sociology’s agendas must tackle the changes in progress from multiple angles. What I intend next is to explore, in a preliminary way, one of the issues that I consider relevant to such an agenda. I will focus my attention on one of the new social actors in civil society,

namely the so-called Non-Governmental Organizations. My purpose here will be just to search for a general picture of such an actor, and, in the process, reflect on questions that its presence raises. More precisely, looking at NGOs in Brazil, I seek to draw their profile and, more important, formulate new research questions that might help us to shed light on their structures and the roles they play.

NEW ACTORS ON STAGE The rediscovery of civil society in recent decades finds an echo in a new wave of voluntary associations, social movements, strategies to build up social capital, investigations into the sources of social trust, and similar phenomena (Anheier and Themudo, 2002; Della Porta and Tarrow, 2005; Fernandes, 1994; Keck and Sikkink, 1999; Khagram et al., 2002). I take these developments as manifestations of the deep transformations in the way society perceives itself and its basic resources of organization, as discussed above. Common to all of them is the emphasis on solidarity resources as distinct from state authority or market-based interests. The new labels that describe civil society actors – non-governmental organizations, third sector, solidary sector, etc. – point clearly to alternative means to state and market. Civil society actors are supposed to provide crucial ingredients to social life, things that are either absent or badly supplied by the traditional authority and marketinterest mechanisms. One has to bear these developments in mind in order to understand the significance that the so-called NGOs have come to acquire all over the world (Clarke, 1998; Clayton, 1996; Fowler, 1997; Landim, 1988; OECD, 1988; Salamon and Anheier, 1996; Wapner, 1995). For some, they are the natural consequence of the weakening of national states challenged by globalization. For others, they express rather the impatience of

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society with traditional forms of participation. Some view these new actors as virtuous, as a positive sign of societal strengthening. Instead, others see them as the perverse face of neo-liberalism that releases the state from social obligations, calls for philanthropy, and converts legitimate rights into charitable gifts. No matter what the explanations are for the origins of NGOs, and in spite of their ambiguous implications, they have proliferated to become a truly global reality. In my view, more important than identifying the motivation behind the propagation of NGOs is to explore to what extent they may be seen as responses to an altered social perception of the basic mechanisms of societal organization. Also crucial is to map out the actual consequences of such developments for social organization and their possible longterm consequences. Thus, I am, not siding with the vast literature dedicated to celebrating the virtues or the vices of the Third Sector, philanthropic initiatives, and NGOs. Nor will I, for the moment, pay attention to the ideological representation these organizations make for themselves. My aim will be rather limited: to indicate some systematic information on the structure and function of NGOs in Brazil so as to lay the ground for further inquiry into changes in the ways society and state interact. By choosing NGOs as an illustration of both cultural and institutional changes in progress, I am, to some extent, taking them as proxies for civil society, although well aware that NGOs do not exhaust the universe of civil society. It is important to take into account that, in the context of Latin American countries, the proliferation of NGOs is quite a detour from the state-centered view that prevailed for most of the twentieth century. In fact, both the development literature, and the actual policy strategies adopted in the so-called Third World, had as an assumption that national states had the responsibility to champion economic growth, to stimulate social modernization, and to promote social inclusion. Regardless of their socialist or capitalist inspiration, development models

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conferred upon the state the responsibility for enforcing economic rationality. In countries where state capitalism was the recipe, the governmental sector not only acted as a strategic investor to create the proper conditions for private capital, but was also itself an actor in the market game (Stepan, 1978). Moreover, authority resources were credited with the responsibility to provide social welfare. Even if social welfare was understood as subordinate to the discretion of the paternal authority rather than the recognition of a legitimate right, it was to the government that the prevailing ideology credited the responsibility for social protection. True enough, faith-inspired charity has always been very salient. However, in the Latin American context, religious modernizers were part of the active leadership demanding state-led social development. In the case of Brazil, starting from the 1930s, the state played the key role in the adopted growth model. Both under democratic and dictatorial regimes, national state firms constituted the backbone of developmental processes and state capitalism was perceived as the most legitimate model to overcome underdevelopment and to promote social inclusion (Martins, 1976; Reis, 1998b). Under the modernizing military dictatorship (1964–1985), the number of state firms soared (Evans, 1979; Trebat, 1983). At the same time, the process of state-building proceeded with significant government penetration into hinterland areas and belated extension of social benefits to rural dwellers. The picture changed quickly in the 1980s, as much in Brazil as elsewhere. Pledges for a lean state, and renewed praise for new government management, typical of Thatcherism and Reaganomics, quickly echoed in the Third World. Actually, be it within the advanced capitalist world, the former communist bloc, or the former Third World, less state and more society became the prevailing ideology. In Latin America, from Mexico to Brazil and Argentina, fast economic privatization reversed the previous pro-statist orthodoxy in just a few years.

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Large state firms, which had been the uncontested market pillars and a source of national pride for so many Third World countries, became, almost from one day to the next, the scapegoats for economic backwardness. Opposition protests notwithstanding, the vanishing developmental state, both as an economic model and as the official ideology, was surprisingly fast. In the Brazilian case, there are occasional nostalgic claims for rescuing national development projects under the aegis of the state, particularly among old elites, be they representatives of the business sector or union leaders. It is also true that in appealing to the masses, party leaders still resort to a discourse that puts emphasis on state developmentalism. However, the actual economic recipes enforced are far from the formulas of state-based capitalism prevailing in the past. It is not that the state has ceased to be a relevant actor for the market to operate. However, it is impossible to deny that the role of authority has changed significantly and that the ideological justifications for state protectionism are no longer part of the official discourse. Even if it is true that in the last few years we observe a clear resurgence of state-centered discourses in several Latin America countries, we are not back to the old days of uncontested state-championed capitalism. Now, state authorities appeal to the new civil society associations to legitimize themselves. The official discourse is full of exhortations to public/private partnership, and appeals to civic solidarity. To the demise of state capitalism corresponds the ascension of an ideology of slim government, an exhortation of the Third Sector, and pleas for devolution of competence to civil society. Furthermore, in Brazil and elsewhere, governments have discovered that partnership with NGOs can be an attractive alternative to gain flexibility and/or to avoid bureaucratic controls. In the Brazilian case, there have been frequent press reports on the use of NGOs for state patronage and nepotism. Although critics like to use this in order to condemn NGOs as such, there are also NGOs aimed precisely at fighting

corruption and the lack of transparency while calling for the accountability of public agencies. Other important changes in the official discourse have taken place, suggesting that the interaction between state and society requires new ideological justifications. Conventional ways to perform authority roles came under critical scrutiny, and everywhere patterns of behavior typical of the market became the benchmark of government officers. Under the ‘new public management’ ideology, bureaucrats are expected to orient their behavior to market efficiency criteria (Barzelay, 2001; Lane, 2000; McLaughlin et al., 2002; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000). To solve fiscal problems, the public sector is expected to seek inspiration in the market. Welfare reforms everywhere recast the protective function of governments in new moulds, so as to bring it closer to sound contractual practices. In such a context, civil society actors enter the scene as alternatives either to collaborate with the state or to become its surrogate for carrying out social functions. While deeply aware that there have always been multiple forms of civil society organizations in action, I focus here on NonGovernmental Organizations as expressive of new formulas for social organization. While the definition of NGOs is the subject of controversy, some consensus exists that they are non-profit oriented, have a formal structure, are autonomous in relation to governments, and are non-representative (Baccaro, 2002; Landim, 2002; Salamon, 1999). The evidence I use in the following text comes from a research entitled ‘Market, State and Society in the Implementation of Social Policies’ that I am conducting in collaboration with Brazilian colleagues. My comments are based upon preliminary results of a survey, aimed at identifying basic characteristics of NGOs active in Brazil. As emphasized above, I am convinced that there have been significant changes in the way we conceive of societal arrangements today, changes that need clarification, and that call for research into areas thus far not sufficiently covered. Along these lines, I take

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NGOs as part of new forms of organization that are widely mentioned, whether these be good or bad, about which we still need to learn much more. At this stage, my main purpose is to investigate how these new organizations, labeled NGOs, structure themselves, how they interact with the state, how they operate. There are innumerable case studies of particular NGOs, but there is little systematic analysis of the collective phenomena of their creation and consolidation. Thus, I set myself the task of obtaining not a close-up picture, but rather some sort of panorama photograph of a class of Brazilian NGOs. I am well aware that the risks of simplification in such a broad approach are immense. Moreover, there are specific difficulties in mapping out NGOs in Brazil that make generalization even more problematic. How to select a reliable sample? It was not an easy task to consolidate a list of NGOs active in Brazil. There were many problems to sort out before confronting the decision between the too inclusive or too exclusive definition criteria one encounters. The data bases consulted varied from around 600 listed in the neatly organized archives of the Brazilian Association of Non-Governmental Agencies (ABONG) to the over 200,000 registered by the official Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE). Seeking to consolidate the database to extract a sample, it became evident that the very disputes over the definition of what a NGO is should constitute an investigation issue. Debates about the ‘right’ definition already express a relevant political competition between distinctive interests. From the vast range of definitions for NGOs, we have chosen the one based on three characteristics: non-profit orientation, no representative basis, and independence from government. However, doubts persisted: Should the term be applied to describe any non-profit organization? Should it include traditional religious and sports associations? Should it apply to professional organizations that seek to advance particular social causes? Should it be restricted to associations that embody the

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aims of specific social movements? These are vivid theoretical and practical disputes that the effort to map out the NGO universe clearly revealed. Given such huge disparities in current definitions, plus the practical difficulties in operating a survey, we made crucial choices: first, we selected just Brazil-based non-governmental organizations that are explicitly involved with activities in the following areas: health, education, gender, minority rights, human rights, children and youth, and environment. Therefore, we excluded sports, leisure, and other activity areas that traditionally counted on voluntary organizations, often religion-based ones, and that significantly differ from the typical discourse of NGOs. Our choice here was to concentrate on NGOs that supply services traditionally provided by the state (authority) and/or by the market sector. The decision to include just Brazil-based NGOs was coherent with the idea of focusing mainly on the changing interaction of the nation-state with its nationals, though the importance of international and global actors for domestic NGOs is explicitly contemplated in the survey.2 Second, we limited our study to organizations active in six urban centers: Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Brasilia, Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre, and Salvador. Three of the cities were selected to account for the largest absolute concentration of NGOs in the country (Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Brasilia); two others have the largest relative concentration of civic organizations in the country according to official statistics (Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte). Finally, we decided to include Salvador, the capital city of Bahia State, because it is the urban center that has the largest number of NGOs acting in the Northeast region, where poverty and social exclusion are particularly acute. I contend that, even if not explicitly random, the sample, comprising 301 cases, is somehow representative of the universe of Brazilian nongovernmental organizations. In addition, I maintain that, discounting spatial and functional bias, the survey results do provide relevant information on the struc-ture and functioning of NGOs

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in Brazil. Furthermore, I believe that the information in question is likely to be useful and will inspire new investigations to illuminate the significant changes that are taking place in the forms of interaction between society and state in Brazil, and elsewhere. The first point to be observed is that NGOs, as defined here, are indeed a recent development in the country. The large majority of the NGOs in our sample (84%) came into being in the last twenty years, as illustrated in Figure 6.1. Actually, the growth of NGOs was even more intense in the 1990s than in the 1980s, as is suggested by a more comprehensive study of the governmental agency of Brazilian statistics (IBGE, 2004). Taking into account the recency of the nongovernmental organizations in the sample, I wondered if one could find the first signs of institutionalization in this universe. Were they moving toward established patterns of structuring and action, or were they still undefined as to their way of acting, or even to their chances of survival? The answers to such questions must certainly be taken as very tentative. With this word of caution, I looked at indicators, such as: (1) the ‘generation’ of the

organization; (2) its adaptability as measured by the organization’s capacity to redefine its objectives so as to adjust to changes in its environment; (3) its degree of autonomy as suggested by financial dependency on a single or more sources of support; and (4) its professionalization as suggested by the number of people on their payroll. Taking all of these indicators into account, one could expect that the older the NGO, the better the chances that it will become more adaptable, less dependent upon a single source of financial support, and more professional in its structure. Looking at the data, one observes that NGOs display significant flexibility as measured by changes in their objectives and/or publics. Thus, Table 6.1 shows that around one-third of the total sample (32.3%) indicates that they have experienced changes in their goals and/or clientele. The data also suggest that age seems to affect the NGOs’ capacity of adaptation: the proportion of organizations that changed objectives is higher the earlier the period they started to operate. Next, I asked if the propensity to adapt to contextual demands varies across the sector in which the NGOs act. Are there variations in adaptability according to the kind of activity

50.0%

Percent

40.0% 30.0%

20.0% 10.0%

0.0% Up to 1984

1985-1994

1995-2004

Figure 6.1. Distribution of NGOs according to year of establishment. Source: As Fundações Privadas e As Associações sem Fins Lucrativos no Brasil, 2nd ed., Rio de Janeiro: IBGE, 2004, Sample Survey 2004/2005.

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Table 6.1

Changes in objectives and/or publics of NGOs according to date established

Date established

Up to 1984 1995–1994 1995–2004

Total

Changes in objectives and/or publics of NGOs Yes No 21 27 43.8% 56.3% 40 80 33.3% 66.7% 36 96 27.3% 72.7%

Count Row % Count Row % Count Row % Count Row %

97 32.3%

203 67.7%

Total 48 100.0% 120 100.0% 132 100.0% 300 100.0%

Source: Sample survey 2004/2005.

NGOs develop? Table 6.2 indicates that the organizations primarily dedicated to healthrelated activities are the ones with the lowest propensity to change (21.1%), followed by organizations dedicated to rural communities and native groups (22.2%), while the most flexible are the NGOs that have poverty and unemployment as their major target, and those dedicated to poverty and unemployment among youths (25%). The substantial differences we observe between NGOs active in distinct areas might indeed reflect the

Table 6.2

conditions peculiar to each sector. Thus, for example, we could suppose that the organizations dedicated to health activities are less adaptable, given the fixed investments they make in equipment and specialized personnel. Table 6.3 shows the major sources of financial support of NGOs, according to their age. We observe that dependence upon foreign funds is higher among the older ones, decreasing dramatically in the group of newer NGOs. The ones established in the recent decade count most on domestic

Changes in objectives and/or publics according to main area of activity

Major area Health (HIV, physical of activity deficiencies, cancer) Poverty, unemployement Youth groups in risk situation Excluded urban communities Women, blacks and other minorities Native and rural communities Organization of the third sector and civil society Others Total


Count Row % Count Row % Count Row % Count Row % Count Row % Count Row % Count Row % Count Row % Count Row %

Changes in objectives and/or publics of NGOs Yes No 42 15 21.1% 78.9% 9 8 52.9% 47.1% 32 68 32.0% 68.0% 12 21 36.4% 63.6% 11 23 32.4% 67.6% 4 14 22.2% 77.8% 14 28 33.3% 66.7% 11 17 39.3% 60.70% 97 33.3%

194 66.7%

Total 57 100.0% 17 100.0% 100 100.0% 33 100.0% 34 100.0% 18 100.0% 42 100.0% 28 100.0% 291 100.0%

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Table 6.3

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Major source support of NGOs according to date established Major source of financial support

Date established

Up to 1984 1985–1994 1995–2004

Total


Government sources 4 9.5% 24 22.4% 26 21.1% 54 19.9%

Domestic non-gov sources 9 21.4% 19 17.8% 39 31.7%

Foreign sources 12 28.6% 36 33.6% 14 11.4%

67 24.6%

62 22.8%

Various sources (no single Self support dependency) 10 7 23.8% 16.7% 12 16 11.2% 15.0% 26 18 21.1% 14.6% 48 17.6%

41 15.1%

Total 42 100.0% 107 100.0% 123 100.0% 272 100.0%


non-governmental sources of support. The flow of foreign funds is particularly salient for those organizations established between 1985 and 1994. Age, however, does not seem to affect the propensity to diversify fund sources. The proportion of those that manage to diversify their supporters, thus avoiding single dependency, is more or less the same among older and newer NGOs. We also observe that the proportion of NGOs that count on government sources as their major supporters has remained about the same for those organizations established within the last two decades. In order to check if NGOs have experienced change in their patterns of financial dependency, we enquired what their major sources of support were ten years ago. Table 6.4 summarizes the answers we obtained. Comparing the information in this table with the data for the total of NGOs in Table 6.3, we observe Table 6.4 Major sources of financial support of NGOs ten years ago Government sources Domestic non-governmental sources Foreign sources Self support Various sources (no single dependency) Total Source: Sample survey 2004/2005.

Frequency 43

Percent 19.4

57 61 33

25.7 27.5 14.9

28 222

12.6 100.0

that the biggest change refers to the decline of almost five percentage points in the proportion of organizations that, ten years ago, depended mainly upon foreign sources for financial support. We also observe that the proportion of NGOs that either rely mainly on self-support or diversify their sources of support, grew slightly in comparison to ten years ago (2.7 and 2.5 respectively). The two tables also show that the proportion of NGOs depending on domestic funds from both government and non-governmental sources remained almost unchanged. Further research will be necessary to investigate what are the possible implications of the observed changes in funding patterns. It is premature to anticipate changes in the performance of the NGO sector as a result of a lesser proportion of organizations dependent upon foreign funds. Nor can we foresee that the larger number of NGOs relying on self-support and/or on diversified financial sources will bring new patterns of interaction with authority structures, which is a shift away from the traditional political mechanisms, such as patron–client networks. The generalized beliefs about the growing capacity of civil society organizations to be independent and to share public responsibilities will have to be demonstrated. Still focusing on the issue of institutionalization, I enquire if NGOs reveal a tendency toward a more professionalized structure as

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Table 6.5

Number of paid workers of the NGOs according to year of establishment

Date established

Up to1984 1985–1994 1995–2004

Total


Number of stable paid workers of the NGOs No paid workers 1 to 9 10 to 49 50 or more 3 15 19 11 6.3% 31.3% 39.6% 22.9% 16 40 48 15 13.4% 33.6% 40.3% 12.6% 30 48 48 6 22.7% 36.4% 36.4% 4.5% 49 16.4%

103 34.4%

115 38.5%

32 10.7%

Total 48 100.0% 119 100.0% 132 100.0% 299 100.0%


they get older. To look into this, I asked what the proportion of paid workers was across different generations of NGOs. The findings, as shown in Table 6.5, indicate that the share of unpaid workers increases substantially as we move toward the new generations of NGOs. Also noticeable is the fact that the older the generation of the NGO, the larger the number of workers on their payroll. Could we then suggest that, as with regular bureaucracies, NGOs tend to expand as they get older? We can take this as a hypothesis to be explored, in the same sense that we should investigate further in order to examine if the strong presence of voluntary work among younger NGOs reveals the presence of innovative structures or just the recency and lack of institutionalization of some NGOs. My next set of questions focuses on the internal process of decision-making. Do NGOs active in Brazil rely on participatory mechanisms? Are there indications that NGOs have innovative, non-bureaucratic ways of operation as they tend to be portrayed by their defenders? The answers shown in Table 6.6 suggest that NGOs are sensitive to legitimacy issues: more than three quarters of them say that they consult their constituencies ‘always’ or ‘sometimes’. Nevertheless, as to the actual decisionmaking process, 69% say that their top managers are the only ones in charge, and 18% say that this is often the case. Judging from such information, we have no elements to suggest that NGOs are significantly different

from conventional bureaucratic organizations in their decision-making process. Taking into account the emphasis in the literature on the importance of fast communication for the proliferation of NGOs, the survey also enquired into the degree of computerization among these organizations. Indeed, all of the organizations sampled use electronic mailing lists, and 70% of them have broadband access to the Internet – a very high proportion if one takes into account the low ratio of computers per capita in the country and the even lower index of fast Internet access. Moreover, 81% of them have a web page. Of this total, nearly twothirds update the page once a month or more, as shown in Table 6.7. However, Table 6.8 shows that most of them (86.9%) use the page primarily to inform about their own initiatives, while 7.4% say their basic purpose is to provide information of public utility, and 5.7% only seek first to network people. Our data do confirm the idea that NGOs are highly computerized. We are used to hearing that fast connectivity is as much part of the global world as NGOs themselves Table 6.6 Leaders consult their constituencies Never Almost never Sometimes Always

Frequency 43 26 100 130

Total 299 Source: Sample survey 2004/2005.

Valid percent 14.4 8.7 33.4 43.5 100.0

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Table 6.7 updated

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How often is the webpage

Daily Twice a week Weekly Monthly Less than once a month

Frequency 32 14 47 54 90


Valid percent 13.5 5.9 19.8 22.8 38.0 100.0

(Matthews, 1997). We are also used to hearing that minorities and excluded groups can now bypass their isolation and move directly from the local to the global level, thanks to the Internet. Notwithstanding the many anecdotal success stories about natives who quickly mobilize international support for their cause, can we say that NGOs are in general more apt to communicate with civil society than state agencies? I would argue that it is premature to jump to this conclusion. To begin with, taking into account that less than 20% of the Brazilian population has access to home computers, one must conclude that generalized communication is a problematic feature of e-practices in Brazil, no matter if such practices are originated by the state or by civil society organizations. Second, it is important to bear in mind that unequal access to electronic communication may indeed accentuate oligopolies of participation and representation. Furthermore, one has to observe that, like NGOs, the governmental sector in Brazil presents, in relative terms, a very high degree of computerization, despite the fact that citizenship remains restricted to a minority. Access to government has become in many ways much easier and comfortable for those who already had less difficult access. For example, today, 95% of the Brazilians who Table 6.8

Major purpose of the webpage

To advertise its actions To provide information of general interest Networking

Frequency 212

Percent 86.9

18 14

7.4 5.7


100.0

fill out an income tax declaration do so through the Internet. But, these are only 16.5 million or around 9% of the population. So the chance that NGOs will reach only those who are already part of the political community seems high. Certainly, the quality of citizenship may increase considerably, but the consequences for the worse-off may not be so spectacular as the imagery of new participatory channels suggests. Naturally, since NGOs have largely targeted e-publics, they can be more effective in communicating and mobilizing support. But as such, they should be compared to interest groups, unions, lobbies, etc., not to the public sector. To further enquire into the nature of the relationships between NGOs and the state, we then asked how the former see themselves: would they say that they are primarily a social or a communitarian organization that works mainly through voluntary participation? Or are they better described as an organization of specialists and technical advisers dedicated to collective goals? The answers we received reveal a quite balanced division between ‘communitarian’ and ‘advisory’ NGOs. But among the latter, the proportion of those who say they act in partnership with the federal government is higher. In turn, at the local level, the proportions are reversed with more ‘communitarian’ than ‘advisory’ NGOs acting in partnership with the government. Last but not least, we enquired into the propensity of NGOs to take over functions traditionally performed by state agencies. Though this part of the study has hardly started, it is possible to say that NGOs of a more advisory and/or technical profile are more likely to develop partnership with the federal administration than those that define themselves as ‘communitarian’. The latter show a slightly higher rate of partnership with local administrations than do the advocacy type. As to partnership with regional states, there are no big differences between the two models of NGOs. These results are reproduced in Tables 6.9, 6.10, and 6.11.

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Table 6.9

Characteristics of the NGO

Partnership with the federal government according to characteristics of the NGO

Communitarian Professional/technical

Total

Count Row % Count Row % Count Row %

Works with the federal government Yes No 73 79 48.0% 52.0% 88 58 60.3% 39.7% 161 54.0%

137 46.0%

Total 152 100.0% 146 100% 298 100.0%


What can we conclude from the evidence examined? Certainly, the data do not allow us to say much about the changed patterns of interaction between society and the state. Yet, the very fact that we are looking at civil society organizations whose explicit mission is to deliver services and goods formerly perceived as the responsibility of public authority signals a deep cultural change. More important though, the data reveal the extent of our ignorance about key questions related to our society. We do not know, for example, how NGOs can be made more accountable, more responsive. We also do not know if they actually enhance social participation or else signal new forms of monopoly power. By definition, they are not representative, yet to the extent that they take over roles and functions, they might be forming loci of power and privilege. Do NGOs provide more efficient and less corrupt distribution of social services than do governmental bureaucracies? While this is nowadays the assumption of international agencies, we have no clear Table 6.10


evidence that this is indeed a feature of NGOs. To conclude this preliminary study, I would say that as crude as the analysis is, it suggests the relevance of proceeding to an examination of the survey data already available. It also shows the need for new sources of information on the new forms of organization that are taking over tasks traditionally restricted to governmental agencies, with just marginal collaboration of old philanthropic initiatives. The study also suggests that one should perhaps question to what extent new actors, like NGOs, are actually innovative in the way they organize themselves, their forms of action, their sources of finance, etc. Are they really making a difference? In what sense? Who are the major beneficiaries? Are they actually more participatory than other civil society organizations? To whom are they accountable? To their donors? To their beneficiaries? These and other crucial questions are not framed as a form of criticism, but rather as a matter of fact, as highly needed

Partnership with local government according to characteristics of the NGO


Total


Count Row % Count Row %

Works with the local government Yes No 84 68 55.3% 44.7% 73 73 50.0% 50.0%

Total 152 100.0% 146 100.0%

Count Row %

157 52.7%

298 100.0%

141 47.3%

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Table 6.11


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Partnership with the regional government according to characteristics of the NGO


Total

Count Row % Count Row %

Works with the local government Yes No 66 86 43.4% 56.6% 68 78 46.6% 53.4%

Total 152 100.0% 146 100.0%

Count Row %

134 45.0%

298 100.0%

164 55.0%


knowledge for questions of efficiency and justice alike.

CONCLUDING REMARKS To conclude this chapter I insist that the conceptual realignment of state, market, and societal forces is, at the same time, the result of the historical transformations which are occurring, and an intellectual attempt to confer meaning on the changes in question. Thus, the agenda of sociology has to contemplate the empirical processes at play and, at the same time, account for the changing ways of conceiving society. As nation-states experience local and global pressures, the quickly changing patterns of interaction among state, market, and civil society remain under-theorized. Although some draw attention to a decline in associational forces (Putnam, 2000), there is plenty of evidence that new participatory forces are at play, forces that defy our old schemes of interpretation. On the global scale, the explosion of the so-called Third Sector, the growing salience of the idea of corporate social responsibility, or the move from governability to governance in the lexicon of international agencies are some of the indications of the changes at play. While distinctive, these processes converge as expressions of a new way to conceive of social life. Each of such manifestations has received considerable attention within sociology. However, we lack a broad theoretical framework that can

help us better tie together the many corners of the contemporary social world. To face this challenge, we must move from abstract theorizing to empirical research and viceversa in the high-speed mood typical of the globalized world.

NOTES 1 Research for this work was possible thanks to a joint grant from CNPQ and FAPERJ, respectively the federal and the Rio de Janeiro state agencies for scientific research. 2 A forthcoming (2009) paper, in collaboration with Mariane Koslinski, explores the possible impact of transnational connections on NGOs. Contrary to the usual assertion that foreign ties tend to make NGOs in less-developed countries less domestically rooted, we show that external ties are closely associated with more dense domestic networks. See M. C. Koslinski and E. P. Reis, Transnational and Domestic Relations of NGOs in Brazil’.

REFERENCES Alexander, Jeffrey (ed.) (1998) Real Civil Societies: Dilemmas of Institutionalization. London: Sage. Anheier, Helmut and Themudo, Nuno (2002) ‘Organizational Forms of Global Civil Society: Implications of Going Global’, Global Civil Society Yearbook, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Axtmann, Roland (2004) ‘The State of the State: The Model of the Modern State and its

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Contemporary Transformation’, International Political Science Review, 25(3): 259–79. Baccaro, Lucio (2002) ‘Civil Society Meets the State: A Model of Associational Democracy’, discussion paper. International Institute for Labor Studies: Geneva. Barzelay, Michael (2001) The New Public Management: Improving Research and Policy Dialogue. Berkeley: University of California Press. Bendix, Reinhard (1964) Nation Building and Citizenship: Studies of Our Changing Social Order. Berkeley: University of California Press. Carroll, Archie (1999) ‘Corporate Social Responsibility: Evolution of a Definitional Construct’, Business and Society, 38(3): 268–95. Clarke, Gerard (1998) ‘The Politics of NGOs’, in Gerard Clarke (ed.) South-East Asia: Participation and Protest in the Philippines. London: Routledge. Clayton, Andrew (ed.) (1996) NGOs, Civil Society and the State: Building Democracy in Transitional Societies. Oxford: INTRAC. Cohen, Jean and Arato, Andrew (1992) Civil Society and Political Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Della Porta, Donatella and Tarrow, Sidney (eds.) (2005) Transnational Protest and Global Activism. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. Elias, Norbert (1984) ‘On the Sociogenesis of Sociology’, Sociologisch Tijdshrift, 11: 14–52. Evans, Peter (1979) Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State and Local Capital in Brazil. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Fernandes, Rubem Cesar (1994) Privado Porém Público: O Terceiro Setor na América Latina. Rio de Janeiro: Relume-Dumará. Fowler, Alan (1997) Striking a Balance: A Guide to Enhancing the Effectiveness of NonGovernmental Organizations in International Development. London: Earthscan. Garriga, Elisabet and Melé, Domènec (2004) ‘Corporate Social Responsibility Theories: Mapping the Territory’, Journal of Business Ethics, 53(1–2): 51–71. Hall, John (1995) ‘In Search of Civil Society’, in John Hall (ed.) Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison. Cambridge: Polity Press. Hemingway, Christine and Maclagan, Patrick (2004) ‘Managers’ Personal Values as Drivers

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of Corporate Social Responsibility’, Journal of Business Ethics, 50(1): 33–44. IBGE (2004) As Fundações Privadas e Associações Sem Fins Lucrativos no Brasil, 2nd edn. Rio de Janeiro. Keane, John (1988a) Democracy and Civil Society. London: Verso. Keane, John (ed.) (1988b) Civil Society and the State: New European Perspectives. London: Verso. Keck, Margaret and Sikkink, Kathryn (1999) ‘Transnational Advocacy Networks in International and Regional Politics’, International Social Science Journal, 51(1): 89–101. Khagram, Sanjeev, Rilker, James V. and Sikkink, Kathryn (2002) ‘From Santiago to Seattle: Transnational Advocacy Groups Restructuring World Politics’, in S. Khagram, J. V. Rilker and K. Sikkink (eds.) Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. pp. 3–23. Landim, Leilah (ed.) (1988) Sem Fins Lucrativos: As Organizações Não-Governamentais. Rio de Janeiro: ISER. Landim, Leilah (2002) ‘Experiencia Militante: Historias das Assim Chamadas ONGs’, Lusotopie, I: 215–39. Lane, Jan-Eric (2000) New Public Management. London: Routledge. McLaughlin, Kate, Osborne, Stephen and Ferlie, Ewan (eds.) (2002) New Public Management: Current Trends and Future Prospects. London: Routledge. Martins, Luciano (1976) Pouvoir et Développement Économique: Formation et Evolution des Structures Politiques au Brésil. Paris: Anthropos. Matthews, Jessica (1997) ‘Power Shift’, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb: 50–66. OECD (1988) Voluntary Aid for Development: The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations. Paris: OECD Development Centre. Pérez-Diáz, Victor (1993) The Return of Civil Society. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Pollitt, Christopher and Bouckaert, Geert (2000) Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Putnam, Robert (2000) Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. NY: Simon and Schuster.

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Reis, Elisa P. (1998a) ‘O Estado Nacional como Ideologia’, in E. P. Reis (ed.) Processos e Escolhas: Ensaios de Sociologia Política. Rio de Janeiro: Contracapa. Reis, Elisa P. (1998b) ‘Elites Agrárias, StateBuilding e Autoritarismo’, in E. P. Reis, (ed.) Processos e Escolhas: Ensaios de Sociologia Política. Rio de Janeiro: Contracapa. Reis, Elisa P. (2004) ‘The Lasting Marriage between Nation and State Despite Globalization’, International Political Science Review, 25(3): 251–7. Salamon, Lester (1999) Patterns in Public Service: Government – Nonprofit Relations in the Modern Welfare State. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Salamon, Lester and Anheier, Helmut (1996) The Emerging Non-Profit Sector: An Overview. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Sommers, Margaret and Gibson, Gloria (1994) ‘Narrative and Social Identity’, in Craig

Calhoun (ed.) Social Theory and the Politics of Identity. Oxford: Blackwell. Stepan, Alfred (1978) The State and Society, Peru in Comparative Perspective. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Trebat, Tom (1983) Brazil’s State Owned Enterprises: A Case Study of the State as Entrepreneur. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Van Rooy, Alison (1998) Civil Society and the Aid Industry. London: Earthscan Publications. Wapner, Paul (1995) ‘Politics beyond the State: Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics’, World Politics, April: 311–40. Weber, Max (1978) Economy and Society. 2 Vols. Berkeley: University of California Press. Wolfe, Alan (1989) Whose Keeper? Social Science and Moral Obligation. Berkeley: University of California Press. Zadek, Simon (2004) ‘The Path to Corporate Responsibility’, Harvard Business Review, 82(12): 125–32.

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7 New Collaborative Forms of Doing Research1 Jaime Jiménez

INTRODUCTION As we enter the twenty-first century, it becomes apparent that the economic advancement of nations in both the first and the third worlds is based on the way they apply knowledge. It is clear that in terms of the globalized economy, those countries with advanced technology have a competitive advantage over those less developed. Although the cheap labor factor still constitutes an element of relative importance in the geographical location of ‘maquila’ plants, this factor will gradually become less relevant in light of the technological developments that require firms to move to second and third generation ‘maquilas,’ involving a more skilled labor force (Gerber and Carrillo, 2006). Since the end of the twentieth century, the idea that society as a whole was nearing a new era, the ‘era of knowledge’ (Albrow and King, 1990; Crook et al., 1992; David, 1992) became fashionable. It was a novelty to associate the birth of a new century with the beginning of a new era. But, what is behind the recognition of a new global paradigm?

Globalization of the economy: This trend, which began at the end of World War II with the establishment of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs in 1947 (General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, 2006), gained momentum in the decade of the 1990s, with the creation of the World Trade Organization in 1995 (World Trade Organization, 2006) and the establishment of diverse free trade agreements geared to promote, regulate, and standardize free trade throughout most parts of the world. As of 1997, these covered 90% of all international trade, encompassing most countries except China, some former communist countries, and a few other small countries (Anderson and Cavanagh, 1997). Competition for world markets: The large global economic blocs are engaged in a battle to conquer world markets, where products and services with greater technological content and lower cost flood the markets of the entire globe without being noticed by the population at large. It is clear to the large corporations that the investment in research

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oriented to applications and frontier technology results in economic benefits in the mid- and long-term, and at times in a reasonably short-term. Vertiginous technological development: The scientific and technological research that took place during World War II was the basis for the impressive technological advance observed in the second half of the twentieth century. Developments in micro- and nanotechnology, bio-medicine, genetics, and other disciplines and trans-disciplines have set the pace for the constitution of a society that cannot be understood without examining contributions of the scientific and technological knowledge attained in recent decades. Advancement in communications: The speed at which any type of information is disseminated today surpasses the most fertile imagination of the past. The new information and communication technologies (ICT) allow both the information related to current research, and that related to international trade, markets, and the state of global finances, to be disseminated almost in real time. ‘Reification’ of science and technology: The fact is that science and technology are increasingly treated as a commodity, thought of in terms of markets, competitiveness, and commercial product development (Elzinga, 2004). The common belief that ‘knowledge is power’: This assertion assigns to scientific knowledge the capacity to dominate the economic, political, and social spheres, as knowledge itself is held to be the most important factor of production. The world’s arrival in the era of knowledge (Albrow and King, 1990; Crook et al., 1992; David, 1992) is changing the perception of the role of science and technology in society. In part, scientific production appears to be linked to the needs of the global market. However, in the past several years, alternative forms of ‘doing science’ have emerged

throughout the globe, which really are more socially accountable than existing models. These new alternative forms respond to the need to make scientific research more participative, including social sectors that have a stake in the application of scientific findings. In the following, two alternative forms of doing research in Latin America are reviewed, and a comparison is made with the main features of the model (‘Mode 2’) defined by Gibbons et al. (1994) and Nowotny et al. (2001, 2003, 2005), which to our mind is mostly limited to research related to the satisfaction of the global economic market needs and therefore does not go far enough in terms of change. The conclusion is that some segments of society are concerned with the consequences of scientific research and are putting in practice new decisionmaking models that confront current trends. These new forms of doing research are two samples of cooperation among segments of society in search of innovative ways to approach regional development to improve the quality of collective life.

A NEW PARADIGM PROPOSED FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY At the end of the twentieth century, some authors observed that in previous years, the way of ‘producing knowledge’ had changed, and proposed a new model (Gibbons et al., 1994). Concurrently, other authors observed that research in universities was undergoing some significant changes in the forms of knowledge it produces (Fuller, 2000, 2003). The importance of the work of Gibbons and his associates resides in the fact that they have continued research on this topic (Nowotny et al., 2001, 2003, 2005), attempting to reply, not always successfully, to the observations of their critics. According to Gibbons and his associates, this new way co-exists with the traditional form, and it includes not only science and technology but also the social sciences and the humanities,

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NEW COLLABORATIVE FORMS OF DOING RESEARCH

to the extent that these areas of knowledge approach the modes of operation of the ‘hard’ sciences. It affects: ● ● ● ● ● ●

what knowledge is produced, how it is produced, the context in which it is pursued, the way in which production is organized, the systems of reward it activates, and the mechanisms that control the quality of what is produced (Gibbons et al., 1994: 7).

These characteristics are firmly articulated in the case of the ‘hard’ sciences: physics, chemistry, and biology. Inasmuch as the social sciences and humanities have tried to follow the ‘hard’ sciences in rigor, similar social systems have been implemented to govern production of knowledge in these areas (Gibbons et al., 1994: 7). To distinguish them from the traditional form, these authors call the new mode of knowledge production ‘Mode 2,’ and name the classical way, ‘Mode 1.’ What follows are some characteristics of Mode 2 in the context of application: ●

●

●

●

●

●

Problems are not restricted to a discipline or a group of disciplines (multi-disciplinary); they are trans-disciplinary. The work is carried out in non-hierarchical, heterogeneous, and transitory organizational forms. No preference is allocated to university institutionalization. The work involves the close interaction of many actors. In light of the above, the production of knowledge becomes more socially accountable. This type of research utilizes an ample range of criteria to apply quality controls.

Table 7.1

●

93

Mode 2 becomes more flexible and deeply affects what counts as ‘good science’ (Gibbons et al., 1994: 3–8).

In contrast, the term ‘Mode 1’ refers to a form of production of knowledge – a complex of ideas, methods, values, and norms – that has been developed to disseminate the Newtonian model to more and more fields of inquiry and ensure that what is considered ‘established scientific (formal) practice’ is observed. Table 7.1 compares the main characteristics of the two modes of producing knowledge, as set out by the authors. Mode 2 research includes a larger group of ‘practitioners,’ who are temporary and heterogeneous, collaborating on a problem defined in a specific, localized context. According to this orientation, there is a potential imbalance between the volatility and the permanence of institutions that cultivate Mode 2 knowledge production. This is a new situation that appears to be intermediate between stable and flexible organizational forms. The production of knowledge is less and less a self-contained activity. It is neither the ‘science’ of the universities nor the ‘technology’ of industry (Gibbons et al., 1994: 156). The authors assert that a fundamental change that is effected by Mode 2 research is that the production of knowledge is a more ‘socially distributed’ process (Gibbons et al., 1994: 156), meaning that this type of knowledge is both supplied by and distributed to individuals and groups across the social spectrum. This assertion is based on the following attributes of Mode 2:

Comparison of the characteristics of Mode 1 and Mode 2 of knowledge production

Mode 1 Problems proposed and resolved by a specific community Disciplinary Homogeneity of research teams Hierarchical organization Permanent Peer quality control Less socially accountable Source: Derived from Gibbons et al. (1994: 3).

Mode 2 Problems proposed and resolved in the context of application Trans-disciplinary Heterogeneity of research teams Heterarchical organization Transitory Quality control by diverse actors More socially accountable and reflexive

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● ● ●

●

●

●

●

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It is highly contextualized. It produces ‘marketable knowledge.’ There is a porosity of disciplinary and institutional boundaries. Scientific careers are interchangeable: a person may interchangeably be an administrator, head a laboratory, be a scientific entrepreneur, etc. It introduces trans-disciplinarity in other than ‘hot’ topics. It signals a growing importance of hybrid fora in the configuration of knowledge. The fora are constituted by experts and non-experts as social actors (Gibbons et al., 1994: 156).

Policy of technological innovation The explanation that the proponents give for the emergence of this new model of doing science is that the economic decline of the 1980s and increased competition on a world scale forced policymakers to narrow their perspective on the role of science in the achievement of national objectives, and to ‘straddle’ the scientific activity of industrial innovation and competitiveness. Science policy moved toward technology as a more effective way of supporting national industry. In part this change is a response to the reduced competitiveness of the United States vis-à-vis Japan. To some extent, decisionmakers reached the conclusion that the technological base of the world economy had come to an end.

Impact of this change on the university The vision of the university in Mode 2 changes from having a monopoly of knowledge production, ‘a social technology for the production of universal knowledge’ (Fuller, 2003: 217), to being a ‘partner’ in the national and international contexts. This role change will imply a redefinition of excellence among academics (professional aspirations, contributions to the discipline,

institutional loyalties). Since competition will be more open, the university will need to identify ‘niches’ of specialization where it can become more competitive (Gibbons et al., 1994: 157). According to Nowotny et al. (2005), Mode 2 was espoused most warmly by politicians and civil servants struggling to create better mechanisms to link science with innovation. This linkage does not necessarily correspond to increased social accountability. Moreover, the research examples given in Gibbons et al. refer to applications benefiting a reduced number of stakeholders, without any reference to general societal needs. The Boeing 700 series and the Phillips cassette are examples given by Gibbons et al. (1994: 60) of Mode 2 projects primarily favoring Boeing and Phillips, not society at large.

A NEW ‘SOCIAL CONTRACT’ Toward the end of the 1990s, the role that science plays concerning society and development came under serious scrutiny. In the past, science policy was based mainly on acts of faith. It was propelled by faith that research activity would naturally lead to technological innovation, which in turn would guarantee economic growth, and thus social cohesion and peace. It was believed with a certain naïveté that ‘what is good for science is good for humanity,’ leaving science policy decisions in the hands of scientists. Currently, such acts of faith are severely challenged in light of the fact that scientific and technological advances that have contributed to economic development have also brought about irreversible ecological deterioration, technological disasters, and the development of low-cost weaponry of mass destruction which is difficult to dismantle. All the above are unfortunately associated with the exacerbation of social inequality, exclusion, and the increase in asymmetries

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between nations, in terms of wealth and power. The above challenges motivated UNESCO to organize the World Conference on Science: ‘Science for the 21st Century’ (1999a, b), in Budapest in 1999. The objective of the Conference was the formulation of a new relationship between science and society. They advocated a relationship that would replace the excessive confidence society placed in the good judgment of scientists, that is, a new ‘social contract’ (Mayor, 1999), based on the assumption that science is to be subjected to public scrutiny. At this conference, the debate on the need for a democratic discussion of scientific priorities, the size of its budget, its institutional structure, and the use that is given to the results of scientific labor was renewed. It was asserted that such decisions cannot be left simply in the hands of scientists and government officials. At the Budapest Conference, emphasis was also placed on the point that scientists must not orient their research solely toward topics that appear attractive in terms of the availability of grants, such as military research and research that responds to market requirements. They must also orient their work to topics related to general social interest. Furthermore, scientific research must not be developed as isolated disciplines, but must be based on inter- and trans-disciplinary approaches that will bring about a convergence between the natural and the social sciences. This was heralded as a means to understand reality fully, and to transform it. What is sought here is to confront the challenges that the twenty-first century presents with greater possibilities of success in advancing toward a society with greater liberty and equality among men throughout the world. From the Budapest Conference it is acknowledged that we must create the framework for a new social contract with science, one that is based on the participation of large sectors of society, and not only on those who currently have a stake in the decision-making of science. In the new contract, decisions should be made on the basis of the interests

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of large social networks. This is not to say that organizational forms for decisionmaking that have been perfected in the past and which, in general, have produced good results for the advancement of science must be dismissed. The objective is to obtain a wise balance between academic autonomy and social responsibility, access to results and benefits produced by science and the legitimate individual interests of those who promote it, a redistribution of knowledge and copyrights, economic growth and ecological equilibrium, demands that originate in the market and those that do not, long-term and short-term projects, and collective and individual interests. The agenda for a new social contract with science appears complicated. On the one hand, it is not clear whether ‘hard’ scientists are willing to yield the privileges they have traditionally enjoyed, in order to share their decisions with society at large. On the other hand, it is not clear how social groups can involve themselves in an informed manner. The ideal situation is to identify ways that allow the points discussed in Budapest to be understood as legitimate topics of public interest, subject to new decision-making mechanisms that go beyond those that utilize experts in relevant sectors. This set of ideas constitutes the ‘Spirit of Budapest.’

NEW WAYS OF GENERATING KNOWLEDGE The scientific community, decision-makers, and society in general have responded to the challenges that globalization and the emphasis placed on the use of knowledge in all societal activities impose on the motivations and on the ways and means of generating knowledge. In the past few years, new forms of producing knowledge have been observed which, although they do not correspond to Mode 2 as described above, present several of its characteristics, and distance themselves from the traditional way of doing science (Mode 1).

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These forms are an attempt to incorporate beneficiaries of scientific and technological research in the plethora of decisions involved in scientific work, from decisions on what to research to judgments on how to apply results for the benefit of society as a whole. They are a response to the globalization of science, and constitute interesting alternatives to the ‘reification’ of scientific research. They constitute a ‘third’ way which puts emphasis on social responsibility. I am calling them ‘Mode 3,’ as opposed to Mode 1 and Mode 2.

Venezuela’s ‘Research Agendas’ For the past forty years, Venezuela has attempted to put into practice some form of scientific policy through its guiding body, the National Council for Scientific and Technological Research (‘Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Tecnológicas, CONICIT’), now called the National Fund for Science, Technology and Innovation (‘Fondo Nacional de Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación, FONACIT’). Like other countries in Latin America, through the creation of the CONICIT, Venezuela sought to be able to rely on a steering organ for science and technology which would be responsible for the growth of the country’s scientific and technological apparatus according to a policy that privileges development (Jiménez and Escalante, 1995: 89). Despite a periodic formulation of national science and technology plans, drawn up by four different governments, that established priorities with respect to the type of science the country required, the conduct of science has been in the hands of the scientific community, which has long enjoyed full permanent ownership of policy (Vessuri, 1992: 29). Attempts have been made to associate the growth of the scientific infrastructure with the production of social benefits, according to what is commonly known as the ‘linear innovation model.’ The allocation of resources, however, was perceived more as an expense

than as an investment, more as an ‘ideological luxury’ than as a program associated with a socio-economic development plan (Vessuri, 1984: 14). In practice, scientific activity was managed autonomously, on the assumption, in line with the linear model of scientific development, that applications are an automatic and inexorable sub-product. The role assumed by CONICIT was that of a supplier of resources for science, for those scientists who carried out their work according to this conception. Thus, the contract between science and society was limited to a ‘sponsorship’ by society of mode 1 type of research, which was not appropriate for the local needs (González et al., 1992: 359). With that perspective, the possible social use of knowledge was not considered an issue of concern for scientists. Thus, scientific research in Venezuela was an activity carried out by researchers, following their own objectives, even in the case of ‘applied’ research (Vessuri, 1992: 31). In consequence, ‘peer review’ was crucial to decide what it is that is allowed, and what is not. Moreover, peer review was the basic method of evaluation, of recognition, and compensation for notable performance and the generation of results, all of it almost exclusively evidenced by scientific publications (González et al., 1996: 89; Escalante and Jiménez, 1998: 68; Escalante and Jiménez, 2003: 338). Peer review thus becomes a sort of ‘accountability among colleagues’ that does not leave room for the participation of external judges or the opinion of ‘non-peers,’ that is, people who could contribute with a social evaluation of what should be done (Ávalos and Rengifo, 2003: 186). Research Agendas In 1996, in contrast with the framework presented, CONICIT, subsequently continued by FONACIT, began the program ‘Research Agendas’ (Ávalos and Rengifo, 2003), as a new approximation to the formulation of techno-scientific policy in Venezuela. The program was designed as

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a process for building bridges between research, knowledge, and technology, on the one hand, with the needs and opportunities of society, on the other, in an effort by officials from non-scientific spheres, to find ways for scientists to return part of the investment made in them by the Venezuelan society at large. It is an interactive public policy based on the coordination of diverse social agents around common problems, supported by the legitimacy and autonomy of several participating interests, and oriented toward the happy culmination of diverse negotiations. As expected, participation plays a very important role in the process, and replaces bureaucratic or technocratic decision-making concerning the orientation of research and the use of its results. Decisions cannot be imposed as pre-established and final, rather, they are the result of interaction by participating institutions, and it is possible to submit them to revision at any stage of the process (Ávalos and Rengifo, 2003: 188). Agendas are stipulated in a process where interactive actor networks define problem networks that should be assumed by knowledge networks, not exclusively of scientific research. A dynamic of interaction is generated, defined by the nature of the problem networks: the social origin of the problem situation, the projects negotiated by cooperation, the means of evaluation – which go beyond considerations of purely scientific or technological merit – for the selection of projects. This negotiation is based on trust, cooperation, and co-financing, on transparent rules with shared benefits and risks, on the decentralization of decision-making and participation, and on the social orientation and evaluation of results (Ávalos and Rengifo, 2003: 188). According to this orientation, scientific research should be financed not as a response to a proposal for sponsorship from some specialized scientific group, but as a response to a larger agenda of interests, that includes social concerns. The process implies the delimitation of a social space in which different actors identify and demand responses/ solutions/support of socially produced

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knowledge by inter- and trans-disciplinary networks of institutions and individuals, beginning with the confluence of resources and capacities from inter-institutional sources, and incorporating considerations of the context for applications of the findings by the final users/beneficiaries/clients. Therefore the values that go hand in hand with the process are cooperation, commitment to multiple legitimate interests, and links to national objectives of modernization, equity, productivity, democratization, and environmental sustainability, among others. The organizational climate associated with the process is of learning and creative problem-solving, easing the complex process of negotiations that the creation of an agenda necessarily implies (Ávalos and Rengifo, 2003: 189). Some agendas have had an impact in terms of ‘tangible’ results. For example the Cocoa Agenda, financed by the State and private producers, achieved an increase in the average cocoa production per hectare from 200 to 650 kilograms in some areas of the country, trained over 5,000 farmers, created a germoplasm bank with the best plague resistant, quality seeds, and mapped potentially productive areas. The Rice Agenda, funded by Fundarroa, an important production association, and public resources, produced four improved varieties of rice, increased productivity by 70% in some areas of the country, and improved yield from 3.2 to 7 tons per hectare. Other agendas of a different nature, such as the Oil Agenda, produced very important knowledge in the field of mathematical modeling for the oil industry (Genatios and La Fuente, 2004). The Research Agendas program has contributed significantly to experimenting with new approaches and practices in the field of public policy on research and development in Venezuela. This experiment has facilitated the emergence of similar initiatives that have been welcomed more favorably.2 The major contributions of the Agendas are: ●

the adoption, in a limited way, of a knowledge production model (different from the conventional one)

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emphasizing trans-disciplinary work, new project evaluation criteria involving peers and non-peers, and a research orientation developed according to specific needs; the emergence of an innovative concept of research on public policies; the possibility of new forms of work based on alliances with other organizations, public or private, in the network modality, assuming new values associated with cooperative work; the beginning of a new institutionality, including some official regulations for more adequate policies in this area; the opening of new dialogue spaces related to the subject of research, making reference to problems of social concern, allowing the inclusion of new sectors, actors, and agents; and the enhancement of financial support from both the private sector and some international agencies (Ávalos, 2006).

This way of working suggests the emergence of a new way of doing research directly and unquestionably linked to societal needs, in line with the ‘Spirit of Budapest,’ baptized in this text as ‘Mode 3.’

Regional scientific communities in Mexico In Mexico, a group of established researchers in the fields of the life sciences, working mostly in public institutions, aware of the need to break with traditional models of higher and graduate education and to create new regional research centers that truly respond to regional needs, have taken it upon themselves to innovate in these areas of human livelihood (CIDE, 2003). The idea was born of the recognition that the demand for higher education and scientific research for the first 20 years of the twenty-first century will not be satisfied via the traditional educational systems. The researchers have taken advantage of this reality to initiate innovative education systems based on learning and on the identification and solution of problems. Concretely this means that once a problem is identified, the student searches and finds the knowledge

that is pertinent and will lead to a solution. The researchers assert that: The rise of these systems is based on advances in cognitive sciences, which demonstrate that learning is accomplished – especially when referring to higher abilities and levels of cognitive performance – when the emphasis is changed from teaching to learning, based on personal and group study carried out by the students (CIDE, 2003: 1. Free translation by the author, italics added).

These systems consider the heterogeneity of the students’ conditions, academic and otherwise, and this makes it necessary for the programs to be non-uniform. They are adapted to the circumstances of each student, thus liberating the education process from the dogmas of traditional pedagogy. Orienting and carrying out their own learning process, the students reach intellectual independence through the permanent exercise of critical judgment. The idea of regional scientific communities began to crystallize when the ‘La Laguna’3 College of Veterinarians brought this up as a demand to a group of scientists. The veterinarians were looking for a way to satisfy the needs of local professionals in the agriculture and livestock sciences, and to continue their academic training without having to abandon their daily work activities. In light of this scenario, the academics’ concept of teaching and research is developed as an answer to a heterogeneous set of individuals with different social, professional, and economic backgrounds. The innovative conceptualization of teaching and research was formalized many years after the start of activities, through the creation, in 1999, of an umbrella establishment named the Center for Innovation and Educational Development (CIDE), for ‘La Laguna’ and its surrounding area (CIDE, 2003: 1). CIDE recognizes that Mexican society needs scientists, and that the independent development of societies in the world cannot come about without the formation of a critical mass, capable of approaching scientific and technical problems that will allow them to grow, based on the acknowledgement and

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protection of their natural resources and their rational and sustainable exploitation. It modifies the way in which learning takes place to reach the levels of quality that are sought, and accommodate a greater number of applicants, without affecting or increasing requirements for physical infrastructure. CIDE has constituted itself as a learning community whose basis is scientific activity and methodology, as well as the appropriation of a scientific and technological platform, made possible by the use of up-to-date information technologies. It is composed of a group of professor-researchers of the highest academic credentials from different educational institutions of the country, each one with more than 20 years experience in the design and operation of innovative undergraduate and graduate programs. They accommodate a student body that is heterogeneous in academic background, work experience, ideology, age, and economic condition, who share a democratic ideal, a humanistic vocation, and an objective vision of the world, based on scientific thought (CIDE, 2003: 4). Keeping information current: In science, the information explosion has created a desperate need for constant updating and perfecting. Demand for information has never been as high, and this increase in demand makes it necessary to guarantee the supply of reliable information of the highest quality. To ensure that its proposals and actions are solidly based on facts reported in the updated, high quality literature, CIDE assumes that the search and use of up-to-date relevant information published in the scientific mainstream is a fundamental premise for the fulfillment of its objectives. The aforementioned principle implies keeping up-to-date on the acquisition and control of the latest available versions of information resources which makes the exchange of information and communication among academic peers possible, regardless of their place of residence. Currently, science is man’s most dynamic and important productive force

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(Chomsky and Dietrich, 1996), and like any other social activity, it is a product of a persevering and collective effort. However, it is constantly in a process of development, with advances, regressions, and limitations (CIDE, 2003: 3). Therefore, the members of CIDE are committed to permanent updating in the areas of computing, science, pedagogy, and communications in the foreign languages that are dominant in the dissemination of advances, and go beyond the thinking of Bronowski (1976), when asserting that science seeks consciously to adapt to the future, by considering that the most effective way of predicting the future does not consist in imagining it, but in producing it (CIDE, 2003: 3). The learning-research model: For CIDE, learning and research are two sides of the same coin. The student learns to research as part of a general learning process. He/she develops a great ability to use information tools in order to obtain the scientific information he/she needs to bring him/her closer to the solution of the problem which is the object of his/her research. At the same time, CIDE identifies and incorporates in a systematic way the new tools and technologies for independent and continuous learning, sustained in a flexible academic organization that stimulates group and personal study activities concurrently. It encourages a new model of interaction, both between teacher and student, as well as among students at diverse levels and degrees of advancement. CIDE personnel place special emphasis on learning activities of students and tutors, study habits, logical and mathematical capabilities, the use of information systems, and the development of rhetorical and linguistic logic abilities to improve their capacity to communicate research results as well as facts and scientific explanations. Because of the nature of its student body, the CIDE incorporates substantial curricular modifications that allow students to adjust their study activities to the time they have available. Not counting on infrastructure to

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carry out teaching activities, facilities are negotiated in the area where the regional scientific communities are located: the use of libraries from other institutions, laboratories, computers with access to global communication systems such as the Internet, sites for the recovery of empirical data, among others. Group work emerges in the ‘socialization’4 of results among teachers and students, and it takes place in any physical space that provides the facilities to gather all of its members: mentors, students, collaborators, and observers. CIDE’s collegial body and group of advisers know the time required for learning in each one of the different phases of the graduate training process, at both the Master’s and the Doctoral level. In consequence, they have the ability to evaluate the progress of the students in each phase, in line with the time that has been invested individually in the student’s educational process and according to his/her particular situation. The individual does not compare him/herself to peers, since neither previous attributes nor the disposition of time will ever be the same. The arrangements described above imply that effective work time is what determines the presence and stability of attributes that characterize a scientific worker, and that the pace of learning will be a function of the time invested in processes of academic work, rather than of any rigid schedule marked by the school calendar. Evaluation: CIDE defines student academic evaluation as the development of individual attributes, measured as the fulfillment of specific activities common to any graduate program of quality. Among other standard graduate requirements, these activities may include the number of pages read, the number of filing cards formulated, the quality of the information analysis, the formulation of bibliographic retrieval lists, the logical organization of the facts identified in the files consulted, the interpretation demanded by the identified facts, and the formulation of a glossary of new terms.

In addition, due to the unusual nature of this program, the student also has to learn to identify and negotiate with the relevant individuals, firms, agencies, or institutions where he/she can carry out field work that may include observations, experimentation, and measurements of the object of study. Likewise, students have to develop the ability to assess the time, monetary resources, and instrumentation necessary for their experimental work. Emphasis is put on the student’s capacity for self-expression both orally and in writing, including the ability to correspond with scholars by e-mail. This capacity is necessary in order to succeed in a program demanding additional initiative and creativity from the student. The individualized curricular design and the educational practices in CIDE acknowledge the diversity of individualities, temperaments, aspirations, and vocations needed to assure equal opportunities to each and every one of the students by offering a method, a pace, and a way of learning that suits both the specific needs of the student and the object of study. Institutional planning Institutional policy includes elements that tend to democratize learning in a context of deep economic and social differences. These elements include the promotion of financial support for students of lesser economic capacity, in an effort to achieve equality of access to graduate education. CIDE’s policy favors activities for the training of teacher-advisers and students, through projects that emphasize the use of information of excellence, the study of problems located at the frontier of knowledge, the socialization of knowledge, periodic evaluation (by peers) of the academic activity, and the establishment of links with individuals and institutions dedicated to scientific research. CIDE recognizes the importance of having a presence in mainstream science, but maintaining academic work within the bounds of research relevant to regional and

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national needs. Therefore, CIDE’s objectives in the production of knowledge include the development of an innovative model of research where projects are linked to social needs; reach an internationally competitive level in research results through scientific production in visible publications; and produce reliable, precise, and replicable research results with scientific relevance, within the limits set by standards of measurement. CIDE promotes inter-institutional agreements that will make the achievement of institutional educational objectives possible, and produces scientific knowledge that will aid national development by searching for solutions to problems related to the biological environment. To make the promotion of human resources a reality, CIDE’s objectives also include maintaining a link between teaching and research, to promote academic collaboration with national and international research centers, to identify and promote new paradigms of learning, to establish training in alternative teaching practices, to modernize cybernetic learning units, to maintain constant updating of study plans in accordance with society’s structural changes, the advancement of scientific knowledge, and the organic knowledge of learning processes. Financing: How is this project financed? According to several inquiries made by the author, it is mostly self-financed, and, compared to any other alternative, public or private, is not expensive. In an interview with Dr. Rafael Rodríguez (2007), CIDE’s Coordinator in Torreón, Coahuila, he explained that students do not pay either registration or periodic fees. The transportation expense of external advisors is covered with funds raised by the students themselves. External advisors stay in the homes of either local advisors or the students themselves. Laboratory facilities are negotiated individually by the students, according to their needs. For example, the seat of CIDE in Torreón is the ‘La Laguna’ branch of the Antonio Narro University. Since the Torreón advisors are

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full-time academics of ‘La Laguna,’ they allow the students to carry out the experimental work in the University laboratories, with the consent of University authorities. Another instance of individual negotiation is the case of Rocío González, a microbiologist working on her PhD. She works in the Microbiology Laboratory of the Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS), the national social security agency that covers workers in the private sector. González carries out her experimental work in her laboratory, with permission of the authorities. Students purchase their own disposable laboratory materials. CIDE’s coordinators and advisors do their job as a social contribution to regional development, as a way of returning to society some of what they have got from it; hence they do not expect a regular economic compensation. Since CIDE does not have a physical infrastructure or faculty salaries, it is capable of keeping expenses at a low level. Regional scientific communities: The objective of CIDE is to form regional scientific communities (López-Pérez, 2004). The community is formed based on a group of ‘brains’ who have in common an interest in scientific development, and invest everything they have at hand to reach that objective. Generally this is an individual decision, where people from educational institutions, research centers, and firms participate. In the words of one of its founders: ‘we are above all interested in forming brains that will develop professional activity in the real world (firm, farm, etc.).’ It is clear that these communities are not produced in the universities, even when they carry out research, since they have different characteristics and objectives. These communities have developed research centers, in some cases. Such is the case of the first community established, working out of Colima, the capital of the State of the same name, where there is a biotechnology laboratory, producing scientific data and results that are published in prestigious international journals. CIDE has

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established regional scientific communities in Colima (1982), Torreón (1999), Sinaloa (2001), Puebla (2001) and one is in the process of creation (in 2005) in Nayarit (2005). Recently, a new scientific community (CEJUS, 2004) was initiated in the Justo Sierra Study Center (‘Centro de Estudios Justo Sierra, CEJUS’) in Surutato, an isolated village located in the mountains of the northwestern state of Sinaloa (Jiménez and Ramón, 1989; Jiménez, 1992; Jiménez and Escalante, 1999). CEJUS is a unique educational experience based on the same educational and humanistic principles advocated by CIDE. It was created in 1978 by the family heads of Surutato to improve the quality of education their children were receiving from the government, and to prepare them with working skills appropriate to the labor needs of the region. After a long period of struggle and confrontation, the Surutato community was able to mold the official education institutions according to their needs. Parents participate by donating labor and materials for the creation and maintenance of their educational center. The federal government contributes with salaries for the teachers and scholarships for the students (for more details see Jiménez and Escalante, 1999). The scientific community initially offers undergraduate studies in various professional careers related to the sustainable exploitation of the region’s natural resources, namely, the water, the land, the forest, and the weather. CEJUS is the meeting point for ‘socialization’ of results of CIDE’s students spread in the northwestern region of the country, in the states of Sinaloa, Nayarit, Sonora, and Durango. With time, CEJUS will become a research center similar to the CIDE centers already in existence.

MODE 3: A NEW WAY OF DOING SCIENCE Both the Venezuelan ‘Research Agendas’ and Mexico’s ‘Regional Scientific Communities’

respond to the need to do socially relevant science. Both are innovating ways of creating knowledge. Research Agendas are born within the bounds of official science, as an initiative of CONICIT, whereas Regional Scientific Communities are a ‘grass-roots’ initiative, arising as a private concern of established academics coming mostly from public universities, as a response to felt needs of individuals and groups in rural communities. Both could serve as examples of Mode 2 research, however the property of ‘social accountability’ whose presence is a debatable aspect in Mode 2, is of the foremost importance in these new forms of doing science in Venezuela and Mexico. Indeed, we are in the presence of a different mode of doing science, ‘Mode 3,’ whose salient property is the genuine response to social needs, missing in Mode 2. The research agendas of Venezuela and the regional scientific communities of Mexico are only two Latin American examples of new forms of doing research with emphasis in social responsibility. Vessuri (2003: 270) reports two additional Latin American examples: one in Brazil involving a number of scientists as well as producers who have managed to produce soil fertility in the Brazilian cerrados to achieve an efficient and productive agriculture. The other one, in Costa Rica on specific poisons of Central American snakes, is benefiting the whole region with antidotes, developing ‘undergraduate and graduate education, and a broad social intervention to establish training programs for prevention and handling of ophidian accidents’ (Vessuri, 2003: 270). In France, new ways of interacting between science, technology, and society have been developed, in which lay people work along with scientists to produce and diffuse knowledge. The term ‘research in the wild’ has been coined to refer to this new phenomenon (Callon and Rabeharisoa, 2003). An example is the organization of families of patients with muscular dystrophy to collect information about the generation and development of this terrible illness. They discuss it with

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specialists, engaging in a new type of interaction in which lay citizens contribute to the knowledge of an illness so that they impart to specialists the capacity at least to have a better understanding of its complexities. In this case, interested groups show how research must be conducted, even demanding that specialists explore particular lines of research that they have uncovered. These examples of ‘research at the service of mankind’ are in consonance with an alternative definition of development, not necessarily associated with ‘growth.’ Development is not a matter of what one has, but of what one does with what one has. Development ‘is the desire and ability to use what is available to continuously improve the quality of life. This ability cannot be given to others even by those who have it. It must be developed in and for oneself’ (Ackoff, 1974: 221-2). This definition is suitable for social contexts enduring rejection and scarcities to engage in research projects relevant to some segments of society, with a clearly defined felt need. Projects like those described in this section give a sense of progress in the right direction, that is, toward genuine development. In conclusion, at the dawn of the twentyfirst century, a renovated and perhaps idealistic concern of putting science at the service of humanity’s immediate needs is gradually emerging, materializing in concrete research projects. We are before new forms of doing science, different from Mode 1 and Mode 2. The major feature of this new mode is a genuine concern for solving problems endured by specific segments of society. We call it ‘Mode 3’ to differentiate it from the modes defined by Gibbons et al. Indeed, the research agendas and the regional scientific communities are congruent with the ‘spirit of Budapest,’ and seek to develop a science that is at the service of those who sustain it, serving the interests of many, and leading to a better quality of collective life. Both are vivid examples of innovative forms of cooperation taking place in the early years of a new century, a matter of great concern for the

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International Sociology Association Research Committee Conference held in Ottawa in the summer of 2004.

NOTES 1 I wish to acknowledge the contribution of Juan Carlos Escalante and Carlos Rodríguez in compiling and revising the bibliography. 2 The official Science and Technology Plan 2005– 2030 points to the need for a revolutionary change that leads to a ‘new scientific culture.’ It implies going from a scientific culture of ‘fragmented, individualized, parceled, disciplinary, and linear’ knowledge to a ‘participative, dialogic, collectively organized, transdisciplinary, and integral’ knowledge (Ávalos, personal communication, 2006). 3 ‘La Laguna’ or ‘Comarca Lagunera’ is a region in the north of Mexico embodying part of the Coahuila and Durango states. 4 ‘Socialization’ is used here in its current sense in Spanish. This entails the sharing of knowledge one has and the enriching of such knowledge through the participation in exchanges among community members.

REFERENCES Ackoff, R. L. (1974) Redesigning the Future. NY: John Wiley & Sons. Albrow, Martin and King Elizabeth (1990) Globalization, Knowledge and Society: Readings from International Sociology. London: Sage. Anderson, S. and Cavanagh, J. (1997) ‘World Trade Organization’, Foreign Policy in Focus, 2(14), www.fpif.org, consulted August 8, 2006. Ávalos, I. (2006) El saldo del Programa de Agendas, in M. Albornoz and C. Alfaraz (eds.) Redes de conocimiento: construcción, dinámica y gestión. Buenos Aires: RICYT/ UNESCO. Ávalos, I. and Rengifo, R. (2003) ‘From Sector to Networks: The Venezuelan CONICIT Research Agendas’, Technology in Society, 25(2): 183–92. Bronowski, J. (1976) A Sense of the Future: Essays in Natural Philosophy. Cambridge: MIT Press. Callon, M. and Rabeharisoa, V. (2003) ‘Research “in the Wild” and the Shaping of

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New Social Identities’, Technology in Society, 25(2): 193–204. CEJUS (2004) Comunidad Científica. Educación Superior (Scientific Community. Higher Education). Surutato, Badiraguato, Sinaloa, México: Centro de Estudios Justo Sierra (CEJUS). Chomsky, N. and Dietrich, H. (1996) La sociedad global, educación, mercado, y democracia (Global society, education, market and democracy). México: Joaquín Mortiz. CIDE (2003) Plan de Desarrollo del Centro de Innovación y Desarrollo Educativo, S.C. (Development Plan of the Innovation and Educational Development Center, S.C.). Unpublished document, pp. 1–11. Crook, S., Pakulski, J. and Waters, M. (1992) Postmodernization: Change in Advanced Society. London: Sage. David, P. (1992) Knowledge, Property and the System Dynamics of Technological Change, paper delivered in the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics, Washington. April–May, 1992. Elzinga, A. (2004) ‘Metaphors, Models and Reification in Science and Technology Policy Discourse’, Science as Culture, 13(1): 105–21. Escalante, J. C. and Jiménez, J. (1998) ‘Meritbased Incentive Systems and the Problem of Productivity in Science and Technology in Two Latin American Countries’, Science Studies, 11(2): 63–75. Escalante, J. C. and Jiménez, J. (2003) ‘Los Estímulos a la Productividad Académica y la Producción Real en Ciencia y Tecnología en dos Países Latinoamericanos. Los Casos de México y Venezuela’ (Incentives to the Academic Production and Real Production in Science and Technology in two Latin American Countries. The Mexico and Venezuela Cases), in M. A. Briceño (compilador), Universidad, Sector Productivo y Sustentabilidad. Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela y Consejo de Desarrollo Científico y Humanístico, Serie Humanidades y Educación. pp. 331–45. Fuller, S. (2000) The Governance of Science. Milton Keynes, U.K.: Open University Press. Fuller, S. (2003) ‘In Search of Vehicles for Knowledge Governance: On the Need for Institutions that Creatively Destroy Social Capital’, in N. Stehr (ed.) The Governance of Knowledge. New Brunswick NJ: Transaction Books. pp. 41–76.

Genatios, C. and La Fuente, M. (2004) Ciencia y Tecnología en Venezuela. Caracas: OPSU. General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (2006) http://www.ciesin.columbia.edu/TG/PI/TRAD E/gatt.html, consulted on August 28, 2006. Gerber, J. and Jorge C. (2006) ‘Are Baja California’s Maquiladora Plants Competitive?’, Research and Seminars, http:// migration.ucdavis.edu/rs, consulted on July 7, 2006. Gibbons, M., Limoges, C., Nowotny, H., Schwartzman, S., Scott, P. and Trow, M. (1994) The New Production of Knowledge. The Dynamics of Science and Research in Contemporary Societies. London: Sage Publications Ltd. González, E., Bisiacchi, B., Viana di Prisco, G. and Di Prisco, M. C. (1992) ‘El programa de promoción del investigador en Venezuela’, Interciencia, 17(6): 358–65. González, E., Arévalo, C. and Velasco, M. (1996) ‘Programa de promoción del investigador (PPI) en Venezuela: ¿Reconocimiento o estímulo?’, Interciencia, 21(2): 348–57. Jiménez, J. (1992) ‘Surutato: An Experience in Rural Participative Planning’, in J. M. Choukroun and R. M. Snow (eds.) Planning for Human Systems. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. pp. 407–16. Jiménez, J. and Escalante, J. C. (1995) ‘S&T Development in Mexico in Light of Current Global Transformations’, in C. Honig (ed.) Science and Technology Policy: An International Perspective. London: The British Library. pp. 89–92. Jiménez, J. and Escalante, J. C. (1999) ‘Community Development through Participative Planning’, Proceedings of the Conference on Russell L. Ackoff and the Advent of Systems Thinking. A Conference to Celebrate the Work of Russell L. Ackoff on his 80th Birthday and Developments in Systems Theory and Practice. Villanova: Villanova University Press. pp.167–78. Jiménez, J. and Ramón, F. (1989) ‘Evaluación de Estrategias de Cambio en el Proyecto de Educación Comunitaria (Change Strategies Evaluation in the Community Education Project)’, Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios Educativos (Latin American Journal of Educational Studies), XIX(3): 93–123. López-Pérez, J. (2004) Comunicación personal vía correo electrónico (Personal communication via e-mail).

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Mayor, F. (1999) ‘Message: A New Contract between Science and Society’, UNESCO website. URL: www.unesco.org/bpi/science/con tent/press/anglo/print.htm. Nowotny, H., Scott, P. and Gibbons, M. (2001) Re-Thinking Science. Knowledge and the Public in an Age of Uncertainty. Cambridge: Polity Press. Nowotny, H., Scott, P. and Gibbons, M. (2003) ‘Mode 2 Revisited: The New Production of Knowledge’, Minerva, 41: 179–94. Nowotny, H., Scott, P. and Gibbons, M. (2005) ‘Re-Thinking Science: Mode 2 in Social Context’, Nowotny web site. URL: www.nowotny.ethz.ch/pdf/Nowotny_Gibbo ns_Scott_Mode2.pdf. Vessuri, H. (1984) ‘La formación de la comunidad científica en Venezuela’, Introd., en Hebe Vessuri (ed.) Ciencia Académica en la Venezuela Moderna. Caracas: Acta Científica Venezolana.

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Vessuri, H. (1992) ‘Ciencia, tecnología y modernización en Venezuela’, en La Ciencia en Venezuela: pasado, presente y futuro. Caracas: Cuadernos Lagoven. Vessuri, H. (2003) ‘Science, Politics, and Democratic Participation in Policy-making: A Latin American View’, Technology in Society, 25(2): 263–73. World Conference on Science (1999a) ‘Declaration on Science and the Uses of Scientific Knowledge’, UNESCO website. URL: w w w. u n e s c o . o r g / s c i e n c e / w c s / e n g / declaration-e.htm. World Conference on Science (1999b) ‘Science Agenda – Framework for Action, paragraph 38’ UNESCO website. URL: www.unesco. org/science/wcs/eng/framework.htm. World Trade Organization (2006) website. URL: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_ Trade_Organization, consulted on August 28, 2006.

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PART TWO

Trends in Conceptualizing Conflict, Competition, and Cooperation in Subfields of Sociology

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8 Conflict, Competition, Cooperation in the Sociology of Development and Social Transformations Ulrike Schuerkens

In this chapter, we present the scientific meaning of the notions of conflict, competition, and cooperation in our particular research field. These three notions are important for the analysis of social change in societies of the geographic, or better, the economic North and South. The notion of conflict was of interest mainly in the 1970s and was used by scholars such as Dahrendorf, Coser, Rex and Collins. In recent years, with the end of the Cold War and the consequent decline of states in Eastern European and African countries, there has been a renewed interest in the topic. Scholars have asked why, in these countries, social transformations have resulted in difficult social situations and why social conflicts, often based on ethnic identities, have been widespread. The notion of cooperation is another important term of our research field because of the fact that the whole development project is based on

processes of cooperation linking northern and southern countries in common endeavours. This chapter surveys the history of development cooperation since the 1950s when large groups of countries have been included in an ever-growing world-system. Since the end of the global competition characteristic of the era of the Cold War, processes of competition play a lesser role in our field insofar as democratic institutions in the South are often weakly developed and elites tend to confront each other on ethnic grounds, and that often occasions violent conflicts. Insofar as globalization is linked to economic competition, we request which cultural characteristics competition asks for in the different world regions. The three notions are important at the macro, meso and micro levels depending on socio-historical situations. In this chapter, principally because of constraints on length, we focus on the macro level. In the last 50 years, the international

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political situation has influenced local groups, nation-states, and transnational relations in different ways. The changing importance and meaning of the three notions in our research field can redraw this situation. To summarize, drawing on societies from several regions of the world, this article addresses the problematics of these notions, the types of explanations proposed, and outlines some of the main recent empirical findings.

THE NOTION OF COOPERATION1 After the declaration of USA President Truman in 1947, cooperation emerged as an international task that had to include the nonEuropean world in the twentieth (European) century by increasing the standards of living of all societies. The relation of subordination of colonized people to colonizers changed insofar as former colonies were gradually integrated into a world system, organized as an economic hierarchy. In fact, the United States was interested in gaining access to the markets in the colonial empires of European colonial powers (cf. Rist, 1996: 126). The ‘development project’, as McMichael (2004) defined it, lent legitimation to political actions aimed at developing ‘underdeveloped’ nations. The increase of economic production was considered the element that could transform the situation of developing countries. The Bandoung Conference (1955) where nations of the South met, declared that cooperation was necessary in order to integrate ‘underdeveloped’ nations into the global economy. In 1962, the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations, U Thant, wrote a report in which he asserted that development was considered an economic change accompanied by social transformations. The influential economist W. W. Rostow (1960) thought that cooperation with the West would mean economic growth and the possibility of democratic development in the South. Rostow’s idea was that a universal ‘modernity’ would replace ‘traditions’.

The French economist F. Perroux (1961) analyzed the ‘colonial situation’ (Balandier, 1985) that he condemned, and asked for transformations of the unequal social, political and economic structures after countries achieved formal independence. During this period, the theory of modernization was shown to be applicable, insofar as the political strategies of cooperation implemented by the countries of the North privileged internal growth in and international assistance to the South. Latin-American intellectuals counter-attacked with the idea that international cooperation would not improve the situation in the South but that instead external dependence had increased. The arguments of these intellectuals were progressively adopted by political opponents to the USA and by groups in the South that tried to criticize modernization theories. Yet the adoption of the dependencia theory was not followed by concrete political measures. For Rostow, internal inequality was considered positive because, as he saw it, competition would lead to development. By contrast, Latin-American scholars underlined that inequality was problematic and required state intervention. The former declared that an increasing integration of ‘young nations’ in the global market would automatically result in development; the latter declared that separation from the unequal world economy would be necessary to improve the situation of these countries. Studies of the ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America, cf. Frank, 1967) had shown that free exchange brought advantages to the North and disadvantages to the South, which would result in the ‘core-periphery’ scheme of the global world. These scholars asked for regional economic integration, industrialization that would substitute for imports, and the intervention of the state in order to avoid inequality. The Third World movements that appeared during this period tried to correct the disparities of the colonial division of labour (primary goods exchanged for manufactured products). The result of this discussion was that ‘development’ and ‘underdevelopment’ were

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SOCIOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATIONS

considered to be linked globally (Azoulay, 2002). Cooperation was situated in the longue durée that insisted on structural conditions of internal (local elites) and external (world economy) domination. Numerous scholars from the South and the North contributed to this discussion by analyzing different factors (for example, Cardoso and Faletto, 1979; Frank, 1967) and insisting on evidence of unequal relations, characterized more by conflict than by cooperation. In 1973, the movement around the New International Economic World Order asked for a redistribution of the advantages of economic growth. The idea was to improve the integration of the countries of the South in the global system. But financial crises, the beginning of the debt regime and structural adjustments changed the focus of this movement. The new regulation system had less consideration for the protection of labourers than it did for the protection of financial credits. The imposition of austerity measures by indebted governments worsened social inequalities even more. During these years, the importance of the ‘basic needs’ approach began to emerge, even if its theoretical foundations (a common ‘human nature’) were rather limited. Finally, theoretical approaches began to lose their importance in the face of actions taken by international cooperation actors, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and other organizations of the United Nations. The ‘laws’ of the market were increasingly opposed to humanitarian actions of UN agencies and NGOs. Political actions placed the westernization of the world by economic, political and social leaders in question. Indigenous groups were defended to a greater extent. The breakdown of the Iron Curtain resulted in the disappearance in Eastern Bloc countries of a model of development that had been favoured by parts of the South. In 1987, the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) published a report entitled Our Common Future. The document came to be known as the Brundtland Report after the Commission’s

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chairwoman, Gro Harlem Brundtland. It focused on the necessity of supporting environmental measures and international development. The Earth Summit organized by the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 popularized the idea of irreversible sustainable development: 172 governments participated in the conference; 108 at the level of heads of States or governments. Since the final years of the twentieth century, the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) favoured a development approach that added a human dimension to economic growth. Development had become conditional on cooperation in a global world. International organizations, together with national political and economic elites, favoured increasingly international cooperation while numerous counter-movements appeared that criticized the globalization process, such as ATTAC (Association pour la taxation des transactions pour l’aide aux citoyens) or the Chiapas movement in Mexico. It is interesting to analyze feminist critiques of development that are concerned with the negative impact of mainstream development on the lives of women. In some cases, development projects, introduced to improve welfare of certain groups, have led to a decline in women’s well-being. Since the 1970, the women’s movement and women’s activists have contributed to research programmes in both the North and the South. In the 1970s, women were brought ‘into’ development; this focus was named the women-in-development (WID) approach. The WID approach influenced the policies of the World Bank without challenging existing gender ideologies that conceive of all reproductive work as women’s work. Some ten years later, the focus was extended with the influence of feminist theorizing about research on women-and-development (WAD). More recently, feminist researchers in the North have underlined the need to contextualize discourse on development in order to show its effects on women. These studies are complementary to those of indigenous feminists.

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Moreover, current feminist research on development covers issues such as the debates about the environment and about sustainable development. Feminists have underlined the fallacy of using numerical measures of economic growth to assess the attainment of goals. In this connection, one of the main problems is the public–private dichotomy, which maintains that women can gain equality by participating more in the formal economy, without assigning any economic value to women’s reproductive work. Unequal gender relations became a central concern of development in the 1990s. Some feminists insist that development policies have to be ‘engendered’ and women have to be empowered so that development will be beneficial to them. Neo-classical development theories that consider indigenous attitudes and institutions as barriers to development tend to place women’s understandings of life outside their concepts of development. Recent feminist scholarship has contributed to an examination of the ways women’s labour is used in factories and in export-processing zones. These scholars have documented how women receive lower wages than men for comparable work (Chow, 2003). Using a gender perspective means asking what kinds of development can promote the interests of women in the South. This may be the necessary link between human development and economic development in a world characterized by the neo-liberal globalization credo. Amartya Sen, the 1998 Nobel laureate in economics added a further dimension to recent discussions on cooperation: he underlined that globalization needs to be backed by national social policies, a sort of social safety net like the one which was created in Western European states at the beginning of the twentieth century. In France, the 2005–2006 urban riots and youth protests suggest that not only developing countries are concerned with these effects of globalization when economies open widely to international capital inflows so that people find it difficult to survive in highly competitive environments.

According to Sen, programmes that empower people have to focus on microcredits, literacy or land reforms. In his book Development as Freedom, Sen (1999) underlines the conception that freedoms include political freedom, economic facilities, social opportunities and security. He reiterates the advantages of capabilities (‘substantive human freedoms’) over narrower measures of human development. In Sen’s opinion, the idea of human capital fails to capture the contributions of human capabilities to wellbeing and their influences on social change. New concepts are thus incorporated in the development discourse: empowerment and participation. In sum, up until the 1970s, development theory and practice were dominated by the idea of economic growth and economic indicators. This understanding reflected a lack of knowledge about the low level of investment in human and social capital, and the weakness of markets. The further assumption, that growth would trickle down from the rich to the poor, reflected ignorance about rather different social structures. Distributional issues began to emerge in the 1970s with a focus on topics such as poverty and inequality in the South American centre-periphery approach. The dependencia school highlighted the constraints imposed on the development processes in the periphery by an unequal international economic system. In the 1980s, world system theorists interpreted interdependence in dynamic terms in order to prepare the ground for studies of the impact of globalization on poor people and poor countries in the 1990s. North–South cooperation thus remains complex, with its slowly changing focus. We can conclude this part on cooperation by underlining the fact that, despite cooperation measures for over 50 years, the elementary needs of more than one billion of people are not satisfied. Furthermore, the possibility of satisfying them in the future is questionable. Thus, we confront a double global crisis: a crisis in the distribution of income and a crisis in growth. The only convergent

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phenomena in the economies of the South and the North seem to be the growth of social inequality and of poverty during the last two decades. In the South, development is necessary because of the fact that the most important needs of huge population groups are not satisfied. In the North, an improved life quality of the whole population should be privileged, not only a quantitative growth. Sustainable development was defined by the Brundtland Commission as a development that satisfies the needs of the present without compromising the capacity of coming generations (cf. McMichael, 2004: 250). Perhaps it is necessary to reverse priorities: the economy might be transformed in order to become an instrument. Consistent with this choice would be that economic and financial criteria would no longer be societal priorities. Projects for sustainable human development would then tackle problems such as the spread of wealth and an improving quality of life.

THE NOTION OF CONFLICT In the 1960s, a growing scientific literature was convinced that conflict, defined as opposing social classes, allowed social change to emerge. In the 1990s and at the beginning of the twenty-first century, some scholars have begun to stress that the absence of social change has led to conflict situations that can be found in several African countries, such as the Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, but also in the Balkans.

Conflict theories of the 1960s A common feature of all conflict theories of this period is the assumption that change is explained by contradictions or elements that generate tensions in all societal systems. The reasons for these conflicts are linked to elements of the social structure that, on the one hand, determine or sanction norms

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and, on the other hand, control and award resources such as income, wealth, prestige, influence, etc. Theoretical approaches insist on processes of societal life that lead to instability and conflicts within the different sectors of a society. Change is considered to be taking place due to a dialectical relationship of important structural elements of a society (values, ideologies, power relations, distribution of resources, etc.) and elements that are in competition with these arrangements. The result is societal change. Power relations of a society in economic, political and cultural systems are tackled, but normative elements, such as rules or attitudes, are not considered. Marx, one of the earliest theoreticians of conflict, studied the capitalist ‘revolution’, which he described as a historical phenomenon that contributed to providing the ‘proletariat’ with opportunities to realize human liberty and self-determination in order to control historical processes. This idea had two important consequences: first, according to Marx, relations of production determine the distribution of professional and financial possibilities, the influence on enterprises and the interest structure of a society. The second conclusion is that an improvement of material conditions will be linked to the institutionalization of democratic forms of interaction. Marx saw two causes for societal conflicts: structural contradictions and antagonistic class relations. The structural contradictions were seen in the negative consequences of the social division of labour and the link between productive forces and relations of production. Marx and Engels considered the division of labour the main factor that caused contradictions between individual and societal interests. These contradictions, according to Marx, should increase, because of structural contradictions between ‘base’ (Basis) and ‘superstructure’ (Überbau). The changes in the base (the productive forces) would simply further changes in the societal superstructure (laws, political institutions, educational programmes, family structures, etc.).

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The history of human interaction was, according to Marx, determined by the conflict of two social groups: one that controlled the means of production and another that did not possess this power. A potential for conflict leading to a spontaneous change was thus created by the ‘natural’ difference of interests between both groups. This conflict not only changes system relations, but also leads to a breakdown of the given social structure and the development of new sorts of relations based on new means of production.

Varieties of non-Marxist conflict theories2 The theories of conflict conceived by Ralf Dahrendorf (1964), Lewis A. Coser (1967a), David Lockwood (1964), Raymond Aron (1963), John Rex (1981) and Randall Collins (1975) maintained many elements of the Marxist approach to the explanation of social change, but dropped the utopian idealism of Marx. By contrast, earlier theoreticians of conflict, such as Gumplowicz (1885/1926) and Ratzenhofer (1907), did not explain social change as deriving from social structure; rather they looked at change as the outcome of conflict between different social systems. We can still find this position today, expressed in claims that: 1 ‘Underdevelopment’ is the consequence of the relation between different parts of the world (‘First World’, ‘Second World’ and ‘Third World’; ‘core countries’ and ‘periphery’). 2 Less developed and more developed societies are distinguished by looking for characteristics such as individual traits of modernity. 3 Social change of less developed societies is understood as the result of their own history and that of the Northern countries.

Dahrendorf (1967), who discussed the Marxist theory of class structure and social change extensively, accepted the model of a dichotomous class structure and the Marxist position that class theory explains

social change. He developed a theory of conflict where group interests confront each other and where change results from the conflict of antagonistic interests that are characteristic of a given power structure. Dahrendorf thought that the exercise of any form of authority implied a latent conflict of interests within the affected groups: those who have power and those who must put up with the power of the powerful. He considered the opposition of interests as the main cause of social change while conflicts among interest groups represented the medium that led to the change of a given power structure. Societal norms and rules that are fortified by law are, according to Dahrendorf, the main reason for the opposition of interests. Coser (1967a) was interested in the conflict approach insofar as he considered that social change was the result of tensions resulting from competition for scarce resources, such as power, wealth and prestige. There is a constant tension amongst those who have an interest in the maintenance of the status quo and those who seek an increase in their share of power, income, ownership and prestige. This tension does not always mean conflict, because efforts to maintain or to change a given structure of distribution result from a comparison with others. Coser (1967b: 17–35) considered that the degree of legitimacy of an unequal distribution of rights and opportunities plays a decisive part and may create conflicts between members of groups occupying different hierarchical positions in a society. A social conflict between underprivileged and overprivileged groups is created only when the first has developed a consciousness that its members are negatively privileged, in short, that their share in societal resources is inadequate. Conflict always occurs during the interaction of two or more actors. There is a ‘transaction’ in order to create a changed social structure. Social change is induced because conflict always leads to the establishment of a system of social relations or to its re-establishment. In contrast to Dahrendorf, Coser succeeded in using a conflict approach to explain not

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only power and its consequences for social change, but also how social interests, needs and the power structure of a society are interdependent as they are modified and strengthened. Coser could thus develop a typology of social conflicts that included international and internal conflicts between and in groups, and those conflicts that vary according to their degree of violence. In addition, he included conflicts that take place directly (for example a strike) or indirectly (for example through competition); moreover, he considered conflicts that include real participants or their substitutes. The history of industrial society is characterized by a multiplicity of forms of conflict (among them conflicts between employers and employees) that have changed from violent direct conflicts to organized conflicts via labour unions. While the Marxist theory of societal change predicted a widening of industrial conflicts in the political sphere, theoreticians influenced by Weber’s notion of power3 believed that modern Western industrial society was able to regulate economic conflicts politically, by fixing laws on employer–employee relations, for example, and by elaborating schemes for assuring a minimal wage and for social security. Other conflict theoreticians explained the weaker effects of class conflict by the weak link between differences of interest and real conflict behaviour. They pointed out the pluralism of interests according to social positions and social life-worlds (Dahrendorf, 1969) or the stabilizing effects of some conflicts (Coser, 1967a). In their efforts to explain conflicts, however, functionalists underlined the far-reaching disappearance of divergent interests between classes, a fact that was empirically proved by the existence of a multiplicity of social classes and groups, the delimitations of which presented empiricalmethodological riddles. In a classic article, Aron (1950) examined conflicts of interest that arise in pluralistic societies, but he criticized the Marxist notion of a society without classes. He wrote: ‘In one way a classless society resolves the

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conflicts found in fully mature capitalist societies, but the solution involves the reduction of society to obedience rather than general liberation’ (1950: 134). The relations between different groups which are in competition for their share of income and can be distinguished from one another by their power and by the political and economic means that they can utilize often become conflictual. The two principal sources of conflict in a modern society are, according to Aron, on the one hand, unequal conditions in the means at the disposal of a given group in competition for income and, on the other hand, the problem of an economic recession that may affect industrialized societies. Change takes place when interest groups are formed and when they enter into open competition. While it is possible to analyze types of conflicts, as well as their causes and consequences at the level of social groups or societies, it is also possible to tackle the sociological analysis of conflicts at an international level. Aron’s book Peace and War (1963) is a good example of the importance of the vocabulary of conflict theory for the analysis of relations between states, when power, violence, types of war and peace are discussed. Aron saw two alternative interpretations of war as a means to regulate relations between states that insist on their national interest. Whether there is peace through law (for example by interstate treaties and international committees) or peace through government (for example through the construction of a world empire or simpler, through zones of influence) depends on 1 the extent of power that participant nations can have at their disposal, 2 the interest that the participants display, and 3 the role that these elements have while producing or changing these constellations.

Together with further indications of the integrative functions of conflicts (Coser, 1967a) and conflictual characteristics of norms (Dahrendorf, 1964; Lockwood, 1964),

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these remarks allow us to note a decisive characteristic of social life: the consensual nature of conflict and war, and the antagonistic nature of order and peace. Aron’s full meaning is shown in his proposal (1963) of a third alternative to war, namely peace through power equilibrium. This situation can be explained, on the one hand, by the consensus of power blocs on minimal rules of behaviour and on limits to spheres of influence and, on the other hand, by an equilibrium in the possession of weapons of deterrence (for example the Cold War situation). Treaties on rules of behaviour may control conflicts and conflicts may have positive consequences for the further existence of a society; but the history of most societies provides many examples that relations between members of societies, based on norms, may be founded on force and rule, and may develop a great potential that can lead to conflict and change. To conclude, we are able to show that theoreticians of conflict locate the origin of social contradictions, conflicts and social change in the redistribution of power. This may be economic, political or status power, or the ‘cultural’ power to define goals and norms. Conflicts between those who control access to scarce and valuable resources of a society and those who wish to have a greater share in these resources induce significant changes. While social structures may be explained by behaviours that result from different types of available societal resources, social change results from movements within these possibilities or from preceding conflicts (Collins, 1975: 61, 89). To simplify, one could describe non-Marxist theoreticians of conflict as proponents of a cyclical conflict theory, because they consider conflict and rule of law as universal. By contrast, Marx and his followers present a dynamic and evolutionary conflict theory. They consider conflicts as necessary for social change. The first theory speaks of gradual change as a consequence of conflicts and the second theory sees conflicts as the triggers for

sudden changes. However, both recognize that the flexibility of a given societal system can induce gradual and/or violent change. When we return to current political situations, it is an essential task of international political and social development measures to try to maintain and fortify state structures in order to prevent the collapse and the degeneration of states which may cause political conflicts. Without development, ethnic conflicts may not end. Therefore, many states are dependent on external aid measures that permit them to democratize, decentralize and demilitarize societies successfully. A desire for self-determination, a lack of opportunities for political and economic participation, undermining the maintenance of a particular cultural identity, etc., may cause conflicts that are expressed in power struggles of competing elites for the control of the state and of its material resources. In such situations, the cultivation of ethnic and religious identities helps to create images of enemies. Political entrepreneurs (two examples are those in the Democratic Republic of Congo and in the Ivory Coast) do not hesitate to mobilize a politicized ethnicity as an instrument for their conquest of power.4

On wars and development Classical theories of war and development have produced a statistically-based theory known as the ‘Phoenix Factor’ (Strakes, 2006: 1677). This theory states that a country that is defeated in a world war will catch up and eventually overtake the victor as its postwar development accelerates. In the framework of this theory, it is the country’s domestic economic performance that is important for its recovery and not the provision of foreign aid. In fact, this theory may apply to the great powerful nations, but not to the majority of developing countries faced with different structural problems inside and outside their region. Conflicts may even be perpetuated here when there is a lack of effective means of dispute resolution.

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Political leaders may, furthermore, be responsible for policies that intend to maintain their hold of power or that intend to benefit society as a whole. Certain privileged groups, as some theoretical approaches have emphasized, can hinder growth after a conflict. The deficiency in growth will perpetuate tensions and the result will be further domestic conflicts. Political and military repression implemented to maintain the power of the reigning elite will contribute to fuel resistance movements. It is obvious that these conflicts waste valuable resources and hinder investments that may benefit the whole of society. Illustrative cases are concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa in particular. The above-mentioned findings demonstrate that civil wars, which have become more prevalent than international conflicts, cannot be ignored by prosperous nations. They are largely concentrated in low-income countries. Yet these conflicts can impact the world as a whole, and not only neighbouring countries, as the Iraqi conflict demonstrates. The attempt to impose democratic accountability and constitutional government has been destructive in this case. Reconstruction aid must certainly be linked to reforms and institution-building efforts, but political pragmatism has to be supported by researchbased programmes, in order to obtain successful post-conflict environments.

Empirical evidence of conflicts in the post-World War II era Conflicts have seldom become a topic of empirical transformation and development studies,5 yet some rather general remarks can be formulated. The world of the end of the nineteenth century was a world of nationstates in competition. The global world of the twenty-first century is a world characterized by political unity where territorial frontiers no longer form violent borderlines. After World War II, the new global order was based on the cooperation of states in the system of the United Nations. Violence no longer

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occurred at the frontiers between the principal Western states, but existed between the ‘free world’ and the states with communist regimes. The Cold War led to a bipolar system of military conflicts, even in developing countries, favouring one or the other of the systems. The period beginning in the 1990s marks an era when major conflicts between larger states disappeared and when minor, but often highly violent, conflicts of smaller states and societies became more frequent. The beginning and the end of the period of the Cold War were marked by two principal military and political crises: that of the period from 1945 to 1947 and that of the period from 1989 to 1991, when the global order emerged from the breakdown of the Cold War order. The former national–international order was characterized by international, or rather, interstate conflicts. Revolutions and civil conflicts were based on this international structure. Conflicts of this period displayed the antagonism between the two sides of the Cold War. After the end of the Cold War, new forms of disintegration appeared, linked to the failure of communist states. Conflicts arose in the former Soviet and the former Yugoslavian multinational states, where elites fought for political control of new states and territories. In Somalia and in some other African states, local forms of rule disintegrated. Recent conflicts are thus geographically localized. In unstable forms of some states there are now conflicts which question the global order, rather than the Cold War system, as was the case in the past. Currently, interstate conflicts are more or less limited to ‘villain’ states, such as the Iraq of Sadam Hussein. Most of the states in the world no longer accept violent situations with other states, although some may indirectly support conflicts against populations in their own territories or in those of their neighbours (for example Congo (Vlassenroot, 2003)). Often, these later states are no longer able to impose taxes and/or raise armies. New forms of policing, a function that the USA, the United Nations and the European Union began to

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carry out in the 1990s, may characterize the future. The political aim has been to guarantee respect for law and order. Yet, it seems to be certain, as Shaw underlines, that future social transformations and global development will continue to be characterized by conflicts (Shaw, 2003: 75).

THE NOTION OF COMPETITION IN TRANSFORMATION STUDIES With the growing globalization of the last decades, the breakdown of the communist states and the spread of the neo-liberal economic credo, the notion of competition began to be discussed in the sociology of development. The discussion centred on whether the economic ideology linked to the notion could be an impetus for development in countries socially and culturally very different from the Western core countries. As there was no real alternative to the Western economic ideal of competition, economists and sociologists began to ask whether the notion of economic competition could be integrated into social, cultural and economic systems in Asia, Latin America and Africa. The answer depended on the social structure of societies in the different world regions. In this context, it is necessary to define the notion of culture, which will make it possible to show the importance of cultural elements in economic endeavours. Culture can be conceived as a system of common experiences on the basis of which one can understand one’s own group and confront other groups. Culture is thus a network of meaning structures that help social actors to orient their ideas toward a common worldview. These values facilitate human actions in concrete situations. Culture orients the actions of human beings. It is obvious that some cultures are better suited to active participation in global phenomena than others. In the tradition of Max Weber, a Confucian performance ideal, for instance, is more adapted to economic competition than egalitarian

African conceptions. The German historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler recently stated that the prevalence of socio-economic and political constellations in social history should be replaced by the prevalence of cultural lifeworlds that govern the construction of social reality (1998: 9). This reflection on the cultural construction of life-worlds in a global society seems to be a precondition for the analysis of discourses on economic globalization in non-European societies. In this connection, it is not the image of globalization that is in the foreground, but the construction and development of worldviews deriving from cultural contexts. These worldviews determine the result of cultural dialogues and the outcome of globalization processes in different world regions. It can no longer be denied that today all cultures are exposed to a new historical process of change and that elites and masses are challenged to confront the outcomes of global processes with creative answers, protest, selective adaptation, etc. The era of the uncritical acceptance of Western elements has been abandoned by non-Western cultures for a greater consciousness of self. Nevertheless, global players pressure local and regional cultures to adopt Western definitions of adaptation and efficiency. The world market, defined by competitive capitalism, the importance of private property and the virtue of individual aspirations for gain, has become the dominant world system, a system that was introduced by colonial processes in non-Western societies during the last several centuries. World cultures are shaped by their adaptability to global economic processes. The criterion for selection as an acceptable culture is being able to accommodate capital investment and capital use (cf. Tetzlaff, 2000: 41). Experience has shown that societies that possess structural equivalencies to Western societal models have been preferred by transnational enterprises, and societies where solidarity and equality are high social values have been avoided. In its World Culture Report (1998: 283), UNESCO shows that in

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Asian countries values such as independence and responsibility receive high social scores whereas in African countries values such as obedience and religious beliefs are favoured. According to global players, competition for socio-cultural systems that permit the highest profits has become established. Societies that are capable of learning changes required by capitalist logic receive higher scores than societies that resist these changes. This approach that intends to unite economic interests, cultural preferences and political institutions in one logical system permits analysis of why some societies are more able to confront world market conditions than others. The notion of competition is not easy to accept in societies that value traditions and mythical conceptions favouring, for example, strong reciprocal exchanges based on kinship.

The notion of competition in southern countries Globalization has been considered by influential elites in Asia as merely an economic endeavour that could be separated from its parallel societal structures, such as democratization or Asian values, especially family values, respect of the ancestors and the community, hard work and thrift (cf. Schubert, 2000: 141). The integration of Asia into a global economic world, with its required international competition, is generally not challenged. The discussion focuses more on the right way to undertake this transformation than on the target as such. Asian values have been considered responsible for rapid economic growth in the region. Western critics emphasize that these values favour small enterprises, but that they are not capable of expanding their growth, because of the centralized family organization. The need for a cultural adaptation to the economic conditions of globalization has been realized in countries such as Singapore, Malaysia or South Korea. At the same time, the region is beginning to consider democracy as the necessary political regime for a market economy,

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even if some countries such as China or Vietnam continue to resist this understanding. After the crisis of the 1990s, the problem of social inequality has received growing attention in several countries in order to permit the creation of social conditions that are more fair. In China, several understandings of globalization exist (Keping, 2000): there are scholars who insist that the visible side of globalization is represented by economic integration and the invisible side by the integration of democratic and global values. Others consider globalization as the final form of capitalism in its current structure. In general, Chinese political elites think that opportunities for globalization have to be combined with challenges to Chinese society that became obvious in the crises of the 1990s. Many intellectuals argue, however, that globalization should be accepted in Asia without a westernization of society (cf. Keping, 2000; Schubert, 2000; Lin, 2001). In Africa, the situation is quite different: elites in most African societies have not favoured economic competition (Damon and Igué, 2003). Africa is situated at the margin of economic globalization with few transnational enterprises in a limited number of oilproducing countries, such as Nigeria, Gabon and Congo. Private capital flows are low except for South Africa. Most of the countries are highly indebted and have low productivity rates. The level of human capital is low so that an economic take-off is difficult to realize. Intellectual elites leave the countries for Europe or North America. Economic elites place their savings in northern countries. Structural economic factors can hardly be changed. Social and cultural values, such as the value of the family or strategies of survival, traditional values, jealousy of another’s success, vertical networks of redistribution between elites and masses, hinder the advance of economic competition. All these elements contribute to a marginalization of Africa that can only be bypassed in a few economic niches (cf. Aderinwale, 2000; Kappel, 2000).

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South America shares some of the characteristics of the African continent. Economic growth has not been declared the primary target of society, and individual success has not become the main aim of social actors (Naím and Tuchin, 1999). During the twentieth century, the market mechanism had no chance to expand because of the many small interior markets. State intervention was the means for ensuring, and the consequence of, the growing importance of the state. South American societies are characterized by a stability that has been guaranteed by an extreme heterogeneity of economic sectors, societal groups and states and that has become a negative factor restraining economic growth, learning and competition. Traditional economic and power structures continue to exist. With a power base in the latifundia, elites have been interested in consumption and the maintenance of their privileges and fortunes. They have been closely linked to church, military and conservative forces in the United States and other Western countries. Throughout there has been no interest in the social integration of poor black and underprivileged white people. Elites have not favoured capitalist production and economic competition. Integrative tendencies have remained weak, despite a more or less common history. Recent crises in several states have shown that new values and attitudes of workers and managers have become necessary. These groups require more equity and economic changes. But change will be slow in a barely favourable societal environment. In contrast to Asia, a reappraisal of traditional values and norms that could support societal transformations is hardly possible. An outstanding example is the authoritarian and paternalistic attitudes and expectations and the neglect of a technical culture in Cuba (Esser, 2000). In many countries, remittances sent home by transnational migrants are substitutes for economic progress. Since 1970, more than 10 million women and men from Latin America have settled in the United States. This means a growing cultural and economic interdependence

between North and Latin America. Asia’s participation in transnational migrations is even higher (1,000,000 emigrants in 2000) while Africa’s emigrants were 500,000 in 2000 (Guilmoto and Sandron, 2003: 62–83; Schuerkens, 2005).

Competition and the wealth of nations The causes of inequalities between nations have been discussed for more than two centuries. In 1748, Montesquieu published De l’Esprit des Lois where he suggested that temperate climates were more favourable to economic development than tropical climates. Some thirty years later, Adam Smith in his Wealth of Nations proposed that the skills of a group are the main factors influencing national wealth differences. More recently, Diamond (1998) re-introduced arguments on the significance of climatic and geographic factors. There is a further theoretical explanation that suggests that national differences in intelligence may play a crucial role in economic development. Even if this approach does not seem to be ‘politically correct’, there is some evidence for this argument. Lynn and Vanhanen (2002) published a book with the promising title IQ and the Wealth of Nations. It is widely assumed that the peoples of all nations have the same average level of intelligence, even if psychologists know that there are large differences in average levels of intelligence between different countries. The main argument against these results seems to be that intelligence is measured according to highly valued capacities in Western countries, so that it is culturally biased, and that emotional and social capacities highly valued for example in African cultures do not interest these scholars. Nevertheless, there is evidence that intelligence is a determinant of earnings among individuals, a fact that has already been established for early adulthood and that continues to be valid in later life phases. Since the 1950s, these findings were extrapolated

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in different studies to groups and then to nations (Lynn and Vanhanen, 2002). The recent study of Lynn and Vanhanen used data from the World Bank and the UNDP. The authors could confirm the hypothesis that national per capita incomes and rates of economic growth are positively correlated with national IQs. The following quote gives the authors’ main argument: Nations whose populations have high IQs tend to have efficient economies at all levels from top and middle management through skilled and semiskilled workers. These nations are able to produce competitively goods and services for which there is a strong international demand and for which there is therefore a high value, and that cannot be produced by nations whose populations have low IQs (www.rlynn.co.uk/pages/article_intelligence/10.asp).

The conclusions are based on a sample of 60 nations that the authors regard as representative of the totality of nations because all categories of nations were included (South, North, East and West). If one accepts the premise of the study about the definition of IQ and its worldwide acceptance based on Western success criteria, the evidence given by this study may have significant political and social implications.

CONCLUDING REMARKS This analysis of the use of the concepts of cooperation, conflict and competition in the study of social transformations and the sociology of development has shown that cooperation is one of the fundamental notions of our field and remains an important element in the explanation of developmental processes in our contemporary world. The notion of competition is of interest if only because the global economy introduces competitive economic behaviour in all regions of the world even if the upper social classes are those most affected. The notion of conflict was important during the period of the Cold War. In recent years, it has begun to interest scholars studying social transformations, because the poor outcomes of transformation

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processes in southern countries often mean a growing escalation of conflicts, such as ethnic conflicts, civil wars or violence in other forms of social relations, for example gender roles. If one compares the meanings of the three notions, one sees that cooperation and conflict are notions that are very helpful for Marxist approaches or world system approaches, while competition and cooperation are notions favoured by scholars influenced by the Weberian tradition and modernization studies. In our current global world characterized by the neo-liberal credo, the notion of competition is becoming even more important as scholars begin to do research on the success or the failure of economic policies in various world regions characterized by different cultural life-worlds (Schuerkens, 2004, 2008). The results of these studies of recent transformations of local socio-economic practices may have wider implications for development cooperation. Conflicts may thus be strongly based on aspects linked to particular cultures, a fact that would validate Huntington’s thesis that the central political actors of the twenty-first century will be civilizations rather than nation-states. As shown in this article, analysis in our field is often at the macro level, but the meso and micro levels interest scholars as well.6 Most of the time, individual actors are constrained to participate in macro settings characterized by these notions, even if there may be factors that exclude privileged and/or underprivileged actors (for example elites who go abroad during societal conflicts or the poor who participate in an informal economy, who are hardly influenced by social competition).

NOTES 1 The widely acclaimed book of Philip McMichael Development and Social Change. A Global Perspective (2004) was particularly helpful in preparing this part of the article on cooperation. The author gives a historical and theoretically inspired overview

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of the topic of cooperation since the 1940s. For other approaches see the reader edited by J. Timmons Roberts and Amy Hite, From Modernization to Globalization. Perspectives on Development and Social Change (2000), and the book by Rist (1996). The topics of development policy and aid cannot be tackled here because of length constraints. 2 Cf. for more details Strasser and Randall 1979: 51–68. 3 Weber was more a historian of social change than a theoretician. He considered power as the capacity to influence the will of other people. His approach is of interest to the notion of competition where cultural factors are important (e.g., the Protestant ethic). 4 Both conflicts are based on conflicts linked to regional or ethnic belongings that the respective ruling elites exploit in order to maintain their political power. 5 Cf. Shaw (2003) for more information and details on the topic. 6 Neil J. Smelser applied theory to social actors and groups; Weber and Durkheim analyzed organizations and social change; Hagen focused on psychological factors (cf. Roberts and Hite 2000: 1–23).

REFERENCES Aderinwale, Ayodele (2000) ‘Afrika und der Gobalisierungsprozess’, in Rainer Tetzlaff (ed.) Weltkulturen unter Globalisierungsdruck. Erfahrungen und Antworten aus den Kontinenten. Bonn: Dietz. pp. 232–58. Aron, Raymond (1950) ‘Social Structure and the Ruling Class’, British Journal of Sociology, 1(3): 126–44. Aron, Raymond (1963) Frieden und Krieg. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer. Azoulay, Gérard (2002) Les théories du développement. Du rattrapage des retards à l’explosion des inégalités. Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes. Balandier, Georges (1985) Sociologie des Brazzavilles noires. 2nd edn. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po. Cardoso, Fernando H. and Faletto Enzo (1979) Dependency and Development in Latin America. Berkeley: University of California Press. Chow, Esther Ngan-Ling (2003) ‘Gender, Globalization and Social Change in the 21st Century’, special issue of International Sociology, 18(3): 441–640.

Collins, Randall (1975) Conflict Sociology: Toward an Explanatory Science. NY: Academic Press. Coser, Lewis A. (1967a) Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict. London and NY: The Free Press, Collier-MacMillan Ltd. Coser, Lewis A. (1967b) ‘Social Conflict and the Theory of Social Change’, in Lewis A. Coser, (ed.) Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict. London: The Free Press, CollierMacMillan Ltd. pp. 17–35. Dahrendorf, Ralf (1964) ‘Toward a Theory of Social Conflict’, in Amitai and Eva Etzioni (eds.) Social Change. NY and London: Basic Books. pp. 98–111. Dahrendorf, Ralf (1967) Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press. Dahrendorf, Ralf (1969) ‘Zu einer Theorie des sozialen Konflikts’, in Wolfgang Zapf (ed.) Theorien des sozialen Wandels. Köln: Kiepenleuer & Witsch. pp. 108–23. Damon, Jacqueline and Igué, John O. (eds.) (2003) L’Afrique de l’Ouest dans la compétition mondiale. Quels atouts possibles? Paris: Karthala, Club du Sahel et de l’Afrique de l’Ouest -OCDE. Diamond, Jared (1998) Guns, Germs and Steel: A Short History of Everybody for the Last 13,000 Years. Vintage: London. Esser, Klaus (2000) ‘Gehemmte Modernisierung in Lateinamerika’, in Rainer Tetzlaff (ed.) Weltkulturen unter Globalisierungsdruck. Erfahrungen und Antworten aus den Kontinenten. Bonn: Dietz. pp. 260–95. Frank, André Gunder (1967) Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, UK: Penguin Books. Guilmoto, Christophe Z. and Sandron, Frédéric (2003) Migration et développement. Paris: La Documentation française. Gumplowicz, Ludwig (1885/1926) Grundrisse der Soziologie. Innsbruck: Universitätsbuch handlung Wagner. Kappel, Robert (2000) ‘Afrikas Entwicklungspotenziale im Globalisierungsprozess’, in Rainer Tetzlaff (ed.) Weltkulturen unter Globalisierungsdruck. Erfahrungen und Antworten aus den Kontinenten. Dietz: Bonn. pp. 202–31. Keping, Yu (2000) ‘Chinesische Sichtweisen auf Globalisierung: von “sino–westlichen” zum

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“Globalisierungs”–Diskurs’, in Rainer Tetzlaff (ed.) Weltkulturen unter Globalisierungsdruck. Erfahrungen und Antworten aus den Kontinenten. Bonn: Dietz. pp. 151–73. Lin, Yi-min (2001) Between Politics and Markets: Firms, Competition, and Institutional Change in Post–Mao China. NY: Cambridge University Press. Lockwood, David (1964) ‘Social Integration and System Integration’, in George K. Zollschan and Walter Hirsch (eds.) Explorations in Social Change. Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin. pp. 244–57. Lynn, Richard (2008) ‘Intelligence and the Wealth and Poverty of Nations’. http:// www.rlynn.co.uk/pages/article_intelli gence/10.asp, consulted January 20, 2008. Lynn, Richard and Vanhanen, Tatu (2002) IQ and the Wealth of Nations. Westport, CT: Praeger. Marx, Karl (1975) Das Kapital zum Selbststudium (Erhart Löhnberg, ed.). Frankfurt am Main: Fischer. McMichael, Philip (2004) Development and Social Change. A Global Perspective. 3rd edn. London: Pine Forge Press. Naím, Moisés and Tuchin, Joseph S. (eds.) (1999) Competition Policy, Deregulation and Modernization in Latin America. Boulder, Col.: Lynne Rienner. Perroux, François (1961) L’économie au XXe siècle. Paris: Presses universitaires de France. Ratzenhofer, Gustav (1907) Soziologie: Positive Lehre von den menschlichen Wechselbeziehungen. Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus. Rex, John (1981) Social Conflict – A Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis. London: Longman. Rist, Gilbert (1996) Le développement, histoire d’une croyance occidentale. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po. Roberts, J. Timmons and Hite, Amy (2000) From Modernization to Globalization. Perspectives on Development and Social Change. Malden, Oxford, Melbourne: Blackwell. Rostow, Walt W. (1960) The Stages of Economic Growth. A Non-Communist Manifesto. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Schubert, Gunter (2000) ‘Die Asienkrise als Grenzmarkierung der Globalisierung? Bewertungen

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aus der Region’, in Rainer Tetzlaff (ed.) Weltkulturen unter Globalisierungsdruck. Erfahrungen und Antworten aus den Kontinenten. Bonn: Dietz. pp. 120–50. Sen, Amartya (1999) Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schuerkens, Ulrike (ed.) (2004) Social Transformations between Global Forces and Local Life-Worlds. London, New Delhi, Thousand Oaks: Sage and Monograph issue of Current Sociology, 51(1–2; 3–4), 2003. Schuerkens, Ulrike (ed.) (2005) Transnational Migrations and Social Transformations. Monograph Issue of Current Sociology, 53 (4): 527–742. Schuerkens, Ulrike (ed.) (2008) Globalization and Transformations of Local Socioeconomic Practices. London, NY: Routledge. Shaw, Martin (2003) ‘Guerre et globalité. Le rôle et le caractère de la guerre à l’intérieur de la transition globale’, in Pierre Hassner and Roland Marchal (eds.) Guerres et sociétés. État et violence après la Guerre froide. Paris: Karthala. pp. 49–75. Strakes, Jason E. (2006) ‘War and Development’, in Thomas M. Leonard (ed.) Encyclopedia of the Developing World, Vol. 3. NY, London: Routledge. pp. 1676–80. Strasser, Hermann and Randall, Susan C. (eds.) (1979) Einführung in die Theorien des sozialen Wandels. Darmstadt and Neuwied: Luchterhand. Tetzlaff, Rainer (ed.) (2000) Weltkulturen unter Globalisierungsdruck. Erfahrungen und Antworten aus den Kontinenten. Bonn: Dietz. Vlassenroot, Koen (2003) ‘Économie de guerre et entrepreneurs militaires: la rationalité économique dans le conflit au SudKivu (République démocratique du Congo)’, in Pierre Hassner and Roland Marchal (eds.) Guerres et sociétés. État et violence après la Guerre froid. Paris: Karthala. pp. 339–68. UNESCO, World Culture Report (1998) Culture, Creativity and Markets. Paris: UNESCO. Wehler, Hans-Ulrich (1998) Die Herausforderung der Kulturgeschichte. München: Beck.

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9 Health Sociology: Conflict, Competition, Cooperation Elianne Riska, Ellen Annandale and Robert Dingwall

INTRODUCTION There are few specialty areas in sociology whose practitioners have pondered their mission and place in the discipline as much as have those in the sociology of medicine and health. Almost all the early medical sociologists have looked back, traced the sociopolitical context giving rise to their field, and asked why so little theorizing has been done (e.g., Horobin, 1985; Jefferys, 1996; Mechanic, 1993; Straus, 1999). Most specialty fields can draw on the classics of sociology or trace their roots to the early Chicago School. This automatically locates their work solidly in mainstream theorizing. Medical sociology, however, emerged and developed in the US and Europe after World War II as a byproduct of the larger socio-political project of constructing a health care system based on scientific and hospital medicine, ideally one that would be accessible to all citizens. In the US, the momentum for the rise of the discipline, and its institutionalization, came from academic sociology and from financial support from the National Institute of Health in the 1950s (Bloom, 2002; Cockerham, 1983; Mechanic, 1993; Pescosolido and

Kronenfeld, 1995). The initiative in Europe, e.g., in Germany and the UK, came from medicine and was characterized by applied and practical concerns. Thus, in its beginning, medical sociology was less integrated into sociology departments in the European context than its US counterpart (Annandale and Field, 2001; Claus, 1983; Cockerham, 1983; Stacey and Homans, 1978). In the British context, this is revealed in A. H. Halsey’s (2004) mapping of the ebb and flow of interest in various subfields of sociology from 1910 to 2000. His analysis of topic areas which appeared in three leading general sociology journals during that period shows that stratification, social theory, social policy, political sociology, religion, education, economic organizations, occupations, and gender all appear more frequently than health and illness. Medical sociology is often connected with practical concerns – improvements in public health and equality – and only a few works have looked at the theoretical traditions of medical sociology (e.g., Gerhardt, 1989). This review uses the themes of conflict, competition, and cooperation as analytical tools to examine the theoretical streams that

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HEALTH SOCIOLOGY

shaped the early writings in medical sociology and the later field of health sociology. It is symptomatic that the Research Committee on Medical Sociology of the International Sociological Association, established in 1963, formally changed its name to ‘Research Committee on Sociology of Health’ in 1986. This change reflected not only the shifting focus from illness to health but also developments in the theoretical perspectives in mainstream sociology. The early division between sociology of and in medicine was an effort to highlight the specific theory-based concerns of sociology as compared to the medicinedriven inquiries of the latter (Straus, 1999). The shift from an approach characterized as medical sociology to the sociology of health has developed in two stages. The first stage became apparent in the 1970s when sociology began to take a critical stance toward itself as well as toward medicine (Twaddle, 1982: 350). Sociologists began to promote health issues and an approach that took into account the broad range of institutions and occupations that influenced health. A second phase emerged in the 1990s, when a new post-Fordist economy with its neo-liberal policies and demands for flexibility were reflected in the rise of consumption and a new type of individualism, and new health policies that had to be conceptualized and understood (Annandale and Field, 2001). For example, cultural sociology and post-structural theorizing have inspired sociological work on the social construction of the gendered body, on narratives of health and illness, and on health promotion policies as part of a new type of surveillance and governance in society. Sociologists, who once gave little or no consideration to matters of health, have been drawn to do so following the corporeal turn that has accompanied these shifts. This has led some optimistically to assert that, whereas once the sociology of health was an ‘outsider’, ‘much that is exciting in contemporary sociology is gaining from, and contributing to, the field of health and illness’ (Bury and Gabe, 2004: 1). Yet it still has to be

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said that many social theorists are less concerned with the social patterning of health and illness; the experience of illness; and the delivery of health care – abiding concerns of the sociology of health – than they are with the body as an arena for consumption, desire, and body projects. The social meaning of obesity, for example, is typically given far more attention than its material consequences in terms of morbidity and mortality (e.g., Bauman, 2005). Our review is Western-centric, which itself attests to the narrow focus of the sociology of health and illness until very recently. The three themes – conflict, competition, cooperation – are self-evidently global concerns played out differently in different parts of the world (e.g., Doyal, 1995; Gallagher and Subedi, 1995; Kawachi and Wamala, 2007). A more global perspective, which is now beginning to emerge in the discipline, would certainly raise additional questions about the relevance of particular theories or theoretical approaches.

THE MACRO-SOCIOLOGICAL THEMES GIVING RISE TO MEDICAL SOCIOLOGY

The social-causation perspective The nineteenth-century classic texts in sociology explored the character of industrial and urban society, and the social order of modernity. Classical social theory dealt with health as an indicator of the distribution of resources in modern society but did not look at it as a social institution. Emile Durkheim (1952), for example, treated the suicide rate as an indicator of the character and degree of social integration and social regulation in modern and traditional societies rather than seeing it as a public health issue. By contrast, Friedrich Engels (1987) examined the poor health of the English working class and saw health as a key to characterizing their material conditions and location in the class structure.

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Both Durkheim and Engels marked out a new perspective for looking at health: the social-causation perspective. This perspective suggests that health is a value that is related to social factors and unevenly distributed in society. The themes of cooperation and conflict appear in the work of both authors, although their focus was on the broader workings of society rather than on the phenomena of health and illness per se. Harriet Martineau, who was a contemporary of Engels, found a more central place for health in her sociology. A medical sociologist before the term was coined, Martineau not only shared Engels’ and concerns with the relationship between work and health and what the status of a community could tell us about its morals (or social convictions of right and wrong) (Martineau, 1838, 1861), but extended her interest to encompass the experience of illness and a critical analysis of the relationship between the medical profession and the laity (Martineau, 1844/2003). When modern sociology emerged, health was included in some of the early classics. For example, Robert and Helen Lynd (1937) discuss public health and the politics of medical provision in the second of their famous Middletown studies, but this work did not generate a legacy of further research. Credit is, then, usually given to Talcott Parsons as the first major sociologist to devote sustained attention to medicine as a social institution that, like religion and work, regulates certain kinds of behaviour in modern society. Medical sociologists often depict Parsons as a conservative figure, because of their lack of attention to the more recent scholarship on his life and work (e.g., Camic, 1991; Gerhardt, 2002). However, his experiences of the 1930s depression in the US, and his firsthand observation of the rise of Nazism in Germany, gave him a powerful sense of the fragility of social order. The Social System (Parsons, 1951) was his attempt to explain how societies could sustain a sufficient degree of order to survive through time. He had a particular interest in the management

of deviance, and used medicine as a case study in what we might now call ‘soft policing’. The sick role offered a space to people whose deviance was unintended, but the impersonal physician served as a gatekeeper to prevent its various exemptions and claims on others from being abused, and thereby disrupting the smooth running of society. While this was often read in the 1950s and 1960s as an expression of cooperation and consensus as the values underlying the social institution of medicine, we might now prefer to see it as a joint process of managing a disruption of the social order.

The interactionist and social constructionist perspective Parsons may have pioneered the field, but there were competing perspectives presented by the disciples of the Chicago School of sociology from the start. This perspective has continued as the interactionist and social constructionist tradition in the field of medical and health sociology. In the American context, Everett Hughes (1958) and his students, notably Howard Becker (Becker et al., 1961), introduced the themes of competition and negotiation in the description and analysis of the socialization of the medical student, the work of the physician, and work with clients. This was taken up in the influential work of Anselm Strauss and colleagues, who emphasized the ‘negotiated order’ of the hospital and medical work (e.g., Strauss et al., 1963). Working within the same broad tradition, Erving Goffman (1959) and Eliot Freidson (1970) also elaborated the Parsonian view of the sick role and of the role and power of the physician. It is important not to overstate the opposition between interactionist and Parsonian approaches: both Goffman and Freidson reworked Parsons’s penetrating insights into the issues raised by sickness for sustaining the economic, political, and moral order of societies into different theoretical contexts. But both acknowledged its fundamental relevance to the programme of medical sociology.

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Freidson (1970) incorporated the sick role into the new approach to the sociology of deviance that had been developed during the 1970s. As Bosk (2006) points out, this was the first application of ‘labeling theory’ to illness in general, as opposed to the specific domain of mental illness. Freidson understood that Parsons had illustrated the sick role through examples from contemporary industrial societies, but that it was essentially applicable to any society. The gatekeeping need not necessarily be performed by physicians; it could be performed by anyone who occupied a functionally equivalent role – shamans, witches, priests, or whatever – and the conditions attached to its tenancy would also be locally defined. Co-operating with recognized advice might mean concordance with a drug regime but could equally mean prayer, fasting, sacrifice, self-mortification, or whatever practices were legitimated in a particular social environment. The boundaries of exemption might be drawn in different ways, depending on the perceived seriousness of the condition. Nevertheless, the core idea of a role available for occupancy by those whose deviance was unintended, providing a route for reintegration back into the wider society, remained intact. As both Freidson and Goffman saw, this made a considerable contribution to understanding the difficulties confronted by those who could not overcome their deviance – people with long-term sickness or disability in an industrial society, but equally people who could not shake off a possessive spirit in others. This understanding of the sick role took Goffman and Freidson in different but complementary directions. Freidson recognized the way in which the sick role was a point of convergence between two of the great institutions of any society – medicine/healing and law. These were the institutions that were, on the one hand, collectively legitimated to manage deviance and, on the other, supplied legitimacy to the individuals and organizations that carried out the practical tasks involved. Much of Freidson’s work, then, became an exploration

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of the conditions of legitimacy of the gatekeepers to the sick role, the physicians. What was the source of their authority to discharge this responsibility? How effectively did they do this? Over the course of thirty years, he chronicled the changing nature of the relationship between US medicine, its patients, the state and the corporations of advanced capitalism. In the process, his views swung round from the impassioned critique of the abuses of medical power, with which he closed Profession of Medicine (Freidson, 1970) to a more appreciative stance in his last major work, Professionalism: The Third Logic (Freidson, 2001). Here he sees professional autonomy and the independent culture of professional work as one of the last protections that stand between the sick and the ruthless calculative logic of neo-liberal market societies. If the professions fall, then the trapdoor of the iron cage will indeed swing closed with a vengeance. Goffman’s work, however, inspires a somewhat more optimistic line of thinking. Although not as elaborately formulated as Freidson’s approach, Goffman (1969) identified face-to-face interaction as a crucial site for the analysis of the sick role. The interesting thing about medical symptoms is how utterly nice, how utterly plucky the patient can be in managing them … He is someone who does not will to be demanding and useless. Tuberculosis patients, formerly isolated in sanitaria, sent home progress notes that were fumigated but cheerful. Brave little troops of colostomites and ileostomites make their brief appearances disguised as nice, clean people, while stoically concealing the hours of hellish toilet work required for each appearance in public as a normal person. We even have our Beckett player buried up to his head in an iron lung, unable to blow his own nose, who yet somehow expresses by means of his eyebrows that a fullfledged person is present who knows how to behave and would certainly behave that way were he physically able (Goffman, 1969: 366).

In the same paper, Goffman goes on to examine the implications for family interaction and the links between a person’s immediate caregivers and the medical profession in the management of the sick. At the heart of his paper is an understanding that the sick role is

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a co-production in everyday life, a claim that is constantly fragile and needs endless renewal and re-legitimation by interaction partners. This becomes an important theme for studies of doctor/patient interaction such as those by Strong (2001) and by Maynard (2003). In the early 1970s, further themes from the labeling perspective were introduced through the concept ‘medicalization’, as proposed by Irving Zola (1972). The medicalization thesis has been a popular framework in medical sociology and absorbed into public discourse. In its crude version it harbors a conflict perspective: physicians are not Parsonian benevolent and altruistic servants, but an occupational group with an interest in expanding its domain of authority. Although Zola himself did not portray the process of medicalization in such conflictual and conspiratorial terms, the medicalization thesis resonated with a variety of social movements, which began critically to examine the client’s status in larger social institutions and the role of certain professionals (physicians, police, educators) as agents of social control. The (then) new feminist health movement is a case in point. The medicalization thesis became a way of documenting that women’s primary care health needs were inappropriately medicalized. According to feminists, medical knowledge pathologized women’s bodies, and medicine was part of a broader patriarchal control of women (e.g., Chesler, 1972; Ehrenreich and English, 1973, 1978). Women’s health advocates urged women to regain control over their health, especially in the area of reproductive health, and to demand health services which would consider women’s specific health needs. In the US, the early women’s self-help movement of the 1970s resulted in the development of specific women’s health agendas in the political context, and also commercialized versions of women’s health centers from the late 1980s onward (Morgen, 2002). In the European context, the importance of the welfare state and of other health professions beyond medicine in promoting women’s

health led to an interest in the impact of midwifery (e.g., DeVries et al., 2001; Oakley, 1980) and public health nursing (Dingwall, 1977; Dingwall and McIntosh, 1978) on women’s and children’s health. Feminists drew attention to what hitherto had been neglected, a qualitatively different domain of lay or unpaid care beyond medicine (e.g., Graham, 1984; Stacey, 1984, 2002). Although a popular thesis, the empirical basis of medicalization was questioned from an early point, most notably by P. M. Strong (1979) in Britain. Drawing on his own research on alcoholism, Strong pointed out that most physicians had little interest in expanding their professional jurisdiction and argued that medical sociologists had simply used statements by the profession’s moral entrepreneurs to illustrate an a priori critique based on their own interests and prejudices. A similar argument has been made by Maynard (1991), who noted how doctor/patient interaction studies had identified power and oppression in phenomena, such as the structural organization of turntaking or the maintenance of topical and thematic coherence, that are much better understood as functional requirements of the interaction. The inaugural themes of cooperation and consensus were, then, subject to challenge by the 1970s as sociologists sought to bring issues of power and control to the heart of the discipline. New dimensions were added in the 1980s, when sociologists of health began to draw in a significant way upon poststructural theorizing, e.g., the works of Michel Foucault (1965, 1975). Foucault’s approach to power reconceptualized the subject, who was no longer viewed as a creative agent in the manner of the conflict and interactionist perspectives, but as a ‘complex and variable function of discourse’ (Foucault, 1977: 138). A range of analyses explored the ways in which specific historical configurations of knowledge and power constructed particular ways of knowing about and acting in relation to health and illness (e.g., Armstrong, 1987; Arney and Bergen, 1984; Turner, 1987).

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The Foucauldian view of power contrasts with realist approaches, including neo-Marxist and neo-Weberian approaches as well as the work of many feminists, all of which make it clear that power and status are possessed and exercised by individuals or groups, sometimes to consciously repressive ends. However, the ‘competition theme’ within the sociology of health is concealed in the typically neo-Weberian conceptualizations of society that underlie most social epidemiological research on health inequalities (e.g., Mackenbach et al., 1999). The conceptualization of social groups by means of their socio-economic characteristics, transformed into background variables, reflects the Weberian status categorization of the distribution of economic and social resources in society. As Shim (2002) relates, this distils the effects of social and relational ideologies, structures, and practices into characteristics of discrete and self-contained individuals. Disciplinary paradigms and practices effectively deny that historical changes in social policies, ideologies and prevailing meanings of difference ‘get under the skin’ and fundamentally affect well-being. Epidemiology thereby renders invisible the very social relations of power structuring material and psychic conditions and life chances that contribute to the stratification of health (Shim, 2002: 134)

This is reflected in studies of gender and health inequalities where European research has tended to use neo-materialist and Weberian approaches to measure the relationship between social factors and ill health. The North American tradition has continued to be based on a role theory of health (e.g., Rosenfield, 1992; Waldron et al., 1998), which has its origins in the Parsonian sexrole theory (Annandale and Hunt, 2000).

The revitalization of the theme of social integration as a prerequisite for health The theme of cooperation was revitalized in the mid-1980s, when social cohesion, measured by social networks and psychosocial

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mechanisms, was again perceived as crucial for the maintenance of health. The socialnetwork thesis has captured a variety of theoretical concerns about the relationship between social integration or social cohesion and health. A renaissance of the Durkheimian argument of the importance of social integration in understanding social behaviour has been promoted in Lisa Berkman’s work, where the concepts of social networks and psychosocial environment have drawn attention to relationships between the individual and the primary group, measured by a person’s integration into social networks (Berkman, 1984; Berkman et al., 2000). In the 1990s, the same theme of social integration, consensus, and cooperation was developed further, but with a focus on community or place, especially in terms of sense of trust and social cohesion, and social support as an explanation for social differences in health. This community-level analysis has developed into the so-called social-capital theory of health. Communitarian researchers see the restoration of a sense of community and voluntary organizations as the social capital that will improve both individual and social health. Others, who profess libertarian views, give social capital a more marketoriented meaning. They perceive the restoration of trust as the necessary normative and social infrastructure for both the workings of society and the market. In the more conservative political climate of today, terms like trust and social capital have become a way of analyzing the ‘health’ of society (Lemke, 2001; Navarro, 2002). The turn to psychosocial theorizing seems to be a particular European trend of the late 1990s onwards. For example, a Special Issue examining health inequalities as a product of the psychosocial environment was published by Social Science & Medicine in 2004 (Marmot and Siegrist, 2004). Furthermore, British researchers Richard Wilkinson (1996, 2005) and Michael Marmot (2005) have argued that there is a psychosocial link to health through the influence of social inequality on social relationships. It is

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argued that, once societies have reached a certain level of affluence or prosperity, they pass through the threshold where the absolute standard of living of a population is no longer associated with improvements in life expectancy. Instead what matters is where people stand in relation to others; that is, relative deprivation. Marmot dubs this ‘status syndrome’. The argument is that, striving for status generates social hierarchies which in turn generate gradients in health. It is therefore subjective experience that matters; it gets under our skin and impacts upon the biological body (Wilkinson, 2005). Those with more power and status, more control over their life circumstances, and greater social support fare better in terms of health. Those lower in the status hierarchy suffer from feelings of hopelessness, anxiety, insecurity, and anger, and this leaves its mark on their health, directly through biological stress pathways related to weakened immunity and indirectly through negative health behaviours such as cigarette smoking, and excess consumption of alcohol and high fat and high sugar ‘comfort foods’. Wilkinson (2005: 315) advances that, ‘it is only by improving the quality of social relations that we can make further improvements in the real quality of our lives’. In his view, it is not simply a matter of reducing those social divisions that promote stigma, stress, and intolerance, but also of reducing the status competition that fuels the pressure to consume. Critics of social-capital theory and of the psychosocial perspective point to the overemphasis on the positive effects of strong social networks, arguing that such networks can also be experienced as coercive. Bartley (2004) and others take issue with the emphasis that is placed on people’s perceptions of their place in society. As she puts it, ‘there is something rather depressing about [the] idea that not being a “top dog” in some kind of fixed hierarchy could be so psychologically catastrophic as to have an effect on life expectancy itself … Do people die of envy?’ (2004: 125–6). In Canadian health sociologist

David Coburn’s view, it is not so much that income inequality produces lower cohesion and trust, leading to poor health, but that ‘neo-liberalism (market dominance) produces both higher income inequality and lower social cohesion’ (Coburn, 2000: 137). He argues that lack of social cohesion is the product of the social inequality and social fragmentation of society caused by the competitiveness of laissez-faire capitalism and its undermining of the welfare state. Similar views are expressed by British researchers and others who deplore the romanticized picture of the traditional community in much social-capital theory (Pearce and Smith, 2003: 128). They suggest that this rhetoric sets unrealistic expectations of community involvement and resources, and diverts attention from the health effects of macro-level social and economic policies. In this way, social-capital theory offers little in the way of effective intervention. Critiques of social-capital theory of health have also been presented by advocates of the political economy perspective stemming from Marxist theory (e.g., Navarro, 2002; Waitzkin, 2000). The materialist perspective on health inequalities emerged in the 1970s to draw attention to the way in which social class inequalities are reflected in inequalities in health status and access to health care (e.g., Navarro, 1976, 2002; Waitzkin, 2000). The neo-materialist interpretation suggests that health inequalities result from the differential accumulation of exposures and experiences that are based on material living conditions (e.g., Lynch et al., 2000). Taking up this theme and drawing on the work of Jürgen Habermas, with reference to Britain, Graham Scambler (2001: 103) emphasizes that health inequalities are the product of the growth of inequality within the shift from ‘organized’ to ‘disorganized’ capitalism, which is characterized by the destabilization of work and the emergence of new forms of inequality (as well as derivative processes such as the new individualization). The invisibility of the structural sources of health inequalities, especially economic

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inequality and race, has been institutionalized in the American context due to the special political language adopted in current US health policy. Health inequalities are described as ‘health disparities’, a new concept which, more often than not, is sanitized from all indications of economic and structural inequalities. This conceptualization of ill health has been confirmed in a recent US law – the Minority Health and Health Disparities Research and Education Act of 2000 (P.L. 106–525) – that encourages research on what sociologists have traditionally called race and class.

CHALLENGES FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

The entry of the biological body and the cultural body Brain research and genetic research have created an intellectual climate that has increased the authority of reductionist science for explaining a wide range of social problems and social behaviour (Duster, 2006). While sociological research on health and illness has looked at forces outside the body for explaining inequalities in health, biological scientists are searching for neurotransmission pathways and patterns or specific genetic markers inside the body which would provide a more generic and ‘fundamental’ scientific reason (Conrad, 2000, 2005; Duster, 2006: 3–5). Risk-factor thinking has introduced new forms of reductionism and medicalization of behaviour. This thinking tends to ignore the structuring of health by social class, race, age, and gender and therefore the way that certain macro-level institutions and ideologies in society influence health. Health risks are interpreted as individual responses that, at the aggregate level, result in certain health patterns. This reductionist view of the determinants of health gives little credibility to the impact of social factors related to the themes

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of conflict, competition, cooperation as explanatory factors on health. While the reductionist explanations of health and illness offered by the new neurobiological and biogenetic research challenge the approach of medical and health sociology, those taking a social constructionist approach to technology and science gave sociology a special role in unravelling ‘truth claims’, especially to document how rates and categories are constructed (Duster, 2006: 10; Epstein, 2004; Timmermans, 2000). For example, it has enabled sociologists to point to the ways in which subjects are sorted, named, and classified into categories which then become referred to in explanations as ‘natural’ categories, like gender and race. The individualization of health risks overlaps with another trend in current public health thinking that attributes to health information a crucial role in shaping health behaviour. Increasingly the individual’s health behaviour is interpreted in terms of a conscious choice and personal responsibility in avoiding health risks and in selecting appropriate health services. As Mildred Blaxter (2004) relates in a review, although there is an increasing imperative to (attempt to) control risks to health, the ability to do so is not evenly distributed in the population. She points out that this chimera of risk control is apparent even for the resource-rich. For example, even when all known risk factors for heart disease – one of the (if not the) leading causes of death in most developed nations – are considered together, they account for only about 40% of the incidence of the disease. Another challenge to the social-causation perspective on health and illness is the emergence of a new subfield in sociology: the sociology of the body. The merit of early sociological theory of the body was that it liberated the sick role from its abstraction and contextualized the body as part of modernity (e.g., Shilling, 1993; Turner, 1984). As noted earlier, the new theoretical focus turned the body into a feature of reflexive modernity and the reflexive self (Giddens, 1991) as it

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became a project of modification and enhancement (Crossley, 2005; Featherstone, 2000; Shilling, 2005). These theoretical perspectives drew attention to the negotiated character of the social order and the themes of conflict and cooperation as the built-in dynamics between agency and structure. While early sociological works on the body gave some credit to feminist research as the vanguard that had brought this topic to the domain of sociology, the same authors have been criticized for not seeing the relevance of gender in their own analysis of the body (Adkins, 2004; Witz, 2000).

The invisible theme A recent book on the history of medical sociology in the US provides an encyclopedic overview of the stages of the institutionalization and subsequent trends of medical sociology as an academic discipline (Bloom, 2002). In that review, official agencies (e.g., NIH) are given a crucial role in the development of medical sociology, while the women’s health movement and the crucial Boston Women’s Health Collective publication, Our Bodies, Ourselves (Davis, 2002) and later feminist theorizing on health are totally absent. Mainstream American medical sociology is presented unproblematically as malestream. Two theoretical developments in sociology might explain this general trend in the sociology of health. First, the general tenets of theorizing on gender and health grew out of the conflation of sick-role theory and sex-role theory (Gerhardt, 1989). The functionalist interpretation of women’s high rates of illness has been called the ‘compatibility hypothesis’, which refers to the compatibility between the housewife role and the sick role (Gerhardt, 1989: 280). The argument was that women’s expressive role in society was congruent with the adoption of the sick role (e.g., Cooperstock, 1971). This cultural interpretation of the higher morbidity of women than men is still today taken to be a valid framework in the

interpretation of men’s underutilization of health services and their assumed underreporting of health symptoms. Recent feminist critiques of classical and contemporary sociological theory point to the importance of unravelling the gendered assumptions inherent in theoretical perspectives in sociology (e.g., Adkins, 2004; Witz and Marshall, 2004). This is also the case for theories in medical sociology and the sociology of health and illness. The founding concepts – the sick role and the role of the physician – exemplify how the two phenomena rested on a consensus perspective. Although originally both were gender neutral concepts, the sick role became conceptualized as compatible with the traditional female role, while the medical profession became a prototype of the kind of new occupational and contractual (male) relations that emerged in modern society. This consensus theory of health has had a strong position in mainstream American medical sociology, where the sex-role theory of health has been an underlying theme in empirical research on women’s health. The theme of conflict was introduced in the mid-1980s, when role-strain theory became a way of explaining women’s, but also more recently men’s health (e.g., Rosenfield, 1992; Umberson et al., 2006). The second reason for the marginalization of feminist theorizing and research in medical sociology stems from the relegation of feminist research on health to the field of women’s studies rather than mainstream medical or health sociology. The conflict perspective in theorizing on gender and health stems back to the feminist critique of the male-dominated profession and the suggested male-biased character of medical knowledge in the 1970s. The feminist perspective grew out of the critique of the male body as the standard of health in the 1970s (see Boston Women’s Health Collective, 1973; Chesler, 1972) and emerged as a thematic issue in the work of academic activists such as Barbara Ehrenreich (Ehrenreich and English, 1973, 1978) in the US and of

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Margaret Stacey (1988) and Ann Oakley (1984) in the UK. These early works rested on the assumption of the existence of patriarchy as the underlying organizing principle in society, affecting women’s social and cultural position. Later gender-relations theory pointed to the social category of gender as a binary and hierarchical classification of gender status. The analytical tools for understanding the gender order have been hegemonic masculinity and the intersectionality of gender, race, class, and age in shaping gender, femininities, and masculinities (Annandale, 1998; Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005; Lorber, 2001; Witz and Marshall, 2004). This conflict perspective has been further developed within post-structuralist feminism, which has been inspired by the works of Michel Foucault (1975; see Petersen and Bunton, 1997) and Judith Butler (1993). The body has become the site for exploring the discourses of medical knowledge and the medical profession in the construction of the gendered body (Lorber and Moore, 2002). International and national research on gender and health has tended to divide into those who undertake quantitative research on gender inequalities in health and who work within the tradition of social epidemiology (e.g., Kuh and Hardy, 2002; Mackenbach et al., 1999) and those who use a social constructionist or phenomenological approach and qualitative methodology, and look at the gendered aspects of illness experience and health (e.g., Elson, 2004; Mamo and Fishman, 2001; Popay and Groves, 2000). Since the mid-1990s, men’s health has emerged as a new field of research (e.g., Sabo and Gordon, 1995), and recent profeminist research on sexuality and masculinity has developed a male-focused health approach (Loe, 2001; Mamo and Fishman, 2001; Rosenfeld and Faircloth, 2006). This genre of studies has been characterized by a conflict perspective, largely based on social constructionist and post-structuralist theorizing. This shift is reflected, for example, in the reintroduction of the medicalization thesis as

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the biomedicalization thesis (Clarke et al., 2003). In much of this work men’s health – rather than women’s health – has been examined. A gender-analysis of men’s health has, though, been hard to promote for a number of reasons. For example, public health advocates tend to reduce male gender to psychological concerns, reflected in a preoccupation with the association drawn between norms of masculinity and men’s reluctance to seek professional help. Furthermore, feminists tend to interpret claims for resources and a higher profile for research on men’s health as a form of backlash against the importance of women’s health concerns which have drifted from view (e.g., Gordon and Thorne, 1996). The examples above suggest the importance of identifying the systems of superordination and subordination that characterize society and their implications for men and women. A clear gender perspective on health professionals, on illness and health, and on gender differences in the use of health services is still needed. The challenge for a twenty-first century sociological research agenda on gender and health is twofold. First, it is important to unravel the hidden agenda of the terms gender and health: at issue is not only women’s health but also men’s health. Second, there is currently a curious vacuum in theorizing on women’s health at a time when theorizing on men’s health seems to proliferate, seemingly inspired by the medicalization of men’s sexuality and the availability of life enhancement drugs like Viagra and its descendants, Cialis and Levitra. The current vogue for ‘gender sensitive’ health policy, reflected in the gender mainstreaming policies of many countries (e.g., Doyal et al., 2003; Jonsson et al., 2006; Wamala and Agren, 2002) may dampen down the fiery stand-off between ‘men’s health’ and ‘women’s health’. It has been argued that, by making both female and male health visible, gender mainstreaming ‘holds the greatest potential for improving the health of both women and men’, i.e., for achieving

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gender equity (Khoury and Weisman, 2002: 61). Effectively, gender sensitive health policies attempt to turn (or return) gender-as-conflict (between men and women) into gender-as-consensus (i.e., something that, in varying ways, matters for everyone). While the consensus approach has its merits, it also harbours the risk of turning gender into a characteristic of individuals. Gender is at heart a relational concept that connotes structural relations of inequality, which does not simply imply difference, but also hierarchies of power (Busfield, 1996; Lorber, 2001).

CONCLUDING REMARKS The themes of conflict and competition characterized much of the theoretical critique of the consensual perspectives forming the mainstream of medical sociology in the 1970s. These themes have been replaced by the theme of cooperation in the twenty-first century’s debate on health. The theme of cooperation/social cohesion – the Illichian pastoral and the Durkheimian characterization of lost village life – was present in earlier decades, but social-capital theory has revitalized the theme of social factors related to health, factors that hark back to the (seemingly) less complicated days of social and human relations as the promoter of human health. A similar backward look at the archaic body and primordial society as the basis of health is present in recent neurobiological stress theories on the impact of current urban and work environments on health. An appeal to consensus is also evident in recent gender sensitive policies in health care which focus attention on the individual man or woman. These kinds of perspectives on health (re)introduce reductionist thinking in explaining health and thereby make the social patterning of health invisible. The emphasis on social structures as influencing health and on medicine as a social institution – the founding themes of medical

sociology – needs to be more overtly present in research in medical and health sociology if the field is going to maintain a vibrant theoretical profile. Similarly the social categories of gender, class, age, and race should not only be used as social background variables in mapping health, but also as structures and embodied social categories which have bearings on health experiences and health behaviours (Krieger and Davey Smith, 2004; Shim, 2002). A gender-informed approach guarantees a rich area of research on gender and health that has a potential for providing new insights and theoretical contributions to both international and national sociological knowledge in medical and health sociology. Critique of the lack of theory generation in medical sociology has been expressed in the past. Horobin (1985) characterized medical sociology in the UK in the 1970s and 1980s as ‘small-scale, here-and-now ethnography’ because a large part of the body of medical sociology was project-based, a circumstance that he argued impeded the cumulative theoretical development of the field. Although more academically based, medical sociology in the US tended to lose touch with the basic theoretical issues of the early founding theories somewhere in the 1980s (Mechanic, 1993). Along with the neo-liberal health policies characterizing most Western societies, medical sociologists have lost their previous major promoter and funding agency – the government. Health care and its delivery is less and less a matter of direct concern to government, as marketized models of societal organization are increasingly presented as the only possible strategy for success in a globalized economy. Governments do not need to design health systems: the market will sort out what is efficient and effective, whether or not it is also equitable or humane. If governments have no stake in this, and if the correctness of their assumptions about the market is taken a priori, then there is no reason to use tax funds to investigate the design of delivery systems. Similarly, if class inequalities in health – or, as it appears we must now call them, ‘health variations’ or

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‘health disparities’ – are the result of poor individual choices in the impersonal market, then they are not great policy issues that will drive investments in social science. A marketized system needs market research, not medical sociology. This situation is a challenge for a field that grew after World War II as part of the new trends in medical education, and in the development of primary care and of the welfare state. This challenge could also provide a historical moment for the field to return to the major theoretical issues and, in the words of David Mechanic (1993: 96), to once again ask the big questions.

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Boys in White: Student Culture in Medical School. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Berkman, Lisa F. (1984) ‘Assessing the Physical Health Effects of Social Networks and Social Support’, Annual Review of Public Health, 5: 413–32. Berkman, Lisa F., Glass, Thomas, Brisette, Ian, and Seeman, Teresa E. (2000) ‘From Social Integration to Health: Durkheim in the New Millennium’, Social Science and Medicine, 51: 843–57. Blaxter, Mildred (2004) Health. Cambridge: Polity Press. Bloom, Samuel W. (2002) The World as a Scalpel: A History of Medical Sociology. NY: Oxford University Press. Bosk, Charles L. (2006) ‘Avoiding Conventional Understandings: The Enduring Legacy of Eliot Freidson’, Sociology of Health and Illness, 28: 637–53. Boston Women’s Health Collective (1973) Our Bodies, Ourselves: A Book by and for Women. NY: Simon and Schuster. Bury, Michael and Gabe, Jonathan (2004) ‘General Introduction’, in Michael Bury and Jonathan Gabe (eds.) The Sociology of Health and Illness: A Reader. London: Routledge. pp. 1–21. Busfield, Joan (1996) Men, Women and Madness. London: Macmillan. Butler, Judith (1993) Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of ‘Sex’. London: Routledge. Camic, Charles (1991) ‘Introduction’ in Charles Camic (ed.) Talcott Parsons: The Early Essays. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp. ix–xix. Chesler, Phyllis (1972, reprinted 1989) Women and Madness. NY: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Clarke, Adele E., Mamo, Laura, Fishman, Jennifer R., Shim, Janet K. and Fosket, Jennifer Ruth (2003) ‘Biomedicalization: Technoscientific Transformations of Health, Illness, and US Biomedicine’, American Sociological Review, 68: 161–94. Claus, Lisbeth M. (1983) ‘The Development of Medical Sociology in Europe’, Social Science and Medicine, 17: 1591–7. Coburn, David (2000) ‘Income Inequality, Social Cohesion and the Health Status of Populations: The Role of Neo-liberalism’, Social Science and Medicine, 51: 135–46.

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Cockerham, William C. (1983) ‘The State of Medical Sociology in the United States, Great Britain, West Germany and Austria: Applied vs. Pure Theory’, Social Science and Medicine, 17: 1513–27. Connell, R. W. and Messerschmidt, James, W. (2005) ‘Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the Concept’, Gender and Society, 19(6): 829–59. Conrad, Peter (2000) ‘Medicalization, Genetics, and Human Problems’, in Chloe E. Bird, Peter Conrad and Allen M. Fremont (eds.) Handbook of Medical Sociology. 5th edn. Upper Saddle River. NJ: Prentice Hall. pp. 322–33. Conrad, Peter (2005) ‘The Shifting Engines of Medicalization’, Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 46: 3–14. Cooperstock, Ruth (1971) ‘Sex Differences in the Use of Mood-modifying Drugs: An Explanatory Model’, Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 12: 238–44. Crossley, Nick (2005) ‘Mapping Reflexive Body Techniques: On Body Modification and Maintenance’, Body and Society, 11(1): 1–35. Davis, Kathy (2002) ‘Feminist Body/Politics as World Traveller: Translating “Our Bodies, Ourselves”’, The European Journal of Women’s Studies, 9(3): 223–47. DeVries, Raymond, Benoit, Cecilia, van Teijlingen, Edwin R. and Wrede, Sirpa (eds.) (2001) Birth by Design: Pregnancy, Maternity Care and Midwifery in North America and Europe. NY: Routledge. Dingwall, Robert (1977) The Social Organisation of Health Visitor Training. London: Croom Helm. Dingwall, Robert and McIntosh, Jean (eds.) (1978) Readings in the Sociology of Nursing. Edinburgh: Churchill Livingstone. Doyal, Leslie (1995) What Makes Women Sick: Gender and the Political Economy of Health. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Doyal, Leslie, Payne, Sarah and Cameron, Ailsa (2003) Promoting Gender Equality in Health. Working Paper Series No. 11. Manchester: Equal Opportunities Commission. Durkheim, Emile (1952) Suicide: A Study in Sociology. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Duster, Troy (2006) ‘Comparative Perspectives and Competing Explanations: Taking on the

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Gordon, Linda and Thorne, Barrie (1996) ‘Women’s Bodies and Feminist Subversions’, Contemporary Sociology, 25: 322–25. Graham, Hilary (1984) ‘Providers, Negotiators, and Mediators: Women as the Hidden Carers’, in Ellen Lewin and Virginia Olesen (eds.) Women, Health, and Healing. London: Tavistock. pp. 25–52. Halsey, A. H. (2004) A History of Sociology in Britain. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Horobin, Gordon (1985) ‘Medical Sociology in Britain: True Confessions of an Empiricist’, Sociology of Health and Illness, 7: 94–107. Hughes, Everett C. (1958) Men and Their Work. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press. Jefferys, Margot (1996) ‘The Development of Medical Sociology in Theory and Practice in Western Europe, 1950–1990’, European Journal of Public Health, 6: 94–8. Kawachi, Ichiro and Wamala, Sarah (eds.) (2007) Globalization and Health. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Khoury, Amal J. and Weisman, Carol S. (2002) ‘Thinking about Women’s Health: The Case for Gender Sensitivity’, Women’s Health Issues, 12: 61–5. Krieger, Nancy and Davey Smith, George (2004) ‘“Bodies Count,” and Body Counts: Social Epidemiology and Embodying Inequality’, Epidemiologic Reviews, 26: 92–103. Kuh, Diane and Hardy, Rebecca (2002) A Life Course Approach to Women’s Health. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lemke, Thomas (2001) ‘“The Birth of Biopolitics”: Michel Foucault’s Lecture at the Collége de France on Neo-liberal Governmentality’, Economy and Society, 30: 109–207. Loe, Meika (2001) ‘Fixing Broken Masculinity: Viagra as a Technology for the Production of Gender and Sexuality’, Sexuality and Culture, 5: 97–125. Lorber, Judith (2001) Paradoxes of Gender. New Haven: Yale University Press. Lorber, Judith and Moore, Lisa Jean (2002) Gender and the Social Construction of Illness. 2nd edn. NY: Altamira Press. Lynch, John W., Smith, George Davey, Kaplan, George. A. and House, James, S. (2000) ‘Income Inequality and Mortality: Importance to Health of Individual Income, Psychosocial Environment, or Material Conditions’, British Medical Journal, 320: 1200–4.

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Lynd, Robert S. and Lynd, Helen M (1937) Middletown in Transition: A Study in Cultural Conflicts. NY: Harcourt, Brace. Mackenbach, Johan P., Kunst, Anton E., Groenhof, Feikje et al. (1999) ‘Socioeconomic Inequalities in Mortality among Women and Men: An International Study’, American Journal of Public Health, 89: 1800–6. Mamo, Laura and Fishman, Jennifer R. (2001) ‘Potency in All the Right Places: Viagra as a Technology of the Gendered Body’, Body and Society, 7(4): 13–35. Martineau, Harriet (1838) How to Observe Morals and Manners. London: Charles Knight and Co. Martineau, Harriet (1844/2003) Life in the SickRoom (Maria Frawley, ed.). Ormskirk: Broadview Press. Martineau, Harriet (1861) Health, Husbandry, and Handicraft. London: Bradbury and Evans. Marmot, Michael (2005) Status Syndrome: How Your Social Standing Directly Affects Your Health. London: Bloomsbury. Marmot, Michael and Siegrist, Johannes (eds.) (2004) Special issue on ‘Health Inequalities and the Psychosocial Environment’, Social Science and Medicine, 58(8). Maynard, Douglas (1991) ‘Interaction and Asymmetry in Clinical Discourse’, American Journal of Sociology, 97: 448–95. Maynard, Douglas (2003) Bad News, Good News: Conversational Order in Everyday Talk and Clinical Settings. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Mechanic, David (1993) ‘Social Research in Health and the American Socio-political Context: The Changing Fortunes in Medical Sociology’, Social Science and Medicine, 36: 95–102. Morgen, Sandra (2002) Into Our Own Hands: The Women’s Health Movement in the United States, 1969–1990. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Navarro, Vicente (1976) Medicine under Capitalism. NY: Prodist. Navarro, Vicente (2002) ‘A Critique of Social Capital’, International Journal of Health Services, 32: 423–32. Oakley, Ann (1980) Women Confined. Oxford: Martin Robertson. Oakley, Ann (1984) The Captured Womb. Oxford: Blackwell.

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Parsons, Talcott (1951) The Social System. NY: Free Press. Pearce, Neil and Smith, George Davey (2003) ‘Is Social Capital the Key to Inequalities in Health?’, American Journal of Public Health, 93: 122–29. Pescosolido, Bernice A. and Kronenfeld, Jennie J. (1995) ‘Health, Illness, and Healing in an Uncertain Era: Challenges from and for Medical Sociology’, Journal of Health and Social Behavior, (Extra issue): 5–33. Petersen, Alan and Bunton, Robin (eds.) (1997) Foucault: Health and Medicine. London: Routledge. Popay, Jennie and Groves, Keleigh (2000) ‘Narrative in Research on Gender Inequalities in Health’, in Ellen Annandale and Kate Hunt (eds.) Gender Inequalities in Health. Buckingham: Open University Press. Rosenfeld, Dana and Faircloth, Christopher (2006) Medicalized Masculinities. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Rosenfield, Sarah (1992) ‘The Cost of Sharing: Wives’ Employment and Husbands’ Mental Health’, Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 33: 213–25. Sabo, Donald and Gordon, David F. (eds.) (1995) Men’s Health and Illness: Gender, Power and the Body. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Scambler, Graham (ed.) (2001) Habermas, Critical Theory and Health. London: Routledge. Shilling, Chris (1993) The Body and Social Theory. London: Sage. Shilling, Chris (2005) The Body in Culture, Technology and Society. London: Sage. Shim, Janet (2002) ‘Understanding the Routinised Inclusion of Race, Socioeconomic Status and Sex in Epidemiology: The Utility of Concepts from Technoscience Studies’, Sociology of Health and Illness, 24: 129–50. Stacey, Margaret (1984) ‘Who Are the Health Workers? Patients and Other Unpaid Workers in Health Care’, Economic and Industrial Democracy, 5: 157–84. Stacey, Margaret (1988) The Sociology of Health and Healing. London: Hyman. Stacey, Margaret (2002) ‘Concluding Comments’, in Gillian Bendelow, Michael Carpenter, Caroline Vautier and Simon Williams (eds.) Gender, Health and Healing. pp. 267–83.

Stacey, Margaret and Homans, Hilary (1978) ‘The Sociology of Health and Illness: Its Present State, Future Prospects and Potential for Health Research’, Sociology, 12: 281–307. Straus, Robert (1999) ‘Medical Sociology: A Personal Fifty Year Perspective’, Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 40: 103–10. Strauss, Anselm, Schatzman, Leonard, Ehrlich, Danuta, Bucher, Rue and Sabshin, Melvin (1963) ‘The Hospital and its Negotiated Order’, in Eliot Freidson (ed.) The Hospital in Modern Society. London: Free Press. pp. 147–169. Strong, Philip M. (1979) ‘Sociological Imperialism and the Profession of Medicine’, Social Science and Medicine, 13A: 199–215. Strong, Philip M. (2001) The Ceremonial Order of the Clinic: Patients, Doctors and Medical Bureaucracies. Aldershot: Ashgate (first edition 1979). Timmermans, Stefan (2000) ‘Technology and Medical Practice’, in Chloe E. Bird, Peter Conrad and Allen M. Fremont (eds.) Handbook of Medical Sociology. 5th edn. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. pp. 309–21. Turner, Bryan (1984) The Body and Society: Explorations in Social Theory. Oxford: Blackwell. Turner, Bryan (1987) Medical Power and Social Knowledge. London: Sage. Twaddle, Andrew C. (1982) ‘From Medical Sociology to the Sociology of Health: Some Changing Concerns in the Sociological Study of Sickness and Treatment’, in Tom Bottomore, Stefan Nowak and Magdalena Sokolowska (eds.) Sociology: The State of the Art. London: Sage. pp. 323–58. Umberson, Debra, Williams, Kristi, Powers, Daniel. A., Liu, Hui and Needham, Belinda (2006) ‘You Make Me Sick: Marital Quality Over the Life Course’, Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 47: 1–6. Waitzkin, Howard (2000) The Second Sickness: Contradictions of Capitalist Health Care (Revised edition). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Waldron, Ingrid, Weiss, Christopher C. and Hughes, Mary Elizabeth (1998) ‘Interacting Effects of Multiple Roles on Women’s Health’, Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 39: 216–36.

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Wamala, Sarah and Agren, Gunnar (2002) ‘Gender Inequity and Public Health’, European Journal of Public Health, 12: 163–5. Wilkinson, Richard G. (1996) Unhealthy Societies: The Affliction of Inequality. London: Routledge. Wilkinson, Richard (2005) The Impact of Inequality: How to Make Sick Societies Healthier. London: Routledge. Witz, Anne (2000) ‘Whose Body Matters? Feminist Sociology and the Corporeal Turn in

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Sociology and Feminism’, Body and Society, 6(2): 1–24. Witz, Anne and Marshall, Barbara L. (2004) ‘The Masculinity of the Social: Towards a Politics of Interrogation’, in Barbara L. Marshall and Anne Witz (eds.) Engendering the Social: Feminist Encounters with Sociological Theory. Berkshire: Open University Press. pp. 19–35. Zola, Irving K. (1972) ‘Medicine as an Institution of Social Control’, Sociological Review, 20: 487–504.

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10 Sociological Theories of Professions: Conflict, Competition and Cooperation Julia Evetts, Charles Gadea, Mariano Sánchez and Juan Sáez

The sociological study of knowledge-based work, occupations and professions is a longstanding field of academic research which has been boosted significantly over the past decade and is set to expand further as societies and economies become even more dependent on service sector work, both nationally and internationally. There have been important historical reasons for different concepts, theories and analyses of professions in Continental European societies (particularly Germany and Scandinavian countries) in contrast to Anglo-American societies. The Continental functional proximity between state government bureaucracies, public state universities and professions created a minority of free professions, (‘freie Berufen’ and ‘professions libérales’), and favoured sociology of class and organization to the disadvantage of sociology of professions (Burrage, 1990). The Anglo-American less centralized state governments, private or

at least relatively independent universities and free professions, on the other hand, created a majority of market-related professions and an elaborated sociology of professions, which has had strong impact worldwide. By means of so-called Anglo-American neoright ideologies and Continental neo-liberalism, an extensive convergence has, however, taken place. Work on new public management, managerialism, entrepreneurialism, marketization, and more explicit and integrated professional work organizations has made Anglo-American sociology of professions even more applicable in Continental societies as well (Svensson and Evetts, 2003). For several important reasons, the need for comparative studies of different professional occupations is becoming increasingly important. Firstly, considerable convergence has taken place between Continental European and Anglo-American societies. Secondly, control by the management in professional

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work organizations, the self-control exercised by professionals, and the control by customers have changed and become more intertwined; and as a consequence the organizational context strongly determines the relations and the conditions for professional work. Thirdly, the prevailing ideology and quest for professionalism demands more comparative studies of occupations in general and in the context of the division of labour as a whole. These reasons are further developed and examined in the ‘Introduction’ to Svensson and Evetts (2003). This type of work and workers forms the structural and institutional arrangements for dealing with uncertainties in modern risk societies. Knowledge-based work, occupations and professions are extensively engaged in managing risk. In this sense, risk assessment and the use of expert knowledge enables customers and clients to deal with uncertainty. Knowledge-based occupations control the conceptualization of problems and issues in their areas relating to risk, as well as access to, and definitions of, possible solutions. Examples of such groups range from the old established professions of law, engineering, religion and medicine to those involved in service sector employment in education, health and social care – as well as the newer categories of knowledge workers in areas such as information technology, management, security, leisure, the arts and entertainment. Professionals and knowledge workers are also emblematic examples of contemporary changes in public policy, in corporate management and the organization of work. Thus, social workers are coping with the crises of welfare in social services, engineers and lawyers have to manage the ‘new spirit of capitalism’ (Boltanski and Chiapello, 1999), and most European professions are trying to find new methods of regulation in order to be able to deal with the effects of globalization and European Union expansion. The sociological study of knowledgebased work, occupations and professions is one in which international comparison and

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collaboration has been particularly fruitful. One example of this is the productive contrast between concepts, models, interpretations and theories developed and used by English-speaking sociologists and the orientations developed by French and by Spanishspeaking researchers. The field has its own history and has developed in different ways in these linguistic sociological communities. This chapter will review and assess the theoretical differences and similarities, focusing particularly on aspects of conflict, competition and cooperation in the interpretations.

ANGLO-AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATIONS: FROM OCCUPATIONAL COOPERATION AND CONFLICT TO OCCUPATIONAL CONTROL In Anglo-American sociological interpretations and theories, the concepts of profession, professionalism and professionalization have received considerable (sometimes critical) attention. Four phases can be identified and each phase focussed on a different key concept which resulted in different theories and explanations. The balances of conflict, competition and cooperation in interpretations is different in each phase with cooperation predominant in the first two phases, conflict and competition in the third phase and a focus more on aspects of control in the latest phase.

Professionalism as occupational value In early British sociological analysis, the key concept was ‘professionalism’ and the emphasis was on the importance of professionalism for the stability and civility of social systems (e.g., Carr-Saunders and Wilson, 1933; Marshall, 1950; Tawney, 1921). In these interpretations professionalism was regarded as an important and highly desirable occupational value and professional

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relations were characterized as collegial, cooperative and mutually supportive. Similarly, relations of trust characterized practitioner/client and practitioner/management interactions since competencies were assumed to be guaranteed by education, training and sometimes by licensing. The early American sociological theorists of professions also developed similar interpretations and again the key concept was the occupational value of professionalism based on trust, competence, a strong occupational identity and cooperation. The best known, though perhaps most frequently mis-quoted, attempt to clarify the special characteristics of professionalism, its central values and its contribution to social order and stability, was that of Parsons (1951). Parsons recognized and was one of the first theorists to show how the capitalist economy, the rational-legal social order (of Weber) and the modern professions were all interrelated and mutually balancing in the maintenance and stability of a fragile normative social order. He demonstrated how the authority of the professions and of bureaucratic hierarchical organizations both rested on the same principles (for example of functional specificity, restriction of the power domain, application of universalistic, impersonal standards). The professions, however, by means of their collegial organization and shared identity demonstrated an alternative approach (compared with the managerial hierarchy of bureaucratic organizations) towards the shared normative end. The work of Parsons has subsequently been subject to heavy criticism mainly because of its links with functionalism (Dingwall and Lewis, 1983). The differences between professionalism and rational-legal, bureaucratic ways of organizing work have been returned to, however, in Freidson’s (2001) recent analysis. Freidson examines the logics of three different ways of organizing work in contemporary societies (the market, organization and profession) and illustrates the respective advantages and

disadvantages of each for clients and practitioners. In this analysis he demonstrates the continuing importance of maintaining professionalism (with some changes) as the main organizing principle for service work.

Professions as institutions: the ‘trait’ approach In the 1950s and 1960s, Anglo-American researchers shifted the focus of analysis on to the concept of profession as a particular kind of occupation, or an institution with special characteristics. The difficulties of defining these special characteristics, and clarifying the differences between professions and occupations, have long troubled analysts and researchers. For a period the ‘trait’ approach occupied sociologists who struggled to define the special characteristics of professional (compared with other occupational) work. For example, Greenwood (1957) and Wilensky (1964) argued that professional work required long and expensive education and training in order for practitioners to acquire the necessary knowledge and expertise; professionals were autonomous and performed a public service; they were guided in their decision-making by a professional ethic or code of conduct; they were in special relations of trust with clients as well as with employers/managers; and they were altruistic and motivated by universalistic values. In the absence of such characteristics, the label ‘occupation’ was deemed more appropriate and for occupations having some but not all of the characteristics, the term ‘semi-profession’ was suggested (Etzioni, 1969). The ‘trait’ approach also emphasized cooperation as well as the special importance of professional work. It is now largely assessed as being a time-wasting diversion in that it did nothing to assist understanding of the power of particular occupations (such as law and medicine) historically, or of the appeal of ‘being a professional’ in all occupational groups.

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Professionalization and market closure Following this institutional diversion, sociologists became sceptical about the whole idea of professionalism. The emphasis on occupational cooperation shifted to aspects of occupational competition and conflict. The 1970s and 1980s produced a highly critical set of literature on professions where the key concept was the processes of professionalization, particularly in dominant and powerful occupational groups such as medicine and law. During this period professionalism came to be dismissed as a successful ideology (Johnson, 1972) and professionalization was interpreted as a process of market closure and monopoly control of work (Larson, 1977) and occupational dominance (Larkin, 1983). Professionalization was intended to promote professionals’ own occupational self interests in terms of their salary, status and power as well as the monopoly protection of an occupational jurisdiction (Abbott, 1988). A further development of this theorizing was the linking of gender and occupational closure. Witz (1992) examined how both men and women engaged in professional projects but, because they had differential access to resources, gender necessarily influenced both the form and the outcome of the closure projects. Since the mid-1980s, the flaws in the more extreme versions of this view of professionalization as market closure and occupational power, dominance and competition have become apparent (e.g., Annandale, 1998). In particular, radical governments have successfully challenged the professions and introduced regulatory regimes which include target setting, performance review, managerialist regimes and accountability measures. One line of development has been the view that the demand-led theory of professionalization needs to be complemented by an understanding of the supply side (Dingwall, 1996). Thus, instead of the question – how do professions capture states? – it is suggested

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that the central question should be – why do states create professions, or at least permit professions to flourish? This has resulted in a renewed interest in the historical evidence about the parallel processes of the creation of modern nation-states in the second half of the nineteenth century and of modern professions in the same period (Perkin, 1988). It also resulted in renewed interest in comparative analysis as well as in consideration of professional occupations in Europe where, for the most part, the concept of profession (if it existed at all) was used and interpreted by sociologists in rather different ways.

Return to professionalism: new directions In the 1990s researchers began to reassess the significance of professionalism and its positive (as well as negative) contributions both for customers and clients, as well as for social systems. Freidson (1994, 2001), for example, has argued that professionalism is a unique form of occupational control of work which has distinct advantages over market or organizational and bureaucratic forms of control. As already indicated, to an extent this indicates a return to the concept of professionalism as a normative value which was developed by Parsons (1951). In addition there are new directions in the analysis (Evetts, 2003). This interpretation involves the examination of professionalism as a discourse of occupational change and control in occupational groups and work organizations where the discourse is increasingly applied and utilized by managers. Fournier (1999) considers the appeal to ‘professionalism’ as a disciplinary mechanism in new occupational contexts. She suggests how the use of the discourse of professionalism in a large privatized service company of managerial labour serves to inculcate ‘appropriate’ work identities, conducts and practices. She considers this as ‘a disciplinary logic which inscribes “autonomous” professional practice

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within a network of accountability and governs professional conduct at a distance’ (1999: 280). At the level of individual actors, the appeal to professionalism can be seen as a powerful motivating force of control ‘at a distance’ (Burchell et al., 1991; Miller and Rose, 1990). This professionalization will be achieved through increased occupational training and the certification of the workers/ employees – a process labelled as credentialism by Collins (1979, 1981). In these cases the appeal to professionalism is a powerful mechanism for promoting occupational change and social control. The appeal to the discourse by managers in work organizations is to a myth or an ideology of professionalism which includes aspects such as exclusive ownership of an area of expertise, autonomy and discretion in work practices and the occupational control of the work. The reality of the professionalism that is envisaged is very different. The appeal to the discourse of professionalism by managers most often includes the substitution of organizational for professional values; bureaucratic, hierarchical and managerial controls rather than collegial relations; managerial and organizational objectives rather than client trust based on competencies; budgetary restrictions and financial rationalizations; the standardization of work practices rather than discretion; and performance targets, accountability and sometimes increased political controls. The use of the discourse of professionalism is not confined to managers in work organizations, however. As a discourse of self-control it can also be interpreted as an ideology which enables self-control and sometimes even self-exploitation. Born (1995) illustrates this very well in her account of the world of French contemporary music practice. It is also clearly expressed in the work culture of artists, actors and musicians in general. One is self-defined as a professional, imposing time or other limits on one’s efforts is rendered illegitimate. The expectations by self and others from the professional have no limits. For the professional, the needs and

demands of audiences, patients, clients and students become paramount. Professionals are expected and expect themselves to be committed to, even to be morally involved in, the work. In sum, it seems that in Anglo-American interpretations of profession, professionalism and professionalization, the early analyses based on occupational value emphasized cooperation, collegial support and managerial and client trust. Later interpretations based on market closure resulted in a theoretical and conceptual emphasis on occupational conflict, competition and domination. In some recent interpretations, processes of occupational (self) control and social order are receiving increased attention, thereby enabling other organizational occupations (including journalists, social workers and the military) as well as artists and musicians to be considered as occupations controlled by the discourse of professionalism.

FRENCH INTERPRETATIONS: A LONG HISTORY AND A LATE DEVELOPMENT In French sociology, as elsewhere in continental Europe, professions are defined more broadly and the research focus is on questions of occupation more generally, including occupational identity, career trajectories, training and expertise, and employment in public sector organizations. It is also the case that the continental ideal-type emphasizes ‘elite administrators possessing their offices by virtue of academic credentials’ (Collins, 1990: 15) and the political struggles for control within an elite bureaucratic hierarchy (1990: 17). The sociology of professional groups in France has also utilized conflict, competition and cooperation in interpretations, though the historical development has been different in this country. The sociology of professional groups has old roots in French sociology. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Durkheim (1992) called for the revival of professional

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organizations which had been destroyed by the French Revolution. He assessed professionalism as a form of moral community based on occupational membership. Such a moral occupational community would require a more locally based and individually operated form of professional control of work which is dependent on strong processes of occupational socialization, identity formation and reinforcement. In his view, these professional associations could provide an antidote to the dangers of anomie produced by capitalism and the risks posed by the collapse of ethics in the world of work and production. Clearly there are difficulties with the Durkheimian vision and Freidson (2001) has indicated some of these problems. Firstly, it is necessary to emphasize that when Durkheim used the concept of ‘profession’ he was following French usage and meant occupations in general, and not the particular set of prestigious and privileged occupations referred to in English usage. Secondly, Durkheim did not have in mind occupational associations like the medieval guilds or contemporary professional associations such as the Law Society, the British Medical Association and the French medical syndicates, composed of worker/practitioners only. He wanted explicitly to include both workers and employers (practitioners and managers) in the same ‘self-governing’ units. Thirdly, and more importantly for his vision, Durkheim was extremely vague about what he meant by an occupation and an occupational group. It is also the case that there is no evidence in his work of any, even potentially, viable occupational associations. Indeed the only example he gave was of what he terms a pathological form of specialization. He claimed that in science, for example, specialization had created fragmentation and isolation rather than the organic solidarity Durkheim had anticipated. Despite these difficulties, the Durkheimian model had a big impact on early AngloAmerican interpretations of professionalism (such as Carr-Saunders and Wilson, 1933; Marshall, 1950; Tawney, 1921; and even

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Parsons, 1951). The theoretical interpretation was functionalist and the emphasis was societal stability through occupational relations of collegiality and cooperation. Durkheim’s hopes seemed to be fulfilled a few years after his death in 1917 in the tense economic conditions of the 1930s. In this period in France the demand for legal protection and advantages was very strong, several professions acquired legal status, such as journalists in 1935 (Delporte, 1999), and a licence or professional title, such as engineers in 1934 (Grelon, 1986). Occupational competition was beginning, however, in that this social and political movement which has been called the ‘professional fact’ by some historians (Ruhlmann, 2001), was involved in the unstable social space of the middle classes and in the troubles produced by the economic crisis. Then the dramatic changes produced by World War II intervened. The corporatism that had been strongly promoted by the Vichy Regime became linked to collaboration with fascism and Nazi power. As a consequence, after the war, corporatism – together with the defence of professional interests (other than workers’ interests) – became taboo and was not an accepted subject for many French sociologists. The first decades after the war have been recognized as the ‘second birth’ of French sociology. Partly under the influence of American methods and theories, French sociology became more empirical and tried to analyze the developments in a society involved in accelerated modernization. The social category of the ‘cadres’ (corporate executives), created before the war, became more and more visible and some sociologists tried to introduce notions inspired by the sociology of the professions into their analysis of this special kind of employee. For example, the categorization of ‘cosmopolitan’ versus ‘local’ (which is classic in Anglo-American analysis of the role and value conflict between identification with the ‘profession’ and identification with the ‘organization’) was adopted in some French papers (e.g., Durand, 1972).

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During a thirty year period, the sociology of professional groups in France remained fairly stationary – despite the intellectual developments taking place among Englishspeaking sociologists in this field. The sociology of professional groups had been a major theoretical perspective in the sociology of the cadres, but it was a marginal field in the discipline of sociology more generally and it could not be compared with the powerful sociology of work. The sociology of work tended to focus on the situation of workers (usually male workers, in big industrial enterprises) and this trend increased in importance after 1968, when the class paradigm became dominant in French sociology. No sooner had the sociology of professional groups begun to be known in France than it was in decline. Some research on the professions was done at the beginning of the 1980s, for instance on the medical profession (Baszanger, 1981), but the amount increased progressively. Some important research was published in the middle of the decade: Segrestin (1984) dares to return to the ‘phenomenon of corporatism’; Paradeise (1984) presents professions as ‘closed labour markets’. In some ways, these studies complement the critical literature on professional groups that was also prominent in English language analyses during this period where the interpretations were of occupational conflict, competition and dominance. Interactionists’ approaches to work and occupations increased in importance (Desmarez, 1986). Some historians also contributed and were able to attract the interest of young researchers to the study of engineers and technical occupations (Grelon, 1986; Shinn, 1980; Thépot, 1985). In the 1990s French society faced a crisis in employment, and the integration of young people into the labour market became more and more difficult, even though they had a higher education level than previous generations. Professional integration and the construction of professional identity by young people become a major political and

social concern. These factors, combined with the collapse of East European communist states and the decline of Marxist theories, but also with other internal changes in the discipline (Dubar, 2004; Gadea, 2003), help to explain the return to the development of the sociology of professional groups in France in the 1990s. The interactionist approach and micro-level analysis of worker integration, identity and socialization became dominant in France and the sociology of professional groups began again to attract research interest. Dubar’s theory of social and professional identity (1991), inspired by Mead, Hughes, Becker and Goffman, is one of the most quoted works of the decade. It can be seen also in the collective book from the first interim conference of the ISA working group ‘sociology of professional groups’ (created in 1990 in Madrid), held in Paris in 1992 (Dubar and Lucas, 1994) that the range of occupations studied by French sociologists became larger and many young PhD students chose a professional/occupational group for the subject of their research. The interactionist theoretical paradigm tends to focus on the occupational labour market and social integration, although the conditions or contexts for such integration can be conditions of conflict, competition and cooperation. There are also additional complicating factors including race and ethnic tensions, gender and class inequalities. These changes were also linked to the arrival of new generations of empirical, research-orientated young sociologists and to a major shift in the relationship between social scientists, managers and public policy makers. During this period the French socialist government encouraged social research on work, technologies and employment in large enterprises and public services. Thus managers and corporate officials became more interested in the sociological interpretations of the dynamics of professional groups both inside organizations and within the labour market. The question of professional identity had important policy and political dimensions. Currently in France the sociology of professional groups is seen to be an

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attractive and successful research field, but some questions persist which could be important for the future of this field. It is important to emphasize that the continuing dominance of the interactionist paradigm is uncertain. In the sociology of professional groups additional and stronger links need to be established with other theoretical perspectives. If these links are not made, then, at the next ‘scientific revolution’, the sociology of the professions could decline again along with the outdated paradigm. It is surprising to see how this almost monopolistic position of interactionism masks or hides other possible approaches. For instance, the neo-Weberian authors, who have been the most popular in the sociology of professions internationally, are hardly ever cited in France. Moreover, this current interactionist orthodoxy seems to want to deny some important French schools such as Bourdieu’s work or Foucault’s theories of knowledge and power which are prominent in international theorizing. It would be regrettable if the rediscovery of the stimulating American interactionist school of the 1950s tended to isolate French sociology both from more recent Anglo-American and international approaches as well as from other French sources. In addition, a sociological field also needs to be present in sociological curricula and this teaching has to be helped by textbooks and manuals. There is little available about sociology of the professions in teaching materials, and only one textbook has been published in France (Dubar and Tripier, 1998). The recent development of this field needs to be reinforced and we can find in the diversity and creativity of young researchers many reasons to think that this development will continue. As proof of this vitality, the network on the sociology of the professions, recently created in the national Association Française de Sociologie (AFS), has grown rapidly, so that now it is one of the very biggest networks, and many of its participants are young researchers and doctoral students. There are examples of excellent theses

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recently published on subjects as diverse as auctioneers (Quemin, 1997), nursing auxiliaries (Arborio, 2002) and chartered accountants in a globalized context (Ramirez, 2005). At the same time, the specific professional category of the ‘cadres’ has been studied by researchers who link it with new themes such as unemployment (Pochic, 1999), or with the increasing influence of managerial rationality in such fields as social work (Chéronnet, 2005). In sum, conflict was the dominant perspective in the scientific field. It was, however, implicit, in a latent state, between the paradigms of the class-focused sociology of work and the interactionist paradigms of the sociology of the professions. The weakening of the first seems to have left more space for the development of the second. The sociology of the professions is sometimes seen as challenging the well-established sociology of work, but it is more important to see these two fields as complementary and as creating and facilitating additional links with other domains, such as the sociologies of organizations, education, health, law, culture, arts and sport, at national and international levels.

SOCIOLOGY OF THE PROFESSIONS IN SPAIN Similar theoretical shifts, changes in key concepts and chronological developments have been apparent also in Spanish sociological research on professional groups. An early focus on theoretical functionalism resulted in the production of mainly descriptive studies of the occupational work of particular occupational groups. Here the emphasis tended to be on the contribution of particular groups of workers and the importance of their work. A key text, MartinMoreno and de Miguel which constituted a milestone in the development of the field in Spain, was published in 1982. This book made a number of interesting observations and significant contributions although a clear

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emphasis on analysis and interpretation came later. The more recent period is characterized by marked improvements in both data collection and international influences. In this section we review these periods with particular emphasis on the concepts of conflict, competition and cooperation.

Sociology of the professions in Spain before 1982: the liberal professions During this period Spanish analyses of the professions centred mostly on the study of particular occupational groups (usually important professional groups) and there was little or no comparison between them. Examples of these early studies are those by Marañón (1952) on medicine, Alvarez-Sierra (1955) on medical assistants and midwives, and Gómez Barnussell (1972) focusing on teaching as a profession. The approach was essentially descriptive with a functionalist interpretation. The kinds of information offered in such research considered questions such as the place of the profession in the social context, its potential for employment, its social role and status and the motives of practitioners for becoming professionals and doing that work. Martin-Moreno and Miguel (1982) identified two main features of research during this early period. Firstly, it was professional practitioners themselves (rather than scholars and researchers) who analyzed their own work practices and procedures. As a consequence, the findings are mostly descriptive as well as subjective in that they underline and amplify the positive aspects and contributions of professional work. However, there were some interesting exceptions; analyses such as that by Marcos Alonso (1974) around engineers in Catalonia, and those by Estruch and Güell (1976) on so-called social assistants (the future social workers) by Martín Barroso (1978) about the potentialities of nursing as a profession in the welfare state, and by Todolí (1975) reflecting on ethical commitments of professionals, represent descriptive but independent approaches (by outsiders) to professional practices.

These essentially functionalist interpretations emphasized contributions and cooperation and the research is mostly idealistic and rhetorical. Secondly, the data sources most often used in these accounts were the work of professional associations, newsletters, journals and codes, and again subjectivity and partiality are predominant. Thirdly, assessments tend to be self-laudatory, almost uniquely centred on the virtues and positive aspects of professionals such as doctors (Marañón, 1962), lawyers (Belda Calatayud, 1957), or teachers (Manjón, 1945). In general then this was a period of slow but sustained development. There were debates about the need to improve the quality of previous studies and to operate with more adequate concepts, research methods and processes. There were the beginnings of a critique of the liberal model which, although still weak, indicated the start of a search for alternative interpretations. It is also the case that functionalist theories were predominant in the first part of the period. The main traits and features of professions (Lacalle, 1976; Laguna, 1975) had strong links with the ‘trait’ approach to professions as institutions in Anglo-American interpretations. In addition, other researchers were beginning to show an interest in processes of conflict and competition which included how older professions evolve and new professions come about in a context of other important social changes (Busquets, 1971; De Miguel, 1979; Iice, 1975; Lacalle, 1976; Martín-Moreno and De Miguel, 1976; Subirats, 1981). Spain was becoming more and more a services society (the role of tourism in Spanish economic renewal from the early sixties was outstanding), but still one within a non-democratic regime. In this context, professions (and the welfare state) developed unevenly: higher professional status and privileges remained in the hands of the dominant social classes. Martín Serrano (1982), from a Marxist perspective, criticized this form of dominance linked to professions. The relationship between professions and gender also gained research prominence since some professional groups seemed to be more feminized

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than others (Álvarez Sierra, 1955; De Borja, 1981; De Miguel, 1979). However, this issue would not be tackled in depth until later (for example García and García, 2000; Gómez Bueno, 1996; Jar Couselo, 1992; SánchezApellaniz, 2001). Conflict theories and interpretations (including Marxism) became increasingly important in the second part of this period as Spanish sociologists tried to understand the apparent power and influence of some particular occupational groups. However, positivist and interactionist approaches (e.g., De Miguel, 1979; De Miguel and Salcedo, 1987, which exemplify the latter) were also predominant in this period.

Martín-Moreno and de Miguel (1982): a milestone text? This was the first book in Spanish on the sociology of professions. Its title, Sociología de las profesiones, clearly acknowledged the existence of such an intellectual field in Spain and it included a review of earlier Spanish work in this area. Despite its significant contribution towards a more scientific and independent (non-self-laudatory) analysis of the professions, in retrospect it seems to have had only a limited influence on subsequent theoretical developments. In general the book lacked historical background. Also, its reflections are disconnected from developments in the field abroad. The authors refer to the liberal model of professions and its principles and drawbacks; to the ideology of professionalism; and to the meritocracy and elitism of professional groups which result from their corporate motivations and strategic power locations. However, this liberal model is criticized by reference to Spanish sources which do not draw their conclusions from either sound research or firm theoretical interpretations. Therefore, the analysis by Martín-Moreno and de Miguel lacks not only an appropriate use of adequately constructed models, but an effort to compare and confront the liberal model of professions with alternative interpretations.

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In addition, concepts such as career, prestige, professional body and class, salaried workers and bureaucrats are introduced. However, these concepts are not related to any body of theory which helps to understand the meanings they are conveying. Instead, these concepts are used as issues/topics around which some statistics about professions are presented. It is also the case that the only empirical research in the book is the literature review its authors produced.

Sociology of the professions since 1982: professionalization and jurisdictional competition Studies of and publications about professions, and the number and kinds of professions considered, have certainly increased during this later period. Indeed almost any occupation was considered to be a profession: those in, for example, public transportation (González Carbajal, 1998), agriculture (Gago, 1996) and many others. While the quality of these publications was very heterogeneous, there were some common features. In particular, the concept of profession was neither discussed nor compared with similar concepts to find out differences; it seemed that occupation and profession were just equivalent terms. In this respect, Spanish studies tended to be similar to those in France and elsewhere in Europe where the distinctiveness of professional (in contrast to occupational) work was seldom emphasized. It is, then, only in more recent interpretations that the category of knowledge work – and its increased significance in modern and global economies – is gaining in importance. For a time, the proliferation of so-called professions, trades and occupations challenged the sociology of professions. These occupations were colonized by lay knowledge and common sense which seemed to threaten the prospect of concept building in the field. In effect, two different sectors of research emerged: one devoted to publicizing and popularizing professions and attracting clients as well as practitioners, and another

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one more concerned with developing a scientific field within the terms of reference of the social sciences. Contributions of the first type (Colegio de Abogados de Barcelona, 1983; Pérez Pulido and Herrera Morillas, 2003; Tejada and Rodríguez, 2003) were mostly descriptive, with no reference to international literature and based predominantly on the analysis of survey data (although some qualitative research techniques such as interviews were also included) about a specific occupational or professional group. In the second type of research literature, the influence of international concepts and theories became important and significant. In particular, professionalization became the key concept around which researching efforts were organized and interpreted (Fernández Pérez, 1995; González Moll, 1996; Guillén, 1992; Llovet and Usieto, 1990; Riera, 1998; Sáez, 1996, 1998a–c, 2003). This concept came to occupy a core place in discussions and replaced the term profession as the central organizing concept or focus in the field. As a consequence, and in line with developments in Anglo-American interpretations, the concepts of occupational closure and jurisdictional competition became prominent in interpretations. The international work which has had a strong influence on Spanish sociologists in the field has been that of Abbott (1988). However, during this period, an effort to review the sociological literature connected to the analysis of professions was carried out by Múgica (1998, 1999), who makes an interesting link between classical sociological theory (Weber, Durkheim and Simmel) and both traditional and emergent professions. In addition, there has been a shift away from the liberal concept of profession towards a more democratic one, in line with developments by Swedish colleagues (e.g., Bertilsson, 1990) where professions located within a democratic society may become agents for the equitable distribution of goods and resources. Connected with this, we are also witnessing efforts to revise professional codes of ethics (ASEDIE, 1999a, b; Gómez Pantoja, 2001;

Wanjiru, 1995), analysis of issues of autonomy and competition within professional markets, and how the control of professionals from government agencies can arise. In addition, in a context in which the citizen-client-consumer is mainly bound to market-driven processes, attention to both information management (documentalists, librarians, archivists and journalists) and economic professions has increased (Alonso and Vázquez, 2000; Canel et al., 2000; De la Sierra et al., 1981; Guillén, 1989; Moreiro et al., 1995). The key concepts in Spanish theories and interpretations of professional groups continue to be professionalization together with deprofessionalization and proletarianism (Fernández Enguita, 1993; Fernández Pérez, 1995; Rodríguez and Guillén, 1992). As a consequence, interpretations tend to focus on processes of occupational closure and competition. Occupational conflicts, particularly in respect of the power and dominance of some occupational groups, continue to be emphasized. In addition, the clashes of managers and professionals in service work organizations have been analyzed – sometimes as a form of deprofessionalization. The study of professionalism as a discourse of occupational change and social control has not yet been addressed directly. Also, the renewed attention to the advantages of professionalism as a third logic (Freidson, 2001) for both clients and practitioners has not made an impact, though the influence of Bertilsson (1990) could anticipate and lay the foundations for such an effect. Thus, in the Spanish sociology of professional groups, interpretations based on occupational competition have mostly replaced both the emphasis on conflict and an earlier focus on contribution and cooperation. Issues to do with occupational change and control are yet to be systematically included.

CONCLUDING REMARKS From this brief review of the theoretical developments in the intellectual field of the

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sociology of professional groups in AngloAmerican, French and Spanish research literature, the concepts of conflict, competition and cooperation have all been utilized and emphasized at different times. Early functionalist analyses of professionalism emphasized occupational cooperation as well as collegial support and managerial and client trust. Later interpretations of professionalization as a process of market closure were accompanied by a change in conceptual emphasis to occupational conflict, competition and domination. More recent interpretations have returned to the concept of professionalism whereby the occupational values of cooperation, collegiality, discretion and trust have been perceived to have distinct advantages for clients as well as practitioners compared with the logics of the organization and the market. In addition, however, recent interpretations have also included the analysis of professionalism as a discourse of occupational change and social control. In these respects, sociologists of professional groups have refocused attention on some of the questions of classical sociology about mechanisms of social order and social control. In this framework, the important research question becomes how and in what ways the discourse of professionalism is being used (by states, by employers and managers, and by some relatively powerful occupational groups themselves) as an instrument of occupational change (including resistance to change) and social control. Thus sociologists of professional groups would want to add (occupational) control to the identified key concepts of conflict, competition and cooperation in sociological theory.

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France au XXe siècle. Paris: Seuil, l’Univers historique. Sáez, Juan. (1996) ‘La profesionalización de los educadores sociales: algunas consideraciones introductorias’, in J. A. López Herrerías (coord.), El Educador Social: Líneas de Formación y de Actuación. Madrid: Guillermo Mirecki Editor. Sáez, Juan (1998a) ‘Formación y Profesionalización de los Educadores Sociales: Descripción de una Experiencia’, I Congreso Estatal del Educador Social. Barcelona: FELPES. pp. 348–67. Sáez, Juan (1998b) ‘El educador social: formación y profesión’, in A. Escarbajal, La Educación Social en Marcha. Valencia: Nau Libres. Sáez, Juan (1998c) ‘Las funciones del educador Social: algunas reconsideraciones actuales’, in VV.AA., Atención a los espacios y tiempos extraescolares. Granada: Grupo editorial universitario. pp. 85–107. Sáez, Juan (2003) La Profesionalización de los Educadores Sociales. En Busca de la Competencia Educativa Cualificadora. Madrid: Dykinson. Sánchez-Apellaniz, M. (2001) ‘Tendencias de las mujeres en su desarrollo profesional’, REIS, 85: 67–83. Segrestin, Denis (1984) Le phénomène corporatiste. Paris: Fayard. Shinn, Terry (1980) Savoir scientifique et pouvoir social. L’Ecole Polytechnique de 1794 à

1914. Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale de Science Politique. Subirats, M. (1981) El empleo de los licenciados. Barcelona: Fontanella. Svensson, Lennart G. and Evetts, Julia (2003) ‘Introduction’, in L. G. Svensson and J. Evetts (eds.) Conceptual and Comparative Studies of Continental and AngloAmerican Professions. Goteborg Studies in Sociology, No. 129, Goteborg University. pp. 5–17. Tawney, R. H. (1921) The Acquisitive Society. NY: Harcourt Brace. Tejada, C. and Rodríguez, L. (2003) ‘De la cara al espejo: imagen colectiva de los profesionales de la información en España y Francia’, Actas de las Jornadas FESABID 2003. Barcelona: FESABID. pp. 431–42. Thépot, André (1985) L’ingénieur dans la société française. Paris: Editions ouvrières. Todoli, J. (1975) Nivel ético del profesional español. Madrid: Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorros. Wanjiru, G.Ch. (1995) La ética de la profesión docente: estudio introductorio a la deontología de la educación. Pamplona: EUNSA. Wilensky, Harold L. (1964) ‘The Professionalization of Everyone?’, American Journal of Sociology, 70(2): 137–58. Witz, Ann (1992) Professions and Patriarchy. London: Routledge.

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11 Competition, Conflict and Cooperation, and the Naturalization of Social Difference in Sport1 Fabien Ohl

The notions of conflict, cooperation and competition are clearly polysemous, and have different meanings according to context, culture, values, intellectual trends and historical periods. The use of these terms varies as well within the sociology of sport.2 Once we have clarified their meanings, we intend to show that (1) while competition represents an important object of study within the sociology of sport, conflict and cooperation have received only secondary attention. Indeed, competition constitutes the reference point from which cooperation and conflict have been observed. We also intend to show (2) that researchers have often approached competition and conflict through the perspective afforded by the analysis of capitalist ideologies. However, other research has shown competitive sport to have broader ideological underpinnings that cannot be reduced to class conflict. Moreover, (3) competitive sport, particularly

through its staging and narration, helps to naturalize gender and race. Further, (4) competitive sport cannot be considered a homogeneous social practice, because of the variety of ways people relate to competition. Lastly, (5) while cooperation is not as visible as competition, research shows that they must not be viewed as existing in opposition to each other: the connections between them are constructed in many different ways from one culture to another.

COMPETITION, CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN SPORT: POINTS OF REFERENCE Competition, understood as a confrontation codified and regulated by accredited organizations, is a central element in sport. The history, resources and identities of the most powerful

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sports organizations (CIO, FIFA, NBA, etc.) are all closely linked to competition. A number of studies (Elias and Dunning, 1986; Veyne, 1987) have shown that modern sports competitions are characterized by the quest for records and for ever-higher levels of performance. This veritable ‘cult of performance’ (Ehrenberg, 1991) owes its success to the fact that sporting competition embodies a democratic ideal. Everyone, whatever their origin or status, is encouraged to surpass themselves, to flirt with limits and to reinvent themselves with a new social identity. Given competition’s central role, it is hardly surprising that, among the keywords in the publications studied (395 articles drawn from the Sociological Abstracts3 database), it is cited far more often than ‘conflict’ or ‘cooperation’ (see Figure 11.1). This is not to say that what is at stake in these publications is a systematic analysis of competition and its significance. Competition is, as it were, a contingency, whose role is as the benchmark of sporting activity. As such, it receives extensive treatment in the media. Whether one is comparing the media treatment of men’s and women’s sports, or engaging with the question of doping, or the iconic figures of sports heroism, competition invariably constitutes the backdrop. Studies of the phenomenon of competition itself and of the consequences of its use as a social model are rarer. The analysis of a sample of articles (483) taken from the three main journals of sports sociology4 both confirms these tendencies and makes them more complex. Competition is mentioned nine times as a

keyword, while conflict and cooperation each receive six mentions (Ohl, 2000b). If the numbers seem small, the fact is that other themes (women, 66 mentions, socio-cultural factors, 52, etc.) also contain analyses in which conflict, cooperation and, especially, competition are treated without being referenced as keywords. A more qualitative examination of scholarly work shows that references to conflict in sport follow two main patterns. On the one hand, the notion of conflict is associated with those of confrontation and violence in sport. Hooliganism, violence on the field and inflicted injuries and pain are the subject of numerous studies. On the other hand, and more obviously, conflict is considered in terms of class conflict. In this perspective, sport is seen as a locus for the expression and reaffirmation of social class. In both cases, two dominant attitudes influence the analyses. The first is characterized by a positive, even laudatory, perception of sport. This position leads to the proposition that sport constitutes a special space, which is relatively free from class conflict and societal violence. In this conception, sport is a neutral, even apolitical, field; and it is necessary to struggle against those evils, supposedly ‘external’, that threaten it. The second position is articulated around two types of criticism of sport: on the one hand, that it constitutes a praxis in which symbolic violence is expressed and which naturalizes class differences (Bourdieu, 1980), and, on the other hand, that sport constitutes an instrument of state ideology serving capitalism and totalitarian ideologies (Brohm, 1976).

48; 12%

211; 54%

136; 34%

Competition

Figure 11.1

Conflict

Cooperation

Distribution of articles concerning conflict, cooperation and competition.

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SOCIAL DIFFERENCE IN SPORT

Cooperation is rarely used as a keyword; nevertheless it is present in studies, particularly those that focus on sports organizations. In a rather naïve and idealistic way, sport is seen as representing an ideal carrier of cooperation and friendship between peoples. In fact, it presupposes ‘external’ cooperation between competitors – at least they must agree on the rules or agree to discuss them – and often ‘internal’ cooperation as well. In team sports, winning is predicated on cooperation among the members of a given team. Furthermore, in individual sports as well, it often involves the mobilization of a complex group of professionals (coaches, fitness and psychological trainers, doctors, physiotherapists, etc.) to assist in the production of the performance. Aside from G. Lüschen (1970), few authors have attempted to analyze the notions of competition, cooperation and conflict directly in the sociology of sport. For Lüschen, competition is a safeguard against conflict,5 inasmuch as the space and time of competition are stable and well-defined. Moreover, competition is very predictable and structured, with specific rules and a judge whose authority is recognized by competitors on both sides. This is not necessarily the case with conflict, whose outcomes are far more uncertain. For analogous reasons, N. Elias and E. Dunning (1986) prefer to speak of ‘tension’ rather than ‘conflict’. As a result, the adjustments made to cooperative undertakings and to the regulation of conflicts – both of which allow social organizations to come to agreement about the terms of future interactions – are much less varied within sporting organizations than elsewhere. Of course, the history of sport is dotted with numerous conflicts, mishaps, incidents of violence and situations of crisis, but only rarely have these modified the foundations of any particular game. If it is clear that sport today is more dependent on the economy and on the media than at any time in the past, it is equally true that, compared to other social organizations which are more vulnerable to economic competition and to the choices of

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consumers or voters, the monopoly which sports organizations enjoy over major competitions affords them considerable autonomy within their environment. Nevertheless, due to their high degree of international interdependence, sports organizations have little local or national autonomy: even locally, sports organizations enforce international rules. In addition, the involvement of individuals in sports, which is usually voluntary, goes hand in hand with processes of socialization which legitmate acculturation to the values of various sports subcultures, and thus foster cooperation among participants (Coakley, 2003). In most institutionalized sport, competitions result in few conflicts over the basic rules of engagement. This fact differentiates institutional competitive sport from traditional games whose rules fluctuate much more, from sports, which are not organized, and from new practices whose definitions are more a matter for negotiation. Despite this, competitive sport does take a variety of forms. There are, of course, those major media events, in which competition is a contest between people or groups representing larger social communities (a city, region, or nation). These competitions differ from more traditional contests in terms of the attention given to measurement and to records (Guttman, 1978). Competition may also be ‘internal’, played out among members of the same team to obtain a leadership position, or to become the player with the most recognition. Research into the effects of ‘internal’ competition has provided no clear-cut results (Lüschen, 1970). It can be beneficial: by increasing pressure on players, it challenges them to improve their performance. But it can also be harmful, as in instances where it destroys trust among team members and prevents them from cooperating. Imagine, for example, the members of a team of mountain climbers who distrust each other completely, or who are competing against each other to reach the summit. In many sports, competitive success presupposes cooperation, and there have been numerous inquiries with utilitarian goals.

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Their objective is to discover the optimal levels of cooperation and competition in order to maximize a group’s performance. Yet sociologists of sport have shown little interest in this type of approach, preferring to focus on various forms of cooperation, both those among members of a team and those with opponents (which G. Lüschen, 1970, has designated by the term ‘association’). This brief discussion of the meanings of these concepts within the sociology of sport shows that they are not necessarily contradictory and that they cannot be defined unequivocally (with, for instance, internal conflict and competition defined as negatives, and internal cooperation and external competition as positives). We can also see from this that competition is a fundamental element of sports culture. Consequently, we shall structure our discussion around competition, while examining how conflict and cooperation have also been taken into consideration.

COMPETITION AND CONFLICT IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF SPORT Although earlier research into these questions exists, such as the work of J. Strutt (1801) in the area of sports history, or that of T. Veblen (1970 [1899]) on the intersection of economics and the sociology of sport and leisure; the sociology of sport only came into its own as a speciality in the 1960s. Initially it was not a uniform field; instead it was characterized by a great variety of approaches. Analyses at the time were often informed by functionalism, treating competition in sport as making a positive contribution to socialization. The idea was to show that sport, particularly through competition, offered a way to prepare for social life. In fact, international sports activities have generally been viewed as a means of integration, of rapprochement between communities and of the prevention of conflict (Maguire, 1999). For the majority of media and sports

organizations, sports competitions provide an opportunity to go beyond nationalisms to promote international cooperation and conflict regulation. Indeed, some examples of sport affecting armed conflict exist. For example, for a few days at the beginning of September 2005, the Ivory Coast seemed to forget the war – the separation of the north of the country, in the hands of rebel forces, and the south, held by the government, and the rumours of military coups-d’état – because of the last phase of the qualifying process for the 2006 World Cup in football. Of course, the effects of this truce were very short-lived; the fighting was subsequently taken up again. Despite the existence of these beliefs in an (Olympic) sporting truce and the existence of a functionalist approach, however, sport and competition have most often reinforced established divisions. The role of sport in the construction of nationalisms, the development of conflicts and violence, as well as in sexism, has, of course, inspired distrust and has been subjected to criticism by sociologists of sport. The contradictions between official discourses on sports, which like to insist on the educational outcomes of competitive sport (good health, lessons in fair play, equality, etc.), and the darker realities (inequality of access to sports, health problems among athletes, widespread doping, organized cheating in competitions, ties to the mafia, the role of sport in reinforcing nationalism, etc.) were quickly picked up on, particularly in Marxist-inspired analyses. Such analyses of sport were more prevalent during the 1970s and early 1980s than they are at present. Sociologists and other sports analysts felt they should concern themselves with the power wielded by sports organizations, the media and big business. Their argument was intended to demonstrate that sports culture, and the spectacle offered by competitive sport in particular, constituted, as part of mass culture, an instrument of indoctrination. In the transformations which the culture of sport has undergone, these researchers perceived a dependence on and a submission

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to the requirements of the mass media (Gruneau, 1983), and the logic of the capitalist system (Brohm, 1976, 1993). Underwritten as they were by the State, businesses and the media were seen as being excessively powerful, involved both in the control that the capitalist system exerted over day-to-day existence and in the production of nationalisms and violence in sport. We understand, then, that during the 1970s and 1980s, it was conflict – viewed as class conflict – that dominated the sociology of sport. References to conflict allowed many important questions about the use of sport in society to be raised. The main objective was to examine how sport was used to maintain, or even reinforce, power and privilege. Questions mainly related to the body of the athlete, alienation and dispossession of the body, the role of sport in sustaining social inequalities, the effects of the commercialization of sport on social bonds, and of the profits made from sport by those who controlled economic power (Coakley, 2003). Competition, as a system associated with capitalism, was the most common target of these analyses. Radical critiques of sport were more prevalent in Germany, France, Canada and elsewhere than they were in the United States (Ohl, 2006). The frequency, during this period, of references to the notion of conflict is an indication of the will to understand the political role of sport. Widespread representations of the apolitical nature of sports organizations (Holt, 1992: 146) tended to leave the monopoly of sports discourses and investments in the hands of the bourgeoisie. Marxist approaches allowed scope for opposition to these beliefs. Indeed, the progressive commercialization of sport and the greater access enjoyed by the working class to participation in sports, including in competitive forms, could not be considered an acceptable form of working class culture. Often inspired by the Frankfurt School, researchers considered sport to be an element of the cultural and ideological superstructure, particularly because of the perceived proximity between sport and the capitalist organization

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of labour (Rigauer, 1969). Such researchers underscored the alienating dimensions of the processes of both the commercialization of sport (Vinnai, 1970) and the consumption of sports events (Hoch, 1972). Capitalist ideology was accused of alienating popular culture and leading the working class into passivity, if not degradation. Competitive sport, with its obsession with records and violence, acts as ‘an opiate for the people’ that masks class conflict (Brohm, 1976). In addition to its references to class conflict, Marxism also inspired some feminist work on sport (Laberge, 2004). The contributions of Theberge (1984) and Hall (1985), for example, showed how class – and gender – based differences together have contributed to sustaining structures of social domination.

COMPETITION AS IDEOLOGY AND OBSTACLE Marxist critiques of sport corresponded with objections by social actors themselves to the influence exerted by traditional competitive sports at a time when the sports culture was diversifying. Forms of competition were multiplying, and participatory leisure activities were overtaking formal competition in terms of numbers of participants. This diversification of practice coincided with greater accessibility to sports for women. As a result of this, the question of competition has often been approached from the angle of gender inequality. Indeed, sport had plainly constructed itself as ‘a fiefdom of virility’ (Elias and Dunning, 1986) and its history was marked by considerable segregation. This highly masculine articulation of sport is not based on its intrinsic characteristics, especially not on the bodily constraints that it imposes. It is not, therefore, a ‘naturally’ determined attribute of sporting praxis. Rather the initial resistance to the feminization of sports was cultural. One need only observe the inroads women have made, during the latter part of the twentieth century,

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into traditionally highly ‘masculine’ sports, such as football, rugby, ice hockey, boxing, wrestling or body building, to be convinced that it is not physical obstacles which prevent women from participating in such sports (Mennesson, 2005). It is mainly because profound and enduring upheavals have changed masculine identity during the twentieth century that sport was invented and has been used in this way by men. A. Rauch (2005) has shown how women have been able to assume roles reserved, until recently, for men; how, among others, they have taken control of their reproduction and their sexual pleasure. The sense of what it is to be a man has changed and sport has been instrumentalized as an important resource in the celebration of masculine identity. In line with their general aspirations for gender equality, women have fought throughout the twentieth century for access to sport and physical education as a right. Sporting institutions, which have, for the most part, been exclusively masculine, have had reservations about women’s participation. Gaining access to competitive sport was a long-term struggle for women, and took the form of demands for equality of access without segregation to both sporting activities and organizations. In the face of continuing segregation and the difficulty of limiting masculine control, some feminists have also advocated the creation of women-only associations and competitions (Hargreaves, 1994). Researchers have shown that competitive sport has played a role in the difficulties women faced in gaining access to sport without being undervalued. Gender order or hierarchy, feminine submission and masculine hegemony are strongly reinforced by the images and commentaries in competitive sport. They reinforce sex roles and a dominant image of masculinity which is constructed and promoted almost systematically by competitive sport (Connell, 1987). For instance, Garber (1995) shows how the narratives associated with couples’ ice-skating routines invariably dramatize heterosexual

romance. It is not merely a pair, but explicitly ‘a couple’ simulating erotic and loving aspects of a very traditional vision of male/female relationships. Other work has shown that media commentaries on the trials and performances in women’s sports reinforce stereotypes of women. Thus, MacNeill (1988) published a critique of how aerobics performances are staged, arguing that the staging feeds the commodification of women’s bodies and works against their empowerment. In aerobics, both the presentation of self and the staging seem to be guided by a culture of seduction: the aerobic movements shape the female body in accordance with male desire. In the face of this control of competition over the way sport is practised, some sports feminists like Birrell and Richter (1987) also question the definitions of sports proposed by researchers in the social sciences (that of Guttman, 1978, in particular), because these are predicated largely on competition and thus present a very masculine and reductionist view of sport. These authors also show that women can transform sporting techniques, by playing on goals, segregations, hierarchies, and transform practices informed by their dependency into resources to fight against male hegemony. It has been observed that competitive sport offers the paramount opportunity to bestow praise on athletes who are male and, preferably, white. It extols aggression as a value, and thus promotes a very traditional and often homophobic understanding of masculinity, while contributing to the construction and naturalization of gender (Hargreaves, 1994; Messner et al., 2000). Researchers have also underscored that this predominance of traditional definitions of masculinity, promoted by the culture of sport and its competition, is not even unproblematic for men, especially with regard to the construction of their masculine identity. Participation in sports that entail aggressive competition creates relational difficulties for men. Messner and Sabo (1990: 14) note that men are ‘aware of how competition, homophobia, and misogyny in the sports world limited [their] ability to develop truly

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intimate relationships with women and with other men’. While much work has been done on gender, other social categories are also essentialized by competitive sport. This is true of ‘racial’ categories. Without being able to give a full account of the rich body of work available on the question, we can point out that competitive sport fosters a naturalization of social behaviour in several ways: through a racialized perception of competitive sport fed by an ostensibly ‘scientific’ discourse (scientism) (Coakley, 2003); through the media which convey racial stereotypes by recalling clichés about the physical abilities of black athletes, the psychological qualities of white athletes and the tactical talents of Asian athletes (McCarthy and Jones, 1997; Tokiharu Mayeda, 1999); through sports organizations, clubs in particular, which promote racial discrimination in play or in the allocation of positions of responsibility in professional teams (coach, administrator, etc.) (Smith and Leonard, 1997). Other authors have shown how, contrary to the idealization of competitive sport as an important factor in the promotion of selfesteem and personal development, socialization through competition can result in isolation. Sparkes (2004: 409) illustrates such effects of competition well through an analysis of the case of Lance Armstrong, who asserted that ‘the things that were important to people in Plano were becoming less and less important to me. School and socializing were second to me now; developing into a world-class athlete was first’. This social isolation can, of course, produce excellent sports results, but existential suffering too. Economic pressures on competition limits the autonomy of athletes and emphasizes the instability of their social situation. Certain very visible organizations take charge of athletes, but the construction of self-identity becomes problematical, especially because of the contradictions inherent in the juxtaposition of the instability of athletes’ social situations and the demands made

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on them for loyalty and total commitment to a club (Robidoux, 2001: 191).

THE DIVERSITY OF RELATIONS TO COMPETITION Without discounting the problems generated by competitive sport and its spectacles, researchers influenced by ‘cultural studies’ approaches or by ethnographic research have observed a diversification of sports culture. Their work has attested to a much more complex and varied vision of sports. Many of these authors, including some feminists, were inspired by Gramsci (1971). The idea that dominant groups impose their hegemony by ideology and political and cultural practices has been influential in the sociology of sport. While Gramsci underscores the imposition of norms and processes of reproduction, he also notes a certain instability and complexity of practices, particularly owing to the relative autonomy of grass-roots social groups. Similarly, Gruneau (1983) has concluded that one cannot approach sports as a stable and uniform social praxis. His neo-Marxist analyses of sporting practices in Canada is informed by the work of the Birmingham School. He uses the concept of hegemony to analyze the singularities of modern sport and show that sport is not merely a space for the maintenance of hegemony: it also constitutes a space for dispute. In its combination of critical Marxism and cultural studies, the work of J. E. Heargreaves (1986) shows that, while sporting culture may reproduce the social order, it is not a rigid mechanism. Cultural hegemony results from the continuous effort of dominant classes to maintain their preeminence, but this should not let us ignore the complexity of the social order and of the processes of dissent by the dominated classes themselves – their processes of resistance to, rejection of and re-appropriation of dominant practices. In these iterations, sport and sporting competition do not boil down to a simple

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system of rivalry. Sport may also be a mode of resistance to power and a means of acting on and modifying practices (Howell, et al., 2002). Such resistance to hegemony here forms part of a logic of conflict, principally of class conflict. Starting from the perspective of a number of different problematics, studies in French inspired by the work of Pierre Bourdieu (1980) have dealt with a variety of resistance movements to the prevailing sports orthodoxy, which are frequently symbolized by traditional competitions promoted by the major international organizations (federations, CIO, FIFA, etc.) as being the expressions of class conflict (Pociello, 1981). Anti-competitions or newly invented forms of competition – mass road running, mass sporting events, alternative competitions and sports, etc. – have often been backed by groups with greater cultural capital, which are opposed to sports organizations that they consider highly conservative. Another argument used to show that competition cannot be analyzed uniformly is the claim that there are multiple forms and diverse processes of consumption which must be considered. Indeed, the success of competitive sport goes hand-in-hand with a vast range of commentaries: journalists, fans, athletes, TV spectators, and even sociologists, all participate in this process of making sense of competitive sport. One tends primarily to retain scores and images, all too often neglecting the discourses associated with them. Competitive sports have often been approached as warlike contests, which promote nationalism and masculine hegemony (Brohm, 1993). The metaphor of war certainly lends itself to the construction of narrative, but sports commentary does not discuss this aspect exclusively. The narratives of sport also provide opportunities to recount human cooperation and conflict in the context of competitive contests. Moreover, texts and commentaries on sports are hardly idle chatter. The putatively apolitical nature of sports conceals concepts that are politically charged (Defrance, 2000) and the chatter – such as that heard, for

instance, on the hundreds of American radio stations devoted to sport (talk radio) – constitutes a space where individuals who think of themselves as apolitical or unable to express their political opinions freely (men, whites, conservative Republicans, members of the middle and lower social classes; see Goldberg, 1998) can express very political points indeed. Even in football (soccer), often considered the most remarkable enterprise of indoctrination and creation of fanaticism in sport, uses are more diverse. Indeed, football has been the object of a plethora of studies, particularly by European researchers, because of its unrivalled global reach, its economic dimension, its impact through the media and the hyper-abundance of ‘chitchat’ that it generates. Football can serve as a ‘metaphor for life in society’ (Bromberger et al., 1995). It is sport in general, however, that plays this role. Eco (1985) discerns an ambiguity in modern competitions. On the one hand, they serve as a pretext for small talk and gossip which have the effect of belittling individuals. For, even if sport provides a reliable resource for social interaction, chatter about sport is shallow both conceptually and in terms of human relations. On the other hand, given the extreme complexity of society and that the possibility of understanding it is beyond the reach of (most) individuals, talk about sporting performances and competitions has become a metaphor for life in society. In the process, this kind of talk impoverishes social debate and displaces political involvement. A real anxiety therefore exists about such mass culture. This should not, however, stop us from noting that the chit-chat engendered by sports competitions nonetheless facilitates the expression of a variety of social values (Ohl, 2000a). While the conditions of everyday life are not conducive to such clearly defined competitions as those enacted in sport, sporting competitions and their rituals are undeniably symbolically efficient (Birrell, 1981), and contribute to making sense of daily life by supplying models of identification. Public interest is stimulated even more since the narratives of

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sport are grounded in real situations polarized by elements such as: contests versus acts of cooperation; important levels of rationalization (physical movement, training, economy, etc.) versus the uncertainty of results (a favourite can lose); a model of equality that seeks to be exemplary versus injustice (fraud, doping, etc.). A sociology of entertainment shows us that even if images and commentaries are often stereotypical, spectators are not passive consumers of the media; rather, they extract meaning on the basis of their own social experience (Rowe, 1999).

OVERCOMING THE OPPOSITION BETWEEN COOPERATION AND COMPETITION The staging of competition tends to intensify rivalries and downplay the fact that many different forms of cooperation can be observed in the variety of both competitive trials and the relationships among competitors. If we have concentrated on the question of competition, it is because of its importance – both objective and symbolic – and because so much of the research in the field of the sociology of sport is concerned with it. It is difficult to dissociate the analysis of the concept of cooperation in sports from competitions which are often thought of as pretexts for cooperation and the ritualistic staging of friendship between cities, nations and peoples. This implicit denial of victory as a final outcome and the analysis of conflict and tension as integral habitual elements of contests – consider the political uses of sports during the Cold War, for instance – has often been exposed by sociologists of sport. However, due to the dominance of references to competition, the notion of cooperation has not been very successful in the sociology of sport. Most authors have thought about sport from the perspective of competition, with some even asserting that sport is not ‘a cooperative venture’ (Heikkala, 1993).6 Moreover, paying some attention to cooperation does

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not mean that one must be unaware of the segregation that occurs in sports, nor of the inequalities of access and the persistence of social, sexist and racial stereotypes. Sport’s apolitical ethic, its notions of the rapprochement of peoples and of neutrality have been a longstanding smokescreen: systems of social segregation, particularly by race, class and gender, have only allowed cooperation across highly selective social networks. Cooperation mainly occurs within these groups. Segregation is amplified by media narratives which essentialize differences. The sporting models broadcast through the advertising and marketing of sports brands generally promote a highly traditional vision of gender and ‘race’, and mobilize athletes in the defence of their commercial interests. The values of equality, justice and cooperation are a fiction in which we can observe how ethics and justice are instrumentalized in support of the financial interests of brands and sports organizations (Jackson and Andrews, 2005). One need only watch competitive sport in order to conclude that it seems normal that men and women do not work together in the production of a performance. Of course, we may sometimes accept that male trainers can oversee female teams, but the opposite is extremely rare. In any case, on the playing field mixed events are very few and far between. Nor should one resort to clichés about childhood as a period of innocence about confrontation when cooperation in sports can be encouraged. In a study concerned with heroism in sports, P. Duret (1993) examined how children between the ages of 8 and 12 conceived of relations of opposition and cooperation within competition. They were asked to comment on a comic strip about a volleyball match. One result was that there were fewer (47%) positive elements of encouragement, which indicate forms of cooperation, than negative elements of denigration and rivalry (75%). Another result was that the ‘time spent in practising a sports activity emerged as a major source of change in the ratio of encouragement to jeering’(my translation).

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A sustained involvement in sport led to a significant drop in encouragement and to an increase in denigration: beginners are more cooperative than experienced players (Duret, 1993: 111). Furthermore, and contrary to accepted stereotypes, in this study, girls were no more generous and altruistic than boys. Still, physical performance is also a social performance that is predicated on quite extensive cooperation. For a competition to take place, there has to be a minimal level of agreement about the values of the game, the intrinsic interest of taking part in the sport, its rules, how a winner is decided, how the plays are judged, etc. Relations between participants can never simply be reduced to conflicts. Sports enthusiasts cooperate to produce emotion, to create interesting games, to break a record, and so forth. Sport is even used as a model of cooperation. To be convinced of this, one need only consider how frequently advertisements deploy images of sportsmen and women, or the use of sport in human resources management in business and industry. The work of N. Elias and E. Dunning (1986) has contributed to the analysis of cooperative acts by showing that one could not set cooperation in opposition to tension between groups. These two notions are very closely linked, and neither would be the same without the other. There is thus a basic polarity in sports between cooperation and tension between two teams; cooperation and competition also exist within each team, and it would be a mistake to oppose these processes (Coakley and Dunning, 2000: 16). Cooperation is present in most social interactions, and sport is but one particular form of interaction. International sporting competitions are especially suited to a staging of cooperation through a kind of ‘dramaturgical cooperation’ (Goffman, 1959) intended for an audience of fans or spectators who expect to receive from their team a positive image and a celebration of the values of being part of a shared community. Cooperation is also a requisite for playing games, whether they are competitive or not. In tennis, for example, cooperation between

partners, on both sides of the net, is essential. Both must produce a ‘good’ game if it is to be an enjoyable one. Cooperation cannot be limited to the activities of members of a team who are cooperating in the production of a performance. There is also ‘antagonistic cooperation’ which Lüschen (1970) calls ‘association’. The very different approach taken by Bourdieu (1980) offers a complementary analysis of cooperation on the basis of the properties of fields and the logics that structure the field of sports. His notions of ‘habitus’ and field have been used to observe social rivalries outside sport, which are expressed through the culture of sport. Several works (Pociello, 1981) have shown that conflicts over the definition of sporting practices reflect the various social positions of protagonists or masculine domination (Laberge, 1995). However, within each field, including that of sport, protagonists cooperate and share the fundamental values of the field. Within sport, there are shared beliefs and agreements about the interest and value of sport, all of which both make possible and structure cooperation and competition on the one hand, and reduce the potential impact of conflict on the other (the game itself is very rarely questioned in institutional contexts, but the rules are often negotiated in selforganized praxes). Research has also shown that teams and the media, as well as spectators, cooperate to produce the sporting performance. If such spectacles have achieved their present popularity, it is because these actors, drawn from different fields, all cooperate in their production. This is particularly true of agents in the fields of media, business and politics who cooperate to produce large-scale sporting events and who, thus, make up the media complex of sport (Rowe, 1999). Sport depends on economic, political and social configurations, but it is also the active production of meaning by individuals and groups (Hargreaves and McDonald, 2002: 52). Individuals also cooperate within sporting groups to challenge dominant sporting cultures, to create new sports or to renew the

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ways old ones are practiced. Cooperation is integral to the game but equally to how the game is conceived (e.g., taking it more or less seriously, etc.).

THE DIVERSITY OF SOCIAL USES OF COMPETITION AND COOPERATION IN SPORTS Competitive sport has very variable practices which can celebrate confrontation or cooperation, depending, of course, on culture. Pepitone (1980), for example, reports that, in the United States, attitudes toward competition vary among children, depending on their social background. Those from underprivileged and rural milieux are less inclined to become involved in competitive activities. Other work has shown that culture influences the social use of competition. Indeed, for the Navajo Indians whom Allison and Luschen (1979) have studied, the main goal of competition is not to win but rather to affirm group solidarity. In this example, competition even elicits embarrassment since dominating one’s adversary and using the body to impose oneself are not valued in their culture.7 Sports competitions can also serve as the context for an encounter in which the actors cooperate for the production of an identity (see, for example, Francophone identities in Dallaire and Denis, 2000). Thus competition is often a pretext for cooperation rather than a quest for victory. If the time-honoured saying that ‘playing is more important than winning’ is little more than a cliché in major sporting events, it is a more influential ethic in other sports competitions. Thus in most countries there are numerous grassroots contests in which the primary motives for participation are such factors as social bonding, conviviality or the pleasure of taking part in a shared activity. Competition, therefore, is more a pretext than an end in itself. One need only consider such contests as the Médoc Marathon, which takes place in the vineyards of Bordeaux in

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France, and where the final results are based on the quality of participants’ fancy dress as well as their time. The event has more to do with the party atmosphere than with the race, and participants can taste the local wines and produce during the run (Bessy, 2000). The Internet site of the Médoc Marathon (2006) states that the event is aimed at ‘those for whom sport is synonymous with health, enjoyment and conviviality. Anyone dour, aggressive or obsessed with performance should stay away’ (my translation). Thus, the event positions itself in opposition to traditional forms of competition, which are considered to be too combative and not convivial enough. The Médoc Marathon is not unusual; indeed there is a wide variety of sporting events in which the notion of competition is no more than an excuse. The Gay Games would be a case in point. These are organized in a number of countries and attach more importance to cooperation and social bonding than to rivalry. These and similar competitions are not about achieving victory over others, but rather in relation to oneself. This is managed by avoiding competitive situations in which there is only one winner while all the other participants are losers. The approach explains the refusal of the games’ organizers to adopt the classic model of competition, preferring a different ethos instead. Tom Waddell, a former Olympian who started the Gay Games, points out that ‘You don’t win by beating someone else. We defined winning as doing your very best. That way, everyone is a winner’ (Messner, 1994: 126). While there is intensive media coverage for competitive events, sport cannot be reduced exclusively to competition and spectacle. It would be wrong to consider sport as a homogeneous culture and to focus only on the dominant and mediatized forms of competitive sport. There is a diversity of sports cultures which it would be wrong to ignore, although segregation and sexism in sport frequently result in the devaluation of certain practices and groups. Sport is also made up of a set of minority practices, far removed

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from the major institutions, in which people meet, create bonds and cooperate without any consideration of rivalry or competition. Consider the gatherings of roller skating enthusiasts, which are common in major cities, where thousands of people meet without seeking confrontation or ranking.8 In fact these devotees report that the social bonding is more important than performance or winning. Clearly acknowledging the diversity of sport and of the forms of sporting participation, as well as giving attention to the acts of cooperation which they entail, should not lead to an idealized vision of sport. Work on globalization (Harvey and Saint-Germain, 1995; Maguire, 1999) and on the loss of autonomy within the field of sport – with respect to the media, to marketing and to the economy (Rowe, 1999; Sugden and Tomlinson, 1998) – has shown that sporting spectacles and the way sport is practised remain very much at the mercy of political and economic forces.

CONCLUDING REMARKS In conclusion, making an a priori opposition of the concepts of competition, conflict and cooperation appears to be problematic. We have observed the wide variety of social uses made of sport, including competition, which can be an occasion for rivalry or a pretext for cooperation. A gulf exists, however, between the diversity of sport’s uses and the most visible forms of sports culture, particularly the way it is presented in the media. Despite the many nuances that can be applied, representations of sport contribute to the essentialization of social difference and give the impression that competition is the normal, even the sole form of social relations. Competitive sport is presented as a democratic ideal that cancels out social difference in favour of equality of opportunity (Erhenberg, 1991). It frequently promotes the idea of a society where, through work, activity and determination, every individual

has the same opportunities in social competition, and each must construct his or her own success. This is an anti-deterministic view of the social order. What is at stake in sport and in its mediatized competitions is not, therefore, only of concern to sociologists of sport. The sociocultural context that has shaped the processes of identity construction has favoured these uses of sport, thereby contributing to an inflation of practices, images and commentaries about competition. The decline of the ‘great narratives’ (Lyotard, 1979) and of class conflict as points of reference for identity has upset the symbolic organization of societies and exacerbated problems associated with the construction of the self in modernity (Kaufmann, 2004). Narratives built around competitive sport are part of a much more general evolution of social identities, and contribute to the construction of new modes of selfhood. The idealization of individuals and communities who succeed through their talent is a dramatization of the role of individual will and merit, and reinforces the idea that success does not depend on one’s social background (Erhenberg, 1991). Thus competition is not simply a codified contest, but also a backdrop for social interaction. If we are not careful, the ‘de-socialization’ and naturalization of performance through the lens of competitive sport may bolster the idea that competition, whether against others or oneself, is the sole legitimate ideology by which human behaviour may be understood.

NOTES 1 I make a point of thanking Ann Denis and Devorah Kalekin-Fishman for their help as editors and as ‘rewriters’ of the English version of the text. It goes without saying that the text itself is completely my responsibility. 2 We will deal mainly with Western sociology, mostly European and North-American, and thus with Western sport. There has been research in Japan, China, South Korea, and also in South America and other countries, but apart from the language difficulty, that work was not available to me.

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3 Articles concerning the sociology of sport published before January 2004. 4 The content of three international journals, International Review for Sociology of Sport (n=157), the Journal of Sport and Social Issues (n=140) and the Sociology of Sport Journal (n=186), was analyzed for the period between 1990 and 1996. 5 This is not about class conflict, but more broadly any conflict of interests among individuals or groups. 6 ‘Specifically, in top sport, the problem is that self-interest is justified within the logic of competing; the rationality of competing does not support the cooperation needed for the proposed solution’ (Heikkala, 1993). 7 It is doubtless true that the processes of the globalization of sporting cultures may have had the effect of reducing these cultural specificities and imposing a more unified competitive model (Maguire, 1999). 8 When asked about motivation – ’What does participating in sport [as a player or spectator] mean to you?’ – the answers ‘sport is for being with close friends’ (75%) and ‘sport is for meeting people’ (63%) far exceed the answer ‘sport is about performance’ (42%) (Mignon and Truchot, 2002).

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Heargreaves, John E. (1986) Sport, Power and Culture. Cambridge: Polity Press. Harvey, Jean and Saint-Germain, Maurice (1995) ‘L’industrie et la politique canadiennes du sport en contexte de mondialisation’, Sociologie et sociétés, XXVII(1): 33–52. Heikkala, Juha (1993) ‘Discipline and Excel: Technologies of the Self and Body and the Logic of Competing’, Sociology of Sport Journal, 10: 397–412. Hoch, Paul (1972) Rip Off the Big Game. NY: Doubleday and Company. Holt, Richard (1992) Sport and the British. A Modern History. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Howell, Jeremy W., Andrews, David L. and Jackson. Steve J. (2002) ‘Cultural and Sport Studies: An Interventionist Practice’, in J. Maguire and K. Young (eds.) Theory, Sport and Society. Oxford: Elsivier. pp. 151–77. Jackson, Steve J. and Andrews, David L. (2005) Sport, Culture and Advertising. Identities, Commodities and the Politics of Representation. London, N. Y.: Routledge. Kaufmann, Jean-Claude (2004) L’invention de soi. Une théorie de l’identité. Paris: ArmandColin. Laberge, Suzanne (1995) ‘Toward an Integration of Gender into Bourdieu’s Concept of Cultural Capital’, Sociology of Sport Journal, 12: 132–46. Laberge, Suzanne (2004) ‘Les rapports sociaux de sexe dans le domaine du sport: perspectives féministes marquantes des trois dernières décennies’, Recherches féministes, 17(1): 9–38. Luschen, Günther (1970) ‘Cooperation, Association, and Contest’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 14(1): 21–34. Lyotard, Jean-François (1979) La condition postmoderne. Paris: Minuit. MacNeill, Margaret (1988) ‘Active Women, Media Representations and Ideology’, in J. Harvey and H. Cantelon (eds.) Not Just a Game: Essays in Canadian Sport Sociology. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press. pp. 195–211. Maguire, Joseph (1999) Global Sport. Cambridge: Polity Press. McCarthy, David and Jones, Robin L. (1997) ‘Speed, Agression, Strength, and Tactical Naïveté. The Portrayal of the Black Soccer Player at Television’, Journal of Sport and Social Issues 21(4): 348–62.

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12 Controversies as Sites of Conflict and Collaboration: Insights from Sociology of the Arts Jan Marontate

INTRODUCTION Conflict and collaboration have been depicted as opposing poles in studies of theoretical and methodological approaches (Burrell and Morgan, 1982). In sociology of the arts no single theoretical framework prevails, but notions related to these ideas occupy an important place in the field. The first part of this chapter presents selected theoretical frameworks of importance for contemporary work in sociology of the arts and discusses them in connection with the themes of this volume: conflict, competition and cooperation. The second part of the chapter presents research on art controversies and discusses how controversies can serve as observation points for the study of society. Controversies may be considered sites of conflict (between groups with divergent values and practices) and sites of collaboration (in establishing consensus and coordinated action within groups).

We argue that research about art controversies provides rich insights into values and practices in art worlds and in society more generally.

CONFLICT AND COLLABORATION IN THE FIELD OF SOCIOLOGY OF THE ARTS

Studying the arts sociologically There are many ways of studying the arts sociologically. Research in sociology of the arts focuses on processes such as artistic production (or creation), mediation, and reception (or consumption) as well as the values and practices of people, networks and organizations involved with these processes (Zolberg, 1990). Increased general interest in the field has been stimulated by cultural analysts and policymakers who have identified

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SITES OF CONFLICT AND COLLABORATION

the arts as a critical component for community well-being and economic vitality in contemporary society (Florida, 2002). In addition to drawing on toolkits developed by sociologists, sociologists of the arts also sometimes engage with scholarly debates rooted in other fields, among them: musicology, art history, literary theory, film studies, cultural studies, political science, economics, arts management, museology, philosophy and aesthetics (Bennett, 2000 [1995]; Clifford, 1998; Levine, 1980; Lopes, 2002; Nochlin, 1973 [1971]). Some scholars working in humanistic traditions maintain that art expresses aesthetic values and is created by exceptional geniuses who are somehow ‘outside’ of society. As Vera Zolberg, a founding member of the sociology of art research committee of the International Sociological Association, observed, proponents of these ‘internal’ approaches in the humanities have opposed the ‘external’ approaches favoured in sociology (Zolberg, 1990). Their arguments are similar to those expressed by historians and philosophers of science and technology who reject sociological approaches. But few sociologists of the arts advocate the extreme forms of relativism and social constructivism associated with the ‘strong programme’ for social studies of science (Barnes and Bloor, 1982; Mukerji, 1994). Sociologists of the arts do, however, differ among themselves about whether and how to take aesthetics or specific characteristics of artworks and artists into account in their research (Heinich, 2002; Hennion, 2002; Léontsini, 2002; Zolberg, 2005). How can sociologists make meaningful statements about patterns in the arts while recognizing the distinctive qualities or ‘singularity’ of artworks or artists? Nathalie Heinich created an insightful, somewhat irreverent typology of positions adopted by researchers in reflections on ‘what art does to sociology’ (1998a). She identified various stances adopted by researchers, including anti-reductivist (emphasizing aesthetic qualities of the art), critical, descriptive, pluralist, relativist and committed stances (akin to

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‘action research’). She favours a neutral stance that confronts the apparent incommensurability between the nomothetic bent of sociology (with its search for patterns and laws) and the ostensibly ideographic character of singularities associated with distinctive artistic events. Heinich argues that singularities in the arts, such as the practice of breaking with past artistic traditions by innovators in the contemporary visual arts, may be considered features of patterns of behaviour associated with social recognition processes in contemporary art (Heinich, 1998b, 1998c, 2000). Other sociologists have developed different theories and methodological strategies that take aesthetics into account in varied ways. For example, Tia DeNora (2003) has proposed a way of studying musical events that embraces the complex interplay between characteristics of music and the meaning-making processes of listeners who are considered active agents in an interpretative approach she has called ‘music sociology’. Zolberg (2005) and Jacobs and Hanrahan (2005) have argued that aesthetic sensibilities have emerged as a central theme in scholarly work in the sociology of culture, and that this ‘aesthetic turn’ in scholarly research provides new avenues for re-invigorating ways of thinking about agency and structure. Models of agency adopted by sociologists of the arts vary, with profound consequences for research design. Vocabulary varies too. Specific terms may be selected or avoided in order to evoke different approaches: for example ‘arts consumption’ and ‘reception’ imply different views of cognition and praxis. ‘Consumption’ is often used in arts management studies by advocates of quantitative methods focused on predicting behaviour or organizational analysis, while ‘reception’ is more commonly used in interpretative work that seeks to understand lived experience and meaning-making. However, more than one theoretical framework and methodological approach may be associated with the exactly the same term. For example the term ‘production of art’ (as opposed to

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‘creation’) might signal a positivist orientation or refer to Pierre Bourdieu’s complex notions about the ‘field of cultural production’ or to Richard Peterson’s ‘production of culture’ perspective. Several prominent approaches engage with notions related to conflict, competition and cooperation in distinctive ways. Let us consider the place of conflict and collaboration in selected perspectives that have marked sociological research on the arts and informed emerging new perspectives, among them: Marxist and neo-Marxist approaches, symbolic interactionism, neo-structuralism and the ‘production of culture approach’.

Conflict as a basis for social action and Marxist approaches Approaches that emphasize conflict as a core element in social processes related to research on the arts and culture were popular with sociologists in Latin America, Frenchspeaking Canada, Britain, France and elsewhere in Europe during the twentieth century, but have been less important in English-speaking North American scholarship interested in the arts (Wolff, 1981). Seminal early work by Marxist sociologists such as Theodor Adorno, Antonio Gramsci and Lucien Goldmann conducted during the middle of the twentieth century continues to fuel debates about the place of class-based tastes and aesthetic practices in processes of domination and resistance. Adorno (1962) suggested that certain art forms and practices associated with them stimulate cognitive process and enhance critical thinking (i.e., classical music in the Western traditions he admired) whereas American culture industries promoted art forms (like popular music broadcast on radio stations) that can induce passivity or states of consciousness that are detrimental to society and human consciousness. Others disagree with this negative assessment of the place of popular art forms in social life, contending that artistic phenomena catering to working class values or ‘low brow’ tastes can challenge elitist

hegemony in creative ways (Fiske, 1993). Studies of art forms associated with popular culture (like graffiti or country music) sometimes focus on how these forms of artistic expression express resistance and create new genres. However, many art forms now associated with ‘high culture’ and elites, like opera or Shakespearean theatre, once catered to ‘low-brow’ audiences (DiMaggio, 1991; Levine, 1980). Popular and outsider art forms have served as resources for artistic avantgardes and inspired social movements. Nonetheless, the appropriation of styles and content associated with marginalized groups does not necessarily signal democratization of the arts (Marcus, 1998; Michaels, 1993 [1987]). Western high culture institutions and art markets continue to marginalize many ‘minority’ artists (such as women and non-white males) and their work (Trajtenberg, 2003). Relations between artistic genres and taste are frequently examined from the perspective of conflict theory, however early critical theorists often failed to take into account the specificity of aesthetic content and tended not to test their theories with systematic observation. Sociologists of the arts have generally moved towards a more nuanced understanding of art–society relations with a greater emphasis on empirical testing (Lee and Peterson, 2004; Lena, 2004). Nonetheless, the legacy of conflict theory persists, even in non-Marxist perspectives. Marxist aesthetics combined with insights from psychology and semiotics have contributed to new ways of considering ‘substantive content’ (i.e., aesthetic and symbolic characteristics of artworks) by examining works as ‘texts’ or codes. Moreover, art world participants may ‘use’ the arts in diverse manners that are not necessarily in conflict, even though the uses are different (Marontate, 2004a, 2004b). In this connection scholars have revisited Adorno’s complex oeuvre (DeNora, 2003; Witkin, 1998, 2002). DeNora’s approach integrates the interplay of the qualities of music, consciousness and agency in studies of how people engage with music in everyday life, passively and actively, in ways that make

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music-listening a technology of the self adding new dimensions to Adorno’s ideas about reception (DeNora, 2000). Others propose more macroscopic approaches that feature conflict and cooperation in a national or world systems perspectives (Luhmann, 2000; Trajtenberg, 2002, 2005).

Art worlds as sites of collaboration Art worlds are also studied as sites of collaboration. Note here the choice of the term ‘collaboration’ instead of ‘cooperation’. Collaboration means working together and implies active agency. ‘Cooperation’ is a form of collaboration but it is more restrictive since it implies working together for a specific shared goal of common interest. Instances of cooperation in this narrower sense do occur in the arts (for example, in artists’ collectives, professional associations or special interest groups); however, the more general notion of ‘working together’ implied by the term ‘collaboration’ seems better suited to much sociological analysis of the arts. Howard Becker proposed a highly influential model of the social organization of the arts in what he termed ‘art worlds’. His work is rooted in interpretative sociology, notably in symbolic interactionism, but has been deeply marked by his own creative experiences in his work as a jazz musician (Becker, 1982, 2005). In his model participants in art worlds develop creative relationships through shared conventions, consensus and collaboration. ‘Art worlds’ include various types of participants, some with roles outside occupational categories traditionally associated with the arts (for example, camera equipment manufacturers). Art worlds differ according to the form of collaboration and level of integration of artists. Participants may be involved with more than one art world at a time, for example a musician in a symphony orchestra might also perform with a band in jazz clubs. People may participate in more than one way. An art conservator working in a museum may serve as an arts administrator for an artists’ cooperative. A jazz musician may also play Italian popular

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music or Yiddish tunes at weddings or Bar Mitzvah celebrations. Becker identified four main types of artists in terms of their degree of integration with a ‘system’ of aesthetic values and practices: integrated professionals (who work within the conventions of their art world in highly structured organizational frameworks, like classical musicians in symphonies), mavericks (who know the rules of the game but choose not to follow them), folk artists (who work in genres with shared traditions and utilitarian uses, like quilt-makers) and naïve artists. Becker’s model is widely considered to be more egalitarian than Pierre Bourdieu’s ‘high culture model’, in part because Becker acknowledges the work of individuals not always associated with art making (such as technicians), and in part because he recognizes different types of art worlds as distinct entities rather than as lesser or imperfect forms of artistic practice. However, Becker’s model is not wholly egalitarian, since it ranks types of art worlds in comparison with highly structured elites.

The high culture model as an arena for competition Sociologists of the arts are not only concerned with direct participants in artistic creation. Publics, fans, connoisseurs and patrons have played crucial roles in structuring both popular and high culture art forms (Martorella, 1995). Arts organizations shape (but are influenced by) social boundaries and practices. Participants in dissemination processes like critics, gallery owners and impresarios may serve as gatekeepers in processes that define and legitimate practices in conflicts and in collaborative endeavours (Balfe, 1993; Crane, 1987; Fournier and RoyValex, 2002; Moulin, 1987; Shrum, 1996). In the so-called ‘high culture model’ agents or actors compete for power and position in a field with a hierarchical structure (Bourdieu, 1993). Organizational structures of arts institutions and patterns of patronage are often intimately connected to status distinctions

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and power relations. Formal organizations may provide either an arena for conflict and competition among agents vying for position in an artistic field or a milieu for collaboration (DiMaggio, 1986; Marontate, 2005). Paul DiMaggio (1992) studied how the use of not-for-profit organizational models in theatre, opera and the dance in the United States promoted institutional change and transformed status hierarchies, creating new elites. Although the high culture model is associated with elite tastes and learned culture, it is also used in research about the persistence of inequalities and the failure of democratization efforts to erase class boundaries. Elite participants in arts organizations have sometimes tried to balance prestige with diversity and accessibility (Ostrower, 2002). In research on the social production (and reproduction) of culture Pierre Bourdieu developed core concepts associated with the high culture model that are now used by many sociologists of the arts (sometimes rather indiscriminately), among them, cultural capital, habitus and the notion of the creation of belief in the value of symbolic goods (Bourdieu, 1984, 1993, 1996; Bourdieu et al., 1991/1969). His work on taste as class-based predilections and a process distinction met with opposition from some sociologists. For example, Antoine Hennion (2001) rejects the idea of ‘objective’ distance and insists on understanding the meaning-making practices of people involved with the arts in a version of actor-network theory applied to the study of taste as a reflexive performative mediation practice. Hennion proposes that a sort of collaboration occurs between artworks and art-lovers (who he calls ‘amateurs’) in a co-production of aesthetic experience and aesthetic object.

The production of culture perspective and other new approaches Richard Peterson’s ‘production of culture perspective’ has different origins than Bourdieu’s

‘field of cultural production’ despite similarities in their names (Peterson, 1976). It is rooted in American empiricism and maintains that the symbolic content of culture is shaped by the context in which it is produced and disseminated. The perspective encourages systematic observation. For example, Peterson observed that collaboration among music promoters, musicians and fans was crucial for the invention of conventions that came to define country music, but competition and conflicts were factors in change and innovation (Peterson, 1997). His work has been influential on research about the interplay of the arts, media and informally-produced culture enhancing understanding of artistic ‘scenes’ as social phenomena (Alexander, 2003; DiMaggio, 2000; Dowd, 2002). Other recent research is founded on quite different ontological and epistemological assumptions. Sociological approaches to the study of aesthetic phenomena as singularities have been developed in connection with research on the working lives of arts professionals (Heinich, 1993, 1998b, 1998c; Marontate, 2001). The very notion of ‘career’ in the arts is marked by tensions between the idea that career profiles develop in a predictable pattern with routine stages and systems of artistic recognition premised on originality and unique practices that distinguish new art from non-art and avant-garde artists from their predecessors (Heinich, 1998c). The need to be recognized as singular has became a pattern in contemporary artistic careers. Pierre-Michel Menger (1989, 1999) proposed that artists develop careers through a series of strategic choices and a succession of jobs. Work may be difficult to distinguish from training opportunities. Menger observed that performing artists confront the precariousness of the demand for their services by developing strategies for rational diversification analogous to the sort of risk management practiced by managers of investment portfolios. Rather than ‘putting all their eggs in one basket’ they develop networks of clients and employers to maximize their chances of finding remuneration at any given moment.

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Artists do not always make ‘rational’ choices from an economic standpoint. Given a choice between roles, actors did not always choose the highest paid position but the one with the best chance of enhancing future opportunities (for example choosing roles in prestigious performance venues). Research on artistic labour markets suggests that patterns observed in the arts may be useful for anticipating broader trends relevant for the future of work (Menger, 2003). Work in the arts is characterized by rapidly changing tastes, strong seasonal variations, irregular remuneration and multiple concomitant part-time employment. The trajectories of artists’ working lives, marked with insecurity and competition, may provide insights into twenty-first century patterns of working lives in the new economy in other fields (Marontate, 2002). Studies of outsider art and non-Western art forms suggest that art worlds may be diversifying but symbolic and material boundaries maintain inequalities in access to resources and recognition (Griswold, 2000; Kasfir, 1999; Zolberg and Cherbo, 1997). Only a select coterie of artists attains national and international recognition. Controversial art may be suppressed even destroyed because it commemorates events that powerful groups prefer to forget or expresses values that offend (Lubar, 1996; Roth and Sala, 1998; Tota, 2001, 2002; Wagner-Pacifici and Schwartz, 1998).

ART CONTROVERSIES AS OBSERVATION POINTS FOR STUDYING SOCIETY Studying cases in which art is rejected, attacked, destroyed or neglected can help us understand the multiple meanings of art and provide insights into more general sociological issues raised by the notions of conflict, competition and cooperation (Marontate, 1998, 1999). Art controversies do not simply constitute a paradigmatic case of social conflict

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but conflict is always present. Controversies also provide a rallying point for collaboration among like-minded participants. Methodologically, art controversies provide opportunities for observing how antagonists make sense of their world and actively work to shape society. Controversies may be seen as social events in which antagonists express themselves about ‘usual’ patterns, communicate their expectations by highlighting rules they believe have been broken and justify their positions (Boltanski and Thévenot, 1991; Canguilhem, 1975; Gamboni, 1997).

REJECTION AND DESTRUCTION OF ART AS FORMS OF RECEPTION Dario Gamboni (1997) observed that the rejection and destruction of art is not a new phenomenon. ‘Vandalism’ was named after violent fifth century invaders who destroyed imperial monuments. ‘Iconoclasm’ was a method to enforce the official Byzantine doctrine devoted to eliminating the worship of graven images. Ironically ‘iconoclasm’ is often used in a way which gives cultural legitimacy to destructive acts since it acknowledges that the people who damage or destroy artworks do so consciously. It also underlines the power of artistic representations in society; otherwise there would be no need to destroy them. On the other hand ‘vandalism’ commonly refers to senseless acts, committed without intention. Vandals are seen as ignorant people unaware of the values embodied in works they destroy. Yet, even acts that may appear gratuitous can engender a sort of dialogue providing insights into the interplay of material and symbolic culture. In Gamboni’s words, ‘works of art are rarely – though not never – meant to be degraded or destroyed. It follows that attacks generally represent a break in the intended communication (pattern) or a departure from the “normal” attitudes and modes of communication ...’ (Gamboni, 1997: 11). Thus, acts of aggression are acts of communication,

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too, expressing different attitudes about morality, ethics, politics and aesthetics. Gamboni’s research in this area began with a study of a 1980 outdoor exhibition of modern sculpture in Bienne, Switzerland in which over half the works were willfully damaged or destroyed. This was surprising because outdoor art exhibitions had been held there for 25 years without incident. There were no simple explanations. Gamboni (1983) examined events leading up to the show and the context. Publicized conflicts among the exhibition’s organizers, and reports of large expenditures in this town of skilled labourers badly hit by rising unemployment had set the stage for public outrage. The exhibition was installed in a public park making regular park users (largely working class men) a captive audience and intruding on their leisure space. Purchase of a hard-tofind exhibition catalogue was necessary for informed viewing. Gamboni found many different explanations for the rejection of specific works. For example, works made of expensive materials displaying technical skills valued in industry suffered less damage than pieces in less conventional materials, perhaps due to the anger of unemployed factory workers at the use of public funds to subsidize what they saw as poor craftsmanship. Nude sculptures (which are commonplace in art museums) were surprising and offensive to some members of the general public. One case attracted considerable publicity: the destruction of an installation by Gerald Minkoff called ‘Video Piece’ by the town’s chief gardener who was taken to court. The work consisted of painted television sets that had been partly buried in a design that spelled out in Braille the equivalent of ‘I see’. The pattern could only be perceived from an aerial view making the work inaccessible to the blind (or sighted viewers without an airplane and knowledge of Braille). The gardener claimed he had mistaken the work for garbage. When ordered by the judge to pay the artist damages, the gardener countered

with a newspaper advertisement asking for donations of old T.V. sets with the idea of replacing the work himself, heaping insult onto injury from the point of view of the artist by implying that anyone could remake this work of art.

Transgression and the ‘rules of the game’ in contemporary art Art controversies are forms of social interaction frequently associated with ‘successful’ recent art. Nathalie Heinich (1998c) maintains that controversies are intrinsic features of recognition processes in the field of the contemporary visual arts. She identified a three-fold process that is reminiscent of a French children’s game called ‘the hot hand’. The game involves keeping one’s hand on top of others in a frantic rules-oriented game of transgression (of norms by artists), rejection (of works by publics) and integration (of new art into artistic canons by peers and gatekeepers). New art deliberately challenges boundaries between good taste and bad, between art and non-art, fomenting conflict between uninitiated publics and art-world insiders. Consequently, new forms of contemporary art have become increasingly provocative as avant-gardes compete and art professionals collaborate in innovation processes that become difficult for publics to understand. Heinich maintains that indifference is purgatory for contemporary artists. Negative public reactions are preferable to indifference for artistic careers. Successful contemporary art generates social conflict but it must receive critical acclaim from art professionals and thus entails collaboration too (to establish consensus in art worlds). As well as the ‘game’ of transgression, rejection and assimilation produces an escalating sense of alienation in the general public because many tastes and values expressed in contemporary art worlds are irreconcilable with widely-held standards in civil society.

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Controversy as a forum for public debates about civil society: a case study Art controversies and the rejection of art by diverse publics inform us about more general social issues too (Balfe, 1993; Halle, 2002; Heinich, 1998b; Tota, 1997). For example, a conflict in the United Kingdom over the award of the prestigious Turner Prize provided a forum for debates that focused not only on art world politics and aesthetics, but also on social issues such as housing shortages, racism and poverty while garnering much publicity for participants (Button, 1999; Marontate, 1998). The Turner Prize, with a purse of £20,000, is awarded annually to a British artist under 50 years old for the ‘best artistic production’ in the year. Four finalists exhibit their work at the prestigious Tate Britain art gallery and become the topic of public debates. Demonstrators often stage protests about the choices, voicing objections on the basis of aesthetics, politics or morality, depending on the dominant discourse of the season. Since 1993, the Turner Prize has attracted much attention, thanks in part to another prize known as the ‘X Prize’ offered by the K Foundation in that year (K Foundation, 1993a). The K Foundation was formed by two musicians, Jimmy Cauty and Bill Drummond, members of a music group known then as ‘KLF’ (Kopyright Liberation Front). These musicians, who had made a fortune with techno-rave music, had outraged the music industry on the occasion of a music awards ceremony (the Brit Awards) that was televised live. They had been nominated for a relatively calm chill music album. For their performance at the Brit Awards gala, the musicians organized a raucous battle of the bands. Drummond pointed a machine gun at the audience and fired a round of blanks, embarrassing music industry representatives who lost face by ducking while on camera. They further dismayed gala participants by putting a dead sheep in the foyer of the

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theatre, a gesture that was all the more combative because the musicians they shared the stage with that night were militant vegetarians. When the K Foundation offered the X Prize, worth £40 000 (twice the value of the Turner Prize) for the worst work of art done by a British artists in 1993, observers first thought the offer was a hoax (Anonymous, 1993b, 1993c). The musicians launched an expensive publicity campaign that ridiculed the selection processes of prize competitions and poked fun at contemporary art (K Foundation, 1993b). One ad mimicked a grant application form but featured questions like ‘Numerous non-short listed artists believe they deserve the K Foundation Award prize money. Are they thus implying they deserve the £40 000 cash more than Amnesty International, Oxfam, Shelter ... or Battersea Dogs Home?’ (K Foundation, 1993c). Other ads had already indicated that the finalists for the X Prize competition had already been chosen, and were the same as the Turner prize finalists. One invited the public to vote, presenting a ballot under the heading ‘Let the People Choose’, with a message at the bottom of the ballot mocking political slogans used in election campaigns: ‘Remember that democracy is a gift, not a birthright’ (K Foundation, 1993b). The musicians paid for television commercials during the broadcast of the Turner Prize Awards, promising to ‘transform art history forever’. Estimates of the total cost to the musicians of the prize, advertisements and related activities went as high as £200,000 (Cooper, 1993; Lister, 1993). A young artist named Rachel Whiteread won both prizes, for the best and the worst in British art that year. She was judged on all of her artistic production in 1993, but particular attention was paid to a life-sized outdoor sculpture called ‘House’ that was made from poured concrete impressions of the interior of a Victorian home. The home was demolished and she reassembled the concrete slabs on the site turning the impressions of the inside of the building into outside walls.

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This expensive project was sponsored by Artangel, a non-profit foundation which solicits funds from the private sector for contemporary art. The principal corporate patrons were a brewery and a construction company, but the project was also partly subsidized by public funds. Issues related to the site, financing and iconography of the work were complex and inspired contradictory readings. Even Whiteread’s choice of materials – poured concrete – was significant since it made reference to the practice of British proprietors of blocking toilets in abandoned houses as a way of discouraging homeless squatters. Some saw this as an expression of solidarity with the homeless. However, the work was located on the site of a planned subsidized housing development and its presence there was delaying the construction of 67 homes for people with low incomes. On 23 November 1993 (one month after completion of the work and the very day the Turner prize jury announced its decision), city councillors voted for the demolition of the sculpture in order to allow the construction project to proceed as planned (Ellison and Donegan, 1993). A professional photographer had been hired to document each stage in the construction and these images were featured in a limited edition publication but Whiteread had deliberately avoided publicity before the installation was finished in order to maximize the impact of the completed work (Lingwood, 1995). After the unveiling a growing crowd of visitors came to see the work before it was demolished. Whiteread issued a statement declaring that she would refuse the X Prize. In response, the K Foundation threatened to burn the money at its own award ceremony if she didn’t accept it. They invited journalists from music magazines and the popular press to an award ceremony held three weeks after the Turner Prize awards (Cooper, 1993). Each guest was given a stack of bank notes and asked to nail it to a wooden panel in an elaborate frame. The finished ‘picture’ made of prize money was photographed before being

veiled and transported to the entrance of the Tate Gallery in a procession of limousines escorted by armoured tanks. Whiteread arrived three minutes late for the scheduled presentation ceremony and accepted the money. Denounced for staging a vulgar publicity stunt, the musicians responded with the publication of a catalogue of their own works of art, all made of banknotes nailed to framed panels which they offered for sale at half the face value of the materials. For £5000 a collector could buy the artwork called ‘Ten Thousand’ (made with £10,000 worth of banknotes) and make an immediate profit of £5000 by destroying the artwork and using the currency. Defenders insisted this expenditure confirmed the musicians’ genuine commitment to offering a critique of contemporary art worlds. (The Crown prosecuted them for defacing currency.) Dozens of articles about the events and the artwork were written by journalists, critics and art historians. Some found references to feminism and the body in the impressions of the interior walls. Others likened the work to major monuments of public art and architecture. Although art critics were on the whole delighted with the work, the general public and mainstream press reacted with shock, amusement and disdain (Farson, 1993). Cartoons and letters to the editors published in newspapers ridiculed the artists’ techniques, questioning their aesthetic worth and symbolism (Graham-Dixon, 1993). Much criticism centred on doubts about claims that the sculpture expressed solidarity with homeless people, a sentiment taken up in a cartoon showing squatters trapped in poured concrete (Williams, 1993). The cost of the project left others perplexed. Why spend all this money on an uninhabitable concrete mould instead of building a real house (Anonymous, 1993d)? There were also debates about the conditions for the construction of the work. The house was the last building situated in an historic community, but the former owner was an elderly man who didn’t want to leave and had refused to sell it to the construction

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company for demolition. What were the motives of the people who managed to convince him to leave his home expecting that an artist would memorialize his residence? Protests took many forms, including acts of vandalism – like splashed paint and graffiti. One hand-scrawled message read ‘homes for all—black and white’. Art world insiders claimed the controversy only served to consolidate evidence of the pertinence of the artist’s work. In the words of one jury member ‘Talent at the highest level attracts derision’ (Ellison and Donegan, 1993). Criticisms of the musicians continued. One cartoon depicted them as ‘art terrorists’ dressed as masked bandits holding the X Prize money (Anonymous, 1993a). The musicians portrayed themselves as iconoclasts, and presented their gesture as an assault against hypocritical and unfair elites, a rebellion against the very institution of prize competitions and a statement about the lack of opportunities for young artists and young people in general, targets that appealed to the adolescent fans of their techno-music. Questions about the sincerity of the musicians and the artist were irrelevant to many art world insiders because, as Heinich observed, in some art worlds controversy and rejection by uninitiated publics are common, at least for successful artists. The musicians had challenged conventions in the world of popular music too at their own award ceremony by expressing disdain for the people who honoured them and then later generated conflict with their injurious characterization of Whiteread’s work as the worst of the year. But respect for tradition is an expectation that applies to ordinary citizens, not to artists. The careers of the artist and many key figures in the controversy flourished. The musicians who funded the X Prize experienced financial and legal problems but soon resumed work as performing artists. The story of the reception and destruction of Whiteread’s work illustrates both how controversy and singular events contribute to recognition processes within art worlds and provide opportunities for public debates about broader issues in civil society.

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Art controversies and the new dynamics of culture, money and power Not-for-profit cultural institutions, like publicly-funded museums, have complex relations with wealthy patrons. Many have put in place arms-length governance policies that make arts professionals nominally responsible for aesthetic decisions, in order to reduce the influence of financiers or funding agencies and to enhance their credibility as cultural authorities (DiMaggio, 1991, 2000; Ostrower, 2002). However, recent art controversies provide evidence that economic forces have considerable power in art worlds, especially in arts institutions. In the context of the controversy in connection with the 1993 Turner and X Prizes the amount of money involved heightened public interest in the musicians who awarded the X Prize and in the artist who won both prizes. The musicians had spent a small fortune. Their advertisements and public statements suggested that hypocrites make money more important than artistic values, but by awarding their prize for the worst in British art they showed that an artist who creates artwork many people consider worthless can make a great deal of money. The young artist had, after all, won £60,000 and benefited from considerable funds to create an artwork that was destroyed. This outraged the former owner of the site the artist used. According to one observer: Mr. Gale [the former owner] couldn’t get his head around the idea that art money is funny money (as the K Foundation, in their confusion, were soon to prove). You don’t buy a new flat with this stuff. It’s theoretical, an equation that has to be balanced. It’s more like a signature or hallmark. Money is the guarantee of seriousness.… If you’re already famous, then it’s the material you work with, your medium. If you’re unknown and you cop an unexpected bundle from the Saatchi’s you are promoted directly into the heavy paper surveys. But you can’t spend this kind of cash. That would be like squeezing the juice from one of Zurbaran’s lemons. Contemporary art is about credit; the metamorphosis of money into power (Sinclair, 1993 reprinted in Lingwood, 1995: 22).

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Debates about the place of money in art worlds and the rights of those who contribute funds to control cultural institutions were central in another art controversy related to an exhibition called the ‘Sensation Show’ at the Brooklyn Museum in 1999–2000. The NY City Mayor Rudy Giuliani condemned the exhibition – sight unseen – and tried to punish the museum by withdrawing city funding. Giuliani claimed the show offended the public’s moral standards in matters of religion and sexuality. The mayor was derided in the press for his ignorance (embodied in his refusal to view the show) and accused of racism and self-serving political motives (in courting publicity to appeal to conservative voters). Giuliani’s wrath centered on Christopher Ofili’s use of elephant dung and images of genitalia from a pornographic magazine in a mixed media depiction of a black Virgin Mary done in a faux-naïve style. (Ofili is a Catholic of African heritage.) Commentators also impugned the motives of the show’s curators, the museum, other artists, and the show’s patron, Charles Saatchi, who owned many of the works. In addition to press coverage there was also systematic empirical research conducted on this case. Sociologist David Halle (2002) studied public attitudes towards censorship through interviews with visitors leaving the exhibition and a telephone survey. He found that people did not support censorship in ‘bounded’ institutions (that is, museums with entrance fees) as opposed to art in freelyaccessible public spaces. As we have seen, art world reputations that profit from controversies do so by converting notoriety into cultural capital and often (not incidentally) material capital. In the case of the ‘Sensation’ controversy, the museum, the artists and the collector who owned the works did just that. The museum was mobbed with visitors. Its director publicly defended the involvement of the collector with aesthetic decisions (the traditional realm of curators) in a statement posted on the museum’s website despite criticism that this private collector was using the museum to

increase the market value of his art collection. (Christie’s auction house handled the subsequent sale of some of the collection in 2000.) Had financial interests usurped the place of aesthetics as a gatekeeping principle? This open embrace of the authority of funding sources with economic interests constitutes a significant break with American traditions of art philanthropy and not-for-profit models of elite involvement in museums.

CONCLUDING REMARKS As we have observed, there is no single dominant theory or methodological stance in sociology of the arts but conflict, competition and collaboration have marked many approaches. Hierarchical models of the field of artistic production and reception that emphasize conflict and power relations have guided much research about organizational structures and recognition processes. Perspectives with different epistemological roots emphasize the place of collaboration and shared conventions in art worlds, particularly in work on creative processes and mediation. Interestingly, the idea of competition in sociology of the arts is associated with both collaboration and conflict, with inclusion and exclusion. In competition for recognition, artists must be recognized as artists to be included in processes that carry with them the risk of exclusion and that can engender controversy. Art controversies may bring notoriety to contemporary artists, but their meanings in art worlds and in general society differ. Controversies do not only involve art world subcultures or sectarian interest groups. Strong negative reactions demonstrate the power of art to stimulate discourse about issues that are often neglected in public discourse (Lavine, 1992). Controversies provide opportunities for the peaceful airing of opinions and differences in civil society, promoting solidarity among like-minded participants, and have the potential to inspire cultural change but conflict is always present.

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Studies of art controversies provide insights that are relevant for other research areas in sociology, among them: sociology of organizations, sociology of work and occupations, research methodology, sociological theory and political sociology. For example, they provide opportunities for understanding disputes in other areas. In research about forms of justifications used by opponents with irreconcilable differences in various types of disputes, Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot (1991) proposed a typology of appeals to higher authority used to justify positions (such as political philosophies of civic worth or market worth). The trick, of course, for competitors is to arrange the hierarchy of justice in such a way that one’s own set of criteria prevails. Justifications based on the market place are only one element in public debates about art but economic issues often surface in controversies. Boltanski and Chiapello (1999) developed a theory about the ‘new spirit of capitalism’ that identified changing attitudes towards money in civil society. They adopt a minimalist notion of capitalism as a cycle of conversion of capital into goods and then back into capital resulting in an unlimited accumulation of wealth premised on consumption. This neo-capitalist ideology justifies commitment to economic goals and profit-making becomes a moral imperative. Profit-making is considered ‘desirable, interesting, exciting, innovative or meritorious’ with dire consequences for the poor and for public welfare more generally (Chiapello, 1999: 95). Social inequalities escalate, inducing a generalized political nihilism. If we reconsider the case studies of controversies presented in this chapter from this perspective, acceptance of the open intervention of economic forces in art worlds may be seen as a manifestation of neo-capitalist logic with profound implications for the study of broader socio-political trends. Sociological research on art controversies has the potential to provide insights into how groups negotiate authority and arrive at a sense of justice in a changing world, helping us to better understand ways in which conflicts and

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collaborations shape and are shaped by the new dynamics of art, money and power in contemporary society.

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Hennion, Antoine (2001) ‘Music Lovers: Taste as Performance’, Theory, Culture and Society, 18(5): 1–22. Hennion, Antoine (2002) ‘Quelques remarques sur la pragmatique et la réflexivité’, Sociologie et Sociétés, XXXIV(2): 219–22. Jacobs, Mark and Hanrahan, Nancy (eds.) (2005) Blackwell Companion to the Sociology of Culture. NY: Blackwell. Kasfir, Sidney (1999) ‘African Art and Authenticity: A Text with a Shadow’, in Olu Oguibe and Okwui Envezo (eds.) Reading the Contemporary: African Art from Theory to the Marketplace. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. pp: 89–113. K Foundation (1993a) Advertisements, Sunday Times, August 29: 9–14. K Foundation (1993b) Advertisement (‘Artists Are Not Fulfilling Their Responsibilities to Produce Work Worthy of the Very Late 20th Century. Why?), The Observer, November 7: 8. Lavine, Steven (1992) ‘Audience, Ownership and Authority: Designing Relations between Museums and Communities’, in Ivan Karp, Christine Mullen Kreamer and Steven D. Lavine (eds.) Museums and Communities. Washington: Smithsonian Institution. pp. 137–57. Lee, S. and Peterson, R. A. (2004) ‘Internetbased Virtual Music Scenes’, in A. Bennett and R. A. Peterson (eds.) Music Scenes. Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press. pp. 187–204. Lena, J. (2004) ‘Meaning and Membership’, Poetics, 32: 297–310. Léontsini, Mary (2002) ‘Questions de contexte: théories postmodernes et déconstruction’, Sociologie et Sociétés. XXXIV(2): 223–8. Levine, Laurence (1980) Highbrow/Lowbrow: The Emergence of Cultural Hierarchy in America. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Lingwood, James (1995) Rachel Whiteread: House. London: Phaidon. Lister, David (1993) ‘Money to Burn in an Eccentric Cause’, Independent, November 24. Lopes, Paul (2002) The Rise of a Jazz Art World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lubar, Steven (1996) ‘Exhibiting Memories’, Museum News, 75: 60–1, 71–3. Luhmann, Niklas (2000) Art as a Social System. Standford: Stanford University Press. Marcus, George E. (1998) ‘Censorship in the Heart of Difference: Cultural Property,

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Indigenous Peoples’ Movements, and Challenges to Western Liberal Thought’, in Robert Post (ed.) Censorship and Silencing: Practices of Cultural Regulation. Santa Monica: Getty. pp. 221–42. Marontate, Jan (1998) ‘The Critical Power of Destructive Acts: A Case Study of Transgression and Recognition in Contemporary Art Worlds’, paper presented at a Conference on Social Theory, Politics and the Arts. Philadelphia: Drexel University. Marontate, Jan (1999) ‘L’anti-prix comme acte social: vers une esthétique de la subversion’, in Jean-Olivier Majastre and Alain Pessin (eds.) Du Canular dans l’art et la littérature. Logiques Sociales. Paris: L’Harmattan. pp. 169–88. Marontate, Jan (2001) ‘Singularities and the Sociological Imagination: On Nathalie Heinich’s Sociology of the Arts’, Boekmancahier, 13(48): 210–29. Marontate, Jan (2002) ‘Les rapports d’appartenance et l’art contemporain en région périphérique’, Sociologie et Société, XXIV(2): 139–62. Marontate, Jan (2004a) ‘Le vécu inattendu comme défi au statut artistique de l’œuvre: l’art public non controversé’, in Alain Pessin (ed.) Les non-publics. Les arts en réception(s). Paris: L’Harmattan, Vol. II, pp. 49–67. Marontate, Jan (2004b) ‘Technical Standards and Institutionalization Processes in New Deal Art Projects’, Journal of Arts Management, Law and Society, Winter, 33(4): 281–98. Marontate, Jan (2005) ‘Museums and the Constitution of Collective Memory’, in Jacobs and Hanrahan (eds.) Blackwell Companion to the Sociology of Culture. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 286–302. Martorella, Rosanne (ed.) (1995) Art and Business. An International Perspective on Sponsorship. London: Praeger. Menger, Pierre-Michel (1989) ‘Rationalité et incertitude de la vie d’artiste’, Année Sociologique, 39: 111–51. Menger, Pierre-Michel (1999) ‘Artistic Labor Markets and Careers’, Annual Review of Sociology, 25: 541–74. Menger, Pierre-Michel (2003) Portrait de l’artiste en travailleur. Métamorphoses du capialisme. Paris: Le Seuil. Michaels, Eric (1993 [1987]) Bad Aboriginal Art: Tradition, Media and Technological

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Horizons. Theory Out of Bounds Series. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Moulin, Raymonde (1987) The French Art Market: A Sociological View. New Haven: Rutgers University Press. Mukerji, Chandra (1994) ‘Toward a Sociology of Material Culture: Science Studies, Cultural Studies and the Meanings of Things’, in Diana Crane (ed.) The Sociology of Culture. Cambridge: Blackwell. pp. 143–62. Nochlin, Linda (1973 [1971]) ‘Why Have There Been No Great Women Artists?’, in Thomas Ness and Elizabeth Baker, (eds.) Art and Sexual Politics: Women’s Liberation, Women Artists, and Art History. NY: Macmillan. pp. 1–43. Ostrower, Francie (2002) Trustees of Culture. Power, Wealth and Status on Elite Arts Boards. Chicago: University Chicago Press. Peterson, R. A. (ed.) (1976) The Production of Culture. Beverly Hills: Sage. Peterson, R. A. (1997) Creating Country Music: Fabricating Authenticity. Chicago: University Chicago Press. Roth, Michael and Sala, Charles (1998) Disturbing Remains: Memory, History and Crisis in the Twentieth Century. Los Angeles: Getty Institute for the History of Art and the Humanities. Shrum, W. (1996) Fringe and Fortune: The Role of Critics in High and Popular Art. Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press. Sinclair, Ian (1993) ‘The House in the Park: A Psychogeographical Response,’ reprinted in James Lingwood (1995), Rachel Whiteread: House. London: Phaidon. p. 22. Tota, Anna Lisa (1997) Ethnografia dell’arte. Per una sociologie dei contesti artistici. Rome: Logica. Tota, Anna Lisa (ed.) (2001) La memoria contesa. Studi sulla comunicazione sociale del passato. Milan: FrancoAngeli.

Tota, Anna Lisa (2002) Homeless Memories: How Societies Forget Their Past, Studies in Communication Sciences, 1: 193–214. Trajtenberg, G. (2002) ‘Plastic Arts and NationBuilding in Israel’, Nations and Nationalism, 8(2): 215–34. Trajtenberg, Graciela (2003) ‘Modernisms in Action: Comparing the Relationship between Visual Arts, Social Classes and Politics in Israeli Nation-Building’, Comparative Social Research, 21: 87–109. Trajtenberg, Graciela (2005) Between Nationalism and Art – the Construction of the Israeli Field of Art During the Yishuv Period and the State’s First Years. Jerusalem: The Hebrew University Magnes Press. Wagner-Pacifici, Robin and Schwartz, Barry (1998) ‘The Ambiguous and Contested Meaning of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial’, in Philip Smith (ed.) The New American Cultural Sociology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 151–66. Williams, Kipper (1993) ‘The Lady and the Wimp’, Time Out, November 3–10: 178. Witkin, Robert W. (1998) Adorno on Music, International Library of Sociology. London: Routledge. Witkin, Robert W. (2002) Adorno on Popular Culture. London: Routledge. Wolff, Janet (1981) The Social Production of Art. NY: NY University Press. Zolberg, Vera (1990) Constructing a Sociology of the Arts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Zolberg, Vera (2005) ‘Success and Failure of the Sociology of Culture? Bringing the Arts Back’, Sociedad e Estado, May 20(2): 337–50. Zolberg, Vera and Cherbo, Joni Maya (ed.) (1997) Outsider Art. Contesting Boundaries in Contemporary Culture. Cambridge: Cambrige University Press.

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13 Rethinking the Sociology of Childhood: Conflict, Competition and Cooperation in Children’s Lives Robert van Krieken and Doris Bühler-Niederberger

INTRODUCTION – THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF CHILDHOOD In the US political soap opera, The West Wing, there is an episode where a group of middle-school children calling themselves the ‘Future Leaders for Democracy’ visit the White House with a view to arguing for lowering the voting age. In the ensuing discussion, the point is made that the exclusion of children from voting has the effect of uncoupling decision-making from decisionconsequence bearing. The argument was that it seems problematic that those who have to live with the future outcomes of today’s debates and arguments should be denied any voice in those public discussions. As the young man advocating the lowering of the voting age, Cody, puts it: ‘We’re children, and

that in itself shouldn’t render us meaningless. But in this society, we are meaningless, because we’re powerless. We have no voice.’1 This is not the first time that the question of children’s ‘voice’ has been addressed in the public sphere, but over the course of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, some important shifts have taken place in the way children and childhood are understood, both in broader public debate and in the social sciences.2 The background to our analysis of these shifts is the three-fold distinction between the concepts competition, conflict and cooperation. The roots of this conceptual triad lie in Park and Burgess’ (1969 [1921]) outline of what they saw as four central social processes: competition, conflict, accommodation, and assimilation. For Park and Burgess, competition

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was the most elementary and universal characteristic of all social interaction, understood as the struggle for existence in a world of limited resources. When humans become conscious of competitive dynamics and organize their social relations accordingly, these processes need another term, conflict, to capture the various social forms which subsequently emerge, such as status, hierarchy, subordination, and so on. ‘Competition,’ wrote Park and Burgess, ‘determines the position of the individual in the [ecological] community, conflict fixes his place in society’ (Park and Burgess, (1969 [1921]: 574). Accommodation was the mechanism of stabilizing and institutionalizing processes of conflict, the basis of social order, but also always provisional and fragile, always vulnerable to being undermined by competition and conflict. Assimilation, finally, refers to more deeply-seated mechanisms of accommodation at the level of culture and habit. It is, they wrote, ‘a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons and groups, and, by sharing their experience and history, are incorporated with them in a common culture’ (Park and Burgess, (1969 [1921]: 735). Effective assimilation does not eliminate competition and conflict altogether, but does integrate cultural and symbolic orientations sufficiently to establish a more or less stable ‘community of purpose and action’ (Park and Burgess, (1969 [1921]: 735). Since Park and Burgess’s original formulation, the tendency in the social sciences has been to group accommodation and assimilation together under the term ‘cooperation’, seeing them as closely connected with each other.3 To see how these three processes run through the social development of childhood, we need to start with the following observation. Beginning with the League of Nations’ Declaration of Children’s Rights in 1924, and decisively reinforced by the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) in 1989, an essential element of the social and political discourses surrounding children is now that

they have certain kinds of rights specific to them, even if the actual meaning and effect of the idea varies enormously (Alston et al., 1992; Freeman, 1998; Guggenheim, 2005; Roche, 1999). This does not mean that the development has been continuous; Göran Therborn points out the historical discontinuity between the first wave of interest in children in philanthropy, medicine (pediatrics), and law around the turn of the twentieth century, and the post-welfare state dominance of the discourse surrounding children by conceptions of public welfare and services, social science, economics, and politics (1996: 30). To say that there may be increasing recognition of children as social and political subjects is also not to deny how partial that recognition remains, in social and political theory as much as in the public sphere more broadly. It remains difficult to link questions of human development over the lifespan to ‘big issues’ such as state formation, modernization and development, globalization, and changing political structures and relations. As one of us wrote, ‘the standard categories of sociological research – individual, society, gender, class, action, structure, state, economy, and so on – continue to operate without reference to the fact that human beings exist in an interdependent relationship with both previous and succeeding generations’ (van Krieken, 1997: 447), and this is only gradually changing. The observation that childhood and children’s experiences have been given less attention than they deserve is itself not especially new. Erik Erikson complained in 1950 about the absence of ‘reference to the fact that all people start as children and that all peoples begin in their nurseries’ (1950: 16). The anthropologist Charlotte Hardman proposed in 1973 that children should be ‘studied in their own right, and not just as receptacles of adult teaching’, aiming to reveal ‘whether there is in childhood a selfregulating, autonomous world which does not necessarily reflect early development of adult culture’, and suggesting that ‘at the level of behaviour, values, symbols, games,

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RETHINKING THE SOCIOLOGY OF CHILDHOOD

beliefs, and oral traditions, there may be a dimension exclusive to the child’ (Hardman, 1973: 87). But the identification of a distinct field for the study of childhood began to take off roughly two decades ago (Alanen, 1988; Jenks, 1982; Lee, 1982; Synnott, 1983; Thorne, 1987) and is still unfolding in relation to the organization of sociological research. In the United Kingdom this stream of sociological thought has been called ‘the new sociology of childhood’ (James and Prout, (1997 [1990]), although one could argue about whether there was ever an ‘old’ sociology of childhood, since until the 1980s children were more or less the province of developmental psychology and education, and in sociology would generally be subsumed within studies of the family, socialization, and youth. A central role has been played by French historian Phillippe Ariès’ 1960 book L’enfant et la vie familiale sous l’Ancien Régime, published in English two years later as Centuries of Childhood.4 Although there have been extensive critiques of his method and interpretation of the evidence (e.g., Cunningham, 1995; Pollock, 1983), Ariès denaturalized childhood by outlining how children have been understood and treated differently in different historical periods. In many respects the emergence of a distinct sociology of childhood can also usefully be understood as an ongoing intellectual wrestling match with the concept of ‘socialization’ (Alanen, 1988: 57–61), which dominated social scientific approaches to the study of childhood until the 1980s and framed the sociological approach to children entirely in terms of their ‘becoming’ adult and as ‘productions’ of the family and the school (Alanen, 1988, 1989; James and Prout, 1997 [1990]; Lee, 1998; Qvortrup, 1993, 1995; Zeiher 1996). The historical emergence of a conception of childhood as ‘socially constructed’ had the following three features related to the interplay between competition, conflict, and cooperation. First, childhood became a terrain across which various aspects of the three processes were played out. The bourgeoisie,

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for example, found an ally in the new childhood experts for the optimization of their children’s chances as self-maximizing individuals in an ever-changing modern world. Second, childhood had a particular function in class relations. The construction of a distinct sphere of childhood, isolated from the labour market and protected from the worst excesses of urban, industrial society, contributed to the social success of the children of the bourgeoisie. From its beginnings in early modernity until today, a construction and maintenance of a ‘correct childhood’ made an important contribution to the realization of the status aspirations of, first the middle class, and gradually the ‘respectable’ working class (Budde, 1994; de ConinckSmith, 1997; Schlumbohm, 1980; Tanner, 1998). The competitive dynamics of the ongoing construction of childhood can be seen in the constant tension between a ‘proper’ childhood and a deficient one, with particular groups – the lower working class, migrant groups, in countries like Australia Indigenous families – being identified as generating inadequate childhoods requiring some sort of intervention (van Krieken, 1992, 1999a, 1999b, 2003). Third, the question of changing relations of power and authority between adults and children has led many scholars towards the concept of a ‘generational order’ in which childhood is seen as having a social-structural character similar to class, race, or gender. As Leena Alanen put it: Hence childhood, too, is a relational concept: childhood only exists in relation to adulthood. … This leads to the suggestions that parallel to a ‘gender agenda’ we can also imagine a ‘generational agenda’ being at work – a particular social order that organizes children’s relations to the world in a systematic way, allocates them positions from which to act and a view and knowledge about themselves and their social relations. (Alanen, 1994: 37)

In one sense every generational order is one of conflict, or at least potential conflict, to the extent that there is a power relation between adults and children. However,childhood

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sociological studies also point to the cooperation between age groups, without which the daily practices of ‘growing up’ could not be realized, even though the arrangements of such cooperation may be quite divergent at different times and across national as well as class cultures. In the next section we will examine some of the main research themes in contemporary sociological studies of childhood, but with a view to seeing how they might usefully be re-thought in terms of the concepts competition, conflict, and cooperation. Different theoretical orientations and empirical concerns generate differing degrees of attention to all three, and we will suggest considering that there may be conceptual advantages to be gained in a relatively diverse field of sociological research by making the treatment of, and linkages between, all three concepts more explicit.

THEORY AND RESEARCH IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGIES OF CHILDHOOD The sociology of childhood has been characterized by an initially very enthusiastic embrace of social constructionism, theories of action, and ethnomethodology. As Alanen put it, childhood was and is, … the ever-constituted result of decisions and actions of particular historical social actors, in the economical, political and cultural struggles that potentially concern the whole spectrum of their interests. To account for childhood then calls for analyses of these broad social processes that in their interaction come to constitute – rather than deliberately aim to constitute – social practices that define childhood. (1988: 64)

Against this background, it is possible to distinguish roughly three different theoretical approaches: ●

In a structural approach one studies statistical distributions of poverty, wealth, life chances, health conditions, educational outcomes, and so

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on (Bradshaw and Mayhew, 2005; Qvortrup, 1998; Sgritta, 1996). In a historical and constructivist approach, one analyzes discourses and practices concerning childhood, including the construction of expertise and scientific knowledge concerning children, and the emergence of particular strategies of governance in relation to childhood (Alanen, 1989; Ambert, 1986; Best, 1990; BühlerNiederberger, 1998; Donzelot, 1979; James et al., 1998; Nelson, 1986; Zelizer, 1985). In an ethnographic approach one studies interaction and communication in children’s everyday experiences, in the family and at school, on the street, among peers, at play, etc. (Alanen and Mayall, 2001; Breidenstein and Kelle, 1996; Corsaro, 1992).5

It is now fair to say that there are a number of analyses of childhood that make productive use of key concepts and debates in sociological theory, which play a significant role in establishing the research agenda in the field. Different authors have established a variety of connections between studies of childhood and the broad range of theoretical orientations in economic, political, and cultural sociology, the work of feminist theorists, Foucault, Lefebvre, Luhmann, Latour and actor-network theory, complexity theory, Elias, Beck, Deleuze, and Guattari, and others. In Germany, for example, an attempt has been made to reconcile the concept of socialization with the social constructionist and ethnographic approaches (Bühler-Niederberger, 2005), by drawing on the idea of ‘self-socialization’, initially formulated by Luhmann (1994) as a logical consequence of the argument in systems theory that psychic systems (like any other system) have to be conceived as autopoietic systems which are not influenced directly by their environment, but develop in a self-referential way, according to their own logic of operation (see also Krappmann, 2002; Zinnecker, 2000). There are certainly resources in place for a robustly theoretical sociology of childhood. Having said that, we must recognize that sociological studies of childhood tend to retain a relatively ‘light’ relationship with the

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central debates and issues in sociological theory. Where the work of writers such as Foucault or Beck is drawn upon or referred to, it tends to fall into the category of ‘application’ or ‘illustration’, rather than engaging actively with the central issues of theorydevelopment at stake. Commenting on ‘the current state of theory on children and of the sociology of children in general,’ Ann-Marie Ambert (1995) stresses, despite the presence of some theoretically-developed work in the field, the ‘danger that we develop a sociology of children that avoids some important theoretical issues on a larger scale’ (1995: 253). If one were unkind, one would speak of empirical profligacy, but this argument should not be pushed too far, since the whole sociology of childhood project lends itself particularly well to ethnographic research methods which do not always sit well with abstract theoretical constructions. There is nothing intrinsically wrong with theoretical application or illustration, and useful things can be said about particular research topics without necessarily commenting on the broader issues in sociological theory. What, then, of the central empirical concerns in sociology studies of childhood today? Because we know so little about the reality of children’s lives, there is an enormous amount of knowledge to be gathered. The possibilities for case studies are extensive; they include, all potentially across different countries and historical periods: ●

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Working children, effects of organized interventions to regulate child labour; Childhood experiences (school, family, play, street, etc.); Street children (policy, interventions, etc.); Migration, ethnicity, integration among children of varying ethnicities; Children’s literature, in different historical periods, countries, etc.; Children’s participation, in organizations, politics, etc.; The changing ideas, institutions and practices surrounding children’s rights and citizenship; Changing relations in family life: between siblings, children and parents or grandparents, etc.;

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Schooling (e.g., literacy, gender differences, bullying, etc.); Health Issues: HIV/AIDS, obesity, smoking, etc.; Impact of war on children in different countries.

It is difficult to navigate one’s way through such a rich body of research, but the majority can be grouped roughly into the following five areas: (1) children’s actual experiences, particularly their active participation in family life, the public sphere and schooling, children’s play and use of space; (2) children’s lives beyond family and school, especially working and on the street, especially, but not only, in developing countries; (3) inequality, in terms of gender, class, race, ethnicity, the rural/urban divide, and globally; (4) children’s rights, citizenship, and legal processes and institutions more broadly, especially in relation to criminal law; (5) education, welfare, and health – the different dimensions and effects of particular institutional contexts such as health, education, welfare. We make no attempt to provide any sort of overview or summary of these areas, but simply highlight a selection of the major themes and discuss some useful examples. There are also a range of other fields of study that we have left out of consideration here, but which also attract significant research attention and would also fit within the analysis here, such as changed forms of parenting, motherhood, fatherhood, divorce, children’s experience of war (as child soldiers and as civilians), children as refugees, the impact of television and the media, and cultural constructions and representations of childhood.

Children’s experience, agency, and voice In the dominant generational order, children’s contribution and participation as social actors in everyday interactions tends to be either ignored or underestimated (Jenks, 1982), despite the obvious centrality of children to the everyday operation of institutions of socialization (Davies, 1983). A central theme in many sociological studies of childhood,

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then, is to reveal the agency of children in such interactions, and it is often shown that very young children are already able to produce competently ordered interaction situations, since they know and apply the basic rules of social interaction and are even competent searchers for rules that might exist or be meant by adults; they may also create new elements for meaningful interaction (Bråten, 1996). Another theme is children’s contributions as (competent) social actors in relation to their interaction among themselves, in which they build friendships, act out conflicts, (re-)produce gender categories (Alisch and Wagner, 2006; Breidenstein and Kelle, 1996, 1998; Corsaro and Eder, 1990; Shiose, 1994, 1995; Strandell, 1997), in what concerns their use of the offerings of consumer culture (Hengst, 1990, 2000; Olesen, 2000; Rayou and Henriot-Van Zanten, 2004; Zinnecker et al., 2002), in using urban spaces and in modern time management (Behnken, 1990; Behnken et al., 1989; Mayall, 1994; Rabe-Kleberg and Zeiher, 1984; Zeiher and Zeiher, 1994). These are just some examples of a very rich vein of research in the sociology of childhood revealing children’s interactions in public and private contexts, which had been hidden or ignored for a long time. More recently, several new topics have become important in researching children’s agency and ‘voice’. The first is the question of the precise way children experience and deal with hardship, poverty, violence, and difficult neighbourhoods. One might take this to constitute the limit of the concept of children’s agency as they appear to passively endure such adverse conditions, but the research shows that there is a variety of strategies children choose to handle such situations, that they may also be helpful to each other, among siblings or peers, and that all such things influence the impact of the situation and the child’s view of it (Mullender et al., 2003). Second, the problem of the way children interact in settings and situations where they have been encouraged by adults to actively participate in handling situations, in decisions and debates, where they are,

therefore, meant to be ‘actors’ as defined by adult decisions and institutions (Baraldi, 2003; Clark and Percy-Smith, 2006). Third, and this is still a rather new research question, the way in which children perceive and conceptualize their families, and the extent to which this depends on the child’s particular family situation. While the research does not come to a conclusive position on the latter question, it does show that, for children, emotions and contacts are much more important to define the family and its boundaries than biology or formal structures (Morrow, 1998; Rigg and Pryor, 2007).

Children’s work and life on the street In Pricing the Priceless Child, Viviana Zelizer (1985) showed how one can see a shift in the ideologies surrounding childhood in Western societies between the 1870s and 1930s, from a conception of children as ‘useful’ to a much more sentimental and emotional one of the ‘priceless’ child. The shift was heavily dependent on state intervention – mainly policing ever-expanding legislation against children’s employment and truancy and gradually raising the minimum school-leaving age – which is why Therborn speaks of modern childhood as ‘a creation by the nation-state, against the threatening encroachments of the market (for child labour) and against the sovereignty of patria potestas, of paternal power and the seclusion of the family’ (1996: 30). One problem with this very influential account of the changing adult conceptions of childhood, however, as Zelizer (2002: 377) herself has written recently, is that it does not have much to say about ‘children’s own experiences of economic change’ (see also Miller, 2005; Zelizer, 2005). The concept of a ‘normal childhood’ tends to disguise not only very basic competencies of social action, but also what has to be considered as informal or even formal work. Such children’s work can be of hugely variable

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quality and quantity, and takes place under widely differing circumstances, but it is part of the reality of children’s lives certainly in the developing world, but also in an ever-increasing number of parts of the advanced industrial world (Nieuwenhuys, 1994; Zeiher, 2000). Zelizer (2002: 377) pleads, accordingly, for an accompanying consideration of ‘children as active economic agents, and adults as simply one category of persons with whom children carry on economic activities’. Arguing against analyzing modern children merely as consumers, she is in favour of seeing them as also playing pivotal roles in production and distribution across three types of social relations: with (1) other members of their households, (2) organizations outside their own families, and (3) other children. She finds that children’s activities in the spheres of production, distribution, and consumption show significant autonomy from those of adults, although they generally experience their relationship with adults as one of the unequal exercise of power (2002: 379). Children’s contribution to domestic labour, for example, is now extensively ‘monetarized’ in the form of allowances which generate complex household economies. The question of children’s work becomes still more significant when we look beyond Western societies. Once the central critique of the ‘priceless child’ thesis was that most families across the globe do not have the luxury of excluding their children from economically productive activities. The analysis was said to account only for developments in economically highly developed countries, and that increasing levels of poverty and inequality endanger the argument even in the advanced industrial parts of the world. Zelizer (2002: 393) suggests that social scientific research into children’s economic activity needs to be developed in the following three directions: ... towards the variable and unequal experiences of children within high-income capitalist countries; towards the enormous variety of children’s circumstances in the lower-income regions where

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most of the world’s kids actually live; towards the historical changes that are transforming children’s economic relations in rich and poor countries alike.

This is now one of the most important areas of research in the sociology of childhood (Nieuwenhuys, 2005), examining the nature, structure, and dynamics of children’s economic activity in developed as well as developing countries (Lavalette, 1994, 1996), the relationship between child labour and the concept of children’s rights (Myers, 1999) and broader labour relations standards (Blagbrough and Glynn, 1999), the role of organizations such as trades unions (Myrstad, 1999) and working children themselves (Liebel, 2003).

Inequality, poverty, and globalization In addition to the general concern to identify what binds individual children together into a particular construction of the social category ‘childhood’, there also remains a continuing interest in the enormous differences between childhood experiences across class, gender, race, ethnicity, and time, and in differing national settings. The varying impacts of processes of globalization and the government policies developed in response to them have also been of interest, particularly in relation to the distribution of poverty, life-chances, and well-being. Like many areas of sociology, the research in the field is heavily weighted towards studies of childhood in the advanced industrial countries, but an engagement with these issues produces greater attention to childhood experiences in the developing world. Attention to the structure and dynamics of childhood in Latin America, Africa, the Indian subcontinent, and Asia, as well as the specific nature of childhood in indigenous communities, is gradually increasing. We cannot do justice here to the enormous body of research done in this area, but it will be useful to highlight a selection: See Bühler-Niederberger and van Krieken, 2008, and the other papers in that special issue of Childhood.

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In addition to constructing a different range of opportunities and life-chances, globalization processes constantly reconfigure relations of power and inequality and generate new forms of poverty. The extent and distribution of poverty varies significantly according to age, so that a particular shift in the overall rate of poverty will produce much greater changes for children and the elderly than for adults aged 18–50. The global economy throws up new forms of work in which children figure prominently, so that the extent and impact of child labour is central to the everyday experience of most of the world’s children, creating a problematic relationship with school and family life. This is a question which is not confined to the less economically advanced countries; for example, in Britain a number of studies have shown the extent to which children’s paid work, such as newspaper and milk delivery, fast-food service, is far more extensive and problematic than is generally assumed (Hobbs et al., 1992; Lavalette, 1994, 1996). Another especially important issue is the effects that global economic forces have on government policies in relation to children, which structure their lives in varying ways. For example, Bradshaw (1993) has argued on the basis of a study of children’s experiences in Zambia that the impact of the global debt crisis, especially cuts to government spending in health and education, has fallen particularly heavily on children. More generally, in countries where welfare provision is weaker, this also correspondingly increases adults’ dependence on the income generated by child labour, and decreases their capacity and willingness to ‘invest’ in their child’s future, since the needs of the present are too pressing. This also underpins phenomena such as child prostitution, which in turn is interlinked with global tourism patterns. Although the spread of new communications technologies and the internet has the potential to ‘globalize’ childhood in the sense of strengthening differing forms of social interaction across geographical boundaries,

it also generates particular forms of inequality in relation to the extent and type of access to such technology. The term ‘digital divide’ (Koss, 2001) has been used to capture the divisions between those with consistent and effective access to the new communications technologies and those with little, poor, or no access. In her overview of the research in the field, Sonia Livingstone (2003) has indicated that the key concerns in relation to children’s use of the Internet include the changed forms of identity-construction and leisure activity, the transformation of processes of learning and literacy, the question of new dangers and problems related to expanded access. These include evolving commercial interests, as well as children’s access to each other and adults, the impact of particular kinds of content, especially in relation to sex and violence. In all of these areas there are significant inequalities closely connected to other, more familiar, social inequalities to do with wealth and income across the globe, and this will become an increasingly important field of study in the sociology of childhood.

Children’s rights, citizenship, and the law The children’s rights movement evolved out of the orientation towards ‘child-saving’ (Platt, 1969), with the emergence of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1989 an important watershed (Archard, 1993; Eekelaar, 1986, 1992; Freeman, 1998). Jeremy Roche (1999) has pointed out that there are two unavoidable problems characterizing the claims to citizenship and rights made in relation to children. The first is that, although every category of citizenship refers to a variety of types of personhood, the category ‘child’ covers a particularly diverse range, from a newborn infant to a 15-year-old. The arguments for citizenship rights are more persuasive the older the child is, but like the question of children’s criminal responsibility, there will always remain a border zone or a

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grey area where some decision-making process will be required, on the basis of indeterminate and contested criteria, to determine where any particular child stands on questions of comprehension and capacity. One can see this ambiguity, as Nick Lee (1999) points out, in Article 12 of the UNRC: State parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child.

‘The child’ does not exist, there are only particular and individual children, and any construction of children’s rights and capacity for citizenship will always have to juggle both the ‘being’ and the ‘becoming’ view of the child (Lee, 1999: 457). Second, the variable capacities of children mean that the question of their representation will always be an open question. The older particular children are, the more directly they will be able to represent themselves in society and politics, but at some point, at least some if not most children will need to be represented by adults and their citizenship rights will have to be championed by others. The forms taken by children’s participation will, then, remain contested and open to diverse interpretations as to the extent to which they are being adequately or appropriately represented, or simply functioning as proxy for other interests (Guggenheim, 2005). One of the key areas where this issue comes to the surface is the relationship between the universalism of the concept of ‘rights’ and the particularity of diverse cultural understandings of childhood and adulthood. The implicit norms built into the UNCRC, for example, appear to focus on the nuclear family at the expense of kinship and community networks, and they seem to value individual over collective rights. This can be problematic to the extent of seriously undermining the meaningfulness of the Convention and the whole idea of children’s rights in particular cultural settings (Burman, 1996; Burr, 2004). It may be too strong an

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argument to suggest that the discourse of children’s rights is a new form of colonialism, but at least some questions are worth asking about whether an individualized concept of ‘rights’ is in fact necessarily the best way of advancing children’s participation in social, political, and economic life as well as advancing their status as citizens (Guggenheim, 2005). One area where the status of citizenship is granted to children at a relatively early stage is crime and the allocation of criminal responsibility in law. The age below which children cannot be held criminally responsible for their actions ranges from 7 to 18 across different national jurisdictions, but in general children are granted this responsibility well before they are able to vote, drive a car, serve in the army, enter into contracts, or see particular kinds of films. Normally there is also a ‘transition zone’ between criminal infancy and adulthood where children are seen as possessing a conditional criminal responsibility, where the presumption of an incapacity to form criminal intent (doli incapax) is rebuttable, and it is the court’s task to assess the child’s degree of understanding and moral capacity (van Krieken, 2005). This dimension of the social construction of childhood shows many of the same instabilities and volatility of the concepts of children’s rights and citizenship. In England, for example, the 1993 murder of James Bulger triggered a rejection of this doli incapax presumption, and since 1998 all English children over the age of 10 have been considered fully criminally responsible. In other countries, such as Germany, the debate is more about raising or lowering the age of criminal incapacity. Like questions of children’s rights, the issue of children’s responsibilities is also caught between the two conceptions of childhood – being or becoming.

Education, welfare, and health Although the more recent sociological approaches to childhood stress the active role

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played by children in the construction of their social world, their lives remain framed by a number of core institutional settings, particularly the school, health and welfare systems, and to this extent the socialization approach still has much to offer. Here, too, there is a wide variety of research programmes in progress, and we can only highlight a selection of the main issues. In relation to schooling, the core concerns currently include literacy, gender differences, new technologies, children with special needs, bullying, and the varying impacts of neo-liberalism and the ‘marketization’ of the education system around the globe. With respect to health, they encompass infant mortality, smoking, drugs and alcohol, sexuality and HIV/AIDS, obesity, suicide and mental health, and general well-being among children. In the field of welfare, research themes include the operation of institutional and foster care, the relation between child and youth welfare and criminal justice, unevenness in service provision across class, ethnicity and the urban/rural divide, the question of children’s capacity to seek or refuse welfare intervention independently of their parents or adult carers, and the role of child welfare service provision in social and economic development generally. Running through the heart of much of this research is a set of questions concerning the extent to which children are being conceptualized as social agents in their own right, as opposed to issues being framed primarily in terms of the concerns and interests of adults. For example, in relation to education policy reforms over recent decades in the developed countries, Michael Wyness (1999: 354) has argued that there has been only a little movement towards treating children more as competent social actors. The rhetoric of ‘choice’ which is so central to the subjection of schooling to the mechanisms of the market will still treat parents as the social agents or consumers making the choices, not school pupils themselves. As he puts it, There is almost an inverse relationship here between the changing fortunes of parental and pupil influence. As parents appear to have become

progressively more influential both as consumers of education and governors of schools, pupils have lost the few bargaining powers they once had. (Wyness, 1999: 358)

Similarly in relation to health, James and James (2004) point out for the example of childhood obesity that the policy focus on this question has reflected more the adult priorities concerning the longer-term effects of obesity as children become adults than those of children themselves, who also have more immediate concerns, such as mental and sexual health, which are given disproportionately less attention (James and James, 2004: 165–6). In general it remains an open question how much ‘voice’ is given to children in relation to medical care, social welfare interventions, and their own schooling. The exact nature of the relationship between school, family, leisure, and work, as well as the power balance between parents, state, and other organized authorities, and children continues to constitute a central concern for the sociological theory and research in these fields.

TOWARDS NEW CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS? Although there are now a number of interesting discussions of the theoretical dimensions of research in the sociology of childhood (James et al., 1998), there is still only a limited engagement with sociology’s ‘big’ themes, such as globalization, state formation, individualization and post- or ‘second’ modernity, citizenship and individualism, the long-term decline of patriarchy, postmodernization, changing configurations of power and authority, or shifting constructions of the nation-state and sovereignty. For example, the work of Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (1995) on family life and individualization has a range of implications for the sociology of childhood (Kelley, et al., 1998), and Beck (1997) has also made a very suggestive attempt (drawing on the work of Heinz Abels, 1993) to include childhood in his analysis of the ‘second modernity’ and contemporary

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forms of individualization, looking at the expansion of children’s citizenship rights, the shifting of the boundaries between public and private life, the changing relations between generations (the ‘generational order’). What is perhaps most important for the sociology of childhood is that one of the central conceptual concerns which has dominated the field – coming to see children as competent social actors – can itself be seen, following Beck’s analysis, as a social product, of what he refers to as ‘second modernity’. His critique of the concept of socialization, paralleling that of childhood sociology, is that ‘young people no longer become individualized. They individualize themselves. ‘Biographization’ of youth means becoming active, struggling, and designing one’s own life’, so that ‘socialization is now only possible as self-socialization’ (Beck, 1997: 163). His analysis of the increasing importance of the ‘self-fashioning’ of childhood and youth ends with the following diagnosis: The different, often extremely disparate sources of meaning and experience for young people: school, television, advertising, the values and symbols of the chosen peer group, the strict performance standards of the world of work, the traffic jungle (their own car!), not forgetting the wellmeaning precepts of parents, all these force young people to conceive of and organize themselves as tinkerers of their own personalities. (Beck, 1997: 163–4)

This means that what is meant to be a conceptual advance on earlier sociological conceptions of childhood is well and truly bound up with the very processes of social transformation which affect the contemporary childhood that it is aiming to describe. Rather than simply having to assert their status as actors in the face of a society, and a social science, which arrogantly refuses to acknowledge it, with only valiant ‘new’ sociologists of childhood as allies; in many respects children today are increasingly both socially required to be ‘competent social actors’, and finding their agency hedged in more and more by shifting forms of regulation and governance (Bell, 1993; Hultqvist and Dahlberg, 2001; McGillivray, 1997; Prout, 2000; more generally, Rose, 1999).

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The social-structural problem is that the resources with which children are meant to assemble their personalities and identities – concepts of self and other, difference, normality, beauty and attractiveness, desirability, charm, etc. – are at the same time subjected to processes of standardization, formation, and organization; so that the most important question facing the sociology of childhood becomes less ‘are children competent social actors?’ and more ‘on what basis do children act, with what resources at their disposal?’; ‘what constitutes their supposed “freedom” of action?’ (O’Neill, 1994). The same may also be true of the other conceptual focus of the sociology of childhood, the identification of childhood as a distinct social sphere with a logic and dynamics of its own; this too is a product of particular social transformations rather than simply a liberation from outdated conceptual restrictions. The reasons for their being ‘outdated’ go beyond the perceptiveness of a new generation of sociologists; they also include a continuing intensification of the requirements of adult citizenship, which now requires ‘deeper roots’ in the individual’s biography, such as earlier and more nuanced training for the demands of individual identity in the contemporary world. In a sense Cody’s demand in The West Wing for the ‘right’ to participate in politics can be understood as driven by a broader social requirement that Cody begin his selfconstruction as a political subject earlier, so as to increase his flexibility and responsiveness to the competitive dynamics of his future political subjectivity.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS: AN INTEGRATED THEORETICAL AND RESEARCH AGENDA IN SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES OF CHILDHOOD We would like to conclude with some thoughts on possibilities for the restructuring of theory and research in the sociology of

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childhood taking some steps towards the integration of the concepts competition, conflict, and cooperation. One – even if only one – of the ways in which greater theoretical coherence and creativity in the sociology of childhood could be encouraged would be to turn towards a greater utilization of this conceptual triad, because attention to all three would encourage a broader range of conceptualizations. For example, there is a tendency in most of the literature to think in terms of competition and conflict, but with little explicit attention paid to cooperation, especially between the generations. Sociological research into childhood often shows clearly that the experiences of childhood are only possible with significant degrees of cooperation, even though the concept of ‘generational order’ tends to exclude such a conceptualization. This includes cooperation amongst peers as well as cooperation with adults in the sense of real work contributions and competent social action. The exact form taken by such arrangements of generational cooperation are quite divergent across time, national and class contexts, and cultures. It may consist simply of a mere calculus to survive for adults and children (Henderson, 2006; Lareau, 2003; Oleke et al., 2006) or – at the other extreme – a highly ambitious arrangement of preparation for future life, including a self-socialization allowing tasteful and unique self-presentation (Bühler-Niederberger, 2005; de Singly, 1996; Sirota, 2002). But both require cooperation between the age groups, either in the process of the formation of self, where selfobservation, self-reflection, discovery, and continuous working out of one’s own uniqueness is needed, or in the pursuit of survival, which demands the skill and dexterity of the child and his/her competence to create and maintain social affiliations. Nonetheless, the normative impact of the idea of a ‘proper childhood’ remains and limits or stigmatizes the range of cooperative arrangements that may be worked out. To study childhood as it lies somewhere between extensive divergence and variety, especially

in terms of cultural differences, on the one hand, and processes of ‘universalization’ (such as the idea of children’s rights) on the other, will, particularly in a globalizing world, remain an important topic of childhood sociological theory and research.

NOTES 1 The West Wing, Season Six, Episode 17 ‘A Good Day’, 2 March 2005. 2 With the qualification that whether and how these shifts have been translated into actual changes in children’s everyday lives is a separate, empirical question. 3 There are clearly arguments for returning to Park’s and Burgess’ original four-fold distinction and giving assimilation more specific attention (van Krieken, 2005), especially in the twenty-first century world of global population flows and the instability of multiculturalism and cultural identity generally; but there is not the space to explore them here, so this is another question with which research in the sociology of childhood could usefully engage. 4 Also influential was Lloyd de Mause’s (1974) The History of Childhood. 5 For another useful overview, see Alanen (2000).

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Shiose, Yuki (1995) Les loups sont-ils Québécois?. Sainte-Foy, Québec: Presses de l’Université Laval. Sirota, Regina (2002) ‘When the Birthday Invitation Knocks Again and Again on the Door: Learning and Construction of Manners’, Zeitschrift für qualitative Bildung-, Beratungs-, und Sozialforschung, 1: 11–39. Strandell, Harriet (1997) ‘Doing Reality With Play: Play as a Children’s Resource in Organizing Everyday Life in Daycare Centres’, Childhood, 4(4): 445–64. Synnott, Anthony (1983) ‘Little Angels, Little Devils: A Sociology of Children’, Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, 20(1): 79–95. Tanner, A. (1998) ‘Im Schonraum der Familie. Bürgerliche Kindheit im 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhundert’, in P. Hugger (ed.) Kindsein in der Schweiz. Zürich: Offizin. pp. 65–76. Therborn, Göran (1996) ‘Child Politics: Dimensions and Perspectives’, Childhood, 3(1): 29–44. Thorne, Barrie (1987) ‘Re-Visioning Women and Social Change: Where Are the Children?’, Gender and Society, 1: 85–109. van Krieken, Robert (1992) Children and the State. Sydney: Allen and Unwin. van Krieken, Robert (1997) ‘Sociology and the Reproductive Self: Demographic Transitions and Modernity’, Sociology, 31(3): 445–71. van Krieken, Robert (1999a) ‘The Barbarism of Civilization: Cultural Genocide and the “Stolen Generations”’, British Journal of Sociology, 50(2): 297–315. van Krieken, Robert (1999b) ‘The “Stolen Generations” and Cultural Genocide: The Forced Removal of Australian Indigenous Children from their Families and its Implications for the Sociology of Childhood’, Childhood, 6(3): 297–311. van Krieken, Robert (2003) ‘When is Child Welfare Cultural Genocide? On the Politics

of the Organised “Improvement” of Children’s Lives’, in H. Sünker, R. Farnen and G. Szell (eds.) Political Socialisation, Participation and Education. Frankfurt: Peter Lang. pp. 87–112. van Krieken, Robert (2005) ‘Frech oder schuldig. Wie das Recht über die Strafmündigkeit der Kinder denkt in England, Deutschland und Australien’, in D. Bühler-Niederberger (ed.) Die Macht der Unschuld. Opladen: Leske+Budrich. van Krieken, Robert (2005) ‘Assimilation and Liberal Government’, in T. Rowse (ed.) Contesting Assimilation. Perth: API Network. pp. 39–47. Wyness, Michael G. (1999) ‘Childhood, Agency and Education Reform’, Childhood, 6(3): 353–68. Zeiher, Helga (1996) ‘Kinder in der Gesellschaft und Kindheit in der Soziologie’, Zeitschrift für Sozialisationsforschung u. Erziehungssoziologie, 16: 26–46. Zeiher, Helga (2000) ‘Hausarbeit. Zur Integration der Kinder in die häusliche Arbeitsteilung’, in H. Hengst and H. Zeiher (eds.) Die Arbeit der Kinder. Weinheim: Juventa. pp. 45–70. Zeiher, Hartmut and Zeiher, Helga (1994) Orte und Zeiten im Leben der Kinder. Weinheim: Juventa. Zelizer, Viviana (1985) Pricing the Priceless Child. NY: Basic Books. Zelizer, Viviana (2002) ‘Kids and Commerce’, Childhood, 9(4): 375–96. Zelizer, Viviana (2005) ‘The Priceless Child Revisited’, in J. Qvortrup (ed.) Studies in Modern Childhood. Basingstoke: Macmillan. pp. 184–200. Zinnecker, Jurgen (2000) ‘Selbstsozialisation – Essay über ein aktuelles Konzept’, Zeitschrift für Soziologie der Erziehung und Sozialisation, 20: 272–90. Zinnecker, Jurgen, Behnken, I., Maschke, S. and Stecher, L. (2002) Null Zoff and Voll Busy. Opladen: Leske+Budrich.

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14 The Lifecourse of the Social Mobility Paradigm Stéphane Moulin and Paul Bernard

INTRODUCTION How are advantageous and disadvantageous socio-economic positions transmitted across generations, and how are they reproduced or altered over the lifecourse trajectories of individuals? This question has engaged sociologists in what has come to be identified as the field of social mobility. It was launched when Pitirim Sorokin published, in 1927, Social and Cultural Mobility. Since this first attempt at providing a systematic theory, a social mobility paradigm has developed, and it has also been challenged. Our intent is not to systematically review the vast literature in this field, a task that has been achieved very competently in a number of places (see below). We rather want to draw attention to some key conceptual assumptions made by most analysts of social stratification and social mobility. According to Kuhn (1970), paradigms spring from the recognition of anomalies in previous scientific explanations. Paradigms propose a new set of methods to search for new answers to reformulated questions. The usefulness of a paradigm is established

with the offering of some enticing empirical findings. A paradigm transforms a group of persons who share the same collection of beliefs and agreements into a discipline or, at least, a disciplinary field. After a period of scientific inquiry and competition among pre-paradigmatic currents, a period of normal science follows, characterized by the creation of specialized journals and a claim to a special place in academe. One of the main features of a paradigm is thus its gradual evolution into normal science, until the advent of the next paradigmatic revolution, based on the identification of a new set of anomalies which lead to revisions of methods, and of empirical findings. We will argue here that a new paradigm may be emerging in the field of social mobility, inspired by the lifecourse perspective. It is useful to broach the question of the definition of social mobility from this very perspective. We have defined it in a fairly broad sense at the outset: it refers to the degree and mode of transmission of social privilege (and underprivilege) over the life of individuals, and from one generation to the next. But what paradigms do is, precisely, to

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suggest and then to impose, though not without some resistance, ways in which a given phenomenon should be productively researched. We will argue that this has been done under a few very powerful assumptions, some of which may now be put more vigorously in question, especially at the periphery of the field. Our chapter will proceed in three stages. In the first section, we will use several available reviews of the social mobility literature1 to portray the inception and the evolution of the social mobility paradigm. We start from Sorokin’s contribution not only because it came first, but also, more importantly, because it offered a number of powerful, and yet somewhat disparate, insights into social mobility. We then show how subsequent developments in this field selected some of these insights, while others were largely neglected or marginalized in the emerging literature. In the second section, we provide empirical indications for our interpretation of the evolution of the field, using a review of the papers published in the specialized journal Research in Social Stratification and Mobility (RSSM), from 1981 to 2006. RSSM has become the most representative specialized journal in the field and the privileged medium of publication for members of RC28.2 We use this material to show that, by and large, a certain paradigmatic view of social mobility research became dominant and turned into normal science. Meritocracy, especially through education, and a focus on individual trajectories, rather than institutions, became the central themes, relegating other issues to the periphery. In the third section, we point to recent indications of a broadening of the field of social mobility: more attention is now paid to other institutions at play in the transmission of privilege, such as the characteristics of labor markets, changes in family composition, health, and welfare states. We discern in this evolution the growing influence of the lifecourse paradigm, which has led to the exploration of many new research avenues. This is briefly illustrated with another set of

empirical data: the programs of the scientific meetings of Research Committee 28 of the International Sociological Association, which are usually held a few times a year. In recent years, many new themes have been explored, indicating that the social mobility paradigm may be evolving, or at least that it is confronted with the challenge of new anomalies and contending interpretations.

THE SOCIAL MOBILITY PARADIGM In this section, we analyze the evolution of the paradigm of social mobility from its creation in the 1920s to the end of the 1970s.

Sorokin’s creation of the social mobility paradigm Sorokin’s Social Mobility (1927), reprinted in 1959 in the volume Social and Cultural Mobility, can be considered, as a paradigmatic revolution in Kuhn’s sense. Recently arrived in the US from Russia, where both the Tsarist government and the Communists jailed him, Sorokin wants to find evidence for substantial levels of social fluidity in modern societies; such fluidity he considers as a scientific ‘anomaly’, which cannot be explained either by Social Darwinism or by Marxism. These approaches to social inequalities were incapable of interpreting the shift from an ascribed to an achieved status order. According to Sorokin, ‘neither the attacks of the radicals against the caste aristocracy, nor the exaggerated dithyrambs to the upper classes as the offspring of a long existing hereditary aristocracy seem to be warranted by the facts’ (Sorokin, 1959: 457). Marxism as well as Social Darwinism presupposed a static social structure rather than the fluid composition of present occupational groups. Sorokin uses a simple system of gradation to describe the social structure: ‘Social stratification means the differentiation of a given

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LIFECOURSE OF THE SOCIAL MOBILITY PARADIGM

population into hierarchically superposed classes. It is manifested in the existence of upper and lower social layers’ (Sorokin, 1959: 11). Such schemas had already emerged under the influence of Social Darwinism in England at the end of the nineteenth century (Szreter, 1984).3 Sorokin uses this perspective to disprove the Marxian analysis of class struggle; according to him, the proletariat was both numerically weak compared to the growing number of middle class people, and qualitatively deficient compared to the members of the ‘upper classes’.4 This is Sorokin’s first key contribution to shaping the field; as we will see below, it contributed powerfully to focusing debates on the functional aspects of social stratification and social mobility, which were seen as ways to mobilize talent and effort in rapidly modernizing societies. Sorokin made two other key paradigmatic contributions to the field. At first sight, they appear as simply logical, if clever, extensions of his initial insight, one in the direction of methods, the other offered as an interpretive framework. Methodologically, Sorokin proposed to measure social fluidity using a new tool: mobility tables, and especially intergenerational tables, which testify to society’s ability to redistribute talent over the long run. Social mobility is defined as ‘any transition of an individual or social object from one position to another’ (Sorokin, 1959: 133). Sorokin’s schema of gradation makes it equivalent to vertical mobility, ‘ascending and descending, or social climbing and social sinking’ (Sorokin, 1959: 133). He uses an intergenerational mobility table to analyze changes in the distribution of incomes in a population of 788 fathers and sons from the US, and he infers from these data that ‘each economic stratum of Western societies is composed not only of sons of fathers who belong to this stratum, but in a considerable proportion of newcomers’ (Sorokin, 1959: 478) and that ‘only an insignificant part of each economic class remains in the same class during five or more generations’ (Sorokin, 1959: 479).

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Sorokin not only offers empirical evidence that the composition of the society is fluid and changing; he also interprets this social mobility through an original structuralist view of institutional mediations. According to him, vertical mobility functions through ‘membranes’, ‘staircases’, ‘elevators’ or ‘channels’ which ‘permit individuals to move up and down, from stratum to stratum’ (Sorokin, 1959: 164). The most important of these agencies are the army, churches, schools, and political, economic, and professional organizations. This structuralist view is supported by a functionalist comparison between the social structure and the human body: he considers these agencies of vertical circulation ‘as necessary as channels for blood circulation in the body’ (Sorokin, 1959: 180). In these channels, there seems to exist a kind of ‘sieve’ ‘which sifts the individuals and places them within the society’ (Sorokin, 1959: 182). Cuin (1993) has even suggested that Sorokin’s theory is ‘hyperstructuralist’ since individuals are not really actors: they are educated, tested, selected, and distributed by these agencies. Given the inequality of individual abilities, not only shaped by the environment, but also based on heredity, social improvement can only happen if these agencies produce social mobility by assigning the right persons to the right positions, according to their physical and intellectual abilities. These three elements in Sorokin’s approach seem to form a unified whole: modernizing societies need a good measure of social fluidity, and their major institutions must certainly be providing it, since mobility tables reveal significant amounts of movement between vertically arranged positions. But upon reflection, the components of Sorokin’s paradigmatic revolution are not that closely connected; in fact, the tensions between them prefigure many of the debates in the field over the following decades, as we will see in the next few pages. First, albeit important, gradation schemes are but one way to examine mobility and the circulation of individuals between the various

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social positions and roles. Indeed, most researchers will subsequently devise and use complex schemes of socioeconomic categories, usually based on occupational groupings rather than income. Many of these categories are not easily rank-ordered with respect to one another in any convincing way, however. Consequently, exchanges of members between them over the lifecourse and across generations may call for ‘qualitative’ interpretations going beyond the vertical dimension. Other researchers will rather closely adhere to Sorokin’s gradation idea, and try to devise various one-dimensional indicators of the vertical social position of various occupations (occupations have by then become the almost universal instrument for estimating social mobility, because they are considered as rather stable indicators of social position and social class, contrary to income, which is more volatile). We will review this source of tension in Sorokin’s approach, as well as in the evolving field of social mobility, in the next section. A second source of tension originating in Sorokin’s approach concerns the connection between mobility tables and interpretations of fluidity based on the role of social structures and especially institutions. Sorokin was, implicitly, inaugurating a comparative style of analysis, in his case between modern and more traditional societies. Early on, analysts of social mobility will adopt this idea, and start comparing contemporary societies with respect to their fluidity; the latter is taken as an index both of modernity and of equity, in the guise of equality of opportunities. But these social institutions are considered as a whole, not in any of their specific influences.5 Indeed, the analysis usually proceeds at the macro level, paying scant attention to the meso level of specific institutions evoked in Sorokin’s interpretive stance; no connection is usually suggested, not even ‘qualitatively’, between what happens to specific occupational categories and these institutional conduits for mobility. The one exception, starting in the mid-1960s, is the insistence, among

analysts who have devised one-dimensional indicators of vertical social position, on the key role of one institutional mediation, schooling. We will review this debate among social mobility analysts below, in the section on ‘The Tension between Individualist and Structuralist Views’.

The divergence between schemes of gradation and class schemes The mobility table has been, for a long period, the most characteristic tool of the social mobility paradigm. Many crucial distinctions have been made and many findings achieved using mobility tables: horizontal and vertical mobility, intergenerational and intra-generational mobility, and then countermobility, inflow and outflow analyses, forced and pure mobility.6 A shared vocabulary was thus developed from the thirties to the seventies. But starting with Blau and Duncan’s very influential book, The American Occupational Structure, in 1967, proponents of the gradation approach were given a new and powerful analytical instrument with the status attainment model, based on regression analyses involving continuous scales of SocioEconomic Status (SES) and of schooling. An explicit distinction between two traditions among analysts of social mobility developed thereafter. The social structure can be regarded as a system of gradation, or as a system based on social relations of dependence (Ossowski, 1963). According to Weber, the status order describing ‘the way in which social honour is distributed’ and ‘represented by special styles of life’ is quite distinct from the economic order describing ‘the way in which economic goods and services are distributed and used’ (Weber, (1977) [1922]: chap. 9, part II). This distinction has often been simplified into an opposition between a Weberian analysis of social status and a Marxist class analysis, but it is indeed much broader. Marxian social classes are ‘qualitative’ and relational, but as we will see later,

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so are the neo-Weberian social classes proposed by Giddens (1973) and Goldthorpe (1980).7 The choice between these two ways of describing social structure appears related to the influence of particular ideological perspectives at different periods of time. We have already discussed the reasons for the emergence of a schema of gradation. By contrast, many other occupational classifications, such as the French one, were influenced by historical class struggles and by political movements representing the working class (Desrosières, 2002). The tradition of analyzing social structure in terms of a status order has been very powerful in American sociology. In the twentieth century, the popularity of vertical classifications by strata was supported by a powerful cultural representation of American society as an open society, which provides equality of opportunities for social achievement (Cuin, 1993). This literature on social stratification has developed two main methodological tools: the classification by strata and the index of socio-economic status. Conducting exhaustive interviews and surveys in Newburyport in the thirties, Warner and his team of researchers, for instance, found that the social division of the town should be analyzed as a schema of gradation and tried to build an index of social prestige (Warner, 1963; Warner and Lunt, 1942). These methodologies have been extensively used in American sociology to reduce the multidimensional aspects of status to a unique, continuous, and simple scale. Two of the main methodological contributors to the descriptive analysis of stratification, Duncan (1961) and Treiman (1977), both devised procedures for hierarchically scaling occupations. Many other scholars have rejected this implied unidimensionality of stratification. We find explicit critical perspectives in many important contributions, such as Dumont’s work on the caste system (1966) or Bourdieu’s focus on the structure of various forms of capital (1984) [1979]. While schemas

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of gradation in the sociology of stratification see social positions differing in degree rather than kind, contemporary class schemas emphasize qualitative differences and relational dependence. One of the main contributions to the analysis using class schemas is due to Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992), with the CASMIN project. The purpose of their class schema is to differentiate occupational positions ‘in terms of the employment relations that they entail’. After presenting the classical three-fold division between employers, employees and self-employed workers, they make another distinction, among employees, between two kinds of employment relations: the ‘labour contract’ that ‘entails a relatively short-term and specific exchange of money for effort’ and the ‘service relationship’, which ‘involves a longer term and generally more diffuse exchange’. Service relationships are thus found mostly within bureaucratic organizations ‘where it is required of employees that they exercise delegated authority or specialized knowledge and expertise’ (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992: 43). This conceptualization of class structure takes partial inspiration from Marxism, the main difference being that Goldthorpe does not refer to issues of exploitation and domination (as was done, in particular, by Wright (1989, 1997)). And the reference is quite explicit to Weber, since the service class works in large public or private bureaucracies. The class and stratification perspectives on social structure are quite distinct, and they profoundly influence the way the social structure is characterized, and the way social mobility is analyzed. In conceptualizing vertical mobility in particular, a schema of gradation is needed if one is to qualify mobility as either ascending or descending. On the contrary, lines of class demarcation cannot translate into differences on a single vertical scale, because they are conceptualized in relational terms. Many authors following a class perspective thus focus on permeability of class boundaries (Goldthorpe, 1987; Wright, 1997). This being said, hierarchical

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aspects can be recognized, and certain authors do look for hierarchical effects in social mobility patterns.8

The tension between individualist and structuralist views Since Sorokin’s pioneering work, theories of social mobility have faced a tension between structuralist and individualist views of institutional mediations. In a strict structuralist perspective, such as Sorokin’s, individuals are not actors: they are educated, tested, selected and distributed by agencies or channels of circulation. According to strongly individualist views, on the contrary, the individuals are, to a large extent, allpowerful actors: their achievements are the exact rewards accruing to their talents and efforts. Most of the American literature on social mobility puts forward a mixed view, with an equal interest for structural and motivational factors: the former correspond to the equilibrium between the demands for various abilities and the supply of talents, the latter to personal qualities and motives. Davis and Moore’s foundational paper (Davis and Moore, 1945) about the American functionalist theory of stratification clearly holds such an implicit view: ‘as a functioning mechanism a society must somehow distribute its members in social positions and induce them to perform the duties of these positions’. We owe the first explicit theoretical formulation of this mixed view to Lipset and Bendix (1959). According to them, ‘the amount of social mobility’ is largely determined by five structural factors: the number of available vacancies, the rates of fertility, the rank accorded to occupations, the number of inheritable status-positions, and legal restrictions. At the same time, they emphasize that the ‘consequences of upward mobility’ are very different from one culture to another; the existence of ideological egalitarianism in the US, in particular, facilitates the acceptance of upward mobility.

According to Cuin (1993), the ideological trajectory of American sociology leads from such structuralist or mixed views of institutional mediations to a dominant individualistic view, best illustrated in the status attainment programme proposed by Blau and Duncan (1967). This programme investigates the extent to which the present occupational status of individuals is associated with the status of their family of origin, or rather reflects their own achievements, and in particular their educational attainment. The question they keep raising is: ‘how and to what degree do the circumstances of birth condition subsequent status’ (Blau and Duncan, 1967: 118). Their results show that half of the association between father’s education and son’s occupation appears to be mediated by the latter’s educational achievement. According to this individualistic perspective, modernizing societies shift from ascriptive to achievement criteria, and there is a movement towards meritocratic selection through the educational system. This individualist view was confronted, in the 1970s, with radical critiques coming from a number of sociologists of education. Anderson’s paradox constituted a major anomaly for the now established individualistic paradigm of social mobility research. In spite of a strong individual correlation between education and occupation, Anderson (1961) found that relative occupational position seems to be independent of relative educational position. Boudon (1974) used this finding to urge a return to the structuralist point of view, which can readily recognize that there is a substantial amount of independence between changes in the educational structure and changes in the occupational structure, potentially leading to ‘educational inflation’. As Sorokin pointed out five decades earlier, the function of schools largely involves certifying children for particular positions, and not only promoting each individual’s abilities. This theoretical tension between individualist and structuralist views has produced many methodological controversies on the

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possibility of distinguishing structural and non-structural sources of mobility. Developing an overview of the different generations of these methodologies, Ganzeboom et al. (1991) propose to distinguish three generations in mobility studies. The first generation focused on the degree of ‘openness’ of different social structures, as measured by the rate of occupational mobility between generations. Some sociologists of this generation proposed to make a distinction between structural and circulation (or exchange) mobility, the former being determined by the amount of mobility required by the very structure of the table (changes in the marginal distributions between one generation and the next). Sociologists of the second generation criticized these concepts, arguing that they were statistical artefacts with no clear substantive interpretation. The use of multivariate statistical techniques – path analysis or structural equation modelling – allowed them to go beyond mobility as such to study status attainment from an individualistic perspective, as proposed by Blau and Duncan (1967). The use of continuous quantitative variables allowed for the assessment of the relative importance of various paths to occupational status, involving schooling and the direct transmission of status across generations through other mechanisms. The third generation is characterized by a return to the analysis of intergenerational occupational mobility using qualitative categories. In this generation, new statistical techniques such as log-linear and log-multiplicative analysis allow for a clear distinction between absolute and relative mobility (see Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992). Differences among countries as to how occupational structures vary from one generation to the next largely explain how their mobility regimes vary; in other words, the basic structure of mobility chances is common to all industrial societies. Treiman and Ganzeboom (2000) have recently identified a fourth generation of studies. According to them, the availability

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of much improved comparative data and analytical techniques has allowed for new combinations of quantitative (continuous variables) and ‘qualitative’ (categorical variables) approaches, and for a more thorough examination of the effects of ‘social contexts’ on social mobility. As a consequence, they say, there now is a convergence of approaches used in the previous two generations of studies. While many of the developments they point out are indeed innovative, we ourselves interpret them less as an extension of previous efforts, and more as a shift in paradigm, towards a lifecourse perspective. Before we examine these new trends, however, we should turn to the decades of normal science which characterized generations two and three.

A TURN TO NORMAL SCIENCE An examination of the articles published in the specialized journal Research in Social Stratification and Mobility (RSSM)9 allows us to highlight the major shared assumptions of this much focused and very productive field of sociological research. We argue that most articles share a meritocratic perspective as well as an individualist view of institutional mediations. Again, due to excellent available reviews of the field, we will focus mainly on the exceptions to the rule, on the articles that diverge from the mainstream.

Meritocratic assumptions Though the social mobility paradigm allows for a wide range of ways of describing the social structure and interpreting longitudinal trajectories, most of the articles published in RSSM provide a conventional meritocratic interpretation of social mobility: education is the main factor in upward mobility, and occupational positions are the rewards of individual educational achievements.

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The social mobility literature at first translates its interest in longitudinal trajectories into a narrowly focused interest on the bivariate relationship between the occupational classes of fathers and sons (and later on of mothers and daughters) (Treiman and Ganzeboom, 2000). It then turns to earnings or income, and to education. Few papers refer to other aspects and determinants of social position such as lifestyles (Sobel, 1983), life experiences through social interaction, cultural orientations, and political action (Kingston, 1994), patterns of practices involving residential selection, children’s peer groups, volunteer organizations (Kendall, 2006), or region, housing, and cultural consumption (Ganzeboom et al., 1990). While Sorokin’s pioneering work evoked many social mobility agencies such as the army, the church, the family, political, as well as economic and professional organizations, schools appear as the conventional channel of vertical circulation in RSSM. Most of the papers try to understand differences in educational attainment and aspirations, racial or ethnic inequalities in access to education, and, in a tacit use of human capital theory, returns to schooling or training. By contrast, few articles point to the crucial role of the family in mediating social mobility through such mechanisms as inheritance of a business (Szelenyi and Manchin, 1989; Yonay and Kraus, 2001), marriage and divorce (Cohen, 1986; Lichter and Landry, 1991; Park and Smits, 2005; Peterson, 1987), child care and family responsibilities (Maume and Dunaway, 1989; Spilerman and Schrank, 1991; Wenk and Rosenfeld, 1992). A few focus on social networks (Cohen, 1986; Coverdill, 1998), political organizations (Frankel, 1991; Hanley and Treiman, 2005; Massey et al., 1992; Opper et al., 2002; Useem, 1984), and community organi zations (Hoff, 2005; Rubin, 1992). While army and church have long been traditional channels of vertical circulation, only Dronkers (1985) has examined the role of religious affiliation in mediating mobility and no article considers the role of the army.

While media stars, gangsters, and famous sport players often represent archetypical figures of ascending vertical mobility, no article is devoted to the crucial role of such organizations as sports clubs, criminal gangs, and the arts. Very few articles criticize such implicit assumptions as the theory of industrialism and the normative theory of educational meritocracy. Only Jackson et al. (2005) and Dev Sharda (2005) have tackled the former, while Wesolowski (1981) is very much alone in discussing the theoretical weaknesses and social dangers of the meritocratic social doctrine. According to him, the social mobility literature largely shares the following assumptions: the effort a young person invests in obtaining higher levels of education should be adequately rewarded; persons with higher education contribute more, and therefore are entitled to obtain more; differential rewards are necessary for social development.

Individualist views of institutional mediations Most authors in RSSM study individual effects rather than collective identities, beliefs and attitudes, macro-social contexts, institutions, collective processes, and cultures. The modelling of mobility is more concerned with ‘effects’ on social stratification than with social classes, seen as identity groups shaping their members’ individual and collective destinies. A small number of articles analyze the ‘subjective’ aspects of stratification and mobility, and many of these exceptions can be found in the Marxist and neo-Weberian traditions, where studies examine patterns of class consciousness or class formation (Colbjornsen, 1988; Eisenstadt, 1984; Wallace and Jepperson, 1986; Western, 1998). Only a few papers focus on collective interests (Bills, 1998; Wilson, 2001), socio-economic beliefs (Jackman and Senter, 1983; Kluegel, 1988), public attitudes (Sikora, 2005), social perceptions (Ayalon et al., 1988), or social values (Silver and

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Muller, 1997). These papers could provide interesting insights into social mobility research since they tend to show complex interactions between ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ social classifications. In particular, only two empirical papers explore subjective aspects of stratification as they intersect gender or ethnicity/race divisions. Jackman and Senter (1983) explore differences between whites and blacks, and men and women, in the values attached to various traits (intelligence, emotion); they analyze how dialogue about perceptions between these groups can range from consensus to muted conflict. Ayalon et al. (1988) show that individuals from subordinate ethnic groups who enjoy high social and economic status still perceive discrimination. This individualist view of social mobility mediations leads to the neglect of macrosocial contexts and cultures in many respects. Of course, the focus of social mobility research has very much been comparative from its inception. But it was for the most part without the benefit of macro-variables, systematically characterizing the different societies, and without ‘thick descriptions’ of the macro-social context, and of the mesolevel differences among societies (institutions and organizations shaping people’s trajectories). Most authors tend to agree with the conventional idea that cross-national comparative research needs, first and foremost, standardized data (Treiman and Ganzeboom, 2000). There are exceptions, though, as illustrated by some studies published in RSSM which focus on the role of the welfare state: social stratification effects of redistributive policies (Wilson, 2001), affirmative action (Edelman and Petterson, 1999; Manley and Roos, 1999; Snipp and Hirschman, 2005), minimum wages (Volscho, 2005), full employment proposals (Sheak and Dabelko, 1993). Valocchi (1986) has proposed a comparison of the welfare states of Great Britain, West Germany, and Sweden in the post-WWII period. Drobnic and Blossfeld (2004) explicitly discuss the theoretical framework of welfare

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state regimes. The notion of societal context is evoked in Zhou and Suhomlinova (2001). Charles (1998) and Wallace and Jepperson (1986) propose culturalist interpretations of international differences with respect to conventional variables. One of the main reasons explaining the increasing focus on individual ‘effects’ is the hegemony of statistical methods. The quantitative approach has partially ‘swallowed up’ the qualitative one, as is apparent in the modelling of mobility tables. The latter is largely concerned with the ‘effects’ of social origin on individual destination (net of structural changes in occupational distributions), rather than with what the particular flows between specific categories can tell us about the social processes involved: for instance inheritance, strategies with respect to schooling or marriage, and ‘opportunity hoarding’ (Tilly, 1998). This hegemony is even more visible in the extensive use of multivariate analysis of continuous, vertical variables. The growing pressures for the harmonization of data and for the sophistication of methods partially explain the lack of interest in less easily captured cultural differences. There are thus relatively few qualitative papers in RSSM. Most of the time, qualitative surveys are simply seen as an exploratory stage before quantitative data collection. Very few papers rely on the analysis of a limited number of interviews, among them Finlay (1988), Finlay and Martin (1994), Hoff (2005), Spitze and Shaffer-King (1985), Useem (1984), and Vallas (2001). This has contributed to a neglect of the ‘subjective’ aspects of mobility and macro-social contexts. While multilevel analysis has ambitions to capture social contexts more effectively, it cannot replace ‘thick’ descriptions of such contexts.

AN EMERGING PARADIGM While the question of social mobility continues to fascinate a large number of sociologists,

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and while it has given rise to rich debates over the last six decades, our examination of articles published in the main journal in the field since 1981 has shown that a pattern of normal science has set in. There also appears an increasing sense of a mismatch between this mainstream approach and the contemporary reality of the reproduction and transmission of social inequality over time. This is why a new paradigm is emerging.

The emergence of the lifecourse approach As we saw earlier, the 1991 review of the succession of three generations of mobility studies by Ganzeboom, Treiman, and Ultee was very optimistic: methodological issues had been tackled, improved answers to classical questions had been provided, the field was moving on. The very same first two authors are more tentative in talking about the fourth generation of studies in 2000. There were major advances in comparative projects, the survey designs and the data were better, the methods ever more sophisticated. But the changes, while largely positive, were less easily characterized. There was a return to ‘the central question of how the stratification outcomes of individuals are affected by their social environment’, but the ways in which it was tackled became much more diversified, suggesting that a number of researchers had identified anomalies, aspects of social mobility that were not adequately accounted for through the usual approaches. Treiman and Ganzeboom (2000) thus praise the completion of the classical CASMIN project (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992), which definitively established that there is a core mobility pattern common to all industrialized nations. But they then cite a number of new avenues being explored. For instance, Shavit and Blossfeld (1993) examine the effects of various factors on the odds of making the transition from each educational level to the next, while Shavit and Müller (1998) focus on how variations in the educational systems of various countries

(especially with respect to vocational training) affect the transition between school and work, and in particular the status of the first job. DiPrete and Grusky (1990) constructed macro-variables to characterize year to year changes in employment and personnel policies and in government job training budgets in order to systematically compare levels of occupational attainment. DiPrete and his colleagues (1997) also characterized the career mobility regimes stemming from the organization of labour markets in four societies with different political traditions, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the US. These efforts testify to a much finer grained attention to the variation of institutional arrangements between countries. And while educational institutions still receive the bulk of this attention, variations in the organization of labour markets are also considered. This extends Sorokin’s intuitions about the key role played by a broad variety of institutions in the reproduction, transmission, and changes of social privilege. Treiman and Ganzeboom (2000) also recognize other new avenues. In the Marxist tradition, Wright (1989) has led an ambitious comparative project on class structure and class consciousness, paying attention to national variations in the distribution of individuals, male and female, into positions of authority and control over enterprises; he and his colleagues also broached the issue of the permeability of class boundaries, and of its influence on class consciousness. Kelley and Evans (1993) led an effort to explore perceptions regarding social position, and their connection to political attitudes. Szelényi, Treiman and their colleagues (1995) sparked a number of research projects, using retrospective life-history data, about how individual trajectories were transformed in post-communist Eastern European societies; attention was paid especially to whether the logic of stratification was radically altered with these societal changes, or whether, on the contrary, those who held privileged positions beforehand were able to put these advantages to use afterwards. Mayer also compared different birth cohorts interviewed in the German Life

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History Study (see, among others, Brückner and Mayer, 2005), examining how they were hit by important historical events at various ages, with different consequences on their trajectories and life chances. Blossfeld led an ambitious project comparing the effects of the globalization process on the lifecourses of individuals in fourteen countries, belonging to five different welfare regimes (Blossfeld et al., 2005). He examined four groups: young people, males and females in mid-career, and aging workers, in order to see how, according to the institutional context of their countries, their trajectories (educational, occupational, and familial) were impacted by new economic uncertainties. While these developments clearly represent major shifts, and indeed increased sophistication, in the exploration of the influence of the social environment on social mobility, Treiman and Ganzeboom (2000) do not identify them as providing a basis for the emergence of a new paradigm. In the same vein, they deal in quite a technical way with one of the key aspects of the relationship of individuals to institutions, referring to it as the problem of ‘selection bias’. What they refer to is the fact that individuals found in particular social positions are not a representative crosssection of the overall population. They get an education to prepare for a specific profession, they only work if the wages offered are high enough, and so on. In other words, individuals make decisions in situations of complexity and uncertainty; this, as we will see, is a basic tenet of the lifecourse approach. We will argue that this portends the emergence of a new paradigm in the field of social mobility. Attention is paid to new and intriguing phenomena; this then leads to innovative results, using new methods (in particular the new data provided by detailed retrospective life histories or ambitious household panel surveys). The development of these genuinely longitudinal methods represents a belated response to longstanding critiques against transversal approaches to social mobility (Bertaux, 1973). This new paradigm combines an increasingly rich

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representation of social contexts with a view of individuals neither as simply acted upon by society, nor as free agents; social actors are influenced by institutions and life circumstances, but they also make choices among alternatives in a context of path dependency (Myles, 1998). Traditional mobility tables assumed that a few key milestones (parent’s position when ego was about 16 years old, and then ego’s first position and current position) provided an adequate representation of the whole trajectory. This assumption has now become quite problematic. Current jobs do not adequately represent economic status in a context of high and increasing levels of job instability. Social origin is increasingly difficult to characterize because of changing levels of homogamy/heterogamy, of family disruptions, and of gender differences in life cycles. The complexity of transitions from school to work, and from there to retirement also causes difficulties for the proper identification of first and final jobs. All of these illustrate non-linear features of increasingly unstable social trajectories. They denote anomalies in the traditional social mobility paradigm. In their own review of the recent work of Research Committee 28, Hout and DiPrete (2006) hint at the emergence of such a new paradigm. They identify recent advances in five areas: (1) the impact of family structure beyond the status variables that were the core of the Blau–Duncan model, (2) the impact of neighbourhoods, (3) the impact of school systems, (4) the impact of labour markets, and (5) the impact of the welfare state. These areas are clearly more diversified than those cited in earlier periods; even more importantly, they are seen as corresponding to rich patterns of institutional influence. Families evolve as the trajectories of their members change, and vice versa. Neighbourhoods affect the lives of individuals who live there, but they are also powerfully shaped by shifts in the composition of their populations. Schools do not only teach, they also select, track, certify in ways that vary from one place to another. Labour markets are

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not only markets, they are also at the confluence of numerous collective influences and institutional interventions, which shape supply and demand. And welfare states have precisely been set up to rectify, up to a point and in a variety of ways, social inequalities and their reproduction. According to Hout and DiPrete, a growing proportion of research in the field of social mobility focuses on the lifecourse rather than on the more traditional intergenerational issues. This is what we want to briefly document here. But we first need to circumscribe the notion of the lifecourse.

What does the notion of lifecourse mean? This is a rich and growing research perspective, going all the way back to Wright Mills’ The Sociological Imagination (1959). It can be, and has been, summarized in a number of ways. Marshall and Mueller’s account (2003) is particularly useful because it identifies connections initially established by Glen Elder (1992), a major figure in lifecourse research, with the social mobility research agenda. In Blau and Duncan’s work, as well as in analysis by means of social mobility tables initiated by Sorokin, time-ordered variables are crucial, as well as the diversity both in individual experiences, and in social environments, especially national environments. As Marshall and Mueller point out, this is closely related to the notion of differentiation over time, or cumulative advantage, which plays an increasingly key role among lifecourse researchers (Elman and O’Rand, 1995; Ferraro and Kelley-Moore, 2003; O’Rand, 1996). We are offering here our own version of the basic principles of lifecourse analysis, a version well suited to identifying the contours of an emerging paradigm in the social mobility field. We identify four such principles. In the first place, life is longitudinal: Indi viduals, as human agents, build their future on the basis of the constraints and opportunities

provided by their past. At each stage of their lives, they examine their circumstances, using whatever information, ideas, and beliefs life has made available to them. They then adopt a course of action in order to maintain or alter this situation. The process is iterative, as circumstances change, in part as a result of the course of action selected earlier. There are of course significant disparities in the circumstances of individuals, as well as in the quality of the knowledge available to make decisions. Moreover, lifecourse research has shown that initial differences in opportunities, sometimes relatively limited, tend to be amplified with the passage of time. The timing and sequence of events and transitions also play a key role, and consequences of these events and transitions unfold in the short, but also in the middle and the long term. In the second place, life is multifaceted: Individuals contribute to, and derive resources from various institutions with which they are in contact – the family, communities, markets, the State. Indeed, the lifecourse of individuals essentially depends on the extent to which they enjoy resources such as good health, a mastery of knowledge, and a certain level of economic security. These three basic resources can be seen as both causes and consequences of one another, as the lifecourse unfolds: at various junctures, individuals only fare as well as their health, literacy, and economic security will allow; and in turn health, literacy, and income security are largely the product of what happens at these successive junctures. The reference to various interdependent forms of capital is useful here: resources are not only used, they are also accumulated (or depleted) over the lifecourse, thus affecting life chances and social conditions in a cumulative and interactive way. Besides economic capital, human and cultural capital, and health capital, social capital is increasingly evoked. Through social networks, individuals can indeed mobilize other useful resources for themselves, their families, and their communities. In the third place, lives are linked. This means that the lifecourse of individuals is

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profoundly affected by what happens in the lifecourse of their family members, and vice versa. We are all born to parents, who usually care for us and expect some form of care and love as they age. A similar relationship binds a large proportion of middle-aged individuals to their own children as well, and indeed it is experienced in the context of increasingly diverse families, intact, single parent or reconstituted. This has critical consequences for the lifecourse of individuals, not only when they are young or aged and dependent, but also when they are middle-aged and sharing the burden of caring for dependents in their families, in their communities, and in their society’s institutions (e.g., pension schemes). Finally, lives are lived in social contexts. Individuals are embedded not only in families, but also in communities, which can offer various levels of opportunities (for instance jobs, quality of schools and childcare services, physical security, quality of the environment, availability of commercial services) and of support (sociability, community organizations). These obviously shape the trajectories of residents, especially in the case of the more place-bound sub-populations, such as children, the aged, the handicapped, and the poor. States also play a key role in shaping lifecourses, through their policies in the fields of health, education, social assistance, urban affairs, transportation, the environment, and so on. Research reveals striking differences even among advanced societies, which Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) has characterized as differences in welfare regimes. Such regimes represent different global and historically resilient models of organizing the production and distribution of welfare by markets, States, families, and communities: liberal countries emphasize markets and residual social programmes, social-democratic countries offer universal social protection while emphasizing widespread participation in the labour market, and conservative countries tend to rely more on families and on occupation-based social insurance schemes. This last element draws

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the lifecourse perspective away from a rather individualistic stance, and anchors it in the comparative analysis of the interplay between individuals, groups, and institutions.

Explicit and implicit uses of the lifecourse perspective in recent social mobility research These principles are increasingly inspiring researchers in social mobility, who are asking new questions and identifying new factors in implicit reference to Sorokin’s view of the key role of a variety of institutions. Hout and DiPrete’s review of the field (Hout and Diprete, 2006) provides strong indications in this respect. We cannot do better than refer the reader to this document, and briefly paraphrase its summary of recent developments and findings (mostly using the paper’s substantial subtitles). According to them: ●

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Educational tracking increases the variance of educational outcomes. School-to-work transitions are smoother and early job mobility is lower in countries where the school curriculum is oriented towards providing vocational training and certification for entry into specific occupations. Strong welfare states and institutionalized labour markets reduce poverty and the growth in wage inequality. Social welfare policies that facilitate the combining of work and motherhood cause women’s work careers to be more continuous, and societal differences in these policies create societal differences in the structure of women’s careers over the lifecourse. Strong welfare states smooth the dynamics of the socioeconomic lifecourse by buffering the impact of mobility events. Welfare states and labour markets affect occupational mobility via their impacts on the process of vacancy creation in the labour market, and on the size of the self-employment sector. State intervention in the mobility process has created historical periods (typically of limited duration) where particular groups or classes defined by occupation, employment status, or political

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party membership were favoured or disfavoured in the mobility process. These interventions into the mobility process typically created persisting differences in the subsequent life chances of the affected cohorts. Family disruption generates downward mobility both over the lifecourse and across generations. Marital homogamy is found in every country, but there is considerable heterogeneity in its extent.

These recent developments testify to a shift in paradigm, even though Hout and DiPrete never claim that there has been such a paradigm change. We do. With respect to socioeconomic position, and to the transmission of social privilege, individuals are now increasingly seen as navigating, in the company of their parents, children, and (successive) spouses, a complicated world, where the various dimensions of life interact. They are at once workers (in increasingly non-standard jobs), parents and carers, students or in a lifelong learning trajectory, retired but not necessarily out of employment. To negotiate all of these dimensions, they enjoy disparate amounts of various forms of capital, they fit more or less into institutional contexts, they have differential access to social networks, and thus to resources, or they are socially isolated. This interface with groups and institutions reflects where they live, in differentially endowed neighbourhoods (Bernard et al., 2007), and in welfare regimes which organize differently the division of labour between markets, the public sector, families, and communities in the production and distribution of well-being (Bernard and Boucher, 2007). And of course, this broadening of the ambit of social mobility has led researchers to devote much more of their work to gender differences and gender issues. In Research in Social Stratification and Mobility, three recent papers explicitly refer to the lifecourse approach to show its heuristic interest compared to the social mobility paradigm. Palloni and Milesi (2006) show how social stratification theories ignore mechanisms originating in early childhood; they find support for lifecourse theories, since early childhood health affects later economic success and adult health status.

Drobnic and Blossfeld (2004) use the lifecourse principle of ‘interdependent or linked lives’ to remedy failures of the traditional social mobility paradigm in understanding mechanisms for access to labour market positions. In their review of the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study (WLS), Sewell et al. (2004) show how interest shifted, over 40 years, from the analysis of post-secondary aspirations and educational attainment to long-term analysis of the lifecourse and aging. A brief examination of the activities at the scientific meetings of ISA’s Research Committee 28 between 1991 and 200710 confirms the impression that a new paradigm is emerging. Welfare states, for instance, were featured in the meeting titles three times, in Sweden in 1996, in Germany in 2001, and in Norway in 2005 (this list of countries is not unexpected). And the 2007 meeting, in Montreal, was entitled: ‘Comparative advantage: education, health, wealth, and institutional contexts’. The examination of a few key words is also telling. We have divided the period into two sequences of almost equivalent lengths: 1991–99, and 2000 to the present. Lifecourse is mentioned 6 times in paper titles in the first period, and 13 times in the second one. Poverty has respective counts of 3 and 7, wealth of 2 and 5, social capital and networks 2 and 11, welfare states/regimes 2 and 11, and divorce and separation 2 against 5. Finally, social inequalities of health, which are an important and productive field in social epidemiology (see, for instance, Marmot and Wilkinson, 2003), are surprisingly absent from the research agenda of students of social mobility; they may be on the rise, though, with 3 papers and 13 respectively in the two periods. These are modest counts, but they seem to indicate a growing interest, among researchers, in a new approach to social mobility. Indeed, quite a few major contemporary researchers in the field examine social mobility from a lifecourse point of view. Mayer has done extensive work in this perspective, both conceptually (2001, 2004; Settersten and Mayer, 1997) and empirically

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(Brückner and Mayer, 2005). DiPrete (see DiPrete and McManus, 2001) has turned to income as a better representation of the longterm socio-economic position of individuals in this age of employment volatility. He has introduced new factors in international comparisons besides occupational history, such as family disruptions and welfare regimes. He has also contributed to the development of the crucial notion of cumulative advantage (DiPrete and Eirich, 2006). Leisering (2002) has analyzed the interplay of government and the lifecourse, paying attention to welfare careers as well as employment careers. Hout, in collaboration with Beller and Hout (2006), has examined how crossnational differences in the association between origins and destinations correspond to differences in both welfare regime type and access to post-secondary education. Breen (2004) has led an effort to systematically compare social fluidity in eight European countries whose policies are quite different; he has focused on the situation of young people (Breen, 2002), as well as on the interplay between social origins, family structures and events, the characteristics of educational systems, and social destinations (Breen and Jonsson, 2005). He and his colleagues found a declining association between class origins and educational attainment in many countries, and raised questions about which sets of welfare and educational institutional arrangements, besides the social democratic ones, can bring about this similarity in achievements. He has also addressed (with Cooke, 2005) the issue of the persistence of the gendered division of domestic labour.

CONCLUDING REMARKS We have proposed a reading of the evolution of the field of social mobility in terms of evolving paradigms. Sorokin’s seminal research launched the field on many promising avenues. Some of his intuitions were found at the core of the original social mobility

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paradigm, which mainly asked, in three successive ‘generations’ of research undertakings, whether societies were equally fluid and whether such fluidity was progressing with modernization. The mobility table was much used at first, and then fell into some disrepute as multivariate status attainment models, featuring education variables, held increasing sway. But mobility tables drew attention again with the availability of more powerful modelling tools and datasets; the qualitative categories ceased, however, to serve as the basis for interpretations of class experiences. As to the third element in Sorokin’s perspective, the role of a multiplicity of diverse institutions in sorting individuals into social positions, it was more or less abandoned by mainstream scientific work in the field. More recently, however, a new paradigm has arguably become more important. One key factor had been the neglect of such phenomena as increasingly volatile careers, complex institutional arrangements in educational systems, the changing role and even nature of families, now often characterized by dual careers and instability (with attendant consequences on economic positions), the influence of welfare regimes (which intervene in very different ways to help individuals and families control their trajectories), or even the role of health as a mediating factor in the reproduction and transmission of social inequality. In this context, a growing number of researchers are turning to the notion of the lifecourse as a possible way to organize these new research findings and to shape the future in this field of sociology. And of course, the field has kept its international comparative tradition, which should serve it well as the interplay of individual trajectories and diverse institutional arrangements in various countries is further explored.

NOTES 1 Among others, see for the oldest ones Bendix and Lipset (1953), Lipset and Bendix (1959), Miller (1960), or Pease et al. (1970) and for more recent ones

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Ganzeboom et al. (1991), Cuin (1993), Treiman and Ganzeboom (2000), DiPrete (2000), Hout and DiPrete (2006). 2 The Research Committee of the International Sociological Association on Social Stratification and Social Mobility (RC28) was established as far back as 1950, and ever since, it has, been a very active forum for discussion among a core set of specialists. 3 For instance, the statistician Galton was one of the first to implement the principle of stratification to perform a descriptive analysis of social divisions. Using Booth’s surveys in London, Galton (1909) wanted to demonstrate that such a division can be derived from a normal distribution of civic worth. 4 ‘The class of the proletariat is recruited principally from the failures of the upper strata and from the less intelligent elements of the lower classes, incapable of ascent’ (Sorokin, 1959: 457). 5 For instance, for which social classes does the army play a role as a social mobility conduit? What is the role of largely intra-class organizations, such as trade unions or professional organizations, as opposed to the ones who are, at least in principle, open to various social classes, such as schools and churches? 6 For a review, see Boudon (1973) and Cuin (1993). 7 These authors even proposed a definition of social classes which included among its parameters that a class was relatively impermeable to mobility from and to other classes. 8 See for example Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992: 123–5). 9 We have reviewed 261 articles, contained in 24 volumes ranging from 1981 to the present. 10 This is the period for which the programs of the meetings are available on the Web. Thirty-five meetings were held, and we have the list of papers for 29 of them.

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PART THREE

Research on Social Issues - Interweaving Processes

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15 Health, Illness and Mortality in Less Developed Countries: Convergence, Divergence, and Stagnation Bali Ram and Shefali S. Ram 1

INTRODUCTION In spite of increasing globalization and interdependence between various parts of the world over the past three decades, there has been an increased divergence between more developed and less developed regions in terms of socioeconomic development; although there has been a strong convergence within the former group and strong divergence within the latter group (Pritchett, 1997). A few developing countries such as China, India, South Korea, and Indonesia have made enormous economic gains, while many including Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina have continued to stagnate despite large capital inflows of foreign direct investment. SubSaharan Africa, which historically has lagged behind most regions, has continued to experience negative per capita economic growth over the past two decades. Eastern Europe and the Russian Federation experienced the

largest declines in their economic growth during the 1990s, while much of Latin America and the Caribbean have recovered after the economic slump of the 1980s. Global progress on many other indicators of social and economic development has also been uneven. Although these regional economic conditions are not necessarily a product of demographic situations, they are clearly reflected in demographic behaviours. The purpose of this chapter is to examine how far social and economic changes have led to the convergence, divergence, and stagnation in health, illness, and mortality patterns in less developed parts of the world, and why some countries and various subgroups have made enormous gains while others have been left behind. (For the sake of analytical convenience, we include in the less developed regions all countries which are not classified as ‘developed’ according to the World Bank. We do not make a distinction between less

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developed, least developed, and developing countries.) Basically, we focus on four factors – economic development, income inequality, public spending on health, and maternal education – that are inextricably linked with the process of globalization and mortality patterns. This chapter is largely descriptive rather than analytical and borrows heavily from the existing literature on the subject. Much of the data comes from published reports of the United Nations, World Bank, and Demographic and Health Surveys. We begin with a brief description of the demographic transition and epidemiological transition theories, which provide the rationale for the convergence hypothesis. Then we examine some selected measures of health, illness, and mortality. Next, we examine the roles of the above-mentioned four factors in bringing about the convergence, divergence, or stagnation in health and mortality patterns. Essentially, we focus on the conflict and competition between nations and groups for access to scarce resources for improving health conditions and reducing mortality. This study is guided by the assumption that there is inherent duality in all societies and in today’s competitive world, nations, groups, and population segments which lack the skills, resources, or opportunity to compete well, fall behind the more privileged and resourceful nations, groups, and segments. The basic premise of the discussion is that people and sections with better social, economic, and political resources are better able to exploit the available resources at the expense of those with poorer resources. The challenge for governments, donor agencies, and international bodies is how to develop cooperative strategies – an important ingredient of convergence – for the efficient allocation of scarce resources among competing sectors. Finally, we offer some implications of these processes for public policies.

THEORETICAL CONTEXT The demographic transition theory is one of the best known theories of population change.

Since the early writings of its proponents, this theory has undergone numerous modifications and critical appraisals (Caldwell, 1976, 1986a; Friedlander et al., 1999). The theory has moved from being a descriptive device for portraying declines in mortality and fertility in various parts of the world to an explanatory and predictive device of population change. In its initial formulations, the theory viewed societies moving from a stage where mortality and fertility were high to a stage of transition where mortality declined first and rapidly, was then followed by fertility declines, and finally reached a stage where both fertility and mortality were at a low level. According to this theory, within a country both mortality and fertility decline as a result of various structural changes (urbanization, industrialization, a rise in women’s status, a rise in education, a decline in religiosity), commonly subsumed under the rubric of ‘modernization’. Building on the theory of demographic transition, Omran (1971) proposed a theory of ‘epidemiologic transition’ according to which the ‘shifts in health and disease patterns ... are closely associated with the demographic and socioeconomic transitions that constitute the modernization complex’ (Omran,1971: 527). The focus of the theory is on ‘the complex changes in patterns of health and disease and on the interactions between these patterns and their demographic, economic, and sociological determinants and consequences’ (Omran, 1971: 510). According to this theory, transition from high to low levels of mortality typically accompanies social development, as in the West, or a combination of medical development and social changes as experienced by many developing countries. The transition emphasizes the secular and long-term shifts from high infant mortality, primarily caused by infectious and communicable diseases, to low levels of mortality, concentrated among the elderly, due primarily to chronic, degenerative, and man-made diseases. According to the epidemiologic transition theory, changes in disease patterns typically occur in three stages and Omran (1971, 1977) identified each stage by the major

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MORTALITY IN LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

determinant of death prevailing at that time. The first stage, which occurred in Europe through the eighteenth century, is the ‘age of pestilence (infections) and famine’. This stage was patterned by extremely high and fluctuating mortality, where life expectancy varied between 20 and 40 years. Most developing countries remained in this stage until the mid-twentieth century and some of them (several countries in sub-Saharan Africa, for example) are still struggling to move to the next stage. The main factors responsible for high and fluctuating mortality during this period were infectious and parasitic diseases, plagues, wars, natural disasters, and famines. This stage emerged slowly into the second stage of transition, the ‘age of receding pandemics’, when major infections first began to decline. This stage occurred in Europe during the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth century and was characterized by a decline in major infectious diseases and the frequency of epidemics, which have nearly disappeared. Life expectancy increased to between 30 and 50 years. In the early stages of the transition, the decline in mortality was mostly due to improved food supply and overall better living conditions and to a lesser degree due to medical progress, sanitation measures, or organized public health activities (McKeown, 1976; Rockett, 1994). In the latter half of the nineteenth century, substantial mortality declines were due to improvements in public health and sanitation measures, such as purification of water, better sewage disposal, and better food hygiene. Thus, diseases such as whooping cough, respiratory tuberculosis, measles, scarlet fever, and diphtheria were brought under control long before any medical interventions. The third stage, ‘the age of degenerative and man-made diseases’, was distinguished by a continued decline in mortality, which eventually reached stability at a relatively low level, with life expectancy reaching around 70 years. Typhoid, tuberculosis, and cholera were replaced by manmade degenerative diseases such as cancer, heart disease, stroke, and diabetes, as the major causes of death.

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Essentially, the concept of convergence lies at the heart of these theories (Goesling and Firebaugh, 2004; Omran, 1971; Vallin and Meslé, 2005; Wilson, 2001), and they implicitly assume that less-developed countries would follow the experiences of the West and consequently there will be a demographic convergence between various regions. This notion has led most demographers and statistical agencies to assume a convergence of mortality patterns in their population projections, including those prepared by the UN (2007) periodically for various countries. Studies have pointed out a number of limitations of the transition theory (Salomon and Murray, 2002), the detailed discussion of which is beyond the scope of this chapter. A major limitation of the theory is its claim to be a universal theory of a ‘linear’ and ‘unidirectional change’ (Frenk et al., 1989: 30; Salomon and Murray, 2002: 205). Most analysts assume that once mortality starts to converge across countries, the trend does not reverse (Goesling and Firebaugh, 2004). As discussed later, a number of countries have substantially deviated from the path of convergence (McMichael et al., 2004; Moser et al., 2004; Ruzicka and Hansluwka, 1982; Vallin and Meslé, 2005), while others have shown the sign of ‘counter transitions’ (Frenk et al., 1989: 31). Another limitation of the theory is its lack of emphasis on the inherent conflict and competition that discourage convergence between various population subgroups. When Omran revisited his theory of epidemiological transition 30 years after his original publication, he hypothesized that ‘while the transition produces change in all social classes, it usually starts earlier and proceeds more quickly among the more affluent and privileged than among the poor and disadvantaged sectors of the same society’ (Omran, 1998: 110). The privileged are better informed, have better access to the health care system and make better use of the available resources, whereas the less privileged lag behind and in certain instances – particularly in highly segmented societies – have a hard time catching up.

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More recently, Vallin and Meslé (2005: 85), reformulated this hypothesis: Arguably, each major improvement in the matter of health is likely to first lead to a divergence in mortality since the most favoured segments of the population benefit most from the improvement. When the rest of the population accesses the benefit of the improvement (through improved social conditions, behavioural changes, health policies, etc.), a phase of convergence begins and can lead to homogenization until a new major advance occurs. The entire health transition process thus breaks down into successive stages, each including a specific divergence-convergence sub-process.

There is a growing body of evidence that suggests that despite impressive achievements in reducing mortality and extending life expectancies, many populations and particularly those in disadvantaged groups have remained in the early stages of the epidemiological transition, where communicable and infectious diseases including pneumonia, diarrhoeal diseases, malaria, measles, and tuberculosis are still the major cause of death. Some analysts argue that under the forces of globalization, health gains in a number of developing and less-developed countries have not been shared equally and the conflict between needs and resources has continued to persist. The competition for the available resources has mainly benefited the better-off, while certain segments, especially women, children, and the poor have been left behind. The less privileged continue to live in poorer health conditions and when stricken by a disease or disaster they are more likely to die than are the more privileged (Cornia, 2001; Ram, 2001; Sen and Bonita, 2000; Wilkinson, 1996; World Bank, 2003). This phenomenon could be referred to as ‘epidemiological polarization’ as Frenk et al. (1989: 31) have labelled it.

OVERALL TRENDS IN HEALTH, ILLNESS, AND MORTALITY Looking from a long-term perspective, there has been a worldwide improvement in health

conditions and a decline in mortality. In 1800, the global average life expectancy at birth was about 28.5 years. Over the next 100 years, it improved very little, reaching 32.0 years in 1900. However, much more rapid progress occurred in the first half of the twentieth century, when life expectancy increased by 14 years and reached 46.4 years during 1950–1955. Progress was faster during the latter part of the century when global life expectancy rose to 66.0 during 2000–2005 (Riley, 2005; UN, 2007). In Europe, which has led the demographic transition, the pattern was more pronounced. During the first half of the century, life expectancy rose from 42.7 years in 1900 to 65.6 years during the period 1950–1955 and to 73.8 years during 2000–2005. In Europe, the largest reductions in mortality occurred from declines in air-borne and water-borne infectious and communicable diseases, resulting from large improvements in public health provisions such as sewage and water supply, better availability of food and improvements in nutrition, and the dissemination of hygienic knowledge among, populations, rather than from improvements in public health technology (McKeown, 1976). It was only during the latter phases when medical advancements (such as inoculation and vaccination for smallpox, cholera, tuberculosis) helped reduce mortality further. In the less developed parts of the world, progress was much slower, although the regions exhibit enormous variations in mortality and socioeconomic development. For example, for the period of 1950–1955, life expectancy at birth in Asia was only 41.0 years, and in Africa it was only 38.5 years, lower than that observed in the Americas and Europe fifty years before (41.0 and 42.7 years). However, progress was made rather quickly in several countries, while there was little change in many others. Between 1950 and 1955 and 2000 and 2005, life expectancy rose from 41.0 to 67.5 years in Asia and from 51.4 to 72.0 in Latin America and the Caribbean. China’s experience was exemplary, where life expectancy rose from 40.8 years

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during 1950–1955 to 65.3 years during 1975–80, although the pace of progress has become slower since then (UN, 2007). Much of the mortality decline in developing countries occurred as a result of improved and imported medical technologies, particularly those related to the use of vaccines and antibiotics for controlling infectious diseases, which were introduced in the early 1940s (Bloom and Williamson, 1997). In Europe, it took almost one and half centuries for life expectancy to rise from 33.3 years in 1800 to 64.7 years in 1950. China made a similar gain in less than 25 years. Sri Lanka is a classic example, where medical technology played an important role in reducing mortality within a short period. In this country, life expectancy at birth rose slowly and steadily from about 32 years during 1920–22 to 46 years during 1945–47, with a gain of 14 years in about 25 years. With the introduction of DDT against malaria, life expectancy rose to 60 years in 1954, with a gain of an additional 14 years within just 7 years (Livi-Bacci, 1992; UN, 1963). In sum, less-developed countries were able to control their level of mortality just by importing a wide range of cost-effective medical technologies, without much social and economic development. These observations are suggestive of the convergence hypothesis. However, there are some important exceptions where the mortality level stagnated or showed signs of reversal. In the 1950s and 1960s, mortality levels in Eastern Europe and the former communist states of the Soviet Union used to be closer to those in the industrialized world. However, in recent years the patterns changed dramatically. In Eastern Europe, life expectancy rose from 64.2 years for the period of 1950–55 to 69.6 years during 1965–70, but fluctuated around the same level until 1985–90 before declining to 67.8 years during 2000–2005 (UN, 2007). The experience of the Russian Federation is striking. Its life expectancy used to be among the world’s highest, but now it is no better than that of many developing countries. The Russian life expectancy rose from 64.5 years during the period of

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1950–55 to 69.3 years during 1965–70, very close to that of Europe and North America. Since then, it has continued to decline and has reached a level as low as 64.8 years during 2000–2005, below the levels in Asia (67.5) and Latin America and the Caribbean (72.0). This was largely a result of an increase in adult mortality rather than infant mortality, which has continued to decline, albeit at a slower pace (UN, 2000: 33–34). Increased stress from the transition to a market economy, abrupt economic transition, large recessions, and uncertainty may have been partially responsible for this uneven pattern, although reasons for this phenomenon are still unclear (Brainerd and Cutler, 2005; Murrell, 1996). Slowdowns and reversals in mortality patterns are most apparent in sub-Saharan Africa, where a number of countries are still in the first and second stages of epidemiologic transition. In this region, life expectancy rose from 37.6 years during 1950–55 to 49.9 years during 1985–90, but has declined since then and reached 48.8 years by 2000–2005 (UN, 2007). Once again, the stagnation and reversal in mortality in this region have to do primarily with a rise in adult mortality, particularly that resulting from the emergence of HIV/AIDS (UN, 2003b: 11–16). The infant mortality rate has continued to decline, although at a slower pace than in early periods. Africa, China, and India were almost at the same level in the 1950s. China, however, has made enormous progress since the 1960s and has reached a mortality level close to that of Latin America and the Caribbean. India’s progress was slower until the early 1980s. Only recently, has its mortality started to decline at a rather fast pace, although still at a much slower pace than China’s. Africa’s mortality level was not only very high to begin with, but also its improvement has been very slow. Tropical geography, sluggish economic development, widespread malnutrition, the emergence of new epidemics like AIDS, and other infectious diseases such as endemic malaria and

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tuberculosis, and to some extent wars and armed conflicts are known to be responsible for these mortality conditions (Bloom and Sachs, 1998; Sachs et al., 2001; UN, 2000: 18–19). Even today, a large segment of the population in many African and Asian countries is at the early stages of epidemiological transition, marred by largely avoidable diseases. Around 2000, 15% of the total population in Ghana, 34% in Zambia, and 49% in Botswana were affected by malaria; the prevalence of tuberculosis exceeded 500 per 100,000 persons in countries such as Zambia, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Kenya, and Indonesia; and the maternal mortality rate exceeded 500 per 100,000 live births in Kenya, Nigeria, Zambia, and India (UN, 2005; WHO, 2005). In recent years, AIDS has emerged as a major killer in Africa. The AIDS epidemic on this continent has been called the ‘most devastating health disaster in human history’ since the Black Death, and sub-Saharan Africa, the hardest hit region, has been called a ‘dying continent’ (Ezzell, 2000: 96; Lamptey et al., 2006: 3). According to one estimate, in 2003 there were about 38 million (1.1%) adults (15–49 years) infected with HIV globally, of whom 25 million (7.5% of all adults) were in sub-Saharan Africa alone. The adult HIV prevalence rate exceeded 25% in Swaziland, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, and Botswana (World Bank, 2005b). In recent years, there has been an increase in the prevalence of HIV in a number of countries on other continents, with India, Russia, Brazil, China, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Myanmar in the forefront (Cohen, 2003; Steinbrook, 2004). The numbers for India are staggering: about 4.5 million people (0.8% of all adults) were infected with HIV in 2002, up from less than half a million ten years earlier (Cohen, 2004). AIDS alone is estimated to have reduced life expectancy by 4 to 26 years in a number of African countries (US Bureau of the Census, 1999). Potential years of life lost due to the AIDS epidemics are particularly large in Zimbabwe (26 years), Namibia (24 years), Botswana (21 years),

Swaziland (20 years), Zambia (19 years), and Kenya (18 years). Although there are some success stories including those of Zambia, Kenya, Uganda, Thailand, and Cambodia where the prevalence rate has declined, there do not seem to be any signs of significant change in many other developing countries. Signs of divergence and stagnation are apparent when the average annual percent decline in the infant mortality rate between 1950–1955 and 2000–2005 is plotted against the initial (i.e., 1950–1955) level of infant mortality (UN, 2007). Countries with a low initial mortality level (for example, with an infant mortality rate below 100 during 1950–1955) are a homogeneous group, which experienced large declines in their mortality rates over the 45-year period, mostly at a rate above 2.0% annually and only a few between 1.0 and 2.0%. However, countries with high initial mortality (for example, with a rate over 150 during 1950–1955) are a very heterogeneous group. This has led some analysts to conclude that while richer countries are converging around much lower mortality levels, poorer countries are converging around very high mortality levels (Goesling and Firebaugh, 2004).

FOUR MAJOR DETERMINANTS OF CHANGES IN HEALTH AND MORTALITY PATTERNS There is a vast literature on the correlates and determinants of health and mortality change. Broadly speaking, they can be classified into two categories. The first category includes factors such as population size, population density, geography, climate, and ethnic heterogeneity, which facilitate or impede health improvement programme, but cannot be manipulated by policy makers. The second category includes factors which directly or indirectly influence health and mortality levels and can be manipulated by policy makers. In this chapter, we examine the roles of four factors in the latter category, which governments, non-governmental organizations,

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and international bodies have found relevant in order to bring about reductions in mortality in less developed countries.

Economic development Income is known to be a robust and strong determinant of mortality. Following the classic study of Preston (1975, 1976), a number of studies examined the relationship between income and mortality at the national level and found that mortality fell rapidly during the early stages of economic development and then levelled-off at later stages (Deaton, 2003). It appears that a small rise in per capita income results in large reductions in mortality, especially during the early stages of epidemiologic transition. Once mortality has reached a relatively low level (e.g., with a life expectancy around 70 and an infant mortality rate around 20), income does not seem to make much difference. We also find that there are wide variations in mortality, suggesting that mortality reductions can occur without significant economic development (World Bank, 2003). An examination of the correlation between annual growth rate in the gross domestic product and the annual change in the infant mortality rate reveals that there is a weak relationship between changes in per capita income and changes in infant mortality. The most impressive declines in infant mortality occurred in countries with improved economic situation, albeit only slightly. However, mortality declined even in countries which have not experienced much improvement in their economic conditions or have experienced a decline, whereas it declined with varying rates for countries with similar rates of economic growth. As Preston (1975, 1976) argued, factors exogenous to a country’s current level of income, such as the import of health and medical technologies, anti-malarial programme, and mass immunization may have played a far greater role than economic development per se in explaining mortality declines in many less developed countries.

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Economic inequality Some researchers question the utility of economic development in explaining health and mortality without taking economic inequality into account (Anand and Ravallion, 1993; Flegg, 1982; Houweling et al., 2005; Rodgers, 2002; Sen, 1998; Wilkinson, 1996), although there is a body of literature that is sceptical of the inequality–mortality hypothesis (for a review, see Lynch et al., 2004). Considerable evidence has accumulated to show that despite impressive economic growth in many countries over the past 50 years or so, large masses of their population have remained in poverty. Economic growth has not benefited a vast segment of their populations. It is argued that the effect of economic development on mortality depends on how its benefits are distributed between various segments of a population and the mechanisms through which it operates to reach the poor and disadvantaged who are most vulnerable to high morbidity and mortality. Inequality tends to reduce access to health services and medical facilities even when they are available. Studies have shown time and again that a somewhat similar socioeconomic gradient in disease and mortality, with lower rates among the rich and higher among the poor, exists in every country, developed or less developed. The gradient remains largely unaltered even when socioeconomic differences in medical care or life style factors, such as smoking, unhealthy eating, or risktaking behaviours are accounted for (Marmot, 2001). The essence of this argument is that the problems associated with ill health that affect the poor, less educated, and underprivileged disproportionately are not necessarily a consequence of their different life style. Rather, their disadvantaged social status, deprived neighbourhoods, and work environment translate directly or indirectly into poorer health in several major ways. Data collected by the Demographic and Health Surveys on infant mortality rates by asset quintile for various less developed countries, around 2000 are revealing

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(World Bank, 2005a, Table A3). Generally, there is a decline in the infant mortality rate with the decline in inequality. However, the gradient differs widely by country. The gradient is steepest in India, followed by that in Peru, Egypt, Bangladesh, and Uganda. It is not as steep in Nepal, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Colombia, while it is somewhat curvilinear in Ethiopia and sporadic in Mali and Tanzania. In sum, there is no systematic pattern of relationship between the gradient and the countries’ levels of economic development and economic inequality, implying that other factors must explain this variability. It is well known that these global aggregate statistics can obscure large disparities between and within nations, particularly when they are not examined in a multivariate manner. However, they are not completely out of line with various in-depth analyses (Braveman and Tarimo, 2002). By analyzing access to health care, prevalence of specific diseases, and mortality patterns for about 100 districts and counties in China, Zhao (2006) found that growing economic inequality impeded progress in mortality decline in poor areas and among disadvantaged social groups despite globalization and impressive overall economic growth over the last 25 years. By analyzing child mortality data in 11 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Brockerhoff and Hewett (2000) found that by and large ethnic mortality differences were linked to economic inequality and differential use of child health services. A major reason for socioeconomic disparity in mortality is differential access to health care facilities by social class. Studies show that mothers from lower socioeconomic backgrounds are less familiar with basic health care practices and are less likely to visit health personnel or hospitals (Caldwell, 1986b). Also, children from lower socioeconomic backgrounds are less likely to receive vaccinations. In almost every less developed country for which reliable data are available, the immunization rate is higher among the rich than among the poor (World Bank, 2005b, Table 2.6). The gap is much wider in

the least developed countries and it tends to shrink with a rise in per capita income. This implies that economic development does help to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor at least in terms of getting children immunized. According to some research, it is poverty and not economic inequality that is responsible for high mortality in less developed countries. Inequality is usually to the disadvantage of the poor and therefore it is likely to result in high overall mortality in countries where the poor form a large segment of the population. As Deaton (2003: 115) argues, ‘individuals are more likely to be sick or to die if they live in places or in periods where income inequality is higher. The raw correlations that exist in (some of the) data are most likely the result of factors other than income inequality, some of which is ultimately linked to broader notions of inequality or unfairness’ rather than income inequality per se. This hypothesis has received support in a number of recent studies (Deaton, 2003; Gravelle et al., 2002; Lynch et al., 2004; Mackenbach, 2002; Wagstaff and Doorslaer, 2000). To some scholars, the socioeconomic gradient in mortality in a country is a reflection of conditions which are difficult to gauge by objective measures such as per capita income, Gini index, and so on. Wilkinson (1996), a most well-known advocate of the ‘inequality–mortality’ hypothesis, finds that income inequality, like air pollution or toxic radiation, is itself a health hazard. Some scholars (Daniels et al., 1999; Sapolsky, 2005a, 2005b) argue, it is not just the lack of absolute deprivation associated with low economic development (such as the lack of access to basic material conditions necessary for health such as clean water, adequate nutrition and housing, and general sanitary living conditions) that explains health and mortality differences between and within countries, but rather a ‘lack of sources of self-respect that are deemed essential for full participation in society’ (Daniels et al., 1999: 221). They argue further that ‘feeling poor

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may be at the core of why being poor predicts poor health.… The disease consequences of feeling poor are often rooted in the psychological consequences of being made to feel poor by one’s surroundings’ (Sapolsky, 2005b: 652). In sum, the greater the inequality in a society, the greater is the likelihood for the poor to be psychosocially stressed and consequently in poorer health.

Public spending on health Another variable that has often been linked to economic development and inequality as a determinant of high mortality in lessdeveloped countries is the low per capita public health expenditure (Anand and Ravallion, 1993; Houweling et al., 2005; World Bank, 2003: 35–42). Poor and unequal societies not only spend less on health on a per capita basis, but also poor people in those societies do not have equal access to knowledge and health facilities. There exists an intense conflict and competition between various groups for the access to scarce resources for improving their wellbeing, including health conditions. Moreover, the less privileged are not able to make better use of the available resources, due largely to lower education, remote residential locations, and poorer social and political networks. In most developing countries the poorest fifth of the population receives less than a fifth of the health expenditures, while the richest fifth receives much more (World Bank, 2003, Table 3). Even in a country such as India which is one of the fastest growing economies and among the largest beneficiaries of globalization in recent years, the poorest fifth of the population received about 10% of public health expenditures during 1991–2001, whereas the richest fifth received 32%. The situation was much worse in countries such as Ecuador, Armenia, and Guinea, although other poor countries such as Kenya, Bangladesh, Indonesia, or Vietnam have done better. In countries such as South Africa, Nicaragua, and Sri Lanka, there was no such imbalance between the rich and the poor.

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In Latin American countries, the situation was reversed, where poorer people were in an advantageous position as far as the share of public health expenditure was concerned. However, several studies do not find public spending on health to be an important predictor of mortality. The oft-cited study by Filmer and Prichett (1999) found public spending on health to be a poor predictor of child mortality, once variables such as per capita income, female education, and access to safe water were held constant. This is a contentious issue that needs further research.

Maternal education Mother’s education is known to be an important determinant of infant mortality. In a number of studies, Caldwell (1986b) showed that in less-developed countries educated mothers were more likely than illiterate mothers to be sensitive about the risks of health problems among infants and children, and more knowledgeable about the available health care facilities. Also, they were more likely to bring sick children to hospitals and health practitioners, and to follow the suggested treatment. Thus, for every country where data are available, the infant mortality rate for children born to illiterate women is higher than for those born to women with a secondary school or higher level of education (World Bank, 2005a: Table A3). In general, the effect of education on mortality does not vary with the level of economic development.

CONCLUDING REMARKS Over the past fifty years, the progress in morbidity and mortality declines in the less-developed world has been highly uneven. While mortality in developed countries, particularly that which occurs during infancy and childhood, has been reduced to extremely low levels (for example, an infant mortality rate of 3 per 1000 live births in

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2003 in Finland, Norway, Sweden, Japan, and Singapore), in many less-developed countries it has remained at extraordinarily high levels (for example, an infant mortality rate of over 150 in Angola, Niger, and Sierra Leone). Even in less-developed regions enormous heterogeneity exists, with infant mortality varying between a rate as low as 8 in Costa Rica and 13 in Sri Lanka to the high levels mentioned above. Not only have health and mortality levels in less-developed countries been slow to converge, but also the differences between the various subgroups within countries do not show significant signs of diminution. Ironically, much of this divergence has become apparent during times when the world has become more interconnected and interdependent and when medical technologies have become more readily available. People in every society want to live longer and save their children from death, and will do whatever is necessary to reduce mortality. Then why should there be such slow progress in the convergence in health, illness, and mortality patterns between and within countries? This chapter focused on four major factors to address this question: economic development, income inequality, public spending on health, and maternal education. By far, economic development is the most important and robust predictor of mortality decline in the less-developed world. It brings reductions in mortality among the rich and the poor, and the well educated and the illiterate via high expenditures on health and widespread availability of medical and health care facilities. However, many countries (e.g., Bangladesh, Ecuador, and Egypt) have reduced their mortality levels without significant economic progress (Croghan et al., 2006), while others (e.g., China and India) have experienced increased divergence in mortality patterns despite rapid economic development (Braveman and Tarimo, 2002; Zhao, 2006). Moreover, some others are so poor that they cannot afford to buy enough food and medicine in the world markets or spend enough on the improvement of technologies

such as water purification and delivering treated water to rural homes (Mosk and Johansson, 1986; Sachs et al., 2001). It is true that the availability of medical and health facilities is an important proximate determinant of mortality decline and international bodies and donor agencies can cooperate in providing guidance and assistance to national governments (Croghan et al., 2006). However, outcomes depend heavily on whether the assistance reaches the needy segments of the population. Apparently, there is inherent conflict and competition between nations and groups for the access to scarce resources that are required to improve health conditions and reduce mortality. During the course of globalization and economic development over the past 30 years or so, this conflict has intensified in many countries, including China and India and people with the fewest needs have succeeded in getting better access to maximum resources. Considerable evidence has accumulated to suggest that the gap between various segments of the populations within some countries has widened in recent years, with those in greater need falling behind. The less privileged and more disadvantaged individuals and groups who are more likely than the privileged to be exposed to higher risks of illness and early death are finding it difficult to get easy access to health care services and to make adequate use of the available resources. In good economic times, the poor and the disadvantaged simply cannot compete with the rich and resourceful, and in bad economic times, they are the ones who are hit hardest. Widening social and economic inequality has encouraged conflict and competition between various segments of the population and has intensified the maldistribution of health care facilities. Economic development is certainly the real answer to reducing morbidity and mortality and to improving health conditions in less-developed countries. However, it is well known that inducing economic prosperity is not only complicated, but it is a long-term project. Despite great strides in industrialization,

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globalization, and efforts of international organizations over the past half century, lessdeveloped countries have not been able to catch up to the more developed part of the world, and in fact, a number of countries, particularly in Africa, have been showing negative economic growth and stagnation in health, illness, and mortality. Also, as mentioned above disparities in health among more and less privileged social groups have widened in recent years. Thus, an increase in public spending on health and maternal education is the most viable public policy option. Small spending on health can bring large reductions in mortality in high mortality countries, where most of the deaths still occur among women, infants, and children from diseases that are largely avoidable (e.g., maternal mortality, diarrhoeal disease) based on the existing knowledge and through costeffective means. Women, even those with little education, will be able to make better use of existing health care facilities in order to save themselves and their children. It is possible, indeed likely, that such expenditure will reach the urban, affluent, and privileged groups first, particularly in very poor countries; but then it will slowly ‘trickle down’ to all. This is where state efficacy, good governance, and strong political will for good health will be of utmost importance (Caldwell, 1986b; Mosk and Johansson, 1986; Ruzicka and Hansluwka, 1982). International bodies, donor agencies, and national governments need to play greater cooperative roles in guiding globalization for the benefit of the vast segments of the population, particularly the poor and the less advantaged.

NOTE 1 This chapter was prepared by Bali Ram in his capacity as Adjunct Research Professor, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada and Shefali S. Ram when she was a graduate student with the Department of Community Health and Epidemiology, Queen’s

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University, Kingston, Canada. It draws heavily on our earlier presentations at World Congress of Sociology, Durban, South Africa, July 23–30, 2006 and International Sociological Association (ISA) Research Council Conference, at the University of Ottawa, May 28–30, 2004. The views expressed in this chapter are the authors’ own and do not reflect those of the institutions where they are currently employed.

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Cohen, Jon (2004) ‘HIV/AIDS: India’s Many Epidemics’, Science, 304: 504–8. Cornia, Giovanni Andrea (2001) ‘Globalization and Health: Results and Options’, Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 79: 834–41. Croghan, Thomas W., Beatty, Amanda and Ron, Aviva (2006) ‘Routes to Better Health for Children in Four Developing Countries’, Milbank Quarterly, 84: 333–58. Daniels, Norman, Kennedy, Bruce P. and Kawachi, Ichiro (1999) ‘Why Justice is Good for our Health: The Social Determinants of Health Inequalities’, Daedalus, 128: 215–51. Deaton, Angus (2003) ‘Health, Inequality, and Economic Development’, Journal of Economic Literature, 41: 113–58. Ezzell, Carol (2000) ‘Care for a Dying Continent’, Scientific American, May: 96–105. Filmer, D. and Prichett, L. H. (1999) ‘The Impact of Public Spending on Health: Does Money Matter?’ Social Science and Medicine, 49: 1309–23. Flegg, A T. (1982) ‘Inequality of Income, Illiteracy and Medical Care Determinants of Infant Mortality in Developing Countries’, Population Studies, 36: 441–58. Frenk, J., Bobadilla, J. L., Sepulveda, J. and Cervantes, M. L. (1989) ‘Health Transition in Middle-income Countries: New Challenges for Health Care’, Health Policy and Planning, 4: 29–39. Friedlander Dov, Okun, Barbara S. and Segal, Sharon (1999) ‘The Demographic Transition Then and Now: Processes, Perspectives, and Analyses’, Journal of Family History, 24: 493–533. Goesling, Brian and Firebaugh, Glenn (2004) ‘The Trend in International Health Inequality’, Population and Development Review, 30: 131–46. Gravelle, H., Wildman, J., and Sutton, M. (2002) ‘Income, Income Inequality and Health: What Can We Learn From Aggregate Data’, Social Science and Medicine, 54: 577–89. Houweling, Tanja, Casper, Anton E., Looman, W. N. and Mackenbach, Johan P. (2005) ‘Determinants of Under-5 Mortality Among the Poor and the Rich: A Cross-national Analysis of 43 Developing Countries’, International Journal of Epidemiology, 34: 1257–65.

Lamptey, Peter R., Johnson, Jami L. and Khan, Marya (2006) ‘The Global Challenge of HIV and AIDS’, Population Bulletin (Population Reference Bureau), 61: 1–24. Livi-Bacci, Massimo (1992) A Concise History of World Population. Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell. Lynch John, Smith, George Davey, Harper, Sam, Hillemeier, Marianne, Ross, Nancy, Kaplan, George A. and Wolfson, Michael (2004) ‘Is Income Inequality a Determinant of Population Health? Part 1. A Systematic Review’, Milbank Quarterly, 82: 5–99. Mackenbach, Johan P. (2002) ‘Income Inequality and Population Health’, British Medical Journal, 324: 1–2. Marmot, Michael (2001) ‘Inequalities in Health’, New England Journal of Medicine, 345: 134–6. McKeown, Thomas (1976) The Modern Rise of Population. London: Edward Arnold. McMichael, Anthony J., McKee, Martin, Shkolnikov, Vladimir, and Valkonen, Tapani (2004) ‘Mortality Trends and Setbacks: Global Convergence or Divergence?’, Lancet, 363: 1155–9. Moser, Kath, Shkolnikov, Vladimir and Leon, David A. (2004). ‘World mortality 1950–2000: Divergence replaces convergence from the late 1980s’, Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 83: 202–8. Mosk, Carl and Johansson, S. Ryan (1986) ‘Income and Mortality: Evidence from Modern Japan’, Population and Development Review, 12: 415–40. Murrell, Peter (1996) ‘How Far Has the Transition Progressed?’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10: 25–44. Omran, Abdel R. (1971) ‘The Epidemiologic Transition: A Theory of the Epidemiology of Population Change’, Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly, 49: 509–38. Omran, Abdel R. (1977) ‘Epidemiologic Transition in the U.S.’, Population Bulletin (Population Reference Bureau), 32(2): 1–40. Omran, Abdel R. (1998), ‘The Epidemiologic Transition Theory Revisited Thirty Years Later’, World Health Statistics Quarterly, 51: 99–119. Preston, Samuel H. (1975) ‘The Changing Relation Between Mortality and Level of Economic Development’, Population Studies, 29: 231–48.

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Preston, Samuel H. (1976) Mortality Patterns in National Populations. NY: Academic Press. Pritchett, Lant (1997) ‘Divergence, Big Time’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11: 3–17. Ram, Bali (2001) ‘Globalization, Inequality, and Demography’, in Demographic Futures in the Context of Globalization: Public Policy Issues. Proceedings of the Federation of Canadian Demographers, Ottawa, Carleton University, pp. 117–23. Riley, James C. (2005) ‘Estimates of Regional and Global Life Expectancy, 1800–2001’, Population and Development Review, 31: 537–43. Rockett, I. R. H. (1994) ‘Population and Health: An Introduction to Epidemiology’, Population Bulletin (Population Reference Bureau), 49(3): 1–44. Rodgers, G. B. (2002) ‘Income and Inequality as Determinates of Mortality: An International Cross-sectional Analysis’, International Journal of Epidemiology, 31: 533–8. Ruzicka, Lado T. and Hansluwka, Harald (1982) ‘Mortality Transition in South and East Asia: Technology Confronts Poverty’, Population and Development Review, 8: 567–88. Sachs, Jeffery D., Mellinger, Andrew D. and Gallup, John L. (2001) ‘The Geography of Poverty and Wealth’, Scientific American, March: 70–5. Salomon, Joshua A. and Murray, Christopher J. L. (2002) ‘The Epidemiologic Transition Revisited: Compositional Models for Causes of Death by Age and Sex’, Population and Development Review, 28: 205–28. Sapolsky, Robert (2005a) ‘Sick of Poverty’, Scientific American, December: 93–9. Sapolsky, Robert (2005b) ‘The Influence of Social Hierarchy on Primate Health’, Science, 308: 648–52. Sen, Amartya (1998) ‘Mortality as an Indicator of Economic Success and Failure’, Economic Journal, 108: 1–25. Sen, Kasturi and Bonita, Ruth (2000) ‘Global Health Status: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back’, The Lancet, 356: 577–82.

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Steinbrook, Robert (2004) ‘The AIDS Epidemic in 2004’, The New England Journal of Medicine, 351: 115–17. UN (1963). Population Bulletin of the United Nations, No. 6. NY: United Nations. UN (2000) World Population Monitoring 1998. NY: United Nations. UN (2005) Population, Development and HIV/AIDS with Particular Emphasis on Poverty. NY: United Nations. UN (2007) World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision, Vol. I. NY: United Nations. US Bureau of the Census (1999) World Population Profile: 1998. Washington DC. Vallin, Jacques and Meslé, France (2005) ‘Convergences and Divergences: An Analytical Framework of National and Subnational Trends in Life Expectancy’, Genus, 61: 83–124. Wagstaff, Adam and Doorslaer, Eddy van (2000) ‘Income Inequality and Health: What Does the Literature Tell Us?’, Annual Review of Public Health, 21: 543–67. Wilkinson, Richard G. (1996) Unhealthy Societies: The Afflictions of Inequality, London, England: Routledge. Wilson, Chris (2001) ‘On the Scale of Global Demographic Convergence: 1950–2000’, Population and Development Review, 27: 155–71. World Bank (2003) World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for Poor People. Washington, DC and Oxford: World Bank and Oxford University Press. World Bank (2005a) World Development Report 2006: Equity and Development. Washington, DC and Oxford: World Bank and Oxford University Press. World Bank (2005b) World Development Indicators. Washington, DC: World Bank. WHO (2005) The World Health Report. Geneva: World Health Organization. Zhao, Zhongwei. (2006) ‘Income Inequality, Unequal Health Care Access, and Mortality in China’, Population and Development Review, 32: 461–83.

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16 Conflict, Competition, and Cooperation in Twenty-First Century Military Peacekeeping Operations1 David R. Segal, Christopher Dandeker, and Yuko K. Whitestone

BACKGROUND The nature of military conflict, the strategies used by the international community to control such conflicts, and the norms guiding that control have changed since the end of the Cold War in Europe in the late 1980s. In particular, new patterns of cooperation have evolved among nations forming coalitions for the purpose of conflict control, while at the same time competition has evolved among potential peacekeeping coalition partners as new participants in peacekeeping operations have required that traditional participants in multinational peacekeeping reevaluate their roles in the process. This chapter is concerned with these patterns. It has been common to refer to the period since the collapse of the Berlin Wall in the late 1980s as the post-Cold War period. We regard this characterization as too comprehensive. While tension between communism

and political democracy ended almost three decades ago in the North Atlantic region, continuing nuclear threats from North Korea, as well as manifestations of China’s attempt to maintain a communist political system even as it attempts to join the global market economy, reflect a Cold War that is still being waged on the Pacific Rim (Kurashina and Segal, 2007). In a set of comparative analyses of military forces after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, which postulated a shift in military missions toward peacekeeping, Downes (2000: 188–9) noted with regard to Australia and New Zealand that territorial defense, regional security, and alliance security all were currently higher priorities than peace support and enforcement. Thus our analysis deals with a transition period, in which new forms of conflict, cooperation, and competition are evolving in some areas, while more traditional forms persist in others.

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MILITARY PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

The major military conflicts of the twentieth century were conventional wars between nations or coalitions of nations, represented on the battlefield by military forces acting as agents of their states. Military forces of other nations, primarily drawn from the ‘middle powers’, such as Canada, the Netherlands, and the Nordic nations (Moskos, 1976), have been involved in trying to control these inter-state conflicts through participation in multinational peacekeeping operations for over a half-century, first under the auspices of the League of Nations, then of the United Nations, and for the past two decades, under the auspices of new international entities, such as the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai (Segal and Gravino, 1985). The first recorded multinational peace operation under the auspices of an international organization was a ‘peace force’ of over 3,000 military personnel from the United Kingdom, Sweden, Italy, and the Netherlands, formed by the post-World War I League of Nations to maintain regional security for a plebiscite in the Saar Basin in 1934 (Lewis, 1992). The League subsequently used other multinational forces to mediate disputes upon request of member nations. The constraints under which this model of peacekeeping was applied contributed to the League’s inability to prevent World War II. After World War II, the United Nations developed a new peacekeeping system that was constrained by the Cold War. The antagonisms of the bipolar international system, dominated by the tensions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and represented among the permanent members of the UN Security Council by the United States and the Soviet Union, made it unlikely that consensus and cooperation on peacekeeping could be achieved in the Security Council. The UN Charter contains no reference to peacekeeping, let alone a formula for its performance. Former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammerskjold described peacekeeping as ‘chapter six and a half’ in the UN charter: chapter six calls for peaceful resolution of

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conflicts, while Chapter VII allows the Security Council to take military action to intervene in conflicts if diplomatic efforts fail. The UN did develop a system for dealing with international conflict that began with the deployment of unarmed military observers to the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in 1948 (Fabian, 1971). From that point until December 2004, there were a total of 60 UN peacekeeping operations, two-thirds of which were initiated in 1991 or later, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when the Security Council was no longer constrained by the Cold War bipolarity.

THE CHANGING NATURE OF CONFLICT Much of classical sociological theory, such as the writings of Comte and Spencer, idealistically postulated a social evolution from societies characterized by warfare to peaceful societies characterized by industrial and economic relations (Gobbicchi, 2002). This evolution did not take place. On the contrary, while the nature of war has varied greatly over the course of human history, social change has brought us to a stage in which ‘war has tended to spread more rapidly, to destroy larger proportions of life and property, and to disorganize the economy of states more than ever before’ (Wright, 1965: 7). Armed conflict remains a serious social problem (Gleditsch et al., 2002). War existed among primitive people, but at low levels of lethality given primitive technologies. Economic development did not eliminate war, but rather produced a congruence between civilian and military facts of material life (Keegan, 1976), such that as society became industrialized, so too did military technology, increasing its lethality. Battle progressed from using agricultural implements (axes and knives) in hand-to-hand combat, through single use weapons that could be used at a distance (arrows, spears),

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through line-of-sight firearms after the development of gunpowder (first single shot and later repeating), to weapons that could be used from ‘stand-off’ distances that did not require direct visual contact between combatants (artillery, bombs), to weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological, and nuclear). One consequence of this increasing lethality, even in pre-nuclear war days, was an increasing reluctance on the part of European military leaders to go to war, which would decimate their profession and destroy their social base (Vagts, 1959). At the same time, there was also a growing recognition that the limited wars of the late twentieth century were no longer clashes between the conventional military forces of nations, but rather involved conflicts within a given nation, including armed revolts, insurrections, paramilitary formations, terrorism, and other forms of internal or non-state warfare (Janowitz, 1968: 16). Franco et al. (2005) report that the vast majority of conflicts since World War II have been within states. Some have suggested that war, in the strict sense of inter-state conflict, has been in decline since 1945 (Smith, 2005; Van Creveld, 1991). With the advent of nuclear weapons, two competing perspectives on war emerged among military leaders. The absolutists reflected assumptions made by the military as it emerged as a profession in the nineteenth century. They assumed that the outbreak of war was inevitable, rooted in the nature of man. They emphasized the historical continuity of military solutions to political problems, the permanency of war as a social form, the quest for victory as the desired end, and the likelihood that nuclear wars would be short. The pragmatists, by contrast, emphasized the discontinuity of the nuclear age from the past, the length of time that would be required for the international system to recover from a nuclear war, and the absence of certainty that such a war would produce peace (Janowitz, 1960: 264). Janowitz reported that between 1945 and 1960 there was a decline in the influence of the pragmatic

school on the officer corps. Most importantly, by 1970, he saw the military being transformed into a constabulary force, grounded in pragmatic doctrine (Janowitz, 1971). Historically, the concept of the military was rooted in absolute doctrine. The absolutist military engages in war as an inevitable means and a form of punishment and retaliation to pursue total supremacy. In contrast, a constabulary force is ‘continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations rather than victory’ (Janowitz, 1960: 418). The social organization of peacekeeping, along with strategies of deterrence, did help to control inter-state war during the second half of the twentieth century. However, at the same time, the attention of the world increasingly turned to the persistence of intra-state conflicts based on religious, racial, and ethnic differences.

CHANGES IN THE PEACEKEEPING RESPONSE Evolving as a military mission, the nature of peacekeeping changed. Early ‘first-generation’ peacekeeping missions starting in the midtwentieth century involved the interposition of lightly armed (or unarmed) impartial military personnel as observers between the forces of two conflicting nations that had sought an end to their conflict and agreed to the presence of third-party peacekeepers to help negotiate or verify a cease-fire or a treaty. These missions included the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB), to ascertain whether communist nations in the north of Greece were infiltrating her borders (1947), the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), to monitor cease-fires after the first ArabIsraeli war in 1948, and the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), stationed in Kashmir in 1949 to monitor the status of cease-fires (Segal, 1995). By the 1990s, new more muscular

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forms of peacekeeping were initiated to deal with conflicts still ongoing. These conflicts did not always involve conventional military forces acting as agents of states, and sometimes were internal to states or reflected states in the process of failing. These ‘second-generation’ (Mackinley and Chopra, 1993), or ‘strategic’ (Dandeker and Gow, 1997) peacekeeping operations involved larger peacekeeping forces, and more extensive use of force in achieving or keeping the peace. In addition, they involved national participants that had previously been excluded by the bipolar tensions of the Cold War and the UN peacekeeping norms of minimum use of force, impartiality, and host country consent, or had been limited by constitutional constraints against out-of-area operations or by the tendency to exclude the armed forces of less developed nations. The United States and the Soviet Union had not been perceived as disinterested third parties in international conflicts, and had demonstrated their resistance to the principle of minimum use of force in favor of doctrines that varied between proportional use of force and overwhelming use of force.

CHANGING NORMS OF PEACEKEEPING The changes that have taken place in the twenty-first century with regard to the norms of use of force, impartiality, and host nation consent have implications for theories regarding whether armed forces have a role in the pursuit of world peace, as well as implications for theories regarding what that role might be. Wright (1965: 1310), in the idealistic tradition of Comte and Spencer, suggested that military attempts to prevent war would not be successful, but rather that simultaneous attacks on war would have to be made on educational, social, political, and legal fronts. Janowitz (1968: 30) argued that such a model of controlling conflict recognized the basic issues of economic development,

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international communications, and political arrangements that were necessary for the development of a world community, but failed to incorporate a realistic understanding of the role of the military in constructive international relations, with the military moving in the direction of becoming a policetype organization, eventually becoming smaller, and changing its pattern of activity in a constabulary direction, with the United Nations (first-generation) peacekeeping operations serving as an example of constabulary military forces (Janowitz, 1968: 32–3). Janowitz had not postulated that constabulary operations would be limited to firstgeneration peacekeeping, and in fact suggested that the pragmatic constabulary orientation was appropriate across the entire spectrum of conflict intensity. Recent theorizing has in fact focused on a differentiation of types of second-generation missions. Dandeker (1999) in particular has built upon and modified Dobbie’s (1994) critique of the failure of twentieth century peacekeeping doctrine, which distinguishes between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The former includes first-generation type interposition missions, as well as strategic peacekeeping which may involve the use of force, but in Dobbie’s view abides by the traditional peacekeeping norm of consent. The latter, for Dobbie, dispenses with the consent norm, and more closely resembles traditional military operations, including the identification of an enemy. In first-generation missions, the conflict is the enemy, and the peacekeepers are allied with the principal parties to the conflict in defeating it. Operation Desert Storm (the first Gulf War) after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq would be an example of peace enforcement. Dandeker and Gow (1997) suggest that strategic peacekeeping need not have the consent of the conflicting parties, but must be regarded as legitimate in terms of the legal and normative basis of the mission, the support of a wide range of parties, and the degree to which performance of the mission generates further support for the mission, as well as for its perceived legal and normative basis.

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The military forces of the intervening nations play a major role in this legitimation process. In this conceptualization, in comparison to first-generation peacekeeping, strategic peacekeeping in Dobbie’s formulation may have the consent of the conflicting parties, although the level of consent may be lower than that found in first-generation operations, and in Dandeker and Gow’s formulation, may abandon the first-generation norm of consent in favor of broader legitimacy. The political objective that characterizes first-generation missions, such as a treaty, is absent, although agreement on a solution to the conflict rests with the conflicting parties. The mission is likely to be more coercive than first-generation operations, with the strategic initiative being taken by the intervening nations, rather than the parties to that conflict even though the whole point is for the parties themselves to settle their dispute under the strategic ‘prodding’ of the intervening military and political forces. The need for the use of force is likely to be greater. These missions will be complex, with a number of actors, and the pressures on the force commander – both military and political – are likely to be great. If the robustness of the mission progresses to peace enforcement, not only does the initiative reside with the intervening parties, but so too does the definition of the solution to the conflict. Thus, in peace enforcement, not only is the norm of consent not necessarily operational but neither is the first-generation norm of impartiality, particularly as it has been equated to neutrality in first-generation missions (Donald, 2003). As Donald (2003: 435) notes, ‘it is impossible to use force and be always perceived to be impartial’. The peace enforcers explicitly become parties to the conflict.

CHANGES IN PEACEKEEPING PARTICIPATION One of the enduring questions in international peacekeeping has been who should do it.

As noted above, the standard assumption in UN first-generation peacekeeping missions had been that military personnel from the neutral middle powers would be the best peacekeepers. Moskos’s (1976) research on the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), which included a military contingent from the United Kingdom, challenged this assumption. Moskos showed that military professionalism contributed strongly to the ability of soldiers to adapt to the norms of peacekeeping. The finding was subsequently replicated with American combat troops (Segal and Meeker, 1985). Nonetheless, the superpowers were generally excluded and other major powers were minimally represented in first-generation missions. In the early 1980s, when a proposed UN force in support of the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel, which was to have no major power military presence, failed to gain UN sponsorship, an alternative proposal was put forward to use American troops to guarantee the peace in lieu of the moral suasion of the UN. That presence, while accepted, was a matter of some concern (Segal and Segal, 1993: 56). In the long run, the successful participation of the United States, Great Britain, and France in that mission contributed to a change in norms. In the post-Cold War period, peacekeeping participation became an option for US policy, and Russia became a cooperative Security Council member with regard to the authorization of peacekeeping operations (Kurashina and Segal, 2007). International expectations regarding the peacekeeping role of the UN expanded in the late 1980s, reaching a peak with the Gulf War, in which the Security Council made a series of decisions to carry out sanctions against Iraq after the invasion of Kuwait. The United States and major European powers participated in military operations in the Gulf, reflecting a change in the nature of peace missions and in a first wave of changes in the nature of the participants in these missions. The major nations also dismissed attempts by other

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nations that sought to support the mission through means other than sending troops. Germany and Japan, despite their contributions of billions of dollars, were held accountable for their failure to fulfill the norm of burden sharing by sending military personnel. This was the dawning of a second wave of new actors in peace operations, producing a renewal of discussion on what sorts of personnel should be involved in peacekeeping.

CHANGING ROLES IN PEACEKEEPING The changing patterns of conflict to which the global community attended yielded new patterns of competition and cooperation among states involved in the control and resolution of conflict, and between states and international organizations involved in that endeavor. Patterns of sovereignty were changing and new participants appeared on the peacekeeping field. Some of these new participants were major powers whose participation had previously been constrained by the norms of first-generation peacekeeping. Others were nations that had been aggressors in World War II, whose military participation, particularly outside their national territories, had been constrained by post-War ‘peace’ constitutions (Germany and Japan), but who found themselves cross-pressured by newly emerging norms of burden sharing in support of international peace and security at the end of the twentieth century. In the early 1990s, there was a concern about the overwhelmingly white and Western dominance of peacekeeping. Although the adequate geographic representation of troop contributions was one of the basic principles of international peacekeeping missions, 46% of UN soldiers were military personnel of European nations (Blechman and Vaccaro, 1994). By the late 1990s, as many as three quarters of the UN troops consisted of contingents from developing countries (Weerts et al., 2001). These new entrants into the

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process of military participation in peacekeeping had to define their appropriate roles in the conflict management process. As their presence in peacekeeping operations became more visible, developing countries started voicing concerns about the dominance of Western nations in UN peacekeeping and violation of the norm of impartiality, by favoring their interests and relying on their sources of intelligence information (Alley, 1998). In a study of burden sharing for peacekeeping operations between 1994 and 2000, Shimizu and Sandler (2002) reported that the financing of peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War period increasingly relied on a handful of NATO allied countries with advanced technological capabilities and economic power. The authors suggest that this disproportionate burden-sharing is a cause for concern because the political agenda of a few powerful shareholders would undermine public acceptance of UN-led peacekeeping operations. However, Shimizu and Sandler (2002) cautioned that what countries participate in missions and how many troops they send are not good indicators of burden-sharing. The burden for some developing nations that send their troops to peacekeeping missions is negative. For example, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Egypt are willing to participate in missions because the payment they receive from the UN is a source of additional income for their underpaid soldiers and of foreign currencies. Some researchers and critics are concerned that this practice causes a decline in mission effectiveness as developing countries are allowed to send poorly trained and underequipped soldiers to missions (Bobrow and Boyer, 1997; Brooks, 2003; Diehl, 1993; Mackinlay and Chopra, 1993; Shimizu and Sandler, 2002). In addition, some new entrants have special arrangements with the UN, and they participate in a very limited range of peacekeeping functions and require protection from troops of other nations (Brooks, 2003). Despite these new issues, the UN has welcomed new entrants to manage

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the soaring numbers and intensity of peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War period (Lebovic, 2004). As peace-keeping operations increasingly opened to wider participation, traditional participants in peacekeeping, in turn, were required to assert, and in some cases change, their own roles in the context of changing peacekeeping norms. An additional dimension of ‘new participation’ in peacekeeping has emerged as a result of the downsizing of military forces around the world (Segal and Babin, 2000). Activities that were previously performed by regular military personnel are increasingly turned over to supplementary personnel. Sometimes these are reserve military personnel mobilized for peacekeeping missions (e.g., Segal and Tiggle, 1997), and sometimes they are civilians, some of whom serve under contract to perform activities that had previously been performed by military personnel, but are now outsourced by the military (Moskos, 2003: 6–7), and others as civil servants employed by military forces. Thus, the groups involved in twenty-first century peace operations include military personnel from the middle powers that were the traditional ‘first-generation’ peacekeepers; non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as the International Red Cross and Doctors without Borders, that have been regular participants in humanitarian operations; military forces from major powers whose participation was limited by the norms of firstgeneration peacekeeping; and military forces from nations that had previously restricted their roles to homeland or regional alliance defense, but who now are expected by the international community to make a burden-sharing contribution to collective security. Moreover, these various military forces may be comprised of regular soldiers or reservists, with widely varying levels of training and preparation for peace operations, and they are likely to be supported in the field by civilian employees and contracted civilian personnel. Our current analysis focuses on nations represented by regular armed forces in peacekeeping.

Dandeker (1999) suggests that adaptability to peacekeeping missions varies as a function of national histories and military ethos. He proposed two types of societies: ‘societies with a pronounced war-fighting ethos’ (e.g., the United States), and ‘societies with a moderate war-fighting/national defensecentered ethos’ (e.g., Sweden). We now suggest that there should be a third type: societies with a pacifist/national defense-centered ethos (e.g., Japan). These three types raise different issues with regard to peacekeeping participation, and the issues change as a function of the differences between first-generation peacekeeping, strategic peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. After the end of the Cold War in Europe, major Western powers increasingly came to participate in peace operations, as Cold War era peacekeeping doctrines that restricted their involvement disappeared. Those states whose military cultures are built upon a warrior ethos find they have to shift to a more constabulary orientation in order to effectively execute traditional peacekeeping or lower-end strategic peacekeeping missions, and they encounter organizational resistance along the way. For example, Dandeker (2000: 32–3) notes that participating in UN peace and stability operations is a third mission option for the British forces, after ensuring the peace and protection of the United Kingdom and ensuring against threats to the Kingdom. Similarly, Boene and Martin (2000: 59) note that the Chirac administration’s defense policy made the French military more similar to the British or US model, although they note that ‘Paradoxically, this ... has caused an enlargement and deepening of the constabulary trends that emerged in the late phase of the East–West standoff’. The United States, like the United Kingdom, especially since the late 1990s, is one of the relatively few nations in the world with an expeditionary military culture. While most nations regard their armed forces as supporting homeland defense, contributing to domestic social control, and symbolizing sovereignty, the United States and the

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United Kingdom have expected much of their militaries to be stationed, and more recently deployed, outside the country. Upon removal of the Cold War exclusionary doctrine, the United States started participating in UN peacekeeping operations, although it has tended to regard these missions as distractions from the primary mission of fighting and winning wars. It has nonetheless participated in missions across the peacekeeping spectrum, ranging from the interposition mission of the Sinai MFO to very forceful peace enforcement on the Arabian Peninsula. Indeed, Moskos (2000: 15) postulates that since 1990, the major mission definition of the American military has shifted from alliance support to peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. Those nations whose military cultures are built upon a moderate war-fighting/national defense ethos, and which have a long history of peacekeeping participation that dates to the Cold War era, are expected to continue their participation. However, the increased involvement of major powers threatens their established role in the international community as the major source of peacekeeping personnel to some degree. This challenge to their traditional role, the more martial stance of the major powers with regard to peacekeeping, the relative increase in peace operations at the more forceful end of the peace operations spectrum, and the relative ambiguity of peacekeeping norms during this period of transition may produce a change in their peacekeeping behavior. One example of traditional peacekeepers moving in a more assertive direction comes from Canada, which has learned from long peacekeeping experience that sometimes the use of force is necessary. This change in posture involves liabilities. While on peacekeeping duty in Somalia in 1994, members of the Canadian Airborne Regiment tortured and killed a Somali youth. This incident shook the Canadian Forces and Canadian society, and the regiment was deactivated (Winslow, 1998). Pinch (2000: 158–9) notes that as the Cold War ended, Canada had already ‘increased its participation in peacekeeping,

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humanitarian, and related UN-sponsored missions’, which involved more instability and risk than previously, but also notes that defense policy stated in 1991 and reiterated in 1994 placed the highest priority on defense of sovereignty and civil defense, and alliance responsibilities, with peacekeeping accorded a lower priority. Another form of maladaptation of traditional peacekeepers is passivity. The Netherlands, like Canada, has also been an effective participant in UN peace operations for decades. However, in 1995, while responsible for maintaining the security of a safe UN refugee enclave in Srebrenica, a battalion of Dutch peacekeepers assisted Serbs in removing 8,000 Muslim men and boys from the enclave. The Serbs then killed 7,000 of these refugees – the worst massacre in post-World War II Europe. The Dutch Cabinet resigned. The Dutch soldiers who were deployed to Srebrenica continue to suffer psychological difficulties due to their experience. Van der Meulen (2000: 104) reports that in the wake of Srebrenica, the Dutch have been ‘more prudent’ in their willingness to join UN missions, and have been more consciously balancing the ideal of safeguarding a peaceful international order against their own national security interests. The societies that are heavily oriented toward territorial defense and have recently had relatively pacifist cultures include Germany and Japan. Despite the role that Germany played in NATO during the Cold War era, these nations had low profiles in global military affairs, and did not operate outside of their own territories. These roles had been imposed on them by the victorious powers at the end of World War II. The new norms of burden-sharing in support of international security are now requiring a shift in their military cultures in a more assertive or aggressive direction, with an expectation that they will participate militarily in operations outside their own national areas. Germany and Japan have different military cultures, and have followed different strategies in moving into the current era, although

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both nations place international organizations and their policies at the core of their own national security policies. The main mission of the German military during the Cold War was area-specific: to contribute to the common defense of NATO. The German armed forces were not authorized to participate in out-of-area operations. Fleckenstein (2000: 86) reports that with the end of the Cold War in Europe, the mission of the Bundeswehr has undergone a fundamental change, and that while the defense of Germany and fulfillment of alliance obligations remain primary missions, contemporary assignments will embrace ‘all types of peace-support operations’. In 1996, the Bundeswehr established a crisis reaction force, which can be used for peacekeeping. It consists of more than 50,000 troops: about 16% of the German armed forces. Japan, like Germany, values the United Nations and its policies. However, social and legal norms are the primary determinants of Japanese national security policy (Katzenstein, 1996). Japan developed a strong anti-military culture in the post-World War II period, and isolation of the armed forces from the larger society facilitated the growth of a pacifist ideology in society. Japanese national security policy is an exclusively defense-oriented one, derived from the spirit of Article 9 of the new Constitution. Article 9 sets forth the renunciation of war and possession of war potential, and denies the state the right of belligerence. As early as in 1958, the United Nations asked Japan to send troops to a peacekeeping operation in Lebanon. Japan could not comply because the legality of the newly established Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) was called into question. Although the JSDF is regarded as a military force in the global community, it has never been regarded as ‘the military’ within Japanese society. Started as a police auxiliary, the JSDF does not have some of the fundamental characteristics of a military organization, such as a court-martial system. Unlike Germany, Japan’s security relationship with neighboring nations is distant, and the US–Japan

security alliance is the only bilateral military alliance. The Gulf War was a turning point from the self-imposed exclusion from international peacekeeping for Japan. In 1990, the original UN Peace Cooperation Bill did not pass the Japanese Diet because a majority of lawmakers felt that sending JSDF troops overseas was a violation of the Constitution and would not receive public support. Instead, the Japanese government made a 13 billion dollar contribution to the Gulf War coalition. This ‘checkbook diplomacy’ was criticized by the press in the Western democracies, and Japanese society realized that UN policies were not always compatible with national norms. Japan has subsequently sent troops to Cambodia, the Golan Heights, and to East Timor, and authorized sending ground troops for post-War reconstruction assistance in Iraq in December 2003. This military reinvolvement has costs to Japan, as reflected in tensions between Japan and China over natural resources, and over security issues such as those regarding the straits between China and Taiwan; all rooted in the history of Japan’s role in World War II. Italy was the third member of the World War II axis to be largely confined to homeland defense in the post-War period. The current Italian Republic was founded in 1946, and joined NATO in 1949, although ‘Italy tried for forty years to avoid direct military involvement of its troops, even while emphasizing its willingness to participate in humanitarian and peace operations’ (Nuciari, 2000: 144). The adoption of a New Defense Model in 1991 made peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance the prevailing mission, particularly for volunteers in the Italian military. Germany, Japan, and Italy are not the only nations that have been drawn into cooperative burden-sharing in peace operations by changes in the structure of the international community and in the nature of conflict. Since the nineteenth century, for example, Denmark prior to 1990 had avoided deployment of its military personnel outside its own

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borders, except for NATO exercises or firstgeneration UN peacekeeping missions. By contrast, since 1990, Danish soldiers have been deployed out of area repeatedly, including operations in the Gulf War and in the former Yugoslavia (Sorensen, 2000). During this period, the number of Danish soldiers assigned to UN missions has tripled to 1,500, and a new Danish International Brigade of 4,500 soldiers was established to support UN actions. Current Danish deployments for peace operations are also less dependent on host country consent than was previously the case.

DISCUSSION The nature of conflict has changed through human history. There were wars, or at least battles, long before there were nations. Familial groups, clans, and tribes warred against each other with stones, clubs, agricultural implements, darts, arrows, and spears. As states evolved, so too did the technology of warfare, with wheeled vehicles, such as chariots, horses, and armor becoming instruments of conflict. The introduction of gunpowder displaced the mounted warrior (or knight) from the central place on the battlefield. While some early sociologists had expected warfare to disappear, it did not. Through to World War II in the middle of the twentieth century, social groups sought to develop increasingly lethal military technologies, and were willing to use them in war. The mid-nineteenth to mid-twentieth century was a period of total war in this regard, accompanied by the development of a profession of arms, which acted as the instrument of organized legitimate violence on behalf of the state. With the advent of weapons of mass destruction, both military forces and the states they represented became less willing to wage total war. The international community increasingly sought strategies to contain,

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control, and resolve conflicts between states. The establishment of stable alliances, the maintenance of sufficient strength to deter aggression, and the evolution of military forces oriented toward controlling and reducing conflict – constabulary forces – were part of the repertoire developed for these purposes. During the twentieth century, the major alliances were themselves in competition for influence and this competition both limited the set of nations that could credibly participate in constabulary, or peacekeeping, operations, and the level of force that could be used in these operations. With the end of the Cold War in Europe, these constraints were lifted. The range of nations that could or were expected to cooperate in peacekeeping operations, and who now have to negotiate their appropriate roles in this cooperation, balancing their national interests against those of supra-national bodies, increased. As we have moved beyond first-generation peacekeeping, the level of force used in peace operations has also increased. Peace enforcement increasingly resembles war. In its most frequent incarnations, it pits trained military forces of modern nations, using modern military technologies that do not include the most lethal weapons in their arsenals, in conflicts with irregular forces representing tribal, ethnic, or religious interests, and using whatever weaponry they can acquire. Such asymmetric conflict is evolving as the dominant form of the twenty-first century. However, it would be a brave person who predicted the end of major inter-state war as developed and less developed nations watch with concern the competition for resources such as oil and water, and look to the military, as before, as a prudent means of being able to prevail over rivals in any context. As before, peace operations will have to compete with war fighting in the budgetary, political, and doctrinal tensions over priorities that bedevil any military – no matter how strong and well resourced. Even assuming the future dominance of asymmetric conflict, one must consider the question of how effective the different kinds

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of peacekeeping operations reviewed above are likely to be as a response. In this regard, ongoing operations in Iraq as well as Afghanistan will influence the United States and others in their perceptions of the ‘utility of force’ to use Rupert Smith’s phrase (Smith, 2005). Iraq, in particular, provides a challenging case of an attempted militaryinduced process of regime change and democratization, beginning with a short military invasion and then a protracted and complex period of – simultaneous–counter-insurgency and reconstruction, where the political risks of failure and the costs already accumulated are substantial. Although one must be cautious in making anything other than preliminary observations about the implications of current operations in Iraq, some points are clear. First, while there continues to be a debate about the legality, legitimacy, and prudence of the invasion of Iraq in pursuit of regime change, as well as about the extent to which the post-conflict phase of reconstruction could have been resourced and managed better than it was by the military and by the United States Department of Defense and State Department, the – some would say reckless – optimism of 2003 has now faded away. This is likely to lead the United States (and perhaps its allies such as the United Kingdom) to adopt a much more cautious approach to complex and longlasting military engagements of this kind in the future. Even accepting the strategic need to prosecute a ‘Long War’ against terror, this is likely to lead to a preference for using the military in ‘strategic raiding’ – based on a swift application of force to clearly identified and restricted targets and then a withdrawal – where and when it feels this is imperative. (On the idea, of raiding, see Prins, 2002.) A second point is that the current difficulties and perceived lack of genuine progress in the operations against counter-insurgency in parts of Iraq are likely to lead to a wider and more profound realism, if not pessimism, in political and military circles as well as among wider publics about the utility of force in achieving the goals of nation building, peace,

and democracy in war-torn and unstable parts of the world, and not just in the Middle East. A case in point is the widely discussed book by General Sir Rupert Smith (Smith, 2005), which encompasses not only Iraq but also Bosnia in the 1990s, where he was force commander. Third, this outcome would be unfortunate, especially if it led to a lack of interest in participating in peace missions not least among those countries whose expertise is particularly valuable, especially in peace operations of the more ‘strategic’ kind. Actually, what these events should provoke is a continuing debate on how armed force, as one of the instruments of a state’s policy tool box, can be conjoined with other instruments – political, diplomatic, economic, and cultural – to achieve success (not in the absolutist sense of military victory) in terms of the above goals. In this regard, we know from the experience of the varieties of peace operations discussed earlier that, in the end, peace has to be built by the warring parties themselves, no matter how much ‘strategic pushing’ is provided by outsiders. To be sure, any such pushing has to be backed by a political will and an understanding of what force can and cannot be expected to achieve; this is an especially important point for those contemplating engaging in a war-torn country where the prospects for an early peace and withdrawal of intervening forces are remote (note that such forces still remain in Bosnia and Kosovo for example) or seeking to democratize a state through a policy of military-led regime change. Again, we know from earlier experiences of peace operations that these are multinational enterprises for reasons of both financial cost and international political legitimacy. Yet different countries are likely to have varying degrees of political will, and this often extends to their political agendas, attitudes toward risk, including casualties, and thus to policies on force protection and rules of engagement. Some contributors, to be frank, are likely to be a burden as much as an asset for a force commander, although the political context normally prevents

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such officers from being candid about this observation. Fourth, we also know that the manner in which that ‘strategic pushing’ is provided on the ground by the military forces of different nations working with other non-military actors has a bearing on the outcome. While some national forces take well to peacekeeping, others find it more difficult or at least have rather different attitudes toward the use of force, as in recent discussions of the conduct of the US and UK armed forces in Iraq (Aylwin-Foster, 2005). As Janowitz pointed out long ago, the military needs to be acutely aware of the political context in which they operate. That is to say, force should be used to produce a political effect: in particular to influence warring parties, who are warring not only with each other but also with those from outside, seeking to provide the momentum for a political framework in which they can co-exist, to settle a dispute, and to ensure that those who wish to continue to fight – indeed to perceive the forces of intervening parties as hostile invaders – are isolated from the mainstream of civilian politics. As they face this challenging task, the armed services of different nations need to digest the key lesson of the past fifty years or so: that there is no purely military battlefield any more (Smith, 2005). How they deal with this fact and indeed how their behavior is increasingly monitored not only by local populations but also by a wider global audience will occupy a good deal of their time in the future (Aylwin-Foster, 2005; Dandeker, 2006; Shaw, 2005). Finally, it is interesting to note that in addressing the challenges of twenty-first century military operations, armed forces have been drawing on sociological knowledge to a level unprecedented since World War II. This has ranged from drawing on sociological theory to understand the structure of unconventional forces involved in conflicts (e.g., Reed and Segal, 2007) to carrying out research about the impact of involvement in these conflicts on soldiers and their families (e.g., Hotopf et al, 2006).

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NOTE 1 Revision of a paper prepared for presentation at the International Sociological Association 2004 Research Council Conference, University of Ottawa, May 28–30. This research was supported in part by the US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences under contract W74V8H-05K-0007, and by the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute under contract DND 2002/0603. We are grateful to the editors and to three anonymous reviewers for their comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.

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Janowitz, Morris (1968) ‘Armed Forces and Society: A World Perspective’, in J. Van Doorn (ed.) Armed Forces and Society: Sociological Essays. The Hague: Mouton. pp. 15–38. Janowitz, Morris (1971) The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait.2nd edn. NY: Free Press. Katzenstein, Peter J. (1996) Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Keegan, John (1976) The Face of Battle. London: Jonathan Cape Ltd. Kurashina, Yuko and Segal, David R. (2007) ‘New Missions, or Old Missions for New Actors?’, International Review of Sociology, 17(1): 5–24. Lebovic, James (2004) ‘Uniting for Peace?: Democracies and United Nations Peace Operations after the Cold War’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 48(6): 910–36. Lewis, Paul (1992) ‘A Short History of United Nations Peacekeeping’, Soldiers for Peace: Supplement to Military History Quarterly, 5(1): 9–23. MacKinlay, John and Chopra, Jarat (1993) A Concept for Second-Generation Multinational Operations. Providence, RI: Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University. Moskos, Charles C. (1976) Peace Soldiers: The Sociology of a United Nations Military Force. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Moskos, Charles C. (2000) ‘Toward a Postmodern Military: The United States as a Paradigm’, in Charles C. Moskos, John A. Williams and David R. Segal (eds.) The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 14–31. Moskos, Charles C. (2003) ‘Introduction’, in Jean Callaghan and Franz Kernic (eds.) Armed Forces and International Security: Global Trends and Issues. Munster: Lit Verlag. pp. 5–9. Nuciari, Marina (2000) ‘Italy: A Military for What?’, in Charles C. Moskos, John A. Williams and David R. Segal (eds.) The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces After the Cold War. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 137–55. Pinch, Frank C. (2000) ‘Canada: Managing Change with Shrinking Resources’, in

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Charles C. Moskos, Jay A. Williams and David R. Segal (eds.) The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 156–81. Prins, Gwyn (2002) The Heart of War: On Power Conflict and Obligation in the TwentyFirst Century. London: Routledge. Reed, Brian J. and Segal, David R. (2007) ‘Social Network Analysis and Counter-insurgency Operations’, Sociological Focus, 39(4): 251–64. Segal, David R. (1995) ‘Five Phases of United Nations Peacekeeping: An Evolutionary Typology’, Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 25: 65–79, Summer. Segal, David R. and Babin, Nehama E. (2000) ‘Institutional Change in Armed Forces at the Dawning of the 21st Century’, in Stella Quah and Arnaud Sales (eds.) International Handbook of Sociology. London: Sage. pp. 218–35. Segal, David R. and Gravino, Katharine S. (1985) ‘Peacekeeping as a Military Mission’, in C. D. Smith (ed.) The Hundred Percent Challenge. Cabin John, MD: Seven Locks Press. pp. 38–68. Segal, David R. and Meeker, Barbara F. (1985) ‘Peacekeeping, Warfighting, and Professionalism: Attitude Organization and Change among Combat Soldiers on Constabulary Duty’, Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 13: 167–81, Fall. Segal, David R. and Segal, Mady W. (1993) Peacekeepers and their Wives. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Segal, David R. and Tiggle, Ronald B. (1997) ‘Attitudes of Citizen-Soldiers Toward Military Missions in the Post-Cold War World’, Armed Forces and Society, 23: 373–90. Shaw, Martin (2005) The New Western Way of War: Risk Transfer and Its Crisis in Iraq. Oxford: Polity.

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Shimizu, Hirofumi and Sandler, Todd (2002) ‘Peacekeeping and Burden-sharing, 1994–2000’, Journal of Peace Research, 39: 651–68. Smith, Rupert (2005) The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World. London: Allen Lane. Sorensen, Henning (2000) ‘Denmark: From Obligation to Option’, in Charles C. Moskos, John A. Williams and David R. Segal (eds.) The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 121–36. Vagts, Alfred (1959) A History of Militarism: Civilian and Military. NY: Free Press. Van Creveld, Martin (1991) Transformation of War. NY: Free Press. Van der Meulen, Jan S. (2000) ‘The Netherlands: The Final Professionalization of the Military’, in Charles C. Moskos, John A. Williams and David.R. Segal (eds.) The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 101–20. Weerts, Jos M. P., White, Wendy, Adler, Amy B., Castro, Carl A., Algra, Gielt, Bramsen, Inge, Dirkzwanger, Anja J. E., van der Ploeg, Henk M., de Vries, Maaike and Zijlmans, Ad (2001) ‘Studies on Military Peacekeepers’, in Y. Danieli (ed.) Sharing the Front Line and the Back Hills. Amityville NY: Baywood. pp. 31–49. Winslow, Donna (1998) ‘Misplaced Loyalties: The Role of Military Culture in the Breakdown of Discipline in Peace Operations’, Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, 35(3): 345–65. Wright, Quincy (1965) A Study of War: Second Edition, with a Commentary on War since 1942. Chicago, IL. The University of Chicago Press.

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17 Conflict, Competition and Cooperation in the Social Division of Health Care Paul Leduc Browne

Health care in contemporary societies encompasses a vast and complex set of practices, organizations and institutions. As inescapable as birth, illness and death, it represents on average about one-tenth of the GDP of Western European and North American states today, and is thus a very significant source of employment, innovation and economic competitiveness. It has also become an ever more central field of political conflict, as welfare states in transition are torn between competing social forces, values and models. As engines of economic redistribution (Evans, 1999), public health insurance systems have been the target of campaigns warning of the fiscal crisis of the state and promoting tax cuts and privatization (Browne, 2000; Sen, 2003). Major industries in fields, such as construction, manufacturing, information technologies, biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, financial services and personal services have grown up in and around health care and compete for the enormous profits to be realized therein. These economic and political changes impinge ever

more heavily on the institutions, organizations and practices in health care. The question arises: in systems of health care dominated by ideological conflict, centralized command structures and economic competition, what is the place and fate of care, as a cooperative form of practice and organization? Care has become ever more salient in recent years as a key concept of sociological and political theory (Armstrong, 2004; Daly and Lewis, 2000; Fink, 2004; Hankivsky, 2004; Kittay, 1999). There has been much attention to aspects of care (e.g., emotional labour) in fields relevant to the sociology of health care, such as management studies, gerontology or women’s studies. But it seems marginal – or at the very least taken for granted, not discussed – in debates about the political economy of health care (as pointed out also by Daly and Lewis, 2000). A basic idea in much of the literature on care is that the latter is the first and foremost work (e.g., Armstrong and Kits, 2003; Bolton, 2000; Bolton, 2005; Browne, 2003; Daly and Lewis, 2000; Fink, 2004;

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SOCIAL DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE

Himmelweit, 1999; James, 1989, 1992; Maheu and Bien-Aimé, 1996; Twigg, 2000). A rich and expanding body of research has shown how understanding care as labour, and labour as care, sheds light on the complexity, fertility and specificity of both concepts, broadening and deepening their understanding. How does health care as a set of public and private enterprises relate to health services as care? The answer resides first in the conceptualization of care as complex, collective labour, in which the building of specific types of cooperative and dialogical relationships is both a condition and a desired outcome; and second in an analysis of the ways in which forms of conflict and competition generated by the social division of health care today reify care and lead to the exploitation of care work.1 This chapter carries forward the discussion of care as labour by highlighting the key role of this concept in bridging the various literatures on care – those which deal with conflict and competition over power, status and resources in a political economy perspective, and those which stress cooperation, emotion and giving in an anthropological or social work approach. In developing this analysis, this chapter draws mainly on North American, British and French sources from a variety of disciplines and relies mostly on empirical studies conducted in Canada and Québec. It contributes to the literature on care in its effort to mediate analyses of care at different spatial scales and different levels of abstraction. In seeking thus to generate a more totalizing concept of care, the chapter moves from the abstract to the concrete, from care in general to the dynamics of the social relations of health care stemming from the division of labour. The most abstract level specifies the nature of care as a process of physical, emotional and intellectual work, but does not yet explicate the relations of production under which this work takes place. That is done at subsequent levels of the analysis. The reader will note that the meaning of the concept of care shifts as the argument

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moves from the abstract to the concrete and factors in the distinctions established by the social division of labour. The initial discussion of care may at first strike the reader as too general; however, subsequent stages of the argument will disclose the value of this approach from the standpoint of analysis and critique. My argument will unfold in four sections. Health care today resembles a vast and heterogeneous collection of services and practices, such as surgery, laboratory work and insurance. In my view, it is possible to subsume them all under the concept of care, but this means departing from common-sense understandings of what it is. My first section will abstract from the relations of production and situations in which care occurs in order to construct a concept of care as a specific complex, collective form of labour. This will set the stage for a second section discussing some general aspects of today’s social division of care, in particular the relationship between the logics of exchange, redistribution and reciprocity. In the third section, my attention will bear on the fragmentation and reification of care work, and on the segmentation of those who care by gender, class, status (notably professional status) and by economic logic (exchange, redistribution, reciprocity). In today’s world, care is gendered in a number of ways. Several aspects of care (body work, emotion work) tend to be socially constructed as ‘women’s work’, not just in the sense that the majority of caregivers (including remunerated professional and non-professional workers in the health care system) are women, not just in the sense that these activities are construed as of lesser value because women do them, and not just in the sense that men who do them may consequently lose status, but also in the sense that it is believed to be in the nature of women to do them, to the point that these activities are no longer really counted as work, but simply as the way women are. A certain kind of gendering in practice and ideology results in the reification, devaluation and occlusion of care (Hochschild,

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1983; James, 1989). A fourth section will extend the argument of the second by discussing the situations in which care work becomes exploitation. This will revolve around an analysis of necessary and surplus labour in care work.

CARE AND LABOUR Care is labour in the sense that in pursuit of a goal it sets in motion natural forces in order to act upon nature and realize a new objectivity (Browne, 1990; Lukács, 1980). A particularity of care as labour is that the human body as a social objectivity is its instrument, its material substrate and its product. This is even more evident in health care, where the purpose of labour is the prevention and cure of illness, the realization of wellness. The work is inescapably material, dealing as it does with dirt, disease and death. This activity is multidimensional, combining physical, intellectual and emotional aspects (James, 1989, 1992). The multidimensional nature of care is illustrated by the way other languages, such as French and German, require several words to convey its various dimensions: Liebe, Sorge and Pflege in German; amour, souci and soin in French. While care work is first and foremost body work (Twigg, 2000: 137ff.), it is a specific form of it. As Susan Himmelweit puts it: ‘the process of caring is itself the development of a relationship. The care a carer provides is basically inseparable from the relationship that is being developed with the person she is caring for’ (Himmelweit, 1999: 29). Its hallmark is co-production by ‘caregivers’ and ‘users’, for it is a process in which production is not separate from consumption. As Julia Twigg points out: ‘It is in the dynamics of the care encounter that the nature of what is produced is defined; production and consumption collapse into one another. [...] [U]sers and workers are co–producers of care’ (Twigg, 2000: 1, 121; also see Baldock, 1997: 83). Dialogue is an essential dimension of care.

In recent years, a considerable and burgeoning literature on emotion work has appeared (for a recent survey, see Bolton, 2005, as well as Hochschild, 2003: afterwards; Rastetter, 1999; Steinberg and Figart, 1999). The founding text of this tradition, The Managed Heart by Arlie Hochschild (1983), shows how social life is regulated by the countless acts of work performed by individuals in order to shape their own and others’ emotions within the context of ‘feeling rules’. Just as acting in the theatre creates an effect (suspension of disbelief, etc.), so emotion work in everyday life is performative activity that achieves a given effect, shaping subjects’ mutual attitudes and relationships. The effect is a joint production, for feeling is usually a collective activity, bound up with the exchange of ‘gestures or signs of feeling with others’: ‘We bow to each other not only from the waist but from the heart. Feeling rules set out what is owed in gestures of exchange between people’ (Hochschild, 1983: 76). Hochschild speaks of the ‘payment of latent dues’, but regards this basically as an essential part of the gift relationship in everyday life: ‘The deeper the bond, the more central and latent the gifts exchanged, and the more often a person compensates in one arena for what is lacking in another. One way that such compensations are achieved is through the medium of emotional gift exchange’ (Hochschild, 1983: 83–4).2 Emotion work as a joint work of production is at the heart of the production of the care effect. One could perform a colonoscopy on someone in the same way that one investigated the pipes in a house. But it would scarcely count as care. At the same time, caring for is not the same as caring about. Care does not necessarily take place within relationships of love or friendship. Indeed, recipients of care interviewed by Francine Saillant described their professional caregivers as ‘friends’, but ‘not friends like their other friends’ (Saillant, 2001). Often, the relationship of care brings together strangers in situations of great intimacy, in which

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emotions and bodies are laid bare (indeed, it is frequently easier for the acts of care to take place between strangers, than between friends or kin where issues of taboo or loss of status arise – see Twigg, 2000: 73–4). Care work is the production of the trust without which the other aspects of care as process and outcome could not happen. As the production of trust, in the context of which intimate and even painful practices may be performed in order to restore health or reduce pain, care is also tied to consent. For example, states have enacted laws and professional bodies have created protocols governing consent by care recipients or those who represent them. Consent is based on trust, and also on information and understanding, on a sharing of objectives and values. Care is thus reflexive work, ‘entailing loops in which recursive knowledges, emotions, and valuejudgements can be reinvested in the relationship between producer and user’ (Maheu and Bien-Aimé, 1996: 190 [my translation – PLB]; Offe, 1985). Care in the abstract cannot be an adequate description of every concrete example of care work; nor will every specific task abstracted from the whole display every feature of labour. Taken singly, in isolation, the vast number of practices, organizations and institutions that make up health care, from hospitals to the home, from surgery to sitting with Alzheimer’s sufferers, from dialysis to diagnostic tests, might seem to involve little or no intervention in the body (psychological counselling) or emotional work (analyzing a blood sample). It is essential, however, to bear in mind that such specific examples are the product of a given division of labour. As such they may display at best some aspect of, and some connection to, care in general, not care as such. It is only when they are taken as a whole that we can grasp their interrelations and commonalities. Does health care occur on the micro-sociological level of individual practices and interactions or on the macro-sociological level of collective productive processes and institutions? Is it, for example, performed between a nurse and a

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patient in a hospital, or is it something that the hospital as a whole accomplishes? Or again, is it the rich totality of the many relations and processes constituted by a society’s health care ‘system’ as a whole? The answer is all of the above. As Pat Armstrong (2004) puts it, one needs both to lump and to slice, that is., to try to deploy concepts dialectically as a way of seizing phenomena in their unity-within-difference.

THE RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION IN/OF CARE – SOME INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS The key question to be addressed is: who cares and under what circumstances do (can) they do so (Armstrong and Kits, 2003)? If care is work, then it can be the object of a labour process analysis, that is., an analysis of the relations of production (classic contributions include Braverman, 1974, Burawoy, 1979, 1985; Hales, 1980; recent ones include O’Doherty and Willmot, 2001; Smith and Thompson, 1998). Such an analysis can be summed up in three questions. Who decides what is to be done? Who performs the work needed to execute what has been decided upon? Who enjoys the fruits of this work? Imagine an abstract model of care in which all parties to the care relationship shared in the positing of its goals, made an equal effort to execute the tasks required to achieve those goals, and enjoyed the fruits of that work, the bodies of all involved being the objects of labour. In such a situation of perfect co-production, in which all parties actively built the relationship with each other, engaging in emotion work in order to enhance each other’s well-being, there would be a virtuous circle of reciprocity, a spiral of giving in which each party, rather than seeking to abolish the debt through payment of its equivalent, instead perpetuated the mutual indebtedness by continual giving to the other (Godbout, 2000). The wealth produced by care would consist, to be sure, of the

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use-values required to look after the body’s needs; but care work would more significantly mean the production of relationships, capacities, mutual well-being – the production of values that go well beyond immediate utility, the drive to accumulate or the will to power. This is of course an ideal type, a sort of identical subject-object (Lukács, 1971), which treats the temporally distinct moments of care as simultaneous. Its usefulness resides in the means it affords to judge the power asymmetry in care and the strength of the care effect. In the absence of perfect co-production, the three questions addressed to the labour process (who decides? who executes? who benefits?) may point to different subjects (i.e., signify a split between intellectual and manual labour, between coordinators and workers, between owners and hired hands, between producers and consumers). The relations of production are then likely to entail asymmetrical power over the labour process, uneven participation in the actual work, and unequal enjoyment of the fruits of labour. In the context of care, this can mean unequal sharing of its burdens, of its conditions, of its rewards, incomplete realization of the right to care – both to care for another (‘to give care’) and to be cared for (‘to receive care’). Miriam Glucksmann’s emphasis on the total social organization of labour reminds us of the need to include in the analysis all work – intellectual and manual, male and female, waged and unwaged, forced and voluntary (Glucksmann, 1995). Taking inspiration from Polanyi, we can think of health care as embedded in a plurality of economic forms: market exchange (capitalist relations of production), redistribution (state allocation of resources), reciprocity (gift exchange), domestic administration (economic relations rooted in the relations of kinship). (On reciprocity, redistribution, exchange and domestic administration, see Laville et al., 1993; Laville, 1994, 2001; Polanyi, 1957.) Jean-Louis Laville has written extensively

about the social or solidarity-based economy (l’économie solidaire) as a hybrid of exchange, redistribution and reciprocity. I believe that these logics are present well beyond the social economy,3 notably in health care (although a good case could be made for defining public health care systems as ‘solidarity-based economies’). However, I believe that the metaphor of ‘hybridization’ downplays the elements of conflict and competition too much. I wish to go a step further, by arguing that these different formations are not merely juxtaposed, but mediated as aspects of a dialectical whole. Supposing that kin are even available (not a self-evident assumption in North America today), the combined pressures associated with the physical and emotional aspects of care may prove overwhelming within the bounds of kinship. Faced with demanding situations with which they cannot fully deal within the existing boundaries of their relationship, one or both of the parties may prefer to turn to a stranger, to resort to a relationship based on giving (e.g., the help of volunteers in formal and informal contexts), redistribution (state assistance) or exchange (purchasing health services on the market). This is true of situations in which taboos and the threat of loss of status preclude certain forms of intimacy (see above). But it is obviously also true of situations in which the labour power and means of production are not available, that is, all those situations calling for the application of knowledges and techniques (e.g., surgery, pharmacology) that only arise on the basis of significant development of the productive forces of society and an elaborate division of labour. In relations of reciprocity, the creation of debt through giving is a key way of forging social relationships; but it is also an affirmation of power. Both parties may welcome the expression of this power, because they wish to be ever more bound to each other. It may also be possible to achieve the virtuous circle of giving by ‘giving back’ to someone else than the original giver. This is often the motive expressed by volunteers. However, because

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the creation of debt in the gift relationship or in kinship may be bound up with asymmetries of power, redistribution and exchange can seem to offer advantages over reciprocity. State redistribution governed by a citizen’s right to public services incurs no debt. Market purchase of a service liquidates debt in the very instant that it occurs. This may offer the greatest freedom to consumers with purchasing power and many options among which to choose (Godbout, 1987). For those who need care, either the state or the market routes may restore balance and some semblance of symmetry to a relationship made intolerable by one-sided indebtedness. The parties to a care relationship must constantly maintain a delicate and precarious balance, in order to avoid the Scylla of oppression and the Charybdis of dependency (Gagnon et al., 2000). A public-sector agency acting as a third party can provide a framework of rules and expectations that provides stability and a measure of protection to all involved. The state and market are conducive also to the development of capitalintensive curative systems predicated on a high volume and intensity of specialized activities (e.g., surgeries). Unfortunately, the market and the state offer no panaceas. One may simply escape the frying pan of personal dependency by falling into the fire of alienation. Himmelweit (1999) suggests that care ceases to be itself and becomes a mere service when it is completely commodified. Following Radin (1996), she posits a process of ‘incomplete commodification’ in care, where workers do not exhaust their effort in the tasks they are contracted to perform, but give time beyond these tasks, out of love for their work and pride in what they do. ‘Work’ contrasts with ‘labour’ in Radin’s and Himmelweit’s usage of those terms. Labour to them means an activity which is completely commodified and consists only of the contracted tasks; work differs, because money does not ‘exhaust’ its value and it ‘is understood not as separate from life and self, but rather as part of the worker and indeed

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constitutive of her’ (Radin, 1996, cited by Himmelweit, 1999: 36). In Marxist terms, one could speak of this as objectification and alienation, understanding that ‘labour’ in Radin’s usage (or alienation as presented by Marx in the 1844 Manuscripts) is an ideal type, since the separation between work and life, and the instrumentalization of the former, are rarely so absolute. Bolton (2005) stresses this point as well, criticizing Hochschild (unfairly, in my view) for having too reductionist and pessimistic understanding of the alienation of emotion work in the modern economy. Bolton argues that workers as social actors have much greater latitude than Hochschild recognizes in determining the emotional dimensions of the relationships within which they work. The notion of incomplete commodification implies that remunerated service only truly becomes care within hybrid relations of production, in which the logics of exchange and/or redistribution combine with the logic of reciprocity. To be sure, in a situation of complete commodification, the worker might perform the emotional labour required to produce feelings of trust and ease within the care recipient. But this hardly qualifies as coproduction, as I have defined it here, for the worker’s relationship to the work and to the person needing care is purely instrumental. In the light of the previous section, of course, one might regard ‘full’ and ‘incomplete’ commodification as different levels of abstraction, that is, a moment of analysis that strips away layers of complexity to show the pure workings of the commodity form, and a moment that more closely represents the concrete phenomena.

THE TOTAL SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF LABOUR IN CANADIAN HEALTH CARE A vast array and diverse range of practices and organizations exist within the total social organization of care work. What appeared in

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the first stage of the argument as a simple labour process can now be regarded as a vast number of distinct activities, which may often appear not to be part of care at all, as immediate emotional and body work is divided off from other activities, such as laboratory work, food preparation or administration. All of these activities are part of the overall production of health care, but the division of labour causes some to be regarded as care and others as distinct from care. How could the administration of a hospital be regarded as care? Yet, try to imagine how care could take place in a hospital without forms of coordination of activities and resources. Seen in isolation, the work of an accountant or of a member of the cleaning staff in the hospital does not look like care, which one associates rather with the work of nurses, for example. But all of these activities are part of a larger process, which gives them their overall purpose, meaning and definition. Health care at this level of the analysis comprises different spaces, temporalities, hierarchies and networks. Hospitals are cureoriented, heavily unionized (at least in the case of public hospitals in Canada/ Québec), dominated by centralized management and a hierarchy of professionals; at the opposite end of the spectrum, volunteers bring warm meals to housebound people and individuals care for their kin. The social division of care is the basis of multiple, intersecting relations of class, status and power within the state, between the state and its citizens, employers and employees, producers and consumers, professionals and non-professionals, regulated and non-regulated workers, waged and unwaged workers, as well as between regions, sectors and institutions. The dynamics of conflict, competition and cooperation, which were merely latent at the earlier level of analysis, now occupy a central place in the discussion. Gender runs through all of this as an omnipresent faultline. In Esping-Andersen’s terms, publicly insured health care is an instance of decommodification (Esping-Andersen, 1990). In Canada, for example, it protects access to

care by physicians and hospitals from market forces, making it universally and freely available as an attribute of citizenship, rather than as a commodity. However, drug and equipment costs outside of hospital, long-term institutional and community care, dental and vision care, physiotherapy, and a whole range of other mainstream and alternative treatments and therapies are covered only partly or not at all. They must therefore be purchased directly or indirectly via private insurance, by the individual. Health care is thus only incompletely decommodified as an object of personal consumption. Health care also costs states tens of billions of dollars, which are spent on buildings, equipment, vehicles, pharmaceutical products, and especially on wages, benefits and professional fees. Labour power and means of production are largely, but certainly not entirely, commodified in health care. In an era of fiscal restraint, there have been enormous incentives for governments to cut back on the areas that are fully insured, by shifting care to ‘extended health services’, for example, by moving patients out of hospitals and providing them with community care. In the words of Nona Glazer, there has been a massive work transfer from professionals to non-professionals, from regulated to unregulated workers from waged to unwaged workers and from hospitals to the home (Glazer, 1988, 1993). Several studies have shown the negative impact of this cascading process on women who bear the lion’s share of the burden of unwaged care work (e.g., Aronson and Neysmith, 1996; Gagnon et al., 2001; Guberman et al., 2005). Under the pressure of cost containment, the health care system can be seen to have gone through stages analogous to those of service industries in general. With the rise of mass public and private health insurance systems that strove to bend the professionals and major equipment and drug suppliers to their will in the creation of mass produced services at the lowest cost (‘fordism’), the health care system underwent change from the rule of a somewhat paternalistic elite of mostly

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male medical professionals. The domination of professional elites and bureaucratic procedures provoked a grassroots backlash that took the form of interest in alternative medicine and therapies, as well as of communitybased movements to bring workers and users together in egalitarian, cooperative or associational organizations (see the radical grassroots initiatives that were at the origins of Québec’s Centres locaux de services communautaires – CLSCs). More recently, the introduction of the new public management in health care (Browne, 2000) has brought with it an emphasis on the use of market mechanisms – in particular competition – to effect efficiencies: separating purchaser from provider; contracting out; introducing fees; enhancing efficiency through the standardization of practices; improving relations with the ‘customer’ through the ‘personalization’ of services, that is., the introduction of carelike elements, such as aspects of co-production, emotional labour and so on (Bellemare, 1999; Ughetto et al., 2002). Standardization of many aspects of care is quite another matter, however, because of their ‘product complexity’ and ‘consumer complexity’, as John Baldock (1997: 82) has suggested. Because emotion and body work is often inseparable from the concrete relationship between the individuals it joins (Himmelweit, 1999: 29), care is inextricably bound up with ‘individual differences, varying from person to person and across time and space’ (Baldock, 1997: 83), making it poorly suited to standardization (Laville and Nyssens, 2001: 11–12; Leys, 2001). In the rationalization of the mass production of health services, whether in the hospital or the home, those aspects of care which are most easily standardized, which have greatest prestige or which have greatest clout have been given priority (Campbell, 2000). The emotion work of building care relationships has tended to be marginalized and occluded, because it is not standardizable, because it is time-consuming and expensive, and because of its gendered nature. Because care consists in the collective work of building relationships, its essential

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condition is time for body work, emotion work, dialogue – for listening. ‘Time is a gift of self, even when it is remunerated; it blazes the path of reflexivity (between care givers and recipients and each for her/himself) and of the space to be taken’ (Gagnon et al., 2000: 155). Because the building of trust is such an essential part of care, continuity is one of its key features (Himmelweit, 1999: 35). Time is money, according to the old cliché. Private wealth can purchase time – and therefore the opportunity for ‘labour’ to become ‘work’ in Radin’s and Himmelweit’s terms – for a price. (On time and care, see Browne, 2003; Gagnon et al., 2000; Twigg, 2000.) Few people can afford this, though. In the public sector, time has grown scarce and expensive, as cutbacks have become the imperative of every ministry and program. Although there are considerable expenditures on supplies and equipment in health care (for figures see Browne, 2000), wages make up a significant portion of the costs. Reducing the latter has therefore meant finding ways of economizing on the expenditure of labour power, that is, reducing the time available to health care users. The clock time of capital and the state is in contradiction with the process time of care. As Julia Twigg puts it, the ‘needs of the body cannot be saved up and dealt with once a week’ (Twigg, 2000: 100–101; also Davies, 1994). The time of care can be related to the kind of social relationship it is. David Graeber (2001) usefully shows how giving can take different forms, which may themselves be highly gendered, pulling either in the direction of open-ended or closed relationships. In the latter, actors weigh their gifts much more carefully and tend to await reciprocal gifts before giving again. In the former, actors give continually without expectation of reciprocal gestures and without any thought as to whether such gestures have been forthcoming – behaviour characteristic of a relationship of care. Each of these forms of giving can become corrupted. Closed relationships can ‘degenerate into outright competition’ or barter; open-ended giving, of the

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kind one finds in care, exposes givers to the danger of ‘patronage and exploitation’, of personal dependency on the recipient. ‘As structures of action, one is concerned with maintaining the value of a timeless human commitment; the other, that of a more ephemeral autonomy’ (Graeber, 2001: 225). In the health care professions, curative activities (e.g., surgery) were traditionally identified as male while caring activities were regarded as female. Curative acts are punctual and often singular events. They lend themselves to closed relationships of gift or commodity exchange, and indeed to competitive displays of power, skill or wealth. (I recall my endodontist some years ago calling his colleague into the room to boast of the difficult root-canal operation he had just conducted on my tooth and to bask in the ensuing praise and admiration.) Caring acts, by contrast, are fluid and plural, in constant need of repetition (James, 1989; Neysmith, 1998; Twigg, 2000), entail open-ended giving, and are prone to lead to patterns of dependency. Not only are the vast majority of those who occupy caring (as opposed to curing) profession’s women, but the perception and response to caregiving varies as a function of the gendered construction of each professional category (care by physicians and nurses is not perceived in the same light) (Twigg, 2000) and as a function of whether it is occupied by a man or a woman (patients and other professionals may not relate the same way to a male or female physician or surgeon, for example) (Molinier, 2003). More broadly, men’s and women’s respective relations to caring, in its physical, emotional and intellectual aspects, are differently constructed, as are (correlatively) their respective relations to giving. Where men’s giving and caring may be the object of praise as the manifestation of virtue, women’s caring and giving is more likely to be reified as an expression of women’s nature, and as such is more likely to be socially invisible. ‘Emotional labor is recognized not when the outcome is right, but on those occasions

when it goes wrong. The product itself is invisible. The value of the labour is only recognized in negative forms, in disorder, rather than in its positive form of “adjustment”’ (James, 1989: 28). Looking after others’ bodies and emotions has traditionally been regarded as ‘women’s work’ and, as such, as ‘natural’. In fact, this is so much the case that it has often not been seen as work at all and certainly not as something on which one would put a price (Hochschild, 1983: 163, 165; James, 1989). Different aspects of care have been abstracted from each other and made to appear quite independent of the other aspects. Professionals perform work which involves specialized knowledge and technical skills. Other tasks are left to poorly paid, unregulated workers, disproportionately women of colour, often immigrants. Some professionals, who have been engaged in a decades-long struggle for increasing status, recognition and autonomy, seek to dissociate themselves from such subaltern tasks. In fact, the emotional labour that is thought to be an unskilled and spontaneous extension of women’s nature is subtle and demanding, requiring not only reserves of patience, empathy and tact, but powers of psychological analysis. Emotional labour is not easily quantified, is difficult to account for, is often regarded as an unskilled activity accomplished by people of a lower social status, and can expose its practitioners to the risk of dependency; body work is associated with dirt, waste and decay (Twigg, 2000). The social division of care work, and thus the different constructions of the nature of care, are key issues in the competition between professions for status, salaries and power. In a context of ‘lean production’, nonstandardizable tasks, such as emotion work, still need to be done – only they often have to be done on the side, because they are no longer considered ‘value-added’ and are therefore no longer remunerated, or because increasingly rationed time makes them more and more difficult to accomplish. Workers continue to perform them as ‘extras’, as gifts – transforming ‘labour’ into ‘work’ – and are

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understood as doing so out of their own goodness as people. Management may or may not tolerate these deviations from working to rule. The fact remains that the ‘extras’ are not remunerated and are seen as a ‘labour of love’ that workers do as a result of being intrinsically good people (Aronson and Neysmith, 1996; Hochschild, 1983: 167; Twigg, 2000: 121). Fully commodified labour is a sum of discrete, identifiable tasks; incompletely commodified work is greater than the sum of its parts, never reducible to a set of operations prescribed in a contract. In a holistic concept of care, ‘extras’ would be recognized as an integral part of the work and be part of the overall work plan, not left to personal whim. By splitting the labour process asunder, rationalization reduces formal care to a set of rationalized, costed services, making much of care on the ‘supply side’ not only informal and invisible, but also, in a sense, an ‘irrational residue’, like weeds growing in a manicured garden. On the ‘demand side’, those in need of care are constructed – either as passive patients and clients or as active, empowered consumers of products and services. As passive clients, they are no longer conceived as co-producers; as active consumers, they may be, but in the context of a contractual, market relation, in which they may act as employers. In many cases, however, those in need of care, and their kin, are mobilized as agents of their own care and made to act as substitutes for paid workers who are no longer present or no longer have time. As the home increasingly becomes the site of post-acute care, patients and their kin are trained by timecrunched professionals to effect a range of technical tasks. This work transfer, driven by the financial imperatives of the public sector, remains largely invisible and unrecognized. What were identified in the first section as essential aspects of care, namely its coproduction by ‘workers’ and ‘users’, and its union of physical, emotional and intellectual work, are eclipsed by the working of the social division of care.

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These are the classic features of reification (Lukács, 1971): the fragmentation of the unity of human action by a division of labour driven by a will to impose an instrumental rationality of control; the consequent replacement of that unity in the consciousness of the agents by a series of binary categories (rational–irrational, objective–subjective, social–natural, etc.); the reduction of the relations produced by complex collective labour either to aspects of an objective, bureaucratically imposed, process or to aspects of the subjective nature of the individual workers; the opposition between active producers and passive consumers, between those who do and those who receive. As a result of reification, there is conflict between care as a dialogical, reciprocal process of co-production, and as a service distributed or sold to individual recipients.

‘NECESSARY’ AND ‘SURPLUS’ LABOUR What seems like exploitation, waste or superfluity in the logic of commodity exchange, and like irrationality in the logic of redistribution – doing more than was demanded, giving more than was expected, donating without expectation of a return – is the epitome of sensible behaviour in the logic of reciprocity. Furthermore, while the person who gives without receiving the equivalent appears as the loser in the logic of the market, the opposite would tend to be the case in the logic of giving: the person who does not give back remains in debt and thus, potentially, in a position of inferiority. As an employee, the worker’s relationship with the employer is governed by the logic of the market; as a caregiver, her relationship with the person for whom she cares is governed by the logic of reciprocity. This juxtaposition of the commodity and gift forms makes it possible for the worker to be subject to the dual imperatives of the employer’s will and the complex requirements

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of the care relationship. Where caregiving takes the form of wage labour in a formal or institutional setting (hospital, long-term care facility, community care), the care relationship is subordinate to, and limited by, the employment relationship. This means that the institutional goals may come into conflict with the right to care (both to give and to receive care) and the development of care as reciprocity. It also means that when such relations of reciprocity develop, they may either be regarded as a nuisance by the employer or as a source of profit in the form of work done for free by the employees, which might otherwise need to be remunerated. The caregiver’s gifts to the person for whom she is caring may end up constituting a gift to the employer, work done for free. Thus relations of giving mediate relations of exchange, making it possible for managers in the public and private sectors to get more work out of the workers than they need to pay for. Workers are owed debts for their labour which are never repaid, because the existence of these debts is concealed and denied. The gift relationship functions as a mediation of workers’ exploitation in the health care system.4 From the standpoint of those who have designed the labour process, the separation between formal, rational and visible care on the one hand, and informal, ‘irrational’ and invisible care on the other, is in a sense a distinction between necessary and surplus labour, understood respectively as work that must be accomplished because it is mandated by the employment contract and additional work that the workers may do on their own time and out of their own will. From the standpoint of the gift relationship, this so-called ‘surplus’ is in fact necessary, the indispensable giving back and creation of debt. A feminist analysis would reject the notion that giving this ‘surplus’ is a matter of individual choice, and would point to the habitus shaped by patriarchal relations of oppression, as well as the pressures to which caregivers are subject in precarious, low-wage employment. To the extent that women pass through

a ‘long apprenticeship’ (James, 1989: 37) which predisposes them both to enter into open-ended relations of giving and to undertake the emotional and physical labour of care, then gender mediates giving and exchange, and hence mediates the class relation between employer and employee. In Twigg’s words, care is seen as stemming from women’s nature: ‘It is not what they do but who they are. Extras thus represent work that is extracted on the basis of the traditional gender contract, but not officially recognized or recompensed in the formal one’ (Twigg, 2000: 171). In the picture presented here, the ‘traditional gender contract’ is not so much a contract as a particular form of habitus. A Marxist analysis would suggest that the workers perform both ‘necessary’ and ‘surplus’ labour even when they work to rule, because the value of their labour power is less than the value that their labour produces. It would also recall that the problem does not reside in the gift relationship as such, but in the division of labour which separates out men’s from women’s work, wage relations from gift relations, formal from informal work, and so on, giving rise to the reification of specific social practices and relationships as women’s nature, as superfluous and so on.

CONCLUSION To sum up, a trend in the institutional and professional side of health care today is to compress the time of work in formal health services, reducing the possibility of building the relations of care. Meanwhile, the work of forging deeper, more open-ended relationships of reciprocity is increasingly transferred to volunteers and family members, because paid health care workers do not have time for such work (except in the form of ‘extras’) or because it is no longer considered appropriate for them to do it – except in the context of high-priced private services. One result of this trend has been the growing exploitation by private entrepreneurs and

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privatization advocates of public anxiety over the time of care, that is, both its timeliness and duration, as waiting for treatment appears to lengthen, while hospital stays and contact time with healt hcare professionals seem to get ever shorter. Another consequence has been the enormous pressure felt by physicians, nurses and other caregivers in recent years as a result of budget cuts, massive restructuring, work speed-ups, and the introduction of new management strategies. In Canada, nurses responded with unprecedented union militancy (Briskin, 2006). At the same time, many have left the profession, while recruitment of new nurses has been insufficient. A huge labour shortage threatens Canada’s health care system. The popular and ideological perception is of health care systems in crisis because of soaring costs. The analysis here suggests that health care systems are experiencing a deeper crisis rooted in the way their societies allocate and manage time – a process increasingly dictated by the imperatives of capital accumulation – and in the way this fragments the cooperative relations of care by pitting caregivers and users, producers and consumers, employers and employees, managers and workers, professionals and patients, waged workers and volunteers against each other in relations of competition and conflict.

NOTES 1 It was only as I was finishing this chapter that I came across Daly and Lewis’s article, ‘The Concept of Social Care and the Analysis of Contemporary Welfare States’ (2000). Daly and Lewis also make the case for analyzing care as labour, viewing it holistically beyond the fragmentation brought about by the division of labour, examining the social relations of wealth and power entailed by the social division of care, and taking into account not only the public and private sectors, but also the third sector, as well as the informal and domestic economies. Although my starting point is Marxist theory and my object health care, while their starting point is feminist theory and their object what they call social care, there is much in common between their approach and mine.

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2 To be sure, emotion work is also an instrument of manipulation in the private and public spheres. The Managed Heart analyzes two extreme examples of the colonization of this faculty in the capitalist economy, in one case (flight attendants) with a view to seducing customers, in the other (bill collectors) with a view to bullying them. However, I shall reserve discussion of these dynamics for the following section. 3 In Quebec, and increasingly in Canada, the social economy is defined as those forms of nonstatutory collective enterprise (e.g., associations and cooperatives), which exist primarily to serve their members or the community, rather than simply to maximize profits or generate financial returns; which are governed democratically by their members, with involvement by their workers and the users of their services; which stand for the primacy of persons and labour over capital in the distribution of their surpluses and revenues; and which promote the values of participation, empowerment and collective responsibility. (This definition is adapted from those used by the Canadian Social Economy Hub (www.socialeconomynetwork.ca) and Québec’s Chantier de l’économie sociale (www.chantier.qc.ca).) 4 Sharon Bolton (2005) usefully distinguishes between different aspects of emotion management in the workplace. Pecuniary emotion management, as the type of emotional labour required of employees in commercial settings (e.g., Hochschild’s flight attendants who must always appear cheerful and pleasant), differs in her view from prescriptive emotion management, the sort of emotion work that professionals such as lawyers, physicians and nurses are trained to accomplish in order to cope with the stresses of their jobs. These both differ from philanthropic emotion management, which Bolton defines as the gift of emotion work with no expectation of a return. Bolton (2000) shows that nurses take pride and pleasure in this kind of emotion work; therefore, she does not view it as alienating. My point here is not that it is alienating as such, for it is not, but rather that the specific character of the gift relationship must be analyzed, both as it appears in itself in a given situation and as it is mediated with other forms of relations of production. Bolton presents the different aspects of emotion management as though they could coexist as separate things, without exploring their mediations. Labour process theory, which Bolton commends, would suggest, however, that one form is likely to be hegemonic and the others subordinate.

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Amaratunga, Pat Armstrong, Madeline Boscoe, Ann Pederson, Kay Willson (eds.) Caring For / Caring About. Women, Home Care, and Unpaid Caregiving. Aurora: Garamond Press. pp. 5–43. Armstrong, Pat and Kits, Olga (2003) ‘Caregiving in Historical Perspective’, in Paul Leduc Browne (ed.) The Commodity of Care. Home Care Reform in Ontario. Ottawa: CCPA Books. pp. 23–64. Aronson, Jane and Neysmith, Sheila (1996) ‘You’re Not Just There to Do the Work: Depersonalizing Policies and the Exploitation of Home Care Workers’ Labor’, Gender and Society, 10(1): 59–77. Baldock, John (1997) ‘Social Care in Old Age: More Than a Funding Problem’, Social Policy and Administration, 31(1): 73–89. Bellemare, Guy (1999) ‘Marketing et gestion des ressources humaines postmodernes. Du salarié-machine au salarié-produit ?’, Sociologie du travail, 41: 89–103. Bolton, Sharon (2000) ‘Who Cares? Offering Emotion Work as “a Gift” in the Nursing Labour Process’, Journal of Advanced Nursing, 32(3): 580–86. Bolton, Sharon (2005) Emotion Management in the Workplace. NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Braverman, Harry (1974) Labor and Monopoly Capital. The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century. NY: Monthly Review Press. Briskin, Linda (2006) ‘Feminization, Gendering and Worker Militancies’, paper delivered at the Congress of the Humanities and Social Sciences. Toronto: York University, June 1. Browne, Paul (1990) ‘Lukács’ Later Ontology’, Science and Society, 54(2): 193–218. Browne, Paul Leduc (2000) Unsafe Practices: Restructuring and Privatization in Ontario Health Care. Ottawa: CCPA Books. Browne, Paul Leduc (2003) ‘Care, Power and Commodification’, in Paul Leduc Browne (ed.) The Commodity of Care: Home Care Reform in Ontario, Ottawa: CCPA Books. pp. 171–211. Burawoy, Michael (1979) Manufacturing Consent: Changes in the Labor Process Under Monopoly Capitalism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Burawoy, Michael (1985) The Politics of Production. London: Verso.

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Godbout, Jacques T. (2000) Le don, la dette et l’identité. Homo donator vs homo oeconomicus. Montréal: Boréal. Graeber, David (2001) Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value: The False Coin of Our Own Dreams. NY: Palgrave. Guberman, Nancy, Gagnon, Eric, Côté, Denyse, Gilbert, Claude, Thivierge, Nicole and Tremblay, Marielle (2005) ‘How the Trivialization of the Demands of High-Tech Care in the Home Is Turning Family Members into Para-Medical Personnel’, Journal of Family Issues, 26(2): 247–72. Hales, Mike (1980) Living Thinkwork: Where Do Labour Processes Come From? London: CSE Books. Hankivsky, Olena (2004) Social Policy and the Ethic of Care. Vancouver: UBC Press. Himmelweit, Susan (1999) ‘Caring Labor’, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 561: 27–38. Hochschild, Arlie Russell (1983) The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling. 2nd edn. Berkeley: University of California Press. Hochschild, Arlie Russell (2003) ‘Afterword to the Twentieth Anniversary Edition’, in The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling. 2nd edn. Berkeley: University of California Press. James, Nicky (1989) ‘Emotional Labour: Skill and Work in the Social Regulation of Feelings’, Sociological Review, 1: 15–42. James, Nicky (1992) ‘Care = Organization + Physical Labour + Emotional Labour’, in Ellen Annandale, Mary Ann Elston and Lindsay Prior (eds.) Medical Work, Medical Knowledge and Health Care. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. pp. 265–84. Kittay, Eva Feder (1999) Love’s Labor: Essays on Women, Equality, and Dependency. NY: Routledge. Laville, Jean-Louis (1994) ‘Économie et solidarité. Esquisse d’une problématique’, in JeanLouis Laville (ed.) L’Économie solidaire. Une perspective internationale. Paris: Syros. Laville, Jean-Louis (2001) ‘Les raisons d’être des associations’, in Jean-Louis Laville et al., Association, démocratie et société civile. Paris: Éditions La Découverte / M.A.U.S.S. / C.R.I.D.A. pp. 61–140. Laville, Jean-Louis, Duhm, Rainer, Eme, Bernard, Gherardi, Silvia, MacFarlane,

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Richard and Thomas, Allen (1993) Les services de proximité en Europe. Pour une économie solidaire. Paris: Syros/Alternatives. Laville, Jean-Louis and Nyssens, Marthe (eds.) (2001) Les services sociaux entre associations, État et marché. L’aide aux personnes âgées. Paris: La Découverte/M.A.U.S.S. / C.R.I.D.A. Leys, Colin (2001) Market-Driven Politics: NeoLiberal Democracy and the Public Interest. London: Verso. Lukács, Georg (1971) History and Class Consciousness. London: Merlin Press. Lukács, Georg (1980) The Ontology of Social Being. 3. Labour. London: Merlin Press. Maheu, Louis and Bien-Aimé, Paul-Antoine (1996) ‘Et si le travail exercé sur l’humain faisait une différence ...’, Sociologie et sociétés, 28(1): 189–99. Molinier, Pascale (2003) L’énigme de la femme active: égoïsme, sexe et compassion. Paris: Payot. Neysmith, Sheila (1998) ‘From Home Care to Social Care: The Value of a Vision’, in Carol Baines, Patricia Evans and Sheila Neysmith (eds.) Women’s Caring: Feminist Perspectives on Social Welfare. 2nd edn. Toronto: Oxford University Press. pp. 233–49. O’Doherty, Damian and Willmot, Hugh (2001) ‘Debating Labour Process Theory: The Issue of Subjectivity and the Relevance of Poststructuralism’, Sociology, 35(2): 457–76. Offe, Claus (1985) ‘Work: The Key Sociological Category?’, in John Keane (ed.) Dis– organized Capitalism: Contemporary Transformations of Work and Politics. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. pp. 129–50. Polanyi, Karl (1957) The Great Transformation, Boston: Beacon Press. Radin, Margaret J. (1996) Contested Commodities. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Rastetter, Daniela (1999) ‘Emotionsarbeit. stand der forschung und offene fragen’, Arbeit, 8: 374–88. Saillant, Francine (2001) Seminar on the gift and reciprocity at the University of Ottawa, February 2001. Sen, Kasturi (2003) Restructuring Health Services: Changing Contexts and Comparative Perspectives. London: Zed Books.

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Smith, Chris and Thompson, Paul (1998) ‘Re-evaluating the Labour Process Debate’, Economic and Industrial Democracy, 19: 551–77. Steinberg, Ronnie and Figart, Deborah M. (1999) ‘Emotional Labor since the Managed Heart’, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 561: 8–26.

Twigg, Julia (2000) Bathing – the Body and Community Care. London: Routledge. Ughetto, Pascal, Besucco, Nathalie, Tallard, Michèle and du Tertre, Christian (2002) ‘La relation de service: une tension vers un nouveau modèle de travail?’, Revue de l’IRES, 39(2): 1–29.

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18 Markets Against Society: Labor’s Predicament in the Second Great Transformation Edward Webster and Robert Lambert

Sociology had its beginnings in the attempts by classical social thinkers, such as Marx, Durkheim and Weber, to interpret the first ‘great transformation’ to the market economy. Its emergence was connected to the widespread concern with the economic, social, cultural and moral effects of moving from a non-industrial to an industrializing society. This concern reflected the major fault line of politics at the time between the proponents of economic liberalism and their advocacy of the self-regulating market and, on the other side, those who favored intervention to ‘protect society’. The rapid growth of economic liberalism over the past 20 years has led sociologists to define the current period of world history as the Second Great Transformation (Munck, 2002). The theoretical work of Karl Polanyi has emerged as the most influential in the construction of a sociology of the Second Great Transformation (Burawoy, 2000: 693; 2003a; Munck, 2004). In Karl Polanyi’s classic study of the industrial revolution, in what he called the Great Transformation, he

showed how society took measures to protect itself against the disruptive impact of the unregulated market. This he called the ‘double movement’ whereby ever-wider extensions of free market principles generated counter-movements to protect society. Against an economic system that dislocates the very fabric of society, the social countermovement, he argued, is based on the ‘principle of social protection aiming at the conservation of man and nature’ (Polanyi, 2001: 33). What implications does the Second Great Transformation have for the labor movement? A ‘triple tension’, Richard Hyman writes, lies at the heart of union identity (2001: 3). Trade unions, he says, are drawn in three directions as they engage market, class and society. Put differently, unions, as institutions, engage in competitive relations (through the market), conflictual relations (through class-based conflict) and cooperative relations (through society). In European trade union history this gave rise to a ‘triple polarization of trade union identities’ (2001: 4). As associations of

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workers, unions attempt to regulate the wage-labor relationship and thus cannot ignore the market. As organizations representing the interests of workers confronting employers’ interests, they are class agencies. Unions are also part of society, coexisting with other institutions and other constellations of interests. Hyman presents market, class and society as a ‘geometry of trade unionism’, connected in an unstable balance in the three points of a triangle. Thus business unionism (market focus), integrative unionism (social focus) and radical unionism (class focus) never exist in a pure form. He concludes that in practice, ‘actually existing unions have tended to incline toward a contradictory admixture of two of the three ideal types’ (2001: 4). The aim of this chapter, through drawing on the work of Karl Polanyi, is three-fold: first, to deepen our understanding of globalization from a Southern perspective; second, to identify the predicament facing trade unions where they are drawn into the efficiency discourse of economic liberalism, leading them into becoming agents of restructuring rather than instruments of social justice; third, to examine the emergence of an alternative response, what we call social movement unionism, to this predicament. This alternative tendency attempts to link the workplace to social and political issues. It is a form of union organization that facilitates an active engagement in workplace issues and the community. It engages in alliances in order to establish relationships on a systematic basis (Lambert and Webster, 1988: 21). The chapter is divided into two parts; in part 1, we locate the Second Great Transformation in the context of the South. We define ‘South’ politically rather than geographically as those zones of the global economy that have historically been subject to colonialism and struggle to break from their subordinate past. We have chosen to focus on Brazil and South Africa as they have experienced similar patterns of industrialization. Both countries underwent a rapid transformation of

the labor process, a despotic system of labor control, a lack of social infrastructure in the community and restricted access to political power. This is the pattern of industrialization that creates the conditions for the rise and rapid growth of social movement unionism (Seidman, 1990). We argue that the successful construction of a welfare state never occurred in the South in countries such as Brazil and South Africa. Instead, what is emerging in the South is a counter-movement for the construction of an integrated society and of a public domain against the market for the first time. In part 2, through a reflection on earlier experiences of social movement unionism in Brazil and South Africa, we examine the possibilities of trade unions emerging as key actors in a broad Polanyian type of countermovement consisting of a coalition between labor and the global social justice movement (Munck, 2002; Waterman, 2001). The sustainability of such a social movement approach under the impact of political transition is a crucial question which has been discussed elsewhere (Sitas, 2005).

PART ONE: A SOCIOLOGY OF THE SECOND GREAT TRANSFORMATION For Polanyi the First Great Transformation of the nineteenth century led to counter-movements which, over a number of decades, led to a class compromise between capital and labor resting on full employment, strong trade unions and democratic societies. The trade union discourse during this period was that of class mobilization, a discourse that emphasized the importance of working people having an institutionalized voice in the market and society. This ‘Northern class compromise’, it has been argued, is being undermined by the current phase of liberalization, the Second Great Transformation (Webster and Adler, 1999). At the center of this transformation are market-driven politics that have led to ‘a remarkably rapid erosion

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of democratically determined collective values and institutions’, as state sovereignty is increasingly surrendered to large global corporations (Leys, 2001: 4). In this shift, market ideology (competition and individualism) has penetrated every facet of society. Trade unions have not been immune. As a consequence, some trade unions have assumed an expanded role: they are now the advocates of market-driven politics. They are instruments of ‘best practice’; they are a driver of competition and efficiency. Australia is a good illustration of this radical shift. Over the past two decades, the role and purpose of trade unionism has been defined in these expanded, marketized terms: many have become partners in corporate restructuring. The Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), following the lead of the newly elected Hawke/Keating government in the 1980s, embraced a positive conception of restructuring – the process created efficient, competitive corporations that were integrated into the global economy, seizing the opportunities of global market access. This vision flowed from the ACTU’s in principle support for the economic liberalization agenda of the Hawke/Keating Labour Government and their unambiguous commitment to neo-liberal globalization, to an open economy and to market-driven politics. This strategic shift signaled ‘an historic watershed’ heralding a new era of partnership, of ‘cooperative industrial relations’ that would dissolve ‘ingrained distrust’ between employers and unions, improve productivity and ‘minimize traditional conflict’, thereby energizing market-driven politics (Ogden, 1992: 11). Many unions, as agents of class interests, dissolved before this new orientation. Ironically, this embrace of restructuring by the ACTU did not signal a new era of union growth. Rather, the steady decline of trade unionism in Australia is a feature of the 1990s, as the Labour government opened the door to non-union employment relations, for if flexibility is the essence of market efficiency, industrial laws need to be reformed accordingly. The Labour government’s reforms were

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further advanced through the Liberal/ National government’s 1996 Workplace Relations Act, which introduced individual bargaining and a variety of measures that consolidated managerial prerogative, giving corporations virtually unlimited scope in driving restructuring. During the period of these changes, union membership in Australia has declined steeply. The Australian unions seem to be in free fall, with membership down to a mere 23.1% of the workforce in August 2002. This slide needs to be viewed against the backdrop of their relative historical strength, which had remained above 50% for all but 13 years (11 of those years following the Great Depression: 1931–1941) between 1920 and 1980 (Peetz, 1998). These developments reflect a key feature of the Second Great Transformation – the declining power and influence of trade unionism, deemed necessary to secure flexible markets and the construction of unequal worlds of work. The restructuring flowing from rapid liberalization in the North is leading to what Burawoy (1985) calls ‘hegemonic despotism’. This erosion of the workplace power of trade unions and of the benefits they had won for their members is matched by the erosion of the welfare state and the rights to a social wage, which had been accumulated through decades of working class struggle. The sphere of the public and the social, which had been established by the counter-movement in response to the domination of the market during the First Great Transformation, is being rolled back by the forces of neo-liberal globalization unleashed in the Second Great Transformation. The impact of the two Great Transformations in the North is illustrated schematically in Figure 18.1. Much of the literature on transformation has been written from the perspective of the advanced industrialized countries of the North. These studies have taken the Northern model, the particular, and made it universal. When Africa is discussed in this literature it is treated as ‘a black hole’, a marginal part of the world described by Castells (1996) as the

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Figure 18.1 The First Great Transformation

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The northern compromise Form of state Democratic welfare state

Work restructuring Hegemonic – high wages, high employment

Social development Social citizenship*

The Second Great Democratic, Hegemonic despotism – Erosion of the Transformation ‘hollowed-out’ state flexible firm welfare state * Social citizenship is the right to income security and other forms of welfare such as education and health, a right to share to the full one’s social heritage and the right to a safe, healthy and peaceful environment.

Fourth World. However, countries of the South have followed a historical trajectory that differed markedly from the First Great Transformation of northern industrialized nations. The history of the South is marked by the colonial experience of political and economic subordination to the needs of the northern capitalist economies. As Barchiesi (2006) argues, at the core of the welfare state of advanced capitalist society was a link between wage labor and social citizenship. The ‘social question’ was solved and workers’ demands were met by the introduction of the welfare state that began a process of redistribution through state transfers. However, in the South, he suggests, colonialism could not deal with the ‘social question’. These countries lacked the preconditions for a successful resolution of the social question, a political coalition made of strong unions, well-organized employers and a government that considers industrial citizens its core constituency (Moene and Wallerstein, 2002). In Polanyian terms, they skipped a stage. These societies never secured a welfare state, high-waged employment and social citizenship as their own democratic transition occurred at the very moment of the Second Great Transformation. Political liberation was secured within the global environment of market-driven politics and restructuring of work and society. To understand the growing informalization of work and the attendant social crisis in the South, it is necessary to locate the Second Great Transformation in the context of the colonial legacy of social underdevelopment. Let us illustrate our argument through one southern country, South Africa.

During the First Great Transformations, rapid accumulation in South Africa was based on cheap non-free labor, benefiting specific sectors of white settler society as well as Northern capital. These economic ends were secured by the formation of a state based on the white settler population, which was able to ensure the domination and suppression of the colonized black population. In contrast to the counter-movement in the North through which society was able successfully to challenge the destructive tendencies of the market by constructing the welfare state, South Africa saw the forging of a despotic racial order based on migrant labor and the brutalities of racial segregation, and the ruthless suppression of political dissent. Counter-movement took the form of a national liberation movement which first became powerful in the 1950s and was only able to achieve a political breakthrough with negotiated transition in the early 1990s – ironically (as the last apartheid President so astutely observed) at the same time as the forceful reassertion of market forces triumphed over communism. Thus, in contrast to the North, countries of the South such as South Africa have never experienced the successful construction of a welfare state through the counter-movement of society in response to the market forces of the First Great Transformation. The task facing society is not the defense or strengthening of society and the public domain, but rather to form a counter-movement for the construction of an integrated society and of a public domain against the market for the first time – and in the face of the even more powerful market forces of the Second Great Transformation.

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The impact of the two Great Transformations in the South is illustrated schematically in Figure 18.2. Restructuring flowing from economic liberalization has resulted in a growing differentiation within the worlds of work, producing three major zones of work. First, there are the core formal sector workplaces, with workers in more or less stable employment relations with wages, benefits and access to democratic worker and trade union rights. Second, there is the zone of casualized and externalized work where non-core workers are compelled into less stable employment relations, sometimes with temporary or part-time contracts with the core enterprise, at other times in more precarious contracts with intermediaries, such as labor brokers, informal factories or subcontractors. Then there is the third zone, or periphery, where people are ‘unemployed’ and ‘make a living’ in informal sector activities, ranging from lucrative criminal activities and those that permit a degree of petty accumulation through to subsistence activities (Webster and von Holdt, 2005) The resulting social crisis experienced in poor households and poor communities is exacerbated by the underfunding of public services, as well as the privatization of essential services – both of which are economic and social policies fostered by the Second Great Transformation. Instead of extending social rights to all citizens, restructuring in South Africa is transferring the responsibility of social protection to the household and to the poor, threatening the very sustainability of communities and the reproduction of society. This emerged in the United Nations Human Development Report 2003. About 48.5% of the South African population (21.9 million people) currently falls below the Figure 18.2

national poverty line (UNDP, 2003: 41, Table 2.20). Income distribution remains highly unequal and has deteriorated in recent years. This is reflected in the high Gini-coefficient, which rose from 0.596 in 1995 to 0.635 in 2001 (UNDP, 2003: 44, Figure 2.11). The Human Development Index (HDI) for South Africa moved from 0.72 in 1995 to 0.67 in 2003 (UNDP, 2003: 45, Figure 2.13). Indeed the life expectancy index declined to 51.8 years in 2002 (UNDP, 2003: 44).

PART TWO: AN ALTERNATIVE DIRECTION – SOCIAL MOVEMENT UNIONISM Discourse is power and the transformation in union discourse we have identified reflects the power of the forces of neo-liberalism over organized labor, epitomized in the way unions have become imprisoned within liberal economic values. Discourse is a moment of communication and persuasion regarding lines of action and belief. The discursive moment is a ‘form of power, it is a mode of formation of ideas and beliefs’ (Harvey, 1996: 83). The general failure of unions to present an alternative discourse on restructuring is an indication of the success of the neo-liberal political project in this regard. Deeply held beliefs and values of organized labor are mocked as reflecting those of a bygone era. They are barriers to progress. They undermine the economy. In absorbing these beliefs and values and in becoming market agents, business unionism signaled a profound political transformation that undermines class consciousness. This orientation has reinforced the notion of

The global south: the case of South Africa

The First Great Transformation

Form of state Settler colonial/ apartheid state

Work restructuring Colonial despotism – low wages, migrant labor

Social development Colonialism excluded the majority

The Second Great Transformation

Democratic post-colonial state

Growing differentiation and informalization of work

Crisis of social reproduction – legacy of colonial underdevelopment

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market necessity and in so doing has asserted that the foundational values of trade unionism are now market values: individualism, competition, efficiency, profit, shareholder enrichment. This model’s social vision is of a society of individual opportunity and upward mobility. This is a politics that stimulates individual aspirations, assuaging the desire to climb the social ladder. Such a value shift is radical, corroding the essential driving power of unionism – the culture of solidarity. Touraine (1987: 112) has highlighted the implications of this value shift. He noted: Beliefs and convictions have been lost, with the result that militant workers lack certainty and sometimes even feel that they no longer know what their action means... it is impossible not to notice how much weaker ideas of a desirable future have become.

A worker explained, ‘We are at the end of our tether because there is no prospect of a more just, amicable society’ (Touraine, 1987: 115). Others observed that ‘the trade union movement is less and less ethically identified ... trade unionism must rediscover these values in order to give meaning to its activities’ (Touraine, 1987: 118). In the context of this decline, Harvey (2000: 49) asks, ‘... in a time when the class struggle has receded ..., is this not also a time when the painting of fantastic pictures of a future society has some role to play?’ Such a shift in discourse lies at the heart of the union’s predicament. The question of what kind of society unions are fighting for captures the fact that imaginative strategy embraces both the vision (what is being fought for) and the present predicament (what is being fought against). Both dimensions are shaped by ethics, by ‘foundational beliefs’ that could make ‘political action meaningful, creative, and possible’ (Harvey, 1996: 2). Justice (the justness of social relations) is the core, foundational value that inspires a social movement alternative to business unionism. Market necessity is undermined through highlighting how market-driven politics functions as a mechanism of injustice. Pessimism and inaction

that derives from the notion of the ironclad nature of markets is transformed into anger at the injustice and inequity of market restructuring. Shifting the discourse from efficiency and competitiveness to exploitation and justice re-ignites the need for solidarity, the vision of a desirable future and the optimism of social agency. Business unionism and its embrace of market ideology represent but one union orientation. Here we identify a historically grounded alternative – social movement unionism (SMU) – that is driven by a different set of core values. A justice discourse inspired the fight against racial oppression in South Africa and military dictatorship and extreme inequality in Brazil, giving rise to SMU as a key facet of the resistance. In both nations the strategic orientation was articulated by the union leadership: these were not struggles for limited, sectional gains in wages and conditions, important though these might be. This was a much wider resistance for human emancipation, recognition and dignity. To secure such a vision, the injustice of these regimes had to be fought against. The social movement pathway generated by this strategic value choice provides a model for unions consumed by restructuring. If a counter-movement is to emerge, a global social movement for emancipation, equality, meaning, security and against the insecurity, inequity and restructuring’s destruction of meaning will need to be imagined and constructed through the power of movement. The first signs of such a movement are evident in the rise of the World Social Forum process and the global social justice movement. Unions face a critical strategic choice, captured in Figure 18.3. Let us illustrate the choices facing labor through an analysis of the emergence of social movement unionism in South Africa and in Brazil during the 1970s and 1980s. Our contribution is part of the renaissance of scholarly interest in SMU in recent years led by Peter Waterman. His ‘SMU adventures’ situates the question of alternatives in ‘the new global

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Figure 18.3

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The critical strategic choice for trade unionism

Political orientation Market-driven politics

Market Re-regulation to empower corporations in the guise of market freedom. Privatization and the transformation of the state

Class Promoting the flexible worlds of work; Lean production; Work intensification, casualization

Society Markets as the engine of the social; Transforming social programs; Welfare to workfare

Societal-driven politics

New forms of social regulation; Asserting social and democratic control over corporations

Limiting casualization; Social benchmarking

Social citizenship; Expanding the public domain. Re-centering the local

justice and solidarity movement’ and the need for ‘a new labor internationalism’ (Waterman, 2001, 2002, 2003a, 2003b, 2004). This resurgent scholarly debate is a response to the crisis of business unionism. The experience of South Africa and Brazil provides fertile ground for reflection on the alternative needed to engage restructuring because the state regimes in both countries, backed by corporate interests, appeared all powerful. The possibility of challenging the state looked like a pipe dream just as today the notion that corporate restructuring can be halted seems like a fantasy, like desire. From the outset, in these countries it was clear that collective bargaining in and of itself could never challenge political oppression. Powerlessness was the focus of the trade union debate in South Africa in the early 1970s. Analysis of the 50-year history of nonracial unions revealed phases of expansion followed by decline. Labor historians concluded that there were two fundamental flaws: mass mobilization was not consolidated into workplace organization; structures of leadership accountability were weak, resulting in instances of corruption that divided the new unions. This led to the advancement of a concept of internal democracy centered on worker control that was consciously anti-bureaucratic in its thrust. Workers would form a majority on all structures and elected, paid officials would have no vote. An open organizational culture of accountability and mandates was stressed.

This created a high level of participation, which gave workers a sense of empowerment that stimulated the rapid growth of strong workplace-based unionism throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Baskin, 1991; Friedman, 1987; Maree, 1986). Above all, this radical internal democracy generated a depth of leadership forged in the cut and thrust of building solidarity and engaging in collective action. There was a similar trajectory in Brazil where the clandestine work of activists developed a workplace militancy that undermined the military controls established in the 1960s. A 1978 metal sector strike wave overcame ‘a sense of powerlessness’ that had prevailed (Seidman, 1994: 154). A social movement orientation is what distinguishes this form of unionism from business unionism. Seidman (1994: 199), in considering the extension of factory-based demands into the political arena, concludes: [T]hat question – what led unions and communities to interpret their interests in parallel terms and to participate in joint campaigns against both employers and the state – is perhaps the key to understanding the meaning of social-movement unionism.

Referring to Castells’ City and the Grass Roots, she notes that this workplace-community interface ‘is hardly a straightforward process’ (Seidman, 1994: 199). Labor movements generally avoid direct involvement in community campaigns, focusing instead on the workplace, while urban social movements tend to avoid a class-based rhetoric that might alienate the middle class.

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Seidman stressed the significance of agency in resolving this divide. She argued that SMU emerged in South Africa and Brazil during this period of democratic union growth because of the activist leadership that prevailed. Activists formulated ideologies that were based on the lived experiences of workers and linked the workplace to the communities from which workers came. In both countries, state policies impoverished workers and communities through adopting an industrialization strategy that combined low wages with urban spoliation. ‘Class struggles in the “sphere of production” spilled over into the “sphere of reproduction” as workers sought to raise the historically defined level of the cost of reproduction of labor’ (1994: 203). Brazil of the 1970s and 1980s was characterized by intense community mobilization around domestic needs. These included campaigns to fight cost of living increases, improve public transport, regularize title deeds and provide health clinics and day-care facilities for working mothers. Catholic activists from the Christian base communities1 sought to strengthen the links between the emerging urban social movements mobilizing on these issues and the labor movement. The Christian base communities encouraged their members to participate in the new unions, arguing that these were one of the few forces available to empower community struggles. The new unionists encouraged their members to participate in community campaigns because they considered that these issues impacted on the erosion of real wages and the declining conditions of working class communities. Such a relationship was mutually reinforcing. The growth of the new unions after 1978 stimulated community activism, whilst in turn the new urban social movements strengthened the labor movement through supporting striking workers. A similar process was at work in South Africa during the 1980s, with the emergence of community organizations in the black townships mobilizing on issues, such as bus

fares, rents and municipal governance. Civic associations, student groups and street committees organized rent and consumer boycotts and protest marches. Between 1984 and 1987, the new unions became increasingly prominent in the anti-Apartheid struggle, organizing stay-away protest strikes and engaging with community movements in a range of campaigns. Township-based Shop Steward Councils became a forum for debate and the forging of linkages between workplace and community (Lambert and Webster, 1988; Webster, 1988). Initially, the emergence of SMU was viewed as a Southern phenomenon appropriate only to unions involved in struggles against repressive, anti-democratic regimes. However, over the past decade, the notion of SMU has entered into the discussion on union revitalization in the United States (Johnston, 2001; Lopez, 2004; Moody, 1997; Turner et al., 2001; Voss and Sherman, 2000). The most recent contribution is that of Clawson (2003), who argues that we may well be on the brink of ‘a new upsurge’ of SMU that will challenge restructuring. The book has created widespread interest because it appears to fulfill a deep felt need – he presents a clear case for a new form of unionism. In an age of profound pessimism regarding the possibility of challenging restructuring, Clawson’s unabashed optimism is enticing. Movements are built and driven by optimism. Pessimism erodes the will to challenge injustice. Clawson argues that society has the ability to challenge the overwhelming power of corporate forces and the weakening of the labor movement. Indeed, he identifies a range of innovative strategies and new alliances that provide possible models for a societal response to the market. He is optimistic about the possibilities of an upsurge of social movements that would lead such a challenge to market liberalization. A new upsurge, he argues, ‘will fuse the unions of today with the issues and the styles of the social movements of the 1960s, producing new forms and taking up new issues’ (Clawson, 2003: ix–x).

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In an illuminating opening chapter to the book, Clawson captures the basic building block of SMU, identified in the analysis of South Africa and Brazil in the 1970s and 1980s, namely, that the organizational form of SMU is radically democratic. This is the key to developing a sense of empowerment and optimism that change can be wrought. The chapter identifies a significant feature of the market era: in spite of the fact that corporations are hostile to unionism and as a consequence, workers are fearful and hesitant, the beginnings of a counter-movement can be identified. The chapter begins with an example of factory workers who are exposed to hazardous substances. They are afraid to form a union, but eventually take various forms of action as an expression of their discontent. They were ‘crushed’ by management. ‘Workers were demoralized, convinced that people like them could never get their rights; the best thing to do was to swallow their anger and keep their heads down’. Even though the leader of the workers in the factory was courageous, ‘he and his co-workers were left feeling demoralized and defeated, that it was useless to stand up for themselves, or worse than useless because it led to humiliation and grief’ (Clawson, 2003: 2–3). Clawson contrasts this defeat with the case of Rhode Island Hospital, where a union was successfully organized and a struggle over conditions won. The hospital is a classic example of the ethos of market rationalism where constant cost cutting is in vogue, regardless of the impact on workers and their families. As part of cost cutting, the hospital raised the health insurance rates of their employees by as much as 400%. Such an intervention is not simply a rational cost issue; it is a justice issue. What is fascinating in Clawson’s description of the hospital is the way that the union was formed and the type of campaign that developed. Crucially, the union organizer stressed that ‘the union is not the organizers or staff ... the union is you ... the union is going to be whatever we make it when we organize it’ (Clawson 2003: 10). The union

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was built through identifying natural leaders in every shift and work area, forming an organizing committee, organizing small group meetings at workers’ homes, building a strong majority who supported the union in the hospital; then organizing ‘a walk into the CEO’s office unannounced’. There was a feeling throughout the hospital that we ‘are finally going to take control of the situation’ (Clawson, 2003: 11). Despite management hostility and attempts to intimidate individual workers, the union won recognition. Clawson concluded that whereas the factory workers were ‘defeated and humiliated’, the nurses were ‘exhilarated and empowered’. This democratic, participatory and actionorientated unionism contrasts with business unionism, whose goal ‘is to increase the number of dues-paying members, not to empower workers ... the organizing staff is “the union” in their own minds and in the minds of workers. Paid staff make all the key decisions, and do things for the workers instead of helping workers to develop their own power’. At meetings, ‘paid staff do almost all the talking’. Hence workers ‘may not feel that they have the capacity – or the right – to democratically make decisions about their priorities. Certainly they don’t feel that workers have the power to stand up to management; at best they hope “the union” (meaning the paid staff) will do so for them’. In contrast ‘the union building approach’ is about ‘empowering workers ... giving them the confidence, the solidarity, and the tools needed to stand up for what they believe in and win it’ (Clawson 2003: 10). The Clawson book provides telling evidence that the fearful passivity of workers can be transformed through democratic union organizing. The crucial point is that the potential for union growth has not been realized because the top-down organizing strategy of business unionism has failed to draw on the grievances that workers have. However, democratic unionism in and of itself will be unable to confront corporate restructuring, ‘Unless there is a new period of mass social movements, labor is likely to

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continue to lose ground’ (Clawson, 2003: 20). He concludes, ‘But if unions are able to combine the new style and tactics with the mass mobilization characteristic of unions at their best, this would create an awesome political force whose potential is only now being explored’ (Clawson, 2003: 23). Clawson argues that successful social movements have always been preceded by a string of failures. These ‘failures’ were testing the limits and vulnerabilities of existing structures, making possible a paradigm shift from one system to another. Current struggles are ‘the prehistory of the upsurge’ of mass civil disobedience against the injustice of neoliberal restructuring (Clawson, 2003: 26). In this age of market politics and corporate dominance, to imagine an alternative mode of organizing the economy and society is also an ethical choice, for this is not a condition that only affects employed workers who might be union members. Restructuring affects youth in search of their first job, who discover the nature of the casualized job market; it affects the families of the retrenched and the families whose well-being is affected by corporate cost cutting; it affects farmers and owners of small businesses whose life work is undermined through cheap imports. Despite their decline, unions remain the largest and strategically best organized of civil society actors. Their location in the economy provides them with bargaining power that is greater than any other civil society organization. Increasingly, unions are also drawing on communities to support their demands for social justice. They therefore have the capacity to assume a new historical role; that of building a new social movement against corporate restructuring and of visioning, debating and formulating a democratic and humane alternative to unregulated liberalization.

CONCLUDING REMARKS As we have shown, there is an unstable balance among the bases of trade union identities – business unionism, with its focus on

competition in the market, class-based unionism, with its emphasis on conflict, and social movement unionism, with its emphasis on cooperation between the workplace and society. We suggested that in the First Great Transformation in the North, the identity of unions was class-based, while in the Second Great Transformation it has increasingly become market-based. In the second part of the chapter we identified an alternative union identity, social movement unionism which emerged in South Africa and Brazil in the 1970s and the 1980s. However, social movement unions proved quite ephemeral. Seidman (1994: 274) concludes her study by noting: Over time, as states and employers recognize trade unions and engage in collective bargaining, such labour movements may become institutionalized, part of the regular pattern of labour relations in their countries; social-movement unionism may well be a transitory phase, as relatively privileged workers create channels through which to articulate interests.

In the cases of South Africa and Brazil, SMU was indeed a transitory phase. Following political change in both countries, unions resumed their traditional collective bargaining form, revealing that these unions momentarily engaged social movements in civil society for short-term advantage without any change in the mode of workplace organizing. Von Holdt (2003: 147) makes a similar point when he argues that one of the weaknesses of SMU analysis is to assume that its distinctiveness ‘lay in its political and community alliances’ thereby neglecting ‘to investigate whether it might also demonstrate distinctive workplace practices’. In relation to South Africa, this analysis had ‘placed the building of alliances with other social movements and community organizations at the center of the concept’ and had tended to regard this as ‘an external alliance between autonomous organizations and movements and therefore did not investigate the impact of alliance politics on the union movement itself’ (Von Holdt 2003: 148). In his careful analysis of a single workplace, Highveld Steel

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in South Africa, Von Holdt demonstrates the complexity of this interface – how movements interpenetrate through complex and dynamic networks. Beverly Silver distinguishes between two types of worker resistance; what she calls the ‘Polanyi-type’ and the ‘Marx-type’ unrest (Silver, 2003: 20–4). However as Burawoy notes, although Silver makes this distinction, her book is largely about ‘Marx-type’ struggles. Today, he suggests, ‘one might argue that the neo-liberal dispensation struggles against capitalism are taking a sea change from Marxian-type struggles based on power in production to Polanyian-type struggles based on resistance to the commodification of land, labor and money’ (2003b: 4). To what extent is such a ‘sea-change’ taking place in South Africa? There are significant signs that the South African government is shifting from its narrow focus on global integration and competitiveness to acknowledge that the state will have to redistribute resources actively in an effort to overcome the social crisis caused by poverty. This new thinking is organized around the concept of ‘two economies’. In his February 2003 State of the Nation address, President Thabo Mbeki described the division between these as a ‘structural fault’ (Mbeki, 2003). However, our case studies of working life in the periphery demonstrate that the discourse of two economies can be misleading (Webster and von Holdt, 2005). Most of the economic activities in the periphery are dependent on markets created by formal economy activities. The three zones of work we identified earlier are, we suggest, asymmetrically interdependent. It is likely that such activities in the periphery will only be able to expand to the extent that the formal economy itself expands. Generally speaking, the ‘second economy’ has very little prospect of expanding independently and thereby stimulating the formal economy – indeed, it can hardly be described as an economy. In place of conceptualizing South African society as divided into two economies, we prefer an analysis that highlights dynamic, variable and complex processes of social

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inclusion and social exclusion. Indeed, expansion and diversification of the formal economy is necessary for overcoming the socio-economic exclusion of masses of citizens, and the role of the state will be critical. Unless budget cutbacks are reversed and there is significant investment in management and human resources in public institutions, as well as adequate staffing, the decline of the public sector will continue. A plethora of new social movements – the Anti-Privatization Forum (APF), the Soweto Electricity Forum (SEF), the Landless People’s Movement (LPM), Gun Free South Africa (GFSA), the Treatment Action Committee (TAC) – have emerged in response to the social crisis in communities, mobilizing around a wide variety of issues, including the commoditization of essential services, such as electricity, access to land, gun violence and treatment for those with AIDS. Some of the social movements are small but others, such as TAC and GFSA, have already made a significant impact on government policy. We have suggested that the restructuring of work has displaced much of the contestation and disorder of South Africa’s ‘chaotic’ workplace transition into households and communities, deepening social crisis, conflict and disorder there. The significance of social movements located in the community is their potential to re-socialize this crisis – which is experienced as a private crisis, distress and conflict in households and communities – by building social solidarity around it, projecting it into the public arena, mobilizing support and action, and influencing the state and public policy. For such a counter-movement to be truly effective, it should link struggles over workplace restructuring to campaigns over the social crisis in communities – in other words, uniting the trade union movement and social movements in a broad coalition against the destructive impact of the market on society. This is already evident in the alliance between the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the TAC, and in the People’s Budget campaign, which is based on a coalition of COSATU, the South African

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NGO Coalition (SANGOCO) and the South African Council of Churches. The combination of social reconstruction and pressure from below with a responsive state that is beginning to rethink the certainties of neoliberal economic policy may provide the best hope for extending the public domain and, for the first time, building an inclusive society in this part of the Global South. Instead of the successful integration of economies into the new global work order, there is a growing challenge to the subordinate position of the South within the new global order through such movements as the World Social Forum, to which several of these new social movements are linked (Taylor, 2004). What is clear from our analysis is that Polanyi’s notion of a counter-movement cannot be transferred mechanically to the Global South; social context and history account for a different trajectory to that of the North. But a counter-movement is emerging to construct, for the first time, an integrated society against powerful market forces. In this process, trade unions, in alliance with social movements, are playing a central role in protecting society against the disruptive effects of the unregulated market.

NOTE 1 Christian communities in Latin America are based in the lives of working people. They provide the space for Christian communities to express their culture within the structures of the church. They form part of a Christian movement linked to economic and political liberation.

REFERENCES Barchiesi, Franco (2006) ‘Social Citizenship and the Transformation of Wage Labour in the Making of Post-Apartheid South Africa, 1994–2001’. Unpublished PhD Thesis. Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand. Baskin, Jeremy (1991) Striking Back: A History of COSATU. Johannesburg: Ravan Press.

Burawoy, Michael (1985) The Politics of Production: Factory Regimes under Socialism and Capitalism. London: Verso. Burawoy, Michael (2000) ‘A Sociology for the Second Great Transformation?’, Annual Review of Sociology, 26: 693–5. Burawoy, Michael (2003a) ‘For a Sociological Marxism: The Complementary Convergence of Antonio Gramsci and Karl Polanyi’, Politics and Society, 31(2). Burawoy, Michael (2003b) ‘Where Next for Labour?’, Critical Solidarity: Newsletter of the Labour and Labour Movements Section, American Sociological Association, 3(3): 2–4. Castells, Manuel (1996) The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture and the Rise of the Network Society. Oxford: Blackwell. Clawson, Dan (2003) The Next Upsurge: Labour and the New Social Movements. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Friedman, Steven (1987) Building Tomorrow Today: African Workers in Trade Unions, 1970–1984. Johannesburg: Ravan Press. Harvey, David (1996) Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference. Oxford: Blackwell. Harvey, David (2000) Spaces of Hope. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Hyman, Richard (2001) Understanding European Trade Unionism: Between Market, Class and Society. London: Sage. Johnston, Paul (2001) ‘Organize for What? The Resurgence of Labour as a Citizenship Movement’, in L. Turner, C. Katz and W. Hurd (eds.) Rekindling the Movement: Labour’s Quest for Relevance in the 21st Century. Ithaca and London: ILR Press. pp. 27–58. Lambert, Rob and Webster, Edward (1988) ‘The Re-Emergence of Political Unionism in Contemporary South Africa?’, in W. Cobbett and R. Cohen (eds.) Popular Struggles in South Africa. NJ: Africa World Press. Leys, C. (2001) Market Driven Politics. London: Verso. Lopez, Steven (2004) Reorganizing the Rust Belt: An Inside Study of the American Labour Movement. Berkeley: University of California Press. Maree, Johann (1986) ‘An Analysis of the Independent Trade Unions in South Africa in the 1970s’. Unpublished PhD Thesis. Cape Town: University of Cape Town. Mbeki, Thabo (2003) ‘State of the Nation Address’. Cape Town: House of Assembly, 12 February.

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Moene, Konrad and Wallerstein, Michael (2002) ‘Social Democracy as a Development Strategy’, research chapter published by Department of Economics, University of Oslo. Moody, Kim (1997) Workers in a Lean World: Unions in the International Economy. London: Verso. Munck, Ronaldo (2002) Globalization and Labour: The New ‘Great Transformation’. London: Zed Books. Munck, Ronaldo (2004) ‘Globalization, Labour and the “Polanyi Problem”’, Labour History, 45(3): 251–69. Ogden, Max (1992) ‘The Future of Unionism in Australia’. Australian Council of Trade Unions. Typescript. Peetz, David (1998) Unions in a Contrary World: The Future of the Australian Trade Union Movement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Polanyi, Karl (2001) The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. Boston: Beacon Press. Seidman, Gay W. (1990) ‘The Emergence of Political Unionism in Brazil and South Africa’, South African Sociological Review, 3(1): 32–48. Seidman, Gay W. (1994) Manufacturing Militance: Workers’ Movements in Brazil and South Africa, 1970–1985. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press. Silver, Beverly (2003) Forces of Labour: Workers’ Movements and Globalization since 1870. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sitas, Aristides (2005) ‘30 Years since the Durban Strikes: Black Working Class Leadership and the South African Transition’, Current Sociology, 52(5): 830–49. Taylor, Rupert (ed.) (2004) Creating a Better World: Interpreting Global Civil Society. Bloomfield: Kumarian Press. Touraine, Alain (1987) The Worker’s Movement. NY, Paris: Cambridge University Press. Turner, Lowell, Katz, Harry and Hurd, Richard (2001) Rekindling the Movement: Labour’s Quest for Relevance in the 21st Century. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2003) South Africa: Human Development Report. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.

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Von Holdt, Karl (2003) Transition from Below: Forging Trade Unionism and Workplace Change in South Africa. Scottsville: University of Natal Press. Voss, Kim and Sherman, Rachel (2000) ‘Breaking the Iron Law of Oligarchy: Union Revitalization in the American Labor Movement’, American Journal of Sociology, 106(2): 303–49. Waterman, Peter (2001) ‘Trade Union Internationalism in the Age of Seattle’, in Peter Waterman and Jane Wills (eds.) Place, Space and the New Labour Internationalism. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 8–32. Waterman, Peter (2002) ‘Harmonizing the Workers of the World: Reasserting a “Classical and Simple” Working Class in the Face of a Complex Global Justice and Solidarity Movement’. URL: http://www.nu.ac.za/ccs/ default.asp?3,28,11,491. Waterman, Peter (2003a) ‘The Liberation of Time from Work: Some Reflections on Work after Capitalism’, chapter for Life after Capitalism Programme, World Social Forum. URL: http://www.zmag.org/watermanwork.htm. Waterman, Peter (2003b) ‘2nd Thoughts on the WSF: Place, Space and the Reinvention of Social Emancipation on a Global Scale’. URL: http://www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/ dinamic.asp?pagina=bal waterma2ing. Waterman, Peter (2004) ‘Adventures of Emancipatory Labour Strategy as the New Global Movement Challenges International Unionism’, Journal of World–Systems Research, X(1): 271–53. Webster, Edward (1988) ‘The Rise of Social Movement Unionism: The Two Faces of the Black Trade Union Movement in South Africa’, in T. Frankel, N. Pines and D. Swilling (eds.) State Resistance and Change in South Africa. London: Croom Helm. pp. 174–96. Webster, Edward and Adler, Glenn (1999) ‘Towards a Class Compromise in South Africa’s “Double Transition”: Bargained Liberalization and the Consolidation of Democracy’, Politics and Society, 27(3): 347–54. Webster, Edward and von Holdt, Karl (eds.) (2005) Beyond the Apartheid Workplaces: Studies in Transition. University of KwaZulu Natal Press, Pietermaritzburg.

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19 Political Consumerism: An Extension of Social Conflict or a Renewed Form of Economic Collaboration? Marco Silvestro

INTRODUCTION A significant proportion of collective protest action is currently assuming renewed forms, sometimes innovative and often politically ambiguous. The use of the economic market as an arena for protest and venue for social change (as a place to present social demands) is an example of this renewal of forms. Through various economic phenomena, we can glimpse political propositions aimed at regulating the economic field using tools specific to this domain. The following examples illustrate these trends. Fair trade and ethical finance seek to modify the rules of commerce and international investment. Sustainable or organic agriculture, forestry and fish breeding seek to protect the soil, territories, populations and cultures. Community-supported agriculture (CSA) links consumers and producers in an innovative local agro-food system. The ‘new’

social economy develops alternative enterprises to meet particular needs. Barter systems and social currency allow people to exchange goods and services outside of the rules of the market. Free software and alternative rules for intellectual property pose a major challenge to the capitalist system through contesting its very foundation, private property and patents. Voluntary simplicity and the Slow Food movement offer a radical critique of the foundations of the consumer society and an improvement in the quality of life through breaking away from the logic of capitalist consumer society. Finally, advertising campaigns and the mass media, such as the anti-sweatshops campaign and direct action against certain companies, denounce the practices of multinationals (Jensen, 2003; Klein, 2000). The shared goal of actors in this vast ‘movement’ is to develop ways of producing, distributing, selling and consuming which

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POLITICAL CONSUMERISM

are compatible with social justice, economic equity, protection of the environment and democracy. This is a vast programme, certainly not ‘new’, but employing a repertoire of collective action that hopes to be a response to the current phase of capitalism (global, financial and oligopolistic). The use of the economic market as an arena for social demands gives rise to a certain number of questions about the definition of political action and spaces of political regulation. Indeed, how can economic acts such as producing, selling and buying, always theorized as being apolitical, now constitute a political demand? How can the slogan ‘buying is voting’ have the massive mobilizing effect that it now does? A considerable number of social science works have studied the use of the economic market as an arena of social and political protest. In this article, I would like to contextualize work that has focussed specifically on understanding acts of ‘responsible consumerism’ (also called ecological consumerism, or political consumerism) in the food sector. In this way I wish to demonstrate that, in these projects, the theoretical limits to political action are not clearly established and that consequently it is difficult to distinguish between purchasing behaviours resulting from changing social tastes and those due to the espousal of a political position. It is even more difficult to establish a link between the evolution of social taste and the adoption of a political position. Thus, the question arises as to whether the purchase of ‘ethical’ products really constitutes a political act or whether this is instead part of the logic of social distinction, ‘ethical’ products generally being rarer, of better quality and more expensive. Finally, I wonder if participating in a consumer movement which is critical of norms of production and product characteristics is an act of collaboration with the system of mass consumption or a genuine act of protest against this system, a protest that is being expressed in a new arena. The article is developed in successive layers. Starting with the most individualistic

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explanations, I progressively add new dimensions to the analysis to show how acts of consumption may be theorized in different ways. Thus, I start with market research and consumer studies that conceptualize consumer acts as apolitical expressions of individual autonomy. A second type of research, coming from American rural economic sociology, proposes an interpretation that incorporates the social determinants of consumerism – the social imaginary and representations, as well as the territorial systems of food production, distribution and consumption. A third approach, from political science, considers the purchase and boycott of goods and services as non-conventional political participation, in other words as an adjustment, a response, a shift in the locus of power and an expression of reflexive individualism. This approach, although interesting as a theorization of political acts, nonetheless, proposes a conceptualization of the individual that strikes me as disembodied and under-socialized. This is why, before concluding, I offer several propositions to tie the study of consumer practices to the sociology of collective action.

CONSUMER SOCIETY UNDER ATTACK Consumer society is a relatively recent configuration of social relations, a result of rapid advances of industrial and capitalistic logic within all spheres of social relations. The history of its development reveals the dissemination by different stakeholders in global capitalism of an ideology of domestic reproduction by the consumption of goods purchased outside the household (Herpin, 2001; Princen, 1999: 348). Through technological progress and the market economy, this ideology promises the attainment of happiness, personal emancipation and the elimination of social and economic inequalities, as well as suffering and war. On the other hand, thinkers of the Frankfurt School quickly highlighted the alienating character of this

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burgeoning society. Unbridled material possessions, as well as constant monetary relationships, create one-dimensional human beings (Marcuse, 1968) committed to a life in pursuit of a standardized form of happiness. The mass production of the ‘cultural industries’ leads to cultural poverty, as a result of the thirst for profit to the detriment of the diversity and quality of their contents. Baudrillard (1970), on his part, showed how social representations, forged in the culture of mass consumerism, continually expand the possible range of individual needs and desires, with the latter arising more from psychological conditioning than physical needs, and favouring a culture of distinction through possession, which is thoroughly bourgeois. Consumer society is also characterized by the ideological promotion and social construction of a hedonistic individualism, presented as being free of class, race, gender and religious constraints, which is socially achieved through economic participation in consumerism. In these analyses of the consumer society, daily acts of consumption are generally theorized as apolitical, routine and often irrational. Consumerism, in this sense, belongs to and collaborates in the politico-economic system. A good example is the American President George W. Bush who, the day after September 11, 2001, exhorted his fellow citizens to continue their normal life by consuming at shopping centres. However, since the circulation of ecologists’ critiques, consumer society has been questioned and put on trial. ‘Critical’ or ‘responsible’ acts of consumerism are multiplying, and this is reflected in the research concerns of marketing psychologists. In fact, because not inspired by the critical tradition, most research in marketing and consumer studies that examines health scandals in the food business and genetically modified organisms (GMOs), does not consider changes in demand for food products as a critique by consumer society (Lusk and Sullivan, 2002; Mucci et al., 2004; Rowe, 2004; Wilcock et al., 2004). These works of behavioural psychology applied to marketing seek to

understand the intentions and purchasing behaviours of consumers starting with their perceptions of the safety and quality of food. The anthropological postulate is that individual consumers are sovereign, autonomous beings who act according to a model of rational action in which behavioural change is a function of the calculation of advantages and disadvantages associated with modifying personal habits. Attitudes (i.e., relatively stable judgements about objects) are the result of individual socialization and experiences of purchasing and using food products. Individual perception is formed from individual knowledge, which is by definition always incomplete, and often even erroneous. In these studies, the importance of risk perception is limited to the individual or the family unit. Issues related to biotechnology, food poisoning on a grand scale, pollution, the cost of food, and its taste and nutritional qualities are not even broached, except from the narrow perspective of the individual consumer. They are never raised in terms of public interest, the global political economy, a critique of the industrial model, questioning lifestyles, or a critique of the power relations between companies and consumers. Furthermore, for these researchers, consumers use formal rationality (the calculation of costs and benefits) but their choices are, for the most part, motivated by impulses and irrational desires. Consumers are conceived of as being profoundly conformist, very susceptible to advertising discourse, and focussed inwards on their personal ambitions and wishes, which are achieved socially and in private by purchases and ownership. These analytical models of marketing do not accept that the emotions, feelings, beliefs and values which influence attitudes about purchasing have any political significance. In other words, they are not related to the distribution and regulation of power relations within a society. On the contrary, questions of food safety and quality are reduced to a simple technical problem that can be resolved through trusting the rules of the market: [T]he market for food safety will be in equilibrium when the price consumers are willing to pay for

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increases in safety is equal to the price at which suppliers are able to produce the increases. At such an equilibrium, the level of safety supplied by the market will reflect a level of risk which is non-zero but acceptable. (Wilcock et al., 2004: 62)

This extract illustrates a purely ‘economicist’ reading of economic regulation: the level of acceptable risk is that which emerges ‘naturally’ from the equilibrium between two prices. The collective decision, the regulation of the economy by the political community, has no place in this reading. Consequently, changes in consumer choice occur when there is individual perception of a risk and an alternative product is available for consumption at an acceptable price. Clearly, using this formal model to calculate costs and benefits only succeeds in explaining acts of food consumption by beliefs and attitudes, without explaining how they arise and what they mean. These explanations are ‘undersocialized’. While habitus is taken for granted, social determination is effectively ignored and the ideological dimension is set aside. Although valid at the micro-sociological level to understand behaviour of subjects who give no evidence of reflexivity or of an impartial judgement of consumer society, this type of explanation cannot take account of the critiques of those who claim to be ‘political consumers’. In fact, these political consumers locate themselves at the margins of consumer society, whereas the works mentioned above are right in its midst. Clearly, research in marketing and consumer studies conceives of consumerism, regardless of how it is expressed, as an act of membership and collaboration with the liberal capitalist politicoeconomic system.

RESPONSIBLE CONSUMERISM AS A CHANGE IN VALUES AND AN IMPROVEMENT OF CAPITALISM A second interpretation of changes in food consumption habits is offered by American

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research in rural economic sociology that is interested in the critical study of networks of food production, distribution and consumption (Allen et al., 2003; Goodman, 2000, 2003; Goodman and Goodman, 2001). In contrast to the works mentioned earlier, these clearly situate consumerism within systems of representation and social relations that determine the particular form of networks of production, distribution and consumption. The main argument is that, in the case of ethical or sustainable consumerism, the relations of production and consumption are reconfigured, on the one hand, by changes in the social imaginary and, on the other hand, by globalization’s effects on local spaces, in other words, a socio-territorial reorganization of production. From this perspective, individual consumer habits are influenced by culture, identities, social imaginaries and by contingent factual elements. We could, therefore, conceive of responsible consumerism as the effect of a change in the social imaginary, in food tastes and/or in consumers’ political ideas, in short, by a cultural change. In that meaning, although implemented individually in a private space, consumerism is an activity which is largely socially determined. According to David Goodman and his colleagues, the social imaginary which makes up the discourse on responsible consumerism is mainly concerned with the redefinition of relations between humans and nature, a redefinition made necessary by the perception of the finiteness and fragility of the earth’s ecosystem. Since the first ecological critiques, a number of elements drawn from ecologists’ analytic framework have penetrated social representations and, today, discourses often promote consumer habits which are radically different from those prevailing in the consumer society from the 1950s to 1990. During this first period of the establishment of a society of mass consumption, the imaginary was one defining social status by the quantity and quality of the family assets. Mass production and consumption were seen as a means of reducing status inequalities by offering

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increasingly affordable products. At the end of the World War II, the consumption of products purchased outside the domestic sphere was also an act of allegiance to the nation, a patriotic act that indicated, in North America and Europe, participation in the American Dream. Consumption thus became a normal counterpart to paid work, the relationship between the two ensuring reproduction of the domestic unit. Tastes in food products, at this time, were promoted by the advertising image of technological progress, of a variety of products and the freedom that this entails. From this flowed an appreciation of processed food products, coming from the laboratories of large agro-food industrial firms. Using the approach proposed here, the current popularity of fair trade, organic farming, ethical investments and, more generally, of responsible consumerism, could be explained by changes in the mentalities, values and aspirations of consumers. Ronald Inglehart (1990) has already advanced the strong hypothesis of a cultural transition in Western capitalist societies that would lead individuals towards more ecological, pacifist, community-oriented, spiritual yet self-indulgent aspirations, what he refers to as post-materialist values. This change in individual and social values cannot fail to lead to a change in social tastes and consumer choices. In the food sector, the shift to more self-indulgence, based on personal pleasure and influenced by a concern for the local community and ecology, is brought out by what a number of researchers have called the ‘quality turn’ (Buttel, 1997; Goodman, 2003; Murdoch and Miele, 1999). This quality turn is associated with the desire to eat better by using better quality foods. It is seen in the proliferation of ‘alternative agro-food networks’ alongside the networks of large-scale production-distribution (Goodman, 2003: 1). One characteristic of these alternative networks is that they define themselves essentially by their strong roots at the local level of economic relations and by relations of trust between producer

and consumer. Goodman mentions that this would be a case of a progressive replacement of the industrial world’s logic of quality – standardization, production/mass consumption, cost reduction and deterritorialization – that dominates the current representations of consumption, by a logic inspired by the sphere of domestic activities. The latter attributes more importance to localized relations of confidence, and to knowledge about the conditions under which food is produced. The parameters of product quality are also radically redefined by normative propositions which are unfavourable to the logic of the agro-food industry that has prevailed for the past 50 years. The two alternative conceptualizations of the future of capitalism will entail different developments in this quality turn. A first approach suggests that the colonization of the world experienced by the logic of the capitalist market is unavoidable and is entering its final phase, with almost all aspects of life segmented and commodified. From this, we can only proceed to the reform of capitalism by using the means that it offers us, that is, sanctions by the economic market, codes of conduct for companies, product certification and the lobbying of firms and governments. A second conceptualization considers that other socio-economic systems of organization could coexist with capitalism despite the latter’s claims to hegemony. This would then involve a struggle with capitalism and the decolonization of the present world by the creation of relations between production and consumption that are ecologically, socially and democratically sustainable alternatives (Goodman and Goodman, 2001: 97). The first conception gives responsible consumerism a significance similar to that presented in the first part of this chapter, in the sense that it offers explanations in terms of market adjustment. ‘With sustainable food consumption reduced to production standards and related food-safety claims, it is easily consigned to the neo-liberal terrain of individualmarket choice and consumer sovereignty’

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(Goodman and Goodman, 2001: 104). The example of certification of consumer products (organic or fair trade labelling) is essential here. This labelling reproduces the capitalist logic of differentiating among products and increasing the number of products offered, by using a logo guaranteeing certain product characteristics, a logo that acts like a brand name and should inspire confidence. Organic products or fair trade products are sold on the market, respond to the laws of supply and demand, and are purchased by individual consumers. In that sense, Nike’s logo and a label of organic certification are equivalent in their acceptance of the logic of trade and of the market economy’s rules of operation. Consequently the political proposals for change are quite weak. From this world view the quality turn could have a purely cultural significance. The desire for food produced locally and identified as ‘home-grown’, ‘craft’, ‘organic’, or ‘fair trade’ is part of the cultural transition identified by Inglehart, and derives from the logic of social distinction (Bourdieu, 1979). And it adopts a middleclass perspective, rather than that of an antiestablishment political philosophy. Thus, the quality turn would be essentially a cultural phenomenon of the upper and upper-middle classes, becoming more widespread on the basis of the development of social norms, in other words, top-down and from the centre to the periphery. The quality turn therefore remains within the ideals of the American Dream: social success, the achievement of personal desires and comfort are the most important objectives. In accepting this model, we would expect the capitalist system of production to adapt itself to the new social taste which, after having demanded practical and affordable food products, now asks for some luxury, refinement, exoticism, a guarantee of producers’ economic rights and protection of the environment. The basis of the system is not questioned; it is the products and some production practices that are being questioned. In the second conceptualization of the future of capitalism, as developed by Goodman and

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Goodman (2001), the accent is on the possibility of political change, treating the alternative systems of production and consumerism as counter-hegemonic elements of defiance, a refusal to participate in a system of production and consumption that, for a number of reasons, is judged to be socially unjust, risky in terms of health and destructive of the environment. Dubuisson-Quellier and Lamine (2003) show, for example, that there are various degrees of commitment in antiestablishment consumer practices. For example, the purchase of labelled clothes or crafts, fair trade products, or of organic food are not necessarily anti-establishment acts if these acts are not repeated over time. On the contrary, community-supported agriculture (CSA) proposes a reversal of the logic of production and asks consumers to get involved in agro-food activities that profoundly transform their traditional role. Consumers become ‘partners’ of the organic farm and commit themselves to financing the harvest in advance, to working in the fields and, above all, to receiving in return what the earth has to offer, according to the climatic and agronomic conditions. Not only does this last condition reverse the current temporality of food consumption, it is also very subversive of the representation of the ‘customer as king’ who chooses what he or she wants when he or she wants it. In the context of such a partnership, acts of responsible consumption assume a significance other than the mere cultural and social modification of taste; they are the expression of a political judgement and choice in favour of a different organization of the relation of food production, distribution and consumption. They constitute a break with the traditional perspective and social institutions that support the social reproduction of households. Indeed, we are here dealing with a new form of consumerism. Traditional consumerism, in the industrial society of mass consumption, consisted of defending consumers’ economic interests: the right to the lowest price, the right to a certain quality (defined in the agro-food sector in terms of

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health and safety) and the right to sufficient information to make an informed choice. This consumerism broadly shares the economic vision of capitalism, is part of the consumer society and uses its rules of operation (market sanctions, labelling and lobbying) to attain objectives (the defence of individual rights) that are in accord with the system. It is embodied in the organizations and social movements that have demanded the regulation of products (safety and quality) and support for consumers’ right to pay the best price. The ‘new form of consumerism’, or political consumerism, seeks for its part to go beyond economic interests and individual consumer rights by putting forward collective interests, such as social justice, protection of the environment, workers’ rights and fair pay. In addition to its concern with product quality, this consumerism directly addresses the methods of production, the rules of trade, the rule of maximum profit and the culture of mass consumption. Michele Micheletti has defined political consumerism as follows: [P]olitical consumerism is choice among producers and products with the goal of changing objectionable institutional or market practices. These choices are informed by attitudes and values regarding issues of justice, fairness, or noneconomic issues that concern personal and family well-being and ethical and political assessment of favorable and unfavorable business and government practices. Political consumers engage individually or collectively in such choice situations. Their market choices reflect an understanding of material products as embedded in a complex social and normative context. (Micheletti, 2003a: 1)

POLITICAL CONSUMERISM AS NON-CONVENTIONAL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND AS INDIVIDUALIZED COLLECTIVE ACTION This definition of responsible consumerism includes it as a form of political participation and makes it accessible in concepts of political science. Thus, for a group of researchers

(Micheletti 2003a, 2003b, 2004; Micheletti and Stolle, 2003; Micheletti et al., 2003; Stolle and Hooghe, 2004; Stolle et al., 2003), political consumerism is clearly a ‘non-conventional’ form of political participation that appears within the space of the market economy. This is a form of ‘individualized collective action’, adapted to contemporary individualism, and permitting a mode of civic engagement which is more closely related to daily life. They see responsible consumerism as favouring personal expression, speaking up, creativity, and identity performance, all dimensions of political participation that cannot be overlooked in any traditional analysis of socially acceptable ways of expressing ideas. As purchasing goods has become practically the only way of procuring commodities necessary for the reproduction of life, we can understand that, for individuals, a purchase gives the impression of making a gesture with direct repercussions in the marketplace. It is a much more effective gesture than expressing oneself through an anonymous institutional political system, which is full of distortions and intermediaries. It is in this way that some advance the slogan ‘buying is voting’ and affirm that one can, thanks to repeated actions, ‘change the world one act (of purchase) at a time’ (Waridel, 2003, 2005). Using the language of reflexive modernization of Ulrich Beck (1992, 1996) and of the cultural transition of Inglehart, the works of researchers around Michele Micheletti perceive Western citizens as reflexive individuals, obliged by the context to become autonomous and responsible for their fate. On the one hand, their reflexivity makes them aware of the risks of industrialization and, on the other hand, their disappointment with the promises of liberal democracy and the welfare-state makes them sceptical of the ability of political institutions to regulate these matters. In this context, the traditional political space is strongly criticized: political representatives and institutions appear increasingly distanced from people’s lives and incapable of regulating issues of economic, political and cultural globalization.

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The theoreticians of new social movements had already identified this relative disaffection with political institutions and the restructuring of collective action in the cultural space in order to fight institutions from the outside (Kriesi et al., 1995; Melucci 1989, 1996; Offe, 1987). They concluded that collective action increasingly assumes intricate and shifting forms, which are more supple, and sometimes submerged and inactive. The issues are increasingly removed from those of the world of work and class struggles, touching instead on personal conditions of existence and the recognition of social and political rights. Klaus Eder (1985, 1993) even speaks of the moral crusade of a very broad ‘middle class’, quite well integrated into the economic system, that tries to influence the development of societies in terms of its cultural and economic ‘postmaterialist’ interests. Jacques Ion (1997a, 1997b, 1994) has identified an important alteration in the process of civic, social and political engagement since the 1970s. His thesis is that, in industrial societies, the individual belonged, often on the basis of class identity, to one hierarchical, centralized, federated organization, where he or she was lost in the masses. Today, particularly since the 1980s, the individual negotiates a more ‘selective’ or ‘flexible’ commitment to some organizations or some causes.1 Therefore, rather than belonging, we associate with organizations. This form of commitment is less restrictive than total commitment; it allows people to define their level of commitment themselves and to express their selves. Over time, not only is the mode of belonging changing, but so too are the modes of organization and the process of construction of public issues. Tim Jordan (2002), in a study of radical forms of activism, also notes that current radical political action is taking on more subjective forms, and is increasingly oriented towards actually experiencing the desired society. For him, contemporary social movements, in addition to fighting institutions, are engaged in discussion and experimentation,

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both within movement and between movements. This allows for the generation of ‘new ethical forms, new moralities, that are seeping into the smallest crevices of society and are becoming the ways in which we think the good life can be lived’ (Jordan, 2002: 23). He shows how concrete and immediate experience of change has become a focal point of the new ethics, which is being woven within the range of progressive thought. According to him, the ‘new activism’ places respect for difference and solidarity among those who respect these differences at the centre of its ethic. Furthermore, disillusioned by both reformism and revolution, an increasingly significant activist fringe is involved in concrete (experimental) activities that create, sometimes only fleetingly, the social relationships which they envisage for the society of tomorrow. This partially explains the multiplication of direct actions, experiments with direct democracy, occupations, and alternative practices for production, distribution and consumption. Thus, the significance of political action is no longer limited to Policy, with a capital P, but also concerns policy as expressed outside institutions, in daily social relationships between groups and between individuals. The individual form of this type of political involvement would be what Miguel Benasayag and Florence Aubenas (2002) describe as ‘dissenting subjectivity’ (subjectivité contestataire), a reflexive mode of being that seeks to maintain a psychologically satisfying equilibrium (reducing cognitive dissonance) between personal beliefs (moral, ethical and political positions) and the social conditions of existence that go beyond what the individual can control. In this concept of being, coherence can only be attained through the search for lifestyles which are consistent with one’s beliefs. In this sense, daily acts of consumption may acquire political significance if they persist over time and if the individuals participate in the social networks that develop counterhegemonic discourses and practices. In L’écologie au quotidien (Ecology in Everyday Life), Michelle Dobré (2002)

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develops a complementary argument, saying that the economic logic of consumer society has colonized domestic space and that, today, this provokes increasing pangs of conscience about the inability to live according to one’s personal principles. Exploring the topic of ecological representations, the author then shows the development of practices of ‘everyday resistance’. Recycling and reusing, systems of local bartering, voluntary simplicity and responsible consumerism are all attempts to escape from the logic of consumer society. However, for her, acts of everyday resistance do not constitute a political force or a social movement to the extent that they are largely fragmentary, are not applied consistently, and are only resistance to an oppressive situation rather than concrete affirmation of a new model.

SYNTHESIS: THREE POSITIONS ON RESPONSIBLE CONSUMERISM AS A POLITICAL ACT Clearly, as we end this analysis, we find ourselves with three major positions on responsible consumerism as a political act. First, starting from a traditional conception of political participation, Micheletti and her colleagues seek to demonstrate that the normative impulse that collective discourse gives the individual, as well as the personal gesture that acts of purchasing entail as a vote in the economic market, are enough to make consuming (or buying) a political act. Therefore, for them, political consumerism is a positive strategy of ‘individualized collective action’ that allows for self-expression and direct influence on the world market, a new arena for expressing political power. Nonetheless, the scope of political spaces and their articulation are fluid; political space is at one and the same time that of national boundaries and institutions, that of a de-territorialized economic market and that of domestic space. The position of Micheletti and her colleagues is consistent in some respects with

that of the market researchers, in the sense that both are based on an individualized conception of social relations. For marketing experts, the individual is not very reflexive, and is even rather impulsive. While the exact opposite is true from the political scientists’ perspective, in both cases the individual appears largely unaffected by social determinants, such as socio-economic status, habits and local culture, and socialization from birth to adulthood. Furthermore, the two positions are hardly critical of the bases of consumer society and its operating principles (the differentiation of products and the renewal of needs by advertising). On the contrary, each in its domain reflects the neo-liberal paradigm. Marketing and consumer studies conclude that consumers’ demands are apolitical and part of a normal process of the capitalist economic system, the evolution of demand. Therefore, this is collaboration with the system, adherence to its principles. For their part, political science researchers affirm that thoughtful, autonomous and critical individuals, motivated by personal political convictions, act politically by making consumer choices. These choices modify demand for products and oblige producers to adjust their practices. These are, then, acts that one may deem political but that essentially have effects on the economic practices of production. If this is politics, it is the neo-liberal politics of self-regulation by the invisible hand. Second, a position such as that of Michelle Dobré ranks responsible consumer practices ahead of collective action, considering that they constitute resistance, and defining it as a disruptive reaction to a threat which is still misunderstood. Making alternative consumer choices individually – for example, buying used clothes to extend the life of manufactured products – is not a political act. If this act is performed by hundreds of people, it will have cumulative effects, but will it be collective action? Surely not, as the actors are unaware of acting collectively to defend a position in the public arena.

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Political acts, in this view, only arise when organizations and individuals develop sustainable and clearly critical discourses and practices – based on their objectives or their ways of functioning – about one or a number of dimensions of current capitalist economic relations. The CSA initiatives, for example, propose radical changes and give consumers a role radically different from that assigned them in post-World War II Western societies. For an action to be truly politicized, it is not enough merely to claim that it is expressing a political position. Cooperation with the system or challenging it is measured by the duration, the repetition and the institutionalization of alternative practices. This is akin to the position developed by researchers such as David Goodman and his colleagues, who have come to conceive of certain alternative practices of production and consumption as political acts, when they express social imaginaries which are critical of the hegemonic pretensions of capitalist logic. The political potential, whether to promote change or maintain the status quo, is therefore measured by the analysis of the social forms of networks of production, distribution and consumption. Micheletti and her colleagues, as good political scientists trained in the analysis of electoral systems, only record intentions and actual actions, without taking into account the socialization of individuals, their real conditions of existence and their positions in social networks. A third, even more radical, position would be one of ‘dissenting’ or ‘critical’ subjectivity, the ongoing search for coherence and balance between beliefs and real life. This is a logic that arises from total personal commitment. Inspired by libertarian positions and those of Gandhi, for example, authors such as Jordan or Benasayag will theorize about a total situational commitment, an individual position that consists of immediately putting into action the world which is envisioned. From this perspective, strategies of collective action must contribute to bringing about the ideal society. Responsible consumerism thus becomes a temporary expedient, and a point

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of departure in the search for real alternatives, while for most other researchers, responsible consumerism is an end in itself. A position like that of Benasayag or Jordan does not entail only a modification of consumer choices, but rather an individual withdrawal from the institutions and lifestyles of consumer society and a collective reconstitution of concrete alternatives in order to ensure the reproduction of life. In this position, there is clearly a protest and a refusal to collaborate with the current economic and political system.

CONCLUDING REMARKS I hope that I have succeeded in demonstrating that, in the mainstream trends of social science research about responsible consumerism (or political consumerism), the conception of politics is often, if not nonexistent, at least vague. The definitions and analytical models change depending on whether one adopts the viewpoint of marketing, political science, economic sociology or of critical sociology. Research on consumerism in general is quite disparate. As a result, it is not clear that one may conceptualize and understand behaviours which are ‘labelled’ responsible consumerism as political acts. In my opinion, such research would benefit from an analysis of consumerism as a socially constructed activity, which is differentiated according to socio-economic contexts, cultures and local traditions. At present, this is not being done; everything that has preceded and determined the act of consumption is taken for granted. We also need to adopt a clear definition and detailed indicators of political participation and consumerism as a political act. Theoretical work on this subject is still embryonic and the authors referred to in this article are pioneers. As we have shown, there are a number of nuances to consider about political commitment and the depth of the critique that an act of consumption may express.

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If ‘buying is voting’, does this mean that the person who chooses to be completely disconnected from the system of mass consumption is not making a political statement? University research on this emerging phenomenon also urgently needs to assemble more precise and plentiful data about these ‘political consumers’. Who are they? What are their occupations? Do they mostly belong to the middle class or upper-middle class, as we suspect? What about their local inclusion in social networks? Along the same lines, we need to go further than opinion surveys and factual questionnaires and get the political consumers themselves to speak. We need to reconstruct the meaning that they give to their actions and evaluate the real effects of these acts. Concretely, this will involve analyzing the life course of people who openly call themselves ‘political consumers’ in order to understand how such people, as members of social networks and spheres of life, build their personal identities. To what collective discourses, collective identities and frameworks for collective action, do they refer in order to situate their own acts? Do they express and claim this identity of political consumers elsewhere and in other ways? Do these people belong to organizations? Are they engaged in other activist pursuits (Filieule, 2001; Passy and Giugni, 2000)? It is only by starting from a corpus of numerous interviews, a description of several contexts of collective action and the analysis of many activist networks and/or networks of production, distribution and consumption, that we may go beyond the identification of the phenomenon and a description of its general characteristics, to arrive at an understanding of its socio-political dynamics, and an evaluation of its political scope. Because we are not satisfied with the current dominant explanations that establish an equation between a purchase and a vote, as in the slogan ‘buying is voting’, this poses serious challenges to the conceptualization and practice of democracy. In my opinion, this equation between a purchase and a vote shows that contemporary individuals have

internalized the logic of liberal capitalism (CEPS, 2007). These are the same individuals who are presented as being so liberated and reflexive. Without a critical sociology of responsible consumerism, we run the risk of presenting as anti-establishment acts that may in fact only be a new form of participation in and reproduction of the capitalist system of oppression.

NOTE 1 The French expression Jacques Ion uses is ‘engagement distancié’, which implies commitment to a cause without being committed to a particular organization.

REFERENCES Allen, Patricia, FitzSimmons, Margaret, Goodman, Michael and Warner, Keith (2003) ‘Shifting Plates in the Agrifood Landscape: The Tectonics of Alternative Agrifood Initiatives in California’, Journal of Rural Studies, 19: 61–75. Baudrillard, Jean (1970) La société de consommation. Paris: Gallimard. Beck, Ulrich (1992) Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London: Sage Publications. Beck, Ulrich (1996) The Reinvention of Politics: Rethinking Modernity in the Global Social Order. Oxford: Polity Press. Benasayag, Miguel and Aubenas, Florence (2002) Résister, c’est créer. Paris: La Découverte. Benasayag, Miguel and Stulwark, Diego (2000) Du contre-pouvoir. Paris: La Découverte. Bourdieu, Pierre (1979) La distinction. Paris: Éditions de Minuit. Buttel, Frederick H. (1997) ‘Some Observations on Agro-food Change and the Future of Agricultural Sustainability Movements’, in David Goodman and Michael J. Watts (eds.) Globalizing Food: Agrarian Questions and Global Restructuring. London: Routledg, p. 344–65. Collectif d’étude sur les pratiques solidaires (CEPS) (ed.) (2007) La consommation responsable. Entre bonne conscience individuelle et

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transformations collectives. Montréal: Éditions Écosociété. Dobré, Michelle (2002) L’écologie au quotidien. Éléments pour une théorie sociologique de la résistance ordinaire. Paris: L’Harmattan. Dubuisson-Quellier, Sophie et Lamine, Claire (2003) ‘L’action sur les marchés comme répertoire pour l’action politique. Conditions et limites de l’engagement des consommateurs’, paper presented at the Les mobilisations altermondialistes, Conference, Paris: France. December 3–5. Eder, Klaus (1985) ‘The “New Social Movements”: Moral Crusades, Political Pressure Groups, or Social Movements?’, Social Research, 52(4): 869–90. Eder, Klaus (1993) The New Politics of Class: Social Movements and Cultural Dynamics in Advanced Societies. London: Sage. Fillieule, Olivier (2001) ‘Propositions pour une analyse processuelle de l’engagement individuel’, Revue française de science politique, 51(1): 199–215. Goodman, David (2000) ‘Organic and Conventional Agriculture: Materializing Discourse and Agro-Ecological Managerialism’, Agriculture and Human Values, 17: 215–19. Goodman, David (2003) ‘The “Quality Turn” and Alternative Food Practices: Reflections and Agenda’, Journal of Rural Studies, 19: 1–7. Goodman, David and Goodman, Michael (2001) ‘Sustaining Foods: Organic Consumption and the Socio-Ecological Imaginary’, Social Sciences, 1(1): 97–119. Herpin, Nicolas (2001) Sociologie de la consommation. Paris: La Découverte. Inglehart, Ronald (1990) Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Ion, Jacques (1994) ‘L’évolution des formes de l’engagement public’, in Pascal Perrineau (ed.) L’engagement politique – Déclin ou mutation? Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, p.23–39. Ion, Jacques (1997a) La fin des militants? La Tour d’Aigues: Éditions de l’Aube. Ion, Jacques (1997b) ‘Interventions sociales, engagements bénévoles et mobilisation des expériences personnelles’, in Jacques Ion et Michel Peroni (eds.) Engagement public et exposition de la personne. La Tour d’Aigues: Éditions de l’Aube, p. 77–84.

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Jensen, Hans Rask (2003) ‘Staging Political Consumption: A Discourse Analysis of the Brent Spar Conflict as Recast by the Danish Mass Media’, Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, 10: 71–80. Jordan, Tim (2002) Activism: Direct Action, Hacktivism, and the Future of Society. London: Reaktion Books. Klein, Naomi (2000) No Logo. Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf Canada. Kriesi, Hanspeter and Koopmans, Ruud (eds.) (1995) New Social Movements in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Lusk, Jayson L. and Sullivan, Patrick (2002) ‘Consumer Acceptance of Genetically Modified Foods’, Food Technology, 56(10): 32–7. Marcuse, Herbert (1968) L’ homme unidimensionnel. Paris: Éditions de Minuit. Melucci, Alberto (1989) Nomads of the Present. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Melucci, Alberto (1996) Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Micheletti, Michele (2003a) ‘Shopping as Political Activity’, Axess Magazine, No. 9. Online: http://www.axess.se/english/2003/ 09/theme_shopping.php Last accessed September 20, 2004. Micheletti, Michele (2003b) Political Virtue and Shopping: Individuals, Consumerism, and Collective Action. NY: Palgrave MacMillan. Micheletti, Michele (2004) ‘Just Clothes? Discursive Political Consumerism and Political Participation’, paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions. Uppsala: Sweden. April 13–18. Micheletti, Michele, Follesdal, Andreas and Stolle, Dietlind (eds.) (2003) Politics, Products and Markets: Exploring Political Consumerism Past and Present. NJ: Transaction Publishers. Micheletti, Michele and Stolle, Dietlind (2003) ‘The Gender Gap Reversed: Political Consumerism as a WomenFriendly Form of Civic and Political Engagement’, paper presented at the Gender and Social Capital Conference. St. John’s College: University of Manitoba. Winnipeg, Canada. May 2–3. Mucci, Andrea, Hough, Guillermo and Ziliani, Cesar (2004) ‘Factors that Influence Purchase Intent and Perceptions of Genetically Modified Foods among Argentine

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Consumers’, Food Quality and Preference, 15(6): 559–67. Murdoch, Jonathan and Miele, Maria (1999) ‘Back to Nature: Changing Worlds of Production in the Food Sector’, Sociologia Ruralis, 39(4): 465–83. Offe, Claus (1987) Les démocraties modernes à l’épreuve. Paris: L’Harmattan. Passy, Florence and Giugni, Marco G. (2000) ‘LifeSpheres, Networks, and Sustained Participation in Social Movements: A Phenomenological Approach to Political Commitment’, Sociological Forum, 15(1): 117–44. Princen, Tom (1999) ‘Consumption and Environment: Some Conceptual Issues’, Ecological Economics, 31: 347–63. Rowe, Gene (2004) ‘How Can Genetically Modified Foods Be Made Publicly Acceptable?’ Trends in Biotechnology, 22(3): 107–9. Stolle, Dietlind and Hooghe, Marc (2004) ‘Consumers as Political Participants? Shifts in Political Action Repertoires in Western

Societies’, in Michele Micheletti, Andreas Follesdal and Dietlind Stolle (eds.) Politics, Products and Markets: Exploring Political Consumerism Past and Present. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Stolle, Dietlind, Hooghe, Marc and Micheletti, Michele (2003) ‘Political Consumerism: A New Phenomenon of Political Participation? An Exploratory Study in Canada, Belgium and Sweden’, paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions. Edinburgh: Scotland. March 28–April 2. Waridel, Laure (2003) L’envers de l’assiette et quelques idées pour la remettre à l’endroit. Montréal: Éditions Écosociété – ENJEU. Waridel, Laure (2005) Acheter, c’est voter. Le cas du café. Montréal: Éditions Écosociété, Équiterre. Wilcock, Ann, Pun, Maria, Khanona Joseph and Aung, May (2004) ‘Consumer Attitudes, Knowledge and Behaviour: A Review of Food Safety Issues’, Trends in Food Science and Technology, 15: 56–66.

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20 Modes of Structured Interplay in the Modeling of Digital Futures Markus S. Schulz

Conflict, competition, and cooperation are the three fundamental modes of creating future society. This article aims to show that these three categories can be meaningfully applied to an analysis of the social shaping of the new global mediascape and digital futures. It examines the rise of the Internet and its related technologies from a global and comparative perspective, paying particular attention to the role of key social actors and the changing modes of their interplay. It will then discuss the social consequences of current trends and point to the stakes of future development. The goal is thereby not to provide an exhaustive account of the creation of digital futures but to contribute to the orientation of questions for empirical research with normative relevance.

COMPETITION, CONFLICT, AND COOPERATION IN FUTURES RESEARCH Futures studies owe as much to nineteenth and early twentieth century traditions of

thought as any other sociological field. This is especially true when tracing the origins of how the principles of competition, conflict, and cooperation entered the field. Charles Darwin’s evolution-theoretical concept of the ‘survival of the fittest’ and Adam Smith’s notion of the ‘invisible hand’ of the market that could be entrusted with distributive and regulatory order functions came to inform the model of competition. Karl Marx’s notion of inevitable class struggle was taken up and further developed by different strands of conflict theory. Emile Durkheim’s notion of a modern society held together by organic integration and the collaboration of complementarily specialized social sectors lacked attention to conflict but it raised important questions about the conditions of possibility for social order and cooperation. The field of futures studies, which began to boom in the 1960s and 1970s, shared its technological enthusiasm with the theorists of early industrialization. The wave of futures studies prepared in the 1960s was above all characterized by a belief in technology as savior. Books about the future in the year 2000 had become widely discussed

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bestsellers (e.g., Bell, 1968; Jungk and Galtung, 1969; Kahn and Wiener, 1967). Most of these displayed an outspoken optimism based on technological progress and focused on the benefits of space age technologies and mass consumer goods (see the overview in Bell, 1997a). This optimism was given credence by experiences in daily life. Technological breakthroughs, such as the landing of an Apollo rocket and the first steps of a man on the moon, were televised to a global audience. Mass-produced technology, including automobiles and an increasing plethora of household electronics, had become affordable to ever wider circles throughout the wealthier countries. It was hoped that the Green Revolution would feed the Third World, and that technology would trickle down to all people on the planet. Yet, this technological optimism was soon to give way to a more pessimistic perspective. A variety of heterogeneous factors led to this shift. The oil crisis of the early 1970s led to a world-wide recession. The consequences of this abrupt stoppage of growth were felt not only by motorists but by consumers world-wide. The welfare-states of the First World ran into a crisis of legitimacy. The historical compromise between capital and labor was put to a test as the cake for redistribution had slowed down its growth or even had stopped growing (Offe, 1987). The Report to the Club of Rome by Dennis Meadows and his collaborators expressed a strong warning about the Limits of Growth (Meadows et al., 1972) and became famous as it touched a chord of concern. An environmental movement began to emerge in an increasing number of industrialized countries criticizing the abuse of planetary resources. Other critics warned about the specter of a Third World War. The growing arsenals of nuclear weapons had resulted in thousandfold overkill capacities. Technology came to be seen as an imminent threat by the Cold War’s peace movement. The Third World developed the Dependency School (Amin, 1977; Cardoso and Faletto, 1979; Frank, 1967),

which argued that modernization theories and trickle-down assumptions of development were naïve and that the Third World was positioned in a system of unequal terms of trade that did not allow any betterment for systemic reasons. After the decline of futures studies during the late 1970s and the 1980s, we see a reemergence of futures research with yet more sophisticated methodologies, sharper methods, and a consciousness of time characterized by a fundamental contingency that is open to the horizon of the possible and the politically shapeable (Bell, 1997a, 1997b; Boulding and Boulding, 1995). Contemporary social theory expressed this in its emphasis on the ‘creativity of action’ (Joas, 1996) and in the explicit inclusion of ‘human agency’ as a factor (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998). In an effort to summarize the work currently being undertaken within the field of futures research, one can distinguish four major approaches: (1) forecasts, especially those based on Delphi-Interviews with leading experts in research and development (e.g., Beck et al., 2000); (2) studies that employ scenario building techniques about possible and probable futures (e.g., Schulz, 1999, 2001d); (3) empirical research on the futures of the past or present, that is., the images of futures prevalent during past moments of time (Bell, 1997a); the processes by which such past images of the future were constructed (Mannheim, 1936); and the efficacy of these visions for social change – this is what can be called the sociology of the imaginary (Castoriadis, 1991); and (4) normative or norm-analytical theorizing about preferable futures (Bell, 1997b), including theorizing on the relationship of values and futures, as will be attempted here. The principles of competition, conflict, and cooperation play a role in all four of these approaches. Futuristic forecasts that draw on the expertise of scientists, engineers, economists, and other specialists accept implicitly their assumptions about

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how more or less smoothly current trends are expected to continue. Alternative scenarios might be constructed according to assumptions of successful cooperation between decisive actors, its conflictual breakdown, or some intermediate path. This has been done, for example, in an interdisciplinary study of the impact of the climate change on the Lower Weser region in Germany, in which indicators of social conflict, economic competition, and global cooperation were integrated into a regional econometric model for the generation of path-specific long-term future scenarios (Schulz, 1999, 2001d). The study of the futures of the past shows how certain expectations can, depending on context, serve as self-fulfilling prophecies or bring about just the opposite of what was expected (cf. Bell, 1997a). Warnings about the cost of conflict can help to persuade the relevant actors to cooperate. Predictions about rising values in the stock market tend to contribute to increases in the stocks’ value. Most recent normative theorizing tends to postulate cooperation as a necessary mechanism for the making of preferable futures (Bell, 1997b; Masini, 1999). The major exceptions are free market advocates, for whom competition is the only conceivable engine of innovation, growth, and progress. Yet, no matter how strongly market advocates embrace the notion of competition, it can function only on assumptions of cooperation with regard to market rules and institutional structures enforcing these rules. However, a more detailed discussion of the role that the principles of competition, conflict, and cooperation play in all of the diverse strands of futures research would be beyond the scope of this chapter. I will therefore focus my discussion in an exemplary fashion on a – in my view – particularly salient aspect of the current future, that is., the modeling of digital futures. A brief examination of fundamental empirical data will point to the theoretical and normative issues at stake.

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UTOPIAS, DYSTOPIAS, AND BEYOND The rising speed with which the New Information and Communication Technologies (NICT) are being introduced has inspired much euphoria among scholars and the larger public. Marshall McLuhan’s famous notion of a ‘global village’ (McLuhan,1964) gained with the breakthroughs in digital technologies and the rise of the Internet renewed popularity. After the disillusionment with radio and television, which fostered war propaganda and mass culture industries more than global neighborliness, the Internet provided a new canvas for projecting hopes and seemed to offer the benefit of a true interactivity that the earlier electronic media had lacked. The number of people going online experienced growth rates so enormously high that it appeared to observers as if it would be only a matter of a relatively short time until everyone could share the bounty of the Internet and become part of a global community. The utopian hopes for computer-mediated global reconciliation evaporated in the course of events associated with September 11, 2001, and were replaced by dystopian views of an unavoidable ‘clash of civilizations’ (Huntington, 1996). The specter of cyber terrorism was employed to justify new security measures. Critics warned of the NICT’s repressive potential, pointing to a future of universal surveillance, not only by an Orwellian ‘big brother’ government, but also by private corporations (Lyon, 2001; Sassen, 2000). On the other hand, business hopes for windfall gains from e-commerce shattered, at least temporarily, when the ‘dot.com’ bubble imploded and the limits of market expansion became apparent. NICT diffusion, which was once regarded almost as an automatism, turned out to be a much more complicated matter. I will return to the various aspects of these contradictory visions of alternative digital futures after a brief examination of empirical data on the global diffusion of NICT, which will also help to point to the theoretical and normative issues at stake.

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THE DIFFUSION OF THE NEW INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES IN GLOBAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE By the end of 2004, the global cyberspace of the Internet was populated by more than 870 million users world-wide, according to estimates published by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU, 2005). More reliable than estimated user numbers are counts of Internet host computers.1 A July 2005 count by Network Wizards put the figure for host computers world-wide at above 350 million (ITU, 2005). A quarter century ago, in August 1981, there were only 213 hosts, which were accessed by not more than a few thousand users (ITU, 1999; Zakon, 2002). According to a widely shared assumption, the price for Internet access is bound to decline with competitive mass production of the necessary hardware and, as a consequence, the number of users was and is expected to continue its rapid rise. Current trends were and are seen as strongly suggesting that in a few years, Internet access will be just as common for the majority of people in the industrialized zones of the world as newspaper, radio, and television are today, while there may be at least a partial convergence of these media. Prognoses, however, that predicted constant annual growth rates of 100% for the early years of the new century (Odlyzko, 2001) have already proved wrong. Although the Internet can already be accessed in virtually every country of the world, the distribution of access is very uneven. Internet access in the financially weaker countries still continues to be largely restricted to educated urban elites. This is especially true for countries in Africa, south of the Sahara and north of the Republic of South Africa. Latin America takes an intermediate position, as there are some countries with little infrastructure and others that are developing rapidly.

At the end of 2004, more than half of the world’s estimated Internet users were based in North America and Europe, but only 7% in Latin America and, even fewer, only 2%, in all of Africa (ITU, 2005). A breakdown of the more reliable host counts shows a similar imbalance. At the end of 2004, an estimated 85% of the world’s 265 million Internet host computers were in North America and Europe, but only 2.5% were in Latin America and a mere 0.16% were in Africa, where most of them were concentrated in the Republic of South Africa (ITU, 2005). The most recent user estimates published by ITU (2005) indicate that in the world-wide average there are 13.86 Internet users per 100 persons. The corresponding figures for the USA and Canada are 62 and for 63%, for Europe 31.8%, for Australia/Oceania 51.7%, Asia 8.3%, and for Africa 2.6%. There are also great disparities within regions. In Latin America, for example, the corresponding user figures range from 27.9% in Chile and 23.5% in Costa Rica down to 2.5% in Paraguay and 2.2% in Nicaragua, while the most populous countries, Brazil and Mexico, have averages of 12.1% and 13.4% respectively (ITU, 2005). There is a plausible expectation that the share of less represented regions will rise as the penetration rates in North America and Europe approach saturation levels, yet these uneven distribution figures need to be kept in mind when discussing the rise of the Internet and the diffusion of the new information and telecommunication technologies. Only onethird of the world’s Internet users reside outside OECD countries, while of the world’s broadband users, it is less than a fifth (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], 2005). More striking yet is the imbalance when looking at the access opportunities in the poorest countries. As the OECD (2005) observed, the 45 least connected countries, together, have no more international connectivity than a single high-end user with a 100 mega bits per second broadband line in Japan. Yet, the meaning of center and periphery does not neatly coincide with national borders, if it ever did.

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Educated urban elites from currency-weak countries appear on the same side of the digital divide as the middle classes of postindustrial countries. Digital inequalities exist across and within countries. A brief glimpse at the diffusion patterns of television sets can provide some indication of the ability to save up funds over long periods of time to acquire a popular but somewhat costly electronic device. Television sets are appliances that depend neither on a wired infrastructure nor on sophisticated skills for their use, and they have had several decades for their diffusion. While the average number of TV sets per 100 inhabitants is well above 80 in the USA, the equivalent figures in the Latin American countries mentioned above range from 14% to 32%. The diffusion rates for TV sets illustrate the limitations of market-driven distribution models insofar as they show that these electronic devices could be obtained by some part of the population but not by others, and that the portion of the population that was able to acquire them is several times smaller than that in the USA.

DIGITAL INEQUALITIES Whereas much of the emerging sociology of cyberspace has focused on domestic aspects of leading OECD countries, this article advocates a global and comparative perspective that takes into account the experiences and conditions of both center and periphery. The restructuring of communicative relations is global, though not globally uniform. The trajectories of regulation, usage, and impact of the NICT vary widely between world regions, across and within countries. Current trends point to very unequal chances for participating in the emerging network structures and public spheres of incipient global civil society (Castells, 1996; Sassen, 1997; Schulz, 2001a; Wellman, 1999). The modes of NICT implementation and regulation at national and global levels have a decisive impact upon the distribution of access

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chances, access quality, and opportunities for usage. Studies of Internet access in the USA during the late 1990s pointed to a ‘digital divide’ along the lines of income, education, age, gender, and rural/urban (US Department of Commerce, 1995, 1998). According to more recent data however, these divides tend to disappear, except for the most disadvantaged parts of the population, including the poor and the disabled (US Department of Commerce, 2000). Yet digital inequalities are not only a matter of having or not having basic access, but also a qualitative issue with educational and socio-economic aspects, beyond technological aspects narrowly conceived. What one can do with access, depends on the bandwidth and speed, on navigational skills (Hargittai, 2001), and the capacities to process information critically and communicate effectively within multimedia environments. In addition, more and more commercial service sites require extrapayments for access; while the expanding corporate intranets are password protected and off-limits to outsiders (Sassen, 1997). Whereas findings valid for the USA case might not be totally different from those for other post-industrial countries, these cannot be further generalized to cover the situation in the global South which seems to be strikingly different. Why are digital inequalities a problem? Are there not more urgent concerns in countries in which basic needs for clean drinking water, nutrition, sanitation, shelter, health, and basic education are not met? Is not the diffusion of new technologies just a matter of the time it takes to trickle down to the latecomers? The problem we are witnessing is a widening of the gap between those who are well-off and those who are marginalized and excluded. Those who can connect to cyberspace can use it for their social, economic, and political benefit. Let me illustrate the potential importance of access to NICT for marginalized groups with two examples. In the perhaps most famous case, the Zapatista rebels in Chiapas gained world-wide attention

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and mobilized unprecedented solidarity when their cause was relayed by supporters onto the Internet (see Schulz, 1998, 2001b, 2001c for more detailed discussions). Less known is the case of the Unión Regional de Ejidos y Comunidades de la Costa Chica (Regional Union of Communal Landowners and Communities of the Costa Chica, the URECHH), a regional association of indigenous communities on the Costa Chica in Oaxaca. The URECHH was able to overcome its problems with the intermediary buyer of its members’ agricultural products after it located a fair trade buyer in Canada on the Internet with the help of Servicios Profesionales de Apoyo al Desarollo Integral Indígena (Professional Support Services for Integrated Indigenous Development [SEPRADI]), a Mexico City-based NGO. In both cases, access to global means of information and communication meant gaining political and economic strength, without which the prospect for an upgrading of conditions might not have improved in the same way. The social distribution of formal and effective NICT access is largely the product of pronounced socio-economic inequality and at the same time a cause for further inequality. An elite of the well-connected and best connected is emerging vis-à-vis a majority that has only insufficient access or no access at all. Those who are excluded from access are at a disadvantage relative to those who are connected. This is true both economically, because they cannot access profitable knowledge and useful contacts, and politically, because they cannot use these media for generating communicative power. Digital inequality, thus, is not an irrelevant ‘luxury’ kind of inequality. It is not only an additional dimension of social inequality but it increases the existing inequalities. The already marginalized parts of the population are exposed to the acute danger that digital marginalization will marginalize them even further. Having pointed to the stakes involved in the formation of the new global mediascape, I will now examine more

closely the processes by which these are created.

THE SOCIAL SHAPING OF THE INTERNET The theoretical perspective employed here rejects not only the resilient assumptions of technological determinism but also one-sided political-economic structuralism and outright voluntarism. To be sure, one-sided perspectives can have the heuristic merit of recognizing through exaggeration the significance of underappreciated factors. For example, White (1966) made the famous technological-determinist argument that feudal society was the result of the invention of the stirrup. In her view, the stirrup led to a dramatic increase in military power because it made fighting on horseback more effective. Mounted combat then required a new economy that could produce new weapons and specially trained fighters and war horses. This led in turn to a social reorganization and the rise of an aristocratic elite of mounted warriors. This historical reading has been criticized (Hilton and Sawyer, 1963). White’s account is an innovative way of showing how technology can matter, but it is overly simplistic. The stirrup had come into use in many other places without causing a reorganization of society in the Frankian way. Innis (1951), and later McLuhan (1964), pointed out that all societies are profoundly shaped by the particular propensities of specific communication technologies. Ellul (1964) argued that in modernity, technology had taken over and turned humans into its servants. These types of arguments are enormously important not only for scientific discourse but also for the normative debate about what kinds of media technologies might have more preferable social implications. However, the problem with technological determinism, especially in its popular varieties, is that it lets technological change appear as a quasi-natural process that is

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beyond the reach of public deliberation. One-sided economistic approaches fall into the same trap (see discussion in Elster, 1983). On the other hand, voluntaristic approaches underestimate the power of structures. The stories about genius inventors make for a popular genre but exaggerate the role of individuals (Hong, 2001; Weightman, 2003). These shortcomings can be overcome through a more holistic approach that balances structure and agency, and through studies of how social shaping processes are accomplished in the more or less conflictual, competitive, or cooperative interplay of social actors who are understood as being embedded in institutional and structural contexts, which in turn provide both limits and resources for creative action. This approach draws on technology studies by Latour (1987), Bijker (1995), MacKenzie and Wajcman (1999), and more generally, the agency and structure balancing work of Giddens (1984). How NICTs are shaped is thus seen as the outcome of a complex interplay of social forces. These forces include socio-economic structures, legal frameworks, political systems, cultural patterns, the options and constraints set by previous technologies, and the agency locatable in a range of social actors with differential means of influence (cf. Kubicek et al., 1997 and Wilson and Kahin, 1997 for the USA and Europe; Herzog et al., 2002 and Schulz, 2001a for Latin America). The contextually embedded social actors involved in these more or less contentious shaping processes include, inter alia, transnational corporations with interests in software, hardware, and e-commerce, intergovernmental organizations and international treaty frameworks, political-administrative elites, domestic legal frameworks and courts of jurisdiction, domestic corporations and lobby groups, NGOs, users, consumers, and civil society initiatives, all with differential interests, resources, imaginary capacities, and strategies acting in changing contexts and constellations. Several partly overlapping phases can be analytically distinguished in the development of the Internet according to which

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social actors took the lead and according to an analysis of the type of interplay among actors.

Phase I (1970s–1980s) The Internet’s predecessor, the ARPAnet, was funded by the US Department of Defense in an effort to bolster the American lead in research and technology after the Soviet Union’s successful launching of Sputnik had indicated that the Cold War opponent was catching up. The concepts of a redundancy of links and the transmission of messages in smaller, flexibly switched packets had been developed in the 1960s at RAND, a think-tank close to the Pentagon, as part of a plan to set up a decentralized communications infrastructure that could survive the breakdown of some of its nodes in the scenario of a nuclear attack (Baran, 1964). Although initially hesitant about the possibility of relinquishing control over their computers by linking them to others, computer scientists recognized the benefits of such a network rapidly and developed a thriving culture of cooperation among colleagues at distant campuses (Abbate, 1999). ARPAnet was eventually transformed into the NSFnet, with funding provided by the National Science Foundation. The conflict of the Cold War can thus be seen as having given impetus to the development of the Internet in its early phase. Yet, within the conflict the principle of publicly funded cooperation among research scientists was crucial. Moreover, the state-led development of ARPAnet and NSFnet must also be seen in connection with developments centered in the counter-culture of the Californian Silicon Valley.

Phase II (1970s–early 1990s) Silicon Valley computer scientists envisioned decentralized personal computers as alternatives to the big mainframes that only resourcerich institutions could afford. Linking their computers via conventional phone-lines and

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modems, they developed an open culture of free content sharing and collaborative work on software codes. The sociable uses of the net gave rise to increasingly far-flung ‘virtual communities’, such as those on the Whole Earth Lectronic Link, the electronic bulletin board system better known under its abbreviation as the WELL, which was founded in the Bay Area of San Francisco in 1985 by Stewart Brand and vividly described by Rheingold (1993). NGOs soon recognized the potential of these network technologies for their efforts to build linkages not only among activists across the USA but also abroad. The San Francisco-based Association for Progressive Communication (APC) spearheaded the outreach efforts to global civil society and played a pivotal role in setting up nodes in scores of countries around the world.

Phase III (mid-1990s to the present) The third phase is characterized by increased commercialization. It began with the introduction of graphical user interfaces, which lowered the threshold of skills required for using a computer and facilitated navigation on the rapidly expanding World Wide Web. The Hypertext Markup Language (HTML), which was crucial for the construction of the World Wide Web, was developed with public funding in the European research center, CERN, but private companies took the lead in developing a plethora of software applications and in providing access to the net. America Online (AOL) and other companies became the most popular access providers of the then privatized Internet for an exponentially increasing number of subscribers. The market for computers and software was soon dominated by IBM-compatible hardware and Microsoft’s proprietary operating systems and applications.2 As the number of users began to represent an ever-growing consumer market, advertising companies invented new techniques of sending out electronic spam, integrating pop-up ads on popu-

lar web-sites, and collecting data profiles of users. The ability to freely exchange identical copies of digital content on the net alerted first the music and later also the film industry. Their lobby efforts led in the USA to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), which severely restricted the previous user rights to fair use of cultural content. Largescale non-commercial peer-to-peer file-sharing networks (P2P) were more or less effectively shut down and replaced by profitseeking content providers.3 Corporations with vested interests in patents and copyrights had already exercised their influence on the Trade Round on Intellectual Property and Services (TRIPS) and model laws prepared by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) (Sell, 2003; UNCITRAL, 1998), which in turn were to shape the legal definitions of the participating countries (Schulz, 2002). The world-wide computer networks are the technology behind the global trade in financial derivatives and the accelerated circulation of capital. In principle, they would allow a taxation of these flows, which could then be used to fund supranational agencies and cooperative initiatives; but there is insufficient political will to do this. The competition-based mode of development failed to solve the problems posed by digital inequalities and the needs of citizens for a global media infrastructure supportive of a democratic public sphere. The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the OECD continue to push countries toward privatization and liberalization of their telecommunication sectors with the argument that competition brings down prices. But this is only true under the condition that strong state regulation is capable of creating and enforcing level playing fields. A private oligopoly that captures its regulatory agency is not necessarily performing any better than a well-run state provider. The main problem, however, in many poorer countries with a high degree of social

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inequality is that the impoverished sectors are not of much interest to commercial providers if these are left unregulated. And it would solve the problem neither of how to access password-protected, subscriptiononly quality content nor of how to provide the education for turning passive consumers into active users. In the absence of valid regulations for toxic waste, obsolete NICT garbage from the well-connected countries is usually dumped under the rubric of recycling in the poorer countries, where it creates environmental health hazards. It thus appears that the unfettered market forces that prevent people at the margins of the digital world from sharing the benefits of the cyber-age expose them at the same time to its externalized cost. In a recent study, the Basel Action Network (BAN), a Seattle-based NGO, estimated that three quarters of the NICT products shipped to Nigeria for recycling are actually neither usable nor economically repairable and end up as unaccounted toxic waste, which is frequently discarded in poor shanty-towns (Puckett et al., 2005). This toxic waste regime is partly made possible by the fact that the United States has neither ratified the Basel Convention, which would make such practices illegal, nor implemented equivalent regulation. Meanwhile hopes are being projected on the new round of technologies. Wireless services are currently experiencing a boom. The number of wireless phones has already surpassed the number of fixed phone lines. Although wireless connections are currently not as powerful as services via Digital Subscriber Lines (DSL) or cable, it can be expected that they will be improved and eventually will replace wired technologies. This presents opportunities especially in countries with less developed fixed line infrastructures but sufficient individual purchasing power. The development of a US$100 laptop computer could push up diffusion rates throughout the developing world and may help computer manufacturers expand beyond rapidly saturated markets. But it still leaves

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open the question of whether a US$100 laptop user in Sub-Saharan Africa will have the same kind of access to the Internet as a high-end user in NY or Tokyo. It also leaves out the question of whether the low-end user will be able to engage in the same information and communication multi-media activities as the high-end counterpart or whether he or she will be a second-class citizen in cyberspace while being told to just wait for the next new technology to trickle down and solve any problem then.

MODELING DIGITAL FUTURES A new phase in the development of the Internet might have just started but its mode and outcome are quite uncertain. That the future NICT will offer more capabilities and more bandwidth supportive of audiovisual content is easy to imagine, as leading research institutions are already building with public funding Internet2 as a high-speed successor to the current Internet. The trends point to it being dominated by a mixture of commercial and USA security interests but there are also emerging counter-trends. The US Department of Homeland Security that was set up in the wake of the attacks on the World Trade Center in NY and the Pentagon in Washington seems bound to assume more and more control in the name of the war against terrorism. The Echelon system for the interception of international Internet communications through filters was already established prior to these attacks. Private companies are inventing ever new technologies for collecting data on consumers in a legal environment which does not provide effective protection. An anti-trust suit against Microsoft was discontinued by the federal administration but individual states continue the legal battle in the USA, and the European Union has advanced its own legal proceedings to curb what it perceives to be flagrant monopolistic business practices undermining fair market competition.

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There are also signs of an alternative future development of the Internet driven by the principle of cooperation. This model is supportive of the vision that the global mediascape belongs to a global community and that there should be a social right for communication. Parallel to the 2003 Geneva World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), NGOs organized their World Forum on Communication Rights, in which they affirmed the social right to communication and demanded a more equitable framework for global communication. On a practical level, a non-proprietary operating system has been developed under the name of Linux by a network of computer programmers who embrace cooperative values and share a commitment to an open source code that can be freely used by anyone. Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela are among the countries most strongly promoting the use of Linux, though Microsoft has threatened costly law suits, claiming that Linux would violate copyrights. As a result, the city of Munich, Germany felt it necessary to put its Linux program on hold. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU), which had been largely on the sidelines of the Internet’s development, published the results of a web survey on the question: ‘Should Cyberspace be declared a resource to be shared by all?’ Of the 1250 online respondents 94.2% voted ‘yes’, and 5.78% ‘no’ (ITU, 2004). The percentage of ‘no’ votes was higher in better connected world regions than in the less well-connected ones. Although the survey does not qualify as strongly representative, it does indicate a new level of awareness within the ITU. Whether the future Internet will follow the path of a ‘Future I’ dominated by commercial and national security values and the modes of competition and conflict, or the path of a ‘Future II’ inspired by an alternative agenda based on the social right to communicate in the mode of cooperation, is up to the actors who are getting involved in the process of its social shaping.

CONCLUDING REMARKS This chapter has argued that conflict, competition, and cooperation are the fundamental modes of creating future society. It traced these three categories from the beginning of the sociological discipline in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and demonstrated their applicability in an analysis of the social shaping of the NICT, focusing especially on the Internet. The values and cooperative mode of Californian computer engineers and researchers have had a profound impact on the shaping of computer networks. Their libertarian convictions and practices translated into horizontal networking, free sharing of ideas, and cooperative interaction. The Internet’s predecessor, the ARPAnet, was able to flourish largely due to funding provided by the Pentagon with its aim of bolstering the technological lead against the Cold War adversary. The later privatization of what was to become known as the Internetled entrepreneurs to compete with one another over clients and customers, resulting, among others things, in the invention of email-spam and spam-blocking software and in the battles between file-sharing software and record companies. Not only does the computer code, narrowly conceived, matter in the shaping of digital futures, but also the legal code, as established by lawmakers and interpreted and applied by courts. Whether the values of citizens should have been given higher regard than the values of record labels appears to have been debated only in circles too small to exercise any great pressure on the USA policy makers who voted on the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. However, views that look only at developments in OECD countries are too limited. When taking a more global perspective, we come to acknowledge that it is only a small fraction of the world’s population that has access to the new digital media. What values are behind such an unequal distribution of human goods? How does it come about that

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the digital futures are primarily framed in terms of marketable property rights and not in a language of human rights to access information and communication? How are images of digital futures imagined, by whom, and with what implications for broader concerns such as social equality and democratic efficacy? Applying the concepts of conflict, competition, and cooperation as heuristic devices to an analysis of how the NICT are being shaped, not only contributes to overcoming resilient assumptions of technological determinism but also helps to open the horizon for broader empirical and normative debates and for the imagination of alternative futures. In this chapter, the contrast between alternative trajectories was used to indicate what is at stake in the shaping of the technological preconditions of social communication. NICT exclusion is not merely another dimension of social inequality; it increases existing inequalities. The already marginalized parts of the population are exposed to the acute danger that digital marginalization pushes them even further to the edge. This presents a major barrier to democratic inclusion and global social equity. In the absence of broader access policies, the new digital inequalities are exacerbating the existing social inequalities within and across countries. What is the solution? Waiting for a trickledown of NICT is certainly not enough. That would only deepen the existing inequalities during the diffusion period because those who can make effective use of NICT have a relative advantage over those who cannot, thus diminishing the chances for any leapfrogging. Moreover, when considering how quickly the development of new hardware and software makes older versions obsolete, continuous investment seems to be required more than in the case of technologies with early maturity and relatively negligible subsequent refinements that do not undermine their interoperability. Access and access quality are only the most basic issues in the establishment of new

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global communication relations. The ways in which NICT can be used depends on aspects of national and international policy, such as privacy, censorship, surveillance, taxability of economic transactions, consumer protection, rights to information and communication, administrative transparency, intellectual property rights or privileges, regulatory control, standard-setting authority, and dispute resolution procedures. The course and mode of the diffusion and shaping of NICT is not an historical ‘automatism’. Social actors are not just passively impacted by new technology. They can, rather, impact the way these are implemented to the extent of their active appropriation and involvement in regulatory processes. As studies critical of technological determinism suggest, technology is a product of its ‘social shaping’, a process dynamically determined by technicians, developers, corporations, inter-governmental organizations, national legislators, lobby groups, users, and consumers, interacting within specific socioeconomic, legal-administrative, cultural and political environments. Some actors appear to have more influence than others. The question now is whether NICT will be shaped more by corporate interests or by actors in civil society in the North and in the South? The power of consumers operates according to the binary code of buying or not buying. The power of users rests on the creative use of a given technology. NGOs, such as the San Francisco-based, globally active Association for Progressive Communication (APC) or the Mexican LaNeta, boosted the use of computer-mediated communication among grassroots actors through the provision of network access and technical expertise. The Internet-savvy transnational supporters of the Zapatistas pioneered global cyber-activism, disseminating alternative information, linking activists, and mobilizing campaigns around the world. Yet, these types of activities might not impact those other aspects of the shaping processes that

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take place in closed-door negotiations. Without doubt, it is important to set up practical projects that provide marginalized communities with NICT access, but it seems that the resources of NGOs, especially in the global South, are far too limited to fundamentally alter deep inequalities. Perhaps most crucially lacking are actors in civil society who diffuse critical knowledge about the stakes of legal regulatory issues, conceive of democratic alternatives, and mobilize to exert pressure on governments to use national policy leverage and push for more equitable international treaties. The dangers of digital marginalization and socio-technological misdevelopments are acute. Similar to the extent to which decisions during the early periods of the establishment of a new medium tended in the past to have a fundamental impact on its subsequent trajectory, today’s social decisions about NICT are setting the tracks for future developments that might be even more difficult to adjust at later stages. The mode according to which NICTs are being regulated has a decisive impact upon the distribution of access chances, the distribution of access quality and the opportunities for effective usage. The technological pre-conditions of social communication are too important for the actors of civil society to leave the arena to others. The rapid pace of NICT development and its social shaping presents social research with urgent challenges. More research on the emerging new global mediascapes is needed to enable relevant actors to identify shapeable policy aspects and make better choices. Research about the roles of conflict, competition, and cooperation as analytically distinct modes of the structured interplay that shapes NICT can help in modeling digital futures which are more desirable than the alternatives pointed to by current trends.

NOTES 1 Strictly speaking a host computer is not the same as a server. A server is a computer program

that waits to be contacted by a client program and then exchanges information with the client, while a host is a computer on which one or more servers are running. Yet, pars pro toto, host computers on which the server software of a local computer network runs are often referred to in short-hand as servers. 2 From the viewpoint of Microsoft Corporation, the market for operating systems is characterized by competition. Anyone could just write a new code for an operating system and compete with Microsoft’s Windows. The US Justice Department under Clinton and Judge Jackson, who oversaw the Justice Department’s lawsuit against Microsoft, saw it differently. In their view, Microsoft had assumed a dominating position in the market for operating systems and abused their market power to prevent smaller players from even entering into competition over other software applications by keeping crucial parts of the operating system code secret and by bundling its platform with other applications. 3 Napster, once the most famous P2P network, was shut down in July 2001 after an injunction by the United States Ninth Circuit Court and went into bankruptcy during the following year. In October 2003, Napster was re-launched as a commercial online music provider, then competing with Apple’s iTunes store, which was opened six months earlier. After Napster’s decline, KaZaA rose in popularity. It was seen then as less vulnerable than Napster because it had no centralized server. Yet in September 2005 an Australian court ordered KaZaA to install filters that would prevent the exchange of copyrighted materials. While KaZaA has lost in popularity to P2P rivals such as BitTorrent, eDonkey, and Gnutella, it seems likely that any P2P networks will be pursued in similar ways as Napster and KaZaA once they have grown to a size significant to commercial interests.

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(eds.) Zerfall der Öffentlichkeit? Wiesbaden, Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag. pp. 266–281. Schulz, Markus S. (2001d) ‘Der langfristige Soziale Wandel und seine Interpretation in Ökonometrische Langfristprognosen’, Bremer Diskussionspapiere zur Ökonomischen Klimafolgenforschung, 8: 1–55. Schulz, Markus S. (2002) Mexiko zwischen Demokratisierung und Liberalisierung: Internet und Politik in Lateinamerika, Vol. 1. Frankfurt: Vervuert. Sell, Susan K. (2003) Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. UNCITRAL (United Nations Commission on International Trade Law) (1998) ‘UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce with Guide to Enactment (1996), with additional article 5 bis as adopted in 1998’. URL: http://www.uncitral.org. [Retrieval March 8, 2000]. US Department of Commerce (1995) Falling through the Net: A Survey of the ‘Have Nots’ in Rural and Urban America. Washington, DC: US Department of Commerce. US Department of Commerce (1998) Falling through the Net: New Data on the Digital Divide. Washington, DC: US Department of Commerce. US Department of Commerce (2000) Falling through the Net: Toward Digital Inclusion. Washington, DC: US Department of Commerce. Weightman, Gavin (2003) Signor Marconi’s Magic Box: The Most Remarkable Invention of the Nineteenth Century and the Amateur Inventor Whose Genius Sparked a Revolution. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo/Perseus Books. Wellman, Barry (ed.) (1999) Networks in the Global Village. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. White, Lynn (1966) Medieval Technology and Social Change. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wilson, III, Ernest J. and Kahin, Brian (eds.) (1997) National Information Infrastructure Initiatives: Vision and Policy Design. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Zakon, Robert H. (2002) ‘Hobbes’ Internet Timeline v5.0’. URL: http://info.isoc.org/guest/ zakon/Internet/History/HIT.html. [Retrieval June 12, 2002].

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21 Sociological Theory, Social Change, and Crime in Rural Communities Joseph F. Donnermeyer, Pat Jobes and Elaine Barclay

INTRODUCTION This chapter presents ‘community’ as a key concept from which to develop a comparative approach to the examination of crime among rural people and rural communities. Community is treated as a sociological framework that can relate individual behaviour, underlying economic and social structural characteristics, social meanings and the various demographic and ecological dimensions of social phenomena that are relevant to the examination of crime in the rural context (Liepins, 2000). A community approach recognizes the unique characteristics of rural social structure and rural cultures, but avoids a single template for rural settings, recognizing instead that specific rural places are each affected by historical, cultural, social, economic and geographical components. We emphasize rural for three reasons. Conceptually, rural communities across the globe share sufficient similarities to be considered a common phenomenon despite enormous cross-national and cross-cultural differences. Scientifically, rural community characteristics and their relationship to crime

have remained relatively unstudied in the field of criminology, despite their global reconfiguration. Finally, crime in the rural context suffers from two mutually reinforcing myths. The first is that rural crime rates are always much lower than urban rates when comparing data from similar kinds of social units, such as state/provincial or county/county-equivalent level areas. Hence, stating the myth, rural crime research is neither necessary nor important to the scientific advance of criminology. The second is that rural places display less heterogeneity than urban places. Therefore, since rural communities are mostly alike and the data says urban rates are generally higher, by extrapolation, all rural places display lower crime and exhibit less interesting criminological phenomena to study (Donnermeyer and Jobes, 2000).

THE EVOLUTION OF RURAL CRIME SCHOLARSHIP Tönnies (1957) utilized his now famous Gemeinschaft–Gesellschaft dichotomy to

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examine the relationship of human will to criminological behaviour (Deflem, 1999). He claimed that essential will, associated with a Gemeinschaft-like form of social organization, was related to murder and other forms of violent behaviour (as well as perjury and arson); while arbitrary will, which is connected with a Gesellschaft form of social organization, explains more rationally planned types of crime, such as theft, con and fraud and robbery (Deflem, 1999). From Tönnies’ point of view, the dichotomy is trans-historical, that is, communities were made up of a mix of both types of will. Unfortunately, Tönnies’ dichotomy was misinterpreted to some extent, so that by the time the Chicago School of sociology was beginning its empirical studies of crime, the focus was squarely on the heterogeneity and other so-called Gesellschaft features of urban neighbourhoods (Deflem, 1999). Even though the Chicago School developed at a time that was not too far from America’s frontier days of violence and lawlessness, the myths about rurality and lack of crime had formed. Studies of crime within the urban milieu already had cornered the intellectual market in criminology. Adding to the situation was a very comprehensive review of scholarship about rural society, including rural-urban comparisons of official crime rates from the USA and several other European countries by Sorokin et al. (1931). They concluded that ‘the number of crimes or offences is greater in the cities than in the country’, that ‘cities produce a proportionately greater number of offenders than does the country’, and ‘in general the agricultural population is one of the least criminal of all occupational classes’ (Sorokin et al., 1931: 266–67). Throughout the first 80 years of the twentieth century, rural crime research was largely ignored, except to be juxtaposed to the conditions that cause crime and were falsely assumed to exist only within urban places. Some exceptions did exist. Smith (1933) wrote a comprehensive account of rural crime in the USA, but apparently it did

little to change the headstrong urban bias of criminology. Vold (1941) was careful to point out that homicide rates in the rural portions of some states exceeded those in the major cities of other states. Clinard’s (1942, 1944) work on rural criminal offenders highlighted both similarities and differences from urban offenders, as did Gibbons’ (1972) study of criminals in rural Oregon over 30 years later. Dinitz (1973) conducted victimization research in a small Ohio town, representing one of the first attempts to use a crime survey in a rural locality. Furthermore, studies of juvenile delinquency in rural places by Lentz (1956), Feldhusen et al. (1965) and Polk (1969) were early exceptions to the urban dominance of criminology. The situation began to change significantly in the late 1970s and since then, rural crime scholarship has slowly but inexorably increased. Some criminologists focused on the so-called ‘culture of violence’ found in the southern region of the USA (O’Connor and Lizotte, 1978) and explored further issues of homicide in non-metropolitan counties (Bankston and Allen, 1980). Fischer (1980), utilizing classic Chicago School of criminology themes about urbanism (Wirth, 1938), examined the spread or diffusion of violence from urban to rural places. Smith and Huff (1982) studied the perceptions of crime and victimization among residents in a rural county of northwestern Indiana. Wilkinson (1984a, 1984b) and his associates (Wilkinson et al., 1982, 1984) adopted a more social disorganization-like approach to the examination of rural violence, considering the possibility that poverty combined with social and physical isolation disrupts mechanisms of social control within places with small populations. One critical mass of research, this time focused more on property offences, was conducted by Phillips and associates (see book of readings by Carter et al., 1982). Phillips’ work is important because it greatly influenced the development, for the first time, of a network of scholars who began to pursue sub-topics within rural crime that reflected

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CRIME IN RURAL COMMUNITIES

many of the same themes found within criminology proper. In other words, at this point, researchers with rural interests began to talk to one another. One theme was agricultural crime, summaries of which can be found in Barclay and Donnermeyer (2002) and Donnermeyer and Barclay (2005). Most of this research has examined the relationship between physical and layout features of agricultural operations with the probable occurrence of various types of theft, vandalism, trespassing and other crime. These studies either directly or unknowingly utilized what is known today as situational crime prevention theory, that is, the theory which argues for a relationship between features of the immediate physical and social environments that either facilitate or constrain crime (Clarke, 1992; Tilley and Laycock, 1999). In turn, the roots of situational crime prevention go back to Newman’s (1972) pioneering work on ‘defensible space’. In other words, agricultural crime researchers adopted a place-based criminology theory without the Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft baggage. A focus on the relationship of crime to rural community economic and social structure and rural community change developed as a second strand of research. Scholars in this area used classical sociology themes derived from Durkheim, Weber and a variety of twentieth century theorists who continue to inform the work of scholars of crime today, including proponents of social disorganization theory (Barnett and Mencken, 2002; Freudenburg and Jones, 1991; Jobes, 1999a; Kowalski and Duffield, 1990; Lee et al., 2003; Osgood and Chambers, 2000; Petee and Kowalski, 1993; Rephann, 1999; Spano and Nagy, 2005; Wells and Weisheit, 2004). One variation on this theme has a long tradition in mainstream criminology which touches upon issues of rural crime, and harkens back to Wirth’s (1938) article on ‘urbanism as a way of life’. It is the idea of a relationship between crime levels and various measures of ‘urbanism’ (i.e., anonymity, segmented, less organized) which by implication defines ‘ruralness’ (cohesive, integrative,

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more organized) (Ingram, 1993; Laub, 1983). Although we argue that these characterizations get dangerously close to a misinterpretation of Tönnies’ original dichotomy, they nonetheless helped contribute to the advance of rural crime studies. The third theme concerns the victimization experiences and attitudes of rural people toward crime and criminal justice. These studies have ranged from fear of crime among ranchers and farmers (Saltiel et al., 1992) to perceptions of incivilities (public drunkenness, litter, graffiti and other forms of so-called ‘broken windows’) in rural Michigan (Reisig and Cancino, 2004). Recent studies of note include the Bouley and Wells (2001) study of perceptions among residents of a southern rural county, Ball’s (2001) examination of opinions about crime and disorder in rural Maine, and Bachman’s (1992) in-depth comparison of victimization rates from the USA Department of Justice’s National Crime Survey. The next theme focuses more on criminal justice issues, such as studies of rural police and courts (Brock et al., 2001; Decker, 1979; Ellsworth and Weisheit, 1997; Feld, 1991; Golden, 1981; Kraska and Cubellis, 1997; Maguire et al., 1991; Marenin and Copus, 1991; Myers and Talarico, 1986; Payne et al., 2005; Weisheit et al., 2006). Many of these studies explicitly compare policing styles, outcome/recidivism of probationers and court procedures and practices as exhibited in rural and urban localities. The greatest differences are found in policing styles and are related to the discretionary behaviour of police in relation to local community expectations, values and expressions of social class differentials (Weisheit et al., 2006). Not only in all the other major themes, but especially with regard to criminal justice issues, the comprehensive summary of rural-related scholarship by Weisheit et al. (2006) has made a significant contribution to the advance of rural criminology. The study of domestic violence (also known as intimate partner violence) is the newest development within rural crime

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research, and the most critical in approach among the five themes described thus far, using various social constructivist approaches to analyze people’s experiences as victims and their experiences of the rural context in which this form of violence occurs. Its findings challenge the long-accepted notions in criminology that social cohesion is related to less crime (DeKeseredy and Joseph, 2006; Gagne, 1992; Miller and Veltkamp, 1989; Van Hightower and Gorton, 2002; Websdale, 1995, 1997). This literature turns concepts of Gemeinschaft upside down with its findings about the relationship of intimate partner violence and rural patriarchy. Further, the research indicates that peer networks are used by rural male abusers to exchange information about ways to control their partners through physical and psychological violence (DeKeseredy and Joseph, 2006). Going all the way back to the first theme, that is, agricultural crime, Barclay et al. (2004) examined the ‘dark side of Gemeinschaft’ as it affects the discretionary behaviour of police in their response to reports of stock and other kinds of theft by agriculturalists in New South Wales. Again, the social cohesion of a rural community can contribute to crime, not constrain it. The final rural crime theme is the extensive body of literature that has developed around the issue of illicit substance use by various rural populations, including both adolescents and adults. This literature is much more multi-disciplinary in scope, and include literally hundreds of studies utilizing rural samples. Notable special compilations of scholarship on rural substance use include a book of collected chapters on substance use and violence in rural communities (Blaser, 1994), a technical review by the National Institute on Drug Abuse (Robertson et al., 1997), plus special journal issues edited by Edwards (1992) and Edwards and Donnermeyer (2002). Unfortunately, there are many gaps in the rural literature, such as systematic research on organized drug production in rural areas, although Weisheit (1992, 1993) and Clayton

(1995) make valuable contributions to this topic. However, more recent rural-related issues, such as the diffusion of methamphetamine production, trafficking and use in rural communities of many Midwestern USA states is under-researched (Donnermeyer and Tunnell, 2007). Issues related to environmental crimes are likewise ignored, and a great many of these crimes occur in rural places, but represent how globalization influences the lives of rural people in all societies. In addition, vandalism is a little studied rural phenomenon, from the viewpoint of both the victim and the offender, despite early work by Phillips and associates (as summarized in Donnermeyer and Phillips, 1984). Aside from specific gaps in the literature, there are two very important shortcomings in the present state of rural criminology. One is the USA-centric nature of the literature. To date, nearly all of the scholarly work on rural crime is limited to the USA, although the Edwards and Donnermeyer (2002) volume cited above was intentionally international in its focus, and included empirical studies from a variety of countries. Even it, however, did not provide a comparative framework for integrating the findings and observations of each study. Fortunately, there is now a small but growing body of international work, even though this work is restricted mostly to English-speaking countries. Notable advances include contemporary work in: (1) Australia (Barclay and Donnermeyer, 2002; Barclay et al., 2007; Donnermeyer and Barclay, 2005; Hogg and Carrington, 1998, 2003, 2006; Jobes et al., 2004; Jobes et al., 2005); (2) Canada (Wood and Griffiths, 1996); and (3) Great Britain (Aust and Simmons, 2002; Dingwall and Moody, 1999; Little et al., 2005). Although rural populations and communities within these countries are large and diverse, little rural crime research can be found beyond their borders, where languages, cultures, economic conditions and the pace of change can vary enormously. It is possible that issues of crime in rural places of these neglected areas may be far different, or remarkably similar. Either outcome has

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important implications for criminological theory in general and certainly for the advancement of a rural criminology. Unfortunately, no one really knows. A few studies from other nations have been published recently, but they hardly fill the tremendous need that exists, given the large rural populations of so many of these countries and the rapidity of global-based change (Erulkar, 2004; Fafchamps and Moser, 2003; Jobes, 1999b; Koenig et al., 2003; Jain et al., 2004; Krishnan, 2005; Panda and Agarwal, 2005). Furthermore, some aspects of rural crime are trans-national in scope. Drug production and trafficking is one example. The other is human trafficking. The second problem is that rural criminology has yet to develop viable conceptual frameworks that allow scholars to synthesize current scholarship effectively and advance theory and research beyond the borders of a single country, especially the USA. The remainder of this chapter proposes the beginning steps of a solution to both problems.

COMMUNITY AND RURAL CRIME C. Wright Mills (1959) stated a basic sociological relationship between macro-level change, which he called ‘public issues’, and the situation of individuals at the micro-level, which he termed ‘personal troubles’. Without knowledge of the context of broad structurallevel conditions and change, little could be understood about individual behaviours, including criminality. It is context that counts, and whether criminology research utilizes quantitative or qualitative data, there is a need for conceptual frameworks that recognize the situated context of crime (Kitsuse and Spector, 1973). Definitions of crime are indicators of the norms, mores and ideologies of groups who compete for power and influence within various societies (Greenberg, 1981). Most definitions of community agree that it is a geographical place in which networks

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of actors communicate, solve problems and conduct their daily lives (Liepins, 2000). Hence, community forms the starting point for the development of a comparative framework in which to understand rural crime, and to assist in the continued diffusion of rural crime research to a diversity of settings. There are three common features of rural communities (and their populations) which justify the need for a specialized sub-field within criminology. Rural communities, by definition, have smaller populations and lower population densities. Patterns of daily living are comparatively more limited than in urban communities, and involve a greater share of persistent personal face-to-face interactions among people who know each other. Finally, rural communities are today rapidly losing their isolation and autonomy to the forces of globalization. Compared to the past, nearly all rural places around the world are influenced to some extent, and many to a great extent, by external cultural, economic and social forces. Proximity to cities, industries with absentee ownership, tourism and development policies of nationstates are just a few of the factors that influence the loss of autonomy of rural places today. In turn, these factors must be accounted for in conceptual frameworks designed to improve the theoretical sophistication of rural crime research. Issues interrelated with crime, such as power, dominance, gender and discrimination, further exacerbate external processes shaping the dynamics and the attributes within and between rural communities throughout the world. Despite commonalities, as well as the diversity, of rural places, why use the concept of community as a starting point for the advance of theory in rural criminology? The answer lies in the central roles of community in the formation of behaviour and attitudes (Oetting et al., 1988). As already mentioned, community is a concept capable of linking ‘personal troubles’ and ‘public issues’. The structural level study of crime, much of which emerged from the Chicago School of sociology and continues in the work of

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Sampson and associates, helps make this connection (Bursik, 1999; Saegert and Winkel, 2004; Sampson and Groves, 1989; Sampson et al., 1997). The reason is that community is both geography and sociology; hence, a community’s social ecology, including the time and space dimensions of crime, are simultaneously reflective of local conditions and of the wider society in which a place is situated (Liepins, 2000). Rural communities may shield residents from global forces that disrupt local social cohesion and promote criminal and deviant behaviour, or, they may allow these forces to facilitate the local expression of crime. Also, communities, both large and small, are networks of individuals and organizations who both compete and cooperate for economic, social, political and cultural power. These local processes of competition and cooperation are emblematic of similar processes at the national and international levels. Although their local expressions are greatly influenced by local context, they also are linked to extra-community dynamics. Third, rural (as well as urban) people experience the forces of globalization and its impact on their society and culture through the places where they live. For example, consider the concept of vicarious victimization. Cable television reports news on murders and other violent crimes at places distant from the viewer’s home and neighbourhood, yet, exposure to crime stories in the media can increase one’s sense of vulnerability to crime and influence one’s behaviour, such as walking on a country road or attending nearby public events (Gibson et al., 2002). A fourth feature of communities of all sizes is that they provide the specific context in which people express their opinions and behaviours. In relation to crime, how members of rural communities anywhere in the world define what a crime is and whether or not they feel safe, is based on the local context. Furthermore, criminal behaviour itself is influenced by locality, through family, neighbours, friendship cliques and a host of other social groups and local conditions.

All communities perform a normative function whereby different communities exhibit varying degrees of tolerance/intolerance for certain criminal and deviant behaviours. Finally, all places exercise socialization and social control functions (Oetting et al., 1998). Attitudes and behaviours of individuals are transmitted, mostly through such primary groups as family and peer groups, and through formal agencies, such as school systems, police and courts.

SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION: THE FIRST STEP TOWARD A SOLID THEORETICAL GROUNDING The most frequently employed place-based theory in criminology is ‘social disorganization’ theory, which emerged from research of crime in urban neighbourhoods by sociologists of the Chicago School (Tittle, 2000). There are obvious but significant reasons for this, although it can be argued that ‘disorganization’ is not the correct label for what the theory really says, and the idea of disorganization does not reflect the reality of how crime emerges, increases and declines within the varying contexts of different sized places. One reason for the popularity of social disorganization theory is its emphasis on the ecology of crime (Bursik, 1999). Simply put, crime varies geographically by conditions exhibited within different kinds of localities. As Tittle (2000) points out, earlier versions of social disorganization theory emphasized differences between cities, and part of this focus was on the relationship between urbanism and crime. City level comparisons are problematic because of their internal heterogeneity and for a while, social disorganization theory fell out of favour. However, once the focus was re-set to examine differences within specific areas or neighbourhoods of cities, and by extension, smaller places as well, the theory once again became popular. Hence, the latter-day version of social disorganization

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could ignore processes of change because there were so many other possible ways of empirically analyzing information about neighbourhoods cross-sectionally, that the theory could be rigorously tested without regard to co-variation or time. Time was the second prime dimension of original conceptualizations of human ecology, and was always problematic for sociologists who lean toward quantitative analysis. Now changes in levels of social disorganization across time at the same place could be ignored and the empirical enterprise of theory testing from cross-sectional data of many places could continue unabated. As well, variations between different kinds of neighbourhoods or places could be argued as indirectly examining social change, or at least, having implications for social change. Remarkably, one of the only exceptions to the application of a static view was by rural sociologists who had become interested in the possibility of changing crime rates due to the boomtown phenomena of the 1980s in western energy towns (Freudenburg and Jones, 1991; Krannich et al., 1985, 1989; Wilkinson et al., 1982, 1984). Second, many of the conditions said to be indicative of relative levels of social disorganization can be measured, and statistical tests of relationships with various crime phenomena can be conducted. These conditions include demographic/population composition, such as population heterogeneity and population turnover or transience; economic conditions, such as poverty rates and income inequality; family indicators, such as proportions of single parent families and divorce rates; and social structural/human capital characteristics, including frequency of interacting with neighbours (Bursik, 1999; Sampson et al., 1997). Third, different kinds of criminological phenomena can be tested utilizing a social disorganization framework. Not only official police statistics concerning crime, but arrest data, calls for service, perceptions of crime and fear of crime, among others (Tittle, 2000). We contend that social disorganization theory provides a first step toward the solid

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theoretical grounding of rural crime research, and leads down a path toward the development of more advanced conceptual frameworks which have yet to be created. Ultimately, the goal, as is the mission of all science, is to advance scholarship to the stage that social disorganization theory is considered obsolete, with due recognition given to its historical importance. The adoption of social disorganization theory as a first step in synthesizing rural crime research may impress the reader as ironic, given the history of its urban bias and the simplistic interpretation of Tönnies’ Gemeinschaft–Gesellschaft dichotomy. However, we also contend that a proper interpretation of social disorganization is able to account for place-based variations without engaging in a form of the ecological fallacy that makes blanket assumptions about crime in all rural places. The social organization of communities of any size has three specific sources. First, informal relations among primary groups, such as neighbours, friendship cliques, and extended family determine much of the variation in a place’s density of acquaintanceship (Freudenburg, 1986), hence, also control the behaviour of members. Second, participation in these primary groups overlaps, creating webs of reciprocity that can be seen through the demographic composition, social class (or caste, depending on the place of reference) characteristics and the cultural expectations expressed within the context of specific places. Finally, social organization is variably reinforced by external links, that is, forms of social capital utilized by various actors within specific groups at specific places. We begin our journey by discarding the traditional functionalist assumption that a condition of so-called ‘disorganization’ is abnormal. It simply makes no sociological sense to start with an image that places of any size are normal only when they are organized and cohesive. We could argue that it makes better sociological sense to assume that rural places are continuously changing due to

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influences which are commonly identified as sources of disorganization, such as population change and population turnover. Hence, that is the normal state of things. In addition, we start anew with the notion that at every place, representations of both crime and lawabiding behaviour are the products of varying forms of organization (Barclay et al., 2004).

COMMUNITY CHARACTERISTICS AND RURAL CRIME As mentioned, it was long assumed that rural communities had less crime because their social structures were more homogeneous, cohesive and integrated than those in urban places; that is, rural places manifested less social disorganization. Recent research has shown that rural communities are not crime free. Rural rates may be higher in particular types of rural places and for specific kinds of crime than urban rates (DeKeseredy and Joseph, 2006; Jobes et al., 2004; Weisheit and Donnermeyer, 2000), as Vold (1941) tried to make plain to an earlier generation of criminology scholars. Simply put, rurality does not imply the sociological equivalent of immunity from crime. At this point, it appears that social and cultural factors may be more important in the explanation of crime variations in rural communities than in urban areas, where economic conditions show greater weight (Jobes et al., 2004, 2005; Osgood and Chambers, 2000; Wells and Weisheit, 2004). For example, in a study of local government areas (LGAs) of rural New South Wales (LGAs are equivalent, to some degree, to counties in the USA), Jobes et al. (2004) found that various economic indicators did not statistically explain variations in crime rates. Their regression analyses of official crime rates for assault, breaking and entering, motor vehicle theft and malicious property offences (i.e., vandalism) found statistically significant relationships only for certain demographic and social characteristics, including population

mobility, population growth, proportion of single-parent households, home ownership and race heterogeneity of the local population. However, of greater import was their cluster analysis (Jobes et al., 2004). First, they found that their set of 123 rural LGAs could cluster statistically into six types or profiles, which could be arrayed on a continuum by population size. Second, they discovered that population size and rates of crime showed some relationship, but two clusters or types of rural LGAs exhibited noticeably higher crime rates, and the distinctiveness of both clusters suggests that something other than urbanism (or conversely, rurality) was at work. One was the cluster of LGAs with the largest average population, that is, rural LGAs which were service centres to their surrounding hinterland (cluster 1– ‘Urban Centres’). This cluster showed above average educational levels and income, but below average levels of married couples and higher proportions of indigenous people and of immigrants, that is, people born overseas. The other cluster (cluster 5 – ‘Medium Declining Communities’) was the second smallest in average population size, but showed a different set of characteristics, including net out-migration, below average educational levels, low income, a higher than average proportion of indigenous people, but only a small percentage of the population was born in another country and immigrated from overseas. The social structure or organization of the first cluster was distinctive based on population or demographic characteristics. The fifth cluster was unique for what today would be called social capital (Recker, 2005). In comparison to the other clusters, the first showed the highest or second highest rates of crime for motor vehicle theft, malicious damage and burglary. The fifth cluster exhibited the highest rates between all six clusters for assault and burglary. Third, each of the four crime types varied across the six clusters of communities in somewhat different ways. In other words, different kinds of rural places demonstrated different crime profiles. Furthermore, rural

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places which fell into the same clusters showed similar crime profiles. Wells and Weisheit (2004) conducted a similar county-level analysis in the USA, but included both non-metropolitan and metropolitan counties, and official crime rate data (i.e., Uniform Crime Reports of the FBI). Their results were similar to those of Jobes et al. (2004). Economic variables were inversely related to both property and violent crime rates in metropolitan counties, but had only weak effects for the non-metropolitan counties. They concluded that the mix of similar and dissimilar results when comparing metropolitan and non-metropolitan county crime rates with various social and economic indicators suggests ‘using more than one causal model to explain crime in both settings’ (Wells and Weisheit, 2004: 17). Osgood and Chambers (2000) examined rural youth violence within non-metropolitan counties of four USA states of the South and Midwest. Like the findings of Jobes et al., (2004), their results demonstrated a nonlinear relationship between the population size of non-metropolitan counties and violent crime arrest rates among juveniles. They concluded that ‘per capita rates of juvenile arrest for violent crimes are significantly and consistently associated with residential instability, family disruption, and ethnic heterogeneity’ (Osgood and Chambers, 2000: 106). Further, family was a ‘critical element’, that is, areas where adults were ‘actively engaged in parental roles ... bring formal and informal controls to bear on the behaviour of children throughout the community’ (Osgood and Chambers, 2000: 106). Moreover, poverty and delinquency did not exhibit the same kind of relationship as urban-based social disorganization theory would have predicted. Osgood and Chambers (2000) suggest that this is because the ethnic homogeneity of rural places in their study correlated with poverty and residential instability, whereas many urban places would find ethnic heterogeneity related to both. In other words, Osgood and Chambers’ (2000) results from the USA echo the cluster analysis of rural

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LGAs in New South Wales (Jobes et al., 2004), especially for the more rural cluster, the fifth cluster, which had a declining population. The research reviewed above, and other work focused on rural crime that implicitly or explicitly adopts a social disorganization framework or logic, have identified five primary sets of factors that combine to create particular types of rural communities with specific profiles of crimes.

Proximity By their nature, rural places have smaller populations and lower population densities. Wilkinson (1984b) was among the first authors to suggest that rural communities exhibit considerable variability in rates of crime because of their smaller populations. By itself, size is meaningless, but small size interacting with other factors creates unique contexts in which both law-abiding and criminal behaviours, as defined by the norms and laws of a society, are expressed. Rural communities proximate to large, urban centres, and rural communities that experience rapid economic and population change (both growth and decline) are examples of places in which crime can increase rapidly. The specific sources can include the relocation of factories, military bases, energy development, tourism and other forms of economic gain and loss (Freudenburg and Jones, 1991; Wilkinson, 1984a). Further, many of these economic activities exploit rural people through directives emanating from urbanlocated headquarters.

Poverty Rural communities that manifest higher than average rates of poverty also possess fewer resources to support institutions, such as schools, which promote pro-social behaviour (Oetting et al., 1998). In some situations, poverty may act as a protective factor against

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the development of crime if it serves to reinforce cohesion among the members of a small, remote community where class differences are minimal because the community itself is both economically and politically marginalized. More typically, however, poverty is an indicator of social class divisions that are local expressions of countrylevel and international economic structures (Greenberg, 1981). With economic inequality come social and political inequality, creating rural-located social structures with sub-groups manifesting divergent values, norms and group loyalties. Persistent and deep poverty creates a different situation than inequality. Some members living in these places can begin to develop alternative means of sustenance (often referred to as ‘informal economic activities’), some of which may include involvement in illegal activities, especially drug production (O’Dea et al., 1997; Rojas, 2002; Weisheit, 1992). Moreover, notions of male masculinity and rural patriarchy are most evident in high poverty rural localities, which in turn, are associated with various forms of domestic violence (DeKeseredy et al., 2006).

Residential mobility Rural communities dependent on extractive industries may experience ‘boom and bust’ cycles, accompanied by transient populations and higher rates of crime (Freudenburg and Jones, 1991). The introduction of tourism or of a new industry to exploit cheap rural labour can change a rural locality’s crime profile. Regardless of the source, high rates of in- and out- migration can lead to rural social structures with high rates of crime. Probably one reason why Tönnies’ (1957) Gemeinschaft remains such a popular word, and one frequently associated with idealized forms of rural living, is that it evokes the image of a place where people know each other and generally engage in cooperative relationships. High rates of population mobility reflect the opposite, that is, social

structures in localities with transitory populations and much less cohesion, and these conditions, in the absence of other mitigating forces, frequently display high rates of crime.

Race and ethnicity Differences in customs and a lack of shared experiences lead to fragmented social structures that may breed fear and distrust (Sampson and Groves, 1989), especially when combined with poverty and other economic features that exacerbate these divisions. Jobes et al. (2005) illustrate these dynamics in their study of two rural Australian communities with significant proportions of indigenous people. In the first locality with high crime, there was a fair degree of race-based distrust and division in the community. In the second locality, there were less divisive relations, even though residential segregation was a fact of life. In the latter, crime was much lower.

Family Family and extended family are a primary source of socialization (Oetting et al., 1998). Sampson (1986) argues that single parents are often too strained for time and money to supervise their children effectively and to interact with other adults. Alternative structures for socialization, such as gangs or delinquent cliques can develop. On the flip side, family can be a primary source for creating the context, including the modelling of values and behaviours, for such offences as spouse, child and elder abuse, and for involvement in other forms of violence, such as assault and bullying.

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION The foregoing discussion draws heavily from literature within a few English-speaking

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countries. The five dimensions that define the organization of a community partially compose and influence rural communities of other countries as well, though the dynamics with which they operate may vary dramatically. The problem is that there is not enough research to know for sure. Crime in rural places displays high variability. Some communities are stable, with little in- or out- migration and neighbours who know each other well. In these communities, crime levels are generally low (Jobes et al., 2004), although some studies suggest that it is merely the case that crime in stable rural and agricultural communities is simply less invisible (Barclay et al., 2004; DeKeseredy and Joseph, 2006). When two or three of the factors are in rapid flux or are sources of considerable strain, levels of crime increase markedly, not because of social disorganization per se, but because forms of social organization conducive to crime are created. Further, one factor unique to all rural communities is their small size, which can make them more vulnerable to the development of new forms of social structures in a shorter period of time. We also argue that stability should not imply lack of crime, as endemic crime can occur because informal local patterns of unethical, immoral and illegal behaviours, such as domestic violence, are perpetuated. There is increasing recognition that rural crime is a social phenomenon that merits international sociological analysis. There is a need for concepts that promote crossnational and cross-cultural analyses. A theoretically grounded approach to rural crime will facilitate innovative and fertile discourse amongst scholars, whether their approach is qualitative or quantitative. An established and persistent concept in sociology, ‘community’, is at the core of key theories of criminology, including social disorganization theory. Community structure is applicable to comparative analyses across the full spectrum of social structures from traditional to post-modern. Equally important, community structure is a crucial causal force behind crime in both rural and urban areas.

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Gradually, rural crime is being recognized as a significant set of phenomena for empirical research and the application of criminological theory. The volume of studies focused on crime in the rural context that now appears in journals and in presentations at professional society meetings where criminologists congregate, is already at a noticeable level and continuing to grow each year. This presents many valuable opportunities for the advancement of scholarship for rural criminology and for the general field of criminology. Focusing on rural-related crime in this new century requires dual acknowledgement of local context and global influences, hence extending Mills’ (1959) original idea. Simply put, the extension incorporates community as the key to a specification of local context, whether this specification is operationalized quantitatively or qualitatively. Ultimately, a comprehensive theory of rural crime must account for ways that broad national and global-level influences affect the context of daily living as defined by the kinds of community/neighbourhood level factors that create distinctive forms of local social structures and their accompanying crime profiles. What are the next steps? The first real advance will be to discard the logic implied in so much of the criminological literature, including that focused on rural crime, that disorganization (i.e., disruption, lack of stability, rapid change) and high levels of crime are necessarily related and that organization (i.e., stability, cohesion, and integration) is related to low levels of crime. As we have found, this is not easy. If readers of this article go back to the beginning and carefully examine each word, sentence and paragraph, they will certainly find passages that appear to correspond to what we now suggest is obsolete. The important point, however, is that rural crime researchers must begin to identify forms of ‘social organization’ that co-vary with different types of crime. This is where the thinking about crime needs to be turned upside-down, and crime in the rural context is the ideal laboratory.

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Rural communities, by virtue of their smaller size and population densities, and because they are physically (and in other ways) discrete places with a wide variety of demographic, economic, social and cultural conditions, constitute ideal locations for testing criminological theories. Further, new frameworks must be developed that can take account of social organization and crime in the tens of thousands of rural places located beyond the borders of a few English-speaking countries. We conclude by suggesting that these new developments can best be effected by the study of crime in rural places, with the urban bias of mainstream criminology held in abeyance, appreciated for what it is, but recognizing its limited potential for extending intellectual boundaries.

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PART FOUR

Illustrative Case Studies

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22 Hunger and Plenty: Fragmented Integration in the Global Food System1 Mustafa Koc

INTRODUCTION Many sociologists of agriculture and food argue for a systemic approach to examine the complex social, economic and political relations involved in different stages of production, distribution and consumption of food in modern societies. The food system refers to a web of social relations, processes, structures and institutional arrangements that cover human interaction with nature and with other humans in their attempt to reproduce their livelihoods (Fonte, 2002; Friedmann, 2000; Koc and Dahlberg, 1999). The existence of human societies has depended on their collective ability to interact with their environment, and to respond to the social and ecological challenges they faced (Diamond, 2005; Harris, 1978). The survival of individual members and societies required collective action. Anthropological studies looking at the few remaining foraging societies, leftovers of the pre-Neolithic world, argue that cooperation and egalitarian social relations were crucial for the survival

of the earlier primitive communal societies. In these societies, sharing was an essential adaptive survival strategy. A simple division of labour based on gender and age rather than on social class distinctions, identified communally defined roles in everyday activities such as hunting and gathering. Conflicts arising from demographic pressures or inter-tribal rivalry for hunting grounds were not infrequent, but their consequences were highly detrimental to their social existence. The agricultural revolution in the Neolithic era made it possible to produce a surplus beyond everyday needs. Agricultural activity necessitated increased collective action and complex social relations, thus creating a potential for conflict in an increasingly stratified society around gender and class lines. In agrarian societies, access to basic necessities of life, such as food, access to means of production, distribution of surplus, ownership rights, entitlement and rituals of eating often reflected differences in the social hierarchy. Conflict and cooperation became two contradictory tendencies shaped

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by the need for collective action for survival and differences in access to power.

THE MODERN FOOD SYSTEM The modern food system has emerged and evolved gradually in the last 500 years. The basic tenets of this period are broadly shaped by the general characteristics of the capitalist accumulation process identified with private ownership of means of production and generalized commodity relations. The expansion of commodity relations freed labour both from feudal bondage and from access to and control of means of production. In an increasingly commodified economy, where producers lost their traditional rights of access to land and where all means of production are privatized, labour itself became a commodity. Day-to-day survival compelled people to sell their labour power in return for a wage by entering into contractual relations with the owners of the means of production. While driven by the coercive laws of competition among individual enterprises, the capitalist system simultaneously socialized the labour process and division of labour by emphasizing ‘working together’ and ‘cooperation’ within the enterprise. Competition among individual producers for the maximization of profit required each enterprise to find ways to increase the productivity of labour by modernizing the social division of labour (Marx, 1977: 437). As all enterprises operated under these competitive pressures, the anarchy of production would necessarily lead to periodic crises of overproduction and cause a decline in rates of profit. This in turn created further pressures for the spatial expansion of commodity relations around the world. As Engels argued, ‘the contradiction between socialized production and capitalistic appropriation … present[ed] itself as an antagonism between the organization of production in the individual workshop and the anarchy of production in society generally’ (1975: 61).

Expanding on the tendencies of overaccumulation and underconsumption, early twentieth century, observers of the global movements of capital, such as Hobson and Lenin, argued that competition for profitable markets led to tendencies towards concentration and centralization of capital, and to the emergence of monopolies. The growing tendency to export capital led to imperialist expansion and colonialism. Rivalries for the control of territories among imperial powers and emerging nation states were responsible for armed conflicts at the regional or the world level (Hobson, 1938; Lenin, 1970).

FOOD REGIMES The dynamics of accumulation, the agents of expansion and the nature and patterns of political conflict have presented significant variations during different phases of the global expansion of commodity relations (Koc, 1994). Each of these stages, while reflecting the general laws of motion of the accumulation process, has been unique in terms of the dynamics of production and distribution, and the patterns of sociopolitical arrangements and state regulations (Aglietta, 1979; Koc, 1994; Lipietz, 1987; Van der Pijl, 1984). From a ‘world system’ perspective, various observers (Friedmann and McMichael, 1989; Le Heron, 1993; McMichael, 1994) have identified food regimes that correlate with dominant economic trends, unique regulatory premises, historical characteristics, national and international policy features. While domestic political and social influences are responsible for variations in the patterns of capitalist penetration and resistance to it, the food regimes concept allows us to see general economic and political tendencies that have led to the current corporate global food system. In the following section we will examine patterns of competition, conflict and cooperation during the three food regimes in the twentieth century.

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The first food regime (Atkins and Bowler, 2003; Friedmann and McMichael, 1989; Le Heron, 1993; McMichael, 1994) emerged in the pre-World War I period under British hegemony. It was based on global exchange of manufactured goods from European states for tropical goods from the colonies. Complementary product exchange gave way to competitive product trade according to comparative economic advantage. In the colonized territories, land that was appropriated from aboriginal peoples was granted to a new class of settler farmers. Unlike peasant economies of pre-capitalist societies that were organized by the rules of subsistence and reproduction, the family farm specialized in commodity production. As industrial capital began to ‘appropriate’ parts of the agricultural labour process, the same competitive dynamics that emerged among industrial enterprises also determined the relations among the rural simple commodity producers. Cooperation among pioneers in early years of settler farming weakened under commodity pressures. On the other hand, in the newly emerging nation-states new alliances formed among wider social segments of the population, bonded through nationalist ideologies. Nationalism helped hegemonic social classes to define boundaries of their home markets and unify diverse segments of the society around a new imaginary community. The second food regime corresponded roughly to the period following the World War II until the mid-1970s, shaped by the US hegemony and the Cold War competition. Reflecting the overriding Fordist accumulation tendencies during this era, the restructuring of agricultural sectors by agro-food capital aimed at mass production for mass consumption (Baca, 2004). Three factors: namely direct investment through transnational corporations (TNCs), the development of durable food and intensive meat commodity complexes, and strong state protection for agriculture – food and farm subsidies – marked the general tendencies of the second food regime. Food aid, commodification and modernization policies, which were often

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encouraged by the Western TNCs and international development agencies in the newly emerging Third World colonial states, destroyed local farm economies. They also led to urbanization and reconstructed urban diets fashioned according to Western models. Emphasizing economies of scale, efficiency, productivity and profitability, a productionist paradigm prevailed throughout the first and second food regimes. For example, Green Revolution schemes introduced during the second food regime were justified as the crucial tools to respond to increasing global population and hunger. Instead, the destruction of rural peasant forms of production led to rapid urbanization, increasing poverty and more hunger while millions of unemployed, or marginally employed, urban residents became increasingly dependent on foreign aid packages (Atkins and Bowler, 2003; Friedmann, 1987; Le Heron, 1993; McMichael, 1998). The crisis of the second food regime and the general accumulation crisis of Fordism in the mid-1970s gave way to the third food regime. The collapse of Breton Woods, the oil crisis, global economic recession and Third World debt led to corporate and state restructuring in the 1980s. Corporate response to the crisis included measures, such as a shift to new information technologies, decentralization and privatization, emphasis on increasing rationalization and efficiency; deskilling, cheap labour, intensification of the work process; global sourcing and shrinking of time and space. Globalization of industrial and agricultural production was accompanied by an even more dramatic globalization of the financial markets in this era (Aglietta, 1982; Giddens, 2000; Hall and Jacques, 1989; Harvey, 1982; Lipietz, 1987; Thornton, 2004).

THE GLOBAL FOOD REGIME The emerging global world order defined a historical conjuncture in the restructuring of

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the capitalist state, state society relations and a shift in the balance of power among different social classes and groups (Araghi, 2003; Barndt, 2002; Bonanno et al., 1994; Friedland, 2004; Koc, 1994; McMichael, 2005; Moreira, 2002, 2004; Pritchard, 2005; Tilzey, 2006). A shift in international geopolitical alignments after the end of the Cold War, the integration of China into the global economy as a state capitalist nation, and the emergence of the EU as a new power bloc challenging the hegemony of the US on the global economic front, set the stage for a new international order. Competition for agricultural exports, the disruption of traditional trade patterns with developing countries and the increasing commercial power of agro-food corporations created new tensions between national and transnational capital. Trade disputes between the North and the South at the international trade talks of the World Trade Organization (WTO), international disputes around institutionalized food surpluses and the impacts of farm subsidies, the formation of new regional trade blocs such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and ‘the war on terror’ defined some of the general characteristics of this era. The response to the crisis of Fordist accumulation involved two potential courses. First, a more expansionist global Fordism (Lipietz, 1982) would spread the mass production and consumption model to the semiperiphery. Second, the intensification of the process of accumulation in the capitalist centre, with the use of new information technologies and automation, transgenics2 and corporate reorganization encouraged overconsumptionism among certain segments of the population (Pianta, 1988). While the first of these processes was only partially achieved, the latter resulted in significant transformation in the social organization of labour, production and consumption patterns in advanced industrial countries. The social restructuring in the late twentieth century was justified by the dominant neoliberal ideology. Offering a populist critique of state interventionism, regulation and

costly social programmes, the neo-liberal ideology that gained hegemony in the last two decades of the twentieth century in the West introduced a business-oriented vision of corporate and state restructuring; it also legitimized the social consequences of these changes. Under the neo-liberal regime, the normal is identified as a decentralized and deregulated liberal economy, where the local state will create the services and infrastructure for the private sector, community groups will supply voluntary services to replace or reduce welfare costs and the locality will be attached to global networks through connections offered by transnational corporations (TNCs) (Bonanno, 2004; Burch and Goss, 1999). This process paralleled an increase in military spending in the US in the 1980s (often called the ‘Star Wars’). With the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, instead of fading away, this military tendency emerged as a ‘military Fordist’ accumulation strategy (Kaldor et al., 1988; Melman, 1985). Later it was endorsed by neo-conservative unilateralism, a derivative of the neo-liberalist ideology emphasizing imperial hegemony through military supremacy, regional wars, disenfranchising and exclusion (Durham, 2006; Kristol, 1995; Thornton, 2004). The global food regime (McMichael, 2005) emerged in the era of neo-liberal restructuring in response to the accumulation crisis of Fordism in the last two decades of the twentieth century. The corporate food regime shows many of the general tendencies of the previous food regimes – albeit in an intensified way – and continues to introduce, on the other, new ways food is grown, sourced, processed, marketed, distributed and consumed. The productionist paradigm (Lang and Heasman, 2004) that emerged during the industrial revolution has continued to shape the Green Revolution and the genetic revolution, transforming the way food is grown (Busch and Bain, 2004; Goodman and Watts, 1997; Kneen, 1999; Paul et al., 2003). Mass use of agrochemicals, hybrid plants, factory farms, monocultures, intensive livestock

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rearing and pharmaceuticals accompanied structural and spatial changes in farming, such as contract farming, increasing globalization of supply and the disappearance of the notion of seasonality (Constance and Bonanno, 1999; Ervin et al., 2003). In processing, marketing and distribution, changes included just-in-time sourcing, extrusion technology, cosmetics and additives to disguise products, development of niche products, decentralized forms of labour process and work organization. The Fordist restructuring of the food system emphasized branding, product diversification, product placement methods, advertisement, marketing for specific consumer types, centralized ordering, the use of information technology, flexible specialization and reduction in stocks. It also led to the expansion of food miles, by increasing the use of air freight, heavy lorry networks and satellite tracking (Pritchard and Burch, 2003).

FROM COMPETITION TO CORPORATE CONCENTRATION The most significant characteristic of this era has been increasing corporate concentration and control in this process, paralleled with the declining role of nation-states. Supranational bodies and international treaties, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the WTO, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank play an increasingly significant role in shaping freedom for financial, commercial and productive capital, while nation-states define the boundaries of globally interlinked home markets, and regulated/restricted movement of labour. Mostly through mergers and buy-outs, a few companies control the largest segment of the agri-food business. To see the extent and speed of corporate concentration, we can look at the US beef-packing industry. In the mid-1970s, about 25% of the market was controlled by four companies. By the mid-1990s about 20 feedlots were handling half the

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cattle in the US and these were directly connected to the top four companies processing 81% of the beef (Hendrickson et al., 2001). Similar trends were observed in Canada. The concentration ratio of the top four companies (CR4) reached in pork packing 76.2%, beef packing 73.2%, grain handling 64%, wheat flour milling 78.76% in 2003/2004. In retailing CR4 for 2004–2005 was 77.99%. In fertilizers CR4 varied from a low of 81.3% in nitrogen to 100% in nitric acid, ammonium nitrate, ammonium sulfate and nitrogen solutions. From banking (CR5 = 82.41) to transportation (CR2 in railways = 100) farmers faced oligopsonistic3 markets (Market Share Matrix Project, 2006). These corporate concentration trends are not unique to North America. In agrochemicals, the top 10 global corporations control 84% of the $30 billion market. Thirty-two grocery retailers account for 34% of the global food retail market estimated at $2.8 trillion. In seeds, the world’s top 10 seed companies have increased their control from one-third to one-half of the global seed trade between 2003 and 2005 (ETC Group, 2005). One company (Monsanto, owned by Pharmacia) accounted for 94% of the total area sown to genetically modified crops in 2000 (Ervin et al., 2003; Heffernan and Hendrickson, 2005; Lang and Heasman, 2004; RAFI, 2001). As Hendrickson (2003) and others have demonstrated, the ever-increasing levels of horizontal integration through consolidation since the mid-1970s allowed some companies to control even wider sections of the food system. As Table 22.1 demonstrates three or four big corporations in the US food system control anywhere between 63% and 83.5% of the market in some of the Table 22.1 Level of concentration in the US food processing sectors (2005 figures) Sector Rate of concentration Beef packers 83.5% Soybean crushing 71% Pork packers 64% Flour milling 63% Source: Heffernan and Hendrickson, 2005.

Companies 4 3 4 4

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key agricultural commodities. New strategic alliances, mergers and takeovers, vertical and horizontal integration strategies allow global TNCs to control various segments of production, marketing, service and financial functions. Agro-food TNCs are often able to combine productionist, commercial and speculative strategies, and control wider segments of the markets (Moreira, 2002). Vertical integration, on the other hand, by connecting diverse segments of production, processing and retailing, allow firms to own their upstream suppliers and downstream buyers, creating virtual monopolies. In this scheme, farmers have nowhere to move except out of the market.

by the market dynamics that continue to short-change them. Like hunger, the farm crisis became a permanent feature of the modern food system (Qualman, 2001). In Canada, there has been a persistent decline in real net farm income since the mid-1980s. Between 1985 and 2004, real net farm income declined by an average of $104 million per year (according to the 1992 dollar rate), although output prices slightly increased by about $90 million annually. In the same period, productivity gains were estimated at $238 million. Increase in input prices, however, chipped away about $422 million annually from farmers’ net farm income, producing poverty in the midst of plenty (Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, 2006). NFU figures indicated that the market net income in the early 2000s fell even below the Great Depression levels in Canada (see Graph 22.1) (NFU, 2005; Qualman and Wiebe, 2002). The tendency towards a concentration and centralization of ownership in agriculture that started in the post-World War II era, has continued to decimate the farm population, and has resulted in increasing consolidation among Canadian farmers. Between 1971 and 2001, for example, the average number of

POVERTY AND PLENTY

Dollars per farm (adjusted to 2005 dollars)

While proletarianization or marginalization was inevitable for the rural dispossessed, survival on land continued to be a challenge even for those who continued to produce in increasingly oligopolistic markets. While feeding the world, many farmers in the North as well as the South realized that their ability to feed their own families was undermined

$40,000 $30,000 $20,000 $10,000 1985

$0 −$10,000 −$20,000

2001

1996

Market net income in farming in Canada, 1926–2005.

1991

Graph 22.1

1985

1981

1976

1971

1966

1961

1955

1951

1945

1941

1935

1931

1926 Source: NFU, 2005.

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dairy cows per farm more than tripled while the average number of pigs per farm increased more than ten times (Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, 2006: 66). Fewer farms controlling larger operations, such as mega farms and factory farms, dominate the food scene (Buttel, 2003). They use large amounts of agro-industrial inputs, fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides, hormones and antibiotics in an attempt to maintain increasing productivity in a market dominated by fewer and fewer TNCs. Farming has become increasingly separated from its populist roots as a ‘way of life’ under pressures of commodification, intensification and globalization. Yet, an increase in productivity only ensures survival for some, at least for one more season. Farmers rely increasingly on extra-farm income, and many could not survive without costly government assistance (Lobao and Meyer, 2001). Identifying progress as growth-oriented industrial models of production, technological progress and commodification, agricultural development policies often encourage the tendencies that caused the problems. The Green Revolution, which emphasized mechanization, artificial irrigation, specialization, hybrid and genetically modified seed technologies, has been promoted without critical scrutiny of its long-term consequences for rural ecology, soil, water and air quality, deforestation, and loss of biodiversity and gas emissions that are responsible for global warming (Wackernagel and Rees, 1996). The anarchy of production was inevitable in a system that was organized around the goal of maximization of profit for each enterprise rather than for societal needs. Unique features of the commodity markets, including the subsidies and other incentives offered by governments, led to the build-up of surpluses and created the crisis of overproduction. This is cyclical in nature in capitalist economies and a permanent feature of the agrifood system. Hunger and surpluses continued to grow together, and attempts to use surpluses to alleviate hunger have only worsened the

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situation as cheap food destroyed attempts for local self-reliance. Treating food as a commodity rather than as an essential of life leads to externalizing the health-related costs of hunger, malnutrition and diet-related diseases. While the modern food system has reduced some of the stresses of the last century regarding food safety and nutritional adequacy, new concerns about the health impacts of diets have emerged. Worldwatch Institute estimated that while the world’s underfed population declined slightly between 1980 and 2000 to 1.1 billion, the number of overweight people, during the same period, surged to 1.1 billion. The same report quoted the World Bank figures to the effect that hunger cost India between 3% and 9% of its GDP in 1996. At the same time, obesity cost the United States 12% of its national health-care budget in the late 1990s, around $118 billion, more than twice the $47 billion attributable to smoking (Gardner and Halweil, 2000). In Canada the prevalence of obesity has increased dramatically since the 1980s. In 1978/79, the age-adjusted adult obesity rate was 14%. Twenty-five years later, this figure was 23%.

FRAGMENTED GLOBALISM, MARGINALIZATION AND HUNGER Since the 1980s, the impact of neo-liberal restructuring has been to add to the ranks of the poor and the marginalized on a global scale. Whether living in the shantytowns of Third World cities, or in the flooded slums of New Orleans, the poor face similar conditions of poverty, exclusion and marginalization (Therborn, 2006; UNDP, 2005). In the meanwhile, the income gap between the rich and the poor has continued to grow. A study released by the Helsinki-based World Institute for Development Economics Research of the United Nations University (UNU-WIDER) reports that in the year 2000, the richest 1% of adults in the world owned 40% of global wealth, the richest 2% owned

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more than half and the richest 10% accounted for 85%. Meanwhile, the bottom half of the world adult population owned barely 1% of global wealth (Davies et al., 2006). The global movement of capital in the post-Cold War era has been a very selective process, creating islands of integrated communities and territories, while leaving many others marginalized (Bauman, 1998; Conway and Heynen, 2006; Ghosh and Guven, 2006; Kennedy and Danks, 2001; Perrons, 2004). The boundaries of development and underdevelopment, inclusion and exclusion are no longer necessarily formed along the north-south axis, but at the community level (spatially as well as socially) all around the globe (Amin, 2006; Frieden, 2006; Geyer, 2006). Conditions of membership in the global economy, foreign aid, free trade partnerships, preferential status by international agencies and investment opportunities are tied to membership status. Nations, ethnic groups, regions and cities compete for global membership status. Being the ‘other’ in this process has become an increasingly heavy burden. In 1996, at the World Food Summit (WFS) in Rome, World leaders admitted that approximately 800 million people around the world did not have enough to feed themselves and their families (Koc and MacRae, 2001). A commitment was made to reduce the number of hungry people by half by 2015 at the WFS, but this commitment was later considered to be unattainable. At the followup conference in Rome that met in June 2002, the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO) changed its projection to reduce hunger to 440 million by 2030, still above the original 2015 target. In the emerging new-world order in the early twenty-first century, there appears to be an abandonment of the commitment to cooperation, universalism and developmentalism, key characteristics that made modernity appealing to wider masses. The ‘empire’, as Hardt and Negri (2000) attempt to describe it, is not a republic built upon the ideals of liberté, égalité, fraternité, but a project of

world domination, a ‘decentered and deterritorializing apparatus of rule’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000: xii), a world market that includes less than one-fifth of the world population, an exclusive club that defines membership as privilege. Access to food is still regarded by many as a privilege rather than as a basic human right, and hunger and malnutrition prevail. Ill effects of malnutrition hurt even larger numbers of people, mainly children, women and the elderly. Far from disappearing, hunger and malnutrition are on the increase, even in advanced industrialized countries like Canada with a relatively effective social safety net (Riches, 1997). The National Population Health Survey (NPHS) released by Statistics Canada indicates that about 15% of Canadians were considered to be living in a ‘food-insecure’ household at some point during 2000/01 (Statistics Canada, 2005). These figures show a significant jump over the figures from the previous survey which claimed that 10.2% of Canadian population was food insecure. The Canadian Association of Food Banks (CAFB, 2006) reported that 753,458 people used a food bank in a typical month in 2006. The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) reported that about 12.6 million American families worried that they couldn’t afford to buy food (Nord et al., 2006). People living on low incomes, recipients of social assistance, the elderly, single mothers, children of lone parents and Aboriginal people, as well as ethnic minorities face a much higher risk of food insecurity than the general population. Many observers argue that food insecurity has little to do with lack of food (Lappé and Lappé, 2002). FAO (2002) sources indicate that on a global scale 17% more calories are produced per person today than three decades ago, despite a 70% population increase. This amount is estimated to offer an average of 2,720 kilocalories (kcal) per person per day. In fact, a significant proportion of agricultural produce is being used as animal feed or industrial products such as gasoline, biodiesel, lubricants and other

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industrial products instead of food. In the US, for example, it is estimated that 90% of all soya beans, 80% of all corn and 70% of all grain is used as animal feed (Schwartz, 1996: 30). The main issue is not availability but accessibility of food to people. This has a lot to do with low income, lack of access to land and other means of production and sustainable livelihoods for the increasingly marginalized segments of the world population. UN sources estimated that in 2000, about 2.7 billion people struggled to make a living with less than two dollars a day. While there is some progress in poverty alleviation, at least in some parts of the World, the oftcited figures of the human consequences of global poverty are alarming. While in most cases exclusion is handled through the hidden hand of the market place, in the Cold War era international sanctions were increasingly used as a tool to put pressure on uncooperative states to weaken their military ability and political will (Brzoska, 2003; Colonomos, 2004; Cortright and Lopez, 2000; Davidsson, 2004; Drezner, 2003; Gordon, 1999; Hawkins and Lloyd, 2003; Marks, 1999; Messer and Cohen, 2001).

CONCLUDING REMARKS The global food system is organized according to principles of efficiency, productivity, profitability and comparative advantage. Misgivings about safety, fairness, local and regional development and national security are seen as socio-economic, and political stability concerns only indirectly relevant to the conditions of accumulation. Reviewing the characteristics of the modern global food system, this chapter has argued that certain chronic or periodic problems that are associated with the food system, such as the farm crisis, hunger and malnutrition and obesity, are not anomalies but are reproduced by structures and institutions of the modern food system. The intensification of commodity relations in agriculture and in the food system,

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and the concentration and centralization of ownership have resulted in the destruction of subsistence economies, peasant and simple commodity production in agriculture. This has in turn led to massive rural-urban migration patterns, to increasing hunger and poverty both in the countryside and in the urban shantytowns. Despite its tremendous transformative capacity, the modern food system tends to pay more attention to efficiency, productivity and profitability than to equity, sustainability and health (Lang and Heasman, 2004; Nestle, 2002). Globalization of the agri-food system offers potential for cooperation on a global scale, reduced vulnerabilities to regional food security crises and a broader selection of food choices to those who can afford it. Nevertheless, globalization also causes problems that threaten food security. The most visible impacts of globalization include: 1 an increase in inequality, poverty, hunger and poor health, as well as a loss of cultural diversity; 2 increasing exploitation of the natural environment which is manifested in increasing pollution, the degradation and loss of resources, and the loss of biodiversity; 3 the steady loss of national and local sovereignty to concentrations of economic and corporate power, with a corresponding reduction of democratic power and social controls.

When the wide-ranging impact of globalization is considered, the so-called success of the current food system – its great productive capacity – is seen as its biggest liability for long-term economic and ecological sustainability. Its very structures lead to an undermining of local and traditional systems which provide efficient and accessible production and distribution. They also steadily reduce future food options of the world’s many societies and cultures – both through the destruction of their cultural and biological diversity and by making them dependent upon big corporations that are motivated by private gain and accountable only to their shareholders.

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Recognizing the complexity and extent of the problems within the food system is the first step towards developing creative political and practical solutions. Setting up a just and sustainable food system resistance to fragmented globalism must be boosted by a search for local solutions and increasing global cooperation.

NOTES 1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Mid-term Research Council Conference of the International Sociological Association (ISA), University of Ottawa, May 29, 2004. I would like to thank Ann Denis, Devorah Kalekin, Ellen Desjardins, Suzanne Dietrich, Jennifer Welsh and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions. 2 Transgenics is a term referring to the science of intentionally introducing a foreign gene or genetic construct into the genome of a target animal or plant. 3 Oligopsony refers to a market situation in which only a small number of buyers exist for a particular product, resulting in imperfect competition.

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Friedmann, Harriet (1993) ‘The Political Economy of Food: A Global Crisis’, New Left Review, 197: 29–57. Friedmann, Harriet (2000) ‘What on Earth is the Modern World-System? Food-Getting and Territory in the Modern Era and Beyond’, Journal of World-Systems Research, VI(2): 480–515. Friedmann, Harriet and McMichael, Phillip (1989) ‘Agriculture and the State System: The Rise and Decline of National Agricultures, 1870 to the Present’, Sociologia Ruralis, 29: 93–117. Gardner, Garry and Halweil, Brian (2000) ‘Underfed and Overfed: The Global Epidemic of Malnutrition’, Worldwatch Paper, 150. Geyer, Hermanus S. (ed.) (2006) Global Regionalization: Core Peripheral Trends. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Ghosh, Baidyanath N. and Guven, Halil M. (eds.) (2006) Globalization and the Third World: A Study of Negative Consequences. NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Giddens, Anthony (2000) Runaway World: How Globalization is Reshaping Our Lives, NY: Routledge. Goodman, David and Watts, Michael J. (eds.) (1997) Globalizing Food: Agrarian Question and Global Restructuring. London: Routledge. Gordon, Joy (1999) ‘Economic Sanctions, Just War Doctrine, and the Fearful Spectacle of the Civilian Dead’, Cross Currents, 49(3): 387–403. Hall, Stuart and Jacques, Martin (eds.) (1989) New Times: Changing Face of Politics in the 1990s. London: Lawrence and Wishart. Harris, Marvin (1978) Cannibals and Kings: The Origin of Cultures. NY: Vintage Books. Harvey, David (1982) The Limits to Capital. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Harvey, David (2000) Spaces of Hope. Berkeley: University of California Press. Hawkins, Darren and Lloyd, Joshua (2003) ‘Questioning Comprehensive Sanctions: The Birth of a Norm’, Journal of Human Rights, 2(3): 441–54. Heffernan, William and Hendrickson, Mary (2005) ‘The Global Food System: A Research Agenda. Report to the Agribusiness Accountability Initiative Conference on Corporate Power in the Global Food System’, Hertfordshire, UK: High Leigh Conference Centre, available at

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http://www.foodcircles.missouri.edu/global. pdf [accessed on August 21, 2007]. Hendrickson, Mary (2003) ‘An Overview of Concentration in the Food System, available at http://www.foodcircles.missouri.edu/ leopold/index.htm [accessed on August 21, 2007]. Hendrickson, Mary, Heffernan, William D., Howard, Philip H. and Heffernan, Judith B. (2001) ‘Consolidation in Food Retailing and Dairy: Implications for Farmers and Consumers in a Global Food System’ National Farmers Union, available at http://www.foodcircles.missouri.edu/whstudy2.pdf [accessed on August 21, 2007]. Hirst, Paul and Thompson, Grahame (1996) Globalization in Question. Cambridge: Polity Press. Hobson, John A. (1938) Imperialism: A Study, 3rd rev. edn. London: Allen and Unwin. Kaldor, Mary, Albrecht, Ulrich and Schmeder, Genevieve (eds.) (1988) The End of Military Fordism. London: Pinter. Kennedy, Paul and Danks, Catherine J. (eds.) (2001) Globalization and National Identities: Crisis or Opportunity? NY: Palgrave. Kneen, Brewster (1999) Farmageddon: Food and the Culture of Biotechnology. Gabriola Island, BC: New Society Publishers. Koc, Mustafa (1994) ‘Globalization as a Discourse’, in Alessandro Bonanno, Lawrence Busch, William. H. Friedland, Lourdes Gouveia and Enzo Mingione (eds.) From Colombus to Conagra: Globalization of Agriculture and Food. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press. pp. 265–80. Koc, Mustafa and Dahlberg, Kenneth A. (1999) ‘The Restructuring of Food Systems: Trends and Research and Policy Issues’, Agriculture and Human Values, 16(2): 109–16. Koc, Mustafa and MacRae, Rod (eds.) (2001) Working Together: Civil Society Working for Food Security in Canada. Toronto: MSWG. Koc, Mustafa, MacRae, Rod, Mougeout, Luc and Welsh, Jennifer (eds.) (1999) For Hunger-Proof Cities: Sustainable Urban Food Systems. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre (IDRC). Kristol, Irving (1995) Neoconservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea. Chicago: Elephant Paperbacks. Lang, Tim and Heasman, Michael (2004) Food Wars. London: Earthscan.

Lappé, Frances M. and Lappé, Anna (2002) Hope’s Edge. NY: Jeremy B. Tarcher/ Putnam. Le Heron, Richard (1993) Globalized Agriculture: Political Choice. Oxford: Pergamon Press. Lenin, V. I. (1970) Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House. Lipietz, Alain (1982) ‘Towards Global Fordism?’, New Left Review, I(132): 33–47. Lipietz, Alain (1987) Miracles and Mirages: The Crises of Global Fordism. London: Verso. Lobao, Linda and Meyer, Katherine (2001) ‘The Great Agricultural Transition: Crisis, Change, and Social Consequences of Twentieth Century US Farming’, Annual Review of Sociology, 27: 103–24. Market Share Matrix Project (2006) available at h t t p : / / w w w. m a r k e t s h a r e m a t r i x . o r g / [accessed on August 22, 2007]. Marks, Stephen P. (1999) ‘Economic Sanctions as Human Rights Violations: Reconciling Political and Public Health Imperatives’, American Journal of Public Health, 89(10): 1509–13. Marx, Karl (1977) Capital, Vol. 1. NY: Vintage Books. McMichael, Phillip (ed.) (1994) The Global Restructuring of Agro-Food Systems. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. McMichael, Phillip (1998) ‘Global Food Politics’, Monthly Review, Jul./Aug. 50(3): 97–112. McMichael, Phillip (2005) ‘Global Development and the Corporate Food Regime’, in Frederick H. Buttel and Philip McMichael (eds.) New Directions in the Sociology of Global Development. Amsterdam: Elsevier. Melman, Seymour (1985) The Permanent War Economy: American Capitalism in Decline. NY: Simon and Schuster. Messer, Ellen and Cohen, Marc J. (2001) ‘Conflict and Food Insecurity’, in Eugenio Diaz-Bonilla and Sherman Robinson (eds.) Shaping Globalization for Poverty Alleviation and Food Security: 2020 Vision, Focus No. 8, Brief No. 12. Washington: International Food Policy Research Institute. Moreira, Manuel B. (2002) ‘The Dynamics of the Global Capital and Its Consequences on Agriculture and in Rural Spaces’, International Journal of the Sociology of Agriculture and Food, 10(1): 41–7.

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Moreira, Manuel B. (2004) ‘Agriculture and Food in the Globalization Age’, International Journal of the Sociology of Agriculture and Food, 12: 17–28. NFU (2005) ‘The Farm Crisis and Corporate Profits’, a report by Canada’s National Farmers Union, November 30. Nestle, Marion (2002) Food Politics: How the Food Industry Influences Nutrition and Health. Berkeley: University of California Press. Nord, Mark, Andrews, Margaret and Carlson, Steven (2006) ‘Household Food Security in the United States’, 2005 USDA Economic Research Report, No. ERR-29. Paul, Helena, Steinbrecher, Ricarda, Michaels, Lucy and Kuyek, Devlin (2003) Hungry Corporations: Transnational Biotech Companies Colonise the Food Chain. London: Zed Books. Perrons, Diane (2004) Globalization and Social Change: People and Places in a Divided World. London and NY: Routledge. Pianta, Mario (1988) New Technologies across the Atlantic: US Leadership or European Autonomy? Tokyo: Harvester Wheatsheaf, The United Nations University. Pritchard, Bill (2005) ‘Implementing and Maintaining Neoliberal Agriculture in Australia Part 1: Constructing Neoliberalism as a Vision for Agricultural Policy 1’, International Journal of the Sociology of Agriculture and Food, 3(1): 1–12. Pritchard, Bill and Burch, David (2003) Agri-Food Globalization in Perspective: International Restructuring in the Processing Tomato Industry. Aldershot, UK and Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate. Qualman, Darrin (2001) The Farm Crisis and Corporate Power. Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives. Qualman, Darrin and Wiebe, Nettie (2002) The Structural Adjustment of Canadian Agriculture.

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Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives. RAFI (2001) Globalization, Inc.: Concentration in Corporate Power: The Unmentioned Agenda, RAFI Communique i.71 Jul./Aug. 01 available at http://www.mindfully.org/WTO/ C o n c e n t r a t i o n - C o r p o r a t e - P o w e r. h t m [accessed on August 25, 2007]. Riches, Graham (ed.) (1997) First World Hunger: Food Security and Welfare Politics. London: McMillan. Sassen, Saskia (1998) Globalization and Its Discontents. NY: The New Press. Schwartz, Richard (1996) ‘The Problems of Intensive Livestock Agriculture’, WHY Magazine, 23: 30. Statistics Canada (2005) ‘Canadian Community Health Survey: Obesity among Children and Adults’, The Daily, Wednesday, July 6. Therborn, Göran (2006) Inequalities of the World. London and NY: Verso. Thornton, William H. (2004) ‘Neoglobalism: The Fourth Way’, Antipode, 36(4): 564–74. Tilzey, Mark (2006) ‘Neo-Liberalism, the WTO and New Modes of Agri-Environmental Governance in the European Union, the USA and Australia’, International Journal of the Sociology of Agriculture and Food, 14(1): 1–28. UNDP (United Nations Development Program) (2005) Human Development Report 2005: International Cooperation at a Crossroads: Aid, Trade and Security in an Unequal World. NY: The United Nations Development Programme. Van der Pijl, Kees (1984) The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class. London: Verso. Wackernagel, Mathis and Rees, William (1996) Our Ecological Footprint: Reducing Human Impact on the Earth. Gabriola Island, BC: New Society Publishers.

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23 Social Movements in Brazil: Characteristics and Research Maria da Glória Gohn

INTRODUCTION This chapter presents a brief panorama of the social movements in Brazil in the last decades of the twentieth century and at the beginning of this millennium; and characterizes the changes in the collective actions and in the new forms of cooperation in civil society in recent years, in urban and rural areas. The chapter also presents the principal authors in the literature about social movements and the theoretical paradigms used by the Brazilian researchers in their research describing the setting for ‘associativism’1 during recent decades. Initially we point out that we are using the concept social movements as used by Alain Touraine in his analyses. In that sense, social movements are collective actions of civil society: where there are collective actors making demands, there is an opposition that constitutes a social adversary, a conflict that impels the movement and a project based on the subject of the demands. The collective action develops a sense of identity among the participants (Touraine, 1978). It is important to remember that in Brazil and in many other Latin American countries,

at the end of the 1970s and during part of the 1980s, the popular social movements articulated by groups opposed to the military regime became famous. They were mainly movements with a Christian base, inspired by the Theology of Liberation. When we talk about popular movements, we consider the poor as the agents of the movements, and not the common people or citizens participating in grassroots movements, as in several other countries, including the United States. At the end of the 1980s and during the 1990s, the social political panorama suffered a radical change. Initially, street demonstrations, which made popular movements visible in the cities, decreased. Some analysts diagnosed a crisis within the movements because they had lost their target and main enemy: the military regime. In reality, there were many causes for this demobilization. It is an unquestionable fact that through their demands and organized pressure, the social movements of the 1970s and 1980s contributed decisively to the recognition of several social rights, which became law in the new Brazilian Constitution of 1988. The appearance of other forms of popular organizations,

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more institutionalized, started in the 1990s. Some examples are various forums like the National Forum for the Struggle for Housing, the National Forum for Urban Reform, the National Forum for Popular Participation, the Forum for São Paulo XXI, and so on. These forums established the practice of large-scale national meetings, generating diagnoses of social problems, as well as defining goals and strategic objectives in order to cope with them. Several partnership initiatives between organized civil society and public power emerged, impelled by the government policies, such as the Participative Budget, the Minimum Income, the school grants, administrative counsels in social public areas and so on.

THE SETTING FOR SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND OTHER FORMS OF ‘ASSOCIATIVISM’ IN BRAZIL It has become commonplace to hear that civil society is consolidating itself as the driving force behind innovations and change, even on an international level. In Brazil, the notion of civil society is undergoing reformulation, following the trajectory of the country’s political and social struggles. Generally speaking, civil society first came into prominence in the period known as the ‘transition to democracy’, at the end of the 1970s, when the term was introduced into the political vocabulary then current and became the object of theoretical elaboration. In political terms, it became synonymous with the participation and organization of the civil population in the struggle against the military regime. One of the main focal points of civil society’s articulation at that time arose from the notion of autonomy: it was a question of getting organized independently of the state (mostly by ignoring the state). Direct participatory democracy carried out autonomously, at home and at work, was held to be the ideal model for building a counter-hegemony. To participate in the practices of organizing

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civil society was tantamount to an act of civil disobedience and of resistance to the dominant political regime. During this period, new players appeared on the public stage, giving special emphasis to popular urban social movements, demanding public goods and services, land and housing, as well as the new social movements that fought for the recognition of social and cultural rights: race, gender, sex, standard of living, environment, safety, human rights and so on. The common ground of these social players was the demand for social rights and justice. In the sphere of urban movements, there was a great increase in the diversity of the collective players taking part in the struggle: they were not exclusively confined to the trade unions or political parties. The popular movements played an important role in the construction of the Constitution of 1988. It adopted several social rights that produced juridical instruments of participation for civil society, among them the participative councils and decentralization in the federal sphere, for instance, which promoted the delegation of responsibilities to municipalities. With the gradual opening of channels of participation and political representation following the fall of the military regime, the social movements (especially the popular ones) have been losing the centrality that permeated discourse on participation in civil society. There began to be a fragmentation of the ‘historical social subject’, who played a relevant role in the social change and transformation that focused on the popular sectors and was the fruit of an alliance between the trade union movements and the popular neighbourhood movements (workers and residents). A plurality of new actors appeared as a result of new forms of ‘associativism’ on the political scene. This led to a broadening and diversification of organized groups: the creation of new movements, associations, institutions and NGOs. This trend has created several social networks and configured new patterns for the organization of citizens in what is widely recognized as ‘civil society’.

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Civil society is composed of old and new actors, promoting collective actions, such as putting pressure on the authorities, mobilizing people in the streets and acting with state agents in the planning and administration of public policies, like the above-cited councils. The defence of the autonomy of civil society is no longer a fundamental structuring focal point for building a democratic society. Old and new players now define the aims of their struggles with and conquests over political society, especially in the field of public policy. The expansion of the number of players of and in civil society was prominent throughout the 1990s. In the analyses and discourses of the leaders, the decentralization of the popular subject and the emergence of a plurality of new players bestowed importance on new analytical categories such as social exclusion and citizenship. The latter categories came to the fore in the 1980s, but in the 1990s they took on new meaning. Political leaders incorporated ideas about civil participation, the exercise of civility and the social responsibility of citizens for their rights and duties into official discourse. In this scenario, civil society becomes entwined with political society, making possible a new contradictory and fragmented character of the State in the 1990s. A new public space, a ‘public non-state’, developed where advisory bodies, forums, networks and links between civil society and representatives of public power were introduced into public administration to meet the highly articulate social demands, treated now as part of the country’s ‘Social Question’. The category of social exclusion and the pursuit of inclusion dominate the debate on social issues. In this context, governments consider participation of civil society crucial to the democratization of public administration so as to change the priorities of the administrations. Nowadays, there are several programs of the state with civil society that initiate policies aimed at the regulation of conflicts in urban areas. The state has ‘captured’ the subject of collective conflicts, organizing many projects

and events and giving them economic support. These actions are considered by the state as partnership projects involving social movements; but, in fact, the majority of these actions are developed with NGOs and civil associations rather than with social movements.2 The actions are promoted by the public administration. The poor now have specific public programs, such as the ‘bolsa família’ (family allowance), that provide them with some financial support. These programs are introduced because of high rates of unemployment and dependence on government help. Since the year 2000, social movements in Brazil have reorganized themselves. They did this by combining their initiatives with the action of more institutionalized forms of organization (see Note 2). Examples are: the Movement of Landless Workers (MST) and the ‘Forum Nacional Pela Reforma Agrária’ (National Forum for Land Reform). Other examples are the cooperation of the AfricanDescendants Movement, which has participated in the development of government policies for the official demarcation of land which was ‘possessed’ by their forefathers, and the Indigenous Rights Movement, which has worked together with the Indigenous National Council. These forms of cooperation have appeared in a new moment of the democratization process in Brazil (and, more generally, in Latin America as a whole), in which the struggles of the social movements are resulting in the social inclusion of historically excluded peoples. This new scenario has attracted the attention of analysts and policy makers to the study of social movements. In the next section we will focus on the main theoretical approaches that have been guiding these studies.

THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO ANALYSES OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN BRAZIL

Authors and paradigms used as references Briefly we can say that in the studies about social movements in Brazil, there are three

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theoretical paradigms: the materialist, the cultural and the institutional. The materialist paradigm has been developed by Marxists in Brazil and is based on the writings of Marx and on the work of such authors as Gramsci, Hobsbawm, E. P. Thompson and Manuel Castells (in his books of the 1970s). Most of the popular social movements which arose in Brazil during the transition from the military to the democratic regimes were predominantly analyzed using the ‘class theory’ of this paradigm. It emphasizes the economic aspects of the demands that came from the movements and their contradictions with the capitalist model of economic production prevailing in the country. Nowadays, this approach is an important inspiration for rural movements. The second theoretical paradigm, the cultural, is based on the phenomenological approach and on other cultural and critical theories. It emphasizes the values, the subjectivity and the socio-cultural aspects of mobilized groups; the authors who have used it stress on the construction of group identities. In studies of social movements using this paradigm, the authors have theorized the ‘identity of the movements’, with an emphasis on the collective identity of the ‘new social movements’. By learning from the practical experience of participation in collective actions, the people create this identity. This theory focuses on cultural perspectives on reality and seeks to understand collective actions as belonging to a multicultural world. The principal international references for this theory are the analyses of Alberto Melucci (1996) and Alain Touraine (1973, 1978, 1994, 1998, 2005). This approach has inspired a multicultural analysis of the movements that make demands related to questions of gender, ethnicity and race. The third model is the ‘institutional’ paradigm, which emphasizes the behaviour of individuals – mainly leaders – within organizations, and the processes of integration and institutionalization of collective actions in the political order. The central questions in the social movement studies using this

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paradigm are: how and why are social movements created? What are the organizational dimensions of the collective’s actions? What are the motivations, feelings and ideas of actors in the movement? This paradigm is having a great influence on analyses of social movements in the United States and in some European countries such as England. It has spawned ‘resource mobilization’ and ‘political mobilization’ theories. In this last theory, the focus is on the investigation of the political opportunities that movements are using to improve their actions. It focuses also on the topics of injustice, identity and efficacy in actions of the collectives. John McCarthy and Doug McAdam (McAdam et al., 1996), and Anthony Oberschall (1993) are among the principal authors who have used this paradigm in analyses of social movements. In Brazil, nowadays, the theory of political opportunities is used by some authors to analyze such topics as civic citizenship, citizen participation, belonging, empowerment, networks of sociability and social ties.

Categories for the analysis of social movements in Brazil Most Brazilian studies about social movements in the 1970s and 1980s relied on the Marxist approach; they emphasized social classes and the economic contradictions in society. These studies, such as Moyses (1982), analyzed the popular movements as a new historical subject that claimed citizenship rights, urban services and housing. The Marxist idea of contradictions was used in a different form for examining popular movements. Theorists looked at urban contradictions rather than at class, which had been the typical approach in working class analyses. It is important to spell out the difference between the concepts prevailing in popular movements and those prevailing in the syndicalist (trade union) movement. In the popular movements, the demands usually stemmed from bad urban conditions, failures of public services (health, education, transport, etc.).

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The demands of the working classes in the trade unions on the other hand, were for increases in salary and better working conditions. The unions were reorganizing themselves in new ways which became known as the ‘new syndicalism’. Therefore, we can see that the panorama of social movements in Brazil of the 1980s not only called attention to the labour movement but also put the poor on researchers’ agendas. Theories were previously organized in terms of the conflicts among social classes. Reading Antonio Gramsci’s ideas on the organization of civil society (1979) heavily influenced the researchers who were using the Marxist approach. For Gramsci, the construction of a new hegemony is based on the strengthening of the social movements of civil society which are in opposition to political society. Researchers who participated in social movements elaborated some of these analyses. They diagnosed reality and contributed recommendations for strategic actions of popular movements. These movements had the support of priests, intellectuals, leftist politicians, and they produced collective action that was known as the ‘New Strength of the Periphery’ (Gohn, 1985). Brazilian authors such as Kowarick (1975), Singer and Brant (1981), Moyses (1982) and Oliveira (1972) gave fundamental theoretical support to research, studying the social movements of that time in Brazil. They developed the themes of social marginality and new urban surroundings and critiqued dualistic theories. The Marxist paradigm is still important nowadays in Brazil, but it is no longer used by a large number of researchers. After the mushrooming of the popular movements in the 1980s and the new stage in national politics3 in Brazil in the 1990s, the number of researchers involved in work on social movements diminished (with a slight rise in the study of rural movements). Currently, there is again an increase of research on new movements, NGOs, the Third Sector, new forms of ‘associativism’ and public policies, but most researchers do not use the Marxist approach.

Since the second half of the 1980s, the cultural theory of identity has had an important influence on Brazilian studies of social movements, in particular, on attempts to explain the emergence of new actors on the political scene (Sader, 1988). These movements are described as making ‘a revolution a day’ (Scherer-Warren and Krischke, 1987). New themes have emerged about such issues as women, children, indigenous peoples, the descendants of Africans, and the poor in general. The Afro-Brazilian, the Indian and the women’s movements in Brazil have been analyzed using this paradigm by Cardoso (2002), Cunha (1987), Guimarães (1998), Munanga (1999) and Valente (1994). The theme of multiculturalism gained importance in the study of social movements in the 1990s (Pinto, 2000). Touraine (1994, 1997, 2005) became the principal reference for analyses of social movements in Brazil during that period. He discussed the crises of modernity and the emergence of new actors in society. His concept of ‘identity’ has become very useful for analyzing social movements by specific minority groups. In the 1990s, researchers of Brazilian social movements extended their analytical reference points and incorporated the field of culture in a relevant way. Many researchers from the United States and Canada exerted an influence on a wide range of contemporary theoretical approaches.4 With the changes caused by globalization in the world, new themes came to the fore, notably the question of participation in civil society. The principal international researchers on social movements analyzed these changes in society and elaborated new theories. Castells (1996, 1997), for example, researched networks of collective action. Touraine (1994, 1997, 1998) studied the effects of modernity in society and the emergence of new forms of solidarity as ways of constructing the subject in historical actions. Melucci (1996) discussed subjectivity and the role of the media in social movements. Other authors such as Tarrow (1994) wrote about the power of social movements.

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Cohen and Arato (1992), Hall (1995), and Lyman (1995) discussed civil society and democratization. They articulated the topic of social movements in terms of public space and democratic regimes using Habermas’ perspective. All these authors have influenced Brazilian analyses of social movements. In the 1990s, there was also a revival of some classical exponents of sociological analyses, coming from critical social theory, political science, psychology or philosophy. Such authors as Bobbio, Arendt, Tocqueville, Elias, Bourdieu, Giddens and Foucault contributed to the development of theoretical fields, as did such critical theorists as Habermas, Alexander and Honneth. The influence of historians such as Hobsbawm became more marked and widespread in several fields, not only in social movements studies. In the 2000s, within sociological analysis, there was also a revival of some classical exponents of symbolic interactionism including studies by Goffman, and Wirth on sociability in the city. New analytical categories developed for use in the analysis of the movements, among them: the public sphere, civil society, social exclusion and inclusion, political culture, planetary citizenship, active citizenship, civic citizenship, citizen participation, political opportunities, belonging, empowerment, social networks, social ties and so on. The category ‘globalization’ has been used so widely that it no longer explains social differences and this has produced a homogenization of the interpretation of social reality. However, there was a reorientation of the analyses. They were no longer exclusively focused on the social movements and NGOs; rather the focus shifted to the interaction of civil society with political society, to the public, not the state sphere, to the policies of partnerships of the movements and organizations with the government and public administration (although participation is almost exclusively by NGOs and rarely by the movements). They were, then, relocated to institutional analysis. This has given rise to the elaboration of additional analytical

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categories, such as: sustainability, cultural diversity, democratic governance, local power, radical and deliberative democracy and accountability (see Souza Santos, 2002). These categories affirm that cultural differences should be respected – the values, habits and behaviour of both groups and individuals, belonging to a society, globalized by the economy and by the multiple interactions of the media (TV, Internet, etc.). In Brazil, studies of social movements have recently been published in books by Avritzer et al. (2004), Costa (2002, 2006), Dagnino (2002) and Dagnino et al.(2006), Doimo (1995), Gohn, (2000, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2006a, 2006b, 2007), Scherer-Warren (1993), and Teixeira (2001), among others.

WHICH SOCIAL MOVEMENTS HAVE BEEN RESEARCHED: A PANORAMA In Brazil, most of the studies and publications about social movements have been coordinated by women. Interstingly, the presence of Afro-Brazilians has only been examined by researchers of the Afro-Brazilian movement. A brief overview of the social movements of the last decades of the twentieth century and the beginning of this millennium in Brazil discloses part of the construction of the political democratic process of recent decades; it also shows the extent of poverty and exclusion within society. This panorama can be described using the following thematic focal points of struggles and demands: 1 Movements about living conditions in cities, centred around housing issues, with these struggles expressed on two fronts: (a) the articulation of socio-political networks comprised of intellectuals of the centre-left and popular movements about urban issues (the habitat, the city, strictly speaking). They have participated in the process of developing and obtaining the ‘Estatuto da Cidade’ (City Statute), a federal law of 2001 on issues of urban policies. The National Congress

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adopted it after 13 years of debates and intensive pressures from and negotiations with the national social movements that demanded urban reform, such as the National Forum for Urban Reform; (b) networks of popular social movements of the homeless (street-dwellers and squatters) and their networks of articulation with the unemployed. They are supported by pastoral movements of the Catholic Church and are organized in such major cities as São Paulo, Belo Horizonte and Recife. Actions of middle-class groups against urban violence and in favour of freedom from strife (in traffic, on the streets, in schools, regarding acts against people and their possessions). Popular mobilization and organization based on institutional structures of participation in the politico-administrative management of the city (such as the Participatory Budget and Administrative Advisory Bodies). This type of organization was introduced, among others, by the Labour Party Administration in Porto Alegre (1989–2004), São Paulo (2000–2004), and Belo Horizonte (2000–2004). When the party lost the elections in 2004 in São Paulo and in Porto Alegre, this form of organization stopped. ‘Mobilizations’5 and movements to recover environmental structures, both of a physical-spatial nature, such as squares and parks, as well as of collective equipment and services (in the fields of health, education, leisure, sports and other public services which have degenerated over the past few years due to neo-liberal policies). ‘Mobilizations’ of union movements against unemployment. Movements of solidarity and support for street children, adolescent drug-users, HIV carriers and others with special needs. ‘Mobilizations’ of the Movement of Landless Workers (MST), in the camps (which are discussed in more detail in a later section of this chapter). Ethnic-racial movements of Indians and those of African descent. Movements involving gender issues (women and homosexuals). Movements such as the World Social Forum against neo-liberal policies and the effects of globalization (against the Free Trade Area of the Americas, the FTAA). Movements for demanding human and cultural rights. Movements for education (in the popular sector: for nursery schools and for places in state schools;

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in the university sector: hiring teachers, more funds for education and control of the monthly increases in tuition at private universities). Religious movements to defend different beliefs, sects and traditions. Youth cultural movements. Movements of popular cooperatives. The movement against the construction of dams, in the south and northeast of the country. The environmental movement, that has developed since the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNICED), informally known as the Earth Summit, Eco 92 that took place in Rio de Janeiro, in 1992.

We can observe in the above list that a broadening of the demands, actors and forms of social movements has occurred. Some of the movements have become the sites of great conflicts, notably the landless workers’ movement and the movements against neoliberal policies and the effects of globalization. Others, such as the youth cultural movements and the environmental movement, are organized in NGOs. They develop competitive relations among themselves because they have to apply for resources from the same agencies in order to survive. Other new movements, such as the cooperative movements (recycling of materials, for example), have developed relations predominantly of cooperation, among themselves and with NGOs. The Marxist theoretical approach has inspired the leadership of the trade union movements in their ‘mobilizations’ against unemployment, as well as the leaders of the ‘mobilizations’ and movements of the Movement of Landless Workers (MST), in the camps. The popular organization based on institutional structures of participation in the politico-administrative management of the city (Participatory Budget and Administrative Advisory Bodies) has been constructed, and analyzed using rational choice theory, the rationality of participation and deliberation of the people are considered. In other movements that appear on the above list, the leaders are inspired by the cultural theoretical approach. These movements are pluralistic in

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their social composition and draw on a wide variety of ideological conceptions.

Pluralistic social movements: some characteristics The movements with an identity centred on ethnic and racial factors, such as the AfroBrazilian movement and the indigenous movement have survived and are gaining strength at the beginning of this millennium. The indigenous movements made important institutional conquests in the 1988 Constitution, among them the demarcation of their lands and instruction in their own language. However, their situation is precarious. Recently, with support from international NGOs, they have begun to sell their products in globalized rather than alternative markets, at fair and competitive prices. In 2006, at the time of the second ‘Environmental Institute’ there were 225 groups of Indian peoples (approximately 600,000 persons) living on Brazilian territory. They occupy 1.08 million square kilometres (12.74% of the national territory). The Afro-Brazilian movement struggles against racial prejudice. Recently the federal government approved quotas for university entrance and passed a federal law, the ‘Race Equality Statute’ (2006). The movement is also struggling for ownership of the land already occupied by Afro people. One stream, for example, is the ‘Quilombola Movement’. This name comes from ‘Quilombo’, a word that has origins in the Bantu language and is close in meaning to words, such as habitation, camp, forest and warrior. In Brazil, in the nineteenth century, the ‘Quilombo’ was a territory occupied by fugitive slaves from farms. Nowadays, contemporary ‘quilombos’ in Brazil are constituted as the ‘Quilombola’ community. In 2006, there were 2,842 ‘Quilombola’ communities recognized by the federal government. A total of 69,649,861 Brazilians were classified as black and brown by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics in 2000, making up 47% of the national population.

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Even though most of the lower socioeconomic classes in Brazil are made up of black or ‘mulatto’ (brown) people, there are few lower class Afro-Brazilian organizations. More common are NGOs of the middle-class Afro-Brazilians which operate independently on broader political issues such as poverty and focus their interest on the question of racial discrimination. Among movements characterized by the age of the members, we can distinguish a movement of those who are younger, a movement of senior citizens and the ‘defence of children’ movement. Youth is predominant in the youth movements, both in the students’ movements (concentrated in the state universities) and in the popular youth movements. Youth’s cultural manifestations are expressed through music (hip-hop, rap and other musical styles). The modern anarchist movement is on the rise among the young middle-class Brazilians. Movements in defence of street children and others of senior citizens (concentrated in the middle classes) complete the gamut of the generations’ movements. Gender movements include women’s and homosexuals’ movements. Some women’s organizations act more like NGOs than like social movements, and the majority of their activists are from the middle class. The programs of these movements have focused on women’s health, breast-feeding campaigns and so on. Gay and lesbian movements have grown in Brazil over the last decade. Since 1996 the ‘Gay Parade’ has taken place annually in São Paulo, with a steadily increasing number of participants. Two million people participated in 2005 and 2,300,000 in 2006. Before ECO 92, interest in the environmental question was very much restricted to the middle classes, but afterwards, it became a concern of the popular neighbourhood movements. This constituted a great qualitative leap because in the popular demands and calls of the 1970s and 1980s, the environmental issue was played down in centres such as São Paulo. In Brasilia there are many offices of international organizations of ecologists that fight for the preservation of forests

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and the Amazon region. Preserving clean water in rivers and lakes is also the theme of several movements and councils. At the beginning of this millennium, an as yet diffuse movement against violence developed, especially in large urban centres. We certainly already had a Human Rights movement and this has played an important and fundamental role since the struggles of the 1970s and 1980s. The Human Rights movements have created national networks and are associated with international networks such as Amnesty International. However, at the moment, due to an overall lack of security within Brazilian society, the movement against violence in the cities has gained strength. Organized in neighbourhoods, it represents a clamour of civil society in the area of public security, to seek protection for the lives of citizens as they go about their daily business. Public opinion polls show that safety has become the population’s main concern, far greater than the fear of unemployment or of contracting a serious illness. The movements against violence in urban centres are based on localized groups and actions, and motivated by personal loss; they have begun to create networks, to mobilize the neighbourhood community associations, which are often intimidated by organized armed groups in the region. The movement against urban violence has organized marches, street demonstrations and so on. Even the student movement, which repeatedly makes entrances and exits from the public stage, has played an important role in the anti-violence movement, in campaigns such as disarming the population. To complete the present overview of urban social movements, we must not fail to mention the anti-globalization movement, which is also present in Brazil, and although in its infancy, is well organized. Despite the differences existing within this movement, which is composed of a network of networks, it combines criticism of the causes of poverty, social exclusion and conflicts with the search for and creation of a consensus that makes joint action possible. Together with economic

globalization, the movement proposes an alternative type of globalization, based on respect for different local cultures. This was its contribution to the construction of a network of globalization based on solidarity. Some of the anti-globalization movements were present at the First, Second, Third and Fifth Social Forums in Porto Alegre in 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2005; and those in 2006 in Venezuela and in 2007 in Kenya.

THE POPULAR MOVEMENTS IN BRAZIL

Urban popular movements It is important to emphasize that the sociopolitical setting described in the first part of this chapter has contributed to changes in popular movements. In recent years, the problems and the demands in poor areas have not diminished but have increased. The arena of strikes has changed because the forms of organization have changed too. The movements started to participate in networks with governmental entities, as the councils of management (even though, as is mentioned in the first part of this chapter, most public policies are formulated in partnership with NGOs and civil associations, and not with the members of movements). The popular movements have always been heterogeneous in terms of issues and demands. They are united by their socio-economic needs. In the 1990s, they created and developed networks and relationships with other social movements (from the rural areas, as MST), with unions, other social bodies, political parties and religious entities, NGOs and so on. However, profound alterations have taken place in daily life where the internal dynamics are generated. On the one hand, they have lost visibility in the urban areas; on the other hand, they have incorporated other elements, and with this have left the level of general demands, and achieved a more operational level, that of proposals. Although the

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nucleus of their demands remains practically the same, they are adopting new practices. Among the popular movements, the struggle for housing has continued to have central importance as the most organized popular struggle in the urban area. Some sectors became institutionalized, operating on the judicial plane, through advisory bodies, and making important conquests, such as the aforementioned City Statute. Another sector, together with its advisors, transferred to the NGOs in civil society, taking part in institutional projects, such as the self-administered mutual-help cooperatives and various branches of the shanty-town movements, which have initiated projects dealing with re-urbanization, removal or transfer to projects run by the public sector. A third segment has followed the model of the rural popular movement: it carried out invasions, no longer of empty areas (increasingly scarce and distant in the great urban centres), but of public and private buildings, either not in use or abandoned, in the central area of large cities. A fourth category in the housing struggle was headed by street dwellers (in São Paulo alone they number about 10,000). Living under bridges, in the doorways of shops, in squares and public places, these ‘dwellers’ increased significantly in the 1990s, both in number and in the spaces occupied. The organization of street-dwellers is rather difficult because they ‘float’ in space and they usually do not have steady jobs. In the 1990s, many of these dwellers were ‘recruited’ by MST (we will analyze this movement in the next section). The urban popular health movement, despite having become fragmented, entered into a struggle on the question of the cost of health insurance and medicine, the role of public health centres and so on. It has taken part in National Health Conferences and many of its members became involved in the administration of health advisory bodies as consumers’ representatives. With regard to the field of health, it is important to note that in some places the popular advisory bodies, created in the 1980s, still survive alongside

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the official administrative advisory bodies. Health Councils are part of a movement in which political actors and civil society have joined forces to institutionalize social participation in the process of formulating, implementing and monitoring public policies (see Coelho, 2004). The movement for transportation became considerably institutionalized and other actors came on stage, among them the independent bus drivers (who offer alternative transport), with their extremely undemocratic behaviour, as shown in their strikes. Changes in public policies related to mass transport were responsible for diminishing the conflicts in this area. But, for some social categories, such as students, there has been conflict whenever the ticket price has increased. The movement for day nurseries, which was important in the 1970s and became quite institutionalized in the 1980s, is being revived in several cities, such as São Paulo. One example is the movement of those without a day nursery. The popular movement for education is worth noting. Even though it has never had great visibility as an independent actor, at the beginning of this millennium it is taking a new form among all levels of society. Its demands have frequently been adopted by the teachers’ union and by other educational professionals. They have also been absorbed into more comprehensive battles such as the struggle for education at the time that the 1988 Constitution was being drawn up. These demands for education were put into practice by the National Forum for the Struggle for Public Schools and were basically put forward by middle-class actors. In fact, the economic crisis and unemployment have led many middle-class families to seek places in public schools. Not only are these families now more numerous, they were already used to taking an interest in schoollife and expected to do so within the State system, even though the latter had previously been closed to any community participation. As a result, schools began to play the role of

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community centres since the lack of funding and the need to solve new problems, such as safety, violence among young people and the world of drugs, drove them to look for partnerships with other entities and organized associations in the neighbourhood or region. Finally, there is a new neighbourhood movement, which differs from the residents’ associations and Friends of the Neighbourhood that have played a traditional role in various parts of Brazil. These are Community Centres of Production which have the goal of organizing the segments of the population dedicated to the production and commercialization of innumerable products for domestic use or as food. They set up warehouses for recycling products, encourage the production of food without agrochemicals, build small brick factories, apiaries and chicken farms, and market home-produced cheeses and sweets. In short, they are involved in a vast number of activities centred in cooperatives or associations in the less affluent neighbourhoods themselves. Behind these associations there are more comprehensive NGOs,6 which assess the groups wanting to set up projects, enable them to obtain funds and help them write reports and so on.

The rural popular social movements: the landless and the MST The MST is the most famous of the approximately 80 rural social movements in presentday Brazil (Fernandes, 2004). It was created in 1984. In the 1990s, social conflicts involving direct fights were displaced from the city to the countryside with the landless movements. Of the organized groups that appeared, the MST was the most noticeable and received international attention. The MST is a mass movement, but its coordination is structured as a movement/organization of staff. The MST is led by coordinators, less than 100 in all. They sustain such a mass movement the membership of which they themselves have difficulty in counting, in

terms of numbers of militants, followers and adherents. To act as an organized movement, the MST assumes an on-going role in training these coordinators. The principal campaigns organized by the MST took place in the cities: rallies, boycotts, demonstrations, occupations of public buildings and so on. Little by little, the MST has become a reference group for the struggles of other social categories of the lower and the middle classes, and even for the actions of some entrepreneurs – who went to the streets in demonstrations with banners and white caps (one of the emblematic signs of the MST is the red cap). The MST helps groups to set up settlements when they occupy the land. After the implementation phase of a settlement, the MST continues its support by means of technical assistance in productive cooperatives, the political organization of members and training in the area of education (literacy for children, training of teachers and technical training for youths and adults). The process is one of differentiated education, geared to men and women in the field, which was initiated in 1987 with the creation of an Education Sector. It experienced qualitative leaps after 1990 with the creation of a National Education Collective and the publication of materials such as educational exercise books, bulletins, and material on farming, history and other collections. In 2004, the MST inaugurated a national school for training leaders – the Florestan Fernandes School.7 By 2006, the MST was organized in almost all the states of Brazil. The number of land occupations increased again in that year: there were 57 between January and March. This was an increase over 2005, when there were 41 cases between January and March (compared with 56 cases during the same period in 2004). Public policies dealing with the movement have changed and are now contradictory. The MST dialogues directly with the federal government; it exerts pressure and is heard. However, there are few responses by the government to the demands. The conflict has been growing steadily as many leaders of the MST have

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been criminalized by the media and by the justice tribunal because they had participated in illegal actions (invasions of land). The great annual MST March has continued, and the media publicize it, but the popular interest of civil society in it is not as great as it was in 1997, the year of the first great March. Then, thousands of the landless came from their homes in the settlements and marched on foot to Brasilia, the federal capital. In fact, nowadays, the impact of the demands on public opinion has diminished, as has support from civil society. Violence in the city, including the risk of being robbed or kidnapped at any time of day or night, has resulted in urban dwellers changing their attitudes. They now censure the actions of the MST because of their fear of any actions that threaten the social structure. The media presentation of the MST during the recent past as criminal has contributed to this change in public opinion. While people recognize the need and urgency of access to land by the landless, they do not approve of the MST’s methods. Furthermore, the MST has also lost the support of many Brazilian intellectuals. A curious point is that outside Brazil the MST continues to have a good image. Many international researchers have come to Brazil to collect data about it. The MST has organized a reception sector that shows visitors many settlements. It is supported by many international movements, such as Via Campesina (a Latin-American rural movement, organized in such societies as Bolivia, Ecuador and Mexico), and by some NGOs. This support has contributed to the MST’s favourable image abroad.

CONCLUDING REMARKS In Brazil, during the transition from the military regime to democracy, social movements were predominantly analyzed from the viewpoint of Marxist theory and by theories of identity or new cultural theories of social movements. In the 1990s, there was an

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increase in research on NGOs, the Third Sector and new forms of collective initiatives and public policy. The researchers extended their analytical reference points and incorporated cultural analyses. The visibility of forms of collective initiatives that work in institutionalized spheres has been reduced. The urban social movements declined in importance during the 1990s, becoming less visible in the streets. In the 1990s, with an increase in mobilization in rural areas, the landless movements, especially the MST, extended their activities. In the opening years of the 2000s, there was a revival of social movements in urban areas, especially of the movement for housing. Social conflicts have returned to the streets and the media report them. Theories of cultural identity are predominantly used in the analyses. The networks of social organizations around micro-projects for generating income have increased, coordinated by NGOs. On the one hand, this change is explained by the economic crisis and high unemployment. On the other hand, it is explained by the increase of collective actions of solidarity. In this context, the category of civil society takes first place in analyses by researchers. This chapter considers all the NGOs, the social movements, the commissions, groups and entities struggling for human rights and the defence of those excluded because of economic, gender, race, ethnic and religious discrimination as actors of civil society. In contrast, the category of social movements has been used more often to analyze rural movements, such as the MST, the Indian Movement and the ‘Quilombola’ Movement; and, in a broader sense, to analyze the mobilization of civil society in campaigns against hunger and unemployment. Our research concludes that we are living in a new moment in the trajectory of Brazilian ‘associativism’. Now, the initiatives include social movements, Forums, social networks and NGOs. Most NGOs are changing their names to simply ‘Third Sector’, but doing so does not replace the form of social movement which was typical of the collective

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actions of protest, resistance and struggle that predominated in the 1980s (especially since this form is still very strong in rural areas). This process feeds on the conquests made by social movements, mainly those consolidated by law. But it has translated the practices of those movements into practices of a non-political nature, and reformulated the objectives of collective actions, of struggles against social exclusion generated by the economic model, in favour of agendas that seek inclusion and social integration into the current economic model, within the moulds proposed by the government and funding agencies. In some cases, however, social movements from the 1980s – for example, the housing movement – have established a fruitful dialogue with the new NGOs and other civil associations, creating new Forums and networks in the public sphere.

NOTES 1 ‘Associativismo’ is a Portuguese word which is widely used in Brazilian sociology. We could define ‘associativismo’ as a tendency or action of members of social groups, usually from popular classes, to congregate in representative associations – unions, for instance – or in social movements, or in non-governmental organizations, for the defence of their interests. One alternative is to use the word associativismo between inverted commas in an English text. I have found one example in the World Development Report 2006 (UNDP, 2006), that says: ‘In most countries, cooperatives and producer associations co-exist. Such is the case for instance in Brazil where the “associativismo” is very active in the Northwest and in the south of the country and is taking root too in Cerrados’. In this chapter I will use the word ‘associativism’ to express ‘associativismo’. 2 NGOs- (Non Governmental Organizations) are juridical forms; they are institutionalized and nonprofit organizations. Civil associations are also institutional forms, but not necessarily non-profit. A social movement is a collective action organized by civil society; it is not institutionalized. 3 In 1984, the military regime ended and democracy returned to Brazil. Democracy was formally institutionalized with the new 1988 Constitution. 4 Without providing an exhaustive list, here are some authors who deserve special mention: Charles Tilly, Jean Cohen, Andrew Arato, Sidney Tarrow,

Jeff Goodwin, George Yúdice, Hank Johnston, Bert Klandermans, Aldon Morris, Joshua Cohen, Joan Scott, John McCarthy, Anthony Oberschall, Doug McAdam, Margrit Mayer, John Logan, Robert Putnam and Pierre Hamel. 5 In Brazil, campaigns, protests, marches and the like, are called ‘mobilizations’. 6 Neighbourhood associations, composed of local citizens organized on a voluntary basis, have organized such collective initiatives as cooperatives. These associations are different from NGOs, which are institutionalized, and which can help the associations to organize the cooperative, for example. 7 Florestan Fernandes was a famous Brazilian sociologist. He was a Marxist, member of the Workers Party-PT, elected federal deputy in the 1980s. He died in the 1990s.

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Touraine, Alain (1973) Production de la société. Paris: Seuil. Touraine, Alain (1978) Le voix et le regard. Paris: Seuil. Touraine, Alain (1994) Crítica da Modernidade. Petrópolis: Vozes. Touraine, Alain (1997) Podremos vivir juntos? Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Econômica.

Touraine, Alain (1998) Do the Social Movements Exist? Congresso Internacional da ISA, Montréal, Cananda. Touraine, Alain (2005) Un nouveau paradigme. Pour comprendre le monde aujourd’hui. Paris: Fayard. Valente, Ana Lúcia E. (1994) Ser negro no Brasil hoje. 16 ed. São Paulo: Ed. Moderna.

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24 Making Sense of Social Justice and Social Mobilization in Latin America: A Discourse Analysis Victor Armony

This chapter examines the responses given by forty activists in El Salvador and Honduras to five questions on social justice and social mobilization. We are interested in collecting and analyzing data on the social representations that frame the mobilized actors’ identities, perceptions, and normative orientations.1 Rather than seeking to obtain short and precise answers on specific issues, we aimed at eliciting a more complex narrative. The respondents’ discourse was analyzed by means of a computer-assisted procedure. Our approach is based on the assumption that social representations reflect a commonsense understanding of the social world, thus providing the actors with a meaningful organization of reality (Moscovici, 1984). This is not an overly deterministic approach, but it refers to the social and historical dimension of

thinking and knowing (Billig, 1993). In this perspective, we follow McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly in ‘betting that particular cultural understandings and practices can produce quite general effects’ (2001: 346). As Melucci and Lyyra (1998: 210) have underscored, ‘A concrete social movement is always a complex and heterogeneous process that unfolds within a field of opportunities and constraints and contains a magma of empirical components’. The growing use of qualitative approaches to study social mobilization stems in part from the rising interest in culturalist explanations among sociologists and political scientists. Even when culture is not considered the main explicative factor, researchers will now often take into account the actors’ discourse and perceptions, sometimes resorting to very detailed ethnological

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observations (Auyero, 2003). Cultural elements, which are by definition highly complex and socially situated (i.e., they are rooted in history and subjectively actualized in everyday life), add to the ‘magma of empirical components’ that makes every social movement unique. How can we then associate particular cultural understandings with general effects? We have first to consider the objective transnationalization of social activism along the lines of an emerging ‘masterframe’ of ‘global social justice’ (Della Porta and Tarrow, 2005: 12). This has led both to an ideological convergence among social movements and to extended chains of argumentation, that is, discursive linkages between local conditions as directly experienced by actors and more general issues. This, of course, is not a new phenomenon: a common Marxist masterframe allowed activists in very different cultural contexts to link everyday injustices to the wider – and more abstract – issues of ‘class struggle’ and ‘the proletariat’s historic mission’. However, we need to point out an important difference: the emerging masterframe, as opposed to the sternly universalist and positivist Marxist one, actually puts cultural particularism – on a national, ethnic, group, and even personal level – at the centre of people’s narratives. In brief, we see a global call to assert local identities. But that is only part of the whole picture. It is obviously true that the ‘local’ argument has acquired social and political legitimacy, that movement leaders meet and develop a common vocabulary at international forums, and that organized civil society tends to adopt the anti-globalization and human rights rhetoric. However this simplistic perspective (‘activists talk the activist talk’) does not suffice and should be complemented by a sociological analysis of social representations. As Pierre Bourdieu, building on Émile Durkheim’s theory of social representations, points out, the social order is maintained through the correspondence of ‘objective and mental structures’ (Bourdieu, 1994). By methodically observing the way in

which individuals frame their worldview, we get much more than information on their intentions, interests, actions, and environment. As we will see, certain regularities in their discourse reveal the presence of cognitive structures that have been internalized. This paper’s goal is to analyze relevant data about current social mobilization in Latin America and also to show the heuristic potential of this particular approach. While there is ample evidence of the transformation of movement activity since the 1970s, McAdam, Sampson, Weffer, and MacIndoe point out that almost all of the work on changes in social mobilization has been ‘speculative in nature’ (2005: 5). This gap must be filled with more ‘event research’, as these authors suggest, and also with more and better ‘discourse analysis’. We contend that the systematic analysis of discursive patterns can help to unveil social representations in a way that quantitative polls and qualitative in-depth case studies cannot (Abric, 2003). People freely and spontaneously create unique narratives to make sense of their world, but they do so by referring to a limited and socially determined set of available cognitive and normative frames (Snow and Benford, 1992). Much more empirical research is still needed in order to gain a better understanding of the mechanisms through which the individual and the collective coalesce in social mobilization. By ‘treating individual statements as texts’ (Hawkesworth, 2003: 533) and, particularly, through the observation of recurrent word choices and their articulation in conceptual networks, we can explore ‘the way a given structural situation is defined and experienced and the meanings that will be attached to actions’ (Oliver et al., 2003: 12).

SOCIAL MOBILIZATION IN EL SALVADOR AND HONDURAS Several new movements have emerged in Latin America during the past decade, ranging

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SOCIAL JUSTICE IN LATIN AMERICA

from the Zapatistas in Mexico to the landless rural workers in Brazil. While each of these movements has particular features, it is nevertheless possible to observe a number of common traits, as well as a clear-cut contrast between them and the insurgent or resistance movements of the Cold War era. The case of Argentina’s Piqueteros – picketers who block highways and bridges – is particularly telling. They form a movement of mostly urban unemployed and impoverished men and women who sometimes resort to civil disobedience tactics in order to capture the attention of the government, the mass media, and public opinion. But their fundamental drive is to achieve autonomy and selforganization (Armony, 2004). These new social movements are more focused on ethical issues and operate within the parameters of what Maria da Glória Gohn (2000: 36–7) calls an ‘individual citizenship’, linked to the notion of ‘social rights’ – particularly through the idea of social ‘services’ – and to the actors’ subjective experience. As Boaventura de Sousa Santos puts it, ‘the emancipation that they fight for is one that aims at transforming [their] everyday life [...] here and now and not in a distant future’ (2001: 178). The surge of citizen mobilization in Latin America has led to a renewed interest in the symbolic dimension of social protest and the subjective aspects of social activism. Although resource mobilization theory (McAdam et al., 2001) is quite helpful in regard to the understanding of how social movements rise, develop, and succeed (or fail), its focus on organization, strategy, and outcomes tends to exclude the systematic study of discourse. Protest movements that have been emerging in Latin America since the mid-1990s defy conventional wisdom about social mobilization. They show many features that are usually found in the socalled New Social Movements (Della Porta and Diani, 1999), but they also display some very distinctive traits. For example, the relationships between reason and emotion or between material conditions and subjective

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interests appear to be less clear or direct (Jordan, 2002). Some protest movements seem to reach a critical mass through the spontaneous aggregation of actors in the streets and public spaces (which fits to a certain extent the category of ‘mass behaviour’), with no leaders, no organization, or a highly decentralized one, and with no specific political aim. However, they have shown a surprising level of cohesion in terms of the actors’ stated motives, and they have given rise to some innovative types of coordination and cooperation. These features reveal both a strong subjective component and a shared representation of the issues at stake. These become apparent in the actors’ discourse. Interestingly, this transformation of social mobilization in Latin America seems to follow trends that can be observed in North America. In an empirical study of the changing nature of movement activity in Chicago over a 30-year period, McAdam, Sampson, Weffer, and MacIndoe argue that ‘If socioeconomic disadvantage increased the likelihood of protest in 1970, the reverse is true today’ (2005: 15). Using data on some 4,000 collective civic events and public protests between 1970 and 2000, they show that the recent period is characterized by more routinized, less disruptive forms of demands. Their research also suggests that the issues motivating public protest activity have grown more local over time. The data collected by McAdam, Sampson, Weffer, and MacIndoe ‘lends empirical weight to those who have theorized about the “institutionalization” of protest and the rise of a “movement society” in the US’ (2005: 16). While the differences between North America and Latin America are still obviously significant, it is interesting to note that on both continents social mobilization seems to be associated with a quest for rights and recognition that is framed in more local and individual terms, and not necessarily or uniquely related to economic claims (Auyero, 2003). Most current mobilization in Latin America conveys a demand for inclusion in the political and economic system, rather than for its revolutionary

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transformation (Garretón, 2001). This ‘reformist’ citizen activism is fuelled by the heightened expectations brought to the fore by political democratization, and also by the sense of injustice created by the perceived disconnection between state and society (Davis and Rosan, 2004). In this chapter, we analyze the discourse of forty social activists in El Salvador and Honduras. They belong to different kinds of organizations and movements: communitybased initiatives, labour unions, NGOs, student associations, political parties, and women’s groups. Some of them hold positions of leadership, while others are regular members. The interviews were all conducted in March 2004 by the same person. At that time, El Salvador was going through an electoral process: the fifth presidential election since the democratic transition in 1979 and the third since the 1992 Peace Treaty signed between the government and the leftist guerrilla movement known as the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN), to end a 12-year civil war that cost more than 70,000 lives. The FMLN, which had since become a political party and entered the political system, arrived second in the election held on March 21, 2004. The right-wing candidate of the Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA), Antonio Saca, became the new president with almost 58% of the votes. Quite understandably, El Salvador is a highly polarized society. Salvadorians have a fresh memory of the civil war and, particularly among FMLN supporters, of the violence exerted by death squads of the extreme right not only on guerrilla fighters, but also on ordinary citizens, progressive priests, and union leaders. Honduras is one of the poorest countries in the hemisphere, but it can be seen as a relatively stable society when compared to its neighbours in Central America. While Honduras has certainly been plagued by numerous rebellions, civil wars, and changes of government, it accomplished a democratic transition in the early 1980s and has since been spared the political conflicts that

deeply divided Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. However, a natural disaster devastated the country. In 1998, Hurricane Mitch severely damaged Honduras’ economy and a full recovery is yet to be seen. Ricardo Maduro, a USA-educated centre-to-right businessman, was elected president in 2001. He promised a crackdown on violent crime, which many Hondurans believe is one of the main problems in their country. Crime, conducted mainly by youth gangs known as maras, is obviously linked to the fact that economic inequality is rife in Honduran society. Poverty and unemployment are prevalent among the majority of citizens. The neoliberal reforms carried out during the 1990s sharply reduced the number of unionized jobs and significantly weakened the labour unions. The labour movement nevertheless continues to play an important role in Honduras. It probably embodies for most Hondurans the essence of the popular movement, more than any other organization, including left-wing political parties. El Salvador and Honduras represent two different societal outcomes in the context of common structural conditions. Both countries, much like their neighbours, are economically dependent and their wealth is distributed very unequally, with a majority of citizens living in poverty. Despite Honduras’ comparatively better record, democratic institutions are fragile in Central America and the rule of law is far from being upheld fully, particularly in regard to socially and culturally marginalized populations. We chose El Salvador and Honduras for the first phase of our comparative study because of the similarities and differences between them.2 On the one hand, although Honduras is ‘poorer’ than El Salvador (in terms of per capita Gross Domestic Product, 1990–97 average: US$ 753 and US$ 1,392 respectively), these two countries have a similar level of human development (as measured by the United Nations Development Programme: Honduras ranks 117th and El Salvador ranks 101st out of 177 countries in 2004) and share several demographic features (e.g., comparable

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population size and growth rate; similar age structure, rural-urban distribution, and religious and ethnic make-up of the population.) On the other hand, as we already pointed out, their political history has followed quite dissimilar paths. We do not intend to explain – or even factor in – these differences here. Our goal in this chapter is to show how social representations in two neighbouring states with distinct structures display common patterns.

A DISCOURSE ANALYSIS A five-question protocol was designed and interviews were conducted on a one-to-one basis. The sample was obtained through multiple snowballing (chain-referral) as well as from contacts with networks of social activists. (The interviews were conducted under the author’s supervision by Rosa Amelia Maltez, a graduate student at the Université du Québec à Montréal.) In this regard, the sample is obviously statistically unrepresentative. However, we carried out quantitative procedures on the respondents’ vocabulary in order to detect objective patterns in their discourse. These procedures are themselves statistically based and allow probabilistic inferences about the subjects’ word choices. The questions in the interview protocol were extremely simple and purposely broad. Each of them contains one or two key words that aim to trigger reactions and associations: (1) What are the main injustices in this country? (2) Who benefits from them? (3) What should be done in order to put the country on the right track? (4) Who speaks on behalf of the people? (5) What is your role in this movement? The first question’s focus is on the notion of injustice, and implicitly addresses the definition of ‘Us’. The second question encourages the respondent to elaborate on the issue of social and political conflict, by naming the adversary. The third question refers to the goals and objectives of social mobilization, the fourth to the issue of representation and cooperation,

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and the fifth to the actor’s self-perception in the context of social change. On the surface, these five questions address concerns and topics with which all members of social movements are very familiar. In fact, in many cases, the answers may convey elements taken directly from the movement’s official platform. But by giving respondents the opportunity to elaborate and by telling them, at the beginning of the interview, that we seek their personal perspective, we elicit what the respondents apparently believe to be their own thoughts on these matters. These particular questions lead respondents to speak about social conflict and cooperation. They mirror the crucial, timeless questions of collective action: What is to be done? What brings us together? Who is with us and who is against us? We recorded an average of 4,000 words from each respondent, or approximately 800 words for each of the five questions in our interview protocol. The text database contains in all 158,000 words. Our method of discourse analysis is heterodox as it does not apply the usual criteria found in most quantitative or qualitative studies. Quantitative approaches usually focus on electoral and political data, eventanalysis (including media coverage analysis), and opinion polls in order to describe and explain the behaviour of the mobilized (or non-mobilized) individuals and groups. These approaches provide robust data and a comparative and cumulative perspective, but they fail to grasp the complexity, heterogeneity, and internal logic of the activists’ representations. Qualitative approaches build on historical research, ethnological observation, and in-depth interviews with key informants in order to grasp the way actors define and experience their actions and their environment. These approaches provide insight into activists’ discourse, but they (usually) fail to produce robust data and a comparative and cumulative perspective. In-depth semistructured interviews can sometimes strike a balance between the quantitative and qualitative approaches, but they, for the most part, are based on context-specific research objectives.

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Our approach aims at overcoming some of these limitations (Duchastel and Armony, 1996). By asking simple and general (non-context-specific) questions and empirically observing consistent patterns in the interviewees’ discourse, we obtain robust data from a comparative and a cumulative perspective, while preserving to some extent the complexity, heterogeneity, and internal logic of activists’ representations. We have applied to the interview transcripts a computer-assisted procedure based on the principle of ‘distinctive notions’.3 This principle is theoretically linked to the concept of paradigmatic preferences, which refers to the recurrent linguistic choices made by speakers when several similar words are available to them. The paradigmatic selection can be seen as a menu of possible choices between similar but not fully equivalent words that can be used to fit a slot in a given sentence. If a given individual consistently uses the term ‘immigrant’ when referring to alien residents, instead of other semantically equivalent terms such as ‘newcomer’ or ‘foreigner’, it is possible to infer a paradigmatic preference (which can be, and often is, involuntary and unconscious). Interestingly, this phenomenon can be observed through statistical means. Words that are significantly overused or underused by a group of speakers when responding to a given question may reveal a meaningful pattern of preferences within the stream of discourse. A common criticism of this kind of word-based statistical approach is that words mean different things to different people and in different contexts. While this remark is in itself obviously true (language is, by definition, fluid), it misses a crucial point: this analysis focuses on the signifiers. The fact that most respondents, with different personal and cultural backgrounds, chose the same words to respond to certain ideas tells us about a shared disposition to frame social reality in a particular way. The analyst does not presuppose that this meaning exists; she observes it as a social fact (see Laclau and Mouffe, 1985).

This method was applied to the five questions in the two countries included in the first phase of our research (El Salvador and Honduras). The tables show the main distinctive terms elicited for each question in each country, that is, the words that the activists in each country tend to prioritize when they enunciate their response to a particular question. The rationale behind this procedure is quite simple and it is based on the same assumptions underlying the commonly used word-association technique. We aim at observing recurrent, non-random patterns in the subjects’ choice of words when they react to a representation (usually conveyed by a concept or a sentence). The columns show the total frequency of each term (the number of times it appears in the country database), the partial frequency (the number of times it appears in the answers to a specific question), and the level of significance regarding the difference between expected and observed frequencies. If we observe that the word x shows a significantly higher than expected frequency in the answers to question y, we consider that the word x is statistically associated with the question y. All terms that are semantically empty were eliminated from the tables, as well as those whose overrepresentation is mostly due to their frequent use by particular respondents. We set the confidence limit (the chance that the observed differences are due to an underlying reason) at 99% (a z-value of 3). The terms in the tables were sorted by statistical significance (the higher the z-value, the lower the probability of a random difference), and translated from Spanish into English. All instances of the selected words were observed in context in order to make sure that they convey a relatively stable meaning. Table 24.1 shows the results obtained from the distinctive-notion analysis of the answers to the first question: ‘What are the main injustices in this country?’ We observe a strikingly clear pattern in terms of crosscountry and thematic coherence. The respondents dwell on the notion of ‘injustice’, and while they link it to all-encompassing

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Table 24.1

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‘What are the main injustices in this country?’

HONDURAS WORD TF PF Z health 105 70 14 education 106 68 13 access 46 35 10 doctor 22 21 10 application 32 26 9 lack 66 41 8 services 39 27 7 insurance 33 24 7 service 18 16 7 hospitals 13 12 6 distribution 11 11 6 illnesses 24 18 6 population 43 27 6 perpetrate 26 19 6 wealth 13 11 5 countryside 39 24 5 children 25 18 5 attention 19 15 5 protection 13 11 5 hospital 11 10 5 area 26 18 5 justice 74 39 5 city 33 21 5 hours 20 15 5 hands 19 13 4 conditions 59 30 4 housing 30 19 4 privatization 12 10 4 rural 27 17 4 wages 43 21 3 cities 12 9 3 poverty 56 27 3 man 12 9 3 production 31 18 3 industry 15 10 3 model 12 9 3 bad 30 16 3 TF: Total Frequency – number of times a given word appears in the activists’ discourse as a whole; PF: Partial Frequency – number of times a given word is used by activists to respond to a specific question; Z: Level of significance of the difference between the expected partial frequency and the observed partial frequency

WORD health hospitals employment lack access problem impunity doctors causes fees conditions services poverty months wages justice day budget perpetration maquilas university coffee area education system

EL SALVADOR TF 112 15 21 29 18 49 19 19 12 14 55 35 36 18 30 43 45 16 15 45 44 16 44 130 76

PF 70 15 16 20 13 26 14 13 8 10 26 19 19 12 16 23 22 11 10 23 22 11 22 54 34

Z 13 8 5 5 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

ideas, such as the national interest and the common good, most of them make an explicit connection with the subjective concerns of ‘ordinary people’. They might have given similar answers to the question ‘What’s wrong with this country?’ but the notion of ‘injustice’ clearly elicited the focus of their discourse on social issues that have a direct bearing on everyday life. The most distinctive notion in both samples is ‘health’.

We also see in the vocabulary a particular focus on the accessibility of medical services through terms, such as ‘access’, ‘doctors’, ‘hospitals’, ‘insurance’, and ‘services’. In El Salvador, as in most Central American countries, public services, including basic government functions such as policing and the administration of justice, are generally scarce, if not simply absent in rural areas. This statement is an example of this sense of

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state-society distance expressed by several respondents: ... we find that many injustices are perpetrated in this area, our people don’t have accessible health services, there are no medicines in the hospitals (Case S5. Male leader of a student association in El Salvador).

We also observe in the answers to the first question a number of recurrent references to the distribution of wealth, education, poverty, and employment. However, even if the individuals in our sample were contacted primarily because of their participation in a social movement or community-based initiative, in several cases they tend to provide examples of problems taken from their own personal experience: ... speaking of wages in these maquilas, you earn the same minimum salary that is not enough for anything. They make us work from seven in the morning to seven in the evening with the same salary, because the extra hours get lost when you claim them; they say to you that you’re mistaken (Case S3. Female worker and union organizer in El Salvador). ... the moment we need [a doctor], it becomes quite difficult for us to have access to them even in hospitals, because they are concentrated in the bigger hospitals. For us, to come from the country’s interior, sometimes it is even difficult to get a means of transportation (Case H17. Male leader of a peasant labour union in Honduras).

Both men and women tend to spontaneously frame the idea of injustice in a narrative in which the access to health and other social services summarizes and illustrates the denial of citizenship. While respondents of both genders display this tendency, it is interesting to note that female respondents use politically charged categories such as ‘people’ or ‘government’ to answer this first question significantly less often than their male counterparts. The second question (‘Who benefits from this situation where injustices prevail?’) aims at bringing the respondents to name and describe the antagonist, a key representation in any socio-political narrative. Table 24.2 shows that ‘they’ are essentially ‘the rich’, the ‘business people’, the ‘banks’, the ‘capitalists’,

and the ‘oligarchy’. These are, of course, the usual suspects in countries such as El Salvador and Honduras, where the financial resources are concentrated in the hands of a few families. But it is interesting to note in the respondents’ discourse, a link between the perceived ‘systemic’ forces that create social injustice – namely the ‘transnationals’ – and their experience and perception of the maquila, both a reality and a symbol: ... [in the maquilas] the human being is not seen as human; the business people and the government only see an object of production (Case S16. Female union leader in El Salvador).

The participants – with no significant difference between men and women – consistently point to the unfair conditions they find at the maquilas – low wages, long hours, lack of social benefits – and deplore the fact that these businesses do not behave as responsible corporate citizens. They do not pay enough taxes; they only take their self-interest into account, etc. Although this discourse would be considered perfectly normal in a North American setting, it reveals an intriguing phenomenon in Latin America. The maquila or maquiladora is a labour-intensive assembly plant wholly or predominantly owned by foreigners. The maquilas manufacture products for export, usually using parts and materials shipped on a duty- and tariff-free basis from the market to which the finished product is returned. Their ‘foreignness’ is obvious to the workers they employ and to the communities where they are implanted. It is hardly surprising that the maquilas have come to embody the symbol of globalization in many Latin American countries, particularly in Mexico and Central America. A key aspect of the maquila is that young women represent a large proportion, sometimes the majority, of its workforce. A particularly interesting phenomenon is that the maquila’s foreignness paradoxically contributes to foster higher expectations regarding labour rights and work conditions. They are perceived as taking advantage of local corruption and laxity, but social activists measure the

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Table 24.2

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‘Who benefits from this situation?’

EL SALVADOR HONDURAS WORD TF PF Z WORD TF PF Z them/they 244 92 15 transnationals 40 29 16 rich people 56 34 13 businesses 93 43 12 transnationals 21 19 13 owners 37 23 10 owners 26 18 9 them/they 205 66 9 big 67 31 8 profits 17 12 7 families 42 23 8 allowances 22 13 6 businesses 64 29 7 taxes 18 12 6 ministry 45 22 7 banks 17 10 5 capitalists 17 12 6 maquilas 58 22 5 oligarchy 11 9 6 Supreme Court 18 10 5 public servants 19 12 6 funds 18 9 4 bank 16 10 5 (they) should 10 7 4 business people 19 11 5 big 73 23 4 controls 13 9 5 (they) pay 26 11 4 banks 15 10 5 business people 34 14 4 dollar 16 9 4 control 12 7 4 same 32 14 4 work 218 52 4 colonies 23 11 4 justice 74 21 3 class 29 14 4 wants 33 11 3 pay 19 10 4 public servants 14 7 3 financial 10 7 4 major 16 8 3 works 10 7 4 (they) sell 11 6 3 (they) control 10 7 4 same ones 54 17 3 work-related 17 8 3 maquila 53 17 3 wealth 18 8 3 laws 36 13 3 capital 17 8 3 money 37 12 3 dollars 43 14 3 workforce 12 6 3 (they) want 17 8 3 Salvadorians 41 15 3 few 22 9 3 millions 25 11 3 trade 22 9 3 exploitation 20 9 3 maquila 20 9 3 taxes 29 12 3 TF: Total Frequency – number of times a given word appears in the activists’ discourse as a whole; PF: Partial Frequency – number of times a given word is used by activists to respond to a specific question; Z: Level of significance of the difference between the expected partial frequency and the observed partial frequency

maquila’s actors against their own ‘foreign’ standards: ... the owners of the maquilas, the transnationals that, with our work, obtain more profits than they would in their countries, because over there they have to do what is fair, what the law says (Case H10. Female participant in a peasant movement in Honduras).

It is the third question (‘What should be done in order to put the country on the right track?’) that brings the respondents in our sample to focus on the political realm (‘government’,

‘politicians’, ‘president’, ‘state’, etc.), as we see in Table 24.3. While it was not expected that this question would elicit radical terms such as ‘revolution’ or ‘class struggle’, it is still remarkable to find an extensive vocabulary related to an essentially pragmatic perspective: ‘measure’, ‘plan’, ‘policy’, ‘problem’, ‘project’, ‘proposition’, ‘solution’, ‘solve’, ‘to talk’, ‘to think’, ‘to try’, etc. A key distinctive notion in the social activists’ discourse is that of ‘change’, which appears in several forms (i.e., the verb and

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Table 24.3

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‘What should be done in order to put the country on the right track?’

EL SALVADOR WORD TF change 89 debt 13 FMLN 93 ignorance 14 (it) needs 28 crisis 20 (we) want 27 (we) need 22 problems 52 measure 30 (to) live 14 sectors 39 in front of 44 (to) work 43 allow 10 policies 57 solution 10 centre 24 government 281 solve 14 needs 28 population 93 (to) talk 34 (they) can 39 state 86 constitution 26 (to) begin 11 (to) try 12 democracy 24 changes 25 development 26

HONDURAS WORD TF PF sectors 134 51 everyone 186 64 development 80 34 (to) change 25 16 democracy 22 15 government 296 82 civil society 24 14 (to) demand 11 8 vision 16 10 change 29 14 political 39 18 project 43 18 society 67 25 (to) think 22 11 difficult 46 17 (we) think 18 10 (to) work 40 16 changes 40 17 possible 20 11 (we) should 19 10 to be able to 192 52 new 10 7 plan 31 14 people 264 65 will 14 8 politics 84 23 real 15 7 (we) want 52 18 (we) need 22 10 popular 57 17 own 13 7 politicians 64 21 president 33 13 proposition 23 9 situation 94 26 TF: Total Frequency – number of times a given word appears in the activists’ discourse as a whole; PF: Partial Frequency – number of times a given word is used by activists to respond to a specific question; Z: Level of significance of the difference between the expected partial frequency and the observed partial frequency PF 42 11 36 10 14 11 14 12 21 15 8 15 17 17 7 20 7 11 70 8 12 27 12 13 24 11 6 7 10 10 11

Z 11 7 7 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Z 9 9 8 7 7 6 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

with the help of faith ... and democracy, well, we would have something better ... (Case S13. Male participant in a political movement in El Salvador).

the singular and plural noun). We also see in both samples the terms ‘democracy’ and ‘development’. In what would have been denounced by the left as ‘reformist’ language not long ago, the respondents have tended to frame their narrative in terms of ‘lacking’ (the word ‘lack’ itself is a distinctive notion in the answers to the question about injustices in both samples) and the need for ‘more’ and ‘better’:

Many respondents identify themselves with the ideological left (and several women with the ‘women’s movement’), and they hope for a major change in politics. But in most instances, they put forward a desire for better governance rather than for a project of structural transformation:

... a significant change that would produce a better environment ... to hope for a stronger left ...

I believe that it’s there where we could begin to change our country, to have a stable and engaged

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government, and then to create public policies ... so things can be reversed and it becomes possible to work efficiently, and to get involved with the people’s health ... their basic needs ... (Case S5. Male leader of a student association in El Salvador).

The fourth question (‘Who speaks on behalf of the people?’) raises the issue of collective identity and political representation. The idea of the ‘people’ is given in public discourse in Latin America. Never precisely defined, it usually refers to the majority of the population as it stands outside – and against – the ruling classes, that is, the rich and powerful groups and families (sometimes seen as intertwined with foreign interests and thus alienated from the national community). But this dichotomy becomes Table 24.4

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extremely complex in the actual political dynamic. The popular sectors in Latin America have historically engaged in diverse ‘multi-class’ alliances, which may include the intellectuals, the army, nationalist entrepreneurs, etc. Certain members of these elites have actually become the ‘representatives’ of the people at different times and in different contexts. While the first question deals with the representation of ‘Us’ as victims of injustice, the fourth question brings the respondents to express their perception of the ‘popular’ sectors as organized actors in the socio-political arena. Table 24.4 shows that the national situation affected the kind of response we got. In El Salvador, for example, the presidential election made activists more aware of the right-left divide and of the political

‘Who speaks on behalf of the people?’

EL SALVADOR HONDURAS WORD TF PF Z WORD TF PF Z the Church 57 44 24 the Church 61 53 35 voice 31 25 15 labour unions 42 28 14 the poor 106 53 15 voice 27 21 13 organizations 85 44 14 leadership 32 22 11 leadership 26 21 13 the poor 94 37 8 leaders 27 20 11 Catholic 14 11 7 Catholic 19 15 9 Bloque popular 31 17 7 Monseñor Romero 17 13 8 organizations 119 41 7 FMLN 93 32 5 proposals 14 11 7 ballot 19 11 5 truth 431 102 6 obtains 11 8 5 role 28 15 6 (to) change 30 15 5 force 36 16 5 plan 35 16 5 movement 88 27 4 (to) vote 14 8 4 I 232 57 4 (Handal) Schafik 16 9 4 actions 30 11 3 (to) mention 20 10 4 CGT 28 10 3 the left 65 23 4 (we) believe 59 17 3 (we) can 72 23 4 our 57 16 3 defense 13 8 4 labour union 47 14 3 leader 13 8 4 parties 31 12 3 churches 11 7 4 NGOs 20 9 3 message 11 7 4 ability 18 8 3 politicians 35 14 4 leaders 16 8 3 unions 16 7 3 we 460 95 3 (we) see 42 15 3 (ordinary) people 190 44 3 the right 57 18 3 (I) believe 104 27 3 party 124 32 3 campaign 13 7 3 TF: Total Frequency – number of times a given word appears in the activists’ discourse as a whole; PF: Partial Frequency – number of times a given word is used by activists to respond to a specific question; Z: Level of significance of the difference between the expected partial frequency and the observed partial frequency

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process itself, But among the main distinctive notions common to both countries and to both genders, the Catholic Church and ‘the poor’ stand out. The social and political importance of the Catholic Church in Central America, as well as the ideological message of the Theology of Liberation, obviously explains these results in part (Cleary and Steigenga, 2004). But it can also be seen as another expression of the mounting loss of confidence in the political institutions, sometimes even including the leftist parties and the labour unions. The connection between the church and the poor is seen as a fundamental social bond. I consider that the church also has a leadership ... speaking on behalf of the poor ... but perhaps mostly at a spiritual level ... the church often captures the message of the majority of the poor through the closeness it has with them (Case S14. Female member of a municipal council in El Salvador). ... the Church is for us, at least in this region, our saviour, not only for our sins but also for the assaults that ... are carried out against us; she raises her voice on our behalf, when they see that an injustice is being committed ... against us (Case H8. Female member of a local development organization in Honduras).

For the most part, this bond is described in terms of local politics, everyday life, and community issues. In this context, the ideas of cooperation and group solidarity are prevalent. We have seen so far that the respondents’ discourse tends to be structured around notions, such as health, education, social services, wages, workplace conditions, and (pragmatic) change. The churches (mostly Catholic, but also Protestant) are seen as key elements in a quest for social justice. The answers to the fifth question (‘What is your role in the movement?’) further illustrate this focus on community work, as opposed to a more militant stance. Table 24.5 shows that in both countries this means speaking of ‘struggles’, but also of collective work, organization, and learning. Interestingly, it is in the answers to this question that the language becomes feminized. The most distinctive notion is ‘women’ in

both samples, and we also observe several instances of gender-specific terms. This phenomenon is explained by the fact that it is the women in the samples who introduce a distinctive vocabulary in their discourse. It is not necessarily a ‘women’s discourse’ or a ‘discourse on women’, as the focus is generally set on issues that affect men, women, and their families: ... we believe that with our help men and women can attain other levels of organization, and other economic levels, and that they can have solidarity among themselves, and that they can have a better life, by improving their way of thinking, their consciousness (Case H6. Female leader in a labor union in Honduras).

Some terms, such as ‘children’ or ‘home’, are traditionally linked to the experience of women. But other correlations are less easily explained. For example, Table 24.6 shows that the words ‘rights’, ‘spaces’, and ‘organization’ are used significantly more by women than men in our samples. A more ‘subjective’ enunciation also seems to characterize women’s discourse (i.e., the more frequent use of the first person singular pronoun in their responses). Although we cannot generalize at this exploratory stage, it appears that women contribute a different vocabulary and, more fundamentally, a somewhat different representation of citizenship that increasingly permeates the activists’ discourse. In a study of women’s participation in past revolutionary movements in Latin America, Julie D. Shayne showed that traditional notions of femininity simultaneously enhanced and limited the value of their contribution (Shayne, 2004: 160). It is not yet clear if this will also be the case with contemporary social movements, but our data seems to support the hypothesis that women’s participation has also made inroads into citizen mobilization at the discursive level.

CONCLUDING REMARKS We have suggested in this chapter that current forms of mobilization in Latin America

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Table 24.5

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‘What is your role in the movement?’

HONDURAS WORD TF PF Z women 260 106 16 organization 99 49 12 federation 30 19 7 land 41 23 7 men 21 14 6 instruction 10 9 6 struggle 72 30 6 teachers 18 13 6 labour union 35 19 6 succeeded 24 14 5 peace 12 9 5 our 99 36 5 groups 26 15 5 support 37 18 5 process 37 18 5 comrades 44 20 5 structure 16 10 4 woman 51 20 4 rights 74 26 4 answer 27 14 4 working 29 14 4 departments 17 10 4 projects 34 16 4 peasant (adj.) 11 8 4 they/them (fem.) 62 20 3 department 10 6 3 (we) try 11 6 3 we 460 110 3 Visitación Padilla 10 6 3 we (fem.) 42 17 3 struggles 10 6 3 succeed 32 14 3 actions 30 12 3 communities 34 13 3 agricultural 14 7 3 (to) solve 18 9 3 basis 16 8 3 national 75 26 3 (we) struggle 12 7 3 struggling 11 6 3 TF: Total Frequency – number of times a given word appears in the activists’ discourse as a whole; PF: Partial Frequency – number of times a given word is used by activists to respond to a specific question; Z: Level of significance of the difference between the expected partial frequency and the observed partial frequency WORD women working communities work struggle project (to) instruct (we) work capable students university instruction important popular our groups we (fem.) (I) can (I) feel aid organization necessary our (pl.) organizations area support labour union (adj.) social new (pl.)

EL SALVADOR TF 198 39 30 187 72 51 10 17 10 26 13 13 28 17 38 18 12 18 16 31 40 18 60 85 44 25 25 125 13

PF 86 24 17 57 28 20 8 11 8 12 8 8 12 9 15 10 8 9 7 11 15 8 18 25 16 10 11 33 7

Z 19 10 7 6 6 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

are associated with a shift in social representations. Goals, means, and strategies certainly changed during the 1990s, but today’s activists seem different from those in other time periods at a conceptual level also. Our approach does not aim at confirming this shift or measuring its scope. We are interested

in observing how the individuals involved in social mobilization perceive and give meaning to their own actions. We consider that recurrent vocabulary choices are due to underlying reasons, and that those reasons are to a great extent socially determined. We conducted a computer-assisted discourse

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Activists’ distinctive vocabulary by gender (El Salvador and Honduras)

MEN WORD TF PF people 471 277 service 31 27 situation 185 118 activities 22 19 price 27 22 university 51 38 actions 47 36 workers 201 123 same/equal 68 47 (the) left 67 47 (we) consider 28 23 marginalization 15 13 federation 37 27 (we) call 21 17 services 74 50 really 120 73 president 68 45 persons 191 110 issues 25 20 interests 50 35 conflict 18 15 (we) struggle 18 15 aspects 15 13 situations 33 24 oligarchy 12 11 face 16 14 epoch 13 12 peasant 56 38 faith 19 16 (to) give 94 59 causes 13 12 votes 17 15 TF: Total Frequency – number of times a given word appears in the activists’ discourse as a whole; PF: Partial Frequency – number of times a given word is used by activists to respond to a specific question; Z: Level of significance of the difference between the expected partial frequency and the observed partial frequency

WORD women we (fem.) they/them (fem.) I maquilas woman men maquila workers (fem.) companies children code owners teachers goal comrades (fem.) rights production insurance violence human (I) say job hours (we) see spaces worker (fem.) communities rural municipalities organization

WOMEN TF 458 54 95 550 103 94 49 73 66 157 65 48 63 20 20 30 181 42 61 35 41 130 405 31 132 40 28 64 16 15 139

PF 429 53 80 360 83 77 45 60 56 116 54 43 52 20 20 28 128 36 49 31 35 92 257 27 90 33 24 48 16 15 94

Z 99 14 11 10 9 9 9 8 8 8 8 8 7 7 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 6 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5

analysis in order to detect patterns of word use. The fact that the research participants tended to organize their narratives around specific terms provides us with an insight into their social representations. Even though there is a growing interest in the symbolic dimension of social mobilization, few sociologists and political scientists dwell on social representations as objects of analysis per se. Our goal is to contribute to fill this research gap. This chapter presented some results from a cross-country study. The answers to the five questions in our interview protocol showed certain clear patterns. We saw that respondents

Z 8 6 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4

tended to make an explicit connection between the idea of justice and the subjective experience of ‘ordinary people’, including themselves. They identified the foreign investors who own the maquilas as the beneficiaries of the unjust economic system and by doing so they again linked the larger picture – neo-liberal globalization, market liberalization – to their everyday life. We have seen that social activists focus on selforganization, learning, and a desire for ‘more’ and ‘better’ rather than ‘something else’. They trust the church, but not necessarily the political parties. Very few traces of a nationalist stance were observed in their discourse.

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Our objective in this research is three-fold. First, we aim to demonstrate, by means of statistical procedures, that the ‘magma of empirical components’ (Melucci and Lyyra, 1998: 210) and the ‘particular cultural understandings and practices’ (McAdam et al., 2001: 346) that underlie social mobilization follow some general patterns even at the most subjective level. In this regard, our methodology enables us to obtain robust data on the activists’ discourse. These results can be used, along with other types of data (polling, event-analysis, etc.), to trace changes and describe ‘cultural’ tendencies in social movements. ‘Subjective’ information – when not collected through sampling – is too often dismissed as either non-reliable or only relevant to a specific context. We have shown that, by asking simple and general, noncontext-specific questions and empirically detecting patterns in the interviewees’ choice of words, we can observe the social representations that frame their identities, perceptions, and normative orientations. Second, our analysis seems to confirm the trend towards cultural particularism in social mobilization. We see, in the activists’ narratives, the centrality of the ‘here and now’ and the focus on ‘transforming everyday life’ (Santos, 2001: 178). However, this phenomenon does not necessarily translate into purely ‘spontaneous’ or mostly ‘fragmented’ activism. Our research reveals a significant degree of cohesion in terms of the actors’ shared representations of the main issues at stake. As we said, these representations are not uniquely related to economic claims. They convey a demand for inclusion in the political and economic system, rather than for its revolutionary transformation. The hypothesis of the ‘institutionalization’ of protest and the rise of a ‘movement society’ in Latin America, even if there are still significant differences when compared to North America, is supported by our findings. Third, our approach is particularly suited for comparing different groups within the social movements. Different vocabularies mean different ways of framing social reality.

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Obviously, not every choice of words reflects a significant divergence in people’s worldview. However, systematic preferences when selecting words to articulate it may indicate a distinct perception of self and of the issues at stake. In this regard, a particularly interesting aspect to analyze is gender-based differences in discourse. If we consider that one of the innovative aspects of the current forms of social mobilization in Latin America is the framing of grievances through the language of rights, and that preliminary evidence shows that women produce a discourse that is more strongly connected to the idea of ‘rights’ than that of men while linking it to life-world themes; we can speculate that women’s participation in sex-integrated social movements may have a causal effect on the way in which social mobilization is framed. Specifically, this means that the female activists’ focus on life-world themes and rights claims could contribute to further the shift towards ‘citizen mobilization’ and away from other forms of mobilization that focus on political issues and are prone to frame their agenda in terms of antagonistic confrontation. Citizens’ movements seek recognition of individual and group rights, rather than trying to impose a specific program of overall social transformation. They stress on intra- and inter-group cooperation, but they assign a particular value to autonomy, both individual and communal. Does this shift towards a less disruptive, more routinized, and more individualized mobilization spell the end of conflict as the main factor of social change in Latin America? The answer is, of course, no. However, conflict, as well as cooperation, becomes more institutionalized through the notion of citizenship. The notions of citizenship and dignity were not often explicitly invoked, but they appeared to permeate the respondents’ narratives. Their central demand is to be treated fairly by the state and by the market. The very idea that fair conditions at the workplace and proper services provided by the state should be normally expected constitutes in itself a new phenomenon in

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Latin America. But is this a process of depoliticization? It could actually be argued that we are witnessing the emergence of new forms of political action, based on a more individualistic – but not necessarily egotistical (self-centred) – conception of emancipation and empowerment. More research is needed to explore the changing links between citizenship and subjectivity. Discourse analysis is a particularly useful tool to this end.

NOTES 1 This project is funded by a Standard Research Grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. 2 This research will include four more countries: Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, and Guatemala. 3 This procedure was carried out using Lexico3, a software program developed by André Salem at Université de la Sorbonne Nouvelle – Paris III (France).

REFERENCES Abric, J.-C. (2003) Méthodes d’étude des représentations sociales. Ramonville, France: Éditions Érès. Armony, Victor (2004) L’énigme argentine. Images d’une société en crise. Montréal: Athéna. Auyero, Javier (2003) Contentious Lives. Two Argentine Women, Two Protests, and the Quest for Recognition. Durham: Duke University Press. Billig, Michael (1993) ‘Studying the Thinking Society: Social Representations, Rhetoric, and Attitudes’, in Glynis M. Breakwell and David V. Canter (eds.) Empirical Approaches to Social Representations. Oxford, UK: Clarendon. pp. 39–62. Bourdieu, Pierre (1994) Raisons pratiques. Sur la théorie de l’action. Paris: Seuil. Cleary, Edward L. and Steigenga, Timothy J. (eds.) (2004) Resurgent Voices in Latin America: Indigenous Peoples, Political Mobilization, and Religious Change. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Cohen, Jean L. and Arato, Andrew (1999) Civil Society and Political Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Colburn, Francis (2002) Latin America at the End of Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Cox, Robert W. (1996) ‘A Perspective on Globalisation’, in J. Mittelman (ed.) Globalisation: Critical Reflections. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publisher. pp. 21–30. Davis, Diane E. and Rosan, Christina A. (2004) ‘Social Movements in the Mexico City Airport Controversy: Globalization, Democracy, and the Power of Distance’, Mobilization, 9(3): 279–93. Della Porta, Donatella and Diani, Mario (1999) Social Movements: An Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Della Porta, Donatella and Tarrow, Sidney (2005) Transnational Protest and Global Activism. People, Passions, and Power. NY: Rowman & Littlefield. Duchastel, Jules and Armony, Victor (1996) ‘Textual Analysis in Canada: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Qualitative Data’, Current Sociology, XLIV(3): 259– 78. Garretón, Antonio (2001) ‘La transformación de la acción colectiva en América Latina’, Revista de la CEPAL, 76: 7– 24. Gohn, Maria da Glória (2000) Os Sem-Terra, ONGs e Ciudadanía: A sociedade civil brasileira na era da globalização. São Paulo: Cortez. Hawkesworth, Mary (2003) ‘Congressional Enactments of Race–Gender: Toward a Theory of Raced–Gendered Institutions’, American Political Science Review, 97(4): 529–50. Jordan, Tim (2002) Activism! Direct Activism, Hacktivism and the Future of Society. London: Reaktion. Laclau, Ernesto and Mouffe, Chantal (1985) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics. London and NY: Verso. McAdam, Doug, Sampson, Robert J., Weffer, Simon and MacIndoe, Heather (2005) ‘“There Will Be Fighting in the Streets:” The Distorting Lens of Social Movement Theory’, Mobilization, 10: 1–18. McAdam, Doug, Tarrow, Sidney and Tilly, Charles (2001) Dynamics of Contention. NY: Cambridge University Press.

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Melucci, Alberto and Lyyra, Timo (1998) ‘Collective Action, Change, and Democracy’, in Marco G. Giugni, Doug McAdam and Charles Tilly (eds.) From Contention to Democracy. NY: Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 203–27. Moscovici, Serge (1984) ‘Le domaine de la psychologie sociale’, in S. Moscovici (ed.) La psychologie sociale. Paris: PUF. pp. 5–22. Oliver, Pamela E., Cadena-Roa, Jorge and Strawn, Kelley D. (2003) ‘Emerging Trends in the Study of Protest and Social Movements’, in Betty A. Dobratz, Timothy Buzzell and Lisa K. Waldner (eds.) Research in Political Sociology, 11: 213–44.

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Santos, Boaventura de Sousa (2001) ‘Los nuevos movimientos sociales’, Observatorio Social de América Latina, 5: 177–84, September. Shayne, Julie D. (2004) The Revolution Question: Feminisms in El Salvador, Chile, and Cuba. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Snow, David A. and Benford, Robert D. (1992) ‘Master Frames and Cycles of Protest’, in Aldon D. Morris and Carol M. Mueller (eds.) Frontiers in Social Movement Theory. New Haven: Yale University Press. pp. 133–55.

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25 Industrial and Labour Studies, Socio-Economic Transformation, Conflict, and Cooperation in KwaZulu Natal Ari Sitas

‘There is gold in the workers’ brain’. (Motto, Nissan Motor Corporation)

INTRODUCTION

‘they took the gold from the holes where the walls are singing there is none in our brain, there is; bile, there’. (Terence Miya-ex Mineworker)

For a brief period of approximately 20 years the platform was there for ordinary black people to express not only their grievances and anger but also a rich trove of popular wisdom, self-determination and ingenuity. The rise of a labour movement created the conditions for anticipation as ordinary people got caught between a past that had become unlivable and a future that had not been born. Furthermore, the Apartheid state and its repressive policies made sure that people mattered and were central to the emerging politics of liberation. As most studies of labour problems in the 1970s and 1980s have commented: the survival of trade unions necessitated the development of democratic shop steward structures, the circulation

I will argue that both the slogan of the Nissan Corporation, so popular in new managerial circles and the black miner’s response and lament are wrong. Instead I will attempt to show how more complex than a precious clump are the legacies and pressures that ruminate in workers’ cultural formations and brains; I will also attempt to show how difficult it will be to find a way into a culture of participation and growth, and, how social analysis can contribute to clarifying the decisions that will have to mark our lives in these times of change, here in KwaZulu Natal (KZN).

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COOPERATION IN KWAZULU NATAL

of leaderships and tight forms of popular accountability. Trade unionism and its regional features have been extensively researched in broad overviews describing its growth and assessing its successes and failures. Their modern narratives usually start from the province of Natal: the Durban strikes of 1973, the growth of industrial trade unions, their democratic forms, their struggles for recognition and their confident surge into a political challenge against Apartheid (Basckin, 1991; Friedman, 1987; Lambert and Webster, 1988; Maree, 1986; Murray, 1987; Sitas, 1990.) By the 1990s, not only were trade unions present in 80% of all the firms with more than a thousand employees (Labour Monitoring Group, 1988) but, also, as two large-scale social surveys (Ginsburg et al., 1995; Orkin and Pityana 1992) demonstrated, there was depth and substance in the democratic beliefs of these worker leaders. This, in KwaZulu Natal, did not vary despite the high proportion of shop steward leaders with migrant worker roots and with homesteads in the countryside. Whereas a clear picture of shop stewards, their beliefs and priorities has emerged, less has been written on the self-motivation and cultural energy of another kind of leadership: a cultural core which was particularly strong in KwaZulu Natal until 1992 (Meer, 1987). Indeed much of the cultural energy in creating a labour movement subsisted on forms of rhetoric, performance and communication, deeply embedded in Zulu traditions and symbolism (Bonnin, 1987; Sitas, 1986, 1987, 1988). It has been estimated that approximately 1500 members of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) in Natal were active between 1985 and 1992 in such energetic work. Furthermore, the cultural formations and networks that pre-existed trade unionism, what sociology terms ‘informal organizations’, betrayed not only a silent and subterranean resistance against managerial authority (Sitas, 1985) but also a deep-seated culture of mistrust (Hemson, 1979) and social distance from managerial prerogatives.

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We are now witnessing, though, a transformation of the trade union movement in South Africa from a social movement into an ambiguous new entity, in a province marked by violence, dissent and intolerance. We are witnessing, too, a new language of participation and cooperation. As ordinary citizens we need to ask about the prospects of the tide turning into a cooperative relationship; about the prospects of success for a new managerial initiative that speaks of innovation and change. What can we say about the priorities of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (hitherto-RDP), which demands the self-motivation of ordinary people to ‘drive’ it? How can this cruel laboratory of social relations yield a new society? Our studies have the unfortunate task of answering these difficult questions.

THE DEFINITION OF POST-APARTHEID PRIORITIES AND THE BLACK LABOUR ‘DEFICIT’ Corporate capital, organized labour, the Government of National Unity (GNU) and the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) all seem to agree: a democratic future demands a productive and prosperous economy. The secret for achieving this, we are told, lies in the motivation, productivity, work ethic and discipline of our predominantly black work force. This belief is also nurtured by scholars and policy-makers whose different approaches converge on the need for a productive and disciplined labour force and within that new-sought discipline, the central role human capacities will have to play: ‘the ability to survive and succeed in the new world … depends not on the amorphous notion of “competitiveness”’, notes Michael Porter (1990: 6), ‘but on the productivity with which a nation’s resources (labor and capital) are employed’. The consensus that such an effort by predominantly black people, which calls for the

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transformation of aptitudes and attitudes, hinges on four frames: (a) Necessity: the new globalized world economy demands a new competitive capacity. Therefore, as neo-liberal economists insist, labour needs to develop a new sense of discipline, indeed some have gone far enough to call for what amounts to, in the words of Michel Foucault (1979), a new ‘disciplinary regime’ that would develop in tandem with a new productive culture. Without it, local, regional and national economies will buckle under the productivity-driven miracles of the East. As Peter Berger argued recently the East had found an economic culture, which brought about modernization and a ‘secularity of its own’ (1987: 162). Oriental Confucianism with its ‘respect for superiors, its collective solidarity and its emphasis on discipline’ (Berger, 1987: 163) has created a new dynamo in the world economy, without undergoing Westernstyle ‘individuation’ (Berger, 1987: 170). (b) Nation-Building: the new South Africa demands a move from a culture of adversarialism between capital and labour, between white power-blocs and black people, to a new system of cooperative bargaining based on ‘corporatist’ relations between the state, capital and labour. The glue for this new ‘growth’ and ‘development’ or to use a more scientific description, the ‘synergy’ between competing interests is to be provided by the Reconstruction and Development Programme in the name of the national interest. Of course as Mike Morris has argued (1991: 34), ‘the composition … of the national interest is precisely a site of struggle between the various contending classes and social forces in any historical situation’. Nevertheless, such struggles are seen to be postponed given the RDP’s holistic, moral and consensual approach to growth. Very few people would deny the need for meeting basic needs, developing our human resources, restructuring the economy and democratizing our society, in short, burying Apartheid’s legacy with determination and vigour. At a micro-level, managements have been receptive to the RDPs priorities too. As recent

research has shown (Kruger and Sitas, 1995), such a sense of cooperative bargaining is held in high regard in most managerial circles in the largest corporations of KZN. As a human resource practitioner in one of these giants asserted (Kruger and Sitas, 1995: 11)) with enthusiasm: to look at how people have changed and how the paradigms are beginning to change themselves, all this ... elasticity! The old ... is starting to burst. Soon a new one will come through the gap with a new colour mentality, a new way of doing things. At the moment it is mainly subliminal than out in the open.

Despite the ‘subliminal’ nature of the ‘new’, growth and development is seen to be the consequence of serious motivational strategies for worker participation. ‘We need to motivate our workers to be part of the productive effort’, asserted a senior HR Director in KZN and added with conviction that, ‘when a black man clocks in the morning, he’s clocking out, in his mind’. The new paradigm, the new ‘glue’ is the latest managerial rage. The need for a new motivational approach has been trumpeted further by the Government of National Unity: no lesser man than Nelson Mandela has argued that motivation, responsibility, self-discipline, all embedded in the ‘Masakhane’ campaign, were central for the delivery of the RDP and the building of a democratic ‘rainbow nation’. (c) Current Incapacity: Both the competitive demands of a new world economy and the need to build a developed country are faced with a devastating weakness: our defective human resource capacities. As the RDP stated (1994: 58), racial domination created nothing short of ‘destruction, distortion and neglect’. The black population lacks the skills, suffers from illiteracy, and lacks technological education and training. Nothing short of a human resource revolution would be able to create the human capital for international competitiveness and economic growth. As Manuel Castells stated too, in his remarkable work, The Informational City (1989: 15),

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COOPERATION IN KWAZULU NATAL the … capacity of labor to process information and generate knowledge is, more than ever, the material source of productivity, and therefore economic growth and social well-being. Yet this symbolic capacity of labor is not an individual (my emphasis) attribute. Labor has to be formed, educated, trained and retrained, in flexible manipulation of symbols, determining its ability constantly to reprogram itself …

(d) Good Practice: The latest ideas in managerial thinking, and indeed the latest from the main government administration schools, seem to have turned away from looking at profitability as a chemical adjustment of ‘factored’ prices, or injections of cash. They are convinced that the qualitative transformation of socio-cultural relationships, and a more participatory culture on the shop floor is good for business. Much of the new managerial leadership argues that workers cannot be treated as a commodity or a unit of production any more. Following some Japanese models of work organization they argue that workers must be seen as a human resource for productivity and innovation and that their participation is central to managerial decision-making. They are responsible for the new forms of authority – not only the iron cage of bureaucratic control but also the soul cage of participative management. Finally, to quote a senior executive in KZN: ‘… human beings are all diverse and one had to become far more flexible in your approach to problems, and people were invariably at the base of those problems…’. They are ‘not just objects to be shuffled around’. This was not only good practice but also a rational decision based on technical innovations, which in turn demanded multi-skilling, on the spot decision-making and a new decentralized command structure. Despite the invocations and appeals from managements and government captured by the frames of necessity, of nation–building, of incapacity and good sense, black workers seem to be resistant to the framing. One has witnessed, too, the growth among black workers of a culture of militant ‘entitlement’.

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Even in the most quiescent contexts, black workers seem to be indifferent to managements’ efforts to introduce participative schemes. The new era, in turn, seems to have constructed a new creature: the black worker of the new South Africa – at once a ‘resource’ and a ‘problem’, a ‘body’ and a ‘brain’ that is ‘untrained’ and a repository of ‘gold’ and tacit knowledge, but also an unproductive traditionalist and a modernizing partner, something to be reshaped and someone who must ‘reprogram itself’, a creature of feelings and aspirations and a militant problem, the nation itself and an obstacle to nationbuilding. There is in front of us a developing invention which, to summarize the media pronouncements, must be at the same time: ‘patriotic’, ‘tolerant’ of wage-restraint measures, ‘putting’ others first who are more needy, like the unemployed, ‘self-educated, multi-skilled and flexible’. The new ‘dominant language’ or ‘hegemonic discourse’ demands a new ‘soul’, a new voluntary surrender and discipline, based on what Tito Mboweni has named a ‘sense of social partnership’ (1995: 26). It demands that ‘the ordinary citizen needs to internalize respect for human rights, for democratic ways, for the rules of society’ (1995: 28). The ‘discourse’ signposts a struggle around ‘normative transformation’ (Sitas, 1984: 195). All of us are busy, in the interests of reason, progress and transformation, constructing a new mechanism of inclusion and exclusion, with very subtle discriminations; we are unwittingly creating a new political economy of aberration: the black worker on strike, the young man who sees work as another kind of slavery, the violent vigilante, the idler, the criminal, the reluctant bureaucrat, the revolutionary activist, the marginalized, are among many more unlisted here, the new pariahs, the exemplars of social indiscipline. According to Michel Foucault (1979: 138) a warning becomes necessary, as ‘… discipline increases the forces of the body (in economic

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terms of utility) and diminishes the same forces (in political terms of obedience). If economic exploitation’, continues Foucault, ‘separated the force and product of labour, let us say that disciplinary coercion establishes the constricting link between an internal aptitude … The soul’, he concluded, ‘was, the chain of the body’. The claim that black workers need to develop a new soulful orientation for economic growth, for the RDP marks two shifts. Firstly, such a participation is not seen as a pragmatic/strategic or an instrumental necessity but as a ‘value’ – it is the moral imperative of nation-building. Secondly it marks a shift from a focus on inequality and power in this society to an appeal to ‘voluntarism’: to the compliance, performance or failure in the efforts of ordinary people. Our failure will be counted, not so much on the scales of class, power, race and access but on the effort of ordinary people. It is precisely here that sociology is asked to both use and suspend its analytical tools: to help in the motivation of the majority of our people to ‘deliver’, and be silent on the constraints that make motivation impossible; conversely, to choose to speak the ‘unspeakable’ is seen to be damaging the motivational effort.

COLONIAL MANAGERIALISM Industrial sociology and psychology, the disciplines that constitute Industrial and Labour Studies, were developed to deal with the problem of ‘motivation’ in modern bureaucracies and mass production enterprises. Their history in the advanced capitalist countries differs fundamentally from our own. As engineers, planners and economists in the West concentrated on the flows and rhythms of the production process, and defined the nature of work, its output and its quotas, social scientists were enlisted to deal, in the words of Harry Braverman, 1974 with the ‘human machinery’. Their task was to

help workers adjust to the dictates of mass production and help managements to fathom new motivational strategies. At first their founders were pragmatic men, searching for influence, credibility and funds for their ideas. They felt that the rising scientific management movement that swept through industry in the first 30 years of the twentieth century was ignoring the ‘human factor’. With their insights and methods, industry could motivate a rather recalcitrant labour force; through cooperation between the University and industry one could create a feedback process through which the new cadre of personnel managers could expect to be trained. In turn, these experts could become effective handlers of labour problems. It is precisely this interaction between industrial sociologists and psychologists and industrialists in the West that branded them as ‘servants of power’. Instead of being seen as scientists of work-related problems they were seen to be the ideologues of adjustment to the dominant norms and values of society. Instead of questioning the nature of work, its monotony and repetitive character, they sought to adjust workers to its rhythms. Instead, finally, of lending their craft to human improvement, they sought commissions and awards from the short-term priorities of corporate elites. Furthermore, sociology’s broader theoretical tradition claimed to be able to explain the chemistry of capitalism’s success. Weber’s idea that modernity could not only be explained through economic causes but had to grasp cultural and ideational factors – ‘the part which religious forces have played in forming the developing web of our … worldly modern culture’ (1958: 90) led to problematic conclusions. Capitalism’s emergence, its calculating rationality and its accumulating ethos was seen to be peculiar to Europe, and this ‘emergence’ was due to the selfdiscipline, asceticism and motivation of what he termed its ‘Protestant Ethic’. Of course there was the related claim that the Orient remained the ‘enchanted garden’ of the world, since powerful values embedded in

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Confucianism and Buddhism became obstacle to modernity. They did not facilitate the self-discipline amongst entrepreneurs and workers to achieve the savings, investment and growth of Europe. By the 1960s Weber’s explorations of world religions, economic rationality and development were turned into crude parodies through theories of ‘modernization’. These theories described a necessary evolution from ‘traditional’ to ‘modern’ societies which demanded a change in occupational roles and cultural values, since as long as the communal ties of the past marked the lives of ordinary people, backwardness was to be their lot. The flattening of the world’s cultures and their histories into a ‘traditional society’, or a ‘pre-capitalist’ mush, was not only ‘Eurocentric’ in conception, empirically wrong, and self-serving; it also missed the point that other values could be more dynamic as environments for accumulation than European ones. Islam, Buddhism and Confucianism have not been strangers to economic growth; since World War II, such a claim would sound preposterous. In South Africa, social analysis was marked by the many apologists of segregation and Apartheid. The notion of a culturally backward black labour in South Africa, marked by the chains of ‘traditionalism’ has been common fare throughout the twentieth century. Similarly, the connection between race, culture, control and productivity has not been new either. It has always been reworked and re-presented as a peculiar problem and a constant debate: the capacity of black people to be modern, to be good workers, to be disciplined employees. It has been the dominant monologue of white supremacy. Blade Nzimande (1991) has fingered such ideas as the core of our distorted minds and unfortunately too our managerial commonsense: ‘The Native in industry is an incredible problem’, mused a Foundry Manager in 1946. ‘He’ was uncontrollable, disinterested in wage incentives, making unreasonable demands and ‘once you have nailed him down and he

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finds that he cannot wriggle any longer out of his work ... he simply walks out to find an easier job ...’ (Brecknell, 1949: 1127). The Board of Trade and Industries and the Federated Chamber of Industries disagreed: Natives possess a natural aptitude for the performance of repetitive tasks, which are the basis of mass production manufacture. … The facts of monotony and consequent fatigue, so important a problem in mass production is virtually nonexistent as far as the Native is concerned, especially if he is employed on machines with rhythmic motions (Federated Chamber of Industries, in Greenberg, 1980: 191).

By 1959, W. Hudson (1959: 54), a personnel specialist could write through the pages of Engineer and Foundryman that there are signs that the genesis of African Industrial Man has already taken place. The traditionalist may still survive in remoter areas. The migrant labourer may represent a half-way house in the development, a stage that may be acceptable under certain tropical conditions. But in the transition to industrialization, the urban African worker has already passed the point of no return.

From the perspective of black intellectuals in the 1940s and 1950s, the above opinions must have felt like the dialogue of the deaf and the blind. The notions of ‘African Industrial Man’, of the tribal ‘Native’, of the ‘problem’ and ‘cipher’ was at the heart of the ‘mass murmurings’ and conflicts of the period. It was to the credit of Natal University’s sociology department, through the leadership of Leo Kuper, to have rejected the Apartheid commonsense of ‘tribal Africans’. Instead of an inferior culture he spoke of colonial domination and cultural pluralism. Instead of the ‘detribalized Native’, he saw the frustrated aspirations of a black middle-class; and as a liberal, he stared at the ‘mass murmurings’ of defiance and struggle and highlighted the passive resistance traditions of the region. Instead of accepting the fences between people that Apartheid erected, he explored spatial patterns and racial forms of urban poverty. For our understanding of the sociology of industry though we have to turn to the seminal work of Pierre Van Den Berghe (1964)

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who found Caneville – the sugar plantation, mill and the town that developed around it (1964: 66), a ‘benevolent dictatorship’ with a strict ‘hierarchy of races’ (1964: 73). He unpacked for us the peculiar colonial managerialism that marked the industrial heritage of our region. The widespread repression of the early 1960s marked also the decline of the ‘Natal School’. Leo Kuper left for moral and political reasons; his protégés Ben Magubane and Fatima Meer went into exile, and spent many years banned, respectively; Hilstan Watts continued measuring poverty, but was left unnoticed until the early 1970s when the Security Police found his insistence that there were poor black people, subversive. At best a ‘pragmatic realism’ developed which began to dialogue with power elites about the need for reform. Through large social surveys it tried to convince that the aspirations of the black majority were foreign to Apartheid decrees. At the broader level, the dignity black people and black labour were imbued with in the Kuper ‘period’ reverted back to the crude culturalism of management schools: ‘motivating the Bantu to work’. It was only after the Durban strikes in 1973, however, and the continuing challenge of black worker militancy in the 1970s, that a new sociological school arose, which has been described as the New Labour Studies. Its priorities were to ‘understand ... the subjective experience of work’ (Webster, 1991: 3). As he explains: in trying to find answers to why workers were joining the new industrial unions in large numbers, sociologists were drawn beyond the workplace to an examination of working class cultural formations as well as powerful political traditions that shape the attitudes and political behaviour of black workers. These new directions brought the subjective experience of work into industrial sociology generating a number of studies which analyzed culture and working life and the relationship of unions to new social movements – what has been called social movement unionism (1991: 3).

Particularly in Natal, with its divided workforces and idiosyncrasies, New Labour Studies

sought to look at people and workers, not as commodities, the muscle, the fibre, the brain – they were not only a calculation or a price, but a social force and therefore groupings with cultural significance, and individuals with private, social needs ‘and the creative energy to participate fully in cultural and political life’ (Webster, 1991: 3). Such an emphasis moved from the abstractions, ‘factor of production’, ‘abstract labour power’, to view working people’s lives from the perspective of the concrete, the qualitative, what I have termed, the ‘cultural formation’. The emerging field was the result of a variety of ‘fusions’ between theoretical work, moral critique, commitments to struggles for worker rights, the mixing up of many antiApartheid discourses and the challenge of major socio-economic struggles in the area. There were also echoes of Christian liberation theology, and the communitarian traditions of Ethiopian and Zionist churches brought to the projects through working class intellectuals. Our first contribution (Kruger and Sitas, 1995) was to understand a managerialism which was bifocal. There was the world of white managers, artisans and workers (and to a lesser extent of ‘Indians’ and ‘Coloureds’), which was governed by ‘modern’ statutes and collective bargaining. There was also the world of black workers, and ‘Zulus’ which over and above the segregationist statute of the Apartheid years, was also governed by ‘traditional’ authorities. This style of governance of people at work, we can label as ‘colonial managerialism’. A managerialism that ruled African workers differentially and elicited traditional forms of control to maximize its modernized benefits. A style similar to Chakrabarty’s (1989: 177) description of Bengali jute-mills in the first part of the twentieth century, with its peculiar governance steeped in an imagined oriental tradition, its displays of power and opulence and control. What was peculiar about Natal’s industrialization was the coexistence of ‘scientific management’ and bureaucratic forms of control

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alongside such ‘indirect rule’, ‘tribal’ or ‘traditional’ forms of consent and coercion. Black workers were not only denied labour rights because trade unions were seen to be an anathema to the factory owners – far from it, trade unionism was seen as a necessary headache among white, Indian and coloured workers – but because they were seen to be ‘foreign’ to African culture and aspirations. Our focus on managerialism was the first contribution in industrial and labour studies. The second, and my work has incessantly chipped away at this, was to understand ordinary people’s cultural formations and, as a participant, to fathom the ‘creative energy’ that animated the trade unions throughout the 1980s. Before analyzing the significance of this militant tradition, I will outline a series of concepts that define the parameters of the formation of this new consciousness.

THE SOURCES OF DISSONANCE, ALTERITY AND RESISTANCE ON THE SHOP FLOOR The following lists the operative concepts, used for an understanding of dissonance, alienation and resistance. First, I would like to posit a distinction between ‘defensive combinations’ and ‘cultural formations’. In the context of modern institutional and organizational life, with its work patterns, its repetitive tasks and routines, people recoil from and refract pressures by forming groups, networks and informal associations. Defensive combinations are so many practical ways of regulating the rhythms of work, of regulating social interaction, of regulating relationships to authority and power. In the classic work on asylums by Erving Goffman (1974) we were shown how the patients coped in their total institution and developed a public and a private world, which regulated the perceptions and interactions. ‘Defensive combinations’ might turn to ‘cultural formations’ if the regulation of everyday life is underpinned by reciprocal

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norms, values and symbolic markers, and belonging to a group is not only driven by practical and instrumental considerations. Second, I would like to posit a distinction between ‘dissonance’ and ‘alterity’. ‘Dissonance’ denotes the relationship between organizational goals and the practices that result from ‘defensive combinations’. There is always dissonance between the performance demands of an organization and the actual rhythms of work on the shop floor. Such dissonance, if not managed, creates a ‘drift’ between the definition of a ‘good worker’ and the actual empirical sum of workers and their actions in the engine room. Consequently, organizational life becomes a shifting terrain where managements try and turn dissonance into productive engagement by force or fiat. ‘Alterity’ denotes a relationship between organizational goals and the actions of ‘cultural formations’. Here, the organizational goals and worker goals are distinct and follow differential trajectories. Such a difference and indeed tension is not necessarily conflictual, but it can lead to organizational inertia. The cultural formations of ordinary workers can always present the demands of managements as ‘external’ to their aspirations and logic. The struggle to transform conditions of dissonance and alterity into constant productive adjustment constitute the sphere of shop floor politics. Third, I would like to posit a distinction between ‘domination’ and ‘hegemony’. ‘Domination’ is the ability of a group, a power-bloc, a class, to exercise its will with or without its subordinates’ consent. ‘Hegemony’ is the ability of a group, a power-bloc, a class, to exercise moral and intellectual leadership or authority and through that gain its members’ or subordinates’ consent. Consent might be unifocal: involving a feeling of total ‘belonging’; it can also be based on differentiation: involving a feeling of being legitimately different – e.g., despite poverty and obvious wealth, the poor might come to think that they deserve

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their station. Hegemony, finally, as Belinda Bozzoli (1991: 2) has argued, is a process, a ‘moving equilibrium in which spaces are created, fought for and won by those at the bottom from those at the top’. Both domination and hegemony can exist at the institutional level: this school, this factory, that church; or can exist at the broadest level: the state, between states, across empires. Fourth, social movements arise once the webs that connect rulers and ruled, the powerless and the powerful, get torn by crises, by violations of expectations, by manifold instances that might be intrinsic or extrinsic to the relationship. They sustain themselves as movements by mobilizing the dissonance and alterity that exists, and coordinate in new ways the defensive combinations and cultural formations that subsist in ordinary people’s lives. They sustain themselves better if the process of coordination involves the mobilization of physical and symbolic resources. Through the latter they establish new relationships and a counter-hegemony that begins to challenge dominant norms and institutions. This should be distinguished from movements of revaluation – a radical attempt to impose the imagined old norms. Finally, the crisis and collapse of cultural formations might lead to anomie, normlessness and despair. Fifth, I would like to posit four related and yet distinct ‘pressures’ that are crucial in the genesis of cultural formations. These are ‘alienation’, ‘disvaluation’, ‘disoralia’ and ‘degendering’. I posit these as substitutes for Marx’s all encompassing concept of alienation or Durkheim’s 1984 anomie, as the defining psychopathologies of modern times. ‘Alienation’ still echoes Marx’s argument that modern capitalism created a world in which workers were alienated from the product of their labour and the work process itself, which made them indifferent to the priorities of capital and created unique psychosocial pressures. ‘Disvaluation’ refers to a pressure that demands of people not reciprocal, morally grounded relationships but instrumental ones

based on hierarchy, exchange value and output quotas. ‘Disoralia’ refers to a pressure, which arises, from the distortion of symbolic, linguistic and communicative interaction due to the command language and practical intent of organizational and civic life. ‘Degendering’ refers to pressure on customary gender roles. All these pressures, acting in concert, propel people to recoil from them and in that process group together with others to refract their force and create communities of meaning and practices that regulate everyday life. In this sense, one has to concur with Bozzoli that ‘consciousness [is] formed within and against structures, rather than above and around them’ (1991: 2). With this elaborate process of conceptual distinctions we can trace parameters of experience and conflict, of accommodation and resistance. We can also explore how a challenge to managements and the apartheid state subsisted within a ‘symbolic capital’ generated by ordinary black workers in Natal in the context of their struggles for workers’ rights, democracy and a new communitarianism. I argue that in the course of trade union mobilization, black workers used whatever practical and emotive means they had at their disposal to create a new language and many new images of resistance. In the process, a shifting and volatile ‘discursive formation’ of class, nation, ethnicity and gendering has emerged which has helped the threading together of an importantly new ‘horizontal comradeship’. More specifically, approximately a thousand of them participated in the making of plays, reviving oral traditions of performance, composed and sung, wrote and told stories as an aspect of their self-definition. Their contribution in turn, has crafted many of the ways their co-workers understood their consciousness-in-the-making. As many of Natal’s workers crowded inside union offices, halls and then, stadiums, they could not but come to touch and be touched by the cultural energies around them.

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The case study is based on the narratives of 120 of these grassroots intellectuals. That their emergence and ‘image-ing’ of the nature of their experience has happened under extreme conditions of conflict and ‘struggle’ needs little comment. The core of the cultural leadership in the trade unions came from all over the KwaZulu Natal countryside. More precisely, 23% trace their parental homesteads in the territories of Northern Natal/KwaZulu, the heart of the Zulu Kingdom of the late nineteenth century; 20% of them from Natal’s Midlands, 18% from Southern Natal, 11% in the northern interior areas around Paulpietsburg and Newcastle. Only 6% came from any areas adjacent to Durban. They reflected a wide net of experiences from all over the region. These parental homesteads experienced the agrarian transformations and pressures of the last century – the Midlands all the way to Northern Natal in the interior were marked by conditions of labour tenancy on white farms, with major upheavals in the 1906/7 periods and the post 1960s period as labour tenancy was abolished. The Northern territories experienced chief-regulated access to land and migrations to the Reef and Durban for a wage. The South homesteads share experiences closer to those of the North; but with an intensification of ‘betterment schemes’ in the late 1950s with large upheavals. Most (95%) of their fathers were a migratory labour force. In 60% of the cases, mothers were responsible for homestead reproduction without any moves to the urban areas. Although their parental homesteads were rural, urbanization was already underway during their parents’ working life, as 39% of them were born in townships. Still, the emotional grip of the countryside was enormous as 61% were born in the countryside and underwent primary socialization there. The majority (46%) of the black workers in this case study were semi-skilled machine and process operators. Another 26% – 13% each – clerical workers and drivers, and only 6% of them were unskilled labourers, 4% domestic workers and 2% supervisors.

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This compares well, with shop steward statistics compiled in 1992, where the majority in KwaZulu Natal, (48%), were drawn from similar occupations (Meer, 1987). By contrast 72% of their parents were classified as unskilled migrant workers. In 1941, Baba Khumalo came from the Underberg region to find a job in Durban. His patriarch, who refused to enter the labour market, sent his sons out for contracts and, through the earnings gathered, kept his rural homesteads intact. Whereas at first Khumalo relied on kin and their networks to get jobs in domestic service, in gardening and cleaning, he found the job that was to keep him for the rest of his years at a large rubber company. The company shed its Indian workers after a strike and proceeded to employ migrant African workers. As one of the first mass producing firms, it tested one of the beliefs of the time: that ‘Natives’, because of their cultural make-up and their need for money, were suitable for mass production. He was given a job and found a bed in the municipal compound. Khumalo’s descriptions of the work process, its impersonal moments, and its ruthless performance standards capture what he termed ‘khalo’, the Zulu word denoting pain and lament, grievance and lamentation, in short, a series of feelings that could be covered by the term for the experience of alienation. These new workers, gathered from all over KwaZulu Natal, soon established networks of regulation, restricting output, socializing new recruits and developing a series of defensive combinations. Within them, an informal leadership, which included him for standing up to a foreman, created a perceived ‘dissonance’. Management responded by appointing a series of tribal representatives or izinduna to create channels of communication between themselves and the reluctant labour force. The factory was a practical, instrumental world though. As a Christian he found it difficult in the compound. On the one hand, his own ‘manhood’ found an outlet in the boxing clubs of central Durban. He became a champion middleweight fighter. On the other,

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he could not adjust to the traditionalist machismo of the compound, which demanded of him traditional Zulu rituals and bare-fisted fighting. This, together with his talent for guitar and his abhorrence of the bawdy maskanda songs of the compound inmates, drove him out of the total institution. He also avoided the expanding shack lands of Mkumbane with their vibrant drinking-house or shebeenculture, and chose the rental of a room from an Indian family in town and, as his immediate cultural formation, a black church. There his music was deployed for the praise of the Lord. In 1949, his Boxing Club mobilized his prowess as a fighter to participate as a Zulu in the Zulu–Indian carnage in Durban. The resistance to Apartheid legislation between 1948 and 1954 ‘pushed’ him into the African National Congress as ‘Luthuli’s soldier’. It was his voice that led many gatherings into the chants and songs of a mobilizing African population. It was his voice that in turn raised his status on the shop floor high enough to tell the izinduna that unless they listened, they would die. It was his status as a boxer that elevated him higher with the rank and file. After the repression of the 1960s, Baba Khumalo continued to lead on the shop floor: by then, dissonance had turned to alterity. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, he was one of the old men who led the factory into trade unionism. His experience, his cultural resonance and his seniority made him central to both the organization of his union and the growing cultural movement. Baba Khumalo is just one example of the thousands who created the ‘cultural capital’ of the movement. Such men (86% of our group was male, due to black women’s problems in committing themselves for many after-hours commitments) created a unique self-definition. The main themes of the symbolism were as follows: 1 Exploitation and alienation : the hardship of working life: being used; being beaten; being turned into things; being chased about; being humiliated.

2 Disvaluation : the decline of respect, of community and traditions, the role of traditional healers or inyangas in the hostel; kinship feuds amongst returning exiles; the woman who, despite advice to the contrary, goes to the city, her loneliness, alienation and madness; the movement of people searching for land to settle their cattle; powerless elders; problem of two wives; problems of deceiving husbands; the greed of the local black middle-classes; Ethiopian religions of the poor vs. other Christian sects. 3 Loss of voice : the violence of urban language, English as power, the inclusivity of songs and their participatory patterns; the transgressive, free and easy interaction and activity of life in the shanty-towns of Mkumbane; oral and epic forms against the mundane command language of the Mill. 4 Gender : men vs. women; the meaning of being a man; the crumbling worlds of women on the land; men as warriors; women as mothers of the community and nation; women as militants and heroines. 5 Struggle : perseverance like that of the Bible’s Job; survival through tricking and sparring like the Uhlakhanyana ‘trickster’ of traditional folktales; buffooning the bosses and whites; unionism and heroism (but also the sending up of trade unionists and their briefcases); solidarity or as it is expressed in isiZulu: umadlandawonye. 6 Khalo : suffering, jail, exile, prison and lament about deaths and mourning.

All those became symbolic markers to distinguish their grievance, and to mark out a shift of cultural formations from dissonance and alterity to a radical challenge of managerial and Apartheid prerogatives. The narrations of defiance in the plays, poems, stories, songs and performances of these people created a possibility for thousands of ordinary workers to develop their own languages of defiance and use elements to transcribe their own experiences. Whereas the political and organizational leadership was given by the shop steward movement, its emotive and cultural strains were given by these creative brokers. The prominence gained by these grassroots intellectuals with their oral lore had its own price, however. Table 25.1 provides an index for this over six years.

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Table 25.1

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Culture activists in Natal’s trade unions: Index of hardships, 1986–92 (N = 120)

Type of hardship 1. Deaths 2. Homelessness due to persecution/incl. burning down of home 3. Assaults, skirmishes and violent combat/incl. hospitalization (but not death) 4. Unable to practice, rehearse or organize events in their community due to victimization or violence 5. Still active in cultural work 6. Job loss/retrenchment 7. Able to improve life-chances and jobs because of creative involvement 8. Still in their old jobs 9. Participation in strikes and stayaways

This crude index compiled from bio-data is useful for some sociological observations: there is no doubt that the majority were part and parcel of a militant labour and political challenge in the region. Eighty percent of them participated fully in at least one strike and one stayaway in the period from 1986–92. Those who did not were mostly Inkatha Freedom Party members who rejected the calls for stayaways and participated rather in what I have termed a movement for revaluation, a counter-mobilization against COSATU. Second, most lost their jobs. Although in some cases victimization was alleged, the majority were victims of the recessionary conditions, of the famous ‘downsizing’ of lean production and its retrenchment policies. In approximately half of the cases of job loss, protest by co-workers turned into a strike, but the effort at reinstatement was unsuccessful. Third, violence seriously affected the lives, the homesteads and the activities of these people. Between 1986 and 1988 violence involved assassinations and raids on homesteads, with people fleeing after such attacks and not returning. From 1990 on, it seems there was community self-defense, fewer people fleeing and an increase of people being hospitalized after ‘battles’. However one examines this, it will remain a shocking testament of the ruthlessness of the Apartheid period and the ‘violence’ in Natal. About 15% of the workers in this study reported serious psychological paroxysms, an incapacity to cope, depression, pessimistic

% experiencing it 6.6 18.3 50.0 39.2 38.7 23.5 17.5 40.8 80.0

reveries, and sleeplessness and anxiety – phenomena which may be termed ‘anomie’. Fourth, a small number experienced job mobility through their prominence in creative and educational work. They emerged as leaders and were employed in NGOs and provided some of the leadership of mass democratic movement organizations. Nowhere in this group’s experience was there any sense of promotion within managerial structures. Rather the distances between their orientations and managements were enormous. The group nurtured a shop floor culture based on low trust of any employer initiative, and a sense of distance that buttressed the resistance to management ideas. They saw the factory as a necessary evil. For most, it was imposed by their migrant contract and influx controls; for many of the younger generation it was a degrading place, a place to run away from. In short, black workers were caught in work routines that were simple and repetitive in a world that cared little about them; within relationships that lacked a moral foundation, within languages they did not speak and which excluded them, within roles that were foreign to them. Out of these elements, they created a culture of solidarity. Since the 1990s, there has been a transformation of the institutional matrix that governed black lives in South Africa. Not only have managerial practices changed, affirmative action policies proliferated, new opportunities for black people to accumulate by monopolizing resources and finally the

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installation of a Government of National Unity led by the African National Congress after the first democratic elections of 1994, a government most of our subjects would have supported. Furthermore, the mass gatherings of the trade union movement declined, cultural activity decreased as the trade union movement turned from resistance to strategic participation. Finally, there was the collapse of most social regulation mechanisms that buttressed the old influx control and migrant labour system. Whereas the period from 1986 to 1992 was defined by the patterns of conflict and industry in the society as a whole, with its tragic consequences to human life, the ‘solidaristic’ project of the trade union movement seemed intact. The changes in managerial strategies were almost imperceptible, and, upward mobility for this grouping of workers involved a move from the shop floor to occupy positions in NGOs, or in the higher echelons of the liberation movement. The last two years of this period, though, betray a rapid institutional change and a dispersing of some of the ‘solidaristic’ activities. There is indeed a fragmentation and diffusion of the solidarity that they had been creating throughout the 1980s. Only half have remained in their old jobs on the shop floor. Of these, most are shop stewards. They therefore continue with the legacies of shop floor democracy and pragmatic adversarialism. All the men, though, have been involved in company-sponsored training and skilling programmes and exactly half of them have been attending courses after hours on their own initiative. Perhaps this is where we will find ‘the reprogrammed’ and ‘reprogramming’ labour force of the future. Moreover, whereas before 1992 upward mobility was anti-systemic, post-1992 mobility is systematic. Since 1984, some of the most talented of the worker creators were being absorbed by the ‘mass democratic movement’ inside the country, the growing cultural organizations and NGOs to provide them with leadership, by now most move

upwards from the shop floor inside a managerial human resource, etc. Five percent have been promoted into personnel and training functions and 5% have found jobs in the bureaucracies of the public authorities and the government. In addition, 5% have left voluntarily to join friends or kin in business ventures. Inter alia, these involve construction projects, trading and servicing. True, 11% have been finding better employment opportunities in NGOs but save the two involved in literacy and rural outreach programmes, the majority is in a precarious situation due to the NGO funding crisis. For 12% the solution has been to return to the countryside. Most of them are combining skills that they have learnt in the city: selling, sowing, driving, budgeting for informal sector activities and rural cultivation; accumulating cattle, growing vegetables and subsisting. But 38% lost their jobs. Whereas, 18% have been reabsorbed in all kinds of other activities, 20% remain unemployed or underemployed, relying on others for their income, and casual labour. These figures are only indications of tendencies. They show that alongside the solidaristic patterns of trade union life there is an equally active process that is animated (not by the community – 60% were involved in the community, 5% are involved now) but by the survival strategies of households and kinbased economic units. Also, despite the continuation of solidaristic language, there is the drive for self-advancement and self-training among shop floor people.

CONCLUSION The task at hand seems a daunting one. How do we make the public theatre of transformation with its creative energies fit the aptitudes and attitudes needed for ‘growth’. The obvious social science answer is a cynical one. We cannot do this, unless the conditions that produce it change. Its ‘fragmentation’ and

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‘diasporization’ would mean spreading this energy across a broader terrain and its involution into discordant cultural formations. A managerial cultural revolution that views black workers as a human resource is a tremendous advance from the colonial managerialism of the ‘old’ regime. But, resources are there to yield their effort, their gold, their bile, and such an instrumental view is selfdefeating. There is no solution unless participation goes alongside with the recognition of the centrality of cultural formations, their autonomy and their negotiated participation in defining the priorities of production. But shifting the discourse of responsibility for national priorities onto ordinary people’s shoulders is problematic: their capacity to correct themselves without transforming the structures of inequality is very unlikely. The glossing of all that with pseudo-cultural language, ‘ubuntu’, African humanism and its capacity to make profits for a couple of bosses is self-serving nonsense. On the one hand, managements are trying to push beyond the institutional cooperation embodied in collective bargaining to turn what was a social movement with its dissonance and alterity into a confluence of interests. Managements have been far-reaching in their innovations. They have taken the most exciting of the ideas developed in the creative wings of the trade union movement and turned them around to serve the priorities of productivity. Worker theatre has turned into industrial theatre; workshops and political role-plays have turned into problem-solving practices; worker self-expression has turned into self-empowerment and training. On the other hand, the trade unions have lost the ability to provide platforms for the expression of alternatives: the Baba Khumalos have been silenced and the mobilizers of yesterday are too unskilled for the new formal cooperation. In the words of one of the trade union movement’s finest, Alfred Qabula (1995: 9): ‘And when the dust of our struggle settled, there was nobody there … we were the ladders for people to climb new heights with spiked shoes’.

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On the shop floors, the talk is still of solidarity/‘umadlandawonye’ and unfulfilled promises, of hatred, of the scars of violence but also of the need for peace and growth. If our craft brings us back to the concerns of finite, vulnerable human beings, industrial and labour studies has to lend its voice to their ‘recoiling and refracting’ agencies. The plight of the self-employed woman selling plastic containers near the Durban station is as worthy a topic of concern as the grievances of an operator of the latest numericallycontrolled lathe. Despite the dilemmas of work and productivity, and of human capacity remains our chief concern – after all, we do want to live in a real democratic country, we do need prosperity – we cannot take the dominant goals of power-elites as ‘given’. Scholars of Industrial and Labour Studies will have to be at war within their souls: a war between a realization that at the heart of participation, cooperation and innovation, and the meeting of basic needs, there is a demand for supportive involvement and a commitment to a radical inquisition of the real gains ordinary people make. Our worth will not be counted by the applause of the powerful but by the discomfort the honesty of our craft sustains. The people of KZN deserve no less.

REFERENCES Abu-Lughod, Janet, L. (1989) Before European Hegemony: The World System 1250–1350. NY: Oxford University Press. Basckin, Jeremy (1991) Striking Back: A History of COSATU. Johannesburg: Ravan Press. Berger, Peter L. (1987) The Capitalist Revolution: Fifty Propositions about Prosperity, Equality and Liberty. Aldershot: Wildwood House. Bonnin, Debby (1987) ‘Class Consciousness and Conflict in the Natal Midlands: The Case Study of BTR Sarmcol Workers’. MA Thesis, Durban: University of Natal. Bourdieu, Pierre (1989) Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. London: Routledge.

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Bozzoli, Belinda (1991) Women of Phokeng. Johannesburg: Ravan Press. Braverman, Harry (1974) Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the 20th Century. NY: Monthly Review Press. Brecknell, Keith A. (1949) ‘Comparison of the Economics of Production Foundries and Engineering Establishments in South Africa and England as at January 1946’, Engineer and Foundryman, Vol. 6, April: 47–9. Burawoy, Michael (1979) Manufacturing Consent: Changes in the Labor Process Under Monopoly Capitalism. Chicago: The University Press. Burawoy, Michael (1985) The Politics of Production: Factory Regimes under Capitalism and Socialism. London: Verso. Burawoy, Michael and Lukacs, Jan (1991) ‘The Radiant Future’, South African Sociological Review, 3(2): 1–27. Castells, Manuel (1989) The Informational City. Information Technology, Economic Restructuring and the Urban Regional Process. Oxford: Blackwell. Chakrabarty, Dinpak (1989) Rethinking Working Class History: Bengal 1890–1940. Princeton: The University Press. Department of Economics, University of Natal (1950) The African Factory Worker. Cape Town: Oxford University Press. Durkheim, Emile (1984) The Division of Labour in Society. London: Macmillan. Eisenstadt, Shmuel N. (1966) Modernization: Protest and Change. Engelwood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. Foucault, Michel (1979) Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. London: Allen Lane. Friedman, Steven (1987) Building Tomorrow Today: African Workers in Trade Unions. Johannesburg: Ravan Press. Ginsburg, David and Eddie Webster et al. (1995) Taking Democracy Seriously. Durban: the Indicator Press. Goffman, Erving (1974) Asylums. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Gordon, Robert J. (1978) Mines, Masters and Migrants: Life in a Namibian Compound. Johannesburg: Ravan Press. Greenberg, Stan (1980) Race and State in Capitalist Development. New Haven: Yale University Press. Guy, Jeff (1990) ‘Gender Oppression in South Africa’s Precapitalist Societies’, in C. Walker,

Women and Gender in South Africa to 1945. Cape Town: David Philip. 33–47. Hemson, David (1979) ‘Class Consciousness and Migrant Workers: The Dockworkers of Durban’. PhD Thesis. University of Warwick. Hudson, Wayne (1959) ‘The African in Industry’, Engineer and Foundryman, January, 31–33. Inteview with Minister Tito Mboweni, South African Labour Bulletin, 17(1): 1995. Kautsky, John H. (1972) The Political Consequences of Modernisation. St. Louis: Washington University Press. Kromberg, Steven (1992) ‘The Role of the Audience in the Emergence of Durban Workers’ Izibongo’, in E. Sienaert et al. (eds.) Oral Traditions and Innovations: New Wine and Old Bottles. Durban: University of Natal. pp. 56–70. Kruger, Vanessa and Sitas, Ari (1995) ‘Industrial Post-Tribalism – the New Managarialism of the 1990s in KwaZulu Natal’, in A. Sitas (ed.) About Just Managing. Durban: HSRC. pp. 7–27. Kuper, Leo (1957) Passive Resistance in South Africa. New Haven: Yale University Press. Kuper, Leo (1965) An African Bourgeoisie: Race, Class and Politics in South Africa. New Haven: Yale University Press. Kuper, Leo, Watts, Hilstan and Davies, Rob (1958) Durban: a Study of Racial Ecology. London: Cape. Labour Monitoring Group (1988) ‘Patterns of Strike Activity in Natal’. Durban: University of Natal. Laclau, Ernesto (1978) Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory. London: New Left Books. Lambert, Robert and Webster, Edward (1988) ‘The Re-emergence of Political Unionism in South Africa’, in B. Cobbet and R. Cohen (eds.) Popular Struggles in South Africa. London: James Curry. pp. 20–41. Maree, Johann (1986) ‘An Analysis of the Independent Trade Unions in South Africa in the 1970s’, PhD Thesis. University of Cape Town. Marks, Monique (1995) “We Are Fighting for the Liberation of our People”: Justifications of Violence by Activist Youth in Diepkloof Soweto’. Johannesburg: Centre for Violence and Reconciliation, University of the Witwatersrand. Marx, Karl (1967) Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society, in Loyd D. Eastman and Kurt H. Guddat, (eds.) Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor Book.

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Meer, Shamim (1987) ‘Profile of Shop Stewards in Durban’, paper for History Workshop, University of the Witwatersrand. Mills, C. Wright (1970) The Sociological Imagination, Harmondsworth: Penguin. Moodie, T. Dunbar (1978) The Formal and the Informal Structure of a South African Goldmine. Research Report, Anglo-American Corporation. Morris, Mike (1991) ‘State, Capital and Growth: The Political Economy of the National Question’, in S. Gelb (ed.) South Africa’s Economic Crisis. Cape Town: David Philip. pp. 32–49. Murray, Michael (1987) South Africa: the Time of Agony, Time of Destiny – the Upsurge of Popular Protest. London: Verso Books. Nzimande, Bongikhosi (1991) ‘The Corporate Guerillas: Class Formation and the African Corporate Petty Bourgeoisie in Post-1973 South Africa’, PhD Thesis, Durban: University of Natal. Orkin, Mark and Pityana, Sipho (eds.) (1992) Beyond the Shopfloor: A Survey of COSATU Shop stewards. Johannesburg: Ravan Press. Porter, Michael (1990) The Competitive Advantage of Nations. London: Macmillan. Qabula, Alfred (1995) ‘Collected Poems’. Durban: Killie Campbell Africana Library. Reconstruction and Development Programme (1994) Government of South Africa Document: www. gov.za Rose, Michael (1975) Industrial Behaviour. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Sitas, Ari (1984) ‘African Worker Responses on the East Rand to Changes in the Metal Industry, 1960–1980’. PhD Thesis. Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand.

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Sitas, Ari (1985) ‘Mass Production and Accommodation in a Large Rubber Factory’, paper presented at SASA Conference, Johannesburg. Sitas, Ari (1988) ‘The Flight of the Gwala-gwala Bird’, paper presented at the History Workshop, University of the Witwatersrand. Sitas, Ari (1990) ‘Class, Nation and Ethnicity in Natal’s Labour Movement’, Institute for Commonwealth Studies, Societies of Southern Africa–Seminar Series, No. 38, London. Sitas, Ari (1991) ‘Trade Unions and Democracy’, in K. Nurnberger (ed.) A Democratic Vision for South Africa. Pietermaritzburg: Encounter Press. pp. 74–85. Sitas, Ari (1993) ‘Managing the Democratic Revolution’, South African Labour Bulletin, 18(5): 23–31. Van den Berghe, Pierre (1964) Caneville: The Social Structure of a South African Town. Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press. Van Onselen, Charles (1991) ‘The Social and Economic Underpinnings of Paternalism and Violence in the Maize Farms of the South Western Transvaal, 1900–1950’. Mimeo Oxford University Conference on Violence in Southern Africa. Von Kotze, Astrid (1988) Organise and Act: The Workers’ Theatre Movement in Natal. Durban: Culture and Working Life Publications. Weber, Max (1958) The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. NY: Charles Scribner and Sons. Webster, Edward (1991) ‘From Mayo to Marx, Sociological Theory and the New Industrial Sociology in South Africa’, occasional paper, Sociology of Work Project. Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand.

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26 Economic Globalization and Singapore’s Development Policies: Competition, Cooperation and Conflict Alexius A. Pereira

INTRODUCTION Economic globalization is often understood as a process of increasing ‘... integration of national economies into the global economy through trade, direct foreign investment (by corporations and multinationals), short-term capital flows, international flows of workers and humanity generally, and flows of technology’(Bhagwati, 2004: 3). With regard to direct foreign investment, also known as foreign direct investment (FDI),1 it is commonly accepted that competition between corporations and multinationals drives them to ‘go abroad’ either to acquire ‘cheaper’ and/or ‘better’ resources, or to penetrate new markets. Hence, it is when firms actually invest abroad that national economies become more integrated. However, this chapter argues that equally important is the system of competition between nation-states for FDI that also contributes to the process of

economic globalization. In other words, the eventual flow of FDI cannot be simply understood as the manifestation of corporate strategy but must take competitive state policies into account as well. This chapter will use the case of Singapore to illustrate how its development policies between 1965 and 2005, which focused on attracting FDI, were not only dependent on the process of economic globalization but also contributed to the process.

FDI AND ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION For purposes of this chapter, FDI is defined as ‘… the process whereby firms from one country (the source country) acquire ownership of assets for the purpose of controlling the production, distribution and other activities of a firm in another country (host country)’

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SINGAPORE’S DEVELOPMENT POLICIES

(Moosa, 2002: 1). In this conceptualization, FDI might involve the establishment of new business units in another country, or the acquisition of firms in another country. Most studies agree that (capitalist) firms invest abroad for two main reasons: (1) resource acquisition and (2) market expansion (see Dunning, 1998; Henderson et al., 2002). For the issue of resource acquisition, firms go abroad in search of ‘cheaper and/or better’ factors of production. Factors of production are the elements necessary for producing goods or to perform services. There are primary as well as secondary factors of production; the former refers to factors that contribute directly towards production, including land, labour, raw materials and capital. However, equally important are secondary factors, which include any element that supplements the industrial production processes, including state policy, fiscal incentives, financial inducements, tariffs, availability of infrastructure and political stability (Dobson, 1997: 7). Studies have shown that transnational corporations do not merely seek out the lowest cost factors of production. Instead, what is most important is the balance between the quality of these factors and the cost (see Hayter, 1997). Hence, firms will invest abroad if factors are either cheaper or better, preferably both, as this would enhance their profits. There are many reasons why the quality and cost of factors of production vary from location to location, including geographic, historical, political and economic reasons. However, transnational corporations will try to take advantage of these differences as a strategy to maximize profits. The second reason why firms invest abroad is for purposes of ‘market expansion’. Markets may include consumers, but may also include other enterprises, which have a demand for the product. It is very important to firms to constantly expand their markets, as this would greatly enhance their profits. They might also seek to enter into new markets to prolong the life cycle of their products. In many ways, these firms are operating with a typically capitalist outlook. In the

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search for optimizing profits, they will seek to exploit resources and enlarge markets. However, capitalism cannot flourish without the input of the state. In Marxist theories, not only does the state protect property rights and uphold the law, so that firms have a ‘predictable’ and ‘calculable’ operating environment; the state often ‘prepares’ and ‘disciplines’ labour as well (see Jessop, 2002). While earlier Marxist theories centred on understanding the relations of production within a national economy, when these theories are utilized for explaining processes in the global economy, they will require some rethinking, particularly as capital will deal with more than one state within the global economy. This notion is central to the process of FDI: its eventual destination cannot be solely dependent on the strategies of transnational corporations alone; governments can and do directly influence FDI inflows (Howells and Wood, 1993). This is because states have the ability to grant or deny foreign investors access to local resources and markets. Further, as recent history has shown, states will compete against each other to attract FDI. This position – FDI for development – is the complete opposite of the earlier dominant position, which was that of highly nationalist and protectionist state dirigisme. In this era, import substitution for purposes of grooming domestic enterprises was viewed as the primary pathway towards modernization and development (see Sachs, 1999). The shift towards greater economic globalization began (but was not yet dominant) in the 1970s. There was a political rather than an economic agenda of ‘neo-liberal capitalism’ or ‘neo-liberalism’ furthered by leaders of certain governments, such as the USA and the UK.2 Under the guise of ‘Thatcherism’ and ‘Reaganomics’ – referring to the economic policies of the UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and USA President Ronald Reagan – there was a strong push from these countries to so-called ‘third world countries’ to lower protectionist barriers in favour of ‘free trade’. These ideas were

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supported by several international organizations, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the World Trade Organization. These agencies warned that developing nations had to lower or remove economic barriers, or otherwise face losing out in the potential growth that would come from global free trade (Moran, 1998). In this light, the neo-liberal ideology would argue that FDI is an efficient means for generating economic development and growth in the local economy. For example, FDI can bring the generation of employment, foreign currency earnings, and the transfer of technology or managerial techniques to the local area (see Lall, 1996). These would be some of the main reasons why states might attempt to attract FDI intentionally. However, given that there are often several countries courting the same investor, competition is generated. At the most basic level, states would be competing on the basis of ‘comparative advantage’, which refers to the preexisting and inherent aspects of a country that would be of interest to potential investors. For example, some countries might have an abundance of natural resources, while others might have large domestic consumer markets. However, to enhance its competitive position, a state might offer financial and tax incentives or even direct subsidies over and above granting access to resources and markets. Studies have also shown that states might seek to ‘manipulate’ access to local resources and markets to enhance competitiveness. For example, governments may negotiate with local labour groups to establish an attractive wage package that would encourage transnational corporations to locate operations in the country. Also, some states might invest in national educational, health, housing and infrastructure projects to improve the quality of human capital in the country so as to attract FDI (see Sklair, 1993, 1994). As will be discussed further in the next section, manipulated advantages are commonly known as ‘competitive advantages’.

Yet, the crux of this analysis is that when many governments begin to implement FDIattraction strategies, ostensibly for the purposes of development, this not only creates inter-state competition for FDI but also further drives the process of economic globalization. With states competing for FDI, firms will have an even wider choice over where and how they might utilize their investments. Viewed from a Marxist perspective, economic globalization is therefore an extension of the logic of capitalism. Capitalism is driven not only by the entrepreneurial drive of firms, but also with the complicity of states. Although some would argue that economic globalization has been underway for hundreds of years, as manifested through colonialism and empire-building across the world, many believe that the 1980s was when it became dominant. Also, with rapid advancements in technology and logistics, and with the rapid integration of financial markets around the world during the decade of the 1980s, economic globalization finally ‘took off’ with governments and corporations participating through international trade and FDI (Sklair, 1994). All of these factors worked together to cause an increase in the annual volume of global FDI inflows at an average of 28% per annum between 1986 and 2000 (see UNCTAD, 2004: 3). Although overall the volume of FDI increased significantly between 1970 and 2000, the reality is that competition for FDI has also been increasing (Nunnenkamp and Spatz, 2002; Oman, 2000). This is mainly due to many governments, especially after 1980 and the fall of communism in Europe, viewing FDI as a potential source of domestic economic growth and development (Lall, 1996). There are concerns that this competition between national (and even sub-national) governments would lead to ‘a race to the bottom’, where society would suffer at the hands of transnational corporations. For example, some governments might intentionally suppress wages or remove worker protection rights in order to attract foreign investments. Other observers have predicted

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that the competition could even lead to interstate conflicts, especially since there would be tremendous domestic political pressure for governments to deliver development (Thomas, 2000). On the other side of the debate, some – particularly agencies such as the United Nations Commission for Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, as well as ‘pro-globalization’ academics – argue that competition encourages states to ‘improve themselves’ so as to be attractive to potential investors. For example, states might invest in providing mass education locally, so as to ‘improve the quality of human resources’, which might in turn be attractive to foreign investors seeking qualified workers. This process could potentially be a ‘win–win’ situation for the foreign investor and the local population.

UNDERSTANDING COMPETITION In order to understand the focus of this chapter – inter-governmental FDI competition – it is necessary to revisit some of the basic dynamics of general business competition which take place under regular ‘market’ structures. In this market, FDI is set as the main commodity being ‘traded’. Therefore, in such a conceptualization, potential investor firms are viewed as ‘customers’, which demand resources or market access, while states are viewed as the supplying ‘clients’. While it is true that there obviously will be competition between customers (i.e., transnational corporations), this chapter seeks only to understand and explain competition between ‘clients’ (i.e., governments). The key to understanding this form of competition is the concept of ‘competitive advantage’, which suggests that all economic agents should strive for unique characteristics (‘differential advantages’) in order to distinguish themselves from other agents in the eyes of the customers (Alderson, 1965).

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In a business sense, this differential advantage might be achieved through offering better prices, selecting advertising appeals, and/or product improvements and innovations. Some even suggest that a good reputation and earned trust can be advantageous as well. Economic agents understand that business success comes not just from achieving competitive advantage but from sustaining it over time. A natural consequence of competition is conflict. Here, ideas from Park and Burgess from the 1920s, are still relevant: [Competition and conflict] are forms of interaction, but competition is a struggle between individuals, or groups of individuals, who are not necessarily in contact and communication; while conflict is a contest in which contact is an indispensable condition. Competition, unqualified and uncontrolled as with plants, and in the great impersonal life-struggle of man with his kind and with all animate nature, is unconscious. Conflict is always conscious, indeed, it evokes the deepest emotions and strongest passions and enlists the greatest concentration of attention and of effort. Both competition and conflict are forms of struggle. Competition, however, is continuous and impersonal, conflict is intermittent and personal (Park and Burgess, 1969 [1921]: 236).

Implicit in the conceptualization is the notion that competition is a ‘zero-sum’ game, where there are only winners and losers. Interestingly, Park and Burgess also offer another concept that is particularly useful to this analysis, the idea of ‘competitive cooperation’ (Park and Burgess, 1969 [1921]: 188). The basic notion is that although economic agents are often viewed as self-interested parties, they are also strategic creatures that will plan and forecast whether cooperative arrangements with other agents, often competitors, might lead to outcomes which are more beneficial to ‘going alone’. Cooperation among competitors can take on many forms, from the informal (strategic alliances) to the very formal (legally binding equity joint ventures). At the very same time, it is important to note that conflict is inherent in any form of competition. From their somewhat functionalist perspective, they argue that conflict is

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natural, and that a process of ‘conflict resolution’ will almost immediately follow (Park and Burgess, 1969 [1921]: 241–2). Perhaps drawing from Marx, who claimed that history was due to economic conflict as a result of the struggle between classes, Park and Burgess drew parallels with the struggle between religious sects as well as ‘races’. When analyzing conflict emanating from economic competition, the authors adopted a typically functionalist evolutionary perspective, suggesting that economic conflict will always be a struggle between competitors, whereby the strong will survive and the weak will fall away, and that this is ‘good’ for the market. Still, they warn of ‘predatory’ competition, where sometimes the strong are not necessarily those who are the ‘best’. As many sociologists and economists have developed the idea further, it is important to note that competition need not always be free and fair. There are likely to be ‘costs’ to competition, as competitors might engage in ‘wasteful’ activities such as rent-seeking as a shortcut. The ideas of Park and Burgess on competition, cooperation and conflict are directly relevant to explaining and understanding the nature of inter-governmental competition for FDI. The following sections will use some of these ideas and concepts in examining this competition in a case study of Singapore, which has relied on an FDI-oriented development strategy for nearly 40 years. Indeed, although it is a country with less than 4.5 million residents, it has ranked among the top national recipients of FDI since the 1970s; for example, between 1999 and 2001, Singapore was the sixth highest recipient of FDI world-wide (UNCTAD, 2004: 10). Although the analysis will oversimplify several issues – by treating the Singapore government as a single homogeneous entity, assuming that all social agents (such as national governments) have acted in an ethical, rational and fair manner, and reducing the details presented to the barest minimum – the overall thrust of the argument should still be clear.

CASE STUDY: SINGAPORE

Weak competition The government of Singapore adopted a national development strategy that was dependent on FDI soon after political independence in 1965 (see Mirza, 1986; Pereira, 2000). Before independence, Singapore was mainly a trading emporium supported by the British colonial administration. In 1963, after the British had announced that they were going to eventually withdraw completely from the region, Singapore joined Malaya to form Malaysia. From Singapore’s perspective, this move was designed to give the resource-scarce island an economic hinterland, which would help it survive. However, due to political and economic differences with the government in Kuala Lumpur, Singapore was eventually expelled from Malaysia in 1965 (Huff, 1994). Without Malaysia, Singapore faced problems of a stagnant economy and a rapidly growing population. Thus, the government – led by Lee Kuan Yew’s People’s Action Party (PAP) – chose the most ‘pragmatic’ solution, which was to turn to FDI in order to create jobs quickly (Schein, 1996). The Singapore government designated the whole island as an ‘export processing zone’, introduced favourable tax incentives to transnational corporations involved in industrial production, and offered prepared industrial infrastructure, providing ready-built factories, telecommunications, transportation links and utilities. It also heavily disciplined local labour through nationalizing labour groups in Singapore, intervening in the wage negotiation process to ensure that wages remained highly attractive to foreign investors (rather than local labour) and reforming labour laws to make work stoppages illegal (Leggett, 1993). All these policies combined to create a cheap, disciplined and ‘pro-business’ location that would be attractive to transnational corporations. The Singapore government – frequently described as an archetypical

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‘developmental state’ (see Castells, 1992; Huff, 1995; Perry et al., 1997) – was able to introduce these policies because of its political dominance within Singapore society. For many years, the People’s Action Party held total control over Parliament (see Rodan, 1997). Although Singapore lacked industrial experience, and did not have a sizable consumer market, many industrial transnational corporations set up production sites on the island, particularly those that wanted to relocate lower value added production away from high wage areas such as the USA, Western Europe and Japan. Although the state’s strategies were responsible for this relatively high inflow of FDI, it was also important to note that Singapore was one of the very few countries within Southeast Asia where American, European or Japanese companies could locate production during that period (1970–1980) (Pereira, 2000). Countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand were pursuing domestic import substitution industrialization (ISI) strategies, which meant that national economic policies were intent on protecting domestic firms from foreign producers. Communist countries such as China, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and North Korea, and heavily pro-socialist countries such as India almost completely shut out FDI. Thus, during that period, Hong Kong – not fully an independent country – and certain enclaves in Taiwan and South Korea were probably Singapore’s only serious competitors for FDI. The Philippines was generally open to FDI, but remained mainly an agricultural economy (Booth, 2004). Singapore’s ability to attract FDI was aided, therefore, by a relative lack of direct competition in the region (Pereira, 2000: 430).

Intense competition By the 1980s, the political economy of Asia had changed dramatically. Many Asian governments had conceded that their domestically oriented import substitution industrialization

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strategies were either progressing too slowly, or had failed altogether (see Booth, 2004). These governments had observed the rapid growth of countries that had adopted FDIoriented strategies. The exemplars were not only Singapore and Hong Kong, but also Ireland, Malta and Mexico (see World Bank, 1994). At the same time, there was an exponential growth in the volume of capital seeking to go ‘transnational’ (see Dicken, 1998). The electronics sector was the most dominant player in the global economy. Driven by intense competition between firms, corporations began a global search for the most cost effective locations for production (see Henderson, 1994). Even industrial enterprises from newly industrializing countries such as South Korea and Taiwan were seeking to relocate in cheaper production sites, adding to the growing volume of global FDI. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, there was also an ideology of ‘neo-liberalism’ emerging from the USA and Western Europe, where the political belief in ‘free markets’ and ‘less statism’ became more significant (Sachs, 1999). This led some governments to lower economic barriers, not just for trading purposes but also to attract foreign investment. In the late 1970s, many governments of developing economies began experimenting with FDI-oriented development strategies, usually through the establishment of ExportProcessing Zones, Special Economic Zones, or the Free Trade Zones (see World Bank, 1994). These zones were specially designated areas or estates, where foreign capital would be permitted. Such zones were a strategy to take advantage of global production needs but still insulate the rest of the country from foreign capital. Goods produced from these zones could not be sold in the rest of the country, thus still protecting domestic industrial enterprises. The main benefits of these zones were that employment was generated (because industrial multinational corporations required labour), and that foreign income was generated (based on the wages

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paid to the local labour by industrial transnational corporations). In Asia, such zones began to emerge in Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and even, since 1979, in communist China (see Felker, 2003). Even India and Vietnam, countries that were heavily protectionist or communist, were opening up to FDI. The consequence of the rapid adoption of FDI-oriented development strategies in Asia was that the competition for FDI intensified significantly. Singapore – a beneficiary of the ‘first’ wave of FDI in Asia – was unable to compete with the new industrial regions of Asia, which included parts of China, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand. Put another way, Singapore’s initial ‘competitive advantage’ was not sustainable. Labour costs in Singapore, which were slowly rising because of continued economic growth between 1965 and 1980, became uncompetitive when compared to labour less than 20 kilometres north and south of the island, in Malaysia and Indonesia respectively. Land costs were increasing as well, because of the island’s limited space. In the emerging industrial regions of Indonesia and Malaysia, factory and land rents were reportedly only 10% of those in Singapore (see Kumar and Lee, 1991). Thus, not only was Singapore unable to attract new FDI, but industrial transnational corporations that had stationed their operations in Singapore since 1965 were beginning to move out to the emerging industrial regions in Asia. This was potentially devastating to the Singapore economy, which was heavily reliant on foreign capital for both economic growth as well as sustaining employment since foreign industrial enterprises contributed to over 75 percent of Singapore’s output while employing 80% of the workforce during the 1980s (see Huff, 1994). In response to the increasing competition, the Singapore government became more innovative with its FDI-oriented strategy. It realized that Singapore could not compete solely on the basis of low wages for industrial labour. It tried to differentiate Singapore’s labour force from those in the

emerging regions. While labour in Malaysia or China had extremely low wages, they were not highly educated or able to undertake complex industrial tasks. The Singapore government invested heavily in tertiary technical education, especially in the industrial sectors. The aim was to attract industrial transnational corporations with high value added activities to come to Singapore to establish operations, or to encourage existing enterprises to upgrade their operations. In the 1980s, the Singapore government built new polytechnics and established an engineeringoriented university (Nanyang Technological University), in addition to expanding the engineering faculty at the existing National University of Singapore. With these moves, Singapore’s highly educated workers were generally ‘cheaper’ than their peers in the USA or Europe. At the same time, this heavy state investment in human resources meant that Singapore had a ‘differential advantage’ over its neighbours, who were offering low cost but mainly unskilled labour. This eventually led to a new wave of transnational investments within Singapore, mostly in the semiconductor, petrochemical and precision engineering sectors (see McKendrick et al., 2000).

Cooperation At the beginning of the 1990s, the Singapore government was worried about the possible negative consequences of inter-state competition for FDI. While it had been able to move ahead of the competition successfully, the Singapore government realized that this was perhaps only a short-term solution. It would only be a matter of time before developing nations such as India and China began to compete for high technology FDI, mainly because these countries were also rapidly improving the quality of their human resources. In addition to offering investors cheaper high quality human resources, countries such as India and China could also offer transnational corporations a massive consumer

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market, something Singapore could never offer. Thus, the Singapore government came up with an even more innovative strategy involving cooperation with other national governments to attract FDI jointly and thus to pre-empt further head-to-head competition. This was made possible because FDI could be ‘disaggregated’ (Dicken, 1998). In the 1990s, transnational corporations became more involved in ‘flexible production’, where they divided production of a single product over several countries to optimize cost efficiencies. In other words, one television set could be made up of components assembled in different countries; for example, the screen was made in China, the exterior casing in Malaysia, the circuits in Japan, the wires in Indonesia and the final product was assembled in Singapore. The final product could be sold anywhere in the world. Furthermore, there might be a possibility that individual components would not even be made by subsidiaries of the parent company in another country. The parent corporation might subcontract components to third party companies (these are known as OEM or original equipment manufacturer companies), and the process is sometimes known as outsourcing. National boundaries no longer matter to transnational corporations in terms of the product’s nationality; borders only matter in that they represent different costs or capabilities (Dunning, 1998). The Singapore government observed the process of increasing differentiation of FDI, and adopted new strategies to take advantage of it. Rather than compete with other governments for FDI, it entered into negotiations with several national governments in the Asia Pacific region to jointly cooperate on attracting FDI. The plan was to split the FDI in a manner that would benefit both governments. For example, transnational corporations could situate certain strategic tasks such as Headquarters functions or other higher value added production in Singapore, while locating their lower value added operations in a cooperating country. Towards this end, the Singapore government was fortunate in that

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it generally had ‘excellent’ diplomatic relations with most countries in East and Southeast Asia (Dent, 2003; Leifer, 2000). It also had a good reputation as an effective industrial developer and administrator; as such, cooperating governments felt that they could learn from Singapore’s earlier experience. Therefore, they were willing to cooperate to jointly attract FDI. This new cooperative strategy was the focus of the Singapore government’s so-called ‘regionalization’ policy, introduced in 1990 (see Ho, 2000; Perry and Yeoh, 2000). The Singapore government further intensified the regionalization policy by introducing an innovative scheme known as the ‘regional industrial parks’ programme. Here, the Singapore government was directly involved in the development and administration of industrial parks in selected cities across the Asia Pacific region. The logic was again cooperative. Transnational corporations would be able to enjoy low rent and labour costs, as the parks were located in emerging industrial zones. However, this estate would be managed by the Singapore government. This was attractive to transnational corporations, as they regarded the Singapore government as being efficient and trustworthy in industrial administration (see Schein, 1996). These parks also promised to have ‘Singaporestandard’ industrial infrastructure and administration, which was held in high regard by transnational corporations. The cooperating host government would benefit from all the developmental effects of FDI (such as employment creation and income generation through wages). For its part, the Singapore government hoped to benefit in part from the sales of the industrial properties and the management fees, and in part from the higher value added investments that went to Singapore. By 1995, the Singapore government had launched eight industrial parks; they were in Batam, Bintang and Karimun (Indonesia), Suzhou and Wuxi (China), Bangalore (India), Song Be (Vietnam) and Rayong (Thailand). Each of these regional industrial parks involved the direct

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cooperation of the respective national governments. By 2005, it could be argued that the Singapore government’s regionalization strategy had generally turned out to be relatively successful for most of the parties concerned, despite a few setbacks which will be discussed in the next section. The main beneficiaries have been the transnational corporations, who have been able to ‘disaggregate’ their operations much more conveniently and effectively, thanks to the cooperation between Singapore and the host governments. The local host governments too have been fairly satisfied, as the parks have been able to generate employment and other developmental effects. Although the Singapore government has reported that these regional industrial parks have not made any financial profits, the strategy is still considered crucial to Singapore’s own domestic industrial restructuring process as, since the late 1990s, Singaporean small and medium enterprises have also been shifting lower value added operations to these parks (see Chia, 2000).

Conflict As mentioned in the previous section, the regional industrial parks were generally successful in achieving the original target, which was inter-state cooperation to jointly attract FDI. However, there was one case where there was obvious inter-government conflict: the Suzhou Industrial Park project, which was a collaborative project between the Singapore and China governments. This project was located 60 kilometres west of Shanghai, just outside Suzhou city. From the Singapore government’s perspective, it was the largest of its regional industrial parks, in terms of geographical size as well as financial outlay (see Pereira, 2003). Between 1994 and 1997, the Suzhou Industrial Park was one of the fastest growing FDI zones in the whole of Asia, as multinational and transnational corporations saw that it had China-level

costs (in terms of land rents and labour wages) but Singapore-standard industrial infrastructure and administration. Also, this project had the strong support of two national governments, which gave investors a sense of long-term stability. However, conflicts between the two governments began to emerge soon after 1997. This was in part due to the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis. Even though the Crisis did not affect China, it had the impact of significantly reducing FDI in the whole region as global consumer demand meant that transnational corporations were more cautious about investing in new factories around the world (see Haggard and Low, 2002). With this decline in the supply of FDI, the inter-governmental competition in the whole Asia-Pacific region intensified. Indeed, in some cases, even subnational governments competed against national governments. This was the case in the Suzhou Industrial Park, as it saw direct competition for FDI from the neighbouring Suzhou New District, an industrial estate administered by the Suzhou Municipal Authority. The Suzhou New District modelled itself on the Singapore-developed Suzhou Industrial Park. It claimed to offer Singapore-standard industrial infrastructure and administration as it had learnt by ‘observing’. More significantly, it could offer even lower land rents than the Singaporedeveloped Suzhou Industrial Park (see Pereira, 2003). The competition for FDI by the Suzhou New District strained the Singapore–China inter-governmental cooperation. Between 1998 and 1999, the Singapore government asked the Chinese government to discipline the Suzhou Municipal Authority, proposing that any new FDI would go to the locally run Suzhou New District only after the other project was ‘fully filled’. Much to the frustration of the Singapore government, the central China government in Beijing chose not to take any action to ‘discipline’ the subnational government. The Suzhou Municipal Authority remained defiant: it claimed that there should be ‘free and fair’ competition

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for FDI. In 2001, the Singapore government – frustrated by the seemingly ‘unfair’ competition – officially disengaged from the Suzhou Industrial Park project. Although it remains as a minority shareholder in the project, it has effectively handed over the administration of the Park to the Chinese government (Pereira, 2003).

Competition, again Although its regionalization strategy is still in operation, the Singapore government re-assessed its policy options for the future, and eventually rolled out yet another largescale project designed to re-establish the island’s ‘competitive advantage’. The Biomedical Sciences Initiative, launched in 2003, has many thrusts. On paper, the Singapore government claims that it is hoping to eventually become a hub of biotechnology production and research and development (R&D). However, based on what the Singapore government actively pursued between 2003 and 2005, it became clear that the strategy involved targeting ‘pharmaceutical FDI’. More specifically, the Singapore government was encouraging large pharmaceutical corporations to set up production facilities in Singapore, along with some pharmaceutical research and development activities. Although the pharmaceutical sector is generally distinct from the biotechnology or biomedical sector, there are many overlaps. For example, pharmaceutical corporations are known to invest and acquire biotechnology companies that can contribute to drug development. Regardless, as far as the Singapore government is concerned, pharmaceutical activities, along with medtech (which refers to medical technology), are considered part of the biomedical sciences initiative. What is interesting about the Singapore government’s initiative is that the pharmaceutical sector is not normally known as being ‘globalized’. Unlike, for example, textiles, and the automotive or electronics sectors,

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the large pharmaceutical corporations have not been seen ‘going abroad’ to acquire cheaper resources in the third world (Rugman, 2005). The main reason for this is that there is ‘... a set of stringent local and regional regulations [which] prevent pharmaceutical companies from adopting a global strategy’ (Rugman and Brain, 2004: 13). These regulations include national drug approval processes, price controls and most importantly, quality control. Hence, pharmaceutical corporations – regardless of their size – tend to remain regional or local3 rather than global (Rugman and Brain, 2004: 24). While there is some evidence that the large pharmaceutical companies have attempted to export to new markets, products bound for a particular region are often produced within that region. To illustrate, pharmaceutical companies do not produce drugs in so-called ‘low cost’ countries for re-export back to the US consumer market (see for example Rugman, 2005). Against this economic backdrop, the Singapore government tried to position the country as a low cost but high quality location for pharmaceutical production and R&D. Late in 2001, before the Biomedical Sciences Initiative was officially launched, the Singapore government began to invest heavily in building specialized infrastructure and developing human resources with the hope of attracting large pharmaceutical corporations to set up production facilities, as well as R&D activities on the island. The two largest infrastructural investments were the building of the Tuas Biomedical Park and the Biopolis. The Park is a purpose built industrial estate with ‘state of the art’ logistical and technical facilities that can satisfy even the most technologically advanced production (paraphrased from Tuas BioMedical Park marketing brochure4). The investments made in the infrastructure preparation were reportedly over US$0.6 billion. Thisincluded high technology water treatment facilities as well as logistics facilities. The investments have paid off, as these sites have been approved by the biotechnology corporations as having the basic quality control, whereby

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products made in Singapore can be reexported to the first world (Singapore Biotech Guide 2007/2008: 20). Biopolis was launched as a multi-purpose complex that could house both R&D activities as well as other corporate functions. Costing US$350 million to build, and located beside the National University of Singapore Science Park, it is hoped that the complex will eventually accommodate 2,000 biotechnology research scientists. The Singapore government – fully aware that the biomedical sciences sector requires specialized academic personnel (often with the minimum of doctoral degrees in bioengineering or a related science) particularly for R&D activities – has also been investing heavily in upgrading human resources. For example, between 2001 and 2004, 276 postgraduate scholars were awarded overseas and local government scholarships to pursue doctoral programmes in various aspects of biomedical sciences, including pharmaceutical R&D (A*Star, 2005: 8). According to the director of A*Star,5 which is a statutory board tasked with promoting the biomedical initiative, each scholarship recipient is expected to cost the government about US$0.6m (FDI Magazine, 2003: 7). Although the state has created many opportunities for young Singaporeans to train to become biotechnology or health sciences experts, it has also gone ahead with a very liberal immigration policy for experts (as well as postgraduate students) in the pharmaceutical field, despite the expression of concern about this policy by the local population. After all, large pharmaceutical corporations would be concerned only about hiring qualified specialists regardless of their nationality. While the state’s investments in infrastructure and human resources have been frequently trumpeted by the Singapore government around the world as a strategy to attract pharmaceutical FDI into Singapore, there were two other important policy instruments, which were less publicized to the general public. These instruments, drawn up with foreign investors in mind, were the

‘intellectual property’ (IP) regime and the ‘bioethics code’. The strict IP regime was to assure large biotechnology corporations that their products would not be ‘pirated’ locally, and would not face competition from locally produced ‘generic drugs’. At the same time, the Singapore government formed the Bioethics Advisory Committee to draft a comprehensive set of guidelines and to make recommendations for changes to the law (where necessary) on various aspects such as stem cell, human tissue, and genetic research (Singapore Bioethics Advisory Committee Official Homepage). In addition to the high quality infrastructure and the (growing) high level of human resources, the IP regime and overt bioethics code would serve to enhance Singapore’s competitive advantage as a location where large pharmaceutical corporations could operate securely. Between 2003 and 2005, many large pharmaceutical corporations made substantial investments in Singapore. In 2003 alone, Singapore attracted over US$500m in biomedical – including biotechnology and pharmaceutical FDI – related fixed asset foreign investments (Beh, 2004: 36); in 2004, it rose to US$700m (Singapore Investment News, December 2004 Special Supplement: 9). These recent investments included the establishment of new production facilities by several large global pharmaceutical firms (see Table 26.1). At the same time, several other corporations have established fairly large biotechnology or pharmaceutical research and Table 26.1 Cases of biotechnology foreign direct investment in Singapore (selected) Company Investment Schering-Plough Ltd1 US$230m US$100m GlaxoSmithKline2 Novartis AG3 US$200m Pfizer4 US$375m Sources: 1 Singapore Investment News, February 2004, p. 3. 2 Singapore Investment News, July 2004, p. 4. 3 Singapore Investment News, September 2004, p. 4. 4 Singapore Investment News, October 2004, p. 6–9. Source: Singapore Economic Development Board, http://www.sedb.com.sg/

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development investments. For example, in addition to its manufacturing plant in Tuas, GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) has invested US$70m in a R&D facility within the same compound (Singapore Straits Times, 5 November 2005). This would be GSK’s sixth R&D plant, after two in UK, and one each in USA, Italy and Ireland. Novartis AG set up a R&D facility to develop drugs for tropical diseases, such as dengue fever and tuberculosis (Singapore Investment News, August 2004). The other two high profile pharmaceutical R&D projects include operations by Eli Lilly, known as the ‘Lilly Systems Biology 2’ Centre, and Schering-Plough’s biochemical R&D facility, located at the University Science Park. It would be a mistake to attribute the large inflow of pharmaceutical FDI into Singapore solely to the government’s Biomedical Sciences Initiative. There were also other exogenous factors that allowed Singapore to enjoy ‘differential advantages’. For example, the biotechnology policies of the two largest countries in Asia, China and India, had a significantly different focus. For both of these countries, the focus was on developing domestic biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms. Hence, the aim in attracting FDI was to encourage large biotechnology and pharmaceutical corporations to establish joint ventures with domestic firms with the aim of acquiring capital and technology. The foreign investors, in exchange, sought access to these (potentially) huge consumer markets. The situation was very much the same in Taiwan and to a lesser degree in South Korea, because the latter country was not particularly keen on FDI in the first place. Other Asian countries, such as Malaysia and Thailand, also have biotechnology policies, but they are in the ‘infancy’ stage. Japan is excluded from the analysis, as it is considered one of the ‘first world’ economies, where FDI emanates rather than arrives. As such, up to the beginning of 2006, pharmaceutical FDI in both production and R&D within Asia were mainly concentrated in Singapore, but there was very little elsewhere. Pharmaceutical FDI in mergers and

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acquisitions were almost totally absent in Singapore but significant in Asian countries such as China and India. Hence, this somewhat ‘tacit’ division of labour has benefited Singapore, as far as FDI competition is concerned. Coupled with the Singapore government’s provision of high quality infrastructure and the growing pool of qualified human resources, Singapore has been able to re-capture the ‘competitive advantage’, at least for the time being. Some critics (mostly political lobby groups in the West) offer an alternative explanation for the flow of biotechnology and pharmaceutical FDI to Singapore. They claim that Singapore has an extremely ‘liberal’ bioethics policy even with the bioethics guidelines. Hence, their argument is that Singapore’s high level of pharmaceutical FDI was due to its competitive advantage in lesser ‘morality’. In other words, scientists and companies involved in stem cell research that is banned in the ‘first world’ have since flowed to Singapore (see, for example, reports in Far Eastern Economic Review 2003; Businessweek (Online) 2005). In response to these criticisms, it is worth noting that there are places which have even less ‘morality’ than Singapore as far as bioethics is concerned. Yet, there does not seem to be any regular flow of pharmaceutical or biotechnology foreign investments there. Hence, it is more likely that pharmaceutical FDI has come to Singapore because of the state-‘created’ competitive advantages, as well as the current structure of the Asian regional economy. Given that the Singapore government had once gained and then subsequently lost its ‘competitive advantage’, and also given the nature of economic globalization, the Singapore government would be foolish to assume that pharmaceutical FDI would always flow into Singapore. When other states decide to pursue a similar policy agenda, and begin taking action to put in place measures that will be attractive to large pharmaceutical corporations, Singapore will face competition that it did not face between 2000 and 2005.

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With regard to the issue of economic globalization, as this mini-case study has also shown, the pharmaceutical sector does, in fact, have a global strategy. Firms would like to acquire ‘more efficient’ – or simply put, cheaper and/or better – resources from abroad, in addition to seeking to expand into new markets. Previously, local state regulations had prevented this process. However, as Singapore has shown, if the state creates the right conditions for capital, which in this case involved providing the adequate level of infrastructure and human resources, then capital will respond accordingly. It is a good illustration of how capitalism and the state jointly drive economic globalization through competition.

CONCLUDING REMARKS The purpose of this case study was to understand the dynamics within inter-state competition for FDI, and also how this competition in turn contributes to economic globalization. With regard to the dynamics of competition, an examination of the case of Singapore between 1965 and 2005 shows how a government, through its policies, was able to achieve competitive advantage. However, sensing the erosion of this advantage through the emergence of new competitors, the state not only attempted innovation to find new advantages but also attempted to enter into cooperation. As expected, conflict was found to inhere in all competitive situations. Indeed, conflict can easily emerge within cooperation, either because of internal rivalry or external competition. This case also shows that inter-state competition was a critical factor in driving economic globalization. Due to the policies of the Singapore government in the 1960s, many transnational corporations were able to exploit cheaper resources in Singapore for the purposes of cost savings. When other Asian countries wanted to attract FDI for purposes of local development, they began

competing against countries like Singapore. This competition not only offered transnational corporations even more choice for investment locations but probably also even cheaper resources. When the Singapore government collaborated with other governments to jointly attract FDI, this gave transnational corporations even greater options. Finally, when the Singapore government introduced the Biomedical Sciences Initiative, as a strategy for regaining competitive advantage, it showed that the pharmaceutical sector – a business sector that was once considered not to have a global strategy – immediately seized upon the new opportunities to acquire cheaper resources outside of its home market. This chapter concludes by revisiting the most basic premise of capitalism, namely that capital is not only driven by the entrepreneurship of firms but also requires the involvement of the state. Under conditions of economic globalization, where capitalism is predominantly global rather than national, global capital now requires the involvement of competing states.

NOTES 1 In some cases, direct foreign investment is treated as a component of FDI (see especially UNCTAD website at http://stats.unctad.org/fdi/) for purposes of national statistical accounting. However, for this chapter, the two concepts will be used interchangeably. 2 There were also other contributing factors, such as the devaluation of the US Dollar (Plaza Agreement), for the rise of economic globalization. See Sklair (1994) for a summary. 3 Regional here refers to the case of ‘the European Union’ countries, or the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) countries, while local refers to specific countries including Japan, which is considered a ‘first world’ economy (see Rugman, 2004). 4 Found at website, http://www.jtc.gov.sg/Pro ducts/industry+clusters/tuas+biomedical+park.asp 5 The following information is posted at A*Star’s official website: The agency comprises the Biomedical Research Council (BMRC), the Science and Engineering Research Council (SERC), the Corporate Planning and Administration Division (CPAD), the

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A*STAR Graduate Academy (A*GA) and the commercialization arm, Exploit Technologies Pte Ltd (ETPL). Both BMRC and SERC promote, support and oversee the public sector’s R&D research activities in Singapore. A*GA supports A*STAR’s key thrust of human capital development through the promotion of science scholarships and other manpower development programmes and initiatives. ETPL manages the Intellectual Property created by the research institutes and facilitates the transfer of technology from the research institutes to industries. CPAD supports the two Research Councils, A*GA and ETPL in performing the functions of Finance, Human Resource, Corporate Policy and Planning, Corporate Communications, Legal, Information Technology and Audit (http://www.a-star.edu.sg/).

REFERENCES A*Star (Agency for Science, Technology and Research) (2005) National Survey of R&D in Singapore 2004. Singapore: A*Star. Alderson, Wroe (1965) Dynamic Marketing Behavior: A Functionalist Theory of Marketing. Homewood: Richard Irwin. Beh, Swan Gin (2004) ‘Singapore Overview: Courting Western R&D, Manufacturing’, in Kenneth Hardy (ed.) On the Threshold: The Asia-Pacific Perspective, Global Biotechnology Report 2004. Singapore: Ernst and Young. pp. 36–8. Bhagwati, Jagdish (2004) In Defense of Globalization. NY: Oxford University Press. Booth, Anne (2004) ‘Linking, De-linking and Re-linking: Southeast Asia in the Global Economy in the Twentieth Century’, Australian Economic History Review, 44(1): 35–51. Business Week (Online) ‘Asia is Stem Cell Central’, 10 January 2005, http://www.busi nessweek.com/magazine/content/05_02/b3 915052.htm Castells, Manuel (1992) ‘Four Asian Tigers with a Dragon Head: A Comparative Analysis of the State, Economy, and Society in the Asian Pacific Rim’, in Richard P. Appelbaum and Jeffrey Henderson (eds.) States and Development in the Asian Pacific Rim. Newbury Park: Sage. pp. 33–70. Chia, Siow Yue (2000) ‘Singapore: Destination for Multinationals’, in John H. Dunning (ed.) Regions, Globalization and the KnowledgeBased Economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 364–80.

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Dent, Christopher (2003) ‘Transnational Capital, the State and Foreign Economic Policy: Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan’, Review of International Political Economy, 10(2): 246–77. Dicken, Peter (1998) Global Shift: Transforming the World Economy. London: Chapman. Dobson, Wendy (1997) ‘East Asian Integration: Synergies between Firm Strategies and Government Policies’, in Wendy Dobson and Siow Yue Chia (eds.) Multinationals and East Asian Integration. Ottawa and Singapore: IRDC and ISEAS. pp. 3–27. Dunning, John H. (1998) ‘Globalization and the New Geography of Foreign Direct Investment’, Oxford Development Studies, 26(1): 47–70. FDI Magazine ‘Innovation and Education Bring Success to Singapore’s Biotech Industry’, 5 August 2003. p. 7. Far Eastern Economic Review, ‘Ambition in a Test Tube’, 9 January 2003. p. 32. Felker, Greg B. (2003) ‘Southeast Asian Industrialization and the Changing Global Production System’, Third World Quarterly, 24(2): 255–82. Haggard, Stephan and Low, Linda (2002) ‘State, Politics and Business in Singapore’, in Edwin T. Gomez (ed.) Political Business in East Asia. London: Routledge. pp. 301–23. Hayter, Roger (1997) The Dynamics of Industrial Location: The Factory, The Firm, and The Production System. Chichester: Wiley. Henderson, Jeffrey (1994) ‘Electronics Industries and the Developing World: Uneven Contributions and Uncertain Prospects’, in Leslie Sklair (ed.) Capitalism and Development. London: Routledge. pp. 258–88. Henderson, Jeffrey, Dicken, Peter; Hess, Martin; Coe, Neil; Yeung, Hendry Wai-Chung (2002) ‘Global Production Networks and the Analysis of Economic Development’, Review of International Political Economy, 9(3): 436–64. Ho, Kong Chong (2000) ‘Competing to be Regional Centres: A Multi-agency, Multilocation Perspective’, Urban Studies, 37(12): 2337–56. Howells, Jeremy and Wood Michelle (1993) The Globalisation of Production and Technology. London: Belhaven Press. Huff, W. Gregg (1994) The Economic Growth of Singapore: Trade and Development in the Twentieth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Huff, W. Gregg (1995) ‘The Developmental State, Government, and Singapore’s Economic Development Since 1960’, World Development, 23(8): 1421–38. Jessop, Bob (2002) The Future of the Capitalist State. Cambridge: Polity Press. Kumar, Ramesh and Lee, Tsao Yuan (1991) ‘Growth Triangle: A Singaporean Perspective’, in Tsao Yuan Lee (ed.) Growth Triangle: The Johor Singapore Riau Experience, Singapore: ISEAS. pp. 1–35. Lall, Sanjaya (1996) ‘Transnational Corporations and Economic Development’, in UNCTAD (United Nations Conference for Trade and Development), Transnational Corporations and World Development. NY: Routledge. pp. 44–74. Leggett, Chris (1993) ‘Corporatist Trade Unionism in Singapore’, in S. Frenkel. (ed.) Organized Labor in the Asia-Pacific Region: A Comparative Study of Trade Unionism in Nine Countries. Ithaca: ILR Press. pp. 223–9. Leifer, Michael (2000) Singapore’s Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulnerability. London: Routledge. McKendrick, David, Doner, Richard and Haggard, Stephan (2000) From Silicon Valley to Singapore: Location and Competitive Advantage in the Hard Disk Drive Industry. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Mirza, Hafiz (1986) Multinationals and the Growth of the Singapore Economy. London: Croom Helm. Moosa, Imad A. (2002) Foreign Direct Investment: Theory, Evidence and Practice. London: Palgrave. Moran, Theodore H. (1998) Foreign Direct Investment and Development: The New Political Agenda for Developing Countries and Economies in Transition. Washington DC: Institute for International Economics. Nunnenkamp, Peter and Spatz, Julius (2002) ‘Determinants of FDI in Developing Countries: Has Globalization Changed the Rules of the Game?’, Transnational Corporations, 11(2): 1–34. Oman, Charles (2000) Policy Competition for Foreign Direct Investment: A Study of Competition among Governments to Attract FDI. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Park, Robert and Burgess, Ernest W. (1969) [1921] Introduction to the Science of Sociology. 3rd edn. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Pereira, Alexius A. (2000) ‘State Collaboration with Transnational Corporations: The Case of Singapore’s Industrial Programmes (1965–1999)’, Competition and Change, 4(4): 423–451. Pereira, Alexius A. (2003) State Collaboration and Development Strategies in China. London: Routledge Curzon. Perry, Martin and Yeoh, Caroline (2000) ‘Singapore’s Overseas Industrial Parks’, Regional Studies, 34(2): 199–206. Perry, Martin, Kong, Lily and Yeoh, Brenda (1997) Singapore: A Developmental CityState. Chichester: Wiley. Rodan, Garry (1997) ‘Singapore: Economic Diversification and Social Divisions’, in G. Rodan, K. Hewison and R. Robison (eds.) The Political Economy of South-East Asia. Melbourne: Oxford University Press. pp. 148–78. Rugman, Alan M. (2005) The Regional Multinationals: MNEs and Global Strategic Management. Cambridge and NY: Cambridge University Press. Rugman, Alan M. and Brain, Cecilia (2004) ‘Regional Strategies of Multinational Pharmaceutical Firms’, Management International Review, 44(3): 7–25. Sachs, Jeffrey (1999) ‘Twentieth-Century Political Economy: A Brief History of Global Capitalism’, Oxford Review of Political Economy, 15(4): 90–100. Schein, Edgar (1996) Strategic Pragmatism: the Culture of Singapore’s Economic Development Board. Cambridge: MIT Press. Singapore Bioethics Advisory Committee Official Homepage, http://www.bioethicssingapore.org/ Singapore Biotech Guide 2007/2008. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Business Information Private Limited. (http://www. biomed-singapore.com/etc/medialib/bms_ downloads/newsroom.Par.0010.File.tmp/ BIOTECH%200708.pdf) Singapore Investment News, August 2004, ‘Novartis Opens Research Facility on Tropical Diseases’, p. 5. Singapore Investment News, Dec. 2004 Special Supplement, ‘2004 Investment Commitments Surpassed Expectations’, p. 2.

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Singapore Straits Times, ‘Drug Giant GSK to Open Cutting-edge R&D Plant Here’, 5 November 2005, H1. Sklair, Leslie (1993) Assembling for Development: The Maquila Industry in Mexico and the USA. San Diego: Center for U.S.–Mexican Studies, UCSD. Sklair, Leslie (1994) ‘Capitalism and Development in Global Perspective’, in Leslie Sklair (ed.) Capitalism and Development. London: Routledge. pp. 65–188.

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Thomas, Kenneth P. (2000) Competing for Capital: Europe and North America in a Global Era. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press. UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) (2004) World Investment Report 2003: FDI Policies for Development: National and International Perspectives. Geneva: UNCTAD. World Bank (1994) World Development Report 1994: Infrastructure for Development. Washington DC: Oxford University Press.

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27 The Dynamics of Local-Global Relations: Conflict and Development Henry Teune

The ecological paradigm is presented as the basic structure of one of the fundamental dynamics of conflict and change. The structure of conflict is across levels of human organization and aggregation that drives change that comes from the environment, the more encompassing level, affecting the ‘lower’, less encompassing, living systems that resist such intrusions. This paradigm is readily applied to the dynamics of localglobal relations, where the global influences the local and the local the global. The global today carries the elements of openness and democratization that shape national, regional, and local values, processes and practices. How this happens is discussed at the end of this chapter in the context of a large scale, cross-national research program that assesses democratic values and change and how political leaders in local governmental units relate to them. The systematic study of relationships among local and higher levels and neighboring niches of living systems has long standing in science as the ecologies of all living species.

The formulation of this ‘revolutionary idea’ is relevant to one of the most important changes taking place today among human social systems – local and global – a process with many different results that are challenged in controversies that extend beyond traditional studies of international relations to global issues of the environment, the integrity of cultures, indeed, the basic human relationships that are part of the development of global human rights.

INTRODUCTION: THE ECOLOGICAL PARADIGM The concept of ecology entered modern sociology in the second half of the nineteenth century as one of its dominant theoretical modalities. Ideas about ecology as a theoretical framework have changed dramatically since then. The conceptual history of ecology begins as an idea about the dynamic relationships between living and physical systems

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THE DYNAMICS OF LOCAL-GLOBAL RELATIONS

in the 1850s and is firmly attached to biological evolution (Darwin, 1859). It is then imported by early, secular social development theorists (Marx, 1867; Spencer, 1862); becomes a sub-field of sociology called human ecology in North America (Park et al., 1925); and finally bounces back to Europe as social ecology (Dogan and Rokkan, 1969). In about a generation, social ecology has moved as a discipline from the national to the international and now to the global, the ultimate social niche.1 From the point that ecological analysis was opened as a paradigm for the study of human change in general, it is now being considered as a way to interpret theoretically the most important transformation of the past several decades, the integration of all human societies into a single human social system. An essential component of ecological analysis is the definition of an environment – a niche – that must be justified theoretically and empirically. However conceived, the world unto its ‘ends’ was always an ‘environment’ for the human race. In social ecology, the neighborhood was defined as an environment within a city or settlement; the city, as a space for population distributions by social class in ‘capitalist’ development with its free migration of people and capital; the region, as formal and informal units determining the economic functions of spatially aggregated cities; and the country, as the powerful political entity controlling basic social and economic relations among groups and individuals. The progression is from local niches, to regions as aggregates of localities, to countries as aggregations of regions, and, finally, to the dynamics of globalization that makes the world a total physical, living, and human system, ‘the ultimate environment’ of theoretical relevance today. Since the fifteenth century with its European naval explorations, the world is seen, mostly in outline form, as a changing, single living system, focused on dispersions of germs and plant and animal populations invading world regions and localities mostly through human carriers. Although the world has been understood as a single physical

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system with a common origin and history for several centuries, our observational and analytical capacities still allow only a partial understanding of the place of the earth in the cosmos. Eventually our grasp of the world has come to include the reality that our world emerged from larger, more encompassing systems that continue to shape it both incrementally by the impact of energy and matter and episodically by massive intrusions from outer space. Challenges abound in the study of the evolution of species. Even now, the search goes on for evidence of catastrophic events from space millions of years ago that transformed the configurations of living systems. Understanding of the world as a single human system is not within easy analytical grasp, and research and teaching about it remain ensconced in national sociologies. While the global human system can be addressed from the perspective of an international sociology, the challenge of constructing a global social science remains. Still, politics about the virtues and vices of a global human system are supplanting the focus on the influence of particular civilizations and states that seek control and dominance. An ideological struggle about a global human system is taking place on the cusp of a transformation from an international world composed of states continuing to pursue their interests in competition over limited resources to a global system of growth and development with cooperation. The structure of the ecological paradigm for theory and research has the following fundamental characteristics: at least two levels (environment and the encompassed entities); at least two points in time; and at least one relationship, conflict being the most common. Implied are comparisons across systems and across time. From this ecological perspective, processes that increase complexity and change as growth or decline at the global level both incorporate and stimulate conflict dynamics at the local levels. In social ecology, as in any macro-social analysis, the first question is the aggregation rules of relevance for explanation; and

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the second, the relative and sufficient autonomy of the aggregates or systems being examined from those encompassing them (Hannan, 1981). This means, in the first case, that explanations, for example, of the economic growth of regions are significantly different within a country to justify separate regional analysis and, in the second case, that regional economic growth in patterns is different from national economic growth. In social ecology and its corollary of comparing social, economic, and political systems, a necessary assumption for comparing social niches or systems is that their defined boundaries have some degree of independence from higher level systems. Thus, questions posed by the grand hypothesis of the world as a total human system is the extent to which changes within identifiable local niches, cities, regions, countries, and corporations, for example, are sufficiently determined by their own, autonomous internal processes to be amenable to comparisons as ‘closed’ systems. Alternatively, the question is the extent to which local conflicts are local responses to those at higher levels, more encompassing niches, including the global system. Local conflicts and the processes of dealing with them at least must be considered partial responses to global influences, even if that influence is expected to vary from very little to a great deal. The two core theoretical and empirical issues for global ecological analysis, then, for comparative across-level, across-time, and across-system analysis in an evolving global system – are first, what is local and what is global, and second, what are the dynamics by which those global-local relationships change? What is the ‘best’ level for explaining the most variance, including change? For example, does change in voting participation occur because of changes in individuals resulting from the spread of more education nearly everywhere? Alternatively, are changes in participation a result of the homogenizing effects of reduced pressures from social and economic groups reflecting national trends of the weakening strength of

groups on individuals? Are these changes in engagement in voting generational, a mixing and weakening of the influence of cultures on political behavior, or the political coming together of transnational regions in Europe and Latin America and elsewhere? Or does globalization diminish the range of differences and choice on the left and right in political party politics and thus dampen the motivational intensity of political party differences? The challenge of local-global relationships comes from (a) the reality that all observations are micro or local, made within specific contexts and at specific points in time, and (b) the necessity that all theoretical generalizations must be connected to higher order systems through inferences. Those inferences should also include conjectures about influences from neighboring systems as well as those about the histories of systems – the legacies of the past that explain current, and predict future states of the system.

AN ECOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF LOCAL-GLOBAL CONFLICT The idea of ecology appears to have been appropriated by many political groups concerned with human destruction of the physical and living environments. One consequence is a reluctance to use the ecological paradigm in social research. Still, as the ecological paradigm continues to acquire theoretical prominence in the realm of biological evolution in research on genes, it is likely to regain its position for understanding the main developmental dynamics of change stemming from new forms of local-global social relationships in the twenty-first century. Globalization has brought about institutions, although still weak and unsure, for addressing conflicts among nations and some that are beginning to deal with group conflicts that can escalate into wars of genocide and terror. The traditional, international and group conflicts involve winners and losers in zero-sum contests.

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Globalization as development embraces world prosperity rather than the total success of some over others. The global, however, has emerged as the new and the modern, threatening traditional social orders based on established patterns of belief and values. For some groups, the enemy is global, intruding everywhere. For those attached to the global, the new institutions represent freedom and opportunity, just as ‘new’ nation-states offered an alternative to the restraints and limits of the local or control by aliens from other cultures. Relationships across levels of human organization are inherently conflictual. First, the higher level always has more variety than any unit does at a lower level. It has all the variety of any unit plus that of all other units. The probability of higher levels of aggregation yielding new types of diversity is greater than that of lower level units with less variety combining into something different. Higher levels are also bigger and more powerful and can absorb lower levels. The main cities in a region, as centers of variety, have historically functioned as centers of innovation. Second, because higher levels have a greater capacity simply to absorb variety from others, their rate of change is faster. The more variety a system has, the less disturbing is any novelty because it is a small percentage of the total. Higher levels seek to absorb the local by processes of incorporation, often resisted by the lower levels. Conflicts between a higher level center and lower level localities are aggravated by the spatial distances that carry a history of conflicts between the center and the periphery. As the lower levels adapt to change, they are confronted with more change from higher levels and, as noted, at an accelerating rate. Nation-states have been established in almost all parts of the world except those that are least developed economically. Most of those areas today have institutionalized processes whereby local and national differences can be resolved whether in regional governments, new forms of decentralization, or negotiated economic distributions. For the time being, at least in most countries, the worst of national conflicts with the local have been smoothed.

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Local-global conflicts from intrusions where the global invades the local with novelty, more rapid processes of change, and with resources that redefine and influence local positions of wealth and standing also bring prospects for local prosperity and autonomy. Nonetheless, local resistance is potentially violently destructive of the global. Often the local resists or presses different priorities than the global. Although local conflicts with the global can escalate to violence, they often appear only symbolically in demonstrations. The other side of global intrusions, especially when they are invited by local groups, are additions of variety to the locality as well as connections to alternative, higher level systems that allow the locality to bypass the controls of regions and states. In the coming decades, local conflicts with higher levels are likely to be focused on the global, with the local attempting to enlist national authorities to help in resisting global intrusions. In sum, the transcendent dynamic of localglobal relations as a source of conflict is the evolution of social (human) systems, incorporating the ‘classical’ ecological dynamics of competition and conflict into processes that tie globalization to developmental processes. Globalization is a process that is inclusive of all diversity through the integration of social, political and economic systems.2 This process differs from that of empires, where populations are subordinated to a center in limited ways, but generally left autonomous in the pursuit of their own culture. During the past quarter of a century or so, development has shifted from the national to the global (Teune and Mlinar, 2000). For over two centuries the state, with its varied political economies, exercised hierarchal control from a center which was justified by economic growth and social justice and a different, often new, overriding political identity. The state is, however, unlikely to regain its role as the main engine of economic growth and integration of small units into larger systems. Although the state may control

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more of its populations relative to what it did in the past, the global – corporations, courts, international governmental agencies, new transnational regions – has preempted national autonomy in several domains, notably in trade, finance, and human rights, and to some extent, in environmental health policies. Globalization, the consequence of decades of development at local and national levels, feeds those processes, speeding up development (Teune, 2001).

GLOBALIZATION As emphasized, globalization is the summation of the processes by which human societies become integrated at higher, more inclusive levels of aggregation, moving from small groups, to tribes, to empires and states with a higher level of integration, and finally to the world as a total human system. The processes of social and human development for the past 8–10 thousand years have yielded higher, more encompassing, levels of human organization. Agricultural societies, by occupying territory, have obliterated nearly all hunting-gathering ones, often through massive displacements and killing. Hierarchical states attempted to incorporate local religious, ethnic, economic and other differences into singular identities of either subjects or citizens, but with few exceptions, incompletely. Most states today retain a structure of differences among religious and ethnic groups, as well as between rural and urban populations. By the end of the twentieth and into the twenty-first century, many globalization processes are underway, especially the transformations of the remaining agricultural societies into urbanized social orders based on some mixture of industries, services, information, and research. During those same decades, a world of states had just about come into its own as the dominant form of successful human organization based on individual citizens. States replaced the

older forms of ecological dominance of political empires, based on enforced allegiance. The world of states is being replaced by a global political order, however incipient and inchoate, with floundering institutions such as the UN, the World Trade Organization, and the International Criminal Court. Because this began to happen before many areas of the world had become fully integrated into the hierarchies of their newly founded states with stable and effective national governments, local political order often broke down into tribal, ethnic, and religious wars. Many of the newly independent states were façade states, pretending to have control through a working bureaucracy and loyal army. In fact, they were manipulated by religious, economic, and ethnic interests that generated conflicts. These divisions, threatening overt conflict, often led states to engage in suppressing cultures, classes, and ethnicities to maintain order. Russia as a weak state is considered a puppet of economic interests and several Middle Eastern countries are in the hands of religious leaders. In the politics of empire, strong neighbors, or the competing centers, invade localities and either extract resources through local intermediaries or simply incorporate local groups, thereby absorbing local diversity into the larger system. Using and mixing many elements of diversity from their territories, empires may emerge as creative civilizations adding technologies, institutions, and art to the human stock. The limit of empires is their hierarchical control through domination. Developmental processes, in contrast to these strictly competitive ecological dynamics of dominance and control, feed on variety, and the agents of developmental change – new components and new relationships – must nurture the creation of variety. Development, emanating from the commingling of populations and exchanges, at some point becomes variety-intensive based on innovation. This is reflected in the comings and goings of innovation-driven researchers into enclaves and groupings. The consequence of integrating diversity is a structure

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for creating more diversity and the dynamics of integrating it. Thus, transnational regions have more diversity than individual countries and hence the tensions between the policies in Brussels in the European Union and its member states. The same pattern holds for the global and the transnational regional, where the European Union and North American Free Trade Association act to protect themselves against intrusions from the global in technology and agriculture. This theory of developmental change, generating changes in both the nature of the components of the system and the relationships among them, departs from classical theories of development as economic growth and its distribution in two ways. First, it includes social and political relationships and values, and not just goods and services of differential value. Second, it brings technology, producing new objects, and ideas, and combining and fusing them more efficiently and quickly, into the heart of the developmental processes of change rather than treating it as exogenous (Teune, 1988a). Eventually the developmental dynamics of integrating diversity occurs almost entirely at the highest possible level of human aggregation, the global system, providing access to all variety anywhere on earth to everyone, everywhere at decreasing costs. Hence, globalization as development weakens the constraints of space and time, diminishing the key social ecological theoretical variables of competition over limited resources and space. Development, as integrating diversity, also eliminates the applicability of the logic of equilibrium that is central to the classical ecological processes of competition and conflict in the spatially constrained dynamics of invasion, dominance and succession. Nonetheless, scarcity and dominance remain implanted in the physical and social ecology of the past in organizations and roads and buildings, standing in conflict with processes of development that produce access for nearly everybody to practically any object or idea without regard to either where they are

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or to which community or political system they belong. Because local-global relations are enmeshed in a set of dynamics of change with the global impacting settled localities more than the local impacts the global (or sub-systems of the global), the process is perceived as favoring the global as winners and the local as losers. Whether local actions can offset the global of the last few decades is a major research challenge for the social sciences as well as for investors. During recent decades rapid technological advances in transportation and communications, making controllable territorial boundaries for defense of countries and localities nearly impossible, has favored the global even more strongly. What perhaps is different about contemporary local-global relations is that variety comes from everywhere, hence the pervasive strangeness of all kinds of variety entering the local at an accelerating rate. More than that, nation-states have become yet another local, despite being mostly unfinished in the formation of their capacities to control. Local-global relations are, then, fundamental in that transnational and global organizations and institutions compete with lower levels, and the lower levels have ‘collective perceptions’ that they are being exploited and destroyed by higher levels (or a response reservoir from their histories that responds as if they were). The conflicts are manifest in anti-global political protests; populist, often nationalistic, political reactions in political movements and political parties; and in terrorism against modernity, as represented by the West and its symbols of agents of change for a better life. Most of these overt acts of conflict are reactions to global forces. The successes of the resistance to globalization often appear as a hodgepodge of status quo arrangements or the restoration of past conditions. Whether and how global forces change or destroy the local is a political matter of what is right, that is, of acceptable means for the global to enter the local. But it is appropriate

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to speak about ‘global wars’ not because violence is occurring everywhere, but because of the structure of the conflicts between the global and the local, whether or not they break out in violence. Among the many potential evils of globalization is the suspension or blockage of local democratic processes in favor of, or in deference to, more encompassing and generally more powerful systems, whether of a region, a state, a transnational region or the world. One consequence of globalization that is often expressed is the fear that in order to succeed, global actors will by-pass local institutions, including local, democratic ones. To do so, they cultivate anti-democratic and corrupt local practices. More than that is the belief that political participation, to be meaningful, must be local and occur in an environment free of threats from outsiders. Versions of these arguments were part of many violent efforts by national governments to assert control of localities. The data that will be presented later in this chapter as an example of globalization’s impact on the local governmental units support the contrary view: globalization expands alternatives opened by higher level institutions, not only increasing freedom of choice for the local but also stimulating local democratization through the acceptance of diversity of cultures and practices. These new connections include non-governmental regional and international organizations and, in some areas of the world, justice in the form of courts and forums to redress national violations of rights. Globalization also empowers local populations by opening up opportunities to challenge local authorities and threaten to ‘vote’ by exiting. New choices generated by globalization can be seen in the rapid development and acceptance of a ‘third tier’ of regions within Europe, many in response to initiatives of local regions within countries, accompanying advances in the institutionalization of the European Union (Bullmann, 1997). Regional bodies provide voice and strength to interests that are not heard in the national capitals or in Brussels,

the seat of the political center of the EU. In any event, a shift of political issues to global/regional levels has taken place, and it is unlikely that the national will regain as high a proportion of control over the local ever again in the face of these alternative regional and global institutions.

IDEOLOGICAL PROCESSES IN GLOBALIZATION Human societies sought their betterment not only from exchanges with others but also by simply taking from and dominating their neighbors (Keeley, 1996). Integration of societies was also brought about through ideologies of peace and cooperation. These ideologies were religious in nature, promising better societies based on extramundane legitimacy and justice. All of the major systems of belief in a new order of peace – Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam – got caught up in persistent internal factional fights and wars with neighbors and lost their credibility as unifiers and peacemakers. Secular globalization processes must be underpinned by ideologies, belief systems that support their more inclusive social systems. Globalization processes of the last decades of the twentieth century carried with them the ideology of ‘liberal democracy’, an open, inclusive, secular ideology which, however associated with older kinds of imperialism, stands as an ideology of human development without commitment to any particular group, civilization, or religion. This general democratic ideology is based on inclusion without commitment to a group, which makes it difficult to target specific enemies other than the general evils of the global unknown. The new global order based on this secular ideology is being given shape by open institutions in major regional affiliations and institutions in Europe, Asia, North America, Latin America, and Africa. Some of these already have a regional politics as is seen in

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a broader Europe in defense (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO), trade and finance (European Union, EU), human rights (Council of Europe, CoE) among others. The global institutions, often referred to as ‘international’ institutions, are generally divided politically into governmental and nongovernmental organizations. There are ‘global courts’, the International Court and regional ones in most parts of the world, the most active one being the European Court of Human Rights. There are also some semblances of global armies and police in the UN and most recently a ‘broadened’ NATO. Democratic order has penetrated, but this change appears to have happened in a moment, and seems to have become only shallowly rooted in some places with questionable growth, as the case of Russia will illustrate later in the chapter. Wherever democracy is established, however thinly it has penetrated, the potential for violent conflict appears to have diminished. Accompanying democratization and global economic penetration was political decentralization to localities and regions and weakening state control of national economies. After the democratic revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989 and in the years following, there were global dispersions of democratic values and knowledge supporting ‘democratic’ change, indeed, revolutions, reaching to Asia and Africa and including the non-violent democratic transformations in Georgia and the Ukraine in 2004–05. Democratization in the 1990s became a global ‘Second Democratic Revolution’, about 200 years after the first ‘European’ democratic revolution in 1789. The developmental dynamics at work in global-local relations have redefined the classical social ecological dynamics: centers and peripheries, learning and adaptation, dialectics among levels and rates of change, and competitive games among levels of human organization. These are at the core of classical social ecology as conflicts that have replaced the more basic, and mindless, ecological dynamics of living systems of

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predator/prey, growth/diffusion, and random variation/adaptation (Teune, 1978).

Centers and peripheries The most important fact about this period of globalization is that the US economy dropped from providing about half of the world’s economic production around 1947 to somewhat under 25% just after the beginning of the twenty-first century. That percentage will continue to drop only because of a continued high growth rate in China relative to the US. An indisputable indication of globalization is the decentralization of production and distribution. Globalization undermines the view of a world system of centers and peripheries, described by Lenin as empires and in other interpretations as ‘dependency’ with capitalist centers controlling underdeveloped countries and regions. A longer-term perspective on globalization and development is the dispersal of world production, the localization of national capitals, the rise of varieties of enclaves of innovative people and organizations, and the emergence of networks of ensembles of sectors of activities that mutually enhance creativity and productivity. As globalization continues, the world is being re-structured into an urban world of multiple centers that defines a global political economy (Teune, 1988b). The estimate is that nearly half of the world’s population is urban. The impact of diminishing differences between centers and peripheries is to promote globalization as integration rather than as dominance.

Learning and adaptation Ecology can be used as a theoretical paradigm to analyze long-term processes of learning and adaptation, resulting in improved capacities for more learning and at a faster rate. To date, humans have been the triumphant learning species.3 The occupiers of a niche ‘learn’ to cope with their environment by

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selecting out those of its members who do not survive long and by providing advantages in reproduction to those who do. This is one version of ecology as conflict and adaptation – a mechanistic one of ‘mindless’ learning. Another, of course, is conscious adaptation to cope better with changes in the niche. Globalization contributes to learning and adaptation to differences and modes of communication, accelerating the capacities of localities to become part of a global economy and institutions.

Dialectics: levels and rates The dialectics of development derive from the fact that higher levels of aggregation have more variety and diversity than lower levels and that the greater the variety, the more likely new variety will be generated. Developmental processes generate structures of conflict in the processes of local adaptations to globalization, often creating volatility in local markets and politics. As national markets become globalized, volatility increases in the short run but they become more stable over time as the production and integration of new variety spreads. Conflicts arise from the introduction of novelty that divides the localities, and causes scissions in groups and individuals within them, between those that have and do not have access to the new and ‘global’. Thus, at least the perceptions of local conflicts that matter should have increased at the local levels that have recently opened to the global.

Competitive games Conflicts between the local and the global parallel those much studied between the local and the national. One way of looking at locally organized efforts to deal with the global is to treat them as an ecology of games (Long, 1958). Leadership, collective action, and local interests come into play. The logic of local collective action is to maintain

relationships that sustain local interests. The regional, national, and global each have interests in enhancing their control of the local in order to access local resources through forced appropriation or purchase. This situation comprises a set of competitive games among these levels of interests. The engagement in this form of conflict should stimulate local politics once open democratic practices are allowed.

LOCAL-GLOBAL RELATIONS AND THEIR IMPACT ON LOCAL DEMOCRACY This analysis will conclude with a look at one of the greatest penetrations of the global ideology of democracy into the values and practices of local political leaders – the beginning of the ‘global democratic revolution’ of the 1990s and carrying on during the opening years of the twenty-first century. The Democracy and Local Governance Research Program began in 1990 in order to examine these processes. It is one of the large cross-national, comparative research projects started after the end of the Cold War, directed to examining the impact of a massive change in world order on local governance and democracy (Teune, 2003, 2006). The general hypothesis is that globalization provides an impetus to local democratic institutions, values, and practices. These would be linked to pressures on the local toward openness to higher level systems: regional, national, and global. The impact would depend in part on the democratization processes at national governmental level and, of course, on the local differences in levels of development and the position of local governments in terms of the ease of entry of global associations. The research is built on national samples of local political units ranging in population from about 25,000 to 250,000, cities and in some cases counties having cities as their center, that are of significance for political participation and for the delivery of social

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services. Local political leaders were targeted for interviews – mayors, deputy mayors, council members, political party leaders, and, if appropriate, heads of governmental administrative entities. A sample of about 15 was selected in each locality.4 Data have now been gathered in 29 countries, mostly in Eurasia but also Brazil and the US. In several countries, especially those that are former communist countries, data have been collected at two or three points in time. Two countries – Poland and Russia – for which data are now available into the twenty-first century will be the focus of analysis in this chapter, with comparisons with Sweden, an established democracy. Data will be presented on the values and behavior of local political leaders from these three countries which reflect different experiences with globalization and democratic governance. The data are taken from the beginning, the middle and the slowing down – 1991–2003 – of the most extensive globalization and democratization periods in human history. The results of the research show that the global has an impact on local democratic values and practices everywhere but the impact varies depending on past exposure to globalization and alternatives open to political leaders at the local level. The three countries discussed here vary widely in their past general exposure to globalization and local democratic politics. Sweden, of course, is global and has options open to the global both in Europe and elsewhere. Poland had more exposure to globalization both before and after the demise of its communist political system, and had alternatives, at the time of this study, in the expanding European institutions, most importantly, the European Union. Russia, the successor state to the former Soviet Union, had little general exposure to the global and nearly none to democratic political experiences. Nonetheless, all of these countries have been impacted in some ways by globalization. The expectation from the general increase in exposures to globalization and democratization during

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the 1990s is that local leaders in Sweden, already at a high level of local democratic engagement, would move slightly forward in their support for democratic values and practices; Poland would move forward somewhat; and Russia would vacillate, moving negatively in some ways and positively in others. In terms of overall commitment to democratic values, those expectations are supported. In terms of seeing conflicts in a developing and strengthening democratic environment globally and nationally, the perceptions of conflicts among local leaders, even the intense ones that interfere with local political decisions, increased significantly in regard to local conflicts between 1995 and 2001(03) in Poland and Russia; whereas in Sweden there was a negligible increase in perceived local conflicts. Regarding social tolerance necessary for the value of democratic inclusion (willingness to have various groups as neighbors), there was a dramatic drop in intolerance among local political leaders between 1995 and 2001(03) in both Poland and Russia. This suggests that the impact of the global democratic changes in the 1990s was more enduring in the social than in the political domains. The institutionalization of the behaviour of seeking support from many groups in the locality when making decisions, however, significantly declined from 1995 to 2001(03) in Poland and Russia, but increased in Sweden as it moved to decentralization during that decade. These findings are presented in some detail in what follows. Poland and Russia were both dramatically impacted by their rapid exposure to the global system in 1989–1990. Poland was an involved participant in European affairs prior to the collapse of its communist political system. Once it became clear that it would be admitted to NATO and the EU, Poland instituted major political changes. It also had experimented with different kinds of local governance, and, when a new constitution came into effect in 1990, chose a system with decentralization and local autonomy that is compatible with European standards as developed by the EU but with more central

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control over regional government than in most other countries of Europe. Since Russia established a new political regime in 1993, its official position is that its political system is democratic. Even after a shift was made (after the re-election of Putin in 2004) to more centralized political control in a strong presidential system by a law curtailing direct elections of governors of regions in favor of appointment by the central government, the official interpretation is that Russian democracy is compatible with the democratic standards subscribed to by members of the EU. Data about what happened to the democratic values, beliefs, and practices of local political leaders from 1995 to 2001–03 will be highlighted, with Sweden as a contrasting ‘control’ country. (Sweden stands out as the ‘most democratic’ country of all the 29 countries in this study on nearly all the comparative measures used in this research.) The evidence is that the big changes in the newly ‘globalized’ countries occurred at the very beginning of the democratic ‘revolutions’, during the early 1990s. These changes were accompanied by significant turnovers among the people occupying the full range of positions of local government, following changes in the incumbents and institutions at higher levels of government. After the ‘shocks’ of institutional and leadership changes associated with the political collapse of the ‘last great empire’, the Soviet Union, there is continued impact of the global on the local leaders’ perception of the importance of foreign investments. When asked about the impact of the global on their localities in terms of investment, exports, imports, pollution, foreign workers, there

Table 27.1

was a perception of much more foreign investment, some increase in tourists, and in Russia, of foreign workers. There is little increase in perceived impact from the global media, but the democratic values of tolerance changed remarkably during this time. A few of the variables highlight the changes from 1995 to 2001 in Poland and from 1995 to 2003 in Russia. The main macro difference of specific political relevance to globalization between these two countries was that Poland in 2001 was in the midst of preparations for joining the EU, scheduled for 2004, and moving to greater global engagement, while in Russia there were clear signals that the Presidency would be strengthening central institutions at the expense of regional and local autonomy. That process appears to have continued from the time of the study throughout the terms of office of President Putin.

Democratic values The democratic values of leaders in two countries have changed significantly within this short time frame, increasing in Poland and dropping in Russia. To measure this, a Demscore was constructed from three items from each of three democratic value scales – political equality, pluralism (acceptance of conflicts) and minority (vs. majority) rights.5 Although many refinements are possible and alternative scales were carefully explored, this nine item scale turned out to be the broadest and clearest measure for differentiating among the 16,000 or so leaders interviewed across many cultures and

Demscore1 (mean score)

1991 1995 1999 Poland 0.10(N = 448) Russia −0.10(N = 1068) Sweden 0.45(N=440) 0.48(N=438) 1 mean of nine items each with ‘agree’, ‘tend to disagree’, ‘disagree’ as possible answers. Note: Ns are for individual leaders nationally and are the same for all tables.

2001(03) 0.13(N =443) −0.16(N =719)

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time points in the Democracy and Local Governance research program. The Polish leaders stay with the global democratic orientations they had previously embraced, despite turnovers of leaders, while the Russian leaders responded to the initiatives of President Putin to increase central control with a reduction in their commitment to democratic values, even as their global democratic values of tolerance of ‘marginal’ social groups increased. Both countries remained relatively open to foreign economic, media, and other influences, especially investments, although Poland was poised to join the European Union in 2001 and Russia was on the periphery of these European and globalizing changes. Messages about the nature of democracy from Brussels and Moscow are different. Polish political leaders moved toward becoming like the most democratic leaders in Central Europe, while those of Russia appear to be drifting toward the value configurations characteristic of their past and their counterparts in Central Asia. The data show some European pull and a drift away of the periphery, in this case Russia. Swedish leaders stand firm. A standard question widely used to indicate commitment to democracy is trust in the people. That question showed some sharp changes over the time period examined depending on relationships with the European Union (trust in most of the people = 1). Trust dropped in all three countries, but substantially so in Russia where disagreements have probably not only become more intensive among people but also acknowledging them is more acceptable. Local political leaders were asked what groups they would not want as neighbors. Fourteen were listed, including right and left Table 27.2

Trust in people: percentage yes1

1991

1995 Poland 44 Russia 30 Sweden 92 1 yes most, of the people =1.

1999

90

2001(03) 40 23

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political people, criminals, and addicts. A high rejection of those with AIDs and homosexuals in both Poland and Russia dropped between the time periods, as did the percentage for Roma in Poland. (The percentages in Sweden were negligible and the question about the Roma was not asked there.) This is one indication of the ‘sticky’ but very basic nature of the social rather than political values of democracy. Indeed one of most dramatic impacts visible in these data is the staying power of globalization’s impact on the acceptance of diversity among Russian local political leaders.

Local autonomy, leader influence, and localism What was the impact of globalization on local autonomy? The general assumption is that local democracy requires substantial local autonomy and even the autonomy to expand local responsibilities. One of the general hypotheses of the research was that a rapid diminution in national authority through democratization and opening up of countries through globalization would expand local autonomy, or at least the perceptions of autonomy by local political leaders. Nothing like that happened. Indeed, there is nearly no change. In fact, Sweden, which is formally centralized, has local political leaders who believe that they have as much autonomy as any country (about the same as in the US in 1991). The local leaders in Russia saw no change during the first Table 27.3 Group not wanted as neighbors: percentages1 1995 2001(03) Poland AIDS 44 21 Homosexuals 48 34 Roma 31 14 Russia AIDS 50 38 Homosexuals 57 29 Roma 21 25 1 Each mention = 1. Note: Sweden, less than 1% for AIDS and homosexuals.

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Table 27.4

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Having local autonomy: mean1 1995 0.56 0.56

1999

2001(03) 0.56 0.58

Table 27.6 Local priorities vs. national priorities – mean score1

Poland Russia Sweden 0.65 1 ’Have local antonomy’ = 1, asked about 13 policy areas, including education, employment, pollution, housing, etc. Note: Not asked in Sweden in 1991.

1991 1995 1999 2001(03) Poland 0.17 0.11 Russia 0.29 0.32 Sweden 0.13 0.15 1 Answer options: ‘agree’ or ‘disagree’; positive = local.

years of a re-centralization. In Poland local leaders perceived a drop in autonomy, most probably because there was an increase of central authority over the provincial level of government with the appointment of, rather than previous election of ‘governors’. Using a three-point scale, a general question was asked about how much influence the local leaders had in each of 14 policy areas. Many of the areas were similar to those for the arenas covered in the question about autonomy – housing, education, taxation. Self-perceived influence went up in Poland, a country in which globalization was accelerating, surpassing even the levels in Sweden in both years. It remained unchanged in Russia, at levels exceeding Swedish responses in 1991. A plausible interpretation of these results was an increase in the politicization of issues at the local level in both Poland and Russia and in the knowledge of the local political leaders in both countries about the direction of local governmental reform toward local self-government throughout the European Union. Localism was one of several multi-item value scales. It is based on four agree-disagree items reflecting local vs. national priorities: national goals should not have priority over local ones; local community problems should be first; no community can progress without national priorities; locals should not worry about national problems. The Polish

leaders became less, although still relatively highly oriented to the local, and the Russian leaders slightly more focused on the local, with no change among the Swedish leaders even though Sweden was in the process of loosening central governmental control throughout this period. Conflict, however measured, is generally the most powerful predictor of a number of differences among localities and countries. The general hypothesis was that globalization and democratization would increase the perception of conflicts in localities. The increase in globalization does indeed appear to lead to higher levels of conflict in these countries. This is true in both Poland and Russia, where issues became politicized locally rather than repressed or moved to regional and national levels of government. One likely reason for mentioning conflicts as detrimental to local political decisions is that after an initial period, local political leaders learned that it was acceptable to admit that conflict existed. Under communism, conflicts had been seen as a pathology of capitalism, not socialism. In Sweden, the perception of conflict interfering with getting things done is relatively low and has barely increased since the 1991 Swedish study. Paralleling an increase in conflict is a drop in the ‘civic’ and political support groups sought out by political leaders. The question was: from what groups ‘do you seek support’

Table 27.5 14 areas

Table 27.7 Conflicts interfere with public action – mean1

Influence across policy areas:

1991 1995 1999 2001(03) Poland 0.83 0.89 Russia 0.66 0.65 Sweden 0.60 0.73 1 Scoring of answers: ‘very much’ =2, ‘some’ =1, ‘none’ =0.

1991 1995 1999 2001(03) Poland 0.90 1.18 Russia 0.67 1.07 Sweden 0.40 0.39 1 Scoring of answers: ‘very much’ =2, ‘some’ =1, ‘no’= 0.

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Table 27.8 Number of support groups sought across 16 groups – mean1 1991

1995

1999

Poland 4.82 Russia 3.40 Sweden 5.96 6.29 1 Mention of each group sored as 1.

2001(03) 3.95 2.86

when making decisions and each leader was given a list of 16 such groups, ranging from friends to political party leaders and higher administrators. There was a significant drop in both Poland and Russia, and, in contrast, an increase among Swedish leaders who were among the highest of all leaders in 29 countries in seeking such support. It is expected that learning processes will increase the number of groups sought out for support over time.

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citizens’ of the world, certainly of the European Union, NATO, and the Council of Europe. The actual impact of democracy on societies, of course, is mixed. Whatever the future story of democracies in a globalizing world, it will include the engagement of local communities and a strengthening of their voice in national and global affairs. Global and local conflicts are a consequence of the recent encapsulation of world regions into a global system. The local, ruled by petty elites and intolerant of difference, rather than being a conflictive impediment, to development as it was during the years of the formation of modern states, may become a liberating, cutting edge social entity of innovation and change in global systems. The local, aligned with global institutions, may by-pass the national as an important arena for reducing conflicts and managing violence.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS Local-global dynamics open up the local to influences from a wider range of other systems. Those processes of globalization and openness have been associated with the democratization of countries and localities since the 1990s. Opening up to the global has also meant reducing national control over local populations. This has allowed for at least the expression of conflicts within localities, both old and new. But in general, the consequence of globalization has been greater autonomy for the local political expression of conflicts, if only in regard to the national governments. Democracy with its value of inclusion of differences and acceptance of conflicts supports what may prove to be one of the most important events in recent human history of the whole world joining together in a single economy and society of shared values, a community of democratic societies. That hope emerged in the first blush of the 1989 revolutions in communist countries of Europe and subsequent political revolutions in Eurasia. Since then democracy has become defined as a global requirement for states to be ‘good

NOTES 1 A partial history of social ecology is discussed in Teune (1992). Hamm (1992) gives a brief history of social ecology in the International Sociological Association. These presentations were made at the XI World Congress of the International Sociological Association (1986), New Delhi. 2 This discussion is based on Mlinar and Teune (1978) and Teune and Mlinar (1978). Alternative concepts of development include social and economic changes of a variety of types that focus on inclusion, integration and growth. See Sen’s concept of development defined as freedom (Sen, 1999). 3 The most comprehensive contemporary use of the ecological paradigm to explain human and social development through learning and throughout human history is Kenneth Boulding (1978). 4 The data, questionnaires, codebooks, and other general information about this research are available at www.ssc.upenn.edu/dlg. The basic design and instrumentation are also given in Jacob et al. (1993). In addition to other general publications, a number of country reports have been published in English and other languages. The number of localities included in the random samples used here were: Poland, 1995, 30 poviats (local governing units with a town center and adjoining countryside); 2001, 30 poviats, including reorganized poviat towns; and Russia, 1995, 73 rayons; 2003, 49 including the rayons in the 1995 sample. In Sweden, the 1999 study was based on 20 communes,

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as was the study in 1991–92. The web page referred to is updated from time to time. One update on this research with new theoretical perspectives is Stefan Szücs and Lars Stomberg (2006). Both were also directly involved in the two Swedish studies referred to in this report. Special thanks go to Ms. Tatania Iskra for organizing the Polish data with Dr. Krzysztof Ostrowski of the Pultusk School of Humanities; Prof. Zahn Toschenko of the Russian State University of Humanities for the 1995 Russian study and Prof. Gali Galiev of the Academy of Labor, Bashkortostan, Russia for the 2003 research. 5 The following nine items are scored additively as indicated below into a simple score, called the Demscore, based on four point agree-disagree response categories. The Demscore provides a rough but comprehensive measure of democratic values separating local political leaders in all the countries surveyed, without use of the many nuances called for in more detailed country by country comparisons. A. Pluralism 1 Public decisions should be made by unanimous consent. (−) 2 Preserving harmony in the community should be considered more important than the achievement of community programs. (−) 3 A good leader should refrain from making proposals that divide the people even if these are important for the community. (−) B. Minority rights 4 The rights of minorities are so important that the majority should be limited in what it can do. (+) 5 Any individual or organization has the right to organize opposition or resistance to any government initiative. (+) 6 The government has the responsibility to see to it that rights of all minorities are protected. (+) C. Political equality 7 Few people really know what is in their best interest in the long run. (−) 8 It will always be necessary to have a few strong, able people actually running everything. (−) 9 Certain people are better qualified to run this country due to their traditions and family background. (−) In addition, a number of other democratic value scales were constructed based on these and other items, yielding the dimensions given below, but including transparency (honesty in public affairs) and political responsibility.

REFERENCES Boulding, Kenneth E. (1978) Ecodynamics: A New Theory of Societal Evolution. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Bullmann, Udo (1997) ‘The Politics of the Third Level’, in Charlie Jeffery (ed.) The Regional Dimension in the European Union: Toward a Third Level in Europe. London: Frank Cass. pp. 3–19. Darwin, Charles (1859) On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection. John Murray: London. Dogan, Mattei and Rokkan, Stein (eds.) (1969) Social Ecology. Boston, MA: MIT Press. Hamm, Bernd (1992) ‘Introduction’, in Bernd Hamm (ed.) Progress in Social Ecology. New Delhi: Mattel Publications. pp. 1–10. Hannan, Michael T. (1981) Aggregation and Deaggregation in Sociology. Lexington, KY: Lexington Books. Jacob, Betty M., Ostrowski, Krzysztof and Teune, Henry (eds.) (1993) Democracy and Local Governance. Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii. Keeley, Lawrence H. (1996) War Before Civilization. NY: Oxford University Press. Long, Norton E. (1958) ‘The Local Community as an Ecology of Games’, American Sociological Review, 44: 251–61. Marx, Karl (1867) Capital. Otto Meissner: Hamburg, Germany. Mlinar, Zdravko and Teune, Henry (eds.) (1978) Social Ecology: From Equilibrium to Development. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications. Park, Robert, Burgess, Ernest and McKenzie, R. D. (1925) The City: Suggestions for the Study of Human Nature in the Urban Environment. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Sen, Amartya Kumar (1999) Development as Freedom. NY: Knopf. Spencer, Herbert (1862) First Principles. Holt: NY. Szücs, Stefan and Stromberg, Lars (eds.) (2006) Local Elites, Political Capital, and Democratic Development: Governing Elites in Seven European Countries. Weisberg, Germany: Verlag. Teune, Henry (1978) ‘Social Ecological Theories of Change’, paper presented at the IX World Congress of the International Sociological Association. Uppsala. Teune, Henry (1988a) Growth. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications. Teune, Henry (1988b) ‘Growth and Pathologies of Giant Cities’, in Mattei Dogan and John Kasarda (eds.) The Metropolis Era: A World

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of Giant Cities. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1: 351–76. Teune, Henry (1992) ‘Current Issues in Social Ecology’, in Bernd Hamm (ed.) Progress in Social Ecology. New Delhi: Mattel Publications. pp. 11–26. Teune, Henry (2001) ‘The Developmental Consequences of Globalization’, paper presented at the Joint Meetings of the International Studies Associations. Hong Kong. Teune, Henry (2003) ‘Democracy, Globalization, and Local Politics’, paper presented at the International Seminar on Equality and Justice in Globalized Societies, International Sociological Association. Mexico City.

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Teune, Henry (2006) ‘The Consequences of Globalization and Local Democracy’, in Chung-Si Ahn (ed.) New Development in Local Democracy and Decentralization in East Asia: Korea in Comparative Perspective. Seoul, Korea: Seoul National University Press. pp. 3–22. Teune, Henry and Mlinar, Zdravko (1978) The Developmental Logic of Social Systems. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications. Teune, Henry and Mlinar, Zdravko (2000) ‘The Developmental Logic of Globalization’, in Jose Ciprut (ed.) The Art of the Feud: Reconceptualizing International Relations. Westport, CT: Praeger. pp. 105–122.

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28 Negotiating Identity, Conflict, and Cooperation within a Strategic Model of Address Sandi Michele de Oliveira

INTRODUCTION Within the field of sociolinguistics, broadly defined to include works on ‘language and society’ or ‘language in context’ in the disciplines of sociology, linguistics, anthropology, psychology, communication, (critical) discourse analysis, gender studies, pragmatics, philosophy, etc., the issues of identity construction, conflict and cooperation have long research histories, as exemplified by Atkinson and Heritage (1984), Coates (1986), Giles and Powesland (1975), Grimshaw (1990), Gumperz (1982b), Kondo (1990), LePage and Tabouret-Keller (1985), Myers-Scotton (1983), Sacks (1992), Schiffrin (1985), Scollon and Scollon (1995), Tajfel and Turner (1979), and van Dijk (1980). Their definitions have been variously shaped by these disciplines, and technical definitions have evolved. However, as this chapter will demonstrate how these issues can impact the

selection or interpretation of address forms, as opposed to furthering a particular social theory, their use here approximates their non-technical definitions. ‘Address forms’ are taken to mean both pronouns of address (glossed as ‘you’) and nominal forms (names, titles) used in direct address. Personal and social identities are considered from strategic as well as representative angles, as each is present in the communicative process. Conflict is viewed as occurring when ‘participants take alternative positions on the same issue (whether reconcilable or mutually exclusive)’ (Leung, 2002: 3), i.e., when speakers do not share a common view or goal and choose to make this difference clear, whereas cooperation occurs when speakers use conversational strategies to minimize distance and/or seek a common goal. Therefore, conflict and cooperation are considered opposing forces in conversation, although studies focusing on these phenomena

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STRATEGIC MODEL OF ADDRESS

have developed definitions for each which are broader and not necessarily in opposition. Competition, the third concept in the theme of this volume, is not considered here, as it appears to be a different sort of element in conversation: a conversational goal which, depending on the strategic goal of the speakers, may involve both strategies of cooperation and of conflict. For instance, in order to enhance one’s personal advancement (competition), a speaker may decide to instigate conflict with a competitor she feels is inferior and to demonstrate a cooperative spirit with those in higher positions, choosing the conversational strategies accordingly. In this article the term ‘strategies’ follows the rationale set out by Brown and Levinson (1978: 90): We continue to use the word ‘strategy’, despite its connotations of conscious deliberation, because we can think of no other word that will imply a rational element while covering both (a) innovative plans of action, which may still be (but need not be) unconscious, and (b) routines – that is, previously constructed plans whose original rational origin is still preserved in their construction, despite their present automatic application as ready-made programs.

As the title of this chapter indicates, conflict and cooperation are viewed as dynamic, negotiable items in the communicative process that can be created or avoided through the judicious use of address forms. Exemplified here are some of the ways speakers can maximize or minimize conflict and cooperation with interlocutors through their selection of address. The establishment and maintenance of address form relationships are presented within the framework of a model of negotiation that portends to present the complexity of the communicative process more accurately than previous models. De Oliveira Medeiros (1985), an ethnographic study of European Portuguese address, presents the original formulation of this model. Portuguese is distinct from many other languages in that nominal forms, FN (first names), LN (last names), nicknames, titles (social, professional, administrative, etc.) can be used as pronouns in direct

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address, contrasting with other languages in which nominal forms can only be used to attract the attention of a particular hearer or characterize the relationship between the speaker and hearer. Nominal forms, often referred to as vocatives (Leech, 1999), or alerters (Blum-Kulka et al., 1989), are crucial to the analysis of social relationships in any language. The term ‘vocative’ is more widely known and is therefore the term used here. After the presentation of the model and an exemplification of ways in which conflict and cooperation can be achieved through addressing strategies, it will be demonstrated how the model can be applied to other languages, even those whose pronoun system is not nearly so complex as the one in Portuguese.

THEORETICAL MODELS USED TO ANALYZE ADDRESS When Brown and Gilman (1960) 1972 published their ground-breaking work on address forms, the fields of sociolinguistics and discourse analysis were not yet recognized as disciplines in their own right, the essentialist paradigm was still in place, and speech patterns were viewed primarily as reflections of the speaker’s demographic profile, considered her identity. Classifying relationships along the vertical dimension of Power and the horizontal dimension of Solidarity, Power is defined in a way to include unequal professional rank, age, educational or socioeconomic status, as well as the affective considerations of respect, deference and the desire to maintain distance, and situational considerations of formality or protocol. Solidarity is defined loosely as ‘symmetric relationships’, emphasizing comradeship or equal rank/status. Affective factors are also included (trust, intimacy, solidarity), as are situational (informality). Focusing on binary pronoun systems, such as tu (T) vs. vous (V) in French, they associated T with solidarity and V with power. The Brown and Gilman model has been powerful in the sociolinguistic literature,

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probably due to the idea that complex social relationships are reducible to either the vertical or horizontal dimension; that is, people are either similar or different and, if different, that there must be a way to rank those differences. Since so many features are included in each dimension, researchers have the possibility to choose the specific aspects of power or solidarity which their data appear to represent. Further, as the design of the model derived from a study of languages with a binary or tertiary pronoun system, the inadequacies of their model are not immediately apparent (duality of dimensions, duality of address). However, not only is the model ill-suited to languages with a more complex address form system, no recognition is given either to the ability of speakers with little personal power to make use of situational power or to the fact that individual pairs of speakers can negotiate address form patterns which do not conform to societal expectations. Additional methodological problems are not referenced here but are addressed in de Oliveira (1995a). Brown and Levinson (1978) use this model as the foundation for a system of politeness strategies they present as ‘universal’, combining considerations of Power, Solidarity and Social Distance with notions of face and speech acts. Since they view address forms as part of a limited number of strategies, as opposed to an integral feature of communicative process in general, theirs is not a model of address. Still, their work merits mention here, as a large number of studies on address have examined address from this viewpoint. In recognizing that speakers have goals which they attempt to attain through the use of conversational strategies, they have developed a model which is more sophisticated than that of Brown and Gilman (1960). However, they do not provide any new theorization of Power and Solidarity, using instead the definitions developed nearly two decades earlier. They continue to assume that specific forms can be mapped onto specific functions (for example, that use of a V-form implies formality or

respect and use of a T-form, informality or intimacy) and thus seem unaware that speakers substitute new interpretations of forms for the conventional ones when they negotiate a pattern of address which is unconventional relative to societal norms, and the hierarchical decision-making structure appears to negate the flexibility of the individualization of the strategies. The paradigm shift from essentialist to constructivist notions of identity started in the 1980s, with the earliest studies examining the negotiation of identity through address being Myers-Scotton (1983) and de Oliveira Medeiros (1985). Despite the blossoming of constructivist thinking in sociolinguistic research generally, with an everincreasing awareness that speakers can use discourse processes to underscore or disguise aspects of their social or personal identity, or even construct new ones, both the Brown and Gilman and the Brown and Levinson models continue to serve as the reference points for studies regarding address, probably because so many researchers do not theorize address or consider aspects not taken into account in these models.

A STRATEGIC, COGNITIVE MODEL OF NEGOTIATION A comprehensive model of address must be able to incorporate and account for the variety of forces that motivate address form selection. The model outlined here is based on the analysis of observational, questionnaire, and interview data personally collected during two decades of fieldwork in Portugal examining both actual usage and informants’ judgments regarding address. As a resident of the community of study for nine of the 20 years of the study, both participant and non-participant observation was undertaken in a wide variety of social environments. Questionnaire and interview data were collected at regular intervals during the period (1982–83, 1993, 1998 and 2003) from a total

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of approximately 2,000 informants. Both the questionnaires and interviews were ethnographic in nature, designed to gain an understanding of aspects of address not usually considered in address form studies, such as the cognitive processes speakers used to select appropriate forms and to interpret the forms used with them, reasons for changing from unmarked (expected) forms to those considered unusual by conventional norms, variation in use at the level of the individual. The presentation of the data includes both qualitative description and frequency of response statistics, as appropriate, both for the original study (de Oliveira Medeiros, 1985) and follow-up studies (de Oliveira, 1995b; de Oliveira, 2005). After continued considerations of power and solidarity, as well as other forces underlying address choices (Braun, 1988; Brown and Levinson, 1978; de Oliveira, 1997; Spencer-Oatey, 1996; Taavitsainen and Jucker, 2003), the importance of the construction and negotiation of identities within address form relationships is confirmed. It portrays the types of decision-making or cognitive processes guiding speakers to their eventual choices. Other mapping attempts, such as Ervin-Tripp (1972), chart the choices of an ‘idealized’ speaker; such representations seem to imply a specific decisionmaking hierarchy, despite a disclaimer stating that the chart is but a single representation of the communicative possibilities. Here, no particular factor or consideration is viewed as the ‘first’ to be made, and disclaimers are unnecessary. Further, individual variation is not viewed as an anomaly but a natural feature of human communication. The multidimensional model is too complex for complete presentation here, as it incorporates the forms people use, the strategies that guide them, and speakers’ motivations and conversational goals in the three stages of their relationship: the initial contact, the negotiation of an address form relationship and the eventual renegotiation(s) of the relationship. To date, the problems associated with its representation on a single page

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have not been resolved; therefore, it comprises a series of two-dimensional diagrams, some of which are presented in this chapter. Interaction takes place on one of two conversational planes – one governed by conventionalized notions of appropriateness (or protocol), the other by the individual relationship established by each dyad of interlocutors, who sometimes negotiate address usage others find unusual. Informants mention reverting, temporarily, to conventionalized forms in the presence of certain others (a difficulty for researchers of actual usage, rarely acknowledged), to appear to be ‘correct’. Hymes (1974: 111) refers to a speaker’s adherence, or not, to linguistic norms as ‘markedness’, expected linguistic choices being ‘unmarked’ and unexpected choices ‘marked’. Recognizing that speakers choose whether to adhere to address norms on either plane, four distinctions were coined to account for marked or unmarked usage on each: marked conventionalized, unmarked conventionalized, marked negotiated and unmarked negotiated (de Oliveira, 1985: 136). This distinction is critical for interpreting usage, as it sets the parameters for judging markedness in usage. In other types of behavior we see examples of this in statements such as ‘Oh, don’t worry about her – she’s just being herself’, which informs the hearer that we know that by conventional norms her behavior would or might be considered unusual, but it is within her normal limits. The cognitive strategies used to evaluate the relevant social and situational factors are combined with negotiation strategies to produce a wide range of address form patterns. By viewing this model in the context of the complex Portuguese address form system, the inadequacy of previous models becomes clear. Table 28.1 presents a simplified schema, the forms organized according to their conventionalized interpretation. A distinction is made between the explicit ‘V-pronoun’ voceˆ and use of the third person singular form of the verb, without an expressed pronoun, represented as [voceˆ], a linguistic convention to indicate that the verb form used is the one

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Table 28.1

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Simplified schema of the address form system in Portugal

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corresponding to the pronoun voceˆ, but the pronoun itself is not expressed. It is referred to as the ‘zero form’ (a grammatical reference) in recognition of the lack of pronoun, or the ‘avoidance tactic’ (a reference to strategy), since its neutral interpretation makes it the ideal choice for speakers unsure of the appropriate form to use. With this ‘tactic’, they can temporarily avoid defining their relationship with the other. This gives them time to evaluate the relationship and to hear how they are addressed by the other. Further explanation of the categories and the forms can be found in de Oliveira (2005, revised from 1994). In the third column are the conventionalized semantic features associated with each form, which appear in square brackets according to conventions adopted from phonology. The plus and minus signs indicate the presence or absence of the feature; for example, [−Formal] indicates a lack of formality associated with this form’s use in conventionalized exchanges. When adults make initial contact (Stage 1 of a relationship), conventionalized notions of politeness apply. In many cultures V-forms (pronominal and/or nominal) are required. Unmarked conventionalized usage tends to maximize the possibilities for cooperation and minimize conflict with the hearer, precisely because the speaker is following societal expectations. However, address need not be reciprocal, even when a V-form is used, since the categorization of forms is done on the basis of the grammatical relationship (pronoun/verb) and not on the semantic interpretation. Thus, V-forms exist in several categories of varying degrees of (conventionalized) formality. The form selected as conventionally appropriate serves as the reference point for future negotiation. While speakers may negotiate a different address form during their first contact, with a strategy such as ‘Please, that sounds so formal’, often this is left to a subsequent encounter. In fact, each successive encounter offers the opportunity to (re)negotiate address change. In Stage 2, the speakers sense that a relationship is growing and consider signaling that

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change through address. At this stage, both T- and V-forms are possible, as is reciprocal and non-reciprocal address. Once a speaker feels that the address forms being exchanged no longer adequately represent the developing relationship between the two, she may make use of one or more strategies of negotiation, thus instigating a move from conventionalized to negotiated usage. If the strategy is unsuccessful – that is, if the other speaker does not feel greater affinity or wish to acknowledge it through address, conventionalized usage continues. If, on the other hand, the strategy is successful, the speakers effectively move the conventionalized patterns, determined by societal norms, into the background, while highlighting the individual relationship they have or seek. Once a new pattern has been negotiated, a pool of unmarked negotiated forms is established (a combination of pronominal and nominal forms). Speakers may renegotiate the address form one or more times, a process taking place in the negotiated plane. Temporary shifts in usage (marked negotiated usage) may occur for a variety of reasons, such as anger or conversational goals. Additionally, a factor external to the relationship can result in a temporary shift to a conventionalized form; this may be due to the demands of protocol and/or the presence of certain other people. When this happens, the socially conventionalized plane is superimposed, in a sense, on the negotiated plane. When speakers decide that the reason for the change no longer exists, they resume use of their unmarked negotiated forms. Apparently speakers have a number of behavioral rules in their heads: for instance, they know the pragmatic rules governing protocol (and the situations requiring it); they recall the form(s) last used (even after a period of months or years), and they know which third parties, when present, will affect their sociolinguistic choice. The two planes of interaction, conventionalized and negotiated, and the distinctions between unmarked and marked forms represent the top layer of the model (the forms themselves).

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The second layer of the model demonstrates the strategies that speakers use which lead to the choice of one form rather than another. Those strategies differ, or may differ, in accordance with each stage of the speakers’ relationship. In Stage 1 speakers must determine an appropriate unmarked conventionalized form; Figure 28.1 presents

some of the considerations made. The sample factors are grouped into visual signs, auditory signals, internal factors (those relating to the affective considerations of the speakers or hearers), and external factors (those imposed by society, such as protocol, or established within society, such as relative rank).

Negotiated Plane

STAGE 2: Establishing an address form relationship

Sample visual signs: Non-linguistic clues of H’s desire for greater closeness H’s manner of dress Sample auditory signals: Paralinguistic clues of H’s desire for greater closeness H has initiated a renegotiation strategy Sample internal factors: The desire to show solidarity The desire to show respect The desire for reciprocity in address The desire to increase/decrease the affective distance Sample external factors: The way H is ‘known’

Strategies for maintaing distance (culturally determined)

STAGE 1: Addressing strangers

Successful Negotiation Strategies

Unsuccessful Negotiation Strategies

Conventionalized Plane Sample visual signs: Apparent relative age, SES, educational level H’s manner of dress Sample auditory signals: The way others address H The way H is introduced Sample internal factors: The desire to show solidarity The desire to show respect The desire for reciprocity in address Sample external factors: Specific protocol in effect The way H is ‘known’ Relative rank

Coding: S = speaker

Figure 28.1

H = hearer SES = socioeconomic status

Stages of address form relationships

Negotiation strategies (culturally determined)

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As indicated above, negotiation strategies can be successful or unsuccessful. If successful (that is, if the hearer recognizes that the speaker is attempting to negotiate a new relationship and signals agreement by using a new form or by not signaling displeasure at the use of the new form), the relationship moves to Stage 2. If not, the speakers continue to use the conventionalized form(s). However, even when the address pattern is unchanged, a cognitive difference exists relative to Stage 1: speakers need not evaluate the factors to determine the form. Instead, they retrieve from memory the form previously used. Here, to simplify the representation, an arrow is merely drawn back to the conventionalized plane. As the outward address pattern would be the same, this simplification does not grossly distort the communicative picture. Even if speakers are receptive to the use of forms which do not draw attention to status differential, they are not obliged to respond positively to the attempts at (re)negotiation proposed by others, and there are verbal and nonverbal cues that speakers use to communicate their desire to maintain the address status quo. Thus, underlying Stages 1 and 2 is another layer of analysis, which includes the strategies that native speakers use to determine the status of a stranger and thus be guided to an appropriate first form. These strategies surely vary from culture to culture, but there are undoubtedly some commonalities. In the box below the strategies is the list of forms, ranked according to the degree of formality or intimacy of their conventionalized interpretation, the least formal appearing first. Figure 28.2 presents the strategic level of the interaction on the socially conventionalized plane, with sample strategies from European Portuguese. Figure 28.3 presents the negotiated plane, in parallel fashion. While most readers are unlikely to absorb the details related to Portuguese, hopefully the precision of description will help in an overall understanding of the types of information and detail which might be included in studies of other languages.

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In the negotiated plane, address forms cannot be ranked according to conventionalized considerations of formality or status, as a form’s interpretation can become separated from its conventionalized meaning. Thus, the pragmatic or semantic interpretation of forms (as T or V) changes according to their use. The analogy of an accordion helps visualize the negotiation process. Imagining Figure 28.3 as a box, the two left and two right columns are part of the fixed structure, and there are markings along the side corresponding to the conventionalized interpretation of the forms. The list of forms is the accordion, placed so that the accordion expands and contracts horizontally within the box. As the accordion is played (as the negotiation process takes place), compression and expansion take place. During compression, forms normally separated by great distance are brought together, symbolizing the fact that people can negotiate the use of a form whose conventional interpretation is more ‘intimate’ than the speakers’ social status differential might indicate. Conversely, people with a very close relationship may never ‘play’ the accordion, preferring forms whose conventionalized interpretation is more distant than their relationship would appear to ‘merit’. Below this layer of strategies lies a third, comprised of the factors and motivations shaping the decision-making process. More specifically, this level includes the personality, societal and familial socialization processes, identity construction and conversational goals, consideration of face needs, etc., all of which will ultimately determine the types of strategies speakers will use and the pool of forms from which selections are made. Evidence that differentiated pools of forms exist comes from the informants, who state that certain forms, such as ‘senhora dona FN’, sound ‘too heavy’ and they do not use them. If true (informants are not always reliable in recounting usage), such forms are simply not in their personal address form pool, despite being in that of others.

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Strategy 3:

In the absence of other information, use manner of dress as a guideline in addressing the stranger.

Source: Adapted from Oliveira Medeiros (1994: 35-36)

Level

Address Form(s)

1

TU

2

FN, LN or NICKNAME

3

VOCÊ (Usage of você as a first form varies highly and is rare; it would not be chosen in instances of protocol, nor when the speaker knows the hearer has a title.)

4

[VOCÊ] (On the conventionalized plane use of the 3rd person singular form of the verb without a pronoun can be part of a wait-and-see strategy while the speaker collects information on the status of the hearer.)

5

SENHOR(A) (Use of o (a) Sr(a) can be a stylistic option to avoid the “heaviness” of continual title use.)

6 6a 6b 6c 6d

TITLES Social titles Academic titles Professional titles Administrative titles

7

VOSSA EXCELÊNCIA (Use is rare in oral form, and titles incorporating o Sr. have gained in popularity [e.g., o Sr. Presidente]; however, situations of protocol may require its use.)

(As an initial form, likely restricted to children [to approx. age 16], or school colleagues) [FN = First Name, LN = Last Name]

(The same as for tu.)

↓ ↓ ↓ ↓

(On the conventionalized plane, men would be addressed as Title + LN [not FN] at the first meeting.)

↓

(In situations of protocol, a marked conventionalized form is one that does not adhere to protocolar norms.)

Observe how others address H and choose an initial form one from the highest category heard.

↓ ↓

A marked conventionalized form would be the rejection of social norms of appropriateness.

Strategy 2:

↓

Situations of PROTOCOL would require forms of Level 6 or 7.

Rely on a third party to provide relevant information regarding the education and/or social class of the stranger.

↓

Figure 28.2

Strategy 1:

↓

Unmarked conventionalized usage (with adults) results in use of the title of H’s greatest status known by S.

SAMPLE STRATEGIES FROM EUROPEAN PORTUGUESE

Strategies used for selecting a first form may result in the selection of a form of almost any level.

These strategies are determined within the context of a particular language and culture.

Strategic level of the conventionalized plane

ADDRESSING CONFLICT AND COOPERATION In considering conflict and cooperation in the light of the negotiation of address, it becomes clear that they are not static aspects in the communicative process, but elements in play through the strategic choices the

speakers make. On the conventionalized plane, both a positive public face and cooperation are achieved through the speaker’s deliberate use of unmarked conventionalized forms. This is, after all, the idea behind politeness – to ‘cooperate’ with social norms. Using Table 28.1 as the point of reference, being cooperative means seeking reciprocity

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(N.B. Explicit use of você is one of the most offensive mechanisms for marking anger, despite its central location in the chart.)

RENEGOTIATING

AN

ADDRESS FORM RELATIONSHIP

The speakers negotiate usage they find comfortable for the developing relationship. The pattern(s) may follow conventionalized norms of usage, or they may fall outside them.

SAMPLE STRATEGIES

FROM EUROPEAN PORTUGUESE

Strategy 1:

Suggest use of new form: Wouldn’t it be easier if we address each other by tu?

Strategy 2:

Ask to use the new form: “Do you mind if I address you by tu?”

Strategy 3:

Ask H about address preferences. (S hopes H will respond by agreeing to a form signifying greater intimacy.)

Strategy 4:

Invite H to use a new form: “(If you like,) [Y]ou may address me by tu.”

Strategy 5:

Verbally clue change to a new form: “I’m going to begin addressing you by tu,” giving H an opportunity to object.

Source: Adapted from de Oliveira (1994: 38-39) Level 1

Address Form(s) TU (Once speakers have negotiated use of tu, level 1 and level 2 forms co-occur.)

2

FN, LN or NICKNAME

3

VOCÊ

[FN = First Name, LN = Last Name]

(Usage is highly idiosyncratic; e.g., it can denote anger or to disambiguate when the intended referent is unclear.)

4

[VOCÊ] (In this plane use of the 3rd person singular form of the verb without a pronoun can be a stylistic option to serve as a placeholder for a more formal form, without the “heaviness” of continual pronoun use.)

5

SENHOR(A) (Use of Sr(a) can be a stylistic option to avoid the “heaviness” of continual title use.)

6 6a 6b 6c 6d

TITLES Social titles Academic titles Professional titles Administrative titles

7

VOSSA EXCELÊNCIA

(One difference in the negotiated plane over the conventionalized is greater use of Title + FN, rather than LN, with men.)

Strategies used for renegotiation generally take the relationship to a more intimate level

The greater the distance between the unmarked form and the marked, the greater is the impact of the marked form.

FOR

Forms indicating greater familiarity (você and V.Ex.(a) a being exceptions)

Marked negotiated usage tends to be in the direction of greater conventionalized formality.

STRATEGIES

(On the negotiated plane, use of this form would most likely be interpreted as ironic.)

Figure 28.3

Strategic level of the negotiated plane

in address, using a form in the same category or in as close a category as possible. Speakers intending to provoke conflict may choose a marked form. While one may assume that it would be from the highest numbered category possible (conventionally

indicating greater formality and distance), Portuguese speakers choose forms which are as far removed as possible in either direction, and have been known to use even tu to make their point, which is to clearly distinguish between this usage and the expected form.

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However, just as other types of conflicts can provoke social, political, economic or even physical consequences, so too can the use of a decidedly marked form, depending on the gravity of the social infraction and its interpretation by others. The richness of the negotiated plane, given its individual character, makes it more interesting to analyze. The variability in pragmatic interpretation reveals how the desire for conflict or cooperation can affect address form use. Cooperation is evidenced by the choice of forms accentuating agreement and inclusion. This can be as straightforward as choosing the form or forms the speaker knows the hearer most likes to hear. There are also forms (diminutives, nicknames and other terms of endearment, as well as forms such as colega [colleague], camarada [comrade], ‘my friend’, whose very nature signals a similarity of situation. When speakers of American English hear a question along the lines of ‘So, what’s new, old friend, old pal?’ they are probably tempted to ask the speaker what he wants. The use of these terms immediately points to the long relationship the two have shared, which appears to confer legitimacy and perhaps commitment on the hearer to respond to a request for ‘cooperation’ in the sense of help (a loan or some other type of service). For many speakers, use of these address forms is so closely connected to the presumed request, that the supposedly substantive part of the exchange, asking for news about the other, may not even be internalized as a question. Another strategy for building cooperation is to attempt to renegotiate a change in the unmarked pattern of address, towards forms whose conventionalized interpretation denotes greater intimacy. Strategies for displaying or creating conflict can be overt or subtle. Overt expressions of conflict include the overuse of titles (delivered perhaps with a certain ‘bite’), which we might classify as over-adherence to the norm, or the omission of such titles when their use would be expected. People express extreme anger by selecting a form as distant from the unmarked form as possible, as in

‘Your Excellency wanted it WHEN?’ More subtly, speakers can choose forms which may be considered annoying without being noticeably offensive to the ears of outsiders. For instance, speakers may use address forms or nicknames which they know are displeasing to the hearer. The variability in the semantic interpretation of forms, and the recognition that speakers can negotiate patterns of address which fall outside conventional norms, means that the speaker who wishes to provoke conflict in a subtle fashion has several tools at her disposal. In other words, each form has its conventionalized meaning, but it also carries the possibility for a number of negotiated meanings; this flexibility in use allows for creative addressing strategies. Two forms whose use is particularly flexible are colega (colleague) and the Zero Form (Avoidance Tactic), Level 4 of the schema in Table 28.1. Conventionally, colega is interpreted as a form of cooperation, emphasizing the shared work situation of the two speakers. Between colleagues of similar rank who are not particularly close, its use may pass unnoticed. By addressing a colleague of inferior rank as colega, one signals a desire to minimize distance, suggesting that the junior colleague need not ‘stand on ceremony’. However, estranged colleagues of equal rank, who formerly used other address forms, may choose colega to be conventionally polite while still maintaining distance (see also Bing’s 1995 discussion of ambiguity in address). This form can also be used to avoid acknowledging the superior rank of an adversary. Given colega’s unmarked interpretation of cooperation, this tactic disguises the underlying conflict. Use of ‘my esteemed colleague’ is much less subtle; conventionally politeness is again signaled, but intonation and gestures can key an alternative interpretation. The Zero Form/Avoidance Tactic is considered a ‘neutral’ option. It gives speakers more time to consider an appropriate form and hear how they are addressed. However, societal expectations are that speakers will, within a reasonable period, select a form

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providing a sociolinguistic reference point for the hearer. Informants report mistrusting long-term use of this tactic, as it is unclear whether the speaker wishes to maintain distance or feels offended. Their response may be to avoid contact with such speakers or, in extreme cases, call attention to the apparent slight. On the other hand, exclusive use of the Zero Form may not always be noticed immediately, as conversationalists commonly intersperse it with other V-forms to ‘lighten’ the conversation and avoid sounding stilted. The continual insistence on titles can be interpreted as either excessive politeness or conflictive, as the following actual service encounter demonstrates: Good morning, senhora doutora. How are you, senhora doutora? Can I help you, senhora doutora? I’ll see what I can do, senhora doutora.

[response] [response] [response] [response], etc.

Thus, even a form seemingly unproblematic due to its apparent neutrality, can be used to achieve various conversational goals: to allow time for relationship assessment, to ‘lighten’ a conversation by not drawing attention to relative status (a technique which can be viewed as promoting cooperation), or to avoid giving respect (a means through which one can create or promote conflict). Addressing strategies to avoid conflict are more difficult to summarize, since they seem to vary according to the type of relationship the speakers share. If the relationship is a close one, the speakers may avoid conflict by choosing reciprocal forms of address to emphasize the commonality of experience, situation, mood, or the like. However, if the speakers are not particularly close, or if there is great status differential between them, a speaker may choose forms whose conventionalized meanings denote greater deference. Alternatively, speakers may resist perceived attempts to renegotiate the address form pattern due to increasing distance in the relationship.

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These representative conversational strategies are part of a much larger set. Relevant theoretical advancements in sociolinguistic inquiry, the underpinnings of these strategies, will be laid out in the identity management layer of the model (in preparation). For instance, Goffman’s (1974) and Tannen’s (1993) work on framing provides an analytical tool for understanding the ways address can both frame a situation (on the negotiated plane) or be framed by it (on the conventionalized plane; see Gumperz (1982a) for a discussion of contextualization cues). Wood and Kroger (1994) examine discourse perspectives of facework. Giles et al. (1991) demonstrate how speakers subconsciously adjust their linguistic behavior to be more similar or different to those of a particular group, while LePage and Tabouret-Keller (1985) consider this accommodation as an identity creation strategy. Leung (2002: 15) presents an excellent overview of the various theoretical perspectives that have addressed conflict talk. These are but a few of the avenues being pursued.

THE APPLICATION OF THE MODEL TO OTHER LANGUAGES Researchers of languages with a much simpler pronoun system than that used in Portuguese may naturally question the benefits of considering a model as elaborate as the one presented here, believing that the degree of precision is unnecessarily fine for the data they are analyzing. However, the mere existence of a precise instrument of analysis might better serve to encourage researchers to consider whether the communicative complexity which is expressed in Portuguese through the pronoun system exists in other languages but is expressed through other mechanisms. Anecdotal data suggests that speakers use vocatives to ‘fine tune’ the interaction along a particular track. Vocatives which may be used to promote cooperation include such forms as ‘colleague’, terms of endearment (used even with strangers, as in department

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stores in the southern USA), diminutives (‘Daddy’ instead of ‘Dad’). On the other hand, vocatives can also be used to express or provoke conflict, as in ‘buster’ in the expression ‘Watch it, buster!’ Other examples include the use of someone’s full name when only FN is expected, use of ‘Your Excellency’ to someone for whom that is not their professional title, adding a derogative adjective to FN or LN (‘Crazy Sally, come here!’), Table 28.2

although it should be noted that even derogative forms can be used as terms of endearment if negotiated by the speakers. In order to emphasize the applicability of this model to other languages, Table 28.2 reproduces the hierarchical address structure presented in Table 28.1, substituting sample vocatives for the address pronouns of Portuguese. While these vocatives are taken from English, most or all of these same kinds

Applicability of hierarchy to other languages

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of distinctions are made in other languages. Thus, the complex system of address pronouns in Portuguese is paralleled by a wide array of address vocatives in other languages. The principal difference seems to be the degree of discretionary power that speakers have, or feel they have, to omit the titles which will shade or categorize the relationship or situation. Here the presumption is that speakers of a language such as English would feel more comfortable in omitting vocative forms (when possible) than Portuguese speakers would feel in avoiding the use of a particular pronoun option. Observational data suggest that Portuguese speakers are much more aware of the way they are addressed and discuss infractions with greater frequency than do speakers of English. Appropriate address seems to arise with some frequency on talk shows, both in conversations to determine the appropriate form to use with a guest, as well as more general exchanges on inappropriate usage that has been witnessed by the host or guests. One area of research which merits greater attention is the co-occurrence of vocatives and pronouns. In binary pronoun systems, the pronoun accompanying the secondperson singular form of the verb is considered the T-pronoun. The V-pronoun may be the one used with the third-person singular form of the verb, as in Spanish, or the second person plural form of the verb, as in German and the Scandinavian languages. As described above, the T-pronoun is conventionally associated with informality and intimacy, the V-pronoun with formality and respect. That assumption, if true in all languages and in all communicative situations, would imply that the semantic field (interpretation) of the T-pronoun would be the same from language to language and independent of the situation of its use. However, obvious differences exist. Danish du, for instance, is nearly as widespread as you in English, whereas use of Italian tu is more restricted among adult speakers. Within a single language, variation also exists in the matching of a particular vocative to the pronoun.

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For instance, while some native Spanish speakers report that they might use the vocative ‘Profesor’ with tú, others state (personal communication) that if they address their professor in that way, they would not use tú. Thus, the boundaries between T- and V-pronouns are different in each language. In addition to the situational variation within a single language described above, differences in the usage and semantic interpretation of forms are also found in varieties of the same language. At a conference on address forms in the Spanish-speaking world (Karl-Franzens-Universita¨t, Graz, May 2006), it became clear that uniformity does not exist regarding the semantic interpretation of the pronouns tú, Ud, or vos. As a result, the pairing of vocatives and pronouns would not be the same across all varieties of Spanish. By taking the perspective that the importance of address (including vocatives) is not limited to a few communicative strategies or to all-inclusive definitions of Power and Solidarity, researchers can more easily understand the complexities of interpersonal communication and the role communicative strategies play in achieving conversational goals (including conflict and cooperation) and in constructing one’s identity. To this end, an additional area to be explored is the degree to which titles become an integral part of the legal identity of the individual. For example, in Germany, the doctoral title Dr. becomes a part of the family name and therefore appears both in one’s national identity card and passport. In Portugal bank and credit cards include the academic title of the cardholder, but it is not considered part of the family name and therefore does not appear on the national identity card or in the passport.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS This chapter has examined some of the ways speakers can manipulate the address form system to encourage cooperation or to

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provoke or avoid conflict. The fact that address is variable at the level of the individual, rather than determined by one’s demographic profile, is not recognized in the Brown and Gilman model, which has shaped the field of address since its publication. Moreover, often considered to be but a small part of the larger field of politeness, address is often under-analyzed and insufficiently theorized. The model presented here offers a framework for understanding how individuals create identities for themselves, as individuals and as co-interlocutors, through conversational strategies and address form choices. It further offers a window into understanding how the choices made minimize or maximize the speakers’ ability to achieve cooperation or conflict. Space limitations prohibit a more thorough description of how the ‘accordion effect’ serves to disconnect negotiated meaning from the mooring of the conventionalized interpretation, a more precise description of the third layer of analysis (the personal and social identification processes, conversational goals, consideration of face needs, etc.), a fuller illustration of how these social and individual identities are created and shaped by various address form strategies, and a more complete explanation of the model’s usefulness in analyzing address form systems which do not appear to require this degree of intricacy. This model may appear unnecessarily complicated for researchers of languages with one or two pronouns of address, as is the case with most European languages. However, it has been demonstrated that the distinctions which can be made in Portuguese through nominal pronouns are made in other languages through vocatives. Unfortunately, many studies of address focus on pronouns while ignoring vocatives. Perhaps researchers find the number of nominal forms daunting, or the shades of meaning too subtle for analysis using the analytical models most often referenced. This model offers greater explicative power, as it allows for the integration of pronouns of address and nominal forms within a single interpretative framework.

REFERENCES Atkinson, J. Maxwell and Heritage, John (eds.) (1984) Structures of Social Action. Studies in Conversation Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bing, Janet (1995) ‘Killing Us Softly: Ambiguous Markers of Power and Solidarity’, in M. Bucholtz, A. Liang, and L. Sutton (eds.) Communication In, Through, and Across Cultures. Berkeley, CA: Berkeley Women and Language Group. pp. 44–9. Blum-Kulka, Shoshana, House, Juliane and Kasper, Gabriele (1989) Cross-Cultural Pragmatics: Requests and Apologies. Norwood: Ablex Publishing Corporation. Braun, Friederike (1988) Terms of Address: Problems of Patterns and Usage in Various Languages and Cultures. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Brown, Penelope and Levinson, Stephen (1978) ‘Universals in Language Usage: Politeness Phenomena’, in Esther Goody (ed.) Questions and Politeness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brown, Roger W. and Gilman, Albert ([1960] 1972) ‘The Pronouns of Power and Solidarity’, in Pier Paolo Giglioli (ed.) Language and Social Context. NY: Penguin Books. pp. 252–82. Coates, Jennifer (1986) Women, Men and Language. NY: Longman. de Oliveira, Medeiros, Sandi Michele (1985) A Model of Address Form Negotiation: A Sociolinguistic Study of Continental Portuguese. PhD dissertation, Austin: University of Texas. de Oliveira, Sandi Michele (1993) ‘Um Modelo Psico-sociolinguístico de Formas de Tratamento’, Actas do VIII Encontro da Associaça~o Portuguesa de Linguística, Outubro 1991. Lisbon: Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa. pp. 330–42. de Oliveira, Sandi Michele (1994) ‘Winning Friends and Influencing People Abroad: Using Native Speakers’ Communicative Strategies’, Intercultural Communication Studies, IV(1): 23–44. ~es de Oliveira, Sandi Michele (1995a) ‘Reflexo Sobre Poder e Solidariedade’, Actas do X Encontro da Associaça~o Portuguesa de Linguística. Lisbon: Universidade de Lisboa. pp. 407–18.

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de Oliveira, Sandi Michele (1995b) ‘Mudança e Continuidade Nas Formas de Tratamento em Évora’, Actas do 4° Congresso da Associaça~o Internacional de Lusitanistas, Universidade de Hamburgo, 6 a 11 de Setembro de 1993, Lisbon: Lidel. pp. 203–14. de Oliveira, Sandi Michele (1997) ‘Accounting for Personal and Social Identity: A Theoretical Construct’, Proceedings of the First International Conference on Discourse Analysis. Lisbon: Universidade de Lisboa. pp. 145–56. de Oliveira, Sandi Michele (2005) ‘A Retrospective on Address in Portugal (1982–2002): Rethinking Power and Solidarity’, Journal of Historical Pragmatics, Special Issue on the Evolution of Pragmatic Markers, 6(2), pp. 307–23. Ervin-Tripp, Susan M. (1972) ‘On Sociolinguistic Rules: Alternation and co-occurrence’, in John J. Gumperz and Dell Hymes (eds.) Directions in Sociolinguistics: The Ethnography of Communication. NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. pp. 218–50. Giles, Howard, Coupland, Nikolas and Coupland, Justine (1991) ‘Accommodation Theory: Communication, Context, and Consequence’, in Howard Giles, Nikolas Coupland and Justine Coupland (eds.) Contexts of Accommodation. Developments in Applied Linguistics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 1–68. Giles, Howard and Powesland, Peter ([1975] 1997) ‘Accommodation Theory’, in Nikolas Coupland and Adam Jaworski, (eds.) Sociolinguistics: A Reader. NY: St. Martin’s Press. pp. 232–9. Goffman, Erving (1974) Frame Analysis. NY: Harper and Row. Grimshaw, Allen D. (1990) Conflict Talk: Sociolinguistic Investigations in Conversations. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Gumperz, John J. (1982a) Discourse Strategies. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Gumperz, John J. (ed.) (1982b) Language and Social Identity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hymes, Dell H. (1974) Foundations in Sociolinguistics: An Ethnographic Approach. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. Kondo, Dorinne K. (1990) Crafting Selves: Power, Gender, and Discourses of Identity in

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a Japanese Workplace. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Leech, Geoffrey (1999) ‘The Distribution and Function of Vocatives in American and British English Conversation’, in Hilde Hasselgård and Signe Oksefjell (eds.) Out of Corpora: Studies in Humour of Stig Johansson. Amsterdam: Rodopi. pp. 107–18. LePage, Robert B. and Tabouret-Keller, Andrée (1985) Acts of Identity: Creole-based Approaches to Language and Ethnicity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Leung, Santoi (2002) ‘Conflict Talk: A Discourse Analytical Perspective’, Working Papers in TESOL and Applied Linguistics. Vol. 2, Special Issue. URL: http://www.tc.columbia.edu/academic/ tesol/Webjournal/LeungFinal.doc.pdf. Myers-Scotton, Carol (1983) ‘The Negotiation of Identities in Conversation’, International Journal of the Sociology of Language, 44: 115–136. Sacks, Harvey (1992) Lectures on Conversation. 2 Vols. Gail Jefferson (ed.) Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Schiffrin, Deborah (1985) ‘Everyday Argument: The Organization of Diversity in Talk’, in Teun A. van Dijk (ed.) Handbook of Discourse Analysis, Vol. 3. London, UK: Academic Press. pp. 35–46. Scollon, Ron and Scollon, Suzanne Wong (1995) Intercultural Communication: A Discourse Approach. London: Blackwell. Spencer-Oatey, Helen (1996) ‘Reconsidering Power and Distance’, Journal of Pragmatics, 26: 1–24. Taavitsainen, Irma and Jucker, Andreas H. (2003) Diachronic Perspectives on Address Term Systems. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Tabouret-Keller, Andrée (1997) ‘Language and Identity’, in F. Coulmas (ed.) The Handbook of Sociolinguistics. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 315–26. Tajfel, Henri and Turner, John C. (1979) ‘An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict’, in G. Austin William and Stephen Worchel (eds.) The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole. Tannen, Deborah (1993) Framing in Discourse. Oxford: Oxford University Press. van Dijk, Teun A. (1980) Text and Context: Explorations in the Semantics and Pragmatics of Discourse. London: Longman.

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van Dijk, Teun A. (1989) ‘Social Cognition and Discourse’, in Howard Giles and W. Peter Robinson (eds.) Handbook of Social Psychology and Language. Chichester: Wiley. pp.163–83.

Wood, Linda A. and Kroger, Rolf O. (1994) ‘The Analysis of Facework in Discourse: Review and Proposal’, Journal of Language and Social Psychology, 13: 248–77.

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29 Conflict and (Ethno-Linguistic) Diversity: Canada/Québec Philippe Couton, Ann Denis, Leslie Laczko, Linda Pietrantonio and Joseph-Yvon Thériault 1

INTRODUCTION This chapter presents a case study on ‘Conflict and (Ethno-Linguistic) Diversity: Canada/Québec’. It consists of five interrelated presentations initially prepared for a roundtable by members of the Department of Sociology2 at the University of Ottawa, which hosted the International Sociological Association Research Council conference in May 2004. The objective of the roundtable was to provide a perspective on Canada’s ethnic and linguistic diversity, and to stimulate further thinking about these issues in a comparative and international context. Canada’s ethnic structure is complex and multidimensional, combining as it does various axes of differentiation that intersect and overlap. In rough historical order, these are the cleavage between Aboriginal peoples and the dominant society(ies), the historic French-English dualism which has left two distinct settler societies, waves of almost continuous immigration, and claims by

Québec for a special status if not full independence – hence our references to ‘Canada/Québec’. The intention of this chapter is to provide a selective overview, not an exhaustive analysis.3 The emphases reflect the authors’ respective areas of specialization within ethnic relations, as well as the frequent separation, in both government institutions and the academy, of studies of First Nations from those of the two colonizers (the French and the British) and subsequent immigrants. This separation is, no doubt, partly due to the differing legal relations of these collectivities with the State and to the tendency for it to be mainly anthropologists who have studied the First Nations. The emphases in this chapter are also informed, we realize, by our location in a bilingual (French and English) university, in Canada’s capital, which is located just over the border from Québec, and whose intellectual points of reference are in both English and French speaking universities, in Québec and in the rest of Canada. Part of the University of

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Ottawa’s mission is to provide service to the minority francophone population of Ontario,4 a mission which our department embraces and incorporates into its scholarly agenda in a variety of ways. Pietrantonio’s opening section examines official institutional discourses about diversity in the field of cultural policies. How diversity is conceptualized in a number of recent policy documents reveals differences between the federal ways of thinking and framing issues, and those of Québec. The differences are linked to differing national visions and national projects. The examination of these differences and tensions is a recurring theme throughout the chapter. In the second section, Laczko situates Canada’s overall level of internal ethno-linguistic diversity in comparative perspective. He argues that Canada’s level of diversity is by many empirical measures higher than that of most other developed societies, because it combines different types of diversity. Next, Couton contrasts federal immigration policies with those of the Québec government. The latter have evolved both in tandem with and in tension with federal ones. He explains how Québec has been able to successfully shape its own immigration policy over the past few decades, placing greater emphasis on recruiting French-language immigrants. The fourth contribution, by Denis, focuses on contradictory features of both Canadian immigration policies and other policies which have framed ethnic relations since the 1960s in Canada and Québec. While aspects of these policies are racist, sexist, and classbased, certain features are more progressive, with state policy leading rather than following public opinion, and promoting increased inclusion and rights of social citizenship. In the final section, Thériault extends the analysis of state policies on ethno-linguistic issues by discussing the differing, and to some extent contradictory, language policies pursued since the 1960s by the federal and Québec governments. These reflect differing visions of language as a cultural tool, bringing us full circle back to questions of diversity

and cultural policy introduced by Pietrantonio in the first section, and now examined by Thériault within the context of the federal political system. He argues that the formal equality of French and English, spelled out in the federal bilingualism policy and the provisions of the federal Charter of Rights and Freedoms, hamper the Québec government’s goal – also recognized federally as legitimate – of ensuring the primacy of French within that jurisdiction. Taken together, the sections give a sampling of recent and ongoing research on Canada’s complex ethnic dynamics, without claiming to be exhaustive. The conclusion draws together the strands of ethno-linguistic diversity which have been examined.

DIVERSITY AND CULTURAL POLICIES: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE INSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE ON CANADA/QUÉBEC CULTURE (LINDA PIETRANTONIO) In the study of Canadian society, the ‘management of diversity’ is an important issue relative to Canada/Québec relations. This ‘management’ is constructed principally through social policies, to which we will refer in this chapter as so many ways of raising the issue of ethnic relations. It must be emphasized that the expression ‘management of diversity’ itself, used by certain key Québec and Canadian government departments since the end of the 1980s, was initially proposed by sociologists of ethnic relations in their analyses of the institutional (non)consideration of ethnic diversification of the population in various sectors such as education, police services, housing, etc. In both cases, the expression ‘management of diversity’ has a strongly Foucauldian meaning, that is to say, managing populations as a means of social regulation. According to Foucault, this practice, mediated by public policies which are endowed with a discourse introduced and supported by legislation, first

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CONFLICT AND DIVERSITY: CANADA / QUÉBEC

appeared in the eighteenth century in order to promote the institutionalization of the nation and the family. For the author, such normative management will lead, notably, to the construction of a standardized sexuality, what we refer to today as the heteronormative system. The ‘management of diversity’ evoked here is also linked to the normative aims of a standardized nation. Since the 1990s, we have observed that various institutional bodies in Canada and in Québec choose to use the term diversity where, previously, they would have spoken of multiculturalism in Canada and interculturalism in Québec. The use of the concept of diversity within these two socio-political entities is worth noting since, through this notion, the measures, policies and programs thus put in place create and project a national identity; that is to say, they create a social institutional subject with parameters of identity that are matters of debate. We know that on this subject Québec proclaims its distinctiveness from Canada. To be precise, the debates in Québec about institutional recognition of the population’s ethnic diversity (or normative pluralism) essentially began in the 1980s. For reasons related to the history of ethnic relations in the country and linked to the Québec nation’s demands for special status, in Québec, the term multiculturalism was rejected first in favour of the idea of ‘cultural convergence’ – of the migrant population towards the host society (1978) – and later to favour interculturalism (1986). Many ‘intercultural policies’ were then introduced, particularly in the field of education. They had the same objectives as the Canadian multiculturalism policy (Juteau et al., 1998) except in relation to language. (Other sections of this chapter refer to the same distinction.) The debate between multiculturalism and interculturalism culminated in Québec, in December 1990, with the adoption of a Québec policy on immigration and integration. (See the sections by Couton and Denis in this chapter.) There is an extensive literature on this debate which bears witness to

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the effervescence in Québec’s intellectual and academic milieu on the question of modalities for the integration of immigrant populations and their descendants into the ‘nation’. Ethnic relations – formative of material and symbolic boundaries between groups – do shape the manner of thinking about diversity within the geo-juridical borders of Canada. Hence, one can also find there explanations for why the term ‘diversity’ has different meanings or semantics in Canada and Québec. The institutional usage of this term in Québec now dates to the mid-1990s and on a number of occasions, has presented further opportunities for affirming the national identity of French Canadians. We can see this by analyzing cultural policies in order to examine normative pluralism. Such an approach has rarely been used to date to study ethnic relations (Pietrantonio, 2002). Analysis of the relationship of cultural policies to normative pluralism deserves attention since these policies harbour social, political and cultural elements considered to be the specificities of a nation (Handler, 1988). While the typical analyses of normative pluralism have often focused on policies and programs related to official multiculturalism, ethnic boundaries are discernible within all institutional discourses on culture. Furthermore, we believe that this is ideal material for a discursive analysis of ethnic relations, one which also provides the opportunity for a fruitful association between the sociology of ethnic relations and the sociology of culture. In the field of cultural policies, since the end of the 1990s uses of the concept of diversity have been developed that encourage us to identify various types of normative pluralism. There has, in fact, been a long standing opposition between the Canadian model and the French republican model, or even the German one. Indeed, a fresh look at normative pluralism5 appears even more important as an international and institutional (thus, normative) discourse is developing about culture and diversity, within which both Canada and Québec are playing a leading role.

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On the one hand, the federal government created the International Network on Cultural Policy (INCP) in 1998 which, by 2003, brought together 68 ministers from around the world, each with responsibility for cultural policies. On the other hand, Québec was closely associated with negotiations on the International Instrument on Cultural Diversity (IICD)6 that resulted in the adoption of the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of Diversity of Cultural Expressions on October 20, 2005, during the 33rd session of the General Conference of UNESCO. My reflections are based on a comparative analysis of three distinct corpuses of institutional discourse about culture: (1) all of the seven official policies on culture produced in Québec from 1961 to 2000 (see Pietrantonio, 2002); (2) the weekly press releases of the Bureau de la diversité culturelle (Office of Cultural Diversity, BDC), which became, in mid-May 2004, the Secrétariat gouvernemental à la diversité culturelle (Government Secretariat for Cultural Diversity)7 (for 2000 and the period from 2003 to 2004) – this unit has, in fact, operated the Internet site for the Ministère de la culture et de communications du Québec (Québec Ministry of Culture and Communications) since January 2000;8 and, finally, (3) the annual reports of the International Network on Cultural Policy (INCP),9 a network in which Canada continues to play an important role, after having initiated it. It has held an annual conference since its inception in 1998 and is undergoing some expansion since only 40 countries were members in 2001. In each of these three corpuses, the discourse on culture is constructed in relation to an international reference point. Indeed, we could say that this has also been the case for cultural policies in Québec since they were first developed during the 1960s. Thus, we can argue that since 1998, in institutional milieus dealing with culture, it has been the question of regulating global commerce and trade that has permitted the international deployment of the discourse on diversity. (Denis presents a similar

interpretation in her section of this chapter.) This subject is raised to protect against ‘globalization’ and its anticipated effects of homogenization. Therefore, discourse on diversity is constructed on feared power relationships, whose effects are worrisome, both in terms of identity and in terms of economics. Throughout the corpus, the ‘United States’ constitutes the spectre of globalization and is seen as the home of the feared cultural homogenization. Doubtless, the discourse about the recognition of global cultural diversity would not be experiencing the same growth were it not for this dread of a worldwide American cultural homogenization which is promoted by commercial hegemony. The ‘fundamental issue of cultural diversity’ in the field of cultural policies is explicitly presented as the protection of the identity of peoples from ‘commercialization’.10 Throughout this ‘dossier on cultural diversity’, it is a question of promoting nations’ distinctive characters. In the three corpuses examined the unit of meaning of cultural diversity is, for the most part, based on the idea of a cultural homogeneity of nations which enable nations to differentiate themselves from one another. In other words, diversity is mainly used in the sense of promoting national cultures, which are, however, assumed to be ethnically homogeneous. This entails a new register in the institutional usage of the concept of diversity. However, in the case of the INCP, the discourse on the protection of national culture seems concomitant with the need to take account of intra-national cultural diversity, which strongly distinguishes this corpus from the other two. In Québec, such a new usage of the notion of diversity in the wake of globalization takes little account of intra-national ethnic diversity. Intra-group ethnic diversity, in terms of categories based on social class, gender, age, etc., is, in fact, ignored in the whole corpus, except for what constitutes Québec’s cultural policy of 1978.11 It is worth mentioning that until very recently; i.e., less than 10 years ago, in both Canada and Québec, the concept of diversity

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referred basically to immigrant minorities (Juteau et al., 1998; Li, 2003a). In Québec, the notion of ‘cultural communities’ appeared at the beginning of the 1980s to identify this segment of the population, and then, in the middle of the 1990s, the terms ‘Québecers from cultural communities’ or ‘citizens from cultural communities’ marked a willingness to expand the national borders, which were always being debated.12 These labels are also intended to distinguish minorities (stemming from immigration) from ‘Québecers’, who were the former ‘French Canadians’. What is noteworthy in these new usages of the notion of diversity is the fact that, through this institutional discourse on the need to take cultural diversity into account, the idea of an ethnically homogeneous culture re-emerges. Within the corpus about Québec, results of the analysis could not be clearer about this. Diversity has no relevance in describing Québec’s culture or that of the francophone majority. It is perceived as external and parallel to the Québec community of French Canadian origin, except in the 1978 policy, which we have already referred to as being exceptional. This distinguishes the official discourse on culture in Québec from that of federal bodies and brings us back to the early history of this country where immigration played an important role, including British immigration. (See the sections by Couton and Denis on this.) Such an institutional discourse recalls the problematic aspects raised by Stuart Hall (1992) with regard to concepts of homogeneous national and cultural identities that, alone, could guarantee particular identities and values, to the exclusion of all others. This discourse also eloquently introduces a new element in the notion of diversity, that of protecting national cultures. To take account of this phenomenon of cultural diversity on a worldwide scale, we have to think in national and international terms, which is, strictlyspeaking, accurate, both geographically and politically. Even if the institutional discourse on culture, affected by that of globalization,

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is now perceived through the notion of diversity, this world remains divided into national territories. Yet to grasp the complexity of the phenomenon of diversity – even while allowing that we want to confine this diversity to ethnicity – we cannot think only nationally and internationally. To take account of this reality, analyses need to encompass the national, the intra-national, the international, and the extra-national dimensions within the same system (Crane, 2002). The extranational dimension also allows us to consider the impact of Diasporas in each society, and thus it is associated with the intra-national dimension (Appadurai, 2001). This phenomenon is rarely considered explicitly in analyses. Similarly, the intersections of diversities based on gender and ethnic identity are too rarely examined. Beyond the Canada/Québec comparison of institutional discourse about culture, we need to be aware of the tension between protecting the national culture, on the one hand, and, on the other, valuing cultural resources on a global scale, as expressed by the idea of diversity as a weapon against homogenization. It is indeed the concept of diversity that structures the current discourse on cultural policies, thus providing these policies with a new perspective. I see in this an invitation to turn our attention once again to the aspects of culture that have been selected for protection at the national level, and that take account of our representations of the nation. For the moment, these representations comprise the core of concepts relative to human diversity. They should also be constantly compared to empirical realities stemming from the avowed existence of cultural diversity and ethnic (and sexual) diversification of institutions. In that respect, it is of interest to note that recently, first, second, and third generation immigrants, and ‘visible minorities’, have begun appearing in francophone Québec media – on television and in print media. It should be emphasized that this new representativity of the population in these media is primarily due to affirmative action, employment equity measures, and programs

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designed to fight against discrimination.13 Finally, let us acknowledge the efforts of a significant portion of the Parti Québécois, a sovereignist party, to build an inclusive Québec nationalism. Conceiving of diversity as the fact of minorities who exist in parallel with a homogeneous national majority constitutes one form of ‘imagined community’. How are we to interpret a conception of diversity (here global) which refers to the sum of national differences, where nations are themselves seen as homogeneous culturally? Indeed, of what diversity are we speaking when it is due to differences between national groupings, which are themselves conceived of as being ethnically and culturally homogeneous? As Laczko now discusses, such assumptions of intra-national homogeneity are misleading in Canada, and of decreasing pertinence throughout the ‘developed’ world.

CANADIAN DUALISM AND CANADA’S EVOLVING CLEAVAGES (LESLIE LACZKO) Canada’s ethnic structure is complex and multidimensional, and several dimensions or axes of ethnic diversity can be distinguished. The evolving relationship between Aboriginal peoples or First Nations and the larger society, Canada’s historical and overarching French-English dualism with a Frenchlanguage sub-society centred in Québec, and its history as an immigrant-receiving society are often identified as three distinct axes that each have their own dynamic. This chapter concentrates on the second and third of these, and the connection between them. The language cleavage is overarching in the sense that Aboriginal and immigrant ethnic minorities are to variable degrees part of the larger French and English language communities, if only for communication purposes. Looking within Québec, the three axes are present as well, except that the size of the French-language majority within Québec is proportionately

greater than the size of the English-language majority in Canada as a whole. To round out the picture we could add the historically significant religious cleavage,14 and the increasingly salient distinction between visible minorities and other immigrant communities. These various axes of cleavage co-exist and often intersect in the context of a relatively decentralized federal political system and ongoing regional rivalries and alliances. This section locates Canada’s ethnic pluralism in comparative perspective and illustrates the connection between the main axes. In recent decades both the scholarly community and the general public are becoming increasingly aware that homogeneous nationstates are very much the exception on the world stage, and that most states in the contemporary world system are in fact multilingual, multinational, and polyethnic. Indeed, in a world with thousands of distinct ethnic groups and languages and fewer than 200 independent states, we should expect most states to be heterogeneous to some extent. Over the past few decades several attempts have been made to quantify the volume of ethnic and linguistic diversity or pluralism within states. Quantitative indices of diversity are of course fraught with many difficulties and need to be handled and interpreted with caution. By themselves, they do not tell us how and whether linguistic and ethnic cleavages are politically significant. Still, it is interesting to note that Canada’s level of internal ethno-linguistic diversity or pluralism, whether measured in the 1960s or the 1990s, is much higher than that which would be expected given its high level of development. Canada is an exceptional case (an outlier, in statistical terms), in this overall inverse relationship, as are, at least in the earlier data from the 1960s and 1970s, Switzerland, Belgium, and the United States (Laczko, 1994, 2000, 2002). These societies all display pluralism scores15 that are significantly above the trend line, which shows the overall inverse relationship predicted between a country’s level of socio-economic development and its ethno-linguistic diversity.

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Canada shares with Belgium and Switzerland its pattern of parallel linguistic institutions and its consociational16 way of organizing linguistic pluralism and regional differences. Canada also shares with the United States (along with Australia and New Zealand) its history as a new world settler society, where Aboriginals became a minority early on and wave after wave of immigrants followed. In Canada, special legislation, notably the Indian Act of 1876, defined a distinct legal status for Aboriginals. I have argued that it is this combination of types of pluralism that makes Canada distinctive (Laczko, 1994). In recent decades, Belgium and Switzerland have added immigration to their historical linguistic and regional cleavages, but they have no counterpart to Canada’s Aboriginals. Similarly, the United States has no close parallel to the linguistic dualism that characterizes Canadian history, despite the growth of its Spanish-speaking minority. In my recent and ongoing analysis of the most recent data sets from the 1990s, based on the lists compiled by Kurian (1997, 2001), it seems that, on the whole, Canada’s overall relative position as a country with an aboveaverage level of pluralism has been maintained from the 1960s to the 1990s. If we list countries by their level of diversity from high to low over four time points spanning four decades, (i) Canada’s level of ethno-linguistic diversity is among the highest in the world at each time period, and (ii) Canada’s main neighbours at the upper end of these lists are almost all countries with much lower levels of development. The existence of the cluster of highly-developed, yet highly-plural countries reflects the fact that some highly developed societies such as Canada, Belgium, and Switzerland have followed a separate historical path that set them somewhat apart from the till-recently paramount model of one dominant language per core state. At the same time, many developed countries have become more heterogeneous and accepting of both territorial linguistic minorities as well as minority immigrant diversity over the past

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two decades, and this trend is likely to continue (cf. Kymlicka, 2003). The historian William McNeill (1986) has noted that countries such as Canada have a head start in facing the challenges of polyethnicity as the world’s developed states become more diverse and multicultural. He argues that polyethnicity is on the rise everywhere and that from a long-view historical perspective, this trend signals a slow but steady return to the ‘normal’ state of human affairs. Given the complex pattern of Aboriginal First Nations, linguistic dualism, and immigrant multiculturalism in Canada as a whole, but also within Québec, a useful question that can be asked is how the three axes interact and influence each other. It is important to look at Québec separately, because Québec’s internal pluralism is the key to Canada’s exceptional position as a state with a higherthan-expected level of pluralism given its high level of development. Although French speakers are a minority of approximately 25% of the population in Canada, they constitute over 80% of the population of Québec. Québec is thus a mini-Canada with its French–English proportions reversed. The main difference, of course, is that Québec’s English-speaking minority historically exercised a level of power and influence out of all proportion to its numbers, while in the other Canadian provinces the French-language minorities historically had to fight for their very survival. As Québec’s Francophone majority has become a ‘sociological’ majority (and not just a numerical majority) since the 1960s, its English-speaking minority has been pressured to adjust to its new role as a Québec minority rather than as a fraction of Canada’s English-speaking majority that happens to live in Québec. This new status is reflected in French-English bilingualism rates within Québec. Although the proportion of the population that is bilingual is increasing in Québec among all categories of the population, for the past two decades Anglophones have displayed higher bilingualism rates than Francophones, a reversal of the century-old traditional pattern whereby

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bilingualism was disproportionately concentrated among the urban and more educated sectors of the Francophone majority, alongside widespread unilingualism in the Anglophone community, even within Québec. It is also clear that within Québec, the historical French-English dualism has affected the other two axes of differentiation: both Québec’s Aboriginal peoples and its immigrant ethnic communities display characteristics not shared by their counterparts elsewhere in Canada. In particular, they display higher rates of ancestral language retention than their counterparts in other provinces. As a consequence, young people from immigrant families in Québec are often fluently trilingual, speaking both official languages as well as their ancestral language. These patterns can be traced to the presence, within Québec, of two competing dominant societies or mainstreams, and the evolving balance of power between them. We can add that, since the 1960s, just as Québec’s Anglophone community has been called upon to redefine itself, so Québec’s Aboriginal and immigrant ethnic communities have been called upon to redefine themselves as Québec minorities distinct from their counterparts in the rest of Canada (Laczko, 1995). The interaction between these various lines of cleavage is often complex, and can be briefly illustrated with an example from recent history, dealing with the progress ‘out of irrelevance’ of Canada’s First Nations. The politically significant redefinition of their communities as First Nations in recent decades is a result of Aboriginal leaders taking a cue from Québec nationalism. This process has of course taken place across the country. Also, in public opinion polls, for several decades, from the 1960s to the 1980s, Québecers and Francophones displayed more sympathetic attitudes towards Aboriginal grievances than did the population of English-speaking Canada, perhaps reflecting some sort of awareness of the shared historical fact that Francophone Québecers and Aboriginals were both incorporated into the

Canadian state in less than voluntary fashion. This pattern changed with the constitutional debates/crises of the late 1980s and early 1990s. The Meech Lake Accord,17 designed to recognize in a modest way Québec’s distinctiveness, failed because it was not ratified by all provincial legislatures. Specifically, the Manitoba Legislature’s failure to ratify the Meech Lake Accord in 1990 occurred because an Aboriginal member of the legislature, Elijah Harper, argued he could not support an agreement designed to satisfy Québec while First Nations grievances remained outstanding. This was widely viewed in Québec as an anti-Québec and anti-French gesture, of the sort that has long characterized the history of Western Canada. In parallel fashion, in the climate of polarized public opinion, opposition to the Accord in English-speaking Canada was often accompanied by statements of support for Aboriginal rights and grievances. As a result, in the 1990s, opinion polls showed Québecers often taking a harder line on Aboriginal issues than did respondents from the rest of Canada (Laczko, 1997). Within this national context of complex lines of ethno-linguistic cleavage, Couton now examines Canadian immigration policy, with a particular emphasis on Québec’s increasing autonomy and the ways in which its immigration selection and settlement policies support its project of an equal French nation within Canada, if not an autonomous nation.

CANADA’S IMMIGRATION POLICY DUALISM (PHILIPPE COUTON) Under the constitutionally joint provincial and federal jurisdiction, immigration has contributed to Canada’s diversity in a unique manner. While historically provinces have been at best junior partners in immigration matters, they, and Québec in particular, have been playing a greatly expanded role since the 1960s. The rise of Québec nationalism

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during that period was of course the prime mover, but the emergence of a more consultative approach to federal policymaking also played a role. The 2002 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act continues, for instance, the tradition of provincial consultation first mandated in its 1976 predecessor. The result of these forces has been an increasingly diverse immigration policy, with various provinces, and even cities, clamouring to play a role. British Columbia and Manitoba have obtained some control over parts of immigration policy, and Ontario has been negotiating for both more input and funding for decades (Beach et al., 2003: section III). But Québec is the sole jurisdiction to have obtained nearly complete policy control. Canada is therefore the only major immigration country to have a ‘bifurcated’ immigration system, with two distinct administrative units having different policies, goals, and institutional structures (Garcea, 1998). Since immigration has traditionally been one of the defining prerogatives of national states, this policy fragmentation (dualism, really) raises a number of questions, but also hints at larger trends, which will be briefly explored. Historically, immigration has affected Canada’s two settler communities very differently. It was a tool in the settlement of the Canadian West, a way to counter US expansionism, and an instrument of economic growth for the federation as a whole. After initial colonization by the French and the British, largely in separate regions of the country, the four great phases of immigration to Canada – the settlement of loyalists (to Britain) fleeing the American revolution in the late 1700s, the immigration of workers and paupers from the British Isles (chiefly Ireland) during the early to mid-1800s, the great migratory influx of the early 1900s from Europe, especially Britain, and most recently the sustained and increasingly diverse immigration of the post-WWII period – have had uneven consequences for Canada’s English and French ‘founding’ (colonizing) groups.18 Each of those four phases created a particular challenge to the

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equilibrium born of various struggles and compromises that culminated in the 1867 settlement. Bluntly put, immigration was frequently perceived by Canada’s Francophones as a plot to dissolve their culture into a rapidly expanding Anglophone majority (Grenier, 2003; Kelley and Trebilcock, 1998: 20). This perception was partly based on facts. The first two great waves of immigration were almost entirely of British origin, contributing to the emergence of new provinces, while the next two massively integrated into Canada’s Anglophone majority, until very recently (Henripin, 1994). Even within Québec’s borders, in Montréal in particular, most immigrants tended to gravitate towards the vast North American (Englishspeaking) cultural hegemon. And during most of its history, Canada’s immigration policy was blithely unconcerned with its effect on Québec or French-Canadians in general. This was of course just one of many shortcomings of what was, until the 1960s, not so much a coherent policy but an essentially arbitrary series of Cabinet or department-level regulations, explicitly exclusionary, driven by an uneasy mix of short-term economic imperatives (supplementing the labour force) and larger strategic objectives (populating the West) (Green, 1976; Green and Green, 2004). It comes as no surprise then, that the rising political fortunes of Québec nationalism in the 1960s and 1970s moved immigration to the centre of the political stage. A number of Québec politicians had long felt that federal immigration policies were not in line with the province’s needs. Even before the election of the first Parti Québécois19 government in 1976, the province took steps to enhance its role in this area. Québec created its own immigration department in 1968, a century after the first federal law on immigration was passed in 1869, and began to negotiate a series of agreements with federal authorities (Paˆquet, 1997). The first of these was signed in 1971, and led to the permanent 1991 agreement, granting Québec nearly unilateral responsibility for the selection and integration

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of its immigrants.20 Québec even obtained a substantially higher share of federal settlement funds, based on the recognition, stated in the agreement, that it needs additional resources to help immigrants integrate in a manner that takes into account its distinct identity (Li, 2003: 170). The key period in this process was the second part of the 1970s, when the Parti Québécois secured important immigration powers in 1978 (under the Cullen-Couture agreement),21 and also attempted to direct immigrants towards the provincial linguistic majority by making French education mandatory for school-aged newcomers. The bifurcation of Canada’s immigration policy is therefore largely the product of Québec’s efforts at greater policy autonomy, with the objectives of protecting and developing the use of French, and countering demographic decline. Contemporary migration to Canada is, as a result, linguistically dichotomized. As Table 29.1 shows, French is spoken in half of the main source countries of immigrants to Montréal, compared to none for Canada’s two other immigrant cities.22 In 2002, nearly half of the immigrants to Montréal spoke some French, against only about 2% of those moving to Toronto and Vancouver (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2002).23 Since the concentration of immigrants of similar

Table 29.1

origin in particular locations tends to be self-reinforcing, this is likely to be a longterm trend (McDonald, 2004). At the same time, immigration to Québec has been consistently more modest than to other large provinces. As Figure 29.1 illustrates, Québec has never reached a share of new immigrants proportional to its demographic weight in Canada (whereas Ontario consistently exceeds it). But compared to other developed countries around the world, even major immigration destinations like the United States, France, and Germany, Québec ranks as a major immigrant-receiving society (see Figure 29.2). These figures illustrate both the success Québec has had at shaping its migratory influx and the continuing ambivalence with which it approaches it. This ambivalence goes beyond numbers, and is further illustrated by the fluctuating mission (and name) of the ministry in charge of immigration since its creation over 30 years ago (Helly, 1996; Symons, 2002), which Pietrantonio chronicles earlier in this chapter. Not unlike other immigrant-receiving societies, Québec’s official approach to immigration has been attempting to strike an uneasy balance between operating within the conceptual framework of individualistic citizenship and accepting the reality of communal diversity. Canada’s immigration policy is

Top 10 source countries, Montréal, Toronto, Vancouver, 2002

Montréal Toronto Vancouver +*Morocco India China China China India +*France Pakistan Philippines +*Algeria Philippines Korea, Republic of +Romania Iran Taiwan +*Haiti Sri Lanka Iran Pakistan United Arab Emirates United Kingdom India Korea, Republic of United States +*Lebanon Ukraine Pakistan Sri Lanka Jamaica Hong Kong Adapted from : Facts and Figures, Ottawa: Citizenship and Immigration, OECD, 2002. + Member of the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (see http://www.francophonie.org/) *French is widely spoken and/or an official language.

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30 25 20 Quebec Immig %

15

Quebec Pop %

10 5 0 1970

Figure 29.1 1970–2000

1980

1990

2000

Québec’s proportion of Canada’s immigrants and of Canada’s population,

Adapted from: Duchesne, Louis. 2005. La situation démographique au Québec. Bilan 2005. Québec: Institut de la statistique du Québec.

also equivocal, but that is due to policy priorities which oscillate between labour market, demographic, and humanitarian goals. ‘Diversity management’ in Québec has as a result taken a unique turn, with, for instance, the development of an ‘intercultural’ perspective, different from Canadian multiculturalism, and which places a much stronger emphasis on the importance of a common language and shared values (Gagnon, 2000; Symons, 2002; see also Pietrantonio’s contribution to this chapter). Not unlike other immigration countries, Québec has also been

attempting to ‘regionalize’ its immigration, i.e., to encourage immigrants to settle outside of Montréal (Vatz Laaroussi, 2005). Regional municipalities have played an active role in this process, often seeking immigration for demographic, economic and cultural reasons (Guilbert, 2005). While Montréal has experienced large-scale migration for much of its history, these other cities have not, prompting them to organize a range of programs to attract and retain immigrants (Guilbert, 2005). This immigration policy dualism raises a number of analytical questions, but two head

30 25 20 15 10 5

Figure 29.2

ium Belg

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ria Aust

ec Queb

ce Fran

tes d Sta Unite

den Swe

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d erlan

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Switz

New

Zeala

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0

Proportion of foreign-born, top 10 countries and Québec, 2000

Adapted from: Trends in International Migration, OECD, 2002; Statistics Canada, 2001 Census. (Note: Closest year when 2000 not available; Luxembourg was omitted).

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the list. First, is this simply part of the slow evolution of Québec towards full statehood? That may be the case, but Québec is but one example, albeit the most developed, of the increasing involvement of sub-national political units in immigration, in Canada and elsewhere. Québec is unique in that it seeks to include immigration in a specific nationbuilding project, but many of its objectives are similar to those of other provinces in Canada and to those of other political communities in the rest of the world. The emergence of a number of semi-autonomous sub- and trans-national spaces, including cities, regions, migrant communities, exiled polities, etc., is a global phenomenon (Faist, 2000: 281), independent of Québec’s stateseeking politics. This leads to the second question: Is this trend towards the displacement of nation-state sovereignty indicative of the increasing irrelevance of traditional immigration policies? The emerging ability of large conurbations and other sub-national jurisdictions to influence their migratory inflows may actually signal the development of more targeted, localized immigration policies (Nairn, 2003). Instead of the global, random migration some predict, we may be witnessing the rise of fine-tuned population movements, resulting in niched diversity, with Montréal, for instance, tending to become a microcosm of the French-speaking world. The multiple efforts of the provincial government to integrate newcomers into Québec’s French-speaking political community are reinforcing this trend, sometimes with mixed results, but with some clear successes as well, including the rising use of French rather than English as the preferred home language of recent immigrants (Grenier, 2003; Helly, 1996). Against this backdrop of national immigration policies, Denis now considers the contradictory tendencies of these and other state policies related to ethnic relations – towards exclusions based on racism, sexism and classism, on the one hand, and towards the promotion of ethnic diversity, on the other.

IMMIGRATION AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY (ANN DENIS) Throughout its history Canada has been a settler society, encouraging immigration, as Couton has mentioned, mainly for the utilitarian objectives of increasing the population and meeting labour market needs. These reasons have at times been leavened by humanitarianism, as in the case of admitting refugees, while family reunion policies incorporate a combination of utilitarian and humanitarian considerations. Although the Canadian immigration policies have been severely (and legitimately) criticized as exclusionary,24 at the same time, along with other national policies related to ethnic relations, they have often been proactive in promoting inclusion, leading, rather than following, public opinion in the promotion of ethnic diversity. This section will highlight some of the contradictory tendencies that result – evidence of racism, sexism and classism in Canadian immigration policies, and evidence supporting the interpretation of the Canadian and Québécois governments as promoting ethnic diversity. Permanent, rather than temporary, immigration has been the norm in Canada. Until 1962 this resulted in an explicitly racist immigration policy: depending on their national origin, which was considered to be a predictor of their ability to assimilate to the dominant Anglo/British culture, potential immigrants were welcomed (if British, including those from the (ex-)colonies, or American, and ‘white’), accepted (if European, with those from Southern and Eastern Europe being the least welcome) or excluded, usually implicitly, if not of European (‘white’) origin.25 Since 1962, with the introduction of the ‘points system’, Canadian immigration policy became formally non-discriminatory, with admission as an ‘independent’ or ‘economic’ immigrant26 based on points assigned for individual attributes other than national origin. The preferred attributes are those

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deemed useful for economic integration in Canadian/Québécois society, such as education, training, occupation, a job offer and knowledge of English or French. In 1978 a subcategory of ‘investor’ was added to the independent category: for them money for investment largely replaces the skills criteria. The second basis of admission is as a ‘sponsored’ immigrant, financially dependent for 10 years on an independent immigrant or a Canadian citizen. Sponsored immigrants are not assessed using the points system. In 1978, a third category of immigrant was added, ‘refugee’. Based on the Geneva Convention definition, a refugee is a person who, ‘owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion’ (quoted in Anderson, 1993: 46), is outside the country of his/her nationality or habitual residence and is unable, or, because of such fear, unwilling to return to it. Refugee claimants may be selected abroad or assessed when they arrive in Canada. That having money to invest allows one to become an independent immigrant by sidestepping the ‘universal’ criteria of the point system suggests class bias in immigration policies, favouring neo-liberalism. The criteria for the attribution of temporary work permits, the exception in a settler society, also reflect class bias, together with racism and sexism. These permits have been largely given to seasonal agricultural workers, who are non-European men (Satzewich, 1991), and to the more numerous live-in domestic workers or caregivers, on contracts of one to two years, who are predominantly non-European women.27 Both accept working conditions that Canadians refuse. For example, domestic workers are constrained to reside with their employer, and changing one’s employer was initially impossible. While it is now possible for live-in caregivers to apply to become independent immigrants at the end of their contract (as was also true into the 1960s), in addition to the criteria other

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applicants had to meet, between 1981 and 1992 they were expected to have taken courses and/or participated in community activities during their live-in service, despite the fact that they are typically living in affluent neighbourhoods with poor public transport.28 In contrast, professional and technical workers who obtain temporary work permits experience no such constraints. In fact, by the latter part of the twentieth century, this became a means of fast-tracking their work authorization, which has, since 2001, been extended to their spouses (Abu-Laban and Gabriel, 2002).29 These workers are much more likely to be of American or European origin. That normally only one person per family, typically a man, is assessed as an independent immigrant, results in women being disproportionately admitted as legal dependents. As such they are particularly vulnerable to domestic violence, even though (or perhaps because) they may make significant contributions to the family income as wage-earners from the time they arrive. The reduction in 2001 of a spouse’s obligatory dependency from ten to three years provides a welcome attenuation of the effects of this sexist practice, without, however, eliminating it (Coˆté et al., 2001). Turning now from immigration law, since 1969 a number of government measures legitimizing ethnic diversity have been introduced, including, for Canada, the Official Languages Act (1969), which makes both English and French official languages in Canada; the Multiculturalism Policy (1971), subsequently formalized as the Multiculturalism Act (1988), which declares that Canada is a multicultural society; the Employment Equity Act, which defines women, Aboriginals, visible minorities and people with disabilities as ‘designated groups’ for whom employment equity is to be promoted (1986); and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982), together with federal and provincial Human Rights Codes. Whereas federal multicultural policies are premised (often implicitly) on the use of English or French in communication

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with the ‘host’ society, as Pietrantonio discusses earlier in this chapter, Québec’s integration policies for ethnic minorities are premised on integration into the Frenchspeaking Québécois community (Juteau et al., 1998), articulated increasingly as a ‘universal’ national one (Juteau, 2002). While the French language charter in Québec, which has made French the official language in that province, can be considered a measure reducing linguistic diversity and contradicting the spirit of the Official Languages Act, it must be contextualized as the strategy of an ethno-linguistic minority to maintain an official national language, French. Thériault discusses this more fully in the next section of this chapter. Parallel measures are unnecessary for the maintenance of the other official language, English, elsewhere in Canada, in view of its international hegemony. On the other hand, the legislated obligation to air Canadian content (of any language) in the media could be analyzed as an equivalent strategy of resistance to (American) cultural hegemony by Anglophone Canadians. These Canadian content regulations are, however, much less contentious for English-speaking Canadians than either official bilingualism or the legal predominance of French in Québec is. Official bilingualism is criticized outside Québec, especially in Western Canada, for imposing ‘unnecessary’ obstacles on the career advancement of federal public servants, by requiring that they demonstrate the ability to deal with professional matters in the ‘other’ official language. Within Québec, as Thériault discusses in the next section, it is criticized for diluting the use of French. Commentaries about multiculturalism have also been varied (and, to some extent, mutually contradictory). On the one hand, the introduction of multiculturalism has been analyzed both as a response to the vocal opposition by those of other non-Aboriginal origins to the emphasis in the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism on the rights and contributions of the ‘charter’ British and French origin groups. On the other, it has been

seen as a means of limiting the importance of the French origin group, especially outside Québec. The content itself of the policy has changed over time, from stressing cultural (‘folkloric’) maintenance to promoting intercultural understanding. Critiques of multiculturalism have a number of bases: that multiculturalism threatens the legitimation of an official and distinctive status for the languages of the two ‘founding’ settler ethnic groups; that the principle of promoting any ethnic diversity should be rejected; that the policy implementation only promotes short term cultural pluralism and masks assimilation; that emphasis on the cultural obscures systemic discrimination in the fields of housing, employment and relations with civil authorities (e.g., Abu-Laban and Gabriel, 2002; Dua and Robertson, 1999; Li, 2003, 2003a; Porter, 1974 [1972]; Rocher, 1973). These heated debates about official bilingualism, about multiculturalism and the Québec interculturalism policy, about levels (and composition) of immigration, together with views reported in public opinion polls on these subjects, combined with experiences of discrimination by ethnic minorities (e.g., Bobb Smith, 2003; Dua and Robertson, 1999; Henry, 1994; Henry et al., 2000) lend support to the analysis of the government as proactive rather than reactive. Such analysis must, however, be nuanced: beginning in the 1960s, government policies were clearly both proactive and more inclusive, shifting towards liberalism and humanitarianism. Since the 1980s, however, there has been a further shift – these tendencies now vie with strong government propensities, encouraged by private sector pressures, to promote a reactive (and exclusionary) vision of globalization based on neo-liberalism, economic self-sufficiency and ‘diversity’ conceived of as an economic benefit for trade, not as a more intrinsic social benefit (Abu-Laban and Gabriel, 2002; Li, 2003). Some would ask whether this change also spells the demise of national settler societies, but continuing claims of national identity and sovereignty suggest that such a conclusion would be premature.

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In the next section Thériault closes the analysis of Canada and Québec by examining how issues of social citizenship are impacted by language policies, and how policies legitimizing ethno-linguistic diversity have paradoxically also weakened one of the national language communities. His analysis highlights the complexity of the Canadian linguistic question, in particular the contradictory logic that determines the paradigm of linguistic citizenship in Canada.

CITIZENSHIP ISSUES AND OFFICIAL LANGUAGES IN CANADA (JOSEPH-YVON THÉRIAULT)

Bilingualism and Binationalism Canada has not always been a bilingual country. The project of the majority of its Founding Fathers in 1867 was to create a great Anglo-British nation. The ‘Constitution’ of 1867, the British North America Act, is relatively silent on language. It recognizes the bilingual character of Québec legislation and of the federal parliament, but does not say anything about the language of the federal administration and linguistic rights for Francophones. It recognizes the rights of existing separate schools, but above all protects their confessional character (Catholic or Protestant) and not their French character (Landry and Rouselle, 2003: 15). During the 1960s, language became a true citizenship issue: it involved a political discussion about the very nature of what it is to be a Canadian or a Québecer. The main impetus of this movement was the neonationalism of Québecers whose aim was to redefine the pact of Confederation on the basis of an equality between the two ‘founding nations’. As a result, the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism was established in 1963, with the mandate of proposing the reforms necessary to respond to the historical recriminations of French Canadians. As its name indicates, this Commission was

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not exclusively linguistic. It was interested in the bicultural nature of the country and its recommendations, published between 1965 and 1970 supported a political bilingualization and biculturalisation of Canada. The Commission especially stressed the political, economic, cultural and linguistic inequality in which the French Canadian community had been maintained. In proposing measures aimed at the equality of the ‘founding’ peoples, the Commission made the sociological observation that, in fact, there were in Canada a dominant majority and a dominated minority. Linguistic policies were to be written in an effort to overcome the effect of the majority domination. The proposal of a re-founding of Canada on the basis of linguistic duality was accepted by the federal government, but without any proposals to transform the ‘de facto’ French Canadian minority into part of an egalitarian community. In 1969, the federal government adopted a law on bilingualism, the Official Languages Act. However, it refused to associate the recognition of linguistic duality with recognition of a national duality. Canadian bilingualism would rest principally on the individual freedom of each Canadian, all across Canada, to use one or the other of the official languages when dealing with federal government agencies. As for the bicultural character of Canada, the federal government completely reversed the logic of the Royal Commission and proposed, in 1971, a policy of multiculturalism that endorsed the idea ‘that cultural pluralism is the very essence of the Canadian identity’ (Houle, 1999: 110, my translation).

Official language: a societal language From this brief historical overview, it is important to underline that the Canadian linguistic question does not raise, either politically or sociologically, the question of rights or the recognition of ethno-linguistic minorities. Politically, in Canada, English and

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French have equal status: they are both official languages. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, under article 23, recognizes, for official language minorities, the right to instruction in the other official language (French outside Québec, English in Québec). However, this right is recognized by virtue of membership in one of the official language groups of Canada and not by virtue of minority rights: this is why other minority language groups do not have such a right. Furthermore, in Québec, French is the official language and Québec’s language policy reflects a desire to have French as the common public language. Official languages policies in Canada and in Québec therefore do not proceed from a policy of multiculturalism (or rather multilingualism), which would voluntarily recognize minority languages in partnership with the dominant language(s). Language policy in Canada, as in Québec, is more a classical policy of national language, sometimes expressed in terms of a binational state, sometimes in terms of national minorities. Moreover, looking back on Canadian political history, multiculturalism was developed, as Denis has noted, if not in opposition to, at least partly in an effort to limit, nationalistic demands associated with official languages (notably demands of Francophones). Sociologically, the matter is a little more complex. In the Canadian and North American contexts (less than 25% of the Canadian population is French speaking, as is only about 3% of the population of North America), the French language in Canada is in a precarious minority situation everywhere, even in Québec. Francophones are at great risk of being assimilated outside Québec, except in the province of New Brunswick where the erosion of the French language is slow. Even in Québec, it is only in a situation of relative stability, in spite of language laws that have, for some 30 years, promoted its usage. There, neither French language activists, nor the courts (which are regularly called upon by both activists and

governments to rule on linguistic rights), understand this situation in terms of minority rights. Instead, they interpret the issues in terms of equal status (equality rights).

Political systems in opposition Thus, by declaring two official languages, the federal language policy since the 1970s has been intended to dissociate language from its community or particular cultural content. In doing so, however, the federal government created de facto linguistic minorities in its territory (the Francophones outside Québec and the Anglophones in Québec) which, by requiring an actual linguistic equality, reintroduced a link between language and culture. Thus, article 23 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (enshrined in the Constitution of 1982) obliges governments (above all provincial ones, since education is a provincial responsibility) to provide education and to supply educational institutions to linguistic minorities, where numbers justify it. In recent years, the Supreme Court of Canada has tended to interpret the clause on language laws generously, which means that it has forced governments not only to provide services in two official languages, but also to promote the development of the official language communities when they are minorities. This also means, however, by virtue of the same principles, that the Supreme Court has invalidated some Québec language laws, the aim of which is the promotion of French, as being contrary to the linguistic equality promoted by the Charter and to the respect of linguistic minorities. Notably, the courts have invalidated restrictions imposed in Québec on enrolment of Anglophone Canadians in English schools, and in the French unilingualism of public signs.30 At the same time as the federal government established a linguistic regime favouring panCanadian bilingualism and promoting official language minorities in the provinces where

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they are a minority, the policies of successive governments of Québec have gone in the opposite direction. On the one hand, Québec’s nationalist movement, which was at the root of the politicization of the linguistic issue at the beginning of the 1960s, became committed to increasing autonomy, which means that it perceived duality (French and English Canada) less as a characteristic of the Canadian nation than as an arrangement between two nations (Québec and Canada), each having its own linguistic territory. Furthermore, the linguistic interventions of successive governments of Québec have been supported by the general acknowledgement that the government of Québec is the only government with a majority of French-speakers in its territory, which means that Québec has a particular duty to protect and to promote both the language and societal institutions necessary for it to flourish. This acknowledgement is compatible with the underlying recognition by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, that language and cultural community are intimately related and that, in fact, in Canada, sociologically, one of the official languages, French, is a minority language. Thus, establishing legislation, even in Québec, that aims to protect French and, consequently, to limit the presence of English is deemed to be justifiable. It is in this framework that Québec’s principal language laws, particularly Bill 101, the French Language Charter, have stipulated the clear predominance of French in Québec’s territory and have spelled out the means of implementation. Even though Québec’s linguistic policy has been implemented with more flexibility in recent years, the intention of making French the only public language in Québec is still active.31

Two linguistic projects, two citizenship projects There exist, then, in Canada and in Québec two linguistic regimes, each proposing a different

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political definition of the linguistic-national space. One presents an instrumental conception of languages, where they should be at the undifferentiated service of individual citizens. The other one presents a more communitarian version, where the promotion of the language contributes to the cultural project of building a francophone nation within North America (Taylor, 1992). They are two regimes which oppose and mutually nullify each other. By their promotion of bilingualism, the linguistic policies of the federal government directly contradict the efforts of the Québec government to make its territory the only political space in America where the common public language is not English. Paradoxically, the efforts of the Canadian government, begun following the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism to promote the French language in order to ensure linguistic equality among Canadians, ends up opposing the most systematic effort to enhance the political prestige of this language by the language policies of Québec. Conversely, Québec’s language policies, developed to a large extent on the basis of a sociological acknowledgement of French as a minority language in North America, come into conflict with the rights of official language minorities.32 There have even been instances of the Québec government supporting the refusal of Anglophone provincial governments to broaden the educational rights of their Francophone minorities, apparently on the grounds that it would be dangerous if these expanded minority rights were extended to Québec’s Anglophone ‘minorities’. An example is Québec’s support for the government of Alberta refusing to extend French education (see: Maheu vs. Alberta, [1990] 1 R.C.S. 342). The conflict between the linguistic regimes stems from the existence of two national projects, the Canadian and the Québecois. Each of these projects has a hegemonic claim that ends up making it difficult, if not impossible, to recognize the asymmetry of the linguistic situations. French, while being on

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an equal political plane with the English language, is, on a sociological plane, in a minority situation (even in Québec).

CONCLUDING COMMENTS This chapter began with an analysis of Canadian and Québec official discourses about ethno-linguistic diversity in the field of cultural policies within an existing nation-state (Canada) characterized, from an international perspective, by an unusually high level of internal ethnic heterogeneity for a developed society. This is the result of a combination of different types of ethno-linguistic diversity. The sometimes contradictory contributions of Canada’s and Québec’s immigration policies and other policies which have framed ethnic relations were then examined, culminating in an analysis of the tensions related to conflicting citizenship projects for the two official language groups in Canada and Québec. While the contemporary official discourses articulate cooperation, in the form of recognition of the legitimacy of cultural variation, this cooperation is expected to occur within the more (in Québec) or less (Canada) explicit framework of domination by one ethnolinguistic collectivity. We conclude with some analytic comments about the ethno-linguistic complexity of Canada/Québec and the cross-cutting axes of diversity this reveals. Canada/Québec can be considered an interesting case study of how to understand diversity within a postcolonial, contemporary society composed of a wide variety of ethno-cultural groups. As we have seen, diversity is a key feature of Canadian society. It is at the very heart of Canada’s political system and forms the narrative basis for the recognition of its varied social groups. Competition and sometimes conflict among its constituent parts – ethnic, linguistic, religious (and regional) – is a common thread running through the history of Canada and has also been central to Canadian sociology, notably within the

political economy tradition which has informed much of the sociological analysis, including in ethnic relations (see Clement and Vosko, 2003, as a recent example of this tradition). The current quest for greater recognition of diversity now reaches beyond the institutional policy of multiculturalism of 1971 although the latter remains an important source of legitimation of this recognition. Varied and sometimes conflicting perceptions of diversity persist, rather than a unified Canadian representation of it – although perhaps we are in the process of achieving a consensus in the middle of the first decade of the second millennium. The CanadianQuébecois leadership role in the development of the international Convention on the Protection and Promotion of Cultural Contents and Artistic Expressions, adopted in 2005 under the auspices of UNESCO, suggests this might be the case, although Thériault’s analysis of Canadian and Québec language policies suggests the contrary. Whereas subsequent sections of this chapter concentrated on the diversity in population composition and the diversity of policy responses intended to manage the population, the first one centred its analysis on the meanings and usages of the term ‘diversity’ within the field of the politics of culture, identified differences in the semantics of the term, and outlined possible new forms of normative pluralism. The material analyzed supports the conclusion that the power relations and social differentiation issues, themselves examined later in the chapter, do shape the meanings of the concept of ‘diversity’, always in relation to a form of idealized nation. Out of this initial analysis, two major explicit usages appear: openness to cultural diversity within nations and international recognition of cultural diversity to portray the sum of homogeneous nations throughout the world. In both, diversity is reduced to ethnicity: every other aspect of cultural diversity of the collectivities is concealed. The various usages reveal the normative aspect of the term, and the concentration on a limited portion of its possible meaning.

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Many strands of diversity might be the best way to portray Canada/Québec, characterized, depending on the players being examined, by often simultaneous conflict and competition, as well as relations of cooperation. That various processes of social differentiation are involved is attested by the many issues addressed through Canadian (and Québec) policies and laws which regulate power relations between majority and minority groups (e.g., multicultural policy, linguistic policies, Aboriginal policies, immigration policies, cultural policies, etc.). When made explicit, the various bases of diversity can tell a great deal about histories of both individuals and collectivities, which are marked not only by ethnicity, language and immigration status, but also by such other social locations as gender. Clearly, the impact of the paradigm of diversity on the imagined nation or national boundaries remains to be analyzed. It would, perhaps, be more realistic to speak of the diversity of diversity than of a stabilized meaning of the term. We can identify at least five axes crosscutting the social and sociological usages of the term: diversity as social discourse; diversity as a narrative of institutional policies; diversity as a social fact; diversity as a political rhetoric; and diversity as a concept, a tool to study and understand social realities. The sometimes blurred boundaries between those axes call out for an epistemology of diversity. More modestly we will suggest the following as points to consider in tackling diversity in sociological research: (1) the complexities it challenges us to incorporate into our analysis, (2) its heuristic value, (3) the impact on our analysis of what is perceived as diversity by institutions, and finally (4) the limits to our sociological application of ‘diversity’. First let us consider the complexities we are challenged to incorporate. Since the 1970s conceptualizations of ethnicity have become less essentialized and less static (see, e.g., in quite different ways, Appadurai, 1996, 2001; Guillaumin, 1995; Hall, 1992; Schermerhorn, 1970). These conceptualizations allow us to consider a wider range of social statuses

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which may be the empirical referents of ethnicity, along with the dynamic (and even fluid) nature of these referents. Theoretical approaches which focus on majority/minority or dominant/subordinate social relations are especially useful. Moreover, by the early 1980s, a number of feminist sociologists, working independently, started to develop what has now become intersectional analysis, incorporating concurrent consideration of ethnicity/race, gender and class (and sometimes other social locations as well). These pioneers included Danielle Juteau (Juteau and Roberts, 1981) in Canada, Bell hooks (1981) in the United States, and Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis (1983) in Great Britain. Analyses which emphasize fluidity and multiple identities related to ethnicity have, to date, been more widely adopted than those focussing on intersectionality (of sex, race, ethnicity), but both challenge us to incorporate the complexities of concurrently occupying the multiple social locations, while recognizing that their meanings are not necessarily remaining static. At the same time, to take up our second point, about the heuristic value of diversity, there has been a tendency, since the end of the 1980s, to homogenize all migrants of European descent when studying their migration and integration in Canada/ Québec. This is no doubt a result of a substantial increase in the source countries of migration, reflected in the much greater immigration from non-European regions, notably Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East. As noted in this chapter, immigrants from these regions and their descendants are often referred to collectively in Canada as ‘visible minorities’, although the acceptability of this concept is contested as ethnocentric by some of those to whom it is applied. Like the ‘non-visible minorities’, they, too, have often been homogenized in recent analyses (e.g., Li, 2000). This is a tendency which we consider just as problematic as the homogenizing of those of European origin, given the differences among their respective social

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realities: ‘diversity’ reminds us to challenge analyses which homogenize. At the same time, we do acknowledge that the dichotomy on the basis of being a member of a ‘visible minority’ or not can facilitate an overview of over-arching practices of social discrimination which are based on physical features or appearance. Our third point raises the impact of social institutions and policies on scholars and illustrates it in the Canadian/Quebecois context. In effect, sociologists often find themselves working within, or doing contract research for, government ministries which address issues of ethnicity, language and immigration, such as the Department of Canadian Heritage or Citizenship and Immigration Canada. At the same time as they help shape the discourse on these topics, their analytic vision may be constrained by institutionally defined boundaries. The three solitudes separating the study of First Nations peoples, official language groups and one or more of the ‘other’ ethnic groups is a case in point. Separate government departments or sections have responsibility for each, resulting not just in varied policies but also varied (and separate) funding opportunities for research about these groups. There are also considerations of diversity in the policy and institutional pluralism that result from migratory flows. Whereas diversity is most commonly understood as the rising social and cultural pluralism that marks a number of urban areas throughout the world, the fact that migration also generates a wide array of policy responses to the movement of people is often overlooked. Nation-states have, of course, developed their own ‘immigration models’ over the past two centuries, but increasingly regions, subnational units in federations, and more recently cities are developing their own institutions and programs. The case of Québec discussed in this chapter is a very clear example of this, although Québec is in many ways a quasi nation-state. Its gaining control over immigrant selection and integration could be simply understood as part of a

larger process of nation-building, but to do so would involve overlooking the fact that other Canadian provinces and municipalities are also asking for some control over immigration. Institutional diversity, however, goes beyond simply increasing the role of subnational actors in regulating migration. Cities, in particular, are being shaped by migration flows, which are often very specific. Migration has always been sharply patterned: flows become established and tend to maintain themselves in specific directions. In other words, migrants are not randomly distributed across the world. This is obvious in the case of post-colonial migration or temporary migrant worker programs. But there are also regional specificities that emerge because of geographical proximity (Cubans in Miami), cultural and linguistic resemblance (Francophones in Montréal), network effects (residential concentration within cities). These tend to generate different responses that greatly diversify the policy and institutional responses to migration. In that sense then, diversity also means the rise of different polities endowed with their own approaches and structures designed to handle diversity (Nairn, 2003). The great, and partly fictitious national models of managing migration and cultural pluralism are in part giving way to more localized, frequently urban and regional models of understanding, building, and experiencing diversity. Finally, we will consider limits in our applications of diversity. Empirically, in our analyses sociologists of ethnic relations generally work with no more than three or four aspects of the social differentiation that constitutes human diversity: for instance, migration or citizenship status, together with race, language and/or religion. Rarely can we consider all aspects of an individual’s social identity within groups, such as those based on sex, age, ethnicity, language spoken, disability, being part of a Diaspora, or the dynamic character of any (or all) of such social locations. From this observation we might consider that our own analyses contribute to making

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human diversity – including its constitution and transformations – invisible, perhaps because such complexity is so difficult to consider. Before giving up in the face of seemingly impossible challenges that this approach presents, however, we should remember that it is only relatively recently that sociologists have begun tackling them. The foregoing analyses have situated the ethno-linguistic diversity and tensions of Canada/Québec within an international context, highlighting both their distinctive features and the fact that our experiences may offer insights about potentials and pitfalls in the management of ethno-linguistic diversity within a framework which, formally, is committed to equality. That equality can be both an individual and a collective right, results in tensions and in contradictions. Furthermore, national cultural policy may be premised on intra-national homogeneity, combined with international diversity, or on a recognition of intra-national diversity. In fact, the political boundaries of national jurisdictions as well as the realities of transnational border crossings need to be factored into both our analytical and policy frameworks as we address issues of ethno-cultural and linguistic diversity in the twenty-first century. This chapter’s overview of Canada and Québec’s ethno-linguistic dynamics has been necessarily selective, as we have already noted. Canada’s scores on the quantitative indices of diversity alert us to some of the particularities of the Canadian case, but in themselves they do not tell us much about how ethnic and linguistic cleavages are structured, how they change over time, and how the whole picture is framed. We have tried, in this concluding section, to tease out what it means, in terms of research practices, to take into account the diversity of diversity, and the many challenges of attempting to do so. We conclude that the heuristic value of the concept of diversity remains an open question, particularly if we consider conflict, competition and cooperation as they impact on any concept of diversity. It is a question which, we feel, merits further exploration.

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NOTES 1 Authors’ names are listed alphabetically. All contributed equally to the joint segments of this chapter, in addition to writing their respective sections, and all participated in the overall revision of the chapter. 2 Until May 2006 it was a Department of Sociology, rather than the joint Department of Sociology and Anthropology it now is. 3 Notably absent from this collective effort is any substantial discussion of Canada’s First Nations. 4 In fact, in the spirit of communicating the bilingualism, at the conference two of the papers were presented mainly in French, two mainly in English, and one equally in the two languages. Visual aids assisted the understanding of the French papers, since all in the audience understood English. 5 In 1970, in Comparative Ethnic Relations: A Framework for Theory and Research, Schermerhorn contrasted normative pluralism with political, cultural, and structural pluralism. He encouraged us to conceive of a single form of normative pluralism: either it is or it isn’t. The new discourse on the diversity of cultural policies allows us to see that we should be attentive to different configurations of those policies, and certainly to the uses that develop from the notion of diversity. 6 On this subject, see the document prepared by the jurists Ivan Bernier and Hélène Ruiz-Fabri (2002). 7 Published on the Internet at http://www. mcccf.gouv.qc.ca/diversite-culturelle/eng/index.html. This url includes the Newsletter on the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. 8 The objective of the ‘Secrétariat gouvernemental à la diversité culturelle’ is to ‘inform and sensitize people from all backgrounds to issues of cultural diversity’; ‘provide expertise on the links between trade and culture’; ‘guide relevant works and studies’; ‘participate in interdepartmental coordination’, and ‘advise departmental and governmental authorities’. See also the Internet site of the Secretariat, whose url is given in Note 7. 9 Reports also published on the Internet site of the network at http:www.incp-ripc.org/index_e.shtml 10 A remark found particularly in the study ‘Sur la faisabilité juridique d’un instrument international sur la diversité culturelle’ (On the Legal Feasibility of an International Instrument on Cultural Diversity) by the jurists Bernier and Ruiz-Fabri (2002). 11 La politique québécoise du développement culturel Vol I – De quelle culture s’agit-il? This is an exceptional policy in many respects that raised the question of the institutional presence of diversity and its political recognition. In this official text, culture is not merely the fact of ethnicity; it is also seen as including gender and other forms of social differentiation, including language.

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12 These labels also correspond to the departments responsible for immigration and integration, whose successive changes in designation correspond to the same phenomenon: the Ministère des Communautés culturelles et de l’Immigration (MCCI, Ministry of Cultural Communities and of Immigration, 1981–1993); the Ministère des Affaires internationales, de l’Immigration et des Communautés culturelles (MAIICC, the Ministry of International Affairs, Immigration and Cultural Communities, 1993–1996); and then the Ministère des Relations avec les citoyens et de l’Immigration (MRCI, Ministry of Relations with Citizens and of Immigration [translation, A.D.], 1996–2005). In 2005, this department was renamed once again, with a variant, the Ministère de l’Immigration et des Communautés culturelles (MICC, Ministry of Immigration and Cultural Communities). It is interesting to note that before the establishment in 1968 of the first department in Québec responsible for immigration, the Ministère de l’Immigration du Québec (MIQ, The Ministry of Immigration of Québec, 1966–1981), matters related to immigration were handled by the Ministère des Affaires culturelles (Ministry of Cultural Affairs, 1966). For a summary portrait of these different departments, please see the interesting article by Gladys Symons (2002). 13 Moreover, the term ‘visible minority’ refers to these measures. It appeared in 1984 in the document Equality Now and on the heels of the work of the federal Royal Commission on Equality in Employment, where Judge Rosalie Abella, today a Supreme Court judge, was the sole commissioner. See also the section by Denis in this chapter which provides other details related to this concept. 14 Aboriginal religious traditions were marginalized by Christian proselytizing under both the French and British colonial régimes. For many decades after the British Conquest the most salient cleavage was between the Protestant majority and the Catholic minority, with the latter category being the majority religion in Québec. Most English speakers were Protestant and just about all French Canadians were Catholic. Starting in the 1800s the English-speaking population became more diverse in its religious composition, with the arrival of waves of Irish and Jewish immigrants. In recent decades, Canada has experienced extensive secularization, as reflected in declining religious attendance rates and a growing proportion of the population reporting no religious affiliation. At the same time, new waves of immigration have increased the numbers of Muslims, Buddhists and members of other religions. 15 For the earlier periods, the index of pluralism is measured by the ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF) scores assigned by Soviet ethnographers as reported in Atlas Narodov Mira (Taylor and Hudson, 1972). For each country, the index of ethno-linguistic

fractionalization is defined as the probability that two individuals selected at random within the country will be from different ethnic groups. For the later period, the index is a simple measure of the proportion of the population that is not a member of the dominant ethno-linguistic category as reported in Kurian’s handbooks (1997, 2001). In addition, a refined and updated successor to the original ELF (cf. Okediji, 2005) also places Canada’s overall level of diversity as the highest in the developed world. 16 The term consociational democracy refers to the way societies that are divided into ethnic, linguistic, or religious segments or regions often rely on a pattern of elite consultation and accommodation between representatives of each segment. See for example Lijphart (1977). 17 This set of failed constitutional amendments, negotiated by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and his provincial counterparts, is named after the government meeting house in the Gatineau Hills north of Ottawa where negotiations were held in 1987. The Accord specified that each provincial legislature was to confirm its agreement within three years. 18 The disastrous impact of immigration on Canada’s First Nations will not be discussed here, due to space restrictions, but would deserve a separate discussion. 19 From its inception, a major point in the platform of this party has been Québec political autonomy. 20 See a brief discussion of the agreement by Margaret Young at: http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/ library/PRBpubs/bp252-f.htm 21 From the names of the respective ministers who signed the accord, which granted immigrant selection and integration powers to Québec (Grenier, 2003). 22 The vast majority of immigrants to Canada settle in those three urban centres. 23 Canada received about 230,000 immigrants in 2002, the majority from Asia. See Citizenship and Immigration Canada (2002) for details. 24 Much of the criticism has related to the period, until 1962, when national origin was a major factor in the determination of admissibility. As Couton has explained, there was no separate Québec policy at that time. On the other hand, criticisms about exclusion on the basis of criteria under the ‘point system’ and de facto exclusion due to the locations of immigration offices overseas could also apply to Québec. 25 For example, by requiring uninterrupted passage from point of origin to Canada, by the imposition of a ‘head tax’, or by a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ with the country of origin, whereby the person could not leave that country to come to Canada (Abu-Laban and Gabriel, 2002; Hawkins, 1988). 26 The terminology has varied over time, as have the precise criteria and the weight given to each. 27 During the periods when designated occupations were accorded points – the system now emphasizes

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CONFLICT AND DIVERSITY: CANADA / QUÉBEC training and job experience instead – the points accorded for these occupations decreased, even though there was clearly a continuing demand for such workers (see, e.g., Arat-Koc, 1999; Bakan and Stasiulis, 1997; Calliste, 1989; Daenzer, 1993, especially Chapter 5, for details). 28 There have been numerous changes over the years, some more, some less restrictive, in the regulations for live-in domestic workers. After a period of relative openness through the 1950s (when many candidates were European), the tendency has been towards increased restriction, which Daenzer (1993) and Arat-Koc (1999) have qualified as indenture. Incremental improvements have typically required intensive lobbying by the domestic workers’ association, INTERCEDE, with some support from Canadian liberals and feminists. 29 The introduction of spousal authorizations invites analysis: does it reflect increasing numbers of women among the professionals and technical workers on temporary permits and the ‘need’ to make provision for their husbands? the ‘need’ to facilitate two income households in the upper middle class? or ...? 30 See Plourde (2000) for a study of the evolution of linguistic policies in Québec. 31 On the recent evolution of Québec’s linguistic policy, see Stefanescu and Georgeault (2005). 32 This conclusion is also expressed by Léon Dion (1980).

REFERENCES Abu-Laban,Yasmeen and Gabriel, Christina (2002) Selling Diversity. Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press. Anderson, Wolseley W. (1993) Caribbean Immigrants: A Socio-Demographic Profile. Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press. Anthias, Floya and Yuval-Davis, Nira (1983) ‘Contextualizing Feminism – Gender, Ethnic and Class Divisions’, Feminist Review, winter, 15: 62–73. Appadurai, Arjun (1996) ‘Diversity and Disciplinarity as Cultural Artifacts’, In: Disciplinarity and Dissents, in C. Nelson and D. Gaonkar (eds.) Cultural Studies. NY: Routledge. pp. 23–36. Appadurai, Arjun (2001) (ed.) Globalization. Durham, London: Duke University Press. Arat-Koc, Sedef (1999) ‘Gender and Race in “Non-discriminatory” Immigration Policies in Canada: 1960s to the Present’, in E. Dua and A. Robertson (eds.) Scratching the Surface:

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Canadian Anti-Racist Feminist Thought. Toronto: Women’s Press. pp. 207–33. Bakan, Abigail and Stasiulis Daiva (eds.) (1997) Not One of the Family. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Beach, Charles M., Green, Alan G. and Reitz, Jeffrey G. (eds.) (2003) Canadian Immigration Policy for the 21st Century. Montréal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Bernier, Ivan and Ruiz Fabri, Hélène (2002) ‘Évaluation de la faisabilité juridique d’un instrument international sur la diversité culturelle’, document préparé pour le Groupe de travail franco-québécois sur la diversité culturelle, Groupe de travail franco-québécois sur la diversité culturelle. Bobb-Smith, Yvonne (2003) I Know Who I Am. Toronto: Scholars’ Press/Women’s Press. Calliste, Agnes (1989) ‘Canada’s Immigration Policy and Domestics from the Caribbean: The Second Domestic Scheme’, in J. Vorst et al. (eds.) Race, Class and Gender: Bonds and Barriers. Toronto: Between the Lines and Society for Socialist Studies. pp. 133–66. Citizenship and Immigration Canada (2002) Facts and Figures. Ottawa. Clement, Wallace and Vosko, Leah (eds.) (2003) Changing Canada: Political Economy as Transformation. Montréal: McGill-Queens University Press. Coˆ té, Andrée, Kérisit, Michèle and Coˆ té, Marie-Louise (2001) Sponsorship ... for Better or for Worse. The Impact of Sponsorship on the Equality Rights of Immigrant Women. Ottawa: Status of Women Canada. Crane, Diana (2002) ‘La mondialisation culturelle vue sous l’angle de la sociologie de la culture’, communication présentée dans le cadre du colloque Les statistiques face aux défis de la diversité culturelle dans un contexte de globalisation, organisé par l’Institut de statistique de l’UNESCO à Montréal, en octobre. Daenzer, Patricia (1993) Regulating Class Privilege. Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press. Dion, Léon (1980) ‘Les incidences démolinguistiques sur les institutions canadiennes’, in Tendances démolinguistiques et évolution des institutions canadiennes. Numéro spécial de Thèmes canadiens. Montréal: Association d’études canadiennes. pp. 54–75.

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Dua, Enakshi and Robertson, Angela (eds.) (1999) Scratching the Surface: Canadian Anti-Racist Feminist Thought. Toronto: Women’s Press. Duchesne, Louis (2005) La situation démographique au Québec. Bilan 2005. Québec: Institut de la statistique du Québec. Faist, Thomas (2000) The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and Transnational Spaces. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gagnon, Alain-G. (2000) ‘Plaidoyer pour l’interculturalisme’, Possibles, 24(4): 11–25. Garcea, Joseph (1998) ‘Biculturalism and the Bifurcation of the Immigration System’, Canadian Ethnic Studies, 30(3): 149–72. Green, Alan G. (1976) Immigration and the Postwar Canadian Economy. Toronto: Macmillan. Green, Alan G. and Green, David (2004) ‘The Goals of Canada’s Immigration Policy: A Historical Perspective’, Canadian Journal of Urban Research, 13: 102–39. Grenier, Gilles (2003) ‘Immigration Policy in Canada: A Québec Perspective’, in Charles M. Beach, Alan G. Green and Jeffrey G. Reitz (eds.) Canadian Immigration Policy for the 21st Century. Montréal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press. pp. 201–7. Guilbert, Lucille (2005) ‘La ville de Québec: Un laboratoire pour la mise en œuvre de médiations avec les réfugiés’, Canadian Ethnic Studies – Études ethniques au Canada, 37(3): pp. 59–75. Guillaumin, Colette (1995) Racism, Sexism, Power and Ideology. London, NY: Routledge. Hall, Stuart (1992) ‘The Question of Cultural Identity’, in Stuart Hall et al. (eds.) Modernity and its Futures. London: Polity Press. pp. 273–325. Handler, Richard (1988) Nationalism and the Politics of Culture in Québec. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press. Hawkins, Freda (1988) Canada and Immigration. 2nd edn. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Helly, Denise (1996) Le Québec face à la pluralité culturelle, 1977–1994. Montréal: Institut Québécois de Recherche sur la Culture. Henripin, Jacques (1994) ‘Questions démographiques et politiques’, Chapter 13 in Alain G. Gagnon (ed.) Québec: État et Société. Montréal: Québec-Amérique.

Henry, Frances (1994) The Caribbean Diaspora in Toronto: Learning to Live with Racism. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Henry, Frances, Tator, Carol, Mattis, Winston and Rees, Tim (2000) The Colour of Democracy. 2nd edn. Toronto: Harcourt Canada. hooks, bell (1981) ‘Ain’t I am Woman’ Black Women and Feminism. Boston, Mass: South End Press. Houle, François (1999) ‘Citoyenneté, espace public et multiculturalisme: la politique canadienne du multiculturalisme’, Sociologie et sociétés, XXXI(2): 101–23. Juteau, Danielle (2002) ‘The Citizen Makes an Entrée: Redefining the National Community in Québec’, Citizenship Studies, 6(4): 441–58. Juteau, Danielle, McAndrew, Marie and Pietrantonio, Linda (1998) ‘Multiculturalism à la Canadian and Intégration à la Québécoise. Transcending their Limits’, in R. Bauböck and J. Rundell (eds.) Blurred Boundaries: Migration, Ethnicity, Citizenship. Aldershot, England and Brookfield, VT: Ashgate. pp. 95–110. Juteau-Lee, Danielle and Roberts, Barbara (1981) Ethnicity and Femininity: (d’)après nos experiences, Canadian Ethnic Studies, Special issue on ‘Ethnicity and Femininity’, XII(1): 1–23. Kelley, Ninette and Trebilcock, Michael (1998) The Making of the Mosaic: A History of Canadian Immigration Policy. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Kurian, George T. (1997) The Illustrated Book of World Rankings, 4th edn. Armonk, NY: Sharpe Reference. Kurian, George T. (2001) The Illustrated Book of World Rankings, 5th edn. Armonk, NY: Sharpe Reference. Kymlicka, Will (2003) ‘Being Canadian’, Government and Opposition, 38(3): 356–85. Laczko, Leslie S. (1994) ‘Canada’s Pluralism in Comparative Perspective’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 17(1): 20–41. Laczko, Leslie S. (1995) Pluralism and Inequality in Québec. NY: St. Martin’s Press and Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Laczko, Leslie S. (1997) ‘Attitudes toward Aboriginals and the Changing Role of the Language Cleavage’, Québec Studies, 23: 3–12.

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Laczko, Leslie S. (2000) ‘Canada’s Ethnic and Linguistic Dynamics in an Evolving World System’, in Thomas D. Hall (ed.) A WorldSystem Reader. Lanham and Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 131–42. Laczko, Leslie S. (2002) ‘Canada’s Ethnolinguistic Pluralism from the 1960s to the 1990s’, presented at the Triennial Meeting of the Nordic Association of Canadian Studies. Stockholm, August. Landry, Rodrigue and Rouselle, Serge (2003) Éducation et droits collectifs. Moncton: Les éditions de la francophonie. Li, Peter (2000) Earnings Disparities between Immigrants and Native-born Canadians, Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthroplogy, 37(3): 289–311. Li, Peter (2003) Destination Canada. Don Mills: Oxford University Press. Li, Peter (2003a) ‘Visible Minorities in Canadian Society: Challenges of Racial Diversity’, in D. Juteau (ed.) Social Differentiation: Patterns and Processes. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. pp. 117–53. Lijphart, Arend (1977) Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. New Haven: Yale University Press. McDonald, James Ted (2004) ‘Toronto and Vancouver Bound: The Location Choice of New Canadian Immigrants’, Canadian Journal of Urban Research, 13: 85-101. McNeill, William (1986) Polyethnicity and National Unity in World History. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Ministère de la culture (1978) La politique québécoise du développement culturel. Vol. 1. De quelle culture s’agit-il? Québec: Ministère de la culture. Nairn, Tom (2003) ‘A Myriad Byzantiums’, New Left Review, 23: 115–33. OECD (2002) Trends in International Migration. Paris: OECD. Okediji, T. O. (2005) ‘The Dynamics of Ethnic Fragmentation: A Proposal for an Expanded Measurement Index’, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 64(2): 637–62. Paˆ quet, Martin (1997) Vers un ministère québécois de l’immigration. Ottawa: La société historique du Canada. Pietrantonio, Linda (2002) ‘Who is “we”? An Exploratory Study of the Notion of “the

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Majority” and Cultural Policy’, Canadian Ethnic Studies, 34(3): 142–56. Plourde, Michel (s. la dir.) (2000) Le Français au Québec. 400 ans d’histoire et de vie. Québec: Fides, Les Publications du Québec. Porter, John (1974 [1972]) ‘Dilemmas and Contradictions of a Multi-Ethnic Society’, in Christopher Beattie and Stewart Crysdale (eds.) Sociology Canada: Readings. Toronto: Butterworth & Co. Québec, Ministry of Immigration and Cultural Communities (2006a). Rapport du Groupe de travail sur la pleine participation à la société québécoise des communautés noires. Québec. Québec, Ministry of Immigration and Cultural Communities (2006b). La planification triennale de l’immigration 2005–2007. Québec. Réseau international sur les politiques culturelles on line at: http://206.191.7.19/index. f.shtml Rocher, Guy (1973) ‘Les ambiguités d’un Canada bilingue et multiculturel’, in Guy Rocher, Québec en Mutation. Montréal: Éditions Hurtubise. pp. 117–26. Satzewich, Vic (1991) Racism and the Incorporation of Foreign Labour: Farm Labour Migration to Canada since 1945. London: Routledge. Schermerhorn, Richard A. (1970) Comparative Ethnic Relations: A Framework for Theory and Research. NY: Random House. Secrétariat gouvernemental à la diversité culturelle on line at: http://communiques. gouv.qc.ca/gouvqc/communiques/gpqf and at:http:www.mcc.gouv.qc.ca/international/ diversite-culturelle/index.html Stefanescu, Alexandre and Georgeault, Pierre (2005) Le Français au Québec. Les nouveaux défis. Montréal: Fides for the Conseil supérieur de la langue française. Symons, Gladys L. (2002) ‘The State and Ethnic Diversity: Structural and Discursive Change in Québec’s Ministère d’Immigration’, Canadian Ethnic Studies, 34(3): 28–46. Taylor, Charles (1992) Rapprocher les solitudes. Écrits sur le nationalisme au Canada. Québec: Les Presses de l’Université Laval. Taylor, Charles and Hudson, Michael C. (1972) World Handbook of Social and Political Indicators, 2nd edn. New Haven: Yale University Press.

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ranslat Vatz Laaroussi, Michèle (2005) ‘L’immigration en dehors des métropoles: Vers une relecture des concepts interculturels’, Canadian Ethnic Studies – Études ethniques au Canada, 37(3): 97–113.

Young, Margaret (2004) ‘Immigration: The Canada–Quebec Accord’, Ottawa: Library of Parliament. Available online http://www. parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/ bp252-e.htm

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PART FIVE

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30 Conflict, Competition and Cooperation: Means and Stratagems for Shaping Social Reality in the TwentyFirst Century Ann Denis and Devorah Kalekin-Fishman 1

The three terms which are part of the title of the Handbook and appear at the head of this chapter represent a classical view of how to categorize different kinds of social relations. In compiling the articles in this collection, we have discovered that they are not only conceptual instruments with the aid of which sociologists practice their discipline. They also have a wider usage as faithful reflections of what goes on in sociology and as bases for coping with the mounting number of questions that arise in the social world. Furthermore, conceptualizations of conflict, competition and cooperation are indications of how to find solutions to social problems. As noted in the ‘Introduction’, this volume is based on discussions that took place at a Research Council conference at which representatives from the Research Committees of the International Sociological Association

were asked to reflect on cooperation, competition and conflict in sociology. The collection of papers that was chosen for this Handbook provides evidence of how ubiquitous the three focal processes are, how diverse the modes of entry into the study of society and how closely linked sociology as a discipline is to the political and economic features of its subject matter. Thus, conflict, competition and cooperation are indeed the basic means and stratagems that underlie the mission of sociology in the twenty-first century.

CONFLICT, COMPETITION AND COOPERATION EVERYWHERE Beyond the request to include some reference to the processes of cooperation, competition,

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and conflict, those submitting papers were free to choose their approaches to theory and research in the discipline of sociology. The result, as the organization of the Handbook shows, was a highly diverse collection in which we can see that the focal processes are valid for topics that can be aligned on a kind of continuum of substantive issues, from the general grasp of sociology as a science to evidence of how sociology can be used to describe and explain particular cases. A short review of the materials in the successive parts of the Handbook will underline the ubiquity of conflict, competition and cooperation from every current vantage point for examining society, as well as disclosing how diverse the approaches can be. Some contributors chose to present a general overview of the subfield of sociology which is at the core of interest to the people organized in a particular research committee. From the overview, readers are able to derive an understanding of how cooperation, competition and conflict have been absorbed into sociology as a discipline. Others, as we see in Part 2, chose to focus on the three ‘required’ processes in order to examine where and how they figure in the various working concepts and theories that concern their research group. Those whose articles appear in Part 3 present investigations of how, from their particular mode of conceptualization, conflict, competition and cooperation shed light on pressing social issues. In Part 4 the researches presented zoom in on specific cases where one or the other of the processes is a distinctive characteristic of the events portrayed. Within each part, however, there are important differences among the articles as researchers offer what they perceive to be the point of view of the research committee they represent, or, in the case of those not representing research committees, an important perspective in the area within which they work. Thus every chapter relies on a theoretical and a methodological apparatus which has been developed in a recognized

sociological subfield. Among the articles in Part 1, which presents general approaches to research, for example, there is a clear division between those that emphasize the concern with the theoretical framework of research and those that emphasize the concern with methods and practices. The chapters on alienation (Langman and Kalekin-Fishman) and belonging (Yuval-Davis) emphasize positive and negative outcomes of structurally embedded processes of conflict, competition and cooperation in their on-going dynamics. The chapter on socio-technics (Hogsbro, Pruijt, Pokrovsky and Tsobanoglou) introduces the notion of the uses of sociology in social intervention, as a tool which is both practical and critically analytic. Banakar’s chapter on socio-legal research, Reis’ chapter, with its focus on the links between social transformations and changes in conceptualization, and Jimenez’s chapter on the need to involve concerned lay persons in research all blueprint designs for work that sociologists should be doing in light of how they view the nature of society. Part 2, in which there are specifications of how conflict, competition and cooperation are treated in a selection of subfields, is also characterized by several different perceptions. Chapters on the sociology of development (Schuerkens), on sociological theories of professions (Evetts, Gadea, Sánchez and Sáez), on the sociology of childhood (Van Krieken and Bühler-Niederberger), and on social mobility (Moulin and Bernard) focus for the most part on how re-conceptualizations of conflict and cooperation in their subfields are likely to improve the match of research and research findings to the realities of living in each domain. Those on the sociology of the arts, the sociology of sport, and health sociology, on the other hand, view the developments in their fields as expressions of broader social trends. From evidence of the impact of economic forces on what happens in art, Marontate concludes that the art world is governed by the same neo-capitalist logic that characterizes a globalizing world.

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CONFLICT, COMPETITION AND COOPERATION

Viewing the direction of influence as being that from the domain of sport to universal social phenomena, Ohl expresses a fear that the escalating obsession with competitive sport throughout the world may be leading to a general societal perception of competition as ‘the sole legitimate ideology by which human behaviour may be understood’. A surprising contribution is the finding highlighted in the chapter on the sociology of health (Riska, Annandale and Dingwall), namely that the concepts with their classical theoretical import are less and less important in the field. Here, the privatization of health care and the widespread practical concern of researchers with intervention are detailed as factors undermining what we may call the ‘pure’ disciplinary approach to the domain. A major part of sociological research is dedicated to applying sociological tools to describe and analyze social problems that arise. From this vantage point, the variety of topics dealt with in Part 3 is a measure of how widely applicable conceptualizations of conflict, competition and cooperation are. The broad range of problems to which they can be applied include the ambiguities of conflict and cooperation in peacekeeping operations (Segal, Dandeker and Whitestone), the persistence of inequalities in determining demographic trends (Ram and Ram), the influence of capital accumulation on competition and conflict in the governance of health care (Browne), the dilemmas confronting labour unions in neo-liberal societies (Webster and Lambert), the diverse political meanings of consumerism (Silvestro), the precariousness of digital futures (Schulz), and the persistence of rural crime (Donnermeyer, Jobes and Barclay). Finally, from Part 4 it is clear that the implementation of instruments derived from the conceptualization of conflict, competition and cooperation is useful for uncovering the workings of specific cases. Among them are the cases of the globalized food system (Koc), social movements in Brazil (Gohn), industrial relations in South Africa (Sitas),

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policies for furthering development in Singapore (Pereira), municipal democracy in different countries in Eastern and Northern Europe (Teune), as well as in analyzing the discourse of social justice in Latin America (Armony), and negotiations about the use of forms of interpersonal discourse in Portuguese (de Oliveira). The final substantive case study presents the work of a group of Canadian researchers (Couton, Denis, Laczko, Pietrantonio and Thériault) who use the angles of vision of the key concepts to analyze ethnolinguistic diversity in Canada/Québec. They examine the complex ways in which the interplay of conflict, competition and cooperation emerge from an examination of government policies, migratory flows, gender and language communities. The researchers also show how the processes affect research agendas.

EMERGING THEMES While interpretation of the processes may vary from subfield to subfield, basically the classical investigations of conflict, competition and cooperation have turned out to be adaptable to the examination of events and issues in both the twentieth and the twentyfirst centuries. Each chapter deals with how a particular research focus frames an epistemology, a vision of what it means to think in terms of relationships that lead to conflict, competition and/or cooperation. Several chapters deal with the processes from the point of view of a sociological analysis of the organization of the discipline or of a particular subfield in sociology (see, for example, chapters by Banakar, Schuerkens, and Evetts, Gadea, Sánchez and Sáez). Interestingly enough, from these analyses there is convincing evidence that conflict, competition and cooperation are not necessarily discrete processes in unfolding social events. Conflict and competition may give rise to cooperation (arts); conflict may lead to competition and even cooperation (alienation); or efforts to

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ensure cooperation may lead to situations of structured conflict (ethno-linguistic diversity in Canada/Québec). Shared themes emerge in a different way among several groups of chapters. In sketching the topics of the various chapters, we have seen that conflict, competition and cooperation are processes that can be discerned at every level of social contact. With regard to macro-phenomena depicted in the collection, conflict, competition and cooperation are shown to govern events related to globalization and international peace-keeping arrangements, to food systems, to demographic trends, to the modelling of digital futures, as well as to the management of economic affairs (including labour relations) and governance on a global or a national level. They are palpable on the meso or intermediate level as shown in the work on crime in rural communities, on sport, on the arts, and in the analyses of social movements and of NGOs in Brazil. But they also come to the fore in the examination at the micro-level of how individual consumer behaviour is to be understood, how adults and children meet and influence one another, even how people think about their own actions, how they address one another, how they feel socially connected – or alienated, and how research is done and how it can be done in small groups. Among the materials of the collection, where researchers from different continents have related to the issues that are of the highest importance for them in their work as sociologists, it has also been possible to bring to light issues which are central to the sociological enterprise across the globe. The issue of dialectical processes is central, as the chapter on alienation underlines. The sweep of globalization is inevitably encountering the seeds of resistance and their success can be followed in the evolution of social movements which present a new form of political activism. In this Handbook, researchers who have investigated grass roots organizations that express discontent in Latin America, base their work on descriptions of social

movements from different points of view. The rise of grass roots movements of different kinds in Brazil is described in some detail by Gohn, while it is seen by Reis as a process of solidarity that marks far-reaching changes in the warp and weave of society as well as in the evolution of how people think, with the latter being a dimension which Armony analyzes from a different point of view. But social movements are not restricted to Latin America and there is also the issue of the boundary between individual acts of resistance and collective action, which Silvestro addresses. The kinds of dynamics that the contributors to this volume have examined are of interest to many researchers who are looking into how the pressures of globalization are being countered (McFarland, 2007; Polletta and Jasper, 2001). Yet, despite the enthusiasm with which the spread of grass roots movements for political ends is met, a sober theoretical view also inspires new sociological questions. Could it be that with this activism the seeds of renewed, perhaps more effective, repression are being sown – Webster and Lambert suggest as much, and, in a different way, so does Schulz. And if so, how can such consequences be prevented? A second commanding theme is that of stratification. Although only one chapter in the Handbook (by Moulin and Bernard) has a term – ‘social mobility’ – explicitly related to ‘stratification’ in its title, the chapters that deal with health, health care, demography, digital futures, hunger and plenty, labour studies, and the market, not to mention the problems of language and ethnicity in Canada/ Québec, and the politics of belonging, all cogently address issues of how populations are divided into strata by different principles of distribution. While specific outcomes can be traced in each domain, they combine to indicate the dimensions of stratification and the varied hierarchical arrangements that enforce the divisions and shape identities for the identification of strata. Concretely, they point to how the demands made on and by different groups are multi-dimensional and liable to create clashes of interest. From the point

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of view of the people involved, handling allocation to one or another stratum of society requires the ability to discern complexities of life in the twenty-first century and what can only be called the agility to adjust to the kaleidoscopic problems one is called upon to face. Another side of the coin is the fact that these very concerns can be defined as having to do with diversity. All the researchers represented in the collection, and perforce their Research Committees, provide evidence that diversity permeates all aspects of social living. But this perception goes far beyond a mere citation of the fact of diversity. On reading the chapters, one cannot escape the conclusion that among sociologists, there is an explicit desire to promote the recognition of diversity as legitimate and even desirable. Support for diversity whether in terms of religion, gender, race, ethnicity or language basically reflects a recognition of trends in the structuring of societies throughout the world. By contrast with the advancement of nominally homogeneous nation-states that characterized the nineteenth century and much of the twentieth, the twenty-first seems to be characterized by social entities that are diverse – and becoming more so. Many of the chapters note that states and regions are undergoing wide-ranging changes toward increasing diversity. Even when territorial units define themselves as exclusive in terms of nationality, the population count turns out to include significent groups of ‘others’ who are necessarily part of the demographic landscape. This perception has implications for the type of theorizing and the directions in research that sociology will be taking in the twenty-first century. As Couton, Denis, Laczko, Pietrantonio and Thériault sum up their findings, the case study of Canada/Québec alerts sociologists to the ‘diversity of diversity’ which, as the Canadian researchers note, requires further investigation. By problematizing diversity, the contributors to the round table have defined a task that awaits the engagement of teams of sociologists within the next decade. Going beyond intersectionality, the challenge is to

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explore the inter-relations among the groups formed by all the statuses that are available to human beings in different social milieus. Rather than limit their work to dealing with the ‘big’ categories of ethnicity, gender, race and class, researchers will have to define how status sets combine in parts or wholes. They will have to elaborate new methodologies in order to discover the interrelationships of the various factors. While diversity in one form or another permeates the chapters of the Handbook, the salience of gender does not. That it is an integral part of at least a quarter of the analyses, and incorporated into illustrations in at least a third of the other chapters indicates, however, how far sociology has evolved from the gender blindness that characterized much of its work as recently as a quarter century ago. Both the empirical specifics of women’s experiences and new approaches to theorizing that have resulted (see chapters by YuvalDavis and Browne, for instance) provide wide-ranging illustrations of the ‘international feminist challenge to theory’, which was the subject of a pre-Congress conference of Research Committee 32 (Women in Society) in 1998 and a subsequent publication (Segal and Demos, 2001). Perhaps feminism, as a current within sociology which has been instrumental in introducing intersectionality as an analytic concept within our discipline, will again offer leadership as we struggle with the theoretical and methodological challenges of incorporating the interrelationships of various factors into our analyses. Another dimension of diversity is geographical – this Handbook is, after all, a publication of the International Sociological Association. Despite being officially trilingual, the main language of communication in the association is English, and that is also the language of this Handbook (although it does include chapters that were translated from French, the second language of the conference which gave rise to it). Equally important has been what one could call the Anglo-European hegemony within sociology – in terms of the ‘founding fathers’ and

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continuing referential literature. We encouraged our authors to contextualize their analyses and, if possible, to incorporate material from and about more than one society. Thus, where the literature examined is primarily Anglo-European, this is acknowledged (rather than silenced, with the implication of universal coverage). Moreover most chapters are characterized by references to more than one society or sociological literature. Of particular interest however, in view of the existence of the Anglo-European intellectual hegemony, are chapters which draw on literature from both the economic (and political) North and South, or are firmly anchored in their theorizing, methodology, or analysis in the South. The conclusion by Webster and Lambert of the inadequacy of Northern theorizing about the labour movement of the South (and perhaps of the North as well), the Latin American research initiatives described by Jimenez, and the recognition by Donnermeyer, Jobes and Barclay of the challenge of developing analyses of rural crime which are pertinent in the South as well as the North are just three examples from the Handbook of challenges to the Northern hegemony. There is another theme that emerges from even a summary leafing through the collection. We see that research in depth of the kind noted, if only because of the topics tackled, the methodologies supported and the tenor of the explanation, seems to show that sociologists as a community are intensely interested in making the world a better place. The platform for public sociology (Burawoy, 2005; Calhoun, 2005) turns out to be the specification of an agenda which, although apparently widely supported, is held in privileged concealment – betimes even from ourselves. Under the different chapter titles, sociologists from all the continents unabashedly press for the acceptance of difference, for extending and securing human rights, for expanding the scope of society beyond the boundaries of the nation-state and even well beyond the exclusivities of scientific communities. The platform enunciated in the concluding remarks of the chapter on socio-technics can easily be seen to be suitable to the points of view of other

contributors to the Handbook. Hogsbro, Pruijt, Pokrovsky, and Tsobanoglou say: We need to address issues of innovation, social security and social integrity. Sociology must combine the empirical study of social phenomena, and the critical analysis of social forms and processes with the production of policy guidelines directed to both governments and social movements. These guidelines should aim at guarding fundamental civil rights, while facilitating negotiated change and the accommodation of aspirations of diverse communities .... The practical sociologist must master a multiplicity of sociological approaches to gain a more realistic understanding of the complexity of the changing social world, and must do something about it.

Still, this does not mean that sociological theorizing is done. With respect to the discipline as we still know it, there are challenges that have not been adequately met and aspects of theory that remain to be clarified. Although the processes that were set as the challenge to the contributors have been approached from a variety of angles, the actual work of building a social milieu, the principles that stem from the work of ethnographers, the nuts and bolts of encounters that are suffused with conflict, competition and cooperation still remain to be described and analyzed in full. And finally, there remains the constant challenge of locating conflict, competition and cooperation within the discipline of sociology. Struggling to cope with the relentless developments that surround our lives, sociologists have not yet found exhaustive ways of describing and analyzing the connections between how the focal processes operate in the running of the world with what goes on within the disciplinary community or communities (relationships) and, more tantalizingly, what goes on within the discipline (epistemology). Finding how these connections emerge and interweave would be a leap forward in sociology.

NOTE 1 Authors’ names are listed alphabetically, since both contributed equally.

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REFERENCES Burawoy, Michael (2005) ‘2004 American Sociological Association Presidential Address: For Public Sociology’, British Journal of Sociology, 56(2): 259–94. Calhoun, Craig (2005) ‘The Promise of Public Sociology’, British Journal of Sociology, 56(3): 355–63.

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McFarland, Andrew (2007) ‘Neo-Pluralism’, Annual Review of Political Science, 10: 45–66. Polletta, Francesca and Jasper, James M. (2001) ‘Collective Identity and Social Movements’, Annual Review of Sociology, 27: 283–305. Segal, Marcia Texler and Demos, Vasilikie (eds.) (2001) Advances in Gender Research, Vol. 5: ‘The International Feminist Challenge to Theory’.

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Index

aborigines 32–3 accommodation 186 activism 285–6, 351–2, 464 cyberactivism 295–6, 301 in El Salvadore and Honduras 354–66 KwaZulu-Natal 368–9, 376 language 448 Latin American movements 352–4 in USA 353 Second Great Transformation 265–74 ACTU (Australian Council of Trade Unions) 267 Adorno, Theodor 11, 16, 172 address forms (Portuguese) 416–30 address form relationships, stages of 422–3, 424, 426–7 address form system, schema of 420 address model 418–24 applying Portuguese model to other languages 427–9 conflict and co-operation in address 424–7 hierarchical address structure 428–9 introduction to 416–18 strategic cognitive model 419–24 strategic level of conventionalised plane 423, 425 strategic level of interaction 422–4 Zero Form/Avoidance Tactic 426–7 Africa globalization issues 119 mortality rates and AIDS 227–8 Ahponen, Pirkkoliisa 23 AIDS/HIV 227, 228 Alanen, Leena 187, 188 Alexander, Jon 43 alienation 9–25, 376, 462 in the arts 11 capitalism as alienating 10 communication and 19–20 of communities 18–20 and consciousness 16 conspiracies of elites 17 de-alienation 20–4 domestic work 21 Hegel, views on 14–15 identities 22–4 Marx, views on 10, 14 meanings of 9–12 of modern social life 13–14, 16 overcoming 20–4 and popular culture 17–18 proletariat 10–11 of right-wing movements 17

schools 21–2 by scientific projects 16 in sociological research 12–14 spiritual 23–4 through sport 159 of television 17–18 through technological changes 13 of wage labour 10–12, 13, 15, 16 alterity 375-80 Ambert, Ann-Marie 189 Annandale, Ellen 124–35 Áralos, I. 96 Ariés, Philippe 187 Armony, Victor 351–66 Aron, Raymond 115 art 11 arts, sociology of the art controversies 175–82 art worlds as sites of collaboration 173 art as a career 174–5 class and 172 high culture model and power 173–4 production of culture perspective 174–5 Sensation Show, Brooklyn Museum 180 study of 170–2 Turner Prize and K Foundation 177–9 Asia 119 mortality rates 226 assimilation 186 Australia 294 rural crime 308, 312–13, 314 Trade Unionism 267 authority 76–8 Brazil, NGOs 79–88 fetishism 16–17 Banakar, Resa 58–72 Barclay, Elaine 305–16 Baumgartner, M. P. 65 Beck, Ulrich 194, 195 Becker, Howard 173 Bell, Vikki 31 belonging 29–38, 285, 462 boundaries 30–1 citizenship 31, 76–7 diasporic communities 33–5 identities 30, 31–2 indigenousness 32–3 land rights movements 32–3, 337, 338, 342, 346-7 nationalism 29, 36 security, women 35–6, 37–8 Bendix, R. 206

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Berghe, Pierre van den 373–4 Berlet, Chip 17 Bernard, Paul 201–15 Best, Stephen 20 Biomedical Sciences Institute (Singapore) 393–6 Blau, P. 206 Bourdieu, Pierre 162, 172, 174, 205, 341, 352 bourgeoisie 10, 187 thought 15, 16 Brah, Avtar 33 Brazil, NGOs 79–88, 102, 347–8, 348n2, 464 adaptation to society trends 83 computerization of 85–6 definitions of 81 funding of 83–4 government partnerships with 80 Internet usage 86 objectives of 82 and the state 86–8 workers in 84–5 Brazil, social movements in 336–48 Afro-Brazilian movement 341, 343 categories for analysis of 339–41 civil society, notion of 337–8 early movements 337–8 gender movements 343 movement of landless workers (MST) 338, 345, 346–7 NGOs 347–8 overview of 341–3 pluralistic 343–4 Quilombola 343, 347 research into 341–3 rural 346–7 social movement unionism (SMU) 270–4 studies of 338–41, 347 trade unionism 340, 342 urban population movements 344–6 Breen, Richard 215 Brown, Roger 417–18, 430 Browne, Paul Leduc 250–61 Bruntland Report 111 Bühler-Niederberger, Doris 11 Burgess, Ernest W. 185–6, 387–8 Canada 294 corporate control of agriculture 327 ethnic structure 433 farming crisis 328–9 food supply 330 health care in 256–61 hunger in 330 obesity in 329 peacekeeping role 243 rural crime 308 Canada/Québec, ethno-linguistic diversity 433–55 bilingualism, Québec 439–40 452, 446, 447 cultural communities 437 diversity, general analysis of 450–3 diversity management 434–8, 443 ethnic diversity, legitimising 445–7, 465–6 immigration 434, 435, 440–5, 451–2 language policies 448–50 multiculturalism 435, 445, 446 pluralism, level of 435, 438–40, 445–6, 452 capabilities 36, 112 capitalism alienation 10 and art controversies 181 consumerism 11, 23 Durkheim, views on 10 Gramsci, Antonio 11 Marx, Karl see main entry Marx, Karl and pop culture 17–18

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and rationalization 10 and responsible consumerism 282–3 and sport 158–9 wage labour 10–12, 13, 15 Weber, views on 10 CASMIN project 205, 210 Castells, Manuel 22, 267, 370-1 CEJUS (Justo Sierra Study Center) (Mexico) 102 Chicago School of sociology 126, 306, 310 China 230 globalization issues 119 mortality rates 226, 227 sociology in 49 childhood sociology 185–96 children as social actors 195 children at work 190–1 children’s experiences 189–90 children’s rights/responsibilities 192–3 education, welfare, health 194 future directions of 195–6 globalization, effects of 192 history of 186–8 research in 188–94 children economic activity of 191 experiences of 189–90 Internet, use of 192 in politics 185–6 rights of 192–3 as social actors 195 vaccinations 230 Church, the 11 in El Salvador and Honduras 361–2 CIDE (Center for Innovation and Educational Development) (Mexico) 98–102 ‘Citizens’ Juries’ 52–3 citizenship 31 and children 192–3 civil society 77 in Brazil 337–8, 340, 341 NGOs 78–88 class systems alienated 16 and arts 172 bourgeoisie 10 childhood 187 conflict 113–14, 156, 161–2 health, effect on 125, 129–31, 225–6, 230 proletariat 10, 113, 216n4 and quality turn, food consumerism 283 social stratification 202–3, 210 sport 156, 159, 161–2 Clawson, Dan 272–4 clinical sociology 46 Coburn, David 130 Cohen, Robert 33 colonial managerialism 374–5 commodity fetishism 15, 24 communication face-to-face 19–20, 416–30 technological advances in 92, 291–302 community living 18–20 see also belonging communities diasporic 33–5 and rural crime 309–10 competition 109, 119, 185–6 in childhood 196 in conversation 416, 424–7 competitive advantage 387 and futures research 292–3, 300 in health sociology 128–9, 134 intergovernmental FDI 386–7

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competition (Continued) and Internet development 298–9 nations, between 119, 121 amongst peacekeepers 236 in professions 141–4 Singapore (case study) 388–96 South America, lack of, 120 in Southern countries 119–20 in sport, 155–66 summary 461–6 for world markets 91–2 competitions 162–3 conflict 109, 121, 186 in address forms 424–7, 430 in Anglo-American sociology of professions 144 in childhood sociology 196 among competitors 387 in conversation 416 and ecological competition 387–8 empirical evidence of, after 1945 117–18 in European sociology 151 in French sociology of professions 145, 147 and futures research 292–3, 300 and increase in globalization 405, 408, 412–13 and intergovernmental FDI competition 387–8 linguistic (Canada/Québec) 449 local-global interpretation of 402–4 in medical sociology 132–4 and peacekeeping 236–47 and professions 141–4 science, technology and society 91–6 in Spanish sociology of professions 147–150 in sport 155–66 summary 461–6 theories of, 1960’s 113–16 theories of, non-Marxist 114–16 war 115–17, 237–8, 245 see also peacekeeping CONICIT (National Council for Scientific and Technological research – Venezuela) 96 consciousness 14–15, 16 consumer society 279–81 consumerism, food 280–4 consumerism, responsible/political 278–88 certification of products 283 consumer society 279–8 CSA 283, 287 fair trade/ethical, popularity of 282 food consumption habits 280, 281–4 as a political act 286–7 as political participation 284–6 convergence, concept of 225 conversation and conflict/cooperation 416–7 strategic model of address 419–24 cooperation 109, 186 in address forms 424–7, 430 in childhood sociology 196 and competition (sport) 163–7 in conversation 416 among food producers 324 and futures research 292–3, 300 in health sociology 129–31, 134 intergovernmental for FDI (Singapore) 391 and Internet development 297–300 in Kwazulu Natal 368–81 among peacekeeping nations 236, 241 in sport 164–6 summary 461–6 theory development and practice 110–13 see also UN corporate social responsibility 78 Coser, Lewis A. 114–15

INDEX

Costa Rica, collaboration of science and sociology 102 Cotterell, Roger 66 Couton, Philippe 434, 440–4 crime, childhood 193 crime, rural 305–16 agriculture-related 307, 308 in Australia 308, 312–13 community and 309–16 crime and social structure 307 criminal justice issues 307 domestic violence 307–8 police and courts 307, 308 social disorganization theory 310–12 studies of 305–9, 315–16 substance abuse 308 urbanism 306 in USA 306–8, 313 victimization 307 CSA (Community Supported Agriculture) 283, 287 culture and identity alternative 13, 14 cultural formation pressures 376 culture, definition of 118 music 13, 17 popular, alienation of 13, 17 television 17–18 cyberactivism 295–6, 301 Dahms, Harry 16 Dahrendorf,, Ralf 109, 114 Dandeker, Christopher 236–47 David, Matthew 16 de–alienation 20–1 Dean, Michael 47 defensive combinations 375 democracy effect of globalization on 406–9 Local Governance Research Program 408–13 Poland, Russia and Sweden comparisons 410–11 demographic transition theory 224–6 Denis, Ann 3–6, 434, 444–7, 461–6 Denmark, welfare policy 47 DeNora, Tia 171, 172–3 development theory and cooperation 110– 13 feminist approach to 111–12 deviance, sociology of 126, 127 dialectical approach 14–15 diasporism 33–5 digital futures 291–302 conclusion 300–2 digital inequalities 295–6, 300 futures research 291–3, 300 Internet 293–300 NICT, global diffusion of 293–5, 300–2 DiMaggio, Paul 174 Dingwall, Robert 124–35 DiPrete, Thomas A. 211–12, 213–14, 215 disease patterns 224–5 dissonance 375 diversity, summary 465–6 division of labour 113 Dobbie, Charles 239, 240 Dobré, Michelle 285–6 doctrinal studies, legal 61–2 domestic labour 21 domination 375 Donnermeyer, Joseph F. 305–16 Dunayevskaya, Raya 15 Dunbar, Claude 146 Duncan, O. D. 206 Dunning, E. 164 Duret, P. 163–4 Durkheim, Emile 10, 291

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health sociology 125 law, analysis of 66 professions 144–5 ecological paradigm 400–13 definition of 400–2 dialectics of development 408 and globalization 403–7 learning and adaptation 407–8 local-global conflict 402–4 local-global relations and impact on local development 408–13 economic development and intelligence, role of 120–1 mortality patterns 229 economic activity of children 191 growth restraint, South America 120 inequality and mortality patterns 229–31 education, 194 and social mobility 207 social movement for (Brazil) 345–6 Ehrlich, Eugene 68 El Salvador and Honduras, social justice discourse analysis 355–66 Church, the 362 injustices 356–7 injustices, remedies 359–60 injustices, those who benefit from 358 maquilas 358–9, 364 people, speaking on behalf of the 361–2 social mobility in 352–5 social movements 362–3, 365 vocabulary by gender 363–4 Elias, N. 164 Engels, F. 113, 125, 324 epidemiologic transition theory 224–5 Erikson, Robert 205 ethical issues see consumerism, responsible/polictical ethnic diversity (Canada) 445–7, 465–6 ethnic groups Canada 433–52 rural crime and 314 Europe, mortality rates 226, 227 Evetts, Julia 140–51 Favel, Adrian 30 FDI (foreign direct investment) and economic globalization 384–7 and Singapore (case study) 388–96 feminism 21 belonging and security 37–8 domestic work, as alienating 21 economic development, effect on women and health care 128, 132, 251, 256, 258, 260 women in development (WID) 111–12 medical sociology 128, 132–4 in sport sociology 159–60 First Great Transformation 266, 267, 268, 274 FONACIT (National Fund for Science, Technology and Innovation – Venezuela) 96 food community supported agriculture (CSA) 283–4, 287 ethical and fair trade 280, 282–3 food system, global 323–32 Canada 330 corporate control of 327–8 food regimes 324–7 global food regime 325–7 GM crops 327 meat packing industry 327 modern day 324

poverty and plenty 328–31 World Food Summit (WFS) 330 Fordism 325–7 Foucault, Michel 128–9, 341, 370, 371–2, 434–5 Fournier, Valerie 143–4 France 112 collaboration between science and sociology 102–3 professions, sociology of 144–7 Freidson,Eliot, 126, 127, 142, 143, 145 Frankfurt School 18, 159 and alienation 10–11 bourgeois thought 15 consumer society 279–80 futures research 291–3, 300 Gadea, Charles 140–51 Gamboni, Dario 175–6 Ganzeboom, Harry B. G. 207, 210–11 GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) 91, 327 Geertz, Clifford 53 gender and health 132–4 and health care 258 notions of ideal via popular culture 13 and occupational closure 143 and social movements (Brazil) 343 sport, inequality in 159–60 temporary work permits, Canada 445 Germany 243, 293, 300 Gibbons, M. 92–4 Gibson, Rick 21–2 Gilman, Albert 417–18, 430 Gilroy, Paul 33, 34 Giminez, Martha 21 globalization 75, 112, 192, 226, 233, 403–7, 464 alienation, as creating 17 anti-globalization movement (Brazil) 344 cellular 51–2 children, effect on 191–2 and cultural diversity 436 economic 384–7 of the economy 91 of food system 323–32 glocalization 52, 54 ideological processes in 406–13 impact on local democracy 409–13 ‘Planning Cells’ 52–3 rural communities, impact on 310 sociology, effect on globalization 53–4 and sociotechnics 50–3 Glucksmann, Miriam 254 Goffman, Erving 126, 127, 375, 427 Gohn, Maria da Glória 336-50 Goldthorpe, John H. 205 Goodman, David 281, 282, 287 governance 48–9 in Brazil 79–80 and globalization 52–3 repressive 17, 117 in work organization 50 governmentality, sociotechnics 46–50 Gow, James 239, 240 gradation and social mobility 202–6 Graeber, David 257 Gramsci, Antonio 11, 161, 340 Greenwood, E. 142 Gruneau, Richard 161 guru industry 49–50 Hart, H. L. A. 60, 71 health changes in health patterns, determinants of 228–31

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health (Continued) epidemiologic transition theory 224–6 maternal education 231 public spending on n231 trends 226–8 health care 250–61 Canadian 256–61 care and labour 252–3 children 194 and government 134–5 labour process of care 253–5 maternal education 231, 232 ‘necessary’ and ‘surplus’ labour 259–60 public spending on 231, 232 women and 251 health sociology 124–35 development of 124–5 deviance, sociology of 126, 127 in Europe 124 feminist health movement 128, 132 gender studies 132–4 health risks 131–2 health care and government 134–5 inequalities 130–1 interactionist/social constructivist perspective 126–9 medical sociology, development of 126, 132–4 medicalization thesis 128, 133 sick role, analysis of 126, 127–8, 132 social-causation perspective 126, 131 social-capital theory of health 129–31, 134 social network thesis 129 status syndrome 130 in USA 124 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 14–15 hegemony 11 Heidegger, Martin 22 Heinich, Natalie 171, 176 Hennion, Antoine 174 Hogsbro, Kjeld 42–54 homophobia, in sport 160–1 Honduras see El Salvador and Honduras hospitals 256, 273 households 21 Hout, Michael 211–12, 213–14, 215 human rights 31, 35–6, 342, 365 children’s 185, 186, 189, 192–3 KwaZulu Natal 373–4 indigenousness 32–3 see also activism; social movements; women Hyman, Richard 265, 266 identity 30-2, 166, 340 and alienation 22–4 and Brazil social movements 340 and cultural diversity 436 through models of address 418–19 and social movements 340 symbolic 34 immigration policies (Canada/Québec) 440–5 INCP (International Network on Cultural Policy) 436 India AIDS 228 hunger 329 indigenousness 29, 32–3 individualism, glorification of 18–19 inequalities between nations 120–1 health 225, 130–1 Inglehart, Ronald 282 intelligence and economic development 120–1 interactionist approaches, French professions 146–7

INDEX

Internet 291, 293–300 alienating 13, 18 children, use by 192 cyberactivism 301 de-alienation 20 distribution of access to 294–5 Internet2 299–300 Linux 300 Phase I 297 Phase II 297–8 Phase III 298–9 recycling of technology 299 Ion, Jacques 285 Iraq 246–7 ISA Research Committee 26 (RC26) 43, 45, 46 Islam 17 Italy, peacekeeping 244 Janowitz, Morris 238, 239 Japan, peacekeeping 243–4 Jímenez, Jaime 91–103 Jobes, Pat 305–16 Jordan, Tim 285 jurisprudence 59–61, 62 sociological 67–8 sociology, how it can learn from jurisprudence 70–1 K Foundatiuon 177–9 Kalekin-Fishman, Devorah 3–6, 9–25, 461–6 Kellner, Douglas 20 Khumalo, Baba 377–8 Koc, Mustafa 323–32 knowledge 92 in France 102–3 Mode 1 93, 103 Mode 2 92, 93–4, 102, 103 Mode 3 96, 98, 102-3 new social contract with science 95 scientific communities, Mexico 98–102 Venezuela’s Research Agendas 96–8, 102 World Conference on Science 1999 95 Krieken, Robert van 185–96 Kuper, Leo 373 KwaZulu Natal (KZN), cooperation in Baba Khumalo 377–8 black workforce, motivation of 369–72 colonial managerialism 373–8 concepts defining cultural formations, 375–80 New Labour Studies 374 new managerialism 381 sociology in South Africa 372–5 trade unionism 368–9, 375–80 labor care as 252–60 child 190–1 food production 324 KwaZulu Natal 368–81 Marx, according to 10, 15 Second Great Transformation 265–74 Singapore 388, 390 women’s 112 see also social movements; trade unions labor movements see Trade Unions Laczko, Leslie 434, 438–40 Lambert, Robert 265–76 land rights movements 32–3 Langman, Lauren 9–25 language address forms, other languages 416, 427–9 bilingualism (Québec) 439–40, 446, 447, 452

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ethno-linguistic diversity (Canada) 438–9 Portuguese address forms 416, 417–27 social activism study, El Salvadore and Honduras 356, 362, 363–4, 365 socio-linguistics 416–17 Latin America, social justice and mobilization interviews 351–66 discourse analysis 355–66 El Salvador and Honduras 352–5 law 58–72 and children 193 criminal justice, rural crime 307 doctrinal studies of 61–2 jurisprudence 59–61, 62, 67–8, 70–1 Law in Context 69 Law and Society 67, 69 Policy Research 69–70 role of 58–62 Socio-Legal Studies 64, 68–70, 71–2 sociological jurisprudence 67–8 sociology and 62–4 sociology of 64–7 see also crime, rural Law and Society 67 legal positivism 60 lifecourse, notion of 212–4 life expectancy 226–7 Lipset, S. M. 206 local-global relations and conflict 402–4, 408 and globalization 404–6 impact on local democracy 408–13 Los, Maria 43, 44 Lukacs, Georg 15, 16, 24 Lüschen G. 157, 158 Lynn, Richard 120–1 maquilas 358–9, 364 market mechanisms 76, 78 Marmot, Michael 129–30 Marontate, Jan 170–81 Martín-Moreno, J. 147, 148, 149 Martineau, Harriet 126 Marx, Karl 20 alienation 10,11, 24, 376 conflict theory 113–14, 116, 291 dialectical analysis 14–15 on technology 20 medical sociology see health sociology medicalization thesis 128, 133 Melucci, Alberto 339, 340, 351 Menger, Piérre-Michel 174–5 Mexico, scientific studies in 98–102 CEJUS 102 CIDE 98–102 Internet access 296 Zapatista rebels 295–6, 301 Micheletti, Michele 284, 287 migrants 34–5, 120 Miguel, A. de 147, 148, 149 military, the see peacekeeping modernization 110, 224 mortality rates 224–7 conflict and competition for resources 232 economic development and 229, 232–3 economic inequality and 229–31 maternal education and 231, 232 public spending on health 231, 232 Moulin, Stéphane 201–15 MST (movement of landless workers) 338, 342, 345, 346–7 MTV 13 multiculturalism (Canada/Québec) 435, 445, 446 music, alternative culture 13

nation states 76–7 National Fund for Technology and Innovation 96 nationalism 29, 36, 364, 441 New Labour Studies (in KZN) 374 NGOs (non-governmental organisations) 75 civil society 78–88 and the Internet 86, 298, 299, 300, 301–2 as peacekeepers 242 NGOs in Brazil 79–88, 102, 347–8, 348n2, 464 adaptation to society trends 83 computerization of 85–6 definitions of 81 funding of 83–4 government partnerships with 80, 338 Internet usage 86 objectives of 82 and the state 86–8 workers in 84–5 NICT (New Information and Communication Technologies) 293–5 digital inequalities 295–6, 300–1 Internet 13, 18, 192, 291, 292–300 North America 110–13, 327–8 occupations, knowledge-based 141 Ohl, Fabien 155-66 Olivera, Sandi Michele de research on Portuguese address forms 417, 418–27, 416–30 Omran, Abdel R. 224–5 organization, issues of 49–50 Park, Robert E. 185–6, 387–8 Parsons, Talcott 126, 127, 142 peacekeeping 236–47 Canada 243 changes in participation in 240–1 changing norms of 239–40 changing roles in 241–5 Dutch 243 France 242 Germany 243 Iraq 246–7 Italy 244 Japan 243–4 peacekeeping 242 UN 237, 239, 240–3 US 237, 239, 240, 242–3, 246–7 Pereira, Alexius A. 384–96 Perroux, F. 110 Peterson, Richard 174 Petrzycki, Leon 67–8 pharmaceutical corporations (Singapore) 393–6 Phillipps, Howard G. 306–7 Phoenix Factor 116 physicians 127–8 Pietrantonio, Linda 434–8 Pokrovsky, Nikita 42–54 Podgorecki, Adam 43–4, 45 Poland communism, breakdown of 44 impact of globalization on local democracy 409–13 Polanyi, Karl 265, 266 politics 17 Africa 119 Asia 119 and children 185–6 and citizenship 31 civil society, Brazil 338, 339 consumer 278–88 democracy, Russia/Poland 409–13 diasporic 33–5 El Salvadore/Honduras 360–2

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politics (Continued) feminist 37–8 and globalization 406, 407, 408–10 and indigenousness 32–3 and power 116, 117 Québec/Canada 441, 449–50 South America 120 population convergence, concept of 225 demographic transition theory 224, 225 disease patterns 224–5, 228 epidemiologic transition theory 224–5 mortality and fertility rates 224–8 Porpora, Douglas 23–4 Porter, M. 369 Pound, R. 67–8 power 122n3 address forms, reflected in 417–18, 419 between adults and children 187–8 in the arts 173–4 and conflict theory 114–15, 116 Foucault’s approach to 129 knowledge as 92 and medicalization 128–9 Québec language 439–40, 447–50 in sport 159–9 of Trade Unions 267 production, factors of 385 professionalism 143 new analyses of 143–4 as occupational value 141–2, 151 professions, sociology of 140–51 Anglo-American sociological interpretations of 141–3 comparison, Anglo-American and European 140–1 French interpretations of 144–7 in Spain 147–50 ‘trait’ approach to 142 professionalization and market closure and monopoly 143, 151 and Spanish sociology 147–50 professions, traits 142 profit-making 181 proletariat 10, 16, 113, 203, 216n4 Prosono, Martin 18 Prujit, Hans 42–5 Québec see Canada/Québec racial discrimination Afro-Brazilian movement 341, 343 in sport 161 Radin, Margaret J. 255 Ram, Bali, 223-33 Ram, Shefali S., 223-33 rationality 10, 20, 23 Reis, Elisa P. 74–88 religion 24 Rengifo R. 96, 97 research, collaboration with science and technology 92–6 CEJUS 102 CIDE 98–102 CONICIT 96 in Costa Rica 102 in France 102 in Mexico 98–102 Modes of 92–4, 96, 102–3 Research Agendas, Venezuela 96–8, 102 Riska, Elianne 124–35 Rostow, Walt W. 110

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RSSM (Research in Social Stratification and Mobility) 202, 207–9, 214 rule-based thinking 60 Russia impact of globalization on local democracy 409–13 mortality rates 227 Salerno, Roger 19 Sánchez, Mariano 140–51 Sandler, Todd 241 Schmidt, Vivian 48 Scheff, Thomas 19 Schmidt, Joachim M. K. H. W. 43 Schuerkens, Ulrike 109–21 Schulz, Markus S. 291–302 science and sociology 92–3, 95 Mexican studies in 98–102 World Conference on Science (Budapest 1999) 95 Second Great Transformation 265–76 in Australia 267 in South Africa 268–9 Segal, David R. 236–47 Seidman, Gay W. 271–2 selfhood see identity Sen, Amartya 36, 112 Sensation Show, Brooklyn Museum 180 Serrano, Martin 148 Shimizu, H. 241 sick role 126, 127–8, 132 Silvestro, Marco 278–88 Singapore and FDI 388–96 Biomedical Sciences Initiative 393–6 competition for FDI 389–90 inter-governmental competition to attract FDI 391 regional industrial parks, setting up of 391–2 Suzhou Industrial Park and government conflict 392–3 Sitas, Ari 368–81 Smith, Adam 120 Smith, David N. 16 Smith-Lovin, Lynn 18 social capital theory of health 129–31, 134 social causation perspective 126, 131 social cohesion 29, 94, 129–31, 134 social constructionist perspective 126 social disorganization theory 310–12 social justice interviews, Latin America 351–66 social mobility, paradigm of 201–15 gradation and class 204–6 individualist/structuralist views 206–7 lifecourse approach 212–14 meritocratic considerations 207–8 new approaches to study of 210–12 RSSM studies of 202, 207–9, 214 social stratification 202–3, 210, 464–5 Sorokin’s creation of 202–4, 206 vertical 203 social mobilization see social movements social movement unionism (SMU) 269–74 social movements 351–2, 376, 464 Brazil 336–48 Latin America 352–4 USA 353 social stratification 202–3, 210, 464–5 socio-linguistics 417–8 sociological jurisprudence 67–8 sociological knowledge, application of 49–50 sociological practice 45–6, 53–4 globalization 50–3 meso level, intervention at 49–50

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sociology 62–3 contemporary changes in 74–8, 88 sociology and the arts 170–81, 462 sociology, childhood 185–96 sociology in China 49 sociology, clinical 46 sociology, health 124–35, 462 sociology and law 61–4, 64–7, 70–2 sociology of professions 140–51 sociology in South Africa 372–5 sociology and universities 94 sociotechnics 42, 43–5, 54 ‘Citizens’ Juries’ 53 and globalization 50–3 governmentality of 46–9 guru industry 49–50 ‘Planning Cells’ 52 and sociological theory 48–9 solidarity and authority studies 74–8 in address forms 417–18, 419 alienation 19 NGOs and Brazil 78–88 Sorokin, P. A. 201, 202–4, 206, 215, 306 South Africa social movement unionism 270–6 sociology in 372–5 Trade Unions 268–9 Kwazulu Natal 369–81 South America 110–13, 120 Spain, sociology of professions 147–50 pre-1982 148–9 since 1982 149–50 spirituality 23–4 sport competition as ideology/obstacle 159–61 competition and conflict in sociology of sport 158–9 competition/cooperation together in 163–6 competition, diversity of 161–3 gender inequality in 159–60 homophobia in 160–1 isolation of athletes 161 meaning within sociology of sport 155–8 racial inequality in 161 sociology of, early analyses 158–9 status syndrome 130 stratification RSSM 202 Strong, P. M. 128 Súez, Juan 140–51 Sutton, J. 65 Sweden impact of globalization on local democracy 409–13 technology as an alienating force 13, 20–1 development of 91–2 digital inequalities 295–6, 300–1 futures research 291–3 Internet 13, 18, 20, 192, 229–31, 291, 293–300, 301 NICT 293–5 television, as a device for alienation 17–18 terrorism 34, 35, 36, 293 Teune, Henry 400–13 Thériault, Joseph-Yvon 434, 447–50 Tónnies, Ferdinand 30, 305–6, 314 Touraine, Alain 336, 340 Trade Unions 265–6 and Baba Khumalo 377–8 in Australia 267 in Brazil 270-5, 340, 342 in Kwazulu Natal 368–9, 376

social movement unionism 269–76 in South Africa 267–9, 270 ‘trait’ approach (professions) 142 Travers, Max 69 Treiman, Donald J. 208, 210–11 Tsobanoglou, George 42–54 Turner Prize 177–9 UN (United Nations) 117, 237, 239, 240–3, 407 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) 192–3 poverty 330, 331 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 35 UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) 111 universities and sociology 94 urbanism 306 USA beef-packing/agriculture 327–8 Chicago School of sociology 126, 306, 310 communities, alienation of 18–19 co-operation, notion of 110 food consumption habits, research, 281 health sociology 124–35 individualism vs structuralism 206 Internet development 295, 297–99, 300 Internet usage 294, 295 Law and Society 67, 69 obesity 329 peacekeeping operations 237, 239, 240, 242–3 rural crime research 306–8, 313 shootings, high school 21–2 social movements 353 social stratification studies 205, 206–7 welfare policy 47–8 women’s health movement 128, 132 Vanhanen, Tatu 120-1 Venezuela CONICIT 96 FONACIT, 96 Research Agendas 96–8, 102 vertical mobility 203–4 video games, as an alienating force 21 wage labour 10–12, 13, 15, 16 in NGOs 84–5 see also Trade Unions war 237–8, 245–6 and development, theories on 116–17 see also peacekeeping Weber, Max 10, 122n3, 204, 372 Webster, Edward 265–76 Weisheit, Ralph A. 307, 313 welfare policy 209 Denmark 47 Third World 79, 267–8 USA 47–8 Wells, Edward L. 313 Whiteread, Rachel 177–9 Whitestone, Yuko K. 236–47 Wilensky, Harold 142 Wilkinson, Kenneth P. 306, 313 women belonging and security 37–8 in El Salvador 362, 365 and health care 128, 132, 251–2, 258, 260 as immigrants in Canada 445, 455n29 inequality in sport 159–61 maquilas 358–9 maternal health education 231, 232 social activism interviews, El Salvador and Honduras 362, 365

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women (Continued) social movements (Brazil) 343 women in development (WID) 111–12 work, organisation of 49–50 World Conference on Science (Budapest 1999) 95 Yuval-Davis, Nira 29–38

INDEX

Zapatista rebels 295–6, 301 Zelizer, Viviana 190–1 Zˇ izˇ ek, Slavoj 24 Zola, Irving 128 Zolberg, Vera 171

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